INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE APPLICATION INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS filed in the Registry of the Court on 11 June 2018 APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (QATAR v. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES) COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE REQUÊTE INTRODUCTIVE D’INSTANCE enregistrée au Greffe de la Cour le 11 juin 2018 APPLICATION DE LA CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE SUR L’ÉLIMINATION DE TOUTES LES FORMES DE DISCRIMINATION RACIALE (QATAR c. ÉMIRATS ARABES UNIS) I. THE AMBASSADOR OF THE STATE OF QATAR TO THE NETHERLANDS TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE The Hague, 11 June 2018. I have the honour to enclose two originals and a soft copy of an Application from the State of Qatar instituting proceedings against the United Arab Emirates before the International Court of Justice concerning the United Arab Emirates’ interpretation and application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, as well as the State of Qatar’s Request for provisional measures in the same proceedings. I also enclose an instrument signed by H.E. Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, appointing Dr. Mohammed Abdulaziz Al- Khulaifi as Agent for the purpose of filing the Application and the Request for provisional measures, and representing the State of Qatar in the subsequent proceedings. (Signed) H.E. Sheikh, Jassim bin Mohammed Bin Saud Al-Thani. THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE STATE OF QATAR TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 7 June 2018. I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the State of Qatar has appointed Dr. Mohammed Abdulaziz Al- Khulaifi, Legal Counsel to H.E. the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, as its Agent for the purpose of filing the Application of the State of Qatar instituting proceedings against the United Arab Emirates before the International Court of Justice regarding the United Arab Emirates’ interpretation and application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and representing the State of Qatar in the subsequent proceedings. Please also be informed that all communications relating to this case should be sent to the Embassy of the State of Qatar in The Hague, the address of which is Borweg 7, 2597 LR ‘s-Gravenhage, The Hague — Netherlands. (Signed) Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani. 2 2018 General List No. 172 4 II. APPLICATION INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS table of contents page I. Preliminary statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 II. Jurisdiction of the Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 III. The facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 A. Imposition of discriminatory measures against Qatar and Qatari Nationals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 B. Impact of the UAE’s discriminatory measures . . . . . . . . . . . 30 1. Interference with marriage and choice of spouse . . . . . . . . 32 2. Interference with free expression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3. Interference with medical treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 4. Interference with education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 5. Interference with right to work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 6. Impacts on property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7. No legal recourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 C. International condemnation of the UAE’s actions and Qatar’s attempts to achieve diplomatic resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 IV. The UAE’s violations of the CERD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 V. Relief requested by the State of Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 VI. Judge ad hoc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 VII. Reservation of rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 VIII. Appointment of Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 List of Annexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 6 To the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, the undersigned, being duly authorized by the State of Qatar (“Qatar”), states as follows: 1. On behalf of Qatar and pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court (“Statute”) and Article 38 of the Rules of Court, I have the honour to submit to the Court the present Application instituting proceedings against the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”). The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 36 (1) of the Statute and Article 22 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), which entered into force on 4 January 1969. Both Qatar and the UAE are parties to the CERD, acceding to it on 22 July 1976 and 20 June 1974, respectively. I. Preliminary Statement 2. This Application concerns a legal dispute between Qatar and the UAE regarding the UAE’s deliberate and flagrant violations of the CERD. The UAE, unlawfully seeking to pressure Qatar to allow it to interfere in Qatari sovereignty over its affairs, has targeted Qataris and their families for discriminatory treatment. In the process, the UAE has caused severe and irreparable harm to Qatar and Qataris. The UAE’s chosen approach to international affairs contravenes core principles of international human rights law, including the protections contained in the CERD. 3. The UAE has enacted and implemented a series of discriminatory measures directed at Qataris based expressly on their national origin — measures that remain in effect to this day. In particular, on 5 June 2017 and the days that followed, the UAE: — expelled all Qataris within its borders, without exception, giving them just two weeks to leave; — prohibited Qataris from entering into or passing through the UAE, and ordered UAE nationals to leave Qatar or face severe civil penalties, including deprivation of their nationality and the imposition of criminal sanctions; — closed UAE airspace and seaports to Qatar and Qataris and prohibited all inter-State transport, which together with co-ordinated measures enacted simultaneously by other nearby States, rendered Qatar inaccessible by air, by land, and by sea 1; — interfered with the rights of Qataris who own property in the UAE; — prohibited by law any speech deemed to be in “support” of Qatar or opposed to the actions taken against Qatar, on threat of severe financial penalty or up to fifteen years’ imprisonment; and 1 The other States closing their borders or prohibiting transport are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (“Saudi Arabia”), the Arab Republic of Egypt (“Egypt”) and the Kingdom of Bahrain (“Bahrain”). 8 — shut down the local offices of Al Jazeera Media Network (“Al Jazeera”) and blocked the transmission of Al Jazeera and other Qatari stations and websites 2. 4. Further, the UAE has not only failed to condemn racial hatred against Qataris, but has directly incited hate speech, as well as a full-scale media campaign against Qatar and Qataris. UAE Government officials themselves actually have participated in social media attacks on Qatari “sympathizers” and have called for attacks against Qatar. 5. These and other actions described herein targeting Qatar and Qataris (collectively, “discriminatory measures”) are unlawful. The UAE imposed them on Qataris across the board, without any justification under international law, and in particular, without exception and without reference to the particular circumstance of the Qataris impacted. There was no possibility of a hearing or any form of review for the Qataris impacted, much less one affording basic due process. The UAE’s actions clearly violate the CERD. 6. Tragically, but inevitably, the burden of the UAE’s discriminatory measures has fallen on Qataris, who have been subjected to human rights abuses since June 2017. The gravity of the harm suffered has been exacerbated by the historically close ties between the people of Qatar and its neighbours. For decades, citizens of Qatar and the UAE, who share a common language and cultural heritage, have studied and worked together, prayed together, and married into each other’s families. The sweeping and indiscriminate nature of the discriminatory measures has interfered with the most basic elements of daily life for Qataris. They have been denied the ability to marry and live together as a family, to receive medical care, to obtain an education, and to work and own property in order to provide for themselves and their families — simply on the basis that they are Qatari, married to Qataris, the children of Qataris, or otherwise linked to Qatar. 7. In December 2017, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”) published a report documenting the devastating negative impact the discriminatory measures have had on the human rights of Qataris. The OHCHR concluded, in relevant part: “[The discriminatory measures], consisting of severe restrictions of movement, termination and disruption of trade, financial and investment flows, as well as suspension of social and cultural exchanges imposed on the State of Qatar, had immediately translated into actions applying to nationals and residents of Qatar, including citizens of KSA, UAE and Bahrain. Many of these measures have a potentially durable effect on the enjoyment of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of those affected. As there is no evidence of any legal decisions motivating these various measures, and due to the lack of any legal recourse for most individuals concerned, these measures can be considered as arbitrary. These actions were exacerbated by various and widespread forms 2 Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Bahrain announced their own imposition of the same or similar measures beginning on 5 June 2017. “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Severs Diplomatic and Consular Relations with Qatar”, Saudi Press Agency (5 June 2017), http://www.spa. gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637298; “Egypt Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar”, Saudi Press Agency (5 June 2017), http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en &newsid=1637371; “Bahrain severs relations with Qatar”, Saudi Press Agency (5 June 2017), http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637356. 10 of media defamation and campaigns hated [sic] against Qatar, its leadership and people. The majority of the measures were broad and non-targeted, making no distinction between the Government of Qatar and its population. In that sense, they constitute core elements of the definition of unilateral coercive measures as proposed by the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee: ‘the use of economic, trade or other measures taken by a State, group of States or international organizations acting autonomously to compel a change of policy of another State or to pressure individuals, groups or entities in targeted States to influence a course of action without the authorization of the Security Council’. Moreover, measures targeting individuals on the basis of their Qatari nationality or their links with Qatar can be qualified as non-disproportionate and discriminatory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The majority of cases remain unresolved and are likely to durably affect the victims, particularly those having experienced family separation, loss of employment or who have been barred from access to their assets.” 3 The OHCHR’s conclusions mirror those of multiple other human rights bodies, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Committee to Protect Journalists, as well as national human rights bodies, such as Qatar’s National Human Rights Committee (“NHRC”) 4. 8. The discriminatory measures constitute blatant violations of the UAE’s core obligations under the CERD to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination, including discrimination based on national or ethnic origin. Their harmful impact remains ongoing, and all good-faith efforts by Qatar and other members of the international community to negotiate a resolution have failed. 9. Qatar therefore respectfully asks the Court to exercise its jurisdiction to uphold core human rights protections: to hold the UAE accountable for its flagrant violations of the CERD, to redress the harm thereby caused to Qatar and its people, and to employ the full extent of its authority to prevent further harm. II. Jurisdiction of the Court 10. The Court has jurisdiction over this dispute pursuant to Article 36 (1) of the Statute and Article 22 of the CERD 5. 3 Application instituting proceedings (hereinafter “Application”), Annex 16, OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17-24 November 2017, “Report on the Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights” (December 2017) (hereinafter “OHCHR Report”), paras. 60-61, 64 (emphasis added). 4 To date, the NHRC has published five reports on the general effect of the discriminatory measures on Qatar and Qataris, all of which are cited in this Application. However, the figures which underlie these reports vastly understate the actual impact of the discriminatory measures, as they rely on self- reporting by affected individuals, many of whom fear reprisal. 5 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 4 January 1969, 660 United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS) 195 (hereinafter “CERD”). 12 11. As members of the United Nations, Qatar and the UAE are parties to the Statute. Article 36 of the Statute provides that the Court’s jurisdiction comprises “all matters specially provided for . . . in treaties and conventions in force” 6. Both Qatar and the UAE also are parties to the CERD 7. Neither party has entered a reservation to Article 22 of the CERD, which provides for the Court’s jurisdiction: “Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement.” 12. A dispute has plainly arisen between Qatar and the UAE concerning the interpretation and application of the CERD 8. 13. Qatar repeatedly has raised the specific human rights violations resulting from the UAE’s unlawful discrimination since June 2017 and thereafter. For example, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2017, Qatar’s Emir, His Highness Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani, condemned the “illegal blockade”, the resulting negative impact on Qataris, and the broad violations of “the human rights conventions with arbitrary measures that have caused social, economic and religious distress to thousands of citizens and residents of the Gulf Cooperation Council States, by violating the basic human rights to work, education, freedom of movement and the right to dispose of private property”, as well as violations of “human rights conventions and agreements, which guarantee the human right to freedom of opinion and expression” 9. In September 2017, the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Sheikh Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani, brought to the attention of the Human Rights Council the “grave violations” of human rights resulting from the “illegal siege” imposed by the UAE and others, which he stated “clearly violates international laws and covenants related to human rights” 10. Detailing 6 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 36 (1). 7 Qatar acceded to the CERD on 22 July 1976 and the UAE on 20 June 1974. 8 See e.g. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 19 April 2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 115, para. 22 (citing Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74) (holding that a dispute arises where there are “clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non- performance of certain treaty obligations”); see also Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 3, para. 49 (citing Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 11) (holding that a dispute is “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons”). 9 Application, Annex 15, “Address by His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar, at the General Debate of the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 19 September 2017” (certified translation) (hereinafter “Address by H.H. Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani”), p. 4; see also General Assembly of the United Nations, “Qatar: H.H. Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Amir” (19 September 2017), https://gadebate.un.org/en/72/Qatar. 10 “Address by His Excellency Sheikh Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, at the 36th Regular Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 11 September 2017”, available at http://webtv. 14 instances of family separation and other interferences with “fundamental rights and freedoms”, he stated that “it is difficult to understand why people should pay the price for these political rifts” 11. He also reiterated Qatar’s readiness to engage in dialogue to end the crisis, but within the framework of mutual respect and preservation of the sovereignty of the States 12. 14. For its part, the UAE continues to violate the CERD and assert — without any legal basis — that such measures are justified, while at the same time ignoring or outright denying the existence of the ongoing human rights violations. On 18 August 2017, six Special Rapporteurs wrote jointly to the UAE to bring to its attention the “adverse situation and the violations of human rights of Qatari migrants in the United Arab Emirates . . . as a result of the United Arab Emirates Government’s decision to suspend ties with the State of Qatar, particularly their right to movement and residence, family unity, education, work, freedom of expression, health and the right to property, without discrimination on any basis” and explicitly referenced the CERD and specific rights protected thereunder 13. The joint communication further urged the UAE to take all necessary steps to respect the rights of persons affected 14. In response, on 18 September 2017, the UAE stated it was “highly displeased” that the communication was issued as an urgent appeal and declined to address the asserted violations in any detail, stating only that it “continues to uphold” the CERD, and that it is “fully aware of its obligations and commitments in that regard” 15. 15. In January 2018, the UAE, along with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt, issued a “joint statement” attacking the conclusions of the OHCHR Report, expressing “their denunciation of the report’s methodological failure that included a misleading description of the political crisis”, and taking the position that “the boycott . . . of Qatar is part of the exercise of their sovereign right to protect and defend their national security”, without making any attempt to address the substantive violations raised in the report 16. In February 2018, His Excellency the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs again addressed the Human Rights Council, raising again the unlawful actions, including by the UAE, invoking the conclusions of the OHCHR Technical Mission, which “objectively and systematically un.org/watch/qatar-1st-meeting-36th-regular- session-human-rights-council/5571405779001/ ?term=&lan=original (hereinafter “MFA 11 September 2017 Statement”); Application, Annex 13, Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office in Geneva — Switzerland, “H.E. the Foreign Minister delivers a statement before the 36th Session of the Human Rights Council” (11 September 2017). 11 MFA 11 September 2017 Statement, supra note 10. 12 Ibid. 13 Application, Annex 11, “Joint Communication from the Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council to the UAE”, AU ARE 5/2017 (18 August 2017) (hereinafter “Joint Communication of Special Procedures Mandate Holders”), pp. 1, 4. 14 Ibid., p. 7. 15 Application, Annex 14, “Reply of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations at Geneva to the Joint Communication from the Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council”, HRC/NONE/2017/112 (18 September 2017), pp. 2, 3. 16 Ibid., Annex 18, “Joint Statement Issued by Four Boycotting States Denouncing Report of UNHCR’s Technical Mission on Its Visit to Qatar”, Saudi Press Agency (30 January 2018). 16 describes the serious human rights violations by the blockading countries against citizens and residents both in the State of Qatar and in the blockading countries”, and confirming that “these violations continue to this day” 17. He called upon the Council and its Special Procedures mechanisms to put an end to the human rights violations, which he referred to as “unilateral coercive discriminatory measures” 18. 16. Later in February 2018, the UAE responded to Qatar’s intervention at the Human Rights Council in a statement issued with other countries, to state that they will “continue to exercise their sovereign right to boycott the Government of Qatar, guaranteed by international law 19 ”. The UAE also stated that “this small political crisis between countries must be resolved within the framework of the existing Kuwaiti mediation efforts led by His Highness Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah 20”. 17. Unfortunately, UAE’s support for the Kuwaiti mediation efforts has been in name only. While Qatar expressed its willingness to engage in an “unconditional dialogue” 21, including as part of the Kuwaiti mediation, the UAE has repeatedly rejected attempts by Kuwait and other third parties to provide a basis for good faith discussions, instead stating that the UAE has no intention of ending the discriminatory measures, or of even negotiating with Qatar, without full capitulation from Qatar to the UAE’s illegal political demands 22. Indeed, the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, “[w]hile applauding a Kuwaiti effort 17 Application, Annex 19, Permanent Mission of Qatar to the United Nations Office in Geneva — Switzerland, “Statement of H.E. Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 37th Human Rights Council” (25 February 2018) (hereinafter “MFA 25 February 2018 Statement”); see also Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Calls on Human Rights Council to Immediately End Siege Countries’ Violations” (28 February 2018), https://www. mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2018/02/28/qatar-calls-on-human- rights-council-toimmediately- end-siege-countries%27-violations (describing an additional statement made by Qatar in response to the UAE’s statement discussed infra, paragraph 16, in which Third Secretary of the Permanent Delegation of Qatar Talal Al-Na’ama reiterated that the UAE’s actions constitute “unilateral coercive measures in contravention of the principles of international law, international human rights law and the Charter of the United Nations”). 18 Ibid., Annex 19, MFA 25 February 2018 Statement, supra note 17. 19 See Annex 20, “Arab Quartet responds to Qatar’s remarks at the UN Human Rights Council”, Al Arabiya English (28 February 2018). 20 Ibid. 21 See Application, Annex 15, Address by H.H. Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, supra note 9, p. 5 (calling for an “unconditional dialogue based on mutual respect for sovereignty” to address the ongoing human rights crisis, noting that Qatar “has supported since the beginning” the mediation efforts of the Kuwaiti emir); see also Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry’s Spokesperson: Qatar Continues to Welcome Kuwaiti Mediation, Hopes for Serious Steps by Siege Countries” (3 March 2018), https://mofa.gov.qa/en/ all-mofa-news/details/2018/03/03/foreign- ministry%27s-spokesperson-qatar-continues-towelcome- kuwaiti-mediation-hopes-for-serious-steps-by-siege-countries; Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Highly Appreciates H.H. the Emir of Kuwait’s Speech on Gulf Crisis” (24 October 2017), https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/10/24/ qatar- highly-appreciates-hh-the-emir-of-kuwait%27s-speech-on-gulf-crisis. 22 See infra paragraphs 26-28 (describing political demands); see e.g. UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, “Arab Officials Demand Action from Qatar in Briefing with UN Correspondents” (20 July 2017), https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/ MediaCenter/News/Pages/20-07-2017-UAE-Qatar.aspx (quoting Reem bint Ibrahim Al Hashimy, UAE Minister of State for International Cooperation, as referencing political demands and stating that “our demands are clear. The principles for mediation are laid out. Now it is on Qatar to come to the table”); see also Ali Bakeer, “GCC Crisis: Why Is Kuwaiti 18 to mediate the crisis . . . said Emirati and Saudi officials planned to concede nothing to Qatar 23”. In December 2017, the UAE even declined to send its Head of State to participate in the 2017 GCC summit, despite an invitation to do so from Kuwait and public statements from Qatar that the summit would provide a “golden opportunity” to “start a dialogue” to resolve the crisis, leaving the Emirs of Qatar and Kuwait as the only Heads of State to attend the meeting 24. The result of the UAE’s tactics is that, in spite of the efforts of the Emir of Kuwait and others, including the United States, France and the European Union, no resolution has been brokered 25. 18. Most recently, on 1 May 2018, in light of the urgency presented by the human rights crisis caused by the UAE’s discriminatory conduct, His Excellency Sultan Ben Saed Al-Marikhi, the Qatari Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, requested that the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Anwar Gargash, agree to negotiate to address the ongoing violations of the CERD 26. The request asked for a response within two weeks. The UAE did not respond at all. Six weeks later, the UAE still has not responded. 19. The Parties have not been able to settle their dispute, despite genuine attempts by Qatar to negotiate with a view toward resolving the dispute 27, nor Mediation not Working?”, Al Jazeera (11 August 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/ opinion/ 2017/08/gcc- crisis-kuwaiti-mediation-working-170807093244546.html. 23 Jon Gambrell, “Emirati Diplomat to AP: ‘Nothing to Negotiate’ with Qatar”, US News (7 June 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2017-06-07/uae- rulingfamily- member-qatar-now-questioning-its-leaders. 24 Ahmed Hagagy, “Gulf Rulers Boycotting Qatar Skip Annual Summit”, Reuters (5 December 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar- summit/gulf- rulersboycotting- qatar-skip-annual-summit-idUSKBN1DZ15U; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, “Foreign Minister: Qatar Sees any GCC Meeting Golden Opportunity for Civilized Dialogue” (22 October 2017), https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/ details/2017/10/22/foreign- minister-qatar-sees-any-gcc-meeting-golden-opportunity-forcivilized- dialogue; see also Patrick Wintour, “UAE announces new Saudi alliance that could reshape Gulf relations”, The Guardian (5 December 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2017/dec/05/uae-saudi- arabia-alliance-gulf-relations-gcc. 25 “Trump Offers to Mediate Talks on the Qatar Crisis”, Reuters (7 September 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-usa/trump- offers-to-mediate-talks-on-qatarcrisis- idUSKCN1BI2SG; “Qatar Emir Meets Merkel, Macron on First Foreign Tour since Crisis”, France 24 (15 September 2017), http://www.france24.com/en/20170915-qatar-emirangela- merkel-emmanuel-macron-gulf-crisis; “Communiqué de presse à l’issue de l’entretien entre le Président de la République et l’Emir du Quatar”, Elysée (15 September 2017), http:// www.elysee.fr/communiques-de- presse/article/communique-de- presse-a-l-issue-de-lentretien- entre-le-president-de-la-republique-et-l-emir-du-quatar/; Ali Bakeer, “GCC crisis: Why is Kuwaiti mediation not working?”, Al Jazeera (11 August 2017), http://www. aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/gcc- crisis-kuwaiti-mediation-working- 170807 093244546.html. 26 Application, Annex 21, “Request for Negotiation, H.E. Sultan Ben Saad Al- Marikhi, Qatar Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, to H.E. Anwar Mohammed Gargash, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, dated 25 April 2018”, received via fax and registered mail on 1 May 2018. 27 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 1 April 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 70, para. 157. (“[T]he concept of ‘negotiations’. . . requires — at the very least — a genuine attempt by one of the disputing parties to engage in discussions with the other disputing party, with a view to resolving the dispute.”) 20 have the Parties agreed on another form of dispute resolution. It is evident that further attempts at negotiations would be futile, and waiting any longer is prejudicial to Qataris currently suffering as a result of the UAE’s violations of the CERD 28. 20. Upon the filing of the present Application, the matters in dispute between Qatar and the UAE concerning the UAE’s interpretation and application of the CERD therefore fall within the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. III. The Facts A. Imposition of Discriminatory Measures against Qatar and Qatari Nationals 21. The “spark that lit the fuse” for the UAE’s unlawful actions occurred on 23 May 2017, when cyber hackers posted a fake news story on the website of the Qatar News Agency (“QNA”), attributing incendiary false statements to the Emir of Qatar supporting the Islamic Republic of Iran and criticizing the US President 29. Qatar immediately and publicly confirmed that the QNA website had been hacked and the story was false 30. Qatar called the operation an act of “cyberterrorism” that “represent[ed] a clear violation and breach of international law and of the bilateral and collective agreements signed between the member states of the 28 On 8 March 2018, Qatar deposited a communication with the CERD Committee under Article 11 of the CERD. While the CERD Committee procedure set out in Articles 11-13 of the CERD provides a framework by which the parties might come to a consensual resolution, initiation or completion of that procedure is not a precondition to the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. See e.g. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 142, para. 43, joint dissenting opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, (“The Committee established by the Convention has no power to impose a legally binding solution on the disputing States . . . ultimately, a favourable outcome depends on the readiness of the parties to come to an agreement, in other words, on their willingness to negotiate . . . [W]here a State has already tried, without success, to negotiate directly with another State . . . it would be senseless to require it to follow the special procedures in [Articles 11-13 of the CERD].”). Here, where the UAE has stated that its demands are non- negotiable, its conduct has made evident that reliance on negotiations would be futile, and as the prejudice to the human rights of Qataris continues unabated, Qatar has concluded that it must invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to achieve a binding resolution of the dispute. 29 See William Maclean, “Gulf rift reopens as Qatar decries hacked comments by emir”, Reuters (23 May 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-cyber/gulf-rift- reopens-asqatar- decries-hacked-comments-by-emir-idUSKBN18K02Z. 30 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, “Foreign Minister: ‘Qatar Will Address the Media Campaign Targeting It’” (25 May 2017), https://mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofanews/ details/2017/05/25/foreign- minister-%27qatar-will-address-the-media-campaigntargeting- it%27; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, “An Official Source at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Perpetrators of the Electronic Piracy against Qatar News Agency Website Will Be Prosecuted” (24 May 2017), https://mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/ details/2017/05/24/an- official-source-at-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-the-perpetrators-ofthe- electronic-piracy-against-qatar-news-agency-website-will-be-prosecuted. 22 GCC, as well as collective agreements with the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the United Nations” 31. 22. Nevertheless, the UAE continued to broadcast the false statements widely and seized upon them as an excuse to implement the discriminatory measures. In particular, on 5 June 2017, the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following statement, announcing that the UAE was severing all diplomatic and consular ties with Qatar and enacting a broad series of discriminatory measures against Qatar and Qataris: “UAE affirms its complete commitment and support to the Gulf Cooperation Council and to the security and stability of the GCC States. Within this framework, and based on the insistence of the State of Qatar to continue to undermine the security and stability of the region and its failure to honour international commitments and agreements, it has been decided to take the following measures that are necessary for safeguarding the interests of the GCC States in general and those of the brotherly Qatari people in particular: (1) In support of the statements issued by the sisterly Kingdom of Bahrain and sisterly Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates severs all relations with the State of Qatar, including breaking off diplomatic relations, and gives Qatari diplomats 48 hours to leave UAE. (2) Preventing Qatari nationals from entering the UAE or crossing its points of entry, giving Qatari residents and visitors in the UAE 14 days to leave the country for precautionary security reasons. The UAE nationals are likewise banned from traveling to or staying in Qatar or transiting through its territories. (3) Closure of UAE airspace and seaports for all Qataris in 24 hours and banning all Qatari means of transportation, coming to or leaving the UAE, from crossing, entering or leaving the UAE territories, and taking all legal measures in collaboration with friendly countries and international companies with regards to Qataris using the UAE airspace and territorial waters, from and to Qatar, for national security considerations. The UAE is taking these decisive measures as a result of the Qatari authorities’ failure to abide by the Riyadh Agreement on returning GCC diplomats to Doha and its Complementary Arrangement in 2014, and Qatar’s continued support, funding and hosting of terror groups, primarily Islamic Brotherhood, and its sustained endeavours to promote the ideologies of Daesh and Al Qaeda across its direct and indirect media. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . While regretting the policies taken by the State of Qatar that sow seeds of sedition and discord among the region’s countries, the UAE affirms its full respect and appreciation for the brotherly Qatari people on account of the profound historical, religious and fraternal ties and kin relations binding UAE and Qatari peoples.” 32 31 “UAE Violated International Law by Hacking QNA Website: Qatar”, Gulf Times (17 July 2017), http://www.gulf-times.com/story/556991/UAE-violated- international-lawby- hacking-QNA-webs. 32 Application, Annex 2, “Statement of Support for Blockade and Cessation of Ties by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs” dated 5 June 2017 (hereinafter “UAE 5 June 2017 Statement”). 24 23. The UAE implemented these and other discriminatory measures in a calculated and brutal manner, without regard to their impact upon individuals and their rights. Such measures included: — closing airspace to Qatari aviation companies and Qatari-registered aircraft, as well as air transportation to and from Qatar, which together with co-ordinated measures enacted simultaneously by other nearby States rendered Qatar inaccessible by air and by land 33; — imposing transport restrictions on Qatari ships and their use of UAE territorial waters and seaports 34; — collectively expelling Qataris from UAE territory, giving them just two weeks to leave 35; and — prohibiting Qataris from entering into or passing through UAE territory and ordering UAE nationals to leave Qatar or face severe civil penalties, including deprivation of their nationality and criminal sanctions 36. 33 See note 32 supra. The UAE’s measures were taken in co- ordination with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt. See Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Announcement of Cessation of Ties” (5 June 2017), www.mofa.gov.sa/ServicesAnd Information/news/MinistryNews/Pages/ArticleID20176513029701.aspx; Bahrain Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the severance of diplomatic relations with the State of Qatar” (5 June 2017), http://www.mofa.gov.bh/Default. aspx?tabid=7824&language =en-US&ItemId=7474; “Qatari Planes Banned from Egyptian and Saudi Air Space”, BBC News (6 June 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world- middleeast- 40164552. Saudi Arabia immediately closed Qatar’s only land border after severing ties with Qatar on 5 June 2017. See Tom Finn, Ibrahim Saber, “Qatar-Saudi land border deserted after frontier shut”, Reuters (12 June 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-gulf-qatar- border-saudi-idUSKBN1931PO. Though the border was briefly reopened in August 2017, Saudi Arabia’s customs directorate indefinitely closed the border on 18 December 2017. “Saudis permanently close only land border with Qatar”, Al Jazeera (20 December 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/saudi- permanently-closesland- border-qatar-171220062311052.html. 34 Application, Annex 4, UAE, Federal Transport Authority Circular No. 2/2/1023, “Entry Restrictions to All Qatar Vessels and Cargoes: Implementation Process of the Decision Related to Qatar Sanctions” (11 June 2017). 35 Ibid., Annex 2, UAE 5 June 2017 Statement, supra note 32. 36 Ibid., Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3, para. 34; Ibid., Annex 2, UAE 5 June 2017 Statement, supra note 32. As reported by the Saudi Press Agency, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and others announced similar measures that day and in the days that followed. See e.g. “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Severs Diplomatic and Consular Relations with Qatar” (5 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en& newsid=1637327; “Egypt Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar” (5 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637371; “Bahrain Severs Relations with Qatar” (5 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, https://www.spa.gov.sa/ viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637356. See also, “Yamen [sic] Severs Relations with Qatar” (5 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en &newsid=1637361; “Libya Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar” (5 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637406; “Mauritania Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar” (7 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http:// www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637919; “Comoros Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar” (7 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory. php?lang=en&newsid=1638089; “Djibouti Reduces Its Diplomatic Representation with Qatar” (8 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en &newsid=1638421; “Niger recalls Ambassador to Qatar” (10 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1638877. 26 The UAE issued these discriminatory measures without concern for the fact that many families in Qatar and the UAE are composed of both Qatari and Emirati nationals. 24. After 5 June 2017, the UAE escalated its restrictions on freedom of expression, particularly in relation to Qatari broadcasts and broadcasters. Having already blocked access to at least eight news websites operated by Qatari entities, including Al Jazeera, at the end of May 2017, the UAE also blocked the transmission of other Qatari stations and websites, including channels owned by Qatar’s beIN Media 37. Reporters Without Borders and other human rights groups condemned these acts and the UAE’s demand that Qatar silence Al Jazeera, highlighting their unjustified and disproportionate impacts on core human rights 38. 