Request for the indication of provisional measures

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION
OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES
1. I have the honour to refer to the Application submitted today to the Court instituting
proceedings in the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”) against the United States
of America (“USA”), and, pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute and Articles 73 to 75 of
the Rules of Court, to seize the Court of an urgent request for the indication of
provisional measures in order to preserve the rights of Iran under the Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights signed at Tehran on 15 August 1955 (the
“Treaty of Amity”) entered into force between Iran and the USA on 16 June 1957,1
pending a decision on the dispute introduced before the Court by the Application.
2. The present request refers to the pending dispute between Iran and the USA relating to
the re-imposition and announced aggravation by the USA of a comprehensive set of socalled
“sanctions” and restrictive measures targeting, directly or indirectly, Iran, Iranian
companies and/or Iranian nationals, resulting from the US Decision of 8 May 2018 (“the
8 May sanctions”), which constitute breaches of the Treaty of Amity.
I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
3. The Court has jurisdiction in the present case pursuant to Article XXI (2) of the Treaty of
Amity which provides:
“Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or
application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall
be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting
Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means.”
1 284 UNTS 93, II Recueil des traités bilatéraux 69, 8 UST 899, TIAS No. 3853. The text of the Treaty of Amity is
appended to this Request as Annex 1.
2
4. In the Ukraine v. Russia case the Court recalled its usual position according to which it:
“may indicate provisional measures only if the provisions relied on by the
Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which its jurisdiction could be
founded, but need not satisfy itself in a definitive manner that it has jurisdiction as
regards the merits of the case (see, for example, Immunities and Criminal
Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France), Provisional Measures, Order of
7 December 2016, para. 31).”2
5. There is no doubt that the dispute between Iran and the USA falls within the jurisdiction
of the Court under Art. XXI (2) of the Treaty, since Iran claims that several provisions of
this treaty are violated by the re-imposition and announced enlargement of the US
sanctions. And it certainly does so prima facie.
II. THE FACTS
6. The facts in support of this request for the indication of provisional measures are set out
in more detail in the Application instituting proceedings. In summary, the USA decided
to re-impose in full effect and enforce the 8 May sanctions that the USA had previously
lifted in connection with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the “JCPoA”), on the
spurious pretext that Iran would be maintaining a military nuclear programme, which is
notoriously wrong.3
7. On 16 January 2016, the President of the USA acknowledged “the fundamental shift in
circumstances with respect to Iran’s nuclear program” and lifted a series of so-called
“nuclear-related sanctions” and restrictive measures as provided for in the JCPoA.4
2 ICJ, Order, 19 April 2017, Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v.
Russian Federation), para. 17.
The
US Administration also issued various “waivers” of certain sanctions under the relevant
3 See below, paras. 8-9.
4 See Application Instituting Proceedings, para. 9.
3
US legislation.5 The USA also removed a number of Iranian nationals and companies
from the lists of designated persons maintained by the US Office of Foreign Assets
Control (“OFAC”) and issued a number of licenses and authorisations in the context of
the JCPoA. For the same reason, the European Union lifted its own restrictive measures,
mainly through the Council Decision 2015/1863 of 18 October 20156 and the Council
Regulation 2015/1861 of 18 October 2015.7
8. Since 2015, the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) has consistently verified
that Iran has been in full compliance with its obligations under the Safeguards
Agreement, as well as with its voluntary nuclear-related commitments under the JCPoA
and the Additional Protocol8 including the “non-diversion of declared nuclear material in
Iran”9 and the absence of undeclared material10.
9. Nevertheless, as explained in Iran’s Application, on 8 May 2018, the USA decided that it
will “begin re-imposing the US nuclear-related sanctions.”11
5 Iran Sanctions Act, 5 August 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (“ISA”); Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability and Divestment Act, 1st July 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1313 (CISADA); National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 31 December 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 2006 (NDAA);
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, 10 August 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1215 (ITRA);
Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act, 2 January 2013, Pub. L. 112–239, 126 Stat. 2004 (IFCA).
The USA’s underlying
reasons for “re-imposing” sanctions are notoriously wrong. For example, one day after
the official announcement of the 8 May sanctions by the USA, the IAEA Director-
General declared “that the nuclear-related commitments are being implemented by
6 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 of 18 October 2015 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning
restrictive measures against Iran, available at: eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32015D1863.
7 See e.g.: Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1861 of 18 October 2015 amending Regulation (EU) No 267/2012
concerning restrictive measures against Iran, available at eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/
EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32015R1861.
8 IAEA, Board Report, Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations
Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), 24 May 2018, available at: www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-andiran-
iaea-reports.
9 See: IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, 14 November 2006, available at: www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2006-64.pdf.
10 IAEA, Board of Governors, Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations
Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), 24 May 2018, available at:
www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/06/gov2018-24.pdf.
