INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO
CESSATION OFTHE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND TO NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT
(MARSHALL ISLANDS v. INDIA)
COUNTER-MEMORIAL
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA
16 SEPTEMBER 2015 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING NEGOTIATIONS RELATING
TO CESSATION OFTHE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND TO
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
(MARSHALL ISLANDS v. INDIA)
COUNTER-MEMORIAL
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA
16 SEPTEMBER 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................1
II. NON-EXISTENCE OF A DISPUTE...........................................................2
A. India’s Support to Nuclear Disarmament.......................................................4
B. Absence of Prior Bilateral Negotiations between the RMI and India ..........10
C. The Artificiality of the RMI’s Claim............................................................13
III. THE REMEDIES SOUGHT BY THE RMI CANNOT BE GRANTED
IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER STATES.......................................................17
IV. THE DISPUTE ALLEGED BY THE RMI FALLS OUTSIDE THE
SCOPE OF INDIA’S OPTIONAL DECLARATION.....................................23
A. Reservation (4) Excludes Disputes Relating to or Connected with Facts or
Situations of Hostilities, Armed Conflicts, Individual or Collective Actions
Taken in Self-Defence.......................................................................................27
B. Reservation (5) Excludes the Alleged Dispute Brought by the RMI from the
Court’s Jurisdiction ...........................................................................................30
C. Reservation (7) Excludes Disputes Concerning the Interpretation or
Application of the NPT.....................................................................................33
D. Reservation (11) Excludes Disputes the Foundations of Which Existed Prior
to the Date of India’s Declaration .....................................................................36
V. THE JUDGMENT WOULD SERVE NO LEGITIMATE PURPOSE..38
VI. SUMMARY...............................................................................................41
SUBMISSION......................................................................................................43
LIST OF ANNEXES...........................................................................................45 I. INTRODUCTION
1. On 24 April 2014, the Republic of Marshall Islands ( “RMI”)
submitted an Application against nine States in possession of nuclear weapons,
including India, alleging a failure of these Respondent States to honour their
obligation to pursue in good faith, and bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading
to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under stri ct and effective international
control. In its letter of 6 June 2014, India explained that there was no dispute
between India and the RMI and object ed to the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice in the matter. The Court, by its Order of 16 June 2014, held that it
was “necessary for the Court to be informed of all the contentions and evidence
1
on facts and law on which the Parties rely on the matter of its jurisdiction;” and
accordingly directed the parties to file pleadings to address the question of the
jurisdiction of the Court. The RMI filed its Memorial on 16 December 2014.
2. In this Counter-Memorial, India will demonstrate that there is no legal
dispute between India and the RMI (II.). Furthermore, even if the Court were to
find that the dispute as identified in the Memorial exist s, the Court would
nonetheless lack jurisdiction since the other indispensable Parties are not taking
part in the proceedings (III.),several reservations to India’s Article 36(2)
Declaration bar its jurisdiction (IV.) and the remedies which the RMI is seeking
against India cannot be granted practically (V.)
1
I.C.J., Order, 16 June 2014, Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the
Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. India), p. 2.
1II. NON-EXISTENCE OF A DISPUTE
3. In its Memorial, the RMI describes the subject -matter of the alleged
dispute as follows:
“The subject matter of the present dispute brought before the Court by the
Republic of the Marshall Islands […] is the failure of the Republic of India
[…] to honour its obligation towards the Applicant (and other States) to
pursue in good faith, and bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading to
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control. This obligation to negotiate a nuclear disarmament
includes, in the first place, the obligation to negotiate in good faith to cease
the nuclear a2ms race by each of the States that are in possession of nuclear
weapons.”
However, as demonstrated by India below, the RMI fails to identify a “ real
dispute” between the Parties, the existence of which constitutes “the primary
condition for the Court to exercise its judicial function.” 4
4. As the RMI rightly recalled in its Memorial, 5quoting from the
PCIJ, “[a]dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal
views or of interests between two persons.” 6As the Court has long made clear,
2
3RMIM, para. 2.
I.C.J., Judgment, 4 December 1998, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v.Canada), Reports 1998, p.
449, para. 31.
4I.C.J., Judgments, 20 December 1974, Nuclear Tests (Australia v.France) and Nuclear Tests
(New Zealand v. France), Reports 1974, p. 271, para. 55 and p. 476, para. 58.
5RMIM, para. 14.
6P.C.I.J., Judgment, 30 August 1924, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Series A, No. 2, p. 11.
See also recently, I.C.J., Judgment, 1 April 2011, Application of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation),
Preliminary Objections, Reports 2011, pp. 84-85, para. 30.
2“[w]hether there is a dispute in a given case is a matter for ‘objective
7
determination’ by the Court.” Therefore:
“it is not sufficient for one party to a contentious case to assert that a
dispute exists with the other party. A mere assertion is not sufficient to
prove the existence of a dispute any more than a mere denial of the
existence of the dispute proves its non- existence. Nor is it adequate to
show that the interests of the two parties to such a case are in conflict. It
must be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the
other.” 8
5. In assessing whether a dispute between the Parties exists, the
“Court’s determination must turn on an examination of the facts .” In the present
case, facts speak for themselves:
- As the RMI itself acknowledges, 10 India has always been a strong
supporter of the necessity of nuclear disarmament (A.);
- RMI has, contrary to its position in the Application, never sought to
engage in bilateral consultations with India (B.);
7
I.C.J., Advisory Opinion, 30 March 1950, Interpretation of Pe ace Treaties with Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Reports 1950, p. 74. See also recently, I.C.J., Judgment, 1
April 2011, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Reports 2011 , pp. 84-
85, para. 30 and Judgment, 20 July 2012, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or
Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Reports 2012, p. 442, para. 46.
8I.C.J., Judgment, 21 December 1962, South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia
v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections , Reports 1962, p. 328. See also I.C.J., Judgment, 3
February 2006, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002)
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Reports 2006 , p.
40, para. 90; Judgment, 1 April 2011, Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary
Objections, Reports 2011, pp. 84-85, para. 30 and Judgment, 20 July 2012, Questions relating to
the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgiumv. Senegal), Reports 2012, p. 442, para. 46.
9I.C.J., Judgment, 1 April 2011, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections,
Reports 2011, pp. 84-85, para. 30.
10
RMIA, paras. 35-37.
3 - The artificiality and abusive character of the RMI’s claim are apparent
from the reading of the Application and the Counter -Memorial and from the
context (C.).
A. India’s Support to Nuclear Disarmament
6. While asserting that RMI’s position lacks any merit whatsoever , it
is necessary at the outset to set out India’s position in the matter of nuclear
disarmament and nuclear proliferation.
7. As India explained in its Letter of 6 June 2014, it is “committed to
the goal of a nuclear weapon free world through global, veri fiable and non-
11
discriminatory nuclear disarmament.” India is a member of the Conference on
Disarmament (“CD”) , the international community’s “single multilateral
disarmament negotiating forum” , 12 since its inception and has consistently
supported the commencement of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the CD.
India’s 2006 Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament urges the reaffirmation of
the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon States to the goal of complete
elimination of nuclear weapons as the first concrete step towards achieving the
goal of nuclear disarmament; it calls for the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons
Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of
nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non -
discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified
11India’s letter dated 6 June 2014, para. 2 (RMIM, Annex 3).
1UNGA Resolution A/RES/S-10/2, “Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General
Assembly”, 30 June 1978, adopted by consensus, para. 120.
4 13
timeframe. A resolution tabled by India at the UN General Assembly every year
calls for the negotiation of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear
14
Weapons in the CD.
8. India’s Letter of 6 June 2014 simply confirmed the posi tion
defended by India since its birth as an independent State . India’s first Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was among the first world leaders to champion the
15
cause of nuclear disarmament. Addressing the Third Special Session of the UN
General Assembly on Disarmament in 1988, the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
proposed an Action Plan for a Nuclear -Weapons Free and Nonviolent World
Order to attain the goal of nuclear disarmament in a time -bound, universal, non-
discriminatory, phased and verifiable manner. 16 As a nuclear weapon state, India
is cognizant of its responsibility and its support for global, non -discriminatory
nuclear disarmament has not diminished. For example, in 1998 when it declared
itself a nuclear weapon state, India stated at the highest political level that“India
remains committed to the basic tenet of our foreign policy – a conviction that
global elimination of nuclear w eapons will enhance its security as well as that of
the rest of the world.” In 2013, at the UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting
on Nuclear Disarmament, Salman Khurshid, Minister of External Affairs of India,
summarized his country’s position concerning nuclear disarmament as follows:
13
Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament originally issued in the First Committee under the
14mbol A/C.1/61/5 and submitted to the CD as CD/1816 of 20 February 2007 (Annex 1).
