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NOR-Corrigé ~raduction
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CR 200019(traduction)

CR 200019(translation)

Lundi5juin 200à15heures

Tuesday5June2000at 3p.m. The PRESIDENT: Pleasebe seated. The Sittingis open and1give thefloor to Professor

O08 ,Eric David.

Mr. DAVID: Thank you, Mr.President. Mr.President,Members of the Courtt,hismoming

1broke off at thepoint when 1hadjust startedto deal with the seconditem ofthis presentation

conceming thebasis ofQatar'stitle to Zubarahand had shown you that the basis of this titleis

boundup withthe establishmentof Qatar'stitle to the wholeof the peninsula. The presentation1

am aboutto makeis limited tothehighlyunlikelycase inwhichit is consideredthat that titlehas

not yet been established and that Zubarah has a status separate from that of the rest of the

peninsula. Six yearsare important, narnelythose from 1873 to 1878.And 1shallnow startwith

1873.

A. 1873

13. In 1873,when Bahrain,relying on its authority over the Naim, for the first time

presented the Britiswitha claimto~ubarah'becausethe Turkshadclaimed the submissionotfhe

Chiefof the Naim to them, theBritishimrnediately expressed douba ts to the reality of therights

Bahrain claimedto haveover either Zubarah, theNaim orthe rest ofthe peninsula2.MajorGrant,

First Assistantto thePolitical Resident,rote in August 1873concemingthe Ruler ofBahrain's

claimover theNaim,that, afteraninvestigation:

"he had no meansof formingan opinionon the claimadvancedby the Bahrein Chief
to sovereigntyover the Naimtribe, butfiom verbal information he inferred that any
power exercisedby Bahreinof lateyearsoverthat tribehadbeen merelynominal ifit
existed ataly3.

Thusthe British,whohad beenintheregionforhalfa century-the firstPoliticalResidents

in the Gulf date fiom 1822-18234-stated that they knewnothing of the ties that the Ruler of

Bahrain claimed existedbetweenhimselfandthe Naim,andal1they wouldconcede,onthebasis of

'Memonalof Qatar, ara.8.16.
2~emorialofQatar, ara.8.17.

3~emonalof Qatar,Ann.11.8,Vo4,p. 188(emphasisadded).
4~emorialof Bahrai, . 311.information gathered atthat time,wasthat if Bahrain did have anyauthorityoverthat tribe, it was

purely nominal.

The Political Resident fully confirmed this view and in his reply dated 28 August 1873

emphasizedtheuncertain character of Bahrain's rights: "the BahreCinhiefhadnotthepower, ifhe

wished, to protecttribes residingin Katar, and... he could notexpect Governmentto interfere

where therightswereinvolvedin ~ncertaint~"~.

Mr. President,Members of the Court, 1 have read these quotationsbecausethey lie at the

origin of the positionthat the Britishwere tomaintainconsistently atthe time, and for nearly a

centuryaftenvards6,narnelytheirrefusa1to endorseBahrain'sclaim toZubarah.

Letus tum to thesecondimportantperiod, 1874-1875.

B. 1874-1875

14.In 1874the Chief of a rival branch of the family of the Rulers of Bahrain,Nasir bin

Mubarak, fled to the mainland to place himself under the protection of the Turks. With a

troublesometribe,the Beni Hajir,he threatenedtoattack Bahrainfiom the coastof Qatarbut was

dissuadedby the presence ofBritishvesselsand also,it shouldbe noted, by the orders of,among

others,SheikhMohammedbinThani7.

15. At the end of the year the Ruler of Bahrainwas afraidthat Nasir bin Mubarak would

attacktheNaim of Zubarah,andhe requested authorizationfiom the British tobe allowedto help

them. The Govemmentof India reiteratedon this occasionthe statementsmade in 1873 to the

effectthatthe RulerofBahrainhadnopossessionsonthemainlandand that hisrightstherewereat

best uncertain*,and, consequently,he should not interfereon the mainland in any way. "Not

interfereon themainland", Mr. President,that wasthe leitmotivthatthe Britishrepeated constantly

to the Ruler ofBahrainthroughout 1875'and in 1877'~s ~ome examplesof whichyou can see on

the screen.

S~ernonalof Qatar,Ann.11.8,Vol.4,p. 188(emphasisadded).

6~bid, eplyofQatar,AM. 111, ol.3,p. 29; MemonalofQatar,AM. 111., ol. 8,pp.427 et seq.
'Memonalof Qatar,Ann.11.7,Vol.4,pp.59-60.

*~emonalof Qatar,Ann.11.8,Vol.4,p. 192.
g~emonalof Qatar,Anns.III.30,III.32and11, ol.6,pp. 147,155and159.

'O~emonalof Qatar,Anns.IL7and11.8,Vol. 4,pp.67and195.However, thisin no way alters the fact that Sheikh Jassim Al-Thani exercisedhis authorityat

Zubarah in 1878,that Bahrain itself acceptedthe Turkishpresencethere without reservation of

rights andthat Article 11 ofthe Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913,confirmedby that of 1914,

stipulates,n a phrasewith whichyou will be familiar,that "thepeninsulawill begovernedas in

the past by the shaykhJasim-bin-Saniand his successors". Inspeakingof the "peninsula"as a

whole, theBritishconfmed that their opposition tothe Turkish presencein Zubarahdidnot inany

way entai1recognitionoftherights claimedbyBahrain.

19. Accordingly, Mr. President, Members ofthe Court,thereare fourpurelyfactualaspects

wherebytheperiodfrom 1873to 1878 canbe distinguished- evensumrnedup - namely:

- Britain's complete scepticisasregardstherights claimedbyBahrain inZubarah,

- itsoppositiontoany interferenceby BahraininZubarah alongside the Naim;

- the exerciseofauthorityby SheikhJassiminZubarahin 1878;

- the acceptanceby bothBahrainandtheBritishthatZubarah shouldbe controlledby theTurks.

And how doesBahraindealwith eachof thesepoints? Letus, if you will permit,takethem

onebyone.

20. RegardingBritish scepticism about Bahrain's supposerd ights in Zubarah, Bahrain's

Memorial, Counter-Memoriaa lnd Reply havevery little toSay. The Counter-Memorial merely

quotes a passagein which Saldanhaspeaks of the uncertaintyof the British concerningfeudal

rightsbetweentribesand theRulerof Bahrain'sinabilitytoprotecttribes livingin Qatar. Bahrain

then concludesthat this feelingof uncertaintyon the part of theBritish quickly gaveway to the

convictionthattheNaimwere a BahrainitribeI3.In actual fact,al1that Bahrain managestoshowis

that theBritish foundthat onseveraloccasionsthe Ruler of Bahrainmade giftstotheNairnortheir

Chief - without,moreover,any significant benefitin return14- but they did not infer fromthis

thatBahrainhadanysovereigntitle over Zubarah.

'3~ounter-~emorolfBahrain, pa4.6.

'4~ounter-~emoriaolfBahrain, 5.1. 21. Bahrain'sMemorial is silent on the subject of British opposition to any Bahraini

interventionalongsidethe Naim, and itis not until the Counter-Memorialthat Bahrainadmitsthat

this oppositionexisted. In Bahrain'sview, it stemmed from the anxietyof the British notto be

caughtup in a war withTurkey'*.This explanationis true, but onlypartially: what Bahrainomits

to Sayis that the British desire to avoid complicationswith Turkey wasalso determinedby the

uncertainornominal characterof Bahrain's supposedrights toZubarah.

22. We now come to JassimbinThani'ssiege of Zubarah in 1878: Bahrain viewsthis

event- andhere1reproducealmostwordforword whatBahrainsaysin its Memonal - Bahrain

views the siegeof Zubarahas anexampleof a Britishrefusal to allowthe Al-Thaniandthe Turks

to exerciseauthorityinzubarah16.

Mr. President,Membersof the Court,whenit is recalledthatthissiegetookplacebeforethe

very eyes of the British, it is somewhatdifficult to agree with Bahrain when it assertsthat the

Britishopposedthis action. Itis of course alwayspossible todenythe obviousandSaythata cat is

not a cat,but this willdeceiveonly thosewhohaveproblemswiththeir sightand arenotallergicto

cats.

23. As regards the acceptanceby both the British and the Rulerof Bahrain that Zubarah

shouldbe occupiedby theTurks", in neitherits Memorial,nor its Counter-Memorialnorits Reply

has Bahrainanythuigto Sayonthis point.

24. Bahrainthus has no seriousresponseto the argumentsput forward by Qatarregarding

Qatar's initialtitle to Zubarah, atitle that was acquired in themiddleof the nineteenthcenturyat

O ' the sarnetirneas Qatar acquiredtitle to the peninsulaand, if Zubarah'sstatus is believedto have
1
differedfromthatof thepeninsula, atthelatestin 1878.

"~ounter-MemonalofBahrain,paras.98etseq.
'%lemorialof Bahrain,paras.167e.ndpara. 172.

"Memonal of Qatar,Ann.IL5,Vol. 3,p.225. We shall now show that Qatar'stitle to Zubarah was continually confirmed in the years that

followed. This brings me to the third part of my statement.

III.CONFIRMATI OOFQATAR' SOVEREIGN TITLETO ZUBARAH

25.The confirmation of Qatar's title to Zubarah stems onthe one hand fromQatar's exercise

of authority in Zubarah, and on the other from the general recognition of this titleby other States.

My treatment of these two points will be succinct and condensed,the details having already been

given in Qatar'swritten pleading1.shall begin with Qatar'sexercise of authority in Zubarah after

1878.

A. Theexerciseof authoritybyQatarin Zubarahafter 1878

26.The best-known examples of Qatar's exercisingauthority in Zubarah occurred 1889,

1892, 1895,1911, 1935 and 1937.

- 1889: Sheikh Jassim gave a follower of the Al-Khalifah permission to reside in the fort of

Murair, near Zubarah, and later expelled himas a result of a dispute1'.

-
1892: A Turkish document reveals that Jassim levied taxes onpearl-fishermen throughout the

peninsula, including theadministrativesub-divisionsiyes)of Zubarah andudeid19.

- 1895: The episode of Jassim's harbouringin Zubarah the Al-bin-Alitribe whohad left Bahrain

following a conflict withits Ruler. It will be recalled that theepisode ended swiftly when the

British decided to destroy Jassim's dhows- his boats, that is - not because of any supposed

rights of Bahrain to Zubarah, but solely iner to prevent the possibility of Jassim's forces

invading~ahrain~'. In its Memorial Bahrain does not hesitateto assert that theBritish reaction

1 4 was motivated by the Ruler of Bahrain's title to the region. Bahrain writeand 1 quote:

"citing as its motivation the Ruler's titleto the Zubarah region, Britain dispatched a warship to

Zubarah ..."" («mettant en avant [le] titre [du souverain] sur la région[de Zubarah], la

Grande-Bretagneenvoya unnavire de guerre à Zubarah*).

1Replyof Qatar,para.(e).
1Replyof Qatar,para.Cf).

'O~emorialof Qatar, para.8.24; Replyof Qatar,para.6.8 (g).
"~emorial of Bahrain,para. 179. Mr. President, Members of the Court, we have not foundeither in the documentsrelied upon

by Bahrain or in Our own documents any indication whatever that the British reaction was

motivated by any "Ruler'sTitle to the Zubarahregion" («titre du souverain sur la régionde

Zubarah»). On the contrary, Qatar has quoted a number of texts showing that the sole concern of

the British was simply to ensure Bahrain'ssecurity andthus to prevent Bahrain from being attacked

by sea2'. The question of Bahrain'stitle to Zubarahdid not anse.

- 1911: The Ruler of Bahrain himself requested from Sheikh Jassim, through the British

Political Agent at Bahrain, permission to rent the site of Zubarah for an annual payment of

10,000rupees, an offer Jassirnflatly refused Ljudges'folders, No. 601~~A . ccording to Bahrain,

this proposa1is no proof that Qatar controlled the whole peninsula because, first, Abu Dhabi

had made a sirnilar offer regarding the region to the south and east of Doha and, second, the

British were merely hopingto obtain Jassim'sde jure recognition of a defacto situationB. In

al1honesty, Bahrain's reasoning is somewhat beyond us: first, the fact that Abu Dhabi made

the Ruler of Qatar the same offer as Bahrain made for Zubarah implies nothing other than

recognition that the temtory which it was sought to rent belonged to Qatar- one rents a

property from its owner or his agent, not from a third Party; second, if, as Bahrain says, the

British wanted legal confmtion of a situation that pertained in fact, then Qatar's refusa1to

rent Zubarah to Bahrain, and the acceptance of this refusal by both the British and Bahrain,

entail, in the very terms used by Bahrain, de jure recognition of Zubarah'sstatus, that is, its

belonging to Qatar.

1935: The concession granted by Qatar to APOCcovers the whole peninsula as shown in the

map annexed to the agreement; it therefore constitutes an act of sovereigntypar e~cellence'~.

Since this point has already been dealt with in detail by my leamed colleagues,

Mr. Shankardass and SirIan Sinclair,1need Sayno more on the subject.

22~ounter-~emorialof Qatar, para.5.19 (7-9); Replyof Qatar, para.6.8(g).

23~emorialof Qatar,para. 8.26.
'4~ounter-~emorial of Bahrain, para.121.

25~emorialof Qatar.paras.6.26 and 8.29; Replyof Qatar, p(p).6.8 - Finally, 1937: The Rulerof Qatar's action,aimed at assertinghis authority overtheNaimin

zubarahZ6i,s again a typical actof sovereignty, butBahraindoesnot hesitate to describethis

action as an act of "aggression" incompatiwith the lawof theLeague of Nationsand the

Briand-Kellogg~act~~.1shall not dwellon the meritsof this descriptioneither,since,despite

what Bahrainsuggests,the "aggression"never even attractedthe attention of the Leagueof

Nations.

