Public sitting held on Thursday 13 July 2017, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the cases concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Cos

Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2017/16
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2017
Public sitting
held on Thursday 13 July 2017, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Abraham presiding,
in the cases concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and Land Boundary in the Northern Part of Isla Portillos (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)
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VERBATIM RECORD
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ANNÉE 2017
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 13 juillet 2017, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président,
dans les affaires relatives à la Délimitation maritime dans la mer des Caraïbes et l’océan Pacifique (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua) et à la Frontière terrestre dans la partie septentrionale d’Isla Portillos (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua)
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COMPTE RENDU
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Present: President Abraham
Vice-President Yusuf
Judges Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Robinson
Gevorgian
Judges ad hoc Simma
Al-Khasawneh
Registrar Couvreur

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Présents : M. Abraham, président
M. Yusuf, vice-président
MM. Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
MM. Bhandari
Robinson
Gevorgian, juges
MM. Simma
Al-Khasawneh, juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier

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The Government of Costa Rica is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Manuel A. González Sanz, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship;
H.E. Mr. Edgar Ugalde Alvarez, Ambassador on Special Mission,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Sergio Ugalde, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
as Co-Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Marcelo Kohen, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, member and Secretary-General of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Samuel Wordsworth, Q.C., member of the English Bar, member of the Paris Bar, Essex Court Chambers,
Mr. Coalter G. Lathrop, member of the North Carolina Bar, Sovereign Geographic,
Mr. Arnoldo Brenes, member of the Costa Rican Bar, Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship,
Ms Kate Parlett, member of the English Bar, 20 Essex Street Chambers,
Ms Katherine Del Mar, member of the English Bar, 4 New Square, Lincoln’s Inn,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Simon Olleson, member of the English Bar, Three Stone,
as Counsel;
Mr. Ricardo Otarola, Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship,
Ms Ana Patricia Villalobos, chargé d’affaires, Embassy of Costa Rica to Venezuela,
Ms Alejandra González, Minister Counsellor and Consul General of Costa Rica to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Christian Kandler, Minister Counsellor at the Costa Rican Embassy in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Najib Messihi, Ph.D. candidate, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva,
as Assistant Counsel;
Ms Ericka Araya, administrative assistant at the Embassy of Costa Rica in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Assistant.
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Le Gouvernement du Costa Rica est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Manuel A. González Sanz, ministre des affaires étrangères et des cultes ;
S. Exc. M. Edgar Ugalde Alvarez, ambassadeur en mission spéciale,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Sergio Ugalde, ambassadeur du Costa Rica auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
comme coagent, conseil et avocat ;
M. Marcelo Kohen, professeur de droit international à l’Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement de Genève, membre et secrétaire général de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Samuel Wordsworth, Q.C., membre des barreaux d’Angleterre et de Paris, Essex Court Chambers,
M. Coalter G. Lathrop, membre du barreau de Caroline du Nord, Sovereign Geographic,
M. Arnoldo Brenes, membre du barreau du Costa Rica, conseiller principal auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères et des cultes,
Mme Kate Parlett, membre du barreau d’Angleterre, 20 Essex Street Chambers,
Mme Katherine Del Mar, membre du barreau d’Angleterre, 4 New Square, Lincoln’s Inn,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Simon Olleson, membre du barreau d’Angleterre, Three Stone,
comme conseil ;
M. Ricardo Otarola, conseiller auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères et des cultes,
Mme Ana Patricia Villalobos, chargé d’affaires à l’ambassade du Costa Rica au Venezuela,
Mme Alejandra González, ministre-conseiller et consul général du Costa Rica auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Christian Kandler, ministre-conseiller à l’ambassade du Costa Rica au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Najib Messihi, doctorant à l’Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement de Genève,
comme conseils adjoints ;
Mme Ericka Araya, assistante administrative à l’ambassade du Costa Rica au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme assistante.
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The Government of the Republic of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of Nicaragua to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, member of the International Law Commission,
as Agent and Counsel;
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the English Bar, Emeritus Professor of International Law, Oxford University, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the United States Supreme Court, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Mr. Alex Oude Elferink, Director, Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, Professor of International Law of the Sea, Utrecht University,
Mr. Paul Reichler, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., member of the Bars of the United States Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Benjamin Samson, Ph.D. candidate, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University Paris Nanterre, Visiting Scholar, George Washington University Law School,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Alain Pellet, Emeritus Professor at the University Paris Nanterre, former member and former Chairman of the International Law Commission, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, Counsellor, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Claudia Loza Obregon, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Yuri Parkhomenko, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP (United States of America),
as Counsel;
Ms Gimena González, Researcher in public international law,
Ms Ilona Tan, Legal Intern, Foley Hoag LLP,
as Legal Assistants;
Mr. Robin Cleverly, M.A., DPhil, CGeol, FGS, Law of the Sea Consultant, Marbdy Consulting Ltd,
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Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, ambassadeur du Nicaragua auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas, membre de la Commission du droit international,
comme agent et conseil ;
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, professeur émérite de droit international à l’Université d’Oxford, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Lawrence H. Martin, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, du district de Columbia et du Commonwealth du Massachusetts,
M. Alex Oude Elferink, directeur de l’Institut néerlandais du droit de la mer, professeur de droit international de la mer à l’Université d’Utrecht,
M. Paul Reichler, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre des barreaux de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
M. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, professeur de droit international à l’Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Benjamin Samson, doctorant au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université Paris Nanterre, professeur invité, faculté de droit de l’Université George Washington,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur émérite à l’Université Paris Nanterre, ancien membre et ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, conseillère juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, conseiller à l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Claudia Loza Obregon, conseillère juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Yuri Parkhomenko, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP (Etats-Unis d’Amérique),
comme conseils ;
Mme Gimena González, chercheuse en droit international public,
Mme Ilona Tan, stagiaire en droit au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP,
comme assistants juridiques ;
M. Robin Cleverly, M.A., D.Phil, C.Geol, FGS, consultant en droit de la mer, Marbdy Consulting Ltd,
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Ms Victoria Leader, Geographical and Technical Consultant,
as Scientific and Technical Advisers;
Ms Sherly Noguera de Argüello, Consul General and Minister Counsellor of the Republic of Nicaragua,
as Administrator.
