INTERNATIONALCOURTOF JUSTlCE
PLEADINGS,ORAL ARGUMENTS,DOCUMENTS
CASE CONCERNING MILITARYAND
PARAMILITARYACTIVITIESIN AND
AGAINST NICARAGUA
(NICARAGUA v. UNITED STATESOF AMERICA)
VOLUMEIV
COURINTERNATIONALEDE JUSTlCE
MEMOIRES.PLAIDOIRIESET DOCUMENTS
AFFAIRE DES ACTIVITESMILITAIRES
ET PARAMILITAIRESAU NICARAGUA
ET CONTRE CELUI-CI
(NICARAGUA c. ÉTATS-UNISD'AMÉRIQUE)
VOLUMEIV The case concerning Militury and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), entered on the Court's
General List on 9 April 1984 under number 70, was the suhject of Judgments
deliveredon 26 Novemher 1984(Mililary and ParamilitaryActiviriesinandagainst
Nicaragua(Nicaraguav. UnitedStates of America), Jurisdictionand Admissibility,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 392) and 27 lune 1986 (Milirary and
Paramiliiary Activities inand against Nicaragua (Nicaraguav. United States of
America), Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986,p. 14). Following the discontinuance
by the applicant Government, the case was removed from the List hy an Order
of the Court on 26 Se~ternber 1991(Miliiarv and Paramiliiorv Aciivities in und
ogainslNicaragua(~icaraguo v. Unit~d~rare~of~merica), order of26 Seplember
1991, ICJ. Reports 1991, p. 47).
The pleadings and oral arguments in the case are being published in the follow-
ing order:
Volume 1.Application instituting proceedings; request for the indication of pro-
visional measures and consequent proceedings; Memonal of Nicaragua
(lurisdiction and Admissibilitv).
volume II. ~ount~r;Memo&l zthe United States of America (Jurisdiction and
Admissibility); Declaration of Intervention hv El Salvador and observations
thereon hv ~icaraeua and the United States of America
Volunic III oral ar$mrnts on jurisdieiion and ~~rnissihilit~:exhihitr and docu.
nienis suhmiiied hy iïi'iiaripua and the liniisd Siaies or Amcrisa in conneciion
wiih the oral urocedure on-iurisdiction and admissihilitv.
Volume IV. Memorial of Nicaragua (Merits); supplemen<aldocuments.
Volume V. Oral arguments on the merits; Mernorial of Nicaragua (Compensa-
tion); correspondence.
Ininterna1references hold Roman numerals refer to volumes of this edition;
if they are immediately followed by a page reference, this relates to the new
agin natioof the volumein question. Onthe other hand, the uaee numbers which
arcpreceded or followed by a reference to one of the pleidi&s only relate to
the original pagination of the document in question, which, if appropnate, is
represented in this edition .y .igures within square hrackets on the inner ma-gin
oithe relevant pages.
Neither the typography nor the presentation may he used for the purpose of
interpreting the texts reproduced.
L'affairedes Activitésmilitaires et puramilitaires au Nicaraguaet contre celui-
ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique),inscrite au rôle générad le la Cour sous
le numéro70 le 9 avril 1984,a fait l'objet d'arrêtsrendus le 29 novembre 1984
(Activitésmilitaires erparamilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaraguac.
Etots-Unis d'Amériuue).comoétenceel recevabilité. arrêtC . IJ. Recueil 1984.
p.392) et le 27 juii 1986 (~>rivitésmilitaires 2 ~~ramili~airesau~~icara~uie;
contre celui-ci (Nicaraxua c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique),arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1986,
p. 14). A la suite du désistementdu gouvernemént'demandeur,elle a été rayéedu rôle par ordonnance de la Cour du 6 septembre 1991 (Aclivifésmilitaires et
au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci(Nicaragua c. Etuts-Unis d'Am&
riqut), ordonnance du26 septembre 1991, CI.J. Recueil1991, p. 47).
Les piècesde procédure écriteet les plaidoiries relatives à cette affaire sont
publiéesdans l'ordre suivant:
Volume 1. Requêteintroductive d'instance: demande de mesures conservatoires
y rclatitc, mCmoireJu Nicaragua (compétcnccet rec~vabiliiéj.
ri
Volume II Contre-m2moire des Etair.Unis d'Amérique (compétence ei
recevabilii2~; dCclaration d'intervention d'El Salvador et obser\,aiioni du
Nicaraeua et des Etats-Unis d'Amériauesur cette déclaration
Volume IÏI. ProcCdureoralc sur lesquest;ons de cornpetenceet recevahilii~;Josu-
menis dcpiisé.;par le Nicaragua ei les litais-Unis d'AmCriqur aux fins de 13
orocédureorale relative à la comoétenceet à la recevabilité.^
~o'lumeIV. Mémoiredu ~icara~ua (fond); documents additionnels.
Volume V. Procédure surle fond; mémoiredu Nicaragua (réparation); corres-
pondance.
S'agissant desrenvois, les chiffres romains gras indiquent le volume de la pré-
sente édition: s'ils sont immédiatementsuivis par une référencede page, cette
référence renvoie à la nouvelle oaeination du volume concerné.En revanche. les
numéros depage qui ne sont p;éGdésou suivis que de la seule indication &ne
piècede procédurevisent la pagination originale du document en question, qui,
en tant que de besoin. estreproduite entre crochets sur le bord intérieur despaEes
~ ~c~rnées
Ni la typographie ni la présentation ne sauraient étre utiliséesaux fins de
l'interprétation destextes reproduits.Mernorial of Nicaragua (Merits) - Mémoiredu Nicaragua (fond)
............
PART 1.THEFACTS AND THE EVIDENCE
Chapter 1.The facts ..................
Section 1.Prior proceedings in this case ..........
Section II. Introduction and summary ...........
A. Developments since the Court's Judgment of 26 November 1984
B. The future intentions of the United States .......
Section III. Statement of facts .............
Chapter II. The nature of the evidence before the Court .....
Section 1.Purpose of this Chapter ............
Section II. The provisions of Article 53 of the Statute .....
Section III. Express admissions of responsibility on the part of the
Government of the United States ...........
A. The legal basis of admissibility of evidence in the form of
admissions of government officiais ..........
B. Express admissions made by President Reagan and other respon-
sible officialsof the United States Government ......
1. Public statements of President Reagan ........
2. Public statements of other senior Administration officials .
3. House of Representatives: Report of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence ............
C. The particular relevance of express admissions on the part of
United States officiais ..............
D. Official descriptions of United States operations as "covert
action" ...................
Section IV. The evidential significance of the reference to collective
self-defenseby the United States in the previous proceedings in this
case .....................
Section V. Recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence
A. Matters of public knowledge ............
B. Evidence of a system, a general policy and a pattern of activity
Conclusions .
PARTII. THECONVENTIONL AALW ..............
Chapter III. The actions of the United States estahlished by the evidence
before the Court constitute the threat and use of force against
Nicaragua in violation of Article (4) of thc United Nations Charter,
for which the United States isliable under international law ...
Section 1. The actions of the United States, as established by the
evidence, constitute use of force against Nicaragua in violation of
Article 2 (4) of the Charter ............. COXTENTS - TABLE DES MATIERES
A. Direct action by United States military and civilian employees
is a use of force in violation of Article2 (4) of the Charter .
B. The actions of the United States, inorganizing, directing,training
and supplying armed bands for systematic and continuous
incursions into Nicaragua is a use of force in violation of Article
2 (4) of the Charter ...............
1. The writines of ~ublicists ............
2. The of ihe United States .........
3. United States practice .............
4. The criteria for State liahility...........
(a) Direction and control ............
(b) Substantial involvement ...........
(c) Adoption and ratification ..........
C. The United States use of force, as shown by the evidence, is
"against the territorial integrity and political independence" of
Nicaragua ..................
Section II. The use of force by the United States against Nicaragua
cannot be justified as an exercise of the right of self-defense . .
A. The status of the justification of self-defense in the context of
current admissions by the United States as to the purposes and
obiectives of its oolicv ..............
B. lnany event, thejustification of self-defensecannot be supported
in the circumstances of this case ...........
1. Legaljustifications for the use of force ........
2. The factual hasis for the justification of self-defense is not
present in this case ..............
Conclusion .....................
Chapter IV.The actions of the United States estahlished by the evidence
before the Court are in violation of United States obligations under
the Charter of the Organization of American States ......
Section 1.The use of force by the United States agdinst Nicaragua in
violation of the United Nations Charter is equally a violation of
Articles20 and 21 of the Charter of the Organization of American
States .....................
Section II. The use of coercive medsures by the United States against
Nicaragua to force it to change itsGovernment or politicsconstitutes
intervention in the interna1 and external ardirs of Nicaragua in
violation of Article 18 of the OAS Charter ........
A. The historical background of the non-intervention articles of
the OAS Charter ................
B. Leaal authorities as to the meanine of "intervention" in the
OAS Charter ....... y
C. The position of the United States ..........
Conclusion .....................
Chapter V. The multilateral treaty reservation (proviso (c)) to the
United States declaration acccptina the iurisdiction of the Court has
no application to this case ..... Section 1. The admissions of the United States as to the purpose of
its actions, made after its withdrawal from the proceedings, destroy
any possibility of applying proviso (c) here ........
Section II. Nicaragua's arguments made al the jurisdictional phase
likewisepreclude the application of the proviso here .....
A. The judgment of the Court of 26 November 1984 establishes
that Nicaragua's general and customaty law claims and its
claims under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation of 1956 are properly before the Court for adjudi-
cation on the merits ...............
B. The inapplicability of proviso (c) in this case has no bearing on
the interpretation of reservations such as those of India,
El Salvador and the Philippines ...........
C. The United States arguments for the application of the proviso
are unfounded, even apart from the recent admissions of the
United States as to the purpose of its actions ......
Conclusion .....................
Chapter VI. United States violations of its obligations under the Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 21 January 1956 ...
Section 1.Object of the chapter .............
Section 11.The scope of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation of 1956 ................
A. The 1956treaty is a Treaty of Friendship ........
B. The Treaty of 1956must be interpreted in conformance with the
"general rule of interpretation" established in international law
C. United States practice recognizes the legal siguificance of the
non-commercial aspects of FCN treaties ........
Section III. The United States kas violated and continues Io violate
numerous provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation of 1956 ................
A. The United States has deprived and continues Io deprive the
1956Treaty of its object and purpose .........
B. The United States has violated and continues to violate its
obligations under the 1956Treaty to accord equitable treatment
to the citirens of Nicaragua ............
C. The United States has violated and continues to violate the
provisions of the 1956 Treaty relating to the freedom of
communication ................
D. The violations of the 1956Treaty hy the United States cannot
be justified under any circumstances .........
PARTIII. THECUSTOMAR LYAW ...............
Chapter VII. Breaches of obligations arising under customary or general .
international law for which the United States bears responsibility
Section 1.Purpose of the chapter ............
Section II. Violations of the sovereignty of Nicaragua .....
Section III. Breaches of the obligation not Io use force or the threat
of force ....................
Section IV. Breaches of the principle of non-intervention ....XII CONTENTS - TABLE DES MAT~RES
Section V. Breaches of the obligation not to infringe the freedom of
the high seas or to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce...
Section VI. Breaches of the obligation not to kill, wound or kidnap
citizens of Nicaragua...,............
Section VII. Obligations arising under customary international law:
the question of justification for breach.........
Conclusion .....................
PARTIV. RELIEF REQUESTE AND SUBMISS~O N.........
Chapter VIII. The relief requested of the Court by the Government of
Nicaragua ....................
Section 1.Introduction ................
Section II. The continuing violation...........
Section III. Assessment ofthe quantum of damages ......
Section IV. Submissions. ...............
Annexesto the Meniorin1of Nicaraguo
Annex A. Affidavit of Commander Luis Carrion, Vice Minister of the
lnterior of Nicaragua . ..............
an ne.^B. Affidavit of Miguel d'~scoto Brockmann, Foreign Minister of
Nicaragua ....................
Annex C. Statements of United States President Ronald Reagan and
senior officiaisof his administration, and official dccuments of Agen-
cies of the US Government ..............
Anne.r B. United States Statutes .............
Annex E United States Congressional Reports, debates and other
statements by Mernbers of Congress relating to US military and
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua.......
Annex F Press disclosures of statements by United States officialsand
others.......................
Anne.r G. PsychologicalOperationsin Guerrilla Warfare, a manual
produced by the US Central Intelligence Agency .......
Annex H. The Freedom Fighter's Manual of sabotage techniques, a
booklet produced by the US Central Intelligence Agency ....
Annex 1. Reports of attacks by the US-sponsored mercenaries on the
civilia. n,~~lation of Nic~ra~~-~...........
Anne.\.J.I;actual data periaining to the mining of Nicaragua's ports
Annex K. Treaty i)Fricndship. Coinmcrïe and Navigation bstuecn ihc
Cnited States of Amcrica and thc Keoublic of Niïar-.ua. ?I Jlinuarv
1956,and related materials ..............
Annex L. List of Nicaraguans killed by United States military and
pdrdmilitary activities, 1981-1984............
Reportssubmiftedby Nicarugua
Attacks by the Nicaraguan "Contras" on the Civilian Population of
Nicaragua: Report of a Fact-Finding Mission, September 1984-
January 1985 ...................
Introduction ...................
Part 1.Attacks on cofiee picker.............
1. Namasli - January 18, 1983 ............ 2. Telpaneca . December 4. 1984 ............
3. Agronica Farm (Felipe and Maria Barreda) .December28. 1982
4. La Sorpresa .November 14. 1984 ..........
Part II.Attacks on farms and villages ...........
5. La Estancia . October 14. 1982 ...........
6. Sumubila .April 17. 1984 .............
7. Bocana de Paiwas - Aue-st 1981-November 1984 .....
8. Jalapa .July 1982-June 1983 ............
9. Ocotal .June 1. 1984 ...............
10. Rancho Grande .March 25. 1983 ..........
II. El Coco . December 18. 1983 ............
12. El Jicaro . October 1982-October 1984 .........
13. Jacinto Hernandez Co-operative . December 16. 1983 ...
14. Nortbern Jinotega . January 1982-November 1984 .....
15. Bernardino Diaz Ochoa Co-operative . November 18. 1984 . .
16. Siuna .August 1982-November 1984 .........
17. San Jeronimo . May 16. 1984 ............
18. El Castillo Norte .May 15. 1984 ...........
Part 111 .Ambushes of civilian vehicles ...........
19. San Juan de Limay (Sister Nancy Donovan) . Janua..... 1985
21. Ambushes in El Cuah . Octoher 1984mber .........
Part IV. Kidnappings ................
A . Individual kidnappings ..............
22. Six examples ................
William Santiago Vasquez ...........
Antonio Espinoza Morales ...........
Moise Fajardo Sambranaez ............
Joséde la Luz Padilla Rojas ...........
Amado Gutierrez ..............
B. Mass kidnappings on the Atlantic Coast ........
23 . Slimalila. April 23. 1983 ............
24 . Francia Sirpe .December 19. 1983 ........
