INTERNATIONALCOURT OFJUSTICE
GABC~KOVO-NAGYMARo PROJECT
(HLTNGARYISLOVAKIA)
SUBMITTEDBYTHE
SLOVAKREPUBLIC
VOLUME I
2MAY 19941 DrînkinWaterSupplie.s...........................0..................4
I Agriculture..................................-41..............................
42
i TheDanubeBranchesandtheSideAnn System ..............
E. Conclusion .............................................
..................
I
CHAPTER ll. THE PROPOSEDSOLUTION:THE G/N
1 PROJECT ...........................................................
ThePartiesConsideredtheG/NSyste mobe the
BestSolutioninTerms ofthe IdentifiedProblems
Is,y lm andthe OptimalUtilisatiooftheDanube .................. 47
d . A TheBxkgound to theChoiieoftheGN Eystem.........47..
B. TheReasonsBehindtheChoiceoftheGIN System:
AHistoryofDesignandEnvironmentaSltudies.........................
1Constniction.NavigatandEnergy Productio.......49....
..............................................
Surfaceand GroundWater 50
Agricultureand Forestry.......................51......................
TheBioprujec..................................51............................
IndependentAppraisa..........................54......................
SECTIO N. The OutIineoftheGlN SystemanditsBenefitstu .
the Parties...................................59...............................
A. Descriptionand Operationof the S....................59...............
TheGabfi'kovoSection..........................62.......................
TheDunakilitiWeirand Reservo..................62...............
The BypassCanal:HeadwaterSection............................
TheGabEikovoStep ........................................................64
The BypassCanal:TaiIwaterSection.............................
ReguIationMeasuresinthe OIdRiverb........................
The NagymarusSectio...........................-66....................
The RiverStep.................................66............................. ...
. III.
TheNagymaros HeadwaterSection ...................67............
Excavationofthe Riverbed...........................68.................
B . The Safetyofthe PlannedStructures.........................68................
GeneralSafètyConsiderations........................68...............
C . The DeveIopingNature of the Project.......................75..............
TechnicalChangesin the SysteminPlaceby May 1989..-75
D . TheObligation ofthe Partiesunderthe1977 Treaty ...........77.......
SECTIO N. The G/N SystemProvidedthe Solutions to the
PrubiernsIdentifiedby the Parties..................80............
. .
A . TheExtst~ng Problems .....................................81.....
. .
Navigation..........................................83...........................
EnergyProduction ..................................85.......................
Erosionof Riverbed.................................85......................
The Mosoni Danube and the SideAmis ................86.........
8 . TheImpactoftheG~SystemWouIdNotBetuCreatea
New Series ofInsoIubIeProbIerns...........................87..................
SurfaceWater ......................................87..........................
GroundWater ......................................91.........................
TheNaturalEnvironment ............................97..................
AgriculturandForestry .............................100................
C . Conclusion ............................................101..........................
.
CHAPTER m . CUNDUCT OF THEPARTIESTU THE 1977 TREATY
PRIOR TU MAY 1989 .............................IO3................
SECTION 1. The Period 1977-1984: Delaysin the Project Due
toHungary'sEconomicDiff"icu1tie s................104.....
SECTION 2. 1985-May 1989: Accelerationof the Projectat
Hungary's Reqriest.................................108..................
SECTION 3. TheIssue of Water QrraIiv ......................................... 109 SECTIO N. TheP..fies'Observationsof theirConstruction
ObIlgaf~ons................................................................... 114
SECTION 5. Hungary's SubsequentDistortion ofthese Events ...115
SECTION 6. TheUnderlyingReasonsfor Hungary's Actions ........
The Economic FactorsBehindtheDecision to
Delay theProject....................................18....................1
. *
The Maqa Letter ................... ...............120.......
The Economic FactorsBehind theDecisionto ~ccelerite
theProject..........................................25.....................
TheEnvirumental ProtestsinHungary .........................125
Conclusions...................................................................127
CHAPTERIV . A'JTEMPTS TO FINDA SOLUTIONTO
THE DISPUTE ....................................29.....................
SECTION 1. PreIirninarPoints ................................129....................
SECTIO N. Hungary'sSuspensionof Work: 1989...............135......
A . The Suspensionof Work at Nagymaros ......................135....
TheTwoHunganan Documents Present Ond
26 June1989 ......................................137.........................
ThePaperoftheHungarianAcademy .................138........
The "ProfessionalSummar y ........................139..............
TheCzechosIovakStatementof 12JuIy1989 ..........142...
Meetingof Experts17-19 JuIy1989 ..................145.........
B . TheExtensionofHungary'sDecisionto Suspendto the
Whole ofthe G/N System ..................................147.....................
C. Czechoslovakia'Cs onsiderationofProvisionalMeasure.......151.
D. PossibilitiesafCompromise ...............................154..................
E. ThePositionof the PartieattheEndof 1989 ................157........
SECTION 3. The Periodfmm January 1990 tu 23 ApriI1991:
HungaryForecIosesNegotiation ....................159..........
A. TheHardeningofHungary'P sositio........................................ 159
B. The FirstInvolvementof theEuropeanCommunities ................
C. TheProceedings oftheHungarianParliamen .................165....... SECTION 4. ThePeriod hetween 23 Aprii1991 and the End
of October 1992 ...................................167.....................
A. Czechoslovakia 'sontinuedAttemptsto Broaden
theNegotiationsto Includethe EC; Postponement
ofDamming foraThird Yeu ...............................167..................
B. ThePositionoftheParties attheEndof 1991 ...........................
C. TheEnd to aPossibleCompromiseSolution:the
PurportedTenninatian of theTreaty byHungary ..............7...
D. TheFirst StepsToward Going tu the Court:
August-Octuber2 992 ......................................177.......................
SECTIO N. The Bistory of EC Involvernent up to
theEnd of 1992....................................1.80...................
CHAPTERV . THETEMPURARYSOLUTION:VARIANT "CM ..187
SECTIO N. ThePracticalandNecessaryStepsTaken
byCzechoslovakia asa Resultof Hungaryts
Withdrawalfromthe Project .......................188............
A. The Immediate Impact ofHungary'sWithdrawa ..............188......
LossofAnticipated Flood Protection.................188.........
Loss of AnticipateNavigationCapacity ..............190......
Loss of AnticipatedEnergyProduction................191.......
Loss of EnvironmentalProtection....................191...........
PoteritialDeterioratiof theGIN SystemConstmctionsl92
B. Czechoslovakîa' RseasonedReaction :the Considertion
ofthe Vanantsofthe GN System ...........................193...............
Variant"A" ........................................194........................
Variant"B" ........................................194..............
Variant"C" ........................................195.........................
' It II
Variant D ........................................195.........
Variant"FIt........................................195.........................
VarrantIG T........................................197........................
The SeIectionofVariant "CI1........................198.............SECTION 2. The 'truttu$1s and the ImpIementation of
Variant C .......................................199......................
A. Variant "CM:StructuresandFunctioning......................199...........
TheCompletion ofWorksIntended to beCamed Out
byHu ngq .................................................................... 200
Thehnovo WeirCornplexMd Resewoir...................201
The Lmpiementation of Variant"CH....................02........2
FurtherWorks ......................................203......................
B. Modificationsof theGN ProjectMadeinOrder toPermit
the OperationofGabEikovo A;dditional easuresTaken
to RestoretheDanubeSide Arms Systemand toEnsure
Good Ground WaterConditions .............................204................
TheDanubeSide Arms ...............................05..............
MeasuresAimed atEnsuringGood Ground Water
QuaIity.............................................0.7......................
SECTIO N. TheBenefitsProvided By Variant "CM ......................209
ImprovernentofNavigationConditions ................211.......
EnergyProduction ..................................211....................
SurfaceWater: Levelsand Quality....................212..........
GroundWater:LevelsandQuality ....................213..........
Flora andFauna ....................................215......................
SECTION 4 . The ProvisionaIor TernporaryCharacterof
Variant"C"and the PossibiIityof Refurning
tu the TreaîyRegime ..............................217.................. B. The BreachofSecondary Obligations.......................274...........
TheDuty toConsult;andthe ScBIementof Disputes....274
TheObligation ofCompensation. ....................276..........
CHAPTER m. TEE LAWFULNESSOFVARIANT "C" ..........,279..
SECTIO N. TheBackground to Variant "C"Recalled ...........279...
SECTION 2. Variant "C" and the1977 TreatyArrangements.. ,282
A. Variant"C"as anAnernpt toSecure theUbjectsofthe '
1977 Treaty ..........................................282............................
B. Variant"CMand theDuty toMitigateLosses ................290..........
SECTIO N. Variant "C"and OtherIssuesofInternational
Law ..........................................29.1...........................
..
A. TheTreaty-BasedDiversion,VariantWC",Co~ictsWith
No PerernptoryRuleof InternationalLaw Relating
tothe DiversionofInternationalWater.....................292...........
C. Variant"C"DoesNot Confiictwiththe Inviolability
ofHungary'Fsrontiers...................................,295......................
D. Variant"C"isin Conformitywiththe 1976 Boundary
WatersManagement Agreement............................,299...............
E. Variant"C"isinConformitywiththeRu1esandP~nciples
of CustornaryInternationalLawthat Regulate
SharedWatercourses......................................301.......................
F. SlovakiaWasFuIIyPrepated tu Couperatewith
Hungaryin Respectof Variant"CH.....:....................306................
SECTIO N. Conclusionon Variant"Cf' .........................08.
CHAPTER WU. THELEGALJUSTIFICATIONSOFFERED
BY EUNGARYFOR SUSPENSION,
ABANDONMENTOFITSOBLIGATIONSAND
THE TERMINATIONOFTEE 1977TREATY .....311
SECTION 2. The InternationalLawRules Governingthe
SuspensionandTerminatioqof Treaties. ...........313.....
SECTION 3. TheJustificationof an "~cologicalState of
Necessity" ...........d...........................320............ A. There wasno "EcologicalStateofNecessity"byReference
to the ScientificFacts.....................................320......................
B. HungarydidnotBelieve,attheMomentit
Uniawful l Suspended,Abandoned itsPerformance under
andTerminatedthe 7977 Treaty,thataState of Necessity
Existed............ ......................................324......................
C. TheInvocation of an "Ecologica ltateofNeceçsity"Ignores
theProvisionsof the 1977Treaty ...........................332................
SECTION 4. Hungary'sClaims to SuspendorTerminateby
Reliance on ''Ecologicai ecessity"Canno tbeJustified
UnderArtides 60-62 of the Vienna Convention.......333
A. HungaryHasDernonstrated No Supervening
ImpossibiIitof PerformanceunderArticle 6 I................3..3....
B. Hungary Has DernonstratedNo FundamentaiChange
ofCircumstancesunderArticle62 .............................................
C. Hungary HasDemonstratedNo MaterialBreach
byCzechoslovakia orSlovakiaunderArticle 60 ...............339.....
The AiIegedFailureto FuIfiIDutiesfortheProtection
ofNature andWaterQuaIity ..........................................
TheClâirnthatVariant"CuRepresents aMateria1Breach
ofthe 1977Treaty ..................................342....................
SECTION 5. Hungary'sActionsAre Not Lawful,Even
As Countermeasures ..............................343.................
A. IfCountermeasuresApplyAt AI1 Withira TreatyReIation-
ship,inRespect ofMeasuresAIready Regulatedunder
ArticIe60 ofthe ViennaConvention,TheyMust
Be Directed toCertainPurposes ...............................................
B. If CountermeasuresApplyAt Al1Within a Treaty Relation-
ship,inRespect ofMeasuresAlreadyRegulatedunder
Article60 ofthe ViennaConvention,Certain
PreconditionsMustbe Met ..................................345..................
ThereMustHaveBeen aPriorAtternpt tu Secure
Reparatbn, W hichHasBeenRejected .................345.....
ThereMustHaveBeenRecoursetu ThirdParty Settlement
to Determinethe Existenceof aWrongfiil Act............... 345
TheCountermeasureMustBe Proportionateto the
PriorBreachof Obligation............................346..............
SECTION 6. HungiiïytsCIairnas tothe PriorÎtyto be Accorded
toSubseqtient Erivironrnenfa1 Rules................347........ 1. DecIarationthatthe 1977TreatyRemains a Treatyin Force,and
that HungaryActed WithoutLegalJustificationin Suspending,
AbandoningitsPerformance and Purportingto Terminate the
Treaty ............................................
53.........................
11.Dedaration as io theBrestchby Hungary .......................3.5.......
A. HungarJt'sUnilaterd Interruptioofthe WorksAgreed in
the 1977 TreatyDuringMay-Octuber1989.. ............................
B. Hungary'P surported "Termination o"fthe 1977Treaty
inMay1992 ........................................356.......................
III. An OrderforRestitutio In Integrum .......................356...........
A, Cessation...........................,.....................3.56..........
W. Compensation .............................................60.........................
.3
V. TheLossesCausedto SlovaZcia ............................364.
1. Losses Caused to SlovakiainTheGabEikovo Section..........364..
A. Costs incurredduring 1990-1992 byCzechoslovakiain
protectingthe simcturesof theGIN Prujectand adjacent
areas due ruHungary'snon-performance .....................364..........
B. CostsofmaintainingtheoldbedoftheRiverDanube
pendingthe availabilitofthe newcanalfornavigation
1990-1992, duetoHungary'n son-performance ........................
C. Losses to the Czechodovak navigationauthoritiesdueto
the unavailabiliof the bypasscanal1990- 1992....................... ,366
D. Constmction costsof Variant"CM (1991-1992) ...............366.......
2. hsses Causedtu SIovakia in the NagymaroaSection...........367..
Lossesinthe fieldofnavigationandflood protection
incurredsince 1992bySlovakiadue tothefaiIureof
Hungaryto proceedwiththeNagyrnaros sectionofthe
Project ............................................367.....................
3. Loss of EIedncity Production...............................369.................
Volume Iï Annexes 1-22
Volume Iil Annexes 23-56
VoIume IV Annexes 57-141 IlIustrationsIndex
IllusNo. A~~earinprat
-ara.
IIIusNo. 1 GeographicallocationofSlovakia Intro., para.13
Ilfus.No.2 Slovakia:principalitierivers Intro.,para.13
andIakes
IIlus.No.3 Reliefmapof SIovakiaand Hungary Intro., par13
Illus.No.4 DanubeRiver:hm ils source to its Para.1.O2
mouth on the BIackSea
DanubeRiver:eastlwestwatenvay Para.1.03
acrossCentralEurope
IllusNo. 6 DevinGate atConfluenceof theDanube Para. 1.03
andMorava Rivers,wherethe Danube
entersSlovakTenitory
IllusNo. 7 Danube Rivereastlwes t atenvay Para.1.O5
acrossEasternEuropeto theBlack Sea
IllusNo. 8 Generallocationofthe G/N Project
on the DanubeRiver Para.1.07
Illus.No.4 DanubeRiver:Bratislavatu Budapest Para.1.08
showing:ZitnyOstrovand Szigetkoz
IlIus.No.10 CornparisonbehiteenDanubeRiveron Para.I.O9
1735mapand as iappeared circa1960
IIIusNo. 11 Rhine-Main-Danube HydroelectricWatenvay
Projects (completed,underconstruction
or planned) Para.1.13
Illus.No. 12(A) Austria'HydroelectriPcower Plants Para.1.f3
onthe Danube:Freudenau
Illus.No. 12(B) Austria'HydroelectricPowerPlants Para.1.13
ontheDanube:AschbackA , bwinden
Asten,Wallsee-Mittenkerchen,
Ybbs-PersenbeugandMelk
IIIusNo. 13 HungarianNrrcIearPowerPIant Para.1.15
ontheDanube atPaks
111~sN.o.14 Cross-Sectioof DanubeRegion Para. 1.22
ViewedDownstrearnfromBratislavaIllus.No. 15 Photographsof 1954FIoodingnearBratislava Para.1.31
IIIus.No.16 Areacoveredbythe 1965Flood Para.1.33
Photographs of1965 Floodingon
IIIus.No. I7(A, Para.1-33
B, C andD) SIovaksideof Danube
Illus.No.18 GraphîcRepresentationof the Deche Para.1.43
of theWater LevelatBratislavover
the past30years
IUusN. o.19 Percentageofuse of Hydroelectric Para.1.51
Potential:CountryComparison
Illus.No. 20(A) Danube Deltadownstreamof Para.1.67
Bratislava:irca1780 andcirca1970
IIIus.No.20(B) Compariso ofRhineDeltabefore Para.1.67
(circa1780)and aftera"single
riverbed"wascreate (irca1935)
IIIus.No. SI GiN Projec:GeneraILayout Para.2.32
IIIus.No. 22 LongitudinalProfilofthe GlN Para.2.33
Project
Illus.No. 23 GN Project:GabEikovoSection Para.2.38
(GeneralSetting)
Illus.No. 24 G/N Projec:GabcikovoSection Para. 2.38
(Detail)
Illus.No.25 ~Unakilitiweir Para.2.39
Illus.No.26 GabEkovo S.tep Para.2.45
Illus.No. 27 Nagymaros Step Para.2.51
Illus.No.28 Apportionment ofResponsibiltiesunder Para.2.73
Article5of the7977Treaty
IIIusNo. 29 SlovakSide Am System Para. 2.96
IIIusNo. 30(A) GroundWater WeIIsSuppIying Paras.2.103-2.105
Bratislavaand SurroundingRegions
IllusNo. 30@) Bank-FilteredWaterSupplySources Paras. 2.103-2.106
forBudapest
Illus.No.31 Stateof Completionof Construction Para.3.25
ApportionedunderArticle5 ofthe1977
Treaty asofMay 1989
Illus.No.32 GabëkovoSection: ~orn~afison of
VariantsStudied Paras.5.15- 5.19IllusNo. 33 Variant"Cu(GeneralLayuut) Para. 5.26
Ulus.No. 34 Vajant "C" (Detail) Para.5.26
Illus.No.35 CunovoComplex Para.5.29
Illus.No.36 (A-D) PhotographsofEcologicalRecoveryin Para.5.40
Regionof SIovaS kideArms INTRODUCTION
InitiationofProceedines
1. The presentcase wassubmitted to the Courtby the SlovakRepublic
("Slovakia")and the Republicof Hungary("~un~ary")'by the joint notificationon 2 July
1993 of a Special~~reernent~p , ursuantto Article40, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the
Court. The SpecialAgreement, signecion 7 Apd 1993,entered intoforceon 28 June 1993
upon the exchang of instrumentsofratification3
2. This Mernorialis fled by SIovakia in accordance with the Court's
Orderof 14 July1993mg 2 May 1994 for thefiIingbyeach ofthe Partieof a Mernorial.
The SaeciaIAgreement:the RoIeofthe Court
3. At Ieastat thisstagein the proceedingsthere appears to be nu need
for an extensiveanalysisof the SpeciaIAgreementor of the rule ofthe Court under it.
Slovakiawillthereforedrawattentionhere to ody a few of theternisof thisAgreement.
4. As to the preamble of the Special Agreement, three points are
particularlto be noted. &, the term"Treaty"is definedto refernot onlyto the Treaty
between Hungaryand Czechoslovakia Concerningthe ~onstruction and Operationof the
GabCikovo-Nagymaros Sy stemof Locks, signedin BudapestonSeptember 16, 19774, but
also tu its "reIatinstruments". As willbefullydiscussedbelowin ChapterVI, the 1977
Treaty comprises an ensemide of inextricablyIinkedagreements that include, besides the
1977 Treaty itself,thefollowingagreements,Iistedhere inchronoIugicaIorder:
1 -.
HereinafterrefertojointIasthe"Pmies".
2
Hereinafter refeIoas the"SpecidAgreement". Annex1.
3
below.skof theCourt under theprovisionstRe Swid Agreemerttisdrscussedimmediately
4 Hereinaftereferreto as the "197Treaty".Annex 2. The GabEfkovo-NagyrnarS osstemof
Locksis hereinafreferretoasthe"G/NSystem" orthe"GN Project". -
Agreementbetween Czechoslovakia and Hungaryon Drafting of a
Joint ContractualPlan of the GabEikovo-NagymarosSysrern of
Lockç,enteredintoin Bratislavaon 6 May I9~6~ ;
- Agreementbetween Czechoslovakiaand Hungary on the Regulation
ofWaterManagernen otnBoundaryWaters,enteredinto in Budapest
on 31 May 1976~;
- Agreementbetween Czechodovakia and HungaryConcerningMutual
Assistancein theConstruction of the GabEikovo-Nagymaro Ssystem
ofLocks,enteredintoinBudapest ,n 16September 1977~ ;
- TheJointContractualPlanagreed toby Czechoslovakia andHungary
pursuantto the 1976 JointContractual Plan Agreement,to which
referenceismadeinArticle4 ofthe 1977~reat~';
- AgreementbetweenCzechusluvakiaand Hungary on the Joint tatute
of the Goverment Ple~potentiariesWch ReguIatesTheirActivities
in the Constructionand Operation of the GabEikovo-Nagymaros
SystemofLocks, entered into inBratisIavaon 11 October 197g9;
- TheProtoc01of IO Octuber 1983 amendingthe 1977 ~reaty";
- The ProtocoI of IO October 1983 amendingthe 1977 Mutual
Assistance~~reement l l;
5
Hereinafterrefertoasthe"1976JointContractuallanAgreement".Annex3.
6
Hereinafierrefertoasthe"1976BoundaryWatersManagement Agreement".Annex4.
7
Hereinaftreferreto athe"1977MutualAssistanceAgreement".Annex5.
8
Annex 3.Summary ody, preparein1978.
9 HereinafiereferrIoasrhe"1979JoinrStatuteAgreement".Anne5.
1O Anner;7.
11 Annex8. - TheProtocoI of 6 Febnrary1989 firrther amendingthe 1977 Mutua1
Assistance Agreement and also terminating the 1983 Protocol
amending the sarne~~reernent' ;~
- In addition,the 1977 Treaty specificallink te carryingout of its
tems tu the provisions of two muhilateraltreaties, the Convention
ConcerRrngthe Reee of Navigation on the Danube, concirrded at
BeIgrade on 18 August 194813 , and the DanubeFisheriesAgreement,
concluded atBuchareston 29 Januaty1958'~.
5. The importantpoint relatingto thtext of thepreambleisthat
the Parties recognizedSlovakiato be the solesuccessorState to Czechoslovakiain respect
of rightand obligationsrelatinto theG/NProject .
6. The pointisthatthepreambie recdlstheParties':
". .commitment toappIy,pendingthe Irrdgment of the InternationalCouriof
Justice, sucha temporarywater managementregirneof the Danube asshaII
beagreedbetweenthe Parties."
The TemporaryWater ManagementRegime (hereinafter referredto asthe "TWMR") is
again addressed in Article 4 of the SpecialAgreement,whichmakes it clear that the
establishmentof the TWMRandtheresolutionof problemsarisingunder it are mattersthat
have not beensrrbmitted tothe Court. Thus, the determinationof the TWMR falls outside
the scope of the task of the Court in thiscase, aIthorrghcertain facfualfindings of the
Slovak,Hunganm and European Communities'expertscharged with submittinga proposal
for the TW are ofsome relevance tothe caseand willbe discussedwhereappropriatein
this Mernorial.
13
Hereinafkr refemtoasthe"1948DanubeConvention".ArtrieIO.
14
Hereinafterrefertoa the"Danube FisheriesAgreementt1.Annex1I 7. Article2 of theSpeciaIAgreementrequeststhe Court todecide -on
thebasis ofthe 7977 Treatyand"rulesandprînciples of generaIintemafionailaw, asweII as
suchother treatieas the Courtmayfindapplicable" - thesefourquestions:
"whether[Wungary]was entitled to suspend and subsequently abandon, in
1989, theworks on theNagymaros Projectand on thepart ofthe GabEikovo
ProjectforwhichtheTreatyattributed responsibilito Hungary;
whether [Czechoslovakia w]as entitledto proceed,inNovember 1991,to the
"provisionalsolution"and to put into operationfiom October 1992 thia
system [asmore particuIarIdescribed];
what are the legal effectsof the notification, on May 19, 1392, of the
terminationoftheTreatybypungav];
[whatare]theIegd consequemes, includirigthe righand obligationsforthe
Parties,arisin6om [the Court'sJudgment onthe [threejquestions[setout
above]."
8. Each of thesequestionsconcernstheinterpretationandapplicationof
the 1977 Treaty and the performanceof CzechoslovakiaandHungaryin respect of their
Rghts and obligationsthereunder.This, then, is thefocus of the presentcase before the
Court. It isthe positionof SIovakiathatthe1977 Treatyremainsin &II forceand that the
actionsofthe Partieswithrespecttu the 1977Treatycontinue to be relevant.
Structureof the Mernorial
9. Slovakia'sMernorialhas therefore been stnicturedaroundthe 1977
Treaty. Itis dividedinto ninechapters,thefirsfiveof whichformPart I and deal withthe
factsof thecase.
- Chapter1addresses the particularprubiemsanddeveloprnentneeds in
thisregionofthe Danubethat Ied to the decisionofCzechoslovakiaand Hungarytu develop
and tu reachjoint agreementonthe GtN Project assetout inthe 1977Treaty.
-
Chapter 11then discussesthe backgroundof the G/N Projectand
describesinsome detailhow it was proposed under the Projecttosoivetheseproblemsand
to meet these needs. This Chapteremphasises the extensivestudy.andresearch during a
period of more than 20 yearsthat went into the fumnlation of the GN Projeci and aIso
examines the basicworkingsof the GN System. - Chaprer III describes the performance of Czechoslovakia and
Hrrngaryunder the 1977TreatyupuntiI 13May 1989t he datewhen, as reflected ithefi-
questionput tothe Court in the SpecialAgreement, this disputebegan - with HungaMs
suspensionand subsequent abandonmentof the performance of its obligations under the
1977Treaty. This ChapteraIso considerthe motives thatIedHirngaryru seek tuabort the
GINProjectand tu escapehm itsobIigationunder the 1977Treaty.
- ChaptwIV dealswith pertinenteventssubsequentto May 1989. It is
shownhowHungarysucceeded in postponingforthreeyearsthe damming ofthe Danube in
breachof itsobligationunderthe 1977Treatyandthat,duringthisperiod,Hungarysought
only toobstmct theG/NProject,neverundertakint go establiswithscientificdataitsdaim
of impendingecologicaIdisaster. It is demonstratedhow Czechoslovakia proceededwith
new studiesthat failedto substantiatethe Hungarianclairnand that, atthe sametime,
Czechoslovakia repeatedlysought to reacha compromise solution,attemptsthat Hungary
continuailyrebuffed.
- ChapterV completesthe factualpart of the Mernorial with an
explanationof Czechosiovakia'lsimitedimplementatio nf the 1977 Treaty. This hasbeen
by means of the provisionalsolutioncalledVariant "CH. The extensivescientificstudy
behindthe adoption of Variant"CIandthe need to put into effeatprovisionaslolutionare
both consideredindetaiIinChapterV.
- Bart II of the MernorialcrintaiasIegaIanalysisof the actions of
CzechosIovakiaand Hungary under the 1977Treaty, examiriingHungaryls breaches
(Chapter VI) ,he IawfuInessof Variant"Cu (Chapter VII), and thtotalinadequacy of the
IegaIjustifications offeredby Hnngary for suspending,abandoningthe performance of its
obligationsand then prrrporiedIyterminatingthe 1977Treaty(Chapter VIII).
- ChapterIX, whichconcludesthe IegaIpartof theMernoriai,explains
the remediessought by Slovakia.
- TheMernorialends with Slovakia'Submissions. IO. In bringinto a closethediscussionof thestmctureofthisMernorial,
a few words aboutthe documentary evidencefurnishedby Slovakiaare in order. This
MernorialV, olume1, is accompanied by threeVolumesof Annexes(VolumesII - IV).
VolumeII (Annexes 1 -22) contains, a& the internationalgreements that bear
directlyon thiscase,includinthe SpecialAgreement andthe 1977 Treaty. The cover of
each volume ofannexes indicatesbymex numberthe annexes includedwithin.
Z1. A Iargeportionoftheannexe evidence consîstof extractedpartsof
longer documenta that areneither published norreadiIy available and, except for the
extraas,arenot reIevant.Inordertu spare theCourt SIovakîahas takenfuIIadvantageof
Article50 (2)ofthe Rules of Court bymexirig ody a transIationofthe relevant partof
each wch document,wtziIe depositingthewhoIedocumentinthe Registry.
Certain PertinentGeoerra~hicaa Ind HistoricaIFactsConcerninz Slovakia
12. The SIovakRepubliccameinto being as one of the two successor
States offormerCzechoslovakia on I January 1993, becorning a memberofthe United
Nations on19January 1993.
13. The geographicd locationof Slovakiais shownon Illus.No. 1 ;its
principalcitieand its riversand lakesappearonIllus.No. 2; thetopographof thisregion
is shown on Iilus.No. 3l5. Slovakiaincludesan areaof 49,035 squarekilometres. Its
boundariesonthe West arewith Austria(127.2 km)and the CzechRepublic(265 km),on
the south withHungary(679 km), onthe eastwith Ukraine(98 km),andon thenorth with
Poland (598 km).
15 The Illustrations appin bisMernoriahavebeenpreparebyMarylandCartographies,Inc.,
Cdumbia, MqImd. InternationalboundariesconcerningotherthaappearthereoasweII
asthenamesand indcated Iimits of Starebasedonthe besavaiIabsIurces;heydo not,
however,refleSIovakiasfncialpositionwrespecttherero. 14. The populationstnrcmre of Slovakia, separatedinto the different
ethnrcandnationalgroups withinthe country accordingtu the1991 census,is portrayed on
thefollowingtable:
Nationality Poriulation Percentane
Slovak 4 511 679 85.63
Hungarian 566741 10.76
@PSY 80 627 1.53
Czech 53422 1.01
Uîherl6 56 466 1.O7
Comparativp eopuIationstatisticsofneighbourîngcounriesaresetout inthe nexttabIe:
Country
Austna 7.770
CzechRepublic 10.380
Hungary
Poland
Ukraine
15. Ithas been saidof new Stateslike Slovakthatthey have no history.
Asthe SIovakwriter ViadimirMinA Eut it inbi1968 essay,WhereAreOur Castles":
"We haveno history..if this is maup solelyof kings,emperors, dukeq
princes,victories,conqrrests,violenceand pil"age.
Of course,the SIovakpeopIesdo indeedhave an ancienthistorinCentralEurope. As the
Italian writer Claudio Magis wrotehisbook, ~anube'~.
"Bratislava,capital of Slovakia,is one of the "heof Mitteleuropa,with
layer upon layer of centuriesforever present, unresolved conflicts and
lacerations, unhealedwounds andunreconciledcontradictions.
16
"Other"includesRuthenian,Ukrain,ennanandPolish.
17
First pubIishedin IfdbyGarzantitditore, Milder the iitDmubio, 1986.English
translation,CoIIinsHamiII,Lo1990,p220. The Central Europeans are ignorant of thscienceof forgetring, of filing
awayevents ..[Mlyfiends and1used tudiçcusstheciry'name,which unes
we Iked best: Bratislava, the SIovakname, Pressberg [Pressbirrg], the
Geman one,or Poszony7the Hungarian name derîvedhm Posonium, the
ancientRomanoutpost on the Danube.The fascinationofthose threenames
bestowed a specid gImur on a composite, mukinationaI history, and
someone's preferenceforone or the otherwag in a chiIdisway, a basic
stance takentowards the Weltgeist. That istu Say, we had to choose
between the instinctivecelebrationogreat,powerful cultures suchasthe
German, the ones that make history, or our romantic admirationforthe
exploits of rebellious, chivalrousand adventurous peoples such as the
Magyars, orelseOurfelIow-feelinforwhat ismore subduedand hidden, for
the smallpeoplessuch asthe Slovaks,who remain fora long tirnea patient,
unregarded substratum, a humble, fertilesoi1waiting centuries for the
momentof itsflowering"
16. Theregion of CentraiEuropethat incIrrdesSIovakiwas first settled
by the Cdrs, who came hm the west in the 5th CenturyB.C. ShortIybefore the birth of
Christ,the RomanEmpireadvanced tu the Danube,and Romangarrîsonswere established
in SIovakia. king the eraofthe migrations ofpeoples (5th-6th CenturiesA.D.), the
SIavsarrivedinlargenumbers hm the east;andinthe 9thCenmry A.D., outof the various
principaIitiesthat had spmnup,theGreat MoravianEmpire was fomed. During its brief
existence, it dealt on virtqua1ytermswiththe HolyRomanEmpire. It was during this
periodthat Christianityspreadthroughoutthe regionofthe Danube.
17. Duringthe 9th and 10th Centuries,the Magyars penetratedthe
Danubian plains;and aRerunsuccessfurlnilitaryventuresinto WesternEurope, they settled
bythe Danube,creatingthe HungarianKingdom. Foralmost 1,000yearsthereafler,starting
with the reignof St. Stephen(967-I038t)e,SlovakpeopIesweremled by Hungary. After
the Ottoman invasionand the defeatof the Hungariaamy in southern Hungaryat Mohics
on the Danube in1525, and the subsequent Ottoman occupationof much of present-day
Hungary, including Budapest, the capitaI of Hungarywas moved tu Bratislavawhich
became the seatof the HrrngarianParIiarnentuntiI 1848.r three centurietheHapsburg
king5 ofHungarywere crowned in Bratislava, herethe centralgovemental officesof the
kingdomhad beenestabliçhed. 18. TheI~nganddificuIthistoryofthemIeoverrheSIovakpeopIesby
the various kings and regimes of Hungary came tu an end aeer World War 1, when
CzechosIovakiawas established as one of the srrccessoStates tu the Austro-Hungarian
Empire. But the effectsof such a history are seldom easilyeerased,he situation bang
aggravatedhereby the so-calleVienna Awardof 2 November 1938. By this Award,
Germany and Italypurportedto transfetoHungary asliceofterritorthatincluded alarge
part of the Slovaksideof theDanubeborderhgthepresentG/N Project and towns such as
GabEikovo. The areacomprised one-fifthof Slovakia,andwas inhabiteby a quarterof its
inhabitanS.
19. IntheParis Peace Treaty of1947, thepre-WorId WarII frontiers of
Czechoslovakia were reinstated.Shortly aftenvards, in 1948, the name of the town of
GabEikovo was changed hm the previoriçnameof Be% tuthe cnrrentname". This was to
honour one of the heroes of the resistanceagainst the Nazis, the SIovaknamed Jozef
Gabfik,who organisedthe assassinationof the Reichsprotektor inPragR.,Heydrich,the
highest representativofthe GermanNazi regime in the country. Itis fromthe name of
Jozef GabEikthatGablikovo isderived.
20. It is not surprîsi ner,fore, that SIovakiaEnds offensive the
persistentuse today by Hungay, even in of?iciaIdipIomaticorrespondence,of the name
Bos for the town of GabEkovo. For example,theHungarian Goverment fiequently refers
to theG/N Project as the "BodNagyrnarosProject"eventhough the 1977Treaty refers to
the Projectas the "GabEikovo-NagymarS oystemof Locks" and the oficial title of the
presentcase before the Courtis"GabCkovo-Nagyrnaros Project(HungarylSlovakia) " By
using thename"Bos",Hungarian officiaiand mediaseem toimplythat the town is in some
sense stillHungarian,manifestina surprisingdegreeof insensitivityto the feelingsof their
northern neighbours.
21. Mer the change of the political regimein Czechos~ovakiain
Novernber 1989, theprocess of transfomingthecentrallycontroIIedecvnornyintoa market
economy began - and was continuedby Slovakiauponachievisn egarate statehood.But
the new State was faced with S~~UUS problems: a decline in overaIIproductiona steep
increase in unemployment,and an annualinflatioratoef over 19%. SIovakiahad also to
1%
Dunng peridsofHungariamIe ofthterritory,townwas cdledBus.strugglewith a largetradedeficit(for1993, SK26,7 billi~n)'~.Theseeconomic factors
relate directly the measurestakenby Slovakia tocomplete the G/N Project in spitof
Hungary'srefusal,for Slovakianeeds tu derive what ben& it can from fhis major
investment in such areaas improvedflood protection, navigation,tourism, eIectrîc power
generationand thereductionof energyirnportfrom abmad.
19 A billion1,000miIIion. 1US= 32.5SIova Koma (crowns):ratasofIOFebruary1994. PART1
THE FACTS 1.O1 The purpose of this FirstChapter ituexplain,inthe sirnplesof
tems, why CzechosIovakiaand Hungarydecided to invest inthe constmctionof the
systemofweirs,locks and hydruelectrîcpower plantsatGabEikovo and Nagymaros - the
GiN Pruject. In Section 1,a generd backgroundpiciureof the region ofthe Danube
River and, in pariicrrlar,the SIovakidElungarysection is pruvided. The Danube's
geographicaplositionandimportanceisbrieflyexaminedas is theprevioususage byman
that has transformeda systemof constantlychangingmeanders intoa fast-flowingand
uniforrn channel, leading to specific and harmfulimpactswithin the riverbasin.In
Section2, Slovakiaexplainsthe significanof this transformation,the specificproblems
that havebeen created and the needboth to remedythem and to obtain the optimum,
sustainableutilisationof this sectithefDanube. Inso doing t,eindividualproblems
of flooding, navigation,energy production, wateresources and the environmentare
examined.
SECTION 1. The Danube -Backgroundand UtiIîsation
A. GeneralDescri~tionof theRegionof the Danube
1.02 From its source in Germany'Bs lack Forest (Schwarmald) close
to the source of the Rhine RivertheDanube River - secondin size amongEuropean
rivers odyto theVoIga -flows eastwards to the BIack Sea (Illus. No4). It is the
principaeastiwest waterway acrossthe countries oCentrai Europe, crossingtheland-
IockedStatesof Auçtrîa,Slovakiaand Hungaryand linkingthem tothe BIackSea on the
eastand,on the West, vithe RhineRiver,tu theNorth Sea.
1.03 From the Black Forest, theDanube,knownby its German name,
the "Donau",passeseastwardthrough Ulm and Regensburg. Just west of Regensburg,
at Kelheim,the Main -DanubeCanal,completedin September1992,meetsthe Danube,
linkingthe waterways ofthe Rhine and the Danube (Illus. No. 5). From there, the
Danube crosses Austria,flowingthrough Linz and Vienna, andentersSlovakia attheDevin Gate, the point where theMorava RiverfIowS into the Danube hm the north
(Illus.No.6). Fora distanceof7.5km, the Danrrbefoms the boundarybetweenAustria
and Slovakia. It then traverssouhemSlovakîa(whereit isknown as the "Dunaj")for
a distance of 22.5 km, tu the point where the Hunganan boundary with SIovakia
intersectsthe DanubesoutheastofBratislava.
I.O4 For the next 142 km, the Danube forms the boundary between
Slovakiaand Hungary until its junctionwith the IperRiver,where the boundary then
abandonsthe river andturnsnorth. TheDanube (nowknownbyitsHungarian name, the
"Duna") continueseast into Hungarianterritorfor a short distanceand thenmakesa
suddenbend to the south passingtfiroughBudapestand foiiowinganorthlsouthcourse
through Hu~igary(450 km)tu the Euntierwith Croati Ua.ike thatofeitherAustriaor
Hungary, thegeographîcd situationofSlovakiameans that e,ceptforthe short distance
that the DanubepassessoIeIythroughSIovakterritory, its opportunituput the waters
oftheDanube tu optimum use isessentiallydependent.onjoint projectswith uneor both
ofthese NU States.
1.O5 The internationalcharacteoftheDanube isretaineas it fiowson
to the Blacksea(Illus.No. 7). Continuingsouthwards,froHungary,the Danubeforms .
for a short distance the Croatia-Yugoslavia boundary. Then it turns eastwards once
more, passing through Novi Sad and Belgrade, tu the point where it becornes the
boundarybetweenYugosIaviaand Romania. Mer passingthe Iron Gate, the Danube
zigzagssouthward to thetripoinof the boundaries betweenYugusIavia,Bulgariaand
Rornaniaand then bends castward(the speIIingof its namechanginghm country tu
country)where itfonns the boundarybetweenRoma~a and BuIgaria as faras Silistra.
The Danube thtn mers the Iowiandssection oE+ania. A navigation canaiwas
recentlycompleted connectingthe Danube with theBIack Sea,buttheRiver itselfiows
northward on to Galati and then finalto theeast again, forming threebranchesthat
cross the Danube Delta. The northern branch becomesthe boundary between the
Ukraine and Romania and the middlebranch reachesthe BlackSeaat Sulina,which is
generallydesignatedasthe mouth oftheDanube.
1.O6 What this geographicaidescriptionbrîngs out is that nine States
today share the rivebasin of the Danube - a riverthat begins its 2,875 km juurney
eastwards tu the BIackSeafrom an altitude o1,078 rnetresabove sea Ievel(measured
from the Bahic Sea). The sharingof the Danube,amorig these States createsan
interdependeritrelatîonship that runs in both directions, upstream and downstream.
Pollutioncaused by an up,ream State rnay hm a downstream State;a downstreamC...
1 BRAnSlAVATO BUDAPEST [
lII State'sfailureto removenavigationalobstaclesmaycausedamageto bothupstream and
downstreamStatesby interferhgwithor lirniting theuse of thistrans-European water
artery that, together withtheRhine and the MainRivers,extends fiom Rotterdamto
Sulina.
1.O7 The G!NProject, as conceived inthe 1977Treaîy, is IocatedIess
than haifwayhm the sourceof thisinternationalwatercourse,encompassingthe region
ofthe Danube roughIybetween 1860 rkm oust south of Bratislava)and 1696 rkm (at
~agyrnaros)', a stretchof some 164 km (Illus.No 8).In the upstreampartof the Gm
Projectregion,at Sap(~alkovi~ovo)~l,ocated at1810 rlun t,egradient oftheDanube
decreasessuddenly as a resultof the geologicalhistoryof the region3. The flatter
topographychangestheDanubehm a largebutnonethelesstorrentialriverwith a steep
gradienttu a much slowerflowing river. As SI1 be show in the next Section,this
r change inthe Danubegradienthas given rîsto seriousnavigationaldifficnltiesanhas
1
created additionalprubIerns,eçpeciailywith regard to the increased riskof severe
flooding.
1.O8 Just downstream of Bratislava, te anubeforms two brancheson
~ eitheside ofthemain channel:on the north,theMaly Danube inSlovakia;on the south,
theMosoni DanubeinHungary(Illus. No. 9). Ths effectivelycreatestwo largeislands
to thenorîh andsouth of the mainriverbed:iitng 0strov4 inSIovakiaand Szigetkozin
Hungary.
1 .O9 Between Bratislavaand Sap (PalkoviÇovo), as a resultof the
change ingradient,theDanube formed a deltaregionthrough which itonce meandered
I The Danubetraditionalismeasuredin rivkilometres("rkm"starting from the mofth
the Danubeat SuIinaandmasuring rrpsttoitsource.
2
PaIkoviCovistheformernameof thetom offrcidIrenamedSap. Astheformername still
appearsonmostmapsand indocumentsitisdso avenbdowin brackefsaftthenameSap.
3
Inancient geologimi tirna {theTertera), Europeanconrinentend& in thareaof
today'sViennaandBratislava. Althoughthe sea retrastthe AIps and the Carpathian
mountainswereformed,alargdepressiowasIdtintheDanubianlowlandareaThe gradua1
formationof theDanubeled,effectitothefillingupof this depresassedimentfrom
the alpinesourcewerecarriedown and depositedin this region. Eventuasoymuch
sedimentwasdepositthathedepressiodisappearandthe accumulatesedimenbeganto
actasa brake,slowingdownthefloofthriver.Theimpactsofthisreconsiderin greater
dehi1below. Briefiy,the deposof sedimenhaçcrcatea larggravel-ba aqiferthat
varieshm 5ro300 rnormorein depth. Somrrchsedimehasbeen depositedthaf river
came IOflw a- the surrorrnterraicreatinaseverefloodingtendene.
4 Mearring"WhearIsland".
I dong shaIIowbranches. This can be seen cIearIon early maps, suchas reproduced in
IIIus.No. IO,a 1736 map. In the 250 years thathaveeIapsed sincethen, the Slovak-
Hungariariportionof the Dan~~bien this deltregionhas changed radicall. Thishas
- beencaused by'theinterventionofman, who hassoughtto control floodingto improve
navigationto farm thefertilelandandto harvesttheriverineforests. Duringthis time,
theregion hasalsobecome populated5 and partiallindustridised. Thefundamental
changesbrought about by humaninterventionin thi sectionofthe Danube riverbasin
long pre-dated the inceptioofthe GN Project. One of the central objectives of the
Projectwas tu addrew themainadverseconsequencesofthesechanges.
B. Utilisationofthe Danube
1.10 The firstconstructionworks dong theDanubewere aimed at
floodcontrol and theimprovement of navigation.Even as earlyas the 17th Century,
organised work on the German sectors ofthe Danube was started. Regrrlarwater
managementoperations commenced intheregionof the.UpperDanube,whereimpruved
conditionsfor navigatiowere first createdSimiIarworks were started on the Rhine
even earlier. Thesriversand the transpormeana theyoffered were,even atthat time,
offundamentai economic importanceto Central Europe. Indeed, the proposa1 to
connectthe RhineandDanuberiversby acanallinkingthe MainRiver totheDanubehas
anancientorigin,datingback tothereignof Charlemagne.
1.11 The importanceof the Danube as partofa network of navigabIe
rivers has appreciablyincreasednow thatthe Rhine-Main-Danube Iinkhas becorne a
reality.Agreement un the vast errgineeringproject ofthe Main-Danube an aiwas
reached in 1921,constmstion work began in 1962 anI the Canal war opened on 25
September 1992. The 30 yearproject costDM 4 billio(or DM 24 millionper km16 .
The Canaiis 171 km in length,hasa depthof 4m and :awidthof 55 m. An extended
usage of the Danube as an economical and environmentallyacceptablemeans of
transport seems to be a certainty,subject to the removal of remainingnavigational
troublespots.
5 On average,thSlovaksidof the Danubhasa populatiodensityof betwe85 and 150
personspersquarehlometre.
6 By cornpaison,km of the newrailwaylineHann-vWürzburgcos36 millioDM; and 1
km of the newhighwBA3 Munich-Northcos49millionDM. 1.12 Upstreamof Bratislavan, avigatihas been faciIitatedbecauseit
takes pIace Iargelythough artifrciaIIycreated reservoirscands. Downstream of
Bratislava,unlythe sectoto Budapest continuedto present navigationdiEcuI ties at
the timeof theopeningof the Main-Danube canal.ResoIvingthe navigationalprobIems
beîween Bratislavaand Budapestwas, ifact o,e oftheprincipdobjectivesof the1977
Treatyestablishingthe Gm Project. The ideof achievingthis aimpmIy bymeanaof a
bypass cand was notrevolutionary. Today some4 1.5% ofthe total navigableIengthof
the DanubebetweenKeIheim(Gemany) andSurina Rumania onthe BIack Sea)consists
of artificidiycreatedreservoorcanals.
1.13 But, of course, navigation is not the od-way in wfiich the
Danube hascontributedtuthe deveIopmentof itsriparianStatesThe Danube'swaters
areutiIisedfor domesticpurpusesas pari of industrialprocesand for the production
of hydroeIectricpower. By the time the Main-Danubecanalwas compIeted,the Rhine
and Danube riversfor muchof their respectiveIengihsfomeda seriesof hydroelectric
projectsas maybe seenon IIlus.No.1I. IntheGerm sectorof the Danube, somt26
such projeas have bean completsd; in Austria, nine hydrodactrpwer pIants with
navigationalIocks are in operation otheDanube and a tenth (Freudenau) has been
startedon the outskirof Vienna. A chart listingtheseAustrianpIantsand the year of
constructionappearsbeIow:
Iochenstein-(withGemany)
Ybbs-Persenbeug
Aschach
Waiisee -Mitterkirchen
Ottensheim-Wilhering
Aitenwijrth
Abwinden-Asten
MeIk
Greifenstein
Freudenau
The Iocationof these pIantstogether withtheir picturesappearsas INo.s12(A) and
m.
1.14 The water management projects aIong the Danube have been
largdy basedun the principIeof cornbiningnavigationdimprovementsand floodontroi
measureswith the productionof dectrical energy. For cuuntriessuch as SIovakand
Hungary, the accompanying production of electricitis eçpecidly important. With
Iimited resourcesto pay for expensivenavigationa1and flood control projects, the
electricityproducd perrnirsthemtu repaythe enormouisnvestrnent.It maybe noted inthisregardthat the fundsexpended by SIovakiato dateon the Projecthavecornedirectly
fro mts budgetor hm other domestic sources and nothm borrowingsabroad.
1.15 Asmentionedabove,Slovakia hashad udy a restrictedabiiito
ben& from theDanubebecausethe riverfluwswhuliywithin itsterritorjl farmere
22.5 km. Hungary has not been hampered in this way. Three specific uses which
Hungary hasdready madeoftheDanube,maybe mentionedhere:
- As a coulantfor itç largeriücieapressurisedwatw reactor (the
VVER Sqvietversion) at Paks 115 km south of Budapest,which
requires theuse of Iargequantitiesof Danube water (IIIus.NO.
-3).
-
As a source of watw for the operation of the large petroIeum
productsrefineryIocatedat Almhrito, eastof Komarom.
-
In connectionwith the twofussi1fud burningpowerstations at
Dunamenti, 40 kmsouthof Budapest.
1.16 Slovakia'sprimaryutilisation, by contras< was plamed tu be
thruugh thejoint schemewith Hungary,that is theGiN Project. Thisis a hydroeIectric
project producingpuwer in a simi1arway to any one of the many projects dong the
Rhine,the Ethone and the Danube,inciudingseveral projectsin the Danubedownstream
sectionbetween Hungary and the BIack %a7 . As mentionedat paragraph 1.13 above,
hydroelectricplant construction isstiIicontinuing on the Danube in other States:
construction inow undenvay in AustriaatFreudenau,and Austnacurrentlyappears to
be consideringafreshthe possibiliv of building a plantjust upstream of Bratislava,at
Wolfstatil.
1
Insufaasthe G(NstructurmaybeparîicuIarIlyarthiresuItfromtherelarivIargeçize
ofthe Danubein the region of tGlB Projecl, cornparedotherErrropeanriverand
comparaitoupstreamsectionsof Danube ilself. For examthebypasscanaithaforms
part othe GIN Systerniofsubstantial drrnenskcause itmua be abletohandie &e
Danube'sfld watersafdy.Such do~vnstreaDanubepmjec~sasat the Iron GateinvoIve
Iargestnrctusorthesamereason.IMO. 1.7 As a resutof exlier deveIopmentsdong both the Rhineand the
Danube, the G/N Project has benefiterom the experienceencountered (andmistakes
made) in otherprojects,particularlin relatioto the effecof such projectson the
environment. The GIN Projectcornesintobeingat a timewhenthereis a heightened
awareness of the importance ofenvironmentap l rotection. Iisin the light of this
increased concern for environmentdy sound development that SIovak, Czech and
Hungarianexpertshavequestionedand strrdieeveryaspectof theenvironmentdimpact
of the GIN Project. This, together with the impressiveextent tu which such
environmenta1considerationshave beentaken into account, wiIIbe demonstrated in
detaiIinChaptersIIandV below.
1.18 Thus, the utilisatiof the Danube contemplatedin the GN
Projectmarks neithea radicalnor an ill-considermove awayfrom pre-existingor
other ongoing riverprojectqbutratheran evolution.For over 300 years,the Danube
hm servedasan avenue forcommerceand as thebasisof the economicdeyelopmentof
its riparianStates. Its watershavebeenmanagedand extensivelyutil#yetheseStates.
The region of the Danube dong the Slovak-Hungarian boundary has also becorne an
increasinglydevelopedarea. It is intensivelyfamed, athe forests in the river basin
betweenBratislavaandBudapesthavelong been managedso as toproduce industrially
usefulwood, leadingto thegradua1repIacemenotfthe originalspeciesThis ,ong with
theextensivenavigationand floodprotectionworks,both inthisregionandinupstream
States,has createdspecificenvironmentaelffectsthahad tobe addressed. Theseare
discrrssedinthenextSection,butmaybe ~~mmarise as follows:
- The rhreatof severe inundaticaused bythe extensivedykirigof
theriver, which preventadmorenafuraldissipationof highriver
waters hm occurring.
-
Theloweringof theriverbedcausedbothby the straighteninof
theriverchannel(whichincreased waterflowratesandtherefore
erosion) and by reduced sedimentationdue to upstream
waterworks.
- The consequentIoweringofthelocalgroundwatertatablw e,hichis
toa largedegree governedbythe waterIeveIintheDanube. - The dryingup ofrîverbranches as a resuItof the Ioweringof the
IeveIof the Danube as weII as of floodand navigationaicorrtrol
measUres,whichin tum has affecteciadverselythe flora andfauna
of theregion. l
I
- The introduction of new species of trees and the attendant
changesthishascausedinthe fauna andflora of the region.
I
-
Riverpollutionresultirighm po~ulationincrease, hm industriai
activityand hm the useof fertilisersonthe adjoiningagricuItura1
land. !
One ofthe main consequences of the GN Project ;as that masures to halt or to
mitigatethese adverse environmentalimpacts could be put into effect. Insofar asthe
Project may be thought of as unique, itis so only to the extent it presents a unique
oppo~unityto rernedythe problems of a rapidlydeteriorathg and highlyartificial n~er
landscap .e I
1 This is not the opinionof Slovakiadone. It has been confimed
by the Working Group of Independent Expertson Variant "Cu of the GabEikovo-
NagyrnarosProject. This Group consisteci of independent experts,together wirh a
representative hm each of Czechoslovakiaand Hungary,appointedin 1992 by the
European Comrnunities(EC) to study the impactsof variant "CM. In its Report of 23
November 1992, this EC Working Groupconcluded: ;
"In the past, the measures taken for the naGigation cunstrained the
possibiIitiesfor the developmentof the ~anube and the Aoodplainarea.
Assumirigthe navigationwiIIna longeruse the mainriver over alerigthof
40 km a unique situation hasarîsen. Initiated by technicalrneasurethe
nver and the floodplaincandeveIopmorenaturallf ."
The meansadopted toobtainthis more natural developmentare consideredin Chapters
II andV below. Pior to this, there wilIbe exarnined:inSection2 below the specific
environmentalandother problemscausedby the utilisationof this streofthe Danube
8 The EC WorIUngGroupof IndependentExpens on~ar&nt "C"of the GabEfkovo-Nagymaros
Project, Workin~Grouv Report, 23 Novembe1992 (le ltEC Working Group repoof 23
November 1%Y), Amex 12alp.58{ernphasisdded) !.priertotheinceptionof theGN Project, dongside the generd faiIturutilisethewater
resourcesinanoptimalmanner.
SECTION^. The Problems Requiring Remedial Action in the
SlovaWHungarianSection' of the Danube and the Need to
n r
1.20 As the previousSectionhas shown,the ripariaStates upstream
and downstrearn of the Slovak-Hungariansectorof the Danube, pariculary Germany
and Austria,havemade extensiveuseof the Danuberiverbasin. Incontrast, theçector
betweenBratislavaandBudapest - thoughpopulated, farmedand industrialise- has
beenineffectivelymanaged and used almostsolely for rivertransport. Yet thisarne
sectorstillrepresenttheDanube's onlymajor remainingnavigationablottleneck.After
World War II,both Czechoslovakiaand Hungary startedto consider water schemes
dong their sections otheDanube, and inthe earIy 1950sthe hÿ.opartiesentered into
negotiationstofomrtIatea joint programtuaddress the posçibilitiesof developmeas
wdl ristuded withthe urgentproblernsrequirhg remedialaction. Duringthe morethan
20 yearsof study that evenmdly ledtuthe adoptionof theGlN Project as the optimal
solution, actiotodeal withtheseproblemscame to appear incteairngIurgentjdue in
particulato two severefloodscausinglargescaledestructioin1954 and 1965.
A. TheProblemof Floods
The NaturaIFIoodingPhenornenon
1.21 The Danube is a dynamic river subject tu exiremely wide
variationinitswater flowrate. InBratislava,the recordedflowratvarieshm around
600 m3/s to twentytimes thisfigureduringfloodcondition8 As such,fioodingof the
Danubelowlandsused to bea normalsurnmerand winteroccurrence. Beforethis region
became inhabitedthese fioods were beneficialortobe more precise, theycreated a
unique environment adapted andbasedonthe floods of the Danube.The firsthuman
settIementswere not endangeredbysuch floodsbecausethey were establishedon higher
ground and were Iarget Iyaffectedby the unregrrlatedriver. Buasthese settlements
expanded,theimportance of the fierand itstendencytu flood grew in human tems.
9
ThefluctuatioinwatevolumeintheDanubeareextreme-ranginon averageaBratislava
from570 m31s(low)to2,025m31s(averageto 10,25m3/s(maximum). The abbreviation
l1rn3/n1eancubicmetrespersecond.Although exact measurements of flood levelshave ody been maintained at Bratislava
since 1876, prîor jrearsof fioods of particuIar importance are known from various
sources.
Such floods occurredinthe followingyears:
Beyond thislastdate, the details of severe flood havebeen carefullyrecorded,
together withthe steps necessaryto combatthe flood. Theyaars in which different
degrees offloodcontrol activityarerecordedin the archivesof the hydrologicaofficeof
the Slovak HydrometeoroIogical InstituteinBratisIava+e as~IIOWS'~ :
1.22 Beforeturningto the impactof t$e concerted attemptsto restrict
the Danube'snaturalflood patterns,it is essentiatofocus on another peculiarityof the
IO i BratidavawaterIeve1
+ firçdegreof floownvd activîîy 550 cm
++ seconddegr= offiwdconirolactiviiy 750cm
* thirddegreof floodcontraciiiiy 850 cm
The monthinwhch thefloodoccurred içindicat wih aRoman numeraIforthose yearin
which morethanonefloodoccurred.SlovakNungxian section : theriverflows abovethe local terrainas can be seen on
Illus.No. 14. ThisresuItsfrom the abrupt changein gradientnear Sap (PalkoviEovu),
described earlier,where hugeamountsof sediment,brought down from the Danube's
alpinesource, settleas the water flowvelocitysuddedydecreased. In this way, thck
layersof sand and gravelwere laid down abovethe bedrock. Thus, the Danube here
flows dong thetop of agravel conethat extendssidewardsanddownwardsas far asthe
MaliDanube ,tthe northand theMosoniDanubeto the south.
1.23 The elevatednverbed tends in itnaturd stateto wander, and a
çystemofriverbranches iscreatedwith changingwaterlevels,funring whatisknown as
an "idand delta". In temç of floodingthesignikance of this phenornenonis obviorrs.
The effectof theriverbrrrstingits banksin this regionis extreasthere is no naturd
raisedterrain to contaîn the escapingwaterflow. There isaIso a secondary form of
flooding. Becausethe Danubedominatesthe landscape the increasedpressureof extra
flows during high water levels effectivelypushes ground water upward through the
gravel aquifer. This canlead to floodingin iower lyiareasthat areat some distance
from the river,althoughthere areareasof drygroundinbetween. Aswill be seenbelow,
thisfloodingbyrisingground water canbe severeandispossibleevenwhena traditional
dykesysternis inplace, because the waterinfiltratesthe aquiferbeneath the artificid
structure.
1.24 Thus, rhis section of the Danube IowIands has become
permanentlyexpused to the threat of floods, Ieadito protective measrrresagainst
effects of highdischargesin the Danubein the forof dykes(flood levees) and against
flooding by risingground waters through an extensivedrainage system. The Slovak
right and lefi rivbanks are enclosedin the form of dykes dong almost their entire
length. The enclosed sectionson therightbank of the Danube on Hungarian territory
are also significant. However, downstrearnof Gyor the bank is formedby thehigher
gruundof the nearbyfoothillsandthere isthereforeno needfordykes sinceflood waters
arecontainedbythe naturaIterrain.
Man's Intervention
1.25 Accordirigto availableearIy records, atremptsto regdate the
Danubeby the constructionof dykes,the dosing of river branches and the straightening
out of the mainmeandersof the river downstreamof Bratislava cm be tracedback to
the 13th Centurywhen Queen Mary, the wifeof Bela IV, soughtto protect her Mosoniestatesfrom floods. Systematic flood protectiondid .mt however begin untiIthe 17th
Century.
1.2 It is one ofthe paradoxeof floodcontroIdong riverssuch asthe
Danube that the fiood protection rneasurestaken, as weII as those taken tu improve
navigation,havethe eEectofincreasingtherisk offlood downstream" . Artficialworks
that channe1the water into a uniform riverbedboth increasethe velocityof the water
flow and the quantityof waterdescendingsincethereis no natural dispersal.River
regulatory measures taken in the 19th Century in theDanubeabove the Bratislava-
Budapestregion simplyincreasedthe danger of floods in this downstreamsection.
Moreover,the management of theriverintheSlovak-Hungariar negionwas c&d out
on a largelyad hoc basiç at that th, and it was not rrntiI1880 that the centrai
authorities undertook a more concerted andunifiedappruach to regdation, drawingon
the experiencein flood protectionacquiredon otherEuropean rivers by French, Dutch
and Germanengineers.
1.27 Systematk observation of waterconditions and dischargestarted
in Bratislavain 1823, and records are availabledatingfrom 1876. These scientific
observationsshowthat evenin the 19th Century, the extent andfrequencyof summer
floods was beginning to increase. As a resuli,newly constructeddykes could not
withstand increasedwater levelsandfurtherdyke reinforcementswere required. At the
time,the scientifiunderstandingof riverfloodswaslimited and engineering skillsinthe
construction of dykeswere rrndeveloped.The eflectof the dykeworks was simply tu
retain morewater inthe main charnel,withthe resultthat duringthe floodsof 1897 and
1899 recordhigh warer IeveIswere measured and the inundationof 50,000 hectares at
Ci~ovand 10,000 hectaresatLeIpusztaoccurred. With floodscame rîsinground water,
which flooded the plainsalong the river, requiriadditionalmeaçures ofgreat expense
suchas the constmction of drainage canais,outlets and pumpingstationsover a large
portion ofiitny Ostrov. By 1929 therewere 15 such pumpingstations and 435 km of
canalsinthis area.
II
De-forestationtheripperpart of theDanube bahashada simiIareffect siareduction
in treereducesthtopsoi aSlittoreraiaprecipitation. 1.28 The extensivere-inforcementofthe dykesand theîrIinkageinto a
continuous water irnpoundment structure had extrerncly significant hydraulic and
environmenta l pactsthatmay be summarised as f01lows':
- Theprevention of thenaturaldispersalofwater intothe plainand
theconcentrationofwaterflowsinto asinglechannel.
- Increas edlociryof water fiow, leading to erosion of the
riverbeddomstream of Bratislavand depositionof this sediment
downstream of Sap (PdkoviEuvu).
- Raising the riverbedIeveI at Sap (PalkoviEovo),Ieading tu
increasedrivewater IeveIsand£ioodi.ngrisk.
- Transformationof flora and fauna due to changed water
conditions.
1.29 The resulting phenomenaare surnrnarisedby the EC Working
&uup of IndependentExpertsinits reportof 23 November 1992:
"Before the muItipIeirnpoundmentsinthe upperDanubecatchment areas
andthe embankmentand endikementin Austria,Slovakiaand Hungary
the Danube was stiIafiee-flowingbraidedriver with a wide floodplain
that extendedfar beyund the present dikes. The fIoodpIainabçorbed
muchofthe peakfloods,whichconsequentlyweresIowIyrîsingandlong-
Iastinginmost years. Also flow velocities may havebeen lower than
today.
With thepastendikementse ,speciallyduringthelastcentury, floodpeaks
became steeper and higher, floodingmorefrequent butin generalwith a
shorter duration. The originalzonationin vegetationtowards higher
gruunds and associated forestswas largely 'diked'out of the system.
Most of the higher, no longer flooded soiIs, were converted into
agricultural lands.Although some remnantsof thesewoods are still
existing,especiaIIyontheHurigarianside thelands in between the dikes
were consequentIyflooded more often and the river armsdushed and
scouredmorei~itensivel~ ".~
12
Theseimpactsalsostemmedfromnavigationl orkandtheintensificatofagricuItuand
forestryproductinths regiooftheDanube.
13
ECWorlungCroupReport of23 November1992,Annex 12,ap.15. The 1954and 1965 Fioods
1.30 In 1954, andagain in 1965, devasrating floods occurred that
demonstratedthat inthisstretchotheDanubetraditiond mmhodsof floodcontrol were
ineffectuai.Thesetwo floodswillbe describedherebecause they pruvïdedmuchof the
impetus forthe deveIopment of the scheme that becarnthe G/N Project in th1977
Treaty. Indeed,the designoftheagreedProject resulteto asignificantextenfrom the
informationderivedfromthese floods.
1.1 The 1954 flood devastated the Hungarian side of thDanube,
causingdamageamounting toUS$ 1.5billion,dueto breaksin the dykesinthreeplaces
alongthe nghtbank'" Aithoughthe fac trat the breaksoccurreon the Hungarianside
sparedthe SIovakside from surfaceflood waters, the leakagof undergroundwaters
underthe lefi bankdykesystem, togetherwiththetrappingof internawaters thatcould
not drain away into the Danube, led tu theinundation of some10,000 hectares in
SIovakia,destroyingthecropsthere-5).
1.32 The 1954 floodledto extensivereinforcementof the dykesalong
both banks of the Danube and along its tributarie. he heightof the dykes were
increased allowing fora new safety margin of 1.2- 1.5m,the existingdykes were
reinforced and new dykes were constmcted. The length of the new dyke system
protectingiitny Ostrov wassome 195km. Downstream of Komamo the dyke system
was now 59 km long, whiIsra further40 km of dykes Iinedthe leftbank tributaries.
FinaIIy23 km of dykes stretchedhm Bratislava to the border with Hungary onthe
rightbank. In aI1,some145,000 hectaresoflandwere protected in zitn* Ostrowhilst
40,000 hectareswere protectedinotherregions lnaddition,new drainagecanalswere
excavated where interndwaters hadcauaedflooding. ,
1.33 Inthe followingyears,inundationwas largeIycontrolled,although
therewas a severefloodin 1963.But, inJune1965,thetemtory of Slovakia was stnick
by a devastating flood. The combinationof exceptionallyhigh rainfall and the late
meltingofwinter snows inthe Alpscreated acatastrophicflood wavethat led to breaks
inthe dykes nearthe Slovakvillagesof ~i~ovoand Patince. The extent of its effectsare
shownon Illus. No. 15 asweIIas on photographs appearinghere atIllus. No17(A-Dl.
In the periodMach-JuIy 1965 theflow ofthe riverthrough BratisIawas almost equal
tu thetotalaverage flowof the Danubeina normalyear. Some 65,000 hectaresonthe
14 ~svAnyrar6,kbadakandDmakilii.S@111y ppd brpiacnmfm toihcIntrrnntl oirtofJustice ILLUSTRATION NO. 15ÇperiiUgprrputd f~ prroentaiiontuthhieriutioni1CourtofJustice.
LLUSTRATTON NO. 17Aprrpd for prcé~niafZothelahrnitimaCourofJwiicc. ILLUSTRATION NO. 17BSpedaiîyprrpmtdprrscatPH1theInkmalional Courtof lustice. ILLUSI NO. 17C --..
<&, , ;Y-,, ,
k. .:.,.. :
<+ ' >,,. : ..,
:,':9 : , ., 'iLr "
- :%!i>
%-,"r;;+,$;,--y ,,"". i
' , - ,8.::<,L' . <>,
a -*s7 + , 1'
-'*rw~3< A -
i,: .%Slovak sideof the riverwereflooded;53,693 inhabitantsof 49 viIIagesand sertlements
were evacuated.The flood destroyednearIy4,000 houses and damaged a firther6,000
or more. Some66,000 farm animalswerekilled and another200,000evacuated" .The
floodreachedthe streetof Bratislava. Totaldamagecalculatedwasintheorder of US$
833 million(Czechoslovak Crowns 6 billion)16. At thsame time, serious damageto
agriculturalindresultedfiomfloodingbygroundandinterna1waters on both the Slovak
and Hungarian sides. InSlovakia,114,000 hectaresofproducinglandweresaturated.
In Hungary,the damage amouited to US% 164 miIIion(1.5 billionforints). allthe
1965 flood isreckoned as the greatest naturd disastto affectSlovakiain modern
times.
1.34 The 1954 and 1965 fluods,together with experience gauied
during severefloodsin 1929, 1947 and 1963rshowedthat traditionalmethods of flood
controlwere insufficientinthisregionofthDanube. Thegeologicalcomposition ofthe
substratspermitted rapid ground water flowithrough highlypermeablegrave1layers.
Thus, attimes of flooding,Ieakageeven into thoseareaçprotected by dykesoccurred,
undermining the surfaceson whichthe dykesrested. In spite ofthe flood protection
worka carriedout afterthe 1954flood,thepercentageof sectionswith leakagproblems
increas feud 37% to67%. AI1the previous experienceshuwedthat the improvement
of dyke souIdnot respond tuthe urgent needto protect the territory. New solutions
werethereforerequiredthat dîd notdependsoIeIyon dyke prorectioand thataddressed
the particularproblemsof flood control in this section of the Danube. These solutions
were incorpuratedinto theGM Project which, based ona great ded of study and
extensiveinterpretationof previousfloodevents,providedinter forathe dissipationof
flood watersthrough a precisewater regulationsystemand the constructionof dykes
withundenvatersealingscreensto preventseepagel'.
B. Navigation
1.35 A year before adoptioof the GN Project in th1977 Treafy,
Czechoslovakiaand Hungary entered into the 1976 Boundary Waters Management
Agreement. There,agreement was reachedasto certain regularoryrneasrrrestu be taken
coveringthe water regime of the Danube and its tributaries in the region where these
15 Theanimalstransportoutof theregionwereasfollow35,75 9ows,58,04pigs,83,000
chicken8,700sheep654goatsand394horses.
16 -ee,Annex13,explainingtmethodofcalculatiinUS$.
17 See,paras.2.80-2.81,below.
-form theboundarybetweenthe two States.InAnicle i3(1) ofthe 1976Agreement, the
I
pariiesagreedto abideby the recommendations of the DanubeCommissionconcerning
navigation parameters adopted pursuanto the 1948 banube Conventionregarding the
I
regime ofnavigationon theDanube. ThisConventionwaIconcIudedbysevenDanubian
States,includingbothCzechoslovaki andHungaryand ratifiedbyrhemin 1949".
1.36 In Article 3 of the 1948 ~adube Convention, the signatories
undertookthe foIlowingobligations:
Article3
1
"TheDanubian Staresunderidce tomaintainth~irsecrionsofthe Danube
ina navigableconditionfor river-goinand,UT the appropriatesections,
for sea-going vessels,to carry out the vrks necessary for the
maintenance and improvement of neatioq conditions and mt tu
obstnict or hindernavigatioon the navigablqchanneisof the Danube.
The Danubian StatesshaIIconsult the DanubeCommission (art5) on
rnattersreferretointhisartide.
The rîparîanStatesmaywithintheirownjurisd/ctionundertake workifor
the maintenanceof navigation,the executioof which isnecessitatedby
urgent and unforeseen circumstances. ~he States shall inform the
Commissionof the reasonswhich have necessitatedthe worksa,nd shall
furnishasumrnarydescriptionthereof."
AlthoughrecornrnendationsissuedbytheDanube Commission were not, under the 1948
I
Danube Convention,mandatory for the DanubianStpu, the technical and ecunomic
impact of irs recommendations, pariicuIarIy in the area of navigation safetywas
unquestioned;and, in the 1976 Agreement (Article I1. CzechosIovakiaand Hungary
specificallcommitted thernselvesto maintain and mark the watenvay and to fix the
navigationroute in their sector of the Danubein accokdancewirhthe recummendations
of the DanubeCommission.
1.37 In its recommendations,the Danube Commission established
parametersforthe navigationchannelin eachparticul,!section of the Danube according
1
to varying conditionsof discharge,the prevailinggeomorphologyand any engineering
w~rks'~. The parametersrecommended by the ~an?be Commission for the Slovak-
18
Gemany andAmtriasubsequentiaccederothe~onvkn~on.
19 1
-ee, Recommandations ReIatiàeI'EtabIissem+es Gabaritsdu Chenal, dOuvrages
Hydratechni etAutressurIDanube,Budapest1988,Annex 14.These recommendarions
weredevelopedinstagesandapprovedbythe ~ondisçion aits XVIIIm, XXI,XXIII,
XXXVII and XLV sessions. -29-
Hungariansectorare setout inthe followingtable2':
Minimumparameters Sectionswithnatural Sectionswith artificially
ofnavigationroute regimeof flwat impoundedwater Ievel
minimum discharge at minimum discharge
depth width radius depth width radius
m m m m m m
Sect.Devinlrkml8801 2.5 150a 1000 3.5 150 1O00
-KI.NemA:rkm 17901 100b
120c 750d 750 d
Sect.KI.Nedrkm
17901-Ipellrkm1708 2.5 180 a 1000 3.5 180 1O00
100 b
150c 750d 200e 750d
The mostimportant of the requirements setout above is that a minimumnavigation
depth of2.5 metreshadto beguaranteedduringlownavigabledischargein conditionsof
a natural flow regime, that is, where the river fiisnot elevated by engineering
structures.
1.38 Even though the length of the Slovak, Slovak-Austrian and
Slovak-Hungaria n anubereachis reiativelyshort, this172 km, it containsections
and localitieswith very different characteriaticw The character of these sections is
determinedby both geornorphulogicalpecuIaritiei.e n.t,rd conditionswhich cannut
be alteredand by humanactivitieswhich haveled tu the modificationof the riverbed.
Pnor tu theGIN Project,this sector of the Dmube containedsome 15sha1Iowssections
where the minimumrequireddepth was not met by a shortfa1of between 0.8and I.O
metres whileinthedock basinsthenavigationdepthfailedbyup to1.5 metres.
During the design phase oftheGiN Project and earlier,it had
1.39
becorne clearthat, asin the case of flood protection considered above, traditional
rnethods of deaiing with navigational hazards were insuficient and extratirdinariIy
expensive. The history of modern atternpts to regdate navigationin this region
iIIusrratesthisBetween 1886 and 1896, importantworks were buiIt dong the river
between rkm 1880 (Devin Gate) and rkm 1747 toassuresafe navigationconditionat
mean water IeveIs. At the beginning ofthisCentury, the riparian States sought tu
20
Note:
b- sectionwirockbottomegrbottomofthe riverbed
c- forsectiowithrasidegradabLboiiom
d - sectiowithinconverrientgeomorphoIogy
c- in tcrimes.establishsafe conditio at low water level, and a sbes of measureswere taken to
artempt tuachievetlIisaim:
-
CIosing of river branchessu asto direct the flow intone main
straightenedchanneI;
- Fortîficationof rivbank wsithhuneand concreteworks;
- Dredgingof grave1on therivergottom;
- Placing reguIating dykes {or groynes) in the riverbed to
concentratethe flowintothe navigationchanneI;
Dredgingof movingsandbarrks.
1.40 Aside from theirhigh cost,thede masures were not effectiveto
imprave navigationon a long-term basis. By considerablyaltering the river'snatural
I
flow, they producedserious side effecton the surroundingenvironment,giving risein
particulartuchangesinground waterlevels, as discussedin SectionZ(D)bdow. In the
I
meantirne,technicalprogress andmodernisationinriver transport,tonnage increasesand
demands for greater profitability Ied tu the continuousneedto improve navigational
I
conditionshm the standpointofboth safetyand economy.
1.41 The most impoflant physicalîApediment to navigation was the
I
decrease inthe gradientintheDanubedownstream ofBratislava tu about one quarter of
the upstream gradient. This Ied tu the formation inrfiisregion of shalIowsor "ford
sections"full of navigationalhazards. ThemainnverbeI becorneswider and the river
startsto meander, depositing and re-sitinlargegrave1idands as it fluws. The actuaI
navigation channel, however,was reduced: depths we!e less than therecornmended 2.5
rn atlow dischargeandnavigationwidth less than 120 m. The Danube Commission
1
classifiethispartof the Danube as one ofthe threemost difficultsectionsto navigate
aIongthe entire~anube~l.
1.42 In the 1960s, grave1dredging &as thought to be the solution to
the problern of deposition (caused by the factthit more sediment settledin the
21 Sincethesigningofthe 197Treatythe mcuitieaatltheothetwosection(atSulina-Braila
in the DanubeDeltaborderitheBlack Seaandin the IroGatesaor betweenYugoslavia
and Romania)havebeenresolved. 1.47 The çcopeof the problem facedby the partietothe 1977 Treaty
maybe seeninthe fact thatinthe Bratislavasectionof the river,the minimumnavigation
depth of2.5 m wasguaranteedin tems of navigabiedaysforjust 51% of 1984 andjust
40% of 1991. The percentageavailabilifor each yearfrOm 1980 tu1991 is shown in
the foIIowingtable:4
Year Percentageof dayswith fulnavigation
possibiIiat Bratislava
1.48 The ongoing nature of the difficultyin maintainingserviceable
navigationconditionswas attestedtat a meetingof the technicalexpertsof the Danube
Commission, held7-15 December 1992. The expertsnoted not only the difficultyof
navigation in the Bratislava-Nagymarossectionofthe riverbut also the heightened
importanceofmaintaininganopenwatenvay inthe lightofthe Danube-Main-Rhinelink:
"La rkuniona notéque ces dernièreannées sur Iessecteurs non éclusés
du Danube, surtout dans des corrditionsde basses-eaux dues A la
sécheresselesgabaritseffectifsdu chenainer6pondaientpaspendant100
i205 jours paran a ceux exigés parIes "RecommandationsrelativesB
I1etablissementesgabaritsdu chenal, des ouvrages hydrotechniqueet
autressur IeDanube" de la Commissiondu Danube surtout en ce qui
concernelesprofondeurs.
Pendant Iapériod ee basniveauxsur une sériede seuiIs(y compridans
Ie secteuBratislav-Naparus) les profondeursminimaétaientjusqu'à
13 -14 dm.
La riunion attire l'attentionde IaCommissidu Danubesur le fait que
suiti l'ouverturdu canalMain-Danubelesprofondeursinsufisantes sur
le Danubelimiterontlanavigationsur tout le parcours de laIiaison-hin
Main -Danube.
24 TheEC WorlungGroupReportof23November1992,atp.22Annex 12. La réunionprie avec insistance la Cinquante-et-uniemesession de
recommander aux autoritécompétentesdes p\ys danubiensde prendre
les mesuresnécessairesen wie d'uneaméliorationdes conditionsde la
navigationsur le Danube en conformitavec l'arti3lde la Convention
relativaurégime dela navigationsurle~anubb(Belgrade1948) et avec
les"Recommandation rslativeà l'établissements gabaritdu chenal,
desouvrages hydrotechniqueset autressur leDanube"adoptéespar la
Commissiondu ~anube~ "
Translation
"Themeetingnoted that,in recentyearsin the Son-impoundedsectors of
the Danubeand, pariicuIarIyduringp&ods of1,owwater dueto dmght,
the operabledimensionsof the navigationchfmel did not cornplyfor
between 100 and200 daysperyear with the reyuirementsof the Danube
Commission's "Recummendatiuns relatingtu ,the establishmentof the
dimensionsof the navigatiochannel,ofhydroTechnica and other works
onthe Danube",particuIarIwithregard tu thedepthrequirements.
I
Dunng periods oflowwaterlevels-in a serieOf fordsections(includîng
in the BratislavdNagynaros sector),the minimudepths were down tu
I.3-1.4rn.
The meeting drawsthe attention of th~anubk Commission to the fact
that, follo$ng the opening of the ~aîn-~anle canal,the insuficient
depths in the DanubewiIIfimitthe navigationaIona11the Iengthof the
The meetingstronglyrequeststhe fifiy-fisessionto recommendto the
comptent authoritiesof theDanubeStates to,takethe necessarysteps
with a view to improvingconditionson the Qanube in confomity with
article 3 of the Convention regardingthregime of navigationon the
Danube (Belgrade 1948) and withthe "Recomhendationsrelatingto the
establishment of the dimensions of the navigation channel, of
hydrotechnicaiand otherworks on the Danube"adopted by the Danube
Commission." 1
I
149 The poornavigationconditionsalong theBratislava-Nagymaros
stretch were tolerated by the Czechoslovakand ~bn~arian authorîties only in the
expectation of the implementationof the G/N Prpject, under which navigational
obstacles would be cornpletely removed. The ir$mssibility of guaranteeing the
recommendedconditions for navigationby other meanswas also confirmedby the
Danube ~ommission~~.Moreover,it rnustbe rerneibberedthat throughout the period
leadingupto the plannedimplementation ofthe GM project the intensityoFnavigation
26 -ee,para5.143etsq.,beIow. Europe
OenmaN
ma
USSR PERCENTAGE OF USE OF
Greece
Portugal
8uig~t~
Cwtho~akia
Poland
JSA
Germsny
S*nzerbnd hie llrhon 1W3
LK
France 7
Spedally preparedfor ptothe InternatioofJustice. ILLUSTRATION NO, 19
1.52 Hungary,exploitsverylittleof iis hydroelectricotentialwhereas
Switzerlandexploits nearly 75% of such potentiadand Austriaover 67%. The
comparativeuse of hydroelectric potentialby counties in Europe and elsewhere is
l
show on the graphappearing above as UIus.No. 19. The graph shows, fir hattthe
reIativeIyshort sectionof the Danube, ssharein pariwith Hungary, representsaround
one-quarier of Slovakia'overd1hydroelectricpotential. Second,it shows that throrrgh
I
operation of the GabEikovo faciIitySIovakia isbrought up to about the average of
European use of hydroelectricpuwer potential.Third,it showsthatHungaryhas IargeIy
trirned awayfromhydroeIectricpower. In fact, it appearshm the InternationalEnergy
Agency'slatest reporton Hungarythat this countryha!moved towards nuclearpower as
I
its primarysource of energy:
I
"Brown coal and Iignite predominated in the 1950s and '60s. An
important penetrationof fueloil and natural gas occurred in the '70s.
Nuclear energyenteredthe çystem in theearIy'80s and to some extent
has displacedal1fuels,butespeciallyfueloiP ."
This shifkis showninpercentage terms in thefollowinbtable. The years1975 and 1989
are considered,being the respectiveyears in which Hungarîanapproval of the G/N
Project was sanctionedandinwhichit-suspended itspIrformanceof the 1977 Treaty:
29
InternationalnergyAgency,EnergyPolici~un~ad, 1991Surveyatp.63,Annex16. Lignite - oal FueI OiI Natural Gas NucIear
7975(%) 15.6 47.7 23.8 19.6 '0.0
I989(0/6) 9.4 24.2 5.4 21.5 39.6
The reasonfor the markedincreasein nuclearpower is the commissioriinof four 440
MW pressurised w'aterreactorsofthe SovietVVERtypebetween 1983 and 1987.
1.53 The rele~anceof this referencetoHungary'senergy policies is
.simplythat in 1977 itagreed tb deveIopits hydroeIectr-cpotential in the joiG/N
Projectwith Czechoslovakia. Sice thatdate,it appearto havemade politicaldecisiuns
to invesinother forms of energ production. Insofaassuch aIIocatioof resourcesdid
not impedethe fulfilmentofHungary's 1977Treatyobligaîionsit cannot bcthe subject
of comment. Butthis isnot whathas happened.It would appearfiomthe Declaration
by Hungary on 16May 1992 (the "1992 ~eclaration")'~that Hungaryno longer needs
the additionalelectricd power that the G/Project would haveprovided;and in any
eventit spentits resourceson otheformsof energyproduction. It is anywayclearfrom
the 1992 Declaration that,startingin the early 1980s, Hungaryexperiencedhancial
diiculties imeeting itobligationsunderthe 1977Treaty.
1.54 In contrast,Slovakiahas takenthe decisito followthe leadof
its neighboursand to exploit itshydroelectricpotential. of 1990it employedover
30% of such potential. The additionof theGabEikovo hydroelectricplant hasbrought
thisfigureup to 52.6%. In1992,govemental approval was givento a schemeto build
an extensivenetwork of srnaIhl ydroelectricplanon rivers in Slovakiamountainous
northern regions,tu corneirit.productionbefore 2005. Thiswil enable Slovakiato
rrtiIisealrnost 78% itstotal hydroelectricpotential. The reasons for this policyare
simple:frrs Slo,akiaconsiders such utilisatiotu becost effective; second, SIovakia
namrally wishesro benefithm naturalrenewabIeresourceswithin its buundaries;and
m, itwishes tureduce reliance on imported frrdand tu optimise the use of cIean
energyresources3'.
1.55 The equivdent consurnption in coaI of SIovakia's total
hydroelectric potentiaI is 9.8 miIIiontonnes per annum. This representsalmost double
30 Declaralion of Gwernmtnl d the HungarianRepublic the teminatioof the1977
Treav,15May 1992,Annex 17atpp.3- 5.
31
-ee,theDeclarationof theEnerFm concernintheputtinofthe hydroelectricpower
planGaMikov ntooperation,1990,AnnexIB(TranslatbyHumgay). Slovakia'scurrentcoalproduction,whichis expectedIodeclineto 3.6milliontonnesper
yearin 2005. If Slovakiawishedto replacethis potendiatlhroughits coalbumingplants,
it would not onlybe forced to exploitone of its fed non-renewableresources but to
importheavily also. Alternativelyto produce thishydroefectricpotential, Slovakia
wouldhaveto quadrupleitsproduction of electricitybrneansofimported naturalgasor
I
toimport andprocess 25.27 tonnesofnuclearhel perWear.
I
l
1.56 Hydroelectricityby contrast represents Slovakia'sgreatest
resource for energyproduction. SIovakiahas adegree of selfsuficiencyinthisarea in
I
that it hasdevelopedextensive technicalexpexîencefnd isin a positiontu employits
own specialists fur the design, construction and &ration of hydroelectnc plants.
Certain equiprnein stnot manufactureclIoîally, bvt this may be imponed hm
neighbouring countriesinparîiculartheCzech~e~ubhc andAustria,which is preferable
tu the importationof nuclear fuels,naturalgas or poal hm more distant locations.
Findly, themove to hydroelectricpower may facilitatethe phaîingoutofold fossilfuel
andother plantsinorder tu contributeto acleaneren$ronment.
he Sinkingof theRiverbedand Subsesuent Lowering of the
R GroundWaterTabIe 1
1.57 Interms of the problemsexistkg priorto the GM Project, the
issuesofwater flowintheDanubeandthe environmentare directlylinked. As discussed
l above,flood controland navigationmeasureshad led Itothe loweringof the river water
leveldownstreamof Bratislava, leadingin turntoa rdductionin the levelof the ground
1
water table and therefore to a harmfulimpact both on the riverineecosystemsand to
agriculturafand forestryproductionin iitni Ostrovand Szigetkoz The causesof this
Group of Monitoring and Water
decrease have been surnmarised by the EC Working
ManagementExperts intheir reportof 2 ~ovember 1993 :
"The main charnel has been significantlylowdreddue to erosion caused
by acombinationofseveralmanmadefactors:
I
- dam construction in Austriain the l$st decades resulting ina
sediment(inparticularbedload)deficit;.
I
- excavationof gravel; - preventionofbankerosion duetu fortificationofriverbanka.
UntiIthe dammingof the Danube,erosiontook placebetween Bratislava
and Dunaremete. Similariy,sedimenttitiunoccurred downstream of Sapl
PalkoviEovo.
In some placesthe rivebed haabeenlowered morethan two meterssince
the 1960ts,IeadingtuIowergruund water IeveIsoccasional dryhg out of
riverbranches (cg. downstream ofBratislava)andIess flushingof most
riverbranches. Thelowering ofthe riverbedduringthe past30 yearshas
been particuldy large between Bratislavaand Rajka 115 km tu the
south]. It is estimatedto be about 0.8meter at GabÇikovo and near
BratislavaaboutI.5 mete?' ."
1.58 The lowering of the Danube'swater leveiwas accompaniedby a
decliningground water tablewhich had a particularlysevere impact in ternisof the
dryingout of wetlandwood areas. The conditions were no Iongersuitablefor water
supplythrough capillaryrisefiornthe low ground water tables,and more irrigationwas
neededthroughoutthe westernpartsof both iitny Ostrovand Szigetkoz. The negative
influenceof ground water decrease can still be seen on the woods in areas close to
Bratislava where around 500 hectares of forestryhave driedup altogether. The
disappearanceofwetlandwoodson both sidesof the Danubeseemed tobe unavoidable,
a situation closely resemblingwhathappenedto the Rhine inlanddelta in the previous
century. As a result of thisgroundwater decrease, areasof softalluvialforest were
being repiacedby hard alluvialforest or by cultivatedpoplar and white willow. Thus
many natural forestwere replacedby plantations,where introduced strains of poplar
have beenrrsed.
1.59 The situationwas wmmented on bythe EC Fact FindingMission
on Varianr"C" of theGabCikovo-NagpamsProjectin itsreportof 31Octuber 1992:
"Finally,it is importatoemphasize th& the environmentalconditionsin
certainrespectsaredeterioratingtoday due tu river bederusion and thus
Iowergrorrnd water tables (declinvaryingfromapproximatdy 2 m over
the last 30 years near Bratislava tu approximately status quo near
KomArno).Thus,the riversidevegetationis slowlydryingout resrrltingin
significant changes in vegetation speciesetc, and the conditions for
32
ThisEC Working Group >vasformedofessentidlthe samepersonne1asfie EC Working
Groupof Indqendent Expertsrefertoin para.I.I9, abo&e. AssessrnenofImriacsof
GabEkovo ProiecandRcccimmcndaitnsforSrem htninnof MonitoringSvstem,2 November
1993 (the"EC WorkingGroup reprt of 2 Novernber19937, Annex 19, pp.24-25.
DunaremeteisjusupstreamofSap(PrtlkoviEwo). agricultural water supply through capillary $se hm the low ground
water tables are no longer good enough and hence moreirrigation is
required. It is realizedthat suddechangesas a consequenceof e.g the
GabCkovo-Nagyrnarosprojed will occur imthediately, and that it will
take some tirneuntila new eîological balancedevelops. However. the
"status quo"situationli.e. me-damconditions)is neithera stationarynor
a natural situation.but rither a lslowerl tdnsition fiom one cultural
landscapeto another one withthe inherentconsequences of this on the
ecologicalconditions33."
1.60 This situation was also refle&edin the result of the' parties'
research projects into the riverine ecusystem. Since the beginning of the I950s,
I
extensive researchtu compile an inventoq of the bioIogica1diversityof the territory
aIong the Danube (plan and animd species,commünities and ecosystems)has been
carriedout. Resulrs indicat teatthenaturd floodplkn forestof theDanube wasbeîng
I
repIacedbycultivated furestsof introduced poplarsubIecttu forestmanagement.Ut her
changes in wiIdIife and flora were caused by water management and man-rnade
structures, preventingnaturalflooding,preventingthehow of waterin the rivebrancher
and alsochangingthe waterqualitythere.
1.61 The centrai depression of the Danube Lowlandis made up of
water bearing sedimentswhich,intheir deepestsections, reach thicknessesof 300 m or
more. These sedirnentsconsititute one of the moit importantaquifercomplexes in
I
Central Europe. In terms of the rechargeof this aquifer,the dorninatingfactor is the
Danube. It influences the intensof aquiferrechdge (by infiltrationthe speed and
direction of ground water flow and also the chemicaIcomposition of the water in the
aquifer. Thus, interms ofthewater qudityinthe aquifer,waterqualityinthe Danube is
the major factor.
I.62 As aresult of thdecrease inthklevelof the,l3anuw betess,the
conditionsfor the rechargeof the aquiferand its watérsupplywellsweredeterîorating.
