Documents submitted by United States of America after the Closure of the Written Proceedings: Expert Report and Diplomatic Note from the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Washington D.C. to the United States

THE LEGAL ADVISER
DEPAATMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

November 20, 2002

Sir,

At the November 6 meeting of the agents of the Islamic

Republic of Iran and the United States of America regarding
t~e Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran
v.! United States of America), I indicated the intention of
t~e United States to file one or two additional documents

in support of its written pleadings in this case.
Accordingly, in accordance with Article 56 of the Rules of
Court, I have the honor to submit in support of the written
pleadings of the United States in this case the following

two documents:

• Report of Deborah Martin, November 18, 2002 {Exhibit

262)
• Diplomatie Note from the Royal Norwegian Embassy,
Washington, D.C., to the United States Department

of State, November 20, 2002 (Exhibit 263)

One original and one hundred and twenty-five copies of each
document are being delivered to the Registry. I certify

that the copies of these documents are true copies.

With respect to the Report of Ms. Martin, the United
States had intended to address the subject of this report

during the oral proceedings without having filed _a written
report in advance. We are new of the view, including after
consideration of the letter of the Agent of Iran to yeu
dated September 18, 2001, that the Court's authorization of

the production of this document at this time will assist
the Court and the parties by facilitating the most
efficient presentation by the United States during the oral
proceedings and should lend greater focus to the

Mr. Philippe Couvreur,
Registrar,
International Court of Justice,­

The Hague. f.
'

AGENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

The Hague

IN THE NAME OF GOD

20 January 2003
No. 34666 30 Dey 1381

Re: Cil Platforma (Ialamic Republic of Iran v.

United States of America

Sir,

r have the honour to refer to your letter dated 22 November
2002 by which you transrnitteu to me a copy of a letter dated 20
November 2002 from the Agent of the United States, together with
copies of two new documents which the United State~ desired ta
produce under Article 56 of the Rules of Court, and requested my
Government's views.

Despite the unreasonable delay by the United States in
submitting the new documents in question, which could have been
produced at an earlier stage of the proceedings, the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran does not abject to the late
production of these documents.

Pursuant to Article 56, paragraph 3, of the Rul~s of Court,
the Government of .the !slamic Republic of Iran is hereby
submitting comments prepared by Mohammad Youssefi on Exhibit 262
filed by the United States. The Government of the Islamic

Republic of Iran respectfully requests that these 'Comments })e
made part of the record in the case.

Fifty copies of the comments are being filed with the
Registry. The original will follow shortly. I certify that the
copies of the comments are accurate copies.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran reserves the
right, as necessary, to make addi ti anal comments · on the new
documents submitted by the United States during the oral
proceedings.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest cons.ideration.

M.H. Zahedin-Labbaf
Agent of the Islamic
Republic of Iran.before
the International Court
of Justice

H.E. Mr. Philippe Couvreur
Registrar,
International Court of Justice
Peace. Palace,
The Hague EXHIBIT 262

Report of Deborah Martin, November 18,2002 REPORTOFDEBORAHMARTIN

Introduction

l. My name is Deborah Martin. I am employed as an Imagery Analyst.by the

National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), an agency of the United States

Government. I have been employed as an Imagery Analyst for NIMA, and for its

predecessor agency, the National Photographie and Interpretation Center, since 1985. In

connection with this position, I have received extensive training from the U.S.

Government in accepted principles and practices of imagery analysis. This has included

training in identifying from overhead imagery worldwide military orders ofbattle (land,

sea, and air arrnarnents). My present duties and responsibilities include analyzing

overhead imagery taken from satellites and aerial reconnaissance aircraft for the purpose

ofproviding defense-related information used in the planning and conduct ofmilitary

operations by the U.S. Government.

2. In<l:dditionto being knowledgeable about imagery, 1 am also know1edgeable

about a variety ofweapons and weapons systems manufactured in the United States and

in other nations. 1am familiar with the various missiles in the lranian and Iraqi

inventories in the 1984-1988 timeframe. At that time, bath Iran and Iraq possessed and .

deployed the HY-2 anti-ship croise missile. 1am familiar with the HY-2 croise missile .

system, including the HY-2 missile transporter, missile launcher, missile storage crates,

artdhow the launch site is prepared and configured. In the past, my involvement with theHY-2 emise missile system bas also included the analysis and deployrnent ofthis system

in several countries.