25. Set Net Point .June 19. 1983 ..........
26 . Sukatpin .October 1983 ............
27 . Sangnilaya .December Il. 1984 ..........
Part V . Rapes ...................
28. Seven examples .................
Digna Barreda de Ubeda .............
Marta Arauz de Ubeda ..............
Mirna Cunningham ...............
Mileydis Salina Azevedo and Ermelina Diaz Ta........ ....
Josefina Inestroza and Abelina lnestroza
Statement of Donald T . Fox and Micbael 1 . Glennon. March 7. 1985
Methodology ...................
Sc0pe ......................XIV CONTENTS - TABLE DES MATIERS
Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Biographies of members of fact-finding delegation . . . . . . .
Supplemenialannexes io the Memorial of Nicaragua
Supplemenral Annex A. Chronological account of military and para-
military activities in and against Nicaragua, April-August 1985 . .
Supplemenral Annex B. Statements of President Ronald Reagan and
senior officialsof his Administration . . . . . . . .~ ~ ~ . . . ~
1. Statements of President Ronald Reagan . . . . . . . . .
II. Statements of senior Reagan Administration officials . . . .
Supplemenral Amex C. United States Congressional debates and
enactments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Suu..emenial an ne.^ D. Press disclosures relatine "o United States ~
military and paramilitary activities in and against Uic~r:tgui. .
Supplr~menralAnncx E. An Amrrica\ \Vatch Kcport. Iluman Rightr in
Nicardam: Rearan. Khctoric and Kealitv. Julv 1985 . . . . .
~uppleme~ial~nn& F. Communication daced lfluly 1985delivered to
the Government of Nicaragua hy the Amhassador of the United
States in Managua, and note verbale dated 18 July 1985 hy the
Government of Nicaraeua in renl. , . . . . . . . . . ~
Siq~pltnir~rru:llnti~\-G ~Ïfidav,t of Edgar Chamorro . . .
Si~pplrmc~nra Alnnc.~II. Note for the United St~tes Dcpartment tiState
Io the Embassy of Nicaragua. i4'ashington. I May 1985 . . . .
Document InformaUy Made Available tu Members of the Court by the
United States Information Office in The Hague - Document mis
officieusement à la disposition des Membres de la Cour par le Bureau
d'Information des Etats-Unis à IdaHaye
"Revolution beyond Our Borders": Sandinista Intervention in Central
America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. What the controversy is about . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. The praxis of intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. El Salvador . . .
B. Honduras . . .
C. Costa Rica . . ,
III. The collective response
IV. Conclusion . . . .
Appendices
1.Glossary . . . . .
2. Chronology . . . .
3. Former guemllas . .
4. Nicarae-ans in exile .
5. M-16s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Evaluation hy the General Command of the FMLN upon the first
phase of the xeneral offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Sources . T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .MEMORIAL OFNICARAGUA
(MERITS)
MÉMOIREDU NICARAGUA
(FOND) PART 1
THE FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE
CHAPTER 1
THE FACTS
Section 1. Prior Proceedingsin this Case
1. On 9 Aoril 1984.Nicaraeua filedits A..lication in the Court cha-p;-nethe
Uniicd ~taic; uith miliiary and p<ir;lm~litaa;tivities in and against Nicar<igu<i
in violaiion of United States obligations under the Charters of the Unitcd Nations
and the Organization of American States and under general and customary inter-
national law. The Application asked the Court for a declaration that the United
States activitieswere unlawful, an order to the United States to cease and desist,
and compensation. In addition, Nicaragua requested the indication of interim
measures of protection under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court.
2. On 25 and 27 April 1984,the Court heard oral observations on the request
for interim measures of protection. Thereafter, by its Judgment of 10May 1984,
the Court indicated provisional measures.
3. Pursuant to an Order of the Court of 14 May 1984,written and oral pro-
ceedings were conducted on the preliminary issues of junsdiction and admissi-
hility. In ils Judgment of 26 Novemher 1984,the Court held that it had juns-
diction Io entertain the Application on the basis of Article 36, paragraphs 2 and
5, of the Statute of the Court, and also hy virtue of the compromissory clause
in the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United
States and Nicaragua of 21 January 1956.The Court also held that the Applica-
ti4. The United States announced, on 18 January 1985, that it would not
participate Surther in this case. Thereafter, Nicaragua, pursuant to Article 53 of
the Statute of the Court, called upon the Court to decide the case despite this
failure of the Respondent to appear and defend. By Order of 22 January 1985,
the Court set 30 April 1985as the date for submission of Nicaragua's Memorial.
5. This Memorial is submitted in accordance with the terms of the Order of
22 January 1985.
SectionII. Introduction andSummary
6. The Uriiicd St:itcs of Amcrira ir uring armed Sorce3g:iinst Slicaragua and
ini~.n.cninin Kicarii~u~'sinicrnal atriliri. in \,iulaiionuI'NIc~.;os\creigni).
tcrriiorial inirgriiy and politi~alindcpîndcncc and of thr mosi fund;inicntal and
univrrsally acccptcd principlcs of inirrnotion31 I3u United Staics armed l'urre\
and intellig~ncepcfsonncl h<i\cmincd Nisar<igua'spuris and conducicd air and
n<i\alaitarks iin t;irrets wiihin ihc lcrriior) of Nisliragua and tvithin 11slerri-
torial waters, includiig attacks on oil storage tanks, pipelines, port facilitiesand
merchant ships.4 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
7. The United States has also created an army of more than 10,000mercen-
aries- many of whom served the former dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle -
installed them in base camps in Honduras along the border with Nicaragua,
trained them, paid them, supplied them with arms, ammunition, food and
medical supplies, and directed their attacks against human and economic targets
inside Nicaragua. The United States has acknowledged spending more than
US$70,000,000on these illegalactivities since 1981.
8. Nicaragua has already sufferedand is now surering grievous consequences
as a result of these activities:
- more than 2,600 Nicaraguans have beenkilled by United States military and
intelligenceforces and the mercenary "am " created by the United States;
- more than 5,500 have heen maimed, woundied,raped or kidnapped;
- more than 150,000people have heen driven from their homes, includingmore
than 20,000residents of the port of Corinto who had 10be evacuated when
oil storage facilities were set aRÿme by rockets in an attack planned and
carried out by United States military forces;
- thousands of others have suffered as a result of the deliberate destruction of
hrnis, bridge>,xirporir. pipclincs,poser statioii~.\<h<i<ila\nd huspitals inside
Sicaragux. I'hccust tri9i:aragus siilel) in damages IO capitxl fiicilitio and
production has e~ccededllSS378.?U0.000
9. Thcsc aciiviiies arc continuing as this Mcmori.il irtiled. Notwith~tan<ling
the Court's Order of IUMay 1984on intcrim medsurcsof protection. ihc Unitcd
States militarv and oaramiliarv activities aeainst ~icaraeia bave continued un-
abatcd. ~orC~içarÿ~uans ïrc'bcing killcd;nd in~urcd.ynd more dcriruction of
propny is laking pldce. As a conaquenu, of ther continuing wulaiions the \IIU-
ation remainscniid. The Government of Nicaram facesa lonz-lem uromam of
coercion,murder, and rapine, intended to culminatein its forcibk overchrow. For
these reasons, Nicaragua wouldrespectfullyremind the Coun that these prd-
ings continue to have an urgency rarely if ever seen in international litigation.
10. The United States has publicly accepted responsibility for these illegal
activities. The military and paramilitary operations in Nicaragua are openly and
expresslyauthorized by an Act of the Congressof the United States. In December
1983,at the urging of the President and after receivinga full report on the extent
of the activities,the United States Congressenactedthe IntelligenceAuthorization
Act for fiscal year 1984,Section 108 of whichprovides:
"During fiscal year 1984,not more than S24,000,000of the îunds available
10the Central Intelligence Agency,the Department of Defense,or any other
agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligenceactivity may
be obli-ated or exoended for the nu. .se of which would have the effectof
supportinp. direcily or indirccil). militan or pararnilitxr) opcrationj in
Nicariigua hy an) nation, group. organilation. movcnicnt or ~ndi\iduiil."
(Ann. D, Attachment 4.) ~ ~
To continue and to further escalate these activities, President Reagan is urging
the Congress - as this Memorial is being prepared - to appropriate an addi-
tional $28,000,000 for use during fiscal year 1986(1 Oclober 1985-30 Sep-
tember 1986).(WP 4/19/85,)'
'Abbrwiationr used intheOmtionsto ocriodials are asfollows:NYT forthe Nov York
Tincs; WPforthe WadiUlgtoPno*; WU ior the WallStreerJouml; BGfortheBostonGlobe
and LATfor the Lar Angeler ï'k ïhe Otedanida are indudedin Annex F, "FTE
Dirlosuresof Statements byUnitedSuta OlXOals andOthers". Each ciutionIo a penodial
includathe month, dayandyear(in thatorder)oftheissuein whichitappeared. MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 5
II. At first, these activities wereundertaken secretly - "covertly", in United
States official oarlance. The obiect was not to conceal them from Nicaragua.
uhich could noi be unawars of repeatcd sttacks .,cross its orin borders. ~aiher.
the object u,ar IO hide the in\,<il\,emcntuithe C'nitcdStaies irom 11suu,n people
and from ihc u,orld This is itselian acknowledament thai thcsc activiiier cînnot
withstand legal or public scrutiny. Even todayrthe full details of United States
actions are not disclosed, except to special congressional oversight committees.
But, of course, an operation the sizeof the United States-sponsored intervention
in Nicaragua could not remain hidden for long. As stated by the Minority Leader
of the United States House of Representatives, Mr. Robert Michel:
"This is called covert aid. Right now it is about as covert as an elephant
standing on a football field. Everybody knows il is there and calling it co-
vert does not hide it." (129 Cong. Rec. H 5738 (27 July 1983), Ann. E,
Attachment 3.)
12. The objective of the United States activities against Nicaragua is Io
overthrow the Nicaraguan Government. This has been true from the outset
and was publicly acknowledged as early as July 1983,when the Chairman of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligenc- of the House of Reoresentatives.
whiih ovcrsecs ihc "co\,eri activitie\" againsi Nicaragua, reporterl ti)his Irllou,
lcgibbt<irithlit "the purpoçe and ihc mihsionof thc operation u,a to oi~crthrou~
the Governnieni of i\'i<;irnrua" (I?Y ('on#.Ri,'.1.15748(27 Julv IY83j.Ann. C.
Attachment 3). -
A. Developments Since the Court's Judgment of 26 November 1984
13. After Nicaragua filed ils Application against the United States in this
Court. on 9 Aoril 1984,the United States took the ~osition. for the first lime.
thai ils miliiary and paraniilitary .tciiviticr against Nicaragua werc for the pur-
pose ul "collective seIl'-dcknsc". Durtng ihe procecdings on Intenm mcasurcs
01'protection. ;and on iurirdiction and aJmissihiliiy, the Ilnitcd Staies alleced.
wiÏhout submittine orooî. that its actions were in resoonse to an "armed attaik"
by Nicaragua aga&&other Central American States:The United States publicly
maintained this position until 18 January 1985, when il announced its decision
not 10participa~eany further in the case. Since then, references to self-defense
have al1but disappeared from officialstatements. The United States has dropped
the pretense that ils use of force against Nicaragua was for the purpose of
"collective self-derense". President Ronald Reagan and other senior United
States officialshave oubliclv acknowledeed in clear and uneauivocal lems that
the purpo,e i>fthe United StaiehaLiir,iiiesagainst Nicaragua was the removal of
the prcwnt Nicaraguan Governnicni, form3tion of 3 ncw govcrnment Io in.
clude the mercenaries su~oorted hv the United States, and fa;-reaching changes
in the interna1~icaraguii politicil system. - -
14. On 21 February 1985,President Reagan responded as followsto questions
posed during a nationally televised newsconference:
"Q. Mr. President, on Capitol Hill - on Capitol Hill the other day,
Secretary Shultz suggested that a goal of your policy now is Io remove the
Sandinista government in Nicaragua. 1sthat your goal?
ThePresident. Well,removed in the senseof ils preseni structure, in which
it is a communist totalitarian state, and it is not a govemment chosen by
the people. So, you wonder sometimes about those who make such claims
as to its legitimacy. We believe,jus1 as 1 said Saturday morning, that we6 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACT~VITIES
have an obligation tobe of help wherewecan to freedom fightersand lovers
of freedom and democracy, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua and wherever
there are people of that kind who are striving for that freedom...
Q. Well, Sir, when you say remove it in the sense of ils present structure,
aren't you then saying that you advocate the overthrow of the present
government of Nicaragua?
The President. Well, what I'm saying is that this present government was
on[e] element of the revolution against Somoza. The freedom fighters are
other elements of that revolution. And once victory was attained, the
Sandinistas did what Castro had done, prior to their time, in Cuba. They
ousted and managed to rid themselvesofthe other elements of the revolution
and violated their own promise to the Organization of American States, and
as a result of which they had receivedsupport from the Organization, that
they were - their revolutionary goal was for democracy, free press, free
speech, free labor unions, and elections, and so forth, and they have
violated that.
And the people that are fighting them, the freedom fighters opposing
them, are Nicaraguan people whowant the goals of the revolution restored.
And we're going to try to help.
Q. 1sthe answer yes, Sir? 1sthe answer yes, then?
The Presidenr. To what?
Q. To the question,aren'i you advocaiing the overthroo wf the preseni
governmeni? If ... you suhstitute another form of what you say was the
revolution?
The President.Nor if rhepresenigovernmenrwouldiurn uroundundsay,
a11righi, ifrhey'dsay, 'UncleAI1right, come on hack in10the revolutionary
government and let's straighten this out and institute the goals." (Official
Transcript, pp. 183-184,infra,Ann. C, Attachment 1-14(emphasis added.))
To "say uncle" is a common colloquial expression inthe United States, which is
formally defined as: "to give up in defeat"'.
15. On Il March 1985, President Reagan was asked how he could justify
"helping to overthrow a government merely because we don't like ils political
coloration". He replied :
"Well, they cal1themselves a government ...1 think we have to ignore
this pretense of an election they just held.This is no1a government. This is
a faction of the revolution that has taken over at the point of a gun. And
under the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of
American States, there is every reason for us to be helping the people that
want the original goals of the revolution instituted." (Interview Business
Week 3/11/85, Ann. C, Attachment 1-16.)
16. On 3 April 1985, in a report to the Congress entitled "US Support for
the Democratic Resistance Movement in Nicaragua", PresidentReagan again
emphasized that the objective of UnitedStatesmilitary and paramilitary activities
against Nicaragua was to pressure the Nicaraguan Government to make drastic
changes in its own structure and in its domestic political system. (Ann. C,
Attachment 111.5.)The report urged the Congress to appropriate $14,000,000
during fiscalyear 1985for
See,e.g., OxJordAmericanDicrionary(Oxford UniversityPress1980,p. 748) MEMORIALOF NICARAGUA 7
"resumption of aid to the Nicaraguan armed resistance at levelssufficientto
create real pressure on the Govemment of Nicaragua (20,000- to 25,000-
man insurgent forcein the north and 5,000-to 10,000-manforcein the south)"
jNYT4/17/85)'.
