Written reply of the Marshall Islands to the question put by Judge Cançado Trindade at the public sitting held on the morning of 16 March 2016

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO
CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND TO NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT

(Marshall Islands v. India) (Jurisdiction)

. Reply of the Marsha11Islands
to the question put by Judge Cançado Trindade at the end of the public sitting of
16 March 2016 at 10 a.m.

*

Question:

In the course of the written submissions and oargumen thes~wo contending

Parties,the Marshall Islands anlndi both referred to U.N. General Assembly
resolutions on nuclear disarmamerit. Parallel to the resolutions on the matter
which go back to the early 70's(First Disarmament Decade),.there have been two
more recent seriesf General Assembly resolutions, .namely: those condemning
nuclear weapons, extending from1982 to date, and those adopted as a follow-up

tothe 1996I.C.J. Advisory Opinion on~ucle areapons, extending so far from
1997 to 2015. ln relation to this last series of General Assembly resolutions,­
referred to by the contending Parties, - I would like to ask both the Marshall
Islands and India whether, in their understanding, such General Assembly

resolutions are constitutiveailexpression oopinioiurisand, if so, what in
their view is tbeir relevance to the formation of a customary international law
obligation to pursue negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament, and what is
their incidencepon the.question of the existence of a dispute between the

·Parties?

Answer by the Marshall Islands:

A) Whether, inthe Marshall Islands' understanding, the General Assembly
resolutions referred to in the question are constitutive of an expreopinioof

iurisand what in its view is their relevance to the formation of a customary
international law obligation to pursue negotiations leadingclear
disannament.

1. In theMarshallIslands'view,thecustomaryinternationa"awobligationto

pursuenegotiationsleadingtonucleardisarmamentwasauthoritatively
recognizedforthefirsttimeintheCourt'sAdvisoryOpinionof 8July 1996,
whichestablishedthat"[t]hereexistsanobligationto pursueingoodfaithand

1-5 bringto a conclusionnegotiationsleadingto nucleardisannamentin ali ï' ts
1
aspectsunder strict and effectiveinternationalcontrol" .

2. Alreadyin theFirstDisarmamentDecadeof the 1970s,theU.N. General
Assemblybad calleduponStatesto negotiatefor completenuclear
disarmament and a haltto thenucleararmsrace? Since 1982,several

recurringUNGAresolutionshaveunderlinedthe imperativeofnegotiationson
nucleardis3rmament lllustratively,inthe 1982Nucleararmsfreeze
resolution the GeneralAssemblyrecognized"theurgentneedfor a
negotiatedreductionof nuclear-weaponstockpilesleadingtotheir complete
elimination".In a 1983 resolutionconcerningNuclearweaponsinailaspects4,

theGeneralAssembly,beyondstressing"the urgentneedfor thecessationof
the developmentand deploymentofnewtypesandsystemsofnuclear
weapons as a steponthe roadto nucleardisarmament",recognizedthat
"priorityin disarmamentnegotiationsshouldbegivento nuclearweapons".
Similarly,in a 1986resolutiononCessationofthe nuclear-armsraceand
nuclear disarmament,the GeneralAssemblyexpressedthe viewthat"ali
5
nationshavea vitaliiiterestin negotiationson nucleardisarmament" In a.
1994resolutiononBilateralnuclear-armsnegotiationsandnuclear
disar1J1amentt,he UNGAstressedthat"it is the responsibilityof allStatesto
adoptand implementmeasurestowardsthe attainmentofgeneraland
completedisannamentundereffectiveinternationalcontrol".

3. The GeneralAssemblyresolutionsonNucleardisarmamentadoptedafterthe
1996AdvisoryOpinionandthe resolutionsfollowingup onthe Advisory
Opinionareclearonthe obligationto pursuenegotiationsleadingto nuclear
disarmamentandon itscustomarystatus.In the latterresolutions,theUNGA

bas constant!y underlined"theunanimousconclusionofthe International
CourtofJusticethat tl;tereexistsanobligationto pursuein goodfaith and
bringto a conclusionnegotiationsleadingto nuclear disarmamentin allits
aspectsunder strictand effectiveinternationalcontrol",and called"upon all
Statesto fulfilimmediatelythat obligationby commencingmultilateral
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nègotiationsleadingto anearly conclusionofa nuclearweaponsconvention" .
Whiletherearea numberof Statesabstainingfrom orvoting againstthese
resolutions,the oppositionofthese Statesgenerallyis not directedagainstthe

1Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1996,
para.105,point 2F. ·
See A/RES/S-10/23 ,0 June 1978(withouta vote),adoptingthe Final Documentof the

TenthSpecialSession(FirstSpecialSessiononDisarmamento )ftheGeneralA.sseinb1y e,p.
para. 50 ("achievementof nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of
3greements").
AJRES/37/lOOB 13,December1982(119-17-5)N , ucleararmsfreeze.
4AJRES/38/1830 2,0December1983(108-19-16)N , uclearWeapons inAli Aspects.
5AIRES/411864 F,December1986(130-15-5)C , essationofnuclear-annsraceand nuçlear
disarmament .
6AJRES/49/75L 1,5December1.994 (withoutavote),Bilateralnuclear-aims negotiationand
nucleard.isarmament:
7See,e.g.AIRES/68/42 , December2013(133-24•25)F , ollow-uptotheadvisoryopinionof

theInternationalCourtof Justiceon the legalityof the threator use of nuclearweapons,
paras.1,2,p. 3/3(emphasissupplied).

2-5 recognitionof an obligationto pursueingoodfaithand concludenegotiations
onnucleardisarmament.Thisis demonstratedbythe separatevotein 2006
retainingoperativeparagraphonewelcomingthe Court'sconclusionregarding
thedisarmamentobligationby avoteof 168to threewithfiveabstentions .

4. ln a sirnilarvein,in theNucleardisarmamentresolutions,the UNGAbas
welcomed"the unanimousreaffinnationbyaliJudgesofthe Courtthat there
existsan obligationfor allStatestopursueingoodfaithandbringto a

conclusionnegotiationsleadingto nucleard9sarmament in ali its aspectsunder
strictand effectiveinternationalcontrol."

5. In theRMI's view,the attitudeof StatestowardsGeneralAssembly

resolutionsis an importantelementfordeterminingthe èx.istence ofa
customaryinternationalrule.As·theInternationalCourtofJusticeobservedin
Nicaraguav. UnitedStates,"opiniojurismay,thoughwithail duecautiqn,be
deducedfrom, interalia,the attitudeof thePartiesand theattitudeof States
towardscertainGeneralAssemblyresolutions" Inthe samevein,the Court,

in the 1996AdvisoryOpinion,notedthatUNGAresolutions"can,in certain
circumstances,provideevidenceimportantforestablishingthe existenceofa
ruleor the emergenceof anopiniojuris" 1.

6. Morerecently,andbythe sametoken,the InternationalLawCommission's
DraftConclusionsontheIdentificationof CustomaryInternationalLaw,
provisionallyadoptedonfirst readingbytheDraftingCommitteein 2015,
recognizethe importanceofthe attitudeof StatestowardsGeneralAssembly
12
resolutions. Draft Conclusion6 providesthat"forms ofStatepractice
include ... conductin connectionwithresolutionsadoptedby an international
organizati'onorat anintergovernmentalconference".DraftConclusion10
establishesthat"fonns of evidenceof acceptanceaslaw (opiniojuris) include

8AIRES/61/83,6 December2006,Follow-uptothe advisocyopinionof the International

Courtof Justiceonthe legalityof threator useofnuclearweapons,wasadoptedasawhole
byavoteof 118-27-26;operativeparagraphonewasretainedby a voteof 168 to 3 (Israel,
Russia,UnitedStates)with 5 abstentions(Belarus,France,Latvia,Kyrgyzstan,UK).See
OfficialR~ord Gesn,ralAssembly,67thplenarymeeting,6 December2006,A/61/PV.67,
f!!26-27.
See e.g. A/RES/68/47, 5 December 2013 (122-44-17), Nuclear·disarmament, p. 3/7
(emphasissupplied).
1Mtlitary andParamilitaryActivities in and againstNicaragua {Nicaraguav. UnitedStates