3. I have been asked to review the images provided by the United States to the

International Court of Justice in exhibits 94 and 208 and to describe what they show. In

connection with my duties at NIMA, I was responsible for analyzing this sarne imagery at

the tirne it was collected, and can thus confinn that the images in exhibits 94 and 208

were taken on the dates indicated. The following report contains my analysis ofthese

images.

Background Information

4. The following information pertains to Graphies 1-5 in Exhibit 94 and Images 3-13

in Exhibit 208 to the pleadings of the United States in the Oil Platfonns Case before the

International Court of Justice. Each of these images was taken by an overhead satellite or

an aerial reconnaissance aircraft and rendered onto photographie film and paper prints for

use in this Court. For the overhead satellite images, the film images were scanned into a

computer using a digital scanner in order to produce these prints referred to as imagery

defived products (IDPs).

'
5. 1 IDPs may be printed at various degrees of resolution. Resolution levels are

analogous to different settings on a zoom lens for a camera; as levels of resolution

increase, it becomes possible to identify smaller features within the image.

26. The IDPs in Exhibits 94 and 208 were produced at the level of resolution

approximately equivalent to the best commercial imagery that was then available. In

light of recent advances in commercially available imaging technology, the IDPs in

Graphies 1-5 ofExhibit 94 and Images 5-7 ofExhibit 208 have been re-printed at

increased resolution, which renders the abjects shown more visible. For convenience, I

have attached to my affidavit a complete set of the images and IDPs that were included in

Exhibits 94 and 208, substituting the aforementioned re-printed IDPs for those submitted

in Exhibits 94 and 208. I have labeled these as Attachments A-U. My analysis relates

to the images and IDPs attached to this affidavit.

7. The attached IDPs show HY-2 missile launching sites, HY-2 missiles, and

associated equipment on territory controlled by Iran in 1987 in the area of Al Faw

Peninsula. A number of factors support this conclusion. Having photographs and line

drawings of the HY-2 croise missile and associated equipment depicting their distinctive

visual characteristics made it possible to identify the abjects shown in the IDPs as

components of and equipment associated with the HY-2 croise missile system. After

determining that the abjects shown in the IDPs belonged to the HY-2 emise missile

system, several factors led to the conclusion that the HY-2 cruise missile sites shown in

the IDPs were under the control oflran: (1) knowing that in early 1986 Iran captured

from Iraq the part of Al Faw area shawn in the IDPs; (2) knowing that Iran had the HY-2

croise missile system in its inventory; and (3) knowing the configuration of the standard

3-------

HY-2 cruise missile launch site, as well as the configuration of the temporary HY-2

emise missile launch sites that were employed by Iran.

Analysis of Attachments A. B. and C

8. Attachment A (Exhibit 94, Al Faw Area), Attachment B (Exhibit 94, Al Faw Area

Map Inset 1), and Attachment C (Exhibit 94, Map Inset 2) show the area generally known

as Al Faw, and provide the overall geographical context for the IDPs that follow. As

indicated on these images, the succeeding IDPs focus on smaller areas described in the

inset boxes.

Analysis of Attachment D

9. The IDP in Attachment D (Exhibit 94, Graphie 1)was taken from a U.S. satellite on

16 October 1987, the same day as the attack on Sea Isle City and one day after the attack

on Sungari. The geographical coordinates of the area showri in Attachment D are

295900N/0483410E. The IDP in Attachment D shows equipment used in launching

HY-2 emise missiles: a transporter with a canvas-covering of the kind typically used to

protect a missile; a transporter without a missile; two trucks towing two HY-2 missile

launchers; and ether support trucks. These HY-2 weapon system components are

distinctive and readily identifiable by their configuration, dimensions, and positioning for

deployinent. The attached IDPs show these unique characteristics.