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Mme Victoria Leader, consultante dans les domaines géographique et technique,
comme conseillers scientifiques et techniques ;
Mme Sherly Noguera de Argüello, consul général et ministre-conseiller de la République du Nicaragua,
comme administrateur.
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Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. So the Court meets this afternoon to hear the conclusion of Nicaragua’s second round of oral argument and I shall now give the floor to Mr. Samson.
M. SAMSON : Merci, Monsieur le président.
LE CHAMP D’APPLICATION DE L’ARRÊT DU 16 DÉCEMBRE 2015
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, c’est à nouveau un honneur et un privilège de comparaître devant vous pour défendre les droits du Nicaragua dans l’affaire relative à Isla Portillos.
2. Cet après-midi, je montrerai d’abord que le Nicaragua n’a pas manqué à ses obligations découlant de l’arrêt du 16 décembre 2015 (I.) et je reviendrai ensuite sur l’interprétation que donne le Costa Rica des paragraphes 69 et 70 de cet arrêt (II.). Cette plaidoirie sera brève, les conseils du demandeur ayant soigneusement évité de répondre à la majorité des arguments que j’ai présentés vendredi dernier, notamment à propos du paragraphe 70 de l’arrêt de 2015. Je me contenterai de répondre aux quelques points nouveaux soulevés par le Costa Rica.
I. Le Nicaragua n’a pas violé l’arrêt de la Cour du 16 décembre 2015
3. Dans ma plaidoirie de vendredi dernier, j’ai montré qu’à la fin du mois de novembre 2013, le Nicaragua avait repositionné son camp militaire en dehors du territoire litigieux, conformément à l’ordonnance de la Cour du 22 novembre 2013. J’ai aussi indiqué que le Costa Rica n’a pas contesté ce repositionnement sur le banc de sable de la lagune Harbor Head, à l’ouest de la position que le camp occupe aujourd’hui.
4. Le Costa Rica voudrait faire croire qu’en réalité, il contestait cette position mais qu’il n’en avait informé ni le Nicaragua, ni la Cour. Lundi, le coagent du Costa Rica a tenté d’expliquer ce silence :
«the suggestion that Costa Rica should have continued to write protest letters to Nicaragua on this point is frankly absurd … It cannot … reasonably be suggested that Costa Rica should have continued to expend considerable resources to request new
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provisional measures … The Judgment on the merits was pending imminently, and Costa Rica hoped it would resolve the matter once and for all.»1
5. Deux remarques sur ces protestations indignées :
 premièrement, peut-être est-ce dû à ma jeunesse, mais une période de deux ans ne me paraît pas relever de l’imminence. J’ai du mal à croire qu’un Etat qui se prétend victime d’une utilisation illicite de la force2 patiente deux ans sans objecter ; et
 deuxièmement, je veux bien croire que le Costa Rica souhaitait éviter de nouvelles dépenses, cela me paraît naturel ; mais si le demandeur pensait réellement qu’entre 2013 et 2015, le camp se trouvait toujours en territoire litigieux, cela n’explique pas pourquoi ce dernier ne l’a indiqué, ni dans les rapports qu’il a envoyés régulièrement à la Cour, conformément aux ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires, ni lors des audiences d’avril 2015 ou dans les conclusions que l’agent du demandeur a lues à la fin de celles-ci.
6. L’ambassadeur Ugalde vous a ensuite dit que ceci était en réalité un détail et que ce qui comptait était la position du poste d’observation après l’arrêt de la Cour de 2015 : «What is telling is the way in which Nicaragua reacted to the Court’s Judgment on the merits in the Certain Activities case»3. Well, is it Mr. President?
[Projection no 1  La position du poste d’observation du Nicaragua depuis 2015]
7. Selon le demandeur, «[f]ollowing the Court’s declaration that the [disputed] territory in question was indeed Costa Rican»4, le Nicaragua aurait repositionné son camp militaire plus à l’est. Les photographies que vous a montrées Me Del Mar le prouverait. Ces photographies sont reproduites à l’onglet no 43 de vos dossiers d’aujourd’hui. Elles datent respectivement des 8 mars et 5 juillet 2016. Celle du 8 mars apparaît sur vos écrans et le cercle rouge indique l’emplacement du camp militaire. Ce que ni le coagent ni le conseil du Costa Rica ne vous a dit, c’est que le poste d’observation occupait ce secteur depuis janvier 2015  voici une photo le montrant ; en voici une autre, elle date du 12 décembre 2015. L’affirmation du Costa Rica selon laquelle le Nicaragua a
1 CR 2017/13, p. 48-49, par. 11-12 (Ugalde).
2 Voir, par exemple, MCR, par. 3.9 ou CR 2017/13, p. 52, par. 19 (Ugalde).
3 CR 2017/13, p. 49, par. 13 (Ugalde).
4 Ibid.
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repositionné son poste d’observation à la suite ou pour se conformer à l’arrêt du 16 décembre 2015 est donc fausse.
