INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION
ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT
OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(CROATIA v. YUGOSLAVIA)
MEMORIAL
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
VOLUME 1
1 MARCH 2001 CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1
History of the Case 1
Relationship between Application and Memorial 2
Reasons for the Institution of Proceedings against the FRY 3
Relevance for Croatia 4
Regional and Global Relevance 6
The Role of the International Court of Justice 7
Croatia’s Approach to the Presentation of the Case:
Methodological Issues 8
Structure of the Memorial 10
Part One: Factual Elements 10
Part Two: Legal Elements 12
Submissions 14
PART ONE: FACTUAL ELEMENTS 17
CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND 19
Introduction 19
Section One 22
The Formation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 22
The Constitutional Structure of the SFRY 25
The Political System of the SFRY: The League of Communists
of Yugoslavia 28
Physical Geography and Territorial Borders of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and Croatia 28
Ethnic Composition of the SFRY, Including Croatia (and in
particular those areas which were to be targeted as part of
“Greater Serbia”) 29
Constitutional Structure of the Republic of Croatia 30
Section Two 31
Phase One: The Rise of Greater-Serbian Nationalism
1981-1987 31
The 1974 Constitution 32
Growth of Tension in Kosovo 33
Serbia Seeks Amendments to the Constitution 33
The 1986 SANU Memorandum and the Rise of Serb
Nationalism 34
The Demonization of the Croats 38 IV
The Validation of the Chetnik Movement 39
Historic Revisionism and Serb Propaganda 40
Phase Two: Slobodan Milošević’s Rise to Power 41
The End of Regional Autonomy 42
Intensification of the Propaganda Campaign against
other Yugoslav Republics 45
The 14 Congress of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia (LCY) 46
The Relativisation of the Borders between Republics by
Serbia 47
The “Amputation” of Croatia 50
The Instrumentalization of the Serbs in Croatia and the
Creation of the Serb Democratic Party 53
Phase Three: The Conflict and Genocide in Croatia 55
The Serb Rebellion in Croatia 57
The 1990 “Referendum” on Serb Autonomy and its
Aftermath 58
Slovenian and Croatian Proposals for Confederation 61
Escalation of Violence: the Buffer Zone Policy 61
The Collapse of the Presidency of the SFRY 63
The Serbian Takeover of the Federal Institutions of the
SFRY and the JNA 66
The Referendum on Independence of Croatia 67
The Serbs Vote for Association with Serbia 67
Section Three: International Mediation 68
The Involvement of the United Nations: UNPROFOR 71
United Nations Condemnation of Human Rights
Violations and Ethnic Cleansing in the Former SFRY 74
The Dissolution of the SFRY and the Proclamation of the
Creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 76
Replacement of UNPROFOR with UNCRO 79
Operations “Flash” and “Storm” 80
Dayton Agreement (1995) 80
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) 81
Agreement on Normalization of Relations (1996) 82
The FRY Becomes a Member of the United Nations
(2000) 83
CHAPTER 3: THE JNA AND THE PARAMILITARY GROUPS 85
Section One: The JNA and its Transformation into a Serbian Army 85
The JNA’s History 88
The JNA and the Political Changes from 1990 90 V
(a) The Ethnic Composition of the JNA and the Officer
Corps 91
(b) Restructuring of the JNA in 1988 and the Adoption of
a New Military Strategy 92
Purpose of Reorganisation and the Preparations for the
Genocide 94
The JNA’s Attempt to Proclaim a State of Emergency 100
Conclusion 106
Section Two: The Serb and Serbian Paramilitary Groups Active
in Croatia and their Relations with the JNA 107
Emergence of Paramilitary Groups 108
(a) An Overview of the Principal Paramilitary Groups 109
(b) The “Control” of the Paramilitary Groups by the JNA and
the Serbian Leadership 114
- Orders from the JNA and Government of
Serbia/FRY Relating to the Provision of
Logistical, Matériel and Financial Support to
Paramilitary Groups 117
- Orders Providing for the Integration of Members
of Paramilitary Groups into the JNA and other
Cooperation Agreements 118
- Restructuring of the Serb Paramilitary Groups
into the “Army of the Republic of Serbian
Krajina (RSK)” 120
Conclusions 122
Section Three: An Overview of the Commencement of the
Genocidal Acts in Croatia 122
The Final Stages of the JNA’s Operations in the Republic
of Croatia 130
The Continuing Support of the JNA/VJ to the Rebel Serbs
and the Paramilitaries 131
CHAPTER 4: GENOCIDAL ACTIVITIES IN EASTERN
SLAVONIA 135
1. Introduction 135
Geography 135
Demographic Change 135
General Themes 137
Military Organisation of the JNA in Eastern Slavonia 138
Outbreak of Violence 140
2. Tenja 142
3. Dalj 147
4. Berak 150
5. Bogdanovci 153 VI
6. Šarengrad 157
7. Ilok 160
8. Tompojevci 164
9. Bapska 167
10. Tovarnik 172
11. Sotin 179
12. Lovas 183
13. Tordinci 191
14. Vukovar 193
Mitnica 202
Borovo Naselje 203
Central Vukovar 205
Vukovar Hospital 209
Ovčara 210
Velepromet 212
Catholic Churches 217
Mass Graves 217
Terror Continued after 1991 218
CHAPTER 5: GENOCIDAL ACTIVITIES
IN THE REST OF CROATIA 219
Introduction 219
Section One: Western Slavonia 220
1. Introduction 220
Geography 220
Demography 220
Outbreak of Hostilities 220
Military Organisation of the JNA
in Western Slavonia 222
Destruction of Cultural Monuments 224
Concentration Camps 224
Ethnic Cleansing 224
2. Municipality of Pakrac 225
Pakrac 225
Veberov Sokak 227
Kusonje 228
3. Municipality of Podravska Slatina 230
Voćin 230
Hum 232
Četekovac 234
Balinci 235
Donji Čaglić 236 VII
4. Municipality of Daruvar 237
Đulovac 237
Doljani 239
Vukovije 240
Veliki Miletinac 240
Section Two: Banovina 241
5. Introduction 241
Geography 241
Demography 241
The Outbreak of Hostilities 242
Military Organisation of the JNA in Banovina 244
Destruction of Cultural Monuments 246
Mass Graves 246
6. Municipality of Glina 247
Glina 247
Novo Selo Glinsko 248
Joševica 249
Gornje and Donje Jame 251
Skela 252
7. Municipality of Petrinja 253
Kraljevčani 254
Glinska Poljana 255
8. Municipality of Dvor na Uni 256
Dvor na Uni, Zamlača and Struga Banska 256
Divuša 257
Other Locations 258
9. Municipality of Hrvatska Kostajnica 259
Hrvatska Kostajnica 259
Baćin 259
Kostrići 260
Kostajnički Majur 260
Other Locations 261
Section Three: Kordun and Lika 263
10. Introduction 263
Geography 263
Demography 263
Outbreak of Hostilities 264
Military Organisation of the JNA in Kordun and Lika 265
Destruction of Cultural Monuments 267
Mass Graves 268
11. Municipality of Vrginmost 268
Crna Draga 269
Novo Selo Lasinjsko and Lasinja 269 VIII
12. Municipality of Slunj 269
Lipovača 270
Lađevac 270
Other Locations 272
13. Municipality of Ogulin 273
Saborsko 273
14. Municipality of Karlovac 275
Karlovac 275
Banski Kovačevac 275
15. Municipality of Otočac 276
Dabar 276
Vrhovine 277
16. Municipality of Gospić 277
Široka Kula 278
17. Municipality of Titova Korenica 279
Vaganac 279
Poljanak 281
Smoljanac 282
18. Municipality of Gračac 283
Lovinac 283
Section Four: Dalmatia 285
19. Introduction 285
Geography 285
Demography 286
The Outbreak of Hostilities 286
Military Organisation of the JNA in Dalmatia 289
Destruction of Cultural Monuments 290
20. Municipality of Šibenik 291
Piramatovci 291
Cicvare 292
Sonković 292
Other Locations 292
21. Municipality of Drniš 293
Puljane 293
Siverić 294
Drniš 295
Miljevci 296
Other Locations 296
22. Municipality of Knin 298
Kninsko Polje 298
Kijevo 299
Ervenik 299
Vrpolje 300 IX
23. Municipality of Obrovac 300
Jasenice 300
Medviđa 301
Other Locations 303
24. Municipality of Benkovac 303
Bruška 303
Korlat 304
Smilčić 304
Other Locations 305
25. Municipality of Zadar 306
Škabrnja and Nadin 306
Other Locations 309
26. Municipality of Sinj 309
Peruča 309
27. Dubrovnik 311
PART TWO: LEGAL ELEMENTS 315
CHAPTER 6: JURISDICTION 317
Both States were Parties to the Genocide Convention
without Reservation at the Time of Croatia’s Application 319
The Court has Jurisdiction Over Disputes Existing at the
Time of Croatia’s Application Concerning Responsibility
for Breaches of the Convention 320
The Dispute between the Parties as to Responsibility for
Breaches of the Convention was Continuing and
Unresolved at the Date of Croatia’s Application 321
The Genocide Convention has Complete Coverage
Ratione Temporis 321
Conclusions 323
CHAPTER 7: THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 325
Introduction 325
Section One: The Background to the Genocide Convention 326
The Scheme of the Convention, its Negotiating History and
Subsequent Practice 331
Section Two: The Meaning of Genocide: The Mental Element 337
2.1 Introduction 337
2.2 The Mental Element – Mens Rea 338
(1) The Nature of the Intent Required 338
(2) Proving Intent to Commit Genocide 339
(3) Specific Intent in Article II 344 X
(a) “to destroy” 344
(b) “in whole or in part” 345
(c) “a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group” 347
(d) “as such” 349
Section Three: The Meaning Of Genocide: The Physical Element 350
(a) “Killing members of the group”: Art. II(a) 350
(b) “Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group”: Art. II(b) 350
(c) “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life designed to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part”: Art. II(c) 351
(d) “Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group”: Art. II(d) 353
(e) “Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group”: Art. II(e) 354
Section Four: Conspiracy, Incitement, Attempt and Complicity 355
Conspiracy: Article III(b) 355
Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide:
Article III(c) 356
Attempt: Article III(d) 357
Complicity: Article III(e) 359
Section Five: The Obligation to Prevent and Punish 363
Prevention 363
Punishment 365
Section Six: Command Responsibility 366
Conclusions 368
CHAPTER 8: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FRY FOR
VIOLATIONS OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 371
Section One: Genocide was Committed on the Territory of Croatia 371
(1) The Crime of Genocide (Article II of the Convention) 372
(a) A Consistent Pattern of Events Amounting to
Genocide 372
The Physical Element: Genocidal Acts 377
The Mental Element: Genocidal Intent 381
(2) The Crimes of Conspiracy, Incitement, Attempt and
Complicity (Article III) 386
Conspiracy (Article III(b)) 386
Direct and Public Incitement (Article III (c)) 387
Attempt (Article III (d)) 389
Complicity (Article III (e)) 389 XI
Section Two: The Conduct in Question is Attributable to the FRY 391
(1) The Applicable Principles of Attribution 391
(2) The Situation on the Territory of the Former SFRY: The
Temporal Element 393
(3) The Conduct for which the FRY is Responsible 396
Acts of the Armed Forces (JNA/VJ) 397
Acts of Paramilitary Groups over which the JNA and
the Serbian Leadership Exercised Direction and Control 397
Subsequent Adoption and Ratification 400
Section Three: The FRY is Responsible for Failure to Prevent
and Punish the Violations of Articles II and III of the Convention401
(A) Responsibility for Failure to Prevent Genocide
(Article I) 402
(B) Responsibility for Failure to Punish Genocide
(Article I) 404
Section Four: The Obligations of Cessation and Reparation 406
SUBMISSIONS 413 XII
LIST OF COLOUR PLATES
Title Para.
Plate 1 Political Map before World War 1 2.06
Plate 2 Political Map of the State of the Slovenes, Croats
and Serbs (October 1918) 2.06
Plate 3 Political Map of Yugoslavia (1945 – 1991) 2.24
Plate 4 Croatia in Europe 2.25
Plate 5 Croatia and Neighbouring States 2.25
Plate 6 Croatia – Regions Mentioned in the Memorial 2.25
Plate 7 Photographs of Vojislav Šešelj at a Press Conference
on 1 July 1991 2.76
Plate 7bis ‘Greater Serbia’ According to Vojislav Šešelj 2.77
Plate 8 Croatian Municipalities Illegally Attached to ‘SAO
Krajina’ 2.77
Plate 9 Croatia – Population According to Nationality/
Ethnicity in 1991 2.103
Plate 10 Territorial Organisation of the JNA by Military
Regions (to 1988) 3.18
Plate 11 Territorial Organisation of the JNA by Military
Regions (after 1988) 3.18
Plate 12 Serbian Paramilitary Units 3.44
Plate 13 Slobodan Milošević, President of FRY and Željko
Ražnjatović Arkan, Serbian Parliamentarian and
Paramilitary Leader, at the Funeral of Radovan
Stojičić Badža 3.52
Plate 14 Dates of Occupation of Towns and Villages
Addressed in the Memorial – Eastern Slavonia 4.02
Plate 15 Exhumation of a Mass Grave at Lovas, June1997 4.03
Plate 16 ‘Velepromet’ Warehouse – Converted to Detention
Facility - Vukovar 4.179
Plate 17 Dates of Occupation of Towns and Villages
Addressed in the Memorial – Western Slavonia 5.04
Plate 18 Dates of Occupation of Towns and Villages
Addressed in the Memorial - Banovina 5.70
Plate 19 Dates of Occupation of Towns and Villages
Addressed in the Memorial – Kordun and Lika 5.128
Plate 20 Dates of Occupation of Towns and Villages
Addressed in the Memorial - Dalmatia 5.189 XIII
LIST OF ANNEXES
VOLUME 2 REGIO–AL ANNEXES
Part I: Eastern Slavonia
Ethnic Structures
Witness Statements – Tenja
Witness Statements – Dalj
Witness Statements – Berak
Witness Statements – Bogdanovci
Witness Statements – Šarengrad
Witness Statements – Ilok
Witness Statements – Tompojevci
Witness Statements – Bapska
Witness Statements – Tovarnik
Witness Statements – Sotin
Witness Statements – Lovas
Witness Statements – Tordinci
Witness Statements – Vukovar
Witness Statements Referred to in “Prison Camps”
(Annexes, Volume 5, Appendix 6)
Military Documents
Other Relevant Documents
Part II: Western Slavonia and Banovina
A. Western Slavonia
Ethnic Structures
Witness Statements
Military Documents
Other Relevant Documents
B. Banovina
Ethnic Structures
Witness Statements
Military Documents
Other Relevant Documents XIV
Part III: Kordun and Lika and Dalmatia
A. Kordun and Lika
Ethnic Structures
Witness Statements
Miltary Documents
Other Relevant Documents
B. Dalmatia
Ethnic Structures
Witness Statements
Military Documents
Other Relevant Documents
VOLUME 3 – COLOUR PLATES
Part I: Maps
Section 1: Geographic Maps
Section 2: Historic and “Aspirational” Maps
Section 3: Ethnic Map
Section 4: Regions, Towns And Villages Mentioned in The Memorial
Section 5: Towns and Villages Subject to Genocidal Acts
Section 6: Military Maps
Section 7: Mass Graves and Prison Maps
Section 8: Damage to Ecclesiastical Objects
Part II: Illustrations
Part III: Photographs
Section 10: Video Frames
Section 11: Location
Section 12: Destruction of Towns and Villages
Section 13: Destruction of Hospitals
Section 14: Destruction of Churches
Section 15: Civilian Suffering
Section 16: Mass Graves
Section 17: Graffiti
Section 18: Involvement of Politicians XV
VOLUME 4 – GENERAL ANNEXES
Genocide Convention
Application by the Republic of Croatia and Orders from the Court
UN Resolutions and Other UN Documents
Relevant Legal and Political Documents
International & National Press Comment
Military Documents
Military Press
VOLUME 5 – APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Chronology of Events, 1980-2000
Appendix 2: Video Tape Transcript
Appendix 3: Hate Speech: The Stimulation of Serbian Discontent and
Eventual Incitement to Commit Genocide
Appendix 4: Testimonies of the Actors (Books and Memoirs)
Appendix 5a: Serb Paramilitary Groups Active in Croatia (1991-95)
st
Appendix 5b: The “21 Volunteer Commando Task Force” of the “RSK
Army”
Appendix 6: Prison Camps
Appendix 7: Damage to Cultural Monuments on Croatian Territory
Appendix 8: Personal Continuity, 1991-2001
VOLUME 6 – LISTS OF DETAINED AND MISSING PERSONS
1. List of Persons Detained in Camps under Serbian Control on the Territory of
the FRY, BH and Croatia
2. List of Missing PersonsXVI CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
HISTORY OF THE CASE
1.01. On 2 July 1999 the Republic of Croatia (Croatia) submitted its
Application to the International Court of Justice (the Court) instituting
proceedings against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) for
violations of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention). The Court has jurisdiction
under Article IX of the Genocide Convention.
1.02. By Order dated 14 September 1999 the Court granted Croatia a
period of six months for the submission of its Memorial. By a further Order
dated 10 March 2000 the Court acceded to Croatia’s request for an
extension and set a new date for the submission of Croatia’s Memorial of
14 September 2000. In December 1999 and January 2000, there were major
political changes in Croatia, including the election of a new President and a
change of Government. This also led to the appointment of a new Agent
and the appointment of Co-Agents with responsibility for these proceedings
before the Court. In light of these changes, and recognising its
responsibility to ensure that on a matter so serious as genocide the Court
should benefit from access to a complete Memorial and Annexes, Croatia
sought a second extension. By its Order dated 27 June 2000 the Court
acceded to Croatia’s request and set 14 March 2001 as the new deadline for
the submission by Croatia of its Memorial. This Memorial is submitted in
accordance with that Order. 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPLICATION AND MEMORIAL
1.03. The Croatian application of 2 July 1999 contains two main claims
of genocide. The first claim was that from 1991 to 1995 the FRY
repeatedly violated the Genocide Convention:
“By directly controlling the activity of its armed forces,
intelligence agents and various paramilitary detachments, on the
1
territory of the Republic of Croatia, in the Knin region , Eastern
and Western Slavonia, and Dalmatia, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia is liable for the “ethnic cleansing” of the Croatian
citizens from these areas – a form of genocide which resulted in
large numbers of Croatian citizens being displaced, killed,
tortured, or illegally detained, as well as extensive property
destruction – and is required to provide reparation for the resultant
damage”.
1.04. The second claim in the Application stated that:
“In addition, by directing, encouraging, and urging Croatian
citizens of Serb ethnicity in the Knin region to evacuate the area in
1995, as the Republic of Croatia reasserted its legitimate
governmental authority (and in the face of clear reassurance
emanating from the highest level of the Croatian government,
including the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo
Tuđman, that the local Serbs had nothing to fear and should stay),
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia engaged in conduct amounting
to a second round of “ethnic cleansing”, in violation of the
Genocide Convention.”
1.05. This Memorial provides the evidence and legal material to support
Croatia’s case only in respect of the first of the claims; namely that the
FRY is responsible under international law for violations of the Genocide
Convention which occurred between 1991 and 1995. The genocide was
primarily targeted against Croats, although victims also included Croatian
citizens of other ethnic or national origin.
1.06. Croatia’s Memorial addresses the FRY’s role in the events of 1995
only insofar as it is necessary to better understand its violations in the
period from 1991 to 1995. The Memorial does not pursue the claim that the
1 At the behest and with the support of the Serbian leadership the Serb residents of this
area declared the “Republic of Serbian Krajina” in December 1991. This illegal
declaration was not recognized by the Republic of Croatia, and was universally rejected
by the international community. For ease of reference, Croatia will hereinafter
collectively refer to the areas of Knin, portions of Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, and
Banovina as the “Knin region”. 3
FRY’s involvement in the events of 1995 constituted violations of the
Genocide Convention. In 1995, at the time of the liberation of occupied
areas by Croatian forces, Croatian Serbs were incited to leave newly
liberated territories as an organized action by the rebel authorities acting
under the control of the FRY. However, some of them also fled due to a
fear of war, a fear of prosecution for war crimes committed against Croats
and a fear of reprisals. Although the suffering of the Croatian Serbs in 1995
is beyond doubt, according to the evidence presently available it does not
meet the elements required for the establishment of a crime – and hence for
state responsibility – under the Genocide Convention.
REASONS FOR THE INSTITUTION OF PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE FRY
1.07. Croatia has a number of reasons for bringing its case against the
FRY before the International Court. Some of these reasons are primarily
relevant for Croatia, but others have regional and even global relevance
given the gravity of the subject matter addressed. Croatia did not bring its
case to the International Court of Justice for a number of years. The fact
that the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY) has not yet issued
indictments against those persons most responsible for genocide in Croatia,
and that it cannot provide for any compensation to the victims of the
genocidal and other internationally criminal acts perpetrated during the
conflict, were among the reasons why Croatia instituted proceedings
against the FRY in 1999. The failure of the FRY to hand over to the ICTY
or to bring to trial any of its citizens indicted for war crimes committed in
Croatia, or to punish the perpetrators of genocidal acts and war crimes
nationally and to compensate victims, was a contributing factor.
1.08. Croatia submitted its application against the FRY at a time when
Slobodan Miloševi ć, the key individual responsible for war crimes and
genocide, was still the President of the FRY. Since then, there have been
important political changes. In Croatia, after ten years of the rule of HDZ
(Croatian Democratic Union), the first turnover of power took place in a
peaceful and orderly fashion, substantially strengthening the rule of law. In
the FRY, the Miloševi ć Government has been replaced, opening the way
for democratic processes. However, the recent changes in the region, which
indicate a transition to democratic principles, do not obviate the need for
bringing this case: the case is concerned with the responsibility of the FRY
as a state, in relation to its responsibility for committing genocide, its
failure to take steps to prevent genocidal acts, and its continuing failure to
punish any of those individuals within its jurisdiction and control who 4
perpetrated or contributed to the genocidal acts. By pursuing this case on
the basis of the extensive material set forth in the Memorial, Croatia hopes
that the citizens of the FRY might be encouraged to confront the actions of
the previous regime and their consequences (for which the FRY has a
continuing responsibility) and thus contribute to democratic processes, the
establishment of the rule of law and lasting peace and stability in the
region.
RELEVANCE FOR CROATIA
1.09. This case has far-reaching legal and historical relevance for Croatia.
Croatia suffered great losses that can be attributed to the war of aggression
and genocidal campaign launched against it in 1991 by the Serbian
leadership. These losses include 10,572 persons killed, 1,419 persons still
2
missing and unaccou3ted for, and 7,624 imprisoned in various camps and
detention centres, a majority of them on the territory of FRY. Beyond the
personal losses and material destruction (including economic facilities,
housing and infrastructure), destruction of cultural property was also great.
More than one third of all cultural monuments and churches in Croatia
were heavily damaged or destroyed, and a very large number of cultural
objects was looted by the occupying Serbian forces. A substantial portion
of the enormous damage to property and economic activity in Croatia is
directly related to the genocidal acts described in this Memorial for which
the FRY is responsible.
1.10. Without prejudice to the other war crimes or crimes against
humanity and criminal responsibility of the perpetrators, including acts
which might not in isolation be characterised as genocidal in character but
are to be so characterised in the context of Serbia’s genocidal campaign,
and the responsibility and liability of the FRY for these acts, in this case
Croatia seeks to establish the clear responsibility of the FRY for violations
of the Genocide Convention. It is submitted that several of the acts set out
in Article II of the Genocide Convention were carried out, including killing
members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to the group,
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part and imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group. These violations include
perpetrating genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement to
genocide, attempt to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, and the
2
The source of information on the deceased and missing is the Office of the Government
of Croatia for Detained and Missing Persons. These numbers are expected to change as
3 more information becomes available.
For a provisional list of missing and detained see Appendices, Volume 6. 5
failure to prevent genocide. They also extend to the failure to punish those
persons within the jurisdiction of the FRY who have committed genocidal
acts, a failure which continues to this day. All of these acts have been
committed and are attributable to the FRY, and Croatia seeks from the
Court a declaration that genocide has been committed, to order the FRY to
punish the perpetrators and reveal the whereabouts of persons still missing
as a result of the genocidal campaign, as well as return the mortal remains
to their families. Croatia also seeks the return of cultural property stolen in
the course of the genocidal campaign to their rightful owners. Croatia has
also turned to the Court to obtain a legal determination of the principles of
reparation which are applicable and ultimately the quantum of
compensation for genocide victims and their families, so far as it concerns
or arises from conduct in violation of the Genocide Convention.
1.11. From Croatia’s perspective it is particularly unacceptable that
genocidal acts have not been prosecuted in the FRY even ten years after
some of them have been committed, and five years after accepting the
obligations set forth in the Dayton Agreement. 4 It is equally unacceptable
that successive Governments of the FRY have refused – and continue to
refuse – to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Law Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
established by the United Nations Security Council and mandated by the
Security Council and the General Assembly on a continuing basis to
investigate and prosecute serious crimes against international law
committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
1.12. Despite recent democratic changes, the FRY still provides safe
harbour to many individuals (including senior members of its former
Government, and especially its former President) who have been indicted
by the ICTY. These circumstances make it impossible to individualize
responsibility in the FRY and thereby bring those responsible to justice. In
any event, the Serbian leadership has both planned and carried out, either
directly or through its agents, the genocidal acts described in this Memorial,
Croatia considers that, as a party to the Genocide Convention, it has a
particular responsibility to take steps to provide for the accountability of the
FRY through these proceedings. The authority of the International Court of
Justice – the principal judicial organ of the United Nations – provides the
single most important forum within which a condemnation of genocidal
acts may be obtained, and hence a deterrent effect which may assist in
preventing possible further violations of the Genocide Convention by the
FRY or by any other state. Croatia has brought this case because there can
be no impunity for genocide.
4 See Chapter 2, para. 2.153. 6
1.13. Finally, this case has important historical relevance for Croatia.
Proceedings before the ICTY are brought against individuals, focused on
particular crimes committed by particular perpetrators. Croatia expects that
the proceedings before the International Court of Justice will, amongst
other things, shed light on the overall context within which events unfolded
in Croatia in 1991 and subsequently, and that the ruling of the International
Court will prove beyond doubt the nature and extent of the genocidal acts
which occurred, as well as the involvement and responsibility of the FRY
under international law. The proceedings before the International Court of
Justice are necessary to address issues, which cannot be addressed in any
other legal forum. They will provide a clear and credible historical record
of the events in question. The Court has a vital and unique role, which is
not to be neglected or avoided by reference to the possibi5ity of criminal
proceedings, which may be brought against individuals.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL RELEVANCE
1.14. The proceedings also have broader regional and even global
relevance. The establishment, through the legal process, of the truth of
accusations of genocidal conduct can contribute towards bringing justice
and redress to the victims. Justice and redress are also a prerequisite for
healing and reconciliation. The establishment of the whereabouts of the
missing persons, often victims of genocide, is a painful process, but a
necessary step for the sake of a better future. To establish lasting peace and
stability in the region, it is essential to determine what happened, and to
qualify the genocidal acts committed in an appropriate and objective
manner. So far as states (rather than individuals) are concerned, this is
specifically and exclusively the province and function of the Court. Such a
process can also contribute to better relations over the long term between
neighbouring states and between people living in the same communities or
in close proximity. A judgment by the International Court of Justice can
contribute a reliable and authoritative basis for the acceptance of proven
matters of historical fact, and can prevent the creation and perpetuation of
different and biased national histories, based on myths, legends and
distortions, which are often deliberate.
1.15. In certain respects the proceedings brought by Croatia against the
FRY relate to the proceedings that Bosnia and Herzegovina has initiated
against the FRY. The genocidal acts in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina were a part of the same pre-planned scheme of imposing
Serbian control – and establishing a “Greater Serbia” – on various parts of
5 See infra. paras. 1.16-1.17. 7
the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY), including through genocidal acts. They involved many of the same
perpetrators and followed a similar pattern. Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina have decided to cooperate in their proceedings against the
FRY. They have stated that:
“These proceedings were initiated with the aim to ascertain both
the full truth about the sufferings and loss of lives incurred in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, as well as
the legal, political and historical accountability for them. The
proceedings are not directed against Serbs in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. Rather, they are directed against the State authorities
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which are to be held
responsible for the aggression, suffering and loss of lives incurred
and genocide committed against the Croats and Bosniaks.” 6
However, the two proceedings are distinct and each has its own
rationale and legal purposes. Croatia brings this proceeding in its own
name and in the name of the victims of the genocide committed on its
territory.
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
1.16. Although the Bosnian and Croatian cases are not the first attempts
to launch proceedings at the International Court of Justice on the basis of
7
the Genocide Convention, they do provide a first opportunity for the
highest international judicial body to determine, conclusively and
authoritatively, an interpretation and application of the meaning and scope
of the Genocide Convention. Article IX of the Convention identifies the
Court as the ultimate guardian of the Convention. The Court has the
opportunity and responsibility to define the circumstances under which
genocide has occurred and in which a state will be responsible for causing
genocide, for failing to prevent it, and for failing to punish it. The Court
also has the historic opportunity to pronounce upon the practice of misusing
members of an ethnic group, associated with the perpetrator state but living
in other states, for the purpose of territorial expansion, as well as on the use
of state-sponsored hate speech and propaganda in inciting genocide.
6 Joint Statement of the Ambassador Muhamed Ša čirbey, Agent for Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Ambassador Ivan Šimonovi ć, Agent for the Republic of Croatia, in
Proceedings Instigated upon Applications of the Genocide Convention against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia before the International Court of Justice, New York, 12
June 2000: see Annexes, vol 4, annex 2.
7
See infra. Chap. 7, para. 7.16 et seq. 8
1.17. The ICTY, which is an ad hoc criminal tribunal, charged with
prosecuting individual crimes, cannot fully perform that task. Indeed, a
failure to bring the main perpetrators such as Slobodan Miloševi ć to trial
would ultimately lead to the misrepresentation of the nature of the conflict
and the incorrect inference that all sides to the conflict were equally
involved in genocidal acts and war crimes. All individual crimes should be
punished, either by the ICTY or by national courts. But the International
Court’s confirmation that genocide has been perpetrated, and that the FRY
is responsible for genocide, is a necessary prerequisite for the citizens of
the FRY to face the responsibility of their military and political leadership,
and their own responsibility, thereby enabling the citizens of the victim
country to forgive and rebuild trust in their neighbours.
CROATIA’S APPROACH TO THE PRESENTATION
OF THE CASE: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
1.18. The Genocide Convention defines the responsibility of the State
Parties – not the perpetrators of individual crimes – and is concerned
exclusively with genocide and not other international crimes. In the
presentation of its case Croatia has appropriately narrowed the scope of
evidence that it presents and relies upon. To the extent possible the
evidence presented in this Memorial is based on primary sources, especially
witness statements, documentation (including that captured from the
JNA/VJ), or the personal testimonies of high-level officials.
1.19. In relation to some of the witness statements upon which Croatia
relies, it has in this Memorial, for humanitarian reasons, taken steps to
ensure the appropriate protection of the identity of those persons (women
and men, including children) who have been subjected to sexual and sex-
related crimes. It includes witnesses and persons referred to in the
testimony of witnesses. For social and humanitarian reasons the use of the
real names of these persons in the Memorial might expose them to real
risks and adverse consequences. In the absence of existing procedures
within the Court’s Statute and Rules, and pending a determination by the
Court as to the approach to be taken, Croatia has made anonymous the
identity of persons falling within the two categories above, by the use of a
pseudonym. Wherever this occurs in the text of the Memorial an asterisk
(*) has been placed after the name of the person, where it appears for the
first time in the Memorial.8
8 Croatia has deposited with the Registrar of the Court a document identifying the real
names of these persons. 9
1.20. Reference is also made to secondary sources, such as United
Nations resolutions and documents of other international organizations,
non-governmental organizations, books, and other sources in order to
confirm or supplement the primary material. In accordance with the Court’s
Rules, in some instances only relevant paragraphs are quoted in the
Annexes and Appendices.
1.21. In the text of the Memorial, reference has been made to “ethnic
cleansing”. “Ethnic cleansing” is a relatively new term whose definition in
international law has not fully crystallized. It is, however, widely used not
only in academic studies and the media, but also in resolutions of the
United Nations organs and other international organisations. Croatia
understands that the term “ethnic cleansing” includes various practices
oriented towards the removal of national, ethnic or religious groups from a
certain territory. In general, those practises intended to destroy the group
correspond to genocide. Various practices related to “ethnic cleansing”
which individually do not necessary amount to genocide, if taken together
and bearing the hallmarks of the requisite intent to destroy a targeted group
on a certain territory, constitute genocidal acts as well. Whilst a dialogue on
clarifying the relationship between the terms “ethnic cleansing” and
“genocide” is no doubt useful for the development of international
humanitarian law, for the purposes of this case, Croatia limits itself to
proving that genocide, as defined by the 1948 Convention, has been
perpetrated.
1.22. It is also appropriate to explain the use of some terms in the
Memorial. In the Memorial Croatia has described the process of dissolution
of the SFRY and the takeover of the federal institutions of the SFRY by the
Serbian leadership. For the single state comprising all six Republics (and
the two Autonomous Provinces), and working in accordance with the
Constitution of 1974 on the principle of equality, Croatia uses the term
“Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (“SFRY”). The term “rump
Yugoslavia” is occasionally used to designate the Serbian controlled entity
which emerged with the dissolution of the SFRY. The abbreviation “FRY”
has been used for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a state consisting of
the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro (which existed as
entities within the SFRY) and which was a state in statu nascendi from
9
mid-1991, even though it was only self-proclaimed on 27 April 1992. On
the same date the name of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was changed
to the Yugoslav Army (VJ).
9 Whilstn statu nascendi this entity has sometimes been referred to as the “rump
Yugoslavia” under the control of the Serbian authorities. 10
1.23. It is also important to note that in this Memorial the terms “Croats”
and “Serbs” refer to the respective national (or ethnic) groups irrespective
of where they live. On the other hand, the term “Serbians” refers to Serbs
from Serbia.10
STRUCTURE OF THE MEMORIAL
1.24. Croatia's Memorial consists of six volumes. Volume 1 contains the
main text of the Memorial, while Volumes 2 to 6 contain supporting
materials. Volume 2 contains witness statements and captured documents,
as referred to in the main text. Volume 3 contains maps, organograms and
photographs, and Volume 4 various relevant national and international
legal and political documents and reports. Volume 5 contains Appendices
covering the following issues: chronology, hate speech, testimonies of the
actors, paramilitaries, cultural damage, prison camps, personal and political
continuity, and a transcript of the text of the documentary film, which is
also a part of the Memorial. Volume 6 contains as Appendices lists of
detained and missing persons related to the genocidal campaign.
1.25. The main text of the Memorial, Vol. 1, consists of eight Chapters
and Submissions. It is divided into two parts: Part One addresses the factual
elements, and Part Two addresses the legal elements.
P ART O NE – F ACTUAL ELEMENTS
1.26. Following this Introductory Chapter, Part One comprises Chapters
2 to 5. Chapter 2 sets out the general historical and political background
against which the genocidal acts were carried out in Croatia in 1991 and
subsequently may be understood. The starting point is the death of the long-
term President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz
Tito, which was followed by the process of dissolution of the SFRY
(comprising the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, and the two Autonomous Provinces of
Kosovo and Vojvodina). The inherent tensions within the SFRY between
the ambition of the largest ethnic group – the Serbs – to dominate, and the
interests of other groups – to protect their equality and pursue their national
interests through the establishment of their national states – had been
suppressed for many years. However, after President Tito’s death they
surfaced. The federal institutions, which were charged with protecting
equality, were undermined and then usurped by the new Serbian leadership,
10 This terminological difference can be linguistically expressed in the Croatian, Serbian
and English languages but cannot be expressed in the French language. 11
led by Slobodan Miloševi ć, which was committed to establishing a Serb
dominated Yugoslavia, or a “Greater Serbia” which would include within
its borders more than half of the territory of Croatia. In this context the
Republics predominantly inhabited by a non-Serb population opted for
independence as the only scenario for the maintenance of their civil and
political rights. Given that the Serbs constituted a large majority of the
officer corps of the JNA, by the autumn of 1991 the JNA had been
transformed into the de facto Serbian Army under the control of the Serbian
leadership. The takeover by Serbian President Miloševi ć and the Serbian
authorities had occurred in the spring of 1991 and was completed by the
autumn of that same year, well in advance of the formal proclamation of
the FRY on 27 April 1992. Throughout that period the state-controlled
media in the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro were systematically used
to demonize the targeted non-Serb ethnic groups, creating a climate
conducive to genocide, inciting it and justifying it.
1.27. Chapter 3 describes the role of the JNA and the paramilitary
groups in carrying out the genocidal acts, which began in the summer of
1991. The Chapter describes the process of the transformation of the JNA –
which started as the principal military force of the SFRY – into a de facto
Serbian national army, its role in the 1991 conflict in the Republic of
Croatia, and its cooperation with various paramilitary units in perpetrating
genocide. Although the JNA was formally classified as the army of the
FRY (subsequently called the Yugoslav Army or “VJ” only after the
adoption of the Constitution of the FRY on 27 April 1992), it will be shown
that it has acted as the organ and instrumentality of the Serbian leadership
since 1990. The aggression against Croatia was secretly but carefully
planned and prepared in cooperation between the Serbian leadership,
headed by President Miloševi ć, and the JNA leadership. The Serbian
political leadership incited rebellion amongst parts of the predominantly
rural Serbian population in Croatia, politically mentored and supported it
(including with finance and arms), while the “Serbianized” JNA cooperated
closely with the rebel Serb paramilitary groups, which emerged after 1990.
Throughout the whole period irrespective of its label or its professions, it
continued to cooperate intensively with rebel Serbs in Croatia.
1.28. Chapters 4 and 5 rely on original witness statements to describe
the genocidal acts which were perpetrated in Croatia in 1991 and
subsequently. Due to the difficulties in gathering evidence, Croatia does not
claim that the material is complete. In the period from 1991 to 1995
Croatia, as a newly emerged sovereign state and member of the United
Nations, was organizing its administration whilst subject to outside
aggression. Surviving brutal aggression, organizing a resistance, preventing
genocide and liberating occupied areas had a much higher priority than
keeping a precise record of all crimes and all violations. The FRY’s
authorities also took care to avoid the production and distribution of written 12
documents, which could dire11ly relate them to genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes. The efforts of the Croatian government to
obtain original evidence and primary materials were made even more
difficult by the fact that some of the evidence had to be obtained a number
of years after crimes had been committed. Due to the destruction of their
homes, survivors, witnesses and their families have often been living as
displaced persons and refugees, scattered throughout Croatia and abroad.
However, the evidence presented is fully sufficient to prove genocide. In
providing evidence, the Croatian Government greatly benefited from
cooperation with non-governmental organisations.
1.29. Chapter 4 provides a detailed account of the genocide, which
occurred in Eastern Slavonia, including the events in Vukovar in Autumn
1991. Although genocide has been perpetrated in all of the occupied areas
of Croatia, the case of Eastern Slavonia, and especially Vukovar, has been
elaborated in more detail because of the number of victims, the abundant
evidence of direct participation of the JNA in genocidal acts, and the clear
involvement of the highest Serbian leadership. The body of evidence
collected from victims and witnesses of genocide, and confirmed by
independent observers and commentators, provides an important case study
of the genocide perpetrated against Croats, which is a reflection of the
events in other parts of Croatia during the same period.
1.30. Chapter 5 provides an account of the genocidal acts, which
occurred throughout other occupied parts of Croatia: Western Slavonia,
Banovina, Kordun and Lika and Dalmatia. The same genocidal pattern
analysed in detail in the case of Eastern Slavonia, was repeated elsewhere
in these other occupied areas. Chapters 4 and 5 are intended to describe
events: the legal implications in terms of the charge of genocide, which
flow from the evidence outlined in these Chapters, are addressed in Chapter
8.
P ART TWO – L EGAL E LEMENTS
1.31. Part Two of the Memorial comprises Chapters 6 to 8, dealing with
legal elements, and concluding with Croatia’s Submissions. In Part Two,
the Memorial explains the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction, and
demonstrates that the facts established by the evidence constitute violations
of the Genocide Convention, and that the violations are attributable to the
FRY which is responsible under international law.
11 See respectively the memoirs of Borisav Jovi ć (Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.3) and
General Veljko Kadijević (Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.1). 13
1.32 Chapter 6 explains the basis upon which the Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Article IX of the Genocide Convention and Article 36(1) of the
Statute of the Court. At the time the Application was lodged, Croatia and
the FRY were parties to the Genocide Convention without reservation.
Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over disputes existing at that time
concerning responsibility for breaches of the Convention, and there were
(and continue to be) such disputes. Moreover, as the Court has affirmed,
there was no temporal gap in the coverage of the Genocide Convention, so
far as the entire territory of the former SFRY is concerned.
1.33. Chapter 7 provides an overview of the Genocide Convention,
including such international practice as may assist the Court in applying it
to the facts set out in this Memorial. It addresses the historical background
to the Convention (including its negotiating history); the mental and
physical elements of the crime of genocide; the related acts of incitement,
attempt and complicity; and the nature and extent of the obligations of the
states bound by the Convention to prevent and punish genocide.
1.34. Finally, Chapter 8 sets out the FRY’s responsibility in public
international law for violations of the Genocide Convention. The killing of
members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part, and the imposition of measures to
prevent births within the group, were committed by, or on behalf of
Serbian-controlled bodies and the FRY, in statu nascendi with the intent to
destroy significant parts of the population of non-Serbs, primarily Croats,
in the various parts of Croatia that the Republic of Serbia and the FRY
sought to annex in pursuit of their aspiration to establish a “Greater Serbia”.
The destruction was perpetrated by killing or physically removing Croats
through expulsion and subsequently removing all traces of their presence in
the newly-conquered area by destroying churches, cemeteries, museums,
and other symbols of religious and cultural heritage. These areas were then
integrated into the political, economic and administrative system of the
Republic of Serbia and the FRY. 13
1.35. The genocidal acts were committed according to previously
prepared plans, and executed in an organized manner, either by the JNA
(and later the VJ), or by paramilitary units under the direction and control
12
13 Alternatively, Article 35(2) of the Statute of the Court.
See UN General Assembly resolution 49/43 (“The situation in the occupied areas of
Croatia”), Annexes, Volume 4, Annex 4. The resolution states, inter alia, at paragraph
2 that the activities of the FRY “aimed at achieving the integration of the occupied
territories of Croatia into the administrative, military, educational, transportation and
communication systems of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) are illegal, null and void, and must cease immediately”. 14
of the leadership of the Republic of Serbia and the FRY. As will be
demonstrated in Chapter 8, genocide and the related offences can be
attributed to the FRY. The Serbian leadership which controlled the “rump
Yugoslavia” and then created the FRY (comprised of the Republics of
Serbia and Montenegro) was involved in the genocide through orders to the
military and paramilitary units under their control and through the use of
state-controlled media to systematically incite genocide.
1.36. The Serbian political and military leadership headed by Slobodan
Milošević was personally, ideologically and politically continuous from the
beginning of the final phase of the dissolution of the SFRY in spring 1991,
until the end of the period under survey in August 1995. The Serbian
leadership, whether acting within and in control of the “rump Yugoslavia”,
Republic of Serbia, or the FRY, participated in planning, inciting and
executing the commission of the crime of genocide. The formal act of self-
proclamation of statehood by the FRY in April 1992 does not permit the
same political and military leadership to escape responsibility under
international law for the acts which it took. The Court can ensure that a
state cannot avoid responsibility for its acts by re-inventing itself in a
different guise.
S UBMISSIONS
1.37. Croatia’s Submissions flow from the material set forth in the
Memorial and represent the legal consequences of the established facts and
applicable law. They are set out at the end of this Memorial. There are five
main submissions.
First, that the Court should declare that the FRY is responsible for
violations of the Genocide Convention, by committing genocide, by
complicity in genocide, by attempting to commit genocide, by
incitement to commit genocide, and by failing to prevent genocidal
acts against Croatian citizens and in particular Croats in attacked or
occupied parts of Croatia between 1991 and 1995.
Second, that the Court should declare that the FRY is responsible
on a continuing basis for its failure to punish violations of the
Genocide Convention, and to require without delay that the FRY
shall take steps to punish its citizens or persons under its
jurisdiction or control responsible for genocidal acts.
Third, that the Court should order the FRY to provide information
as to the whereabouts of citizens of Croatia who are missing as a
result of the genocidal acts for which it is responsible, so as to 15
enable the families of the deceased to dispose with the mortal
remains of their relatives.
Fourth, that the Court should order the FRY to return cultural
property seized in the course of its genocidal activities.
Fifth, that the Court should declare that the FRY is liable inter alia
to make reparations for the violations of the Genocide Convention
for which it is responsible.16 PART ONE:
FACTUAL ELEMENTS18 CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
INTRODUCTION
2.01 Genocide is not a single act but a series of acts, a programme and a
campaign. It occurs in a given geographical and historical context, even if,
legally and morally, the genocidal acts themselves can never be excused by
reference to historical or any other factors. The historical account in this
Chapter is, however, provided in order to assist the Court in understanding
the overall context of the conflict in Croatia, as well as the history of the
various entities concerned. Part One (paras. 2.05-2.35) describes the
geography, ethnic composition and political and constitutional background
of the SFRY. Of central importance are the constitutional structure and the
territorial borders of the SFRY and each of its constituent Republics,
including Croatia, as they existed during the period from the adoption of
the 1974 SFRY Constitution until the period beginning on 15 May 1991,
when the process of dissolution of the SFRY entered its final stage.
2.02 Part Two (paras. 2.36-2.116) describes the events leading up to the
genocidal acts which took place in Croatia after its declaration of
independence in June 1991 and which are the subject of Croatia’s
Application to the Court. This Part focuses on the period following the
death of President Tito of the SFRY in 1980 up until the actions of the
Serbian controlled members of the Presidency in seeking to block the
appointment of the Croatian Representative, Stjepan Mesi ć, as President of
the Presidency of the SFRY in May 1991. The period witnessed the rise of
Serbian nationalism, leading to a situation by 1991 in which Croatia was
essentially presented with two options by Serbia: it could remain within a
federal Yugoslav state dominated by Serbian interests, alternatively it could
become an independent state but within a sharply reduced territory, with
Serbia taking over control of large swathes of territory which had lain
within the borders of the Republic of Croatia since at least the Second
World War. When Croatia’s citizens opted overwhelmingly for
independence in a national referendum in May 1991, Serbia embarked on a
campaign of territorial acquisition with the object of establishing Serbian
control in parts of the Republic of Croatia, including in particular Eastern
1 The other Republics were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia
and Slovenia. 20
and Western Slavonia, Banovina, Kordun and Lika and Dalmatia. This
campaign was conducted by the Serbian leadership, acting through the
instrumentality of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) (which it controlled)
and paramilitary groups which had either been incorporated into the
structures of the JNA or which were under the effective control of the
Government of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, acting from Belgrade. The
campaign of territorial acquisition and the ethnic cleansing and
“Serbianisation” of Croatian territories was accompanied by the genocidal
destruction of a significant part of the Croatian populations of Eastern and
Western Slavonia, Banovina, Kordun and Lika and Dalmatia. It is the
genocidal destruction of a significant part of the Croatian populations in
these areas which is the subject of Croatia’s Application and this Memorial.
2.03 Part Three of this Chapter (paras. 2.117-2.162) deals with events
2
taking place from the end of 1991, after the JNA, supported by local Serb
rebels, had occupied large parts of Croatian territory, through to the
winding up of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern
Slavonia (UNTAES) in January 1998. It describes the work of the
European Community’s Conference on Yugoslavia and the involvement of
the United Nations in seeking to resolve the crisis in the former SFRY,
including the deployment of peace-keeping missions and the establishment
of United Nations Protected Areas. It also covers the proclamation of the
FRY, and the adoption of the Dayton Peace Agreement. It looks at the way
in which the United Nations in particular monitored the human rights
situation in the former SFRY during this period.
2.04 In considering the events of 1981 to 1998 (covered in Parts Two
and Three of this Chapter) it becomes apparent that they fell within five
periods:
1) 1981-1987. The initial period following the death of Tito saw
the promotion of a Serbian national programme for the
restructuring of the SFRY, based on the idea of a “Greater
Serbia”. A fervent form of Serbian nationalism, fuelled by the
media, helped to mobilize Serbian public opinion in support of
a “Greater Serbia”. Many prominent figures from Serbian
political and social life helped to promote the nationalistic
fervour which is documented in this Chapter. In this context,
the 1986 “Memorandum” prepared by the Serbian Academy of
2 The military campaign from May 1991 to D ecember 1991 in the context of which the
genocidal acts in Croatia were carried out is summarised in Chapter 3 which describes
in overview the role of the JNA and the paramilitaries, and describes the direct control
which the Socialist Republic of Serbia had over the armed forces and paramilitary
groups which perpetrated the genocide. The genocidal acts are described in detail in
Chapters 4 (Eastern Slavonia) and 5 (other parts of Croatia). 21
the Sciences and Arts (SANU) was particularly important in
fuelling the rise of Serbian nationalism.
2) 1987-1990. This period saw the rise to power of Slobodan
Milošević, first through the Serbian League of Communists
and then within the Government of the Socialist Republic of
Serbia, culminating in his election on 6 December 1989 as
President of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. As a politician,
Milošević legitimised extreme nationalist ideas and as
President of the Republic of Serbia he embedded them as part
of the official ideology and practice in the Republic of Serbia.
Serbian President Miloševi ć ended the autonomy of the two
Serbian autonomous provinces: Vojvodina and Kosovo. He
also tried to impose a Serbian model for the restructuring of
the SFRY both by constitutional means, using SFRY’s
existing constitutional machinery and institutions, and also
through illegal forms of public pressure and intimidation. The
role of hate speech propaganda, directed against other ethnic
groups within the SFRY, including the Croats, was essential in
this regard.
3) April 1990–May 1991. Following democratic elections in the
Republic of Croatia, representatives of the political party of
the Serb rebels in Croatia – the Serbian Democratic Party
(SDS) – refused to accept the authority of the newly elected
Croatian government and, with the help of the Serbian leaders
of the Republic of Serbia and the JNA, began preparations for
a rebellion against the Government of the Republic of Croatia.
In August 1990 Croatian Serb rebels closed off the region
round Knin in southern Croatia. The rebellion gradually spread
into other parts of Croatia where Serbs represented the
majority or at least a significant proportion of the local
population. During this period the Serb paramilitaries were
armed by the JNA, and the “SAO Krajina” was “proclaimed”.
4) May 1991-January 1992 : After those members of the
Presidency of the SFRY controlled by the Serbian leadership
refused to confirm the Croatian representative Stjepan Mesi ć
as President of the SFRY Presidency in May 1991, conflict
intensified throughout Croatia. The JNA initially purported to
play the role of intermediary, but later it openly took the side
of the Serb rebels. A planned and strategic programme of
genocide was carried out in the campaign against Croatia as
part of the policy of extending the borders of a “Greater
Serbia” and establishing areas of Serbian occupation within
the territory of the Republic of Croatia. By October 1991, the
Presidency of the SFRY was reduced to a group which 22
consisted only of members from Serbia and Montenegro and
Serbian-controlled representatives of Vojvodina and Kosovo.
An unconstitutional state of emergency was pronounced by
this group on 4 October 1991.
5) January 1992-January 1998 : This period covers: the
introduction of United Nations presence in the occupied
territories in Croatia; the proclamation of the FRY; the peace
negotiations which led to the Dayton Peace Agreement of
November 1995 and the Paris Agreement of December 1995.
During this period unsuccessful political attempts to resolve
the crisis were followed, in 1995, by successful military action
undertaken by Croatian forces which led to the withdrawal of
FRY sponsored forces from the liberated territory of Croatia.
This was followed by the adoption in 1996 of an Agreement
on the Normalisation of Relations between Croatia and the
FRY and the closure, following the successful completion of
its mission, of UNTAES in January 1998, at which point
Eastern Slavonia was fully reintegrated into Croatian control.
SECTION ONE
2.05 This part of the Chapter describes the political, constitutional and
ethnic background of the SFRY, and in particular that of Croatia, together
with its physical geography (A Chronology of Events during the period
1980-2000 is contained in Volume 5 at Appendix 1).
T HE ORMATION OF THE OCIALIST EDERALF R EPUBLIC
OF Y UGOSLAVIA
2.06 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was formally
3
established in 1945. Prior to the Second World War, most of the territory
which was to form the SFRY had been contained within the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which was created in 1918 following the First
World War and the break up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This
kingdom was established as a South Slav state consisting of Croatia,
Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina which had all been part of the
Hapsburg Empire, together with Serbia, which had declared itself a
3 In November 1945 a communist-dominated constituent assembly abolished the
monarchy, proclaimed the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and adopted the
country’s first Constitution. 23
Kingdom in 1882 following independence from the Ottoman Empire, 4
Montenegro, also independent of Turkey after 1878, and Macedonia (from
which the Turks had been expelled in 1912) (See Plates 1 and 2).
2.07 The constitution of this new state, which established a highly
centralised system of government, was adopted in 1921. Increasingly, the
Kingdom came to be regarded as Serb-dominated, particularly in Croatia
where there were demands for the introduction of a more federal system.
Following the shooting of Croatian deputies, including Stjepan Radi ć,
leader of the Croatian Peasant Party (the principal voice of Croatian
interests), in the parliament in 1928, a royal dictatorship under the Serb
royal family was established in 1929. The new name of “Yugoslavia” was
introduced as part of a unitarist policy which sought to foster greater
national feeling. In 1934 King Alexander was assassinated by a member of
the Macedonian nationalist organization (VMRO) in action organized by
the Croatian Ustasha, a separatist terrorist movement founded by Ante
Pavelić and supported by the Hungarian and Italian governments.
Democratic government was not restored under the new Regent, Prince
Paul. Persistent support for the reinstatement of democracy and for
constitutional reform eventually led to the 1939 “Sporazum” (or
Agreement) under which an autonomous self-governing Croatia was
created covering about a half of the territory of today’s Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
2.08 When war broke out in 1939, Yugoslavia declared itself neutral. In
March 1941 there was a military coup d’état in Yugoslavia undertaken by
Yugoslav Army officers after the signing of the “Trojni Pakt” (Triple
Alliance). In April 1941, Hitler invaded Yugoslavia and its territory was
partitioned among the Axis powers: Germany, Italy, Hungary and
Bulgaria. The Germans and Italians used Croatian aspirations for
independence to set up the “Independent State of Croatia” (or NDH) which
6
included not only most of the territory of present day Republic of Croatia
but also the entire Bosnian territory. Vlatko Ma ček, leader of the largest
Croatian political party, the democratic Croatian Peasant Party (HSS),
refused the German offer to take power and the leader of the nationalistic
4 Serbia had been an autonomous principality of the Ottoman Empire since 1830. Under
the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano following the war with Turkey, both Serbia and
Montenegro made territorial gains and the Congress of Berlin in the same year
confirmed their de jure status as independent states, see Tim Judah “The Serbs, History,
Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia” Yale Nota Bene 2000, Second Edition, at page
5 67.
For a discussion of this period see Christopher Bennett, “Yugoslavia’s Bloody
Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequence” Hurst 1995 at pages 42-43.
6 The Croatian regions of Istria and much of Dalmatia remained under Italian ibid.
page 43. 24
Ustasha movement, Ante Paveli ć, was installed by the Germans and
Italians. Ustashas implemented Nazi policies and persecuted Serbs, Jews,
Roma/Gypsies and anti-fascist Croats. 7
2.09 Serbia was occupied by Germany and a collaborating government
led by General Milan Nedi ć was established. Their policy followed the
ideological principles of Nazism. The Chetniks, led by Draža Mihajlović ,
wanted to see a restored monarchy ruling over a country dominated by
Serbia and collaborated with the Nazi’s in the hope of securing this goal. 8
Chetnik troops were initially organized in Serbia and then in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Montenegro as well as in parts of Croatia, particularly in the
area around the town of Knin. The Chetnik movement was based on an
extreme form of nationalism which centred on the idea of a “Greater
Serbia”. In implementation of their nationalist aims they committed
atrocities against Moslem and Croat populations in parts of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatia.
2.10 The resistance movement in Yugoslavia was the multi-ethnic
communist-dominated Partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito who wanted to
establish a federal state and institute wide-ranging social reforms. In the
early years of the resistance, Croats and Serbs from Croatia constituted the
overwhelming majority of the Partisans. By 1942 the Partisans had taken
control of a large part of central NDH. At this time, Tito established the
Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), the
9
nucleus of Yugoslavia’s future government. Following Italian capitulation
in September 1943, the Partisans captured significant quantities of Italian
arms and many more Croats from the coastal regions joined the Partisans.
In November 1943, at its second session in Jajce, AVNOJ was constituted
as the supreme legislative and executive body of Yugoslavia and the
National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia was established as its
supreme executive body. It was decided that Yugoslavia should be
reconstructed as a federal Republic with six units. The Royal Government
in exile was divested of the right to represent the country. It was decided
that a general election or referendum to decide the fate of the monarchy
would be held after the war. 10 By 1944, most of Croatia was liberated
territory and ZAVNOH, the Regional Anti-Fascist Liberation Council of
Croatia which had been founded in 1943, was constituted as the highest
representative legislative and executive body in Croatia in May 1944. Tens
7 See further Part Two infra at para. 2.53.
8
See Bennett, note 5 supra at page 47. The original Chetniks were those Serbs who
rebelled against Ottoman rule in the nineteenth century, see Ivo Goldstein “Croatia, A
History” Montreal 1999, at page 145.
9 Ibid., p. 147.
10 Ibid., pp. 149-150. 25
of thousands of Croats who tried to flee because of their collaboration with
the Germans or because they were opposed to communism were returned
by British forces and were killed by the Partisans at the end of the war.
2.11 The growing rivalry between Stalin and Tito in the period following
the Second World War culminated, in 1948, in the expulsion of Yugoslavia
from the Communist bloc. Yugoslavia went on to build a communist
system of its own, outside the Soviet sphere of influence. The position of
the Republic of Croatia from 1945 until 1990 remained largely unchanged
in the sense that it constituted a federal unit with limited sovereignty. On
each occasion when there were attempts to re-examine the position of
Croatia within the Federation, the communist regime responded with
repressive measures. This was particularly so in 1971, when a popular
movement subsequently known as the “Croatian Spring” was put down and
many of the participants imprisoned. This movement had sought greater
decentralization, the transfer of greater power to the Republics and general
democratization of Yugoslav society.
T HE C ONSTITUTIONAL TRUCTURE OF THE SFRY
2.12 Following the proclamation of the Federal People’s Republic of
Yugoslavia by a Constituent Assembly in November 1945 a constitution
was promulgated on 31 January 1946. 11 Under this Constitution, monarchy
was replaced by a federation of six Republics. Two areas within Serbia
were accorded distinctive constitutional status: the Autonomous Province
of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija. This was
done because of the large non-Serb populations living in those areas.
2.13 Following Yugoslavia’s expulsion from Cominform in 1948, the
country embarked on the Yugoslav road to socialism. This shift was
reflected in the 1953 Constitution which recognised the establishment of
Workers Councils. A new Constitution was adopted on 7 April 1963 which
strengthened self-management and extended it beyond industrial
organisations into social services and political administration. The 1963
Constitution also made Kosovo an autonomous province rather than an
autonomous region as under the 1946 Constitution. The 1963 Constitution
was amended in 1967, 1968 and 1971.
11
The 1946 Constitution was modelled on the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union,
drawn up by Stalin.
12 See Bennett, note 5 supra at p. 53. 26
2.14 The importance of the 1974 Constitution was that it made
concessions to those who sought greater devolution 13- the constituent
elements of the federation were given a considerable degree of self-rule. 14
Nevertheless, autonomy was limited because of centralised party control in
the Republics.
2.15 The 1974 Constitution recognized the right of every nation to self-
determination, including the right to secession, national freedom and
independence. Article 1 described the SFRY as
“a federal State having the form of a state composed of voluntarily
united nations and their Socialist Republics, and of the Socialist
Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which are
constituent parts of the Republic of Serbia…”.
Article 5 provided that the territory of the SFRY was a single unified whole
and consisted of the territories of the Socialist Republics and went on to
provide that “the territory of a Republic may not be altered without the
consent of that Republic” and that the territory of an Autonomous Province
could not be altered without the consent of that Autonomous Province.
Article 5 also provided that “boundaries between the Republics may only
be altered on the basis of mutual agreement, and if the boundary of an
Autonomous Province is involved, also on the basis of the latter’s
agreement.”
2.16 Tito was made President for Life under the terms of the 1974
Constitution (Article 333) but after his death Presidential authority vested
in a collective Presidency which included representatives of the Republics
and Autonomous Provinces. By virtue of Article 321, the SFRY Presidency
was to be composed of a member from each Republic and Autonomous
Province. Members were to be elected for a term of five years (Article
324). Under Article 327 the Presidency of the SFRY was required to rotate
the position of President and Vice-President from among its members for a
term of one year, according to a schedule laid down by the Presidency
Rules of Procedure.
2.17 Article 282 of the Constitution provided for a Federal Assembly of
the SFRY, described as “the supreme organ of power within the framework
of federal rights and duties”. The Assembly consisted of the Federal
Chamber and the Chamber of Republics and Autonomous Provinces. Under
13
These tendencies had culminated in the “Croatian Spring” of the late 1960’s and early
1970’s, see Bennett, note 5 supra, at page 74 and Goldstein, supra pages 184-
14 185.
Matters which were reserved the federal level included foreign affairs, defence and
essential economic matters. 27
Article 283 of the Constitution, the SFRY Assembly: decided, inter alia, on
amendments to the SFRY Constitution and alterations of the boundaries of
the SFRY; elected the President of the Republic and proclaimed the
election of the SFRY Presidency; elected and relieved of office the
President and members of the Federal Executive Council.
2.18 Articles 346 to 368 governed the powers of the Federal Executive
Council, described as the executive body of the SFRY Assembly. The
Federal Executive Council was responsible inter alia , for introducing
federal bills, ensuring the execution of policy and ensuring the execution of
the country’s defence policy. It was composed of members elected in
conformity with the principle of equal representation of the Republics and
corresponding representation of the Autonomous Provinces (Article 348).
The Federal Executive Council was responsible to the Chambers of the
SFRY Assembly for its work (Article 359).
2.19 So far as military matters were concerned, the Presidency of the
SFRY was stated to be “the supreme body in charge of the administration
and command of the Armed Forces of the SFRY in war and peace”(Article
313). Under Article 316, the Presidency could transfer specific affairs
concerning the administration and command of the Armed Forces to the
Federal Secretary of the National Defence (Ministry of Defence) which
would remain responsible to the Presidency. By virtue of Article 328, the
President of the SFRY Presidency was in charge of the command of the
Armed Forces of the SFRY, in conformity with the Constitution. The
President was also to be Chairman of the Council for National Defence.
2.20 Article 245 of the Constitution stipulated equality of all peoples and
nationalities; Article 249 provides for a single citizenship for Yugoslavia
and for the citizenship of the Socialist Republics as well as equal protection
before the law.
2.21 An extensive list of the rights and duties of the Federation was set
out in Article 281 of the 1974 Constitution under which the Federation
shall inter alia: “ensure the independence and territorial integrity of the
SFRY and protect its sovereignty in international relations; decide on war
and peace (1); regulate the fundamentals of the system of national defence
and ensure their implementation…regulate the administration and
command of the Armed Forces of the SFRY and exercise supreme
command over the Armed Forces; regulate and organize the [JNA],
administer it and exercise command over it; regulate the management and
use of social resources utilized by the [JNA] and for its needs; regulate
citizen’s national service...regulate the special rights and duties of military
personnel in connection with their service in the Armed Forces..regulate
and organize military courts and the office of military prosecutor..(6);
regulate general conditions and principles concerning the imposition of 28
sanctions for criminal offences and economic violations…define criminal
offences against..humanity and international law… (12); protect
constitutionality as established by the present Constitution…”.
2.22 Yugoslav federalism operated under the strict control of the
Communist party - almost all institutions of the state were mirrored by
similar institutions within the Communist party structure. Thus Marshall
Tito was both the Head of State and Commander in Chief of the Army as
well as being head of the Communist Party. Following Tito’s death in
1980, the state was presided over by a collective Presidency, while
command of the Army was vested in the General Staff and the SFRY
Ministry of Defence.
THE P OLITICALSYSTEM OF THE SFRY:
T HE LEAGUE OF C OMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA
2.23 The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was renamed the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia in 1953. The LCY was divided into eight units:
representing the six Republics and the two Autonomous Provinces. The
introduction to the 1974 Constitution recognised the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia as “the prime mover and exponent of political
activity aimed at safeguarding and further developing the socialist
revolution…” The process of devolution within the SFRY led to a tendency
among the eight individual Leagues to pursue their own development
strategies.
PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY AND TERRITORIAL B ORDERS
OF THE SOCIALIST EDERAL R EPUBLIC OFY UGOSLAVIA (SFRY)
AND CROATIA
2.24 The SFRY was bordered by Italy, Austria, Hungary, Romania,
Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, as shown on the Map at Plate 3. As shown,
the territory of the SFRY included the 6 Republics of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, as
well as the two Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. As also
shown, within the SFRY, the Republic of Croatia was bordered by
Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.
2.25 The location of Croatia within Europe is shown in Plates 4 and 5.
The Republic of Croatia covers a territory of 56,538 square kilometres. As
shown on Plate 6, the Republic of Croatia included various geographical
15 See Bennett at p. 75. 29
regions. In this Memorial, particular reference will be made to Eastern and
Western Slavonia, Banovina, Kordun, Lika, and Dalmatia because it is in
these regions that the genocidal acts which are the subject of this
Application were committed.
E THNIC C OMPOSITION OF THE SFRY, I NCLUDING C ROATIA
(AND IN PARTICULAR THOSE AREAS WHICH WERE TO BE TARGETED
AS PART OF “G REATER SERBIA ”)
2.26 According to the 1991 census the population of the SFRY was
23,528,230 (a rise from 22,427,585 in the 1981 census). 16According to the
figures for 1981, the percentage of Croats was 19.8% and of Serbs 36.3%
(19.7% and 36.2% respectively in 1991), whilst Moslems made up 8.9%,
Albanians 7.7%, Slovenes 7.8%, Macedonians 6%, Montenegrins 2.6% and
Yugoslavs 5.4%, with others forming 5.5% of the population.
17
2.27 In 1991 the population of Croatia was 4,784,000 people. The great
majority, approximately 78% as at 1991, 18of the population are ethnic
Croats. National minorities made up about 15.9% of the Croatian
19
population, including 12.2% Serbs. Within different parts of Croatia the
proportions varied markedly, so that, in some regions, in certain villages
and towns Serbs were a majority or a significant minority. It is in many of
these areas that genocidal activities were targeted, as described in Chapters
4 and 5 of the Memorial.
2.28 In the Serbian Republic as a whole (including Vojvodina and
Kosovo), Serbs made up some 66.4% of the population as at 19820 while
Croats made up 1.6% (65.8% and 1.1% respectively in 1991).
2.29 Approximately one-fifth of the Croats of the SFRY lived outside
21
Croatia as at 1991, most of them in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
16
See table in “Balkan Tragedy” Susan L Woodward, Brookings Institution Washington
DC 1995 at p. 32 and sources referred to therein.
17 “Croatia Between War and Independence” University of Zagreb, Edited by BožoČović,
18 Zagreb November 1991 at p. 48.
Woodward , note 16 supra, see table at p. 33.
19 Ibid., at p. 33.
20
Ibid., see table at p. 34.
21 Čović, note 17 supra, at p. 48. 30
C ONSTITUTIONAL S TRUCTURE OF THE R EPUBLIC OF C ROATIA
2.30 The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, adopted on 22
December 1990, defines the Republic of Croatia as an integral and
indivisible democratic and social state. The Constitution’s primary
principle is that of national sovereignty according to which power derives
from the people and belongs to the people as a community of free and equal
citizens. The people exercise power through the election of representatives
and through direct decision-making.
2.31 By the Constitutional Decision on the Sovereignty and 22
Independence of the Republic of Croatia adopted on 25 June 1991, the
Republic of Croatia was proclaimed as a sovereign and independent state
and initiated proceedings for dissociation from the other Republics and
from the SFRY. The Decision also states that the Republic of Croatia will
initiate proceedings for seeking international recognition.
2.32 Article IV of the Decision provides that only those laws shall have
force on the territory of the Republic of Croatia which have been passed by
the Parliament (Sabor) of the Republic of Croatia and, until the termination
of dissociation, also those federal regulations which have not been
repealed. It also states that the Republic of Croatia assumes all the rights
and obligations that were transferred to the bodies of the SFRY by the
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and by the Constitution of the
SFRY. Article III of the Declaration on the Proclamation of the Sovereign
and Independent Republic of Croatia of the same date provides that the
Republic of Croatia in its capacity as legal successor of the former SFRY
guarantees to all states and international organisations that it will fully and
conscientiously exercise all rights and perform all obligations relating to
23
the Republic of Croatia.
2.33 Within the SFRY, Croatia, like the other constituent Republics, had
its own parliament, known as the Sabor. Following free elections held in
1990, the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia became a multiparty
governing body. The Croatian Parliament consists of the House of
Representatives and the House of Županijas (counties). The former is a
legislative body which passes laws, adopts the state budget, decides on
changes in the Constitution, war and peace and alterations in the boundaries
of the Republic. An Electoral Law was adopted in 1992 providing for the
election of a House of Representatives on the basis of a mixed plurality-
proportional system. The House of Županijas is concerned with regional
interests, citizens of the counties elect three representatives by secret ballot
22
See Annexes, vol 4, annex 9.
23 See Annexes, vol 4, annex 8. 31
and the president may nominate five members to the House. The House of
Županijas has the right to propose all bills which are decided upon by the
House of Representatives and can also discuss them and has the right of
suspensive veto on laws passed in the house of Representatives-this veto
can be overruled by a majority of the House of Representatives.
2.34 With effect from 8 October 1991, Croatia informed the United
Nations Secretary General that it considered itself bound by state
succession to the treaties to which the SFRY had been a party.
2.35 The President of the Republic of Croatia is the Head of state. The
Republic’s first President was Franjo Tuđman who was elected with 56%
of the votes in the first round of the elections held on 2 August 1992. The
second and current President, since 7 February 2000, is Stjepan Mesić.
SECTION TWO
P HASE O NE : THE RISE O F REATER -SERBIAN
N ATIONALISM 1981-87
2.36 The death in 1980 of the President of the SFRY, Josip Broz Tito,
marked a turning point which was to lead to the conflict in the Balkans and
genocide in Croatia. Many had thought that it was primarily due to
President Tito that the inter-ethnic conflict of the Second World War had
been brought to an end, and replaced by a period of greater mutual trust
between the different ethnic groups in the SFRY. With the benefit of
hindsight, President Tito’s solutions appear to have contributed indirectly
to the conflict which erupted in 1991. One party dictatorship suppressed to
a large extent different interests, including national ones, which made
things potentially even more volatile. The conditions for conflict were also
sparked by the economic failures of the SFRY, which became marked in
the long lasting economic crisis of the 1980’s. The result was a
disillusioned and frustrated population, and fertile ground for demagogic
activities. President Tito’s pragmatic solutions merely delayed the re-
emergence of underlying issues.
2.37 President Tito was plainly aware of the inter-ethnic problems which
lay just below the surface of the SFRY. They were suppressed by
restrictions on freedom of expression and the press, and the dominance of
the one party system. No successor to President Tito was able to maintain
24 “Decision on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia”, 8 October
1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 10. 32
the same degree of ethnic and political stability. After his death the
supreme state power of the SFRY was taken over by the collective
Presidency of the SFRY, consisting of eight politicians representing each of
25
the six Republics and the two Autonomous Provinces. The Presidency
had existed under President Tito but during his lifetime, remained subject
to his political dominance.
The 1974 Constitution
2.38 To understand the role of the Presidency of the SFRY one needs to
look back to various developments in the life of the SFRY in the 1960’s
and early 1970’s, including experiments with market economy and
economic liberalism and 26e opening of borders to allow for the free
movement of persons. These developments indicated that the centralized
machinery of the state and the centrally planned economy were not
functioning as efficiently or as effectively as was intended. The 1965
economic reforms included certain elements towards a market economy
and was accompanied by a degree of liberalization and democratisation of
political life. In parallel there were moves towards decentralization,
providing greater powers to the constituent Republics of the SFRY. The
decentralizing urge gave rise to the 1971 amendments to the 1963
Constitution of the SFRY, and also the adoption of a new Constitution in
1974. The 1974 Constitution had a number of significant features. Most
notably the sovereignty of the six constituent Republics and the two
Autonomous Provinces was enhanced, and there was established a “federal-
confederal” relationship between the six Republics. This meant that the
position of the Republics was strengthened in relation to the federal
structure of the SFRY. At the heart of the changes was the composition of
the Presidency of the SFRY according to the principle of equal
representation of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces. The SFRY
Republics, in contrast to the two Autonomous Provinces, were defined as
states but both Republics and Autonomous Provinces represented
constituent elements of the Federation.
2.39 With the adoption of the 1974 Constitution, the Socialist Republic
of Serbia began to question the basic principles governing the structure of
the SFRY, in particular the authority of the Autonomous Provinces of
Kosovo and the Vojvodina, which were independent of the Serbian
Republic. After President Tito’s death in 1980 Serbia claimed that Kosovo
27
and Vojvodina had, in practise, become states in their own right. Serbia
25 See Part One, at para. 2.16.
26
27 See Goldstein, note 8supra, at pp. 170-3.
See the SANU Memorandum, discussed below at paras. 2.43 et seq . 33
objected to this because of the loss of control over the Provinces (and their
supportive votes in the Presidency) that this entailed so far as it was
concerned.
Growth of Tension in Kosovo
2.40 Kosovo thus played a key role early on after the death of President
Tito. In the spring of 1981 unrest broke out and, following police
suppression of student demonstrations at the University of Priština, there
were Albanian nationalist demonstrations throughout Kosovo. According to
official figures, twelve people died during the unrest and 150 were injured
but because the area was closed to foreign journalists, some have suggested
28
that the actual figures may have been considerably higher. The Federal
authorities of the SFRY initiated a total blockade of communication and
transport. These events led to even sharper divisions between the Serb and
Albanian communities in Kosovo: the Kosovan Serbs petitioned Belgrade
29
to draw attention to their plight and the Kosovo Albanians sought greater
autonomy, including a Republic of Kosovo within the SFRY. The use of
force in Kosovo was considered justifiable by many within the Serb
population. It reflected also the beginning of a process in which the Serb
populations in Kosovo and in other Republics of the SFRY – in particular
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina – sought to ensure that their political
domination and the protection of Serbian ethnic interests should be
achieved by any means, including the use of force.
Serbia Seeks Amendments to the Constitution
2.41 After the 1981 riots in Kosovo, the view that the position of the
Socialist Republic of Serbia within the SFRY was unsatisfactory achieved
popular support in Serbia. Subsequently, views promoting Serb national
interests began to be expressed more often, and more openly. In November
1984 the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (“CK
SKS”) demanded greater Serbian unity and a more favorable position for
Serbia and for Serbs within the SFRY Federation. A so-called “programme
for reintegration” was elaborated by the League of Communists of Serbia
with the object of centralising the federal structure in Belgrade. With
hindsight, it is apparent that these developments marked the first step
towards the disintegration of the SFRY. Although the basic premise of the
28
“Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: causes, course and consequences” Christopher
29 Bennett, Hurst 1995, at p. 89.
“Serbia under Milošević: politics in the 1990’s” Robert Thomas, Hurst 1999, p. 35. 34
1974 Constitution was not yet being directly challenged, the growth of
Serbian nationalist demands were well in evidence by 1985.
2.42 Serbia thus sought to engage the other Republics of the SFRY in
discussions about the maintenance of federal structures, under the slogan of
“Saving socialism-communism and the Yugoslav state”. The five other
Republics and the two Autonomous Provinces relied on their constitutional
rights under the 1974 Constitution to maintain the status quo of a
decentralized system, and declined to accept Serbia’s initiative. At this time
– in 1985 – the line up of the Republics of the SFRY and the Autonomous
Provinces was 7 to 1 against Serbia’s position of promoting greater
centralization. Serbia found itself to be increasingly isolated, and for the
first time since the establishment of the SFRY, without support in its efforts
to limit the sovereignty of the Republics.
The 1986 SANU Memorandum and the Rise of Serb Nationalism
2.43 In respect of the genocidal acts perpetrated by Serbs against Croats,
a catalytic event was the appearance of a Memorandum in 1986 by the
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU). 30The Memorandum,
which became known as the SANU Memorandum, was published in draft31
by the Belgrade daily newspaper Večernje Novosti . The SANU
Memorandum was a manifesto: it set forth a Serb nationalist re-
32
interpretation of the recent history of the SFRY. 33 It carried considerable
weight because of the authority of its authors. The Memorandum reflected
the basic precepts of the growing Serbian nationalist movement, which was
premised on the belief that the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the Serbs in
the Republics of the SFRY outside Serbia were in a uniquely unfavorable
situation within the SFRY. The appearance of the SANU Memorandum is
one of the key developments which gave rise to the circumstances in which
a genocide could be perpetrated in Croatia.
30 The Memorandum was drafted by a committee of 23 SANU members, see Thomas,
31 ibid. at p. 41.
“Večernje Novosti”, (Belgrade), 24 and 25 September 1986, see Judah notsupra at
p. 158. The Memorandum was subsequently published in a limited edition and then
republished several times, see also Branimir Anzulovi ć “Heavenly Serbia, from Myth
to Genocide” Hurst 1999 at p. 204, note 48.
32 SANU Memorandum, Annexes, vol 4, annex 14. See also Bennett, note 5 supra at pp.
33 81-82.
The authors included Dušan Kanazir, President of SANU and vice-President Antonije
Isaković. Serbian novelist and later first President of the FRY, Dobrica Ćosić has been
described as the driving force behind the Memorandum even though he did not
participate in its drafting, see Anzulović note 31 supra at p. 116. 35
2.44 The 1986 SANU Memorandum gave authority to the grievances of
Serbs for the wrongs which had allegedly been perpetrated upon them in
the SFRY system. By emphasising the right of the Serbian people “to
establish their full national and cultural integrity regardless of which
34
republic or autonomous province they live in”, the Memorandum
contributed to the rebirth of the idea of a “Greater Serbia” which would
encompass those parts of the territory in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina within which significant Serbian ethnic populations lived.
From the vantage point of the subsequent conflicts, the aspiration for
Serbian integrity reflected in the Memorandum can be interpreted as an
aspiration for the establishment of a Serbian state, embracing all those
territories within the SFRY which had Serb populations.
2.45 The Memorandum set forth a detailed analysis of the “crisis” in the
SFRY, accusing the late President Tito of having deliberately weakened
Serbia, and outlining the ways in which Serbia was said to have been
discriminated against, economically, culturally and politically. The SANU
Memorandum repeatedly criticised the constitutional position of Serbia: the
fact that two parts of its territory, Kosovo and Vojvodina, had been
afforded the status of Autonomous Provinces which had led to them
behaving as if they were “Federal units” rather than constituent parts of
Serbia. Serbia, it was claimed was now “the only nation in Yugoslavia
without its own state”. The Memorandum referred to the idea of a form of
nationalism having been imposed “from above”, and it alluded to the fact
that whilst other Yugoslav nations developed their national identities with
official support the same privilege was not extended to the Serbian people.
The Memorandum claimed that President Tito’s communist regime was,
36
from its inception in the 1920’s, both anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav, and
it claimed that the previously unified Serbian nation was dispersed among
the several Republics. 37The Memorandum found that this strategy made it
impossible for there to be established a Serbian state within the SFRY,
thereby ensuring the political and economic domination of Slovenia and
Croatia over Serbia.
2.46 The Memorandum went on to charge many in the SFRY of being
“anti-Serbian” because they had supported or tolerated the Albanian
protests in Kosovo in 1980 and 1981 and described events in Kosovo
34 See SANU Memorandum, note 32 supra, at p. 91.
35
36 Ibid., p. 81.
See for example pp. 76-77, ibid. where it is argued that the constitutional system set up
under Tito and Kardelj allowed Croatia and Slovenia to maintain political and
economic domination.
37 The SANU Memorandum focussed on the “great number of Serbs living outside
Serbia..more than the total populations of some other nations” see p. 87, ibid . 36
during this period as “physical, political, legal and cultural genocide of the
Serbian population”. 38The Memorandum also claimed that in Croatia a
covert programme was underway for the assimilation of the Serb
population, the ultimate purpose being the “Croatization” of ethnic Serbs. 39
One of the main arguments in support of the Memorandum’s principal
thesis was based on a common conception of the special position of the
Serbs as compared to other peoples. 40The Serbian people in the SFRY
constituted a primary entity, uniquely endowed with rights which bypassed
the political and geographical divisions enshrined in the 1974 Constitution:
“The integrity of the Serbian people and their culture throughout
Yugoslavia has emerged as the crucial issue of their survival and
41
development” ; “[The Serbian nation] .. is now the only nation in
Yugoslavia without its own state”. This approach had been initiated in the
late 1960s and elaborated by one of the most prominent Serbian
intellectuals, the writer Dobrica Ćosić who was to become Yugoslav
President in the 1990s, and derived from mystification, the cult of sacrifice
and an obsession with history. 43
2.47 To redress the problem facing the Serb people, the SANU
Memorandum proposed a review of the SFRY Constitution under which
the Autonomous Provinces would become integral parts of the Republic of
Serbia. Other defects would also have to be addressed, namely the fact that
under the 1974 Constitution the SFRY had become “a very loose state
community”. Thus the Memorandu44called for the strengthening of the
federal state of the SFRY. This option, generally referred to in the SFRY
as the “Unitarian option”, was unlikely to be acceptable to other Republics
in the SFRY, fearing the domination of Serbian interests in a unitarian
state.
2.48 The ideas adopted by the Memorandum drew on other views
expressed by the Serbian intellectual community. In the 1980’s prominent
Serbian historians spoke out, and later, other commentators including
Serbian scientists, writers and journalists lent their support to the idea that
38
Ibid., at p. 82 et seq.
39 Ibid., at pp. 84-87.
40
D. Ćosić, Stvarno i moguće (“The Real and the Possible), Ljubljana-Zagreb, 1988, at p.
190: “There are few European nations tortured by history as the Serbian nation was
tortured.”
41 SANU Memorandum, note 32 supra at p. 85.
42
Ibid., p. 81.
43 D. Ćosić, note 40 supra at p. 188: “The Serbian nation is known in the present time for
its great sacrifices and sufferings for freedom, which makes the essence of the idea of
the Serbian collective spirituality and moral”.
44
SANU Memorandum, note 32 supra at pp. 92-93. 37
the Serbs had been “tricked”, “sti45ed”, “killed”, “persecuted even after
being subjected to genocide”, and that Serbs were the eternal winners in
war but the losers in peacetime. 46 Theories about a conspiracy against the
47
Serbs began to emerge. And in the growing Serbian propaganda campaign
old communist dogmas and beliefs – such as equality among peoples and
ethnic groups, brotherhood, unity and solidarity – were abandoned in
favour of Serbian nationalist slogans and references to the Serbian
Orthodox creed, to Kosovo, and to Serbian historical myths. 48
2.49 The Memorandum was criticised in the Communist Party controlled
media between the autumn of 1986 and the spring of 1987, both within the
Republic of Serbia and in the other Republics of49he SFRY, and there were
calls for the SANU leadership to resign. The Memorandum was also
condemned by some of Belgrade’s leading communists including the
50
President of the Republic of Serbia, Ivan Stambolić . Nevertheless, certain
militant groups of Serbs in Kosovo and the rest of Serbia found support in
the message contained in the SANU Memorandum. 51Some commentators
have suggested that, but for Slobodan Miloševi ć, the Memorandum might
have languished. However, he was able to harness and develop further the
52
nationalist sentiments of which the Memorandum was an expression.
2.50 Despite criticism from certain quarters as described above, the 1986
SANU Memorandum was followed by a fervent nationalist campaign in the
Serbian media. Articles appeared and speeches were given which promoted
Serbian nationalism, demonized the Albanians, the Muslims and the Croats
and invoked their genocidal tendencies, and validated the Chetnik
movement. Following the publication of the Memorandum, nationalist
goals were expressed more freely and openly.
45 See “Hate Speech: The Stimulation of Serbian Discontent and Eventual Incitement to
Commit Genocide”, Appendices, vol 5, appendix 3 at paras. 30-32.
46 See for example Hate Speech note 45 supra, Appendices, vol 5, appendix 3 at para. 19.
See also Woodward, note 16 supra at pp. 75 and 92.
47
See for example Hate Speech ibid. at paras. 36-37.
48 See Bennett, note 5 supra at p. 81 et seq.
49
See Thomas, note 29 supra at p. 41.
50 Stambolić stated that the chauvinist message of the Memorandum was “diametrically
opposed to the interests of Serbs throughout Yugoslavia.” , Norman Cigar “Genocide in
Bosnia, the policy of ethnic cleansing” Texas A&M University Press 1995, p. 24.
51
Ibid., p. 42.
52 See Norman Cigar “Genocide in Bosnia” note 50supra at p. 32. 38
53
The Demonization of the Croats
2.51 With the growing Serbian propaganda efforts and the emergence of
extreme Serbian nationalism also came the promotion by Serb interests of
the idea that the Croats had always had – and now maintained – a genocidal
intent against the Serbs. In 1986 this theory was articulated by Vasilije
Krestić, a Professor of History at the University of Belgrade and member of
the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in a newspaper article entitled
“On the genesis of the genocide against the Serbs in the Independent State
of Croatia (NDH)”. 54 In that article, he stated that: “it is certain that the
genesis of the genothdal acts thmmitted against the Serbs in Croatia is to be
found in the 16 and 17 century, when the Serbs started to settle in
Croatian countries.”
2.52 Professor Kresti ć refers to other examples of Croatian-Sethian
conflicts which took place in the second half of the 19 century and
beginning of the 20 century in Croatia, and consistently blames the Croats
for the conflicts, accusing them also of wishing to destroy the Serbs.
Subsequently, other Serbian historians and journalists, influenced by the
ideas of Professor Krestić and his colleagues, as well as the ideas set out in
the 1986 SANU Memorandum, gave vent to the theory that the Croatian
people were collectively to blame for the large number of Serbs that were
killed by the Ustashas during the period 1941-45 and were accordingly, by
their very nature, genocidal in character and adhering to a continuing
genocidal intent against the Serbs.
2.53 From the early 1980’s, a growing number of Serbian newspapers
ran inflammatory articles about the Ustasha concentration camp in
Jasenovac, where terrible crimes had been committed against Serbs, Jews, 55
Roma/Gypsies, Croats and others during the Second World War. These
articles, authored by Serb historians and commentators such as Milan
Bulajić and Velimir Terzi ć exaggerated the numbers of those56urdered in
the camp, claimed that 700,000 Serbs had been killed. These figures were
subsequently increased to one million, and then several million, until
finally it was said that the precise number of Serbs killed “could not be
53
See generally Hate Speech, note 45 supra, Appendices, vol 5, appendix 3, in particular
paras. 30-38.
54 “Književne novine” 716, Belgrade, 15 September 1986.
55
56 See Hate Speech, note 45 supra, Appendices, vol 5, appendix 3 at paras. 29-31.
See also interview with Terzić in Intervju (Belgrade) August 5 1983, 9; and see
Bulatović “Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac” 1990, 413 cited in “Heavenly Serbia” note
31 supra at p. 201. 39
determined”. These claims did not accord with serious studies into the
number of victims murdered in the camp which had been carried out in the
1980’s. These studies had taken place against a background of longstanding
58
uncertainty about the exact number of victims. In 1946 it had been
claimed that 46,000 people had died in Jasenovac. In the following decades
the estimated number of victims increased and official figures gave the
number as between 600,000 and 700,000. An investigation into the matter 59
in the 1960’s found 59,000 names but the results were not made public.
Studies carried out in the 1980’s using demographic and historic analysis
showed that the number of victims was probably between 83,000 and
100,000. This approximate figure was reached in two separate
investigations, one carried out by a Croatian demographer, Žerjavi ć and 60
61
the other by a Serbian demographer, Kočović.
The Validation of the Chetnik Movement
2.54 Alongside the propaganda campaign for the strengthening of the
Federal state and the demonization of the Croats, there emerged also a
belated effort to validate the Chetnik Movement. Until the 1980’s this had
been a taboo subject. The intention of Serb nationalists was to reinterpret
62
the generally negative attitude of both communist historiography and
Western European historical analysis towards the Chetniks, who had been
Britain’s allies when the Second World War had broken out but who had
subsequently collaborated with the Italians and the Germans, and
committed atrocities against Moslems, Croats and anti-Fascist Serbs.
2.55 In public debat63in Serbia, the Chetnik movement was glorified, and
their crimes ignored. This was intended to convince the Serbian public
that crimes committed in the name of “national aims” were justifiable. The
57
M. Bulajić, Ustaški zločini genocida (Ustashas’ Crimes of Genocide); V. Terzi ć, Slom
Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941 (“The Break-up of the Kingdom of Jugoslavia in 1941”) I-
II, Beograd 1982; See also R. Bulatovi ć, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac s posebnim
obzirom na Donju Gradinu (“Concentration Camp Jasenovac, with special regard to
Donja Gradina”), Sarajevo, 1990.
58
See generally Anzulović, note 31 supra at pp. 103-104.
59 See Goldstein, note 8supra pp. 200-201.
60
V. Žerjavić, Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u Drugom svjetskom ratu “The Losses of
the Yugoslav Population in World War Two”, Zagreb 1989; “Obsessions and
Megalomania about Jasenovac and Bleiburg”, Zagreb 1992, p. 43 ff.
61 B. Kočović, Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji, “Victims of World War Two in
Yugoslavia”, London 1985.
62
See for example J. Tomašević “The Chetniks: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia 1941-
1945, Stanford CA 1975.
63 See Terzić, note [46] supra. 40
books of Veselin Đuretić (including “ Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna
drama” (“Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama”)), and a novel by Vuk
Drašković (“Nož” (“The Knife”)) a distinguished writer and later, politician
and former leader of an important Serbian party – Srpsk64Pokret Obnove –
sought to resurrect the reputation of the Chetniks.
Historic Revisionism and Serb Propaganda
2.56 The period 1985-1990 was characterized by these and other efforts
at promoting Serb nationalism. These efforts escalated after 1990, often
reaching absurd levels. By the beginning of 1991 Serbian propaganda was
relentlessly seeking to demonstrate the historic enmity of the Croats for the
Serbs. In April 1991 a Member of the Serbian Parliament – Milan Paroški –
made a well-publicised and widely reported speech in the village of
Jagodnjak in Baranja (north-eastern Croatia). He declared that anyone who
claimed the land as theirs “is a usurper, and you have the right to kill him
65
like a dog”. Baranja was occupied by Serbian forces in August 1991,
within six months of that speech, and remained under Serbian control until
1996. 66
2.57 These and other examples of historical revisionism might only have
been interesting and peculiar cultural phenomenon for observers to note.
However, subsequent events, particularly after Slobodan Miloševi ć seized
power in 1987, revealed the contribution which they made to the genocidal
acts which followed. The demonization of the Croats as harbouring
genocidal intentions against the Serbs, coupled with the promotion of the
idea of the Serbs as victims, played a significant role in preparing the
67
ground for the policy of ethnic cleansing and other acts of genocide.
2.58 Throughout Serbia – but in particular in Belgrade – hate speech was
tolerated, and became an acceptable, even desirable, form of public
68
communication. Many prominent personalities from Serbian political and
cultural life participated in this hysteria in the period 1986-1991. Hate
speech was one of the crucial elements which incited some Serbs to commit
64 See generally Anzulović “Heavenly Serbia” , note 31 supra, chapter 5.
65
“Vjesnik”, (Zagreb), 23 April 1991. See Video tape transcript clip 3, Appendices, vol 5,
appendix 2.
66 In relation to UNTAES see below at paras. 2.155-158.
67
See Hate Speech note 45 supra, Appendices, vol 5, Appendix 3 in particular paras. 35-
68 37.
See Bennett note 5 supra at p. 97 et seq. See also “Hate speech”, note 45supra,
Appendices, vol 5, appendix 3 particularly paras. 17-22 in relation to the role played by
Serbian newspapers. 41
genocide in Croatia in 1991 and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the
following years. 69Hate speech became an important factor in the
preparations for Serbian territorial expansion, undertaken by Serbia,
Montenegro, the JNA and a part of the Serb population of Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1991-93. The ideas described above
were repeated, and they had profound effects: they convinced the listeners
not only that they were true, but also that every action taken on the basis of
“an eye for an eye” was now justified and that the domination of one ethnic
group over another could be a legitimate and desirable goal. Revisionist
history encouraged the Serbs to see themselves as superior to other ethnic
groups within the SFRY, and therefore entitled to greater rights than others.
According to such history the Serbs had contributed the most towards the
creation of the SFRY, and the SFRY had treated them unjustly in return.
The Serbs had liberated all the other Yugoslav peoples, who returned the
favour with exploitation, genocide and the destruction of Serbia. The desire
for revenge focused in particular on the events of 1941, “for which no one
has ever been held to account”. In this context the Serbian people began to
show “justified anger”, first towards the Albanians in Kosovo, then towards
the Croats, and finally towards the Bosnian Moslems.
2.59 Despite the nationalist rhetoric which tended to portray Serbs as
victims in the SFRY, Serbs were significantly over-represented in Federal
administrative organs in proportion to their representation in the population
of the SFRY. In 1991 for example, the total number of people working for
the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs and diplomatic consular
representation was 2,238, of whom 1,210 or 54.07% were Serbs, while 127
or 5.6% were Croats. 70This was at a time when Serbs represented
approximately 36% of the population of the SFRY and Croats, 19-20%.
The figures also show that other non-Serbian nations were very poorly
represented in Federal organs of the SFRY.
P HASE TWO : SLOBODAN M ILOŠEVIĆ S R ISE TO P OWER
2.60 Against this background, and contributing to it, in 1987 Slobodan
Milošević moved to centre stage in Serbian politics. He had been a bank
manager and member of the Communist Party during his career. As a
young man, he was effective in building up 71pport because, it was said, he
provided what “people wanted to hear”. He was also effective in
69 See generally Hate Speech ibid Appendices, vol 5, appendix 3 and by way of example
paras. 47 and 50.
70 See Table 8 in “Croatia in Yugoslavia 1918-1991” contained in “Greater Serbia from
Ideology to Aggression” Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, 1993.
71
For an account of Milošević’s rise to power see Bennett note 5 supra, pp. 96-101. 42
72
exercising control of the media. In the spring of 1987 he was elected
President of the Central Committee of the Serbian communist party making
him, in effect, the leading figure in Serbian politics. Within a few months,
by the autumn of 1987, he had “purged” the party’s Central Committee and
the Local Committee of Belgrade of liberal spirits and had begun to rule
73
with the “firm hand” with which he was later to become associated.
During this time, he provided overt support to the Serbs against the
Albanians in Kosovo. Indeed, on 24 April 1987 on a visit to Kosovo he
gave a famous (and inflammatory) speech addressing the local Serbs at
which he repeated the slogan that “Nobody is allowed to beat this
people”. The speech was widely viewed as a signal that under his
leadership Serbian interests would prevail – whether in Kosovo or
elsewhere in the SFRY. The speech and the slogan were widely broadcast
in the Serbian media, and as a result a majority of the Serb populations – in
Serbia and in the other Republics – identified him as the defender of their
interests in Serbia and the SFRY. Miloševi ć’s aim at this point was to head
a mass nationalist movement and build a political base from which he could
dominate Serbian politics. 75
The End of Regional Autonomy
2.61 Serbian President Miloševi ć carried out a campaign of agitation
aimed at promoting Serbian nationalism. In the summer of 1988, supported
by militant groups of Serbs from Kosovo, he organized mass rallies in the
larger towns of Serbia, at which his followers threw yogurt at those local
officials who, in the name of autonomy, were opposed to Miloševi ć’s
centralising tendencies (this was the so-called “Yogurt Revolution”). 76In
the following months, there were widespread resignations of local officials
in the Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina (and later in the
Republic of Montenegro). These resignations led to the replacement of
government officials in Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo by supporters of
President Milošević, resulting in the loss of political autonomy in the two
72
“The Yugoslav Drama” Mihajlo Crnobrnja (former SFRY representative to the
European Community), I B Tauris Publishers London New York 1994 at p. 118.
Crnobrnja points out that even while Communist party boss in Belgrade Miloševi ć
effectively took control of the main Serbian newspapers and television.
73
74 Ibid., p. 96.
See Thomas, note 29 supra at p. 44.
75 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
76 th
See Bennett p. 99 and see Slobodan Miloševi ć, “Godine raspleta”, 1989,edition, p.
261. See also Silber and Little “The Death of Yugoslavia”, Penguin, BBC Books, 1995
at pp. 60-63. 43
77
Provinces. In Montenegro, a pro-Serbian leadership – supportive of
President Milošević – was established in January 1989. 78 In March 1989 a
Serbian Constitutional Act abolished, in contravention of the Federal
Constitution of the SFRY, the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina,
centralising power within the Socialist Republic of Serbia. In the ensuing
demonstrations in Kosovo, according to official figures 24 Albanians 79re
killed, while unofficial figures set the figure far higher. With these
changes in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro, Serbia came to control 4
votes in the Presidency of the SFRY (out of 8). This development can be
seen as marking the beginning of the constitutional crisis in the SFRY.
2.62 President Milošević made it clear that he would be willing to go
further in promoting Serbi80 interests, that he was equally interested in
matters outside Serbia, and that it would not be long before he began to
exert Serbian pressure on the leaderships of the SFRY and the other
Republics. A 1988 statement provided coded anticipation of future events:
“The solution for the problem in Yugoslavia would be provided by
the policy to which the majority of the people in this country has
committed itself, both institutionally and non-institutionally,
statutorily and non-statutorily, on the streets and at homes, both
along populist and elitist lines, with and without arguments, in any
case, in a way that makes it clear that it is a case of politics for
Yugoslavia, in which the people will live in a single state, on an
81
equal basis, with greater affluence and a richer culture”.
2.63 A year later, on 28 June 1989, at the celebration of the 600 th
anniversary of the Gazimestan Battle in Kosovo, President Milošević gave
a speech about the lessons of the battle in Kosovo, and how they could be
applied to “contemporary battles fought by the Serbs”. For the first time
Serbian President Milošević stated expressly that the use of force would not
82
be ruled out to protect Serbian interests. He also stated that, six centuries
after the battle:
77
See Bennett, note 5 supra pp. 99-100.
78 Ibid., p. 99.
79
80 See Bennett, p. 100.
See Marcus Tanner “Croatia, A Nation Forged in War” Yale University Press 1997, pp.
217-220.
81 S. Milošević, Godine raspleta, note 76 supra.
82
See “The Serbs History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia” Tim Judah, Yale
Nota Bene 2000, at p. 164. 44
“we are facing new battles. Not armed battles, though this too may
be the ca83. We cannot win them without determination and
valour.”
This statement by Miloševi ć was interpreted by observers in Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a declaration that force would be used to
impose Serb domination within the SFRY.
2.64 During 1990, against the background of the dissolution of the
USSR, multiparty elections were held throughout the SFRY. Many parties,
particularly in the most economically developed Republics, proposed a
loose confederation for the SFRY to replace the Federal structure of the
1974 Constitution. It would have permitted the Republics to choose their
own form of government, including multiparty democracy rather than
84
communism. These proposals were seen as a means of protecting the
interests of the individual Republics – and the rights of ethnic groups –
against the centralizing and Serb-dominating policies of President
Milošević. New Governments were elected in Croatia and Slovenia,
committed to the maintenance of the sovereign rights of the Republics and
a looser, less-centralised federal structure.
2.65 In response to these developments Serbian President Miloševi ć
asserted that a confederal structure would call into question the existing
borders between the Republics. Other fig85es in the Serb leadership also
rejected the idea of a confederation. Expressing support for the rightful
claims of the Serbian ethnic minority in Croatia and in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Milošević announced that if the SFRY was to be organized
other than in accordance with the Serbian scheme to which he was
committed – a strong, centralized state – he and his followers would take
steps to give effect to a Greater Serbia. President Milošević said:
“… we hold that each nation has the equal right to decide freely
about its destiny. Such a right can be constrained solely by the
same, equal right of other nations. As far as the Serb people are
concerned, it wants to live in one State. Hence, division into
several States which would separate the Serb people and force it to
live in different sovereign States is, from our point of view,
unacceptable, that is – let me be clear – out of the question. The
83
See Video tape transcript Appendices, vol 5, appendix 2, Clip 2.
84 See Bennett note 5 supra at p. 109.
85 Borisav Jović in “ Last Days of the SFRY (Excerpts from a Diary)” Appendices, vol 5,
appendix 4.3, notes on 1 January 1991 that “For us a state must be unitary or federal. A
confederation is not a state and as a nation we refuse to consider that... This means in
practice that we contest the Republics’ right to secede, because that right does not
belong to them, but rather to the nations.” 45
Serbian nation will live in one State and every nation wanting to
live with the Serbian people in the same State on an equal basis is
welcome. For us, confederation is not a State. […] [A]s far as the
Serbian nation is concerned, a solution according to which it
would be separated into several States, cannot be discussed.” 86
The implication of the speech was clear: the Serbs would continue to live in
the SFRY, or they would live in a new Yugoslav state which would
encompass the large parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in which
they were a majority – or significant minority – of the population.
2.66 The decline of communism throughout Europe gave rise to the
search for new ideologies for Serbian communists, in particular
nationalism. Hatred towards others was accompanied by a “blood and soil”
ideology (“Serbia is where Serbian graves can be found” was an oft-
repeated expression). At Serb nationalist rallies in 1989, those in the crowd,
in particular individuals wearing traditional Chetnik uniforms, shouted “We
want arms!” Wishing to break the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of
Kosovo and Vojvodina, Milošević claimed that “Serbia will be a State, or
otherwise it will not exist at all”.
Intensification of the Propaganda Campaign against other Yugoslav
Republics
2.67 After the November 1990 election campaign in Serbia and
Montenegro, Serbian propaganda intensified against the other Republics of
the SFRY. The first to be affected was Slovenia, which in the 1980’s had
adopted the most liberal economic and social policies of the SFRY. Public
opinion in Slovenia was increasingly sensitive to the growing populist
campaign emanating from Serbia, and opposed to the policies of Serbia
under President Miloševi ć. As a result Serbia put pressure on Slovenia,
boycotting its products and accusing it of having “separatist” designs and
“seeking the collapse of Yugoslavia”. Serbia also brought pressure to bear
on Croatia. The Serbian media described the development of multi-party
system in other Republics as a “reawakening of retrograde ideas”. Serbian
politicians and the media continually claimed that these developments
reflected the “re-establishment of the Ustasha movement”.
2.68 In November 1989, Serbia exerted pressure outside its borders for
the first time. Pro-Serbian demonstrators from Kosovo (by arrangement
with the Serbian authorities) called for a “rally of truth” in Ljubljana in
Slovenia on 1 December. The stated intention was to inform the Slovenian
86 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 January 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 30 46
public about the “true” happenings in Kosovo; the real intention was to
remind the Slovenian Government of the consequences of its pursuing an
independent line. The demonstrators also announced that they would stop
off in Zagreb. This was the first attempt to export a Serb nationalist
ideology to areas which were not majority Serb.
The 14 Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY)
th
2.69 In January 1990 the 14 Congress of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia was held in Belgrade. 87The Congress marked the moment at
which the rupture of the SFRY became a real possibility, and was widely
88
recognised as such. The Congress was charged “with the task of finding a
solution for the deepening social crisis” – namely the differences between
the Republics – of which some (Slovenia, Croatia) sought greater
independence, whereas others (Serbia) sought to centralize power within
the federal structures. Since all decisions of the League were to be voted by
consensus of the Republican delegations, it was apparent that Serbian
President Milošević could not impose his conception of centralization and
Serbian domination on the other member Republics of the SFRY. The
Slovenian and Croatian communists had already made preparations for
democratic elections, and were increasingly committed to greater political
and economic sovereignty for the individual Republics. After thur days of
fruitless discussion, the Slovenian delegation left the 14 Congress, and the
Croatian delegates declined to accept the proposal of the Serbian and
Montenegrin delegations for the Congress to continue. The Congress
collapsed.
2.70 Following the Congress, positions among the Serb leadership
appeared to harden. Borisav Jovi ć notes that, following a meeting of the
SFRY Presidency on 13 February 1990, Serbian President Milošević said to
him “There is going to be war by God!” 89
2.71 In the autumn of 1990, Serbian President Miloševi ć began to make
other plans to maintain Serbian control over the SFRY and the Republics.
Power in the SFRY could not be assured by Serbia through control of the
constitutional structures. The Presidency of the SFRY had no power, and
87 A Congress would normally be held every few years in order to frame party policy, this
Congress was called by Milošević as an extraordinary meeting.
88
Milošević intended to use the Congress to impose his model of a unified, disciplined
party which did not tolerate dissent (the Serbian model) and defeat those such as Ku čan
who wanted more local autonomy, see further Bennett note 5 supra at p. 110.
89 Jović, note 85 supra, vol 5, appendix 4.3, note of 13 February 1990; Chapter 3, para.
3.3. 47
the policies of the Republics were increasingly being made within the
Republics themselves. The possibility of the use of all kinds of pressure –
including military force – in the interests of the goal of a “Greater Serbia”
was actively explored. The Serbian leadership became progressively closer
to the leadership of the JNA. 90 Since Serbian and Montenegrin officers
were dominant in commanding positions in the JNA, they were easy to win
over, while the officers from other ethnic groups had to be either forced to
obedience or removed from positions of authority. 91
The Relativisation of the Borders between Republics by Serbia
2.72 As the disputes between the Republics became more intense,
significant differences emerged as to the location of territorial borders. As
described above, the territorial borders of the Republics had not been
changed since 1945, save for minor adjustments. Moreover their
maintenance was expressly provided for by the 1974 Constitution of the
SFRY. Two opposing views emerged. For Serbia, the only internationally
recognised borders were the outer borders of the SFRY. From a Serbian
perspective all borders of the individual Republics, were merely
“administrative” in character and could be modified. 93 According to this
view, which was contrary to the 1974 Constitution, these borders did not
express the sovereign limits of the Republics, since only the SFRY was
sovereign. It followed that the insistence by some of the Republics –
Slovenia and Croatia – that they were sovereign within their existing
borders was unacceptable for Serbia. 94This view was maintained in Serbia
even after the dissolution of the SFRY and the formation of the FRY.
Professor Ratko Marković, a Professor at Belgrade Law School and Serbian
politician, in a paper published in 1994 describes the borders between the
federal units as not having the status of state borders and commented that
90 Chapter 3, para. 3.3 et seq.
91
Chapter 3, paras. 3.15-3.16.
92 See Part One infra at para. 2.15.
93
See “Ethnic Composition of the Population of Serbia and Montenegro and the Serbs in
SFR of Yugoslavia”, University of Belgrade, Belgrade 1993 at p. 17, describing the
Serbs as “internees of the administrative interior boundaries between the Yugoslav
federal units” and criticising the European Community’s aspirations to recognize “the
administrative boundaries between Yugoslav federal states as the untouchable state
borders.”
94 See the Introduction to a 1991 book on the issue published in Belgrade by Miodrag
Zečević, Bogdan Leki ć, “Državne granice i unutrašnja teritorijalna podela
Jugoslavije”(International Borders and Internal Territorial Division of Yugoslavia)
Građevinska knjiga Beograd 1991 which refers to an attempt by some Republics to
declare their administrative-territorial borders to be international borders. 48
the federal units within the federation are not foreign states vis-à-vis each
95
other and that internal borders were not unchangeable.
2.73 Serbia considered that no Republic could determine the fate of
peoples who wanted to stay in the SFRY. If individual Republics (Slovenia
and Croatia were the most likely) opted for “secession” – the proclamation
of autonomy or independence – the borders of the “secessio96st” Republics
would be determined by the rest of the SFRY. In the process of
determining the borders, the principle of the self-determination of those
people who did not want to leave the SFRY – in particular the Serbs –
should be paramount and would mean in practice that these peoples would
decide on the borders for all the others. Serbian nationalists went so far as
to claim that, by entering the SFRY, the right of the people to self-
determination was extinguished, and the only legitimate option that existed
was to remain in the SFRY.
2.74 Some Serbian politicians advocated the view that Serbia alone was
entitled to decide on the borders of the SFRY and the Republics, since the
creation of Yugoslavia after World War One was due exclusively to the
role played by Serbia. According to this view, the states which had been
part of the Austria-Hungarian Empire in 1918 were actually Serbian
territorial gains. A leading proponent of this view was Professor Kosta
Čavoški, a prominent intellectual and Professor of the Law School in
Belgrade. In April 1991 he wrote:
“The Serbian people, of course, cannot accept [these borders],
because if they did so, it would annul all the results of the
liberation wars fought between 1912 and 1918. Therefore, the
Serbian people must show in advance its determination not to
accept the existing inter-republican borders if Yugoslavia is split
up.”97
This view was endorsed by the leadership of Serbia.
2.75 Further claims were made on the basis of the alleged culpability of
others, especially the Croats, towards the Serbian people. This was also
addressed by Professor Čavoški:
95
See “What are Yugoslavia’s Internal Borders?” published in “The Creation and
Changes of the Internal Borders of Yugoslavia” published by the Ministry of
Information of the Republic of Serbia, Beoprint 1994, at p. 9.
96 See for example Speech of Borisav Jović speaking to political activists of Vranje, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, January 18 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 31.
97
Srpski nacionalni program (“The Serbian National Program”), Special edition “IPM”
Srbija, April 1991, p. 23. 49
“Since in the former Independent State of Croatia (NDH) genocide
was committed against the Serbian people, according to my
opinion, the situation before 1941, in other words the census from
1931, must be taken as the basis for delimitation of the borders on
the territories in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This has to
be taken into consideration, since no people, not even the Croatian
people, should benefit from the crimes that it had committed
against other peoples”. 98
2.76 Pro-Milošević politicians in Serbia began to propose the revision of
borders on grounds of ethnicity. They stressed the fact that no less than
24% of the Serbs in the SFRY lived outside Serbian borders. Whilst
correct, that fact omitted to mention that the same situation applied, for
example, to Croats, 22% of whom lived in Republics of the SFRY other
than Croatia. Numerous Serbian politicians and intellectuals proposed the
location of the new border between Croatia and Serbia. In the first half of
1991 the most prominent advocate of the new border was Vojislav Šešelj, a
Serbian politician and President of the Serbian Radical Party who
subsequently became a member of the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia
and Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia (and who was re-
elected to Parliament in the elections of December 2000 ). 99
In his public appearances he proposed as a new bor100, the “line” running
through Virovitica-Karlovac-Ogulin-Karlobag He said:
“The western border is the Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica
line. The rest of them are already internationally recognised. There
can be no changes unless a new war takes place. These are
Karlobag, Ogulin, Karlovac and Virovitica. The blue areas are
populated by a Serbian majority. You can see that Croats don’t
have much territory left. We don’t have any paramilitary
formations in this narrow Serbia. We only enlist volunteers and
send them to Serbian Slavonia, Baranja, western Sirmium and
Krajina. They are directed to the command of local Serbian
commanders. There they follow combat orders.
98
Ibid., p. 20.
99 Šešelj was promoted in August 1990 to the rank of Chetnik commander or vojvoda by
Momčilo Dujić, wartime commander of the Chetniks in the Knin region. The two later
fell out in 1993. Duji ć is wanted in Croatia for numerous crimes committed against
Croats, Thomas p. 141.
100
See Tanner note 80 supra at pp. 245-246. 50
The army troops protect Serbian people there, so that our units do
not have to take action.” 101(See Plate 7).
He also said:
“The Serbian Radical Party and the Serbian Chetnik Movement
believe that within the borders of the free and independent Serbian
State should be included, in addition to the existing territories, the
smaller Serbian federal [territories] as well as Serbian Macedonia,
Serbian Montenegro, Serbian Herzegovina, the town of
Dubrovnik, Serbian Dalmatia, Serbian Lika, Banija and Kordun,
Serbian Slavonia and the Baranja. We believe that the western
borders of the Serbian State extend along the line Karlobag-
Ogulin-102lovac-Virovitica. We do not know what lies behind this
line.”
This statement – supported by Serbian President Miloševi ć 103 – confirmed
the extent to which the territorial definition of “Greater Serbia” (set out at
Plate 7/bis) had, by 1991, achieved general political acceptance.