11 OFAC, 8 May 2018 (updated June 27, 2018), Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of
Sanctions Pursuant to the May 8, 2018 National Security Presidential Memorandum Relating to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), hereafter (“OFAC Re-imposition FAQ”), Section 1.1.
4
Iran.”12 The EU13 and other JCPoA Participants14 have officially endorsed the IAEA’s
findings.
10. The US decision is unsupported by the international community. The Secretary General
of the United Nations15, as well as all the other JCPoA Participants16 and other States,
consider that the US decision with respect to the 8 May sanctions does not serve the
interests of international peace and security.
11. Some of these 8 May sanctions have already started to be re-imposed. The Statement of
Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to Iran of Commercial
Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services (JCPoA SLP)17 was revoked
immediately as of 8 May 2018.
12 IAEA, Statement by Director General Y. Amano, 9 May 2018, available at:
www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/statement-by-iaea-director-general-y….
13 European Council of the European Union, Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU following
US President Trump's announcement on the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), 9 May 2018, available at:
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/05/09/declaration-…-
eu-following-us-president-trump-s-announcement-on-the-iran-nuclear-deal-jcpoa/.
14 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Press release on the meeting of the Joint Commission
of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 25 May 2018, available at: www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3234684; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of
China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Regular Press Conference on May 9, 2018, 9 May 2018,
available at: www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1558096.shtml.
15 “I have consistently reiterated that the JCPOA represents a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation and
diplomacy and has contributed to regional and international peace and security” in United Nations Secretary-
General, Statement by the Secretary-General on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 8 May 2018,
available at: www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-05-08/statement-secretary-ge…-
action-jcpoa.
16 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Ministry statement on developments around
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear programme, 8 May 2018, available at:
www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/conten…; Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Regular Press Conference
on May 9, 2018, 9 May 2018, available at:
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1558096.shtml; Task Force Iran, Declaration by the
High Representative on behalf of the EU following US President Trump's announcement on the Iran nuclear deal
(JCPOA), 10 May 2018, available at: eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iran/44307/declaration-high-representative-behalfeu-
following-us-president-trumps-announcement-iran_en.
17 OFAC, Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to Iran of Commercial
Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services, 16 January 2016, available at: www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/
sanctions/Programs/Documents/lic_pol_statement_aircraft_jcpoa.pdf (hereafter, “Statement of Licensing
Policy for Aircrafts”).
5
12. The OFAC also revoked two major licenses on 27 June 2018:
- General License H, which authorised certain transactions between US-owned or
US-controlled foreign entities with the Government of Iran or persons subject to
the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran;
- General License I, which made possible activities relating to contingent contracts
related to activities eligible for authorisation under the JCPoA SLP.
13. On 27 June 2018, OFAC also amended the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (ITSR)18 which allowed the import into the United States
of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs and certain related financial transactions, in order
to narrow the scope of the licenses and to authorise only the wind down of those
transactions by 6 August 2018.
14. The USA announced that the other elements of the 8 May sanctions will be fully reimposed
and enforced in two phases, one after a 90-day wind down period from 8 May
2018 (that is to say, on 6 August 2018) and the other after a 180-day wind down period
from that same date (that is to say, on 4 November 2018), pending yet further sanctions.
To achieve these objectives, the US Administration also replaced the applicable
“waivers”19 under US law with “wind-down waivers” that are supposed to allow for the
orderly wind-down of activities that were until then duly authorised under waivers. The USA
also announced that it will re-impose the relevant provisions of five executive orders20
18 OFAC, Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR 560, 28 June 2018, available at:
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/06/28/2018-13939/iranian-transac….
19 “Waivers” are renewable permissions which have the effect to create exceptions in authorising activities that are
otherwise prohibited under relevant sanctions. They are provided under the following US sanctions Acts: Iran
Sanctions Act, 5 August 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (“ISA”); Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability and Divestment Act, 1st July 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1313 (CISADA); National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 31 December 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 2006 (NDAA);
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, 10 August 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1215 (ITRA);
Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act, 2 January 2013, Pub. L. 112–239, 126 Stat. 2004 (IFCA).
20 Executive Order 13574, 32 May 2011, 76 FR 30505; Executive Order 13590, 20 November 2011, 76 FR 72609;
Executive Order 13622, 30 July 2012, 77 FR 45897; Executive Order 13628, 9 October 2012, 77 FR 62139;
Executive Order 13645, 3 June 2013, 78 FR 33945.
6
which were lifted by the Executive Order No 13716 of 16 January 2016.21 The issuance
of these wind-down orders does not mean that they will have effect only in the future.