8. La raison pour laquelle le Nicaragua a déplacé son poste d’observation en janvier 2015 et en août 2016 est purement pratique. Comme vous pouvez le voir en comparant les photos de 2015 à celles de 2013 et 2014, qui figurent également dans vos dossiers à l’onglet no 43, la zone sur laquelle se trouvait le poste d’observation en 2013 puis en 2014 s’est affinée. Il a donc fallu le déplacer au début de l’année 2015  voici les deux photos de 2015  la première de janvier  que je vous ai montrée il y a quelques instants et la seconde de décembre. C’est cette même raison qui a conduit le Nicaragua à déplacer à nouveau son poste d’observation en août 2016, sur la partie occidentale du banc de sable de la lagune Harbor Head, comme vous pouvez le voir sur la photographie actuellement projetée. Point d’invasion ou d’agression, simplement une poignée d’hommes cherchant à rester au sec.
[Fin de la projection no 1]
9. Le Costa Rica est bien conscient que le poste d’observation ne se trouve pas aujourd’hui sur ce qui était le territoire litigieux dans l’affaire relative à Certaines activités. Dans sa plaidoirie de lundi, le coagent du demandeur a dit, à propos du repositionnement du poste d’observation en août 2016, c’est-à-dire dans la zone où il se trouve aujourd’hui : «This was a deliberate military action taken by Nicaragua, at a time when it was aware that questions concerning that area were going to be addressed by the Court at the same time it would hear the Maritime Delimitation case.»5 Cette affirmation confirme une chose : la zone où se trouve actuellement le poste d’observation du Nicaragua ne peut pas faire partie du territoire litigieux dans l’affaire relative à Certaines activités ; en effet, si cette zone avait été attribuée au Costa Rica, avec l’autorité de la chose jugée, dans cette affaire, elle ne pourrait pas aujourd’hui être une des questions pendantes devant la Cour dans l’affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime ou dans celle relative à Isla Portillos. Cela devrait logiquement conduire à un rejet de la conclusion du Costa Rica demandant à la Cour de déclarer «[that] by establishing and maintaining a new military camp on the beach of Isla Portillos, Nicaragua … is in breach of the Judgment of the Court of 16 December 2015 in the
5 CR 2017/13, p. 47, par. 6 (Ugalde).
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Certain Activities case»6. Me Martin reviendra dans sa plaidoirie sur l’autre conclusion du Costa Rica relative à la prétendue responsabilité du Nicaragua.
II. L’intenable interprétation des paragraphes 69 et 70 donnée par le Costa Rica
10. Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, j’en viens maintenant à l’interprétation des paragraphes 69 et 70 de l’arrêt du 16 décembre 2015. En abordant cette seconde partie de ma plaidoirie, j’ai bien en tête les mots de l’ambassadeur Argüello Gómez et comme lui «I will not attempt to lecture you on what you decided». Je montrerai simplement que la position que le Costa Rica défend aujourd’hui est intenable.
11. Lundi, tentant de nier le caractère incomplet de la définition du territoire litigieux dans l’affaire relative à Certaines activités, le professeur Kohen s’est exclamé : «Vous avez indiqué trois accidents géographiques ; où qu’ils passent ou seraient reliés, c’est par là que le territoire est défini. Ce n’est pas très difficile à comprendre.»7 Il est toujours bon de se remettre en question, Monsieur le président. Peut-être que l’interprétation du paragraphe 69 est hors de ma portée. Ce qui me paraît moins plausible, c’est que la compréhension de ce paragraphe soit hors de portée du juge Guillaume qui, dans sa déclaration jointe à l’arrêt du 16 décembre 2015, écrit à propos du territoire litigieux : «[La Cour] s’est … abstenue d’en fixer les limites.»8
[Projection no 2  Une des frontières présentées par le Costa Rica dans l’affaire relative à Certaines activités]
12. L’assurance du professeur Kohen apparaît encore plus curieuse à la lumière des contradictions du demandeur lors des audiences d’avril 2015. Lors du second tour de plaidoiries orales du Costa Rica, le 28 avril 2015, deux conseils du Costa Rica ont donné deux interprétations différentes à la définition du territoire litigieux retenue par la Cour dans son ordonnance du 8 mars 2011 et présenté deux frontières différentes. Sur vos écrans apparaît une image que vous a montrée Me Wordsworth le 28 avril 2015. La ligne rouge, dont l’épaisseur a pour but de camoufler
6 CR 2017/14, p. 27-28 (Ugalde Álvarez).
7 CR 2017/13, p. 40, par. 12 (Kohen).
8 Certaines activités menées par le Nicaragua dans la région frontalière (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua) et Construction d’une route au Costa Rica le long du fleuve San Juan (Nicaragua c. Costa Rica), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2015 (II), déclaration du juge ad hoc Guillaume, p. 837, par. 18.
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l’inconfort du Costa Rica, représente la frontière terrestre selon Me Wordsworth ; la frontière est composée d’un segment unique, il s’étend quelque part entre la lagune Harbor Head et la zone de l’embouchure du fleuve. Ce jour-là, Monsieur le président, vous avez ensuite donné la parole au professeur Kohen, qui a donné sa propre description de la frontière terrestre :
«La frontière dans le «territoire litigieux» suit donc la rive droite du fleuve San Juan dès son embouchure vers le sud. Vers l’est, depuis l’embouchure du fleuve jusqu’à la lagune Los Portillos, le territoire est par conséquent costa-ricien. La frontière suit ensuite le rivage autour de la lagune Los Portillos.»9
D’après le professeur Kohen, la frontière terrestre ne serait pas composée d’un segment unique mais de deux, avec Isla Portillos entre eux. La situation était donc semble-t-il un peu plus difficile à comprendre qu’il n’y paraît.