10. Included in Exhibit 94 is a manufacturer's photograph of a HY-2 cruise missile

transporter loading a missile onto a launcher and in a manufacturer's line drawing of a

4HY:-2emise missile transporter with missile. The unique shape and configuration of the

transporter shown in the manufacturer's photograph and line drawing is visible in the

IDP. Particularly noteworthy are the four unique rib frameworks that support the

protective canvas covering, which are depicted in the manufacturer's line dra'Yingand

are visible in theWhen the transporter arrives at the launch site, the protective

canvas covering is removed for transfer of the missile to the launcher. The dimensions of

the transporter provided in the manufacturer's line drawing, including the fifteen meter

length, confonn closely to the dimensions of the abject detennined by analyzing the IDP

and associated information, thus confirming that what is shown in the IDP is in fact an

HY-2 emise missile transporter.

11. The HY-2 emise missile launcher is shawn in the manufacturer's photographs of a

HY-2 emise missile transporter loading a missile onto a launcher and of a HY-2 emise

missile launcher, and in a manufacturer's line drawing of an HY-2 emise missile

launcher (canvas removed), included in Exhibit 94.e shape and configuration

of the launcher shawn in the manufacturer's photographs and line drawings is visible in

the ·IDP. Particularly noteworthy is the flat surface of the missile rails and the side

extensionsfthe stabilizingjack housing that are shawn in the manufacturer's

ph6tographs and line drawings and are also visible in theensions of

thllauncher provided in the manufacturer's line drawing, with a length of 6.9 meters,

cohfonn closely to the dimensions of the abject determined by analyzing the IDP and

as~o cformtin,eths confirming that what is shawn in the IDP is in fact an HY-2

emise missile launcher.

512.. Additionally, the specifie positioning of the transporter with missile, transporter,

and trucks towing launchers in Attàchment D supports the conclusion that this is a HY-2

emise missile staging area. In the case ofthe trucks towing missile launchers_,two

distinctobjects-the truck and the missile launcher being towed-------cab ne seen hitched to

each other. Their alignment suggests they are ready for rapid deployment. Two missile

transporters are also nearby, in a position to support the transfer of missiles to these

launchers at the launch site. The proximity of the trucks towing launchers to missile

transporters is consistent with such launch preparations. The HY-2 emise missiles are

transported separately from the launchers on the protective missile transporters, which

can traverse rough terrain. During launch preparations when both launcher and

transporter arrive at the launch site, the launcher is stabilized at the launch position and

the missile transporter is backed up to the launcher. The transporter transfers the missile

from its cradle rails to the launcher' s rails.

Analysis of Attachment E

13. The IDP in Attachment E (Exhibit 94, Graphie 2) was also taken from a U.S.

satellite on 16 October 1987, the same day as the attack on Sea Isle City and one day after

the attack on Sungari. The area shown in Attachment E is less than one kilometer south

ofthe area shown in Attachment D. The IDP in Attachment E shows four HY-2 emise

missile crates. These crates are identifiable from their unique shape, configuration, and

dimensions.

6----------

~·,'

14. As shown in the U.S. Navy photograph and depicted in the manufacturer's tine

drawing ofthe HY-2 emise missile crate (included in Exhibit 94), these crates are

rectangular in shape with a pointy pitched roof, and have a distinctive protrusion at one

end for the missile nosecone. These characteristics are visible in the IDP: light can be

seen reflecting off of the protrusion of the crate for the nosecone of the missile and the

pointy pitched roof of the crate casts a triangular shadow on the ground. The dimensions

ofthe crates provided in the manufacturer's line drawing --in particular the length of7.6

meters -- conform closely to the dimensions of the object determined by analyzing the

IDP and associated information, thus confirming that what is shown in the IDP are in fact

HY..2 cruise missile crates.

15. The IDPs in Attachment F (Exhibit 94, Graphie 3), Attachment G (Exhibit 94,

Graphie 4), and Attachment H (Exhibit 94, Graphie 5) were taken from a U.S. satellite on

9 September 1987,just one month before the attacks on Sungari and Sea Isle City. The

geographical coordinates of the area shown in Attachments F-H are the same as shown in

Attachments D and E, with Attachment F approximately one kilometer northeast of

Attachment b.