27.Toconclude,Mr.President,the facts1havejust put forwardconfirmthatQatarexercised

sovereignty in Zubarahunopposedby the British. Given the social context and geographical

conditionsof a Gulf Sheikhdomat this period,the presenceof Qatariauthoritiesin Zubarahbears

fullwitnessto thisexerciseof sovereignty. In anycase Bahrainhasno analogousevidenceof acts

of sovereigntyover Zubarahto relyon. Inthis regard, its onlyargumentrests on thepresenceof

theNaim,anissuewhichwillbedealtwith later.

B. Recognitionof ~atar's titleto ZubarahbyotherStates

28.Qatar'stitle toZubarah has been recognizon manyoccasions,both byBahrainitself -

a point whichwill be developedby Mr. Shankardass- as well as by the British,the Turksand

othernations.

O ' 1. The British position

29.As faras the Britishareconcemed,theyrecognizedthatZubarahbelonged toQatareach

timethe questionarose. Amongthemoreimportantexamples,apartfiomthose alreadymentioned,

including themaps presentedby Mr. Bundy,are Article 11 of theAnglo-OttomanConventionof

1913,confirmedby that of 1914,andtheTreatyof 1916betweenBritainand the RulerofQatar. It

2%iemonalof Qatar,paras. et seq.

27~emonalofBahrain, par1.3has already beenremarked thatthese treaties recognizedthe Rulerof Qatar's authority over the

wholepeninsula28.

Later, at the time of the 1937 events,the Britishrepeated in every waypossiblethat the '

Rulerof Qatarhad a perfectrightto actashe didwith regardto theNaim.

30.From 1937 onwards,the sole concemof the Britishwas to find asolutionwhichmight

improve relations between Bahrain and Qatar without opening up the question of Qatar's

sovereigntyover Zubarah. It waswiththis in mindthat Great Britain brokered theagreementof

24 June 1944Ljudges'folders, No.6112',which providedfor the restorationof fiiendlyrelations

between thetwo Rulers and contained amutual undertakingto do nothingthat mightaffect the

existingsituation,includingthat of theoilconcessiongrantedby Qatar.

Accordingto Bahrain,this agreement,which willshortly be dealt with in moredetail by

Mr. Shankardass,obliged Qatar towithdraw the guards from the fort which had been built at

Zubarah. Qatarconsentedtowithdraw theguardsfromthe fortbut stationed them nearby.Bahrain

protestedagainstthe presence ofthe guardsand also against a nurnber of other actionscarried out

at Zubarah. Significantly,onno occasiondid theBritishoblige Qatarto put anendtothe disputed

actions3'.

31. In 1947,the British carriedout a delimitationof the two Sheikhdoms' maritime areas3',

taking no account of Bahrain'sclaims to Zubarah and notably withoutoffering Bahrain any

maritime area off Zubarah,which wouldhave been requiredhad Zubarah belonged toBahrain.

What ismore,Bahrain neverprotestedonthisparticular issue.

32. In 1950, Qatar accepted anew arrangementallowing a lirnitednurnber of Bahrain's

subjects to go to Zubarah. To theBritish it wasclearthat Bahrainwas not makingany claim to

sovereignty over Zubarah andthey notified Qatar to this effect Ljudges'folders, No. 6213'.

28~emorial f Qatar,paras.8.27-8.28;Replyof Q, ara.6.(m)and(n).

29~emorial f Qatar,AnnU.240, Vol.8,p.183.

3%emorialof Qatar,Anns111.244,111.247,111.254,11.26111.267, ol. 8,p201,214, 257,297and325.
"Memonalof Qatar,Ann. 111.25, ol. 8,p.267.

32~emonalof Qatar,Ann.111.26, ol. 8,p. 317.However, followingincidents in 1952,Qatarprohibitedaccessto the site ofZubarah, withoutany

objectiononthe partof the~ritish~~.

33. In 1954,the Britishsoughtto propose a new arrangement which,withsome alterations,

accorded with previous agreementsb ,utagainwithout suc ces^^^.

34.Finally,followinga newrequestby Bahrainon 13June 1957,in whichit explicitlyasked
1
theBritishtodecideupon itsrightsin ZubarahandBahraincommitteditselfinadvancetoabideby

theirdecision,the British replied formally,on 10August 1957,that theyhad never supportedany

Bahrainiclaimto sovereigntyover ZubarahandthatQatar wasat libertyto controlaccessto it asit

pleased35.

Bahrainmadea determinedattemptto resurrectits claimin 1961,but the British maintained

thepositionwhichthey had takenin 1957~~.

35. Whatis Bahrain's response to al1this? In substance, itsthesis is thatthe British position

was a political ratherthan a legaloneand that the Britishhad alwayshesitatedas to whatposition

to tal~e~~.This argument can only be upheld if we turn a blind eye to the innumerable British

documents that oficially reject Bahrain'sclaims and fasten on to certain British statements in

which the author, without knowledge of the facts in their entirety, expresses his uncertainty.

Nevertheless it remainsme thatthe finaldecisions,reachedaftera thoroughstudyof the question,

reveal that from 1873to 1961the BritishrejectedBahrain'sthesis infull awarenessof the issues

involved.

2. TheTurkirhposition

36. That Turkey claimedsovereigntyover the whole Qatarpeninsula, includingthe site of

Zubarah,is very clear fiom the factthat it was the exerciseof this sovereignty overZubarahthat

was at the originof the problem; it was becausethe Turkswishedthe Naimto submitto them in

1873that the Ruler of Bahrain then announcedhis claims to Zubarah. TheTurks were mer

33~emorial f Qatar,Anns.111.and111.272V, ol. 8,pp.343and351.
"Mernorial f Qatar,Anns.111.276 d11.283, ol. 8,pp.3et seqand403 etseq.

35~emorial f Qatar,Ann.111.28, ol. 8, pp. 411-412.
3%ïemoriaolf Qatar,Ann.III.287,Vol. 8,p. 425.

37~ounter-~emoriaolf Bahra, aras.9etseq. present in Zubarahin a militarycapacityat the time of the events of 1878and 1895, each time

sendinga warship3*.

37. On a number of occasions,as Dr.AliAl-Merishowedlast week,the Turks, inintemal

documents,described Zubarahas a subdivision ofthe kaza of Qatar (1891, 1892, 1896,1903)and
.
plannedto appointanofficia1there (1888, 1889, 19031 ,909)~'.

The British opposed this - and not always unequivocally - not because of Bahrain's

supposed rights to Zubarah, but out of concem, as always, for Bahrain'ssecurity. Finally,

Article 11oftheAnglo-OttomanConventionof 19 13,referredto in that of 1914,confixmsthatthe

Turks andof coursethe Britishwerein agreementthatAl-Thaniauthorityextendedthroughoutthe

wholepeninsula40.

Bahrainhas relied on Great Britain'rsefusalto acceptthe presence ofmudirs at Zubarahin

order to assertthat the British recognized Bahrain's rights ozubarah4',whereas- forgiveme

for the repetition this positionwas taken only out of the concemon the part of the British to

preventBahrainfrombeingattacked fiom~ubarah~~.

3. The positionsof otherStates

38. Qatar has presented an enormousquantityof mapsoriginatingin Stateswhichare not

parties to the present dispute, eitherfficia1State maps (Turkish,British, Russian, French and

Italian),or frompublishinghousesrenownedfor their geographical expertise; not a single on oef
019

thesemapsshowsal1orpart of Zubarah included inBahrain'sterrito~y~~.

As Mr. Bundy has demonstrated, thevery fewmapswhich Bahrain hasmanagedto present

show nothingtocontradictthat asserti01-1~~.

38~emonalof Qatar, para.8.16; Memonalof Qatar,Ann.11.5,Vol.3,pp. 224-225and331; Memonalof Qatar,
Ann.11.8,Vol.4,p. 228. .
39~ounter-~emorialof Qatar, paras.5.17(5-7)and 5.22; Reply,ara. 6.8; Replyof Qatar,Anns. III.6,
111.9,111.10,111, 11., 11.2, 11.,11.2,11.25,11.2, 11.,tc., Vol.3, pp. 37, 55,64, 79, 117,121, 127, 133,
139,145,177,etc.

4%emonal ofQatar,para. 8.27; Counter-Memorial of Qatar, par5a..21.
41~ounter-~emonalofBahrain,paras. Il l and 115.

42~ounter-~emonalofQatar, para.5.19.
43~eplyofQatar,paras. 6.10-6.12.
44~upplemental ocumentsof Bahrain,Anns. 14-22. Andthis, Mr. President, brings me tomy final point: thebasis ofBahrain'sclaim,namelyits

triballinkswiththeNaim.

IV.THE BASISOF BAHRAIN 'LAIM: ITSTRIBALLINKSWITHTHE NAIM

39. Bahraintriesto baseits claimto sovereignty overZubarah onassertionsto the effectthat

the region had alwaysbeen fiequentedby theNaimtribe and that this tribeowed allegianceto the

Rulerof Bahrain. Itwillbe seenthat, evenif such an argumentcould be accepted,in the present

instanceit is foundedneitherin the law applicablein this case, norin the facts. 1shall begin with

tribalties inthe law applicableinthe present case.

A. Tribalties inlaw

40. Bahrainbases itsclairntosovereigntyoverZubarah on thetribal tiessupposedlyexisting

between its Ruler and the Nairn tribe who fiequent the area of Zubarah. In Bahrain'sview4',

international jurisprudence,as reflectedin the Western Sahara(1975) and Dubai/Sharjah(1981)

cases, accepts that ties of allegiance can form the basis for sovereignty. This interpretationis

correct,provided that this allegianceulfils four conditions,which are set forth not only in these

two cases, but also in the recent cases of Eritredemen (1998) and BotswanaNamibia(1999);

thoseconditionsare thefollowing:

- theties of allegianceareclearlyrea~~~;

- theruler hasreal control overthetribe4';

- the tribe exercisesfunctionsof State authonty over thearea itis stayingin, in the narne ofits

- allegianceisrecognizedas abasis of titleintheareadg.

As will nowbe seen,the relationsbetweenthe Naim andthe Ruler of Bahrainfulfilnoneof

theseconditions.

45~emorialof Bahrain,para.74.

46westernSahara,I.C.J.Reports1975,p. 44, para.95.
471bid.

48~otswandamibia, I.C.J.Reports1999,para.and;implicitlyinEritreaflemen,9October 1998,para.315.
49westernSahara,I.C.J.Reports197544,para.95. 1. The realityof ties of ailegiance

41. Bahrain carefully avoids speciving a time by reference towhich the reality of these

supposedties of allegiancehas to be determined. Theonly time at which these ties could have

been significantwould have been inthe nineteenthcenturyat the time of the separation between

Bahrainand Qatar,fust, becauseitwas in 1873that Bahrain raisedthe issue ofZubarahforthefirst

time, and second, because the jurisprudence just citedrecognizes that they were of greater

importanceatthat timethannow. Butwe haveseenthatin 1873the realityof the ties ofallegiance

between the Naimand the Ruler of Bahrain wasvery doubtfulin the opinionof the British,since

they consideredsuchties, if they existed atall,tobepurelynominal.

42. Furthemore, at the time of the events of 1868, the Naim tibe formed part of the

coalitionof Qataritribes thatwentto war againsttheRuler of Bahrain.In the Dubai/Sharjahcase,

the arbitrators, despite giving fairly wide scope to the concept of allegiance, nevertheless

considereda tribe'sgoing to war againstits sheikhas a termination ofthis allegiance; in factthey

concludedthat althougha changeof alliance fiomone sheikh to another did not entai1a change of

allegiance,they added that thiswasonly "providedwar wasnot wagedagainstthe Rulerto whom

allegiancewas owedflS0.But this is preciselywhat the Naim did as regards the Ruler of Bahrain

whenthey alliedthemselveswithotherQataritribesto fight againstBahrainin 1868. By fighting

against Bahrain, they terminated their allegianceunder the criteria developed fiom the

031 Dubai/Sharjah case. Even supposing such allegiancehad been renewed in 1868, the British

consideredthe eventsof 1878asconstituting atransferoftheNaim'sallegianceto Sheikh~assim".

There are other facts thatshowthat the allegianceof the Nairnto the Rulerof Bahrainwas

verytheoretical.

43. Oneofthe classicalcriteriafor whether allegianceis realornot is the impositionoftaxes

on the tibe that owes allegiance. Regarding thisthe Political Residentwrote in 1937that "[tlhe

Bahrain Government,however,admitthat they do not administeror take taxes at zubarahVs2i ,n

'OZLR91,p. 637.

S'~emonalof QatarAnn.111.283, ol.8,p. 403.
52~emonalof QatarAnn.111.126,ol.7,p. 128.contrast tothe Al-Thaniin the nineteenthcentury,accordingto a Turkishdocument thatwe have

alreadymentioned5'.

44. Finally, it shouldbe rememberedthat followingthe confrontationin 1937,the Chiefof

the Al-Jabr section ofthe Naim undertook to submitto the Ruler of Qatar when he wason the

peninsulas4.Thus,we see that thereality ofties of allegianceto the Rulerof Bahrein hasnot been

established, farfrom it.

2. Controlbythe ruler over thetribe

45. The arbitratorsin theDubaaharjah caseemphasizedthat thecriterionof allegiancehad

far lessweightin the twentiethcenturythanit did in thenineteenthand thatthe closerthe disputed

territorieswereto the centresofpowerthemoresignificantthe criterionof controls5.Inthepresent

case the Rulerof Bahrainhad no control overthe Naim, incontrastto the Ruler of Qatar, who,as

we have seen, particularly in regard to the events of 1878 and 1937, was perfectly capable of

exercisingcontroloverthe area.

3. Theexercise of acts of Stateauthority

46. We know of no exampleof the Naim'sperformingacts of Stateauthorityat Zubarahin

the name of the Ruler of Bahrain. Onceagain the only acts of imperiumperformed atZubarah

wereby theRulerof Qatar.