The pressure from such a force, President Reagan said, would convince
"the Sandinista leadership that it has no alternative to ... [the] acceptance
of the March 1 Peace Proposa14 and establishment of a legitimately plura-
listic democratic political structure" (Ann. C, Attachment 111-5,p. 236,
infra).
17. On 4 April 1985,President Reagan proposed a cease-firefor 60 days, and
negotiations, mediated by the Nicaraguan bishops, for internationally supewised
elections and other changes in the Government of Nicaragua. During that period,
assistance Io the mercenaries would no1 be used for arms or munitions. "If there
is no agreement within 60 days, 1will lift these restrictions unless both sides ask
me not 10." (Officia1 Transcript, p. 189, infra, Ann. C, Attachment 1-19.)
Nicaragua rejected this proposal as an unlawful intervention in ils own internal
affairs. President Belisario Betancur of Colombia, to whom the United States
had presented ils proposa1 as a representative of the Contadora Group' called
it "a preparation for war" (NYT 4/16/85; NYT 4/17/85). President Betancur
said that "any foreign support to guerrilla groups, whatever the origin, is clearly
in opposition to the prevailing doctrine in Latin Amenca regarding foreign
intervention in the internal affairs of our continent" (NYT4/16/85).
18. Secretary of State George P. Shultz also said, in testimony to the House
of Representatives Committee on Foreign AKairs:
"what we have in Nicaragua is a government that's a bad-newsgovernment.
Now, how can that gel changed? We'd like to see them change. But they
don't seem inclined to do so. So we have followed these alternatives and we
will continue to follow these alternatives." (WP 2/20/85; NYT 2/20/85.)
19. The United States now admits, indeed, it openly proclaims, that ils purpose
is to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government. Although Nicaragua maintains
that this purpose motivated the United States from the incepiion of ils use of
force against Nicaragua in 1981, what is new since the las1 lime the parties
appeared before the Court is this public United States admission, al the highest
levels of government, that it is and has heen engaged in an effort to overthrow
the Nicaraguan Government. The recent statements from the highest officiaisof
the United States Government demonstrate that there is no fone-r even the
slightcsi ciTor1to lusiify Uniicd Stiitcs milttary and p;ir;imilitaryastivities against
Nicaragda as "~oIIccti\~csclf-dcrcnse".11mus1 now be takcn as uncontroi~crtcd
' Asexplainedin the New York Times article,the vcrsiof the reportreleasedto the
public,AnnexC. Attachment 111-5did no1containal1of the information containedin
the reportsubrnittedIoConpress.Thenon-publicinformationh ,owever,issummarizedin
the Nèw York Timesarticle.
me "March I PeaceProposai", put fonh by mcrcenaryleaders,called upon the
dissolvethe National~<sembly,holdtetnewNnationalektions under "international super-
%t~lon''d.iband al1ncighborhoodSandiniriapxiy orgnn17si1an and complrirlyrrurp.t&c
theNtcaraguan politicalrjrirr(IVP4/15,85. .\nn C,Atiachmîni III-5pp 231-23?.in/i< i
' 'ï'h"Conindora -rouo" ir--~~~-~~~-~>fh(c~iioColumbia~~.n~,~el~and t'anama.
nations th;; have iaintlvS~ansared multilateraln~aotiatiamramone the fi;e centrai8 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlLS
that the activities of the United States challenged by Nicaragua's Application,
and described in detail below, have been and continue to be for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua.
B. The FutureInlentions ofthe UnitedStates
20. The United States has made clear its intention to continue indefinitely to
use armed force against Nicaragua, to intervene in Nicaragua's interna1 affairs
and, in the proccss, to inflict increasing harm to Nicaraguan lives and property.
Pursuant to a concerted program commencing in March 1981, when President
Reagan first authorized "covert activities" of a military and paramilitary nature
against Nicaragua, the United States has steadily escalated the size and destmc-
tiveness of its ooerations. Accordinz to official reDorts orovided to the United
States ~on~rcss; in November 198ï President ~éa~anouthorized the Central
Intelligence Agencyto recruit, train, supply and direct a 1,500-man mercenary
force 10 conduct hit-and-run raids against selected Nicaraguan targets;
$19,950,000wasthen allotted for suchpurposes. ByDecember 1982,an additional
$30,000,000had been allocated to the program, the force had grown to 4,000
men and the attacks against Nicaraguan territory were occurring on an almost
daily basis. By February 1983,the force had grown 105,500men; hy May 1983,
to 7,000; and by July 1983, to 10,000.By the spring of 1983,the hit-and-run
raids had grownto large-scaleassaults intended to capture portions of Nicaraguan
territory and establish a "provisional government".
21. In Seotember 1983. President Reaean authorized a further exoansion of
the force to' 12,000-15,000men, and a sh.iftin tactics to emphasize destruction
of vital economic "targets". Another $24,000,000was approp..ate. to finance
these activities. UnitedStates armed forcesand intelli-encewrsonnel then beeanb
to cary oui air and naval aitail;> apainsi designaicd Nicaraguan cL.oni)mic
insi:llllition, Mure ihan 19ruch atiacki wcrccarricd oui in ihc lirri ihrce monihs
of 1984. Durinr the samc irriod. Linitcd Stsier armed li>rwsand intclliecncc
personnel plad hundreds of mines in Nicaragua's threemain ports: cohnto,
Puerto Sandino and El Bluff.At least 10ships - five from third States - were
damaged or destroyed by exploding mines, and Nicaragua's capacityto carry on
~eacefulmaritime commerce wasseriouslv im~aired.
22 In 1984a supplcmcnial sourie 01'.lunding for ihcsc açti\,iiics uar intri>-
duïcd. Prii;itt individu al^and gr<>upsu,iihin the Cniicd Siaics wcrc enc<~uragcd
by the Cniicd States Adminirirition io sontrihute linancial and maicrial support
in the nicrceiiar) 3rmy Miirc ihan $5.0iiiI.Uii0w;is r.iiscd in th15mlinncr, anil
pri\:itc "v~~luniccrr".cncourligcd anil arsiricd b) ihc Adiniiiirir~tion. hcgan in
provide training and combat support for the mercenaries.
23. During 1984, attacks hy mercenary forces and United States personnel
resulted in 1,265Nicaraguans killed, and in destruction of capital facilities and
production valued at more than $180,000,000.These figures were significantly
higher than in any previous year.
24. Now President Reaean has asked the Coneress to aoorooriate another
$28,000,000 to carry on the miiitary and paramikary acti;iiies'against Nical
rama throuyh at least 30 September 1986.At a recent newsconference Presi-
dit ~ea~ai stated that the- United States will continue to support its mer-
cenary army even if the Congress does not appropriate more funds. When
asked, "if the Congress refused to appropriate more funds, would you look for
some other avenues 10 help the contras, some other way to continue your de-
sire to see a restructuring of the Nicaraguan government", President Reagan
responded : MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 9
"We're not going to quit and walk away from them no matter what
happens." (OfficialTranscript, p. 190,infra, Ann. C, Attachment 1.19.)
25. In his 3April report to the Congress on "US Support for the Democratic
Resistance Movement in Nicaragua", President Reagan said:
"Direct application of United States military force, ... must realistically
be recognized as an eventual option, given our stakes in the region, if other
policy alternativesfail." (NYT4/17/85.)6
Seetion III. Statement of Facts
26. The following is a detailed chronological account, based on the evidence
before the Court, establishing the full scope of the use and threat of force by the
United States aaainst Nicarama. and the res~onsibiiitv of the United States
for ihc damage and dcstructio~ caused by its m'iliiiar an2 psrsmilitary activitics
againsi Nicaragua during the pai fi~ur)cars. The arrouni is draun friim puhlir
sutcmenis bv Prcsidcnt Kcaaîn and senior olli~.iîlsof the Unitcd Sutcs Ad.
ministration :.official documents oreoared bv the Administration for its own
iisc in planning and i'irrying 0.11thcrc acti\,iticr: oiIi:ial reports of cummittccs
of rlic Uniicd Stdics Congrchsrcsponsible for o\,cr>ccingthesc actit itics, rccordcd
statements by senior members of those committees during legislative debates;
and United States domestic legislaiion appropriating funds for the activities. The
account of events inside Nicaragua is drawn from the official record of attacks
against Nicaragua maintained by the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of
Nicaragua.
27. Some of these facts were presented to the Court in the Chronological
Appendix to Nicaragua's Application of 9 April 1984. Since then, much new
evidence on these matters has hecome available and is included below. Events
from April 1984to April 1985are also set forth.
28. It should also be recalled that the military and paramilitary activities
descnhed took place against a background of economic pressures also designed
to destabilize and coerce the Government of Nicaragua. Among these measures
are the termination of al1bilateral economic assistance to Nicaragua on 1 April
1981,the 90 percent reduction of the Nicaraguan sugar quota for export to the
United States in May 1983. and interventions bv the United States into the
Jelikraiions OFmultinaiional IcnJing insiiiuiiuns For ihc purporc of blocking
criti~dllynecJed eionomic dc\,elciprneniIciîn, to Uicaragu;~.On 311Jaituar) 1985,
Secrctar) i,fStaic Georpc 1' Shulii)wroie Io I)r. Ani<~nioOrtii) hlcna, Prehidcni
of the [;ter-~merican ~evelo~ment Bank, urging that the Bank refusecredits to
Nicaragua notwithstanding Nicaragua's satisfaction of the Bank's technical and
economic criteria. (Ann. C, Attachment 11-10.)In all, this and similar inter-
ventions have deprived Nicaragua of more than $200,000,000 in loans from
lending institutions.
29. On 9Murch 1981, less than two months after assuming the officeof Presi-
dent or the United States, President Reagan made a formal "presidential finding",
authorizing the Ccntral lntclligence Agency (CIA) to plan and undertake "co-
s There is no legal requiremenithat the Presideniobtain the prior consent of the
territory.SecWarduPowenteResolution,Titlc50,rUnitedStatesCode, Sections1541-1548,n
Ann. D, Attachment 1.10 MILITARYAND PARAMlLlTARY ACTIVITIFC,
vert activities" directed against Nicaragua. As required hy Title 50 of the
United States Code, Section 413 (a), the "presidential finding" was promptly
communicated to the two committees of the United States Congress that over-
see al1 United States sponsored "covert activities", the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives7. The purpose of the covert activities was 10
destabilize the Government of Nicaragua and so weaken it that it would be
compelled to alter ils domestic and foreign policies. Organized military and
paramilitary activities against Nicaragua hegan soon theredfter.
30. At first, the CIA conducted these activities through existing armed bands
of former oiiicers and enlisted men of the Nicaraguan National Guard, the
military force of the régimeof General Anastasio Somoza Debayle. When that
reeime was ~ ~ ~hrow~ in Julv 1979.manv National Guardsmen Red across the
hGder to Honduras. In 1981,>ome;nits kere stiii together in encampments jus1
inside Honduran territory. With CIA direction and support, the former National
Guardsmen heean conductine raids on civilian settlements. local militia out~osts
and rrmy patr;ls inside Niça~rgua Hcwuse thcse activities had Iittle or no ;fici
on the Nicaraguan Govcrnment, the ClA uai initructed to prepare 3 plan for
expanded, more systematic and more aggressivemilitary and paramilitaj activi-
lies against Nicaragua.
31. In November1981, the CIA presented ils plan to the President. The plan
called for the creation of an army of mercenaries, to he financed, trained, armed,
supplied and directed by the United States. The mission of the mercenary army
would be to conduct armed attacks on military, civilian and critical economic
targets inside Nicaragua and to harass the Nicaraguan Government. The first
stage of the CIA plan called for creation of a force of 1,500 men. The core of
the mercenary force would be the former National Guardsmen with whom the
CIA had already begun working. Prior to presentation of the plan, Lieutenant
General Vernon A. Walters, an adviser to President Reagan and previously
Deputy Director of the CIA, had met in Honduras with the leaders of these
Guardsmen and ohtained their commitment 10 unite in10 a single force under
United States direction and control in return for arms, training, supplies,
financing and other support. CIA Director William Casey had also met, in
Washington, with General Leopoldo F. Galtieri, then Chief of Staff and later
President of Argentina, and secured General Galtieri's commitment to send
Argentine military offtcers to Honduras to train the mercenary force. Il was
agreed that the expenses of the Argentines would he paid by the CIA. (NYT
3/19/85; LAT 3/3/85; WP 3/10/82; WP 5/8/83; see also WP 12/16/84.)
32. On 12 Novemher,white the CIA plan was under consideration hy the
President, Secretary of State Alexander Haig was asked in a hearing hefore the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives for an assurance
that the United States would not hecome involved in attempts to destabilize or
overthrow the Nicaraguan Government. He responded: "No, 1would not give
you such an assurance." (Hearing hefore the Committee on Foreign AEairs,
"operations"in forcigncauntries(exceptas necessaryto gather intelligence)unlessand
untilthe Presidentmakesa findingthat eachsuchoperationis importantto the national
securityof the UnitedStates.(22 United States Code. Section2422.) In addition,the
President mus1fullyinrom the Committees on lntelligenccof the UnitedStatesSenate
and Housc ~TRcprcsentativc sfanysuchoperations. (50 UnitedStatesCode, Section 413,
Ann. D, Attachmcnt2.) MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA II
House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (12 Nov. 1981). Ann. C,
Attachment 11-1 ; WP 11/13/81.)
33. On 16 November 1981, at a meeting of the National Security Council,
President Reagan expressly approved the CIA plan, and on 23 November he
signed National Security Decision Directive 17to that effect. An accompanying
classified document explained that $19,950,000 wouldbe allocated to the CIA
for the 1,500-man force, but that "more money and more manpower will be
needed". The document further explained that the CIA would:
"build popular support in Centralmerica and Nicaragua for an opposition
front that would be nationalistic. anti-Cuban and anti-Somoza; support the
opposition front through formation and training of action teams to collect
intelligence and engage in paramilitary and political operations in Nicara-
gua and elsewhere; work primarily through non-Americans to achieve the
foregoing, but in some circumstances the CIA might - possihly using
United Statespersonnel- take unilateral paramilitary acti(WP" 3/10/82;
WP 4/3/83.)
34. On 1 Decembtr 1981, President Reagan issued a second "presidential
finding" regarding Nicaragua, fonnally authorizing the "covert activities" ap-
proved at the 16 Novemher National Security Council meeting. Again, in ac-
cordance with United States domestic law, the intelligencecommittees of both
chambers of Congress were informed of the "finding". However,the committees
were officiallytold only that the CIA would create a paramilitary force of 500
men and that this force would be used solely to interdict alleged arms trafic
from Nicaragua to guerrillas in El Salvador and to strike at alleged Cuhan
military installations in Nicaragua(WP 2/14/82; WP 3/10/82; NYT 3/14/82;
3/28/82; Newsweek 11/8/82; LAT3/3/85.) When these events were later revealed
in the WashingtonPost, among other penodicals, Senator Barry Goldwater who,
as Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence received regular
CIA briefings on the anti-Nicaragua activities, said: "Everything in thPost
story was true. They didn't have everything, but everything they had is true."