Analysis of Attachment F

16. The IDP in Attachment F shows a HY-2 emise missile launcher. The

analysis that supports this conclusion is the same as the analysis used for the IDP in

Attachment D. The HY-2 cruise missile launcher is shown in manufacturer's

photographs of a HY-2 cruise missile transporter loading a missile onto a launcher, and

7 ~..·

of il HY-2 croise missile laWicher,and in a manufacturer's line drawing of an HY-2

emise missile laWicher(canvas removed), included in Exhibit 94. The Wiiqueshape and

configuration of the launcher shown in the manufacturer's photographs and line

drawings is shown in the IDP. Again, important distinctive characteristics inc_ludethe

flat surfaceof the missile rails and the side extensions of the stabilizingjackhousing that ..

are shown in the'rnanufacturer's photographs and line drawings and are also visible in the

IDP. The dimensions ofthe launcherprovided in the manufacturer's tine drawing, in

particular the length of 6.9 meters, conform closely to the dimensions of the object

determined by analyzing the IDP and associated information, thus confirming that what is

shown in the IDP is in fact a HY-2 emise missile launcher.

Analysis of Attachment G

17. The IDP in Attachment G shows two HY-2 emise missile launchers and two HY-2

emise missile transporters. Again, the analysis that supports this identification is the

same as the analysis used for the IDP in Attachment D. The transporter is shown in a

manufacturer's photograph of a HY-2 emise missile transporter loading a missile onto a

launcher and in a manufacturer's line drawing of an HY-2 emise missile transporter with

missile, included in Exhibit 94. The unique shape and configuration of the transporter

shown in the manufacturer's photograph and tine drawing is shown in the IDP. The four

unique rib frameworks that support the protective canvas covering, which are depicted in

the manufacturer's line drawing, are also discernable in the IDP. The dimensions of the

transporter provided in the manufacturer's line drawing, in particular the length of 15

meters, conform closely to the dimensions of the object determined by analyzing the IDP

8 '.·

and assoeiated information, thus eonfinning that what is shown in the IDP is in faet a

HY-2 emise missile transporter.

18. The HY-2 emise missile launcher is shown in manufacturer's photographs of a

HY-2 emise missile transporter loading a missile onto a launeher and of a HY-2 croise

missile launeher, and in a manufacturer's line drawing of an HY-2 emise missile launcher

(eanvas removed), included in Exhibit 94. The unique shape and configuration of the.

launcher shown in the manufacturer's photographs and line drawings is shown in the

IDP. The flat surface of the missile rails and the side extensions of the stabilizingjack

housing that are shown in the manufacturer's photographs and line drawings are also

visible in the IDP. The dimensions of the launcher provided in the manufacturer's line

drawing, in particular the length of 6.9 meters, confonn closely to the dimensions of the

object determined by analyzing the IDP and associated information, thus confirming that

what is shown in the IDP is in fact an HY-2 emise missile launcher.

19. The IDP in Attachment H shows two HY-2 emise missile crates. As with the

crates shown in Attachment D, the crates in Attachment H are identifiable because of

their unique shape, configuration, and dimensions. As shown in the U.S. Navy

photograph and depicted in the manufacturer's line drawing ofthe HY-2 emise missile

crate (included in Exhibit 94), these crates are rectangular in shape with a pointy pitched

roof, and have a distinctive protrusion at one end for the missile nosecone. These

features are discernable in the IDP. The dimensions of the crates provided in the

manufacturer' s line drawing, in particular the length of 7.6 meters, conform closely to the

9dimensions of the object detennined by analyzing the IDP and associated information,

thus confirming that what is shown in the IDP are in fact HY-2 cruise missile crates.

Analysis of Attachments 1,J and K

20. Attachment 1 (Exhibit 208, Image 1) and Attachment J (Exhibit 208,·Image 2)

show the area generally known as Al Faw, and provide the overall geographical context

for the IDPs that follow. As indicated on these images, the succeeding IDPs focus on

smaller areas described in the inset boxes.