25. The UAE also announced that it would criminalize “sympathizing” with Qatar 39. The Attorney General of the UAE released a statement on 7 June 2017 that “expressing sympathy, bias, or affection for [Qatar], or objecting to the position of the State of the United Arab Emirates and the strict and firm measures that it has taken against the Qatari Government, whether through social media with tweets or posts, or any other verbal or written method, is considered a crime” under the UAE’s Federal Decree on Combating Cybercrimes 40. According to the Attorney General’s statement, the punishment for violation includes a jail 37 “Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain Block Qatari News Websites”, Committee to Protect Journalists (25 May 2017), https://cpj.org/2017/05/saudi- arabia-uae-bahrain-block-qatarinews- website.php; Zahraa Alkhalisi, “Blocked in Dubai: Qatar cartoon and soccer channels”, CNN Media (8 June 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/06/08/media/uae-qatarmedia- blocked/index.html; “Request for Consultations by Qatar, United Arab Emirates — Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, and Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”, WTO Doc. WT/DS526/1 (4 August 2017), https://docs.wto. org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds526/1%20 or%20wt/ds526/1/*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUI Changed=true#. 38 “Unacceptable Call for Al Jazeera’s Closure in Gulf Crisis”, Reporters Without Borders (28 June 2017), https://rsf.org/en/news/unacceptable-call-al- jazeeras-closure-gulfcrisis. 39 Application, Annex 3, “Attorney General Warns against Sympathy for Qatar or Objecting to the State’s Positions”, Al Bayan Online (7 June 2017) (certified translation); see also Application, Annex 1, “Federal Decree — Law No. 5 of 2012, Issued on 25 Ramadan 1433 AH, corresponding to 13 August 2012 AD, on Combating Cybercrimes” (hereinafter “Federal Decree on Combating Cybercrimes”). 40 Application, Annex 3, see also “Qatar sympathisers to face fine, jail”, Gulf News (7 June 2017), https://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/qatar- sympathisers-to-face-finejail- 1.2039631; “UAE bans expressions of sympathy towards Qatar-media”, Reuters (7 June 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/gulf-qatar/uae-bans- expressions-of-sympathy-towardsqatar- media-idUSL8N1J40D2; “UAE threatens 15 years in prison for expressions of ‘sympathy’ with Qatar”, Committee to Protect Journalists (7 June 2017), https://cpj. org/2017/06/uae- threatens-15-years-in-prison-for-expressions-o.php; Sam Wilkin, “Support for Qatar Could Land You in Jail, U.A.E. Warns Residents”, Bloomberg (7 June 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-07/support-for-qatar-could-land-you-injail- u-a-e-warns- residents. 28 term of up to 15 years and a fine of not less than AED 500,000 (approximately US$136,000) 41. 26. A few weeks later, on 23 June 2017, the UAE escalated the crisis of its own making, issuing a threat to maintain the discriminatory measures indefinitely if Qatar did not accede to a list of thirteen political demands (the “13 demands”) 42. These included demands that Qatar: permanently shut down Al Jazeera, all affiliate stations, and all other Qatar-funded news outlets; subjugate its foreign policy and ability to pursue diplomatic and strategic relationships to the will of the UAE; hand over individuals “wanted” by the UAE; and allow broad intrusions — including monthly “audits” — into Qatar’s internal decision-making 43. Qatar was given ten days to respond, which was subsequently extended by 48 hours at the request of the Emir of Kuwait 44. 27. While the UAE had claimed, without substantiation, that the discriminatory measures were motivated by its national security concerns, the substance of the 13 demands made clear that they were actually an attempt to curtail media freedom and undermine Qatar’s sovereignty by attempting to dictate Qatar’s international relations, as well as interfere with Qatar’s internal affairs. On 28 June 2017, the Committee to Protect Journalists issued the following statement: “[T]he demand to shutter all Qatari-funded media—including the international network Al Jazeera, but also the news websites Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, Middle East Eye, Arabi21, Egypt’s Rassd news agency, and others — shows 41Application, Annex 3, see also Annex 1, Federal Decree — Law No. 5 on Combating Cybercrimes, supra note 39. 42 Ibid., Annex 7, “The 13 demands on Qatar from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt”, The National (23 June 2017). 43 Specifically, the demands of the UAE included that Qatar: terminate the Turkish military presence currently in Qatar and end any joint military co- operation with Turkey inside of Qatar; consent to yearly “compliance” audits for ten years, including monthly audits for the first year; pay reparations for losses purportedly caused by Qatar’s policies, in an amount to be determined “in co- ordination” with Qatar; cease contacts with political opposition in the UAE and hand over details of Qatar’s prior contacts with and support for those groups; curb diplomatic ties with Iran, close its diplomatic missions there, expel members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard from Qatar, cut off any joint military co- operation with Iran, and engage only in trade and commerce with Iran that “complies” with US and international sanctions; revise citizenship laws, in particular the practice of granting citizenship to nationals from the UAE who are “wanted” in the UAE, and revoke Qatari citizenship if that citizenship violates the UAE’s laws; align itself with the other Gulf and Arab countries militarily, politically, socially, and “on economic matters, in line with an agreement reached with Saudi Arabia in 2014”; sever ties and stop all means of funding for individuals, groups, or organizations that have been designated as terrorists by the UAE, the United States, and other countries; and freeze assets of wanted individuals from the UAE and provide any desired information about their residency, movements, and finances. See ibid. 44 “Qatar given 10 days to meet 13 sweeping demands by Saudi Arabia”, The Guardian (23 June 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/23/close-al- jazeera-saudi-arabiaissues- qatar-with-13-demands-to-end-blockade; “In response to Amir of Kuwait’s request, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt agree to extend the grace period offered to Qatar to 48 hours” (3 July 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang =en&newsid=1644914. 30 clear contempt for the principle of press freedom and to [the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt’s] treaty commitments to the rights to free expression and to freely receive and impart information. The demand also represents a clear attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries where these media companies operate — under the guise of demanding that Qatar not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, thereby limiting the diversity of sources for information and views in the region.” 45 28. On 5 July 2017, the UAE issued an additional list of “six principles” with which Qatar must comply in order for the discriminatory measures to be lifted 46. In a public statement, the UAE claimed that these “principles” were consistent with principles in various international conventions related to “combating international terrorism”, including to “refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of States” 47. The UAE later underscored that these “principles” were intended to supplement, rather than replace, the original 13 demands 48. But again, the UAE’s reference to combating terrorism has been revealed as just pretext. For example, a UAE official has been quoted as saying that the discriminatory measures would end if Qatar agreed to give up hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and a financial plan designed to force Qatar to pass the World Cup to another Gulf State was leaked in November 2017 49. As before, Qatar refused to comply with this latest challenge to its sovereignty 50. B. Impact of the UAE’s Discriminatory Measures 29. Due to their relative proximity, shared culture, and previously open borders, many Qataris live, work, study and travel within the UAE, and are married to Emiratis. The same is true for many Emiratis in Qatar. 30. As a result of these close ties, the discriminatory measures have had a devastating impact on Qataris and families of which they are a part. They have inter- 45 Joel Simon, “Calls to shutter Qatari media show contempt for press freedom”, Committee to Protect Journalists (28 June 2017), https://cpj.org/2017/06/calls-to- shutterqatari- media-show-contempt-for-pr.php. 46 See Application, Annex 9, “Full joint statement of boycotting countries on Qatar crisis”, Al Arabiya English (5 July 2017). 47 Ibid. 48 See “Boycotting quartet reaffirms its demands on Qatar”, Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports — Egypt Edition (3 August 2017), https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?arti cleid=1345752318&Country=Qatar&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Inte rnational+relations&u=1&pid=1325726316&oid=1325726316&uid=1; “Four Arab States Double Down on Qatar Boycott”, Agence France Presse (30 July 2017), http://www. newagebd.net/article/20920/four-arab- states-double-down-on-qatar-boycott. 49 “UAE official urges Qatar to give up World Cup to end crisis”, Fox News (9 October 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/10/09/uae- official-urges-qatar-to-give-up-worldcup- to-end-crisis.html; Ryan Grim and Ben Walsh, “Leaked Documents Expose Stunning Plan to Wage Financial War on Qatar — and Steal the World Cup”, The Intercept (9 November 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/11/09/uae-qatar- oitaba-rowland-banquehavilland- world-cup/. 50 See “Sheikh Tamim: Any talks must respect Qatar sovereignty”, Al Jazeera (22 July 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/sheikh-tamim-talks- respect-qatar-sovereignty- 170721184815998.html. 32 fered with basic human rights protected by the CERD, including the rights to marriage and choice of spouse, free expression, education, medical treatment, work, property, and others. Further, Qataris have been denied any effective means of legal recourse to seek redress against the discriminatory measures. 1. Interference with marriage and choice of spouse 31. Family ties often cut across national boundaries in the Gulf region, with 3,694 marriages between Qataris and citizens of the UAE as of June 2017 51. These ties often span generations, and for these families, the ability to live and move freely between their multiple countries of citizenship is essential to maintaining the togetherness of their family units and the well-being of the parents and children within those units. 32. The collective expulsion of Qataris from the UAE, the recall of Emiratis in Qatar, and the prohibition or restrictions on entry and travel to the UAE have had a profound impact on mixed-nationality families. Since the imposition of the discriminatory measures, Qatar’s NHRC found 82 cases of family separation involving the UAE, and stated that the “real impact is greater” 52. Likewise, Human Rights Watch found almost half of the individuals interviewed (22 of 50), which included Qataris, reported that the travel restrictions had cut them off from immediate family members 53. 33. In addition to forced separation, the discriminatory measures have disproportionately harmed infant children born in Qatar to Qatari mothers and Emirati fathers. Because these children possess their fathers’ nationality, the families must rely upon the UAE to obtain proof of the infant’s nationality. However, since the UAE has withdrawn its Embassy from Qatar, the only way to obtain proof of national identity and passports for the infant is for the parent and child to travel to the UAE — which Qatari mothers cannot do subsequent to the discriminatory measures 54. As such, these families are left with an impossible choice — leaving the infant’s mother behind in Qatar, thereby risking indefinite family separation, or staying together as a family in Qatar without proof of the child’s identity, at risk of de facto statelessness for the child 55. 34. Although the UAE, following the outcry from international human rights organizations, purported to implement measures to account for the “humanitarian situation” of Qatari-Emirati families, these measures are patently insufficient to mitigate the human rights violations of Qataris. As reported by the UN High Commissioner and other human rights organizations in the aftermath of the imposition of the discriminatory measures, the measures taken by the UAE — consisting primarily of announcing “committees” and “hotlines” for Qatari-Emirati 51 Application, Annex 11, “Joint Communication from the Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council to the UAE”, pp. 1-2. 52 Ibid., Annex 22, National Human Rights Committee, “A Year of the Blockade Imposed on Qatar” (June 2018) (hereinafter “NHRC Fifth Report”), p. 14; Annex 12, National Human Rights Committee, “100 Days under the Blockade” (30 August 2017), p. 5. 53 See Annex 10, Human Rights Watch, “Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses” (12 July 2017) (interviewing Qatari, Saudi, and Bahraini individuals) (hereinafter “Human Rights Watch, July 2017 Report”). 54 See “Gulf Crisis Shows How Discrimination in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar Tears Families Apart” (21 July 2017), Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/ news/2017/07/21/gulf- crisis-shows-how-discrimination-saudi-arabia-bahrain-uae-and-qatartears. 55 See Application, Annex 10, Human Rights Watch, July 2017 Report, supra note 53. 34 families purportedly to deal with issues arising out the discriminatory measures — have been “clearly insufficient to address the human rights impact” 56. Further, in some cases, individuals have been hindered from using them by fear of reprisals 57. Out of 50 Gulf nationals interviewed by Human Rights Watch, only 12 attempted to use the UAE’s “hotlines”, and only two of these 12 obtained permission to live in Qatar 58. The majority of Gulf nationals interviewed did not attempt to call the hotlines, citing concerns that the hotlines could expose them to reprisal or, more simply, would be futile 59. The NHRC’s June 2018 Report concluded: “according to international organizations and reports despite the formation of these alleged committees and the allocation of telephone numbers to receive communications, this procedure has been deemed highly ineffective” 60. Against the scope and gravity of the UAE’s blanket expulsion and exclusion of Qataris based on their national origin, these “hotlines” are cosmetic at best and cannot address the devastating human rights impact on Qataris. 35. As documented by the OHCHR Report, “[t]he decision of 5 June has led to cases of temporary or potentially durable separation of families across the countries concerned, which has caused psychological distress as well as some difficulties for some individuals to economically support their relatives left in Qatar or the other countries” 61. 56 Application, Annex 14, “Reply by the United Arab Emirates to the Joint Communication from Special Rapporteurs of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights”, HRC/NONE/2017/112 (18 September 2017) (“[a] committee representing all relevant entities in the country has been established in order to facilitate procedures for families of mixed Emirati- Qatari nationality and to deal with issues related to real estate, businesses and vehicles owned by Qatari nationals, as well as matters related to health. In that regard, a hotline has also been set up”); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Qatar diplomatic crisis: Comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on impact on human rights” (14 June 2017), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21739& LangID=E (noting that measures implemented to address dual nationality families “are not sufficiently effective to address all cases” and that the UAE and Bahrain have threatened to jail and fine people who express sympathy for Qatar); Annex 6, Amnesty International, “Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human dignity trampled and families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes” (19 June 2017), p. 2 (hereinafter “Amnesty International, June 2017 Report”); Application, Annex 10, Human Rights Watch, July 2017 Report, supra note 53. 57 See Application, Annex 6, Amnesty International, June 2017 Report, supra note 56, p. 2. 58 See ibid., Annex 10, Human Rights Watch, July 2017 Report, supra note 53, p. 6. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid., Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 10. 61 Ibid., Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3, para. 32. 36 2. Interference with free expression 36. As noted above, after 5 June 2017, the UAE immediately moved to undermine free expression from and regarding Qatar, including by blocking access to Qatari news websites and criminalizing so-called “sympathy” with Qatar. At the same time, prominent UAE outlets began to publish anti-Qatar editorials on a daily basis 62. The UAE’s attacks on free expression have been described by the OHCHR as part of a “widespread defamation and hatred campaign against Qatar” 63. Between June and October 2017, at least 1,120 press articles and 600 anti-Qatar caricatures were published in Gulf States, including the UAE 64. Press articles and anti-Qatar caricatures continue to be published in the UAE, and popular entertainment programmes routinely broadcast anti-Qatar messages 65. 37. The UAE’s campaign against Qatar is not limited to the Gulf. SCL Social, a British communications company, revealed in its 2017 public disclosures pursuant to the US Foreign Agents Registration Act that the UAE’s National Media Council had paid it US$330,000 to launch a public relations campaign against Qatar on social media 66. The contract reportedly required the creation of advertisements for social media websites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube that linked Qatar with terrorism and promulgated an artificial movement using the hashtag #boycottqatar 67. The English-language campaign was arranged to coincide with the United Nations General Assembly meeting in September 2017 68. 62 See e.g. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “What’s going on with Qatar?”, The Washington Post (1 June 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/01/ whats-going-on-with-qatar/?utm_term=.9a4d95e090f1. 63 Application, Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3, para. 14. 64 Ibid., para. 16 (considering negative press articles and anti-Qatar caricatures published in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain). 65 Ibid., paras. 16-17. 66 SCL Social Limited, Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (6 October 2017), https://www.fara.gov/docs/6472-Registration- Statement-20171006- 1.pdf; Anita Kumar and Ben Wieder, “Steve Bannon’s already murky Middle East ties deepen”, McClatchy Washington Bureau (23 October 2017), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/ news/politics- government/white-house/article180111646.html. 67 Julia Ainsley, Andrew W. Lehren and Anna R. Schecter, “The Mueller effect: FARA filings soar in shadow of Manafort, Flynn probes”, NBC News (19 January 2018), https:// www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/mueller- effect-fara-filings-soar-shadow-manafort-flynnprobes- n838571. 68 See SCL Social Limited, Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (6 October 2017), https://www.fara.gov/docs/6472-Registration- Statement- 20171006-1.pdf. Image 1: Caricature from UAE News Agency 38 38. UAE Government officials have also made public statements fostering anti-Qatari sentiment. In November 2017, a former Chief of the Dubai Police Force and current Head of General Security for the Emirate of Dubai falsely accused Al Jazeera of provoking an attack in Egypt and called for the bombing of the media network 69. The UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs tweeted support for a Saudi royal court adviser’s so-called “blacklist”, a campaign intended to expose the names and identities of anyone showing sympathy with Qatar and anyone who “conspires” against the UAE 70. He expressed that this “blacklist” “[was] extremely important” in exposing nationals who were sympathetic to Qatar 71. These calls foment a toxic and hostile culture that affects all Qataris and exposes even relatively benign acts of civility toward Qataris to the risk of punishment. In July 2017, for example, an Emirati national was arrested for publishing a video voicing his opinion that Emiratis should not stand against Qatar; Amnesty International called for his release, but whether he remains detained is unclear 72. In December 2017, Youssef Al Serkal, the President of the UAE General Sports Authority, was discharged from his position after public shaming by Emirati media for hugging a Qatari official 73. 39. Together, the co-ordinated campaign to shut down speech from Qatar, proliferate false and inflammatory news about Qatar and its people, criminalize sympathy toward Qatar and its people, and isolate and punish Qataris, interferes with the right to freedom of expression and creates a culture of fear for Qataris and those related or otherwise associated with them. A Qatari woman with brothers in the UAE told Amnesty International that they “are scared to speak to us even over the phone. The law does not allow them to sympathize with us. They are very reserved in the conversations we have, as if we were strangers.” 74 69 Dhahi Khalfan (@Dhahi_Khalfan), Twitter (24 November 2017), https://twitter.com/ Dhahi_Khalfan/status/934069452261425152 (unofficial translation: “The alliance should bomb the terrorism propaganda machine. The channel of ISIS, Al Qaeda and Al Nusra, the Jazeera of terrorism”); “Dubai security chief calls for bombing of Al Jazeera”, Al Jazeera (25 November 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/dubai- security-chief-callsbombing- al-jazeera-171125143439231.html. 70 The Saudi adviser created a hashtag on Twitter, #TheBlacklist, with the stated intention of compiling accusations of “conspiracy” against Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain. “Saudi Twitter users urged to expose Qatar sympathisers”, Al Jazeera (20 August 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/saudi- twitter-users-urged-expose-qatarsympathisers- 170820100619561.html. 71 Ibid.; “Tweet names of Qatar sympathisers to ‘blacklist’: Saudi royal aide”, Middle East Eye (18 August 2017), https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-royal- adviser-callsnames- add-blacklist-qatar-sympathisers-1564107564. 72 Application, Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 34. 73 “Qatar’s blockade in 2017, day by day developments”, Al Jazeera (21 October 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/qatar- crisis-developments-october-21- 171022153053754.html; Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 34. 74 “Gulf dispute: Six months on, individuals still bear brunt of political crisis” (14 December 2017), Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/ 7604/2017/en. 40 3. Interference with medical treatment 40. Qataris frequently accessed medical treatment in the UAE, either because they resided in the UAE or because certain essential medical treatment was not available in Qatar. The UAE’s collective expulsion of Qataris and blanket restrictions on Qatari travel included Qataris receiving essential medical treatment. As a result, Qataris requiring medical attention in the UAE that is not available in Qatar have been denied necessary care, as have Qataris in the UAE who have been prohibited from continuing their course of medical treatment 75. As of June 2018, the NHRC of Qatar had documented four cases of interference with medical treatment by the UAE 76. 41. Similarly, the UAE subjected medicines and medical supplies to its blanket restrictions on ports and shipping. Before 5 June 2017, 50 to 60 per cent of Qatar’s pharmaceutical stock came from supply companies in Gulf countries, the majority of which are based in the UAE 77. The Qatar Ministry of Health reported that it has thus far been able to cover the increased cost of importing most materials from other suppliers, but it has not been able to source all of the medicines previously shipped from Gulf States 78. 4. Interference with education 42. The discriminatory measures have gravely undermined the education of Qataris who were studying in the UAE. Among other effects, UAE schools summarily expelled Qataris or dropped Qatari students from class registration, refused to refund registration and other fees, and refused to grant students access to educational records 79. As of June 2018, the NHRC documented 148 complaints related to interference with education by the UAE 80. 5. Interference with right to work 43. The discriminatory measures have also violated the rights of many Qataris who work or own businesses in the UAE. Qataris working in the UAE when the discriminatory measures were imposed had their employment threatened or summarily curtailed when they were forced to leave the country. To cite just one example, Mr. H.A., a Qatari national born in 1953, stated: “I reside in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi in the UAE since 30 years and I am working there. After the decision 75 See Application, Annex 8, National Human Rights Committee, “Second Report regarding the Human Rights Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State of Qatar” (1 July 2017), p. 23 (documenting treatment at hospitals in the UAE, as well as in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt). 76 Ibid., Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 51. 77 Ibid.; see also Barbara Bibbo, “Euro-med urges GCC countries to lift Qatar Blockade”, Al Jazeera (24 January 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/euro-med-urges-gcccountries- lift-qatar-blockade-180124190054488.html. 78 Ibid., Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3, paras. 47-48. 79 Ibid., Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 18.; ibid., Annex 10, Human Rights Watch, July 2017 Report, supra note 53; Ibid., Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3, paras. 50-53. 80 Ibid., Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 18. 42 to sever relations with the State of Qatar, I was forced to leave everything in Abu Dhabi and return to my country, and I lost my work and my life.” 81 Further, the campaign of incitement against Qatar and Qataris has undermined business relationships and operations involving the UAE, threatening the livelihood of Qataris working or with interests in the UAE 82. 6. Impacts on property 44. The UAE has also enacted various measures interfering with rights to property based on Qatari national origin. In particular, Qatari individuals who own property in the UAE have been severely impacted. Property ownership in the UAE is common: Qataris bought approximately US$500 million worth of property in Dubai in 2016 alone 83. Because of the discriminatory measures, Qataris have been unable to visit their residential or commercial properties in the UAE since the UAE’s collective expulsion of Qataris in June 2017. In addition, many Qataris are effectively banned from engaging in property transactions due to requirements that they enter into a power of attorney to enable a non-Qatari to sell property on their behalf. Valid powers of attorney must be authenticated by a UAE Embassy, but the UAE Embassy in Qatar is closed, and the UAE Embassies in other jurisdictions have reportedly refused to authenticate such powers of attorney for Qataris. Qataris also have reported that Emiratis are unwilling to enter into business transactions for fear of sanction by their own Government, including prosecution for showing “sympathy” to Qatar 84. As a result, in many instances, property owners do not know the status or security of their real property. The UAE has also violated property rights by freezing assets of Qataris and limiting financial transfers to Qataris, including based on the named individuals’ and entities’ “links” to Qatar 85. 45. In its June 2018 report, the NHRC identified 458 individual claims related to property in the UAE 86. The claims include instances of Qataris being prevented from accessing real property or managing assets in the UAE and Qataris whose businesses may no longer rely on long-term agreements with Emirati counterparts 87. 81 Application, Annex 12, National Human Rights Committee, “100 Days under the Blockade” (30 August 2017), p. 7. 82 Ibid., pp. 7, 9-10. 83 “The boycott of Qatar is hurting its enforcers”, The Economist (19 October 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and- africa/21730426-if- saudis-and-emiratiswill- not-trade-doha-iranians-will-boycott. 84 See “Gulf firms struggle to keep Qatar business ties despite crisis”, Reuters (7 June 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/gulf-qatar- economy-idUSL8N1J42RL. 85 Application, Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 24; “UAE asks banks to freeze accounts of those named on Qatar- linked blacklist: WAM”, Reuters (27 July 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar- emirates/uae-asks-banks-to- freeze-accountsof- those-named-on-qatar-linked- blacklist-wam-idUSKBN1AC0YH. 86 Ibid., supra note 52, p. 24. 87 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 44 7. No legal recourse 46. Many Qataris have been left without any available legal recourse to vindicate their rights. The UAE has failed to provide any formal mechanism for Qataris to challenge the discriminatory measures or their effects 88. As they cannot enter the UAE, Qataris are prevented from physical access to UAE courts and institutions, and as a result of the “sympathy” laws and the threat of punishment associated with those laws, Qataris are also effectively barred from pursuing their rights through UAE local counsel or powers of attorney 89. The OHCHR Report noted the absence of any formal litigation mechanism for victims of the discriminatory measures 90. As explained therein, “legal co-operation has been suspended, including power of attorney. Furthermore, lawyers in these countries are unlikely to defend Qataris as this would likely be interpreted as an expression of sympathy toward Qatar.” 91 In June 2018, the NHRC documented the inability for Qataris to “resort to the courts” and to “exercise the right to litigation and [the] right to defence”, including through the “[n]on-implementation of court orders issued in favour of Qataris” 92. C. International Condemnation of the UAE’s Actions and Qatar’s Attempts to Achieve Diplomatic Resolution 47. The UAE’s discriminatory measures have been widely condemned by the international community. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated shortly after the imposition of the discriminatory measures that he was “alarmed” by the possible human rights impact of the measures being adopted and their “potential to seriously disrupt the lives of thousands of women, children and men”, as well as “extremely troubled” by the criminalization of expressing sympathy for Qatar 93. 48. As noted, on 18 August 2017, when six Special Rapporteurs of the UN Human Rights Council sent a joint communication to the UAE raising concerns about the violation of Qataris’ human rights, the UAE responded only to deny that the rights of Qataris had been violated, at once repudiating its prior statements and denying that it ever implemented certain measures, while also asserting that it had taken steps to reduce the humanitarian consequences of these measures 94. 49. The OHCHR subsequently dispatched a technical mission to Qatar in November 2017, with a mandate to gather information on the discriminatory 88 See Application, Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3, para. 40. 89 Ibid. “Furthermore, lawyers in these countries are unlikely to defend Qataris as this would likely be interpreted as an expression of sympathy towards Qatar.” The discriminatory measures therefore not only prevent Qataris from seeking redress against violations of their rights, but also render them unable to defend themselves if claims are brought against them in the UAE. 90 Ibid., Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3, para. 40. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid., Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 53. 93 OHCHR, “Qatar diplomatic crisis: Comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on impact on human rights” (14 June 2017), https://www. ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21739&LangID=E. 94 See supra para. 14. 46 measures’ detrimental impacts on human rights and report recommendations to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The technical mission determined that the measures (including the discriminatory measures imposed by the UAE) were arbitrary and unlawful, with significant negative effects on the enjoyment of fundamental human rights in the region, including the rights to freedom of expression, movement, family life, health, and education 95. 50. Likewise, Human Rights Watch found that Qatar’s isolation by its neighbours “is precipitating serious human rights violations”, including by “infringing on the right to free expression, separating families, interrupting medical care . . . interrupting education, and stranding migrant workers without food or water” 96. Amnesty International similarly concluded that the “arbitrary measures” taken against Qatar have resulted in “thousands of people in the Gulf fac[ing] the prospect of their lives being further disrupted and their families torn apart” 97. Reporters Without Borders decried the demand made to close Al Jazeera and other media outlets, calling it “an unacceptable act of blackmail” 98. 51. Since the UAE’s imposition of the discriminatory measures, Qatar has worked to minimize the impact of the UAE’s discriminatory conduct on Qataris and others present in Qatar. It has sought to alleviate the potential harm to the many UAE nationals who wish to remain in Qatar by relaxing residency permit requirements to confront the difficulty many UAE nationals may face obtaining renewals of their passports 99. Qatar also has urged its nationals and residents to remain neutral and to treat with dignity the UAE nationals who have remained in Qatar 100. 52. Further, as detailed above, Qatar has made numerous efforts toward a negotiated resolution of this dispute with the UAE. However, these efforts have been met by either a refusal to respond or a stated refusal to negotiate. The UAE has made it explicit that it will not compromise: it insists on Qatar’s complete capitulation to its unlawful 13 demands 101. 95 See generally, Application, Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3. 96 Ibid., Annex 10, Human Rights Watch, July 2017 Report, supra note 53, p. 1, Annex 10. 97 Ibid., Annex 6, Amnesty International, June 2017 Report, supra note 56. 98 “Unacceptable call for Al Jazeera’s Closure in Gulf Crisis” (28 June 2017), Reporters Without Borders, https://rsf.org/en/news/unacceptable-call-al-jazeeras- closure-gulf-crisis. 99 Alaa Shahine and Nafeesa Syeed, “Game- Changing Qatar Law to Grant Expats Permanent Residency”, Bloomberg (2 August 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2017-08-02/qatar- passes-landmark-law-to-grant-permanent-residency-to-expats. 100 Qatar Ministry of the Interior, “MOI Statement on Residents from Countries that Cut Ties with Qatar” (11 June 2017), https://portal.moi.gov.qa/wps/portal/MOIInternet/ mediacenter/moinews/newsdetails/!ut/p/a1/rVNdU8IwEPw1fQy5Ni1NfYtFy0cBpQi0L0x aA1ShLSWC-usNH4MPiqBjnpLM3s7u7R2O8AhHGV-nUy7TPOPz7TuqjhuMmnUd 9JZnUBtYw2JO0HMJDAAPcYSjJJOFnOFwkyzmaYzSTIoyExLxUoMVR4s8zcRmpY FuAhF2LBAkXEem48SIJ0YVCUgMapkTYdvWlq9I0kccXoQe4VAJ7DjAdKcLLY_ Ctbrekk77rq-3lcAz-vf1RwCtAwUW9Jv9665rAOgX-T_DsAPAicPgAGjWaw0ggfLgV 4li8Nuu4d4DmPYB8IPJJo6m8zzeBRayLCZ0iqNSTEQpyspLqb5nUharKw00KPJS8nlF hVKZ5uvKkmvwXdUsX0k8-gLGoWqY_akF-h0TWPW21vKNgIBr4OCXCe4JT7TYAuPhEeF9M67UQoHNqGOysODXxM2Lxii9Gm5jJhahVwN_ 6vq3L_sQiCy8UOAi8WC krcUPffq774YIh5TIFaxfvcn7AO8IyXh. 101 See supra, paras. 17-18. 48 IV. The UAE’s Violations of the CERD 53. The UAE’s imposition of the discriminatory measures violates the provisions and principles underlying the CERD, which commits States to pursuing “a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms” 102. CERD Article 1 (1) defines “racial discrimination” as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life” 103. 54. The UAE has taken the opposite course: it has unlawfully targeted Qataris on the basis of their national origin. It has done so in an attempt to pressure Qatar into capitulating to the UAE’s insistence that it be allowed to meddle in Qatar’s internal affairs and to force Qatar to compromise its own human rights obligations, for example, by forcing the closure of Al Jazeera. The UAE’s course of action places Qataris on an unequal footing, violates their basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, and is blatantly inconsistent with recognizing the “dignity and equality inherent in all human beings” 104. 55. While CERD Article 1 (2) envisages certain distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, the CERD Committee has emphasized that this discretion “should not be interpreted to detract in any way from the rights and freedoms recognized and enunciated in particular in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” 105. Further, many of the rights and freedoms enumerated in Article 5 of the CERD “are to be enjoyed by all persons living in a given State, such as the right to equal treatment before tribunals . . .” 106. 56. Article 1 (2) does not permit States parties to distinguish between different groups of non-nationals. Under the CERD, such differential treatment constitutes prohibited discrimination “if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to 102 CERD, supra note 5, Art. 2 (1). 103 Ibid., Art. 1 (1) (emphasis added). 104 Ibid., at preamble. 105 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “General Recommendation XXX on Discrimination against Non- Citizens”, UN doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004) (hereinafter “CERD Committee General Recommendation XXX”), para. 2; see also CERD, Art. 1 (2). 106 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “General Recommendation XX on Article 5 of the Convention”, UN doc. A/51/18 (1996) (hereinafter “CERD Committee General Recommendation XX”), para. 3. The CERD Committee enumerated a limited subset of rights that are “the rights of citizens, such as the rights to participate in elections, to vote, and to stand for election”. 50 a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim” 107. Any distinctions that do not qualify under these criteria are an arbitrary and illegitimate misuse of the discretion afforded to States under Article 1 (2). The arbitrariness of the discriminatory measures is underscored by the fact that the measures target Qataris and do not apply to other non-citizens of the UAE who are subject to its jurisdiction. Nor have individual circumstances been taken into account: the discriminatory measures have been applied en masse. It cannot be plausibly argued that these measures are proportionate to any legitimate aim. 57. Under Article 2 (1) of the CERD, the UAE is under an obligation to “pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races” 108. To this end, the UAE is obliged to, inter alia: (i) refrain from, prohibit, and prevent racial discrimination; (ii) amend, rescind, or nullify laws and regulations with discriminatory effects; and (iii) encourage integration. 58. The UAE has contravened its specific obligations under CERD Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7, as well as the customary international law principle of nondiscrimination, by implementing sweeping discriminatory measures targeting Qataris on the basis of their national origin. In short, not only has the UAE failed to meet its obligations under CERD by enacting measures to prevent, prohibit, and criminalize racial discrimination and to combat prejudices, but it has also acted in direct opposition to the Convention by actively engaging in acts of racial discrimination and fostering a culture of prejudice. 59. Prohibition on Collective Expulsion and Ban on Entry. The mass expulsion of Qataris from the UAE and the total ban on entry of Qataris into the UAE are deliberate violations of the prohibition on racial discrimination against noncitizens under the CERD. This includes the prohibition against collective expulsion as articulated in General Recommendation XXX, which was adopted by the CERD Committee in August 2004 and is frequently brought to the attention of States parties. In particular, blanket expulsion of Qataris from the UAE and the ban on entry by Qataris into the UAE discriminate against Qataris on the basis of national origin 109. Without regard for General Recommendation XXX, UAE authorities expelled Qataris with no consideration of the personal circumstances of each individual, denied Qataris the right to challenge the expulsion order, and provided no other effective remedy 110. While the UAE has attempted to justify the ban as a counter-terrorism measure, such a measure lacks any legal basis and is unsubstantiated and based on demonstrably false allegations 111. Further, the expulsion of Qataris and the prohibition on entry by Qataris has been taken 107 CERD Committee General Recommendation XXX, supra note 105, para. 4. 