Written Statement of the Government of Netherlands

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13407
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Written Statement of the covernment of the Netherlands

~.. 1

Ml NISTERIE VAN BUITENL..A.NOSE ZAKEN

THE NETHERLANDSGOVERNMENT,

Having regard ta Resolution WHA 46.40 adopted on 14 May 1993 by the Forty­

sixth World Health Assembly of the World Health Organization, whereby the

Assembly decided ta request the International Court of Justice to give an

advisory opinion on the following question:

"ln view of the health and environmental affects, would the use of

· nuclear weapons by a State in war or ether armed conflict be a breach of

its obligations under international law, including the WHO Constitution?";

Having regard ta the Order of the Court of 13 September 1993, by which the
Court fixed 10 June 1994 as the time-limit within which written statements

might be submitted to the Court by the World Health Organization and by those

of its member States which are entitled ta appear before the Court, in

accordance with Article 66{2) of the Statute of the Court;

Having regard ta the fact that the Netherlands is a member State of the World

Health Organization and a party to the Charter of the United Nations, and by

virtue of Article92 of the Charter alsoa party to the Statute of the Court;

Wishing ta avail itself of the opportunity given by the Courts Order of 13

September 1993 ta member States of the World Health Organization entitled ta

appear before the Court ta make a written statement on the above-mentioned

request by the World Heatth Organization for an advisory opinion from the

Court;

Has the honour ta present the following statement: 2

OBSERVATlONS ON THE COMPETENCE OF THE WORLD HEALTH

ORGANIZATION TO REQUEST, AND ON THE COMPETENCE AND

DISCRETION OF THE COURT TO GIVE, THE ADVJSORY OPINION

1. According to Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations

"(1) The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the
International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any

legal question.

(2) Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies,

-. which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly,

may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions

arisingwithin the scope of their activities".

(Emphasis added)

2. According to Article 65 of the Statute of the International Court of

Justice which forms an integral part of the UN Charter:

"(1) The court may give an advisory opinion on any ~-question

at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations ta make such a

request.

(2) .•.•. " (emphasis added)

3. While Article 96 of the UN Charter determines who is competent to­

reguest an advisory opinion from the Court, Article 65(1) of the Court's

Statute determines the competence of the Court to give an advisory

opinion. According to Article 96( 1) of the UN Charter only the UN General

Assembly or Security Council may request the Court tc give an advisory

opinion on .5!..!Ygal question. Other organs of the United Nations and

specialized agencies which have been so authorized by the UN General
Assembly may only request an advisory opinion on legal questions arising 3

within the scope of their activities.

:4. According ta Article X(2) of the 1947 Agreement concluded between the

United ~atio nnd the World Health Organization (19 UNTS p. 194) the

latter organization is entitledta request the Court tc give an advisory

opinion on "legal questions arising wrthin.the scope of its competence

ether than questions concerning the mutual relationships of the [World

Health] Organization and the United Nations or ether specialized

agencies".

ln respect of ether (legal) questions the WHO cannat be considered to be

a "body ... authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United

Nations to make ... a request Ifor an advisory opinion]" and it follows

from Article 65(1) of the Court's Statute that the Court will not be

competent to give an advisory opinion on ether such (legal) questions.

i
:5. The Netherlands Government is of the opinion that the WHO is not
l'
competent ta make the above-mentioned request for an advisory opinion

from the Court for the following ressons.

1
,6. The question submitted to the Court for an advisory opinion concerns

the legality or illegalitv of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or

ether armed conflict under eurrent international law, including the WHO

Constitution.

1
7. The use of nuclear weapons, to which the WHO request for an advisory

opinion relates, constitutes only one, albeit extremely harmful, form of

the use of force.

;8. ln the opinion of the Netherlands Government, the only organs of the

United Nations or specialized agencies competent to request an advisory

opinion on the legality or otherwise of the use of force, including the use

of nuclear weapons are those which by virtue of their powers and 4

functions take a legitimate special interest in the advisory opinion of the

Court on the legal question submitted to the Court. These organs of the

United Nations or specialized organizations are, in the view of the

Netherlands Government, only those which are competent to

(i)decide to proceed themselves to resort to the use of force, or

(ii) authorize ether entities (States or international or regional

organizations or arrangements) to resort to the use of force.

9. According to the Netherlands Government, of the bodies entitled to
request an advisory opinion from the Court, only the Security Council

(primarily) and · possibly under certain conditions subsidiarily- the

General Assembly of the United Nations are competent in one or more of

the ways referred ta at section 8.