21. The IDPs in Attachment K (Exhibit 208, Image 3) and Attachment L (Exhibit 208,

Image 4) were taken from a U.S. satellite on 5 September 1987, one month prior to the

attacks on Sungari and Sea Isle City. Attachment M (Exhibit 208, Image 5) was taken on

16 October 1987, the day of the attack on Sea Isle City and one day after the attack on

Sungari. Ail three images show HY-2 Site 3. The geographical coordinates for HY-2

Site 3 are 295550N/0482640E. As indicated on Attachment K, the boxed annotations

labeled Graphie 2 and Graphie 3 indicate the areas shown in Attachment L and

Attachment M.

Analysis of Attachment L

22. Attachment L shows standard permanent HY-2 emise missile launch positions as

weil as one truck on an access road. The launch positions are characterized by their

concrete surfaces and distinct "keyhole" shape. The circular part of the keyhole is the

missile launcher position, and the straight section of the keyhole, which is the adjoining

10 .......

apron, is used for the missile transporter to align and back up to the launcher. This apron

also serves as a general directional reference point for use in aiming the missile, though

missiles may be fired in various directions .fromsuch sites. The standard concrete HY-2

cruise missile keyhole launch pad bas been used at permanently fixed HY-2 la,_unch sites

by.Iraq, Iran, and other countries to facilitate rapid and efficient missile firings.

Temporary HY-2 emise missile launch sites, for example the Nahr-e Owyeh site used by

Iran (addressed subsequently), do not use the concrete pads, but have been prepared and

pre-surveyed for similar rapid and efficient missile firings.

23; The presence of the truck on the access road shown in Attachment L indicates that

the road was capable of supporting vehicle traffic and permitting access to the launch site

as of5 September1987, the date on which the image was taken.

Analysis of Attachment M

24. The IDP in Attachment M shows two standard HY-2 emise missile launch sites,

identifiable by their distinctive keyhole shapes. The IDP also shows an access road

leàding to the launch sites with support trucks traveling on the road. The support trucks

are identifiable by their distinctive cabs and cargo beds. Again, the presence of support

trucks on the access road indicates that the road was in operation on 16 October 1987 and

capable ofsupporting large vehicle traffic. The smooth surface ofthe concrete keyhole

launch positions and dirt access roads indicate that HY-2 Site 3 was then capable of

emise missile operations.

11Arialysis of Attachments N and 0

25. The IDPs in Attachment N (Exhibit 208, Image 6) and Attachment 0 (Exhibit

208, Image 7 show the site known asthe Nahr-e Owyeh launch site. The IDP in

Attachment N was taken from a U.S. satellite on 16 October 1987, the day ofthe attack

on Sea Isle City and one day after the attack on Sungari. The geographical coordinates of

the overview area shown in Attachment N are 295613N/0483738E. The IDP in

Attachment 0 is an enlargement or magnification of the Nahr-e Owyeh launch site, also

taken on 16 October 1987. The geographîcal coordinates of the area depicted in

'
Attachment 0 are the same as Attachment N. The IDP in Attachment 0 shows two HY-2

launch positions and support tents. The support tents are set up in pairs and are

recognizable by their canvas covering and pitched roofs. These tents are in a position to

support launching HY-2 emise missiles, for example, by housing the necessary

electronics equipment.

Analysis of Attachment P

26. The IDP in Attachment P (Exhibit 208, Image 8) also shows the Nahr-e Owyeh

launch site, but it was taken by a U.S. satellite on 14 December 1987, approximately two

months after the attacks on Sungari and Sea Isle City. The geographical coordinates of

the area shown in Attachment Pare the same as in Attachments N and O. Like the .IDPin

Attachment 0, the IDP in Attachment P shows the two HY-2launch positions ofthe

Nahr-e Owyeh launch site along with support tents. Attachment P also shows a HY -2

missile on amissile launcher ready to be fired from Launch Position 1. The missile and

launcher are identifiabley their dimensions and size, and placement at the center of the

12launch position. The pointed nose of the missile is aimed toward the water, the missile's

wings shghtly flare out at the reare missile, and the high vertical stabilizer or tail of

the missile can be seen in the shadow of the missile on the ground.