4. Allegiance as basis of titleunderthe local law

47. Severalpiecesof evidenceshowthatthehabitua1frequentingofa temtory by a tribethat

is notunder the authority of thesheikh towhom the temtory belongsdoes not in any way imply

appropriationof suchterritoryby thetribeor byits overlord. Both Qatarand the Britishnoted that

tribes that were not under the Ruler's authority fiequenthe temtory of Qatar; this in no way

impliedloss ofthe Rulerof Qatar's sovereignty ovehristemtory. Thusinthe caseof the Dowasir

when they emigratedto Saudi Arabiain the 1920s,the PoliticalResidentwrotethat the allegiance

of the Dowasirto the Ruler of Bahrain"naturally givesno claim to the Shaikh of Bahrain to the

53~eplyofQatar,par6.80.

54~emorial fQatarAnn.III138,ol.7,p.191.
"ILR,91,p.589. part of Hasa occupiedby them [the ~owasir]"~~.Twenty-five yearslater, in 1948,the Political

Agent in Bahrain,analysingthe customary law applicablein this part of the world, explained that

tribes moved freely within a sheikh'temtory withoutthis entailingthe tribe'ssubmissionto that

sheikhor, inversely,transferof the sheikh'stemtory to that tribes7. Al1elsebeing equal, itcould

hardly be arguedthat theNaim'sfiequentingof the Zubaraharea constituteda loss of the Rulerof

Qatar'ssovereigntyoverthis area.

48. In conclusion,Mr.President, although tiesof allegiancecan in certain cases form the

basis ofa titleto sovereignty, thejurisprudence, conscious of thextremefragilityof thiscriterion,

has hedged it about with strict conditions,none of which are fulfilled in the present case. Any

attemptneverthelessto relyontiesofallegianceinthecaseof Zubarah mustencounterproblemsof

a purelyfactualnature.

Letus considertribal tiesinthe specificcase oftheZubarah Naim.

B. Tribaltiesin casu

49. The ties of allegianceassertedby Bahraincan have norelevance in the present case,
023

given the composition ofthe Naimtribe, theiractualpresencein the area and the inconstancy of

theirallegiances.

1. Thecompositionof theNaimtribe

50. As Bahrain admits,the Nairn tribe consistedof several sections. These sectionsdid

frequent the Zubaraharea,butnot al1of themowedallegianceto Bahrainand notal1of themwere

found in Zubarahproper. Thus Bahrainrelies on the allegianceof the Al-Jabr,at the sametirne

recognizing that another section, the Al-Ramzan, owed allegiance to the Ruler of Qatar.

Independentlyof what has already been said, this fact alone is enough to destroy the whole of

S%iemorialof Qatar, Ann.111, ol. 7,pp. 131-132.
57~upplementl ocumentsof Qatar,doc. 16. See also,ibid., doc. 14; MernoriAnn. Iii.138, Vol.7,
pp. 191-192.Bahrain's claimto Zubarah,sincethisclaimisbasedonthe allegianceof theNaimin general,even

though only one section of them is supposed to have maintainedits allegianceto the Ruler of

~ahrain~'.

51.The claimto Zubarahbased onthe allegianceof the Al-Jabr tothe Ruler of Bahrainis

evenless admissiblein that themap submittedby Bahrainin supportof its claimshowsthat it was

not the Al-Jabrbut other sectionsof the Naimthat had their quartersclose by ~ubarah~~ Ljudges'

folders,No. 631,and that, in any case,in July 1937the Al-Jabryielded to the Ruler of ~atar~'.

Bahrain's pleadingsm , oreover,donotcontestthesefacts.

2. The presenceof theNaimin the area

52. The presenceof the Naim at Zubarahwas notat al1constant. WhileBahrain recognizes

that it is impossibleto prove that theNaimwerecontinuallypresent atZubarahthroughoutthe last

two centuries6',it asserts thatQatar has not, on the other hand,proved their absence. However,

Mr.President,evidenceis not lacking:

- in 1811,Zubarahwas destroyedandLorimermentionsthe reoccupationof the "desertedsite of

Zubarah"foronlya fewmonthsin 184262;

- the fact that the Naim wereexpelledmanumilitari fromZubarahin 1878is not contestedby

Bahrain;

- Britishreports of1879-1880and 1888described Zubarahasur~inhabited~~;

- in 1903a TurkishdocumentnotedthatZubarahwas~ninhabited~~;

- in 1908Lorimermade the general pointthat theNaim wouldgo to Zubarahin winter,but that

in summerthey lived in Bahrain or,in the case of someof them, in Doha. He also said that

58~ounter-~emoriaolf Qatar,paras.5.53-5.57.
59~emonalof Bahrain,Ann.229, Vol.4,p.98(a).

64Memonao lf Qatar, para8..43.
61~eplyof Bahrai, ara.256.

62~eplyof Qatar,para.6.34.
631bidMemorialof Qatar,Ann.11.8,Vol.4,p.220.

64~eplyof Qatar,para.6.34. there were no Naim settled in Qatar at that time. Bahrain does not challenge these

observation^^^;

- in 1934a British reportstatedthatZubarahwas"nowa min without oneinhabitant"66.

In sum,itcanhardlybe saidthattheNaimwerean established presenceinZubarah.

3. The inconstancyof theNaim'saiiegiances

53. It hasalreadybeen seenhow onlysomeof the Naim,but notal1of them,paid allegiance

to the Rulerof Bahrain.Furthemore, it hasbeenseenhowthis allegiancewas brokenoff in 1868.

Although it seemsto have been renewed subsequently,the reality of this allegiance remains

doubtful. In 1908LorimerobservedthattheNaimactedas mercenaries forboth BahrainandQatar

andthattheir loyaltywas veryuncertainb7.Al1Bahraincan Sayto this is that a distinctionmustbe

madebetweenthe Naimof the north-west ofQatarand those whoare supposedto have emigrated

to Wakrain the mid-nineteenthcentury6*.Sonowwe have twokindsofNaim! Not onlymustwe

distinguishtheZubarahNaim fiom those foundin other parts of the peninsula,but we must also

distinguishthe"good"Naimof Zubarah,(Le.,according to Bahrain, theAl-Jabrwho allegedlypaid

O 2 5 allegianceto theRulerof Bahrain),fiom the otherNaim whoalsofrequentedZubarah(suchas the

Al-Ramzanwho paid allegianceto theRuler of Qatar,and aboutwhomBahrain does not speak)!

This distinction betweenthe Naim of the north-westof the peninsulaand other QatarNaim is

sufficient to show, once more,thata claim to titlebased on such impreciseties of allegiance is

unworkable.

54.As to the fickleloyalty of thistribe, Bahrainhas nothing toSayon this subject- and

with good reason: 40years afier ~orimer~~i,n 1948the British noted once again that the Naim,

65~ernorilf Bahrai, nn.74,Vol. 3,pp.395-396.

66MemoriaolfBahrai, nn.101,Vol. 3,p. 576.
67~ounter-~emoriolfQatar,paras.5.19(1)and5.47; Replyof , ara.6.46.

68~eplyofBahrai, ara.255.
69~eefootnote90.morethan any other Bedouin tribe,were known from Bahrainto Oman forchanging allegiance

everytime it suitedhem70Ljudgesf 'olders,No.641.

55. In conclusion,Mr. President,Membersof the Court, if certainghosts do linger in the

desert,they remainghosts,survivingonlyin the mindsof those who believein ghosts. The basis

for Bahrain's claim toZubarah belongsmore to the realm of fantasy than to legal reality,and it

derivesno weightfromthe simplefactofbeinganoldclaim. Indeed, it maywellbe askedwhether

the Court,in al1the territorialdisputesbrought beforeit, hasever been presentedwith a claimas

insubstantiallybased as this one: a claim to sovereigby a State thathas renounced itbefore,a

claimwhose basis was alwaysrejectedeven by theprotecting Power, Le.,Britain, aclaimupheld

by not one singlse erious cartographicdocumentfrom third parties, a claimbased on ties of

allegiance, whosereality is uncertainas is even the identificationof the tribe concerned, and a

claimput forwardin termsthat areat times so extravagan- and here 1wouldrespectfullyrefer

the Court to paragraph272 of Bahrain's Reply, which is a masterpieceof absolute denial of the

reality and soexaggerated,that onegetsthe impressionthat eventhe authorsdo notbelieveinit,

except to believe, as did Alice in Wonderland, thatwhen so many out-of-the-waythings have

happened,very fewthingsindeedarereally impossible7'.

Mr. President,Members oftheCourt,1ammostgrateful toyou foryourkindattention,and1

wouldask younowto givethe floorto Mr.Shankardass.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor David. Je donne maintenant la parole a

M. Shankardass.

70~upplementDlocumentsof Qatar,doc. 16.

71~ewisCarrol, lice inWonderland. M. SHANKARDASS :Monsieurleprésident,Madame etMessieursde la Cour,

Les dénisdesouveraineté sur Zubarah :Zubarahnefait pasl'objet d'unlitigesérieux

1. 11m'incombe demontrer rapidement à la Cour que de nombreux éléments de preuve

historiquesattestentqueBahreïna abandonnétout droid te souveraineté sur Zubarahet àcertaines

occasions a expressémentniéen avoiret qu'en conséquence,sa revendicationen la matièrene

constituepas une véritablequestionlitigieuseenl'espèce.

2. M.EricDavid vous a déjà montré que la revendication desouveraineté deBahreïn sur

Zubarah ne repose suraucun fondement juridiqueet qu'elle n'ajamais été reconnue, ni par les

Britanniques,ni par qui quece soit.

3. Le premier événement qui indiqq ueeBahreïn renonce à toute prétentionde souveraineté

surZubarahest,bienentendu,l'accord de 1868entrela Grande-Bretagneet ~ahreïn' :le souverain

de Bahreïnétaitsanctionné pour avoir agressé Qatar eitl avaitété convaincude s'engager parécrit

àne plus intervenir surla péninsulede Qataren violation de la paixmaritime. Il s'agissaitlà de

l'exécution etde la confirmation des obligations incombant à Bahreiiien vertu dela convention

d'amitié de 18612. La Cour se rappelle que cette conventionvisait à contenir les activités de

Bahreïncompromettantlapaix maritimede même qu'àassurersa sécurité3. Ainslie, souverain de

Bahreïn s'engageaità(cs'abstenirde commettre touttjpe d'agression maritime,et de se livrer en

mer à la guerre, àla piraterieetà l'esclavage tantqu'[il]recevr[ait]le soutiendu Gouvernement

britanniquevisantàgarantirla sécurité d[ eses]possessions».

4. La Cour serappelleque lorsquele souverainde Bahreïnapportaen 1874son soutienaux

Naim de Zubarah, les Britanniques ont formuléune mise en garde : pour bénéficier de leur

protection, il ne devaitni êtrel'agresseurni prendre des mesures quil'entraîneraientdans des

complicationset quele Gouvernementbritanniquejugeait inopportunes4. La répon dsesouverain

à l'époque, telleque le résident politique britannique,le colonelRoss, l'a rapportée

'Mémoirede Qatar,annexe11.,ol.5,p. 75.
Mémoirede Qatar,annexe11-,ol.5,p. 45.

Mémoirede Qatar,par.5.3-5.4.
MémoiredeBahreïn,annexe 70,vol.p.294.le 19décembre1874au Gouvernement des Indes, était très claireme unntdénide souveraineté sur

Zubarah. Le souverainaurait dit qu'«en envoyantde l'aide à Zubarah, il entendaitdéfendresa

propre île, et nonempiétersur sesvoisins, mais[qu'il]étaitprêtàse laisser guiderpar lapolitique

du gouvernement»5(lesitaliquessont denous).

5. Dans ses écritures,Qatar a donnédes exemples, dontcertains ont étéexpliqués par

M.David, qui établissentque, bien qu'à plusieurs reprises le souverainde Bahreïn ait prétendu

avoir différents droits sur letemtoire continental, il a en faitacceptéla condition posée ples

Britanniquesdene pas intervenirà Zubarah pendant plus de cena tns. Ainsi, ils'est acquitté des

obligations qu'il avait souscrites en vertu des traités conclusavec les Britanniques afinde

bénéficierdesavantagesliés àla protectionoffertepar ces derniers.

6. Le fait que le souverain de Bahreïn lui-même ne prenaip tas trop au sérieux sa

revendicationsur Zubarah et qu'il se contentaitd'y avoir recours àcertains moments à des fins

politiques ressort clairementd'un exemple particulièrement révélateurIl s'agit du procès verbal

du 17janvier 1920 d'une conversation entre l'héritierdu trône de Bahreïn et l'agent politique

relative à une proposition faite par Bahreïn tendant à ce que les Britanniques approuvent

l'ouvertured'un port àZubarah. Au cours decet entretien, l'agent politique del'époque,dansla

logique des observationsqu'il avaitlui-même déjàfaites àce sujet, estimant quele souverainde

Qatarverrait dans cettepropositionune ((menacemortelle»6,déclaraau princehéritierqu'il était

peu probable que les Britanniquesapprouventune telle proposition; il poursuit son rappordte la

façonsuivante :

«A mon grand étonnement, Abdullah a pleinementreconnu le poids de mes

arguments, puis, faisant calmement volte-face, a déclaré : (Nous ne voulons pas
réellement((Zubarab àcepoint-là, maisnousvoulons en revanchefairevaloirun titre
sur le continentety obtenirun port de façonque,siBinSaud aménageait lui-mêm une
port àAlJubail (au nordde Qatif), nousne soyonspascomplètementruinés...))'

'Zbid ..295.
Mémoire deQatar,annexe111.6,ol. 6,p. 310.

'Mémoire de Bahreïn,annexe87,vol. 3,p. 524. Le princehéritierdéclara alorstrès fianchemenqtuele cheikh Isa«se ferait unplaisir de ne

plus revenir sur la questionde Zubarahsi le gouvernementde Sa Majestélui promettait de ne

jamais autoriserBin Saudà aménagerun por t Al ~ubail~'.

7. En fait, ce n'est pas avant 1937 quele souverainde Bahreïn transformaen «crise»

((l'incidentdeZubarab survenu au cours de cette année-là d,ont M. David a montréqu'il ne

s'agissaitderien d'autre quede l'exercice, parle souverain deQatar, de son autorità Zubarah.