[Fin de la projection no 2. Projection no 3  L’incomplète définition du territoire litigieux]
13. Mais allons plus loin et tentons de vérifier la proposition du professeur Kohen :
 Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, vous voyez à l’écran la rive gauche du fleuve San Juan et la rive orientale de la lagune Harbor Head ;
 ajoutons-y les trois incidents géographiques mentionnés dans la définition du territoire litigieux : la rive droite du fleuve San Juan, la rive droite du caño litigieux et la lagune Harbor Head. Voilà la situation dans laquelle se trouvait la Cour lorsqu’elle a délibéré dans l’affaire relative à Certaines activités ;
 au sud, il est effectivement simple de relier le caño litigieux au fleuve ;
 au nord en revanche la situation est plus compliquée : les Parties n’ayant pas informé la Cour de manière satisfaisante, celle-ci ne précise ni l’emplacement de l’embouchure du fleuve ni les limites de la lagune ;
 la Cour ne possédait pas d’information suffisante sur le segment de côte s’étendant entre la lagune Harbor Head et l’embouchure du San Juan : y a-t-il un chenal entre cette portion de côte et le marécage d’Isla Portillos ? Si oui, où se trouve-t-il ? Ce chenal relie-t-il la lagune à l’embouchure du fleuve ou se jette-t-il avant dans la mer des Caraïbes ? ;
 enfin, la Cour n’indique pas non plus l’étendue du banc de sable de la lagune Harbor Head ;
9 CR 2015/14, p. 32, par. 25 (Kohen).
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 le professeur Kohen vous dit : aucune difficulté, il suffit de relier. Le problème est qu’il est bien incapable de vous dire comment relier ces différents incidents. En réalité, avec tant d’informations manquantes, il était impossible de déterminer où passait la frontière.
[Fin de la projection no 3]
14. La citation de votre arrêt de 1994 dans l’affaire Libye/Tchad selon laquelle «[d]éfinir un territoire signifie définir ses frontières»10, ne permet pas au professeur Kohen de combler les manques. C’est peut-être vrai dans l’abstrait, mais en l’espèce — dans l’affaire relative à Certaines activités —, la Cour a indiqué clairement dans le paragraphe 70 de son arrêt du 16 décembre 2015 1) exclure la limite nord de ce territoire litigieux, c’est-à-dire le cordon littoral séparant Isla Portillos de la mer des Caraïbes ; et 2) s’abstenir de préciser la frontière par rapport à ce cordon.
15. A ce propos, le Costa Rica voudrait vous faire croire que la question laissée en suspens par le paragraphe 70 est celle du banc de sable de la lagune Harbor Head11. Je suis sincèrement désolé d’avoir à le répéter, Monsieur le président, mais le paragraphe 70 fait référence au «segment de la côte caraïbe qui s’étend entre la lagune de Harbor Head … et l’embouchure du fleuve du San Juan», c’est-à-dire le segment au nord d’Isla Portillos et non au segment de côte, ou banc de sable, qui s’étend au nord de la lagune.
16. Je n’insiste pas davantage sur le paragraphe 70 :
 le Costa Rica n’a répondu à aucun des arguments que le Nicaragua a soulevés à propos de ce paragraphe ;
 il n’a pas pu expliquer pourquoi la Cour n’avait pas représenté le territoire litigieux, ni pourquoi lui-même n’avait pas pu le faire ; et
 il n’a pas non plus réussi à expliquer le croquis no 1 joint à l’arrêt du 16 décembre 2015.
17. Monsieur le président, une dernière chose confirme que la position du Costa Rica n’est pas tenable. Robin Cleverly, qui assiste le Nicaragua dans ces affaires, a attiré mon attention sur un détail de la définition du territoire litigieux. Dans l’affaire relative à Certaines activités, vous avez
10 Différend territorial (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Tchad), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1994, p. 26, par. 52.
11 Voir, par exemple, CR 2017/13, p. 45, par. 26 (Kohen) et p. 46, par. 4 (Ugalde).
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défini le territoire litigieux comme «la zone humide d’environ trois kilomètres carrés»12. La zone «humide» «d’environ trois kilomètres carrés» et pas simplement la zone «d’environ trois kilomètres carrés». Je dois dire que ce détail m’avait échappé. En géographie, une zone humide et une plage sont deux éléments distincts. Une plage n’est pas une zone «humide», ce n’est pas a wetland, c’est-à-dire, pour reprendre la longue définition donnée par la convention RAMSAR, une «étendue[] de marais, de fagnes, de tourbières ou d’eaux naturelles ou artificielles, permanentes ou temporaires, où l’eau est stagnante ou courante, douce, saumâtre ou salée»13.
[Projection no 4 – Le banc de sable de la lagune Harbor Head]
18. Avant de conclure, permettez-moi de clarifier un dernier point. Vendredi après-midi, je vous ai montré cette image. Je pensais que les indications permettaient de comprendre à quoi correspondent les zones rose, verte et rouge. Apparemment, ce n’est pas le cas. Lundi, l’ambassadeur Ugalde a affirmé que
«Mr. Samson accepts that Nicaragua’s repositioned military encampment lies north-west of the sandbar separating the Los Portillos/Harbor Head Lagoon from the Caribbean. He put this image on your screens … The green part indicates the location of the sandbar. That is clear from his speech, in which he refers to this part as being «le banc de sable de la lagune».»14
Ceci est incorrect :
 la zone en vert montre simplement une zone qui n’est pas en litige, comme c’est d’ailleurs écrit ;
 cette zone couvre une partie, et une partie seulement, du banc de sable de la lagune Harbor Head ;
 le banc de sable a été identifié par Me Martin et non par moi  voici une image qu’il vous a montrée vendredi.