The sanctions have already started to have significant effects. For instance, the US
Administration made it clear that new contracts with Iran, signed after 8 May 2018, are
not welcome.22
15. Before 6 August 2018, the USA will fully re-impose and enforce sanctions relating to the
following sectors and activities:
- the purchase or acquisition of US dollar banknotes by the Government of Iran;
- direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of graphite, raw, or semifinished
metals such as aluminium and steel, coal, and software for integrating
industrial processes;
- significant transactions related to the purchase or sale of Iranian Rial, or the
maintenance of significant funds or accounts outside the territory of Iran
denominated in the Iranian Rial;
- the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign
debt; and
- activities related to Iran’s automotive sector.
16. Before 4 November 2018, the USA will fully re-impose and enforce sanctions relating to
the following sectors and activities:
- Iran’s port operators, and shipping and shipbuilding sectors, including on the
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (“IRISL”), South Shipping Line Iran, or
their affiliates;
- petroleum-related transactions with, among others, the National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC), Naftiran Intertrade Company (“NICO”), and National Iranian
21 Executive Order 13716, 16 January 2016, 81 FR 3693.
22 See point 2.2 of the OFAC Re-imposition FAQ.
7
Tanker Company (“NITC”), including the purchase of petroleum, petroleum
products, or petrochemical products from Iran;
- transactions by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran and
designated Iranian financial institutions;
- the provision of specialised financial messaging services to the Central Bank of
Iran and Iranian financial institutions;
- the provision of underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance; and
- Iran’s energy sector.
17. Not later than 4 November 2018, the USA will also re-impose individual sanctions that
applied to designated individuals and entities from the Specially Designated Nationals
and Blocked Persons List (the “SDN list”) and others lists maintained by OFAC:
- The SDN List contains the names of individuals, groups or entities whose assets
are blocked and with whom US persons are prohibited from dealing.
- The Non-SDN Iranian Sanctions Act List (“NS-ISA List”) which contains the
names of persons subject to blocking and non-blocking sanctions.23
- The List of Foreign Sanctions Evaders (“FSE List”) which contain a list of
foreign individuals and entities determined by the USA. It also lists foreign
persons who are accused by the USA of having facilitated “deceptive
transactions” for or on behalf of persons subject to US sanctions.
- The List of Foreign Financial Institutions which includes the names of foreign
financial institutions that are subject to sanctions under the CISADA, the NDAA
and the IFCA.24
18. The re-imposition of sanctions immediately affects almost 500 entities which are listed in
Annex II, Attachment 3, of the JCPoA, including among others: National Iranian Airline
23 These acts are referenced in footnote 19, above.
24 Ibid.
8
Company (Iran Air) and other Iranian airlines, National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)
and other Iranian oil companies, National Petrochemical Company, National Iranian
Tanker Company (NITC), Iran Shipping Line Company (IRISL), and other shipping
companies, the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and a majority of Iranian banks and financial
institutions, etc. The designation of these entities, and of entities owned by them, on US
Lists entails the blocking of the assets of and the risk of extra-territorial sanctions against
any persons (whether US or also in certain cases non-US nationals) engaging in any
activities with those on the Lists after their re-listing.
19. Furthermore, the USA announced that it does not intend to limit the enforcement of
damaging measures against Iran to the measures identified on 8 May 2018. The US
President announced that “sanctions will go into full effect” in order to reach their
“highest level” and create for Iran “bigger problems than it has ever had before.”25 The
US Administration is indeed able under US law to modulate the enforcement of the
sanctions. The current US Administration is pushing the sanctions to their maximum with
the sole aim of bringing Iran to its knees.
20. Thus, the US Secretary of State has declared, with respect to sanctions targeting Iran,
Iranian companies and Iranian nationals, that “new ones are coming” and that “this is just
the beginning.” According to the US Secretary of State, “[t]hese will indeed end up being
the strongest sanctions in history when we are complete.”26 Threatening to issue new
sanctions is part of the overall US sanctions policy. The threat of itself creates significant
additional damage to the Iranian economy, and to the Iranian people, by creating
uncertainty for all actors who would wish to have any economic relationship with Iran,
and by deterring any such relationship, even if that relationship is not currently covered
by the scope of sanctions.
25 US President Trump, Remarks by President Trump and President Macron of France Before Restricted Bilateral
Meeting, 24 April 2018, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-preside…-
france-restricted-bilateral-meeting/.
26 USA, Remarks by the Secretary of State, After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy, 21 May 2018, available at:
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/05/282301.htm.