1O. The Netherlands Government believes th at a careful examination of the

Constitution of the WHO will reveal that in any event the WHO is not

competent in any of these ways. ln this connection it is also not without

importance that, among the many functions of the WHO listed in Article

2 of the WHO Constitution, subparagraph {h) of that article mentions.only

the function "to promote, in co-operation with ether specialized agencies
where necessary, the prevention of accidentai injuries" (emphasis added).

11. The Netherlands Government submits that it cannat be maintained that

the WHO has a legitimate spec.ial interest in requesting the Court to

pronounce on the question of the leqalitv or otherwise of the use of

nuclear weapons. The principal objective of the WHO is "the attainment

by ali peoples of the highest possible leve! of health" (Article 1 of the

WHO Constitution). Of course, to the extent that an advisory opinion of

the Court prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would make the use of

nuclear weapons Jesslikely, the request for such an advisory opinion

would promote the protection of health and the environment. lt would,
however, in the view of the Netherlands Government, not be justifiable to 5

acknowledge on this basis the existence of a legitimate special interest on

the part of the WHO. Having regard ta the detriments! effects which the

use of nuclear weapons might have on afl aspects of life and human
society most ether specialized agencies could with equal right claim a

special interest in the questionof the legality or otherwise of the use of

nuclear weapons.

12. ln the view of the Netherlands Government, neither the WHO nor any

ether specialized agency has a legitimate special interest in the question.

lt can by no means be maintained that an advisory opinion on the

question of the legalîty or otherwise of the use of nuclear weapons can

reasonably be regarded as necessary, or at any rate as required, for the
fulfilment of the purposes of the WHO. The WHO has therefore no·

legitimate special interest in seeking an opinion on that matter from the

Court.

13. lt may be recalled that under to Article X{2)·of the 1947 Agreement

between the United Nations and the World Health Organization, the WHO

is entitled to request an advisory opinion on "legal questions arising .

within the scope of its competence ether than questions concerning the

mutual relationships of the [WH]Organization and the United Nations or
ath er specialized agencies." ln the opinion of the Netherfands

Government, it could be argued that the preliminary question of whether

only the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations

is entitled ta request the advisory opinion concerned or whether the WHO

is also entitled ta do sa- which question must be solved before the Court

may deal with the merits of the request- constitutes a "question (..]

concerning the mutual relationships of the [WH]Organization and the
United Nations ... ". As the merits of the request cannat be dealt with

without a pronouncement of the Court on a question concerning the

mutual relationships of the WHO and the United Nations- a question on

which no advisory opinion may be sought by the WHO and with the 6

result that the Court is not competent to give an advisory opinion- the

Netherlands Government submits that the Court should abstain from

giving the advisory opinion requested by the WHO.

14. If, in spite of wh at has been submitted by the Netherlands Government,
the Court would nevertheless consider the WHO competent to request,

and itself competent to give, the advisory opinion concerned, the

Netherlands Government would draw attention to the tact that the

Court's power to give advisory opinions is a discretionary one. As stated

by the Court itself in the Peace Treaties case (ICJ Rep. 1950, p. 71 ):

"Article 65 of the Statute is permissive. lt gives the Court the

power to examine whether the circumstances of the case are of

such a character as should lead it to decline to answer the

Request".

15. Although the Netherlànds Government is in general very much in faveur

of the exercise by the Court of its competence to give advisory opinions,

it believes th at there are good policy reasons wh y, in this particular case, .

the Court should decide to abstain from giving the advisory opinion

requested.

16. One important reason, mentioned before in connection with the question

of the competence of the WHO to request the advisory opinion, is the

absence of a legitimate special interest on the part of the WHO in the
advisory opinion. If this fact does not in itself suffice to deny the WHO's

competence to request the advisory opinion, it should, according to the

Netherlands Government, in any event suffice to deny the advisory

opinion on the policy ground that no advisory opinion should be given to

bodies which cannet demonstrate a legitimate .special interest in the

advisory opinion requested. 7

17. ln the opinion of the Netherlands Government, there is also reason ta fear

that whatever reply the Court may give to the request submitted by the
WHO, it will create a real danger of undermining the operation of the

1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuc1ear Weapons (Treaty Series

of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1968 No. 126), which forms the

cornerstone of international efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear

weapons.