The “Amputation” of Croatia
2.77 The 1986 SANU Memorandum, the statement of Šešelj and the
practice of President Milošević coalesced around a104dea that came to be
referred to as the “amputation of Croatia”. According to this idea, some
50 % of the existing territory of the Croatian Republic would be cut away
from the existing boundaries of 105 Republic of Croatia and included within
an extended Serbian state. For its Serbian proponents the idea had the
double benefit of allowing the international community to form the
impression that Croatia would be able to express its right to self-
determination, whilst at the same time ensuring that Serbia would secure
significant territorial gains and bring Serbs within Croatia into the territory
101
See Video Tape Transcript, clip 4, Appedices, vol 5, Appendix 2, See vol 3, Plate 2.6;
vol 3 Plates 10.3 and 10.4.
102 Srpski nacionalni program, supra note 97, p. 34.
103
See Silber and Little note 76 supra at p. 161.
104 Borisav Jovi ć reports Serbian President Miloševi ć srrth
“amputation” of Croatia in a conversation with him on 28 June 1990, note 85 supra,
Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.3.
105
See Annexes, vol 3, Plate 2.6. 51
106
of Serbia. The core of the “amputation” consisted of those parts of
Croatia in which Serbs were the majority or a significant minority of the
population (but the “amputation” was also to include larger towns falling
within “Greater Serbia” – such as Dubrovnik, Split, Zadar, Šibenik and
Osijek – in which there were relatively few Serbs). The original core of 11
districts with a Serbian ethnic majority gradually grew due to the further
addition of smaller Serbian enclaves, but also of those areas, where the
st
Serbs had never been the majority population. A map published on 1
March 1991 in the Serbian weekly paper Nin provided the clearest possible
indication of the Serbian intent to extend its territorial limits into the
Republic of Croatia. 107 (See Plate 8).
2.78 The “Greater Serbian” territorial plans were also elaborated and
outlined by others with public responsibilities in Serbia, speaking on behalf
of scientific institutions or political parties. In March 1991 Jovan Ili ć,
Professor at the Belgrade University and President of the Serbian
Geographic Society, in an interview for the Belgrade daily paper, openly
pleaded for new borders should the SFRY collapse:
“The basic principle of the boundary determination should be an
ethnic principle, because the main argument between the Croats108
and the Serbs has a religious and national background.”
In an interview given in October 1991 Professor Ili ć also pleaded for a
mass migration of the various populations:
“If the border determination is done at the level of towns, and not
at district level, then it can be done well. There is a sustained
territory in the area around the town of Zadar and Biograd na
moru, along the Kninska Krajina, from Lika, Banija and Kordun to
the river of Sava, where the Serbs are the majority population; in
some towns there are 90 Serbs out of 100 inhabitants… It is
possible to put in place certain migrations of the population, only
if this would guarantee stability and peace in Yugoslavia. It would
be an additional eff109, which would secure peace even for the
next generations.”
106
Borisav Jović reports a conversation with Dobrica Ćosić on 11 September 1990 in
which the latter refers to the drawing up of an ethnic map of Serb territory which
included Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in order to show the areas where the
Serbs were in the majority, note 85 supra, Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.3.
107 See also above at para. 2.76.
108
“Nin”, (Belgrade), 8 March 1991.
109 Intervju, 11 October 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 18. 52
Inherent in this statement is the assumption that peoples of different
ethnicities could not live together. The clear implication was that non-Serb
populations should not remain in these areas. They could leave voluntarily,
they could be forced out, or they could be destroyed. During 1991 this view
became dominant in Serbian policy and public opinion and was endorsed
by the political authorities at the highest levels. At a meeting of the SFRY
Presidency and the “Supreme Command Staff” on 15 March 1991, Borisav
Jović, at that time Serbian representative and President of the SFRY
Presidency, is reported by former President Mesić to have said:
“The Serbs have the right to live in Yugoslavia, and if someone
wants to secede, then the Serbs have the right to live in a State
regardless of [what] it is called. You in Croatia will have to
understand this.” 110
2.79 Mihajlo Markovi ć, a prominent public figure, member of the
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, one of the authors of the 1986
Memorandum, and Vice-President of the Socialist Party of Serbia,
addressed the problem of the new borders in an interview with Politika (a
pro-government newspaper) on 30 August 1991. Seemingly, Markovi ć was
ready to accept Croatian independence:
“Those nations, who want to leave, will do so, and those who
prefer to stay, will stay in Yugoslavia.”
But at the same time he set the territorial conditions:
“Yugoslavia must determine its new borders... That new border
must follow the line of the border determination between the
Serbian and the Croatian people. The JNA must take control of the
new border”. 111
At the time Markovi ć was Serbian President Miloševi ć’s most important
political adviser. It is notable that at precisely the time that the JNA had
embarked on its genocidal campaign in Croatia – summer 1991 – he was
treating the Army as though it was the “Serbian Army”, subject to control
by the Government of the Republic of Serbia, under instructions of
President Milošević.
2.80 In contrast to the Serbian ideas about the transformation of borders
and territory, the other Republics, primarily Croatia and Slovenia, argued
for the retention of the existing borders, which had been in place unchanged
110
Stjepan Mesić, “Kako je srušena Jugoslavija” (“How Yugoslavia was Brought Down”),
111 Mislav Press Zagreb 1994, at p. 26, Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.2.
Politika, 30 and 31 August 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 16. 53
since World War Two and in most cases before that, 112and for their
international recognition. The legal basis for this view was the 1974
Constitution according to which the Republics were defined as states and
not administrative units, 113 with guaranteed territorial and border
integrity.114 The Constitutions of each of the Republics contained similar
provisions. This opinion, which was first formulated by Croatia and
Slovenia, was later accepted by Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and for a short period of time even by the Montenegrin leadership. It is to
be noted that this view was confirmed later in 1991 by the Arbitration
Commission established under the European Community Conference on
Yugoslavia (known as the Badinter Commission). 115
The Instrumentalization of the Serbs in Croatia and the Creation of the
Serb Democratic Party
2.81 The Serbs in Croatia reacted in different ways to the political
changes and the appearance of opposition parties in 1989. The Serbs living
in the larger cities in Croatia, especially the intellectuals, had a more
realistic understanding of Croatian aspirations than those living in villages
and in towns with a Serb majority. Some of the “urban” Serbs became
involved in the Croatian opposition parties, and others were sympathetic.
By contrast, in the parts of Croatia where they were a majority, the attitude
of some Serbs to the development of a multi-party system in Croatia was
one of concern and distrust. Under the influence of the media onslaught
from Belgrade, and allegedly fearing a repetition of the events of 1941,
112 See Part One infra at paras. 2.06-2.10.
113
Article 3 of the 1974 Constitution provided in part that: “The Socialist Republics are
states based on the sovereignty of the people….”.
114 Article 5 of the 1974 provided that the borders between the Republics could be changed
only on the basis of an agreement between the Republics, see further Part One above at
para. 2.15.
115
All the Republics of the former Yugoslavia accepted the authority of that Commission.
In Opinion No. 3 of 11 January 1992, the Badinter Commission expressed its view on
the nature of the borders between the Yugoslavs republics. The Commission found that
the outer borders of Yugoslavia “must be respected in any case” Then it found that the:
“demarcation between Croatia and Serbia, or between Serbia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, or between other neighboring countries, can be changed only by free and
common agreement... In the absence of such an agreement, the former border
determination gains the status of a border protected under international law. This is the
conclusion made according to the principle of respecting the territoriastatus quo”.
Badinter Commission Opinion No 3. See V. Degan, Samoodređenje naroda i
teritorijalna cjelovitost država u uvjetima raspada Jugoslavije (“Self-determination of
the nations and the Territorial Integrity of the states in the time of the downfall of
Yugoslavia”), Zakonitost 46, No. 4, pp. 543-569. 54
some Serb communities began to “organize themselves”. 116Often this was
with the assistance of public authorities in the Republic of Serbia and the
JNA, which was by then already under strong Serbian influence. 117In 1989
and 1990 some Serb communities also started to arm themselves, and to
118
draw up “emergency plans”.
2.82 In February 1990 the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) was formed by
Serbs in Croatia. 119 In their documentation they claimed that the “regional
partition in Croatia was outdated” and that it “did not respond to the
historic interests of the Serb nation”. The Party proposed a new
administrative partition; this later developed into a request for complete
autonomy or a later separation.
2.83 In different parts of Croatia, some Serb communities organized
election campaigns that called into question the trend towards
democratisation in Croatia and the SFRY. In February 1990 “truth
meetings” were organized in four Serb villages in the area of Vukovar, as
in the other parts of the SFRY. The Communist authorities stopped this
with the explanation that “mono-national assemblies would only worsen the
relatively stable situation”. But the Serb meeting in Vojni ć on 4 February
1990 accepted the idea, for the first time, of forming a so-called “Serb
Autonomous Region” (SAO) in Croatia. In March 1990 in Petrova Gora on
Kordun, about 70 kilometers south of Zagreb, local rebel Serbs arranged a
rally near the well-known Partisan monument. Before a crowd of nearly ten
thousand Serbs including those from the villages in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and some from Serbia, they declared their dissatisfaction with
the programmes of nearly every Croatian party. “Greater Serbian”
aspirations could be heard (several groups were shouting “This is Serbia!”).
The crowd responded especially positively to the production of a large
sheet of paper with the outline of Yugoslav borders drawn; within the
borders was a blank space. The image was intended to indicate a unified
Yugoslavia, without any Republics or any Republican borders. Every
reference to Yugoslavia, the JNA or Serbia was greeted with euphoria.
They read out a message to the Serbian public:
“we dismiss all individual dreams of a confederation and this is
the last warning for those who want to destroy Yugoslavia…”
116 See Thomas, note 29 supra at page 55 and see “The Serbian Krajina” Mile Dakić, Iskra
Knin 1994 (“Information Agency of the RSK”), Chronology of Important Events for
1989 and 1990 for instances of Serb organisation.
117
Chapter 3, para 3.27 et seq.
118 Mile Dakić, note 116 supra.
119 The SDS was formed by Jovan Raškovi ć and other Serb nationalists, see Tanner note
80 supra at p. 224. 55
2.84 Following the elections of April 1990 in the Republic of Croatia,
120
which were won by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and the
establishment of a new Government of the HDZ headed by Franjo Tuđman,
the Serbs became more radical in their attitudes in those areas where they
were a majority or formed a significant percentage of the population. The
Serb nationalist SDS extended its influence at the expense of the
Communists, who renamed themselves the Social Democrats. Within a few
months the Social Democrats had lost almost all support in the Serb areas.
The distrust of the Serbs in Croatia became even greater with the adoption
of the traditional Croatian flag and national coat of arms, without any
communist symbol, which was “viewed” by the political authorities in the
Republic of Serbia as heralding a return to the Ustasha flag and coat of
arms (notwithstandin121he fact that a similar flag and coat of arms had been
used for centuries). A significant part of the Serbian population in the
Republic of Croatia was obtaining its news information exclusively from
the Serbian media, which was misrepresenting the situation in Croatia: as
described above and in Chapter 3, they were constantly claiming that the
new Government of the Republic of Croatia was an Ustasha government
and that it was preparing a genocide on the Serbs.22
P HASE T HREE : THE C ONFLICT AND G ENOCIDE IN C ROATIA
2.85 Published documents and some memoirs, especially those of
Milošević’s closest associate Borisav Jovi ć, later member and President of
the Federal Presidency, 123and the SFRY Defence Minister Veljko
Kadijević,124indicated that conflict between Serbia and Croatia was
inevitable. By 1991 Serbia’s policy had two alternative objectives: to
prevent Croatia from achieving independence from the SFRY and
maintaining it under Serbian control exercised through Federal institutions,
alternatively (if that policy failed) ensuring that an independent Croatia
existed within significantly reduced borders than that of the Republic of
Croatia within the SFRY. The latter objective was premised on a Serbian
desire to ensure that a large part of the territory of the Republic of Croatia
should remain subject to Serbian control, even if that meant the use of force
and, ultimately, the displacement or destruction of significant parts of the
120
Tanner p. 227.
121 Ibid., at p. 223.
122
123 See Bennett, note 5 supra at p. 129.
Jović, B, Poslednji dani SFRJ. Izvodi iz dnevnika (“The Last Days of SFRY. Extracts
from Diary”). Belgrade, 1995. Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4. 3.
124 Kadijević, V, Moje viđenje raspada – vojska bez države , “As I See the Disintegration-
An Army without a State” Belgrade, 1993, Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.1. 56
Croatian population. Such displacement or destruction required the
involvement of the JNA and Serbian paramilitaries.
2.86 An important element of the Serbian policy was the encouragement
and logistical support of Serb rebellion in the Republic of Croatia, with the
aim of subordinating the Republic of Croatia to a centralized SFRY under
Serbian President Milošević, within the frame of a “Greater Serbia”. Not all
Serbs, 125and not all Serb-populated areas, joined the rebellion against the
new Government of the Republic of Croatia which was elected in May
1990. 126
2.87 The representatives of the SDS claimed to be seeking “autonomy”
for the Serb nation, but it remained unclear how such autonomy was to
relate to Serbia. The SDS did not present the Croatian public with an
official detailed document, nor did most of the Serbs in Croatia participate
in any democratic, electoral or parliamentary127ocess in the course of which
such matters would have been addressed. From the summer of 1990 until
the summer of 1991, when Serbia’s genocidal campaign began, mass
protests and demonstrations were organized on the territory of the Republic
of Croatia. Their purpose was mainly to encourage Serbs to mobilise. The
only thing that could be considered a program was a statement by the first
President of the SDS, Jovan Rašković:
“for every step which Tu đman takes distancing Croatia from
[SFRY] we shall make a step towards distancing ourselves from
128
Croatia”.
2.88 In the meantime the Belgrade media continued to prepare the Serb
population for the impending Croatian “genocide” against them, in
particular during the 1990 election campaign and subsequently.
Notwithstanding the fact that no one had been injured, the leadership of the
Serb Democratic Party (SDS) consciously intensified the perception of
threat to the Serbian community in Croatia. In May 1990 unknown
perpetrators allegedly injured a young SDS activist in Benkovac, near
Knin. Rašković used the opportunity to proclaim a total break in relations
between the SDS and the Croatian Government and Parliament, alleging
129
“intimidation” of Serbs. Rather than take up their parliamentary seats in
125
126 See Bennett note 5 supra, p. 164.
Examples include Serbs from Gorski Kotar, where Serb propaganda was not so strong,
so that the Croatian politicians agreed to reasonable suggestions on time, and the
rebellion was stopped.
127 The SDS boycotted the Sabor in which it had won 5 seats during the elections, see
128 Tanner, note 80 supra, at p. 229 and Bennett, note 5 supra, at p. 130.
See Goldstein, note 8supra at p. 217.
129 See Bennett note 5 supra at p. 130. 57
the Sabor, on 1 July 1990 the SDS M130 formed the Union of communes of
Lika and northern Dalmatia. There followed further incitements,
encouraging large sectors of the Serb population in parts of Croatia, in
particular Eastern Slavonia, to rebellion.
The Serb Rebellion in Croatia
2.89 On 25 July 1990, the Government of the Republic of Croatia passed
amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia: the term
“socialist” was removed from the name of the country, a new coat of arms
and flag was adopted, and the titles of the President of Croatia (instead of
the President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Croatia) and
Minister (instead of Republic Secretary) were introduced. On the same day,
at a mass rally in the village of Srb, on the border with Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Milan Babi ć of the SDS announced the establishment of a
“Serb National Council”, turning the Union of Serbian districts which had
been set up on 1 July into the “government” of a break away state. 131 The
establishment of the Council was premised on a refusal by the Serb
community to recognize any of the constitutional changes taking place in
Croatia. The first act of the Knin-based “Assembly” was to declare the
sovereignty and independence of the Serb nation in Croatia. The Council
issued a Declaration on the sovereignty and autonomy of the Serbs in
Croatia, and it announced that there would be a “referendum” on the
question of Serb autonomy in Croatia. 132
2.90 T133following month, in August 1990, SDS members seized all
weapons from the local storage depots of the Territorial Defence in those
regions which they controlled. This was often done with the help of the
local police officers who then renounced their loyalty to the Croatian
government. The Croatian government attempted unsuccessfully to
negotiate with the representatives of the local Serbs, in an effort to secure
the return of the weapons and calm the situation. The “Serb National
Council” announced that a “referendum on Serb autonomy” would take
130
See Tanner note 80 supra at p. 231 and also Bennett note 5 supra at p. 130.
131 See Tanner note 80 supra at p. 232.
132
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 July 1990, Annexes, vol 4, annex 29. The
“referendum” was first announced by Raškovi ć at the Srb rally, see Tanner at p. 232.
133 Milan Martić, Minister of Police, and later Minister of Defense and President of the
self-proclaimed Serb autonomy in Croatia, speaks about this in 1991. Different from
1990 when the weapon robbery had to be hidden according to Martić in 1991 there are
no reasons “for me not to say that the break in of the citizens into the police weapon
depots a year ago was staged” (Borba, 19 August 1991). See also Bennett at p. 136. 58
place in August 1990. 134Several dozen Croatian police officers traveled to
Knin with helicopters to prevent the “referendum”. The J135threatened to
attack them and forced them to return to Zagreb. The self-styled “Serb
Council for National Resistance” claimed to be terrified because of the
“arrival of the Ustashas”. People began to flee, and the mayor of Knin,
Milan Babić, by now a key figure among the Serbian rebels in Croatia,
declared on Serbian Radio Knin that “a war situation” had arisen. 136
2.91 The Serbs blocked the roads and rail lines in northern Dalmatia, in
the area of Knin, Obrovac and Benkovac, using tree-trunks and
137
barricades. Although the Croatian press and politici138 sought to portray
these events as the acts of drunken extremists, it appeared that these
developments and the provocation of the Croatian government had been
planned and organized in Belgrade. Moreover, it now became apparent that
the JNA was arming the local Serb population, a precursor to the support
that was to be provided by the JNA to Serb rebels in Croatia during the
139
autumn on 1991 and subsequently.
2.92 The direct consequences of the “tree-trunk-revolution” were
significant: rail traffic through Knin stopped; the ports of Zadar, Šibenik
and Split were blocked and there was a significant decrease of traffic. As
soon as the first incidents took place in mid August, many tourists left the
140
Croatian summer resorts.
The 1990 “Referendum” on Serb Autonomy and its Aftermath
2.93 A “referendum” on Serb autonomy in Croatia took place on 19
August 1990. It was supported by the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the
political authorities of Belgrade. The141were no proper voting lists, so that
many people in Belgrade voted. The result, almost 100% in favor of
autonomy, provided the basis for further measures. The “Serb National
Council” pronounced all municipalities with substantial or majority Serb
populations to be “autonomous”. Shortly afterwards, Babić proclaimed the
birth of the “Autonomous Region of Krajina”. In the following months the
134 See Bennett note 5 supra.
135
Tanner note 80 supra at p. 233; Silber and Little note 76 supra at p. 108.
136 See Tanner note 80 supra p. 233; Silber and Little note 76 supra at p. 109.
137
See Bennett note 5 supra p. 136 and Tanner note 80 supra at p. 233.
138 See Tanner note 80 supra at p. 233.
139
See Goldstein note 8 supra p. 218 and Chapter 3 para. 3.59 et seq.
140 See Tanner note 80 supra at p. 278 and footnote as to the “incalculable”loss of earnings
from tourism in the region as a result of the war.
141
See Goldstein note 8 supra at p. 219. 59
Serbs repeatedly blocked road and rail lines in Knin and Eastern Slavonia,
but there were no casualties until 31 March 1991, 142 notwithstanding the
constant rumours and propaganda about the “genocidal objectives” of the
Croats.
2.94 On 22 December 1990 the new Constitution of the Republic of
Croatia was proclaimed, completing the program of constitutional liberal-
democratic reforms. The Constitution envisaged a multi-ethnic Croatia with
safeguards for minority communities. The reaction of the Serbian
community in Knin was to adopt a resolution on the establishment of the
“Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina (SAO Krajina)”, with its own
“Constitution”. 143
2.95 The territorial extent of the “SAO Krajina” may be seen in the map
at Plate 8. It is to be noted that those territorial limits correspond with the
boundaries proposed by Šešelj. 144The Serbs in “SAO Krajina” immediately
stopped paying taxes to the Croatian Government, and the police stations of
the “SAO Krajina” separated themselves from the policing system of the
Republic of Croatia.
2.96 The situation in Croatia was further inflamed by Serbian newspaper
reports claiming that Croatia was organizing “terrorist activities”, and
preparing for a war against Serbia and Serbians. These reports also claimed
145
that the JNA units were being put into combat readiness. In January 1991
the Presidency of the SFRY sought to take measures to decrease the
growing ethnic tension in Croatia. 146For its part the Republic of Croatia
sought the disarmament of the rebel Serbs in Croatia, whilst the Serbs –
with the support of the JNA – were adamant that the newly formed
Croatian police forces should be disarmed.
2.97 On 25 January 1991 TV Belgrade broadcast a film entitled “The
Truth about the Armament of the HDZ in Croatia”. 147The film was made
under the guidance of the information service of the Federal Defence
Secretariat/Yugoslav Secret Service (KOS) and produced by the JNA film
142
143 The first 2 victims of the war according to Judah, note 82supra at p. 175.
The Statute of the “SAO Krajina” was adopted by the self-styled “Temporary
presidency” of the Municipal Union of Northern Dalmatia and Lika and the Serbian
National Council on 21 December 1990, see Daki ć note 116 supra “Chronology of
Important Events”.
144
See para. 2.76 above.
145 For Croatia’s building of its armed forces and the JNA response see Judah, pp. 172-3
and Chapter 3, paras. 3.29-3.30.
146
147 Chapter 3, ibid.
Referred to in Bennett note 5 supra at p. 144. 60
company. 148The film sought to justify the proclamation of a state of
emergency in Croatia and called for the arrest of leading Croatian officials
– in particular the Defense Minister Martin Špegelj – on the grounds that he
149
was il150ally arming the Croatian police. The JNA was placed on full
alert. However, the eight-member Presidency of the SFRY rejected the
proposal of the Republic of Serbia and the JNA to proclaim a state of
emergency, with the Republics of Slovenia, Croa151, Macedonia, and
Bosnia and Herzegovina voting against. Jovi ć resigned and Miloševi ć
made a number of speeches confirming that the refusal of the other
republics to declare a state of emergency “had pushed Yugoslavia into the
final stages of its agony”. 152
2.98 At the same time, Serbian President Miloševi ć gave a speech in
which he said:
“I have asked the Serbian government to carry out all preparations
for the formation of additional forces whose volume and strength
would guarantee the protection of the interests of Serbia and the
Serbian people (…). The citizens of Serbia can be sure that the
Republic of Serbia is capable of ensuring the protection of its own
interests and those of all its citizens and the entire Serbian people.
The Republic of Serbia, the citizens of Serbia and the Serbian
153
people will resist any act of dismantling our homeland.”
In a televised speech reported on 17 March 1991, the following day,
Milošević declared that:
“Under the existing conditions, the Republic does not recognise
154
the legitimacy of the Federal Presidency.”
148 See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 January 1991.
149
A warrant for his arrest was issued by the Federal Secretariat for National Defence on
30 January 1991 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1February 1991. See Silber and
Little note 76 supra p. 118-120.
150 Bennett note 5 supra at p. 145.
151
See Bennett note 5 supra at p.146.
152 See Orlando Sentinel Tribune, March 17 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 34, Jovi ć later
153 revoked his resignation.
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 March 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 35.
154 Supra note 152. 61
The following month, in April 1991, he told the Serbian Assembly that the
reserve police were being mobilised to:
“enable us in every case to be secure, and to be able to defend the
interests of our Republic 155, by God, the interests of the Serbian
people outside Serbia.”
2.99 Generally, however, Serbian President Miloševi ć tended to be
cautious in making public statements about specific plans for example to
mobilise Serbs in other Republics: in an article in November 1991 he was
reported as saying:
“Are we going to tell everyone what we are going to do on the
radio? We can’t do that. But if we need to fight, we’ll really fight.
We may be no good at working or trading but at least we know
well how to fight”. 156
Slovenian and Croatian Proposals for Confederation
2.100 On 12 February 1991 President Tu đman of Croatia and President
Kučan of Slovenia issued a joint declaration setting out proposals for the
future of the SFRY along the lines of a confederal arrangement and
emphasizing that the SFRY could only survive as a voluntary league of
157
sovereign Republics. On 28 February 1991, the “Serb National Council”
and the Executive Board of the “SAO Krajina” adopted a “Resolution on
the Secession of the “SAO Krajina” from Croatia”. 158 Jovan Rašković, head
of the SDS and “President” of the “SAO Krajina”, publicly stated that th159
Republics’ borders were merely those imposed by President Tito.
Escalation of Violence: the Buffer Zone Policy
2.101 In March 1991 local Serbs disarmed the Croatian police in the
Western Slavonian town of Pakrac and purported to declare the district of
Pakrac a part of Babić ’s “Krajina” (see Map at Annexes, Vol 3, Plate
155
From Bogami ćemo da se tu čemo (“By God, we will fight”), “ Nin”, (Belgrade), 12
April 1991, 40 – also from stenographic record of the Serbian parliament. See United
Press International 6July 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 38.
156 “Nin” 8 November 1991, cited in Tanner, note 80 supra, see page 243 and note at page
157 317.
See Tanner note 80 supra at p. 239.
158 See “The Serbian Krajina, Historical Roots and its Birth” ISKRA 1994, Chronology of
Important Events. A resolution on purported secession was adopted by the
159 municipalities of the “SAO Krajina” on 19 March 1991.
Supra note Rašković Srb rally. 62
4.3A). This led to the intervention of the Croatian police. The SFRY
Presidency (Jović) ordered the Croatian police to withdraw. 160The JNA
purported to take on the role of mediator between the opposing sides (the
first time this had occurred). In fact it was protecting the Serbian side. 161
This became a model for similar interventions by the JNA in the following
months of spring and summer of 1991. At the end of March 1991, the
military police units of the “SAO Krajina” occupied Plitvice. 162During the
military exchange between the Serb rebels and Croatian police, one
Croatian policeman and one Serb died. These were the first casualties of the
conflict on Croatian territory. In April 1991 JNA units occupied the area of
Plitvice with the stated purpose of creating a “buffer-zone”; in reality they
were providing assistance to the Serb rebels in the establishment of
permanent defenses on Croatian territory. 163This marked the beginning of
the Serbian effort to establish new borders for the “SAO Krajina”.(See
Plate 8).
2.102 Other incidents began to occur in Croatia between the rebel Serbs
and the Croatian authorities. At the end of April 1991 local Serbs blocked
access roads around Borovo Selo (near Vukovar), with the assistance of
Šešelj’s paramilitaries which had arrived from Serbia. 164 Two Croatian
policemen were kidnapped. This led to the intervention of the Croatian
police, who were themselves ambushed. Twelve Croatian policemen from
the Osijek police force were killed at Borovo Selo, and more than twenty
165
were wounded. This prompted the arrival of the JNA at Borovo Selo,
ostensibly with a view to creating another “buffer-zone” between the
Serbian and Croatian communities. The effect was to prevent the Croatian
authoriti166from exercising control in the territory of the Republic of
Croatia.
2.103 Slavonia was of particular interest to the Republic of Serbia. In
particular, low-lying Eastern Slavonia, which bordered Serbia, was
amongst the richest regions in Croatia and the SFRY, with extensive
natural resources, including oil. It also had significant Serb populations
(See Plate 9). In October 1991, Jovan Ili ć, the president of the Serbian
160 See Financial Times 4 March 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 33.
161 Tanner note 80 supra at p. 242, who points out that the army tank’s barrels were
162 pointed at the Croatian police.
Bennett note 5 supra at pp. 150-151.
163 Bennett note 5 supra at p. 152; Tanner note 80 supra at p. 244.
164
See Tanner note 80 supra at p. 246, Chapter 3, paras. 3.33 and 3.51 and see Serb
Paramilitary Groups Active in Croatia (1991-95), Appendicies, vol 5, appendix 5.
165 See Tanner note 80 supra at pp. 246-247.
166
See Tanner at p. 247. 63
Geographic Society, explained the rationale for a specific Serbian proposal
to redraw the borders of Slavonia:
“[…] I feel that it would be a just solution if a large part of Eastern
Slavonia were to be united with Serbia and that the Serbs from the
[crisis] areas and Western Slavonia, who want to be citizens of the
Third Yugoslavia, move into that area. Vinkovci, Vukovar and
Osijek, as the important towns would be included in that part of
Slavonia so that the urban Serbs from Zagreb, Rijeka and other
167
Croatian towns would have a place to move to…”
In the same interview – for the Belgrade weekly Intervju – Jovan Ili ć
proposed a solution to the “problem of the Serbs in Western Slavonia”. 168
This involved an exchange of populations, in which:
“…the part of Eastern Slavonia which remains a part of the Third
Yugoslavia [i.e. Serbia] has to be considerably larger and to
include the municipalities of Slavonski Brod, Đakovo, Donji
Miholjac, Valpovo, Našice and everything else that lies east of
that line. The Serbs from Western Slavonia, Croatian towns and
the Diaspora would move into that area, everyone who wants to,
except the Serbs in the SAO Krajina, which [itself] remains a part
of the Serbian nation.”
2.104 The timing of these interviews indicates that this thinking provided
the intellectual rationale for the military action which was to follow,
including the mass displacement and destruction of a large part of the
Croatian population.
The Collapse of the Presidency of the SFRY
2.105 At this time the usual rotation in the Presidency of the SFRY
Presidency was due to be carried out. In accordance with the 1974
Constitution, 169in mid-May 1991 the Serbian representative (Borisav Jović)
was to be replaced by the Croatian representative (Stjepan Mesi ć). This did
not happen. Serbia and Montenegro, with the support of Serbian controlled
members of the SFRY Presidency voted against the election of Mesić ,
leading to a split 4-4 vote in the Presidency (with the representatives of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia voting in favor
of the rotation). It was apparent that the vote against was supported by
high-ranking JNA officers, acting in coordination with the Serbian and
167 See Annexes, vol 4, annex 18 (Intervju, 11 October 1991).
168 Ibid.
169
Article 327 of the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY. See also Tanner p. 247. 64
Montenegrin representatives in the Presidency. Evidently this was a
moment of constitutional crisis: it marked the beginning of the dissolution
of the SFRY, and the crucial step in the Serbian takeover of the apparatus
of the state. And it was clear at the time that the internal constitutional
rupture was a cause for international concern. In particular the European
Community sent the President of the Council (Jacques Santer) and the
President of the European Commission (Jaques Delors) to Belgrade to try
and seek a solution. This was followed by an official statement of the EC’s
position in the first week of June: the EC declared its support for the unity
of the SFRY while also calling for the rotation in the Presidency to be
respected. 170A Bosnian-Macedonian initiative to solve the crisis by
establishing a so-called “Four plus Two” plan, incorporating a confederal
relationship between Croatia, Slovenia and the other four Republics which
would themselves remain in a federation, was unsuccessful. 171
2.106 On 25 June 1991, both the Croatian and the Slovene Parliaments
proclaimed their dissociation from the SFRY. This was followed by
Slovenian forces seizing control of frontier crossings with Austria, Italy and
172
Hungary and hoisting the Slovene flag. On 27 June, units of the JNA
headed towards Ljubljana airport and fighting broke out between Slovene
forces and federal troops. After fighting had broken out in Slovenia, the
European Union sent further representatives, a foreign ministerial “troika”,
to Belgrade on 28 June 1991 and secured agreement that Mesić would be
installed as President and that Croatia and Slovenia would “freeze” their
independence declarations for three months. 173This duly occurred at a
midnight session of the SFRY Presidency on 30 June - 1 July 1991, but by
this time Mesić found that he was not in control of the JNA. Fighting broke
out again in Slovenia, and the JNA was now under exclusive Serbian
control.
2.107 To summarise, it became increasingly clear during this period that
the non-Serbian federal authorities had no authority over the Serbian
controlled elements in the SFRY Presidency and other organs. 174President
Mesić’s lack of authority at this time is evidenced by the way in which his
order of 11 September 1991 that all JNA units return to the barracks was
ignored despite the fact that this formally constituted a legally binding
170
171 See Tanner p. 248.
See Tanner p. 248.
172 Tanner note 80 supra p. 249.
173
Ibid., p. 251.
174 This tendency had been in evidence at earlier stages, for example Kadijević had refused
to communicate with the non-Serbian part of the SFRY Presidency in March 1991
following the Presidency vote against the proclamation of emergency measures sought
by the JNA, see Tanner, note 80 supra at p. 243 and note at p. 317. 65
Order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The President of
the Federal Executive Council, Markovi ć, demanded the resignation of the
Federal Defense Secretary General Kadijevi ć and his Deputy Admiral
175
Brovet. This too was refused. President Mesi ć’s true position is
illustrated by the fact that in October 1991 the SFRY payroll office stopped
paying his presidential salary, apparently by order of Jović and Kostić. 176
2.108 The decline in authority of the President of the Presidency of the
SFRY and the increasing control exercised by the Serbian authorities, is
also indicated by the way in which peace negotiations were conducted
during this period. An example of this is the way in which the signing of a
cease-fire agreement was dealt with on 1 September 1991. The Agreement,
which was concluded in Belgrade, was signed by the Presidents or by the
Presidents of the Presidencies of the six Republics, the President of the
Federal Executive Council (Ante Markovi ć) and by President Mesi ć as the
President of the Presidency of the SFRY. The formulation used for
President Mesi ć was not that which would normally have been used
however: he signed “For the Presidency of the SFRY, acting also in its
capacity of Collective Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces”. In
normal circumstances and under the SFRY’s constitutional framework, this
addendum to the title of President of the Presidency of the SFRY would
have been unnecessary because the function of Supreme Commander
clearly derived from the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY. The same
177
formulation was also used in another agreement signed on the same day.
2.109 An example of the growing power of Serb authority within the
federal structures is indicated by the way in which the signing of the Igalo
Agreement on Ceasefire was arranged. This Agreement was signed by Lor178
Carrington (Chairman of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia), President
Tuđman of Croatia, Serbian President Miloševi ć and, on behalf of the
federal authorities not any member of the Presidency or head of
175 President Mesić had also called for Kadijevi ć’s resignation in early October following
176 the air attack on Banski Dvori in Zagreb, this was ignored, Tanner p. 258.
See “How Yugoslavia was Brought Down” Stjepan Mesi ć, supra note 110 at p. 289,
Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.2.
177 The other agreement was the Memorandum of Understanding on the Extension of
Monitoring Activities of the Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia. There are other examples
of negotiations in which the Presidency of the SFRY does not play a role but the
Federal National Defence Secretary and members of the JNA leadership are actively
involved, see for example the Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 721 of 1991 and his Report pursuant to Security Council Resolution
749 of 1991 at para. 4.
178 See below at paras. 2.117 et seq. 66
government, but by the Serbian General Veljko Kadijevi ć, the Federal
National Defense Secretary. 179
The Serbian Takeover of the Federal Institutions of the SFRY and the JNA
2.110 During the collapse of the SFRY Presidency as described above, the
leadership of the Socialist Republic of Serbia had taken control of the
federal institutions of the SFRY, which were located in Belgrade, and was
directing the activities of the JNA. These developments, which are
described in detail in Chapter 3, culminated on 4 October 1991 with
President Mesić being deposed by the members of the Presidency from
Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo. 180 They had called a meeting
in Belgrade which they knew Mesi ć, who was in Zagreb, would be unable
to attend because of the fighting in Croatia. 181Subsequently, after expelling
Slovenia from the Presidency and in that way obtaining a 4:3 majority in
the Preside182, Branko Kosti ć of Montenegro was appointed acting
President.
2.111 Stjepan Mesić has noted that he was formally recorded by Branko
183
Kostić as having been President until only 30 September 1991. In
November 1991, the deposed President Mesi ć wrote to the UN Secretary
General Perez de Cuellar and a number of other international statesmen and
heads of state requesting that the UN send peacekeeping forces to
Yugoslavia. He wrote in his capacity as “last President of the SFRY
Presidency” reminding the Secretary General of the way in which he had
been appointed and how Serbia and the “pro-Serbian JNA” had rendered
completely impossible the functioning of the federal institutions. He went
on to make the point that for “the four members of the Presidency” (that is
to say the non-Serbian controlled members) and himself, the execution of
their functions had been made impossible, even in relation to securing a
179
Kadijević also signed an agreement on 23 November 1991 together with President
Tuđman, President Milošević and UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance, for reports of these
signings see “Vjesnik” 8 November 1991, p. 2 and “Vjesnik” of 25 November 1991, p.
1.
180 On October 4 the Serbian controlled members of the SFRY Presidency had purported to
declared a state of emergency or “war danger” in contravention of the procedures laid
down in the constitution, described in “How Yugoslavia was Brought Down” Stjepan
181 Mesić, supra note 110, at pp. 268-269, Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.2.
See Tanner note 80 supra at pp. 256-7.
182 He was appointed to the post by his own vote and that of the three Serb members of the
Presidency representing Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo.
183
See Stjepan Mesić note 110 supra, p. 320, Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.2. On his own
request in December 1991 he sought to terminate his Presidency with effect from 8
October 1991. 67
peaceful forum for the resolution of the crisis in the SFRY. He stated that it
was “senseless to keep speaking of the SFRY [Presidency] because it does
not exist...”.84
2.112 By the time Mesi ć had been deposed widespread fighting had
erupted in Croatia and Serbia’s genocidal campaign was underway. As
described in detail in Chapter 3, by September 1991 the JNA was under the
control of Serbia, Serbian paramilitary groups had been established to
engage in armed activities in Croatia, and by Order of 13 September 1991,
those paramilitary groups had been formally incorporated into the JNA. 185
A genocidal campaign was underway in Banovina and Eastern Slavonia.
The genocidal acts which occurred during the campaign are described in
detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
The Referendum on Independence of Croatia
2.113 As a background to these developments, on Sunday 19 May 1991 a
referendum was held in Croatia on the question of independence. 83.6
percent of registered voters cast their votes, with 93.2 percent (2,845,521
people) voting in favor of independence. With the disintegration of the
constitutional order of the SFRY, the citizens of the Republic of Croatia
voted for Croatia’s dissociation from the SFRY, leaving the possibility that
Croatia might join a confederation of sovereign states with other Republics.
2.114 On 25 June 1991, on the same day that the Slovenian Parliament
proclaimed independence, the Sabor in Zagreb proclaimed Croatia “a
sovereign and independent state”. 186 Following the escalation in the
fighting in Croatia particularly in Eastern Slavonia, the EC Troika returned
to Belgrade and President Tu đman formed a cabinet of national unity in
August. 187
The Serbs Vote for Association with Serbia
2.115 The Serbs in the “SAO Krajina” gave their response to the Croatian
declaration of independence: on 27 June 1991 the unification of the “SAO
184
See Stjepan Mesić, ibid. at pp. 312-314, Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.2.
185 Chapter 3, para. 3.63 et seq.
186 See “Declaration on the Proclamation on the Sovereign and Independent Republic of
Croatia” Annexes, vol 4, annex 8; “Constitutional Decision on the Sovereignty and
Independence of the Republic of Croatia” Annexes, vol 4, annex 9. See also Tanner p.
249.
187 See “Decision on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia” 8
October 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 10. 68
Krajina” with the self proclaimed Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the so called “Union of Bosnian Krajina” was proclaimed. The Declaration
stated that the “United Krajina” will direct all its activities in the interest of
the integration of Serbian people with the aim of making one State in which
all Serbs from the Balkan peninsula will live.” Subsequently, on 19
December 1991, the “Parliament of the SAO Krajina” proclaimed the
establishment of the “Republic of Srpska Krajina” (“RSK”).
2.116 The decision of 27 June 1991 was the catalyst for the genocidal
campaign described in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Following this campaign, 10,
572 persons died and 1,419 persons are still missing and unaccounted for.
The final part of this Chapter deals with political events at the national and
international level which occurred in the period the establishment of the EC
Peace Conference in August 1991 following the commencement of the
campaign.
SECTION THREE:
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION
2.117 The EC Conference on Yugoslavia, chaired by former British
Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington and held in The Hague, was established
in August 1991 following the escalation in the fighting in Croatia in order
to try and resolve the growing conflict. The participants included the
Presidents of the six Republics of the SFRY and General Kadijevi ć. It was
set up under the auspices of European Political Cooperation (EPC) together
with a five member Arbitration Commission, which was to become known
as the Badinter Commission after its Chairman, who was the Chair of the
French Conseil Constitutionnel. 188The Commission’s task was to examine
a number of questions posed by the Conference and by Serbia, as well as to
examine four applications made by Republics of the former SFRY for
recognit189 as new states and to comment on the constitutional law of
Croatia. All the Republics of the former SFRY accepted the authority of
the Commission.
188 The Conference and the Commission were established by two EPC Declarations dated
27 August and 3 September 1991. As an external relations matter dealt with under the
EPC, the Conference technically fell outside the framework of the “EC” proper but is
generally referred to in the literature as the “EC Conference”.
189
The Commission issued 10 Opinions together with Comments and an Interlocutory
Decision. 69
2.118 The EC Conference opened in the Hague on 7 September 1991.
When the meeting adjourned on 12 September, a Declaration was adopted
stating that internal borders could not be changed by force and that the
rights of minorities had to be guaranteed. The Conference continued to
meet periodically during September 1991. Amidst the escalation in the
fighting the mandate of the EC monitors was extended indefinitely on 13
October. On 18 October 1991, Lord Carrington presented a set of proposals
to the participants: there was to be no change in Yugoslavia’s internal
borders and in return Croatia was to lift the blockade on remaining JNA
bases to enable the JNA to withdraw completely from the Republic. The
plan was acceptable to all Republics except Serbia. The conflict in Croatia
worsened with the result that a further package was put forward consisting
of a ceasefire, an end to the blockade of Army bases and the withdrawal of
the JNA from Croatia. Serbia then put forward a package of counter
proposals including the according of special status within Yugoslavia to
“Serbs regions” in Croatia. The proposed compromise offered in response
would have afforded similar rights to Albanians in Kosovo as well as other
groups within the SFRY and this was unacceptable to Serbia which then
increased its efforts to capture as much Croatian territory as possible, and
rid that territory of its non-Serb population.
2.119 On 5 November 1991, Lord Carrington brought forward revised
proposals which included a two tier association of sovereign Republics and
a state of equal Republics similar to the “Four plus Two” package put
forward by Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in June 1991. Serbian
President Milošević rejected the proposals but said that Serbia would agree
to the deployment of a UN force in Croatia although heavy fighting
continued, in particular around Vukovar which eventually fell on 18
November 1991. On 8 Novemb1901991, the EC agreed to impose trade
sanctions on the SFRY. On 12 November 1991 the EC declared its
condemnation of the further escalation of attacks on Vukovar, Dubrovnik
and other Croatian towns.
2.120 In its first Opinion, the Badinter Commission expressed the view
191
that by November 1991 the SFRY was in the process of dissolution. The
European Community had agreed in October 1991 that, in principle,
Republics were entitled to independence and on 16 December 1991 the
Council of the European Community decided to offer the possibility of
separate diplomatic relations to those SFRY Republics seeking
independence provided that they met certain conditions including
acceptance of various human rights commitments including those contained
190
The EC agreed to lift sanctions against all the Republics except Serbia and Montenegro
on 2 December 1991.
191 Opinion No 1 of December 1991; see infra para. 2.117. 70
in the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Act and the Paris Charter and
192
also including acceptance of the inviolability of frontiers. The Badinter
Commission was asked for advice on applications from the Republics and
the EC decided to reach a decision on the matter on 15 January 1992. On
15 January 1992, the Presidency of the European Community announced
that the EC and its Member states had decided to recognise Croatia and
Slovenia as independent states (the EC Peace Conference having heard a
report from the Badinter Commission on the two Republics’ adherence to
193
the EC Guidelines for Recognition).
2.121 In its Opinion No. 3 of 11 January 1992, the Badinter Commission
had expressed its view that the outer borders of the SFRY “must be
respected in any case” and that the: “[demarcation] between Croatia and
Serbia, or between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, or between other
neighboring countries, can be changed only by free and common
agreement. In the absence of such an agreement, the former border
determination gains the status of a border protected under international law.
This is the conclusion made according to the principle of respecting the
territorial status quo”.194
2.122 Increasingly the role of the EC Peace Conference was incorporated
into the broader international effort to resolve the crisis undertaken by the
United Nations whose role is described below. The work of the EC
Conference on Yugoslavia was continued in effect by the UN-EC
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) which began its
work in August 1992. The Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee were
Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen (who replaced Lord Carrington as Chairman
of the EC-sponsored peace process). The role of the UN is discussed further
below. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
also played in active role in seeking to resolve the conflict, for example by
deciding in July 1991 to send an EC-based mission to supervise the
ceasefire which was in place at that time and to dispatch a CSCE good
offices mission to assist political dialogue.
192 “Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and
in the Soviet Union” Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 16 December
1991: EPC Press Release 128/91 and Declaration on Yugoslavia, Extraordinary EPC
193 Ministerial Meeting Brussels 16 December 1991: EPC Press Release 129/91.
Croatia was subsequently admitted to membership of the United Nations in May 1992.
194 See V. Degan, Samoodre đenje naroda i teritorijalna cjelovitost država u uvjetima
raspada Jugoslavije (“Self-Determination of the Nations and the Territorial Integrity of
the States in the Time of the Downfall of Yugoslavia”), Zakonitost 46, No. 4, pp. 543-
569. 71
2.123 The European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) was
established and undertook monitoring work throughout the conflict in the
SFRY.
T HE NVOLVEMENT OF THE U NITED N ATIONS : UNPROFOR
2.124 On 8 October 1991, the UN Secretary General appointed Cyrus
Vance as his Special Representative for Yugoslavia. An agreement (the
“Vance Plan”) was adopted in Geneva on 23 November 1991. 195Following
the cease-fire agreement of November 1991, the proposal for the
deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation, pursuant to the “Vance Plan”,
was formally agreed in December 1991. 196
2.125 All sides involved in the conflict accepted this plan: the
Governments of the Republic of Croatia and of the Republic of Serbia, the
JNA, and, after strong pressure from Belgrade, representatives of the Serb
community in Croatia. Under the “Vance Plan”, a UN protection force
(UNPROFOR) was to be assigned to parts of Croatia, designated as “UN
Protected Areas” (UNPA). 197These protected areas (see Volume 3, Plate
2.7) were areas in which the Serbs were either a majority or a significant
minority, and areas where the “tensions between the communities had led
to a conflict”.98“The Plan” provided for the demilitarization of these areas,
with all armed forces withdrawing completely, including the JNA. Police
monitors would control the activities of local police forces, and stop
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. Working with UN humanitarian
agencies, UNPROFOR would also secure the return of refugees and
displaced persons to their homes. The creation of the UNPAs was not
intended to prejudice or otherwise affect the outcome of any political
settlement in the former SFRY.
2.126 Multi-party elections were due to be held in Bosnia and 199
Herzegovina in December 1991. As the crisis in Bosnia deepened,
Serbian President Miloševi ć wished to disengage from Croatia in order to
195 The Agreement Between the Special Representative of UNSG (Vance) and
representatives of Croatia, Serbia and the former SFRY.
196
A proposal for a UN peace-keeping operation in Croatia was published as Appendix III
to the UN Secretary General’s report of 11 December 1991.
197 See UN Security Council Resolution 721 of 27 November 1991 (sending p eacekeepers
to Croatia) and UN Security Council Resolutions 727 of 8 January 1992, 740 of 7
Febraury 1992 and 743 of 21 February 1992 establishing UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR’s
mandate was extended by UN Security Council Resolutions 749 of 7 April and 752 of
15 May 1992.
198
Baletić, Z. and others, “Croatia between Aggression and Peace”, AGM, Zagreb, 1994.
199 A referendum was held in March 1992 and independence was declared on 6 April 1992. 72
concentrate on that situation. He put pressure on the rebel Serbs in Knin to
accept the “Plan” for this reason. 200He was able to accept the “Vance Plan”
as it effectively left the rebel Serbs in control of areas they had seized
during the conflict.
2.127 Following a further cease fire agreement on 2/3 January 1992, and
under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 743 of 21 February
1992, UNPROFOR was established for an initial period of 12 months (its
mandate was extended in subsequent Security Council Resolutions). The
UN protected areas were divided into four sectors: see Plate 2.7 (in Volume
3). The South Sector included the hinterland of northern Dalmatia and
eastern Lika. The North Sector included the area of Kordun and Banovina,
and the East Sector the area of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western
Sirmium. All three sectors were the parts of Croatia that were at the time
controlled by the rebel Serbs. Only the West Sector, that included the
western part of Slavonia, was mainly under the control of the Government
of Croatia (with only a small area around Oku čani under the control of the
rebel Serbs). Under the “Plan”, the status of the UNPA’s would not be
changed until an “an overall political solution of the Yugoslav crisis” was
found, an approach which Croatia was unhappy with. As described in
Chapter 3, when the JNA withdrew from Croatia towards the end of May
1992, i201eft much of its weaponry with the Serb Territorial Defence and
police.
2.128 In addition to the UNPA’s, UNPROFOR also found it necessary to
take control of the so-called “pink zones”. This was the term used to
describe parts of Croatian territory outside the UNPA’s which remained
under Serb control after the cessation of hostilities in January 1992. In
order to avoid the outbreak of further hostilities, the Republic of Croatia
agreed to accept UNPROFOR assistance in reinstating Croatian authorities
in these areas despite the fact that under the “Vance Plan” it had been
intended that these areas should be handed back unconditionally following
JNA withdrawal. In the end the “pink zones” effectively became an integral
part of the UNPA’s and stayed under the control of Serb rebels.
2.129 Under the “Vance Plan”, the UNPA’s were supposed to be
demilitarised but this demilitarisation did not materialise. Secure under the
protection of the UNPROFOR, the Serbs consolidated the consequences of
their genocidal campaign, ridding occupied areas of non-Serbs and
destroying non-Serb property (including cultural and religious monuments)
200
Borisav Jović reports a “difficult and dramatic” meeting on 2 February 1992 attended
by Milošević during which the leadership of the “RSK” accepted the Vance Plan, note
201 85 supra, Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.3; see also Tanner , note 80 supra at p. 288.
Chapter 3, para. 3.96. 73
in such a way as to make conditions of life impossible for the Croat and
other populations. 202These actions which are detailed in Chapters 4 and
203
5, were specifically condemned in a UN Report on the situation of
human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in February 1993. 204
In the Report, Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki, who had visited the
UNPAs, found that “the de facto authorities of the self-proclaimed Serbian
region of “Krajina” (“RSK”) are vigorously pursuing a policy of ethnic
205
cleansing.” In his next report submitted in November 1993, the
Rapporteur referred to the deliberate and systematic shelling of civilian
objects in Croatian towns and villages and to th206esulting deaths and
injuries among the civilian population. The intention to prevent on a
permanent basis the return of the refugees, who were mainly of Croatian
207
nationality, was also evident. In Baranja, for example, a group of Croats
remained in 1991, but by 1995 they had left. Furthermore, the “RSK” was
able to provide military assistance to “Republic of Srpska” (“RS”) in
Bosnia and Herzegovina during the assaults on the Bosnian safe area of
Bihać in 1994 and 1995. 208
202
In Security Council Resolution 757 of 30May 1992 (which introduced wide-ranging
sanctions against the FRY) the Security Council expressed its deep concern at persistent
ceasefire violations, at the continued expulsion of non-Serb civillians and at the
obstruction of and lack of cooperation with UNPROFOR in parts of Croatia.
203
See generally Chapters 4 and 5.
204 The Report was submitted by Tadeus Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1993/50 appointed to investigate first hand the
human rights situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia pursuant to
Commission Resolution 1992/S-1/1 of 14 August 1992. See also General Assembly
Resolution A/RES/49/196 of 9 March 1995 in which the Assembly expressed its
serious concern at the prevalence of lawlessness in the Serbian-controlled territories of
Croatia and the lack of adequate protection for Croatian and non-Serb populations
remaining in Serb controlled municipalities.
205
February 1993 Report ibid, para. 143.
206 Fifth Periodic Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia, E/CN.4/1994/47 of 17 November 1993 at para. 161. Similar findings were
made in a Report of 4 November 1994, A/49/641, S/1994/1252.
207 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/48/153 of 7 February 1994 adopted on 20
December 1993 urged an immediate end to the practice of ethnic cleansing and in
particular that the authorities of the FRY use their influence with the self-proclaimed
Serbian authorities in Croatia to bring the practice to an immediate end and reverse the
effects of that practice.
208 “With No Peace to Keep” George Stamkoski, Grainpress 1995, at p. 46. 74
UNITED N ATIONS CONDEMNATION OF H UMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AND E THNIC C LEANSING IN THE FORMER SFRY 209
2.130 The United Nations monitored the situation of human rights in the
former SFRY on a regular basis throughout the crisis. Reference is made to
UN reports of specific incidents and human rights violations in Chapters 3,
4 and 5 of this Memorial. In order to place these sources in context, this
section makes general reference to some of the key resolutions and reports
adopted during this period.
2.131 In August 1992 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
appointed the former Polish Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki as
Special Rapporteur to investigate the situation on human rights in the
former Yugoslavia. He made his report on 28 August 1992 and
recommended among other things that a human rights tribunal should be
established to investigate “mass and flagrant” human rights violations. He
noted that ethnic cleansing0was “the cause of most such violations”.
2.132 The Special Rapporteur continued to monitor the situation in the
former SFRY. He investigated the situation in the UNPA’s and the plight of
ethnic Croats and other non-Serbs in these areas was recorded. In his 1994
report, for example, the Special Rapporteur noted continuing human rights
violations against Croats and other non-Serbs in parts of Sectors South and
East.212
2.133 Both the UN Commission on Human Rights and the General
Assembly, in condemning the practice of ethnic cleansing in the former
SFRY, found that the Serbian leadership in the territories under their
control, the JNA and the political leadership of the Republic of Serbia “bear
primary responsibility for this reprehensible practiceThe Commission
on Human Rights called on all states to consider whether the acts
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia “constitute genocide, in
209 For extracts of relevant UN Resolutions and Reports on the situtation of human rights
in the former SFRY, see Annexes, vol 4, annex 5.
210 The Commission on Human Rights adopted a definition of ethnic cleansing in its
Resolution 1992/S-1/1 in which it declared that ethnic cleansing is “aimed at the
211 dislocation or destruction of national, ethnic, racial or religious groups”.
See Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, E
CN.4/1992/S-1/9 at para. 6.
212 See Report E/CN.4/1994/110 at paras. 107-109.
213
Commission on Human Rights, second special session, Resolution “The situation of
human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia”1992/S-2/1 of 1 December 1992,
para. 3 and UNGA Resolution A/RES/47/147 of 26 April 1993 adopted on 18
December 1992 at para. 3; endorsed in UN General Assembly Resolution
A/RES/47/147 of 26 April 1993, para. 16 see Annexes, vol 4, annex 5. 75
accordance with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide”. 214
2.134 In October 1992, the Security Council decided to establish a
Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information with a view to
providing the Secretary General with its conclusions on the evidence of
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of
215
international humanitarian law committed in the former SFRY. The
Commission was duly established and proceeded to investigate what had
happened at Vukovar and Ovčara among other violations.
2.135 Non-governmental organisations were also active in monitoring
human rights violations in the former SFRY throughout the conflict. In
August 1992, Helsinki Watch published a report in which they examined
the instances of ethnic cleansing various parts of the former SFRY
including Serbian-controlled areas of Croatia. The Report noted that:
“During the war in Croatia, Serbian forces engaged in practices which
closely resembl216hose used to “cleanse” areas of non-Serbs in Bosnia and
Herzegovina” It went on to point out that “In Croatia, Serbian civilian,
paramilitary, police and military authorities have systematically expelled
non-Serbs from their homes in Serbian-occupied areas of the country”. 217
2.136 A cease fire agreement between the Croatian Government and the
“RSK” was concluded in March 1994 under the auspices of the
International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). Nevertheless a
programme of “ethnic cleansing” continued as indicated by the adoption in
December 1994 of UN General Assembly Resolution 49/43 which strongly
condemned the Serbian self-proclaimed authorities in the Serbian
controlled territories of Croatia “for their militant actions that have resulted
in “ethnic cleansing” of the United Nations Protected Areas, and their
consistent refusal to comply with the relevant Security Council
218
resolutions”. The Resolution also requested the FRY to “cease
immediately any military and logistic support to the self-proclaimed
authorities in the Serbian-controlled parts of Croatia”(paragraph 3).
214 Commission on Human Rights, second special session, Resolution “The situation of
human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia”1992/S/2/1 of 1 December 1992,
215 paragraph 12. Annexes, vol 4, annex 5.
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) S/RES/780, 6 October 1992, see para. 2.
216 Helsinki Watch Report on the former SFRY dated August 1992, p. 52.
217
Ibid., at p. 52.
218 UNGA Res 49/43 of 9 December 1994 , at para. 4 , Annexes, vol 4, annex 4. 76
T HE D ISSOLUTION OF THE SFRY AND THE PROCLAMATION OF THE
C REATION OF THE F EDERAL R EPUBLIC OF Y UGOSLAVIA (FRY)
2.137 On 29 November 1991 the Badinter Commission gave formal
expression to a state of affairs which independent observers and
commentators already recognised. In its Opinion No. 1 of that date it stated
inter alia
“ – that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the
219
process of dissolution;”
This “process of dissolution”, which began in May 1991, plainly implied
that the disappearance of the SFRY was accompanied by the emergence of
new international actors, namely the emergence into independent statehood
of the former Republics of the SFRY, including the Socialist Republics of
Serbia and Montenegro that became the FRY. This process was finalised –
as stated in Opinion No. 8 of the Badinter Commission – in the
establishment of five independent states, all being successor states to the
former SFRY.
2.138 On 27 April 1992 the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of
Montenegro proclaimed the formation of the FRY. In a declaration of that
date, the FRY stated that:
“The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the State,
international legal and political personality of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, shall strictly abide by all the
commitments that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
assumed internationally.”20
221
2.139 The first President of the FRY was Dobrica Ćosić. The
Constitution of the FRY was adopted on 27 April 1992. The preamble to
the 1992 Constitution refers to the “unbroken continuity of Yugoslavia”.
The Constitution provides that the FRY shall be a sovereign federal state
composed of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro and
provides that the FRY may be joined by other member Republics as
provided for by the Constitution. The capital is Belgrade. The Constitution
provides inter alia for the rule of law, the recognition and guarantee of the
219 Opinion No. 1, 92 ILR 162, 166.
220 UN Doc. A/46/915). Neither Croatia nor any of the other Republics of SFRY which
became independent accept that FRY was the “continuation” in a legal sense of the
SFRY.
221
He was ousted on 6 June 1993 following a vote of no confidence by the Federal
Council of the Yugoslav Assembly. The current President is Dr. Vojislav Koštunica
(elected 7 October 2000). 77
rights and freedoms of man and the citizen recognized under international
law, and the rights of minorities. 222
2.140 Article 16 provides that the FRY shall fulfill in good faith the
obligations contained in international treaties to which it is a contracting
party and provides that international treaties which have been ratified and
promulgated in conformity with the constitution and generally accepted
rules of international law shall be a constituent part of the internal legal
order.
2.141 Article 99 lays down the powers of the Federal Government which
include formulating and conducting domestic and foreign policy and
enforcing federal statutes, laws and other general enactments. Article 100
provides that the Federal Government is made up of a Prime Minister,
Deputy Prime Minister and Federal Ministers. Section VIII of the
Constitution deals with the army of the FRY and provides that the Army
shall be under the command of the President of t223Republic pursuant to
decisions of the Supreme Defence Council.
2.142 In its Opinion No. 10 of 4 July 1992, the Badinter Commission
gave the view that FRY was a new state which could not be considered the
sole successor to the SFRY. 224
2.143 On 22 May 1992 the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia, which had
declared their independence on 25 June 1991, were admitted to
membership of the United Nations, 225together with the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. 226 On 30 May 1992 the Security Council adopted
Resolution 757 (1992), noting:
“that the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United
Nations has not been generally accepted.”
222
FRY Constitution Articles 9-11, Annexes, vol 4, annex 15.
223 Article 135 of the Constitution.
224
Opinon No 10 is reproduced in 31 ILM (1992) 1488 at 1526.
225 Security Council Resolution 753 (1992) and General Assembly Resolution 46/238
(Croatia); Security Council Resolution 754 (1992) and General Assembly Resolution
46/236 (Slovenia).
226
Security Council Resolution 755 (1992) and General Assembly Resolution 46/237. On
8 April 1993 the Republic of Macedonia was admitted to membership of the United
Nations: Security Council Resolution 817 (1993) and General Assembly Resolution
47/225 (admitted under the provisional designation of “the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia”). 78
2.144 On 4 July 1992, the Arbitration Commission of the Peace
Conference on Yugoslavia in its Opinion No. 8 expressed the opinion:
“that the process of dissolution of the SFRY referred to in Opinion
No. 1 of 29 November 1991 is now complete and that the SFRY
no longer exists.” 227
In reaching that view, Opinion No. 8 took note of Security Council
Resolutions 752 and 757 (1992) and noted that “Serbia and Montenegro …
have constituted a new State” and that “the former national territory and
population of the SFRY are now entirely under the sovereign authority of
the new States”. 228
2.145 On 19 September 1992 Security Council resolution 777 (1992)
stated that the FRY “cannot continue automatically the membership of the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”. It also recommended to
the UN General Assembly that the FRY “should apply for membership in
the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the
General Assembly”. General Assembly Resolution 47/1, adopted three days
229
later, took the same approach. Immediately following the adoption of
General Assembly Resolution 47/1 the FRY Prime Minister announced in
the General Assembly:
“I herewith formally request membership in the United Nations on
230
behalf of the new Yugoslavia, whose Government I represent.”
However, the FRY took no further action at that time to apply for
membership of the United Nations. The Security Council and the General
Assembly subsequently adopted resolutions limiting the involvement of the
FRY in the work of the UN. 231The FRY was granted membership of the
232
United Nations on 31 October 2000.
227 Opinion No. 8, 92 ILR 199, 202.
228
Ibid. (emphasis added).
229 Security Council Resolution 777 of 19 September 1992 and General Assembly
Resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992.
230
UN Doc. A/47/PV.7, 141, at p. 149.
231 Security Council Resolution 821 (1993); General Assembly Resolution 47/229.
232
See General Assembly Press Release of 1 November 2000 GA/SM/210 Annexes, vol 4,
annex 6. 79
R EPLACEMENT OF UNPROFOR WITH UNCRO
2.146 On 23 September 1994, the Croatian Sabor passed a resolution on
the future of UNPROFOR in Croatia, expressing dissatisfaction with the
presence of UNPROFOR in Croatia. The Sabor insisted that the UN
mandate could not be extended and was considered to be terminated. The
Croatian Parliament then called on the President to negotiate a new
mandate with the UN in accordance with the conditions laid down in the
Resolution which included: dissolution and disarming of all armed groups,
allowing the safe return of those expelled and working towards the
restoration of the Republic of Croatia’s authority in all the occupied zones.
There was some concern in Croatia that the UN operation would lead to a
situation similar to that in Cyprus, resulting in a permanent institutionalised
partition. The Sabor’s resolution was followed on 30 September 1994 by
UN Security Council Resolution 947, which was regarded as failing to
meet these demands. The Croatian government agreed to an extension of
the UN mandate for three months.
2.147 Following the escalation of events in Bosnia in the latter part of
1994, which effectively stalled further peace talks between Croatia and the
“RSK”, Croatia announced that it wished to terminate the UNPROFOR
mandate. In his report to the Security Council of 17 September 1994, the
Secretary General clearly indicated UNPROFOR’s shortcomings, stating
that the original mandate had proved difficult to implement and that
demilitarization of the UNPA, the restoration of Croatian authority in the
“pink zones” (see Plate 2.7) and the establishment of border controls and
assistance for the return of displaced persons remained unfulfilled. On 12
January 1995, President Tu đman wrote to the UN Secretary General
informing him of the decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate on 31
March 1995 (when the existing mandate expired). This was followed by
UN Security Council Resolution 981 of [date] by which the UN Protection
Force in Croatia was renamed the United Nations Confidence Restoration
Operation “UNCRO” with a mandate lasting until 30 November 1995.
UNCRO, among other things, was to monitor the ceasefire agreement of
March 1994 as well as control the movement of military personnel,
equipment and supplies over the borders of Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the FRY for which it was responsible.
2.148 Despite the change of name, the UN operation was still unable to
move towards a resolution of the situation: the rebel Serbs simply did not
wish to negotiate on the basis of remaining within the Republic of Croatia.
The Serb rebels rejected the so-called “Z-4 Plan” which had been drafted
by international mediators and which proposed the status of a state within a
state for the Knin region. The mandate of UNCRO was terminated on 15
January 1996. The end of the mandate required the withdrawal from former 80
Sectors West, North and South of all UN military units as well as their
accompanying civilian components
O PERATIONS “F LASH AND “STORM ”
2.149 The existence of major-Serb held areas, particularly the self-
proclaimed “RSK”, in the heart of the state was a critical obstacle to the
political and economic development of the country. 23Accordingly, the
Republic of Croatia resolved to address the problem directly through the
use of military force and in 1995 Croatian234rces, in two key operations,
regained control of the UN Protected Areas.
2.150 During Operation “Flash” (Bljesak) in April 1995 the Croatian
army and police re-took all of Western Slavonia. Operation Flash followed
a number of incidents including the closure of the Zagreb-Belgrade
motorway by the “RSK President” Milan Marti ć and the revenge killing of
a number of Croats who were travelling along the motorway at Okučani.
2.151 The second major operation was Operation “Storm” (Oluja). In
August 1995, during Operation Storm, Croatian forces liberated the area of
the Northern and Southern UN Sectors from Serb forces in a period of less
than five days, thus bringing to an end the so-called “RSK”.
2.152 During this period in 1995, Croatian Serbs were incited to leave the
newly liberated territories as an organized action by the rebel authorities
acting under the control of the FRY. However, some of them also fled due
to a fear of war, a fear of prosecution for war crimes committed against
Croats and a fear of reprisals.
D AYTON A GREEMENT (1995)
2.153 On 21 November 1995 the General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, more commonly referred to as the
Dayton Agreement (or Dayton Accords) was initialed by the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic
233
See discussion of this point in “Croatia’s Territorial Consolidation and Prospects for the
Future” by Mladen Klemen čić and Clive Schofield in Geojournal 38: 393-398 1996
Kluwer at p. 395.
234 Smaller-scale operations had already taken place in which Croatian forces had regained
control of areas in the UNPAs including the retaking of Maslenica bridge (and other
sites near Zadar) linking Dalmatia with northern Croatia in January 1993.
235
With the exception of a strip of land near Vukovar. 81
of Yugoslavia in Dayton, Ohio.36The Agreement was subsequently signed
237
in Paris on 14 December 1995. The Agreement contains a General
Framework Agreement addressing such matters as recognition, respect for
human rights and co-operation with UN and other international agencies in
the implementation of the peace settlement including in the investigation
and prosecution of war crimes and other grave violations of international
humanitarian law. To the Framework Agreement are attached 11 Annexes
dealing with specific matters ranging from military matters, including the
need to establish a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR), to
refugees and to elections .
2.154 The central role played by the Serbian leadership is indicated by the
fact that although the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was one of the state
Parties which was to sign the Agreement, its Head of Delegation was not an
official from the Federal Government, but the President of Serbia,
Slobodan Milošević - who signed the Agreement together with President
Tuđman of Croatia and President Izetbegović [of Bosnia and Herzegovina].
UNITED N ATIONS T RANSITIONAL A DMINISTRATION FOR E ASTERN
SLAVONIA , ARANJA AND W ESTERN IRMIUM (UNTAES)
2.155 The United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) was established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1037 (1996) of 15 January 1996 as
a peace keeping operation for an initial period of 12 months. The
establishment of UNTAES was requested by the parties to the Basic
Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western
Sirmium which was signed on 12 November 1995 by representatives of the
Croatian Government and the Serbs.238UNTAES was fully deployed in the
region from May 1996, based in Vukovar. In his first report on UNTAES,
the UN Secretary General described the mission’s objectives: these
included bringing the Region, demilitarized and secure, under the sovereign
control of the Government of Croatia; retaining the multi-ethnic character
of the Region and enabling all refugees and displaced persons to enjoy the
right to return freely to their homes and live there in conditions of security.
Free and fair elections were also to be organised not later than 30 days
239
before the end of the transitional period.
236 30 ILM (1996).
237
UN Ref: A/50/790-S/1995/999.
238 Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium,
Annexes, vol 4, annex 11.
239
Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Transitional Administration for
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, S/1996/472 of 26 June 1996. 82
240
2.156 UNTAES had an administrative and a military component. The
Transitional Administration was to govern the region during the transitional
period. This would include ensuring the possibility for the return of
refugees and displaced persons and re-establishing the normal functioning
of public services in the region. The Agreement also requested the UN
Security Council to authorize an international force to maintain peace and
security in the region and assist in the implementation of the Agreement.
The Agreement provided for the demilitarization of the region241ot later
than 30 days after deployment of the international force”. Among the
matters addressed by UNTAES were the provision of assistance in
implementing agreements between Croatia and the FRY concerning the
restoration of highway and railway links, and facilitating the establishment
of Croatian immigration and customs facilities at the border with the FRY.
2.157 An Agreement on the Procedures for Return, signed by the
Government of Croatia, UNTAES and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was concluded in 1997.
2.158 Pursuant to the Basic Agreement, elections in the region were held
242
beginning on 13 April 1997. The mandate of UNTAES expired on 15
January 1998 and the operation was considered to have been a major
success.
A GREEMENT ON N ORMALIZATION OF R ELATIONS (1996) 243
2.159 On 23 August 1996, the Republic of Croatia and the FRY signed an
agreement on normalization of relations. Under the terms of the
Agreement, each agreed to “respect, in accordance with international law,
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the other”; that
they would “carry out the regulation of their frontiers and the delimitation
through mutual agreement only”; and that they would settle disputes
through peaceful means and refrain from the threat or use of force (Article
2). Within 15 days from signing the Agreement, the Contracting Parties
240
As to the mandates of these two components, see in particular Security Council
Resolution 1037 (1996) of 15 January 1996 setting out the mandate for demilitarization
etc.
241 Article 3 of the Agreement. This began on 21 May 1996 and was completed on 20 June
1996, see Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Transitional
Adminstration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, S/1996/472 of 26
June 1996, at para. 14.
242
See letter of the UN Secretary General of 29 April 1997 (S/1997/343) addressed to the
Security Council conveying the conclusions of the Transitional Administrator regarding
the successful holding of elections in the region, Annexes, vol 4, annex 7.
243 Annexes, vol 4, annex 12. 83
were to establish full diplomatic and consular relations (Article 3). The
Parties also agreed to resolve the issue of the succession of the SFRY on
the basis of the rules of international law and through agreement (Article
5).
2.160 The Agreement also addressed a number of other issues including
the question of missing persons and the rights of refugees: the Parties also
undertook to “speed up the process of solving the question of missing
persons” and to exchange all available information about those missing
(Article 6) and to “ensure conditions for the free and safe return of refugees
and displaced persons to their places of residence or other places that they
freely choose” and to ensure to these persons the return of their property or
just compensation. Also in relation to the question of refugees, the Parties
undertook to ensure full security to the refugees and displaced persons who
returned and to assist them in ensuring the necessary conditions for a
“normal and safe life” (Article 7).
2.161 The Agreement also provided for a further agreement on
compensation for property damage and for the establishment of a joint
commission to facilitate implementation of Article 7 and addressed such
matters as transport, movement of non-nationals and the need for mutual
agreements in a number of areas.
T HE FRY B ECOMES A M EMBER OF THE U NITED N ATIONS (2000)
2.162 In October 2000, the FRY formally applied for United Nations
membership, thereby belatedly accepting the situation as laid down by the
competent United Nations organs in the resolutions above-cited. On 31
October 2000 by its Resolution 1326 (2000) the Security Council
recommended to the General Assembly that the FRY be admitted to
membership of the United Nations. On 1 November 2000 by its Resolution
55/12 the General Assembly decided to admit the FRY to membership of
the United Nations. On that date the FRY became a new member of the
United Nations, as an equal successor (along with Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia
and Herzegovin244nd the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) to the
former SFRY. On 14 November 2000 the General Assembly adopted
Resolution 55/24 (on Bosnia and Herzegovina), in which it welcomed the
mutual recognition among the successor states of the former SFRY within
their internationally recognized borders and went on to stress the
244 See Statement of the President of the General Assembly on the occasion of the
admission of the FRY to membership of the United Nations (“The admission of the
FRY to the United Nations signifies a new era in cooperation between the new Member
State and the other members of the United Nations, including its neighbours and other
successor States of the former SFRY”): Press Release GA/SM/210, 1 November 2000. 84
importance of full normalization of relations among those states including,
inter alia , the settlement of all issues relating to the succession of the
former SFRY “on the basis of the legal equality of all five successor states,
in order to contribute to the achievement of a lasting peace and stability in
the area.” 245
245
See UN General Assembly Resolution 55/24 of 14 November 2000 on the Situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, A/RES/55/24, at the 11 recital to the preamble. CHAPTER 3
THE JNA AND THE PARAMILITARY GROUPS
3.01 Chapter 2 set out the general historical framework and the timetable
under which the Serbian genocide in Croatia has been perpetrated. This
Chapter describes how the conditions under which the violations of the
Genocide Convention under the direction of the Serbian leadership could
take place through the instrumentalities of the Yugoslav People’s Army
(JNA) and the paramilitary forces, under the direction and effective control
of the Republic of Serbia. It describes the transformation of the JNA into an
armed force promoting Serbian objectives (Part 1, para. 3.2 et seq) and the
establishment, arming, financing and control of Serb and Serbian
paramilitary groups active in Croatia (Part 2, para. 3.43 et seq). It concludes
with a brief overview of the opening of the genocidal campaign in various
parts of Croatia, indicating the extent to which the JNA and paramilitary
groups worked together (Part 3, para. 3.72 et seq).
SECTION ONE:
THE JNA AND ITS TRANSFORMATION INTO A SERBIAN ARMY
3.02 From 1945 to mid-1991 the JNA was the Army of the SFRY, acting
only under the direct authority and control of the Presidency of the SFRY
and the SFRY Ministry of Defence. In mid-1991, with the collapse of the
SFRY Presidency, the Serbian leadership of the “rump Yugoslavia” took
over control of the JNA, following changes of structure and personnel
dating back to 1988. From spring 1991 onwards the JNA operated as a de
facto “Serbian Army” promoting Serbian interests (including the ambitions
of the FRY, which was at that point in statu nascendi , for a “Greater
Serbia”). The “Serbianized” Army formally changed its name into the
Yugoslav Army (VJ) following the proclamation of the FRY on 27 April
1992. Even after that date some orders of the Army of the FRY were
adopted in the name of the SFRY, indicating the direct continuity between
the Serbian-controlled JNA and the Army of the FRY. 1
1 See below para. 3.41. 86
3.03 In summary terms, the transformation of the JNA from an Army of
the SFRY into a “Serbian Army” can be traced back to the period 2
immediately after the publication of the 1986 SANU Memorandum. In
1987 and 1988 the JNA was restructured into new Military Regions,
including the newly established 1 stMilitary Region to encompass the
entirety of region that corresponded wit3 the plan for “Greater Serbia” as
envisaged in the 1986 Memorandum. In May 1990 the JNA disarmed the
Territorial Defence (TO) of Croatia, 4transferring armaments from the
barracks and storage depots of the Republic of Croatia to the depots and
barracks of the JNA, and later to Serbian paramilitary groups in parts of
Croatia which had a relatively high proportion of Serbs amongst the
population. At the same time, the results of multi-party elections in the
Republics of Slovenia and Croatia, also in 1990, caused the JNA to actively
promote the unity of the SFRY in the face of the aspirations of Slovenia
and Croatia for independence. The maintenance of the SFRY (as well as
greater centralization and Serbian dominance) was synonymous with the
promotion of Serbian interests. In the period from April to June 1991 and
again in September 1991 changes were made to the command structures of
the JNA: non-Serb officers in the upper echelons of the JNA were
systematically replaced with Serb officers supportive of the emerging plans
to establish a “Greater Serbia”. After the short conflict in Slovenia, in June
and July 1991, and the JNA’s withdrawal from Slovenia, it became
apparent that the aim of maintaining the original borders of the SFRY was
no longer possible. Having failed to achieve this objective, the JNA acting
pursuant to the objectives of the Serbian leadership which had assumed
control over the “rump Yugoslavia” – in fact a FRY in statu nascendi –
following the collapse of the SFRY, took steps to establish the borders of a
new Yugoslavia according to the plan for “Greater Serbia”. These borders
would encompass those areas of the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina within which lived significant Serbian populations or which
were of economic or geo-strategic interest to the Serbian leadership. 5 To
achieve this the JNA – in conjunction with, and supported by, Serb
paramilitary groups, some of which were formally integrated into the JNA
– pursued a course which led to the expulsion and destruction of Croats.
That course led to acts against the Croat populations residing in these
regions, which violated the Genocide Convention.
3.04 During 1991 the preparation for and the perpetration of genocide by
the JNA and the paramilitaries within its control and command may be
2
3 See Chapter 2, para. 2.49 et seq.See also Annexes, vol 4, annex 14.
See Annexes, vol 3, Plate 6.1 and Plate 6.2. For Map of “Greater Serbia” see Plate 2.6.
4 See infra. para. 3.24 et seq.
5
See Annexes, vol 3, Plate 3.1. 87
divided into three distinct phases. The first phase continued until early
March 1991, where by its non-intervention and covert support the JNA
gave the rebel Serbs of the “SAO Krajina” the time and space to
consolidate their co6trol of the territory over which they had proclaimed
their sovereignty. General Kadijevi ć, the SFRY Minister of Defence,
stated that the JNA’s aim during this stage was to protect Serbs in the
territory of the Republic of Croatia from the attacks of Croatian Armed
Forces, to enable the local Serbs to prepare their defence, and to prepare the
JNA for the war against Croatia. 7
3.05 The second phase of the JNA’s involvement ran from early March
to July 1991. During this period, the Serbs of “SAO Krajina” attempted to
enlarge their territorial acquisitions beyond the areas in which they enjoyed
a majority, to other areas where Serbia had economic or geo-strategic
interests. During this phase the JNA became a key player, initially trying to
promote the impression that it was acting as a “neutral” force, enjoined
with the task of creating a “buffer zone” between Croat and Serb
populations, and subsequently as a protector and accomplice of the rebel
Serbs. The incidents at Borovo Selo, Pakrac and Plitvice are examples of
this.8
3.06 Subsequently, the JNA moved to the third phase of its engagement
after July 1991. To achieve its objectives, the JNA located armoured and
mechanised units close to potential combat areas to assure their early
intervention. Other units of the JNA were located in and around the
Republic of Croatia so they could engage in direct and decisive
interventions. Preparations for these deployments commenced as early as
1990: they are reflected in an Order dated 15 May 1990 which provide10for
a major re-classification and restructuring of military units. This Order
was issued the day after the JNA instructed the TO’s to hand over their
weapons. 11
3.07 It was during this third phase that ethnic cleansing and genocidal
acts began to be systematically performed through cooperation between the
JNA and rebel Serbs. In the final phase during the autumn and winter of
1991 – described in the following Chapters 4 and 5 – the JNA with Serb
paramilitary groups destroyed a significant part of the Croat population in
6 See Chapter 2, para. 2.89 et seqand below para. 3.28.
7
8 Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada, 1993, p. 127; Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.1.
Chapter 2, paras 2.102.
9 Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada, 1993, p. 127; Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.1.
10
See below para. 3.26.
11 See below para. 3.24 et seq. 88
violation of the Genocide Convention. This was done under the direction of
the Serbian leadership in Belgrade. In carrying out these activities the JNA
invited volunteers from the paramilitary groups, and incorporated them into
the JNA’s command structure.
T HE JNA’ HS ISTORY
3.08 The JNA emerged from the Yugoslav communist party and the
Partisan forces of Josip Broz Tito active in the Second World War. After
that War, though the JNA leadership was not directly involved in political
decision-making, it played a major role in the overall federal leadership of
the SFRY. The adoption of the 1974 Constitution provided an opportunity
to reconcile two views. The first promoted a strong, centralised, well-
equipped Army; the second promoted a de-centralised Army within the
Republics. The 1974 Constitution caused a shift towards the latter view:
establishing a de-centralised military structure, comprising on the federal
level of the JNA together with the distinct Territorial Defence Forces (TOs)
established in each of the Republics, and subject to their staffing and
control. The SFRY Constitution provided that the JNA and the TOs were at
par, and during a war the TO forces were to act in a complementary
manner. While the JNA acted under the control of the Presidency of the
SFRY, the TO’s acted under the control of the Republics or Provinces, in
peacetime.
3.09 While national defence was a Federal responsibility, the SFRY had
a decentralised command and control system. The SFRY itself considered
that the Federal Government would be unable to control military forces
throughout the SFRY, and envisaged that the Governments of the
Republics would co-operate with the military authorities of the SFRY for
13
regional defence. Decentralized training and mobilisation also 14quired
dispersed military training facilities throughout the country. Weapons
caches and supply stores were also dispersed throughout the Republics to
ensure ready access in the event of invasion from outside the SFRY. This
strategy was known as Total National Defence (ONO), and it sought to
ensure a wide distribution of trained soldiers, weapons, and ammunition
across the various Republics. This required the co-ordination of the Army,
12
See The Strategy of All-People’s Defence and National Self-defence SFRY , The Federal
Secretariat for National Defence, Centre of the Armed Forces for strategic research and
studies “Maršal Tito”, Belgrade, 1987, Annexes, vol 4, annex 49.
13 David C. Isby, Yugoslavia 1991 – Forces in conflict, 3 Jane’s Intelligence Review 394
(1991).
14
Ibid. 89
Territorial Defence Forces (TO) and the local population, and was adopted
15
as Law in 1969.
3.10 The Armed Forces of the SFRY comprised the Army, the Navy, the
16
Air Defence Forces, border troops and the Territorial Defence (TO). It
was supposed to be “the unique armed forces of the working class … and to
provide nation-wide defence and social protection…”. The JNA was the
“common armed force of all nations and nationalities…” and the “strike
force of the united armed forces”. 17 Operationally, the Federal Ministry of
Defence in Belgrade controlled the JNA. The Federal Ministry of Defence
was itself subordinate to the collective Presidency of the SFRY, whose
decisions were based on a majority of its eight members. If the Presidency
were to collapse – as it did in 1991 – the JNA would be without Federal
control.
3.11 By 1991 the core of the JNA comprised a cadre of some 70,000
regular officers and soldiers, augmented by some 150,000 short-term
conscripts. The JNA was closely connected with the League of
Communists. As with other communist countries, the Communist apparatus
was tightly integrated into the strategic scheme, and party structures at all
levels were geared to support military and societal mobilisation for war. 20
Military structures accommodated a shadow chain of command responsible
to the League of Communists.
3.12 Against that federal background, each Republic maintained its own
TO headquarters over which the Federal JNA General Staff exercised
strategic control, leaving tactical control to the regional or local
21
leadership. The TO units were a reserve force usually made up of veterans
15
ONO was codified in Art. 240 of the 1974 Constitution, which states that the armed
forces consist of the JNA and the TO.
16 See also James Gow, “The Yugoslav Army: An Update”, Jane’s Intelligence Review
501 et seq . (November 1993); Milan Vego, “Yugoslav Ground Forces”, Jane’s
17 Intelligence Review 247 et seq. (June 1993).
Supra fn 12.
18 After 1991 the reorganised JNA came under the de facto command of President
Milošević, who was reportedly personally involved in the appointment of successive
Chiefs of Staff and also of other senior officers. From 1991 he was also reported to
have become increasingly involved in strategic and major tactical decisions, including
the type and level of military supplies and assistance given to Serbs in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatia.
19 David C. Isby, “Yugoslavia 1991: Forces In Conflict”, 3 Jane’s Intelligence Review
20 397 (1991).
Ibid., p.394.
21 Ibid., at 395. 90
of active JNA service, and a cadre of professional soldiers. 22The TO units
drew their strength locally, and reflected the ethnic makeup of the local
area. The TO was
“a broad … organisational forum of all working people and
citizens for the armed combat and execution of certain tasks of the
society’s self-protection, and the b23adest organisational form for
the armed defence of all peoples”.
THE JNA AND THE P OLITICAL C HANGES FROM 1990
3.13 The JNA occupied a privileged position in the SFRY, with its
officers enjoying privileges as compared with other government
employees. Reforms in the 1980s resulted in cuts in the Army’s budgets
in the face of growing criticism of the JNA’s role in the political affairs of
the SFRY. This led the Army to ally itself increasingly with Serbian
conservatives, who opposed political reform and greater autonomy for the
Republic25 and undergo a process of ‘Serbianisation’ beginning in the mid-
1980’s. The victory of a non-communist party with a strong national
orientation (the HDZ) in the elections of 1990 in the Republic of Croatia
led to an even closer convergence between the JNA and some dissatisfied
Serbs. The SFRY Defence Minister General Kadijevi ć and other SFRY
officials were openly hostile to the HDZ, publicly referring to it as Ustasha
26
in character and declaring that they would not allow it to take power. Th27
JNA equated the loss of communist control with a threat to the SFRY.
The close relationship between the JNA and Serbia is reflected in the diary
22 Ibid. at 397-398.
23
See supra fn 12, pp. 54-56. On the role of the TO, See also The Federal Secretariat for
National Defence, Centre of the Armed Forces for strategic research and studies,
Strategy for Armed Defence, 1983, Annexes, vol 4, annex 120.
24 See The Washington Post, 4 December1990.
25
The process of “Serbianisation” was carried out in a number of inter alia by a
continuous ideological, political and social homogenisation of the Officer Corps aimed
at ‘pro-Yugoslav’ socialisation, which was carried out by long active service away from
home Republics and the glorification of Serbian history in Federal military academies.
See Davor Domazet, “How Aggression Against Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
Was Prepared or the Transformation of the JNA into a Serbian Imperial Force”,
Croatian International Relations Review, vol V, No. 14-1999, p 3.
26
See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 5, 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 40.
27 Several retired generals under the aegis of the JNA formed the League of Communists
– Movement for Yugoslavia (LC-MY). The organisation was a staunch supporter of the
Yugoslav Communist League. The LC-MY was committed to fight for socialism and
Yugoslavia. The JNA organization of the Yugoslav League of Communists joined the
th
Movement on 17 December 1990. See The decision at the 10 Conference of the
League of Communists of the JNA, 17 December1990. 91
entry of Borisav Jović at the time a Serbian representative in the Presidency
of the SFRY, about the meeting held in Slobodan Miloševi ć’s office on 10
January 1990:
“Meeting at Slobodan`s. Present: Pera, Slobodan, Bogdan, Zoran
and I. We reached an agreement on everything in an open, friendly
discussion of nearly three hours. The main battle should be played
out at the 14 Congress of the SKJ, to preserve the integrity of the
SKJ and democratic centralism, at least formally. The goal is to
isolate the Slovenes, to keep Croatia and Macedonia and possibly
Bosnia and Herzegovina as well from joining them. JNA
representatives will be the standard bearers and we will back them,
so that we are not leading the way, because that could have a
negative effect on28he Croats and Macedonians. The Army accepts
this sort of role.”
3.14 It is against this background that the JNA’s transformation into an
armed force supporting Serbian interests occurred between 1987 and 1991.
It was reflected in particular in changes to (a) the JNA’s ethnic composition
and management, and (b) its restructuring in 1988.
(a)The Ethnic Composition of the JNA and the Officer Corps
3.15 As the JNA was created as a unifying force, the SFRY Ministry of
Defence sent conscripts on service out of their home districts to avoid the
dominance of any ethnic group in regular army units located within a
particular Republic. Despite these efforts, a characteristic feature of the
JNA’s professional soldiers was the disproportionate ethnic and national
composition of the JNA corps: Serbs accounted for 63.2% of the Corps,
whereas the Croats amounted to just 6.3%. The imbalances became more
marked after 1986, when the Serbs accounted for almost 70% of the JNA
29
Officer corps.
3.16 This disproportion was also reflected at the Officer level, especially
in the ranks of General and Commissioned Officers. Although in 1991
there were a number of Generals in the JNA from Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina and, most were ethnic Serbs, so that the overall balance of the
Officer Corps sharply favoured Serbian ethnic interests. Although Serbia
was entitled to 56 Generals it had 77; by contrast Croatia had only 22 of the
28 See Borisav Jovi ć, Poslednji dani SFRJ, Politika, Belgrade (1993). The entry for 26
January 1990 confirms that General Kadijevć is sharing information with Serbian
members of the Presidency but not others who may be “separatists”; Appendices, vol 5,
appendix 4.3.
29
Supra fn 25, pp. 2-3. 92
30 Generals to which it was entitled. Moreover, most of the 22 Croatian
generals were of Serbian ethnicity, whose allegiance to the “Greater
Serbian” ideal became readily apparent with the onset of the war. The
imbalances were equally great at the level of Colonel (commander of a
brigade-regiment): there were 1511 Serb Colonels (as compared with the
850 there should have been) and just 219 Croatian Colonels (as compared
with the 463). 30
(b) Restructuring of the JNA in 1988
and the Adoption of a New Military Strategy
3.17 A further shift towards the promotion of Serbian interests was
achieved with the restructuring of the JNA in 1988, according to the
“Jedinstvo” (“Unity”) plan. 31This Plan had as its primary objective the
limitation of the potential role of the TOs, by removing their significant
powers and making them subordinate to the Military regions. 32The 1988
restructuring was inspired by the events in Kosovo between 1981 and 1989,
nd
when the JNA (through its 52 Corps) was able to maintain Serb
domination in Kosovo notwithstanding the fact that 90% of the population
was non-Serb.
3.18 Until 1988 the organisational structure of the JNA provided for 6
Armies and Independent Corps. Their territorial locations generally
corresponded to the internal borders of the Republics (see Plate 10). In
1988, the six Armies were replaced with new battlefield regions, entitled
Military Regions. Three Military Regions and a Naval Region were
established (See Plate 11). Prior to the 1988 restructuring each Republic
had its own JNA group and units located within its territory, the
commander of which was usually a national of the Republic in which it was
located. The creation of three Military Regions no longer corresponded
with the borders of each of the Republics, and the Republics had less
influence on the local command of the JNA. 33 The restructuring
30
Revija Obramba, Ljubljana, No. 4-1991, p. 56-61, Teodor Geršek, “Kdo drži v rokah
jugoslavensko armado”.
31 The SFRY Presidency approved the plan “Unity”. The plan came into effect on 25
December 1988. See Federal Secretariat of National Defence, The headquarters of the
st
SthY Armed Forces, the 1 Administration, DT no: 374-172/87, 31 Oct 1988, to the
5 Army Command, Order; Annexes, vol 4, annex 126 and Federal Secsttariat of
National Defence, the headquarters of thethFRY Armed Forces, the 1 Administration,
DT no: 374-184/87, 10 Nov 1988, to the 5 Army Command, Annexes, vol 4, annex
121.
32 See Federal Secretariat of National Defence, the Headquarters of the SFRY Armed
Forces, Order, 14 March 1989, Annexes, vol 4, annex 58.
33
Supra fn 25, p.4. See also Annexes, vol 3, Plate 9.1. 93
subordinated the TO which were under the control of each of the Republics
to the battlefield commands of the JNA. The JNA justified this change to
avoid “the duality of strategic, operative, and tactical commands”. 34 These
changes were badly received by the Republics, with the exception of
Serbia, which considered the restructuring to be a limitation on their rights
under the 1974 Constitution.
3.19 The northwestern part of the Republic of Croatia had been the base
th
for the JNA’s 5 Army and Military and Naval Region until 1988 (see Plate
10). The restructuring divided Croatia in two. The new 5 thMilitary Region
(whose Command began to function in December 1988, based in Zagreb)
encompassed the whole of Slovenia and that part of the territory of the
Republic of Croatia which fell west of the line corresponding to that linking
the towns of Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag (the line identified by the 1986
35
SANU Memorandum as being the western limit of “Greater Serbia”). The
rest of Croatia, the southern part falling within “Greater Serbia”, was
divided between the 1 stMilitary Region and the Naval Region. The 1 st
Military Region was based in and controlled from Belgrade, and its area
included the whole of Slavonia (East and West), which was under the
th
command of the 17 Corps in Tuzla. The Naval Region with its
headquarters in Split, covered the Adriatic coast and a part of Northern
36 st
Dalmatia. The consequence of the restructuring was that the new 1
Military Region clearly corresponded with the western and northern
borders of “Greater Serbia”, along the line connecting Virovitica-Karlovac-
Karlobag. 37
3.20 As stated above the restructuring of the army was accompanied by
the adoption, in May 1987, of a new “Strategy of All-People’s Defence and
34 See Federal Secretariat for National Defence I, “Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRY” 1945-
35 1985, Book 7/I, Belgrade, 1990, p. 375-376, Annexes, vol 4, annex 50.
These were the areas the Military Region inherited from the former 5 thArmy (Croatia)
and the 9 thArmy (Slovenia). The 5 thMilitary Region comprised four Corps: the 14 th
and 31 Corps based in Slovenia; the 13 thCorps based in Rijeka, and responsible for
nd
the northern part of Istra and the Croatian coast and the 32 Corps in Varaždin,
responsible for North-western Croatia. Most of Kordun was under the command of the
6thProletarian Infantry Division with it’s headquarters in Karlovac; and Zagreb and its
surroundings formed a separate Command for the defence of Zagreb. The 5 thCorps of
the Airforce and Air-defence, which was based in Zagreb, supported the 5 thMilitary
th
Region. See Report on the Combat Readiness of the 5 Army, December 1988,
Annexes, vol 4, annex 122.
36 Northern Dalmatia was under the command of the 9 thCorps based in Knin; the 5 th
Naval sector with headquarters in Pula was responsible for the northern part of the
th
Adriatic coast; the 8 Corps with headquarteth in Šibenik was responsible, for the
central part of the Adriatic coast; and the 9 Corps with headquarters in Kumbor, in
Boka Kotorska was responsible for the southern part of the Adriatic coast.
37 See Chapter 2, para. 2.76. 94
38
National Self-defence of the SFRY”. The Strategy envisaged that the JNA
would continue to have a role as protector of the socialist system. In a
Chapter of the Strategy entitled ‘Extraordinary Circumstances’ (in other
words, a situation pertaining prior to a state of emergency) any potential
destabilisation of the SFRY could be addressed by permitting the JNA to:
threaten to use force against the hostile internal or
international forces; or
directly participate in eliminating “extraordinary
39
circumstances.
This Strategy changed the potential terms of engagement of the JNA. For
the first time it could intervene directly in events which might, for example,
include efforts by one of the Republics to establish an independent state.
3.21 The restructuring of the JNA and the 1987 Strategy for Deployment
in “Extraordinary Circumstances” were accompanied by other
developments. JNA officers who had indicated support for the idea of
“Greater Serbia” were elevated. According to the SFRY Defence Minister
General Kadijević, the JNA’s new organisational structure wou41 reduce
control of the Republics over the TO’s and the JNA. The relevant
structures are set out in Volume 3, Part 2.
P URPOSE OF R EORGANISATION AND THE REPARATIONS
FOR THE G ENOCIDE
3.22 The JNA had two war plans to be invoked in a case of aggression
against SFRY. These two variant were known as S-1 (which addressed
potential threats from the eastern bloc) and S-2 (which addressed potential
threats from the West, i.e. NATO). With the sweeping changes across
Eastern Europe in the early 1990’s the JNA increasingly anticipated a threat
only from NATO, believing that 42TO’s forces would most likely strike
from Hungary and Bulgaria. The JNA developed a military doctrine
premised upon counter-attack, which would force the NATO forces to
retreat. The JNA carried out several exercises practising these manoeuvres.
38 Supra fn 12.
39
Supra fn 25, pp. 5- 6. See also supra fn 12.
40 Supra fn 25, p. 4.
41 Supra fn 25, p. 4 citing General Kadijević at p. 78.
42 th
See Command of the 30 Partisan Division, Top Secret No. 651-10, Order for the
mobilisation of the 5 Corps, 23September 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 51. 95
These exercises were to inform the JNA’s activities in Eastern Slavonia and
43
elsewhere in Croatia in 1991.
3.23 The restructuring of the JNA, the adoption of the 1987 Strategy and
the above-mentioned military exercises provided a means for the Socialist
Republic of Serbia and the Serbian leadership to position the JNA as a
defender of the status quo, committed to the maintenance of the unity of the
SFRY, in the face of any future moves towards independence in Slovenia
and Croatia. Accordingly, the JNA treated the “Krajina” rebellion in 1990
as a spontaneous uprising of “unarmed Serbian people” in response to
Croatian nationalism, its response being to protect these people. The
Belgrade regime hoped that Croatia would attack JNA garrisons, so that
radical action taken by the JNA could be interpreted as action taken in
44
defence.
3.24 The introduction of the multi-party system and the subsequent
victory of a non-communist party in the Republic of Croatia in April 1990
provided the catalyst for the JNA’s new role. On 17 April 1990 the Defence
Minister of the SFRY orally ordered the commandants of the Military
districts and the TO’s of the Republics and the Autonomous Provinces to
evaluate the security of all buildings of the Territorial Defence that held
weaponry and ammunition. 45The following month, acting under orders
from Belgrade – but without the knowledge of the Presidency of the
Socialist Republic of Croatia – the JNA confiscated the weapons of the TO
of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. On 14 May 1990 the Chief of Staff of
the JNA ordered that weapons be removed from the premises of the TO and
43
Supra fn 25, pp. 7-9. An example of the exercises was an exercise carried out in May
1990, called “Romanija-90”, under the command of the 5 thMilitary Region. The “Red”
(JNA) was to execute the strategic offensive on the battlefield in the final stage of the
war and the “Blue” (NATO) was to execute a strategic defense. The object of the
training was to improve the commanding structure and experiences in the operative
(corps commands) and strategic levels (military region command). The combat actions
executed by the JNA in Croatia from September 1991 onwards corresponded to the task
of the “Red”, whilst the Croatian army was the “Blue”.thee The Report on Monitoring
and Evaluation of the “KŠRV” “Romanija-90” of the 5 Military Region Command,
Annexes, vol 4, annex 123.
44 Supra fn 25, p. 10; see also Kadijević, p. 133. Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.3.
45
The existence of this order can be seen in the Order of the SFRY Presidency to the
Presidencies of the Republics, No.150/3-3/690, 31 May 1990, Annexes, vol 4, annex
52.
46 Command of the 1 Military Region, 15 May 1990, Order; Annexes, vol 4, annex 48.
See also Smail Čekić, Military Preparations for the Aggression Against the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Agresija na Bosnu i Hercegovinu i borba za njen opstanak
1992 – 1995, Law Faculty of the University in Sarajevo, Sarajevo, 1996, p. 80. 96
placed under the control of the JNA. 47When the JNA’s buildings were
filled the remaining armaments were left in the TO buildings but the
ammunition was removed by the JNA. 48The transfer was to be completed
st
by 21 May 1990. This decision was endorsed by the Presidency of the
SFRY. It is interesting to note the observations of Borisav Jovi ć, then
President of the Presidency of the SFRY:
“We take measures to ensure that weapons are taken from civilian
Territorial Defence (TO) depots in Slovenia and Croatia and
transferred to military depots. We will not permit Territorial
Defence weapons to be misused in any conflicts or for forcible
secession. Practically speaking, we have disarmed them. Formally,
the head of the General Staff did this, but it was actually under our
order. Extreme reaction by the Slovenes and Croatians, but they
49
have no recourse.”
3.25 The JNA’s actions were to leave the TO’s of the Republics of
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia virtually without arms. The
SFRY Defence Secretary, General Kadijević, justified the action by stating
that the weapons were under the exclusive authority of the federal JNA and
not the Republics, who had no rights over these weapons. He stated that the
weapons could be returned if the Republics ensured good conditions of
50
protection. The Presidency of the Republic of Croatia demanded the
return of the weapons at a session of the Presidency of the SFRY on 8 June
1990. 51
3.26 After the removal of the weapons of the TO of the Republic of
Croatia the JNA also made significant organisational and structural changes
in the 1 and 5 Military Region situated on the territory of the Republic of
Croatia and in the Naval Region. The Armoured and Mechanized Brigades
of the JNA were upgraded from category “B Class” to “A Class”, while in
several mechanized Brigades the armo52ed and mechanized battalions were
integrated into their structures. This upgrade was a rare occurrence, and
significantly enhanced the firepower and mobility of these Regions.
47
See Federal Secretariat of National Defence, the Headquarters of the SFRY, 14 May
1990, Annexes, vol 4, annex 53.
48 Ibid.
49
Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ, Prizma, Kragujevac, 1996, p. 146, Appendices, vol
5, appendix 4.3.
50 Borisav Jovi ć, Poslednji dani SFRJ , Prizma, Kragujevac, 1996, pp. 146-147
Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.3.
51
Kronologija rata, Zagreb, 1998, p. 25.
52 In the 1 Military Region the 329 Armoured Brigade was transformed from “B Class”
to “A Class””. This implies a larger number of people and tanks within a brigade. The
armoured brigade of “B Class” uses up to 30 percent of armoured vehicles in everyday 97
th
3.27 The most significant changes were made in the JNA’s new 5
Military Region. By June 1990 its 6 th Proletarian Infantry Division and the
Command for the defence of Zagreb had been dissolved. The regions
around Zagreb, Kordun and Banovina were put under the command of the
th
newly formed 10 Corps of the JNA, with its headquarters in Zagreb, a
move which not foreseen by the “Jedinstvo” (Unity) plan. 53 With hindsight
it is apparent that these developments and those referred to in the previous
paragraphs were intended to prepare the JNA for the role it was to assume
from the summer of 1991. In particular, the JNA was now in a position to
limit the activities of the Croatian Ministry of Interior, which in the spring
of 1990 was attempting to suppress the rebellion of the Knin Serbs who
were being encouraged and supported from Serbia. In his memoirs, the then
President of the Presidency of the SFRY, Borisav Jovi ć, noted that the
SFRY Defence Minister General Veljko Kadijević had said in June 1990:
“….that they had decided on forming special motorised Corps. in
the regions Zagreb, Knin, Banja Luka and Herzegovina which will
54
be able, if needed, to act the same way as in Kosovo.”
3.28 As a consequence of these changes, of the four Corps of the JNA
th th th nd th
which had their headquarters in Croatia (9 , 10 , 13 and 32 of the 5
Military Region) only the last two were deployed in areas where Croatians
were in a majority of the population. Although the 10 thCorps had its
headquarters in Zagreb most of its units were located in areas with majority
Serb populations. The Knin Corps was, for the most part, located in an area
55
with a Serbian majority. When the Serbs in Knin rebelled, the peaceful
displacement of the JNA enabled the local Serbs to organise their defence
st
activities, while the “A Cthss” uses over 60 percent. The 221 Motorised Brigade of the
Knin Corps and the 10 Motorised Brigade of the Mostar Corps. Incorporated
armoured and mechanized batallions.
The units of the “A” class were about 60-100%, the “B” class from 15-60%, and the
“R” class up to 15% complete in the wartime structure of the units. The “A” class units’
personnel basis were soldiers who regularly served the army. According to Yugoslav
doctrine, those units very quickly transformed to wartime formations and were ready
for almost immediate use. In the circumstances as they were in Croatia 1990-1991 until
the outbreak of open conflict, units of this type performed tasks ordered by the Federal
Secretariat for National Defence, Order, 15 May 1990, Annexes, vol 4, annex 47.
53 th nd st
The 140 Motorised Brigade “R”thf the 32 Corps and the 31 Mechanised Brigade
“R” were joined into the 140 Mechanized Brigade of “A Class”, which means that the
140 Mechanized Brigade was reorganized, while the 31 stMechanized Brigade was
shut down. There were also upgrades made to the 32 nd Corps, where the 265 th
Mechanized Brigade, the 13 Corps, and the 13 thProletarian Motorised Brigade were
th
upgraded into “A Class.”. See ibid; See also Command of the 5 Military Region, DT
No. 2-14, Report about the realisation of the plan “Jedinstvo-2 and 3”, in 1990, 24
January 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 54.
54 Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 1996, p. 152, Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.3.
55
See Chapter 2, paras. 2.80-2.92. 98
and administrative structures. The mere act of creating a “buffer zone”
between disputing communities reflected the JNA’s acceptance that the
Serb rebels were in some way equal in legitimacy to the democratically
elected government of the Republic of Croatia. The Serbs in “Bosanska
Krajina” and in Serbia supported the JNA’s role. 56 The presence of the
th
JNA’s 9 Corps in the Knin region, a predominantly Serb area made it
possible for the Serbs to establish and arm their paramilitary forces. Led by
57
members of the Serbian Democratic Party, t58 Serbs recruited a
paramilitary force to include retired JNA officers. These developments
moved with greater speed following the proclamation on 21 December
59
1990 of the “Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina” (“SAO Krajina”).
The JNA supplied paramilitaries with arms. (see below at para. 3.54 et seq.)
The paramilitaries formed units to block communications, control
movements, and carry out surveillance activities, which were co-ordinated
from Knin and supported by the JNA. Although the General Staff of the
JNA in Belgrade60as fully aware of these and other activities it chose to
ignore them. In this way the developing “situation” in the Knin region
was directly attributable to the involvement of the JNA.
3.29 In January 1991 the Presidency of the SFRY took a decision to
disarm the paramilitary units, having received a communiqué from the
SFRY Ministry of Defence on the unauthorised establishment of armed
paramilitary forces. In January and February 1991 the JNA newspaper –
“Narodna armija” – dedicated two issues to the arming of the HDZ’s
“terrorist” formations in Croatia, including the TO, but made no mention of
56
Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ , 1996, pp. 178-179. Appendices, vol 5, appendix
4.3.
57
See Chapter 2, para. 2.82.
58 See Command of the 9 Corps of the Airforce and Air Defence, Security Service, to the
Security Department KRV (Command of Air-Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence) and
PVO (Anti-Aircraft Defence), Notice about the state on the terrain around Zadar and
th
Knin, 10 December 1990, Annexes, vol 4, annex 55 and Commandthf the 9 Corps of
the Airforce and Air-defence, Security Service, from the 27 of March 1991, to the
Security Department KRV and PVO, OA (Operative Action) “Štit”, notices about the
activity of SDS on the terrain around Zemunik.
59 See Plate 8 (also Vol 3, Plate 2.5); See Chapter 2, para 2.94. The “SAO Krajina”
included the municipalities of Knin, Obrovac, Benkovac, Gra čac, Titova Korenica,
Dvor na Uni, Glina, Vojnić and Hrvatska Kostajnica. In February 1991 they were
joined by the Municipalities of Vojnić, Vrginmost and Pakrac.
60 See Federal Secretariat for National Defence, Top Secret No. 6-1, 10 January 1991,
which contains information about unauthorised forming of armed forces. Annexes, vol
61 4, annex 56.
See The Order of the Presidency of the SFRY, fn No.3, 9 January 1991, Annexes, vol 4,
annex 57. 99
62
the arming of the rebel Serbs. At the same time the JNA Military Court in
Zagreb brought charges against the Croatian Minister of Defence, General
63
Martin Špegelj, for incitement to armed rebellion.
3.30 The JNA’s attack on the Croatian police forces and support for the
Serbian paramilitaries was reflected also in the views of General Kadijevi ć,
the SFRY Defence Minister. On 6 December 1990 he was reported as
having said that the Territorial Defences constituted “a base and the
skeleton of the republics’ armies”, and that
“territorial defence, the way it was founded at the end of the
Sixties and64t the beginning of the Seventies, is, objectively a great
fraud….”
The Minister of Defence’s views were perceived as a threat to Croatians
and Slovenes, who favoured a semi-confederate model for SFRY, which
would guarantee protection of their national interests. The statement was
also seen as a direct attack on Presidents Tito’s legacy, the same legacy that
the JNA was purportedly guarding.
3.31 In March the Government of Croatia learnt that the Staff of
Supreme Command had been operationalised, but unconstitutionally and
65
without the required authorization of the SFRY Presidency. The Staff of
Supreme Command for the armed forces was only intended to operate in
times of war. Its operationalisation reduced the competence of the
Republics’ TO, and the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 66
Serbia and Montenegro were drawn into the war against Croatia. Its
operation was clearly unconstitutional, as there had been no proclamation
of war or a state of emergency by the Presidency of the SFRY, the
prerequisite for its existence.
62
See “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade) , Special Issue, 26 January 1991, “Istina o
naoružavanju teroristi čkih formacija HDZ u Hrvatskoj”; “Narodna Armija”
(Belgrade), 28 February 1991, “Istina o naoružavanju teroričkih formacija HDZ u
Hrvatskoj (2)”. Annexes, vol 4, annex 148.
63 See Chapter 2, para. 2.97.
64
See “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 6 December 1990, pp. 5-9, “Bić e razoružane sve
oružane formacije uspostavljene izvan jedinstvenih i ustavom SFRY definisanih
oružanih snaga”, Annexes, vol 4, annex 147.
65 Antun Tus, “Rat u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj do Sarajevskog primir”, Rat u Hrvatskoj i
66 Bosni i Hercegovini 1991-1995, p. 68.
Supra fn 32, pp. 3- 5. 100
T HE JNA’ A S TTEMPT TO ROCLAIM A S TATE OF E MERGENCY
3.32 As described in Chapter 2, during the March 1991 session of the
Presidency of the SFRY the Federal Defence Minister General Kadijevi ć,
requested the Presidency of the SFRY to proclaim a state of emergency and
suspend all “normative acts that are against the Constitution of the SFRY
67
and the federal law68. This was apparently a result of the March 1991
events in Pakrac. The request was not adopted, although it was supported
by the Serbian controlled representatives of the Republics of Serbia and
Montenegro and the Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.
Having failed to obtain the declaration of a state of emergency the JNA
implemented a contingency plan for “the protection and defence of the
Serbian people out of Serbia and the gathering of the JNA within the
borders of the future Yugoslavia”, 69implying that FRY in statu nascendi
would territorially correspond with the planned “Greater Serbia”. This
represented another step towards the JNA’s transformation from its
obligations under the 1974 Constitution, towards its new role as a Serbian
Army demonstrating its support for the rebel Serbs in Croatia and serving
the cause of “Greater Serbia”. Between April ath July 1991, in application
of this contingency plan, the JNA’s 10 Corps organised the transfer of
arms and ammunition from its warehouses in Lika directly to the Serbian
70
Democratic Party. Further structural changes were made in April 1991,
when the Secretariat for National Defence of the SFRY agreed to transfer
71 72
additional units of the JNA to Croatia and to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
67
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada, 1993, p. 113; Borisav Jovi ć, Poslednji dani
SFRJ, 1996, pp. 286-295.
68
See Chapter 2, para. 2.101. See also Financial Times, 4 March 1991, Annexes, vol 4,
annex 33.
69 Emphasis added. Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada, 1993, pp. 113-114.
70
Srpska Vojska Krajine, General Staff, Security department, Top Secret No. 321-99
from the 16 tof October 1994, to the General Staff of the Republika Srpska, Request
for the authentication of dates and interview. See Letter of Dušan Smiljani ć, Annexes,
vol 4, annex 65.
71 rd nd
A part of the elite 63 Parachute Brigade was sent to Zagreb from Niš. The 2
Armoured Battalion of the 51stMechanised Brigade in Pan čevo was sent to Banovina
near Petrinja to supplement the 622 ndMotorised Brigade. The 2 nd Mechanised
Battalion of the 36Mechanised Brigade in Subotica and the 2ndMechanised Battalion
of the 453rdMechanised Brigade in Sremska Mitrovica were sent to Eastern Slavonia,
th
to the Vukovar and Vinkovci areathhere they were put under the command of the 17
Corps. See Command of the 17 Corps, DT No. 11/1-93, 14 May 1991, Order,
Annexes, vol 4, annex 59; Reconnaissance and Control Report of the 622th Mechanized
Brigade and the 4 thArmored Brigade; Anton Tus, “Rat u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj do
Sarajevskog primirja,” Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini 1991-1995, pp. 68-69.
72
“Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 23 May 1991, pp. 15-16, “Ljudi i tehnika odoljevaju
svim iskušenjima”. 101
3.33 At the time of the acceleration of the collapse of the SFRY
73
presidency in M74 1991 and the murder of twelve Croatian policemen in
Borovo Selo, the General Staff of the JNA in Belgrade acted to place the
JNA in a state of “combat readiness” and prepared to mobilise additional
units should the Federa75and Republic authorities prove to be unable to
perform their tasks. This decision led to the mobilisation of reserves. A
few days later, by Order dated 14 May 1991, units of the JNA’s 1 Military st
Region in Slavonia and Baranja were informed that preparedness levels
were being raised to the highest level. The Order stated that in case of
attacks on military objects, the 17 th Corps command could retaliate against
the responsible parties. It also provided that armoured and mechanised units
and artillery and air-defence units could be used to repel attacks. 76The
Order was premised upon an expectation by the JNA that its barracks
would be attacked by Croat forces, thereby providing a legitimate reason to
“repel” the attack and subjugate the elected government in Zagreb. 77
3.34 Following the short military conflict in Slovenia, in which the JNA
relinquished control over state border and customs posts (the loss of
Slovenia from the SFRY was in no way inconsistent with the idea of
establishing a “Greater Serbia”), the JNA forces were withdrawn from
Slovenia and re-deployed in areas in and around Croatia. These forces were
directly involved in the genocidal activities described in Chapters 4 and 5.