9
III. THE RIGHTS THAT IRAN IS SEEKING TO PROTECT
21. As the Court recently recalled, its power:
“to indicate provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute has as its object
the preservation of the respective rights claimed by the parties in a case, pending
its decision on the merits thereof. It follows that the Court must be concerned to
preserve by such measures the rights which may subsequently be adjudged by it
to belong to either party. Therefore, the Court may exercise this power only if it is
satisfied that the rights asserted by the party requesting such measures are at least
plausible (see, for example, Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial
Guinea v. France), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2016,
para. 71).”27
22. As explained in the Application,28
- Article IV (1) which requires the Parties to accord fair and equitable treatment to
nationals and companies of the other party, prohibits unreasonable or
discriminatory measures that would impair the legally acquired rights and
interests of Iranian nationals and companies, and requires the Parties to assure that
their lawful contractual rights are afforded effective means of enforcement;
through the 8 May sanctions, the US has breached and
is breaching multiple provisions of the Treaty of Amity, namely:
- Article VII (1) which prohibits restrictions on the making of payments,
remittances, and other transfers of funds to or from the territories of the other
Party;
- Article VIII (1) which requires the Parties to accord to products of the other Party,
and to products destined for export to the territories of the other party, treatment
no less favourable than that accorded to like products of or destined for export to
any third country in all matters relating to duties, other charges, regulations and
27 ICJ, Order, 19 April 2017, Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v.
Russian Federation), para. 63.
28 See Application Instituting Proceedings, 16 July 2018, paras. 32-42.
10
formalities on or in connection with import of any product of the other party or on
the export of any product to the territories of the other party;
- Article VIII (2) which prohibits the Parties from imposing restrictions or
prohibitions on the import of any product of the other Party or on the export of
any product to the territories of a Party, unless the import/export of the like
product to all third countries is similarly restricted or prohibited;
- Article IX (2) which requires the Parties to accord to nationals and companies of
the other Party treatment no less favourable than that accorded to nationals and
companies of any third country with respect to all matters relating to import and
export; and
- Articles X (1) which guarantees the freedom of commerce and navigation
between the territories of the two Parties.
To preserve its rights under the Treaty of Amity,29 pending the decision of the Court on
the merits, Iran requests the suspension of the application and enforcement of the 8 May
sanctions.30
IV. URGENCY AND THE RISK OF IRREPARABLE PREJUDICE
23. According to the Court’s case-law, it will indicate provisional measures:
“only if there is urgency, in the sense that there is a real and imminent risk that
irreparable prejudice will be caused to the rights in dispute before the Court gives
its final decision (…). The Court must therefore consider whether such a risk
exists at this stage of the proceedings.”31
29 See above para. 22.
30 See above paras. 11-20.
31 ICJ, Order, 19 April 2017, Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v.
Russian Federation), para. 89.
11
24. Concerning the requirement of urgency, the Court held in the Avena case that “there is
urgency in the sense that action prejudicial to the rights of either party is likely to be
taken before [the Court] final decision is given.”32
25. In the present case, certain elements of the 8 May sanctions have been decided with
immediate effect, and other elements will be reintroduced not later than 6 August 2018,
and still another set not later than 4 November 2018. At these dates, the 8 May sanctions
will come into full effect and Iran will suffer further severe damages with significant
repercussions. There is no practical possibility that the Court could give its final decision
before these dates. There is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice will be
caused to the rights in dispute before the Court gives its final decision.
26. As shown in the Application instituting proceedings, Iran’s economy and Iranian
nationals and companies have already started to suffer damage from the US decision,
and, in particular, from the mere announcement (and anticipation) of their extra-territorial
effects. Recent international reports from the IMF33 and the World Bank34 underline that
the re-imposition of sanctions would have the effect of disconnecting Iran from the global
trade and financial system and would negatively affect Iran’s whole economy.
27. At this stage, one of the immediate effects of the announcement of 8 May sanctions (and
its anticipation) has been the devaluation of Iranian currency.35 Since October 2017,
when President Trump merely suggested that the USA would re-impose sanctions, the
value of the Rial has dropped dramatically.36
32 ICJ, Order, 5 February 2003, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), ICJ
Rep., para. 50.
This devaluation has resulted and is
33 IMF, Islamic Republic of Iran: 2018 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 18/93, March 2018, p. 27,
available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/03/29/Islamic-Republ…-
Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-45767.
34 World Bank Group, “Iran Economic Monitor – Sustaining Growth: the Challenge of Job Creation”, 2017, p. 13,
available at: documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/347831520515722711/pdf/124020-WP-PUBLIC-P162048-Iran-
IEM-Fall-2017-7Mar18-MM.pdf.
35 See R. Goldberg and S. Ghasseminejad, “Iran’s currency is in free fall — time for the US to exploit it”, The Hill,
04 November 2011, available at: thehill.com/opinion/national-security/382670-irans-currency-is-in-free-fall-timefor-
the-us-to-exploit-it.
36 The EUR/IRR rate was 4,702 on 1st October 2017 and 9,217 on 27 June 2018, hence a 95 % increase, source
available at: www.tgju.org.