(Time 3/22/82.)
35. To organize and direct the miliiary and paramilitary activities in and
against Nicaragua, CIA Director William Casey appointed Duane Clarridge, a
career CIA officialwho was then serving as chief of the Latin American division
of the CIA's Directorate of Operations. The activities were subject to overall
supervision hy a "restricted interagency group" headed by the Assistant Secre-
tary of State for lnteramerican Affairs, initially Thomas O. Enders and later
Langhome A. Motley. Other members of the group were General Paul F. Gor-
man, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who later became Commander
in Chief of the United States Southern Command hased in Panama and was
replaced hy ViceAdmiral Arthur Moreau; Lt. Col. Oliver North, a Marine offi-
cer with extensiveparamilitary experience who served on the National Security
Council staff; and the CIA's Clarridge(WSJ 3/5/85; see also LAT3/3/85.) The
day-to-day conduct of the military and paramilitary activitiesthemselveshelonged
mainly to CIA Director Casey and Clarridge. A United States intelligenceofficer
said: "It's really Casey'swar(WP 12/16/84.)
36. Thereafter. the CIA station inTeeuciealoa. Honduras. auicklv erew to
approximately 25 officers under a new &ion Lhicf. CIA ~keitor 6aYey and
Clarridge made frequent visits to the area. (LAT 3/4/85; see aWPo 12/16/84.)
Under the supervision of the Tegucigalpa station, the mercenary fofce was
recruited and trained. Those chosen to be "officers" in this paramilitary army
were given special training at a military base in Lepaterique. Members of the12 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTlVlTtFS
forcc ucre givcn five-wccktraining coursr., ai base camps in ruuthern Honduras
lusi acro?s thc border froni Sicaragua. The training includerl h.i,ir infdntry and
weapons instruction, but also focused heavilyon sabotage, use of explosivesand
demolition of bridges.dams, power stationsand other structures. A specialgroup
of Miskito Indians were taken to Vivorillo, a small island off the east Coast of
Honduras, and trained in undenvater operations, including the demolition of
undenvater pipelines and port facilities. All weapons, explosives and other
military equipment were supplied by the United States. Each rnember of the
force received a regular salary for his services from the United States. (NYT
4/3/83; Time 12/6/82; LAT 3/4/85.)
37. In December 1981,these mercenary forces began to carry out hit-and-run
attacks against targets inside Nicaragua, always returning to their base camps in
Honduras. The frequency, intensity and destructiveness of these attacks grew
rapidly. (Affidavit of Commander Luis Carrion, Ann. A, Exhibit A (hereafter
"Carnon Affidavit").)
38. On 8 December1981,CIA-trainedmercenanes invaded the communityof La
Esperanza, ordenng the inhabitants to cross over to Honduras and threatening
those who refusedwith death. (Canion Affidavit,Ann. A, ExhihitA, p. 136,infra.)
39. On 14 December 1981,CIA-trained mercenaries attacked the Nicaraguan
town of San Carlos in Zelaya None province, kidnapped 12 perçons, and took
them back to base camps in Honduras where they were killed.(Ibid)
40. On 28 December 1981, mercenary forceskidnapped four people [rom the
community of Bilwaskaima, includinga woman doctor and a nurse. The mer-
cenaries took the women to Honduras, where they were gang-raped. (Ibid.)
41. On 2 January 1982, a mercenary force of 60 men attacked the town of
Raiti, and killed three Nicaraguans. The same day a force of 45 men attacked
the town of Limbaica, stole two boats, vehicles,and equipment and then burned
a bridge at Alamikamba. (Ibid.)
42. In early Februury 1982, mercenariesattacked the Nicaraguan border post
at Las Brisas in Nueva Segovia province, killing three border guards. Later in
February, similar mercenary units attacked the border post at Mata de Pla-
tano. (Ibid.)
43. On 14 March 1982,a CIA-trained and equipped demolition team crossed
into Nicaragua and blew up two vital bridges, at Rio Negro in Chinandega
province and Ocotal in Nueva Segovia. (Ibid) In a briefing to memhers of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives in
May 1982,CIA officiaisacknowledgedthe CIA'sresponsibilityfor the destruction
of the two bridges. (WP 5/8/83; see also LAT 3/4/85.) Indeed, after the destruc-
tion of the bridges, a United States intelligenceoiïicer stated, "there was great
enthusiasm in the CIA and in the Administration ...We are finally hringing
pressure to bear on the Sandinistas" (LAT 3/4/85).
44. This purpose is also reflected in contemporaneous official documents,
which were circulated withinthe United States Administration to report on the
military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua and serve as a basis for
policy and operational decisions. An April 1982 National Security Council
"Summary Paper", which servedas the basis of a meeting of the United States
National Security Planning Croup, reported that: "In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas
are under increased pressure as a result of Our covert efforts." (<'UnitedStates
Policyin Central America and Cuba through F.Y. '84,Summary Paper", Ann. C,
Attachment 111-1.)
45. A 16 July 1982 "Weekly Intelligence Summary", circulated within the
United States Administration by the Defense Intelligence Agency,described the
attacks in and against Nicaragua during this period as follows: MEMORIALOF NICARAGUA 13
"Activitv Since 14 March. On 14 March. insureents initiated new wave
of guemlla activity by sabotaging Iwo important bridges in the northwest
near the Honduras border ... Concurrently, guerrilla activity in the north-
east and alone the Honduran border heiehtened, and security forces were
confronted wiïh a seriesof small scaleinsirgent attacks that have continued
unabated ..." (Ann. C, Attachment 111-2.)
46. This renort also stated that in the 100-dav~eriod between 14March and
21 lune 1982,'atleast 106armed attacks occurrei bithin Nicaragua. It described
these attacks as falling inIo the following categories:
- sabotage of highway bridges and attempted destruction of fuel tanks at a
military facility;
- sniper fire and attacks against small military patrols;
- attacks b, sm~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ds on Nicaraeuan-soldiers:
- assassination of Nicaraguan government officialsand a Cuban adviser;
- burning of a customs warehouse, buildings belonging to the Ministry of
~onstruction, and crops. (Ibid.)
47. On 4 July 1982, a group of mercenaries attacked the village of Seven
Bank. The attack resulted in 14 Nicaraguan dead. (Carrion Affidavit, Ann. A,
Exhibit A, p. 137,infi.)
48. On 16 J~dy 1982, a 60-man force raided the village of San Fernando, in
Nueva Segovia, killing a villager, kidnapping four peasants and burning govern-
ment officesbefore withdrawine to Honduras. flbid J
39. On 24 Jul) 140, ;imercFnar) iurce suppurt:~ hy hcavy artillery attacked
ihc villageof San I;rancisco del hurtr.. Chinandega pro\,ince In Ihis p~rtiiularly
bruial rdid, Ihc mersenaries uixned lire indiscrirninatcly on the villapers. killiny
14of them, wounding 4 moreand kidnapping 8 othersand taking thëm back 1;
Honduras. Four more Nicaraguans were killed pursuing the attackers. (Ibid)
50. In Augusr 1982, CIA officials reponed to the congressiondl intelligence
committees that the United States was then supporting a 1,500-man mercenary
force based in Honduras, and that the force was regularly carrying out hit-and-
run raids on Nicaraguan military and economic targets. The committees were
also informed that ams and other military equipment were provided to this
force by the United States through Honduran military depots and that the
United States was paying each member of the force a basic monthly wage.
(WP 5/8/83.)
51. While these attacks were takine dace. the United States sent more of its
n~ii inilitary personnel in10the regioi;6>r the ostensible purpore of holdingjoint
milit:iry maneuvers uith Hunduras \luch of the rniliiary cquipmcnt iloun in fur
the joint maneuvers was turned over to the mercenary units when the maneuvers
ended. (NYT 4/3/83.)
52. Subsequently, the CIA recommended and President Reagan authorized a
manifold increase in the size of the mercenary army and a corresponding
exnansion of its activities. In addition. the United States decided to move a
substantial number of mercenary units from their Honduran base camps to new
camps inside Nicaragua, where, it was felt, they would beable 10carry out more
aggÏessive and more ambitious attacks on Nicaraguan targets. To accomplish
these ends, and to sustain the increased force, an additional $30,000,000 was
allocated to the program (WP 5/8/83; WSJ 5/5/83).
53. To make the mercenary force appear more attractive Io members of the
congressional intelligencecommittees who werebeginning to question the purpose14 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACT~VITIES
and efectiveness of the operation, the United States Administration selected a
seven-member "political directorate", some of whom were not known to have
previous ties to the Somoza régimeor the National Guard, and began to refer
to the mercenaries as the "Nicaraguan Democrdtic Force" (or FDN, by its
Spanish acronym). (NYT 3/18/85; WP 2/28/85; WP 11/27/84.) One of those
selected, Edgar Chamorro, was approached in Miami, where he was then living,
hy the head of the CIA's officein that city. The CIA officialtold Chamorro "he
was speaking on behalf of the President of the United States, who was very
interested in getting rid of the Sandinistas" (WP 11/27/84). Chamorro was
selected for the "political directorate", he was told, because the CIA needed
"people who they could seIl to Congress" in order to maintain its support for
the "covert activities". "They wcretrying to repackage the FDN for Congress",
Chamorro said. "and 1was not a Somocista." Chamorro aereed to his aoooint-
ment for $1,500-$2,000 permonth. (NYT 11/1/84; seeal& WP 12/17/84'; WP
2/28/85 ; WSJ 3/5/85.)
54. By December 1982, CIA recmitment eforts had swelled the mercenary
forceto 4,000men, according to the CIA'sreport to the congressionalintelligence
committees that month. (WP 5/8/83.) The committees were also informed that
the CIA had not succeeded in its efforts to minimize dependence on National
Guardsmen wbo bad served the Somoza régime.In fact, the CIA reported, the
force was dominated by former Somoza loyalists. This was necessary, the
congressional committees were told, because the "Somocistas" were the only
ones willing to fight against the Nicaraguan Government. (WP 5/8/83 ; see also
Report of the Permanent SelectCommittee on Intelligence,p. 243,infa, Ann. E,
Attachment I .)
55. Mercenary units then began to be moved into Nicaragua, together with
their weanons and suoolies. The lareest sinele infiltration of this ~enod took
place on j0 ~ecember,Ghen fivecolumns,each consisting of 125~isiito Indians,
crossed from Honduras into eastern Nicaranua, and headed in the direction of
Puerto Cabezas. a strateeic seaoort on ~icdraeua's Atlantic Coast. Their mission
wss Iociipturc the portGJ holb 11uniil re~nîo~ccnicntarrited and ."pro! irioniil
govcrnmcnt" crinsirting cimerccnary leaders çould bc inst.illcJ.(.YY'/'4 3 83.)
56. In <>iir/iJu,ruil198.3.as a relud dIo ihc elli~riIo seiïc Puerio Ciihc7as.
teûni of ~cskito lndiûns. trainci by the CI,\ in underwater denioliiion txiics
ai ihç Vi\,orillo ha*,. rahoiligcrl kcy piiri injiallati(.V YI4 3 83) The elfort
to capture the port failed, however, when Nicaraguan armed forces intercepted
the main component of the attack force and caused it to dishand. Other
mercenary units concentrated their attacks on agricultural workers and other
Nicaraguan civilians, in an effort to disrupt production and create panic among
the population. For example, on 18 Januury 1983,a unit attacked a truck filled
with coffee pickers in Namasli, Nueva Segovia. Two children were killed and
several adults were wounded. ("Attacks byNicaraguan 'contras'on the Civilian
Population of Nicaragua", Ann. 1.Attachment 2.)
57. As the size and aggressiveness of the mercenary army grew, so did the
number of United States personnel directly involved withthem. By the beginning
of1983,there were more than 125CIA operatives in Honduras. Approximately
50 of them were full-time CIA employees under diplomatic or other official
cover. (Miami Herald 12/19/83.)The rest, some of whom were recalledfrom re-
tirement, worked for the CIA on a contract basis. United States military
personnel werealso directly involvedin the "covert activities"against Nicaragua.
At least 15 United States Air Force oilots and technicians hased in Honduras
iunductcd reconnaissance flightr uring tu\> Beechcrait Quccn Air t\rin-engine
airplanes with elccironic cquipmcnt. 'lhey pr<i\idcrlregular iniclligcnce rcporii MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 15
on the movements and placement of Nicaraguan military units and equip-
ment. (NYT 4/3/83.) United States Ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne
Kirk~atnck acknowledeed dunne a United Nations Securitv Council debate that
the United States conducted r&ular reconnaissance flights over Nicaraguan
territory. (37 UN SCOR (2335th mtg.),p. 48, UN doc. S/PV 2335Corr. 1(19821.)
58. In addition to these direct activities by United States military personnel,
United States forces participated, in earlyFebruary 1983, in another round of
joint military maneuverswith Honduran arrned forces.Thesemaneuvers,conduc-
ted near the Honduras-Nicaragua border, werecodenamed "Ahuas Tara 1"("Big
Pine In, in the language of the Miskito Indians). (WP 1/29/85.)
59. The United States also continued 10 expand the size of the mercenary
force itself. IFebruary 1983, the CIA reported 10the congressional intelligence
committees that the force now consisted of 5,500 men. (WP 5/8/83.) In May
1983, the CIA informed the two committees that the force had grown to 7,000
men. (WP 5/8/83.)
60. InMay 1983, senior representatives of the United States Administration
and the Congress, including President Reagan, made a series of public ac-
knowledgments that the United States was conducting military and paramilitary
attacks in and against Nicaragua. These were made - and continue Io be
made - in the context of the Administration's periodiccampdigns to persuade
the Congress to continue appropriating funds Io carry on "covert activities"
against Nicaragua.
61. On 5 Mav 1983. President Reagan wasasked at a newsconference whether.
if thc ~on~ress voted against pro\id;ng further funds for the mcrienary fi>riy.cs.
the Administraiion would aitcmpi io circumrent such a restriction by delivr.ring
the fundr ind~rectlythro~gh third çountrics Hc replied:
"Now, if they [the Congress] want Io tell usthat we can give money and
do the same things we've beendoing - money, giving,providing subsistence
and so forth to these people directly and making it overt instead of c-vert
that's al1 right with me." (Official Transcript, p. 168, infro, Ann. C,
Attachment 1-1.)
62. On 6 May 1983,SendtelntelligenceCommittee Chairman Barry Goldwater
announced publicly, after a closed sessionof the comrnittee, that
"what we've done is fund Nicaraguan-Cuban covert military action as
currently defined through Sept. 30 and authorized an additional $19 million
Cromthe reservefor contingency [the CIA'sbudget] to fund a new, redefined
program on receipt of a new presidential finding" (WP 5/7/83).
In a letter to the Director of the Congressional Research Service, Senator
Goldwater described the Senate Intelligence Committee's action in the follow-
ing manner :
"Recently the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported the
liitelligence Authonzation Act of FY 1984[S-12301.The classifiedannex of
this bill contained language which described the terms under which funds
authorized for use in the current covert paramilitary action program directed
at the Sandinista government in Nicaragua would be released.A sanitized
version of this language is enclosed ..." (Letter of 27 June 1983 from
Senator Goldwater to Mr. Gilbert Gude, Ann. E, Attachment 2.)