Duringthe 1980s, it was recordedthat the intensityoinatural waterinfiltrationfromthe
Danube had decreased by as much as 20% in sbme areas. A reduction in the
productivityof water supply wellswas evident,partjcularlyin the upper part of iitng
"
Again, thir reporr was mrnpiled by essentidlysamelpersonnelas theEC Groiipof
Independent Experts refeIoin para. 1.19,abovSeeE.C FactFindingMissionReporton
Varian"C" oflthGabElkmo-NawarosProject @lis'siReport), 3Octaber1992 (the "EC
FactFindingMissionreparto31Oclober1992'7,Adex 20,af p.13(emphasiastdded).
IOstrov where ground water levelshad decreasedby up to 2 m in the 30 years since
1960. The qualityof groundwater was intluencedbymanyfactors, the principalbeing
humanpollution". In recentdecades the penetrationofpollutionfiom the surfacehas
caused the increase of chlorides,sulphates and nitrates in the uppemost zonof the
aquifer. Funher pollutionhasbeencausedby nitrates,coming especiallyhm the use of
agriculturafertiIisers.
Agriculture
1.63 In terms of its agriculture,thetemtory of Ztng Ostrov has
remained oneof the hast productiveregions ofSIovakia.But sirikuigwatwlevelshave
alsohad a significanchm due ta gound warer leversdrupping inplaces below the
topsoillayer. Szigetkoz(in Hungary) isalsoan agriculturallyproductivregion,but it,
too, has been affectednegativelyby the reductionin the levof thewater table in the
last three decades.In any event, the upper partsof iitny Ostrov and Szigetkoz are
characterîsedbythe scarciiyof rnoisturoverthe gruwingseason, caused by insuficient
naturd precipitation,whichis unevedy distnb~ttdduringthe year. Over Iong periods
without precipitationand atIower dischargesin the Danube,crops were often aRected
by insufficientmoisture,resultingin crop yieldsdecreasingsometimesby as muîh as
80%.
1.64 It wasthereforenecessarytadevelopextensiveirrigationsystems.
A comprehensiveschemewaslaiddown in 1950,whenit wasdecidedthat about 75,000
hectares in SIovakiahad to Iseirrigated. However, it was fuund thatthere were no
existingwater resourcestomeet thisgoal.Funher irrigationschemesweredeveloped in
1964, 1967, 1976 and 1980,the aim being to provideirrigation systems for 24,000
hectaresby 1980 and for51,000 hectaresthereafter.
1.65 The importanceofprovidingnew suppliesof water tuagricrrltura1
areasinthis regionwasais increased by predictiunsufclirnatic changecontairiedithe
forecast for hydroclirnatic developments uvsr the next decades. A decrease in
atmospheric precipitationhas beenpredictedinthis regioand confirmed by analysesof
the trend of temperaturesand precipitation recordedat meteorological stationsin iitny
Ostrov. Thus,inorderto maintainagriculturap lroduction,iwas althe morenecessary
34 See,para. 3.1,m., below,foadrscusion otheanernpttoaddrestheproblemofwater
pollutiwithintheProject. tu addressthe problernsof sinkinggrounwater 1eveisand insuficient water resources
for irrigationneeds.
TheDanubeBranches and the SideArrn Svstem
1
1.66 Due tu the lowenngof the nderbed south of Bratislava, water
I
l flowintu both thMosoni Danubeand the Ma& DanubewasgraduaIIy cnrtailed. These
branchestake theiflow hm the Danube and,as the(leuelof waierintheDanubefell,
the entry pointsinto the branchecame only to recéiveflow duringhigh discharges.
Fromthe mid 1970s,theMali Danubeshowed aclear!decreasingtrendand theMosoni
~anube was receivingnoflowfiornthe main Channeflor approximatel3y00 daysper
year-&, oniy whennear floodIeveIswerereachedinthe Daube. Ineach riverbranch
thisledtu amarked drop inwaterflowratesandthereforewaterquaiity.
1.67 A similaimpactwas felt inthesidearm systemwhere the water
flowwas reduced to sucha levelthattheriverbrancheswere slowlydisappearingin the
samemanner as had occurredin thebranch systernsbfthe River hin ne" .he Rhine
delta and its branchesoriginallyfolloweda pattern siPtorrhatof the Danube. Its
branchesbegan todisappearat leasthala centu~ybefh a similaprocersbegan on the
Danube sinceworks tocreatea "unitecl"riverbeciikeRhine had stanedearlier. The
I
similârityof the pattern foIIowedby each of these risshown in Illus. Nos. 20(A)
and(BI).
1.68 In itnaruralstate,the Rhine,likethe Danube, did na have a
I
stable rîverbed andtbedchanged aRereach flood. Thipresent aemajorprobIernfor
international navigation.The narrowing of the &bed ~mied out to irnprove
I
navigation in the 19th Centrrq increasedthe flowgradient on the Rhine triggered
erosion activity.The bed became substantiallydeeper,bringingabout the gradua1
isolation and disappearancof rnost branches.~his development is shown in Illus.
2û(B), whichshows the branchesofonesectionofthelRhinein 1780 andagainin 1915.
Althoughthe same pattern appearsinIllus.No. 20(A),howinga sectionofthe Danube,
as theGN Project developed, SIovaLa and Hungarywere abIe to beriefihm the
knowledgeand experienceacquiredinrelationto the&ne. One of the objectivesofthe
GN Projectas ithas evoived isto reversethe trendthat was causing the Danube
35 The Danubehastwo mainbrancheinUus regiothe~ali Danubeandthe MosoniDanube.
The sidam ÇvstemisformedosmaIIebranches,Iocatedtheirnmediatefloadpl5fthe
main riverIn the dessnption of thesetemseYsidem" and "branchesare usedbranchesand sideams to dry upand topreventa repetitionofthe disappearancoef the
Rhinebranchsystem on SIovak andHungarian temtory.
1.69 The section of the Danube downsrream of Bratislava still
preservesan extensiveriverbranch systemalthough, priorto the inceptionof the G/N
Project,thiswas slowlydisappearingdueto the channellinof waterflowinto onemain
riverbed. In morerecent times, the situation of the Danube floodplain startedto
deterioratrapidlyas thebranches wereisolated,that isthewere deliberatelyseparated
by dykesfromthe mainchannel.Whilemeasurement in 195911960showedthateven at
minima flow in the mainDanubechannelapproximately 100m31o sf water stillflowed
thruugh the river branches,justtwenty years later these brancheswere completely
isolatechm the fiveduringal1flows oflessthan2000 m3k. The brancheswere fully
active only during flowsabove 4000 m3is Thus, the nemork of sidearms - so
importantto the fIoodpIaiecoIogy -was hIIy activefor about20 days ayear ody and
waswhoIIyisoIated hm theDanubeduring atIeasthdf ofthe year.
1-70 As aconsequence,the waterconditionsin these riverams were
poor. Due tu the lowvelocitieof flowand longpends of stagnation,thewaterqudity
of the sidebranchesdifferedradicallyfromthaof the mainDmube charnel. The water
inthe brancheswas characterisedby highalkalicontent,highorganicmatter and low or
zero oxygen content. The self-cleaningabilityof the river branch system was
substantiaIIyimpaired. Sedirnentationwas not washed out of the branchesand large
quantitiesof the ground waterin the adjacentareasweredegradedas the poor quality
waterinfiItratedinto the aquifer. Aa result,plansfor anew water supplyworksat
Dobroho~fwereabandoneddueto highlevelsof nitriteand ammoniumsalts foundin the
ground waterthat hadinfiltratefrornthesideam system.
1.71 1t ibeyond questionthat the current conditionof the Danuband
itsfioodplain is the result of centuries of human intervention.is ariver thathas
contributed greatly tu the developmeritthe States sharing the Danubebasin. It is a
river that has been extensivelyutiIisedfor navigation, water supply,fishing and more
recently for hydroelectricpower production and other purposes. This utilisationhas
greatlyalteredthe flowcharacteristisftheDanube.
1.72 It isequallybeyondquestionthat whenevermeasuresare takento
modiQ the flow of a river,as contemplated by the GIN Project, there will beenvironmenta elffects,someadverse. This is true oi11 1rojectson riverssuch asthe
Danubeor theRhine. Oneimportant factorin theprl lent caseis that thsame modem
technoIogythat has madepossiblecornplexriver pro :ctshm aIso Iedtu techniquestu
measure the envirumental impacts andtu avoid,offs , mitigate,or rernedy To
theextentcertaineflects areirreversibl- forexampie whereit isneceçsarytu trmsform
the Iandinorder tu accommodate dams,dykeaandrei :moirs- thesearematters that are
the subjectof poIiticaIchoiceby theaffectedcouritfit tu be weighedin the balance of
competingconsiderations and priorÎties.
36 Inthe EC Fact Finding Missrepn of 31Oclober 992, iwas concIudeatp.II that"rhe
envirmen~d impactsofreducing thedtschargeinieDanube are negrive, unIesç proper
remdiai acîionare raken". Annex 20 (ernphasiiadded). Its approacwas thus that
rom in ChapterV beiow, suchimpacts
environmenta1impaccd bemitigatedAswiIIbe
werededtrvitinthecourseoftheG/N Projectanw ia greatdeaofsuccess. CHAPTERIr. THE PROPOSEDSOLUTION:THEG/N PROJECT
2.01 The G/N Project has cost Czechoslovakia and the Slovak
RepublicUS $2.6 billion(Cz Crowns24.3 billion)to date. The largerpart ofsumis
hasbeen devotedto constructionbuta verysignificanportionhas alsobeen spenton
design,research,environmentaand other studies. The reasforthis hugeinvestment
intoresearch works is thatinsigriingthe1977 Treaty, the partieswere not çimply
estabIishingthe Iegbasisfora joint hydruelectricpro-ebut weredso puttinginto
place what they considered to be the best means of soIving the environmentd,
navigationalandotherproblemsinthisectionoftheDanube.
2.02 The choiceofthe GINSystem was not arbitra noyw,asitan il]-
consideredemanationof the politiof theera. Itwasthe resultof more than twenty
years of detailed research carried out by the most prestigious institutions in
Czechoslovakiaand Hungaryand, in addition,by speciallyestablishedjoint bodies. In
this period, 25 possibleindividualschemeswere conside,achwith its ownserieof
variant+. Thus, in total, more thm one hundred differentproject designswere
2.03 The constmction of a riverstep in the Nagymarosarea ofthe
Danube was first activeIyconsîderedbHungary in the immediatepost WorIdWar Ii
period, beforetheCommunistParty came tu puwel. When, in the early 1950's
Czechoslovakia began to examinethe possibility of development of the Danube
I downstreamof Bratislava,the two Statesmetto considerwhetherajoint projectwould
leadto a moreharmonisedand practicabledevelopment. A JointExpert'sCommission
1
was formedin 1952 and detailednegotiationsbegan at this date. Duringthe yearsthat
followed,Hungary was a forceful partyat the negotiation table, pushfor equal
1 sharing ofthe power productdat the hydroelectricplants,althoughCzechoslovakia's
share of the hydruelectircpower potentialtu beutilisedwas greater, and atoneng
point fur the bordto be rnovedintothe centre line of the bypass caAnlimpeîus
towards the adoptionofthe GIN Project was providedby the1965 flood aIthough, it
must be noted rhat çuch adoption was, if anyihing, impeded by the CzechosIovak
1
ThesebasicschemesardepictinAnnex21.
2
-ee,the1994interviewwiththeHungaracademiciEmilMosonyi(ProfessinGermany)
inMamar Tudomby, No.1/94,Annex22. 1
ComrnunistPartyCentrd Corrimittee, hichinsisteon fùrtherresearch into dîernative
projects.
2.04 The purposeof this Chapter istu explainwhy the G(N System
was chosenover themultiplealternativeSectionI Iooks briefiarthebasic àrmsof the
partiestothe 1977 Treatyintems of establishg a coordinated,integrateandoptimal
usage of theisecti ofthe Danube. The background to the choice of theG/N System
is summarised and it is shown that researof the most detailedand extensivenature
I
dictated that the best means of obtainingthbasic 1ims of thepartieswas the G/N
System. Theparties'approach to the studyof environmentaproblems is also examined.
Thusit willbe seenthat studiesrelatingto the environmentalimpaof the Projectwere
1
carriedout asworrldbe expected and were in accordancewith internationaipractice in
tems of extentand detail.
2.05 In Sedion 2, the actual woikings of the GM System are
I
explained. It is show how the stmchrresenvisagedby the partiestu the 1977 Treaty
were originaIIydesignedtuworkandhowthe piannedoperationof these stmctureswas
tailoredtotake into accountinformationgathered duringthe constructionphase. The
intended workingof the System is therefore examinedasat the signatureof the 1977
Treaty and also asat May 1989, that being the date when Hungary firstsignailedits
withdrawal fromthe Project. Finaily,in this Section Slovakiaexaminesbrieflythe legal
basis for the implementation of the G/N Project, that is the parties'respective
consrructionobIigaionsunderthe 1977Treaty .
2.06 Sedion 3 shows how the GfN $stem providedsoIurionstu the
problems of theDanube and itsbasin, describeclth :previous Chapter. This section
effectivelyexplainthe Iogicbehind thehuge investm :nt in the Projeet. SIovakiaaIso
examinesthe anticipated environmentalimpact of theGIN Project on the Danube. In
particular,the System'sexpected impacton surfacea id ground water Ievels, drinking
:d environmentare explained. It
water quality andin addition,the naturaland cultivat
will be shown that the extent of such impact wa: continuously reviewed as new
assessrnenttechniquesweredeveloped. The Project1 lasimplementedin a fashionthat
allowed the partiesto updateandmodi@the system so as to enablethe mitigatiof any
impactsperceivedro be ha&]. SECTIO N. The Parties Considered the GIN Svstem to be the Best
Solutionin Termsof the IdentifiedProblemsand theO~timal
Utilisationofthe Danube
A. The BackgroundtutheChoiceof theGiN Svstern
2.07 The need to estabIishthe propermanagementof the Bratislavto
Budapestsection of the Danube and to make use of its hydroelectricpotentid was
recognised inthe imrnediatepost-SecondWorld War period. Becausethe Danube is
borderedon both sidesbySlovakia for oniy22.5 of its 2,875 kilometrelength,iwas
apparentthat cooperationwith theneighbourîngStatesof AustnaandHungarywas the
best means of ackievingoptimal utilisationof theriver. As a resultof extensive
consultationbetweenthe threeStatesand multiplestudies,by the end of the1950sa
schemewas in placeprovidingfor the coordinatedrrtiIisatioof the Dmbe hm the
Austrian villageof WolfstaIlItoNagymms, situated177 kiIometres downstream in
Hungary .
2.08 ThefirstmeetingbetweenCzechoslovakia and Hungaryto discuss
a joint river projectwas held in July-August1952. It was recognised that any
developmeritof the Danubewou1d have tu takefullaccount of the changeof gradient
which occurs close to Sap (PaIkoviEovo)at rkm 1810. As mentioned in Chapter 1
above, uupstrearof thispointthe rivisrelativeIfastflowingwhereas downstream the
gradient is considerabIymore gentle. Iwas thereforenecesary tu choose a direrent
type ofdeveloprnentforthe differentsections. Firswasidecided thatattheendof the
downstream section i.e i.t,e Nagymarosregion, a simpleriver step coulbe put into
place3:this would involvethe dammingof the river by a weir (that is, a dam with
opening gates tocontrol water flows)and the resultanimpoundmentof a headwater
section. Electriciwould thenbe prodrrcedasthe warerwas channelledvia a hirbine
into the riverbed below. Due tu the diffenng water IeveIsupstrearnof the dam and
downstrearn inthe river beIow, suchweir systems arecommudy-referred tuas steps.
For the section upstream of Sap (PaIkoviEovo),ir wasagreed byboth Hungary and
Czechoslovakia that some forrn of bypass canal was required - partIyto enabfe
navigationandpartlyto allowthe incorporationof a further stepor seriesof steps for the
production ofhydroelectricity.
3 As noteatpara. 2.0aboveHungarywasalreadyconsidertheconstructionaçtcpin the
Nagymarosregron. 2.09 In the ensuhg years, each party srrbmitteda huge number of
possibIedesigns,chartingthe rneritof differerstep locationsmultiple steps,canals of
diReringlengthsor differenlocationsbath inrems of junctionswith the Danubeandthe
choice of the left or the rightbank. It was not ?dl 1963 that, ingovernmental
negotiationsheld 18-20 April,thepartiesarrivedat a$esignbasicallysimilartothe GIN
System,althoughthiswasnot accepted atthisstage asthedefinitiveoptimalsolution.It
was not for a furtherten years,in January 1974, ker multipledesign changes and
continrrorrrefinement,inadditiontu the considerationfother alternatives,that tGN
schemewas approvedby the Czechodovakgavement. Hungarianapproval of the
scheme was accordedthefollowing Far.
B. TheReasons Behindthe ~hoik of the G/N Svstern: a Historv
of Desietnand EnvironmentalStudies
2.10 A period of 22 years ha'd elapsed bewen the first
I
intergovemmental negotiationsheld by the parties a,ndthisapprovaI of the Project.
Dunngthisperiod,manyhundreds ofrerearchprojecd were camedout. A listof al1the
I
basicstudiesundenakenpriortu govemmental approv~lof the Projectin1974, together
with a sumrnaryof their contents and the extent {O which recommendations were
accepted, formsAnnex23 to this pleading. In all, a staggerîng364 research projects
weretakeninto accountinthe fonnuIation ofthe desigIof the G/N Systemup to 19744.
However, as willbe shown below, the finaldecisiona/,to the Projectdesigndid not by
any means mark the enddate of Projectmonitoringshdies, impact assessrnentand the
updating of researchso as tu fake hl1 advantage of yew techniquesand technological
deveropmen ts.
2.11 Themajority of thestudieslistedinAnnex23 were carriedoutby
the Czechoslovak, Slovak and Hungarian ~cader!ies of Sciences, the principal
I
universitiesof each State,theResearch Institute of Iater Management(in Bratislava
and in Prague), Hydroprojectin Bratislava,and VIZITERVand VITUKI in Budapest5.
Researchdocuments were presented hy these bodies doI a Joint Commissionof the two
States,responsiblefor apprwing and adoptingrestarc'hcanclusions,where appropriate,
I
and fonnrrlating the Joint Treaty Program. In termsof nrrmbers, 113 studieswere
4
It rnustbe noted that Annex23 only lresearchProjectswhose recornmendatiwere
actuaily takeninaccount.The total numbof stuclpnor to 1974is thereforegreatlyin
excessof ths figure.
5 VIZITERV is the Hungarian Consulting Companyfor WaterEngineering; VITüKl is the
Hmgarian ResearchCentrefor WaterResortrces~eveidpmnt.producedwhichfocrrssed on the GIN Sjrstem as anintegrated whole. A hrhr 135
were specificallydedicatedtothe GabEikovo part ofthe Project and 116 studies were
directedtu Nagyrnarosalone. Inaddition, a Iârge nurnberof more speciaIisedstudies
were commissoned6.
2.12 WhiIetheterritoryin whichNaparos lies isfumed IargeIyof
limestonerock formationswith a depthinexcess of300m,the GabEkovo sectionof the
G/NProject lieson alayerofgravelsanddso severaihundred metres indepth. To build
large concrete structureson suchgravelfoundationsdemands an enormousamountof
detaiIedplanning,especiailyintenns of locatingthe optimumplacementfor construction.
Infact,some 39 studies were devotedto researching the geologyand seisrnology of the
GIN Project area. As discussedin greaterdetail at paragrrtp2 h.60, et seq.,below,
seisrnic studies were carried out in collaboration withexperts from Gidroprojekt
Moscow, and four comprehensivestudies preparedby VIZITERV '(~uda~est)were
devotedto the tectonicsof the Bratislav- Budapestregion. As a resultof such studies,
the hydroelectricplantand navigationlocks at GabEikovo weremoved 700 m upstrearn
andaway hm the areaofa geologicalfaultline.
Construction,Navi~ationand Enerw Production
2.13 Some39 studies werededicated to ensuringthe safeand proper
construction of the Dunak3itiweir, the Nagymaros and GabErlrovostepsand the bypass
canal. The impactof suchstudiesmay be seen, furexample,inthe irnpressivedepth and
solidityof foundationworks. Inaddition,inordertu complywiththe recommeridarions
of the Danube Commission, 15studies were devored solelytu navigationissues suchas
the operation,maintenance and safetyof the chosen route. FinaIIy45 strrdiesaddressed
6
-ee, for example, "Arbeitgemeinschaft Donauforxhung der Socieras Inrernationalis
Lirnnologiae", Professor R. Liepold, StE.tSchweizerbartiscVerlagsbuchhandIring,
1965.
7 While the existenceof this fault linewasknownto the paexactlocationonlbecarne
clearas a resuof irnprovesounding techniques. The location of geologicalfaults under
hundredsofmetresof grave1is highlycomplicanddthe consequent relocationof GabEikovo
testifiestthethoroughneççand high qualityof the backgrostudiecarriedoutby the
parties. It musthowevbestressedthat the originaldesigndimenofthe GabEikovotep
tookfullaccounoftheexistenceothe fault Iine. Thedesignthereforeallowedfor the stepto
be locateonorclosetothefauItlinewithotherbeingany negativsafe myplications. The
subsequentrelocationshowsthe higconservatiapproachadoptedbythe partiesin terms of
aety considerations.issuesof energyproduction and,in particular,ow to Optimisethe operationof the G/N
Systernto achieveenergyproductionalongside goodnavigationconditions.
I
Environment
. 2-14 ithlsalreadybeensh0~11inCh~p 1t,rIabuvethat:heG~Syrtem
was borhiniendedand accepted tohave a wide rangeofimpactson the environment. In
the main, such impacts were berieficiam, the reçolutionof the environmentdly
I
disastroussevereftoodingof theDanube. Nonetheless,itwas accepted -and it was self-
evident - that the PrcrjecwouId havea substantidimpact on the immediate area:
principallyintems ofthe actud constructionofthereservoirsandthecanal and intems
of localchangesinwaterIeveI.These impactswereextensive 1considered bythe parties
- both priorto and afterthe signatureof the 1977 +Iaty. As a resuit, the range of
environmentas ltudiesisextremeIywide,coveringsrrbjectsasdiverseas floodprotection,
I
ground water, the sideam systern,forestry pIarirIiand fish stocks. These studies
showed that the Project was sustainabie in environmental terms. Details of the
environmentalstudies carriedout priorto 1974areaibo containedin Annex23 to this
1
pleadingandthe contents ofthesestudiesare brieflyreviewedbelow.
Surface andGroundWater
2.15 It was of obvious importance to the partiesto establishthe
hydrological impacot f the Projectand37 studiesweredevotedto problems arisingfrom
1
differentpossiblewaterregimes.Particularattentionwas devotedto flooding,but other
aspectswere also carefullyresearchedsuch as sedirnmtation, tregimeof bedload and
suspendedload,riverbottom erosion,ice conditionsar!dthe impact of winterconditions
on the Danube generallf . Intermsof the efTectofthe Systernon thequalityof surface
I
and ground waters, some 36 major studieswere carrieout. The effect on waterqrraliry
of changes in hydrau1icparameters,climatîcconditionsnd moregeneralfactorssuch as
puIIution was thoroughly dealt with, as was the iIfinence of the Systern and its
impoundedsections on groundwater IeveIsand quaIify. These studies demonstratecito
I
the satisfactionof the partiesthat theProjectwouldnaffectsurfaceor groundwater in
an unacceptabIy negativeway and, tu the contrary, would Iead to certainspecific
improvementsin water quaIity.
S The regimeofbedloadandsuspendedIoad hasbecodtinuousm~onitoreatBratislavasince
1955. AgricuItureand Furestrv
2.16 A further series of studieswas devoted tu the impact of the
Project on agricuIturand forestry. The regime of ground waters and its impact on
agicultural productionwas evaluated. Plans were developed for the recultivation of
landtemporarilyoccupied duringthe constructionphasewhilstthe optimisatioofforest
managementder thecompletionof the Project wasstudied. One part of these studies
was aimed at the protection of woods in the inundation area and one important
conclusion reachedwas that thiswoodlandshouIdbe protected by the constructionof
smalloverflowweirs inthe Danubesidearms. Thesewouldoperate so asto holdback
thewaterflowinthe riverbranchesandtherebyincreaselocalgroundwater levels. The
construction of similarweirs in the old Danube riverbed was also proposed (and
designed)byHungarianscientists,andvarious rnethodsof regiIatinggroundwaterIevels
inthe areasadjacentto the oIdirverbewere exploredbyVITUKI,Budapest.
The Bioaroiect
2.I7 As earIyas1963, aconcerted efforwas made tu examine theJO-
calledtenitoriaIltechnicdimpacts of thePruject, that is the effectGmf tSysternon
the ecosystemsof the surroundingarea. It wasdecidedthat aterritorial pIanshuuld be
drawnup,the aim ofwhichwouldbeto evaluateenvironmentalimpactsand toresolvein
a comprehensiveway anythat mightbe unfavourable. On the Czechoslovak side,the
work was entrustedto URBION, Bratislava,whileon the Hungariansideit was carried
out by VATI,Budapestg. Parts of the territorial plan were rendered obsolete bthe
ongoingchangesinthe Systemdesignand in 1975a further studywas commissionedto
be entitled:"Biologicalprojectof the territoryaffectedby the constructofthe G/N
Project"(the"Bioproject").
2.18 This study was completed in 1976 by URBION with the
participationofthe SIovak Acaderny of Sciences. The Bioproject isa very substantia1
piece of work. Itcomprises 15 closing reports,21 publishedvolumes, 72 published
articles and17 non-pubiishedworks such as techrical s~dies. As a result othisand
sîmiIarstudiesat the tirneof the signatureof the 2977Treatythe partiesalreadyhadthe
basis for an understando ifnthe impacts of the GN Syçtem on its inmediate
9
URBIONandVAT1were theInstitutesforUrbanandRegionalPlanning for Czechoslovakia
andHungaryr,espectively.environment andmay thereforebe consideredto have zadean informedpoliticalchoice
to accept suchimpacts1*.
2.29 The purpose of the Bioproject as to undertake basic research
and, in addition,to coiiectmd evduate the existing: diescconcemingthenaturai and
bioIogicaIstatu osfthe territortu be affected. The 1 bitofBioprojectwas wide. Its
compilers wereinstmcted to examine the changescau: d bythe construction intermsof
bioIogicd and socio-ecologîcairelations, forestry aniwater management, agriculture,
fisheries,hunting,hygiene md the protection of natre. It was expectedtu propose
measures to guarantee both the protection of the en7rament duringthe construction
phaseandthe biologicarestorationofthe areaafter cc
ipletionofthe Project.
2.20 Before considering the recorn endations of the Bioproject, it
should be pointed out that,in termsof internationalpractice, the Bioproject may be
considered unusuddueto the widenatureof itscovei .geandits detailedapproach. In
1975 it was not standard eitherin Westernor Easten European or other eountries, to
carry out environmentalassessmentstudiesto sucha extent pior to the construction
phase of a hydroelectric or other large constructi4 1 project. The completion of
Bioproject enabIedimportant modifications tu be m ie to the operation of the GtN
Syçtem and engendered the constructionof ancillary'aciIitiesaimed atprotecting the
envirument. In total,more than 200 proposaisfc ensuring such protection were
furmuIated.Ofthese, the foIIowingmay beseen as the nostimportant:
-
First. for the maintenance of neadow and forestareas after
changesinthe ground water Ievelfincludingre-forestai3nofthe construction areas).
- Second,forthe deIineationof aj iculturalland intareas inwhich
the conditionsfor productionwereexpected(i) not to e altered,(ii)to be improved and
(iii)to be affected adversely. A series of remedialme jureswas proposed for the third
category. In the caseof permanently saturatedareas,z rystem was evolvedconsistingof
protectionIeveesand seepagecanals,whichwereinten edto reducehighwater levelsor
to restrict these tofixed areas. Attention was givi I to the re-use of topsoit frorn
construction sitesand, at the sametime, a proposa1 irthe biologicalrecultivation of
those areasto be temporarilyoccupied duringthe cons uctionphase was elaborated.
'O
The Bioprojecwas presenredinstagestotheHmga: rnAcademy of Sciencesbymeans of
specialreports. The pubwaçkeptinfomed fhrough .enationairevie"fivotnProsuedie"
("EnvironmenIF). - Third, for the delineation of21 experimentalareas of land
reserves, arableland, permanencultureand permanentgrassareasfor the purpose of
furtherobservation.
- Fourth, for the impact of construction and changed
hydrobiologicarelationsonfishand otheraquaticspeciesto be evaluatedto achievan
appropriatesystemofwatermanagement.Aproposal forthe re-creationofpiscicultural
conditionsinthe systemof Danube branchesand inthe seepagecanalswas accompanied
by aproposal for theadaptationofthe subsoand riverbank area,toensurethe optimal
compositiun of water msystema Further proposalçwere aimedat the protection of
rarefishspecies.
- Fift fhrthe conservationof wildIife. For example,rneasures
airnedatcreatingandprokcting the placesofassembIa ynd overnightstayof water and
migratorybirdswere envisaged. Proposaisfor the protectionof tfireateanirnaland
the maintenanceof the ecologicalbalanceof naturalwood cultureswerefinaliseAlso
establishedwere proposalsfor the protectiofanimalspecieslivingon the temtory to
be permanentlyflooded,for theirtransfetoand settlementin new areasas wellas for
the re-populationof afTectterritoribyanimalssuitedto thechangedconditions. The
aim in each casewas to ensure balancedand natural conditionsfor wildlifaRer the
constructionphase.
- Sixth, for the grtaranofewater purity, account being taken of
the existingdegree of puIIutionof the Danubeas weasthe changingneeds of riparian
inhaùitants, of industryand of agriculture. The Project propusedmeasures toguararitee
the purityof the Danubewater and groundwater sources on Zitni Ostrov, tu provide
improved conditions in the Danube's tributanesand tu improve the purification of
wastewatersfromindustrialplantsalongthe riverbanks. The demandfor water supply
in the region was calculated. Proposals for the rational utilisationof waste and the
constructionofwater-supplyand sewercanalsystemswereelaborated.
- Seven ftrtheprotection ofthe riverineecosystems. In order to
preserve theterritorto be affected by construction,a plan for the protection of the
naturd environment was elaborated, expenmentalareas were delimitecland protected
areas of naturd conservation were selected. In addition,a technicd soIrrtion was
developed ropresemeand improvethe hranchsystemof the Danube,whichwouId alsu
comprise thepreservationofecoçysternsintheareabetween thenavigationcanaland the
oldriverbed. 2.24 This strrdwas not basedon newscientificdata andit appe&sthat
insuficient attentiowas accordedbythe study'scornpilers tu updares in the Project
design and the mass of infurmationcollected on the Project by Czechoslovak and
Hungarianscientistsalike. In any event, the draft strrdywavery poorfy receivedby
HungarianscientistsinvolvedintheProject. Inparticularacritiquewas preparedby the
Director of theHungaria N ational Hydraulic,Investing,Consultingand Engineering
Company ("DVIBER")inorderto assistinthe preparation of anyfinalreport1:
"Sincethe finalreport willbeanimportant issue,the draft needs several
corrections in order to contain factuai statements and to exclude
misunderstand ornmgssinterpretationsThe drafl suggests several
actions which have been dreadycompletelyorpartlyexecuted,an up-
datingofthe draficorrespondin gothe recentstatusisaIsonecessary."
2.25 Inpariicular,in isrrrnmaryove~ew section, the Massachusetts
study makesfour recommendationsthar it considered to be pre-conditionsru the
operationof the GM Systern:
"In reviewingthe projectand informationgathered during our visitwe
feelit is essentialthat fourconditionsmet ar toputtingthe syçtem
inoperation:
- installationofamonitoringsystemto track water quality,
at least five years priorto barrageoperation,to create a
baselineset of data;
- development of a 3-dimensionai computer modeling
svstemto betterunderstandthe complex operationof the
river system, sucasthe movement of pollutantsto, and
within,the groundwater;
- establishmentof a Geonraphic Information System to
integrare the data colIectedhm the monitoring and
modering systems, andtofacilitate spatialevaiuation of the
potentialconsequencesof theproject;and
- formationof an inde~eridentwaterauthoritv(theproposed
GabSikovo-Nagymaros EnvironmentaI Commission) tu
evaluate and comment on decisiuns made about the
projectand tu serveas a public forum for information
disseminationandexchange ''
13 AlsocontaineinAnnex25.
14 -bid. 1
But, as the OVI13ERcriticismsmakeclear, each one ofthese conditionshad already
been fulfilleThus:
"- a monitoing syrternexistsandl water qualitydata are
collecteimce 25 years. This monitoringsysternis under
hrther development.
- acomplete3-dimensionalmodelibgsystem cm be afinal
god, receritlymostly 2-dimensiofïalmodeareavailable,
whichare suficiently describ;he phenornena. Models
for pollrrtantsare under improvement in various
complexit.
within the framework of the/ monitoring system a
Geographic Information System was developed at
VIZITERV whichfacilitesspatiaand timelyevaluations.
theresponsiblauthorityfortheipvestrnentis Muustrfor
Environment and Water Management. Independent
supewisingbodieshavebeen creled bythe Parliament(an
ad-hoccomrnittee)andby the Councilof theMinisters(a
so-called "public"committee 1composed by several
representativesof the independentenvironmentalists).
I
Thus,themajor recommendations of Amencan expertshavebeenalready
implemenred,independentlyFromthe draflrepor."5
2.26 A further report was produceby the Massachusettsgrottp in
May 198916.Thisconîisted maidyofthe samemateriaIilgefier with manyillustrations,
a considerritionosuggestedalternativestu the GIN Pruject and new sections entitled
I
"Visualand CulturalAnalysisof the NagyrnarosBarrageProject"and "Proposa1for a
DanubeBend NationalHeritagePark". Ofgreaterintqest is a further section prepared
by ProfessorHarry Schwarzof ClarkUniversity,~orcdster,Massachusetts,entitled"An
EngineeringEvaluation of the Bos-NagymarosBarrage System". This evaluation is
referredtoat paragrap2.59 belowbewise Slovakiachnidersthat itis basedon a more
I
carefiilexaminationofthe Project thantheremain06rthe updatedstudy. Inparticular,
ProfessorSchwarz appearsto have spent 9 days durikghisvisit to Hungaiyto have
1
interviewed OViBER and VITW engineersand ru have Iistenedto the opinionsof
opponentsofthe ~roject". 2.27 Short1y aftemrds, BechteI Environmentai Incorporated
("Bechteltt), a worIdwide organisation based in California and specialising in
environmentalimpact assessrnentstudies, was requestedby Hungary tu review the
potential environmental impacts, operational considerations and plannedmitigation
masures with regard to th Gm System. Bechtd was sent extensive Project
documentationby VEITERV in Juiy 1989. BechteI subsequenilyspent some time in
Hrrngary and it produced a cornprehensivereport (the "Bechtelreport") in February
1990. Czechoslovakiaaiso commissioned an independentreport dnringthis perîod. In
the lightofHungary'c slaimsand itownconcern to ensurethatthe Project shouIdnot be
environmentally damaging, it approached the Canadian Company,Hydro-Québec
International ("HQI"). HQI was commissioned in September 1990 to review the
potential contaminationof or reductionin the water table,the existingenvironmental
studiesand, in addition,thesecurityof thevarious constructionworks. Its report (the
"HQIreport") was produced inDecember 1990".
2.28 The Bechtel and HQI reports are important documents, not
merelybecausetheywerecommissioned ata timewhenconcernforthe environmentwas
being voiced on a popularlevel - in Czechoslovakiaas well as in Hungary -but also
becausetheyprovide an impartialand detailereview of theProjectstudiesandresearch
data compiIed by the partie3up to 1990. The reports show independentlythat
environmentalimpact had not ody already been carefully considered in the various
Projectsrrrdies,but hadso been takeninto accciuntand mitigatedtu alargedegree. Of
course suchmitigationis anongoingprocessad, unsurprisîngly,the reports did pointtu
aras where hrther mitigationmight be required. But neitherreport predicts or even
hintsatanenvironmentaldisaster.
2.29 The detaiIed findingofthe Bechiel andHQI reportswilIbetaken
rrpin Sections2 and 3 below. But these reports have a speciaIimportancein that they
also provide a review -and give an independentopinion of - the pre-existing strrdies
related to the environmentcarried outforthe GCNProject. Both reports testie tu the
quality and scope of such studies. For example,the BechteI report notes in its
introduction:
"The project has used a sound technicd and scientificbasis to identify
impactsand appropriatemitigationslg"
18 ExtractsoftheBechtand HQIreportfom Annexes27and 28 respectively.
19 Bwhtel reporon cit.p.1-7.SimiIariyt,eHQI reportnotes:
"Les techniciens et les travaux font géAéralemenp treuve d'une
compétence etd'u noucidu détail levés."'
Translation:
"The technicians and the works generdy &ow a high standard of
cornpetenceand attentiotu detail."
2.30 Neither report is enticaof thk approach adopted in the Gm
Project -that is the consideratioofenviromentaIlimpact in conjunction with the
putting into operatioofan agreed design- for thiswas the internationdly accepted
meansof proceediig atthattirne.TheHQI reporexplainsthi point:
"Laconception du projet ~ab~ikovo-~agymabsremonte a plus &ne
vingtained'années. IIva de soi qu'à cette époque,I'intégratiodnes
préoccupationsenvironnementales revêtaientmoins d'importance
qu'actuellemente,tce,partoutdans le monde.1A cet égard, des études
environnementaleo sntétéentrepriseparallèlemen atlaconstmction des
ouvrages du complexe,soit vers l'année 1975. La solutiontechnique
étantdéjàchoisie,ces étudesneportaientdonC passurunecomparaison
de variantesmaisbien plutôtsurl'optimisatio#du projetretenu.En ce
sens,lesetudesréalisée àscetteépoqueétaien! comparablesà cellesqui
furent effectuéenAmériqu euNord, sur le territoiredela BaieJames
parexemple 2'."
Translation:
I-
"The conceptionof the GabEkovo-NagymaroP i rojectdates baekmore
than twenty years. It ito be noted that atrhat time, throughout the
world, the integration of environmentai Iconsîderations had Iess
importance than today.Thuî, environmentalsfudieswere carned out in
paraIIelwith the construction of the System, that is around 1975.
I
TechcaI solutionshaving already been chos~n,these stirdies did no1
consistofa cornparisonof alternatives,but Ia3herof the optimisation of
the adopted Project. In this sense, the contemporary studies were
comparable with thosecarriedout in North kerica, on the James Bay
territoq,forexample."
2.37 In addition, accordito both IeFonç,fie prujecr research into
the ailimportant area of the impactoftheGN System on the Iucd water regirne has
I
20 HQI reparOR.ci{p.46.
21 m., p.106.been extremeIy thorough. This must be particuIarlynoted,since in Hungary's 1992
Declaratiun "the lack of an established hydrogeoIogicaI mode] and the Iack of
hydrobiologicalandwriterqualitystudies"iscrîticisedZ.n contrast, the Bechtelreport,
commissionedbyHungary, foundthat:
"The hydrologie regime of the projecarea has been thoroughlystudied
andpotentiallysignificantmpactshavebeenidentifiedbyVIZITERVand
associatedexpertsand Bechielconcurs withthisassessmentZ 3"
Thuq not only dues Hungav make acompletely unfounded alIegationbutalsoitmay be
seentu becriticifmgitsownresearch body,VIZITERV. Moreover, asimilarconclusion
with regardtrithe sttrdiescarrieiui by Czechoslovikspecialistisreachedinthe HQI
report:
"Legenred'essaiseffectués (pompages,essaisde pemréabilitqsuivide la
piézométr etedesrégimes descrues) et leur nombrede meme que leur
interprétatioont et6faits d'unefaçon trèsacceptableselolesstandards
internationaux. Nous devons mêmesignalerde nombreuxcas où les
hydrogéologuec sonsultéosntfaitpreuved'ingéni~sité~~."
Translation:
"The type of testscarriedout (pumping,permeabilitytests, analysesof
piezornetryand food regirnes),their numberand their interpretationare
al1in compIeteaccordance with internationalstandards. We must even
pointto numeruus casesinwhich thehydrogeolog cos uslted showed
ingeniousness."
SECTION 2. TheOuflineofthe Gm Svsternand its Benefitsfo theParties
2.32 The G/N System,as envisagedby the 1977 Treaty,was a multi-
purpose project designedto regulatthe usage of the Danube fora length of over 200
km, that is from the entrancepoint othe riverintotheDunakiliti-HruSov reservoir to
the end of the dredged sectionof theriverbed dose to Budapest. In addition to the
utilisationof the river'shydroelectricpotential, a reliable navigationroute was to be
22 Amex 17, p6.
23 Bechterreparou.cilpp.1-t an1-2.
24
HQI reponop.cit.g.43.ensuredand protectionagainstfloodsgreatlyimproved. The stretcof rîverconcerned
isshownin Illus. whî~w hichprovidesthe locationsof the principalstructures of
theG/N Systern.
2.33 The hnctionhg of the System Ias an integrated whole- may be
describedgraphicallyby meansof a Iongitudid profileof this sfretchofriverThisis
I
shown by IllusNo. 22. At the Iefsideof the proGIet,he Danubereaches Bratislava,
stillfiowingata fastratehm itsAlpinesource. It ldescendso Dunakiliti,where,as
planned,it is dammed byaweir. A largereservoiris ireatedthat bringsthe water level
upto the level of 131.1 rn,a levelchosenboth to abid anyincreasein water levels
1
upstream of the borderwith Austria and to enable good navigationconditionsup to
Bratislava.TheDunakilitw i eir is locatatrh 1842. Asplanned,part of the Danube
passes through thisweir and continuesdong the pre?iousriverbed,but for the larger
I
partthewater flowsthrough a 7 km longheadwater canal,whose entranceisIocatedat
the Iowerend of thereservoir.Inorder tu concentratethehydraulicenergy,water IeveI
I
ismaintained inthe canalat 131.1 rnuntil the flow reaches the GabEkovostep. This
involvesraisirigthad and its banksabovethe Igcd terrai navigationis transferred
intothiscanal.
2.34 The GabEikovo hydroelectricplantandnavigationlocks form the
firstofthe Project'stwo steps. Herethe waterfallhm1 131.lm to a new downstream
1
levelof around 108.3m, passingthrougha seriesof hydroelectricturbinesintoan 8km
tailwatercanalthatrejointheDanuberiverbed at rkm1811,that ijust upstreamof Sap
(PalkoviCovo). For approximately20 km downstream of this point the riverbed is
excavated- inorder to achieveagreaterfailatthe GabEkovostep and roaIIrrwfor safer
navigation. Thus, the Ievelof 108.3m ismaintain&; dong thisreachand, in fact,is
reducedonIysIightIybythe tirnetheriverreachesthe next srepatNagymaros. In eEect,
I
an extended headwater sectionis createdwithin the existingriver banks by rhe weat
Nagyrnaros,repIacingwhat isanywaythe first slow flowingsectionof the Danube. In
I
spiteof the long distance travelled,the stat NagymIros down tuthe new riverbed
IeveIisless than 10 ml5. Hydroelectricpowerisonce more produced as the river flows
through the step into a second dredgesectionof the Danube, markingthe end of the
G/N System.
25 Thisdepend ontheflowaccrrmuIatin lhheadyter secti-the rangeithestepheight is
fror3 toIOm. 2.35 The 1977 Treaty stresses thefactthat the Project fums an
integratedsystem. Article I . specificaIStatesthat "the Syçtem of Locks ...shaII
constitutea singleandindivisiboperationaslysternofworks"". The reason fur thisis
technicalaswell as legal. Itwas the parties'intentionthathe hydroelectricplantat
GabEikovoproduceelectric power mainly at peak flows, that is in short intervals
coincidingwithpeakdemandsinelectricity.Thismay be describedasfollows:thewater
accumulatesin the reservoiand is releasedthroughthe turbinesfora givenperiod of
rime,plamed tu bearound fivehorrrs;peakproduction ceasesatthe endof this period,
andtheleveIin thereservoiis dlowed tobuiIdup suthat thecycleof peakproduction
cm continuez7.
2.36 The parties pIannedthat there wouid be twopeakproduction
periods per day-tu cope with the rnonirnand eveningperiodsof peakdernand. As a
result of the peak cycle, the water IeveI in the tailwatercanal and even firther
downstreamwouldobviouslyVary. Suchfluctuationcouldnot be acceptedaIong a
length of the Danubewithoutfurtherregulation,as it would lead tosevere erosion,
environmentap lroblems andwouldalsoconstitutea navigationah l azard. Thus,it was
planned thatthe Nagymarosstep would actas a flow regulator. By impoundiig the
watw behinda step, the impact of fluctuatinglevelsin the tailwatercanalwouldbe
minimised as thiswould naturallybe reduced atthe confluencewith a relativelylarge
body of water. In addition, the Nagyrnaros step wou1dgcneratepower on a constant
basis ody, i.e its,discharge into the riverbed beIow would never Vary su that
downstreamofthis pointno impactof the waterfluctuationscouIdbe felt.
2.37 In spiteof theintegated natureof the Systern,Articles1.2and
1.3 of the1977 Treaty dividedthe Systemintotwo basicsections- consistingofthe
GabEkovo sectionandtheNagyrnaros section(Illus.No. 1).Theprincipalworksinthe
GabEikovo section consistedof the Dunakili eirandreservoir,the headwatercanal,
theGabEikovo powerplantandlocks,thetailwatercanalandtheregulationmeasuresin
theDanuberjverbedand sidearms. IntheNagymarossection,theprincipaw l orkswere
theexcavation ofthe Danube,flood protectionstructures and thestep itself, comprising
74 Annex 2. Threferencto"Iockç"in Arî1.1avers the weiandstepin thGN Systenr.
27 Accordingtotheori'na1projecitwasplannedkt when discharg iethe Danubewere
higherthan4000m Is,GabElkwowodd operatecontinuouslandthe reservoirwaterIwei
rvouidbe maintainat 131.10 m. As sooasthe Danubedischargdecreasebelowthis
valuethe GabEikovostepwouldchangeover to peaoperationFor peak operation,the
capacityof the resebehveenmaximum andminimumoperationlevelwoulbewithinthe
range131.10-130.7m.thepowerplant and locks. Thisis a logicaldivisionj the purposesof the description
of the Systemand is foIIowedhere28.
TheGabEikovoSection
2.38 hillustrationofthisparrofth Systemis providedas Ilius. No.
23- whileLllus.No. 24 ddineatesin greaterdetailthe irroundingarea and the location
of thedifferenctonstmctions.
The DunakilitiWeir andRese -ir
2.39 FromIllus. No. 24 and Illus.No 5- it mayreadily beseen that the
firstmajor constructioninthe System was tu bethe D .akilitiweirat rkm 1842and the
reserroirstretchingbehindthe weir upstream torkm 58. It wasthe partiesintention
that the damming of the Danube at thispointwould c: ttea reservoirapproximateIy 16
km long and 3-4 km wide. The sidesof the reservoir ere tu be fonned pariIybypre-
existingriverdykes,upgradedtu cope with the penna: nt hydrauiicpressure,and partly
by newlyconstructed dykes2'. Other key features oj he reservoirwere first, the exit
point on the right bank for the Mosoni Danube 2 1, second, the seepage canals,
constmctedonboth banksto capturewater seepingfrc thereservoir.Thiswaterwould
thenbe channelledinto irrigationcanals,the MosoniD ubeandthe side brancho efthe
Danube and therefore servea beneficialpurposeiriste; of raisinglevelsadjacentto the
reservoirandcausingwaterlogging.
2.40 An iIIrrstrationof the DunakiIitir is providedas Illus. No. 25.
Aithough the main functionof the war was tu createa imaintainthe appropriate water
IeveIfor channellingtu GabEikovo,other importantfi :fions were tu be served, being
principallythe provisionof a safe navigationrouteth1 igh thereservoir,the regulation
of flow intothe Danuberiverbed below and the discha e of excess waters duringflood
conditions. The weir was designed to be able tocop withthe 10,000 year flood and
couldthereforesafelydivert a flowof 5270 rn3/s,that 2.5 timesthe Danube'saverage
28
A shorf technicaldescripofthervholeSystertog er with variousillustratisgiven
intheHungarianinformarorybooklet,producbyOVi SR, thafoms Annex29.
29 The heightofthe dykeswasdesignedsotha rhecres vodd be 22.m above thebackwater
Ievelatadischargeof4000m31s. Thus, durinthe 1 yearfloodthedistancebetweenthe
waterieveIin fireservoand thedykecresissri111.n.The 100yearflod isa flood, the
IikeIihooofoccurrenceowhichis 1%.flowrate, into the brpascanaiduringflood condition^^^. Inaddition, the weirwas tu
provide a means for the evacuation of icenoes from the reservoir during winter
conditions. Regulationwas to be achievedby sevenweir gates,each 24 m ide. The
weir alsocomprised both a temporarynavigationlockon the rightbank with afish pass
to enablefishto traversethe structurewithoutdamage and an intakefor the supplyof
waterto theHungariansystem ofsidearms up to 200 m3/s.
2.41 Constnicfion of thiç weir was a major project due to the
undwlyingIayerof more than 200 rnof graveusand. Extensiveforindationwork was
therefore requireda huge open pit beingexcavatedand protected onîtsperipheryby a
çealingscreen of concrete, somc27 metres deep. A firm base was then formed by
injectingthe san&gravel mîx with cement to a depth of five metres bdow the
constructionpit. Thus,thefoundationsdescended to atotaIof 32 m below ground level,
providinga totallsafe baseforthe constructionworks.
The BypassCanal: HeadwaterSection
2.42 Undoubtedly one of the must importantfacetsof the 1977 Treaty
is the agreementbythe partiestuchanne1 themainpart ofthe Danubeflow into acana1
located on~zechoslovaktemtory between rkm1842 and 1811. This canai perfoms
three mainfunctions. First,it creatsafeand constantnavigationconditions,enablinga
wbstantial reduction in jorrrney tirne, an increaineship freight capacity and the
avoidanceof what was a hazardous and frequentIyimpassablesectionof the Danube.
Second,it channeIsthe water to the GabEikovopower plant,enablingthe productionof
electricity. Thirdasmentionedabove, it enables the safehandlingof the 10,000 year
floodbyhandlingsafelythe diversionof nearly5,300m3/s.
2.43 The canaliça major structure in itself. the greater part of its
Iength,for example,the canalismore than270 m wideand at Ieassevenmetresdeeg.
But it must be recognised thata canal of such propurtions was vital not merely for
navigationand for thehydroelectricpower plant but also tu enablthe safe channelling
of flood watersaway hm thereservuir.Put sirnplythe Danubeis a largeriverand itis
obvious that the canal too worrld have to be of simiIar, substantial proportio ns
particular in order to accomodate the Danube waters at flood levels. Because the
headwater canalretainsthe reservoirwater levelof 131.1 m alongits 17 km length,its
banks and its own water level rise above the local terrain. Any failtoeprovidean
30 Thc 10,000yeafloodia floodrhlikelihoodofoccurenceofwhich0.01%.r
- 64 -
I
adequatesafety marginin the design and constmctiori might havecaused the canai to
burst itsbanks and floodthe surrounding area. As designed and constructed,such a
scenario is whollyim~ossiblc. The holdingbanks are sealedby layersof cancrete and
asphaltand are constructed buth tu provideasafety marginof twometres above the
containedwater IeveIand toresistsevereearthquake,thatisrrptu factor8 on theMSK
scaIe31.The bottom of the cd is sealedby a plasticsheet,protected bya lm thick
layerof gravel.
2.44 Afurtherfeature is that,as with the reservoir,the bypasscanal
benefits from seepage canalsto reguiate the local ground water level. One clearly
beneficia mpacthere is that excessseepagewaîer from the lefsideseepagecanalmay
eitherbe used forinîgationorchanneIIedby a culverunder the canalIocated4 kmalmg
its length irito tIeft sidebranchesof the Danube. 'The maximum capacity of this
culvertis60 rn 3/s,contrîbutintu thebdansed and r&tdised waterregirneplannedfor
the Danubeside ams.
TheGabEikovo step
2.45 Illus.No. 26 portraysthe GabEkovostep, situated between the
villageof Gablikovoandthe Danube(at rkrn1821). As thisillustration shows, the step
consistsof two mainparts:the hydroelectricpower plwt andthe navigationlockw The
powerplant is designed su that eightturbines,eachwith a diameteofsome 9.3 metres,
produce power to a total maximuminstalledcapacity06720 MW. Rivercraftpass tothe
leftof the power plant through twinnavigation Iocks34 rnetreswide and 275 metres
long. Thus, a tug towing ninebarges, each witha capacityof1,600tonnes, can mount
or descend the 23 merre srep Injust 14 minute- therime reqrriretu fiIor empty the
lock.
2.46 As with the Dunakilitiweir, GabEkovohas had to be builton
layersof water-bearinggravelsands,with a thicknessherein excess,of300 metres. The
step therefore had to be located and constnicted taking into account the need for
substantialfoundationworkq togetherwith the local seismicand tectonic conditions.
Once again,it was necessary that largeconstnrctipitkbe excavated -one eachfor the
powerpIanrand the navigationIocks. The area ofeach pirwas around 80,000 m2, that
is thesizeof ten footballfields. Foundatiunsseven mgtresand five metres thick were
31 The MSK scalis theMedvedev-Sponhener-Karsckie.&, para.2.60 ses bel,w.1
1 laidown forthe powerpImtandthe locks,respectively,the lowestpoint of whichis in
each case 60 rnand 46 m below the immediate terrain. These state of the art
constructionworksare depictedingreater detailAnnex 29. By way of cornparisonit
may be notedthatthe constructionpit bottoat GabEikovo was comparableinsizeto
thepits associatedwiththebuildingof theAlsatianpowerplanton the Rhine,where a
similarconstructiontechnolowas applied.
The By~assCanal:TaiIwaterSection
2.47 The tailwa~ercanalcaryhg water and shipping hm GabEikovo
to the Danube riverbedis 8.km long,approximately275 rnwide, andis cutinto the
terraito adepth of 13m. A substantialsafetymarginintennsof waterflowis again
provided,thewaterdepth atpeakflowbeing some 2 m below the banks. Protection
from floodsis furtherguaranteeby protectivedykesconstructedon both sidesofthe
canal. The banksof the tailwatercanal arefortifieda 70 cm thickriprap)totake
account of the water IeveIflucrions expectedduringpeakoperation of GabEikovo.
Where the tailwatecana1 rejoins thDanube atrkm 1811, the design pruvided that
dredgingwould be carriedout between Sap(PalkoviEovo )nd Gonyu(around 15 km
downstream) so thatthe water levattheconfluencewould be 0.7m belowitsprevious
level(whendischargefromthe tailwatercanalwas at thepeakoperationflow of 4000
rn3/s). Asa result of suchdredging,navigationwouldbe facilitatfloodwater level
decreasedandthe powerproductionof GabEkovo increaseddue tothe greatedepth of
its step. In ordtupreventerosion, waterwouldbeimporrnded hm the Nagymaros
stepand a transitional section ztarting6 km upstrearn from the confluencewas aIso
pIannedtobe excavatedintheDanuberiverbed.
Regulation Measures in the OldRiverbed
2.48 Due to theconsrrucriunof the bypacanal, it was anticiparhat
thenaturai water regimin thDanube between rkm 181 1and rkm 1842 wouIdchange.
Discharges coming fiom the reservoiwou1d pass rnainIythrough the bypass canal,
althorigh flow would be rnaintainedin the oId riverbed. Dischargesexceedinthe
bypasscanal capacity,icefloesand bedload would alsobe conveyedthrough the old
Danuberiverbed.
2.49 In the upperpari ofthe ald Danube riverbed, underwater weirs
were designedtu allowwater to be maintainedata IeveIcorrespondingto Iow water
IevelintheDanube in pre-damconditions. The Danube branchesin the adjacent areawould be dammedup at severalplacesso as tocreatdasenes of distincregions, each
with its own surface waterlevel but witha continuousflow maintainedbetween the
regionsto ensuretheir revitalisation. effecta senes of cascadeswould be created
and, asa result,more favourableand stableconditioqswould be created also. These
rneasureswere aimed ateliminatingthe urifavourabIimpacton the floodplain forest
ecosystems caused by the sinkingriverbed anddso improvinglocal ground water
2.50 Along the rniddle part of tde old Danube section, it was
nbnetheless anticipatethat ground water levelswolld decrease in adjacent riparian
zones. Water losseswouIdthereforebe compensated bymeans of the developmentof
existingirrigation systemsThe Dunakilitweirwould aIsobc operated in surra way
1
thata discharged 50 m31swould be pruvîded inthewIntei seasonandup to 200 11-1315
over the growing seasonaccording to'requirements,with the possibiliryof occasional
flushingto removeexcessive sedimentation.
TheNagvmarosSection
1
2.51 The generallocation ofthe ~ahrnaros sectionof theProject is
I
depicted in Ellus. No. 21 (agpearing ai paragraph2.32 above); the individual
constmctionsare shownhere inIllus.No.27. Thispar/ofthe GM Systernwas intended
I
by the partietosatisFfourbasicfunctions:first,tcornpensatefluctnatingwater IeveIs
caused by peakoperation of GabEikovo;second, to allow for the safe evacuition of
1
floodwatersfrom thiregionof theDanube;third,to p1oducehydroelectricpower; and,
finally, to enablesafe navigation. These functions yere to be fulfilledby the one
principalconstruction of this section, being the Nagymaros step. Threeothsetsof
works were also envisaged:the dredgirigtheDanuberiverbeddownstreamof the step;
flood protection rneasuresin SIovakrerritoryrrpstream,finally,similara1thougIess
extensivemeasures onHungarianterritory, aIsoupstreaof thestep(IIlrr.o. 211.
The River Ste~
2.52 The Nagyrnaros step itself wa1 be situatedon a large bend in
the Danube riverbed atrkm 1696.2betweeri the villagesof Nagyrnms and Visegrad..
The geography of this location had been srrrveyedand studiedby the Hungariansgrior
Ieven tu the first governmentd negotiations in 1952". At these negotiations the
HungariandeIegatiunrecommendedthis Iocation because of the favourabIeconditions
with regardtu geoIogyand morphoIogy, beingin particularthepresence of hard andesite
bedrock which would form a solid foundationfor the stmcture. Thus, construction
wouIdpresent a IesserchalIengethm forthe DunakiIitiandGabiiikovostructures.
2.53
The step itselfasdesigned ,onsistsof three functionunits -the
weir, ahydroeIectricpowerplantandtwonavigationlocks3'. The weirisIocatedon the
rightside of the constructionand,as atDunHkiliti,cunsists of sevengares wch 24 rn
wide. In total the weir is 200 m wide and, in the event that flood dischargein the
Danubereaches 6,000 11131esach gatewiIIbe opened tu its maximumpositionand the
fiow Iet thuugh without my energe xtraction.Adjoining the weir is the hydroeIectric
power plant, which has a maximumabsorption capacityof 2,800 111315.The plant
CO~~S~S of sixhorizontalturbines,each of a 7.5m diameter,the total installcapaciv
of whichis 158MW. Findly,the two navigationIocks areIucatedon the leftbank and
are of the samedimensions and capacityasthe GabEkovo Iocks.
The NamrnarosHeadwaterSection
2.54 The eRectof theNagyrnarosstep isthat the water Ievelupstrearn
is kept permanentlyat a Ievelwithïnthe rangeof 10711 1 10811 1a,t is uto 3 m above
the previoushigh water IeveIand, at some points, kglier than the adjacent terrain34.
Nonetheless, the impoundedwater would be confrnedwithin the existing riverdyke
structures. As a result,these pre-existingriverdykes,which were intendedtu provide
protection against fluuding, wouId become pemanently Ioaded structures. Thus, the
parties pIannedtu strengthenal1existingstmcturesandincorporatenewelementssuch as
underground screen-waIIa and sealing aprons to prevent underground erosion of the
foundations. Suchworks wereplannedboth on the Danube'sdykes and thedykes on the
SIovaktributaries -the Iper, the Hrun, theV&h - and alço on the Iower sectionof the
Mali Danube3'. Aiong a11such dykes,ir waa intendedthat drainage canaIswouId be
32 As rroteat para2.03above,priortothis daltheconstructionofriverstep inthiarea,
independ efntnyjoint projecl,wasdready king consibyHungary.
33 In ordertobuiIdthe step,it wnecessartotemporarilydivertthe fIowof the Danand
proiscthewnstnrction sitemeansofa coEerdam.
36 The preciseIwewouIdfluctuateduIOpeakoperationaGabEkovo.
35
The works on the Ieflbanwodd not consîitratsinglsectiobut would btformedof 8
scparatsetsoffloodprotection.workthefollowingregiontheIowerIpel, the IowerHran,buiIttu maintainlocalgound water Ievels at asuitableheight su as rrou harm i~cal
agicuItural production. SeepagewaterswouIdbe punipedbackinto the riverby means
of newpumpingstations.
2.55 The measures requiredupstreamon Hungarian territoryareIess
substantialfosimple,geographicreasons. The rightbank in theuppersectionis fumed
by ateTaceraisedabovethe Danube water IeveIandin theIowersection ofthe Danube,
the river flows beiweentheBorzsony and Pilismciuntains,which dope directlytowards
the river channel. Thus, the naturd terrain fuItulaIarge extent the purpose of the
dykes necessq ontheSIovak bah3'. However,there.isa considerabIeconcentrationof
industryin thiarea of Hurigaryandrelocationof some IocaIraiIwaysand road systems
nrnriingdongside the Danubewould be necessq inconjunctionwith the compIetionof
theProject.
Excavationof the Riverbed
2.56 Downstreamof Nagparos, the partiesintended tu dredge the
Danube riverbed alonga Iengihof 40 km. The purpose of thia wouid be to faciIitate
navigationandtoincreasethedepth ofthe stepatNagymaros.Ashort way downstream
of thestep,theDanube splitsinitwo charnelscreatinga maII islandcdled Szsntendre.
Both cbannds areopentu navigationand it was thereforeenvisagedthat both would be
dredged, althorrghon completionof the Project it wa~plannedthatonly themain Vac
branchbe used for internationalnavigation.
B. The Safetv ofthe fIanned Structures
2.57 Itisvitalthat largedam structures that retain huge amounts of
wateraresafe and canwithstandnot ody extreme floodor constan utdenvater erosion
conditions,but the pussibilityof earthquake conditionsalsu. The flood1955,duhg
whichseveral flood protectiondykescollapsed, demoqstratedthat structuresinthis area,
unless properiy designed,were suscepribIetu erosionbeneaîh their foundations. Aa
Kravany,IraKornarnotom, Kornarnd Medve6ov,iheVkh IefBankand, frrrallytVah
right barMMal$Danube.
36
. NonetheIesstherwerepIanned10beswen separatehood protectionzoonthe Hungarim
rightbank:VisegradDvm~s, Pilismarut, Esztergom, NyergesGjfalulDuna, om5rom,
KorniromlG6nyüandNagymarosflpoly.direct resrrItof this flood,large nurnberof studies were undertaken to enable the
pinpointhg of theexact causesofdyke faiinreand the preventionofsimilaroccurences
in the fiture. As tu the possiblityof earthqrrake,gave1 saresknown tobe prone tu
the phenornenonof liqiiefactionand it wastherefureessentid thafulaccountbe taken
of possibIeseismicmovement.
2.58 There is nodoubt that thengineers involvedin his Projectwere
fuIIyawareof the dificulties facedintems of possibIestructuralerosionand that these
dificulties wertaken intoaccoiinr.Thuq the HQI reportnotes:
"Les principes de conception des ouvrages ont pris en compte la
complexitéde fonctionnementdu projet et les dificilesconditionsde
fondationdes ouvragesde référence "'
Translation:
"The designprincipIesof the structureslook into accountthe complexiry
of Project operation and the dificuIt conditions with regard tu the
forrndationsofthe majorstructures."
It continue..
"Ainsi,lorsqueIeschargeshydrauliques&passaientdesvaleursde I'ordre
de 8 iIO métres, on acherché i assureruneétanchéitc ompléte du fond
de Ia retenue. Pour des têtes d'eauidkrieiires, ona pris des mesures
importantes pour limiter les gradients d'ecouIernentqui sont Ia cause
premitre des phénomènes d'érosioninterne. Ces mesures, appIiquées
suitei uneanalyseapprofondiede ces phénoméne dsanslesconditionsdu
site, sont accompagnéesde façoncohérented'undispositifd'auscultation
important adapti àun ouvragede grande iongueur, ou il existe toujours
une possibilitéde rencontrer Iocalementune conjuguaisonde conditions
défavorables. Les données presentk eeles que dGcrites plus haut
indiquent que les réparationséventueles seront dampIeur Iimitee et
devraientavoir peu d'impactsurleprojet.
Les planset devis,leurapplicationet le contrôde qualitécorrespondent
en généraalux standardsappliquéspour cetype d'ouvrage$' ."
Translation:
"Thus,whenthe hydraulicstructuresexceededheights inthe orderof 8to
10 metres, the complete water-tightnesof the bottom of the dyke was
37 HQIreport,op.cit.,p. 78.
38 m. sought. For headwatersof lowerdepth, significantstepshave beentaken
to limit the flow gradients,whichare the primary cause of interna1
erosion. These measures,appliedas a result of an in depth analysiof
such phenomenonin on-site conditions, have been accompanied in a
coherentmannerby an extensivesoundingsystemadapted for a work of
great length,where it is alwayspossibleto fina local convergenceof
unfavourable conditions.The resultsas those describedabove indicate
thatpossiblerepairswillbe Iimitedand shouldhave little impact onthe
Project.
The designs and estimates, their application and the qualitycontrol
correspond in generd to the applicable st'mdards for this type of
structure."
Put simply,the lessons to bededucedfrom the 1965 and previousfloods have been
learnt:the stmcturesas designedand builtcomply with internationalstandardsand are
safeagainstwater inducederosion.
2.59 Very similarconclusions were:reachedby Professor Schwarz in
the Massachusettsstudyof May 1989. Withregard O his inspectionof the Dunakiliti
weirand reservoir system,heconcluded:
"Thework appearedto becaniedout inan excellentprofessionamanner
and thework sitegenerdlywellorganised andweIIcared fd9. I1
As tothe possibilityofbreachesinthedykes,weirsor banks fofthe headwatercanal),he
noted:
"Competent and periodic inspection and immediaterepair of any
defrciencydiscoveredis the guaranto efesaf+ for the low-Iying areas.
Seriousdamage hm a suddenfailureof the barrage by war or sabotage
is udikeIy.
The Iow heightof the dams and the relativèlysrnaIIamount of warer
stored wouldcreatea flood wavenot greaterthana naturd floodd0."
ProfessorSchwarz'soverallconclusionis evenmoreimportant:
"The project as piesently designed is saund from an engineering
viewpoint. AI1the studiescustornariIyasso~iatedwith such a project
appeared tohavebeenmade. The designappearsefficientfor power and
navigation,and is,atthe sametirne, as cum~atibleto the Iandscape as
39 UniversityofMassachusestudyM,ay1984Annex26, p.31.
40 m, p.35. possible. Constructii sonroceeding at a rapidPace and also appears
well-organisedand carrieout ina iiighiyprofessionalrnmer4'".
2.60 Intems of earthquakeprotection, a threeyear studycarried out
frum 1975-1978 provided anextremely detded histov of the location of seismic
muvernentin the Project area and its eRectsfrom the year 1400 tudate. This strrdy
shows that the areaaffectedbythe Projecthas beenseismicaliyactiveparticulariyinthe
region of BratisIavaand KomAmo and dong farilt Iineas, for exampIe,at Budapest.
But seismicactivityisnotof a degree suEcienttu pose a threat eithtu thelargecities
thathave been brrilup inthi egion or tu the GN System structures, which had of
course beendesigned to withstandseism icovemerit~~~ .s the HQI report explains,a
hrther verificatiowas achievedbytests canîed outin 1982,whichinvoIved simuIated
seismicshocks:
"De plus, en 1982, des vérificationsde stabilitédes digues sous Ia
sollicitationdesecousses sismiquesontétéeffectrrées au niveau de la
liquéfactiopossibledes sablessilteux. Ces calculsont étbaséssur des
densitésrelativesestiméesàpartirdes essaisde pgnétrationsdynamiques
suivantplusieursméthodes,dont la méthodesimplifiée de Seedet Idriss
qui estla méthodegénbalernentutiliséeen Ame~que du Nord pour ce
type de problème. A partir de ces caIcrrls,I'accderationmaximaIe
susceptiblede provoquer ce type de phénomèneQ s aitkvaluée...Cette
valeurIorsque comparée aux accélérationesnvisagéesalors,àpartir des
intensitésM.C.S. (merneen Ies majorantd'une unit&)montrait que ces
phénornénes n'étaientpas à craindre, comme I'indiquaientIes dom6es
hist~riqrres"
Translation:
"Moreover, in 1982, verificationof the stability othe dykes under
induced seismic shock was carried out with a view to the possible
liquefactionof siltlsands.These caiculationswere based on relative
densitiesestimatedfrom testsof dynamicpenetration following severai
rnethods,includingthesimplifiedmethodof Seedand Idrisswhichis the
41
-bid.,p37.
42
HQI reportopcit,p. 62.
43 Ibid.pp. 69-70. ThMCS measuremenits thMercalli-CancariIs caleofibtnrity.
Thisscaleis curreninuseinItaly,GreecSpainandPortugalandina modifieversion in
theUnitedStateofArnerica.The de ninsfrom 1-12. ThMedvedw-Sponhener-Karnick
sale (MSK),isadwelopmentof theMCSscaleand isnow inuseintherestofEurope.This
scaleninsfrom1-10. Neithescaleconvertintthe well-knoR wnchtSeraleas thiisa
measuremen tfthemagnitudeofanearthquaki,.et.eamountofenergyrelease,ndnot of
intensi.y method generallyusedinNorth Americafor this type of problem. From
these crtlculations,tmaximum accelerationsusceptibleto provoke this
typeof phenornenon was evaluated..Thisvalue,whencornparedwiththe
previouslyenvisagedintensities,usinthe MCS scale(evenin upgrading
these by one) showedthat such phenornena were not to fearas indeed
the historicaldata indicated."
2.61 Itshouldbe self-&dent that itwas in theparties'interestto
investigatethepossibilitof earthquakewiththe utmost careand, indoing so,to ensure
the allowanceof a suitable safetymarginin the constructionsand the abifty thandle
possibleworst case scenarios.For example,withreg+dto the bypasscanalthe parties
tested the stabiliofthe protectiondykesfor the most unfavourableload: a rupture in
the canal'slining coupled witha simultaneousearthquake. High safety factors were
achieved and it was shownthat, evenin thecaseof a werystrong earthquake, thedykes
would retainthe canal'swater and protecthe surroundingterrain44.Such securitywas
achievedby removing the grave1sandssubjectto liquefactionin the constructionarea
and replacingthesebymoresolidmaterials.
2.62 Hungaryhasallegedin its1992:Declarationthat the Prcijecttook
insufficientaccountofseismicconsiderationsby applyingthe figureof6.0° MCS inthe
constructiondesignphaseandthat a figureinthe regionof8.7"- 9.0'MSKshouldhave
beenapplied4'. Such an allegationis sirnplywrong.
2.63 The principal stnrctrrresof the GIN Project were, as wouId be
expected, designed and built in amrdance with applicableconstmctioncoded6. As a
resrrlt,the structureswereorigindlydesigneturemaifistableevenduring anearthquake
of 9" MCS. This design rating was cIearIyconsemativewhen measuredagainst the
seisnic map of the area apgrovedbyCzechosIovak and Hungarianexperts at meetings
heIdon 23-25 November 1965, which recorded thattIieProject arewas situatecmostly
in a zone of intensity6" on the MCS scale, reaching 7" MCS in the Bratislava and
Komamo areas,that is away hm the main constmction sites. These analyseswere
reviewed atvarious timesduringtheProject ThefoIIowingfourstudies areof particular
interes:
44
"The Bimtinnal GabEikovo-Nagymarorsoject",V. I&veandM. Szmtd,Water Power&
Dm Consmtion, Novernber1986p,.33. Annex30:
45
Sec .nnex 17,p.17.
46 '
The relevancadesemproyedduring the designphase wON-736115 CSN-736503C ,SN-
730035andCSN-736850. Dr. 3. JanAEek - Dionyz Stbr GeologicalInstitute,Bratislava:
(1)
Geolonic assessrnentand evaluation of definitive sitina othe
Gabcikovostep.
(2) Ing. A. Molnk - Geophysical Institute, Slovak Academy of
Sciences,Bratislava(1977):Onpotential earthauak eazard at the
GabEikovw oaterwork.
(3) Dr. 1.BrouCek (ed.)- Geophysica Institute, Slovak~cadem~ of
Sciences,Bratislava(1975): Seismicityof Slovakiaandits reIation
to the stmctureof the Carpathianrekon. Finalreport.
Ing. 1.Klapetek, CSc - ResearchInstituteof CivilEngineering,
(4)
Bratislava(1982). Instructions for designinn hvdrotechnic
buildingstructures inseismicrenions. State researchreport No.
P-12-526-266.
2.64 According to Dr. JanaEekt,he maximumseismicintensityin the .
Project regionwas 7" MCS. In fact, comparedto the region of more pronounced
seisrnicactivityinthe Hungarianpartofthe Danubelowlands,the regionof litny Ostrov
&, the Projectregion, was found to be relativelaseismicor quiescent. This analysis
was effectivelysupportedby Mr. Molnir, who foundthat maximum observed intensities
overthe documentedhistoneperioddid not exceed the valueof 6" MCS. Similarly,Dr.
BrouEek foundthatthe G/N Systemwasto be sitedin an area withrelativelythe lowest
seismicactivityof the regionand that themaximumobservedintensityat the planned
constructionsites was 5" MCS. The MSK scale was appliedby Mr. Kiapetek in his
analyses and heconfirmedthat the dykeswere safein thecase of an earthquake of an
intensity7.5'MSK,the approximateequivalentof 9"MCS. Suchhighintensities have
neverbeen observedinthe are^^^^.
47 -ee,also,HQI reporOD. cit..63; studyof SeismicDepartmeoftheResearch Instituteof
Geodesy and Geophysics,HungarianAcademy of SciencesMauof Maximum Earth~uake
Intensitiin Hunaarvdelirnitiareaswith intensitiinexcessof> 5" MSK, D. Csomor
(GeophysicalInstitute of the HungarianAcademy of Sciences, Budapest, 1978);D.
Pxochstzkm(aGeophysicalnstituteofthe CzechosloAcademyof Sciences,Prague): Map
of Maximum Observed Intensiof Hun~arv and SouthernSlovaiua. Contributiof the
Geophy sicaiInstit,lovakAcademy ofSciencesNo. 111981;Commission ofAcademiesof
SciencesofSocialistCountrforPlanetarGeophysical esearc(GeophysicalInstituteof the
CzechoslovakAcademyof Sciences,Prague,1978) Atlas of IsoseismalMaps: Central and
EasternEurope.. 2.65 In tems of independentassesskent,the seismicintensitieîof the
regionand the srrstainabitofthe proposedconstructionshavebeen carefullyreviewed
at varioustirnesby GidroprojectofMoscow. The &llowing strrdiesare opmicular
relevame:
(1) GabEkovo hydroelectric power plant on the Dmbe river
(CSSR). Conclusions of consultations on technicd proiect,
Gidroprojekt,Moscuw, 7972.
(2) Gabiikovo hydroelecfricpower pIant on the Danube river
(CSSR). ConcIrrsionsof consuItations. Assessrnentof seismic
çafetvand resistance of dykes of power canal inGabEikovo
hvdro~owerdant on the Danube river, Gidroprojekt, Moscow,
1981.
(3) GabEikovo hydroeiectric pouier plant on the Danube n~er
(CSSR). ConcIusionsof consuItations.Geotechnic assessrnentof
soi1rrnderlyinaa basof dyke of power canaland assessrnentof
stress conditionand deformationsof dykeand subsoilof power
canalin the GabEikovohydroelectrîcpower plant on the Danube
rivertakinnseisrnicaspectsinto account, GidroprojektMoscow,
1982.
As a result of these strrdies,the Soviet codSNZP II A.12-69 "Buildingin seismic
zones" and SNIP II 7-81were rakenintoaccount in theacrualconstruction phase. The
consequence of the applicationof these strict codesthatthe dykesare safefor an
earthquakeof an 8"MSK intensity.
2.66 In conclrrsion,the designismorethan suficient and, inany event,
the principalstructures havebecn Iocated awahm the more seismicaIIactiveareas
(Bratislava and Kornkirno). There are no stmctures dose tu Bratislava, while the
stmctures closeto the Kornhrno areaare flood protectiodykes. As the HQI report
points out,thestabilityothesedykes couid not presena hazardevenin the eventof a
severeearthquake,becausethe chances of havinga simultaneousflood are, in practical
lems, zero. Evengreaterprecautionswere takenwitfithefloodprotectiondykef sorthe
headwater canal,becausetkis sectionof thcanaiis highethanthe surmnding terrain.
As noted above, al1materialsinthdyke çubjecttu Iiquefactionwere replaced. As the
HQI report notes: "Les diguesles plusélevéeb sordantlecanald'amené sentAl'abridetout
risquedu faitde la substitutides matgriaux IiquéfiabIe~"~
Translation:
"Thehighestdykesoftheheadwater canalare immune to any rÎskdue tu
the subsfmtionof materidssubject tu Iiquefactio".
The constructions of the GIN System were in accordance with the highest safety
standardsand throughout thehistoryof theProjectthe partieshave madeevery effort to
updateandtake fullaccountof localseismicvalues.
C. The DevelopingNatureofthe Proiect
2.67 Itis clearnot leastfrom the 1977 Treaty, that the partiesalways
en$saged that the functioningof theProjectwould be monitoredon a continuingbasis
and that technicalaspectsof the Systemwouldbe updatedand improvedas the Project
progressed.Article 1 simplysets out the principalworks of the system,the detailedand
technical elaborationof which was to be carried out in accordance with the Joint
Contractual Plan,referredto inArticlesl(4)and 5. The continualupdatingof thisPlan
was foreseenasone of the principalfunctiunof thePlenipotentiarîeswho, asprovided
for by Article3 (31,were tu approveproposais for its modificationwittzinthe scopof
the 1977 Treaty.
2.68 It hasalreadybeenseenthat environmentalimpact was considered
by the partiespria tu the signingof the1977 Treaty. It is neverthelestruethat in the
period sincethat dateenvironmenta1 issues have cornetu occnpy a far greater placein
the foregroundin largeconstructionprojects,whetherin Central Europeor eIsewherein
the worId. As a result of the increasedconcernin this area, piroxitieshave tu a degree
beenreassessed andthe Systemhasbeenmodified.
TechnicalChangesin the Svstemin Placebv May 1989
2.69 One of the areasof particularconcern has been the restoratioof
the ecosystemsbordenng the Danube riverbedand its associated system of meanders
downstrearn of Dunakiliti. The quantityof water to continuedown this section of the
river was not specifiedin the 1977 Treaty,but accordingto the Joint ContractualPlan
-. -.
48 HQIreport,OD.cit.,63,(emphasisadded).thisamount was tobe between50 and 200 m3/s,thatlis 50m3/s duringthewinterand
200 m3/s during the growth season, with occasionalhigher flows to prevent excess
sedimentation. Following the Bioproject, its 1986 update and subsequent re-
examinationscarriedout especiallysince1988,it was considerethatthisamount should
be increased. As atMay 1989,the condusionhadbeenreachedthat the DunaMifiweir
shouldcharmeu 1p to 350m3is into the Danuberiverged on a continual basis,wiîh the
flow being tempormilyin~reased to 1,300 dis each week in ordertu prevent the
depositionoffine sedimentinthe riverbed. \ 1
2.70 At thesamc date,the followingimportantmodificationswere also
foreseen:
- The construction of 7-8undemater weirs in the Danube tu
increa heewaterlevelinthe fiverand theground water IeveIin
the inmediatearea.
- The constmction of variousweirs in the Danube side arms to
conserve theheightof the localiwatertable. This wouldcreatea
system of distinct regions, each with its own water level, but
interlinkedbya seriesof cascades. Thusaconstantfiowof water
would be achieved.Eachweirbould have a submergedopening
toenable fisto passand re-passwithout difficulty.
1
- The constructionoflowered sectionsin thebanksof the Danube
to sothat when the flow of 1,300 m3/s was channelled into the
Danube, this could pass into the side arms, alIowingalso the
crossingof fishandotherquatic life.
- The constructionof fishpassesbetween the Danube riverbed and
thesidearms.
- The constructionof anoutlet fium the bypasscanal to diverta
guaranteed 20-50 m3is intothe lefibank side arrn systernthe
actualarnuunt to be decidedüpononce the region'srieedswere
evduated. Thisamountcould thenbe increasedrrpto234 d1s at
various timesduringthe growingseason inorder ro simulatelocal
flood conditions. This would represena net benefit because,on
average,süchaninundationwouldhave occurred only once every two yearsbefurethe GCNSystemwasput intopIace. As the HQI
reportnotes:
"Selon I'avisdes experts consultés, cette gestion
procurerait des conditions d'écoulemen tmdiorées par
rapportaux conditionsactueIIeqen évitantentreautres Ia
stagnatiode I'eaudans certainméandres et I'assèchement
d'autresportionde ceux-ci"."
Translation:
"According to the experts consulteci, such water
managementwouldIeadtu flow conditions superior tuthe
actud conditions, avoiding amongst other things the
stagnationofwaters incertainmeandera sndthe dryingup
ofothers."
The furiher investmentrequiredfor auch masures was acceptedby Czecbosiovakia at
least; and, awillbe seen in Chapter V beIow, it was fullyready to impiement these
modifications.
D. TheObIigationsof thePartiesunderthe 1977 Treatv
2.71 The purpuse of thissub-sectionis not tu analysein detaiI the
respectiveobIigationofthe partiestothe 1977Treaty. Thi hasbeenleft to Chapter VI
beIow. The aimhere issimply tuexpIainhuwthe years of design and study resu1tingin
the G/N Systemwere tu be brought tu hition bythe partieaccording tu their treaty
obligations, in particularthuse contaïned in Chapter III of rhe Treaty, headed
"Realizationof the SystemofLockç"andcomprisingArticIes 4 to 8.
2.72 The central provisioofArticIe4 isthat thejoint investment,that
is the construction of the GCNSystem, be carried out in accordance with the Joint
Contractual Plan, whichwould provide the technicalbaaisfor the constructionworks.
The detaiIed contents of this PIanwas alreadythe subject of a separateagreement
betweenthe parties dated 6 May 1976, the 1976 Joint Contractua1PIan Agreement5'.
EssentiallytheJointContractualPIanwastu providethe detaiIedwork scheduIeand the
bais fur the ordering of the eqnipment and materials and the drawing up of the
construction plans.
49
HQIreportop.cir..p104. 2.73 ArticIe5 provides for the apportionmentof the costs of the joint
investrnentandthe necessaryconstnictionworks. Such costswere tu be borneequaIIy -
Article 5(1). The divisionof the construction works was obviouslymore complicated.
The guidingprincipIe was that eachpartywouId be responsible for the constructionof
those works situatedon itsterritory. HoweverIas 63%of the envisaged workswere to
be on Czechoslovak territoryitwas necessarythai Hungary be responsiblefor some
construction in CzechosIovakia in order to aUow fur an equal apportionment. The
resultingapportionment,as provided forin Article5(5),isshown by meansof IIIus.Nu.
-8. Detailedwsting of thiswork was tu becarriedout inthe JointContractualPlanand
the settIement of anydiFerenccwas tu be in the fom of additionallabour and supplies
bythe relevantparty(Article 5(6)). Anyadditionil costs were not to be apportionai
except in the case of damage arising hm unavoidabIecircumçtances,unfureseeable
geulugicalconditions,.ormutualljragreedmodifications adoptedin anupdate of the Joint
ContractualPlan.
2.74 The basic timescalefor the impIementationof the Project was
given in AriicIe4f4), which providecifor the putting into serviceof the hydroelectric
power stationsin the period 1986 - 1990. A more detailedbreakdownof this schednle
was provided in the 1977 MutuaIAssistanceAgreement,aignedbythe parties on the
same day as the 1977 Treaty' . ArticIeIll) of the1977 MutuaIAssistanceAgreement
provided as follows:
"The Contractingpartieshave agreed turealizethe Gabeikovo -
Nagymaros Syçtem ...accordingtu the fu1Iowingstructure:
Thebeginningof preparatory works 1978
The hydropowerstationGabEikovo
- Putting intooperationthe firstgeneratorunit 1986
- Putting intooperation theeighthgerreratorunit 1989
The hydroelectricpower plantNagyrnaros
- Puttinginto operationthe firsgeneratorunit 1989
- Putting intuoperation thesixthgeneraturunit 199052."
2.75 It wiIIbe seen in Chapter IiI beIow th& thistirnescde was
subjected tu furtber modification at the request of Hnngary. The 1977 Mutua1
AssistanceAgreement also provided for a re-allocationof the cunstmctiun works as
apportioned inArticle 5(5) of the1977 Treaty. CzechosIovakiawas to carryout sume
51 Ame.S5.
52
PortionsoftexindenledforpurposeufcIarityof the works on the Dunakilitiweirand the taiIwate51ctionof the bypasscanal,whiIst
Hungq was tccarry out additionai worh near the zonfluenceof the canal and the
Danube. in dl, thisrneantthat Czechodovakiawasto 1 ear an additionaiexpenseof 276
miIIionCzechodovakCrowns,whichwas tu be comp :nsatcdby the righttua greater
shareofthe powerproduced atGabtikovo duringthe y4US 7486 - 198853.
SECTION 3. The Gm Svstern Provided t:
Identifredby the Parties
2.76 The G/N Systern was intendedtc be ofmutual.and generalben&
tu the partiesin termsof theefficientmanagement an1.sustainabledeveIopmentof the
Danube's water resources. aven that 25 years of detailedresearch preceded the
igthat the parties were, in fact,
signatureof the 1977 Treaty, it should not be surprisi
correctin theirbeliefthattheSystemwould be beneficitI. IshouIdfirstbe remembered
that the probIems in this section ofthe Danube we -elargelycaused by incoherent
atternptsto impruve navigationdatingback at IeastUI e centrrry. As the EC Wurking
Group of IndependentExpirtsnotedinNovember199: .the remuvaI of navigationfrom
the section of the Danube upstream of Sap (Palkovi 5uvo) actudly created a unique
opportunity tore-estabIishamorenaturd environment
"In the Fast,. themeasures taken for the n; vigation constrained the
possibilitieforthe developmentof the Danubi and the floodplainarea.
Assumingthe navigationwiIIno longerusether rainriverovera Iengihof
40 km a unique situaticinhas arisen. Initiatedtechnicalrneasuresthe
riverandthe Aoodplain can develop more natur;Ily.Ir
2.77 Dernandsontheriverin termço: navigationhadled tu the radical
alteration othe Danube hm a systernof meanders to 1single,straight channd,eading
inturn tu severeflooding,erosionandorherenvironme rtaIprublems. Smalllocalfloods
that do not exceed the area of the floodpIainwoor lands may be of ben& to the
ecoçystem, but major inundations such as those of :954 and 1965 are catastrophic,
whetherintems of theenvironmentor damage to pers ns,Iivestockand property. And,
53
ArticI3 of th1977Mumai AssisiancAgreement prc~idethatHungq shouIdcompensate
CzechosLo~aIrbyameansofa totaof848 GWhprodu edatGabEkovo. A Mer aIIowance
waç madefor thefactthaCzechosIov~ikwadd bec immittingits investmatanearIier
date. Thexfore, the allocationin fortheperiud1985-1989 was foa totaof 1022.5
GWh inthe favourof CzechosIovaaobesta~edasfoI3ws:
54
EC WorkingGroupReport of13Novernber1992,Annçalthoughthe prime airnof the variousmodificationsto the river'scourse habeen to
simp1iQnavigation,the Bratislava-Budapesstection hadnonetheless remainethe most
dificult sectionotheDanubetu navigateand was ody fuIIynavigabIeforIessthantwo-
thirds of the year. The river flowefastebecause its route was more direct, but no
benefitwas reaped fium this flowin termsofenergyproductionandd that happened
was thatthe Danubecut itsway into the terrain,loweringthe groundwatelevelinthe
adjacentcountvside.
2.78 The purposeofthis Sectionistoexamin tee extenttu whichsuch
problemswere shed withirithe GIN Projectand, inaddition,the extenttu which the
modificationof the DanubeeEectedby the GIN System couId engender0th- problems
requiringsolutions. Thus, this SectionexpIainsthe beneficid impactof the Project in
tems of floodwntrol, navigation,energyproduction and otherareasbut dso examines
fearsthat the Systemkght have a detrimentaimpact on water IeveIsor water quaIity
with theiassociatedimpactson the envirument. Reference ismade, where possibIeto
independentopinionsbecause, inthe pst, Hungq has soughtta devaiuethe researcof
both Czechuslovak and Hungarianinstitutionand tuportrayevenitsown scientistsand
engineersas thevoicelesservantsofthe fumer regime. Thestatementscontainedin the
BechteI and HQI reports, for example,show this portrayd to be whoIIy-inaccurate.
SlovakiawilItry tureferto themand toother independentrepor tssoften as possible
fortheyprovidestrong,impartialevidenceofthe beneficidnatureof the G/N Systern.
A. TheExistineProblems
2.79 Flood controI wasoneof the principalconcems ofthe parties in
the concIrrsionof the 1977Treat- ArticIe13 specificaIIyprovidforthe CO-ordinated
handlingof flood conditionsand the dischargofhigh waters through the GtN System.
The Danubedready hasan extensive çystemof dykes to prevent flooding. But such
dykesalonehavenot proved inthepasttu be an effectivemeansof floodcontroIandthe
regionremainadpermanentlysndangeredbyinundationinspiteof the existenceof 1,300
km of drainagechmels andassciciatedpurnpingstations55.
55 Sec .arasI.I- 1.34above. 2.80 FIuodcontrol wouId beachievei by theGlN System because the
Danube 'sterswouldforthe firsttimebecarefuIIyrnnaged. Inthe GabEikuvo section
the floodwould be dividedbehveenthe bypasscanal, heDanuberiverbedand the side
arm systern, thus ailowinsome dissipationof floo waters in the Danube and its
branches insteadof themere channeIIinof theflood Iownstream tu the next probIem
area. In addition,appropriasafetymarginshad been ncorporatedinthe designso that
ieretainingIeveIsof the various
water Ievelscould dways remain comfortabIybeIow 1
constructions. Thus,forexample,the sidesof thereshoir wereto be2.5m above the
n Rowswere at 4,000 11131and
Ievelof waterduringnormaI operationconditionswh
thebypass canal.IIowsfora2.0 m margin.