By tacitly accepting the departure of Slovenia the JNA was abandoning its
commitment to maintain the unity of the SFRY and shifting its support to
the “Greater Serbian” version of Yugoslavia. Borisav Jovi ć writes in his
diary on 20 June 1991:
“That same day [24June] (in another meeting), we will meet with
Kadijević and Adžić and ask them to give us a precise answer on
whether they will conduct a redeployment of the military along the
new (Serbian) borders of Yugoslavia, in order to prevent major
73
See Chapter 2, paras. 2.105/2.106.
74 See Chapter 2, para. 2.102.
75
See “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 9 May 1991, p. 5, “ Podići borbenu gotovost JNA”
Annexes, vol 4, annex 148. See also Annexes, vol 3, Illustrations 9.2 and 9.3.
76 Identical measures were adopted in the units of the 5 thMilitary Region and the 5 th
th
Corps of the Airforce and Air-defence, See facsimile of the Command of the 10
Corps, DT No. 36-3, Order, 10 May 1991 in Božidar Javorović , Narodna zaštita grada
Zagreba u Domovinskom ratu , Defimi, Zagreb, 1999, pp. 69-70, Annexes, vol 4, annex
60.
77 In June 1991, the JNA intensified its operations in Eastern Slavonia, by involving the
river war fleet, which began to control bridges and forts on the Danube, from Bezdan to
Ilok. The fleet also provided gave artillery support to the ground units in the
surroundings, see “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 7 August 1991, p. 11, “Odjekuje neka
druga pjesma” Annexes, vol 4, annex 149. 102
losses by the Serb nation and to defend its territory. If we do not
receive clear guarantees of defence, then we will have to organize
ourselves and abandon the army.” 78
On 27 June 1991 Jovi ć writes about Milošević and the meeting with
General Kadijević:
“Slobodan and I at Kadijevi ć’s. Slobodan insists several times
(correcting yesterday’s mistake) that the military must defend the
future borders of Yugoslavia: “Why should it defend Slovenia’s
borders, that are temporary. We must defend that which will be
permanent.” He persist in mentioning only Slovenia, perhaps for
tactical reasons toward the military, which is intoxicated with the
unity of a Yugoslavia that no longer exists, but for us it is clear
79
that also relates to a Croatia without Serb territory in it.”
And by 30 July 1991 General Kadijevi ć’s position, and that of the JNA, is
clear:
“Veljko, Slobodan, and I are sitting in my office. Before the
Presidency session with the Presidents of the Republics on the
future of Yugoslavia. Veljko wants to report to us, “clearly and
definitively”, on his position and final orientation:
The JNA should be transformed into a military force of those who
wants to remain in Yugoslavia, comprising at least: Serbia, the Serb
nation, plus Montenegro. Those are the principles on the basis of
which the withdrawal and the change of leadership should be
80
conducted.”
3.35 In the meantime, the JNA had already taken steps in that direction.
On 28 June 1991 General-Colonel Blagoje Adži ć, Chief of General Staff,
signed a Special ‘Instruction’ authorising the use of armoured and
mechanised units to inter alia control the borders of Croatia; put down
subversive demonstrations; destroy diversionist, renegade terrorist and
81
other groups; put down any armed rebellion; and prevent civil war. The
circumstances in which the Order was adopted made it clear that it was to
be used only against Croatian Government forces, and not against the rebel
78
Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ , Prizma, Kragujevac, 1996, Appendices, vol 5,
appendix 4.3.
79 Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ , Prizma, Kragujevac, 1996, Appendices, vol 5,
appendix 4.3.
80
Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ , Prizma, Kragujevac, 1996, Appendices, vol 5,
appendix 4.3.
81 See Federal Secretariat for National Defence, Instruction on the use of armoured and
mechanised units, Int. No. 697, 28 June 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 62. 103
Serbs. The armoured-mechanised units ensured the JNA’s superiority over
the Croatian police and the few infantry units of the ZNG (Croatian
National Guard Corps).
3.36 Also in June 1991 significant changes were made to the leadership
82
and command structure of the83NA, whose Officer Corps was by then
about two-third Serbian. General-Colonel Konrad Kolšek, a Slovene, was
replaced by General-Colonel Života Avramović, a Serb as commander of
th
the 5th Military Region. The command of the 5 Airforce and Air-defence
Corps, which had responsibility for the area of the 5 Military Region, was
commanded by General Major Marjan Rožič (Slovene). The command was
subsequently taken over by the Serbian Head of Staff, Colonel Ljubomir
Bajić. 84 By this time the Commanders of every armoured and mechanised
JNA brigade located in Croatia and in the adjoining areas were Serbs or
Montenegrins. The same was true for most of the Motorised Brigades. The
“Serbianisation” of the command structures of the JNA reflected the lack of
confidence in non-Serb commanding officers within the federal JNA. The
national structure of the CO’s staff in the JNA in Slovenia and Croatia at
this time was absolutely weighted in favour of Serb officers who accounted 85
for 57% of the officer cadre, whereas the Croats made up just 12%. The
changes are reflected in the diary of Borisav Jović on 8 August 1991:
“We really have no alternative but to intensively expel the Croats
and Slovenes from the military, pull the military back to territory
that we will definitely defend, and furiously purge it of HDZ
forces. Anything else is a rambling approach and a waste of t86e.
Little by little, but slowly, this is in fact taking place.”
th
3.37 87 In Julthand August 1991 the JN88mobilised nds 5 Corps in Ba89a
Luka, its 12 Corps in Novi Sad, and its 2 Corps in Montenegro. The
82 See Los Angeles Times, 16 July 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 38.
83
See Newsweek, 15 July 1991.
84 “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 6 July 1991, p. 4, “Nova postavljenja” Annexes, vol 4,
annex 149.
85
Ibid., p. 6, “Napadnuto je sve jugoslovensko.” Annexes, vol 4, annex 149.
86 Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ , Prizma, Kragujevac, 1996, Appendices, vol 5,
Appendix 4.3.
87
“Narodna armija” ( Belgrade), 22 August 1991, pp. 20-21, “Mobilizacija na nišanu
stranaka.”
88
89 “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 10 July 1991, p. 18, “Prekaljeni tenkisti i artiljerci.”
“Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 13 July 1991, p. 44, “Odbrana otadžbine sveta
dužnost.”, Annexes, vol 4, annex 149. 104
mobilisation of the JNA’s 52 ndCorps in Kosovo was also provided for. 90
Some of these mobilisations were carried out by commanders of JNA’s
combat units, ignoring regular procedures and commands of superior
authorities. However, as the mobilisation was not as successful as the
JNA anticipated it was decided that the military service of conscripts
92
should be extended by 20 days for the September 1990 conscripts.
3.38 By July 1991, armoured-mechanised units of JNA’s 1 stMilitary
Region were stationed at the borders of Croatia. This was a clear
demonstration of force by the JNA, aimed at heading off independence and
providing support to Serb rebels. The same month the JNA occupied
bridges across the Danube separating the Republic ofthroatia from the
Republic of Serbia. By an Order dated 5 July 1991 all armoured-
mechanised units at the border of Croatia were ordered to familiarise
themselves with the local topography and possible attack directions, so that
“during the execution of their tasks” they would be able to foresee the
engagement of the opposition forces, their manoeuvres and their
93
objectives.
3.39 By the end of July 1991 the transformation of the JNA had been
achieved. Any pretence that it was playing a neutral role between different
ethnic groups had disappeared altogether. Within Croatia the JNA was
commanded by Serbs. Outside Croatia the collapse of the Presidency of the
SFRY had led to a vacuum of political authority, which was filled by the
authorities of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro and the Autonomous
Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, all under the control of Slobodan
Milošević and his supporters in Belgrade. The JNA had been transformed
into an Army to promote Serbian objectives, including territorial
objectives. The totality of the transformation was reflected in a speech
given by retired JNA General Đoko Jovanić on 31 July 1991 to celebrate
th
the 50 anniversary of the 1941 insurrection in Croatia, where he called
upon those present to re-unite the JNA’s 6 th unit from Lika Division with
the aim to
90
“Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 6 July 1991, p. 42, “Brani ćemo jedinstvenu
Jugoslaviju”; “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 6 July 1991, p. 42, “Odlučnost da se brani
zemlja.” Annexes, vol 4, annex 149.
91
Comments of the Defence Minister of Bosnia, reported in “Narodna Armija”
(Belgrade), 7 August 1991, p. 7, “U korist sopstvene štete” and“Narodna Armija”
(Belgrade), 14 August 1991, p. 13, “Vojni rok samo u BiH i Makedoniji”. Annexes, vol
4, annex 149.
92 “Narodna armija” ( Belgrade), 22 August 1991, pp. 6-7, “Podrška poverenja armiji.”
Annexes, vol 4, annex 149.
93 th
See Command of the 17 Corps, Order, 5 July 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 63. 105
“finally bring to an 94d the started work – the liberation from the
vampire Ustashas”.
3.40 By this time the activities of the JNA were completely controlled by
95
the President of Serbia – Slobodan Milošević – in Belgrade. In September
discussion turned to the issues of renaming the JNA. Borisav Jovi ć records
the views of General Kadijević in his diary on 24 September 1991:
“Veljko then concludes the following: The military will lose the
war against Croatia unless motivation and the success of
mobilization are ensured. That cannot be achieved with a semi-
legitimate Yugoslavia. Serbia and Montenegro should declare that
the military is theirs and assume command, financing, the war, and
everything else. All the generals on the General Staff, except one,
are Serbs, and they all support this approach and think the same
way.” 96
Jović then explains why renaming is not possible at this stage, for strategic
and political reasons:
“[W]e cannot accept the demand that the military drop “Yugoslav”
from its name. That would mean Serbia and Montenegro would
completely lose all their advantages, both political and military, in
the existing conflict and dispute. How do they think that a
Serbian-Montenegrin army can wage war with Croatia and defeat
it?”97
The same rationale for maintaining the use of the name “Yugoslavia”, in
relation to the Army and more generally, to promote a “Greater Serbia” was
given by Šeselj, when he said:
“[It] is one army for the whole territory… We cannot cross the
Serbian borders with a Serbian army! Do you want the Desert
Storm here? I would have everyone shot who wants a Serbian
army today! I, the main enemy of the state, imprisoned by
Milošević himself! I want a Serbian army when I get a Serbian
state! Now we want to set the borders. Diplomatically we are O.K.
94
See “Narodna armija” (Belgrade), 31 July 1991, p. 14, “Otpor nasilju”, Annexes, vol
4, annex 149.
95 See as example the transcript that shows that Serbian politicians Slobodan Miloševi ć,
and Radovan Karadžić have together planned political and military actions, without the
knowledge and involvement of the SFRY Presidency, Annexes, vol 4, annex 64.
96
Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ , Prizma, Kragujevac, 1996, Appendices, vol 5,
appendix 4.3.
97 Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ , Prizma, Kragujevac, 1996, Appendices, vol 5,
appendix 4.3. 106
because we want Yugoslavia without Slovenes and Croats… We
must fight for a Serbia that covers all Serbian territories! We shall
call such a Serbia Yugoslavia as long as that is in our interest. It’s
in our interest to avoid the war with Moslems and Macedonians.
We will have Yugoslavia with 20 federal states if necessary! Now
it’s important that we are no longer with Croats and Slovenes. In
the war you cannot have elections….” 98
3.41 With the final collapse of the SFRY Presidency in October 1991,
the Serbian leadership obtained full control of the JNA. With the
proclamation of the FRY on 27 thApril 1992 the JNA formally became the
Yugoslav Army (VJ). But even then the new Army continued to accept
Orders emanating from the SFRY, which was treated as being entirely
synonymous with the FRY. 99And several officers of the JNA involved in
the action at Vukovar were promoted by the new authorities of the FRY,
providing direct evidence of the approval of – and ratification by – the FRY
for the events occurring in Croatia in November 1991. 100
C ONCLUSION
3.42 The first Part of this Chapter demonstrates the transformation in the
composition and role of the JNA. By October 1991 the JNA was acting as
an army to promote the establishment of a “Greater Serbia”, controlled by
the Serbian leadership. The consequences of this transformation become
abundantly clear in Chapters 4 and 5, which provides in graphic detail the
acts which the JNA was prepared to take to establish Serb control in
Eastern Slavonia and other parts of Croatia, including ridding the area of
Croats by their physical destruction and other genocidal acts where
necessary.
98
See Appendices, vol 5, appendix 2, Video Clip 13.
99 See, for example, Order of the General Staff of the SFRY, Armed Forces 1 st
Administration, Operations Centre to the Commands of the 5 , 10 , 13 and 17 Corps
and four Military Regions, 11/5/92, Annexes, vol 4, annex 90.
100
See Order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, 19 November 1991,
Annexes, vol 4, annex 104. See also photographs, Annexes, vol 3, 10.9 and 10.10. 107
SECTION TWO:
THE SERB AND SERBIAN PARAMILITARY GROUPS ACTIVE IN
CROATIA AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE JNA
3.43 The “liberation from the vampire Ustashas” 101by means of the
genocidal campaign which began in the summer of 1991 was not
perpetrated by the JNA alone. The JNA was assisted in its efforts by a large
number of paramilitary groups (comprising “special forces”, “militias”,
“paramilitary units” and “police units” of the “SAO Krajina”). 102In its
findings of fact the Trial Chamber of the ICTY described the situation as
follows:
“[T]he JNA experienced a shortage of manpower, especially when
it came to play the role of an occupying force in hostile territory,
as was the case in Croatia.… In consequence, increasing reliance
was placed on Serbian paramilitary forces […]. These paramilitary
forces operated in conjunction with the JNA and were used as
infantry shock troops to make up for declining numbers in the
regular army. They included Željko Ražnjatovi ć’s Serbian
Volunteer Guard (later known as “Arkan’s Tigers”) and Vojislav
Šešelj’s Chetniks […]. The JNA … actively cooperated with and
assisted these paramilitary units during 1991 and 1992 in
operations in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzeg103na and freely
supplied them with arms and equipment.”
3.44 As described below and in Appendix 5, some of the paramilitary
forces emerged in Serb villages and towns in Croatia, and others came from
Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Vojvodina. They were
present throughout the area, as the Map at Plate 12. The witness statements
referred to in this Memorial testify to the involvement of paramilitary
groups across Croatia. In 1990 and 1991 the paramilitary groups were
established with the support of the Serbian leadership, and their activities
endorsed by them. 104Through the JNA, and by other means, the Serbian
leadership provided financial and logistical support to the paramilitary
groups, training them, providing them with armaments and even paying
their salaries. By an Order dated 13 September 1991 the paramilitary
groups could be integrated into the JNA and treated formally as part of the
105
JNA. Pursuant to that Order many individual members of paramilitary
101
Supra, para. 3.39.
102 See below para. 3.49 et seq.
103
Prosecutor v.Tadić (Judgment) (ICTY Case IT-94-1-T), 7 May 1997, para. 111 (112
ILR 1, 48).
104 See below at para. 3.51 et seq. and Appendices, vol 5, appendix 5.
105 See below para. 3.58 and 3.63 et seq. 108
groups were integrated into the JNA. In all senses the Government of
Serbia, and after 27 April 1992 the Government of the FRY, had “effective
control” of many of these groups, who were commended for their activities.
EMERGENCE OF PARAMILITARY GROUPS
106
3.45 After the Knin rebellion in May 1990, the Serbs in Croatia began
arming themselves with the support and encouragement of the JNA and the
Serbian political authorities. This support manifested itself in several
107
forms, including financial, logistical and personnel support. Initially,
villages inhabited by a majority Serb population became outposts of both
the JNA and newly established Serb paramilitary groups. Following the
disarming of the Croatian TO, in May 1990, these groups’ acquired
weapons. As described in detail in Chapters 4 and 5, beginning in the
summer of 1991 JNA units and paramilitary groups began their genocidal
campaign against Croatian citizens in a bid to ‘remove’ them from
territories falling within “Greater Serbia”. All efforts by Croatian forces to
stop this campaign were thwarted by the JNA. As early as 5 July 1991 in
Mirkovci and Tenja, the JNA openly sided with the Serbian paramilitary
groups and created a protective zone within which Croatian authorities
were to be excluded.
3.46 By mid July 1991 the rebel Serbs in Croatia were on their way to
building extensive paramilitary structures under the patronage and
protection of the JNA’s armoured and mechanised units. A majority of the
paramilitary units that operated in the “Krajina” were supported both
logistically and financially by the Government of Serbia and the JNA.
Though the process had commenced in mid 1990, it was only with the
JNA’s active involvement in these parts of Croatia that it gained
momentum. This part of the Chapter begins by describing the paramilitary
groups that were formed and supported by the Republic of Serbia (A), and
then explaining their relationship to the JNA and the Serbian leadership of
the “rump Yugoslavia” and the FRY (B).
106
107 See Chapter 2, para. 2.88.
See below at para. 3.54 et seq. 109
(A) A N VERVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL P ARAMILITARY G ROUPS
3.47 According to Croatian intelligence sources, 32 different volunteer
paramilitary units operated in the Republic of Croatia in the period from
1990 to 1997. Sixteen of these groups were organised in the Republic of
Serbia, and the other 16 operated from the “Krajina”. 108 The “police” and
“Territorial Defence” units of the “SAO Krajina” inherited weapons from
the TO of the Republic of Croatia and received supplies from Serbia.
However, these forces were ad hoc, loose formations, which, without the
JNA’s support, would have been unable to perpetrate the genocide that
occurred.
3.48 As described in Appendix 5, the paramilitary organisations existed
in several forms. Some were highly organised and operated in several areas
of Croatia, in close cooperation and direct coordination with the JNA.
Others were loosely organised and acted in specific areas. Although the
creation of some of the groups preceded the conflict, which erupted in the
summer of 1991, others were formed to respond to particular incidents or
needs during the conflict. The Serbian paramilitary groups were organised
by the Serbian Government, by political parties, and by local police or
political or community leaders. The members of these organisations were
drawn from the JNA, Territorial Defence Forces (TO) and local militia and
police. They also included local civilians, expatriates, and even foreign
nationals. According to some reports, the paramilitary organisations also
included criminals released from prisons solely for the purpose of forming
these units.109According to the Report of the UN Commission of Experts,
the paramilitaries, often operating with the JNA, were responsible for
genocidal acts of the kind described in Chapters 4 and 5 of the Memorial,
108
See Annexes, vol 3, Plate 6.7. Paramilitary units formed in the territory of Serbia
include “Serbian Guard”; “Serbian National Renewal (SNO) – White Eagles”; “Dušan
the Mighty Detachment”; “Association of Kosmet (Kosovo and Metohija) Fighters”;
“Association of Fighters of the 1990 War”; “Serbian Volunteer Guard – Tigers”;
“Captain Dragan Formation”; “Serbian Chetnik Movement”; “Scorpions” or “Boca’s
Special Forces”; “Stevan Sin đelić Volunteer Detachment”; “Yellow Ants” or “Red
Berets”; Serbian National Security Services Group; “Vase Martinovi ć – Palestinian –
Group”; “Ćale Group”; Volunteers from Serbia – members of the 70antry Brigade
“Plački”; “21 Volunteer Diversion Detachment” and Paramilitary units formed in the
“SAO Krajina” and other places in the territory of the Republic of Croatia include
“Dinaric Chetnik Division”; “Miščević’s and Vase’s Special Forces”; “Vekić’s Special
Forces; “Mijović’s Special Forces”; Chetniks from Petrova Gora in Vukovar; “Beader
Boška Group”; “Milan Atljia Group”; “Goran Opa čić Group”; “Šilt’s Group”; “Stiv’s
Group”; “Regional Council” Group; “Minđušar Group”; “Labra Group”; “Krajina
109 Tigers”; “Delta Group” and “Kameni Group” and the “Joso Kova čević Group.”
See Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 780 (1992), S/1994/674/Add.2 (vol I), 28 December 1994,
Annex IIIA, Special Forces. 110
including the killing of civilians, torture, rape and other forms of sexual
violence, destruction of property, and looting.
3.49 The UN Report classifies the paramilitary forces operating in the
region into four categories: Special Forces; Militias; Paramilitary units; and
police augmented by armed civilians. 110
i Special Forces tended to operate with substantial autonomy
under the command of an identified leader. They operated in
several areas and sometimes engaged in joint operations with
the Army. These groups were supplied, and often trained, by
the governments they served. Many of these Special Forces
111
reported solely to senior political officials.
ii Militias consisted of members of the former Territorial
Defence Forces, and tended to operate, in the geographic area
from which they originated under the command of the regular
army. 112
iii The Paramilitary Units were forces under the command of a
local leader. Their area of operation was generally confined to
the town or village from which the members were drawn,
although they did operate alongside similar groups in other
towns or villages. 113
iv The police augmented by armed civilians operated within a
given county, under local, sometimes political leadership.
These forces frequently acted with autonomy, although they
were reportedly under the control of the Ministry of Interior or
114
other political organisations.
For purposes of this Chapter and the Memorial, all these categories,
including the so called “Army of the Republic of Srpska Krajina (RSK)”
which emerged after the proclamation of the “RSK”, are referred to as Serb
paramilitary groups. The more important Serb groups active in Croatia –
“Arkan’s Serbian Volunteer Guards” (“The Tigers”), the “Serbian Guard”,
the “Dušan the Mighty Detachment”, the “White Eagles”, “Captain
Dragan’s Group”, Vojislav Šešelj’s “Chetnik Movement”, Martić’s “Šiltovi
Group” and his Police “Martić evci” – are described in Appendix 5. The
“21 Volunteer Commando Task Force” (referred to as the “21 stDOD”) of
110
111 Ibid.
Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113
Ibid.
114 Ibid. 111
the 21 Kordun Corps of the “RSK Army”, which was formally established
st
on 1 August 1993, is of particular note, since its membership was largely
drawn from the Yugoslav Army of the FRY and its establishment and
activities in Croatia until December 1994 were directly controlled and
supported by the Yugoslav Army. Its structure, activities and relationship
with the FRY and the Yugoslav Army are described in detail in Appendix
5B.
3.50 Although the first reports of paramilitary activity only appeared in
April of 1991 it is now clear that some of these organisations were formed
as early as 1990. In their establishment and activities two individuals from
the Republic of Serbia played a key role: Željko Ražnjatovi ć (popularly
known as “Arkan”) and Vojislav Šešelj were amongst the most significant
figures active in the paramilitary network in Croatia. Forces under their
leadership played a central role in the genocide, as described below and in
Chapters 4 and 5.
115
3.51 Vojislav Šešelj began organising volunteers to support the
Serbian rebels in Knin in late 1990; by the summer of 1991 his activities
enjoyed official approval from Serbia. 116In May 1991 Šešelj’s group was
117
responsible for the killing of 12 Croatian policemen in Borovo Selo. He
115 Vojislav Šešelj was born in 1950 in Eastern Herzegovina. By 1990, he began his rise in
the Serbian political arena. In June 1991, Šešelj was elected to the Serbian Assembly.
Šešelj’s campaign was reported to have been supported and funded by Slobodan
Milošević. Evidence of Miloševi ć’s support was the uncritical, prime time coverage
Šešelj received on the Milošević controlled, state-run television, which, for many Serbs,
is the only source of information. As a member of parliament, Šešelj continued his
attacks and threats against Albanians, Croatians, Muslims, and the West and became
more popular. He and his party made strong showings in the federal elections in May
1992 and the Serbian parliamentary elections in December 1992, where they won
nearly 30 per cent of the seats in parliament, resulting in a coalition with Miloševi ć.
The coalition between Miloševi ć’s ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Šešelj’s
Serbian Radical Party (SRS) thrived till May 1993, when Miloševi ć endorsed an
international peace plan and seemed to abandon his support of the Bosnian Serbs.
Šešelj, criticised the government for turning its back on fellow Serbs, resulting in
placing the coalition in jeopardy. In late September 1993, Šešelj called for a vote of no-
confidence in the Serbian government led by Miloševi ć’s SPS. This prompted
Milošević to dissolve the Serbian Parliament and call for elections in December 1993.
The SPS then began a public attack on Šešelj. The authorities arrested several members
of the SRS on charges of murder, rape, kidnapping and illegal arms possession. None of
those detained, however, were charged with crimes that occurred outside the territory of
the “rump Yugoslavia” . Šešelj responded to the charges regarding his paramilitary
activities by alleging that Milošević’s government was backing these activities.
Šešelj’s counter-attacks on Miloševi ć were not widely heard, since he was denied
access to the state-run media, and the SRS did not hold public meetings fearing a ban.
This resulted in a poor showing for Šešelj and the SRS, where they won only 39 seats.
116 Robert Thompson, Serbia under Milošević, Hurst & Co., London, pp. 96-97.
117
See Chapter 2, para. 2.102. 112
described the killing as a triumph for Serbs and promised that more killings
would follow in the quest to expand Serbia’s borders. In July 1991 Šešelj’s
Serbian Radical Party (SRS) announced its intention to march to Croatia to
murder its “genocidal fascists”, receiving the tacit approval of Serbian
President Milošević. 118 In August 1991, in an interview with the German
magazine Der Spiegel Šešelj said that his troops were sent “from Belgrade
to the crisis areas” in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina with the task of
organizing Serb rebellions:
“If there are 20 to 30 Chetniks in every village, this is sufficient to
119
encourage the people there”.
There is substantial evidence that Šešelj and his paramilitary formations
had direct links to, and the support of, the Serbian governments and the
JNA. He himself stated that:
“We, the Chetniks, are that army today. Army officers are
commanding our Chetniks. We have painted over almost all
helmets...On the army helmets we painted the two headed Serbian
eagle. Each and every officer of that army is commanding our
men. A lot of soldiers fled the army so they used our men. The
army would attack with tanks, mortars and cannons. Our men
would then take house by house. This army took down the stars let
us keep our Chetnik hats”. 120
121
He also stated that it was the Army who gave them weapons. And during
his campaign for election to the Parliament of the FRY in 1993 he indicated
that several members of the Miloševi ć government were involved in
122
recruiting individuals for paramilitary operations in Croatia.
3.52 Arkan’s 123first reported involvement in Croatia came on 29
November 1990, when he and three others were arrested in Dvor na Uni by
118
See The Guardian, 2 July 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 36.
119 Supra fn 109.
120
See Appendices, vol 5, appendix 2, Video Clip 13.
121 Thompson, p.97.
122
Thompson, p.93. He mentioned in particular Radmilo Bogdanovi ć (Minister of the
Interior in 1991); Mihalj Kertes (a former SFRY Deputy Interior Minister, then Serbian
minister without portfolio); Jovica Staniši ć (Head of the Secret Police) and his sub-
ordinates Radovan Stojičić (a Deputy Serbian Interior Minister); and Franko Simatović,
(a senior Serbian Secret Police Commander).
123 Željko Ražnjatovi ć ( nom de guerre -Arkan) was born in 1952, and is said to have
carried on criminal activities throughout Europe. He was wanted in several European
countries for crimes ranging from robbery to murder. While travelling through Europe,
he allegedly worked for the Yugoslavian Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SSUP)
or the secret police. See Thompson, p. 94. 113
Croatian authorities and charged with arms offences, whilst reportedly
124
attending a meeting with Serbian insurgents. Arkan was tried and
convicted, but released from prison pending appeal. When fighting began
in Croatia, Arkan and the “Tigers” were deployed in Eastern Slavonia
where they were engaged in action in and around Vukovar in the summer
and autumn of 1991. 125There is overwhelming evidence of Arkan’s ties
with the Governments of Serbia and the FRY, with the self-declared
Serbian Republics, and with the JNA. He was appointed as leader of the
“Serbian Volunteer Guard” (known as “the Tigers”) by the FRY’s counter-
intelligence organisation, and the Federal Department for National
Defence. 126 Serbia’s Defence Minister also stated that Arkan was protected
by Interior Ministry officials. 127 Arkan had a close relationship with
General Boro Ivanovi ć, the former commander of the JNA barracks in
Osijek, as well as with Radovan Stoji čić (known as “Badža”), the former
Serbian Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs, with whom he co-ordinated
the combat activities of his paramilitary units in the Eastern Slavonian
battleground. Arkan entered the political arena during the 1992 Serbian
elections. Along with three of his deputies, he was elected to the Serbian
Parliament as representatives from Kosovo, even though he had no known
ties there.128 At Plate 13 he may be seen attending the funeral of Radovan
129
Stojičić Badža in the company of President Miloševi ć. Arkan himself
was assassinated in Belgrade on January 15, 2000.
3.53 The forces of Šešelj and Ar130 were directly involved in the
genocidal activities in Croatia. Both men and their forces were active
with the JNA in events in and around Vukovar and Eastern Slavonia later
131
in the autumn of 1991. During the siege of Vukovar, Arkan publicly
124 Thompson, p. 95. This meeting is said to have been attended by Milan Marti ć, then the
Secretary of the SUP (Secretariat for Internal Affairs) of the “Krajina SAO”, Marko
Dobrijević, then the secretary of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS); and Nebojša-
125 Nešo Mladinić and Dušan Orlović, active organisers of the uprising in the Knin region.
See Appendices, vol 5, appendix 2, Video Clip 8.
126 This is supported both by Šešelj and by Dragoslav Bokan, the leader of the “White
127 Eagles”.
Supra fn 109.
128 Fuelling concerns that ethnic cleansing was eminent in Kosovo during the 1992
campaign, he delivered a speech, in the presence of Milošević, swearing that he was an
enemy to Albanian infants. While campaigning, he drove a car with license plates that
said ‘Vukovar’ as a reminder of his role in the attack on that city.
129 When Stojičić, a Deputy Minister of Police, was assassinated in Belgrade by unknown
perpetrators, Arkan and Miloševi ć together attended his funeral and may be seen
together in the photograph at Plate 13. Arkan himself was subsequently assassinated.
130
See Chapter 4, para. 4.143 et seq. and Chapter 5, para. 5.197; See also Appendices, vol
5, appendix 5.
131 See Appendices, vol 5, appendix 2, Video Clip 9. 114
132
stated that his men were under the command of the JNA. In some areas
Arkan exercised command over all the forces operating in the area: both the
paramilitary groups, and the JNA. In other counties these forces operated
under the command of the JNA. Sometimes these units operated
independently or in conjunction with other paramilitary groups. In some
instances, Šešelj and Arkan would incite the Serb villagers. They would
often warn the non-Serb residents before entering the village and demand
that they surrender their weapons. Because of the reputations of Arkan and
Šešelj’s forces these warnings often prompted non-Serb civilians to leave
the village. Upon entering a village, sometimes under the cover of shelling,
particularly in those counties where they were operating simultaneously
with the JNA, Šešelj’s and Arkan’s troops would carry out their genocidal
activities. In almost all counties in which Šešelj’s and Arkan’s troops were
operating there are allegations of killing of civilians, rape, looting,
destruction of private or cultural property, and prison camps. After
occupying an area, and after initial killings, Šešelj’s and Arkan’s troops
would usually turn over control to a local paramilitary group or to local
Serb leaders. In some instances, however, members of Arkan’s and Šešelj’s
units remained and performed “administrative” functions.
(B) THE “CONTROL OF THE PARAMILITARY G ROUPS
BY THE JNA AND THE SERBIAN LEADERSHIP
3.54 The JNA was actively involved in cooperation with, and supporting
the activities of, Serb and Serbian paramilitary groups. As described in the
paragraphs above, the JNA disarmed the Croatian TO’s in May 1990 and
then made some of the weapons available to rebel Serbs, who subsequently
rearranged themselves into paramilitary groups. The “buffer” role played
by the JNA in late 1990 and early 1991 allowed Serb rebels to organize
themselves, including through the establishment of paramilitary groups.
These activities were a prelude to the JNA’s direct support for, and then
reliance on, paramilitary groups. Some of the paramilitary groups evolved
into the “TO of the RSK”, which itself then evolved into the “Army of the
RSK”. The JNA supported the paramilitary groups, the “RSK TO”, and
then the “RSK Army”.
3.55 Such support and reliance served several purposes for the JNA and
political leaders in Belgrade. It clouded the issue of command and control,
enabling the JNA to reduce the chance of its identification and providing its
officers and soldiers with a shield when perpetrating the destruction of a
significant part of the Croatian population on the occupied territory after
August 1991. Notwithstanding the fact that many of the paramilitary
132 See photograph, Annexes, vol 3, 10.6. 115
groups did not wear uniforms or other conventional military badges or
symbols, making identification difficult, it is clear that the JNA co-
ordinated their activities with paramilitary groups in several counties in
Croatia, and in each of the regions described in Chapters 4 and 5. It is no
coincidence that these regions fell within the strategic arc the Serbs needed
to link the Serbian populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia
within a contiguous Serbian state, and within the area identified by the
1986 SANU Memorandum as forming part of “Greater Serbia”.
3.56 The activities of the paramilitary groups were controlled by the
JNA, the Serbian leadership of the “rump Yugoslavia” and then the
Government of the FRY. In many of the activities described in Chapters 4
and 5 the paramilitary groups worked hand-in-hand with the JNA, under
the authority of the Serbian leadership. It is unquestionable that the Serbian
leadership was aware of, and supported and coordinated the activities of,
the Serb paramilitary groups. Often the Serb paramilitary groups operating 133
in Croatia wore JNA uniforms and used JNA arms and other equipment.
The Belgrade authorities were regularly informed about events and
activities in the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia. 134
3.57 There is overwhelming evidence of coordination and collaboration
between the JNA and Serb paramilitary groups in the witness statements
relied upon in Chapters 4 and 5. There is video evidence of Arkan planning
a genocidal offensive on the outskirts of Vukovar. Whilst addressing troops
Arkan stated that the JNA would proceed in tanks and:
“…[We] must launch a blitz attack to secure their passage. The
army…they would shell the first line of houses. But the tanks will
not go in…so we must save the day. Scouts told us that Serbs are
in the cellars and Ustashas are on the first floor. This makes our
task more difficult, it’s not a typical mop up, we can’t just throw
bombs into cellars. If we do that, we will kill our own people. We
must be careful not to kill our own, our Serbian brothers!
All team leaders, when you enter the houses to mop them up, use
rocket launchers to neutralize the first floor! The cellars must
remain intact! We will take them by going from house to
house!” 135
There are clear expressions of public support for the activities of these
groups from leading Serbian politicians. Political support for the rebel
Serbs in the “Krajina”, including the paramilitary groups, was manifested
133 Supra fn 109; See also photograph, Annexes, vol 3, 10.7.
134 See Operational Report of the “RSK”, 10 April 1995, Annexes, vol 4, annex 67.
135
See Appendices, vol 5, appendix 2, Video Clip 9. 116
in several forms. Serbian paramilitary formations were publicly encouraged
(either in the press or by the speeches made at public gatherings and rallies)
in Belgrade and other towns. Commanders of the Serbian paramilitary
formations and political representatives of the “RSK” often went to
Belgrade to receive instructions. There were frequent communications and
meetings between the Serb leaders of “SAO Krajina”, later the “136” and
the Serbian leadership, including Slobodan Miloševi ć, and with Serb
leaders from other parts of the former SFRY. They were even summoned to
a meeting of the Serbian controlled Presidency in February 1992. 137At a
subsequent meeting in Belgrade Slobodan Miloševi ć suggests the manner
of organising and financing the army of the “RSK”. 138Serbian political
support subsequently extended to detailed proposals for the unification of
139
Serbia, Montenegro and “Republic of Srpska Krajina”, with a conference
being convened in Belgrade, FRY in December 1994.
3.58 As described below there is documentary evidence proving that the
JNA and the Serbian leadership provided armaments, finance and logistical
support to the rebel Serbs and their paramilitary groups. The close
connection between the JNA and the paramilitary groups is further proved
by the existence of an Order authorising the integration of “volunteers”
from paramilitary groups into the JNA, and a subsequent decision
integrating some or all members of certain paramilitary groups into the
140
JNA. And once Serb control had been established over large parts of
Croatia, by December 1991, the JNA and then after the formal
proclamation of the FRY the Yugoslav Army continued to provide direct
support to the military forces of the rebel Serbs. This continued after the
signing of an unconditional ceasefire in Sarajevo on 2 January 1992, and
136 See as examples Transcript of the Conversation between M. Marti ć and G. Hadži ć,
Annexes, vol 4, annex 68 and A letter to President Miloševifrom the “RSK”, June
137 1993, Annexes, vol 4, annex 69.
See Order, Presidency of the SFRY to Milan Marti ć, ‘Secretary of the Interior of the
RSK’ summoning him for a meeting of the Presidency on 27 February 1992, in
Belgrade to discuss the arrival of the UNPROFOR, 21 February 1992 Annexes, vol 4,
annex 70.
138
See The Official Record of the Conversation Between Representatives of the “RSK”
and the President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Miloševi ć, 12/11/92 Annexes, vol
4, annex 71.
139 See The Resolution of the “National Assembly of RSK”, 18/8/94, Annexes, vol 4,
annex 72.
140
See General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, III Administration, 13 September
1991, Instruction about the entrance of volunteers in the JNA, Annexes, vol 4, annex
73. See also General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, III Administration, 13
September 1991, Instruction about the entrance of volunteers in the JNA, 10 D ecember
1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 74, at para. 6. 117
after the arrival of UNPROFOR in May 1992 and the “departure” of the
JNA/Yugoslav Army from Croatian territory on 19 May 1992.
Orders from the JNA and Government of Serbia/FRY
Relating to the Provision of Logistical, Matériel
and Financial Support to Paramilitary Groups
3.59 The JNA provided weapons to paramilitary groups from 1990
onwards. As described above, the weaponry of the TO of the Republic of
Croatia was transferred to JNA barracks in May 1990. It was later
st
distributed by the in JNA in the 1 Military Region to municipalities with
Serb majorities where Serb TO’s and Volunteer units had started rebelling
against the democratically elected government of the Republic of Croatia.
The delivery of ammunition was diverted from the Croatian TO for the use
of Serb paramilitary groups: for example, ammunition ordered by the
Headquarters of the TO Split from the factory “Prvi Partizan” in Titovo
Užice was delivered to the “VP” Golubi ć, which later became a training
centre for Serb paramilitary groups. Out of date weaponry discarded by the
JNA was passed on to paramilitary groups: for example, the Command of
st
the 1 Military Region proposed putting ten T34 tanks at the disposal of
paramilitaries. 141When the JNA formally left the territory of Croatia in
May 1992142aponry was left behind for the use of Serb paramilitary
groups.
3.60 There is evidence that Serb paramilitary groups requested 143– and
were supplied with – weapons and ammunition from the Republic of Serbia
and the FRY. These requests often came through the Headquarters of the
“SAO Krajina”, 144 which was obviously flooded with requests from local
Serb rebels. Novak Višeković from Srijemske Laze (Sirmium), a member
of one of the paramilitary groups, testified about the supply of weapons. 145
According to his statement weapons were distributed in Srijemske Laze
three times: First as early as February 1991, then in March 1991 and finally
141 See Command of the 1 MR, 10/3/92 to the “TO RSK” Annexes, vol 4, annex 75.
142 st
See Command of the 1 Brigade TO Glina, 19/5/92 to the “ZNŠTO” Command Banija,
Annexes, vol 4, annex 76.
143 See Request of “SAO Krajina” to the Ministry of Defence, Republic of Serbia for
ammunition, military equipment and medical supplies, 18/ 11/91, Annexes, vol 4,
144 annex 127.
See The Serbian Ministry of Defense in its letter of 11 December1991 asks that the
requests for the supplies go through the “SAO Krajina” Headquarters, Annexes, vol 4,
annex 77.
145
Witness Statement of Novak Višeković is available on video tape. 118
in June 1991. The weapons first came from Belgrade, and were then
transported by the JNA.
3.61 The Serbian leadership also provided financial and other support to
the “RSK”. In February 1992, for example, the Serbian Ministry of
Defence transferred funds directly to the “SAO Krajina” Territorial
Defence Headquarters for Knin and Lika. 146Support also came directly
147
from the Federal budget of the FRY, and was requested and obtained
from the FRY Federal Ministry of Defence. 148
3.62 Support to the “RSK” also came in the form of fuel and other
149
supplies. The FRY continued these supplies in 1993 and 1994.
Orders Providing for the Integration of Members of Paramilitary Groups
into the JNA and other Cooperation Agreements
3.63 As stated above the JNA began to integrate “volunteers” to
overcome it’s man power crisis. In accordance with a “Special Instruction”
issued for enlisting volunteers, they were to be treated equally with regular
conscripts. Every volunteer had to submit an admission form whereby he
accepted “…to follow the existing federal laws and other Acts, and orders
that regulate relations and life and work in the Yugoslav People’s Army.
Subsequently the Federal Secretariat of National Defence also passed
orders admitting “temporary contract soldiers” and engaging
“volunteers.”(See below paras. 3.80)
3.64 Subsequently, a number of individuals associated with paramilitary
groups were formally integrated into the JNA as volunteers. 150
3.65 There was close co-operation between the paramilitary units and the
rebel Serbs. There was also coordination between these groups and the
JNA. This is apparent, for example from the letter of consent dated 25
November 1991 issued by the President of the Municipal Assembly of
146 See Command of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, 8/2/92 whereby
funds were transferred to the “SAO Krajina” Territorial Defence Headquarters for Knin
and Lika, Annexes, vol 4, annex 78.
147
See “Notification on the amount of money allotted to the Republic of Srpska Krajina”,
Federal Ministry of Defence, 30 September 1993, as per which a sum of 480,259 billion
dinars was allotted to the “RSK”, Annexes, vol 4, annex 79.
148 See The Decision of the Federal Ministry of Defence for transfer of funds, Annexes, vol
4, annex 80.
149
See Letter from the “RSK Government” to Jugopetrol in Belgrade, 28 May 1992 for
the supply of fuel, Annexes, vol 4, annex 81.
150 See below paras. 3.80 et seq. 119
Petrinja permitting the participation of Arkan’s “Tigers” in the “fighting”,
who were to be under the command of the JNA. The document states inter
alia:
“We agree that the members of Željko Ražnjatović -Arkan’s unit
participate in combat at JNA and TO positions in the Petrinja
municipality. The unit will be under the command of a senior
nd
officer and will be a part and under the command of the 2
Motorized Battalion, of the 622 nd Motorized Brigade Commander
151
Bogdan Ercegovac....”
Other orders and documents show that paramilitary groups that formed part
of the Territorial Defence of the “SAO Krajina” were under the authority
of, or acted in association with, 152 the JNA, and that JNA officers were
153
assigned to the TO of the “SA154rajina” or assisted in the formation of
TO’s of “SAO Krajina”. Representatives of the “Army of the RSK” were
summoned to meetings at the JNA headquarters in Belgrade. 155 In this
st
regard also the material relating to the “21 DOD”, in particular the
notebooks of Captain Mili ć I. Martinovi ć, describe the close relationship
156
between the “Army of the RSK”, the Yugoslav Army and the FRY.
151 See Letter of “Consent” issued by the President of the Municipal Assembly of Petrinja,
25/11/91, Annexes, vol 4, annex 82.
152 st
See “The order of the commander of 1 Operational group, 19/10/91 Annexes, vol 4,
annex 83.
153 See Order of the commander of the 6 tOperative Group appointing Major Miloš
Cvjetičanin as Commander of TO Korenica, 17/1/92, Annexes, vol 4, annex 84.
154 See Command of the 2 nd Lika Brigade to “SAO Krajina” Ministry (Milan Marti ć),
which states that the Federal Secretariat of National Defence ordered the formation of
nd
155 the 2 Lika Brigade, 12/11/91, Annexes, vol 4, annex 85.
See Command of the Federal Secretariat for the National Defence of SFRY regarding a
meeting to be held on 3 December 1991 with the Serbian Army of Krajina in Belgrade,
30/11/91, Annexes, vol 4, annex 86.
156
See above para. 3.49 and Appendices, vol 5, appendix 5B. 120
Restructuring of the Serb Paramilitary Groups into the “Army of the
Republic of Srpska Krajina (RSK)”
3.66 The “ratification” by the JNA and the Serbian leadership of the
activities of the paramilitary groups is clearly reflected in the JNA’s
contribution (with the support of the Federal Secretariat for National
Defence of the “rump Yugoslavia” and then the FRY) to the restructuring
of the paramilitary groups and TO’s operating in Serb occupied “Krajina”
into the Army of the self-proclaimed “Republic of Srpska Krajina”
(“RSK”). This occurred in preparations for the “withdrawal” of the JNA
(now known as the Yugoslav Army) from the Croatian territory after 19
May 1992, and continued subsequently.
3.67 In March 1992 the “rump Yugoslavia”’s Federal Secretariat for
National Defence issued directives to the TO’s of the “RSK” during the
JNA’s mobilization and the demobilization on the territory of the “Republic
157
of Srpska Krajina”, and adopted orders re-organising the TO units of the
“Republic of Srpska Krajina.” 158 The following month, in April 1992,
Belgrade issued an order assigning high ranking JNA officers to the 159
headquarters of the TO of the “Republic of Srpska Krajina”. An Order of
11 May 1992 directs that senior officers, soldiers and civilians from certain
JNA units who were born on the territory of the “Republic of Srpska
Krajina” are to “reinforce” the TO and “RSK” and remain within the
territory.160
3.68 Even after its withdrawal from the Republic of Croatia, the JNA,
which by now had evolved into the Yugoslav Army, continued to station
officers on Croatian territory and send new officers to the “Army of the
Republic of the Srpska Krajina”. Other contemporaneous JNA/Yugoslav
Army documents identify groups of officers and soldiers seconded to the
157
See General Staff of the Armed Forces of SFRY, III Administration, DT No. 1116-1,
instructions for the work of staffs and units of the TO on the preparations and
realisation of demobilisation and remobilization, 12 March 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex
87.
158 th
See Federal Secretariat of National Defence, Top Secret No. 1349-1 from 24 March
1992, order for organisational and formational changes in the TO RS Krajina, Annexes,
vol 4, annex 88, and Federal Secretariat of National Defence, General Staff of the
Armed Forces of SFRY, III Administration, Top Secret No. 1943-2 from 28 tApril
1992, to the General Staff “TO RSK”, Annexes, vol 4, annex 89.
159 See Extract of list of the activities of military personnel, members of the “VRSK”,
Annexes, vol 4, annex 91, this document shows that even after the JNA left the territory
of the Republic of Croatia the greater part of the officer personnel was from the
Yugoslav Army.
160 See Order of the General Staff of the SFRY, Armed Forces 1 stAdministration,
Operations Centre to the Commands of the 5 th, 10 , 13 and 17 thCorps and four
Military Regions, 11/5/92, Annexes, vol 4, annex 90. 121
“RSK”; 161provide for individual Yugoslav Army soldiers and officers to be
sent to the paramilitary formations on the occupied territory of the Republic
162
of Croatia; and indicate the deployment of conscripted soldiers from the
FRY to occupied territory of Croatia. 163Some of the Yugoslav Army’s
highest military commanders served in the “Army of the RSK”, including
Generals Čeleketić, 164 Lončar, 165 Novaković and Mrkšić.
3.69 The FRY Ministry of Defence paid salaries to the active military
person and civilians in the “Army of the RSK”. By letter sent on 10
February 1992 Milan Marti ć, then “Minister of Interior” of the “RSK”,
asked the Serbian Minister of Interior to ensure that funds assigned to the
“TO of Kraji166Territorial Defence” be transferred to the “RSK” M167stry
of Interior. Other documents confirm actual payments.
3.70 Soldiers of the JNA and then the Yugoslav Army who were
seconded or transferred to active service in occupied Croatia, including
under the direction of the military forces of the “RSK”, continued to benefit
from the service conditions and status applicable in the FRY. They were
provided with daily reimbursement during combat activities from 24
168 169
November 1991; travel allowances and reimbursements of expenses.
161
See Command of the Combat Airforce thd Anti-Aircraft Defence, 1/4/92, Annexes, vol
4, annex 92 and Command of the 18 Corps, 13/4/93, Annexes, vol 4, annex 93.
162 See as an example Order for the transfer of personnel, Federal Secretariat for National
163 Defense, 24/1/92, Annexes, vol 4, annex 94.
See Command, Federal Secretariat for National Defence of the Yugoslav Army,
27/1/93, Annexes, vol 4, annex 95.
164
See Order of the commander of “RSK” by which, Colonel Čeleketić was appointed as
the Commander of the Western Slavonian Corps, from 12 February 1993, Annexes, vol
4, annex 128; . See also The decree of the “President of the RSK”, 22 February 1994
where Milan Martić appoints Colonel Milan Čeleketić a major general, Annexes, vol 4,
annex 130 and a similar appointment by the Yugoslav Army, 21 December 1994, which
also promotes Milan Čeleketić to the rank of major general, Annexes, vol 4, annex 129.
165
See The decree of the “President of the RSK”, Milan Marti ć, from 16 December 1994
that promotes the colonel, Dušan Lon čar, to the rank of major-general, Annexes, vol 4,
annex 131.
166
See Letter of Milan Martić, “Minister of Interior of the RSK” to the Serbian Minister of
the Interior, 10/2/92, Annexes, vol 4, annex 139.
167 See as example the Report of 25 February 1994, Annexes, vol 4, annex 140.
168
See Decision of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, 24/11/91, Annexes, vol 4,
annex 96.
169
See Decision of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, 24/11/91, Annexes, vol 4,
annex 97. 122
C ONCLUSIONS
3.71 It is apparent from Part 2 of this Chapter that the Serb and Serbian
paramilitary groups, which were active in Croatia, were established with
the support of the Serbian leadership with a view to contributing towards
the creation of a “Greater Serbia”. It is also clear that the Serb and Serbian
paramilitary groups were financed, armed, supported and controlled by
Serbia, and that they carried out their activities in close cooperation with
the JNA and then the Yugoslav Army of the FRY. On occasion they were
even formally integrated into the command structure of the JNA, or
integrated as volunteers.
SECTION THREE:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
GENOCIDAL ACTS IN CROATIA
3.72 As shown in Chapter 2, Serbia’s genocidal campaign in Croatia
was premised upon the creation of “Greater Serbia”, which envisaged the
inclusion of over half of the territory of Croatia. Within that border Serb
control would be established, including by the removal or destruction of the
Croat and other non-Serb populations. By spring 1991 the federal
institutions of the SFRY had entered the final stage of their dissolution, and
the SFRY itself was being transformed into a “rump Yugoslavia” under the
control of the Serbian leadership which was subsequently – after the
proclamation of independence of other Republics – proclaimed as the FRY.
The Serbian leadership in Belgrade was also by now, in mid-1991, in
control of the JNA. When Croatia opted for independence in June 1991 the
Serbian leadership took active steps to incorporate large parts of Croatian
territory into “Greater Serbia” through a military campaign, which
envisaged ‘cleansing’ that area of its Croat population.
3.73 The military campaign was carried out by the JNA and Serb and
Serbian paramilitary groups. The details of the campaign, and in particular
the techniques used to remove and destroy the Croat population, are
described region-by-region, community-by-community, in Chapters 4 and
5. But the overall approach was remarkably similar throughout Croatia. The
JNA and the paramilitary groups would begin by threatening to engage in
artillery shelling of a particular locality, and might actually then begin to do
so. If there were no Serbs at a particular locality the shelling would be more
brutal. Occupation would be followed by the deliberate killing of non-Serb
civilians, and especially Croats, on a massive scale. Upon entering a mixed
locality they would take steps, usually in collaboration with the local Serb
population, to identify Croats and other non-Serbs and their property.
Croatian and other non-Serb owned property would be systematically 123
looted or destroyed. Significant numbers of the Croat population would be
subjected to motiveless and brutal attacks, including rapes and sexual
crimes, and motiveless killings, the purpose of which was to induce a state
of terror in the Croat civilian population. These crimes would often be
accompanied by overt ethnic abuse and threats to “cleanse” the locality of
Croats. Local Serb “authorities” would be established and would impose a
regime of humiliation and dehumanisation on the remaining Croat
population, who would be required to identify themselves and their
property with white ribbons and other distinctive marks. The Croat
populations that did not flee or were not killed were denied access to
materials necessary to meet their basic needs, including medical supplies,
and their movements would be restricted. They would be put to forced
labour; and their property would be destroyed or looted, and Croatian
cultural and religious monuments would be damaged or destroyed. Schools
and other public utilities would be required to adopt Serbian cultural
traditions and language. The Serbian “authorities” would organise
transportation to expel the remaining Croatian civilian population. Those
who left under these conditions were required to complete documents
assigning their property to the local Serb administration. Large numbers
were transported to prison camps in Serb-occupied territory or in Serbia
itself. Many of those who remained were exterminated. These acts are
described in details in Chapters 4 and 5, by reference to witness statements
and other materials. In the section below the genocidal campaign across
Croatia is summarised.
3.74 Serbia’s genocidal campaign began in the summer of 1991 when,
under the protection of the JNA, Serbian paramilitary groups based in the
“SAO Krajina” began their genocidal campaign against the Croatian
population. After early incidents in Eastern Slavonia in March-April 1991,
Banovina became the next trouble spot in June 1991 with the formation of
st
the 1 Dvor Detachment, a par170litary group formed by Serbs in the
County of Dvor na Uni. The Croatian villages of Zamla ča and Struga
were completely destroyed. 171Partofthe329 thArmoured Brigade of the
JNA, which was located directly in the area, merely observed th172
destruction and failed to take any steps to prevent it. Notable in this
regard was the “protection granted by the JNA to Serbian paramilitary units
which attacked the police station at Glina in May 1991.
170 See Bulletin of the 33Infantry Brigade, Dvor na Uni, December 1991, p. 3, Annexes,
vol 4, annex 132.
171 nd
“SAO Krajina”, County of Dvor na Uni, Staff of the TO, 2 Battalion, to the
Commander of Staff, Conclusion, 12 September 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 98.
172 See Report to the Assistant of the Head of Staff for the ONP 32Armoured Brigade,
to the Command of the 329 Armoured Brigade, Annexes, vol 4, annex 99. 124
3.75 On 1 August 1991 Serbian paramilitary units attacked the police
station in Dalj, in Eastern Slavonia. The JNA’s 51 stMechanised Brigade,
supported by the Airforce, openly sided with the paramilitary groups. As a
result, there were many dead and several hundred Croats were expelled
from the villages of Dalj, Aljmaš and Erdut. According to the JNA
newspaper, which was seeking to justify the JNA’s involvement and incite
future crimes and genocidal acts against Croats, the villagers of Erdut had
“the most monstrous and morbid plans created by the sick minds of the
Ustashas…” whereby, “as per detailed lists, in specified locations, every
living Serbian was to be squeezed to the last drop of blood, which would
then be stored in bottles”. 173Several months later, one of the officers
openly presented a completely different view of that same event, according
to which “ the unit’s... first task was to attack the Croatian forces in Erdut
across the Bogojevo bridge. The tanks moved to attack and wreaked havoc
among the enemy lines. We got to Aljmaš on the backs of Croatian
fighters”.
3.76 In July 1991 part of the JNA’s 14 th Corps from Slovenia was
transferred to the Prijedor-Derventa-Zenica region of Bosnia and
174 175
Herzegovina. It was reinforced by the presence of other forces. Thus, it
was in the presence of the JNA’s 14 thCorps that the rebel Serbs from
Western Slavonia that “proclaimed” the Serbian Autonomous Region
(“SAO”) of Western Slavonia on 13 August 1991, purporting to attach
themselves to the “SAO Krajina”. On 16 August 1991, Serb paramilitary
units attacked the Croatian police and the Croatian National Guard at
Okučani. It was at this point that the JNA in the region was transformed
into a Serbian Army. The 265 Mechanised Brigade intervened on the side
of the rebel Serbs. The following week the JNA sent further reinforcements
th
in the form of the 329 Armoured Brigade to Western Slavonia, which 176
continued to support the rebels by purporting to act as a ‘buffer zone.’
The JNA’s attacks were centred on the Croat populations in the region,
with the objective of linking the areas within a contiguous arc and bringing
Serb populations within the planned “Greater Serbia”.
173 See “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 22 August 1991, p.13, Annexes, vol 4, annex 149.
174
See Order, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, I Administration, No. 51-1,
25 July 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 100.
175 The 1 armoured Brigade, and the Airforce Brigade were sent to Banja Luka. See
“Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 10 August 1991, p. 11, “Srda čan doček u Banjaluci”
and “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 14 August 1991, p. 4, “Ponovo krila nad
176 Zalužanima”, Annexes, vol 4, annex 149.
See “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 22 December 1991, p. 26, “The man from the crisis
Spots”, Annexes, vol 4, annex 150. 125
3.77 The end of conscription from the Republics of Croatia and
Slovenia, and the poor response to calls for mobilisation in Macedonia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Serbia, left JNA’s units in Croatia
and Slovenia weak. With many discharged soldiers not being replaced the
JNA lacked sufficient numbers to fully enforce “Greater Serbian”
aspirations. In August 1991, the Sabor (Croatian Parliament) demanded the
withdrawal of the JNA to its barracks and then out of Croatia. 177However,
as the JNA ignored these demands, Croatian forces began surrounding JNA
barracks. The Croatian forces intensified this pressure after an Order dated
11 September 1991, issued by the Presidency of the SFRY, demanding the
withdrawal of JNA units to their barracks was rejected by the JNA as being
illegal.
3.78 With the blockade of the JNA barracks, and the improved
armaments of the Croatian Forces, the JNA’s agenda became clearer. The
Staff of the Supreme Command of the JNA in Belgrade stated by way of
“warning to civilians to withdraw from …inhabited towns” and that:
“…For every attacked and conquered object of the JNA –
immediately one object of vital significance for the Republic of
Croatia will be destroyed [and] for every attacked and conquered
garrison – vital objects in the town, where the garrison is located,
will be destroyed…” 178
This stance was endorsed by the Vice-President of the now defunct
Presidency of the SFRY, Dr. Branko Kosti ć, a representative of
Montenegro, who by this time had in practise taken on the position of
President and was openly acting on behalf of the Republic of Serbia and the
179
emerging FRY. Acting unconstitutionally the SFRY Presidency adopted
emergency procedures allowing the Presidency to reach decisions based on
a majority of those present and voting, even when all the members of the
Presidency of the SFRY were unable to assemble. 180
3.79 By October 1991 the JNA’s overt goal was the removal of non-Serb
populations from areas of “Greater Serbia” within Croatia, with the full co-
operation of the Serbs in “SAO Krajina”. 181For this purpose the JNA
177
See “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 7 August 1991, p. 5, “Teror nad istinom”, Annexes,
178 vol 4, annex 149.
See “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 2 October 1991, p. 7, “Poslednje upozorenje”,
Annexes, vol 4, annex 150.
179 See “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 5 October 1991, p. 3, “Neposredna ratna opasnost
uslovljava rat”, Annexes, vol 4, annex 150. See also the Proclamation in the Official
180 Gazette of the SFRY on 18 October 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 135.
See The Guardian, 4 October 1991. Annexes, vol 4, annex 39.
181 Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada, 1993, p. 134. 126
envisaged the use of fifteen or more armoured, mechanised and infantry
brigades, in addition to ground forces already deployed. According to
General Veljko Kadijević, the operational strategy involved a total aerial
and naval blockade of Croatia and the “liberation” of Serbian areas in
Croatia, and the JNA’s garrisons, located deep in Croatian territory. 182To
this end he instructed the JNA to intersect Croatia along the following four
lines: Gradiška-Virovitica; Biha ć-Karlovac-Zagreb; Knin-Zadar; and
Mostar-Split. The largest group of armoured-mechanised forces would
liberate Eastern Slavonia, and then proceed westward, to merge with the
forces in Western Slavonia and head for Zagreb and Varaždin, on the
Slovenian border. 183Upon reaching specified objectives, the JNA was to
secure and defend the borders of “SAO Krajina” in Croatia, pull out the
remaining units from Slovenia and ultimately withdraw from the rest of the
Republic of Croatia. 184In short the JNA’s aim was threefold: to establish
control over the crisis areas, to protect the Serb population from genocide,
and to liberate the members of the JNA and their families, the preconditions
for this was the “defeat of the Ustasha forces”. 185The fulfilment of these
objectives – a “hidden agenda” – was the occupation and partition of the
Republic of Croatia.
3.80 Though the response to m186lisation in Vojvodina was 93%, in
Serbia it was only about 26%. Consequently, to overcome the problem of
manpower, the JNA began to integrate volunteers. In accordance with the
Special Instruction issued for enlisting volunteers, they were to be treated
equally with regular conscripts. Every volunteer had to submit an
admission form whereby he accepted “…to follow the existing federal laws
and other Acts, and orders that 187ulate relations and life and work in the
Yugoslav People’s Army…” By this Order – of singular importance in
establishing the “effective control” of the Serb-controlled JNA over Serbian
paramilitary forces – the JNA incorporated into its fold various Serbian
paramilitary groups, who now fought alongside the JNA, united in the
common goal for the creation of “Greater Serbia”. 188
182
Supra fn 25.
183 The plan did not provide for the ‘liberation’ of Slovenia.
184
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada, 1993, pp. 135-136, vol 5, appendix 4.1.
185 Supra fn 26. See also “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 5 October 1991, p. 5, “U
Hvatskoj je na djelu neonacizam”, Annexes, vol 4, annex 150.
186
Ivan Veselinovi ć, “Razbijanje Jugoslavije i uloga Jugoslavenske narodne armije”,
Stvaranje i razaranje avnojevske Jugoslavije, Belgrade, 1997, p. 300.
187 See General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, III Administration, 13 September
1991, Instruction about the entrance of volunteers in the JNA, Annexes, vol 4, annex
73.
188
See the Federal Secretariat of National Defence, Top Secret, which talks of the
immediate admission of temporary contract soldiers into the JNA, 17 December 1991, 127
3.81 Along with the incorporation of the Serb paramilitaries into the
JNA, a number of JNA Officers were sent to the TO’s Staff in “SAO
Krajina” and the operative zones of Banovina, Kordun and Lika, with the
189
task of leading the local Serb paramilitary groups. By this time the self-
styled Territorial Defence of “SAO Krajina” had been restructured and
formally incorporated into the JNA. On 30 September 1991 a retired
General-Colonel of the JNA, Ilija Đujić, was appointed commander of the
“TO of SAO Krajina”. 190
th
3.82 Several armoured-mechanised groups, including the JNA’s 12
Corps, the 1 Guards Proletarian Mechanised Division and the 24 thCorps
were deployed in Eastern Slavonia. The JNA’s camthign in this region was
underway by 25 August 1991, with the 12 Corps engaged in combat in the
Vukovar region. In September 1991 the JNA’s 3 rdGuards Proletarian
Mechanised Brigade attacked Vinkovci. According to the Commander of
the 3 Proletarian Guards Mechanised Brigade, within three days his forces
had “liberated” all the villages between Šid and Mirkovci. 191By October
nd
1991 these forces had been joined by the 252 Armoured Brigade, and the
Serbian volunteer units “Šumadija” and “Lepenica” which went on to
192
occupy the villages of Đeletovci, Bapska and Šarengrad. The commander
of the division, General Major Dragoljub Aran đelović – in an interview
with the JNA newspaper “ Narodna Armija ” – stated that his unit had
cleared, and was now holding the area between the Danube and the Bosut,
where rebel Serb administrations were beginning to take shape. 193 These
statements reflected the common goal shared by the JNA and the rebel
Serbs, namely to remove or exterminate the non-Serb population from areas
of Croatia within the borders of “Greater Serbia”. An example of this
objective sts reflected in the “treaty” of 14 October 1991 between the
JNA’s 1 Guards Proletarian Mechanised Division and the inhabitants of
Annexes, vol 4, annex 133 and the Order of the Presidency of the SFRY on the
engagement of volunteers, 13 December, 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 134.
189
See Federal Secretariat of National Defence, Order No. 24-175 of the Head of
Personnel Administration to the “SAO Krajina”, Staff of the TO, 20 September 1991.
Annexes, vol 4, annex 136.
190 See “SAO Krajina”, Decision of the President, No. 1/1-91 from 30 September 1991,
191 Annexes, vol 4, annex 101.
See “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 19 October 1991, p. 8, “Nema mira u Mirkovcima”,
Annexes, vol 4, annex 150.
192 st nd
See Command of the 1 pgmd, Top Secret No. 851-18 to the Command of the 252
Armoured Brigade, from 4 October 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 102.
193 See “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 2 October 1991, p. 4, “Kao nekad, pod razvijenom
ratnom zastavom”, Annexes, vol 4, annex 150. 128
Ilok, whereby the non-Serb citizens were made to leave the town or face
the consequences. 194
th
3.83 Beginning on 25 August 1991 the JNA’s 12 Corps began a
massive attack on Vukovar and surrounding villages. The assault was
195
coordinated by the JNA and Serb paramilitaries: in mid September the
JNA press was writing about the Serbian paramilitary groups which were
greatly contributing to the “final liberation” of Vukovar. The siege of st
Vukovar proved to be difficult for the JNA’s units of the 1 Military
Region. The absence of military logic, and the way in which the siege was
prosecuted, incontrovertibly demonstrated that the conflict in Croatia was
no longer a bid to prevent “secession” but rather a genocidal campaign to
rid the area of its Croatian inhabitants. Military logic dictated that the JNA
and the Serb paramilitaries should have surrounded Vukovar with fewer
forces and continued westward. However, the JNA and paramilitary units
persisted with the siege, which lasted about 86 days. The military
operations against the city were carried out by two groups: Operative
Group “North” under the command of JNA General-Major Andrija
Biorčević, and Operative Group “South” under the command of JNA
Colonel Mile Mrkšić, supported by a unit of the 1 stAirforce Corps. The
overall operational Commander was JNA General Života Pani ć, the
commander of the 1 Military Region. 196The city fell on the 18 November
197
1991.
3.84 The JNA’s 5 th Corps, cooperating with Serb paramilitary groups,
was engaged in the expulsion of Croats and other non-Serbs from Western
Slavonia throughout September 1991. After occupying Oku čani in early
September, ththJNA moved towards Novska and Pakrac. The forces ofthhe
JNA’s 265 Mechanised Brigade and the JNA’s 329 Armoured Brigade
194
Treaty of 14 October 1991 between the representatives of the town of Ilok and the JNA,
Annexes, vol 4, annex 103. See also Chapter 4, para. 4.62 et seq.
195 The JNA forces included the elite 1 Guards Proletarian Mechanised Division, the 12 ,th
36 51 , and 453 rdMechanised Brigade, the Guards Motorised Brigade, the 80 th
nd th th
Motorised Brigade, the 252 Armoured Brrdade, the 20 Partisan Brigade, the 16
Mixed Artillery Brigade, and the 63 Parachute Brigade. These units were
accompanied by Serbian TO from Sremska Mitrovica and Kragujevac, volunteer units
from Belgrade, Novi Sad, Ruma, Inđija, Sombor, Smederevo and Smederevska Palanka
in Serbia. The paramilitary units involved in the fall of Vukovar involved Šešelj’s
“Chetniks”, Arkan’s “Tigers”, and TO units from Negoslavci and Vukovar. See
Appendices, vol 5, appendix 5.
196
See Federal Secretariat of National Defence, Order of the Federal Secretariat, 19
November 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 104.
197
Most of Vukovar was razed to the ground. One incident, in particular, symbolises this
battle; the mass grave at Ovč ara, where some more than 200 Croats were taken by
Serbs from the Vukovar Hospital and summarily executed and then left in a shallow
mass grave. See Chapter 4, para. 4.171et seq. 129
bolstered the forces of the JNA’s 5 thCorps. Although these forces had the
unconditional and complete support of the local Serbian population, the
forces were unable to push through Croat lines to join the JNA’s 32 Corps nd
in Varaždin, Bjelovar and Virovitica.
3.85 They were supported by the TO’s of “SAO Western Slavonia”, who
operated in the area around Lipik-Pakrac-Daruvar. These forces committed
genocidal acts against the Croatian population in an attempt to ethnically
cleanse the area around Daruvar and Podravska Slatina. This continued
until the arrival of the Croat forces in early November 1991, forcing a
retreat, which was halted by the signing of the Sarajevo cease-fire on 2
January 1992.
th
3.86 The 5 Military Region that was responsible for Central Croatia
planned a series of attacks. The strategy was obvious in Kordun, where the
JNA hoped to reach the imaginary western border of “Greater Serbia” by
systematically cleansing the region of its non-Serb population. However,
the plans of the 5 thMilitary Region fell through, primarily because of the
nd
surrender of the 32 Corps onth2 Septemthr 1991 and the blockade of
most of the forces of the 10 and 13 Corps. Another contributing factor
was the weak response to calls for the mobilisation of reserves.
3.87 The Serb paramilitary units in Kordun and Banovina were under the
command of the JNA’s 3 rd Operative Zone. From 19 th October 1991 they
198
acted and were used as organic components of the JNA units. thombat
activities in certain areas of Lika were taken over by the JNA’s 9 Corps,
and the rest of Lika and Kordun was under the command of the third
th
Operative Group, established under the command of the 5 Military
Region. With the support of local Serb units, the JNA was able to occupy
Slunj and banish all Croats living there.
3.88 In Lika, the Serb forces mainly engaged in artillery strikes against
Croatian settlements, often supported by the Airforce. Until mid-November
th
1991, the combat activities were mainly lead by the JNA’s 9 Corps, wh199
was also responsible for the actions of the paramilitary units in the area.
th
3.89 In northern Dalmatia, combat activities were lth by the JNA’s 9
Corps supported by local Serbian TO’s. The 9 Corps was one of the few
operative groups, which did not lack manpower, as it was situated in a
majority Serb area, and also recruited from Montenegro, as well as through
198 st
See Command of the 1 Operative Group, Top Secret No. 100-233, 19 October 1991,
Annexes, vol 4, annex 105.
199The9 thCorps was assisted in its operations by the and 10 Armoured Battalion, the
1 Battalion of the 4 tProletarian Motorised Brigade and the 1 sBattalion of the 592nd
Motorised Brigade. 130
large scale enlisting from the area of Šumadija (north-western Serbia). 200
After expelling the Croats from the villages of Kijevo and Kruševo, by
early September the Corps began attacking Adriatic cities. Through
October 1991, the 9 thCorps commanded by General-Major Vladimir
th
Vstović and Colonel Ratko Mladić, together with the 8 Naval Sector, the
1 Airforce Corps, and paramilitary groups and volunteer units, launched
aggressive attacks with a view to “cleansing” the hinterland and the cities
201
of Šibenik and Zadar. After this operation, Colonel Mladić was promoted
to the rank of Major General and later became the Commander of the
Serbian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3.90 Southern Croatia was under the command of two Operative Groups
of the JNA. The 37 Užički Corps’s task was limited to securing the airport
202
indMostar and intimidathng the non-Serbian population. The forces of the
2 Corps and the 9 Naval Sector were located around Dubrovnik and
were commanded by General-Lieutenant Colonel Jevrem Coki ć.203The
indiscriminate shelling of Dubrovnik began on the 1 October 1991. The
city was surrounded and completely cut off from the rest of Croatia.
General Cokić admitted that the Republic of Montenegro put at his disposal
militia forces in addition to the federal reserves under his command, to
carry out this operation. 204 At the end of October 1991, the civilian
population was given an ultimatum to leave the city. 205As the ultimatum
was not accepted, the shelling continued until December 1991.
T HE F INAL STAGES OF THE JNA’ O S PERATIONS
IN THE R EPUBLIC OF C ROATIA
3.91 By December 1991, the Serbian leadership recognized that it had
arrived at a stalemate. Large parts of Croatian territory were now under the
control of the JNA and Serb paramilitary groups, and a majority of the
Croatian population had been removed or destroyed. However, the
establishment of the full borders of “Greater Serbia” as envisaged by the
1986 SANU Memorandum had not been attained. After the surrender of the
200
See “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 9 October 1991, p. 35, “Snažni udari armije”
Annexes, vol 4, annex 150; Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada, 1993, p. 139.
201
See Maps relating to the JNA’s attack on Zadar and Šibenik, Annexes, vol 3, Plate 6.3
and 6.4.
202 See Command of the 9thCorps, Operative No. 14, from 23 September 1991, Annexes,
vol 4, annex 106.
203
See “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 9 January 1992, p. 14, “Istina je probila sve
barijere”, Annexes, vol 4, annex 151.
204 Ibid.
205
See Chapter 5, para. 5.236. 131
nd
JNA’s 32 Corps on 22 November 1991, an agreement was reached
between the Croatian Government representatives and the JNA, according
th
to which the forces of the 5 Military Region would withdraw from
Croatian territory, leaving the Croatian forces the armament removed from
the TO. 206This withdrawal was completed by the 30 thDecember 1991. 207
Serbia and the JNA hoped that the imminent arrival of UN peacekeeping
forces would freeze the situation and enable them to consolidate their
extensive territorial acquisitions, thereby maintaining the status quo.
T HE C ONTINUING SUPPORT OF THE JNA/VJ
TO THE REBEL ERBS AND THE P ARAMILITARIES
3.92 Whilst withdrawing from Croatian territory, the JNA took several
measures to protect the territorial gains it had made on behalf of Serbia.
208
The JNA created new border units and police brigades. More
significantly, it restructured the armed forces of the Serb paramilitaries
from an army of reservists and volunteers into an army, which adjusted its
structure to new needs by removing different flaws of that organization.
This was carried out pursuant to an Order dated 27 February 1992, issued
by the Head of the JNA General Staff in Belgrade. 209The Order provided
for the establishment of a “Headquarter Staff of the Territorial Defence of
the Republic of Srpska Krajina” (“GŠ TO RSK”) and a regional Staff of the
TO in Banovina, with brigades in Glina, Petrinja and Kostajnica, as well as
county staffs in Glina, Kostajnica, Dvor na Uni, Petrinja and Sisak. 210To
achieve this task, in March 1992, the General Staff of the JNA in Belgrade
sent the General Staff of the “GŠ TO RSK” an “Instruction” containing
guidelines for the preparation and realisation of demobilisation and re-
mobilisation, of the TO’s staffs and its units after the withdrawal of JNA
units from the Kordun area. 211Each of these instruments reflects the close
relationship between the JNA, the Serb paramilitaries on the territory of
Croatia, and the political authorities in Serbia.
3.93 Subsequent orders of the General Staff of the JNA in Belgrade
included several organisational changes in the “TO of the Krajina”,
206
See the Agreement between the official delegates of the Government of the Republic of
Croatia and the JNA, 22 November 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 107.
207 See “Narodna Armija” (Belgrade), 4 January 1991, p. 4, “Izmještanje do kraja
izvršeno”, Annexes, vol 4, annex 151.
208 th
SethCommand of the 8 Operational Group, 31 March 1992, to the Command of the
10 Corps, Annexes, vol 4, annex 109.
209 See Annexes, vol 4, annex 110.
210
211 Ibid.
See Annexes, vol 4, annex 111. 132
whereby the “Krajina TO” was to take over the tasks of the JNA units. At
the regional level there were established TO staffs, artillery divisions,
mixed anti-armour divisions, light artillery batteries of the Air-defence
units and rear-echelon bases. 212Orders also related to the establishment and
administration of special militia units under the command of the SFRY
Defence Ministry. An Order of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of
the SFRY, dated 28 April 1992 (i.e. the day after the proclamation of the
FRY), established the administration of militia brigades to be formed in
Serb-held territories of occupied Croatia in Knin, Korenica, Vojnić ,
Petrinja, Okučani, Vukovar, Beli Manastir and Benkovac. 213
st
3.94 By Order of 22 April 1992 several JNA Officers (ranking from 1
class captains to colonels) were sent to the “TO of Krajina (RSK)” to train
soldiers of the “Krajina army” (“VRSK”) and create a command structure.
According to the above-mentioned Order, the three ‘Serbian Autonomous
Regions’ of (“SAO Krajina”, “SAO Western Slavonia” and “SAO
Slavonija, Baranja and Western Sirmium” were militarily united into the
“Republic of Srpska Krajina”, which became the first of the two Serbian
‘countries’ to be created outside Serbia, 214with the objective of being
merged into the Republic of Serbia as part of “Greater Serbia”.
3.95 After the arrival of UNPROFOR, in mid-May 1992, only the militia
units in the “Krajina” area remained armed,215ilst the forces of the JNA
and its successors were demobilized. By Order of 11 May 1992 – again
from the JNA of the SFRY – the Generals Staff ordered the JNA to
withdraw its materiél and manpo216 from Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Croatia by 19 May 1992. With the implementation of this Order the
JNA’s “official” role in Croatia came to an end.
3.96 The JNA’s formal withdrawal did not, however, signify the end of
its – or its successor’s – involvement with, and support for, Serb
paramilitaries and political organisations in the Republic of Croatia. From
May 1992 until August 1995 the FRY’s involvement in Croatia manifested
itself in various forms, including continued military assistance, financial
212
213 See Annexes, vol 4, annex 88.
See Order of the Federal Secretariat, 28 April 1992, Annexes, vol 4, annex 112.
214 The other being Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
215
See “RSK”, General Staff of TO, Top Secret, Order, 7 May 1992, Annexes, vol 4,
annex 113.
216 See Order of Federal Secretariat of National Defence, Operative Centre, No. 53-3, 11
th th th th th
May 1992, to the Command of the 5 , 10 , 13 and 17 Corps and 4 Military
Regions, Annexes, vol 4, annex 90. 133
217
aid, logistical and personnel support. This was most evident in Eastern
Slavonia, given its geographical proximity to the FRY, where the JNA
continued to station armoured and mechanised units from the Novi Sad
Corps, right up to the demilitarisation of the former Sector East in 1996.
218
3.97 Army officers of the FRY were posted to the “RSK” 219 on the basis
of Article 271 of the Law on service in armed forces. The service of
military officers of the FRY in the “Krajina” was treated as though it was
220
service in the Republic of Serbia. The JNA and its successor continued to
regulate the status of these officers, was responsible for the payment of
salaries, travelling allowance, and sanctioning reimbursements for the
expenses of living away from family, transportation and by regulating their
service condition. 221Serbian Army officers serving in the “Krajina” were
given an additional allowance of 20% of their basic pay in recognition that
they were serving “under more difficult (special) conditions” at the behest
“of the Head of General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia”. 222 A refusal to
serve in the “Krajina” could result in various sanctions including dismissal
from active military service. Officers who had served their terms in the
“Krajina”, and wished to return to the Yugoslav Army required the consent
of the General Staff of the “Serbian Army of Krajina”, without which they
could not be re-transferred. 223
3.98 The Yugoslav Army’s support to the “Krajina Army” was also
reflected in the fact that several military specialists from the Republic of
th
Serbia were sent to the “RSK”. For example, the personnel in the 105
Airforce Brigade who were largely from Yugoslavia. 224 As late as 1995 the
FRY was still supporting military efforts in “Krajina”: the downing of a
U.S Air Force F-16 plane, in June 1995, demonstrated the continuing
217
See Letter of Request to the General Staff of the Yugothav Army for arms and
equipment, Annexes, vol 4, annex 137; Report of the 18 Corps on the state of Combat
readiness to the General Staff of the “VRSK”, 13 October 1993, Annexes, vol 4, annex
138 and Order from the Commander of the “VRSK”, 30 December 1993, Annexes, vol
4, annex 141.
218
The self-styled “Republic of SAO Krajina” was proclaimed on 19 December 1991 by
the so-called Constitutional Parliament of the “SAO Krajina”.
219 See Command of the 18 Corps, Top Secret, 13 April 1993, General Staff of the RSK,
Annexes, vol 4, annex 114.
220
See para. 3.92 above.
221 See above paras. 3.68 et seq.
222
See for example Military Unit 4001, Belgrade, Int. No. 15/18-116-84, 5 May 1994,
official papers, Annexes, vol 4, annex 115.
223 See “RSK”, General Staff of the Serbian Army, Confidential No. 5/1-135 to the
224 General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, 22 September 1994, Annexes, vol 4, annex 116.
See General Staff of the Army of Srpska Krajina, Top Secret No. 41-326, 14 May 1994,
to the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, Annexes, vol 4, annex 117. 134
support of the FRY, as Western official stated that all anti-aircraft batteries
in Serb held territories throughout the former Republics were a part of an
integrated air-defence system headquartered in Belgrade, and under t225
direct command of the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army.
3.99 The “Krajina’s” continuing dependence on the FRY with regard to
the organisation and financing of its paramthitary forces was the agenda of a
high level meeting in Belgrade on 12 November 1992 between Zdravko
Zečević, the ‘Prime Minister’ of “Krajina”, President Slobodan Milošević
of the Republic of Serbia, the Serbian Prime Minister and the Governor of
the National Bank of Yugoslavia. At the meeting, President Milošević
agreed to continue financing the “Army of the RSK” and the militias, as
had been done previously. He also agreed that the Republic of Serbia would
finance the maintenance of equipment, as well as the active senior officers
and civilians who remained in “Krajina”. Based upon this undertaking, the
“Krajina” government requested the Ministry of Defence of 226 FRY for
the requisite sums of money for 1992 and 1993. In fact, the Federal
Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia informed that a
rebalance of federal budget was made in order to provide 480.259 billion
227
Yugoslav dinars for the “Republic of Srpska Krajina (RSK)”. Clearly,
during the entire existence of the Serbian quasi-state on the territory of the
Republic of Croatia, the FRY continued to provide it’s financial and
logistical base.
225
The Washington Post, 4 July 1995, Annexes, vol 4, annex 45.
226 Republic of Srpska Krajina, the Presidency of the Government of Belgrade, Official
notes of the talks with the representatives of the “Government of RSK” with the
president Slobodan Miloševi ć, Republic of Srpska Krajina, Ministry of Defence,
th
Minister, DT No. --/95 from the 7 of February 1995, to the “Government of RSK”,
227 Report on the work of the Ministry of Defence in 1994, Annexes, vol 4, annex 119.
Supra fn 147. CHAPTER 4
GENOCIDAL ACTIVITIES IN EASTERN SLAVONIA
4.01 The sheer scale of the atrocities that took place in the territory of
Croatia during the period covered by this Memorial does not allow for an
exhaustive presentation of every relevant event. The evidence in support of
Croatia’s claim has for convenience been split into two parts. This Chapter
focuses in detail upon events in Eastern Slavonia, primarily in the period
between the May 1991 and November 1991. The evidence collected from
victims and witnesses of genocide, and confirmed by independent
observers and commentators, provides an important case study of the
genocide perpetrated against Croats, one which is reflective of events in
other parts of Croatia in the same period. Chapter 5 summarises events in
other parts of Croatia in a more general manner, focusing upon the extent to
which the patterns of genocide which occurred in Eastern Slavonia were
repeated elsewhere. These two Chapters are intended to describe the
relevant events: the legal implications in terms of the charge of genocide
which flow from the evidence outlined in these Chapters are addressed in
Chapter 8 below.
1. ITRODUCTION
Geography
4.02 Eastern Slavonia, that is the Croatian Podunavlje, is the north-
eastern part of Croatia at the Danube River and borders with Serbia. This
region was the prime target of Serbian expansionists once armed hostilities
began in earnest in the summer of 1991: see Plate 14 (see also Volume 3,
Plate 4.2).
Demographic Change
4.03 The demographic changes brought about by Serbian action in the
region between 1991 and 1995 were profound. In 1991, prior to the
hostilities and the occupation of Eastern Slavonia, this region was divided
into nine administrative municipalities: Beli Manastir, Osijek, Vinkovci,
Donji Miholjac, Đakovo, Županja, Valpovo, Našice and Vukovar.
According to the 1991 Census , ethnic Croats comprised the major part of
1
The 1991 Census was the last official census of the SFRY. 136
2
the population in all nine municipalities. Besides ethnic Croats, there were
also other nationalities in Eastern Slavonia.
4.04 After the territory of Eastern Slavonia was occupied, the structure
of the population altered dramatically. Before the occupation in Eastern
Slavonia as a whole 70,24% of the population were Croats, and 17,15%
Serbs. By 1993 in the occupied area only 2% were Croats and 97% Serbs.
The specific changes in relation to the individual towns are dealt with
below. At the same time, 57,028 housing units were completely or partially
destroyed. The figure includes 32,924 housing units in the Osijek-Baranja
County and 24,104 housing units in the Vukovar-Srijem County. 7,994
units were damaged or destroyed in Vukovar alone. There was also
extensive damage to and destruction of ecclesiatical objects (see Volume 3,
Plate 8.2).
4.05 The drop in population can in part be explained by exile. From the
territory of the Vukovar-Srijem County, altogether 50,873 persons were
displaced. From the area of the Osijek-Baranja County, 33,557 persons
were displaced. 4
4.06 According to the latest figures on the total number of still “missing
persons” from the area of Eastern Slavonia is 886 persons, 5 though this is
considered to be an understatement.
4.07 At the time of writing, 61 mass graves have been found in Eastern
Slavonia: see Volume 3, Plate 7. 2,028 people have been exhumed of
whom 1,533 have been identified. In the Osijek-Baranja County, 171
persons were exhumed and 135 of them were identified. In the Vukovar
2
Croat communities made up the absolute majority in the municipalities of Vinkovci
(79.6%), Osijek (61.7%), Vukovar (48%), Beli Manastir (41.9%), Županja (87.62%),
Donji Miholjac (83,63%), Đakovo (91,73%), Valpovo (90,61%), and Našice (80,55%).
The percentage of the ethnic Serbs in Vukovar was 37.2%, in Beli Manastir 25.5%, in
Osijek 20.0%, in Vinkovci 13,0%, in Županja 2,46%, in Donji Miholjac 11,80%, in
Đakovo 3,78%, in Valpovo 2,86% and in Našice 10,98%. According to the same
Census, the municipality of Vukovar had 84,189 inhabitants, 36,910 of which were
Croats and 31,445 were Serbs. The town of Vukovar had 44,639 inhabitants, 21,065 of
who were Croats and 14,425 were Serbs. The municipality consisted of the town of
Vukovar and 28 villages; in 15 of them, Croats comprised the majority population,
Serbs had the majority in 10 villages, and Hungarians, Ukrainians and Ruthenians each
in one village. See the Ethnic statistics for Eastern Slavonia, Annexes, vol 2(I)
3 According to the figures of the Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees-regional
office in Vinkovci.
4 According to the figures of the office for Displaced Persons and Refugees-regional
office in Osijek.
5 125 persons from the Osijek-Baranja County, 761 persons from the Vukovar-Srijem
County. 137
Srijem County 1,857 persons were exhumed, and 1,418 of them were
identified. Further mass graves are still being discovered. Moreover, many
of the mass graves, which came into being in the relevant period, acted as
temporary burial sites only. The JNA often dug up the bodies and moved
them to other parts of the occupied territory or Serbia. For example, dead
bodies from the villages Tordinci were taken to Serbia and dead bodies
from Tikveš were taken to Beli Manastir.
General Themes
4.08 Throughout Eastern Slavonia and elsewhere in Croatia the
implementation of the strategy of ethnic cleansing and genocide followed a
typical pattern. The individual experience of the villages is dealt with
below and in the following Chapter. The common approach of the JNA
involved a clear pattern implying co-ordination and premeditation. Prior to
the occupation of a village the JNA would send an ultimatum to the
Croatian inhabitants of the village to lay down their weapons or else face
the village being levelled to the ground. At the same time, promises were
made that the Croatian civilians would not be harmed if they did not offer
armed resistance. Generally no resistance was offered. In some cases a
small degree of militia resistance was offered, there being no significant
arsenal available to the Croatian population at that time. The JNA would
then engage in an artillery attack, followed by the infantry of the JNA
entering the village together with Serb paramilitary groups. After the JNA
and these units had captured a village, they embarked upon a campaign of
terror making it either physically or psychologically impossible for
Croatians to continue living there. Mass and non-selective executions of
Croatian civilians (men, women and children) would take place. The
remainder of the population was subjected to variants of martial law,
imprisonment, forced exile or deportation to camps. In many of these
villages the remainder of the Croat population, which was often very small,
was forced to display white ribbons, either on their sleeves or on the doors
of their houses. The common form of abuse levelled at Croats, especially as
a preamble to acts of violence, was that they were “Ustashas”. During the
occupation, many Croatians fled to the neighbouring towns, which had not
(yet) been captured. Some were killed in ambushes by Serb paramilitary
units on the way.
4.09 All of these operations were ostensibly designed to establish rebel
Serb authorities in the villages, towns and cities of this region, part of the
“SAO Krajina”. Territorial Defence and Police Departments were set up to
represent the rebel Serbian military authorities. A Local Committee and
Civilian Protection Authority were set up as part a rebel Serb civil
administration. However, the “Serbianisation” of the region went far
beyond the establishment of military and administrative hegemony. It 138
involved the large-scale destruction of the Croatian population as an ethnic
group. The process started with the brutal torturing and mass killings of
Croatian civilians. It progressed to the exiling of remaining Croatian
inhabitants by force from the village. Croats were forced to sign documents
verifying their voluntary consent that all their property should be left to the
“SAO Krajina”. At the same time light and heavy Serbian artillery was
used to destroy all traces of Croatian architecture, culture and religion.
Targets of destruction included Catholic churches, monasteries, graveyards,
monuments, TV and radio transmitters, railways and factories.
4.10 The consistent pattern of atrocity in these regions is the clearest
possible evidence of a genocidal policy on the part of the Serbian
occupying forces. The evidence set forth in this Memorial – including in
particular witness statements of persons directly involved and corroborating
independent reports – discloses the direct involvement of the JNA and a
very high level of co-operation between the JNA and the paramilitary
groups responsible for inflicting some of the most extreme violence. It is
clear beyond doubt that the JNA military commanders not only failed to
intervene to prevent paramilitary genocidal acts, but actively provided
logistical and direct military support. In many instances, there is clear
evidence that paramilitary organisations were involved in joint planning
with the JNA and in most instances, operations were jointly carried out.
There is contemporary videotaped evidence of Serbian paramilitary leader
Željko Ražnjatović – Arkan issuing instructions to uniformed soldiers on
how to co-ordinate activities of the JNA and the paramilitaries during the
attack and how to ensure that the killing of civilians was confined to those
of Croat ethnicity.6
4.11 The Serbian strategy was largely successful in its aim of destroying
the Croatian population in the occupied regions. The demographic evidence
establishes that many of the towns and villages which had a predominantly
Croatian population prior to their occupation, had become almost
exclusively Serbian by 1993 as a result of genocidal acts. 7
Military Organisation of the JNA in Eastern Slavonia
4.12 The military occupation of Eastern Slavonia involved the use of
JNA forces already stationed in Croatia as well as forces from Bosnia and
6 Chapter 3, para. 3.57.
7 As shown in the following paras. (references to village or town concerned): Tenja paras
4.20 and 4.30; Dalj para. 4.31; Berak para. 4.38; Bogdanovci para. 4.47; Šarengrad
para. 4.56; Ilok para. 4.62; Tompojevci para. 4.73; Bapska paras. 4.81-4.82; Tovarnik
para 4.94; Sotin para. 4.107; Lovas para. 4.116; Tordinci para. 4.133; Vukovar para.
4.140. 139
th
Herzegovina and FRY. Firstly, the 17 Corps of the JNA, which had
previously been responsible for that part of the Republic which included
Eastern Slavonia transformed itself into an occupying Serbian Army. In
th
addition, battalions from other parts of the JNA, particularly the 12
Corps, which were moved from Serbia into Croatia, reinforced the 17 th
Corps.
4.13 The roots of the occupation were foreshadowed in the reforms to
the army organisation in 1988. Until then, Eastern Slavonia was the area of
th
the 7 Army with headquarters in Sarajevo. Thereafter a system of military
regions was introduced. The 7 thArmy was dissolved and the area became
st
part of the so-called Central battlefield, technically referred to as the 1
Military region with headquarters in Belgrade. In contrast to the former
system of armies with division composition, the Military Regions were
organised in Corps. According to this system, Eastern Slavonia was the
responsibility of the 17 thCorps with headquarters in Tuzla. The area
presided over by the 17 thCorps also included Baranja and Northeast
th th
Bosnia. The striking power of the 17 Corps was the 12 Proletarian
Mechanised Brigade of the JNA, which had its headquarters and the main
force in Osijek. Other parts of the brigade werethtationed in Vukovar and
Našice. In Đ akovo, there was the 158 Mixed Anti-armoured Artillery
Brigade; in Slavonski Brod the 670 thPontoon Battalion; in Vinkovci the
th th
12 Mixed Artillery Regiment and the 17 Light Artillery Regiment of the
Anti-Aircraft. The 51 Border Battalion, also in the composition of the 17 th
Corps, was located in the Baranja. The 17 th Corps bordered on the 12 th
Corps in the East, at the river Danube, which had its headquarters in Novi
Sad. Near the Republican borders of Serbia and Croatia, the 12 thCorps had
th rd
two mechanised brigades, the 36 in Subotica and the 453 in Sremska
Mitrovica, which played a major role in the war against Croatia. In the
West, the 17 Corps bordered on the 5 Corps from Banja Luka, which had
th
authority over Western Slavonia. Both neighbouring corps, the 5 and the
12 Corps, were part of the 1 Military Area.
4.14 On 4 October 1991, a state of emergency was declared by the
unconstitutional “Yugoslav Presidency” 8 as result of a request by the
Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the SFRY.
th nd
The 17 Corps of the JNA was reinforced with the 2 Mechanised
Battalion of the 36 Mechanised Brigade from Sremska Mitrovica and the
st rd
1 Mechanised Battalion of the 453 Mechathsed Brigade from Subotica.
Both of these Battalions came from the 12 Corps of the JNA and were to
constitute the external occupying force. They were assigned to the areas of
8 Chapter 2, para. 2.110. 140
Vinkovci and Vukovar and subordinated to the Command of the 17 Corps th
9
of the JNA.
Outbreak of Violence
4.15 In April and May 1991, Serb rebels in Croatia, supported by
manpower from Serbia that came over the Danube, were engaged in the
destruction of the constitutional system of the Republic of Croatia. In some
villages, with a substantial proportion of Serbs in the population, barricades
were set up at surrounding roads. For towns like Borovo Selo and Tenja,
such actions were a prelude for the imposition of paramilitary government.
4.16 Armed hostilities started on 1 May 1991, when the Serbian flag was
hoisted in Borovo Selo. Members of a police patrol who attempted to bring
it down were attacked. On the following day a group of policemen were
sent to the village as reinforcements to the failing local administration.
Twelve of them were murdered by paramilitaries. Within hours after the
event, units of the JNA descended upon the locality, ostensibly to establish
a “buffer” between the Serb and Croat communities. The manner of the
intervention was to be a decisive turning point in the role of the JNA in the
region. The Army carried out no investigation into the murders. Moreover,
it stopped the Croatian police from carrying out any investigation or arrests,
thereby protecting and promoting the emergence of paramilitary groups.
The JNA effectively occupied Borovo Selo and obstructed a return to law
and order. Encouraged by the JNA the Serb population in surrounding
villages engaged in rioting, road blocking and sabotaging railway lines.
Under the protection of the so-called JNA “buffer zones”, villages with
majority Serb populations such as Mirkovci and Tenja, became rebel Serb
strongholds. In this manner, the unrest spread into the broader area of
Vinkovci and Osijek.
th
4.17 In July 1991 the Battalions of the 12 Corps of the JNA crossed tth
border between Croatia and Serbia. The Commander of the 12 Corps,
Major General Mladen Brati ć, justified this troop movement on the basis
that he had to prevent “extremists” from tearing down bridges. The official
paper of the JNA “ Narodna Armija” explained that their aim was to
“prevent a fratricidal war and to protect the borders of Yugoslavia, but also
to engage in the fight against paramilitary units, which are every day more
and more present in that area”. 10 In this statement “paramilitary units”
9 Command of the 17 Corps, DT.No. 11/1-93 from 14 May 1991, Order, Annexes, vol
2(I), annex 158.
10
Narodna Armija,13 July 1991, p. 15, “Mupovci svakodnevno provociraju vojnike”
(“Members of the MUP provoke the soldiers every day”);Narodna Armija 7 August
1991, p. 4, “Razlozi za zadovoljstvo” (“Reason for satisfactNarodna Armija, 13
July 1991, p. 20 “Izdaja nam otvorila oi” (“Betrayal opened our eyes”); Narodna 141
meant Croat Police units, not rebel Serb units. In the broader area of Osijek,
Vinkovci and Vukovar, the reinforced 12 Proletarian Mechanised Brigade
of the JNA under the command of Colonel Boro Ivanovi ć occupied the
roads leading out of the towns, with the excuse that it was engaged in an
“exercise”. 11 Having established protectorates, such as Tenja (see
paragraph 4.20 below) where the Serbian population was in a majority, the
JNA worked with Serb paramilitary groups to attack other villages where
the majority of the population was ethnic Croat. On 6 July 1991, after an
“agreement” with rebel Serbian paramilitary units, the overwhelming
majority of the Croat inhabitants of Antin left the village. The 93 Croats
that remained were confined to house arrest outside working hours and had
to wear white ribbons on their sleeves. At the time of writing it is still
unknown what happened to 15 of them. On 7 July 1991, the units of the
JNA carried out a mortar attack on the village of Ćelije, the inhabitants of
which were exiled from the village under the control of the JNA. After the
population of Ć elije had been banished, the village was completely
destroyed and burned down. Today, the village no longer exists.
4.18 At the beginning of August 1991, the JNA started to carry out direct
military operations against Croatian villages. The first to be attacked were
Dalj (see paragraph 4.32 below), Erdut and Aljmaš. The main force
involved was the 51 Mechanised Brigade of the JNA from Pan čevo under
12
the command of Colonel Enes Taso. On arriving at Aljmaš the unit was
involved in the killing of 58 Croatian civilians. The entire remaining
Croatian population was banished to Osijek. The major part of the Brigade
entrenched itself in the vill age Bijelo Brdo, which was inhabited by Serbs.
The JNA’s 2 Mechanised Battalion stayed in Erdut. 13
4.19 After Erdut, Dalj and Aljmaš had been occupied, communications
th th
systems were introduced to parts of the 12 and 17 Corps of the JNA
“with the purpose of following paramilitary units”, as they called the
Croatian Army, and “the joint operations against them”. 14 Until the end of
armija, 20 July 1991, p. 23, “Opstojavaju vojni čki mostovi” ( “Military bridges
survive”); Narodna Armija, 17 July 1991, p. 10, “Do jednog za otadžbinu”
(“Everybody for the homeland”); Narodna Armija, 31 July 1991, p. 12-13, “Prvo ratno
iskustvo” ( “First war experience”), Annexes, vol 4, annex 149.
11 Narodna armija, 16 July 1992, p. 18, “Trijumf s malo gor čine” (“Triumph with a
bitter taste”).
12 Military Court Osijek, Kir-36/92, 6 March 1992, Hearing of I.K. , former
Commander of the Mechanized Platoon in the 51 stMechanized Brigade of the JNA
Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 20.
13 Ibid. Also Narodna Armija, 22 August 1991, p. 13, “Razoružanje ili rat”
(“Disarmament or wath), Annexes, vol 4, annex 149.
14 Command of the 17 Corps, No. 11/1566-2 from 4 August 1991, Order, Annexes, vol
2(I), annex 159. 142
August, the JNA’s 36 Mechanised Brigade of the JNA, reinforced by rebel
15
Serb paramilitary groups, occupied Baranja. In September 1991, the JNA
started an all out military assault on Eastern Slavonia. Between 28
September and 17 October 1991, the villages of Sotin (paras. 4.107-4.115),
Ilok (paras. 4.62-4.72), Šarengrad (paras. 4.56-4.61), Lovas (see paras.
4.116-4.133), Bapska (paras. 4.81-4.93) and Tovarnik (paras. 4.94-4.106)
were captured by the JNA and Serb paramilitary groups. The campaign
culminated in the massacre at Vukovar after 18 November 1991 (paras.
4.160 et seq.).16
2. TENJA
4.20 The village of Tenja is located in Eastern Slavonia around 6 km
southeast of Osijek. According to the 1991 census, 7,663 inhabitants lived
in Tenja, of whom 2,813 were Croats, and 4,177 Serbs. The rest of the
population was made up of other nationalities. 17
4.21 Tenja is one of the early examples of the Serb paramilitary groups
creating a Serb stronghold in a village where Serbs made up a majority of
the population. The degree of violence in which the Serbs engaged in order
to achieve their aim went far beyond what was “militarily” necessary given
18
the ever dwindling numbers of the Croatian minority. At the same time
the village provided a primary base for the JNA to launch its attack on
Osijek from August onwards. After 20 April 1992 no Croats were left in
the village. The JNA occupied the city and on 6 October 1991 together with
Serb rebels from Tenja massacred the Croat inhabitants of the farm town
“Orlovnjak”.
4.22 On 1 July 1991, barricades were erected so as to restrict admissions
to the local Serb population only. A self-proclaimed Serbian region
“Baranja-Slavonia-Srijem” was established with Goran Hadži ć as the
“President”, after which Serb rebel inhabitants gathered in the old part of
Tenja in order to organise the setting up of the barricades. By 7 July 1991,
Tenja was isolated, without any intervention from the JNA. Serb
15 Narodna Armija, 9 October 1991, p. 11-12, “ Duž linije što spaja i razdvaja” (“Along
the line that connects and separates”), Annexes, vol 4, annex 150.
16
Veljko Kadijević, “Moje viđenje raspada” (“As I See the Downfall”), 1993, p. 135-136,
Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.1.
17 Ethnic statistics for Tenja, Annexes, vol 2(I).
18 Witness Statement of J. P., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 4: “I have heard Božo
Vidaković saying that as long as he is in the village of Tenja there is going to be no
Croats.”
19
Chapter 2, para 2.102et seq. 143
paramilitaries formed the headquarters of a “Territorial Defence” under the
leadership of Jovan Rebra ča, in order to organise military matters. In
addition they formed a “Civil Defence”, under Mile Jaji ć, to deal with
administrative matters. Branko Grković commanded the police station.
4.23 In the months after the establishment of a Serbian “authorities”,
Tenja underwent a brutal transformation in its social values. For example,
L.B., was ill towards the end of July. She asked her Grandmother
R.T., a Serb by nationality, to take her to the clinic. A doctor,
Goran Hadžić, told her “there was no medicine for the Croats and that she
should di e because they had to save the medicine for the Serbs”. 20
21
According to the witness M .K., one of the extremist Serbs, who
emerged as a leader in atrocity in the early days, was his neighbour Božo
Vidaković known as “Trafikant”. On one occasion V idaković told the
witness that “it was a little difficult to kill som eone for the first time, but
after you had done it once it was not difficult to k ill someone later”.
According to M ., Vidakovićwould be responsible for a number of the
killings in the village, including the murder of L. B. husband,
S.B. (see below).
4.24 After the occupation, the new Serb authorities began searching the
Croatian houses under the pretext of searching for weapons. T h ey listed all
Croatian residents, recording their sex, age, and ot he r figures. Widespre ad
looting of Croatian property took place. That process is testified to by
L.B., who experienced the theft of every moveable piece of
property from her house, by her Serbian neighbour. This was after her
husband was murdered. 22
4.25 The residents of Croat nationality were compelled to forced labour.
They were made to perform difficult and humiliating tasks and were in
effect deprived of all their freedom and personal dignity, as they were made
to live like slaves. 23 All this took place under armed guard. 24Croatian
women were routinely raped, along with having to labour in the fields and
gardens. While the Croat K.C. was made to clean the police
station, she was indecently assaulted by one of the officers. According to
20
Witness Statement of L.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 5.
21 Witness Statement of M.K., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 1. and Witness Statement
of P.Š., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 6.
22 Witness Statement of L.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 5.
23 Witness Statement of P.Š., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 6.
24
Witness Statement of D.M. , Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 7: “While we were
digging the trenches the guard kept us at gunpoint and we had to do everything they
asked from us”. See also: Witness Statement of M.R, Annexes, vol 2(I),
annex 8. 144
her friend M.M., Mrs. C.’s experience drove her to attempt
25
suicide.
4.26 The residents of Croatian ethnicity were forbidden to move freely
on the street. They had to stay inside the houses with the shutters down
save when they went to work. When Croats passed Serbs on the street they
26
had to turn their heads away and not look at their faces. It was also
forbidden to watch any Croatian Television channels. On at least one
occasion when soldiers found out that someone was doing so, they shot at
their house. 27
4.27 Arbitrary arrests and maltreatment of Croats started immediately
after the barricades were set up. For example, from 7 July the witness
Z.B. was detained in the police station for six days during
which time he and others were frequently beaten and forced to kneel down
and eat grass. A police officer, Dragan Rudež, used a hosepipe in order that
the victims of the beating who were about to pass out could be rev ived so
that the beating could continue. 28 Amongst the detainees were M.B.,
F.C., D.B., M.D. with his father
and mother, A.M., M.N., F.B., M.C.,
K.K., V. and I.V ., J.M., and many others who
were also physically maltreated and beaten. As to the conditions of
detention and interrogation, the witness R. J., describes how two
persons stood each at one side of the table with telephone cables in their
hands. 29 Each time he stopped talking or denied an answer, one of the
interrogators nodded to the other one and said, “Refresh his memory”, after
which they started beating him all over his body. A. M. spent five
days in the prison. He was taken for questioning each day, during which
time he was tortured; when he lost consciousness due to the beatings, they
spilled water over him and continued beating him. He was given only water
30
and no food. The witness J.S. was physically tortured: beaten all
over his body with hands, feet and police batons by the persons present,
while they tied the testicles of the other questioned person and hit him
there.31
25
Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 9.
26 Witness Statement of M.K., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 10.
27 Witness Statement of I.I.*, Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 11.
28
Witness Statement of Z.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 12.
29 Witness Statement of R.J., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 2.
30 Witness Statement of A.M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 13.
31
Witness Statement of J.S., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 14. 145
4.28 From the very beginning of the occupation, the random murder of
Croatian civilians was committed. The victims included Ivica Prodanović ,
Đuro Kiš, Stevo Ba čić, Ivo Valenti ć, Vlado Valenti ć, Ante Golek, Josip
Medved, Franjo Fu ček, Marko Kneževi ć, Mara Kneževi ć, Kata Tot,
Anuška Horvat, Josip Prodanovi ć, Jure Šarić, Josip Hodak, Stjepan Peni ć,
Seka Penić, Francika Pogović, Pero Mami ć, Mato Na đ, Marija Cerenko,
Manda Banović, Betika Gotovac, and Andrija Gotovac. Croatian residents
that have survived testify about the brutal murders. According to the
witness Z.M., Mato Nikolaš was murdered after he failed to attend
work for two days. Mato was found dead in his attic, completely naked and
stabbed more than 20 times. His body was taken to the access road to
Ćelije. There it was dropped into a hole where it lay with other unburied
bodies, which had previously been dumped in the same ma nner. 32On the
night on 19 September 1991, three armed men entered her house, forced
her husband out, and killed him in the centre of Tenja. She later discovered
that Vidaković was responsible. “They would not even let me see him
before they buried him. They told me that there was nothing to be seen and
he was buried in the village of Ćelije”. J.K. testifies about the
murder of local postman Josip Medved. He was in a neighbouring garden
when he heard the Serbian soldiers ordering Josip Medved to dig a hole.
When he finished digging, he started screaming and calling for help, but
soon there was silence. The Serbian soldiers had killed him. 34 One elderly
man of Croatian nationality, nicknamed “Herco”, was killed while he was
35
cutting the grass in the local park. L.R. testifies as to how a local
Serb, Milan Macakanja, forced A na Horvat and Mr and Mrs Peni ć into a
truck, beating them with pol ice batons all over their bodies. They hav e been
missing since then. He also saw the dead body of Đuro Kiš in the cinema,
which was being used as a detent ion centre. He was half-naked, his hands
tied with barbed wire and with a g unshot wound in his forehead. 36Further,
Đ.B. saw the bodies of Croatian civilians being taken with tractors
and buried in black plastic bags in the local graveyard in Ćelije. The bodied
37
were buried in a makeshift grave which he was forced to dig.
4.29 The key involvement of the JNA with the Serb paramilitary groups
in Tenja occurred on 6 October 1991 and related to an attack on the village-
32 Witness Statement of Z.M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 15. Z. M. also
has the information about the murders of Stevo Ba čić, Ivo Prodanović, Jozo Božičević,
Mato Nađ, and Mira Pekež.
33
Witness Statement of L.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 5, who testifies about the
murder of her husband.
34 Witness Statement of J.K., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 16.
35 Witness Statement of J.P., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 4.
36 Witness Statement of L.R., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 17.
37
Witness Statement of Đ.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 18. 146
farm “Orlovnjak”. The farm was located 4 km southeast of Osijek between
the village Novi Seleš, the municipality of Antunovac and Tenja. The
Serbiantharamilitary units of Tenja acted in co-operation with the parts of
the 12 Motorised Brigade of the JNA, Osijek, which was partly transferred
from the town to Tenja. “Orlovnjak” was a cattle-raising farm owned by the
agricultural company Osijek. Before the war, 161 inhabitants of different
nationalities, who were employed at the IPK Osijek, lived there. After the
barricades were set up in Tenja, the Serbs from the farm joined forces with
their people in the village and other Serbian bases. A smaller number of
residents of Croatian nationality stayed to look after and feed the large
number of cattle that were left on the farm. In the morning hours of 6
October 1991, the Serbian unit composed of approximately 100 soldiers
armed with heavy and infantry anti-armoured weapons, commanded by
Savo Grnović, were deployed in the northeast side of the farm. They waited
for the attack of the 38A unit that was approaching the farm from the east
and southeast sides. At the time, there were around 20 male and female
civilians and around 10 defenders still left in Orlovnjak. After artillery fire
was opened from the northeast side, the Serb paramilitary infantry unit
attacked and soon after that occupied the farm. When they got into the
“Orlovnjak” the units killed a number of civilians including Ante Perković ,
Stjepan Bartolović, Mato Škrebek, Emil Dujmovi ć, and defenders: Darko
Kišurek, Ivo Vadljak, and Milan Gaj čić. All of the dead were shot in the
back of their heads. 39 On 18 February 1997, a mass grave was exhumed on
40
the farm and the remains of three persons were identified. Although the
village was captured by rebel Serbs, the operation and the killing was made
possible by the 12 thProletarian Mechanised Brigade of the JNA who
effectively blocked any assistance which might have come from Croatian
forces based in Osijek. This was a clear example of the JNA using its
control of the surrounding roads as a means of creating an opportunity for
the Serb paramilitaries to carry out operations designed to liquidate
Croatian populations. At the time the JNA’s 12 thBrigade was still
described as carrying out “exercises” in the locality.
4.30 The final expulsion of the Croat population in Tenja took place on
20 April 1992 by way of forced exile. The remaining residents of Croat
nationality were summoned according to a previously drafted list. They
were forced at gunpoint to deposit the key to their house and their property
with the local police. Thereafter they were forced into two buses and
banished to Osijek (98 persons).
38 See map at vol 3, Plate 5.1.
39 The letter from the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, Annexes, vol 2(I),
annex 163.
40
List of exhumed mass graves of the Government Office for Detained and Missing
Persons of the Republic of Croatia, Annexes, vol 2(I), annexes 165 and 166. 147
3. D ALJ
4.31 The village of Dalj is located near Osijek. According to the 1991
Census it had 5,515 citizens of whom 1,085 were Croatian and 2,882 were
Serbian. The rest of the population was made up of other nationalities.
After the occupation the number of Croatian citizens decreased to 500,
although a further 104 citizens were forced into exile on 18 April 1992. The
number of citizens of Serb nationality increased as a result of migration
from Western Slavonia. These settled in the houses of murdered and exiled
Croatians.
4.32 The attack on Dalj started in the morning of 1 August 1991. It was
carried out by JNA Corps from Novi Sad and the Požarevac Armoured
Battalion. They were assisted by the JNA’s Danube War Fleet ships, which
bombed the main defence points of the village and also by artillery attack
from Vojvodina (Serbia). JNA tanks (51 stMech. Brigade from Pan čevo
42
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Enes Taso) came from the
territory of Vojvodina over the Bogojevo Bridge. In addition the JNA was
reinforced by the paramilitary Serb formations from Vojvodina Such a
combined force easily broke the resistance of the Police of the Ministry of
the Interior (MUP) of Croatia and the members of the Croatian National
Guard (ZNG). Although the group of MUP and ZNG members that
survived the attack laid down their weapons and surrendered, many of them
were subsequently executed. Those dead included Mario Vukovi ć, Dario
Dujmović, Dražen Kiš, Ivica Horvat, Đuro Lon čarek, Dragan Cesarec,
Josip Glibuši ć, Stanislav Guljuši ć, Ivan Dizdar, Darko Sekuli ć, Tomica
Belčević, Mladen Pelinkaš, Željko Rogulji ć, Josip Kamenjija, Antun
43
Mihaljevac and Josip Kraštek. The JNA was directly involved in the
campaign. 44
4.33 During the attack a great number of Croatian civilians were also
killed. The witness H.S. saw her husband I.S. shot dead as
he checked on the damage to their house. When she went to a Serbian
41 Ethnic statistics for Dalj, Annexes, vol 2(I).
42
Ministry of Defence (MORH) from 10 Sep. 1994; official record ostthe informative
conversation with I.K., former mech. platoon leader of the JNA 51Mech.