108 CERD, supra note 5, Art. 2 (1). 109 See CERD Committee General Recommendation XXX, supra note 105, para. 9 (recommending that States “[e]nsure that immigration policies do not have the effect of discriminating against persons on the basis of . . . national . . . origin”). 110 See ibid., para. 26 (recommending that States “[e]nsure that non- citizens are not subject to collective expulsion”); ibid., para. 25 (recommending that States provide “equal access to effective remedies, including the right to challenge expulsion orders”). 111 See, e.g., “US praises Qatar’s fight against terrorism and calls for blockade to be lifted”, Middle East Monitor (22 July 2017), https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170722-uspraises- qatars-fight-against-terrorism-and-calls-for-blockade-to-be-lifted/; Robert Windrem and William M. Arkin, “Who Planted the Fake News at Center of Qatar Crisis?”, NBC News 52 without any assessment of threat on an individual basis, which, by definition, constitutes an unlawful and disproportionate response 112. 60. The UAE’s Incitement of and Failure to Condemn Racial Hatred and Prejudice. Under Article 4 of the CERD, parties to the Convention “[s]hall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination” 113. States must also “declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, [and] incitement to racial discrimination” 114. Further, States parties have an obligation to condemn propaganda that promotes racial hatred or discrimination in any form 115.The CERD Committee has recognized that prohibited racist hate speech includes statements that discriminate on grounds of national origin, such as statements directed against immigrants or non-citizens 116. States parties’ obligations under CERD thus mandate “resolute action to counter any tendency to target, stigmatize, stereotype or profile, on the basis of . . . national or ethnic origin, members of ‘non-citizen’ population groups” 117. This includes with respect to statements made by public officials, educators, the media, statements made on the Internet and other electronic communications networks, and in society at large 118. The statements of public officials are “of particular concern” 119. (19 July 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/who- planted-fake-news-center-qatarcrisis- n784056 (noting confirmation by US and Qatari officials that statements allegedly made by the Emir of Qatar were false and likely planted by hackers working for the UAE); Embassy of the State of Qatar in the United States, “Qatar regrets the decision by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to sever relations” (6 June 2017), http://washington. embassy.qa/en/news/detail/2017/06/07/qatar- regrets-the-decision-by-saudi-arabia-the-unitedarab- emirates-and-bahrain-to-sever-relations (expressing “deep regret over the decision of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain to close their borders and airspace and cut off diplomatic relations”, and calling such measures “unjustified” and “based on baseless and unfounded allegations”). 112 See CERD Committee General Recommendation XXX, supra note 105, para. 10 (recommending that “any measures taken in the fight against terrorism do not discriminate, in purpose or effect, on the grounds of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin and that non- citizens are not subjected to racial or ethnic profiling or stereotyping”). 113 CERD, supra note 5, Art. 4 (c). The Committee has made clear “that the provisions of article 4 are of a mandatory character” and that “[p]ublic authorities at all administrative levels” are bound by those provisions. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “General Recommendation XV on article 4 of the Convention” (1993) (hereinafter “CERD Committee General Recommendation XV”), paras. 2, 7. 114 CERD, supra note 5, Art. 4 (a). 115 Ibid., Art. 4. 116 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “General Recommendation No. 35 on Combating racist hate speech”, UN doc. CERD/C/GC/35 (2013) (hereinafter “CERD Committee General Recommendation No. 35”), paras. 6-7. 117 CERD Committee General Recommendation XXX, supra note 105, para. 12; see also CERD Committee General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 116, para. 10 (“The Committee recalls the mandatory nature of article 4 . . .”). 118 CERD Committee General Recommendation XXX, supra note 105, para. 12. 119 CERD Committee General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 116, para. 22. The Committee noted in particular “the role of politicians and other public opinion- formers in contributing to the creation of a negative climate towards groups protected by the Convention, and has encouraged such persons and bodies to adopt positive approaches directed to the promotion of intercultural understanding and harmony”. Ibid., para. 15. 54 61. Article 7 of the CERD prescribes that, in addition, States parties undertake: “to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination and to promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial or ethnical groups, as well as to propagating the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and this Convention” 120. 62. The UAE has failed to meet its obligations under Articles 4 and 7 of the CERD by failing to condemn racial hatred and prejudice and by inciting such hatred and prejudice against Qatar and Qataris. The discriminatory measures themselves focus minds on national origin and encourage discrimination and prejudice on that basis. Government officials in the UAE have directly incited hatred by engaging in media attacks on Qatari “sympathizers” and calling for physical attacks on Qatari institutions, and the UAE’s criminalization of “sympathizing” with Qataris both inflames its anti-Qatar hate campaign and effectively stifles any response within the UAE to counter it 121. 63. Discriminatory Interference with Protected Rights. Article 5 of the CERD, referring to a State’s “fundamental obligations” under Article 2, requires that States parties “undertake to . . . eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment” of basic human rights. The rights and freedoms listed in Article 5 are not intended to be exhaustive but rather indicative of the fundamental human rights guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the core human rights treaties 122. Under the CERD, the UAE is obligated “to guarantee equality between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of these rights to the extent recognized under international law” 123. By enacting and enforcing the discriminatory measures, the UAE has violated, inter alia, the following human rights protections recognized under international law and enumerated in Article 5 of the CERD. — Violations of the Right to Marriage and Choice of Spouse. The UAE has interfered with the right to marriage enumerated in CERD Article 5 124. By expelling Qataris from its territory, recalling UAE citizens from Qatar, and prohibiting Emiratis from traveling to Qatar, the UAE has separated families and spouses 125. Human rights leaders have observed that the discriminatory meas- 120 CERD, supra note 5, Art. 7. The CERD Committee has highlighted the essential role of high-level public officials and the media, including social media, in condemning hate speech and promoting tolerance. CERD Committee General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 116, paras. 37, 39. 121 See supra, paras. 25, 36-39. 122 See CERD Committee General Recommendation XX, supra note 106, para. 1. Qatar reserves all rights to refer to rights in other instruments or customary international law not explicitly enumerated in Article 5. 123 CERD Committee General Recommendation XXX, supra note 105, para. 3. 124 CERD, supra note 5, Art. 5 (c) (iv). 125 See supra paras. 29-33. 56 ures have had “a brutal effect, splitting children from parents and husbands from wives” 126. — Violations of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression. The UAE’s discriminatory measures relating to freedom of expression are a transparent attempt to silence dissenters, violating the right to freedom of expression enjoyed by Qataris and transgressing the principles of inclusion and respect for diversity that underlie the CERD 127. The UAE violated these rights by, among other things, criminalizing and announcing an intention to vigorously prosecute any expressions of sympathy toward Qatar on social media or in any other form, blocking the transmission of Qatari news stations and websites (including Al Jazeera) into the UAE, and demanding the closure of Qatari media outlets 128. — Violations of the Right to Public Health and Medical Care. The UAE’s discriminatory measures, including the mass expulsion of Qataris and the prohibition on travel between the UAE and Qatar, unlawfully interfere with the right to health and medical care 129. Qataris receiving medical treatment at hospitals in the UAE have been prohibited from continuing their treatment, and Qatar has been prevented from importing necessary medical products 130. — Violations of the Right to Education and Training. The UAE’s discriminatory measures have also unlawfully violated the right to education by forcing Qatari students studying in the UAE to interrupt their programmes of study and return home to Qatar 131. — Violations of the Right to Property. The UAE’s discriminatory measures have caused, in purpose and effect, violations of the right to property 132. As a result of the forced expulsion of Qataris from the UAE, Qataris have been denied the ability to access, enjoy, utilize, or manage their property 133. Further, the UAE has frozen Qatari assets and limited financial transfers to and from Qataris based on national origin 134. 126 OHCHR, “Qatar diplomatic crisis: Comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on impact on human rights” (14 June 2017), http://www. ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21739&LangID=E. 127 CERD, supra note 5, Art. 5 (c) (viii). 128 See supra, paras. 24-26, 36-39. 129 See CERD, supra note 5, Art. 5 (e) (iv) (“In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: . . . The right to public health, medical care, social security and social services”; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA res. 217 (III) A (1948), Art. 25 (“[E]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including . . . medical care.”). 130 See supra, paras. 40-41. 131 See supra, para. 42. See also CERD, supra note 5, Art. 5 (e) (v) (“In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: . . . The right to education and training.”). 132 See ibid. 133 See supra, paras. 44-45. 134 See supra, para. 44. 58 — Violations of the Right to Work. The UAE’s discriminatory measures have caused violations of the right to work 135. Qatari business owners have been prevented from entering the UAE in order to manage and oversee their businesses, renew necessary business and worker licenses, or renew their leases 136. — Violations of the Right to Equal Treatment before Tribunals. The discriminatory measures enacted by the UAE have effectively denied Qataris the right to equal treatment before UAE courts and other organs of the justice system 137. By preventing Qataris from entering the country, criminalizing “sympathizing” with Qatar and creating a climate of racial hatred and incitement, the UAE has hindered Qataris’ ability to hire an attorney, challenge discrimination, or otherwise exercise their legal rights 138. 64. Denial of Effective Protection and Remedies against Acts of Racial Discrimination. The UAE has also failed to provide Qataris in their jurisdiction with effective protection and remedies against acts of racial discrimination, in violation of Article 6 of the CERD. As noted, the entry ban prevents Qataris from appearing in UAE courts to challenge the discriminatory measures, and the criminalization of statements of “sympathy” for Qatar and the general atmosphere of hostility toward Qatar and Qataris have undermined the ability of Qataris to pursue remedies through local counsel in the UAE 139. As a result, even if avenues for redress are ostensibly available to Qataris under UAE law, these avenues have been rendered completely ineffective because Qataris are unable to use them. V. Relief Requested by the State of Qatar 65. Qatar, in its own right and as parens patriae of its citizens, respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare that the UAE, through its State organs, State agents, and other persons and entities exercising governmental authority, and through other agents acting on its instructions or under its direction and control, has violated its obligations under Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the CERD by taking, inter alia, the following unlawful actions: a. Expelling, on a collective basis, all Qataris from, and prohibiting the entry of all Qataris into, the UAE on the basis of their national origin; 135 See CERD, supra note 5, Art. 5 (i) (States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: [. . .] (i) The right to freedom of movement and residence within the border of the [State].)” 136 See supra, note 5, paras. 43-44. 137 See CERD, supra note 5, Art. 5 (a) (“States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: (a) The right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering [justice].”). 138 See ibid., para. 46. 139 See ibid., paras. 25, 36-39, 46. 60 b. Violating other fundamental rights, including the rights to marriage and choice of spouse, freedom of opinion and expression, public health and medical care, education and training, property, work, participation in cultural activities, and equal treatment before tribunals; c. Failing to condemn and instead encouraging racial hatred against Qatar and Qataris and failing to take measures that aim to combat prejudices, including by inter alia: criminalizing the expression of sympathy toward Qatar and Qataris; allowing, promoting, and financing an international anti-Qatar public and social-media campaign; silencing Qatari media; and calling for physical attacks on Qatari entities; and d. Failing to provide effective protection and remedies to Qataris to seek redress against acts of racial discrimination through UAE courts and institutions. 66. Accordingly, Qatar respectfully requests the Court to order the UAE to take all steps necessary to comply with its obligations under CERD and, inter alia: a. Immediately cease and revoke the discriminatory measures, including but not limited to the directives against “sympathizing” with Qataris, and any other national laws that discriminate de jure or de facto against Qataris on the basis of their national origin; b. Immediately cease all other measures that incite discrimination (including media campaigns and supporting others to propagate discriminatory messages) and criminalize such measures; c. Comply with its obligations under the CERD to condemn publicly racial discrimination against Qataris, pursue a policy of eliminating racial discrimination, and adopt measures to combat such prejudice; d. Refrain from taking any further measures that would discriminate against Qataris within its jurisdiction or control; e. Restore rights of Qataris to, inter alia, marriage and choice of spouse, freedom of opinion and expression, public health and medical care, education and training, property, work, participation in cultural activities, and equal treatment before tribunals, and put in place measures to ensure those rights are respected; f. Provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition of the UAE’s illegal conduct; and g. Make full reparation, including compensation, for the harm suffered as a result of the UAE’s actions in violation of the CERD. VI. Judge AD HOC 67. In accordance with the provisions of Article 31 (3) of the Statute of the Court, and Article 35 (1) of the Rules of the Court, Qatar declares its intention to exercise its right to choose a judge ad hoc. 62 VII. Reservation of Rights 68. Qatar reserves the right to supplement and/or amend this Application, as well as the legal grounds invoked and the relief requested, as may be necessary to preserve and vindicate its rights under the CERD. VIII. Appointment of Agent 69. Qatar hereby designates as its Agent Dr. Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi, Legal Adviser to His Excellency Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 70. Pursuant to Article 40 (1) of the Rules of the Court, communications relating to this case should be sent to: Embassy of the State of Qatar Borweg 7 2597 LR The Hague Netherlands The Hague, 11 June 2018. (Signed) Dr. Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi, Legal Adviser to His Excellency Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Agent of the State of Qatar. 64 CERTIFICATION The aforementioned Agent of the State of Qatar certifies that the documents listed below and annexed to the State of Qatar’s Application are true and accurate copies of the originals of these documents. 66 140 LIST OF ANNEXES* Annex 1. Federal Decree — Law No. 5 of 2012 on Combating Cybercrimes, dated 13 August 2012. Annex 2. Statement of Support for Blockade and Cessation of Ties by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 5 June 2017. Annex 3. “Attorney General Warns against Sympathy for Qatar or Objecting to the State’s Positions”, Al Bayan Online, dated 7 June 2017 (certified translation). Annex 4. UAE Federal Transport Authority Circular No. 2/2/1023, “Implementation Process of the Decision Related to Qatar Sanctions”, dated 11 June 2017. Annex 5. National Human Rights Committee, “First Report Regarding the Human Rights Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State of Qatar”, dated 13 June 2017. Annex 6. Amnesty International, “Gulf/Qatar Dispute: Human Dignity Trampled and Families Facing Uncertainty as Sinister Deadline Passes”, dated 19 June 2017. Annex 7. “The 13 Demands on Qatar from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt”, The National, dated 23 June 2017. Annex 8. National Human Rights Committee, “Second Report Regarding the Human Rights Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State of Qatar”, dated 1 July 2017. Annex 9. “Full joint statement of boycotting countries on Qatar crisis”, Al Arabiya English, dated 5 July 2017. Annex 10. Human Rights Watch, “Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses”, dated 12 July 2017. Annex 11. Joint Communication from the Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council to the UAE, dated 18 August 2017. Annex 12. National Human Rights Committee, “100 Days under the Blockade, Third Report on Human Rights Violations Caused by the Blockade Imposed on the State of Qatar”, dated 30 August 2017. Annex 13. Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office in Geneva — Switzerland, “H.E. the Foreign Minister delivers a statement before the 36th Session of the Human Rights Council”, dated 11 September 2017. Annex 14. Reply of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations at Geneva to the Joint Communication from the Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council, dated 18 September 2017. * Annexes not reproduced in print version, but available in electronic version on the Court’s website (http://www.icj-cij.org, under “cases”). 68 Annex 15. Address by His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar, at the General Debate of the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, dated 19 September 2017 (certified translation). Annex 16. OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17-24 November 2017, “Report on the Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights”, dated December 2017. Annex 17. National Human Rights Committee, “‘Six Months of Violations, What Happens Now?’ The Fourth General Report on the Violations of Human Rights Arising from the Blockade of the State of Qatar”, dated 5 December 2017 (certified translation). Annex 18. “Joint statement issued by four boycotting States denouncing report of UNHCR’s Technical Mission on its visit to Qatar”, Saudi Press Agency, dated 30 January 2018. Annex 19. Permanent Mission of Qatar to the United Nations Office in Geneva — Switzerland, “Statement of H.E. Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 37th Human Rights Council”, dated 25 February 2018. Annex 20. “Arab Quartet responds to Qatar’s remarks at the UN Human Rights Council”, Al Arabiya English, dated 28 February 2018. Annex 21. Request for Negotiation, H.E. Sultan Bin Saad Al- Marikhi, Qatar Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar to H.E. Anwar Mohammed Gargash, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, dated 25 April 2018. Annex 22. National Human Rights Committee, “Fifth General Report, Continuation of Human Rights: A Year of the Blockade Imposed on Qatar”, dated June 2018.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE APPLICATION INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS filed in the Registry of the Court on 11 June 2018 APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (QATAR v. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES) COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE REQUÊTE INTRODUCTIVE D’INSTANCE enregistrée au Greffe de la Cour le 11 juin 2018 APPLICATION DE LA CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE SUR L’ÉLIMINATION DE TOUTES LES FORMES DE DISCRIMINATION RACIALE (QATAR c. ÉMIRATS ARABES UNIS) I. THE AMBASSADOR OF THE STATE OF QATAR TO THE NETHERLANDS TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE The Hague, 11 June 2018. I have the honour to enclose two originals and a soft copy of an Application from the State of Qatar instituting proceedings against the United Arab Emirates before the International Court of Justice concerning the United Arab Emirates’ interpretation and application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, as well as the State of Qatar’s Request for provisional measures in the same proceedings. I also enclose an instrument signed by H.E. Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, appointing Dr. Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi as Agent for the purpose of filing the Application and the Request for provisional measures, and representing the State of Qatar in the subsequent proceedings. (Signed) H.E. Sheikh, Jassim bin Mohammed Bin Saud Al-Thani. THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE STATE OF QATAR TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 7 June 2018. I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the State of Qatar has appointed Dr. Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi, Legal Counsel to H.E. the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, as its Agent for the purpose of filing the Application of the State of Qatar instituting proceedings against the United Arab Emirates before the International Court of Justice regarding the United Arab Emirates’ interpretation and application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and representing the State of Qatar in the subsequent proceedings. Please also be informed that all communications relating to this case should be sent to the Embassy of the State of Qatar in The Hague, the address of which is Borweg 7, 2597 LR ‘s‑Gravenhage, The Hague — Netherlands. (Signed) Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani. 2 2018 General List No. 172 I. L’AMBASSADEUR DE L’ÉTAT DU QATAR AUX PAYS-BAS AU GREFFIER DE LA COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE [Traduction] La Haye, le 11 juin 2018. J’ai l’honneur de vous communiquer ci- joint deux exemplaires originaux et une copie électronique de la requête par laquelle l’Etat du Qatar a introduit une instance contre les Emirats arabes unis devant la Cour internationale de Justice concernant l’interprétation et l’application que ceux- ci font de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale, ainsi que de la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires déposée par l’Etat du Qatar dans le cadre de cette même procédure. Est également jointe à la présente une lettre de S. Exc. le cheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, vice-premier ministre et ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Etat du Qatar, désignant M. Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi comme agent aux fins de déposer la requête et la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires, et de représenter l’Etat du Qatar dans la suite de la procédure. (Signé) S. Exc. le cheikh, Jassim bin Mohammed Bin Saud Al-Thani. LE VICE-PREMIER MINISTRE ET MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES DE L’ÉTAT DU QATAR AU GREFFIER DE LA COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE Le 7 juin 2018. J’ai l’honneur de vous informer que le Gouvernement de l’Etat du Qatar a désigné en tant qu’agent du Qatar M. Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi, conseiller juridique auprès de S. Exc. le vice-premier ministre et ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Etat du Qatar, aux fins de déposer la requête par laquelle l’Etat du Qatar a introduit une instance contre les Emirats arabes unis devant la Cour internationale de Justice concernant l’interprétation et l’application que ceux- ci font de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale, et de représenter l’Etat du Qatar dans la suite de la procédure. J’ai également l’honneur de vous faire savoir que toutes les communications concernant la présente affaire doivent être adressées à l’ambassade de l’Etat du Qatar aux Pays-Bas, sise Borweg 7, 2597 LR, à La Haye. (Signé) Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani. 3 2018 Rôle général no 172 4 II. APPLICATION INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS table of contents page I. Preliminary statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 II. Jurisdiction of the Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 III. The facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 A. Imposition of discriminatory measures against Qatar and Qatari Nationals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 B. Impact of the UAE’s discriminatory measures . . . . . . . . . . . 30 1. Interference with marriage and choice of spouse . . . . . . . . 32 2. Interference with free expression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3. Interference with medical treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 4. Interference with education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 5. Interference with right to work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 6. Impacts on property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7. No legal recourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 C. International condemnation of the UAE’s actions and Qatar’s attempts to achieve diplomatic resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 IV. The UAE’s violations of the CERD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 V. Relief requested by the State of Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 VI. Judge ad hoc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 VII. Reservation of rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 VIII. Appointment of Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 List of Annexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 5 II. REQUÊTE INTRODUCTIVE D’INSTANCE [Traduction] table des matières page I. Déclaration liminaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 II. Compétence de la Cour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 III. Les faits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 A. Introduction de mesures discriminatoires contre le Qatar et les Qatariens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 B. Effet des mesures discriminatoires mises en oeuvre par les Emirats arabes unis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 1) Entrave à l’exercice du droit de se marier et de choisir son conjoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2) Entrave à l’exercice du droit à la liberté d’expression . . . . . 37 3) Entrave à l’exercice du droit aux soins médicaux . . . . . . . . 41 4) Entrave à l’exercice du droit à l’éducation . . . . . . . . . . . 41 5) Entrave à l’exercice du droit au travail . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 6) Effets sur le droit à la propriété . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7) Absence de voies de recours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 C. Condamnation internationale des agissements des Emirats arabes unis et tentatives du Qatar pour parvenir à un règlement diplomatique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 IV. Les violations de la CIEDR commises par les Emirats arabes unis . . 49 V. Remèdes sollicités par l’Etat du Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 VI. Juge ad hoc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 VII. Réserve de droits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 VIII. Désignation d’un agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Liste des annexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 6 To the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, the undersigned, being duly authorized by the State of Qatar (“Qatar”), states as follows: 1. On behalf of Qatar and pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court (“Statute”) and Article 38 of the Rules of Court, I have the honour to submit to the Court the present Application instituting proceedings against the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”). The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 36 (1) of the Statute and Article 22 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), which entered into force on 4 January 1969. Both Qatar and the UAE are parties to the CERD, acceding to it on 22 July 1976 and 20 June 1974, respectively. I. Preliminary Statement 2. This Application concerns a legal dispute between Qatar and the UAE regarding the UAE’s deliberate and flagrant violations of the CERD. The UAE, unlawfully seeking to pressure Qatar to allow it to interfere in Qatari sovereignty over its affairs, has targeted Qataris and their families for discriminatory treatment. In the process, the UAE has caused severe and irreparable harm to Qatar and Qataris. The UAE’s chosen approach to international affairs contravenes core principles of international human rights law, including the protections contained in the CERD. 3. The UAE has enacted and implemented a series of discriminatory measures directed at Qataris based expressly on their national origin — measures that remain in effect to this day. In particular, on 5 June 2017 and the days that followed, the UAE: —— expelled all Qataris within its borders, without exception, giving them just two weeks to leave; —— prohibited Qataris from entering into or passing through the UAE, and ordered UAE nationals to leave Qatar or face severe civil penalties, including deprivation of their nationality and the imposition of criminal sanctions; —— closed UAE airspace and seaports to Qatar and Qataris and prohibited all inter‑State transport, which together with co‑ordinated measures enacted simultaneously by other nearby States, rendered Qatar inaccessible by air, by land, and by sea 1; —— interfered with the rights of Qataris who own property in the UAE; —— prohibited by law any speech deemed to be in “support” of Qatar or opposed to the actions taken against Qatar, on threat of severe financial penalty or up to fifteen years’ imprisonment; and 1 The other States closing their borders or prohibiting transport are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (“Saudi Arabia”), the Arab Republic of Egypt (“Egypt”) and the Kingdom of Bahrain (“Bahrain”). 7 A Monsieur le greffier de la Cour internationale de Justice, le soussigné, dûment autorisé par l’Etat du Qatar (ci- après, le « Qatar »), déclare ce qui suit : 1. Au nom du Qatar, et conformément au paragraphe 1 de l’article 40 du Statut de la Cour et à l’article 38 de son Règlement, j’ai l’honneur de soumettre à la Cour la présente requête introductive d’instance contre les Emirats arabes unis. La Cour a compétence en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l’article 36 de son Statut et de l’article 22 de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (ci- après, la « CIEDR »), laquelle est entrée en vigueur le 4 janvier 1969. Les deux Etats en litige sont parties à la CIEDR, le Qatar y ayant adhéré le 22 juillet 1976 et les Emirats arabes unis, le 20 juin 1974. I. Déclaration liminaire 2. La présente requête a trait à un différend juridique entre le Qatar et les Emirats arabes unis concernant des violations délibérées et flagrantes de la CIEDR commises par ces derniers. Les Emirats arabes unis, qui exercent en toute illicéité des pressions sur le Qatar pour que celui- ci les laisse s’ingérer dans des affaires relevant de sa souveraineté, ont pris les Qatariens et leurs familles pour cible de mesures discriminatoires. Ce faisant, ils ont causé un préjudice grave et irréparable au Qatar et aux Qatariens. La ligne de conduite qu’ils ont adoptée à l’égard des affaires internationales va à l’encontre de principes fondamentaux du droit international des droits de l’homme, et notamment des protections prévues par la CIEDR. 3. Les Emirats arabes unis ont adopté et appliqué un ensemble de mesures discriminatoires, toujours en vigueur à ce jour, qui ciblent les Qatariens au motif exprès de leur origine nationale. En particulier, le 5 juin 2017 et dans les jours qui ont suivi, ils ont : —— expulsé tous les Qatariens se trouvant à l’intérieur de leurs frontières, sans exception, en ne leur laissant que deux semaines pour partir ; —— interdit aux Qatariens d’entrer sur le territoire émirien ou de le traverser, et ordonné à leurs nationaux de quitter le Qatar sous peine de lourdes sanctions civiles, comme la déchéance de nationalité, voire de sanctions pénales ; —— fermé l’espace aérien et les ports émiriens au Qatar et aux Qatariens, et interdit toute circulation entre les deux Etats, mesures qui, conjuguées à l’action coordonnée et simultanée d’autres Etats de la région, ont coupé tout accès au territoire qatarien par les voies aérienne, terrestre et maritime 1 ; —— entravé l’exercice des droits des Qatariens possédant des biens aux Emirats arabes unis ; —— frappé d’interdiction légale toute expression présumée d’un « soutien » au Qatar ou d’une opposition aux mesures le visant, tout contrevenant étant passible de lourdes sanctions pécuniaires ou de peines d’emprisonnement pouvant aller jusqu’à quinze ans ; et 1 Les autres Etats ayant fermé leurs frontières ou interdit toute circulation sont le Royaume d’Arabie saoudite (ci‑après, l’« Arabie saoudite »), la République arabe d’Egypte (ci- après, l’« Egypte ») et le Royaume de Bahreïn (ci- après, « Bahreïn »). 8 —— shut down the local offices of Al Jazeera Media Network (“Al Jazeera”) and blocked the transmission of Al Jazeera and other Qatari stations and websites 2. 4. Further, the UAE has not only failed to condemn racial hatred against Qataris, but has directly incited hate speech, as well as a full‑scale media campaign against Qatar and Qataris. UAE Government officials themselves actually have participated in social media attacks on Qatari “sympathizers” and have called for attacks against Qatar. 5. These and other actions described herein targeting Qatar and Qataris (collectively, “discriminatory measures”) are unlawful. The UAE imposed them on Qataris across the board, without any justification under international law, and in particular, without exception and without reference to the particular circumstance of the Qataris impacted. There was no possibility of a hearing or any form of review for the Qataris impacted, much less one affording basic due process. The UAE’s actions clearly violate the CERD. 6. Tragically, but inevitably, the burden of the UAE’s discriminatory measures has fallen on Qataris, who have been subjected to human rights abuses since June 2017. The gravity of the harm suffered has been exacerbated by the historically close ties between the people of Qatar and its neighbours. For decades, citizens of Qatar and the UAE, who share a common language and cultural heritage, have studied and worked together, prayed together, and married into each other’s families. The sweeping and indiscriminate nature of the discriminatory measures has interfered with the most basic elements of daily life for Qataris. They have been denied the ability to marry and live together as a family, to receive medical care, to obtain an education, and to work and own property in order to provide for themselves and their families — simply on the basis that they are Qatari, married to Qataris, the children of Qataris, or otherwise linked to Qatar. 7. In December 2017, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”) published a report documenting the devastating negative impact the discriminatory measures have had on the human rights of Qataris. The OHCHR concluded, in relevant part: “[The discriminatory measures], consisting of severe restrictions of movement, termination and disruption of trade, financial and investment flows, as well as suspension of social and cultural exchanges imposed on the State of Qatar, had immediately translated into actions applying to nationals and residents of Qatar, including citizens of KSA, UAE and Bahrain. Many of these measures have a potentially durable effect on the enjoyment of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of those affected. As there is no evidence of any legal decisions motivating these various measures, and due to the lack of any legal recourse for most individuals concerned, these measures can be considered as arbitrary. These actions were exacerbated by various and widespread forms 2 Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Bahrain announced their own imposition of the same or similar measures beginning on 5 June 2017. “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Severs Diplomatic and Consular Relations with Qatar”, Saudi Press Agency (5 June 2017), http://www.spa. gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637298; “Egypt Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar”, Saudi Press Agency (5 June 2017), http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en &newsid=1637371; “Bahrain severs relations with Qatar”, Saudi Press Agency (5 June 2017), http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637356. 9 —— fermé les bureaux régionaux du réseau de médias Al Jazeera (ci- après, « Al Jazeera ») et empêché celui- ci de diffuser, de même que d’autres chaînes et sites d’information en ligne qatariens 2. 4. Pire encore : non contents de ne rien faire pour condamner la haine raciale contre les Qatariens, les Emirats arabes unis ont directement encouragé les discours haineux et une campagne médiatique généralisée visant le Qatar et le peuple qatarien. Des représentants du Gouvernement émirien ont même pris personnellement part à des diatribes contre les « sympathisants » du Qatar sur les médias sociaux et appelé à attaquer le Qatar. 5. Ces mesures, et toutes les autres mentionnées dans la présente requête, qui ont pour cible le Qatar et les Qatariens (et qui sont collectivement dénommées ci- après les « mesures discriminatoires ») sont illicites. Les Emirats arabes unis les ont imposées à tous les Qatariens sans distinction, sans aucune justification en droit international et, en particulier, sans exception ni considération pour la situation particulière des Qatariens touchés, qui n’ont eu aucune possibilité d’être entendus ni d’obtenir un quelconque réexamen de leur cas, encore moins un examen leur offrant les garanties fondamentales d’une procédure régulière. Les agissements des Emirats arabes unis emportent clairement violation de la CIEDR. 6. Conséquence tragique, mais inévitable, les mesures discriminatoires émiriennes pèsent de tout leur poids sur les Qatariens, dont les droits de l’homme sont bafoués depuis juin 2017. Le préjudice ainsi causé est d’autant plus grave que le peuple qatarien entretenait de longue date des liens étroits avec ses voisins. Pendant des dizaines d’années, Qatariens et Emiriens, qui partagent une langue et un patrimoine culturel communs, ont étudié et travaillé ensemble, prié ensemble, et uni leurs familles par les liens du mariage. D’application générale et aveugle, les mesures discriminatoires sont venues perturber, jusque dans ses aspects les plus essentiels, la vie quotidienne des Qatariens. Ceux- ci se sont vu priver de la capacité de se marier et de vivre avec leur famille, de bénéficier de soins médicaux et d’une éducation, ainsi que de travailler et de posséder des biens afin d’assurer leur propre subsistance et celle de leur famille –– et ce, pour le seul motif qu’ils sont Qatariens, mariés à des Qatariens, enfants de Qatariens ou autrement liés au Qatar. 