2.81 Upstrem ofSap (Palkovicovo fieSysternwas to hancilethe
10,000 yearflood,thatisa flood,theIikelihooof QG brrençeof which ii0.01%. This
compared veryfavourablywith the existingstnrmre I&hich, atthe time of the1965
flood,wereody capableofhandIingthe 100 yearflooc1Downstream,the existingdykes
were to be reconstmctedwith particuIarattention binggiven to the probIem of the
undenvater erosionofthe foundationsof thesestructui.This wouldenableprotection
against the1,000ysar flood(th IikeIihoudof whichi
that the designeciIevofflood protectionwastu be, nce mure, in accordan wieh or
evensuperior tu internationalstandardsThesepoint: are cunfimed in the HQI report
bymeans ofits conclusiotoa detaïlastudyoftheSy temp sonstructions:
"La revue desinfrastructuresde retenue prés^éeplushaut, permet de
constater qu'ii I'étatactuel Ie projet dG ,bEikovooffre dgjà une
protection accrue contreIes crues. En e:ploitatiun, bien que ces
ouvrages aient614conçus pour Ia crue milliraiela revanche prhe
devrait permettre, moyennant certaines ver;cations ou ajustements
leI'ordredu décimillenale
mineurs, deseprotégerdes crues pluseIev&s Tages hydrauliques. La
en accord avec Ie dimensionnementdes ou
protection contre les crues exceptioneIestainsi en accordavec les
réalesnenéralementutiliséespour des évacuzeurs de crue. Le projet
assureradonc un niveau de protectionnetterntameliorévis-a-visde la
périodeavant 1355,niveauque I'ondevra s'effierde conserverIorsdes
modificationskventuelles,en particulierIorsdeénagemend te I'ancien
IitduDanube envisagédansIestravauxde miti*tionSb''
"The reviewof the dykestructrrresgiven abri. Ieadtu the conclusion
that in its actud state the GabEikProject2 ready offers an increased
56 HQIreportOP.cil., p.77(ernphadded). protectionagainstfloodig. In operation, although the structureshave
been designed for the 1,000 year flood, taking into account certain
verificationsand minor adjustments,the safety mare allowed shouId
entai1protection against more severfIoods of the orderof the 10,000
vearflood.inaccord with thedimensionsof the hydraulicstructuresThe
;>rotectioiagainst exceptionalfloods thus m&ts w ith the generally
applicablereguIationsfor floodcontrui works. The Project dl thus
assure a Ievelof flood protectiongreatly superiortu thof the period
before 1965,a IeveIwhichone mustendeavot ormaintainat the timeof
possiblemodifications,particuIaatthe tirneof the irnprovementof the
old Danuberiverbedenvisagedinthe mitigationworks."
Navi~afion
2.82 Oneofthe mainobjectivesof the GINProjectwas to improve the
navigationdong what was the onIy remainingdificuit stretch of thDanube. Such
difficul~wasprimarilyintems of therestrictedwidthof the navigatiochad andthe
inwficient water depth, which meant that the BratisIav- Budapest çector was ody
useable subject to severe restrictions for aroun120 days a year. Moreover, the
maintenance costsof this section werverysigriificarihigherthan inany other section
ofthe Danube, wMst operation costs of navigationwerehighdue tu thef. thatbarges
wuld ody be partiaIlyloaded. The solutiontothe navigationproblemshad to comply
with the requiredminimumwaterwaywidthof 100- 180 m (dependingon the individuaI
stretch of riverand water depth of 3.5 rnin irnpoundedsections, establishedby the
Danube Commission. The parties tu the 1977 Treaty had expressiyagreed tu thisby
means of AriicIeI8(1). This cornpliancwas tobe achievedby the bypasscanal, the
GabEkovosysternofIocks,the sectionsof impoundedwater and thedredgedsections of
n~erbedboth downstreamof Sap(Palko~%uvo)and Nagymms. As a result, avaiIabIe
navigationtimewouldbe increasedto 330 daysper year andnighttimenavigationwouId
be possibIeon a permanentbasisdue tu the reductionof obstacIes. A200% increaçein
shiptraffron the rivercouIdbe handIedwithout problemand suchan increasehas been
predictedwithintenyears5 '
2.83 These benefitswuuld to a degree accrue to the Parties. Each
wuuld receivegreater revenuein tems of the greaterthroughtraEc, and the increased
availabilityofcheap transportwouIbe of obviousbenefittu industryIocatedinSIovakia
or Hungary. SuchbenefitswouldaIsobeof obviousimportanceto a1Centra1European
countries, which wouId benefit not merely emomicaIIy from the cheap transport
providedby an easiIynavigabIeRhine-Main-Danubesystern,but aIsoin environmentai
51
BechteIreporop.citp.1-18.tems due especiallytu reducedroadhaulage. These importantbenefitswere stressedin
a resolutionpmed on 76Febnrq 1990, byUnion Ouest-Européenne des Chambresde
Commerceet d'Industriedes regionsrhénane,rhonadienneet danubienne,requiringinter
&a thecompletionof theGN Project:
"Au cours de sa séancedu 16 février1990 au Luxembourg l,nion
Ouest-Enropknne des Chambres deCommerce et d'Industrdes régions
rhénaneirhunadienne et danubienne,dont font parti90 chambres de 7
pays,a exigé...lareprisedes travaude constructiondu projet commun
tch&coslovaco-ho GagErokoso-Nagymaros .in1992 le caridMain-
Danube sera misen exploitation. De cettefaçon sera réalisle trafic
ininterrompuentre Ic Main et lrggion danubienne...LZrnionexprime
sesregrets[au sujetde Ia non-réalisation, 'autantplus qu'ungrande
arierenavigable,cellede lliaisonRhin-Main-Danubep ,ourraitjouerun
rûle dkisif dans le problème de l'ouverture vers une coopération
économiqueplusintensive entrelesétatsmembresdu CAEMet ceux de
Ia Cornmunaut6européenn e.. Qui plus est, le transport par voie
navigableestle pIusavantageuxdu point devuede I'6cologieUne telle
voiepourraitcontribued'unefaçon importanteaudéchargemend t u trafic
routier en Europe. L'infrastnrcturedesvoies de transport des états
danubiens n'estencore développéequ'enpartie et quant au réseaudes
etas rhénansiIsetrouvesur~harge~.r
"Duringita sessio on16 Febnrary 1990 heldat Luxembourg,the West-
European Union of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the
Rhine,Rhune,andDanubeRegions,whichcomprises 90 chambers hm 7
cuuntries,hasrequested..the continuationof constructionwurksreIating
tuthe joint Czecbdovak-Hungarianproject,GabEikovo-Nagyrnaros. At
the end of 1992,the Main-Danubecana1willbe put into operation. Thus
trafic may run without interruptionbetweerfieMain and the Danube
region... The Unionexpressesits regrets [Ah regard to the non-
redisation of wurks] more especiallyas a great navigableartery,that is
the Rhine-Main-DanubeIink, wou1d be able to play a decisive role in
relationtu the problemof theopeningtuwardsamoreintensiveeconomic
cooperation betweenMemberStates of the CMEAand ofthe European
Comrnunities...What is mure, transport by waterway is the most
advantageous from an ecologïcal viewpoint. .Sucha watenvay couid
contributein an importantwayto the lessering of road trafic in Europe.
Thelandtransport infrastruo cfthr eanube States isstiody partiaIIy
deveIupedwhiIstthe networksof the RhineStatesareoverburdened." EnergvProduction
2.84 IthasalreadybeenseeninChapter1above that thernajurityof the
~unti-ieson the Danubehave decidedto makeuse of its waterin hydroelectricpower
production. Bofh CzechoslovakiaandHungary reliedtoa largeextenton imporiedgas
and nuclear fuelfor theprodudion of electrkis.andhad faileto makeuse of the
constantand emissionfreeflow oftheDanube.Thereforetheyhad aneed for incieased
electricityoutput, anthe GN Systeq as designed,was capable of supplying3,675
GWhonanannual basis.Althoughthiswouldhavebeen no morethan a portionof each
country'stotal power production, it nonethelesspresented a olean alternattuethe
combustionofthethermalplantequivalentof 4.3 milliotons of coalorI milliontonsof
oi1and providedan oppor[unityfor the closingdom of old fossilfiel plants or the
modificationofnuclearpower plants T he Bechtelreport concludesits sectionon this
issue:
"TheGNB providesan uiexhaustiblecleansource of energy, does not
require imported goods, and relies on a new and as yet unused
resour~e~~''
By contrast,the bumingofthe coalequivalenttu producethesame powerproduces 1.25
milliontonnesof ashesc,onsume s.58milliontonnesofoxygen(for the repruductionof
wkoh 458,000 hectaresof conifmus forest is required)and emits 141,000 tonnes of
sulphurintotheatmospherealmg withmanyotherpoisonousgases.
2.85 The erosionof the Danuberiverbed,caused by reduced IeveIsof
sediment and theincreasedveIocity of the river, meant thatpriortu 1992 the river
was erectivdy sinkingintheBratislavto Sap(Palkovï~ovo)section -inment yearsby
as much as 20 cm per year As depictedin illus. No 18(atparagraph 1.43 above),
water IeveIat Bratislavahad su& byaround2 m,creatingobvious-acc peublsmstu
the port In the area of the town bridgas littlas 1m of grave1riverbedremainecl,
under which therewas ody sufisand and silt. Oncethis remaining1rnIayerof natural
protectionwaseroded,largeholeswoulddevelopinthe sands,creatingdangerousrapids
and making navigationhazardous, in additiontu undermiring the foundationsof the
bridges and other structures borderingthe river. Emore imporiantly,such erosion
had thesubsequenteffectoflowering thelocalwatertable. Downstream,this had1edtu
59 BechfereporOP.cil., p.2-87. The BereportreftorkeGM Projecl"GNB"the dryingout of the meadows and forests in the adjacentterrainand sideam areas.
Thus, during the growing season drought conditionswere experiencedin twu out of
every three years becauseground water didnut reach the topsoil Iayer,which was
necessaq suas tuenable the rootsofplant andtreestu receivethe water by means of
capillaraction.
2.86 Riverbederosion therefure constituted a severe envirumental
problem. As a result of the Gm Systemthis would beeIiminated. Upstrem of
DunakilititherivervelocitywouIdbe redrrcedand erosionwouId cease,whereas inthe
old riverbed the proposedundmater weirs, would preventfurther cutting into the
terrain. By means of the dredgingworks in the remahhg stretches of river,a stable
riverbedandwaterIeveIwouIdbe achieved.
The MosoniDanubeand the SideAms
2.87 It must be stresçed that, due to the erosion of the Danube
riverbed,theMosoniDanube(whichliessolelyon Hungarianterritory)did not, prior to
the inceplionof the GM Project,receiveany£Iowhm the Danube for 300 daysin each
year. As explairredabove,this was due to the facttbat the water IeveIin the Danube
ody reached theIeveIof the intakinto the MosoniDanube IeveI at higher flows.This
Ied tupour water qualityin certaiareas. The partiesthereforeplmed turesolvethis
deficiencyby dedicatinga minimumof 20 m31sto theMosoniDanube by meansof an
intakehm the Dunakiliti-Wov reservoir. This Row would not ody be constant but
wouId be substantialIyhigher thatheprevious averageflow hm theDanube. The side
arm system, wfich had becorne stagnantin places, was aIsopIannedtu receive greatly
increased Aows, principaIIyhm outlets constructed in the bypasscanaland in the
DunakiIitiweir, but aIsofium the reservoir'sseepage canals. The beneficia1nature of
thesegreaterflows isclear.The BechteIreport notes:
"Waterqualityinthe sidearmawiiIbe improved. ThecurrentIystagnated
side ams waters wi11be replacedby the steady50 11131osr more flow
reIeasedhm the upstream reservoir.
The water qualityin the MosoniwiII be equa1 tu orbetter than the past
water quality.."."
50 BechleIreporW. cit., p.1-8.This ben& wuuld be enjoyed both in tems of the local environmenand in human
terms. The water receivedfium theseepage cd5 wouId be clean,havingundergone a
naturd filtrationprocess. It would Ieadtu anextended and more naturd growth of
riverbedvegetation,betterconditionforIocaIwiIdIife(Ianbasedor aquatic),not tsay
the increased beauîy of the immediatma and iîs greater suitabilityfor recreatiund
activities.
B. The Irn~actofthe G/N SysternWouIdNot Be tu Createa New
Seriesof InsoIubIeProbIems
2.88 In its 1392DeclarationasweIIas elsewhere,Hungary has made a
series of unsubstariatedaIIegationsthat the GIN Project wouIdresultin sometiiing
approaching an environmentaIcatastrophe. The purpose ofthis Section is notu deai
withsuchaIIegationsindetail. Theaim israthertoshowthat the Project'impacton the
inmediateenvironment was properlyof concerntu both partiesand that this concern
translated itseintoboth the desirefor independentconErmation as to the extentof
environmentriprobIemsand the undertakingof a seriesof mitigationrneasurel Itwas
tks concernthar Icdtuthe commissioningofthe HQTandBechtelreports -reports that,
quite simply, did not support Hungary'sdaim predictiunthat thG/N System wouId
have adisastrousimpactonthe environment.
2.89 Four main areasof concernwiIIbe examined ,eingthe impactof
the G/N System un: fIr surf,ce wateri.e t.e,waters of the reservoirsthebypass
canai, the Danube,its brancheand sidearms:second g,uund water,which includesof
coursedrinkingwatersuppIies;thir he,natrrraIenvironment;and,fourth, the cultivated
environment,that is Iand devoted toagricultureor forestry. AIIof these meas are
interrelateand, inone sense,each of theIastthreeareasis subsidiartu the principal
area of cuncern,whichis surface water. It thequantityand Iocationofsurface water
thatdictates local gound water IeveIsand, similarsurfaccwater qualirydictates the
qualityof groundwater.
Surface Water
2.90 Theimportanceof the protection of water qualiwas recognised
bythe partiestu the1977 Treatywhu, bjrmeansof Article15('I)were obligedto ensure
"thatthe qualiiyofthe water intheDanubeisnot impairedas a resuItof the wnstruction
61 The BechteIreponoles"The projecha expendedsubstantefforttodeveIopdattobe
usecitimpIementmitigatiofproje- relarenvironmenlaiimpact@., p.1-20.and operation of theSystem of Lucks"I n addition, Artide15(2) provided for the
monitoringof water quaiity.A prioritywas accorded tu theseobligationsand,indeed,
these were restated shorily prior tu Hungary'sfirst indicationthat it wouldbreach the
1977Treaty. At the 23rd sessionof the Czechoslovak-HungarianCornmitteefor
Ewnomic, Scientificand TechnicalGooperation(the "ESTC Cornmittee"),heldin ApriI
1989, it was acceptedthat it wto be abasicreqrrirementof the implementatioof the
GM System that there shoulbe nodeteriorationofthe water qudity in thDanubeb2.
Inthe Iightofsucha joint resolvtisnot surprisingthasucha largeamountof research
was devoted tu hydrologicdissues I.ntems ofsuch research,the Bechtel report
concludes:
"GNB surfaceand groundwater conditions havebeenthuroughiy studied
by VIZITERV and otherexpertsm II
This researchha5ledtu the concIusionsummarised bdow.
2.97 Fast flowingbodies ofwater, such as the Danube in its upper
reaches,tendto havea naturdiy highwaterqualitybecausethe rapidmovement prevents
algaegrowih and dso leads tu a highdissulvedoxygencontent. The mainttireat tu this
quality is not causedby the Gm Systern,but rather by the useof the Danube as a
convenient conduit for thedisposalof untreated industrial and human waste. The
cessationof thispracticeformoneof thecentrdrecommendationsof the Bechtelreport
(which alsoshowsthat Hungaryis hardlyimmuneto the charge of faiIingto respect the
need forgood water quaIitinthe Danube):
"One of themust effectiveways of improvingthe quaIityofbuthsurface
andground water and itsattendanteffects on ecological conditions is tu
cIeanup the sources ofthe polIutionItisnot the intent of this report tu
discusssuchwncerns, but wme of the more criticalareasof concern are
the sewage dischargeinto the Mosoni at Gyür; the Ieachingof bauxite
red muds, and the asbestus cernent plant, near KomBrom; and the
excessiveamounts of farmfertilizersseepiinto the groundwater in the
Szigetküzandalmg the Iowerreaches of thepr~ject~?'~
2.92 The creation of the reservoir and the headwatersectionof the
river upçtreamof Nagymms couId nonethelesshave aneffecton surfacewater quality,
62 a para3.14, m., beIow.
63 BechteIreparOP.cil.,1-9.
54 m., p.1-1and 1-20.although thismight be tienefrcialrather than otherwise. Reservoirs,by slowing down
water flows, leadtu increased deposition of sedirnentsanhereforethe clarificatioof
water in the reservoir.In addition,the increaseinwater surface area- by about four
times in the caseofthe Dunakiliti-HruSov reservoi- dso iricreaseoxygenabsorption
and thus the dissolvedoxyge nontent of thewater. Firially,the longer retention time
allows thebreaking down of the orgariiIoad in the riverTheBechteIreports states:
"Thesethree factorswiIIimprove the waterqualityb."
2.93 However, during the summer months the increased water
temperature could lead to greater algae productionand a resuItantdrop in dissolved
oxyge inthe reservoûand therefore its watequaliyt.The Bechtelreportproposestwo
solutionstu this prubIern: increasedflowsover theDunakiIitiweir duringthe summer
rnonthstu reduce fhcdetention periodsandtheoperation of Gabiiikovoduringthistime
as arun-of-riverplant&., un a constantflow basis,thus alsoreducingdetentiontirne=.
Both these solutionshave been taken into account. Increasfe ldw ratesduring the
growing season were always pImed for. Moreover, the fluw rateover the Dunakiliti
weir being consîderedin 1990 was 350 m31s instead of 50 -200 dis as originally
enviçagedand, as wiIIbe seen in Chapter IVbelow, inOctuber 1989, Czechosluvakia
waswilling to consider aProjectmodificationtu the effectthat peak production atthe
GabEikovo plantwouldundercertainconditions bemodifredorpostponed.
2.94 A further areaof concern was the depositionof heavy rnetaIs in
the reservoir. Metalsuchas ironand zincare not dangerouswhen they are absorbed by
other sediments. But, if anaerobicconditionsdevelop,i.ew ,hen there is no dissolved
oxygenat the bottomof the reservoir,suchmetals canbecomesolubleandthereby pass
into ground water supplieswhich,to a degree,may become contarninated(althoughthe
contaminated water does not then passdirectly into thgreater depths used forfiesh
water supply). The sirnplestand best method of eliminatingthis problem is by
elirninatingthe dischargeoheav y etalat the source,for industrialeffluisthe major
source of heavy metal load in the Danube. Aiternatively,sediments containingheavy
66 -bid>at p2-5. A thirdsolution,incorporiinthe Variant "C" reservoir,wconstmct
underwater directionalweirsthat kept waterflowing. These rsedimentatioin the
navigationchanneland,moreoverd, irectexcesssedimentatioto the righside ofthe
reservoiwhere alayerofplasticsheetingpreventsthe seepagdepositinto the ground
waterbelow.metalscan be dredged which,since thebuild-upof suchsediments isa slowprocess,can
be camed out at3-5 yearintervds6.
2.95 As mentioned above,it was ant,icipatthat thewater qualityin
the Danubeside arms andthe Mosoni Danube wouldimprovedueto theincreasedflow.
The water quaIityin the Danuberiverbedwould also improve due tothe aerationeffect
as thewater passesthrough theDunakiiitwi eir. Thusitappearsfrom the Bechtelreport
that this weirwouldhaveanoverailbeneficialimpact on waterquality:
" Wateraualitv. The oldDanub eiverchannelwillreceiveflowfsiom the
upstreamreservoir. As previouslydiscussed,the water quaiity inthe
HmiSov-Dunakiliti reservoir will be improved, except for possible
seasonal degradation problerns. Concerning ,flows released over the
Dunakilitiweir,thewaterqualitywillbe improvedbecauseoftheaeration
induced when the flow tumbles over the concreteenergy dissipation
blocks6'"
2.96 In tems of surface water levels, theresemir seepage cmaIs
wouId preventwaterIogging in the adjacent terrainand charnethewater into the side
arms tu help maintain the surface water Ievelsin ,thesurrounding regions. The
firnctioninof this rechargesystemmay bestbe seen bymeans ofIIlus.No. 29. On the
Ieftbank,seven waterimpoundmen tructures(markedI iaesA - G on the illustration)
were designed to enablewaterIeveIstu be raisedand maintainedas desired,formin ag
descendingcascade hm Dobroho5ftu near GabEikovothatwouldensurethat maximum
ben& accnred tu the IocaI environment. Simila wcirkswere designed on Hungarian
temîtory,theintakestructurefor this rechargesystembeingpart of the DunakiIitiweir.
Moreover, Hungary was planned to benefit (and now benefits)exclusiveIy from the
additionalflowinthe MosoniDanube.
2.97 The qualityofwater duwnstream of Dunakilitiwould depend to a
large extenton the qualis of thewater Ieaving the résemir. However, a substantia1
impacton the water quality in the downstream çectiunisaIso the rewlt of poIIution
coming frum the various tributaries,together with the waste waters of communitiesand
industryroundespecialIyon the right bankin thisregion. Aswith the DunakiIitiweir, a
constant flowover the Nagymarosweir would redrrcethe productionof contaminating
algaes. The flow through the weir would againhave an aeratiun eEect but, in general
67 -bid.atp.24.
MI m., atp. 2-and2-8.terms, downstreamofNagymarostheimpactofthe G/N Systemon surfacewater would
be minimal. Thisisconfimed by the Bechtelreport:
"Downstreamof Naqrnaroç. The pIannedoperation of the project wiII
not sigriificantlydtethe flow characteristicsahydroIogyof the river
downstreamofNagymaro~ ".~
2.98 It willbe rememberedthat Articl15(2) requiredthe partiesto the
7977 Treaty tomonitorthe condition OFthe Danube'swaters. Thisrequiremenh t asbeen
hifilled anda sophisticatedmonitoringsysternhas been put into place. Thissurpasses
internationanoms becauseof thearrayof environmentalparameterssampled. Thusthe
Bechtelreportnotes:
"Incornparisonwirh U.S. hydropower monitoring systems,the proposed
GNB monitoringsystem isunique becauseit moriitorsmoreparameters
than the ColumbiaRiver Basin, Ohio River Basin,or TennesseeVaIIey
Authorîty(TVA). Hydropower facilities onthese fivers munitor water
qualityandlor minimum streamfiowsfor fish and recreationbut do not
monitor the array of environmentalparameters sampled in the GNB
monitoringsystem. With a few additions,this systemwill representa
state-of-the-art monitoring program for integrating environmental
considerationawithoperationsmII.
GroundWater
2.99 The issueofthe impactof theG/N Systemon ground watcrlevels
and quality has received great attention, both public and expert, in Hungary and
Slovakia, as might be expected. Reduced gound water Ievels could lead tu the
aridificationof certain areas, while any contaminationof ground water might aIso
contaminatedrinkingwater supplies. The specifrcfeus of the IocaIpopulation are noted
inthe HQI report and,indeed,an assessrnentof thevalidityof suchfearsforrnedone of
the centraiobjectivesofthis report:
"En effet,leprojeest constmit sur unirnporrantaquifèrequi fournitl'eau
de consommation àune partieimportantede la Slovaquieeten particulier
i Bratislava. Dans cetterégion, des évknementspassésont rendu 1a
popuIation très sensible aux risques éventuels ou appréhendésde
détérioration dla qualitédes eaux souterraines. Dansce contexte,et an
sachantque le projet aura un impact indéniabeur la nappe,des craintes
69
. Ibid.,p.2-18.
70 Ibid.,p1-8.
- spicifiques ont étfomul6es faceau projet. C'estafinde ripondre àces
craintesqueplusieurs ktudesontété entreprisesdans lecadre du projetet
c'estaussi dans ce contexte que certainsobjectifsde la mission dHQI
visentà donnerune opinionextérieureet impartialesur les résultatsdes
étudeset surles effetappréhendé dsuprojet7."
Translation:
"In fact, the Project is constructed above an1important quifer which
suppliesdrinkingwaterto a significantartof Slovakiaand, inparticular,
to Bratislava. Zn thisregion, past events have left the populace very
sensitiveto possiblerisksor apprehensiveof deterioration in the quality
of undergroundwaters. In this context,andknowin ghat the Prrrject
wouId have an urideniableimpacton the water tabIespecificfears have
been formulatedin face of the Project. It is in.ordtorespond tu such
fears that severai studies have been carriedl out within the Project
fiamework and itis alsowithin this contextthat certainobjectivesof
HQI'smissionhavebeen aimed at givinganexternalandimpartialopinion
ontheresultsof studiesandtheiranticipated effectonthe Project."
2.100 In examining here in detaiIthe impactof the Project on ground
waterlevels and quality, the extemaland impartial&inion referred to in the above
citationand Iater provided by the HQI report is first cunsidered.,The HQI report
consideredonlythe groundwaters Iocated inSlovaktemtorybut, as willbe seen later,
the Bechtelreport alsocame to the conclusionthat fearsof the deterioratioof ground
watersinHungarianterritorywere unfounded. Theco~clusion ofthe HQI report was as
foIIows:
"Evaluation qualitativde risquedecontamination
I
Dans les sections précédentes,nous avons kécrit sommairement les
conditionsphysiquesde la nappe de litny Ostrov dans la zone duprojet
de memequela qualitéde I'eau etles modes de contaminationpossibles.
Nous avons aussi rew et discutédiversaspects du projet de meme que
les processus géochîmiquessuswpribIesd'affecterIaqualitéde I'eau.
1
Suite a cette analyse sommaire,il nous apparait que les risques de
détériorationdelaqualité de l'easontfaibles. Les principauxarguments
enfaveur de cettopinionsont lessuivants.
- I'eau intiltréedu Danube sur de courtes distancesest de borne
qudi té(voircaptages de Bratislava) :
- la mobilisationéventuelledes métauxidans les sédiments sera
contrecarréeparlabaissedepennkabilité des sédimentset l'apport
71 HQI reportoa citp ..9. d'eaurapideet massifdansl'aquifèreà partir des fouillesau fond
du réservoir
- aucune &idence d'hydrocarburesmobiles n'a éte décellée[sic]
darislazone duréservoir
- Ies nappes aIIuviaIescomparables montrent peu de cas de
contaminationdansces conditions.
Le seul phénomènesusceptible de détériorerla qualité serait la
mobilisationdu fer et manganèseet cette éventualitpéeut n'êtreque
lointaineen raison de l'apportrapide d'eau au fond des fouilles
dtiIuiltratioDans la pire des éventudiié, fer etle rnanganésesont
facilesàretiredeI'eauet neposent pasde risquepour Iasanté''"
Translation:
"Qualitativeevaluatioof theris of contamination.
In the precedingsections,we have descnbed in summq the physicd
conditionsof the~itn*Ostrovwater tableinthe Projectzone,as weIIas
the water qualityand thepossiblforms of contamination. Wehave dso
reviewed and discussed diverse aspects of the Project and also the
geochemicalprocesseswhichmayaffectwaterquality.
As a resuIt of this conciseanalvçis.it appetousthat the risksof a
deterioration in water aiialitvare very low.The principal arguments
srrpportingthisopinioare asfollows:
- the water infrltratedfrothe Danube over shortdistancesiçof
goodquality (seethewater-catchent ofBratislava);
the possibletransferof rnetalsin the sedimentswbelcountered
by the drop in permeabiIityof the çedimentsand the rapid and
massiveinjectionof waterintothe aquiferthroughthe excavations
inthe bottomof the reservoir;
-
no evidence of mobile hydrocarbonshas been detectedin the
reservoirzone;
- comparablealluvialwater tablesshowfewcasesof contamination
insuch conditions.
The odyphenornenonsusceptible toIeadtu a deterioratioin thewater
quality would be the mobilisation of iron and manganese and this
possibilitycanonlybe distantdueto the rapidflowofwaterat thbottom
of the infiltration channels.In the worst possible case, iron and
manganeseare easyto recover fromwater and do not posea riskto the
health."
72 m., p.52,(emphasiadded). 2.101 In termsof groundwater Ievds, oneof theprincipleaimsof the
hydrologicasltudiescarriedoutinthe constmctionperiodhasbeen toidenta meansof
maintainingthe water,tablein &tn$ Ostrov,Szigetkozand the sidearm areas.It has
alreadybeen seen atparagrap2h.87abovethat thesidems wouIdreceivemorewater
as a rewItof the Gm System, as would the Mosoni Danube. As the BechteI report
notes,any negativeimpactin0th- areasofSzigetküz(and,indeed, Ztn+ Ostrov)would
be reduceddue,interaliato thewaterreceivedfromtheseepagecanais:
"Theseinterceptionchannelçwill transporthe reservoirseepage tothe
Szigetküzsideam charnelsandwiIImaintain theIocaIground waternear
historicIevels.Noadditionimitigatioisrequired"."
Thisbenefitwouldnaturally befeltinthewholeof theSzigetkozregion. Analogmode1
studiescarriedoutbyHungaryhaveindicatedthat,dueto theartificialrechargeplan,the
ground water tablelevelcould be maintainedwithin50 cm of the pre-Project level in
80%-90% ofthe Szigetkuz'. Itmust,ofcourse, beremernberedtbat such studieswere
catned out andevaliiatedwhen the ptamed dischargehm Dunakilitiinto the Danube
riverbed was 50 -200 dh. Given that by mid-1989the constructionof undenvater
weirsanda dischargeof350 m31s wereenvisagedfortheDanuberiverbedi ,t couldhave
been expectedthat the impact on Szigetkoz groundwater levels would have been
minimal.It willbe çhownin ChapterV below, thatthisexpecrationhaseffecbiveIbeen
cofimed insofar as ispossible,bearinginmindtheProject'sincompIetstate.
2.102 TheMalyDanubewouldalso receivean increased and constant
flow. An averageincreasein dischargeof around 101113 w1ss plannedby the parties
andwouId againmaintain andindeedincreasehistoricwater IeveIsinlitnp Ostrov. This
againhas beenc~nfrmed'~.
2.103 The effectof groundwaterlevelson the aquifersunderlyingthe
Danube basinhas alsobeen carefiillystudied. Important sources of drinkingwaterfor
the localpopulationare located in the area of the HniSov-Dunakilitrieservoirand
73 Bechtelreporopcit., p. 2-15.
1s Sec .ara.5.52,below.downstream of Naparos, supplyingBratislavaand Budapest,re~pectively'~.These,
together with the location ofother drinkingwater andmonitoringwells, are rnappedon
Illus.No. 30CA)and (BI. The G/N Systemwould not have a substantialimpact on the
Bratislava drinkingwater supplies. The recharge of the supplywells from the area
upstream of Dunakilitiwould increasew,hile it wouldbeexpectedthat the downstream
rechargewoulddiminish slightly.Theoveraiieffectisan equilibrium:
"Thenet change to the aquifergroun wdatersupply due to the altered
recharge reee wiIIbe minimai - possiblyincreasing or decreasing
slightly"."
2.104 A pariof the supplyof drinkingwater tu Budapestis takenfiom
bank-filter water suppIywells, Iocated downstreamof Nagymaros,that are dug in
permeable and shailowgrave1close to theDanube (Illus. No. 30cB)). There is aIink
between the qualityof the waters in thesewells and the water qualityin the Danube
because the wells are rechargedindirectlyfrom the Danube. But, neithertheBechtel
report nor the HQI reportpredictsa declinein this quality. Indeed, the Bechtelreport
points to the possibilitof a slight improvementand, in any event, predicts that the
Projectwillnothave ameasurable impacton the ofthesewells:
"The pIanned operationof the projectwillnot si~nificantalter thflow
characteristicsor hvdroIoavothe riverdownstream of Namrnaros ...
Becausethe project wiII notdter the flow of the riverin this area&
proiect cm not have a masurable impact onthe performanceof the
wells. From a water qiialitvstandnointas discuçsedin the sectionon
surfacewater. the pro-iecoperationmi~htresultin an improvedwater
qualityexceptfor afewmonthsduring the~ummer' ~"
2.105 Nonetheless, Hungary's 1992 Declaration gives the clearest
impression on itsveryfirstpage that the G/N Project seriouslythreatens the qualityof
drinking water supplied to the population of Budapest, which exceeds 2,000,000
people'9.A morebdanced explanationofthe quaIityand sourcesof harm to Budapest's
drinkingwater ista be forrndin a report on the "Stateof the HungarianEnvironment"
16
Thereare,ofcowse,weIIsImateddong îheDanubbemeertrhesetivsectoorfwatersuppIy.
The impactoftheProjectosuchweirwiIIbekneficial, ifanythi&,. BechteIreporoq.
cit .2-17.
77
Ibid.p.2-15.
78
-bid.,p.281(emphasisadde)
79
Annex17.preparedby the Hungarian Academyof Sciences,the Miriisuyfor Environmentand
WaterManagementandthe Centrd Statisticd OEce in 1990''. Thisreport brings ou1
thefollowingpoints:
- Firs the .atersuppIy sourcesfor Budapestare Eum wellfields
tu the nortand southof theciîythe furtheof thesenorthernwellfieldfrom Budapest
lyingover 50 kmdownstremof the aquifersthat underlythe regofthe GiN Project,
and inanyeventdownstream of Nagymaros(Illus.No. 3003));
- Second, a test of thewater in 103 wells in the northernand
southernfieldssupplyingBudapestshowsthat water drawn fromthe southern fieldswas
of substantially poorer qudity than thdrawn fiom the fields norih (upstream)of
Budapest:8.7% of the wellwaterin the northemfieldswasof consistentlypoorquality
whereas the figurefor waterhm thesouthern fieldswasup to 47%;
- Third, the quaIityof weII water south of Budapest has
deterioratecidrasticallysin1963 Iargeidue to the "untreated wastewaterdischarged
from sewer outlets in Budapest",a situation not expected to improve for at least 5-10
yearsfiam the date of the report.
2.106 Thus,the poor qualitof Budapest'swater islargelthe result of
pollutionfromBudapest, TheweIIsintheregion oftheG/N Projecfsupplywatw maidy
tu Bratislavand the regions surroundingthe Project, aare upstream uf Budapest.
The Iocation of these weIIsappearsunIIIus.No. 30CA). The quaIity ofthe drinking
water frum these wells is generallygo-and it hasnotdeterîoratedsince Variant"C"
hasbeen put into operation.Thisis no Iesstrue for the ground water in the region on
Hungarianterritory. As was predictedbythe BechteIand HQI reports andas has been
confrrmed by theevidencecoiiatedbythe ECWorkingGroup of Independent Experts,
there hasbeenno deteriorationof thewaterintheDanube asaresultofthe G/NProject:
"In generalno ground water qualitychanges can be identifiaRer the
damrningof the Danube ... accord in^to the Humarian Data Report
&fl3? no significant changes have been detected in the mund water
quality."
80 Annex32.
81 EC WorkingGrouprepon.f2November 1993, Annex1p.40(emphasiadded). 2.107 By way ofconcIusion ,tisobviousthat anjrdam projectwiIIhave
an effecton ground waters. This was weII-knowntu the designers of theGN System,
whu therefore incorporateda comprehensivesysternof measures aimed at monitoring
and, wherenecessary,at correcting this efect in urdertooptimise the impactof the
Project on gruund water conditions. Put simply,the sciIutionsenvisagedtu resolve
problems hm these changeswere whoIIysuEcient:
"The extensivemitigationmeasuresplanned by the project to controIthe
impactsun groundwaterwnditionsappear adequates2."
The Naturd Environment
2.108 The muItipIe studicscarriedout prior to the 1977 Treatled the
partiestu considerthat theproposed deveIopmentof the Danube was sustainablefrom
an environmental point of view. Active steps had been taken tu safeguar tde
environment - for example,the bypass canalhad beenIocatedtu the norih of the side
am systern su thatthis ecoçyçtemcouIdbe preserved. Intems of the actualdraftingof
the 1977 Treaty, environmentalimpactremained a major cuncern of the parties. The
development was tube carriedout alungsidean obIigationtu protect the environment,
forArticle 19provided:
"The Contracting Parties shaII,through thmeansspecified in the joint
contractual pian, ensure cornpliance with the obligations for the
protection of nature arisingin connection with the construction and
operationofthe Systernof Locks."
2.109 It is seIfevident that the impIementation of the 1977 Treaty
invoIveda changeinIand usage and aconsequent eEect on the environmentinthe areas
ofconstmction. Indeed it maybe saidthat themajor impactof the GIN Project on the
environment of the Danube basin hadaIreadybeen feItby 1989. In terms of changeof
use of the Iucalterraitisundeniablethat the envirumental impact oftheconstruction
hadbeen hi&. For example,thebuildingof the bypasscanaland the GabEikovostep had
meant tu the SIovakpeupIethe Iossof over3,000 hectaresof forest. Such Ioss camot
be reversed. However,the changeinIanduse was a consciousdecisiontakeninthe Iight
of the positive developmentand envirumental benefits to be offered bythe Project.
SimiIarly,the creation of the Dunakiliti-HmSovreservuir requithe cIearingof 1,100
hectares of managedpoplar forest andat Ieaçt200 hectares of natural vegetation. But
these losses musi be kept in perspective.he seriousprublernsin this section of the
82 BechrelReparW,.cit., p.1-10.Danube necessitated adequateso~utions. In orderto alleviatethnsk of fioodingin
Bratislava,the otheroptionwouldhavebeentu createaninundationstrip250 rnwide on
both sidesof theDanube. This would haveled to theIossof some 1,500hectaresof
hardwoodforest and wouId not have pruvideda permanentsolutiontu the danger of
severefloodinginany event.
2.110 Bearingin mindthe lussesairsinhm the changein Ianduse, it is
naturd that thepartiesshouId have wishedto keep anyfurther adverse effectto the
absoluteminimum. But, beforeexaminingthe stepstakento restricttheseeEects,it is
essentiato seethe ecologicdirsksinperspective,that tuunderstandthe existingIand
use ofthisareaof the Danube.Ztnj~Ostrov and Szigetkozare notnaturereserves. Of
Szigetkoz's40,100 hectaressome 84% are devotedtu agriculturandmanaged forestry
use. The remaining16%(approximately6,500 hectares)is madeup of industrialland,
residentiallanand bynaturalhabitat.
2.111 Placingthe G/N System in its historicperspectiveit is quite
cIewthat the major "environmentaiimpact"hasaIreadybeen feltZ3.lit@ Ostrov and
SZrgetkOz are heavily cultivated areas anare significmty populated. It may be
rernemberedthat one of the major sources of pollutionof the Danube is agricultural
fertiliser from SzigetkoThisis notto saythat remainingareasof natural habitat are
not significar-quite thereverse. The Iucationof theseareasand the positive steps
required to maintaintheir natural conditionwere weIIknown tu the Project'sdesign
enginsers. The areas are srnaIl,they are manageableand wiIIactualfybenefithmthe -
Project, which wiIInoody guaranteethe requiredwater flows in çome areasbut wiI1
a1suhaItthe darnagingsinkingof the Danube riverbed that wadryingout theregion's
naturaIrneadowand forestland.
2.112 The vegetation in the Danubian floodplain consists of
appruximately80% artificiaci m.a,aged)popIartrees. The rernainingareasconsisof
willow thicket, willow-poplargdIery furesand ash-oak-elmgalery forest. It was
anticipatecirhat the floodpIainwould be affectedby the change of water IeveIin the
Danube riverbed. With a discharge reduced tu 50 -200 m3is unaccompanied by
underwater weirs,it wacdculated thata250-300 rn widezone of floodplainvegetation
wouid be subjecttu airdificationhm the DunakiIitiweir tu the backwaterconfluence
with the bypasscanal.Thiswould resuItinthe areasofwiIIow and willow-poplarbeing
repIacedbyvegetationadapted tudriermilssuch asoak-steppe.
83 &, dso,theHQI reporatpara.2.16belw . 2.713 The principameansofmitigatingthis Iosswasdready envisaged
in 1989 -to increase the flowinto the Danube riverhedt350 m3is. Accordiig to the
BechteIreport:
"Threetypes of mitigation are possible for this impact on naturd
vegetation. First and preferably,the impact could be reduced by
increasing the flow releasedcontinouslyto the mainchahel of the
Danubes "
As a resultof the proposed increased ffows, aridificationeffectswould beminimal
especiallyifthiswere accompamieb dyundenvater weirs toraisethe waterlevelsfurther.
The remarning two mitigationsreferredto intheBechtelreport dependedsolelyon the
goodwiII andintentof Hungaq. Theycomprisethe estabIishment ofa revegetationplan
in the Szigetkozand the irnplementatiof the rrnfrrndplan toexpan the remnantsof
native forestalmg the Musoni Danube. Far hm king adverseIyaffected by the
Pmject, such forestwouIdmpay ben& fromthe new, steadyflowof20 m3/sinto the
MosoIii Danube. Similarly, the sideam area worildnot be threateneddue to the
arrificirechargeplan:
"Natural vegetation occurrîngin the vicinity of the Danube side
channeVoxbows is not expected to experiencesignificant adverse
impactss5"
Thisappliesequallyto boththe Hungarianand the Slovaksidearm systems. In fact,the
channellingof constantwaterflowinto theseareaswould bringan end to the process of
stagnification,wouldbe of netbenefitto the environmentand wouldencourage a return
to a more naturalecosystem.
2.I14 Downstream frum Sap (PalkoviEovo)I ,arge settlementsand industrial
areashavedeveIopedalong the Danube with aresultant reduction in natural vegetation.
Somefurihervegetaîionwould belostdue to the constmctionof flood protection dykes,
and the increased water IeveIin the Danubeof, for example, 2rn atKomarno wuuId
resrrlinsomechanges inspeciestype. Inlow-lyingareas, increaseinwater IeveIwould
be controIIedby dykes, seepagecanaisand prrmpingstations,reducingthe impacton the
vegetation. Wherethe Danube's bank sndsurroundhgterrain dominatethe river, there
84 Bechtelreporop. cit.2-23.
85
-bid.,p. 2-24.would be some increasein local groundwaterlevels, whichwould lead towards the
colonisationofmore hydrop hilispecies.
2.115 Intheregionjustabove Nagymarus thereisa higherconcentration
of naturd vegetation. TheeEectof &e Projecton this vegetatiowouIdagain be some
reducticindue to constructionworks and change tomore hydrophilic species where
water IeveI increaçes are plmed. The most effectivemitigationhere would be
revegetation prograns. This has been considered by the parties. Downstrearn of
Naparus there wouId be no sigrirfcant impact eitheron natural vegetatior local
wi1dIifea6
Agricultureand Forestrv
2.116 Both Szigetkozand litng Ostrov arehighiyfertileand cultivated
tractsof land:
"En susde cc qui a étédit endétaiIpIus haut, concernant le milieu
naturel, il faut ajouque ce milieutraverséparIe Danube est mixteet
para-urbain. On y pratiqueI'agnculturde façoinntensivede mêmeque
kxploitation furestiére.La régioncompriseentre le Danube(Dunaj), le
Petit Danube (Mal9Dnnaj) et le Vhh se denomme"Ile de BIS'(hg
Ostrov),et onconsidtreses solsàI'échdlenationalecommeétantles pIus
fertilespour desfinsagricoles.
Bien que Itrrbaniçationnesoit extensivequ'àBratislava,on retrouune
quinzainede viIIeet villagesdans la portion tchécoslovquedes rivdu
Danube, pour unepopulation de pIus d'undemi-milliond'habitants, en
incluantla villede Bratisla."8'
Translation:
"In addition twhat has beensaid in detailaboveconcerningthe natural
environment, it must be added that the environment crossed by the
Danubeis mixedand partlyurban. Itis anareaof intensivefarmirigand
exploitationof forestry. The regioncomprisecbetweenthe Danube,the
Mali Danube and the VAhis caIIed"WheatIsIandIa 1nd in national tems
its Iandareconsidered asthe mostfertileforagriculture.
86 B~htd reportOP.cilp.2-49.
87 HQIrepart,m. cil.,85. Aithuughthe urbanisationisnot intensivesavefor at BratisIava,therare
fifieetoms andvillagesintheCzechodovak sideof the Danube'sbanks,
givinga populationofmore than hdf amiIIionincludingBratislava."
The Project wouIdundeniablyhave had aneffecton the productivityof theseimportant
regions if noplanshad been made to maintainwatw Ieveb: without the dedication of
new flows,furtherproductivitjrwouIdhavebeen reduccd by onethirds8 .ut dustu the
artificirecharge system,impactson agriculture andforestry would bc insigRrficanor
beneficiai
2.117 Lussesdue tufloodqpreviousiysufferedintermsof both furestry
and agriculturd production,would be reduced and agricuIturd land, especially,would
ben& hm the reductionof areassubjccttowaterlogging.Thus,the HQI report states:
"Lerabattementde la nappe I'avaldu projepourra êtrebknkfiquepour
l'agriculturdanscetterégionoii Iedrainagiestrequisg .
"The decreaseinthe watertablein the downstrearn sectionof the Project
maybenefitagricultureinthisregionwheredrainage isrequired".
The BechteI reportpredictsa net ben& tu agricultureand an opportunity for increased
crops production. fisgeneraIconclusionsareas follows:
"The project wiII provide several benefits tu agricuituraland forestry
production in the Szigetkoz with installationof theartificirecharge
systern. These benefitsincludeincreasesin arableIandwithmorecontrol
of gruund water IeveIsand floods, as wellas a more stabiIizedwater
supplyfor irrigation".
2.178 SIovakiahas shuwnabove, fir thtt,he GN Projectconstitutesa
very thoroughlyresearched and envir~nmentall~ sustainabledevelopmentof thjssection
of the Danube and, second,that it was whollyunrealiaticfor Hungaryto daim in 1989-
88
Betcheireporop.cit.. p.2-Iiçestimaredorexample,thaody 300 oftheSzigetkot's
7,80 0ectltrof foresrwodk adverselaffecied,wwhhimpactwuid bemiiigatedba
move awayfrompoplarplantaiioothersspecies.
89
HQIrepart,W. cil., p.36.
m
Betchd repor9. ch,p. 1-13.1990 that its withdrawd fiom the Project wdue tu newly discoveredenvironmenta1
problems. Environmentaiimpactshad been carefuIIyand extensivelystudied by both
parties tu th1977 Treaty bothbefureand der the wnclusion of the Treaty. It had
beenfoundrhat theenvironmen tould benefito ahighdegreehm the Project and that
any negativeimpactscouIdbe mitigatedatthe sametime asthe parties'development
gods were redised. The partiesconclusionshavebeen confrmed bytwoindependent
sources(the HQIand BechteIreports)quitesimply,therewas noenvironmental disaster
inthe ofing.
2.119 However, therenowexists evenbettereevidenchat the design of
theGKNSystemis environmentalIy sound. Thisis inthe fum of the actualoperatiof
the Systemin rnbdihd fum and itscareh1 monitoringby the EC WorkingGroup of
IndependentExperts,both ofwhich areconsideredinChapter V bdow. Unsurprisingly,
the evidence shows that the voIuminousresearch into the Project was solidly bmed.
Thus, tu takeoneimportantexample,the Systernhasbad absoIuteIynonegativeimpact
on the drinking watw suppIiesfor eitherBratislavaor Budapest. By contrast, the
unsubstantiatedaIIegationsthwereofferedas thereasonsbehindHungaq*~ withdrawd
hm the Projechavenow beenconfimecltu bewhoIIynduunded.CHAPTER III. CONDUCTOFTHEPARTIESTOTHE 1977 TREATYPIUOR
TO 13MAY 1989
3.01 In thisChapter, the attitudeand actions of Czechoslovakia and
Hungary towardscarryÎngout theirobligationsunder theProject areexarnined up until
Hrrngary'ssuspensionofperformance under the1977 Treaty inMay 1989,with particular
ernptrasionHungary'sconductandthe reasonsfor it. The foIIowiaresomeof the major
concIusionstu bedrawnhm the examinationinthisChapterof thisphaseof the-Project's
history:
- m, hm theoutset,Hungarywas adificuIt Project parrner;due to
economic problems(not environmentai concem) Hungav sought
delaysin theagreed time scheduleas well as changesin thewofi
distribution;
- Second,negotiationsbetween thepartiessucceeded,nevertheless,in
arrivingat agreementtoamend the 1977 Treatyanditsrelatedtreaty
documents su astu reffectime scheduIeextensionsin deferencetu
Hrrngary'çconomicdificulties;
- Third, these amendrnentqwhichwere made in 1983 inthe form of
ProtocoIs,hadthe effect of reaffrming both the validityof1977
Treaty and the objectsof the G/N Project; until its suspensionof
performance in May 2989, the HungarianGovernmentrepeatedly
assuredCzechoslovakiaofitsfirmintentionto fulfitsobligationto
completetheProjectin accordan wih the 1977 Treaty;
- Fourth, soon fier th1983 Protocol delayînthe Project'timetable
had taken eflect and was being carried out, Hungary's attitude
towardsthe Project begato changeand, instead of seekintodeIay
the Project, it requestedthat the Project'sschedrrlebe acceIerated; in
spite othe financialdifficuItiesthis caused Czechosiovstepsto
speed rrpthe çchedule began tube taken asearly as 1985-1986,
leadingultimateltotheProtocolof 6 February1989, whichfomaIIy shorîened rheschedule by 15 months; the 1989ProtocoI, like the
1983 Prutocols,wasa reaffimationofthe 7977 Treatyandthe G/N
Proje ;ct
- Fifthinspiteof thedelaysandaccelerationsinthe schedule,byearly
1989Hungary, likeCzechoslovakia,had accomplisheda largepartof
its constructionobligationsrequiredbythe 1977Treaty;
- Sixth,inthemid-1980s,environmentalgroupsbeganincreasingly to
singleout the G/N Projectas target;inHungary,oppositionto the
Projectgainedthepolitical supporotthepartythat inMay1990 was
electedtu Ieadthe Hungarian Goverment, with the rewlt that the
Projectbecme a highiyvolatipoliticaissueinHungq.
SECTION 1, The Period 1977-1984: DeIavs in the Proiect Due tu Hungawk
EconornicDifficulties
3.02 Mer signature of the 1977 Treaty,workon the Projectwas started
bybothparties in accordance withthe Treatyandthe 1977 MutualAssistanceAgreement.
At the 17th session of the Joint Czechoslovak-Hungaria Cnommittee for Econornic,
Scientifiand TechnicalCooperation2,4-26February1981,itwasconcluded thatduringthe
years 1978-1980 constructionunderthe Project hadbeen accomplished accordin to the
TreatyandtheMutualAssistanceAgreement andthat workhadbegun on althe main parts
of theprojecr.
3.03 Sincein thisandthe next ChaptersreferencewiIIbemade tovarious
cornmitteesand techrziclroups,it maybe helpfuto setout hera briefdefinitionof them:
- JointCzechoslovak-Hungaria nornmitteefor Economic, Scientific
and Technical Cooperation(the "ESTC"Committee):the senior
competentjoint authority,reporting directly to the top of the
Governmentof each State;responsiblefor al1questionsconcerning
cooperationbetweenthe States;also supenrisethePlenipoteniaries. - Joint Czechoslovak-HungarianBroader(Edarged) Tecimica1Group
("BTG"): responsibiefurpreparingthe te* of the 1977Treatyand
Mutud &sistance Agreement under the supervision ofthe ESTC
Committee.
* Plenipotentiariehe two seniordelegatestutheG/N Project named,
respectivy1,byeach Stateresponsibleforconstmctionand operation
ofthe Project; assumedthe dutiesof tBTG; were supervisedby the
ESTC Cornmittee.
- JointOperatingGroup:setup bythe Plenipotentiariesas the working
grouptu resolvetechical problems.
- CzechosIovak-Hungarian Commissionfor BuundaryWaters("Joint
BoundaryWaters Commission"):estabiishedpursuant tu the 1976
Boundary Waters Management Agreement; responsibIe for
monitoring and taking masures to parantee the qualiw of the
Danube waters; the Commission'sPIenipotentiariesreporteci direcrly
tothetop of theGovernent ofeach State.
A strikinfeatureof thescornmittee sndguups making the basidcecisiunsconcerningthe
G/N Projectwasthe highgovernmentaIIeveI atwhichtheyoperated.
3.04 Evenat thiseariystage,inspitof thepositivetoneofthe protawl of
the 17thsessionofthe ESTCCornittee, Hungarybegan tufaIIbehindschedule;andit suon
requested a slowdown in theworks due tu the economi probIemsthe country was then
experiencing. Thisled toa seriesof meetings in 1981, includinameeting of the Vice-
Chairmenof the EST€ Cornmitteeon IO~e~tembe? and a meetingofthe Chairmenof the
Conmittee un 21 ~e~tember~. Hungary svught a delay of as long asfiveyears, whik
Czechodovakia attempted ta restrithe deIaytu two years,Iater incremingthe acceptable
delaytu rhreeyears. Atthe aametirne, Czechoduvakïaaskedthat it be reimbursedin some
fashïunforthe custstoit ofanysuch May. Discussionscontinueclinto 1982 without thisquestionbeing nsolved4. The ESTC Cornmittee subsequentlyvisitedthesite and saw for
itself the advancestateof constructionon the Czechoslovakside, inclrrdingthe cIearinof
some 5,000 hectaresof fam land and forestfor theProject,with severalthousandworkers
Iocatedon site.
3.05 At the 18th sessionof theESTC Cornmitteeheld during 31 May - 1
June 1982, it wasagreed M drawup a newconstructionschedule and tirnetablepostponing
theputringof the GabEikovosection inîu operationuntil1990'. The start of constructionof
the Nagymarossection would be delayed until 1989-1990, with operation of the first
turbuielgeneratorunittu commence by 1993 ifpossible. Itwas stipulatethat the parties
would adhere tcithebasicplinciplesofthe 1977Treaty. At this session,certaipruposalsof
Hungary for the revisionof the Projecbased on Hungary'sre-examinationof the technicd
aspects of the Project were referred tu, including ils ecologisal impact. There is no
indicationin the protucolof thsessionjust whattheseproposaiswere,but Hungaryagreed
tu hand over the resultsof its studietriCzechoslovakia,who agreed in turn tu consider
them provided they did notchange the concept of theProjectas agreedin the 1977 Treaty.
Czecboslovakia was never given any such Hungariantechnical -dies or proposais for
revision.
3.06 As the discussionscontinuedinto 1983,it becarneclear that Hungary
was in Fact seeking to irnprove its financialposition under the Projeot. In the end,
CzechosIovakiaeIected not then tu pnrsue the remedies to which it might be entitled,
provided that s speedy oondusioncould be reached to implementthe deoisionsreached at
the 18th sessionof the ESTC Cornmittee.
3.O7 On 23 May 1983, in responsetu the CzechoslovakPrime Minister's
letter of3 M~JJ',the HungarianPrime Ministerreassured Cmchoslovakiathat, in spite of
dificult ecunomicconditions,Hungarywas doing al1it wu1d ta Mfil its obIigations undw
the 1917~reaty~. Then, a tuniing point inthe negotiationsoccurreon 9 July 1983, atthe
4
-ee, Amex 42, aIetterdate26 ApriI1982,in whichtheHungarianVice-Prime MinisrerMr.
MarjaiassurcdhictiunlerpathaHmgq wasnotin violationthe1977Traiy.
5
Annex43.
6
hex 44.
7 Annex45.meetingof the Chairmenof the ESTC ~ommittee' . II was agreedtu adhere to the original
apportionment of work beiweenCzechosIovakîa and Hungary, as setout inthe 1977 Treaty
andin the MutualAssistanceAgreement,andto adoptthe deIayinthe schedule asappruved
atthe 18th sessionof theComrniitee,that is,toputthe Gabtkovo section intooperationin
1990 and the Nagymarossection into operation in 1993. The finap laragraph of the
memorandumreferred to the questionof protectioof theenvironment:
"The Comrnittee chairmen stated that the 11977 Treaty and Mutual
Assistance Agreement] took into consideration,with regard to the then
knowledgelevel,the measures concerningthe environmentprotection and
nature protection. Bothparties, however, consider necessary to keep on
findingreasonablesolution of contingent in favourablephenornenain the
course of the realizationof the constructionand to find ways leadingto
impruvement of the environmeritquality. With regard to this,it will be
necessarytu enable necessarymodificationof the technicalprujects.To this
purpose to createconditionsforeffectivecouperation."
This was a confirmationthat the environmenthad dready beencarefurlyconsiderd but that
Project modificationsmightstillbe found desirableinthe Ii&t of anynew findingssu astu
improvethe quaIitJrofthe environmerit.
3.08 In order to reflectthe changeinscheduIet ,he PIenipotentiariewere
charged with preparingthe necessaryProtocols to amend the 1977 Treaty and MutuaI
Assistance Agreement.The Protocolswerepromptlydrawn upand signedon 10 October
1983' . The effect of the Protocol amendingthe 1977 Treatywas to delaythe Project by
roughlyfour years. The Protocol arnendingthe MutualAssistanceAgreementchangedthe
deadlines on various parts of the Project and adopted a new tirnetable. The Protocol
arnendingthe Treaty waç approvedbyboth Parliaments,and instmmentsof ratificationwere
exchangedin Febnrary 1984. As arnendmentsthat modifiedonly the Project scheduIebut
not orher basicelernentsof the ProjectirselftheProtocoIs were clearla reafirmation of
the 1977Treaty andtheGINProject.
3.09 The ESTC Cornmittee again visitedthe sites in connection witthe
Cornmittee's19th session held during 20-22 Febnrary 1984~'. The PIenipoteniarieswere
a
Annex46.
9
Annexes 7and 8.
10
Annex47.instructedto maintaiprogressunder theProjectin accordancewitkthe 1977 Treaty,under
therevisedschedule.
SECTION 2. 1985-May 1989: Accderation of the Proiect at Hungarv's
Req uest
3.10 Soon &er the adoption of the new schedule, the Hrrngarian
Goverment began tu considerthe possibiIityof speediup the Project and, in particrrlar,
thesectionrelatingtuNagymaros andthe taiIwatersectionofthebypasscanal. Thisshifiin
attitude is refiecinthe protocolof the 20tsessionof theESTC Cornmitteeheldon 10-
12 April 1985". Hungarybrought in Amtrian and Yugoslavcontractorsto carry out the
works12,and itasked Czechoslovakitao advanc theescheduleonthe partsof theProject for
which itwasresponsible.TheCzechoslovakGovernmentfound icouldaccelerateworkat
GabZikovo by substitutincertainequipmenmt anufacturedinCzechoslovakiaforequiprnent
to bepurchased fiom theU.S.S.R. In 1986,Hungaryawarded totwo Austrianenterprises
the contractfor the whole Nagymarosstep, to be completedwithin 33 months. The
contractwas financedby a consortiumof Amtrian banks tobe repaid by the srrppIof
electricitystartiin1996.
3.11 At the 21st sessionof the ESTC Commiiteeon 19 May 1986, the
proposaisof the two govemmentrfor acceleratingthe Project were discussed."Hungary
sought toadvancethe scheduie for prrttinginto operationthe Iast turbindgenerariniof
the Nagymarossectiontu 1 Febmary 1993at the latesta shortenhg of the schedule by
about 15 months. Iaiçof particular interestnote that, accordingtuthe record of this
session,the Hungarian proposalfor accelerationwas based in parton the "protectionof
[the] environmentandthe surrounding countryside".It was considered thatthe suitable
legalinstmment to carryout thischangewould be aProtocol amendingthe 1977 Mutual
AssistanceAgreementonly. Furtherdiscussionof theaccelerationofthe Project continued
atthe 22nd sessionofthe ESTC Cornmittee,6-9 July198714.
11
Annex48.
12
The weiratDunakiIiwas Iargefoyk buiItbyAustnancompanies,financedby Anstrian bank
Ioansthedownstreardredgingoperaiwas fobeched oufby aYugoçIavcampany.
13
Annex49.
14
Amex 50. 3.12 Preparatorywork atNagymarosunder the Austriancontractstarted
in 1987. ThisindicatethatHungaryhadbegun toorganisetheworksonits partof theG/N
Projectaccordingto theshortenedtirnetablmanymonthsbef0r.etheimplementing Protocol
was signed and took effecon 6 February 1989. The delayinthe signingof the Protocol
was due in partto the extensiveeconomicandfinancial adjustmentsthat advancingthe
schedulerequired of Czechoslovakia. The 1989 Protocolterminatedthe 1983 Protocol
amendingthe 1977 Mutual AssistanceAgreementbut the provisionsof the 1977 Treary
remaineduntouched" . Thus, in Februay 1989, bath partiesagainreaffimed the 1977
Treaty andthe Gm Project,except as modifiedin respecto the time schedule. The initiai
testofthe FirstturbinelgeneratorintGabEfko~ hoydroeIectricpowerplant was scheduIed
for 2 July1990"~ and agreement was reachedthat the dammingof the Danube and the
fiIIingof threservoirandthe bypasç canalwouldtakepIaceduring Uctober - December
1989, theoniytime oftheyearin which thioperationwas feasible".
SECTION 3. The IssueofWaterOuaIitv
3.13 At the 5-7 Octuber 1988 session of the Hungarîan Parliamerit,a
reportof the HungarianGovernent onthe prugess ofconsmction underthe GiN Project
was conçidered. By a substantid rnajorityt,heParliament cunfïrmed the decisionto
halise the GIN Project juintIy withCzechoslovakia on the basis of the 1977 Treaty,
includingtheNagymaros section,aswellas theacceleratioaofthescheduleby 15rnonths.
However, it directed that the quality of the Danube'swater must not be allowed to
deteriorateandthereforethat the peaoperatioriofthe GabEikovoplant shouldbegin only
aftercompletionof sewage plantsby both countries. The Parliament resolved that an
agreementbetween the two States should be drawnup settingout the principlesof
environmentap lrotectiotogoverntheProject.
3.14 At the23rdsessionof the ESTCCornmitteeon 2-3 March 1989, the
Plenipotentiariwsere calleduponto submita reporon thefulfillmenofthe work schedule
15 Annex9.
16 Annex51.
17 Sec .ara.4.02,below.
18
-ee, Chap. fn.8.beforethe endofthe Paragaph 1.3ofthe protoc01of this meeting indicatesthat the
CornmitteeaIsoconsideredthequestion ofenvirumental protection:
"The Parries agreed on the fact that the operation of the GabEikovo-
Nagparos System of hcks must not worsen the environment in the
territorconcerned,the basicrequestisthatby the operationof theSystem
the qualitofwaterofthe Danube rivemust not beworsened."
This cIearfyreflected the actionsof the HungarianParliamentjmentioned. The Slovak
Mînîsterof Forestry and WaterManagementand his Hungairancounterpart, in cooperation
with the PIenipotentiarifor the Project, were instnrcttu draw up by I5 A$ 1989
concreteproposdstu safegüardtheenvironment andthe qualityof thewater of the Danube.
3.15 The matterof regulating the purityof the boundarywaters of the
Danube had been specificallyaddressedin the 1976 Boundary Waters Management
~~reernent~' .rticle11of thaAgreement providedthat thepartiewould do their best to
"guarantee the purity of boundary waters" and to lower pollution by constmcting or
reconstmctingpurificationplants. TheAgreementalsoprovidedfor the systematichecking
of water purîtyandfor there-establishmentof the Czechos~ovak-HungarîanCommission
forBoundary Waters. Article 15 of the1977 Treatyhad alsodealtspecificallywith water
quality,requirin(in paragraph2) that the partiensure "that the qualityof waterin the
Danube isnot impaireasa resultof constructionand operation"ofthe G/N Project. also
providedthat "monitoringof waterqualityinconnectionwiththe constructioand operation
of the [GN Project]" was tobe carriedout on the basis of the 1976 Boundary Waters
ManagementAgreement.
3.16 The Joint BoundaryWaters Commissionappointed under the 1976
Agreementadopted anumberof measuresin irnplementation of the water prrrîtyprovisions
of the ~~reement". Water taken hm the Dmube was tested 12 timesa year, taking 48
çamples for examination against 26 parameters (23 physiochemical, I biological,1
rnicrobiologicaland1radiological). As provided in Arri15 of the 1977 Treary, tG/N
Project was intendedtu followthe technicalmeasureson water qualityestablished by this
JointCommission.
19 Annex 52.
20
Amex 4.
21
Annex 53. 3.17 Mer the action takeat the Octuber1988 sessionof the Hungarian
Parliament, theHungarianmembew oftheJoint Buundq WatersCommissionput together
a more rigoros setof guidelinforthe extendedtestinof the watersof the Danube&er
the GM Projeît hadgoneintoeffect.Theeequencyofwater samplingwas tube increased
to 26 timesayear, testedagains54 profleson theHungarianside and 45 profileon the
Czechodovak side. In addition, the methoof testing wasto be aimed at Iucatingal1
significantsourcesof poilution. These proposaiswere discussedat meetingsofthe Joint
ComniIssionin December1988 and Fetiruary 1989~~The reachof the Danube affectedby
the GM Project wasdehed tu bethepar of the riverlyingbeîweenthe DevinGate, where
the Morava Riverflows intothe Danube,andNagparos, includingthe leRand right hand
branchesof the Danube-thMd$ Danubeand theMosoni Danube. Agreementwasreached
un the frequenq of sampling(24 timesa year},the parameters (61) anthe location of
sampling(i2 dflerentlocations),modifyingslightlythe Hungarianproposal.
3.18 At the sametimeas it was considehg the option of more stringent
masures for the monitoringof waterquality,the Joint Commissiondso tumed its attention
tu measures fur protection of water purity through sewage treatment alreadytaken or
planned byeah State. This involvedessentiallyan up-dating of an earlier rofothe
Commission in Mach 1985 summarisingthemeasurestaken by each Statup tu theend of
1984, and planned tu be accomplishedby 1995, in theaxa of the Danube shared in
commun. Acîordingto the 1985report, 620 sewagetreatmentplantshadbeenoonstructed
on the CzechosIovaksideof the communCzechosIuvak-Hungarian sectionof the Danube,
and 77% ofal sourcesof watw puIIutionhad their uwn sewage treatment faciIitks.
iocation of the then existing sewagt treatrneanttsisset out in thefollowing table
compiledfromthe 1985report:
River Municipal Industria1 Tuta1
~anub&&hoçlovakia 14 14 28
V5h 59 269 328
&on II 152 163
1pe~lCzechosIovakia O 95
Total 9G 530 020 3.19 In the Hungarian area of the commun Czechoslovak-Hungarian
sectionof the Danube,213 sewagetreatmentpIantshadbeen constructed up tu theend of
1984,and 78% of al1sourcesof water poIIrrtihad their own sewagetreatment facilities.
This issummarisedinthe foIIowingtable:
=ver Municina1 Industria1 Total
i 3.20 As tu water purityrneasureprogrammeduptu the end of 1995, the
Joint Commission's1985 report indicated that Czechoslovakia plamed tu construct,
between 1985 and 1930,25 sewagetreatmentplant andbetween 1990 and 1995,95 more
plants. On the Hungarianside,the figureswere 40 plantabeîween1986 and 1990 and 43
plantsbetween 1991 and 1995. -
3.21 In theup-datedreport of the JoiCommissi appruved at its 20-24
!
February 1989 session,iwas noted that, duirng 1985-198C8,echoslovakiahadin fact
constnrcted I1 new sewage treatment pIants in threIevantareaand that37 more were
aireadyunder constnrction. The memurespIanncd byboth States for the peri1990-1997
were alsu submitted. These figuresshowed Czechosluvakiatu have exceeded its pIanned
constructionofsewagetreatment plants.
FoIImvïngthe 23rdsessionofthe ESTC~ornmitte? ,representatives
3.22
of the Ministries of eacState charged with preparinga precisewater protection plan,
together with the PIenipotentiariesfor Boundary Waters of each State on the Joint
Commission,met on 7-8 Aprii 1989'~. They had beforethemthe resuItsof the workof the
Joint Commission atits meetingsin December 1988 andFebruary 1989 concerningthe
extensionof the waterpurityprogramfor the periodfollowingthe puttingintooperationof
23 Sec .ara3.14,above.the GM Project. They agreedto start sucha program as of 1ApriI 1989,and they put in
motion a proposed program forsafeguardingthe environmentand the qudityof thewater of
theDanube,astheyhadbeenchargedto do at the23rd session oftheESTCCornmittee.
3.23 The joint recommendations issued by the Boundary Waters
Plenipoteniarieson 8 April 1989 emphasised the importance. of protection of the
environment and, as a result, they recommended that a special agreement between
CzechosIovakiaand Hungarybe conclrtded todeal with the matterand that the preparation
of suchan agreement be cornpletedby the end of June1989". The propoîed elementsof
suchanagreement were the following:
- That eachState shouldtakeappropriate rneasuresfor folIow-upand
evaiuationof the water qudityofthe Danube, as agreed at the 7-8
Aprilmeeting,to be putinto effeasof 1 April1989;
- Thatthe values resultingfromtesting the water qualityagainstthe
agreed parameterstaken from the results of the joint long-term
follow-upof the water qualityof the Danube,as wellas from tests
justprîorto filIingtheDunakiliti-bSov reservoiatthe endof 1989,
should serveas the bais for evaluatingvariationin water quality
afieputtingthe Projecintoeffect;
- That peakoperation should startody aRer the constmctiun of the
necessaryfaciltiesfor the protection of water prrrity, and that the
operationof theGD4 Project shouldbe governedby the conditionof
protectingwater purity;
That to carry out the above, the two States should ngree on a
program of construction of the necessary sewage plants before
startinthepeak operation;and
25 Annex54. - That bothStatesshoufd informthe publiabout theadoption of these
measures tu protect the envirument and, especiallthe quality of
water.
3.24 The recommendations of 8 April 1989 of the Boundary Waters
Plenipotentiariesconstitutoneofthemajoritemstaken upat the meetingof the Chairmen
of the ESTC Committee held in Bratislavon 3 May 1989~~,preparatory to a meeting
between Prim e inistersonthe subjectof economicandtechnicd cooperation. The agreed
record of thesediscussionscontainedthe proposalto concluda specialagreement for the
protection ofwater quality as recornmended inthe Ministers'Report of 8 April. The
HungarianChairman refusedto signthe protocolof the meeting,statingas his reason that
the Hungarian Governent was not in a position to sign snch an agreementbefore the
Hungarian Parliamenthaddekidedwhether to cd1fora nationareferendum onthe question
of constmction of theNaparos section ofthe Project. Inretrospect, this was a clear
signalof Hungary'sintentiontu breach th1977 Treaty, anaction take10 daysIatw when
theHungarianGovernent announced itssuspensionof work ai the Nagmaros site duto
whatit claimedto beanecologicaIemergency.
SECTIO N.
The Parties'Observanceof theirConstructionObligations
3.25 The history of the Project up to May 1989 is not only one of
negotiation and Treaty amendment; it isalso a historyof construction. As noted at
paragraph 2.73above, and shownby Illus.No. 28, Arricl5j5)ofthe 1977 Treaty assigned
tu each parry specificonstruction obligations. During the perîod 1977-1989, these
obligationswere for the greaterpaperformed. The statusof completionof the Projecas
atMay 1989 - thedate of Hungary'ssuspensionof work atNagyrnaros -isshownby IIIus.
No. 3 I.Inçofaras CzechosIovakiawas concerned,bythe springof 1989 its obligatioto
construct thIefibankHnrgov-DunakiIitireservoirdykeswas 98% fulfiIIed,to constmct the
headwater sectionof the bypass canalwas 95% fiilfilled,and to construct the GabEikovo
system of locks andpowerplant was 85% fulfilled.The flood protection measuresin the
Sap (Pa1koviEovo)-Nagparossectorunderitsresponsibilitywere 60% complete. 3.26 But Hungary, had not been idle either during this period. The
Dunakilitiweirwas 90% complete. Constructionof therightbank dykes of the Dunakiliti
weir was 85% completeinHurigarianterritorand 70% compIete inCzechosIovak territory.
Hungaryhad fulfilleditsobIîgationsto constmcflood protection dykesinthe IpeI'regionof
CzechosIovakia up to80%.ThetaiIwatersectionof the bypasç canalwas 60% complere, as
were the flood protectiomasures un the rigtbankof the Palkovi~uvo-Nagparos sector
of the Danube. Constructionofthe Nagymarosstep wasdso weIIundeway.
3-27 Thus,as showrion IIIusNo. 31,by May 1989the GabEikqvosection
of the GIN sysierwasapproaching cornpletionanda significaportionof theworks on the
Nagymarossectionhad been carriedout- at the cost ofavery substantialinvestmentby
bothparties. Thesignificanc ef thiistwofoId,mt, aswiththe 1983 and 1989Protocols,
it confirmsthat the questionof the status, importandevalidityof the GA4Project under
the 1977 Treatyhad notbeen calledinto question(and would not be prior to May 1992).
Second, as noted in greater detail in Chapter V below, by impIernentingits unilateral
suspension after May 1989, Hungary leR Czechoslovakiain what was quite sirnply an
impossibleandwhollyunexpectedposition.
3.28 ln Hrtngary'1992 ~eclaration'~, there is a short discussionof the
periodcuveredbythisChapter,startingwith thesigningof the 1977Treaty and endingwith
Hungarylssispension of perioimance under the Treaty on 13 May 1989. It contains
importantomissionsandseriousmisstatements.Forexample, inmeaioning the initd iallys
in the Project, in paragraph 2, it attributes them tu "economic diffrculties arising
simuItaneousIyin both countries",whereasit wasonly Hungary'seconornicdifficultiesthat
led to thesedelays. In the same paragraph,the Declaratiostatesthat in the negotiations
enteredinto asa result of Hungary'requesttoextend theProject'sschedule,the possibility
ofrenouncingthe Projectwasconsidered. Thisassertion iswhollywithout substance. Such
a possibilitywas certainly not considered by Czechoslovakia; and as for Hungary, it
repeatedly affirmedtoCzechoslovakiaits intentionto observe the provisionsof the1977
Treaty. The Protocolsof 1983 and 1989 amendingthe 1977 Treatyand MutualAssistance
Agreementreaflirmedthe continuingvalidityof the Treatyandthe intentionof bothPartiesw - -
ARTIC -- -_ Responstbillty forthe cosh of the ji t Inveetment,
...- apportlonm&t oflpbourandsupplies.
1 -1 - -
hkllLti dm, InHungarïmtiPrrli~ry;
I
(6lmpmcmcn!4 therrldbaalthfan&, inHunprtanandCzcdrŒiwak icrtilwy: tu cany out its provisions,as did the parties'fuIfiIImeof a substantial part of their
construcrionobligations. ThisstatementintheDecIarationis simplywrong.
3.29 The 1992Declaration (inparagraph5) refersto areportof an adhoc
cornmittee of the HungarianAcademy ofSciences,fomed in 1981,whichwasapprovedby
the Preçidiumofthe Academyin aStatementissued in Decernber 1983. It is allegethat
this Statementcriticisedthe lack any comprehensivestudyof the ecologicaleffectof the
GM Project or assessrnenotfitsrisksandrecommendedpostponementor evencancelIation
of the Project. Atthe time,Czechodovakia wasaware ofno such reportand was not &en
anysuchStatementof the Academy. The conclusid oIegedIycontaineciin the Academy's
statementare not reflectedin the tecordof the numeroujs ointmeetings of thevarious
groupsand comrnitteesthat were concerned with the Project, includingmeetingsat the
PrimeMirister IeveI. It caody be cuncluded,inthe Iightofthissilence,that the Hungarian
Governerit rejected these views. Thisis confimzedbjranimportantHungariandocument
discussedstartingat paragraph3.37 below. It isof course,not uncommonfor projectsof
I this magnitudeto have their critics. Butif suchviews had had serious support at the
govemental IeveItheywould certainIyhaveappeared intherecords of the meetingsthat
openlydiscussedthesevery issues;andthey wouIdhaveshow upciearly asthe considered
view of the HungarianGovemment -whichwe know they were not, for they simplwere
l notdiscussedaccordingto theavailablerecord.
3.30 Hungary's 1992 Dedaration dues not atternpt to explain the
Hungarianshiftinattitudethat resultedinits requestto speedup the Project, northe actions
takenby Hungaryas earlyas 1985-1986 toshortenthe tirnetable,nor the 1989Protocothat
formaIIyrnodifedthe Project scheduIe,incIudingnotablythe Nagymarossection,so astu
accelerateit by15rnonths. Insteadthe Declarationalkgesthat in 1988and 1989HungaMs
supposed review of the construction program revealed"serious insufficienci...in the
preparatory work carriedout inthe70's"mentioning,inter dia, the lack of hydrobiological
and waterqualitysmdies. Aside fmm the obviousinconsistencybefween Hurigary'srequest
and actionstoacceleratethe Project'sschedule and any such aIIegfindings,none of the
records of the large numberof meetingsheld durin1988 and 1989 containany mention of
this sort of criticism of the Project. Water qualitytesting, as discussed above,had been
conducted from the outset of the Project underthe supervisionof the Joint Boundary
- Waters Commissionand was given increasedattentionas time went on, culminatingin the
recommendations of8 April1989 for the conclusionof a formalagreementbetweenthe twoStateson waterquality.Whatis more,Hungary's 1992 Declarationfailsto mentionthat
Hungq refusedtu sign the protocolof the meeting of the Chairmen of the ESTC
Conmittee on3 May 1989 atwhichthe 8Aprilrecommendations were approvedz 8
SECTIO N. TheUnderlvin~Reasonsforffungaw's Actions
3.31 It has been shom in the preceding sectionsthat there was a
fundamenta ackof consistencyinHungary'p serformanc efits obligatiounder the 1977
Treaty up to May 1989. The motivesbehind Hungary's actionsassume animportance
-becausethey serve asevidenceeither tu validateor undermint thesubsequent defences
oEered by Hungary tu excuse itsbreachof the 1977 Treaty. The principal evidentiary
sources thatpoint tothe realreasonsforHungary's actionsare:(i) the economicfactors
existingatthetime; (ii)certaindocumentaryvidencefrom theHungarian sideand(iii)the
explmations thatthe HungariariGovernent itselgave foritactions.
TheEconomic Factors Behind the Decisionsto Delaythe Proiect
3.32 In ChapterIIabove, Slovakiahasshownthat theG/N Project offered
significantbenefittu the partiesin many diferen areasçuch as navigation and flood
control. But just asflood controlacquireda new sieficance afterthe 1954 and 1965
floods,so the availabiliof sourcesof hydroelectrienergybecamemoreimportant after
the 1973 oil crisis. dongside other developedEasternand Westerncountries,this crisis
encouraged Hringarytu frrrthitçatternpttostrengthenitsdomesticeriergybase. Interms
of the utilisationof its hydroelectpower potential,the G/N Projectwas particularly
importantbecause,unlike itneighbourssuch asAustriaandCzechoslovakia,andsuch other
European countriesas Germany ,SwitzerlandandFrance, Hungary'shydroelectric power
potentiai isreiativeIow. Other thanaIongthe northernstretches oftheTisza River, the
Danube was and is theonlyattractivepotential source of hydroelectricpower and then
primarîlyinthejointsector betweenHungaryandCzechoslovakia wherethereis the more
siibstantialgradieintthe river. Added to the gradientadvantagesof the sectorof the
Danube between CzechosIovakiaand Hungary,discusçedin Chapter 1, was the facr that
Czechoslovakia was rich in technical experiencein the building and operation of
28 para. 3.24,above.hydroelectripowerplants,for ihad aireadyforsome timestartedtoutilisitshydroelectric
powerpotentid dong its orher rivers.
3.33 Ofcourse, bythetirneofthe 1973 oilcfisis, theGMProjecrhad
beenunderconsideration fortwo decades H.ungarywas thereforeinthe positionofbeing
abletu proceedwitha well-researchedandwell-estabiisheointprojectthatwouldincrease
its domesticenerg production atlow operationalcost. Alternatively,it could mm away
fromthe potentiaIbenefits,leavingCzechoslovakiatupursue sucha hydrodectrîc project
alone- tobuilditsownhydroelectripcowerworks on thepartof theDanube nrnningsoldy
through Czechoslovakterritoryor to enterintoajointprojecwith Austriaor to combine
thetwo, inordertu creata system ofhydroeiectripower works(butexcludinH g ungary).
3.34 It appears self-evidentthat the best alternativefor Hungarywas tu
enterintoa jointprojectwithCzechoslovakia. But itmustbe stressedthatthe economic
difficultiesthat Hungarythen faced made it difficulto undertake such a substantial
investmentasthe GN Prujec.
3.35 Hungaxyattemptedtu meet theseecunomicdiffrcultieatthe timeof
the 1977 Treaty by providingin the 1977 Mutual AssistanceAgreementthat the initial
investmenut ndertheProjectwouldbe madebyCzechoslovakiaH . ungary'sexpenditurwas
thus delayeduntiltheearly1980s. But in1981 theHungarianGovernment realisedthat its
prublems were more severe than previouslythought, and the possibilitwas raised by
Hungary of postponingworkunder the Project until1990. Itwas at this tirne,during the
negotiationswith Czechoslovakiathatled to the 1983 Protocolsextendingthe Project's
schedule,thatthe spectreofan allegedlynegativeenvironmentalimpactwas first usas a
tu01inthe discussionsbetweenthe pafiies.
3.36 Thiscoincidedwith thebeginningsof the envirumental movemcntin
Hungary. However, there is compelling documentaryevidence to show that the
environmentalargumentsusedby Hungary againsttheGIN Projectwere developed as a
pretexttosupportHungary'seconomicmotivesfordelayingthe Project. TheMariai Letter
3.37 This evidenceconsists of a letter hm the Hiinguian Vice-Prime
MinisterJtizsefMarjaito Dr. Ihos Szenthgothai,Presidentofthe Hungarim Academy of
Sciences,dated 19 March1984 (hereinaftereferredto as the "Marjailetter")2g.Itis a
documentof thegreatest interep,articularyhen read alongsideparagraph5 ofHungary's
1992 Declaration.
3.38 The purpose of the Marjailetter was, accordin tg itsopening
paragrapht,o commentonthe"standpoint( or position)ofthePresidium oftheHungarian
Academy of Sciences concerning "scientificalisputablequestions"relatingto theG/N
Project.This"standpoint"isa referencto the "Statement"of December 1983 issuedbythe
Presidiurnof the Academy that iismentioned in paragaph 5 of Hungary's 1992
~eclaration~. Before consideringtheMarjailetter,tisnecessaryto returntu paragraph5
of the Declaration,whichdescribes the background of the Academy's statement in the
folIowingway :
- The "necessityof a scientificinvestigatiof the envirumental
efXecrs1 f thGN Projectamse in 1981when Hungary was conducting a "re-examination"
ofthe Project;
- An ad hoc commitree was set up by the Hungarian Academy of
Sciencesto investigareth"scientificacontestedprublems"of theProject;
The reportof the ad hoc committee, compiledfrom a numberof
differenttechnicaland scientificstudies,was approvedbythePresidiumof theAcademyin
its Staterneof December 1983.
3.39 Paragraph5 of Hungary's 1992 Dedaration quotesthip sassagefrom
the Presidium'sStatemen:
30
para3.29above. "The Joint Agreed Plan did not consider in any comprehensiveway the
ecoIogicd eSects-andconsequenc ofsthe GabErlcovo-NagymarB osrrage
System. No assessrneritasbeen madeof the techical, ecological,economic
rîsksofthe projecasa cuherentand interzictivesysterOn the basisofthe
enurneratedand 0th factors,thePresidiumof the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences considered it justified and,at least reasonabie to postpone
significanttheconstructionwork,to makechangesinthe plans,or ratherto
cancelthe constructioonce fordl."
TheDeclaration goes on tuSay:
"Itwas characteristicor the politicalcircumçtanceat thattime, that the
statementwas completelyneglectedbythe government and bypartyofficials
anditspublicationwas simplyprohibited."
3.40 The Majai letter tella very diffant story. The staternentof the
Presidiumhad been given toVice-PrimeMinisterMarjaiby Hungary's Prime Mifister to
study. Far from being "completelynegIectedby the government" as paragraph 5 of the
Declarationasserts,thePresidium'sstatementwasgivenclose attentionat the top echelons
of the Government. Endeed,Mr. Marja bieginshisIetterbystatingthathe GIN Pro~ectisa
matterof suchimportancethat decisionsof theGovernment in respectu it shorrldbe taken
withthe greatestcare.He thenrecallssome importantbackgroundinformation:
- Economic difficulties,believatthe time ofenteringintothe 1977
Treaty tu be temporary,led the parties tu providein the cornpanion
Mutual AssistanceAgreement that Czechoslovakiawould perform
the initialworks, ratherthanHungary,so that Hungary'investmentç
would onlystartatthebeginningofthe 1980s;
-
In earIy1981 Hungary redisedthat its economic dificulties were
long-termin natureand, hencc, Hurigarypressedfor a suspensionof
investments until 1990 in the negotiations that ensued with
Czechoslovakia;
- Since it realisedthat it woulbe dificrrlto gain Czechoslovakials
agreement,the HungarianGovernmentsought to strengtheriits hand
in thesenegotiationsbv addin~to its economicjustification for the
delav some argumentsbased on the need for further research of
env ironmenta1impacts;arguments were found invalidafter the Plenipoteniarieshad convened scientistson both
sidesto stndythem. Ashe çaysinhisletter:
"In both cases it became evidentthat çucharguments don't exist, they
conhned the existingvalidconcept andwell-thought-out character of the
[GN Project]."
In the end, Hungarydid not reach its goalof intempting the constructionof the GlN
System. Bythat time,the lener concludes,worksin Czechoslovakia hadprogressed tothe
pointwhereinterruptionwouldhave causedgreat darnagew , hichHungary couldnot have
contemplatedreimbursingb ;ut at least the Projechad been postponed for four years
without artdaim fordamages.
3.45 Having expIained the reasons behind Hungarylsrequest for the
interventionof the Academy in 1982, the Maqai Ietter proceeds to make some specific
comment s aboutthePresidium'SstatementproducedinDecember 1983:
- Ail the worksfor protection of the environmenterrvisaged inthe
resolutions of the CounciIfor ErivironmentdProtection adopted on
21June 1983 had beencarriedout;
- As tu thePresidiurnfindingof a"generalthreatto the environment,
worseningof the qrrdity of groundwater and surface water, fm
land"etc.,tuadegree evenworse than had been predictedt,he letter
cornments:
"1 must state that 1 am not informed about prognoses
indicatinthe worsetendency. Suchprognosiscouldbe dune
ody on the basis ofresearchesaccornpiishedbythe institutes
of theAcademy of Sciences. Exceptstudiesdune previously,
there areno newer studies which couIdconfIrm it. 1 don't
considerit decisivebut the latest analysisOur and foreign
experienceconfinnthat in suchwater worksthe qualityofthe
dischargedwater is better than the qualityof water entering
the retentionarea"
It is evidentfiomthe letter thachangein Hungary'sattitude concerningthe GN Froject
was occurring;for by March 1984, the date of the letter, negotiationswith Austwere
already underway to providefinancingand technicalassistanceto Hungary to assist it infulfiIIiits obligatiounderthe G/N Project.As a result,Hungarybelievedit had founda
way aroun ts economicdifficuItiesin carryiout the Projectand was, infact,about to
requestthattheProject'sschedulebeaccelerated3.'
3.46 Et is appropriatetu pausehere inthis discussion ofthe Ietterto
observe how tdy unusud it isthat a Governmentofficidatthishigh leve- Mr. Marja i as
Hungary'sVice-PrimeMinister - shouldhave such a firmgraspof scientificand technical
mattersas hisletterreveals.ItisevidentthatMr.Marjaihad a thorough howledge ofthe
Projectand,as the seniorHungarianoEciaI atthe ESTC Cornmitteemeetings,he continued
to participatinthediscussionsofthe Project duringmuchofthisperiod" .
3.47 .The letter then tums to a second point raised in thePresidium's
Statement, which concemed the costsof preventingecological damage, which he said
should be shared. He crincIudesthat it couId be "assertedwith certitudethat haveno
çubstantiateddaimsagainstCzechoslovakia".
3.48 Mr. Marjai then addresses.theview of the Presidiumthat waste
waters on the adjacentenitoryshouldbe biologicaHytreatedbefure prrttirigthe Dunakiliti-
Hnigov reservoir into operation. Mr. Majaimay be seentu havebeen in favour ofsuch
treatment,as wouId be expected,but he notes that, although the "freatmentofsewage
watersinthe wholecountry is veryundeveloped",theproblemcouldnot be solvedinsucha
short time. Furthermore,both countrieshad committedthemçelvesto treat sewage water in
the regionto the extent that pulIrrtionof the Danube would not increase and, thus, the
quaIityof wattr shouIba improvîngconsiderably.He statesthat he had been infomed that
Czechoslovakia alreadyhada numberofsuch sewage plantsunder con~tniction~.
3.49 Aftertakingup some of the economicconclusionsexpressedin the
Statement of the Presidiurn, Mr. Majai reaches the concIusion that a Iong term
postponement of the investment,or its suspensioas thePresidiurn advocated, would not
be possibleorjustifieci:
31 See,para3.10eJa., abwe.
32
-ee,para3.03,abova
33
Thiswasofcomconect. &, paras3.18103.21above. "ThePresidiumshould takeinto accuunttheexistingsituationas wellas the
fact that its argumentsreIyin great extent oon presumptions,due to the
Iack ofscientificresearch requiredearIierseveraltimes by the govemment.
Behindthernajority ofobjectionsthere aremostlycontradietoryscientificor
expert opinions,the confrontation,cornparisonand scientificevaluationof
which -at leastonthe existingleveof knowledge -was notyet done."
The EconornicFactors Behind the Decision to AcceIerate the
Pruiect
3.50 The reasonbehindHungaryd ecisionto seekagreementto speedup
the Project was once again pnrnarilyeconomic. For once Austrian financingbecame
availableand an agreementwith variousAustriaricompmiesfor the compIetionofmuch of
theconstructionhadbeenreached,th~rewere econornic reasonsto compIetethe Projecias
quickiy as possible. The sooner electricitycouldbe producedby the Project, the sooner
Hungarycouldbenefitfiom the peakpower electricitysharedby the partiesunder the GIN
Project.
Environmental Protestsin Hungam
3.51 Hungaryhas a listoryof environmentalprotests dating back to the
lare1970slearIy 1980~~whenprotestsweredirected atsuchtargets asIead poIIutionon the
outskirts of Budapest (1977)and waste dumping thatwas polIutirigthe drinkingwater at
Vhc (1981)~~. Later protestswere made againstthe dumping of hazardous wastesat Paks
(TIIus.No.13at para. 1.5) and elsewhereandagainstthe bauxiteminingthat threatened the
thermal Iakeat~éviz?~. Accordingtu oneHungarianobserverofthe scerie atthetime:
"The main reason for these environmental protests is not deep-seated
ecological concern. In some cases, concei over health effects is the
rnotivating factor, but whether this reflects an environmental
cons~ienciorrsnesis questionable. Rather,thesedernunstrations reflecthe
grievous economic,poIitica1and cultural injusticesthsucîetyhassufïered
and that have made it destmstful of the centers of power and its
techt~ocrats."
34 -ee,PersanylM.,"RedPollution,Green Evolution"in EnvironmentalActionin Eastern-urorie
RespansesroCrisiN.Y. , ondon ,993M.E. Sharpe, pp140-141.FortheIocatroof Vac(on
theDanube easof Nagymxos andnonh of Budapest)s, IIIusNo. referred atparas.
2.103-2.10above.
36 -bid. 3.52 As noted earlier,therewere indeedseriousenvironmentalproblemsin
Hungaryinthe 1970s and 1980s- andthey remaintoday -such aswaterpollution,that were
finingtargetsfor environmentai Whythen, didthe GM Project suddedy became
a speciaitarget of environmentalistattack?The answer is primarilpolitical. The GM
Projectwas an easy targetin that iwas readilydefinableand that blameforthe Project
cuuld be placedun CzechodovakiaasweII as unan unpoprrIarHungarian regime. The
everyday proHem ofHungary's internawaterpollution,thoughmurepressing in rd terms,
was a probiem for whichthe responsibilityandHungary'sown shortcomingscould not be
easilyshifiedIt waseasierto focusattentiononthe supposedeffectsofthe GN Project on
waterquality,and inlargeparttublame Czechoslovakia t, m tuaddress squarelythe major
probIem:
"Water pollutionisprobablythe singlemost seriousenvironmentalproblem
in Hungary ...The Iargestwater consumer is industry,which accountsfor
81% ofthecountry'stotalwater conçumption ..Aithoughsewagetreatrnent
hasimprovedinthe last 10tu 20 years,iisstillfahm ~uficient~."
3.53 To remedythisproblem wouldinvolve an enormousinvestment. The
G/NProject, incontrast,was an easytarget that heldouthepromiseof eliminatingamajor
investmentat a time when Hungarywas undergoing seriouseconomicdiScuIties and had
made heavyinvestmentsinalternative sourcesof electripower, suchas the nucIearFaciIity
atPaks.