19. La partie la plus occidentale de ce banc de sable apparaît en rose sur l’image que j’ai projetée car elle est aujourd’hui revendiquée par le Costa Rica, pour la première fois en plus d’un siècle.
12 Certaines activités menées par le Nicaragua dans la région frontalière (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 8 mars 2011, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), p. 19, par. 55.
13 Article 1er de la convention relative aux zones humides d’importance internationale particulièrement comme habitats des oiseaux d’eau (2 février 1971), Nations Unies, Recueil des traités, vol. 996, no 14583, p. 252.
14 CR 2017/13, p. 50, par. 15 (Ugalde).
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[Fin de la projection no 4]
20. Cette mise au point faite, il me reste, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, à vous remercier pour votre aimable attention. Monsieur le président, je vous prie respectueusement de bien vouloir donner la parole à Me Martin.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Samson. Je donne la parole à M. Lawrence Martin.
Mr. MARTIN:
NICARAGUA IS SOVEREIGN OVER THE COAST
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, good afternoon. It is my honour to respond to the arguments you heard Monday concerning the location of the land boundary on the north coast of Isla Portillos. This includes the small Nicaraguan encampment on the beach near the lagoon.
2. I will focus only on the critical differences between the Parties brought into relief by Costa Rica’s second round presentations. I can be brief. There was, to be frank, not a lot of substance to what we heard on Monday. For the avoidance of doubt, let me be clear: Nicaragua maintains all of its arguments as presented in its first round in their entirety.
A. The location of the land boundary
3. On Monday, in his characteristically gentle way, Professor Kohen accused me of merely repeating arguments that Ambassador Argüello previously made but, he said, were rejected in 201515. What Professor Kohen’s arguments reveal is just how desperate Costa Rica is to hide behind your 2015 Judgment to avoid the substance of this dispute.
4. Yes, in response to a question from Judge Donoghue, Ambassador Argüello explained that Nicaragua retained sovereignty over the entire beach16. Costa Rica expressed a different view17. But at paragraph 70 of your 2015 Judgment, the Court expressly declined to resolve these arguments. You observed: “In their oral arguments the Parties expressed different views on this
15CR 2017/14, pp. 38-39, para. 10 (Kohen).
16CR 2015/7, pp. 23-25, paras. 59-61 (Argüello).
17CR 2015/14, p. 34, paras. 30-31 (Kohen).
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issue, that is, the issue concerning sovereignty over the coast. Neither Party requested the Court to define the boundary more precisely with regard to this coast. Accordingly, the Court will refrain from doing so.”18
5. Costa Rica thus cannot evade Nicaragua’s arguments  whether mine or Ambassador Argüello’s  by pretending the Court answered questions it expressly declined to answer.
6. Professor Kohen’s response on the substance of Nicaragua’s arguments centred largely on the assertion that a boundary running in any part along dry land would defy the letter and spirit of the border régime reflected in the 1858 Treaty, the Cleveland Award and the first Alexander Award19. But, does Costa Rica really mean what it says?
7. Mr. President, this is now the fourth case in recent memory that deals in one way or another with the waters of the River San Juan. The Court by now knows well that the river’s flow is greatly reduced; only about 10 per cent of the waters from the upper San Juan now pass through its lower reaches.
8. Imagine then the scenario where the river finally succumbs to natural forces and dries up completely, as it has been in the process of doing since well before General Alexander arrived on the scene. In that event  which is entirely possible  would Costa Rica still argue that the boundary must, as a matter of legal necessity, follow a watercourse  perhaps then, the Río Colorado? I doubt it. It would argue that the boundary should be defined by the dry bank of the former river.
9. Should the result be any different with respect to Alexander’s former “first channel met”, which has now partially disappeared? We say the answer is plainly “no”. The boundary here should be defined by the approximate location of the former southern bank of the caño, just as it would be defined by the former right bank of the river proper in the event it were to dry up.
10. In this respect, we consider it significant that working in 1897, [slide] Alexander perceived no obstacle to drawing part of his boundary line across dry land: specifically, the sand spit then extending from the rest of Costa Rica’s Isla Portillos.
18Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (II), p. 697, para. 70.
19CR 2017/14, p. 36, para. 5 (Kohen).
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11. Clearly, Alexander did not consider a boundary running partially across dry land a legal impossibility. Indeed, he felt compelled to cut across land territory by the mandate to start at Punta de Castilla and then somehow get from there to the river proper. I made this point in the first round20 and received absolutely no response on Monday. [Slide off]
12. In the first round, I also noted the Parties’ agreement that the impact of future changes to the channels and the banks of the river could only be determined on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the principles of international law, just as General Alexander ruled21. I then observed that neither in its Memorial nor its first round argument did Costa Rica articulate any such rules or explain how they applied to the circumstances of this case22. I invited Costa Rica to clarify its position in the second round.
13. What was Costa Rica’s response? Not much. I have read and re-read the transcripts. The only thing I could find was a vague reference by Mr. Brenes, made in passing, to principles of accretion and erosion23. But he conspicuously made no effort to explain how those principles might apply is the unusual circumstances of this case.
14. We are all, of course, familiar with the elementary rules governing the effects of accretion and erosion, as compared to avulsion, on a watercourse boundary. But none of those labels applies exactly to the situation we have here. And Costa Rica tellingly makes no argument that they do. What we have here is not a question of a riverine boundary wandering with a gradual expansion and contraction of its banks. It is instead, a question of the boundary watercourse disappearing virtually altogether.