UNGA Resolution A/RES/69/69 “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear
Weapons” of 2014, tabled by India (Annex 2).
15See for example Statement made by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in Lok Sabha on 2 April
1954, Documentson India’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy, VolumeI , pp 23 -27,Eds. Gopal Singh
and S.K. Sharma (Annex 3).
16A World Free of Nuclear Weapons: An Action Plan, submitted by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
at the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarm ament, June 9, 1988 (Annex
17.
Paper Presented in the Lok Sabha by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on “Evolution of
India’s Nuclear Policy” on 27 May 1998. (Annex 5).
5 “[F]rom the days of our freedom struggle, we have been consistent in our
support for the global elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.
Mahatma Gandhi, the Father of our nation, was moved by the tragedy of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki but remained unshaken in his belief in non -
violence. He wrote that he regarded the employment of the atom bomb for
the wholesale destruction of men, women, and children as the most
diabolical use of science. More than six decades later, it remains our
collective challenge to craft a nuclear weapon free and nonviolent world
order.
India remains convinced that its security would be strengthened in a
nuclear weapon free and non-violent world order. This conviction is based
both on principle as well as pragmatism. We believe that the g oal of
nuclear disarmament can be achieved through a step -by-step process
underwritten by a universal commitm ent and an agreed multilateral
framework that is global and non- discriminatory. There is need for a
meaningful dialogue among all states possessing nuclear weapons to build
trust and confidence and for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in
international affairs and security doctrines. Progressive steps are needed
for the de -legitimization of - nuclear weapons paving the way for their
complete elimination.
In 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi presented to the UN General a
comprehensive Action Plan for a nuclear weapon free and non- violent
world order, which if implemented would have rid the world of nuclear
weapons by 2008. India’s subsequent pr oposals in the General Assembly
and the Conference on Disarmament are testimony to our consistent
support for nuclear disarmament based on the key principles of the Rajiv
Gandhi Action Plan for achieving nuclear disarmament in a time bound
manner.
As a responsible nuclear power, we have a credible minimum deterrence
policy and a posture of no- first use. We refuse to participate in an arms
race, including a nuclear arms race. We are prepared to negotiate a global
No-First-Use treaty and our proposal for a Convention banning the use of
nuclear weapons remains on the table. As we see no contradiction between
nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation, we are also committed to
working with the international community to advance our common
objectives of non- proliferation, including through strong export controls
and membership of the multilateral export regimes.
6 Mr. President, the Non- Aligned Movement, of which India is a pr oud
founding member, has proposed today the early commencement of
negotiations in the CD on nuclear disarmament. We support this call.
Without prejudice to the priority we attach to nuclear disarmament, we
also support the negotiation in the CD of a non- discriminatory and
internationally verifiable treaty banning the future production of fissi le
material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices that
meets India’s national security interests. It should be our endeavour to
return the CD, which remains the single multilateral disarmament
18
negotiating forum, to substantive work as early as possible.”
9. Following this meeting, on 5 December 2013, the UN General
Assembly adopted Resolution 68/32 (“Follow -up to the 2013 high- level meeting
of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”). Only India, China, DPRK
and Pakistan voted in favour ; France, Israel, the Russian Federation, the United
19
Kingdom and the United States voted against.
10. As the RMI rightly notes in its Application, “India has consistently
voted for the General Assembly resolution welcoming the Court’ s conclusion
20 21
regarding the disarmament obligation .” It has done so concerning the other
relevant resolutions. For instance, in the recent years, India voted for:
- Resolutions 67/39 (“High- level meeting of the General Assembly on
nuclear disarmament”) of 3 December 2012; 22
- Resolutions 68/32 and 68/46 (“Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting
of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament” and “Taking forward
multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”) of 5 December 2013; and 23
18Statement by Salman Khurshid, Minister of External Affairs of India, at the High Level Meeting
of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, 68th United Nations General Assembly in
New York, 26 September 2013 (Annex 6).
19See A/68/PV.60, p. 12.
2See Fn. 61: “Most recently adopted as A/RES/68/42, 5 December 2013”.
21
22RMIA, para. 35.
23See also RMIA, para. 36
Ibid.
7 - Resolutions 69/41 (“Taking forward multila teral nuclear disarmament
negotiations”) and 69/58 (“Follow -up to the 2013 high- level meeting of the
General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”) of 2 December 2014.
11. India’s own resolutions at the UN General Assembly (“Convention
on the Prohibition of the U se of Nuclear Weapons”, tabled every year since 1982
and “Reducing nuclear danger” , tabled every year since 1998) 24 give further
expression to India’s desire to work with other member states of the United
Nations to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament.
12. Even more s trikingly, India is the only S tate possessing nuclear
weapon that co-sponsors and votes for the UN General Assembly resolution on
“Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons”, which “calls upon all States to
immediately commence multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of
a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing,
deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing
25
for their elimination.” It is revealing that for ten years (2003 -2012) prior to the
RMI contemplating this recourse to the ICJ, while India consistently voted for and
sponsored this resolution, the RMI voted against the resolution or abstained nine
times and voted in favour only once. 26This shows not only the inconsistency of
the RMI’s belief in multilateral negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament but
also the artificiality of its claim in this case.7
2UNGA Resolution A/RES/69/69 (Annex 2) and Resolution A/RES/69/40 of 2014 respectively
(Annex 7).
25
UNGA Resolution A/RES/69/43, “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons”, 2 December 2014 ( Annex 8).
26e also RMIA, para. 36.
27Table comparing the voting record of India and the RMI on the ICJ Resolution (Annex 9).
See paras. 20-26below.
8 nd
13. According to the RMI, i t is during th e2 Conference on the
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons at Nayarit in February 2014 that, by its
statement, the RMI, for the very first time allegedly “raised a dispute with each
28
and every one of the States possessing nuclear weapons, including with India.”
29 30
The reading of the India’s and the RMI’s statements at this conference clearly
shows that their positions on the issue of nuclear disarmament, fa r from being
31
“positively opposed”, in fact converge . If the RMI called on “all states
possessing nuclear weapons to intensify efforts to address their responsibilities in
moving towards an effective and secure disarmament”, India expressed its support
for nuclear disarmament and reiterated its commitment to the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound, universal, non- discriminatory,
phased and verifiable manner. It stated its belief that nuclear disarmament can be
achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment
and an agreed global and non- discriminatory multilateral framework andit called
for a meaningful dialogue among all states possessing nuclear weapons to build
trust and confidence for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in international
affairs and security doctrines.
28RMIM, para. 18.
29 Available at: http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-
Statements.htm?dtl/22936/Statement_by_India_at_the_Second_Conference_on_the_Humanitarian
30mpact_of_Nuclear_Weapons_at_Nayarit_Mexico
Available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/n…-
3114/statements/MarshallIslands.pdf
I.C.J., Judgment, 21 December 1962, South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa;
Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Reports 1962, p. 328. See also I.C.J., Judgment,
3 February 2006, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002)
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Reports 2006 , p.
40, para. 90; Judgment, 1 April 2011, Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary
Objections, Reports 2011, pp. 84-85, para. 30 and Judgment, 20 July 2012, Questions relating to
the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgiumv. Senegal), Reports 2012, p. 442, para. 46.
914. As recently as at the 2015 Session of the CD, the World’s single
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, India underlined through a formal
statement that negotiations on nuclear disarmament was its priority and that it
supported the commencement of negotiations in the CD on a Comprehensive
Nuclear Weapons Convention. 32This support was reiterated on several occasions
during the 2015 Session of the CD. 33
B. Absence of Prior Bilateral Negotiations between the RMI and India
15. RMI’s application purports to raise , what is plainly a contrived
dispute. In order for a dispute to arise, there has to be an attempt to raise an issue
the failure to resolve which gives rise to a dispute. India does not accept that there
is any accepted principle of international law as is sought to be asserted by RMI.
Nonetheless if RMI was serious in relation to the matters raised in its application,
it should have in the first instance raised the matter with India.