Brigade, Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 3; Narodna Armija , 2 August 1991, p. 13,
“Razoružanje ili rat” (“Disarmament or War”), Annexes, vol 4, annex 149.
43 Some Records of the autopsy of the bodies of the members of ZNG and MUP of RH in
the file of the County Court in Osijek no. K-95/94, Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 168.
44 Witness Statement of A.K. , Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 21. A.was
part of a group that tried to escape from Dalj August 1991. When they go to the
intersection leading to the village of Aljmaš, the JNA blocked their path. About 200
civilians, many of them small children, had to lie in a ditch throughout the night.
Eventually they got a boat to Osijek. 148
doctor, Žarko Medić, to get a death certificate, he attributed the deat h to a
heart attack. On the 2 August a tractor loaded with dead bodies was brought
to the witnesses’ house to take her husband away. When she came to the
Catholic cemetery to bury her husband she saw 37 corpses, 7 of which were
completely naked. 45Other survivors witnessed at least eighteen dead
bodies buried in a mass grave in the Catholic graveyard. A reporter from
Reuters at a press conference in Osijek also confirmed this. In addition,
twenty-five corpses from Dalj were transported to the hospital in Osijek.
During Government negotiations on August 13 1991, the Serb
representatives from Dalj admitted that either 56 or 57 Croats had been
killed in the village.46Two of 25 bodies transferred to Osijek hospital were
of identified civilians: Petar Đevlekaj, a banker of Albanian origin, and
Nikola Tadijan, a baker’s assistant and an ethnic Croat. Autopsy reports
have been discovered from Osijek hospital which relate to two civilians. In
relation to Nikola Tadijan the reports state that he was shot from behind by
rifle fire. In relation to Petar Đ evlekaj, the report states that he was
executed by two shots to the head. There were contusions and lacerations
47
on his body, which were inflicted by beating prior to death. On 27
February 1998, three bodies were exhumed from a hidden grave. On 3
March 1998, a further 11 bodies were exhumed from another grave. 48
4.34 Immediately after the occupation, the Serbian paramilitaries formed
the so-called “Territorial Defence Headquarters (TO)” as a local military
authority and the Local Committee (MZ) as a civilian authority. Under the
management and orders of the TO Headquarters the torture and murder of
Croatian citizens took place. According to the witness S .D. the
Serbs from Dalj brought in Serbs from other areas to carry out the beatings
and torture. At the same time, Serbs from Dalj carried out atrocities upon
Croats in other nearby places. Once hostilities began in Vuk ovar, captured
49
soldiers and civilians were brought to Dalj and tortured and murdered.
4.35 In addition, the TO Headquarters organised forced labour, house
arrests and looting under the guise of “official” searches. 50Random acts of
violence occurred. Armed men shot at H. S.’s house in October
45 Witness Statement of H.S., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 22.
46 Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92, p. 112.
47
Croatian Medical Journal, War Suppl. 1, 1992 which states that on 3 August 1991
autopsies were performed on Petar Đevlekaj and Nikola Tadijan at the Ward for
Pathology and Forensic medicine in the Osijek hospital.
48 List of exhumed mass graves of the Government Office for Detained and Missing
Persons of the Republic of Croatia, Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 166.
49 Witness Statement of S.D., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 23.
50
Witness Statements of E .M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 24; and M.P.
Annexes, vol 2, annex 25. 149
1991, causing her to flee from the village. In order to escape she needed an
exit permit which was only obtained on the condition that she assigned all
her property to the Local Committee. The witness M. A. had the
same experience. Other Croatian civilians fled to Osijek and Hungary
without permits. Many were captured by the local paramilitaries as they did
so. Today such people form the bulk of the 300 inhabitants of Dalj still
categorised as “missing persons”. It appears that the numbers killed were
greater than the official statistics.1
4.36 During the course of the occupation the parish of St. Joseph’s
church (built in 1912) was mined and the church was completely destroyed
leaving only a pile of bricks. The witness M.D. was being held
as a prisoner in a house next to the church at the time. The windows and the
doors of the house caved in as a result of the detonation and he and other
prisoner had to be moved. After the first explosion only the tower was left
standing. The next day, the Serbs mined the tower. 53
4.37 At the beginning of 1992 the “TO Headquarters” drew up a list of
the remaining Croats and ordered that their banishment be organised. In the
evening hours of 18 April 1992, the members of the TO Headquarters
accompanied by members of the paramilitary Serbian formations (Arkan’s
“Tigers”) set out by bus from the entrance into Dalj, from the direction of
Erdut. They began forcibly removing Croatian citizens at gunpoint from
their houses. 54 A second bus arrived from the outskirts of Dalj, coming
from the direction of Borovo Selo, and paramilitaries began to banish the
Croatian population. The people were forced to sign statements
55
relinquishing all rights to their property. After they were forced into two
buses, around 11:30 p.m., the people were taken to the temporarily
occupied village of Sarvaš where they were forced out of the buses and told
to walk onto the mined road towards Nemetin. At the same time the
Serbian paramilitaries fired automatic weapons above their heads. Before
entering the bus, all banished citizens were forced to sign a statement
confirming that they were leaving their entire belongings and estates to the
MZ Dalj. 104 citizens were banished from Dalj on that night.
51 Witness Statement of A.K., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 21.
52 Diocese Đakovo and Srijem War Damages 1991-1994, Đakovo 1994.
53
Witness Statement of M.D., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 26.
54 Witness Statement of E.M., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 24.
55 Witness Statement of M.A. Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 27.
56
Witness Statements of H.S., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 22 and M. A.,
Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 27. 150
4. B ERAK
4.38 The village of Berak is situated in Eastern Slavonia approximately
16 km south of Vukovar. In 1991 its population was mostly Croatian. Out
of 926 residents, 515 were Croats, 348 were Serbs, with the remainder
made up of other nationalities. 57 In May 1992, the rest of the residents of
Croatian nationality were forcibly exiled from Berak and then forced to
walk over a minefield to Vinkovci. Out of 515 Croatians who lived in
Berak in 1991, 440 were exiled during the occupation and 30 persons
disappeared from a “basement” which housed many of the remaining
inhabitants from October to December 1991. The whereabouts of 14
Croatians remains unknown.
4.39 From May 1991 there had been unrest in the village, most
significantly because of a Serb boycott of the schools. Weaponry was being
sent by the JNA to Berak and distributed to extremist Serbs by a retired
general, Perica Vučetić.
4.40 On 2 September 1991, the members of the JNA and Serb
paramilitaries together seized Berak. Once JNA tanks had secured the
centre, a megaphone was used to order Croats to surrender their arms.
Before the order could be complied with the tanks opened fire on Croat
houses. There were no members of the Croatian Army in the village.
According to J.G., the JNA wanted to provoke an armed conflict,
but there was no resistance. 58 Most of the civilians fled into the woods.
According to J.B., at least four others who were killed were
Ivica Ore, Tomislav Gvozdanovi ć, Ivica Poto čki and Jozo Mrkonji ć. 59
After the occupation of the village, the command of the TO was
established. The Commander was Veselin Rakini ć. The Commander of the
police was Žarko Kvoč ka. The Local Committee of Berak was also
established, the head of which was Đorđe Vuletić. During the first month
after the seizure, a police curfew was introduced to apply only to Croats
and freedom of movement was limited to those who possessed passes. On 6
September 1991, a member of the TO of Berak, Ilija Čučković, killed Kata
Garvanović in the street. Examples of random violence included the bea ting
60
of the witness M.H.*.
57 Ethnic statistics for Berak Annexes, vol 2(I).
58 Witness Statement of J.G., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 28.
59
Witness Statement of J.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 29.
60 Witness Statement of M.H. , Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 30: “I was beaten
with boots over my face, lips and they knocked out 12 of my teeth. They beat me over
my back, spinal cord, over my whole body”. 151
4.41 On 30 September 1991, 104 Croatian inhabitants of the village,
mostly women and old people, were rounded up and brought to the
warehouse of a co-operative farm. Thereafter they were brought to the
basement of a house belonging to D.P. , which was used as a
cam p. T hey were guarded by members of the TO including Zoran Kvo čka,
Mile and Pajo Rušnov, Drago Tepši ć and Pero Šijuk. Kvo čka told them,
61
“You will stay here until you die of hunger”. On 6 October 1991 27 men
were transferred to Begejci. During that journey, the soldiers extinguished
cigarettes on their hands and foreheads and beat them with iron wires. In
Begejci they were placed in barns with 180 other Croats where they were
subjected to forced labour and torture, being required to dig their own
graves.62 In the meantime 44 women, older men and children from the
original basement-camp disappeared. Some of their bodies were eventually
found in a mass grave between Orolik and Negoslavci, in a valley called
63
“Šarviz.”
4.42 The survivors of the basement camp later testified to the intense
brutality to which they were subjected during their period of imprisonment.
The TO carried out acts of physical abuse, regardless of age and gender.
In the evening, the prisoners were lined up, men and women separately, and
individuals were selected for interogation. During questioning, the witness
M.M. was physically beaten all over her body by a Serbian
paramilitary using his rifle butt. When she begged those responsible to stop
beating he64on her fingers, she was told that she would not need them
anymore. M.K. was taken to the street together with A.R.
and ordered to lie down on the ground, after which they were hit
with rifle butts. P .B.* witnessed the physical abuse of Marijan
Marinčić during the questioning in the camp. To this date Marijan Marinčić
is a missing person. On 28 O ctober 1991 R.B. had a rat, placed
beside her face in order to bite on it. This went on for over 6 hours.65 When
she was brought back to the basement, she was covered with bruises and
bites. A 71-year-old woman, M.B. *, was brought outside the
basement and stripped in front of the so ldiers. She was lat er killed and
dismembered and her remains were thrown into a well. The same fate befell
L. and T.G. , who were killed the same day. Their
61
Ibid.
62 Witness Statement of K.M.*, Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 31.
63 Witness Statement of M.M. , Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 34; Records of the
exhumation of human post-mortem remains from 25 March 1998, after which the
following persons have been identified: Ivica čki, Marija Manjoš, Anka Č učić,
Ljubica Mari ć*, Kata Garvanovi ć, Tomislav Gvozdanovi ć, Nada Juratovac, Jozo
Mrkonjić, Ivica Ore and Janko Latković Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 167.
64 Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 32.
65
Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 34. 152
bodily remains (arms and legs) were found near the well. 66 On her release
from the basement camp, N.J. hung herself. 67
4.43 On the 1 December 1991 the surviving members of the basement-
camp were allowed to return to their homes. Their possessions had been
plundered. They were compelled to forced labour. Z.L. suggested
to her husband, J . that they go and sleep somewhere other than their
house, but he would not leave. On 23 March 1992 she came home to find
that he was missing. She eventually found him in the playground lying on a
rock. His he ad had been cut in two.
4.44 In Berak, there were instances of sexual abuse of Croatian women.
On 20 October 1991, L .M., M.H. (born 1947) and
her mother-in-law (born 1922) were raped in front of a large group of
people, who were watching. The mother-in-law was taken away the next
morning and never returned. 68During the next month, L .M. and
M.H. were, either individually or together, taken away on
several occasions and raped throughout the night:
“Sometimes they took me or L. during the night and raped
us, I was their special target because I had 6 sons and they were
threatening me because I had delivered 6 Ustashas. I could not
stand it anymore. A few of them were jumping over me torturing
and raping me and laughing all the time. All of them, except from
J., could have been my children, and J. said that he did it for
fun. His son N. and M.Š. were raping me. M.Š.’s
uncle M . called ‘F. ’ (1947) only jumped over me but he
couldn’t do anything.” 69
4.45 The witness P.B. * also testified to having been raped by 7
men. She was accosted by JNA reservists, with White Eagle marks. They
had shouted after her in the street, “We will exterminate their seed. There is
no place for their bones”:
“They immediately stripped me, and made me kiss and lick their
penises. Seven of them raped me, mostly by forcing me to engage
in oral sex. The whole time I was blindfolded. They raped me. The
hardest thing for me was to swallow the sperm and urine. The
whole time somebody was shouting, “Fuck your Ustasha mother,
where is the gold your son stole”. He caught my breasts a few
66 Witness Statement of M.H. , Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 30, and Z.L.,
Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 33.
67 Witness Statement of Z.L. Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 33.
68
Witness Statement of M.H., Annexes, vol 2 1), annex 30.
69 Ibid. 153
times and hit me in the abdomen, when I couldn’t swallow
70
anymore, they threw me out onto the concrete floor.”
She was forced to endure oral sex for more than two hours, and also to
swallow semen and urine. After she was raped, they made her run and
started shooting at her.
4.46 During February 1992, the first Serb families from Western
Slavonia arrived in Berak. They were moved into the houses of the exiled
Croatian inhabitants. In May 1992, the Croatian inhabitants were exiled
from Berak. Accompanied by UNPROFOR they reached Mirkovci, from
where they had to walk over a minefield to Vinkovci. 71 According to J.B.
the Serbs had ethnically cleansed the village, only a few
families of non-Serb nationality stayed there. As in other villages, the exiles
were forced to sign statements declar ing that they voluntarily gave up their
property to the Serb authorities 72
5. B OGDANOVCI
4.47 The village of Bogdanovci is situated in Eastern Slavonia,
approximately 8 km southeast of Vukovar. According to the 1991 census,
1113 persons lived in the village, 914 of who were Croats and 19 Serbs,
while the rest belonged to other ethnic groups. 73 During the occupation, 84
Croatian civilians were killed or disappeared, and by 1 January 2000 the
74
destiny of 38 of them was still unknown. The rest of the Croatian
inhabitants were exiled from the village by force. On 17 October 1997 and
14 November 1997, exhumations were conducted in Bogdanovci, when 22
75
persons were exhumed, 21 of which were identified.
4.48 The first attack on the village of Bogdanovci was carried out on 13
August 1991 with 6 mortar grenades fired from the neighbouring village of
Bršadin, where Serbs were in a majority. On 23 August 1991, Serbian
70
Witness Statement of P.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 35.
71 Witness Statement of A.P., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 36.
72 Witness Statement of J.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 29.
73
Ethnic statistics for Bogdanovci Annexes, vol 2(I).
74 Witness Statement of A.C., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 38: “My husband I.
and other 60 men did not want to leave their homes, and now nobody knows what
happened to them…The Serbs took my son I . to “Velepromet”…So far, there was
no living sign of him, I do not know whether he is dead or alive…Many Croatian
captives were forced to a market where they were slaughtered, the blood ran knee-
deep”.
75 List of exhumed mass graves of the Government office for Detained and Missing
Persons of the Republic of Croatia, Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 166. 154
paramilitary units seized the crossroads to Vukovar (4 km from
Bogdanovci) and used around 10 armoured vehicles to attack Bogdanovci.
On the 25 August the tower of the local church was directly hit with a shell.
76
The roof frame was damaged. The attacks continued every few days
throughout September. This included the use of JNA mortar bombs, despite
the fact that the village did not contain a Croatian Army unit and was
essentially undefended (save for a few army officers and civilian
volunteers). According to the witness M.K. the main JNA
bombardment came from the direction of Bršadin and the “ Đergaj” forest
which is near Bršadin. During these attacks the Catholic Church was
destroyed together with the local school of Bogdanovci. In addition, the
paramilitaries had come into possession of anti-aircraft weapons which they
77
used on the village. On 17 September 1991, two cluster bombs were fired
at the village. A further cluster bomb fell on 30 September 1991. On that
occasion 20 Croatians were wounded.
4.49 On 2 October 1991, Serb paramilitary groups and the JNA carried
out a combined artillery-tank and infantry attack from the direction of the
village of Marinci and Petrovci. Approximately 40 tanks and armed
vehicles were involved. There were approximately 150 JNA soldiers.
During this attack many Croats hid in the basements of their houses, only to
be murdered by hand grenades which were thrown into the houses. Đurica
Katić, Zdravko Katić and Ivan Križanovi ć were killed while hiding in the
basement of A.M.’s house. A grenade was thrown through the
window. Ana and Ilija Tadić and Kata Ceranac were killed in the basement
of Ž.M.’s house. 78 In the same manner a grenade was thrown
into the basement of A.Z. ’s house and Stana Šimi ć, Ana
Zvonarević and Marta Grubanovi ć were killed. M .M. and
M.Š. were seriously wounded. As he attempted to escape from the
exit of the basement Josip Dominkovi ć was killed by fire from artillery
79
weapons. The experience of the day is attested to by M.M.:
“One of the Yugoslav soldiers asked them if anybody was still in
the cellar and M. tried to explain to him that her husband was
still in the cellar and that he could not get out because his leg was
injured from the shelling. This soldier then cautiously entered the
cellar, while two other soldiers questioned them, and the fourth
soldier was standing a little further and holding his gun towards
76 Witness Statement of A.T., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 39.
77 Witness Statement of M.K., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 40.
78
Witness Statement of M.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 41.
79 Witness Statement of V.S., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 42: “…...The bodies I
mentioned could not be buried for a long time, so they started to smell…...we spilled
petroleum over them and burned them”. 155
the centre of the village and looking towards them from time to
time. After the first soldier had returned from the cellar, he told
them to return to the cellar. They all obeyed him and when they
were back in the cellar, the Yugoslav soldiers threw several bombs
into this room (M. believes it was three or four), [and M.
does not remember a big flash] and a suffocating smoke after their
explosion, she also knows that she fell after being hit and did not
feel anything at that moment. M. believes that she lost
consciousness after this, and during the night she felt somebody
pulling her and after this she also heard an inarticulate voice and
recognised her daughter. Her daughter was asking her to help her
get a certain object off her neck which would not let her breathe,
they recognised then that this object was the body and leg of their
killed relatives Ana Zvonarevi ć and Marta Grubanovi ć who were
lying next to them. Since it was night and dark in the room, M.
did not know if there were more survivors beside her daughter and
her, and because of the pain and fear, none of them dared move.
Not until morning at daybreak and before M. had heard
somebody calling out from outside the cellar, did she see that
everybody except her daughter and her were dead in the cellar,
and she also saw that her husband J. was killed with a bullet to
his head, and this was done when the Yugoslav soldier had gone to
the cellar the previous night to see who was hiding in the cellar.
Due to fear M. did not answer any of the calls, until their
neighbour B.V. came to the cellar in order to help them
and called their fellow-townsmen S.T., and then they
first helped M. and got her out of the cellar after which they
80
took her to the neighbouring house of the C. family.”
4.50 In the evening of the same day, Zvonko Vukovi ć, Dominko
Ceranac and Silvester Edelinski were murdered. Stjepan Bartulovi ć was
thrown into the well in front of his house. Marko Peni ć was killed during
the shelling.81 According to A .T., during the attack on 2
October 1991, near the chapel, members of the Serbian aggressor army also
killed the civilians Vinko Mari ć and his wife Zora Mari ć, who in their car
tried to flee from Bogdanovci. 82 M.M. later found out that the
several Croatian police officers were killed while trying to enter the village
to provide assistance. Thereafter it was thought that there was no possible
83
way out.
80 Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 43.
81
Witness Statement of Z.P., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 44.
82 Witness Statement of A.T., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 39.
83 Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 43. 156
4.51 Knowing of the mass killings of Croatians in other villages, many
inhabitants tried to flee to safer Croatian territory before the attack. On the
road to Marinci, around 10 people were killed. The dead included Vinko
Marić, Zora Marić, Pavo Šad and Ilija Mari ć. A.C. was one
of the people who managed to escape, “My husband I. (born in 1931), as
well as 60 other men, did not want to leave their homes, and we never again
heard of them”. 85
4.52 The following days saw several cases of torture. The witness M.B.
describes how a Croat called “Kuštro” was stretc86d on a tree in
front of the church and tortured until he died. Each time the members of
the JNA and the Serb paramilitary groups entered the village, they came to
the Croat’s houses and tested whether the tubes were hot; in this way, they
found out whether there were civilians in the house. Then they shouted:
“Croats out!” Every civilian who came out of the basement, was killed.
Then they tossed bombs into the basements and executed those who were
afraid to come out. 87Throughout these attacks the only people who were
killed or wounded were ethnic Croats.
4.53 On 10 November 1991, after relentless attacks using heavy artillery
and infantry, the units of the JNA from Niš and Ma čva, supported by the
Serb paramilitary groups, occupied the village of Bogdanovci. As far as the
witness Z. P. could remember they used 30-50 vehicles and 300
soldiers. During the attack at least 15 members of the Croatian National
Guard Corps were killed. In addition ten members of an Albanian family in
Vladimir Na zor Street were killed.
4.54 The witness Đ.B. gives an account of the violence that
was meted out on Croatian civilians:
“On 10 November 1991, when the army of the JNA from Niš and
Mačva entered the village I was in the basement at M.A .'s
house. That day the village was capt ured. 5 soldiers of the JNA
tested whether the pipes were hot. 15 people were in that
basement, and when the attack started, I went to the barn door. I
knew that they would come to execute the civilians in Croatian
houses, because they did it before, during the 6 previous attacks on
the village. They used to come to the houses and tested whether
the pipes were hot and in that way found out whether civilians
84 Witness Statements of A.T. , Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 39, and Z.P.,
Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 44.
85
Witness Statement of A.C., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 38.
86 Witness Statement of M.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 41.
87 Witness Statement of Đ.B., Annexes, vol.2 (I), annex 45. 157
were hiding in the house. Then they shouted: “Croats, out!”, under
“Ustasha” they understood all Croats, even a newborn Croatian
child. Everybody that came out of the basement was killed
instantly, after which a hand grenade was thrown into the
basement, and in that way those who did not want to come out
were executed. I saw that they went to every Croatian house.
Because it was dark and it was raining, I could not see how close
to the basement they had come. I had a hunting gun, from which I
fired in their direction as soon as I saw them, so I thought that they
retreated, because they thought that resistance would be offered.
But soon they came back and threw three hand grenades into the
basement. Stjepan Matijaševi ć was killed, and several persons
were wounded. My wife then came out of the basement and asked
whether I was alive. I said that everybody from the basement
should come to the barn, after which we organised ourselves. We
were 16, three were seriously wounded, and we started to flee
from the village. We went over the field towards the river Vuka,
and we lay there until Ivan Matkovi ć, called “Lasta” came, who
told us that the village had been captured and that the following
persons were killed: Pero Matić and Josip Jerkovi ć, and that
T.K. was seriously wounded. The 16 of us fled to
Nuštar, where we surrendered.” 88
4.55 The occupation was designed to make continued Croatian life in
Bogdanovci impossible. The whole village was seriously damaged, but
Croatian infrastructure was the particular target: family houses of Croatian
civilians, farm buildings important for their livelihood, and many sacral
objects (the Church Rising of the Holy Cross, the fire station, the
Community centre, the Farming Co-operation etc.). Đ.B. also
testifies about the behaviour of the members of the JNA in Bogdanovci. He
witnessed a bomb being tossed into the basement of M.A. ’s
house, on which occasion Stjepan Matijašević was killed. 89
6. ŠARENGRAD
4.56 The village of Šarengrad is situated in Eastern Slavonia near the
town of Vukovar. According to the 1991 Census the population was
predominantly Croatian (approx. 90%). Out of 1005 inhabitants, 904 were
90
ethnic Croats, and 48 were ethnic Serbs. The rest of the population was
made up of other nationalities. Out of 904 villagers of Croatian nationality
88
Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 The Ethnic statistics for Šarengrad Annexes, vol 2(I). 158
who lived in Šarengrad in 1991, 798 were exiled and during the occupation
4 persons disappeared and their destiny is still unknown. After these events
80% of the population was Serb.
4.57 At the beginning of September 1991, the JNA attacked Vukovar,
Osijek and Ernestinovo. JNA planes flew over Šarengrad. On 7 September
1991, the 2 Guard’s Proletarian Mechanised Brigade of the JNA, with the
help of the special formations of the Serb Territorial Defence 91 and the
Serb paramilitary groups attacked the village. They launched artillery
attacks from the Serbian side of the Danube. The 252 nd Armoured Brigade
of the JNA was involved in the attack on Croatian side of the Danube.
92
Units from the brigade eventually occupied the village. During the day
the tower of the Catholic Church was hit. The JNA repeatedly fired at it
until half of the church was completely destroyed. 93 The parish house and
the Carmelite Nunnery was completely destroyed. The attack lasted the
whole night and was mounted with increasing intensity.
4.58 On 8 September 1991, the JNA issued an ultimatum that all
Croatian weapons had to be surrendered by the next morning. The next day
at 9.00 a.m., the weapons were put down in front of the local school, and
the inhabitants surrendered. On 10 September, a mortar attack was carried
out on the village, after which two armoured vehicles came to the village
and seized it without resistance. During the mortar attack, Jure Sarač ević,
Josip Vuletić and two members of the Croatian National Guard Corps were
killed.94 The members of the JNA searched the Croatian houses and
granted several inhabitants permission to leave the village. However, 4 km
from Šarengrad the exiles were ambushed by Serb paramilitaries. Mijo
Mijić and Josip Kolak were killed. M.M. w as shot in his chest and
taken to the hospital in Novi Sad. Other Croatian civilians were also killed
95
for no reason. The same night, the inhabitants of Šarengrad saw that the
village of Bapska was on fire and they heard firing. Panic ensued causing
people to gather some of their possessions and run from the village.
91 st
1 “pgmd” Command, Conf. No. 851-18 from 4 October 1991, Command 252, Order
“Op.br.”, Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 162.
92 Narodna Armija, 13 November 1991, “ I dezerteri se vra ćaju” (“And the deserters are
returning”), p.19, Annexes, vol 4, annex 150.
93 “The Wounded Churche in Croatia – Destruction of Sacral Buildings of Croatia 1991-
1995”. The wounded church in Croatia, Destruction of sacral buildings in Croatia,
1991-1995, Zagreb, 1996: The Church of the Holy Peter and Paul in the parish of
Šarengrad was built in 1698 and is a cultural monument.
94
Witness Statement of Ž.M., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 46.
95 Ibid.: “In a turn on the road leading to Šid, the driver Ivać hit by a bullet and
killed. Also killed were Miroslav Kolak and the wife of A.V. Antun Mijić’s
son was wounded. He was hit in his shoulder… He fell and cried for help. Nobody
dared to help him. He died.” 159
4.59 On 11 September 1991, many of the remaining population fled the
village and joined the group of 12,000 exiled people in Ilok. Eventually that
group was exiled from Ilok, as well. A large number of young people went
on to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vojvodina (Serbia), but were captured
by the members of the Serb paramilitary groups and transported to
concentration camps in Serbia. Thereafter many Serbs from other parts of
Slavonia were brought into the village. Two captains from the JNA were
involved in this migration. A decree of martial law was subsequently
96
imposed on the Croatians who remained.
4.60 412 Croatian inhabitants stayed in Šarengrad, many of whom were
too old to travel. In the next few months these people were exposed to
physical and psychological maltreatment, humiliation and robbery. A.G.
(born in 1925) was one of the people who were too old to travel:
“One night they chased me into a house and questioned me; afterward they
kept me tied, almost nude, in my yard while pointing several guns at me.” 97
M.G. witnessed Serb soldiers who had found a military uniform
behind the house of A.G. and forced her to put it on. They then
chased her around the village to the local school, where they beat her. 98
I.G. was beaten and accused of being a Croatian policeman even
99
though he was not. Croatian children were forced to attend Serbian school
in Ilok. They had to learn from Serbian books, write in Cyrillic letters and
speak the Serbian language. Many children, like B.Ž., simply
stopped going to school for fear of bullying and subjection to education
based on the “Greater Serbian programme”. Her godfather was later
arrested and her godmother was raped. 100 The witness O.Š. * was
detained with another 30 inhabitants and brought to a makeshift prison,
where he was beaten throughout the night. All the captives were compelled
to undertake forced labour (clean soldiers’ boots, clean uniforms). An older
married couple was beaten to death over a number of hours in front of their
son A., who was forced to stand and watch while in handcuffs. O.Š.
sat next to A. who had to sit beside the corpses of his parents
throughout the night. 101 All Croatians in the village were forced to wear
white ribbons. 102
96 Witness Statement of P.Š.* Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 47.
97
Witness Statement of A.G., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 48.
98 Witness Statement of M.G., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 49.
99 Witness Statement of I.G., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 50.
100
Witness Statement of B.Ž., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 51.
101 Witness Statement of O.Š., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 52.
102 Witness Statement of A.L., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 53. 160
4.61 On 26 March 1992, the remaining 170 Croatian inhabitants were
exiled from Šarengrad. They were forced into a bus, intended for the
103
transport of exiles. A.G. saw people being dragged and kicked
out of their houses, many of them old, some in wheelchairs. 104 They were
forced to sign statements that they were voluntarily leaving their town and
were assigning all their property to the settled Serbs. 105
7. ILOK
4.62 The town of Ilok is situated in Eastern Slavonia, 31 km southeast of
Vukovar. Aside from Vukovar it was the biggest town in the region. It is
the most eastern town in Croatia and is surrounded by Serb territory on
three sides. According to the 1991 Census, the town had 6,775 inhabitants
of who 4,248 were of Croatian and 484 of Serb nationality (approx. 18% of
the entire population). The rest of the population was made up of other
nationalities.106During the war Ilok was the initial site of refuge for Croats
banished from other parts of Eastern Slavonia. However, during the attack
on Vukovar, the Ilok authorities capitulated in the face of JNA demands
that 15,000 Croats should leave the town. The mass exodus took place on
17 October 1991. The few Croats who remained in the town experienced a
brutal regime.
4.63 Before the conflict Ilok was a flourishing cultural and agricultural
centre, where Croats and Serbs lived in essentially peaceful co-habitation.
In the spring of 1990 some Orthodox gravestones were vandalised.
According to a doctor in the town, “The Serbian local authorities tried to
prove that Serbs were endangered in the town of Ilok. However, people
stuck to their usual routine and there was no indication that the Serbs were
endangered or hated. Life continued in a peaceful manner until the spring
of 1991, when the first Serbian extremists arrived”. 107
4.64 On 7 May 1991, members of the JNA seized access to the bridge
over the Danube. Thereafter JNA ships patrolled the riverbanks of the
town. On 25 July the JNA began an artillery attack on Ilok from ships on
the Danube with no warning or reason. On that occasion a few family
103
M. Kevo-D. He čimović; The War for Croatia- a war chronicle of Eastern Slavonia,
Vinkovci/Osijek, 1992.
104 Witness Statement of A.G., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 48.
105 Witness Statement of L.C., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 54.
106 Ethnic statistics for Ilok, Annexes, vol 2(I).
107
Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92: Forcible Displacement of the Complete
Population of the Town of Ilok and Surrounding Villages – A testimony of a medical
doctor, an inhabitant of Ilok, now a displaced person in Zagreb p. 164. 161
houses, the church and the convent were ruined. At this stage about 80% of
the women and children were evacuated, but they returned in August. Due
to the events in the neighbouring villages the citizens of Bapska, Šarengrad,
Tovarnik, Lovas and other villages were at that time also being evacuated
to Ilok. There were approximately 7,000 refugees in the town. After the
attack on Vukovar, Ilok slowly became completely cut off from the outside
world. From 14 September 1991 Ilok was in complete isolation. On 10
October 1991 negotiations began between the local Croatian government
and the JNA. The Army representative was Major General Dragoljub
Aranđelović. The local Croat leaders were concerned to avoid the degree of
bloodshed that occurred in other areas. A ‘referendum’ held in the town
was supported by 76% of the Croat population. An agreement with the JNA
on the resettlement of all citizens of Croatian nationality from Ilok was
made. 108
In return for the ‘voluntary’ exodus of about 15,000 Croatian
civilians the JNA promised to secure a safe passage into Croatian held
territory.
4.65 On 17 October 1991, a convoy about 15 km long, of approximately
15,000 Croatian civilians was formed and left Ilok. European Union
Observers were present. The exit of the convoy from Ilok lasted the whole
day. During the crossing of the bridge, the convoy was exposed to
humiliation and molestation by the JNA and paramilitary Serbian forces
who took the opportunity to rob them of the few valuable possessions that
they were able to leave with. All of the public vehicles were confiscated,
despite assurances of the JNA that they would assist the evacuation.
4.66 On the same day as the forced exodus (17 October 1991)
formations of the JNA came into Ilok. A small number of Croatian people
that did not want to leave their homes, were exposed to physical and
psychological harassment, molestation, constant robbery, groundless
imprisonment and killing. This policy was not simply the design of the
rebel Serb paramilitary groups. The witness F.D. emphasises that the
JNA commanders co-operated with the paramilitaries. He cites, in
particular the JNA’s Colonel Bjeli ć and Commander Todorovi ć, and
Lieutenant Colonel Filipović. Under the c ontrol of these officers the local
police were able to carry out the random killing of Croats who had stayed
behind. According to F.D. the murdered included:
1. Lončarević – elderly lady – they killed her by shooting her in
the ears, then they burnt her and threw her in the canal, she
was killed in the yard, in front of the house.
2. Cinkovski – young man killed in Pajzoš in the wine cellar, he
was beaten to death.
108
Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 161. 162
3. Demiter, a Slovak – he was killed by the military police.
4. Mato Bošnjak– killed on the road when he was coming back to
109
his house in Zmaj Jovina Street.
4.67 The experiences of the remaining Croats in Ilok are described by the
witness P.V.:
“They took all Croatian men and we had to perform working
duties or military duties. People would work for days without any
food or any compensation. The Serbs would humiliate us all the
time. For example they would urinate in our drink portions and
then they offered us to drink that. Our people had to clean the
streets not because of the cleanliness but because of the
humiliation. We were not allowed to gather publicly. When we
walked on the streets for example the Serbs would spit on us from
the church, they would hit us with rocks and insult us.
We were not allowed to go into the field, they took our mechanical
devices so everything we had on those fields was deteriorating.
We had absolutely no rights. We could not get a job, they
disconnected the phones to the Croatians. We had nobody’s
protection, not even the protection of the so-called police, nor the
protection of the UNPROFOR.
One day the Serbs barged into my house and they took the cross,
the rosary and the Catholic calendar off the wall and they
destroyed it all. We could not complain to anybody. They turned
my house upside down, they pointed a knife at my back”. 110
4.68 B.K. also testifies about the intensity of the physical
violence. Two Serbian masked civilians came into his house by force and
tortured him:
“One grabbed my hair and the other twisted my hands behind my
back and he handcuffed me. The one who held me by the hair had
a knife in his hand. He cut my lower lip and chin with it. Then he
cut out the cross with four Serbian C signs on my forehead. The
blood was flowing down my face. After that he put the knife under
my throat and he told me that he would butcher me. I did not know
if he put the blunt or the sharp side of the knife under my throat. I
was bleeding all over my face and clothes and I did not know if he
cut my throat or not. Only later I saw that he turned the knife on
109 Witness Statement of F.D., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 55.
110 Witness Statement of P.V., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 58. 163
its blunt side. Then he hit me with his boot on both of my legs.
They took off the handcuffs and then they went”. 111
4.69 S.M. was arrested because she mistakenly said “glazbeni”
(meaning “musical” in Croatian) instead of “muzič ki” (musical in Serbian).
After being taken to the police station she had a knife put to her throat and
was threatened with death. D.T .’s grandmother and grandfather
were attacked in their home with axes. His grandfather was killed and his
112
grandmother had her eye cut out.
4.70 As a result of the exodus on 17 October over 2,500 Serbs were
moved into the deserted town of Ilok and into the 640 deserted Croatian
113
homes and 60 flats. Milka Vladić was shot at as she went to Church. The
church door was blown up with explosives. 114 Generally freedom of
movement was severely curtailed. D.M. struggled to remain
in the town until 1995. However in the end she could “not bear the
psychological pressure” and fled as Serb families successfully removed her
from her house. 115 A Serb family also moved into the house of
116
F.D.
4.71 The involvement of the JNA in surrounding and ultimately
expelling all the Croats from ste town is entirely clear. The main force
involved was the JNA’s 1 Guard Proletariat Mechanised Division under
the command of Major General Dragoljub Aran đelović, as evidenced by
th 117
the “agreement” made on 14 st October 1991 in Šid (Serbia). In the
cleansing of Ilok the 1 Mechanised Battalion, the cannon battalion, the
anti-armoured battalion of the 1 Guard Proletariat Mechanised Brigade of
the JNA forged with the detachment of the Territorial Defence from Titond
Užice, Serbia. 118 The scouts and the military police of the 252 Armoured
111 Witness Statement of B.K., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 57.
112 Witness Statement of D.T., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 56.
113 Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92: p. 168.
114
Witness Statement of M.V., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 59.
115 Witness Statement of D.M., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 60.
116 Witness Statement of F.D. Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 55.
th
117 Agreement from 14 October 1991 between the representatives of the town of Ilok and
the JNA Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 161; Narodna Armija, 2 October 1991, p 4” Kao
nekad pod razvijenom ratnom zastavom” (“As once under the unfurled war flag”),
Annexes, vol 4, annex 150; Narodna Armija , 22 December 1991, p. 21, “Ti divni ljudi,
hrabri mladi ratnici” (“Those wonderful people, young warriors”). The conversation
with the commander of the 1 sGuard proletariat mechanized brigade Colonel Milorad
Vučić. He said that the people who left the town in fear were being extremely hostile.
118
Narodna Armija, 22 December 1991, p 21, “Ti divni ljudi, hrabri mladi ratnici”
(“Those wonderful people, proud warriors”). A conversation with the commander of the 164
Brigade were also involved. 119The commander of the Guard division,
Major General Dragoljub Aranđelović, in the interview for the newspaper
“Narodna Armija“ boasted that his formation “cleansed and firmly holds
the space between the Danube and the Bosut, and that in this region the
120
authorities were beginning to form”.
4.72 In Ilok the exhumations of the mass graves were carried out on 1
June 1998, and from 6 – 8 September 1999, when the remains of 17 bodies
were exhumed. Only 3 persons have been identified. 121
8. TOMPOJEVCI
4.73 The village of Tompojevci is situated in Eastern Slavonia in the
territory between Vukovar and Lovas. According to the 1991 Census, the
village had a Croatian majority. Out of 510 inhabitants, 402 were Croatian
and 27 Serbian. 122The rest of the population was made up of other
nationalities. From the 412 citizens of Croatian nationality from 1991, 385
of them were expelled during the occupation. The others are either missing
or murdered.
4.74 On 1 October 1991, Tompojevci was shelled for the first time. On 9
October 1991 it was occupied, after the JNA units attacked the village from
the direction of Čakovci and Bokšić. Immediately after the occupation, the
JNA and the Serb paramilitary groups established a local military
government. There is no direct knowledge as to which JNA units were
involved in the occupation. However, on the basis of a published army
report it appears that artillery regiment of the JNA’s 1 stGuard Proletarian
Mechanised Division was used to bombard 123 village. Thereafter the units
of this division occupied the village.
4.75 The JNA in Tompojevci was responsible for the serious damage
and robbery from the church of St. Mary Magdalene, built in 1856 and
renovated in 1906:
st
1 Guard proletariat mechanized brigade Colonel Milorad Vučić, Annexes, vol 4, annex
150.
119 Narodna Armija, 13 November 1991, “I dezerteri se vra ćaju” (“The deserters are also
coming back”), p 19, Annexes, vol 4, annex 150.
120 Narodna Armija, 2 October 1991,p 4, “Kao nekad, pod razvijenom ratnom zastavom”
(“As once under the unfurled war flag”), Annexes, vol 4, annex 150.
121
List of the exhumed mass graves of the Government Office for Detained and Missing
Persons of the Republic of Croatia, Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 166.
122 Ethnic statistics for Tompojevci Annexes, vol 2(I).
123 Narodna Armija , 16 July, p. 18 “Trijumf s malo gor čine” (“The Slightly Bitter
Triumph”). 165
“The situation in the village was really terrible. The church was
shelled. Its interior was completely devastated. Holy pictures lay
around as well as everything else. The army made a public toilet
124
out of the church. “
4.76 According to L.M. after the JNA came into Tompojevci,
their police went round Croatian houses. Later they moved into some
empty houses which were left by those who had fled. They used to stay
there for a few days. They took whatever they needed from these houses.
Afterwards these houses were unrecognisable. The doors and the windows
were broken. They even threw pigs into the rooms. 125
4.77 Before the expulsion of the Croatian population in May 1992, the
rebel Serb authorities imposed martial law. A curfew was imposed on
Croatian citizens between the hours of 6 pm to 6 am According to the
witness I.B.: “We were living like prisoners in our own houses, as
if we were not human. We were living in our village as prisoners in a camp
without any rights at all.” Serbian paramilitaries entered the houses to
126
m olest the inhabitants and threatened to kill them. Movement passes
were introduced only for Croats into the village. In effect, the Croatian
citizens had to have an approval of the local government for each occasion
that they left their houses.127Normal life was impossible given that water
supplies and electricity were cut off from the Croatian households. The
rebel Serbs engaged in daily provocation of Croatian citizens. They would
throw bombs into their yards. At night they would beat on their windows
threatening to slay them. 128 Branko Vranješ and two of his friends, all of
them of S erb nationality and in JNA uniforms, told S.L.*: “I
shall expel all Croats from the ‘SAO Krajina’”. M.L. was
interrogated by the local leader Đuro Kljajić throughout the night, a man
who had been a friend of the family before the Serbs took power:
“He came to my house at night and asked me to give him family
albums. He took the photo of my son Ž. ’s First Communion.
On that same night he came once again around 10 pm with two
armed men whom I don’t know. On that occasion he said that
Ustashas destroyed Vukovar and that I ran away because my
friend vica Ore, hi s two sons and uncle were killed in Berak. He
went away and then came again around 2 am and took me for a
124
“The Wounded Church in Croatia, the Destruction of the Sacral Objects in Croatia,
1991-1995”, Zagreb, 1996, p. 174.
125 Witness Statement of L.M., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 61.
126 Witness Statement of I.B., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 64.
127
Witness Statement of V.V., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 62.
128 Witness Statement of S.L., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 63. 166
hearing in their Territorial Defence which was placed at Hunter’s
inn. He questioned me about the arms and wanted to know where
my sons and my husband were. I said that the army took the arms.
He was yelling at me saying that Latin letters won’t be written in
this village anymore and that people won’t go to church. I said I
knew the Cyrillic alphabet and he was yelling at me and scolding
me and after an hour and a half they took me home.” 129
4.78 The witness M.H. was present when the body of his
cousin Đ.H. was exhumed. He was murdered and later buried in a
ditch by Z.S. and B.R., both of Serb nationality.
4.79 Croatian citizens were also forced to undertake forced labour. So-
called work platoons were formed, which all remaining Croa tian citizens
were required to join reg ardless of their age or ability to perform the
assignments. During the course of the work beatings took place which the
Serbs referred to as the “payday”. On 16 March 1992 Nedjeljko Vulić was
called to his “payday” and he never returned home again. 130 Several other
Croats were murdered or disappeared, among them were: Ivan Šari ć, Josip
Mesaroš, Rozalija Horvat, Nedjeljko Horvat, Nedjeljko Vuli ć and the
married couple Stracenski.
4.80 Croatian citizens were forced under gunpoint to sign the following
statement on 17 March 1992: “I voluntarily leave the village, because I
wish to settle in the Republic of Croatia (RC), and with this leave my entire
property to the ‘SAO Krajina’ Government.” They were then forced into
two buses and banished from the village. 131 Serbian families from Western
Slavonia settled in the houses of the expelled Croats. Those who refused to
leave, in spite of being threatened and abused, were murdered by the Serb
families from Western Slavonia. This was the fate of Rozalija Horvat and
Josip Mesaroš who were killed by a Serb family, who later settled in their
house. V.V. and his family were expelled from their house by the
newly settled Serbs (N edo Romić and Dušan Z latar). They were only
allowed t o take the bare necessities with them. According to the data at the
disposal of the Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees of the
Government of Croatia, 299 people were banished.
129
Witness Statement of M.L., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 65.
130 Witness Statement of I.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 64.
131 Witness Statement of L.M. , Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 61: “When I left, I had
to sign a paper saying that I leave my property to the so-called ‘SAO Krajina’. I told
them: ‘I do not have anything to sign!’ A soldier put a ‘scorpion’ on one side of me and
another soldier put another on the other side.” See: Witness Statement of M.L.,
Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 65: “They told us that we have to leave our houses in
five minutes and get on a bus…They also ordered us to leave the houses open.” 167
9. B APSKA
4.81 The village of Bapska is situated in Eastern Slavonia, 26 km
southeast of Vukovar. It lies between the village of Šarengrad and Šid.
Before the occupation, Bapska had a Croatian majority (91%). According
to the 1991 Census, the village of Bapska had 1,624 citizens of whom
1,478 were of Croatian nationality1323 of Serbian nationality and the
remaining of other nationalities.
4.82 Of the 1,478 citizens of Croatian nationality according to the 1991
Census, 1,369 were expelled during the occupation and two persons
disappeared. At 1 January 2000 the destiny of one Croat is still unknown.
4.83 On 3 October 1991, at 3:00 pm the JNA gave the inhabitants of
Bapska an ultimatum that all armed men should surrender their weapons. A
Serb civilian was sent to the village with a piece of paper on which the
ultimatum was written. The time complying with the ultimatum was 6:00
pm of that same day. The ultimatum was not complied with. Consequently
on 4 October 1991 at 12:00 noon, cannon fire from several directions
attacked the village. The attack lasted until 7:00 pm Around four hundred
missiles fell on the village; many of them were selectively fired at several
family and farm buildings. The library and the Roman Catholic Church
were damaged and many civilians were injured.
4.84 On 5 October 1991, during the morning hours, another cannon
attack began which lasted until 12:30 pm when the JNA tanks came to the
village and started shooting at the residential houses. The commander of
the JNA’s 1 stGuard’s Proletarian Mechanised Division, Major General
Dragoljub Aran đelović, ordered the 2 ndGuard’s Proletarian Mechanised
Brigade of the JNA to take over the task of occupying the village, with the nd
assistance of the “special forces of the Territorial Defence”. 133 The 252
Armoured Brigade of the JNA offered support with their tanks within the
village.134The 1 Guard’s Proletarian Mechanised Division had captured
the village by 14 October 1991.
4.85 After the occupation of Bapska more than 1,000 Croatian citizens
fled in the direction of Šid (Serbia). However, after getting to the outskirts
of Šid a group of Bapska refugees was stopped by the Serb police and they
were imprisoned and taken to the sports hall “Partizan”. On the 14 and 15
132 Ethnic statistics for Bapska Annexes, vol 2(I).
133 1st “pgmd” Command, str.pov.br.851-18 from 4 October 1991, to the Command 252,
Order “Op.br.” , Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 162.
134
Narodna Armija,, 13 November 1991, “I dezerteri se vra ćaju” (“And the deserters are
returning”), p.19, Annexes, vol 4, annex 150. 168
October 1991, Serb soldiers came to the hall and read the names of the
citizens from Bapska from their list and separated fifteen people including:
I.B., M.K., I.R., Z.F., M.F.,
J.Š., S.B. , Đ.B.. These people amongst
others were used as a “human shield” to protect Serb forces as th ey entered
neighbouring villages. Others who fled from the v illage took refuge in the
surrounding woods. According to Ž.Ž., the woods were full of
lost and frightened people. Josip Vuletić , the commanding officer of the
Croatian army in Ilok, Šarengrad, Bapska and Mohovo was killed. The
civilians, who were killed, were as follows: Mato Rumberger, Ivan Mijić ,
Miroslav Kolak (Krca), Nada Vrbanić, Borislav Sabol.
4.86 After the occupation, during November and December 1991, the
Serb forces started systematically to burn and destroy Croatian family
houses and farm buildings. About 70 properties were destroyed. Members
of the Croatian population were exposed to psychological and physical
violence. M.K.’s husband and friend J. were shot for no reason.
The husband survived but his friend did not. At least 17 people were
murdered. Croatian families were prevented from buying food. 135
4.87 The so-called “SAO Krajina Government” was established and
rebel Serb authorities formed (Local Committee Bapska and the Local
Committee Board Bapska). From 15 October 1991 to December 1991,
according to the direct orders of the Commander of the TO Bapska Major
st
Vasić and his assistant Captain 1 Class, Nikola Krtini ć, the Croatian
population was forced to undertake forced labour and had to report to the
Local Committee building daily with special passes. The houses of
Croatian owners were marked with white ribbons. 136 The phone lines of
Croat houses were cut off while the lines out of Serb houses remained
intact.137
4.88 The intensity of the abuse of the Croatian men during the early
morning line-up for the daily forced labour is testified to by the experience
of A.L. before his death. At the beginning of November 1991 (the
exact date is unknown), during a line-up before the LC Bapska building,
Legler was forced to drive a tractor through a minefield in order to pick
corn. He was unable to driv e and therefo re was extremely hesitant in
135 Bora Sabo, Miroslav Kolak, Ivica Miji ć, Nada Vrbani ć, Mato Rumberger, Zdravko
Tustonić, Josip Radovanovi ć, Branko Todorevi ć, Andrija Bošnjakovi ć, Jozef
Trobojčević, Stjepan Divljakovi ć, Pera Foro, Bora Sapro, Ilija Divljać, Ivica
Cvitković, Pava Solaković and Stjepan Rukavina.
136 Witness Statement of K.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 66: “We, the Croats, had to
put up white rags to mark the Croatian houses.”
137
Witness Statement of A.K., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 67. 169
carrying out the task. He was then approached by the Commander of the
TO, Nikola Krtinić, who started beating him on the head with the metal part
of his gunstock. When L. fell to the ground the commander continued
to kick him and beat him all over until he had lost consciousness. The
following morning A.L. had hung himself in his home. 138
4.89 Since a large number of the Croatian citizens of Bapska refused to
leave the village, in spite of the daily and systematic abuse, they were
tortured even more. Their houses were searched, robbed and burnt on a
daily basis, all under the pretext that the rebel Serb authorities were looking
for weapons. One witness who experienced harassment was I .F.
He states that the Serbs chased him out of his house one evening, having
beaten him and knocked his teeth out. When he returned the following
morning he found the house in flames and he was be aten and taken to
F.B.’s residence where they also took other citizens according to
a list and tortured and beat them. 139I.L. was also tortured on
several occasions, once after the occupation where he was kicked by a mob
of soldiers under the order of a JNAthfficer because they found a fireman’s
helmet in his house. On the 12 December1991 the torture took on a
greater intensity:
“They made me lie down in a shell hole and drove the tractor on
me. With the right wheel they pressed my abdomen. My two ribs
broke….Then one of the soldiers (they were in the JNA uniforms)
pulled out a knife from his boot and stabbed me in my left
arm….Then another JNA soldier wounded me with an axe. He hit
me with the cutting edge on my buttocks. That was a deep and
wide wound. I couldn’t and I wouldn’t go to see a doctor because I
was afraid to leave my house, I think that they would kill me.
After being stabbed with a knife and hit with the axe they told me
to climb a haystack and that they would set me on fire. They
talked between themselves and they said on code “33”, then they
“fed” submachine guns (reloaded) and shot around me. Then they
ordered me to climb down and they put a bomb in my clothes on
my chest. They told me they would blow me up….It was terrible
for me also because all that torture was happening in front of my
old mother who was screaming all the time: “Don’t kill my child.”
140
They stopped the search and left me alive”.
138 Witness Statements of A .Š., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 68, and J.K.,
Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 69.
139
Witness Statement of I.F., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 70.
140 Witness Statement of I.L., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 71. 170
Despite the torture I.L. and his family still did not leave his house.
He also refused to sign a statement that he would relinquish his estate to the
“SAO Krajina”. He was therefore taken from his house by force on 8 April
1992, and put on a truck together with more men and women and forced to
leave the village.
4.90 Many Croatian women were also systematically abused and
tortured. For example the witness P .M.* states that the Serbs
robbed her house daily. On 13 January 1994, two of the Serb soldiers began
to commit sexual violence:
“When they were done, one of them took me to one room. There
he raped me. I tried to defend myself at which he hi t me on the
back with a rifle and slapped me once. That way he managed to
rape me. The other robber had a stocking on his head and went
into the room of my eighty-one year old mother K. I.*.
He hit her on the head with his hand, after which she fell to the
floor and he raped her then. After this he asked her for money,
since she had none he searched her and tore her navel with his
bare hands. They left after this. They threatened that we do not
report them to the so-called militia since they were co-operating “.
Since the family still refused to leave their houses, in spite of the abuse,
robberies and rapes, they were banished from the village together with
P.’s daughter on 17 May 1995. Their house was given to a Serb family
141
from Okučani and they were driven away to Šid on a cart wagon.
4.91 There were other incidents of sexual maltreatment of men. This is
testified to by the witness F .K.* who was taken with others from
Bapska to Paragovo and imprisoned in a wine cellar:
“I was taken for questioning and beating three times. They beat
me with sticks, legs, and fists. Four military policemen beat me.
Usually four men beat one. They were beating my genitals,
kidneys, everywhere. Especially they beat the genitals. They knew
that I had three children and that my wife was pregnant. They
were saying that as they were beating me. Once they beat my
genitals about 30 times and they were saying: “Fuck your Ustasha
mother …, You won’t make any more little Croats.” Their goal
was ethnic142eansing, and that us, Croats, would be as few as
possible”.
141 Witness Statement of P.M., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 72.
142 Witness Statement of F.K., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 74. 171
4.92 Members of the JNA and the paramilitary units damaged the local
church of St. George the Martyr (built in 1764) on 25 October 1991. It was
subsequently turned into a police station and its basement into a prison. In
April 1992 the wholesale destruction of all Catholic monuments was
organised. All crosses in the village were destroyed together with the
chapel of St. Mary, the chapel “Na Pajzošu”. Several tombstones, including
the tombstone in the chapel of St. Mary were mined. The Chapel of St. th
Mary was a landmark of cultural significance. It was built from 12 to the
14 century and renovated in 1976-77. 143 According to the witness A.Š.,
in April 1992 Veselko Galić ordered Ivan Duvnjak, Josip
Bohnička and Stjepan Šomoljanski to destroy all the cross es in the village
and around it with a pick. Milan Mijatović, normally responsible for utility
services in the village, tore the crosses down with a tractor:
“On that occasion, all crosses in the village which stood at the
following locations were destroyed: crossing of the B. Radi ć and
the S. Radi ć Streets, crossing of the V. Nazor Street and the M.
Gubec Street, crossing of the Palih Boraca Street and the Šidska
Street, at the end of the Šidska Street beside the road leading to
Šid, at the extension of the Palih Boraca Street, at the extension of
the Poljski put, at the extension of the M. Gubec Street on the road
of Poljski put, near the road at the extension of the S. Radi ć Street
leading to Šarengrad, as well as the chapel of “St. Anne”, which is
located on the road Bapska-Šarengrad at the crossing of the road
which leads to the farm “Dunavka”. 144
4.93 The great exodus of the Croatian population from Bapska occurred
in April 1992. Based on a prepared list they were expelled from their
houses. They were forced to sign statements that they were relinquishing
their entire estate to the “SAO Krajina”. Serbs from Western Slavonia were
settled in their houses. The banishment was organised in two steps, during
which 150 Croatian citizens were exiled. They continued to forcibly
depopulate and expel Croats. In May 1995, under a threat to their lives a
group of 69 Croats were expelled from their homes. 145
143 The Wounded Church in Croatia, the Destruction of Sacral Monuments in Croatia,
1991-1995, Zagreb, 1996.
144 Witness Statement of A.Š., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 68.
145
A list of expelled Croatian residents of Bapska was drawn up by the UNHCR on 29
June 1995, and delivered to the Office for displaced persons and refugees of the
Government of the Republic of Croatia, Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 168A. 172
10. T OVARNIK
4.94 The village of Tovarnik is located in Srijem on the eastern border of
the Republic of Croatia, 23 kilometres south-east of Vukovar. According to
the 1991 census, 3001 people lived in the village. 2136 of them were Croats
(71%), and 670 people were Serbs. The rest of the population was made up
146
of other nationalities. The village of Tovarnik is located along the main
road that connects Šid with Vukovar or Vinkovci. Hundreds of JNA
armoured vehicles and soldiers passed through Tovarnik from Serbia via
Vukovar. 147 Of 2136 Croatian inhabitants, who lived in Tovarnik in 1991,
1865 were exiled. By 1 January 2000, the fate of 19 persons remained
unknown. It is estimated that during September and October 1991, at least
61 Croatian civilians were killed in Tovarnik. The Government Office for
Detained and Missing Persons of the Republic of Croatia carried out
exhumations from 22 to 23 January 1998 and from 27 to 28 January 1998.
A total of 48 bodies, among who 44 were identified, were exhumed. 148
4.95 The first incident in Tovarnik took place on 21 September 1991 in
the evening, when a large convoy of JNA armoured vehicles, while passing
through the village, opened fire and destroyed civilian houses which were
placed along trd road. On 22 September 1991 a tank assault on Tovarnik
began. The 3 Guard Proletarian Mechanised Brigade of the JNA under the
command of the Lieutenant Colonel, Slobodan Antonić 149 (a part of the 3rd
Armoured Battalion 252 “okvr”) 150carried out the attack. Complete
occupation took place on 23 September 1991 when the Infantry of the JNA
and the Serb paramilitary group the “White Eagles” entered the village.
After they occupied Tovarnik, the village was under the control of the
nd 151
JNA’s 2 Guard Proletarian Mechanised Brigade. Immediately after the
Serbian Army had entered the village, an operation to entirely cleanse the
village of Croats began. 152 The degree of ethnic malice within the ranks of
the JNA is testified to by the witness J.V.:
146
Ethnic statistics for Tovarnik Annexes, vol 2(I).
147 Mass killing and genocide in Croatia, 1991/92, page 106.
148 The list of the exhumed mass graves of the Government Office for Detained and
Missing Persons of the Republic of Croatia, Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 166.
149
Narodna Armija, 4 December 1991, page 25 “Beskrajna vera u komandanta Antoni ća”
(“Endless belief in the commanding officer Antonić”), Annexes, vol 4, annex 150.
150 Narodna Armija, 2 November 1991 “Primer odanosti i hrabrosti” (“Example of loyalty
and courage”), page 13; Narodna Armija, 9 November 1991 “Vera u ljude i tehniku”
(“Belief in people and technology”) page 25, Annexes, vol 4, annex 150.
151
Command 1pgmd, Conf. No. 851-18 from 4 October 1991, to Command 252, Order
Op.br, Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 162.
152 Witness Statement of Đ.M., Annexes, vol.2 (I), annex 78, who testifies that
the leading commaner of the Serbian Army, Ranko Mili čević, said to him: “If this is
going to be Serbia, no Croat will stay here.” 173
“The first army that stopped at my house – the reserve of the
JNA – captured my husband and took him to the camp in Begejci,
although he was a civilian. He did not participate in anything, nor
did he have any weapons. The first soldier that entered my house
asked me my nationality, and when I said “A Croat” they started
shouting at me telling me that Milošević told them before they
went off to war that they were going to the front line and that their
task was to kill and destroy everything Croatian, and that they
would push us Croats into the Adriatic sea. They told me that it
would be better for me if I was a Serb, which I refused because
there were no Serbs in my family, I told them that I was a Croat
and that I would remain thus.” 153
4.96 On the day of the occupation there was an execution in front of the
Catholic Church. On that occasion seven civilians were killed: Željko
Vrančić, Berislav Šimuni ć, Antun Šimuni ć, Mato Živi ć, Manda Živi ć,
Janko Budim and Franjo Kuzmi ć. J.I. had direct experience of
the murder of unarmed civilians. She and her neighbours hid in a basement
but were found by the Serbian “soldiers”:
“On the second night the soldiers found us and took us to a
Serbian house. It was the house of M.S. Six of us
among the imprisoned persons were adults. We sat until midnight.
Then they (the soldiers) came and ordered us to go to sleep. We
spent the night there. In the morning we got up and took our bags.
We were told to leave the bags because we would not need them.
They took us to a building. There were six of us: Franjo Kuzmi ć,
Mara Kuzmić (his wife), Janja Jurić, Marko Šijak, another woman
and I. They lined us up in the yard near that old building. We sat
down when we saw what was going to happen to us, only two
people among us stood still. They began to kill us one by one.
When it was my turn, he did not kill me. He stabbed me in my
arm, and when I shrieked, he stabbed me again. I fainted. When I
regained consciousness, I did not know where to go. Everybody
154
around me was dead.”
4.97 As in other villages the genocidal activities of the JNA encouraged
and overlapped with the ethnic based violence of the rebel Serb
paramilitary groups. The evidence of the JNA officer who served in
Tovarnik, M.P. shows in the clearest possible terms that the
JNA was under orders to carry out gratuitous attacks upon Croatian life and
culture:
153 Witness Statement of J.V., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 76.
154 Witness Statement of J.I., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 75. 174
“I was in Tovarnik for three days and a lot of horrible events were
imprinted on my memory, although I try to forget them. I also
remember isolated individuals who particularly stood out in the
killings of civilians – I know that they laughed and ridiculed
people and they killed them. I remember a reservist, whose
surname was U., and his group that particularly stood out
in the killing of people – they massacred civilians using knives.
[…]
I remember well the order of Major Bajat that every civilian had to
be killed and that nobody should bring any body to him. I saw
when 10 people were executed by a firing squad in front of the
building of the Municipality. A group of reservists killed them, but
I don’t know any specific information about them. I know that
they were members of Vlado’s group. I witnessed all of those
events that occurred in the town of Tovarnik. […]
During those days, I also saw situations when reservists threw
bombs in shelters, that is in the basements of particular houses,
and then, they would fire automatic weapons.
There were, in Tovarnik, corpses lying on a road and in yards. The
burial of the dead wasn’t allowed. I’ll never forget the number of
dead people – 48. I counted so many dead women, children and
older men. I saw that killing with my own eyes.” 155
4.98 Serb civilian and military authorities were established in the village.
The Territorial Defence was commanded by Vlatko Glavaši ć. The police
station was set up in the house of Dr. Živorad Cveji ć. The Commander of
the police station was Janko Milanković. The head of the Local Committee
was Aleksandar Trifunovi ć, who was later substituted by Jovan Medi ć.
According to J.V. the rebel authorities restricted movement
around the village and ordered the remaining Croatians to wear white bands
round their arms and to fasten white cloth to their gates. As to the
“Serbi anisation” of culture, the witness M.D. noted:
“Everything was written in Cyrillic script. They changed everything to the
Cyrillic script on the second or third day. The name on the Local
Committee building was written in Cyrillic script. They wrote on the walls:
156
“Serbia all over to Tokyo.” Croatians had to report to the Serb police in
front of the local committee every morning. They were then compelled to
force labour. The experience of the Croatians under the new regime is
described by M.G.:
155 Witness Statement of M.P., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 79.
156 Witness Statement of M.D., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 83. 175
“Then he [a police officer] said: ‘Let two at a time step out!’ They
lined us up in front of the Z .’s house and asked us what we
were, were we Croatian women?…Later on they asked us if we
knew that all Croats should be murdered and everything that’s
Croatian destroyed. Three tank s were on the street burning the
houses which weren’t knocked down.” 157
4.99 The basement of Dr. Živorad Cveji ć’s house served as a prison for
many of the Croatian population. The testimony of the only civilian, who
survived, B.H.* described the treatment that took place:
“It was hell there. They beat Ante Markanović so hard that he died
of the injuries. He was lying dead with us in one room for three
days. The smell of a dead human body is the worst smell in the
world. He beats you, he tortures you, gives you neither food nor
water, and then you have to sleep next to a dead man…” 158
4.100 In Tovarnik, levels of gross inhuman violence were reached, often
as a prelude to the killing of the victims.thastration also becste a pre-
occupation of the torturers. Between 28 September and 1 October 1991
B.H. witnessed the castrations of P.D. *,
B.K.* and M.B.*:
“They were castrated by D ragica Gorijaščanin from Tovarnik …
First they grabbed P. and pushed him down by the road. He
was the weakest. They were all beaten. Four men pushed him
down and took his trousers off. She castrated him. We had to
watch. I was watching, but I was so scared that I didn’t see much.
I don’t know if she cut off everything or just scrotums. P. was
screaming. The Ch etnis were laughing and yelling in pleasure.
Dragica was laughing too, she was happy with what she was
doing. I felt as if her laughter could be heard in Zagreb too. One of
the Chetniks had a wooden stick and he hit P. a few times
across his neck. P. showed no signs of life any more. Then
three Chetniks shot at P. The fourth Chetnik took a pistol and
shot him in the head.
Then they did the same with other two victims, but I was in shock
so I don’t remember who was the first. The procedure was the
same: they pushed the victims down, took the trousers, castration,
screaming, laughing, hitting with wooden stick, shooting with rifle
and shot from the pistol in the end. I was standing there with P.M.
and I thought that they would do the same to me.
157 Witness Statement of M.G., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 80.
158 Witness Statement of B.H., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 81. 176
After she did the job, Dragica turned to the car she had come in
and got in and her hands were covered with blood. In the car was
the captain in a JNA uniform. The Chetniks were in JNA uniforms
with Chetnik marks. The captain had a cap on his head, he was
between 45-50 years old. I hadn’t seen him before or since. He
had brought Dragica and took her away.
The Captain could see from the car everything that was going on,
he was 15 meters away, or even less. I could see him too,
including the marks he had. He got out of the car and opened the
door for Dragica when she approached him and then he got into
the car again. Then we started to load the dead and we put them on
the tractor [on which] we had come. 159
4.101 L.S. also testified about the brutal torture and molesting
of detained Croatians. She was an eye-witness of the physical abuse of her
brother I.J. who was beaten to death and his wife R. who had all
of her fingers broken afterwards. 160 During the first days of the occupation
70 Croatian villagers were taken to the concentration camp at Begejci.
More than a hundred of them had first undergone torture in the basement-
prison. During the transport to the camp, several of the prisoners were
executed. S. T. remembers that two of the Serb guards were
saying that they would go to do some “cleansing work”. Marin Lović and
Baja Hapčak were executed by firing squad. 161 In the camp the torture and
abuse continued. Prisoners were forced to masturbate one another and then
forced into homosexual intercourse, after which they were beaten again. 162
Back in Tovarnik, M.D. was kept in the village to carry out
forced labour, most notably burying the Croatian dead (see below). Serbs
from outside Tovarnik carried out the torture that he and others were
subjected to. During one night he and a tin-smith were “beaten in shifts”:
“Three individuals were present during the torture. One was
standing behind me, one on my left side, the other on the right.
They were holding sticks. The police commander, Ljubo was at
the other side of the room, at the table……I was interrogated
about a lot of stupid things. They told me that I had to remember
everything. I told them that I did not know what I was supposed to
remember and that I would tell them everything I knew. They told
me to put my hands on the table. Then they beat my hands. They
made me shout: ‘Serbia all over to Tokyo.’ Then they made me
159 Ibid.
160 Witness Statement of L.S., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 77.
161
Witness Statement of S.T., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 82.
162 Mass killing and genocide in Croatia, 1991/92, page 107-108. 177
shout louder. At one moment the commander said it was enough.
He asked me to turn around, so he could ask me something. Then
the other one told me to turn towards him. When I turned this
other one hit me on the back so I immediately fell on the floor.
They started kicking me and hitting me with night-sticks. I was
lying down on the floor. I doubled up, so whatever happened, it
happened.” 163
4.102 It was a common practice in the village for the Serb paramilitary
groups to force Croats to bury their fellow dead. One of these grave diggers
was M.D. He confirms the existence of the mass graves and
numerous murders of Croatian civilians. He was responsible for the
collecting of the corpses of the killed Croatian civilians. He went all over
the village to collect them with his tractor. Afterwards he drove them to the
Catholic cemetery. On 30 September 1991 he was burying bodies together
with three other prisoners. They buried 24 persons of Croatian nationality.
164
The corpses were disfigured and had already been dead for a few days.
Due to this disfigurement, he was only able to recognise some of the dead:
Franjo Kuzmić, Mara Kuzmi ć, Felka Glibo, Jelka Strolina, Aco Popović ,
Đuro Miklošević, Janko Budim. The witness had to bury killed Croats on
one more occasion. Eventually they ran out of space in the graveyard and
had to start digging trenches in the area outside the Catholic cemetery. Here
they buried the Reverend Ivan Burik. 165
4.103 Another gravedigger was B.H. He testified about
burying Ante Markanovi ć during which four prisoners (B.H.,
D.M., M.B. and M. Č.) were separated and
under threat of arms forced to load the body of the deceased into the trailer.
They we re taken afterwards to the Cathol ic cemetery where they were
ordered to dig a large hole. Since the witness realised that they were also to
be killed after the digging, he managed to escape, and later on, passing by
166
that same grave, he saw the corpses of each of his fellow workers.
163 Witness Statement of M.D., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 83.
164 Ibid.: “Worms were coming out of their bodies. It was stinking terribly. Serbian soldiers
even gave us 4 or 5 masks.”
165 Ibid.: “The three of us were loading them into the tractor. I asked: ‘Who is this?’ My
son answered: ‘Dad, that is I.S. ’s old man, P. ’…I couldn’t recognize him
because half of his head was missing and his tongue was out, but my little son managed
to recognize him”.
166 Witness Statement of B.H., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 81: “They had brought
us to the graveyard and ordered us to dig a grave….Our people were already buried
there in a long trench, some 15 to 20 people….While we were stepping out of the
trailer I helped M.B., who was beaten up, to get off and I saw that one of the
soldiers had taken his left out during the ride… During the whole ride their words,
which said that no one had ever returned from the cemetery, were ringing in my ears.” 178
4.104 The St. Matthew’s church in Tovarnik (1804) was badly damaged
on 22 September 1991 by tank shelling fired from close range. The
graveyard Chapel of the Eminence of the Holy Cross was completely
destroyed. Villagers who have survived testify about the killing of the local
priest Ivan Burik. 167 The Serbian paramilitary units “White Eagles” had
established their command in the house of I. D. near the Catholic
church, and it was one of the members of the “White Eagles” who killed
the priest in the parish house. The building of the Croatian polic e station
and the railway station were set on fire on 21 September 1991. The
transmitter of the Croatian television was completely destroyed the same
day, while the Cultural centre was set on fire on 22 September 1991.
4.105 In December 1991 the rebel Serb authorities reached a decision that
only 5% of Croatian population could stay in the Tovarnik area. According
to the witness Đ.M. , the commander of Tovarnik, Ranko
Miličević had declared, “If this is to be Serbia, no Croats will live here”. To
achieve that aim the Serbs carried out mass expulsions. 168There is not any
precise information on the number of Croats who live in the Tovarnik area
today, but according to the estimation made in 1992, 95% of Croats were
expelled from that area. Less then 100 of them stayed there. Those who
stayed are mostly older people.
4.106 Even after the first wave of expulsion the rebel Serbs continued to
banish people. On 24 April 1992 paramilitaries entered the home of A.G.
and ordered him and his family to leave the village. R.Đ.
was banished on 27 October 1992 after a Serbian family from
169
Western Slavonia had moved into her hou se. The Croatian inhabitants
were not allowed to leave their yard; nor could they meet or visit each
other. They were only allowed to go to the shop. Croatians were not
allowed to move around the village without white rags around their
170
arms. Many Croatian families left the village because they had exhausted
all their food supplies, and new supplies were not available to them. 171
Although only older persons stayed in the village, the physical torturing by
167 Witness Statement of M.D., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 83:” We couldn’t find
the reverend anywhere. Someone came to the idea that we should look in the
basement… We found reverend lying in the basement on the ground. In the middle of
his chests there was a hole whose radius was 5 centimeters, you could tell that a whole
clip had been fired at him.”
168
Witness Statement of I. Đ., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 84: “They wouldn’t let
me carry anything. I wanted to put my shoes on, but they took it off, and they said to
me: “Just get up on your feet, get out, go to Šid.”
169 Witness Statement of R.Đ., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 85.
170 Witness Statement of A.I., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 86.
171
Witness Statement of A.G., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 87. 179
the settled Serbs continued. It was estimated that only 28 Croats were left
in the village.
11. S OTIN
4.107 The village of Sotin is situated in Eastern Slavonia near Ov čara,
approximately 8 km southeast of Vukovar. According to the 1991 Census it
had 1,324 citizens, 789 were Croatian, 372 were of Serbian. 172 The rest of
the population was made up of other nationalities. The exodus of the
remaining Croats from Sotin occurred on 27 December 1991 and 7 April
1992, when every remaining Croat was expelled from Sotin. Of the 789
citizens of Croatian nationality according to the 1991 Census, 717 were
expelled during the occupation and 40 people disappeared. As of 1 January
2000, the fate of 33 Croats was still unknown. 12 bodies were exhumed
173
from a mass grave on 7 October 1998, of which 7 have been identified.
4.108 During the spring and summer of 1991 the JNA moved freely
within the region and skirmished between the JNA and the Croatian
defence forces occurred. During one of these bouts of violence Dražen
Luketić was killed. His funeral took place in th e village on 28 August 1991.
It was disrupted by a rocket attack by the JNA which was launched from
Vojvodina (Serbia). This was followed by an attack by 3-4 JNA aircraft.
Two women, A.I. and S.H. were wounded. The coffin
was left on the street. These events prompted mass evacuations from Sotin,
Tovarnik and Lovas. On the following day the JNA laun ched a further
attack. This was carried out by the JNA’s 1 Armoured Battalion under the
command of Major Cvetan Dimitrov from the 1 stGuard’s Proletarian
rd
Mechanised Brigade, with the help of units of the 453 Mechanised
Brigade of the JNA.
4.109 The attack lasted from 29 August to the 14 October 1991 when
Sotin was finally occupied. However, during that period no resistance was
offered since the village was threatened with destruction if a shot was fired.
The conduct of the JNA served little military purpose and can only be
explained by a desire to inflict maximum damage on the local Croatian
civilian population.
4.110 The ndA tanks that entered the village on 14 October 19991 were st
from 252 Armoured Brigade, which was reinforced by the JNA’s 1
Guard’s Proletarian Mechanised Division. The JNA Brigade was under the
172 Ethnic statistics for Sotin, Annexes, vol 2(I).
173
List of exhumed mass graves of the Government Office for Detained and Missing
Persons of the Republic of Croatia, Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 166. 180
command of Colonel Jovan Vu čković. They burnt and destroyed houses,
stores and other establishments owned by Croats. H. V.* was
hiding within his family in a basement. Their Serb neighbour demanded
that they come out or he would throw a bomb:
“The two of us went out of the basement and we had to lie down
on our bellies just near the water tap and there the two people
searched through our pockets. In the meantime, while his wife,
mother-in-law and his granddaughter were standing there, the two
men entered the basement and took sexual advantage of his
mother-in-law. After that the two of us were forced on the road
and we had to kneel down and so they put a noose around our
necks and over the back, passing it between our legs, and we had
to stretch our hands and then they tied us up. Tied in that way, we
came to the house of B.U . We stopped there, because it
was fired upon from the tank on the house of A. T., and
then neighbour M.B. forcibly brought the Bakša couple.
After that we walked behi nd the tank, we came to my house and
my neighbour Ž .M., who was at th e same time the
member and the commander of that group, told me to go with
M.B. and to show him where my brother’s rifle was. We
went there so that I could show him where the rifle was, but it was
not there. Somebody has hidden it somewhere else during the
evacuation from Sotin. As I came into the camp, I met my brother
and he told me where he had hidden the hunting rifle, 40 bullets
and a hand-grenade, and I think that all of this is still there. Since
they did not find the weapon, the neighbour who was a
commander (the above mentioned) ordered the last tanker to fire 2
shells at my house and I had to watch that. After that they fired at
my brother’s son’s house, the godfather J.S. and that same
tank must have been from the village Sotin since he aimed at the
most sensitive parts of the houses”.174
Civilians of Croatian nationality were tied up and were forced to walk
behind the tanks as the destruction of the Croatian life of the village took
place. S.L. was tied to the barrel of the gun and lost
consciousness as his captors shot through it. 175 Several of the witnesses
attest to the fact that the local Serbians were showing the JNA which
houses to destroy. 176
174
Witness Statement of H.V., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 90.
175 Witness Statement of S.L., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 91.
176 Witness Statement of P.H., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 92. 181
At the same time the Catholic Church was destroyed, while the Orthodth
church remained untouched. 177The destroyed church was the 18 Century
Church of the Holy Virgin Mary and the Helper of Christians.
4.111 Croatian civilians were arrested without reason and were
subsequently exposed to abuse, beating and psychological torture. S.L.
and other Croatian guards were taken to a gym hall where they were
tortured over several days and then taken on to a Serbian prison:
“At night they would take us two by two to a Hunting house where
they would tor ture us. They broke my knees there, with an iron
bar. Then they would take the two of us back, and get another two.
It lasted the whole day. The next day we had to clean the gym
because the floor was covered with blood….In the evening, it was
already dark; they put us in some trucks and took us to Sremska
Mitrovica, to a hall in the prison. The floor was covered with oil. I
saw there lots of people from my village that I knew. It was
October 4 or 5, 1991. We pretended not to know each other. The
torturing continued. We had to pass through a cordon. Reservists
of the JNA were beating us. I saw F.Z. * and M. Z.*
there, they were father and son, and the soldiers forced them to
masturbate one another. They were standing about 10 meters away
from me. I saw how the soldiers beat them and tortured them. I
had heard noise and what the three of them had been saying to
each other….Then they had ordered them to take off their clothes
and they had had to do that. Then the soldiers had ordered them to
masturbate one another, which they had refused to do, and the
soldiers started to beat them again. It lasted for a long time. The
reservists had been saying the Ustashas were homosexuals and
that was all they know how to do. They were screaming that they
would destroy Croatian semen. F. had 5 children. The reservists
left them naked as they were, and ordered that they mustn’t dress.
So they were like that. They couldn’t and wouldn’t masturbate one
another, but they were forced to try… “ 178
4.112 Those who were not detained and tortured were the subjects of
daily threats. There are two Serb witnesses – J.J. and M.T.
– who are able to testify that Croats were warned on 27 September 1991 to
leave the village or suffer the consequences. On th e same day the following
people were taken out of the village by a force comprising JNA and
paramilitary troops: Marko Filipovi ć, Kata Filipović, Marko Kušić, Manda
Kušić, Andrija Rajs, Andrija Raguž, Marko Raguž and his daughter Mira,
177 Witness Statement of B.M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 93.
178 Witness Statement of S.L., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 91. 182
Mirela Raguž and Ivo Matijaševi ć. The destiny is unknown (see the
account of B.M. below). According to T. there was a
vineyard called Stara Ciglana, which is located 1500 meters from Sotin in
the direction of Tovarnik. At one poin t in the war people we re unable to go
any more than 500 meters from the area due to the smell of decaying
bodies. During the winter of 1991 some 1500 Serbs were brought to the
village from Western Slavonia.
4.113 V.G.* was hiding with her family on 30 September 1991
when two soldiers came into their house. At first they wanted to look under
a mattress for weapons. However, when she threw down the mattress one
of the soldiers told her to take her clothes off:
“I remember that I had a black track suit on, and I refused to take
it off, then he approached me and tore the tracksuit off me. He
ordered me to lie down and then he raped me. The whole time this
other soldier kept a gun pointed at me. That lasted for about 10
minutes. After that the soldier that held a gun pointed at me, raped
me. During that time, this other one held a gun pointed me”.
On 31 September 1991 one of the soldiers who had raped her returned to
the house. He took her mother upstairs and raped her. Thereafter the
witness went upstair179nd was forced to get down on her knees and was
raped from behind.
4.114 The rebel Serb authorities introduced curfews together with
obligatory passes so as to restrict the movement of Croatians in the village.
The women had to carry out forced physical labour without payment. The
witness B.U. was forced with her sister and her father to do
forced labour in the slaughterhouse throughout 1992 without being paid.
During this period all Croatian citi zens had to wear white ribbons around
their arms and mark their houses with white sheets. 180
4.115 Croatians were randomly killed and without reason. The witness
M.M. recounts one such example. At the end of September, prior to
the first wave of banishment, Dražen Tolp and another man known to her
as Đaković were dragged out of their car and shot at close range. T he
witness and her husband were able to see the nature of the murder because
181
they retrieved the bodies with the help of a Serb and buried them. The
179
Witness Statement of V.G., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 94.
180 Witness Statement of B.U., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 89.
181 Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 88. 183
witness B.M. gives a detailed account of the murdered and the
182
missing.
12. L OVAS
4.116 The village of Lovas is located in Eastern Slavonia, approximately
16 km southeast of Vukovar. According to the 1991 census, of 1,681
citizens 1,441 were of Croatian and 133 were of Serbian nationality. The
rest of the population was made up of other nationalities. The national
183
population structure was such that 85.7% were Croats and 7.9% Serbs.
In the village of Lovas, from 2 to 9 July 1997 the mass grave of sixty-eight
people at the local graveyard was exhumed, of whom sixty-seven were
identified.184Of the 1441 Croatian inhabitants who lived in Lovas in 1991,
1182 were banished during the occupation. Around 1500 Serbs were
brought into the village from Western Slavonia, Bosnia and Hercegovina
and Vojvodina in Serbia.
4.117 In the beginning of autumn 1991, after the attack and occupation of
the villages of Sotin and Tovarnik, the majority of the inhabitants (around
2,000) of those villages escaped to Lovas. The authorities in the city
pleaded for a peaceful policy and insisted on the maintenance of
appropriate relationships, so that Serbs would not feel endangered in the
village on account of their minority status. 185On 27 September 1991, a
group of three representatives of Lovas was formed. They held negotiations
with the JNA (Lieutenant Colonel Milić Jovanović and Colonel Želimir
186
Petrović) aimed at preventing the destruction of the village. On that
occasion the JNA issued an ultimatum that the entire armaments of the
village had to be handed over on 28 September 1991 failing which the
village would be attacked and destroyed. During the night, the local
residents (mostly women and children) left for Ilok. Around 600 local
residents stayed in the village. The next day the negotiations continued. The
representatives of Lovas informed the JNA Colonel, Želimir Petrović , that
the weapons would be handed over and that the local residents had taken
refuge in Ilok. After that, the JNA Colonel suggested that all refugees
return guaranteeing their safety. Three days after the negotiations, almost
182 Witness Statement of B.M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 93, for a full list of the
dead and the missing.
183
Ethnic statistics for Lovas, Annexes, vol 2(I).
184 List of exhumed mass graves of the Government Office for Detained and Missing
Persons of the Republic of Croatia, Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 166 and Record of
exhumation, Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 168B.
185 Mass Killing and genocide in Croatia 1991/92 at page 172.
186
Ibid., p. 173. 184
all local residents of Lovas came back, although the village was without
electricity, the telephone connections were cut, and water was available
only occasionally.
4.118 On 30 September 1991, the JNA deployed armoured and artillery
weapons from the southern and western side of the village. Given the
promise of the JNA during negotiations, the local residents were taken
entirely by surprise. In the middle of the day a strong attack with artillery
and mortar fire was launched at the grain silos of the village. The
bombardment was repeated every day from 1 until 10 October 1991.
4.119 On 10 October 1991, an artillery attack was launched against the
part of the village (Brdo and Žabar) where the Croatian houses were. At the
same time, the infantry entered from the northern side of the village. From
that moment the liquidation of the civilians of Croatian nationality began.
The JNA’s 252 nd Armoured Brigade from Kraljevo was the main force
which occupied the village, 187 with the help of the Serbian paramilitary unit
“Dušan Silni” lead by Ljuban Devetak and Željko Krnjajić . There was no
resistance in the village, because there was no army there and the locals had
given up their arms as part of the “negotiations”.
4.120 During the first stages of the attack at least 23 unarmed Croatian
civilians were killed, while one woman was wounded. Other victims were
executed by firing squad when the infantry of the JNA entered the village.
20 Croatian houses were burned down and the local Catholic Church was
burned and levelled to the ground. Immediately prior to the attack Serbian
inhabitants of Lovas marked their houses so that they would not be hit. 188
4.121 Many of the local residents, especially the women and children, hid
in the basements of their houses. On several occasions bombs were thrown
into the basements. In this manner, a bomb was tossed into M.P. ’s
basement with 8 civilians in it and into J.J. ’s basement with 6
civilians in it. Local Serbs joined the army and showed them which houses
to go to.189 M.M. testifies about her experience in a basement,
where she was hiding with her children:
187 “Narodna armija”, 13 November 1991, “I dezerteri se vra ćaju” (“Even the Deserters
are Coming Back”), p.19., Annexes, vol 4, annex 150.
188
Witness Statement of S.P., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 97.
189 Witness Statement of L.S., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 98. 185
“On 10 October 1991 at 7.30 am, when the attack started, I went
into the basement with three children. The Serbs fired at the house
and killed two neighbours, Dragutin Pejić and Mijo Boži ć...They
had no arms, they were civilians. In fact, they took them out of the
basement and killed them... They tossed a bomb into our
basement. We were terrified because of the shock we experienced
and the sound which the bomb made. Because of the tremendous
fear we experienced my daughter did not have her period for a
year. Passing by the dead bodies, my children and I, and another
12 of us, ran to a cornfield during the night. A truck took us to
Ilok.”190
4.122 N.M. also testifies about her experience on the day
of the occupation. She was hiding in her basement with her family when
the JNA came into her yard:
“My husband was the first who stepped out. One Chetnik tossed a
bomb into the basement. My husband was taken to another street
and killed. I was sent to the basement again, where I stayed until
3.00 pm. When I got out, I saw my neighbours’ houses on fire.
Until Saturday morning, I did not know that my husband had been
dead for two days. My neighbour told me that. I saw them taking
the dead bodies on a trailer and driving them to the graveyard.
They dropped them into a hole and covered them with an
191
excavator”.
Like this witness’ husband several men of Croatian nationality were taken
out of the houses at gunpoint, separated from their children, and then killed:
see Plate 15 (Mass grave at Lovas). Mato Keser was separated from his
three small children and then murdered in front of them. Alojzije Poli ć,
Josip Polak, Stipo Ma đarević, Pavo Đ aković, Stipo Peji ć, Juraj Poljak,
Josip Kraljevi ć and Mato Adamovi ć were killed in a similar way. P.M.
saw Kata Pavli čević come out of her house with a Serb, R.G.,
only to be shot and left lying in the gutter. 192 According to
S.P., a member of the JNA took Anka Jovanović to a barn and set
her on fire.193
4.123 On 17 October 1991, Ljuban Devetak, the commander of the
Serbian paramilitaries in Lovas, ordered all Croatian male local residents
between the ages 18-65 to gather in front of the Community building to be
190 Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 99.
191 Witness Statement of N.M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 100.
192
Witness Statement of P.M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 101.
193 Witness Statement of S.P., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 97. 186
assigned labour. Around 100 people came. They were forced into the yard
where they were subjected to the following experience as described by the
witness P.V., who was one of their number:
“The Chetniks went through the village and collected the
residents, mainly Croats between the ages of 18 and 55. I think
that there were about 70 of us. We had to spend the entire night
sitting, not moving, on the benches in the yard of the collective –
when someone moved they would take them to the dining area and
kick and punch them and beat them with metal pipes, steel wires
with machine nuts on top, rifle butts. They took people away the
entire night. They mounted a machine gun in front of us, and 11
Chetniks armed with automatic rifles guarded us. We were told
that if anyone moved they would kill all of us with the machine
gun. They continued with the tortures the next morning and they
beat some of the people in front of us. They would call out the
name of the victim and they were taken to the middle, then they
were kicked and punched and beaten with metal pipes, steel wires
with machine nuts on top and rifle butts”. 194
4.124 The following day they were interrogated and cruelly tortured.
Some men were stabbed with knives. The witness S. P. explains
what happened:
“ In the morning of 18 October 1991... they started taking out their
frustrations on us. First, Petronije slapped me repeatedly and then
hit me with his boot in the chin, which left a scar and two teeth
were broken; he continued beating me. At the same time, Ljuban
Devetak started calling people, who were then taken out and
195
beaten with iron tubes and stabbed with bayonets before us.”
11 of the men were beaten to death: Luka Bali ć, Josip Turkalj, Marina
Mađarević, Đuka Luketić, Mirko Filić, Ivan Sabljak, Marko Sabljak, Mato
Hodak, Marko Vidić, Ivan Vidić, and Ivan Đaković.
4.125 Thereafter 50 men were singled out and forced to go and clear a
minefield, which was laid in a clover field. This was to be the “minefield
massacre” of Lovas. On his way to the field, Boško Bo đanac was shot
because he was unable to keep up due to being stabbed in the leg during the
previous night’s torture. 196According to L.S. , “The
Chetniks were quarrelling who was going to kill him, and they shouted to
prevent us turning around and watching. After tha t we he ard automatic
194
Witness Statement of P.V., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 95.
195 Witness Statement of S.P., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 97.
196 Ibid. 187
197
gunfire. The man was killed on the spot”. Once they entered the field,
the men were forced to hold each other’s hands and kick aside the clover as
they walked forward. These anti-personnel mines were laid in a sequence to
the effect that the detonation of one mine would lead to the detonation of
all of them. The group stopped when they saw the mines. The detonation of
the one mine caused the consequent chain reaction. 21 people were killed
instantly and 12 were wounded as the result of the explosions. Thereafter
the Serbian soldiers told those alive to shout out so that they could be
rescued. However, those who shouted were simply shot at and more people
killed and wounded. The accounts of two survivors, Z.T. and
L.S. are given below:
“…They moved around 60 m away from us so they would be safe
if we activated a mine. At one point, we saw a green long w ire
with the mines tied to it. The wire was approximately 15 cm above
the ground and hidden but we could see it although it was green.
Around which were a couple of mines secured to sticks and a
couple of “pašteta”(special anti-personnel mines). There were a lot
of explosions and detonations. I saw a boy falling into the mines.
His name was Ivan Kraljevi ć. There are two versions: that he
himself jumped on the mines and another that a Serbian soldier
pushed him with his leg. As he fell down he activated the
minefield-the explosion was in a chain reaction because they were
stepping mines. Many of them were killed then. I got shrapnel in
my lungs. When that happened they asked if there were any
seriously wounded. When those who were seriously wounded
lifted their arms up, they were shot. A bullet wounded my arm. As
the minefield was activated, at the same time a larger number of
mines exploded. Ivan Conjar and Mato Hodak got killed beside
me. Mato Hodak did not die instantly but he asked to be killed for
he was seriously wounded and then I heard the shootings”. 198
“As far as I remember, somebody ordered one of us to pull the
string. It was then that K. (one of our guys) allegedly threw
himself on a mine. According to the others, a Chetnik came from
behind and pushed him onto it. I was standing on the opposite si de
so I could not say for sure. One or two mines exploded. There was
a panic. People started screaming in pain. Several of them fell.
There were some wounded. They (Chetniks) started shooting at us
from behind our backs. I threw myself on the ground. When they
stopped, probably to reload their guns, we heard an order from the
road. They ordered the wounded to raise their hands. I heard a
197 Witness Statement of L.S., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 98.
198 Witness Statement of Z.T., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 102. 188
clicking sound, they were reloading their weapons. I raised my
hand because I was wounded in my back. And then I realised what
was going to happen, so I lie down again, and lowered my arm.
They resumed shooting. In this second round even more people
were killed. I lay in the grass, and therefore could not see
anything. Then there was a silence. I heard the sound of a vehicle
coming down the road. Then somebody opened a car door and
yelled: “Stop shooting! Stop! It’s enough.” The shooting stopped.
Then the man ordered soldiers to go and fetch a truck from the
village and take all of the wounded to Šid. Later I found out that
he was an officer. I lifted my head a bit and saw dead bodies lying
around me, and I heard the wounded who cried for help”. 199
Those who got killed were buried after three days in a narrow canal near
the graveyard. They were laid one beside another and shallowly covered
with soil. Although there are several accounts that a JNA officer stopped
the shooting once the explosions had occurred, the witness P. V.
emphasises “that the Chetniks and the JNA soldiers were working
together”.200
4.126 On 18 October 1991 the Serbs used the remaining captured Croats
as a human shield in order to enter the remaining Croat houses. According
to B.F., who was one of the people who made up the wall, it was
in this way that the Serbs protected themselves from possible resistance. 201
In due course much of the property in the Croatian households was
plundered.
4.127 Between 19 October 1991 and the New Year violence against
civilians continued. During the period some sixty-eight innocent people
were murdered. The majority of the executions were carried out at the
Catholic graveyard. The dead included the following: Petar Luketi ć with
his sons Ante and Đuka, Đuka Krizmani ć, Alojzije Krizmani ć, Zoran
Krizmanić, Luka Balić, Josip Jovanović, Marin Balić, Katica Balić, Marija
Luketić, Rudolf Jonak, Darko and Željko Pavi ć, Andrija Dev čić, Pero
Rendulić, Stipo Dola čki, Zvonko Martinovi ć, Marko Damjanovi ć, Anica
Lemunović, Ivan Conjar, Božo Vidi ć etc. The witness N.K.
testified about many brutal murders. He was ordered to drive around the
village with his tractor and trailer and collect the corpses. He had to pick up
the body of his son Đ.K. and his nephew Z. K.
together with six others:
199
Witness Statement of L.S., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 98.
200 Witness Statement of P.V., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 95.
201 Witness Statement of N.K., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 103. 189
“Their dead bodies were then transported to the cemetery where
an excavator dug a long canal. Bodies were then thrown into that
canal. They didn’t let us arrange them. Bodies were left in the
canal in the way as they were being thrown from a tractor-trailer.
We were guarded by several Chetniks (whom I didn’t recognise
because they weren’t from our village) who prevented us from
arranging the dead in the canal. On that job, besides me, were the
following locals: M.S., T.L. and S.F.
202
M.S. wrote the names of the victims”.
4.128 All Croatian residents had to wear a white bands and hang white
rags from the doors of their houses. 203 Their movement was limited by
introducing a police curfew from 5.00 pm until 7.00 am. Every Croat was
bound to carry a pass. The population was forced to undertake forced
labour. 204Every employee in the “police” and other authority structures
had an assigned housekeeper (a Croatian woman). Such housekeepers
included Š.A.*, M.P.*, D.L.*, A.Š.*, all of
who were raped during the course of their forced services. Š .A.
served the paramilitary commander, Ljuban Devetak. 205 The other Croatian
women were taken by force to perform work in the fields or in woods and
they were verbally humiliated and touched with the excuse that they wanted
to search them. On one occasion, when they were taken to the wood, they
showed them a dead body in order to frighten them, and said: “One day you
206
will end up like this”. P.M. and others were given the task of
making a 70 meter long blockhouse in three days or be killed. 207The name
of the local school was changed (it was named after an Orthodox saint),
children had to learn and write in Cyrillic letters, and talk in ekavian
208
dialect.
4.129 During this period the Serb paramilitaries engaged in sexual
violence towards Croatians. Rape and other forms of sexual abuse and
humiliation often took place. A.M. * testified that in November
1991 a Serb soldier gave her an ultimatum: “If you do not sleep with me,
202 Ibid.
203
Witness Statement of P.M. , Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 101: “It was forbidden to
lock the houses and we had to have a white band around our arms. A white sheet had to
be placed also at the gates.”
204 Witness Statement of V.R. , Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 105: “Only the
Croats worked; the Serbs stayed in the village and the Serbian settlers moved into the
houses, unless all Croats were gone.”
205 Witness Statement of F.D.*, Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 106.
206
Witness Statement of Z.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 107.
207 Witness Statement of P.M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 101.
208 Witness Statement of V.R., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 105. 190
your mother and father will disappear and you will disappear over night”
After this he threw her on the bed and raped her which he repeated during
the following days. On another occasion, a Serb soldier raped her by
pointing a rifle at her forehead until she agreed to take off her clothes and
have sex with him. According to the witness the paramilitaries made a habit
of collecting groups of Croatian women from the village and then raping
them. 209 P.M. testified to other sexual abuse of Croatian women. 210
4.130 In the period just before Christmas the violence intensified.
According I.F., on 22 December 1991, policemen from Knin came to
the village and collected about 20 Croatian people and began to beat them
with metal rods and wooden boards over their entire body. They brought
them into the offices of their local government:
“To two of the twenty they drilled holes into the soles of the feet
with a power drill, and they drilled a hole below my brother’s
knee, I think it was his right one. They also removed 11 of my
brother’s teeth, from the right side, he had white gold fillings on
these teeth, two other prisoners also lost one tooth each. They
removed the teeth with ordinary workmen’s pliers, and they would
use a spoon to put salt onto the wounds. They paid particular
attention to five of the prisoners : M.M., E.F., V.B., D.R., I.J., they
would beat them in the head and the entire body, and especially in
the genital area.
My brother and M.M. were tied to two steel posts with handcuffs
for 24 hours. I saw my brother in Lovas again, 90% of his body
was covered by bruises. He and V.B. had to spit into each other’s
faces. They also forced one other to slap and hit. The other 15
were imprisoned until 25 December 1991. They were beaten upon
their bodies. B., age 30, was especially beaten in the genital
211
area.”
4.131 M.M. was also subjected to torture by the Knin police:
They took me to the basement after the first beating, where they
continued their physical abuse. While they were beating us, a
Chetnik by the name of Z. took a cup with salt in it, and
emptied it into my mouth, although they had already beaten out
three of my teeth and I was covered with blood.
209 Witness Statement of A.M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 108.
210
Witness Statement of P.M. , Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 101: “One evening
around 21:00, while they were taking me for questioning, I saw through a slot in the
door of I. F.’s house how the Serb soldiers forced three girls to serve
them naked.”
211 Witness Statement of I.F., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 96. 191
After that, they took me out of the basement into the garage in the
yard. I found Đ.R. and his mother in that garage, and
after a short period, they also brought M.F. to that garage.
Then Radovan Tepevac, aka Obrad, handcuffed us and k icked us
with his feet.212
4.132 The established Serb civilian and military administration decided
213
that only 8% of the Croats could remain in the village. After the violence
at Christmas 1991, the remaining Croats began to flee. Serb families from
Western Slavonia moved into their houses. The older Croatian inhabitants,
who did not want to leave, were executed. This was the fate of P.K.
and her daughter E.K. who were killed after
[P.’s] husband was taken to a camp in Sremska Mitrovica. In the camp
he was beaten to death. He also died after he had been beaten. His wife and
daughter were killed after their house was burnt d own. 214 According to the
Administration of the Municipality Lovas of the Vukovar-Srijem County
1,571 people were banished, and around 60 family houses were burnt down
or destroyed.
13. T ORDINCI
4.133 The village of Tordinci is situated in Eastern Slavonia at the
crossroads leading respectively to Vinkovci, Vukovar and Osijek. Tordinci
is approximately 20 km west of Vukovar. According to the 1991 census,
1017 inhabitants lived in Tordinci, of which 858 were Croats and 70 were
Serbs, while the rest were members of other ethnic groups. 215 Of the 858
inhabitants, who lived in Tordinci in 1991, 829 were exiled, and up to 1
January 2000, 29 of them are still missing. There are no direct informations
on the seizure of Tordinci. According to the happenings around the village,
it is clear that a unit from the composition or the reinforcement of the 1 st
Guard’s Proletarian Mechanised Division seized the village.
4.134 The first attack on Tordinci village was on 25 July 1991 around
2.00 am. Five mortar shells, fired from the village of Pa četin (where Serb
inhabitants were in a majority) by the JNA and rebel Serb paramilitary
groups, hit the village. Four shells hit the centre of the village, one of them
hit the roof of the medical clinic, while the fifth shell hit a Croatian house
212 Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 109.
213 Witness Statement of D. J., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 110: “...Ljuban
Devetak said that in the former state in Lovas were 8% Serbs, but now it will be the
contrary, there will be only 8% Croats, maybe none...”
214 Witness Statement of S.V., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 111.
215
Ethnic statistics for Tordinci Annexes, vol 2(I). 192
and destroyed it completely. After the first artillery attack there was no
further action in relation to Tordinci until the night between the 19 and 20
August 1991 when a mortar attack from Pa četin and Mlaka began again.
Around 40 mortar shells were fired at the village. After this attack, artillery
bombardment on Tordinci continued every day. On 7 September 1991, the
JNA’s first combined artillery and infantry attack was carried out. On 8
September 1991, the mortar attack was aimed at the Catholic Church,
where at that time a mass was taking place. The church was seriously
damaged.
4.135 On 25 October 1991, there was a combined infantry and artillery
attack from the direction of Gaboš, Ostrovo, Pa četin and Antinska Mlaka.
The same day, the village was captured by the JNA, and Serb paramilitary
groups, as well as by the armed rebel Serb inhabitants. The JNA
Commander during the attack was Boro Ivanović from Bobota. During the
occupation 11 Croatian inhabitants of Tordinci were killed: Ivan Tomši ć,
Stanko Sesar, Andrija Boži ć, Ivica Lovaković, Martin Joži ć, Ivan Mr đa,
Josip Maleti ć, Andrija Ištokovi ć, Adam Mišeti ć, Andrija Kati ć, Ivica
216
Pecelja. On the second day, when the village was completely captured,
Serb paramilitary groups under the command of Željko Ražnjatovi ć -
Arkan and the Military Police of the JNA entered the village. They began
executing, torturing and capturing Croatian civilians, without any
conceivable military or other justification.
4.136 According to the witness T.R. , bodies of dead Croatian
inhabitants were lying in the streets. In his street alone he saw 4 or 5
corpses. Many of the bodies were thrown down the well in a bid to conceal
the murder. S.V. testifies to the numerous murders of unarmed
civilians. He saw rebel Serbs taking a group of Croats, who were wearing
only undershirts, to th e nearby wood “Budžak”, from where long lasting
machine-gun bursts could be heard. After that, an excavator driven by
D.O. was used to bury the dead. Serbian inhabitants actively took
part in torturing and beating the captured Croatian population. T.R.
was one of a group of Croatians who were d etained in the village
centre on 26 October 1991 and beaten and tortured by rebel Serbs.
4.137 A.I. was also brutally tortured. They took him to a
m anure yard, threw him into it and pushed the barrel of a gun into his
mouth. They smashed two teeth, put a knife under h is throat and with a
police baton beat him all over his body. He was then forced to drink out of
a water bowl for dogs, which was full of blood. 217
216 Witness Statement of T.R., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 112.
217 Witness Statement of A.I., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 113. 193
4.138 A mass grave, containing approximately 209 Croats was
discovered near the Catholic Church. These were inhabitants of Tordinci
and the surrounding villages (Antin etc.). The registrar of Tordinci was to
list the people in the mass grave, but because of the number of corpses, he
was unable to complete the task. Till today the identity of some of these
persons is not known. In 1993, the bodies were removed from the grave and
transported to an unknown place in Serbia. During this process, members of
the Serbian paramilitary groups and the JNA (Armoured Tank Unit of the
“C” Artillery under the command of Boro Ivanovi ć) blocked the access
roads to Tordinci. Columns of JNA trucks were used to transport the
remains of the dead and only 5 bodies of the inhabitants of Tordinci and 9
inhabitants of the village Antin were left in the grave. These were
subsequently exhumed and identified, while the others are still registered as
missing.
14. V UKOVAR
4.139 In the plans for “Greater Serbia”, Vukovar was assigned a leading
place in the “new Serbian region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western
Slavonia”. Prior to its almost complete destruction Vukovar was the
planned capital of the region. Even after it was essentially razed to the
ground, a JNA general spoke of rebuilding the city into a future capital. The
extent of the genocide that occurred in Vukovar in November 1991
exceeded any other area during the hostilities. During the three month siege
leading up to the November occupation, approximately 1,700 people were
killed, of which 70% were civilian. Some 260 civilians were taken from the
Vukovar hospital and executed in the grounds of the Ov čara concentration
camp on 20 November 1991. As many as 2000 other people were killed
after the occupation of the city. The JNA commanders, supported by Serb
paramilitary groups, sought to dismantle all signs of Croatian life and
culture in the city. The events in Vukovar revealed the true character of the
JNA and its transformation into a military force promoting Greater Serbia,
and actively participating in the genocide of Croats.
4.140 Vukovar is located in Eastern Slavonia, on the banks of the Danube
River, marking the border between the Republic of Serbia and the Republic
of Croatia. The city lies approximately 34 km south east of Osijek. It is the
capital of the Vukovar municipality comprised of some 28 villages and
stretched over about 600 km. In the 1991 census, the population of the
Vukovar municipality, was 84,189, of which 43.8% were Croatian, 37.4%
Serbian and the rest were Hungarian (1.6%), Yugoslavs (7.3%), and others
(9.9%). In the same 1991 census, the population of Vukovar City, was
44,639 of which 21,065 were Croatian, 14,425 Serbian, 4300 Yugoslav and 194
4,500 others. 218 Even after the peaceful reintegration of the region, in
January 2000 only 7,500 of the original 21,000 Croatian population have
returned to the City. It is difficult to estimate the total number who were
killed. The Government Office for Detained and Missing Persons, has a list
of people still missing. The current number is 511.
4.141 As early as the Middle Ages, in the period before the Ottoman
breakthrough to the Pannonian plain, Vukovar was the centre of the so-
called Vukovar County, which was under the rule of the Croatian
authorities. After the liberation from Turkish occupation in 1745, Vukovar
became the administrative centre of Srijem County, which was reintegrated
into the Croatian State. As a result of the Turkish occupation, a number of
different ethnic groups migrated to the City. The most numerous group was
Croatian. There was also a sizeable German population which was forced
to leave the City during the Second World War. The Serbian population in
the region increased significantly after the Second World War as a result of
state organised migration from less developed regions. Vukovar was
regarded as a town where all nationalities got along well. (Before the
conflict the mayor of Vukovar, Slavko Dokmanović, was a Serb) There is
no evidence to suggest that Serbs were unsafe in Vukovar before the
conflict. Indeed a clear majority of the Vukovar municipality had voted for
an independent Croatia in the referendum of 2 May 1991. 219
4.142 The occupying army which participated in the Vukovar campaign
was comprised of the following units of JNA: the 1 stGuard Proletarian
th th st rd
Mechanised Division, the 12 , 36 , 51 anth453 Mechanised Brigade, the th nd
Guard Motorised Brigade, the 80 Motorised Brigade, 211 and 252
Armoured Brigade, the 20 thPartisan Brigade, the 16 thMixed Artillery
Brigade, and the 63 Parachute Brigade. After the fall of Vukovar the 80 th
220
Motorised Brigade from Kragujevac was on garrison duty in the town.
The decisions of Belgrade to deploy the elite Guard Mechanised Division,
under the command of Mile Mrkšić, was an indication of the level of ethnic
based violence which was to follow. It was a unit that was based outside the
Military Regions and directly subordinated to the Federal Secretary of the
National Defence in Belgrade. 221 One of the Generals of the Guard
Division, Major General Dragoljub Aran đelović had previously boasted in
an interview to the gazette “Narodna Armija” that his unit had “Cleansed”
218
Ethnic statistics for Vukovar Annexes, vol 2(I).
219 See: the account of the Nobel Peace Prize nominee, Dr Vesna Bosanac, who was the
head of the Vukovar Hospital: “Mass Killing and Genocide in Vukovar”, 1991/92.
220 Narodna Armija, 7 November 1991, p. 21, “Udahnuti život gradu” (“To Breathe Life
into the Town”), Annexes, vol 4, annex 150.
221 Narodna Armija 28 November 1991, p. 13, “Ime koje se pamti po slobodi” ( “A name
remembered by liberty”), Annexes, vol 4, annex 150. 195
and is strongly holding the area between the Danube and Bosut, and that in
that region government organs are beginning to form (emphasis added)”. 222
These ground forces were reinforced by war ships of the River Combat
Fleet, part of the 63 rdInfantry Brigade from Niš, the 252 ndfrom Kraljevo
and the air force.
4.143 These JNA forces were assisted by the units of the Serbian TO from
Srijemska Mitrovica, Kragujevac, the volunteer units from Belgrade, Novi
Sad, Ruma, In đija, Sombor, Smederevo and Smederevska Palanka from
Serbia. Of the rebel Serbs the units from Negoslavci and Vukovar also
participated in the attacks. 223The Serb paramilitary groups involved in the
genocidal activities were Arkan’s “Tigers”, the “Šumadija Squad” and the
“Dušan Silni”. Notwithstanding the fact that these paramilitary groups were
made up of local people, they were under the command of JNA officers and
supported by JNA troops. According to Professor Mark Wheeler, who
testified at the ICTY trial of Dokmanovi ć, Serb paramilitaries and the JNA
co-operated in the sacking of Vukovar. 224The involvement of paramilitary
groups was also reflected in the comments of the Federal Secretary of
National Defence, General Veljko Kadijevi ć, when he congratulated the
forces on their victory in Vukovar, paying tribute to the “officers, soldiers
and volunteers” who jointly participated in the military operations. 225
4.144 The JNA unit with primary responsibility for the subsequent
occupation of City was the Guards Brigade, commanded by Colonel Mile
Mrkšić. After the siege of Vukovar, he was promoted to the rank of general
in the JNA and later became the Supreme Commanding officer of the Army
226
of the “Republic of Srpska Krajina”. When the “Krajina” was liberated
by the Croat Army in August 1995, Mrkšić returned to FRY.
4.145 Subordinate to Colonel Mrkši ć was Major Veselin Šljivanč anin,
who had direct operational command of JNA forces in the latter stages of
the siege of Vukovar. 227 Major Šljivančanin was the security officer for the
Guards Brigade of the JNA, and he also commanded a military police
222 Narodna Armija 2 October 1991, p. 4, “Kao nekad, pod razvijenom ratnom zastavom”
(“As Once Under the Unfurled War Flag”), Annexes, vol 4, annex 150.
223
Narodna Armija 2 November 1991, p. 22, “Srušen mit o Mitnici” (“The Destroyed
Myth of Mitnica”), Annexes, vol 4, annex 150.; Narodna Armija 7 November 1991, p.
26, “Doprinos TO Negoslavci u osloba đanju Vukovara” ( “The Contribution of the TO
Negoslavci in Liberating Vukovar”).
224 Agence France Presse, Jan. 20, 1998, Annexes, vol 4, annex 46.
225
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 23, 1991 Annexes, vol 4, annex 43.
226 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 22, 1995 Annexes, vol 4, annex 44.
227 Witness Statement of E.M. , Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 127, who acted as the
courier to Major Šljivančanin. 196
battalion, which was part of the brigade. Later, he was promoted to the rank
of colonel and sent to command an army brigade in Montenegro (FRY).
After the fall of Vukovar he explained to journalists that the motives of the
JNA in the city had been underpinned by a wish “to safeguard our soldiers
and civilians that the Croatian forces were holding as captives. We wanted
that the people of Vukovar could live in peace”. 228 Šljivan čanin was
primarily responsible for ordering and supervising the execution of the 260
civilians who were taken from the Vukovar hospital on 20 November after
the surrender on the previous day.
4.146 Another part of the brigade that took an active role in the siege and
occupation of the city was the JNA’s special infantry unit commanded by
Captain Miroslav Radi ć, a close associate of Major Šljivan čanin. He now
lives in Serbia. Lt. Col. Miodrag Panić headed an elite motorised army unit
229
sent from Belgrade. He sought to justify the destruction of Vukovar by
saying that Vukovar was the “fortress of fascism”. 230
4.147 The struggle of the JNA to achieve an all out conquest of Vukovar
started on 25 August 1991, after an initial artillery attack on the suburb of
Borovo Naselje. In the case of Vukovar, a purely military strategy would
have dictated a blockade of the town by minor forces; thereby affording an
opportunity for more substantial forces of the JNA to move forward into
the Croatian hinterland. What emerged was a priority not only to control
the region, but also to entirely extinguish the Croatian population that lived
in it. This is clear from the witness statement of V. Đ., a JNA
parachute commando who was transferred to one of the Serb “special
police forces”:
“…in October, we set off by personnel car riers to clean up
Vukovar. […] Slobodan Trošić led our group. He introduced us to
the chief commander Jovan Savi ć who told us that he was an
active soldier, a native of one village near Slavonski Brod and that
he was serving in Pan čevo. He was a sergeant by rank. One
morning before an operation, he delivered us a lecture and he told
us that he had been on battlefields in Sarvaš, Dalj, Beli Manastir
where he had killed Croats regardless of their old age, age, gender
and whether they were civilians or members of the National
Guard. He said that he butchered women, children, he had killed
them at a close range with a gun in the mouth, he had locked up
people in rooms that he blasted later on … During one cleaning
228
United Press International, 21 November 1991 “Army seeks to justify destruction of
Vukovar” by Nešo Đurić, Annexes, vol 4, annex 41.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid. 197
operation of the town, I was in the rear with my group. We went
from Sajmište to Mitnica. Our task was to clear all houses and
basements. In one house, we found two members of the National
Guard and about 10 civilians. Some of them were older and some
of them were younger. Jovan Savi ć killed one civilian right away
and he blindfolded members of the National Guard and brought
them in one room. He placed civilians between them, he put
bombs, with the safeties pulled out, in hands of members of the
National Guard, he locked up the room, came outside and told us
to wait for him to finish the job. After a while, an explosion was
heard and Savi ć went inside and we heard several machine-gun
bursts and screams. After a while, he stepped outside and said that
those inside were quiet and that we could proceed.” 231
According to this witness’s statement the “procedure” was repeated several
times that day.