7. En décembre 2017, le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme (ci- après le « HCDH ») a publié un rapport rendant compte de l’effet dévastateur des mesures discriminatoires sur les droits de l’homme des Qatariens. Voici ses conclusions sur ce point : « [Les mesures discriminatoires] imposées à l’Etat du Qatar –– restriction importante de la circulation, perturbation voire suppression des échanges commerciaux ou financiers et des investissements, et suspension des échanges sociaux et culturels — ont été immédiatement mises à exécution à l’encontre des nationaux et résidents qatariens, notamment sur les territoires d’Arabie saoudite, des Emirats arabes unis et de Bahreïn. Nombre de ces mesures risquent d’entraver durablement l’exercice, par les personnes touchées, de leurs droits de l’homme et libertés fondamentales. A défaut d’avoir été justifiées par une quelconque décision judiciaire, et en l’absence, pour la plupart des personnes concernées, de voie de recours disponible, ces mesures peuvent être considérées 2 L’Arabie saoudite, l’Egypte et Bahreïn ont annoncé qu’ils imposeraient eux-mêmes des mesures identiques ou similaires à compter du 5 juin 2017. Voir agence de presse officielle de l’Arabie saoudite (Saudi Press Agency) (ci- après, « agence de presse saoudienne »), 5 juin 2017, « Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Severs Diplomatic and Consular Relations with Qatar », http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637298 ; « Egypt Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar », http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637371 ; « Bahrain Severs Relations with Qatar », http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en& newsid=1637356. 10 of media defamation and campaigns hated [sic] against Qatar, its leadership and people. The majority of the measures were broad and non‑targeted, making no distinction between the Government of Qatar and its population. In that sense, they constitute core elements of the definition of unilateral coercive measures as proposed by the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee: ‘the use of economic, trade or other measures taken by a State, group of States or international organizations acting autonomously to compel a change of policy of another State or to pressure individuals, groups or entities in targeted States to influence a course of action without the authorization of the Security Council’. Moreover, measures targeting individuals on the basis of their Qatari nationality or their links with Qatar can be qualified as non‑disproportionate and discriminatory. ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The majority of cases remain unresolved and are likely to durably affect the victims, particularly those having experienced family separation, loss of employment or who have been barred from access to their assets.” 3 The OHCHR’s conclusions mirror those of multiple other human rights bodies, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Committee to Protect Journalists, as well as national human rights bodies, such as Qatar’s National Human Rights Committee (“NHRC”) 4. 8. The discriminatory measures constitute blatant violations of the UAE’s core obligations under the CERD to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination, including discrimination based on national or ethnic origin. Their harmful impact remains ongoing, and all good‑faith efforts by Qatar and other members of the international community to negotiate a resolution have failed. 9. Qatar therefore respectfully asks the Court to exercise its jurisdiction to uphold core human rights protections: to hold the UAE accountable for its flagrant violations of the CERD, to redress the harm thereby caused to Qatar and its people, and to employ the full extent of its authority to prevent further harm. II. Jurisdiction of the Court 10. The Court has jurisdiction over this dispute pursuant to Article 36 (1) of the Statute and Article 22 of the CERD 5. 3 Application instituting proceedings (hereinafter “Application”), Annex 16, OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17-24 November 2017, “Report on the Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights” (December 2017) (hereinafter “OHCHR Report”), paras. 60-61, 64 (emphasis added). 4 To date, the NHRC has published five reports on the general effect of the discriminatory measures on Qatar and Qataris, all of which are cited in this Application. However, the figures which underlie these reports vastly understate the actual impact of the discriminatory measures, as they rely on self-reporting by affected individuals, many of whom fear reprisal. 5 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 4 January 1969, 660 United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS) 195 (hereinafter “CERD”). 11 comme arbitraires. Leur effet est exacerbé par diverses formes de diffamation très répandues dans les médias et par des campagnes d’hostilité dirigées contre le Qatar, ses autorités et sa population. Ces mesures revêtent pour l’essentiel un caractère général et non ciblé, et ne font aucune distinction entre le Gouvernement et le peuple qatariens. En ce sens, elles présentent les principaux éléments constitutifs des mesures coercitives unilatérales, que le comité consultatif du Conseil des droits de l’homme a définies comme des « mesures économiques, commerciales ou autres prises par un Etat, un groupe d’Etats ou des organisations internationales agissant de façon autonome pour contraindre un autre Etat à modifier sa politique ou faire pression sur des particuliers, des groupes ou des entités dans les Etats visés pour influencer une ligne de conduite sans l’autorisation du Conseil de sécurité ». En outre, des mesures ciblant des personnes au motif de leur nationalité qatarienne ou de leurs liens avec le Qatar peuvent être considérées comme [disproportionnées] et discriminatoires. ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� La majorité des cas n’est toujours pas réglée et les victimes risquent d’en souffrir durablement, en particulier celles dont la famille a été séparée, qui ont perdu leur emploi ou ont été privées d’accès à leurs biens. » 3 Les conclusions du HCDH rejoignent celles de nombreux autres organes de défense des droits de l’homme, comme Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch et le comité pour la protection des journalistes, ainsi que d’organes similaires oeuvrant à l’échelle nationale, comme le comité qatarien des droits de l’homme (National Human Rights Committee, ci- après, le « NHRC ») 4. 8. Les mesures discriminatoires constituent des manquements caractérisés des Emirats arabes unis à leurs obligations fondamentales d’interdire et d’éliminer la discrimination raciale, conformément à la CIEDR, notamment la discrimination fondée sur l’origine nationale ou ethnique. Elles continuent de faire sentir leurs effets néfastes, et toutes les tentatives de négociation faites de bonne foi par le Qatar et d’autres membres de la communauté internationale ont échoué. 9. Le Qatar prie donc respectueusement la Cour d’exercer sa compétence afin de donner effet aux protections fondamentales des droits de l’homme, en rendant les Emirats arabes unis comptables de leurs violations flagrantes de la CIEDR, en remédiant au préjudice ainsi causé au Qatar et à sa population, et en faisant usage de toute l’autorité qui est la sienne pour empêcher qu’il leur soit encore porté préjudice. II. Compétence de la Cour 10. La Cour a compétence à l’égard du présent différend en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l’article 36 de son Statut et de l’article 22 de la CIEDR 5. 3 OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17-24 November 2017, « Report on the Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights » (décembre 2017) (ci- après, le « rapport du HCDH »), par. 60-61, 64 (les italiques sont de nous), annexe 16. 4 A ce jour, le NHRC a publié cinq rapports, tous cités dans la présente requête, sur l’effet général des mesures discriminatoires visant le Qatar et les Qatariens. Toutefois, les chiffres sur la base desquels ces rapports ont été établis sont loin de rendre compte de l’effet véritable des mesures discriminatoires, les informations étant rapportées par les victimes elles-mêmes, dont beaucoup craignent des représailles. 5 Convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale, entrée en vigueur le 4 janvier 1969 (ci‑après, la « CIEDR »), Nations Unies, Recueil des traités, vol. 660, p. 195. 12 11. As members of the United Nations, Qatar and the UAE are parties to the Statute. Article 36 of the Statute provides that the Court’s jurisdiction comprises “all matters specially provided for . . . in treaties and conventions in force” 6. Both Qatar and the UAE also are parties to the CERD 7. Neither party has entered a reservation to Article 22 of the CERD, which provides for the Court’s jurisdiction: “Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement.” 12. A dispute has plainly arisen between Qatar and the UAE concerning the interpretation and application of the CERD 8. 13. Qatar repeatedly has raised the specific human rights violations resulting from the UAE’s unlawful discrimination since June 2017 and thereafter. For example, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2017, Qatar’s Emir, His Highness Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al‑Thani, condemned the “illegal blockade”, the resulting negative impact on Qataris, and the broad violations of “the human rights conventions with arbitrary measures that have caused social, economic and religious distress to thousands of citizens and residents of the Gulf Cooperation Council States, by violating the basic human rights to work, education, freedom of movement and the right to dispose of private property”, as well as violations of “human rights conventions and agreements, which guarantee the human right to freedom of opinion and expression” 9. In September 2017, the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Sheikh Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al‑Thani, brought to the attention of the Human Rights Council the “grave violations” of human rights resulting from the “illegal siege” imposed by the UAE and others, which he stated “clearly violates international laws and covenants related to human rights” 10. Detailing 6 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 36 (1). 7 Qatar acceded to the CERD on 22 July 1976 and the UAE on 20 June 1974. 8 See e.g. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 19 April 2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 115, para. 22 (citing Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74) (holding that a dispute arises where there are “clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-performance of certain treaty obligations”); see also Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 3, para. 49 (citing Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 11) (holding that a dispute is “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons”). 9 Application, Annex 15, “Address by His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar, at the General Debate of the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 19 September 2017” (certified translation) (hereinafter “Address by H.H. Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani”), p. 4; see also General Assembly of the United Nations, “Qatar: H.H. Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Amir” (19 September 2017), https://gadebate.un.org/en/72/Qatar. 10 “Address by His Excellency Sheikh Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, at the 36th Regular Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 11 September 2017”, available at http://webtv. 13 11. En tant que Membres de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, le Qatar et les Emirats arabes unis sont parties au Statut de la Cour, dont l’article 36 dispose que la compétence de cette juridiction s’étend « à tous les cas spécialement prévus … dans les traités et conventions en vigueur » 6. Les deux Etats en litige sont également parties à la CIEDR 7. Ni l’un ni l’autre n’a fait de réserve à l’article 22 de la CIEDR, qui confère ainsi compétence à la Cour : « Tout différend entre deux ou plusieurs Etats parties touchant l’interprétation ou l’application de la présente Convention, qui n’aura pas été réglé par voie de négociation ou au moyen des procédures expressément prévues par ladite Convention, sera porté, à la requête de toute partie au différend, devant la Cour internationale de Justice pour qu’elle statue à son sujet, à moins que les parties au différend ne conviennent d’un autre mode de règlement. » 12. Il existe de toute évidence entre le Qatar et les Emirats arabes unis un différend touchant l’interprétation et l’application de la CIEDR 8. 13. Le Qatar a maintes fois dénoncé les violations des droits de l’homme particulières résultant de la discrimination illicite exercée par les Emirats arabes unis depuis juin 2017. Par exemple, dans le discours qu’il a prononcé en septembre 2017 devant l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, l’émir du Qatar, S. A. le cheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, a condamné le « blocus illicite », ses conséquences néfastes pour les Qatariens, et les violations générales des « conventions relatives aux droits de l’homme découlant de mesures arbitraires qui, sur les plans social, économique et religieux, ont infligé des souffrances à des milliers de ressortissants et résidents des Etats du Conseil de coopération du Golfe (ci- après, le « CCG ») en bafouant leurs droits de l’homme fondamentaux au travail, à l’éducation, à la libre circulation et à la propriété privée », ainsi que des violations de « conventions et d’accords relatifs aux droits de l’homme garantissant le droit de l’homme à la liberté d’opinion et d’expression » 9. En septembre 2017, le ministre qatarien des affaires étrangères, S. Exc. le cheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al- Thani, a appelé l’attention du Conseil des droits de l’homme sur les « violations graves » des droits de l’homme résultant du « siège illicite » 10 imposé par les Emi6 Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice, art. 36, par. 1. 7 Le Qatar a adhéré à la CIEDR le 22 juillet 1976 et les Emirats arabes unis, le 20 juin 1974. 8 Voir, par exemple, Application de la convention internationale pour la répression du financement du terrorisme et de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 19 avril 2017, C.I.J. Recueil 2017, p. 115, par. 22 (citant l’avis consultatif relatif à l’Interprétation des traités de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la Roumanie, première phase, C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 74), où il est déclaré qu’un différend existe entre des Etats lorsque leurs « points de vue … quant à l’exécution ou à la non-exécution de certaines obligations découlant des traités … sont nettement opposés ») ; voir également Violations alléguées de droits souverains et d’espaces maritimes dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2016 (I), p. 3, par. 49 (citant la décision rendue dans l’affaire des Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine, 1924, C.P.J.I., série A no 2, p. 11), où il est déclaré qu’un différend est « un désaccord sur un point de droit ou de fait, une contradiction, une opposition de thèses juridiques ou d’intérêts entre deux personnes ». 9 « Address by His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar, at the General Debate of the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 19 September 2017 » (traduction anglaise certifiée) (ci- après, le « discours de S. A. le cheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani »), p. 4, annexe 15 ; voir également Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, « Qatar: H.H. Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Amir » (19 septembre 2017), https://gadebate.un.org/fr/72/qatar. 10 « Address by His Excellency Sheikh Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, at the 36th Regular Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council », 11 septembre 2017, retransmission sur http:// 14 instances of family separation and other interferences with “fundamental rights and freedoms”, he stated that “it is difficult to understand why people should pay the price for these political rifts” 11. He also reiterated Qatar’s readiness to engage in dialogue to end the crisis, but within the framework of mutual respect and preservation of the sovereignty of the States 12. 14. For its part, the UAE continues to violate the CERD and assert — without any legal basis — that such measures are justified, while at the same time ignoring or outright denying the existence of the ongoing human rights violations. On 18 August 2017, six Special Rapporteurs wrote jointly to the UAE to bring to its attention the “adverse situation and the violations of human rights of Qatari migrants in the United Arab Emirates . . . as a result of the United Arab Emirates Government’s decision to suspend ties with the State of Qatar, particularly their right to movement and residence, family unity, education, work, freedom of expression, health and the right to property, without discrimination on any basis” and explicitly referenced the CERD and specific rights protected thereunder 13. The joint communication further urged the UAE to take all necessary steps to respect the rights of persons affected 14. In response, on 18 September 2017, the UAE stated it was “highly displeased” that the communication was issued as an urgent appeal and declined to address the asserted violations in any detail, stating only that it “continues to uphold” the CERD, and that it is “fully aware of its obligations and commitments in that regard” 15. 15. In January 2018, the UAE, along with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt, issued a “joint statement” attacking the conclusions of the OHCHR Report, expressing “their denunciation of the report’s methodological failure that included a misleading description of the political crisis”, and taking the position that “the boycott . . . of Qatar is part of the exercise of their sovereign right to protect and defend their national security”, without making any attempt to address the substantive violations raised in the report 16. In February 2018, His Excellency the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs again addressed the Human Rights Council, raising again the unlawful actions, including by the UAE, invoking the conclusions of the OHCHR Technical Mission, which “objectively and systematically un.org/watch/qatar-1st-meeting-36th-regular-session- human-rights-council/5571405779001/ ?term=&lan=original (hereinafter “MFA 11 September 2017 Statement”); Application, Annex 13, Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office in Geneva — Switzerland, “H.E. the Foreign Minister delivers a statement before the 36th Session of the Human Rights Council” (11 September 2017). 11 MFA 11 September 2017 Statement, supra note 10. 12 Ibid. 13 Application, Annex 11, “Joint Communication from the Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council to the UAE”, AU ARE 5/2017 (18 August 2017) (hereinafter “Joint Communication of Special Procedures Mandate Holders”), pp. 1, 4. 14 Ibid., p. 7. 15 Application, Annex 14, “Reply of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations at Geneva to the Joint Communication from the Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council”, HRC/NONE/2017/112 (18 September 2017), pp. 2, 3. 16 Ibid., Annex 18, “Joint Statement Issued by Four Boycotting States Denouncing Report of UNHCR’s Technical Mission on Its Visit to Qatar”, Saudi Press Agency (30 January 2018). 15 rats arabes unis et d’autres Etats, qui — a‑t‑il dit — « emporte clairement violation des lois et pactes internationaux existant dans ce domaine ». Relatant des cas de familles séparées et d’autres entraves à l’exercice de « droits et libertés fondamentales », il a déclaré qu’« il [était] difficile de comprendre pourquoi des personnes devaient payer le prix de ces clivages politiques » 11. Il a également réaffirmé que le Qatar était prêt à dialoguer pour trouver une issue à la crise, mais dans un climat de respect mutuel qui soit propice à la préservation de la souveraineté des Etats 12. 14. Les Emirats arabes unis, de leur côté, s’obstinent à violer la CIEDR et à prétendre –– de manière totalement infondée en droit –– que pareilles mesures sont justifiées, tout en ignorant ou en niant catégoriquement l’existence de leurs violations continues des droits de l’homme. Le 18 août 2017, six rapporteurs spéciaux leur ont adressé une communication conjointe afin d’appeler leur attention sur la « situation difficile dans laquelle la décision de leur gouvernement de rompre toute relation avec l’Etat du Qatar avait plongé les immigrés qatariens aux Emirats arabes unis, ainsi que sur les violations des droits de l’homme de ces Qatariens, en particulier de leurs droits à la libre circulation et au choix de leur résidence, à l’unité familiale, à l’éducation, au travail, à la liberté d’expression, à la santé et à la propriété, sans subir de discrimination pour quelque motif que ce soit », faisant expressément référence à la CIEDR et aux droits particuliers protégés par celle‑ci 13. Dans cette communication conjointe, les rapporteurs spéciaux exhortaient également les Emirats arabes unis à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour assurer le respect des droits des personnes touchées 14. Pour toute réponse, le 18 septembre 2017, les Emirats arabes unis ont déclaré que le ton alarmiste de cette communication était « extrêmement déplaisant » et ont refusé d’accorder la moindre considération aux violations signalées, se bornant à affirmer qu’ils « continu[aient] de respecter » la CIEDR et qu’ils « n’ignor[aient] rien de leurs obligations et engagements à cet égard » 15. 15. En janvier 2018, les Emirats arabes unis, de concert avec l’Arabie saoudite, Bahreïn et l’Egypte, ont publié une « déclaration conjointe » dans laquelle ils attaquaient les conclusions du rapport du HCDH, dont ils « dénon[çaient] les failles sur le plan méthodologique, notamment la description fallacieuse de la crise politique », et faisaient valoir que « le boycott … du Qatar relev[ait] de l’exercice de leur droit souverain de protéger et de défendre leur sécurité nationale », sans s’intéresser d’aucune façon aux violations substantielles signalées dans le rapport 16. En février 2018, S. Exc. le ministre qatarien des affaires étrangères s’est une nouvelle fois adressé au Conseil des droits de l’homme et a dénoncé encore les mesures illicites mises en oeuvre, notamment par les Emirats arabes unis, invoqué les concluwebtv. un.org/watch/qatar-1st-meeting-36th-regular-session- human-rights-council/557140577 9001/?term=&lan=original ; mission permanente de l’Etat du Qatar auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies à Genève (Suisse), « H.E. the Foreign Minister Delivers a Statement before the 36th Session of the Human Rights Council », 11 septembre 2017, annexe 13. 11 Voir note 10 ci-dessus. 12 Ibid. 13 « Joint Communication from Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council to the United Arab Emirates », UA ARE 5/2017, 18 août 2017 (ci- après, la « communication conjointe des rapporteurs spéciaux »), p. 1 et 4, annexe 11. 14 Ibid., p. 7. 15 « Reply of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations at Geneva to the Joint Communication from Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council », HRC/NONE/2017/112 (18 septembre 2017), p. 2 et 3, annexe 14. 16 Agence de presse saoudienne, « Joint Statement Issued by Four Boycotting States Denouncing Report of UNHCR’s Technical Mission on Its Visit to Qatar », 30 janvier 2018, annexe 18. 16 describes the serious human rights violations by the blockading countries against citizens and residents both in the State of Qatar and in the blockading countries”, and confirming that “these violations continue to this day” 17. He called upon the Council and its Special Procedures mechanisms to put an end to the human rights violations, which he referred to as “unilateral coercive discriminatory measures” 18. 16. Later in February 2018, the UAE responded to Qatar’s intervention at the Human Rights Council in a statement issued with other countries, to state that they will “continue to exercise their sovereign right to boycott the Government of Qatar, guaranteed by international law 19 ”. The UAE also stated that “this small political crisis between countries must be resolved within the framework of the existing Kuwaiti mediation efforts led by His Highness Sheikh Sabah al‑Ahmad al‑Jaber al‑Sabah 20”. 17. Unfortunately, UAE’s support for the Kuwaiti mediation efforts has been in name only. While Qatar expressed its willingness to engage in an “unconditional dialogue” 21, including as part of the Kuwaiti mediation, the UAE has repeatedly rejected attempts by Kuwait and other third parties to provide a basis for good faith discussions, instead stating that the UAE has no intention of ending the discriminatory measures, or of even negotiating with Qatar, without full capitulation from Qatar to the UAE’s illegal political demands 22. Indeed, the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, “[w]hile applauding a Kuwaiti effort 17 Application, Annex 19, Permanent Mission of Qatar to the United Nations Office in Geneva — Switzerland, “Statement of H.E. Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 37th Human Rights Council” (25 February 2018) (hereinafter “MFA 25 February 2018 Statement”); see also Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Calls on Human Rights Council to Immediately End Siege Countries’ Violations” (28 February 2018), https://www. mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2018/02/28/qatar-calls-on-human-rights- council-toimmediately- end-siege-countries%27-violations (describing an additional statement made by Qatar in response to the UAE’s statement discussed infra, paragraph 16, in which Third Secretary of the Permanent Delegation of Qatar Talal Al-Na’ama reiterated that the UAE’s actions constitute “unilateral coercive measures in contravention of the principles of international law, international human rights law and the Charter of the United Nations”). 18 Ibid., Annex 19, MFA 25 February 2018 Statement, supra note 17. 19 See Annex 20, “Arab Quartet responds to Qatar’s remarks at the UN Human Rights Council”, Al Arabiya English (28 February 2018). 20 Ibid. 21 See Application, Annex 15, Address by H.H. Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, supra note 9, p. 5 (calling for an “unconditional dialogue based on mutual respect for sovereignty” to address the ongoing human rights crisis, noting that Qatar “has supported since the beginning” the mediation efforts of the Kuwaiti emir); see also Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry’s Spokesperson: Qatar Continues to Welcome Kuwaiti Mediation, Hopes for Serious Steps by Siege Countries” (3 March 2018), https://mofa.gov.qa/en/ all-mofa-news/details/2018/03/03/foreign-ministry% 27s-spokesperson-qatar-continues-towelcome- kuwaiti-mediation-hopes-for-serious-steps-by-siege-countries; Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Highly Appreciates H.H. the Emir of Kuwait’s Speech on Gulf Crisis” (24 October 2017), https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/10/24/ qatar-highly- appreciates-hh-the-emir-of-kuwait%27s-speech-on-gulf-crisis. 22 See infra paragraphs 26-28 (describing political demands); see e.g. UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, “Arab Officials Demand Action from Qatar in Briefing with UN Correspondents” (20 July 2017), https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/ News/Pages/20-07-2017-UAE-Qatar.aspx (quoting Reem bint Ibrahim Al Hashimy, UAE Minister of State for International Cooperation, as referencing political demands and stating that “our demands are clear. The principles for mediation are laid out. Now it is on Qatar to come to the table”); see also Ali Bakeer, “GCC Crisis: Why Is Kuwaiti 17 sions de la mission technique du HCDH, qui avait « dressé un inventaire objectif et systématique des violations graves des droits de l’homme que les pays maintenant le blocus infligeaient à des ressortissants et résidents non seulement sur le territoire qatarien, mais aussi sur leur propre territoire », et confirmé que « ces violations se poursuiv[aient] à ce jour » 17. Il en a appelé au Conseil et à ses procédures spéciales pour mettre un terme aux violations des droits de l’homme en question, qu’il a qualifiées de « mesures coercitives unilatérales de discrimination » 18. 16. Quelques jours plus tard, toujours en février 2018, les Emirats arabes unis ont répondu à l’intervention du Qatar devant le Conseil des droits de l’homme par une déclaration publiée conjointement avec d’autres Etats, dans laquelle ils indiquaient qu’ils « continuer[aient] d’exercer leur droit souverain, tel que garanti par le droit international, de boycotter le Gouvernement qatarien » 19. Ils y affirmaient également que « cette petite crise politique ente Etats [devait] être réglée dans le cadre de la tentative de médiation koweïtienne en cours, sous la direction de S. A. le cheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah » 20. 17. Malheureusement, le soutien des Emirats arabes unis à la tentative de médiation koweïtienne n’existe que sur le papier. Alors que le Qatar a exprimé sa volonté de s’engager dans un « dialogue sans conditions » 21, notamment dans le cadre de la médiation koweïtienne, les Emirats arabes unis n’ont cessé de rejeter les tentatives du Koweït et d’autres Etats tiers visant à poser les bases de discussions de bonne foi, et ont au contraire déclaré qu’ils n’entendaient nullement mettre fin à leurs mesures discriminatoires, ni même négocier avec le Qatar, tant que celui- ci ne se serait pas complètement rendu à leurs exigences politiques illicites 22. De fait, 17 Mission permanente du Qatar auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies à Genève (Suisse), « Statement of H.E. Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 37th Human Rights Council », 25 février 2018 (ci- après, la « déclaration du 25 février 2018 du ministre des affaires étrangères »), annexe 19 ; voir également ministère qatarien des affaires étrangères, « Qatar Calls on Human Rights Council to Immediately End Siege Countries’ Violations », 28 février 2018, https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2018/02/28/qatar-calls-on-human-rights- council-to-immediately-end-siege-countries%27-violations (renvoyant à une autre déclaration du Qatar répondant aux propos émiriens cités au paragraphe 16, dans laquelle le troisième secrétaire de la délégation permanente du Qatar, M. Talal Al-Na’ama, réaffirmait que les actes des Emirats arabes unis constituaient « des mesures coercitives unilatérales contrevenant aux principes du droit international, notamment du droit international des droits de l’homme et de la Charte des Nations Unies »). 18 Ibid., voir note 17 ci-dessus, annexe 19. 19 Voir « Arab Quartet Responds to Qatar’s Remarks at the UN Human Rights Council », Al Arabiya English, 28 février 2018, annexe 20. 20 Ibid. 21 Discours de S. A. le cheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, voir note 9 ci-dessus, p. 5 (dans lequel le cheikh appelait à l’ouverture d’un « dialogue sans conditions, sur la base du respect mutuel de la souveraineté de chacun », afin de remédier à la crise en cours sur le plan des droits de l’homme, et relevait que le Qatar « avait appuyé dès le début » la tentative de médiation de l’émir koweïtien), annexe 15 ; voir également ministère qatarien des affaires étrangères, « Foreign Ministry’s Spokesperson : Qatar Continues to Welcome Kuwaiti Mediation, Hopes for Serious Steps by Siege Countries », 3 mars 2018, https://mofa.gov.qa/ en/all-mofa-news/details/2018/03/03/foreign-ministry%27s-spokesperson-qatar-continues- towelcome- kuwaiti-mediation-hopes-for-serious-steps-by-siege-countries ; « Qatar Highly Appreciates H.H. the Emir of Kuwait’s Speech on Gulf Crisis », 24 octobre 2017, https:// www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/10/24/qatar-highly- appreciates-hh-theemir- of-kuwait%27s-speech-on-gulf-crisis. 22 Voir ci-dessous, par. 26-28 (exposé des exigences politiques des Emirats arabes unis) ; voir, par exemple, ministère émirien des affaires étrangères et de la coopération internationale, « Arab Officials Demand Action from Qatar in Briefing with UN Correspondents », 20 juillet 2017, https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/20-07-2017-UAEQatar. aspx (citant Mme Reem bint Ibrahim Al Hashimy, ministre d’Etat émirienne à la coopération internationale, qui, au sujet des exigences politiques des Emirats arabes unis, a déclaré ce qui suit : « nos exigences sont claires. Les principes de la médiation ont été posés. 18 to mediate the crisis . . . said Emirati and Saudi officials planned to concede nothing to Qatar 23”. In December 2017, the UAE even declined to send its Head of State to participate in the 2017 GCC summit, despite an invitation to do so from Kuwait and public statements from Qatar that the summit would provide a “golden opportunity” to “start a dialogue” to resolve the crisis, leaving the Emirs of Qatar and Kuwait as the only Heads of State to attend the meeting 24. The result of the UAE’s tactics is that, in spite of the efforts of the Emir of Kuwait and others, including the United States, France and the European Union, no resolution has been brokered 25. 18. Most recently, on 1 May 2018, in light of the urgency presented by the human rights crisis caused by the UAE’s discriminatory conduct, His Excellency Sultan Ben Saed Al‑Marikhi, the Qatari Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, requested that the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Anwar Gargash, agree to negotiate to address the ongoing violations of the CERD 26. The request asked for a response within two weeks. The UAE did not respond at all. Six weeks later, the UAE still has not responded. 19. The Parties have not been able to settle their dispute, despite genuine attempts by Qatar to negotiate with a view toward resolving the dispute 27, nor Mediation not Working?”, Al Jazeera (11 August 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/ opinion/ 2017/08/gcc-crisis- kuwaiti-mediation-working-170807093244546.html. 23 Jon Gambrell, “Emirati Diplomat to AP: ‘Nothing to Negotiate’ with Qatar”, US News (7 June 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2017-06-07/uae-rulingfamily- member-qatar-now-questioning-its-leaders. 24 Ahmed Hagagy, “Gulf Rulers Boycotting Qatar Skip Annual Summit”, Reuters (5 December 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-summit/ gulf-rulersboycotting- qatar-skip-annual-summit-idUSKBN1DZ15U; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, “Foreign Minister: Qatar Sees any GCC Meeting Golden Opportunity for Civilized Dialogue” (22 October 2017), https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/ details/2017/10/22/foreign-minister- qatar-sees-any-gcc-meeting-golden-opportunity-forcivilized- dialogue; see also Patrick Wintour, “UAE announces new Saudi alliance that could reshape Gulf relations”, The Guardian (5 December 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2017/dec/05/uae-saudi-arabia- alliance-gulf-relations-gcc. 25 “Trump Offers to Mediate Talks on the Qatar Crisis”, Reuters (7 September 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-usa/trump-offers- to-mediate-talks-on-qatarcrisis- idUSKCN1BI2SG; “Qatar Emir Meets Merkel, Macron on First Foreign Tour since Crisis”, France 24 (15 September 2017), http://www.france24.com/en/20170915-qatar-emir-angela- merkel-emmanuel-macron-gulf-crisis; “Communiqué de presse à l’issue de l’entretien entre le Président de la République et l’Emir du Quatar”, Elysée (15 September 2017), http:// www.elysee.fr/communiques-de-presse/ article/communique-de-presse- a-l-issue-de-lentretien- entre-le-president-de-la-republique-et-l-emir-du-quatar/; Ali Bakeer, “GCC crisis: Why is Kuwaiti mediation not working?”, Al Jazeera (11 August 2017), http://www. aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/gcc-crisis- kuwaiti-mediation-working- 170807 093244546.html. 26 Application, Annex 21, “Request for Negotiation, H.E. Sultan Ben Saad Al-Marikhi, Qatar Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, to H.E. Anwar Mohammed Gargash, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, dated 25 April 2018”, received via fax and registered mail on 1 May 2018. 27 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 1 April 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 70, para. 157. (“[T]he concept of ‘negotiations’. . . requires — at the very least — a genuine attempt by one of the disputing parties to engage in discussions with the other disputing party, with a view to resolving the dispute.”) 19 leur ministre d’Etat aux affaires étrangères, « non sans saluer la tentative de médiation du Koweït, … a déclaré que les autorités émiriennes et saoudiennes ne comptaient faire aucune concession au Qatar » 23. En décembre 2017, les Emirats arabes unis ont même refusé que leur chef d’Etat participe au sommet tenu cette année-là par le CCG, bien que le Koweït leur eût adressé une invitation et que le Qatar eût publiquement déclaré que le sommet offrait une « occasion idéale » de « nouer le dialogue » afin de régler la crise, de sorte que les émirs du Qatar et du Koweït ont été les seuls chefs d’Etat à assister à la rencontre 24. La tactique émirienne a eu pour conséquence que, en dépit des efforts déployés par l’émir du Koweït et d’autres, dont les Etats-Unis, la France et l’Union européenne, aucune sortie de crise n’a pu être négociée 25. 18. Tout récemment encore, le 1er mai 2018, face à l’urgente nécessité de remédier à la situation critique des droits de l’homme causée par le comportement discriminatoire des Emirats arabes unis, S. Exc. Sultan bin Saed Al-Marikhi, ministre d’Etat qatarien aux affaires étrangères, a demandé à son homologue émirien, S. Exc. M. Anwar Gargash, d’accepter de négocier afin de mettre fin aux violations continues de la CIEDR 26. Une réponse était demandée dans un délai de deux semaines. Les Emirats arabes unis ont totalement ignoré cette demande. Six semaines plus tard, ils n’ont toujours pas répondu. 19. Les Parties ne sont pas parvenues à régler leur différend, bien que le Qatar ait véritablement tenté de négocier à cette fin 27, et elles ne sont pas non plus conveIl appartient à présent au Qatar de venir s’asseoir à la table des négociations. ») ; voir également Ali Bakeer, « GCC Crisis : Why Is Kuwaiti Mediation not Working? », Al Jazeera, 11 août 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/gcc-crisis- kuwaiti-mediationworking- 170807093244546.html. 23 Jon Gambrell, « Emirati Diplomat to AP: « Nothing to Negotiate » with Qatar », US News, 7 juin 2017, https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2017-06-07/uae-rulingfamily- member-qatar-now-questioning-its-leaders. 24 Ahmed Hagagy, « Gulf Rulers Boycotting Qatar Skip Annual Summit », Reuters, 5 décembre 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-summit/ gulf-rulers- boycottingqatar- skip-annual-summit-idUSKBN1DZ15U; ministère qatarien des affaires étrangères, Foreign Minister: « Qatar Sees any GCC Meeting Golden Opportunity for Civilized Dialogue », 22 octobre 2017, https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/10/22/ foreign-minister- qatar-sees-any-gcc-meeting-golden-opportunity-for-civilized-dialogue ; voir également Patrick Wintour, « UAE Announces New Saudi Alliance that Could Reshape Gulf Relations », The Guardian, 5 décembre 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ dec/05/uae-saudi-arabia- alliance-gulf-relations-gcc. 25 « Trump Offers to Mediate Talks on the Qatar Crisis », Reuters, 7 septembre 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-usa/trump-offers- to-mediate-talks-on-qatarcrisis- idUSKCN1BI2SG ; « Qatar Emir Meets Merkel, Macron on First Foreign Tour since Crisis », France 24, 15 septembre 2017, http://www.france24.com/en/20170915-qatar-emir-angela- merkel-emmanuel-macron-gulf-crisis ; communiqué de presse à l’issue de l’entretien entre le président de la République et l’émir du Qatar, Elysée, 15 septembre 2017, http:// www.elysee.fr/communiques-de-presse/ article/communique-de-presse- a-l-issuede- l-entretien-entre-le-president-de-la-republique-et-l-emir-du-quatar/ ; Ali Bakeer, « GCC Crisis : Why Is Kuwaiti Mediation not Working? », Al Jazeera, 11 août 2017, http://www. aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/gcc-crisis- kuwaiti-mediation-working- 170807093244546.html. 26 « Request for Negotiation, His Excellency Sultan Ben Saad Al-Marikhi, Qatar Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Anwar Mohammed Gargash, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, dated 25 April 2018 », reçue par fax et enregistrée le 1er mai 2018, annexe 21. 