Comme nousl'avons démontrél,e souverain,sans aucuneraison, se sentit offensé.Il entreprit

alors plusieurs actionspeu judicieuses consistantnotamment à imposer des restrictionsà la

circulation des personneset des biens entre Qatar et Bahreïn, auxquelles Qatar réponditar la

pareille. Les autoritbritanniques sontdoncintervenuespourdétendre lesrelationsentre lesdeux

Etats. Leurs différentesdémarchesen 1944, 1950et 1954ne furent couronnéesque d'un succès

relatif. BienqueBahreïnsoutiennedanssonmémoireg que,depuis 1937,il n'ajamais «renoncé» à

ses revendicationssur Zubarah,il ressort au contraire du dossier qu'au coursdes tentatives de

médiationbritanniques,lesouverain de Bahreïn,tout enrevendiquant parfois certaindroitsprivés

à Zubarah, a expressémenett de façon répété dénié toute souveraineté surZubarah. C'est ainsi

que le9 décembre1943, le résident politique a rapporté, à la suite d'une discussionavec le

souverainde Bahreïn,que celui-ci craignait bienplus de perdre la face que de perdre des biens,

qu'il étaitcertain que, sousune forme ou une autre,un arrangement était possiblet qu'il faisait

confianceauxBritanniquespourlemettreaupoint'0.

8. C'est sansdoutel'accorddejuin 1944entreles souverainsde Qataret de Bahreïn,en fait

le seulaccordjamais concluentre les deux souverains,auquelils étaient parvenusavec l'aidedes

Britanniques,quireprésentesoussa formela plus officielleledénide toutesouveraineté bahreïnite

surZubarahet la reconnaissancede la souverainetédeQatar. Ce bref accord,qui est le document

no61 dansvotredossier, estlibellédanslestermes suivants,quiapparaissentmaintenant à l'écran:

«Le souverain de Bahreïnet le souverain deQatarconviennentde rétablir entre
eux des relationsaussi amicales qu'elles l'étantnslepassé. Le souverainde Qatar
s'engage à ce que Zubarah demeure en l'état, sanqsue rien n'ysoit fait qui n'existait

*Ibid.

Mémoird eeBahreïn,ar.31.
'OMémoird eeQatar,annexe111.232v,ol.8,p. 147. pas dans lepassé,celapar égardpour Al Khalifah et en sonhommage. Poursapartle
souverainde Bahreïns'engage à ne rien fairequi puisseporteratteinte aux intérêd tsu
souverain de Qatar. Le présent accord n'affecte pals 'accordavec la compagnie

pétrolièreopérantàQatar dontlesdroitssontprotégés.»11

9. La Cour remarquera quetout ce que le souverainde Qatar accepte aux termes decet

accord,c'est «que Zubarahdemeure enl'état, sans que rien n'y soitfait qui n'existaitpas dans le

passé».Autrement dit, il se contentait de laisser la vieiveille de Zubarah,et non pas la régionde

Zubarah,quelle quesoit celle-ci,à l'étatde sitearchéologiquec,e quiestencore lecas aujourd'hui.

En revanche,la renonciation du souverain deBahreïn à toute revendicationde souverainetésur

Zubarahest manifestedans la disposition particulière protégeant ld ersoits reconnusà Qatar par

l'accordde concession pétrolière qatarienne d 1935.

10.Bahreïn tentededémontrerdansson mémoire'q 'ue la Grande-Bretagne a admisen 1961

au plus tardque son refus de reconnaîtrela souverainetéde Bahreïnsur Zubarah était dénué de

fondementet cite à l'appui deson affirmationun compterendu du Foreign 0ffice13. Le passage

choisiillustreparfaitementla stratégieque Bahreïn adoptedans la présenteaffaire, qui consisteà

fausser lesélémentp srésentéà s la Couren ne citant, dansles documentsinvoqués,que les extraits

qui appuientsa thèse. La Cour jugera très intéressan lt paragrapheprécédanlte passagecitépar

Bahreïn. Voici ce qui est dit dans le compte rendu du Foreign Office au sujet de cet accord

«Cornmela politique adoptée est de détruire l'argumenptrincipal du souverain
de Bahreïn selon lequelle statuquo en 1944signifiaitnotammentque Bahreïn avait

souverainetésur Zubarah,je propose de modifierle projet de textede la manièreque
j'ai indiquée.))

L'auteurpréciseque lesmodifications ont pour objet ((d'indiquerclairementque nousn'acceptons

pasl'argumentationdu souveraindeBahreïn)).

11.Que larevendication de Bahreïn àl'égarddeZubarahfût surtoutune question deprestige

et non de souveraineté, c'est ce qu'a répété le souverainde Bahreïnquelques annéesplus tard,

en 1946,au coursd'une conversation avec le résidentpolitiquequi en a consignéla teneur comme

suit:

"Mémoird eeQatar,annexe111.24,ol. 8,p. 183.

lMémoird eeBahreïnp, ar.334.
lMémoird eeBahreïna, nnexe220, vol. 4, p. 925. «Sije l'ai biencompris,il a déclaré qu'il ne revendiquaitpas la souveraineté
sur Zubarah, mais voulait uniquementavoir accès à ses pâturages et à son eau.
Lorsqueje lui ai fait remarquer qu'il nepouvait tirer aucunprofit de Zubarah, il a

réponduqu'ilne s'agissaitpas de profit car il savait qu'inj, avait rien de valeurà
Zubarah,maisdeprestige.»'4

Il a également déclaraéu résident politique qul'incertitudelui était insupportabet qu'il désirait

une décision,dans unsens oudansl'autre,fût-elledéfavorable. 4

12.Je me permetsde rappeleren outreàla Courun certainnombre d'autres cas,mentionnés

dans les écriturede Qatar, oùdesfonctionnairesbritanniquesont pris actedu faitque le souverain

de Bahreïn a chaquefois démenti exerceu rnesouveraineté quelconquesurzubarahl*.

13. La renonciation définitivd eu souverain de Bahrein à exercer tous droits éventuelsà

Zubarah trouve confmation dans les démarches qui ontsuivi la décision britannique de

décembre1947,dontmon collègue, M. David, aparléet par lesquellesles souverainsdeBahreinet

de Qatar ont été avisésde la délimitation des fonds marins entre leursEtats. Il est clair que la

Grande-Bretagnea considéré que Zubarahfaisait partie de Qataret a tenu compte de la côte de

celui-cipour fixerla ligne de 1947. Bahrein arejetéla décision pourdivers motifs,maisn'a émis

aucuneréserveniprotestationau sujetde droitsqu'il aurait le caséchéan àtZubarahou surcelle-ci.

La prétention maximale que formule Bahreinen refusant d'accepter«la lignede 1947))était«que

toute l'étendued'eausituéeentre noscôtesjusqu'à et y comprisDibalet Jaradahdoit être incluse

dans lamer surlaquellenous avonsdesdroits s~uverains))'~.

14.Parla suite,le souveraindeBahreïn,tout en niant souventexpressémentrevendique urne

souverainetéquelconquesur Zubarah,n'aréclamé que des droitsde natureprivée'7.Dansla lettre

qu'il a adressée le24juin 1948au ministre britannique des affaires étrangères, EmeB stevin,le

souverain a dit de sa revendicationqu'elle concernait certainsterrains à Zubarah et que son

intentionétait de((conserverpour toujoursàtitrede propriétéprivée le tsrrains ainsiindiqués)).Il

a préciséqu'in l'avaitjamais revendiquéet nerevendiquaitpasde droits sur le pétroleàZubarahet

l4MémoiredQ e atar,vol. 8,annexe111,. 211.
" Mémoird eeQatar,par.8.49-8.50;contre-mémdeQatar,par..38.

l6Mémoird eeQatar,annexe IV.11, ol. 10,p. 83.
" Mémoird eeQatar,annexeIII.258,vol. 8,p. 273. que tous les profitsliésàces droits appartenaient entièrement ac uheikh de~atar'~ et cela dans

une lettrequ'ila adressée au ministrebritanniqud eesaffairesétrangères.

15. Enjanvier 1950, l'agent politique à Bahreïn a expressémenc tonfirmédans une lettre

adresséeau souverainde Qatar que le cheikh de Bahreïn nerevendiquaitpas la souverainetésur

Zubarahni sur aucuneautre partiedu temtoire de Qataret ne revendiquaitpas nonplus de droits

sur le pétrole;il tenaitsimplement à pouvoir envoyerles sujetsdont il avait la charge fairepaître

leurstroupeaux à~ubarah'~

16. Lorsque Bahreïn ade nouveau soulevéla question de Zubarah en 1957, le résident

politique afait savoirau ministrebritanniquedes affaires étrangères - il s'agissaitdeM. Selwyn

Lloyd - que «le sentiment du cheikh Salmanà propos de Zubarah ne semble êtrepartagépar

personned'autre à Bahreïn))et il a ensuite confirmé que leB s ritanniques n'avaient jamaisdonné

aucun signe d'encouragementni d'appui à la revendication de souverainetéde Bahreïn sur

O 3 1 zubarah20.Aussi rappela-t-onau souverainen août 1957que Bahreïn n'avaitpas souveraineté sur

Zubarahni aucunautredroit a y fairevaloi?'.

17. A partir dejuillet 1961, Bahreïn a purementet simplementoubliépendant uncertain

nombred'années ses revendications sur Zubarahet ne cite aucunautre documentaprèscettedate

indiquant que le différend relatifà Zubarahfait l'objet de nouvelles discussions ou d'unnouvel

échangede correspondanceavecle Gouvernementbritannique. La seule foisoù ilen fait état c'est

dans une brochuresurBahreïn qu'ila faitdistribueren 1966,lors d'une sessionde la conférence

générale de l'Unesco,brochure dans laquelleil indique que larégion deZubarah fait partie de

1'EtatdeBahreïnetcontrelaquelle,commeBahreïnle signalelui-mêmeQ , atara dûmentprotesté22.

18. Mon collègue, M. Salmon, vous parleradans un exposéultérieurde certaines des

négociationsqui se sont dérouléeesntre les souverainsde Qatar et de Bahreïn en 1961, 1967

et 1969 en vue de régler la question de la frontièremaritime. Bahreïn n'a jamais soulevéde

revendicationquelconque à l'égard de Zubarah au cour dse ces négociationsdont les participants

l8Mémoire deQatar,annexe111.260,ol8,p.291.

l9MémoiredeQatar,annexe 111.266,ol8,p.320-321.

20MémoiredeQatar,annexe 111.283,ol8,p.405.
21MémoiredeQatar,par.8.53 et8.54mémoirede Qatar,annexe111.287,ol.8,p.425.

l2Mémoirede Bahreïn,par335;mémoirede Bahreïn,annexe224,vol.4,p.935. ont toujours adoptépour principe que Zubarahfaisait partiedu territoirede Qatar. Il n'a pasété

nonplus questiondeZubarah lorsqueQatar etBahreïnont étudiéen 1965la propositionquitendait

àles fairerecouriràl'arbitrage pourréglerleursdifférends.

19.Commela Courle saitdéjà, il aété convenu,une foisquelaprésencebritannique à Qatar

età Bahreïneut pris fin en 1971, quele roi d'Arabiesaouditejouerait le rôle de médiateurentre

Qatar et Bahreïn pourles aider à régler leurs différends.Qatar a déjàmontréque le premier

principe du cadre de règlementpour la médiationsaoudiennene visaitque les questionsen litige

concernant«desîles, des frontièresmaritimesetdeseaux territoriales))sans qu'ily fût fait mention

de Zubarah. En outre, Bahreïn aprétenduau cours de la phase relative à la compétenceet à la

recevabilité dansla présenteaffaire que «[l]a preuve que [la questionde Zubarah] continue de

préoccuperBahreïn se trouve dansun mémorandumque Bahreïn a adressé à l'Arabiesaoudite

en 1986...»23Or,cemémorandum n'ajamais étéproduit.

20. Permettez-moi defaire état ici de quelques autres éléments de preuve qui, je pense,

situerontleprétendudifférendrelatifàZubarahdansla perspective voulue.

21. Le premier élémenetst une observationofficielle figurant dans le rapport annuel de

Bahreïnlui-même poulr'année1937-1938, donnantla version bahreïnitedes événements survenus

àZubarahenjuillet 1937,quisetrouvereproduiteintégralement dans votredossier sousla cote 65.
032

On y trouve la phrase suivante qui s'affiche maintenant à l'écran :((Zubarah,l'objet de cette

querelle, est unendroitqui neprésenteapparemmentaucunintérêtL . a ville est totalementen

ruines...»4 IIn'est pas ici non plus questiond'unerégion. Le rapportrelèveque les Al-Khalifah

considèrent Zubarahcomme leur foyer ancestral,se souviennentque leurs ancêtresont construit

Zubarahety sontenterrésetconclutque :

«mêmesi, au cours des dernièresannées,les cheikhs Al-Khalifahse sont rarement
rendus à Zubarah, ...ils en veulentpourtantàQatar de prétendre que Bahreïnn'apas

de droits sur Zubarah. Que l'objetde la querelle soitune questionde principe et de
sentimentfait qu'il estd'autantplus difficiledeentendre.~~'

23Conû-e-mémoidreBahreïn(compétence et recevabiéa)r,.2.11.

24RépliqueeQatar,annexe111.5,ol. 3,p. 368.
25Zbid.La Cour estimeracertainementque de tels sentimentsou ressentiments nesauraient guèreêtre le

fondementd'unerevendication de souveraineté.

22. Ensuite, lorsque Bahrein,en 1938, engage des négociationsavec les deux sociétés

pétrolièreesn vuedel'octroid'une concession sur sonsecteurnonattribuéquiporterait doncsur le

reste de Bahreïn tel queje l'ai décritdans mon exposéprécédenti,l n'est jamais question de

Zubarah. En réalitél,orsque Belgraveadresse, le 8 juin 1938, unelettre à l'agent politique(à

présentsoumiseàla Courdans lesdocuments supplémentaires de ahr rein)^a^ec, en annexe,une

carte indiquant lestemtoires du souverain, la Cour relèveraque la carte en question englobe

manifestementles îles Hawar maispasZubarah.