18. The Netherlands Government attaches great value tc the Non-Proliferation

Treaty and ta the unconditional extension of its operation for an indefinite
period of time in 1995. As is weil known, the Non-Proliferation Treaty

acknowledges the legality of the possession of nuclear weapons by

certainStates, i.e. the five recognized nuclear weapon States, while ether

States parties ta the treaty have undertaken not tc develop or otherwise

acquire nuclear weapons (Article Il of the NPT).

19. A judgment of the Court declaring the use of nuclear weapons illegal

might jeopardize the extension of the operation of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty in 1995. On the ether hand, a judgment of the Court declaring the

use of nuclear weapons legal might induce a number of States to

withdraw their support for the treaty or encourage ether States ta refrain

from acceding ta the treaty, thereby undermining its universel application.

20. The Netherlands Government believes that the risks involved in the
possession and use of nuclear weapons can be more effectively

countered through further efforts in the field of disarmament and non­

proliferationof nuclear weapons. The problem of increased radioactivity in

the world can aise be better addressed by action ta improve the safety of

nuclear power stations and by promoting the conclusion of a

comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. 8

Il OBSERVATIONS ON THE MERITS OF THE LEGAL QUESTION

SUBMITTED TO THE COURT FOR ADVISORY OPINION

21. Should the Court nevertheless decide that the WHO is competent to

request the advisory opinion and consider the request admissible, and
should the Court therefore be willing to examine the merits of the legal

question submitted by the WHO, the Netherlands Government would like

ta make the following observations.

22. The legal question submitted by the WHO ta the Court is couched in

extremely general terms. More particularly, the question concerns the

possible illegality under current international law, including the WHO

_Constitution, of the use as such, i.e. each use regardless of the manner

of use, of any nuclear weapon by a State in war or ether armed conflict

regardless of the effect of that use on health and the environment.

23. ln the opinion of the Netherlands Government the question of the illegality

of the use of nuclear weapons, if phrased in such general terms can only

be answered in the negative.

24. As stated by the Netherlands Government on ether occasions- e.g.

during the debate in the Netherlands Parliament on the approva/ of the

1985 Agreement between the Netherlands and the United States on the

Stationing of Ground-launched Cruise Missiles in the Netherlands (Treaty
Series of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1985 No. 145) - with regard to

the question of the legality or otherwise _underinternational law of the

possession or even use of cruise missiles, such possession or even use

does not inevitably constitute a violation of the rules or principles of

international humanitarian law in armed conflict or of ether rules or

principles of the jus in bello which more particularly concern the

permissibilityof certain types of weapons in war or ether armed conflict. 9

25. Thus, according ta the Netherlands Government, Article 23{a) of the

Hague Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land

annexed tc Convention IV concluded at the 1907 Hague Peace
Confer~n (ceAJIL 1908 Suppt. p. 90), which prohibits the employment

of "poison" or "poisoned weapons" and/or the 1925 Geneva Protocol for

the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,Poisonous and ether

Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (94 LNTS p. 65), which

condemns the (first) use of "asphyxiating,poisonous or ether gases, and

of ali analogous liquids, materiels or deviees" do not entai! a prohibition

perse of the use of nuclear weapons. lndeed, the ·use of poison and

poisonous gas is generally categorized under chemical warfare and

nuclear weapons are usually distinguished from chemical or biological
-·weapons which are the concern of the provisions referred ta here.

Other primary effects of the use of nuclear weapons are the enormous

blast wave and thermal radiation they produce, effects which are not

covered by the said provisions.

26. The Netherlands Government rejects the view that the use of nuclear

weapons would be unlawful per se, on the grounds that such use would

necessarily lead ta a violation of the rule laid dawn in Article 23(e) of the

1907 Hague Regulations which forbids belligerants "ta employ arms,
projectiles,or material calculated ta cause unnecessary suffering "

(emphasis added). The question tc be raised here is when suffering

caused by a certain weapon can reasonably be called "unnecessary".

27. lt seems th at suffering may be calied "unnecessary" when its infliction

was not necessary ta attain a lawful military advantage or greatly
exceeds what could reasonably have been considered necessary ta attain

that military advantage.

28. The availabilityof considerably Jessharmful means ta attain the military

advantage or the causing of suffering out of proportion ta the military 10

advantage ta be gained therefore appear ta be the essentiel yardstick for

determining whether the use of certain weapons must be deemed to

cause "unnecessary" suffering.

29. Hence, in the view of the Netherlands, the use of nuclear weapons

cannat in abstracto be deemed unlawful. The question of whether a

specifie use is in contravention of the said obligation cannat therefore be

weighed until the exact implications, bath at the leve! of -mUitary

advantage gained and with regard to the injury caused, are known.