4.148 In the Spring and Autumn of 1991, villages such Sotin, Ilok,
Šarengrad, Lovas, Bapska and Tovarnik, which are dealt with in the
paragraphs above, had been captured relatively easily, albeit with great
violence. The assaults on these villages were characteristic of the military
excesses against a civilian population that were to occur on a greater scale
in Vukovar. In all these campaigns the JNA used a highly inappropriate
arsenal of heavy weaponry against a predominantly civilian defence force
that it was known were only armed with hunting guns and a small
assortment of other light weaponry. Thereafter the JNA participated either
directly or indirectly in a wide range of brutalities designed to achieve
ethnic cleansing and extermination of Croats. After the occupation of the
aforementioned villages, a relatively stable borderline was determined
between Croatian and Serbian forces, with the exception of Vukovar, which
had a free corridor towards Vinkovci. The difference between Vukovar
and the territory seized in the early summer days of the conflict is that the
Croatian population refused to flee the town, staying put largely in the
basements of their own houses and other public buildings, most notably the
232
Hospital building.
4.149 The bombardment of Vukovar by the JNA was probably the most
sustained attack on an urban area in Europe since the Second World
War. 233 The estimate daily round of missiles is 10,000. The head of the
Vukovar Hospital, Dr Vesna Bosanac attempted to estimate the loss of life
which the siege caused:
231
Witness Statement of V.Đ., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 119.
232 The Guardian (London), November 1991 Annexes, vol 4, annex.
233 Ibid. 198
“From 25 August to 20 November 1991 there were 1850
wounded (70% civilians) of all nationalities…….In my opinion,
about 1,100 persons got killed during these 3 horrible months and
only about 30% of them were Croatian soldiers or policemen
while about 70% were civilians, including many elderly women
and children”. 234
4.150 Aside from the extensive loss of life and injuries the three months
of military assault destroyed almost the entire fabric of Croatian cultural
life. The old baroque city nucleus with all of its cultural, historic, religious,
business, and residential buildings, was completely destroyed. From among
approximately 9,000 family houses, less than a thousand houses were left
standing. 5,580 flats were also destroyed. The following buildings were
demolished: the Catholic Churches of St. Philip and Jacob (1730) and St.
Roko (1740); the Eltz castle (1749), the Hall of workers (1897), the Town
hall (1818), the buildings of the Srijem County (1777), the Court house
(1900), the museum, the house in which the Nobel prize winner Lavoslav
Ružička was born, the library with 90,000 volumes, the Bauer collection of
paintings, three grammar and six primary schools and four cemeteries. It is
235
estimated that about 90% of all other buildings were destroyed.
4.151 Most of the city’s inhabitants spent 3 months in basements. Some
were in the basements of their own houses. Others were in collective
shelters in major building in the various parts of town, such as for example
“Olajnica” I and II, the basement of the “Varteks” store, the shelter in
Strossmayer Street, the basement in the “Vladimir Nazor” elementary
school. In the majority of these collective shelters there were more than 500
people. Owing to the duration and intensity of the attacks, civilians lived
without electricity, water, and food. Many people rarely stepped out on to
the streets. Many civilians were killed when they tried to get food, water
from cisterns and wells. The dead included children. Dragana Jela ča, 8
years old, died from shelling when she came out of her house to get some
fresh air. She had wounds to her chest, lungs, liver, spleen, left kidney, guts
and both thighs. Two sisters, 7 and 11 years old, were badly hurt when they
236
left their shelter to go to the toilet after 4 days of confinement.
4.152 It became a defining aspect of the siege that countless bodies of
dead people could not be buried due to the danger of the shelling. Corpses
remained on the streets, in yards and basements. The Croatian volunteer
soldiers transported 520 dead people to the hospital for identification. 158
234
Mass killings and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92, page 229: statement of Dr. Vesna
Bosanac.
235 Ibid. at p.217.
236 Ibid. page 230, statement of Dr. Juraj Njavro. 199
among them were Croatian solders, 24 were members of the Croatian
police, and 338 were Croatian civilians (men, women, and 8 children). This
mass group of corpses was taken to the “German catholic cemetery” near
the Eltz castle where approximately 300 bodies were buried. The bodies
were also taken to the sport stadium “Sloga”. Around 70 coffins were left
on the grass and field around the stadium. When there were no coffins left,
marks with numbers and names in bottles had to be hung from the necks of
529 dead bodies. 237 They were left unburied on the town meadows. Even
the hospital was unable to properly dispose of the people who died there. A
number of bodies were left in the car park of the Harbour headquarters
across the road from the hospital. Belgrade later tried to suggest that the
dead bodies were Serbians. This point is contradicted by Doctor Bosanac
who had to make the difficult decision of simply leaving the bodies in the
238
car park.
4.153 On 5 September 1991 the JNA captured a suburb of Vukovar,
Sajmište. 90 civilians were killed in the process of the occupation. In the
next few days the JNA and the paramilitaries engaged in mass looting and
violence. At least 30 more civilians were killed. The building of the
Velepromet commerce was established as a concentration camp which
would subsequently house prisoners from Vukovar after the surrender on
19 November. Organised killing and torture would later take place in the
camp. At the time the JNA also captured Petrova Gora. The Muslim JNA
soldier, E. M., who became the courier to Major Šljivan čanin
estimated that before the final fall of Vukovar at least 50 people were killed
at he Ve lepromet Camp. The witness gives an account of the JNA conduct
in Petrova Gora:
“Every day 4-5 people were brought and killed. They were killed
either by weapons or slaughtered. Sometimes even mass killings
took place. Captain Miroslav Radić was the commanding
officer….[He] commanded people to be killed in a house near the
store. In Nada Dimi ć Street, an elderly lady, a Croat who lived
with her daughter was killed by Spasoje – nick-named “Štuka” –
from Ruma. He raped the daughter and what happened to her
afterwards I don’t know. Spasoje was a member of my
platoon….The local Serbs, the Serbs from Vukovar, were also
involved in the killing”.239
237 Ibid. page 229, statement of Dr. Vesna Bosanac.
238
Ibid.
238 Ibid, page 230, statement of Dr. Juraj Njavro.
239 Witness Statement of E.M., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 127. 200
4.154 In the subsequent days attacks on the city, including air attacks,
were launched from these newly acquired JNA sites in Petrova Gora and
Sajmište. According to Dr. Bosanac two 250 kg bombs were dropped
directly on the hospital “although it was clearly and appropriately marked
by Red Cross signs at all times (two red crosses 30 x 30 metres in size were
placed on each side of the hospital).”
4.155 Even before the actual centre of the city was taken, killing and
torture had begun. The witness A. S.* states how she was targeted
because her name appeared on a list of Croats who were to be killed:
“On 16 September 1991 M.L., called M., from Vukovar,
came to my backyard from Zrinjska Street […] and spoke to me:
‘A., what are you doing?’ […] M. told me that he was going to
kill me, that is, that he was sent by the Serbo-Chetnik formation
that gave him a list of Croats that should be killed. On that
occasion he showed me the list and my photo that was clipped to
the list, while he covered two photos with his hand, and I could
not see them, that is, I could not determine the identity of the other
persons. On the list that M. showed me, and some of the names
he read to me, I saw that there were about thirty persons on it. He
told me that he killed Marijan Bodrožić , and what I, personally,
later found out to be true, although I saw Marijan lying down in
M.T.’s garden, Z. 7, while Marijan’s house is at
Z. 3.
During the conversation with M. I tried to talk normally in a
way that I tried to persuade him that it was not necessary for h im
to do so, since I know him personally and also his family, but he
did not want to come to his senses, but he started using vulgar
language, telling me that I was “the Ustasha whore and that I
should be fucked, and later killed”. I told him then that I was an
older woman and that I could be his mother, and if he wanted to
have intercourse, that there were younger women who would
gladly have intercourse with him. […] Then he came to the bed,
where I was already sitting, made me lie on my back, and tore off
my clothes completely, lay between my legs, and with his fingers
he pushed his penis into me, and kept lying on me one or two
minutes.” 240
4.156 The witness T.C.* gives an account of what took place
in the suburb of Vukovar, Čakovci. She recalls how one man was shot by a
sniper as he fed his dog. Vinko Lucić and his wife Luja were dragged from
their house and killed in front of it:
240 Witness Statement of A.S., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 126. 201
“Chetniks killed at her own house Anica Kova čević and her son
Josip Kovačević (10 years old). Anica was killed on a couch and
Josip was killed in his bed…Some time later, Ivan Karagi ć was
killed in his yard. He was killed by Miloš Šobota and his son
Dragan Šobota. After all this, one day at about 4 p.m. Radivoj
Ivković, called Š iljo (about 25 years old) , entered my house. He
locked the house door and the kitchen door. I can not say who was
outside. He started shouting, then he grabbed me and told: “You
are the first one, Ill kill you!” Then he tied my hands behind my
back with some wire. He pushed me on a couch and ordered me to
take off my clothes. As I could not do it with my tied hands, he
tore it and raped me. Then he said me: “Stand up now!” As I was
afraid, tied and destroyed I could not do it. Then he searched the
whole house, he was looking for weapons allegedly. I had no
weapons because my husband died in 1987 and I did not either
hear or see my daughter for one year. As I had not any pension I
worked for years by all these Serbs that did it to me”. 241
4.157 There are several accounts of Croats being crucified. One by
M.D. in relation to the fate of a person called Cigo who
lived in the Koreja district. “He was crucified on a wagon and they (the
Serbs) fired a morta r at him”. A similar fate befell the husband of the
witness F. J. who describes how Serbian soldiers crucified her
242
husband (he was alive) on a railroad wagon and fired a tank shell at him.
G.K.* was captured on 15 September 1991, not far away from her
house together with N.F.*, M.K.*, and Z.R.* (all
of them Croatian women). The Serbs locked them up in the basement and
forced them to undress completely. Each one of them was raped. 243J.P.,
witnessed the killing of his nephew Z .P. as he hid in a
deserted property. Members of the Serbian paramilitary formations stopped
him as he attempted to supply food to civilians. They forced him to lie on
the ground. Then one of the soldiers went into a nearby house and took out
an electric chainsaw. The soldiers then proceeded to cut off Z. ’s arms,
legs and finally his head with his uncle looking on helplessly from his
hiding place. He watched four Se rbian paramilitary soldiers throwing parts
of the body into a nearby ditch and walk away singing. 244
241 Witness Statement of T.C., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 128.
242
Witness Statement of F.J., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 129.
243 Witness Statement of G.K., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 130.
244 Witness Statement of J.P., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 118. 202
Mitnica
4.158 Other than the genocidal events that took place in Vukovar city
proper, atrocities were also committed in the city’s suburbs. Vukovar is
made up of several suburbs that included Mitnica, Borovo Naselje, Centar,
and Ovčara. Before the final surrender of the city on 19 November 1991, all
communications were cut off between three key suburbs of the city namely
Mitnica, Vukovar Town Centre and Borovo Naselje. Each part of the
municipality had to defend itself. The first part of the city to be captured
was Mitnica, which fell on the afternoon of 18 November. Negotiations for
surrender began immediately between the commanders of the Mitnica
Defence and the JNA. 245 The JNA arrested all Croat men between the ages
of 14-70 years, and even civilians were labelled as POW’s and transported
to Ov čara, 246 Camp Sremska Mitrovica 247 via Negoslavci, Šid and
Adaševci. As the ICRC and EC monitors accompanied the convoys, they
were unable to observe what happened to the remaining civilians, some of
whom were transported to Camps at Staji ćevo and Begejci. The witness
M.M. describes a conversation with one participant – Jovo Savić –
who described his role at Mitn ica:
“Then on several occasions, I was with him when he talked to
which bat tlefields in Croatia he had been. He told us that at
Mitnica in Vukovar he butchered people, shot them in the mouth
with a gun, threw bombs into basements where women, children
and old people were. He said that he had locked up a group of
people in one toilet and gave them bombs, with safeties taken out,
to hold and that after a while those bombs exploded. When he held
a speech to an armed unit in Novi Grad, he said that everything
had to be cleaned from Croats and Moslems and that everyone
should fight for Greater Serbia and for Slobodan Milošević…” 248
4.159 M.F. testifies about the strength of the artillery attacks on
Mitnica, where there were no military objects but only civilians. He was a
245 Witness Statement of A.D., Annexes, vol.2 (I), annex 132.
246
Witness Statement of P.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 146, who remembers 3
convoys coming into Ovčara, the first of which was from Mitnica. This later proceeded
to Mitrovica. According to A.D. soldiers were taken to Ov čara and
civilians to Velepromet.
247 Witness Statement of S.R., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 133, who surrendered at
Mitnica and was taken to Mitrovica, where they were beaten by 2 rows of Chetniks
with sticks, rifles and truncheons. They were stripped, and about 100 were put in a
room roughly 50 sq. mt. in size. P.B. also went to Mitrovica where he says
they were strip searched and beaten. From there he was transferred to Niš and
interrogated by the KOS (Serbian Counter Intelligence Service), who obtained forcible
confessions.
248
Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 122. 203
member of the artillery unit commanded by Žarko Tkal čević. In the end of
August, or more precisely, at the beginning of September, the unit was
redeployed near Negoslavci from where it attacked Mitnica. This unit
included six 120 mm mortars. The unit launched approximately 300 shells
to the area of Mitnica every day, given that it operated during days as well
as nights.249 The area of Mitnica was also shelled from the directions of the
barracks, Danube, graveyard, Vučedol, which practically means from every
side. M.Š. testifies about it as well as about numerous civilians of
Croatian nationality who died as the result of constant shelling (according
to the sta tement of M .Š., Milan Lukini ć, Franka Breši ć, Bruno
Brešić, Željka Breši ć, who was five months pregnant, and Tomo Babel
were among numerous civilian victims). 250
Borovo Naselje
4.160 When the JNA troops entered Borovo Naselje, there were about
4000 people in the shelters. 251 The majority of these were elderly and
crippled. About 1000 civilians were in the shelter at the Borovo Commerce.
According to D.G., as the Serbian forces entered the area they
were killing those who did not leave their basements by throwing bombs
through windows. The Commerce shelter was at one point set on fire by the
JNA. There were at least 850 people there, including women, children and
invalids. Those Croatian guards who went to put out the fire did not
252
return. K.O. was one of the wounded who sought refuge in the
Commerce building. He had previously had an arm amputated as a result of
being hit by shelling outside his home. During the attack on the Commerce
building he remembers that the JNA used tear gas. They also shot into the
building killing at least 7 or 8 people. This was in spite of the fact that a
white flag was hung from the windows.
4.161 The JNA commanded by Colonel Košuti ć and Serb paramilitary
groups surrounded the shelter on the 19 November 1991 and demanded that
the people of Borovo Naselje surrender. After being assured that no one
would be harmed, the defenders gave up their weapons and surrendered, 253
though they insisted that detailed and completed lists of all the people
present should be made. This task was never completed as the JNA
immediately started separating the defenders from the rest of the civilians.
All men between the ages of 18-60 were categorised as “defenders”.
249
Witness Statement of M.F., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 125.
250 Witness Statement of M.Š., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 124.
251 Witness Statement of D.G., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 134.
252 Ibid.
253
Witness Statement of P.S., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 135. 204
According to D. K. a person was categorised as a Croatian solider
on the basis that they were capable of carrying a gun. The JNA fi lled 13
buses with these “Croatian soldiers and Ustashas”.
4.162 The bulk of the men were taken to Staji ćevo near Zrenjanin
(Serbia). There were about 1,300 prisoners in the camp, 170 of them were
wounded and 210 of them were sick. There were 23 children and about 150
prisoners that were 60 to 80 years old. 254 The prisoners were kept in an old
abandoned building made for cattle. The physical abuse started as soon as
they got off the bus. They had to come out one by one and they had to walk
towards the stables with “their hands on their backs and their heads tilted
down”. The members of the JNA and the Serb paramilitary groups beat
them with nightsticks, rubber sticks, hands, legs, and boards. They were on
the concrete so many of them suffered from frostbite. About 900 prisoners
sat on the concrete with their legs contorted, their heads down and their
hands on their backs. Every lifting of the head was punished with beatings.
Ten to twelve prisoners shared a space of 2,5 x 2,5 square meters. 255 They
were taken to interrogations and beatings almost 256ry day, especially at
night and many people were also executed. According to the witness
D.K. at least 10-20 people were killed in the first few days.
Thereafter, D., like many of the prisoners, was taken onto Sremska
Mitrovica in December 1991, where the tor257e continued. At least 2 men
from his room were beaten to death. K.O. (the witness with the
amputated arm) was also taken to Sremska Mitrovica. At one point he was
tortured by 4 guards who pul led at the stump on his arm until the wound
opened. He wet his pants. At a later stage he had his foot put in a plaster
cast because his heel was broken. However, the nurses put glass wool in the
plaster cast in order to torture him.258
4.163 The women, children and remaining men in Borovo Naselje, who
were considered capable of fighting, were put into buses and a convoy was
sent towards Dalj. Upon reaching Dalj, Croat women were separated from
Serb women. At one point when the prisoners were in a hall in Dalj the
exhausts of the Serb truck were diverted into the premises for over two
254 Witness Statement of Dr. N.K., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 136.
255
Witness Statement of Z. K., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 157A: “I was put in
the stable on half square meters. My legs were underneath my body and I b ecame stiff.
I got the “boarding and lodging” in the concrete feeding-trough where horses used to
eat before.”
256 Witness Statement of V.H. , Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 137: “… We all
shivered with cold, fear, pain, but … they had no mercy. One person went to relieve
himself and they shot him with the machine-gun, and they beat the other one and the
reservist jumped on his neck with a boot.”
257 Witness Statement of D.K., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 138.
258
Witness Statement of K.O., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 139. 205
hours.259 Some of the accompanying men were abducted and taken to an
unknown destination. The women proceeded to a concentration camp in
Negoslavci (Serbia). J.Z. testifies to the experience of the women
in the camp:
“…only women, without the children, were forced into some kind
of liquor warehouse. There was a lot of broken glass on the floor.
They made us to take off our shoes and walk barefooted on the
glass….They cursed my Ustasha mother and one woman tried to
protect me telling them not to swear at me. At one moment, being
provoked, she cursed their Chetnik mother. One Chetnik grabbed
260
her hair, drew out a knife and slaughtered her…”
Central Vukovar
4.164 On 18 November 1991, the JNA infantry and the Serbian
paramilitary formations entered the Centre of Vukovar. The JNA tanks
passed through the City and shot at every Croatian house and every shelter
where Croat citizens were hiding. The JNA infantry called upon survivors
in the basements to come out on the road and surrender. M.R. was
one such survivor . She was hiding in the basement of her house with her
husband and children when the JNA tanks stopped in front of the house and
shelled it first. Then they called her to come out. Her husband, S.R.,
came out first and he warned the soldiers that the children were in
the basement:
“…I hear a body fall ing. My husband is lying dead on the steps,
blood is running, I scream, the children yell…I scream and beg
them not to kill my children. I gathered all my sons. I dragged my
husband from the steps to the couch. I was covered with blood, the
brain was coming out, and it was so warm on my palm. Screaming
I took a rag and I wrapped up his head so the children would not
see the brain. I kept kissing him and I wiped the blood until the
children stopped me and begged me to run saying: ‘Mom, let’s run
away, daddy is dead, let’s run away’. We went upstairs… He
searched for the gasoline and he put everything on fire. The house
was burning, everything was smouldering…” 261
4.165 In the immediate presence of the JNA officers, members of the Serb
paramilitary groups engaged in horrific violence. They came into the house
of V.O. First they killed his mother (born in 1926), shooting
her in the temple. They then opened continuous fire on her dead body. The
259
Witness Statement of D.G., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 134.
260 Witness Statement of J.Z., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 140.
261 Witness Statement of M.R., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 141. 206
same soldiers continued to walk down the street breaking windows on the
various basements and then throwing hand grenades inside the basements.
According to O., the Barković family of 8 civilians was killed in this
262
way. The paramilitaries also came to the front of N.L.’s basement.
They called over the megaphone for her and her family to come out with
their hands on their heads. Th e witness’ son, B .L., was shot as he
came out of the front of the door. They then cut off his left leg. He lay
dying in front of her and she was not allowed to help him. The
paramilitaries then brought out three completely nude men and they said:
“…You see this now, recognise them because the same thing will happen to
you.” Thereafter the witness and the rest of her family were forced to walk
through the City. It was full of dead bodies and at times they had to walk
across corpses. They were later taken to the concentration camp
Velepromet. 263
4.166 L.D. testifies to a similar experience of blood-strewn
streets. Having been forced out of a basement shelter, which the JNA and
the members of the Serb paramilitary groups entered:
“…many dead, bloody people were found and one woman had a
cut abdomen, her baby was taken out and replaced with a dog with
the sign: “This is what Croatian mothers give birth to.” The
container was full of hands, heads, legs, sticking out, … and you
could smell the bad stench.” 264
4.167 Other Croat prisoners who were apprehended in the street of
Vukovar were taken to the area called “drvena pijaca” (Rade Kon čar
Square). Although they were given a guarantee that nothing would happen
to them, the JNA killed a Croat prisoner in front of the crowd, shooting a
bullet through his head. The prisoners were then taken to the Lužac area
where they were beaten and abused. Further executions took place. The
witness, B.R. , saw about 40 members of the Croatian
Army with their hands tied on their backs with a wire. It appeared that t hey
had all been shot, although some of them were still alive. The group of
prisoners was then taken on to the village of Bršadin and thereafter the
village of Dalj. Then in both places the torturing and killing continued. 265
4.168 B.B.* was captured as a civilian on the day of the
occupation:
262 Witness Statement of V.O., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 131.
263 Witness Statement of N.L., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 142.
264
Witness Statement of L.D., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 143.
265 Witness Statement of B.R., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 115. 207
“When they captured me, they took all my clothes off, they tied
my hands and legs and they put a shirt in my mouth so that my
lungs would burst. Then they would slowly cut my genitals, [and]
around my left ear and my left hip. I was tied all night and I lay on
the concrete. They put out cigarettes on my stomach and
arms….Since I was all worn out due to the beatings, one military
policeman threw me into a manhole. There I hooked on the fittings
and that saved me from falling to the bottom. An hour and a half
later I got out of that hole and I went through the village of Lužac.
I bumped into the machine-gun nests and I was captured there for
the second time….They brought me into a basement full of water
and coals and 15 more people were there. They beat us with
spades, shovels and rifle-butts. When I lapsed into
unconsciousness they poured water on me and then they continued
to beat me….They knocked my teeth out, the bone under my eye
was crushed and my jaw was fractured….My wounds
suppurated…” 266
4.169 The witness M.M.*, another civilian, was also captured
on the day of the occupation. She was first taken to the Velepromet
building, and later driven in bu ses to Š id and Šabac (Serbia). In March
1992 she and her family (mother, little sister and brother) taken back to
Vukovar:
“There I met J. (elderly woman) and she invited me to visit her.
There we spent the night. As her house was near the road,
reservists noticed me. First entered two of them – Braco and
Mihajlo (about 40 years, called “Faca ”). They asked if they could
speak to me, then they entered the room , ripped my clothes and
raped me one after another. T hey were telling me: “Come on
Ustasha girl, now you will see how Serbs are doing it.” Then came
Ljubo Stojančić (17 years) and an unknown man (40 years, blond,
high, thin, called Crnogorac ). Then they too raped me. (All of
them were neighbours fr om the street and I fought with each of
them.) During the rape I was bleeding. Iko ordered Crnogorac to
bring a beer bottle and they forced me to sit down on it. The rape
lasted from 9 pm to 2 am […] Crnogorac, Braco, Mihajlo and
Ljubo raped me again and they invited two more men – Savo and
Lapo who lived in the same street. It lasted to 3, 4 am Then Faca
stayed alone (it was his apartment) and they raped me till the
morning. All that time my sister was in the room, they covered her
with coats and blankets, she was screaming. When Faca stopped
torturing me I fell asleep. I heard screams but I could not do
266
Witness Statement of B.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 144. 208
anything. When I woke up, little girl was red due to crying and
said: “He touched me down there.” She was crying and telling that
it hurted her down there. I looked at her panties and there was
blood on them (she is visiting a physician even now). Then I went
to the headquarters and reported them to Pajić . […] The following
evening Crnogorac en tered though the window, threatened me
with a knife, pushed me on the bed and raped. All that happened in
front of my little sister (even today the little girl remembers it very
well, better than me). Crnogorac was coming every evening (it
lasted for two weeks). I had not my period all that time. The little
girl was very afraid of night. She was telling: “Now they will
come and torture us.” The rape was happening always in front of
her.”267
4.170 The witness B.I. gives a further account of executions
which he witnessed, as well as the attempt to kill him:
“On 21 November 1991 we were forced to surrender to save the
civilians, the military police then put us in trucks and drove us
towards Trpinja and Bobota. At the butcher’s shop “Životinja” a
group of about 35 people were thrown out. Then I heard gunshots
and these people never returned. […] On 22 November 1991 after
midnight they took my group out to be shot, in the rain. I was
taken by Z.M. who said: “March Ustasha”.
There were 6 other people in my group, but I cannot remember
their names. The group were taken by Dragan Nikić and Sava
Savić from S avulje. Mačvan took us to a meadow where there
were two tractors, one had the equ ipment necessary for digging
and the other was equipped for earth movi ng, but I was not
allowed to look left or right. There was a massive grave dug out in
which I saw many corpses. In front of me was the group led by
Savić, I saw as he killed everyone in his group with a
Kalashnikov. These people were shot next to this canal-grave and
as they were shot their bodies fell into the grave.
After those people were killed a second group came that was led
by Dragan Nikić from Avulse and Savić. As I was waiting in line,
I saw how Dragan Nikić k illed the people with a chainsaw. […]As
I was watching I was not thinking about anything, I was merely
waiting to be killed. Dragan Nikić slaughtered a young g irl in my
hall, she was a blonde by the nam e of J., daughter of M .J.
but I do not know her father’s name. […] Then Nikić said: ‘I
have 500 Ustasha bitches on my soul and I have a room for 5000
267
Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 117. 209
more.’ While he was talking he looked me in the eyes. When my
turn came, Zdravko Mačvan took a knife in one hand and lifted
my head, with his other hand he ran a knife along my throat and I
fell into the grave with the other dead bodies, and then he shot me
twice. I still have two bullet scars on my right upper arm. The
cross on my rosary saved my life. That cross was made of metal
and happened to come between my throat and the knife, it was
almost cut in two, only one edge remained intact, and the cross
became embedded in my throat..” 268
Vukovar Hospital
4.171 Before the war, the Vukovar hospital (established in 1857) had 421
hospital beds, 93 doctors and 1200 employees. It became a central location
in the struggle for the city that it endeavoured throughout the three month
period to keep alive the thousand plus injured people that were admitted to
its wards. In the last days of the siege, several hundred people had sought
refuge at Vukovar Hospital, in the belief that it would be evacuated in the
presence of neutral international observers. This evacuation had been
agreed upon in Zagreb, in negotiations between the JNA and the Croatian
government on 18 November 1991. 269 The head of the hospital Dr. Vesna
Bosanac went to negotiate with the JNA on the 18 November 1991 to the
270
same effect.
4.172 On the afternoon of 19 November 1991, JNA units arrived at
Vukovar Hospital and took control of it. This action occurred in
contravention of a “Protocol of Agreement on Neutralisation of the
Hospital of Vukovar” which stated that the evacuation would take place in
the presence of international observers. Those inside the hospital offered no
resistance. The EEC monitors were supposed to arrive on 19 November
1991, but by that evening the hospital had been taken over by the JNA
forces, under the command of Major Šljivan čanin. The ICRC
representative, Nicolas Borsinger, who tried to enter the hospital was
prevented from doing so by them: see photograph at Volume 3, Plate
10.8..When refused entry to the hospital he said: “You have noticed that the
International Committee is not able to perform its task. It can’t be held
responsible for what happened here. I was prevented from entering the
268 Witness Statement of B.I., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 155.
269
Written Agreement on neutralization and free evacuation of the hospital: Reprinted in
Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92. The agreement was signed by the JNA
and the government of Croatia under the auspices of the ICRC and the EEC Monitoring
Mission, Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 160.
270 Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92 at page 229 (Dr. Bosanac). 210
hospital grounds.” (see Appendices, vol 5, appendix 2). The hospital
remained in the sole control of the JNA and Serb paramilitaries. 271
4.173 On the 20 November 1991, Major Šljivan čanin ordered the nurses
and doctors in the Hospital to assemble for a meeting. While the medical
staff was attending the meeting, the JNA and Serb paramilitary soldiers
removed about 400 men from the hospital. Among those removed were
wounded patients, hospital staff, the city’s defenders, political activists, and
other civilians. By the time the meeting ended, the soldiers had removed
almost all of the men who were at the hospital. Approximately 100 people
were subsequently transferred to the concentration camps at Velepromet
and Ovčara. 272 Another 300 people were loaded onto buses where they
were held under JNA guard. Later that morning, the buses left the hospital
and drove to the JNA barracks in the south of the city. The men were kept
inside the buses at the barracks for about two hours, where the Chetniks
taunted them. During that time, on orders from Major Šljivanč anin, about
15 of the men were removed from the buses, apparently because the men
were part of the hospital staff or were related to staff members. The
remaining people were not seen again. It is thought that at least 260
civilians from the hospital were then taken to Ov čara and Velepromet and
executed.
Ovčara
4.174 The evidence in support of the assertion that the 260 were murdered
is as follows. The buses with the men were driven to a building at the
Ovčara farm, about four kilometres south-east of Vukovar. There JNA
soldiers and Serb paramilitaries took the men from the buses and forced
them to run between two lines of soldiers, who beat the men as they passed.
The witness E.Č. was part of the group. During the bus ride to the
farm he realised that he knew one of his Serbian captors, V.K.
He told him ironically that he should not have gotten on the bus and that it
did not look good for him. He saw at least two people beaten to death as
their heads were smashed against the concrete floor. Inside the farm
building, the soldiers continued to beat the men for several hours, with a
new set of soldiers coming in every few minutes to continue the beatings.
At all material times, Slavko Dokmanovi ć, the President of the Vukovar
Municipality, was present. Č. would have, in all likelihood, have
271 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 November 22, 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex
42, stating that the ICRC representatives were thrown out of the Hospital in spite of the
agreement to the contrary.
272 Witness Statement of E. Č., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 145, who was taken to
Velepromet and the witness statement of S.(28), Annexes, vol 2(I).
annex 157 C who was taken Ovčara. 211
received the same fate as those who were killed. However, in Ov čara he
was saved by a Chetnik who had done business with him before the war. 273
4.175 The men taken from the Vukovar hospital were held in the building
at Ovčara. The Serb authorities listed identifying information about each
man and then divided the men into groups of between ten and twenty. The
soldiers loaded each group in turn into a truck, which left the farm and then
returned empty a short while later. The truck travelled south from the
Ovčara farm building on the road leading to Grabovo. Approximately one
kilometre south-east of the building, the truck moved onto a dirt field road
which ran between a cultivated field and a wooded ravine. At the head of
the ravine, approximately 900 metres from the Ovč ara-Grabovo road, the
soldiers removed the men from the truck. At this spot, JNA and Serb
paramilitaries under the command and supervision of the JNA’s Colonel
Mile Mrkši ć, Captain Miroslav Radi ć, Major Veselin Šljivan čanin, and
274
Slavko Dokmanović were assembled on the site. On the evening of 20
November 1991, these soldiers shot and killed about 260 men. After the
killings, the bodies of the victims were buried in a mass grave at the same
275
location.
4.176 The witness P.B. worked as a tractor driver in Ovčara. He
recalls seeing blood stained tractor-trailers the next morning:
“The remaining prisoners were locked in an old hangar, which is
located in the new part of the Ov čara economy. B. stated
that there was talk that about 170 persons from this convoy were
273
Ibid. Dokmanovi ć was the President from 1990 until mid-1991. In November 1991,
after the fall of the city of Vukovar, he resumed this position. He committed suicide on
29 June 1999, whilst awaiting judgment of the ICTY on his case.
274 In September 1998, the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for former
Yugoslavia, wrote to the UN Security Council, demanding that immediate measures be
taken to ensure that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia transferred Mile Mrkši ć,
Miroslav Radić and Veselin Šljivančanin who were publicly indicted by the Tribunal,
to its custody. The 3 men were indicted in November 1995 for their alleged
involvement in the killing of hundreds of unarmed men forcibly removed from Vukovar
hospital in November 1991. They are believed to be residing in Serbia. Inecember,
the Belgrade Military Court held a hearing investigating the events surrounding the fall
of Vukovar and called the three suspects as witnesses. Several days later, the Tribunal
issued a deferral order, requesting that Yugoslavia halt its investigations and hand over
any information to the Tribunal. To date nobody has been brought to justice for the
mass killings (see AI Index: 01/02/98).
275 Report on Evacuation of the Vukovar Hospital and the Mass Grave at Ov čara, United
Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
780 (1993). For detailed information regarding the preliminary site exploration
conducted at Ov čara, see Physicians for Human Rights, Reports of Preliminary Site
Exploration of a Mass Grave Near Vukovar, Former Yugoslavia and Appendices A-D
(19 January 1993). 212
killed and buried in a previously dug ditch with a dredger. The
man who dug the ditch is C. J. (he is still in Ovčara) and
according to his statement and estimate about 50 persons could fit
in the ditch that he dug. B . said that the Chetniks and the
army dug and expanded the ditch themselves, as well as burying
those killed. During the evening residents of the Ov čara heard
shooting. The following morning when B. came to work he276
saw a blood stained tractor on the economy premises”.
4.177 All of these men were alive after the end of hostilities in Vukovar.
All of these men were taken under JNA guard first to the JNA barracks and
then to the Ov čara farm. This much is confirmed by Major Šljivan čanin’s
courier, the witness E. M. M. testified to the fact that Captain
M.R. told him that people were executed at Ovčara:
“The execution platoon was formed from the third company of the
Guard’s Brigade fr om Belgrade…….Š tuka and Dragan Vidačak
were members of th e plat oon. I came to Ov čara later in the
afternoon and I saw the soldiers stamping on the g round. I
overheard that the people were thrown into the pits and covered
with wood and soil. Afterwards I learned from Captain Radić that
approximately 1040 per sons were k 277ed in Velepromet warehouse
and approximately 200 in Ovčara”.
4.178 Of the 300 men taken from Vukovar Hospital on the morning of 20
November 1991, 260 remained missing until the discovery of a mass grave
in the area in 1996. During the exhumation (30 August – 2 October 1996)
145 persons were identified, and the destiny of 60 Croat patients taken on
the same day in the unknown direction is still unknown. The second group
of the wounded and civilians from the Vukovar hospital was taken to
Velepromet.
Velepromet
4.179 During the first 3 or 4 days of the occupation about 15,000 people
were placed in the warehouse at Velepromet: see Plate 16. They were
interrogated, tortured and killed by the members of the JNA and the Serb
paramilitary formations. They were especially cruel to the members of the
Ministry of the Interior and the Croatian Army. Salt was put on open
wounds of the injured soldiers. According to the statements of witnesses,
about 350 prisoners of Croatian nationality were killed at “Velepromet”. A
certain number of members of the Ministry of the Interior and the Croatian
276 Witness Statement of P.B., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 146.
277 Witness Statement of E.M., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 127. 213
Army (about 180) and civilians (about 4,000) were then sent from the
Velepromet to Ov čara farm where they separated the civilian population
from the fighters and they took the civilians to the camps in Negoslavci,
Orolik, Sremska Mitrovica.
4.180 The witness M. L. was captured and taken to the
Velepromet. On the first night (18 November 1991) she saw the shoo ting
of a group of 12 Croats. Immediately before the execution they beaten and
mutilated. During the shooting itself they were tied up:
“I saw, the rivers of flood were flowing, eyes, hair, teeth, livers,
brains were falling out everywhere around… Before that those
same people were beaten so hard that their bodies were completely
in blood and when they took their clothes off so they could shoot
them I saw that some of them were bleeding from their genitals.
They cut off the fingers of some of them, ears, genitals and those
278
parts of the body were thrown around.”
A similar account is given by the witness A.H.. 279 M.L.
was also the witness to a further execution by firing squad that
happened that same night. Another group of Croats, 25 of them, was
separated and sho t. She also describes how N. B. and
Č. (the witness does not state the name) were thrown and crashed
into the wal ls with their hands tied and how they banged them against th e
doors.
4.181 The witness F.G. describes what happens after he was
taken from the hospital at Vukovar to the warehouse:
“After that we had to leave the basement and they took down our
names after which they started separating us. The one who was
taking down our names told everybody to go to a certain truck.
The trucks were standing south of the hospital, in a one-way street
leading from Borovo to the town centre. … I was sent to the same
truck as my brother J., who is today still listed missing. The son
of the newsman M.S. from Vukovar, Z.S.
aka “K.”, came to our bus. He told us that we would be either
execu ted or slaughtered. He had a special grudge against me since
my uncle, L.G .; had bee n among the first to initiate the
defence of Vukovar. […] We arrived at the warehouses of
“Velepromet” in trucks where soldiers, conscripts, of the JNA
were waiting for us. … All of a sudden the young army –
conscripts – disappeared and the local Chetniks appeared. They
278 Witness Statement of M.L., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 147.
279 Witness Statement of A.H., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 149. 214
started yelling that we should get outside. We got off the truck
after which we had to stand in a circle and they told us that those
who had fought should stay on one side and the others on the
other. I was standing in the group of people who had fought.
…Radivoje Jakovljevićaka “Fridge”…approac hed me and pulled
me by my hair and tu rned me around so was facing him. Then he
took his kn e, took a swing with it as if to stab me in the head, but
I duck so that he missed and instead cut the left side of my
forehead and the scar is visible even today. He also stabbed me
under my right eyebrow. I begged him to shoot me, but was
shouting that I have to suffer before I die. He was saying that he
would pick my eyes out. … Another Chetnik came and they
forced me to the ground and held my arms and legs. The accused
Radivoje Jakovljevićapproached me and want ed to cut my head
off with a knife…but another officer of the former JNA, whom I
do not know, saved me.…I saw approxim atelyfifteen decapitated
bodies in that hole. I also saw heads scattered around in that
hole.280
4.182 The witness J. R. describes how he was the witness when
S. (the witness does not state the last name) was called out of the
group of prisone rs and was taken to the neighbouring room and not long
after that a blnt blow was heard, followed by the sigh of the prisoner and
the fall of the body onto the concrete. The next morning, as he was passing
by the room, he saw on the concrete a blown out human brain and stale
blood that was covered with petroleum. The witness states that the killings
281
lasted the whole night of 18/19 November 1991.
4.183 A.H. attempted to get a group of women and children to
the hospital. However, before she could get them there the group were
arrested by the JNA and taken to the Velepromet Concentration Camp. The
witness was subsequently falsely accused of killing 50 children and through
much of the next few months was under sentence of death. She gives a
detailed account of the excessive violence that took place at Velepromet:
“Bulidža, Simo Samardžija , Kamenko (they cal led him
“Kameni”– “Stony ”) escorted peop le to the place of execution.
They maltr eated and beat me every day, and on the fifth afternoo n
they took me out to watch how they court martial people. On that
day they took out G.K., a young Croatian soldier from
Vukovar. The Chetnik called Bulidža jumped on his back. The
young man fell on his stomach and Bulidža cut off his head and
280 Witness Statement of F.G., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 121.
281 Witness Statement of J.R., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 148. 215
held it up in the air and impaled it. He did all of that in front of
me. Later he brought out a young man from Zagreb (I did not
know him). They never told us their names, we knew only their
nicknames. Zoran Stanković, Miki Ikac and Predrag Petrinjac held
the guy, and Vojvoda Milan Novković “Capalo” switched on a
circular saw . They cut the guy in half. […] Every day they
maltreated, provok ed and humiliated us….They would beat me in
front of my daughter, and she had to stand still, and vice versa.
They used to say: “Look Ustasha what we can do.” They told my
daughter that her child was with them, and that she would never
see him again. They took her to the railway track with the
intention to kill her. They would put me against the wall and shoot
over my head, or beside me….Executions were held day and
night. The place of execution was fifty meters away from the
joiner’s workshop where people were held, so that all of those
who were in the “Velepromet” could watch the executions taking
place, even those who stripped us of our things and jackets, with
the explanation that we would not need them any more. […] 282
4.184 The witness M.G. describes how Serbian soldiers in
the yard of the Velepromet took out 4 of her teeth. They completely
undressed a nun and tortured her. The witness’ daughter, A.G. ,
was undressed and kicked. They beat her head with rifle-butts in to head
and put out cigarettes on her naked body. M. G. also describes
how one night about 20 captured boys of Croatian nationality were kil led.
They were aged from 17 to 24 years old. The JNA later drove trucks over
the bodies of the dead. 283The witnesses D.P., F.G.
and F.K. saw the execution of one young Croat. One of the Serb
paramilitaries took him out from the hangar and took him to the yard where
he cut off,first one ear and then another. After that he grabbed his hair and
cut his throat with a knife. 284 According to witness testimonies, the rebel
Serbs and the newly arrived members of the Serbian paramilitary groups
would enter the hangars where the men and the women with children were
separated. They would choose the prisoners take them out of the hangar and
kill them. The witness F.V. describes how he survived the
execution of Croatian prisoners when he was with no reason separated from
the hangar and included in a small number of men; they were simply told
that they would be executed. Walking in a row, a Serb who once had
worked with him noticed and saved him. His stood and watched the group
282
Witness Statement of A.H., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 149.
283 Witness Statement of M.G., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 150.
284 Witness Statement of D. P., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 120; F. G.
and F.K. also testify about the murder of the young Croat: Annexes, vol 2(I),
annexes 121 and 114. 216
being executed ten to fifteen meters from him. Seized by fear and shock he
285
was unable to move. The Croatian women who stood with their children
in the area of Velepromet were the witnesses of numerous executions and
massacres of captured men. Z.M. and M. S. testify
about this. With their children, they watched a drunken mem ber of the
Serbian paramilitary formations first physically abuse and then shoot in
cold blood three Croatian prisoners. Then he turned and threatened a group
of women and children who were standing nearby with his weapon. 286
4.185 Women of Croatian nationality that were imprisoned in the
Velepromet were taken to interrogations during which they were exposed
to sexual abuse. Group rapes took place. B.V. * was raped the
second day on her arrival in the barracks. Four soldiers raped her one after
another on the floor of the office. Throughout the rape they insulted her and
hit her in the face.287 B.V. also testifies that Serbian soldiers took
M.M.* to the room next door to her. Afterwards they boasted that
15 of them “took turns” on her. M.M . confirmed that she had
been raped later on. After a while, women of Croatian nationality were
taken to barracks in the town where sexual abuse continued. B. V.
saw a group of soldiers rape V. I.*. I. had been previously
rape in Velepromet.
4.186 On 1 December 1991, the military police of the JNA transported
prisoners from Velepromet to the JNA barracks in Vukovar. The
maltreatment and battering took place daily. Serbs, who tortured, battered
and killed prisoners in the “Velepromet” camp, came to the barracks and
285 Witness Statement of F.V., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 123: “…then they really
came and took V. to execute him, and with him they also took me outside. Then
they told us they were taking us to be executed. Then they also took another young man
of approximately eighteen years of age…I saw how that person fired his weapon at
those three men he was leading, I saw them falling to the ground…”
286
Witness Statements of Z.M. , Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 15 and M.S.,
Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 157 B: “…since it was daylight I watched and I saw
all three persons falling to the ground near the channel…this person came back to us
and threatened us with his weapon. I was frightened that they would kill us, so I pulled
the children down, because their life was the only thing that mattered to me.”
287 Witness Statement of B.V. , Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 151: “...V.I.
(about 26 years old) a mother of a 5-years-old son was been kept back for a long time.
When she came back, she told me that they had raped her for the second time. The first
time she was raped in the “Velepromet”. Now she told me that hey forced her to
undress in front of them otherwise they would tear her to pieces. When she came to us,
at first she didn’t want to talk to anybody, she just cried. They raped me the second day
on arrival to the barracks... Five of them took me away – I didn’t know anybody. They
were between 25 and 30 years old. Two of them had their breath smelling on alcohol...” 217
there continued venting their frustrations. J.L. testifies about
groundless and brutal murders of captured Croats. 288
Catholic Churches
4.187 Catholic churches were the subject of specific targeting. More than
a thousand grenades were fired at the Franciscan monastery and the
Churches of St. Philip and Jacob and St. Rok. The priests and all the
clerical staff spent months in the cellar of the monastery where they
organised their living, work and the saying of masses. During the short
breaks between the shelling, they tried to save the lavish library of the
monastery and move it to the cellar. The library was one of the most
valuable in Croatia and it had over 30,000 books. Besides the shelling, the
church and the monastery were a target of the air strikes of the JNA. On 5
October 1991, a JNA aircraft threw a cluster bomb at the monastery,
damaging it heavily. After the occupation of Vukovar, members of the JNA
and the Serbian paramilitary formations forced the priests and clerical staff
into buses and trucks and took them to Sajmište. When getting out of buses,
they were physically tortured, cursed at and humiliated. They were beaten
with wooden bats and kicked. The majority of the priests and clerical staff
were about 70 years old. They forced to take off their clothes and were
made to sleep on concrete floors. Like other prisoners the priests were
subjected to interrogations. They were forced to sing Serbian songs and
cross themselves in the Orthodox way. Priests B.S. K.
(priest of the Vukovar parish), A.P. (priest of the Borovo parish)
and I.M. (curate of Borovo parish) were taken to the concent ration
camp in Sremska Mitrovica (Serbia) from where they were exchanged on
11 October 1992.
Mass Graves
4.188 In Vukovar three mass graves were found: Ov čara, Novo groblje
(new cemetery) and in Nova Street. 200 corpses were found at Ov čara, of
which 145 persons were identified. This grave coincides with the evidence
concerning the people who were taken from the hospital. In Novo groblje
938 remains were found, of which 722 persons were identified. In Nova
Street 10 remains were found, of which 6 persons were identified. 289In
addition a grave containing three people was found in Borovo Selo. These
288 Witness Statement of J.L., Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 152.
289 List of exhumed mass graves pf the Government Office for Detained and Missing
Persons of the Republic of Croatia, Annexes, vol 2 (I), annex 164. 218
numbers are paralleled only in the Prijedor County in Bosnia and
290
Herzegovina.
4.189 Although large numbers of civilians died as a result of the armed
conflict, according to Croatian investigators some showed signs that they
had been extra-judicially executed or otherwise unlawfully killed.
4.190 According to the information of the Government Office for the
Detained and Missing Persons of the Republic of Croatia, the destiny of
511 persons from Vukovar is still unknown. 291As stated above, other
292
estimates suggest that at least 3000 people are missing.
Terror Continued after 1991
4.191 In the period between 1991 and 1995, the rebel Serb ‘authorities’
continued to commit genocidal acts against the remaining Croatian
population in Vukovar.
4.192 A number of Croat women were detained in improvised prisons in
the cellar of a house in Ivan Lola Ribar Street from March 1994 till July
1996. These women were physically and mentally mistreated and raped.
The detained women were raped by several members of the rebel Serb
“Authorities.” The women were taken to a café on Svetozar Markovi ć
Street where they were detained in rooms on the top floors and forced to
perform sexual acts for which they were ‘paid’ 20 German Marks. The
witness H.E.* 293describes the improvised prison, which was under
the command of Željko Rudeš. She also describes many instances of rape
and physical malt reatment at the prison and the café.
290
Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 780 (1992), Annex X, Mass graves, S/1994/674/Add.2
(Vol. V), 28 December 1994.
291 List of the Government Office for the Detained and Missing Persons of the Republic of
Croatia.
292 Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/93, page 221.
293
Witness Statement of H.E., Annexes, vol 2(I), annex 116. CHAPTER 5
GENOCIDAL ACTIVITIES IN THE REST OF CROATIA
INTRODUCTION
5.01 Chapter 4 of the Memorial provided detailed testimony and
documentary evidence of the genocide perpetrated by the Serbian
leadership in Eastern Slavonia, acting through the JNA, in collaboration
with Serb and Serbian paramilitary groups. This Chapter documents the
genocide of Croats which occurred in other parts of the Croatian territory.
These areas, like Eastern Slavonia, had been identified by the 1986 SANU
Memorandum and Serbian leadership as falling within “Greater Serbia”.
The evidence set forth in this Chapter illustrates the systematic pattern of
genocidal acts which occurred in Western Slavonia (Part 1, paras. 5.3-
5.64), Banovina (Part 2, paras. 5.65-5.122), and Kordun and Lika (Part 3,
paras. 5.123-5.186) and Dalmatia (Part 4, 5.187-5.241).
5.02 Croatia wishes to emphasise, once again, that this Chapter does not
purport to be an exhaustive account of every act of genocide that occurred
in these areas. The process of collecting evidence began in 1991 and
continues. The sheer scale of the task makes an exhaustive inventory of
genocide difficult at this stage. The steps taken by the Serbian forces to
destroy evidence of their crimes have also hampered the process
considerably, as has the subsequent – total – failure to cooperate on the part
of the FRY. Nonetheless, the events described in this chapter, and set out
more fully in the witness statements annexed in Volume 2 of this Memorial
are sufficient in themselves to prove genocide. The evidence currently
available demonstrates a clear pattern of genocidal activity throughout
Serb-occupied territory in Croatia between August 1991 and August 1995.
It also confirms that the genocide perpetrated in Eastern Slavonia during
the period formed an integral part of an expansionist military strategy
conceived and implemented by the Serbian leadership.
1 Chapter 2, paras. 2.43-2.50.
2 Chapter 2, paras. 2.72-2.80.
3
Chapter 4, para. 4.1. 220
SECTION ONE: WESTERN SLAVONIA
1. INTRODUCTION
Geography
5.03 Western Slavonia borders Eastern Slavonia in the eastern part of the
Republic of Croatia. It covers approximately 3,166 km² of predominantly
agricultural land, comprising five municipalities and 307 villages. The area
includes the territory around the mountains of Psunj, Papuk and the eastern
hill slopes of Bilogora. To the south the area extends to the Sava River,
including the towns of Okučani, Novska and Nova Gradiška. In this sector,
the Sava River is the natural boundary between the Republic of Croatia and
the Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Demography
5.04 According to the 1991 census, the population of Western Slavonia
was 157,332, of whom 86,618 (55.1%) were Croats, 45,401 (28.8%) were
Serbs, 8552 (5.4%) were Czech, 1430 (0.9%) were Hungarians and the
remaining 15,331 were other nationalities. As a consequence of the
operations of the Serb paramilitary groups and the JNA in the area of
Western Slavonia (see Plate 17; and Annexes, vol 3, Plate 4.3C), 5 mass
graves were found, from which 20 bodies were exhumed and identified (see
Annexes, vol 3, Plate 7.2). Nearly all of the identified corpses were Croats.
The average age was 55. The number of missing persons in the entire
region of Western Slavonia is at least 83.
Outbreak of Hostilities
5.05 The municipality of Pakrac contained the greatest number of Serbs
in the region; it became a major centre for the Serbian Democratic Party
(SDS) after the beginning of multi-party democracy in Croatia in February
1990. A number of SDS public events took place that year, which were
significant for two reasons: first, for their promotion of ethnic conflict and
second, for the supportive presence of senior JNA officers on SDS
platforms. The notable events included the celebration of WW II Veterans
day on 4 July 1990, Uprising Day on 27 July 1990, and a major SDS
4
Veterans’ Day was a big holiday in communist Yugoslavia and was celebrated since the
end of World War II until the establishment of the Croatian State. 221
rally on 16 June 1990, presided over by the SDS leader Jovan Raškovi ć.
The speakers reminded the Serbs present of the sufferings endured by them
during the Second World War. In August 1990 the SDS established a
private cattle farm for the purpose of collecting funds and arms for a
rebellion. The venture was in part funded by the JNA, according to the th
information received from the Pakrac Police Station. On 29 September
1990, Serb rebels were involved in preventing the planned transport of
arms from Pakrac police station to the Ministry of Interior (MUP). Later the
police in Pakrac, with the knowledge of the JNA, supplied these weapons
and other weapons to the Serbian paramilitaries.
5.06 After the vote of the Croatian Parliament to separate from SFRY on
20 February 1991, the Municipal Assembly of Pakrac voted to reject the
parliamentary re6olution and to annex the Municipality to the so-called
SAO Krajina. The Police Station in Pakrac was turned into the “Municipal
Secretariat of the Interior”, under the jurisdiction of the “Secretariat of the
Interior Krajina”. In the subsequent days, the non-Serb police force was
disarmed and an autonomous Serb government established. The Croatian
Army intervened on 2 ndMarch 1991 to try to re-establish constitutional
7
order. As a result of the intervention, JNA forces were deployed to the
area, only to retreat after several days. Towards the end of 1991 the
collaboration between the Serb rebels and the JNA became even more
obvious. In November 1991, the JNA assisted the rebels to acquire arms
from a TO barracks near Podravska Slatina that had previously been
compounded as a result of the Federal Government order. 8At the same
th
time, the JNA and the SDS organized the formation of the 12 Slavonian
Assault Brigade for Slavonia and Baranja in the area of the municipalities
of Daruvar, Grubišno Polje, Virovitica, Pakrac, Požega and Podravska
9
Slatina.
5
Uprising Day was by a decision of the Communist Party celebrated in Croatia on 27
July, also until the establishment of the new Croatian state.
6 Decision on the annexation of the Municipality Pakrac to “SAO Krajina” from 22
February 1991: Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 237.
7
The Chronology of War in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1989-1998, p.42.
8 Witness Statement of M.L., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 169.
9
War Crimes by the Serbian military and paramilitary formations in Western Slavonia
and Banovina (1991-1995), p. 12. 222
Military Organisation of the JNA in Western Slavonia
5.07 In an approach similar to its operations in Eastern Slavonia, the
JNA amassed troops in the region on the pretext of preventing ethnic
conflict, thereby frustrating the efforts of the Croatian TO at the same time
as assisting in the early atrocities of the Serbian paramilitaries. Western
Slavonia was one of the few areas in which there were no peacetime
compositions of the JNA. In administrative terms, the region was under the
th
authority of the 5 Corps, which had its headquarters in Banja Luka and
was commanded by Colonel General Nikola Uzelac. However, the main
part of the 5 thCorps forces was stationed south of the Sava River, in the
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, when ste Serb rebels first
attacked the police station in Pakrac on 1 March 1991, most of the JNA
forces were out of Croatia. The then President of the Presidency of SFRY,
Borisav Jović from Serbia, issued a unilateral order that the JNA establish
“buffer zones” without first consulting the other members of the
Presidency. This action effectively prevented the Croatian police from
th
reasserting law and order. The JNA’s 265 Mechanized Brigade from
Bjelovar and minor units from Virovitica and Zagreb arrived in Pakrac.
Eventually the Command of the 32 ndCorps established its Headquarters in
the town.
5.08 On 13 August 1991, rebel Serbs in Western Slavonia proclaimed
the “Serbian Autonomous Region (SAO) of Western Slavonia” and joined
th
the “SAO Krajina”. On 16 August, paramilitary units attacked Oku čani
and the surrounding villages. Members of the Croatian police and the
National Guard Corps attempted to defend themselves from the rebel
forces. However, the Croatian army was at a disadvantage from the
beginning due to the JNA’s seizure of arms after the order of 23 rdMay
1990. What followed was a decisive moment in the transformation of the
th
status of the JNA in the region. First, the combat unit of the JNA’s 265
Mechanized Brigade from Bjelovar under the Command of Lieutenant
Colonel Milan Čeleketić intervened on the side of the Serb paramilitaries. 11
th
Thereafter, a part of the 329 Armoured Brigade of the JNA came to
Okučani from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The purpose of these manoeuvres
was “to reach a full co-operation” with the Serbian rebels. 12
10
Order for the disarmament of the TO, SSNO OS SFRY from 14 May 1990 and the
document of the Presidency of SFRJ from 31 May 1990 from which it becomes evident
that the Presidency accepts and supports the Order for the disarmament of the TO,
Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 231. Also Chapter 3, paras. 3.324-325.
11 Narodna Armija, 22 December 1991, p. 26, “Čovjek kriznih žarišta” (The man from the
crisis spots); Annexes, vol 4, annex 150.
12
Veljko Kadijević , As I See the Downfall , 1993, p. 138-139; Appendices, vol 5,
appendix 4.1. 223
5.09 At the beginning of September 1991, the JNA captured Oku čani
and directed operations towards Novska and Pakrac. The main army unit
th
involved was the 329 Armoured thigade, reinforced by subordinate units, th
including parts of the 16 Proletarian Motorized Brigade, the 5 Partisan,
the 2 nd Partisan and the 343 rdMotorized Brigade. These forces worked
13
directly with local Serbs, including reservists from “Bosanska Krajina”.
Subsequently the 5 thCorps was also reinforced by units from Serbia,
th th
including the 46 Partisan Brigade from Čačak, a Battalion of the 84
Motorized Brigade from Zaje čar and the Division of multi-barrel rocket
launchers of the 150 Combined Artillery Brigade from Vranje.
th
5.10 Throughout the war, units of the JNA’s 5 Corps, together with
local forces of rebel Serbs lead by the Command of the Territorial Defence
of the “SAO Zapadna Slavonia”, perpetrated several mass crimes against
the Croat population. The aim was to remove non-Serbs from the area
around Daruvar and Podravska Slatina. At the end of October, both units
were stopped by the Croatian army. By the beginning of November, the
units were pushed back to Oku čani, towards the Sava River. A truce was
signed in January 1992.
5.11 The “Army” of the “Republic of Srpska Krajina” benefited
consistently from the support of the JNA. Suc14support included the supply
of military equipment and weaponry. The close relationship between the
two armies is clearly demonstrated from the numerous documents and
15
reports annexed to this Memorial. After the JNA retreated from Croatia
parts of the JNA joined the “Army of the Republic of Srpska Krajina”. 16
13 Krajiški vojnik, official paper of the Krajina Corps of the Army of the Republic of
Srpska, July 1993, p. 32, “Heroji i vitezovi” ( Heroes and knights) ; Srpska vojska
(Serbian Army), official paper of the Army of the Republic of Srpska, Sarajevo, from 9
May 1994, p. 14: “Ratni put popločan pobjedama” (The victorious war path); Annexes,
vol 4, annex 152.
14 Request for ammunition and other equipment, delivered to the “Ministry of Defense of
the Rep. of the Srpska Krajina” on 18 Sep. 1991 (delivered to Lieutenant Colonel
Tomislav Simonović); Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 234.
15
For example: Report of the “Headquarters of the TO Krajina” from 21 and 22 Sep.
1991 to the “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Krajina”. The mentioned
report is about the combined operations of the paramilitary units and the JNA, as well
as the report on the operations itself, the losses, etc. Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 235.
16 th
For example, Lazo Babi ć was a officer in the JNA in the 5 Corps of the JNA, Mile
Novaković was Chief of the Operative Center of the 5 thMilitary Region, while Milan
Čeleketić was since September Chief of Staff of the 265 thArmored Mechanized
Brigade of the JNA. See Chapter 3, paras. 3.97-3.98 . 224
Destruction of Cultural Monuments
5.12 During the course of the hostilities, over 50 Catholic churches and
chapels were plundered and damaged, 30 of which had previously been
categorised as cultural monuments. 18 churches were destroyed. At least 19
others were heavily damaged. The majority of these buildings were built
before the 19 thcentury. For example, the Parish Church of St. John the
th
Baptist in Slavonski Kobaš was built in the 15 century: it was heavily
damaged by the rebel Serbs and the JNA. The Parish Church of the
Appearance of the Holy Virgin Mary in Vo ćin was built in around 1500: it
was almost completely destroyed during the Serbian retreat from Vo ćin.
The JNA and the rebel Serbs destroyed the Parish Church of St. Vid in
Okučani. A local market was established on the site where the church once
stood.17
Concentration Camps
5.13 Two major concentration camps were established in Western
Slavonia at Bu čje and Stara Gradiška. Further details of these camps are
provided in Appendix 6 of Volume 5.
Ethnic Cleansing
5.14 On 9 June 1993, the rebel Serb “Government” of the Municipality
of Pakrac introduced a “Resolution” urging Serbs from other parts of the
country to return to “the ethnically clean Serbian villages of Pakrac”. The
“Resolution” stated that villages representing “the ethnically clean Serbian
area” were now in existence and that the return of Serbs was to begin once
“the Croatian army,18olice and symbols had been removed from the
Serbian villages”. The evidence of ethnic cleansing in the Municipality of
Pakrac and other parts of Western Slavonia are detailed below. Croat
inhabitants of the villages of Uskok, Donji and Gornji Varoš and Pivare in
Nova Gradiška area all moved away in the face of threats and intimidation.
The Croats living in the villages along the Sava River in the area of
Slavonski Brod also moved as a result of the incessant crossings by Serb
reservists from Bosnia and Herzegovina into Croatia who continued to loot
17 The Wounded Church in Croatia, the Destruction of Sacral Buildings in Croatia (1991-
1995), Zagreb, 1996.
18
Decision on the return of expelled Serbs to ethnically clean Serbian villages, Annexes,
vol 2(II), annex 239. 225
19
and kill Croats. When the army entered the village of Gornji Varoš, its
residents were ordered to move out of their houses or they would be
killed.20
2. M UNICIPALITY OF AKRAC 21
Pakrac
5.15 The town of Pakrac had a population of 27,589, of which 9896
were Croats and 12813 were Serbs. On 19 th August 1991, Serb
paramilitaries launched a combined artillery attack on the entire territory of
the municipality of Pakrac with the objective of capturing the towns of
Pakrac and Lipik, together with the main roads that led to the villages. The
JNA’s Banja Luka Corps from Bosnia and Herzegovina is known to have
assisted in the attack. Much of the Pakrac town was destroyed from the
shelling. The town was completely isolated, with no electricity, water,
telephones, gas or other basic supplies. There was no telephone
communication or gas supplies for the next year.
5.16 During the battle for control of Pakrac Municipality, the Croatian
police and Serb paramilitaries dominated different areas. The main
stronghold of the Serb forces was in Pakra čki Vinogradi, a suburb of
Pakrac. On 7 September 1991, the home of L.Š. was attacked and
six Croat men were abducted and “disappeared”. They were Mile Pavi ć*,
23
Željko Nađ, Drago Nađ, Marijan Šmit, Stipe Skeledžija and Goran Djak.
On 14 September 1991, Antun Kroupa was also seized from his home and
24
also remains missing.
19
An example is the crime committed in the village of Ma čkovac when at a family house
four persons were brutally killed and set on fire – witness statement of A.T. ,
Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 170.
20 Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 171.
21
The area of the Municipality of Pakrac is the largest muncipality in Western Slavonia.
According to the Census it had 27,589 inhabitants who lived in 66 villages and two
towns, Pakrac and Lipik. In 1991 the population consisted 12,813 (46.4%) Serbs, 9,896
(35.5%) Croats, 869 (3.1%) Italians, 718 (2.6%) Czechs, 869 (3.1%) Italians, 273 (1%)
Hungarians and a remainder of 3,020 (11%) comprising other ethnic groups who
considered themselves Yugoslavia. Taking into account many of the 11% of the
population who considered themselves Yugoslavian, this area was clearly dominated by
a Serbian majority. In the towns of Pakrac and Lipik, 50% of the population was also
Serbian. The situation was the same in the mountain areas of Psunj and Papuk.
22 Witness Statement of N.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 172.
23
Witness Statement of S.P.*, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 173.
24 Ibid. 226
th
5.17 During the night of 15 September 1991, the P. family home
was attacked. 25At the time, 8 adults and 3 children were hiding there.
Croats in the area had begun staying at each other’s homes because of the
abductions that had begun in the previous days. One of the attackers was a
JNA officer. He threatened and insulted members of the household. He
fired shots in the hallway and into a room where people were sleeping. A
paramilitary Serb, who identified himself as a member of the B. family,
then entered the house. He told the Croats that he and other members of
the same group had recently killed Zvonko and Dragica Hunjek and would
do the same to them. M.B.* was taken away. Three of the household
memebers managed to escape. The others were taken into custody and held
at the police station. It was later discovered that Zvonko and Dragica
Hunjek had been murdered in their home. M.B. was raped and
tortured after wich she was murdered. Her ears were cut off and her skull
was shattered. H.H. buried the bodies. 26
5.18 Nenad Bojić and Milan Kovačević (known as “Sikirica”) later
confessed to this violent attack. Kovačević admitted the murders, as well as
the murder of the married couple Đuro and Roza Te peš. The po lice found
an axe in his home with traces of b lood. He and his accomplice, Nenad
Bojić, were detained by the Serbia n paramilitaries in Bu čje, along with
several other Serbs who were ostensibly held on ac count of being drunk
and disorderly. According to Nenad Bojić , he was imprisoned because “he
left his [guard] position i n Trokut and later because he was drunk”. 27
However, the killers were released within a matter of days.
rd
5.19 On the night of 3 October 1991, Milan Kovačević and Nenad
Bojić having been released from custo dy, attacked the house of I. N.
I.N.’s wife, daughter and grandchil dren managed to escape. It is
believed that I.N. was thrown into the well, around which the re were
traces of blood. Milan Kovačević and Nenad Bojić then forced the door o f
B.D.’s house. The home was occupied by the P. family. B.D.,
his wife L. , their daughter L .Š. and two other children
occupied the house at the time. A. P.*and B.D. resisted th e
attackers. The others escaped and ran to a nearby roadblock where they
pleaded wi th the Serb paramilitaries to provide assistance. The
paramilitaries not on ly refused to help, but in fact a rrested the group and
took them into custody for eight days. Upon the group’s return, they
discovered a large pool of blood and a grave in the back yard. Given that
B.D. had escaped, it was assumed that A.P. was buried there.
His family asked for confirmation from the Serbs as to whether this was the
25 Witness Statement of A.P.*, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 174.
26
27 Witness Statement of H.H., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 175.
Witness Statement of N.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 172. 227
case. No information was disclosed. The family were refused permission to
exhume the grave in order to confirm that the body was A.P.
5.20 Nenad Bojić and Milan Kovačević were again taken into temporary
custod y, but ultimately escaped punishment. M ilan Kovačević gave a
statement, that was origina lly hand-writ ten, indicating that he was released
from prison because “he was not dangerous to the Ar my and the Serbs but
to the Ustashas and th eir families”. 28He also emphasised that the army
29
would not cause him difficulty as his son was a member of the JNA. In
March 1995, the witness I.B. saw Milan Kovačević on Banja
Luka (Bosnia and Herzegovina) television saying, “If the war starts again I
30
will butcher again”.
5.21 The bodies of murdered Croat civilians were exhumed on
November 8 1995 in five locations at Pakra čki Vinogradi. The following
people were identified: Dragica Hunjek, Zvonimir Hunjek, Marta Božić ,
Ivan Šmit, Zdravka Šmit, Rozika Teteši, Đuro Teteši, Zoran Šmit (10 years
old), Mile Pavi ć, Stjepan Kara čun, Zvonko Nadaždi, 31Lazar Grubinić ,
Marija Lacek, Jozo Nadaždi, Blaž Djak. Corpses were also found in Pakrac
and were identified as Helena Sve čnjak, Marija Svečnjak, Ankica Nemet,
Terezija Brus, Nevenka Vu čković, Fanika Pihir, Josip Heidelberg. The
forensic analysis of the bodies suggests that predominantly the cause of
death was close range shooting rather than the effects of shelling. During
the period from between 1992 and 1998, a total of 49 people were exhumed
and identified in the territory of Pakrac. There are records pertaining to the
death of 176 civilians in the municipality. Most other Croat people left the
area. At the same time, Serbs from the Bjelovar-Bilogora and Virovitica-
Podravina counties migrated to the area in accordance with the Resolution
of the Municipality of Pakrac.
Veberov Sokak
5.22 Veberov Sokak is another suburb of Pakrac which was controlled
th
by Serbs in 1991. On 15 December 1991, a massacre of Croat civilians
occurred in the house of V.Z.
28
Witness Statement of Milan Kovačević, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 176.
29 Note of Milan Kovačević’s interview, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 176.
30 Witness Statement of I.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 177.
31
Milan Kovačević admitted to the witness J.P. that he killed Z.N.
and the Š. family with an axe. See Witness Statement of J. P., Annexes,
vol 2(II), annex 178.
32 “Dead Civilians in the former municipality of Pakrac”, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 240. 228
At the time 6 people were sheltering there: Vladimir Zvonarić, Ivo Latinski,
Ante Validžić, his wife, Ante Maca, Ana Zvonari ć and M.Z.
Serbian rebels came into the hallway and fired machine guns. Grenades
were thrown into the kitchen. M. Z. and M.V. were
wounded. Vladimir Zvonari ć, Ana Zvonari ć, Antun Validži ć and a
neighbour Ivan Latinski were killed. 33 The attackers subsequently returned
to the house to ensure that everyone was dead. 34
5.23 The perpetrators of the killings, Željko Sokolović and Mirko Đurić,
later gave statements. Željko Sokolovićtestified that his assi gnment was to
search Croat family households and conf iscate weapons. In the event that
35
no weapons were found, he was ordered to kill:
“… When I was on the threshold of the house, I turned around and
I fired half a burst of bullets through open doors at people that
were in the house. On that occasion, I heard a howl and I moved
on. When I reached the [….] step, I turned around again and I
fired the second burst. My colleague Đurić took 4 bombs and
threw them one after another into the house…”
5.24 Mirko Đurić, who admitted throwing bombs, stated as follows:
“… At the moment when we found La tinski and Validži ć in the
kitchen, Sokolović suddenly lifted his rifle and shot them in the
back from a distance of 1.5 meters…Sokolović turned the bar l of re
the rifle and said to me: “Why are you standing here agape,… -
come on, throw that bombs…” 36
Kusonje
5.25 The village Kusonje is in the municipality of Pakrac, Western
Slavonia. It is 2.5km northeast of Pakrac. In 1991, the village had 1101
inhabitants, of which 891 (80.92%) were Serbs and 99 (8.99%) were
Croats.
33
Witness Statement of M.Z., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 179.
34 Witness Statement of M.V., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 180.
35
Witness Statement of Željko Sokolović: “… When I was on the threshold of the house,
I turned around and I fired half of burst through opened doors at persons that were in
the house. On that occasion, I heard a howl and I moved on. When I reached the
second, the third step, I turned around again and I fired the second burst. My colleague
Đurić took 4 bombs and threw them one after another into the house…” Annexes, vol
2(II), annex 181.
36 Witness Statement of MirkoĐurić, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 182. 229
5.26 On 8th September 1991, a group of 21 Croat soldiers (the majority
of whom were members of the National Guard; two of whom were
policemen) were ambushed by Serb paramilitaries on the road leading into
37
the village. Although these soldiers were ostensibly part of Croatia’s
armed response to the Serb rebellion, they were not engaged in military
action at the time. Ž.L. was part of a joint JNA paramilitary unit
that had allowed another Croatian t ruck to pass without incident the day
before. However, the Serb troops knew that the truck of soldiers was due to
arrive on 8 September and had been given orders that the truck should be
“destroyed”.
5.27 At the beginning of the ambush, the Croatian soldiers took shelter
in Croat houses in the village. Many of 38em were killed. A pitched battle
waged for the rest of the night. On the following day, Serb forces
destroyed the houses where the last soldiers were hiding. Those who
survived were then tortured, despite already suffering serious wounds. The
torture included physical mutilation before the wounded were finally killed.
Several of the victims’ ears and noses were cut off (A.T., V.K.,
P.G.). Another victim’s eyes were cut out (M .P.).
Another was castrated (G. P.*). Two people’s fingers
were cut off and their rings stolen. Other forms of torture included the
throwing of concrete blocks onto prisoners’ legs and injecting poisonous
fluids into their bodies. According to S.V., most of the torture
41
victims were naked. The massacre was videotaped by Željko Mandić, a
journalist from Pakrac. I t is bel ieved that the videotape was given to
UNPROFOR. The dead were buried in a mass grave which was
th
discovered on the 28 of January 1992. In the subsequent days, it is
understood that members of the JNA detained the perpetrators of the
massacre. There is no evidence that they were prosecuted for their crimes
43 th
by the Serb authorities. On the second anniversary of the massacre (8
September 1993), 3 people died and 11 were wounded when a bomb
exploded as a group of Croat civilians tried to place a wreath by the houses
44
where the soldiers had been killed.
37 Witness Statement of Ž.L., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 183.
38 Ibid.
39
Witness Statement of S.V., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 184.
40 Ibid. Witness Statement of Ž.L., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 183.
41
Witness Statement of S.V., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 184.
42 Witness Statement of Ž.L., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 183.
43
VHS/280192/III-8, Video record of the exhumation, autopsy and identification, (The
cited documentation is at the disposal of the Office for the cooperation with
International Court of Justice and ICTY)
44 Witness Statement of V.S., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 185. 230
3. M UNICIPALITY OF ODRAVSKA S LATINA
Voćin
5.28 The town of Voć in is located in the municipality of Podravska
Slatina, Western Slavonia, southwest of Podravska Slatina. In 1991, Vo ćin
had 1569 residents, of whom 1009 (64.31%) were Serb and 426 (27.15%)
were Croats.
5.29 Before the beginning of 1991, Serbs and Croats in the town
coexisted peacefully. The witness F.D. was the coach to the local
football team, which combined people of all ethnic backgrounds in its
ranks. A deterioration in ethnic relations occurred after the visit of Jovan
th 45
Rašković to Voćin on 14 January 1991. At the beginning of August,
rebel Serbs erected barricades, enab ling them to control entry and exit into
Voćin. On 18 August 1991 the President of the Local Committee, Miro
Agić held a meeting with the aim of negoti ating a local peace between
Serbs and Croats. 46Serbs deliberately sabotaged the meeting and on 19 th
August, the rebel Serb Territorial Defence (TO) Headquarters were
established. The police station was occupied and the Croatian flag
destroyed. Serbian and JNA flags were hoisted in its place. 47 All Croats
were forced to attend a meeting in the town centre where they were
informed by Serb paramilitaries that they were not allowed to leave and
that they would be massacred if anyone fired a bullet. 48 All Croatians in
49
the town were summonsed to report to the police station for interviews.
According to a witness, A.H. , paramilitaries from the
Republic of Serbia represented themselves as the JNA. 50 The local Serbs
told their C51at neighbours that they were no longer allowed to associate
with them. All Croats were listed by street address and house number.
This list was drawn up by V.S. and his brother under threats to
their life. They listed a total of 94 Croatian families, none of whom wis52d
to leave their homes. Subsequently they had to change their names.
45 Witness Statement of F.D. , Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 186. Thereafter the
witness was ostracised by his players and eventually threatened with death by the field.
46
Witness Statement of Đ.D., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 187.
47 Witness Statement of A.V. , Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 188; and
J.M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 189.
48
Witness Statement of M.S., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 190.
49 Witness Statement of Đ.D., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 187.
50
Witness Statement of A.H., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 191.
51 Witness Statement of M.P., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 192.
52
Witness Statement of V.S., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 193. 231
5.30 Croat houses were searched on a daily basis. Croats were subjected 53
to food rationing and on certain occasions, a complete denial of bread.
They were also denied medicines, even though supplies were available. 54
Dr. V.M. told D.D. that there was no medicine available
for “Ustasha” children. On another occasion, the doctor ordered the nurse
to administer an expired vaccine to a 1-year-old Croatian girl. 56 Croats
th
were abducted by the paramilitaries. On 14 August, B.I. was taken
from his place of employment at the local hotel to “Sekulinci” warehouse. 57
th
On 19 August, two other Croats, K.D. and F.D., were also
taken to the warehouse. They were tied to a tree and beaten by several
people. F.D. sustained a broken foot, three broken vertebra and
cracked ribs. While being tortured, he heard a woman being rap ed.
Contemporaneously, I.D. and A.Š. were taken to the police
station where they were maltreated and beaten. 58
5.31 In September 1991, Serb forces raided the town and abducted 35
Croat men. These men were detained in the basement of a bank for the
remainder of the day. Many were beaten. Fifteen of the prisoners were then
taken to join a forced labour group, where they had to work at gunpoint. On
rd
3 December 1991, Ljubiško Novaković selected 4 young Croat men from
the work gr oup: Goran Sala č, Ivica Bon, Vlado Supan and Dr ago
Ivanković. These 4 men were later shot. 59
th
5.32 On 18 September 1991, armed attackers invaded the home of
V.M. A.V. and Ž.T. were present. A.V.
60
was dragged out of the house. He has not been seen since then.
5.33 According to Dr. Jerry Blaskovich, an unidentified 23 year old
Croat man returned to the town on leave without knowing that it had been
seized by the Serbs. The man was arrested upon arrival. He was suspended
by handcuffs from a tree in front of the Catholic church. Serbian soldiers
then slashed his face with an electric saw before cutting off his lower limbs.
53
Witness Statements of J.M. Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 189; and M.S. ,
Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 190.
54 Witness Statement of D.V., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 194.
55
Witness Statement of D.D., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 195.
56 Witness Statement of D.V., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 194.
57
Witness Statement of K.T., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 196.
58 Witness Statement of F.D., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 186.
59
Witness Statement of M.S., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 190.
60 Witness Statement of I.D., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 197. 232
He was still alive when they cut him in half. The Serbs then 61oceeded to
pour gasoline over the man’s body and set him on fire.
th
5.34 thn December 1991 the Serbian forces began to retreat. Between 12
and 14 December at least 35 Croats were taken from the town. These
people remain missing. A number of old people were killed because they
were unable to escape. Franjo and Marija Matan či were murdered in their
courtyard and their house was destroyed. 62 Four Serb paramilitaries entered
the house of Mirko Medved and killed him. 63A number of Serb civilians
later told the Belgrade press that Croats were systematically beaten and
murdered in the town. According to the statement of R.M., the
order to execute genocidal acts against the Croatian population was issued 65
by Borivoj Lukić, a commander of the rebel Serb paramilitary unit.
5.35 On 13 December 1991, the Catholic Church of St. Mary, built some
th 66
time in the 14 century, was destroyed. The church had been partially
damaged after several tank grenades were fired at it. It was then mined with
explosives and completely destroyed. Prior to its destruction, the church
had been used by Serbs as a weapons warehouse. Croats were forbidden to
practice their religion in the Church or bury their dead in the graveyard. 67
This intentional destruction of the Catholic church happened immediately
before the Croatian Army entered and regained the town.
Hum
5.36 The village of Hum is located in the municipality of Podravska
Slatina, Western Slavonia, to the southwest of Podravska Slatina. In 1991,
the village had 243 inhabitants, of whom 84 were Croats and 127 were
Serbs. The remaining 13.17% of the population belonged to other ethnic
groups.
61
The Anatomy of Deceit, Dr. Jerry Blaskovich, Modern Times, 1998, p. 87
62 Witness Statement of D.D. : “When we entered the courtyard of Franjo
Matanči we found the slaughtered Franjo and Marija behind the rock, where they were
still twitching in their death pains, with blood running from their throats”. Annexes, vol
63 2(II), annex 195.
Witness Statement of M.S. , “...J.S., who was with us, peaked outside
and saw that those four killed Mirko Medved .”, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 190.
64
Chronology of War, HIC, Zagreb 1998, p. 350, – segment from the newspaper article,
interview with the refugee Pero Ajki ć from Vo ćin and an anonymous person from
Voćin.
65 Witness Statement of R.M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 198.
66
Witness Statement of J.T. “…into the Catholic church were brought truckloads
of different tank, cannon and other heavy munitions…” Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 199.
67 Witness Statement of A.Š., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 200. 233
5.37 On 23 August 1991, the rebel Serbs erected a barricade at the
Kusac crossing towards Levinovac. They later moved it to the entrance of
68
the village. A Croat, Željko Galović, was apprehended as he drove up to
the barricade. He was taken to Vo ćin. The witness M.K. * saw
Galović ‘s dead body on a cargo truck three days later. At first, the Serb
paramilitaries suggested that the deceased had hung himself whilst in
custody. M.K. later discovered that a policeman had killed
Galović. 69
5.38 After the establishment of Serb paramilitary control, Croats were
denied food supplies and electricity, whilst such amenities were freely
available to Serbs. The movement of Croats was restricted70y threats of
death if they ventured beyond the village borders. Anyone attempting to
leave was arrested.
th
5.39 On 24 August 1991, several armed and masked rebel Serbs arrived
in Hum. Amongst others, F.B. and D.J. were abducted.
They were taken to “Sekulinci” camp where they were detained for thirty-
three days. They were locked inside a metal container and tortured on a
daily basis. D.J. was eventually released. F.B.
remained a prisoner. The Serbian Marko Kovač was subsequently heard
71
admitting th at he had slaughtered the pr isoner. F.B.’s
decomposed corpse was found seven months later on 25 March 1992, near
Sekulinci.
5.40 During September 1991, Željko Galovi ć was arrested and taken to
the house of M.E. , the location of the rebel headquarters. He
has not been seen since that time.
th
5.41 On 13 December 1991, Serb paramilitaries raided the home of
Roman Ridl. Ivan Banovac was also sleeping there. Both men were
72
murdered and set on fire. M.B. found them the following day.
Witnesses heard Marijan Đuzel’s being shot in his house. The following
morning his family found his corpse. 73 Marko Vujovi ć was also murdered
68 Witness Statement of N.I., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 201.
69
Witness Statement of M.K., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 202.
70 Witness Statement of I.K.: “...we could not go anywhere, not leave our houses,
not visit our neighbors, nor our fields. If they caught two Croats talking, they threatened
to kill us. If they found someone working in the field they would kill him.” Annexes,
71 vol 2(II), annex 203.
Witness Statement of A.Ž., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 204.
72 Witness Statement of M.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 205.
73
Witness Statement of A.Ž., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 204. 234
74 75
on that night. According to M.B., his corpse was also burnt. In
the wake of the eventual Serbian withdrawal from the village, a large
76
number of houses and commercial objects were burnt down or destroyed.
Četekovac
5.42 The village of Četekovac is situated in the municipality of
Podravska Slatina, Western Slavonia, to the southwest of Podravska
Slatina. In 1991, the village had approximately 300 inhabitants, of whom
77
97.11% were Serb, 2.25% were Croat and 0.64% were Slovaks.
5.43 On 4 thSeptember 1991, paramilitaries, armed with weapons
78
obtained from JNA warehouses, took over the village. According to R.M.,
BorivojLukić was in charge of the whole operation, and ordered
the genocide that was committed ag ainst the Croats. 79The witness S.B.
was one of a group of 12 Croats who were captured by Serbs and
forced to parade through the village as a human shield. 80Ivanka Starčević
was shot. Adam Kroupa lay down on the ground to protect himself from
gunfire. A Serb soldier shot him in the back. Duško Butorac was beaten to
81
death. At least 17 stables and a large number of 82mes were set on fire.
The church in Č etekovac was destroyed. During the assault on Balinci
and Četekovac one rebel Serb group each was entrusted with the task of
“cleaning” the houses in the villages. A third group was to ensure that no
one escaped from the two villages. 83
74 Witness Statement of N.I., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 201.
75
Ibid.
76 Witness Statement of I.K. : “...on this way I saw the local Chetniks from the
neighbor villages and Voć in shoot certain groups of people on the path, in the houses,
in the ditches, at the side of the road, these citizens were from HumČetekovac and
Voćin. It was a horrible sight, I saw how they murdered people for no reason, and I
could not stand to see it.”, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 203.
77 1991 Census, Republic’s Institute for Statistics.
78
Witness Statement of B.D., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 206.
79 Witness Statement of R.M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 198.
80
Witness Statements of S.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 207, and Đ.I. ,
Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 208.
81
82 Witness Statement of M.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 209.
Witness Statement of M.B.:” I saw that this Z. destroyed our church in
Četekovci. He fired at the church from a rocket launcher and knocked down the roof
and the tower. He told me to go to the churh to take out the Croats because despite all
83 their parytaing to God, nobody was there.” Ibid.
Witness Statement of M.K., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 202. 235
5.44 A number of Croats tried to escape from the village, but were
ambushed and killed on the highway by paramilitaries. Among the dead
were Franjo Sabo, Marko Sabo, Zlatan Pin čar, Marija Mati čić, Josip
Tomac, Terezija Troha and Milan Mlakar. 84 All of the dead were unarmed.
Although there are no known livin85witnesses to the massacre, a video
recording exists of the events.
Balinci
5.45 The village of Balinci is located in the municipality of Podravska
Slatina, Western Slavonia, to the southeast of Podravska Slatina. In 1991,
the village had 295 residents, of whom 145 were Croats and 139 were
Serbs. 86
th
5.46 On 4 September 1991, Serb paramilitary forces attacked the
village at the same time that they attacked Četekovac. They had specific
orders to cleanse the area of 87oats. Josip Butorac was gratuitously shot as
he came out of his cellar. When the paramilitaries met in Balinci, they
found an old man. One of the Serbs instructed him to start running, after
which a sniper shot him in the back and killed him. Subsequently, the unit
retreated to the warehouse in Sekulinci where they boasted about shooting
anything that moved. 88 At least 20 Croat civilians and 2 police men were
killed in Balinci and neighbouring Četekovac. Amongst them were Ivan
Biskupović, Juraj Borovac, Ika Biskupovi ć, Rozika Vlatkovi ć, Miro
Lovrinc, Josip Butorac, Ivan Rukavina, Manda Rukavina, Nikola Magdi ć
89
and Ivica Biskupovi ć. All of the dead were civilians and predominantly
older people. The Croatian army, accompanied by television cameras,
discovered the bodies of the murdered people on 5 September 1991. The 90
conclusion of the autopsy report carried out at Osijek General Hospital was
as follows:
84
“War Crimes of the Serbian Military and Paramilitary Forces in Western Slavonia and
Banovina 1991-1995”.
85 VHS/050991/III-11, No 155, (The cited video cassette is at the disposal of the Office
for the cooperation with International Court of justice and ICTY).
86
87 1991 Census, the Republican Institute for Statistics.
Witness Statement of M.B.: “… because this R. was the last one ,and my
husband was still alive.”, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 210.
88
89 Witness Statement of M.K., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 202.
“War Crimes of the Serbian Military and Paramilitary Forces in Western Slavonia and
Banovina 1991-1995”; The witness A. M. buried Nikola Magdi ć, Vol 2(II),
annex 211.
90
Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92, p. 117. 236
“The killing of 20 villagers was a deliberate massacre of civilians.
The victims were found in their doorways and yards, shot in the
back or the side, half of them were elderly people (more than 59
years of age) and five of them were women – it is not likely that
they were using firearms at the time of death. Shooting a 91 year
old woman, executing a 65 year old man by stabbing, or setting a
36 year old ma91on fire, are crimes of unprecedented brutality and
ruthlessness”
Donji Čaglić
5.47 The village of Donji Čaglić is located in the municipality of Pakrac,
Western Slavonia.
nd
5.48 On 2 October 1991, armed Serb paramilitaries entered the village.
Milorad Gašparović was one such paramilitary . He subsequently confessed
to the brutal murder of the Cr oat civilians that took place. The
paramilitaries entered the home of Z. B. 8 civilians were
removed from the basement. One who remained undiscovered heard the
conversation in the yard. The oldest of the Croats asked the armed and
masked soldiers: “What have we done to you, we hav en’t done anything to
anyone.” One of the Serb paramilitaries answered: “You really are true
‘Ustashas’.” They then executed the Croats by firing squad. The victims
were Zlatko Hrunka, Đ uro Žili,92nka Maroševi ć, Zora Barba ča, Marijan
Adžijević and Nikola Ani ć. On the same day, Paulina Žili, Barica Žili,
Ruža Sinjaković and Ana Zaneti were also murdered. The houses of the
victims were also destroyed. 93
5.49 The bodies of the murdered civilians were transported by Vlado
Gašparović's tractor and taken to a prepar ed trench about 30 meters from
the rectory. This trench became a mass grave. A JNA vehicle designed for
94
the purpose was used to make the trench. The massacre was carried out by
the local Serb paramilitaries and JNA reservists from the Banja Luka
Corps on the orders of Marica Gašparović , a representative of th e civil
th
authorities in the village. On 6 October 1991, the JNA entered the village
91 Ibid., p. 118.
92
Witness Statement of N. M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 212, who, together
with other Serbs, took part in the described massacre of the civilians.
93 Witness Statement of N.M.: “... he stuck the knife into the basement door at
the police station in Donji Čaglić, knowing that detained civilians are in the basement.”
Ibid.
94
Witness Statement of R.M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 213.
95 Witness Statement of S.R., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 215. 237
and forced the remaining Croat population to leave. Thereafter, the village
was completely destroyed to ensure that any surviving Croats would be
unable to return to their homes.
4. M UNICIPALITY OF D ARUVAR
Đulovac
5.50 The village of Đulovac is situated in the municipality of Daruvar,
Western Slavonia. It lies approximately 20 km to the east of the town
Daruvar. In 1991, Đulovac had 646 inhabitants of whom 285 were Croats,
96
and 260 were Serbs. Before the conflict Đulovac was called Miokovićevo.
5.51 Serbs began to erect barricades on the roads from Đulovac to
Daruvar and Virovitica in early August 1991. Movement to and from the
97
village was forbidden. Late in September 1991, members of the Šešelj’s 98
units known as “Beli orlovi” (“White eagles”) began to arrive in Đulovac.
The JNA supported the occupation, primarily by endorsing the policy of
barricades and later by supplying arms and food. According to the witness
B.B., JNA reservists led by a 99A captain subsequently came
from Novi Sad in November.
5.52 Soon after the occupation began, rebel Serbs captured five civilians:
F.B., I.K., K.M., I.B., A.T. and
a Catholic priest, I.H.. All 5 were detained in a veterinary station in
Đulovac. All except the priest were physically and psy chologically
maltreated. On 18 thAugust 1991, the same fate befell the civilians Đ uro
Blažević, Mirko Zelić and Ivan Keserica. After being tortured in the
veterinary station, they were taken to the Buč je concentration camp. None
have been seen since. On the same day, Croats A. and A. S.
were also tortured in the veterinary station. The Serbs threatened to set
A.S. on fire. They put a pistol in his mouth and a knife to his
throat.
5.53 Others who were abducted and held prisoner without charge were
A.I., I.H., J.H., D.H., I.G.,
I.G., P.T., V.P., J.K., J.M.,
B.B. and I.B. The witness B.B. provides an
96 1991 Census, Republic’s Institute for Statistics.
97
Witness Statement of M.S., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 216.
98 Witness Statement of R.J., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 217.
99 Witness Statement of B.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 218. 238
example of the treatment they received. He was beaten with a telephone
wire, a baton, a pole made of hazel-tree and a hose:
“Before they would batter us, they handcuffed us to a stand that
was used for binding cattle and they roped us around the waist so
that when we began to fall unconscious during the torture, we
wouldn’t fall directly on concrete, but we would remain hanging
on that rope. The frequency of the torture depended on military
successes….They also mentally traumatised in that they would
take us to a birch-tree where they tied us up and they told us that
we were going to be executed by a firing squad. After that, they
would return us to the shed. There were sometimes as many as 18
of us locked up in that shed, in a space that was no more than 3x3
m. The numbers consistently changed as people were brought and
taken away….A lot of those people that were imprisoned with me
were killed…” 100
rd
5.54 On 23 September 1991, S. A.* was taken from Veliki to
the veterinary station in Đulovac. He was kept there for one month, after
which he was transported to a prison in Bijela and then to Buč je and finally
to Stara Gradiška. Throughout his captivity, he was subjected to torture.
This included the removal of his tongue, the extraction of his teeth and the
laceration of his body and hands. He was beaten on a daily basis, often until
he lost consciousness. A. also witnessed others being tortured. 101On 27 th
September 1991, three civilians from Koreni čani, Ivo Golub, Ivan Gyordji
and Pavle Tršek, were taken to the veterinary station in Đulovac. After
transportation to Bučje in November 1991, they disappeared.
th
5.55 On 7 September 1991, Franjo Žmegač was attacked by a number
of paramilitaries who cut his body with axes and knives. He died from his
wounds. He was subsequently found and buried by a witnesses. Apart from
lacerations all over his body, his nose and jaw had been fractured and the
102
arteries and veins in his neck cut. His house had also been set on fire.
According to M.S., the Serbs video-taped the murder and it was
later viewed by some of the victim’s neighbours. 103
5.56 The most extreme violence occurred when the Serb paramilitaries
began to retreat from Đulovac on 12 December 1991. The B. family
home was raided by a group of Serbs. The witness F. S.,
overheard the attackers shooting members of the family. F. locked
100 Witness Statement of B.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 219.
101
102 Witness Statement of S.A., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 220.
Witness Statement of S.H., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 221.
103 Witness Statement of M.S., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 216. 239
herself in the bathroom and climbed up into an adjacent attic, just as the
Serb paramilitaries threw two bombs through the bathroom window. 104
Before the paramilitaries retreated from the town, they killed at least 10
Croat civilians. The dead included Franjo Blažan, Nada Blažan, Milan
Blažan, Jakov Bijeli ć, Andja Bijeli ć, Jelka Hasak, Jaga Prša, Alfred
Sautner, Ana Sautner and Ankica Smilj čić.105These killings occurred
during a period when the JNA was still in control of the village.
Doljani
5.57 The village of Doljani is in the municipality of Daruvar, Western
Slavonia. In 1991 the village had 1,003 inhabitants, of whom 361 (35.99%)
were Croat and 219 (21.83%) were Serb. The remainder of the population
comprised other ethnic groups.
5.58 The village was attacked by the JNA and Serb paramilitary groups
on 16 September 1991. Four non-Serb civilians were killed in the attack.
I.M.* and his son I.* were hiding in a shed. A gunman burst in
and opened fire with an automatic weapon. The same night, their
neighbours, August Hašek and Božena, were also killed. They were found
106
dead in front of the shed the follow ing day. Božena Hašek was shot in
the chest. Her son August was lying with his head in her lap with a part of
his skull cracked open. 107
5.59 Like many of the inhabitants of the village, the witness
A.K.* was hiding with her family during the heavy fire. The family was in
the basement of their home. No one was sure what was happening outside,
but through the rolling shutters they could see a tank with a Yu go slav flag
on it. Serb paramilitaries forced the family out into the yard and ordered
them to lie on the ground. A young man, aged around the 18 or 19, ordered
A. to go to the kitchen and undress. He pointed his gun at her until she
took off all her clothes. He then raped her. Two other Serb paramilitaries
also raped her. 108
104 Witness Statement of F.S., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 223.
105
Witness Statement of B.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 218.
106 Witness Statement of I.M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 224.
107
108 Witness Statement of A.M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 225.
Witness Statement of A.K. “…After he pointed his gun at me, I had no other
choice but to do what he ordered me. Then, one of them entered the kitchen and raped
me, after him another one came and did the same thing”, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 226. 240
Vukovije
5.60 The village of Vukovije is located in the municipality of Daruvar,
Western Slavonia and lies a short distance from Đulovac. In 1991, 103
people lived in the village, 71 of whom were Croats and 25 o109hom were
Serbs. The remainder were mostly Muslim and Czech. By the end of the
war, the Croat inhabitants had been almost completely banished.
th
5.61 On 8 November 1991, armed members of the Serb paramilitary
units burned J.K.’s barn, and appropriated his tractor. The family,
which had been hiding in the basement, subsequently fled. 110On the same
day, the property of Z.J. , M.O. , 111 S.N.
112
and N.P. were set on fire.
5.62 Due to the escalating violence, many of the Croat inhabitants
grouped together. On 19 th November 1991, Mijo Novakovi ć, Ivka
Novaković and Štefica Kopriva were discovered and shot in the back of the
head by the Serb paramilitaries. M.H. later found their dead bodies
on the steps of the house. 113
Veliki Miletinac
5.63 The village of Veliki Miletinac is situated in the municipality of
Daruvar, Western Slavonia. In 1991, the village had only 99 inhabitants, of
whom 55 were Croats and only 5 were Serbs. The remaining 39 inhabitants
were members of other ethnic groups.
rd
5.64 On 23 September 1991, Serb paramilitary groups opened fire on
several Croat houses in Veliki Miletinac. The attackers shouted: “Ustashe,
come out of the house”. I.A.* tried to escape from the village, but was
shot. He was later found dead in a cornfield, along with P .M.
His parents, A.A.* and S., were then arrested and escorted to
Brđane by soldiers who wor e ha ts with five-pointed red stars and “small
crosses”. A nail was stabbed into the hand of A. A. Upon her release,
she was initially proh ibited from burying her son, I. At length, after
obtaining a permit, she was allowed to bury him without ceremony. Her
strangled dead body was found by M.M. following the liberation
109
Census from 1991, Republican Institute for Statistics.
110 Witness Statement of J.K., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 227.
111
112 Witness Statement of M.O., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 228.
Witness Statements of J.K., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 227.
113 Witness Statement of M.H., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 229. 241
of the village on 11 November 1991. 114Her husband, I. had been taken
to a concentration camp, where he was tortured. The methods of torture
included the removal of his tongue and extraction of his teeth. 115
SECTION TWO: BANOVINA
5. INTRODUCTION
Geography
5.65 The region of Banovina covers 1, 795 km ² to the southwest of the
Sisak part of the Sava River. The lower part of the rivers Una, Kupa and
Glina also flow through the region. The countryside is characterised by a
range of hills, with an average height of 300 km above sea level. The
highest peak is Zrinska Gora (615m). A large part of the area is covered by
forests, especially the municipalities of Dvor na Uni and Hrvatska
Kostajnica. The major town and economic centres of Banovina are Petrinja
(meat industry), Glina and Hrvatska Kostajnica (timber industry). The
population is mainly rural and engaged in farming or cattle breeding.
Demography
5.66 In 1991, the region comprised the municipalities of Sisak, Petrinja,
Glina, Dvor na Uni and Hrvatska Kostajnica. The population at that time
was 173,265, of whom 84,142 were Croats and 71,063 Serbs. Glina, Dvor
na Uni and Hrvatska Kostajnica were predominantly populated by Serbs
(Glina: 34.9% Croats and 60.66% Serbs; Dvor na Uni: 9.58% Croats and
116
86.51% Serbs; Hrvatska Kostajnica: 28.92% Croats and 62.91% Serbs).
There was a Croat majority in Sisak (64.76% Croats and 22,77% Serbs),
while in Petrinja the population comprised an equal balance of Croats
(44.4%) and Serbs (44.9%). The entire area of Banovina was occupied
during the conflict. Only one part of the Sisak municipality remained under
Croatian jurisdiction.
114
Witness Statement of A.A., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 230.
115 Witness Statement of S.A., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 220.
116 Republican Census of the Public Institute for Statistics from 1991. 242
The Outbreak of Hostilities
5.67 As a reaction to political changes in the Republic of Croatia the
Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) members started with mass psychological
mobilization of all Serbs with the aim of creating a “Greater Serbia”.
Accordingly, a meeting of SDS 117 was held in Banovina at the former
th
Marshal Tito Square in Petrinja on 25 June 1990. The meeting was
attended by several thousand Serbs. Dr. Jovan Raškovi ć, the Chairman of
the SDS, spoke at the meeting and openly incited the crowd to disobey the
democratically elected government of the Republic of Croatia. The SDS
had not had a significant presence in Banovina prior to the meeting. It had
not contested the April elections in the area. However, between June 1990
and December 1990, most villa118 of Banovina with a Serb majority
founded SDS committees.
5.68 On 27 September 1990, an official letter from the Ministry of
119
Interior (MUP) of Croatia ordered the withdrawal of 60% of the
weaponry of the reserve forces from all police stations to the Central Police
Department in Sisak. The SDS organised a demonstration to block the
government order. A crowd of 1,500 people ensured not only that the
government plan was blocked, but that the weapons were taken from the
police stations and distributed to the embryonic paramilitary forces in the
120
region. At the same time in the neighbouring villages of Glina and Dvor
na Uni, the Serb paramilitaries seized the entire arms’ stores of the local
police stations. 121
5.69 In the following months, the local SDS, influenced by the so called
Executive Council of “SAO Krajina” in Knin, formed local Secretariats in
Dvor na Uni, Hrvatska Kostajnica and Glina. These bodies subsequently
declared that the jurisdiction of the Croatian Government in that area
ceased to be valid. In the early months of 1991, the newly self-appointed
government was given support to act with impunity by the JNA. During
that period, military helicopters provided weapons to the SDS, who than
117
Official Note of the Police Department (PU) Sisak from 26 November 1991, Annexes,
vol 2(II), annex 297.
118 Witness Statement of Đ. Č.: The witness confirms that the local SDS “ was
founded with aim to expel Croats from the Una River to the Kupa River and establish a
119 state of arms”, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 242.
Official letter of the MUP RH from 27 September 1990, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 298.
120 Official note of the PU Sisak-Moslavina; official note of the PU Zagreb from 16 April
1992, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 299 and annex 300.
121
Narodna Armija, 11 October 1990, pp. 4-5, 15, “Vojska je prigrlila narod” (The Army
has Embraced the People), “Ukradeno oružje”(Stolen Weapons), Annexes, vol 4, annex
147. 243
122
distributed it to the Serbian population in the area. 123 A “Serbian Territorial
Defence force” was established at the local level. A paramilitary training
centre was opened in Šamarica on 18 thJune 1991 for the purpose of
training the volunteer formations of the Territorial Defence, as well as the
special units of the “Police of SAO Krajina”. 124
th
5.70 On 26 July 1991, the Serb paramilitaries and the JNA began
operation “Žaoka” (“Sting”) with the purpose of defeating all Croatian
forces in the area (see vol 3, Plate 18; also vol 3, Plate 4.4). The villages of
Zamlača, Struga Banska, Divuša, Unčani and Kozibrod were attacked with
mortar and artillery fire, which lasted all day. The attack commenced with
approximately 120 mortar missiles,125ortly followed by up to 600 missiles
over the course of the day. Operation “Žaoka” caused a significant
number of civilian deaths and the forced exile of most of the Croat
126 rd
population. After the operation, the JNA Commander of the 3 Battalion
submitted a report on the operation to the military headquarters, indicating
that all platoons had completed their tasks without losses. 127 Thereafter,
villages and towns in the region of Banovina suffered daily assaults, despite
the absence of any military justification.
5.71 The civilian government of the Banovina municipality, with a
Serbian majority, started making decisions for joining these municipalities
to the “SAO Krajina.” On 31 March 1991, at a secret meeting in the
Community Memorial House in Šamarica, the SO Glina decided to join
Glina to the so-called “SAO Krajina”. 128On 5 May 1991, a Community of
the Local Committees (MZ) with129Serbian majority of the Municipality
Petrinja was established. On the same day, the Assembly of that
municipality decided to join the MZs of the Municipality Petrinja with a
130
Serbian majority to the “SAO Krajina”. They also decided to call a
122
Witness Statement of M.C., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 243.
123 The decision on establishing the Headquarters of Territorial Defence (ŠTO) of the
Municipality Dvor na Uni, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 301.
124
The overview of the situation in the Training Centre “Šamarica”, Annexes, vol 2(II),
annex 302.
125 Witness Statement of D.V., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 244.
126
See paras 5.102-5.106
127 Report of the Commander of the 3rd Battalion to the war headquarters on the operation
“Žaoka”, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 303. For details of the loss of civilian life as a result
of operation “Žaoka” see paras 5.102-5.106.
128 Official note of the PU Sisak-Moslavina from 31 May 1994, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex
304.
129
Decision on forming the Community of MZ Petrinja, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 305.
130 “Decision of the Assembly of the Community of MZ with a Serbian majority of the
Municipality Petrinja for the joining with SAO Krajina”, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 306. 244
referendum on 12 May 1991 and to hold it in the entire area of “SAO
Krajina”. 131On the basis of the referendum results, the Central Commission
132
made a Report to the “Assembly of the SAO Krajina” in which it
concluded that the conditions for reaching a Decision for the joining of the
“Serbian Autonomous Region (SAO) Krajina” with the Republic of Serbia
had been established, and that “Krajina” could remain in Yugoslavia
133
together with Serbia. According to this decision, the Banovina
Municipalities of Glina, Dvor na Uni and Petrinja were also considered a
part of the “SAO Krajina”.
Military Organisation of the JNA in Banovina
5.72 Prior to its direct involvement in the war, the JNA was secretly
134
arming Serb paramilitaries. In the summer of 1991, the JNA began to
openly support the expansionist agenda of the Serbian leadership.
5.73 The region of Banovina was under the jurisdiction of the Command
of the 10 thCorps of the JNA. The main part of the army had its
th
headquartend in the town of Petrinja. The Pthrinja barracks housed the 257 th
and 622 Motorized Brigade, the 6 Combined Artillery Regiment, the 6
Combined Anti-armour Artillery Regiment and the 671 Pontoon Battalion.
In the spring of 1991, the JNA capacity in Petrinja was reinforced with the
1 Armoured Battalion of the 51 Mechanised Brigade from Pančevo. 135In
th
addition, the Mechanised Unit of the 329 Armoured Brigade from Banja
Luka was stationed in the south of Banovina, around the area of Dvor na
Uni. The arrival of these reinforcemstts coincided with the Serbind
rebellion in the region. On 21 October 1991, the 592 Motorised Brigade
was sent from the barracks in Šabac (Serbia) to the area of Banovina
136
battlefield.
131 Decision on calling a referendum from 5 May 1991. Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 307.
132
Report of the conducted referendum in the area of “SAO Krajina” from 14 May 1991,
Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 308.
133 Decision for the joining of the “SAO Krajina” with the Republic of Serbia from 16 May
1991, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 309.
134 Witness Statement of Z.M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 245.
135 th
The Command of thend Military Region from 12 May th91, the report of the tour and
control of the 622 Motorised Brigade and the 4 Armoured Brigade; Annexes, vol
2(II), annex 310; Anton Tus, “The War in Slovenia and Croatia Until the Sarajevo
Truce”, “The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995”, pp. 68-69.
136 nd
Order for march and the order for defence of the Command of the 592 Motorised
Brigade, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 311. 245
5.74 At the end of July13791, the regional headquarters of the TO
Kordun and Banovina were formed. On 20 August, the operative zones
of the Territorial Defence “SAO Krajina” had been established. In
September, the areas of Kordun and Banovina were merged into a unified
3 Operative Zone under the command of Rade Vujaklije. 138The units of
the rebel Serbs in Kordun and Banovina were put under the command of
the JNA on 19 thOctober 1991. A JNA Order issued by Major General
Špiro Niković confirms that the Serb rebel and paramilitary forces were to
be “engaged as part of the composition of the JNA units”. 139
th
5.75 After the signing of the Sarajevo Agreement on 10 January 1992,
and the arrival of UNPROFOR, the JNA agreed to retreat from the territorth 140
of Banovina. The official order to retreat was made on 11 May 1992.
However, the JNA ensured that the “SAO Krajina” police who remained
141
were provided with substantial technical and combat equipment. The
administrative functions of the “police” and military units of “SAO
Krajina” continued to be conducted by officers of the Yugoslav Army (the
JNA’s successor), who were paid by the headquarters of the Yugoslav
142
Army and assigned to their duties in the occupied territory of Banovina.
Up until 1995, the VJ continued to supply financial help, logistical support
143
and senior officers to the army of the rebel Serbs.
137
“SAO Krajina”, Government No. 157/91 from 26 July 1991, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex
312.
138
“SAO Krajina”, Commander of the TO “SAO Krajina”, No. 2/1 from 9 October ,
Order; “SAO Krajina”, Government, President. No. 1/1 from 5 October 1991, Note,
Annexes, vol 2(II), annexes 313 and 314.
139 Command of the 1 stOG, No. 100-233 from 19 October 1991; Chapter 3, para 3.63
Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 315.
140 SSNO; GŠ OS SFRJ; Operative Centre No. 53-3 from 11 May 1992, to the Command
th th th th th
of the 5 , 10 , 13 , 17 Corps and the 4 VO, Order, p.21; Annexes, vol 2(II), annex
316.
141 Record of the Commander of the 1 Brigade TO Glina Colonel Marko Vrcelj on taking
over the weapons and military equipment of the 592 ndMotorised Brigade from 19 May
1992 and the Petrinja Bulletin No. 1/92, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 317 and Annexes,
vol 4, annex 152.
142 Decision with which Colonel Stanko Leti ć (CO of the 39 thCorps) acknowledges the
right to expenses refund due to seperate life from family, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 318.
143 Witness Statement of M. S.; Order of the GŠVJ on transfer from 5 November
1993, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 246 and annex 319. 246
Destruction of Cultural Monuments
5.76 During the period in which Banovina was temporarily occupied,
numerous Catholic monuments were destroyed, including parish churches,
chapels, parish houses, monasteries and graveyards. As many as 57 sacral
objects were destroyed or damaged. Amongst the most significant cultural
losses were the Parish Church of St. Nicholas the Blessed, in Hrvatska
Kostajnica (built in 1706), the Monastery and Church of St. Anthony of
Padua in Hrvatska Kostajnica (1729), the Parish Church of St. Catherine
the Virgin Martyr in Divuša (1699), the Parish Church of the Assumption
of the Holy Virgin Mary in Gora (1687), the Parish Church of St.
Bartholomew the Apostle in Hrastovica (1841), the Parish Church of St.
Francis Xavier in Gornji Viduševac (1827), the Monastery and Church of
St. Anthony of Padua in Hrvatski Čuntić (1699), the Parish Church of St.
Elias the Prophet in Maja (1829), the Chapel of St. John the Baptist in
Pecki (18 century), the Chapel of St. Nicholas the Bishop in Skela (18 th
century), the Chapel of St. Simon and Judas Tadeus in Strašnik, the Church
of St. Lawrence the Martyr (1780) and the Church of St. Catherine in the
Petrinja municipality(19 Century). 144
Mass Graves
5.77 39 mass graves have been discovered in Banovina (see Vol 3, Plate
7.3).145To date, 241 bodies have been exhumed of which 175 have been
identified. The largest grave was found in the area of Skelište in Ba ćin. 56
bodies were exhumed of which 38 were identified. In Petrinja, at Marinka,
a grave was found with 22 bodies. Around the “Villa Gavrilovi ć”, 17
bodies were exhumed. In Plavičevac 10 bodies were exhumed.
144 Wounded Church in Croatia, pp.323-324, 332-341, 393-394. See Vol 3, Plate 8.4.
145 Mass graves in Banovina Annexes, vol 2(II) annex 320. 247
6. M UNICIPALITY OF G LINA
5.78 The municipality of Glina had 23,040 inhabitants, of whom 8,041
were Croats and 13,975 were Serbs. The remaining 1,024 comprised other
ethnic groups. Croats made up the majority of the population in the north
whilst Serbs were in the majority in the South. There were also a number of
majority Croat villages in the middle area of the region. These villages,
including Joševica, Dolnjaki, Prijeka, Maja and Svra čica, made up the so-
called Majski bazen. 146
Glina
5.79 In 1991 the town of Glina had 6933 inhabitants, of whom 1448
were Croats and 4831 were Serbs. The Police Department records at Sisak
state that during the occupation approximately 18 Croats were killed or
147
remain missing and over 1000 people were forced into exile.
5.80 On 26 thJune 1991, between 300 and 500 Serb paramilitaries
attacked the main police station in Glina. 16 officers were captured and
148
taken to prison in Knin where they were tortured. Inthewakeofthe
attack, a number of Croat homes and buildings were mined. A bomb was
tossed into an inn owned by I. M. 149In August 1991, members
of the Serb paramilitary units, supported by the JNA forces, captured Glina
and its surrounding villages. In Glina, the witness A. B. remembers
the JNA and Serb paramilitaries lining Croats up in the street and
threatening to kill them. Systematic looting took place, especially at night.
One morning , the dead bodi es of Zvonko and Štefica Brdarić were found in
a local well.150 Most Croats felt compelled to flee the town on account of
the violence. On one occasion, a judge visited the home of P.T.
and forced him to sign a statement which said that he agreed to leave his
entire property to the “Republic of Srpska Krajina” (“RSK”). 151
146
Specifications of the Banished, Killed and Missing Persons from the area of
Municipality of Glina, 23 June 1993 Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 321; the total dead or
missing is estimated to be 249 people.
147 Ibid.
148
Witness Statements of Ž.L. and M. Š.*, Annexes, vol 2(II), annexes
247 and 248.
149 Witness Statement of I.M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 249.
150
151 Witness Statement of A.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 250.
Witness Statement of P.T., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 251. 248
Novo Selo Glinsko
5.81 The village of Novo Selo Glinsko is located in the municipality of
Glina, Banovina, 6 km from the town of Glina. In 1991, the village had 239
inhabitants, all of whom were Croats.