3.54 Thebest-knownofthe Hungarian enviromenta1groups,the "Danube
Circle"Iedby JAnosVargha, focusedits attentioon the G/N Projectusing quasiscientific
arguments cIaimed tu estabish the Project's adverse ecoiogicaI effects. Mthough these
argumentsweresuperficialandrnisleading asdirectedat the G/NProject,the environmental
groups were able to attract national and, then, international attention and to rally
considerable nationwide support. But thiwaç essentialla political movementwith the
protection of the environmentas its message. As the Majai letter demonstrates, such
scientific andtechnologi aralments were not based on scientific studies by the
outstandingspecialisedinstitutionsin Hungary,butthey providedmore ammunition to the
&, para2.103aa., above.
38
ge, May, J."EnvironmentManagementC :ment ProbIemandProspects"iReporon Eastern
Europe,Vol1,No.40, 5Oct1990p,. 23.opponents ofthe ProjectthanMr. Marjai had beenable toobtainto support himin his
negotiationsduring the edy1980swhen economicfactors ody wereinvohed. The GIN
Project rrltimatelybecame"hostagina stmgge betweenthe poIiticaIparties in Hungary
when in February1989 the ruliHungaria SncialistWorkersParty agreedto introducea
rndti-party politicai systemThe Hungaria Dnemocratic Forum (MDF), like other
oppositionpartiehadadoptedthe enviromentalisviewsof theDanubC eircleand,hence,
itsoppositioto theGM Projec. The decisionofthe HungananGuvernmenrunder Prime
MinisterNémeth,anriouncedon 13 May 1989,to suspen dork attheNagymaros sitwas
warmlyapplauded by the MDFandresultedin MDFsupportfor Mr. Németh inthe struggle
betweenfactionsthenunderway. Thi selpsto explainhowthesaniegoverment headed by
PrimeMinisterNémeththat had agreedtu the1989 Protocoltu speedupthe Projectcould
takeactionsoon &er tosuspen operationatNagparos and thenatDunakîliti.
3.55 Regrettably,starting ithemid-1980s t,ere was a good deal of
manipulationof publicopinioninHungaryandinthe Slovakregion of thGN Projectthat
containsa largepopulatioof Hungarianorigin. Unsupporredclaimaofseriousecological
threatsand even devastation caused by earthquakes, am breaks,and the likewere
circulated. It was claimedthat the patentidpoisonofthe drînkinwater of Budapest
was threatened,althoughthis ignoredthe fact that the wells supplyingBudweretfar
away fiomtheregionwhose ground waterwouldbe aiTectedby thG/N Projec- andwere
alreadyseriouslycontaminatehm industrialand agriculmrsourcesthat had nothinto
du withtheProject.
3.56 Fromthe above discrrssiorr,a number of conclusionsappeatu be
warraritedasto threasons behinHungary'sconduct duringrhisperiod:
- Hungary'srequestsinthe earl1980s that thEN Projectbedelayed
appeartu have been dueentirelto economicfactors;environmental
arguments were advaricedfor negotiating purposes theirIackof
ment and artificidity are evidenced by the Marjai letterthe
environmentalargumentsadvancedto supportHungary'srequestto
acceleratethe scheduleare unclearand seerncontrived;they support the con~Iusiothatthe supposedenvironmenta elfectsofthe Project
were notseriouslyput forwarby Hungary;
- When argumentswere directed againstthe G/N Projecbasedon
environmentalfactorssuchas thoseexpressedinthe Statemerof the
Presidium oftheHungarian Academyof Sciences ofDecember 1983,
they were carefully exarnined at the most senior Ievel of the
HungarianGovemment and rejectedforIackoa scientifbasis;
- The GM Project was aneasier andmore attractivtargetfor the
developingenvironmentalist ovementinHungaryseeliingnational,
and then international,recognition than the truly serious
envirumental prublemsin Hungary such as waterquality;but the
oppositioto the Projecwas not basedonnewscientificstudiesand
lackedavalidscientificandtechnicdbasis;soon degeneratedintoa
carnpaigntofrightentheHungarianpeople onthe basisof incorrect
andrnisleadininformation;
- Afterthe politichangesin Hungq, opposition to theG/N Project
becameanidéefixeinthe politicalprogramofthe partthatassumed
power,becausesuchoppositionhad playedan important rolein the
stmggleforpower in 1989and 1990 andinits outcorne.CEIAPTER IV. ATTEMPTSTU FINDA SOLUTIONTU THE DISPUTE
SECTIO 1. PreliminaryPoints
4.01 The eventsaffectingthG/N Projectdd with in this Chaptercover
the periodhm May 1989to theend of1992. The foIIowingchronoIogyof the principal
eventsduringthisperiodprovidesanoverviewofthedeyelopmentofthe dispute:
- 13May1989:Hungary announcesa two-monthsuspension of work
on the Nagymarospart of theProjecbecauseof aIlegedecoIogicd
risksthe amouncementcame ody three rnonth&er the Protoc01of
6February1989shortening theProject'çscheduleb15 months;
- 15 May 1989: the CzechoslovakGovernmentrejects Hungary's
suspensioof work on Nagymaros as havingbeentakenuniIateraiIy,
withoutconsultatioandin violationothe 1977Treaîy;
- 8-9 June 1989: Hungary reafiïrrns its intention to continue on
schedulewith work on the rest of the G/N Project other thaat
Nagymaros;
- 26 June - 12 July 1989: Hungarian and Czechoslovakscientific
evaluationoftheG/N Projectareexchanged revealina fundamental
differenceinviewsasto supposedecologicalrisks;
- 17-19 Ju1y 1989: CzechosIovakand Hrrngarianexperts meet tu
considerthescientificevaluationsjust exchanged;
- 20 July 1989the HungarianPrime Minister specificallyindicates,in
contradictioto Hungary'seariierassurance(8-9 June 19891,that
workonthe GabEaovosection alsofeIIwithînthe scupeof Hungary's
suspensionandthatthe scheduieddamming ofthe Danube içnot to
' occur in1989;- August1989: in the lighof Hungary'ssuspension,Czechoslovakia
begins anexaminationof alternativprovisionalrneasureaswell as
scientificstudies into the environmentaleffects of such rneasures;
Hungaryiskeptinformed;
- This leadsto a seriesof exchanges between the partiesduring
Septemberand October1989;
- On 30 October 1989, Hungary irifums Czechoslovakiathatit fias
abandonedtheNagymarospart oftheProjectasconceivedunderthe
1977Treaty;
- Towards the end of 1989, snficientprogress is made in the
negotiationbetween the partiestu hold out reaI hopeof a
compromise solution;
- November1989and June 1390: Wungarycanceisits contracts with
Austrian and YugosIavfims for work on the Prujectat,firstthe
Nagymarossite and,then, the DunakiIitisiteandelsewhere;
10January 1990:theHungarianPrime Ministerw,ho had participated
inthe1989negotiations,suddenlyputsan end to the earlier atternpts
tu reach a compromise solution;and he makes it clear that
abandunment oftheNagymaros sectioof theProjectand peakhuur
operationwere nolongermatters forfurther negotiati-nthey had
beenunilateralyecidedby Hungary;
- Duringthis period politicalchangesare takingplacein both countries
reflecting the events toccumng throughuut Central andEastern
Europe;
6 March 1990: the Hungarian PrimeMinister informsthe Prime
MinisterofCzechoslovakiathat HungarywiIIsuspendal1workon the
GI% Project, except- conservation and flood protection work, until the completion of scientificstudies,and he invites
Czechodovakia tu do likewise;he cals theG/N Projecta "gigantic
investmentfiasco";
-
22 May 1990: the generalpoliticalprogramof the new Hungarian
Governmentis publishedin whichit announces that, on thebasisof
the opinionofexperts,the G/N Projectwas a mistakenprojectand
that negotiationswouIbe startedairneat endingthe Projectandthe
aIIocationofdamages;
- 26 October 1990:Czechoslovakia take the initiatiof participating
indevelopinga DanubianLowland - GroundWater Mode1 as partof
the EC's"PHARE Project"forthe evduation, inter dia, of tGN
Project'efTec otsgound water' ;Hungaryfaîlstujuin inthi hrdy;
- Atthe same time, Czechoslovakicontinuesto studyalternativeways
of achieving the aims of the 1977 Treaty, and their possible
environmentaleffects;
- End of 1990, eariy 1991: the proposal to broaden the bilateral
negotiationsintotripartmeetings chairedby the EC isdiscussedby
thetwo Govemments;
- 22 AprîI 1991: a high-IeveI meeting of deIegations ofthe two
corrntriestakes plato reviewtheir respective positions conceniing
the Projects;
- 23 April 1991: the Hungarian National Assembly instructs the
Governmenttu negoliateto terminatethe1977 Treaty;
- 14-15 July 1941: in the course of hrther negotiations,
Czechoslovakia again proposes broadening the negotiations to
include EC participation; the Hungarian delegation reveals
1 -eepara4.02,below,foanexplanaiionthePHARE Projecl. that its hands are tied by the 23 April action of the Hungarian
Parliament;
- 30 JuIy 1991: the CzechoslovakGovernent formdIy advises
Hrrngq of its plansto proceed with a provisionalsolution(Variant
-
13April1992:theECacceptsto participate innegotiations to settle
thedisputeifjointlrequestedto do so;
- 7May 1992: the Hungarian Govenunent decidestu dedate the 1977
Treatyterminatedto takeeffecton 25 May,and Hungary oficially
advisesCzechoslovakia of itsdecisionon 19 May; a Declaration
explaininitsactionsisissuedon 16 May2 ;
- 23 October 1992:Hungarysubmits an applicationtothe International
Court of Justice challengingthe legdity of Czechoslovakia's
proceedingwithVariant "Cf1;3
- 24 Octuber 1992: &es a the-year deIay, the dammingof the
DanubeisbegünbyCzechoslovakia underVariant "Cu.
4.02 The Project'sschedule,as advancedby 15 months on 6 February
1989, calledfor the damming oftheDanube to staratthe endof October 1989 -itwas not
possibleto carry out this operation excepat one periudduring the year, inthe autumn,
when the water bel of the Danube was at the optimum Iow IeveI for thisoperation.
Hurigary's actions,as sumrnarised above, had the effect of successiveIy deIaying the
damming of the river for three years, allowing ample opportunitto conduct up-dated
scientifistudiesinto theecoIogicalrisksclaimedby Hungary to be unacceptabIe.During
this period,Czechoslovakiaundertook a seriesof newscientifistudiesaimed at al1aspects
of the effects of the G/N Project, carrying funvard and updating the many scientific
3
Therewas nobasisfortheCourt'jsurisdict;ndon 15 September1993Hungaryinformedthe
Registrarthat it consideredthe Appliasthaving"become withoutobjectand,hence,as
"havinglapsed". studiesthathad bothprecededandfollowed thesigningof the 1977Treaty4. In October
1990, it agreetu participatinthe EC'sPHAREproject tu examinte he likelyeffects of the
GlN Projecton gound watet, one of the principaleIementsofecologicaI irskcitcd by
Hungary to justifitacts,but Hungary turneddom Czechoslovakia' psropusaltojoin in
this project5.None of the contemporaneou s zechoslovak studiessubstantiatedany of
Hungary'spredictionsof an ecological catastrophe; and nonepointed to adverse
environmen aIeffectsthatcouMnot satisfactolberemedisd.
4.03 Repeatedly, the Czechosiovak Governent asked the- Hungarian
Government to letit havethe scientificdata resultingfiom HungarianstudiesaIiegedly
establishingtheecologicalrisksclaimed to exist by Hungary. No such datahave been
furnishedtu thi say by Hungary,andSlovakia has no reasonto believethatany in-depth
ecoIogicaIstudies were conducted by Hungarian scientifigroups at the timc. What
Hungarydid produce were poIiticaIlymotivated internalevaIuafrontshat raisedthesame
questionsas hadbeenconsidered when theProjectwasconceived and adoptedin 1977 and
weresubsequently addressedas theProjectproceeded.
4.04 However, in1988 -989,the Hungarian Governent did proceed tu
commission studiesbytwo outsidegroups: an Americantearn,assistedby anenvirumental
componentoftheUniversity ofMassachusettsw , hichissuedtwo reportsinMarchandMay
1989; and a study by Bechtel Environmental,Inc.of SanFrancisco,whose report was
deliveredin February1990. Thesestudieshavebeenanalysed above in Chapter II6. Like
the Hungarianreports @yen tu CzechosIovakiaon26 June 198g7,neitherof these studies
was aimed atpmducingüp-tu-date scientificdatacunwrning the ecoIogica1effectofthe
G/N Project.TheBechteI report was basedon eulier Hungarianscienfificstudies, whoçe
d
Annexes 23,24 and36.
5
fotheBestruclurioftheDonomy)misa ProgramoîhtEC,whichcamein10exigence i1989IOe
assistthe couriof CentraandEasterEurope,withassistantoPoIandandHungary asils
initialgoal. Czschodovakiaeltoparticipatein17PHARE Projectsof whch the Danubian
Lowland-GrounWd aterMode1is onSee,Annex57,forselectedpagesfrom theofficialbooklet
describithePHAREProject.
6 Seepara.2.23efa., aove.
-
7 See,para.4.1a,m., beIow.
-high quaIitandthoruughness it praised.Etwarnedof no ecologicalcatastrophesof any
kindiftheProjectwereto go forward.
4.05 If, duringthe three years 1989991 in whichit succeede indputting
offthe dammino gftheDanube, the HrrngariaGovernmenthadwished toproceed tocany
orrt itobligationunder the 1977 Treaty,but considerethatd wasprevented fiom doing
so because of seriousecologicalrisks, it must be assumedthat it would have acted
differenty In its own scientificIaboratorior throughoutside scientifiand technical
sources,itmost certainlywould haveshdied the matter intensively,updatingtheearlier
scientifrcstudieson which theProjectwas basedand producing new scientificdata and
hdings. This didnot happa. It seernscIem thatHungary hadrio interest in provingthat
the threatof ecologicaldiçasterexisted;wishedto settletheissueatthe politicalnot the
scientificleveand theclairnof ecologicalcatastropwas expressedin terms calculatedto
have a politicaleffect.Thus, the implementation by Czechasluvakiaof Variant "C"
presenteda danger notto theenvironment ,ut rathetu Hungary'sallegationof ecologicd
disaster:for once Varian"C" was inoperation,theecologicalrîsksonwhichHungary had
basedits abandonmentoftheG/NProjectwould beshown tobe nonexistenor satisfactorily
addressedor, atworst, capableofbeingadequatelyremedied. As ChapterV shows,thatis
preciselywhathappened.
4.06 It is necessarytutake acloser Iookat the pehd from May 1989
onwards inorder tounderstandtheactionsofthe twoGovernmenta sndthe substanceof the
negotiationsthattook placebetweenthem. The discussionthatfollows is separatedinto
four periods:(i) theperiodof Hungary'breachesof the 1977 Treatyduring 1989and the
ensuing negotiationthat held out considerabpromiseof a compromiseaoIurion up tothe
end of 1989;(ii) the period betweenJanuar1990 and23 ApriI1991, when changesin the
composition andstmcmre of bothGovemments uccurred, Hungary'sposition hardened and
attemptsweremadeto broaden the negotiationsso asto enlisttheaid of the EC, the period
ending with theHungarian Parliament'secisionto instructthe Governmentto negotiatto
teminatethe 1977 Treaty;(iii)the period uptu and iricludirigOctub1992,duringwhich
time the CzechoslovakGovernent began to put inîo operation the provisionaIsolution
under Variant "C" of the Project, the HungarianGovernent announced itspurportecl
terminationof theTreatyand filedanapplicatiowiththeCourtseeking tohalt Variant"CH,
and the finaldamrningof the Danubeby Czechoslovakiaunder Variant"C" took placeaRer athree year delay;and(iv)the periodof increasedEC involvementin the disputeutothe
endof 1992.
A. The SuspensionofWork at Nawmaros
4.07 On 13May 1989,Hungaryannounced atwo-month s~spension ofthe
Nagparos works withorrt consultationwith the CzechoslovakGovernent as required
underthe 1977 Treaty. The decisionwasmade known onlythreemonthsafterthe parties
had enteredinto the Protocol of February 1989 shorteningthe Project'scheduleby 15
months -an actionthat had been overwhelminglyendorsed by Hungary'P sarliamentby a
~oa taken in October 1988'. The procedure foIIowed to informCzechosIovakia ofthe
decisionwas asfoIIows:the CzechoslovikAmbassador inBudapest wassummonedtu the
Ministry ofForeignMails and toIdordiy of thedecisiontu suspend;he was hande do
confirmingdocumentof any kindeitherthen or afterwards.Thismust be regardedas an
extraordinaryay to makeknownsucha radicalchangeof position.
4.08 ShortIy afterwards, the Hungarian PIenipotenbiaiytu the Project
assuredhis CzechosIovakcotrnterpart thatthe decisionof ha Governent was strictly
limitedto Nagymaros. Then Hungary's Prime Minister- lessthan two months later -
I revealedthatthe suspensionwas intended to applyto GabEFkovo as welland that the
expandedsuspensionwas mt just fortwo monthsbut was tu mn untiat leastthe end of
October 1989,thus effectivelypostponingthe dammingofthe Danubefor year.
4.09 Czechoslovakia'r sesponsto the 13May announcementof Hungary
was immediate:at a meetingon 15May 1989 betweenthe CzechoslovakForeignMinister
andthe Hungarian Ambassadurin Prague,theCzechoslovakForeignMinisterstated:
t
a Thevote inthe HungariParliamenonthequestionof whethto continuthe Projectthis
bais was317 votes in favo19against,with 31 abstentions.At the time,the environmental
grorrpsinHrrngahad MIy articuIatheir reasonçfor oppotheGN ProjeciPrier tthe
debate in Parliamtnon-stevisiwasmade during SeplembandOctober1388by nearlydl
the memberoflheHrrngarianParIiament. - That the Hungarian decision communicatedon 13 May had been
takenwithoutconsultationandwas a unilateralacinviolationofthe
1977Treaty;
- Thatthe actionto suspendwas,thus, rejecîedand the Czechoslovak
Government insisted on proceeding with the GM Project in
accordance withtheTreaty;
-
That such a unilaterd suspensionof work wouid haveserious
firianciconsequerices,andhenceCzechosIovakiareservedthe right
to presena clairnfodamages; and
- That the CzechoslovakGovernrnent offeredto begintalkstoattempt
to fincornmon groundfor avoidinghesedificultities.
4.IO Thesemattus were takenup at ameetingof Prime Ministerson 24
May 1989 in Pragueg.ItwasagreedthatHungarywouldfurnish inwrîting its reasonsfor
suspensionand that experts fiom both countrieswouldthemeet to studythe situation and
makerecommendations.
4.1 I A meetingbetweenPleniputentiariesfoIIowed on 8-9 June 1989,and
this meetingwas summarîsed ina signedprot~coI'~.The protocolspecificallyrecordfrrst.
the CzechoslovakGovernment's refusalto acceptthe suspensioofwork atNagyrnarosand,
second, its urgentrequesto be giventhe technicaldata on which the Hungariandecision
was allegedlybased- forstudyby a speciallconstituted joint group experts. Hungary's
assurance thatits amounced suspension was Iimitedru Nagymaros is reflected in the
foIIowingpassagesof the protocol:
"The Hungarian Government Comrnissioner and the Hungarian
Plenipotentiarystated,that the Hungariansidewillcompleteconstructionof
the GabEikovoProject in the agreetirneandinaccordance with the project
pIans. Directives havea1readybeen giventu continueworks auspendedin
theareadue to misunderstanding."
9 No agreerecorofthismeetingwamade.
10 Annex 58.This assuranc weas repeated in a letter hm the Hungarîan Pienipotentiary to his
CzechosIovak counterparidated9Juneil .
The TwoHungarianDocumentsPresentedOn 26 June 1989
4.12 At a meetingof PIenipoteritiarosn26 lune 7989, Hungaryhanded
over tu CzechosIovakiatwodo~uments'~ . These were:(i)a document preparedby anad
hoc cornmitteeoftheHungarian Academyof Sciences,onthe effectof theimpIementation
or the non-implementatio onf the Nagymarossection of the Project,consideringin this
regard Iand ecoiogy, water quality,geology and seisrnol~g ynd~(ii)a document,
designatedas a"professionalsummary"of rîsk factorsandxoIogica1hazards ,aidto have
been considerd by the MinistcridCounciIof Hungq in reachingits decisioto suspend
work atNagy~naros'~T . hesecond document isunsignedandundated; andthe sourceof the
reportis nowhereindicated.Czechoslovakia agreedto translatand studythesematerials
and thentu scheduIeameeting ofexpertsof bothcountriestodiscussthem.
4.13 On 13 JuIy 1989, Czechoslovakia confimecl tu Hungaq its
agreementto schedule açcientificdiscussionof thetemporarinterruptioof theProjectat
Nagymaros for 17-19 July 1989,the discussiontobe conductedby expertsdividedinto
threegroups: hydroloa gyd ecoiogy;geology andseismology; andpedology,agriculture
and hydr~geology'~. Tu this lettewas appended a Iistof the CzechosIuvakexperts
scheduled tu participatein the meeting anda Statementresponding tu the documents
presentedby Hungaryon 26 June16. Before turning to the 17-19 July meeting,it is
appropriateto considerthenature andcontent ofthetwo Hungarian documentsas weHas
thecommentsonthemcontainedinthe CzechoslovakStaternent.
Il Annex59.
12 Annex60.
13 hnex 51.
14 Annex62.
15 Annex63."Pedologyi"asciencrelattothestudyofsoi!.
16 Annex64. The Parierof the HungarianAcaderny
4.14 As noted above, the Hungarian Academy's paper dedt with the
questionsof landecology, water quality,geologyandseismoIogy. The statedobjectiveof
this document was to assessthe impact in these areasofthe discontinuanceof the
Nagymarossection ofthe G/N Projec t
4.15 In its discussion of water auality, the Academy's paper is
contraclictory and the andysis of problemaIargeIytheoretical. WhiIstthe eIirninationof
Nagymaros would removethe risks to watw qudity thatmight be associatedwith it, the
paper cornplaingsenerdiyof alackof studyanddata. It isadmittedthat someexperts were
of theview that theGN Projectas a wholewould not negatively influencethequality of
waterwithdrawn fiomthewellssupplyingwatwtu Budapest. But it is also statedthat "new
studies"-not identifie-reveaIthat, evenial1the scheduIedwatertreatmentpIants were in
operation,deteriorationothe waterqrrdityof the DanubecouIdnot be avoided.In its final
conclusion,the paper assertswithout explanation,that the greatest riskarising fiomthe
Project was tothe qualityof drinkingwater endangeringlivingconditionsof three million
people17. IthasbeenshowninChapterII abovethat this cannotpossiblybe soandthat the
qualityofBudapest'swater isdictatedbyquitedifferentfactors.'
4.16 The discussioninthe Academy'spaper of landecolom is also largely
theoretical,and it is claimedthat expensisecondary investmentswould be necessaryto
avoid anumber ofpossibleharmhl effects. For example,tisassurned that the GN Prctject
worild causea drop in grciundwater IeveIdown to the gravesubsoîl,thereby preventing
capillaryaction tsupplywaterto the rootzone above. No atternpt imade tu establisthat
this pivotalassumptianicorrect. To take anotherexample,the paperstatesthat iis "tbe
expected" that due to "changed hydrodynamicconditions a considerabledegradation of
livingcammunities wiBoccur". There is no atternto discusswhy thisis "to be expected"
or todeal with the manypreliminaryand ongoing scientificstudies of the meansof avoiding
such a resuIt,asundertaken in connection with theG/N Project. Zn essence, what was
providedwas no morethanthe most summaryandysis of the problem althoughexpressed
usingscientificterminology.
18
&, para.2.10etSX.,aboveand ILIUS.O30 IBl. 4.17 As to seismoIonv and the risk ofearthquakes, the paper, afier
incorrectIystatingthat there hadbeeaIack ofseismicstudyof the Nagymarossite, cornes
to the surprisingconclusion thatthe expected earthquakeintensityvalue in both the
Nagyrnaros and theGabEkovo areaswould be inthe rangeofGrades 9 to 10 MSK. Aswill
be discussedbelow inconsideringthe CzechoslovakStatementevaluatingthis report,the
evidencepoints to seismjcitjloa considerablyIower range at Na~ymaros, a conclusion
reached (amongmany others)by Hungary'sprominentgeologist,Rérylg.
The "Professiona lurnrna~~~
4.18 The so-called "professionalsummary" - the second Hungarian
document -setsout initsest seven page sseriesof concIusionsthatareunsupported by
specifireferenceto anyrecentstudiesornewdata, suchasthat:
- The G/N Project would decisively change the hydrologie,
hydrobiolugicand ecoIogic character of the entire reach of the
Danubebetweenrkm 1842 (the DunakiIitiweir) and rkm 1696 (the
mouth of the Ipel'River);thiswas obviously a gross exaggeration,
but in anyeventthe summa.ytakesno accountof thefactthatthe
ecoIogy of this sectorof the region of the Danube had been
deteriorathg foa longtimeprior tuthe inceptiunoftheG/N Project;
- The G/N Project would "influencethe livingcommunitiesdong the
river",such as the forestsand the floraand fauna; but again the
srrmrnarytakes no accuunt of the serious deterioration that had
alreadysetin aEecting these communities;
- Pollutionof the Danube would increaseand seriously affect the
quality of drinkinwater - a conclusiontotallyat odds with pnor
srudiesandwith the independent shidyof the Bechtelenvironmental
group that Hungary was tu receive some six months late?',
19 . -
-ee,para.4.30, bel&,. alsopara2.60gîa., above,forfullerdiscussiotheseismobgy
ofthearea.
20
-eepara.2.27, m., above. and subsequentlydisprovedby the testing that followed the putting
into operationofVariant "CM.
4.19 From these unsupporîedand IargeIytheoreticaiconclusionsthe report
(atpage7)makesthis sweeping indiament ofthe Project:
"The projectisincontradictionwithour responsibilityto provide[a] healthy,
safe and acceptable environment for [the] presentinhabitantof the country
and for future generations. Thus, it is not possibleto constnict thetG!N
Project] accordingto theoriginalconceprion and tooperateit."
4.20 The "professionalsummary"then proceeds to state (at page 7) -
without anysupportingargumentsor specificreferenceto studiesor relevantdata -that the
majorpart of the unfavourableenvironmentalimpacts was causedby the peak operation at
GabEikovoand that, therefore, NagyrnarosstrouIdbe eliminated. Yet, the discussion of
impacts in the first seven pages of the summary is in no way tied or related to peak
operation. Neither is the conclusionof the summarythat the HniSov-Dunakilitireservoir
shouldnot be filleduntilaRerthe cornpletionof sewage treatmentplantsor after obtaining
uniforrnand suitableDanubewater quality.In anyevent,thisis a verymisleadingstatement,
for Irtterinthe sumrnary(at page 1)- compIeteIypre-judgingthe question - iis concIuded
thateeve with suchtreatrnentthe waterquality ofthe Danubewouldinevitably beimpaired.
4.21 Thisdocumentthen discusses the questionof the Project'seffect on
the qualityof drinkingwater (page 10). It statesthat the reservoirwouldcausea doubling
of plankton growfh "according to experts".The experts are not identified. Ir adds that the
VITUKIexpertshave a sirnifarview,but citesno reference. To this the srrmmaryadds the
possibledissolutionof magnesium and iron in wells suppliedby river bank infiltratioas
well as the probiem of bad taste and odour, concluding:"al1these circumstances would
considerablyincreasethe cost of dhnhng water in Budapest". But no effort ismade to
expiainhow the wells that supplyBudapestmight be affectedby the Project. & already
shown, these wells lie downstream ofthe Project - the qurtlityofthe drîrikingwater of
Budapest is in fact adversely affected by poilution from the city, The [GN Project]was handiedby previousgovernments as a politicalissue.
The judgmentofthe new government isjusttheopposite tothatof the earlier
ones, butoften questionsand doubtsrelatedto the environment have not
been analyzed scientificallyjustas'in the past. The only acceptable
professional way of treating the project wouid be tu condrrct an
environmentalimpact assessrnentstarting from the current situation,as
recommendedby a Cornmittee of the HungatianAcademyof Sciencesin
early 1990. However, thereseemsto be very littie supportfor such
systematicanalysis. The issue is still too politicaland emotionally
confùsed;whilecancellingthe proiectisthe ody acceptablepoliticastep,it
dues notreflecragooddecision-making procedurez4."
4.25 Appended tothe end of the secondHungarian document is a long
bibliographylisting a variety ofrecentarticlesand studiesfiom al1kinds of sources.
However,statements inthetext ofthedocumentarenotfootnotedto specificsourcescited
here;the wholelist çeemsto havebeen throm in at thend of the papersasif it srrppurted
the "professionalsummary" en masse. But,as Czechoslovakia' statement points out, the
Iist is Iiiglyelective;and not al1of the sources cited supportthe statementsfoundin
paper. To takeone example,the second MassachusettR s eportdated May 1989 is cited,
mentioning the contributioof ProfessorHarrySchwarz.Yet, aspointedoutinChapterII
ab~ve~~,the findings of Professor Schwarz do not sttppon thefindingscontained in the
"prufessionar'summary". For example, Professor Schwarz found the main problern of
pollutionaffectingHungary's water qudity tobe, not the G/N Project,but contaminates
fiomHungary's ownagriculturaa lctivitiesandfromuntreatesewage.
TheCzechoslovakStaternentof 12 JuIy 1989
4.26 The third document to be considered here is Czechoslovakia's
Statementof 12 July 1989, whichdirectly addressed the two Hungarian documentsjust
consideredabove. Its firstfour pages are devotedto a historyof the scientificstudies
concerningtheenvironmentconductedboth beforeand afierthe Project was initiateclunder
the 1977 Tresrty,emphasisingin pmicular the BioIogicaIProjeet of the region of tG/N
Project preparedby URBION in 1975-1976 andsubsequently updated(the"Bioprojec )27.
24
Ibid,p.159. Emphasisadded.
25 Se,para.4.25g a., beIow.
-
26 Sec .ara2.26and2.59gtm., above.
27 See ,ara2.17gtW., above.It bringsout the factthat the ESTC Cornmitteein 1982 calledupon the Academiesof
Sciences of both countnes tu organise a joint geoscientific,hydroIogica1and bioIogica1
research program as partof their198 1-7985 prograrnswith the aim of improving or
conserving the environment to the maximum extentpossible. This recommendationwas
adoptedand can-iedoutand had startedtobear fruitby1989.
4.27 The CzechosIovak Statement concludes this survey of the past by
"... duringal1these- alwaysjointly perforrned- works no reporton new
aspectshasappeared ,or were newscientific findingspresented until May
13, 1989andinfactuntiltoday... ."
Andthis was the caseai aIIevelsof scientifand technicddiscussion:
- Atmeetings of theESTCCornmittee;
- At meetingsof thePlenipotentiariesofthetwo Govements; and
- Atregularmeetingsofthe JointOperatingGroup.
4.28 The Statementadds thatCzechoslovakia:
"...had no informationonany-scientificresults[on the basisof which] the
unilaterallyintermpt worktat Nagymaros stage for the duration of twod]
monthsinorder toverifynewdata."
It thentrrrnstua specificexaminationof the two documentspresentedby Hungaryon 26
JuIy 1989which,the Statement says:
". present nonew or previouslyunknownprofessionalscientific arguments
or documentswhichmayhavebeenleftout of ...the projectdocumentation,
or leftunconsideredbyscientificresearchconducted hitherto the course of
gradua1 suppIementation of the [Joint Contractual Plan]. The material
contains nonew viewpoints for an intervention as radical as stoppage of
construction ofNagyrnarosStage." - 144-
4.29 Czechoslovakia's Statementexpresses the view that itwould be
impossibleto acceptthecornplain tfthe Hungarian Academyof Sciences in itspaper(the
so-called"judgment"t)hat Hungarian scientistshadnothad the opporhrnitytu studythe
reIevant data. Since 1982, the two Academies,foIIowingthe ESTC Cornmittee's
recommendation,had been conductiriga joint scientifprogram into theenvironmental
impactof the Project. TheStatementalso notes that, as towatermanagement,the Joint
Commissionunderthe 1976 BoundaryWatersManagement Agreementhadbeen closely
monitoringthewaterqudity of theDanubefor several de~ades*~. How, therefore,could
Hungary now daimthatit Iackeddata ontks question?
4.30 Mer exposingthefundamenta dlefectsiHungary'sdiscussionof the
waterqualityof theDanube and of drinkingwater,the Statement(pages 9-11)turns to the
discussionof earthquakesappearingin Hungary's two documents. It notes that the area of
Nagymaros hadbeenevaluatedfor seismicityunder the Joint ContractualPIan and that the
geoIogicaIstmctures inthat IocaIityhad beeverifieddurîng the courseof the earthworks
that opened up a huge ditch exposingthe geological cross-sectionsfor examination.
Moreover,it added, the Austrianexpertscarrying out this work undercontract would
certainlyhave verifiethe criticafactorof earthquake riskand issuedwarnings had they
discoveredanydiscrepancyberneen designandtheactual seismicdata(page 10). As to the
Hungarian finding that seismicintensityin the areawas of Grade 9 or TU MSK, the
Statement said:
"Al1informationup to now ..hasbeenbased ondataof aseismicrest area
around the Nagymaros stage,withits seismicityevalrraasdGrade 5 [MCS].
It wasgeneralknowledgethat according to theHungarian geulogist,Réty, a
seismo-tecronîcIinruns inthevicinityof the Nagymaroswatenvork. R6ty1s
workand dataindicatethatneitherherenorin the broader neighbourhood
wereearthquake in excessof3-6' MCSobservedoverthelastmillenniurn."
The Statement then cites three specificreferencesbearing out these conclusionsandpoints
out that expertopiriiorison seismicrîsin thepre-designstageofthe G/N Project durîng
1960-1965 had been cofirmed in 1981 by independent experts and that no geologicd
observations performedduring 1965-1989 had challenged the validity of these expert
opinionsZg.
28
&e, para3.13W., above.
29
&, dm, para2.50, m., above. 4.31 The §tatement goesontu considerthe discussionsby Hungary ofthe
effectof the GIN Projeeon groundwater IeveIsand,hence,on soiIs,pointingout that the
analysisin theHungarianAcademy's paper was excerptedfiom one particuiarscientific
report,but that onlythenegativerisksmentionedinthe reportappearedinHungary's paper
andnot a&II and bdariceddiscussionoftheproblem. Under Czechoslovakia' asnalysiof
effectsonsoils,maidypositivechangeswere forecastandmostof the soi1effectswould be
experiencedon SIovak territorinany event.
4.32 The Czechoslovak Statementthen notesthe shortcoming sfthelist
of referencesattachetu Hungary's"professionasumarj." fpage 151,pointingout thatthe
Iistfailedtu inchde referencestu mmy works of Hurigarîanscientists and experts of
internationareputation and that only a minor part of the relevant studies and other
referencesappearedonthe list.
4.33 The meeting of experts tu consider these documents took place
during 17-19 JuIy1989, broken down into thethreeworking groupsmentioned above30.
Agreed summariesof the discussionsoccurringin each workinggroupwere prepared,
seting outtheareasof agreementanddisagreement:
- Ecologvand hvdrologv. The essenceof thedisagreementbetween
the two sideswas that Czechoslovakiaconsideredthat thevariousproblemsin these areas
had been and were continuing to be studied,that there was abundant scientificdata
available,and that acceptabIesolutionshad been or couId be found. HungarJfview was
that sufficient dwas Iackingand thatsome fiveyearsofinvestigationwas reqrrired.
- Geoiow and seismolom. Thebasicdifference between each sidein
this area camedom tu the following:Hungary statedthattherewere insufficientdata and
studies concerningthe earrhquakeriskatNagymaros and that, in anevent, amonitoring
syçtemshouIdbe put inrooperation before cornpletionothe Project. The Czechodovak
view was thatthejointinvestigationof earthquakreiskwas entirelyadequateand that thegeologicalfindingshadbeen confirmed when on 17July 1989 the expertgroupvisitedand
examinedtherockformationsinthelargeopenconstruction pit.Thisexamination showed
therewaç no activfaultsystemand that the bedrockwas asuitableformationtu provide
total stabiIityfor plannedstructures.Czechoslovakiafavouredextendingthe monitoring
system during constructionofNagymaros tuembracethe entirereachbetween Bratislava
andBudapest.Itwas alsonotedthatthediscussionswere hampered bythefactthat none of
the Hungarian team of experts had been involved in the design and construction of
Nagrnarus and,hence,theylacked thenecesaarypracticalknowiedge.
- PedoIom, agriculture and hvdroIorn. In this area the
Czcehoslovakview wasthatthevariousproblemsraised by Hungarywere allwell known
when the Projecthadbeenformulated andduringthetirneof its irnplementation. hehad
been directly addressed inthe Project,and Hungaq had produced no new data or
infornation not known when the 1977 Treaty was entered into that wouId justify
interruptioofwork atNagymaros.
4.34. At thisand subsequentmeetings,the Czechoslovakscientistsstarted
tu noticea chang en thecornpositon of the scieificteams advising Hungary, and they
senseda disturbingshiRin attitude. The Hungarianexpertsmost familiarwith the Project
startednot toattend, and themeetingswereparticipatedinbyexperts not informedof the
paststudiesor of thedetaiIsof the G/N Project. TheHungarian positions seemedtinged
withconsiderationsof a more politicathanscientificcharacter. Of course, this rnight be
explainedafterMay 1990 bythe fact that, inthe newHungarianGovernment'sstatementof
its generaI political prograof 22 May 1990, the new goverment appeared to have
prejudgedthe issue of the Project's environmentampact and intendedto abandonthe
Project. But quiteapartfrom thesedisturbing features of Hungary'attitude,there is an
importantissueof principle.Itwo Statesnegotiata treaty, isopen to oneof themtu cal1
for suspensionor temination ofthattreaty onthe ground that inow beIievesitought tu
have studied the implicationsof the treaty more carehlly?Mat woiild remainof the
principlepactasunt servandaif the Partieswere ableto suspend or terminatethe treaty
because they hadhad"second thoughts"?WhereStatesenterintotreatycommitments they
must be assumed tohaveconsideredcarefullythe implicationsofthosecommitrnentsbefore
accepting the treary. NegIecrof pior stud-a situationthat certainlydnot exisrinthe
.caseof the G/N Projec-ciinnobe admittedasa newgroundforthe termination oftreaties. intentiotu daim damages for theseunilateraacts of Hungaryin
confiicwiththe 1977Treap;
- The meeting was followed on 8 August by a Ietterhm the
CzechoslovakPIenipoteniarytohi s ungarîancounterpariprotesting
againstthe unilateact ofHungarywhichcaused the postponement
ofthe damming of theDanube andreserving Czechoslovakia' sight
toclaimcompensation andda mage^^^.
4.37 Foiiowingthesecommunications a, CzechodovakNote Verbale of 18
Auest set out the officiai positioCzechosl~vakia~~ h,m which key paragraphs are
quotedbelow :
"Withoutwaitingfor theresponseof theCzechoslovak sideto itsproposais
ofJuIy 20, 1989,the Hungarian sidehas taken memurestu realize them.
Thisconcems in particuIthe decision noto dam the oId riverbecofthe
Danubewhichthe Hungarian sidewas tocmy outinthe GabEikovr siection
inOctobw 1989intunewith thetirnetableofwork.
The FederaIMinistryofForeign AfFairdeemsit necessaryto point outthat
the Czechoslovakside has so far alwayproceededfrom the fact thatthe
decisioof themungarianGovernment ]fMay-13, 1989 onthetemporary
two-monthsuspensionofwork on thepartof the HrrngarîasideappIieonly
tutheNamarus stage.Thiswas being confrmed bythe Hungarianside at
al1tdksheIdsofar.
The [Cze~hoslovakGovernment]hasnot changedits positionof May 15,
1989and continuestoinsistonthe honouringoftheTreaty.
The [CzechosIovakGovemment] at the çametimereservesitseIfthe rigtu
daim compensation fur the damagewhich wiIIbe cauçedin the futuras a
result unilate drciiionsof [:H~~ngary].
The[Czechoslovak Govement] requeststhattheHungarian authoritiestake
such measures that would providefor the fulfilment of al1 obligations
includedinrhe[1977 Treai] inlems sufar agree."
32 Annex57.
33 Annex68.
34 Annex69. 4.38 Then in a strongly-wordedletter to theHungarian Prime Minister
daid 31 August 1989, the CzechoslovakPrime Ministerresponded specificaliytothe 20
JuIyproposds of Hunge. He startedoffby çayingtha:
"The comrnon denominatorof al1thevariantscontainedin your proposaisis
that they are al1 aimed at marring the completion of the Gabfkovo-
Nagymarossptem of locks or of its Nagymms partin accordancewith
treaty documentsinforce"
He theninformedthe Hungarian Prime MinisterthataRer a thoroughexamination of althe
variantscontainedinhisproposalbythe appropriateCzechoslovak bodiesand its scientific,
technicalandeconomic institutionCzechodovakiia nsistethatthe constructioofthe G/N
Systemcontinuein accordancewiththe 1977Treaîy. As to the allegeeco1ogica Iîskshe
stated:
"On the basis of a comprehensiveevaluation of the entire problem, we
concluded thatallthe alleged principaisks you point to were taken into
considerationaIreadybeforeand during the course of construction of the
GabEikovo-Nagymaros aystemofIocks. NegotiationsbetweenCzechoslovak
and Hungarian scientists, technicians and economists foIIowing the
suspensionbythe Hungarim Governent ofwork ontheconstruction of the
Nagymaros partafterMay 13of thisyearfailedto produce any arguments
for postponingthe realizationor for changingthe conceptof constructionof
the systemof locksasagreedinthe treatydocuments."
This ofcourse was a referencetu the recent meetingof expertsdiscussedabove. He went
on to Saythatif Hungary shoulddecide, atvariancewith its intmationaI IegaIobligations,
to proceedunilateraliywith anyof the variantsproposedon 20 July, Czechoslovakiawould
sufferextensivelossesforwhichit wouldpresenta claim. TheCzechoslovak PrimeMinister
concIuded thisIetterwith thiswaming:
"We shaIIhave tu take in this contextaucbmeasures on the sovereign
territory of [Czechoslovakiwhich willguarantee the amountof waterfor
the GabEikovo part specifiedin the [1977 Treaty]. The measurestakenby
the Czechoslovaksidewould be onlytemporary since[CzechoslovakiaJ will
remain ready tu complete the construction of the GabEikovu-Nagymaros
system of Iocks under the above Treary on the condition that [Hungary]
35
Annex71. shows the same wiII and that itcompensates[Czechoslovakia] for the
darnagecausedto itbytheunlawfulstepsby[Hungary]."
Mer receipt of thÎs Ietter, Hunwasy Ieft in no doubofthe serÎousnesswith which
CzechoslovakiaregardedHungary'srecentdecisiontususpendperfumance under the 1977
Treaty.
4.39 On 1 September 1989Hungarydelivereda Note Verbaleresponding
tu the CzechoslovakNote of 18Augrrst'? In the'Hungatian -, the foIIowingpoints
weremade:
- m, Hungaryhadextended to 31 October 1989 the suspensionof
work atNagymaros firstannounce od13May;
- Second,dunngthe periodof suspension,further investigatofnthe
ecological risks was tbe startedand no irreversibletechnical
measureswere to be taken; this implied, thereforethat the
preparatory,worto dam theDanube atDunakiliti astu beincluded
withinthe rangeofactivitiessuspended;
-
Third, thtwo variantof the Project proposedby Hungary'sPrime
Ministeron 20 July were againproposed to be considered in the
courseof jointly reviewingwhethertheGN Project was feasible:
jointresearchwas tobe coriductedover a pend of one year or,
dternatively, over a periof three-tu-fivyears, with ecoIogimI
guaranteesand an optimaloperationasystem tobe developed;and
internationaslcientificorganisas ouldbe broughtinto helpwith
thiswork;
- Fourth, duringa meeting of the Plenipotentiariesand experts in
Budapestheld on 21-23 August,theHungarianside had askedwhat
was meantbyreferencesmade byCzechoslovakexpertsto "technical
countermeasuresc"ontemplatedinthe ligofthe suspensionofwork
atDunakilititheHungarianGovernent warnedthat on the basisof information ithad receivedfromCzechoslovakiathe takingof any
suchmeasrrreswciuld beregardedbyHungary asa breachof the 1977
Treaty.
The Hungarian Note Verbale of 1 September complained that40 days had elapsedsince
Hungary'sproposals had been madeand there was stillno reply to them fiom the
CzechosIovaksida Of course,asseenabove, the Czechoslovak Prime Ministerhad in fact
set out hisGovernment's responseto the proposalsin a Ietterto the Hungarian Prime
Ministertheday beforethe HungarîanNote Verbalewas deIivered.
C. CzechoslovakiaC 'sonsiderationofProvisionaM l easures
4.40 AIthorrghthe CzechoslovakPrimeMinisteisletter of 31 Aupst was
the Ers1time that CzechosIovakiaomally adviçedthe 0th sidethat itwas contemplating
the takingof"temporay" or provisionalmeasrrrest,herehad dready been some discussion
of sucha moveamongtheexperts atthemeetingof 21-23August, astheHungarian Note of
1 September re~eals'~.What had triggeredthe CzechoslovakGovernrnent'sdecision to
consider provisionalmeasureswas the extensionof Hungary's decisionto suspendwork,
whichinrtiallyaffictedody Nagymaros,to theGabEÎkovo sectionand,inparticulastu work
at theDunakiIitisitepreparatortuthe dammingof the Danube planned tostart in Octuber
1989. ThisextensionofHungary's breach ofthe 1977 Treaty hadthe effectof postponing
the scheduleddamming ofthe river bya year and, hence, it postponedthe.fillingof the
reservoirand thebypasscanalas wellastheinitialtestingofthehydroelectricpowerplantat
GabEikovo (alsuby one year).The CzechusIovak Goverrimentfelt compeIIedto consider
taking provisionalmeasureçbecause it had becorneincreasinglyclear that the Hungarîan
Governmenw t asreallystallifortimeinorder to gainanotheryearof deIay.
4.41 As the Czechoslovak NA of 18 August 1989pointed out,stepshad
beentaken by Hungarytu implementits unilateradlecisiontu postpone workatNagymaros
and atDunakiIitieven before being advisedof Czechoslovakialrseaction tu the Hungarian
proposaisof 20 JUIF .nd,as theCzechosIovakPrimeMinisteremphasised inhisIetterof
37 Annex 72.&, alçoAnnex 70,aprotocoofthe 21-2Augustmeetings.IndiscussingVariant
"C"inthisMernorialt,heter"temporaris useinterchangeaby it"provisionat,e latter
beirthetermfoundintheSpeciaAgreementtdescribVariant"Ca.31 Aupst reçponding tothe 20 JuIypropo~als~H~,ungary had producedno new scientific
data orstudiesduringtheinterveningmeetingsand exchangesthatpointedto risks thathad
notalready been fullexamined before orduringthe courseof constmctionof theProject.
This was infact the concIusiosetoutinCzechosluvakial§ statementof 12July 1989 &er
its studyofHuogary'stwo documents presentedon 26 $une4' Itwas atthispoint,then, that
CzechosIovakia begantu examin elternativetemporarymeasuresthat mightbetakenand to
initiatescientificstudiesinto the effectsof suchmeasu, attersthataretaken up in the
nextChapter.
4.42 The decisionofCzechosIovakia to considertemporary memuresof
somekindinorder to cmy outtheagreed purposes ofthe 1977 Treaty-whilstdlowingfor
the possibilityof Hungary'sresumption of the performanceof its treaty obligations-
evidentlycame asa surpristo theHungarian Government.Untilthen it seemsto havebeen
assumedinBudapestthatmerely by raisingthespectreof ecologicaldisaste-without any
new scientific datato back up such prediciionsand even inthe face of thecomplete
disagreement of the Czechoslovak scientists- Hungary coiild force the Czechoslovak
Governent to acceptpostponemeno tf theGIN Projectwhile theseallegationswere being
examined byexperts,perhaps overa periodaslong asfiveyearsand, indeed,untiltheywere
resolvedbyagreementw , hichrnightneveroccur. Czechoslovakia'rsesponseindicatedthat
agreementwould have to be reached over the existence and natureof environmenta1
ernergenciespusited byHungary and over whether remedial meaçures- new or already
contemplated by the Project - were adequateto deaI with them, before accepting
postponemen otrdecidingwhetherorhowthe 1977Treaty needed to beamended.
4.43 Not wrprisingly,thîmovebythe CzechuslovakGovcmenr Ied tua
flurryofmeetings. Therewere two meetingsbetweenthe DeputyPrimeMinisters weIIas
meetings of Iegalexperisofboth countries, and on1I October 1989 the Prime Ministers
againmetbriefly. Inthe meantirneo, n4 October,theHungarian Prime Ministerresponded
to the31 August letteof theCzechoslovakPrimeMirister''. Hislettereflectsthe facthat
Hungaryhadstartedto placeemphasison legal aswell asscientifireasonsinits attemptu
blockproceedingwith the GCNProject.
39 &, hex 71.
40 See ,ara4.12am., above.
41
Annex 74. 4.44 The Hungarian Prime Minister's Ietter o4 Ocfober was sent
fo1luwingtheunilateraldecisiontakenby Hungarynot tu proceed todam the Danube -an
operationthat Hungary mntrolled çirrceit irrvolvedthe Dunakiïieir,which Iay on rhe
Hungarian sideofthe bo~ndary~~ . heletteisa statementof the Hungarianpositionat the
time,inwhich thefollowingassertionsappear:
- That "mmy highiy regarded representatives of science" - not
identifIe- had pointedto "seriousecoIogicaIrisks"if the Project
proceeded asplanned;
- That where environmentaldamagesare perceived, States have the
ri@ and obligationtu suspendworkand tucommencenegotiations
and that therrirno groundsfor clairfor damages;
-
That for Czechoslovakiato proceedwith "technicalmeasureson its
own territory would seriousIy affectrelationsbetween the two
countriesandIeadto internationalrepercussions;
- That the ecoIogicaIriskswere suchthat they couldnot be deait with
in the courseof carryingout theProject on the basis of monitoring
the environmentalimpactsandtakingcorrectivemeasures.
4.45 TheHungananleiterthenput fuward severalpropasals:
- m, that an agreement be reached "on the preparationand
accomplishment of the programme of thecomprehensive technical
operation and ecological guarantee system protecting protecting
47 &, IIlusNo.25,referrta apara.2.3above. the waterquality"tobe eonciudednotIaterthan 30July 199043;
- Second, that internationascientifiinstitutionbe asked to check
adherencetu the sysrernoguaranto efwsater quaIity;
- Thîrd,thatpeakhour operation be eliminateand thatnegotiationsto
modifythe 1977 Treatybeundertaken soasto makechange sthe
Treatyreflectingtheabandonment of Nagymaros.
D. Possibilitieofa Compromise
4.46 The 4 October letteroftheHungarian PrimeMinisterwas followed
by a Hungarian Note Verbaleof 30 October 198944. On the sarneday, also ina Note
Verbale. the Czechoslovak Government presentedits own position in response tu the
matters îaken up ar a meeting between Prime Ministersheld a few days earIier(on 26
Octuber)". Thismeetingwasthe IastmeetingofimportanceheIdprior tu thechangesin the
Governments of both countries arisingfrom the political events affecting Central and
Eastern Europe &er November 1989.
4.47 In Hüngary's 30 October me Verbale, the CzechosIovak
Governent was informed of the position just reached by theHungarian Council of
Ministersafter reviewingthevarioustdks that had takenplacebetweenthe parties. The
Council'sposition was submitted tothe HungarianParliamentand approvedby it on 31
October, as the CzechoslovakGovernmentwas infomed in a second Hungarian Note
Verbale of 3 NovembeP. The followirigwere the principal eIernents of this posiason
reIated inthe HungarianNotes:
43 Hungary'inconsisteconducisagainbroiigouthere,foilne1be recalledlhtheHungarian
siderefus&IOsigtheprotowlofthe meetioftheChairmenof the ESTCornmitteon 3 May
1989,specificailydeawithwaterqudity&, para3.24above.
44 Annex 75.
45 Annex 76.
46 Annex 77. Thatan "ecologicalstateof necessity"woulariseiftheG/'NProject
were tobeput intoeEectinitspresentform;
- That Hungaq proposed that such an ecoiogicd emergency be
avoidedby theabandonmen otfthepeakhoursoperationsystemand,
insteadthatthe system belimitedto a normal flow operation;thus
Hungaryhad abandoned the Nagymaros partofthe Project;
-
Tu "minimise t"erisksthaa nomd fluwoperationmightenta& that
Hungaryconsideredit necessa tryprepareand conchde an inter-
governmentalagreement over thevarious aspectsof therestof the
Project,i.e the.Dunakiliti weir, the reservoithe hydroelectric
power statioat Gabtikovo he by-pascsanal,andthesection of the
Danubedownstream as faas Nagymaros;
- That it was also necessaryto consider an inter-governmental
agreementon (i) protectiof waterquality(ii)technicaloperational
maintenance and (iiia systernof ecoIogical guaranteesand to
deternirneexecutiveresponsibiIifor creatiran eculogicalsystem
ofguaranteestuassuresafeoperation;and
- That,the"preconditioonf fillingup"theDunakiliti-HruSoreservoir
was the concIusionof such an inter-governmentd agreement,but
that:
"...intheevent ofaCzechosIovak statementto bewiIIingto
conclude such an intergovernmentd agreement, the
preparatorywork of the dammingup of the riverbedatthe
reservoircanbe continued"
4.48 Czechoslovakia'seaction tu these proposalswas highlycons1mive.
The CzechosIovakNote presented tathe Hurigarian Governent on the same day, 30
Octobef', directlyaddresseHungary'p sroposalsdiscusseatthe 26 Octobermeeting: - It acceptedtheideaof an inter-governrnentaagreement as outlined
byHungary;
- Provided Hungary starîed without deIay the preparatory work on
damming the Danube, the CzechoslovakGovernent was ready at
once tu negotiate 'suchan inter-gavemental agreement,and it
suggestedthe end of March 1990 as the deadlinefor signingthe
agreement;
With a view tu attempting tu dam the Danube in 1989, it was
proposed that the campetent agenciesof each parïyagree on the
technical principIeof the intergovernmentai agreement, to be
initialledby the Deputy Ministersof Foreign Mairs within a
fortnight, whereuponHungarywould proceedtu dam the Danube;
Ttwas alsoaccepted,inthe Iighoffearsonthe Hungarian sideof the
possible ecological effects of peak operations, that a special
agreemenbt econcludedinwhichpeakoperation wouId be Iimitedor
excluded after technical studies had been concluded; and the
CzechosIuvakGovernent proposed tu cancd the provisionsof the
1984 Protucol advancingthe ProjectscheduIeby 15months, insofar .
asit concernedNagymaroa,in order to give the Hungarianside this
additionatimeinwhch to studythe ecologicaiquestions.
4.49 The cIosing paragraphsof this Verbale(of the CzechosIovak
Government) made irclearthatits positionand proposaihad beenput forwardon the basis
thatthey were in conformitywith the 1977 Treatyand thatCzechuslovakia saw no reason
for amendingthe Treaty as Hungaryhad proposed.More specifically,Czechoslovakia was
notprepared to agreeto the simpleabandonmeno tf theNagymaros part of theProject, and
ifHungaryshouIddo sa unilateralla,claimof compensationfor damageswould be made.
FinaIIy,the Note once again repeated Czechoslovakia'swillingnesto negotiate an inter-
govemental agreement concerningthe pans of the Project other thanNagymaros -where
the two Parties remaineddivided. But Czechoslovakiawarned that, shouId Hungary
continueto failtohlfil its obligatissto theseotherpartsof theProject,inbreach of the
1977 Treaty, Czechos~ovakiawouldhave to proceedto the realisatioof a "provisional substituttechnicalsolution"on its own sovereignterritorand to drawthe quantityof
water from theDanubethat had beenagreedbythe partieunderthe Joint Contractua!Plan.
4.50 The last ofthe documentsin the diplornaticexchangesof 1889 isa
HungarianNa Verbaleof 30 November1989to whichwas attached a draR of proposed
modificationsto the 1977.Treatyq8.The effecton the GIN Project of the proposed
ameridmentstuthe Treatywouldhavebeenthe following:
- Inorderto avoidanalleged"criticalecolu@calsituationpeak hours
operationwould beeliminatedandconstructionat Nagymaros would
be suspended;
- If "ecologicdIyacceptableconditions"were agreed, the rest ofthe
ProjectwouIdbe cornpletedandput intooperation;
- Preparatory workto deflecttheDanube attheDunakilitiweirwould
proceed if Czechoslovakiawas willing (i) to accept the proposed
Treaty modificationto suspendconstructionat Nagyrnaros,(ii)to
conclude an agreementon ecoIogicaIguarantees, and (iiito enter
inO theinterguvermentaIagreementdescrîbedineariierdispatches.
- However, the damming of the Danubewould occur only after
concIusionofthe agreementonecological marantees.
E. ThePositionof the Partiesatthe End of 1989
4.51 Thus,as theend of1989 approachedt,he contrastingpositionofthe
partiemaybedescribed asfollows:
t
- &, Hungaryinsised on amendingthe 1977 Treaty tu reflect the
abandonmentof peakhoursoperationandthe abandonment of work
at Nagymaros; Czechoslovakiawas willing to suspend work at
Nagymaros and to modify or even eliminatepeak hoursoperation shodd thatbe recommended onthe basisof studiesoftheecological
effectsduringthe additional15 monthsmadeavailableas a resultof
cancelling the 1989 Protocol in respect to Nagymaros; thus,
Czechoslovakia couIdnot accepttheHungarianproposition tu amend
the Treatyatthatthe;
- Second, the partiewere ingeneralagreementovernegotiatinginter-
governmentaa l greementsconcerningthe otherpartsof the Project
md inorder tudealspecificalwith ecoIogicaguarantees;
- Third,Hungary had effectivelygained one yeabefure thedamming
of theDanubecouldtakeplace,by making itaconditionof Hungary's
proceedingwithworkatDunakiliti thatCzechoslovakia agreeto the
progosedTreatyamendments concerningNagymaros.
4.52 The positionsof bothsideshad reached a stagewhere a compromise
soiution seemed entirelypossible. Hungaryhad succeeded in securingCzechoslovakia's
agreementto studythedownstream effectof peakhouroperationatGabEkovoand, inthe
meantime, atleastto delaywork-atNagymaros.The Czechoslovak proposa1to revertto the
earlierschedulewouIdgive thepartiesariadditional15rnonthsfor suchstudy. In addition,
by itsuniiateraactof stoppingwork atDunakiliti,Hungaryhad postponedthe dammingof
the river byayear, allowingtime for further studyof thecoIogicaIeffectof the various
partsof the GabEkovooperationandalso to prepareandenterintoseparateagreements,
includingecologicalguarantees. Czechoslovaka igreed to accept such a proposaleven
suggesting adeadline ofthe end ofMach 1990 for cornpietioof theagreements. This
wouId ensure that the damming of the Danube could take place the following year, in
Octuber 1990.
4.53 Thereare two othermattersto note concerning the eventsof 1989.
FA, Hungary'sbreachesof the 1977 Treaty -initiallastu the Nagyrnarossectionofthe
Project and then asto Gab~fkovo -were decisiuns takenby the HungarianGovernment
before the change in regirnethere. Second,the ecolugicalernergencythat HungarycIaimed
to existifthe Projectwent fonvardconcernedO& Nagymarosandthepeakhoursoperation
at GabEikovo.Other environmentalandecologicalrisks were contemplatedby lmtJ parties
as capableof beingdealtwithby agreementsbetweenthetwo Governments. 4.54 Itisimportarittu keep these points in minas the broadeningof
Hungaq'sbreachesofthe 1977 Treatyafier1989are reviewedinthepagesthat folIow.For
Hungaryvoicedi tsconcem over the ecologiceEectsof the Projeetbefure the occurrence
of the historicchangesthat tookplaceinboth countriesThe environment was not some
newfactordiscovered - or liberate-aRerthepoliticalchangesoccurred. Moreover,the
reaiecologicdeffectsthatHrrngarydaimed tofear in1988 had todowithNagymaros and
the effectof peak hour operations atGabEikovo ,ot with the other partsof thGN
Projec.
SECTIO 3. The Period from Januarv 1990 to 23 April 1991: Hungarv
FurecIosesNe~otiation
A, The HardeningofHungarv'sPosition
4.55 Not long aRer the Prime Minister of the new Czechoslovak
Governent hadassurned office,he receiveda letter concerningthe GINProjectfrom
Hungary's Prime MiristerMikIbs Németh,who had heIdthe office of Hungarian Prime
Ministerduringthe 1989 negotiations. Thisletter, da10January 1930,adopteda quire
differentstance fiomthattakenbyHungary inthe diplornaticexchanges of 1989 just
disc~ssed~~.
4.56 By IOJanuary 1990, the new CzechoslovakPrime Mirristerhad had
IittIechanceu give the Hungarianpruposalsof30November any reaI study, for they had
been receivedduring theheight of the political tumoin Czechoslovakia,and the new
Government hadbeen appointedon 10 December1989, only a month beforethe receiptof
thisletter.
4.57 Hungary'çletter o10 January appearsto reflect the assumptionin
Budapest that,der the political changes, CzechosIovakiwould be receptivetu a
reconsiderationof theG/NProject,usingenvironmentalfactorasthe prêtext. heopening
paragraphof the letter givasnegativeaccountof the1989 negotiationsand failtogiveadequate consideratioof themovement toward a compromise at theend of 1989. Then,
thelettercontinues:
"1am in receiptof an iricreasirigreater mount of irifomatiun regarding
the factthat now, in themidst of your signrficante'oritu buiId a new
society,yoii are kdy able to sacrificesome time tu the questions
concerningour common sectionof the Danube. The Hungarian governent
welcomes the commencemeno tf newscientifistudiesinCzechoslovakiaon
thequestions of thejointreservoiand the GabCkovohydroelectricpower
plant.Ibelievethatthepoliticaandsocial reformprocessin our nationshas
füiallbroken down the wall which obstructcd the reveIatioofthe tme
environmentaleflects of the BarrageSystem and forthe preparationand
executionof a decisionwhichis inthelong term intere sftse peoples of
buth our nations.
"I-fistoatthepresenttimeoffersus the opporttrnittureassessthe Barrage
System in depth governed by namraI science, technicd and economic
consideraions,fieedfiomthe fettersoftheearIiepoIiticddecisiunsmadeby
OUTGovernments I
4.58 It wasnot difEcultor Pragueto detectinthisanattemptby Hungary
to abort the GIN Project. Indeed i,the ensuhg paragrapho sf the letter the Hurigarian
PrimeMinistermakesthe foIIowingproposals:
- Notto holdnowthenegotiationsavertheproposais foramending the
1977Treaty made byHungaryin its Note Verbaleof 30 November
1989";
Instead,to engagi n ajoint scientSc srudywiththe involvern efnt
"international scientificorganizations",of the "cornplexecological
effects"of the GabEkovosection of the Project,and to makethe -
commencemen tfthe sectionof theProjectdependenton the results
ofthestudy;
50 Thismove byHungarybringsouthowrnisleadiiç the statementin parofHungary'ç1992
Dechrationthatthe "Govermentof the CzechoslwakSocialistRepublicneverrepliedto this
proposaiof30Nwember 1989ItwasHungaty,infacthatwithdrethsproposal.It is necessaryto pauseheretnote that whatwasto be negotiatedwas oniythe GabEkovo
section&f the ProjectnutNagymaros. ForHungary,the abandonment ofthe Nagyrnaros
sectionand the questionofpeakhouroperationwerenolongernegotiablesubjects. The IO
Januq letterthen goes ontu propose:
- To modi@the 1977Treaty or conclude a new treatybased on the
resultsof thestudyofthe ecologicaleffectsofthe GabEkovosection;
- To conduct and assess theresultsof thejoint study withinthefirst
hdf of 1990; andin the secondhdf of theyear tu stxîtu negoliate
Treatyamendments so that the new Governments of both States
would be involvedinthisdecision;
- To stop consimctiunwork on the GIN Prcijectwitiiin this period
exceptforprese~ng theexisting "statusquo".
4.59 Further, the letter reported that Hungaryhad already cancelled its
private contracts for the works atNagymaros and that Hungary'sposition as to the
"permanent"abandonmentof the Nagymaros sectionremainedunchanged. In June1990,
Hungary was tu canceI itç private contracts concerninthe work at Dunakiliti and
elsewhere. The canceIIationsof these cuntracts, thereby incurringçubs~antialtermination
costs to the Austrianand YugosIavEms concmed, were irrevucable actstaken by the
HungarianGovernmentto halt the Nagymarosand GabEikovo sectionsofthe Project in
furtherbreachof the 1977Treaty. Theywere hardlyactions thatpreservedthe "statusquo"
and theywere takenbeforenewjoint researchprojectshad evenbeen commissioned.
4.60 The new Czechuslovak Prime Ministersought toread the Hungarian
letteria positivelightin hisbriefrepIy15 Febma$', saying:
"In accordancewith the proposals mentioned in your letter and in the
[HungarianNote] of November 30, 1989,1voice support for an immediate
resrrmptionof bilateraltaIkswhich could Iead above tua jointcourseso
thatrheGabEikovo partcouIdbe putintooperation duringthe year 19915."
51
Annex80.
52
ThiswouldrequirethatthedammioftheDanubetakeplacestartinginOctob990He proposedthatanyspecific changesto the 1977 Treatyor othertreatydocuments be
prepared fordiscussioinJune 1990.
4.61 Of course,Prague*IetrercuuIdbeseen as not entireIyresponsitu
-theHungarianproposaia,ndthiswas pointedout inthe HungariaPrime Minister'sepIyuf
6 March5?:
"While1 welcomethesupport fortheresumptionofthebilateranegotiations,
I determinewith regretyourefusatotakepart inthedecisionofthefate of
theGabEikovo BarrageviaweIIfuundedand objectivescientificandspeciaIist
examination shich1hadinitia& inmy letter."
WhattheHungarian Goverment was, in effect,sayingwas that,nonlyhad Nagymaros
beenabandoned - andwas nolonger asubjectfor negotiatio-butthe GabEikovo works
also wereno longerto be carriedoutinaccordancewith the1977 Treatyunless and until
this was determined onthe basisof I1welfoiindedandobjective scientific and speciaIist
examinations "
The Hungariantetter of 6 March 1990 cannotbe read without
4.62
concludingthat, evebeforethegovemmental changesthatoccurredin Hungary in May
1990,Hungary had virtuailywritteoff the G/N Projectand was seeking tu secure the
agreement of CzechosIovakiatu abandon ias weII.Thus, Czechoslovakiawas invited tu
settli.e t.abandon, "agiganticinvestmentfiasco":
"Letus not squanderthis historical opportunityprovidedby the social
changestakingplace.
The handlingof this issue indudes not ody the settlernent of the aate of
giganticinvestment fiasco but dsa question affectingthe social ties of
Hungaryand Czechoslovakiaand the nationalhappinessfor the peopleof the
TWO couritriII.
This was an argumentbasednot onecological, but oeconomic, grounds;andHungary's
positionbecameeven moredearafterthechangeinGovernmenitnHungary.Inthe generalpoliticalprogramannouncedon 22 May 1990,itwas declaredthatthe GIN Projecthad been
'
"mistaken"and thatitsabandonmentshouIdbe negotiated with Czechoslovakia.
B. The FirstInvoIvernentof the EuroaeanCarnrnunities
4.63 During the remainder of 1990 there were meetings between the
PIenipoteniariesandthe environmental ministries,utthe politicaleventstakingplace in
both countriessIoweddom my prugress towards artattempt tu finda solutiontu the
dispute. However,thisperioddidgiveriseto oneimportantdevelopment, in theformof the
agreementreached under the EC PHAREProgramfor ajoint projectentitled:"Surface
Water and GroundWater Model of Danubian LowlandbetweenBratislavaand KomArno:
EcologicalModel of Water Resource and ManagemenV .4 The project had been initiated
andnegotiatedwith theEC Pm Progm byCzechosIovakia,and on6 September 1990
the CzechosIovakPlenipotentiaryproposed to his Hungariancounterpart tu file a joint
application. On 26 October 1990, the CzechosiovakPlenipotentiary fonvarded ta the
Hungarian Commissionerfor Danube Affairsa proposed agreement between the two
Governrnents providing for joint participatiin thisimportant study of environmental
protection". This was foiiowedby a visito Budapest on 7 November 1990 by the
CzechoslovakPIerripotentiaryt,ogether with ProfessorMucha,the Czechoslovakhydroiogy
expert,todiscussHungary'p sarticipation.
4.64 The response of the HungarianGovernrnent ,s expressedin a Ietter
of 15 Nuvember 1990, was carpi& and negattive5?The Iettermisdescribedthe proposed
agreement as being abilateralprojectbetweenCzechoslovakiaand the PHAREProgram,
with Hungary in the position ofa mere consultant.The draR agreement furwarded tu
Hungarybythe Czechoslovak Government was nothingof the kind;thetwo partieswere to
participatejointlyin the studyAlthoughHungary did not flatlyrejectparticipatioin the
project,itinsistedona restructurinso as to place it under the auspicesof theHungarian
Academy of Science or the TechnicalUniversiqat Budapest. Further talks demonstrated
54 Sec.para. 4.02, aboand relatedfn,swellas Annex 57,fora descriptiof the PHARE
Programandofthiçparticurroject.
55 Annex82.
56 Anne>83.Hrrngary 'sckof interesinthe projectand endedinHungary's failuretoparticipateinthis
study ofoneofthe mostcriticalenvironmentaaispectofthe G/NProject.
4.65 In anattempttu ded withthe accusationsmadebyCzechosIovakia at
an earIiermeetingtu the effectthat Hungarywas not proceedingwith research,Hungql's
-15 November Ietter enclosed a Iistofdocuments onthe basis of which the Hungarian
decisionswereclaimed tohave been basedS7.In its replof21 November,Czechoslovakia
indicatedthat the list of materialsannexedto Hungary's15 November letter was
disappointhg and didnotfulf izclhoslovakia'sexpectations5'.
Neverthekss, some indicatioof progresstoward broadenîng the
4.66
bilateraltalkbetween the Ptenipotentiariasndthe environmentam l inistersta trilateral
formatto includethe EC isreflectedin the letter theHungarian PrimeMinister of 14
December1 9905'. HecaileduponCzechoslovakia alsotutake stepstoappointmembers tu
the proposedjoint inter-govemental cornmitteetu which the EC would appointsome
experts tu assist. Ln his repIyof 15 Januâry 1991, the CzechosIovak Prime Mnister
cofirme thatsimilarstepshadalreadybeentakenby his Governmentm. He expressed
Czechoslovakia's "agreemenw t ith talks with,the Hungarîanside on the comprehensive
solutionof problems ofthe [GLN Projectat the Ievelogoverment delegationsas well as
hisbe~iefrhatthesemeasuresshuuldheIplead tua solution.
4.67 Thus, once again,thepartiesseemed to be makingprogresstoward
gettingtechnicaltalksundenvay. But thetime for dammingtheDanubehrtdpassed for a
second yearmnning;andthe promised Hungarian technicalstudieshadyet to be furnished.
Aithough tdks were continuingthere remairiedavery rea1questionas to how productive
these taIks could be ithe Iightof the statement ofrhe new HungarianGovernent inits
poIicydsclaration of 22 May 1990 that thG/N Project wasa "mistakenprojcct" and that
57
It was promisedthaatthe scheduledrnid-DecembermeetingHwgary would furnisurther
materialsThisdidnothappen.Thelettedsostatethatexpertworkrngroupshadbeenfomed
withinîhefimeworkof theHungarimAcadernyof Sciencashadbeen agreeattheSeptember
meeting.
59
Annex 85.
60
Annex 86. 'Hungarywouldinitiatenegotiatjonsineffectto scuttletheProjectandto sharethe resulting
damages with Czechoslovak Itw as cIesirthHungaryhadnot chmged its pointof view
sincethen.
4.68 On 22 April 1991, there was a meeting of the recently appointed
delegations,twhichpositionpaperswereexchanged6 .' Accordingto the sumrnaryof the
discussionpreparedby Czechoslovaki aer the meeting6',both sidescofimed the validity
of the 7977 Trea.yTherefollowed a candidexchang oeviews. Htrngaryinsistedthatjoint
researchin order toassess the ecologicalimpacts of the Project couIdonly beginafter
Czechoslovakia had agreed to suspend work on the Project. Ztproposed that the joint
studiebe conducteciup tothe endofOctober 1991. TheCzechoslovak delegationrejected
thispositioon the basis-that ungaryhad prodricedno scientificevidencetu estabIishthe
need forsuch a suspension,characterisingwhat had been receiveçofarfrumHungaryin
theway of materialas "sciencefiction".Czechoslovakiwas willingto participainexpert
studiesbut insistedthatthisworkbecompletedbyJuly 1991 sothat ajoint decisiocould
then be reachedonthe basisof the scientifevidence. Such a deadlinewas necessaryto
avoidtheIossof athirdyearunderthe originalscheduleforthe dammingof the Danube. At
the end of the meetiagjoint %laration was issrreinwhichthe importanceof continuing
negotiationswas stressedh3. It was statedinthe Declarationthat agreement had been
reached that the Academieof Sciencesof eachcountrywould continuetheir cooperation
andresearch,bringinginexpertsandspecialisedinstufions.
C. The Proceedin~softhe Eun~arianParliament
i 4.69 It wasin this setting, and before any meetingsof the governmental
I
ddegations had occurred, or any further joint research had been undertaken,that the
Hungarian Parliament,on 23 Aprii 1491, i.e the,very next day after thismeeting,
arinouncedinaresoIutîonirsconclusiunsconcemingthe GIN Projeci". Brieflysumariseci,
thesewerethe following:
61
The nevPrimeMifister of SlgvakiahetheCxchmIovakdelegaiion
63
-id.
64
1 . Annex 88. , - Thatputting intooperationthe G/NProject would"resultin serious
ecologicalandeconomicdâmage throughoutthe affectedregion";
- That the HurigarianGovenunent was charged wÎth the task of
negotiating with the Czechoslovak Government regarding the
terminationof the 1977 Treaty and relatedinstmmentsby joint
agreement,
- That a new treaty shouid be concIudedtu settie the issue of the
consequen ofethenon-construction(abandonmen t)f theProject,
accordingto thefollowingprioritiesi,nthorderlisted:
- Restorationand preservation of the ecoIogicaIand nariira1
vdues of the region, particularlyin resptutprotecting the
dnnking watersupply;
- Flood protection;
- Development of shipping in accordancewith the region's
naturalconditions.
Pending the carrying out of these tasks, the Hungarian ParIiamenrdeterrriinedthat works
aimed atwmpleting the Project should continueto be suspended and it charged the
Government ton,egutiattu reachagreement withCzechosIovakia an this.It aIsrequested
the Governmentto discontinuestateinvestmentinthe G/N Projectand to start an auditof
theexpendituresmade todate. Thislegislatiresolutionwouldappear to havebeenhlly in
linewiththe pulicystatementofthe newHungarian Governent on 22 May 1990.
4.70 As hadbeen the case when some progess toward asolutionto the
disputeseemed to be occurringat the endof 1989, so in the sprinof 1991,when some
progressagainseemed possibleandwhenHungaryundertook to make availablresearch
shdies claimed tu havebeenthe basisofitsdecisiunin breachof the 1977Treaty, Hungary
abntptlyput an end toany suchprogress by orderingthecommencemeno tfnegotiationsto
terminate the Project. In contrastu the suspension announcedin the Hungarian PrimeMinister'sletterof 6 March 1990,theresolutionof theHungarian Parliamenitn April 1991
was not madedependent on the outcorneofenvironmentalstudies yet tube conducted .The
outcornewaspre-judged beforethe environmentalquestionscould be examined jointly.
4.71 The decision of the Hungarian Parliament on 23 ApriI1991 was
anotherturningpoint in the negotiationsbetweenthe parties. For by its decision the
Hungarian Parliament tied the hands of the HungarianGovernment in any future
negotiations6. Henceforththe soleobject of suchfuture negotiationsfor Hungary was tu
put anend to the GINProject.
A. Czechodovakia's Continued Attem~ts to Broaden the
Negotiations trIncrudethe EC: Postprinernentof Darnmingf :or a
ThirdYear
4.72 Inthecourse ofnegotiationsbetweenthetwo Governrnentson 14-15
July 1991, Czechoslovakia againproposedbroadening the negotiationsby establishinga
tripartite commissioncomposedof representativeo sf CzechoslovakiaH, ungaryand the EC
to consideraiithe varianttothe G/N Project that mightbe srrbmitteto themby 31 Ju1yG.
The Hungarîan side responded that its Iimitedmandate resuItingfrom the Hungarian
Parliament'sresoIutionof 23Apd 1991 did not permitittuconsiderany proposal thatdid
notcontemplate negotiatingover theterminationofthe 1977Treaty6?.
4.73 On 30 JuIy1991, the Pime Mnister of the SIovakRepublicsent a
lettertothe HungarianPrime Ministefs . This wasshortry afterthe SIovakGoverrimentby
ResoirrtionNo. 384 of 23 July199169andthe Governent of the Czechand SIuvakFederal
Republicby ResolutionNo. 484 of 25 July 199170 had approvedpreparations for putting
65 Thisiswell illustrbyetheprotocolof themeetingof Plenipotentsn 10 Jul1991(Annex
89) atwhich agreementrvasreachedon relativefew issues. Itwas at this meeting that
Czech~slovakiinfomed Hungq ofitç pIatastart pumpingwaterfrorheDmubt on 27luf.
66 Annex 90.
67 See,para4.69,gseq. ,bove.
68 Annex93.
69 Annex 91.
70 Amex 92.into operationVariari"CI1provuking aHungairanresponsethefollowingday. The Slovak
Prime Ministerexpressed his regret thatduringthe periodof transitionwhichtheirtwo
countrîeswere undergoingthere had not been a completeidentityof views on some
questions,merrtionininpariiculartheGINPruject. He then iriformethe HrrngwÎan Prime
Ministerthat Czechoslovakia had decidedto put the Gabifkovo part of the Project into
operationon the basisofa provisionasolufion.In thifrmk and notably courtmus letter,
the SlovakPrimeMinisterpointed outthat:
"Both[G]o~ernments~ m~adethis decisioaftera thoroughevaluationand
areconviricedthat the aIternatofnot mmpleting of thesystem of Iocksis
theIeastacceptabledso hm anecologicdpoint of view I.
The SlovakPrime Ministerwentonto Saythatfiom thestartofconstructiongreatattention
hadbeen givento examining and studyingthematter of ecologicalrisks;andhe said that
theyintendedto continuetoconduct such studiesandto informHungaryofthe reçults.
4.74 The exchangesandmeetingscontinued:
- On 30 July 1991, thesame day as theletterof the Slovak Prime
Minister,Hungarysenta Note Verbaleto Czechoslovakiarequesting
that work atGabEkovobe haltedand, in particular,the steps taken
on 27 JuIyto start filhg thbypass canal with water pumped hm
theDanube7'.
On 12August 1991,theHungarianPrimeMinisterrespondedto the
SIovakPrimeMinister'sletterof 30 July ina Ietterto the Prime
Mînîster of the Czech and SIovak FederaI Republi~'~. It was
moderate in tone, suggesting that hrther taIks shouIreçrrlin a
comrnonsolution.
71
-.etheGoremmen1of SIovakReptrbland he GovernmentoftheCxch andSIova kederai
Republic.
72
Annex94.
73
hex 95. - On 27 August 1991, Czechoslovakiapresented a Note Verbaleto
Hungq inresponseto the HrrngarianNote of30 1~1~'~. Altbough
expressingapgreciatiunfor theeffortof Hungary tokeepthe talks
going, and mentioningthe earIiemeetings on 22 ApriIand 15July
between govemental delegations,the CzechoslovakNote observed
that no constructiveconclusiohad been reachedandnoted that the
Hungarian ddegations now had only the limited mandate of
negotiating thetemination of the 1977 Treaty. Whilst the Note
ernphasisedrhat the decisiontuproceed wirha provisionalsolution
did not precludeinany way the continuationof the taikitrejected
theHungari arnumentthat continuationofthe work in thismanner
was in violatioof internationallaw.The Note also containedthis
positivesuggestion:
"Providedthe Hungarianside submita a concrete technical solution
aimed atputtinginto operationthe Gabëikovosystemof locks and a
solutionofthe systemof lock sasedon the 1977Treatyin force and
the treatydocumentsrelatedto it, the Czechoslovakside is prepared
tuimplement themutuallyagreedsolution."
- On IZSeptember1991,at the invitatioof theHungarian Parliamerit,
the CzechoslovakMinister for theEnvironment addressed a joint
session of severd conmittees of that body. He stressed the
impossibilityofreachina solutionto the disputewhilstHungaryhad
such a Iimitedmandategoveming its participationin negotiati~ns~~;
subsequently, the Chairmen of the three Hrrngafian ParIiarnentary
Cornmittees issued a joint srnement dated I Octuber 1991
emphasisingtheneedforfurthertalksstatingthat thedisputeinvolved
an "expert-scientificmatter",anddeclanngthatiwouldbe desirable
to engage experts hm third countries or fiorn international
74 Annex96.
75
Annex37. 3. The Positionof theParties at theEnd of1991
4.75 The positionsof thepartiesattheendof 1991 and the start of 1992
were summed rrpin the letters exehange bdtween the Prime Ministerson 28 and 19
Decembw 1991 and 23 January 1992". The Czectioslovakpositionwas that a tripartite
commissiontu study theissuesbe created, with participationof foreignexperts nameby
theEC - aproposalit hadalready madeon 15July 1991. TheHungarianpositionwas (i)
thatecologicalaspectshadbeenignored intheplanning oftheG/N Project,(ii)that ithad
suspended work at Naparos and then at Dunakilitibecause of the aImost certain
ecologicalemergencythat would result ithe Projeci wentforward, and (iii)that Hungq
wouIdnot agree togoing ahead withjoint researchintutheexpertand scientifiprobIems
involvedunless CzechoslovakiastoppedworkontheProject.In hisresponseof 23 January
1992,the Czechoslovak Prime Ministersummed up hisGovernment'spositioninthisway:
I
- He stressed the imporimce to his country ofthe G/N Project,
asserîingthat th1977 Treaty remainedinforce;
- Therefore,Czechoslovaki waas p~eparedto fuifillits obligationsand
complete the Project whilst rninimisingany adverse ecological
impacts;
- He reviewedthe history of Hungary'sunilateralbreachesas from 13
May 1989 as wellasthe ensuingnegotiations;
- He pointed out that, although both partiesagreed rhat the final
solutioof the disputedepended on an expert,scientifasçessment,
Hrrngary had faiIed tu frrrniçhany çuppurting studies whereas
Czechoslovakiahad,in the meantirnes,tudiedthmatter,and a listof
theseexpertstudieshadbeengiven to HungaryinDecember 199 1;
- Be informedHungaryof Czechoslovakia'sdecision:
77
Annexes99, 100and102.Annex 101isalettdatedsimply"December99lu,whch issirni oar
theHungarianPrimeMinister'slettof 19December,and was sentbythe Cham of the
HungarianParIiamentohisCzcchoslovcounterpa.t "...In order to minimizethe spreadof economic and ecological
damageon the CzechosIovakterritory, tu optimal1y exploit the
avaiIabIepower potential and tu mate necessary conditions for
navigationon theDanube, theGoverment of theCzechand Slovak
FederaI Republic decided on December 12, 1991 tu put the
GabCikovp oartintooperationandto completeitsconstructiononthe
territorof theCzechandSlovak Federa lepublic.
In any case,thi secisionduesnot violateinternationallawand does
not exclude furthertdks on the possibiiityof findingajoint solution
with regardtu theconstmctionof the GabEkovo-Nagymaro system
oflocks.
In accordance with the conclusionsof talks of governent
delegationsand on thebasisof thejoint statementof theCornmittee
for the ProtectionofEnvironment of theNational AssembIy of the
ReprrbIicof Hungary and the Cornmirteefor Environment of the
FederalAssembIyof the Czech and SIovakFederd Reptrblic of
October 11, 1991, the Czechoslovakside confirrnsits interestin
creatinga joint commissionof experts with the participationof
expertsfiom theEuropeanCornmunities.TheCzechoslovakside is
aIso prepared to take into consideration the resrrIts of the
commission'sactivities within the fufiher course of soIving the
problem of constructionof the GabEikovo - Nagymaros systemof
locks. Provided theseconclusionsand resultsof monitoringthe test
operationof the GabEkovo art confirm that negative ecological
effectsexceed its benefitstheCzechoslovakside is preparedto stop
workon the~rovisiona1 soIutionand continuethe constructionupon
mutualagreement.
In thisrespect1 recommend a joint requesto the PC] tuspeedily
appoint its expertsto the joint Czechoslovak - Hungarîan expert
commissionso that this body couid startits activitiesas soon as
possible7."(Ernphasiasdded).
4.76 In the meantirne,the ParIiamentsof the partieswere holding joint
meetingsof theirrespectiveCornmitteesfor Environment,as reflectedin the Ietterof 27
January1992 fromMr. AlexanderDubEek,the Chairman of the CzechoslovakFederal
Assembly, tu fis Hungarian~aunterpart'~. Itexpressed thehope that furtherdiscussions
mightIead tuacomn solution,asthefollowingquorationindicates:
78 Annex 102(Emphasiadded).
79
Annex 103. "Mr. President, believe thatour positionsarevery close ..and that Our
meetingin Budapestin [the]presence of representativesoour Committees
maybecomeanappeal [to]theGovemments ofboth Couniries.In my view,
the Parliments should not assumethe role of the Governments. But we
could open the doorsfor the Governments to continuethe negotiationstu
preventa deterioratioofour goodneighbourlyrelations."
C. The End to a Possibile Comr~romiseSolution: the Purported
Termination oftheTreaty bvHuneaw
4.77 The 23 Januaryletter of the Czechoslovak Prime Minister was
foI1owed by aHungarianNote Verbaledated I4 February 1992 cdlingthe decisionof the
Czechoslovak Governmentof 12 December 1991 toproceed with Variant "C"a unilaterd
act that was,interdia, in violation of the 1977 Treaty and the 1976 Boundary Waters
ManagementAgreementaa. CzechosIovakia responded by Note Verbale of 18 March
1992*'. Therethenfollowed anexchange ofIong andmore detailedIetrerbetween thetwo
PrimeMinisterson 26 Februq and 23 A@'. Theseexchangesreflectedthefact that the
disputehad reacheda pointwhere furthernegotiationsfier almostthreeyearsoftdks were
not likelyto lead toa solution. The main points set out in thHungaria lntter of 26
February l99Zgw 3erethe following:
- Thatthe Gm Projectwas approved underthe fauitydecision-making
mechanisms of the former politicaregimes ata time when both
countries were ignorant of the "irreversible,damaging ecological
consequences';
- That the evaluationof the "most serious ecological risksof the
Project,by both Hungarianand "the leadersof the foreignexperts-
persons or groups unnamed in the letter - was that the
commencementof operations at GabEiIrovowould lead to a drastic
and considerableinterferenceinthenatirralorder, suas:
80 Annex 104.
81 Amex 105.
82
Annexes106and 108.
83
hex 106. - Imparable damage to the most sidcant drinkirigwater
resourcesof Hirngatyand CzechosIovakia;
A loweringofthegmnd waterlevelwiththe resultant loss of
the region'sexcellentagicultural and forest landsand the
"degradation and annihilationof natural and environmental
vduesI1;
- Thatthe "region'sseismologicallinksandthe relateddangershad not
been re~eale ;d"~~
- That the Czechoslovak expertshad prodttcednosudy to prove that
the expecteddamages andriskswere not realistic.
4.78 The HungarianPrime Minister adhered to the line that trilateral
discussioncouId begin ody if CzechosIovakiasuspendc eonstruction. He assertedthat
Variant "C" was aviolationof the 1977 Treaty and that Hrrngary'ssuspensionof work
startingin 1989 was not a Treaty violationin the light of the existence ofa state of
ecologicalemergency.Finally,he threatenedthat if Czechoslovakiadid not stopwork on
theProject,HungarywouId be piacedin a "positiorif duressforcingitto terninatethe
Treaty".
4.79 Inthe replyof the Czechoslovak PrimeMinisterby letterof 23 April
199285 , hich supplementedthe Czechoslovak Verbaleof 18 March, a numberaf key
pointsweremade:
"TheGovernent of the Republicof Hungary ,since May 13, 1989,
when it unilaterdiy,wîthout anyconsultationswirhthe CzechosIuvak
side,and in violatioofthe 1977 Treaty, suspendedthe fulfilmentof
its obligations arisingfrorn this Treaty,has not subrnitted any
document based on scientificand technicd reasoning which would
confrrmthe fearsof the Hungarianside of anecologicalcatastrophe.
Ln thiscomection Iwas astoished bythe partofyour letterinwhich
84
-ee,para. 2.6et seq.andpara. 4.30above forwidence ofthe totaincorrectnessms
allegation.
85
Annex 108.you had statedwith surprisethat the Czechoslovakexpertshad not
submittedto the Hungarianside anydocumentprovingthat the fears
ofthe Hungarian sidewere groundless. Iisbeyond any doubtthat it
is theHungatian sidewkch is supposed toproveits assertions about
the threaof an ecologicalcatastropheand propos aeçolutirrnwhich
wouIdrespect the stateof workdone withinthe construction of the
Gabiiikovo - Naparos system of Iocks as weII as the overaII
ecoIogicdsituationinthe respectivarea. It itobe regrettedthatit
has sofarnot done so.
Nearlythree years have elapsed since the udawful decisionof the
HungarianEovement, duringwhich the CzechosIovak sidecarrîed
out a wholeseriesof studiesand projectworksaimed at seekingan
optimum solution of the problemsof the GabEikovo - Nagymarus
system of Iocks acceptabIefor both sides. The WzechosIovak
Government] too, considersthe protection of undergroundwaters
and ecological systemsas task[s]of paramount importance. The
above-mentionedresearch,however,has notcodrmed thefearof the
Hungarian sideofanecologicdcatastrophe."
ThePrimaMirister statedthatthe seismiquestionshad beenactively
pursued and settledbetween the Academies of sciences of the two
countries;
He stressed the fact that Hungaq's suspensioof work the years
before had posed aseriesof seriousecokgical, economic and other
problemsthat requiredattention:
"Asa resultof the constructionof water dams in the Germanand
Austriansectionsof the Danube, the voIume ofsedimentsdeposited
by river has begrrnto decrease substantiailywhich hasled tu the
develupment of erosive activiv of the Danube in the section
downstreamof Bratislava.The water IeveIof the Danube has sunk
overthe pastdecade by t- 1,5metresthus cuttingoffa numberof its
branches,forinstanceinthe Mosoni Danube,andtherefore therewas
no waterin itfor300daysin 1991. Unless appropriate measuresare
speedilytaken, thefood plainforets in the areawillbe doomed to
destruction. Another seriousecoloaicd ~rubIemisthe25 kilometres
long and anaverage of 350 rnetrer\ide'bypasscanal,so Farunused,
btriltinuurtemitorynotody by CzechosIovakbut aIsoby Hung-rian
organizationson the basisofthe 1977Treaty."