23. Dans mon exposéprécédenj t,'ai déjàparléà la Cour de l'article de Belgrave publié

en 1928dansleJournalofthe CentralAsianSocietyqui décritla superficiede Bahrein.Cet article

ne fait pas mention de Zubarah (ni, commeje l'ai souligné, des îlesHawar).Nous disposons à

présentdes notes consignées aufil de nombreusesannées danslejournal personnelde Belgrave,

qui prouvent clairementque la question de Zubarahn'étaitrien d'autre qu'une idéefixe du

souverain lui-même à laquelleni sa familleni la populationde Bahreïnne croyaientréellement. a

Cour me pardonnera delire quelques brefsextraitsde ces notes.Sije le fais, c'est parcequeje les

considèrecomme révélatrices de la portée véritad buleprétendudifférend concernantZubarah.

C'estainsi que, le1"mai 1954,Belgravenote ce qui suit :

«Me suisrendu à JufairavecSonExcellenceet, de9 h 30 à 13h 30,avonsparlé
essentiellement de Zubarah ... Il ne s'est pasmontré aussi déraisonnable que
d'habitude mais a affmé avec insistance qu'ilparlait au nom de sa famille et du
peuple de Bahreïn, alors qu'aucund'eux ne s'en soucie, étanttous lassésde la

querelle avec Qataret de~ubarah.)?'

24. Une autre note de cejournal, à la date du 21 février1957,soit trois ans plus tard, dit

ceci :

«ShAbdullahest venuet nousavons discutédel'attitudede SonExcellenceau
sujet de Zubarahqui, tous en conviennent, estdéraisonnableI.l sembleque ses fils

aientrencontré Sh Ali de Qatarau coursd'une chasse;il s'est montrtrèsamical et les
a invitésà dînerà son campement. Toutefois, SonExcellencepersiste à détester les
Qatarienset à avancer sesrevendications,qu'ilest le seuà prendre ausérieux.Nous

26DocumentssupplémentairdseBahreïn,annexe9.
27Extraitdujournalpersonnel deBelgrave,du lmmai 1954.VoirlaeeQatar,par.6.67. avonsperdudesjournées,dessemaines etdes moisà enparler - ouplutôt àécouter
SonExcellenceparler à cesujet.»28

25. Enfin, voici l'observatioqueBelgraveformule à l'intentionde M. AlBaharnalors d'un

entretien- etje citeànouveau, envouspriantdem'excuser :

«Pour le monde extérieur, is l'agissait d'uneaffaire sans importance ...mais
pour les cheikhs de Bahrein, elle mettait en jeu leurdignité, leurprestige et leur
honneur, et c'estce qui compliquait tellement la conclusiod n'un accord,quel qu'il
fût.»29

Permettez-moi, Monsieurle président, defaire encore une citation et cette fois, c'est

M. Al Baharna quiparleetdit ceci

((L'explication ci-dessus montre que la question de Zubarah,dans son état
actuel, n'entre dans aucune catégoriejuridique. Il ne s'agit pas, en réalité,'une
revendicationterritoriale;il s'agit d'unerevendicationdejuridiction surles sujetsd'un

Etatqui setrouventdansun autre

Monsieur leprésident,Madame et Messieursles Membresde la Cour, ces observations,

quandnous les lisonsavec lejugement que Bahreïnporte officiellementdans son rapport annuel

sur l'incidentde 1937queje viens d'évoquee rt avec ce que disaitle princehéritieren 1920, tout

cela démontresimplement,sans le moindre doutepossible, que la question deZubarah n'estpas

une questionlitigieuseopposantsérieusemenltesParties.

Monsieur leprésident,nous sommes à la fin des conclusions queformule Qatar dansce

premier tour en ce qui concerne les questions territoriales. Permettez-mo die vous exprimerma

vive gratitude pour l'attention que vous m'avez accordéeet de vous prier respectueusement

d'invitermon éminentcollègue, M. Quéneudecà , commencerd'exposernos conclusions relatives

à ladélimitationmaritime.Jevousremercie.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you. ProfessorQuéneudec,would you preferto begin your

presentationnow - or forthe Courtto adjournat this point - and for your presentationto break

off after 15minutes?

28ExtraitdujournalpersonneldeBelgrave,du21fév1957.Voir la répldeeQatar, par6..67.

29Mémoird eeQatarannexe111.297,ol.8,p.491.
30Zbid. Mr. QUENEUDEC: 1aminyourhands.

The PRESIDENT: Verywell. We shallhearyou for a quarterof an hourand then adjoum.

Mr. QUENEUDEC: Mr.President, Members ofthe Court, it is an honourand a pleasure to

appearbefore the Court again. Nowwe moveto a differentsetting.

1. My presentation will set forth the essential elements of the State of Qatar's case on

maritimedelimitationin its disputewiththe State of Bahrain.

In doing so,it willidentie the factual and legal aspectswith regard to whichthe Parties are

in fundamental disagreement on this subject. The specific question of the course of the line of

delimitationwill bedealtwith in a subsequentpresentation.

During this presentation andthe one that follows,various illustrationswill be shown on the

screen, taken for the most part from maps submitted with the written pleadings. Since these

pleadings are in English,on mostofthe illustrationswe have retainedthe titlesandindicationsthat

appear on them in English,but someillustrations (toofew,unfortunately)havebeengiven a title in

French. We hopethat the Courtwill understand that itis for purely technical reasonsthat this has

been done, howeverannoyingitmaybe forFrench speakers.

2. Mr. President, while the temtorial questions dividing Qatar and Bahrain are rooted

principally- but notexclusively- in the history of thetwo countries,in the caseof the question

of the maritime delimitationthe issueis aboveal1dominatedby geographicalfactors.

Any process of maritime delimitation is of course subordinated to a consideration of the

geographical setting of the area in which the delimitationis totake place. And this geographical

setting is determinedfirst and foremostby the characteristics of therespectivecoasts of the States

involved, since it is the coasts of the two States concemed that determine the geographical

frameworkof the delimitation.

Thus, when the maritime delimitation line claimedby one of the States appears fiom the

outsetto be extraordinaryor unreasonable,this is aboveal1in relationto the coastalgeography.835, This is precisely the situation with Bahrain'sclaim in the present case. This claimis

manifestlyextravagantin that, in contrastto theline claimedby Qatar, itignoresthetrue coastsof

the two States(illustration1).

3. As may be seen fiom a simple glanceat the map, thedisagreementbetween Qatarand

Bahrain conceming the maritime delimitationis patently clear. Their completedisagreementon

thispointfindsexpressionin thepresentationoftwodelimitationlineswhich areradicallydifferent

and which represent twofundamentallycontrastingperceptionsofthe geographyinquestion.

In accordancewith Article 60 of the Rulesof Court, 1will limit myself to addressingonly

what is sûictly necessary for a proper presentationof the position ofthe State of Qatar,with a

particular emphasison thosepoints on which Qatardisagreeswiththe otherParty's arguments on

the maritimedelimitation.

4. Sixpointsof disagreement maybe identifiedin thisrespect, it being understood, owever,

that the maritime delimitation mayalso be influenced by the Court'sdecisions concemingthe

HawarIslandsand Zubarah.

Thesesixpointsofdisagreementare the following:

- First of all, there is clear disagreementbetween the Parties conceming the appropriate

delimitationprocess;

- Second,andaboveall,there isa fundamentaldifferencewithregardto the determinationofthe

relevantcoastsforpurposesofthedelimitation;

- In addition,of course,there is the dispute concerning thestatusand ownershipof the low-tide

elevationsofFasht Dibaland Qit'atJaradah;

- Additionally,there iscomplete disagreementwith regardto sovereigntyoverJananIsland;

- Furthermore, there are totally opposing views as to whether it is appropriate to take into

accountvariousphysicalanomaliesin the maritime areain question,which Bahrain describes

as "maritimefeatures"andasbeinginal1casesunder its sovereignty;

- Finally,thereis aparticularaspectof thedispute,conceming the question ofarchipelagic status

raisedby Bahrain.

5. Forpurposesof convenience andclarityof presentation,1will groupthesedifferentpoints

in the followingmanner: - First, we shall examine the perception of delimitation, towhich the first two points of

disagreementindisputablyrelate;

- Second, we shall deal with the specific problems conceming, on the one hand, the low-tide

elevationsofFasht Dibal and Qit'atJaradah,and onthe other, JananIsland;

- Third, and finally,we shall seekto demonstrate the irrelevantcharacter of certainpretensions

put forwardby Bahrain in its claim, relating bothto a whole group of "maritimefeatures" and

to its allegedinherentcharacteras an archipelago.

Before addressing these three points in tum, 1would like tomention that the discussion of

therelevanceor irrelevanceof variousother circumstanceswill be treated in a separatepresentation

by ProfessorSalmon.

First,therefore,the perceptionof delimitation.

1.THE PERCEPTIONOFDELIMITATION

6. The Partiesto this disputeperceive delimitationdifferently,not only in their approach to

theprocess itself,but also in their reference to thecoaststhey considerrelevant.

1. Theapproachtodelimitation

7. With regard to the approachto delimitationthat is to result in the drawing of a single

maritime line, a clear distinction must be made betweenappearances and realit- a distinction

necessaq in both the application of the rules of law and the understanding of the geographical

settingof the maritimearea concemed.

(a) Thedisagreementonthe applicationof therules of delimitation

8. First, behind what might appear tobe an agreementof the Parties on the applicable law,

there lies deep disagreement conceming the implementation in this case of the rules goveming

maritime delimitationbetween States.

037 It is evident fiom the written pleadings submitted by Bahrain that it intends to have the

principlesand rulesof maritime delimitation appliedin a mannerwhich is so peculiarthat it cannot

be accepted. 9. This is the case, in particular, with the implementation of the principle of

non-encroachrnent[((non-empiétement))w ],hereby amaritimedelimitationline must not have the

effectof cutting off the maritime projection of one ofthe Statesinuch a way as to deprivethat

Stateof its rights in a maritime arealocated imrnediatelyoff itsasts. And the line claimedby

Bahrainproducesjust sucha cut-offeffect[((effetd'amputation)~].

10. The sarne is tme with regard to the principleprohibiting thewholesale refashioningof

geography, with whichBahrainseemsto wantto takecertain liberties.Bahraininventsforitselfan

artificial coast whose projection ispractically limitless,in sofar as no account isto be taken in

practiceof the westernfrontof the Qatari peninsula. Accordingto Bahrain,theWestcoastof Qatar

is, so to speak, of no use; this, it must be admitted, is a strangeway not only of refashioning

geography,but alsoofrewritinga rather unusual version of"WestSideStory".

11. Moreover, one maybe surprised atthe role,or ratherthe absence of any role,playedby

the concept of proportionalityin the writtenpleadings of the otherParty, despite the factthat an

evidentdisproportionbetween coastallengthsand theextentofmaritimejurisdictionsis,according

to well-establishedjurisprudence,a factor requiredto be taken into account when weighingthe

reasonablenessof a delimitation.

Qatar has already had occasion to draw the Court's attention to this point in its

Counter-Memorial and Reply (Counter-Memorial of Qatar, para. 8.16; Reply of Qatar,

paras. 9.5-9.10).Itisthereforeunnecessaryto dwellon thispointhere.

@) Thedisagreementas to thedivisionof the delimitationarea

12. Second, whileboth Parties have adopted an apparently identicalapproachto the actual

delimitation,byidentifying two distinctsectorswithin thedelimitationarea, it mustbe recognized

thatthe division ofthis are- undertakenby each ofthem - ismadeon the basisoftwodifferent

viewsof the geography.
038
13. It istruethat the dividinglinebetweenthe two sectorscan only be a purelyimaginary

line, since its sole purpose is to distinguish between areas with different geographical

characteristics.Takinginto accountthe reasonwhy such a line is established,however,it cannot be drawn in a purely artificialmanner,but must,on the contrary,take into considerationthe true

geographicalsettingand must,inparticular, reflect the coastal geography.

The dividingline adoptedby Qatar has been drawn in this manner, taking account of this

requirement, in order to clearly distinguishbetween the southem sector bordered by opposite

coasts, and thenorthem sectorwhere, strictly speaking, the maritimearea is no longer located

betweenthe coasts ofthe two States(illustration2).

14.The samecannot besaidof the dividing line that Bahrainhas tried toestablishbetweena

point located offthe northem tip of the Qatar peninsula anan unspecifiedpoint on the low-tide

elevation ofFashtDibal(illustration3).

While thishas never been clearly statedby the other Party,by al1indicationsthis dividing

line nuis betweena point on the low-water lineon the north of Ras Rakan and the northemmost

pointof Fasht Dibal.

Thetotallyartificialcharacterofthe dividinglinethusdrawnby Bahrainisblatant. Thishas

been amply demonstratedin Qatar'swrittenpleadings (Counter-Memorialof Qatar,paras.6.71et

seq.). It isthereforeunnecessaryto develop this point.

Let us simplypoint outthatthe apparently identicalapproachadoptedby the two Stateson

this subjectis materializedin factby a quitereal divergence. And it is nothing if not puzzlingto

readwhatBahrainsays onthepointin its Counter-Memorial:given thatthe dividinglineproposed

by each of the two States is situated at a latitude of 10'to 26O20'N, "the Parties'respective

divisionsbetweenthe two sectorsdonot divergegreatly"[((ilnlya pas de grandedzflérence entre

lesdivisionsopérées respectivemep ntr les Pariesentrelesdeuxsecteurs))](Counter-Memorialof

Bahrain,para.462). It is not surprising,Mr.President, thatlinguists sometimesmake adistinction

between«litotes»and "understatement"!

Ifyouwish,Mr.President,wemightbreakatthispoint.

8 3 9
ThePRESIDENT: Thankyou. TheCourt willadjoumfora quarterof an hour.

TheCourtadjournedfrom 4.30p.m. to 4.50 p.m. The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is resumed and1 give the floor to

ProfessorQuéneudec.