15. In such a circumstance, Nicaragua considers the better view to be that the boundary should continue to be defined by the approximate location of the former channel, such that the boundary that now separates the beach from the wetland behind it corresponds to the line of vegetation. We are confident that Costa Rica itself would argue for an analogous approach in the
20CR 2017/12, p. 30, para. 51 (Martin).
21CR 2017/12, p. 32, paras. 60-61 (Martin).
22CR 2017/12, p. 32, para. 62 (Martin).
23CR 2017/13, p. 57, para. 21 (Brenes).
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event the San Juan proper were to disappear as a contiguous water body below its confluence with the Río Colorado.
16. This result not only comports with the limited learned commentary we could find on the subject, which is cited in footnote24, but is also consistent with the legal mandate, which Ambassador Argüello emphasized again today, to start the boundary at Punta de Castilla and connect to the river proper from there.
17. Costa Rica is obviously aware of the difficulties for its case created by the requirement to start at Punta de Castilla and then connect to the river proper. It therefore tries to shift the Court’s focus away from this difficulty by suggesting that the boundary does not start at Punta de Castilla and go inward. Rather, it says, it is drawn from the land in the direction of the sea.
18. In the first round, Mr. Wordsworth argued that “the land boundary between Costa Rica and Nicaragua follows the right bank of the San Juan River to its mouth at the Caribbean Sea”25. Mr. Brenes performed the same sleight of hand on Monday when he said that General Alexander “was approaching the issue, as it were, coming downstream”26.
19. With respect, that is not what the 1858 Treaty says and it is not what General Alexander was doing. Article II of the 1858 Treaty does not state that the boundary follows the right bank downstream to the sea. Rather, it states that “[t]he dividing line between the two republics . . . shall begin at the end of Punta de Castilla, at the mouth of the San Juan de Nicaragua River, and shall run along the right bank of said river up to a point 3 English miles distant from Castillo Viejo . . .”27. In other words, the boundary starts at Punta de Castilla and then goes landward and up the river from there.
20. Not surprisingly, this is exactly the approach General Alexander took in 1897. He first identified the point that then most closely approximated Punta de Castilla, and then drew the boundary to the river and inland from there28.
24L. Oppenheim, International Law A Treatise (3rd ed., 1920) Vol. I. Peace, pp. 393-394, para. 235.
25CR 2017/8, p. 20, para. 2 (Wordsworth).
26CR 2017/13, p. 60, para. 31 (Brenes).
27Jerez-Cañas Treaty of Limits of 15 April 1858, Art. II, CMN, Ann. 1.
28First Award of the Umpire E.P. Alexander in the boundary question between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 30 Sept. 1897, RIAA, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 220-221 (“First Alexander Award”), CMN, Ann. 2-2.
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21. There is therefore no getting around the problem of how to connect Punta de Castilla with the river proper by pretending the treaty says something that it does not say.
22. The solution Nicaragua proposes would not, as Costa Rica tries to suggest, threaten its sovereignty over the right bank of the river or its “unbroken access to the sea”. Two quick points here.
23. First, even in Alexander’s time, Costa Rica’s access to the sea required it to pass in front of a Nicaraguan beach connected to Costa Rican territory. [Slide] This point can be appreciated by reference to this slide that Mr. Brenes presented last week, the only change to which we have made is to highlight Nicaragua’s beach in orange and add the call-out box you see. In fact, Costa Rica’s vessels would have had to pass through a veritable maze of Nicaraguan sandbars, islands and other features to reach the sea. This was not a problem then and it would not be a problem now
24. Second, by placing its own starting-point for the delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Caribbean Sea at what it calls point SPC inside the beach, [slide] as you see here  a beach that Costa Rica itself says is too ephemeral to count  it effectively admits that the river bank as such ends before the beach.
25. Costa Rica, as the Court knows, [slide off] says you can solve the problem before you by creating an exclave of Nicaraguan territory that includes the lagoon and the sandbar in front of it, no matter the historical importance of the lagoon as explained by Ambassador Argüello earlier.
26. In the first round, Costa Rica argued that the absurdity of this result should not concern the Court because the sandbar will soon disappear29. In our first round, we showed that there is no reason to believe that this is so. The sandbar has been there for well over 100 years and shows no indication of going anywhere anytime soon30.
27. Costa Rica changed its tune in the second round. Absurd it may be, Professor Kohen said, but it is not Costa Rica’s fault31. It is nature’s doing, he said. It is just a matter of taking account of the geographical situation as it is32.
29CR 2017/8, pp. 51-52, para. 31 (Brenes), and p. 29, para. 29 (Wordsworth).
30CR 2017/12, p. 25, paras. 21-22 (Martin).
31CR 2017/13, pp. 43-44, para. 23 (Kohen).
32Ibid.
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28. Well, no, that is not right. The creation of the disconnected exclave Costa Rica proposes would not be nature’s doing. It would require human agency in the form of a judgment that, confronted with these geographical facts, the law compels the creation of the exclave Costa Rica wants. In Nicaragua’s view, the law not only does not compel the absurd solution that Costa Rica seeks, it actually mandates the answer that Nicaragua proposes.
29. Professor Kohen also hints that a parade of horribles would follow if Nicaragua’s proposed result is accepted. What, he asks rhetorically, would be the consequences of introducing a dry boundary along the line of vegetation behind the beach33? Well, we say, no problems would ensue.