27. The Nahr Oweyeh launch site is recognizable as one oflran's temporary HY-2

croise missile launch sites. These unique temporary launch sites do not contain the

standard HY-2 croise missile permanent concrete keyhole pads. The positions are round

in shape with a treated surface (as seen in the darker area around the circular launch site

in AttachmentP over graded earth), and have adjoining straight road approaches or

aprons to align the missile transporter and launcher. Also noteworthy are the perimeter

earthen berms used to protect the launch site from adjacent marsh. In addition to the

2 croise missile transporter and launcher, support tents are also present on Iran's

teinporary HY-2 cruise missile launch sites, as can be seen in Attachments 0 and P.

28. The run-up apron (approach road to the circular pad) at Launch Positions 1 and 2

serves as a general directional reference for use in aiming missiles from these sites. Given

the locationf the Nahr-e Owyeh launch sites it is possible to identify the directions

indicated by their respective run-up aprons. The run-up apron ofLaunch Position 1

points in the direction ofBubiyan Island between the sea approaches to northem Kuwait

and Umm Qasr in Iraq. The missile on the launcher visible on the circular launch pad at

Launch Position 1 in Attachment Pis, in fact, pointed in the direction ofBubiyan Island.

The run-up apronofLaunch Position 2 points in the direction of the al-Ahmadi Sea

13 Island terminal. These paths are depicted in U.S. Exhibit 210, a copy ofwhich is attached

to this report.

Analysis of Attachments O. R. S. T, and U

29. The IDPs in Attachrnent Q (Exhibit 208, hnage 9), Attachrnent R (EX:hibit208,

Image 10), Attachrnent S (Exhibit 208, hnage ll ), Attachment T (Exhibit 208, hnage

12), and Attachment U (Exhibit 208, Image 13) refute Iran's contention that Iraq had

control of a missile site in Al Faw area at geographical coordinates 300012N-48170SE at

the time ofthe attacks on Sungari and Sea IsleCity. The IDPs in Attachments Q-T

demonstrate that no missile site existed at the time of the attacks on Sungari and Sea Isle

City anywhere in the vicinity ofthe location specified by Iran. However, the IDP in

Attachrnent U demonstrates that a missile site was later built near the position specified

by Iran at geographical coordinates 295806N-0481955E.

30. The IDP in Attachment Q was taken from a U.S. satellite on 13 November 1987,

approximately one month after the attacks on Sungari and Sea Isle City. The location of

the area shown in Attachment Q is near Al Faw Salt Factory. The IDP in Attachrnent Q

shows two existing former Iraqi HY-2 launch sites, HY-2 Site 1 and HY-2 Site 2. The

.Libe of Contact, depicting the military-built earthen herm separating the Iraqi forces from

thl Iranian-controlled Al Faw peninsula, is also evident. However, at the location of the
1

1rlqi HY-2 site alleged to exist by Iran there is no indication of a missile site.
1

1431. Similar to the IDP in Attachment Q, the IDP in Attachment R shows HY-2 Site 1,

but in greater detail. The IDP in Attachment Ris a magnification of Attachment Q. The

geographical coordinates of the area shown in Attachment Rare near

295800N/0482100E. Again, in the location of the site alleged to exist by Iran, there is no

indication of a missile site:

32. The IDP in Attachment S was also taken from a V.S. satellite on 13 November

1987. The geographical coordinates ofthe area shown in Attachment Sare

295813N/0482149E. The IDP in Attachment S shows HY-2 Site 2 with four HY-2

launch positions, and is provided to confirm the location of this site and its location in

relation to the other sites.

33. The IDP in Attachment T is another magnification from Attachment Q. The

geqgraphical coordinates of the area shawn in Attachment Tare near

300012N/0481705E. The IDP in Attachment T is well-focused on the location ofthe site

alleged to exist by Iran. Once again, there is no indication of the existence of a missile

launch site in this Iraqi-controlled area behind the Line of Contact benn, even one month

after the attacksin October 1987.