The Prime Minister pointed out that the flood threat and the
navigationprobIemsremainedunresolved; - He stressed the importance of using the Danube as a source of
electricalpower;
- He accused Hungary of blocking tripartite research with EC
participationby imposing the conditionthat construction on the
Projectbe hdted;
-
Assertingthat Hungary hm thevery starthad not advanceda single
constructiveproposai,he opened thedoor for continuednegotiations
withthe foilowingstatement:
"[The Czechaslovak Governrnentj isready to negotiate with the
[Hungarian Government] dl aspects connected with the
im~lementation of the1977 Treat~ .... 1 recommend that scientific
and technicd questionsbe discussédaboveal1by the Plenipotentiaries
of our two Govements, as provided for inArticle3 of the 1977
Treaty. ..The Czechuslovak side hasshown suficient EwiIIingness]
and readinessfor negotiationsbut at present cm no longeraccept
procrastinationsand delayingtactics of the Hungarianside,and thus
cannot suspendwork on the provisionalsolution. In my opinion,
there is stilltirne,untilthedarnmingoftDanube (i.e.until October
31, 1992)-for resolvingdisprrtedquestionsonthe basisof agreement
ofbath states.
I reperiagain that the [CzechodovakGovement], which was the
firstto haveproposedthe settingup ofajoint Commissionof experts,
with the participationof experts from the European Comrnunities,
continuesto be interestedinits establishmentwithoany preliminary
conditionsand is readytu takeinto considerationits conclusionsand
recommendatiuns within frirther decisiun-makingconcerning the
problemof theconstruction ofthe GabEikovo - Nagyrnarosçysternof
locks. The Czechoslovaksideexpectsthe RepubIicof Hungarytu
make a similarstatement."
4.80 On 13 April 1992, Mr. Andriessen, Vice-President of the EC
Commission, had confirmed that they "in principle wouId be wîlling to assist the two
Goverments in identifyinga technicallyandeconomicallyfeasiblesolution ru thiS~~~OUS
pr~blern"~~ H.ence, attached to thCzechosIovaP krimeMinister'sIetterof 23 Apriloust
86
Annex 107. TheCzechoslovakPrimeMinisterreplion 24April(Annex 109)expressinhis
countryredness toacceptthe EC Commission'sproposalandatiachinga propjoint letter
fromthetwocc~untrishich hhaddreadysentfoHmgary.discussedabove)was a proposedjointIettetu be signedbythetwo countriesproposingEC
participationn theconditionssetout byMr.Andriessen.
4.81 Itwas inthesecircnrnstances,whenunceagainsomeprugresstoward
fmitfirInegotiationsseernedpossible,that on7 May 1992 the Hungarian Govemment
adopted a ResuIutionpurportingto terminatethe 1977 Trearya. This was responded tuby
a Resolutionand Declarationby the Slovak Governmenton 11 May declaringHungary's
unilateraaction of 7 May to be nul1 and voida8. The decisionof Hungarywas fonnaliy
notifiedto Czechoslovakiaby Note Verbaleof 19Maf9 and in aletterof thesame date
hm the Hungafian Prime Ministertuthe Czechoslovak Prime Miriister,attached tu which
was a 40 pageDecIaration of Hungq explahhg in detailitsaction*. Czechoslovakia
respondedbyNote Verbale,of 22 May 1992 reaffirmingits viewthat Hungaryhad no legal
grounds toterrninateunilaterallthe 1977 Treaty and the Agreements related to it and
reseMng itsrightsto respondto Hungary 'rsgumenat ndto presenta claimfor damages9 '
4.82 Thus,Hungary'd sedaration of the teminatioofthe 1977 Treaty,tu
take eEect on 25 May 1992, marked an end tu the three-yearperiod of negotiationsto
resolve the dispute over the GIN Project. Hungary had succeeded in postponing the
dammingof the Danube for three successiv yeears, durinwhich time no new scientific
studiesof Hungaryto justifyitssuspensionof the G/NProjeci hadbeenundertaken. Inthe
Iightof these developrnents,the CzechoslovakGovernent had been left with Iittle choice
but to goaheadwiththe completion of Variant"Cu,as a provisionalmeasure. Once again,
Hungary'sdecisionhadcorneat a timewhenthere had seemed tobe some movementtoward
a compromise,for the EC Commissionhad indicated that it was prepared to join the
negotiationsandto tryandworkout aresolution ofthe conflictg2.
81 Annex 110.
88
AnnexI1 1.
89
Annex112.
90
Annexe 113. The Declaratio{referretohein asBmgq's "1992 Declaraiionwas firçl
mentionedatpara.1.5above,andishex 17hereto.
92
-ee, the CzechoslovakPrime Minisletttothe HungarianPrimeMinisteof6 August1992.
Annex 117. 4.83 As a firsstep, the CzechoslovakGovernmentnotified the Vice-
Presidentofthe EC Commissionofthe developments thathad occrrrred,ia letter dated 22
May194293 .The letterstiexpressedhopeof resolvingthe dispure:
"...Mr. Vice-President,please allow me to convey the opinion of the
Czechoslovak Government thattheconflictcanbe resolvedon the basisof
the 1977Treaty. I do notseea solutioninsubmittingdraftsof newtreaties
but rather in negotiationsthebasisof existingtreaty documentin force.
[Czechoslovakia]is prepared tu demonsrate anappropnately forthcoming
and flexiblattitude. High CzechosIovakrepresentativehave suggested a
willingnessto discuss conditionsunder which work on the substitnte
technicalsolution(Variant"CHmightbesuspended.
I amconvinced thatthegreatprestigeenjoyedby theEuropean Cornmunities
bothinCzechoslovakîa andinHungarywiIIdIow firth assistanceandgond
officesof yourCommissionto contnbuteto anacceptabIesolution."
4.84 The Czechoslovak Governmentthen notifiedthe DanubeCommission
on 5 August 1992 of its plato stardamming theDanubeinthe period15 October to 30
November,whichwouldentail theinterruptionof shippinfor about 10 days duringthat
periodg4.TheHüngarianrepresentative on theDanubeCommissionsent tuthe Commission
IettersoprotestagainstthisactionpS
D. The First Stem Toward Going to the Court: Au~ust-October
-992
4.85 Ina letter fromHungary'sPrimeMinisterof 18 August 1992to the
CzechoslovakPrimeMinister,the submission ofthe disputero the International Court of
Justicewas forrnallproposed forthefirst timeg6.Thequestionproposedto be submitted
concernedonlyproceedingwithVariant"C",asifthisalonecomprîsed the disputebetween
Czechoslovakiaànd Hungary asto theG/N Project. The response ofthe Czechodovak
Goverment camein aIetterfiomits PrimeMifister of 23 Septembe19929'.
95
Annex11B.
96
Annex119.
97
Annex 121. 4.86 The 23 September letterrecallfir that,despiterepeatedrequests
Hungaryhad never substantiatedwit"concreteevidence"the feus and doubts expressedby
itover proceedingwith the G/N Project. The lettercontinues,second,to recall the steps
takento involvetheEC Commission in thenegotiationsandhow inMay 1992 thetwosides
"wereverydose tu reachiriganagreement on involvementof the EC Commissionin settIing
the dispute",but thenHungary refusedto take partin the firstrilateraltalks that were
convened,but not held,inViennaon 18May. Third,the letter emphasises that Variant"CH
-a "provisionaltechnicalsolutio-"didnot involve"divertin8theDanube",as Hungq's 18
AugustIetter ddescribeit, but rathertheexpIoitatiopartof the Danubewaters,as agreed
inthe 1977 Treaty, inordwtu minimis eamage causedbyHungary'sunilateraiacts, starting
on 13 May 1989,in violationofthe 1977Treaty.
4.87 Thenthe letterturnstu a fourth point, askingthe questionwhether
the proposaltu go tothe Court was intendedto put a "firllstoto hrther talks aimedat
using thegood osces of the EC Commission. If suCzechodovakiaconsidered it tu be a
stepbackwards for:
"Itwould meanin fact the opening ofnewtalksonrefeningthe dispute to
the InternationalCourtof Justic..without any reason forhopethat these
new tdks wouId be easierthan thuse heIdso far. The process of seeking
means of çetrlement of the dispute wouId thus again be prolonged and
damages causedto [Czechoslovakia]by the coursetaken by the Hungarian
sidewouldcontinueto increase."
The CzechodovakPrimeMinister goes on tustresthat timewas of theessenceand that the
dispute concerned morethanjust the Iegalaspectsof the prubIern- for exampie, iaI'so
concerned the "ecological aspectçomuch stressed by the Hungririanside"which the EC
Commissioncouldhelp toresolve inthe lightof researchwork condu~tein therecent past
by Czechosiovakia aswell as of the partial resultç underthe EC'sPHAREproject. Iwas
possibly through politeneçs that the CzechosIovak Prime Minister did not categorise
Hrrrigary'snew tacticas deIiberateIydilatury: in fact, the Hungarian proposal tu divert
attentiontu a differenset of negotiation(inurdertu frame a cornrirumis as a basis of
referringonlythe questionofVariant "C"to theCourt) had the additional,if disguised,aim
of postponingthe damming of the Danubefor yetanotheryear. Thisis brought out in the
exchango ef letters between Foreign MÎnisteof 14 and 23 September 199P8. Inthe
. ..-
% Amexes 120 and122 meantirne ,s the lettof 30 July 1992fÎom the Vice-Presidentof the EC Commissio no
the newCzecboslovakForeignMinisterdemonstrates*, the EC Commissionremainedready
tu hdp.
4.88 On 28 September 1992, theHungarianPrime Ministerrepiiedto the
23 Septemberletterfromthe Prime Ministerof Czechoslovakia'". Whilsthemade it clear
that he would urgentIyaskfor the'initi afneootiationstoprepare acompromis tobe
1 submitted totheCourt, heagreedwiththe concIusiondrawnin the 23 SeptemberIetterthat
the disputeincludedaspectsthat"couldbe jointIassessed ..mu@ the establishmentof a
trilateralexpercornmitteeincludingPC] specialists".The CzechosIovakPrimeMinister
responded on 2 October19921°',welcorningthefactthat Hungaryhad accepted:
"...without any preliminaryconditionsthe propusalfor opening taIkaof
expertsof our Governments aimed atpreparinga joint reqiiestto the EC
Commission as weII as the mandate forthe triIaterdcommissionas it
correspondsto our previous proposa".
4.89 The 2 October letter commentedon thedecision to proceedwith
l
1 Variant "C"inthe foIIowingrnanner:
"The redization of the provisionaltechicd solutiodoes not invoIvethe
divertingof the Danubebut only the exploitationof part of theDanube
waters ina way envisagedin the 1977 Treaty. The provisional technical
solutionproject is builtonlyonthe territory of [Czechoslovakia]and does in
rioway affecttheStateborderline. Thereforedo notagreewithyaurclaim
thatitjeupardies the sovereigntyand temtoriai integrityof the Repuofic
Hurigary. The Czechuslovakside hasbeen undertakingon its territoody
what Irasbeen agreed uponin the 1977 Treaty and the treaty documents
relatedto it. As soonastheRepublicof Hungaryresumesthe fulfilmentof
its obligationsarisifrom the 1977 Treaty, [Czechoslovakia]is readyto
completethe GabEkovo-Nagymarossystem of locks on the basisof the
jointly agreplan."
The Ietter continuedtu addretheproposaltu refer the disputetuthe Court:
99 Annex124. "Atpresentwhentime isaveryimportant factor,1consideritimperativeto
accomplishaboveal1 talksontheparticipationofthe EC Commissio inthe
resolutionof thedispute.Theopeningof new talkson referringthe dispute
tothe InternationCourtof Justicin The Hague wouId mean impediig the
resultsofthetalksheldsofarbetweenthetwo sidesandthe ECCommission.
Under the Czechoslovak Constitutionthe procedure for consideratioand
approvalof theproposd for referrîthe disputetothe InternationaCourt
ofJusticeis verytime-consuming".
4.90 Itwas inthesecircumstancetshatthe finaleventsoccurredbringing
tuan end thi shaseof the histoof thedispute:
+ On 23 Octuber 7992, Hungq fded with the Court an application,
dated22 Odober, entitled:"Applicationof theRepublicof Hungary
v. The Czechand SlovakFederalRepublic on the Diversionof the
Danube Ri~er"'~.
- On 24 Octuber 1992,Czechoslovakia startetu damthe Danube.
isnecessaryto addressbneflytheinvolvementofthe EC during thisameperîod.
SECTION 5. TheHistow ofEC InvoIvemen tIIDtu the End of1992
4.92 The repeatedattemptsby Czechoslovakia tobroaden the bipartite
negotiationsand studiesinto a tripartiteformatwithEC participationp, articularwith
respecttu scientifiaspectshave beendescnbedearlier in thiçChapter, sfafling witthe
participation by CzechosIovakia(but not Hungary) in the EC'sPHARE projectI.3During
the periodNovember 1990tu theendof 1991, CzechosIovakiapresentedproposalsairnedat
expandingthe negotiationsso asto includeexpertsnarnedbythe EC Commission.These
proposals, however, encounteredthe difficulty that afierthe HungarianParliament's
Resolutionof 23 April1991, the representativesof Hungaryassertedthat they had odya
Iimitedmandate -tu negotiatetheterminationof the1977Treaty - andit didnot aIIowthe
1oz &, fn. above.
103 -ee,paras.4.63-4.68,above.corniderationof suchprop~sals'~~ .nd whenEC involvement became increasinglylikelyto
occur, Hiingary argued that no discussionscotrld begin until der Czechoslovakiahad
suspended dIwork on the GIN Projeet"'. Less than a month after the very positive
exchanges in April 1992 between the Czechoslovak Government and the ECIM,the
HungarianGovernmentadopted a Resolution(on 7May 1992with effect fiom 25 May) to
terminatethe 1977 Treaty iftrilateralnegotiatifailedtutake placeby 15May and if by
thattimeCzechosiovakiahadnot ceasedtoperform al1work on the ProjectI.7
4.93 Czechoslovakiainformedthe EC of these negativedevelopmentson
22 May 1992"'; meanwhilethe EC had already actedto attempt to bringthe parties
together. A meeting in Viennawas scheduIedby the EC for 18 May 1992 and
Ctechoslovakia and Hungary were invited to attend. The Czechosluvak Government
approvedparticipation in the meeting and accorded its representativesa broad mandate
includingenteringintodiscussionsconcerningunder what conditionswork rnight be halted
on Variant "C",but it rejectcdthe cessationof work as a pre-conditionto holding the
meeting and startingthe negotiations. AtthIasminute(on 17 May), Hungaryannouncecl
that it wouIdnot attendthis meetinand on 19 May 1992 Czechoslovakiareceivedofficia1
noticeof Hungary'psurported terminatioof the 1977Treaty.
4.94 The 30 July letter of Vice-PresidentAndriessen of the EC, which
responded to Czechoslovakîa's22 May report ccinceniing the dereriorating situation,
afirmed thefact thatthe EC continuedtobe wiIlingtoofferitsgood off~ces'~.ThisIed to
an agreement inprinciplebetweenthe Governmentsof Czechosiovakiaand Hungary to
establisha tripartite expert commission. The Hungarian Prime Minister'sletter of 28
Septernber tu the CzechoslovakPrime Minister, agreeing to the establishmentof the
- -
104 -ee,paras4.69-41and 4.75above.
105 See,para4.78abave.
IO6 -ee,para4.80, above.
107 -ee,para4.81, above.
'O8 See,para.4.83,abve.
109 Sec .ara4.87abwe,and Amer; 124.commission, forthefirsttimelaiddown no pre-conditionsto thstartof discussions110. ut
thisproved to be illusoryforwhen the two parties met on 13 October to drafta joint
request tothe EC, Hungaryresurrectedthe pre-conditionthat Czechoslovakiasuspend at
once di work tu dam the Danube,a conditionthat the CzechoslovakGovernent rejected.
For the damminghad hady beenput off-forthreeconsecutive pars (1984 tu 199 11,and
the endof October -only afew daysafterthe meeting -wasthe only timethat thisoperation
could becarriedout'" .
4.95 Mer the failureofthesenegotîations,andwith the dammino gf the
Danube imminent,Htlngary increaseditspoliticalpressuresomembersofthe EC, accusing
Czechoslovakia ,teralia,ofunilateradiversionof thenavigationrouteonto Czechoslovak
territorand violationofHungary' srontiers.As a result,whentriiateraldiscussionsfinally
did take placein BmsseIson 22 Octuber 1992, Czechoslovakia found itself undepressure
hm the Commissionof the EC to postpone the damming operation üntiI at Ieasnid-
December 1992. AstheCzechosIovakdeiegationexplained,thiswastechnicallyimpossible:
once conditionsalIowedthedammingoperation to startit couldnotbepostponedby even a
day without postponing the operationfor a fourth year. In the lightofthe state of the
constructionworks and risingwaterlevels,sucha postponementwouid raiseseriousrisksof
flooddamage - afactcofirmed a fewweeksIaterwhen a majorflood occurred -as weIIas
riskstothe safetyof navigation.
4.96 Atthe 22Octobermeeting,inanattempt to reach acompromisewith
Hrrngary,the CzechosIovakdelegationproposed, as cofirmed inan Aide-Mémoiretabled at
the meeting'12,hatrrntiIthecompletionof thework of the tripartitecommissionthe floof
the Danubewould not be divertedfrom themainriverbed and the whole naturalflow would
continueto pass throughthe riverbed. This,of course,was onlya short-term commitment,
for the tripartite commissionwas expecteto completeits missionby the end ofOctober -
and indeed the commissionthat was rrItimateIyapproved isçuedits report on 32 October
1992*13T .he trilaterd discussions faiIed tu Ietu anydecision to appoint a tripartite
"O See,para.4.88above,andAnnex123. It was howeverimplicitinths lettthathe tripartite
commission'mandatewouldbe limitetoVarisu"Cu andwouldnotcompriseanexaminationof
thewholeGINProject.
III &, para4.02,above.commission, however, because Hungary was not satisfied with Czechoslovakia's
cornmitment as setout in the Aide-Memoireand continuedtu insist on suspensoonthe
damming asaconditi ofevenappointingthe cu&~siun"~.
4.97 On 28 October,the UnitedKingdom ,eing thepresidincountryof
-theEC atthe the, organisedameetinginLondon,attendedby thePrimeMinistersof the
VisegradThree(CzechosIovakia H,ungar and Poland t),eBritisPrim Meinister,M.John
Major, and thePresidentof rlEC Comniissiun,MI. JacquesDeiurs. Inordertupreva
the G/N Projectissuebecominganobstruction to the successof thismeeting, itwas
suggested that Czechoslovakiaand Hungarycontinuetalks on ways of resolvingtheir
dispute, with the pafiicipatofthe EC, at aseparatemeeting. Agreedminute of the
meeting were prepared and initided byCzechosIovakia,Hurigarjrand the EC1lS. The
minutessummarised varÎoirconclrrsionsreached:
- m, that al1work on Variant "C" would be stopped at a date
specifiedbytheECCommission on thebasisofa factfindinnmission
to be composed of experts hm each of the three parties:
CzechoçIovakia,Hungaryandthe EC. Theywere to report bacno
Iaterthan nooon 31 October -a mere threedaysafterthe meeting.
Incarryingoutthismissionto examineVariant "CH,account was to
betaken of: (i) riskof damato existingstructures andnavigation;
(ii) rîskof ewlogidamage tu the region;and (iii)risksof flooding
(SprÎng1993)or suddensurges.
- As partof this firstconclus-owhich made possibleagreementon
the three-day fact finding miss-uCzechoslovakiaundertook to
grrarantethe whole (defined as not Iess than 95%) traditional
quanti3 of waterintothe "oldDanuberîverbed",includingthe sector
betweenRajkaand Sap(PalkoviEovo),and torefrainfrom operating
thepowerplantatGabEkovo.
114 -ee,Staternentof CzechoslovakForeign Minisuyof 24 Octob(Amex92127).In this
Staiementitwas indicatthat,durinthe period of the propoCommission'mission,
C~echoslovakaadalsofferedntooperattheGabEikovoowerstation. - Second, to establishaworkingnroup of ex~ertsconsistingof three
experts named by the EC Commission (tu be specialists in
environmentar Inartws,hydroIogyand "waterarchitecture"),"assisted
by"an expertappointeilby eachof Czechodovakia and Hungary.
This second groupwas to reportits findingsto the trilatl eeting
to be held in Brussels"on a dateto be agreedby the three parties
(within 15 days),and make suggestionson urgent measures tu be
taken".
- Thirdt,he specifictasksothe workingnroup,al1reIatingto Variant
"CM , ereset out, namely,to consideitsimpacton theenvironment,
hydroelectricaland water aspects and navigation; itsneed and
urgency in the Iighofflooding rîskand its reversibilityathe cost
ofrestoringthe statusquoante.
- Fourth, tosubrnitaiiaspectsofthe disputerelatingto the GINProject
(Iegd, hancial and ecologicaltu bindinginternationaiarbitrationor
tothe InternationaCourt of Justice;and itwas stipulateclthat the
findingsof the working group of experts wouid riot prejudice
evidenceproducedwithinthe contextoftheselegalprocedures.
- Frfth.that theminutes of the 28 Octuber 1992 meeting were not to
"prejudicethe1egaIrightofthe parties".
4.98 Thus,thefact findinmission (toreportby 31October 1992) and the
working nrouwof expertswere two separate bodies withdifferenmissionsor tasks, even
though, in fact,someof thesamepeople semed onboth bodies. It maybe heIpfrr1 tu pause
here tu describethe differentgroups and reportsthat plaandirnportanrrolinthispart of
the hiçtorof thedispute. Thevarious reportare consideredinsome detailinChaprers1, II
and V. Listed in chronologicaorder, the reports issuedbythe three differentgrouwere
fourinnumber: - TheEC Fact Findinn MissionconcerningVariant "CH:its reportis
dated 31 Octuber 1992"" ;
-
The EC WorkinnGroutl of TndeoendentExperts,just described:its
reportwasissuedon23November1992'" ;
- The EC Working Group of Monitoring and WaterManagement
Expertsfor theGabEikovs oystemof locka:its report was issuedon
November 1393'I;and
- The samegroupas immediateIy above: which issuedits "Report on
TernporarWy aterManagementRegime" on 1December 1993 19.
4.99 With regard to the London meeting of 28 October, the textof the
agreedminutesshowsthat the cornmitmentof CzechosIovakia to maintainat Ieast95% of
the traditionalquantityof water intothe Danuberiverbedandnot to operatethe GabEkovo
hydroelectricpower plant was intendedto relate to a very short period -the three-day
period during whichthe fact findingmissionwas compIeted i.e untir31 October 1992,
when the report was issued. Such an interpretation is confimed by the text of
Czechodovakia'A sideMemoire tabled atthe22 OctobermeetingI2*.
4.100 However, it is apparentfrom the face of the document that these
minuteswere hurriedIypreparedand their statrrsbetwee the partieswas not entirelyclear.
At the EC'srequest,therefore, the CzechoslovakGovernrnentby Ietter dated4 November
1992notifiedthe Commissionthat it hadapprovedthese minutesand wenton toadd:
"As regards the question of stopping work on the Variant "Cl'andthe
maintainingof watersin the originalriverbedoftheDanube,the Czech and
SIovakFederaIRepublicwiIIrespectthe positionsof the fact-findingmission
'16 See,para.1.71(andfn.36),abwe,andAnnex20.
117
-ee,para1.19above,andAnnex 12.
118
-ee,para1.57above,andAnnex19.
'j9 S~e,para.S.O4,aboveandhex33.
120
-ee,para4.96abotle. and the expert working grmp which wiII be an important means of
interpretatiofthe commitment srisinfrom theMinuteslZ.1
4.101 Inthe meantirne ,he fact-findinmission isued its report,on 31
October 1992. It corifIrmedthat it wouldbe technicallypostobdirecmost of the water
fiow of the Danube back intothe old n~erbedfiom 1 Jmuary 1993: "It is technicdy
possibieto directthe main part of thedischargeto the old Danube aroundJanuary 1,
1993lZ2"
4.102 However, thisissu weas renderedirreIevant shortly aRerwaras a
resrrltof meetingsheldinBrusseIbetweenCzechoslovakia,Hungary andthe EC at the end
of Novemberand the beginningof December 1992. At the firsuch meeting,held on 27
November, it was agreed thatCzechoslovakia and Hungaryshould apply,pendingthe
Judgment of the Courta temporary regirnof management of theDanubewaterslZ3 I.t was
agreed thatafurthermeetingshouId be heldtofindise the necessaryarrangementsAt this
secondmeeting, heId O- 11December, the centrd agreementintems of the Danubewater
flowwas that "frrrtherdetaiIedtechnicaldiscusatoexpertslevewould take placein the
nearfuturewith a viewto acceleratintheestablishmen tf the temporarywater regimelZ4".
In other words, experts from either side,together with EC experts, would meet to
recomrnend,interaxa,whatflow shouldbe dedicatedtu the Danuberiverbed. In the event,
this is exactlywhat happeneand,on 1 December 1993,a document was prodrrcedentitIed
"Report onTemporaq WaterManagement Regi~ne"'~~.
4.103 Theactualoperationof Variant"CHandits impact on the ~anube
lowlandsisconsideredindetailinChapterV, whichfollows.
121
Annex129.
122
hex 20.
124
Annex 131
125
Annex33. This reportandits specificrecomrnenatSections9.3 were sigbydtheEC
expertbu1theSlovakandHungarianexpenssigntherepononly. THE TERIPORARY SOLUTION:VARIANT "C"
5.01 The Hungariandecisionto abandontheconstruction of Nagymms
andto suspendtheworkto becarriedout inaccordancewithitsremainintreatyobligations
came at atimewhen theworksonCzechoslovak territorywerearound90%complete. The
CzechosIovak sideofthe HnrSov-Dunakiliieservoirthebypasn cd and the Gabtikovo
step were vÎmalIy finishedand work on the protectivemesures associated with the
Nagymaros sectionoftheProjecwaa undenvay. Thus, by May 1989,a total&US %2.3
billion(CSK 13.8 billion)habeen spentby Czechoslovakiaon the G/N Project. Itis
thereforeobviousthatHungary'dsecisionplacedCzechoslovakiinanimpossibleposition,
fium ahancial, atechnicalndan environmentdpointofview.
5.02 The purpose of this Chapter is tu explain how and why
Czechoslovakiarespondedto thisnewsituationInSection1,theurgenttechnicalproblems
causedbyHungary'sunexpected withdrawaflromtheProjectareexamined.It isshownthat
thiswithdrawalcausedCzechoçluvaki mmediatefinancial amageintems of themeasures
inmitigationthat it wasforcto take.Itialçoshownthat, in the contes othepressîng
need to resolve the techriid probIems cauçed by the deIayed irnplementatîon,
Czechoslovakiare-examined the Project by developingsix new approacheto theG/N
System - inthe beliefthat Hungaryrnight agretothe continuatioof the Projectina
modifiedfom.
5.03 Ln Section2, Slovakiagives somedetails of the modifiedversion of
the Projectthat it eventuaIIyselected,Variant"Cu. Withoutdiscussingthe Iegd implications
of Varian"CM itis shownthat thismodifiedversionoftheProjectcomplieswiththecentral
aimsof thepartiesto the1977Treaty.Theselectionprocedurebehindthedecisionto build
a new weir upstream of Dunakiliti is examineas isthe marner in which this new
cunstmction fits in withtheexisstructurebuilt by theparties. The measUrestaken and
the necessarymodificationstheworkingof theGIN SystemareaIsoexplained.
5.04 Section3 explainsexactlywhat the operationof Variant"C"was
intendedtu acfrievei.e is,purpose,and what ithas, in facf, achievi.e t.e,result.
SIovakiaexaminesthe actual impactof themodifieciirnglementationotheProject with
particular emphasisbeingplacedothe surfacand ground water regimes.in this contea,SIovakia relieswherepossibleunthe evidenceprovidedby theindependeri atnd uptodate
conclusionsoftheECWorking Group reportsreferreto inChapters1,Iland IVabove. As
aireadynoted, theEC Working Group was formedof threeEC appointedexperts and one
experftrum ea~hof Hungary and Slovakia. Its Iatestreports, "Assessrntf Impactsof
GabeikovoPrciject and Recommendi aofns forStrengtheningofMonitoringSystem" and
"ReportonTemporq Water Managemen Rtegime"wereproducedon2 November 2993
and1 ~ecember 1993respectivelyl.FinallyinSection4 the temporarynature ofVariant
"CM isexamined alongsidethestepsnecessaryto retumto theoperationofthe G/N System
asorigindy envisagedby the partito the1977 Treaty.
SECTIO N. The Practicaland NecessarvStem Taken by Czechoslovakia asa
Resultof Hungaw's Withdrawalfromthe Proiect
A. The ImmediateImriactofHungarv'sWithdrawal
5.05 In practicalems Hungary'swithdrawai hm the Projecfwas as
cornpieteas it was unexpected. Czechoslovakia was suddenly stranded with a largely
finishedbutinoperativeSystem,whichhad beenvery expensive both intems of financial
costandthecost oflandlostforconstmctionpurposes. Itwasreceivingno benefitfromthe
Systernand the expected envirunmentalbenefiin termsof the haItingof riverbederosion
and the restoration of theDanube side arms could not be realised. In addition, the
constructionwere exposed tothe riskofdeterioratithrough continuedinoperation.
Loss of AnticioatedFloodProtection
5.06 fnirçinoperativestatetheG~SystemdidofersomeincreasedfIood
protection itermsof rheimproved dykes,whichhadbeen designed to be abltu handIethe
effectof subsoilerosion. Thenewdykeswereputto a severetestbythe summer floodof
1991 whichreached a level of 863 cm at Bratislavathatis 30 cm higher thanthe 1954
flood. These dykeswere shown tu fulfiltheir flood control function without excessive
seepageor erosionproblernn,buttheweahess of the old dykeswas exposed in thsection
I
Annexes19 and33. ïhesetwo reportarereferrtoasthe "EC WorkingGroupreportof2
Nwember1993"andthe "EC WaterManagemen teporto1December1993"respectively.It will
berernemberehatalthoughtheexpertsofbothParsignetdetexof Uuslast report,dsoh
ma6 an exceptiastofiereportinairecommendatiosontaineatsecti9.3.downstreamof Duriakilitand atthe break inthe rivergradienat Sap(PaIkoviEovo).Zn
effect, the eficieGN Systemdykes sirnplychanneIIed the flood problem downstream.
However,thischannellingeffect was evenmore acute thanat the timeof previoussevere
floods dueto two principaclauses:theriverbederosionat Bratislava,whichincreasedthe
velocityofwater flow,and the continuirigsedimentafidownstream at Sap (PakoviEuvo),
which increasedthe brakingeffectin the river. This was a wideiyachowledged problem,
testifiedtoforexample, by theHungarian hydrology expertDr.Vagas,who in 1991was
interviewecilthe Hungarian newspaperK , uryr,andstressedtheabsolu tecessityof the
bypass canaiinordertupreventdevastatingfloodinginSzigetkoz:
"Those who observed the flooof August 1991,werestnrckby the fac hat
themeasuredwaterlevels at Vienna and Bratislavwere 120 cm Iower than
the maximum levelin1954 flood, eveninBudapestthelevei was by 50 cm
lowerthan in 1965 flood. On the contrary,the waterlevelatDunamerete
was of 30 cm higher than the maximumIevelsmeasured in the 1954 flood.
The time bomb is[ticking]! Tmeans that thesectionof theDanube near
Dunaremetehasbeengathering and gathersthe gravei-sandandthisprocess
has been known for hundred years .In the following tenyears, a lower
backwaterof theDanubecan cause a big floodcatastrophe.A headwater
canalwas completed at Szigetküzwkch will protect Szige~k~zagainst
floods. Czecho-SlovakiawiI1never dismantIethisheadwater canalfor this
reasun. IfHungary doesnotdlow thata partofthe Danubewateris drained
to this canalin the event oa flood, thusit cm causethe breakof the
protectiondykebecause ifgatheredsuspendedloadwiI1 reach itspeak1 can
sayody GodSaveSzigetkoz ...1wouldSay thatthiistheopinion ofexperts-
hydrolugists. But thisis also the opinionof the Commissionof water
management of the Hungd Academy of Sciences..The Hungarian
Acaderny has neveraskedfor the opinionof this Commission,even if its
cornpetenceisindisputabl."2
5.07 Put simply,therewas an imminentdangerofafurtherse~ousflood,
or floods,unlesthe GN Projectwas put intooperation.Thisexistednot odyfurSzigetküz
as notedbyDr. Vagas,butalso forthenew "island" createdbetween the rightbankof the
bypasscanalandthe lefibankof the~anubd . In the caseoa severeflood,the antiquated
dykeç protectinthethree villageslocatedon tfiisiçlandcohave givenway, coveringthis
region with severalrnetresof water. The impactwouIdhavebeendevastatingbecausethe
2
Annex34. DurmernetisinHungariateitorynot farfrom GaMkovo.
3 & ,forexample,IIlns.23..flood wouldbe confinedto thenorth bythe bypasscanaland woutd thereforebe unable to
escape and dissipateitwaters4. TheG/N Project structureswere also at nskfium flood
waters, whichwere a potentid causeof damage to anyurifiriishwork. Duringhigh water
Ievelsinthe Danubethe bottomof the emptybypasscanal,in parCicuIa n its uppersection,
was exposed to uplifkhydraulicpressurefrom the nsing riverandgroundwaters. This
-pressurewas potentiallysufacient to lifi andburst the canal'splastic sealingand its
protective layer. It was thusessentid tufiIIthe canalat Ieastpartiallyto providethe
necessq counter pressure. Inaddition,temporary flood cont rolmeasures designed to
protect the constructionsites were renderedlessefficientdue to Hungary's inactivitin
tems of the necessaryexcavationofthe Danuberiverbed downstream of Sap(PaikoviEovo)
and the resnlting backwater eEect. The resolrrtioof such problems tequïred the
cooperationof Hungq or, at least, the implernentationof theGlN Projecrina restricted
fom.
5.08 As a resultof Hungary's failurto dam the Danube and put the
Dunakilitiweirinto operation,thebypasscanalwaç leftemptyof water. Czechoslovakia
andHungarywere thereforeforcedto take stepsto ensure continuhg navigationon the
Bratislava-Sap(PalkoviFovo)stretch. Thisnecessitatedthe dredgingofsome 320,000 m3
of grave1and sand hm the main charnel over the years 1990 to 2992. As a result,
internationanlavigationwas ableto continueto a degree, but the erosionof the riverbed
upstream intheBratislavasection,whichshouldnormally havebeenreducedbythecreation
of the DunakîIitireservoirwas aggravated. Thus, atthe same tirne, in orderto reduce
erosion, some 33,000 m3 of stone was put intothe Danube inan atternpr ro stabilithe
riverbed.Inspiteoftheseremediam l easures,iwas nonethelessnecessaryto limitandeven
to haltnavigationduring theautumn andwintermonthsdue toinsufficienwater depthin
the Sap (PalkoviCovo)region. This caused financial Ioss both tu CzechosIovakia and tu
other usersofthe internationwaterway.
4
The seriousneof thiproblemwas manüestedinAugust1991 when thesethreevillagwere
flded by seepagwater. Loss ofAntici~atedEnem Production
5.09 For as long as theGN Systern was Ieftidle, iwas impossible tu
produce hydroelectricpower. This meant the lossto Czechoslovakia ofits share of an
annua lnergyproductionof 3675 GWh, most of which wouldhavebeen of peakpower
quality&, of agreaterthan usualvalue5.
Loss ofEnvironmentalProtection
5.10 As the Projectwas leflinoperativedue toHungw's refusa1 to dam
the Danube,the erosion ofthe Danube riverbedcontinued unabared, with the resultant
decreasein groundwaterlevels. Inseveral areasa criticalpoint was reacheat which the
ground waters no longerreachedthetopsoillayer. Asthereislittle or no capillaryactinn
gravel,agriculturallanintheupperpartof iitny Ostrovwasdryingup, although there was
water stiIonIy a few rnetresbdow the surfac eh.is efïect wanoted in the EC Fact
FindingMissionreportof 3 2October 7992:
"Thus,the riversidevegetationis slowlydryingout resulting in significant
changes invegetationspeciesetc.,and the conditionfor agriculturalater
supplythrough capillarrisehm thelow groundwatertablesare no longer
good enough andhencemore irrigatiisrequired6."
The region'sforestsweresimilarlyunderthreat. The deterioratiof conditionsinthe river
sidearmsctintinued:the sideam system was leftblockedoff fiom the mainrivercharnel,
the branchesin manyplacesbeing stagnant,siited upor completelydg. The necessary
rneasuresin tems of increasingflowinto thebranch ensd the constructionof underwater
weirsin theDanube (toraisethe water leveandallowdispersalof flowinto the sideams)
were not feasiblwithoutthetransferofnavigationintothebypasscanal.
5 For furtherderasfxChapterIXbelow.
6 TheEC Fact FindrngMrssionrepart1Ocîober1992OD.cit., 13.
7
TheEC WorhngGroupreportof2November 1993,OP,citp.10. "Le maintien prolongé hors de I'eaudes parties conçues pour un
fonctionnernensubmergé risqud'endiminuer ladureede vieet d'augmenter
lesrisquesde dégradationD. ance sensu,neMrse eneau anticipéedu canai
d'amené earaitunedispositioà considérefortement9."
Translation:
"Theprolonged exposureofthose structuresconceiveso asto functionina
submergedstateto an outof water statrisksto reducethe lifespanand to
uicreaspossibilitiofdeterioration. Thus,thinundationofthe headwater
cand wouId apgearan arrangementtubestrongIywnsidered".
The bottom of the headwatersectionof thebypas carrd isdesigned su astu fom une
continuousand impermeabl eurface.Continued exposureto atrnosphericnfluenceand to
vegetationgrowthposed a rearisktathewaterretainingcapacityofthissurface.
5.13 According tothe modified 2977 Treaty schedrrle,thcanal shouId
havebeen filledbyDecember 1989. This,ofcourse,didnot occur.Bythe sumer of 1391,
Czechoslovakiwaas leftwiththe simplechoiceof witnessinan irreversibeeteriorationof
the canalor pumpingwater intothe canalto protecat leasthe bottom surface. Thus,in
July 1991,pumping hm theDanubeinto the headwater canalbegan, a costly and tirne-
consumingprocesswhichJastedmore than one year, athe end ofwhich a Iayerofwater
severalmetresdeepprotected the bottom surface. This couIdnot be regardas anything
but the most temporaryof solutions. Somemeansof irnplementirihe G/N Project was
thusurgentlyrequired.
B. CzechosIovakia'sReasonedReaction: the Considerr iion of the
Variantsof theGM Svstern
5.14 Czechoslovakia'sesponseto Hungary'swithdrawalfiom the Project
was to deviseand offerfor consideratianseriesof alternatibased on theG/N System.
For the majority, these variants assumed tsome form of continuation ofthe Project
would be feasible,eveifrhisinvolveifscompIetionin a mudifredformatorat aIatwdate
than origindly agreed. However, two variants providedrespectivelyfor the indefinite
postponementor cancellationofthe Project. In total, Czechoslovakia considsixmain
variantsofthe agreeG/N Systern,whichitselfbecameknown asVariant"A. Variants"B"
9
HQIreport,OP.cit.. p.83.tu "G"were each carefullystudiand assessedforfeasibili, ithoutanypreconceptionas
tothe suitabiliofanyparticula rariantCzechoslovakia'asimwasto fin hevariant that
would beacceptabl eo bothparties,thatwouIdfulftielbroadaimsof the 1977Treatyand
that wouldresolvethe problemsoutlinedinSectionl(A) above, whiletaking intaccount
specifideties aboutthe environment.
Variant "A"
5.15 Thisvariantenvisagedthe completionofthe G/N Project accordmg
tothe 1977 Treaîywith thNagymaros step.Variant"A is showninthe Gabdkovs oection
in £IlusNo. 32 by the green lirie. Nevertheless,b1989 two sub-variantshad been
developed. Sub-vanant"AI" simpIyprovided for theoriginalProjectto be completed
allowingfor a flow of 50-234 m3/s intothe lefbank sidearms. Sub-variant"A2",the
preferredvariant,allowedforthesame measuresin theleR bank sidearmstogetherwith
water regulationmeasuresin the inundatioara dong theold charnel. It envîsaged the
constructioninthe Danubechanne1of underwaterweirs(witha brpassfor smallvesseIsand
fishmigration)toraiçethe waterIeveandthat waterdischargeinta the olchanne1would
be increasedto 350m3/s.
Variant "B"
5.16 Thisassumed the completionof the onginalProject without the
Nagymarosstep (IlluNo. 32 -greenline).Thiswould mean that the water flowvariations
created by peakpowerproductionat Gab~ikovo would no longerbe counter-balancedby
theNagymaros step. Consequently ,ydroelectrproductionat Gabdkovo would be limited
toconstant flow operation. Protective measureson CzechosIovakterritory, aatflood
control upstreamof Nagyrnaros,wouldhoweverbe realised"
5.17 It mustbe stressethatVariant"B"wouldhaveconstituted a major
alteratioof the originalconceptof thG/N Project. TheProject'saimswould have been
rnodifieas follows:
1O
Variant"B2"incorporahesamemodificatiossVarian"AS" - there wouldbe nopowerproduction atNagymaros;
- insteadof peakpower productionat GabEikovoo ,dy constant
flowoperationwouldbe possible;
- the excavation of the Danube channe1downstrearn of Sap
(PalkoviEovo w)ould not occur and,as a result,the headat
the Gab~ikovopowerplantwouldbe loweredby 1 m, leading
to aconsequentdrop inenergyproduction.
Internationalnavigation
duetu the fwî that the excavationof the Danube charnel
downstrearnof Sap (PalkoviEovo)would not be realised,
unsuitablenavigationconditions wouldremain in the section
Sap(Pa1kovi~ovo)-Nagymaros.
Flood~rotectiun
again, due tothe omissionof excavationworks, the water
IeveIat Sap (Paikovi~uvu)would in the case of hi& water
discharges reach117,25 rnabove seaIevel, endangeringthe
adjacentterritorywithsevereflooding.
'Variant"C"
5.18 This variant,discussedingreater detainSection2 below,envisaged
the operation of a ternporarysolutionby mems of the constmction of a new weir on
CzechosIovakterritory,nearthevilIageofCunovo .Thisworildinvolvethe reductionof the
planned reservoir dimensions (Illus. No32 - biue line). It assurned that neither the
Nagymaros Project, nor the Danubechanne1excavationdownstream of Sap(PalkoviEovo)
wouId be reaiisedimmediatelyl.
Variant "D"
5.19 This variant constituted a radical alteration of the original G/N
Project, pruvidingforitscompletionwithoutthe creationof areservoirat Dunakiliti(Illus.
11 Thisvariant had 3sub-varssbbrifdescnbedinAnnex 35.No. 32 -oranne Iine). Constructionof flood controldykes in the sectionBratislava-
Dunakiliti wouId then be required. Power wouId be produced by means of turbine
installatioatthe Dunakilitiweir. TherewouIdbe no charnel excavationdownstrearn of
Sap(PalkoviCovo) and no step atNagymms. Variant "Du would nonetheIessattempt tu
providesafeinternationanavigationbymeansof dredging to theminimum navigationdepth
of 3.5minimpounded sections. Thisvarianhad 6 sub- varia nAtlhough theseare very
differentinscope,providinginsome cases for theconstructionofa new weir and a new
canal, each shares the common disadvantageof substantial additionai investment
requiremenc toupledwithreduced energyproduction.
Variant "E
5.20 Variant"E" was technicdy identicitoVariant "B"but assumedthat
thebypasscanaiwouId beusedonly fornavigationandfloodcontrol,Saveforwhenflowsin
theDanube exceeded 1,500m3/s,inwhichcasepowerproductionatGab~ikovo wouldtake
place. Thedammingof thechannelby means oftheDunakilitwi eirwouldbe carriedout in
accordance with the original Project, though there would be no construction at
~a~~rnaros' ~ Againthis variant would havinvolvedsubstantiaextra costin the formof
the consrmctionof anewpowerplant at DrrnakiIiti.The resultwouldhoweverhave been a
significantlyreducedpower productiond,ueboth tu theIossof peakoperationand tu the
Iower head of theriver step at DunakiIit(one thirdof the head of thecanal step at
Gaba kovo).
Variant "F"
5.21 This variant providedfor the "mothballingto tf the Project. It
envisagedthat al1the constructionworkswould be çtopped and thatexisting stmctrrres
wouIdbe maintaineclintheirpresentstateandsimplyprotectedhm deterioration. It wouId
then be necessary insofaas possibIe,to return laro its originaIpurpose. SimiIarly,ir
12 The6 sub-variaofVariant"Duarbriefldesc~ibinAdnnex35.
13 Infiow dischargeinto the Dunakilitireservo1500m3/swouldbe directedinto the old
Danubechannel,exceptforsuchwaterflownecessaryfortheoperationof the nalockaton
GaMikovo. New hydroelectcowerplantwouldbeconstructat thDunakiliweirforpower .
production.Inflowsintothereseexceeding150m31sand upto 400m3/swouldbeused for
powerproductioatGabEikovo.wouId be necessary, tuprovide for the re-establishmentof infrastructure dected by the
construction (communications,irrigationand drainageçystems,for example). In addition,
floodcontrolrnethodsto protecttheadjacentareaswouidhavetu beprovided.
5.22 Variant "F"was thoroughlyconsideredinspîteofthe near mmpIetion
of constructionworks on Czechoslovaktemtory. It was rejected becaus such a solution
would haveresultedsolelyindetrimentto the environment,intermsofthe unfinishednature
of the constructionactivity and the extensive and continuous maintenancerequired.
Moreover, itwould haveconstituteda continuingand substantialinvestmentfor noretum.
Protectionof theconstructionsiteagainsftloods,protectioof tensofkilometreo sf dykes
againstdestructive climaticeffectsand protectiof the headwater canalfrom vegetation
growth cunstituteda huge financiaiburden,whichCzechoslovakia would havehad to bear
abne. In addition, thetemporaryoccuparionof large areasof familand for construction
purposeswouIdbecornepermanent. At the same time theriverbederosion of the Danube
wouIdcontinuewith the accompanyingand acceleratedgound water IeveIdecreasein the
ma, Ieadingintum to the deterioratioftheforest ecosystemsandgradua1aridifIcation.
Variant"G"
5.23 Variant "G" provided for the gradua1demolition of the Project
structures, recultivationof the constructionsitesand restorationoflandscape into its
original state.The full technical realisatofnthisvariantwas not possible. This was
confirmedbyProfessorSchwarz intheUniversityofMassachusetts studyofMay 1989:
"Ithasbeensuggestedthat the completedconstruction couldbe removedand
originalconditionsrestored. Suchan attemptwould likelycost asmuch or
more than buildingit, and thereîsa question if total restoration is even
possibIe. Evenwith spendinginordina amteuntsof money,major scars on
the landscapewouldlikelyremain14."
It wouId be impossible,for example,to remove srrbterraneanstructures, such as sealirig
screens. FiIIingmaterialfor the tahater canaland topsoi1for land recultivationwould also
not be avaiIabIinsuficient quarititieThe graveCsandmaterid excavated hm the canal
hadalready been used elsewhere for dykeçconstmctionand concreting, whiletopsoi1had
been used for recultivationof idleland in other areAs.ProfessorSchwarzpointed out,
14
Annex26, p31.the process ofremovingthe constructionswould havebeen very longand inordinately
costly. As with Variant "FM he partieswould receive no ben& in tenns of power
production, improvednavigation and floodcontroI or in termsof the resolutionofthe
riverbederosion problernand the revitalisationof sidearm system. Variant"G" was
thereforerejecieas it counteredthe verypurposeofthe1977Treatyand failedto fulfthe
development gods containedtherein.
The Seleciionof Variant"C"
5.24 Each of the othervariantswas then carefullconsideredfromfour
differentpointofview -econornic,technical,ecologicandsocial. Asa resultthenumber
of variantwas reducedto three:variants"AZ" ,B2","C2".In other words,in each case
sub-variant2 was favoured,whichallowed,for environmentar leasons,the higherflow of
3501113i1 ntothe oIdriverbed.Variants"D"and "E" were eliminateatthis stage as they
representeda radicalmoveawayfromthe originalGM Project, and could not be realised
without Hungariancooperationand consent. Cooperationin theformof Hungary meeting
its 1977 Treaty commitmentswould, of course, havaIsobeen requiredfor variants"A2",
and "Br. Any variant providiig for uofthe DunakiIitiweir or for the constmction of
structuresintheriverbedhirrtherdownstrearequiredHungary'asctiveinvolvement.
5.25 The consideratîo~of variantswas carried out apenly;and at dl
stages,Hungaryand Czechoslovakîaweremeeting atboth the poIiticaIand technical IeveI,
atsome of which meetingsthe variantswere naturaItydiscussed. However,the decisofn
the HungarianParhament, taken on 23 ApriI1991, to instructthe Governmentto negotiate
only the terminationothe 1977 Treatylefi the CzechodovakGovernent withonly two
options:toawait achangeof mindon the partof Hungaryto the endthat it would meet its
Treaty obligationsor to hlfil to the largestpossibleextentthe goalsof the GINProaectby
modifiedimplementationon Czechoslovakterritory,that isby implementingVariant "CH.
But steps towards implementationof Variant"C" were not made without extensive and
detailed reseqchof its specificimpacts on the Danube basin. From1991 nearly ninety
studies were carried out, a list of which, together aibief summaryofeach strrdy,
appears as Anriex36. Such detailedresearch naturallycontinues today in the form of
monitoringairdthe desiretu take advantageof the latest techniquesandmetofanalysis. SECTION 2. The Structuresand the ImaIementationof Variant "CH
A. Variant "C": Structuresand Functioning
5.26 IIlustrationsshowingthe location andthe elementsof the structures
builtto enable the implementationofVariant "Cu - the Cunovo weir and the reduced
reaervoir-are providedas Illus.No. 33 and Illus.No. 34. It may be seen that al1that
Vaiant "Cu diers in ternisof the 1977Treaty is the positioningof the weir origindy
piamed for (and constnicted at)Dunakiliti. A new weir cornplex is constnicted 10
kilometres upstream of Dunakiliti,behind which a reservoirof reducedpioponions is
formed. Thus, the basicais of the 1977Treaty could stibe achieved,at leasinsofaras
rheBratislava-Sap(PalkoviCovos)tretchwasconcerned :
- flood cvntrol by means of the dissipation ofwaters betweenthe
Danube,its sideams andthe bypasscand was possible;
- navigationin accordance withthe recommendationsof the Danube
Commission was possible;
-
the productionof hydroelectricpowerat GabEikovo was achievable,
althoughody una constantflow basis;
- the emsionofthe riverbedcouldbe halted;
- the restoratioofa naturd balanceinthe Danube sidems could be
achieved,atIeaston SIovakterritory;
- a sophisticatedand extensive monitoring systemcould be put into
plme tu ensure the safefunctioning of the System and the good
qualityofsurfaceandground water.
5.27 The implementationof Variant "C" comprised Four stages:firstthe
cornpietionof ufinishedworks on Cze~hoslovaktemtoiy that shouldhave been camed out
byHungaryunder its 1977 Treatyobligations;second, the creation oareservoir upstream
of Dunakiliiibythe çonstmciionofa weircornplex at brionovaonda newsectionof dykes
connectingthe weirwiththe bypass canaland rightsidedyke on Slovakterritory; third, thedamming of the Danube and the putting into operationof the Project; and, finaIIy,the
cornpIetionof ancillarystructuresat hnovci such as navigationIocks and a hydroelectric
powerpIant.
The Cornplefiun of Works Tntendedtu be Carried Out bv
Hun~ary
5.28 According to Article 5 (5) of the 1977 Treaty, Hugq was
responsiblefor the constructionbothof the taiIwater sectionothe bypasscand and of a
connectingdykehm this canalto the sitofthe Danube's damming closetu the Dunakihti
weir. Theseworks, to be carriedouton CzechosIovakterritory, had ben commencedbut
not completed by ~un~uy". The iemaining works were therefore cKned out by
Czechoslovakia in1991-1992, at acost ofUS% 14.3miIIion(CSK 416 miIIionas fo11ows'~:
(i) deepeningof thetailwatercanaitu thedesignedprode;
(ii) cornpietionof excavationand fortificatioof the tdwater canalby
quaq stone andriprap;
(iii) protectionand fortificationof the dopatthe right-handwaIIof the
Iockapproachinthetailwatercanai;
(iv) connection of the tailwatecanal with the oldchanne1 and existing
protectiondykesupstream of theconfIuencewiththe Danube;
(v) remova1of the temporaryIeft-sideprotectiondykedong theDanube
andthecanalcIosingstructure; 4
(vi) wnnection of the tailwater cana1tu the left and right ade of the
GabEikovo step;
(vii) sealingof partof theconnecting dyke upstream of the bypasscana1
with a plasticfoi1Iininun theinsidedope, since a surrrverevealed
15 Thepositionotheseworksisshom onIIIus.No28 referrtoatpara.2.73abave.
16 &, dm, ChapterIXbelow. that the claybottom sealinglayerhad not been realisedby Hungary
according tothe Project specifications.
TheCunovoWeirComnlexand Reservoir
5.29 It may be seenhm Illus. No. 34 that Variant"Cucomprisestwo
major stnictures: first, the actualweir systemat &nova; andsecond, a 10.5 km Iong
reservoirdyke connecting theweir to thebypasscanal17.TheCunovocomplexiscomprised
of three mainelements in itsfirsstage i.e cur.ent status". These are depicted on Illus.
No. 35. First, on the southeniside of the cornplexis the intakintothe Mosoni Danube,
designedto provide a permanenw tater supplyof20 m3/s. Second, formingthemain partof
the structure,isan inundationweirwithtwenty gates,each 24 rn wide. This rnaybe used to
direct pariof flood watersinto the Danube riverbed and inundation area. On the far
northern sideof the complexis the bypassweir, designedto chamel a regularflow into the
Danubeand similarly to channe1 icefioes duringwinterconditions. In betweenare located
the dam closingthe riverbed,the faciliti(yet tobe completed)for a hydroelectricpower
plant and an auxiIiarynavigation Iock forsrnaIIçhips, and a third weir for reIease of
sediments (seeparagrapS h.35 beIow).
5.30 These stnictureshave beenbuiltto the samehighstandards as applied
to the originalProject constructions. Moreover,the çunovo weir, the bypasscana1and the
GabEikovo plant haveaIIbeen in operationnowfor morethan 18monthsa, nd subjected to
thedosest scrutiny. Ths period sinceimplementationhasbeensufficientto verifythe safety
and correctconçtniction of thCunovo weirstructures".
17 The newlyconstnicteddykes aaswiththeoriginaGM Systemstructure,levateto aleve1of
133.6m, thais2.5m abovethe operaîingwaterlevel.crestwidthi6 m and thoutsideslop
is coverwithsoi1toencouragere-vegetaîion.
18
TheseelementsaredescriM ingreatertechnicaIdemiAmex 37
l9
The designedcapaciiyand safereleasingoa 10,000year flood will be achievaftethe
completioofthesecondphase. Inthemeantirniwas acceptedthaatcertaiflowandoperation
conditiontherewasacertainriskodamagetothespillwaysownstreaomftheweir,whichcodd
ocnir~~vrthoutdangerinthestabil oftemain structuror inhabiteareasalongtheDanube.
Thiswas stiowndurintheNovember 1992flood. The Implementationof Variant "C"
5.31 In orderto bnng theCunovo weir systerninto operationdong with
the bypasscand and the hydroelectricpowerpIantatGabEikovoi,t was necessa rydam
the Danube. First, it wasessentid to vedy whether tchosenlocation for the damming
operationatrkm1851.14, nearthevillageofCunovo Cjusupstreamof the pointwherethe
Danubebecomesthe border between Slovak indHungary) was suitabIe. This requirea
detaiIedanalysiof the geologyoftheCunovoregion. Some267diII sampleswere takenin
the sumer of 199I. The ground was furthermapped bythe useof eiectricaisounding.In
ail446 probe testswere camed out. As a result,the choselocatiowasfound to be safe
intermsofgeoIogicaI formation.
5.32 A hydraulicrnodel of the damwas then constmcted on the scaIeof
1:50. On the basisofthis modeI,some 22 dammingoperationvariantswere considered
beforeselectionofthe eventuddammin gethod. It wasalsoessentidtuestablisthe right
moment to divertthe river'sflointerms of hydrologicd conditionsOn the basis of the
long term data avaiiable,thdamminw gas plaririeforthe secondhalf of October 1992
when low flow usually occurs. As provided for in the Protocol of Februar1989, the
dmming was plannedfor late 1989and was thereforeaireadythree yearsbehindschedule.
FaiIure to meet this deadIinewould push back the implementation of Varian"Cu by a
hrther year and therefore substantially increase the darnage already suffered by
Czechoslovakia.Thus,the preparationof the dammingwasbeguninJuly 1992.
5.33 The dammingcomprisedthree stages. The first, the preparation,
consisted in the reinforcernentofriverbedand the narrowing of thmaincharnel from
280 to 200 m. This was completedby mid-October1992. The second stage - starting to
damthe river- was scheduledto commenceon 20 October 1992 but was suspendedpendirig
the negotiationsbetweenCzechoslovakia,Hungary and the EC for the establishmenof a
tripartite commission,as discussed in greater detailin Chapabove. This period was
evenmorecriticalthan originaIenvisageddue to anunusuallyearlyand unpredictedwinter
flood thatsaw the flowrateat BratisIaincreasefror800 m3/sto 1,000 m3/s during the
dayspreceding20 Octoberand from 1,100to 1,400m3/sby 24 October1992. Thereafterit
was not possibleto delay thedammind gue to the rapidly increasingwater leve12'. The
20 Infact, o26Ociober1992the fioexceedetheIimitof1500m31çupto whichthedamming
couIdbestarted.Thereaitcontinutoincreasreachngover6,00m31sonemonth later.second stage dammingoperation therefore began in the rnorning of 24 Octuber and
continued until 27 October 1992. The third stage dm reinforcement workç then
commencedandcontinuedup to 23 December 1992.
5.34 As a resulof the dammingt,he centraaimsofthe GabEikovo section
ofthe GiN Systemcouldbe achieved. Thefollowingstructures,constructedunderthe 1977
Treaty,thereforecame intooperationforthefirsttime:
(i) The reservoir:the waterIeveIrose ssIowIyin thereservoir,md the
dykes began tu filfi1their waterimpoundrnenthnction, whiie the
seepagecanaIs began tochanne1 excess seepagewater, in part tu the
lefibank sideann systemthuugh a culvert nndemeath the bypass
canai.
(ii) The bypasscanal:by 9 November 1992 this was ready to handle
international navigation and the first ships passed through the
GabEikovn oavigationlocksonthatdate.
(iii) The Gabëikovostep: hydroeIectrictestirig began on 26 October
1992.
5.35 Two important setsof furtheworksareplannedin ordeiro optimise
theuse of theDanube atCunovo. First,ahydroelectricpowerplant has been designedto
produce an annual energyproduction of 4 GWhfrom the constant flow directed to the
MosoniDanube. Second,the middlesectionof the ëunovo complexhas been reserved for
the installationof an auxiliarynavigationlathirdweir tobe used to directflood waters
inadditionto paranteehg waterflow into the Danuberiverbedand enablingthe discharge
ofbed-Ioad,and a furtherhydroelectricpower plant. ThenavigationIock wimake possible
the continued useofthe Danube channel asa waterway for srnaIlship s hilethepower
plant, consistingof five turburiitwillenablea benefittu be gained from theflow into
the Danube. ThisplantwiIIproduce up to 174GWh on an annualbasis. B. Modifications of the G!N ProiettMade in Order to Permit the
Uneration ofGabfikovo;Additional MeasuresTaken toRestore
the Danube Side Arm Svstern and tu Ensure Güod Grorrnd
WaterConditions
5.36 The GabEikovosection of the G/N Project was meant tu operate
together with theNagymarossection, each represenfingone partof anintegratedsystem.
The putting into operationof GabEikovo by means of Variant "C"requiredthe very
substantialmodificationof the hydroeiectpower production from apeak to a continuous
basis. Without Nagymaros, peak production would have created extensive water level
fluctuations in the Danube, adversely affecting navigation and leading to unacceptable
erosion of the riverbed andbanks. In termsof technicalmodificationthework involved
was substantial. The losin terniof hydroelectricpower production,however,was even
greater, approachingone half of the predicted annual productîo$'.In addition, peak
producedelectncity ismore vduabIe and, asa resuIof the modification of production at
GabEikovo, Slovakiais furcedto producepeak power bymore expensivemeans,that isby
pumped-storagehydroeIectricplants or thema1peak power pIantsthat consumeimported
gas or Iiquidfuel.
5.37 In additiona potentiallseriousfloodingproblemwascausedbythe
non-completion ofthe Nagymarosworks. Hungary's failurtoexcavatethe Danubechannel
in the Sap (PalkoviCovo)sectionmeant that the water level at the confluencepoint and
therefore in the tailwatcanalwou1d be morethanone metre higherthan planned22. In
order to channel away excess water and to prevent rrnplamed stresseson the canal's
protection dykesitwas necessarytu constructaseepagedrainand a largenumber of wdIs
aIorrgthe taiiwatecanaf3. Flood protectionmeasures were dso necessay on the rïght
bankof the The totacost ofthest memures was US$? miilion(CSK 203miIIion).
21 -ee,ChapteIX,below.
22 At a flooddischarge10,60m31ç&., the 10ycarflood,thwaterlevein thetailwatcanal
wouldbeat117.25m insteadof 1m asprovideintheGN Projecl.
23 &, dso, ChaptiX.
74 Ibid.
- -- . uUmRATi[m MO. MA A
- 1 --
A tutf de ?-rani+ in tht viriniiy of hdïky.
-. The DanubeSideArms
5.38 The extentof theDanube sidems in theregionfrom Dunakiiitto
Sap (PalkoviEovo) is depictein Iilus.No. 34. Onthe Hungarian side there aretwo
separatedsystemsof arms : the "inner"system,cailedthe SzigetiDanube,is situated
betweenthe floodprotectiondykeand the Danuberiverchannel. The "wter" &stem ie
situatedbetweentheDanube floodprotectiondykeand theMosoni Danube.Thissystemis
cailedtheZhtonyiDanube.
5.39 It is impossiblforSlovakiato takethe steps requiredto ensura
balancedwaterregimein the "innersystem"of the rigbanksidearms withoutHungary's
consentand cooperation.Nonethelss,Slovakianowsupplies about25 1113 t1Hungary by
meansof the intakeintothe Mosoni Danubeand water frornthe seepagecanals of the
boo reservoirOf thiswater,amund 15m31s içbeingchmeiied by Hungary tothe
"outer"systemofthe rightbank sideanns(as hm August 1993). It is cIearhm theEC
Water Managementnpori of iDecember 1993 thatifflows ofbetween 30 and 70m3is
were suppIiedtu the "innerusystem groun dater levels on Hungarianterritory would
retum to thelevelspior totheimplementationof Variani"c"~' S.lovaki isaprepareto
guarantee such a flow to Hungary in order to facilitathis and has offeredseveral
alternatitechnicalmeansto achievethisZ6.
5.40 The stepstaken by Slovakia un the lefi 'barik, discusbeIow,
indicatethat thugh technicdrneasureit wouIdbe possibIto restorthe wholeside am
systern, rransfonningthe Hungariansialço intra heaithy andmore naturd ecosystem.
Slovakia'sachievement'habeen ta replicatenaturalwater conditionsin leftbank side
arms sothatanecosystemfarcloserto theoriginalconditionbeforeman's interventionsin
this sectioof theDanube isbeingrecreated. A seriesof photographshas been taketo
enable the cornparisonof this atoday with theareapriortu the srrpplyofnew water
flowsi.e h.w,thisareaappeareddurîngthe renrnonthsofthe year when it dnot receîve
dischargefrom the Danube(Illus. No.36 (A-Dl). This iscIearIyone of the substantial
benefits of the GSysrem as ihasbeen implementedtudate.
2s a, theEC WaterManagemenrteport1December1993a citp.38.
26 -eeProposafoTemporas.WateManagementRegimc, 8Febnrar1994Annex 38. 5.41
Sendingwater flow directlyinto the sidearm system is essential
because the Danube no longersupplieswater to thissystemand, infact,acts largelas a
drain. Accordingto theG/N Project,this problem shouldhavebeen resolvedto anextent
by the constmctionof undematerweirsin the Danube riverbed,irnpoundintghe reduced
flow and thusincreasinthe waterIwe1in thecharinel.These worksweretu bccmied out
by Hungary whicbhad origjnallydesignedthese weirsin 1978andup-dated the design in
1987. Evenwith a reduced water Bow of 50 m%s,these weirswouId haveensured a
channelwidthof 100-150 m. With the increaseflow of 35011131envisaged in1989,'such
weirswould havemaintained themain channel at itspre-Projelevelcorresponding tothe
naturafllowof 1300 rn3/s.Thus,the installatiofsuchweirs was approved &er adetailed
anaiysisby theEC Working Group of IndependentExperts in its reporof23 November
1992:
"The resultsshow that thedesiredeffectofincreasingthe water 1eveIs[by
meansof undenvater weirs]withouireducingtheveIocitiestoo muchand of
presewingthedynarnicw s iththecharacteristifcluctuatispossible27"
5.42 Slovakia hasrepeatedlyproposedtheirnplementatioo nf al1measures
necessaryto ensurethe rechargeofthe sidems systemun boththe Slovak andHungarian
banks. But structuressuchas undenvaterweirs cannotbe constmcted in the Danube main
channe1 without Hungary'sconsent. SIovakiahas howeverbeenable tu caq out al1the
works necessay to the restoration of the lesidebranch system, a territorwvering
approximately4000 hectares.Thishasbeenbymeansof waterrecharge fromtwo intakesin
thebypasscanal:one at Dobrohoff,closeto thecanalentrante,andone atGabEikovo , st
downstream ofthestepz8 TheDobrohostintake suppliea regularflowofaround 50 11131s
inrothesîde ms, whichit is planneto increaseto 140m3is 1-3 timesperyear toachieve
the inundationof the sidam5 as wouId occasionallyoccur undernaturalconditions.The
maximumflow throrighthis intakeis234 m3/s2'. glus.No. 34 shows thatthe lefl side arm
systernhas been dividedinto8 distinct zones,eachwith its own water level. These zones
27 TheEC WorhngGroupreportof 23November1992,op.cit.,54.
28
A seriesospillwaysadso king consîmcteddontheDanube 1efibank, diowing flowtheto
sidmç durinperids of increfloworfloodischar igo&e main charnel.
29
A simiIaitakewasdesignedneatherightbankitheDunakiIitiwetensuretherestoratiriof
theHmgman sideam. aregraded su asto fom a cascadefiom Dobruho3 toGabEikovo,thus ensuringa hi&
oxygen content inthe movingwateandpreventingthe depositionoffinesedimegs.
5.43 The successofthewaterrechargeinto the systeisevidentfromthe
photograph appearinga.sIlIus.No.36 (A-Dl . hegroundwaterlevelsinthe side arm
systemarenow significantlyhighthanthepreProjectlevelsandare even sufficieto
enabietherechargeofwaterlevelsintheadjacenregions.Thisis notedintheEC Working
Group reportof2November 1993:
"However, after dischargingwater into tsidechannelsin the Slovakian
floodplainhm May 1993onwardsthe gound water IeveIhaveincreased
above those correspundiigtu pre-dam conditioThisdemonstrates thata
considerablerecharge now takespIace kom the sidechannels. This has
become possiblbecause therumîng water has removed thefrn meaterid,
previousiycloggingthebedoftheseriverarms".."
Thereportgoes on to say:
"Bycornparison of Fig6.5 and 6.6, whichrepresentconditionsbeforeand
afier puttingwateto the sidechamls on the Slovakiaflood plain, it is
evident thaa good hydrauIiwnnection between the side channeand the
groun d atersystemhasbeenestablished. Thuqasubstantidground water
rechargetakespIacefrom thesidechanneisresuItiinup to1.5m increased
groundwater level$'."
Put simpIy,the sidarms, which priorto the implementatiof Variant"CH were dying
areasare nowflourishinand evenreplacingthe functionof theDanubechannelintermsof
providingwaterto the region.
I Measures Aimed aiEnsurine GoodGroundWater Oualitv
5.44 As aIready discussedin ChapterII above, anextensive body of
researchpiorto the signatureofthe1977Treatywas devoted topredictinthe impact of
the Projeco tn water quaiity, particu1arfylems of possible sedimentaiioor de-
uxydisatioin the DunakilireservoirAs theBechtelandHQIreportsnote,thesestudies
30 The ECWorhngGroupreportof2November1993, ocit., 1. 3showed thatthenetimpacton ground waterqualityworrIdbe minimai,andmight infact
resultinsome improvement32 .onethelessdue to thedifferenteservoidimensionsunder
Variant"C" itwasconsiderednecessaryto carrout anew andextensiveserieofstudies,in
particulatocalculatetheimpactonwaterqualityatthewateiworksof Samorin, Kalinkovo
and ~usovce~~. There isno mystique insofasasthewaterqualityin thesedrinkingwater
weIIsisconcerned. The wateris drawnfiom aquiferswhich arerecharged bythe Danube.
The eExt ofthe Iayersof graveandsand intheaquiferistu filtraand clem the water,
wkch meansthat it isimportantthat wellareIocatedat asuEckrit distanceEomthe river
tudlow forthe filtrationprocess.
5.45 Theeffectofcreatingthereservoir was, ofcourse,toincreasesurface
water intheimpounded zoneand thusto bringthe riverwaterclosertothedrinkingwater
wells. Thereforetherewasa concemthatpollutantsfiomtherivermight reachcertainwells
beforesufficientpufificathad takenplaceandthat thesewouldhaveto be re-sited. This
duesnot irnpIythe largscalecontaminationofthe aquiferinaq way, it simplymeansthat
the pollutantscarriedintheDmube arepoteritiailyreachingdifferentareasincIuareasin
whiirchdrinking waterwe11shave beensu*. The studiescanied out in 1991 simply
recummendtd the dnlling of four new wells atSamorh and pruposed furthermer
treatmentandmonitoring atKalinkovo andRusovce. Inaddition,a seriesof measures was
devisedpior tothe implementationVariant"C"aimed at optimisingwaterqualityat the
wellsites:
- increasingof flowveIociinthe resewoirinplaceswhereinfiltration
occur3;
- prolongatioof theflowrouteof infiltraredwriterbymeanofsealing
aprons;
- measures to influenceflow directionof ground waters into the
temtory;
32 &, paras.2.4to 2.10above.
33 Annex36.System. Ceriain beneh -irnproved navigationflood protection downstreamof Sap
(Palkovi~ovo) ,nd hydroelectricpower production at Naparos - are not realis&Ie
withoutHungary' sooperation.Nonetheless, the successof Varian"C"remainsreadiIy
quantifiablbeothintermsoftheparties'originalimsandof thedevelopmen tftheseaims,
particularln thefieldof environmentaplrotectionIn termsof the environmentV, ariant
"C" offersessentialthesamebenefitsas envisagedfortheGabEikovo sectionofthe G/N
System,althoughinthis areaSlovakii sable to showthatVariant"C"isif anythingmore
successM than originalenvisaged.However,it shouldbeborne inmindthatVariant "Cu
does stilrepresentanunder-utilisaitonthe potentiaIfor the productionof hydroeIectric
power.
FloodControl
5.48 Accordingto theGINProject,theSystemhad to beableto dealwith
'floo wdaters arnountingup to 10,600m3/s ai the Dunakilitiweir. The Variant"C"
constructions,ncefullycompleted,willbeabletohandleandeven to surpaçsthisfigure. A
flowrateof 12,715 m3/swillbe successfullydissipatbetweenthe Danube, its tributaries
and thebypass canalasfollows:
- theCunovo brpass weir 1200m3/s
- the Cunovofloodplainweir 6000m31s
- the brpass canal 5200m31s
- intaketu Mali Danube 501x131s
- intaketoMosoniDanube 25m31s
- intaketolefisidarms mm3/s
Total 1271 m531s
5.49 Thus,byrneansof the operationof Variant"CH,floodprotectiohas
been acheved in the Bratislava-Sa(PaIkoviEovo)sectiononthe Slovak sideand on the
Hnngariansideinthe sectionhm Rajkatu Dunaremete. The stmcmres afiercompletionof
the second phasewillsafeIycharnel the10,000year flood.In the section downstream of
Sap(Falkovi~ovo)theflood riskscontinutuexist and,in fact,the rofdisastrousfloods
hasconsiderablyincreasedduto theIargequânritiesofgrave1depositedinrecentyears. imrirovementofNavigationConditions
5.50 AfterputtingVariant"C"intooperationit waspossiblto move the
shippingroutefrom theoldriverbedintothebypasscanal. Thust,henavigationproblems
occurringinthe sectionbetweenBratislavaandSap(PalkovZovo) have beenovercome.
The Danube waterwayup toBratislavisclassifiasa riverine-seroute.The navigation
locksatGabEikovh oavethe requisidimensionrsecommended bythe DanubeCommission
as wellasthenecessarynavigationdepth. The navigationdepthofat Ieas3.5 m isalso
providedinthe reservoisection. Variant"Chasthereforecontributesignificantto the
establishmentof favourablenavigationconditions in this importantsection of the
transeuropeawnaterway.
Energv Production
5.51 The value of energy productionat GabEikovo is,unfomnateIy,
substantiallowerbuth inquantityandqualieth origindlyplarined. The princreason
for thisisthat peak power production inot posabIe so long asNagymaros remains
uncornplete A d.econdaryreason is thaan increasedfIow has beendedicatedtu the
Danube chme1 -a Buw of around400 m31swas recordedas theI993 average3'.Thereis
an obviouscorreIationbeîweenincreasedflow into the DanubatCunovo and decreased
flaw into the bypasscd and, intrrrn, through the pu& turbinesat GabEikovo.
Nonetheless,in 1993GabEikovo contributed aruund of Slovdia's tutai eIectricity
need~~~.This isamost sigriificantpercentage,especwhenthe Iong Iifeexpecmcy of
the GabEikovopowerplant istaken iriro account.In urder tucompensate the Iost
productiondueto thenon-cornple otfianymxos andaIso inordertooptimiseuse of the
Danube flows, a seriesosmdI hydroelectricpoweplant are plannedoraIreadyunder
construction.These areat theMosoni Danube intake and the intakes into the amde
system at Dobrohogf and intu the irrigation system near GabEikovu.In addition, an
meritionedatparagraph5.35above,a power stationito fum part of the seconstageat
Crrnovo,wkichtogether withthethree intakepower plantswouIdproduceanannututa1of
190GWh.
35
ECWorkingGrcriprepao2 Novernber199,Pcit., i.
36
Ibip... Surface Water: LeveIs and Oualitv
5.52 One of theprime aims of theGN Projectwas tuhaItthe riverbed
erosionatBratislavaand turaisethewaterIeveIthere. As theEC Wurking Group reportof
2 November1993notes, th has nowbeen achîeved:
"At BratisIavahewaterIeveIsduringIowflowperiudshave increasedby 1-2
rnas cornpared to pre-damconditions,i.e.to a leveIcorrespondingto the
situatio40 yexs agd7 ."
Downstreamof Curiovo there has beena decrease insurfacewaterIeveIsbut, aswi11 be
shown beIow, this has not necess~ly had a significantimpacton gound water levels.
Moreover, the IeveI ofwater inthe Danube main chme1 couId easiiybe increased by
construction ofthe undemater weirqorigindlydesiped byHungq. Waterfiow ratesinto
theMd$ Danubeandthe Mosorii Danubehaveincreasedsubstantiallyas havethose into the
SIovakside ms, Ieadingtu amarkedimprovement inwaterconditions:
"Frorn Fig 2.4 itappears that the dischargeto LittIe Danube has been
increased with aboutTO m31s. .~imilarl~t,he discharto MosoniDanube
has beensignrfIcantIincreased.FinaIlyit rnaybenotedthat with the water
intake fromthe powercarialat DobrohoSf to the Slovakianflood plainsthe
water flow through the sidems has been very aignificantIyincreaseas
compared to thepre-damconditionsw, hichmost &en were characterizedby
stagnantwater3'."
5.53 As to the qualityof surfacewater, there is no question of any
deterioration,againaccordingto the ECWorking Groupreportof 2 November 1993:
"Surfacewaterquality
With exception of November - December 1992, when suddenchanges of
regime and a highflood event accurred, no si nificant changes in surface
water qualitvparametersascomparedto rire-damconditionscan be detected
aflerdamming the ~anube'~."
37
-bid.
38
-bid,p. 10.
39
-bid,pii(emphasisaddd).sîgnificantlyincreased amountof water filtrat& hm the resewoir, the pollution is
gradiiallybeingdiluted.
Hors andFauna
5.57 It is notyet possibleto quantifytheimpaofthe implementationof
Variant"C"on the region'sfloraand fauna,due to the Iong response time of natural
ecosystems. Certainpreliminaryonclusionscanhoweverbe made. Firstthediversityand
abundance of floraand faunain the sideam systemshouldincrease due to the water
recharge of theseareas. Second,given that ground water levelsincreasedon Slovak
territoras aresultofVariant "Cu,any impacton floraandfauna shouldbe beneficial.If
Hungary were toagree on the implementionof technicalmeasuresto ensurea sufficient
rechargeinto its um sideam region,thereiseveq reasonto bdieve th& the impacton
gound waterIevelsandsubsequentlyun fierandfauna shouIddso be beneficid.
5.58 One of the objectivesof the 1977 Treaty was to create more
favourableconditionsfor agriculturproductionbyrneasrrringthe deteriorationin gruund
waterlevels andthe resultantdependencyin irrigation. As explaininithe EC Working
Group report,priorto the implementationof Variant"C" the capillarflowto crop rout
systemswas graduallydeclinin:
"Dueto thegeneral declineof theground water tablein largepartsof the
areaduringthepast40 yearstheconditionsforcapillarywatersupply tothe
root zone have decreased and the irrigation water requirementshave
increasecorre~~ondingl~ .~~
This tendency haasbeen reverseddutothe increasedor stabilisedgounwaterlevels.Itis
now possible rumake use of the draining and impoundingfunction of the Project's canal
rietworkin order tu regdate ground water Ievels and tu ensure the leveis necesstoy
46 -bidatp.47.achievecapillarflowinto thesoirootsystems. This capillarflowhas beenevaluatedand
preliminarresultsshow thattheneedforartificiaiirrigainoZt* Ostrovisdropping4?:
"Analyse sf199 1-93Data
Dut tu the increa sfegound watertabIesin large partsof thSlovakian
aretaheconditionshaveimproved.According tuan estimategivenin refl2
the requirementsfor irrigationfiomexiersourcesisexpectedtu decrease
byabout25% as compared tothe pre-dam ."
Thus,in 1993,duringa reiativedry sumer, asavinginirrigatiocostsofaround US$ 5.2
millionwasmade.
5.59 Moreover, it has now been possible to returnland temporariiy
occupiedfor constructionpurposesto agriculturalsage. Duringthe constructionphase
around1400 hectares ofarablelandwere occupied,whichhave nowbeen returned to their
originalpurpose. In addition2000 hectaresofide Iandhave been recultivatedwith the
topsoitakenduringthe constructionofthebypasscanai.
5.60 Theimpactof Variant"C"on Hungarian agriculturalroductionhas
notyetbeen assesse but,pru~idingHungaryrnakes themus1ofthewater fIowsavailabletu
it viathe DanubecharuieI,tMosoRr Danubeandthe intake foritssidearm system,there is
no reasonwhythis shouldnot dso bebeneficid. CefiainlytheECWorkcingGroupreport of
,
23 November 1992 predictednosi& hant change4*.
5.61 AgaintheimpactofVariantnC",o denfendessntrelevelof
ground water. At the momenttherefore,the impacton Slovakiahasbeen to createmore
47 Aithoughextensiresearcintothe impaoftheProjeconsoil watregimeswascarrieciout
pnorto1977andduringconsideratofVarian"C",Slovak isaontinuitostudtyhiareato
achieveoptimalproducinapdtural areas.The Dutccomputermode1SWACROP hasbeen
appliedinthresearcIh.ddition,theimpaonagricultin termsothegroundulaterregime
isbeinganalysedwithin the scopeof the PHAREProj..rticulasinteis thuse othe
Danishcomputemode1DAISY whtchsimulatesthetransprtaofnitratintogrounwaters.
48 TheEC WorkingGroupreportof 2Novembe1993op.cil.,47.
49
TheEC WorkingGrorrpreportof23 Navem1992,ouci..pp55-57.favourableconditionswhde iessfavourableconditions have beencreated in Hungary,
especiallycloseto theDanubechannel:
"As a resultofthe changes in ground waterlevelsthe forestrhasbeen
positiveinfluencedinSlovakiaandnegativelyin~un~ary~ "
The continuationof unfavourabIc eonditionsor their reversd wiidependon whether
undenvater weirsareconstnrctedintheDanubemairichme1 and whether fulladvanragis
takenofthe artificialrechasysternonthe rightbank.
Monitoring
5.62 ItisessentidthattheimpactofVariant"C"inalltheaboveareasis
constantlyrnonitored so that any negative impacts cm be identified and remedied
immediately. As notedinthe Bechtelreport,ahighlysophisticatedmonitorinsystem has
been deveiopedR . This systetehasalso been evaluatedfmrabiy in theEC Working
Group reportof 2November 1993''.Inaddition,thirrepornotesthehugeamount of data
collectedduringtheProjeci,.particulartyinareasof surfaceand gound water anddora
and faund3.
SECTION 4. TheProvisionalor TemporawCharacter ofVariant "C" and the
fl
5.63 The CzechoslovakGovernmenti,n its consideratioof the different
~anants for puning the GabEikovosectiof theGN Projectintooperation, naturaltook
fullaccuun1of thecontinuingvalidiîyofthe1977 Treaty. The CzechodovakGuvemment
has alwaysbeen andthe Slovak Governent remainsprepared to fiilaflils obligations
aising fium the 1977 Treaty. This fact hasbeen underiined during negotiations with
Hungaq both beforeand afler the decisiotuimplement"Variant CM. The provisionaior
50
TheEC WorkingGroupreportof2 Novemb1993on cit.,p. iii.
51
a, para.2.98, above.
"
The EC WoricingGroupreportof2 November1S. tif. See,twith regatosurfacwater
IweIsandqudity, pp.20and23;wiih rtogromdwaterIevelandquaiiipp.34and40.
511
m., pp.14,212%,38and46.temporarycharacter of the solutihown as Variant"Cu WB therefore givenboth Iegd
and atecIuricaIsignificance.
5.64 From the point ofview, the chaice of atemporarysoIution
indicatesthainrealisinVariant"C" therewas nointentioto abandon theconstructioand
implementationof theG/N Systemaccordingto thefuUy valid1977 Treaty,butto achieve
at least partialfilfiiiment of the 1977 Treaty'sgoalsGuideIinesfonnulatedby the
Czechoslovak Governent for the implementation of Variant "CH contained the
requirernentthatthetemporarysolutionshould:
- not hamper in atiyway the possibiIityof redising the objeand
purpose of the 1977Treaty and must preaerv tee possibiIirjfof
retrrrnitutheProjectaccordingtu theTreatyprovisions;
- make possible,duringthe periodup until Hungaryresumes its
obligationsaccordingto the 1977 Treaty,the implementatiof the
aims of the Treaty to the greatest extent possible without the
cooperationofHurigary;
netendangerthe rightsandIegd interestsof thiStates,particnIarIy
withregardto internationnavigation.
5.65 Fromthetechnicalpointof view,Variant"C" istemporaryinthatitis
possibIetoreturnto fulconformitywith the 1977 Treaty. Thihasbeen confirmedby the
EC WorkingGroupreportof 23 November 1992j4. Once the Nagymaros section is
cornpletedandthe agreeddamming of theDanubeatthecommonSlovak-Hungaria section
inrkm1842 is affectedandthe weiratDunaMitiputiito operation,a11weirs at the Eunovo
cornpiexmay be opened. Thereservoirinaccordance withthe 1977TreatywouIdtherefure
be created. Thenew reservoirdykq constntcted for Varia"C", wouId be snrrounded by
watw but couIdhlfiI the%fictioof directingthewaterflow insidethereservoir.
5.66 The functionsof the structursf thetemporarysolutionsituatedat
Cunovowouldbe carriedoutbytheDunakiIitw i eir. Theagreeddischarginto theDanube
54
me EC WorkingGroupreporto23November1992,m. cit.,p. 14.riverbeand watersupplyofthe MosoniDanube wuuIdbe assured fromDunakiIiti. FIoods
exceedingthe capacityof thebypacanalasweIIasicefloes wouIdbe directedthrough the
open gatesofCunuvuand acrossthe DunakiIitiweiFi@, auxiliarnavigationIockat
theDunakiliti eirwodd makepossibIethe navigatioberneenthe reservoiand theoId
Danub eiverbed.
5.67 The changeover interms of theutilisationof the Dunakilitiweir
insteadofCunovo would taketime. Buttheadjustment sthovo would demand farless
timethanHungary would needto completeworksatDunakiliti, ithouttakingintoaccount
the amountoftimeneeded forthecompletionoftheNagymarosstep. Thereforeneithein
tenns oftimescalenor intenns of actual constructionworhas theimplementationof
Vafiant"C" inanywayimpededthe puningintooperation oftheG/N Systemas envisaged
by the1977 TreatyandSlovakia remaim commined tu thjoint developmengoalson the
basisofthatTreaty. PARTII
THELAWCHAPTER VI. BREACHES BY HUNGARY OF ITS INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
6.01 The termsofArticle2(Iof theSpeciaIAgreementprovidethat:
"The Courtis requestedtodecideon the basiof the Treatyandrulesand
principleof generalinternationallaaswellas such other treatiesas the
Court mayhd applicable:
(a) whetherthe Republic of Hungarywas entitled to suspendand
subsequentlabandon in1989,theworks onthe Nagymaros Project
and on the part of the GabEikovoProjectfor which the Treaty
attributedresponsibitotheRepublicof~ungar~' ."
6.02 There isno better estabfishnom of internationallaw thathat
embodied inthe princippactaçuntsenianda.InArticle26ofthe 1969ViennaConvention
ofthe Lawof Treatiesthsame nom isstatedithesetems:
"Everytreatyiforceisbindinguponthe Parties tuandmust beperfomed
bythem ingoodfarth"
6.03 Itisonlytooapparentthatinunilaterdlysuspendingi,nseveralstages
startinon 13 May 1989, and laterentiirabaridonintheworks underthe 1977 Treaty,
andthen announcingits termination- againunilaterdly- on 19 May 1992, Hungary
contravenedthifundamenta plrinciple.
6.04 .Thesecircumstanceisandof themselvesufficto definethepresent
dispute;in uniIateryhoosing nottocarry out its treatyobligations,Hungarycommitted
aninternationalwrongfulactwhichentaîlsits responsibiunderinternationalIawInso
doing, Hungaryhasinfactviolated an ensembleor cornplexof obligariansthathmloa
network of interreIatedagreements.
6.05 To establishrhis,it wiIIbe shown inthis Chfrrershttthe1977
Treaty cannot be consideredin isolarionthis networof agreementsof w&ch it1sthe
pivota1dement (Section1beIow). Second,itwillbe shownthattheunilateraluspension,
subiequentabandonmeno tfworksandpurportedterminationofthe1977 Treaty constituredwrongful actsunder internationallaw (Section2) that, in turn,resulted ibreach ofa
largenumberof obligationsto whicHungari yssubjec(Section3).
6.06 The 1977 Treaty isbut one ofa gruup of inseparabIyintedated
agreements, as the HungxiariParliament itsdfrecognisedinits ResoIutionof 23 ApriI
1991~. The 1977 Treaâyandthe agreementstied to it consfitute what the Courin its
Advisory Opinionof 20December1980 d,escribeinthi s ay:
". whether theyare regardedas distinctagreements or as separatepartsof
one transaction, [they constitutea contractuallegal regime [between
Slovakia and Hungary] which remainsthe basis for theirlegal relations
today3"
Hence,the initiativtaken by Hungaryviolatenot onlythe 1977Treaty itselbut also the
other agreemen hast extenditprovisionsorthat formpartofit.
A. The 1977 Treatv:The "BasicTreatv"
6.07 As hasbeenshow aboveinChapter II he negotiationsthar led up
tu thecondusion ofthe 1977 Treatybegan in the earI1950s4 . Aftersome 12 jiearof
rather inconcIusivediscussion,the generaI princiunewhich the G/N Project rests was
arrivedat: awaterworksçystemco~isistînprincipdlyof an upstream step buiit ona bypass
cand on SIovaktenitory and desigrtetu producepeakflowelectricity;and adownstream
steponHungarianterritorydesignedto produce constantflowelectricity.
6.08 Ttis notwithout interestthat it watheCzechoslovakGovernent
that exhibitedthe most cautionbeforeapprovingthe Project,requiringconvincingevidence
to show the Project'spositiveeffectson the econornic,the scientificand the hurnanlevels.
The first important contacts between Czechoslovakiaand Hungaryonthe subject of the
3 TnterpretatofthAgreement of25March195I khveen tWHO andEml. AdvisorOpinion,
I.C.I. Repo1380p.73,atpp.92-93.
4
See,para.2.0,bove.utilirafiofwaterenergy on themmon senion ofthe Danubetook placein 1952" Litîle
progresswas madein the discussionuntiI1957,when the Hungaian Prime Minister,MT.
Kbdbr,pressedthe Czechoslovak Governent to takeuponcemorethe negotiations6 . In
1958,thetwo States declaredtogetherthat"thecommonutiIizationof waterenergyof the
Danube inthe sectionBratislava-Nagyrnar[osas] desirablforboth states117However,
althoughthe generalprojectdesignwasapproved by 1963, the JointInvestmentTask was
not definitiveaccepteduntil1974 -theCzechoslovak authoritiehavingwished to takea11
thenecessa prrecautionsnd to awaittheoutcome ofthe multipleimpactandother studies
cornmissionedbeforegivingtheirha1 acceptance.
6.09 On 6 May 1976, Czechoslovakiaand Hungaryentered intothe Joint
ContractualPlan ~~reemen?. As itsme mggests, it wasanagreement,in the lightof
studiesand preparatory work,tuprepareaJoint ContrachrdPlan, thedetaibofdeveloping
which, includingthesharingof cristswere setout therein. Article1of that Agreement
provided that the Joint ContractualPlawas tu be "thebasisfor the realisation ofthe
constmction".
6.1O Articl4(1) ofthe 1977TreatyreferredtothisPlan,providingthat:
"The joint investmentshall becarried out in conformitywith the joint
contractualpla...."
ThatthePlanis a document ofprimeimportance isalsobrought out by Article4(2) of the
1977Treaty:
"Thejointcontractuapl lanshall:
(a) Determinethe main dimensionsof theworks of the Systemof Locks,
the technicaIspecificationsoftechicd equiprnent, the finalproject
work scheduleand responsibilityfthe cosrsreferretuinarticle12,
paragraph 2;
(b) Serve asa baas for:
S
Annex3
6 Annex132.
7 Annex133.
8 Annex3. (1) Orderingthe technicalquipmentc ,onstruction, aterials,achinery
andsteelworkfor theSystemofloch;
(2) Drawingup theconstructionplansandspecification."
And inthe net paragaph,hicIe 4(3),ifispruvidedthat:
"Approva Ifthe join contractuaiplanahdi be effectedin conformitywith
the nationaIIaws and regulationsof the Contracting Parties,and the
goverment deIegates [plenipotentiaries]shainform each other of its
approva l
6.11 Hence, thereis no doubt that the Joint ContractualPlan was an
agreement at the sarnelevelas the otherinterrelatetreatiesand inter-Stateagreements:
establishepursuant to the 1976JointContractuaAl greementaswell asthe 1977 Treaty,it
requiredapprovab l theparties,inconformitywith theirnationallawsand regulationwith
notificatioofapproval givento theotherParty.Inaddition, Article25 of the 1977 Treaty
specifiethat:
"TheContractingPartiesshaIIbejointlyliablinrespectof
(a) the contenoftheapproved joiritcontractud pla.