30. We see no meaningful difference between a situation where the boundary separating the beach from the wetland is formed by a small, ever changeable channel, and a boundary where the beach and wetland are separated by the line of vegetation. The beach between the lagoon and the mouth of the river would remain Nicaragua’s, as it always has been, and the wetland behind it would remain Costa Rica’s, as it always has been. This situation has not caused serious difficulties in the past, and there is no reason to believe it would now.
B. The location of the Nicaraguan encampment
31. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that brings me to the location of the small Nicaraguan encampment on the beach near the lagoon. We heard from Costa Rica at some length in the second round, like the first, about the location of Nicaragua’s encampment in the area between 2010 and 2016. I do not need to dwell on the questions relating to the location of the camp prior to 2016. Those issues are of marginal relevance now. The dispute Costa Rica has submitted to the Court as defined in its Application concerns the location of the camp in 2016, and now, not before. It is therefore on that issue that I will place my primary emphasis.
32. There is, in the first instance, no question but that the camp is located in Nicaraguan territory. The entirety of the sandbar and the beach belongs to Nicaragua for all the reasons I have explained.
33CR 2017/13, pp. 43-44, para. 23 (Kohen).
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33. Even if that were not the case, and the Court were to conclude that only the portions of the sandbar and beach that remain separated from Costa Rica’s wetland by a continuous channel belong to Nicaragua (quod non), the fact would remain that the beach in the area of the camp is Nicaraguan.
34. On Monday, Ambassador Ugalde misstated our position on this issue. He said we were arguing that “the military camp is located on the sandbar, and not the beach”34. Presumably, the reference to the sandbar means the sandbar in front of the lagoon. But that is not what we argued. Our argument was that on Costa Rica’s own theory of the case  pursuant to which Nicaragua’s only territory in the area is the portion of the beach separated from the swamp by a channel of water that connects to the lagoon  the relevant part of the beach is still Nicaraguan. This is precisely because there is a channel of water behind the camp that connects to the lagoon.
35. We proved this by reference to satellite images dated December 2016 and January 2017, both of which show a channel behind the camp. Costa Rica does not dispute the point. Ambassador Ugalde admitted that there was in fact “a channel of water behind the military camp” on those dates35.
36. I should note in passing that was equally true in the years [slide] 2013, as we see here [slide] 2014, and [slide] 2015, when Nicaragua maintained a camp in the same area, always with a water channel behind it.
37. On Monday, Ambassador Ugalde offered two arguments about the channel behind the camp and why it should not affect the legal situation. [Slide off] First, he said, the channel was a function of Hurricane Otto, which struck in November 201636. Well, if we had only an image from early December 2016, this argument might have some force. But, of course, we have also the image from 17 January 2017 [slide]  the day after Costa Rica’s Application  that shows the same channel. Since this is a month and a half after the hurricane came and went, the channel is plainly not a transient by-product of that storm.
34CR 2017/13, p. 51, para. 17 (Ugalde).
35Ibid.
36Ibid.
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38. Mr. Ugalde’s second argument was that the channel does not appear in later satellite images from March 201737. [Slide off] But this argument fails because March is near the end of the dry season in the region. And in his first Award in 1897, General Alexander specifically ruled that the situation prevailing in the dry season was not controlling38. Rather, he said, the boundary must be determined by reference to the waters in their ordinary condition39.
39. The evidence before the Court thus shows that, except for the dry season, there is a channel behind Nicaragua’s camp that connects to the lagoon. The camp is therefore on Nicaraguan territory.
40. Lastly, Mr. President, I return to the issue of the declaration Costa Rica seeks. On Monday, Ambassador Ugalde reiterated Costa Rica’s remarkable request for a declaration concerning Nicaragua’s alleged violation of the prohibition of the use of force40. But, we noted with satisfaction that this claim was not repeated in Costa Rica’s final submissions41. It is therefore no longer in issue.
41. That said, Costa Rica still does request a declaration that Nicaragua’s camp violates Costa Rica’s sovereignty as well as the Court’s 2015 Judgment. The latter request is easily rejected. The Court’s 2015 Judgment plainly did not address the coast in this area for all the reasons Mr. Samson has explained.
42. With respect to Costa Rica’s claim concerning the violation of its territorial sovereignty, it is helpful to recall what is not disputed:
 first, that the coast in this area has undergone rapid changes, including in the very recent past;
 second, that, in Costa Rica’s own words, “the camp [is] small, the incursion is not deep”42;
 third, that confronted by requests for declarations like that Costa Rica seeks, the Court has in the past determined that a decision on sovereignty constitutes adequate relief43.
37CR 2017/13, p. 51, para. 17 (Ugalde).
38First Alexander Award, pp. 218-219; CMN, Ann. 2-2.
39Ibid.
40CR 2017/13, p. 52, para. 19 (Ugalde).
41CR 2017/14, pp. 27-28, paras. 1-2 (Ugalde).
42CR 2017/13, p. 52, para. 19 (Ugalde).
43Ibid.; CR 2017/12, p. 36, paras. 84-85 (Martin).
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43. In light of these points of agreement, Nicaragua considers Costa Rica’s request for a declaration that Nicaragua violated its territorial sovereignty to be unfounded. It too should therefore be rejected.
44. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, thank you once again for your generous attention. It has truly been my pleasure. May I ask that you call Ambassador Argüello to the podium to deliver Nicaragua’s concluding observations and present its final submissions?
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, je donne à présent la parole à son excellence, M. l’ambassadeur Argüello, l’agent du Nicaragua.
Mr. ARGÜELLO GÓMEZ: Thank you, Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court.