12
continuing to result in inflation in the prices of goods, commodities, raw materials and
related services in different sectors of the economy. Many people have rushed to buy
gold products to preserve the value of their money. The price of gold coins has more than
doubled in the past few months.37
28. The official announcement by the USA of the re-imposition of sanctions, including
extraterritorial sanctions, has already not only accelerated the devaluation of the Rial, but
also produced very significant damage to Iran’s economy and to Iranian nationals and
companies. Since the decision was made public, multiple US and foreign companies and
nationals have also announced the withdrawal from activities in Iran including the
termination of their contractual relations with Iranian companies and nationals. Some
examples38
Transportation sector
Iranian contracting party Foreign contracting party Subject-matter of the transaction Value (B$)
MAPNA Group Siemens Various projects 3.5
Iran Khodro & Saipa Peugeot Citröen (PSA) Automotive plant and production 5.4
Iran's state railway company Ferrrovie dello Stato (FS) High speed rail line Arak - Qom 1.3
Wagon Pars Alstom Railway 1.4
Islamic Republic of Iran Railways Hyundai Rotem Railway 0.7
Islamic Republic of Iran Railways SNCF Railway not available
CDTIC China Civil Engineering Construction Corp. Railway 0.5
IDRO CJSC Transmashholding Railway 2.9
TOTAL (in Billions of USD) 15.7
in the transportation sector are listed in the table below:
37 C. Carpenter, “Trump Ire Stokes Gold Trade in Iran as Rial Hits Record Low”, Bloomberg, 3 May 2018, available
at: www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-03/iranians-go-for-gold-amid-cu….
38 For other examples, see for instance, E. Wald, “10 Companies Leaving Iran As Trump's Sanctions Close In”,
Forbes, 6 June 2018, available at: www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2018/06/06/10-companies-leaving-iran-as…-
sanctions-close-in/#78cbe8a0c90f.
13
29. These withdrawals are particularly harmful for the Iranian automotive industry which
employs directly and indirectly hundreds of thousands and is dependent to varying
degrees on parts imported from France, China and Korea. French and Korean companies
have already declared that they will withdraw39. This will cause irreparable economic and
social damages, which may also include social unrest.
30. The USA is besieging Iran economically, with all the dramatic consequences that a siege
implies for the besieged population. The access to medicines, including lifesaving
medicines, chronic treatment or preventive care, and medical equipment for the Iranian
people will become increasingly restricted. Despite the notional exemption under US law
for medical supplies, the 8 May sanctions are expected to lead to serious practical
difficulty in obtaining and paying for medical equipment and drugs and materials for
medical treatment.40 According to the World Food Programme, Iran’s ability to import
many essential food items will be severely restricted mainly because of financial
restrictions.41 The 8 May sanctions will, at least, have the same effects on the Iranian
people.
31. As another example, the revocation of the JCPoA SLP (civil aviation licences) has
already proved to be very harmful to Iran and the safety of Iranian civil aviation. Under
the pre-8 May 2018 Statement of Licensing Policy, US and non-US persons were
previously able
39 See e.g.: J. Dupont-Calbo, “PSA et Renault affichent leurs divergences face au piège iranien”, Les Echos, 20 June
2018, available at : www.lesechos.fr/industrie-services/automobile/0301850273403-psa-et-rena…-
face-au-piege-iranien-2185749.php; or “Le constructeur automobile PSA prépare son retrait d’Iran”, Le
Monde, 5 June 2018, available at : www.lemonde.fr/automobile/article/2018/06/05/le-constructeur-automobile…-
son-retrait-d-iran_5309642_1654940.html.
40 In this respect see the earlier statements of the World Health Organization, “Iran – Country Cooperation
Strategy”, May 2017, WHO/CCU/17.01/Iran, available at:
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/136898/ccsbrief_irn_en.pdf;jsessionid=49F78DE5A0B5EAD6D5926778B
23CB1D6?sequence=1; A. M. Cheraghali, “Impacts of international sanctions on Iranian pharmaceutical market”,
DARU Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences, 2013, p. 3, available at:
apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s20247en/s20247en.pdf.
41 World Food Programme, Food and Nutrition Security in Iran, 2016, available at:
docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000021105/download/.