5.82 During the grenade attacks on the village by the JNA and the
th
Serbian paramilitaries on 26 September 1991, the civilian Stjepan
Horvatić (born in 1919) was killed. His body was exhumed on 13 March
152
1996. By the end of September, most inhabitants ha153led fromndhe
village. Only 33 Croat civilians remained. On 2 October 1991,
members of TO of Lušč ani and Brnjeuška, together with members of the
so-called special units, entered Novo Selo Glinsko and killed 32
inhabitants. 154 The only survivor of this event was A.H. who
managed to escape. While running towards Graberje, he heard five heavy
155
explosions from the direction of the village. A Serb - M.P. - was
ordered by local Serbs to show the Serb paramilitaries the route to the
village. P. confirmed that when the Serbs arrived, the Croat people 156
were forced into the street. He subsequently heard shooting. After the
massacre, the Serb paramilitaries buried the dead near the village and set
157
the village ablaze.
152
Record of the County Court in Sisak from 13 March 1996, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex
322.
153
154 Witness Statement of Ž.V., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 252.
Witness Statement of M.P.: «...we heard short shots, then heavy detonation and
an explosion... they assembled the women and killed them in the basement of a house in
the neighborhood, by firing a «Zolja» missile into the room; whereas the men were
allegedly killed in the assembly place», Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 253.
155
Witness Statement of A.H., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 254.
156 Witness Statement of M.P., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 253.
157
Witness Statement of Ž.V. and Witness Statement of M.P.: “...at the
end of 1997 he met Đ.P., who during the war buried the bodies of the
murdered civilians, during which P. stated the murdered citizens of Novo Selo
Glinsko were buried not far from the place of their execution...”, Annexes, vol 2(II),
annex 252 and annex 253.
Witness Statement of A.H. : “...he heard from the village five heavy
explosions, one from his house, one from the school, one from the community house
and one from the end of the village towards the village of Luš čani.”, Annexes, vol 2(II),
annex 254.
Witness Statement of I.B.*: “...the entire village was burned down and the roofs
of several houses that withstood were taken of”. Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 255. See also
Judicial Document Annexes, vol 2(II) annex 323. 249
5.83 Of the 239 inhabitants that lived in the village in 1991, 206 were
banished and the remaining 32 are listed as killed or missing. 158On 13 th
March 1996, the human remains of 9 civilians were exhu159 in Novo
Glinsko Selo. Six of the bodies were identified.
Joševica
5.84 The village of Joševica is located in the municipality of Glina,
Banovina, 5 km south of the town of Glina. In 1991, the village had 133
inhabitants, of whom 126 were Croat and 2 Serbs.
5.85 From June 1991 the so-called “Šiltovi” paramilitaries began to
control access into and out of the village. 160 According to N.Š.,
161 th
the JNA assisted with this blockade. On 5 November 1991, Serb
paramilitaries burned Đuro and Gina Kreštalica alive by setting fire to their
house. Nikola Kreštalica was shot when he tried to escape from the
162
house. The burnt corpses remained in the yard for three days, after which
they were buried by S.Š. Following these murders, the
163
remaining Croat residents were afraid to leave their homes.
5.86 On 16 December 1991, the Serb paramilitary units returned to the
village, moving from house to house firing at Croatian citizens. Twenty- 164
one Croat people (ranging in age from 14 to 90) were murdered,
including Mara Šiftar and her children Luka, Pajo and Ljubica, and Milka
165
Kreštalica (born in 1909). N.Š. returned from a day working
in the fields, to find that his wife and neighbour had both been shot in the
166
head. A.Š. was shot in the temple and the mouth, but survived the
158 Specification of the Banished, Killed and Missing Persons from the area of
municipality of Glina and the Witness Statement of I. B.: «...in the village there
159 are no citizens..» Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 321 and annex 255.
Record of the County Court in Sisak 13 March 1996, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 322.
160
161 Witness Statement of P.K.; Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 256.
Witness Statement of N.Š., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 257.
162
Witness Satetment of Đ.Š.: “.. the house of Nikola Kreštalica was nothing
but ashes, and Nikola was lying dead in front of his house; on the ashes were two burnt
bodies...”. Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 258. See also Witness Statement of P.M. *,
Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 259.
163 Witness Statements of I.Š. and P.M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 260 and
164 259.
Witness Statement of I.M. who gives a list of killed persons, Annexes, vol
2(II), annex 261.
165
Witness Statement of P.M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 259.
166 Witness Statement of N.Š., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 257. 250
atrocity. Her three grandsons (age 16 to 19) and a cousin were murdered. 167
For three days after the massacre, the remaining Croat citizens were not
allowed to bury the dead. The murdered people were eventually buried in
168
the cemetery in Glina.
5.87 On 4 December 1991, the paramilitaries mined and destroyed the
169
Chapel with the Statue of Our Lady of Lourdes (1908). The Church of
St. Elias had already been destroyed in Maja. 170
th
5.88 On 20 December 1991, the majority of the remaining citizens left
the village without possessions, having been forced to obtain passes to
“authorise” their migration. Only ten people remained in Joševica. Serbs
from the neighbouring villages looted the deserted houses. When there was
nothing171re to appropriate, the Serbs broke up the fences and sold the
wood. During 1992, the Croats who had remained were physically and
psychologically abused. N.Š. was beaten and his teeth were
172
knocked out. L.F.* was beaten on numerous occasions and his
wife raped before being murdered. In all, 4 more Croats were murdered:
Stjepan Štajdohar, Kate Kreštalica, Stjepan Mihaljevi ć and L.F.*.
By the end of 1993, there were no Croats left in the village. 173 On 8 and 9 th
August 1996, twenty-three bodies were exhumed at the cemetery in Glina. 174
Subsequent post mortems revealed that they were all shot in the head.
167
Witness Statement of A.Š. and her medical records from the General Hospital
“Dr. Ivo Pedišić”, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 262.
168
Witness Statement of P.K. “...they left the murdered people unburied. The
uniformed men would not allow us to bury them nor to leave our houses.” Annexes, vol
2(II), annex 256.
169
Witness Statement of I.M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 261.
170 Ibid.
171
Witness Statement of N.Š. “...when there was nothing left to take from the
house, they even tore the fences and robbed them...on 20 D ecember 1991 the entire
population except for ten left the village”, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 257.
172
Witness Statement of N.Š., ibid.
173 Witness Statement of L.F. “... my dead wife L. was lying on the bed, her
head was blown up and I noticed that they had raped her, I knew then that there was no
life for me left in the village”, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 263; see also Witness
Statement of N.Š. “...after the murder of Stjepan Štajduhar, Kate Kreštalica,
Stjepan Mihaljević and LF there were no Croats left in Joševica”, Annexes,
vol 2(II), annex 264.
174 Witness Statement of N.Š., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 264; and Record of the
Municipal Court in Sisak, 8-9 August 1996., Annexes, vol 2(II) annex 324 and 325. 251
Gornje and Donje Jame
5.89 The villages of Gornje Jame and Donje Jame are situated
approximately 9 km north of Glina. In 1991, the 44 inhabitants comprised
24 Serbs and 17 Croats. In the village of Donje Jame, the inhabitants were
almost exclusively Croatian: out of 133 inhabitants, 130 were Croats. Only
one was of Serb origin. Records from the police administration in Sisak
state that during the occupation of the village, approximately 30 Croats
were killed or “disappeared” from the two villages whilst at least 117
175
Croats were forced into exile.
5.90 On 3 rdOctober 1991, Serb paramilitaries entered the village of
Gornje Jame and removed the following Croat residents: Ivan Fabac,
Stjepan Fabac and Nikola Fabac. Their bodies were found the next day in a
wood about 1km from the village. They had all been shot in the head. The
victims’ relations had to bury the dead in the woods. Later, Mara Krakar, a
70 year old women, was found dead by the roadside; Milka Rožić and her
deaf and mute daughter, Jaga Roži ć, were found dead in their house, as
were Draga Rastovski and Katica Rastovski. 176 The same day, in the
adjacent village of Donje Jame, Stjepan Dvornekovi ć, Stjepan Jakovljević,
Mijo Krakar, Živko Milošić, Nikola Vrbanac and Gojko Pavlović were also
killed. According to the witness J.F., the murders were carried out
by a combin177on of the “Šiltovi” paramilitary group and people in JNA
uniforms.
5.91 On 11 thDecember 1991, in the village of Gornje Jame, Mato
Kireta’s house was set on fire. The 11 Croat people inside the house
disappeared: Mato and Kata Kireta, Slavica and Darko Dvornekovi ć, Mara,
Željka and Nikolina Fabac, Mara Kuštreba, Milka Rastovski, Jela Vrbanac
178
and Janko Fabac. The whereabouts of these people remain unknown.
5.92 J.F. and J.F. remained in the village of Gornje Jame.
However, their constant maltreatment at the hands of the JNA forced them
th 179
into exile on 4 January 1992. In 1996, the bodies of Stjepan
Dvorneković, Stjepan Jakovljevi ć, Mijo Krakar, Katica Rastovski, Nikola
175 Specification, Annexes, vol 2 (II) annex 321.
176 Witness Statement of J.F., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 265.
177
Witness Statement of J.F. : “No one in the village was armed. No battles were
fought. This could only happen because of the idiotic and pathological hatred of Croats
by Serbs”, ibid.
178 List of Detained and Missing Persons, Vol 2 (II) annex 327 and 328.
179 st
Witness Statement of J.F. The witness was hit in the head onJanaury 1992
to the point where he lost part of his hearing in his right ear, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex
265. 252
Vrbanac, Nikola Fabac, Ivan Fabac, Stjepan Fabac, Živko Miloši ć and
Gojko Pavlovi ć were exhumed and buried in the graveyard in Mala
Solina. 180On 22 November 1991, the commander of the “Krajina police
special unit” Siniša Marti ć – Šilt, was on a reconnaissance mission in the
area of Gornje and Donje Jame and recorded that he did not notice any
“Ustasha formations”. 181 This shows that the members of the Serb
paramilitary formations knew that there were no Croatian forces present in
the area and that their operations were directed to the maltreatment and
killing of the Croatian civilians.
Skela
5.93 The village of Skela is located in the municipality of Glina,
Banovina. In 1991 the village had 109 inhabitants, of whom 95 were Croats
th
and 2 Serbs. On 29 August18291, the JNA and Serb paramilitaries set fire
to the whole village. Those who escaped have stated that at least 10
people were killed, but no remains have been found to date. 183 According to
the Sisak police records, 7 people remain mi184ng. The remainder of the
population of the village was banished.
180 Record of the County Court in Sisak on the exhumation of the mortal remains in Donje
and Gornje Jame from 22 April 1996, 27 April 1996 and 20 September 1996, Annexes,
vol 2(II), annexes 326, 327, 328.
181
Report by Siniša Martić, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 329.
182 Witness Statement of Z.R. The witness buried Jana Papić who was found dead
183 in her home, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 266.
Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92, p. 126.
184 Specification, Annexes, vol 2 (II) annex 321. 253
185
7. M UNICIPALITY OF ETRINJA
5.94 The first attack on Petrinja was perpetrated on 2 September 1991 at
12.00. It was an artillery and mortar attack initiated from the barracks of
the JNA in Petrinja, “Vasilj Gačeša “ and “ Šamarica”, against the building
of the Ministry of Interior (MUP) and civilian facilities. After that, the
Armored Mechanized Battalion of the JNA, supported by infantry units of
the Territorial Defense Petrinja, attacked and broke the defense lines in the
center of Petrinja. On this occasion, many members of the MUP, the
Croatian National Guard Corps and civilians were killed, and a great
number of housing buildings were destroyed and seriously damaged by
artillery missiles from a short distance. A great number of churches (St.
Lawrence Church, St. Catherine Church) were damaged and destroyed. A
number of civilians were cap186ed, who were then taken to the JNA
barracks “Vasilj Gačeša”.
5.95 On 16 September 1991, Petrinja was attacked again. On that
occasion, a great number of civilians were killed, of whom part was buried
at the graveyard, or in those locations they were found, that is, in front
yards and gardens. During the attack against Petrinja, around 25 members
of the MUP and the Croatian National Guard Corps of the Republic of
Croatia were captured by members of the Territorial Defense and the Police
of the “SAO Krajina” at the location called “Vila Gavrilovi ć “. After they
had captured and disarmed them, they executed them by firing squad. Four
members of the MUP and the Croatian National Guard Corps survived the
execution, although with serious injuries. Among them was D.C.,
who gave a witness statement on the aforesaid events. 187The mortal
remai188of the 19 executed persons were exhumed on 14 September
1995
185
The municipality of Petrinja had 35,565 inhabitants, of which 15,790 were Croats,
15,969 were Serbs and the remaining 3,806 were members of other ethnic groups. As
with the municipality of Glina, the northern part was mostly inhabited by Croats, while
there was a majority of Serbian inhabitants in the south. The Croatian villages
Kraljevčani, Dragotinci, Prnjavor Čuntićki and Hrvatski Č untić were situated in the
central part of the southern area of the municipality. As Serbian villages surrounded
these villages, they were the first to be subjected to violence.
186 Witness Statement of P.M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 267.
187
Witness Statement of D.C., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 268.
188Record of the Investigation Department of the County Court in Sisak from 14
September 1995, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 330. 254
Kraljevčani
5.96 The village of Kraljevčani is located in the municipality of Petrinja,
Banovina, approximately 17 kilometers to the south of the town of Petrinja.
In 1991, the village was populated by 151 inhabitants, of whom 87 were
Croats and 64 were Serbs.
th
5.97 On 12 July 1991, members of the JNA and Serb paramilitary
formations mounted a mortar attack on Kraljev čani. This attack was
sustained for the entire day. On 14 thJuly 1991 a JNA tank unit entered the
village and destroyed Croatian houses and farm buildings. A.K. ’s
husband was seriously wounded. The JNA refused to take him to hospital
in Sisak when they discovered that he was Croat. 189Thereafter, many of the
Croats fled toward Dragotinac and Petrinja. 13 elderly people stayed in the
village to look after the houses and to feed the cattle. 190 With the
knowledge that those Croats remaining in the village were essentially
191 192
helpless, Serbians maltreated them and looted the vacated properties.
5.98 On 15 August 1991, a member of the Serbian paramilitaries shot 5
civilians of Croatian nationality: Marko* and Ana Krznar,* Nikola and Ana
Šustić and Marija Turković . 193Marko Krznar was decapitated. His wife
Ana was raped and her breasts cut off. 194 The different parts of the bodies
had to be collected and put in a bag. The family members of the dead
189 Witness Statement of A.K., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 269.
190
Witness Statements of M.T.* and A.K., Annexes, vol 2(II), annexes 270
and 269.
191 Witness Statement of N.T. “…they threatened us (…) to slaughter us all at
this place…” The witness recounts an event where a number of Croatian barns were
burnt and a dead pig was left on the road with a Serbian Cyrillic symbol of 4 C’s,
Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 271.
See also Witness Statement of M.T.: “[A Chetnik] told me, ‘Bear in mind what
happened in the last war and remember what you Croats did. You will not live to see
Christmas here. You better run – not to Petrinja, but across the Kupa”, Annexes, vol
2(II), annex 270.
192 Witness Statements of N.T. and A.K. “…we were afraid to sleep
alone in the houses so we decided to stay together…”, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 271
and 269.
193 Mass Killings and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92, p.123, Croatian Medical Journal, 1992,
No. 33, pp. 43-47; see also the Witness Statements of A.K. and N.T.,
ibid.
194
Witness Statements of M.T. and A.K. : His dead body was without its
arms, legas and head. We panicked, seized with fear”,ibid. 255
buried them under JNA supervision. 195As a result of the killing, the
196
remaining Croat residents left the Kraljevčani.
Glinska Poljana
5.99 The village of Glinska Poljana is located in the municipality of
Petrinja, Banovina, approximately 10 km northeast of the town of Glina. In
1991, the village had 361 inhabitants, of whom 277 were Croats and 74
were Serbs.
5.100 In the summer of 1991, the movement of Croats in and out of the
village was seriously curtailed by a requirement to carry passes. 197On 4 th
October 1991, between 400 and 500 soldiers in reserve JNA uniforms198
entered the village, led by a JNA tank and military truck. Many Croat
citizens were forced to act as a human shield as the army entered nearby
villages. Serb paramilitaries looted Croat households and beat Croat
citizens. The witness I.D. lost his sight in one eye, when he was
kicked in the head by one of the Serb paramilitaries. 199
th
5.101 On 27 October 1991, the majority of the remaining Croat
population in the village was forcibly removed. After days of physical and
mental maltreatment at the hands of the Serbs, the Croats were taken200
Moščenica and handed over to the Croatian authorites. The Croat
inhabitants who returned to the village were killed. The remains of Nikola
Starčević, Mara Star čević and Bara Star čević were found on 2 October
1992. 201 The following residents were also killed: Mara Dobrinić , Franjo
Kovačević, Kata Kova čević, Josip Dvornekovi ć, Jana Hodalj, Nikola
Mileković, Marica Mileković, Stjepan Milekovi ć, Ivo Kova čević and Vid
195 Witness Statement of N.T. “…we came across the smashed bodies, they
picked the parts of the bodies in a bag and sheet...”, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 271.
196
Witness Statements of M.T. and A.K. “…we decided to flee while we
were still able to because we would be the next victims of such crime...”, Annexes, vol
2(II), annex 270 and 269.
197 Witness Statement of I.D., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 272.
198
Witness Statement of I.D.: “that made me conclude that the JNA had started
co-operating with local Chetniks”, ibid.
199 Ibid.
200
Ibid. “... every young Serb was allowed to enter the room... and the beat in the room
whom they wanted to...”
201 Official Note and Record of Investigation from 2 October 1992, Annexes, vol 2(II),
annex 331. 256
Dvorneković. Their remains were exhumed during 1996. 202Jana Starčević,
Mijo Dobrinić, Stjepan Kovač ević, Stjepan Kovač ević, Katica Mileković
and Marijan Smokrovi ć remain listed as missing by the Commission for
203
Detained and Missing Persons.
204
8. M UNICIPALITY OF D VOR NA U NI
Dvor na Uni, Zamlača and Struga Banska
5.102 In 1991, the town of Dvor na Uni comprised 2351 inhabitants, of
whom 135 were Croats and 1993 were Serbs. The ethnicity of the
remainder of the population included 7 Montenegrins, 3 Macedonians, 20
Slovenes, 1 Czech and 1 Hungarian. The village of Zamlač a had 232
inhabitants, of whom 161 were Croats and 51 were Serbs. The village of
Struga Banska had 254 inhabitants, of whom 239 were Croats and 8 were
Serbs.
th
5.103 On 24 June 1991, St. John the Baptist’s Day, members of Serb
paramilitary units blocked all roads and entrances to the villages in the
municipality. Croats unable to get to work were dismissed the next day. 205
th
The main JNA/paramilitary attack began on 26 June (codename “Žaoka”),
commencing with approximately 120 mortar missiles. This was followed
206
by up to 600 missiles during the rest of the day. A human shield of Croat
civilians from Zamlača was forced by the Serb paramilitaries to walk for 6
hours towards Struga Banska. At Struga Banska, the JNA troops present
207
failed to intervene or provide medical asistance. From the villages of
Zamlača and Struga, a number of civilians died whilst part of the human
shield including P.K. and M.B. 208 Three Croat
202
Survey of the documentation of Mr. Gruji ć managed by the Office for Detained and
Missing Persons of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, Annexes, vol 2(II),
annex 332.
203
List of missing persons in the Office for Detained and Missing Persons from 12 July
1996., Vol 2 (II) annex 332.
204 The municipality of Dvor na Uni had a population of 14,555 inhabitants, of which
1,395 were Croats, 12,591 were Serbs, and 569 members of other ethnic groups
(including Macedonians, Montenegrins and Muslims). Of 64 villages, only 6 were
inhabited by a majority of Croatian inhabitants – Divuša, Golubovac Divuški,
Kozibrod, Struga Banska, Un čani and Zamla ča – all of which were situated in the
eastern part of the municipality.
205 Witness Statement of M.V., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 273.
206
207 Witness Statement of D.V., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 244.
Witness Statement of A.K., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 274.
208 Ibid. 257
209
policemen were stripped naked and shot. Another Croat policeman,
T.B., was almost beaten to death. 210 Milan Begić from Zamlača
211
was also killed. In a press release, the JNA subsequently described its
role as that of creating a “buffer zone”. 212
5.104 Later in the day, two Serb paramilitaries came to the hospital in
Dvor na Uni and attacked a number of Croat patients being treated for
injuries sustained as members of the human shield. Mile Puši 213as taken
out to the front of the hospital and his throat was cut. Milan Bartolović,
Petar Špančić and M.M. were driven away from the hospital to the
Žirovac River, where Bartolovi ć and Špan čić were shot. The witness
M. managed to escape by jumping into the river. 214
5.105 During the occupation, the Chapel of St. John in Struga Banska was
heavily damaged. 215When the cannon fire hit the building, the
216
paramilitaries celebrated.
5.106 On 29 July 1991, members of the JNA ordered Croats to leave the
village. Approximately 1500 people were forced into exile. Local Serbs
entered the area and looted the vacant houses. 217
Divuša
5.107 In 1991, the village of Divuša comprised 147 inhabitants, of whom
93 were Croat, 48 were Serb, 3 were Macedonian and 2 were Slovene.
5.108 In the beginning of August 1991, Ljuba Vidakovi ć from Divuša
was killed. Her sister-in-law had left her at the front of the house when she
went shopping. When she came back, Ljuba had been shot twice in the
209 Ibid.
210
Witness Statement of T.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 275.
211 Witness Statement of M.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 276.
212
“Zamlača and Struga under JNA contol”, Annexes, vol 4, annex 152.
213 Witness Statement of A.Š., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 277.
214
Witness Statements of M. M. and A.Š., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 278
and 277. M.M. believed that there was some kind of arrangement between the
paramilitaries and the hospital staff in order to facilitate the killings.
215
Witness Statements of J.S. and T.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 279
and 275.
216 Witness Statement of V.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 280.
217
Witness Statements of D.L. and M. V., Annexes, vol 2(II), annexes
281 and 273. 258
head. 218Afterwards Ankica and Jura Jugović’s house was set on fire with
the two of them in it. During the occupation, the Serb paramilitaries looted
and burnt many Croatian houses. They also destroyed the 17 thCentury
219
Catholic church of St. Catherine.
Other Locations
5.109 Other atrocities in the municipality of Dvor na Uni included the
following:
1. Kozibrod (147 Inhabitants: 141 Croats, 2 Serbs). On 10 th
August 1991, Željko Ivankovi ć and his mother Jelka were
killed, and their remains were later exhumed. 220
2. Unčani (383 inhabitants: 268 Croats, 91 Serbs). At the
beginning of October 1991, Anka Solomun and Matija
Solomun were killed. Anka (78 years) was forced to wrap
herself in a Croatian flag and was beaten to death. Her son,
Matija (57 years) was also be221n. When he tried to escape, he
was killed with a pickaxe.
3. Gvozdansko (181 inhabitants: 41 Croats, 124 Serbs.). Three
Croat civilians were executed and burned in their homes: Mate
Grebarević (60 year222 Ana Grebarevi ć (60 years) and Boško
Šesto (50 years).
218 Witness Statement of L.V., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 282.
219
Witness Statement of J.S., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 279.
220 Ibid.
221
Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92, p. 127.
222 Ibid., p.128. 259
9. M UNICIPALITY OF H RVATSKA K OSTAJNICA 223
Hrvatska Kostajnica
5.110 In 1991, the town of Hrvatska Kostajnica had 3,480 inhabitants, of
whom 1,087 were Croats, 1,889 Serbs, 88 Muslims and others.
5.111 Hrvatska Kostajnica was occupied on 12 thSeptember 1991, after
several days of heavy attacks by JNA units and Serb paramilitary groups.
Civilians who surrendered were taken to prisons in Manja ča in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and to Meč enčane or Glina, along with members of the
Croatian police. The destiny of several of them is unknown. According to
the list of missing persons who disappeared during 1991, 104 persons
remain unaccounted for. 224On 13 thSeptember 1991 Dražen Kostri ć and
Josip Jurčević were killed by Serb paramilitaries.
Baćin
5.112 The village of Bać in is located between the villages of Hrvatska
Kostajnica and Hrvatska Dubica. In 1991, the village had 414 inhabitants,
of whom 393 were Croats, 6 were Serb, 2 were Muslim and the remainder
comprised other ethnic groups.
5.113 On 28 October 1991, approximately 60 ethnic Croats from the
surrounding villages were assembled at the fire station at Hrvatska Dubica,
under the excuse that they would be exchanged. They were then taken to a
meadow near the Una River and executed by firing squad. The dead bodies
225
were put into a pre-prepared mass grave.
223
The former municipality of Hrvatska Kostajnica, according to the present
administrative distribution, is composed of four municipalities: Majur, Hrvatska
Dubica, Donji Kukuruzari and Hrvatska Kostajnica. In 1991 it had 14,851 inhabitants,
of which 4,295 were Croats, 9,343 were Serbs and 1,213 were members of other ethnic
groups. Of the 39 villages in the municipality, only 9 of them had a Croatian majority,
those were: Graboštani, Mračaj, Stubalj, Kostrići, Selište and Kostajnički Majur, which
were situated in the center of the municipality, northern of Hrvatska Kostajnica,
224 Dubica, Baćin and Cerovljani, in the east of the municipality.
List of missing persons from the Hrvatska Kostajnica municipality issued by the
Commission of the Hrvatska Kostajnica municipality on 1 March 1993, Annexes, vol
2(II), annex 333. See also Witness Statement of E.M., Annexes, vol 2(II),
annex 282 B.
225
Witness Statement of V.J. “…they were all killed by shoot firings and their
bodies were buried by a mechanical shovel…” also of J. J. “ …the Forestry
Office of Kostajnica sent a mechanical shovel for the burial of the bodies in the area of
Baćin…”, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 283 and 284. 260
th st
5.114 From 13 March to 1 April 1997, 56 bodies were exhumed. 38 of
these were identified. 226
Kostrići
5.115 The village of Kostri ći is located approximately 3 km north of the
town of Kostajnica. In 1991, the village had 15 citizens, all of which were
Croats.
th
5.116 On the morning of 19 November 1991, members of the Serb
paramilitaries murdered every single person in the village. The youngest
victim was Dario Jurić who was only three years old. The oldest victim was
ninety-three-year old Pero Bašić. In addition, the following Croat residents
were killed: Vera, Tomislav (aged 5 years) and Zlatko Juri ć, Ankica-Jelka,
Marija and Pero (51 years) Bašić, Jure and Anka Kozić, Milka Jurić, Marija
Kostrić (64 years), Ferdinand and Mara Krizman, Kata Bunjevac and
227
Marija Jurić. N.B. testifies that the local “Krajina police”
instructed him to bury the dead. He also confirms that the village was set
on fire on two occasions ther eafter. 228During 1996 and 1997 the following
persons were exhumed and identified: Petar Bašić (51 years), Jelka Baši ć,
Milka Jurić, Marija Jurić, Marija Kostrić, Anka Kozić and Jure Kozić.
Kostajnički Majur
5.117 The village of Kostajni čki Majur is located in the municipality of
Hrvatska Kostajnica, approximately 3 km northwest of the town of
Hrvatska Kostajnica. In 1991, the village had 532 inhabitants, of whom 457
were Croat and 50 were Serb.
5.118 In June 1991, local Serbs erected barricades and began to shell the
village. The majority of Croats fled the village at that time. Their empty
homes were destroyed. The JNA subsequently occupied the village with
infantry and violence escalated. At the beginning229 August 1991, Ana
Serdar was burned to death in her home. M.G. was part of a
226 The record of the investigative exhumation conducted from 13 March until 1 April
1997 on the location of Hrvatska Dubica – Skelište, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 334.
227
Report of the Killed and Missing Persons in the Municipality of Hrvatska Kostajnica-
Kostrići, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 335. See also Witness Statement of M. V.,
Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 285.
228 Witness Statement of N. B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 286. See also Mass
229 Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92, p. 127.
Report of Killed and Missing Persons in the area of Hrvatska Kostajnica Municipality-
Kostajnički Majur, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 336. 261
group of men were abducted from the village and imprisoned in
Kukuruzište. As they walked along the road they were forced to shout,
“This is Serbia”. Milan Lazić was shot when he tried to escape. 230
th
5.119 On 7 October 1991, Marijan Mateković , Drago Petrovi ć, Josip
Filar and Goran Filar were taken from their homes to the prison in
Mečenčane. They have not been seen since that time.
th
5.120 On 14 October 1991, Serb paramilitaries forced Croat village
residents to dig their own graves in their yards. The Serbian paramilitaries
then shot them. The victims included: Ivan Švaga, Dragica Švaga and
Antun Mateković. Nikola Švaga was also murdered. On 14 thNovember
1991, Matija Jami ć was murdered in his yard. On 1 sNovember, Nikola
th
Delić was killed by Marti ć’s paramilitaries. On 17 November 1991,
Nikola Kostrić and his wife Anka were murdered in their house. On the
same day Milka Solomun was found dead. Antun Solomun and Milan
231
Pandža disappeared and remain missing.
5.121 During 1996, the remains of the following were exhumed: Nikola
Delić, Ivan Gavrić, Matija Jamić, Nikola Kostrić and his wife Anka, Antun
Mateković, Milka Solomun, Nikola, Ivan and Dragica Švaga. Of the 457
Croats who lived in Kostajnički Majur in 1991, 408 were banished by 1993
232
and the village was completely burnt down.
Other Locations
5.122 Other atrocities in the municipality of Hrvatska Dubica included the
following:
1. Stubalj (282 Inhabitants: 272 Croats, 2 Serbs) Marijan and
Ana Medić and Marija Letić weremurderedon14 thand 15 th
November 1991 respectively. On or around 26 thNovember
233
1991 Petar Vujčić was murdered.
2. Graboštani (201 Inhabitants: 177 Croats, 9 Serbs). Stevo and
Roza Karanović were murdered on 5 January 1992. 234
230 Witness Statement of M.G., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 287.
231
Report of Killed and Missing Persons in the area of Hrvatska Kostajnica Municipality-
Kostajnički Majur, Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 336. See Witness Statement of D.M.,
Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 288.
232 Information Document County of Sisak-Moslavina from 7 July 1993 and see Witness
233 Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 337 and 289
Witness Statements of P.L. and F.K. , Annexes, vol 2(II), annex
290 and 291.
234 Witness Statement of F.K., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 291. 262
3. Panjani (221 Inhabitants: 32 Croats, 175 Serbs). On 8 th
September 1991, 4 civilians were murdered in the village:
Anđelka Biš ćan, Mladen Bišć an, Gojko Badri ć and Jagoda
Brkljačić. 235The events in the village as follows:
“They tortured the entire Biš ćan family in the courtyard,
after that they massacred them. They took Mladen’s eyes
out with a knife, cut off his nose and then stabbed him.
After that they stabbed An đelka and her mother (...) after
that they put the Biš ćan family on a pile, poured gasoline
236
over them and put them on fire”.
4. Cerovljani (512 inhabitants: 271 Croats, 202 Serbs, 2
Muslims). The witness G.B. * heard from people who
had escaped from the town that Đ uro Petrović, Nikola Likić
237
and Barica Blinja had been killed. The witness, A.B.,
found the burnt corpses of two of the victims. He
also states that Asim Praz ina was led from the town by the
paramilitaries with a r238 around his neck. He has not been
seen since that time.
5. Hrvatska Dubica (2062 inhabitants, 1042 Croats, 794 Serbs).
Many of the people who were massacred in Ba ćin came from
the town. T.K. was part of a group hiding in a 239
basement before being removed and taken to the fire station.
Inside the fire station, the Croats were in a state of extreme
panic. There was a clear sense that something awful was
going to happen. Many begged their captors to spare them.
T. managed to escape, but was found by the side of the
road by local Ser240in JNA uniforms and beaten until he lost
consciousness. In addition, Ivica Dragičević and Rade Gajić
were killed in front of their home and then burned. Idriz
Čaušević, Ivan Krivaji ć and Ivan Matijevi ć were also killed.
The town’s Catholic church was destroyed, just prior to the
arrival of UNPROFOR. 241
235 Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92.
236 Witness Statement of M.I., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 292.
237
Witness Statement of G.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 293.
238 Witness Statement of A.B., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 294.
239
Witness Statement of T.K., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 295. The group
in the basement included I.K. , A.Đ., J.V., M.D. ,
K.V., M.P., M.S.
240 Ibid.
241
Witness Statement of J.J., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 284. 263
6. Predore: Franjo Flekač was murdered on 15 September 1991,
while Marko Flekač and Josip Flekač were wounded and taken
to a hospital that day. However, they were not permitted to
stay there and were forcibly discharged. Tires were put around
their necks and they were set on fire by members of the
Serbian paramilitary. J.J. and others were tortured
by paramilitaries. They were beaten, had water poured over
them, and were made to lie on the ground whilst Serbian
soldiers marched over them. Two other men were slaughtered
and J. was forced to lie on top of them.42
SECTION THREE: KORDUN AND LIKA
10. INTRODUCTION
Geography
5.123 The region of Kordun borders with Banovina. It is located between
the far south of the Karlovac municipality, and Plitvica Bridge where Lika
begins. Kordun includes the municipalities of Vrginmost (now Gvozd),
Vojnić, and Slunj and also parts of municipalities Karlovac, Ozalj and
Duga Resa.
5.124 The region of Lika stretches from the Plitvica Bridge in the north to
the Knin municipality in the south. The Velebit Mountain in the west
divides Lika from the coast. To the east, the region stretches to the border
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the time of the war Lika included the
administrative municipalities of Ogulin, Oto čac, Gospić, Titova Korenica
(now Korenica), Gračac, and Donji Lapac.
Demography
5.125 In 1991, Kordun and Lika had a combined population of 283,405
inhabitants, of whom 165,562 were Croats, 100,167 were Serbs, 1,885 were
Muslim, 352 were Albanian, 41 were Czech and 5,584 described
themselves as Yugoslavs. In the municipalities of Vrginmost and Vojni ć in
Kordun the Serbs were in a majority. Vojni ć had 8,236 inhabitants, of
whom 89.44% were Serbs and only 1.21% Croats. Vrginmost had 16,599
inhabitants, of whom 70.66% were Serbs and 24.36% were Croats. Given
242 Witness Statement of J.J., Annexes, vol 2(II), annex 296. 264
the demography of the reg243, the SDS was to enjoy extensive support in
the period 1990/1991.
5.126 Lika is a sparsely populated area. In 1991, 117,983 residents lived
in 6,640 square kilometers (17.7 residents per one square kilometre). The
region had 56,271 Croats and 51,680 Serbs. The municipalities of Titova
Korenica, Gračac and Donji Lapac had a Serbian majority, and there was
also a Serb majority population in the eastern parts of the municipalities of
Otočac, Ogulin and Gospić.
Outbreak of Hostilities
5.127 As in other regions, Serb extremist politics developed considerably
in the period leading up to the first democratic elections in April 1990.
According to the so-called War Presidency of the Vrhovine Community of
local committees, “the enormous political step was made to awaken the
Serbian national identity and organise the people to protect their interest
through the democratic forms of struggle against a growing pro-Ustasha
and later an open Ustasha threat”. 244
5.128 The first serious incident that occurred between the rebel Serbs and
the units of the Croatian Ministry of the Interior took place in Plitvice at the
end of March 1991: see Plate 19 (also Vol 3, Plate 4.5). Local Serb
paramilitary police units blocked the road between Slunj and Titova
Korenica. The special unit of the Croatian police intervened successfully,
but were prevented from taking effective action by the arrival of the JNA
armoured units from the 1 stand 5 Military Regions. 245Thereafter, the 5 th
Military Region units of the JNA cooperating with the 9 Corps effectively
created an autonomous zone incorporating the Serb majority populations in
Knin and Lika. 246
5.129 On 12 May 1991, the “SAO Krajina Assembly” held a
‘referendum’ for the “SAO Krajina” to join the Republic of Serbia. On 14 th
243
Decision by the so-called “War Presidency of the Vrginmost municipality” from 27
July 1991 on renaming the “SJS” Vrginmost into the “SJB” Vrginmost and integration
with the “Secretariat of the Interior of SAO Krajina”, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 399.
244
Letter from the War Presidency of the Community of Local Committees to the 3rd
Operations Group Command, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 400.
245 Narodna Armija from 4 April 1991, pp. 4-5, “Armija vra ća mir” (“The Army brings
back Peace”), Annexes, vol 4, annex 148; Srpska vojska , Gazette of the “Army of
Republika Srpska”, Sarajevo, 9 May 1994, p. 14, “Ratni put poploč an pobjedama”
(“The War Path Paved with Victories”), Annexes, vol 4, annex 152
246 The Command of the 9 Corps, DT-1-4, from 5 April 1991, to the Command of the 9 th
bVP, The Order for Defence Op. No. 1, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 401. 265
May 1991, th247entral Commission in charge of the referendum submitted
it’s Report to the ‘Assembly’, which stated that all conditions had been
met, and that the “SAO Krajina Assembly” should make the Decision for
the joining of the “SAO Krajina” with the Republic of Serbia where both
would remain a part of Yugoslavia. 248 According to the Decision, “SAO
Krajina” included the Kordun municipalities of Vojni ć and Vrginmost as
well as the Lika municipalities of Gra čac, Korenica, and Donji Lapac. In
July 1991, the retired JNA General of World War II, Đoko Jovanić from
Lika, at the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the uprising in Croatia,
called upon the crowd “to re-establish the Sixth Lika Brigade and finally
finish the started liberation from the blood-hungry Ustashas.” 249 From the
250
beginning of August 1991 the Serb rebellion started in earnest.
According to witness Đ.T., at a certain point in August the JNA
started covertly supplying arms to the local Serbs. He estimates that the
total supply included between 700 and 800 rifles, automatic rifles and
pistols, approximately 15 to 20 rocket launchers, 20 snipers, explosives and
a large quantity of other weapons and ammunition, as well as mortars and 251
hand grenades. JNA trucks and helicopters transferred the weapons. In
September 1991, another consignment of arms was flown into the region. 252
Local Serbs began to do military training in Pan čevo in Serbia and in
Knin. 253
Military Organisation of the JNA in Kordun and Lika
5.130 Before the war, the JNA had its main barracks in the town of Slunj.
The base was part of the 5 thMilitary Region. There were also large
numbers of JNA units in the town of Karlovac and its surrounding area.
th
The main forces in the Kordun were the JNA’s 580 Combined Artillery
Brigade and the 471 Combined Anti-armoured Artillery Brigade of the 5 th
th
MilitarthRegion. The Mechanized Battalion of theth Armoured Brigade of
the 10 Corps was present, as was the 13 Corps (which was comprised of
247
The Report about the referendum staged in the area of “SAO Krajina” from 14 May
1991, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 402.
248 Decision for the joining of “SAO Krajina” with the the Republic of Serbia from 16 May
1991, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 403.
249 Narodna Armija from 31 July 1991, p. 14, “Otpor nasilju” (“Resistance to Violen ce”),
Annexes, vol 4, annex 149.
250
“SAO Krajina”, To Headquarters, no. 68/4 from 6 August 1991, to the Supreme
Commander of the TO “SAO Krajina”, Report from 5/6 August 1991, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 404.
251 Witness Statement of Đ.T., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 338.
252
Witness Statement of M.Č., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 339.
253 Witness Statement of Đ.T., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 338. 266
th th
the 8 Proletarian Motorized Brigade, a part of the 35 Partisan Division,
the 127 Engineer Regiment, and the 540 Pontoon Battalion of the JNA).
rd
The main JNA forces in Lika were the 653 “NC” (Training Centre) in
Ogulin, the 236 thProletarian Motorized Brigade and the bulk of the 35 th
th
Partisan Division from the 13 Corps in Gospić.
5.131 In the summer of 1991, the ‘Ministry of Defence’ of the “SAO
Krajina” made a decision on the formation of the Regional Headquarters of
the Territorial Defence for Kordun and Banovina within the framework of a
unique ‘Territorial Defence Headquarters’ of the “SAO Krajina”.
Subordinated to the Headquarters were the ‘Territorial Defence’
headquarters for Kordun and all other Territorial Defence Headquarters
254
formed in the Kordun municipalities. By the decision onthhe formation of
operative zones of the TO “SAO Krajina” from 20 August 1991, the
Regional Headquarters of the Territorial Defence for Kordun and Banovina
nd
was renamed into the 2 Operations Zone of the “SAO Krajina” Territorial
Defence of Vojnić, Vrginmost, and Slunj. 255The same decision established
st
the formation of the 1 Operative Zone (Dalmatia-Lika) for the area of the
Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Gra čac, Donji Lapac, and Korenica
municipalities as well as the 3 rdOperative Zone for the area of Banovina.
th
On 30 September, the areas of Kordun and Banovina were joined into a
common operative zone commanded by Colonel Rade Vujaklija. 256 Inthe
middle of November, the area of Kordun was placed under the command of
the Operations Group-3 that was directly subordinated to the Commander
th 257
of the 5 Military Region, General Avramović.
5.132 In the autumn of 1991 the army openly distributed weapons from
its warehouses in the regions. General Aleksandar Vasiljevi ć commanded
the whole operation from the “Security Administration” of the Federal
Secretariat for the National Defence (SSNO) supported by the local
258
members of the SDS.
254
“SAO Krajina”, the Government, No: 157/91-1 from 26 July 1991, Order, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 405.
255 “SAO Krajina”, the Government, the President, No: 189/91-1 from 20 August 1991,
Order, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 406.
256 “SAO Krajina”, the Territorial Defence Commander, No: 1/1-91 from 30 September
1991; “SAO Krajina”, the Territorial Defence Commander, No: 2/1-91 from 30
September 1991, Order; “SAO Krajina”, the Government, the President, No: 1/1-91
257 from 5 October 1991, Notification, Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes 407, 408, 409.
The 5 Military Region Command, No: 09/75-1034 from 10 November 1991, to the
Command of the Tactic Group-2, Order, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 410.
258
Witness Statement of M.Č., the Air Force Major of the former JNA. See also
Witness Statement of S.Š. , who describes the distribution of JNA weapons to the
paramilitaries in Lika, Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes 339 and 340. 267
5.133 Colonel Dušan Smiljanić was one of the JNA’s commissioned
officers who played an important role in arming the Serbs. In the letter he
wrote to General Mladić he described the structure of the JNA in Lika, the
JNA’s links with SDS, and the role played by the JNA’s Supreme
259
Command in arming the rebel Serbs.
“At the beginning of August 1991, the operational team “PROBOJ-
2” was formed at the request of the UB (Security Administration)
and was under my command. It was composed of the OB (Security
Agency) of the various branches with the following task:
- arming of the Serbian people
- the central task: the help and participation in the Military
organization
- resisting the Croatian Service in the areas of Lika,
Banija and Kordun
This team worked until the end of 1991. I was a subordinand to the
UB, and I submitted a report to the Head of the 2 VO (military
region), RV (Airforce) and PVO (Anti Aircraft Defence) Security
Service. Beside that I was connected with the MO (Ministry of
Defence) of the Republic of Serbia, concerning the role of that
Ministry in the war being conducted at the time…”
th
5.134 In early 1992, the JNA was restructured and the 6 th Operations
Group (OG) was formed in the area of Lika and 8 OG in the area of
Kordun. 260Likewise, in February and March 1992, organisational and
mobilization changes occurred in the TO’s of the rebel Serbs, where Zone
headquar261s of the Kordun TO and Zone headquarters of the Lika TO were
formed.
Destruction of Cultural Monuments
5.135 In the occupied area, nearly all Catholic objects were systematically
destroyed or damaged, including parish churches, chapels, parish houses,
monasteries and graveyards (see vol 3, Plate 8.5). In the area of the present
Karlovac County, a total of 31 sacral monuments were damaged and 4 were
destroyed, namely in Cetingrad (Church of the Assumption of the Holy
259 Letter of Dušan Smiljanić, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 411.
260 th
Command of the 10 Corps, DT No. 3/15-33 from 8 January 1992, to the Command of
the OG-8, Order, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 412.
261 SSNO, GŠ OS SFRY, III Administration, DT No. 892-2 from 2 rch 1992, to the TO
Headquarters of “RSK”, Order, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 413. 268
Virgin Mary from the 19 thcentury), in Banski Kova čevac (Church of St.
Peter from the 18 thcentury), in Lasinja (Church of St. Anthony of Padua
th
from the 19 century), and in Saborsko (Church of St. John “Nepomuk”
from the 19 century). Six monuments were seriously damaged, namely in
Skakavac (Church of St. Rok the Confessor from the 19 thcentury), in
th
Drežnik Grad (Church of St. Anthony from Padua from the 19 century), in
Rakovica (Church of St. Jelena the Crusader from the 19 thcentury), in
Saborsko (Church of St. Marija of “Rozarija” from the 18 thcentury), in
th
Gornji La đevac (Church of Holy Virgin Queen of Earth from the 20
century) and in Slunj (Church of the Holy Trinity from the 16 thcentury). A
Paulist Monastery, Karlovac-Kamensko, also suffered serious damage.
5.136 In the area of the Lika-Senj County, all together 17 sacral
monuments were damaged. In Vranik the Church was completely pulled
th
down (Church of St. Francis from the 19 century). 7 churches were
partially destroyed, namely in Bilaj (Church of St. Jacob the Apostle from
the 19 century), Lički Novi (Church of St. Anthony from Padua from the
th th
17 century), in Lički Osik (Church of St. Joseph fthm the 19 century), in
Lovinac (Church of St. Michael from the 18 century), Ri čice (Church of
St. Marija Magdalena from the 19 thcentury), in Sveti Rok (Church of St.
th
Rok from the th cen262y), and in Oto čac (Church of The Holy Trinity
from the 18 century).
Mass Graves
5.137 In the area of Kordun and Lika, 11 mass graves of Croat civilians
were found: see vol 3, Plate 7.4. Altogether, 44 bodies were exhumed, 42
of which were identified. The biggest mass grave was at the location
Saborsko-Popov Šanac, where 15 bodies were exhumed, and 14 of them
identified.
11. M UNICIPALITY OF V RGINMOST
5.138 The municipality of Vrginmost is located in the Kordun region. In
1991 the municipality had 16,599 inhabitants, of whom 11,729 were Serb
and 4,043 were Croat. Approximately 95% of the Croats lived in 11
villages: 5 in the north and 6 in the south constituting ethnic Croat enclaves
in what was otherwise a Serb dominated area. Today, the municipality is
called Gvozd.
262
Damage to Cultural Monuments on Croatian Territory, Appendices, vol 5, appendix 7. 269
Crna Draga
5.139 In 1991, the village of Crna Draga had 291 inhabitants, of whom
284 were Croats, 6 Yugoslav, and one individual of unknown ethnicity.
There were no Serbs in the village of Crna Draga. The village was occupied
in October 1991. Most of the residents fled the area, but some stayed
nearby in the woods. Members of the Britvec family who remained in the
village, were subsequently found dead. I.B. later found the corpses
of Ivo and Bara Britvec lying in their bed. He had been shot in his head,
263
chest and stomach; she had been shot in her chest and stomach. The
matter was investigated and linked to a Serbian Brigade Command. S.Č.,
who was a security officer for the 2 ndBattalion, also testifies to this.
After returning from the scene of the crime to the Brigade thmmand, he
talked with Mile Novaković , the commander of the 19 Brigade, who told
him that the murder of the Britvec family was the concern of the Brigade
Command and not his concern. 264
Novo Selo Lasinjsko and Lasinja
5.140 In 1991, 80 Croats and only 8 Serbs lived in Novo Selo Lasinjsko
and 516 Croats and 6 Serbs lived in Lasinja. In October 1991, the
combined JNA and paramilitary forces passed through the area and forced
its entire Croatian population into exile. 265 The village of Novo Selo
Lasinjsko was set on fire. Lasinja was completely destroyed, including the
Church of Saint Antun Padovanski, which was mined after being used as a
sniper nest.
12. M UNICIPALITY OF LUNJ
5.141 The former Slunj municipality, which today consists of the
municipalities Slunj, Cetingrad and Rakovica, had according to the 1991
Census 18,962 citizens, of which 12,091 were of Croatian and 5,540 of
Serbian nationality, i.e. 63,76% Croats and 29,22% Serbs. During the
summer and autumn 1991, the members of the Serb paramilitary
formations and the JNA robbed, burnt down and destroyed the villages with
a Croatian majority. By November 1991, most of the villages were
263
264 Witness Statement of I.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 341.
Witness Statement of S.Č., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 342.
265 Witness Statement of R.M. : “We knew for a longer time that the villages
were empty, as well as Lasinja, and that there would be no resistance. The people left
these villages because of the constant mortar and artillery attacks which were constantly
directed at the villages for a long period before the final attack.”, Annexes, vol 2(III),
annex 343. 270
occupied. The villages of Cvitovi ći, Vukovi ći, Gnojnice, Le đevac,
Grabovac and other smaller Croatian villages were completely destroyed.
The Croats fled their houses towards Saborsko, Slunj and Ogulin or in the
direction of Cazin and Biha ć in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Later, Saborsko
was also completely destroyed, as well as Slunj. The homes of the expelled
Croats were robbed or set on fire.
Lipovača
5.142 The village of Lipovač a is located in the municipality of Slunj,
Kordun. In 1991, the village of Lipovača had 267 inhabitants, of whom 222
were Croat, 44 were Serb and one described himself as Yugoslav.
5.143 All citizens left the village almost at the same time after the
occupation of the village. Only sixteen Croats remained. They were
th
exposed to daily abuse and physical and psychological torture. On 28
October 1991, 7 Croat civilians were murdered. They were Mate and Roža,
Mirko, Franjo, Mira and Marija Brozin čević and Katarina Cindrić. 266 After
this crime, four civilians fled from the village to Bosnia, and only five
Croats remained: Ana Pemper, Barbara Vuković , Juraj Šebalj, Juraj Conjar
and Milan Smolčić. All of them were murdered on New Year’s eve of that
year.267
Lađevac
5.144 The villages of Donji and Gornji La đevac are located in the
municipality of Slunj, Kordun. In 1991, Donji Lađevac had 445 inhabitants,
of whom 431 were Croat and 2 were Serb. Gornji La đevac had 561
inhabitants, of whom 546 were Croat, 3 were Serb and the remainder
belonged to other ethnic groups.
5.145 The majority of Croats left the village in November 1991 due to
intimidation from the occupying paramilitaries. Those who remained were
268 st
exposed to systematic violence and looting. On 21 December 1991 Jure
Vuković was killed. J. M. was beaten by a group of paramilitaries
266 Witness Statement of M.Š., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 344.
267
Witness Statement of I.Š., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 345.
268 For a graphic example of the level of harassment see Witness Statement of M.P.,
Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 346. Paramilitaries came to his house and threatened to
gouge out his wives eyes and knock her teeth out. He was taken to a field where it
appears that he was handed over to an inexperienced paramilitary recruit who was
ordered to kill him as a sort of ‘test’. The recruit shot the gun above the witness’ head
and told him to run away. 271
269
who forced him to bury the murdered corpse of Jure Vukovi ć. In the
hamlets of Dubrava, Polje and Čamernica, Marija Bari ć (born in 1910),
Roza Bari ć, Anka Mrgan, Anka Rupa, Franjo and Joso Šajfer were
murdered. 270The bodies of the three dead women were strewn with flour
271
and left out for the pigs to feed on. Serb paramilitaries beat and stabbed
M.S. in the arm. He was taken to a house where his captors locked
him in a room and threatened to kill him, but he managed to escape. 272
th
5.146 On 18 January 1992, members of Serb paramilitary formations of
the “SAO Krajina” murdered Jure Valenti ć in the hamlet of Lađevač ko
273
Selište. They poured gasoline over him and set him on fire inside a barn.
Three days later Serb soldiers murdered Ivan Rado čaj, Mile Radočaj, Ante
Radočaj and Bare Radoč aj in their house and then burned it down. The
same perpetrators shot Roza Radočaj and Zora Potnar who were living next
door. On 23 rdJanuary 1992, members of the Serbian paramilitary forces
274
murdered Ivan and Anka Morosavljevi ć. In November 1992, Slavko
Klobučar was murdered. 275 In February 1993 Pavo Samardžija was
276 277
murdered. In June 1993 Dane Bogović was murdered. M.G.*
was forced to strip naked by a paramilitary from Serbia. He indecently
assaulted her and then beat her. When Pavo Samardžija intervened he was
278
killed. After the constant abuse, life for the remaining Croats became
unbearable, so that they were eventually transferred to the free territory of
the Republic of Croatia with the help of the Red Cross and UNPROFOR.
However, when left they were obliged to sign a document stating that they
269 Witness Statement of A.K., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 348.
270
Witness Statement of I .M. who found Anka Rupa. When they tried to report the
deaths they were threatened and were refused any protection in order to carry out the
burials. Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 349.
271 Witness Statement of A.K., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 348. See also the
Witness Statements of I.M. , Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 349, and M.S. ,
Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 350. M. S. found Roza Bari ć naked in her kitchen.
Her body was cut into bits and the pigs that had been let into the house were eating
them. The dead bodies of Anka Mrgan and Marija Barić were also naked.
272
273 Witness Statement of M.S., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 350.
Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 351. The deceased was
killed because the paramilitaries asked him documents regarding his landmower and he
did not have them.
274
Witness Statements of M.G. and M.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes
352 and 351
275 Witness Statement of M.G., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 353.
276
Witness Statement of M.G., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 347.
277 Witness Statement of J.T., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 354.
278
Witness Statement of M.G., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 353. 272
would not return. 279 The following bodies were subsequently exhumed
from 6 different mass grave locations: Dane Bogovi ć, Zora Potnar, Roze
Radočaj, Franjo Šajfar, Anka Rupa, Joso Šajfar, Marija Barić, Anka Mrgan,
Roze Barić, Jure 280ović, Ivan Radočaj, Mile Radočaj, Bare Radočaj and
Ante Radočaj.
Other Locations
5.147 Other atrocities in the municipality include the following:
1. Arapovac (59 inhabitants, all Croats). According to the
witness A.K., after the occupation of Slunj on 16 th
November 1991, only 7 Croats remained in Arapovac. All of
them were subjected to violence. Ivo Pleš was taken from the
281
village and has not been seen since.
2. Gornji Popovac (453 inhabitants: 445 Croats, one Serb). On
17 February 1993 two members of the Serbian paramilitary
th
formations raped K.Z. *. On 17 April 1993 two
different paramilitary assailants raped her again. According to
282
the witness, another woman was raped at the same time.
3. Gornji Furjan is a hamlet in the village of Donji Furjan.
(village of Donji Furjan had 470 inhabitants, 376 Croats, 76
Serbs and Gornji Furjan had 143 inhabitants, 142 Croats and 1
Serb). The majority of the Croats in the village fled in
November 1991. Some of them returned to their houses where
th
they continued to live peacefully until April 1992. On 5 April
1992, members of the Serb paramilitary formations took away
Marija Žgela, Vid Žgela, Pave Žgela, Vid Šegavac, Pavo
Žgela and Mile Cindri ć. They were murdered and buried in a
283
mass grave.
279
Witness Statement of M.P., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 346.
280 Record of Exhumations on 16 t, 17 , 18 and 19 thJune 1997, Annexes, vol 2(III),
th th th
annex 416; Record of Exhumations on 25 , 26 andnd7 thptembeth1996, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 418; Record of Exhumations on 2 , 4 and 5 July 1996, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 419.
281 Witness Statement of A.K., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 348.
282
Witness Statement of K.Z., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 356.
283 Witness Statements of A.Ž. and M. P., Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes
357 and 355. 273
13. M UNICIPALITY OF O GULIN
5.148 The municipality of Ogulin had 29,068 inhabitants, of which
17,576 (60%) were Croat, 10,088 (34,7%) were Serb, 5 Czech, 13
Hungarian, 3 Italian, and 2 did not claim an ethnic origin. During the war,
Plaški was the main occupied area and Saborsko was under temporary
occupation. The occupied territory was 325.51 km² (32% of the entire
municipality), including 15 villages and 6,260 inhabitants. 1,285 Croats
(7.15% of the municipal population) were expelled.
Saborsko
5.149 The village of Saborsko is located in the municipality of Ogulin,
Lika, approximately 60 km southwest of the town of Karlovac. In 1991, the
village had 852 inhabitants of whom 800 were Croat, 18 were Serb and 37
came from other ethnic groups.
5.150 The village was surrounded by Serb paramilitary formations from
the beginning of August until its occupation on 12 November 1991. Many
th
Croats left the village during this time. On 12 November 1991, Saborsko
was attacked from all directions by a combined JNA and paramilitary
force.284The order to attack was given by Čedomir Bulat, the commander
285
of TG-2 , and the stcision to attack was taken by Bogdan Grba, the 286
commander of the 1 Battalion of the Serbian paramilitary forces. During
the occupation, the village was completely destroyed, including the Church
of St. John Neopomuk (built in 1726) which was fired on by a tank and
subsequently mined. 287Gravestones were also desecrated. 288
5.151 Due to the intensity of the artillery and mortar attack, which was
preceded by an hour of aircraft bombing, the small number of defenders of
Saborsko were forced to retreat together with the population. When the
JNA and Serb paramilitaries entered the village they set about destroying
284 Witness Statement of S. T., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 358. The Serbian
combatants included “SAO Krajina” Army, 200-300 local people, the “Marti ć’s
paramilitaries”, the JNA and decommissioned JNA troops who had joined the “Serbian
Army”.
285 Čedomir Bulat’s order for the attack, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 414.
286 st
Decision on the attack of commander of the 1battalion Bogdan Grba, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 415.
287 Witness Statement of S.T., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 358.
288
Witness Statement of P.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 359. 274
289
Croat property and killing the remaining civilian population. Jeka
Vuković, A.B., Petar Bićanić, Milan Bićanić, Nikola Bićanić, Ivan
Vuković, Jure Štrk, Jure Vukovi ć (son of Zdenko) an d Jure Vuković (son
of Mil an) were hiding in a basement. They gave themselves up in the belief
that their safety was more likely to be protected by the presence of the JNA.
The Serb paramilitaries first separated the women and the men. The men
were then lined up against a wall and shot. The women were told that they
were free to go, but as they walked away they were shot in the back. Jeka
Vuković was killed instantly. A.B. died later due to the injuries she
had sustained. Another woman, also called A.B., was able to escape
and therefore provides the account of the massacre. 290 Another group of
citizens was taken to the school in Li čka Jasenica, where they were kept
imprisoned for three days. During their imprisonment Nikola Medakovi ć,
one of commanders of the attack, told them that Saborsko no longer existed
as it had been levelled to the ground. 291Almost every survivor from
Saborsko witnessed a murder. M.M. saw a neighbour killing his
sister J. and her husband N.D . 292Some of the people still
don’t know the destiny of their relatives. 293
5.152 The ultimate result of the attack on Saborsko was that the village
was completely obliterated and the population exterminated. Bodies of the
murdered Croats were buried several days later in a mass grave prepared by
294
an excavator. Common graves, as well as individual graves were
subsequently found at several locations in and around the village. 295In
“Popov Šanac,” the remains of 15 Croats were recovered. 14 were
identified. At “Borik” the remains of 2 civilians and 1 Croat soldier were
recovered. The remains of six civilians were recovered from individual
graves. The village was subsequently renamed “Ravna Gora”. According to
the Serb M.M. , it was planned that the village would be
ethnically cleansed. This is corroborated by the fact that the occupying
forces brought road signs w ith he new name in Cyrillic script with them.
M. testified to the fact that the occupying forces were given specific
orders to kill civilians. It is plain that the JNA was complicit in the killings
289 Witness Statement of S. T., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 358. Some of older
soldiers were not thrilled at their victory, because there were no Croatian soldiers in the
village and the subsequent arson and murder of civilians seemed pointless.
290
Witness Statement of A.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 360.
291 Witness Statement of M.D., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 361.
292
293 Witness Statement of M.M. , Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 362.
Witness Statement of J.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 363.
294 Witness Statements of A. Š. and M.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes
295 364 and 365.
The locations are “Popov Šanac”, “Borik”, “Biljevina 282”, “Biljevina 274”, “Biljevina
277” and “Biljevina 272/a”. 275
296
that occurred. On the day of the attack a number of civilians were killed
in Saborsko and 11 people are still missing. 297
14. M UNICIPALITY OF K ARLOVAC
5.153 The municipality of Karlovac had 81,319 inhabitants, of whom
51,880 (64%) were Croat and 21,732 (27%) Serb. Until 8 August 1995, the
borderline between the free and occupied territory of Croatia was three or
four kilometres from the centre of Karlovac, in the barracks and military
artillery ranges of the JNA. The town of Karlovac was during that period
exposed to constant attacks from the barracks.
Karlovac
5.154 In 1991 the town of Karlovac had 59,999 inhabitants of whom
38,533 were Croats and 14,529 were Serbs.
th
5.155 The JNA launched its main attack on the town on 4 November
1991. From then until May 1992, the town and its surrounding villages
were systematically destroyed. According to the order of JNA General,
Svetozar298rjanovi ć, cultural and sacral buildings were deliberately
shelled. Between October and December 1991, 42 civilians were killed,
including Žuta Lokva, 29995 others were injured. In the cannon attacks, 629
private houses, 386 flats, 24 farming objects and 32 personal vehicles were
destroyed or damaged. 78 cultural monuments and 12 sacral objects were
also damaged or destroyed.
Banski Kovačevac
5.156 The village of Banski Kovačevac is in the Karlovac municipality, of
Kordun, approximately 120 km east of the town of Karlovac. In 1991,
Banski Kovačevac comprised 309 inhabitants, of whom 272 were Croat, 2
were Serb, and the remaining 30 were of other ethnic groups.
296
Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 365.
297 Missing people are: Kate Grdi ć, Marko Grdić, Josip Kovačić, Mande Kovačić, Marija
Krizmanić, Ivan Luketi ć, Ivka Sertić , Kata Serti ć, Luka Serti ć, Jure Štrk and Marija
Vuković. Appendices, vol 6.
298
Witness Statements of M.L. and D.P., Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes
366 and 367.
299 Witness Statement of M.L., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 366. 276
th
5.157 On 4 October 1991, the Serb paramilitary formations attacked
Banski Kovačevac with artillery and mortars. The majority of the Croat
citizens escaped and fled. Only 15 elderly people remained in the village.
These people were subjected to periodic violence. According to the Serbian
soldier B.M.*, one of the elderly people was maltreated by one of
his com300es. Another Serbian soldthr raped a Croatian woman
A.C.*. On approximately 20 March 1992, Serbian solders forced the
remaining Croats into a cellar, shot them, and then threw the bodies into a
well. The Serbia n soldier R. M., was on guard duty that night.
301
He heard the cries of the Croat residents as they were shot. Another
soldier, A.G., was later informed that the killings were carried out
with the knowledge and approval of the battalion and brigade
302
commanders. This fact is collaborated by the testimony of R.M.,
who states that the Brigade Colonel’s brother was one of the soldiers who
was subsequently ordered to dispose of the bodies. The dead included five
women and one man: Bara Mihali ć, Kata Mihalić, Veronika Krupić, Mara
Lesar, Mara Đ erek and Grga Mihali ć. Their bodies were removed to an
unknown destination. The bodies of these people remain missing, except
that the body of a woma303as found in a box on the outskirts of the village
in the spring of 1992.
15. M UNICIPALITY OF O TOČAC
5.158 The municipality of Otočac had 24,992 inhabitants of which 16,355
(65.44%) were Croats and 7,781 (31.13%) were Serbs.
Dabar
5.159 The village of Dabar is located in the municipality of Oto čac, Lika,
12 km northeast of Oto čac. In 1991, the village had 596 inhabitants, of
whom 229 were Croats and 347 were Serbs. The remaining 20 inhabitants
were from other ethnic groups.
5.160 On 27 August 1991, Serb paramilitaries abducted Grga Bi čanić.
304
He remains classified as “missing”. On another occasion, M. Z.*
was abducted. He was imprisoned and four of his fellow prisoners were
300 Witness Statement of B.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 368.
301
Witness Statement of R.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 343.
302 Witness Statement of A.G., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 369.
303
304 Witness Statement of S.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 370.
Witness Statement of S.D., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 371. 277
subsequently killed. 305On 19 November 1991, the following Croats were
abducted: Slavko, Marko and Joso Rajkovi ć, Kata and Ruža Rajkovi ć and
two other family members both called Stipe Rajkovi ć. The bodies of these
306
7 people were subsequently handed over to the Croatian police.
5.161 Due to constant threats by the Serbs, the Croats fled from their
homes to neighbouring villages. They returned only secretly to feed their
cattle. On one such occasion, rebel Serbs murdered M.D. and
Marija Klišanić. 307By the end of the period of occupation, only 2 Croat
308
houses remained standing.
Vrhovine
5.162 The village of Vrhovine is located in the municipality of Oto čac,
Lika. In 1991 the village had 873 inhabitants, of whom 742 were Serbs and
65 were Croats.
5.163 On 28 September 1991, Serb paramilitaries carried out an armed
assault on the village. The inhabitants were thrced out of their homes. The
houses were looted and set on fire. On 4 October 1991, “Martić’s group”
took Kata, Stipe, Mate Vlado and Martin Č orak to the Vrhovine Police
309
Station,310JB” Korenica. The next day S.Č. was taken from the
village. The fate of these people remains unknown.
16. M UNICIPALITY OF G OSPIĆ
5.164 The municipality of Gospić had a population of 29,049 of whom
18,613 ( 64.07%) were Croats and 8,976 (30.90%) were Serbs. The Serbs
predominantly lived in the eastern part of the municipality.
305
Witness Statement of M.Z., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 372.
306 Witness Statements of S.T. , S.D. and M.Z., Annexes,
vol 2(III), annexes 373, 371, 372.
307
Witness Statement of S.D. , Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 371. The witness
was the husband of one of the deceased. He also heard that Roža Bićanić was
murdered.
308 Ibid.
309
Official record of the Police Section from 27 February 1992, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex
417.
310 Witness Statements of I. and K. Č., Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes 374 and
375. 278
Široka Kula
5.165 The village of Široka Kula is located in the municipality of Gospić ,
Lika. It lies approximately 3 km from Li čki Osik, which was the rebel
311
Serbs’ base in Gospi ć. In 1991, Široka Kula comprised 553 inhabitants,
of whom 184 were Croat, 346 were Serb, while the remaining inhabitants
belonged to other ethnic groups.
th
5.166 On 28 August 1991, after being surrounded for months, Serb
paramilitary groups entered Široka Kula. Units of the JNA established
posts around the village and began to arm the Serb inhabitants. Those
Croats who stayed in the village were restricted in their freedom of
movement. They were not allowed to buy food from the shops or work in
the factory. The local paramilitary leader, Spaso Đukic, told them, “Any
Croat who wishes to stay alive must move from Široka Kula”. 312
5.167 In mid-September 1991, the following Croats from Široka Kula
were imprisoned in Lički Osik: Ante Orešković, Anka Orešković and Petar,
Ivica, Joso and Ante Nikši ć. They were last seen burying the first civilian
victim in the village, Kata Nikši ć, under armed watch. They disappeared
thereafter and remain registered as “missing”. 313
th
5.168 On 25 September 1991, members of the rebel Serbs came to the
house of M.N. , and fired at him and his wife with a machine gun.
K.N. was killed instantly. Her body fell on M .N. who saved
314
himself by pretending to be dead. The same day, M. and A.N.
were also attacked. M. N. was stabbed in the neck, but survived.
M.N. was wounded, but managed to escape, leaving A.N., his
paralysed wife, and M.N. who was 89 years of age at that time in
the house. 315 Neither have been seen since this time. 316
th
5.169 On 13 October 1991, Serb paramilitaries entered the O.
household where a number of Croats were staying. They immediately killed
M.O. who was 80 years of age at the time, together with M.
311
The weapon factory “Marko Oreškovi ć” in Lički Osik was critical to Serbian military
capapbility in the area.
312 Witness Statement of M.O., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 376.
313
Letter to the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Exchange of Prisoners, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 420.
314 Witness Statement of M.N. , Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 377. See also Mass
Killings and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92, pp. 135-136
315
Witness Statement of M.N., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 378.
316 A.N. was taken by Serbs from the house in a wheelbarrow – Letter from
Members of the Families of the Dead and Missing from Široka Kula, 13 thOctober
2000, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 421. 279
and K.O. The paramilitaries took the dead bodies to a barn and
set them alight. 317Other people attempted to hide in the cellar, but they
were eventually found. The following people were killed, A. , A. and
N.O., M. and V. N. (born 1978). D., I. and
M.O., and M.N. survived the massacre. The same night,
318
they fled in the direction of Perušić.
5.170 In the neighbouring house, Ivan Orešković Juško, who was 95 years
old, was burned alive, while in the house next to his, the ninety-year old
Marija Orešković319s killed. Her body was thrown into her neighbour’s
burning house. Mile and Ana Vojvodi ć were abducted and remain
missing. Ivan and Marica Štimac were killed. Their house was set on fire
with the bodies inside. Paramilitaries also killed Manda Bašan as she
returned home from the village of Grubi ći. Ana Nikšić, who was 76 years
of age, was killed in the hamlet of Nikši ć Brdo. Kata Ćaćić was killed in
320
the hamlet of Ćaćići.
5.171 A woman, whose name was also M.O., whose husband
was killed, managed to flee. She has testified that one Serb ordered: “Kill
321
them all, don’t leave any of them alive!”
17. M UNICIPALITY OF ITOVA K ORENICA
5.172 The municipality of Korenica had 11,393 inhabitants of whom
17.52% were Croats, 75.35% were Serbs and the remaining inhabitants
belonged to other ethnic groups
Vaganac
5.173 Vaganac comprised two small villages: Vaganac Donji and
Vaganac Gornji, which are located in the municipality of Titova Korenica,
Lika. In 1991, Vaganac Donji had 184 inhabitants, of whom 89 were Croat
and 85 were Serb. The remaining 10 inhabitants were members of other
317 Witness Statement of D.O., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 379; see also Mass
Killings and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92, pp. 135-136.
318
Witness Statement of M.O., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 380; and Letthr from
Members of the Families of the Dead and Missing from Široka Kula, 13October
2000, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 421.
319 Ibid.
320 Witness Statement of D.O. , Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 379; and Mass
321 Killings and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92, pp. 135-136.
Witness Statement of M.O., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 376. 280
ethnic groups. No Serbs lived in the satellite village of Vaganac Gornji. Of
its 304 inhabitants, 300 were Croats.
rd
5.174 Attacks on Vaganac began 23 June 1991. As a consequence, 300
Croats fled the area. On 8 thand 9 October 1991, Serb paramilitaries and
the JNA attacked Vaganac. 322The remaining inhabitants were forced to
flee. According to the witness J.J. , those who remained were
killed. The victims included Lucija Bilen, Manda Čančar, Dane Jandri ć,
M arija Kukuruzović, Milka Kukuruzović, Jeka Mikuljan, Ruža Mikuljan
323
and Stipe Kukuruzovi ć. The remains of Dane Jandri ć, Marija
Kukuruzović, Milka Kukuruzović, Jeka Mikuljan and Stipe Kukuruzovi ć
were exhumed on 14 August 1996, while the remains of Ruža Mikuljan
th 324
were exhumed on 20 June 1996.
th
5.175 On 15 October 1991, P.Đ.*, a priest from Vaganac, was
escorted into the village by the JNA as part of a humanitarian mission to
administer to the dead. M.P. , the priest from Slunj, two nuns, four
civilians from Vaganac and two hearse drivers accompanied him. When
they arrived in th e village, they were abducted by “Martić’s paramilitaries”.
The JNA failed to i325rvene to protect them. They were taken to prison in
Titova Korenica. P.Đ. describes the torture which he and his
fellow Croats suffered whilst in custody: 326
“They beat us with shoes between our legs and showed that they
were enjoying it. Then they took me to the corridor and continued
beating me with police batons and sticks. They also kicked me.
They took me to the front of the police building. There were 40
civilians. I was covered in blood; they took off my clothes, spilled
cold water over me, suffocated me with a water stream, ridiculed
my nudity and beat me with everything they could find. The
torture lasted for approximately half an hour. An hour later,
another group of civilians from Korenica arrived, and they
demanded that the whole procedure be repeated. Their wish was
granted (...) Police Commander Ćuić pushed a stick into my
rectum.”
322 They simultaneously attacked the villages of Poljanak and Smoljanac. See paras 5.176-
5.179 and 5.180-5.181 below.
323
Witness Statements of J. J. and I.K. , Annexes, vol 2(III),
annexes 381 and 382.
324 Investigation Records (exhumation), Kir-632/96 and Kir-469/96, Annexes, vol 2(III),
annexes 422 and 423.
325
326 Witness Statement of D.R., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 383.
Witness Statement of P.Đ., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 384. 281
Poljanak
5.176 The village of Poljanak is situated in the municipality of Titova
Korenica, Lika, near the Plitvice Lakes National Park. In 1991, the village
had 160 inhabitants of whom 145 were Croats, 5 were Serbs, and the
remaining 10 were members of other ethnic groups.
5.177 A number of Croatian police officers were ambushed near the
village on Easter Sunday, 1991, and one of the policemen, Josip Jovi ć, was
killed. Until then, the relationship between Croats and Serbs had been
peaceful. 327Many Croats spent the night in the forest due to the unrest, but
were able to return the following day. From this time onwards, the JNA
328
began to surround the area. In September 1991, the first organised Serb
paramilitary attacks upon civilians began. On 6 October, the neighbouring
hamlet of Vukovi ći was attacked. The witness B.V. saw
329
paramilitaries kill Tomo Vukovi ć and an elderly woman. Most of the
Croat part of Poljanak was set on fire on 8 thand 9 October. 330Thereafter,
the majority of Croat inhabitants routinely spent the night in the forest.
th
Only the elderly and infirm remained in their homes. On 24 October 1991,
the first day after the fierce attack, M. L. returned from the forest
and found that his father I. and brother M. had been hung. 331The same
day, soldiers wearing JNA uniforms took M. L. to the prison in
Korenica, where he was tortured. L. and 11 prisoners were
subsequently taken to th e camp “Man jača” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 332
th
5.178 The village was attacked again on 7 November 1991.
Approximately 20 paramilitaries set many of the houses on fire. N.M.
was shot. K333 Matovina was wounded and subsequently died in
Saborsko. Another group of approximately 20 Serbs went to the hamlet
of Vukovići, where they attacked the V. family household. B.V.,
a survivor of the massacre, testifies to the subsequent events. The
Serb paramilitaries took all the residents of the house outside, except for
N.V . who was bed ridden. The paramilitaries shot him where he
lay and then threw a grenade at him. The others were kicked and beaten
with rifle butts. 4 of the men, including the witness, were made to stand in
front of a wall and were shot at by the paramilitaries. The following Croats
327 Witness Statement of M.L., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 385.
328
Witness Statement of M.K., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 386.
329 Witness Statement of B.V., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 387.
330
331 Witness Statement of M.K., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 386.
Witness Statement of M.L., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 385.
332 Ibid.
333
Witness Statement of I.K., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 382. 282
were killed instantly: Slavo Vukovi ć, Dane Vukovi ć, Josip Matovina,
Nikola Matovina and Dane Vuković. B.V. fell to the ground and
managed to avoid the bullets. On finding that he was st ill alive, the
paramilitaries severely beat him.
5.179 Meanwhil334Milka Vuković and Lucija Vuković, who was disabled,
were killed. M.V. later found the bodies of Nikola and Ivan
Vuković – “their heads were smashed and their brains were scattered across
335
the ground”. The witness only had time to cover their bodies with a 336
blanket because she was so afraid that the paramilitaries would return.
M. and B.V. escaped through the forest, thereby avoiding an
ambush which had been laid for them. As th ey passed nearby, they were
able to hear the frustrated shouts of the paramilitaries who felt aggrieved at
not being able to kill them. The paramilitaries buried the dead in mass
graves, the whereabouts of which are mostly unknown. The remainsthf 337
Ivan, Nikola and Tomo Vukovi ć were exhumed on 13 August 1996.
The bodies of the other dead remain “missing”.
Smoljanac
5.180 Smoljanac is located in the municipality of Titova Korenica, Lika,
near the Plitvice lakes. In 1991, the village comprised 256 inhabitants, of
whom 246 were Croat and 3 were Serb. The remaining inhabitants were
members of other ethnic groups.
5.181 In the Easter of 1991, Serbian paramilitaries set up barricades,
restricted freedom of movement and prevented Croat children from going
338 th
to school. Like Vaganac and Poljanak, Smoljanac was attacked on 8
October 1991 by members of the JNA and Serbian paramilitaries. The
majority of the Croat inhabitants fled towards Slunj, while others hid in the
forest. After the attack, the inhabitants returned to the village and found
Joso Matovina and Ana Bujadinović dead. 339Most of the Croats then went
into forced exile. A small number stayed in the vicinity of the village, in
campsites located in the surrounding forests. They visited their houses to
334 Witness Statements of B.V. and M. K., Annexes, vol 2(III),
335 annexes 387 and 386.
Witness Statement of M.V., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 388.
336 Ibid.
337 th
Report of Exhumation, 13 August 1996, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 424.
338 Witness Statement of M.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 389.
339
Witness Statements of I.K. , S.R., I.M. and P.B.,
Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes 382, 390, 391, 392. 283
feed the cattle. 340On 4 December 1991, 15 JNA soldiers and rebel Serbs
entered the village and killed Marko Vukovi ć, Marko Mesi ć, Mira
Vuković, Ivica Rosandi ć, Ante Rumenovi ć, Nikola Bi čanić, Jure Bi čanić
341
and his wife Roža Bi 342ić. Survivors were shot at when they tried to343
retrieve the bodies. The remaining Croats were then forced to flee.
18. M UNICIPALITY OF G RAČAC
5.182 The municipality of Grač ac had 10,434 inhabitants of whom 8,371
(80.29%) were Serbs and 1,676 (16.06%) were Croats.
Lovinac
5.183 The village of Lovinac is located in the municipality of Gra čac,
Lika. In 1991, the village had 533 inhabitants, of whom 460 were Croats,
22 were Serbs and the remaining 51 belonged to other ethnic groups. The
main centre of Serbian paramilitary operations was in Radu č,
approximately 10 km from the village.
5.184 Lovinac was directly attacked for the first time on 20 July 1991. In
that attack, Marija Matajić was killed, several civilians were wouthed and a
great number of houses and facilities were damaged. On 5 August 1991,
Kaja Šarić, an elderly woman, was shot and later died in hospital. 344On the
same day, 5 Croats were abducted from the village: Marko Pavi čić (77
years), Stjepan Katalinić (54 years), Jure Sekuli ć (58 years), Martin Šari ć
(41 years) and Ivan Ivezi ć (34 years). 345 On 13 August 1991, Mile Ra čić
346
found their bodies near the village. Thereafter, the Croat inhabitants
began to leave the village en masse.
5.185 A number of Croat civilians were murdered in the surrounding
villages. Mate Kova čević was killed in St. Rok. Their bodies were
340 Witness Statements of S.R. and P.B. , Annexes, vol 2(III),
annexes 390 and 392.
341
Witness Statements of I.K.and I.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes
382, 391.
342 Witness Statement of P.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 392.
343
Witness Statement of I.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 391.
344 Witness Statement of M.Ž., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 393.
345 th
Autopsy Record, 15 August 1991, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 425. All of them had
been shot in the head.
346 Witness Statements of M.R. and M.Ž., Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes 394
and 393. 284
347
exhumed in 1996. In Smokrić, the two deaf-mute brothers Josip and Mile
Pavičić were killed. 348
5.186 In September 1991, the attacks intensified. J. B. found the
dead body of her paralysed husband. He had been unable to flee the v illage
349
because he was bedridden. 350 Jakov ath Ana Sekulić were killed and their
bodies were set on fire. On 24 September 1991, around 350 Croat
inhabitants of Lovinac fled over the Velebit mountain. Members of the
JNA and the paramilitaries occupied Lovinac and the surrounding villages
the same day and started burning down Croat properties. 351 A number of
church structures were either damaged or destroyed, including the Church
of St. Michael in Lovinac, the Church of St. Francis in Vranik, the Chapel
of St. Anthony in Cvituča, the Church of St. Rok in St. Rok and the Church
352
of St. Magdalena in Ri čice. The graveyard in Lovinac was desecrated.
Not only were the tombstones destroyed, but also, according to the parish
priest, Croat skeletons were dug up and removed:
“When it came to ethnic cleansing, they behaved towards us as if
we were lice or bugs. Even the traces of dead Croats had to be
removed. So they exhumed the skeletons and the skull…Lots of
family vaults were demolished and tombstones were carted away.
They ground down the tombstones and then used the material to
erect monuments to their fighters in the villages.” 353
347 Investigative Report, 22 August 1996, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 426.
348
Witness Statement of I.P. and the Special Report, Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes
395 and 427.
349 Witness Statement of J.B. : “…I saw that our house had been completely….
consumed by fire. On the road in front of the house, I found the dead body of my
husband, lying on his back with his legs bent. Trees logs, 2 to 4 metres long, had been
piled on top of him and he had been set on fire. Only the lower part of his body had
been consumed by the fire, He was wearing a white shirt…so I could see that he was
bloody”, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 396.
350
Witness Statements of I.S. and M.Ž., Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes 397
and 393.
351 Witness Statement of I.S., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 397.
352
Witness Statement of I.S., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 398.
353 Ibid. 285
SECTION FOUR: DALMATIA
19. INTRODUCTION
Geography
5.187 Dalmatia is located in the southwest of the Republic of Croatia. It
stretches from the Adriatic Coast to the Dinaric mountainous regions
around the town of Knin. The coastal areas encompassed the bigger cities:
Split comprised 200,000 inhabitants, Šibenik 47,147, Dubrovnik 52,735;
and Zadar 80,434 inhabitants.
5.188 The mountain hinterland of Dalmatia was less developed
economically and much less densely populated. The largest towns were
Knin, which had 14,352 inhabitants and Sinj, which had 11,378 inhabitants.
The inhabitants of this region were mostly agriculturists, cattle-breeders
and industrial workers.
5.189 The strategic position of Dalmatia, in particular the northern part
where the majority of the Dalmatian Serbs lived, was of vital importance to
both sides in the conflict. The main roads, railroads and energy sources of
Croatia, including the “Peruča” hydro-power plant, were all fully or partly
located within this region. It was possible for the JNA to cut off access
between the two sides of the country by controlling the northern part of the
region. The JNA commander-in-chief, Veljko Kadijević later explained that
the two lines of occupation in Dalmatia were critical to the war campaign
in Croatia as a whole: the first line was Knin – Zadar, the second was
Mostar – Split. 354 These lines of occupation directly corresponded to the
western border of the pla355for “Greater Serbia”: see Plate 20 (also Vol 3,
Plates 4.6B and 4.6C). As Knin was the only town in the Republic of
Croatia where the Serbs were in absolute majority (comprising 82.5% of
the population), military and nationalist sentiments coalesced around Knin,
which can fairly be characterised as the heartland of the Serbian Rebellion
354 Veljko Kadijević , “As I see the downfall”, Politika, Belgrade, 1993, p. 135;
Appendices, vol 5, appendix 4.1.
355
Annexes, vol. 3, Plate 2.6. 286
Demography
5.190 According to the 1991 Census, 951,641 inhabitants lived in
Dalmatia. Approximately 780,000 were Croats (about 82%) and 114,800
(12.06%) were Serbs. 356The coastal areas were populated almost
exclusively by Croats. There was an obvious economic disparity between
the relative wealth of the coast and the more humble agricultural and
industrial economies of the hinterland. However, it is important to note
that both Serbs and Croats lived in the mountain areas, especially in the
larger towns. Croats accounted for the majority of the population in the
southern part of the region (Imotski, Sinj, Drniš) whilst the Serbs made up
the majority in the North (Knin, Benkovac and Obrovac). Knin was the
only town in the Republic of Croatia in which the Serbs were the absolute
majority (82.5%). While mixed Croat and Serb populations lived in the
towns of the mountain area, the rural villages were mostly homogenous in
their ethnic character.
The Outbreak of Hostilities
5.191 Major meetings and rallies, which marked the beginnings of the
genocidal axis between Croatian Serbs and the Serbian leadership in
Belgrade, took place in Knin region. One such rally was held in the Krka
Monastery (15 km from Knin) and another was staged near the Orthodox
Church in Lazarica between 8 thand 10 thJuly 1989. The witness S.C.
remembers that local Serbs, together with supporters from Serbia,
rode around the area in paramilitary uniforms publicly calling for th e
creation of a “Greater Serbia”. 357 Critically, this meeting introduced a new
level of ethnic hatred into Croatian public life. Slogans like “This is
Serbia”, “Hey, Serbia, Knin loves you”, “Slobo, we are waiting for you”
were openly brandished by the crowd. People wore Serbian traditional war
uniforms and emblems and sang Serbian songs. 358The presence of the
Serbian leader of the Second World War, Simo Dubaji ć, was highly
symbolic, as earlier he had proclaimed, “I have called the people to rise up
twice before. The first time was in the period between 1941 and 1945.
356
Unless stated otherwise all the demographic data in this chapter is derived from 1991
Census, compiled by the Republic of Croatia.
357 Witness Statement of S.C., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 428.
358 “Greater Serbian campaign in Croatia”, Chronology of the War – Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina 1989 – 1998, p. 7. 287
The second time was between 1966 and 1970. Now, since 1989 I am
willing to do it again”. 359
th
5.192 On 17 February 1990, the SDS was formed in Knin in anticipation
of the first multi-party democratic elections. 360The party subsequently set
up branches across Croatia, but it remained particularly well organised and
represented in Dalmatia. After the first local elections in April 1990, the
Knin Municipal Assembly, presided over by Milan Babi ć, introduced an
alliance of the “Community of the Municipalities of the Northern Dalmatia
and Lika.” In the Dalmatian Municipalities, the alliance included Knin,
Benkovac and Obrovac. 361These were Municipalities where the SDS had
th
won the elections. On the 25 July 1990, in the village of Srb (Lika), the
first Serbian “Parliament” was held and the “Declaration on sovereignty
and autonomy of the Serbian people” was passed. The Declaration stated
that the authority of the Croatian parliament was not to be acknowledged,
nor were the Croatian Constitution and Croatian laws.
5.193 On the territories of the so-called “Community of the Municipalities
of Northern Dalmatia and Lika” rebel Serbs began to ignore such legal
institutions of the Republic of Croatia as the state-owned companies, the
post-office, banks , the courts and the police. In August 1990, Serbs set up
the first barricades on the roads of Knin and Benkovac, in what became
known as the “tree-trunk revolution”. The original paramilitary groups in
this region grew up as self-styled barricade guards. This development
marked the starting point of violence towards local Croats that escalated
into genocide after the spring of 1991 (on mass graves in Dalmatia see Vol
3, Plate 7.5). On 17 August 1990, Milan Babi ć declared a state of war. 362
Many of the weapons previously under the control of the Republic of
Croatia’s local TO, and to the region’s police force, were distributed to the
SDS membership. 363
5.194 In Knin, the Chief Inspector, Milan Marti ć, who later became head
of the “SAO Krajina” police and head of the “Marti ćevci” paramilitaries,
refused to recognise the authority of the Zagreb Government.
359
“‘Knin photographed during tea’, interview with Simo Dubaji ć”, Nin, Belgrade, 12
March 1989, pp. 30-31., Annexes, vol 4, annex 152. See also The movement of “Great
Serbia” in Croatia”, Chronology of the war – Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1989
– 1998, p. 7.
360 Chapter 2, para. 2.82 et seq.
361
“The decision on forming and constituting the Community of the Municipalities of the
Northern Dalmatia and Lika”, 27 June 1990, Knin Municipal Assembly, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 579.
362 Chapter 2, para. 2.90.
363
Report of the Public Security Center in Benkovac, 18 August 1990, Annexes, vol 2(III),
annex 580. 288
Approximately 5,000 local Serbs went to the police station in order to
364
support Martić’s stance. It was at this point that the JNA blocked the path
of special forces from Zagreb, although they later denied that the act was
365
intended to sponsor the challenge of the Serbian rebels to the rule of law.
The landmark declaration on the secession of the so-called “SAO Krajina”
from the Republic of Croatia occurred on 18 March 1991. 366The Decision
on the integratist of the “SAO 367jina” with the Republic of Serbia
occurred on 1 April 1991.
5.195 The Croats in the territory under the control of “SAO Krajina”
soon came under attack, especially in northern Dalmatia: Knin, Benkovac
and Obrovac, where local Serb authorities took complete control. The Serb
rebellion was not simply directed at the political manifestation of Croatia,
but was directed against all aspects of Croatian cultural and economic life,
including Catholic churches, cemeteries, monuments, business transactions
th
and domestic properties. For example, on 6 March 1991, a bomb exploded
under the house of the Šinko family, the only Croatian dwelling in the
village of Strmica, 15 km outside Knin. Four days later, another bomb
th
exploded in the 15 Century Catholic monastery of St. Anthony in Knin .
Open discrimination of Croats on grounds of ethnicity or nationality, and
even religion, was rife. S.C., a company manager in Knin, was told
in February 1991 that his colleagues did not want to work with a Cr oat. He
was dismissed a few months later and told that his dismissal was due
368
merely to the fact that he was a Croat. A Knin work colleague threatened
a Croat, J.C. , at gunpoint. His Serb neighbours later told him to
leave the area because it was Serbian territory now. 369
5.196 By the spring of 1991, isolated forms of terrorism and
discrimination began to formalise in a concerted attempt to rid the region of
st 370
Croats. On 1 May 1991, “Marti ćevci”, rioted and looted villages near
Knin: Vrpolje (64% of Croats) and Potkonje (78.28% of Croats). Any
364 Srpska vojska Krajine, Issue 1, July 1995, p. 18, Annexes, vol 4, annex 152.
365
Narodna armija , 23 August 1990, p. 5., Annexes, vol. 4, annex 147. Public
Announcement, the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (SSNO). It was
empahsised that the army only acts “in accordance with its constitutionally determined
function and responsibility”.
366 “The decision on separating from the Republic of Croatia”, 18 March 1991.
367
“The decision for the joining of the SAO Krajina with the Republic of Serbia”,
Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 403.
368 Witness Statement of S.C., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 428.
369
Witness Statement of J.C., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 429.
370 Appendices, vol 5, appendix 5 (Serb paramilitary groups active in Croatia (1991-
1995)), para. 8. 289
Croats who resisted were imprisoned. 371 On the following day, in the
village of Pola ča, 5 km to the southeast of Knin, a Croat police officer
th th
Franko Lisica was killed. On 6 and 7 May, a group of 20-30 people
rioted in Knin and destroyed all commercial buildings that belonged to
Croat firms and entrepreneurs. Bombs were thrown at the houses of Knin
Croats. At this point, Croat citizens were forced to leave the towns of Knin
and Benkovac en masse in fear for their lives. 372
st
5.197 On 21 May 1991, Vojislav Šešelj came t373he region and expressed
clear support for the “SAO Krajina”. Šešelj was the President of the
Serbian Radical Party from the Republic of Serbia and later became a vice-
374
president in the FRY Coalition Government with Slobodan Milošević.
Military Organisation of the JNA in Dalmatia
5.198 The key JNA force stationed in Dalmatia was the 9th Corps. Its
headquarters were in Knin. The Corps was mostly deployed in the areas
where the Serb majority populations resided. Until 1991, the Corps was
staffed at a minimum level for peacetime conditions compared to other
regions in the country. The coast was under the control of the 8 thNaval
sector, based in Šibenik.
5.199 After the introduction of multi-party democracy in April 1990, the
military authorities began to prepare for the conflict. The JNA’s 221
Motorised Brigade from Knin was restructured into the more intensive «A»
classification. Armoured and mechanised battalions were added to the
Corps as part of the restructuring process. An armoured battalion was
stationed at Benkovac. A further mechanised brigade was stationed at
Knin. 375 In August 1990, the JNA destabilised the authority of the
democratically elected government by preventing helicopters containing
Special Forces personnel entering the Knin territory. The deployment of the
9 Corps in the Knin military frontier enabled the rebel Serbs to
consolidate their position in other parts of the Republic of Croatia without
obstruction. Thereafter the JNA effectively facilitated the first stages of
genocide by setting up “buffer zones” in order to prevent Croatian
371
Witness Statement of S.I., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 430.
372 Ibid. See also photograph “Displaced Croatian civilians from Knin”, Annexes, vol 3,
15.8.
373
“The War Chronology – Aggression at Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1989-
1998”, Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, 1998, p. 60.
374 Chapter 3, para. 374, Appendicies, vol 5, Appendix Hate Speech para. 39.
375
SSNO, Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Administration, no. 1487-
17/89 from 15 May 1990, Order, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 527. 290
376
intervention. At no time did the JNA intervene to halt or punish the
atrocities which ensued.
5.200 From the Autumn of 1991 onwards, the JNA joined forces with the
“SAO Krajina Territorial Defence” in order to block completely access
th
from Zagreb to the sea. The unit377f the 9 Corps were crucial to the
success of the manoeuvre. The Corps was reinforced by members of
paramilitary organisations. At the same time the Serb rebel groups were
strengthened by the great number of JNA officers who were sent by the
Belgrade military authorities to take over command posts. 378 Besides its
original formation, the 9 thCorps was reinforced with the 9 thand 10 th
st
armoured battalion, and the 1 battalion of the 592 motorised brigade. The
JNA activity in the region included the destruction of the Kijevo on 26 th
379 th
August 1991, including the Church of St. Michael the Archangel. On 18
and 19 November 1991 the JNA was directly involved in the massacre in
Škabrnja and Nadin (see below). In this way the JNA, under the control of
Vladimir Vukovi ć and Ratko Mladi ć, was successful in “cleansing” the
hinterland of Šibenik and Zadar. 380
Destruction of Cultural Monuments
5.201 Systematic destruction of cultural monuments, especially churches,
took place throughout the region. Examples of villages where tanks were
used to blow up sacral monuments at close range include Kijevo,381abrnja
and Lukari: see Annexes, vol 3, Plates 8.6 and 8.7. In the area of the
Zadar Archbishopric (including the church centres in Ražanac, Novigrad,
Zadar, Zemunik, Benkovac and Biograd) 46 Catholic churches and other
sacral objects were destroyed, while 69 Catholic churches and other sacral
objects were heavily damaged. Lost monuments included the thurch of the
Appearance of the Holy Virgin Mary from the 19 century in Benkovac. It
was levelled to the ground and a market was established on the site where it
376 th
The Command of the 9 Corps, DT-1-4, 5 April 1991, to the Command of the bVP,
Order for Defence Op. No. 1, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 528.
377
Veljko Kadijević, As I see the Disintegration , 1993, p. 135-136, Appendices, vol. 5,
appendix 4.1.
378 Federal Secretariat for National Defence, Order no.24-175, from 20 September 1991,
Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 530.
379
Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 431; and S.S.,
Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 462.
380 JNA attack on Zadar and Šibenik in October 1991, Annexes, vol 3, Plates 6.3 and 6.4.
381
Witness Statement of S.S. , Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 462 (Kijevo); Witness
Statement of D.I., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 506 (Škabrnja); and Witness
Statement of J.Č., K.Č., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 455 (Lukari). 291
382
had stood. In the area of the Šibenik Bishopric (including the church
centres in Knin, Drniš, Skradin, Tijesno, Vodice, Rogoznica, Ražine,
Unešić and Šibenik) 38 Catholic churches and other sacral objects were
destroyed, while 87 were damaged. In Split–Makarska Archbishopric
(Cetina Deaconry) one Catholic church was completely destroyed (the
church of Holy Salvation in the village of Vrlika) and eight were
significantly damaged.
383
20. M UNICIPALITY OF IBENIK
Piramatovci
5.202 In 1991 the village of Piramatovci had 484 inhabitants of whom
93.6% were Croat. 412 people were exiled as a result of the occupation. Of
those who stayed in the village, at least 3 people were murdered. The dead
384
included an elderly married couple, Mara Ceranja and Jere Ceranja. An
investigation into the death of Milan Pipuni ć by the Serbian Authorities
falsely concluded that it was a suicide, 385since there were no “external
386
signs of injuries”. Witnesses who saw marks of abuse on the body
directly contradicted this conclusion. 387 In the neighbouring hamlet
Bilostanovi, Rade Bura, Marta Bura and Šimka Bura were found dead. All
388
three of them were over 70. Their throats had been cut.
382 There are now grasslands where the Church stood. See: “The Wounded Church in
Croatia – the Destruction of Sacral Objects in Croatia (1991-1995)”, Croatian Bishop’s
383 Conference etc., Zagreb, 1996, p. 282.
The mucipality of Šibenik had 85,002 inhabitants of whom 83.98% were Croats and
10.55% were Serbs.
384
Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia, 1991/92 page 145. See also “Minutes of
investigation”, District Court in Knin, 13 April 1992, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 539.
385 Death Report, 18 March 1992, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 540.
386
Investigation Record, Municipal Court in Benkovac, 14 March 1992, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 541.
387 Witness Statement of J.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 432. A key characteristic
of the conduct of the Serbian authorities in Dalmatia which relied on the JNA for their
power base, is that they often went through the formalities of investigating murders
only to class them as “suicide”. The fact that these essentially farcical proceedings took
place is in itself evidence of the existence of local governmenponsored genocide
under the auspices of the JNA.
388 Investigation Record, 22 June 1992, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 542. 292
Cicvare
5.203 In 1991, the village of Cicvare comprised 91 inhabitants of whom
12.08% were Croat and 87.92% Serbs. Out of 11 Croats who lived there, 7
were forcibly exiled, whilst two were killed. One man was tied up to a post
with a telephone wire and cloaked in the Croatian flag. He was then beaten
389
until he collapsed. A few days later, he was found hung in his house. The
investigating authorities again came to the conclusion that the death was a
suicide. 390An elderly woman, Milka Cicvara died as a result of nine stab
391
wounds.
Sonković
5.204 The village of Sonković had 695 inhabitants of whom 44.17% were
Croat and 51.9% were Serbs. The Serbian authorities forcibly exiled 315
inhabitants. 6 Croats were killed, including Ante Matić, Grgo Matić, Marija
Matić and Ana Mati ć. 392 Joso and Milka Palinić were found dead in their
393
beds after a missile hit their house.
Other Locations
5.205 Other atrocities in the Municipality of Šibenik included the
following:
1. Rupe (976 inhabitants: 97.23% Croats). Seven hundred and
sixty-five Croats were banished. 394
2. Ićevo (168 inhabitants: 57.73% Croats and 39.28% Serbs). 3
elderly Croat women were killed: inclu395g Mara Duji ć
(daughter of Ivo) who was shot, Mara Dujić (daughter of
389
Witness Statements of B.C.: “the veins on his arms and legs were torn to
pieces”, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 433.
390 Investigation Record, County Court in Knin, 15 January 1992: “…Through the external
examination it is established that he died a violent death due to committed suicide by
contraction of the neck with a noose, that is by hanging. No signs of violence or
anything that would suggest murder are found…”, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 543.
391 Witness Statement of B.C., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 433; Mass Killing and
Genocide in Croatia 1991/92 page 145.
392
Investigation Record, County Court in Knin, 16 January 1992, Annexes, vol 2(III),
annex 546.
393 Investigation Record, County Court in Knin, 2 January 1993, Annexes, vol 2(III),
annex 544.
394
See photograph “The village of Rupe”, Annexes, vol 3, 12.3.
395 Death Report, 26 December 1991, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 547. 293
396 397
Joso) who was slaughtered and Luca Dujić (90 years). In
all 61 people were banished after the village had been
occupied. In the neighbouring 398let of Laškovica, one Croat,
Ante Silov, was murdered.
3. Čista Velika (533 inhabitants: 97,18% Croats). Two Croats
were killed: Nikola Škarić (75 years) 399was set on fire in his
400
own house, and one woman was slaughtered. 502 Croats
fled.
21. M UNICIPALITY OF D RNIŠ 401
Puljane
5.206 The village of Puljane is situated in the Municipality of Drniš,
Dalmatia, 15 km northwest of the town of Drniš. In 1991, Puljane had 155
inhabitants of whom all but one were Croat. 7 Croats were killed at one
time and 3 others were murdered subsequently. 112 Croats fled from the
village.
th
5.207 On 16 September 1991, the JNA and paramilitaries attacked the
villages that surrounded Drniš. On 23 rd November 1991 many of the
younger people who remained were abducted by the JNA and taken into
custody for periods ranging between 10 and 50 days. While they were in
402 nd
custody, the paramilitaries looted many of their houses. Since 22
January 1993, members of the police of the “Republic of Srpska Krajina”
396
Death Report, 26 December 1991, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 548.
397 Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92, p. 145.
398
Ibid.
399 Ibid.
400
Witness Statement of Z.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 523.
401 The Mucipality of Drniš had 24,169 inhabitants of whom 77.51% were Croats and
20.58% were Serbs.
402
Witness Statement of K. S., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 434. See also Witness
Statement of G .B., who describes the experience of captivity: “At the
beginning they would burst into the room, threaten us with weapons, shoot, provoke
and beat even an 85 year old man….. they … forced a Croat to beat another
Croat…Once we didn’t get any water for two days. Anybody….could enter our room
and beat us…. Things were like that for two or three months. …. While we were in the
military barracks 5 civilians died due to bad living conditions, and the lack of medical
help. A civilian called Ante Mujan…died as a result of beating. Quite often they were
cases of mutilation. Once, for example, they cut off the ear of a man called B. after
a failed exchange. They beat us with everything – chains, broomsticks, bags filled with
sand, batons, sticks, and other objects.”, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 520. 294
would come to the village 2 or 3 times a day and systematically harassed
the remaining Croatian population. On 2 ndFebruary 1993, members of the
403
Serbian paramilitaries murdered Josip Para ć (born 1919), Ivan Bra čić
(born 1914), Ana Bra čić (born 1921), Pavao Para ć (born 1923), Marija
Parać (born 1926), and Kata Para ć (born 1920). 404A subsequent
investigation revealed that the killers were members of a Serbian
paramilitary formation whose leader was colonel Stevan Suboti ć, an active
405
officer of the Army of Yugoslavia (FRY). The only punishment the
murderers received was to be dismissed from their units on the basis that
the army did not tolerate independent riflemen. 406Asaresultofthe
massacre the remaining inhabitants of Puljane fled from the village on the
following day. 407
Siverić
5.208 The village of Siverić is located in the Municipality of Drniš,
Dalmatia, 2 km from the town of Drniš. In 1991, the village had 981
inhabitants of whom 881 (88.90%) were Croats.
5.209 The village was attacked on 16 September 1991. According to the
witness I.F.*, 408around 150 missiles fell on the village. Most of
409
the Croats escaped in the direction of Split. Only 120 people remained .
The church St. Peter the Apostle was devastated, the parsonage set on fire,
410
and the cemetery desecrated. On 21 December 1991, paramilitaries 411
burned down 11 residential properties, all of which belonged to Croats.
403
Witness Statements of M.P. and J. P., Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes 435
and 436.
404
“Ivan Bračić and other murders”, Secretariat of Interior, 1 March 1993, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 531. See also Witness statements of M.P. , A.B., M.S.,
J.P., Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes 435, 514, 437 and 436.
405 “Violence and the murders of the citizens of Croatian nationality”, Security and
Intelligence Agency, 1 March 1993, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 532; Resolution of
presence in combat, General-Major of the Serbian Army of Krajina Milan Čeleketić, 9
September 1994, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 533.
406 Daily Report, Security and Intelligence Agency, 3 February 1993, Annexes, vol 2(III),
annex 537.
407
Witness Statement of J.P., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 436.
408 Witness Statement of I.F., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 438.
409
Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92, Croatian University Press, Zagreb,
1992, page 160.
410 “Wounded Church in Croatia – Destruction of the Sacral Buildings in Croatia (1991-
411 1995)”, Croatian Bishop’s conference and others, Zagreb, 1996, p. 247.
Military Police MP Knin, “The minutes on the investigation”, 1 February 1992,
Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 534. 295
Life for those who remained in the village became impossible. P.H.*
was beaten so many times that he eventually collapsed with a
412
heart attack and died a month later. His wife B.* was subsequently
raped. 413 A.F.* was beaten and raped on two occasions. 414 A.K.*,
415
who was mentally retarded was raped on several occasions. A
snapshot of the violence routinely experienced by Croati an civilians is
demonstrated in a UN Report into these events, which summarises 15 cases
416
of serious assault over a period of 6 days between 10 and 16 May 1995.
Drniš
5.210 The town of Drniš had 5,645 inhabitants of whom 76.7% were
Croat. Members of the Serb paramilitary groups tortured the inhabitants
physically and psychologically and forced them to carry out forced labour.
Non-combatants were abducted and taken into custody for interrogation.
Ivan and Manda Mujan were beaten to death. Ivan Radas was found in his
house unconscious in a pool of blood. His ears had been cut off. He died
417
two days latter in hospital. The Croatian woman M. M.* was
raped, after her husband had been brutally beaten. 418The Croats who
419
remained in Drniš hid in fear of their lives. Rebel Serbs made a list of the
Croats who remained and threatened them saying “this is nothing in
420
comparison to what would happen to the Croats soon.” As a result of
such and similar actions, 2,909 Croats were forcibly exiled from Drniš.
412
Witness Statement of B.H.*, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 439.
413
Ibid.
414 Witness Statement of A.F. and I. F., Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes
440 and 438. A.F. reported the rape to the authorities of the “SAO Krajina”,
but no investigation was conducted. Also Official Note, Police station Drniš, 4 March
415 1994, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 581.
Witness Statement of A.K., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 441.
416 th
UN, The Ministry of the Defence of the Republic of Croatia’s Office in Šibenik, 8
June 1995, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 535: K. O. (robbery and murder threats),
J.F.* (house raid and fuel robbery), M.R. (beaten, clothes, food
robbery and putting knife against her throat), I.D. * (electricity cables robbery),
A.M. (food, clothes, tools robbery, intimidation), M.D. (robbery and knife
threats that they would kill his wife), M.R. (setting his barn on fire, devastation
of the house), A.M. (building material robbery), J.M. (house robbery,
putting knife against her throat and her daughters’ Aand S. ), M.B.
(beaten, robbery), V.O. (robbery, murder threats), M.M. (robbery,
house raid).
417 Witness Statement of M.P., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 442.
418
Witness Statement of M.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 521.
419 Witness Statement of M.P., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 442.
420
Witness Statements of I.H. * and M.M. , Annexes, vol 2(III),
annexes 444. 296
Miljevci
5.211 The villages and hamlets around Miljevci (i.e. Bogati ć Miljevački,
Drinovci, Širitovci, Kaoč ine) had a total population of 1,305 of which
98.16% were Croats. 8 Croats were killed during the occupation: Mato
421
Bačić and Marija Ba čić were killed by a hand gr422de, Marija Mazalin
was shot as she tried to hide in a hedge, Paško Kozi ć and Vinko Gali ć
were killed by members of the Serbian paramilitaries, 423Ivan Vlai ć and
424
Šime-Zdravko Lovrić were shot at point blank range. A blind man, Petar
Džaja, was shot while he was tending to his cattle. The witness, A.M.
was threatened with death by Šešelj’s paramilitary gr oup on a
425
number of occasions. Almost all of the dead were over 60 years of age.
Croats lived in constant fear: they were threatened with death by Serbian
paramilitaries so they were forced to run away from the houses and sleep in
the woods. 426 933 Croats were forcibly exiled from the area.
Other Locations
5.212 Other atrocities in the municipality of Drniš included the following:
1. Trbounje (418 inhabitants: 98.97% Croats). One Croat
woman was killed 427in the village, while 404 were forced to
leave due to continual robberies and violence.
2. Kadina Glavica (510 inhabitants: 70.98% Croats). Four 428
Croats were killed. One of them was burned in his barn.
Witness J.T. testified that his wife and a married
429
couple, Ivan and Kata Grci ć were killed. 60 Croats were
forced to flee out of fear for their lives.
3. Kričke (717 inhabitants: 36.4% Croats, 62.6% Serbs). Three
Croats were killed, namely Nikola Barišić, Krste Sikirica and
421 rd
Report,3 police station Drniš, 11 March 1996, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 550.
422Record,3 rdpolice station Drniš, 12 March 1996, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 549.
423
Witness Statement of M. M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 445; Witness
Statement of J.G., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 446.
424Record,3 rdpolice station in Drniš, 11 March 1996, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 582;
Official report on bodies found, 3dpolice station Drniš, 19 September 1996, Annexes,
425 vol 2(III), annex 551.
Witness Statement of A.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 447.
426
427 Witness Statement of A.B. and M.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 519.
Witness Statement of N.K. , who states inter alia that M. M. was found
in a pool of blood with gunshot wounds to her thighs, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 443.
428
Witness Statement of Š.P., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 449.
429 Witness Statement of J.T., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 448. 297
Kata Bitunjac. The latter was found unconscious, covered
with a blanket. She had been beaten all over her body and
430 th
subsequently died in hospital. On 28 August 1992, 431
Queen of the Peace church was mined and destroyed. 233
Croats were eventually banished from the village.
4. Žitnić (510 inhabitants: 47.45% Croats, 50.39% Serbs).
Members of the Serbian paramilitary units killed 5 Croats.
One of them, Ante Mujan was taken to prison in Knin and
432 433
beaten to death; one woman, Cvita Mio čić was burned.
Three elderly people, namely Milenko Ercegovac, Anto
Ercegovac and Marija Ercegovac, remain missing, it is
434
believed that their bodies were thrown into a well. 247
Croats were forced to flee.
5. Oklaj (485 inhabitants: 92.25% Croats). Eight Croats were
killed in the village, including I435 Džapo, Roko Agi ć,
Manda Agić, Marija Dizdar, Ivan Vuci ć (son of Mate),
Kata Vucić and Ivan Vuci ć (son of Marko). The bodies of
Ivan Vucić, Kata Vucić, Ivan Vucić and another unidentified
person were subsequently exhumed. 436 449 Croats were
forcibl437xiled from the village after systematic looting and
arson.
6. Lukari (214 inhabitants: 93% Croats). One Croat woman
was killed, 438 and one Croat woman was raped several
439
times. 113 Croats were forced to flee.
7. Razvođe (507 inhabitants: 66.46% Croats, 31.55% Serbs). 4
Croats were killed, one of whom, Ana Duvan čić, was killed
440
while running across a minefield. She and her family were
trying to escape after paramilitaries from Belgrade had
430
Witness Statement of M.V., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 450.
431 Ibid.
432
Witness Statement of A.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 515.
433 Official Record of Discovery of Place of Burial, 3rdpolice station Drniš, 9 August
1996, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 583.
434 Witness Statement of A.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 452.
435
Witness Statements Z.Č., D.A. , J.B. , Annexes, vol 2(III),
annex 453.
436 Exhumation Record, 12 February 1993, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 552.
437
Witness Statement of N.B.*, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 454.
438 Witness Statements of J.Č. and K.Č., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 455.
439
Witness Statement of N.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 454.
440 Witness Statement of M.D., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 456. 298
indecently assaulted them. 441Z.S.* was raped at
gunpoint. 442 282 two Croats were forcibly exiled.
8. Ljubotić (113 inhabitants: 99.11% Croats). 43 Croats443ed
from the village, while one Croat was killed and at least
one Croat woman raped. 444
9. Matase 4452 inhabitants, 95,75% Croats). One Croat was
killed, while 106 were exiled.
10. Otavice (283 inhabitants: 95.75% Croats). 5 Croats were
killed. Luka Reljanovi ć was seen for the last time on 3 rd
February 1993. He was claiming that the paramilitaries were
threatening to kill him. 446 A corpse was found in the Čikola
River on 23 March 1993. The “RSK” authorities took no
steps to identify the body and officially concluded that it was
447
a suicide. The other Croat civilians that were k448ed
included, Nikola Cigi ć and Boško La đević. 231 Croats
were forcibly exiled. 449Serb paramilitaries destroyed the
mausoleum of the most famous Croatian sculptor Ivan
Meštrović. 450
22. M UNICIPALITY OF K NIN 451
Kninsko Polje
5.213 In the Kninsko Polje (hamlet Marić i), two Croats, Joško Ćaćić and
452
Joško Marić were killed. One of them was stabbed and the death was
441
Ibid.
442 Witness Statement of Z.S., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 457.
443
Witness Statement of V.Z., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 458.
444 Witness Statement of J.L.*, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 459.
445
Witness Statement of V.Z., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 458.
446 Witness Statement of I.G., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 460.
447
Death Report, 23 March 1993, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 553.
448 Witness Statement of I.G., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 460.
449
Witness Statement of J.H., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 461.
450 Vladimira Pavi ć, “Register of War Damages on Museums and Galleries”, Museum
451 Documentation Centre, Zagreb, 1997, pp. 118-121.
The Municipality of Knin had 42,954 inhabitants of which 9.05% were Croats and
88.2% were Serbs.
452
Witness Statement of A. Ć., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 468. In relation to J.Ć.’s
murder, he states that the police deliberately placed a gun by his body and on 299
later decla453 a “suicide”. The deceased had stab wounds to his head, throat
and chest.