6.2 ThePIanmaythus be regardedasan elementof the 7977Treaty itçelf
- and a violationof the Plaas a violaiionof the1977 Treaty. The same appIiestu the
"jointly-adoptemasures and decisionsof the plenipotentiarand,thejointmeasures and
decisiunsof thejoint agenciereferredtoinArticIe25 (I)(bofthe Treaty.
6 13 In ChapterII abovetheconstruction obligationsofthe partiesunder
the 1977 Treatyhavealreadybeenreferredto. These and theremaining obligationsofthe
1977 Treatyare brieflydiscussedbelow:
- Thepurpose oftheTreatywastheconstruction oftheGINProjectas
ajo&t investmentconsistingof the Gabeikovû systemof locks and
the Nagymaros system of locks,which were to "constituta single
andindivisibleoperationalsystemof works.
9 ArticlIZ( I)concemsthe msts f"the operatinmaintenanc(repairandreconstnrctiof
jointIy#vned wor..homejointibytheContractingPartiesinquai rn~asue'~.- The mainstructuresthat resuItehm carying out the Treaty (the
DunakiIitiweir,the brpass canal, theGabéikovoandNaparos
steps) were thecomn propertyof the parties(Artide 81, who
would operatethemjointly (Artides 10 and II) and wouId &are
equaiiin the resultielectrici(Articl9) andcosts(ArticleIZ(1)).
- Article5 of the Treatycontaineddetailedprovisionscoveringthe
respectivresponsibilitiof thepartiesincarryi onutthe work in
accordancewiththepinciples underArticle5(1)that:
"The costsof carryinout thejointinvestmentshalIbeborne by the
ContractingPartieineqiialmeasure."
- ArticIe25 (1) estabIishethe principIeof the joint liabiiity ofthe
Contracthg Parties:
"..inrespectof
(a) the contentofthe approvedjoincontractualpian.
(b) The executionof the Treaty during the constructionand
operation of the System of Locks, the jointly-adopted
measuresanddecisions ofthe Governmentdelegates,andthe
jointmeasures anddecisionsofthejointagencies."
- As a result,the ContractinPartiesagreed to shareliabilityon an
agreedbasisiftheirliabilishouldbe incurred(Article25(2)), whilst
underArticle26, each partyrernainedexclusive~yresponsibleand
bound to pay damages resulting frornits own negligence and
omissions.
- The 1977Treaty alsoconrainedprovisionsconcerningwater resorrrce
managementknctions (Chapter V), includingthe protection water
qudity (Article15),navigation (ChapteVI), and theprotection of
the natüralenvironment(Chapter VII).
- The 1977Treatyestablisheddetailedprocedures for managementand
controlin carryingout the Treaty(Articles6,10 and 11) andfor
settlingdisputes(Article27). 6.14, Inconformitywith itfinalarticle(Article28the 7977 Treaty was
ratifreby Hungary on 21 Febmq 1978andbyCzechosIovakia on 28 June7978, and it
cnteredinto forceon 30 June 1978, the dateofexchang oefinstrumentsofratification.
Hungary hasneve raisea questionastotheTreaty'svddiîy.
6.15 Infac,asrecentlyasearIyJune 1989foIIowingHungary'stemporary
suspensi oonwork at Nagymaros decidedon 13 May 1989,the Hungarîan Govemment
reaffrrmedduringameetingof PIenipotentiair,tsintentiotocarryout the 1977 Treatin
otherrespects:
"The Hungarian Governent Cornmissioner and the Hungarian
PlenipotentiarytatedthattheHungarian partywil completeconstructionof
the GabEkovoproject intheagreedtime andin accordancewith the project
plans. Directiveshavealreadybeen given tocontinueworkssuspendedin
theareadue tomis~nderstandi~'~"
6.16 Then, inspite ofthese assurancesgiven by representativesof the
Hungarian Guvernment; the decisi tonsuspen performancewas made permanent as to
Nagyrnms andthesuspensi w as extende td includetheGabekovo section ofthe
Project. Yet, in thsme breath, Hungarjrdid not IresittoebIamc Czechoslovakiafor
having vioIated the1977 Treaty by its supposedrefusd tu be wiIIingto engage in
negotiations. And, severdtimessubsequenti,Hungaryattempted tujust* its rrniIateraI
suspension, abandonmeriof works and purported temination ofthe 1977Treaty on the
basisthat it waCzechoslovakiawho had violateits obligatiothereunder.To citebut a
fewexamples:
- InvariousNotes Verbalesand letterHungarycharacterisedVariant
"CHasa violationofthe 1977~reat~";
- Similarly,ia letter of 26 February 19toCzechoslovakia'Psrime
Minister,the PrimeMirister of Hurrgarstatedthat "the unilarerai
10 Seepara4.11,above.
II eig,para.4.39,bovewncerning-HungaryNofe Vcrbaof 1 September198andpara.
4.74,boveconcerninHungaryNoreVerbaiof30Jdy 1991. deflectionof theDanube ...questionsthe vdidity ofthe interstate
Treatyof 1977"12;
- In its1992 Declaration,Hungarysoughtto justifyits decision to
terminatethe T977Treaty onthe grounds that:
"TheCzechandSlovak Partydid notfuKl itsdutiesprescnbed in the 1977
Treatyfortheprotection of natureand waterquality.ThereforeCzech and
Slovak Republiccm be condemnedfor material breach of the Treaty.
According tu generd des of internationalaw,a treatycanbe terminated
unilaterdlyagainsaviolatiristatc.
As it isciearhm Chapter II of the presentDeclaration,the Czech and
SIovak Party, continuhg the constructions,did not fuifithe obIigations
indudedin ArticIes 15 arid19 of the Treaty according tu which "The
Contractingfmies ensure that thequaliqof thewater inthe Danube isnot
impairedas aremit ofthe constnrcrionandoperationof thebarrage system"
and "ensur cornpliancewith the obligationfor the protection of nature
arisingin connectionwith the constructionandoperation of the barrage
system"..
The so-called"provisionaslolutioncanbe regarded asan evenmore severe
breachof theTreaty. TheContracting Partiesdetermined verypreciselythe
workto be carriedoutinthe originalTreatyin 1977 and in thesubsequent
relatedagreements .he diversionoftheDanube nearBratislavwasnot riart
ofthem inanvform13 ."
6.17 SlovakiawiI1showinChaptersVI1 and Via bdow thatthisargument
isentire@withuut merit But italso revealsHrrngasl'sfirmbeiiinthevalidityofthe 1977
Treaty,at least utothetimeof theannouncernenotf its purportedunilateralterminationof
rheTreaty.
6.18 Generally speaking,Hungary's conviction that the 1977 Treaty
remained inforceis evidencedbythesuccessiveamendment o theTreatyitselfand to the
1977 Mutual AssistanceAgreement.For, in amending atreaty,a Stateis bythatvery act
certikng that iconsidersthe treatyas valid. Suchproof ofHungary'sbeliefin the 1977
Treaty'svalidity isparticularlystrikingsince the last such amendmentoccurred on 6
12 -ee,para.4.7,bove.
13 Annex 17pp.25-25.Emphasisadded.February 1989, thatisody slightlmore than threemonths before Hungarydecided
uniIateraIu suspendperfomanca
6.19 Inthi segard,it is importtotnote that Partofthe 1969 Vienna
Conventionunthe Law ofTreaticsdevotesseparatesections,firto,thequestionof the
invaiidiof treaties(AdcIes 4to 53)andn,ext,tothe tennirtatiand suspensioof the
operation of treatieHere,inpurporting to put anend tothe 1977 Treaty,Hungary
necessarilrecognised,venifimphcitly,hatatleastuptotheeffectivdatethatitclaimed,
to haveterminatedtheTreatyunilateral-ythatis asfrom25 May 1992 - theTreat wyas
validi.einf,ulfrceandeffectandimposedobligationsontheparties.
6.20 Furthermore romthe verybeginningH, ungaryactedas if thiswere
so. Fullyawarethatit couldnolawfullyproceedunilaterato terminatethe1977Treaîy,
Hungary soughtto convinceCzechuslovakiatumodi and then tu temiriate it by mutual
agreement.
6.21 Infact, dthough it presenCzechoslovakiawitha faia~curnplon
13May 1989when iabmptIy amounced itdecisiontosuspendwork atNagymms, the
Hungarian Goverrunentmade every efforto obtain Czechoslovakiacsoncurrencein this
action.For example,inhis letterto theCzechoslovPrimeMinisterof 4 October1989,
HungarianPrim e inistNémeth statedthat hisGovernment:
"..proposescommon negotiationon technical - econornicmodifications
concerningthesuspensionof theconstmctionof theNagymarospartof the
projectand respectivmodificationofthe Hungarian-Czechoslova kreaty
signedon September16,1977'~."
And the Resolutionadopted on 23 ApriI 1991 by Hungary's Parliamentcalledon the
Goverment tu:
"[T]o conduct negotiatiuwiththe Governent of the Czechand SIovak
FederaIRepubIiregardingthe[temination#yjoint agreemenofthe Treaty
concludedon 16 September, 1977 regardithe Completionand Operation
of the GabEikovo - Nagymaros Barrage Systernand any and al1such
agreementswhichthe StatePartiesto the treaty andlortheir authorized
14 Annex74, bodies have conclrided for the purpose of the execrrtion of the
aforementioned~rtaty'."
Inotherwords, theTreaty andreIatedagreements shoulbdeterminatedby cornmonaccord.
6.22 Mer May 1989, Hungary repeatedly sought to obtain
Czechoslovakia'asgreement to chkges in the 1977 Treaty,albeit changesthatwere not
acceptaHetu CzechosIovakia. This, tao,showsbeyondanydoubtthatHungaryregarded
the Treatyas the Iaw between the partiesso Iongas they did riotrnodifyitby mutuai
agreement. For exampIe, in the Note Verbale of 30 Oder 1989, the Hungarian
Governent indicatethatthe Couricof Ministers:
"..stressesthe proposaion mudication of the Treaty onthe GabEikovo-
Naparos waterwork systemexpressed inPrague,Octuber 11, 1989, and in
Bratislava,October26, 1989 at theCzechoslovak-Hun mgeetiag.The
originalTreaty was signed on September 9, 1977 by pungary and
~zechoslovakial6."
ModificationoftheTreatybymutualagreement wasthe expIicitpurposeof thedrafttreaty
communicatedbyHungaryon 30November 1989accordingto which:
"The contracting pmies have decided tu mudi@ the Treaty between
TCzechoslovakiaand Hung-ry--on the cunstmction and operationof the
~ab~kovo-~agmaros watemrk system, signedin~udatiesi, on September
16,1977 ...".(Articl1,ernphasiasdded).
"Thesigningday.Thecontractingparties[from thedayof signatureshail]
suspendthe realizationof theprovisionsothetreaty,signedon September
16,1977, aswellas the arnendeprotocols,signedon October 15,1983 and
February6, 1989, thatarenotin harmony[with]thistreaty."" (Article4,
paragraph1j.
6.23 It couldnot be indicatedmoreclearlacontrariothatintheeventof
failuretu concludesucharnutnalagreementto modifythe Treaty(andrheother agreements
15 Annex88. Ernphasisadded.
16 % para.4.46,boveandAnnex 75.
17 Secpara.4.50aboveandAnnex78.relatedtu the Treaty which would dso have to have been modifred),the 1977 Treaty
remàrnedin forceaccordingtoHungay*sown admissions.
B. OtherAareemenfsLinked tuthe 1977 Treatv
AgreementsthatStemmedfrornthe Treatv
6.24 The 1977 Treaty, the "basictreaty", refers to several other
agreementsthat supplement and are an inseparablepartof the Treaty, in particularthe
followiiiginstrumento whichreferenceismadeinthe Treaty,asindicatedbelow:
- The Joint ContractuaiPlan(referred tu in Arti1l(4) ofthe 1977
Treaty);
- A separatetreatytu benegotiatedsubsequentlinorder tu revisethe
StateFrontieandto exchange rerritones(Article22(2))18;
- Otherseparateagreements forthetransfeto theterritoryof the other
party of documents , achineryand materiahrequiredin comection
withtheProject(Article24(1)).
6.25 In addition,althoughnot referredtu in the 1977 Treatyitseltwo
agreements were entered into in ordeto carry outhe purposesof the Treaty: the1977
MutuaI AssistanceAgreement and the 1979Joint Srahte Agreement,both of which wiiI
nowbe examined.
The 1977MutuaIAssisfanceAgreement
6.26 ThisAgreementwas enteredinto onthe sameday asthe 1977 Treaty
(16 September 1977) and, similarly,entered iforceon the same day (30 June1978)by
virtueof Article5 of the Agreement.The preambleto the Agreement containsareference
to the1977 Treaty.
IB
Sucha treawas nevedrawnuporenterd into. 6.27 The 1977 MutuaIAssistanceAgreement had a dud purpose: (i)to
establish the preciseworkscheduIeand(iiturnodifythe divisioof workresponsibity as
setout inthe1977 Treaty,and tuprovideforthe resnltîtcompensation.
6.28 - As to thework schedde, Article4(4)of the 1977 Treaty provided
that:
"Operationrelatingto the joint investment shall be organisedby the
ContractinPgartiesinsuchawaythat the powergeneration plantswillbe put
intoserviceduringtheperiod1986-1990."
Pursuant tothigsenerd principle,Article1oftheMutual AssistanceAgreementprovided
that the GabZkovohydroeiectricplanwouldbe pIacedinserviceintwri stagesin1986 and
1989, and the Nagymarus pIant in 1989 and 1990,accordingtu anannexe dchedule
breakdom.
6.29 As tuthe divisioof workresponsibilityatHungary'srequest (inthe
Iîghtof theeconomic problemsthat are discrrssedabove iChapter ILI)CzechosIovakia
accepted, under Article of the Mutuai AssistanceAgreement, to undertake initially,in
order toassistHungary,an additiod portion ofwork the extravdue of which was set in
Article3 asthe equivalentof 1022.5 GWh of electrictyto be recuperatedfiom electricai
production at GabEikovobetween 1986 and 1988. This decision, which modified
temporarilythe principleof theequaldivisionof hydroelectrpower generatedunderthe
Project(Article9 of the Treaty)wastheconsequence of carryingout (andillustrates)the
principlofequalsharing ofcosts(Articl5(1) oftheTreaty).
6.30 Incvnformity with the principset out inArticle 27 of the Treaty,
Article4of theAgreement provided that:
"MI differenceswhich shaIIemergein the frameworkofmutual assistance
shdl be settled bthegovemment plenipotentiariesinaccordance with the
respectivearticlesof the Treaty."
The 1979 Joint Statute Agreement
In accordancewithArticle3(1) of the1977 Treaty, CzechosIovakia
6.31
andHungaryenteredintotheJoint StatutAgreement on 11October 1979dealingwiththestatus,responsibilitsndactivitieofthePIenipotentiariaeppointedtotheProjectby each
side.It wentintoforceuponsignature.
6.32 The terms of the Erstthree paragraphs of ArticIe3 ofthe Joint
StatuteAgreemenp trovidedas follows:
"Thegovenunent pleriipoteritiashds actand take decisionjointly when
exercisiig rightand duties emanating from theTreaty and at solving
problems which ocrr at the redizationand operationof the Systernof
Locks.
The government plenipotentiarieshallensureimplementing of the jointly
takendecisionson the territoryof the ContractinPartyaccordingto the
internationrlegulationsandprinciplof themanagement.
The govemment plenipotentiaries shall settle disputes accordito the
Article27oftheTreaty .
6.33 Article4 of the Agreementlisted in detailthe functions of the
Plenipoteniarîesothbefore thecompletionof the Project and after it had been pIaced in
operation.
6.34 As a reçult of these provisions, the Plenipoteriiaies took joint
decisionswhich in eEect becameveritableinternationalagreementsthemselves,bindinon
the parties.The same was tme of recommendationsof thejoint agencies created under
Article3(2)of the 1977 Trearjrand ArticIe61-5) of the 1979Joint StatuteAgreement,
sincethese recommendationçhad beenapprovedbythePienipotentiarie (s rticl6(6)of the
1979Agreement).
The Pratocols to the 1977 Treatv and the Mutual Assistance
Agreement
6.35 On two separateoccasions,in1983 and in1989, thepartiesmodified
the 1977 TreatyandtheMutualAssistanceAgreement enteredinto onthe sameday inorder
to adjust the Project schedule and tu ded with the consequenc foswing therefrorn in
respectto the obligationsof the parties thereunder. It musstressedthat in eaccase
these changes occurredat thstrong tirgirof Hungary,even though the requestswent in
oppoaite directions:1983 to dow downthe Project; 198ntu speeditup. Nevertheless,
insach case,CzechosIovakiarespondedpositiveIytu Hungary'srequests. 6.36 Followingthe 17thsessionof theESTCCornmittee heldin Febuary
1981, Hungary startedtofallbehindincarryingout theworkit had to perform and asked
thatanewProject schedule beworked out inorderto slowdownthePace ofplannedwork,
forfinanciareasons19. ShortlthereafteH,ungaryrequesteda moratorium until1990.
6.37 Althoughanagreementin principlewasreachedover a new schedrrle
during the 18th sessionof the ESTC Cornmittee in mid-June 1982, the necessary
amendmentstu the 1977 Treatyand Mutrrd Assistanc egreementwere not hdIy agreed
untilOctober 1983 in view of the Iack of agreement as tu how tu compensate
Czechoslovakifaorundertakinwgorkthatit wasHungary'r sesponsibiliyo carryoutz.
Inthe event,no agreement oncompensation was reached,with the
6.38
resulthatthe two rotoc co dleatonlywiththedelaysinproceeding withtheProject:
- The firstof theProtocols,whichamendedArticle 4(4)of the1977
Trearyprovidedthat:
"Operationsrelatinto thejoint investrnentshdI beorganized
by the Contracting Partiesin such a way that the power
generationplantswillbe put into operationduringthe period
1990-1994"
- Under the tems of the secondProtocol the dates for completing
work - and consequentlythe dates on which compensationwas
payabletoCzechodovakia - were prolongedbyfouryears,the end of
constructiobeingfixedat 1995.Both instrumentsentered iriforce
on7 Febmary 1984.
6.39 Then, startingin1985,Hungary sought toacceIeratethe schedule,
citingtheprotectionof the environmentasa reason. Thus,atthisstage,Hungarysawthe
19
-eepara.3.04abwe.
20 &, para.3.05,tseqabove.
21 Annexes7and8.
22 Secp.xa.3.10,m., above.Project as-beneficialtu the environment. The Czechoslovak Governent hesitated in
acceptingtks newproposalbecauseit imposed adificuiteconomicandEnancial burden.
6.40 NevertheIess,CzechosIovakiagave into Hungary's strong pressures
eventhoughthe changes involvedrearranging the ensembleof econornicmeasuresfor the
publicfinancingofthe Project inCzechoslovakiaT . hus,theway layopen tospeed up the
Projectas Hungary desired.
5.41 The newProtoc01accomp1ishing thiswas signed on 5 Febniary
98gn .It accompIishedthe foUowi nganges:
- It annulledthesecond1983 Protoc61that had amendedthe Mutual
hsistance Agreementand modifiedArticle I(1) of that Agreement
withthe followingtirnetable:
"Beginnin gfthepreparatorw yorks 1978
GabEikov oydroelectricpowerplant:
-puttingintooperationthe first[turbindgeneratounit] 1990
-putthg intooperationthe eighth[turbinelgen unrtator992
Nagparos hydroeIectricpowerplant
- puttingintooperationthe firs[rurbine/generatorunit] 1992
- puttingintooperationthe sixth'[turbinelgeneraunît] 7993
Finishingofthe constructionworks 1994."
.
An overallconstructionschedulewas annexetd o theProtocol andthe substitution of a
detailedprogramto replace thatappearing inthe JointContractualPlanwas providedfor in
Article2.
23 Annex 9. In orderachievthenewtimeschedule twas notnecessatoamend the 1977Treaty
once more,asthe partiesintentorernaiwithinthe time limits laid byArticle4(4) as
mmed by the 1983 Protocol. Thus, in to satisfyHungarysemands,itwasnecessary
sirnplto reducethe time limits for the puttinginto operationof GabEikovoand Nagymarosby
amendingonceagainArticl1 (1ofthe 1977MutualAssistanceAgreement. 6.42 Besidesthe foregoingagreements Iinkedtu the 1977Treaty, and
inseparablfromit, severalotheragreementsarespecificdlreferreto in theTreaty.The
Treatywas not thebasisoftheseAgreements butrather theTreaty carrieout certainof
theirprovisionandputthemintooperation. These agreementsw, hichwillbebriefllooked
atnext,were thefolowing:
- The 1976Boundary WatersManagement~~reernent~ ;~
- The 194%Danube onv vent i ;an d^
- The 1958DanubeFisherîesAgreementz6
The 1976 BoundarvWatersManagementAgreement
6.43 As alreadydiscussedabove, the1977 Treatydealtspecificallywith
waterqudity and referredinthis respectothe provisionofthe 1976 Agreementdealing
with monitoringwater quality. Thus, the Boundary WatersManagementAgreement
rernainedthe essentialinstrument betweenthe partiesgoveming the matter of water
managementand, inparticrrlrhemonitoringandprotectionofwaterquality.
6.44 Thepointto bcmade isthatArticl3 of thiAgreement,whichdeds
with thegeneralobligationofthe partierefersthreetimesto mutuallyagreed conditions.
Thus, the 2976 Agreementpresumedthere worrIdbe impiementingagreementsbetweenthe
parLiesand itwas preciselythis funaion thathe 1977 Tr&y and related agreements
performedin respecto thepartoftheDanube reIatedtothe Pruject.
6.45 Sirnila hey1,976 Agreementcreated a Joint Commissionwhose
dutiesaredescribedgenerallyinArticl527,andmoreexactlyin Article lO(1)of the1979
24
Annex4.
25 AnnexIO.
26 Annes11.
27 -eepara3.15a S., above.JointStatute Agreement. Thislast provisionisof particuIarinterestinvim ofthe
importanceof thequestionofwaterque andthe greatemphasisplacedonit byHungary
inthe courseofthisdispute;it empmred thecommissionto:
"...supervisewaterresourcemanagementftihctionq wateramefiorations,
masures tu rr&e water resources,protectionofsurfaceandunderground
watersagainsipollufionmaintenance of fainvamaintenanceof thebed of
the Danube river,protectiagainstthe flooandicemovement."
And Artide1 O(2)foresaw:
"...anagreement tosupervisethe solvingof al1relevantwaterresource
managemenq tuestionintime ofoperatioof theSysternofLocks."
Asnoted inChapter IIabove,inthecourse ofdiacussinwater qridityiwas Hungarywho,
inMay 1989r ,efisedtuproceedfurtherwith stepstuprorectwaterqualityinthe regions
affectebythe G/N ~ruject~~.
6.46 It isevidentas weII,that the1976 Boundq Waters Managemerit
Agreementrernainsin forceandcontinuesto pIaceonthe parties obligatiotothe extent
not otherwisemodifiedby çubsequentreatoragreement,andtheseobligationswere infact
made concreteinthe 1977 Treaty and related agreementsthat constituted the mutually
agreedconditionsmentionedinArticle3ofthe1976 Agreement.
The 1948Danube Convention
6.47 Artide18(l) of the1977Treaty'makesspecificreferenctuthe 1948
DanubeConvention:
"The ContractingPartie is,conformitywith the obIigations prevîously
assumed by thern, and in particuIarwith Artic3eof the [I948Danube
Convention] shdl ensure uninterrupted and safe navigation on the
internationalfairwayboth duringtheconstructionand dunngthe operationof
the Systemoflocks."
28 Seepara.3.24, above. . 6.48 The main purpose of this Conventionwas tu assurefieedomof
navigationon the Danube and toregulateit. Of special relevanceis Artic3eofthe
Conventi won,chprovidedthat:
"TheDanubian StatesundertaketomaintaintheirsectionsoftheDanube ina
navigable conditiofor river-going...vessels,to carry out the works
necesaarfor themaintenanc end irnprovementof navigationconditionsand
nottuobstnictorhder navigation unthe navigablechanneIof theDanube.
The Danubian Statesshd consultthe Danube Commission (Article 5on
mattersrefemedtuinthisArtide."
6.49 The i977 Treatyand relatedagreementswere the means bywtirch
CzechoslovakiaandHungary ched outtheirobligationunder theTreatyinrespectto the
portionofthe Danube dected bythe GM Project.
The DanubeFisheriesAgreement
6.50 Artide20 ofthe 1977Treatyprovidedthat:
"The Contracting Partiewithinthe fiameworkof nationaiinvestmentshdl
takeappropriatmasures forthe protectionof fishînginteresconformity
withtheDanubeFisherîes Agreementc,oncIudedat Bucharestun 29 Jmuq
1958."
6.51 ThisAgreement andtheregulationsforFisheriesinthe RiverDanube
attachedtoit(Articl3) controlledfishingthe watersof theDanube:
O..includingits mouth,tu tributariof the Danubeup to the maximum
extent of ifloodwaters,andtu Iakesestuariesandpools pemanently or
temporarîlyconnectedwith the Danube, îithe Danube flood-basinin the
territoryotheContractingParties,includingtareaadjoiningthe mouth"
ThemixedcommissioncreatedbyArticle12 coordinated theactivitiesothepartiesto the
Agreement.
6.52 Accordingto Article5 ofthAgreement:
"The ContracringParties agretucarry out in the river Danubeanin the
waters referred tu in artide 3 irnprovement works and piscicu1tural
operationstuamelioratethenaturai conditionsfor the breeding,growth and
nomai increaseinstocksof fishoecunomi icportance"They dso undertook tu sooperatethe waterengineerinkworks as tu safeguard"thenomid
migratoq rnovementsoffish and "the nomai breedinganddweIopment of economicd,
valuablespeciesofEsh, inthe sectionofthe riversituatedunderandbelow the saîdworks,
under thenewenvironmenta col nditionsreateby theerectionofthoseworks".
6.53 Although neitherCzechoslovaki nor Hungarywas a signatorytothe
onginalAgreement,in accordanc e ithArticl14 theyadhered toiton29 June 1972 and 18
December 1961, respectively. In addition, the obligationsflowing frum thi s isheies
Agreement were integrateho the biaterd arrangementsEtrisinfromthe 1977 Treaty by
virtueofthe provisionsofArticle20thereof
6.54 Thi s anotheriIIustrationof howth1977 Treatyliesat thcentre of
an interrelatednseparabl eomplex of agreements. Althoughthe questionsposed to the
Court underArticle2 ofthe SpeciaiAgreement formailyrefeto the 1977Treaty,they can
only be understoodandrespondedto inthe contextofthis systemof agreements2'.Article
2 of the SpecialAgreementexpresslyrecognisesthisforitrequeststhe Court"to decideon
the basisofthe Treaty",defining"Treaty"tu includeits"reIateinstruments"and it adds:
"asdI assuh orher treatks atheCourt may findapplicabk3 '.
SECTION 2, Hunvary's Sus~ension, Subsequent Abandonment of its
Performanceand Purported Termination of the 1977 Treatv
Violate thisInterrelatedComnlexof Treaties and Agreements
6.55 The responseto the questionsposedunderArticle 2 of the Special
Agreementbringsintoplaythe lawoftreaties.
6.56 Moreover, CzechosIovakiaand Hrrngaryseveral times in the course
of the dispute made specific referencto the 1969ViennaConvention on the Law of
Treaties. Hungary,for itpart,triedtojuîtify termina6onof the 1977Treatyby relyingin
its1992 DecIarationon severalprovisionofthe ViennaConvention:
l9 . See,para6.06above.
30 Sec ntroductiopara4,above. "Althoughthe Viema Conventior iannot direalybe appIiedin the legd
disputeof the 1977 Treaty (itentered intoforce for bath cotrntriesder
1977),itsprovisionsareguihg in many respects,concerningthecontentof
generallyacceptedinternationa legal noms at the time of the Treaty's
conclusion .hi soes notmeanthat thePartiesmaynot invokeother des of
generaiinternationall w not mentionedin the ViennaConvention,neither
does it mean that noms of the Vienna Convention,even if indirectly
applicablel,iterallyapplyinthepresencase.Oneof the reasonsis thatthe
Conventi atnt,etimeofitsformulationpartiailconformed withcustomary
law;insomerespects itdeveloped andtightenedtheseniles.""
6.57 There is,ofcourse,atechnica lointtu ded with arisiig underArticle
4 of the ViennaConvention by vbe of thefact that neithCzechosIovakia nor Hungary
had adhered tothe Conventionbefore 19 Iuneand 29 July 1987,respectivelp . However,
as theCourt has held,theConventioncodified in Iargepartpre-existingcnstomary lawon
thesubject,asthefollowingcitationoftheCourtbearsout:
"The rules laiddownby the ViennaConventionon the Law of Treaties
concerningterminationofa treatyrelationshonaccount ofbreach(adopted
without a dissentingvote) may in many respects be considered as a
codificationof exîstingcustomalaw onthesubjed3 ."
6.58 AsSirlm Sinclaîr hasnoted, the1969 Convention:
"..incorporatesgroiindsofterminationorsuspensionwhich areexclusiveto
thetreatyanddo mt dependon a subsequenttreaty, but rather de- from
mles ofgeneralinternational "
32
SIovak iucceedeto Czechodovakias apartto the ViennaConventiby its notificationof
successidoned28 May 1993.
33
Lena1ConsequencesorStatesof theCgntinuedPresenceof SouthAfncain Narnibia(SouthWest
Africa)no nui th stiecuriCouncilResolution27(1970)AdvisowOpinion.1.C.J.Re~orts
197I p. 16, ap. 71. Sec,As#,AtipeaiReIatinto theJrrrisdictofthe ICA0 Council,
Judgment, I.C.J.Remr1972,p.46, alp.67;and FisheriesJrr~îsdiction{UniredKrnY.om
Iceland).JurisdtcttheCourt. Judment.I.C.J. Rep1973,p.3, ap.18;andInter~retation
n,
1981 t,73atpp.95-95.
34
1984,p.185.Thus,imfartasHungq Tiseniitltoinvok eengeneramiesof internationalIawster,
Convention.sactionstheyare dreadytobe found, incorporafedivcm, in the Vienna 6.59 Firrther,inFebnrary 1989,after the VierinConventionhad entered
inteoffectfor both parties,Hungq affirmaithe substaritiobiigationsofthe 1977Treaty
by enteringintoa Protoc01tha tdvance te tirnetableAs a result,theprovisionsof the
Viema Conventioncertaidy governedthe supposed rrrriIateremination ofthe Treaty.
Moreover, as tiab eenpointedout in Section1 above,the Protocolwas anintegral partof
the interrelatsystem of agreement s onstitutinthe "contractualgal regime"binding on
theparties. It to thi"contractuallegalregime"thattheVienna Convention applies.
6.60 Section3 of thisChapterwillset out indetaithe treatyobligations
violated byHungary; but it isappropriatehere to note that the unilaterd suspension,
abandonmentof works,then purportedtermination of the 1977 Treaty aloneconstituted
violationsbyHungaryof obligationsinrespecttu rights thatasrecognised in the preamble
of the Specid Agreement,becme vested in8avakia assuccessor State to rights and
obligationsrelatingtuthG/N project3.
6.61 It would not be correct to conclude that the unilateraacts of
Hungmyto suspend,abandon itsperformanca endthenpurportto terminatethe 1977 Treaty
constitutedthe onlyfailureof Hungary to liveupto itstreatyobligations. From thevery
start,givirigeconomicdifficultassan excuse,Hungaryfellshortof meetingits obligations.
As hasbeen discussed above inChapterIII, this failureon Hungary'spart caused delayand
Ied toan amendment of the 1977 Treatyand MutualAssistanceAgeement tu extendthe
agreedworkschedule of the Project. Foratthetirne,Ctechodovakia was more anxious tu
reach acompromiseinthe IightofHungary's ecunomic dificuities in ordto safeguardthe
Project underthe Trearythan tuinsiston irsIegd rightsanddemandcompensationfor the
damagesincurred. This, of course, did not mem that Czechoslovakia had at any time
renouncedrights to daim damages caused by~un~ary' failuresto cary out its obligations
underthe Treatybeforethe amendments of1983 and 1 .
35 &, Introductipara. 5. l
36 -e,e;g, Annex44, a lettfromCzechoslovakiasrimeMinisteof 3May 1983 tothePrime
Minisrerof Hungary. A. Huneam's UnilateralSuspension and SIIbseauent Ahandunmen t
of its Performanceundecthe 1977 Treatv
6.62 Hungary'sdecision to suspendunilaterally and subsequently to
abandon itsperformance maybe seenas occurringinfourstages ,achofwhich willnowbe
examined.
6.63 The fiststage took pIaceon 13 May 1989 ody96 days &er the
taking eEectofthe 1989 Protoc01 shortenhg the Projectlworkscheduieby 15 months.
For, on thatday,the HungarianGovernent - without advaricwarningor consultation-
annound the immediatesuspensionfor two months'durationof work at theNagymaros
site3. ThisnotificationreceivedbyCzechosIovakiw aasnot of Hungary'ssuspension of the
1977Treaty asa whole,onlythesuspension ofitsownobligations inrespectof apartof the
Treaty. Since,however,theworks attheNagyrnarossectionof the G/N Projectwere the
soleresponsibilityfHungary, thisamounted toan degal suspensionof the 1977 Treatyin
part.Czechoslovakia'p srotesofthisactionfolIowedat onceand was expressed invigorous
termsJ8.
6.64 The second stage of Hungary's srrspension and subsequent
abandonmentof performance took placeon 20 July 1989~'. Mer reassurancesgiven to
Czechoslovakiathat Hungarylsdecision was limited tu ~agyrnarod" un 20 July the
HungarianGovernefit announcedthat its extensionincludedthe GabEikovo section of the
Project as well, notablythe damming of the Danube near Dunakiliti weir, whichwas
Hungary's responsibilitand essentialto the operationof the GabEikovosection of the
Project. This suspensionof workat both siteswasuntil3 1 October 1989,extendingthe
earliertwo-monthsuspension atNagymaros.Asinthecase ofthe firststagdecisionit was
transmitted orally It provoked an immediateCzechoslovakprotest" and a series of
subsequent oficiaI rejectiunsof Hungary'sdecisioas unilatera,n violationof the1977
37 B, para.4.0,bovt.
38 Sec .ara4.09, above.
39 -eepara.4.36, above.
40 Sec .ara4.1,a çes.andpara4.35,above.
41 Sec .ara4.36above. -244 -
Treatyxand certainto causeseriousdamage to Czechodovakiafor which it would clairn
compensafion.
6.65
From a IegaIstandpoint, t20 Julydecisionwas a re-ation of
non-performancebyHungq undertheTreaty,extendedtu Gabkkovo and withthedateof
suspensionaIsoextended. Itwas coupledwith a demand thatCzechoslovakia ,ikewise,
suspend performanco efits obligationUnliie the fistphaseof suspension,the 20July
decisionconcemed works inthesectionoftheProjectthatwere sharedbetweentheparties.
Hence, itdidnot suspen tat partofthe Treaty;Hungarysimplyrefused to performits
portionoftheworks there,foranunspecifiedperiod.
6.66 Thisbringsthediscussiontuthe thirdhaseof Hungary'sviolations,
which concemed furtherextensionoftheinitiadecisiom:
- Renunciatioof theNagymarossectionof theProjectresuItingin the
eiiminationofpeakhouroperationatGabEikovo a;nd
- Suspensionof work onal1partsof theProjecton the pretextof the
need to reach an agreement on environmentalprotection and
guarantees.
6.67 As is bruughout in ChapterIV, by the end of1989,Hungary had
made up its miriaboutNaparos and peakoperationsatGabEkovo: these simplyhad tu
be eliminated.There was nothingtonegotiateabout. As to the resof theGCN Project,
Hungary'spositioninthe autumnof 1989was that workshouIdstop -butfor ody a short
time - pending agreementon measures and guaranteesprotectingwater qualityandthe
environment. Czechoslovakiarejectedthe cancellatiof Nagymarosandpeak operation
but iwas willingto acceptamoratorium asto Nagymaros - duringwhichthe issuescould
be studiedandresoIvedbyagreement.
6.68 As tothe GabEikovosectioofthe works -andnotablyDunakilitiand
the dammingof the Danube -CzechoslovakiafuIIyacceptecithe proposto staratonce tu
prepareagreementsontheprotectionof waterqualiv and theenvirument. Beforethe end
of 1989, the assrrrnptof both sides wathatany environmenra aInwater qudity issues
presentedby completingandputtinginto operationtheGabeikovosectionwerernattersthatcouIdbe resolvedbymutuaIagreement. But Naparos and peak operatioat GabEikovo
weresirnpIynot issuesthatHmgq was preparedtu negotiateover.
6.69 Any possibilitof compromise ,f whichsomepromiseseemedto
existintheha1 months of 1989,weredashed byHungarian PrimeMinisterNémeth'lsetter
of 10January 1990~. Thisdevelopmenw t aallthemoresurprisingsinceMi. Németh had
beenPrime MinisterofHungaryduring thepromishgperiod ofnegotiationintheprevious
year .hi ssheredinphasefourof Hungary'ssuspensioandabandonmen otperformance
of itobligationsundethe 1977Treaty.
6.70 From that point on, Hungary'sposition continu4harden. On 6
March 1990 ,sexpresseilinitsPrimeMinistesenerof that date, ungary'spositiwas
simply that dl work on the GN Projectwould be suspendedpending discussionof
modifjingthe 1977Treatyandfurtherresearch.
6.71 Thus, by the springof 1990, Hungary'sdecisionto suspendwas
therefore(i)generalin character(,foran unspecifietimeand (iii)presentedas calling
the Project "mistaken" and caiiing for the negotiation of its abandonmentwith
Czechoslovakia.ThisconstituteinefFectanultimam -forresumptionof workhadbeen
made dependent on acceptancby Czechosiovaki af the amendmenttso the 1977 Treaty,
which asa minimummeantthe eIiminatioofNagp~aro asd peakoperationatGab~ikovo.
Hungary was tu maintainand,indmd funher hardenthirsigid,inflexiblepositionuntîi its
prrrportedterminationofth977 TreatyinMay1992.
6.72 The details ofthe argumentsadvanceciby Hungaryto attempt tu
justifyils decisionsdiscussabove in the?foursuccessivestageswill he examinedin
ChapterVIII,where iis shownthattheseargumentscq noweight. Forprem purposes
it sufficesto mentioas the Czechoslovaklegal expertsdid in the course of a meeting
during18-20 September1989 convenedto discussthelegalissues,thatHungarydecisions
of 13 Mayand 20 July- and afortioriits subsequdecisionsduringthe third and fourth
stages of Hungary'ssuspensionof performance -must be charactensed,as stated by
Czechoslovakiaatthetimeas:
42 Seepara4.55eJm.,above.
-
43 Sespara4.61, m.,above. "..rinilateracts not respectingthe way of sefflingpoinatissu epecified
bythe 1977 Treaty . Atthesametime,this act[ofsuspension]is atvariance
with common intemafional...Iawcodifiedin Atticie57of the 1969 Viema
Convention ... .lt
And it iusehl tu quotehere thetems ofArtide 57ofthe 1969 ViemaConvention:
"Th eperationof atreatyin regardto aiIthepartiesorto a particulaparty
maybe suspended:
(a) inconformitywith theprovisionsofthe treaty;or
(b) atany timeby consen of al1parties &er consultationwith the other
contractingStates"
ThisArticlewas adopted unariimoudy (101 votes in favour)by the Vienna Conference
charged with drawirinp the 7969Convention.
6.73 Inthepresentcase,the 1977Treatycontainsno provisionof any kind
having to do with suspension It is umecessaq tu add, therefore, that neither
Czechoslovakianoi Hungary had agreedon any such provision. It is also ratheran
interesting coimidence that the particularphrase "fier consultation with the other
Contracting States"wasadded to paragrap(h6) oftheabove-citedprovisionof Article57 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention attherequestof~un~ar~~'.
6.74 Withregardtothefactsinthiscase,Hmgarynotodyrefiainedfiom
obtaining the consent of Czechoslovakiabut it avoided any consultation. Hungary's
decisionsof 13 May and 20 July 1989,as wellas those taken later, placedCzechoslovakia
face-tu-face wita faiaccompli,not the Ieastsurprisingelementçofwhich were, fir shtt,
ody the rnonrhsearliea Protocolhadbeen agreedto speed up the Project by I5 mcinths
and, second, thar Czechoslovakîa hadbeen assuredby Hrtngaxy'sPIenipotentiary,only a
monthbefore the20 Julydecision,that the decisionof hisGovernentwas strictIIiiredtu
Naparos. Itcan be seenFrom a ra?ew of the historyof exchangesduring1989and 1990
that Hungary serveciCzechoslovakiawith what were ultimatums: initialasto Nagyrnaros
44 Annex 134.
45 UnitedNationsConferencon the Law of Treaties, andsecondsessioO nsficialRecords,
Documentçof the Conferenc, ICONF.39L. 30,p.269 and seconsession,OfficiRecords,
Summarv Records,2stPlenaryMeetinp. 110paras10and 11.and peak hour operationthen c,ncemhg theentireoperationof the Project. Hungary's
positionswere non-negotiable,butthiseverpreventedCzechosIovakia fiom attemptingtu
reach somesort of solutionthroughdiscussionwithHungary as isestablishein Chapter
IV.
6.75 The unacceptablenatureof Hungary'c sonductis heightenedby the
factthatasthe evidenceshows, theHungarianGovernmend temonstrateditsawarenessthat
an agreemenwt iîhCzechoslovaki asto suspensionofthe 1977Treatywasrequired. Such
was dl the morereqrrireidnthe lighof ArficIe27 ofthe 1977 Treaty,which dealswith
disputesseniement. This provided that disputes shuuldbberesoIvedthrough bilaterd
negotiations.
6.76 TheiilegdityofHungary'sconduct was further aggravatedbythe fact
that its decisitosuspendthe 1977Treaty occurredody 96 days der the 1989Protoc01
was enteredinto and had takeneffect-at theexpress and insistentrequest of Hungay-
shorteningthetime forcompletingtheProject by 15months. Such a completereversalof
positionby Hungaryis incompatiblewith the principle of good faith which, in al1
circumstancesm, ustgoverntheconductof Statesininternationarlelatioandin particular
inthecanyingout oftreaties.
6.77 Moreover,it is the veressenceof the notion of "suspensionof a
treaty thai its corniontnot be c~rn~romieed .~~Aithuughthis principleis dictated by
commun sense,italsu bds expressionin Article72(2of the1969 ViennaConventionin
thesetems:
"During theperiud of the suspension,the partiesshall refrahm acts
tendingtoobstructtheresumptionofthe operatioof the treaty."
6.78 Inthe first placeitis evidentthatHungary'sactions to suspend
performance - firstfor twomonths,then for fivemonths and then foran indeterminate
period(whichinfact lastedthreeyears-renderedimpossibletheperformance of theTreaty
withinthe periodshortenedby the 1989 Protocol. Thatthe HungarianGovernment was
46 SE^ArticI25ofthe1959ViennaConventiononthLaw ofTreaties.
-
41 &, Pad Reuter,IntroductauDroitdesTraites, P.U.F.,P1985p.137 andNgttyenQum
Dinh, PatrickDaiandeMain PeIIet,Droit IntenratiorralPubIPans.1992,p.292.weiiaware ofthi isborneout byitsNote Verbaleof 3November 1989 inwhich itexpressly
indicatedthat it had "caricelthatpartof the Protoc01signedin Februay 1989 on the
accderation otheconstmctîon atthewatework systsrn conceming theNagymaros part"48.
6.79 Secondlyi, makirigtheend ofthe"suspensiono"fthe caqhg outof
the 1977 Treatjrsubordmate tu an acceptace by CzechosIovakia ofthe amtndments
pruposedby Htrngary inits Verbdeof 30November 1989"~ H,ungary aiteredthe
meaningof "suspension".This did not involve"suspension" ,ut ratherthe outright
impositionofanamendmen otnCzechoslovakia l,avinthelatternochoice.
6.80
Suchpracticesareunquestionablnyotcompatiblewiththe elementary
rulesconcemin tgerespectowing to treaties.
B. ThePrtrparîedTerminationofthe 1977 Treaty
6.81 There exîsta widcdiEerenb cetweenthe notionsof suspensioand
terminationofatreaty.With suspension,hetreatyis aIIowetu continueoniyitsoperation
is suspended5'.Termination,howeveri constituresan iflemediastep; and its vdidity is
madesubjecttu certaingorously appIiedconditions,hicharenotpresent inthiscase,as
wiI1be shownbelow.In Chapter Vm itwillbeestablishedhattheparticulacircumstances
invokedby Hungarydo not constitutevalidgroundsfoxterminationso asto excludethe
iiiegdityof Hungary'actions.
6.82 Aswas explainec ibovein ChapterIV, and mentioned againinthis
Chapter,Hungary'spositionvaried considerablybetweenthe time when the Governent
decidedto suspendthe appIicationofth1977 Treaty(13 May 1989) and when itpurported
tu put anendto i(19 May 1992).
6.83 Giventhese frequentchangesof positioon thepartofHungary,it is
dificuIttu presentin a succinctway the successivepositionsadopted. The following
48
Seep.ara4.47above.
49 Seepara.4.50,bove.
50 -ee,inthi egard,thecarefuilyihfted proviofArticles57 and 72 of t1969Vienna
Convention.presentationinfive stagesmaybe helpful, eventhough itmaygive more #hereIIce to
Hungary'm s ovesthantheymerit:
- At theHungarian Govemmenltimited itseltorequiringthatnew
studiebe carrieoutasto theecologicalimpactof the G/N Project;
Czechoshvakia acceded tothisrequesbut opposedsuspendhgwork
becauseoftheecologicdand aconortidamage thiwsouid entail;
- Then,at asecond stage,Hungary insistedonthepostponing ofthe
performanc ef theTreatypendingexaminationof whetherand how
ishouldbe modified;
The stagefollowedalmost atonce,evenbefore thestudieshad
beencomrnissioned w,henthe Hungarian Government appearedto
çubordinatethe resumpti ofwork tu theconcfusionofagreements
on protection of the environment, elimination ofpeak power
operationandcanceIlationof workat Nagymaros; Czechoslovakia
declared itseif prepatodbegin negotiationon dl points except
canceI1atiof Nagyrnwos, drhuugh agreeingtoseparatethe fateof
Nagymaros fromthatofGabEikovo;
- Then,inMarch 1990,occurredthefourth shifin position:Hungary
again posed the problem in scientifiand technical terms and
demandedthat new studiesbe undertaken- which Czechoslovakia
agreedto;
- Whiie thisprocess was getting undenvay, Hungarj once again
tightened its requirementsandtrtodictate the acceptance "the
conclusion ofa new interstate treaty"s the consequence of
terminationofthe 1977Treaty,whilatthe sametimeacknowledging
(intheResolutionofthe HungariaParliamentof 23 Apri199 1)that
iwas to beaccomplishedbycomrnonaccord.
6.84 Asalreadymentionedearlier,the Resolutionof Hungary'sParliament
was certainlyoneof thedecisive elementsin the hardeninofHungary'sposition foritIimitedthe mandateofits representatiinsubsequenntegotiations.As aresult, Hungary
in practice showednot the slightwish thereaftetu negoliateover whetherorhow to
rnodie the 1977Treaty and reiatedagreements - which CzechosIovakia continudly
expresseditswiIIingnestu do - butpureIyand simpIyenvisag ondlytheTreaty'stotal
abrogation.
6.85 TheHungarian PrimeMinisterofficidymadehis intentioveryclear
to hiscounterpar tn 26 February1992" . He invokedthe protectioof "environmental
values" a, goai which, in fact,was pruvîded for in the 1977 Treaty and which
CzechosIovakisaharedcompIeteIywithHungary md had dwaysacceptedto discnss.
6.86 Then, on 7 May 1992, the ~un~arian Governent adopted a
Resolufionprovidinginpart,asfolIows:
"TheGovernent ofHungary isgivena power,onthe basisofthearticI3
of theResolutionof theHungarianParliamentNo 1211992 (of Aprî41, to
terminateunilaterdly,beginningMa25, 1992,the interstateTreatyof 1977
and al1 related Agreements which were concluded by treaty parties,
respectivetheirauthoritiesfor redizaofothiinteratat~reaty'~."
6.87 Despite the protests oftheSIova k overnment on 11 May that
Hungary'sdecIaredintentiontu terminatethe i977Treaiy was "legdlynuII and void",
pointing out that the Treaty, which containno provision for termination, coube
cancelledor change "donlyby agreementof both Partiesto the Treaty",and despite
Czechoslovakia'dseclaredwillingneto negotiate,the HungariaGovernmentdecided on
19 May 1992 tocarryoutthis intention.
Parliament-and at the sametimeadvisedCzechoslovakiaby Note Verbale and lette-of
thefo11owîng~:~
"The Goverment of the Republiof Hungaq investedwith power by the
Parliamentofthe RepubIicof Hungary,herebyteminatesthe 16 September
51
&, para.4.7etçea.
52 Annex110.
53 h, para4.81above. "The Governent of theRepublic of Rungq investedwith power bythe
Parliamen tf theRepublicof Hungary he,rebyterminatesthe16 September
1977 Treatysigned in Budapestbetween thePeople'sRepublic of Hungary
andthe Czechoslovakian SocialistRepubfcconcerningthe constructioand
commencement of operation ofthe Bos-NagymarosBarrageSystem,and
furthemoreterminates allagreementsconcludedby the Parties or their
authoritifortheimplementatioo nftheabove mentioned Treatyeffective25
May1992."
6.89 The so-cded "justificationsfor thisstep" were set out in a
Dedaration of16May 1992enclosedwiththe 19 May Ietter(the1992Declaration).
6.90 It is no1thepurpose of this Chaptertu ded with these su-calIed
"justifications".It sufftoshowthat such aunilaterdterminationthatrelatetuthe 1977
Treaty,as welIas to alagreements concluded in applicationoit,is per sean extremdy
senous breachof well-establishdnd fundamenta plrinciplofgeneralinternationallaw.
6.91 Neither the 1977 Treaty,the basic treaty, nor the subsequent
agreements linkedtoitormodifylngit containprovisionconcerningtermination.
6.92 Insuch a situation,therelevantprovisito examin esArticle56of
the 1969ViennaConvention:
"Denunciationor withdrawaIfrom a treaty containing no provision
regardingtermination,denunciation or withdrawa1.
1. A treatywhichcontains no provisionregardingitsterminationand
whichdoesnotprovidefordenunciation orwithdrawails not subject
to denunciatioorwithdrawau lnless:
(a) itis establishethatthe partiesintendeto admitthe possibilityof
denunciationorwithdrawalo;r
(b) a rîghof denuriciationowithdrawalmaybe impliedby the natureof
thetreat.
2. A Party shalgive not Iesthan fweIvemonths'noticeof itsintention
todenounceor witbdrawhm a treatyunder paragraph1II
Severalremarksconcerning Articl56 arecdIed forin thecoritexof the presentcase,In
the firstplaceimustbe noted that "terminationand"denunciationor withdrawd" areputon the same footing. Therefureitdoea not matterwhether the decisionmade byHungary
may be qudified as a "denunciationo r not. Whether a denuriciationstricto sensuor
mher kînd of termination,itisclearIyilIegaISiricenoneof the conditionsrequired in
artic 56 arefiIfillecl.
6.93 Moreover, without any doubt the Vienna Conventionintroduced a
considerable sofieningof the customaq rules prevkilingtheretofor,and in this sense
constitutedmore a "progressiveevelopment "atherthaa ncodificationstricsensu.
6.94 Traditionapracticehadfavoured theprincipleoftheabsolutestability
of treatieconcluded withouttimelimits,ashad been fidy expressedbythe Powersinthe
LondonProtoc01of 17Ianuary 1877 intheseterms:
"[Cllestun principeessentiedudroitdes gens'qu'auc Puuissancerie peut
se déIiedes engagementsd'unTraité, N en rnodikr Iesstipulations,qu'àla
suite de ~'assenjir&ndtes PartiesContractantesau moyen$une entente
amicale54''
Translation:
"ltis a basicprincipof Iawthat no Statecandisavow ittreatyobligations,
normodiQa treaty'srovisions,saveforwith theconsentof theContracting
Partiesintheformofanamicable agreement."
Thereis abundantandhighlyconsistent Statepracticeinsupport*5
6.95 ReIyîng on "a Iong seriesof intergovementai discussions", Lord
McNairconsidered that"thereisa generd presumptioriagainst thexistenceof any nght of
uniIateratemination ofa ~reat~"~'.Brierljrconsiderethat therewas"certain1ynugeneral
54 De Martens,NouveauRecueilGénkraleesTraité, ol. 18,278.k, also,theDespatcfrom
Earl Granville,British SecforForeignMain, to the BritishArnbassrt St. Petersburg,
dated IONovember1870 and quoted withapprovalby LordMcNair, TheLaw of Treaties,
ClarendoPress,Odord,1961,pp.495-497.
55 -ee,inpartidar, (i) theincidentsconcerningtheClaytorreatofT1850(citedbyMcNair,
I Id pp497-498);(il) AffairedeBatm., pp.498-4991and(iii) Germanyenunciatioof
certainpartsof theTreatyof Versaillescondeùythe Counciofhe League offlationin
terrnveryclosIothoseusedinttLoendonProtocol(0El.1935,No.5,pp.552-552)andinthe
StatriofBerlin (sibyNgrryenQuocDinhg d.,9. &.,p.295,etc.).rightof denunciationof a treatof indehite duratio~'". AndAiticle 34 of the Ward
Research Dra concluded alongexamination of thepracticeasfollows:
"ATreatyrnay be denounced bya partyodywhen such adenunciation is
providedfor inthetreatyorconsented to byaliotherparties.A denunciation
must be inaccordance with anyconditionsIaiddowninthetreatyor agreed
uponbythepartiess 8.
6.96 Suchunmhity ofview iseasiIyexplained :hcvaliditof a uniIaterd
decisiontu put anend tu a treatmaybe acceptcdin ody veryexceptionaicircurnstances,
for otherwise thestabilityofthe Iegd regimeof treatiescouId not be assuredand the
signrficancandapplicationofthe principlepactasunt servanda,so essentidto the whoIe
structureoftheIawof treatieç,wouidbe cdIedintocpestionW.
6.97 The debatesin the InternationaLl aw CommissionIeading $0 the
presenttextof Article56 of the1969 Vienna Convention revealthatthisprovisiongoes as
far asone can go inthe senseof relaxhgtraditiona l octrine. Inhissecondreport,Sir
Gerald Fitzmauricepostulateda presumption infavour ofthe absenceof any rightatal1of
unilaterataminati~n~~. Atthoughhesided with a relativelysuppleformulahissuccessor,
Sir HumphreyWaldock,recognisedthat "he might have gone ratherfar inadmitting an
impliedright of denunciationn.' Intheevent,theseinitialpropositionswere the object of
active (and irnanimous)crîticismin theproceedings of the ~ommission6~. As for the
Commission'sPresidentMt. Jimene dzeAréchega , iviews were he said,"very ciose tu"
theopinion expressedbyMr. A~O~', andhe consideredthat thegeneral mle wasthat:
"..where a treatycontainedno provisionondenunciationortermination,the
rightof denunciationwouldexistoniywhereit couldbe inferredfrom the
-.
57 nie LawofNationsClarendoPress,Odord,1955p. 256.
58 AmericanJournalf InternatiLlaw,1935supplement,p.11731183.
59
-R, Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit IriIernationaI hrbIic, Dalloz, Paris209 et 244;
Oppenheim,9th cdOP.cil., 1205.
W
MCN 4jI07A ,rt4.
61 YearbookoftheInternatioLaw Commission1963,VoI.1,p99,pm. 85.
63 -iid., 104.paras4.-52.I
- 254 -
travaux prenaratoiresor fiomthe circrrmstanceatîendingthe conclusiunof
the treaq. Inal1 other cases,the consent of the partieswouId bc
~~ecessaq .~~
6.98 When the question was raised again by the International Law
Commissio in 1966M ,r.Herber triggsnotd that:
"Itwas a fdacy to approach thesubjectas though thereexisteda choice
betweentwo presumptton sf equalment - firsthat wherea treaty was
silenon the subjectof terminationor denunciationn,o unilateralrighof
denunciatioenxistedand, secondly,thecontrarypresumption that where a
treatywas silentonthepointthe rightofdenunciatioenxisted. Infact,there
was no suchchoice:therulethat atreatywas bindingwas not a presumption;
itwas anobjective NI^of law andit excluded the possibilityof undaterd
denrrnciati~ns.~
Mr. Ago, withoutdiEering ,evertheIesintroduced int he principIthe folIowingnuance:
"...it was the Commission'çdue tu say speci6cdy that a treaty not
contaking such provisionscouldnot be denounced, save in exceptional
cases,inotherwords that icouldbedenounced only ifeithethenature and
characterofthetreatyweresuchthat itwasnecesskly open todenunciation,
oritwas evidentfrom thecircumstance osftheconclusionof thetreaty that
the partieshad intendedadenunciation tobe possible,even if theydidnot
explictlSaysointhetreaty66 ."
And thisbecame,with vev çIightchmgesin the draftingothe finatext,thegenerd ruIe set
out inkrticI56.
6.99 Thus, the principleis nut subjecto any doubt: there exists a very
we1I-establishedpresurnption denyingthe rightof rrniIaterd terminalion otreatiesnot
pruviding for sucha right.Andifparagraphs(a) and(b) of Article56(1)of the Vienna
Conventionare considered to reflectcurrent customaryinternationallaw (whichinfactthe
Articleprobablyweakened), itisclearthatinthepresentcase the requiredconditionsetout
areinno sensemet.
64 ibrd.,p. 1para80. Emphasisadded.
-
65 YearbookoftheInrernatioLaw Comssron. 1966,Vol.1,Part 1,45,para24
€6 -b~dp.45,para.35. 6.100 In thefirstplace,thereis nothingin eiththetravaux préuaratoires
orthe textof the 1977Treaty orinthesubsequena tgreements to suggest"thatthe parties
intendedto admitthepossibilitof denunciatioorwithdrawal" .n factthe indicationsrun
inthe oppusitedirection. Articl3(2)ofthe 1977Treaty and Article6 ofthe 1979 Joint
Stanite Agreementprovided for the establishment by the Plenipotentiarieof each
Goverment of"appropriat peermanenand temporq jointagencies forthe performanc ef
their hnctions"". In additionthe veryidea ofa joint "investment"in the GCNProject,
necessadysripposing a permanency,is hardlycompatiblewith the posib'i ofunilaterd
terminationofthe Treaty- andthe conceptof "joint-ownership (ArticIes8and 10 of the
Treaty)excludes itentirely. And the object ofthe Treatyitself, the constructionof
permanentstructures,admits of no possibilitythata Party may have contemplated
terminationor denunciation. Unilateralterminationof obligationsis a dubiousclaim;
unilaterdteminationof anotheis omership rightisan impossibleclaim.
6.101 Thereis asecondpoint to bemade. These sme argumentsnot onIy
support thesonclusion thatno "rightd denuncîation...jie] impliedbythenature of the
treaty"buttheygo muchfurtherand excludeit absolutelyInthe presentcasethe words of
SirHumphrey Waldock areparticularlypt,forthiscaseconcernsa Treatythathas:
"...a definiteobjectandthe partiesto which must be assumedto have
intended the treaty continueinforceuntithatobjectwasachieved. In the
caseofthose rreatiestherecouldbenoimpliedrightofdenunciationS8."
6.102 And thereisa elementthat supportssucha conclusion. As Lord
McNairstated:
"One factor which would generallyindicate that a treatycuntitininno
express provision for terminationcan ody be terminatedby mutual
agreement is the fact that the treaty is in parexecuted and in part
executo~y~.~
To this headdedthe following:
67 Ernphasadded.
68 Yearfioof thInternationalLawCommission,19,oi.1p.100,para.5.
69
McNair,a.&., p.494. "Executed clausesareobviouslyincapabIeoftermination,and it folows that
the executoryclausesdso should nomdly be terminabIeody by mutriai
agreement7 "
And thisispreciselthesituationhere:when Hungar myadethedecisionto putan endto the
Treaty -and evenbeforethat,wha it decided tosuspend performanc uenderit-theTreaty
had in largepartbeen canied out. By May 1992, 90% ofthe workto be performedon
Slovak territorhadbeen completed.
6.103 The ecoIogicdabsurdityofHlrngary'ssupposedterminationsurpasses
evefiitseconomi absurdity:henHungarypurportedtu put an end tu the1977 Treaty, the
bypass canai had been drnost compIetelyfished, representinga huge excavatedand
reinforcedareaof over 4,000 hectares. The ecologicd catastrophof ths immense area
gougedoutofthe land,intendeto befiliedwith196 millioncubicmetresof water,but left
unfiIled,staggertheimagination.
6.104 IncompatibIcwith thenatureof the Treaty-andtotdly exclrrdedby
thestateof advancement ofthe work andthe dangersprezentwere ittu beabandoned - the
purportedterminationofthe 1977Treatyandisrelatedagreementscunstitrrredaviolationof
the obligationsby whichHungarywasbound. Underpresentdoctrine:
"ThepartyalIegingthatthe natureof thetreatyis sucasto implya rightof
denunciationorwithdrawaw l iilhavetheburden of establishithatit iso.
Itwould seemthat the implicatiocan ariseevenif the partiesdid notso
intend7."
The 1977 Treaty is an internationalagreementby virtue ofwhich both partieswere over
many years required tu expend substantid sums on large scale constmctions and
installations. A terminationtheTreaty prîoto theconclusionof the Pruject, necessarily
nuIIifiedthis immenseeffort, andthe partiesworrldbeenlefi with cunstmctions of great
cost,but deprivedof anyvalue. Inthesecircumstancesi,t cannotbe saidthat a right of
terminationcanbe implied.
70 -bid.,p. 512.
71 Uppenheim'9thed.,op.cii.1299,h.2. "The pnnciple ofpreclusion(estoppelis ageneralprincipleof law whose
relevmce ininternationalIawisgenerdljradmittedandhas beenexpressIy
recognUed by the InternationalCoufiof Justiceitseif inment casesT .3
UnderthisprincipIeapart iynot pemitfedtu takeup a Iegalpositiothat is
in contradictiowith itsown previous representationorconduct, when
anotherpartyhas beenledto assum obligationtowards,or anribute rights
to, thformer partyinreliancuponsuchrepresentation srconduct7'.Ifin
some legalsystems,suchas thecommonlaw system theapplicationofthe
principlmay to someextentbe dependent upon technicalr~les~~ ,he
foundationof theprincipleisessentiallgood faithand fairdeding,which
demand thata party shailnot be able to gain advantagefiom ils uwn
inconsistenci(dIeganscontrarianon audiendu sst)."
6.107 Hungary was bound tu aci in good faith iconformity with the
obligations tawhich it was subject hm the ves, outset. It remainî bound by them.
Hungary hasviolatcd these obligationsby suspendithem and by purportingto terminate
untlateralyheTreatyandrelatedagreements.Hence,Hungary hasviolaieda largenumber
ofassortedrightsbelongingtoSlovak biyvirtueofthesetreatyinstruments.
SEmron 3. Hun~an's Suspension, Abandonment of Performance and
Subsequent furported Terminationof the 1977 Treatv Violates
the NumeruusRi~htsof SIovakia
6.108 The G/N Project constitutesajoint investmenthavingbroad impacts
and airns:
- Itis along-tem Projectdesigned to have aprolongedimpact once
the works provided for inthe ,1977 Treaty are completed; the
executionofsuchworks isthereforenlyone aspectof thisTreaty;
- There are economic,ecological; political and socifacettso the
Project,theimpactof each owhich islongtem;
73
ArbitraiAwarmade bvtheKrnnof Suaion23 December1906Judmerrt,I.C.J.Rewrts. 1960,
~e~orts1461p.17atpp.23-32.pleofPreahVihear.PreliminaObiectionsJudgmentI.C.J.
14 InSpanishsystemsolawthe doctrisknownas"ladoctrinadloactopropios".
'' See,generally,CanadandDominion Su~aCo. v.CanadiaNational(WestIndies)Steamshi~s
-td.(1947Law ReportsAppeaCases, p.55. 1 - The Projeetisgovemed by acornplexof agreements (astu which,
-ee,SectionI above);
- Thecooperationofthe partiesiprovidedforboth inthe construction
ofthe G/NSystem and its subsequetperation;
-
TheProjectlaysdown'for thepartiea verycomplete and diversified
rangeofrightsandobligations.
6.109 Forthepurposesoftheensuing analysiandwith theaimof assisting
theCourtin deterniinhgthe multiplviolationbyHungary of theIegalobligationarising
hm the 1977 Treaty and its reIatedagreements,tvariousobligationsarebrokendown
below int oeparatecategories. Thus, the distinctionismade beiween "primary" and
"secondaryl'breachez. Hungary'sprimary breachescomprise its fadure tu respect its
obligationto constrtrctooperatemd tu maintainthe Systemtu protecttheenviromnent
and tufaciliatenavigatioOn theatherhand,Hungary'ssecondarybreaches arebreachesin
relatioto its dutiestu consuand tu enter into dialoguewith SIovaand to followthe
establisheprocedureswith respectto the settIerneofdisputesand the establishmenof
compensation.
A. Hungaw'sViolationof ItsPrimaw Obligations
Hungawts ConstructionObligations
6.110 Inaccordance withArticle5(5)(b)ofthe 1977Treaty:
"TheHungarianPartyihaIIberesponsiblefor:
1 The Dunakiliti-HnrSovead-water installationsonthe ribank ,n
Czechosluvak temitory, including the connecting weir and the
diversionarweir;
(2) The Dunakiliti-Hrov head-water installationsonthe right bank,in
Hungarianterirtory;
(3) TheDunakilitidam,inHrrngananterritory;
(4) Thetail-watercanalof theby-passcanainCzechoslovak territory; (5) Deepening of thebedofthe Danubebelow PaikoviEovo ,nHungarian
and Czechoslovak terrîtory;
(6) Improvement of the oId bed of the Danube, in Hungariari and
Czechosiovak teritory;
(7) Operationa elquipment ofthe GabEkovo -rem of Iocks(transport
equipment, maintenancernachineryin Czechoslovak tenîtory;
(8) The flood-cofitrI urksofthe Nagymaroshead-waterinstdIations in
the IowerIperdistrict,inCzechosiovate~tory;
The flood-controworksofthe Nagymaros head-waterinstallationisn
(9) theIowerIperdistrictinHungari tenritory;
TheNagymaros serieoflocks,in Hungari tenritory;
(10)
(11) Iocks,inHungarian territory;ed below the Nagymarossystem of
(12) Operationae lquipmentof theNagymarossystem of lock (transport
equipment , aintenancrnachineryi), Hungarîanterrory;
(13) Restorationofvegetationin~ungarid territory. "
6.1II Fiirther, Artici2(2) ofthe 1977 MutuaI AssistanceAgreement
provided that HungaryshouIdcany out variousworks:
"...onthe CzechosIovakside in theareaof the Iow &on river andat the
Gab6ikovostep atthe transitionsecfionadjacetothe taiwatercanal."
6.112 Theseprovisions werenot rnodifiedytheProtocols of October 1983
andFebmary 1989thatchanged theProjecttsirnetabler.
6.113 InChapterIIIab~ve'~,thedegrée of completion(orothenvis of)he
works to be carrieout by Hungaryis shown at themomentthesewereintempted inMay
1989. Thisrevealsthat someof the workswere toa largeextentcomplete(DunakiIiti-weir
on the Hungariantenitory - 90%; Dunakiliti-HruZorveservoiron the righbank - 85%-
76 IntheUniteNationsTrearSenestranslatifie~vorHungarianinab-artic(13)erroneousIy
appearas"Czechoslovak".
11 The definitivetirneaswasagreedtintkiIsastinsdent,appearasfie1stpageofthe
Protoco(hex 9).
7s 1
See,para3.25, seq. 6.118 Breaches ofitsobligationby Hungaryd , erivifiomnon-respect of
the overailconstructioscheduleannexe td the 7989 Protoc01and hm the detaiIed
working scheduleincludedinthe Joint ContractrraIParedetded in thetablereproduced
inhex 135.
6.119 Second,an appreciatioof Hungary'fsarluretomeet its obIigations
cannot be cmkd out hm the perspectivofa singlemoment in tirne. As notedabove,
Hungary'sperformancs eincethe beghing ofthe worh hasbeen ahistoryofdelayscausing
seriousdamage tuCzechosIovakia.
6.120 Third, asimplerecord of Hungary'sfailureto respectits obligations
arîsingfrom Arlicle5(5) ofthe 1977 Treaty and the time limits Iaiddown for their
completiondoes not takefui account ofthe importanceof the non-performanceof such
obligations. These "quantitative"breacheshave had extremelysevere "qualitative"
repercussionsnterrns of thperformanc oef the 1977 Treaty. TheJoinContractualPlan
providesforthe "timescheduleof the construction"". hasnot been possibleturespect
the time limitslaid dom due tu Hungws defici'enperformance. This document
enurnerate(at 10.2)the "conditiorisof keepingtermsand[thdecisivtimeschedule" and
inparticuIar,thdutyof
"... cProviding continuo~~sonstmctionworks on outlet and approach
canal,and permanentabundant supplyof gravel-sandon the dumping
ground81 .II
Hungary'sdelaysintheperformanco efitsconstruction obligatifsllowedbythecomplete
haltof al1its worksdeprivedCzechoslovakiaf indispensableuildinmaterialandforced
itto findcostlyreplacementmateriaslsewhere.
6.121 The mutuaiobjectives laid down by the parties in the Treaty
documentsconstitutelegal obligationsas discussedin Section 1 above. Such objectives
havenot been realiseddueto thedefaultof Hungary. Moreover,asis explainein greater ,
detaiinChapter IX below,the expectedbenefitofthe Projecintems of theproductionof
peakelectrictand improvednavigationhavenot beenredisedor ody tua limiteddegree.
80 Anriex3
81 -bidatp.IO. 6.122The GN Systemis a projecthe separateeIementsofwhich fonn an
integralsystem t:efailureto rediseoneelementinevitabfhasnegativerepercussionson al1
the rest.Inparticulara,stheCzechoslovak Prime Ministerreminded the Hungarian Prime
Ministeron 23 April1992:
"..theNagyrnaros damformsan inseparable artofthe whole system of
locks...2.I
6.123 Hungary'srefisal toconstmct theNagymms step - jüst aits refusal
to putthe nearIycompletedDrrnakilitiweirinto operationandits refusato carry orrthe
necessary channe1excavationworks in the Danuberiverbed at the Sap (PdkoviEovo)
confluence -has prevented the Projecrfrom conformingtu the agreed specificationsand
cauîed considerabledamage fksttutheCzechoslovik and thentuthe Slovak
6.124 From a more generaipointof view, the fact thaHungar yas not
carriedouttheworks thatitwas obligedto hasdso ledto seriousrepercussioninterms of
itsotherobligations-interms ofmaintenance o,peration,theprotectionothe environment
and improvemen tf navigationThis isdiscussebySlovakia ingreaterdetailbelow.
The Obli~ations of Maintenanceand Orieration
6.125 In its purportcd unilateralternination of 1977 Treaîy, Hrngq
hasody partidly depriveditseIfof thuse and benefrtof the System,the equalsharîngof
which was foreseen by Article9. Hrrngarymay sharein the benefitsto the environment
brought about as a result of Vanant "CH and simiIarIfrom the wnsiderably improved
navigationconditionsin theBratislava-Sa(pPalkovirovo)sectionof the Danube. On the
otherhand, the unilateraldecisionstakenby Hungaryhaveimposedconsiderable additional
chargeson Slovakia.
6.126 Article1O(1)of the 1977 Treatyforeseesthemutual managementof
the G/N System - bymeans ofthePlenipoteniarieass provided for inArticle3(3)(b) of the
1977 Treaty andArtides4(2) and 4(6)of the1979 JointStatuteAgreement. Thisprinciple
82 -ee,para4.79abovea,ndAmex 108.
83
-ee,para5.08, g., above.hasimportantfinancialconsequenc aescafefullyregutatedby Article 72(1) ofth1977
Treaty:
"Operatkg, maintenance(repair)andreconstmtion costsof jointly-uwned
works ofthe System of Loch shaIIbe borne jointlyby the Cortiracting
Partiesiequd mesure."
6.127 Sinc 13 May 1989,Hungary hasnot contributeto managemena tnd
operatingcosts, whichhave thusbeen bornesolely by Czechoslovakia.Fromthis has
resultedasevereprejudicetoSlovakiaw, hichcannotbutgrowin thefuture:
- The costsof operationand maintenancestrictosensuwill evidently
accumulate;
- The imitable repairs necessay for the upkeep and sdeîy of the
constructionshould be equdly sharedbetween thepartieswhereas
thesecosts will faIsoIdyto Slovakia udess Hungaty accepts its
share;
-
The cosrsofthe rnairrtenanocetheDanuberiverbed, in relationto
which Article16of the 1977Treaty foreseesthejoint responsibility
of the partieswiIlincreaseandaccordingthe shareofSlovakiawill
increasalso.
6.128 Hungary'f sailureto fulfitsoperationandmaintenance obligations
hasa furtheraspect.
6.129 AIthough not expressiyprovidedfur in the1977 Treaty, iis cIear
thatthe partieshad obIigationsrelatituthe maintenanceand conservation of the works
during the construction phasealso. It would be againstthe pdutyeto acingood faith
if one or both parties aIIowed the cornpieted works or those stilin the course of
constructiontudeteriorat-wherherwittinglyor through negligenceOn severaloccasions,
Hungaryhasshownitself tobe awareof thisobligation.'Thus:
- Mer the firstunilateralsuspensioofworksannouncedin 1981 by
Hungary, Hungary declaredthat within this period,conservation workson the objectsmder constructionthe riverbedand dams on
the Danube wudd beperformed odyg4.
- SimilarlyinJanuaryand March1990, the Hungarian Prime-Minister
informed the CzechoslovakPrime Ministerthat hiscountrywould
stopaliworksexceptfortheconservationand maintenanceworkss5.
6.130 Thisis not whathappened.To thecontrary,Hungary limiteitselfto
stoppingal1workin progres withoutconcedg itselfwith theconservatioof theworks
already carriedout, the upkeepof which has fallensuleon CzechosIovakiaand then
SIovakia.As SIcivakihas indicatethishasbeen aparticulariyheavychargeinreIatioto
the maintenanceand conservationofthe headwatercanal,already IargelycompIetewhen
HungaryabruptIy broughtdicooperationtu anend.
6.131 Furthemore, on 7 Ju1y1993,theHungarian ParIiamentaIIocated in
the 1993 budgetthesum of 800millionforintthatismore thanUS$ 7.8 million,fothe
dismantlingof the cofferdam atNagymaros (k the dam structureessentialforthe
constructioof thestep)andfortherestoratioof thesurroundingarea.Thisdecisiondoes
not appearto havebeenimplernented at themoment of the submissionofthisMernorial.
Nonetheless,aspointedout intheSlovakForeignMinistryNoteofProtestof 13July 1993,
the implementationofthisdecisiotvouldconîtitutea new andgrave breachof the 1977
Treatyand, inparticuiar,of Article 8(w)hichprovidesthat theNagymarosstepshdI be
thejoin ptroperîyof the parties. InsoasrHungq argues that joint propertdoes mt
extendtu remporarystnrcrrrres,thicIearInot acceptablsincethe cufferdamiaimed at
protecting a permanent structure. Moreover, this joint ownership extonthe works
dready completed andthus tothe coffedam:Hungarycannotjeupardise suchworksnor
destroy the coffer dam without the agreement of the co-owner, Slovakia, which
categoricallyrejectsthe suggestthatthecofferdamisnotjoint property becauseof its
temporary nature.
84 Annex449.
85 Annexe79 and81. Obli~ationsRelatinvtuFisheriesand the Environmeni
6.132 AIthoughin facntomorethan a pretext,Hungaryhas with insistence
invoked enviromentd considerationinan attempttujusti@ ifspurported terminationof
the 7977 Treaty. Ln th, theseisa curious distortion of real-tone ofthe principaI
objectiveofthe GM Projecas it deveIopeWB preciselythe protectiand improvement
ofthe environment,notablythroughfloodcontrolthe revitalisationof the driedup sidearm
systemandthe improvemenot fsurfaceandgroundwater.It isthusthe abandonment ofthe
Projectwhichdealsa severeblow to environmentaplrotectioandwhich wodd havebeen
almostfatalbutfortheimplementationof Variant"CM.
6.133Inthe expansionand completion of the provisionsof the 1976
Boundary Waters Management Agreement, Chapter V of the 1977Treaty is devoted to
"Water Reserve ManagementFunctions". In particuIar,Article73 relato"FloodControI
andIce Discharge"and providesinparagraphI that:
"Flood-controloperations shdl be carriedout by the water-resource
managementauthont iesofthe ContracthgParties".
Article15,reIahg to"ProtectionofWaterQuality"p, rovides:
"1. The ContractingParties shall ensurby the meansspecified in the
jointcontractuaplan,that the qualityof waterin the Danubeis not
impaired asa result otheconstructionand operation of the System
oflocks.
2. The monitoringof waterqualityin connectionwith theconstruction
andoperationoftheSystemof Lucks &al1be ched outon the basis
of the agreements on frontier waters in force between the
Governments of he ContractingPartie."
6.134 Itir quite clex from these provkions that the parties intenaed
continuous cooperatiorwith thview tu protecringthe environmenrwithin the framework
of the existine;Proiect. Inotsdisputedthat,asHungaryhas been happy to repeat,the
protectionof the environmentis the joint responsibilityof the parties;but tcannot
constitutea pretextfor the terminationof the 1977 Treaty. To the contrary, t1977
Treatycreatestheinstitutionalframeworkwithinwhichthe consultationsthe partiemust
take placeandwithinwhichtheirdecisionsmustbetaken. 6.135 Bythetime ofthesignaturofthe 1977Treaty,animpressivenumber
of environmen telatestudieshadaireadybeencarried outa6,.Mer its signature,other
studieswereundertakenand oneimportanptart oftheparties'discussionswas devotedto
the protectionand improvement of the environment - notably througtithe ESTC
Cornmittees,meetings between Plenipotentiarieand numerousexpert commissions;
moreover,new agreementswereforeseen. In particula,iscussionbetwee nhe parties
relatintu environmentalprotectioand water qualitcontinuedrightupto onemonth
beforeHungary'sunilateraluspensi ofworks on 13 May 1989~'. Howevcr,Hungq
prtventedsuch discussionhm coming to fnritiunbrefUsin gn 3 May 1989tosign a
protocolrecordingaproposalto prepareaspeîialagreementon water qualit$', although
sometimelaterit wasonce more Hungary whichdidnot hesitatetmake thecontinuation
ofworks subjecttosimilanegotiations.
6.136 Unlike Hungary ,eitherCzechoslovakianor Slovakiahas ever
refusednegotiatiunonthi issue. inparticulaaftwHungq had piacedCzechoslovakia
before thefai accomplis of the suspension, abandonmentof works and purponed
terminatioof the 1977Treaty,theCzechosIovak authoriticontinuousIyindicatetheir
readmes todiscussthepotentiddangers tothe envirurunentdeged byHungary and tu
impiemen togetherthemeans torernedysuchdangersasmighrbe disclosed.Onthi point,
itis of interaisoto notethat,inspiof thedifficulteconomand hanciai positionthat
this caused, Czechoslovakiashowed itself to be readyto study the environmental
considerationisnvokedby Hungarinitsdesirto acceleratheProjecttimeschedulefrom
1985~'.
0.137 By its purpunectierminatofnthe1977Treaty,Hungarybruughr.to
an abruptendthe couperationinstitutedby tTrearywîthaviewto the protedion othe
environment- cooperation which CzechuçIovaforits partwas dwaysmore thanwilling
togive.
86 -Seepara. 2.1m., above.
$7
a, para3.14,seq.above.
88 Seepara.3.24,sa.ahve.
-
89 % para3IO, S.,above. 6.138 Furthemore, in notcompleting itsconstnrctionworks, Hungary
introduceda seriousthreatu the environmentthe consequeno fes hch could notbe
dedt withsavebythe impIementatioof Varia "nCtu.
6.139 In the eventHungary stoppedal1works on 20 July1989. At this
date,thesituatiowas asfoilows:
- TheGabEikov otepwaspracticallycomplete,althoughtheturbines
werenot yetinplace;
- The DunakiIitiweirwasata shdar stateofcompIetion;
- Theheadwater cd was complete;
- TheNagyrnaros steponthe otherhand,wasonly20%finished;
- Hungaryhadnotcompleted theexcavationof the tailwatcanalon
CzechosIovaktenitory nor comenced the excavationworks in its
sectu orfthe Danube,riorthe replationof theriverbedas itwas
requiredtudo underArticl5(5)(b)ofthe 1977Treaty.
6.140 It is importanto dweIIon the consequences of this situatioto
understandthe realecologicacatastrophe thatwoddhaveresultedifthe workshad been
lefiinthistate:
1
- Works ona vastconstructionsitewouldhavebeenbrought toa halt,
leaving thousands of hectares of agriculruraIunuseableand a
massivescaron the Imdscapein tems of the huge but rrselessasphdt
and concretestructures;
The floodprotection, which waone of the principaaims of the
Project,wouldnothavebeen realised; - The water IeveIof theDanube WOU Id havecontinutd to drop as a
resultofthe siinkiriverbeddue, iturn t, the bedloadgrave1being
trappedinvariousAustrim dam projectsupstream;
- And, asa consequence,the Danube sidearms would havereceived
lessand lesswaterflow,deprivingthefloodplainwoodlandsof water
andcondemnin gheseto agradua 1isappearance.
- The irrigationof the region,whether on Slovak or Hungarian
temtory,wouldhavebecomeeven moredifficult;
6.141 Thereis no doubtthattu a largdegee theçe dramaticconsequences
havebeenavoided or,atleastIimitedbythe impiementationofVariant"Cu. However, such
impiementationhasbeen atthesole expenseof Slovakia.What ia more, thisconsideration
becomes relevant wk it isa questionof assessingHungaxy'sbreaches of its treaty
obligatîunqand inthisrespectthereisriodoubtthat,inuniIateraIIysuspending,bandoriing
its performanceand then purportingtorenninate the1977 Treaty, Hungary has seriously
breachedits obligationsintems of the protectionand improvemenofthe environmeniand
its dutiesrelatitothecorrespondingrightstoSlovakia.
6.142 Hungary's deficientperformancealso constitutes a breachof its
obligationsin relationto the Danube Fisheriesand, in particular,Article3 and 5
thereforegO .ungary'srefusalto take partin the irnprovementsenvisagedby the 1977
Treaty and,in particulathose concerningthe revitalisatiof the side arm systemsis a
breachof thisobligationwhichis referrta byArticle20 of th1977 Treaty.
Obli~ations ReIatingto Navigation
6.143 Article18 of the 1977Treaty, whichfums ChapterVI thereof, deals
witb "navigation" and referback tu "obligations previousiyassumed by the Contracting
Parties" andin garticuitu Articl3 of the 1948 DanubeConvention. Under this article,
the partiescomrnittedthemçelves not ody "tumaintaintheir sectionof the Danube in a
navigableconditionforriver-goingvessels"but also"tocary out the wurksnecessary for
90 RelevantpassagfromArlicl3sand5may befoundquoteabwe atparas6.51and6.52above.the maintenanceand improvemen tf navigationcondition^"^^. purportingto terminate
the 1977 Treaty,Hungary hasfailedto meetthese obligationswhich &se fiom the 1948
Danube Convention,the 1977Treaty and dso the 1976Boundq WatersManagement
Agreement.
6.144 Article13(1ofthisIast~greemkt pruvides:
"The competentauthorities of the Contracthg Partiesshd maintain and
mark the wateway and mark the navigation route on the Danube in
accordancewiahrecommendationo sftheDanube Commission ".
6.145 The Danube Commission has adopted numerous such
recommendations. Inthefirstplace,it is importato note thatin annexTI tothe 1948
DanubeConvention itself(whichformsanintegralpartoftheConvention):
"..theContractingPartiesagreethatit is thegeneinteresto maintainthis
sectoringoodnavigablecondition."
-9cond it must beremembered that thCommissiunha "recommended" thatthe minimum
navigabledepth of theDmbe in the CzechosIovak-Hungaria nectorbe 2.5 rnin naturd
sectionsand3.5 m inartificîdsection.92
6.146As the Hungarian and CzechusIovakrepresentatives wrote to the
DanubeCommission,the GINSystern:
"..is situatinthesection oftheDanub etrkm 1860-1657andrepresents
a technicalandeconomic inseparableunit.The construction of the whole
SystemwilIremovethepresent~unfavourac bolnditionfor navigatiointhis
section (wheretheaverage depthis only 18dmandduring low discharges
onIy14dm)andwheretheformation of shallowwaterhindersthenavigation
of hundredsofshipsfromal1Danubian co~ntnes"~~.
91 -eepara.5.47eta.,ahve.
92 Annex 14.
93
hex 135. 6.147 Asof 1977,the DmubcCommissionconsidered that:
"Surle secteurtchécoslovaco-hongro is,secteurentreRajka etGünw y
compris, l'uniqueet rationnel moyend'obtenir les gabarits de chenal
recommandés pour ce secteur est la construction de centrales
hydrauliques .g4
Translation:
"IntheCzechoslovak-Hungaris ector,includinthe sectorbetween Rajka
and Gonyü, the soland lagicalmeansofobtaininthe recomrnendedchannel
dimensio nor thissector isthrorrgh the constructioof the hjrdraulic
worka."
The pian formajor works, adopted in applicationofArticle 8 ofthe 1948 Danube
Conventionduringthe XXXVsessionofthe Commission, specificdy approvedtheGlN
Systernwhich:
". améliorerles conditionsde la navigationsun secteurde 200 km.de
long,de Bratislaà~uda~est~'."
Translation:
"...willimprove the navigation conditions on a 200km section, from
Bratislavato Budapest."
The Commi~ron reviewedtheseobçervaionsin 1984%.
6.148 The Danube Commission has implicitly condemried Hringary's
interruption of the works. In the information rdease reiatito the temination of
constructionworksatNagymarosandthe delayinthe cumpIetionof the GabEikovo section,
itisstatethat:
"The constructionwas unanimouslyincludedby Danubianstates in the Plan
of basic works geared to achevernent recornmendedprofiles of the
navigationroute, hydrotechnicaland otherconstructions onthe Danube in
the period1981 -1990 (DWSES 42/13). The PIm of basicworkswas setupinaccordance with Mide 81b of the
Convention on the NavigationRegime on the Danubeand approvedby the
decisionof thesecond sessionof thDanube Cornmission(DWSES 42f42).
This plan assumes the exwution ofhydrotechnicd wurkr by dl Danubian
Stateinordertuachievethe depthsand widthsofthe navigatioroutedong
thewhoIe navigationroutinaccordance withRxommendationsconcerning
profiIesof thnavigationroute, hydrutechnicand otherconstructionson
the Danube,approvedby theDanubeCommission in197997."
6.749 Inthesame way, themeeting oftechnicalexpertsoftheCommission
on 7-15 December1992rejected Hungary'asssertionand:
"..a relevéque la satisfactiondeexigences des Recommandationsen
vigueur a Petablissementdes gabarits du chenal, des ouvrages
hydrotechni eqtaetressur IeDanube,constituela garantipour que les
conditionsnécessaireàslanavigationsoientassurée.'
Translation:
".hasfoun dhat the satisfacofthe requirerneninthe recommendations
in force for the establishment of navigation channel dimensions,
hydrotechriicandother workson theDanubeconaitutes the guaranreethat
thenecessarynavigationconditionsmabe assured."
6.150 Hungary'isnterruptioonf theworkshasgiven risto numerousother
protests. Thus, as noted at paragraph2.83 above, the Union Ouest-Europeenne des
Chambres de Commerceet d'Industriedes régionsrhénane r,honadiennet danubienneb, y
itsresolutioof 16February 1990,hasdemanded" ...lareprisedestravauxde construction
du projetcommun tchécoslovaquo-hongois~ab~ik~vo-~agyrnaros .~ Irunderlinedthe
indispensabInatureofthe worksso astu enabIenavigatiotobenefithm the %ne-Main-
DanubeIink asmadepossiblebythe openingofthe Main-Danubecanal Inrhesamevein, in
anarticlepublisheas aroficid documentofthe DanubeCommission,the AustriarSociety
of RiverandMaritimeNavigationwruteinDecember 1990:
98 Annex15.
99 Annex31. "L. aituationestencorepire sur le secteurtcheco-slovaco-ho nugroise
Danube où durantla dernièreécennilee niveaud'eaudans lechenaln'apas
atteint 2,5m au cours d'un tiers de l'année. Tandis que la partie
tchécoslovaqu emodifié ses décision,eprenantles travauxinterrompu s
la centralehydrauliqee Gabeikovo, quiétaitàpeuprès terminé de, côté
hongroi les travauxsont restésinterrompujsusqu'iprésenett, suiteà la
dédion du litdufleuve, à l'existencdu canal de construction,des
barragesetc.Iesprofondeursnavigables, ui n'étaiteja passatisfaisantes,
ont encore baisséde 50 cm. C'estnotammentBudapest, où siège la
Commission du Danube, qui n'est pasà mêmede trouver une solution
satisfaisanpourIesecteurdeNagymaros 19.tt
Translation:
"The situationieven worsein the Czechoslovak-Hungaria sectorof the
Danubewhereduringthe last decadethe level of water inthe navigation
charnelbas not reached 2.5mduringone third of the year. While
Czechoslovakia has alteredits decisionsand is continuingthe nearly
completedworks intemptedonGabEikovo o,ntheHungarian sidetheworks
haveremained intempted to dateand, dueto the workson the riverbedto
the construction ofthcd, the damsetc., the navigabledepths,aIready
unsatisfactoxy,havedroppea &ber SClcm.It isnotablyBudapest,theseat
of the DanubeCommission, which has notfuund a çatisfacto~ solution for
the Nagyrnarossection."
For its partthe DanubeCommission ,tiits49tsession,adoptedin April1991 Regdation
DWSES49124which stressesthe necessityof striccornpliancewith recommendations
concerriinprofileof thenavigatioroute.
6.151 The opening of the bypasscanalhas enabledthis situationto be
remedied in par- inas much as the GabEkovo step andthe canaiitseldo reçpond inall
pointstu the requirementsarising fiom the recommendationsofthe Danube Commission,
recommendationçwhîch Hungary and Czechoslovakiawere bound to cornpIy with in
accordancewirh Anicie 13 of the 1976 Boundary Waters Management Agreement and
Article18ofthe 1977 Treaty. Fordl that, suchimprovemeritidue soleltu the effortsof
CzechoslovakiaandSlovakia, and in noway exoneratesHungaryfrom itsresponsibilities:
Hungarydidnot complete its partof the worksthatengenderedthisimprovementandhas
not fulfillitobligations,notably in theNagymarossectionwhichnowconstitutesthelast
seriousimpedimentto navigatioontheDanube. B. The Breachof Secondam Obli~ations
6.152 The 1977Treaty and its relateinstruments did notjust impose
"primaryo bligationsonthe parties, nderwhichtheywerebound to achiwe certainresuls
withinspecifiedtime limits. Italso containednumerous"secondary" obligationswhich
regulatedthe parties'cooperation. By its purportedtermination of the 1977 Treaîy,
Hungary hasalsobreached its subsidiaobligations, hetherintermsof itsdutyto consult
- or tosubmitto a specifiedregimeforthesettlementofdisputesorintemis of compensation
forthe damage shichithas caused toSIovakia.