16. Contrary to what the RMI asserts, there is no “clear evidence that
the RMI had raised a dispute with each and every one of the States possessing
nuclear weapons, including with India.” 34On the contrary, the RMI has never
brought its “ claim” to India’s attention nor invoked India’s responsibility, let
alone has RMI sought to start negotiations with the States against whom it has
instituted proceedings before the I.C.J.
32
Statement by Ambassador D B Venkatesh Varma, Permanent Representative of India to the CD,
33 February 2015 (Annex 10).
See also Statement by Ambassador D B Venkatesh Varma, Permanent Representative of India to
the CD, in the CD Plenary on 7 July 2015 (Annex 11)and on behalf of the Group of 21 on 30 June
2015(Annex 12).
34RMIM, para. 18.
1017. As the P.C.I.J. clearly explained in the Free Zones case, “the
judicial settlement of international disputes, with a view to which the Court has
been established, is simply an alternative to the direct and friendly settlement of
35
such disputes between the Parties.”
18. As early as 1924, the Permanent Court noted that it realized “to the
full the importance of the rule laying down that only disputes which cannot be
settled by negotiat ion should be brought before it” and added that “before a
dispute can be made the subject of an action at law, its subject matter should have
36
been clearly defined by means of diplomatic negot iations.” This position was
reiterated with force by the present Court, in particular in the case concerning the
Right of passage in which the Court considered
“the question of the extent to which, prior to the filing of the Application
by Portugal, negotiations had taken place between the Parties in the matter
of the right of passage.”
and noted that:
An examinat ion of these negotiations shows that, although they cover
various aspects of the situation arising out of the political claims o f India
in respect of the enclaves, a substantial part of these exchanges of views
was devoted, directly or indirectly, to the q uestion of access to the
enclaves.”
And it finally dismissed India’s objections since:
“A survey of the correspondence and Notes laid before the Court reveals
that the alleged denial of the facilities of transit to the enclaves provided
the subject -matter of repeated complaints on the part of Portugal; that
35P.C.I.J., Order, 19 August 1929, Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the Dist rict of Gex, Series A,
No. 22, p. 13.
36P.C.I.J., Judgment, 30 August 1924, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions , Series A, No. 2 , p.
15. See also I.C.J., Judgment, 26 November 1957, Case concerning righof passage over Indian
Territory (Preliminary Objections), Reports 1957, pp. 148-149.
11 these complaints constituted one of the principal objects of such exchanges
of views as took place (…).
While the diplomatic exchanges which took place between the two
Governments disclose the existence of a dispute between them on the
principal legal issue which is now before the Court, namely, the question
of the right of passage, an examination of the correspondence shows that
the negotiations had reached a deadlock.
It would therefore appear that assuming that there is substance in the
contention that Article 36 (2)of the Statute, by r eferring to legal disputes,
establishes as a condition of the jurisdiction of the Court a requisite
definition of the dispute through negotiations, the condition was complied
37
with to the extent permitted by the circumstances of the case.”
19. If RMI was serious about setting about a chain of bilateral consultations, it
would have attempted to engage in such consultations in the first instance, i n the
present case, the record shows that the RMI has never brought its claims India’s
attention. This is unsur prising as clearly these issues do not lend themselves t o a
bilateral resolution . It has also not made a specific proposal for multilateral
negotiations in a UN forum on nuclear disarmament which has been contested by
India; in fact as its voting record in the UN General Assembly shows, it has failed
to support the call for negotiations on nuclear disarmament . The RMI has been
able to refer to only one general statement in a conference called outside the UN
framework as what it describes as “clear evidence that the RMI had raised a
dispute with each and every one of the States possessing nuclear weapons,
38
including with India.” This statement was made in February 2014, two months
before the RMI filed its Application, at a conference during which the position of
the Parties regarding the need for nuclear disarmament actually coincided. There 39
is nothing else in the RMI’s Application and nothing more in the RMI’s Memorial
37I.C.J., Judgment, 26 November 1957, Case concerning right of passage over Indian territory
(Preliminary Objections), Reports 1957, pp. 148-149.
38RMIM, para. 18.
39See para. 13 above.
12which supports the allegation that the RMI has sought to invoke its forged dispute
with India, let alone that it endeavoured to engage in negotiations. In fact, on the
contrary, the RMI mostly abstained on First Committee Resolution on “Follow-up
to the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the Legality of the Use or Threat of Use of
Nuclear Weapons” while India co -sponsored that resolution and voted in favour .
It is only after contemplating instituting proceedings against India at the ICJ that
RMI changed its vote on this resolution to a positive vote.
C. The Artificiality of the RMI’s Claim
20. A confirmation of the artificiality of the RMI’s claim can be found
in the shift of the alleged dispute as presented first in the RMI’s Memorial in
contrast with the presentation made in its Application. The dispute rais ed in the
Application, identified at the very outset in paragraph 2, is based on the “failure to
fulfil the obligations of customary international law with respect to cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and nuclear disarmament enshrined in
40
Article VI of the NPT and declared by the Court.” Further, in paragraph 5, the
Application suggests that “the long delay in fulfilling the obligations enshrined in
Article VI of the NPT and customary international law constitutes a flagrant denial
41
of human justice.” Moreover, in paragraph 7, the Applicant emphasises its being
“a non-nuclear-weapon State (‘NNWS’) Party to the NPT” and explains that “The
Marshall Islands acceded to the Tre aty as a Party on 30 January 1995, and has
continued to be a Party to it since that time.” The obvious assumption underlying
the assertions in paragraphs 2,5and 7 of the Application is that India is in breach
of its alleged obligations under the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear
40Italics added.
41Italics added.
42See also RMIM, paras. 10 or 59.
13Weapons (NPT) of which it is not a Party – a fact recognized by the RMI in
paragraph 6. 43
21. By contrast, the RMI has changed its position in the Memorial [faced with
a jurisdictional challenge] which seeks to distance itself not merely from some of
the assertions of the Application but also from the legal basis that would be
necessary to grant the remedies sought in the Application. There, it is careful to
avoid such formulas and insists that “the pres ent dispute between the RMI and
India is, and can only be, a dispute exclusively under customary international law.
44
This is so because India is not a party to the NPT.” However, it is the
45
Application “which sets out the subject of the dispute”.
22. A reading of the Application including the remedies sought leaves
no doubt that what the RMI seeks to achieve in reality is to cast upon India the
obligation of complying with Article VI of the NPT . In other words the RMI’s
claim amount s to requesting the Court to declare that India is subject to the
obligation provided for in Article VI of the Treaty. That provision cannot be
viewed in isolation; it is a part of the treaty that has been found unacceptable by
several States including India. Indisputably, the Court has no jurisdiction to
compel a State to accept treaty obligations to which it has not provided its
sovereign consent and to which it has persistently objected. India’s position on the
46
NPT is a matter of record. During the NPT negotiations, in accordance with the
43See also RMIM, para. 20.
44
45RMIM para. 36; see also para. 21.
P.C.I.J., Judgment, 4 February 1933, Prince von Pless Administration, Series A/B, No. 52, p. 14;
see also: I.C.J., Judgment, 30 November 2010, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v.
46mocratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Reports 2010, p. 656, para. 39.
See Documentson India’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy, VolumeII , Eds. Gopal Singh and S.K.
Sharma for statements made by India’s negotiator V C Trivedi at the Conference of the Eighteen -
Nation Committee on Disarmament of 12 August 1965, pp. 582- 596; 15 February 1966, pp 612-
627; 10 May 1966, pp 638- 646; 23 May 1967, 687- 700; and 28 September 1967, 706 -718;
14mandate contained in UN Resolution 2028(XX) of November 19, 1965, India had
put forward the idea of an international non- proliferation agreement under which
the nuclear weapon states would agree to give up their arsenal s and other
countries would refrain from developing or acquiring such weapons. This balance
of rights and obligations was missing when the NPT emerged in 1968 even as
India’s security concerns deepened. W hen the Indian parliament ’s lower House
debated the NPT on 5 April 1968, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi highlighted the
shortcomings of the NPT and said that “we shall be guided entirely by our self -
enlightenment and the considerations of national security”. 47India accordingly
made a sovereign choice to stay out of the NPT.
23. From the negotiation of the NPT and its adoption to this day,
India’s position on the NPT has been consistent. For example, when the treaty
48
was extended indefinitely in 1995, India reiterated its position. Again in 2000,
India rejected the treaty as unmindful of its security concerns, discriminatory and
49
incapable of leading the world to nuclear disarmament.