14
“to request specific authorization from OFAC to engage in transactions for the
sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran,
provided such transactions do not involve any person on OFAC’s Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”).”42
32. Relying on OFAC authorisations, multiple Iranian airline companies committed to buy
140 Boeing aircraft (80 for Iran Air, 30 for Iran Aseman Airlines, 10 for Kish Air and 20
for Qeshm Airlines) for a total book value of US$24 billion.43 At the same time, Airbus
sold or was committed to sell 171 aircraft to Iranian companies (98 to Iran Air, 28 to
Zagros Airlines and 45 to Iran Air Tours) for a total of over US$30 billion.44 Save for the
very few aircraft that were delivered before May 2018, all of these transactions are now
in jeopardy, if not already cancelled.45
Aviation sector
Iranian contracting party Foreign contracting party Subject-matter of the transaction Value (B$)
Iran Air Boeing Sale of 80 Aircraft to Iran Air 17.5
Iran Air Airbus Sale of 100 Aircraft to Iran Air 21.2
Iran Air ATR Sale of 20 Aircraft to Iran Air 0.5
Iran Aseman Airlines Boeing Planned sale of 60 Iran Aseman Airlines 6.7
Zagros Airlines Airbus Planned sale of 28 Aircraft to Zagros Airlines 4.3
Kish Air Boeing Planned sale of 10 Aircraft to Kish Air 1.1
Qeshm Airlines Boeing Planned sale of 20 Aircraft to Qeshm Airlines 2.1
Iran Air Tours Airbus Planned sale of 45 Aircraft to Iran Air Tour 5.0
TOTAL (in Billions of USD) 58.4
The following table summarises the contracts that
were cancelled or most adversely affected in the aviation sector as a direct result of the
sanctions:
33. Iran’s commercial airlines and civil passengers are therefore left to use an aging fleet,46
42 Statement of Licensing Policy for Aircrafts.
with limited access to maintenance information, services and spare parts, thus creating a
43 “FACTBOX-Iran's $38 billion airplane purchases under nuclear deal”, Reuters, 8 May 2018, available at:
uk.reuters.com/article/iran-nuclear-aircraft-deals/factbox-irans-38-billion-airplane-purchases-under-nuclear-dealidUKL8N1SE75Z.
44 Ibid; Airbus is a European company, but its aircraft are constituted of more than 10% of US components which
makes them subject to US trade control and restrictions (and same will, most probably, apply to all other aircraft
manufacturers that have resumed commercial relationships with Iran, such as ATR, a French-Italian company, or
Embraer, a Brazilian one).
45 C. Charpentreau, “Boeing confirms passing $20B Iran deal”, AeroTime News, 7 June 2018, available at:
www.aerotime.aero/clement.charpentreau/21390-boeing-confirms-passing-20….
46 P. Hollinger & N. Bozorgmehr, “Iran Air blazes a trail with first new aircraft in 23 years”, Financial Times, 15
January 2017, available at: www.ft.com/content/9b64048c-d94e-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e.
15
risk to airline safety and security.47 This risk has been recognized by an independent
panel of experts in 2006 which “found that the U.S. embargo placed on the I.R. of Iran
has adversely affected the safety of civil aviation.”48
34. The 8 May sanctions are also having or will very shortly have the following damaging
effects on Iranian airline companies and on Iran’s civil aviation sector:
- Aircraft operations: impossibility or restriction to access flight planning solutions
and flight management system databases, to refuel in foreign airports (European,
notably), to train pilots to international standards, to receive updated flight
documentations from manufacturers;
- Commercial activities: restrictions on airline interline agreements for Iranian
companies, limitations on financial transfers, severe complications on cargo
flights (interruption of foreign cargo management services, refusal by
international banks to guarantee and finance operations) including non-access to
some major destinations;
- Foreign airport services, which are no longer provided to Iranian companies;
- Engineering and maintenance operations: restriction or prohibition to purchase
aircraft engines, parts and components, to obtain updated technical
documentation, to request maintenance services from manufacturers or foreign
providers, to ascertain aircraft airworthiness;
- Financial transactions of Iranian airline companies, who can no longer operate
through the foreign banking system, at least without severe restrictions, for
financing, supply or sale purposes.
47 S. Calder, “Iran Aseman Airlines crash: Years of sanctions have left passengers with one of oldest air fleets in the
world”, The Independent, 18 February 2018, available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iranaviation-
crash-aseman-airlines-oldest-fleet-boeing-727-a8216221.html.
48 ICAO, Continuity of the US Trade Embargo on the Civil Aviation of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Safety
Deficiencies Arising Out of it, 15 March 2006, DGCA/06-IP/31, para. 3.2, available at:
www.icao.int/Meetings/AMC/MA/Directors General of Civil Aviation Conference on a Global Strategy for
Aviation Safety (DGCA-06)/dgca_06_ip_31_e.pdf.
16
35. If nothing is done to prevent the US from giving full effect to its sanctions, the lives of
Iranian people and other customers of Iranian airlines will be placed in danger by
preventing Iranian airlines renewing airlines fleets, receiving necessary spare parts and
aircraft repairs in foreign countries in circumstances where the Iranian airlines
companies’ fleets are already old.49 This cannot but lead to irreparable human damages.
36. Another key industrial sector of Iran that has been and is being directly affected by the reimposition
of the US sanctions is the oil and gas sector. As a US State Department
official reported, the United States is asking countries to cut their oil imports from Iran to
“zero” as soon as possible and not later than 4 November 2018.50
- Total SA, announced
Already, several
important actors have decided to withdraw from Iran including the termination of
contractual relations with Iranian companies and nationals:
51 that it would pull out52 of a billion-dollar deal53
- Lukoil, which was to develop oil fields in Iran, decided
it made
with Iran and the Chinese company CNCP.