The "sanitized version" of the committee'sclassifiedannex, attached to Senator
Goldwater's letter, stated that the committee decided to fund the "current covert16 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
paramilitary action program directed at the Sandinista government" only until
the end of fiscal year 1983,and to approve the funds requested for fiscal year
1984 for "a re-directed, re-defined paramilitary covert action program based
upon formulation of a new Presidential Finding". (Ann. E, Attachment 2.)
63. On 13 May 1983, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ofthe
House of Representatives published an official report reviewing the covert
activitiesagainst Nicaragua to date (House of Representatives ReporrNo. 98-122,
98th Congress, 1st Session, Part 1, Ann. E, Attachment 1). The Report stated
that "encouragement and support has been provided to Nicaraguan exilesto fos-
ter insurgency within Nicaragua" (ibid,at 2). It further stated that the purpose
of "United States support and training to anti-Sandinista insurgents" was not,
as the CIA had initially told the committee, to interdict alleged arms trafic
from Nicaragua to El Salvador, but to overthrow the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment :
"The activitiesand purposes of the anti-Sandinista insurgents ultimately
shapc the program. Thcir ,,pr.nl) acknowlcdgcd goal of o;crthrouing rhc
Sandinirtaj. the siïc of th:ir forces and çlT<irtsto increasç iuch L~rce*.anil
finallyihcir activitiesnow and \\hiIr.ihcy ucre on the Slicaraguan-tlonduran
border, point not to arms interdiction, but to military confrontation. As the
numbers and equipment of the anti-Sandinista insurgents have increased,
the violence of their attacks on targets unrelated to arms interdiction has
grown, as has the intensity of the confrontation with Sandinista troops."
(Ibid.at II.)
The Report further stated:
"If there ever was a formula for US policy failure in Central America, it
would involve two elements: (1) acts that could be characterized as US
intervention in Nicaragua; and(2) an alliancewith the followersof Somoza.
Both characterizations can now be made." (Ibid.,at 3.)
The committee concludedthat al1United Statessupport for military and paramili-
tary activities against Nicaragua should be terminated (ibid.at 4).
64. Despite this report the Reagan Administration decided once again upon
an escalation in the level and nature of military activities against Nicaragua. It
authorized yet another increase in the size of the mercenary army as well as a
change in its tactics. In Ju1983, the CIA reported to the intelligencecommittees
that the force had grown to 8,000 men. (WP 7/14/83.)
65. In early July 1983,the congressional intelligencecomrnitteeswereinformed
that there were 8,000-10,000 men inthe mercenary army. (WP 7/14/83.) At the
same time, new tactics were employed. Units were again deployed in camps in-
side Nicaragua. This time, however, instead of confining their activities to more
isolated regions, they were directed to attack population centers, to strike
at important economic targets and, in the words of the CIA's Duane Clarridge,
"Io fight more of a classic guemlla war" (NYT 12/3/84; WP 9/29/83).
66. As part of ils effort to formalize its training of these forces to fight a
"classic guerrilla war", the CIA prepared and distributed an operations manual
entitledPsychologicoO l perafionsin Guerrilla Warfare (Ann. Ci).This document
put in written form the instructions that the CIA had heen givingin a lessformal
manner 10 the mercenaries.The IntelligenceCommittee of the House of Repre-
sentatives confirmed that the manual was written and printed by the CIA.
(Ann. E, Attachment 17.) The manual was written by a special CIA contract
employee using the pseudonym "John Kirkpatrick", who was given this assign- MEMORIALOF NICARAGUA 17
ment by Clarridge. "Kirkpatrick" modeled the manual on a United States Amy
manual prepared in 1968 at the Amy Special Warfare School in Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, and specificallyon the Amy's Lesson Plan No. 643, entitled
"Armed Psyop" and subtitled "lmplicit and Explicit Terror". (NYT 10/29/84;
NYT 10/30/84; WP 10/30/84; WP 10/31/84; see also Transcript of Remarks
of Senator Daniel Moynihan, Vice Chaiman, Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence, 28 October 1984,on ABC News "This Week with David Brinkley",
Ann. E, Attachment 16.)At least 5,000copies of the manual were printed, about
half in Tegucigalpa and half at the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia.
They were distrihuted among the mercenary forces. (NYT 10/20/84; NYT
10/23/84 ;NYT 12/7/84 ; WP 10/20/84 ;WP 12/7/84.)
67. Under the heading "lmplicit and Explicit Terror", the manual instructed
the mercenaries to occupy small towns and then destroy police installations, cut
al1communications lines, set up ambushes, and: "Kkinap al1officialsor agents
of the Sandinista government and replace them in 'public places' withmilitary
or civilian oersons of trust 10our movement." (Ann. G. o. 12.)The manual also
advocated ihe "selective use of violence for pr~pagandiS~iceff&ts" (ibid.,p. 14),
and urged that the rehels "neutralize carefully selectedand planned targets, such
as courtjudges, 'mesta'judges [Le.,justices ofthe peace], policeand state security
officials, CDS [neighborhood Sandinista party committee] chiefs, etc." (ibid,
pp. 14-15).President Reagan, in response to a question at a news conference as
to the meaning of the word "neutralize" as it appears in the manual, said the
following :
"Q. Didn't themanual say 'neutralize'-and can't that be construed as
meaning assassination?
The President. I suppose you could construe it any nurnber of - of
several ways - but, in the Contextin which it was recommended; actually,
~h~ ~was not the actual choice - the oriuinal choice of the word. The real
wurd was 'rcrnove' - nicaning remove from oiFiie. If yiiu came into a
\,ill;igeor iown, rcmove {romoficc reprcscnlati\e~ of ihr Sandimsia govcrn-
ment. When thcv iranslaied itinio ihe Snanirh. ihcv translated 11'neuiralire'
instead of remobe. But the meaning stili remains the same.
Q. Well,how would you goabout doing that without violenceand force?
The Presidenr. No. You just say to the fellow that's sitting there in the
office- you're not in the officeanymore. (Laughter.)" (OfficialTranscript,
pp. 178-179,infra, Ann. C, Attachment 1-8.)
68. In a section on "Control of Mass Concentrations and Meetings", the CIA
manual urged the mercenaries to hire "professional criminals .. . to carry out
specific selective 'jobs''', to iristigate uprisings and disturbances among the
population, and to create "martyrs" for the cause "in order to create greater
conflicts" (Ann. G, p. 33).
69. In addition to the manual on "Psvcholoeical Ooerations in Guerrilla
Warfare", the CIA prepared and distribkted an illustked booklet entitled
Freedom Fighterk Mrrnriol(Anri. H). It was intended not only for members of
the mercenary forces themselves, but also for potential sympathizers within
Nicarae"a in an effort to induce them to commit acts of sabotage aeains- th-
"cr~cnti~lccononiiç infrajiruct~rc" of the country. With cartoun.iype drauings.
the rii,i,do~iFiphrr,ri .!lu~iu<iilllu~tratcsniorc than 40 wa), 11)commii rah~~iagc
uhing .impie housch<ildtuuls". lis suggestions iilcluilc: ilïrnaging <ilficerquip.
ment, imashing uindows. stopping up toilct,. ~alliriginfalsctirealarml. >precding
rJmors. Jis~hlingginernment vchicle,. siealinggo\crnnicnt food iupplici, retiing18 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
fires, and throwing "molotov cocktails" at police offices and fuel depots. The
first edition of themanual prepared hy the CIA had to he redone hecause it
reflected its non-Nicaraguan origins. According to Edgar Chamorro, one of
those the CIA appointed to the "political directorate" of the mercenary forces,
"the C.I.A. wanted us to distribute" the manual, but the illustrations "didn't
look very Nicaraguan". Noting that the manual urged Nicaraguans to steal mail
from mailboxes, Chamorro also ohsemed that "in Nicaragua we don't have any
mailboxes". (NYT 10/19/84.)
70. On 27 and 28 July 1983, the United States House of Representatives de-
bated whether to enact legislation terminating United States support for the
mercenary army. During the dehate, several Representatives who had attended
CIA briefings on the "covert activities" descrihed the purpose and objective of
these activities.
71. Representative Edward Boland, Chairman of the Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, informed his col-
leagues that: "the purpose and the mission of the operation was to overthrow
the government of Nicaragua" (129 Cong. Rec. H 5748 (27 July 1983), Ann. E,
Attachment 3).
72. Representative Lee Hamilton, also a memher of the IntelligenceCommittee,
reported that :
"The administration's intention cannot he separated from the intent and
activities of the military groups we support. The Contras have openly
declared their intention to 'Liherate Nicaragua' and their activities, the sire
of their forces, the level of the conflict, the targets they are choosing, al1fit
with this intention ... The Contras aim to hring down the Sandinistas.
We are now supporting a large army inside Nicaragua. We can no longer
deny that we are fighting a mercenary war in Nicaragua to overthrow the
government of that country." (129 Cong. Rec. H 5725 (27 July 1983), Ann.
E, Attachment 3.)
73. Renresentative Wvche Fowler. another memher of the Intellieence Com-
mittee, informed his colleagues th& "there was no indigenous Lprising of
Nicaraguans against the Sandinista government hefore the United States decided
to finance such an uprising" (ibid.);
74. The Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, James Wright, also
a memher of the IntelligenceCommittee, advised his colleagues that the purpose
of the United States-supported activities was to overthrow the Government of
Nicaragua, and that such activities violate international law:
"Those whom we have reciited, trained, financed, equipped and sent
into that country state unequivocally that theirpurpose is to overthrow the
government of that country. For us to say that it is otherwise really is to
evade the fact and render ourselves suhject to the censure of our friends and
colleagues throughout the hemisphere.. .." (129 Cong.Rec.H 5837(28July
1983), Ann. E, Attachment 4.)
Representative Wright also ohserved:
"Our acts in Nicaragua, the so-called covert acts which are not covert al
all, in equipping and financing and maintaining some 12,000 troops in
Nicaragua, is regarded throughout Latin America as a reckless invasion. It
frigbtens them. They think it is a time bomb that is going to set off a
conflagration throughout the hemisphere. MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 19
They regard this as a violation of the Organization of Amencan States
Charter. As a matter of plain fact, 1think it is, because what we have done,
quite frankly - and let us be honest with ourselves - has heen to finance
an invasion from outside of a sovereign country." (129 Cong. Rec. H 5729
(27 July 1983), Ann. E, Attachment 3.)
75. Representative Michael Barnes, Chairman of the Suhcommittee on
Western Hemisphere Aiïairs of the House Foreign AKairsCommittee, stated that
United States iponsorship and direction of the-mercenary forces was no longer
a secret:
"[A]s everybody in this room knows, as everybody in the world knows,
what the United States decided to do was to unilaterally hire 10,000,
12,000 maybe in the future 20,000, 50,000 we do not know how many
people, to invade Nicaragua ..." (129 Cong. Rec. H 5833 (28 July 1983),
Ann. E, Attachment 4.)
76. At the conclusion of the debate, the House of Representatives voted to
terminate al1United States support for the mercenary forces (ihid.).
77. Becausethe Senatedid not concur, the vote of the House of Representatives
did not result in the end of funding for United States military and paramili-
tary activities against Nicaragua. In fact, immediately after the vote, the Admi-
nistration dramatically increased the level of these activities. President Reagan
approved a new CIA plan calling for expansion of the mercenary army to
12,000-15,000 men, and emphasizing the importance of destroying vital eco-
nomic installations and inoicting maximum harm on the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment. To ensure the success of the plan, attacks against major Nicaraguan
economic targets would be carried out directly hy United States forces, rather
than the mercenaries. United States military and intelligence personnel would
approach Nicaraguan ports and oil facilitiesin speciallydesigned "mother ships",
from which helicopters or high-speed baats would carry them to their desig-
nated targets.
78. Elements of the plan were incorporated into a new "Presidential finding"
authorizing increased "covert activities" against Nicaragua. The "finding" was
presented in written form to the Senate and House Intelligence Committees on
20 Septemher 1983, dong with a request for $45,000,000in additional funding
for the ooeration durine fiscal vear 198411October 1983-30Seotember 1984).
(WSJ 9/$1/83.) It drop$d al1Gretense th'atthe "covert activities" were aimed
at arms interdiction or Cuban military installations and clearlv identified the
program's purpose as destabilization of the Nicaraguan ~overnment and coer-
cion of the Government into adopting new domestic and foreign policies. The
"finding" made no mention of the direct use of United States military and
intelligence personnel in attacks against Nicaragua, however, although this was
a part of the Administration's new plan. (WP 7/14/83; WP 7/29/83; WSJ
9/21/83 ; WP 7/27/83 ;WP 9/29/83 ; WP 4118/84; Ni'T 7/25/83.)
79. To hring further pressure to bear on the Nicaraguan Government, and to
support the mercenary forces, large-scale United States military forces were
deployed in Honduras, near the border with Nicaragua, and in the waters of
both of Nicaragua's coasts. In August 1983, the United States commenced its
largest-evermilitary maneuvers in Honduras, under the name of "Ahuas Tara II"
,''B-gPine II"). The numher of United States troovs oartici~a.ine -n the man-
euvers exceedéd5,000. Large quantities of unitek States arms, ammunition
and other military equipment were brought to Honduras. Many of the exercises20 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTlVlTlES
hrought United States troops close to the Nicaraguan border. Airstrips were
built or upgraded by United States militas. forces at various sites in Honduras.
The purpose was to estahlish hases from which supplies would be regularly
airlifted to mercenary forces inside Nicaragua after the maneuvers ended and
the United States military personnel withdrew from Honduras. (WP 7/27/83;
WP 3/22/85 ; WP 2/24/85.)
80. When the Ahuas Tara II maneuvers commenced, flotillasof United States
warships were sent to patio1 the waters off hoth of Nicaragua's coasts. The first
to arrive was the aircrafr carrier USS Ranger. which, together with its five-
warship escort, remained off Nicaragua's Pacificcoast for 19days. This armada
was replaced by a seven-warshipReetheaded hy the hattleship USS New Jersey,
which continued the natrol through the end of Ausust. Meanwhile. the USS
Coral Sea, another aikrait carrier, and its five-wars6ip escort group, patrolled
Nicaragua's Atlantic coast. Senior Administration and military officiaipublicly
stated - and a contempofaneous memorandum prepared hy the Department of
Defense confirmed - thst a principal purpose of these deployments was to
threaten and intimidate Nicaragua, as part of a program of "perception manage-
ment" aimed at raising alürm in Nicaragua about United States intentions and
therebv eainine concessions from the Nicaraeuan Govemment. (WP 7/22/83:
WP 7i2jj83 ;NYT 3/30/84.) - ,, ,
81. Adolfo Calero, whom the CIA had named head of the "political director-
ate" of the mercenarv forzes, said that the Dresenceof these laree United States
niilitxry iorceï ;ilsj pr<>viiac"\hielil" for a rtzpped-up milii~r) cariipaignhy
ihc rncrrenarics \Zr Calcin c~pl~incdihat ihc I.'nir:il St;itr.riorccj tiould ''\top
the Sanilinisi3r from coing iniii HonJ~ra5" in piirsuii orrncrcciian, unit, Ile
further stated that "thire is a stage heing set up3'for some "spectacuiar" actions
against the Nicaraguan Government. "Everything adds up to the downfall of
the Sandinista governmenr", he said. "lt has to happen, if not hy the end of this
year, then hy the beginning of next year." (WP 7/22/83.) The Big Pine II
maneuvers lasted, without interruption, until8 Fehruary 1984,a period of almost
six months.