30. The Netherlands Government further wishes to emphasize that the

negotiating history of the 1977 Additional Protocol 1(lnt. Corn. Red

Cross, Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August-

1949, Geneva 1977, p. 3)ta the 1949 Geneva Conventions (75 UNTS

pp. 33, 85, 135 and 287) makes clear the intention of the negotiating

States that the rules contained in that protocol, in sa far as they relate ta
the use of weapons, should not caver warfare with weapons of mass

destruction such as nuclear weapons. As the restriction ta conventional

weapons was not explicitly laid dawn in that protocol, the Netherlands -

Jike severa! ether parties ta the protocol - made a declaration on the

occasion of its ratification that it was the understanding of the

Netherlands Government that the rules of Protocol 1relating ta the use of

weapons were intended ta apply and consequently would apply solely to
conventional weapons without any prejudice ta any ether rules of

internationallaw applicable ta ether types of weapon.

31. The history of Additional Protocoll ta the 1949 Geneva Conventions,

moreover, indicates th at in any event the majority of States

acknowledged, explicitly or tacitly, that the use of nuclear weapons is not
already unlawfu/ per se under international humanitarian law. 11

:32. ln this connection the Netherlands Government aise wishes to note that a

general prohibitionof the use of nuclear weapons de lege lata cannat be

deduced from UNGA Resolution no. 1653 (XVI) entitled "Declaration on

the Pro~ibi titon Use of Nuclear and Thermo-nuclear Weapons"

which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 24

November 1961. This resolution which, it is true, declared the use of

nuclear weapons illegal, as it would be contrary to the Charter of the

United Nations, the rules of international law and the laws of humanity,

cannat in the view of the Netherlands Government be considered as

embodying an already existing rule or principle of general international
law. The very tact that the resolution was adopted with 55 votes for, 20

against (includîng the nuclear weapon States the United States, Great

Britain and France) and 26 abstentions proved the absence of a general

opinio iuris on thepart of States that the use of nuclear weapons is

unlawful perse.

UNGA Resolution 2936 (XXVII) on the Non-Use of Force in International

Relations and Permanent Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons,

which was adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1972 -

this time with 74 votes for, 4 against (including China) and 46

abstentions (including France, the United Kingdom and the United States)

- inter alia again solemnly declared hthe permanent prohibition of the use

of nuclear weapons".

Considering the special weight to be attached to the position of the

nuclear weapon States among the States voting against or abstaining and
the very high number of States which abstained, it would, the

Netherlands Government believes, stiJl be very difficult to conclude that

the resolution codified or gave rise ta a generally recognized rule or

principleof international law.

lt is also relevant in this connection that the UNGA Resolution 1653 (XVI)

of 1961 referred ta above invited the Secretary-General of the United

Nations ta examine the possibility of a conference being convened where

participating Stateswould sign a convention on the prohibition of nuclear 12

weapons, but that this attempt, as weil as many later attempts to

promote the conclusion of such a convention, remained without success
due to disagreement on the matter among States.

33. According to the Netherlands Government the use of nuclear weapons

need not- as is sometimes alleged- necessarily amount to genocide in

terms of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide (45 AJIL 1951 Suppl. p. 7). lndeed, as long as the use

of nuclear weapons, or for that matter of any weapons, remains directed

at the combatants of the ether belligerant and is not directed at the

population (which may be considered as a national group) as such with

the intent to destroy that population in whole or in part as such, i.e.
whether having the status of combatant or not, there can be no question

of genocide within the meaning of the 1948 Genocide Convention.

34. The Netherlands Government is, moreover, of the opinion th at the use of

nuclear weapons cannet be considered in itself to be in violation of the

right tc life, as enshrined inter alia in Article 6 of the 1966 International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Annex ta UNGA Res. 2200 .(XXI)

of 16 Deeember 1966) or in Article 2 of the 1950 European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Eur.

Treaty Series. No. 5). According ta the Netherlands Government, these

articlesdo not creste an absolute right to fife. Thus, the travaux

préparatoires of Article 6 of the International Covenant make clear that,

instead of listing the circumstances in which the depriva_tion of life would

not be considered contrary to the right to lite, the drafters decided ta

agree on the formulation th at "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his

lite" (emphasîs added). One of the instances mentioned in this connection
by the drafters as an example of a deprivation of life which is not

arbitrary was ..the performance of lawful acts of war". Explicit support

for such an exception, as far as Article 2 of the European Convention is

concerned, can also be found in Article 15(2) of the European 13

Convention, which provides that "No derogation from Article 2, except in

respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war .•. shall be made

under this provision." (emphasis added).