27 Voir Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), p. 70, par. 157 (« la notion de « négociations » … implique, à tout le moins, que l’une des parties tente vraiment d’ouvrir le débat avec l’autre partie en vue de régler le différend »). 20 have the Parties agreed on another form of dispute resolution. It is evident that further attempts at negotiations would be futile, and waiting any longer is prejudicial to Qataris currently suffering as a result of the UAE’s violations of the CERD 28. 20. Upon the filing of the present Application, the matters in dispute between Qatar and the UAE concerning the UAE’s interpretation and application of the CERD therefore fall within the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. III. The Facts A. Imposition of Discriminatory Measures against Qatar and Qatari Nationals 21. The “spark that lit the fuse” for the UAE’s unlawful actions occurred on 23 May 2017, when cyber hackers posted a fake news story on the website of the Qatar News Agency (“QNA”), attributing incendiary false statements to the Emir of Qatar supporting the Islamic Republic of Iran and criticizing the US President 29. Qatar immediately and publicly confirmed that the QNA website had been hacked and the story was false 30. Qatar called the operation an act of “cyberterrorism” that “represent[ed] a clear violation and breach of international law and of the bilateral and collective agreements signed between the member states of the 28 On 8 March 2018, Qatar deposited a communication with the CERD Committee under Article 11 of the CERD. While the CERD Committee procedure set out in Articles 11-13 of the CERD provides a framework by which the parties might come to a consensual resolution, initiation or completion of that procedure is not a precondition to the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. See e.g. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 142, para. 43, joint dissenting opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, (“The Committee established by the Convention has no power to impose a legally binding solution on the disputing States . . . ultimately, a favourable outcome depends on the readiness of the parties to come to an agreement, in other words, on their willingness to negotiate . . . [W]here a State has already tried, without success, to negotiate directly with another State . . . it would be senseless to require it to follow the special procedures in [Articles 11-13 of the CERD].”). Here, where the UAE has stated that its demands are non-negotiable, its conduct has made evident that reliance on negotiations would be futile, and as the prejudice to the human rights of Qataris continues unabated, Qatar has concluded that it must invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to achieve a binding resolution of the dispute. 29 See William Maclean, “Gulf rift reopens as Qatar decries hacked comments by emir”, Reuters (23 May 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-cyber/gulf-rift-reopens- asqatar- decries-hacked-comments-by-emir-idUSKBN18K02Z. 30 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, “Foreign Minister: ‘Qatar Will Address the Media Campaign Targeting It’” (25 May 2017), https://mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofanews/ details/2017/05/25/foreign-minister-% 27qatar-will-address-the-media-campaigntargeting- it%27; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, “An Official Source at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Perpetrators of the Electronic Piracy against Qatar News Agency Website Will Be Prosecuted” (24 May 2017), https://mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/ details/2017/05/24/an-official- source-at-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-the-perpetrators-ofthe- electronic-piracy-against-qatar-news-agency-website-will-be-prosecuted. 21 nues d’un autre mode de règlement. Il serait à l’évidence vain de s’obstiner à tenter de négocier, et attendre davantage ne ferait que prolonger l’épreuve que subissent les Qatariens actuellement victimes des violations de la CIEDR commises par les Emirats arabes unis 28. 20. A la date du dépôt de la présente requête, les questions touchant l’interprétation et l’application de la CIEDR qui sont en litige entre le Qatar et les Emirats arabes unis entrent donc dans le champ de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour. III. Les faits A. Introduction de mesures discriminatoires contre le Qatar et les Qatariens 21. Le « détonateur » des actes illicites des Emirats arabes unis est un article fabriqué de toutes pièces par des cyberpirates, publié le 23 mai 2017 sur le site de l’agence de presse officielle du Qatar (Qatar News Agency, ci‑après, la « QNA »), dans lequel des propos incendiaires, bienveillants envers l’Iran et critiques à l’égard du président des Etats‑Unis 29, sont faussement attribués à l’émir du Qatar. Le Qatar a immédiatement et publiquement confirmé que le site Internet de la QNA avait été piraté et que l’article était un faux 30. Il a qualifié ce piratage d’acte de « cyberterrorisme » constituant « une violation et une atteinte manifestes du droit international et des accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux conclus entre les Etats membres du CCG, ainsi 28 Le 8 mars 2018, le Qatar a adressé au comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale une communication au titre de l’article 11 de la CIEDR. Si la procédure conduite par le comité, qui est prévue aux articles 11 à 13 de la convention, établit un cadre par lequel les parties peuvent parvenir à une solution consensuelle, il n’est toutefois pas nécessaire que cette procédure ait été engagée ou menée à bien pour que la Cour puisse exercer sa compétence. Voir, par exemple, Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie), opinion dissidente commune de M. le juge Owada, président, et de MM. les juges Simma, Abraham, Mme la juge Donoghue et M. le juge ad hoc Gaja, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), p. 142, par. 43. (« Le Comité institué par la convention n’a aucunement le pouvoir d’imposer une solution juridiquement contraignante aux Etats qu’oppose un différend… Finalement, l’issue favorable dépendra de la disposition des parties à s’entendre, c’est‑à‑dire de leur volonté de négocier… [C]ela n’aurait aucun sens d’obliger l’Etat qui aurait tenté sans succès de négocier directement avec un autre Etat contre lequel il a des griefs à mettre en oeuvre la procédure spéciale prévue aux articles 11 à 13 de la CIEDR. ») En l’espèce, les Emirats arabes unis ayant déclaré que leurs exigences n’étaient pas négociables, il était manifestement vain d’espérer quoi que ce soit de la voie des négociations ; les droits de l’homme de ses nationaux continuant d’être bafoués sans répit, le Qatar a conclu qu’il devait prier la Cour d’exercer sa compétence afin d’obtenir le règlement obligatoire du différend. 29 Voir William Maclean, « Gulf Rift Reopens as Qatar Decries Hacked Comments by Emir », Reuters, 23 mai 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-cyber/gulf-rift-reopens- as-qatar-decries-hacked-comments-by-emir-idUSKBN18K02Z. 30 Ministère qatarien des affaires étrangères, Foreign Minister: « Qatar Will Address the Media Campaign Targeting It », 25 mai 2017, https://mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/ details/2017/05/25/foreign-minister-% 27qatar-will-address-the-media-campaign-targetingit% 27, et « An Official Source at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Perpetrators of the Electronic Piracy against Qatar News Agency Website Will Be Prosecuted », 24 mai 2017, https://mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/05/24/an-official- source-at-the-ministryof- foreign-affairs-the-perpetrators-of-the-electronic- piracy-against-qatar-news-agencywebsite- will-be-prosecuted. 22 GCC, as well as collective agreements with the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the United Nations” 31. 22. Nevertheless, the UAE continued to broadcast the false statements widely and seized upon them as an excuse to implement the discriminatory measures. In particular, on 5 June 2017, the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following statement, announcing that the UAE was severing all diplomatic and consular ties with Qatar and enacting a broad series of discriminatory measures against Qatar and Qataris: “UAE affirms its complete commitment and support to the Gulf Cooperation Council and to the security and stability of the GCC States. Within this framework, and based on the insistence of the State of Qatar to continue to undermine the security and stability of the region and its failure to honour international commitments and agreements, it has been decided to take the following measures that are necessary for safeguarding the interests of the GCC States in general and those of the brotherly Qatari people in particular: (1) In support of the statements issued by the sisterly Kingdom of Bahrain and sisterly Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates severs all relations with the State of Qatar, including breaking off diplomatic relations, and gives Qatari diplomats 48 hours to leave UAE. (2) Preventing Qatari nationals from entering the UAE or crossing its points of entry, giving Qatari residents and visitors in the UAE 14 days to leave the country for precautionary security reasons. The UAE nationals are likewise banned from traveling to or staying in Qatar or transiting through its territories. (3) Closure of UAE airspace and seaports for all Qataris in 24 hours and banning all Qatari means of transportation, coming to or leaving the UAE, from crossing, entering or leaving the UAE territories, and taking all legal measures in collaboration with friendly countries and international companies with regards to Qataris using the UAE airspace and territorial waters, from and to Qatar, for national security considerations. The UAE is taking these decisive measures as a result of the Qatari authorities’ failure to abide by the Riyadh Agreement on returning GCC diplomats to Doha and its Complementary Arrangement in 2014, and Qatar’s continued support, funding and hosting of terror groups, primarily Islamic Brotherhood, and its sustained endeavours to promote the ideologies of Daesh and Al Qaeda across its direct and indirect media. ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� While regretting the policies taken by the State of Qatar that sow seeds of sedition and discord among the region’s countries, the UAE affirms its full respect and appreciation for the brotherly Qatari people on account of the profound historical, religious and fraternal ties and kin relations binding UAE and Qatari peoples.” 32 31 “UAE Violated International Law by Hacking QNA Website: Qatar”, Gulf Times (17 July 2017), http://www.gulf-times.com/story/556991/UAE-violated-international- lawby- hacking-QNA-webs. 32 Application, Annex 2, “Statement of Support for Blockade and Cessation of Ties by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs” dated 5 June 2017 (hereinafter “UAE 5 June 2017 Statement”). 23 que des accords multilatéraux conclus avec la Ligue des Etats arabes, l’Organisation de la coopération islamique et l’Organisation des Nations Unies » 31. 22. Les Emirats arabes unis ont cependant continué de diffuser largement cette fausse information et en ont tiré prétexte pour introduire leurs mesures discriminatoires. En particulier, le 5 juin 2017, le ministère émirien des affaires étrangères a publié la déclaration suivante, par laquelle il annonçait la rupture de toutes les relations diplomatiques et consulaires avec le Qatar et l’adoption d’un large éventail de mesures discriminatoires contre cet Etat et ses ressortissants : « Les Emirats arabes unis réaffirment leur soutien sans réserve au CCG et leur attachement à la sécurité et à la stabilité de ses Etats membres. Conformément à cette approche, et étant donné que l’Etat du Qatar persiste à compromettre la sécurité et la stabilité dans la région et à ne pas respecter les obligations et accords auxquels il a souscrit sur le plan international, les Emirats arabes unis ont adopté les mesures suivantes, nécessaires pour préserver les intérêts des Etats membres du CCG en général et ceux de leurs frères qatariens en particulier : 1) En soutien aux déclarations faites par leurs Etats frères, le royaume de Bahreïn et le royaume d’Arabie saoudite, les Emirats arabes unis cessent tout échange avec l’Etat du Qatar, et à cette fin rompent les relations diplomatiques et demandent aux diplomates qatariens de quitter le pays dans un délai de 48 heures. 2) Il est interdit aux Qatariens d’entrer sur le territoire des Emirats arabes unis ou d’y transiter, et ceux qui s’y trouvent en qualité de résident ou de visiteur doivent le quitter dans un délai de 14 jours par mesure de sécurité préventive. De même, il est interdit aux ressortissants des Emirats arabes unis de voyager ou de séjourner au Qatar, ou de transiter par son territoire. 3) L’espace aérien et les ports maritimes des Emirats arabes unis seront fermés à tous les Qatariens dans un délai de 24 heures, aucun moyen de transport qatarien en provenance ou à destination des Emirats arabes unis ne peut entrer sur le territoire émirien ni y transiter ou en sortir, et toutes les dispositions légales sont prises en collaboration avec les pays amis et les compagnies internationales pour empêcher les Qatariens en provenance ou à destination du Qatar de pénétrer dans l’espace aérien et les eaux territoriales des Emirats arabes unis, pour des motifs de sécurité nationale. Les Emirats arabes unis prennent ces mesures radicales en conséquence du non‑respect, par les autorités qatariennes, de l’accord de Riyad et de ses dispositions complémentaires de 2014, prévoyant le retour à Doha des diplomates des Etats membres du CCG, ainsi qu’au vu du soutien, du financement et de l’accueil que le Qatar persiste à offrir à des groupes terroristes, principalement les Frères musulmans, et de sa constance à promouvoir les idéologies de Daesh et d’Al‑Qaïda par ses médias directs et indirects. ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Tout en déplorant les politiques menées par l’Etat du Qatar, qui favorisent la sédition et la discorde entre les pays de la région, les Emirats arabes unis réaffirment qu’ils ont un profond respect et une haute estime pour leurs frères qatariens, eu égard à la proximité des peuples émirien et qatarien et des liens religieux et fraternels étroits qui les unissent historiquement. » 32 31 « UAE Violated International Law by Hacking QNA Website: Qatar », Gulf Times, 17 juillet 2017, http://www.gulf-times.com/story/556991/UAE-violated- international-lawby- hacking-QNA-webs. 32 Déclaration du ministère émirien des affaires étrangères en faveur du blocus et de la rupture des relations avec le Qatar, 5 juin 2017 (ci- après, la « déclaration du 5 juin 2017 du ministère émirien des affaires étrangères »), annexe 2. 24 23. The UAE implemented these and other discriminatory measures in a calculated and brutal manner, without regard to their impact upon individuals and their rights. Such measures included: —— closing airspace to Qatari aviation companies and Qatari‑registered aircraft, as well as air transportation to and from Qatar, which together with co‑ordinated measures enacted simultaneously by other nearby States rendered Qatar inaccessible by air and by land 33; —— imposing transport restrictions on Qatari ships and their use of UAE territorial waters and seaports 34; —— collectively expelling Qataris from UAE territory, giving them just two weeks to leave 35; and —— prohibiting Qataris from entering into or passing through UAE territory and ordering UAE nationals to leave Qatar or face severe civil penalties, including deprivation of their nationality and criminal sanctions 36. 33 See note 32 supra. The UAE’s measures were taken in co-ordination with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt. See Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Announcement of Cessation of Ties” (5 June 2017), www.mofa.gov.sa/ServicesAnd Information/ news/MinistryNews/Pages/ArticleID20176513029701.aspx; Bahrain Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the severance of diplomatic relations with the State of Qatar” (5 June 2017), http://www.mofa.gov.bh/Default. aspx?tabid=7824&language =en-US&ItemId=7474; “Qatari Planes Banned from Egyptian and Saudi Air Space”, BBC News (6 June 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast- 40164552. Saudi Arabia immediately closed Qatar’s only land border after severing ties with Qatar on 5 June 2017. See Tom Finn, Ibrahim Saber, “Qatar-Saudi land border deserted after frontier shut”, Reuters (12 June 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-gulf-qatar-border- saudi-idUSKBN1931PO. Though the border was briefly reopened in August 2017, Saudi Arabia’s customs directorate indefinitely closed the border on 18 December 2017. “Saudis permanently close only land border with Qatar”, Al Jazeera (20 December 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/saudi-permanently- closesland- border-qatar-171220062311052.html. 34 Application, Annex 4, UAE, Federal Transport Authority Circular No. 2/2/1023, “Entry Restrictions to All Qatar Vessels and Cargoes: Implementation Process of the Decision Related to Qatar Sanctions” (11 June 2017). 35 Ibid., Annex 2, UAE 5 June 2017 Statement, supra note 32. 36 Ibid., Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3, para. 34; Ibid., Annex 2, UAE 5 June 2017 Statement, supra note 32. As reported by the Saudi Press Agency, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and others announced similar measures that day and in the days that followed. See e.g. “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Severs Diplomatic and Consular Relations with Qatar” (5 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en& newsid=1637327; “Egypt Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar” (5 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637371; “Bahrain Severs Relations with Qatar” (5 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, https://www.spa.gov.sa/ viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637356. See also, “Yamen [sic] Severs Relations with Qatar” (5 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en &newsid=1637361; “Libya Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar” (5 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637406; “Mauritania Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar” (7 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http:// www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637919; “Comoros Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar” (7 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory. php?lang=en&newsid=1638089; “Djibouti Reduces Its Diplomatic Representation with Qatar” (8 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en &newsid=1638421; “Niger recalls Ambassador to Qatar” (10 June 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1638877. 25 23. Les Emirats arabes unis ont mis en oeuvre leurs mesures discriminatoires, et d’autres, de manière délibérée et brutale, sans se soucier des conséquences qui s’ensuivraient pour les individus et leurs droits. Ils ont notamment : —— fermé l’espace aérien aux compagnies aériennes qatariennes et aux avions immatriculés au Qatar, ainsi qu’aux avions à destination ou en provenance de ce pays, ce qui, conjugué aux mesures équivalentes prises simultanément par d’autres Etats voisins, a eu pour effet de rendre le Qatar inaccessible par voie aérienne et terrestre 33 ; —— imposé des restrictions de circulation aux navires qatariens, s’agissant notamment de l’accès aux eaux territoriales et aux ports maritimes émiriens 34 ; —— expulsé collectivement les Qatariens se trouvant sur le territoire émirien, en ne leur laissant que deux semaines pour partir 35 ; —— interdit aux Qatariens d’entrer sur le territoire émirien ou de le traverser, et ordonné à leurs propres ressortissants de quitter le Qatar sous peine de lourdes sanctions civiles, comme la déchéance de nationalité, voire de sanctions pénales 36. 33 Voir note 32 ci-dessus. Les Emirats arabes unis ont pris ces mesures en coordination avec l’Arabie saoudite, Bahreïn et l’Egypte. Voir la déclaration du ministère des affaires étrangères d’Arabie saoudite, « Announcement of Cessation of Ties », 5 juin 2017, www. mofa.gov.sa/ServicesAndInformation/news/MinistryNews/Pages/ArticleID201765130297 01.aspx, et celle de son homologue de Bahreïn, « Statement of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Severance of Diplomatic Relations with the State of Qatar », 5 juin 2017, http://www. mofa.gov.bh/Default.aspx?tabid=7824&language=en-US&ItemId=7474 ; voir aussi « Qatari Planes Banned from Egyptian and Saudi Air Space », BBC News, 6 juin 2017, https://www. bbc.com/news/world-middle- east-40164552. L’Arabie saoudite a fermé son unique frontière terrestre avec le Qatar immédiatement après avoir décrété la rupture des relations diplomatiques le 5 juin 2017. Voir Tom Finn, Ibrahim Saber, « Qatar-Saudi Land Border Deserted after Frontier Shut », Reuters, 12 juin 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-border- saudi-idUSKBN1931PO. La frontière a été brièvement rouverte en août 2017, mais la direction générale des douanes saoudiennes l’a refermée pour une durée indéterminée le 18 décembre 2017 : voir « Saudis Permanently Close only Land Border with Qatar », Al Jazeera, 20 décembre 2017 : https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/saudi-permanentlycloses- land-border-qatar-171220062311052.html. 34 Autorité fédérale des transports des Emirats arabes unis, circulaire no 2/2/1023 du 11 juin 2017 sur la mise en oeuvre des sanctions contre le Qatar (« Restrictions à l’entrée des navires et cargaisons du Qatar »), annexe 4. 35 Déclaration du 5 juin 2017 du ministère émirien des affaires étrangères, voir note 32 ci-dessus, annexe 2. 36 Rapport du HCDH, voir note 3 ci-dessus, par. 34, annexe 16 ; déclaration du 5 juin 2017 du ministère émirien des affaires étrangères, voir note 32 ci-dessus, annexe 2. Comme le rapporte l’agence de presse saoudienne, ce pays ainsi que l’Egypte, Bahreïn et d’autres ont annoncé des mesures analogues le même jour ou les jours suivants. Voir, par exemple, agence de presse saoudienne, 5 juin 2017, « Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Severs Diplomatic and Consular Relations with Qatar », https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en &newsid=1637327, « Egypt Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar », https://www.spa.gov. sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637371, « Bahrain Severs Relations with Qatar », http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637356, « Yamen [sic] Severs Relations with Qatar », http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637361, « Libya Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar », http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory. php?lang=en&newsid=1637406; 7 juin 2017, « Mauritania Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar », http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637919, « Comoros Severs Diplomatic Relations with Qatar », http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang =en&newsid=1638089; 8 juin 2017, « Djibouti Reduces Its Diplomatic Representation with Qatar », http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1638421, et 10 juin 2017, « Niger Recalls Ambassador to Qatar », http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en &newsid=1638877. 26 The UAE issued these discriminatory measures without concern for the fact that many families in Qatar and the UAE are composed of both Qatari and Emirati nationals. 24. After 5 June 2017, the UAE escalated its restrictions on freedom of expression, particularly in relation to Qatari broadcasts and broadcasters. Having already blocked access to at least eight news websites operated by Qatari entities, including Al Jazeera, at the end of May 2017, the UAE also blocked the transmission of other Qatari stations and websites, including channels owned by Qatar’s beIN Media 37. Reporters Without Borders and other human rights groups condemned these acts and the UAE’s demand that Qatar silence Al Jazeera, highlighting their unjustified and disproportionate impacts on core human rights 38. 25. The UAE also announced that it would criminalize “sympathizing” with Qatar 39. The Attorney General of the UAE released a statement on 7 June 2017 that “expressing sympathy, bias, or affection for [Qatar], or objecting to the position of the State of the United Arab Emirates and the strict and firm measures that it has taken against the Qatari Government, whether through social media with tweets or posts, or any other verbal or written method, is considered a crime” under the UAE’s Federal Decree on Combating Cybercrimes 40. According to the Attorney General’s statement, the punishment for violation includes a jail 37 “Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain Block Qatari News Websites”, Committee to Protect Journalists (25 May 2017), https://cpj.org/2017/05/saudi-arabia- uae-bahrain-block-qatarinews- website.php; Zahraa Alkhalisi, “Blocked in Dubai: Qatar cartoon and soccer channels”, CNN Media (8 June 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/06/08/media/uae-qatarmedia-blocked/ index.html; “Request for Consultations by Qatar, United Arab Emirates — Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”, WTO Doc. WT/DS526/1 (4 August 2017), https://docs.wto. org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds526/1%20 or%20wt/ds526/1/*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUI Changed=true#. 38 “Unacceptable Call for Al Jazeera’s Closure in Gulf Crisis”, Reporters Without Borders (28 June 2017), https://rsf.org/en/news/unacceptable-call-al-jazeeras- closure-gulfcrisis. 39 Application, Annex 3, “Attorney General Warns against Sympathy for Qatar or Objecting to the State’s Positions”, Al Bayan Online (7 June 2017) (certified translation); see also Application, Annex 1, “Federal Decree — Law No. 5 of 2012, Issued on 25 Ramadan 1433 AH, corresponding to 13 August 2012 AD, on Combating Cybercrimes” (hereinafter “Federal Decree on Combating Cybercrimes”). 40 Application, Annex 3, see also “Qatar sympathisers to face fine, jail”, Gulf News (7 June 2017), https://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/qatar-sympathisers- to-face-finejail- 1.2039631; “UAE bans expressions of sympathy towards Qatar-media”, Reuters (7 June 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/gulf-qatar/uae-bans-expressions- of-sympathy-towardsqatar- media-idUSL8N1J40D2; “UAE threatens 15 years in prison for expressions of ‘sympathy’ with Qatar”, Committee to Protect Journalists (7 June 2017), https://cpj. org/2017/06/uae-threatens- 15-years-in-prison-for-expressions-o.php; Sam Wilkin, “Support for Qatar Could Land You in Jail, U.A.E. Warns Residents”, Bloomberg (7 June 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-07/support-for-qatar-could-land-you-injail- u-a-e-warns-residents. 27 Les Emirats arabes unis ont adopté ces mesures discriminatoires sans tenir compte du fait que de nombreuses familles au Qatar et aux Emirats arabes unis sont composées de nationaux des deux pays. 24. A partir du 5 juin 2017, les Emirats arabes unis ont durci les restrictions à la liberté d’expression, en particulier à l’égard des radiodiffuseurs qatariens. Après avoir rendu inaccessibles, à la fin mai 2017, au moins huit sites d’information en ligne opérés par des sociétés qatariennes, dont Al Jazeera, ils ont empêché d’autres médias qatariens de diffuser, notamment les chaînes du groupe beIN Media 37. Reporters sans frontières et d’autres organisations de défense des droits de l’homme ont condamné ces mesures ainsi que les autres tentatives des Emirats arabes unis pour obliger le Qatar à museler Al Jazeera, soulignant que ces actes se traduisaient par des restrictions injustifiées et disproportionnées à l’exercice des droits de l’homme fondamentaux 38. 25. Les Emirats arabes unis ont également annoncé leur intention d’incriminer toute manifestation de « sympathie » à l’égard du Qatar 39. Dans une déclaration publiée le 7 juin 2017, leur procureur général a indiqué que « toute personne exprimant de la sympathie, un parti pris ou de l’amitié pour [le Qatar], ou une désapprobation de la position des Emirats arabes unis vis‑à‑vis du Gouvernement qatarien ou des mesures strictes et énergiques qu’ils ont prises à son égard, que ce soit dans des messages ou contenus publiés dans les médias sociaux ou par tout autre moyen verbal ou écrit, est réputée avoir commis une infraction » relevant du décret‑loi fédéral sur la lutte contre la cybercriminalité 40, punie d’une peine d’emprisonnement pouvant aller jusqu’à quinze ans et d’une amende d’un 37 « Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain Block Qatari News Websites », Comité pour la protection des journalistes, 25 mai 2017, https://cpj.org/2017/05/saudi-arabia- uae-bahrain-blockqatari- news-website.php; Zahraa Alkhalisi, « Blocked in Dubai : Qatar Cartoon and Soccer Channels », CNN, 8 juin 2017, https://money.cnn.com/2017/06/08/media/uae-qatar-media-blocked/ index.html ; « Demande de consultations présentée par le Qatar, les Emirats arabes unis — Mesures concernant le commerce des marchandises et des services et les aspects des droits de propriété qui touchent au commerce », Organisation mondiale du commerce, doc. WT/DS526/1 (4 août 2017), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006. aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds526/1%20or%20wt/ds526/1/*)&Language=ENGLISH& Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true#. 38 Reporters sans frontières, « Crise dans le Golfe : l’irrecevable demande faite à Al Jazeera et aux autres médias du Qatar », 28 juin 2017, https://rsf.org/fr/actualites/crisedans- le-golfe-lirrecevable- demande-faite-al-jazeera-et-aux-autres-medias-du-qatar. 39 « Attorney General Warns against Sympathy for Qatar or Objecting to the State’s Positions » (traduction anglaise certifiée), Al Bayan Online, 7 juin 2017, annexe 3 ; voir aussi le décret-loi fédéral no 5 de 2012 sur la lutte contre la cybercriminalité (publié le 25 du mois ramadan de l’an 1433 du calendrier hégirien, soit le 13 août 2012 du calendrier grégorien) (ci- après, le « décret fédéral sur la lutte contre la cybercriminalité »), annexe 1. 40 « Attorney General Warns against Sympathy for Qatar or Objecting to the State’s Positions » (traduction anglaise certifiée), Al Bayan Online, 7 juin 2017, annexe 3 ; voir aussi « Qatar Sympathisers to Face Fine, Jail », Gulf News, 7 juin 2017, https://gulfnews.com/news/ uae/government/qatar-sympathisers- to-face-fine-jail-1.2039631 ; « UAE Bans Expressions of Sympathy towards Qatar – Media », Reuters, 7 juin 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/ gulf-qatar/uae-bans-expressions- of-sympathy-towards-qatar-media-idUSL8N1J40D2 ; « UAE Threatens 15 Years in Prison for Expressions of « Sympathy » with Qatar », comité pour la protection des journalistes, 7 juin 2017, https://cpj.org/2017/06/uae-threatens- 15- years-in-prison-for-expressions-o.php ; Sam Wilkin, « Support for Qatar Could Land You in Jail, UAE Warns Residents », Bloomberg, 7 juin 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2017-06-07/support-for-qatar-could-land-you-in-jail-u-a-e-warns-residents. 28 term of up to 15 years and a fine of not less than AED 500,000 (approximately US$136,000) 41. 26. A few weeks later, on 23 June 2017, the UAE escalated the crisis of its own making, issuing a threat to maintain the discriminatory measures indefinitely if Qatar did not accede to a list of thirteen political demands (the “13 demands”) 42. These included demands that Qatar: permanently shut down Al Jazeera, all affiliate stations, and all other Qatar‑funded news outlets; subjugate its foreign policy and ability to pursue diplomatic and strategic relationships to the will of the UAE; hand over individuals “wanted” by the UAE; and allow broad intrusions — including monthly “audits” — into Qatar’s internal decision‑making 43. Qatar was given ten days to respond, which was subsequently extended by 48 hours at the request of the Emir of Kuwait 44. 27. While the UAE had claimed, without substantiation, that the discriminatory measures were motivated by its national security concerns, the substance of the 13 demands made clear that they were actually an attempt to curtail media freedom and undermine Qatar’s sovereignty by attempting to dictate Qatar’s international relations, as well as interfere with Qatar’s internal affairs. On 28 June 2017, the Committee to Protect Journalists issued the following statement: “[T]he demand to shutter all Qatari‑funded media—including the international network Al Jazeera, but also the news websites Al‑Arabi Al‑Jadeed, Middle East Eye, Arabi21, Egypt’s Rassd news agency, and others — shows 41Application, Annex 3, see also Annex 1, Federal Decree — Law No. 5 on Combating Cybercrimes, supra note 39. 42 Ibid., Annex 7, “The 13 demands on Qatar from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt”, The National (23 June 2017). 43 Specifically, the demands of the UAE included that Qatar: terminate the Turkish military presence currently in Qatar and end any joint military co-operation with Turkey inside of Qatar; consent to yearly “compliance” audits for ten years, including monthly audits for the first year; pay reparations for losses purportedly caused by Qatar’s policies, in an amount to be determined “in co-ordination” with Qatar; cease contacts with political opposition in the UAE and hand over details of Qatar’s prior contacts with and support for those groups; curb diplomatic ties with Iran, close its diplomatic missions there, expel members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard from Qatar, cut off any joint military co-operation with Iran, and engage only in trade and commerce with Iran that “complies” with US and international sanctions; revise citizenship laws, in particular the practice of granting citizenship to nationals from the UAE who are “wanted” in the UAE, and revoke Qatari citizenship if that citizenship violates the UAE’s laws; align itself with the other Gulf and Arab countries militarily, politically, socially, and “on economic matters, in line with an agreement reached with Saudi Arabia in 2014”; sever ties and stop all means of funding for individuals, groups, or organizations that have been designated as terrorists by the UAE, the United States, and other countries; and freeze assets of wanted individuals from the UAE and provide any desired information about their residency, movements, and finances. See ibid. 44 “Qatar given 10 days to meet 13 sweeping demands by Saudi Arabia”, The Guardian (23 June 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/23/close-al-jazeera- saudi-arabiaissues- qatar-with-13-demands-to-end-blockade; “In response to Amir of Kuwait’s request, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt agree to extend the grace period offered to Qatar to 48 hours” (3 July 2017), Saudi Press Agency, http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang =en&newsid=1644914. 29 montant minimal de 500 000 dirhams des Emirats arabes unis (136 000 dollars des Etats‑Unis environ) 41. 26. Quelques semaines plus tard, le 23 juin 2017, les Emirats arabes unis ont menacé de maintenir indéfiniment les mesures discriminatoires si le Qatar refusait de se plier à une série de 13 exigences politiques (ci‑après, les « 13 exigences »), aggravant ainsi la situation de crise qu’ils avaient créée 42. Les Emirats arabes unis exigeaient notamment du Qatar qu’il ferme définitivement tous les bureaux d’Al Jazeera et de tous les médias associés à ce réseau, ainsi que tous les autres sites d’information financés par des fonds qatariens ; qu’il conduise sa politique étrangère et ses relations diplomatiques et stratégiques selon les volontés des Emirats arabes unis ; qu’il livre aux autorités émiriennes les personnes « recherchées » par celles‑ci ; et qu’il accepte une large ingérence — y compris sous la forme de « contrôles » mensuels — dans son processus décisionnel interne 43. Le Qatar a été sommé de satisfaire à ces exigences dans les dix jours, délai prolongé ensuite de 48 heures à la demande de l’émir du Koweït 44. 27. Même si les Emirats arabes unis ont prétendu — sans toutefois le démontrer — que les mesures discriminatoires étaient motivées par des considérations liées à leur sécurité nationale, la teneur des 13 exigences montre clairement qu’ils cherchaient en fait à restreindre la liberté de la presse et à dépouiller le Qatar de sa souveraineté en lui dictant sa conduite en matière de relations internationales et en s’ingérant dans ses affaires intérieures. Le 28 juin 2017, le comité pour la protection des journalistes a publié la déclaration suivante : « [L]a demande visant à obtenir la fermeture de tous les médias financés par des fonds qatariens — dont le réseau international Al Jazeera, mais également les sites d’information Al‑Arabi Al‑Jadeed, Middle East Eye, Arabi21 et 41 Voir note 40 ci-dessus, annexe 3 ; voir aussi le décret fédéral sur la lutte contre la cybercriminalité, voir note 39 ci-dessus, annexe 1. 42 « The 13 Demands on Qatar from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Egypt », The National, 23 juin 2017, annexe 7. 43 En particulier, les Emirats arabes unis exigent que le Qatar mette fin à la présence militaire turque sur son territoire, ainsi qu’à toute coopération militaire avec la Turquie à l’intérieur de ses frontières ; qu’il consente à se soumettre pendant dix ans à un contrôle de « bonne exécution », mensuellement la première année puis annuellement ; qu’il verse une réparation pour les pertes qu’auraient causées ses forces de police, d’un montant à déterminer « en coordination » avec lui ; qu’il cesse tout contact avec les groupes d’opposition politique aux Emirats arabes unis et communique toutes informations sur les échanges qu’il a eus antérieurement avec ces groupes et le soutien qu’il leur a apporté ; qu’il limite ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Iran, ferme ses missions diplomatiques dans ce pays, expulse les membres du Corps des Gardiens de la révolution islamique présents sur son territoire, cesse toute coopération militaire avec l’Iran et n’entretienne avec ce pays que des relations commerciales « conformes » aux sanctions américaines et internationales ; qu’il modifie sa législation sur la nationalité, en particulier en vue de mettre un terme à la pratique consistant à naturaliser des ressortissants émiriens qui sont « recherchés » aux Emirats arabes unis et de révoquer toute nationalité qatarienne accordée en violation des lois émiriennes ; qu’il aligne ses politiques militaire, politique et sociale sur celles des autres pays arabes et du Golfe, ainsi que sa gestion des « affaires économiques, conformément à un accord conclu avec l’Arabie saoudite en 2014 » ; qu’il cesse toute relation avec des individus, groupes ou organisations désignés comme terroristes par les Emirats arabes unis, les Etats-Unis et d’autres pays, ainsi que tout financement de leurs activités ; et qu’il gèle les avoirs de toute personne recherchée par les Emirats arabes unis et communique toute information sur son domicile, ses déplacements et ses finances. Voir ibid. 44 « Qatar Given 10 Days to Meet 13 Sweeping Demands by Saudi Arabia », The Guardian, 23 juin 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/23/close-al-jazeera- saudiarabia- issues-qatar-with-13-demands-to-end-blockade ; agence de presse saoudienne, « In Response to Amir of Kuwait’s Request, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt Agree to Extend the Grace Period Offered to Qatar to 48 Hours », 3 juillet 2017, https://www.spa.gov. sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1644914. 30 clear contempt for the principle of press freedom and to [the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt’s] treaty commitments to the rights to free expression and to freely receive and impart information. The demand also represents a clear attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries where these media companies operate — under the guise of demanding that Qatar not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, thereby limiting the diversity of sources for information and views in the region.” 