54
49 Iranian airline companies’ fleet age in years, based on the information available at:
www.airfleets.net/ageflotte/fleet-age-search.htm, and at: www.planespotters.net,
at the end of May that it
would no longer pursue any joint ventures with Iranian oil companies due to the
impending US sanctions.
Iran
Air
Mahan
Air
Iran
Aseman
Zagros
Air.
ATA
Air.
Kish
Air
Qeshm
Air.
Meraj
Air.
Taban
Air
Iran Air
Tours
Caspian
Air.
Atrak
Air
Karun
Air
20.2 23.9 25.7 25.7 23.1 22.5 22.6 21.1 21.8 25.7 26.9 25.9 25.1
50 B. Hook, Director of Policy Planning, “Briefing With an Iran Diplomacy Update”, 2 July 2018, available at:
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/07/283669.htm; see also “U.S. Toughens Stance on Future Iran Oil Exports”, WSJ,
26 June 2018, available at: www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-signals-zero-tolerance-on-future-iran-oil-expo…
and “U.S. pushes allies to halt Iran oil imports, waivers unlikely”, Reuters, 27 June 2018, available at:
uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran/u-s-pushes-allies-to-halt-iran-oil-imports-waivers-unlikely-idUKKBN1JM26Q.
51 S. Kar-Gupta & J. Irish, “France's Total to quit Iran gas project if no sanctions waiver”, 16 May 2018, available at:
www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-france-total/frances-total-to-q….
52 Total, US withdrawal from the JCPOA: Total’s position related to the South Pars 11 project in Iran, 16 May 2018,
available at: www.total.com/en/media/news/press-releases/us-withdrawal-jcpoa-totals-p…-
11-project-iran.
53 The contract was signed on 3 July 2017: Total, “Iran : Total signe avec la NIOC le contrat portant sur le
développement de la phase 11 du champ gazier géant de South Pars”, 03 July 2017, available at:
www.total.com/fr/medias/actualite/communiques/iran-total-signe-avec-la-…-
de-la-phase-11-du-champ-gazier.
17
- Reliance Industries Ltd., an Indian company that owns the world's largest oilrefining
complex, announced55
The following table recapitulates transactions that were cancelled or most adversely
affected in the energy sector as a consequence of the 8 May sanctions:
on 30 May 2018 that it would no longer accept
crude oil imports from Iran.
Energy sector
Iranian contracting party Foreign contracting party Subject-matter of the transaction Value (B$)
Hampa Engineering Corporation Siemens Transportation equipments 1.6
NIOC Total and CNPC South Pars Gas field 4.8
Amin Energy Developers Saga Energy Solar Panels 2.9
Esfahan Oil Refining Co. Daelim Oil 2.2
MAPNA Group General Electric Pipelines 0.2
NIOC Reliance Industries Oil exports 1.3
NIOEC SK E&C Co. Ltd. Upgrade of Tabriz refinery 1.6
Iran's Ministry of Energy Turkey's Unit International Building of 7 natural Gas plants 4.2
NIOEC Sinopec Upgrade of Abadan Refinery 1.1
NIOC Hellenic Petroleum Oil exports not available
NIOC SARAS Oil exports 1.1
TOTAL (in Billions of USD) 21.0
37. These withdrawals by US and foreign companies of activities from Iran, including the
terminations of contractual relations with Iranian companies and nationals, are direct
consequences of the US Administration’s re-imposition of sanctions on Iranian oil
trade.56 As a senior US State Department official reported, the United States is asking
countries to cut their oil imports from Iran to “zero” by 4 November 2018.57
54 “Lukoil puts Iran plans on hold due to threat of U.S. sanctions”, Reuters, 29 May 2018, available at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-lukoil-iran/lukoil-puts-iran-….
Already
between 2011 and 2014, the US and EU sanctions had more than halved Iranian oil
55 “Exclusive: India’s Reliance to halt oil imports from Iran: sources”, Reuters, 30 May, 2018, available at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-iran-reliance-exclusive/exclus…-
sources-idUSKCN1IV1XM; it should be noted that because crude oil imports are contracted months in
advance, Reliance will cease importing Iranian oil in October or November of this year.
56 G. Harris & S. Reed, “Roiling Markets, U.S. Insists World Must Stop Buying Iranian Oil”, NY Times, 26 June
2018, available at: www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/world/middleeast/us-iran-oil-sanctions-.html; see also, J. Payne,
D. Zhdannikov, A.Cooper, “Spooked by Trump, Europe's Iranian oil purchases set to plummet”, Reuters, 29 June
2018, available at: www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-iran-europe/spooked-by-trump-europes-ira…-
plummet-idUSKBN1JP1P4.