The Du@ toConsult;andthe SetfIementofDisputes
6.153 The 1977Treaty reglates the cooperatioof thepartieswith aview
to therealisatioofthejoint investment:
- Article3,as cornpletedbythe 1979Joint StatuteAgreement,invests
the~leni~otentiariewsithageneralresponsibilitorthe executionof
the 1977Treatythroughthe intermediaryofthejoint agencies;
* Article6(2) gives them the powerto superviseand coordinate "the
activiîiesoftheinvestmentagenciesofthe ContractingParties"; and
- Article27 provides:
"1. Thesettlement ofdisputesinmattersrelatinto therealization
and operationofthe Systemof Locksshall be afunction of
the governmendtelegates[Plenipoentiarie.]
Ifthegovemmemdelegatesareunable tu reach agreementon
2. the rnattersin dispute, they shdI refer them tu the
Govements of the ContractingParties furdecision"
6.154 This last provisionhasa particularimportancein thecontextof the
current dispute. As the Court.explainein the CaseconcemineUnitedStatesDiplornatic
andConsularStaff inTehran,itis preciselywhendiiculties aisthatprovisionsofthistype
havetheirgreatest importance'01Whateverthe motivesnow advancedby Hungaryinan
'O' UnitedStateDidomatic and~onsularStaffinTehran,Judgrn..C.J.Re~or1980,p.3,at p.
28.attempt tu justiQ its purported teminaofothe 1977Treaty, these couIinno rnanner
justifytheneglecoftheprocedureforthesettlernentf diferencdesoprovidecltherein.
6.155 Hungary hasconsistentlrefbsedto conformto this procedurein
spiteoftheinsistendemando sfCzechoslovakia.
6.I56 More generallyfHrrngarhas inal1casesacted unilateraland has
continudIy shiedawayfiom al1 proposds for discussionmade by CzechosIovaluae,ven
though, as recordedin the Joint ContractualPlan: "istu be noticed that the whole
rediition of [the GM Project] wouId requirea close interstatecooperation, precise
specificatiof the worksanddutiesof respectiveparties,especidin[the]caseof works
whichwillbe ched out bytheHungarian partyontheterritoryof[CzechosIova 'zi"a]
6.157 Inthisway -andthese areno morethanexamples:
- Asfrom 19 May 1992,the HungarianGovernrnentabolishedthepost
ofPlenipotentiary;
-
The successivedecisionfor the suspensionof works were taken
without any warning and without the dightest consuItation with
CzechosIovakiainspiteof ssubsequentvigorousprotests;
-
Hungarylirnitedthe powerof its delegates,leavingthesewith the
powersolely tonegotiatethe terminatofnthe1977Treaty;
- The sameyear,Hungaryopposedthe creation of a joint commission
proposedbyCzechoslovakia;
- On 17 May 1992Hungary notified Czechoslovaa kiathe EC
Commissionof its refusato take pariinatripartite meetingonthe
environment,schedu1edforthe fuIIuwingdaat~ienna"~;
102 Annex3, par10:"Realization"
'O3 See,ara4.93above. - Hungq imposedpre-condifioris tu thecreationofan EC tripartite
commission,proposedon an unconditionibasis by Czechoslovakia
andthenbySlovakia.
6.158 The recourseto theCourtwillnow no doubtenablethe settIementof
this disputeinthe appropriatemanner. This is warmlywelcomedby Slovakia. This
however does not changethefact that Hungary,by its refisal oal1dialogueand by its
rejectionsofthe proceduresfor consultatiodand settlementof disputesenshnnedin the
- 1977 Treaty,hasbreached both its treatyobligationsandthe generadutyof good faith
imposedonany Stateintheperformance dits internationalobligations1".
The Obli~ationof Comtiensai fon
6.159 SlovakiawiI1indicateinChapterIX below the consequenceswhich
resuIhm Hungary's responsibilitaccordingto the generalprincipleapplicablto State
responsibilitninternationallw.
6.160 .Itis sufficientat this stagto underline thatthe dutyto make
reparatioisthe objectof anexpressprovisionintheform of Article26 of the 1977 Treaty,
relatingto the "exclusiveliabilityofthe ContractingPartiesand paymentof damages";In
accordance with this provision, each of the parties is excIusivelyresponsibfor the
execution(ornon-execution)of theworksincumbent onitand forthe functioningandgood
maintenanceofthe workssituated onitsterritorand eachmust,separatelyand exclusively,
"make compensationfor damagewhich results hm gctsgiving rise tu their excIusive
responsibili~". Thisobligatiisfurtheexpound indArticie12(7)whichprovides:
arisingfrom operatingescosts are, soufar as possible,settfediby workes
performed within the frarneworkof the annualoperating,maintenanceand
reconstmction plan of the System of Locks. The procedure for the
settlementof differencestilloutstandinshallbe determined by agreement
betweenthecompetent authoritis ftheContractinPgarties".
104 -e, NircIearTests{AustrY.FrancelJudmnenr.LC.1.Report1974,p.253 ap.268:"oned
the basic principiesgoverîhecreatiand performancof Iegd abIigationç,whatever kir
sou~cei,the principlgod faith;eealsuBorderandTransbordeArmed Actions{Nicaramnra
V.Honduras)J.ttnsdrctionandAdmrssibJ.ud~ment.LCReports, 198p.69arp.105. 6.161 In spite of the repeated demands of Czechosluvakia and then
Slovakia,Hungary has cmsisteritly rehsed - except in the 1977Mutual Assistance
Agreement and the Protocolsof 1983and 1989- to satistheseprovisions.
6.162 At thetime ofthe bilaternlegotiationwhichtook place inBudapest
on 22 April1991,theHungarian sidediddeclarethat itwas "conscious aboutthe factthat
the Czechoslovak sidehad perfomed moreworkand,by hal accounting,the Hungarim
sidewillhave to pay thedaference inco~ts"'~'.Butto this day, ithastakenno steps in
furtheringthis acknowiedgmtnt,inspitof the continudreminder sfCzechoslovakia.
-6.163 SimiIarlyin 198 Iand 1983, afterHungary*~various deIaysin and
interruptionsofthe works,CzechosIovakia had demanded compensationfor its resultirig
damagesio6. In thesame veh, immediatelyfier the unilaterailntmption of the 1977
Trearyby Hungaq in1389,theCzechosIovak Governent reactedbyreserving the rîghto
claimdamages107. Thispositionwas maintained afterHungaryhad -firstinlu@,rhen in
October 1989 -hardened its positioandextended itsunilateralsuspensionof the 1977
Treaty. Thuson18August1989,in a Note Verbalet,heCzechoslovak MinisterforForeign
AEairsindicatedthatCzechoslovakia:
"..will calculatthe extentof damage sofar caused tothe Czechoslovak
SocialistRepublic by the steps of the Hungarîanside and daim their
compensation.
The Governent of the CzechosIovakSociaIistRepublic atthe sametime
reservesitseltherightto daim compensationfor the damagewhich &II be
caused in the futureas a remit of undaterd decisiansofthe Hrrngarian
People'sRepubric0%.4,
6.164 Although in 1991 Hungary appeared toshow some hesiration and tu
envisagethe discussionof thequestionof compensation t laterofferednoresponse tothe
pressingdemandsfrom theCzechoslovak andSlovakauthorities.As Slovakiahasexplained
above,such a refusalconstitutenotonlythe breachof theobligationon anyStatein virtue
'O5 See,para.4.6,bove,andAnnex87.
'Oh Annexes136and44.
107
% para.4.09above.
'O8
para4.37ahve,and Amex 59.ofthefundamenta principlofgeneralinternationlaw but, inthe presecase,isalso the
breachof a treaty obIigationacceptedby Hungaryin thfum ofArticle 26ofthe 1977
Treaty.
6.165 By vhc of Article2(2)of the Specid Agreement, the Court is
"requestedtudetermiriethe Iegdconçequenc iesi,dingthe rightsand obIigatiforthe
PartiesarisingfiumitIudgment"on theIegdityofthebehaviour ofthePartieswith respect
to the1977 Treaty,the rulesand principlof generalinternationllw, aswell as other
treatiewbich the Courtmayfina dpplicable.InSlovakia'opinion,in orderto fulfiits
mission,the Court must on the one hand declarethatthe 1977 Treaty andits related
instrumentrsemainfullyappiicabandinforcebetweenthePartiesand,ontheotherhand,
accordto Slovakiafullandcomplete reparatioforthedarnages whichithas sufferedasa
resultofHungary'ms ultipandFave breachesofits treatyobIigatio~is.TheserequestswiII
be the objecofChapter TX. But firsit iessentiato addressthe questioas tu whether
certainactions ofCzechodovakia,includingthe implernentatofnVariant"Cuo,rcertain
factsarisinghm simationsexteriortuthe Parties, muuntedtu.circnrnstancesabsolving
Hungary ofany IiabiIiunderintemationallawforthe conductit adopted. THE LAWFULNESSOFVARIANT "CM
CHAPTERVIL
Hungary contendsthat VariantClw'asthe reasonimoved fiom
7.01
suspensionandabandonmen of itperformanc uenderthe1977Treatyto its purported
termination. But its claimto theunlawfulnessfVarian "CtMareadvance asif the
1977 Treaw does not existFrom Hungary'sperspective,iisapparentlyenough to
assertheundesirabiliof the1977 Treaty. Thidlows, inHrrngaryerseq Varian"Ca
tobe andysedas iftheTreatyhadneverexisted.
7.02 Variant"Cu was in facta rehictanresponseby Slovakiato a
persistentpatterof treatyviolatioby Hungary, coupIedwith a resolute failbye
Hungaryto substantiatai the scientificle-whetherby publishinitsownstudies,
commissioningstudies,orbyagreeingwithCzechoslovakijointlyto refthe matterto
internationalxpert- itsinvocationofimminent ecologicadisaster.The Iegalityof
Variant"C" fds tobetestedagainsthat backgrounandbyreference to theobligations
mutuallyundertakeninthe1977 Treatyandtherelatesubsequenatgreements.Slovakia
wiIIdemonstratethe IawfuInessof Varian"C" inrelatiotu thesethe reIevantIegd
yardsticks.
7.03 At thesame timeSIovakiawiIIdsoshow that noperemptoryniIe
of law rendered the Treaty invalidand thus irreIevanas a framework for the
considerationof Variant"CM.Slovakiawillfbrther show that, evenwere the Treaty
obligationsnoatthe heart of tissueVariant"Cuis stilllawfulby referetoeother
principleof internatiollaw
SECTION 1. The Background toVariant"C" Recailed
7.04 The fachal backgroundtu the introduction of Variant "Cuhas
been expIained inChapters IV and V above. Hungary's repeated and continuing
breachesof itsobligations undethe 1977Treaty andrelated instmments have been
demonstratedinChapterVI above.
7.05 Slovakiahere recalls that by meaof the 1977 Treatyit was
agreedto addressavarietyof problemsrelatitotheDanube -the inabilitoprovidethe navigation deptk required bythe DaniiCommission;the need tu provideflood
protection, al1other previousmeasureshavingprovedinsuffkienandthe realitythat,
neitherCzechosIovakianor Hungq being richcouritfies,these objectimuid ody
hancidy be redisedifthepowerputeittiaoftheDanube waseficientlyutilisand the
managementofwaterçuppIie mprwed.
7.06 As hasben elaborated abovein Chapter III C,zechoslovakia
accomplishedaround 90%of itworksunder the 1977Treatyin theperiodfrom 1978to
1989. By contrast,Hungary made littleprogressuntd1981,askedfor and secured a
delayin the timetabforconstructionin1983,thenaskedforand, on6 Febniary 1989,
securedm accelerationintherevisedtimetablefoconstntction.Hungarythenreversed
itsposition oncemoreand refisetu proceed withitobiigationsunder th1977 Treaty
as agreed withn the revisedtimetable. Thiscaused rrnfavciurablcnditionson the
Danube and Iossand damage tu CzechosIovakia.Equdy Hungary's demandin early
1989for an accelerationdspresentedproblemsfor Czechoslovakia.
7.07 A mere 96days afterthe agreementtospeedup the construction,
the Hungarian Government unilaterally, and without consultation, suspended the
constructionofthe Nagymarosstep for two months. On 20 July 1989, Hungary
announced that it was stoppingpreparations to dam up the DanatDunakiliti.This
renderedwithout purposethe work inprugess rhroirghautthe GlN System. Hungary
was clearlyinformecithat it wainviolatioof itçobligationsand that anyaction by
Hungary carrsing furtherdamage would necessitate the putting into operation of
ternporarymeasrrreson CzechosIovak temtory tu redise the quantitiesof waters
GabEikuvo provided for in the Joint ContractualPlan relatingtu the ~reat~'32On
Octaber 1989, theHungarianParliamentorderedthe stopping of the Nagymaros river
step construction andauthoristhe preparatioofa proposaitoalter the 1977 Treaty.
Itsuggestedin aNote Verbaleof 30 November 1989 that the GabEkovosite mightbe
brought to conclusion, but the Nagymaros site abandonedby rnutual agreement2.
Hungarythuswas stillpreparedto accept the bypascanalandother associatedworks,
as envisaged in the 1977 Treaty, provided always that ilsconcerns about peak
production couId bmet. Czechuslovakia,fahm happy,indicatedareadinesstotalk
1 Seee.g, par4.38above.
2 -eepara4.50above. - 281 -
and as a proofof itsserîousnesstoppeddesignwork on the provisionalsoluti on
Slovakterritory.As soon as it was apparenthatCzechosIovakiawas prepared, albeit
reluctantly,odiscussthifurtherrequestforanalterationtothe 1977Treaty,Hungary
thenlostinterestinitsownproposal,andwithdrew itinJanuary1990). Theinstructions
of theHungarian ParliamenstinceApril1991 have been very clear:Hungary was to
negotiatenothingsavethecancellatioofthe 1977Treaty andthedrawingup of anew
treatytu restoretheterratoitsorighd state.
7.08 Fromthe tirneof Hungarytsunilaterdstoppage in May 1989,
CzechosIovakia had sorrght tu havethe allegedenvironmentalproblemsobjectively
specifieand proceduressetinmotion -includiigbyreferencto expertthird parti-tu
resolvethem. Throughout themeetingsof governmentad leiegatîonsof199 2Hungary
insistedonly upon a rightof people to their"originaenvironment" and hence the
cancellatioof the 1977 Treaty. InApril1991 theHungarian delegationhad refused
bilateraliscussionsatthe expertlevel. InJuly1991 theHungarÎandelegationrefused
the formationof a tripartitecommission,includingEC experts,to report on the
environrnentdimpac otfcompletingtheG/N Project. Indeed,the Hungariandelegation
madecIear thatits ody mandate was totemirnatethe 1977Treaty; and that it would
enter bilaterd taks wiCzechosiovakîa(presurnablaysa first stto this endody if
CzechosIovakiaalso çtoppedal1itsown works under the 1977Treaty. These matters
arerecountedindetailatparagraph4.72,etseq.,above.
7.09 Czechoslovakiawas naturally not willingto join Hungary in
rejectinthe legal obligationsmutuallyundertaken. It was apparent,given the clear
refusalofHungar yoproduceevidenceof animminent catastrophor to seeksolutions
to anyidentifiabe roblemsand indeedtodo anythingbutsecurethetermination of the
Treaty,thatitwasnecessaryfor Czechoslovakito reconsider its position. At thofend
July1991 it decidethatthe appropriaeesponsewastu brîngintooperatioas muchof
the 1977Treatyas couldbeeffected inthe absenceofcooperatiobyHungary.
7-10 Thisprulongedhisturyof prevaricationandviolationby Hungary,
as weli asits utterly idexible andunscientificpositionthrou1991,ailows Variant
"Ce to beperceivedfor what it is- an attempt by the injurepany tu secure the
3
-eepara4.55,ga., above.achievementof the mutrrdyagreedobjectivesof the1977 Treaty, in ways consistent
with the 1977 Treatyand with international law generaIIy. Hungary'sattempto
addressVariant"Cu as if has nothingwhateverto do with atreaty mutrrdy entered
uponc,mot becountenmced.
SEm~on 2. Variant "C" and the1977 TreatvArrangements
A. Variant "C" asanAttemcit toSecure theObiectsof the1977
Treatv
7.11 Theproblems addressedbythe 1977Treatyhavebeen elaborated
aboveinChapter Ii.The çoIutionsdected, &er mmyyearsofcarefuIconsideratioand
scientific shrdwas the construction oftwo water schemes, at GabEikovoand
Nagymaros, creafinga single unifIesysternbound hydrauiicdlytogether by the
interconnectewaterlevels andby the methodofpower production4 . The Projecr
provided forsufficientwaterfornavigationand al1other uses,methods for water
managementand reliabenergyproductionincludingpeakoperation.
7.12 It was agreedthatthereshouldba bypasscanal,uponwhichthe
GabEikovo canalstepwould be constructed.Thi s ouldallowtheexploitationof the
differencof thewaterlevelintheDanube betweenBratislavaand KiiiskNema, thus
meetingenergyproductiondemands. This partof the Projectrequired,intea& a
reservoirat Hnrbov-Dunakiliti, tu befumed between dykes buiIt maidy in
Czechoslovakiab,ut partidy dsinHungary. Asfor the bypasscanal,it wouldreceive
about3500-4500 m3/sof water fiomthereservoir,threqniredvolumes fortheMal$
Danube,MosoniDanube and the oIdDanuberiverbedbeingsemredhm thewater IeveI
irnpoundedbythe Dunakilitiweir,IocatedonHungarianterritoryatr1842.
7.13 One of the functioofthe Nagymarossectionwas to utilisthe
Danube waters soasto permitpeakpowerproduction atGabEikovo.Waterreleased at
GabEikovoduring peakoperationswould form anewheadwater sectionand would be
channelledon a constantflowbasisthroughthe Projecl'secondhydroelectricpower
plant, into the DanubedownstreofNagymaros. Thispartofthe Proje consistedof
a weir, power stationand navigation Iucks. The operation of these lockas ar
4 Seeeg,Lokvenc and Szant"TheBinatiud Gakikovo-Nag~marwprojeci"WaterPower
andDamConsmction,November1986oq.&.GabCikovop ,rovidedfor amuchneeded deeperdraught(above 3.5m) for navigation.
This would allow for full compfancewith the recomrnendationo sf the Danube
Commission relatinto thesafetofnavigations.
7.14 Tt isimmediatelyapparent that cessation of work on the
Nagymaros sectionbyHrrngaryon 13May 1989 nutody madeimpossÏbI ehefutfilment
of that partof the Projecî, but presenteinmediate problems for navigationand
environmental conditions. nere was nothhg that Czechoslovakia itseIwas in a
positiontodoaboutthis,save protest.
7.15 When on 20 July 1989 Hungiiry announced cessation of its
preparationtsodam theDanuberiverbed nearDunakilititrendereddevoid of purpose
al1the work thatthe CzechosIovakiahad done on the GabEikovo section,and made
impossiblethe achievementof the bypas canai,improved navigationand safe,clean
energy production. Nor was floodcontrolprovidedforandthia remained apartimIar
probIernfor villageslocatedbetweethebrpas canaiand the old riverbed, untiIwater
couldbe directed into the canal. The interruptionof onrthe Gabckovo section,
shortlybeforecompletionc,ausedecologicddamage,IargeIyon CzechosIovakterritory.
7.16 Czechoslovakiawas in a positionhowever to achievesome, at
least,of the objectives othe 1977 Treaty. It could ensure: that the GabEikovo
watenvorksbe broughtintooperation,therebyminimising thenegativeeffectsofpnor
constrrrctionothe envirorunent; thaasuitabIydeep navigationcharnel be provided;
and thatpuwer begenerated(eveninthe absenceofpeak productionwhichis impossible
without Nagpatos). These Treaty objectivescouIbe achievedthrough brîngingthe
GabEikovw oatenvorksintooperation-but &t couIdbeachievedunly onCzechoslovak
territory.Thistemporarysolutionin favouof thebestpossiblappIicationof the1977
Treaty,andalwaysreverçible if Hungary shouldresumeits own rolein achievingthe
1977 Treatycommitments ,as thebasisofVariant"CH. 7.17 Theentitlerneritfa Statetuput,as best ican,a treatyinto effect
inthe facoef udawfrrIrefusaibythe otherpartyto fulfilitown obIigations,is entireIy
consistentwithestablishedprincipie.
7.18 No Statemay violateitstreatyobligation-which violationsnot
ody jeopardisethe attainmentof the treatyobjectives,but also cause injuryto the
environmentandmassive financiahlm to theotherpaty -andthen cornplainwhen the.
otherparty doeswhat itcanto bringthe agreedtreatytenu intooperation. Hungq's
violationscaused degradationby Ieavingconstructionsin anrrdnished state; itIeR
villageexposed tu severefloodri&; it bIockedenerg yroductionasweII asnavigation
improvement. There has beeninaicted on SIovakiaboth Iossesofariticipatedrevenue,
and the additionilcostsof dedirig with enviromentai degradation and associated
problems 6
7.19 The principlof pactasunt servanda remainsat the heartof the
internationallw oftreatiesas ithasbeen atthe heartof aisysternsof contract7. The
obligationthatensues isthe obligatiotu perform. Thus it is that anaggneved party,
facedwith a fundamental ormaterid breach,haç an eIectio- tu decIarethe agreement
tenninated,ortu insistuponperformance.
"Thereasonfor the principleis obvious: the caritracmay containprovisions
highiyfavourable tothe aggrievedParty, and it would be unjustto allow the
otherpartybybreaking thecontractto brîngaboutan automatic te8rminatioand
soto deprivethe aggrievedpartyofthebenefitsofthoseprovisions ."
7.20 It was never realisticfor Slovakia to elect termination.
Terminationwuuld entai1the totalIossof the enobuus investments already made, the
abandoningof hopeof economicrecovery ofdamagedreadyincurred,further massive
expenditure to deal with the sociai and environmenraiconsequences of leaving the
Projec itits urrfinishstate- and a failurtu resoIvedI thoseproblemstu which the
1977Treatyhad been directed.SIovakiathuselectedthe onlyotherpossibilityopento it
6 TheselossesareconsideingreaterdetailinChapLX,below.
7 See, e.g.R.Zimrnerman,The Law of Obligations:Roman Foundationsof the Civiliam
'Traditi,uta& Co.CapeTown, 1990,atpp.576g m.
8 G.H. TreireI, Remedresfor BrofContractA ComparativeAccamt,Oxford Universitjr
Press,Oxford,198,tp.381.-to attemptapproximata eppiîcatioorperformanc esthe ody meansof fuIflIingnot
ody the purposes ofthe 1977 Treaty,but thecontinuingobligationto implement itin
good faith.
7.21 The entitlement faparty injurebyabreach of treatytoseekto
givb eestekî toitsternis-the dochineofappruxhateapplication -necessarilyentails
certain dtparturesby the injuredpartyfiom thoriginalterms. Ifthe violatingparty
couIdbecompelledtu fuI ftiobIigationtothe lettethere wouIdbe nodispute. The
pointwaa clearIyputbyJudge Lauterpacht:
"1tisa sound principleoflaw that whenever a legalinstrumen tf continuing
validitycannobe appliedliterdy owingto theconductof one oftheparties,it
must,without ailowingthat party to takeadvantageof its own conduct, be
appliedina wayapproximatinm gostcloselyto itsprimaryobjet. Todo thatis
tointerpretnd to giveffecttotheinstrumen -tnotto changeit "
JudgeLauterpacho tbservedthatinorder tugiveeEecttu the treaty thearepermissible
such modificationsin its applicatasnarenecessq tu maintain -but nomore -the
redisationof theobjectivesIn thiscase- asinothersrelatingtu SouthWest Africa in
1950 and in1955 -the Courtwasfacedwith themaintenanceofthe integritofa specid
statusinrem provided forby atreaty-theeffectiveperformance ofthesacre tust for
civilisationthatunderlthe mandate system. Itwas not acceptablethatSouth African
non-compliance with the obligationsof the mandateshouldallow South Africa to
proclaimits termination, or precludethe United Nations from ensuringwhatever
approximateperformancw e asachievable.
7.22 But the doctrine of approximareapplication is not Iimitetu
treatieestabliçhina regîme inrem1'. The underIyîngreasonsof principleand policy
are nothard tu End. m, there is an important commrrnityinterest in the stabiIityof
internationatreatyrelations. The substantivelaw of treatieprovides the Iimited
circurnstancesin whch obligationsfreelyenterintomayinfactnotbe put intoeffect.
To refusethe abilityof theinjuredpartoputthetreatyinto besteffectmerelybecause
9 AdvisomOpiniononAdmissibilitHearinnsofPetitionbvtheCornmitteeonSouthWest
Africa.ICRepens1955,ep.Op.,al 46.the other.party ha refused tu perfom its part,is:in effect tuwideri the tolerated
cîrcnrnstmcesfornon-performance andtu put injeopardythe stabilioffreatyrelations.
7.23 Second, it wiIIfreqrrefitlybe tcasethat no propersatisfaction
for breach of treaty can be achieved Save throughan approxirnate measure of
performance. The needforcompensation forfinanciaIossandquantifiableharmis a real
need for Slovakia. But financiacompensation alonewillnot be ableto eradicatethe
environmental harmofleavingtheworksof theunitaryGINProjectin the unbalanced,
unfinishedstate. Nor cm it of itsdf guaranteethe environmentdbenefitsof flood
protection. Norcm it guarantethe draughtdepthsrequiredby theDanubeCommission
for safenavigation. Nor woüId there be the possibiIitu move hm rtncleanenergy
suppliestu secure,cIem energy. Nor wouId firtureincornebe guaranteedto continue
providingtheseandotherdesirabIe outcornes. Ailoftheseobjectivescannotbe achieved
by rnoneyalone. To achieve them to anysignificantdegree requireseither Hungarian
cooperation- or introducingsuchmodification ssarenecessary to achieveatleast part
ofthese objectiveinthe absenceofHungarian cooperation.
7.24 Third, a Stattmay m benefitfrom itsuwn wrongduî~~g". A
Statethat is imajor breachof its obligationsand hascausedmassiveharrn, Ioss and
damage thereby,maynot seek toprecludethe other.partyfium putting the treaty into
effect abest it may. Ttisremarkablteu findHungary,havingprocIaimedits refusa1 to
proceed %th the 1977 Treaty, insistirigthat 1977 Treatyis tu be the yardstickof
what Slovakiamaydo. Inits 1992 Declarationsupportinitspurported terminationof
the 1977 Treaty,Hungary states:
"TheContracting Partiesdeterminedvery prekiselythe worktu be out in
the onginal Treaty in 1977 and in the srrbsequentreIated agreements. The
diversionofthe Danube near Bratislava was not part of them in any fom.
Duringthe irnpIementationof a treaty neither ofthe partieshas the rîght tu
activitithatarenot authoriyd tu by thetreaty: suchabehaviourarnounts tu a
materialbreachofthe treaty ."
II
Jurisdictofthe CourtsofDanzig.PCIJ.SeriesB.15,pp.26-27,
12
Annex 17,ap.26.The referencetu "during the irnplementationofa treaw is astonishing&en thar
Variarit"C" was conceivedbecause of Hungaryfscontinuing violations of the 1977
Treatyand itclearstatementtshatidid intendtoimpiemen he Treaty. Underthis
view oftreatyIaw,one partyrnayignorethetermsof atreatyandnot perform;but the
otherpartyisconstrainedinitperformanc eytheveryprovisionsof thetreatythatthe
offendingpartyhaspreventedfromcorningintooperation.
7.25 Actingunderthese principles, zechoslovaka eganpreparatory
work fora temporary solution.The decisionof Hungary to cease al work on the
GabEkovosection eEectivefy prevented Czechoslovakia Eom benefittirig hm the
Dunakilitiweir- wfïichwas commody owned and compIeted.Andwithout that, the
DanubecouIdnd flowinto thebps cmd. The odysoIutionwas to buiIdanewweir
ata pointwhereCzechosIovakih aad sol eovereignty. Thusthe Danube was dammed
on CzechusIovak tenitoryatrkm 1852 aboutten kiIometresupstreamhm the 1977
Treaty dammingsite. Unfinished work on Czechodovak territory abandoneciby
Hungarywouldbe finished,therewould be a temporaryreduction of the reservoir
quantityby confirinittoCzechoslovak territory;anthe GabEikovo systemwould be
put intoplacethroughthedamming ofthe~anubel"
7.26 As has been expiainedin ChapterV above, Variant "C" was
chosenwiththe greatestcare, manyother alternativesbeingalsocarefullystudiedinthe
searchtu findthe optimumsoIutiontu the Hungarianrefustucontinueits obligations.
At theend ofthe day,eachof these othealternativewith their sub-variantshad tube
rejected,eirher becausethewere economicdIy absoIuteIyimpossibleor becausethey
wouldbepossibleudy withthe cooperationof ~un~ay'~.
7.27 Variant "CH ailows foimportantstructuresofthe 1977 Treaty
Project to become operational:muchof the reservoir; the whole complex of the
headwate ranal;thewholecomplexof the Gab5ikovostep; thewholecomplex of the
tailwatercanai. Ialsoallowedcertainobjectivesof th1977 Treatyto be realisedat
leastin the areasinfluencedby the GabEikovosectionof theProject. The details,in
relatiotothe objectivesof floodcontrol,improvemeofnavigationconditions,
If
ForfudetaiIsmidereaofthesheadsçeepara.5.2gja., above.
14
&, paras5.14t5.25above.utilisatioofpowerpotential,improvement of pu'nd waterregime, improvement of
agriculturdconditionsand environmentaiprotection,are specifiein detaiIabove at
Chapter V,Section 3.
7.28 That Variant "C" isno more-and no less than a best efforto
secure the redisatiorofthe 1977 Treatyis emphasisedby its temporary nature and
reversibility.Brieftechnical explmationshavebeengîven in ChapterV, Section4, to
demonstrate thisreversibility.
7.29 IfHungary wouldresumethefulfdmentof its obligationsunder
the 1977 Treaty and would damthe Danube at the Dunakilitiweir, as originally
envisaged,the entirereservoircould be filled. Variant"CM couldthen be rendered
inoperableandmergedintotheProject asorigindlyenvisagedsirnpiyby openingdI the
gates,dIowing the water topassfreelytu the DunakiIitiweir. (Ofcourse, ody if the
operationof NagymaroswereputintoeffectwouIdthe whoIePruje cstenvisagedin the
1977Treaty be realise).Indeed, had theEC Wurking Group ofIndependentExperts
found - which it did no- thatecologicdconsiderationsdictatedthat dl the structures
associated wîth Vaniant"C" be removed, a new bed corrIdhave been constructed
between thecIosure and the inundationweir. AIthoughtherewould necessarilybe
substantiacostsinvolvedindecommissioning Variant"Cu,carehasbeentakento ensure
itsreversibility.
7.30 Thereis a furtherreasonwhy Slovakiawas entitled to seek to
havethe terms ofthe1977Treatyputintoeffect: itwasonly thatwaythat thesafetyof
itsinhabitantscanbe guaranteed. EveryStatehas the right tu terriruria1integri-a
rightthatisderiiewhen itstemtory is repeatedlexpusedtu the ravageof ~ncoritrolled
flooding. And itisthe very objecof legitirnategovérnmento provide the people oa
State wirh the safety rhey camt secure fur themselves: "The legitimate object of
goverment is tu do for a commrrrritofpeopIe, whatever theyrieed tu have,done, but 8, Variant "C" and the Dutv toMitiaateLusses
7.34 It iagenerd principIof internationallawthaa partyinjuredby
thenon-performance ofanother contracparty mustçeek tomitigatethe damage he has
sustained.Thusthe "claiman itnotentitleto damagesforlosseshecouldhaveavoided
byreasonable efforts"".Mitigationofdamages is alsan aspectof theperformance of
obligationin good faith. Furthernsofaras non-pkformance byone partymay cause
physicd hm, includinhm tothe environment,a failurbythe other partyto take
actiontomitigatethisconsequencewiLlberegarded ascontributintothe loss.
7.35 An importantreason forthe putringintooperationof Varia"CI'
wasto avoid furthesignificanIossand damage, of both aneconomicand ecoIogicd
nature,that wouId occur hm the statedintention of Hungarytu ceaçeai1 work,
pemanently, on Nagymaros andthen atGabEkovo.
7.36 The factthatCzechoslovakia 'orkwas so faradvancedat the
time of Hungary'srefusalto proceedexacerbatethesituationasvastsums hadalready
been expendedW . ork had alsobeendune by Czechoslovakiaon behalfof Hungary,
underthe Protocolrevisiontu the1977Treaq anditsscheduiedtirnetable.
7.37 The potentiallossesthusinciudedinvestmentsmade withour the
prospects ofgains therehrn. Three elements may be identified: (If research,
constructionandmonitoringcosts,withoutthe productioof dectricityor revenuesfiom
improvednavigation; (2) the prospectof funher expendituresto providenecessary
alternative,albeit inadequate,antiflood protectimeasures; (3) the prospect of
expenditureto minimisethe environmentaldamage,anddegradation causedby leaving
existingconstructionintheirunfinishestate.
7.38 Itwas necessary,asa practicd matter anas amatter of Iaw,tu
seek to mitigatetheslussesandexpenres,and hm theoutset this was perceived anan
important Factor. Studiesrevealedthat only otheralternativethat would not require
the cooperation of Hungarywould infactentai1significantgreatereconomic losses
IE JudgeMosk,Crai~v.Mïnisterof Ener3han-USClaimsTribunalReports,at p. a,3.
aiso22 Iran-USClaimsTribunalRe~oatp. 244;26 Iran-USClaimsTribuRerwrtsat
pp.161-162.thanthose alreadysustaineby CzechoslovakiaV. ariant"C"w+ thus theonlyrealistic
optionforthe mitigatioof damages.
7.39 Moreover,to deIayfirrtherthe woronVariant "C" - which,for
seasunsthat havebeenexplainedaboveinChapter IV,wouId inredity havedelayedthe
damming of the Danube foranother hl1 year- wouldhaveentailed the certainty of
continuing and mounting losses. The concession to refrainfiom works directIy
connected with closingthe rîverbefora periodof six months(untiltheend of June
1991) wasthe maximum thatcouldbe offered consistwtittheduty tornitigate.
7.40 FirialIy,speciconsiderationsrelatinta mitigation obtainin
internationalwatercourses.There is a more generd duty tu prevent ham - "The
rnitigatioof hdI conditions". A watercoursestate should "takeal1appropriate
meastires"tumitigateharmfuIconditions,incIudîngthose resulhmng humanconduct,
and includingflood conditions and continued siltation and erosioni9.Slovakia
concluded,afterexpertstudiesthatto leavetheProjectin itsunfrniscondition,orto
destrq what had been achievedsince1977, would necessarilyentail these damaging
consequenceqwhichit wasoMiged toavoid tuthebestofitsability.
SECTION 3. Variant"C" andOther IssuesofInternationalLaw
7.41 ItistheviewofSlovakia, asindicatedabove,thatthelawfülness
of Variant"C"falsto betestedbyreferencetothe 1977Treaty.Variant "C" serves,by
referenceto thedoctrineof approximaepplicationt,o implemethe 1977Treaty asfar
as possiblein the face of Hungary'snon-cornpliance,makingsuminimum deviations
from what wasintendedinthe 1977Treaty asHungary'nson-performancerequires.
7.42
Huwever,inits1992 Dedaration,HungaryadvancedagIethoraof
reasons,whollyunrelatedto the7977 Treaty,for the illegalityof Var"C". Thus it
was statedthat the provisionalsolution constitutesa breach of the sovereigntyand
territorialintegrityof Hungary;titviolatesthefrontiersof Hungary; thitviolates
the 1976 BoundaryWatersManagementAgreement; that itviolates the rules and
principleofcustomary internationallaonthe utilisatiofintemationalenvironmental
19 a, UC Dr& ~cIe 24, The Law of Non-Navigatl sesof InternationalWatercourses,
NCN. 41447p.II,3March 1993.flowrequirenoconsen ottheotherriparid. Itis cleafrom theLake Lanoux Case
that thisprincipis not restrictotheapplicatiooftheparticulartreatarrangements
goveniingthatinternationallke. Neithethe sharedsovereigntof otherriparians,or
notionsofownership orpriorappropriationm,akeitotherwise:
"The ruIe that Statesmay utilise the hydraulit:powerof international
watercoursesody on condition ofa prioragreementberneen the interested
Statescannot be establisheasa custom,even Iessas a generd principIeof
1awZ."
Further,"thesubjectingby one Stateof suchriversto a form of development which
causesthewithdrawa lfsomesupplies fiom its basin,arenot irreconcilablewith the
interestsofanothestateZ".
7.45 The action France took in Lake Lanoux had an undoubted
poteritid for impactupon Spain.Indeed,the alterationsweremuchmoresignificthan
that erectedby Variant"C".The watersofthe Cm1 were tobe divertedtuthe Ariége,
employed in a hydroelectricplanand thenpiped througha trrd back tu the Carol.
Spain -which was not irseclaimedtobe invioIatonofthe Treatyof Bayunne of 186%
orthe Additional ctofthe sarnedatehad norightofveto. Hungary,whichis indeedin
violation of th1977 Treaty,and whose own actionshave exactlynecessitatedthe
introductioof Variant"CH, is ian evenworse positionthanwas Spain todemand a
veto.
7.46 Nor müst it be forten thatStateshavearight tudeveloprnent.
The rightofaStateto develapitsnaturdresuurceswasrecoesed inPrincipi21 ofthe
1972 StockhoIrnDeclarationontheHumanEnvironment. TheStockholm~ec~aration~~
referstu "thesovereignrigh[ofStates]tu expIoittheirown resourcespursuanttu their
22 LakeLanomArbitration(Franv.Spain)24InternatiolawReport(19571,p. 1.
23
Ibidp.130.
24
m, p.119.own environmentalpoliciesand the responsibiIiyu ensurethatactivitieswithin their
jurisdictionor control donotcausedamage tu theenviromnentof other Statesor of
areas beyond thelimitsof nationaljirrisdiction." RioDecfaration on Envirument
and Deveiopment, adopted at the United Nations Conferenceon Environment and
Development (LJNCEDi)n 1992,~~containsa nearlyidenticapincipie(Pnnciple2), the
onlydifferencebeingtheinsertionof thewords"anddevelopmentd"before "policies".
Thus,there isif anythnganeven greateremphasistoday onthe needto allow Statesthe
freedom to developtheirnaturalresourcespursuantto theiown policiesandina way
that isustainable.
7.47 In anyevent -and the pointmustbe madeagain -the diversionof
the Danube hasbeen agreed tu by treaty.The factthat thediversionoccurs IOkm
beyondthe intendI eocationisattributabltothe fauItof Hungaryinreneging on the
treaty obligatioasthey affecthebypass canal.
B. Variant"C" is LawfulundertheDanube Convention of 1948
7.48 Noris Hungaryassistedby itsallegation,inparagrap5(c)of Pari
Ta of its 1992 DecIarationthat the provisional suIution contravenesthe Danube
Convention of 1948. The Convention,siIenton thequestionof diversion,is partof the
Iargercorps ofinternationallaw that makesnon-arbitrairnessandreaçonableness the
test.Hungarycontendsthat Article 3 "makes itclearthatIawfulinterventioncan ody
becarried outbyagreemenw t iththeripariastates".
Article3 does no such thg. On the contrary,itstipulatesan
7.49
obligationupon npariansto maintaintheir sectionsina navigabcondition,and indeed
tu improve navigabc lenditions. The 1977 Treaiy, which Hungary has refused tu
implement, was directeto this importantIegalobligation. By Vari"C",among other
things, SIovakia seeksto frrI tfiiInternational obligation. The permissionof the
recalcitranState is hardIy necessary. Further, the second paragraphof ArticIe3
providesthar "The ripafiaStatemaywithintheirownjurisdictionundertake worksfor
the maintenance of navigation,the executioof whichis necessitatedby urgent and
26 31 InternationalLena1Materials(19921,874, at PrincipSec,.lsoPrincipi3,p.
877,whichsupportshrightodwelopment.unforeseencirc~mstances"~~.That is exactlywhat Slovakiahasdone. The improved
navigationchannelrequiredbythe DanubeCommissiona ,nd tobe implemented bythe
1977 provisions,was always to have been un CzechosIovakterritury. Hungary has
dishonouredits 1977TreatyobIigation(aselaboratedinChapter VI above). It hadso
failedtu complywithitsdutyunderArticle 3of theDanubeConvention tu improvethe
navigab chaennel.Thisdishonourinb gy Hungaryof its obligationhas presentedan
"urgentand unforeseencircumstance"a, dSlovakiahasdone, on itown territor, hat
isnecessaryto addressthesituatio-thedamming ofthe Danubeandtheprovisionof a
satisfactorynavigatichannel.
7.50 Czechoslovakia has dso compliedwîth itsobligationsregarding
notificatioaboutsuspensionofnavigationonthe I3anube2'.
C. Variant "C" Does Not Conflict with the Inviolabilitv of
Hungaw's Frontiers
7.51 Itisa strmge phenornenonfor a Statetu insist thatfiasIosr
territorto aneighbourwhenthe neighbour hasmade no suchclaim, andindeedpiibIicly
affirmsits continurespectforthepreviousfrontier.Butthisis the positionadoptedby
Hungary -partly,iwould seem,to securesomesort of psychologicaaldvantage,and
partlyasanirious consequence of itown suspensionand purportedterminationofthe
1977 Treaty.
7.52 Variarr"C" has no eEect whatever on the fiontiers between
Hungary andSlovakia; and Slovakia makes no clah upon one inch of Hungarian
territory.
27 The Mirexof Artic3epravides:"TheDmubiaStatewidertak10rnainlauithsecti#ns
of theDmbe ia navigableconditionforriverand,ontheappropriatesectionsea-r
goingveçselIO caq out theworb necesw for themaintenanand improvementof
navigaticonditi ondnottoobstniorhindernavigationrhenavigablechannelsof the
Danube. The DanubianStates shall consdt the DanubeCommis(Art. 5) rnatters
referredto in this article. TheStatemaynwithin theirownjurisdictionundeme
worksforthe maintenaof navigaüon,theexenitionof wiçnecessitaby urgentand
unforesecircumstance. heStateshallinformtheCommissionthereasonwhch have
necessitafieworks,ansMI finish summq descriptioihereof."
28
-e,para.4.84,bove. cadastraiboundary ofthe villageof Rajk ao therightbank oftheDanube at a
point approhately 2 kilometresnorth of hi1 128 (3.5 kdometres eastof the
Chrrrch of Rajka)where the new frontier wilI, in the phcipd chaime1of
navigationofthe Danube, juinthe Czechoslovak-Hungarian fiontieas itexisied
onJanuary 1,1938: the dmZtnd spillwaywirhinthevillagelimitsof Rajka will
remain onHungarim territory "
7.56 ItwillbeseenthatArtic1e1(4)(c)refersbacktothefrontierinthe
principachme1 of navigationinthe Danube ,sitstoodon1January 1938.
7.57 The muItiIaterddetemirnation sf the Treaty of Pais of 1947
wereconfirmed bilaterallyi,n thTreatyBetween the Czechosiovak Republicand the
HungarianPeople'sRepublic Concehg theRegime of StateFrontiers,of 13 October
195630 ,Articlel(1) reiteratthat:
"The State&untiers between the CzechoslovakRepublic and the Hungarian
People'sRepubIicare defiriedinartide I, paragrap4(b)and 4(c) of the Treaty
ofPeacesigned at Parison 10Febmary, 1947.."
Article2(3)furtherprovides:
"On sectorswhere itmns overwater,the fionticrIineshdl foIIowthe middleof
the bedofunnavigable rîverscands orstreams,or inthecase ofnavigablerivers,
the medianIineofthe mainnavigablecharnel atthe Iowestnavigablelever.
7.58 The Systemof weirs,and the intendedbypass canal envisagedin
the negotiationforthe 1977Treaty,clearlyrequiredsome thoughtto begiven towhere
thefiunfierwouldnow run. At acertainstage in the negotiations the technicd experts
on both sidesthoughtthebest solutionwouldbe for theborder to foIIowthe navigation
channel intothe new bypasscanalthatwas rube ~nstnided"'. Thisterritorial gato
Hungary would be compensatedupon the other common part ofthe stateborder. But,
atthe end ofthe day,Hungaryhavingchangedits mind ,heGovernment sfbothparties
29
Thevillages Homath-JarfaluroszvaandDunacsun aretodaycdleJarovce,Rusovceand
eunwo respectively.
30
See,300UnitedNationsTreatySeri150.
31
ke, para.2.6above.agreedotherwise. Chapter TX of the 1977Treatyis devotedto the boundary issue.
Article22 provides:
"(1) The Contracthg Partres have, incomection with the constmtion and
operationofthe System of Lockqagreedon minorrevisionsofandchmges in
thecharacterof theStatefiontiebetweenthe HrrngarianPeople'sRepubIicand
theCzechosIovakSociaIistRepubIic,asfoIlows:
(a) Subsequent to theconstructionof theSystemof Locks, the moveable
characterof the Statefrontierin tholdbed of the Danubebetweenthe r.km
1840and r.km 1811 segments shalremain unchanged ,ndthe positionof that
frontieshdlbe definedbythe centrefineofthe presentmain navigationchanne1
oftheriver;
@) Inthe r.km 1842-1840 sector, upto, the divisiof the bed, theStatc
euntiershdI run, as though hed, dong the centreIineof the presentmain
navigatiochannel;
(c)Inthe Dunakiliti-bgov headwater areatheStatefiontiershallmn from
r.km 1842 alongthe centreline ofthe prescrimain navigation charnel up tu
boundarypoint 167.V.0.a;
(d) Inthe Drrnakiliti-HmSoheadwatwarea,the State hntier shaImn hm
boundarypoint 161 V.0 .ataboundarystone No.1.5 ina straightine insucha
way thatthe tenitoriertffecteto theextentof about 10-10 hectares,shalbe
offsebetween thetwo States.
(2) TherevisionoftheState frontieandthe exchange ofterriturisrovidecflor
inparagraph I shdI be eEected by the ContractingPartieson the basisof a
separatetreat.
(3) TheContracthg Partiesshall,inthetailwatecanaland theheadwatercanal,
and inthe mainshippinglaneintheDunakiliti-HmHo headwaterareaextending
to r.km1850.4,continuewithoutchangeto exercisetherightsand complywith
theobligationto which theywere entitled,obywhich theywerebound,in the
sectorof theriverbeforethe conclusionofthiTreaty,notwithçtandingthatthe
international shippingIhas inrhissectorbvn shifieto the tailwatercanal, or
headwatercanal,respectiveIy,situatedinCzechosIovatemtory."
The situation couid not be clearer. The parties had clearly
7 59
determined thathelineandlocationofthe frontierwas toremainunchanged. Itwas no
longer tobe characteriseby the medianof themainnavigablechannel (whichwould
henceforthbe shifiedtoCzechoslovakterritory).Itwas tube characteriseddiEerentIy
(asspecifiedin ArticIe221,but woulrernaiwbereit was.
7.60 Due tothe refusa1of Hungary to proceedwith construction in
eithertheNagymarosorthe Gabeikovosections oftheProject,theagreedbypasscanalhas been-introducedthrough the rnechanismof Variant "C". Hungary'spurported
terminationofthe1977 Treatyiswithouteffeciand thediversionofnavigationintoan
improvedcharnel on Slovakterritorywas envisaged. So was the retentionof the
previousfrontieinitspreviouslocation.
7.61 Because of Hungary'srefusdtu carry out its undertakiunder
the 1977Treaty,itbasbeen necessq for the ddg for the diversionbegin some
10 km distanthm the pointenvisaged.Butthe intentionofthe partiunderthe 1977
TreatyiscIear.The divertedstretch&ng fium rh 1852to rkm 1842 basno impact
uponthe fiontiejustas therestof thebypasscanalhas no impactuponthe frontier.
Variant"C" ismoreover , provisionalolutionwithoutprejudicto thefuhïlmenofthe
provisionofthe1977Treaty. ,
7.62 Hrrngaryrefuste ucq outagreed provisionthatwouldallow
for an agreed new navigationchannel,withorrt aiteration tu the frontand;then
prodaims that SIovakia,by itseestabIishinthe navigationchanneI, has dtered the
h. Thîs daim
cm onlybe describeassurredistic.
D. Variant "C" is in Conformitv with the 1976 Boundarv
WatersManagementAgreement
7.63 The Governent of Hungaryhas claimed that the provisional
solution,Variant"C",violatesthe 1976Boundq WatersManagement ~~reement".
7.64 Such an assertioisnot warranted. The 1976 BoundaryWaters
Management Agreement specifitscertain obIigatbns, general (Art3)and specific
(Article8-13) in relationto water resourcemanagementmeasures thatcouid entai1
certainconsequences(Article2).
7.65 The 1976 Boundary WatersManagemen~ t~reernentis applicable
to the generaiity of boundary rivand not limited sirntoythat stretchof Danube
whichispartof thecommonfrontierbetweenHungq and Slovakia. It thus appiies,for
example,tu the IperRiverand the Tizsa River. But soasthe commonstretch of theDanubeis concerned, the 1977Treatyis incertain regardalex sueciaIisin respect of
ttiobligationundertakeinn 1976.
7.66 The obligationsof the 1976 Boundary Waters Management
Agreementattachto measuresthathaveconsequences forwaterflows, the bdding of
dams,flood controlworks ,he amelioratioof waterresources,exploitationof water
energy,the layingoutof navigationroutesandflood protection(Article2).The first
obligationof ArticIe3inrespect thereoisof consultatioand agreement. This was
achievedby the1977 Treatywhictias hasbeen shownabove in ChapterVI,was exactIy
directedtodl oftheabove matters. The1977 Treatyrepresentthe"mumal agreement"
required inArticle3(1U)(a)of the 1976 Agreement. At the hem of that mutuaI
agreementwas thatthe stru-res of GabEkovo-Nagyma shrouldbe built, and that
improved navigationfor thbenefitofalusersundertheDanubeConvention shouldbe
achievedthrough a bypas canal,whichwould not itselfresultin a new fiontier.
1977 Treaty provisions providedthe specificmeans by which much of the 1976
Agreementwasto be achieved.
7.67 The dutyof each partto pwformmeasuresfor flood protection
(ArticleIO)and for protectionagainspollution(ArticIeII)andfor safegrrardingthe
navigationroute fArticIesand 12) areal1elaboratedby the Iexs~ecialisof t1977
Treaty. By itsfaiIurtu performits obligations under t1977 Treaty,it is in fact
Hungary thatviolatestheagreements reachednderthe1976Agreement.
7.68 Variant"Cu,which puts in place, to the extent possible, the
provisionsofthe1977 Treatyinthe faceofHungarylsbreachof itsobligationsi,s clearly
alsoconsistent with th1976 Agreement. As hasalreâdybeen demonstrated,Variant
"Cu supportsthe 1977Treaty in respecofa bypasscanal toprovidebetter navigation.
It is eqrrallyconformitywith the 1976 provisions, which hadprovided the starting
point.
7.69 It istrue that, the frontinot being affectedby either the
deviationprovisions of the1977 Treatyor their approximationin Variant"CH,the
"boundarywaters"remainintheold riverbedof the Danube. Andthe 1976 Agreement
remaind seterminativesto obligationsrelatito thabecaus the 1977 Treatyisnot a
comprehensiveIexspecia1iforeverycommitrnent intheearIierinstrument. 7.70 Article5ofthe 1976Agreementprovided for theestablishmenotf
a Czechoslovak-Hungxian Commis sionforBoundary waterg3. .s Commissionwas
duIy establishe(andindeed was hnctionirigithenrn-up to the1977 Treaty). Water
purityremainsundertheregdationof the 1976Meement, and theCommissionhas in
factadoptedmeasures on thimatter)'.
7.71 On 26 August1993,Termsof Referencewereagreedforthe EC
Working Group ofIndependenE txperttu fornulaterecornmendationson aTemporary
Water Management~e~irne~'. The hope istuarriveat atemporaryagreemenp tending
find detemination of issuesbythe Court. Thhoped for agreementwiIIdeterminethe
amount of waterneeded tobe retainedinthe oldrivthed. Theworks needed wildso
bedetermined bymutualagreement.
E. Variant "CH is in Conformitvwith the Rules and Princiriles
of Customarv Internationai Law that Re~uIate Shared
Waterceurses
7.72 SlovakiaemphasisesagainthatVariant"C" istobe understood in
thecontextof treatyarrangementesnteredintoin 1977andwhich remainin existencto
this day.In pointinto principlearisingunderthedevelopingcustomaryinternational
law, Hungaryseeks to divert attentiEurn the applicableregimeoflaw: pacta sunt
semanda.
7.73 Inany event,Varian"CuaIso cu,nfonnswithgeneralinternational
law.
7.74 Hungary's1992 Declarationrefersto varioussources of soR law
to support the principiof reasonable and equitabluse of transboundary naturd
resources. SIovakiahasnoquaml wih the propositiothatevolvinginternationaIaw
does indeedrequirereasonableand eqnitabluseof such sharedresources; buitnotes
33
Annex4.
31
Annex4andçee,para.3.15,gtseabwe.
35
Annex33.both that atiprinciplis seIectivelyappfiand that Variant"C"fuIIyconfoms tu it
wMe Hungary's entireconduct, from 1977 onwards, has beenunreasonable and
inequitable.
7.75 In 1991 the InternationLaw Commission cornpieted thfirst
readhg of its Dr& AtticIesonthe Law of theNon-NavigatiunaIUses of Intemationd
Watercourses. Thesedrdi arti~ksarenow receivingthattentionofgovernmentsm, any
of whom arenow ofleringdetaileresponsesandsuggestiond6 .Hungary's cornrnents
areto befound atNCN.414471Add.2 ,8May 1993,where itdiscovera "no harrnde"
(notwithstandingtheILC referenceto"significantm" and the earlie~elsinkiRules
testof"substantialinjury a"),even more surprisinglp,urportto findit intheLake
Lanoux Case, "accordhg to which construction and hnctioning of abnormal
instdations, i.e.inddtations exceeding normal technicaland politicai riskare
prohibited. Hungary,nowhereexpIainswhat is meant by aninstaIlationexceedinga
normalpoliticarisk.But whatthe Tribunas laidwasin anyeventdifferent-thatSpain
needed toshow,but hadnot, "thatthproposed workswouldentai1 an abnomal risin
neighbourlyrelationorinthe utilizatiof~aters"'~. Andnor hasHungaty shown this.
Risk" softhesamekindwhichtoday arefound dl overtheworld couldgiverise tono
cornplaint,saitheTribunal. fnstaIIatiosimilxtothose erivisagedin tGBl Project
areinusethroughout theDanubeba~in~~T . heProjectconstituteno "abnormalrîsk".
7.76 Article1-6 and8-10 have nowbeenadopted on 2ndReadingby
the DraftingCommittee b,utnot yeibythe Plenary.Theextended workleading tothe
formulationof theCommission' sraA artidebaseditsejfon al1the relevcase law,as
wellas the various LA Rules,includingthose adopte4 atHdsinki 1966~'. Attention
wai also paidtothe contributionofthe Institutde Droit Internatitothe subjecta.
36 See.e,~.he Lawof Non-NavigatioUlsesof InternatilnatercourA,iCN.4144and
Add.,3Mach 1993.
37
LakeLanouxArbitration(FraY.Spain], 24InternatLawaRemrfsII957)p.IO1,alp.
123.
3% Seepara.1.13,above.
-
39
LA, Reparof52pdConference.Heisinkii19pp.478-533.
40
Fora convenientsurvsee,Yeiarboof the Internatil awCommission,1974, Vol. II,
Part II,pp. 199-205,357-365.As is weIknown, the HelsinkRules spokeof theentitlemenof each"basinstate"toa
"reasofiabIcnd quitable shareinthe beneficiuses of the waterof aninternational
drainagebasin"(Art.IV);andprovidedthatwhat is"areasonabIeandequitableshare"is
to be detenninedinthe lighof d the circumstanceqincludinby referencetu Iisted
criteri(ArticlV). Among thelistedcriteriare(e)theeconornicand socialneedsof
eachbasinstate,(f) thepopulatiodependenton thewaters of the basinin eachbasin
state,(g)the comparativecostsof alternativmems of satisfjingthe economicand
sociaIrieedofeachbasin state(h) theavailabilof otherresources(i) the avoidance
ofunriecessaqwasteinthe utilisatiofwaters ofthebasin,(k)thedegreetu whichthe
needsof abasinstatemay besatisfie, ithoutcausingsubstantiailnjtoyeitheparty.
7.77 Itisimmediatelyapparen t9thTateahewasanagreement
designed,inter diatoprovideeach partywith areasonableand eqrritablehareof the
beneficiausesof theDanube. Variant"Cu, SIovakialsefensiveresponsetothehuge
harm and darnagecaused byHungaryin renegirigon these mmgements, isstrongly
supportedby referenceto thesecriteria. Slovakiareservesthe ritotdevelopthese
argumentss,houlditdeemnecessarya, a laterstagofthewrittenproceedings.
7.78 The IL€Dr& ArticIesspeak of "Equitableand reasonable
utilisationandparticipation"inArticl-an articIewhichhasfuund generaIfavourin
theresponsesof States. ArticleS(1) providestantinternational atercourseshaflbe
used and developedbywatercourse Stateswitha view to attainingoptimalutilisation
thereofandbenefitstherefromconsistentwith adequateprotectioofthewatercourse.
Vanant "C" is exactlydirecttu this objective,andthe readyparticipaofoSlovakia
in the PHARE programme atteçtstu the importance giveritu balancing optimal
utilisatiwithongoingmonitoringa , djustiandimproving. Articl5(2) providesthat
watercourseStateshavetheright to utilisewatercourseand the dutytocooperatein
the protectioand developmentthereof. Variant"C" is the onlmeans by whichthe
Danubecan, inthe presentcircrrrnstancescausedby Hungary,be utilisedoptimally.The
evidenceof Slovakia'cooperationwith HungaryregardmgVariant "CMis ample,asthe
Coun isbrieflyremindeilbelow.
7.79 Nor should itbe ignoredthatArticle5 refersto participationas
wellasto utilisation. Equitableparticipisexpected-and thiwas exactlywhat hadbeen envisagedunder the 1977Treaty. ButHungary has refusedto participatto the
achievemeno tfthesecommonbeneficia Inds.
7.80 Artide 6ofthe ILCDr& enmeratesfactorsreIevant toequitable
andreasonabI etilisation.Whetheonthebasis of(b)"thesocid and economic needsof
thewatercourse statconcernedI1(c)"existingandpotentiauseo sfthewatercourse"o, r
(f) "theavailabilofydternativesofcorrespondin g alue,toa plannedorexistinguse",
Variant"C"is clearlyanequitablandreasonabl etilisatiand lawful.
7.81 It ha yettu be decidedwhetherthe EC's Dr& ArtidesshouId
serve asa proposed fiamtworkfor hmre treaties;or asa guide tu applicablegeneral
internationallawintheabsence of watercourstreaties.Inthiscase,of course,there
already a Treaty. But, whether by referenceto the 1977 Treaty itselfor to these
developingprinciples fwatercourselaw,Variant"C" is lawful.It is aweI1withinthe
acceptedbuundsof Statepractict.
7.82 It iclearhm the DiversionofWaters from the Meusethatthe
testindecidinguponthelegdity of unenvisagedactswithinthecontes of a watercourse
treatyiswhetherthe obligationsof thepartiesunder thetreatyareinterferewith, and
whether the acheverneriof the objectivesof the treatyishamed4'. The partieshad
enteredinto a treaty on12May 1863 establiçhina regime fortaking waterhm the
Meuse, incIudinga definitiveseniementof theregime of diversion owater from the
Meuse for the feedingof navigationcanalsandirrigation channels. Mer various
dificultiesbetweentheparties,theNetherlandproceededtoconstruct and completethe
JulianaCanaland constnrctedthe Bosscheveld Lock. Facedwith this prospect, the
BeIgian Governent decided tu constructa "great new watenvay" from Liégetu
htwerp, the Albert canal4'. Iwas tobe fedwirhwaterobtaîned'fromthe Meuse. The
Court fuund that, in the absence afprovision requinngthe consent of Belgium,the
Netherlandswas entitledto disposeof thewatersof the MeuseatMaastrichtprovided
thatthetreatyobligationincumbeno tnit werenotignoreda3.
41 DiversiooftheWatersfrornîMeuse,Jirdgment.19.CIJSerieAIB ,o.70,p.4.
42 -bid.,atp. 15.
43 -bidatp.30. 7.83 Farfromignoringthe 1977Treatyobligationsincumben upon it,
Variant"Cuis thevehiclewhereby -the& vehiclewhereby -Slovakiacan bringto
hition the treatobligationjointlyincumbentuponit andHungary givenHungary's
refusatu cary out obligationswhicwereitsresponsibiliyone. Applyingthetestof
theDiversionofthe Watersof theMeuse case,Variant"C" isnotspec3cailypmhbited
by the 1977Treaty, precludesno rights agreedthereunder,andnot ody isfbIIy
compatibl e iththeobjectivof theTreatyregime,butis dso thody mems to achiwe
them, atleastinpart.
7.84 Nor does aiteratito thepriorconditioofthe common partofa
riverassuchvidate eitherth1977 Treatyorgenerd internationallawIntheDiversion
ofWaters hm theMeuse caseBeIgium cIaimed,inthecourseof ifordargument, that
the erection ofa Borgharen barrageby the NetherIandshad interfered with the
navigabilityotheMeuse below Maastrichto,n the parof theRvercumon toboth
States. The Court found the action not prohibitedper se,but depcndentupon
quantifiablproofof injuriouseEect. (Belgium,unlikeHungary,had not previously
refusedtu carryout itsown obligationsreiatinto the Meuse,causingharrnto the
Netherlands).In the event,suchevîdrncwas not furthcomingM. Eventhe dissenthg
opinionof Sir Cecil Hnrst was baseon his assessrnenthatthe constructionofthe
barrageexduded the safeguardingf interesofnavigationon theMeuseon the stretch
between MaastrichatndVenlo,which wasincompatiblweithapurpose ofthe ~rea$'.
7.85 Hungaryhasnotshow "significanth "arrncausedbyVariant"C".
It hasnot, contratu its daims,lost theusof40 km of itswaters. The 1977 Treaty
always providedfor the diversionof the Danube. Hungarjrhasnot eIostthe shared
useof the IOkilometreofDanubeabovethe point atwhich thedammingwasenvisaged
underthe 1977 Treaty.Any impactsupon Hungarianterritor-which do not amountto
significantharm-aredue toHungary's refusato fuifilits obligationsunder the 1977
Treaty.
7 86 No one Statcanrefuse tofiilfitobligationunder atreatyand
rhenprotest againstthe efforttheinjuredPartytu put the treaty eEect. This iafortiorwhen the treatyconcems an internationalwamourse, inwhich -both as a
matter oftreaty law andof generaIinternationallaw- thereare sharedinterests. The
partythat turnists back upon the agreement thaspecifiethe sharingofinterestsand
the burdensin realising them for thcommon good, cannotassert a veto over the
exerciseofthe rightsunderthe treatyof thotherriparian:"This community of interest
ina navigableriverbecornesthebasis ofa commonlegalnght, the eserrtid features of
which arethe perfectequdityof diirparianStatesintheuserof thewhde courseof the
riverand theexclusionof any preferentid priviieof anyone riparianStatein relation
to theothersM." Byviolatirigitsown obligationunder the 1977Treaîy,and seekîngto
precludethe puttingintoeffectofthe agreedobjectivesof that Treaty throughVariant
"CH,Hungaryisdemandim ag"preferentidrivilegeinrelationtoSlovakia.
F. SlovakiaWas FuIIvPreparedtu Cooperate with Hirngaw in
Res~ect of Variant "CM
7.87 The scope andcontent ofaduty to cooperateinrespectofthe use
of watercoursesis presentlyreceivingsomeattentioninthecomrnents and observations
of States to thILC' sraR articles. Articl5(2)refersto a dutyto cooperate in the
protection and developmentof the watercourse; Article6(2) stipulates that this entails,
when theneed arises,enteringintoconsultationin a spirit of cooperation. putring
Variant"C" into effect Slovakia hascurnpIied with such requirements of general
intemationaiIaw. And it is Slovakiawho has compGed with, and Hungary who has
ignored, ArticIe8 - the generd obligationto cooperate "on the basis of sovereign
equaiity,territorial integrity and mutualbenefit in order to attain optimalutilisation and
adequate protection of aninternational watercourse.Hungary ofîers not cooperation
for optimal use balancedwith adequate protection, but total non-cooperationdiratted
a returnto amythicalpristinepast.
7.88 SIovakÎahere brieflyrecaIIsal1the elements,both in mne rrpto
Variant"C", and subsequenttuitsimplementationt,hat evidenca fuIcoogerationinthe
adequateprotection ofthe Danube. Fulldetailsareto be foundinChapter IV above.
46 Territorid JurisdicttheInternabond Cornmi- ofudm~udmorir5,
1929.PCIJ. SeriesNo.23,atp.27. Sec .lso,LakLmoux Arbiiration Franv.Spain)*
24 IntemalionaILawReoorts,p.1atp.132whikhrejecrthoperatioofaveto.Czechodovak proposais,ouldhavehadin itshmds byJuIy1391the resultaofexpert
suweys astu theimpactof Variari"C" ,udow ubjecfive decisionsastufurtherwork
on the temporq solution.The reaIityisthatHungq had no interest in mutud
cooperation.
7.92 Czechoslovakiahad sought EC involvement in the entire
controversy#verthe 1977Treaty,to geobjectiveassessmenofthe issuesinvolved.It
suggested EC impact monitoring. Hungary resistedany EC involvement at aii.
Eventudy,whenit was clearthathe provisionaolutionwas indeedareality,theEC's
involvementwasaccepted -butody inrelatioto Varian"CM a,ndnotthewiderissues.
7.93 The readiessof Slovakiato cooperateinmonitoring, bjectively
identiwg problems, andtakingnecessaryactioncontinuestothe prerenitime. It has
beenactivelyand positivelinvulvedin the WorkingGroup of Moituring and Water
Management Expens fortheGab&kuv u ystemofhckig .
7.94 Ariy intemationd law duty of cooperation incumbent upon
SIovakiahas been firIImet. But it munt dso be remembered that Hungaq and
Czechoslovakiaentered intoa treaty:thereis no obligationto consulforthe sole
purnose of terminatina. treatv. Anduty of cooperationwithinatreatyis toseek
objectivelto identifyand resolve problemswithin the treatycommitrnents.This
Czechoslovakiahasalwaysdone,justas Slovakidoestoday.
SECTION 4. Conclusion on Variant"CM'
7.95 The ciear starting pofur the Coufimus1 bethe 1977 Treaty,
voluntaniy entered into by Czechoslovak(andnow bindmg uponSlovakiafandby
Hungary. As internationaljudgmentsand awardshaverepeatedlymadeclear,disputes
are to besetriedbyreferencto thetreaties enteredinto by the parties, rhanby
48 This clefrom theEC WoriungGroupreportof 2Nwember 1993 andtheEC Water
Managemenrteportof 1Decem1993.Annexes19and33.referenceto generalprinciplesof internationalmd9. This principlhas recentlybeen
reafiimiedinTeniturialDisputeaibyan Ar&Jamahiri~ a.~hady' .
7.96 The tesfor the lawfulnesof VariantC is thusthatappliedbythe
Corut inDiversionof theWaters oftheMeuse -namely,whetherit violatesthetreaty
agreedbetween theparties.The onlycircumstance inwhich compatibiitywith the1977
Treatywould not be therelevanttestwouldbe (a)ifthe 1977Treatyitself,for reasons
anterior, the bofenlawfullysuspended or terminated;
or @) kause theireas.hadbecornevoidbecause itcontraveneda newlyemergent rule
ofJUS coms thatcame intoexistence subsequentto itsconcIusiun.Sluvakia wiIIshow
inChapterVm beIow,that neîtherofthese circumstancesappks.
49 &, Diversion ofthe Watersof~euk. Judnment,1937.PCIJ SeriesAiB. No.atp. 16;
TerritoriJurisdiaionof InternationClommissioof thRiverOder.Judment No.16,
1929,PCIJSerieA, No.23,arp.22; sedso,Lake LanouxArbitratiFrance v.S~ain)24
InternationaILawRepor1953, p.IOI al p120-121.
51) Territorial Disputenibyan Arablamav.Chad),Judnment1.C.1Rewrts,1994,atp.3%.CHAPTER~ THE LEGAL JUS=T~ICATIONS OFFERED BY
HUNGARYFORSUSPENSION,ABANDONMENT OF ITS
OBLIGATIONS,AND THE TERMINATIONOF THE 1977
TREA'I"Y
SECTIO N. PreliminarvComments
8.01 On 13 May 1989, the Governent of Hungary no~ed the
CzechoslovakArnbassado rnBudapestthaHungary was suspendinthe constructiof
thecommon proectatNagymaros.Mention was made oftheneed toconsideagainthe
teismicandecologicalimpactof theconstmction.No written explanatiwas given.
Hungary'sactionmay, hm the legalpointof view, be describeas the unilaterd
suspensionofitperformanceunderatreaty.
8.02 On 20July 1989,the Prime Mifisterof Hungarstatethat the
decisioto suspendwork relatetod structurcomened withpeak pnfonance and
was validfor all sectionsofthe Danirbe. Hungarythus suspitsworkobligations
not only aNagymarosbut now attheDunakiliti amand elsewherein theGabPikovo
section.
8.03 Aftersuspendinitperformanc endproposingthepostponement
ofthedarnmin ogftheDanubenearto Dunakilifio3-5years,HungaryinOctober 1989
announc hdatiwas permmently abandonin greatyperformancat Nagymarost,hus
excludingfrom theProjectthe achievemetf peakenergyoperation. On30 October
1989.Hungaryinvokedan"ecologicalstateofnecessityandon 30November 1989the
HungarianGoverment made proporals as tuthe conditionon which work mightbe
resumed,althoughatGabGkovo odyl.
1
Sec .ara4.46-4.50above. 8.04 On 10 January 1990 Hungary :announce is suspensionof dl
work, Savefor maintenanc ienthe Gakkovo section,untdanamended or new treaty
wouldbe reached2. u
8.05 On 23Aprii 1991theHUII~~~& Parliamentcalledfonegotiations
fortheterminationofthe 1977 .
8.06 On 7 May 1992 Hungarydecided to terminatethe 1977 Treaty.
Un 19May 1992theDeclarafionconveyingthe decisionto terminatthe 1977 Treaty
washanded totheCzechoslovak Ernbass yn~uda~est(the "1992Declaration").
8.07 Fromthelegalpointof view, this equencemay be classifieas
- The oranotificatioof13 May 1989 was notof suspensionofthe
1977 Treatyas a whole,but of performanceby Hungary of its
om obIigationinrespectofpartof the 1977Treaty. But asthe
key obligationsatNagymaroawere the soleresponsibiiitof
Hungary,thismomts touda-l suspensionofthe operationof
the1977Treaty inpart.
I
- The statemmt of 20 JuIy 1989 was an affirmationof non-
performancebjr Hungary atGabEikovo,coupIedwith a demand
that Czechodovakiatoo, suspendperformance ofits obligations.
The obligationsrelatingtothe GabEikovosection of the 1977
Treatybeingcommon, thispartmo he 1977Treaty was not infact
suspended - though Hungary refused to perform for an
unspecifieperiod.
- In October 1989 Hungary announce its permanentnon-
performanceofthe 1977 TreatyasirreIatetoNaparos.
2-
See,para.4.5f a.,above.
3 1
Sec .ara4.53g M.,above. Thiswas a defactoabandonmentofthe 1977Treaty,wwhicih n the
cIearest tems envisaged the unity of the GabEikovo and
Nagymaros elemenS.
- On 7 May 1992 Hungary decided upon the terminationof the
1977Treatyinitsentireî.
8.08 The justificatiosf~"n~ar~ forsuspendingandthen permanently
abandoningits obligationswere madeordly (13 May 1989 and 20 July 1989) or in
dipIomaticNotes andin the letter ofthe Pime Miriistof Hungary of26 February
19924 . JustiEcatiunareoEered for the tenninatioofthe 1977Treaty inthe 1992
DecIaration.ThisIastdocumentrefersto variouevent bsutdoesnot seekto make ariy
cIearIegd distinctionbeîweenthe diEere nfrrsds tuperform and the eventuai
purportedtermination.
SECTION 2. The International Law RulesGoverning the Susriensionand
TerminationofTreaties
8.09 The legaljustificatiooReredby Hungary faIltobe judgedby
referencetothe 1969 ViennaConvention onthe Lawof Treaties.Hungaryis dearly
anxiousaboutthe legalitofits coriductby referentu theViennaConvention and, in
its1992 Declarationitsearchesfora way IO havethe best ofd worIds- toappIyit
when it suitsannot when itdoes nui. Hungarytriestuaccompfishthisintwo ways -
firstby contending that notdI relevant provisionsof thViema Convention are
opposabIeto Hungary; and second,byconstmctingdlegedjustificationsmtaIIyoutside
oftheViemaConvention scheme.
8.10 As to thefirsttechniqto avoidtheclearrequirementosf the law
oftreaties,Hungaryproclaimsinits 1992DeclaratithattheViennaConventioncannot
directlbe appliedintheIegaldisputesconcerningthe 1977Treatybecausethe Viema
Conventionenteredinto force for both countriesafie1977. It might be indirectlyapplicabl- butthisdoes notmeanthatitanoms liferdy apply in thepresentcase. But
Hungq cannot pickand chooseinthisway.
8.1I It is true that the Vitma Convention has m retroactive
applicatio(Article4). But many ofits tems refiectpre-&hg mIesofintmationd
Iaw Part V ofthCeonventionis widelyaccepted asrefleningintemationailaw. Thus,
insofarasKungq is entitletoinvoke thegenera desof intemationa liw to support
itsactions,these are already to be found, incorporatedwith care, in the Vienna
~onverition.~
8.12 Hungary'o stherattempts tomavoidthe operationof the law of
treatiesareequaiiyunacceptableTheinescapabl etarhg pointis thatreatiesarto be
perfomedin good faith(Articl26, VierinaConvention).Tu ensur teatthisisso,the
Conventionfornulates carefullythedes governingdaims of invatidi~temination or
suspension.Artide 42(2)provides:
"Theterminationof a treatv,idenunciaiionor the withdrawdof
a party>may take placeor& as a resulof the applicatioof the
ravisionsof the treator ofthepresentConvention. The same
;le amlies tosusuensionof theoperationofa treaty.(Emphasis
added).
Itcould notbe clearerthaa partysuspendhgperformanceo ,rclaimingto terminatethe
treatymust bring itselwithintheprinciplesetout irArticles54 to 62 ofthe Vienna
Convention. If it cannot do so, its suspensionwillbe uniawful and its purported
terminationwithout legaleffect.
8.13 Suspension or termination may be permifted if temination or
suspensionisimplîedby the conclusion of a Iater treaty on thsame snbjectmatter
(Article59); if there has beeamaterid breach (Articl60); if therehasoccurred a
superveningimpossîbilitofperformance (Articl61);or ifthere hasbeenafundamental
change of circumstances(Article 62)."Necessity"is nota ground for suspensionor
terminationundertheViennaConvention. Stilllescanbefound a groundof "ecological
necessity". Nor iswhat Hungarysometimesdescribes as "ecologicalrisk"a gound
5 -eefurtheronthispoint,para.6am., above,
!recognisedby the Vienna Convention. Ody if what Hungary chuoses to tenn
"ecologicd necessity"actudIyconstituaesupemersingimpossibilityofperformance,or
a fundamentaclhangeof circumstances,canitaffordale@ justificationfor suspension
orpurported termination.
Equally,Hungary mot invoka e"defence" to jus@ its own
8.14
breachesby relianceon broader heads of "circumstancepsrecludingwrongfuhess"
elaboratedinthecurent workof the InternationLiaw Commissi onthelawof State
responsibility. Moreover,my cIaim by Hungary tosuspend or terminate as a
"countmeasure",presupposes a breach by Slovakia. But Ariicle 60ofthe Vienna
Convention makes ciearthat a "marerialbreacw is the essentid precondititu an
entitlemento suspendortermiriatehd a materidbreacheitheexistsorduesnot exia
- and by reference to the criteriain the Convention. The invocation of
"countemeasures" isatonceIegaUyincorrectandwithoutpurpose.
8.15 IntheRainbow Warrior Case,NewZealandarguedthata State
Party to a treaty,excusingits ownnon-performancw,as not entitledto set asidethe
grounds speciliedintheViennaConvention and relyinsteaon groundswithingeneral
Stateresponsibilit$.Thisargumenwt asnotaccepted bytheTribunal , hichofferedas
its reasonthatArticle60of the ViennaConvention"gives a precisedehition of the
concept ofmaterialbreachof a ueaty"wlrileNieappropriateremediesforbreach is a
abject that belongtothelaw ofsratresponsibili$.
8.16 SIovakiabeiievesthat theTribunds responseignoresdl saveone
paragraphof Article60(Articl60(3)).Matenal breaçhisinfact relevantexactiytthe
remediesstipulateelsewhereinArtide60, wfüchare-manifestlyotreservedforthelaw
ofStateresponsibility. lovakiacontendsthatthisarbilward does notcarrectlstate
the relationshipbetweenthe law oftreatiesand the law of Stateresponsibility;and
reservesits rightoinvitethe Courtsoto find,inthe contextofthe disputebetween
HungaryandSlovakia. 8.17 Hungary seeks tojustifyits teminationasa countemeasure tu
the deged "seriousbreachof treaty" representeby .Variant"C". Slovakiabdieves
Varia" nt" to be consistentwith the1977 Treaty,*and with internationaIaw more
generally.In my event,ifHungarycannotbring itselwittiithetems of Articl60, it
cannot achievethe same resultthou@ the invocationofcouritenmasures. There are
variousreasonswhy thisshouIdbe so.-Beforetuming to these Slovakiafirnotes that
terminationunder Artide60 is lafi; a countermeasuries, by contrastan otherwise
uniawfulact, in respectof whichwrongfuhessis precluded ifthe circumstancesand
conditionsprecedent are met.Hungarycannotsimultaneously arguethat itlawfullv
terminatedfor material reachunderArticle60; and ,tharesponsibilitforitsunlawful
terminationisprecludedbyits characterisaiias a countemeasure.Again, as withits
simultaneousrelianceon terminationbymateria lreach and teminationfor reasonsof
stateof necessity,Hungarymust determine whetherit believesibas acted IawfuIIor
udawfUIIy @ut with responsibilityprduded). At the moment its Iegd case for
terminationrestsindiscriminatelon whatever priicip~esofinternationallawseern to
hand.
8.18 Nothîriginthetextof ArticIe60,or itstravaux~ré~aratoiresor
thetextsof leamed cornentators, Ieadto theviewthattheStatePartiesto theVienna
Convention believedthattheywere also leavingopen- by referencto thelawof State
responsibilitor otherwise- the possibilityof terminationor suspensionon different
grounds. Onthe contrary, the evidenceis thatArticle60 was deliberateldrafiedin
narrowternis,to reflecttheimportanc ef theprincipleof pactasuntservanda. The
SpecialRapporteur, SirHumphrey Waldock, saidthatin puttingfonvard the text of
Article60 a primeconsideratiowas to preventabusiveassertionsoa breach bya Staie
wishing toterminatea treatno longerto its politicaladvantageAndthe Commission
hadin its Find Reportemphasisedthat "it is not open tua State simpiyto a1Iegea
violation ofthe treaty and pronounce the treatyat an end"'. The provisions on
terminationwere fashionedaccordingly.Relianceon theIooseand uncertainprovisions
of countermeasu wrihîiinthe Iaw ofState responsibilirjlunderminewhat was su
8
-ee ,ndReportontheLawof Treaties,PJCN.4116,ds1-3,Yearbookof theInternational
LawCommission 1963Vol.11,pp.73-4.
9
FinalReporontheLaw ofTreaties,AICN.QISER.+dd.YearbookoftheInternatioLaw
Commission 966,Vol. II,254.carefuIIyfomulated, der prolonged discussion, under Article60 of the Vienna
Convention.
8.19 Article 30 of Part I of the ILC Dr& Articles on State
Responsibilityrovides:
"Thewrongfulness of an act ofstate not in conformitywith an
obligationof that StatetowardsanotherState isprecludedif the
act constitutes a measnre Iegitimate under international Iaw
againsr that otherState, in wnsequence of an intemationaliy
wronghI actof thatotherstate."
8.20 Article II of Part Two of the Dr& micles curently under
considerationprovides1:
"1. As long asthe Statewhichhas committed aninternationally
wrongful acthas notcompliedwith its obligationsunderarticl6s
to 10 bk, the injuredStateis entitled,subjectto the conditions
and restrictiosetforthinarticle...not to complywithone or
more ofits obligationstowardsthStatewhichhascommittedthe
internationallywrungfuact,asnecesçaryto induce it tocomply
withits obligationsunderarticlestu19 bis.
2. Where a counrermeasur egahaa Statewhichhascommitted
an intemationdlywrongfulact involvesabreachof an obligation
tuwards a thrd Statesuch a breachcannot bejustifreas against
thethird Stateby reasonofparagraphI."
8.21 Article12 provides:
"1.Aninjured Statemay not takecountermeasuresunless:
(a)itbas recourse toa[bindingi tary]rdisputeseulement
procedure whîch both the injured State and tStatewhichhas
committedthe internationaIIywrongfact arebound to useunder
anyreIevanttreatru which theyare parties;or
IO
Article11and I2haveken adoptebytheD&ng Cornmitteeathe1993sessiobuthave
notyetbeendiçnissindlenary. @) in theabsenc ofesuch a treatyf offersa pindigithird
party] dispute settlement proceduretu the State which has
committed theinternationallywrongfuact.
2. The ri& of theiniured State totake countemeasures is
suspknd Wedenand tutheextentthatan agreedbinding] dispute
senlement procedureis being implernenredingood faitbv the
State which has cornmitte8the internationdy wrorrg£id act,
providedthatthe internatiodly wrongfulact hasceased.
3. A failurebythe Statewhichhas codtted the internationaily
wrongful act tohonour a reqiiesor orderemanating from the
disputesettlemenptrocedureshallterminatethe suspensionof the
rightoftheinjuredStateto take countemeasures."
8.22 Thecontrolsput in placeunderArticle60 arepdy achieved by
theimportance ofrnaterîa olittybreach; and partIby providingorderIyprocedures
to befoiIowed, Therestrictionof Artic60 to anamwIy definedconcept of "materid
breach" ian indicationthat the internationd commuRisnot preparetu go veryfarin
admittirithat abreach ofatreaty,howevergrave,operatesin itseltuput the treaty at
an end. At themost it iaground,if duIyestabIished,for the injuredpartyto terminate
thetreaty ian orderlyway. Inthatsense:
"[Alrticle60has animportantrole in perfonningthe functionof
preserving the jura1 relations created by the treaty and not
allowingthemto be arbitrarilydisturbed,whateverbe the political
andIegalstrainsunderwhichtheymayhavecorne" ".
The artides on countemeasures in the Iaw of ~tke responsibilitycIearIypull in a
different direction.nd that iswhy, in determiningjustificationsfor suspensionand
terminationitisessentidtustaywithinthe ViennaConvenrionsystern.
8.23 Therecanbe noariificidandrigidseparationofthe lawof treaties
and the Iaw of State re~~onsibilit;'~ but the ,uncertainscope and content of
countemeasures underthe law of State responsibilitycanbetappliedand interpreted
soas torender withoutpurposethe deliberatelycircumscrîbprovisionsof Article6of
11 Rosenne, reachofTreatv.Grot,ambridge, 985,p.43.
12 Sima, "RefiectiosnAIticI50 of be Vitnna ~oivention onLawof Treatiand its
BackgroundinGenerd InlemationaI Law",20 Ostex-reichscheZeifurhUEentIiches
Rech (970).the ViemaConvention. Noms emariatinhm the differentranchesof international
lawmustsupplemena tndsupporteachother,not render eachothernugatory.
.8.24 The same conclusionis reachedby cornparingthe statusof the
ViennaConventi provisionson thelaw of treatiewiththoseof theILC'sdr&s on
countemeasures. The former represents corpu sfalreadywellestablishedlaw,now
codified and wideijr accepted. The Court in the Case concernin~ the Leml
g
W-Africal has conkned that Article60oftheVienna Conventi co difiecustornay
internationalad3. The LLC'e sxamination of countermeasnresrepresents work in
prugress,with uncertaintieand remaihg problemscIearIyvisible. Inany case,they
cannotoperateto effectade factorevisionfur StatBearîiestu thViennaConvention,
norto putinquestion establisheprinciplosfgenerailnternationllw" .
8.25 The pointis illustratbythe case concerningthe Air Services
A meementof 27 March 1946(UnitedStatesv. France)wheretheTribuna lidpermit
the use of countmeasures suspending a particularprovision". However, the
countermeasure atissue -the prohibitionof the operation ocertaîn servicebyAir
France su long as the embargoon Pan Am was rnaintairiedby France- the aim
specificallstatedbythe Tribud was tu "restoreaqudity betweetnhe Partiesand tu
encouragethem tocontinuenegotiatiuns"'6 .he masuresin thatcasewerewithin the
treaty,directeat ensuringthat iwas carrieout. ThisclearfywouIdnot apply tuthe
terminationofthe 1977 TreatyinitsentiretybyHungary.In so farastheAir Services
A greementCase Tribunalmightbe saidto beadvancing anybroader propositiothatthe
putativelaw ofcountermeasuresunder Stateresponsibiliprevailsover the provisions
13 LegaCorrsec~nencsrStareoftheContinueci resenofSouthMca inNamibia(South
WestAfrica]nahvithçtandnecrrritvCouncilResol275o1970k AdvrsawOpinion. ICJ
Report1971p. 15atp.47.
14 And, B, Boweff,"TreatiesmdStateResparrsibiIi, MelanaesM. ViraIlv, Le Droit
intemationausenicdeIapaix.dela rusteldudeveIoppemen199t) 137.
15 CaseconcernintheAir ServicesAmeementof 27 Ma1946,(UniteStateY.France)54
, Internatiol awReport119791,304 app. 33- 341.
16 Ibidp.339,atpara.90.of the Viema Convention(sed non), SIovakiaresemes the rightu invite the Courtu
rejectsucha view.
SECTION 3. The Justificatioof an"EcoIo~ica ItateofNecessitv"
8.26 The 1977 Treaty containsnoprovisionsenvisagingsuspensionor
termination.Thereis, however, a provisiononthe settlementof disputes(Article27)
which providesthat iftheGovernent Plenipotentiarie asreunabletoreach agreement
on a matterindispute,itshallbereferredtotheGovernment osftheContractingParties
for decisionThi sarrietwoimplications. Thefirstisthatanyremedies whichaparty
may claimithas inadisputemaynotbeexercised untiIthe procedureinArticle27 have
been complied with. The second ia that ArticIe27 necessarilyimpIies that the
ContractingPartiesdl in good faiîhtv toascertainîmpartidly such factss may be
neededtu resoIvethe dispute.Hungaryresortedtounilaterdmeaures withoutan)lprior
consrrItatiowhatever :the suspensionfor 2-3 monthsof work at Nagymms; the
permanentabandonment ofwork atNagymarost;heabandonmen otfitswork obligations
in theGabSikovosection. It also blockedeveryattempt byCzechoslovaki ao obtain
impartialassessmentsof th"facts"unilateralyssertedbyHungary asa justificatiofor
suchsuspension.
8.27 These generd observationshaveaparticularbearingonHungary's
major daim of "ecological necessity",which itstems toinvoke indiscriminatdy in
respectof suspension,abandonmentandtemination. But, if the principof pmta sunt
servandaisnottu be appliedrathermorerigour is required.
A. ThereWas No "Eeoloeicasliste ofNeeessitv"bv
Reference tothe ScientificFacts
8.28 Objective expert opiniondoes not show the existence of an
imminentecologicaldisaster,or an ecologicastateof necessity,eitheat thattime of
suspensionof the works at Nagymaros and then atGabEkuvo,or at the momentof
purpurred terrnination.As at this time, the best avaiIableimpartiai eviderrce ofthe
expected envirumental impact of rhe Project was oflered bythe Bechtel and HQI
repons, whichSlovakiahasdready consideredingreardetaiinChapter IIabove. Theîereports were commissionedindividudy by the parties,they were proposed by weII
knom companies afterextensivereviewsandthey butharrived at thesame conclusion:
therewas no imminent ecologicaldisaster.The fonowingia a briefSIIMM~ ofthe
importan tdings ofthesereviews:
Water aualitvand auantity
The HQIreport:
"Suite 6 cette analysesommaire, ilnous R paraîtque lesrisques de
détgriuratiodeia qualit&dekart sontfaibles ."
Translation:
"As a resuItof this concisemdysis, it appearstousthat the risksof a
deterioratioinwaterqualityareverylow."
The Bechtelreport:
"Aspreviously ddiscussetdh,ewaterqualityin theHmiiov -Dunakilitrieservoir
wilIbe improve d..1."
"Water qlraIitinthe sideannswillbe improve ..1.11
"The waterqualityin the Mosoni wilibe equaI tuor betterthan the Fast
waterquality..20II
"The pIanned operationof the projectwiIInot significantIyalter the flow
sharacteristicsor hydroloaofthe riverdownstreamof~agyrnaros~~."
If TheHQIreport,OD.c~tp. 52.
18 The Bechtelreporopcit .,24.
19 & p.2-8.
20 Hrrngaryhne enjoysthekneïits of improvementsthewaterqualiiyof theMosoni
Danube. "Theextensivemitigationmeasurepsiannedby the projecttu controIthe
impactsonground waterconditionsappearadequateX "
Dririkingwater
TheBechteIreport:
"Thenet change to theaquiferground water supplydue to thealtered
rechargeregimewiIl be minima -lpossiblyincressingor decreasing
slightv3."
"..the projeccm nothave a measurableimpacton theperformance of
thewells[thasupply~udapest]" ."
Theside ms
The Bechtelreport:
"These interceptionchanndswiIItransporthe reservoirseepageto the
Szigetküzsidearmchanndsandwill maintainthe localground water near
histoneleveisS"
"Naturalvegetation occumng in the vicinio tfythe Danube side
channeVoxbowsis not expected to experience signifiant adverse
impac tz."
Agricultureand forestry
TheBechteIreporr: "The projectwiIl provide severalbenefitato agilcuItirraIand forestry
productioninthe Szîgetküzwith instdlation of the artificiaIrecharge
sYstem2 '
The HQIreport:
"Lerabattementdela nappea I'avadu projetpourra êtrebénéfiqu pour
l'agricultueanscetterégionoule drainageestrequis2 "
"TheIowering ofthe watertableinthe downstreamsection of the Project
maybe beneficitu agricultureinthinregionwheredrainageisrequired"
The safetvofthe constructio~is
The HQI report:
"Les principes de conception des ouvrages ont pris en compte la
complexité de fonctionnementdu et lesdifficilesconditionsde
fondationdesouvrages de
Translation:
"The designprinciplesf thestructurestook inroacmunt the cornplexîty
of Project operation and the dificuIt conditions witregard ru the
foundationsofthe majorstmctrrres."
"Les plans et devis, leur applicationet le contr6le de qrraiité
correspondant en général aux standards appliquéspour ce type
."
23
m, p.1-13.
28
Thc HQIreporm. a.,al p85.
29
w, p.78.
30 Translation:
"The designs andestimates,their applicationand the quaIity control
conespond in generd tu the appiicabIe standardsfor this type of
"...cephénomè~i es esecouss sesmiquesetlaliquéfactionpossibledes
sabIessilteux]n'&aientpasa craindre,comme I'indiquaienls données
historîques.'
Translation:
".thesephenornena [seismishock and theliquefactionof siltedsands]
were nottobefeared, asindeedthe historicdlataindicated."