Mr. QUENEUDEC: Thankyou, Mr.President. Mr.President, Members of the Court, 1

dealt earlier with the difference between the two States in their approachto the delimitation

process, given theirdisagreementboth onthe application of therules of delimitationand on the

division of the delimitationrea. 1 now come to the principal pointof disagreement: the

identificationoftherelevant coasts.

2. The identification oftherelevantcoasts

15.The principalpointof disagreement, however,concemstheidentifkationoftherelevant

coasts,in other words, the determinationof the coasts that have to be taken into account for

purposes of the delimitationin each of the two sectors. First there mustbe an understanding of

what the words mean- what is meant by the word "coast". Some clarification wouldseem

necessaryatthispoint.

In this regard,it may belpfblto begin by recallingthe obvious,as Bahrain'sattitudeis a

perfect illustrationof PaulValéry'sadage: "The obviousiserallywhat disappears fromview

first". The obvious,let us remind ourselves,can be expressed like this: in orderto be considered

relevant, a "coastmustrstbe a coast"[((unecôte doit d'abordefectivementunecôte))].

(a) Thenotio nfa coast

16. As an essential element inany delimitationprocess,thecoast is the general designation

for the zone of contact between the sea and the land. Asuch, the word "coast",taken in a

geographicalsense, can be consideredas synonyrnous with "shore"[((rivage))]or "littoral", the

latter includingboth "the foreshore"[((l'estran))]and "the backshore"[((l'arrière-côte))].It is also

said that the coast marks the separation between the land temtory and the maritime zones

belongingto a coastal State.
O40
17. In moreprecise terms,when internationallawmakesuse of the notionof the coast(the

word in itself havingno particularlegalmeaning),it is referring rather to thehydrographicnotion

of "coastline"((trait de côte))]; in other words, the coast is reduced to a line representing thenot exceeding thebreadth ofthe temtorial sea,this clearlymeansthat thelow-tideelevationcanbe

heldto representthe coastofthatparticularState.

Whereasthis assertion is strictlyaccuratewith regard tothe determinationby a Stateof the

outer limits of its different national maritime zones(temtorial sea, contiguouszone, exclusive

economic zone, continental shelf), it is not necessarily correct with regard to a maritime

delimitationbetween States,and in particular with regardto a delimitationbetween States canied

outby a courtor internationaltribunal,asQatar has already shown.

Inthisrespect,we would respectfully request the Courtto refer inparticularto the discussion

of the distinctionmade by thejurisprudencebetweenbaselinesfor a territorialsea and basepoints

for a delimitationline, a discussion whichis to be found in Qatar'sCounter-Memorialand Reply

(Counter-Memorialof Qatar,paras.7.33-7.38; ReplyofQatar,paras.8.7-8.13).

With this in mind, the identificationof the coasts of the two States for purposes of the

delimitationthen appears relatively simple,in both the southemsector and the northem sectorof

the areatobe delimited.

[Illustration41

@) Thecoasts in the southern sector

20. With regard to the southem sector, a carefullookat the map of the area will sufficeto

showus thatthe portion of thewesterncoast of Qatar thatisrelevantin thepresentcase isthe coast

located directly oppositeBahrain,extendingapproximately betweenRas altUwaynatin thesouth

andRasRakaninthe north.

With regardto the Bahrainicoastthatmustbe takenintoaccount,thisis obviouslythecoast

located opposite Qatar's coastc,omprisingtheeastemcoastal frontof the islandsof Bahrain,Sibah

and Muharraq,in other words, encompassing the coast ruming between Ras alBarr in the south

and the northemtipof JaziratalMuharraq.

It is also obvious fromthe map that the relevant coastof Qatar is substantiallylongerthan

the relevant coastof Bahrain, the ratiobetweenthe lengths ofthe two coastsbeing 1:1.59infavour

of Qatar,as previouslystated. It is also obvious that in this southem sector of the delimitation area, the general

geographicalconfiguration is that of a maritimespace lying between opposite coasts, an area

which, sincetheextensionofthe temtorial seasof thetwo Statesto 12nautical miles, isa maritime

space consisting almost entirely of overlappingtemtorial waters, except in a small triangular

portionnorthofQit'atJaradah.

[Illustration51

21. It cannot thereforebe accepted that theBahraini coast which is to be taken into

considerationin the southem sector is representedby a series of artificial lines linkingvarious

low-tide elevations.This is,nonetheless,whatBahrain hasnothesitated to do.

[Illustration61

As one can see on this map,which is map 14 from Bahrain'sMemorial, the other Party

considersthatthe Bahrainicoast which facesthe coast of Qataris constitutedby a line (whichwe

have addedtothismap) linkingFashtBuThurin the southto FashtDibal in the north,andpassing

throughseveralpoints located on Qita'a elrge,Qit'atash Shajarahand Qit'atJaradah.

This illustration,whichBahrain presentsas its relevant coast, hasobviously nothingto do

with thetrue coastalfront ofBahrainas depictedby the coastlineappearingon al1the maps. This

in fact is a totally artificial "line"and as such cannot be taken into consideration. Indeed,the

constructionmadeby Bahrain of this alleged"coastline"suffersfromseveralshortcomings.

Not onlyis it basedexclusivelyon low-tideelevationsthat are clearly detachedfrom theue

Bahraini coast (which in itselfalready invalidatesit) but it alsoharbours a fundamental defect

0 4 3 because it uses low-tide elevations which, purely owingto their location, will be under Qatar's

sovereignty,as will be seen later. What ismore, it creates some confusion,to which Qatarhas

alreadydrawnthe Court'sattention (Counter-Memorialof Qatar, para 6..83): the shoalofQit'atash

Shajarahis heredepicted asphysicallyattachedto the shoalof Fasht alAni, whereasthe official

Bahraininauticalcharts, inparticularcharts5001 and 5005, demonstratquite clearlythattheseare

two distinct shoals separatedby an expanseof sea(on thispoint, it will suffice simplyto referto

mapsNos. 99and 100oftheMapAtlasannexedto the Replyof Qatar). 22. But this is not all, for Bahrain has asserted that the shoao lf Fasht alAzm itself

constitutesanintegralpart of Sitrah Island andthat its eastemedgeshouldthereforebe considered

as anextensionoftheBahrainicoastoppositethe Qataricoastin thissector. Accordingto Bahrain,

Qatar venturedintofanciful conjectureby alleging that Fashtal Am was naturallyseparatefiom
-'
Sitrah,priorto thetime whenBahrainundertook reclamation worki sn 1982for the constructionof

a petrochemicalplant. According to Bahrain,no naturalseparation existed between Fasha tlAni

and SitrahIslandbefore 1982and, therefore,againaccordingto Bahrain,the workscarriedout at

that time did not lead - in contrastto what Qatar alleges- to thecreation of an artificiallink

betweenthe islandof Sitrahand theshoalofFashtalAm (ReplyofBahrain,paras. 309-315).

Unfortunatelyfor Bahrain'sthesis,this statement has nothingtodowith reality.

23. As is indisputablydemonstratedby thereport preparedby ProfessorThomasRabenhorst

of the Universityof Maryland, submittedby Qatar to the Court last March, a natural channel

separating Fashtal Azm fiom Sitrah Island existed prior to the workscanied out by Bahrain in

1982, and itwas these works that resultedin the creation ofan artificiallink betweenSitrah and

Fasht alAzm.

24. To arrive atthis conclusion,the expertconsultedby Qatarbased his studyin particular

on the examinationof a large-scalemap published in 1977by a British fm on behalf of the

Govemment ofBahrainand to be foundintheUnitedStatesLibraryofCongress.

[Illustration71

On the enlargementof thatmapit canbe seenbeyond any doubtthat in 1977,Le.,before the

works undertakenby Bahrain, Fasht al Am was not naturallyattachedto the island of Sitrah.

Quite to the contrary, Fasht al Azm was separated fiom Sitrah by a passage having al1 the

charactenstics of a natural channel permanentlyaccessible to small boats, presumably fishing

boats, atal1Statesof the tide. Thiswas a navigable channel,as is evidentfiom the leading marks

or othermarkerson its banks thatarevisibleon this furtherenlargementof the relevantportionof

themap. [Illustratio81

It is, to Saythe least,curious that thisinformationwas not used by Commander Carletonin

the expert report which he prepared atthe request of the other Party andwhich is annexed to

Bahrain's Reply(Reply of Bahrain, Ann.14). The reason is doubtless that CommanderCarleton

maynot havebeeninformedbythe GovernmentofBahrainof the existenceof the mapithad itself

commissionedin 1977.

25. Whateverthe reason,when compared to thefirst editionof 1977,the second edition of

this same map, published in 1987, shows clearlythat the works carriedout by Bahrainin 1982

resultedin the artificialattachmentof FasAzml to the islandofSitrahby thepartial filling-in of

thepre-existingnatural channel.

(Illustration9.) This is probablywhat drovethe Bahraini authoritiesto dredgean artificial

replacement channelfurthereaston Fasht alAm. Othemise, if a natural channelhad notexisted

previously,whywould it have beennecessaryto dredgean artificial channel preciselyat the time

embankmentandreclamationworkswerebeingcanied out in thislocation?

26. By al1indications, therefore, theattachmentof Fasht alAzrnto Sitrah Islandis purely

artificial. Underthese circumstances,sinceFasht alAzmis not naturallylinkedto Sitrah Island, it

cannot be regarded as forming anintegral part of that island. In contrast to what Bahrain has

alleged,FashtalAzm is by no means an extension ofthe coast of Sitrah Island. Furthermore,in

thepast, FashtalAzmwasneverconsideredas partofthe Bahrainicoast,eitherwhen the1947line

was established or when a line was drawn in 1948 which was to become known as the

Boggs-Kennedyline fiom the names of its twoauthors, one of whom was at the time the State

O 4 5 DepartmentGeographer andthe other an officerof the Royal Navy attachedto the Hydrographie

Officeof the BritishAdrniralty. Thesetwo personssketched out thevariousdelimitationlinesthat

itwas appropriateto draw inthe Gulf.

There is thereforenoreasonwhatsoeverto take Fasht alAzmintoaccountwhen attempting

to identiQ the relevant coast ofBahrain in the southem sector. The relevant coastremainsthe

coastline constituted by the eastem facades of the islands of Bahrain, Sitrah and Muharraq,

respectively. (c) Thecoasts in thenorthernsector

27. Letus nowtum tothe identification ofthe relevantcoasts inthenorthemsector, in other

words, in the region located north of an imaginary line drawn between the northem tips of

MuharraqIsland (pointMQ) and the northem tip of the Qatar peninsula (pointRK)

(illustration10). We see irnmediatelythat thearea to be delimited is nolonger confined within a

comparativelynarrowstretchofsea,as inthe southemsector,but extendsseawardsfromthe coasts

ofthe two Statestowardsthe centre of theArabianlPersianGulf.

In other words, theareato be delimitedin the northemsector is located"off, rather than

between, the coasts of thetwocountries",to borrowthe wordsused by theAnglo-FrenchCourt of

Arbitration in itsAward of30 June 1977(para. 233).

28. In addition,in this sector,the coastsof the two States abuttingthe maritimearea to be

delimited are extremelyshort (illustration11).

Indeed,on the Qatari side,only a small portionof the coast,betweenRas Abu Amranand

point RK, actually faces the maritime areain question. On the Bahraini side, an even smaller

segmentofthe coastlineofMuharraqIslandis involved.

The geographical settinghere is a situation wheretwo small portionsof coast bear alateral

relationshipto each other- but without being adjacent or bordering coast- and abut the sarne

maritime area, anarea whichextendsbeyondthose coastsas far as the line in the middle of the

Gulf determinedby the Parties'agreementswith Iran. Theresultingconfigurationis thus not, as

Bahrainmaintains, a configuration of adjacentcoasts(ReplyofBahrain,para. 388).

29. The highly artificial natureof Bahrain'sclaim tokethe dividingline betweenthetwo

sectorsthe relevant coastinthenorthemsectoris irnmediatelyapparent. Bahrain has not hesitated

to Saythat: "In the presentcase,the relevantcoast in the northernsectoris the dimension created

by the sectoral line" (Replyof Bahrain,para.388). Yetforthis to be so, the dividinglinebetween

the two sectors must be taken to representthe coastlinesin the southem sector,on condition,

however, that that dividinglineisbasedonthe real coasts.

This was what was done,for example,by the ArbitralTribunal for thedelimitation ofthe

maritime areasbetweenCanadaand Francein 1992. It drewa straightlineacrossthe CabotStraitat the mouth of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Then, it stated that "the closingline across the Cabot

Straitrepresent[ed]coastlinesinsidetheGulf' (Decision of10June 1992,para.29).

However, Bahrainhas criticized Qatarfor takinginto accountal1the relevantcoastsof both

States, includingthose in the southern sector,in orderto veriv whetherthe lineof delimitationis

equitable,in particularin the northernsector. According to Bahrain,the samecoast shouldnotbe

used twice when the delimitationarea is divided into two separatesectors. Bahrain Statesin its

Reply: "whenonesectoralizes,onedoesnot 'double-count"('Replyof Bahrain,para. 388).

1 must admitthat it is difficult tograspBahrain's"logic"in this regard,since Bahrainitself

claims that the dividing linebetweenthe two sectors - its own, artificiallin- representsthe

relevantcoastin thenorthernsector. Moreover,it doesso,we reiterate,byrelyingupon a dividing

linethat iswhollyartificialand clearly arbitrary.

Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, 1now come to the specific issues of the low-tide

elevationsofFashtDibal and Qit'atJaradahandthe island of Janan,whichmakeup the second part

of my statement.

II. The specificissuesofthelow-tideelevationsof FashtDibalandQit'atJaradah
andthe island ofJanan

30. Althoughthese are distinct issues,each with its own specificitywithinthe collectionof

disputesof whichthe Courtis seised,thesetwo issues neverthelesshave onefeaturein comrnon:in

both cases, the ownershipof the low-tideelevations or the islandis at issue. Indeed, Qatarhas

requestedtheCourtto declarethatDibalandJaradahareunderits sovereigntyandthat Bahrain has

noterritorialsovereignty overthe islandof Janan.