1{.America},Merits, Judgment,1.C.J.Reports1986,p.'100,para. 188. ·
Legalityof the Threat or Use o[Nuclear Weapons,Advisory Opinion,LC.J Reports 1996,
pp.254-255,para. 70.Note that ~e Courtalsoobservedthat..severalof the resolutionsunder
considerationin the present case have been adopted with substantialnumbers of negative
votes and abstentions; thus, although those resolutions are a clesign of deep concem
regardingthe problemof nuclearweapons,·they stilfall sliortof establishingtheexistenceof
anoftiniojuris on the illegalityof theuseof suchweapons."(para.71)
12
A/CN.4/L.869,Draft ConclusionsontheIdentification.of customaryinternationallaw,
provisionallyadoptedby theDra:ftingCommitteeon the 14July2015. In thewordsofthe
Special-Rapporteur:10ptnto jurlmaybe·deducedfromthe attitudesof Statesvis-à-vissuch
non-bindingtextsthat purport,explicitlyorimplicitly,to declarethe existing law,be
expressedbyboth voting(infavour,againstor abstaining)ontheresolution,by joininga
consensus,or bystatementsmadeinconnection.withtheresolution".A/CN.4/672,p. 65.

3-5 ... conduct in connection with resolutions adopted by an international
organization or at inter~over conferennet.Slch a view also finds
resonance among scholars3.

7. In the RW's view, the attitude taken by States towards the resolutions adopted
by the General Assembly from 1982to 1995 is to be regarded as an indication
ofan emerging opiniojurisas to the customary law obligation to conduct
negotiations in good faith leading to general and complete nuclear

disarmament. With regard to the attitudetates towards the resolutions
adopted afte1996,particularly those which clearly affinn the existence of a
general obligation to pursue in good faith negotiations leading to nuclear
disannament, this attitude constitutes an expressioniojuriswhich

supports and confirms the Court's recognition in its 1996 Advisory.Opinion
that this obligation is imposed by a rule having a customary status.

B) What is theiri11cidenupo11tl1equestionof the existenceof a dispute
betweentheParties?

8. In the Marshall Islands' view, the opposing attitudes of States towards General ·
Assembly resolutions may contribute to demonstrating the existence of a
dispute. Such attitudes may reveal opposing views as to the existence of an
obligation, as to the interpretation of its scope and/or as to the way in which

this obligation is toimplemented. However, the importance to be attached
to aState's attitude towarGener Assembly resolutions must be assessed in
the light of the specifie circumstances of each case. In certain ~stuations,
attitude simply confirms the overall position ofthat State in relation to the

question which constitutes the subject matter of the dispute. In other
situations, the attitude towards certain resolutions does not of itself say much
about the existence of a dispute, for instance becaqse the State's support for
resolutions recognizing theistence of a certain obligation is contradicted by

the subsequent conduct of the State, which does not confonn to the obligation
in question.

9. Asto the incidence of the abovementioned resolutions upon the question of

the existence of a dispute between the Marshall Islands anditisia,
submitted that the attitudes of the Parties towards such resolutions do not of
themselves demonstrate opposing views. The main issue on which the Parties
have divergent views is whether India is in breach of the customary legal

obligation to pursue good faith nuclear disarmament - not as evidenced by
India'sNGA voting record, but as evidenced by its other conduct. At the
same tirne, it is noteworthy that while India has generally voted in favour of

the post-1996 General Assembly resolutions on nuclear disarmament, it lias

1Cf.AntônioAugustoCançadoTrindade,InternationalLawfor Humankind:towardsa new
JusGentium,Vol.316(2005),RecueildesCours,p.l68, accordingto whoin"[t]heelement

of opinio}urismaybemorepredominantinresolutionsofthe declaratorykinanycase,
resolutionsofinternationalorganizations,andinparthoseoftheUN General
Assembly,bavebeenacceptedas 'sources'ofInternationalLawnotonlybytheICJby also
· byotherinternational(arbitral)tribunals.Theyo:ftengiveexpressiontovaluesand aspirations
of thinte~at iom maunizyasawhole".

4-5 not squarely accepted the obligation as set forth by the International Court of
Justice as one of customary international law. On this issue too, therefore,

there isa dispute between the Parties.

23 March 2016

Ph n van den Biesen
C Agent of the Republic of the Marshall Islands
before theInternational Court of Justice

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