24. India submits that any suggestion of the existence of a jurisdiction
to compel States to accept obligations under a Treaty – in whole or in part – does
not vest in this Court, and any invitation to cast upon States obligations other than
those that flow from clear and well defined principles of customary international
law would seriously erode the principle of sovereignty of States . It is not within
Statement by External Affairs Minister M. C. Chagla in Parliament on 27 March 1967, pp 685-
687; Statements by Ambassador Azim Husain in the Eighteen -Nation Committee on Disarmament
on 27 February 1968, pp 724-730 and in the Political Committee of the United Nations on 14 May
1968 pp 741-755, (Annexes 13-20).
47Statement by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Lok Sabha, 5 April 1968. Ibid, pp 739-741(Annex
48). th
Statement by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee at the 50 Session of the UN General
49sembly on 29 September 1995, relevant extracts(Annex 22).
Statement to Parliament on the NPT Review Conference by External Affairs Minister Jaswant
Singh, May 9, 2000(Annex 23).
15the Court’s jurisdiction to extend Article VI obligations to India which is not a
party to the NPT.
25. India submits that the Application seeks to impose upon India the
obligations under the NPT, and the Memorial seeks to mask the real intent of RMI
by relying on some undefined and unstated principle of International law which
would indirectly achieve the same end.
26. Other clear indication s of the artificial character of the present
50
dispute lie in the undue haste with which the RMI lodged its Application and in
the circumstances in which it was prepared and lodged.
50See para. 72 below.
16 III. THE REMEDIES SOUGHT BY THE RMI CANNOT BE
GRANTEDIN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER STATES
27. The Application and the Memorial make a thinly disguised attempt
to invite this Court to extend its jurisdiction and to assume the role of an
international arbiter of nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation. T his Court
should firmly decline at the very f irst opportunity this invitation to step into the
political and legislative domain if only because of the absence of the other States
possessing nuclear weapons.
28. At the outset, it may be noted again that India, Pakistan and the
United Kingdom are the onl y three States possessing nuclear weapons that
recognize the jurisdiction of the Court by means of declarations under Article
36(2) of the Statute of the Court. In the Applications relating to the remaining six
States, the RMI has included an invitation as foreseen in Article 38, paragraph 5,
of the Rules of the Court. China has formally notified that it does not consent to
the jurisdiction of the Court51 and, to India’s knowledge, the remaining five States
have not yet responded to the Applications.
29. RMI invites the Court to declare that India failed “to pursue in
good faith, and bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament
52
in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. ” It then labours
the point in an attempt to show that this so -called “dispute” is purely bilateral
between India and the RMI and separate from the eight other cases filed by the
RMI against the other eight States possessing the nuclear weapon, and that:
51RMIM, para. 5.
52RMIM, para. 2.
17 “[t]he fact that not all of the nine States are accepting to actually appear in
these respective cases before the Court cannot be deemed an obstacle for
the Court to consider and adjudge each one of the three cases that are
actually continuing (the present case against India as well as the cases
against Pakistan and the United Kingdom).” 53
30. The Memorial acknowledges that the Court has no jurisdiction
over six of the other States with which India would have an obligation to engage
into negotiation, far less upon the many States - parts of the “whole international
community”- which are supposedly interested in the respect of the obligation
(“erga omnes”)allegedly violated by India 55 and which States do not accept the
jurisdiction of the Court. 56
31. The failure to negotiate a treaty with third party States cannot be a
dispute between India and the RMI.
32. According to the well-known “Monetary Gold principle”, in inter-
State adjudication,
“one of the fundamental principles of [the Court’s] Statute is that it cannot
decide a dispute between States without the consent of those States to its
jurisdiction. This principle was reaffirmed in the Judgment given by the
Court in the case concerning Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943
and confirmed in several of its subsequent decisions (see Continental Shelf
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Application for Permission to Intervene,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 25, para. 40; Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984,
p. 431, para. 88 ; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali),
Judgment, I.C. J. Reports 1986, p. 579, para. 49; Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier Dispute (ElSalvador/Honduras), Application to
53RMIM, para. 6.
54RMIM, paras 4-5.
55See e.g. RMIA, para. 40.
56See para. 39 below.
18 Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1990, pp. 114-1 16, paras. 54-56, and
p. 112, para. 73; and Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v.
Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp.
259-262, paras. 50-55).” 57
33. In the Monetary Gold case, the Court found that where, as in the
present case, “the vital issue to be settled concerns the international responsibility
of a third State [that of Albania in that case], the Court cannot, without the
consent of that third State, give a decision on that issue.” 58The Court accordingly
declined to exercise jurisdiction since “Albania’s legal interests would not only be
affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision.” 59
34. In the present case, even assuming that there was some principle of
law that would apply erga om nes to all the States or at least the nine States , the
separation between the nine cases filed by the RMI is artificial since the
obligation enunciated in the Memorial and the Application allegedly violated by
60
India is the same obligation that the RMI invokes in the eight other cases .
Besides, clearly a sensible resolution and effective relief of the problem sought to
be remediated in the Application would only be if the “obligation” were to be
performed jointly by all of them with the active participation of non -nuclear
weapon States, including States that rely on the nuclear umbrella provided by
nuclear weapon States.
57I.C.J., Judgment, 30 June 1995, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Reports 1995, p. 101, para.
58.
I.C.J., Judgment, 15 June 1954, Case of the monetary gold removed from Rome in 1943
59reliminary Question), Reports 1954, p. 33.
60Ibid., p. 32.
Cf. RMIM, para. 3: “The subject matter of all Applications related to a similar failure of each
and every one of these nine States to live up to their obligation to pursue in good faith, and bring
to a conclusion, negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and
effective international control.”
1935. The essential stake and participation of non- nuclear weapon States
in nuclear disarmament is explicitly recognised in the membership of the UN
forums dealing with these issues from the beginning of the nuclear age;
- this obligation is addressed in partic ular to States possessing the nuclear
weapon;
- by definition, “negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its
61
aspects” necessitate the participation of all S tates possessing the nuclear
weapons; and therefore,
- the very subject -matter of the case is the alleged common or joint
responsibility of the nine States possessing nuclear weapons, and
- that all non-nuclear weapon States, including States that rely on extended
nuclear deterrence, are essential stake holders in these negotiations is implicit in
the role that RMI seeks for itself on the issue and explicit in the membership and
62
mandate of the competent UN forums.
36. As the Court recognized in its Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons , “any realistic search for general and complete
disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, necessitates the co -operation of all
States”, especially those possessing nuclear weapons.
37. Even if it were to be assumed that there is a rule of customary
international law obliging sovereign States to negotiate in good faith to arrive at a
consensus on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non- proliferation, the question
whether the actions of a State are lacking in good faith or fail to measure up to the
61
I.C.J., Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Reports 1996, p. 267, para. 105(2)(F).
62See UNGA Resolution A/RES/S-10/2, “Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the
General Assembly”, 30 June 1978, adopted by consensus,Part II.
63I.C.J., Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ,
Reports 1996, p. 226, para. 100.
20so-called obligation can only be a dispute among the States engaged in the
negotiations, and can only be examined in the presence of the States wh ich were
under the alleged common obligation to negotiate complete elimination of nuclear
weapons.
38. Therefore, even if the RMI could show that there is a dispute (quod
non), the alleged dispute could not be decided by the Court in the absence of the
other States possessing the nuclear weapons against which the RMI has seized the
Court, while acknowledging that it lacks jurisdiction in six of these cases.
39. Furthermore, the fact that the obligation allegedly violated by the
States possessing the nuclear weapons would be erga omnes is both irrelevant and
goes against the RMI’s argument.
40. In the East Timor case, the I.C.J. made clear that:
“the ergaomnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction
are two different things. Whatever the nature of the obligations invoked,
the Court could not rule on the lawfulness of the conduct of a State when
its judgment would imply an evaluation of the lawfulness of the conduct of
another State which is not a party to the case. Where this is so, t64 Court
cannot act, even if the right in question is a right erga omnes.”
Therefore, by no means could the erga omnes character of the allegedly violated
norm be a ground for establishing the jurisdiction of the Court.
64I.C.J., Judgment, 30 June 1995, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Reports 1995, p. 102, para.
29. See also: I.C.J., Judgment, 3 February 2006, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Reports 2006, pp. 51-52, para. 125 (and also pp. 31- 32, para. 64) and Judgment, 3
February 2012, Jurisdicti onal Immunities of the State (Germanv. Italy: Greece intervening) ,
Reports 2012, p. 140, para. 93.