1. FashtDibalandQit'atJaradah

31. There is no cornrnongroundbetweenthe Parties withregard to FashtDibal and Qit'at

Jaradah. Thedisputeconcems thelegalcharacterizationof Qit'atJaradahandtheownershipof the

twoshoals.

(a) Thelegalcharacterizationof Qit'atJaradah

32. The status of Fasht Dibal is not problematic with respect to its characterization,as

Bahrainis in agreementwithQatarthatit qualifiesasa low-tideelevation. 33.Thepositionadoptedby Bahrainconcerningthestatusof Qit'atJaradahappearedinitially

hesitant. AsSir IanSinclairpointed outin his firstoralstatement,MapNo. 2 annexed toBahrain's

Memorial tendedto show thatBahrain hadagreed to considerQit'atJaradaha low-tide elevation,

just like Fasht Dibal. Then, having incidentallyyet expressly admittedin its Counter-Memorial

that it was a low-tideelevation(Counter-MemorialofBahrain, para.468),Bahrain attemptedin its

last writtenpleading toshowthat Qit'atJaradahwas atme island andthat Qatar'scontentiontothe

contrary had been contradicted by recent observationsand surveys. In particular, Bahrain

submitteda very brief report by Professor Alexander who,on the basis of six site visits between

April and November1998, concludedthat Jaradah was anisland withinthe definitiongivenby

Article 121oftheUnited NationsConvention ontheLawof the Sea.

Qatar has had this report examined bytwo expertswho concluded thatthe results of the

observationsand conclusionsofProfessorAlexandermaynot havebeenentirelyreliable,owingto

variousapproximationsfound inhisreport. The expertsconsultedby Qatarcouldnot be certainof

the exactnature of Qit'atJaradah. Prefemngto referto it as a "sandfeature"or "sandbar"[((banc

4 de sableo], they considered that the surveys conducted in 1998 did not provide a basis for a

definitive determination whetherit is an islet [((ilôt))] or a low-tide elevation[((haut-fond

découvrant))].Likewise,they deemedit problematicalto make any definitepredictionorprognosis

concerningthenaturalevolutionofthis"sandbar"inthefuture. Allowme to referyou to thereport

by ProfessorsMurphyandPrescottthatQatar submittedto theCourton 1March.

34. Faced withthe conflicting viewsof experts,is the Courtin a position tocorneto sound

conclusions concerning thecharacterization ofQit'atJaradah? Or should the Court sustainthe

position it adopted in 1985 in the Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta)case when a difference of

opinionhad ansen between eminentgeology experts:

"The Courtis unableto acceptthe positionthat in orderto decidethis case, it
must firstmakea determinationupon a disagreementbetweenscientistsof distinction
as to the more plausibly correct interpretation ofapparently incomplete scientific
data."(I.C.J.Reports 1985,p. 36,para. 41.)

If unable to make a choice between scientific explanationsthat might not appear necessarily

conclusive, can the Court not simplyrely on elementaryconsiderationsof comrnon sense? As

foreseen by Jeremy Bentham in his "Treatise on Judicial Evidence",is not a judge's ultimatebenchmarkcommonsenseand ordinaryusageandreasoning? Moreoveri ,s this not whatthe Court

alreadydoeswithregardto interpretation when it gives words theo irrdinarymeaning,as provided

forinthe ViennaConventionontheLaw ofTreaties?

With thisin mind, 1believe itis possibleto formulatethreeobservationswhichat leasthave

the advantageof simplicity.

35. Firstof all,t maybe notedthat in essencethe currentdebateconcemingJaradah's status

as an islet or as nothing morethan a low-tideelevation merely perpetuates the hesitancyof the

British authoritiesuringtheir timeof authorityinthe Gulf. It willbe recalledthat when thenow

familiar 1947linewas drawn,and in subsequentyears,the Admiralty,the ForeignOfficeandthe

British Residentin the Gulfexpresseddifferentviewson this question,at differentpoints in time,

as evidenced by several of the documents produced as annexes to Qatar's Memorial and

Counter-Memorial, tosuch an extentthat it maywellbe asked whetherthe debate andhesitancy

arenot simplya reflection ofthe changes andvariationsthat Jaradahmay haveundergone,andis

doubtless still undergoing,with regardto its physicalcharacteristics,its height, extent, shapeor

orientation,underthe effectsof winds,currentsandtides. Thiswouldexplainwhyit is impossible

to settledefinitivelythe questionas to whetheraradahis permanentlyabovewaterat high-tide,or

whetherit has beenpermanently abovewater duringcertain periods only. (See also Memorial of

Qatar, App. 5,Vol. 15,pp. 135-141.)

36. This questionis associated,in certainrespects, withthe second observation1would like

to make, whichconcemsthe sixphotographsfoundinthe reportby Professor Alexander submitted

by Bahrain(ReplyofBahrain,Vol. 2,Ann.13(a)).

Examiningthese photographs,which weare told were taken.athigh-tide,duringthe spring

tides of April, June,August, September,OctoberandNovember 1998,one can see what seems to

be nothing more than a sandbankbarely protrudingabove the water. This bank is fairly small

(scarcelya fewsquaremetres)and its size, while always small, seems to vary quite considerably

fiom one photographto another,withoutany indicationas to whetherthese variationsresult from

differences in the coefficients of the tides for the dates indicated, or fiom the fact that the

photographswerenot al1systematicallytakenatthesamestageof the tide(finalphase of theflood,

slackof high-tide,or beginningofthe ebb). In threeofthesephotographs,individualsarestandingonthe sandbankand,inat leasttwoof

them, they appearto have theirfeetin the water. Itis quitelikely that rescue boatswerestanding

by, ready tospringinto actionwhenthese photos weretaken. At least,1hope so. Thissuggests

that thesandbank is onlyreallyexposed anddryat lowtide.

This givesthe impressionthat such a protuberancecannotbe characterizedas an island,or

O 5 0 even as anislet, but is closer to what are called,in legal terms, low-tide elevations, whichare

distinguishedfromtrue islandsonnautical charts.

37. This interpretation, apparently one ofcornrnon sense, is reinforced by our third

observation, after scrutiny of the most recent British Admiraltycharts. It is generally

acknowledgedthat Britishnautical chartsof thisregionof the Gulf arethe mostdependableones.

TheseAdmiraltycharts indicatethatQit'atJaradahis a simple low-tideelevation,depictedon the

chart in thesame manner as theneighbouring shoalof Fasht Dibal or the shoalsborderingthe

northem part of the Qat& peninsula(see in particular, British AdmiraltChart No.3790). The

intrinsicvalueof the informationfuniishedby a nauticalchartundeniablyconfirms thecomrnon

senseinterpretation.

38. Suchan interpretation remains unaffectedy an examination ofthe26 otherphotographs

Bahrain has annexedto its Reply (Reply of Bahrain,Vol.2, Am. 25). As is obvious fromthe

15thphotograph,they were takenfrom a helicopteron 7 May 1999, atan unspecified time; but

there is everyreason to believe that itwas at low-tide. By themselves,these photographsprove

nothingwithregardto the exact nature andstatusof Qit'atJaradah. Morespecifically, theyprove

only onething: the abilityof theBahrainiauthoritiesto organize agatheringin this locationoa

smallarmada ofsailingcraftandpleasure boats,oneFriday,at low-tide,in an attempt torescue its

falteringcase.

We do not doubt for one instantthat the Court has îully appreciathe Bahrainiallegation

that thesephotographs showthatthe sandbank,Qit'atJaradah,is traditionally usedby Bahrainisas

a "weekend retreatforrecreationalpurposes"[cc[d[eshabitantsde Bahreïnavaient. ..coutume. ..

de venir se détendre lesweek-ends à Qit'at Jaradah))] (Reply of Bahrain,para.336). It is

obviouslynotDisneyland,but judgingby the photographs, neitheris it the idealplace for a retreat,

even ifforonlya fewmoments,atlowwater. 39. On a more serious note, taking a common sense view, it would appear obvious that,

despite Bahrain'sefforts to demonstratethe contrary, Qit'atJaradah is nothing morethan a natural

.O 5 1 protrusion that is exposed at low-tide and practically coveredat high-tide. This has alreadybeen

demonstratedby, forexample,a satellite photograph that showed Qit'atJaradah,like Fasht Dibal,

as entirely covered by water when the photograph was takenon 30 December 1984(see Reply of

Qatar,Ann. IV.31,Vol. 4, p. 187). This wasalso revealedby Bahrain'sattempt, in1985,tomodify

the structureand foundationsofhese low-tideelevationsin order to transformthem into artificial

islands. This attempt is surely the best conceivable confirmationthat Qit'atJaradah is a low-tide

elevation. It might therefore seemstrange,and, in point of fact abnormal,to useQit'atJaradahfor

any reason whatsoeverin a maritime delimitationprocess.

@) Theownershipofthetwoshoals
40. Let us now consider the other aspect of the issue of Qit'at Jaradah and Fasht Dibal:

whether the rightto claimthesetwo shoalsfallsto Qatarorto Bahrain.

It wouldappearthatthe Court hasbeenamply informedof the opposingviews of the Parties

on this point. Therefore,we needonlypresent afew elementsinder furtherto clarifythe debate.

41. Let us begin by recalling that disputes between States relating to a right or title to

low-tideelevationsare not commonplacein internationallegalproceedings. It appears,in fact,that

thisis the firstcasein whichsuchan issuehasbeen directlyraised.

Bahrain believes however that it has found a precedent in the recent arbitration between

Eritrea and Yemen,and more specificallyin the Award of theArbitral Tribunalof 9 October1998

in the first stage ofthe proceedings(Reply of Bahrain, para.353). In the first stage, the Tribunal

ruled upon the questionas towhich of the two Stateshad sovereigntyoversomeislandsandgroups

of islands located between theirrespectivets. Thesegroupsof islandscompnsednot onlytrue

island formationsbut also, apparently, some low-tide elevations asswiththem. The Award

States,therefore, that the islands, islets, rocks and low-tide elevations forminga particular group

corne under the temtorial sovereignty of one State or the other (Award, para.527), without

* identifyingsuch low-tide elevationsotherthanby their appurtenanceto a gmupof islands; in other

words, withoutdesignatingthem byname. In that arbitrationthe affirmation of sovereignty therefeid not directlyconcern low-tide

elevations,which,in any event, neitherofthe parties claimedas such. Territorial sovereignty over

themwas declaredonlybecausethe Tribunal consideredthey formed part, a dependena cyitwere,

of a group of islands. As a result, itis difficultto transposethe solution adoptedby the Arbitral
I
Tribunal intheEritreaflemen disputeto the question ofthe ownership of twolow-tide elevations

that aredesignatedby name: FashtDibalandQit'atJaradah.

Likewise,no solution is to be found in the Court'J sudgment of 24February1982in the

ContinentalSheZf(Tunisia/Libyac )ase,which also involved agroupof islands,isletsand low-tide

elevations. Atthe time,the Courtdid nomore thanmentionthe situation ofthe Kerkennah islands

andthe low-tideelevationssurroundingthem asa materialpoint (I.C.J.Reports 1982,pp.63-64,

para.79); but the Court did notdealspecificallywiththe low-tideelevations,and was notcalled

uponto decideon theirappurtenance,which,in anyevent, wasnot contested.

42. If this issue hasnowarisenbetweenQatar andBahrain,and comesbefore the Courtfor

the first time, it is because,in layingdownthe seabedboundarybetweenQatar and Bahrain, the

letter dated 23 December 1947fiom the British authoritiesto the Rulers of the two countries

containedthe followingstatement:

"His Highnessthe ShaikhofBahrainisrecognisedashaving sovereignnghts in
(i) theareasof theDibalandJaradahshoalswhichare abovethe springtidelow-water

level. Aftera full exarninationof the positionunderinternationallaw, His Majesty's
Govemmentare of opinionthat these shoalsshould notbe consideredto be islands
havingterritorialwaters." (QatarApplication, nn.3,p. 32)

It shouldbe recalledin passing thatwhatwas presentedas an exceptionin the 1947letterwas not

immuneto criticism, owingto a glaringcontradiction:whileit expresslystatedthatthesewerenot

islandshavingtheir owntemtorial waters,and therefore recognized implicitly that they wermeere

O53 low-tideelevations,theBritishGovernmentnonetheless considered thatthesetwo shoals, although

situatedon the Qatarisideof theline dividing the seabed, generated sovereign rights attributole
4

Bahrain. Sucha position was incompatiblewith the doctrine on thecontinental shelf whichwas
.
thenbeing consolidatedandwhichwouldbe officiallyestablishedshortlyafterwards.

43. Nevertheless,on the basis of this exception, Bahrainnow claims thatFashtDibal and

Qit'atJaradah form an integral part of its territory and that they are perfectly capableof

appropriation, likeny piece of emergedland, underthe rules concerning theacquisition oflandtemtory. It is inthisspirit,andtothisend,thatBahrainreliesinparticularonvarious((eflectivités))

presented as proof of Bahrain'sexerciseof sovereignty overthese shoals. Irrespective of thefact

thatthese allegationsare not alwayssupportedby any evidenceor that they relateto conductor

events that occurredduring an irrelevantperiod, the alleged«eflectivités»put forwardby Bahrain

arequitesimplyinadmissible,astheyare not applicableinthiscase.

Indeed, Bahrain feigns to forget twothings that are nonetheless essential. First, fiom a

strictly physical, practicalpoint of view, a low-tide elevationis hardly something thatn be

appropriated,in the sense that an actualtakingof possessionis difficultto imagine. This is what

drove Bahrain, in 19851would remindyou, to attemptartificiallyto transfonn the two shoals of

Dibal and Jaradah,before being obligedto remedy the matter and to restore the status quo ante

underthe auspicesand controlofthe GulfCooperation Council.And it shouldbe addedinpassing

that the restoration work was canied out by the Dutch Companythat had undertaken the

transformationworkon Bahrain'sbehalfand notby "Qatari bulldozers",contraryto what Bahrain

hasalwayswronglyalleged (seeCounter-MemorialofQatar,paras. 6.87-6.91).