Kijevo
5.214 Kijevo had 1,261 inhabitants, of which 99.6% were Croats. In
Kijevo and its neighbouring hamlets, 10 Croats were killed. A JNA soldier
who was stationed in the village and witnessed the conduct of the
paramilitaries observed that there was no resistance from Croats in any way 454
and that the subsequent violence that ensued was entirely unnecessary. In
July 1992, the bodies of Ivan and Jaka Ercegovac were thrown into a local
455
well, where their daughter found them. In June 1992, Božica Slavi ć’s
body was found in a meadow. In January 1993, Pera Gojevi ć-Zrnić’s body
456
was found on a country road. B.V. was tortured on a number of 457
occasions, including one incident where she was forced to stand in a fire.
Others who were killed included Toma Bili ć, Marka Bili ć, Ruža Slavi ć,
458
Ivan Barešić and Mate Jakovica. In the hamlet of Vujići, the Croats were
abused and terrorised on a daily basis and were compelled to undertake
forced labour. 459 997 Croats were forced to leave Kijevo.
Ervenik
5.215 In 1991 the village of Ervenik had 1,570 inhabitants of whom
2.03% were Croats and 97.19% were Serbs. On 18 January 1992, members
460
of the Serbian paramilitary units, killed a Croat called Drago Č engić, his
wife and his two children and then burnt their corpses. One of the Čengić
boys was 11 years old, the other was 4. Josip Čengić and his wife were also
461
killed. Slobodan Kovačević and Damir Travica confessed to these crimes
Serbian Radio Knin that night a news story was broadcast which falsely portrayed the
deceased as a terrorist.
453 Record on the external examination of the corps, 1992, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 554.
454
Witness Statement of S.S. , Annexes, vol 2(III), annex Annexes, vol 2(III),
annex 462.
455 Witness Statement of B. V., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 463.
456
Ibid.
457 Ibid.
458
Witness Statement of M.G.Z., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 464.
459 Witness Statement of C.V., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 465.
460
Witness Statement of S.K., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 466.
461 Witness Statement of D.T., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 467. 300
462 463
in writing. According to the witness D. R., the perpetrators
were charged, but only as a formality. They were release d a few months
later despite the confession evidence. All other Croats from Ervenik left the
village, although survivors believe that Stana Ivanković (82 years) was also
killed.464
Vrpolje
5.216 During the period of the occupation the Serbs denied the local Croat
population either wages or food. People were sacked from their jobs purely
because of their ethnic background. The friars’ house next to St. Joseph’s
Parish Church was taken over by Serbs. The rectory was destroyed. In
1993, Serbian paramilitaries arrived with the intention of expelling all
465
Croats from the village. As a result the remaining Croat population
sought the assistance of UNPROFOR to flee from Vrpolje. 466
23. M UNICIPALITY OF O BROVAC 467
Jasenice
5.217 The village of Jasenice is located in the Municipality of Obrovac,
Dalmatia, 5 km west of the town of Obrovac. In 1991 Jasenice had 1,308
th
inhabitants of which 97.85% were Croats. After its occupation on 11
September 1991, only about 10 elderly Croats remained in the village and
468
its surrounding hamlets. 469ese people were then systematically
murdered. The witness L.M. saw Luka Modri ć shot from point
462
Witness Statements of S.K. and D.T., Annexes, vol 2(III),
annexes 466 and 467.
463
464 Witness Statement of D.R., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 518.
Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92, page 145.
465
Witness Statement of J.B. , Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 516, who states: “Mile
Vučković called “Čarapan” would bring Chetniks to Vrpolje and show them the houses
of those Croats whom they planned to rob and those whom they planned to force out of
the village.”
466 Witness Statement of A.Ć., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 468.
467
In 1991, the Muncipality of Obrovac had 11,557 inhabitants of whom 32.54% were
Croats and 65.52% were Serbs, see 1991 Census.
468
“Pjevali su dok su ih ubijali” (They sang while killing thZadar Journal, 20 April
1995, p. 9, Annexes, vol 4, annex 152.
469 Witness Statement of L.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 469. 301
470
blank range, a fact that was confirmed by the subsequent autopsy. The
special platoon of the police of the “RSK” boasted about the murder in
471
front of the police station. Thereafter, six elderly Croats were shot in the
nearby hamlet of Meki Doci. They were: Božica Juri čević (1927), Zora
Zubak (1922), her husband Stipan Zubak (1920), Martin Bužonja (1927),
Manda Maruna (1931) and Ivan Maruna (1922). The notes on the autopsies
carried out on 30 thJune 1993 show that these civilians were shot at close
472 473
474ge. Two “RSK” police witnesses N.V. and M.G.
confirm that the local Serbian authorities were aware of these
crimes and that there was a specific order not to investigate them.
Medviđa
5.218 The village of Medvi đa is located in the Municipality of Obrovac,
Dalmatia, 13 km southeast of the town of Obrovac. In 1991, it comprised
688 inhabitants, of whom 395 (57.41%) were Croats and 282 (40.98%)
were Serbs.
5.219 Tensions in the village began in early 1991; fuelled by the fact that
Medviđa was surrounded by villages where Serbian inhabitants were in the
majority. 475 Croats were informed that their presence in the village was no
longer acceptable and they were threatened with death unless they left
immediately. 476The Serbs looted the houses of those who left. 477Between
August and December 1991, the Chur478of Appearance of the Holy Virgin
Maria was severely damaged. During the subsequent occupation, Croats
470 Minutes on the investigation, County Court in Zadar, 22 January 1997, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 555. For an account of the murder see I.M. , “They killed them
singing”, Annexes, vol 4, annex 152.
471 Witness Statement of S.Š., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 470.
472
Minutes on the Autopsy – Stipe Zubak, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 557; Autopsy Report
– Ivan Maruna, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 558; Record of Exhumation – Božica
Juričević, Zorka Zubak, Martin Bužonja, Manda Maruna, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex
556.
473
474 Witness Statement of N.V., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 472.
Witness Statement of M.G., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 473.
475
476 Komazeci: 100%; Zelengrad: 89.45%; Parčić: 100%.
Witness Statement of Š.L., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 474.
477
478 Witness Statement of S.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 475.
“The Wounded Church in Croatia, Destruction of Sacrale Monuments in Croatia (1991-
1995)”, the Croatian Bishops’ Conference, Zagreb, 1995, p. 286. 302
were severely restricted in their freedom of movement and commercial
dealings. 479
th
5.220 On 9 May 1992 Šime and Ika Serdarevi ć, were shot at point blank
range. According to I.P., who found their corpses, Ika Serdarević
was sho480t in the face and Šime Serdarevi ć was shot in the forehead three
times. In July/August 1992 Božo Demo was thrown into a pit, where he
was left to die over a period of three or four days. 481Soka Genda’s husband
remained missing after Serbs had set their house on fire in January 1993.
They left a knife, which was covered in blood, sticking out of the front
door. 482 On 3 rdFebruary 1993, the shepherd Ivan Mrši ć was gratuitously
483
gunned down by machine gun fire. At the same time Serb paramilitaries
attempted to rape K.S.* 484 On 9 February 1993, 9 Croatian civilians
were massacred. S. E. was one of the survivors. Sh e saw Dragica
Erstić killed on the stree t outsid e the house. 485The paramilitaries then went
into the house and started shooting. The witness was wounded, but saved
because the corpse of her 18 year old daughter, M., shielded her. Those
who were killed as a result of the massacre were Petar Ersti ć, Jeka Erstić
(born 1947), Draginja Ersti ć, Dušan Ersti ć, Ivan Ersti ć, Jeka Ersti ć (born
1933) and Mira Ersti ć. According to the statement of the “RSK” police
officer, N.V. , those responsible for the killing were
486
apprehended, but on the intervention of Milan Mart ić, the killers were
released without charge. 487
479 Witness Statement of S. M.: “It was strictly forbidden for us to sell cattle or
leave the village”, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 475.
480
Witness Statement of I.P., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 476. N. V.,
was the police officer who was assigned to the case. Although V. made a report
indicating that so-called “Service for Federal Safety” was responsible, his superiors did
not act upon the information and he was later prohibited from pursuing the
investigation, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 477. See also the witness statement of the
481 “RSK” policeman M.G., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 473.
According to the witness Š.L. , “Serbs bragged and took pleasure in watching
how long he could stay alive”, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 474.
482
483 Witness Statement of S.G., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 479.
Witness Statement of K.S.: “I heard two machine gun bursts and I later saw that
Ivan Mršić was killed on the street…”, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 517.
484
Ibid.
485 Witness Statement of S.E., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 480.
486
The “SAO Krajina” Minister and Police Inspector of Knin.
487 Witness Statement of N.V., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 477. 303
Other Locations
5.221 Other atrocities in the municipality of Obrovac included the
following:
1. Zaton Obrovački (495 inhabitants: 35.16% Croats, 62.39%
Serbs). Members of the Serbian paramilitaries murdered at
least 8 Croats: Luka Modrić , Marijan Modri ć , Božica
Dopuđ and Anđa Klanac. 489On 26 January 1993, a group of
Croat villagers were taken by the members of the Serbian
paramilitaries and killed. The witness J. M., a Serb,
was also taken with the group, but when she was recog490ed as
a fellow Serb she was separated from the group. 146 Croats
fled due to the constant intimidation, robberies and arson. 491
2. Kruševo (1,676 inhabitants: 92.95% Croats). At least 1 Croat
was murdered during the occupation of the village by Serbi492
paramilitaries who were lauded by their superior. 1,557
Croats fled from the village.
24. M UNICIPALITY OF ENKOVAC 493
Bruška
5.222 In 1991, the village of Bruška comprised 373 inhabitants, of whom
89.54% were Croats. Throughout the occupation systematic violence and
st
looting took place. The brutality reached a high point on 21 December
1991 when paramilitaries murdered 9 Croats, including Dušan Marinovi ć,
Roko Marinović, Petar Marinovi ć, Krsto Marinovi ć, Draginja Marinovi ć,
494
Manda Marinović, Stana Marinovi ć, Dragan Marinovi ć, Ika Marinovi ć.
488
Minutes of investigation, County Court in Zadar, 22 January 1997, Annexes, vol 2(III),
annex 584.
489
Witness Statements of J.M. and N.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes
481 and 482.
490 Witness Statement of J.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 481.
491
492 Witness Statement of N.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 482.
Witness Statement of M.J., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 483.
493 The municipality of Benkovac had 33,378 inhabitants of which 40.6% were Croats and
494 56.88 were Serbs.
Commentary, Crime in the Village of Bruška, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 559; Minutes
of Investigation, County Court in Zadar, 26 April 1996 – Dušan Marinović, Roko
Marinović, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 460; Minutes of Investigation, County Court in
Zadar, 26 April 1996 – Petar Marinovi ć, Krsto Marinovi ć, Draginja Marinovi ć,
Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 561; Minutes of Investigation, County Court in Zadar, 26 304
495
They were executed by a paramilitary firing squad outside their homes.
In June 1992, Joso Marinovi ć was murdered. 496The “RSK” authorities
497
attempted to blame the killings on a Croatian terrorist movement. One
eyewitness to the massacre was taken to the prison in Knin, where he died
498
due to the injuries he sustained. 253 Croats fled the village of Bruška.
Korlat
5.223 The village of Korlat had 941 inhabitants, of whom 55.15% were
Croats and 43.03% were Serbs. Serbian paramilitary units 499dered nine 500
Croats, including Martin and Cecilija Buljat, Kristina Galić , Joso
Jurjević, Darinka Jurjević, Luca Zorić and Đurđija Modrić. The Jurjević’s
were an elderly couple. Joso Jurjevi ć’s nose and ears had been cut off and
his thorax had been gouged out. 501 The police beat Milan Buli ć to death
502
with a hayfork. Soka Šikić was blown up when a bomb was thrown at
her house. 503 The church and all Croatian houses in Korlat were
destroyed. 504 Three hundred and eighty-nine Croats were expelled during
the occupation.
Smilčić
5.224 The village of Smilč ić had 641 inhabitants, of whom 29.95% were
Croats and 68.48% were Serbs. 6 Croats were murdered in the village.
Three people were set on fire: Krsto Arbanas, Anica Arbanas, Biserka
April 1996 – Manda Marinovi ć, Stana Marinovi ć, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 562;
Minutes of Investigation, County Court in Zadar, 26 April 1996 – Dragan Marinovi ć,
Ika Marinović, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 563.
495
Witness Statements of A.M. and J.M. , Annexes, vol 2(III),
annexes 485 and 486.
496 Witness statement of Ž.M. , Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 484; Minutes of
497 Investigation, 26 April 1996, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 564.
Commentary, Crime in the Village of Bruška, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 559, Witness
Statement of D.Z., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 487.
498
Witness Statement of Ž.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 484.
499 Witness Statement of J.G., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 488.
500 th
Report of Death, 27 March 1992, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 565.
501 Witness Statements of J.V. , Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 489; J.G. ,
Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 488; and B.Š., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 490. Also
502 Investigation Record, 24 April 1996, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 566.
Witness Statement of C.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 491.
503 Witness Statement of B.Š., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 490.
504
Witness Statement of M.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 492. 305
505
Abanas. I.B.* and L. V.* were raped by a paramilitary
soldier, G.A. In a subsequent confession statement, A.
attempted to justify his conduct by saying that since the women were
506
Croats, he thought he could act according to his own conscience. The
victims went to hospital in Benkovac the following day where they were
told that there was no evidence of rape and they were denied any medical
507 508
reports. All the Croats in Smilčić eventually fled.
Other Locations
5.225 Other atrocities in the municipality of Benkovac included the
following:
1. Lišane Ostrovičke (892 inhabitants: 99.1% Croats). At least 4
Croats were murdered, 509 whilst 825 Croats were forcibly
expelled from the village.
2. Benkovac (3,776 inhabitants: 19.83% Croats, 73.62% Serbs).
Croats were systematically abused and physically attacked.
During the occupation, Serbs planted explosive devices on the
Croat-owned property. The house of one Croat, a veterinarian,
was attacked three times, either by missile bombardment or by
planting bombs. 510 659 Croats fled the town.
3. Rodaljice (162 inhabitants: 100% Croat). A number of Croats
were murdered during the occupation, including Luka Šunić ,
Grgica Šunić, Marija Šuni ć and Milka Grgas. 511The witness
M.Š. was shot in the h512, but survived, and
eventually escaped. 139 Croats were expelled.
4. Lisičić (499 inhabitants, 96% Croats). 4 Croats were murdered
in the village: Maša Kutija, Stana Kutija, Frane Kutija 513and
505
Record of Investigation, 26 November 1992, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 568.
506 Witness Statement of G.A., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 493.
507
Witness Statement of I.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 494.
508 Witness Statement of B.A., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 495.
509
Minutes of Exhumation, 24 May 1996 and Witness statement of T. D.,
Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes 569 and 496.
510
Minutes of Investigations dated 26 March 1992, 11 August 1992 and 30 November
1992, Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes 587, 588, 589.
511 Witness Statements of M.Š. and T.Š., Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes
497 and 498. See also Record of the Performed Burial, 12 June 1992, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 570.
512
Witness Statement of M.Š., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 497.
513 Record of the Autopsy (Exhumation), 28 October 1995, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 571. 306
Nikola Žili ć. 514J.Ž. was indecently assaulted by
paramilitaries who beat her and 515ea tened to kill her. 5 or 6
paramilitaries raped M.B. * 360 Croats were
expelled from the village and the “RSK ” authorities settled
516
Serbs in their houses. The Cathol517Church in the village
was destroyed with explosives. According to witness
statements, only a few Croats remained in the village. Those
518
who remained were denied free movement.
5. Perušić Benkovački (595 inhabitants: 72.77% Croats). 353
Croats were forcibly expelled.
6. Šopot (531 inhabitants, 69.49% Croats). 8 Croats were
murdered, including Luka Marinovi ć, Stipe Marinović, Zorka
Marinović and Vukosava Marinović. When their bodies were
found, Vukosava Marinovi ć was lying on her stomach with
her skirt rolled up over her head. Her underwear had been
removed. Stipe Marinovi ć had been shot in the head and
stabbed. He was wearing underpants. Zorka and Luka
Marinović also suffered fatal head injuries. 519Two were
520
stabbed and two were set on fire. Croats were compelled to
undertake forced labour in the village. 521
25. M UNICIPALITY OF ADARZ
Škabrnja and Nadin
5.226 The village of Škabrnja is located in the Municipality of Zadar,
Dalmatia, 15 km east of the town of Zadar. According to the 1991 Census,
Škabrnja had 1,953 citizens, of whom 1,906 (97.6%) were Croats. The
th th
massacre in the village took place on 18 and 19 November 1991, the
same dates as the fall of Vukovar.
514 Witness Statement of J.Ž., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 499.
515
Witness Statement of A.Š., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 500.
516 Witness Statement of J.Ž., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 499.
517
“The Wounded Church in Croatia”, p. 285
518 Witness Statement of A.Š., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 500.
519
Witness Statement of K.V., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 502.
520 Record of External Examination of Corpses, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 585; Criminal
charges, ibid., annex 586; Witness Statement of K.V., ibid., annex 502.
521
Witness Statement of K.V., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 501. 307
th
5.227 Škabrnja was attacked in the early hours of the morning of 18 th
November 1991. The key JNA units involved were the 180 Motorized
Brigade and the 8 Aircraft Base RV. They acted in collaboration with the
units of the Serb Territorial Defence from Laki ć and various paramilitary
groups including the “White Eagles”, the “SJS Benkovac.” According to
the statement of a former member of the JNA N.B. , 522 the orders
for the attack came directly from the JNA Headquarters in B enkovac.
B.’s statement gives us a graphic picture of what occurred:
“We went through the village and st ationed ourselves near the
church. I saw such horrors there that I cannot even talk about
them. The murdered people were lying around everywhere, houses
were on fire, it was horrible…I saw tanks firing at houses.” 523
5.228 Whilst the village was being attacked, its inhabitants hid in
basements. S.M. describes one such experience where a group of
approximately 60 civilians - many of them the e lderly and women and
children - were taken from a basement shelter and subjected to violence on
the roadside. Many were shot as they came out into the open air with their
524
hands up. In nearby basements, I.K.* saw at least 6 or 7 people
killed.525 A Report published by “Helsinki Watch” in 1992 describes how a
526
59 year old woma527as crushed by a tank. The evidence of S.M.
confirms this. A fifteen-year-old boy, Ž.Š., witnessed
the shooting of his grandmother, L. Š. He also saw his uncle,
K.Š., stabbed to death. Other Croa tian civilians were murdered,
including Joso Miljani ć, Stana Vick ović,528 Ivan Ražov, Joso Brki ć, Rade
529
Šegarić, Kata Rogi ć, Vico Segar530, Soka Rogi ć and the husband and
father-in-law of the witness S.M. On the next day, the JNA
and Serbian paramilitaries attacked the neighbourin g village of Nadin (666
habitants, 97.6% Croats). The Croats in Nadin were killed in their 531
basements in same manner as those killed in Škabrnja. J. K., a
Croat who eventually escaped fr om the village after being detained, heard
from Serbian soldiers that 130 people had been killed in Škabrnja.
522
Witness Statement of N.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 503.
523 Ibid.
524
Witness Statements of S.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 509.
525 Witness Statement of I.K., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 505.
526 th
Extract from the Report of Helsinki Watch, 4 February 1992, Annexes, vol 2(III),
annex 572.
527 Witness Statement of S.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 504.
528
Witness Statement of Ž.Š., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 507.
529 Witness Statement of N.P., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 508.
530
Witness Statement of S.M., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 509.
531 Witness Statement of J.K., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 510. 308
According to other witnesses the murdering of civilians continued into
532
February and March 1992.
5.229 After the occupation of Škabrnja, the JNA collected significant data
about the crimes committed in the village. They discovered that several
Croats including the aged and children were murdered. 533Members of the
Serbian paramilitary formations murdered an elderly man with a rocket
launching missile; they cut off the ears of the murdered people 534and they
535
used civilians as a human shield. No action was taken against any of the
perpetrators. 536On 23 November 1991 the JNA handed over the bodies of
537
35 murdered Croats to the Croatian Government in Zadar. According to
the accompanying Serb records, only 2 of the individuals were in military
538 th
uniforms. On 26 November 1991, 3 further bodies from Škabrnja and 7
from the neighbouring village of Nadin were handed over. On 27 th
539
November 1991, 3 more bodies from Škabrnja were brought to Zadar.
Subsequent autopsies showed that 41 of the dead were killed by bullet
wounds, of which 36 were shot in the head and/or neck at close range. 32
of the victims had between 2 and 13 bullet wounds on their body. One of
the dead was run over by a tank. Two had frozen to death. One of the
bodies bore injuries from manual strangulation. The left ear had been cut
off and the face, left eye and genital areas were mutilated. 540
532
Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 19991/92, pp. 140-144.
533 Reports of Major Branislav Ristić of the 180 Motorised Brigade of the JNA. No. 416-
1 and No. 417-1 from 23 Nov. 1991, Annexes, vol 2(III), annexes 573 and 574.
534 Report of Major Branislav Ristić of the 180 Motorised Brigade of the JNA. No. 423-1
from 27 Nov. 1991, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 538.
535 th
Report of Major Branislav Ristić of the 180 Motorised Brigade of the JNA. No. 416-1
from 23 Nov. 1991, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 573.
536
Ibid. The exhibit includes a number of interviews with JNA officers. According to
Dragan Mitrović, the “Chetniks” brought an elderly couple in front of a tank, forced
them to kneel on the ground and shot them. Nenad Živanovi ć saw an elderly man shot
in the legs as he tried to run away. He was then shot in the head.
537
Video tape “The Victims from Škabrnja in Zadar”, in which the truck that took away
more than ten dead bodies to Zadar and their offloading from the truck as they were in
black plastic bags. The medical staff opens the bags and sees that all murdered were
civilians and that there were many old people among them.
538
Record of the Sanitation Made on the Spot in the Village of Škabrnja, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 575.
539
Video tape: “The Victims from Škabrnja brought to Zadar”
540 Massacre of the Civilian Population from Škabrnja and Nadin on 18 and 19 November
1991, Medical Center Zadar, The Pathology Department: Annexes, vol 2(III), annex
576. 309
5.230 On 6 thJune 1996, a mass grave containing 27 bodies was
541
discovered on the west side of the elementary school. 23 of the people
whose bodies were subsequently exhumed were over 60 and most of them
542
were women. During the exhumation of another mass grave in Škabrnja
called “Ambar”, on 6 June 1996, the bodies of Luca Šegarić and Ivan Babić
were found. 543A member of the Serb paramilitaries, J. B.,
claimed that544 had seen appr oximately 32 graves of murdered Croats dug
in the area.
Other Locations
5.231 Other atrocities in the municipality of Zadar included the following:
1. Zemunik Gornji (1,310 inhabitants: 35.72% Croats, 62.21%
Serbs) and Zemunik Donji: (2318 inhabitants; 77.35%
Croats). At least 5 Croats were murdered, including Draginja
545
Stura, Božo Stura, 546uka Paleka, Stana Prostran, Šime
Šestan, Kata Šestan. 433 Croats fled the village. Although
the JNA admitted being in possession of 9 bodies they refused
547
to hand them over.
548
26. M UNICIPALITY OF S INJ
Peruča
5.232 Between 1991 and 1993, the JNA made a number of unsuccessful
attempts to destroy the Peru ča dam in an effort to exterminate a large part
of the local Croat population. The dam of “Peru ča” hydro-electric plant is
located at the Cetina River, 14 km upstream from the town of Sinj. The
water storage reservoir contained in the dam supplies a considerable part of
541
The Office of the Detained and Missing Persons of the Government of the Republic of
Croatia: The list of the exhumed and identified persons from Škabrnja, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 577.
542 Record of Exhumation; Record of witnessing (the exhumation), Annexes, vol 2(III),
annex 578.
543 Ibid.
544
545 Witness statement of J.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 511.
Witness Statements of M. and Š.V., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 512.
546 Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92, p. 144.
547
Ibid.
548 In 1991 the Municipality of Sinj had 60,210 inhabitants of which 92.66% were Croat
and 4.63% were Serb. 310
Southern Croatia with drinking water. 549There is unequivocal evidence that
the JNA was actively involved in a plot with the Serb local authorities to
blow up the dam and consequently destroy by flooding a number of Croat
villages in its vicinity.
th
5.233 On 17 September 1991, the workers at “Peru ča” fled the dam as a
result of the intensity of a JNA missile attack. 550 On 22 September 1991,
the JNA closed the system so that the water levels would rise to such a
level that the dam would burst. The intention was to create a “water bomb”,
which would have destroyed tens of thousands of Croats who lived in Sinj
and its surrounding villages. 551 The first attempt to destroy the dam was
552 th
prevented by UN intervention. However, on 14 July 1992, UNPROFOR
announced that the UN engineer experts had discovered explosives around
the dam. 553Again, the storage level had been closed off so that the dam had
th
reached its full capacity. On 27 January 1993, an order was made by
General Ratko Mladić to “blow up the dam”. A tape recording of this order
554 th
was made and has been translated. The subsequent explosion on 28
January destroyed large parts of the “Peru ča” dam, but failed to burst the
reservoir. 555
5.234 A secret military memorandum that was written up a decade earlier
had stated that if the dam was destroyed a huge wave, 25 meters high and
with the speed of 133km/h, would within 10 minutes flood Hrvatačko Polje
and would result in the drowning of 4000 persons. 556
549 “Facts and Estimates of the Consequences Resulting form Mining of the Peru ča Dam
by Serbian Forces on January 28, 1993”, Croatian Medical Journal, vol 34(4), 1993, pp.
550 280-4.
“A chronological narrative on the events at the dam from the occupation until the
mining”, Josip Macan, Croatian National Electricity (on file with the Office for
Cooperation with the ICTY and ICJ, Zagreb).
551
1991 Census, Republican Institute for Statistics of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb,
1992, p.176-178.
552
Supra note 550.
553 Ibid.
554
Conversation transcript Mladić-Novaković, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 529.
555 Witness Statement of I.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 513.
556
“Consequences if the Peruča dam was destroyed”, Zvonimir Sever, Elektroprojekt (on
file with the Office for Cooperation with the ICTY and ICJ, Zagreb). 311
27. D UBROVNIK
5.235. As noted above in paragraphs 5.187 and 5.190, the coastal area of
Dalmatia was a major focus of the pre-war tourist industry. At the centre of
this expanding economy was the town of Dubrovnik. The coastline
between Trsteno and Cavtat and the islands near the Lapad peninsula is of
stunning natural beauty. In 1979, Dubrovnik was designated as a
monument of world cultural heritage. In 1991, 71,419 inhabitants lived in
the Dubrovnik area, of whom 82.5% were Croat and 6.7% were Serb. Of
the remaining population, 4.1% were Muslims, 1.6% were Yugoslavs, 1%
were Montenegrins and 4.1% comprised other ethnic groups.
5.236. Echoing its tactics in Vukovar, the JNA attempted to destroy the
town in a manner that went far beyond any conceivable requirements of
military logic557 and can only be explained in terms of a deliberate intent to
destroy an important symbol of Croatian culture. The initial build up of
military and naval forces around Dubrovnik in September 1991 far
exceeded military necessity and in fact diverted Serbian forces from other
parts of the war. The attack started on 1 October 1991. It was clear that the
Serbian leadership intended Dubrovnik to form part of the new “Greater
558
Serbia”. At the end of October, the citizens of the town we559offered an
opportunity to leave, but the majority refused to do so. Thereafter, all
supplies were cut off. The town was bombarded with heavy artillery until
the end of the year.
5.237. On 1 October, the JNA at the same time started a co-ordinated
aggression from the direction the border areas of Montenegro and Croatia.
By making use of its significantly superior position, the JNA blocked
Dubrovnik from land, sea and air with the aim of occupation, forced
displacement of local inhabitants, destruction of Croatian historic, cultural
and religious structures, about which there is detailed documentation in the
town Archive. From the occupied area, the local Croats (about 340 of them)
were taken to camps in Bile ća in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Morinje in
Montenegro. The rest of the population was denied medical help, food and
water. The inhabitants were not allowed to move without restrictions, many
were taken as hostages, exposed to terror, physical and mental intimidation
and abuse, and many of their houses were burned down and mined.
According to the records of the Police Station of the Dubrovnik-Neretva
County, 161 civilians were killed, 272 were wounded and one person is still
missing due to the aggression of the JNA on this part of Croatia. 34,000
557 Branko Mamula, The Yugoslavia case, CID Podgorica, 2000, page 232.
558 Ibid.
559
Naval sector Boka from the 26 of October 1991, to the Dubrovnik crisis center and the
European mission, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 536. 312
persons were expelled from their homes. The inhabitants who remained in
the occupied villages were taken to camps and some where tortured.
5.238. From the villages of Bistroće and Beroje, 11 men were taken to the
camp Morinje, where they were abused and the guards and soldiers took
out their frustrations especially on younger persons. They beat and tortured
them, called them “Ustashas” and spat into their mouths, while they
560
insulted the older ones. During the stay in the camp, one person died.
5.239. In the village Kuna Konavoska, Orah, the JNA captured Obrad
Jako. They took him in the direction of Graba in the Municipality of
Trebinje, Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 9 July 1992, his dead body was
handed over with the suspicious explanation that he had hung himself. 561In
the village of Piplice, family houses were burned down, eight persons were
taken to the camp Morinje, and one of them died due to beating and
torture.562 In the village of Šiljezi, the sick Marko Miši ć was taken away
563
and has not been seen since.
5.240. In the village of Mr čevo in the area of Dubrovnik seaside, F.Đ.
and V.R. were captured. The soldiers threa tened to cut off
their ears and take out their eyes, and then locked them in a barn in the
village Kijev, where they beat them with feet and police sticks. Both were
taken to the camp in Bile ća, where they spent seven days and nights with
legs tied up in chains to the bed. 15 other prisoners were in the camp, and
they were physically tortu564, forced to the ground and beaten with feet by
the guards all the time. The prisoners were tortured in the camps Morinje
in Boka Kotorska and Bile ća in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some were
565
beaten to death. Miho Katuši ć, juvenile was t566n from the village of
Gabrli, and his whereabout remain unknown.
5.241. Many cultural objects were destroyed in Dub567nik. The JNA
caused much damage to sacral monuments. More than 683 monuments
560
Official Record on the Operations of the Aggressor, 28 October 1992, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 590.
561 Witness Statements of I.B., Đ.B., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 526.
562
Official Record on the Operations of the Aggressor, 26 October 1991, Annexes, vol
2(III), annex 591.
563 Official Record on the Operations of the Aggressor, 17 December 1992, Annexes, vol
564 2(III), annex 592.
Witness Statements of F.Đ., V.R., Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 524..
565 Witness Statement of M.Š. , Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 525; Official Record
566 on the Operations of the Aggressor, 28 October 1999, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 594.
Official Record, 11 November 1992, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 593.
567 Investigation Record, 11 November 1992, Annexes, vol 2(III), annex 595. 313
were damaged and the damages were estimated at 60,726,856.94 DEM.
The war damages of the cultural monuments in Dubrovnik are recorded in
the Report of the State Commission for War Damages. Among the
seriously damaged cultural monumenth are: Benedictine Monastery at the
island of Lokrum from the 17 century; Centre for Artistic Education Luka
Sorkočević from the 18 thcentury; Domino Church from the 17 thcentury;
th
Chapel of Annunciation at the island of Lokrum froththe 15 century, City
church tower in the street Placa from the 15 century; City walls – Bastion
palace; Rector’s palace from the 17 thcentury; and many other monuments
listed in the Report on war damages on immovable cultural monuments of
the Republic Croatia, Ministry of Culture, Board for Protection of Cultural
Heritage, where also an estimation of damage on each monument can be
568
found.
568 Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Culture, Board for Protection of the Cultural
Heritage,War Damages of the Immovable Cultural Monuments (by counties), Zagreb,
September 2000.314 PART TWO:
LEGAL ELEMENTS316 CHAPTER 6
JURISDICTION
6.01 By Application dated 2 July 1999, the Republic of Croatia
instituted proceedings against the FRY alleging its responsibility for
violations of the Genocide Convention. The International Court of Justice
has jurisdiction over this dispute pursuant to Article IX of the Genocide
Convention and Article 36(1) of the Statute of the Court. Simply put, the
Genocide Convention was in force between Croatia and the FRY when
Croatia filed its Application, and it was applicable to every act attributable
to the Respondent which violated its provisions. The Court has
jurisdiction ratione personae, ratione materiae and ratione temporis in
relation to all the conduct attributable to the FRY in international law,
irrespective of when it occurred.
6.02 The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in relation to
Croatia’s Application dated 2 July 1999 is based upon the 1948 Genocide
Convention and Article 36(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.
6.03 Article IX of the Genocide Convention provides:
“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a
State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in
Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice
at the request of any of the Parties to the dispute.”
6.04 Plainly, there exists a dispute between Croatia and the FRY
relating to the interpretation, application and fulfilment of the 1948
Genocide Convention. When it made its Application to the Court, the
jurisdictional basis of Croatia’s Application was precisely the same as that
found to be effective by the Court in its 1996 Judgment in the case
brought by Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Respondent. 1 Te
1 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Preliminary Objection, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 595, at paras. 16
and 41. The jurisdictional basis upon which the ICJ recognised its jurisdiction in the
case brought by Bosnia and Herzegovina against the FRY appears to have been
Article 35 (2) of the Statute of the Court, which provides:
“The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other States shall, subject
to the special provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by the Security 318
principles which informed the Court’s approach are equally applicable to
Croatia’s case. The only difference, for jurisdictional purposes, between
the two Applications is that, since the present case was commenced, the
Respondent has become a member of the United Nations. This must
further confirm — if confirmation were needed — the jurisdiction of the
Court under Article 36 (1) of its Statute. 2
6.05 The Court’s jurisdiction arises because (a) at the time the
Application was lodged both states were parties to the Genocide
Convention without reservation; (b) the Court, accordingly, has
jurisdiction over disputes existing at that time concerning responsibility
for breaches of the Convention; (c) there were such disputes, which were
continuing and unresolved; and (d) the Genocide Convention has
complete coverage ratione temporis, therefore there is no question of a
temporal gap.
Council, but in no case shall such conditions place the parties in a condition of
inequality before the Court.”
The Court has not finally decided the meaning of “treaties in force”. However, in its
Order of 8 April 1993 in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) the Court stated that
“a compromissory clause in a multilateral convention, such as Article IX of the
Genocide Convention relied on by [the Applicant] could … be regarded prima
facie as a special provision contained in a treaty in force.” (ICJ Reports 1993, p. 3
at para. 19)
The Court did not revisit this issue in its 1996 Judgment, although that decision is
plainly premised upon the jurisdiction of the Court being founded upon Article IX of
the Genocide Convention and Article 35(2) of the Statute of the Court.
2 Article 36 (1) provides that: “The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which
the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.” Article IX is a “treaty or convention
in force” within the meaning of that provision. 319
BOTH STATES WERE PARTIES TO THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION WITHOUT RESERVATION AT THE TIME OF
CROATIA’S APPLICATION
6.06 Croatia and the FRY were both bound by the Genocide
Convention on 2 July 1999. The SFRY signed the Genocide Convention
on 11 December 1948. It deposited its instrument of ratification on 29
August 1950, without reservation. It became a party to the Convention on
12 January 1951 with its coming into force, in accordance with its Article
XIII. The Genocide Convention applied to the entire territory of the
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia from that date and subsequently
the SFRY, including those areas which form the subject matter of
Croatia’s application. So long as the SFRY continued to exist it remained
bound by the terms of the Genocide Convention. During the dissolution
of the SFRY, Croatia as well as all the other successor states of the SFRY,
including the FRY, became bound by the terms of the Genocide
Convention.
6.07 The basic principle in this regard is laid down in the terms of
Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of
4
Treaties (1978), to which the SFRY was formerly a party. Moreover, it is
generally accepted that the population of a territory entitled to enjoy the
protection of certain human rights flowing from basic human rights
treaties may not be deprived of such rights by the mere fact of the
5
succession of a state in respect of that territory.
6.08 Croatia explicitly accepted its succession to the Genocide
Convention, by notifying the depositary of this fact in a letter dated 12
October 1992 (with effect from 8 October 1991). Similar notifications of
succession have been submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia,
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. No state (including the
Respondent) has objected to the succession of Croatia to the Genocide
Convention and, as the Court noted in the case brought by Bosnia and
3
4 See Chapter 2, para. 2.6.
17 ILM 1488 (1978). Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention provides:
“1. When a part or parts of the territory of a State separate to form one or more
States, whether or not the predecessor State continues to exist: any treaty in force
at the date of the succession of States in respect of the entire territory of the
predecessor State continues in force in respect of each successor State so
formed…”
5 See e.g. M. Kamminga, “State Succession in Respect of Human Rights Treaties”
(1996) 7 European Journal of International Law 184 (1996) with references to state
practice and doctrine. 320
Herzegovina against the FRY there is nothing that impedes states
becoming party to the Convention by means of succession. 6
6.09 With regard to the FRY, the Court has already accepted in its
Judgment of 1996 that the FRY was “bound by the provisions of the
Convention on the date of the filing of [the A7plication by Bosnia and
Herzegovina], namely on 20 March 1993. Since that Judgement, in April
1999, the FRY has instituted proceedings before the Court against ten
States on the basis, inter alia, of Article IX of the Genocide Convention.
In those proceedings the FRY affirmed before the Court that it…
“is a party to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” 8
It cannot therefore be doubted that, as at the date of Croatia's App9ication
to the Court the FRY was bound by the Genocide Convention.
THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER DISPUTES EXISTING
AT THE TIME OF CROATIA’S APPLICATION CONCERNING
RESPONSIBILITY FOR BREACHES OF THE CONVENTION
6.10 Under Article IX of the Genocide Convention the Court’s
jurisdiction extends to disputes existing as at 2 July 1999 between Croatia
and the FRY “relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment” of
the Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of the FRY
for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III of the
Convention.
6
7 ICJ Reports 1996, p. 595, at para. 24.
Ibid., para. 17.
8 ICJ VR 99/14.
9 This submission is without prejudice to Croatia’s consistent position rejecting the
FRY’s claim to be the continuation of the SFRY, a claim which is not recognised by
other States or by international organisations. Indeed the FRY has now applied for
and been admitted to membership of the United Nations: see Chapter 2, para. 2.162.
Since the SFRY ceased to exist as a State, and given that the FRY continues to assert
its status as a party to the Convention, the Note of 27 April 1992 referring to the
FRY’s proclamation can be treated as a notification of succession to the Genocide
Convention. 321
THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS TO
RESPONSIBILITY FOR BREACHES OF THE CONVENTION
WAS CONTINUING AND UNRESOLVED AT THE DATE OF
CROATIA’S APPLICATION
6.11 There was plainly a dispute between Croatia and the FRY as to
responsibility for breaches of the Convention on the date of Croatia’s
Application. The dispute continues and is unresolved. In Chapter 8 of
this Memorial Croatia sets out in detail the violations of the Genocide
Convention arising in respect of conduct between 1991 and 1995 for
which the FRY is responsible under the Convention. 10 Under Article I of
the Genocide Convention, the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide,
whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law which they undertake to prevent and punish. The FRY,
acting through the JNA and paramilitary groupings as well as its officials
and agents, bears direct responsibility for acts which violated Article II of
the Genocide Convention. 11 The FRY is also directly responsible for the
inchoate crimes of incitement, conspiracy and attempt to commit
12
genocide. It is further responsible for failing t13prevent genocide, as
required by Article I of the Genocide Convention.
6.12 Moreover, the FRY has failed to punish individuals who have
committed acts of genocide, including acts within Article III of the
Genocide Convention, and who remain within its jurisdiction and control;
it has not provided for effective penalties against such persons, in
violation of Article IV and V; 14and it has failed to provide information as
to the whereabouts of 1,419 Croatian citizens who were “disappeared” in
Serbia’s genocidal campaign. For all these reasons the FRY is in
continuing violation of the Convention.
THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION HAS COMPLETE COVERAGE
RATIONE TEMPORIS
6.13 The Court has jurisdiction over all the acts directly perpetrated by
or attributable to the FRY, including those which took place before
Croatia's succession to the Genocide Convention with effect from 8
October 1991. As the Court observed in its judgment on Jurisdiction and
10
11 See Chapter 8, paras. 8.2-8.31.
Ibid., paras. 8.6-8.55.
12 Ibid., paras. 8.18-8.31.
13 Ibid., paras. 8.57-8.63.
14 Ibid., paras. 8.64-8.70. 322
Admissibility in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. The Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia,
"the Genocide Convention – and in particular Article IX – does
not contain any clause the object or effect of which is to limit 15
such manner the scope of its jurisdiction ratione temporis".
6.14 As in the Bosnia and Herzegovina v. FRY case, so in the present
case: neither party has made any reservation to the Convention purporting
to limit the jurisdiction ratione temporis of the Court. It is sufficient
therefore to found jurisdiction that the Genocide Convention was
applicable to both Croatia and the FRY as at the date of filing of Croatia's
application. The Court has jurisdiction with regard to all relevant events
which occurred since the beginning of the conflict on the territory of
Croatia and which give rise to the responsibility of the FRY. As the Court
noted in the Bosnia and Herzegovina v. FRY case, this is in accordance
with the nature, object and purpose of the Genocide Conv16tion as
defined by the Court in its 1951 Advisory Opinion.
6.15 The acts for which Croatia holds the FRY responsible for violation
of the 1948 Genocide Convention fall within the jurisdiction of the Court
ratione temporis because:
(a) the provisions of the Genocide Convention were applicable
to the territory of the Republic of Croatia at all material
times, including the period between July 1991 and August
1995; and
(b) the FRY is responsible for the acts in question, for its failure
to prevent genocide, for its failure to punish those persons
within its jurisdiction or control who perpetrated the acts, and
for associated breaches of the Convention referred to in the
Application and further particularised in this Memorial.
15 ICJ Reports 1996, p. 595, at para. 34.
16 Ibid, para. 34. On the 1951 Advisory Opinion see Chapter 7, at para. 7.15. Croatia
endorses the view of Judge Shahabuddeen in his Separate Opinion, confirming the
applicability of the Convention “to the relevant facts which have occurred since the
beginning of the conflict” in the former SFRY. As Judge Shahabuddeen pointed out,
this avoids the creation of an “inescapable time-gap in the protection which the
Genocide Convention previously afforded to all ‘human groups’ comprised in the
former [SFRY]”; such a gap would not be consistent with the object and purpose of
the Convention which “required parties to observe it in such a way as to avoid the
creation of such a break in the protection which it afforded”: ICJ Reports 1996, at pp.
635-636. 323
CONCLUSIONS
6.16 For the reasons set out above the International Court of Justice has
jurisdiction ratione personae , ratione materiae and ratione temporis
pursuant to Article 36(1) of its Statute and Article IX of the Genocide
Convention.324 CHAPTER 7
THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
INTRODUCTION
7.01 Croatia’s Application invites the International Court of Justice to
find that the FRY is responsible for violations of the Genocide Convention,
including direct responsibility for the perpetration of genocidal acts,
responsibility for the inchoate offences of incitement and attempt, and
responsibility for failing to prevent and punish genocide. As set out in the
previous Chapter the FRY is bound by the Genocide Convention. This
Chapter identifies the FRY’s obligations under the Genocide Convention,
as it applies in general to the types of acts and events described in Chapters
4 and 5 of the Memorial. The following Chapter applies the legal regime of
the Convention to the events in Croatia.
7.02 The FRY’s obligations necessarily arise by reference to the
provisions of the Genocide Convention, but in understanding those
provisions it is necessary to have regard to the history of the negotiations of
the Convention (its travaux préparatoires ) and to its subsequent
interpretation and application by the International Court of Justice and
other international tribunals. This Chapter also draws upon other
international practice, the jurisprudence of national courts and the writings
of the principal commentators to assist1in the interpretation of the
obligations set forth in the Convention.
7.03 The Chapter begins by addressing the background to the
Convention and the available resources for its interpretation (Section 1,
paras. 7.05-7.25). Sections 2 and 3 address the essential elements of the
international crime of genocide, namely the mental element ( mens rea,
Section 2, paras. 7.25-7.57) and the physical element (actus reus, Section 3,
paras. 7.58-7.74) as set forth in Article II of the Convention. Section 4
considers the provisions of Article III of the Convention, establishing the
related crimes of conspiracy, incitement, attempt and complicity (paras.
7.75-7.95). Section 5 addresses the obligations upon States to prevent and
to punish genocide, pursuant to Article I of the Convention (paras. 7.95-
7.101). Section 6 of the Chapter sets out the principles of international law
1 In line with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Arts. 31-33. 326
relating to “command responsibility”, and their applicability to the
Genocide Convention (paras. 7.102-7.106).
7.04 It is clear that this case is concerned exclusively with genocide and
with the breach of the FRY’s obligations under the Genocide Convention.
It is not concerned as such with issues of aggression, or the right to use
force (jus ad bellum), or violations of the laws of war (jus in bello), or other
crimes against humanity such as torture. Nevertheless, it is plain that many
acts which are prohibited by the Genocide Convention will also involve
breaches of international human rights and international humanitarian law.
Genocidal acts and a genocidal campaign – such as the one perpetrated by
the Serbian/Yugoslav leadership in Croatia – may occur in the context of
and form part of a broader military campaign, which violates the
prohibition on the use of force under general international law and the
United Nations Charter. Croatia considers that the acts described in this
Memorial plainly violate many norms of international law beyond those
reflected in the Genocide Convention. But Croatia accepts that the Court’s
jurisdiction is limited to the application and interpretation of the Genocide
Convention. Without prejudice to its position on the numerous violations
of international law perpetrated in Croatia and in relation to Croatian
citizens by the FRY, it is the Genocide Convention alone that Croatia
addresses in this Memorial.
SECTION ONE:
THE BACKGROUND TO THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
7.05 The Genocide Convention has its roots in the events leading up to
and including World War II, in particular the mass atrocities committed by
2
Nazi Germany. To understand why the Convention was considered
necessary, however, it is helpful to go back to the period before 1933-1945.
That context also assists in providing an understanding of what the drafters
of the Convention intended it to achieve, specifically the kind of acts that it
was adopted to address.
7.06 The belief that the mass persecution of ethnic, national and
religious minorities could incur international legal responsibility had begun
to emerge during the 19th century. Treaties safeguarding the rights of
3
minorities within states were signed as early as the first half of the century.
2
Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of
Government, Proposals for Redress(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for World
3 Peace, 1944).
For instance, the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey, signed at Adrianople, 14
September 1829, 16 BFSP 647. 327
The atrocities committed against Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in and
around 1915 led to a strongly worded declaration from France, Great
Britain and Russia that they would4hold the Ottoman Government
responsible for the “crimes”. These developments coincided with the
further development of international humanitarian law and the emergence
of international criminal law, as reflected in particular in Articles 227 to
230 of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, which provided for the trial of
Kaiser Wilhelm II and the creation of international war crimes tribunals. 5
The Treaty of Sèvres, signed with Turkey on August 10, 1920 (although
6
never ratified), also provided for the surrender of those suspected both of
war crimes and of what would now be defined as “crimes against
humanity.” These early instruments indicated the desire of the international
community to establish substantive norms of minimum behaviour
applicable to all persons at all times. They also reflected the growing
desire to ensure that procedures and institutions should be established to
ensure that substantive norms could be applied and enforced in particular
cases.
7.07 The period between the First and Second World Wars saw studies
by private bodies such as the Advisory Committee of Jurists and the
International Law Association into the establishment of an international
criminal court, as well as a system of protection for national minorities in
7
Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and the “Serb-Croat-Slovene State”. It
was in the context of these minorities treaties that the term “genocide”
emerged, largely in reaction to the failure to punish gross violations of the
norms imposed by these and other instruments. As early as 1933, it was
proposed in a report for the Fifth International Conference for the
Unification of Penal Law that two new international crimes should be
8
recognised, namely “vandalism” and “barbarity”.
7.08 During World War II, the term “genocide” emerged to cover the
partial or total destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group. Lemkin
9
described “genocide” as an “old practice in its modern development”, and
4
Cited in United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War
Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (London: HMSO, 1948), p. 35.
5 See William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 17-22.
6
7 [1920] UKTS 11.
Hersh Lauterpacht, An International Bill of the Rights of M(New York: Columbia
University Press, 1945), p. 219. Also see the Permanent Court of International Justice
Advisory Opinion in the Minority Schools in Albania case, PCIJ Reports Series A/B,
No. 64 (1935), p. 17.
8
9 Lemkin, Axis Rule, p. 91.
Ibid., p. 79. 328
broke it down into several categories: political, social, cultural, economic,
biological, physical, religious and moral. The term was used by the Allied
leaders and applied to the practices they saw taking place in Nazi-occupied
Europe, practises which had previously been de10ribed by Winston
Churchill as “the crime without a name”.
7.09 The term “genocide” was used in the indictment of the International
11
Military Tribunal established at Nuremberg to try Nazi war criminals.
Although the final judgment in the Trial of the Major War Criminals did
not use the term itself, as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) pointed out in Kambanda “the crimes prosecuted [at Nuremberg]…
were very much constitutive of genocide, but could not be defined as such
12
because the crime of genocide was not defined until later.” Ultimately, in
the Nuremberg process ten defendants were singled out for the role in the
genocide of Jews, including one – Julius Streicher – whose contribution
had not been military or political, but instead stemmed from his editorship
of the propaganda journal Der Stürmer. 13
7.10 The London Charter of 1945 maintained a tight nexus between
crimes against humanity and the war itself. One Prosecutor noted in his
report to the United States Secretary of the Army that none of the
Tribunal’s judgments “squarely passed on the question of whether mass
atrocities committed by or with the approval of a government against a
racial or religious group of its own inhabitants in peacetime constitute
14
crimes under international law.” It was in part a response to this failure
that Cuba, India and Panama sought to place a draft resolution on genocide
on the agenda of the first session of the United Nations General
15
Assembly. A revised resolution, 96 (I), was adopted unanimously and
without debate on 11 December 1946. 16
10
Quoted in Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 12.
11 Pursuant to Article 6 (c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
(IMT), (1951) 82 UNTS 279.
12 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, 4 September 1988,
para. 16.
13
Schabas, Genocide, pp. 41-42.
14 Telford Taylor, Final Report to Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes
Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10 (Washington: US Government Printing
15 Office, 1971), p. 224.
UN Doc. A/BUR.50. The history of the subsequent resolution is summarised in UN
Doc. E/621.
16 United Nations GA Res 96 (I), 11 December 1946. 329
7.11 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) provides a
clear indication of the considerations which propelled the international
community to agree to prepare an international instrument against mass
atrocities of this kind. The Resolution defines genocide as…
“the denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as
homicide is the denial of the right to life for individual human
beings… Many instances of such crimes of genocide have
occurred when racial, religious, politica17and other groups have
been destroyed, entirely or in part.”
The Resolution affirms that genocide is a crime under international law for
which both private individuals and public officials are to be held
responsible. Resolution 96 (I) also eliminated the nexus between genocide
and armed conflict that had applied at Nuremberg. It did not address the
question where prosecutions for genocide should take place, talking only of
“international co-operation.” 18 It did, however, mandate the drafting of a
19
convention on genocide, and contributed to the recognition of a rule of
customary international law on the subject. 20
7.12 Even before the drafting process could begin, however, a second
generation of trials of Nazi leaders took place, pursuant to Control Council
Law No. 10. 21 These trials provided further assistance in understanding
17
Ibid.
18 Ibid. See also Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New
York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960), p. 31.
19
Saudi Arabia had already taken the initiative, submitting a draft convention (UN Doc.
A/C.6/86). The drafting was undertaken by the Secretariat and an Ad Hoc committee
composed of representatives of Saudi Arabia, Chile, Cuba, France, India, Panama,
Poland, Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (UN Doc.
A/C.6/SR.24). Finally, the convention was discussed in the Sixth (Legal) Committee.
20
This Court has noted that General Assembly resolutions can help establish the existence
of rules or of an opinio juris among States. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons (Request by the United Nations General Assembly for an Advisory Opinion ),
ICJ Reports 1996 p. 226, para. 70. The Court associated the resolution with the
Genocide Convention to conclude that “the principles underlying the Convention are
principles which are recognised by civilised states as binding on States, even without
any conventional obligation.” Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention of
Genocide (Advisory Opinion ), ICJ Reports 1951 p. 16. The resolution has also been
cited in many subsequent instruments and judicial decisions, including in the
provisional measures and preliminary objections stage of Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) ICJ Reports 1996 p. 16 at p. 23; ibid., p. 595,
para. 31 (Judge Shahabuddeen).
21 Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity, 20 December 1945, Official Gazette of the
Control Council for Germany , No. 3, Berlin, 31 January 1945, pp. 50-5. In addition to 330
what the concept of “genocide” was taken to mean. The US Military
22
Tribunal held a series of twelve themed trials that applied the term
“genocide” to the activities of the Einsatzgruppen in Poland and the Soviet
23 24
Union, as well as to the persecution of Jews within Germany. Six
defendants in the Rusha case were found guilty of genocide, defined as a…
“master scheme… devised by the top ranking Nazi leaders in
pursuance of their racial policy of establishing the German nation
as a master race and to this end exter25nate or otherwise uproot
the population of other nations.”
This definition encompassed acts which fell short of the physical
destruction of certain populations, the term “uprooting” being suggestive of
the “ethnic cleansing” which characterised the object of many of the acts
which occurred in the territory of Croatia in the period 1991-1995, and
which are described in details in Chapters 4 and 5 of this Memorial. The
criminal convictions by the US Military Tribunals were the first such
convictions in history, and came at a critical time for the understanding of
genocide. 26
the trials discussed above, the Law also formed the basis for trials conducted by
22 German courts in subsequent decades.
Analysed in Frank M. Buscher, The US War Crimes Trial Program in Germany, 1946-
1955 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1989).
23
24 United States of America v. Ohlendorf et al. (1948) 3 LRTWC 470 (USMT).
United States of America v. Alstötter et al . (1948) 6 LRTWC 1 (USMT), 3 TWC 1.
Such prosecutions were made possible by the enabling legislation, which removed the
nexus between crimes of humanity and armed conflict.
25
United States of America v. Greifelt et. al(1948) 14 LRTWC 1 (USMT), pp. 3-19
(emphasis added).
26 The Polish Supreme National Tribunal also found genocidal responsibility on the part
of three defendants. Poland v. Hoess, (1948) 7 LRTWC 11; Poland v. Greiser , (1948)
13 LRTWC 70, [1948] ILR 389; Poland v.Goeth, (1946) 7 LRTWC 4. 331
T HE S CHEME OF THE CONVENTION ITS N EGOTIATING H ISTORY AND
SUBSEQUENT RACTICE
7.13 The Genocide Convention was negotiated over a 22 month period,
commencing with a first draft in March 1947 and concluding in December
1948. Thirty-eight states participated at various stages of the negotiations.
At the outset the drafters of the Convention plainly had a clear idea of what
genocide was, and their views came through both in the debates recorded in
the travaux préparatoires and in the final text of the Convention.
7.14 The scheme of the Convention is a simple one. The Preamble
recalls the UN General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) and the determination
of the international community to rid itself of the “odious scourge” of
genocide. Article I establishes the general obligation to prevent and punish
genocide, a crime whether committed in time of peace or time of war.
Articles II and III, the core of the Convention, define the crime of genocide
and establish liability for secondary participation in acts of genocide.
Article IV provides that all persons shall be liable for prosecution, and that
the defence of “act of state” shall not apply. Article V imposes an
obligation on States parties to take the necessary legislative measures to
give effect to the Convention. Article VI deals with jurisdiction for the
prosecution of genocide, both domestically and before international
tribunals, while Article VII covers extradition. Article VIII affirms that all
States parties can call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to
take action under the Charter to prevent and suppress genocide. Article IX
is the compromissory clause, while Articles X-XIX are the final clauses.
7.15 It is apparent from the negotiating history of the Convention that
the drafters intended to establish an effective and broad prohibition against
conduct aimed at the destruction of human groups, a prohibition equally
applicable to State officials as well as private parties, in peace and in war.
They did not contemplate a highly technical definition, capable of evasion
by refined arguments or by pedantic requirements of special intent.
Evidently, they intended to adopt an instrument whose meaning and
application could evolve over time and be applied to facts arising in
different contexts.
7.16 The Genocide Convention has been raised in cases before this
27
Court on five occasions, including Croatia’s application in July 1999.
The Court’s first opportunity to consider the Convention arose when the
United Nations General Assembly requested an Advisory Opinion on the
27 The applications brought by the FRY against ten NATO members in April 1999 are
formally separate cases, but since they arise under the same set of facts they may be
considered as interrelated and as comprising a single set of cases. 332
permissibility of reservations to the Convention. The Court’s Opinion is
relevant to the present case. The Court found the principles underlying the
Convention to be recognised by civilised states as binding even without any
conventional obligation, and restated the importance of its object and
purposes as “purely humanitarian and civilising”. 28 In short, the
Convention is to be interpreted and applied having regard to its
humanitarian purpose and its universal reach.
7.17 The four subsequent cases, including the present one, were brought
under Article IX of the Convention. The first of these, The Pakistani
Prisoners Case, 29 did not proceed to the merits and raises no points of
substantive law. The three other cases are still pending before the Court.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina v. FRY , the Court has made statements in
relation to the preliminary measures stage that are of direct relevance to
30
Croatia’s case, including in relation to issues of jurisdiction. In its 1993
Order on Provisional Measures the Court stressed the importance of “the
clear obligation” on States to “do all in their power to prevent the
31
commission of any such acts [of genocide],” and recalled the words of
Resolution 96 (I), that genocide “shocks the conscience of mankind, results
in great losses to humanity… and is contrary to moral law and the spirit and
32
aims of the United Nations.” The Court confirmed that it has competence
to decide a dispute over the Genocide Convention even where the events in
question took place within the framework of a civil war. 33 Mot
significantly, the Court has ruled that the34onvention has no provision,
which limits its applicability over time.
7.18 Judge ad hoc Sir Elihu Lauterpacht has attached two individual
opinions at early stages of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. FRY case of direct
relevance to the present case. The first tackled, among other issues, the
question whether genocide had been committed in Bosnia and
28
Reservations in the Genocide Convention, ICJ Reports 1951 p. 15 at p. 23.
29 Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India), Order of 13 July 1, ICJ
Reports 1973 p. 328.
30
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Requests
for the Indication of Provisional Measures , Order of April 8, 1993; Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Further Requests for the
Indication of Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports 1993 p. 325.
31
32 Order of April 8, 1993, para. 45.
Ibid., para. 49.
33 Ibid., para. 43. (rejecting the first preliminary objection of Yugoslavia).
34
See Chapter 6, paras. 6.13-6.14. 333
Herzegovina. 35 He held that it had, 36and that, importantly, in that case acts
37
of ethnic cleansing were acts of genocide. Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht has
also given his support to the inferential approach to proving genocide, in a
38
separate opinion attached to the Order concerning counter claims.
7.19 In the second set of cases, brought by the FRY against ten NATO
members, the Court has not yet had an opportunity to address the merits,
although it has provided some preliminary indications at the provisional
measures phase. In particular, the Court has stressed that “the essential
characteristic [of genocide] is the intend39 destruction of a ‘national,
ethnical, racial or religious group’”. It also made clear that “the threat or
use of force against a State cannot in itself constitute an act of genocide
40
within the meaning of Article II of the Genocide Convention.”
7.20 The Applications by the FRY indicate an approach to the
interpretation and application of the Genocide Convention by the FRY
which appears fully consistent with, and even goes considerably further
than, that adopted by Croatia in this Memorial. Specifically the FRY
alleged in its first Application that the actions undertaken by the NATO
States in Kosovo, “in particular… causing enormous environmental
damage and… using depleted uranium… [breached] its obligation not to
deliberately inflict on a national group conditions of life ca41ulated to bring
about its physical destruction, in whole or in part.” Itthenwentonto
allege specifically that the NATO States breached the Genocide
42
Convention by these actions. This position was further elaborated by the
FRY in its oral arguments before the Court, where it adopted a wide
interpretation of the Convention and a relatively liberal approach to the
standard of proof. The FRY argued, inter alia, that the use of depleted
uranium weapons “inflict[ed] conditions on life on the Yugoslav nation
35
36 ICJ Reports 1993, p. 325.
Ibid., p. 432.
37 Ibid.
38
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of
17 December 1997 – Counter Claims , ICJ Reports 1997, p. 243, individual opinion of
Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, p. 282 (paras. 12-13).
39
Case concerning the Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium et al.) ,
Request for Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, 38 ILM 950
(1999) para. 40. This repeated the definition this Court gave in the provisional measures
stage of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. FRY case, supra, note 39.
40 Ibid.
41
Case concerning the Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium et al.) ,
Request for Indication of Provisional Measures.
42 Ibid., “Legal Grounds upon which the Claim is based.” 334
calculated to bring about its physical destruction”, and that the NATO
States, in bombing the FRY power supply system, had “targeted the
Yugoslav nation as a whole as such.” 43 Moreover, the FRY continued,
NATO States “had to be aware that the destruction of power supply
systems of a country can produce enormous consequences, including loss
of human life. This is… a matter of pre-knowledge on the part of the
[NATO States] and implies the intent to destroy the Yugoslav national
44
group.” Significantly, the FRY has urged the Court to adopt an inferential
approach to the proof of genocide – arguing that evidence presented about
the NATO bombing and its effects permitted “a number of inferences
relevant to the considerations of genocide.” These inferences included “the
large number of civilian deaths and the resulting knowledge of the risk of
death… the sheer extent of the destruction in urban areas… the general
disruption of patterns of life… the extensive damage to the health care
system45nd the deliberate creation of risks to patients by causing power
cuts.” Indeed the FRY went further, arguing that…
“the relentless coercion of a whole nation involving [force]
directed explicitly at the population as a whole must, as a matter of
law, involves responsibility for genocide. As a general principle,
dolus – intention – extends both to intended consequences and
also to risks of harm which are deliberately inflicted as risks of
harm.” 46
It went on to argue that “the political punishment of a whole community”
was both illegal and had “consequences which necessarily constitute
serious breaches of the Genocide Convention,” 47thus extending the
meaning of protected groups under the Convention to include political
groupings.
7.21 Two other international tribunals have considered the meaning of
genocide in international law. They are the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR). Neither of these Tribunals has the general
jurisdictional scope or authority of the International Court: they were
established by UN Security Council Resolutions to address factual and
legal situations of two specific conflicts and to do so in the context of
43
Ibid., Transcript of Oral Argument, 10 May 1999, Agent for the FRY (Rodoljub
Etinski).
44 Ibid. The Agent then stated baldly that “the above facts substantiate the qualification of
the crime of genocide.”
45
46 Transcript of Oral Argument, 12 May 1999, counsel for the FRY (Ian Brownlie, QC).
Ibid.
47 Ibid. 335
48
individual criminal responsibility, not state responsibility. Nonetheless
the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR include provisions that replicate
word for word the core elements of the Genocide Convention as reflected
49
in its Article II, and accordingly the case-law of these two Tribunals may
provide assistance to the International Court in reaching an authoritative
view on the meaning and scope of genocide under the Convention in
relation to factual situations of the kinds revealed in Chapters 4 and 5
above.
7.22 The Prosecutors of both Tribunals have issued indictments for
genocide. 50 So far, only the ICTR has convicted someone for genocide: it
has done so in five cases, two of which have com51eted their appeals stage
and therefore stand as completed cases. A third case – Prosecutor v.
Akayesu – has not yet reached the end of the appeals stage but is
nevertheless notable for the extent of discussion of the definitional issues
on the part of the Trial Chamber. 52
7.23 Beyond its own jurisprudence and that of the ICTY and ICTR, the
Court may also draw inspiration from the practice of other international
judicial bodies, including the courts set up after the Second World War and
other bodies such as the UN Human Rights Committee, which have
addressed issues relating to genocide, including its definitional aspect. The
Court may also draw inspiration from the judicial decisions of national
courts, including the judgement of the District Court of Jerusalem in the
Eichmann case, which applied an Israeli law the terms of which derived
54
directly from the Genocide Convention.
48
UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia; UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda.
49
Art. 4 of the ICTY Statute; Art. 2 (2) of the ICTR Statute.
50 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has seen eight suspects
indicted for genocide, no convictions and one acquittal Prosecutor v. Jelišić, IT-95-
10).
51
Prosecutor v. Serushago, ICTR-98-39; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, which saw the first
conviction and punishment of a head of government for genocide: ICTR Press Release,
ICTR/INFO-9-2-244.EN (October 19, 2000).
52
53 Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Judgment, 2 September 1998.
A-G for Israel v. Eichmann (1968) 36 ILR 5 (District Court, Jerusalem). Conviction
upheld by the Israeli Supreme Court: A-G for Israel v. Eichmann , (1968) 36 ILR 277
(Israel Supreme Court).
54
Ibid., paras. 16, 190. Other national court decisions include two German cases: Appeals
Court of Bavaria, Novislav Đajić case, 23 May 1997, 3 St 20/96; and Dusseldorf
Supreme Court, Nikola Jorgić case, 26 September 1997, 2 StE 8/96; two U.S. cases:
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6 thCir. 1985) (and the related In the Matter of
the Extradition of John Demjanjuk , 612 F.Supp.544 (DC Ohio 1985)); and Kadić v.
Karadžić. 70 F.3d 232 (2 ndCir. 1995), cert. denied, 64 USLW 3832 (18 June 1996); 336
7.24 Other relevant material includes the reports of fact-finding missions
such as the Commission of Experts mandated by the UN Security Council
to investigate war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, and domestic
Commissions established, for example, to investigate the transfer of
indigenous children in Australia and the allegations of genocide in
55
Guatemala in 1982. Although these decisions do not have the same
authority as those of international courts and tribunals, they may illuminate
the Convention and illustrate the opinio juris of States as to the meaning of
genocide. Further assistance may be drawn from attempts made over the
past half-century to codify the law in the field of crimes against humanity,
including the work of the International Law Commission in its Draft Code
on Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. This Code, adopted
in 1996, may be regarded as a codification of customary law on the subject:
it includes, in Article 17, an exact reproduction of Article II of the
Genocide Convention. The ILC’s Commentary relating to Article 17 is
useful. 56 Assistance may also be obtained from the discussions leading to
the adoption in 1998 of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court, Article 6 of which replicates Article II of the Genocide Convention.
Finally, assistance may also be obtained from the writings of jurists and
commentators. 57
two French cases: Javor et al., Order of Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, 6 May
1994; upheld on appeal by the Paris Court of Appeal, 24 October 1994 and by the Court
of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, on 26 March 1996; and Dupaquier et al. , Order of
Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, 23 February 1995; and the Pinochet case in the
United Kingdom, R v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte, [1998] 4 All ER 897. In 1994, Austria tried a Bosnian Serb, Duško Cvjetković,
for genocide allegedly committed in central Bosnia and Herzegovina (S. Pagani, ‘Serb
cleared of War Crimes, Prosecutor Appeals, Reuters World News Service , 31 May
1995). Canada has also heard a genocide case: Canada, Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration v. Mugesera, File No. QML-95-00171, July 11, 1996 (Immigration and
Refugee Board Adjudication Division), reported (in French) in 7 Rev. Univ. Droits de
l’homme 190 (1996). In parallel with the cases heard before the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, there have been a series of genocide prosecutions in Rwanda
itself. See ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the
Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda,’ UN Doc. A/52/486. Prosecutions for mass
killings have also been initiated pursuant to national laws in Bangladesh, Cambodia,
Romania, Ethiopia and Spain. See Schabas, Genocide, pp. 391-393.
55 “Interim Report of the Commission of Experts,” UN Doc. S/35374; Australia, Human
Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, Bringing Them Home. Report of the
National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children
from Their Families, www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/rsjproject/rsjlibrary/hreoc/stolen;
Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification,
Conclusions and Recommendations , ‘Conclusions,’ paras. 116-118,
www.hrdata.aaas.org/ceh/report/english/toc.html.
56 “Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session,
6 May-26 July 1996,” UN Doc. A/51/10, pp. 86-93.
57
See e.g Robinson, Genocide Convention; Schabas, Genocide. 337
SECTION TWO:
THE MEANING OF GENOCIDE: THE MENTAL ELEMENT
2.1 INTRODUCTION
7.25 Article I of the Genocide Convention provides that
“The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.”
The obligation upon the Contracting Parties is “to prevent and to punish”
genocide, an act which is expressly characterised as criminal in character.
The act of genocide comprises two distinct elements: the mental element
(mens rea) and the physical element ( actus reus). 58ese two elements are
inherent in the structure of the Convention itself. This Section considers
first the mental element; the physical element is considered in Section 3.
7.26 The heart of the Convention is to be found in Article II of the
Convention, which defines genocide. This provides that
“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
7.27 To establish that genocide has occurred it is therefore necessary to
prove that there existed an “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” and that this was accompanied
by one or more of the five sets of acts listed in the five sub-paragraphs of
Article II. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 8, Croatia considers that the
acts described in Chapters 4 and 5 of this Memorial fall within those listed
58 “Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session,
6 May-26 July 1996,” UN Doc. A/51/10, p. 87. 338
in Article II of the Convention and that they were motivated by an intent to
destroy Croats as a group; those acts are, moreover, attributable to the FRY,
or at least the FRY was complicit in them; in addition it has failed to
prevent or punish them, notwithstanding the continued presence of the
perpetrators on its territory.
2.2 T HE M ENTAL ELEMENT – M ENS R EA
7.28 To prove genocide it is necessary to show that one or more of the
acts listed in Article II of the Convention were carried out with “intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such.” The term “intent” did not appear in the earliest drafts of the
Convention, but was added by the Ad Hoc Committee at the request of the
United States.59 The subsequent debate in the Sixth Committee did not
focus so much on the nature of “intent” as on whether or not genocide was
60
a crime requiring premeditation.
(1) The Nature of the Intent Required
7.29 As far as the nature of the intent required, the context of the
Convention makes it clear that the degree of intent to be established is that
of specific (or special) intent, corresponding to the dol special or dolus
specialis of the Romano-German systems. 61 To prove genocide it is
necessary that such specific or special intent exists so a62to take it over the
threshold from homicide to the “crime of crimes”. hetravaux
préparatoires of the Convention reveal that there was little discussion of
this aspect by the drafters. Subsequent commentary and jurisprudence
nevertheless confirms the importance of the requirement of specific intent.
7.30 The International Law Commission, for instance, in drafting the
1996 Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, qualified
genocide’s requirement of specific intent as “the distinguishing 63
characteristic of this particular crime under international law”. Inthe
negotiations for the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the
59
UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.24, p.3. The report of Ad Hoc Committee stated that the
proposed definition encompassed the notion of premeditation: UN Doc. E/794, p. 5.
60 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.72-3.
61
Jean Pradel, Droit Pénal Comparé (Paris: Dalloz, 1995), pp. 254-5.
62 As it was described by Judge Laity Kama of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda in the Kambanda case. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, para. 16.
63 “Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session,
6 May-26 July 1996,” UN Doc. A/51/10, p. 87. 339
reference to intent was “understood to refer to the specific intention to
destroy 64re than a small number of individuals who are members of a
group.”
7.31 Recent international judicial decisions confirm this approach. By
way of example, the Trial Chamber of the ICTR ruled in Akayesu that
the…
“special intent of a crime is the specific intention, required as a
constitutive element of the crime, which demands that the
perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged. Thus, the
special intent in the crime of genocide lies in ‘the intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such.’ Thus, for a crime of genocide to have been committed, it
is necessary for one of the acts listed under Article 2 (2) of the
Statute [i.e. Article II of the Convention] be committed, that the
particular act be committed against a specifically targete65group, it
being a national, ethnical or racial or religious group.”
7.32 The Trial Chamber went on to define special intent as “the key
element of an intentional offence, which offence is characterised by a
psychological relation66ip between the physical result and the mental state
of the perpetrator.” InKambanda, the Trial Chamber noted that “the
crime of genocide is unique because of its element of dolus specialis
(special intent) which requires that the crime be committed with the intent
‘to des67oy in whole in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as
such.”
(2) Proving Intent to Commit Genocide
7.33 The Genocide Convention is silent as to the manner in which
genocide is to be proved. By reason of the very nature of the act of
genocide, it is unlikely that any State would formally adopt and then
publicise any plan or other scheme of organisation to carry out or promote
genocide, or otherwise prepare a paper trail which could then lead to its
responsibility for failing to prevent genocidal acts committed by persons
within its jurisdiction or control. But in the absence of documentary or
other material which explicitly evidences a genocidal intent, it is
permissible for the specific intent to be ascertained by inference, in
64
65 UN Doc. A/AC.249/1998/CRP.8, p.2.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 497.
66 Ibid., para. 516.
67
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, para. 15. 340
particular from a relatively consistent pattern of behaviour involving the
prohibited acts and targeted at a protected group.
7.34 The difficulty of obtaining explicit genocidal plans seems to have
been foreseen by the drafters of the Convention. They rejected an effort by
some States to include in the crimes under Article II of the Convention
preparatory offences such as “issuing instructions or orders and distributing
tasks with a view to committing genocide”. 68 As the delegate of the United
Kingdom put it during the course of the negotiations, it would be
“practically impossible” to prove that the object of a preparatory act was to
encourage the perpetration of genocide. 69 It is plain that intent to commit
genocide may be inferred from the facts, including a pattern of behaviour.
7.35 Subsequent practice, including that of international and other
courts, supports this approach. It confirms that the standard of intent set
forth in the language of the Genocide Convention does not impose the
obligation to identify the existence of a specific written plan or system of
organisation; it allows the proof of intent by inference from the existence of
a set of facts, including a pattern of behaviour. The view is confirmed by
the ILC in its Commentary to the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, which states that…
“[t]he necessary degree of knowledge and intent may be inferred
from the nature of the order to commit the prohibited acts of
destruction against individuals who belong to a particular group
and are therefore singled out as the immediate victims of the
massive criminal conduct.” 70
The ILC Commentary also states that…
“[t]he present article clearly indicates that it is not necessary to
achieve the final result of the destruction of a group in order for a
crime of genocide to have been committed. It is enough to have
committed any one of the acts listed in the article with the clear
intention of bringing about the total or partial destruction of a
71
protected group as such.”
68
UN Doc. A/C.6/215 Rev. 1. The Yugoslav delegate was particularly vocal in his
support of the Soviet amendment, arguing that “Propaganda which stirred up hatred
must be punished b ecause it was the very source of acts of genocide”: UN Doc.
A/C.6/SR.82 (Bartoš, Yugoslavia).
69 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.82 (Fitzmaurice, UK).
70
“Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session,
6 May-26 July 1996,” UN Doc. A/51/10, Commentary on Article 17, para. 10.
71 Ibid., para. 18. 341
7.36 A similar approach is reflected in the Report of the Special
Rapporteur of the UN ECOSOC Sub-Commission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in his 1985 Revised and
Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of
72
Genocide. In relation to intent, the Report concludes that…
“[t]he relative proportionate scale of the actual or attempted
destruction of a group… is certainly strong evidence to prove the
necessary intent to destroy a group, in whole or in part.” 73
The Special Rapporteur concluded:
“a court shou74 be able to infer the necessary intent from sufficient
evidence…”
7.37 Adducing “intent” by inference is also reflected in the decisions of
international courts and tribunals faced with the task of proving intent, in
cases involving individual responsibility for genocide. In his separate
opinions attached at the preliminary stages of the Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. FRY case, Judge ad hoc Sir Elihu Lauterpacht has lent support to the
75
inferential approach. In Akayesu the Trial Chamber of the ICTR
concluded that genocidal acts could be inferred from the physical acts, and
specifically “their massive and/or systematic nature or their atrocity”. The
Chamber continued:
“This is the reason why, in the absence of a confession from the
accused, his intent can be inferred from a certain number of
presumptions of fact. The Chamber considers that it is possible to
deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act charged
from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts
systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts
were committed by the same offender or by others. Other factors,
such as the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a
region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and
systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of
72
B. Whitaker, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6.
73 Ibid., p.16. This was specifically approved by the Trial ChamberKayishema. See
also Bunyan Bryant, “Comment, Part I: Substantive Scope of the Convention”, 16
Harv. Int’l L. J. 686 (1975); Lawrence J. LeBlanc, “The Intent to Destroy Groups in the
74 Genocide Convention: the Proposed U.S. Understanding”, 38 AJIL 369 (1984).
Ibid., p. 19.
75 Supra., para. 7.18. 342
a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups,
can enable the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent.” 76
A similar approach is to be found in Kayeshima and Ruzindana, where the
ICTR Trial Chamber ruled that:
“intent could be inferred from words of deeds and may be
demonstrated by a pattern of purposeful action. In particular, the
Chamber considers evidence such as the physical targeting of the
group or their property; the use of derogatory language toward
members of the targeted group; the weapons employed and the
extent of bodily injury; the methodical way of planning, the
systematic manner of killing. Furthermore the number of victims
from the group is also important.” 77
7.38 The approach has also been applied by the Trial Chamber of the
ICTY, which in its review of the indictments against Karadžić and Mladić,
laid out that specific intent…
“may be inferred from a number of facts such as the general
political doctrine which gave rise to the acts possibly covered by
the definition in Article 4 [i.e. Article II], or the repetition of
destructive or discriminatory acts. The intent may also be inferred
from the perpetration of acts which violate, or which the
perpetrators themselves consider to violate the very foundation of
the group – acts which are not in themselves covered by the list in
Article 4 (2) but which are committed as part of the same pattern
78
of conduct.”
76 Prosecutor v. Akayesu , para. 477. Akayesu also lays out in considerable detail the
different types of intent for perpetration of genocide, incitement to genocide and
complicity in genocide. Akayesu is quoted in turn inProsecutor v. Rutaganda , para.
77 398. See also ibid., para. 400.
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana , para. 93. See also ibid., paras. 534-540. In
Serushago, the defendant pleaded guilty to genocide: in his plea he “recognise[d] that
this [the purpose of the killings] is evidenced by the selective searching and targeting of
Tutsi; the indiscriminate nature of the mass killings which victimised women and
children, young people and old people alike, and the fact that they were pursued in the
places where they had taken refuge, i.e. prefectures and communal offices, sc hools and
churches and stadiums with the intent of exterminating them.” Prosecutor v. Serushago,
para. 25. Serushago appealed against the length of sentence imposed, but the appeal
78 failed on 6 April 2000.
Prosecutor v. Karadži ć and Mladi ć, Consideration of the Indictment within the
framework of Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, para. 94. 343
The Chamber went on to find that intent in this case…
”derives from the combined effect of speeches or projects laying
the groundwork for and justifying the acts, from the massive scale
of their destructive effect and from their specific nature, which
aims at undermining what is considered to be the foundation of the
group.” 79
7.39 It is important to note here that the ICTY found that proof of attacks
against cultural institutions or monuments, committed in association with
80
killing, could assist in establishing genocidal intent. TheTadi ć case,
although dealing with crimes against humanity, similarly laid out that
“…knowledge and intent can be inferred from the circumstances”. 81
7.40 In a similar vein to the approach in Karadžić and Mladić, the ICTY
Trial Chamber review of the indictment of Dragan Nikoli ć held that “the
constitutive intent of the crime of genocide may be inferred from the very
82
gravity of those acts”. In Jelisić, although the defendant was acquitted of
genocide, the Chamber was again willing to accept an inferential process of
proof. It defined genocide as “the physical expression of an affirmed
resolve to destroy in whole or in part a group as such...”
7.41 The travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court indicates that no formal plan is needed to demonstrate the
existence of a genocidal intent, although it must be shown that conduct
formed part of a broader pattern of behaviour. 83
79 Ibid, para. 95.
80
For instance, in its hearings into charges of genocide in Karadžić and Mladić case, the
Tribunal heard a UNESCO expert on cultural heritage describe the destruction of
monuments in Mostar and other towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and found it to be
part of a strategy “designed to annihilate the centuries-long presence of the group or
groups.” Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, Transcript of Hearing, 2 July 1996, pp.
35-39.
81
Prosecutor v. Tadić, para. 67, drawing on cases before British and American post-war
military tribunals. The Appeals Chamber did not return directly to the point, instead
concentrating on the question of motive.
82 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Consideration of the Indictment within the framework of Rule 61
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, para. 34.
83
“Discussion Paper Proposed by the Co-ordinator, Article 6: The Crime of Genocide”,
UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/RT.1: “The accused knew… that the conduct was part
of a similar conduct directed against that group.” 344
(3) Specific Intent in Article II
7.42 If intent may be inferred, it is necessary to prove the existence of
the elements of intent as set forth in the chapeau to Article II of the
Convention, namely, “to destroy”, “in whole or in part”, “a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group”, and “as such.” As will be shown in
Chapter 8, each of these elements is satisfied in this case. 84
(a) “to destroy”
7.43 Article II requires that there must be an intent “to destroy” a
protected group in whole or in part. It is clear that the drafters of the
Convention intended to focus on the continuing physical existence of a
group as distinct, for example, from changes in its culture or way of life.
As the International Law Commission has made clear, the definition of
destruction encompasses only “its material sense, its physical or biological
sense”. 85
7.44 On the other hand, it is not necessary that the conduct in question
should have as its object the physical destruction of the members of the
group. This can be seen from the inclusion in Article II of such elements as
paragraphs (d) and (e). For example, the systematic practice of forcibly
transferring the children of a protected group so that others will bring them
up would result, within a generation, in the disappearance of the group and
would amount to its destruction in the sense of Article II. The group, as
such, would no longer exist, and those who deliberately engaged in that
practice, intending that result, would be guilty of genocide. Yet that
practice would involve neither the physical destruction of the parents nor of
the children. Article I has to be interpreted as a whole, and the concept of
the destruction of a group need not be interpreted as requiring the actual
killing of many or most of them: it is not to be interpreted as if genocide
were confined to the acts referred to in paragraph (a). In other words,
“intent to destroy” includes cases where a State seeks to destroy a group as
an entity, even if it does not seek the physical destruction of many or most
of the individual members of the group.
84
85 See Chapter 8, paras. 8.2-8.17.
“Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Forty-First
Session,” UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1989/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 102, para. (4). 345
(b) “in whole or in part”
7.45 The “intent to destroy” must relate to a group “in whole or in part”.
The preparatory work for the Convention provides little authoritative
guidance as to what the drafters meant by the words “in part”, a
formulation which was introduced by the Norwegian delegation.
Apparently the drafters of the Convention sought two objectives: first, to
exclude isolated acts of violence (even if ethnically or racially motivated);
and second, to confirm that there need not be an intent to destroy an entire
group but merely a part of it.
7.46 The language establishes that a State will be liable where it
commits, or fails to prevent or punish, one or more genocidal acts which 86
are premised upon an intention to destroy only a part of the group.
According to one early commentator, this permitted the conclusion that
genocide could be directed against a single town. 87 On this approach, the
acts occurring in Vukovar generally, and in relation to the hospital at
Vukovar in particular, would be sufficient to disclose a genocide, even if
they had been committed in isolation and not (as was in fact the case) as
part of a broader campaign.
7.47 On the other hand there is clearly a threshold requirement, and
genocide as a crime against humanity necessarily involves conduct which
in aggregate has a systematic or collective character and a certain level of
seriousness. Otherwise it would be impossible to distinguish genocide
from individual acts of violence targeted at a member of a group as such,
and genocide would lose its special character as the “crime of crimes”. It is
true that the Yugoslav delegate negotiating the Convention did not exclude
the possibility that genocide could even be perpetrated against a single
person. But this is to confuse the two questions, whether genocide has
been committed and whether an accused (who may only have been
responsible for one or two deaths or other acts) is individually guilty for his
involvement in the genocide. Clearly someone who commits a single
murder in the context of and as part of a genocidal campaign may be guilty
of genocide, but the campaign as a whole must have the character of being
targeted against a protected group with the intent of achieving its
destruction in whole or part. Thus the ILC considered that “the crime of
genocide by its very nature requires the inten88on to destroy a least a
substantial part of a particular group.” The International Criminal
86 Robinson, Genocide Convention, p. 63.
87 Ibid.
88
“Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session,
6 May-26 July 1996,” UN Doc. A/51/10, p. 88. This position was echoed by the
Preparatory Committee of the International Criminal Court, “Draft Statute for the 346
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also considered that genocide must
involve the intent to destroy a “substantial” part, although not necessarily a
“very important” part of a protected group. 89 The ICTY Prosecutor
considered that the definition requires…
“a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group
as a whole, or else a significant section of the group such as its
leadership.” 90
7.48 Even if the general intent must be directed towards the
extermination of a “substantial” or significant part of the group, this need
not necessarily result in the actual destruction of a significant part of the
group. As the ICTY Prosecutor put it in Karadžić and Mladić:
“in view of the particular intent requirement, which is the essence
of the crime of genocide, the relative proportionate scale of the
actual or attempted destruction of a group, or a significant section
thereof, should be considered in relation to the factual opportunity
of the accused to destroy a group in a specific geographical area
within the sphere of his control, and not in relation to the entire
population of the group in a wider geographic sense.” 91
7.49 The Commission of Experts established by the United Nations
Security Council in 1992 to investigate the situation in former Yugoslavia
adopted a similar approach. It concluded that the definition in the
Convention was…
“sufficiently pliable to encompass not only the targeting of an
entire group, as stated in the convention, but also the targeting of
certain segments of a given group, such as the Muslim elite or
Muslim women.” 92
International Criminal Court. Part 2. Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law,”
UN Doc. A/AC/249/1998/CRP.8, p.2, n.1.
89
Prosecutor v. Jeliši ć, paras. 81-2. This echoed Prosecutor v. Kayishema and
Ruzindana, para. 97, where the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda held that
the phrase “in part” “requires the intention to destroy a considerable number of people.”
90 Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, Transcript of Hearing of 27 June 1996, p. 15.
91
92 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in
the Former Yugoslavia”, (1994) 5 Criminal Law Forum 279 at pp. 323-4. 347
(c) “a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”
7.50 The “intent to destroy” under the Convention must relate to “a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. The protections of the
Convention do not extend to linguistic groups, or to political, economic and
social groups which were intentionally excluded because the drafters felt
that they fell outside the scope of the Convention. 93 It is readily apparent
that Croatians constitute an ethnic and a religious as well as a national
group, and that they accordingly fall within the list of protected groups
under the Convention. As the UN Commission of Experts put it in its 1994
Report:
“The different groups relevant to the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia – the Serbs, the Croats, the Muslims, the Gypsies and
others – all have status as ethnic groups, and may, at least in part,
be characterized by religion, ethnicity and nationality.” 94
Further, there is no requirement that the victim group should be a minority;
it can equally be a numerical majority, as was often the case for Croat
victims in particular villages and towns between 1991 and 1995. 95
7.51 The determination of membership of a protected group may be
achieved either on the application of objective or subjective criteria. On
either approach the Croats are plainly a group. The prevailing view at the
time of the drafting of the Convention was that objective criteria were of
the most importance. The objective approach to determining group
membership had been adopted by the Permanent Court in the Minorities in
96
Upper Silesia case, where the Court held that membership of one of the
protected groups was primarily a question of fact. The objective approach
has also been relied by the International Court, most notably in the
97
Nottebohm case, where the Court described nationality as a “social fact”.
7.52 In Akayesu the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda relied
on Nottebohm in its first definition of “national group”, finding that a
national group was “a collection of people who are perceived to share legal
bonds based on a common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights
93 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR. 128.
94
Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), at para. 95.
95 Ibid.
96
Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), PCIJ Series A, No. 12
(1928).
97 Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (Merits) ICJ Reports 1955 para. 4 at p.
49. 348
and duties.” 98 By the same token, an ethnic group was one whose
“members share a common language or culture”; a racial group was found
to be “based on the hereditary physical traits often identified with the
geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious
factors”, 100and a religious group was one “whose members share the same
101
religion, denomination or mode of worship”. In the circumstances of
Rwanda in 1994 the Tribunal’s Chamber interpreted the Convention so as
to ensure protection for “any stable and permanent group”. 102
7.53 More recently, in Kayeshima and Ruzindana, the ICTR signalled a
shift to a more subjective approach. In this case an ethnic group was
defined not only as “one whose members share a common language or
culture”, but also as “a group which distinguishes itself, as such (self-
identification); or, a group identified as such by others, including
103
perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others)”. In Rutaganda, the
Tribunal went one stage further, stating that…
“the concepts of national, ethnical, racial and religious groups
have been researched extensively and that, at present, there are no
generally and internationally acceptable precise definitions
therefore. Each of these concepts must be assessed in the light of
a particular, political, social and cultural context… for the
purposes of applying the Genocide Convention, membership of a
group is, in essence, a subjective rather than an objective
concept.” 104
7.54 This approach has also been adopted by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for all groups except religious ones. In
Jelisić the Tribunal stated that it would…
“evaluate membership in a national, ethnical or religious group
using a subjective criterion. It is the stigmatisation of a group as a
distinct national, ethnical or racial unit by the community which
allows it to be determined whether a targeted population
98 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 511.
99 Ibid., para. 513.
100
Ibid., para. 514.
101 Ibid., para. 515.
102
Ibid., para. 516.
103 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, para. 98.
104
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, para. 55. A case-by-case approach was also recommended in
Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-1, paras. 161-2. 349
constitutes a national, ethnical or racial group in the eyes of
alleged perpetrators.” 105
These debates are of limited significance for present purposes, since it
cannot be doubted that the Croats who were the victims of the Serbian
campaign described in Chapters 4 and 5 of this Memorial themselves
constituted, or were at least an identifiable and significant part of, a
protected national or ethnical group under the Convention.
(d) “as such”
7.55 The “intent to destroy” a protected group must be in relation to that
group “as such”. This phrase indicates that…
“crimes against a number of individuals must be directed at their
collectivity or at them in their collective character or capacity”. 106
7.56 There has been little or no interpretation of the words “as such” in
international case law. The ICTR referred to motive only in the context of
intent: “the perpetration of the act charged therefore extends beyond its
actual commission, for example, the murder of a particular individual, for
the realisation of an ulterior motive, which is to destroy, in whole or in part,
the group of which the individual is just one element.” 107 The phrase
clearly requires that the victims of the genocidal acts should have been
attacked, in aggregate, because of their identification as members of a
protected group. As Schabas puts it: “[e]vidence of [a] hateful [collective]
motive will constitute an integral part of the proof of ex108ence of a
genocidal plan, and therefore of a genocidal intent.”
7.57 In regard to the intention to destroy the Croats as a group, the
evidence relied upon in Chapters 4 and 5 provides numerous examples of 109
Croats being targeted because of their ethnicity or nationality. They
were singled out for attack by reason of their being Croats in an area which
was to become as far as possible purely Serb, and prohibited criminal acts
were committed against them to achieve this purpose. In short they were
attacked “as Croats”. It is apparent that this element of Article II is
satisfied in this case.
105 Prosecutor v. Jelišić, para. 70.
106
Final Report of the UN Commission of Experts, para. 97.
107 Prosecutor v. Akayesu , para. 461. See also the English Divisional Court raising the
question of whether the words “as such” denoted a motive element: Hipperson et al. v.
DPP, (1998) 111 ILR 584 at p. 587.
108
Schabas, Genocide, p. 255.
109 See Chapter 8, para. 8.16, point 7. 350
SECTION THREE:
THE MEANING OF GENOCIDE: THE PHYSICAL ELEMENT
7.58 Article II of the Convention identifies five categories of acts, the
commission of any one of which will amount to genocide, where
accompanied by the requisite mental element. As indicated above, there is
a close relationship between the physical element and the mental element.
The widespread or systematic occurrence of the proscribed acts, committed
against persons belonging to a protected group, may well give rise to a
legitimate inference of the proscribed intent.
(a) “Killing members of the group”: Art. II(a)
7.59 The first act listed in Article II is “killing members of the group”.
This formulation was agreed by the Sixth Committee without a great deal
of discussion and without a vote. In Akayesu the Trial Chamber of the
ICTR identified the two material elements of the required physical element:
the victim must be dead, and the death must have resulted from an unlawful
act or omission of the accused or a subordinate. 110
7.60 It is apparent from the travaux 111the Convention that the term
“killing” means intentional killing. Subsequent developments,
particularly in the context of the ICC Statute, indicate that the term
“members of the group” means “one or more members of the group”. 112
7.61 In the present case there were large-scale intentional killings of
Croats targeted as such, as described in Chapters 4 and 5.
(b) “Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group”:
Art. II(b)
7.62 The second proscribed act consists of “causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group”. Debate amongst the drafters of the
Convention focused on the concept of “mental harm”. In Akayesu, the
ICTR, in the first judicial interpretation of the provision, stated that
“[c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group does not
110 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 588.
111 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.81. See also Robinson, Genocide Convention, p. 63.
112
See “Discussion Paper Proposed by the Co-ordinator, Article 6: The Crime of
Genocide,” UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/RT.1. 351
113
necessarily mean that the harm is permanent and irremediable”. In
Kayishema the Chamber endorsed the definition put forward by the
Preparatory Commission for the ICC, which provided that the reference to
mental harm “is understood to mean more than the minor or temporary
impairment of mental faculties.” 114 It is appropriate to conclude, therefore,
that mental harm means more than minor and temporary impairment, but
does not need to be permanent and irremediable.
7.63 Although rape and other sexual crimes were not expressly
considered by the drafters of the Convention, the Chamber of the ICTR in
Akayesu has confirmed that crimes of sexual violence can fall within the
ambit of Article II(b) of the Convention. 115 This represents an important
116
clarification of the meaning of Article II(b). It brings within the scope of
the Convention the catalogue of rape and other sex crimes which were ―
as has been shown in Chapters 4 and 5 ― systematically and massively
perpetrated against Croat men, women and even children.
7.64 Where a particular proscribed act has been committed in the context
of a genocidal assault or campaign, there is no need to show that the act
itself has contributed to the destruction of the group in whole or in part. It
is only necessary to show that one or more victims actually suffered
physical or mental harm. If the act is perpetrated with the requisite element
117
of intent (mens rea) then the crime has been committed.
(c) “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life designed to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”: Art. II(c)
7.65 The third type of genocidal act is that which deliberately inflicts
upon a group conditions which are designed to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part. In the Ad Hoc Committee the drafters
113
Prosecutor v. Akayesu , para. 501. See alsoProsecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3,
Judgment, 6 December 1999.
114 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para.
94.
115
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 731. On the subject of rape and sexual assault as acts of
genocide, see also Kelly Dawn Askin, War Crimes Against Women, Prosecution in
International War Crimes Tribunals (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997); Beverley
Allen, Rape Warfare, the Hidden Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Gugliemo Verdirame, “The
Genocide Definition in the Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals,” 49 Int’l and Comp.
LJ 3 (2000), pp. 578-598.
116 Rape can also fall under Art. II(c) and (d). It is also covered by a specific provision of
the Statute of the ICTR (Art. 3 (g)), but the Tribunal established that the presence of the
117 requisite intent can make it genocidal in nature.
Schabas, Genocide, pp. 164-5. 352
broadly approved the argument, put forward by China, 118that the physical
element of genocide should include not only destruction of the physical
existence of the group but also subjecting the group to such conditions or
measures as would cause its destruction in whole or in part.
7.66 The ICTR in Akayesu proposed an interpretation of the provision
that defines the means used to inflict such conditions as including…
“subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic
expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical
119
services below minimum requirements.”
In Kayishema and Ruzindana, the Tribunal said that the conditions of life
include…
“rape, the starving of a group of people, reducing required medical
services below a minimum, and withholding sufficient living
accommodation for a reasonable period, provided the above would
lead to the destruction of the group in whole or in part.” 120
7.67 It is important to note that the deliberate imposition of conditions of
life calculated to bring about the destruction of the group does not require
that the destruction actually occurred. What must be proved is that the
121
conditions were calculated to bring about the destruction.
7.68 The Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification concluded
that genocide122d been committed against the Mayan people by the army in
1981-1983. The Commission noted that practices such as the razing of
villages and the burning of harvests left the communities without food,
which, in the opinion of the Commission, amounted to infliction of
conditions of life “that could bring about, and in several cases, did bring
about, its physical destruction in whole or in part.” 123 The Inter-American
118 UN Doc. E/447, p. 25.
119
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 505.
120 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, para. 116.
121
In the Eichmann case, the District Court of Jerusalem held that the count of imposing
living conditions calculated to bring about the destruction was only applicable to those
Jews who survived the Holocaust, rather than to those who were killed. A-G of Israel v.
Eichmann, para. 196.
122 Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification,
Conclusions and Recommendations, ‘Conclusions,’ paras. 116-118,
www.hrdata.aaas.org/ceh/report/english/toc.html.
123
Ibid. 353
Commission on Human Rights has declared admissible a petition alleging
124
genocide in Guatemala in 1982 on the basis of these facts.
7.69 The International Law Commission, in its deliberations on the Code
of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, concluded that
deportation fell within the scope of Article II(c), to the extent that it
occurred with the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part. 125
7.70 Chapters 4 and 5 provide evidence of systematic and massive
perpetration of acts imposing upon Croats conditions of life which were
designed to bring about their physical destruction. The acts included rape
126
and other sex crimes, deprivation of food and medical supplies and
treatments, 127 and systematic and widespread deportation from an entire
region. 128
(d) “Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group”:
Art. II(d)
7.71 The fourth type of genocidal act is the imposition of measures
which are intended to prevent births within a group. The travaux
préparatoires of the Convention suggest that that such measures could
include sterilisation, compulsory abortion, segregation of the sexes and
129
obstacles to marriage. InAkayesu the ICTR concluded that rape could
fall within this head, where it was used to destroy the group:
“in patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is
determined by the identity of the father [rape could be] an example
130
of a measure intended to prevent births within a group…”
The Chamber also pointed to the mental effects of rape, which could be a
measure intended to prevent births “when the person raped refuses
subsequently to procreate, in the same way that members of a group can be
led, through threats or trauma, not to procreate.” 131 The Chamber in
124 Plan de Sanchez Massacre (Case No. 11.763), Report No. 31/99, 11 March 1999, in
Annual Commission of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights , OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 6, p. 132.
125
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, UN Doc. A/51/332 (1996),
p. 126.
126 See Chapter 8, para. 8.12 and 8.14.
127
See Chapter 8, para. 8.12.
128 See Chapter 8, para. 8.16, point 12.
129
UN Doc. E/623/Add.2; UN Doc. E/447, p.26; UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.82.
130 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 731.
131
Ibid. 354
Rutaganda also found that “sexual mutilation, forced birth control, forced
separation of males and females, and prohibition of marriages,” fell within
132
Article II(d).
7.72 Other tribunals have expanded on the definition of possible
measures intended to prevent births within the group. One of the charges
against Adolf Eichmann was that he “devis[ed] measures intended to
prevent child-bearing among the Jews”; these were held by the District
Court to include his instructions “forbidding births and for the interruption
of the pregnancy of Jewish women in th133heresin Ghetto with intent to
exterminate the Jewish people.” The Supreme National Tribunal of
Poland found the director of the Auschwitz camp responsible for
134
sterilisation and castration as a form of genocide. The United States
Military Tribunal also categorised sterilisation and other measures aimed at
restricting births as a form of genocide in Greifelt. 135
7.73 It is clear that Article II(d) can cover a wide range of acts. As
described in Chapters 4 and 5, the systematic perpetration against Croats of
rape and other sex crimes, in particular castration, fall clearly within Article
136
II(d) of the Convention.
(e) “Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”: Art.
II(e)
7.74 The fifth and final type of genocidal act is the forcible transfer of
children of one group into another group. It is not relevant to the facts of
the present case, as disclosed by Chapters 4 and 5.
132 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, paras. 49-53.
133
A-G of Israel v. Eichmann, para. 244.
134 Poland v. Hoess, (1948) LRTWC 11 at p. 25 (Supreme National Tribunal of Poland).
135
136 United States of America v. Greifelt et. al., (1948) LRTWC 1 (USMT), at p. 17.
See Chapter 8, paras. 8.14-8.15. 355
SECTION FOUR:
CONSPIRACY, INCITEMENT, ATTEMPT AND COMPLICITY
7.75 Article II is supplemented by Article III of the Convention, which
provides for the punishment of genocide and of four other specified acts
which do not in themselves amount to genocide: conspiracy to commit
genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; attempt to
commit genocide; and complicity in genocide.
C ONSPIRACY : ARTICLE IIIB )
7.76 A conspiracy to commit genocide will exist where two or more
person have agreed upon a common plan to commit genocide, with the
137
same specific intent as required for genocide itself. The existence of a
common plan may be shown either from documentary evidence or from the
evidence of systematic and methodical action taken by persons under the
138
control of the conspirators or acting on their directions.
7.77 Article III(b) of the Convention reflects a distinction between the
two main Western legal traditions as to the notion of conspiracy. 139 In
Romano-Germanic law, conspiracy is a form of participation in the crime
itself, and is only punishable to the extent to which the crime itself is
committed. In the common law tradition, however, conspiracy is an
inchoate offence, committed once two or more people agree to carry out a
crime, regardless of whether or not the crime itself is committed. At the
drafting stage of the Convention, the common law approach appears to
have prevailed, although Belgium, France and the Netherlands abstained in
the vote on the Article because the Sixth Committee could not decide 140
which French word best captured a concept unknown in French law. The
ICTR, which has convicted one person for the crime of conspiracy to
141
commit genocide, has defined conspiracy as “an agreement between two
137 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda confirmed in Akayesu that the offence
of direct and public incitement to commit genocide at least involves the specific intent
set out in Article II. Prosecutor v Akayesu, para. 559.
138
Schabas, Genocide, p. 265.
139 Jean Pradel, Droit penal comparé (Paris: Dalloz, 1995), pp. 239-241.
140 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.84. The equally authoritative French text has “entente en vue de
commettre le genocide.” Contemporary commentators all but ignored conspiracy. See
141 e.g. Robinson, Genocide Convention, p. 66.
Prosecutor v. Kambanda , para. 40. At least five other indictments or trials for
conspiracy to commit genocide have been issued or are pending. The ICTY has issued
no public indictments for conspiracy. 356
142
or more persons to commit the crime of genocide.” In a recent judgment,
Musema, 143the Trial Chamber examined the travaux to the Convention and
noted the difficulty caused by the different meanings in the two legal
traditions. These differences notwithstanding, the Chamber clarified the
inchoate nature of the offence, holding that “the crime of conspiracy was
included [in the Convention] to punish acts which, in and of themselves,
144
did not constitute genocide.”
7.78 In the present case, as disclosed by the facts set out in Chapters 4
and 5, genocide was actually committed against the Croatian populations
concerned. This does not exclude the possibility that individual Serbian
leaders who did not themselves personally commit or direct the
commission of the acts in question may be guilty of conspiracy in terms of
their overall responsibility for planning the crime.
D IRECT AND P UBLIC NCITEMENT TO C OMMIT G ENOCIDE : A RTIII( C
7.79 Incitement is a form of complicity (“abetting”) and, to that extent,
may also be covered by Article III(e). By including a specific head of
direct and public incitement, therefore, the drafters of the Convention made
it clear that no actual genocide need to have occurred for a criminal offence
to have taken place.145
7.80 Incitement to commit genocide has been defined by the ICTR as an
inchoate offence, one of a class of offences which are “in themselves
particularly dangerous because of the high risk they carry for society, even
142 Prosecutor v. Musema , Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, para. 191. This
definition comes much closer to the Anglo-Saxon definition than the one adopted in
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 559.
143
144 Prosecutor v. Musema, Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, paras. 184-198.
Ibid, para 198. The tribunal went on to acquit Museum of Genocide because it decided
that “no purpose would be served in convicting an accused, who has already been found
guilty of genocide, for conspiracy to commit genocide, on the basis of the same acts.”
Ibid.
145
The United States contested any reference to incitement as an inchoate crime. UN Doc.
A/C.6/SR.84 (Maktos, United States); while Poland, backed by the Soviet Union,
stressed that prevention was also the goal of the Convention, and that freedom of the
press should not be so great “as to permit the Press to engage in incitement to
genocide.” Ibid. (Lachs, Poland). An attempt by the United States to delete the entire
provision was rejected by twenty-seven to sixteen, with five abstentions (UN Doc.
A/C.6/SR.85), causing the United States to declare that it reserved its position on the
provision. Ibid. (Maktos, United States). A Soviet attempt to expand the provision to
include “[a]ll forms of public propaganda aimed at inciting racial, national, or religious
enmities or hatred or at provoking the commission of acts of genocide” was rejected:
UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.87. 357
if they fail to produce results” and thus warrant punishment “as an
exceptional measure”. 146 The Prosecutor of the ICTR has issued several
147
indictments for this offence, leading to two convictions. The Trial
Chamber in Akayesu observed that the drafters had emphasised the
importance of addressing incitement to genocide because of the critical role
that it played in the planning of genocide, and the Chamber agreed that
direct and public incitement is an inchoate offence. 148
7.81 The travaux of the Convention provide little guidance as to the
meaning of the words “direct and public”. “Public” is the easier to define:
the ICTR cited French law to the effect that words are public when they are
149
spoken aloud in a place that is public by definition. The Chamber further
stated that incitement “must assume a direct form and specifically provoke
a criminal act”, and must be more than “mere vague or indirect
150
suggestion”.
7.82 The ICTR has also stressed the importance of interpreting “coded”
language in its context. In Akayesu, it stated that…
“the direct element of incitement should be viewed in the light of
its cultural and linguistic content. A particular speech may be
perceived as ‘direct’ in one country, and not so in another,
depending on the audience.” 151
It noted that implicit incitement could be direct. It has adopted a subjective
approach, focusing “mainly on the issue of whether the persons for whom
the message was intended immediately grasped the implication thereof.” 152
A TTEMPT : ART . III(D)
7.83 The offence of attempt to commit genocide appeared in the earliest
draft of the Convention and was adopted by the Sixth Committee
146 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 562.
147 Prosecutor v. Akayesu; Prosecutor v. Kambanda. In both cases, the convictions could
easily have been for complicity, since the exhortations were followed by killings and
other acts of genocidal violence.
148 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 560.
149
150 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 555.
Ibid., para. 556.
151 Ibid., para. 556. See also Prosecutor v. Kambanda, para. 39.
152
Ibid., para. 557. 358
unanimously without debate. 153 The offence is also included in the statutes
of the two Ad Hoc tribunals, 154 as well as in the draft Code of Crimes and
Rome Statute (in both cases applicable to all crimes in their subject matter
jurisdiction). 155
7.84 The travaux of the Convention, though provide no guidance as to
how the concept is to be applied, beyond the rejection of preparatory acts
156
noted in relation to the prevention of genocide. There has been no case-
law on the subject, as there have never been any prosecutions for attempted
genocide, although guidance may be found in relation to the case law
pertaining to attempts to commit war crimes. 157 The Rome Statute of the
ICC provides an articulation of a threshold, stating that an attempt occurs
when the offender “commences its execution by means of a substantial
step”. 158 The International Law Commission, for its part, has referred to a
159
“significant step.”
153
UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.85. See also Robinson , Genocide Convention , p. 66. A provision
prohibiting “preparatory acts” was rejected by both the Ad Hoc Committee and the
Sixth Committee. UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.17, p.7; UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.86.
154 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993), art. 2(3)(d); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), art. 4(3)(d).
155 “Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session,
6 May-26 July 1996,” UN Doc. A/51/10, p. 18; Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, art. 25(3)(f).
156 The ICTR noted that according to the travaux there could be no such thing as
complicity in attempted genocide. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 526.
157
For instance, France v. Stucker, (1948) 7 LRTWC 72 (Permanent Military Tribunal at
Metz), where a Nazi official was found guilty of attempt when he recommended that
the Gestapo arrest and deport some “political undesirable” individuals, although no
subsequent action was taken. See generally, “Types of Offences,” (1948) 15 LRTWC
158 89 at p. 89.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, art.
25(3)(f).
159
Edward M. Wise, “Part 3. General Principles of Criminal Law,” (1998) 13 Nouvelles
Etudes Pénales, pp. 39, 44. 359
C OMPLICITY : A RT . III(E)
7.85 Finally Article III includes “complicity in genocide”. This can
involve planning, ordering or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning,
preparation, or execution of genocide. The principle that accomplices to
the commission of a crime should be punished is one that has been clearly
160
established under most criminal law systems, and there have been several
convictions for complicity in genocide in relation to the Holocaust. 161 Trial
Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
have identified the principle as being “in clear conformity with general
principles of criminal law”, 162and also based in customary law. 163 The
International Law Commission’s “Nuremberg Principles” also hold that
complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime or a
crime against humanity is a crime under international law. 164
7.86 It is apparent from the debates in the negotiation of the Convention
that complicity is limited to complicity to commit genocide and does not
165
extend to the other acts listed in Article III.
7.87 Both the International Law Commission’s draft Code of Crimes and
166
the Rome Statute include detailed definitions of complicity. Complicity
appears in the statutes for the ICTR and ICTY, not just in their versions of
Article III, but also in a general complicity provision. 167 The significance
160 United Kingdom v. Schonfeld et al. , (1948) 11 LRTWC 64 (British Military Court), pp.
69-70.
161
For instance United Kingdom v. Tesch et al. , (1947) 1 LRTWC 93 (British Military
Court), convicting the manufacturer of Zyklon B gas; United Kingdom v. Kramer et al.,
1947 2 LRTWC 1 (British Military Tribunal), convicting members of the staff at Belsen
and Auschwitz.
162
Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 321.
163 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, paras. 666, 669.
164
“Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment Formulated by the International
Law Commission,” GA Res. 177A(II); “Report of the International Law Commission
Covering its Second Session, 5 June to 29 July 1950,” UN Doc. A/1316/p. 12, art. VII.
165 In the Sixth Committee, the debates centred on a Belgian amendment limiting
complicity to genocide alone, and the acceptance (25-14: 3 abstentions: UN Doc.
A/C.6/SR.87) of an identical amendment put forward by the United Kingdom shows
clearly that Article III(e) is restricted to complicity in genocide, rather than any of the
other acts listed in Article III. This view was confirmed by the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 526.
166 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 6
May-26 July 1996,” UN Doc. A/51/10, p. 18; Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, art. 25.
167 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993), art. 7(1); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), art. 6(1). Both establish criminal liability for persons who 360
of including a crime of complicity has been explained by the Appeal
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
in Tadić:
“Although only some members of the group may physically
perpetrate the criminal act… the participation and contribution of
other members of the group is often vital in facilitating the
commission of the offence in question. It follows that the moral
gravity of such participation is often no less – or indeed no
different – from that of those actually carrying out the acts in
168
question.”
7.88 In the Karadži ć and Mladi ć case, the Tribunal made clear how
important complicity can be in establishing the criminal liability of leaders,
organisers and planners. The Trial Chamber ruled that the accused were
participants in genocide because…
“The uniform methods used in committing the said crimes, their
pattern, their pervasiveness throughout all of the Bosnian Serb-
held territory, the movements of prisoners between the various
camps, and the tenor of some of the accused’s statements are
strong indications tending to show that Radovan Karadži ć and
Ratko Mladić planned, ordered or otherwise aided and abetted in
the planning, preparation, or execution of the genocide committed
in the detention facilities.”169
7.89 In Tadić, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has also developed the concept of
“common purpose” complicity, distinct from “aiding and abetting”, and
170
carrying a greater stigma. Criminal liability, the Tribunal held, could be
extended to cover responsibility where two or more persons have a
common design to pursue a course of conduct where one of the perpetrators
commits an act which, while outside the common design, was nevertheless
a natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that common
purpose. 171 This liability was said by the Tribunal to be derived from
customary law and could be inferred from its own Statute.
have “planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided or abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution of a crime” within their jurisdiction.
168 Prosecutor v. Tadić, para. 191.
169
Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R61, Consideration of the
Indictment Within the Framework of Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
11 July 1996, para. 84.
170 Prosecutor v. Tadić, para. 229.
171 Ibid, paras. 204-20. 361
7.90 In Tadić, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia noted, however, that this case-law did not
specify the degree of aiding and abetting required, although it offered some
examples as guidance. 172 Endorsing the view of the International Law
173
Commission, the Chamber for its own part held that criminal
participation must have a direct and substantial effect on the commission of
the offence, although it noted that “assistance need not constitute an
indispensable element, that it is, a conditio sine qua non for the acts of the
principal.” 174
7.91 In line with the practice of the ICTY, it appears that an accused
person need not be present when the crime takes place:
“direct contribution does not necessarily require the participation
in the physical commission of the illegal act. That participation in
the commission of the crime does not require an actual physical
presence or physical assistance appears to have been well accepted
at the Nuremberg war crimes trials.” 175
Moreover, while mere presence may not alone constitute complicity, it may
do so where the accused has a legal duty to intervene. This is especially
relevant to a situation where a criminal act is being perpetrated by a
paramilitary organisation and an official army fails to act to prevent it,
despite the capacity to do so. The Yugoslavia Tribunal has ruled that a
176
failure to intervene can be a form of encouragement (i.e. abetting). The
responsibility of a superior is not thereby automatic, although presence at
the scene will create a strong presumption of guilt. 177
7.92 The ICTY has recognised that complicity can take place after the
crime as well as prior to commission. 178 The ICTR has also clarified that it
is possible to convict for complicity even if the person who committed the
172
173 Prosecutor v. Tadić, para. 681.
“Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session,
6 May-26 July 1996,” UN Doc. A/51/10, p. 18. The Rome Statute, Art. 25 does not
provide any indication of the quantitative degree of aiding and abetting required.