2141. In reality, the RMI’s argument based on the alleged erga omnes character
of Article VI of the NPT 65 – a treaty obligation on which India, as a non-party to
the NPT and as a persistent objector to that treaty , does not take a position –
destroys the edifice of RMI’s case on jurisdiction since it clearly demonstrates
that, in the least, the issue is definitely not bilateral.
42. Finally nuclear arms are, by the ir very character, such as to be the
cause of global concern and not merely bilateral or regional concern, and the
effective resolution of the question of nuclear disarmament must necessarily be
the subject matter of a multilateral treaty. Unless all the nuc lear and potentially
nuclear States participate in negotiations on nuclear disarmament and arrive at a
consensus, global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament would remain a
66
chimera. As a consequence, all States are “indispensable Parties”, since all
would be affected by the Judgment of the Court sought by the RMI . Such an
international legislative function goes well beyond the jurisdiction of the ICJ and
is strictly the preserve of the UN inter-governmental forums.
65RMIA, para. 40 and RMIM, paras. 7 and 21.
66 See also Section V.
22 IV. THE DISPUTE ALLEGED BY THE RMI FALLSOUTSIDETHE
SCOPEOF INDIA’S OPTIONAL DECLARATION
43. The RMI seeks to found the jurisdiction of the Court on the
declarations made by the Parties under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court.
44. India signed its Declaration on 15 September 1974 and deposited it
on 18 September 1974. This declaration revoked and replaced the previous
declaration made by the Government of India on 14 September 1959. The RMI
deposited its D eclaration on 24 April 2013. India reiterates its position
communicated by its letter dated 6 June 2014 that the Court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate upon the alleged dispute in view of several reservations contained in its
Declaration.
45. Declarations recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as
compulsory are in essence unilateral acts, issued under the authority of State
sovereignty. As the Court held in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua:
“Declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court are
facultative, unilateral engagements, that States are absolutely free to make
or not to make. In making the declaration a State is equally free either to
do so unconditionally and without limit of 67 time for its duration, or to
qualify it with conditions or reservations.”
46. As the Court further explained, “[i]t is for each State, in
formulating its declaration, to decide upon the limits it places upon its acceptance
67
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 418, para. 59.
23 68
of the jurisdiction of the Court.” Conditions or reservations to Article 36(2)
declarations “thus do not by their terms derogate from a wider acceptance already
given. Rather, they operate to define the parameters of the State’s acceptance of
69
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.”
47. The rules of international law that apply to the interpretation of
declarations made under Article 36(2) of the Court’s Statute and reservations
thereto are now well settled.
48. In the Anglo- Iranian Oil case, the I.C.J. explained that a
“declaration must be interpreted as it stands, having regard to the words actually
70
used.” The Court observed that it “must seek the interpretation which is in
harmony with a natural and reasonable way of reading the text, having due regard
to the intention of the Government…at the time when it accepted the compulsory
71
jurisdiction of the Court.”
49. Similarly, the C ourt stated ‘ [e]very reservation mus t be given
72
effect “as it stands’ ”, “in a manner compatible with the effect sought by the
73
reserving State.” As the I.C.J. further explained, the intention of a reserving
State “may be deduced not only from the text of the relevant clause, but also from
the context in which the clause is to be read, and an examination of evidence
regarding the circumstances of its preparation and the purposes intended to be
68
I.C.J., Judgment, 4 December 1998, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the
69urt, Reports 1998, pp. 452-453, para. 44.
Ibid.
70I.C.J., Judgment, 22 July 1952, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (Jurisdiction), Reports 1952, p. 105.
71Ibid., p. 104.
72I.C.J., Judgment, 4 December 1998, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the
Court, Reports 1998 , pp. 454, paras. 47 (citing Certain Norwegian Loans, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1957, p. 27) and 49. See also I.C.J., Judgment, 22 July 1952, Anglo -Iranian Oil Co. Case
(Jurisdiction), Reports 1952, p. 105.
73
Ibid., p. 455, para. 52.
24served.” 74
50. The reservations in India’s Article 36(2) Declaration must be
interpreted in the light of the above principles.
51. India’s Declaration reads as follows:
“I have the honour to declare, on behalf of the Government of the Republic
of India, that they accept, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of
the Statute of the Court, until such time as notice may be given to
terminate such acceptance, as compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement, and on the basis and condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice over all disputes other than:
(1) disputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have
agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method or
methods of settlement;
(2) disputes with the government of any State which is or has been
a Member of the Commonwealth of Nations;
(3) disputes in regard to matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of the Republic of India;
(4) disputes relating to or connected with facts or situations of
hostilities, armed conflicts, individual or collective actions taken in
self-defence, resistance to aggression, fulfilment of obligations
imposed by international bodies, and other similar or related acts,
measures or situations in which India is, has been or may in future
be involved;
(5) disputes with regard to which any other party to a dispute has
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice exclusively for or in relation to the purposes of such
dispute; or where the acceptance of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction on behalf of a party to the dispute was deposited or
ratified less than 12 months prior to the filing of the application
bringing the dispute before the Court;
(6) disputes where the jurisdiction of the Court is or may be
founded on the bas is of a treaty concluded under the auspices of
74
I.C.J., Judgment, 4 December 1998, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the
Court, Reports 1998, p. 454, para. 49.
25 the League of Nations, unless the Government of India specially
agree to jurisdiction in each case;
(7) disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a
multilateral treaty unless all the parties to the treaty are also parties
to the case before the Court or Government of India specially agree
to jurisdiction;
(8) disputes with the Government of any State with which, on the
date of an application to bring a dispute before the Court, the
Government of India has no diplomatic relations or which has not
been recognized by the Government of India;
(9) disputes with non-sovereign States or territories;
(10) disputes with India concerning or relating to:
(a) the status of its territory or the modification or
delimitation of its frontiers or any other matter concerning
boundaries;
(b) the territorial sea, the continental shelf and the margins,
the exclusive fishery zone, the exclusive economic zone,
and other zones of national maritime jurisdiction including
for the regulation and control of marine pollution and the
conduct of scientific research by foreign vessels;
(c) the condition and status of its islands, bays and gulfs and
that of the bays and gulfs that for historical reasons belong
to it;
(d) the airspace superjacent to its land and maritime
territory; and
(e) the determination and delimitation of its maritime
boundaries.
(11) disputes prior to the date of this declaration, including any
dispute the foundations, reasons, facts, causes, origins, definitions,
allegations or bases of which existed prior to this date, even if they
are submitted or brought to the knowledge of the Court hereafter.
(12) This declaration revokes and replaces the previous declaration
made by the Government of India on 14 September 1959.” 75
52. As shown below, reservations 4, 5, 7and 11bar the jurisdiction of
the I.C.J. in the present case.
75
See RMIM, Annex 5.
26 A. Reservation (4) Excludes Disputes Relating to or Connected with Facts or
Situations of Hostilities, Armed Conflicts, Individual or Collective Actions Taken
in Self-Defence
53. Reservation contained in subparagraph (4) of the first paragraph of
India’s Declaration excludes from the jurisdiction of the Court:
(4) disputes relating to or connected with facts or situations of hostilities,
armed conflicts, individual or collective actions taken in self -defence,
resistance to aggression, fulfilment of obligations imposed by international
bodies, and other similar or related acts, measures or situations in which
India is, has been or may in future be involved.
54. Applying the settled principles set out above to this reservation,
actions taken in self -defence, other s imilar or related acts, and extending to
situations i n which India may in future be involved are covered by this
reservation. The words “facts or situations of hostilities, armed conflicts,
individual or collective actions taken in self -defence, resistance to aggression”
read in conjunction with “and other similar or related acts (…) or situations in
which India is, has been or may in future be involved” naturally and reasonably
refer to any circumstances or state of affairs, at any point in time, which threat en
the security of the country. Indisputably India is living in a proliferated region and
the development of missile and nuclear capabilities in Asia and beyond has
76
impacted on India’s national security . India’s measures of self -defence, which
extend to measures and military strategies which in its perception are necessary to
deal with nuclear threats with which it may in future be confronted, are covered
by the reservation.
55. In any event, assessment of nuclear risk, and of measures necessary
76
These security concerns have been articulated in India’s statements from the 1960s itself. See
Annexes 5 and 20.