"Lesdiguesles plusélevée bsordantIecanald'amen&sont iI'abr dietout
risquedu faide lasubstitu dtsmontkriaux~i~u&fiab~e?~."
"The highestdykesofthe headwatw canaiare immune to anyriskdue to
the substitutionofmaterialssubjtutIiqrrefacfr".
The variousreports ofthe EC Working Group expertswerenot of coursein front of
Hungarywhenit purported to terminatthe 1977Treaty. But there,too,no evidenceof
imminent ecologicaldisasteristo be fo~nd~~.
B. Hungaw did Nui Beiieve, at the Moment it UnIawfulIy
Susriended, Abandoned its Performance under and
Terminatedthe 1977 Treatv,thata State ofNecessi@Existed
8.29 Tu invokea Stateof ecoiogicaneceçsity , Statemustbelieve it
exists. Andit musthaveheldthat deep andgenuinebelief atthe moment itdecided to
actcontraryto its internationalobligations. 8.30 But the historyofthe matter,and the events of 13 May 1989
(suspensionat Nagymaros),20 July 1989 (suspensionalsoof works on theGabEikovo
section)and 19May1992(notikationofterminations)howotherwise.
8.3I On the samedate astheconclusionofthe 7 977 Treaty, there was
dso mcluded the 1977 MutualAssistance ~~reement~'.This Agreement providedan
agreed tirnetabIfor comtmction, with work tu startby 1978. It was dready an
amendment, made atHungary'srequest,to the distributiof obligationsthat habeen
agreed toin thenegotiationsleadingup tothe 1977 Treaty, reflectedfirst in the Joint
Investment Taskof 1964, andarnende n 1967, andthen inthe elaboratioof theJoint
ContrachiaPl lanagreedto inAugust1978, and referreto in Articlel(4)ofthe 1977
~reat~~~. Hungary wanteda postponemen tftwo years on theconstruction timetable,
due to two factors: itsbelief in thstableenergysituationup to 1987, and limited
investrnentpossibîlitiThe solutionreached,reflecredin th1977 Mutuai Assistance
Agreement,was not to May, butfor Czechodovakia totake over partofthe works
heretoforeattributetoHungary, and aredistributiof energyallocations.
8.32 Hungary'sfinancialproblems, coupled with its perceptions at
givenmomentsof timeaboutits own energyneeds,wereto be the key to 15 yearsof
prevaricatioandunreliabili.y
8.33 InFebruary1981, Hungary once more asked fora slowdownin
construction,againcitingeconomicdific~lties~~.Atthe meetingin Budapest onJuly1-
2, 1981,the PrimeMinisterof tirrngaryinformedtheCzechoduvakPrimeMinister that
economicprobIems werecausingHungary tu seekthe postporiernentof putting ttirsr
structures into operationby thryears. Later,Hungary runfirmedthat it çought the
interruption of works even unti1990, with ody maîntenanceof existing structures
continuing,
34
Annex5.
35
Annex3.
36
Sec n partintlthletterofDput- Prime inisterMqai, discusapara.3.37, M.,
abve. 8.34 As brought out in ChapterID, Hungarysought ta delay the
Prujectforentireleconomi rasons. AIthoughtherewassomediscussion ofecoIugicd
factorsatthe 18thsessioofthe ESTC Cornmittee(31 May - I June19821,when that
Hungaryagreedto hand over its studionecolo@cal impactsforjointstudy,nosuch
technicalstudiewere receivedby Czechoslovakia. And the evidenceconfirmsthat
Hungaryt sed concemwas economic3'.
8.35 Czechoslovakia rejectean i?temption ofthe works rrnti1990
butwas prepared,ina spiritofoooperatiotu couritenancethreeyear delayinputting
the hydroekric power station atGabEikovointo operation,pruvidedthatitsecured
compensation for the consequentd damages. As negotiations proceeded, Hurigary
proposed rhat Czechoslovakitakeover cenainof its allocatedworkonthe tailwater
sectionofthebypasscanal. Therecordsofthe18th sessio oftheESTC Cornmittee(31
May -1 June1982) showthatHungary was interesteinhaving yetmoreof its work
done by Czechoslovakia (increasingtheeconomic exposureof Czechoslovakia),and
avoidingthepayment of compensatioforlossesoccasionedbytheinterruptions.
8.36 During the course of1983 the ESTC Cornmittee cded upon
Academies of Sciences of both couritries tu engage in couperative work on
environmentd impact.In the meantirnenorhingwasfoundto prdude agreement beirig
reached in rhaumm of that year,in the fonntwo ProtocoIssignedon 10 October
1983. Thefirstpostponed by fouryearstheagreeddatesfor puttininto operationthe
variousstructures. Theywere now to corneinto,operationinthepenod 1990-1994.
The secondamendedthe 1977 MutualAssistance Agreement,alteringdeadlinesfor the
finishingof spesifiedworksInstrumentof ratificatiwereexchanged in 1984. Both
instrumentsentered intoforce1984.
8.37 Thus, in 1984, havingreviewed the situation since its unilateral
stoppage in 1981,Hungarj saw no ecologicaldiraster that would prevent the work
going funvard in the same fum, albeit ona deiayed tirnetableandwith readjusted
allocationsofworkobligation.It producenoevidence,eitherbyitselfor injointwork,rhatwouIdhave supported any daim of grav eisk-and the new agreementsit sigried
were aot atdl directedtosuch issues This.redity is refiected in the admisin the
1992 Dedaration that:
"By thernid-eightiesbecame evidentthattheconstmctionof the
Nagymaros damexceeded thegossibilitiesofHungary both in
financialnd technologicaerms ."
8.38 ThatHungary'isnconsistenc yasbeenmotivated by other factors
ishrther iIIustratbythe factthatalmos tmmediatelytherehr itbegantu requestan
amleration of the Nagyrnaro psrojecicunstmctiun.This new demand, which pIaced
considerdie furihereconomic strainonCzechosIovakia ,eflectedHungary'schanged
perceptionsof itenergy needs. Butonce again environmentalfactorswere rnentioned.
Ths the proposalw. asstatedtu bebasedinpartunthe "protectionof [the]environment
and thesurroundhg count~yside"'~.Whether to intempt the1977 Treaty schedule(as
in 1983),or yhetherto accelerateit(asrequestedfiom 1985),the environmentcoiild
convenientlybeofferedasan argument tobolsterthereareason,whichwaseconomic in
nature.
8.39 As recentlas 6 February1989,thistequest for acceleratiwas
acceded to ina new Protocol, which replacedthe Protocol of 10 Octobe1983. It
provided forthe finastructurestobe put in place15 morrthsearlierthan previousiy
envisaged. NotIring was altered in the component elementsof the Project, which
Hungary apparently did not regardas dangerous or-presentingthe likelihood of an
imminentcatastrophe.
8.40 Hungary had indicateda concm regarding water purîty. The
questionof waterpurityin the Danube isgenerallyregulatedin the 1976 Boundary
WatersManagementAgreement;issuesof waterpurîtythatwould henceforthaise in
relation to tG/N Projectwouldcontinue tobe dealtwith throughthemechanismsof
the 1976 Agreement. Accordingly, extraordinarysessions of Governrnent
Plenipotentiarisnderthe 1976 Agreementwerearranged andaJointBoundaryWatersCommission setup'O. The JointBoundary Waters kommirsion proposed anextension
I
of the samphg and monitoringproceduresaIready in place- çamp1eswouId now be
taken26 times ayear,at 54 locationsonthe Hungariansideand at 45Iocationson the
Czechoslovak side.Thetechniques tobeusedwould how themonitoringof al lossible
waterpollutionfiomthe Danubeand itstributariin'bothterritoriesAn agreement to
biuigthesejointlynegotiatedprocedureisnioperationwas discussebythe Ministersat
the& meeting on 7-8 ApriI1989 and agreement was reached. Therewere further
technicanlegotiationon3 May 1989,andthe agreemen wtasreadyforsignature.
8.41 ButnowtheHungarian delegationrefused to signtheprotocoof
the meetingafkerthesepainstakineffortsto addressanypossiblensk towaterquality.
Thereason givenwasthatfist theHungarian Parliamenmt ustdecidewhether tocd1for
a referendumonthe constructionoftheNaparus part of the Proje.t
8.42 Brrr theagreement atthe technicd IeveIshowed that Hungary
believedthat-certaidyifrhesemeasures weretaken +no ecologicaldisasteinthe fom
ofwater poIIuionwouId ensue.
8.43 Nanethelesa , few dayslater,it suspendedworkat Nagymaros,
andhasfound itconvenien to invokeanecologicanl ecessityinwhichit cleardidnot
believeand of which itprovided noevidence. But at thattirne,Hungaryclaimedto
believe in an ecologicalemergencyonly in relationto Nagymarosand peak hour
operation. Otherenvironmentalfactorswereapparentin yot soseriousthattheycould
notberesolvedbytheparties. 1
8.44 As for the decIaredterminationof 1977 Treaty,thedipIomatic
historyofthe afFa ierweenJuIy 1989andMay7992 showsthat Hungaryresponded tu
various poIiticd pressuresrather than tu a genuinebeiiefofimminentperil. It has not
shownthat it was genuinely ledby new information in thispend tu believe thathe
1977 Treaty provisionstheinselvesnor Variant"CuconstitutadgenuirieeriviromentaI
disaster.
40 -ee,paras3.1-3.24above. 8.45 In May 1989Hungary announced the suspensionofits work
obIigationsatNagymarus, folIowing it inJuIy 1989with a refusd toperformits
obligations inthe GabEikovosection, andan aîrt~uricemenof permanent non-
performanc atNagymaroi snOctober1989.
8.46 It ishardto seewhat objectivescient& informationcaused the
changeof positionstakenonNagymaros betweenFebmary1989 and May 1989; or
between May 1989 and October1989;orbetween Febmary 1989andJuly 1989 asfaras
the GabEikovo sectionisconcerned. Nor did Hungary seem anxiousto resolveany
problem thatmightrequireattention.
8.47 In earIyMay 1989, when it appearedthat ecologicalanxieties
about water poIIirtiuncdd be met through better monitoring methods, Hungary
withdrew hm negotiationfor anagreement onthi issue andindeedrefuaed to sign
minute osfthe Iastmeeting'
8.48 In Ocîober 1989,Czechodovakiaindicated it wouid agree to
Hungarytpsroposalfor anagreementon technical,operationand ecoIogicaguarantees
ifHungary wouldproceedwithpreparatorw york fordarnmîntghe Danube atDunakiliti.
Czechoslovakiafurtherofferedto meet Hungary'sexpressedconcems, toconcludea
specialagreemenbtywhichthepeakoperation of theProjecwould berestrictedor even
excluded if subsequent researchshowed this to be necessary. Yet further,
Czechoslovakiasaid the partiescoulgo back to themore extendeddatesenvisaged,
priorto the Protocolof6February 1989,for thecornpletionof theNagymarospartof
the Pruject, thus allowingtimeforfurtherstudy.
8.49 None of this wasacceptable tu Hungary. Czechoslovakiawas
requiredto abandon its obligafiatsnder the 1977 Treaty, too. Mer years of
inconsistency,exemplifieiy stoppagesand thena dernandfor acceleration, Hungary
thendecidadthat ecologicaifactorspIacedita statofneces* whichaiIuwedof only
one outcume - the mutud decision not tobrriidthe dam and put GabEikovo into
operation. Nu suggestions were offereas tohow the navigation,floodenergy and
41
-eepara. 3.24, above.consequentialenvironmentalproblemswere to be dealt with. In April 1991,
Czechoslovakia againsuggested expertstudiesto identifproblems,and tu propose
solutions.To meetpurponed amietiesabout a"stateofnecessity", zechosIuvakieven
pruposed thatsuchexpert-dies be compIetedbyIuly 1991,so that rationadecisiuns
wuldthen bemadeonthe best courseofaction. ButHungary'sresponse was negative.
8.50 Hungary's1992 Declaration,whichoffersjustificationsfor the
terminationspeak s t jusof Variant"Cu ,ut oftheProjectinitsentirery.Butjustas
Hungary hadavoided objectivassessrnenof aprocl&d ecological necessityrequinng
itto suspendandabandon its obligatiounderand performance ofthe 1977 Treatyin
1989,so Hungarydeterminedlyavoidedobjective,third partyverificationof a stateof
necessity requiriterminationof the 1977TreatyinMay1992. Betweenthe end of
July 1989 andMay 1992 Hungary showed no interesinobjectiveappraisalf alleged
problems -stillleof proposalthatwouldallow rîsktobe removedorminirnised,and
the 1977 Treatyto be compliedwith. Czechoslovakia proposedthe creation of a
trilaterlornmitteeinSeptember 1990.The proposalwas repeated,atvariouslevels,
thmghout the nea
8.51 Mer Hrrngaryrehsed to make a join request tu the EC,
CzechosIovakiai,n Octuber1990, decidedtu participaina PHAREproject, whereby
independent experts would sfudy, ah, problems relatingtu the qualîty of
underground waters on the territory wher? thG/N Project was being built.' No
matchingproposai was receivedhm the Hungarianside,ailowingajoint application.
Czechosl~vakia thusmade its own application,andiths projectof the EC has been
carriedoutonSlovakterritoryalone.
8.52 Nor did Hungary seek anobjectivedeterminatioof any alleged
state of emergencyin respectof theintroductionof Variant"C" by Slovakiain the
autumn of 1992. Again,therehasbeenmerely the unilaterinvocationofa crisis,but
no attempttoverifyit.
32
-eepara4.79,esec,above.
43
-eepara.4.02,above. 8.53 CzechosIovakiacontinued to push again,in luly 7991 and
December 1991, forthe estabIishmentofan expert triparticommission,with EC
rnember~~ .~In January 1992 Czechoslovakia &med ds readinesstu establisha
trilaterexpert commissi tonstartwork as soon aspossible4s. If theCommission
found that the overaliecologicaimpact of the proposedtemporarysolution was
negative,Czechoslovakiaouldstopwork onit. ThisCzechoslovaki a aspreparedto
do, even though vast expenditurehad alreadybeen made on the Project. Hungary
merelyreiteratethattheworkon Variant"C" placeditinastateof ecologicalnecessity
andinsistechatCzechoslovaki stopal1workunder the 1977Treatyregardless4.
8.54 On 24 ApriI 1992 CzechosIov~a accepted the tems thatthe
Vice Presidentof theCommissionhadçpecified-agreementthat theexpertcommission
shouId have no preconditionsimposed on itswork and that its findingswouId be
acceptedd7.By thetime Hungaryproceeded inMay 1992 tu purportto terminate the
1977Treaty,studiesofthe expertscuuldhavebem availabletotheparties.Appropriate
soIutionswuld have been proposed in the lightof whatproblems were objectively
identified.
8.55 But Hungary was not interestedin objectivelyidentifynany
problemsrelatîngto theG/NProject,becausetherewasonlyonesolutionthatit wanted.
Andthis solutionwas desirefora mixtureof economicandpoliticalreasons- reasons
far removedfrom theaileged"ecological ecessithatHungary wouldneverputto the
test.
8.56 Hungarfs response to Czechoslovakia'acceptanceof 24 April
1992 came short1yafterwards.On 7 May 1992, the HungarianGovernment adopted a
44
6eepara.4.8{andreIated.a,ove.
45
-eepara.4.72,ses.,bove.
46
%, para4.75above.
47
Seepara4.80above.Resolutionpurportinto terminatthe 1977 ~reat~~.Hungar yas not interestedto
have objectiveassesmentof the factsunderlyh the dispute;and it cmId ody
countenmce one solution, regdessof what a scient& exmination might show.
Neithersuspensionnoabandoment ofitvariousobligationscouIdbe legallyjrrstified.
8.57 InAussi 1992 Czechoslovakiagainurged thatajoint request
forassistancehouIdbe passe totheEC ~ommissid. Hungatjrbrie appearedto
agree -but when itcame to the meetingtu preparethe joint requesto theEC
Commission,Hungary woddnot procee dnIeswurkby Slovakiaforthedamming of
theDanube(envisaged underthe 1977 Treatyand to bemadefeasibleunder Variant
"C" w)ashdted. Ratherthanproceedwithan experassessme nun,garembarked on
a politicalcarnpaiwithin theEC. As lateas October 1992 CzechosIovakiawas
proposingthatatriparticommissie xnamineaiecologicalimpactof the GabEkovo
scheme,and co-g thatitwouldacceptthefindin gsungarycontinuedto impose
conditionsthatpre-assumethefindingssucha commissionrnighmake,and rendered
itsestablishmeimpossible.As discussein ChapteIV above,itwas ody aithe very
endofOctober 1992 thatatriparticommissionwaseventudlyestablished,its mandate
Iimitetu Varian"CM asopposedtoanexaminationofthewhoIeProject.
C. The Invocation of an "EcoIo~icaStateof Neeessitv"
Ignoresthe Provisionsofthe 1977Treatv.
8.58 Articl27of the1977Treaty'envisageisown disputesettlement
procedure- namely,bilaterlegotiatio(necessaribasedon objectivescientifdata
andnoton unverifieunilaterlssertion).Furth,the1977 Treatyhasits ownbuilt-in
rnechanismsfor constant monitoringand adjustingwork specifications,to meet
environmentaplroblemsastheyarise. Fulluse of suchrnechanismsthereforeprecluded
the unobserveddeveloprnenof anysituatiwhichcould becharacterisedaa statof
necessity and any negative developmentscould be resolvedwithin the 1977Treaty
framework.
48 Sec .ara4.81above.
49 Sec.ara.4.(andrelatfn.),abov.ec.so,pai4.92gtm., above. 8.59 SimiIarly,etailcdprovisionforwatercontrolinbouridarywaters
were put infoplacebythe 1976 BoundaryWaters Management~geement'' . Water
amelioration,protectionof surface and underground waters, fiood protectionand
maintenanceof thebed oftheDanube, were dl anticipateasanongoingprocess. These
provisionshavebeen both inoperationandeffective.The 1977Treatyitself,in Articles
13-17, hasits own detaileprovisionsfor ensuringenvironmenta clontrols and dealing
withproblems.
8.60 The 2979 JointStatuteAgreement,fullyanticipatedby the 1976
Agreementand the 1977Treaty,isfii of!mechanismsfor monitorinand addressingany
ecologicd prublems.Under Anicle 4 modificationscould be approved tu technical
procedures adopted inthe Joint ContractualPlan. Compiiancetechniques forwater
balancewere providedfor. Arrangementswereput in placeregardingflood control,
flood ice disposaiand al1emergencies. Article 5 envisages consta contact and
emergencymeetingsshouldtheneed arise.Article10 specineswhatMISfor ongoing
analysiand adjustmentunderthe mechanismo sf the 1976Agreement.
SECTIO N. Hungary'sCiaimsto Susriendor Terminate bv ReIiance on
"EcologicalNecessitv"CannotBe JustifiedUnderArticles 60-
62 ofthe ViennaConvention
8.61 Evenifanobjective "statofnecessïty"existedin whichHungary
helieved,itcannotbe justifte-as legallitmustbe -by the provisionsof the Vienna
Convention. Ody ifthe dangersrenderedperformance impossibleunder Article61, or
constituteda fiindamentalchangeof circumstancts within ArticI52, rnight groünds
existtojustifHungary'sbehaviour. Slovakiawillshow thinottu be so.
A. Hungarv has Demonstrated no Suaervening Impossibilitv of
Performance underArticle 61
8.62 Hungarydaims in its 1992Declaration, apparentlas a ground
distinctfromthatof"stateofnecessity"that "[tlheterminatofthe 1977Treatycannot
50 See,para3.13gS., abov?be considered wrongfulbecauseintemationallaw ackeptsthe principIe& impossibilia
nemo tenenir. that ione cmut be ubliged to perform the impossible"" . Hungary
firther invokesThe RussianIndemnitv Case to CU&? thata treatyobligationneednot
beperfonned iftheobligarionis"self-destructive"."i
8.63 Slovaloabrie@notes that this issimply a repackagingofthe
argumentof stareofnecessity. And neitheris it formiilatinterms oftherequirements
of Article61,nor doesit meetthem. Article6 l(1)limitsimpossibiIityf performance to
impossibilityresuItiqg"fiom the permanent disappeqance or destruction of an object
indispensablfeortheexecution of thetreaty".NothingiIthepresent case makesArticle
6 1applicable5.3
I
B. Hungarv Has ~emonstrated No Fundamentai Chanze of
CircurnstancesunderArticIe 62
!
8.64 Hungq's daim, advaricd in:its 1992 Deciaradion apparerrtIy
consists of threepoints:(1) Article 62(l)(i bsnot'applicable iaw inrelationtu this
dispute;andmaythusbe ignored;(2) thattbereexist teedCuuncilof MumaiEwnomic
Assistanceand socîdist governmentsin Hungaryand Czechoslovakia in 1977, which
situation has now changed;and (3)there has been fundamentalchange inthat the
importanceof environmenta flactors hasincreasewoqldwide.
51 -7e Annex 17,atp. 24.
52 UnitedNationsRe~orton InternatioAlrbitralwarhsXI,443,
1
53
Even ifanysuchseparatgraundfor suspensionandterminationcoIidedmined,aspari of
rhe IawofStatrespnsibility, HungarywouIdno1me thecriteria. Thwasno quesrionof
physicd impossibiliiyeitinrthe Russian IndemniCase or intheconsmctian ofthe
GabEIkovo-NagyrnaT rrsa~ stnrmeç. The Latin riraxhasnoapplication. TheRussian
IndernnimCaseconcernedeitherformeajeureostataf necessity.The OfiomanGavement
referrctoforcemajeurtodescribtheverydi&cUrtfinanciai situation whichIedit no1tu pay
itsdebtiohe RussianGovemmenr;but thecorrunentatoArticIe33oftheEC saysthat ihe
circumsf~e in whichtheOrtomanGovernment founditsel"was much moreirk e statof
necessiSn.{YearbmkofrheInternationalLawCommission1980,Vol.II,PartII, p.In any
went, thePermanenCt ourtofArbitraticiearlthoughtthetesfora statofnecessitwas
that the existenceof the OttomanEmpirewrts imwrilled or that its inteexternal
situationwas seriouslvendangered(UnitedNationsRepoonsInternationlwards XI,at
443). The Courtthoughtthe claia "manifestexaggeratiom. And so is~un~ary's
claim, whetherit isadaim of necessityor repackaged,inappropnatel,s a claimof
irnpossibility. 8.65 SlovakiawilIaddresseachofthese pointin turn.
8.66 Article62(1)oftheViema Conventionprovides:
"1. A fundamentalchange of circumstance shichhas occurred
with regardto thoseexistingat the time of the conclusionoa
treaty,andwhich was notforeseen by the parties,may notbe
invoked as a ground for terminatingor withdrawingfrom the
treatyunless:
(a) the existenceofthose circumstance sonstitutean essential
basisoftheconsent ofthe partieto bebound bythetreaty;and
@) the efecof thechangeis radicallto transfomthe extentof
obligationstiItu beperfumed underthe treaty."
8.67 Hungary refersin the1992 DecIarationtu ArticIe62(I)(a )nd
continues:
"The preamble of the 1977 Treaty stated explicitlthat the
constructionof thebarragesystem 'wouldsignificantcontribute
to bringingaboutthesocialistintegratiof thememberstates of
CMEA'. Obviously,thehistoricalchangesthat tooplaceinboth
countriesin1989could notbe foreseen. Theçechangesresulted
in acompleteturnoverof thedornesticandinternationaslituation,
includingtheend oftheCMEA and the'socialiintegration'.t is
alsoobviousthat thisIedto radicachangesinthe circumstances
of the barragesystem,puttingsimilargiganticconstructionsin a
differentlight. Thesechangesmade it possibleforenvironmental
considerationtobecome apriority, tleasinIilungary.4
3.68 Theconceptof an entihnment tuinvokefundamental changeof
circumstancesas a ground for teminationofa treatyhas a Iong history,currsiderably
predatingthe ViennaConvention; and su has the great cautionshown by international
tribuna1sin acceptinthedaim in particiAacases befure them: Free Zones ofUmer
Savovand the District oex". Thereasonis nothardto frnd: "it is thefunctiothe
55
FreeZonesofUpotrSavoyandtheDistrictGex,Judment, 1932P.C.I.J.. SeriesAIB,No.
46,p. 96atp.158.law toenforcecontractor treatieven ithey beco'mbeurdensom for thepartybound
bythemWJ6.
8.59 Theimportance giventum$ance withagreementsis iIIiistrated
by theresponseofthe Permanen t ourtinthe SerbiaLems Case, (this timtua claim
offurcemajeuretuexcus non-performance).TheCourt stated:
"Itcannot be rnaintainedhatthe war itself, despiits grave
consequenca eff,ctedthe legal obligationof the contracts
betweenthe Serbian Government and the French bondholders.
The economi~pisloc cauisdnbytieslarcaitiot releasthe
debtorstat... ." 1
8.70 The prime requirement of Article 62 is that change of
circumstancesbe truly fundamental.Even major changesthen haveto be testedby
referencetotheessentiabasisoconsent(Article62(l)(a)andthetransformationofthe
obligationtobe performed(Article62(l)(b)).
7 1 In theFreeZones Casethe PermanentCourt examine tdechange
of circumstancerelieon by Francefordenunciatioof thefke zonesagreementswith
SwitzerImd -the establishmentofFederd Customain849 -and made referencedso tu
uther undoubted changesincIudi tngse relatingto the food sul requirementsof
Geneva,the deyelopmentof cornmirnicatioandtechnicalprugressgeneraliy. But these
failed,becausethehad"nu bearirigonthewhoIebody of circumstance-circurnstances
essentiallygovernedby the geographicdconfiguratofntheCanton of Genevaand of
the surroundingregionwhich theHigh ContractingPartiehadinmind atthetime that
thefreezoneswerecreated5 '. I
8.72 The "whole body of circumstances" that Hungary and
Czechoslovakiahad inmindwhenthe 1977Treatyprovisionsfor the G/N Systemwere
57
SerbianbansJudgmenNo. 14. 192PCIISeriesNo. 20atpp39-40.
58
FreeZoneofUp~erSmov andtheDistrictof Gex..Judm1932P.C.I.J..Serm,s No.
45, p.9atp.158.agreedwere indeeddso the circurnstancgoverned bythegeographicd configuration
of thestretcof theDanube from BratislavviaGab6I?rovo-Nagymaror stptu Budapest.
Thesecircumstanceh savebeenfuUd yescribeinChapter 1,andincludethepropensityto
severe and uncontrolledfloodingthe problernsof securinga navigationchannel of
suita dblethand thepossibilitofsecuringcleanenergyfkomthenatural resourcesof
theDanube. Applying thetestofthe PermanenC t ourt,thepoliticalchangesthahave
occurredin reçentyearin Hungary andinSlovakia- andin CentralandEasternEurope
more generally-"have no bearingin[thiw s]holsbody of circumstances". Tbese
prriblemaandpossibiritisavenot beendteredbythesechanges.
8.73 The essentidbasioftheconsentofthe partiestube boundbjrthe
treaty (Artic62(1)(a))liestu securecefiaiabjectsand prposes. These aretu be
ascertainednotjust fiom thtext ofthe treatbut hm the historofnegotiationd9.
The circumstancesthat led to the prolongednegotiationsbetween Hungary and
Czechoslovakia , ndthe purposes and objectiveof the 1977 Treaty,relatedto the
physicalgeographyofthe Danube andthe eneru, transportagiculturaland flood
protectionneedsof theparties.Notwithstandin ghepreambularreferenceto "socialist
integrationthiswasquiteclearlynotthe"essentialasis"ofthecomrnon consent.
8.74 That "fundamentachange"is riono se agroundfor termination,
udess it hasafected the object and purpofethe obligationsundertake,sillrrstrated
by the Court'sAdvisoryOpinioninthe SouthWest Africcase6'. Inthatcase rherehad
been an irnponant institutionalchange, perhapsevenmorestnking than theintemal
restructurînof HungaryandCzechoslovakia -namely,thedisappearanc efthe Leagile
of Nations,whichwas assignedsupervisoryfunctionsunder theMandateTreaty. The
Courtheld thattheobligationwereundertaken to securethesacredtmst of civiliation
referredtoinArticl22: "Their 'raisond'etre'aoriginaobject remainl' And so iis
withthe objectsofthe 1977Treaty.
59 FisheriesJurisdrctionKKin~domv. Icelandl.Jrrrisdirhe CourtIirdment, I.C.J.
Rewrts1473p.3, ap.17.
50 InternatiorrdSroSouthWesiAfricaAdvisorminion, I.C.J. Re1950.p.128. 8.75 Hungary claimsthattheprovisionsofArticle62l)(b arenot part
ofcnstomq internationalIawand therefuredonut governthe relationbetweenitseIf
and Slovakiain sofarasitinvocationofrebussicstariti ibcosncemed.
8.76 h any event, Slov&a isofthevicw that Article 62(l)(b)wap,
indeedconfirmatory of generdinternationallw, and nota "new" elementin the law
relatinto rebussicstantibusThedraftinghistoryoftheViennaconventionshowsthat
thisprovisioappeared intheearliesofdrafts6'andwasconsistentlypresent,withsmall
drafhg changes,through to theILC'sFinalDr& kcle 59. The travauxfurtherreveal
no suggestionsbyILCmembers orintheSixth CornmitteoeftheGeneraiAssembly that
the requirementthat findsits finalformin ~rticle 62(l)(bd)oes not represent the
customary intemationailawunthe requirernenof rebussicstantibus.
8.77 Inthe FisherieJurisdictiCase, theCourtstatedthat Articl62
of the Viema Convention"may in my respectsbe considered as acodification of
existingcustomary~aw"~'. Later the Court stahd, in generd rems but usii the
essentialwordig ofArticle62(1)@): "inorderthata changeof circumstancems aygive
risetoa groundfor invokingtheterminatioof atreaty,itis alsonecessathatitshould
have resultedin a radicdtransfomationof the extentof the obligationsstill tbe
performed" 64The Courtclearlythoughtthis principleof generalapplication.The
Courtconsidered: "The changemusthaveincreased theburden of theobligationto be
executedto theextentofrenderingtheFerforniancseomethingesseuiaIIydifferenhm
that originalundertakenU6 .' The politicchanges in Hungaryand Slovakiadid not
make the treatyobIigations"essentidiEere fiom thoseundertaken".
8.78 Hungary is unabletumeet the reqrrirementsofArticle 62(a)(b),
whichis applicableboth underthe Conventioandinder generd intermiund law,as the
62 Seedr& Artrcle22(2)(c)ii, 2nd Rof~rofeççorWaldock,Yearbookof the Internationai
LawCommission1963,Vol.1, .79.
63 FisheriesJurisdi(UniteKingdomv. IcelandJurisdictof thCourtJudgmentI.C.J.
Report1973,p. atp.18.internapoliticalchangeto which idudes areidevarit to theexterioftheobIigatiuns
stiltobe performed.
8.79 Slovakia Mer subrnitsthata claim to temiriateby reason of
--bussic stantibushouldbe treatedwiththegreatestreservewherethe claimingparty
basfuIfrIIedmodes~ partof itobligationtodate,whilethe otherpartyhs fiiEIledat
considerabl efforand financialburden,neadyalof the obligationsincumbenupon i.
8.80 Hungary's observation in its 1992 Declaration devoted to
fundamenta change,that "theimportanceofenvirumental resourcesandvalues has
increasednot only inHungary, but al1overthe world" is tme, but withoutany legal
point. The 1977 Treatyis nota multilatertleaty. Ithashad fiom the outset itown
monitoringand adjustment procedures that allow a flexibleresponseto developing
envirumentalconcerns and knowledge.The ESTC Cornmittee was atthe heartofthis
constant review. The JouitCommission appointedunder the 1976 Boundq Waters
ManagementAgreement dso had an importantrule tu Reportsof Ministers
could be studied,nationashidiescouldbe exchanged6 .'A Statereriouslyinterestedin
these environmental facrors wuuId amil itseIfof these techcal and scientik
opportunitieand not createamajor enviromentd problemby itsabandonmentof work
intheabsence ofanyenvironmentalguarantees orplans.
C. Hungaw Has Demonstrated No Material Breach by
Czechoslovakia orSlovakiaunderArticle 60
8.87 The allegedbreachesidentifrd byHungary aretwofold: a failure
byCzechoslwakia tu fulfitçduriesfor the protectionof natureand water quality; and
theintroductionofVariant"C".
66
*, para.3.03abve.
67
-a, paras834-8.94k,Iow. -340 - I
!
The AIie~edFaiIuretu ~ulfij Dufies for fhe Protection of
Natureand Water OuaIitv
fiilfildutprescribedinthe 1977Treatyforthe of naturand waterquality,
refeninginpartidar toArticles15and 19 ofthe~reity~'. Article15(1)providesthat
the"ContractingPartiesMI ensure,bythemeans specied inthejoincontractualplan,
thatthequalitof waterinthe Danube inot impairedasaresuhof theconstructionand
operationof the Systemof Locks". Article19proddes thatthe "ContractingParties
shall,through thmeans specifieinthejointcontractuapIan,ensurecornpliancewith
the obligationfortheprotectionofnahirearisingin:connecî wiohntheconstruction
andoperationof the Systeof t~cks".
8.83 Hungaryhas notyetspecifieinwhatways theseprovisionshave
beenviolated.Itappearstotakethe impairmenotfwaterqualityanda failureto protect
natureasa givenfactinherent the constructioandoperationof thG/N System; and
to deduc from thatunverifiestartingpoiabreach oftreatyonCzechoslovakia'psart.
Slovakiahas shownin ChapterIII abovethe measuies agreedinthe JointBoundary
WatersCommissionformonitoringand improvirigwaterquality.
8.84 As discussedin ChapterIIIab{%, the 1985 Report of the Joint
Boundary Waters Commissionnoted that520 sewage treatment plants had been
crinstmctedonthe CzechosIovaksideof thecornmon mreacof the Danube, an77% of
al1sourcesofwaterpollutionhadtheirown sewagetreatmentfacilities.Thereportalso
referredto Czechoslovakplans to constmct, between 1985 and 1990, 25 sewage
treatmentplants,andbetween 1990 and 1995, 95more plants. The details,andthe
cornpanson with Hungéuiawater sewageconstmctions,arealsotobe found inChapter
III above. The figurescIearIyshowthat Czechoslovahad ifact exceedeirs pIanned
construction schedirlsewage treatment plants. :
8.85 The reportsof the independemissionszuggest,regardingwater
quality,that there are some prublems,but probiems thatcouldbe overcome beforethe
G/N Systemis putintooperation. Furthermortheseproblemsantedatethe 1977Treatyarrangements ,nd are notcaused by the G/N Projea. So far as Variant "CR is
concerned,the EC has been satisfiwithwaterquality.TheECWorking Group report
of 2 Novernber 1993 foundthat ingeneralno groundwaterquality changes couldbe
identifieafterthedamming oftheIlanube6 '
8.86 As forthe protectionof naturethe 1977 Treaty does of course
entai1some changeswhich entailaiterationisnthpreviousenvironmenta statusquo that
affectsscenery,vegetation, fishmimals, dora and fauna. This was what Hungaty
agreedto. ButprovisionswereputinpIace toensurethe importanceof rninimisxnhm
on the one hand, andtaking dl opportunitieto improvethe stafusquo ante> onthe
other70.
8.87 Slovakia hashlly complied withits obligationsunderArtides 15
and 19 of the 1977Treaty,inthe sensethatno impairment ofwaterqualityor disregard
foi the protectionof natureoccurrebyreasonofthe co~istnrctionofthe TreatySystem
or the puttingintooperatioofVariant"Cu; and inthe sensethatSIovakiahas pIayedits
fuIIroIeinensuring this.Furthemore, therehave in factbeen certaierihancements of
thesituationasitwas beforethe damming.
8.88 Hungaryasserts in its 1992Declarationthatits "factimply"the
violationof(a)provision(s)essentialto the accomplishmeof theobject andpurposeof
the treaty"within the rneaninof Article60(3)(b)of the Vienna convention and that
Hungary can thus invoke a materid breach of a bilateralTreaty as a ground for
terminatingthe ~reaty~.
8.89 Slovakia,fullyup tu date in its crrrrentobligatiohas fulfiIIed
around 90% ofrheconstmcrion obligationsforwhich itwas responsible, haadheredro
al monitoringrequirementsa ,ndsoughtover the years toaccommodate its parîner's
inconsistentdemands.Itfinds itbreathtakinthatHungaryshouldclaimmateriab l reach
bySlovakia.
69
para5.56above.
ru Bee,para.6.132,m., above.
-
71 Annex17,p.26. 1
8.90 Furiher, Hungq's invocationpf Article60(3)(b)is shply no1
8.91 The fact thatsome problemsh:ave arîsenfrom time to time
regardingwaterqualitywhich requireattentionandadjustments does not amount to a
"materid breach". These adjustments are absolutelnormal ina project of these
dimensions.
g.92 ArticI6Ot3) ofthe Vienna Conventiondehes a materid breach
asa repiidiatiof the treatriotsanctionedby the;Convention,or thevîuIatiunofa
provisionessentidro the accornpIisiimeof the uhject or purpose of the treaîy. The
purpose ofthe 1977 TreaiyisspecifiedinArticIe 1 thereofTheILC Commentary on
theuseof theterm "matenab ireach"rathethan "fundamentabl reachindicatesthatthis
permitsreferencetoa widerrange ofpurposep. ~he widerrangeof purposeswas the
improvement ofnavigation,the provisionof clean yd inexpensiveenergy,and flood
control. Therehasbeen no materiabl reachwhateverby Slovakia,andHungary cannot
pretendto have suspendedand then terminatethe 1977 TreatyunderArtide 60of the
Viema Convention.
The CIairnthat Variant"C" Rearesenfs aMateria1Breachof
the1977 Treatv
8.93 Matedity ofbreachcanonly be testedbyreferenceto thobjects
and purposesof thetreaty(Article60(2)(b)). Th1977 Treatyenvisagedimprovements
infloodcontrol,energyandnavigation.Variant "CH ,farfrombeingactionthatviolated
theaccomplishmeno tfthe objectand purposeofthe 1.97Treaty,was the ody avaîlable
vehicIeforaccompliskngtheobjectandpurpose asnearlyaspossible.
8.94 This hasbeenelahoratedatlengthinChapter VI1above. Variant
"Cucausednoham; closelyapproximatetdu whatwgs intendedunderthe 1977Treaty;
and entailea departurefromwhatwasenvisaged intermsofthe reductionof the sizeof
12
YearbookoftheInternatiolawCommission19661ro1.p.255.thereservoirby confiringthisto Czecholovaterritory. Moreover,it wasreversibleIt
could nothave constituteamateriablreachinthe sens ofArticle60.
8.95 Hungary had endeavoured byits earlieabandonmen otfwork to
render the 1977Treaty inoperative. But, asJudge Lauterpachrteminds usinthe
AdmissibiIitvfWearinesof PetitionerCase:
"Neitherisitnecessarilrendered impotentand inoperativas the
resuItofthe actionor inactionof oneofthe parties.It continues
inbeing subjecr to adaptation ru circumstances which have
arisen ."
Variant"CHwas suchan adaptation - stilldirectedexactlytowards the achievementof
themutually agreedobjectsandpurposesof the 1977Treaty.
8.96 Hungq cm ody IawfuIIyuspend orterminatethe 1977 Treaîy if
itcornes within the internationalIawprincipIescodified in Arti60eof the Viema
Convention. Tu do so,ithas tu show that Variant"C" itsdfconstituteda material
breachonthe 1977 Treaty; anddso that thisbreachhadoccurredbefureany Hrrngaîan
responseby suspending or terminating the Treaty. Hungaryclearlycannotmeet these
conditions.
8.97 Itprovidesno groundswhateverfor a purportedterminationby
virîueofArticle60(3#b) oftheViema Convention.
SECTION^. Hungar~'s Actions Are Not LawfuI, Even As
Countemeasures
8.98 SlovakiahasexplainedwhyitbelievesthattheViemaConvention
providesthe soletestfor legalityof suspensionsand purported temination of a treaty.
But evenwerethat notso, Hungary'sactsarenotjustifiedunder internationallaw.
73 AdmrçsibiIilyof HearofgPetitioncrstheCornmitteean SouihWest AfriAdvisory
Opinion. ICJ Reports,1923, ap.49. A, If Countermeasures ArioIv At Al1 Within a Treatv
ReIationshiu,in Respect of Measures AIreadv Rezulated
under Artide 60 of the Vienna Convedtion, Thev Must Be
Directedtu CertainPumuses :
8.99 Countermeasure areto be distinguishedfiom punitiveacts. As
çuchtheyservetwo possiblefunctions, eitheofwhichisapplicabl n the presentcase.
The fist consistsofactsdesignedtobring pressureonthe defaultingStatetopersuade it
to end itsillegabehaviourandresumeits legalobligations.It is imrnediatelyapparent
thatHungary cmot bringitselfwithinthiscategory.:SlovakialIegd obIigationsare tu
perîom whatis requiredof itbythe 1977 Treaty. ~ien ifit wereaccepted(which it is
not) that Variant"C" isinbreachof the 7977Treaty,Hungary isrnost certainlynot
engagingincorrntermeasure isorderto sKue cornpliancebySIovakiawiththe terms of
that Treaty. All Hungary'aeffortsovethe yearshavé been directedto avoidingits own
performancea , ndsecurinnon-performan bce~lovakiatoo of its legalobligations.
8.100 The second functionof countenneasures isto re-establishan
equilibriumbetween the parties". Slovakiahas alreadycontended that the specific
provisionsof the ViennaConventionreiathg to susiensionand terminaionof treaties
necessarily provide the preconditions and mark the Iimit of any exercîse of
countermeasirres. Inthe AirServices Amernerit Ch, the arbitral tribunai found the
suspension of a particularobligatioto be of a coriective nature, airnat restoring
equaiitybetweenthe parties7.5Butinanyevent, itis plaithatevenif suspensioncould
be saidto operateto re-establishequilibriumwithina treatyrelationship,termination
cannot. It simplyendstherelationship.
8.101 Hungary doesnot clvm thatits unlawfulsuspensionof thetreaty
inMay-July 1989 were countermeasures. It daimsrathethat ifdecisiontu terminate in
May 1992 waç a countemeasure. But - even Ieavingasidethe probIem of suspension
andterminationas countemeasureswhentheygo beyondthe provisionsof Article 60 of
the ViennaConvention - its termirratinoes not cornewitkn eitherof the recognised
74
-ee,Sicilianos,"TheRelationshipBetwReprisaiandDenunciationor Suspensionofa
Treaty",4 EuropeJournalfInternationalL(2993)341at 344.
75
CaseConcerningthe AirSeMcesAmernent of22 Mach 1346,UnitedSiareY. Frmcef,54
internationaiLRemrtsi 19791p.304alp.339,para.90.categories.Itdoes not seekto secureSlovakia'sornpliancewiththe 1977Treatyit is
allegedtohavebroken -andindeed,Hungaryhadalreadydeclaredthe operation of the
1977 Treatysuspende dometwo yearscarrier.Further,terminatioof the 1977Treaty
couId achiev~ eieitherSIovakiaiscornpliancewith it nor the re-establishmentan
quilibrium betweenthe parties.
B. If Countemeasures Aiirilv At Al1 Within a Treoitv
RelationshipinRespectof Measures alreadyRe~ulatedunder
ArîicIe60 of the VierinaConvention, Certain Preconditiuns
Must beMet
There Must Bave Been a Prior Atternpt to Secure
Rewaration,Which Bas BeenReiecfed
8.f02 Thisrequiremen tas duded to extensivelinthe1979 Reportof
theSpecialRapporteurProfessor~~0". The Commissic onedtheNaulilaaarbitration,
whichspokeufreprisalsbeing carriedou"afteranunfirIfiIdemand -inresponsetu an
actcontrq tuthe lawofnations".Czechoslovaki aascommined no actcontrarytuthe
Iaw of nations.-Hungary has demandecithat Variant "Cube not proceeded with.
Czechoslovakiaclearlyagreedto desistif Hungarywould itselfresume its obligations
underthe 1977 Treaty; and has constructedVariant"C" so as tobe reversibleupon
Hungary'sreturn to the 1977 Treaty provisions. As one comrnentatorobserves,
Professor Rîphageninhis drafi i1985 was "iespondingto the concerntodistinguish
between the case inwkh the situationcreated by the internationallywrongfactis
ireversiblehm one inwhichit isnot" "
DeterminetheExistenceof aWï%~i~fu Alct
8.103Article I2 of Pm Two of the curent draft articles oState
Responsibilityproposes:
76 -YearboooftheIntemationlawCommission1979Vol.11Par2, p.16paras.and7.
77 Alland&
LC Codrfrcation of Rdeç Governin~ InternaRespo~5ibili tn,
C&cation ofStatResponsibileds.SpinedandSima, <1987at 170. 1
i
"1. An injuredStatemaynottake cou~temeasure snies:
(a) ithas recoursetoa bindindthqdparty]disputesettlement
procedurewhichboththe injured Stateand the Statewhichhas
committedtheinternationa wlrongfulactare bound to useunder
any relevanttrextytu whichtheyarep1irtiea."
SIovak nioes asfollows:Hungaryis not "aninjure!State"withinArticle12(1)- itis
Slovakiawhich hs been injured by Hungary'sconduct. Furîher, Hungary has nut
foilowedthe proceduresenvisaged underArticle 271of the 1977 Treatyfsee above,at
paragraph6 s.153etm.). These procedures specifito the 1977Treaty andagreed to
bybothparties,areentirelydifferentfiomthetypesd masuresenvisaged inArticle11
of theIL€ articiesNorhas itwaitedfor anydete-ation bythe Courton thedeged
udawfulness ofVariant "Cuand the remedy. For Hukgarysimpiy tu pronounceVariant
"CM as "internationawron@ll' anduniiaterally~~roLeeo engage incountemeasures
is exactlythattypeofabusiveexercisof countennea~ure isa decentralisesysternthat
has so womed manymernbersof the Sidh ~o-ttee - especiallythose from less
powerful countrie- whencommenting on theILCprbposals78.
I
The CountermeasureMus* !Be Pro~ortionate to the Prior
BreachofObIigation I
1
8.104 The requiremeno tf proportion9ityis inherentin internationallaw
andspecificallyrelevantto countermea~ures'~.uttbere hasbeenno "priorbreach" by
Slovakiab, ecauseVariant"Clrepresentsonlymeasirreasgreedto byHutlgq under the
7% &, Won of thin~emationLlawCommissio ~n.~.4/45312May 1993,pp.23-30 For
thecontraçtiviewsofaUnitedStateauthosupportingtheadoptiofa de "ailowina
statetimplementcountenngsureswithoutriskof laterliabiliactupona goodfaith
beliethatt thevictimoa breach,eventhoughthatbeliefturnsouttobeerroneousin
lightofthresultsofahitration,eeDarnros 74h,mencan Journ alInternationalLaw
(1980785-795. I
79 NauIiIaaArbitration, a~.cit., suReponofdhe SpeciaRapporteur,Yexhok ofthe
InternationaiLawCo~ssion,1979,VoI.U,Part Two,118,fn.595.k, alsoRosenne,
o~.~it..supra,p.3".restrictirhat invothepropodonalivpnnclplarevalidjuças
rnuchforreprisasforthedenunfiat iosuspensiofa breachetreatySee further,on
thefirm need for proporiionalityin countermeCasecon ce ni the Air Services
Agreementof27March 1946(UniteStatesvFranceCase 54InternatioLawReports,p.
304atp. 338.
1 8.105 In my event,itis seIfevidethat thpurported terminationothe
1977 Treaty was not proportionattu any alleged violationby Czechodovakia. The
diversioof theDanube' s aterwas envisagedunderthe 1977 Treaty.Theody change
has been areductionin thevolumeof thereservoirbyconfiningthistoCzechosIovak
territoryonly. Butthatfactis attributabolelyto Hungary' son-performanc ef its
obligations. Everyîhgelsethathas happenedwas intendedtohappenby theterms of
the 1977Treaty enteredinro by Hungary. The fiamewurk ofthe Treaty was kept.
Mureuver ,nd importmtly,the purportcterminationofthe 1977 TreatyinMay 1992
occurredevenbeforeVariant"C" was findy putinplace,when itwas kIIy understood
byHungary thatthemeasurewasreversibleu,ponperformancebyHungary.
SECTIO 6. Hungaw's CIaim as tu the Prioritv to be Accorded tu
SubseauentEnvironmentalRules
8.106 The natureof Hungary'sclaim,advance udder paragraph 6 of
PartIiIof the 1992Declarationi,snot forthemoment cleartoSlovakia. In the first
place, iissaidtocontain"reason fs"the terminatioof the 1977Treaty,ratherthah
Iegd justifications. Andin paragra7,which referstuthe cu-terminologofgruunds
for suspensioand guunds for terminatiounder the Viema Convention,it isstated"
[tlhereforeit is suffiherettorefertoChapter IIIsections3, 4and 5of the present
Declaration"-butno referencismade to section6.
8.107 It iscuntendedby Hungary
thatthedes of general.intemational
law on envimental protection take precedenceuver earlier or contras- treary
provisions,anditrelieon theprincipluflex posteriordero~atle@~rîon.Iexspecialis
derogat le~i generali. The formulation chosen by Hungaisnotthat of jus coaens,
presumablybecauseArticle 64 of the Viema Conventionw, hichdealswithjuscogens
su~erveniens,was cIearIynoa merecodificationofinternationallaw. Hungary,having
takenthe positiothatit is not boundinrespectof thisdisbythe VierinaCorivenrion
as such,but onlyby the generd internationa1las itcodifies,ithusunable toamil
itself of Arti64. Inanyevent,it mattersnot, becauseHungarywouIdnot be able to
show the existenceof relevantju coaenssuperveniens. Hungary, havingaffirmethe
1977 Treaty inal1 its substantiveelements in February 1989, then suspendedperformance at Nagymaros inMay1989. Irwould thpî need toshowtheemergence of
a relevantpre-emptorynom betweenFebruary andMayof 1989.
I
1
8.108 InadditionH, ungarywodd n$d tu showthat a pertinenmle of
jus CU- existed-thatistu say,a mie thatisat onke speciEc*applicablto the facts,
and generally acceptedby the world comunity as Mailingwithin thisvery specid
category ofgeneralinternationallw. i
I
S.109Faced with thesedilemmas ,dngay has apparent slttledfor a
differentclaim: posterior derogat1e~priori.k sAecialisderogat eenerali. This
daim ismadewithout reference to theViema ~onv4ntioS nlovakiaaifims againthat
theViennaConventionr ,epresentativeorthemost ph ofcustomary internationallaw,
is the applicablelaw forthe interpretatioof the 1977Treaty; and thatthe Vie-
Convention is alsoapplicabley vimie ofthefactthatl~un~ary ffirmed the 1977Treaty
in February 1989, which was subsequen tu the entry intoforce foritof the Vienna
Convention. 1
i
!
8.110 The principleof posterior/les~ecialisapplieseitherto two
generalrules of internationallaw, intese, or to &O treatyprovisions onthe same
i
subject matterand bindiig onthe same parties.TheIlatter isof course,governed by
Article30 oftheViema Convention.Hungaryappea rto saythat thespecifiprovisions
of the 1977 Treatyare-tobe setasideinfavo~~orf suQsqtientmles un the protection of
the environment. But treatyprovisions are specificobligationsinter sethatrernain
obligatory,evenin the face ofsubsequentc ,ontraryNles of generalinternationallaw.
Hungary needsto show - butcannot -that treatybinpg onHungary and Slovakiawas
concluded on thîs çubject matter &er 1977, and ,was incompatible with the 1977
~reat~" . I -
i
8.111 Inanyevent, the"lexspecia1is"'saidyHungary to derogatefrom
the1977Treatyis neither a lexspecialisproperlso cqlled,noriitsapplicationapparent
tu thecurrentdispute.Hrrngary,inordertu justiQ w~pensionin 1989,citesinstmrnents
pnortothat date: !
Sb
Further,it wilcourrberemernberethatthe1977breatwas &ectivelyatfirmas latas
6 Febniar1989bythearnendinProtocol fthdate.!
1 - PrincipleNo.4 oftheStockholmDecIaration of 1972 tha:
"NatureconservationÎ,ncludingwild'life, rnustthereforereceive
importanci enplanningforeconomic developrnen "
PrincipleNo.3 oftheWorldCharter for Natureadoptedby the
Generd Assemblyin 1972,that:
"Specialprotectionshd be giventu unique areas,tu represent
sampIesof al1dirent %es of ecosystems and the habitatsof
rareorendmgered species"and that the conservatioof nature
mustbecorne anintegralpartoftheplanningprocess.
- TheBrundtlandReport8' that:
"States shall maintain ecosystems and ecological processes
essentialfor the functioningof the biosphere, shall preserve
biologicaldiversity,and shallobservthe principleof optimum
sustainableyieldin the use of living naturalresources and
ecosystems".
8.112 SIovakiamakcsthe FolIowingobservations:
FA, theseinstrumentsaredIat most"sufiIaw", md reflectadeveIoping
consensus about the importanceof envirumental factorsindecisionmaking. Indeed,
the Introductionto the BrundtlaReport emphasisesthe aspirationalnatureof its work,
referrinto theprinciplesasthose"which ought to beinplacenow or beforethe year
2000". Theseinstrumentsdo not constitutediscretebindingrulesof internationall-w
stillessperemptorynoms that couldbnngArticle64 intoplay.
Second, they are of a considerablegenerality,and certaidy do not
ccinstitutea "lexspeciaI1hatcouldderogate hm the 1977 Treaty.
81
Emm Group on Enviromenfa1 Lawof the WorIdCommission on Environmentand
Development.EnvironmentaIProtectionand SustaiDeveIo~men,Legd Principleçand
Recornmendations,87. Third, in anyeveni, even were they\fim and ~pecificpronsiom oi
international Iawrheywould not derugate fiom treaty provisionsagred inter
betweenthe parties. i
i
I
Foufih,the principleofkx specialibéroeatkgi eeneralioperatesas a
ph~ipleooitirpetation;~ itdoesnot operateto suepend andterminatea treaty.To
suggestotherwiseis to confusenotonlythepnncipleof generalinternationallawwith
the subjectmatterof Artic30 of theViennaConveqtio bn,to confuseeach of these
withthesuspension provisioninSection3 ofthe~ienba Convention.
I
I
Finally-evenwere al1thisnotso -theprinciplesdonot necessitatthe
abandoment of the1977 Treaty. Theseimportanten$ronmentd considerationcm be
1
met withinthe 1977Treaty. The monitoringprovisionsareexacrlydirectetoensuring
that these enWonmental factors arefully takenaiFouounof Moreover, Slovakia's
continuingconcentfor suchcrucialmatfersaswaterdualityand quan~iiintheDanube
is shownby its participationinpreparationsfoi aWatb ManagementReg% andinthe
PHARE project. None of these has suggested t+t the environmenc tan only be
protectedbyabandoringthe G/'NProjectandleavingitinit srese n tfinishestate.
i
8.113 Hungary'sactionshavealreadyeausedmassivehm tu SIovakia-
andham directed to theheart oitsessentiinterest/SIovakiaiessentidinterestsIiein
being ableto protectitspeoplehm flooding,to ptovîde them with slean energat
affordablepnces,toimprovenavigationconditionst( ensurethe proper quaiityof their
drinkingwarerand a decent environmenttulivein. Hungary'unIawfuIsuspensionand
denunciationof the 1977Treaiy hitrttthehem of these essentid interestasd hits
further through seekingto renderwithout object the huge investments made by
Czeçhoslovakia and Slovakia. Slovakia,a struggiing new democracy, is severely
damage dnprovidingfortheessentiallife-needitspeople.
1
8.114 It is not for Hungatodetendne whatarethe essentialinterests
of Slovakiathatrequireprotection. It is extra~rdinar~,arrogant and unacceptablefor
Hungary tu deciare init1992Declarationth&Hungary's perceptioof "imminentperd"isequallytrufor the Slovasided the Danube and:"Cansequentiythe terminatiof
the Treatywould not seriouslyimpaian essentialinterestthe Czech and Slovak
~e~ublics"~.~
8.115SIovakiaconcIudes that noneof the grounds advmced by
Hungaryfor slispendinand terminahgthe 1977 Treatyis sustalltedbythe objective
scientiffacs,or dIowabIeunderiritemtiond law. 9.01 The essenceof SIovakia' saseagains t ungary lies iitsclaïrnthat
Hungary deliberatelyreached the 1977 Treaty. The caseis notonein whichthere isa
controversy over whetherthe conductof one Part yidor did not, as amatter of treaty
interpretation, onstituta breach. The suspension,abandonmen t f perfomce and
purported terminatioof the1977Treaty by Hungarywere al1amatter ofpublic recordand
communicated toCzechoslovakia intheclearestpossibletermsl.Thus, asshown inChapter
VI, a pa faciebreach was clear. And,if Hungaryhad no legaljustificationfor these
breaches, of the 1977 ~rea$, they necessady entailthe internationar lesponsibiliof
Hungary.
9.02 The consequence of that breacis equ* cIear.In the now dasac
formulationof thePermanent Courtinthe ChorzowFactory Case.
"The Court observesthat it isa pnncipIeof internationalIaw,and even a
generalconceptionoflaw, that anybreachof an engagementinvolves aduty
tomakereparation. .The esseritid principIecontaininltheactrrdnotionof
anillegalact..is thatreparationmust, asfaraspossible,wipe out A1the
consequencesofthe illegaactandre-establishthesituationwhichwould,in
aiiprobabilith,aveexistedifthatacthadnotbeen committed3 ."
9.03 Thequestion isthereforew, hatspecificremediesis Slovakiaentitled
to,ifthereparationdueto Slovakia ito wipeout theconsequences of thebreach?
1. DecIarationthat the 1977 TreatvRemains a Treatv in Force, and
that Humam Aded Without LegaIJustification in Sus~endirtg~
Abandoning ifs Performance and Purpartina to Terminate the
Treatv
9.04 It is cIearthat such a declararion is absoIuteIyessentiatu any
resoIutionof the disputebetweentheParties.At the heart of their disputeliesthe daim by
Hungary that iis enritlto setaside the1977 Treatyand regard it aIawfirllyterminated.
1 -ee,ChapterIV,above.
2
-ee,ChapteVIII,above.
3
FactoratChorzow.Merits.JudmentNo.13.P.C.I.SerieA, No. 17atpp.46-47Hunpary'e sxcusefornon-performanc restsonthevie4 thatthe 1977 Treatyn -oisongerin
force. So thisissuemustberesolved bythe Court. 1
l
1
9.05 Situarionshavefaced theCourt /nthepast inwhich 'a&&mg ofthe
j
validityand eEectivenessof an internationalagreement was essentidtu a resoIritioof a
case. Thus theCourt's AdvisoryOpinion on thestatu; of South-West &a, in affinring
that the tenitory remainedunder Mandate, necessailykejectedSouthAfiica'splea thatthe
Mandate Agreement, asa treaty, hadlapse .dSo, tob, in the Hostaeu caseS the Court
found Iranin breach of theViema Conventions of1961 and 1963, andthe Convention on
thePrevention and PunislimentofCrime against1nter&tiondy ProtectedPersonsof 1973,
eventhoughIranregarded thesetreatiesasinapplicable6 ;.theFreeZonesofU~perSavov
and Gex case7, thePermanentCourtrejectedon the'facttheFrenchplea thatthe treaty
arrangemento sf 1815hadlapsed because of theprinciplerebus sicstantibus. In al1these
cases,sincethestatus or relevanceof thetreatieswas aprîrnareylernentinthedispute,any
resolutionof thedisputerequired theCourtto rnake a!declarationas to thevalidityof the
treatiesin question. Slovakiais entitledtosuch a deIlarationasa necersary pari of the
rernedyofsatisfaction. 1
l
l
9.06 Indeed,in a caseruchas theps~nt iitwould beimpossible todispose
of the contentionsof the Parties without determini&the validity of the justifications
advanced byHungaty for its suspension,abandonmentl andpurported termination, and the
curent statlrof,the 1977 Treaty. Al1the remediesclkmedby SlovakiarequiretheCourt
to express afinding on those points. The wholequesi!onof a breach of the 1977 Treaty
4 Internationltatusof SoutWestAfrica.Advisorvhinion. I.C.JRenom. 1950, 128 al132.
Although,inthacaseSouthAfncadidnotarguethat it.hadrighttoterminatetheagreemenas
Hungarydoesin thepresecase. 1
5 United StateDiplornatiand Consular Sm in Tehran.ProvisionalMeasuresOrder of 15
December 1979,I.C.J.Revort1979p. 7atpara.41and,see,alsoUnitedStrttDiplornaticand
ConsularStaEinTehran .udment.I.C.J.Reports1980:3,atpara. 0.
6 IranregardedtheIreauesasinapplicablein the cirmstancesthe caseratherthan void or
terrninated, butnonethetheeflect theCourt'sjudgmenwastohoId thosueatiesvaliand
appIicabIinthecirmstariceç.
1
7 Fr= Zonesof UpperSavov andtheDistrict Gex,Judment. 1932P.C.I.JSeriesNB N0.45al
p.%.The Courtheld Fmce hadfaile10showt haî 18I5Treatarrangementswerepremised
ontheabsence,in 1815,of anms~om dutiesal Genwasuthatthe imposiridn mch customs
constitutadfundamefihchangeinthecoridrtiosbraihngin 1S.
Iassumes that,atthe time of Hungaq'spurportedtermination,the Treaty was in force.
Mureuver, Slovakiadoes not seeka pure deciaratoryjudgment, without morsu that its
applicatioto theCourt mightmn the risofbeingdeclaredwithout furtherobject. The
purposeoftheddaratiun inthicsaseisprwiselytofounditsdaims for furthremdies, as
dl appearbelow.
9.07 Siovakia'senfithent to my fum of reparationpre-supposesthat
Hungary is inbreachofan internationalobligation,and th& îhe Court sufinds. A
declaratioto thiseffectisa perfectlynormalparof thejudicialfunction,but it is not a
declaratorjudgmentsimplicitewhichSlovakia seeks b,.ratheradeterminatioonf breach
asthe necessarypre-conditinuthe furtheordersastothecunductrequiredofHungaryto
makereparatiunforthebreach,includingHungary'IiabiIitopaydamages forthai breach.
9.08 Thebreachesinquestionarebreacheo sfthe 1977 Treatyandofthe
interrelatagreementsa,ndthesehavebeenseparately identifieand explainedinChapter
VI. As wiI1be recaIIed,theyarethe following.
A. *
1977 Treatv During Mav-October1989
9.09 Hungary' sirsunilateralnd unlawful"suspension"ameon 13 May
1989, initialIyinrelatothe wotk atNapparas (an dstensiblfora twa month periad),
but then on20 JuIythe suspensionwasextendetu Hungary'ws orkatGabekovo and for a
further period&il 31 October1989. Then, during1989,thebreach was aggravatedby
reason ofHungary's decisiontoextend the suspensionforan indefinitperiod. On 30
October 1989 HungaryinformedCzechoslovakia thatit hadabandonedthe GiN Projectin
respectof the Nagyrnarossection.
8 This point rettheCouds judgmmt in NriclearTests {Auv.France) Judnrnent. I.C.J.
Repom, 1974,25atpp.270-272. "Cessationofwrone;fiilonduct
A State whoseconduct consfitutesan internationdlywronmI acthaving a
continuirichwacter is underthe obligationto ceasethat conduct, without
prejudicetotheresponsibity ihasalready uicurred"."
9.14 Acceptance ofthe obligationof cessationas a separateobligation
(&, sepetratehm otherforms of reparation)anbe seen intheCourt's jurisprudence.In
the~ostagesCase theCourt decidedthatIran:
".mustimmediately teminate the unlawfd detention..of United States
nationalsnowheldhostageinIran,and must immed12!Oly releaseeachand
everyoneand entrustthem tothe protectyigpower.. .
9.15 In the present case the obligationof cessationis of particular
importance,becausethere is evidencethatHungary intendstocompoundits breach of the
7977 Treaty by embarkingupon measrrres designedtu undo the modesr measure of
performance of the 1977 TreatywhichHungq had compieted prior tu its breach. The
Hungarian Parliamen tn 7 July1993 decided to ailocata budget of 800millionForints
(USS7.8million) for1993to hance thedismantiingofthe cofferdam,built atNagymaros,
as partofthe agreeùGN Project under the 1977 Treaty. A note of protestdated13July
1993 was sentby Slovakia(and acopy transmined tutheCourton 4 August 1993)'~. From
thi sact dune it icleathat SIovakiaruns theriskthat Hungq wiIIaggravate the breach
by continuingacts which violateits treaty obligations. The situationthereforemerian
order fiom theCourtinquitegeneralterms that Hungarymust cease al1actsor omissions
whtchareincompatiblw e ithabonafideexecutionofits'treatyobligations.
II ReponoftheI.L.Con theWorkofirs45thSessio(1993G.A. OffiW. 48thSess.SuppiNo.IO
(A148IO)p.132.
12 United StatesDiplornaticand ConsStafin Tehran.Judment I.C.J.Reports.19p.3 at
pp.44-45. In theRainbowWarriCasetheCourtof Arbitratnotedthatf,rtheobligation of
cessatitoapply,theprimaryobligationbreacby therespondettateconductmustremain
in force: bitrAwardof330April990, 82 Internatil awReport500 at572-3parasI13-
114oftheAward. -358 -
I
i
4
B. Restitution inKind i
i
I
9.16 In many cases - of whichthe present case is an example
excelleric- merecessationof a wrongis not enou& in itself,andconcrete,positivesteps
are requiredof the wrongdoing Statein orderto bnng (bat Stateback into cornpliancewith
italegaiobligations.The remedy isnot Iimitedtothe restitutionofproperty.It extends to
covereverything that needs tobedone by the wrongdohg State to restoretheconditionof
legalityand,wherethis requiresaparty to fum anobligationof which that partystandsin
breach, the remedywill ernbracean orderthat the barty must specificallyperform its
obligation.In thepreîenrcase itcoverseverything that bustbedone byHungary to fun its
obligationsunder the 1977 Treaîy. As fomulated id the currentdraft Arllcle7 of the
ZnteniationaI aw~ommission~~ t,e remedyisthe full1wing:
i
"RestitutioninKind I
1
TheinjuredState isentitleto obtainfioh the Statewhichhas committed an
internationalIwongfuI actrestitutioniEnd, thatis,there-esablishment of
the situationthat existebefore the wrqrigfulact was committed, provided
and to theexten thatrestitutioninkind:i
i
a) is notmateriallimpossible; i
b) wouldnot involvea breach ofan 'obligatioaisimgfiom a perernptory
nom ofgeneralinternationaIalwi
1
c) wouIdnot involve aburdenout fifaII proportiontu the benefit which
the injuredStatewouIdgain from obtainingrestimtionin kindinstead
of compensation; or I
wouldnot senouslyj eopardise thkpoliticalindependenceor economic
cl) stabilityof thStatewhichhas committed the internationalwrongful
act,whereastheinjured Statewouldnotbe similarly affectedifitdid
notobtain restitutioinkind." !
!
9.17 The Internationa law Comm iksionfound restitutiontu be the
primaryremedy, a view that reflectedthe Judgment 'inthe Chorzow Facton, Case, the
practice of States,and arbitral decisionsl'. inrelatioto abreach of treaty there isthe
14 G.A.Off.Rec.48 Sess.uppl.No.10 (A/48/10),p.13.
!
15 Ibid pp. 153-156.In its Commentarythe Commissioncites the FactoatChorzowMerits,
Judmnent No. 13,P.C.I.J.SeriA.No. 17, ap.48, @a Senesofaibitrawards(at En.119).
!
1
i
I
:
j
:furtherconsiderationthatthe partyinjured by the breachnecessarilyseeks, asits prirnary
remedy,the performanc e fitstreaty obligationsbythe delinquentState. If the grimary
remedywere to lieindamages or compensationthis wouidbe tariramounttu diowing the
delinquent Statetu "buy"itseIfout of thostreaq obligations.Tt wouldmean thata State
couldalwaysviolatea treatyprovidedit wasprepared to payfor the privilege. Itwould
negatepactasuntservanda , hichpresuppose serformance a,ndreplace iwiththeprecept
that a Stateunwiiiingtu performmsy,evenif it hasno validreason not toperforrn,pay
compensation.
9.18 As draft Article7 makesclear,the duty to make restitutioisnot
absolute,butinfact Hungarycannotshow that itsexcusesfor non-performanc faIlwithin
theperrnittedexceptions.Provisu (a)cannot apply,becauseperformance of the 1977Treaty
is perfectIypossible.Proviso @) is equdIy inapplicable.If the1977 Treaty did, in fact,
violatea peremptory nom cxîstingin 19771 the Treaty wouldbe a nullity,andHungary
wouldhave soughtto declaretheTreaty nul andvoid: but infact Hungarysoughtfirst to
suspend,thento abandon itsperformanca endthento terminate the Treaty. AndHungary
duesnot, and cannot,identi@any new peremptory norm, arising post-1977, which could
jusîi&theseactsT7.
9.19 Similarly,proviso(c) cannotapply, forthe benefit to Slovakiain
havingthe 1977Treaty implemented isverygeatls, and a realistviewwould see thatsame
implementation, not as a "burden" to Hungary but as a substantialbenefit. That was
Hungarytsom view,necessarîIy,whenHungarynegotiatedthe 1977 Treaty. Statesdo nor
vciluntarilyenterintotreatiinwhich theburdens oumeigh the benefits.
Rosenne,Breach of Treatv, Cambridge,Grotius1985,p.124 explainthe cmcial role of
"reinstatemeotf the performaofthetreaty"aa remedyforbreach.To thesameeffectsee
P.M. Dupuy, "La Responsabid lansle systkmeinternational:definitetfonction,"23
Coll~uium of rhe SociétFrancaispour le Droit InternaiioGelMans. 1990) atp. 14,
emphasisinthat"La miseen oeuvrdelaresponsabilviseaussiBla restaurntdeniaIé~aIite
internationa"e.
16 See,aboveChapterWiI,foraMlerdiscusso ifthi soint.
-
17 The distinctionbetwaeviolationanileofjusconenas abasisforinvalidating(ornullwng)
a treatyandas a groundfor temination, is sinnArticle53and 64 of the1969 Vienna
ConventiononttrLawof Treaties. i
l
9.20 Finally,proviso(d) rnustbe diamissedas inapplicable. A treaty
voluntarilyentered intocannotbe regardedasjeopardising the politicalindependenceor
aconomic staw of aparty becausethe partiethemielves ,nenteringintothe treaty, have
made the judgement that ihisis not so. Accorduiplyt,he remedy of restitutioisfuUy
applicableand Slovakiahasnohesitationinseekingan,order hm the Court that wilrequire
Hungaryto fulfl itsobligationsnder the1977Treaty infull.
1
W. Comriensation 1
4
I
9.21 Theri@ of aninjuredpartyto daim compensation,or damages,as a
residua il& ro çoverdl theloss ordamage whichc+ot bemetbyrestitution is clear.In
theterms ofArticle 8oftheInternationa LlawCommi ssiodraft:
1. The injuredState isentitledfo obrain From the State which has
coMmrtted an internationdy y-rongful act compensationfor the
damage causedby thatact,ifad to the extentthatthe damage is not
made goodbyrestitution inkindI
2. For the purposes of the pres4nt anide, compensationcovers any
economicdlyassessabledamagksusrainedby the injured State,and
mayincludeinteresiand,where appropriateIoss ofprofits."
9-22 Adaimforcompensation is "th; mostusuaformofreparation" l9and
"should becornmensurat weiththeloss,sothatthe injuredpartymaybe made who~e"~~.
!
\
9.23 Once the wrong ir establish&, and assuming that the link of
causaiity2isalso proved,so that the damagecm clea!lybe shownto have resulted hm the
19 Factow aChonowMerits.JudmentNo. 13.P.C.I.SeriesA, No17.atp. 47.
20 LusitarriCase, U.S.IGermanyMixed CIaims Cd'mmission7 United Nations Reoom of
InternaiionaArbitral Award32, citecoussi rat-Coustard Eisemann, Répertoirede Ia
Jurisprudencearbitrale, Vol527., p.
21 See A148110, .171para.6,wheretheInternationlawCommissionsupportçitç preferefor
causaliîyraththanthedistinctionbetwe"direc pd""indirec"amage,citingwith approval
theU.S./Geman Mxed ClaimsCommission: lwrung,theinjuredpartyis entîtIetuthose damages asof ri~htno questionofdiscretionis
involved,hence the Commission deliberatechoice of the phrase" isentitled".In its
Commentary t, Commission ernphasise hat
"damages mustbeMy paid in respectof injuriesthahavebeencaused
immediatelyand exclusivelbythewrongful a&"=.
9.24 In the presencase,asChapter VI1of the Mernorialhas show, the
breach by Hungq IeduItimateItu the adoptionby CzechosIovakiaof Vafiari"C". Had
Hungary perfomed itstreatyobligations,thconstru~tiuof Vanant "Cu wuuidhave been
umecessary.
9.25 Nor was Czechoslovakia lefiwith any realchoice. Faced with
Hungary's recalcitranc, zechoslovakihad thealternativeof eitheracceptingthebreach
as a totafmstrationofthewhole GM Project-and ineffectabandoning astotalwastethe
immens weorkandmassivecapitalexpenditures aireadyinvested- or attemptinto salvage
whatever was possibleof the work alreadycurnpletedi, a manner consistentwith the
originaaims of thetwo partiesa,ndwithoutmakingthe reaiisatioof theonginalscheme
pemanently impossible.Czechodovakia madethe latrc eroicenot simpIybecauseit was
the prudentchoice,both financîdlyand practicaIIy,but aIsobecausethe ladictar hadt
choice.
9.26 For Czechoslovakiawas bound by law to "mitigateitsdamagesW2'.
Czechoslovakia could not sirnplyabandonthetotaiitof its investmentandincurnotonly
that loss buany furtherlossesarisingfromfloodig, damageto agriculture ,isruptioof
transportand relianceon energysource n defaultof the energy expectedFromthe G/N
Projed. The cumulative totalof such losses wouldhavebeenastronomicd. Intrying to
"Il rnatno1how manyIinkstheremay be ithechinof carrsationcomecting Germaacts
wiih rhIossustained,provided tkrnoibreakin thechaiandtheIosscm be cIeariyand
definitetracaiIinby IinktoGermany'sact"-Adminiç~tiveDecisionNo.11:VIIUnited
NationsReporofInrernationd AhitAwardspp.23-30.
22
md, p.175&, aisCornbacau"LaresponsabilnternationaleTIireq,Droit International
mibli(1984)atp.711.
23
This ducan bepostulatasageneralprincipllaw;seeG.H.TreiteRemediesforBreachof
Contract: Odord UniversityPress,Oxfor1988, 179-192citing the
commonlawsystems,GermanandFrenchlaw. I
recover suchlosseshm Hungary, Czechodovakiawohld alrnostceitaidyhaveencountered
the objectionthat it had faitudmiiigateitlussesbi takingmasures on itown te~tory
4
tu utiIitheinvestmentit had dready made.
9.27 Theheadsof damage havealready been outlinedin ChapterVI, for
theyflowfrom andrelate directltotheTreaty breachedbyHungary.
1
9.28 However,at this stageof theicase Slovak iaes not requestthe
Courtto domore thanfindthatHungar isinbreach ofthe1977 Treaty,idenhfytherpecific
breaches,and declare inquitegeneraltems that Hungaiy is liabletu paycompensationfor
dl the lassesanddamageto Slovakiacaused by thoskbreaches. Itis Slovakia'view that,
giventhe complexiryof the case, it is not »asonablto aîkthe Court tu domure atthie
stage. The assesment andquantifcationofcompensation cm best belefttu the second, or
subsequent phaseof thi sase whm, perhaprwith tge assistanceof technicd experts,the
Court cantum to thifinalaspectof thecase. Forthe,Parties,oo,thepostponemeno tfthe
pleadingson quantificatiowillhaveadvantages.~ntjl such timeas the Court has ruledon
the preliminaiyquestions of breachand responsibility,he Partiemayfind dificultyin
focussingtheirpleadingsandCO-ordinatin thgecolleition of daton the precisequestions
whichtheCourt's judgmentwillindicateas relevanttIquantification. hus Slovakiawould
formaiiyrequestthe Court to receiveevidence on, and determinethe actud amounts of
compensation to bepaid,in a subsequentphaseofthe case.
9.29 Thiscourse ofactionishIIy in:accordwith-the Court'sown practice.
In the FisheriesJurisdicrion theCourt said: j
" Inorder toaward compensationthe Court ch onlyactwithreference to a
concretesubrnission as to the existenceand.the amount of each head of
damage. Suchan award must be basedon,precisegroundsanddetailed
evidenceconcerningthoseactswhichhavebey cornmitted ...Itis onlyafler
receivingevidenceonthosematters thattheCo!rt cansatisfyitselthat each
24
FisheriesJrrriçdictionflederalReofGemm irIwIandjMeritsJudment,LC. 1. Reports,
-974, 175ap.204, para. 76.SalsuCork Chmil MerirsJrrdment I.J.Reports1948,p.4
at p.36:"The Cam... reservefor further cansi+raîthe assessrnentof thmount of
compensation...and CaseConcemine, Militani and Paramilitan Activities inand Agaimt
NicaraguaMicarama vUnitedStateof AmericaMe4irçludment. LC.J.Rem, 1985,p.14at
pp.142-143. 1 concreteclaimiswell founded infactandinlaw. Itis possibltorequest a
gerieraldechration establishingthe pnnciplethat compensationis due,
providedthedaimatltasks theCourt toreceiveevidenceandtu determinei,n
a subsequentphase of the sameproceedmg tse,amount of damage tu be
assesse d.
9.30 It is Slovitkisubmission thatsuch compensation ,hen eventually
assesseb dy theCourt,must includeboth interesandloso sf profrtsAs theInternational
Law Commission hasnoted, "iriternatiopracticeseemstu be insupport of awarding
intere instdditionto thprincipa lmountof compensationn". As theCommission funher
notes,thesame generalrecognitionhm beenaccordedtuthe legitimaq ofa daim forIossof
profits,andthequalifyingwords"whereappropriate" u,sedin drafArticle8, paragraph2,
reflectonlythepositionthattherightto claimlossof futureprofits(h may
not beappropriat e nalcases. No such qualificatiarisesinrelationtotheloss ofprofits
ocsuning priortujudgment(damnumeme~~ens)~~.
9.31 Accordingly,Slovakia'cslaimfordarnageswillembracethe heads of
damageitemisedinthefollowingsub-sections.These aregivenatthisstagefor purposesof
illustrationiy. SIovdûa will,at a subsequeritstageof theae proceedings,itemiseand
explaineachhead of damages jiistifyingtheamorrntsclaimed.
9.32 Moreover, at thisstage importantelements of any quantification
remainmatters to be determined. Assumingthe Court orders &IIrestitutiand Hungq
compliesby returningto fiIIcompIiancewith its obligationsundethe 1977 Treaty, when
willthe entireProject,conternplateintheTreaty, be completed? The pointis important
becausethe delay -highiyprejudiciatloSlovakiain financiaterms- willend only on that
date.
25 Oo.cit(A148/10)p.184para.25.Foacomprehensive ey oftheliteratandthepracticeon
the awardiof interesecArangio-Ruiz, econdReporton StateResponsibility.AfCN.41425,9
lune1983,57-58paras77-105He Endsonlyonecase(thMontiioCase(1875)Moore 1427in
rvhichinterwasno1awarded. 1
9.33 Neverthelessb, way of iiiustratibt, efiBuregiven belowcanbe
used as generalguides tothekindof damages Slovaki*has, and willhave,incurred. The
costs (losses)enurnerated in sub-sectionsA-D belowjoccurred prior to the puning of
GabCikovo into operation by memî of the provision@solution. Their occumnw in
subsequent yearswas eliminatedbyVariant "C". I
V. The Losses Caused toSlovakia i
1
1, LossesCausedtuSlovakiain thé GabEikovu section
A. Costs incurred durine 1990-1992 bv CzechosIovakioi in
protecting the structuresof the G/N Proiect and adiacent areas
due to Hungaw's non-oerformance
9.34 Because dthe delay,resulthg from Hungary'sbreach,it was
impossibleto fiIlthererervoirand the byparscanai wiih wateron the agreed date. Thus
Czechoslovakia was compelledto expendconsiderablse ums to protectthereservoirand the
canal and associatedstnicturesuntilsuchtimeas,followingthe completion ofVariant "CH,
the complex couldbe fiiiedwithwateras planned: I
a) Repeateddeaîng awayofvegetafiongro~h
beforefiIIingthe reservoir i 57 millionCSK
!
b) Increasedmaintenanceof çeepage I
canalslopesandinter-dyke areas I 82 millionCSK
c) Protection ofthe headwatercanaibotiom I
from vegetation growth I 65 millionCSK
d) Protectionand repairof the 4
bitumenous sealingof canalslopes ! 28millionCSK
e) Anti-floodprotectionof the !
stnictures(waterproofingelements) I 134millionCSK
f) Preservationof thetechnoIogicaI . I
andhydrotechriicaIequipmentand
bringingitintoanoperational
stateagain ! 168millionCSK
i
g) Chargesforextendedtemporw I
occupation of land 1 90millionCSKh) Costs forpumping waterinttohe
intempted water-coursesanti-
floodprotection,transpotf
citizens,insurance,protection
ofstructures 50mi~lio~CiSK
i) Iocreasedoverheadcostsadditional
smdiesandresearch 30 miIIioCSK
B. Costs of rnaintainingthe old bed of the River Danube pending
the availabilitvof the new canalfor navigation1990-1992, due
to Hungarv'snon-performance
9.35 The delaycausedby Hungary'u snlawfùlsuspensionand termination
forcedCzechos~ovak ia maintaintheold riverbecipenfor navigationuntisuch time as
Variant"CM was completed and thenew bypass canalopened. Czechoslovakiathus faced
additionacostsasfollows:
a) Dredgingoffords and
rnaintaininavigationIanes
rkm 1811-1851.7 37 millionCSK
b) Exte~idedrnarkingof navigation
IanesintheHruSov-Palkuvilovo
sector 2 miIIioCSK
c) Extensionofthedeepening (by
dredgirig)ofBratislavaport 17 miIIionCSK
d) Pawater-suppIyarmter into 19 miIIionCSK
DeIivevof watertu the Zitni
e) Ostrov canals - 17 miIIionCSK
f) Continuousrevisionand
monitoringofstructures 22 millioCSK
g) Control measurementsbefore 0.8 millionCSK
fillilock supervision
21
CSK meansCzechoslovKoruna(crowns)In 1992US$ = 29.5CSK.a) FinishingofstmcturesonCzechoslovak
tenitory byCzechodovakiain placof
Hungq (incIudig research and
designworks) 416 millioCSK
New dyke separatintheoriginal
b) bedof theDanube fromthereduced
reservoirbetweenbypasscanaland
Cunovo plusconneciionbetween
hriovo weirandthe rîghside
dyke 853 dion CSK
c) Weir system athovo (Istphase) 936 &on CSK
d) Damclosiigthe Danube bed 297 millioCSK
~otd~' 2,502 dion CSK
2. LossesCaused toSlovakiain the Nawmaros Section
with the Namrnarussection ofthe Proieet
9.38 Because the water level was not impoundeddue to the failureof
Hungary to completethe Nagymaros section of the Project, the beneficialimpacon
navigationand the agricuituruseof the water expectesince1392 did not uccur. The
IossesincrrrredbySlovakicm be evduatedas foiIows:
Lossof expectedshiptr&c
a) on the Vahriver
b) irrigationumpingwater for 8 miIIioSK
c) Lossesdue to limiteaccess
to Komho Port 8 8 millionSK
a There will mer costs.ForexmpIe, asecondphaseIothe weirsystem and arixifiarfr
navigationIockCunovoisunderconsmaionandestimatero #sr3,631 miI.S{SKmeans
SIovaKoruna- Crom. Asof10Febnr;ir14941US = 32.6SK). Andtheequiprnenof the
pwer -statioCiuiovnmssaryto mitigaenergIosse,iIcostamer 406mirrioSK. Increasedcosts due to
restrictioon shipping
between Sap (PalkoviCovo a)nd
Nagymaros (partiaulnloadingof
vessels,restnctingship
tonnage-Ioss ofutilisationof
Bratislavaand KoMu portsdue
tunavigational"botiIenecks")
e) Floodprotection(tailrace
canal)
Totalfor eachyear29
Should the Nagymarossection remained uncomplete$ for a longer period, significant
additionailnvestment wsould be needed to substitutethe effectsof the irnpounded water
1eve13*. 1 .
I
I
3. Loss ofEIectricitvProduction ,
9.39 The original1977 Treatyenvisaged anaverage annualproductionat
Gabfkovo of 2650 GWh and at Nagyrnarosof 1025 GWh. Mer 1993, that is when
1
I
29 The lomw {osts)whichappw in 1993 areexpecteto~IIX anridy mtiI thecompleti~nothe
Nagpxrossection ofthe Project.
30 Such invesmentçwouldincludeforexample: 1
a> constructionoftheTopolmiq I 178millionSK
weironthe Md9 Danube
bf constructioofnew
pumping stationsancanais
forirrigati(IefiDanube I
riverbank) 1 172millionSK
C) regdationmeasuresonthe
Ipeiandfacilitiesfor
irrigatioof 1650ha of
adjacentlands
- ~YO weirwith pmping stations
- irrigationcands
d) makrngtheesvrrarofrhe
Vahrivernavigabie
- Gutarivestep 860millionSK
-thedeepeningand
regulationofthVAh riverbed 466millionSK
e) costofpurnpingimgation !
ivatafterimplementinb)and c) Il 21 millionSXJyearNagymaros cameinto operation,hemajorityoftheGabEikovo outputwouldbe as peak, or
semi-pe prkduction.
9.40 However, due to the non-constructioof Nagparus, it is not
possiblto geartheoperatioofGabEikov towardspeak productionM.oreover,GabEikovo
hasnot even achievedthe leveof basepowerproduction anticipatein the1977 Treaty
duringitsfiryearsof operation.
9.41 This is direto various factorsarisingdiectIyhm Hungary's
breaches.For exarnplet,hedred@n gownstreamof Sap(FdkoviEovo) hasnutbeen ched
out by Hungary,which has reducedtheheightof theGabEikovo stepand, therefore, the
powerproduced.At the sametime, due intealiatotheabsence ofregulationmeasuresin
the old herbed (dso fonning a part ofthe Hungarian shareof works), an increased
dischargeinto the old Danubeof upt400 m31shas beenchamelled into the old riverbeci
insteauf50-200 m31s asprovidedinthe Joint ContractualPlan. hasIed toa reduction
offlowthrough theGabEikov turbines.
9.42 In tems ofthe 1977 Trentyscheduleas basedonthe 1977 Mutual
AssistanceAgreement,Slovakia's50% allocationof powergenerated(in GWh}during the
firstyearsofoperationofGabErlroo ndNagymaros was tu bethe following:
GabEkovo 199 1513 1523 1325
Nagymros 128 512.5
Total GhJ 199 1513 1651 1837.5
Thiswouldgiveanoverall totaforthefirstfouyearsof operatioof5200.5 GWh.
9.43 This takes into accorrntthe that Czechuslovakiwas tu receive
1022.5 GWh fromthe Hungarîanshare duringthe firsthree yearsofoperation. The dates
for thecoming into operationofthe system(1986-1989) were, ofcourse subsequently
modifiedby the 1983 Protocol. This in turn,wareplacedby the1989 Protocol which
providedthatGabëikobo shouldstartproductioin1990 andNagyrnarosin 1992 .But the
1989 Protoc01 maintainedtheprinciprethatin addition to iown share ofelectricityproduction,Czechodovakia would receiveduing the years 1990-1992 the amount of
I
1022.5 GWhfiom theHungarian share.
9.44 By means of the irnplementatjonof Variant "C", Slovakia has
siiccessfdlypruduceda limitedamorntof eIectriciatGabEikuvo T.his amouutedto 223
GWh in1992 and 1963GWh in1993, givinga totaof 2186 GWh. But, even ifSIovakia
keept shewholeof Hungary' share ofenergy,itslossbcurredduring the fouryearperiod
of 1990-1993, assuming production in linwith the 1977 MutualAssistanceAgreement
schedule,amounts to5200.5 GWhless 2186 GWh,that is3014.5 43%.
9.45 In rems of GnmciaI foss, the&nage is very highdue tothe non-
production of farmorevaluabIepeik qualityelectric~tyT.hisloss wili continu-into the
future,asalthough averageyearlyproductionatGabEikovw oillbe2100 GWh, thevalueof
thiswillbe much less than thevalueof the peak, simi-peak andbase power to which
I
SIovakiaisentitIedunderthe 1977~reatyf'.
!
9.46 In bruad tems, therefore,eveniif Hungary fuifilits 1977 Treaty
comrnitrneni tsduecourse ci, ifNagymarosis brought into fullproductionby theyear
2000)i,tsbreacheswillhavecausedSlovakiaveryconsiderablle osses;
i
9.47 IfNagpwos is a builtand SIovakiaisforcedto continue reIying
on Variant"CM to irnplemeritth1977 Treaty, theenergpyroductibnatGabEikovois likely
to go no higherthan 2100 GWhperyearduring its lifetime.Thelietirne of hydroelectric
power stationcan conseniativelybeestimatedat50 years. EvenifGabëikovooperates at
fui capacityduringsuchperiod,butproducing energy;withouttakingadvantage of apeak
productioncycle,the furrirelossesoverthe next 50yevs willbe prodigious. The lussesof
SIovakia wiIImureuver be increasedby invesrmentandoperarion costsof rneasrrrethat
substitrrtefor the non-existentNagymaros. 1
31 The rmaiamountproduceatEunovo,(222 GWhiyear!,rom199canbediscounted,itrvalue
beingusetore-paythcostofthemachneryandequipmen tnstaltlere.
1 On thebasisofthe evidenceandlegalarguments presentedintbs Mernorial
and rese~ng the right tosupplemeno tr amenditsclaims inthe lightof further written
pleadings,he SlovakRepublic
ReqrreststheCourt tuadiudgeanddeclare :
1. That the Treaty between Czecboslovakia and Hu~igary of 16 September1977
concerningtheconstructionmd operationofthe GabCkovo~agymaros Sysremof
Locks, and relatedinstruments, and to which the Slovak Republic is the
acknowledged successori,sa treatyinforceand hasbeen so fromthe date of its
conclusion;nd that thenotificationofterminationbytheRepublicofHungaryon 19
May 1992 was withoutlegd effect.
2. That the ReprrbIicHu~tgarywasnotentitled tosuspend andsubsquently abandon
theworks on theNagparos Projectand on thatpan of theGabEkovoPrcijectfor
whichthe t977 TreatyattributedresponsibiltorhcRepubIicof Hungary.
3. That, theact of proceedingwith and putting into operationVariant"C",the
"provisionaiolution",aslawful.
4. Thatthe Republic of Hungarymust therefore ceaseforthwith alconduct which
irnptdesthe fuad bona fideimpkmentatian ofthe 1977 Treatyand musttakeal1
necessa stps tohlfil iown obligationsunderthe Treatywirhout funher dday in
ordertorestorecompIiancewiththe Treaty.
5. That,inconsequenceofitsbreachesofthe1977Treaty,theRepublicofHungaryis
liabltopay,andthe SlovakRepublic isentitletoreceive,fullcompensationforthe
lossanddamagecausedto the SlovakRepublicbythose breaches, plus interestand
lossof profits,inthe amounttobe determinedby the Court inasubsequentphase
ofthe proceedingsinthicase.
(Signed).....................
Dr. PeterTomka
Agent ofthe SIovakRepubat:
Memorial submitted by the Slovak Republic