34. Attachment V was taken from a V .S. U-2 aircraft on 15 October 1994 and reveals

the presence of a HY-2 emise missile launch site built earlier. Other information

indicates that this site was built in April 1989. This site built in 1989 is within the

geographical coordinates shown in Attachment U and in Attachment T, and this site is

15reasonably close to the geographical coordinates specified by Iran. This image shows in

sorne detail the site built in 1989 and, for comparison, the HY-2 Site 1 that existed in

1987. The 1989 HY-2 site, established after the Iraqis regained control of Al Faw, was

probably built at a greater and safer distance from the range oflranian artillery. The

United Nations Iraq and Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was later established

at the 1989 HY-2 site to monitor the ten mile (approximate) exclusion zone near the

border area between Iraq and Kuwait after the Desert Storm War with Iraq in 1991.

Conclusion

35. In conclusion, the foregoing analysis of the IDPs submitted by the United States

demonstrates conclusively that: (1) Iran controlled the territory in Al Faw area that

cohtained operational HY-2 cruise missile launch sites capable of launching the missiles

that bitSungari on 15 October 1987 and Sea Isle City on 16 October 1987, complete with

missile transporters, launchers, tow trucks, missile crates, and missiles; and (2) no missile

site existed at the timeof the attacks on Sungari and Sea Isle City anywhere in the

vicinity of the Iraqi-held location specified by Iran.

36. 1declare under penalty ofpetjury under the laws of the United States of America

that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated:

Deborah Martin

16 LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

Attachment A- Exhibit 94, Al Faw Area

Attaehment B- Exhibit 94, Al Faw Area, Map Inset 1

Attaehment C- Exhibit 94, Map Inset 2

Attachment D - Exhibit 94, Graphie 1

Attachment E- Exhibit 94, Graphie 2

Attaehment F- Exhibit 94, Graphie 3

Attaehm Ge~tExhibit 94, Graphie 4

Attaehment H- Exhibit 94, Graphie 5

Attaehment I - Exhibit 208, Image 1

Attaehment J- Exhibit 208, Image 2

Attaehment K- Exhibit 208, Image 3

Attaehment L- Exhibit 208, Image 4

Attaehment M- Exhibit 208, Image 5

Attaehment N- Exhibit 208, Image 6

Attaehment 0 - Exhibit 208, Image 7

Attaehment P - Exhibit 208, Image 8

Attaehment Q- Exhibit 208, Image 9

Attachment R - Exhibit 208, Image 10

Attachment S - Exhibit 208, Image Il

Attaehment T- Exhibit 208, Image 12

Attaehment U - Exhibit 208, Image 13

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J:ATTACHMENT F- EXIllBIT 94,,GRAPHIC 3

U.S. Satellite hnagery Product
HY-2 Croise Missile Vehicles
Al.Faw Area, Iran
9 September 1987 HY-2Cruise Missile Vehicles
Al Faw Area, Iran
9 September 1987

Graphie 3ATTACHMENT G - EXHIBIT 94, GRAPHIC 4

U.S. Satellite lmagery Product
HY-2 CruiseMissile Vehicles
Al Faw Area,Iran

9 September 1987-u
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U.S. Satellite hnagery Product

HY~2 Croise Missile Vehicles
Al Faw Area, Iran
9 September 1987 HY-2Cruise Missile Crates

Al Faw Area, Iran
9 September 1987
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Graphie 5ATTACHMENT 1- EXHffiiT 208, IMAGE 1

AlFawAreaATTACHMENT J- EXHIBIT 208, IMAGE 2

Al Faw Areaw
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-EATTACHMENT K-EXHIBIT 208,IMAGE 3

HY-2 Site 3
Al Faw Area, Iraq
5 September 1987

HY-2 Missile Launching Site 3ATTACHMENT L- EXHIBIT 208, IMAGE 4

HY-2 Site 3

Al Faw Area, Iraq
5 September 1987

HY-2 Missile Launching Site 3ATTACHMENT M- EXHIBIT 208, IMAGE 5

HY-2 Site 3
Al Faw Area, Iraq
16 October 1987

HY-2 Missile Launching Site 3 tT
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Nahr-e Owyeh Launch Site
Al Faw Area, Iran
16 October 1987