Second, and most importantly,in intemational law a low-tideelevation cannotin principle

be subject to sovereignty unlessit is located whollyor partly within the territorial watersof a

territorywhichisitself capableof appropriation.

44. In the Minquiers and Ecrehoscase, which concemed sovereignty overtwo groups of

islets each comprisingtwo or three inhabitable islets,severalsmallerislets and a largenumberof

rocks, the Court was requested in the Franco-British SpecialAgreement to "determine the

sovereigntyover theislets androcks (inso far as they are capableof appropriation)". Interpreting

this wordingintheSpecialAgreement,the Court declared,in its Judgmentof 17November1953:

"These words must be considered as relating to islets and rocks that are
physically capable of appropriation"(1C.J R.eports 1953, p. 53) (the English text
being authoritative)[((matériellementsusceptibls'appropriation))].

Echoingthe wordingof its 1953 Judgrnent,and applyingit to the small island of Meangueritain

the Gulfof Fonseca, an islandwitha surface areaofbarely26 hectares,in 1992theCharnberof the

Court seised of the case conceming Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute stated

unambiguously: "That Meangueritais 'capable ofappropriation'. .. is undoubted; it is not a

low-tide elevation..."(I.C.J.Reports1992,p. 570, para.356). Thispassage fiom theJudgmentof11 September 1992 cannot be clearer. It means that, because it is not a low-tide elevation,

Meangueritais capableof appropriation. This implies, acontrario, that if Meangueritahad been

classifiedas a low-tideelevation,itwould not havebeen declared"capableof appropriation". ,

45. In other words,accordingto the Court'sownjurisprudence, a low-tide elevation isnotin

itself"capableofappropriation". Therefore,if it is to be consideredas fallingunder the temtorial

sovereigntyof a State,thisis solelyasa consequence of its location within amaritimeareaalready

underthat State'ssovereignty,in otherwords,withinthat State'stemtorial sea.

As the Courtwill recall, Fasht Dibal is located9.3 nauticalmiles fi-omthe nearestpointon

the lowwater line on the coast ofQatar and13.7nauticalmiles fiom the nearest pointon the low

waterline on the coast ofBahrain. For Qit'atJaradah,the distances are,respectively,9.4 nautical

milesfiomthe low water line onQatar'scoast and 10.8nauticalmilesfiom the low watermarkon

Bahrain'scoast(Memorialof Qatar,paras.9.11-9.12).

The former isthereforelocated,at leastin part, withinthe territorial watersof Qatar,but is

beyondthe limit ofBahrain'stemtorial sea. Thesecond,admittedly,is locatedwithinthe temtorial

waters of both States, which overlap at this point, but it is closer to Qatar'scoast than it is to

Bahrain's,and it wouldbe, in anyevent, located entirely within the temtorial watersof Qatarwere

a median line drawn by strict applicationof the equidistanceprinciple to delimit therespective

areasofterritorialseaofthetwo States.

Thisis why theStateof Qatar,in thepresent case,isjustified in requestingin its Submission

that theCourtdeclareDibalandJaradahto be low-tide elevationsunderQatar's sovereignty.

2. TheislandofJanan

46. Corningnow to consideration ofJanan, one thing is certain: in contrast to Dibal and

Jaradah,this is clearlyanislandunderinternational law, albeit avery smallisland. Its surface area

barelymeasures 12hectares. Jananis therefore half thesize of the island of Meangueritain the

Gulf of Fonseca, which 1have just mentioned. Jananis also an arid, uninhabitedisland, located

within Qatar'stemtorial waters: it was located partiallywithin those waters when the limitwas

3 nauticalmiles andhasbeen located wholly within them sincethe extensionto 12miles. Lastly,it is an islandcapableof appropriationand subject to theterritorialsovereigntyof the Stateof Qatar,

whichBahrainnowchallenges(illustration 12).

47. In supportof its claimto sovereigntyoverthis island,Bahrainputs forward two sets of

arguments. First,Bahraincontendsthat Jananformspart of theHawarIsland groupawardedto it

by Great Britainin 1939. Second, independently ofthe Britishdecisionof 1939,Bahrainrelies on

various activitiesit has canied out on the island, supposedly displayingits sovereignty. Neither

argument, however,withstandsscrutiny.

(a) TheallegedappurtenanceofJananto theHawar Group
48. In orderto uphold itsallegation that theislandof Jananbelongsto the Hawar group and

to concludethat its sovereigntyover the islandwasthusrecognizedbythe Britishdecisionof 1939,

Bahrainalleges that it has always considered theislandto be part of that group, as evidencedin

particularby the variouslistsit submittedto theBritishauthoritiesin 1936,1937,1938and 1946.

056 Sir Ian Sinclair hasalready demonstratedthe inconsistency ofthis argumentwith regard to

the definition,compositionand locationof the HawarIslands. 1will therefore simplymakea few

additionalremarks.

49. First of all, itmustbe pointedoutthatbysubmittingto theCourtthe wholeof thedispute

as circumscribedinwhat theDohaAgreementof25December 1990calledthe "Bahrainiformula",

the State of Qatar, in its "Act" of 30November 1994, adoptedthe very terrns put forwardby

Bahrainat the meetingof the TripartiteCornmitteeof December 1988. This is why the firstissue

in the statementof issues submitted tothe Courtwas worded as follows: "The Hawar Islands,

including the island of Janan" (see Judgmentof 15 February 1995, I.C.J.Reports 1995, p. 12,

para. 19and p. 25, para.47). It goeswithout sayingthat, in using thesewords, the Stateof Qatar

did notintend to Sayor imply that the island ofJananmight be consideredas part of the Hawar

Islands group. The word "including"quite evidentlydid not mean that, for Qatar, the islandof

Janan was "included" within theHawar group. Thewording was used only in order to make it

clearthat the disputeconcemednot onlytheHawarIslands butthe islandof Jananaswell.

50. Second,in 1939,when the British Govemmentwrongly decidedthat the HawarIslands

belonged to Bahrain and not to Qatar, the letters addresseto the respectiveRulers of the twoStates by the BritishPolitical Resident inthe PersianGulf containedno indicationas to what the

expression"HawarIslands"meant. (SeeQatar Application,Ann.2.) No definition,descriptionor

enumerationwas offered. It was only in 1947, at the time of the determination of a seabed )

delimitation,thattheBritishcircumscribedthe Hawar Islands group by drawingan enclave thatlef?
-
Janan on the outside. Furthermore, the British decision announced in the letters of

23 December 1947contained thefollowing statement: "It shouldbe noted that Janan Island is not

regarded as being includedin the islands of the Hawar group" (QataA r pplication,Ann.3, p. 34).

That positionwas laterconfirmedby a letter dated 30April 1949fiom the BritishPoliticalAgent

to the Ruler of Bahrain (Memorialof Qatar, Ann.IV.133, Vol. 10, p. 179). In the eyes of the

British Govemment,matters were quite clear: in deciding in 1939 upon the atiributionof the

Hawar Islands, they had in no way recognized Bahrain's sovereignty over Janan Island. The

clarificationthey providedon thispoint in1947,in their eyes,prolongedtheir earlierdecision,as it

were.

Therefore,Bahraincannotargueboth thatthe BritishdecisionawardingtheHawarIslandsto

Bahrain was well-foundedbut that the express exclusionby the British of Janan Island wasnot

well-founded.

Even assumingthe 1939decisionto be well-founded,which Qatarhas demonstrated tobe

untrue,Bahraincannotclaim sovereigntyoverJanan Island.

51.Admittedly,Bahrain challengesthe exclusionof Jananfiom the Hawar island groupby

criticising the British authorities for relying, inng this exclusion,on the list establishedby

Belgravein his letterof 29 May 1938. Accordingto Bahrain,in formulatingthis list,Belgravedid

not intendto identifi al1the islandsin the Hawargroup,but simplyto listthose on whichbeacons

had been placed. In particular, Bahrainstresses the fact that the list drawnup by Belgravewas

precededby the words: "Thebeaconsare numberedas follows"[((lesbalisesportent les numéros

suivante))] (Counter-Memorialof Bahrain, para.327). Yet Bahrainfails to mention that,in the

previous sentence,Belgrave expresslystated: "On eachof the islands there is a stone beacon"

(MemorialofBahrain, Ann. 261,Vol.5,p. 1110).

If eachof the HawarIslandsborea beacon,it wouldnot matterwhether the listwas a listof

the islandsor of thenumbers of the beacons. Jananhad not been "beaconed"at the time, at thatdate, and thereforewas not onthe list. As Belgrave'sletter stated thateach island in the Hawar

group had been beaconed,and listed those islands or those beacons, this must mean that Janan

Island was not considered, atthe time the Britishwere aboutto take their decision,as part of the

Hawar Islands group. The decision of 1947,therefore, merely confirmedin this regard a fact

acceptedin 1938-1939.

52. Therefore,one cannotfailto be surprisedby the peremptorystatementmadeby Bahrain,

when submitting its SupplementalDocumentsin March, that,in 1938,during the negotiationsfor

the granting of oil concessionsin the previously unallotted area, Britain recognizedBahraini

sovereigntyoverJanan Island.

It is rathercuriousthatBahrain supportsthis contentionby producinga letter fiom Belgrave

dated 8 June 1938, to which was annexed a map indicating a proposed division of the area in

questionbetweenthe twocompaniesBAPCO and PCL. And Bahrainadds the followingcomment:

"This map recognises Janan Island as an integral part of the Hawar Islands" (Supplemental

DocumentsofBahrain,Ann.9,p. 88).

But far from being evidence of British recognition, as Bahrain alleges, this documentis

nothing morethan a Bahrainiclaim to JananIsland- a claimthat was never recognizedby the

British.

The way in which this documentis presented provides, however,as the Court will have

noted,an illustrationofthetacticfiequentlyemployedby Bahrain of mixing updifferentthingsand

deliberately creatingconfusion.

(b) Bahrain 'sso-called"actsofsovereignty "

53. There remains the other argument put forward by Bahrain, according to which its

sovereignty over Janan Island derives in any event fiom various actions carried out there by

Bahrain. And it specificallyinvokes, as in indication of the assertionof its sovereignty,the

beaconing ofJanan Island.

54.The main objectionthat maybe raisedconceming theargumentderivedbyBahrainfiom

the beaconingof Jananis thatthis kind of activitycannotin itself be consideredas a manifestation

of sovereignty. It can generallyonly be taken into account as a kind of superfiuous,as it were, consideration. Accordingtothe mostwell-established internationajlurisprudence,probativevalue

canattachonlyto activitiesrelatingto the exercisingof Statefunctions: legislation,administration,

jurisdiction.

One cannotinfer fromthe installationof lights, beaconsor buoys[ctbalises»,«bouées))t]hat .

the Statecanyingout suchinstallationswas actingastheterritorialsovereign.

Thus, in the Minquiersand Ecrehoscase, theFrench Governmentargued,interalia,that it

had acted alone for three-quartersof a century in the lighting and buoying of the Minquiers,

without anyobjectionbeing madeby the Britishauthorities. The Court considered,however,that

0 5 9 these acts were insufficientto demonstrateFrench sovereigntyover these islets. As a result, it

rejectedacts of buoyingasbeing "sufficient evidence the intention of thatGovemmentto act as

sovereign" and specified,furthermore,that "nor [were]those acts of such a characterthat they

[could] be considered as involving a manifestation ofState authority in respect of the islets"

(I.C.J.Reports1953,p. 71).

More recently,in the Awardof 9 October 1998in the disputebetweenEritrea and Yemen,

the Arbitral Tribunal had occasionto point out invery clear terms that activitiesof this type,

essentiallycanied out with a view toensuringsafenavigation,did not normallyhave the effectof

creatingterritorialtitle. The Tribunal stated that:

"[tlhe operation or maintenance of lighthouses andnavigational aids is normally
connectedto the preservation ofsafe navigation,and not normally taken as a test of

sovereignty" (Award, para.328) [«[a]ssurer le fonctionnement ou l'entretiende
phares etd'aidesà la navigationest normalementliéà la sécuritde la navigationet
n'estnormalement pas considéré comu mnecritèrede souveraineté))].[Translation
by theRegistry]

Therefore,Bahrainhas no groundsfor assertingthat the fact that it erected a beaconon Janan is

sufficientto provethat itsactingasterritorialsovereignonthis island.

55.Nor canthe factthatBahrainisubjectsused Jananfor fishing activitiesinwatersaround

it serveasan indication of sovereignty. Given theusage and customs in force in the Gulfregion

for manyyears,there is everyreason tobelievethat theBahrainifishermenweredoubtlessnot the .

only ones to periodically visit Janan Island. Furthermore, these visits were temporary and

intermittent and occurred only during the fishing season. Above all, these visits to Janan by

Bahraini fishermenwere for purely private economicpurposes, without being associatedin anyway with any act of authority beingexercisedby Bahrain. Can one seriously believe that the

Bahrainifishermenvisiting this islandhad toobtainprior authonzationfrom the Rulerof Bahrain

in order to put up huts or simple shelters to protect themselves frthe sun? This is, however,

what Bahrain has not hesitated to arguein its Reply (Reply of Bahrain, para.169), relying

exclusivelyon the wordsof the Ruler of Bahrainhimselfin the letterhe addressedto the British

PoliticalAgentin December1947(Memorialof Qatar,Ann.IV.118,Vol. 10,p. 83).

In these circumstances,one might paraphrasehere what the Courtsaid in its Judgrnentof

13December 1999concemingthepresenceof Masubiaon KasikiliISeduduIsland. Inparticular,it

canbe said that thereis nothing toshow thatvisits toJananIslandby Bahrainifishennenhad any

link with temtorial claims by the Bahraini authorities (seeKasikili/SeduduIsland, Judgment,

para.74).

56. Thus in sum, the argumentsBahrain believedit couldrely on as a basis for its claimof

sovereignty over Janan arethereforetotally groundless,and there is no evidence to refuteQatar's

sovereigntyover this island.

Thankyou, Mr.President. Thank you,Membersof the Court.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor. The Court will adjoum until tomorrow morning

at 10a-m.

TheCourtrose at 6p.m.