82. During this period the mercenaries, pursuant to the new CIA plan in-
corporated in the Presidcnt's most recent finding, carried out a number of
deadly and destructive attdcks inside Nicaragua. Simultaneously, United States
military and intelligence forces themselvesrepeatedly attacked vital Nicaraguan
economic installations, including ports, oil storage facilities, pipelinesand ware-
houses. (WP 4/18/84; NYT 4/18/84.)
83. On 3 September 1983, a mercenary unit attacked El Guayo, in Matagalpa
province, kidnapped 18 peasants and hurned their houses. All of the peasants
were later found with their throats slit. (Carrion Affidavit, Ann. A, Exhibit A,
p. 147,infra.)
84. On 8 September1983,IwoCessna aircraft attacked the Augusto C. Sandino
International Airport in Managua, destroying passenger facilities. One of the
airplanes was shot down by ground fire. Registration documents found in the
wreckage disclosedthat the plane, a twin-engine Cessna 404, had been owned
by Iwo United States companies that work under contract with the CIA. (NYT
11/8/83: WP 2/24/85.) The Dil.t. w.o was killed in the crash. carried Davers
wLh thé name'aid télephonenumber of a CIA officer at thé United'~iates
Emhassy in Costa Rica. (CVP2/24/85.)
85. Later in September1983, United States military and intelligencepersonnel,
dispatched from a specialCIA "mother ship" off Nicaragua's Pacificcoast, blew
up oil storage and pipeline facilities at Puerto Sandino. (Carrion Affidavit,
Ann. A, Exhibit A, p. 147.infra; see also NYT4/18/84.) MEMORIALOF NICARAGUA 21
86. On 2 Ocrober 1983, United States personnel attacked oil storage facilities
at Benjamin Zeledon on Nicaragua's AtlanticCoast,causing the loss of 400,000
eallons of fuel. (NYT 10113183.)
- 87 On /O 0,:rohcr l~'83,'inlhe largesi and niost dc~iructi\e of ihcie ;itiacks.
United States m11iiaryand intelligence personnel ;iitacked ihc port of Corinto
on the Pacifii ~o~sthv air and sca and demolirhed ii\e huee oil si<irarc ianks
The attack cos1~icakgua more than 3.2 million gallons oFgasoline aid diesel
fuel, a large portion of Nicaragua's fuel reserves. Over 100persons were injured
and the danger of explosions. (Carrion Affidavit, Ann. A, Exhihit A, p. 148,
inb; see also NYT 10/13/83; NYT 4/18/84; WP 4/18/84: WSJ 5/6/85.)
88. On 14 October 1983, United States naval frogmen using sophisticated
underwater explosive devices again hlew up the oil pipeline a1 Puerto Sandino.
(WSJ 3/6/85.)
89. On 18 Octoher 1983,400 mercenaries attacked Pantasma, Jinotega, killing
47 persons, including farm workers, engineersand architects. They also destroyed
ten tractors and tmcks, a sawmill, a bank, agricultural warehouses and govern-
ment offices.(Carnon Affidavit,Ann. A, Exhibit A. p. 148,infia.)
90. During this period, senior officiaisof the United States Government pub-
licly acknowledged that the United States was actively supporting the mercen-
ary army and explained the objective of that support. For example, Fred C. Ikle,
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated on 12 Seprember 1983 that
the United States "must prevent consolidation of a Sandinista régimein Nica-
ragua" (Remarks to Baltimore Council on Foreign Relations, Baltimore, Mary-
land, p. 200, infra, Ann. C, Attachment 11-2).On 19 October 1983, Presidcnt
Reagan, while addressing a news conference, was asked whether it was "proper"
for the CIA to he involved in planning and supplying equipment for the
October IOattack on Corinto. (It had not yet been puhlicly revealed that the
United States carried out the attack directly, withils ownmilitary and intelligence
personnel.) The President responded: "1 do believe in the right of a country
when it helievesthat ils interests are best servedto practice covert activity." This
"right" exists, according to President Reagan, because "covert actions have been
a part of government and a part of government's responsibilitiesfor as long as
therc has been a government" (Official Transcript, p. 170, in/ru, Ann. C,
Attachment 1-2).
91. The next day, 20 Ocrober 1983, the Housc of Representatives dehated
whether to appropriate the %45,000,000in funding that President Reagan had
requested for fiscalyear 1984.The Chairman of the Permanent SelectCommittee
on Intelligence, Representative Edward Boland, reported to his colleagues on
the principal developments since they had last debated this question, three
months earlier :
"What has happened since July 281 The most alarming change has been
the expansion of the war in Nicaragua. . . It is now an air and sea war.
Insurgents have engaged in hombing raids on Nicaraguan cities, airports,
and harbors. Targets have heen economic, such as the oil storage tanks in
Corinto and the electrical e-neratine-.lant and oil oio.l.ne in Puerto
Sindinu. The grdund u;ir hai hcitcd up agiin - u,iih dccpcr pcnetraiions
of inwrgcni forces inti) ihc icntral highlands and large-rcale~lcisheshetu,ecn
insurgent and Sandinista troops.
[Tlhe administrationhas reformulated itsposition on the war in Nicaragua
in a new Presidential finding. The findingauthonzes the continuation of the22 MILITARY AND PARAMlLlTARY ACSIVLSIBS
present program. The scope of activities whichare authorized is very broad,
and no way limitedto arms interdiction. It includes keepingthe military pres-
sure on the Sandinistas. Its bottom line is continuation of the war." (129
Cong.Rec H 8390 (20 October 1983), Ann. E, Attachment 5.)
92. Representative LeeHamilton, alsoa memberofthe IntelligenceCommittee,
gave a similar report:
"1 think the most significantdevelopmentsthat have occurred sincewe met
in July are two: One, we have a new finding suhmitted by the administra-
tion which considerably expands the purposes of that operation; and, two,
the war in fact has exnanded.
Thr i,~\crt u;ir coniiniicr ~nilh~scxplindcd. \\'cnou seca ncu strdtcg).
Th~t straicgy is io 13rgrtci.)not~~ictdigcts likc cls;ir~isl plants and siorage
C&cr\iiicain.d fiehtrnr in ihc iiiic.i\19 Ci>>>?1<1'r\\ %JI(> \20 Oc~cihri
1983),Ann. E, atta&ment 5.)
93. Reprcreni;iti\c Michacl Ilirncs. Ch~irniiinciiihc Subiotiimiitce on \Vc,tern
Heniisphere AIFalrsut'the Housc ui Rcprcientativcs I-{rrcign,Iltaii. Coniniitiet.
who had recentlv retumed from a trip to Nicarama. where he met with leaders
of the ~icaraguan Government, made the follow~ng'statement:
"Myth would have it that the covert operations are designed to force the
Nicaraguans to the negotiating table. But the trouble with that is that the
Nicaraguans were already there. Nicaragua has been trying to have talks
with the Reagan Administration al1along. It is not Nicaragua that will not
negotiate. It is us. Nicaragua has long sincedemonstrated its willingnessto
address our security concerns on the sole condition that we be prepared to
address their security concerns.
The one thing that the Nicaraguans will not negotiate about is their
revolution. And here we get to the real purpose of the covert operations.
They are designed to overthrow the Nicaraguan revolution.
[Tlhis Government cannot be overthrown at any acceptable cost. If we
install our own Government in Managua, that will not be the end of the
civil war, it will he the beginning of it. Thousands of Nicaraguans will die.
And the conRictwillnot be confinedto Nicarama. Our attemot to overthrow
this Government is going to he disastrous - èisastrous for the interests and
the credihility of the United States." (129 con^ . ec. H 8394 (20 Octoher
1983),Ann. E, Attachment 5.)
94. At the conclusion ofthe debate, the House of Representatives again voted
against the President's request for funds to continue the "covert activities"
against Nicaragua. (129 Cong. Rec. H 8432-33 (20 October 1983), Ann. E,
Attachment 5.)
95. However, the Senate agreed to the President's requestand ultimately a
compromise was reached in whichboth chambers of Congress approved fun-
ding for the "covert activities", but in an amount lower than the President had
requested. In November 1983, new legislation was enacted appropriating "no1
more than" $24,000,000 to finance the "covert activities" in fiscal year 1984.
This legislation, which wasenacted into United Statesdomesticlawon 8 December
1983, explicitly stated that the $24,000,000 was to be used for the purpose of
"supporting, directly or indirectly, militas. or paramilitary operations in Nica-
ragua". (Department of Defense Appropriation Act for 1984, Section 775,
and Intelligence Authorization Act for 1984,Section 108,Ann. D, Attachments MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 23
3, 4.) In late December1983, within weeks after the enactment of the new leeis-
latio'n, a large mercenary force invaded northern Nicaragua from ond duras.
The invaders were repelled,but at a cost of many Nicaraguan dead and wounded.
(WSJ 3/4/85.)
96. Despite the death and destruction inflicted on Nicaragua, there was still
no weakening of the Nicaraguan Government. Accordingly, President Reagan
authorized an increase in the number and size of military and paramilitary
attacks to be carried out against Nicaragua directly by United States military
and intelligenvepersonnel. Acting on a proposal by National Security Adviser
Robert C. McFarlane, President Reagan approved a plan calling for expanded
and intensified attacks by United States forces against Nicaraguan ports, power
plants, bridges and oil facilities.A major new element of the plan called for the
mining of Nicaragua's ports, to curtail Nicaragua's ability to carry on peaceful
maritime commerce. The plan was fonnally approved in December 1983. (WP
4111184:NYT 4116184:Time4123184.)President Reaean's annroval of the vlan.
including the minhg of Nicaragua's ports, was co~firmed'b~ Senator Barri
Goldwater, Chainnan of the Senate Intelligence Committee:
"CIA Director Casey appeared hefore my committee in closed sessionto
brief us on this issue [whether the CIA was engaged in miningNicaraguan
harbors]. 1 learned to my deep regret that the President did approve this
mining program ..." (130 Cong. Rec. S 4198 (10 April 19841,Ann. E,
Attachment 8.)
Senator Goldwater expressed his disapproval of these activities inan open letter
to CIA Director Casey:
"1 found out ... that the CIA had, with the written approval of the
President, engaged in such mining ... [Mline the harhors in Nicaragua?
This is an act violating international law. It is an act of war. For the life of
me, 1 don't see how we are going to explain it." (Ann. E, Attachment 9;
see also WP 4/11/84,) '
Prcridcni Kcligdn,uhcn a>kcd io ju,iify hi\ decision duthorving ihr mining ol
N~ci~rdgua'p sori<i.hiid: "'l'h<>.tiictre homemadc niincs thdt coi.ldn't %i.Iship
. . I ihink ihst ihcrc uas mucli aJo ahout iiothin-." iORcidl 'lranrcri.i..D. 176.
Nlfra,Ann. C, Attachment 1-6.)
97. The mining of Nicaragua's ports was carried out under the direction of
the CIA from January to April 1984. Again, CIA "mother ships" were used as
staging points from which the mining missions were launched.Three types of
mines were used: those that responded to direct contact, to sound waves, and
to water pressure. Severalhundred mines were deployed inthe ports of Corinto,
Puerto Sandino and El Bluff.The mines wereconstructed by the CIA Weapons
Group in Langley, Virginia, with assistance from the Mines Division of the
Naval Surface Weapons Center of the United States Navy in Silver Spring,
Maryland. The CIA Weapons Group made the mine casings and stuffed them
with exvlosives.and the Naval Surface Wea~onsCenter orovided the fuses. alone
\i,iiic~hniial tcsis of pr<itotypcsof ihc dc~'~iccIhr liii;as,cmhly of ihc min&
\\sr pcrlormcJ hy CIA ucap<>nsspccialists iiiIlonilura>. Thcy u.crcJcplo)cd in
ïiirür~ru~ii uatcrs by swicciirllyir~iiicd IKnitcJ St;iic\ militi~ryand intclliecncc
versoniel. includine GIA emdovees of Latin Amencan nationalitv - known
in united States inïelligence iariance as "UCLAs", or "uni1atera1~~-controlled
Latino assets". (WP 4/11/84; NYT 4/8/84; NYT 4/12/84; NYT 4/16/84; NYT
6/1/84; Time4/23/84; WSJ3/5/85.)24 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
98. The mines damaged at least nine vessels,among them Nicaraguan fishing
trawlers and vesselsof third States engdged in peaceful maritime commerce with
Nicaragua. (Time 4/23/84; WSJ 3/5/85.) Because of the mines, some shipping
companies stopped sendiiig vessels to Nicaraguan ports. (NYT 4/12/84.) An
official of PEMEX, the Mexican State oil Company, reported that the mining
had impaired the ability of PEMEX and Nicaragua to charter tankers to deliver
oil Io Nicaragua. (WP 8/18/84.) Direct damage caused by the mines included the
following :
25 February:Two Nicaraguan fishing vesselswere hlown up in El Bluff.
1 March: The Dutch dredger Geopontewas damaged by a mine at Corinto.
,-Alur<.h The Panjmanian ship Lus ("ri,ih,,~.~arrvingnicdiiinc. li>,>dand in-
Jiisrrialinputs. \iar revcrcl) d;~niagedh) ;<iiiiit;ilCiirinio.
20 March: The Soviet Union tanker Lugansk, carrying 250,000 harrels of
crude oil, was damaged hy a mine in Puerto Sandino.
27 March: The Liberian ship Inderchaser,carrying molasses, hit a mine in
Corinto. The Panamanian ship Hominwas attacked by armed speedboats while
unloading sugar at Puerto Sandino. A Nicaraguan shrimp boat was destroyed
by a mine in Corinto.
29 March: The Nicaraguan fishing vesse1San Albinowas destroyed hy a mine
at Corinto.
30 March The Nicaraguan shrimp hoat Alma Saltanawas damaged by a mine
at Corinto. The Japanese ship TerushoMaru,carrying bicycles,automobile spare
parts, construction materials and Cotton, was damaged by a mine at Corinto.
Three speedboats and three helicopters also attacked the Panamanian ship
Homin, the second time that ship was attacked. (Central American Historical
Institute Update, 5 April 1984, Vol. 3, No. 13; Ann. J, Attacbment l ;see also
Lloyds' List and ShippingGazette, Mdrch 1984,Ann. J, Attachment 2.)
The Nicaraguan Government attempted to clear the Connto access channel of
mines by dragging a deep sea fishing net between two fishing hoats. Most of the
Pacific fishing Reet was used in this effort, during which several fishing hoats
were destroyed. (Ann. J, Attachment 1.)