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ü5.ATTACHMENT 0- EXHIBIT 208, IMAGE 7

Nahr-e Owyeh Launch Site
Al Faw Area, Iran
16 October 1987

HY-2 Missile Launching Site at Nahr-e OwyehATTACHMENT P- EXHIBIT 208, IMAGE 8

Nahr-e Owyeh Launch Site
Al Faw Area, Iran
14 December 1987

HY-2 Missile Launching Site at Nahr-e OwyehATTACHMENT Q- EXHIBIT 208, IMAGE 9

HY-2 Sites
Al Faw Area
l3 November 1987ATTACHMENT R- EXHIBIT 208, IMAGE 10

HY-2 Site 1
Al Faw Area, Iraq
13 November 1987

HY-2 Missile Launching Site 1ATTACHMENT S - EXHIBIT 208, IMAGE 11

HY-2 Site 2
Al FawAre~ Iraq
13November 1987

HY-2 Missile Launching Site 2 HY-2Site 2
AlFawArea,Iraq
13November1987

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Iranian Asserted Location of Site 4

Al Faw Area, Iraq
B November 1987

Location of lranian Asserted HY-2 Missile Launching Site 4 Iranian AssertedLocationof Site4
AlFawArea,Iraq
13November 1987

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IMAGE 12 ATTACHMENT U-EXHIBIT 208,IMAGE 13

HY-2 Sites
Al Faw Area, Iraq
15 October 1994

Missile Launching Site Built in 1989 in VicinityLocation of Iranian Asserted HY-2
Missile Launching Site 4 HY-2Sites
Al FawArea,Iraq
15 October 1994

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IMAGE 13 MDS0301013REFERENCE MAP FROM U.S.·EXHIBIT 210 REFERENCEMAPFROMMR.YOUSSEF!,ANNEXB DIAGRAM

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EXHIBIT 263

Diplomatie Note from the Royal Norwegian Embassy, Washington, D.C., to the United
States Department of State, November 20, 2002~· .' ...

ROYAL NORWEGIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Jt.la 5 tf1" 2..

ThèRoyal Norwegian Embassy presents its compliments to the United

States Departrnent of State and has the honour to refer to a communication of
23 September 2002 from the Legal Adviser of the Departrnent of State, by
which it indicated that, in connection with proceedings before the International
Court of Justice in the Oil Platforms Case (Iran v. United States), questions had
arisen relating to excerpts from a Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs cable

submitted as evidence by the United States. The cable in question, dated 12
February 1988, is from the Norwegian ambassador in Tehran to the Ministry
and concerns a Norwegian protest for attacks carried outon 3 February that
year against Norwegian-registered vessels navigating in international waters in

the Gulf. The communication from the Department of State requested any
comments the Ministry might be able to provide regarding this cable. The
Embassy has been instructed to convey the following information:
Based on archivai research and interviews with the personnel involved

at that time, the Ministry hereby con.firms that the cable in question is, in fact,
an authentic Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs document, and that it was sent
by the Nmwegian Ambassador in Tehran to the Ministry on 12 February 1988.
Based on this fact-finding the Ministry would, for the sake of good order, like

to add that it is not in possession of any information which gives reason to
doubt the accuracy of the reporting contained in that cable. On the contrary, the
Norwegian authorities relied on it in their analysis of the serions situation
facing international shipping in that area at the time, and which to a

considerable extent adversely affected Norwegian interests and endangered
Norwegian seamen's lives.
The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs would like to inform the United
States Department of State that the above information and this letter in no way
imply any taking of position, nor any expression of views with regard to the

dispute between the two parties in the case pending before the International
Court of Justice. The Ministry does not intend, nor is it in a position, to provide
any further information or observations in this matter.
The above information wîll also be conveyed to the Islamic Republic of

Iran through its Embassy in Oslo.
The Royal Norwegian_Ernbassy avails itself ofthis opportunity to
renew to the United States Department of State the assurances of its highest
consideration~ _

20 November 2002

United States Department of State
Washington D.C.