45 28. On 5 July 2017, the UAE issued an additional list of “six principles” with which Qatar must comply in order for the discriminatory measures to be lifted 46. In a public statement, the UAE claimed that these “principles” were consistent with principles in various international conventions related to “combating international terrorism”, including to “refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of States” 47. The UAE later underscored that these “principles” were intended to supplement, rather than replace, the original 13 demands 48. But again, the UAE’s reference to combating terrorism has been revealed as just pretext. For example, a UAE official has been quoted as saying that the discriminatory measures would end if Qatar agreed to give up hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and a financial plan designed to force Qatar to pass the World Cup to another Gulf State was leaked in November 2017 49. As before, Qatar refused to comply with this latest challenge to its sovereignty 50. B. Impact of the UAE’s Discriminatory Measures 29. Due to their relative proximity, shared culture, and previously open borders, many Qataris live, work, study and travel within the UAE, and are married to Emiratis. The same is true for many Emiratis in Qatar. 30. As a result of these close ties, the discriminatory measures have had a devastating impact on Qataris and families of which they are a part. They have inter45 Joel Simon, “Calls to shutter Qatari media show contempt for press freedom”, Committee to Protect Journalists (28 June 2017), https://cpj.org/2017/06/calls-to-shutterqatari- media-show-contempt-for-pr.php. 46 See Application, Annex 9, “Full joint statement of boycotting countries on Qatar crisis”, Al Arabiya English (5 July 2017). 47 Ibid. 48 See “Boycotting quartet reaffirms its demands on Qatar”, Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports — Egypt Edition (3 August 2017), https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?arti cleid=1345752318&Country=Qatar&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Inte rnational+relations&u=1&pid=1325726316&oid=1325726316&uid=1; “Four Arab States Double Down on Qatar Boycott”, Agence France Presse (30 July 2017), http://www. newagebd.net/article/20920/four-arab-states- double-down-on-qatar-boycott. 49 “UAE official urges Qatar to give up World Cup to end crisis”, Fox News (9 October 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/10/09/uae-official- urges-qatar-to-give-up-worldcup- to-end-crisis.html; Ryan Grim and Ben Walsh, “Leaked Documents Expose Stunning Plan to Wage Financial War on Qatar — and Steal the World Cup”, The Intercept (9 November 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/11/09/uae-qatar-oitaba- rowland-banquehavilland- world-cup/. 50 See “Sheikh Tamim: Any talks must respect Qatar sovereignty”, Al Jazeera (22 July 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/sheikh-tamim-talks-respect- qatar-sovereignty- 170721184815998.html. 31 l’agence de presse égyptienne Rassd, entre autres — témoigne d’un mépris manifeste pour le principe de la liberté de la presse ainsi que pour les obligations conventionnelles auxquelles [les Emirats arabes unis, l’Arabie saoudite, Bahreïn et l’Egypte] ont souscrit en faveur des droits à la liberté d’expression et à la liberté de recevoir et de répandre des informations. En outre, cette demande, au prétexte d’empêcher le Qatar de s’ingérer dans les affaires intérieures d’autres Etats, est en fait une tentative manifeste d’ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des pays où les médias en question sont actifs, en vue de limiter la diversité des sources d’information et d’opinion dans la région. » 45 28. Le 5 juillet 2017, les Emirats arabes unis ont publié une liste supplémentaire de « six principes » auxquels le Qatar devait se conformer pour obtenir la levée des mesures discriminatoires 46. Dans une déclaration publique, ils ont affirmé que ces « principes » étaient conformes à ceux énoncés dans diverses conventions internationales sur la « lutte contre le terrorisme international », et notamment au principe de « non‑ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des autres Etats » 47. Par la suite, ils ont précisé que les six « principes » venaient compléter, et non remplacer, les « 13 exigences » initiales 48. Là encore, il est apparu que la lutte contre le terrorisme n’était qu’un prétexte. Par exemple, une source a cité un responsable émirien qui affirmait que les mesures discriminatoires seraient levées si le Qatar renonçait à accueillir la Coupe du monde de la FIFA en 2022 ; en novembre 2017, une fuite a révélé l’existence d’une stratégie financière dont l’objectif était d’obliger le Qatar à céder l’organisation de la Coupe du monde à un autre Etat du Golfe 49. Comme précédemment, le Qatar a refusé de se plier à cette nouvelle exigence portant atteinte à sa souveraineté 50. B. Effet des mesures discriminatoires mises en oeuvre par les Emirats arabes unis 29. Du fait de la proximité relative des Emirats arabes unis, dont les frontières leur étaient auparavant ouvertes, et de leur culture commune, nombreux sont les Qatariens qui vivent, travaillent, étudient et se déplacent sur le territoire émirien ou dont le conjoint est émirien. Il en va de même pour nombre d’Emiriens au Qatar. 30. Compte tenu de ces liens étroits, les mesures discriminatoires ont eu un effet dévastateur sur les Qatariens et leurs familles, entravant l’exercice des droits de 45 Joel Simon, « Calls to Shutter Qatari Media Show Contempt for Press Freedom », comité pour la protection des journalistes, 28 juin 2017, https://cpj.org/2017/06/calls-to-shutter- qatari-media-show-contempt-for-pr.php. 46 « Full Joint Statement of Boycotting Countries on Qatar Crisis », Al Arabiya English, 5 juillet 2017, annexe 9. 47 Ibid. 48 Voir « Boycotting Quartet Reaffirms its Demands on Qatar », Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports — Egypt Edition, 3 août 2017, https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?ar ticleid=1345752318&Country=Qata&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic= International+relations&u=1&pid=1325726316&oid=1325726316&uid=1 ; « Four Arab States Double Down on Qatar Boycott », Agence France Presse, 30 juillet 2017, http://www. newagebd.net/article/20920/four-arab-states- double-down-on-qatar-boycott. 49 « UAE Official Urges Qatar to Give Up World Cup to End Crisis », Fox News, 9 octobre 2017, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/10/09/uae-official- urges-qatar-to-giveup- world-cup-to-end-crisis.html ; Ryan Grim et Ben Walsh, « Leaked Documents Expose Stunning Plan to Wage Financial War on Qatar — and Steal the World Cup », The Intercept, 9 novembre 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/11/09/uae-qatar-oitaba- rowlandbanque- havilland-world-cup/. 50 Voir « Sheikh Tamim: Any Talks Must Respect Qatar Sovereignty », Al Jazeera, 22 juillet 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/sheikh-tamim-talks-respect- qatarsovereignty- 170721184815998.html. 32 fered with basic human rights protected by the CERD, including the rights to marriage and choice of spouse, free expression, education, medical treatment, work, property, and others. Further, Qataris have been denied any effective means of legal recourse to seek redress against the discriminatory measures. 1. Interference with marriage and choice of spouse 31. Family ties often cut across national boundaries in the Gulf region, with 3,694 marriages between Qataris and citizens of the UAE as of June 2017 51. These ties often span generations, and for these families, the ability to live and move freely between their multiple countries of citizenship is essential to maintaining the togetherness of their family units and the well‑being of the parents and children within those units. 32. The collective expulsion of Qataris from the UAE, the recall of Emiratis in Qatar, and the prohibition or restrictions on entry and travel to the UAE have had a profound impact on mixed‑nationality families. Since the imposition of the discriminatory measures, Qatar’s NHRC found 82 cases of family separation involving the UAE, and stated that the “real impact is greater” 52. Likewise, Human Rights Watch found almost half of the individuals interviewed (22 of 50), which included Qataris, reported that the travel restrictions had cut them off from immediate family members 53. 33. In addition to forced separation, the discriminatory measures have disproportionately harmed infant children born in Qatar to Qatari mothers and Emirati fathers. Because these children possess their fathers’ nationality, the families must rely upon the UAE to obtain proof of the infant’s nationality. However, since the UAE has withdrawn its Embassy from Qatar, the only way to obtain proof of national identity and passports for the infant is for the parent and child to travel to the UAE — which Qatari mothers cannot do subsequent to the discriminatory measures 54. As such, these families are left with an impossible choice — leaving the infant’s mother behind in Qatar, thereby risking indefinite family separation, or staying together as a family in Qatar without proof of the child’s identity, at risk of de facto statelessness for the child 55. 34. Although the UAE, following the outcry from international human rights organizations, purported to implement measures to account for the “humanitarian situation” of Qatari‑Emirati families, these measures are patently insufficient to mitigate the human rights violations of Qataris. As reported by the UN High Commissioner and other human rights organizations in the aftermath of the imposition of the discriminatory measures, the measures taken by the UAE — consisting primarily of announcing “committees” and “hotlines” for Qatari‑Emirati 51 Application, Annex 11, “Joint Communication from the Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council to the UAE”, pp. 1‑2. 52 Ibid., Annex 22, National Human Rights Committee, “A Year of the Blockade Imposed on Qatar” (June 2018) (hereinafter “NHRC Fifth Report”), p. 14; Annex 12, National Human Rights Committee, “100 Days under the Blockade” (30 August 2017), p. 5. 53 See Annex 10, Human Rights Watch, “Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses” (12 July 2017) (interviewing Qatari, Saudi, and Bahraini individuals) (hereinafter “Human Rights Watch, July 2017 Report”). 54 See “Gulf Crisis Shows How Discrimination in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar Tears Families Apart” (21 July 2017), Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/ news/2017/07/21/gulf-crisis- shows-how-discrimination-saudi-arabia-bahrain-uae-and-qatartears. 55 See Application, Annex 10, Human Rights Watch, July 2017 Report, supra note 53. 33 l’homme fondamentaux garantis par la CIEDR, notamment le droit de se marier et de choisir son conjoint, le droit à la liberté d’expression, le droit à l’éducation, le droit aux soins médicaux, le droit au travail et le droit à la propriété. Les Qatariens ont également été privés de voies de recours effectives leur permettant de demander réparation à raison des mesures discriminatoires subies. 1) Entrave à l’exercice du droit de se marier et de choisir son conjoint 31. Dans la région du Golfe, il est fréquent que des liens familiaux se nouent par-delà les frontières ; ainsi, en juin 2017, on dénombrait 3694 mariages entre Qatariens et Emiriens 51. Cette mixité se retrouve souvent sur plusieurs générations, et il est primordial pour les familles concernées de pouvoir vivre et se déplacer librement d’un pays à l’autre afin de préserver l’unité de leur cellule familiale et le bien-être des parents et des enfants qui la composent. 32. L’expulsion collective des Qatariens hors du territoire émirien, le rappel des Emiriens présents au Qatar et l’interdiction d’entrée et de déplacement sur le territoire émirien ou les restrictions imposées à cet égard ont eu de profonds effets sur les familles mixtes. Depuis l’imposition des mesures discriminatoires, le NHRC a recensé 82 cas de séparation familiale concernant les Emirats arabes unis mais estime que « l’effet réel est plus vaste » 52. De même, selon Human Rights Watch, près de la moitié des personnes interrogées (22 sur 50), dont des Qatariens, ont indiqué que les restrictions de déplacement les avaient isolées de certains de leurs proches 53. 33. Outre les séparations forcées, les mesures discriminatoires ont porté préjudice de manière disproportionnée aux enfants nés au Qatar de mère qatarienne et de père émirien. Etant donné que ces enfants ont la nationalité de leur père, les familles doivent s’en remettre aux autorités émiriennes pour obtenir leur certificat de nationalité. Or, les Emirats arabes unis ont fermé leur ambassade au Qatar, de sorte que parents et enfants n’ont d’autre choix que de se rendre aux Emirats arabes unis pour obtenir ledit certificat — ce dont les mères qatariennes sont empêchées par les mesures discriminatoires 54. Les familles concernées se trouvent donc devant un dilemme : soit la mère est contrainte de rester au Qatar, et la famille risque d’être séparée indéfiniment, soit la famille reste ensemble au Qatar, sans document établissant l’identité de l’enfant, qui risque d’être de facto un apatride 55. 34. Bien que les Emirats arabes unis, à la suite des réactions indignées émanant de diverses organisations internationales oeuvrant en faveur des droits de l’homme, aient prétendu appliquer des mesures destinées à faire face à la « situation humanitaire » des familles binationales, ces mesures sont très loin de suffire à atténuer les violations des droits de l’homme dont les Qatariens sont victimes. Ainsi que l’ont rapporté le HCDH et des organisations de défense des droits de l’homme, après l’imposition des mesures discriminatoires, les démarches émiriennes — qui ont 51 « Communication conjointe des titulaires de mandat au titre des procédures spéciales », p. 1‑2, annexe 11. 52 NHRC, « Fifth General Report, Continuation of Human Rights Violation : A Year of the Blockade Imposed on Qatar » (juin 2018) (ci- après, le « cinquième rapport du NHRC »), p. 14, annexe 22 ; NHRC, « 100 Days under the Blockade » (30 août 2017), p. 5, annexe 12. 53 Voir Human Rights Watch July 2017 Report, « Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses » (12 juillet 2017) (ci‑après, le « rapport de juillet 2017 ») (où il est fait état de témoignages de ressortissants qatariens, saoudiens et bahreïnites), annexe 10. 54 Voir Human Rights Watch, « Gulf Crisis Shows How Discrimination in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar Tears Families Apart », 21 juillet 2017, https://www.hrw.org/ news/2017/07/21/gulf-crisis- shows-how-discrimination-saudi-arabia-bahrain-uae-and-qatartears. 55 Voir Human Rights Watch, rapport de juillet 2017, voir note 53 ci-dessus, annexe 10. 34 families purportedly to deal with issues arising out the discriminatory measures — have been “clearly insufficient to address the human rights impact” 56. Further, in some cases, individuals have been hindered from using them by fear of reprisals 57. Out of 50 Gulf nationals interviewed by Human Rights Watch, only 12 attempted to use the UAE’s “hotlines”, and only two of these 12 obtained permission to live in Qatar 58. The majority of Gulf nationals interviewed did not attempt to call the hotlines, citing concerns that the hotlines could expose them to reprisal or, more simply, would be futile 59. The NHRC’s June 2018 Report concluded: “according to international organizations and reports despite the formation of these alleged committees and the allocation of telephone numbers to receive communications, this procedure has been deemed highly ineffective” 60. Against the scope and gravity of the UAE’s blanket expulsion and exclusion of Qataris based on their national origin, these “hotlines” are cosmetic at best and cannot address the devastating human rights impact on Qataris. 35. As documented by the OHCHR Report, “[t]he decision of 5 June has led to cases of temporary or potentially durable separation of families across the countries concerned, which has caused psychological distress as well as some difficulties for some individuals to economically support their relatives left in Qatar or the other countries” 61. 56 Application, Annex 14, “Reply by the United Arab Emirates to the Joint Communication from Special Rapporteurs of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights”, HRC/NONE/2017/112 (18 September 2017) (“[a] committee representing all relevant entities in the country has been established in order to facilitate procedures for families of mixed Emirati-Qatari nationality and to deal with issues related to real estate, businesses and vehicles owned by Qatari nationals, as well as matters related to health. In that regard, a hotline has also been set up”); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Qatar diplomatic crisis: Comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on impact on human rights” (14 June 2017), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21739& LangID=E (noting that measures implemented to address dual nationality families “are not sufficiently effective to address all cases” and that the UAE and Bahrain have threatened to jail and fine people who express sympathy for Qatar); Annex 6, Amnesty International, “Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human dignity trampled and families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes” (19 June 2017), p. 2 (hereinafter “Amnesty International, June 2017 Report”); Application, Annex 10, Human Rights Watch, July 2017 Report, supra note 53. 57 See Application, Annex 6, Amnesty International, June 2017 Report, supra note 56, p. 2. 58 See ibid., Annex 10, Human Rights Watch, July 2017 Report, supra note 53, p. 6. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid., Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 10. 61 Ibid., Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3, para. 32. 35 essentiellement consisté à annoncer la mise en place de « comités » et de « services d’assistance téléphonique d’urgence » dans le but affiché d’aider les familles qataro-émiriennes à surmonter les difficultés découlant des mesures discriminatoires — « n’ont clairement pas suffi à contrecarrer l’effet de ces mesures sur la situation en matière de droits de l’homme » 56. Qui plus est, il est arrivé que certains renoncent à ces services par crainte de représailles 57. Sur les cinquante nationaux d’Etats du Golfe dont le témoignage a été recueilli par Human Rights Watch, douze seulement ont cherché à joindre les « services d’assistance téléphonique d’urgence » mis en place par les Emirats arabes unis, et seuls deux d’entre eux ont obtenu l’autorisation de vivre au Qatar 58. La majorité n’ont pas tenté d’appeler les services en question parce qu’ils craignaient de subir des représailles ou pensaient tout simplement que cela ne servirait à rien 59. Selon les conclusions du rapport du NHRC de juin 2018, « il ressort des observations de diverses organisations internationales et de plusieurs rapports que, malgré la constitution de ces prétendus comités et la mise en place de services d’assistance téléphonique, cette procédure s’est révélée largement inefficace » 60. Compte tenu de la portée et de la gravité des mesures d’expulsion et d’exclusion appliquées sans distinction par les Emirats arabes unis contre des Qatariens au motif de leur origine nationale, les « services d’assistance téléphonique d’urgence » mis en place sont dans le meilleur des cas de pure forme et ne sauraient suffire à contrecarrer l’effet dévastateur des mesures en cause sur les droits de l’homme des Qatariens. 35. Ainsi qu’il est indiqué dans le rapport du HCDH, « [l]a décision du 5 juin a conduit à la séparation temporaire ou potentiellement durable de familles éclatées entre l’un ou l’autre des pays concernés, ce qui a provoqué un sentiment de détresse psychologique ainsi que des difficultés pour certaines personnes qui voulaient aider financièrement leurs proches restés au Qatar ou dans les autres pays » 61. 56 « Reply by the United Arab Emirates to the Joint Communication from Special Rapporteurs of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights », HRC/NONE/2017/112 (18 septembre 2017) (« [u]n comité représentant toutes les entités compétentes dans le pays a été créé afin de faciliter les procédures pour les familles mixtes émiro-qatariennes et de gérer les problèmes liés aux biens immobiliers, aux commerces et aux véhicules détenus par des Qatariens, ainsi que les questions en matière de santé. A cet effet, un numéro d’assistance en ligne a été mis en place »), annexe 14 ; HCDH, « La crise diplomatique du Qatar : Commentaire de Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme, sur les conséquences en matière de droits de l’homme », 14 juin 2017, https://www.ohchr.org/FR/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx? NewsID=21739&LangID=F (relevant que les mesures mises en oeuvre pour les familles binationales « ne so[nt] pas suffisamment efficaces pour traiter tous les cas » et que les Emirats arabes unis et Bahreïn menacent d’emprisonner les personnes qui expriment de la sympathie pour le Qatar et de leur infliger une amende) ; Amnesty International, « Tensions entre des pays du Golfe et le Qatar : la dignité humaine bafouée et des familles dans l’incertitude à l’expiration du délai imposé » (19 juin 2017), p. 2 (ci- après, « Amnesty International, rapport de juin 2017 »), annexe 6 ; Human Rights Watch, rapport de juillet 2017, voir note 53 ci-dessus, annexe 10. 57 Voir Amnesty International, rapport de juin 2017, voir note 56 ci-dessus, p. 2, annexe 6. 58 Voir Human Rights Watch, rapport de juillet 2017, voir note 53 ci-dessus, p. 6, annexe 10. 59 Ibid. 60 Cinquième rapport du NHRC, voir note 52 ci-dessus, p. 10, annexe 22. 61 Rapport du HCDH, voir note 3 ci-dessus, par. 32, annexe 16. 36 2. Interference with free expression 36. As noted above, after 5 June 2017, the UAE immediately moved to undermine free expression from and regarding Qatar, including by blocking access to Qatari news websites and criminalizing so‑called “sympathy” with Qatar. At the same time, prominent UAE outlets began to publish anti‑Qatar editorials on a daily basis 62. The UAE’s attacks on free expression have been described by the OHCHR as part of a “widespread defamation and hatred campaign against Qatar” 63. Between June and October 2017, at least 1,120 press articles and 600 anti‑Qatar caricatures were published in Gulf States, including the UAE 64. Press articles and anti‑Qatar caricatures continue to be published in the UAE, and popular entertainment programmes routinely broadcast anti‑Qatar messages 65. 37. The UAE’s campaign against Qatar is not limited to the Gulf. SCL Social, a British communications company, revealed in its 2017 public disclosures pursuant to the US Foreign Agents Registration Act that the UAE’s National Media Council had paid it US$330,000 to launch a public relations campaign against Qatar on social media 66. The contract reportedly required the creation of advertisements for social media websites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube that linked Qatar with terrorism and promulgated an artificial movement using the hashtag #boycottqatar 67. The English‑language campaign was arranged to coincide with the United Nations General Assembly meeting in September 2017 68. 62 See e.g. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “What’s going on with Qatar?”, The Washington Post (1 June 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/01/ whats-going-on-with-qatar/?utm_term=.9a4d95e090f1. 63 Application, Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3, para. 14. 64 Ibid., para. 16 (considering negative press articles and anti-Qatar caricatures published in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain). 65 Ibid., paras. 16-17. 66 SCL Social Limited, Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (6 October 2017), https://www.fara.gov/docs/6472-Registration-Statement- 20171006- 1.pdf; Anita Kumar and Ben Wieder, “Steve Bannon’s already murky Middle East ties deepen”, McClatchy Washington Bureau (23 October 2017), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/ news/politics-government/ white-house/article180111646.html. 67 Julia Ainsley, Andrew W. Lehren and Anna R. Schecter, “The Mueller effect: FARA filings soar in shadow of Manafort, Flynn probes”, NBC News (19 January 2018), https:// www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/mueller-effect- fara-filings-soar-shadow-manafort-flynnprobes- n838571. 68 See SCL Social Limited, Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (6 October 2017), https://www.fara.gov/docs/6472-Registration-Statement- 20171006-1.pdf. Image 1: Caricature from UAE News Agency 37 2) Entrave à l’exercice du droit à la liberté d’expression 36. Ainsi qu’il est indiqué plus haut, le 5 juin 2017 et dans les jours qui ont suivi, les Emirats arabes unis ont pris sans délai des dispositions visant à museler la liberté d’expression de tous ceux qui exposaient leurs vues au sujet du Qatar, y compris du territoire qatarien, bloquant notamment l’accès aux sites d’information en ligne qatariens et incriminant les manifestations dites de « sympathie » à l’égard du Qatar. En parallèle, des médias émiriens influents ont entrepris de publier quotidiennement des articles dénigrant le Qatar 62. Les atteintes émiriennes à la liberté d’expression ont été qualifiées par le HCDH de « campagne généralisée de diffamation et de haine contre le Qatar » 63. Entre juin et octobre 2017, pas moins de 1120 articles de presse et 600 caricatures critiquant le Qatar ont été publiés dans des Etats du Golfe, notamment aux Emirats arabes unis 64. Pareils articles et caricatures continuent d’être publiés aux Emirats arabes unis et des émissions de divertissement populaires décrient régulièrement le Qatar 65. 37. La campagne émirienne contre le Qatar ne se limite pas à la région du Golfe. L’agence de communication britannique SCL Social [Limited] a révélé en 2017, parmi les informations qu’elle était tenue de publier conformément à la loi américaine relative à l’immatriculation des agents étrangers (Foreign Agents Registration Act), que le conseil émirien des médias lui avait versé la somme de 330 000 dollars des Etats-Unis pour qu’elle lance une campagne publique de dénigrement du Qatar dans les médias sociaux 66. Le contrat aurait notamment prévu la conception de messages publicitaires, destinés à des médias sociaux tels que Facebook, Twitter et YouTube, associant le Qatar au terrorisme et faisant la promotion d’un mouvement artificiel rassemblé sous la dénomination #boycottqatar 67. Cette campagne, menée en langue anglaise, a été lancée de manière à coïncider avec la session de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, en septembre 2017 68. 62 Voir, par exemple, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, « What’s Going On with Qatar ? », The Washington Post, 1er juin 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/ 06/01/whats-going-on-withqatar/? utm_term=.9a4d95e090f1. 63 Rapport du HCDH, voir note 3 ci-dessus, par. 14, annexe 16. 64 Ibid., par. 16 (où il est question des articles de presse et des caricatures critiquant le Qatar publiés aux Emirats arabes unis, en Arabie saoudite et à Bahreïn). 65 Ibid., par. 16-17. 66 SCL Social Limited Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (6 oct. 2017), https://www.fara.gov/docs/6472-Registration-Statement- 20171006- 1.pdf ; Anita Kumar et Ben Wieder, « Steve Bannon’s Already Murky Middle East Ties Deepen », McClatchy Washington Bureau, 23 octobre 2017, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/ news/politics-government/ white-house/article180111646.html. 67 Julia Ainsley, Andrew W. Lehren et Anna R. Schecter, « The Mueller Effect: FARA Filings Soar in Shadow of Manafort, Flynn Probes », NBC News, 19 janvier 2018, https:// www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/mueller-effect- fara-filings-soar-shadow-manafort-flynnprobes- n838571. 68 Voir SCL Social Limited Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (6 octobre 2017), https://www.fara.gov/docs/6472-Registration-Statement- 20171006-1.pdf. Image 1 : Exemple de caricature publiée par une agence de presse émirienne 38 38. UAE Government officials have also made public statements fostering anti‑Qatari sentiment. In November 2017, a former Chief of the Dubai Police Force and current Head of General Security for the Emirate of Dubai falsely accused Al Jazeera of provoking an attack in Egypt and called for the bombing of the media network 69. The UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs tweeted support for a Saudi royal court adviser’s so‑called “blacklist”, a campaign intended to expose the names and identities of anyone showing sympathy with Qatar and anyone who “conspires” against the UAE 70. He expressed that this “blacklist” “[was] extremely important” in exposing nationals who were sympathetic to Qatar 71. These calls foment a toxic and hostile culture that affects all Qataris and exposes even relatively benign acts of civility toward Qataris to the risk of punishment. In July 2017, for example, an Emirati national was arrested for publishing a video voicing his opinion that Emiratis should not stand against Qatar; Amnesty International called for his release, but whether he remains detained is unclear 72. In December 2017, Youssef Al Serkal, the President of the UAE General Sports Authority, was discharged from his position after public shaming by Emirati media for hugging a Qatari official 73. 39. Together, the co‑ordinated campaign to shut down speech from Qatar, proliferate false and inflammatory news about Qatar and its people, criminalize sympathy toward Qatar and its people, and isolate and punish Qataris, interferes with the right to freedom of expression and creates a culture of fear for Qataris and those related or otherwise associated with them. A Qatari woman with brothers in the UAE told Amnesty International that they “are scared to speak to us even over the phone. The law does not allow them to sympathize with us. They are very reserved in the conversations we have, as if we were strangers.” 74 69 Dhahi Khalfan (@Dhahi_Khalfan), Twitter (24 November 2017), https://twitter.com/ Dhahi_Khalfan/status/934069452261425152 (unofficial translation: “The alliance should bomb the terrorism propaganda machine. The channel of ISIS, Al Qaeda and Al Nusra, the Jazeera of terrorism”); “Dubai security chief calls for bombing of Al Jazeera”, Al Jazeera (25 November 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/dubai-security- chief-callsbombing- al-jazeera-171125143439231.html. 70 The Saudi adviser created a hashtag on Twitter, #TheBlacklist, with the stated intention of compiling accusations of “conspiracy” against Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain. “Saudi Twitter users urged to expose Qatar sympathisers”, Al Jazeera (20 August 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/saudi-twitter- users-urged-expose-qatarsympathisers- 170820100619561.html. 71 Ibid.; “Tweet names of Qatar sympathisers to ‘blacklist’: Saudi royal aide”, Middle East Eye (18 August 2017), https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-royal-adviser- callsnames- add-blacklist-qatar-sympathisers-1564107564. 72 Application, Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 34. 73 “Qatar’s blockade in 2017, day by day developments”, Al Jazeera (21 October 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/qatar-crisis- developments-october-21- 171022153053754.html; Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 34. 74 “Gulf dispute: Six months on, individuals still bear brunt of political crisis” (14 December 2017), Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/ 7604/2017/en. 39 38. De hauts responsables émiriens ont aussi fait des déclarations publiques tendant à alimenter l’hostilité envers le Qatar. En novembre 2017, un ancien directeur de la police de Doubaï, actuellement chargé de la sûreté générale dans l’émirat de Doubaï, a accusé à tort Al Jazeera d’être à l’origine d’un attentat en Egypte et appelé à détruire les locaux de la chaîne 69. Le ministre d’Etat émirien aux affaires étrangères a exprimé sur Twitter son soutien à une « liste noire » établie par un conseiller de la famille royale saoudienne qui entendait dévoiler au grand jour le nom et les qualités de toute personne faisant montre de sympathie à l’égard du Qatar ou « conspirant » contre les Emirats arabes unis 70. Selon lui, cette « liste noire » « [était] extrêmement importante » car elle devait permettre de démasquer les nationaux éprouvant de la sympathie pour le Qatar 71. Ces appels alimentent un climat malsain et hostile qui n’épargne aucun Qatarien et rend passible de sanctions tout acte de simple politesse à l’égard des Qatariens. Un Emirien a ainsi été arrêté en juillet 2017 pour avoir publié une vidéo dans laquelle il disait que, à son avis, ses compatriotes ne devraient pas se dresser contre le Qatar ; bien qu’Amnesty International ait demandé sa libération, nul ne sait avec certitude s’il n’est pas toujours détenu à ce jour 72. En décembre 2017, Youssef Al Serkal, président de l’Autorité générale des sports des Emirats arabes unis, a été limogé après que les médias émiriens l’eurent traîné dans la boue pour avoir donné l’accolade à un responsable qatarien 73. 39. Prise dans son ensemble, la campagne coordonnée visant à bâillonner le Qatar, à diffuser des informations erronées et des propos incendiaires au sujet de ce pays et de son peuple, à incriminer toute expression de sympathie à leur égard, ainsi qu’à isoler et à punir les Qatariens, entrave l’exercice du droit à la liberté d’expression et instaure un climat de peur parmi les Qatariens et ceux qui entretiennent des liens avec des Qatariens ou sont associés à eux de toute autre manière. Une Qatarienne a déclaré à Amnesty International que plusieurs de ses frères vivant aux Emirats arabes unis « craign[aient] de parler [aux membres de leur famille], même au téléphone. La loi leur interdit de sympathiser avec [eux]. Ils font preuve de beaucoup de retenue dans les conversations, comme s’ils parlaient à des étrangers. » 74 69 Dhahi Khalfan (@Dhahi_Khalfan), Twitter, 24 novembre 2017, https://twitter.com/ Dhahi_Khalfan/status/934069452261425152 (traduction française établie par le Greffe à partir de la traduction anglaise non officielle fournie par le Qatar : « L’alliance devrait détruire la machine de propagande terroriste. La chaîne de l’EIIL, d’Al Qaeda et d’Al Nusra, la jazeera du terrorisme ») ; « Dubai Security Chief Calls for Bombing of Al Jazeera », Al Jazeera, 25 novembre 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/dubai-securitychief- calls-bombing-al-jazeera-171125143439231.html. 70 Le conseiller saoudien a créé un hashtag sur Twitter, #TheBlacklist, dans l’intention déclarée de compiler des accusations de « conspiration » à l’encontre de l’Arabie saoudite, des Emirats arabes unis, de l’Egypte et de Bahreïn. « Saudi Twitter Users Urged to Expose Qatar Sympathisers », Al Jazeera, 20 août 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/ saudi-twitter- users-urged-expose-qatar-sympathisers-170820100619561.html. 71 Ibid. ; « Tweet Names of Qatar Sympathisers to « Blacklist »: Saudi Royal Aide », Middle East Eye, 18 août 2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-royal-advisercalls- names-add-blacklist-qatar-sympathisers-1564107564. 72 Cinquième rapport du NHRC, voir note 52 ci-dessus, p. 34, annexe 22. 73 « Qatar’s Blockade in 2017, Day by Day Developments », Al Jazeera, 21 octobre 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/qatar-crisis- developments-october-21- 171022153053754.html ; cinquième rapport du NHRC, voir note 52 ci-dessus, p. 34, annexe 22. 74 Amnesty International, « Gulf Dispute: Six Months on, Individuals Still Bear Brunt of Political Crisis » (14 décembre 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/7604/ 2017/en/. 40 3. Interference with medical treatment 40. Qataris frequently accessed medical treatment in the UAE, either because they resided in the UAE or because certain essential medical treatment was not available in Qatar. The UAE’s collective expulsion of Qataris and blanket restrictions on Qatari travel included Qataris receiving essential medical treatment. As a result, Qataris requiring medical attention in the UAE that is not available in Qatar have been denied necessary care, as have Qataris in the UAE who have been prohibited from continuing their course of medical treatment 75. As of June 2018, the NHRC of Qatar had documented four cases of interference with medical treatment by the UAE 76. 41. Similarly, the UAE subjected medicines and medical supplies to its blanket restrictions on ports and shipping. Before 5 June 2017, 50 to 60 per cent of Qatar’s pharmaceutical stock came from supply companies in Gulf countries, the majority of which are based in the UAE 77. The Qatar Ministry of Health reported that it has thus far been able to cover the increased cost of importing most materials from other suppliers, but it has not been able to source all of the medicines previously shipped from Gulf States 78. 4. Interference with education 42. The discriminatory measures have gravely undermined the education of Qataris who were studying in the UAE. Among other effects, UAE schools summarily expelled Qataris or dropped Qatari students from class registration, refused to refund registration and other fees, and refused to grant students access to educational records 79. As of June 2018, the NHRC documented 148 complaints related to interference with education by the UAE 80. 5. Interference with right to work 43. The discriminatory measures have also violated the rights of many Qataris who work or own businesses in the UAE. Qataris working in the UAE when the discriminatory measures were imposed had their employment threatened or summarily curtailed when they were forced to leave the country. To cite just one example, Mr. H.A., a Qatari national born in 1953, stated: “I reside in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi in the UAE since 30 years and I am working there. After the decision 75 See Application, Annex 8, National Human Rights Committee, “Second Report regarding the Human Rights Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State of Qatar” (1 July 2017), p. 23 (documenting treatment at hospitals in the UAE, as well as in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt). 76 Ibid., Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 51. 77 Ibid.; see also Barbara Bibbo, “Euro-med urges GCC countries to lift Qatar Blockade”, Al Jazeera (24 January 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/euro-med-urges-gcc-countries- lift-qatar-blockade-180124190054488.html. 78 Ibid., Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3, paras. 47-48. 79 Ibid., Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 18.; ibid., Annex 10, Human Rights Watch, July 2017 Report, supra note 53; Ibid., Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3, paras. 50-53. 80 Ibid., Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 18. 41 3) Entrave à l’exercice du droit aux soins médicaux 40. Bon nombre de Qatariens recevaient auparavant des soins médicaux aux Emirats arabes unis, soit parce qu’ils y résidaient, soit parce que certains traitements indispensables n’étaient pas disponibles au Qatar. La mesure d’expulsion collective et les restrictions appliquées sans distinction aux déplacements des Qatariens n’ont pas épargné ceux qui recevaient un traitement indispensable. En conséquence, les Qatariens soignés aux Emirats arabes unis faute de traitement médical approprié au Qatar ont été privés des soins dont ils avaient besoin, de même que ceux qui vivaient aux Emirats arabes unis et à qui il a été interdit de poursuivre leur traitement médical 75. En juin 2018, le NHRC faisait état de quatre cas d’entrave à l’exercice du droit aux soins médicaux imputable aux Emirats arabes unis 76. 41. De même, les Emirats arabes unis ont inclus les médicaments et les fournitures médicales dans la liste des produits frappés par les restrictions sans distinction qui visent l’accès aux installations portuaires et le transport maritime. Avant le 5 juin 2017, 50 à 60 % des stocks pharmaceutiques du Qatar provenaient de sociétés d’approvisionnement installées dans des pays du Golfe, essentiellement aux Emirats arabes unis 77. Selon le ministère qatarien de la santé, s’il a été possible jusqu’ici d’assumer la majoration des coûts liée à l’achat à d’autres fournisseurs de la plupart des fournitures médicales importées, certains médicaments, qui étaient auparavant expédiés par voie maritime de pays du Golfe, ne sont plus disponibles aujourd’hui au Qatar 78. 4) Entrave à l’exercice du droit à l’éducation 42. Les mesures discriminatoires ont gravement perturbé le droit à l’éducation des Qatariens poursuivant des études aux Emirats arabes unis. Des établissements émiriens ont notamment expulsé sommairement des étudiants qatariens ou annulé leur inscription, refusé de leur rembourser les frais d’inscription et autres, et refusé de leur donner accès à leur dossier universitaire 79. En juin 2018, le NHRC faisait état de 148 plaintes pour entrave à l’exercice du droit à l’éducation imputable aux Emirats arabes unis 80. 