1. In strict compliance with Article 60 of the Rules of Court, I will avoid any recapitulation of our arguments, which, I think, have been heard more than enough. I would like, myself, to make a few comments in this last statement of Nicaragua during these oral proceedings. And thus, before reading the final submissions allow me, Mr. President, to again put on record the confidence Nicaragua has always had in the judgments of this Court. A confidence it has shown in its many appearances both as applicant and as respondent before this highest world tribunal.
2. Mr. President, allow me to reiterate my sentiments of great personal honour in being before this Court, the same sentiments of honour and privilege I experienced the first time I was in this Great Hall of Justice a little over 33 years ago.
3. The oral proceedings are normally the most intensive period of work involved in appearances before the Court. I am sure that our Costa Rican colleagues have gone through the same intensive work and tense moments we have had to go through ourselves.
4. Mr. President, the hope of Nicaragua is that the conclusion of this case with Costa Rica will bring a new period of good neighbourly relations between our closely related countries and people.
5. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will now, without more ado, proceed to read the final submissions of Nicaragua.
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FINAL SUBMISSIONS
A. In the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), for the reasons explained in the written and oral phases, Nicaragua respectfully requests from the Court to:
1. Dismiss and reject the requests and submissions of the Republic of Costa Rica.
2. Determine, on the basis of international law, the complete course of the maritime boundaries between all the maritime areas appertaining, respectively, to Nicaragua and Costa Rica in the Pacific Ocean and in the Caribbean Sea:
(a) In the Pacific Ocean, the maritime boundary between the Republic of Nicaragua and the Republic of Costa Rica starts at a point with co-ordinates 11° 03' 56.3" N, 85° 44' 28.3" W and follows geodetic lines connecting the points with the co-ordinates deposited today in written form before the Court:
Points
Latitude
Longitude
P-1
11° 03' 57.6" N
85° 45' 27.0" W
P-2
11° 03' 57.8" N
85° 45' 36.8" W
P-3
11° 03' 47.6" N
85° 46' 34.0" W
P-4
11° 03' 54" N
85° 47' 13.2" W
P-5
11° 03' 25" N
85° 49' 42.4" W
P-6
11° 03' 17.7" N
85° 50' 06.3" W
P-7
11° 02' 44.8" N
85° 51' 25.2" W
P-8 (12 nm)
10° 54' 51.7" N
86° 10' 14.6" W
P-9
10° 50' 59.1" N
86° 21' 37.6" W
P-10
10° 41' 24.4" N
86° 38' 0.8" W
P-11
10° 19' 28.3" N
87° 11' 0.7" W
P-12
9° 53' 9.0" N
87° 47' 48.8" W
P-13 (200 NM)
9° 16' 27.5" N
88° 46' 10.9" W
(b) In the Caribbean Sea, the maritime boundary between the Republic of Nicaragua and the Republic of Costa Rica starts at Point CA with co-ordinates 10° 56' 18.898" N, 83° 39' 52.536" W and follows geodetic lines connecting the points with the co-ordinates deposited today in written form before the Court:
Points
Latitude
Longitude
C-1
10° 59' 21.3" N
83° 31' 6.9" W
C-1a (12 nm)
11° 00' 18.9" N
83° 27' 38.00" W
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C-2
11° 01' 9.9" N
83° 24' 26.9" W
C-3
11° 05' 33.7" N
83° 03' 59.2" W
C-4
11° 11' 8.4" N
82° 34' 41.8" W
C-5
11° 05' 0.7" N
82° 18' 52.3" W
C-6
11° 05' 5.2" N
82° 14' 0.0" W
C-7
10° 49' 0.0" N
82° 14' 0.0" W
C-8
10° 49' 0.0" N
81° 26' 8.2" W
The maritime boundary between Point CA and the land is a geodetic line connecting Point CA and the eastern headland of Harbor Head Lagoon (presently located at the Court’s experts’ Point Ple).
(All co-ordinates are referred to WGS84 datum.)
B. In the case concerning Land Boundary in the Northern Part of Isla Portillos (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), for the reasons explained in the written and oral phases, Nicaragua respectfully requests from the Court to:
1. Adjudge and declare that:
(a) the stretch of coast abutting the Caribbean Sea which lies between the Harbor Head Lagoon and the mouth of the San Juan River constitutes Nicaraguan territory;
(b) the military camp set up by Nicaragua is located on Nicaraguan territory; and consequently
(c) the requests and submissions of the Republic of Costa Rica are rejected in their entirety.
6. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this concludes Nicaragua’s oral pleadings, and on behalf of my country, on my own behalf and that of the Nicaraguan team we wish to extend to you and the Members of the Court our sincere gratitude for the attention and patience you have had with our presentations.
7. Our thanks to the Registrar and the members of his staff including the untiring interpreters and the members of the general staff involved in the preparation and implementation of these oral proceedings. Finally, I would like to thank the members of the Nicaraguan team for their committed job and also extend our best wishes to our Costa Rican colleagues. Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court.
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The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. The Court takes note of the final submissions which Your Excellency has now read on behalf of Nicaragua.
That brings us to the end of the oral proceedings; I should like to thank the Agents, counsel and advocates for their statements.
In accordance with practice, I shall request the Agents of the Parties to remain at the Court’s disposal to provide any additional information it may require. With this proviso, I now declare closed the oral proceedings in the joint cases concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and the case concerning Land Boundary in the Northern Part of Isla Portillos (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua).
The Court will now retire for deliberation. The Agents of the Parties will be advised in due course of the date on which the Court will deliver its judgment. As the Court has no other business before it today, the sitting is closed.
The Court rose at 3.45 p.m.
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