174
175 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 10 December1998, para. 209.
Prosecutor v. Tadi ć, paras. 678, 691; United Kingdom v. Wielen et al. , (1948) 9
LRTWC 31 (British Military Court, Hamburg), pp. 43-44, 46.
176
177 Prosecutor v. Tadić, paras 689-90.
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment, 25 June 1999, para. 65.
178 Prosecutor v. Tadić, para. 692. The contemporary commentator Nehemiah Robinson
wrote that the Ad Hoc Committee intended complicity to refer to “accessorship before
and after the fact.” Robinson, Genocide Convention, p. 69. 362
underlying crime has not been (or cannot be) charged or convicted with that
179
crime.
7.93 As to the mental element required to establish complicity, the
Convention’s travaux provide only limited guidance. 180 The ICTY has
found that there is a…
“requirement of intent, which involves an awareness of the act of
participation coupled with a conscious decision to participate by
planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding
181
and abetting in the commission of a crime.”
7.94 Likewise in Furundžija the ICTY ruled that an aider and abettor
need not “meet all the requirements of mens rea for a principal
offender”; 182the real test is whether the accused had knowledge of the
principal offender’s intent. 183 With regard to the crime of “common
purpose” complicity, the Appeal Chamber in Tadić ruled that it required…
“a state of mind in which a person, although he did not intend to
bring about a certain result, was aware that the actions of the
group were likely to lead to that result but nevertheless willingly
took that risk. In other words, the so-called dolus eventualis is
required (also called ‘advertent recklessness’ in some national
legal systems).” 184
7.95 The ICTR has adopted a similar approach. In Akayesu it ruled
that…
179 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 530. Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam said, in relation to
the draft Code of Crimes that complicity was a “drama of great complexity and
intensity,” and that it could cover acts committed before the principal offence as well as
afterwards. “Eighth Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind, by Mr. Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur,” UN Doc. A/CN.4/430 and
Add.1, paras. 28-38, pp. 31-32.
180 The United Kingdom proposed to insert the word “deliberate” before “complicity,” on
the basis that in some legal systems complicity did not require intent: UN Doc.
A/C.6/236 and Corr.1; UN Doc. A/C.6/SR. 87 (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom). After
others pointed out that this was unnecessary because it had always been clear that
181 complicity in genocide must be intentional, it was withdrawn. Ibid.
Prosecutor v. Tadić, para. 674. This refers to the wider complicity provision, but the
principle is same for the narrower construction of the Genocide Convention. The
Tribunal also made clear that knowledge could be inferred. Ibid, para. 677.
182
Prosecutor v. Furundžija, para. 243.
183 Ibid. See also Prosecutor v. Tadić, para 229(iv); Schabas, Genocide, pp. 301-302.
184
Prosecutor v. Tadić, para. 220. This has been criticised for allowing an individual to be
held liable for an offence that he or she did not truly intend. Schabas , Genocide, p. 303. 363
“an accomplice to genocide need not necessarily possess the dolus
specialis of genocide… an accused is liable as an accomplice to
genocide if he knowingly aided or abetted or instigated one or
more persons in the commission of genocide, while knowing that
such person or persons were committing genocide, even though
the accused himself did not have the specific intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such.”185
Such a knowledge requirement has also been specified by the International
186
Law Commission.
SECTION FIVE:
THE OBLIGATION TO PREVENT AND PUNISH
PREVENTION
7.96 The obligation to prevent the crime of genocide is at the heart of the
Convention. It is referred to in the title and in Articles I and VIII. Article I
establishes a positive obligation on States Parties to the Convention to
prevent genocide. Article VIII makes it clear that all States parties to the
Convention have an interest in the prevention of genocide and can call on
187
the competent United Nations organs to take action in that regard.
7.97 The obligation to prevent genocide means that a State is required to
take positive steps to ensure that those within its jurisdiction and control do
not commit genocide. This positive obligation is clear from Article IV of
the Convention, which provides that the obligation extends to those persons
who are part of the state apparatus, including public officials and members
of the armed forces, as well as to private individuals. The obligation is
positive, in the sense that a State’s responsibility will not be excluded
merely by its failure to act, turning a blind eye to genocidal acts. A State
will incur direct responsibility under the Convention if its own officials
perpetrate genocidal acts. But it will also incur responsibility if private
185
Prosecutor v. Akayesu , para. 544. This reasoning was adopted inProsecutor v.
186 Musema, paras. 181-183.
“Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session,
6 May-26 July 1996,” UN Doc. A/51/10, p. 24.
187 Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, ‘Genocide,’ in Rudolph Bernhardt, edEncyclopaedia of
Public International Law, Vol. II (Amsterdam: North-Holland Elsevier, 1995), pp. 541-
544 at p. 542. 364
persons within its jurisdiction or control carry out such acts, which it could
have prevented.
7.98 Moreover, the obligation to prevent genocide is an obligation owed
to the international community as a whole. As this Court put it in the
Barcelona Traction case:
“By its very nature, the outlawing of genocide [is] … the concern
of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they
are obligationserga omnes.” 188
7.99 Other organs of the United Nations have also made clear on
repeated occasions the importance of the obligation on states to prevent
genocide. Repeated General Assembly Resolutions relating to the situation
in the former SFRY have referred to the Ge189ide Convention or to the
importance of preventing genocide. State practice and opinio juris
reflect the importance attached by the drafters of the Genocide Convention
to the obligation to prevent genocide. For example on the fiftieth
anniversary of the Convention, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
which invited states to “redouble their efforts for the prevention and
punishment of the crime of genocide,” and called upon all States to
“increase and intensify their activities aimed at the full implementation of
the Convention.” 190
188
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd (Belgium v. Spain ), ICJ Reports 1970 3,
p. 32. See also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)),
Further Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures , ICJ Reports 1993 p. 325,
individual opinion Judge ad hoc Sir Elihu Lauterpacht (at p. 436).
189
“The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” UN Doc. A/RES/48/88; “Rape and Abuse
of Women in the Areas of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia,” UN Doc.
A/RES/48/143; “Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia:
Violations of Human Rights in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic
of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),” UN Doc.
A/RES/48/153; “The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” UN Doc. A/RES/49/10;
“Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic
of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).” UN Doc.
A/RES/49/196; “Rape and Abuse of Women in the Areas of Armed Conflict in the
Former Yugoslavia,” UN Doc. A/RES/49/205; “Situation of Human Rights in Kosovo,”
UN Doc. A/RES/49/204; “Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro),” UN Doc. A/RES/50/193; “Situation of Human Rights in Kosovo.”
190 UN Doc. A/RES/50/190.
UN Doc. A/RES/53/43 (22 January 1999), preamble and article 3. 365
PUNISHMENT
7.100 The requirement that perpetrators of genocide and related acts shall
be punished, and the obligation of States parties to punish genocide, is
referred to in the title and Articles I, V and VI of the Convention. 191 Article
IV provides that…
“Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated
in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private citizens.”
As indicated above, it is clear from this provision that the obligation to
prevent genocide arises in relation to public and private acts alike.
7.101 Article VI of the Convention provides that those charged with
offences under Articles II or III of the Convention…
“shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory
of which the act was committed, or by such international penal
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting
Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.”
Although the Convention does not provide for universal jurisdiction in the
192
modern sense, it is apparent that States are not barred from trying their
own nationals for acts committed outside the territorial State, and that in
light of the provisions of Article IV of the Convention they must do so. 193
It is plain that the FRY has a responsibility under the Convention to punish
individuals for acts of genocide and that it has failed to do so. The failure
of a State to punish or prosecute supports the inference that the acts
194
concerned were part of a State sponsored policy.
191 Article VII also provides for an obligation to co-operate in extraditing genocide
192 suspects.
The International Law Commission endorsed universal jurisdiction for the crime of
genocide in 1996, although admitting that it could not be read into the Convention.
“Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session,
6 May-26 July 1996,” UN Doc. A/51/10, p. 42.
193
An interpretation proposed by the Chair of the Sixth Committee and accepted by twenty
to eight, with six abstentions: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.134. The right of States to try their
own nationals for crimes against humanity, no matter where committed, has
subsequently been recognised by the General Assembly in “Principles of International
Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity”, GA Res. 3704 (XXVIII), para. 2.
194 See Letter dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the
Security Council, S/1994/674 (“The practice of so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’ and rape
and sexual assault, in particular, have been carried out by some of the parties so
systematically that they strongly appear to be the product of a policy, which may also
be inferred from the consistent failure to prevent the commission of such crimes and to 366
SECTION SIX:
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
7.102 The Convention is silent as to command responsibility, a concept
which originally developed in the context of war crimes providing that a
commander can be found liable for “fail[ing] to provide195fective control”
of his troops as required by the circumstances. Command responsibility
may give rise to responsibility either as a principal offender or as an
196
accomplice, and it may extend to include political (civilian) leaders.
7.103 Developments since 1948 confirm that the concept of command
responsibility is established in customary international law. This is
reflected in the codification of the offence in Protocol Additional I to the
Geneva Conventions and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
197
International Armed Conflicts and, more recently, in the Statutes of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the
198
Intern199onal Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 200 the Rome Statute of the
ICC, and the 1996 ILC Code of Crimes.
7.104 There have been three convictions before the ad hoc c201inal
tribunals for genocide committed by command responsibility, and a
prosecute and punish their perpetrators”). See also Report of the Commission of
Experts, para. 313, drawing the conclusion that “the existence of a policy by omission”
permits command responsibility to be established.
195 Taken from the judgment in the leading post-Second World War case, United States of
America v. Yamashita , (1948) 4 LRTWC 1, pp. 36-7; In Re Yamashita , 327 US 1
(1945).
196
Although the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found that the law remains
“contentious” where civilian officials are concerned: Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 689.
197 (1979) 1125 UNTS 3, art. 86 (2).
198
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993), art. 7(3); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), art. 6(3). The provisions are identical, and read: “The fact
that [genocide] was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about
to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.”
199 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, art. 28.
This distinguishes between civilian superiors, who can only be liable if they knew or
were wilfully blind as to the acts of their subordinates and did not take appropriate
measures to prevent the offence, and military commanders, who are held liable for
negligent supervision.
200 “Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session,
6 May-26 July 1996,” UN Doc. A/51/10, p. 34, art. 6, and p. 37.
201
Prosecutor v. Kambanda ; Prosecutor v. Serushago , ICTRd-98-39-S, Sentence 2
February 1999; Prosecutor v. Kayeshima and Ruzindana , ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21
May 1999 (Kayishema only). All three were also found guilty of genocide either as 367
202
finding of liability pursuant to Rule 61 in a fourth case. In Akayesu , the
ICTR identified two different bases for establishing the mens rea of a
commander, one based on the strict liability of the commander, and the
other, which it preferred, based on “malicious intent, or, at least…
negligence… so serious as to be tantamount to acquiescence or even
malicious intent.” 203 In Karadži ć and Mladi ć the ICTY adopted the
following approach:
“Insofar as [the Trial Chamber] is considering command
responsibility, it must carry out its examination in order to
discover whether the pattern of conduct of which it is seized,
namely ‘ethnic cleansing,’ taken in its totality, reveals such a
genocidal intent.” 204
Where command responsibility exists, the commander is responsible for
acts of the subordinate, and what matters is accordingly the genocidal intent
of the latter.
7.105 The doctrine of command responsibility will apply when a military
(or paramilitary) commander has given an order for the commission of an
illegal act, including an act, which violates the Genocide Convention. But
it may also apply when a military (or paramilitary) commander has not
given the offending order but has such overall control and direction of the
operation that responsibility can properly be imputed to him; thus political
leaders and public officials have also been found liable under the doctrine
of command responsibility in certain circumstances. For these latter cases
the UN Commission of Experts has identified the necessary mental element
as being (a) actual knowledge, or (b) such serious personal dereliction on
the part of the commander of commander or political leader or public
official as to constitute wilful and wanton disregard of the possible
consequences, or (c) an imputation of constructive knowledge, that is the
commander or political leader or public official under the facts and
principal offender or as accomplice. The closest examination of the issue has been in
relation to war crimes in Prosecutor v. Delali ć et al.,paras. 330-400, where the
Tribunal concluded that “a superior can be held criminally liable only if specific
information was in fact available to him which would provide notice of offences
committed by his subordinates.” Ibid., paras. 390-3.
202 Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić.
203
Prosecutor v. Akayesu , para. 488. Akayesu was acquitted on the portions of the
indictment concerning command responsibility b ecause the Tri bunal found them
ambiguous. Ibid., para. 689.
204 Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, para. 94. Although the decision is equivocal, there
is a strong suggestion that the Chamber considered the two accused to be responsible as
commanders, because the acts “could have been planned or ordered [by them] with a
genocidal intent.” Ibid . In this case, the basis of responsibility would be full-blown
complicity, not merely command responsibility. 368
circumstances of the particular case must have known of the acts and
acquiesced in them. 205
7.106 The Commission of Experts has also identified a number of factors,
206
which will assist in determining the existence of constructive knowledge.
These are:
(a) the number of illegal acts;
(b) the type of illegal acts;
(c) the scope of illegal acts;
(d) the time during which the illegal acts occurred;
(e) the number and types of troops involved;
(f) the logistics involved;
(g) the geographic location of the acts;
(h) the widespread occurrence of the acts;
(i) the tactical tempo of the operations;
(j) the modus operandi of similar illegal acts;
(k) the officers and staff involved;
(l) the location of the commander at the time.
CONCLUSIONS
7.107 In the context of the present case, the Convention imposed upon the
civilian and military leadership of the FRY a clear obligation not to engage
in any acts which violated the Convention, including through the JNA and
those Serb and Serbian paramilitary groups which they directed and
controlled. It is evident from the material set forth in Chapters 4 and 5 that
many acts were systematically and massively carried out in Croatia which
fell within the five categories of acts listed in Article II of the Convention.
Croats were intentionally killed; they were subjected to serious bodily and
mental harm, including rape and other sex crimes; they were subjected to
conditions of life (including destruction of their cultural identity) designed
to bring about their physical destruction; and they were subjected to sexual
and other measures which were intended to prevent births within their
group. All of this was done on a concerted basis, implying the existence of
careful planning and deliberation. The criminal conduct was widespread
205
206 Commission of Experts, Report, para. 58.
Ibid. 369
and not isolated or sporadic; it involved a substantial number of victims
who were targeted because they were Croats (i.e. as members of the
Croatian national or ethnical group). In other words the conduct taken in
aggregate was committed against Croats as such. It was part of a campaign
to eliminate all or virtually all Croats from the areas concerned, i.e. to
destroy or eliminate the group as such in those areas.
7.108 It is clear that the commission of genocide does not require the
actual destruction of all the members of the group. As the ILC put it with
respect to the physical element, it “is enough to have committed any one of
the acts listed” in Article II. In the present case there can be no doubt that
the widespread and systematic nature of the Article II acts perpetrated
against Croats are sufficient to constitute the physical element, which
constitutes the crime of genocide. With regard to the mental element, it is
sufficient to note that the requirement of intent to destroy a group may be
inferred from the existence of a set of facts, including a pattern of
behaviour. As the ILC put it, intent “may be inferred from the nature of the
order to commit the prohibited acts of destruction against individuals who
belong to a particular group and are therefore singled out as the immediate
victims of the massive criminal conduct.” 207 The catalogue of such orders
and acts will be further demonstrated in the following Chapter.
7.109 The Genocide Convention does not, however, limit itself to
declaring or constituting a crime of genocide. It imposes a further, positive
obligation on its State Parties to prevent and to punish genocide. Those
obligations are engaged where the acts threatened or occurring are prima
facie genocidal, or where there is real risk that genocidal acts may be
carried out. As will be made clear in the following Chapter, the FRY failed
to respect its obligations in both respects. And it has failed, and continues
to fail, to respect the obligation to prosecute and punish persons within its
jurisdiction and control who perpetrated genocidal acts.
207 See above, para. 7.35.370 CHAPTER 8
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FRY FOR VIOLATIONS
OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
8.01 This Chapter sets out the basis of the responsibility of the FRY for
the violations of the Genocide Convention which are the subject of the
present proceedings. It demonstrates, on the basis of the evidence presented
in this Memorial, that:
Genocide was committed on the territory of Croatia between
the summer of 1991 and August 1995, and the related acts of
conspiracy, incitement, complicity and attempt were
committed on the territory of Croatia and on the territory of
the FRY (Section 1, paras. 8.2-8.31);
The genocidal acts in question are attributable to the FRY
(Section 2, paras. 8.32-8.55);
In any event, the FRY is responsible for violations of Articles
II and III of the Genocide Convention by reason of its failure
to prevent or punish the genocidal acts (Section 3, paras. 8.56-
8.70);
In accordance with principles of general international law the
FRY is liable for damages by way of reparation for its
violations of the Genocide Convention. In particular the FRY
is under an obligation to provide information as to the
whereabouts of the Croatian citizens still missing as result of
the genocidal acts, and as far as possible to reverse the effects
of those acts in other respects (e.g. by the return of stolen
cultural property) (Section 4, paras. 8.71-8.84).
SECTION ONE:
GENOCIDE WAS COMMITTED ON THE TERRITORY OF
CROATIA
8.02 The events described in Chapters 4 and 5 of this Memorial, taken in
the context of the developments described in Chapters 2 and 3, disclose
breaches of Articles II and III of the Genocide Convention. In particular, it
is clear from the evidence that:
(1) Genocide within the meaning of Article II of the Convention was
committed by officers and soldiers of the JNA/VJ and Serbian 372
paramilitary groups acting in concert. Genocidal acts were
committed in Eastern Slavonia as described in Chapter 4, and in the
other regions of Croatia described in Chapter 5, through
the arbitrary and widespread killing of members of the
Croatian population “as such”, i.e. on account of their
national or ethnic origin;
the inflicting of serious bodily and mental injury on
members of the Croatian population by a variety of means
including indiscriminate acts of violence, torture,
disappearance, rape and other sexual crimes;
the inflicting of conditions of life calculated to bring about
the physical destruction of the Croatian population and its
elimination from the regions concerned (including, for
example, by the physical desolation and destruction of
towns and villages and objects of worship or cultural
relevance); and
the imposition of measures to prevent births within the
Croatian population of those regions.
Each of these acts was committed with the necessary
genocidal intent, in breach of Article II of the Genocide
Convention.
(2) The related crimes of conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and
public incitement to genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and
complicity in genocide, in breach of Article III of the Genocide
Convention, were committed by the Serbian leadership of FRY and
Republic of Serbia, officers of the JNA and the VJ, and paramilitary
commanders under the control of the JNA/JA.
(1) THE C RIME OF G ENOCIDE (A RTICLE IIOF THE CONVENTION )
(a) A Consistent Pattern of Events Amounting to Genocide
8.03 The military campaign in the regions described in Chapters 4 and 5
must be assessed in the context of the aspiration of the Serbian leadership
to establish a “Greater Serbia” by changing established borders, annexing
territory and providing for Serbian control of large parts of Croatia. The
aims adopted can be seen from Chapter 2; the methods adopted emerge
clearly from Chapters 4 and 5 and from the evidence referred to in those
chapters. In summary, the Serbian leadership, the FRY and the Republic of
Serbia embarked on a campaign of territorial acquisition with the objective, 373
not merely of establishing Serbian control in those parts of the Republic of
Croatia in which significant Serb populations were located (including in
particular Eastern and Western Slavonia, Banovina, Kordun and Lika and
Dalmatia as well as neighbouring areas falling within the arc of «Greater
Serbia»), but also of eliminating from those areas as far as possible all or
almost all members of the Croatian population. 1 The process involved the
systematic and repeated commission of unlawful acts prohibited by Article
II, with the specific intent of achieving the physical destruction and
elimination of the Croatian population of the areas in question. Indeed,
these genocidal actions were a necessary part of the policy as it had been
conceived.
8.04 It is clear beyond doubt, not only from the public speeches of senior
2
Serbian political3and military officials and the written memoirs of some of
those officials, but from the military history of the campaign and the
manner in which it was carried out, 4 that the areas of Croatian territory
which fell under Serbian/FRY occupation and control were intended as far
as possible to be cleared of Croats. In other words, the goal of the campaign
was not to achieve Serbian control of those areas with their existing
populations, but to destroy the Croatian population of those regions in
whole or in substantial part, and thereby to ensure that the regions were
exclusively, or almost exclusively, inhabited by Serbs.
8.05 In order to achieve this goal the JNA military commanders, acting
in concert with Serb and Serbian paramilitary groups, adopted a strategy
which went well beyond any legitimate military objectives aimed at
securing control of these territories, and which was calculated to bring
about the destruction of that part of the Croatian ethnic population living in
the regions concerned. This is well-illustrated by the prolonged and
devastating assault on Vukovar followed, as it was, by the systematic
extermination of many of those Croatians who remained following the
1 For Map of “Greater Serbia”, see Chapter 2, paras. 2.76 and 2.77.
2
See e.g. Chapter 2, para. 2.79 (speech of Markovi ć); para. 2.98 (speech of Miloševi ć);
para. 2.103 (interview with Ilić); Chapter 3, para. 3.39 (speech of Jovanić).
3 See e.g. Chapter 3, para. 3.36 (Memoirs of Jović).
4
See e.g. Chapter 3, paras. 3.72-3.99; Chapter 4, paras. 4.12-4.19 (overview of JNA role
in Eastern Slavonia); 4.64-4.66 (JNA role in forced exile of Croats from Ilok); Chapter
5, paras. 5.7-5.11 (overview of JNA role in Western Slavonia); 5.72-5.75 (overview of
JNA role in Banovina); 5.130-5.134 (overview of JNA role in Kordun and Lika); 5.198-
200 (overview of JNA role in Dalmatia); 5.232 (“A Chronological narrative of the
events at the dam from the occupation until the mining”, describing how the JNA
attempted to destroy the dam at Peruča and flood Croatian villages); 5.236 (overview of
JNA role in Dubrovnik). 374
5
occupation of Vukovar by Serbian forces. Neither the assault nor the
extermination had any conceivable military justification. Civilian casualties
and expulsions were in no sense a side-effect of legitimate military
operations; they were the very object and purpose of the campaign.
8.06 Throughout Eastern Slavonia and elsewhere in Croatia the
implementation of this strategy followed a typical pattern. First, the JNA
and paramilitary groups would either engage in artillery shelling of a
particular Croat locality, or would threaten to do so. 6 On entry into the
locality (and whether or not their entry was opposed) they would take steps
to identify Croats and other non-Serbs and their property. 7 Croatian and
other non-Serb owned property, including cultural property,8would be
looted, confiscated and/or systematically destroyed. Members of the Croat
population would be subjected to brutal attacks, including rapes and other
sexual crimes and killings, i.e. to actions in which the victim was selected
by reference to his or her Croat or non-Serb nationality or ethnicity and
which were carried out only because of that nationality or ethnicity. 9 The
purpose and effect of these crimes was to induce a state of terror in the
Croat civilian population and thereby to cause them to flee. Very often
these crimes were accompanied by overt10thnic abuse and threats to
“cleanse” the locality of Croats. Local Serb “authorities” would then be
established and would impose a regime of humiliation and dehumanisation
on the remaining Croat population, enforced by acts of extreme violence,
including sexual violence and arbitrary killings. 11 The local Croat
population would be required to identify themselves and their property with
12
white ribbons and other distinctive marks; they would be denied access to
food, water, electricity and telecommunications and proper medical
13 14
treatment; their movements would be restricted; they would be put to
5
Chapter 4, paras. 4.158-4.187, in particular para. 4.188 providing information on mass
graves in Vukovar containing 1,151 bodies.
6 Chapter 4, paras. 4.17; 4.32 (Ministry of Defence (MORH), from 10 September 1994);
4.48 (M.K. ); 4.57 ( Narodna Armija , 13 November 1991); 4.64; 4.74; 4.83;
4.108; 4.118; 4.134; 4.146 (United Press International, 21 November 1991: “Army
seeks to justify destruction of Vukovar”); 4.149 The Guardian, London, November
1991); 4.159 (M.F.); and Chapter 5, paras. 5.15; 5.70 (D. V.);
5.94 (P.M.); 5.97 (A.K. ); 5.103 (D. V.); 5.118; 5.151;
5.155 (M.L., D.P.); 5.157.
7 See below, para. 8.16 and notes 59 and 61.
8
See below, para. 8.16 and note 67.
9 See below, para. 8.11 and notes 31, 32, 33; para 8.14 and notes 47-9; para 8.16 note 65.
10
See below, para. 8.16 and note 65.
11 See, in particular, below, para. 8.11 and notes 31-3; also para. 8.16 and note 65.
12
See below, para. 8.16 and note 61.
13 See below, para. 8.13 and note 4. 375
15 16
forced labour; their property would be destroyed or looted; 17 Croatian
cultural and religious monuments would be destroyed; and schools and
other public utilities would be required to adopt Serbian cultural traditions
18
and language. Thereafter, the occupying “authorities” would organise
transportation to evacuate the remaining Croatian civilian population, 19
requiring them to sign documents renouncing all their property in favour of
20
the occupying force’s administration. Large numbers were transported to
concentration camps in Serb-occupied territory or in the FRY itself. 21 Many
22
of those who remained were exterminated. This pattern was repeated
throughout Eastern Slavonia, and in the other regions described in Chapter
5.
8.07 The consistent pattern of atrocities in these regions provides the
clearest evidence of a policy on the part of the Serbian occupying forces
which meets the requirements of genocide as identified in Chapter 7. In
short, it involved:
(a)the deliberate and unlawful commission of acts prohibited in
Article II;
(b)committed against the Croat civilian population as such,
(c)with a view to their destruction and elimination.
By way of example of the elements of deliberation and discrimination
involved, there is contemporary videotaped evidence of one paramilitary
leader — known as Arkan — issuing instructions to soldiers wearing JNA
uniforms on how the JNA and paramilitaries should cooperate during
attacks on Lužac (on the outskirts of Vukovar) in order to ensure that the
14
See below, para. 8.13 and note 41.
15 The use of forced labour was characteristic in Serb-occupied towns and villages. For
examples, see Chapter 4, paras. 4.25 (P.Š.); 4.35 (E.M. ); 4.41 (K.M.);
4.60 (O.Š.); 4.67 (P.V. ); 4.79 (I.B. ); 4.87 (KB.);
4.101 (M.D.); 4.114 (B.U., describing the use of all-
female labour gangs in Sotin); 4.123 (P. V.); 4.128 (V.R. );
Chapter 5, paras. 5.31 (M.S. ); 5.210 (M. P.); 5.214 (C. V.);
5.225 (K.V.).
16 See below, para. 8.13 and notes 42 and 44.
17
See below, para. 8.16 and note 67.
18 See below, para. 8.16 and note 68.
19
See below, para. 8.16 and note 66.
20 See below, para. 8.16.
21
Ibid.
22 See below, para. 8.8. 376
killing of civilians was confined to those of Croat ethnicity. 23 That speech
proves genocidal intent in relation to the acts which followed in Vukovar,
which involved, inter alia, the death of thousands of civilians.
8.08 The program was largely successful in its aim of destroying and
eliminating the Croatian population in the targeted regions. The
demographic evidence shows that many of the towns and villages which
had a predominantly Croatian population prior to their occupation had
24
become almost exclusively Serbian by 1993. In the territory of Eastern
Slavonia as a whole, the population ratio prior to the occupation was
70.24% Croat, 17.13% Serb and 12.60% other ethnic groups. By 1993,
after the occupation, the Croatian populat25n had dropped to 2%, and the
Serb population increased to 97%. By that date Croats had physically
ceased to be a group in the area. The area itself was a substantial one. So
too was the number of persons who, solely by reason of the fact of their
ethnicity and not because of anything they had individually done (e.g. as
combatants) were subjected to one or more of the prohibited acts
enumerated in Article II of the Convention. In these circumstances the
conduct in question crosses any conceivable threshold and constitutes
genocide within the meaning of the Convention. 26
8.09 The Serbian military campaign on Croatian territory has been
characterised as “ethnic cleansing”. No doubt the phrase “ethnic cleansing”,
repugnant as it is, covers conduct over a wide spectrum. But where, as here,
23 Chapter 3, paras.3.57; see Appendices, vol 5, appendix 2 (Video Transcript).
24 The towns and villages referred to below are those for which demographic details are
recorded in Chapters 4 and 5, andsome of many villages which were predominantly
Croat before the war, but where the balance changed significantly as a result of
expulsions or massacres. See Chapter 4, paras. 4.38 (Berak); 4.47 (Bogdanovci); 4.56
(Šarengrad); 4.62 (Ilok); 4.73 (Tompojevci); 4.81 (Bapska); 4.94 (Tovarnik); 4.107
(Sotin); 4.116 (Lovas); 4.133 (Tordinci); 4.140 (Vukovar); also Chapter 5, paras. 5.45
(Balinci); 5.47 (Donji Čaglić); 5.60 (Vukovije); 5.81 (Novo Selo Glinsko); 5.84
(Joševica); 5.89 (Donje Jame); 5.93 (Skela); 5.96 (Kraljev čani); 5.99 (Glinska Poljana);
5.102 (Zamla ča, Struga Banska); 5.109 (Kozibrod, Un čani, Gvozdansko); 5.110
(Hrvatska Kostajnica); 5.112 (Ba ćin); 5.115 (Kostri ći); 5.117 (Kostajni čki Majur);
5.139 (Crna Draga, Novo Selo Lasinjsko and Lasinja); 5.142 (Lipova ča); 5.144
(Lađevac); 5.147 (Arapovac, Gornji Furjan); 5.149 (Saborsko); 5.156 (Banski
Kovačevac); 5.159 (Dabar); 5.162 (Vrhovine); 5.173 (Vaganac); 5.180 (Smoljanac);
5.183 (Lovinac); 5.196 (Knin, Benkovac); 5.202 (Piramatovci); 5.205 (Rupe, I ćevo,
Čista Velika); 5.206 (Puljane); 5.208 (Siveri ć); 5.210 (Drniš); 5.211 (Miljevci); 5.212
(Trbounje, Oklaj, Lukari, Razvo đe, Ljubotić, Matase, Otavice); 5.214 (Kijevo); 5.217
(Jasenice); 5.218 (Medvi đa); 5.221 (Kruševo); 5.222 (Bruška); 5.223 (Korlat); 5.225
(Lišane Ostrovičke, Lisičić, Rodaljice, Perušić Benkovački); 5.226 (Škabrnja).
25 See Chapter 4, paras. 4.3-4.5.
26
On the threshold for genocide to have occurred see above, Chapter 7, paras. 7.38, 7.48-
7.50. 377
the “ethnic cleansing” of an entire region is carried out as part of a co-
ordinated strategy involving the killing of non-combatants and the infliction
of torture and brutality on a large scale, solely on account of the victims’
ethnic origin, with the plain object and effect of destroying that part of the
local population which has a particular ethnic origin, the crime of genocide
27
is established.
The Physical Element: Genocidal Acts
8.10 The evidence in support of a genocidal intent rests in part on the
commission of acts of killing and the infliction of serious bodily and mental
injuries on members of the target group. 28 The different acts constituting
the crime of genocide are enumerated in Article II of the Convention,
29
which has already been analysed.
8.11 There can be no basis for doubting that such acts occurred. More
than 10,572 people were killed in the campaign; 1,419 persons are still
missing and unaccounted for. In the whole of Croatia 126 mass graves have
30
been found to date, o31which 61 ar32in Eastern Sla33nia. The scale and
pattern of killing, torturing and raping of innocent Croatian civilians,
27 This approach is reflected in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/121,
adopted on 19 December 1992 without dissent.
28
See above, para. 8.6.
29 See above, Chapter 7, paras. 7.59-7.75.
30
See Annexes, vol 3, Section 7 (Identified Mass Graves), Plate 7.1 (Eastern Slavonia, 61
mass graves); Plate 7.2 (Western Slavonia, 6 mass graves); Plate 7.3 (Banovina, 39
mass graves); Plate 7.4 (Kordun and Lika, 13 mass graves); Plate 7.5 (Dalmatia, 7 mass
graves).
31
For examples of killings that indicate a particular scale, pattern or brutality (e.g.
systematic massacres, massacres of entire families, or random murders used to force
Croats to flee), see e.g. Chapter 4, paras. 4.18 (58 civilians killed with JNA
participation in Aljmaš); 4.28 ( Đ.B., who buried bodies in a makeshift grave he
was forced to dig); 4.33 (“Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia, 1991/92”, p. 112,
where Serb representatives from Dalj admitted that 56 or 57 Croats had been killed in
the village); 4.49 (M. M., describing how grenades were thrown into
basements where Croat civilians were known to be hiding in Bodganovci); 4.66 (F.D.
describing JNA participation in random murders of Croats remaining after forced
exodus of majority from Ilok); 4.123-5 (P.V. , S.P. , L.S.,
Z.T., describing how 50 Croats were singled out in Lovas and
forced to clear a minefield, during which 21 were killed instantly and the wounded were
shot out of hand); 4.153 (E.M. , JNA soldier, describing systematic murders in
Petrova Gora); 4.162 (D.K., describing systematic murders at the prison camp
at Stajićevo); 4.174-8 (E. Č., Report on Evacuation of the Vukovar Hospital
and the Mass Grave at Ov čara, United Nations Commission of Experts, detailing
massacre at Ov čara); Chapter 5, paras. 5.14 (A.T. , murder of family in
Mačkovac); 5.23 (Ž.S. , paramilitary, describing how he had orders to
confiscate weapons from Croat households, and to kill if he could find none); 5.34 378
which is disclosed by the evidence summarised in Chapters 4 and 5, and the
(Chronology of War, HIC, Zagreb, p.350, Serb civilians reporting that Croats had been
systematically murdered in Vo ćin); 5.43 (M.K., describing how paramilitary
groups were given task of ‘cleansing’ specific areas of the village of Četekovac); 5.49
(R.M., JNA vehicle used to prepare mass grave in Donji Č aglić before
massacre perpetrated by JNA and paramilitaries); 5.56 (B.B. , describing
how systematic murders were perpetrated as Serb paramilitaries retreated from
Đulovac); 5.113 (V.J., describing massacre of approximately 60 Croats in the
municipality of Hrvatska Kostajnica); 5.116 (M.V., describing murder of every
person in the village of Kostrići, ranging in age from 3 to 93); 5.122 (M. I.,
describing murder of entire family in Panjani); 5.157 (R.M. , describing
murder of 6 elderly Croats remaining in Banski Kova čevac and the disposal of their
bodies down a well); 5.170 (M.O. , describing systematic murder of elderly
Croats in Široka Kula); 5.178-9 (B. V., describing murder of V. family,
including two disabled members); 5.217 (S.Š. , describing systematic
murder of elderly Croats in Jasenice); 5.220 (S. E., describing massacre in
Medviđa); 5.228 (S.M. and “Helsinki Watch” report, describing systematic
murders in Škabrnja).
Chapters 4 and 5 also contain extensive examples of mass graves that have been
discovered with little or no indication of who the victims are or where they were
originally from. For locations, see Chapter 4, paras. 4.7 (Eastern Slavonia); 4.29
(Tenja); 4.35 (Dalj); 4.72 (Ilok); 4.107 (Sotin); 4.116 (Lovas); 4.138 (Tordinci); 4.178
(Ovčara); 4.188 (Vukovar); Chapter 5, paras. 5.27 (Pakrac); 5.77 (Banovina); 5.137
(Kordun and Lika); 5.146 (Lađevac); 5.226 (Škabrnja).
32
For examples of torture, especially tortures on a systematic basis, see e.g. Chapter 4,
paras. 4.27 (R.J., describing the use of beatings with telephone cables); 4.34
(S.D., describing coordinated torture and murder in Dalj at the hands of
Serbian paramilitaries); 4.41-2 (K. M.and M.M., describing torture
with lighted cigarettes, beatings with rifle butts, and the use of a rat to bite the face of a
woman for over 6 hours); 4.52 (M.B. , describing how a Croat was stretched on a
tree in front of the church in Bogdanovci and tortured until he died); 4.88-9 (A.Š.,
I.L., describing torture in Bapska, including beating of Croat
who refused to drive through a minefield to pick corn); 4.130-1 (I.F. and M.M.,
describing torture with a power drill, and forcing a man with blood in his
mouth to swallow salt); 4.162 (Z.K., describing torture at the prison camp
at Staji ćevo); 4.180 (M. L., describing torture at the prison camp at
Velepromet); Chapter 5, paras. 5.17 (H.H. , describing rape and torture of
victim before her ears were cut off and her skull shattered); 5.27 (S. V.,
describing torture including physical mutilation); 5.30 (F. D., describing being
tied to a tree and beaten); 5.33 (Dr. Jerry Blaskovich, describing savage torture with
electric chainsaw of a Croat in Voćin); 5.53 (B.B., describing beatings with
telephone wire, a baton, a pole made of hazel-tree and a hose, while being handcuffed
to a stand used for binding cattle); 5.54 (S.A. , describing torture including the
removal of his tongue and teeth and daily beatings, frequently to unconsciousness);
5.98 (M.T. and A.K., describing rape of a Croat woman, whose breasts
were then cut off); 5.122 (M. I., describing torture by blinding and cutting
off of the nose); 5.175 (P.Đ., describing torture in prison by beating, cold water
and sexual abuse); 5.210 (M. P., describing ears being cut off); 5.214 (B.V.,
describing how she was forced to stand in a fire).
33
For examples of references to rape, see below, para. 8.14, note 47. For examples of
references to other sexual crimes on men and women see below para. 8.16, notes 48 and
49. 379
subjection of those civilians to random acts of serious physical violence, is
plainly sufficient to constitute the actus reus of the crime of genocide,
within the meaning of Article II (a) and (b) of the Genocide Convention.
8.12 In addition, the conditions of life which were inflicted on the Croat
population which remained in Serb-occupied territory were calculated to
bring about its physical destruction as a group, and also amount to genocide
within the meaning of Article II (c). The Croat population was subjected to
acts very like those which — in a different geographical area — the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has held to fall within
34
the scope of Article II (c) of the Convention. These include:
35
;epar
36
subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet;
37
systematic expulsion from homes; and
the reduction of essential medical treatment and supplies. 38
8.13 In addition, local Croats, having been identified as such, were
required to display signs of their ethnicity 39 and were denied food, water,
40 41
electricity and medical treatment. Their movements were restricted, and
34
See Chapter 7, para. 7.67.
35 See below, para. 8.14, note 47.
36
See Chapter 4, paras. 4.86; 4.77 (S.L. ); 4.106 (A.G.); 4.117; 4.151
(Vukovar, where supplies were cut off during JNA encirclement and attack), Chapter 5,
paras. 5.15; 5.30 (J.M.); 5.38; 5.166, 5.216; 5.236 (Dubrovnik, where supplies
were cut off during JNA siege).
37
See below, para. 8.16 and notes 66 and 67.
38 See e.g. Chapter 4, para. 4.23; Chapter 5, para. 5.30 (referring to the situation in Vo ćin,
where Dr. V.M. told D.D. that there was no medicine available for
“Ustasha” children, even though supplies were available). On another occasion, the
doctor ordered the nurse to administer an expired vaccine to a one year old Croatian
girl): ibid.
39 See e.g, Chapter 4, paras. 4.17; 4.60 (A.L. , describing how Croats were forced
to wear white ribbons in Šarengrad); 4.87 (K .B., describing how Croats had to
hang white ribbons on their houses in Bapska); 4.98 (M.D.); 4.106 (A.I.);
4.128 (P.M.).
40 See above, para. 8.12 and notes 36 and 38.
41
See e.g, Chapter 4., paras. 4.17 (house arrest after working hours); 4.22 (barricades);
4.25 (P.Š., describing how Croats in Tenja were forced to live like slaves);
4.26 (M.K., describing how Croats in Tenja had to stay inside their houses with
the shutters closed except when they went to work, and how they had to turn their heads
away when they passed Serbs on the streets); 4.40 (Police curfew, imposed by random
beating and murder); 4.77 (V.V. ); 4.87 (Croats in Bapska had to report daily to
the Local Committee building with special passes); 4.106 (A.G., describing how
Croats were only allowed to go to the shop, and were otherwise confined to their houses
and yards); 4.128; Chapter 5, paras. 5.38 (I.K. , describing how threats of death 380
they were subjected to repeated looting and to a regime of random and
mass killings, brutalisation and violence. 42 Their cultural monuments and
43
the signs of their cultural heritage were destroyed or suppressed, or looted
and taken to Serbia. 44 Their children were required to be educated as
45
Serbs. For each of these acts the practice was systematic in character, both
within and across the regions concerned. 46 Such conditions of life, inflicted
as they were on purely ethnic grounds, can only have been intended to
secure the overall political objective of ensuring that the Croat population
of the occupied regions would cease to exist, i.e. would be destroyed and
eliminated as such.
8.14 47 Finally, the evidence of systematic rape of Croatian women and 48
men, the sexual mutilation and castration of Croatian men, and the
were made if they went beyond the village borders, and how anyone trying to leave was
arrested; 5.51 (M.S.); 5.100 (I.D.); 5.166 (M.O.); 5.181
(M.B.); 5.219 (S.M., describing restrictions placed on movement and
commercial dealings); 5.225 (A.Š.).
42
A clear example of the brutalisation to which Croats were subject was the use of
“human shields”: see e.g. Chapter 4, paras. 4.85; 4. 110 (S.L. ); Chapter 5,
paras. 5.43 (S.B. ); 5.100 (I.D. ); 5.103 (A.K. ); 5.229
(Major B.R.). For looting, see below, para. 8.16 and note 67.
43
For the destruction of cultural monuments, see below, para. 8.16 and note 67.
44 For a list of locations from which cultural property was looted, see Appendices, vol 5,
appendix 7.
45
See Chapter 4, paras. 4.60 (B.Ž. , describing how Croatian children in
Šarengrad were forced to attend Serbian school and be educated in the “Greater Serbia”
programme); 4.128 (V.R. , describing how Croatian children in Lovas
were forced to read and write in Cyrillic); also Chapter 5, para. 5.181 (M. B.,
describing how Croat children were prevented from going to Croatian school in
Smoljanac).
46 For example, the destruction of churches took place across Eastern Slavonia (e.g.
Chapter 4, para. 4.36 – the Church of the Parish of St. Joseph in Dalj); Western
th
Slavonia (e.g Chapter 5, para. 5.35 – the 14 century Church of St. Mary in Vo ćin);
Banovina (e.g. Chapter 5, para. 5.87 – the Chapel with the Statue of Our Lady of
Lourdes (1908) in Joševica); Kordun and Lika (e.g. Chapter 5, para 140 – the Church of
St. Antun Padovanski in Lasinja, mined after being used as a sniper’s nest); and
Dalmatia (e.g. Chapter 5, para. 5.219 – serious damage to the Church of the Appearance
of the Holy Virgin Mary in Medviđa).
47
See e.g., Chapter 4, paras. 4.25; 4.44 (M.H. , describing her rape, where
“… I was their special target because I had six sons and they were threatening me
because I had delivered six Ustashas”); 4.45; 4.90; 4.113; 4.128-9 (Š. A.,
A.M.); 4.153; 4.155; 4.156; 4.169; 4.185; Chapter 5, paras. 5.17 (H.H.);
5.30 (F.D.); 5.59; 5.88 (L.F.); 5.98; 5.147 (K.Z.); 5.157
(B.M.); 5.209 (B.H., A.F., A.K.) 5.210 (M.M.);
5.212 (J.Č., K.Č., Z.S., J.L.); 5.224 (G.A.);
5.225 (A.Š.).
48 See e.g. Chapter 4, paras. 4.91 (F.K., describing beating about the genitals by
Serbs who were aware that his wife was pregnant and were determined to make sure
that he could not father any more children); 4.100-1(B.H. , describing 381
commission of other sex crimes, 49 when viewed in the context of the
broader genocidal policies of the Serb occupying forces, involved the
imposition of measures to prevent births within the Croatian population of
the occupied regions, within the meaning of Article II (d). In this regard the
approaches of the ICTR in the cases of Akayesu and Rutaganda and of 50
51
national tribunals in Poland, Israel and the United States support the
conclusion that Article II (d) was violated in Croatia.
8.15 It is significant in this context that many of these crimes were
committed in association with ethnically derogatory insults directed
specifically at the capacity of the victim to procreate. 52 The rape and other
sexual crimes committed against Croats was often accompanied by
references to the fact that the victim had previously given birth to
“Ustashas” or of the need to destroy Croatian “seed”. Sexual mutilation,
castration and other sexually-oriented violence was often accompanied by
measures taken to ensure that the victim would be unable to procreate in the
future.
The Mental Element: Genocidal Intent
8.16 The genocidal intent behind these actions is evidenced by a series
of related factors. Each of these may be sufficient to demonstrate genocidal
intent; collectively they provide overwhelming evidence of the intent
required by Article II. The factors include:
castrations of three Croat men at Tovarnik); 4.130 (I.F. , describing beatings
about the genitals perpetrated on five Croat men in Lovas); Chapter 5, para. 5.27
(S.K., describing castration taking place in Kusonje).
49 See, e.g, Chapter 4, paras. 4.25 (M. M., describing indecent assault in Tenja);
4.45 (P.B., describing forced oral sex); 4.101 (“Mass Killing and Genocide in
Croatia, 1991/2”, pp. 107-8, describing forced mutual masturbation and homosexual
intercourse between Croat prisoners in Tovarnik); 4.110 (R.G. , describing
“sexual advantage” being taken of an elderly woman); 4.111 (S. L.,
describing forced mutual masturbation by Croat men); 4.129 (A.M. ,
describing both rape and other forms of sexual abuse in Lovas); 4.185 (M.M. ,
describing both rape and other sexual abuse in the Velepromet camp); Chapter 5, paras.
5.146 (M. G.); 5.212 (M.D. , describing indecent assault in
Razvođe); 5.175 (P.Đ., a priest, describing how Serb police commander pushed
a stick into his rectum during torture in prison at Titova Korenica); 5.225 (A. Š.,
describing indecent assault on Croat woman in Lisičić).
50
51 See Chapter 7, para. 7.66.
See Chapter 7, para. 7.67.
52 See e.g. Chapter 4, paras. 4.45 (P.B., describing how she was brutally raped by 7
men after they had shouted at her in the street “We will exterminate their seed. There is
no place for their bones”); 4.111 (S. L., describing forced mutual
masturbation, where the JNA reservists committing the crimes “were screaming that
they would destroy Croatian semen”). 382
1. the political doctrine of Serbian expansionism which created
the climate for genocidal policies aimed at destroying the
Croatian population livi53 in areas earmarked to become part
of “Greater Serbia”;
2. the statements of public officials, including systematic
incitement on the part of State-controlled media; 54
3. the fact that the pattern of attacks on the Croat civilian
population far exceeded any legitimate military objectives
necessary to secure control of the regions concerned; 55
4. contemporaneous videotaped evidence of the genocidal
56
intent of those carrying out the attacks;
5. the close co-operation between the JNA and the Serbian
paramilitary groups responsible for some of the worst
atrocities, implying close planning and logistical support; 57
53
See Chapter 2, paras. 2.43-2.50 (SANU Memorandum); 2.72-2.76; 2.77-2.80
(“amputation” of Croatia). The impact of this philosophy on the acts which occurred is
apparent from the language used by the advancing forces. One witness in Tovarnik
describes how her husband, a non-combatant, was taken by JNA officers to the
concentration camp at Begejci. After he had been taken, other officers said to her that
their mission was “to kill and destroy everything Croatian” and that they would “push
us Croats into the Adriatic sea” (Chapter 4, para. 4.95, J.V.). The local
Serb commander in Tovarnik, R.M. , was quoted as saying “If this is to be
Serbia, no Croats will remain” in justification of a policy of mass expulsion (see
Chapter 4, 4.105).
54 See Chapter 2, paras. 2.56-2.59; Appendices, vol 5, appendix 2 (Video Transcript);
appendix 3 (Hate Speech).
55
See e.g. the attacks on Vukovar, Chapter 4, paras. 4. 158et seq.
56 See video of the notorious paramilitary leader Arkan, supra. note 23. For details of the
attack on Vukovar, see Chapter 4, paras. 4.139-4.190. For Arkan’s role, see Chapter 4,
para .4.143 (Professor Mark Wheeler cited inAgence France Presse, 20January 1998).
57 It is clear from the whole of the evidence that the JNA planned and carried out attacks
in conjunction with the Serbian paramilitary units operating in these regions. The JNA
provided the paramilitary groups with the weaponry and logistical support necessary to
carry out their attacks. See e.g. Chapter 4, paras. 4.29 (JNA blockaded roads while
paramilitaries committed massacre in the farm village “Orlovnjak”); 4.48 (M.K.
– paramilitary attacks on Bogdanovci taking place with JNA wea pons); 4.108 (JNA
rocket and air attack on Sotin); Chapter 5, paras. 5.49; (R. M. – JNA
vehicle used to dig mass grave in context of massacre at Donji Čaglić); 5.85 (N.Š.
– JNA assisting with blockade of Joševica); 5.129 ( Đ.T. – Serbian
paramilitaries trained at JNA bases in Pan čevo and Knin); 5.232 (“A Chronological
narrative of the events at the dam from the occupation until the mining” – JNA
attempting to destroy dam at Peruča to flood Croatian villages). The JNA role was often
more direct than this, either leading attacks on villages itself, or supervising the worst
atrocities of the Serbian paramilitaries. For examples of this see Chapter 4, paras. 4.40
(Berak); 4.53 (Bogdanovci); 4.66 (Ilok, where Croats who refused to leave during
forced exodus of 17 October 1991 were killed by paramilitaries under the control of a 383
6. the systematic nature and the sheer scale of the attacks on
Croatian civilians; 58
7. the fact that ethnic Croats were consistently singled out for
59 60
attack whilst local Serbs were excluded;
8. the fact that during the occupation, ethnic Croats were
required to identify themselves and their property as such by
JNA Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel and Commander); 4.74 (Tompojevci); 4.84 (Bapska);
4.95 (Tovarnik); 4.125 (Lovas, where the minefield massacre was carried out by the
JNA in cooperation with paramilitaries); 4.139 (Vukovar); Chapter 5, paras. 5.15-7
(Pakrac); 5.58 (Doljani); 5.70 (Banovina); 5.82 (Novo Selo Glinsko); 5.90 (Gornje
Jame); 5.94 (Petrinja); 5.100 (Glinska Poljana); 5.111 (Hrvatska Kostajnica); 5.118
(Kostajnički Majur); 5.122 (Hrvatska Dubica); 5.150 (Saborsko); 5.174 (Vaganac);
5.177 (Poljanak); 5.207 (Puljane); 5.227 (Škabrnja).
58 The campaigns in Croatia demonstrated the use of killings for several different
purposes. One of the most extreme and premeditated examples of mass killing in
Eastern Slavonia occurred in Lovas, in October 1991, when 50 Croatian men were
forced to walk across a minefield. 21 people were killed and a further 12 were injured
when the first mine to explode set off a chain reaction. Many of the injured were
subsequently shot dead in cold blood. See Chapter 4, para. 125 (S.P. , Z.T.,
L.S., P.V.). Probably the largest single mass killing in
Eastern Slavonia was the execution of patients and civilians taken from Vukovar
hospital, detailed at Chapter 4, paras. 4.174-4.178. Other examples of systematic
brutality included the tactics used when entering villages, notably the use of “human
shields,” detailed in Chapter 4, paras. 4.85; 4. 110 (S.L. ); Chapter 5, paras.
5.43 (S.B.); 5.100 (I.D. ); 5.103 (A. K.); 5.229 (Major
B.R.). Another standard technique was to throw grenades into the basements
of Croat properties where it was known that civilians were sheltering. For examples of
this, see Chapter 4, paras. 4.49 (M.B. , describing events in Bogdanovci); 4.121-2
(M.M., describing events in Lovas); 4.158 (M.M. , describing
events in Mitnica, a suburb of Vukovar); 4.165 (V. O., describing events
in Central Vukovar). For other examples of killings, see above, para. 8.13, note [43].
59 See e.g. Chapter 4, paras. 4.24; 4.52 (Đ.B., describing how JNA and Serbian
paramilitary units tested the pipes of Croatian homes to feel if they were hot, before
issuing orders for the Croat civilians to leave their houses and killing any who did);
4.77 (V.V.); 4.123 (P. V., describing how the commander of the Serbian
paramilitaries in Lovas ordered all Croatian male local residents between the ages of 15
and 65 to gather to be assigned forced labour); 4.155 (A.S. , describing
Vukovar, and how a Serbo-Chetnik group sent a Serb acquaintance to her with a list of
Croats to be killed, with her name on it); 4.161 (D.K., describing how persons
in Borovo Naselje were categorised as Croatian soldiers on the basis that they were
capable of carrying a gun); also Chapter 5, paras. 5.29 (V. S. describing how he
was forced under threat of death to list Croats in Vo ćin by street number); 5.48 (N.M.);
5.64; 5.92 (where the Commander of the “Krajina Police Special Unit”
recorded that he noticed no ‘Ustasha formations’ in his assigned area but continued
operations nonetheless); 5.210 (I.H.); 5.216 (J.B.).
60
There is a consistent body of evidence attesting to the fact that local Serbs would point
out which houses belonged to Croats and which to Serbs, so as to ensure that only Croat
property was destroyed. See, for example, Chapter 4, para. 4.110 (P.H.);
4.119 (S.P.); 4.121 (I.S.). 384
wearing white ribbons tied around their arms and by affixing
61
white cloths to their homes;
9. the number of Croats killed and missing as a proportion of
the local population; 62
10. the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted, 63 including
64
injuries with recognisably ethnic characteristics;
11. the use of ethnically derogatory language in the course of
acts of killing, torture and rape; 65
12. the forced displacement of the Croat population and the
66
organised means adopted to that end;
61
For examples of this practise see Chapter 4, para. 4.60 (Šarengrad); para. 4.87
(Bapska); para. 4.114 (Sotin).
62 10,572 persons were killed, and 1419 are still missing.
63
See above, para. 8.13 and note [44].
64
See Chapter 4, para. 4.68 (B.K. , describing how he had the Serbian “Four
C’s” symbol carved onto his forehead in Ilok); 4.157 (M.D. , describing
how Croats were crucified in Vukovar); 5.33 (Dr. Jerry Blaskovich, describing how a
23 year old Croat man was suspended by handcuffs from a tree in front of the Catholic
Church in Voćin, before Serbian soldiers slashed his face with an electric saw before
cutting off his lower limbs while he was still alive; his body was then set on fire with
gasoline). The infliction of ethnically specific injuries extended to post-mortem
mutilation, such as the desecration of a pregnant woman’s body in Central Vukovar
(described by L.D. in Chapter 4, para. 4.166). The foetus had been
removed and replaced with a dog with the sign “This is what Croatian mothers give
birth to.”
65
See Chapter 4, para. 4.45 (P. B., describing how she was raped while being
taunted with “Fuck your Ustasha mother, where is the gold your son stole?”); 4.54
(Đ.B., describing how grenades were thrown into basements to the shouts of
“Ustasha”); 4.91 (F.K., describing how during the course of a serious beating
of his genitals, his torturers cursed him with “Fuck your Ustasha mother…, you won’t
make any more little Croats”); 4.101 (M.D., describing how he was beaten
while being forced to shout “Serbia all the way to Tokyo”); 4.163 (J. Z.,
describing how she was forced to walk barefoot across broken glass while being
taunted about her Ustasha mother); 4.183 (A. H., describing savage beatings
in the Velpromet warehouse while being called Ustasha); also Chapter 5, paras. 5.48
(N.M., describing how he and his fellow Serbs told captured Croat soldiers
that they really were true Ustashas before killing them).
66 See e.g. Chapter 4, paras. 4.30; 4.31; 4.37 (E.M.); 4.46 (A.P. ,
describing how, in the course of expulsion, Croats were forced to walk through a
minefield); 4.47; 4.61 (A.G. ); 4.65; 4.80; 4.93; 4.105 (Ð. M.,
describing how the Serbs had a plan that only 5% of the Croat population could remain
in Tovarnik; 4.107; 4.132 (D. J., describing how expulsions formed part of
a plan to ensure that only 8% of the Croatian population could remain in the village of
Lovas); 4.133; Chapter 5, paras. 5.14 (M.M. ); 5.49 (photographic
documentation); 5.79 (N.Š. ); 5.92 (J.F.); 5.93 (Specification of the
Banished, Killed and Missing Persons); 5.106; 5.121 (M. M.); 5.140 (R.M.);
5.141; 5.146; 5.148; 5.174 (J.J. ); 5.181 (I. M.); 5.196 385
13. the systematic looting and destruction of Croatian cultural
and religious monuments; 67
14. the suppression of Croatian culture and religious practices
68
among the remaining population;
15. the consequent, permanent and evidently intended 69
demographic changes in the regions concerned; and
16. the failure to punish genocidal acts (addressed below).
While individual acts committed in the course of the campaign might —
considered in isolation — have been explained as “common crimes” or as
“excesses” committed in the course of a conflict, all of these factors taken
(S.I.); 5.202; 5.203; 5.204; 5.205 (photographic documentation of Rupe); 5.205;
5.210 (M.M.); 5.211; 5.212; 5.213; 5.214; 5.215; 5.216 (A. Ć.); 5.221;
5.222; 5.223; 5.225. The line between organised expulsion (a particular feature of the
Serb campaign in Eastern Slavonia) and forcing Croats to flee out of fear for their lives
is a thin one. A good example where the latter shades into the former can be seen at
Chapter 5, para. 5.183-5.185, describing the situation in Lovinac in Lika, where attacks
over a period of months forced Croats to flee even before the JNA and paramilitaries
occupied the village.
67
For references to destruction of cultural or religious monuments, see e.g. Chapter 4,
paras. 4.36 (“Diocese Đakovo and Srijem War Damages”); 4.48 (A.T. );
4.55 (Đ.B.); 4.57 (“The Wounded Church in Croatia, the Destruction of the
Sacral Objects in Croatia, 1991-1995”); 4.70 (M.V. ); 4.83 4.92 (“Wounded
Church”); 4.96 (“Wounded Church”); 4.104; 4.108 (B.M. ); 4.120 (S.P.);
4.134; 4.150 (“Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/2,” describing
destruction in Vukovar); Chapter 5, paras. 5.12 (“Wounded Church”, describing
Western Slavonia); 5.29 (A.V. ); 5.35 (J.T. ); 5.43; 5.76
(“Wounded Church”, describing Banovina); 5.87 (I.M. ); 5.93; 5.105 (J.S.);
5.108 (J.S. ); 5.113 (J.J. ); 5.135 (“Damages to Cultural
Monuments on Croatian Territory”, describing Kordun and Lika); 5.155 (M. L.);
5.186 (I.S.); 5.200 (“Wounded Church”); 5.201 (“Wounded Church,” describing
Dalmatia); 5.212 (“Register of War Damages on Museums and Galleries, describing the
destruction of the mausoleum of the famous Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrovi ć in
Otavice); 5.219 (“Wounded Church”); 5.223 (M.B. ); 5.225 (“Wounded
68 Church”); 5.236 (description of Dubrovnik).
The attack on Croatian cultural practice was widespread. For examples, see Chapter 4,
paras. 4.60 (B.Ž. , describing how Croatian children in Šarengrad were
forced to attend Serbian school and be educated in the ‘Greater Serbia’ programme);
4.77 (M.L. , describing the forced use of Cyrillic in Tompojevci); 4.98
(M.D., describing Tovarnik – “Everything was written in Cyrillic script.
They changed everything to the Cyrillic script on the second or third day… [they wrote
on the walls ‘Serbia all over to Tokyo’”); 4.128 (V.R. , describing how
Croatian children in Lovas were forced to read and write in Cyrillic); also Chapter 5,
paras. 5.152 (M.M., describing the use of Cyrillic signs in Saborsko); 5.181
(M.B., describing how Croat children were prevented from going to school in
Smoljanac). As for religious practices, A.Š. described how the Croat population
of Voćin was banned from practising their religion in the Catholic Church there, or
from burying their dead in the graveyard (Chapter 5, para. 5.35).
69 See above, para. 8.8. 386
together point to the inevitable conclusion that there was a systematic
policy of targeting Croats with a view to their elimination from the regions
concerned. This establishes quite clearly the required element of a specific
intent to destroy a protected group in whole or in part.
8.17 It does not matter for present purposes whether the protected group
is taken to be the national group of all Croats, or the ethnical group of the
Croats living in specifically targeted areas. In either event, members of the
group were targeted as such, and the numbers killed or otherwise affected
were on any view “substantial” or “significant”. 70Accordingly the
requirement of an intent to destroy a group “in whole or in part” is met in
the present case.
(2) THE C RIMES OF C ONSPIRACY , NCITEMENT , A TTEMPT AND
COMPLICITY (A RTICLE III)
8.18 In addition or in the alternative, the related crimes of conspiracy to
commit genocide, direct and public incitement to genocide, attempt to
commit genocide, and complicity in genocide were committed by senior
officials of the FRY and Serbian leadership, by officers of the JNA and the
VJ and by leaders of Serb and Serbian paramilitary groups under their
direction and control. All these acts are in breach of Article III of the
Genocide Convention, and the responsibility of the FRY is attracted in
respect of these acts on precisely the same basis as it is attracted in respect
of the completed acts of genocide.
Conspiracy (Article III(b))
8.19 A conspiracy within the meaning of Article III (b) consists in an
agreement between two or 71re persons to commit a genocidal act with the
requisite specific intent. It is not necessary, in this regard, that the acts
which contribute to the conspiracy should themselves constitute genocide. 72
8.20 In the present case genocide was actually committed against the
Croatian populations identified in Chapters 4 and 5. The clear pattern of
mass killing, rape and torture of Croats described in these Chapters, and
summarised above, 73cannot be regarded as simply an accumulation of
individual genocidal acts. The systematic and co-ordinated nature of these
70
71 See Chapter 7, paras. 7.48, 7.49, 7.50 for formulations of the threshold test.
Chapter 7, paras. 7.77-7.79.
72 Prosecutor v. Musema, Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, Chapter 7, para. 7.78.
73
See above, paras. 8.2-8.16. 387
crimes was achieved — and could only have been achieved — through the
adoption of a policy on the part of the FRY and Serbian leadership, the
JNA and paramilitary commanders of committing, or deliberately
authorizing and facilitating the commission of, the crimes concerned. The
events formed an integral part of the Serbian military campaign in the
regions concerned, and had the clear object of ethnically cleansing those
regions through genocidal means. That object is reflected not only in the
systematic nature of the acts but also in the failure of the FRY to punish
individuals responsible for them, in the 74blic speeches of leading Serbian
politicians such as Šešelj and Paroški, and in the honours bestowed upon
members of the JNA involved in the acts. 75
8.21 These and other acts reflect the high degree of co-ordination and
agreement within the ranks of the Serbian leadership, the JNA and the
paramilitary groups. This is sufficient to establish the existence of a
conspiracy to commit genocide. Participants in such a conspiracy include
individual members of the Serbian leadership, officers of the JNA and
leaders of the paramilitary groups who directed the commission of
genocidal acts or who may even have committed the acts themselves.
Participation in the conspiracy extends also to individuals who did not
themselves personally commit or direct the commission of the acts in
question but who nevertheless participated in the overall planning of the
genocide.
Direct and Public Incitement (Article III (c))
8.22 As described in Chapter 7, incitement is a form of complicity which
76
plays an important part in the planning of genocide. Incitement may occur
in written or in spoken form. In this case incitement was reflected in
documents which specifically provoked criminal acts, including newspaper
articles, and in public speeches of leading politicians. It is also reflected in
the orders of Serb paramilitary leaders.
8.23 From 1988 onwards an increasing and large number of articles
appeared in the Serbian press inciting hatred towards non-Serbs. 77 The
newspaper Politika and the weekly magazines Intervju and Duga were used
by the Serbian leadership to create a climate of fear and hatred which
74 See Chapter 2, para. 2.76 (Šešelj); para. 2.56 (Paroški).
75
See Chapter 3, para. 3.41; see photographs Annexes, vol 3, 10.9 and 10.10 (Medal
award ceremony for senior officers of the JNA for their engagement in Vukovar,
Belgrade, 21 November 1991).
76 Chapter 7, paras. 7.80-7.83.
77 Chapter 2, paras. 2.63-2.66 and accompanying notes. 388
would incite the physical destruction of Croats and other non-Serbs in areas
which had been occupied. Numerous examples of newspaper articles and
78
the television media are given in the Appendix on Hate Speech.
8.24 Throughout Serbia – but in particular in Belgrade – hate speech was
tolerated and beca79 an acceptable and even desirable form of public
communication. One example of a public speech given by a leading
politician which was intended to – and did – provoke genocidal acts is the
speech given in April 1991 by Milan Paroški, a member of the Serbian
Parliament, in which he publicly declared (in the presence of a Minister
that anyone who claimed Serbian lands as theirs was “a usurper, and you
80 nd
have the right to kill him like a dog”. And on 2 December 1991 the
Serbian newspaper Vreme reported:
“The President of the SNO in an interview stated calmly: ‘I am for
genocide against the Croats!’ Can anyone go further than this?” 81
8.25 For a clear example of an order given by a Serb paramilitary leader
which incited the wholesale destruction of individuals on grounds of
ethnicity, one need look no further than the order given by Arkan in
preparing to launch an attack on the outskirts of Vukovar:
“…[We] must launch a blitz attack to secure their passage. […]
Scouts told us that Serbs are in the cellars and Ustashas are on the
first floor. This makes our task more difficult, it’s not a typical
mop up, we can’t just throw bombs into cellars. If we do that, we
will kill our own people. We must be careful not to kill our own,
our Serbian brothers! All team leaders, when you enter the houses
to mop them up, use rocket launchers82o neutralize the first floor!
The cellars must remain intact!”
8 26 Each of these acts is “direct” within the meaning of the Convention,
taking into account the persons to whom it was addressed, its cultural and
linguistic content, and the overall context. 83
78 Appendices, vol 5, appendix 3 (“Hate Speech: The Stimulation of Serbian Discontent
79 and Eventual Incitement to Commit Genocide”).
Ibid.
80 Chapter 2, para. 2.63; see photograph Annexes, vol 3, 10.2. For other examples see
Chapter 2, para. 2.64 and accompanying notes.
81
SNO is extreme nationalistic party of the Serbian National Renewal. See Appendices,
vol 5, appendix 3, at para. 50 and accompanying note.
82 Supra, note 23.
83
See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Chapter 7, para. 7.83. 389
Attempt (Article III (d))
8.27 It is the primary contention of the Government of Croatia that the
acts set out at paragraphs 8.2-8.16 above involve the complete commission
of the crime of genocide within the meaning of the Genocide Convention.
Genocide was committed in certain parts of Croatia which formed part of
the planned “Greater Serbia”. In other parts of Croatia, for example as
84
regards the conduct relating to Dubrovnik, genocide was attempted but
not completed. In these parts of Croatia the conduct constituted part of the
overall plan to establish a “Greater Serbia”. It involved “substantial” or
“significant” steps towards the commission of genocidal act85 which are
necessary to establish an attempt to commit genocide.
Complicity (Article III (e))
8.28 Complicity involves the planning, preparation or ordering of
genocide, or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or
86
execution of genocide. The existence of the crime of complicity is
premised on the recognition that, while genocidal acts may only have been
perpetrated by certain persons, others will have participated and contributed
less dir87tly but in such a way as significantly to further the commission of
the act.
8.29 Practice under the Convention (as well as under other international
instruments providing for the crime of complicity) recognises that
complicity can take two forms. These are (1) “aiding and abetting”, and (2)
“common purpose” complicity, where the act is outside a common design
but is a 88tural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of a common
purpose.
8.30 This Memorial identifies a large number of acts amounting to
complicity (in the two forms in which it is recognised) carried out by
political and military leaders as well as other persons for whom the FRY is
responsible. These acts include, but are not limited to, assistance in:
84
85 See Chapter 5, paras. 5.235-5.236.
See Chapter 7, para. 7.85.
86 See Chapter 7, paras. 7.86-7.96.
87
See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 191.
88 See Chapter 7, para. 7.90. 390
(1) planning and preparation of genocidal attacks and other acts on
individuals, homes, churches, villages and towns; 89
(2) identifying Croats and other non-Serbs within particular
villages and towns and other areas in order that they could be
90
targeted and subject to genocidal attacks;
(3) providing weapons and other matériel to Serb and Serbian
paramilitary groups knowing and intending that they would be
used to commit genocidal acts; 91
(4) providing information and other forms of support to Serb and
Serbian paramilitary groups knowing and intending that they
92
will be relied upon to commit genocidal acts;
(5) assisting in the movement of prisoners from their villages to
93
other areas, including to detention camps;
(6) assisting in the operation of detention and other camps,
94
including in the FRY; and
(7) assisting in covering up the violations of the Convention, in
particular by hiding or otherwise disposing of the remains of
persons killed in such a way that they would not be found. 95
8.31 The participation of persons for which the FRY was responsible in
these and other acts was direct and it had a substantial effect on the
96
commission of each of the violations of the Convention. Moreover, it is
not necessary that the persons involved in complicity should meet all the
requirements of the mental element for the principal offender. 97 It is
sufficient that such persons should be aware that they are participating in
the commission of a crime under the Convention, and that they have taken
89 See generally the acts taking place in the villages and towns referred to in note 57
above.
90 See above, para. 8.16, note 61 and accompanying text.
91
See Chapter 3, paras. 3.59-3.62 (providing details of support in the form of weapons
and materiel, finance, logistics, fuel and other supplies).
92 Ibid.
93
See Appendices, vol 5, appendix 6.
94 See Appendices, vol 5, appendix 6.
95
References, Chapters 4 and 5. It is well established that complicity can take place after
the crime as well as prior to its commission: see Chapter 7, para. 7.93.
96 See Chapter 7, para. 7.92.
97
See Chapter 7, para. 7.95. 391
a conscious decision to so participate by planning, ordering, instigating or
otherwise aiding and abetting in the crime. 98In the examples referred to in
the previous paragraph it is abundantly clear that the persons complicit in
the offences were aware that they were participating in the commission of a
crime and that they consciously and voluntarily decided to participate.
SECTION TWO:
THE CONDUCT IN QUESTION IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE FRY
(1) T HE A PPLICABLE RINCIPLES OF A TTRIBUTION
8.32 It being established that the conduct identified in Chapters 4 and 5
above involved acts of genocide and related crimes contrary to Articles II
and III of the Genocide Convention, it is necessary to establish the
responsibility of the Respondent, the FRY, for that conduct. In this context
it must be stressed that, as the Court held in the Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
FRY case, Article IX 99 the Convention “does not exclude any form of
State responsibility”. It thus includes the responsibility of a state for the
conduct of its organs and agents in committing genocide, as well as its
responsibility for the omissions of its organs in respect of the obligations
specifically imposed on states parties to the Convention, e.g. to prevent and
punish genocide.
8.33 Chapter II of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility
(2000) sets out the legal principles governing attribution. 100For the most
part the relevant Articles have received the approval of governments in
their written comments and in oral statements before the Sixth Committee
of the United Nations General Assembly. In accordance with these Articles
(so far as relevant to the present proceedings), conduct involving a breach
of an international obligation is attributable to a state if it involves any one
of the following:
(a) the conduct of any state organ acting in that capacity (draft
article 4 (1));
(b) the conduct of any person or group of persons which is in
fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or
98 See Chapter 7, para. 7.94.
99 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) , ICJ Reports 1996,
p. 595, para. 32
100
A/CN.4/L.600, 11 August 2000. 392
control of, the state in carrying out the conduct (draft article
6);
(c) the conduct of any movement which succeeds in
establishing a new state on certain territory, whether or not
it may be described as an “insurrectional movement” and
even though the conduct may have taken place before the
definitive establishment of the new state (draft article 10);
(d) conduct which, even if it may not be attributable to the state
under one of the foregoing rules, is subsequently
acknowledged and adopted by that state as its own (draft
article 11).
In applying these principles to the facts of the present case, three
preliminary points should be made.
8.34 First, a state is responsible for conduct attributable to it even though
that conduct occurs on the territory of some other state or in an area beyond
national jurisdiction. As the Court emphasised in the Namibia Opinion,
“[p]hysical control of a territory, and not sovereignty or legiti101y of title,
is the basis of State liability for acts affecting other States”.
8.35 Secondly, in determining whether conduct is attributable to a state,
international law looks to the substance and not the form. Thus, for
example, while it is relevant that an entity is classified by national law as an
organ of the state this is not decisive; what matters is whether in substance
and in fact the organ is acting in that capacity and is integrated into the
command system of the state. 102
8.36 Thirdly, it is irrelevant for this purpose that the conduct may have
been performed in excess of authority or contrary to instructions (draft
Article 9). As to this point, there is however no evidence whatever that the
FRY or any of its senior officials at any time gave instructions to anyone
involved not to commit the acts speci103d in Chapters 4 and 5. Indeed all
the indications are to the contrary.
101 ICJ Reports 1971 at p. 54 (para. 118).
102 See, on the relevance of internal law, draft Art. 4 (2).
103
Supra, paras. 8.22-8.26. 393
(2) T HE SITUATION ON THE T ERRITORY OF THE ORMER SFRY: T HE
TEMPORAL ELEMENT
8.37 As noted in Chapter 6, this Court has already authoritatively
established that the Genocide Convention continued to apply throughout
the territory of the former SFRY at all material times, and to bind all states
on that territory without any temporal gap. In the Case Concerning the
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. FRY) , the Court rejected
the FRY’s argument that it was not competent to deal with events occurring
prior to 29 December 1992 (when Bosnia and Herzegovina became a party
to the Convention). The Court said:
“the Genocide Convention – and in particular Article IX – does
not contain any clause the object or effect of which is to limit in
such manner the scope of its jurisdiction ratione temporis, and nor
did the Parties themselves make any reservation to that end… The
Court thus finds that it has jurisdiction in this case to give effect to
the Genocide Convention with regard to the relevant facts which
have occurred since the beginning of the conflict… This finding
is, moreover, in accordance with the object and purpose of the
104
Convention as defined by the Court in 1951…”
8.38 The applicability of the Convention “to the relevant facts which
have occurred since the beginning of the conflict” in the former SFRY
extends equally to facts occurring on the territory of Croatia. As Judge
Shahabuddeen put it in his Separate Opinion, the FRY’s objections would
have effectively led to the introduction of an “inescapable time-gap in the
protection which the Genocide Convention previously afforded to all
‘human groups’ comprised in the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia”, which 105ld not be consistent with the “object and purpose
of the Convention”. That object and purpose “required parties to observe
it in such a way as to avoid the creation of such a break in the protection
which it afforded”.06In short, the Convention was applicable throughout to
the territory of the former SFRY, and to all persons and groups on that
territory, without any gap in its coverage ratione personae or ratione
temporis.
104 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) , ICJ Reports 1996,
p. 595, para. 34.
105 Ibid., p. 635 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
106
Ibid., pp. 635-6. 394
8.39 It follows from the principle that there should be no “time-gap in
the protection” afforded by the Genocide Convention to all human groups
in the former SFRY and its successor States and that the Convention
continued to have its full force and effect whilst the SFRY was in the
process of dissolution. If there was no “time-gap” in the protection afforded
by the Genocide Convention, equally there was also no gap in respect of
the governmental authorities responsible for ensuring that the obligations of
the Convention were given effect.
8.40 Thus the fact that the FRY only formally proclaimed itself on 27
April 1992 does not mean that acts occurring prior to that date cannot be
attributed to it. In reality the proclamation of the FRY formalised a factual
situation which had arisen with the dissolution of the SFRY, namely the
emergence of FRY (comprising the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro)
as a State in statu nascendi , under the control of President Milošević and
the rest of the Serbian leadership. In the period prior to the proclamation of
the FRY the conduct which is the subject of this Memorial was directed by
that leadership, which controlled the relevant political apparatus and the
military, in the form of the JNA and the Serb paramilitary groups. As
described in Chapter 2:
(a) from mid-1991 the SFRY ceased to operate as a functioning
State and was 107horitatively recognised as in a “process of
dissolution”;
(b) thereafter, and in particular from October 1991, the relevant
organs of government and other federal authorities of the
SFRY ceased to function as such and became de facto organs
and authorities of the emerging FRY acting under the direct
control of the Serbian leadership, embodied in particular in the
President of Serbia but extending also to relevant officials in
Ministries of Defence and Interior; 108
(c) the JNA ceased to be the army of the SFRY and became,
initially, a de facto organ of the emerging FRY (comprised of
the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro) taking instructions
directly fro109and acting in the service of, the Serbian
leadership.
8.41 By 25 June 1991 Croatia (and Slovenia) had concluded that the
former SFRY was in the process of dissolution, since its organs could no
107 Chapter 2, paras. 2.105-2.109. See also Opinion No. 1 of the Badinter Commission,
Chapter 2, para. 2.120.
108 Chapter 2, paras. 2.110-2.112.
109
Chapter 3, paras. 3.33-3.42. 395
longer function as the organs of the Federal state and as a matter of fact
they were no longer so functioning. 110 From approximately this time, its
constituent Republics as separate legal personalities assumed responsibility
for the acts of their organs and agents as well as other functionaries under
their direction or control. 111
8.42 The principle that a state in statu nascendi is responsible for
conduct carried out by its officials and organs or otherwise under its
direction and control is well-established, and is recognised in Article 10 of
112
the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility. Thus according to
Professor Brownlie:
“the distinction between status nascendi and statehood cannot be
very readily upheld. States not infrequently first appear as
independent belligerent entities under a political authority which
may be called and function effectively as a provisional
government… [O]nce statehood is firmly established, it is
justifiable, both legally and practically, to assume the retroactive
validation of the legal order during a period prior to general
recognition as a state, when some degree of effective government
existed. Leaving questions of state succession on one side, the
principle of effectiveness dictates acceptance, for some legal
purposes at least, of continuity before and after statehood is firmly
established.” 113
8.43 The process of dissolution of the SFRY and the emergence of the
constituent Republics which were eventually recognised as new states
occurred contemporaneously. Thus as the SFRY dissolved so the Republic
of Croatia assumed responsibility for fulfilling the obligations of the
Genocide Convention. Similarly, with the dissolution of the SFRY and the
takeover during the spring of 1991 of the Federal institutions of the SFRY,
114
including the JNA, so FRY (comprising the Republics of Serbia and
Montenegro) assumed its responsibilities under the Genocide Convention.
110
Chapter 2, paras. 2.113-2.114.
111 See the Constitutional Decision on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic
of Croatia, 25 June 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 9; the Declaration on the
Establishment of the Sovereign and Independent Republic of Croatia, 25 June 1991
Annexes, vol 4, annex 8; Decision and Conclusions of the Croatian Parliament, 8
112 October 1991, Annexes, vol 4, annex 10.
See above, para. 8.34, and for the commentary to the equivalent article (art. 15) on first
reading see Yearbook ILC, 1975, vol. II, pp. 99-106 at paras. 9-14.
113 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5 edn, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1998), pp. 77-78 (footnotes omitted). See further J. Crawford, The Creation of States in
114 International Law (1979), ch. 15 with references to earlier case law.
Supra notes 104 and 105 and accompanying text. 396
The reality of this process is made clear, for example, by the memoirs of
leading Serbian politicians, 115the Constitution of the FRY itself, 116and
117
statements of the new political authorities of the FRY. It was
characterised by a seamless continuity of policy and practice on the part of
the Serbian authorities located in Belgrade.
8.44 Thus the newly emergent states in the former SFRY assumed
responsibility, in respect of the conduct of their organs and officials and of
others under their direction and control, in the period from spring 1991 to
April 1992. There was neither a time-gap in the application of the
Convention, nor a lacuna of governmental authority responsible for the
application of the Convention. This is consistent with the reality of the
situation after mid-1991: by that date the only organised and functioning
authorities on the territory of the former SFRY which possessed capacity to
assume the responsibilities imposed by the Genocide Convention were the
authorities of the six constituent Republics of the former SFRY. The
process of dissolution was formally complete when the last successor state
organised itself as a new state, but the conflict which accompanied the
latter phase of dissolution (the violent phase of dissolution) continued, and
so did responsibility for its consequences.
8.45 Moreover, by virtue of its insistence (at the time and until the year
2000) on its constitutional and political continuity with the former SFRY,
the FRY explicitly recognised the links between the former SFRY’s state
administration and officials of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and Socialist
Republic of Montenegro. These were the same people, carrying out the
same policies, policies which, it has been shown, were genocidal in
character. A list of leading political and military figures illustrative of the
continuity between 1991 to the present day may be found in Volume 5 at
Appendix 8.
(3) THE C ONDUCT FOR WHICH THE FRY ISR ESPONSIBLE
8.46 In accordance with the principles identified in paragraph 8.33
above, the FRY is accordingly responsible for the conduct of its organs and
officials as regards any breaches of the Convention committed by them, or
by persons under their direction or control, at any time after May 1991.
115 See e.g. the memoirs of Borisav Jovi ć, Chapter 3, para. 3.40; also Appendices, vol 5,
appendix 4.3. Also General Kadijevi ć, Chapter 3, para. 3.32, and Appendices, vol 5,
appendix 4.1.
116 See Article 16 of the FRY Constitution, Chapter 2, para. 2.140 (the FRY shall fulfil in
good faith the obligations contained in international treaties).
117
On the commitment to the Genocide Convention see Chapter 6, para. 6.09. 397
Evidently this covers the conduct of the Serbian political leadership,
namely President Milošević and others. Something more needs to be said,
however, as to the conduct of the armed forces and Serbian paramilitary
groups.
Acts of the Armed Forces (JNA/VJ)
8.47 There can be no question but that the JNA – which served as the
armed forces of the FRY (and the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro)
both before and after it was renamed as the VJ – was at all materials times a
118
state organ within the meaning of the ILC’s draft article 4. It is clear
from the evidence that the JNA acted in Croatia under direct orders of the
Serbian leadership in pursuance of Serbian policies. 119 And it is well
established that an armed force which acts in the territory of another State
incurs the responsibility of the State to which the organ belongs, and not
(without more) of the “receiving” State, a fortiori when the latter state has
120
not consented to its presence or its activities.
8.48 Article 4 also governs the attribution to the FRY of the acts of Serb
and Serbian paramilitary groups in Croatia, to the extent that they were in
fact treated as part of the armed forces of the FRY. As described in Chapter
3, a number of the paramilitary groups were formally integrated into the
JNA as “volunteers”, pursuant to the Order adopted on [13] September
1991. 121
Acts of Paramilitary Groups over which the JNA
and the Serbian Leadership Exercised Direction and Control
8.49 Those Serb and Serbian paramilitary groups which were not
formally integrated into the JNA as “volunteers” nonetheless acted under
the direction and control of the JNA or the Serbian leadership. Draft article
6 of the ILC’s Draft Articles provides for the attribution to the FRY of
conduct of persons which are not state organs but whose conduct is in fact
118
See FRY Constitution, Section VIII, in particular Article 135, Chapter 2, para. 2.141.
119 See Chapter 4, paras. 4.12-4.19 (overview of JNA in Eastern Slavonia); Chapter 5,
paras. 5.7-5.11 (overview of JNA in Western Slavonia); 5.72-5.75 (overview of JNA in
Banovina); 5.130-5.133 (overview of JNA in Kordun and Lika); 5.197-5.199 (overview
of JNA in Dalmatia); 5.236 (JNA in Dubrovnik)
120 th
See e.g. Oppenheim’s International Law (9 edn, 1992, ed. Jennings & Watts), para.
159.
121 Chapter 3, paras. 3.63-3.64. 398
122
carried out on its instructions or under its direction or control. It provides
that:
“The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered
an act of the State under international law if the person or group of
persons was in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”
The ILC deliberately chose the word “or” in the phrase “direction or
control”. Thus it is sufficient for attribution that the State in question
(through its own organs or agents) in fact directed the activity in question,
or that the activity occurred under their control, e.g. through their failure
properly to exercise that control.
8.50 The principles set forth in draft article 6 establish the basis for the
responsibility of the FRY for the genocidal acts of paramilitary groups
which could not be considered as organs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia
or the FRY but which acted under their direction or control. Moreover
article 6 reflects general international law as articulated by the Court in the
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua, when it said:
“For [the conduct of paramilitaries] to give rise to legal
responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be
proved that that State had effective control of the military or
paramilitary operations in the co123e of which the alleged
violations were committed.”
8.51 The evidence set forth in this Memorial – including in particular
124
witness statements of persons directly involved and corroborating
122
Draft Article 6 provides: “The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be
considered an act of the State under international law if the person or group of persons
was in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State
in carrying out the conduct.”
123 ICJ Reports 1986 p. 3 at p. 65 (para. 115). Croatia notes the views of the Appellate
Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadić on the test of “effective control” adopted
by the ICJ in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua: see 38
ILM 1518 (1999), at paras. 116-145. For present purposes, and without prejudice to any
views it might express subsequently in these proceedings or in relation to any other
proceedings, Croatia proceeds on the basis that the ILC’s draft Article 6 is consistent
with the standard adopted by the Court in its 1986 Judgment, which standard is met in
these proceedings. See also the explanation by Judge Shahabudeen in Tadić, ibid.
124 (separate opinion).
See e.g. Chapter 4, paras. 4.71 (interview with Major General Dragoljub Aran đelović);
4.97 (testimony of M.P., JNA officer); Chapter 5, para. 5.227 (testimony of
N.B., former JNA member). 399
125
independent reports – discloses the direct participation or involvement of
the JNA side by side with Serb and Serbian paramilitary groups when the
most extreme violence was inflicted. It is clear that the JNA military
commanders not only failed to intervene to prevent paramilitary genocidal
acts, but actively cooperated with paramilitary groups and provided
logistical and direct military support. 126 In many instances, there is clear
evidence that paramilitary organisations were involved in joint planning
with the JNA and VJ. In most instances, operations were jointly carried
127
out.
8.52 Even if these acts, amounting to genocide within the meaning of the
Convention, had not been committed by agents of the FRY or by persons
under its direction or control, it would still be the case that the failure by
the FRY to punish any of the acts described in Chapters 4 and 5 of this
128
Memorial would constitute a breach of the Convention. But in the
context and having regard to the organic and factual links between the FRY
and the individual perpetrators, this failure takes on added significance. It
125
Chapter 2, paras. 2.130-2.126.
126 See e.g. Chapter 4, paras. 4.29 (JNA blockaded roads while paramilitaries committed
massacre in the farm village “Orlovnjak”); 4.48 (M. K. – paramilitary attacks on
Bogdanovci taking place with JNA weapons); 4.108 (JNA rocket and air attack on
Sotin); Chapter 5, paras. 5.49; (R. M. – JNA vehicle used to dig mass
grave in context of massacre at Donji Čaglić); 5.85 (N.Š. – JNA assisting
with blockade of Joševica); 5.129 ( Đ.T. – Serbian paramilitaries trained at
JNA bases in Pan čevo and Knin); 5.233 (“A Chronological narrative of the events at
the dam from the occupation until the mining” – JNA attempting to destroy the dam at
Peruča to flood Croatian villages).
127
See e.g. Chapter 4, paras. 4.29 (cooperation in massacre at village-farm “Orlovnjak”
near Tenja); 4.40 (cooperation in Berak); 4.53 (cooperation in Bogdanovci); 4.66 (F.
D., describing JNA cooperation with Serbian paramilitaries in Ilok); 4.74
(cooperation in Tompojevci); 4.84 (cooperation in Bapska); 4.95 (J.V. ,
describing JNA role in Tovarnik, and how JNA soldiers had been told by Miloševi ć that
they were going to the front line and that their task was to kill and destroy everything
Croatian, and that they would push the Croats into the Adriatic sea); 4.119 (cooperation
in Lovas); 4.139 (cooperation in Vukovar); Chapter 5, paras. 5.15-7 (cooperation in
Pakrac); 5.58 (cooperation in Doljani); 5.70 (operation “ŽAOKA,” attack on forces in
area of Banovina); 5.82 (cooperation in Novo Selo Glinsko); 5.90 (J.F. ,
describing how murders in Gornje Jame were carried out by a combination of the
“Šiltovi” paramilitary group and local people in JNA uniforms); 5.95 (D.C.,
describing cooperation in Petrinja); 5.100 (I.D., describing cooperation in
Glinska Poljana); 5.111 (cooperation in Hrvatska Kostajnica); 5.150 (S.T. ,
describing JNA cooperation with paramilitaries in attack on Saborsko); 5.174
(cooperation Vaganac); 5.177 (M.K. and M.L. , describing
cooperation in attack on Poljanak); 5.207 (K.S. , describing JNA cooperation
with paramilitaries in attack on Puljane, and JNA abduction and detention of young
Croats); 5.227 (former JNA member N.B., describing how orders for the joint
attack on Škabrnja came directly from JNA Headquarters in Benkovac).
128 See below, paras. 8.64-8.70. 400
confirms the intent of the Serbian leadership to destroy in whole or in part
the Croat population of Eastern Slavonia and other parts of Croatia
occupied by the JNA, Republic of Serbia and the FRY.
Subsequent Adoption and Ratification
8.53 Even if individual genocidal acts may have been committed in
circumstances where they were not attributable to the FRY ( quod non),
there is clear evidence that the FRY leadership accepted those acts,
“validated” their consequences in terms of its occupation and
administration of the affected areas, and thereby adopted or ratified the acts
in terms of article 11 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 129
This is reflected, for example, in the honours and decorations bestowed by
the Serbian leadership and the JNA (and then the Yugoslav Army) on many
of those persons involved in the genocidal campaign, including those
involved in the attacks on the Croat and other populations of Vukovar. 130A
state cannot at the same time honour and congratulate certain of its officials
for particular conduct and disavow its responsibility for that conduct.
8.54 The extent of ratification and adoption of the acts of the JNA and
the Serb paramilitaries, however, goes further than this. As demonstrated
earlier in this Memorial, the genocidal activities of the JNA and the
paramilitary bodies were part of a considered plan to rid the areas in
question of their Croat populations and to do so on a permanent basis. 131
Any doubt as to the attribution of this plan to the FRY is resolved by the
subsequent conduct of the FRY leadership in its establishment, direction
and control of the Serb authorities on the territories concerned, and the
attempt to integrate those territories into the “administrative, military,
educational, transportation and communication systems of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)”. 132In this respect there
is a clear analogy between the acts of the FRY and those of the Islamic
Republic of Iran in the second stage of the hostage crisis, as considered by
the Court in the Case Concerning Diplomatic and Consular Personnel .
Even if the seizure of the United States personnel may have involved
private conduct by the student groups, not attributable to Iran, the conduct
129 See above, para. 8.33.
130
See Chapter 4, para. 4.143, where General Veljko Kadijevi ć congratulated the forces on
their victory in Vukovar, paying tribute to the “officers, soldiers and volunteers,” who
131 participated in the operation.
See above, paras. 8.2-8.17 with references to the documentary evidence.
132 An attempt characterised by the UN General Assembly as “illegal, null and void” and
which “must cease immediately”: see UN General Assembly Resolution 49/43 (“The
situation in the occupied territories of Croatia”), para. 2: Annexes, vol 4, annex 4. 401
of Iran in accepting and continuing the detention and its consequences
amounted to a clear act of ratification. As the Court held:
“The policy… of maintaining the occupation of the Embassy and
the detention of its inmates as hostages for the purpose of exerting
pressure on the United States Government was complied with by
other Iranian authorities and endorsed by them repeatedly in
statements made in various contexts. The result of that policy was
fundamentally to transform the legal nature of the situation created
by the occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its
diplomatic and consular staff as hostages. The approval given to
these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the
Iranian State, and the decision to perpetuate them, translated
continuing occupation of the Embassy and detention of the
hostages into acts of that State. The militants, authors of the
invasion and jailers of the hostages, had now become agents of the
Iranian State for whose acts the State itself was internationally
responsible.” 133
8.55 As noted already, the subsequent conduct of the FRY in endorsing
and supporting the situation created by the genocidal activities of the JNA
and the paramilitaries is consistent with and supports the conclusion that it
was the FRY leadership which ordered those activities in the first place.
But even if this had not been so, that subsequent endorsement and support
would clearly have amounted to the ratification and adoption of the
wrongful conduct in the sense of draft Article 11.
SECTION THREE:
THE FRY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FAILURE TO PREVENT AND
PUNISH THE VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES II AND III OF THE
CONVENTION
8.56 Independently of any responsibility it may have for genocide
committed by its organs, or by persons acting under its direction or control,
in accordance with the principles set out in Section 2, the Respondent is
also responsible for its failure to prevent genocide, and subsequently for its
failure to punish persons within its jurisdiction who are suspected on
probable grounds of having committed genocide.
133 ICJ Reports 1980 p. 3 at p. 35 (para. 74). 402
(A) R ESPONSIBILITY FOR AILURE TO P REVENT G ENOCIDE
(A RTICLE I)
8.57 Article I imposes a positive obligation on a State Party to the
Genocide Convention to take all steps within its power to ensure that those
within its jurisdiction, or subject to its control — whether public officials,
members of the arme134orces, or private individuals — do not commit the
crime of genocide.
8.58 The obligation is positive in the sense that a State’s responsibility
will not be excluded merely by its failure to act, turning a blind eye to
genocidal acts. The State will incur responsibility for acts of persons within
its jurisdiction or control — other than its own officials, employees or
agents for which its responsibility is direct — if they carry out genocidal
acts which the State could have prevented. Moreover, the obligation to
135
prevent genocide is “comprehensive and unqualified”.
8.59 The positive nature of the obligation to prevent genocide may be
compared with that which has been recognised by the European Court of
Human Rights as inherent in Article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in connection with the crime of
homicide. In that connection, it has been held that where the relevant
authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and
immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the
criminal acts of a third party, the state will be in violation of Article 2 if
those authorities fail to take measures within the scope of their powers
which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. A
breach will arise where “the authorities did not do all that could be
reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immedia136risk to life of
which they had or ought to have had knowledge”. If this is the test
applicable to an individual case of homicide, it must apply a fortiori to
genocide.
8.60 For the reasons already explained, it is the primary submission of
the Government of Croatia that the genocidal campaign carried out in
Eastern Slavonia, as described in Chapter 4, and in the other parts of
Croatia as described in Chapter 5, was the product of a close collaboration
between senior officers of the JNA, acting on the authority of the FRY and
134 See generally Chapter 7, paras. 7.96-7.99.
135 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Further
Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures , ICJ Reports 1993 p. 325 at 436
(individual opinion of ad hoc Judge Lauterpacht).
136
Osman v. United Kingdom (1998) 29 EHRR 245. 403
Serbian Governments, Serbian paramilitary groups and local Serb militias.
The nature of the collaboration is described in Chapter 3. 137There is
considerable evidence in the form of direct witness testimony, for example,
that the JNA would assist Serb paramilitary groups in blockading certain
villages, and then allow the Serb paramilitary groups to carry out atrocities
138 139
in the villages, or simply turn a blind eye to paramilitary atrocities.
8.61 A clear example of collaboration between the JNA and Serb
paramilitary groups concerns the involvement of Arkan in planning a
genocidal offensive on the outskirts of Vukovar, in which he describes how
his paramilitary group would “mop up” after the JNA tanks had shelled
“the first line of houses”. 140 It is plain that the JNA failed to prevent a
genocidal “mop up”, despite the clear notice of the intent of the
paramilitaries on this occasion.
8.62 The Serbian leadership, the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro,
and the FRY are responsible under Article I of the Genocide Convention
for failing to control the JNA (and those with whom it was collaborating)
and for failing to prevent the direct participation of the JNA — and the
paramilitaries over which the Serbian leadership had “effective control” —
in the planning and execution of the genocide which occurred.
8.63 In any event, however, the JNA clearly had the capacity to protect
the Croat and other civilian population of those regions, and to prevent the
genocidal acts perpetrated by Serb paramilitaries and local Serb militias
and leadership. Their military capacity far outweighed that of the
paramilitaries and local militias operating in the regions. Without the
collaboration of the JNA, the paramilitaries and militias would have been
effectively unable to mount any sustained attacks on the Croat
141
population. In these circumstances, the FRY is also responsible under
137
138 See Chapter 3, paras. 3.54-3.71.
See for example the village of Joševica in Banovina, Chapter 5, paras. 5.85-5.86.
139 See for example the municipality of Dvor na Uni, Chapter 5, paras. 5.103-5.104; the
village of Saborsko, Chapter 5, para. 5.152; the village of Vaganac, Chapter 5, para.
5.175 (the JNA escorted a priest into the village to administer to dead Croats and then
140 failed to prevent Serb paramilitaries from abducting and then torturing him).
Chapter 3, para. 3.57; see also video transcript, Appendices, vol 5, appendix 2.
141 See Chapter 3, paras. 3.60 (evidence as to numerous requests from paramilitary groups
for weapons and ammunition from Serbia and the FRY). See Chapter 4., paras. 4.17;
4.32 (Ministry of Defence (MORH), from 10 September 1994); 4.48 (M.K. );
4.57 (Narodna Armija, 13 November 1991); 4.64; 4.74; 4.83; 4.95; 4.108; 4.118; 4.134;
4.146 ( United Press International , 21 November 1991 “Army seeks to justify
destruction of Vukovar); 4.149 (The Guardian, London, November 1991); 4.159 (M.
F.); and Chapter 5, paras. 5.15; 5.70 (D. V.); 5.93-5.95; 5.97 (A.K.);
5.100 (I.D.); 5.103 (D.V.); 5.118; 5.151; 5.155 (M.L.,
D.P.); 5.157; 5.236 (detailing the attack on Dubrovnik). 404
Article I of the Genocide Convention for the failure of the JNA to take
effective steps, within their capacity, to prevent the acts of genocide
committed by paramilitaries and local militias of which they were, or ought
to have been, aware.
(B) R ESPONSIBILITY FOR AILURE TO PUNISH G ENOCIDE
(A RTICLE I)
8.64 The importance of the obligation to ensure that perpetrators of
genocide and related acts shall be punished is reflected in the fact that the
requirement is referred to in several provisions of the Convention. In
addition to Article I, Article IV states expressly that:
“Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated
in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private citizens.”
8.65 Despite Article IV, the FRY has taken no steps to try and punish the
perpetrators of any of the genocidal acts described in this Memorial, which
occurred systematically in villages and towns across Croatia. The FRY’s
failure occurs notwithstanding the fact that most of the perpetrators are
known to its authorities, are on its territory and are under its jurisdiction
and control. The failure of the FRY to try and punish perpetrators relates
equally to the acts of its own officials and military personnel, and to the
acts of private persons (members of paramilitary groups) within its
jurisdiction or control.
8.66 The FRY’s unwillingness to commit to the punishment of
perpetrators is reflected most publicly in the failure to extradite Slobodan
Milošević to the ICTY in relation to his indictment for war crimes and
crimes against humanity in Kosovo. But the FRY’s failure is not limited to
its former head of state or to other high-ranking officials. It applies equally
to officers and soldiers of the JNA.
8.67 In relation to JNA officers, amongst the clearest example of the
failure to punish is the reaction of the FRY to the activities of Major
Veselin Šljivančanin. Not only was Major Šljivančanin not punished for his
142
conduct at Vukovar Hospital in November 1991; he has been twice
promoted and is now a Colonel serving as an instructor at the Centre of
Advanced Military Schools in Belgrade, where he teaches “tactics”. 143
142
See Chapter 4, para. 4.171 et seq.
143The FRY has refused to extradite Major (now Colonel) Šljičanin to the ICTY
following his indictment for war crimes and/or crimes against humanity by the ICTY
for his conduct at Vukovar Hospital. 405
Other JNA officers responsible for the JNA’s offensive and “liberation” of
Vukovar were also decorated rather than punished. 144
8.68 The same pattern has been adopted by the FRY in relation to private
persons, including those acting for or on behalf of the FRY, who have
perpetrated genocidal acts. There is evidence that the Serbian authorities,
including the JNA, detained perpetrators of genocidal massacres and then
released them without subjecting them to the relevant prosecuting
authorities. In Kusonje, Western Slavonia, for example, on 8 September
1991 Serb paramilitary groups tortured, castrated and killed a number of
Croatian soldiers, and then buried them in a mass grave. 145The JNA
apparently detained the perpetrators of this massacre but there is no
evidence that they were ever prosecuted or punished for their crimes by the
Serb authorities. 146
147 148
8.69 Other private persons, such as Arkan and Šešelj, who directed
the activities of paramilitary groups, in close collaboration with the JNA,
have subsequently served as members of the Parliament of the FRY and, in
the case of Šešelj, have even been members of the Cabinet.
8.70 It should be stressed that Articles I and IV of the Convention
impose continuing obligations. They continue to be violated with each day
that the FRY fails to take steps to punish the perpetrators of the genocidal
acts described in this Memorial.
144
See Chapter 3, para. 3.41; see photographs Annexes, vol 3, 10.9 and 10.10 (Medal
award ceremony for senior officers of the JNA for their engagement in Vukovar,
Belgrade, 21 November 1991).
145 Chapter 5, para. 5.27.
146
Ibid.
147 See Chapter 3, paras. 3.52-3.
148
See Chapter 3, paras. 3.51 and 3.53. 406
SECTION FOUR:
THE OBLIGATIONS OF CESSATION AND REPARATION
8.71 The Genocide Convention contains no specific provision
concerning the consequences of its violation by a party. Neither, however,
does it exclude the general legal consequences that flow from the
commission of a breach, under the law of state responsibility. In particular,
every breach of an international obligation entails the obligation to make
full reparation. As the Permanent Court of International Justice put it in the
Chorzów Factory case:
“the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make
reparation in adequate form. Reparation therefore is the
indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and
there i149o necessity for this to be the stated in the convention
itself.”
To the extent that the FRY is found to be internationally responsible to
Croatia for its violations of the Genocide Convention, it must make full
reparation for those breaches.
8.72 The guiding principle was laid down by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Chorzów Factory (Indemnity) case, in the
following terms:
“The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal
act — a principal which seems to be established by international
practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals — is
that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if the act had not been
committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible payment
of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind
would bear; the award if need be, of damages for loss sustained
which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in
place of it — such are the principles which should serve to
determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to
international law.”150
8.73 This rule is no151estated in the ILC’s Draft Articles on State
Responsibility (2000). Draft Article 31 (1) provides:
149 Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, PCIJ, Series A, No. 9, p. 21.
150 (1927) PCIJ, Series A, No 17, p. 47.
151
A/CN.4/L.600, 11 August 2000. 407
“The responsible State is under an obligation to make full
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful
act.”
This is further specified in Draft Article 35, which provides that:
“Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally
wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation
and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance
with the provisions of the present Chapter.”
8.74 As to compensation, Draft Article 37 provides:
“1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is
under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused
thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by
restitution.
2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable
damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established.”
In relation to satisfaction, Draft Article 38 provides:
“1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is
under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by
that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or
compensation.
2. Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the
breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another
appropriate modality.
3. Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion to the injury and
may not take a form humiliating to the responsible State.”
The Draft Articles recognise that interest will be payable on principal sums
to ensure full reparation. 152They recognise that reparation for moral
damages “reflecting the gravity of the infringement” may be recovered “in
cases of gross infringement of the rights of the injured State” (Draft Article
45 (2) (c)).
152
Draft Article 39 provides:
“1. Interest on any principal sum payable under this Chapter shall be payable when
necessary in order to ensure full reparation. The interest rate and mode of
calculation shall be set so as to achieve that result.
2. Interest runs from the date when the principal sum should have been paid until the
date the obligation to pay is fulfilled.” 408
8.75 It follows from the application of the general rules of state
responsibility, as reflected in the ILC’s Draft Articles, that the FRY is
liable to provide reparation which will wipe out all the consequences of the
illegal acts for which it is responsible. This extends to the material damage
to persons and property as well as the non-material or moral damage
occasioned to Croatia and its people by the massive violations of the
Genocide Convention on its territory.
8.76 In its submissions Croatia has requested the Court to reserve to a
subsequent phase of the proceedings the exact amount of the reparations
owed by the FRY arising from its international responsibility incurred for
its violations of the Genocide Convention. T153 is an approach which the
Court has adopted in previous cases. At this stage, Croatia merely
outlines the various heads under which the principles of reparation fall to
be determined.
8.77 As set out in the Submissions, Croatia requests first and foremost
that the Court should adjudge and declare that the FRY is responsible for
having violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention. Such a
judgment from the Court would provide a primary means of satisfaction,
representing as it would an authoritative determination by the highest
judicial authority of the FRY’s responsibility for the genocidal acts and
related conduct which occurred in Croatia between 1991 and 1995. Such a
declaration would also underscore the primary significance of the Genocide
Convention and the significance for each and every one of its parties of the
obligations which it imposes. It would affirm the importance of the rule of
law and respect for fundamental human rights. A declaration would also
assist in the process of setting the historical record straight and thereby
contribute towards reconciliation over the longer term.
8.78 Beyond the declaration of responsibility for violations of these
obligations, Croatia respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare
that the FRY is continuing to violate its obligations under the Genocide
Convention, in two ways, and that the FRY is required to cease these
continuing violations and bring itself into full compliance with the
Genocide Convention. 154First, the FRY has violated and continues to
153 See e.g. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits,
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 204; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ
Reports 1986, pp. 142-143 and 149.
154
The importance of the cessation of illegal conduct has been underscored by the
International Law Commission:
“Cessation is of far greater relevance within the international legal system – given
the structure of inter-state society and the role of States in the making, modification
and abrogation of rules – than within the legal systems of national societies. Its 409
violate its obligation to punish perpetrators of acts proscribed by the
Convention. The submissions call on the Court to require the FRY to take
steps to punish perpetrators of genocide, including in particular the former
President Slobodan Milošević. Second, as described in Chapters 4 and 5 of
the Memorial, and as set forth in the Appendix in Volume 6, as a result of
Serbia’s genocidal campaign, 1,419 Croatian citizens remain missing; in its
Submissions Croatia asks the Court to declare the obligation of the FRY to
take all steps at its disposal to provide an immediate and full account to
Croatia of the whereabouts of each and every one of these missing persons,
and to that end to work in cooperation with the authorities in Croatia.
Croatia also asks the Court to declare the obligation of the FRY to return
cultural property which was stolen during the course of the genocidal
campaign.
8.79 These declarations – on the wrongfulness of the FRY’s past conduct
and on the need for it to modify its present and future conduct to bring itself
into compliance with the Genocide Convention – would not exhaust all the
means of satisfaction to which Croatia in entitled as a matter of
international law. As a consequence of the illegal conduct for which the
FRY is responsible, Croatia is entitled to obtain – and the FRY is required
to make – full reparation for the damages caused and for the losses
suffered. This entails reparation by the FRY for all material and immaterial
damages and losses resulting from violation of the Genocide Convention,
as envisaged by draft Article 42 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State
Responsibility. In particular, the FRY is liable to make reparation for those
acts which are connected to the Serbian genocidal campaign which
intended to destroy Croats as an ethnic/religious group, including killing,
causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions calculated to bring about its physical destruction, and imposing
measures intended to prevent births. These acts include, but are not limited
to, the acts described in Chapters 4 and 5 of this Memorial, including rape
and other sex crimes, deprivation of food and essential medical supplies,
deportation and expulsion, imprisonment and other cruel and inhuman
treatment in concentration camps, and destruction of cultural and religious
property.
8.80 Further, Croatia is entitled to obtain from the FRY restitution in
kind for all the damages caused by the genocidal acts in the territory of
function is to put an end to a violation of international law which is in progress and
to safeguard the continued validity and effectiveness of the infringed primary rule
which may suffer in the long run from the continuation of the violation. The rule on
cessation thus protects not only the interest of the injured State or States but also the
rule of law”: Commentary to Article 41 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on Statece on, the
Responsibility, YbK ILC, Vol. II, Part Two, 1993, 55. 410
Croatia for which the FRY is responsible. Restitution in kind would amount
to “the re-establishment of the situation that existed before the wrongful act
was committed”. 155Restitution here includes the return of all property and
goods stolen in connection with the genocidal acts for which the FRY is
responsible.
8.81 Since restitution will not, in this case, re-establish the situation
which existed before the genocide, Croatia is further entitled to
compensation from the FRY for all the damages suffered as a result of the
violations of the Genocide Convention for which the FRY is responsible,
where damage is not repaired by restitution in kind. In this regard damage
resulting from genocidal acts includes:
damage to the territory of Croatia and to its property, including
cultural property; and
damage to the cultural and natural heritage of Croatia;
damage to the economy of Croatia, including lucrum cessans,
caused by the destruction or damaging of its factors of
production, natural resources and population; and
damage and losses to the citizens of Croatia, including damage
to property.
8.82 Compensation is also due for all damage caused to the physical and
moral integrity and well-being of the citizens of Croatia. As the
International Law Commission has put it, damage:
“embraces both the ‘patrimonial’ loss sustained by private
persons, physical or juridical, and the ‘moral’ damage suffered by
such persons.” 156
8.83 Finally, it is plain that in a case relating to genocide, where there
has been a massive loss of life and untold human misery has been caused,
that reparation in the form of restitution in kind and of compensation will
never “wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act”, taking into account
the moral and legal damage suffered by Croatia. Accordingly, Croatia
considers that it is entitled also to claim satisfaction for the moral and legal
155 Supra, para. 8.72.
156
YbK ILC, Vol. II, Part Two, 1993, p. 72. 411
157
damage suffered by it as an injured state, in accordance with practise and
the views of the International Law Commission. 158
8.84 Croatia reserves its right to revisit these heads, and to provide full
details of the reparation due to it from the FRY at a further stage of these
proceedings.
157Seethe I’m Alone case (Canada v. United States of America), UNRIAA, Vol. III, p.
1609, at 1618; Re Letelier and Moffitt the Chile-United States of America International
Commission, 88 ILR 727, at 735-6 (11 January 1992), and the Opinion of Professor
Vicuna at 743; Rainbow Warrior, New Zealand v. France, 74 ILR, 241 at 274.
158 Supra, para. 8.82. In its Commentary, the ILC emphasised that such a remedy was of an
exceptional nature as indicated by the phrase “in case of gross infringement of the
rights of the injured State” (Report of the International Law Commission on the work of
its forty-fifth session, p.67, in 1993 YbK of ILC, Part II, p.79) The ILC further explains
that such a remedy is
“given to the injured party over and above the actual loss, when the wrong done was
aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud or wicked
conduct on the part of the wrongdoing party” ( ibid.).412 413
SUBMISSIONS
On the basis of the facts and legal arguments presented in this Memorial,
the Applicant, the Republic of Croatia, respectfully requests the
International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
1. That the Respondent, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is
responsible for violations of the Convention of the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:
(a) in that persons for whose conduct it is responsible committed
genocide on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, including in
particular against members of the Croat national or ethnical group on
that territory, by
killing members of the group;
causing deliberate bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part;
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group,
with the intent to destroy that group in whole or in part, contrary to
Article II of the Convention;
(b) in that persons for whose conduct it is responsible conspired to
commit the acts of genocide referred to in paragraph (a), were
complicit in respect of those acts, attempted to commit further such
acts of genocide and incited others to commit such acts, contrary to
Article III of the Convention;
(c) in that, aware that the acts of genocide referred to in paragraph (a)
were being or would be committed, it failed to take any steps to
prevent those acts, contrary to Article I of the Convention;
(d) in that it has failed to bring to trial persons within its jurisdiction who
are suspected on probable grounds of involvement in the acts of
genocide referred to in paragraph (a), or in the other acts referred to
in paragraph (b), and is thus in continuing breach of Articles I and IV
of the Convention. 414
2. That as a consequence of its responsibility for these breaches of the
Convention, the Respondent, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is under
the following obligations:
(a) to take immediate and effective steps to submit to trial before the
appropriate judicial authority, those citizens or other persons within
its jurisdiction who are suspected on probable grounds of having
committed acts of genocide as referred to in paragraph (1)(a), or any
of the other acts referred to in paragraph (1)(b), in particular
Slobodan Milošević, the former President of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, and to ensure that those persons, if convicted, are duly
punished for their crimes;
(b) to provide forthwith to the Applicant all information within its
possession or control as to the whereabouts of Croatian citizens who
are missing as a result of the genocidal acts for which it is
responsible, and generally to cooperate with the authorities of the
Republic of Croatia to jointly ascertain the whereabouts of the said
missing persons or their remains;
(c) forthwith to return to the Applicant any items of cultural property
within its jurisdiction or control which were seized in the course of
the genocidal acts for which it is responsible; and
(d) to make reparation to the Applicant, in its own right and as parens
patriae for its citizens, for all damage and other loss or harm to
person or property or to the economy of Croatia caused by the
foregoing violations of international law, in a sum to be determined
by the Court in a subsequent phase of the proceedings in this case.
The Republic of Croatia reserves the right to introduce to the Court a
precise evaluation of the damages caused by the acts for which the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is held responsible.
The Republic of Croatia reserves the right to supplement or amend these
submissions as necessary.
………………………..
Agent of the Republic of Croatia
Zagreb, 1 March 2001
Memorial of Croatia