27as a deterrent are sovereign functions. India’s measures of self defence were
plainly intended to be carved out from the declaration under Art. 36(2).
56. The logical corollary of this would be that disputes concerning any
weapons including nuclear weapons which India may choose to possess or
develop in accordance with its international obligations to protect itself from
hostilities, armed conflicts, aggression and other similar or related acts or
situations, which have arisen or may arise in the future, are excluded from the
Court’s jurisdiction.
57. In view of the above, t he RMI’s reliance upon the earlier
77
Declaration of 1959, and the reasons for its modification are misconceived.
58. Indisputably, any disputes concerning the nuclear weapons fall
within the purview of reservation (4) of India’s Declaration. As noted by the RMI
itself, “India has stated: ‘ Nuclear weapons are an integral part of our national
security and will remain so, pending the global elimination of all nuclear weapons
78
on a universal, non-discriminatory basis.’”
59. The RMI has sought to artificially limit the sc ope of India’s
Declaration to “specific situations of use of force.” This is not in keeping with the
plain text of the Declaration which must be interpreted as it stands and having due
regard to the intention of the Government of India, which was to exclude from the
Court’s jurisdiction any matters pertaining to national security and self-defence. It
is also not in keeping with the facts; India has an official doctrine that envisages
situations in which India would be constrained to use nuclear weapons in self-
77See RMIM, para. 41.
78Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV.1139, Final record of the 1139 thplenary meeting on 29
May 2009, p. 8.
28defence (India’s doctrine of no -first use and non-use against non-nuclear weapon
States).79Thus, issues relating to nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament cannot
be adjud icated upon in view of the operation of the reservation contained in
subparagraph (4) of the first paragraph of India’s Declaration.
60. It must also be noted that the formula used in India’s fourth
reservation – “disputes relating to or connected with…” – is particularly broad.
61. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the Court pointed out that
“in excluding from its jurisdiction ‘disputes arising out of or concerning’
the conservation and management measures in question and their
enforcement, the [Defendant’s] reservation does not reduce the criterion
for exclusion to the ‘subject -matter’ of the dispute. The language used in
the English version – “disputes arising outof or concerning” – brings out
more clearly the broad and comprehensive character of the formula
employed. The words of the reservation exclude not only disputes whose
immediate ‘subject -matter’ is the measures in question and their
enforcement, but also those ‘concerning’ such measures and, more
generally, those having their ‘origin’ in those measures (‘arising out of”) –
that is to say, those disputes which,80n the absence of such measures,
would not have come into being.”
62. This is also true in the presen t case; in excluding from the
jurisdiction of the Court “disputes relating to or connected with facts or situations
of hostilities, armed conflicts, individual or collective actions taken in self -
defence, resistance to aggression…”, India deliberately used a language of
79“The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews operationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine”,
Press Release, Press Information Bureau, New Delhi, 4 January 2003 (Annex24).
80I.C.J., Judgment, 4 December 1998, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the
Court, Reports 1998, p. 458, para. 62. See also I.C.J., Judgment, 19 December 1Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf, Reports 1978, p. 34, para. 81 and p. 36, para. 86; Judgment, 10 February 2005,
Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany), Preliminary Objections, Reports2005, p. 25, para.
46 and Judgment, 31 March 2014, Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand
intervening), Reports 2014, paras. 37-38.
29considerable width so as to evince an intention of its exclusion going far beyond
the mere “exclusion to the ‘subject -matter’ of the dispute”. This purposeful
broadness is confirmed and emphasised by the last part of the fourth reservation
specifying that it applies to “other similar or related acts, measures or situations
in which India is, has been or may in future be involved”.
B. Reservation (5) Excludes the Alleged Dispute Brought by the RMI from the
Court’s Jurisdiction
63. The Indian Declaration of 18 September 1974 contains a second
reservation applicable in the present case. Reservation (5) excludes from the
Court’s jurisdiction
“(5) disputes with regard to which any other party to a dispute has
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
exclusively for or in relation to the purposes of such dispute; or where the
acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction on behalf of a party to
the dispute was deposited or ratified less than 12 months prior to the filing
of the application bringing the dispute before the Court.”
64. The wording of Reservation (5) is wide. It does not require that the
declaration of the Applicant expressly refers to the particular case for the purpose
of which that declaration has been deposited. This reservation applies when it is
apparent from the text of the declaration or from the conduct of the Applicant that
it has deposited a declaration “exclusively for or in relation to the purposes” of
that particular dispute.
65. The meaning of Reservation (5) is confirmed by the context in
which it has been introduced in the declaration of India. As recalled above, “[t]he
intention of a reserving State may be deduced not only from the text of the
30relevant clause, but also from the context in which the clause is to be read, and an
examination of evidence regarding the circumstances of its preparation and the
81
purposes intended to be served.”
66. This reservation was absent in the 1940 Declaration and was first
introduced in the 1959 Declaration deposited a few months before the I.C.J.
rendered its Judgment on the merits in the Right of Passage case. The chronology
of this case is key to interpreting r eservation (5) and understanding its purpose.
These proceedings were instituted against India by Portugal. At the moment
Portugal brought this case before the I.C.J., there was no ground on which the
jurisdiction of the Court could be based. Therefore, Portugal deposited an Article
36(2) declaration with the Secretary -General of the U nited Nations on 19
December 1955, three days only before it filed its Application on 22 December
1955.
67. The purpose of Reservation (5) is therefore clear. It aims at
avoiding that a State deposits a declaration under Article 36(2) of the Statute for
the sole purpose of a particular dispute . Behind this reservation lies the principle
of good faith governing the relations between States. India has accepted, without
discontinuance, the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court since 1940. It
would be somehow unfair if other States involved in disputes with India could shy
away from the jurisdiction of the Court in cases that India may bring against them,
while India could be sued at any moment by those States.
68. It is true that “[d]eclarations of accep tance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court are facul tative, unilateral engagements, that States are
81
I.C.J., Judgment, 4 December 1998, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the
Court, Reports 1998, p. 454, para. 49.
31 82
absolutely free to make […]” whenever they want. However, it holds equally
true that :
“[i]t is for each State, in formulating its declaration, to decide upon the
limits it places upon its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court:“This
jurisdiction only exists within the limits within which it has been
accepted” (Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/B,
83
No. 74, p. 23).”
69. It is worth noting that a number of other States have introduced
identical or similar reservations to their declaration recognizing as compulsory the
84
jurisdiction of the Court. It includes the Republic of the Marshall Islands as well
as Australia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan,
Lithuania, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Nigeria (which modified its previous
declaration in 1998 as a consequence of the Land and maritime boundary case
brought by Cameroon in 1994), Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Somalia, Spain and the United Kingdom.
70. In the present case, the record clearly shows that the Republic of
the Marshall Islands has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
“exclusively for or in relation to the purposes” of the case it filed last year:
- On 24 April 2013, the Republic of the Marshall Islands deposited a
declaration recognizing the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. as compulsory with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations;
82Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.United States of
83erica), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Reports 1984,p. 418, para. 59.
I.C.J., Judgment, 4 December 1998, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the
Court, Reports 1998, pp. 452- 453, para. 44. See also ibid., Reports 1984, p. 418, para. 59, and
Judgment, 21 June 2000, Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction of the
84urt, Reports 2000, p. 12, para. 40.
“[…] any dispute in respect of which any other Party to the dispute has accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice only in relation to or for the purpose of the
dispute.”
32 - On 24 April 2014, it filed an application instituting proceedings before
the Court.
71. This is indeed no coincidence: it does not leave the shadow of a
doubt that the Declaration was carefully devised so as to permit the RMI to lodge
its Application on this artificial dispute as it did with an undue haste.
72. In effect, t his chronology also shows that the Republic of the
Marshall Islands filed its Application on e day before the 12-month period set out
in Reservation (5) expired – which, by itself, must also lead to the rejection of the
RMI’s Application.
C. Reservation (7) Excludes Disputes Concerning the Interpretation or
Application of the NPT
73. The reservation contained in subparagraph (7) of the first paragraph of
India’s optional Declaration excludes from the jurisdiction of the Court:
“7) disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a multilateral
treaty unless all the parties to the treaty are also parties to the case before
the Court or Government of India specially agree to jurisdiction”.
74. It must also be noted that, if the RMI’s allegations concerning the scope of
the dispute were to be properly interpreted, reservation (7) would also constitute
85
such a bar. As shown above, the real purpose of the RMI’s Application is to
induce the Court to declare that India is in breach of the obligations stemming
from Article VI of the NPT.