5) Entrave à l’exercice du droit au travail 43. Les mesures discriminatoires ont également eu pour effet de violer les droits de nombreux Qatariens travaillant ou possédant une entreprise aux Emirats arabes unis. Les Qatariens qui y travaillaient au moment de l’imposition desdites mesures ont vu leur emploi menacé ou leur contrat sommairement écourté lorsqu’ils ont été contraints de quitter le pays. Pour ne citer qu’un exemple, M. H. A., un Qatarien né en 1953, a déclaré ce qui suit : « Je réside depuis 30 ans dans l’émirat d’Abou Dhabi, 75 Voir NHRC, « Second Report regarding the Human Rights Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State of Qatar » (1er juillet 2017), p. 23 (où sont décrits les soins dispensés dans les hôpitaux aux Emirats arabes unis, ainsi qu’en Arabie saoudite, à Bahreïn et en Egypte), annexe 8. 76 Cinquième rapport du NHRC, voir note 52 ci-dessus, p. 51, annexe 22. 77 Ibid. ; voir aussi Barbara Bibbo, « Euro-med Urges GCC Countries to Lift Qatar Blockade », Al Jazeera, 24 janvier 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/euro-medurges- gcc-countries- lift-qatar-blockade-180124190054488.html. 78 Rapport du HCDH, voir note 3 ci-dessus, par. 47-48, annexe 16. 79 Cinquième rapport du NHRC, voir note 52 ci-dessus, p. 18, annexe 22 ; Human Rights Watch, rapport de juillet 2017, voir note 53 ci-dessus, annexe 10 ; rapport du HCDH, voir note 3 ci-dessus, par. 50-53, annexe 16. 80 Cinquième rapport du NHRC, voir note 52 ci-dessus, p. 18, annexe 22. 42 to sever relations with the State of Qatar, I was forced to leave everything in Abu Dhabi and return to my country, and I lost my work and my life.” 81 Further, the campaign of incitement against Qatar and Qataris has undermined business relationships and operations involving the UAE, threatening the livelihood of Qataris working or with interests in the UAE 82. 6. Impacts on property 44. The UAE has also enacted various measures interfering with rights to property based on Qatari national origin. In particular, Qatari individuals who own property in the UAE have been severely impacted. Property ownership in the UAE is common: Qataris bought approximately US$500 million worth of property in Dubai in 2016 alone 83. Because of the discriminatory measures, Qataris have been unable to visit their residential or commercial properties in the UAE since the UAE’s collective expulsion of Qataris in June 2017. In addition, many Qataris are effectively banned from engaging in property transactions due to requirements that they enter into a power of attorney to enable a non‑Qatari to sell property on their behalf. Valid powers of attorney must be authenticated by a UAE Embassy, but the UAE Embassy in Qatar is closed, and the UAE Embassies in other jurisdictions have reportedly refused to authenticate such powers of attorney for Qataris. Qataris also have reported that Emiratis are unwilling to enter into business transactions for fear of sanction by their own Government, including prosecution for showing “sympathy” to Qatar 84. As a result, in many instances, property owners do not know the status or security of their real property. The UAE has also violated property rights by freezing assets of Qataris and limiting financial transfers to Qataris, including based on the named individuals’ and entities’ “links” to Qatar 85. 45. In its June 2018 report, the NHRC identified 458 individual claims related to property in the UAE 86. The claims include instances of Qataris being prevented from accessing real property or managing assets in the UAE and Qataris whose businesses may no longer rely on long‑term agreements with Emirati counterparts 87. 81 Application, Annex 12, National Human Rights Committee, “100 Days under the Blockade” (30 August 2017), p. 7. 82 Ibid., pp. 7, 9-10. 83 “The boycott of Qatar is hurting its enforcers”, The Economist (19 October 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/ 21730426-if-saudis- and-emiratiswill- not-trade-doha-iranians-will-boycott. 84 See “Gulf firms struggle to keep Qatar business ties despite crisis”, Reuters (7 June 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/gulf-qatar-economy- idUSL8N1J42RL. 85 Application, Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 24; “UAE asks banks to freeze accounts of those named on Qatar-linked blacklist: WAM”, Reuters (27 July 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-emirates/ uae-asks-banks-to-freeze- accountsof- those-named-on-qatar-linked-blacklist- wam-idUSKBN1AC0YH. 86 Ibid., supra note 52, p. 24. 87 Ibid., pp. 24‑25. 43 aux Emirats arabes unis, et j’y travaille. Lorsque les relations avec l’Etat du Qatar ont été rompues, il m’a fallu tout laisser à Abou Dhabi et rentrer dans mon pays, et c’est ainsi que j’ai tout perdu : mon emploi et ma vie. » 81 La campagne d’incitation à la haine contre le Qatar et son peuple a en outre nui aux relations et transactions commerciales avec les Emirats arabes unis, menaçant les moyens de subsistance des Qatariens travaillant sur le territoire émirien ou y détenant des intérêts 82. 6) Effets sur le droit à la propriété 44. Les Emirats arabes unis ont également adopté diverses mesures entravant l’exercice du droit à la propriété des Qatariens au motif de leur origine nationale. Les particuliers qatariens possédant des biens aux Emirats arabes unis ont notamment été durement touchés. Nombre de Qatariens détiennent des titres de propriété aux Emirats arabes unis : rien qu’en 2016, la valeur des biens immobiliers achetés à Doubaï par des Qatariens était estimée à environ 500 millions de dollars des Etats-Unis 83. En raison des mesures discriminatoires, les propriétaires qatariens sont dans l’incapacité, depuis l’expulsion collective des Qatariens en juin 2017, d’accéder aux résidences privées ou aux biens commerciaux qu’ils détiennent en territoire émirien. En outre, de nombreux Qatariens sont privés de fait de la possibilité de mener des transactions immobilières faute de pouvoir donner procuration à un tiers non qatarien pour vendre des biens en leur nom. Pour être valables, ces procurations doivent être authentifiées par une ambassade émirienne ; or, celle sise au Qatar est fermée, et d’autres, installées dans des pays tiers, auraient refusé de viser de tels documents pour des Qatariens. Des Emiriens seraient aussi réticents à s’engager dans des transactions financières avec des Qatariens par crainte de sanctions de la part de leurs propres autorités, notamment de poursuites pour avoir fait montre de « sympathie » à l’égard du Qatar 84. En conséquence, nombre de propriétaires qatariens ignorent le statut de leurs biens immobiliers et ne savent pas si la sécurité desdits biens est assurée. Les Emirats arabes unis ont également entravé l’exercice du droit à la propriété des Qatariens en gelant leurs avoirs et en imposant des restrictions sur les transferts de fonds destinés à des Qatariens, au motif notamment des « liens » que les intéressés, particuliers ou entités, entretiendraient avec le Qatar 85. 45. Dans son rapport de juin 2018, le NHRC fait état de 458 plaintes en rapport avec des biens situés en territoire émirien 86. Dans certains cas, des Qatariens se voient empêchés d’accéder à des biens immobiliers ou de gérer des biens aux Emirats arabes unis ; dans d’autres, des chefs d’entreprise qatariens ne peuvent plus s’appuyer sur les accords à long terme qu’ils ont conclus avec leurs homologues émiriens 87. 81 NHRC, « 100 Days under the Blockade » (30 août 2017), p. 7, annexe 12. 82 Ibid., p. 7, 9-10. 83 « The Boycott of Qatar is Hurting Its Enforcers », The Economist, 19 octobre 2017, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/ 2017/10/19/the-boycott- of-qatar-ishurting- its-enforcers. 84 Voir « Gulf Firms Struggle to Keep Qatar Business Ties despite Crisis », Reuters, 7 juin 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/gulf-qatar-economy- idUSL8N1J42RL. 85 Cinquième rapport du NHRC, voir note 52 ci-dessus, p. 24, annexe 22 ; « UAE Asks Banks to Freeze Accounts of those Named on Qatar-Linked Blacklist: WAM », Reuters, 27 juillet 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qataremirates/ uae-asks-banks-to-freezeaccounts- of-those-named-on-qatarlinked-blacklist-wam-idUSKBN1AC0YH. 86 Ibid., voir note 52 ci-dessus, p. 24. 87 Ibid., p. 24‑25. 44 7. No legal recourse 46. Many Qataris have been left without any available legal recourse to vindicate their rights. The UAE has failed to provide any formal mechanism for Qataris to challenge the discriminatory measures or their effects 88. As they cannot enter the UAE, Qataris are prevented from physical access to UAE courts and institutions, and as a result of the “sympathy” laws and the threat of punishment associated with those laws, Qataris are also effectively barred from pursuing their rights through UAE local counsel or powers of attorney 89. The OHCHR Report noted the absence of any formal litigation mechanism for victims of the discriminatory measures 90. As explained therein, “legal co-operation has been suspended, including power of attorney. Furthermore, lawyers in these countries are unlikely to defend Qataris as this would likely be interpreted as an expression of sympathy toward Qatar.” 91 In June 2018, the NHRC documented the inability for Qataris to “resort to the courts” and to “exercise the right to litigation and [the] right to defence”, including through the “[n]on‑implementation of court orders issued in favour of Qataris” 92. C. International Condemnation of the UAE’s Actions and Qatar’s Attempts to Achieve Diplomatic Resolution 47. The UAE’s discriminatory measures have been widely condemned by the international community. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated shortly after the imposition of the discriminatory measures that he was “alarmed” by the possible human rights impact of the measures being adopted and their “potential to seriously disrupt the lives of thousands of women, children and men”, as well as “extremely troubled” by the criminalization of expressing sympathy for Qatar 93. 48. As noted, on 18 August 2017, when six Special Rapporteurs of the UN Human Rights Council sent a joint communication to the UAE raising concerns about the violation of Qataris’ human rights, the UAE responded only to deny that the rights of Qataris had been violated, at once repudiating its prior statements and denying that it ever implemented certain measures, while also asserting that it had taken steps to reduce the humanitarian consequences of these measures 94. 49. The OHCHR subsequently dispatched a technical mission to Qatar in November 2017, with a mandate to gather information on the discriminatory 88 See Application, Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3, para. 40. 89 Ibid. “Furthermore, lawyers in these countries are unlikely to defend Qataris as this would likely be interpreted as an expression of sympathy towards Qatar.” The discriminatory measures therefore not only prevent Qataris from seeking redress against violations of their rights, but also render them unable to defend themselves if claims are brought against them in the UAE. 90 Ibid., Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3, para. 40. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid., Annex 22, NHRC Fifth Report, supra note 52, p. 53. 93 OHCHR, “Qatar diplomatic crisis: Comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on impact on human rights” (14 June 2017), https://www. ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21739&LangID=E. 94 See supra para. 14. 45 7) Absence de voies de recours 46. Nombre de Qatariens se retrouvent sans aucune voie de recours juridique pour faire valoir leurs droits. Les Emirats arabes unis n’ont mis à la disposition des Qatariens aucun mécanisme formel leur permettant de contester les mesures discriminatoires ou leurs effets 88. Interdits d’entrée sur le territoire émirien, les Qatariens sont de fait privés d’accès aux juridictions et institutions émiriennes, mais aussi, par l’effet des lois punissant les expressions de « sympathie » et des menaces pesant sur les contrevenants, de la possibilité de faire appel à l’assistance d’un conseil émirien ou d’établir des procurations pour exercer leurs droits 89. Dans son rapport, le HCDH a relevé l’absence de tout mécanisme de recours pour les victimes des mesures discriminatoires 90. Ainsi qu’il est expliqué dans ce rapport, « la coopération juridique a été suspendue, y compris pour les procurations. De plus, les juristes des pays concernés sont peu susceptibles de défendre les Qatariens, car cela serait vraisemblablement interprété comme une expression de sympathie envers le Qatar. » 91. En juin 2018, le NHRC a signalé que des Qatariens étaient dans l’incapacité d’« avoir recours aux instances judiciaires » et d’« exercer le droit d’ester en justice et celui de bénéficier d’une défense », et même de « faire appliquer des décisions de justice qui leur sont favorables » 92. C. Condamnation internationale des agissements des Emirats arabes unis et tentatives du Qatar pour parvenir à un règlement diplomatique 47. Les mesures discriminatoires prises par les Emirats arabes unis ont été largement condamnées par la communauté internationale. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme, a déclaré peu après l’imposition de ces mesures qu’il était « inquiet » de leurs conséquences possibles pour les droits de l’homme et qu’elles « [pouvaient] perturber la vie de milliers de femmes, d’enfants et d’hommes », ajoutant qu’il était très préoccupé par l’incrimination de l’expression de sympathie à l’égard du Qatar 93. 48. Comme il est indiqué plus haut, lorsque six rapporteurs spéciaux du Conseil des droits de l’homme de l’ONU leur ont envoyé une communication conjointe pour leur faire part de leurs préoccupations concernant les violations des droits de l’homme des Qatariens, le 18 août 2017, les Emirats arabes unis se sont contentés dans leur réponse de contester ces violations, revenant, d’une part, sur leurs déclarations antérieures en niant avoir jamais appliqué certaines mesures, tout en affirmant, de l’autre, avoir pris des dispositions pour atténuer les conséquences humanitaires de ces mesures 94. 49. Le HCDH a ensuite, en novembre 2017, dépêché au Qatar une mission technique qui avait pour mandat de recueillir des informations sur les effets préjudi88 Rapport du HCDH, voir note 3 ci-dessus, par. 40, annexe 16. 89 Ibid. « De plus, les juristes des pays concernés sont peu susceptibles de défendre les Qatariens, car cela serait vraisemblablement interprété comme une expression de sympathie envers le Qatar. » Les mesures discriminatoires empêchent les Qatariens non seulement de demander réparation à raison des violations de leurs droits, mais aussi de se défendre en cas de plaintes les visant aux Emirats arabes unis. 90 Rapport du HCDH, voir note 3, par. 40, annexe 16. 91 Ibid. 92 Cinquième rapport du NHRC, voir note 52 ci-dessus, p. 53, annexe 22. 93 HCDH, « La crise diplomatique du Qatar : Commentaire de Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme, sur les conséquences en matière de droits de l’homme »,14 juin 2017, https://ohchr.org/fr/NewsEvents/Pages/Display News.aspx?NewsID=21739&LangID=F. 94 Voir ci-dessus, par. 14. 46 measures’ detrimental impacts on human rights and report recommendations to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The technical mission determined that the measures (including the discriminatory measures imposed by the UAE) were arbitrary and unlawful, with significant negative effects on the enjoyment of fundamental human rights in the region, including the rights to freedom of expression, movement, family life, health, and education 95. 50. Likewise, Human Rights Watch found that Qatar’s isolation by its neighbours “is precipitating serious human rights violations”, including by “infringing on the right to free expression, separating families, interrupting medical care . . . interrupting education, and stranding migrant workers without food or water” 96. Amnesty International similarly concluded that the “arbitrary measures” taken against Qatar have resulted in “thousands of people in the Gulf fac[ing] the prospect of their lives being further disrupted and their families torn apart” 97. Reporters Without Borders decried the demand made to close Al Jazeera and other media outlets, calling it “an unacceptable act of blackmail” 98. 51. Since the UAE’s imposition of the discriminatory measures, Qatar has worked to minimize the impact of the UAE’s discriminatory conduct on Qataris and others present in Qatar. It has sought to alleviate the potential harm to the many UAE nationals who wish to remain in Qatar by relaxing residency permit requirements to confront the difficulty many UAE nationals may face obtaining renewals of their passports 99. Qatar also has urged its nationals and residents to remain neutral and to treat with dignity the UAE nationals who have remained in Qatar 100. 52. Further, as detailed above, Qatar has made numerous efforts toward a negotiated resolution of this dispute with the UAE. However, these efforts have been met by either a refusal to respond or a stated refusal to negotiate. The UAE has made it explicit that it will not compromise: it insists on Qatar’s complete capitulation to its unlawful 13 demands 101. 95 See generally, Application, Annex 16, OHCHR Report, supra note 3. 96 Ibid., Annex 10, Human Rights Watch, July 2017 Report, supra note 53, p. 1, Annex 10. 97 Ibid., Annex 6, Amnesty International, June 2017 Report, supra note 56. 98 “Unacceptable call for Al Jazeera’s Closure in Gulf Crisis” (28 June 2017), Reporters Without Borders, https://rsf.org/en/news/unacceptable-call-al-jazeeras-closure- gulf-crisis. 99 Alaa Shahine and Nafeesa Syeed, “Game-Changing Qatar Law to Grant Expats Permanent Residency”, Bloomberg (2 August 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 2017-08-02/qatar-passes- landmark-law-to-grant-permanent-residency-to-expats. 100 Qatar Ministry of the Interior, “MOI Statement on Residents from Countries that Cut Ties with Qatar” (11 June 2017), https://portal.moi.gov.qa/wps/portal/MOIInternet/ mediacenter/moinews/newsdetails/!ut/p/a1/rVNdU8IwEPw1fQy5Ni1NfYtFy0cBpQi0L0x aA1ShLSWC-usNH4MPiqBjnpLM3s7u7R2O8AhHGV-nUy7TPOPz7TuqjhuMmnUd 9JZnUBtYw2JO0HMJDAAPcYSjJJOFnOFwkyzmaYzSTIoyExLxUoMVR4s8zcRmpY FuAhF2LBAkXEem48SIJ0YVCUgMapkTYdvWlq9I0kccXoQe4VAJ7DjAdKcLLY_ Ctbrekk77rq-3lcAz-vf1RwCtAwUW9Jv9665rAOgX-T_DsAPAicPgAGjWaw0ggfLgV 4li8Nuu4d4DmPYB8IPJJo6m8zzeBRayLCZ0iqNSTEQpyspLqb5nUharKw00KPJS8nlF hVKZ5uvKkmvwXdUsX0k8-gLGoWqY_akF-h0TWPW21vKNgIBr4OCXCe4JT7TYAuPhEeF9M67UQoHNqGOysODXxM2Lxii9Gm5jJhahVwN_ 6vq3L_sQiCy8UOAi8WC krcUPffq774YIh5TIFaxfvcn7AO8IyXh. 101 See supra, paras. 17-18. 47 ciables des mesures discriminatoires sur les droits de l’homme et de présenter des recommandations au Haut‑Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme. Cette mission a déterminé que les mesures (y compris les mesures discriminatoires imposées par les Emirats arabes unis) étaient arbitraires et illicites et avaient d’importants effets néfastes sur la jouissance des droits de l’homme fondamentaux dans la région, notamment les droits à la liberté d’expression, à la liberté de circulation, à la vie de famille, à la santé et à l’éducation 95. 50. De même, Human Rights Watch a constaté que l’isolement du Qatar par ses voisins « entraîn[ait] de graves violations des droits de l’homme », notamment en ce qu’il « port[ait] atteinte au droit à la liberté d’expression, sépar[ait] des familles, interromp[ai]t des soins médicaux … interromp[ai]t des études et bloqu[ait] des travailleurs migrants qui n’avaient ni eau ni nourriture » 96. Amnesty International a également conclu que les « mesures arbitraires » prises contre le Qatar ont eu pour conséquence que « des milliers de personnes dans des pays du Golfe risqu[ai]ent de voir leur vie davantage encore bouleversée et leur famille déchirée » 97. Reporters sans frontières a dénoncé la demande de fermeture d’Al Jazeera et d’autres médias, qu’elle a qualifiée de « chantage inacceptable » 98. 51. Depuis que les Emirats arabes unis ont imposé les mesures discriminatoires, le Qatar s’efforce d’en réduire au minimum les incidences sur ses nationaux et sur d’autres personnes présentes sur son territoire. Il a cherché à atténuer le préjudice potentiel pour les nombreux nationaux des Emirats arabes unis qui souhaitent demeurer sur son territoire en assouplissant les conditions de délivrance des permis de séjour afin de pallier les difficultés auxquelles nombre des intéressés peuvent se heurter pour obtenir le renouvellement de leur passeport 99. Il a également prié instamment ses nationaux et résidents de rester neutres et de traiter avec dignité les ressortissants émiriens demeurés sur son territoire 100. 52. En outre, comme il est détaillé plus haut, le Qatar n’a pas ménagé ses efforts pour parvenir à un règlement négocié de ce différend avec les Emirats arabes unis. Or, il s’est heurté soit à un refus de répondre, soit à un refus déclaré de négocier. Les Emirats arabes unis ont déclaré explicitement qu’ils ne feraient pas de compromis : ils insistent pour que le Qatar se plie entièrement à leurs 13 exigences illicites 101. 95 Voir d’une manière générale l’annexe 16, rapport du HCDH, note 3 ci-dessus. 96 Human Rights Watch, rapport de juillet 2017, voir ci-dessus note 53, p. 1, annexe 10. 97 Amnesty International, rapport de juin 2017, voir ci-dessus note 56, annexe 6. 98 Reporters sans frontières, « Crise dans le Golfe : l’irrecevable demande faite à Al-Jazeera et aux autres médias du Qatar », 28 juin 2017, https://rsf.org/fr/actualites/crisedans- le-golfe-lirrecevable- demande-faite-al-jazeera-et-aux-autres-medias-du-qatar. 99 Alaa Shahine et Nafeesa Syeed, « Game-Changing Qatar Law to Grant Expats Permanent Residency », Bloomberg, 2 août 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 2017- 08-02/qatar-passes- landmark-law-to-grant-permanent-residency-to-expats. 100 Ministère de l’intérieur du Qatar, « MOI Statement on Residents from Countries that Cut Ties with Qatar », 11 juin 2017, https://portal.moi.gov.qa/wps/portal/MOIInternet/ mediacenter/moinews/newsdetails/!ut/p/a1/rVNdU8IwEPw1fQy5Ni1NfYtF y0cBpQi0L0xaA1ShLSWC-usNH4MPiqBjnpLM3s7u7R2O8AhHGV-nUy7TPOPz7T u q j h u M m n U d 9 J Z n U B t Y w 2 J O 0 H M J D A A P c Y S j J J O F n O F w k y zmaYzSTIoyExLxUoMVR4s8zcRmpYFuAhF2LBAkXEem48SIJ0YVCUgMapkTYd vWlq9I0kccXoQe4VAJ7DjAdKcLLY_Ctbrekk77rq-3lcAz-vf1RwCtAwUW9Jv9 665rAOgX-T_DsAPAicPgAGjWaw0ggfLgV4li8Nuu4d4DmPYB8IPJJo6m8zzeBRayLCZ 0iqNSTEQpyspLqb5nUharKw00KPJS8nlFhVKZ5uvKkmvwXdUsX0k8-gLGoWqY_ak F-h0TWPW21vKNgIBr4OCXCe4JT7TYA-uPhEeF9M67UQoHNqGOysOD XxM2Lxii9Gm5jJhahVwN_6vq3L_sQiCy8UOAi8WCkrcUPffq774YIh5TIFaxfvcn 7AO8IyXh. 101 Voir ci-dessus, par. 17-18. 48 IV. The UAE’s Violations of the CERD 53. The UAE’s imposition of the discriminatory measures violates the provisions and principles underlying the CERD, which commits States to pursuing “a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms” 102. CERD Article 1 (1) defines “racial discrimination” as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life” 103. 54. The UAE has taken the opposite course: it has unlawfully targeted Qataris on the basis of their national origin. It has done so in an attempt to pressure Qatar into capitulating to the UAE’s insistence that it be allowed to meddle in Qatar’s internal affairs and to force Qatar to compromise its own human rights obligations, for example, by forcing the closure of Al Jazeera. The UAE’s course of action places Qataris on an unequal footing, violates their basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, and is blatantly inconsistent with recognizing the “dignity and equality inherent in all human beings” 104. 55. While CERD Article 1 (2) envisages certain distinctions between citizens and non‑citizens, the CERD Committee has emphasized that this discretion “should not be interpreted to detract in any way from the rights and freedoms recognized and enunciated in particular in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” 105. Further, many of the rights and freedoms enumerated in Article 5 of the CERD “are to be enjoyed by all persons living in a given State, such as the right to equal treatment before tribunals . . .” 106. 56. Article 1 (2) does not permit States parties to distinguish between different groups of non‑nationals. Under the CERD, such differential treatment constitutes prohibited discrimination “if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to 102 CERD, supra note 5, Art. 2 (1). 103 Ibid., Art. 1 (1) (emphasis added). 104 Ibid., at preamble. 105 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “General Recommendation XXX on Discrimination against Non-Citizens”, UN doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004) (hereinafter “CERD Committee General Recommendation XXX”), para. 2; see also CERD, Art. 1 (2). 106 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “General Recommendation XX on Article 5 of the Convention”, UN doc. A/51/18 (1996) (hereinafter “CERD Committee General Recommendation XX”), para. 3. The CERD Committee enumerated a limited subset of rights that are “the rights of citizens, such as the rights to participate in elections, to vote, and to stand for election”. 49 IV. Les violations de la CIEDR commises par les Émirats arabes unis 53. L’imposition des mesures discriminatoires par les Emirats arabes unis constitue une violation des dispositions et des principes fondamentaux de la CIEDR, qui engage les Etats à poursuivre « une politique tendant à éliminer toute forme de discrimination raciale » 102. Le paragraphe 1 de l’article premier de la convention définit la « discrimination raciale » comme « toute distinction, exclusion, restriction ou préférence fondée sur la race, la couleur, l’ascendance ou l’origine nationale ou ethnique, qui a pour but ou pour effet de détruire ou de compromettre la reconnaissance, la jouissance ou l’exercice, dans des conditions d’égalité, des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales dans les domaines politique, économique, social et culturel ou dans tout autre domaine de la vie publique » 103. 54. Les Emirats arabes unis poursuivent une politique diamétralement opposée : ils ont pris illicitement pour cible les Qatariens au motif de leur origine nationale. Ce faisant, ils tentent non seulement d’exercer des pressions sur le Qatar pour qu’il se rende à leur insistance et les laisse s’ingérer dans ses affaires intérieures, mais aussi de le forcer à se soustraire à ses propres obligations en matière de droits de l’homme, par exemple en le contraignant à fermer Al Jazeera. La ligne de conduite adoptée par les Emirats arabes unis place les Qatariens dans des conditions d’inégalité, porte atteinte à leurs droits de l’homme fondamentaux et à leurs libertés fondamentales et est en contradiction flagrante avec la reconnaissance de la « dignité et de l’égalité de tous les êtres humains » 104. 55. Alors que le paragraphe 2 de l’article premier de la CIEDR envisage la possibilité que soient établies certaines distinctions entre ressortissants et non-ressortissants, le Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale a souligné que ce pouvoir discrétionnaire « doit être interprété de manière à éviter … de diminuer de quelque façon que ce soit les droits et libertés reconnus et énoncés en particulier dans la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, le pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels et le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques » 105. En outre, nombre des droits et libertés mentionnés à l’article 5 de la convention, « tel que le droit à l’égalité de traitement devant les tribunaux, intéressent toutes les personnes vivant dans un Etat donné » 106. 56. Le paragraphe 2 de l’article premier n’autorise pas les Etats parties à établir des distinctions entre différents groupes de non-ressortissants. L’application d’un traitement différent constitue une discrimination interdite au sens de la CIEDR « si les critères de différenciation, jugés à la lumière des objectifs et des buts de la Conven102 CIEDR, voir note 5 ci-dessus, art. 2, par. 1. 103 Ibid., art. 1er, par. 1 (les italiques sont de nous). 104 Ibid., dans le préambule. 105 Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale, recommandation générale XXX concernant la discrimination contre les non-ressortissants (CERD/C/64/Misc.11/ rev.3), 2004 (ci- après, la « recommandation générale XXX du CERD »), par. 2 ; voir aussi CIEDR, article premier, par. 2. 106 Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale, recommandation générale XX concernant l’article 5 de la Convention (A/51/18) (1996) (ci- après, la « recommandation générale XX du CERD »), par. 3. Le comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale énumère un sous-ensemble limité de droits, « tels que le droit de participer aux élections, de voter et de se porter candidat [qui] appartiennent aux citoyens ». 50 a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim” 107. Any distinctions that do not qualify under these criteria are an arbitrary and illegitimate misuse of the discretion afforded to States under Article 1 (2). The arbitrariness of the discriminatory measures is underscored by the fact that the measures target Qataris and do not apply to other non‑citizens of the UAE who are subject to its jurisdiction. Nor have individual circumstances been taken into account: the discriminatory measures have been applied en masse. It cannot be plausibly argued that these measures are proportionate to any legitimate aim. 57. Under Article 2 (1) of the CERD, the UAE is under an obligation to “pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races” 108. To this end, the UAE is obliged to, inter alia: (i) refrain from, prohibit, and prevent racial discrimination; (ii) amend, rescind, or nullify laws and regulations with discriminatory effects; and (iii) encourage integration. 58. The UAE has contravened its specific obligations under CERD Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7, as well as the customary international law principle of non-discrimination, by implementing sweeping discriminatory measures targeting Qataris on the basis of their national origin. In short, not only has the UAE failed to meet its obligations under CERD by enacting measures to prevent, prohibit, and criminalize racial discrimination and to combat prejudices, but it has also acted in direct opposition to the Convention by actively engaging in acts of racial discrimination and fostering a culture of prejudice. 59. Prohibition on Collective Expulsion and Ban on Entry. The mass expulsion of Qataris from the UAE and the total ban on entry of Qataris into the UAE are deliberate violations of the prohibition on racial discrimination against non‑citizens under the CERD. This includes the prohibition against collective expulsion as articulated in General Recommendation XXX, which was adopted by the CERD Committee in August 2004 and is frequently brought to the attention of States parties. In particular, blanket expulsion of Qataris from the UAE and the ban on entry by Qataris into the UAE discriminate against Qataris on the basis of national origin 109. Without regard for General Recommendation XXX, UAE authorities expelled Qataris with no consideration of the personal circumstances of each individual, denied Qataris the right to challenge the expulsion order, and provided no other effective remedy 110. While the UAE has attempted to justify the ban as a counter‑terrorism measure, such a measure lacks any legal basis and is unsubstantiated and based on demonstrably false allegations 111. Further, the expulsion of Qataris and the prohibition on entry by Qataris has been taken 107 CERD Committee General Recommendation XXX, supra note 105, para. 4. 108 CERD, supra note 5, Art. 2 (1). 109 See CERD Committee General Recommendation XXX, supra note 105, para. 9 (recommending that States “[e]nsure that immigration policies do not have the effect of discriminating against persons on the basis of . . . national . . . origin”). 110 See ibid., para. 26 (recommending that States “[e]nsure that non-citizens are not subject to collective expulsion”); ibid., para. 25 (recommending that States provide “equal access to effective remedies, including the right to challenge expulsion orders”). 111 See, e.g., “US praises Qatar’s fight against terrorism and calls for blockade to be lifted”, Middle East Monitor (22 July 2017), https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170722-us-praises- qatars-fight-against-terrorism-and-calls-for-blockade-to-be-lifted/; Robert Windrem and William M. Arkin, “Who Planted the Fake News at Center of Qatar Crisis?”, NBC News 51 tion, ne visent pas un but légitime et ne sont pas proportionnés à l’atteinte de ce but » 107. Toute distinction qui ne satisfait pas aux critères requis constitue un abus arbitraire et illégitime du pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré aux Etats en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’article premier. Le caractère arbitraire des mesures discriminatoires est d’autant plus flagrant que ces mesures visent les Qatariens et ne s’appliquent pas à d’autres étrangers qui relèvent de la juridiction des Emirats arabes unis. Les situations personnelles n’ont pas non plus été prises en considération : les mesures discriminatoires ont été appliquées « en masse ». Il ne saurait être soutenu plausiblement que ces mesures sont proportionnées à quelque objectif légitime que ce soit. 57. Aux termes du paragraphe 1 de l’article 2, les Emirats arabes unis ont l’obligation de « poursuivre par tous les moyens appropriés et sans retard une politique tendant à éliminer toute forme de discrimination raciale et à favoriser l’entente entre toutes les races » 108. A cette fin, ils sont tenus, notamment i) de s’abstenir d’exercer toute discrimination raciale, d’interdire celle- ci et de la prévenir, ii) de modifier, d’abroger ou d’annuler les lois et règlements ayant des effets discriminatoires, et iii) de favoriser l’intégration. 58. Les Emirats arabes unis, en mettant en oeuvre des mesures discriminatoires généralisées visant les Qatariens au motif de leur origine nationale, ont contrevenu aux obligations spécifiques qui leur incombent au titre des articles 2, 4, 5, 6 et 7 de la convention, ainsi qu’au principe de non-discrimination consacré par le droit international coutumier. En somme, non seulement ils ne se sont pas acquittés des obligations que leur impose la CIEDR, en adoptant des mesures visant à prévenir, interdire et incriminer la discrimination raciale et à combattre les préjugés, mais ils ont aussi agi en opposition directe avec la convention en se livrant activement à des actes de discrimination raciale et en favorisant une culture des préjugés. 59. Interdiction des expulsions collectives et du refoulement. L’expulsion massive des Qatariens des Emirats arabes unis et l’interdiction totale qui leur est faite d’entrer dans ce pays constituent des violations délibérées de l’interdiction de la discrimination raciale à l’égard de non-ressortissants énoncée par la CIEDR. Est notamment en cause l’interdiction des expulsions collectives prévue dans la recommandation générale XXX qui a été adoptée par le Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale en août 2004 et qui est fréquemment portée à l’attention des Etats parties. En particulier, l’interdiction faite à tous les Qatariens d’entrer sur le territoire des Emirats arabes unis et l’expulsion générale de tous ceux qui s’y trouvaient est discriminatoire, dès lors que le motif en est leur origine nationale 109. Au mépris de la recommandation générale XXX, les autorités émiriennes ont expulsé les Qatariens sans tenir compte de la situation personnelle de chaque individu, leur ont refusé le droit de contester la décision d’expulsion et n’ont mis à leur disposition aucun autre recours utile 110. Bien que les Emirats arabes unis aient tenté de justifier l’interdiction en la qualifiant de mesure de lutte contre le terrorisme, pareille mesure n’a aucun fondement, juridique ou autre, outre qu’elle est motivée par des allégations incontestablement fausses 111. 107 Recommandation générale XXX du CERD, voir note 105 ci-dessus, par. 4. 108 CIEDR, voir note 5 ci-dessus, art. 2, par. 1. 109 Voir la recommandation générale XXX du CERD, note 105 ci-dessus, par. 9 (recommandant aux Etats de « [v]eiller à ce que les politiques d’immigration n’aient pas d’effet discriminatoire sur les personnes en raison de leur … origine nationale… »). 110 Voir ibid., par. 26 (recommandant aux Etats de « [v]eiller à ce que les non ressortissants ne fassent pas l’objet d’une expulsion collective ») ; ibid., par. 25 (recommandant aux Etats de « [v]eiller … à ce que les non ressortissants aient un accès égal à des recours efficaces, notamment le droit de contester une mesure d’expulsion »). 111 Voir, par exemple, « US Praises Qatar’s Fight against Terrorism and Calls for Blockade to Be Lifted », Middle East Monitor, 22 juillet 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor. com/20170722-us-praises- qatars-fight-against-terrorism-and-calls-for-blockade-to-be-lifted/ ; Robert Windrem et William M. Arkin, « Who Planted the Fake News at Center of Qatar 52 without any assessment of threat on an individual basis, which, by definition, constitutes an unlawful and disproportionate response 112. 60. The UAE’s Incitement of and Failure to Condemn Racial Hatred and Prejudice. Under Article 4 of the CERD, parties to the Convention “[s]hall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination” 113. States must also “declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, [and] incitement to racial discrimination” 114. Further, States parties have an obligation to condemn propaganda that promotes racial hatred or discrimination in any form 115.The CERD Committee has recognized that prohibited racist hate speech includes statements that discriminate on grounds of national origin, such as statements directed against immigrants or non‑citizens 116. States parties’ obligations under CERD thus mandate “resolute action to counter any tendency to target, stigmatize, stereotype or profile, on the basis of . . . national or ethnic origin, members of ‘non‑citizen’ population groups” 117. This includes with respect to statements made by public officials, educators, the media, statements made on the Internet and other electronic communications networks, and in society at large 118. The statements of public officials are “of particular concern” 119. (19 July 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/who-planted- fake-news-center-qatarcrisis- n784056 (noting confirmation by US and Qatari officials that statements allegedly made by the Emir of Qatar were false and likely planted by hackers working for the UAE); Embassy of the State of Qatar in the United States, “Qatar regrets the decision by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to sever relations” (6 June 2017), http://washington. embassy.qa/en/news/detail/2017/06/07/qatar-regrets- the-decision-by-saudi-arabia-the-unitedarab- emirates-and-bahrain-to-sever-relations (expressing “deep regret over the decision of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain to close their borders and airspace and cut off diplomatic relations”, and calling such measures “unjustified” and “based on baseless and unfounded allegations”). 112 See CERD Committee General Recommendation XXX, supra note 105, para. 10 (recommending that “any measures taken in the fight against terrorism do not discriminate, in purpose or effect, on the grounds of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin and that non-citizens are not subjected to racial or ethnic profiling or stereotyping”). 113 CERD, supra note 5, Art. 4 (c). The Committee has made clear “that the provisions of article 4 are of a mandatory character” and that “[p]ublic authorities at all administrative levels” are bound by those provisions. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “General Recommendation XV on article 4 of the Convention” (1993) (hereinafter “CERD Committee General Recommendation XV”), paras. 2, 7. 114 CERD, supra note 5, Art. 4 (a). 115 Ibid., Art. 4. 116 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “General Recommendation No. 35 on Combating racist hate speech”, UN doc. CERD/C/GC/35 (2013) (hereinafter “CERD Committee General Recommendation No. 35”), paras. 6-7. 117 CERD Committee General Recommendation XXX, supra note 105, para. 12; see also CERD Committee General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 116, para. 10 (“The Committee recalls the mandatory nature of article 4 . . .”). 118 CERD Committee General Recommendation XXX, supra note 105, para. 12. 119 CERD Committee General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 116, para. 22. The Committee noted in particular “the role of politicians and other public opinion-formers in contributing to the creation of a negative climate towards groups protected by the Convention, and has encouraged such persons and bodies to adopt positive approaches directed to the promotion of intercultural understanding and harmony”. Ibid., para. 15. 