57 U.S. Department of State “Senior State Department Official On U.S. Efforts to Discuss the Re-imposition of
Sanctions on Iran With Partners Around The World”, 26 June 2018, available at:
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/06/283512.htm.
18
exports, costing the country between US$ 4 and 8 billion each month.58 Given that oil
exports make up 80% of Iran's total export earnings and 50% to 60% of Iran’s State
budget,59 the drastic drop in exports that will result from the re-imposition of US
sanctions60 will prevent the Iranian Government from continuing to provide the public
utilities most essential for its population: including education, health (including access to
medicines and equipment), social services, security, etc.
38. To assess the damages that Iran and Iranian nationals and companies will suffer from the
full implementation of the sanctions, reference may be made to the effects caused by
previous US sanctions,61 while keeping in mind that the 8 May and announced further
sanctions are intended to be even more damaging.
39. US previous sanctions caused severance of the relations between Iranian banks and their
foreign counterparts, thereby creating severe payment problems for imports and exports
of goods even where the payments are related to importing of non-sanctioned items,62 as
well as the inability to receive insurance services or purchase equipment and spare parts
required for Iran’s port operators. Further effects were felt by Iranian shipping and
shipbuilding sectors; and the sanctions reduced the country’s revenue by prohibiting
transactions related to petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products by the
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), and other companies.63
58 “Iran nuclear crisis: What are the sanctions?”, BBC, 30 March 2015, available at: www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-
east-15983302; strikingly, following the entry into force of the JCPoA, the crude oil exports of Iran had
returned to their previous level of 2010 and 2011, see “Crude Oil Exports for Iran”, Federal Reserve Bank of St
Louis, last update of 8 June 2018, available at: fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IRNNXGOCMBD.
59 U.S. Energy Information and Administration, “Sanctions reduced Iran's oil exports and revenues in 2012”, 26
April 2013, available at: www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=11011.
60 “Iran’s oil payment via European banks ‘impossible’”, Mehr News, 25 June 2018, available at:
en.mehrnews.com/news/135110/Iran-s-oil-payment-via-European-banks-impossible.
61 See Application Instituting Proceedings, paras. 35-36.
62 M. Nichols, L. Charbonneau, “U.N. chief says sanctions on Iran affecting its people”, Reuters, 05 October 2012,
available at: www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-sanctions-un/u-n-chief-says-sanctions-o….
63 US Secretary of State, “Statement on Significant Reductions of Iranian Crude Oil Purchases”, Press Statement, 20
March 2012, available at: 2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/03/186086.htm.
19
40. The decision taken by the US may already have caused irreparable damages, which are
becoming worse every day. As explained above, since the US announcement of the reimposition
of the sanctions, US and foreign companies have had no other option, in order
to escape the extraordinary high penalties64 than to choose not to trade and invest in Iran.
The loss of these trading opportunities and investments will not be reparable by money
since they are damaging the whole Iranian economic and social system.
41. The irreparable damages to the whole Iranian economy and society, more particularly to
certain sectors such as the auto industry, the oil industry, the civil aviation and the
banking and financial system, as well as the irreparable damages to Iranian nationals and
companies and the imminent risk to the health and safety of Iranians cannot be fully
described at this stage. Iran will present more factual information to the Court during the
hearings; however, it considers that the above can leave no doubt on the threat of
irreparable harm if the Court does not grant the provisional measures requested below.
V. THE ORDER REQUESTED
42. In view of the above, the Islamic Republic of Iran in its own right and as parens patriae of
its nationals respectfully requests that, pending final judgment in this case, the Court
indicate:
a. That the USA shall immediately take all measures at its disposal to ensure the
suspension of the implementation and enforcement of all of the 8 May sanctions,
including the extraterritorial sanctions, and refrain from imposing or threatening
announced further sanctions and measures which might aggravate or extend the
dispute submitted to the Court;
64 See for instance the $8,9B fine imposed to BNP Paribas for not complying with the US sanctions against Iran and
other States.
20
b. That the USA shall immediately allow the full implementation of transactions
already licensed, generally or specifically, particularly for the sale or leasing of
passenger aircraft, aircraft spare parts and equipment;
c. That the USA shall, within 3 months, report to the Court the action it has taken in
pursuance ofsub-paragraphs (a) and (b);
d. That the USA shall assure Iranian, US and non-US nationals and companies that it
will comply with the Order of the Court, and shall cease any and all statements or
actions that would dissuade US and non-US persons and entities from engaging or
continuing to engage economically with Iran and Iranian nationals or companies;
e. That the USA shall refrain from taking any other measure that might prejudice the
rights of Iran and lranian nationals and companies under the Treaty of Amity with
respect to any decision this Court might render on the merits.
43. Iran reserves the right to amend this Request and the rneasures requested in Para. 42 above.
M. H. Zahedin Labbaf
Agent of the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran
Done at The Hague on I 6 July 20 I 8