85See paras. 20-26 above.
3375. On its plain language, the reservation is widely couched. Disputes
that concern a treaty [i.e. its interpretation or even its application] are excluded.
The expression concern must necessarily imply that if a dispute is such as to
impinge on the subject matter of a Treaty, it would be a dispute that concerns that
Treaty. The case as formulated by RMI in the Memorial – viz. that a general
principle of disarmament applicable erga omnes has blossomed from Article VI of
the NPT is clearly a dispute concerning the NPT in its interpretation as well as its
application.
76. Two more remarks are in order in this respect.
77. First, the issue in the present case is different from that dealt with
by the Court in Nicaragua. In that case the Court considered that
“since the claim before the Court in this case is not confined to violation of
the multilateral conventional provisions invoked, it would not in any event
be barred by th86multilateral treaty reservation in the United States 1946
Declaration.”
78. However, the Nicaragua v. U.S. case must be distinguished from
the present one for at least two reasons.
79. First, the claims of the A pplicants are different. The U.S. invoked
87
the violation of multilateral conventions which “codified” customary
international law. For its part, in the present case, the RMI invokes an alleged
customary international law obligation “ rooted” 88 in a multilateral convention,
precisely Article VI of th e NPT. Therefore, the RMI’s claim will necessarily
8Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaraguv. United States of
America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, pp. 424-425, para. 73.
8Ibid.
88RMIA, para. 59.
34require the interpretation of a multilateral convention, the NPT.
80. Second, the wording of the relevant reservation in these two cases
is different:
- The U.S. reservation excluded “disputes arising under a multilateral
treaty”; while
- that of India excludes “disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of a multilateral treaty”.
81. This difference is im portant. The U.S. reservation exclusive ly
covered disputes “having their ‘origin’ in those mea sures (‘arising out of”) – that
is to say, those disputes which, in the absence of such [multilateral conventions],
would not have come into being.” 8India’s reservation is wider. The variation in
language must be accorded its due importance. The seventh reservation is drafted
in such a way that it is applicable to exclude disputes concerned with whether or
not the dispute bears upon the interpretation of a treaty or simply implies such an
interpretation. This is so in the present case.
82. The RMI seeks to achieve indirectly what could not be achieved
directly. In the earlier part of this Memorial, India has set out reasons why the
RMI cannot raise a dispute ab out India’s alleged failure to negotiate in good faith
treaties with other nations in relation to nuclear non -proliferation and
disarmament. India has also set out its submission that the RMI seeks to impose
upon India the obligations of Article VI of the NPT. By basing itself on assertions
of rules of customary law, the RMI seeks to get over not only the fact that India is
not a party to that treaty, but also that this reservation excludes disputes in relation
89
I.C.J., Judgment, 4 December 1998, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the
Court, Reports 1998, p. 458, para. 62.
35to a t reaty unless all the parties are before the C ourt. The reality remains: the
RMI’s claim in any case cannot be dealt with by th e Court without interpreting
Article VI of the NPT. This is excluded by reservation (7).
D. Reservation (11) Excludes Disputes the Foundations of Which Existed Prior to
the Date of India’s Declaration
83. The r eservation contained in subparagraph (11) of the first
paragraph of India’s Declaration excludes from the jurisdiction of the Court:
“(11) disputes prior to the date of this declarat ion, including any dispute
the foundations, reasons, facts, causes, origi ns, definitions, allegations or
bases of which existed prior to this date, even if they are submitted or
brought to the knowledge of the Court hereafter”
84. In the Right of Passage case, the Court explained that:
“The Permanent Court thus drew a distinction between the situations or
facts which constitute the source of the rights claimed by one of the Parties
and the situations or facts which are the source of the dispute. Only the
latter are to be taken into account for the purpose of applying the
Declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court.” 90
85. This statement was made in the context of the interpretation of the
Indian Declaration of 1940 which contained a much narrower temporal
reservation since it covered “all disputes arising after Febr uary 5th, 1930, with
regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date.” The temporal
reservation to the 1974 Declaration is particularly wide since it excludes “any
dispute the foundations, reasons, facts, causes, origins, definitions, allegations or
bases of which existed prior to [1974], even if they are submitted or brought to the
90
I.C.J., Judgment, 12 April 1960, Case concerning right of passage over Indian Territory
(Merits), Reports 1960, p. 35.
36knowledge of the Court hereafter.” All the italicized words point to the fact that
the issue here is not the date when the dispute formally arose between the Parties
but that of the origin of the dispute.
86. The difference in the wording between the 1940 and 1974
Declarations is key in the present case. Under the 1974 Declaration, “the source of
91
the rights claimed by one of the Parties”, which was irrelevant in the Right of
Passage case, is now relevant. And there can be no doubt that in the present case,
the roots of the dispute must be sought for before 1974. As the RMI itself notes:
“…it is now 68 years since the very first United Nations General
Assembly Resolut ion sought to put in motion the elimination from
national arsenals of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, almost
45 years since the NPT entered into force and nearly 20 years since the
Court delivered its Advisory Opinion. The long delay in fulf illing the
obligations enshrined in Article VI of the NPT and customary international
law constitutes a flagrant denial of human justice.” 92
87. India refused to sign the NPT and to assume the obligations under
that Treaty including those contained in Article VI of the t reaty in 1968. Since 93
then, India has made its position clear that nu clear disarmament could not be
effective on the discriminatory basis underlying the treaty. India’s objection to the
NPT dates back to 1968, when the treaty was opened for signature. Therefore,
India’s alleged failure to negotiate is a cause which had clearly existed prior to the
date of the Declaration and cannot be the subject -matter of an Application before
this Court.
91
92bid.
RMIA, para. 5.
93See Statement made by Ambassador Azim Husain on 14 May 1968 when he inter alia places on
record India’s dissatisfaction with and objection to Article VI, “an imperfect obligation with no
sanction behind it”, and finds it void of compulsive obligation or even a sense of urgency to pursue
negotiations for nuclear disarmament (Annex 20).
37 V. THE JUDGMENT WOULD SERVE NO LEGITIMATE PURPOSE
88. In assuming jurisdiction, the Court, must be guided by factors such
94
as “the efficacy of the solution that can be offered” In the Northern Cameroons
case, it was held that the Court’s Judgment “must have som e pr actical
95
consequence” . The Court, in that case, refused to entertain the claim brought by
the Republic of Cameroon as it could not “render a judgment capable of effective
application” 96 and concluded that the “circumstances […] render any adjudication
devoid of purpose.” 97
89. In view of Article 59 of the Court’s Statute a judgment is binding
only on the concerned Parties. Thus, a Judgment in the present case would have
no binding effect on any nuclear State other than India that refuses to consent to
the Court’s jurisdiction. A unilateral direction to India to carry out negotiations
without the same decision being equally applicable to other States would be
meaningless. The RMI has alleged a breach of the obligation to carry out
“negotiations” leading to nuclear disarmament, not a breach of the obligation to
proceed to nuclear disarmament simpliciter . The term ‘negotiation ’ connotes an
exchange between two or more parties. There can be no negotiation if some of the
States that must be involved are unwilling or not equally bound to engage in a
discussion. Therefore, a judgment directing India to undertake negotiations would
be incapable of effective application. The subject matter of the alleged obligation
is such that it cannot be selectively invoked against India. The obligation to
94
I.C.J., Judgment, 27 June 1986, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs, Reports 1986,
95 168.
I.C.J., Judgment, 2 December 1963, Case concerning theNorthern Cameroons (Cameroon v.
96ited Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Reports 1963, p. 34.
Ibid., p. 33.
9Ibid., p. 38.
38negotiate cannot possibly be complied with by one single State individually.
Moreover, a judgment to that effect would be purposeless since, as explained
above, 98 India has already, firmly and constantly, indicated its willingness to
proceed to negotiations on comprehensive nuclear disarmament in the Conference
on Disarmament.
90. In the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court found that since France had
undertaken the obligation to conduct no further nuclear tests in the South Pacific
region through various public statements made by the French authorities,
Australia’s and New Zealand’s claim s no longer had any object. The Court
rejected the Claimants argument that a judgment affirming the obligation of
France might still be of value. The Court concluded that it “sees no reason to
allow the continuance of proceedings which it knows are bound to be fruitless.” 99
It went on to observe that “[o]nce the Court has found that a State has entered into
a commitment concerning its future conduct it is not the Court’s function to
100
contemplate that it will not comply with it.”