99. The CIA "mother ships" used in the mining operation also served as bases
for attacks against Nicaraguan economic installations by helicopters (whichtook
off from and landed on the ships' decks)and high-speed boats armed with mor-
tars and machine guns. Two Hughes 500 helicopters were accommodated on
at least one of the ships. A Fairchild Merlin IV twin-engine propeller plane
equipped with fonvard-looking infrared radar was also used. An interna1 CIA
memorandum reported on the results of these attacks hetween 1 January and
10 April 1984.The memorandum described 19 separate attacks involving heli-
copters and speedboats launched from CIA "mother ships" during this period,
including the following :
"Jan. 4, - 1984: Helicopter rocket and 'Q' [speedboat] attack against
the Potosi naval hase. . .. 'Q' boat crewed by agents and personnel from
Central America. United States helicopter and crew identified targets which
were taken under fire by Nicaraguan crewed helicopter. CIA crewed Merlin
aircraft eaAio..d ~it~ ~ ~ ~lforward lookine infr-red radar1 orovi,rd ~eal
time intelligencesupport.
Major terminal was hit several times hy 'Q'hoat cannon fire . ..Rockets
set fire and caused damage to buildinas within the comoound. Nicaramans -
admitted to one dead and eight wounlded.26 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
102. On 8 March 1984, President Reagan asked theCongress for a supplemen-
ta1appropriation of %21,000,000for military and paramilitary activities against
Nicaragua in fiscalyear 1984.(Statement on Behalfof President Reagan, 8 March
1984. Ann. C. Attachment 1-3.) It will be recalled that on 20 Seotember 1983
Prcsidcnt R~agÿnsubmitted a requcsi to the (:ongre,r for %5.0(1t',ll00for thesc
activitics in fiscd )car 1984and that ihe Congrr.ss appropriaicd S24.L10U.00a0i
that lime. (Sesupra, paras. 78, 91-95.)
103. On 20 March 1984, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, at a press
conference concerning ths Administration's pending request for $21,000,000,
stated: "we identified what is needed now .. .to keep the pressure on Nica-
ragua ..." (State Department Transcript, p. 20infraAnn. C, Attachment 11-3).
On 28 Murch 1984, in an interview withtheNew YorkTimes,President Reagan
said that the United States would continue supporting the mercenaries fighting
the Government of Nicaragua unless Nicaragua changed its interna1policiesand
oermitted the mercenarieCO "oarticioate in t-e eovemment". (OfficialTrans.r.ot.
p. 171,infra,Ann. C, kac ch m 1-n.t
104. On 5 Aprilthe Senate voted to appropriate the $21,000,000requested by
President Rea-an (130 Cona.Rec. S 3897.Ann. E. Attachment 7). Prior to the
Cnal \oie. Senstor ~hrist,iphcr Ihdd proposed an timciidmrnt thil uoiild have
appropriatcd the S21.000.110(ïq~cslcd by Prc\ident Reagan hut proh~bitedthe
use of any of the funds "for planning, directing, executing,or supporting acts of
terrorism in, over or offshorefrom the territory of Nicaragua". Senator Dodd's
amendment was defeated by the Senate. (130 Cong.Rec. S 3879-3896,Ann. E,
Attachment 7.) The $21,000,000appropriation was then taken up by the House
of Representatives.
105. On 9 April 1984, Nicaragua filed its Application against the United
States with the Court, and its Rcquest for Interim Measures of Protection. Oral
Hearinas on the Reauest were held on 25 and 27 A~ril. On 10 Mav 1984. the
Court Yssued IL>~rdcr granting interim nieiiriirrr 'of protcctiun in favor of
Sicïr~gua. Nevcrthcless,scniur United Staics olliiiali ~~oniinucdihrir iampaign
to obtain approval bythc Ilou.;r,of Kcprcscntativc~of the S?l.trOtI.000supplemcn-
ta1aoorooiiation reiuested bv President Reaean and alreadv aooroved bv the
senai;. /isïi,tant ~Îcrctary il' Siaie for lnt&amcric~n ~flairs' ianghor&A.
.Mutlevpublicly urged thai the HouscoiReprescntatives approw the S21.000.000
for "covert activitiës" in and against Nicaragua becausesupporting the mercenary
forces was "the best bargaining chip we have out there". He called the mining
of Nicaragua's ports a "legitimate form of self-defense", and said that the
"mining comes within the menu of pressures brought in order to modify
Nicaraguan behavior". (NYT 5/9/84; WP 5/9/84.)
106. On 22 May 1984, al a Presidential News Conference, President Reagan
called on the House of Representatives to approve "al1elements" of his Central
American program, including the $21,000,000 for the mercenaries, whom he
referred to as "freedom fighters". (Offil ranscript of News Conference by the
President on 22 May 1984,p. 173, infraAnn. C, Attachment 1-5.)On 23 May
1984, senior Administration officiais, including Secretary of State George P.
Shultz, CIA Dircctor WillkamCasey and the Chaiman of the Joint Chiers or
Staff, General John W. Vessey,Jr.. met with approximately 50 members of the
House of Representatives,argued strongly against shutting offaid for the "covert
activities" in Nicaragua, and indicated that the President would veto any
legislalion providing for termination of these activities. (WP 5/24/84.)
107. On 24 May 1984, during a debate on the funding request, Representa-
tive Edward Boland, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,said: WORIAL OF NICARAGUA 27
"The administration refuses to budge. It refuses to take seriously the will
of the mode exoressed in Iwo votes of this House. So, we must vote anain
and demoistratè to the other body [the Senate] our unitinting cornmitment
to end this deadly war." (130 Cong. Rec.H 4796 (24 May 1984), Ann. E,
Attachment 12.)
There wererepeated referencesduring the debate to this Court's Order of 10May
1984 and the need to respect both the Order itself and international law in
general.(See,e.g., 130Cong Rec.H 4798(24 May 1984),Ann. E,Attachment 12.)
At the conclusion of the debate a maioritv of the House of Reoresentatives then
. .
%<itea dgilinrt theAdininistration'i rcquot. and, 25 a ionsequrnrc. ihc SZI.~JO~i.~lOO
\vas not apprupriated Thu,. the Tirsitirnc the Congrcss dcfeÿted a request from
President Rearan for fund. li~rmil~iarqand pararnilitarb acti\'itiesawinst Nici.
ragua was aftër the Court's ordered ikim measures of protection.-
108. The Administration attempted to persuade the House of Representatives
to reconsider. On 25 May 1984, the Press Secrefary to President Reagan, Mr.
Larry Speakes, confirmed the Administration's commitment to obfaining the
$21,000,000supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 1984. In a White House
Press Briefing,MI. Speakes made the following comments:
"Q. How are you going to secure the money for the Contras now?
Mr. Speakes. The Senate has passed - the Senate version of il provides
for $21 million for the Contras.. .. We will work to - with the House in
order to - perhaps they will concur with the Senate either in conference or
ifit goes back to the House for a vote.
Q. So make another effort?
Mr. Speakes. Yes definitely. We think it's important. We think it's essen-
tial... . We'llwork for both. The El Salvador aid is virtually certain and
we'll work for the covert aid." (Official Transcript of Press Briefing by
Larry Speakes, 25 May 1984,p. 7, Ann. C, Attachment 11-7.)
Also on 25 May 1984, United States intelligenceoficials stated that, even without
the appropriation of additional funds by the Congress to continue these activi-
ties, there were suflicient funds availahle from prior appropriations to carry
on the activities until at least 1 October 1984.(WP 5/26/84.) On 29 May 1984,
spokespersons for the Administration reported that the CIA was planning to
keep United States intelligence personnel in operation against Nicaragua until
30 September 1984 (the end of the fiscal year) under existing appropriations
from the Congress, and to continue the "covert activities" beyond that date if
the Administration were successful in persuading the Congress to appropri-
ate a~~~tional funds for fiscal vear 1985. (NYT.5130184..,ince ,he ~ ~ ~ of
Represcntïtivcs would no1 reciinsidcr 11srr.i'u,alto îpproprutc an additicinal
S21.000.O(Xlto the proCramin fiscdl)car IW, the AJrninistr~tio!iturncd 11,attcri-
lion to securing ihe approval of -bath chambers of Congress for an appro-
priation of funds for fiscalyear 1985.
109. On 10 June 1984, a former CIA employee who was responsible for
analysing political and militdry developments in Central America for the CIA,
David C. MacMichael. stated oubliclv that the iustification asserted ~v~ ~e ,
Adininisiration for its "cuvcrt activitirr" Uicarÿgua'r ülleged shipmcni of
arms to irisurgcntsin El Salvador uas not aupport<.J hy 3ny crediblc cvidcncc
Aicording 10 Mr. MacMtr.hael. "the wholc piciurc that the Admlnistrati<inh;is
prcsenied of Salvadorÿn insurgent operations heing plilnned. directcd 2nd sup-
plicd from Ni'iiiiriguais simply no1 truc". Mr Mai.Miihael further statcd thdt28 MILITARYAND PARAM~LITARY ACTIVITLES
"ihe Adminiiiration and ihc CIA have syslenistic~llvmisrcprescnrcd Sicar~guan
iniol\cmeni in the supplv of arnis Io Salvadoran guerrtllas io~ustiiiiicllori in
o\erthrow ihc Ni'varacuÿnCo\,srnment". tNY7 6 11/84. Il'P6 1384 )
110. InJune1984, fhe Srnate look up consideratiob of the piesideni's request
for $28,000,000for military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua in fis-
cal year 1985 (1 October 1984 to 30 September 1985). On 18 June 1984, the
Senate voted to reject a proposed amendment to the Department of Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1985that would have prohibited the use of any
funds - including the $28 million requested by President Reagan - "for the
. .Doseof which would have the eKect of suo~orti.., dir-ctlv or indirectlv, ..
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any group, organizatioi, movement or
individual". In the course of the debate over this amendment, Senator Joseph
Biden, a member of the IntelligenceCommittee, said:
"[Wlhy go through this charade of telling the press, telling the American
.eo..e. that the aid to the Contras is d-siened onlv to disrunt the arms flow
and the reason weare doing this is that because, for example, the tonnage
of arms flow bas douhled - we do not know what the tonnage was in the
first place.
The heckwith al1of that. What you guysare talking about isoverthrowing
the government. If that is our objective let us get about the business of
overthrowing thegovemment, but let us not kid ourselves." (130 Cong. Rec.
S 7516-17(18 June 1984),Ann. E, Attachment 13.)
Senator Edward M. Kennedy stated during the debate:
"There is not a Member of this body who does not understand that the
funding for the Contras is being used to overthrow the Sandinista govern-
ment." (130 Cong. Rec. S 7499-7500,Ann. E, Attachment 13.)
A majority of the Senate then voted against the proposed amendment, and
thereby refused to prohibit funding for the "covert activities"in fiscalyear 1985.
(130 Cong. Rec. S 7517,Ann. E, Attachment 13.)
IIl. On 2 August 1984, the House of Representatives voted against appro-
priation of the $28,000,000 requestedfor fiscal year 1985.Again, there were re-
ferences during the debate to the fact that continued United States support for
these activitiesviolated this Court's Order on interim measures of protection and
international law in general. (See,cg., 130Cong. Rec H 8281 (2 August 1984),
Ann. E, Attachment 14.) During the debate, Represcntative Edward Boland,
Chairman of the House SelectCommittee on Intellicence. stated that the United
States hds prc,moteil an insurgcncyaimmiited to ihcovcrihrow of the Sandinisia
governmeni" (thid, 118269) Although the Pre\ideni'>rcquest uds JeTe~ieJ in
the House of Re~resentativeson 2 Aucust. the ~dministrat~oncontinued to seek
a compromise between the two Housesof ~on~ressthat would provide sufficient
funds to keep the program going throughout fiscal year 1985.(NYT 8/3/84.)
These eKortscontinued during August and September 1984.
112. In addition, President Reagan and membersof hisAdministration actively
encouraged private citizens and organizdtions to provide funds, weapons, sup-
plies, food and training to the mercenary forces. Senior United States officiais
acknowledged that private groups were in fact supplementing United States
support for the mercenaries with shipments of medicine, food and military
uniforms. DefenseDepartment oficials stated that some shipmentswerecollected
and stored at military bases in Maryland, Michigan, Virginia and Mississippi
and then transported free of charge by the United States Air Force and Navy at
the request of President Reagan. (NYT 7/15/84.) MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 29
113. On 1 Seplember 1984, a Hughes 500 helicopter, with a three-man crew
including two private United States citizens, attacked the town of Santa Clara
in northern Nicaragua, killing four children. The helicopter was shot down by
ground fire from Nicaraguan defense forces. All three crew memhers died. The
two United States citizens - Dana H. Parker and James P. Powell III - were
memhers of a private organization, "Civilian Military Assistance",composed of
former members of the United States Armed Forces. Parker was a Captain in
the Special Forces Group of the Alabama National Guard. Civilian Military
Assistance had been formed for the purpose of providing assistance to the
mercenary forces fighting against the Nicaraguan Government. The group sent
money, weapons and supplies to the mercenaries, and some of its members
provided paramilitary training at base camps and accompanied mercenary units
on combat missions inside Nicaragua. (NYT9/6/84; NYT 9/7/84; WP 9/5/84.)
114. After the deaths of Parker and Powell, Civilian Military Assistance
revealed that it had received assistance from the United States Embassies in El
Salvador and Honduras in its efforts to assist the mercenary forces.(NYT9/6/84;
NYT 9/7/84; NYT 9/11/84.) It was also disclosedthat the helicopter flown by
Parker and Powell and three fixed-wingplanes used hy mercenary forces in the
same attack on Santa Clara had been suoolie..bv the ClA. (WP 9/15/84.) The
ihrce planer, iiIri>ckii-equipperl1'1s\va. [lie hcl~<;>~ter),~d bccn ~;~nsrcrred III
.ipcri,i<liiiiour nionih, Croiiiihe ciisioily of ihc Ilnlicd Stiiiei .Airf?or:cICIa
i%>n-sc~rJ ciinr CliieC~of Siarl inii4ll4tton. ihii<ithe C'IA throi.8h 2 Ucl:iii:~rr.
aviation Company(Summit Aviation, lnc.)where they wereoutfittëd with rocket-
launchers, and ultimately to the mercenary forces. (WP 9/15/84; 9/19/84;
NYT 9/19/84.)
115. On IO Seprember1984, State Department spokesman John Hughes said
that after the $21,000,000supplemental appropriation for fiscal YCdr1985was
defeated, the Administration had decidednot to discourage private United States
nationals from supportingthe mercenary forces.(NYT9/11/85.) President Reagan
also stated that he would 'bot want to interfere" with United States nationals
privately helping the mercenaries in Nicaragua. (WP 10/27/84.) With active
encouragement hy the Administration, more than $5,000.000was provided to
the mercenary forces in the last year hy private groups and individuals in
the United States. (WP 4/19/85; WP 4/18/85.) In addition, the Administration
persuaded the Congress to include a provision in the Department of Defense
Authorization Act for 1985 that formallv oermits the Defense Deoartment to
assist such groups hy sending donated sip~lies to Central ~mericaon military
transport. (Ann D, Attachment 6.)