35. The unlikelihood of a general prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

under existing international taw would, the Netherlands Government

believes, also follow from the tact that there are certain treaties which

regulate the possession of nuclear weapons, such as the 1968 Non­

Proliferation Treaty referred ta above. lndeed, the tact that certain States

are permitted, subject to certain conditions at Jeast, ta possess nuclear

weapons would seem to be difficult to reconcile with the idea that the

use of those weapons is unlawful in itself.

·36. The Netherlands Government further believes that even if it were ta be

assumed that the (first) use of nuclear weapons by a State were unlawful

per se under present international law - quod non -, this would not

necessarily exclude the permissibility of the use of nuclear weapons by

way of belligerant reprisai against an unlawful use of (nuclear) weapons,

provided of course the retaliating State observed the conditions - such as

the requirement of proportionality - set by international law for the taking

of lawful reprisais .

.37. The view held by the Netherlands Government that existing international

law does not in itself prohibit the use of nuclear weapons does not, of

course, mean that in the opinion of the Netherlands Government avery

use of nuclear weapons would necessarily always be lawful.

38. Thus the use of weapons, and hence of nuclear weapons, is permissible
only in self-defence.

39. Moreover, according ta the Netherlands Government, the general

principlesof international humanitarian law in armed conflict also apply ta 14

the use of nuclear weapons. Two principles, in particular, which form part

of that law are the prohibition on making the civilian population as such

the target of an attack and the prohibition on attacking military targets if

this would cause disproportionate harm to the civilian population. The

applicability of general principles of international humanitarian law in

armed conflict- among which must also be counted the principle laid

dawn in Article 22 of the 1907 Hague Regulations th at the right of a

belligerantto adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited - to the

use of nuclear weapons was also confirmed as long age as 1965 in
Resolution XXVIII of the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross

(Vienna) which was passed unanimously. Consensus on this point was

also reached at the diplomatie conference on Additions! Protocoll to the

1949 Geneva Conventions.

40. The WHO has also asked the court ta examine the legality of the use of

nuclear weapons by a State in war or ether armed conflict in the light of

the obligations of that State deriving from the WHO Constitution.

41. As previously noted, the Netherlands Government fully ·realizes that the.

use of nuclear weapons may- depending on the manner and the
circumstances in which they are used and the nature of the targets of

such use - have serious consequences for health and the environment.

Accordingly, the use of such weapons - though this applies in fact to the

use of aff weapons - cannat be reconciled with the principal objective of

the WHO, i.e. "the attainment by ali peoples of. the highest possible levet

of health" (Article 1 of the WHO Constitution).

42. Apart from a general implied obligation of member States of the WHO to
contribute to the achievement of this objective of the WHO and to co­

operate with one another tc that effect, explicit normative standards for

WHO member States in respect of the protection of health are to be.

found in the Preamble of the WHO Constitution which- in addition to a 15

number of principles which seem ta express desired goals or factual

statements rather than rights or obligations ~inter alia provides that

"Governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples which

can be fulfilled only by the provision of adequate health and social

matters" or that "The enjoyment of the highest attainabJe standard of

health is one of the fundamental rights of avery human being without

distinction of race, religion, political belief, economie or social condition".

Explicit obligations for WHO member States inrespect of the protection

of health may further only follow from their explicit acceptance of

conventions or agreements which have been adopted by the World Health

Assembly (Article 20 of the WHO Constitution) or from Regulations
adopted by the Health Assembly, which Regulations, however, cannat by

virtue of their subject matters (Article 21 of the WHO Constitution) affect

the legaHty of the use of nuclear or ether weapons.

43. lt is the opinion of the Netherlands Government that the implied general

obligationof WHO Member States ta contribute to the achievement of

the principal objective of the WHO and ta co~opera ttehat affect

cannat encroach upon the right of individuel or collective self-defence ta _

which States are entitled under Article 51 of the Charter of the United

Nations.

44. According ta the Netherlands Government, the exercise of this right by

States is exclusively governed by the UN Charter and the rules and

principles of the jus in bello discussed above and any ether rule or
principle of international law specifically concerning the use of force in

armed conflict which States may have agreed ta. lt is clear that the

impliedgeneral obligation of member States of the WHO to contribute ta

the achievement of the principal objective of the WHO and to co·operate

with one another tc that effect does not fall into that category.

The Hague, 6 June 1994

Document Long Title

Written Statement of the Government of Netherlands

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