91. In the present case, the remedy sought by the RMI is a direction to
India to comply with its obligation to carry out negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament. That is the object and purpose of the claim. India is a strong
proponent of nuclear disarmament and is committed to the goal of a nuclear
weapon free world through global, verifiable and non- discriminatory nuclear
disarmament. Although India is not a party to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation
Treaty, it actively supports the commencement of negotiations on nuclear
disarmament, regardless of whether it is bound by any rule of international law to
98See paras. 6-14 above.
99I.C.J., Judgments, 20 December 1974, Nuclear Tests (Australia v.France) and Nuclear Tests
(New Zealand v. France), Reports 1974, p. 271, para. 58, and p. 457, para. 61.
10Ibid., p. 272, para. 60 and p. 458, para. 63.
39pursue such negot iations. India is a member of the Conference on Disarmament
and has consistently sponsored resolutions before the United Nations General
Assembly for a ‘Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons’
and for measures on “Reducing Nuclear Danger” under the belief that such steps
would encourage States possessing nuclear weapons to engage in negotiations
leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. India supported UNGA
resolution 69/58 which calls on the Conference on Disarmament to conduct
negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention. On 30 June
2015, India made a statement in the CD on behalf of the Group of 21 in support of
this resolution . India has also maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear
explosive testing sinc e 1998. It has adopted a policy of no- first-use and has
declared that it shall maintain a credible minimum deterrent and not engage in any
arms race. India strongly endorses negotiations between all States possessing
nuclear weapons to build trust and conf idence to promote nuclear disarmament.
However, the relief sought by the RMI would, in the absence of other States
serves absolutely no purpose. The Court should therefore not entertain the claim
submitted by the RMI.
92. The Court in its Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons has recognized that “any realistic search for general and
complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, necessitates the co -
101
operation of all States.” Thus, a judgment in the present case would not bring
about a resolution of the alleged dispute. Unless all the nuclear and potentially
nuclear States arrive at a consensus, nuclear non -proliferation and disarmament
would remain, to reiterate, a chimera.
101I.C.J., Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weap,ns
Reports 1996, p. 264, para. 100.
40 VI. SUMMARY
93. To summarize, the following can be concluded from the above :
(i) India and the RMI share similar views with respect to the subject -
matter of the present case – that is the necessity to pursue negotiations, with the
participation of all States possessing n uclear weapons, leading to nuclear
disarmament; therefore there is no dispute between the Parties;
(ii) The non-existence of a dispute between the Parties is confirmed by the
absolute absence of bilateral negotiations between them and the coincidence of
their views on the subject matter;
(iii) In reality the RMI blames India for not complying with Article VI of
the NPT on the nature and scope of which there is no agreement within the NPT
and with which purportedly there has been no compliance by the State s Parties to
that treaty for 45 years. The said obligation therefore cannot acquire customary
law character imposing an obligation on a non state party who has pers istently
objected to the treaty itself and the obligations contained thereunder;
(iv) In any case, the settlement of this alleged dispute would imply an
interpretation of Article VI NPT either directly or because of the RMI’s
understanding of the meaning of this provision on which it exclusively bases its
interpretation of the obligation to negoti ate; therefore, the dispute alleged by the
RMI would be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court by virtue of reservation
(7) of India’s optional Declaration of 1974;
(v) Reservation (4) in the same Declaration also excludes the present
alleged dispute from the C ourt’s jurisdiction since it obviously relate s to or is
connected “with facts or situations of hostilities, armed conflicts, individual or
collective actions taken in self -defence (...) measures or situations in which India
41is, has been or may i n future be involved.” This clearly includes situations in
which India’s nuclear doctrine of 2003 would be pertinent. The possession and the
alleged quantitative build-up and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons are,
indisputably, a matter pertaining to India’s military strategy. Disputes regarding
an alleged obligation to pursue negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament
squarely impinge upon India’s defence strategy and thus are exclude d from the
Court’s jurisdiction;
(vi) Reservation (5) is a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICJ for
two different reasons;
a.on the one hand, the RMI lodged its Application before the Court
less than twelve months after its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction; and,
b. on the other hand, both this precipi tation and the drafting of the
RMI’s Application and Memorial leave no doubt that the Applicant has accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ exclusively for the present alleged dispute;
(viii) Reservation (11) constitutes another ba r to the jurisdiction of the
Court ratione temporissince it excludes the disputes not only existing before the
adoption of India’s optional Declaration, but also, much more widely, those
having their origins before that date (in the present case 1974) – a condition
indisputably met in this case;
(ix) If the RMI’s alleged dispute with India had any substance, it could
only be settled if, at least, all the States possessing nuclear weapons were Parties
to the proceedings; this being not the case, the Court ca n only decline to exercise
jurisdiction; and
(x) Therefore it will be inevitable that any Judgment rendered in these
conditions would be devoid of any concrete effect; consequently, the Court would
42trespass the “inherent limitations on the exercise o f the judicial function, which
[…], as a court of justice [it] can never ignore”.2
SUBMISSION
In view of the above and all the arguments it would develop or
supplement during the Hearings, the Republic of India requests the Court to
adjudge and declare that it has no jurisdiction with respect to the present case.
Neeru Chadha
Agent of the Republic of India
16 September 2015
102I.C.J., Judgment, 2 December 1963, Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v.
United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Reports 1963, p. 29.
43 Certification
I certify that the Annexes are true copies of the documents referred.
Neeru Chadha
Agent of the Republic of India
44 LIST OF ANNEXES
Annex 1 India, Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament, originally issued in the
First Committee in 2006 under the symbol A/C.1/61/5 and submitted to
the CD as CD/1816 of 20 February, 2007.
Annex 2 “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons ”
(A/RES/69/69), Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 2
December, 2014.
Annex 3 Statement made by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in Lok Sabha
(Lower House of the Indian Parliament), 2 April, 1954.
Annex 4 A World Free of Nuclear Weapons: An Action Plan, tabled at the Third
Special Session on Disarmament of the UN General Assembly, 9 June
1988.
Annex 5 Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy , Paper presented in the Lok Sabha
by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, 27 May, 1998.
Annex 6 Statement by Salman Khurshid, External Affairs Minister of India, at the
High Level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament,
th
68 Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 26 September,
2013.
Annex 7 “Reducing Nuclear Danger” (A/RES/69/40), Resolution adopted by the
UN General Assembly on 2 December 2014.
Annex 8 “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice
on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapo(A/RES/69/43),
Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 2 December 2014.
Annex 9 Table comparing the voting record of India and the RMI on the ICJ
Resolution.
Annex 10 Statement on Nuclear Disarmament by Ambassador D . B. Venkatesh
Varma, Permanent Representative of India to the CD, 24 February 2015.
Annex 11 Statement by Ambassador D . B. Venkatesh Varma, Permanent
45 Representative of India to the CD, 7 July 2015.
Annex 12 Statement on “Follow-up to the 2013 High Level Meeting of the General
Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament” delivered by Ambassador D. B.
Venkatesh Varma, Permanent Representative of India to the CD , on
behalf of the Group of 21 at the CD Plenary meeting, 30 June 2015.
Annex 13 Statement by India’s negotiator V . C. Trivedi at the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 12 August 1965.
Annex 14 Statement by India’s negotiator V . C. Trivedi at the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 15 February 1966.
Annex 15 Statement by India’s negotiator V . C. Trivedi at the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 10 May 1966.
Annex 16 Statement by India’s negotiator V . C. Trivedi at the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 23 May 1967.
Annex 17 Statement by India’s negotiator V . C. Trivedi at the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 28 September 1967.
Annex 18 Statement by External Affairs Minister M.C. Chagla in the Indian
Parliament, 27 March 1967.
Annex 19 Statement by Ambassador Azim Husain at the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 27 February 1968.
Annex 20 Statement by Ambassador Azim Husain in the Political Committee of
the UN, 14 May 1968.
Annex 21 Statement by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Lok Sabha, 5 April 1968.
Annex 22 Statement by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee at the UN
General Assembly (relevant extracts), 29 September 1995.
Annex 23 Statement to Parliament on the NPT Review Conference by External
Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, 9 May 2000
Annex 24 The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Operationalization of
46India’s Nuclear Doctrine, Press Release, Press Information Bureau, New
Delhi, 4 January 2003.
***
47
Counter-Memorial of India