53 Qui plus est, les mesures d’expulsion et d’interdiction d’entrée sur le territoire du pays visant les Qatariens ont été prises sans aucune évaluation au cas par cas de la menace que les intéressés pouvaient représenter, ce qui, par définition, constitue une réponse illicite et disproportionnée 112. 60. Incitation à la haine et aux préjugés raciaux et non-condamnation de leur expression. Aux termes de l’article 4 de la CIEDR, les parties à la convention s’engagent à « ne pas permettre aux autorités publiques ni aux institutions publiques, nationales ou locales, d’inciter à la discrimination raciale ou de l’encourager » 113. Les Etats sont aussi tenus de « déclarer délits punissables par la loi toute diffusion d’idées fondées sur la supériorité ou la haine raciale, [et] toute incitation à la discrimination raciale » 114. En outre, les Etats parties ont l’obligation de condamner la propagande qui favorise toute forme de haine ou de discrimination raciales 115. Le Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale a reconnu que les discours de haine raciste interdits comprennent les déclarations qui discriminent au motif de l’origine nationale, telles que celles dirigées contre les immigrés ou les non-ressortissants 116. Les obligations découlant de la CIEDR imposent donc aux Etats parties de prendre « des mesures énergiques pour combattre toute tendance à viser, stigmatiser, stéréotyper ou caractériser par leur profil les membres de groupes de population ‘non ressortissants’ sur la base de … l’origine nationale ou ethnique » 117. Sont aussi visées les déclarations faites par des agents de l’Etat, des éducateurs et des médias, sur Internet, dans d’autres réseaux de communication électroniques et dans la société en général 118. Les déclarations des agents de l’Etat sont « particulièrement préoccupantes » 119. Crisis? », NBC News, 19 juillet 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/who-plantedfake- news-center-qatar-crisis-n784056 (article dans lequel des responsables américains et qatariens confirment que les prétendues déclarations de l’émir du Qatar étaient fausses et sont probablement le fait de pirates informatiques travaillant pour le compte des Emirats arabes unis) ; ambassade de l’Etat du Qatar aux Etats-Unis, « Qatar Regrets the Decision by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to Sever Relations », 6 juin 2017, http://washington. embassy.qa/en/news/detail/2017/06/07/qatar-regrets- the-decision-by-saudiarabia- the-united-arab-emirates-and-bahrain-to-sever-relations (« regrettant fermer leurs frontières et leurs espaces aériens et de rompre les relations diplomatiques » et considérant ces mesures comme « injustifiées » et « basées sur des allégations totalement infondées »). 112 Voir la recommandation générale XXX du CERD, note 105 ci-dessus, par. 10 (recommandant « que les mesures prises dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme ne soient pas discriminatoires par leur but ou par leurs effets en fonction de la race, de la couleur, de l’ascendance ou de l’origine nationale ou ethnique, et à ce que les non ressortissants ne fassent pas l’objet de profils ou stéréotypes raciaux ou ethniques »). 113 CIEDR, voir note 5 ci-dessus, art. 4, alinéa c). Le comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale a rappelé clairement que « les prescriptions de l’article 4 sont impératives » et qu’elles s’imposent « aux autorités publiques à tous les niveaux de l’administration »), recommandation générale XV concernant l’article 4 de la convention (1993) (ci‑après, la « recommandation générale XV du CERD »), par. 2 et 7. 114 CIEDR, voir note 5 ci-dessus, art. 4, al. a). 115 Ibid., art. 4. 116 Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale, recommandation générale no 35 intitulée « Lutte contre les discours de haine raciale », (CERD/C/GC/35), 2013 (ci- après, la « recommandation générale no 35 du CERD »), par. 6 et 7. 117 Recommandation générale XXX du CERD, voir note 105 ci-dessus, par. 12 ; voir aussi la recommandation générale no 35 du CERD, note 116 ci-dessus, par. 10 (« Le Comité rappelle le caractère obligatoire de l’article 4. »). 118 Recommandation générale XXX du CERD, voir note 105 ci-dessus, par. 12. 119 Recommandation générale no 35 du CERD, voir note 116 ci-dessus, par. 22. Le comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale a souligné en particulier « le rôle joué par les personnalités politiques et autres décideurs dans l’apparition d’un climat négatif envers les groupes protégés par la Convention, et a encouragé ces personnes et organes à témoigner d’une attitude plus positive envers la promotion de la compréhension et l’harmonie interculturelles ». Ibid., par. 15. 54 61. Article 7 of the CERD prescribes that, in addition, States parties undertake: “to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination and to promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial or ethnical groups, as well as to propagating the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and this Convention” 120. 62. The UAE has failed to meet its obligations under Articles 4 and 7 of the CERD by failing to condemn racial hatred and prejudice and by inciting such hatred and prejudice against Qatar and Qataris. The discriminatory measures themselves focus minds on national origin and encourage discrimination and prejudice on that basis. Government officials in the UAE have directly incited hatred by engaging in media attacks on Qatari “sympathizers” and calling for physical attacks on Qatari institutions, and the UAE’s criminalization of “sympathizing” with Qataris both inflames its anti‑Qatar hate campaign and effectively stifles any response within the UAE to counter it 121. 63. Discriminatory Interference with Protected Rights. Article 5 of the CERD, referring to a State’s “fundamental obligations” under Article 2, requires that States parties “undertake to . . . eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment” of basic human rights. The rights and freedoms listed in Article 5 are not intended to be exhaustive but rather indicative of the fundamental human rights guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the core human rights treaties 122. Under the CERD, the UAE is obligated “to guarantee equality between citizens and non‑citizens in the enjoyment of these rights to the extent recognized under international law” 123. By enacting and enforcing the discriminatory measures, the UAE has violated, inter alia, the following human rights protections recognized under international law and enumerated in Article 5 of the CERD. —— Violations of the Right to Marriage and Choice of Spouse. The UAE has interfered with the right to marriage enumerated in CERD Article 5 124. By expelling Qataris from its territory, recalling UAE citizens from Qatar, and prohibiting Emiratis from traveling to Qatar, the UAE has separated families and spouses 125. Human rights leaders have observed that the discriminatory meas120 CERD, supra note 5, Art. 7. The CERD Committee has highlighted the essential role of high-level public officials and the media, including social media, in condemning hate speech and promoting tolerance. CERD Committee General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 116, paras. 37, 39. 121 See supra, paras. 25, 36-39. 122 See CERD Committee General Recommendation XX, supra note 106, para. 1. Qatar reserves all rights to refer to rights in other instruments or customary international law not explicitly enumerated in Article 5. 123 CERD Committee General Recommendation XXX, supra note 105, para. 3. 124 CERD, supra note 5, Art. 5 (c) (iv). 125 See supra paras. 29-33. 55 61. L’article 7 de la CIEDR dispose que les Etats parties s’engagent en outre à « prendre des mesures immédiates et efficaces, notamment dans les domaines de l’enseignement, de l’éducation, de la culture et de l’information, pour lutter contre les préjugés conduisant à la discrimination raciale et favoriser la compréhension, la tolérance et l’amitié entre nations et groupes raciaux ou ethniques, ainsi que pour promouvoir les buts et les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies, de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, de la Déclaration des Nations Unies sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale et de la présente [c]onvention » 120. 62. En ne condamnant pas la haine et les préjugés raciaux et en incitant à l’expression de tels sentiments contre le Qatar et les Qatariens, les Emirats arabes unis ont manqué aux obligations que leur imposent les articles 4 et 7 de la CIEDR. Les mesures discriminatoires elles-mêmes appellent l’attention sur l’origine nationale et poussent à la discrimination et aux préjugés sur cette base. Les représentants des autorités émiriennes ont directement incité à la haine en lançant des attaques médiatiques contre les « sympathisants » des Qatariens et en appelant à des attaques physiques contre les institutions qatariennes, et l’incrimination par les Emirats arabes unis de la « sympathie » à l’égard des Qatariens attise leur campagne de haine contre le Qatar tout en étouffant de fait au sein de la société émirienne jusqu’aux velléités de s’y opposer 121. 63. Entrave discriminatoire à l’exercice de droits protégés. L’article 5 de la CIEDR, qui fait référence aux « obligations fondamentales » visées à l’article 2, prescrit aux Etats parties de « s’engage[r] à … éliminer la discrimination raciale sous toutes ses formes et à garantir le droit de chacun à l’égalité devant la loi sans distinction de race, de couleur ou d’origine nationale ou ethnique, notamment dans la jouissance » de droits de l’homme fondamentaux. La liste de droits et libertés figurant à l’article 5 ne tend pas à l’exhaustivité mais indique simplement les droits de l’homme fondamentaux qui sont garantis par la Charte des Nations Unies, la déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme et les principaux traités existant en la matière 122. En application de la CIEDR, les Emirats arabes unis sont tenus de « garantir un exercice égal de ces droits par les ressortissants et les non‑ressortissants dans toute la mesure prévue par le droit international » 123. Or, en adoptant et en appliquant les mesures discriminatoires, ils ont violé, entre autres, les dispositions protégeant les droits de l’homme ci- après, lesquels sont reconnus par le droit international et énumérés à l’article 5 de la CIEDR. —— Violations du droit de se marier et de choisir son conjoint. Les Emirats arabes unis ont entravé l’exercice du droit de se marier garanti à l’article 5 124. En expulsant les Qatariens du territoire émirien, en rappelant leurs propres ressortissants du Qatar et en leur interdisant de s’y rendre, les Emirats arabes unis ont séparé des familles et des conjoints 125. D’éminents organes de protection des 120 CIEDR, voir note 5 ci-dessus, art. 7. Le comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale a souligné le rôle essentiel que jouent les hauts responsables et les médias, notamment les réseaux sociaux, en condamnant les discours de haine raciale et en défendant la tolérance. Recommandation générale no 35 du CERD, voir note 116 ci-dessus, par. 37 et 39. 121 Voir ci-dessus par. 25, 36-39. 122 Recommandation générale XX du CERD, voir note 106 ci-dessus, par. 1. Le Qatar se réserve le droit d’invoquer tout droit de l’homme reconnu par d’autres instruments ou par le droit international coutumier qui ne serait pas explicitement énoncé à l’article 5 de la CIEDR. 123 Recommandation générale XXX du CERD, voir note 105 ci-dessus, par. 3. 124 CIEDR, voir note 5 ci-dessus, art. 5 c) iv). 125 Voir ci-dessus, par. 29-33. 56 ures have had “a brutal effect, splitting children from parents and husbands from wives” 126. —— Violations of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression. The UAE’s discriminatory measures relating to freedom of expression are a transparent attempt to silence dissenters, violating the right to freedom of expression enjoyed by Qataris and transgressing the principles of inclusion and respect for diversity that underlie the CERD 127. The UAE violated these rights by, among other things, criminalizing and announcing an intention to vigorously prosecute any expressions of sympathy toward Qatar on social media or in any other form, blocking the transmission of Qatari news stations and websites (including Al Jazeera) into the UAE, and demanding the closure of Qatari media outlets 128. —— Violations of the Right to Public Health and Medical Care. The UAE’s discriminatory measures, including the mass expulsion of Qataris and the prohibition on travel between the UAE and Qatar, unlawfully interfere with the right to health and medical care 129. Qataris receiving medical treatment at hospitals in the UAE have been prohibited from continuing their treatment, and Qatar has been prevented from importing necessary medical products 130. —— Violations of the Right to Education and Training. The UAE’s discriminatory measures have also unlawfully violated the right to education by forcing Qatari students studying in the UAE to interrupt their programmes of study and return home to Qatar 131. —— Violations of the Right to Property. The UAE’s discriminatory measures have caused, in purpose and effect, violations of the right to property 132. As a result of the forced expulsion of Qataris from the UAE, Qataris have been denied the ability to access, enjoy, utilize, or manage their property 133. Further, the UAE has frozen Qatari assets and limited financial transfers to and from Qataris based on national origin 134. 126 OHCHR, “Qatar diplomatic crisis: Comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on impact on human rights” (14 June 2017), http://www. ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21739&LangID=E. 127 CERD, supra note 5, Art. 5 (c) (viii). 128 See supra, paras. 24-26, 36-39. 129 See CERD, supra note 5, Art. 5 (e) (iv) (“In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: . . . The right to public health, medical care, social security and social services”; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA res. 217 (III) A (1948), Art. 25 (“[E]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including . . . medical care.”). 130 See supra, paras. 40-41. 131 See supra, para. 42. See also CERD, supra note 5, Art. 5 (e) (v) (“In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: . . . The right to education and training.”). 132 See ibid. 133 See supra, paras. 44-45. 134 See supra, para. 44. 57 droits de l’homme ont fait observer que les mesures discriminatoires avaient eu « des effets inhumains, séparant des enfants de leurs parents et des maris de leur femme » 126. —— Violations du droit à la liberté d’opinion et d’expression. S’agissant de la liberté d’expression, les mesures discriminatoires des Emirats arabes unis visent clairement à museler toute opposition, au mépris du droit des Qatariens à la liberté d’expression ainsi que des principes d’inclusion et de respect de la diversité qui sont au coeur de la CIEDR 127. Les Emirats arabes unis ont violé ce droit, notamment en incriminant toute expression de sympathie à l’égard du Qatar sur les médias sociaux ou sous quelque autre forme que ce soit et en annonçant leur intention de la réprimer implacablement, en empêchant la diffusion sur leur territoire des chaînes et sites d’information en ligne qatariens (dont Al Jazeera), et en exigeant la fermeture des organes d’information qatariens 128. —— Violations du droit à la santé et aux soins médicaux. Les mesures discriminatoires des Emirats arabes unis, notamment l’expulsion massive de Qatariens et l’interdiction de se déplacer entre les territoires émirien et qatarien, constituent une entrave illicite à l’exercice du droit à la santé et aux soins médicaux 129. Les Qatariens soignés dans des hôpitaux émiriens ont été empêchés de poursuivre leur traitement et le Qatar, d’importer les produits médicaux nécessaires 130. —— Violations du droit à l’éducation et à la formation professionnelle. Les mesures discriminatoires des Emirats arabes unis ont également entravé de manière illicite l’exercice du droit à l’éducation, en contraignant les Qatariens venus étudier en territoire émirien à interrompre leur cursus pour rentrer au Qatar 131. —— Violations du droit à la propriété. Les mesures discriminatoires des Emirats arabes unis ont causé, de par leur objet et leur effet, des violations du droit à la propriété 132. Par suite de leur expulsion forcée des Emirats arabes unis, des Qatariens ont été privés de tout accès à leurs biens, dont ils n’ont plus la jouissance ni l’usage et qu’ils ne peuvent plus administrer 133. De plus, les Emirats arabes unis ont gelé des avoirs qatariens et limité les transferts de fonds émis ou reçus par des Qatariens, au motif de l’origine nationale de ceux- ci 134. 126 Amnesty International, rapport de juin 2017. 127 CIEDR, voir note 5 ci-dessus, art. 5 c) viii). 128 Voir ci-dessus, par. 24-26, 36-39. 129 CIEDR, voir note 5 ci-dessus, art. 5 e) iv) (« Conformément aux obligations fondamentales énoncées à l’article 2 de la présente Convention, les Etats parties s’engagent à interdire et à éliminer la discrimination raciale sous toutes ses formes et à garantir le droit de chacun à l’égalité devant la loi sans distinction de race, de couleur ou d’origine nationale ou ethnique, notamment dans la jouissance des droits suivants : … Droit à la santé, aux soins médicaux, à la sécurité sociale et aux services sociaux » ; voir également la déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, résolution 217 (III) A de l’Assemblée générale (1948), art. 25 (« Toute personne a droit à un niveau de vie suffisant pour assurer sa santé, son bienêtre et ceux de sa famille, notamment pour … les soins médicaux. »). 130 Voir ci-dessus, par. 40-41. 131 Voir ci-dessus, par. 42. Voir également CIEDR, note 5 ci-dessus, art. 5 e) v) (« Conformément aux obligations fondamentales énoncées à l’article 2 de la présente Convention, les Etats parties s’engagent à interdire et à éliminer la discrimination raciale sous toutes ses formes et à garantir le droit de chacun à l’égalité devant la loi sans distinction de race, de couleur ou d’origine nationale ou ethnique, notamment dans la jouissance des droits suivants : … Droit à l’éducation et à la formation professionnelle. »). 132 Ibid. 133 Voir ci-dessus, par. 44-45. 134 Voir ci-dessus, par. 44. 58 —— Violations of the Right to Work. The UAE’s discriminatory measures have caused violations of the right to work 135. Qatari business owners have been prevented from entering the UAE in order to manage and oversee their businesses, renew necessary business and worker licenses, or renew their leases 136. —— Violations of the Right to Equal Treatment before Tribunals. The discriminatory measures enacted by the UAE have effectively denied Qataris the right to equal treatment before UAE courts and other organs of the justice system 137. By preventing Qataris from entering the country, criminalizing “sympathizing” with Qatar and creating a climate of racial hatred and incitement, the UAE has hindered Qataris’ ability to hire an attorney, challenge discrimination, or otherwise exercise their legal rights 138. 64. Denial of Effective Protection and Remedies against Acts of Racial Discrimination. The UAE has also failed to provide Qataris in their jurisdiction with effective protection and remedies against acts of racial discrimination, in violation of Article 6 of the CERD. As noted, the entry ban prevents Qataris from appearing in UAE courts to challenge the discriminatory measures, and the criminalization of statements of “sympathy” for Qatar and the general atmosphere of hostility toward Qatar and Qataris have undermined the ability of Qataris to pursue remedies through local counsel in the UAE 139. As a result, even if avenues for redress are ostensibly available to Qataris under UAE law, these avenues have been rendered completely ineffective because Qataris are unable to use them. V. Relief Requested by the State of Qatar 65. Qatar, in its own right and as parens patriae of its citizens, respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare that the UAE, through its State organs, State agents, and other persons and entities exercising governmental authority, and through other agents acting on its instructions or under its direction and control, has violated its obligations under Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the CERD by taking, inter alia, the following unlawful actions: a. Expelling, on a collective basis, all Qataris from, and prohibiting the entry of all Qataris into, the UAE on the basis of their national origin; 135 See CERD, supra note 5, Art. 5 (i) (States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: [. . .] (i) The right to freedom of movement and residence within the border of the [State].)” 136 See supra, note 5, paras. 43-44. 137 See CERD, supra note 5, Art. 5 (a) (“States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: (a) The right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering [justice].”). 138 See ibid., para. 46. 139 See ibid., paras. 25, 36-39, 46. 59 —— Violations du droit au travail. Les mesures discriminatoires des Emirats arabes unis ont causé des violations du droit au travail 135. Des chefs d’entreprises qatariens ont été empêchés d’entrer sur le territoire émirien pour gérer et diriger leurs affaires, renouveler les permis de commerce et de travail nécessaires, ou leurs contrats de location 136. —— Violations du droit à un traitement égal devant les tribunaux. Les mesures discriminatoires adoptées par les Emirats arabes unis ont, de fait, privé les Qatariens de leur droit à un traitement égal devant les tribunaux et autres organes du système judiciaire émirien 137. En fermant leurs frontières aux Qatariens, en incriminant le fait de « sympathiser » avec le Qatar et en créant un climat de haine raciale et d’incitation à la haine raciale, les Emirats arabes unis ont entravé la capacité des Qatariens de se faire représenter en justice, de contester la discrimination dont ils font l’objet ou de faire valoir de toute autre manière leurs droits sur le plan juridique 138. 64. Défaut d’assurer une protection et une voie de recours effectives contre les actes de discrimination raciale. Les Emirats arabes unis ont enfin manqué d’assurer aux Qatariens relevant de leur juridiction une protection et une voie de recours effectives contre les actes de discrimination raciale, en violation de l’article 6 de la CIEDR. Comme il a déjà été dit, l’interdiction d’entrée empêche les Qatariens d’ester devant les juridictions émiriennes afin de contester les mesures discriminatoires et, compte tenu de l’incrimination de toute expression de « sympathie » à l’égard du Qatar et de l’hostilité ambiante dont leur pays et eux-mêmes font l’objet, les Qatariens peuvent difficilement former un recours aux Emirats arabes unis par le truchement d’un représentant local 139. En conséquence, bien que des voies de recours puissent sembler ouvertes aux Qatariens en droit émirien, ces voies ont été rendues totalement inopérantes puisque les Qatariens ne sont pas en mesure de les exercer. V. Remèdes sollicités par l’État du Qatar 65. Le Qatar, en son nom propre et en qualité de parens patriae des Qatariens, prie respectueusement la Cour de dire et juger que les Emirats arabes unis, par l’intermédiaire de leurs organes et agents et d’autres personnes et entités exerçant la puissance publique, ainsi que par l’intermédiaire d’autres agents agissant sur leurs instructions ou sous leur direction et leur contrôle, ont manqué aux obligations que leur imposent les articles 2, 4, 5, 6 et 7 de la CIEDR en prenant notamment les mesures illicites suivantes : a. en expulsant collectivement tous les Qatariens et en interdisant à tous les Qatariens d’entrer sur le territoire émirien, au motif de leur origine nationale ; 135 CIEDR, voir note 5 ci-dessus, art. 5 i) (« Les Etats parties s’engagent à interdire et à éliminer la discrimination raciale sous toutes ses formes et à garantir le droit de chacun à l’égalité devant la loi sans distinction de race, de couleur ou d’origine nationale ou ethnique, notamment dans la jouissance des droits suivants : … i) Droit de circuler librement et de choisir sa résidence à l’intérieur d’un Etat. »). 136 Voir ci-dessus, note 5, par. 43-44. 137 CIEDR, voir note 5 ci-dessus, art. 5 a) (« Les Etats parties s’engagent à interdire et à éliminer la discrimination raciale sous toutes ses formes et à garantir le droit de chacun à l’égalité devant la loi sans distinction de race, de couleur ou d’origine nationale ou ethnique, notamment dans la jouissance des droits suivants : a) Droit à un traitement égal devant les tribunaux et tout autre organe administrant la justice. »). 138 Voir ci-dessus, par. 46. 139 Voir ci-dessus, par. 25, 36-39, 46. 60 b. Violating other fundamental rights, including the rights to marriage and choice of spouse, freedom of opinion and expression, public health and medical care, education and training, property, work, participation in cultural activities, and equal treatment before tribunals; c. Failing to condemn and instead encouraging racial hatred against Qatar and Qataris and failing to take measures that aim to combat prejudices, including by inter alia: criminalizing the expression of sympathy toward Qatar and Qataris; allowing, promoting, and financing an international anti‑Qatar public and social‑media campaign; silencing Qatari media; and calling for physical attacks on Qatari entities; and d. Failing to provide effective protection and remedies to Qataris to seek redress against acts of racial discrimination through UAE courts and institutions. 66. Accordingly, Qatar respectfully requests the Court to order the UAE to take all steps necessary to comply with its obligations under CERD and, inter alia: a. Immediately cease and revoke the discriminatory measures, including but not limited to the directives against “sympathizing” with Qataris, and any other national laws that discriminate de jure or de facto against Qataris on the basis of their national origin; b. Immediately cease all other measures that incite discrimination (including media campaigns and supporting others to propagate discriminatory messages) and criminalize such measures; c. Comply with its obligations under the CERD to condemn publicly racial discrimination against Qataris, pursue a policy of eliminating racial discrimination, and adopt measures to combat such prejudice; d. Refrain from taking any further measures that would discriminate against Qataris within its jurisdiction or control; e. Restore rights of Qataris to, inter alia, marriage and choice of spouse, freedom of opinion and expression, public health and medical care, education and training, property, work, participation in cultural activities, and equal treatment before tribunals, and put in place measures to ensure those rights are respected; f. Provide assurances and guarantees of non‑repetition of the UAE’s illegal conduct; and g. Make full reparation, including compensation, for the harm suffered as a result of the UAE’s actions in violation of the CERD. VI. Judge Ad Hoc 67. In accordance with the provisions of Article 31 (3) of the Statute of the Court, and Article 35 (1) of the Rules of the Court, Qatar declares its intention to exercise its right to choose a judge ad hoc. 61 b. en violant d’autres droits fondamentaux, dont le droit de se marier et de choisir son conjoint, le droit à la liberté d’opinion et d’expression, le droit à la santé et aux soins médicaux, le droit à l’éducation et à la formation professionnelle, le droit à la propriété, le droit au travail, le droit de prendre part aux activités culturelles et le droit à un traitement égal devant les tribunaux ; c. en s’abstenant de condamner, voire en encourageant la haine raciale contre le Qatar et les Qatariens, et en s’abstenant de prendre des mesures destinées à lutter contre les préjugés, notamment en incriminant toute expression de sympathie à l’égard du Qatar et des Qatariens, en autorisant, en promouvant et en finançant une campagne internationale visant à dresser l’opinion publique et les médias sociaux contre le Qatar, en réduisant les médias qatariens au silence et en appelant à des attaques contre des entités qatariennes ; et d. en s’abstenant de protéger les Qatariens contre les actes de discrimination raciale et de leur offrir des voies de recours efficaces leur permettant d’obtenir réparation de tels actes devant les tribunaux et autres organismes émiriens. 66. En conséquence, le Qatar prie respectueusement la Cour d’ordonner aux Emirats arabes unis de prendre toutes les dispositions requises pour s’acquitter des obligations que leur impose la CIEDR, et notamment : a. de suspendre et de révoquer immédiatement les mesures discriminatoires actuellement en vigueur, dont, mais pas seulement, les directives interdisant de « sympathiser » avec des Qatariens et toute autre législation nationale discriminatoire de jure ou de facto à l’égard des Qatariens au motif de leur origine nationale ; b. de suspendre immédiatement toutes autres mesures incitant à la discrimination (y compris les campagnes médiatiques et le soutien à la diffusion de messages à caractère discriminatoire) et d’incriminer de telles mesures ; c. de s’acquitter des obligations qui leur sont faites par la CIEDR de condamner publiquement la discrimination raciale à l’égard des Qatariens, de poursuivre une politique tendant à éliminer la discrimination raciale et de prendre des mesures pour lutter contre semblables préjugés ; d. de s’abstenir de prendre toute autre mesure susceptible d’être discriminatoire à l’égard des Qatariens relevant de leur juridiction ou se trouvant sous leur contrôle ; e. de rétablir les Qatariens dans leurs droits, notamment le droit de se marier et de choisir son conjoint, le droit à la liberté d’opinion et d’expression, le droit à la santé et aux soins médicaux, le droit à l’éducation et à la formation professionnelle, le droit à la propriété, le droit au travail, le droit de prendre part aux activités culturelles et le droit à un traitement égal devant les tribunaux, et de mettre en oeuvre des mesures pour garantir le respect de ces droits ; f. de donner des garanties et assurances de non-répétition de leur conduite illicite ; et g. de réparer intégralement, notamment par une indemnisation, le préjudice résultant de leurs actes commis en violation de la CIEDR. VI. Juge ad hoc 67. Conformément au paragraphe 1 de l’article 35 du Règlement de la Cour, le Qatar déclare son intention d’exercer la faculté de désigner un juge ad hoc que lui confère le paragraphe 3 de l’article 31 du Statut de la Cour. 62 VII. Reservation of Rights 68. Qatar reserves the right to supplement and/or amend this Application, as well as the legal grounds invoked and the relief requested, as may be necessary to preserve and vindicate its rights under the CERD. VIII. Appointment of Agent 69. Qatar hereby designates as its Agent Dr. Mohammed Abdulaziz Al‑Khulaifi, Legal Adviser to His Excellency Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 70. Pursuant to Article 40 (1) of the Rules of the Court, communications relating to this case should be sent to: Embassy of the State of Qatar Borweg 7 2597 LR The Hague Netherlands The Hague, 11 June 2018. (Signed) Dr. Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi, Legal Adviser to His Excellency Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Agent of the State of Qatar. 63 VII. Réserve de droits 68. Le Qatar se réserve tout droit de compléter ou de modifier la présente requête, ainsi que les fondements juridiques invoqués et les remèdes sollicités, pour préserver et faire valoir en tant que de besoin les droits qui sont les siens en vertu de la CIEDR. VIII. Désignation d’un agent 69. Le Qatar désigne par la présente en tant qu’agent M. Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi, conseiller juridique auprès de S. Exc. le vice-premier ministre et ministre des affaires étrangères. 70. Conformément au paragraphe 1 de l’article 40 du Règlement de la Cour, le Qatar indique que les communications relatives à la présente affaire doivent être envoyées à l’adresse suivante : Ambassade de l’Etat du Qatar Borweg 7 2597 LR La Haye Pays-Bas La Haye, le 11 juin 2018. Le conseiller juridique auprès de S. Exc. le vice-premier ministre et ministre des affaires étrangères, agent de l’Etat du Qatar, (Signé) M. Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi. 64 CERTIFICATION The aforementioned Agent of the State of Qatar certifies that the documents listed below and annexed to the State of Qatar’s Application are true and accurate copies of the originals of these documents. 65 CERTIFICATION L’agent susvisé de l’Etat du Qatar certifie que les documents énumérés ci-dessous et annexés à la présente requête sont des copies exactes et conformes des documents originaux. 66 140 LIST OF ANNEXES* Annex 1. Federal Decree — Law No. 5 of 2012 on Combating Cybercrimes, dated 13 August 2012. Annex 2. Statement of Support for Blockade and Cessation of Ties by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 5 June 2017. Annex 3. “Attorney General Warns against Sympathy for Qatar or Objecting to the State’s Positions”, Al Bayan Online, dated 7 June 2017 (certified translation). Annex 4. UAE Federal Transport Authority Circular No. 2/2/1023, “Implementation Process of the Decision Related to Qatar Sanctions”, dated 11 June 2017. Annex 5. National Human Rights Committee, “First Report Regarding the Human Rights Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State of Qatar”, dated 13 June 2017. Annex 6. Amnesty International, “Gulf/Qatar Dispute: Human Dignity Trampled and Families Facing Uncertainty as Sinister Deadline Passes”, dated 19 June 2017. Annex 7. “The 13 Demands on Qatar from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt”, The National, dated 23 June 2017. Annex 8. National Human Rights Committee, “Second Report Regarding the Human Rights Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State of Qatar”, dated 1 July 2017. Annex 9. “Full joint statement of boycotting countries on Qatar crisis”, Al Arabiya English, dated 5 July 2017. Annex 10. Human Rights Watch, “Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses”, dated 12 July 2017. Annex 11. Joint Communication from the Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council to the UAE, dated 18 August 2017. Annex 12. National Human Rights Committee, “100 Days under the Blockade, Third Report on Human Rights Violations Caused by the Blockade Imposed on the State of Qatar”, dated 30 August 2017. Annex 13. Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office in Geneva — Switzerland, “H.E. the Foreign Minister delivers a statement before the 36th Session of the Human Rights Council”, dated 11 September 2017. Annex 14. Reply of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations at Geneva to the Joint Communication from the Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council, dated 18 September 2017. * Annexes not reproduced in print version, but available in electronic version on the Court’s website (http://www.icj-cij.org, under “cases”). 67 140 LISTE DES ANNEXES* Annexe 1. Décret-loi fédéral no 5 du 13 août 2012 sur la lutte contre la cybercriminalité. Annexe 2. Déclaration du ministère émirien des affaires étrangères en faveur du blocus et de la rupture des relations avec le Qatar, 5 juin 2017 [extrait]. Annexe 3. Article publié le 7 juin 2017 par Al Bayan Online sous le titre « Le procureur général met en garde contre toute expression de sympathie envers le Qatar ou désapprobation de la position de l’Etat ». Annexe 4. Autorité fédérale des transports des Emirats arabes unis, circulaire no 2/2/1023 du 11 juin 2017 sur la mise en oeuvre des sanctions contre le Qatar. Annexe 5. Comité qatarien des droits de l’homme, « Premier rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme occasionnées par le blocus imposé à l’Etat du Qatar », 13 juin 2017. Annexe 6. Amnesty International, « Tensions entre des pays du Golfe et le Qatar : la dignité humaine bafouée et des familles dans l’incertitude à l’expiration du délai imposé », 19 juin 2017. Annexe 7. Article publié le 23 juin 2017 par The National sous le titre « Les 13 exigences imposées au Qatar par l’Arabie saoudite, Bahreïn, les Emirats arabes unis et l’Egypte ». Annexe 8. Comité qatarien des droits de l’homme, « Deuxième rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme occasionnées par le blocus imposé à l’Etat du Qatar », 1er juillet 2017. Annexe 9. Article publié le 5 juillet 2017 par Al Arabiya English sous le titre « Crise du Qatar : déclaration conjointe des Etats imposant le blocus ». Annexe 10.Human Rights Watch, « Qatar : les droits de l’homme mis à mal par l’isolement du pays », 12 juillet 2017. Annexe 11.Communication conjointe en date du 18 août 2017 adressée aux Emirats arabes unis par des titulaires de mandat au titre des procédures spéciales du Conseil des droits de l’homme. Annexe 12.Comité qatarien des droits de l’homme, « Troisième rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme occasionnées par le blocus imposé à l’Etat du Qatar : 100 jours de blocus », 30 août 2017. Annexe 13.Article publié le 11 septembre 2017 par la Mission permanente de l’Etat du Qatar auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies à Genève (Suisse) sous le titre « S. Exc. le ministre des affaires étrangères fait une déclaration lors de la trente-sixième session du Conseil des droits de l’homme ». Annexe 14.Réponse de la Mission permanente des Emirats arabes unis auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies et autres organisations internationales à Genève à la communication conjointe des titulaires de mandat au titre des procédures spéciales du Conseil des droits de l’homme, 18 septembre 2017. * Annexes non reproduites en version papier, mais disponibles en version électronique sur le site Internet de la Cour (http://www.icj-cij.org, onglet « affaires »). 68 Annex 15. Address by His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar, at the General Debate of the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, dated 19 September 2017 (certified translation). Annex 16. OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17-24 November 2017, “Report on the Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights”, dated December 2017. Annex 17. National Human Rights Committee, “‘Six Months of Violations, What Happens Now?’ The Fourth General Report on the Violations of Human Rights Arising from the Blockade of the State of Qatar”, dated 5 December 2017 (certified translation). Annex 18. “Joint statement issued by four boycotting States denouncing report of UNHCR’s Technical Mission on its visit to Qatar”, Saudi Press Agency, dated 30 January 2018. Annex 19. Permanent Mission of Qatar to the United Nations Office in Geneva — Switzerland, “Statement of H.E. Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 37th Human Rights Council”, dated 25 February 2018. Annex 20. “Arab Quartet responds to Qatar’s remarks at the UN Human Rights Council”, Al Arabiya English, dated 28 February 2018. Annex 21. Request for Negotiation, H.E. Sultan Bin Saad Al-Marikhi, Qatar Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar to H.E. Anwar Mohammed Gargash, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, dated 25 April 2018. Annex 22. National Human Rights Committee, “Fifth General Report, Continuation of Human Rights: A Year of the Blockade Imposed on Qatar”, dated June 2018. 69 Annexe 15.Discours de S. A. le cheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, émir de l’Etat du Qatar, débat général de la soixante-douzième session de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, 19 septembre 2017. Annexe 16.Mission technique du Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme dans l’Etat du Qatar, 17-24 novembre 2017, « Rapport relatif aux effets de la crise du Golfe sur les droits de l’homme », décembre 2017. Annexe 17.Comité qatarien des droits de l’homme, « Quatrième rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme occasionnées par le blocus imposé à l’Etat du Qatar : Six mois de violations et maintenant ? », 5 décembre 2017. Annexe 18.« Déclaration conjointe publiée par les quatre Etats imposant le blocus pour dénoncer le contenu du rapport de la mission technique du HCDH sur sa visite au Qatar », agence de presse saoudienne, 30 janvier 2018. Annexe 19.Mission permanente de l’Etat du Qatar auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies à Genève (Suisse), « Déclaration du vice-premier ministre et ministre des affaires étrangères à la trente-septième session du Conseil des droits de l’homme », 25 février 2018. Annexe 20.Article publié le 28 février 2018 par Al Arabiya English sous le titre « Le Quartet arabe réagit à la déclaration du Qatar devant le Conseil des droits de l’homme ». Annexe 21.Invitation à négocier adressée le 25 avril 2018 aux Emirats arabes unis et reçue par ceux- ci le 1er mai 2018 par télécopie et courrier recommandé. Annexe 22.Comité qatarien des droits de l’homme, « Cinquième rapport : Poursuite des violations des droits de l’homme : un an de blocus contre le Qatar », juin 2018.
Application instituting proceedings