116. On 3 Oclober 1984, the Senate voted in favor of President Reagan's
reouest for %28.000.000for fiscal vear 1985.Durine the debate that oreceded the
fin2 vote, senatoi Barry ~oldwater, chairman of the senate' Intelligence
Committee, and Senator Malcolm Wallop, a member of the committee, made
the following remarks with respect to the responsibility of the United States for
the activities of the CIA in and against Nicaragua:
Senator Goldwater :
"the CIA is like the rest of our intelligence family, a rnemher of the
Government, and they only do what they are told to do ..." (130 Cong.
Rec. S 12865(3 Octoher 1984), Ann. E, Attachment 15).
Senator Wallop :
"[Ils the CIA's role in Nicaragua hurting the CIA . ..?The Senate must
understand that the foreign policy ofthe United States is not made for the30 MILITARY AND PARAMILLTARY ACTIVITIB
convenience ofits executors. They are an am of foreign policy, todo what
thev are told to do.
They are not ginning up. grncrÿting, consacting whai ihcy arc doing in
h'iraragua on ihcir own. u,ithoui direitii>ns from the Kragan admini~tra.
tion Nor did ihcy do ,O in the Carier administraiii>n They arc doing what
they are directedto do because they are an am of ~nited States Foreign
policy."(Ibid.)
Senator Wallop also said, with respect to the purpose of the CIA's activities in
and against Nicaragua :
"1 would hope . ..that we do not give the erroneous impression that we
have fostered the Nicararuan assistance solelvto interdict arms for the war
in El Salvador. That wOuld cheapen bath hur motives and those of the
Nicaraguans freedom figbting. We would thereby say that they are not
people seekingtheir own freedom in their own country at their own sacrifice
with their own blood and their own discomfort and their own miserv: but
thït the) arc merc Iitilr merïcnaries of the UniteStates,off Jiiind business
br El Salviidor. Thÿt w3s nçvcr truc." (lh~<l,
117. The House of Representatives, having voted against the $28,000,000
appropriation on 2 August refused to hold another vote on the matter. However,
in- 10 October 1984 a compromise was reached between the Senate and the
House of Representatives. On that date, both chambers approved the Conference
Repori onIfouse Joint Resolurion648, ContinuingAppropriuliuns.1985, under
which S14,000,000could be spent in fiscal year 1985to support military or para-
military activities in and against Nicaragua, if the President submitted a
report to the Congress after 28 Febmary 1985justifying such an appropriation,
and if both chambers of Congress then voted affirmatively to approve the
appropriation. This measure was signed into law as Public Law 98-473 on
12October 1984.(Ann. D, Attachment 5.)
118. On 9 November1984, President Reagan signed in10 law the Intelligence
Authorization Act for 1985,which appropriated funds to the CIA for al1of its
onerations durine that vear. Because this measure did no1 include the funds he
had requested forkilitaj and paramilitary activitiesagainst Nicaragua, President
Reagan criticized the Congress for not appropriating the funds, stating that
"the necessity ofUnited States support for this program is beyond question.
1 am signing this Act with every expectation that shortly after the next
Congress convenes [in January 19851it will provide adequate support for
programs to assist the development of democracy in Central America."
(Statement lssued on Behalfof President Reagan, Ann. C, Attachment 1-10;
see also WP 11/10/84.)
119. At the same lime, ta "maintain pressure" on Nicaragua, the United
States again deployed naval units oKNicaragua's coasts, conducted provocative
overflightsof Nicaraguan territory and sent substantial numbers of United States
troops to Honduras, near the Nicaraguan border. In November1984, the United
States Navy deployed 25 warships, including the battleship Iowa, off the Atlantic
Coast of Nicaragua. Previously the aircrafi carrier USS John I;.Kennedy, an
80,000-tonwarship carrying 85combat aircraft had patrolled Nicaragua's coasts.
(NYT 7118/84 ; NYT 11/9/84.)
120. For four consecutive days, from 7 ro II November1984, a United States
SR71 reconnaissance plane flew low over several Nicaraguan cities, producing MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 31
loud sonic booms and shattenng glass windows, to exert psychological pressure
on the Nicaraguan Government and population. The United States did not deny
its responsibility or purpose in conducting these overflights.(NYT 11/12/84; WP
11/12/84.) Such overilights have heen conducted on a regular hasis. During the
preceding 10months of 1984alone, 996overflightstook place. (Carrion Affidavit,
Ann. A, Exhibit A, p. 159,infra.)
121. Also in November.a sookesman for the Denartment of Defense. Lt. Col.
Richard L;ike. wid thai I.nitcd Siaie\ militar) pcrwnncl conilucting rnancui,ers
in Ilondiir~o.includcd the ii~lloa~iiig: compdny oi 120engin:crj huildinp rad,
and resurfacine airstri~s: a comn.ny .f 1506180 trooosconductine ~atro-.ine
cxcrcircs ncxr I'slmcrolii; a incdiwl clcarine conipÿny th~i a,oulJ conduit triage
during a iiar: .ipprwimatcl) a Jorsn oficcr> pr<niding comrnlind and i~ntrol"
for ihr. King', Guard natal excrcise\~hcdulcd Io takc ~l~ce in Dcccniher 1064;
an air foreëexercise involving A37 attack planes and 02~ observation planes;
special forces conducting counterinsurgency exercises with Honduran troops;
and army preventive medicine teams. (WP 11/14/84.)The United States Emhassy
in Tegucigalpa announced that there were then 1,300 to 1,500 United States
troops in Honduras. (NYT 11/19/84.)The Defense Department announced that
major military maneuvers would hegin in 1985.(NYT 11/19/84.)
122. The mercenary forces remained active, staging daily attacks inside Nica-
raguan tertitory. Many of these were aimed at disrupting Nicaragua's elections
for President, Vice-President and National Assembly, which were held as
scheduled on 4 November 1984. Election officiaisand candidates were sought out
and either killed or kidnapped. Voter registration files were ransacked and
records were destroyed. ("Attacks by the Nicaraguan 'Contras' on the Civilian
Population of Nicaragua", Report of a Fact-Finding Mission, Septemher
1984-January 1985,Ann. 1,Attachment 2, pp. 98-99; Carrion Affidavit,Ann. A,
Exhibit A, pp. 158.159, infra.) Then, in November and December 1984, in an
effort to cripple the Nicaraguan economy, the mercenary forces staged an all-
out campaign to interrupt the annual coffee harvest on which the country's
economy depends. (Coffee is Nicaragua's leading export commodity.) Coffee
famis were systematically attacked. Productive acreage was set afire, storage
centers and drying Pacilitieswere destroyed and coffee-pickers - unamed and
in civilian dres- werekilled, often in brutal fashion, to frighten offthe laborers
on whom a successful harvest deoended. ISee. e.e.. Brodv Reoort. Ann. 1.
Attachment 2, pp. 1-19.) W . . A. -.
123. On 14 November 1984, for example, a force of approximately 400-600
men attacked the La Sornresd coffee farm. 40 miles north of Mataealna-..illine
17civilians, kidnapping &thers,and destroying most of the co-operative's facc
litie- the coffeeplant, 600 pounds of coffee,coffeepulping equipment, dormi-
tories, houses, offices, the warehouse where food for the workers was stored,
and more. When the mercenaries overran the fam, they killed the wounded
with bayonets, rifle shots, and grenades, according to the sworn statements
of eyewitnesses.(Brody Report, Ann. 1,Attachment 2, pp. 16-19; Carrion Affi-
davit, Ann. A, Exhibit A, p. 158,infra; see also NYT 11/23/84.)
124. On 4 December1984, a force amhushed a truck carrying volunteer coffee-
pickers from the State communications Company (TELCOR) near Telpaneca,
killing 21 civilians. More than 150 mercenaries attacked with machine guns,
rockets, grenades and rifle fire, according to survivors. The attackers climbed
onto the truck, shot or bayoneted the survivors, and then set the truck on fite.
A survivor (who had jumped off the truck and pretended to be dead) attested,
"1 could hear the cries and laments of tbose who were buming alive". (Brody
Report, Ann. 1, Attachment 2, pp. 4-7.)32 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVII'IES
125. On 26 December1984,in testimony hefore the IntelligenceCommittee of
the House of Representatives, CIA officiaisacknowledged that the mercenary
forces had committed atrocities including murder, torture, mutilation, rape and
kidnapping against unarmed civilians as well as Nicaraguan soldiers who were
hors de combar.This was confirmed bv inde~endent investieations of atrocities
committed by the rnercenary forces. on 24 December 19j4, the Council on
Hemispheric Afïairs, a pnvate research group monitoring human rights in Latin
America, issued a reDon condemnine ihe CIA-directed forces as among "the
worst human rights ;iolators2' in ~atin America, responsible for "systkatic
brutality against a civilian population". The report added that the United States
Administration, "[flor its critical role in facilitating the Contra violence ...
must share respousihility as a hemisphenc violator of human rights". According
to the report, since 1981, "over 800 non-comhatants Iiave been killed hy the
contras after capture, and hundreds more havc died as a result of contra
attacks ...". The report added that
"the contras have ... killed, tortured, raped, mutilated and ahducted
hundreds of civilians they suspect of sympathizing with the Sandinistas.
Victimshave included peasants, teachers, doctors and agricultural workers".
(Ann. 1,Attachment 1, see also WP 12/30/84.)
126. Another report, prepared by Reed Brody, a United States lawyer who
spent four months in Nicaragua collecting over 140sworn affidavitsfrom victims
and eyewitnesses, disclosed "a distinct pattern" of abuses by the mercenaries,
including -
". ..attacks on purely civiliantargets resulting in the killingof unarmed men,
women, children and the elderly; premeditated acts of hrutality including
rape, beatings, mutilation and torture; individual and mass kidnapping of
civilians - particularly in the northern Atlantic Coast region - for the
purpose of forced recruitment into the contra forces and the creation of a
hostage refugee population in Honduras; assaults on economic and social
targets such as farms, cooperatives, food storage facilities and health cen-
ters, including a particular effort to disrupt the coffee harvests through
attacks on coffee cooperatives and on vehicles carrying volunteer coffee
harvesters: intimidation of civilians who oarticioate or coouerate in eovern-
ment or community programs such as' distAbution of'suhsidiz2 food
products, education and local self-defense militias; and kidnappi--, i-timi-
dation, and even murder of religious leaders who support the government,
including priests and clergy-trained lay pastors". (Aun. 1, Attachment 2,
pp. iv-v.)
127. A report puhlished jointly by the International Human Rights Law
Groun and Washington OAice in Latin America. two nrivate United States
orgniiirxtion, ihai nyoniror hunian righi, ci>mpli:incc.mde ihc foll<>uingsi;iic-
ment h~,cil on an ini,c,iigüiiic mi\ri<>nihc) icriitu Nici1rxgu3 lnIThrurlry 1985
"The Contras do attack economic targets such as lumber yards, coffee
roce es sineulants. electric"l e~ ~ratine stations and the lik.. .. ,.vl also
attack iniitiduali deemed to he coniributors to the country's economy or
toits defense,such astelephone workers, coffeepickers, teachers, technicians,
and members of the civifian-based militia
Suh.txnii;il crcdihle si,idencc c*irt, ihdi Contra violsncc ir ;ilro JIICCI~J
wiih <onleircquznc) at individultlsuho havc no appJrent cconumv. niililary.
or political significance and against persons who~are hors de combat. It is MEMORIALOF NICARAGUA 33
important to emphasize that these are not persons caught in crossfire
between Contra and Sandinista military units. These are unarmed civilians
who have no connection with hostilities and who have been the targets of
deliberate attack hy Contra units."
The report concluded that -
"any provisionof aidto the Contras, directlyor indirectly,by the government
of the United States would render our government indirectlyresponsible for
their acts" (Ann. 1,Attachment 3, pp.Ï4-15, 22-23).
128. The pattern of abuses descrihed in these reports bas been further sub-
stantiated by investigations conducted by Americas Watch and hy the New
YorkTimesand other newsorganizations. (NYT3J7J85.JLeaders of the mercen-
ary forces themselvesacknowledged that atrocities had been committed. Edgar
Chamorro, a member of the "political directorate" selected by the CIA, said,
"[f)rankly, 1 admit we have killed people in cold blood when we have found
them guilty of crimes. Wedo believein the assassination of tyrants. Some of the
Sandinistas are tyrants in the small villages." (NYT 10/21/84.)Chamorro said,
"in guerrilla war, if you have to exact justice immediately, sometimesyou have
to do it" (WP 10/22/84). (The assassination of Sandinista officialsand others
implemented the instructions in the CIA manual Psychologicu~ Operurionsin
Cuerrillo Wurfure describedsupru; Ann. Ci. C)hamorro stated further that it was
also "cornmon" practice for the mercenary forces to execute their prisoners
(NYT 12/27/84).
129. On 18 Januarv 1985. the United States announced that it would not
appear in any further>roceedings in this case.
130. Beginningin Februury1985, President Reagan and senior United States
officialscommenced a publiccampaign to persuadéthe Congress to appropriate
the $14,000,000 designated in the Continuing Appropriations Act of 1985 for
military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua. In the course of this
campaign, President Reagan and other senior officialspuhlicly stated that the
nuroose of these activities was to hrine about a chanee of eovernment in
Nicaragua. No longer did United States officia isseri thit the Purpose of the
activities was to interdict an alleged flow of anns to rebels in El Salvador or to
carry on "collective self-defense".
131. On 25 Januury 1985, Vice-President George Bush said during a public
address that
"our support for those in Nicaragua who are fighting the communist
Sandinistas must go forward. The world is starting to understand that the
Sandinistas have betrayed their own revolution, and that those called the
contrasare the true champions of freedom and democracy. We must not
abandon the conIrus now." (Oficial Transcript, p. 214, infra, Ann. C,
Attachment 11-8;see also NYT 1/26/85.)
132. On 29 Januury1985, in testimony before the Western Hemisphere Sub-
committee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Repre-
sentatives, Langhorne A. Motley, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs,stated that "Nicaragua's freedomfightersdeservethe solidarity
of the West ..." (Official Transcript, p. 21infru,Ann. C, Attachment 11-9).
Assistant Secretary Motleysaid that the mercenaries shouldnot be "abandoned",
because "the Nicaraguan democratic resistanceclearly has a principled claimon
our support. These are friends who merit our standing with them- and indeed34 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTIES
san bc frustr.itcJ if the) are denicd oiir help." (Otlici,il Trlinsc;ipp. 217-
Zlb ,rjr<rH: also stdt~J thrltil WOUIÙhc a ser ri omi>ta)<e~for the Congrcsi
no[ io continue apprupriating ïunds to the mercenary forces. lNY7 130 85;
Ii'P 7 185 ,
..-133. On 7 Februar 1985i,n an interview with the Wall Stree JtournaP lresi-
dent Reagan was asked t6 explain the purpose of United States support for
the mercenary forces. He replied that the Nicaraguan Government had "hetrayed
the principles that the people of Nicaragua were fighting fo.. What it'sreally
al1about, is getting the revolution the people fought for." (OfficialTranscript,
pp. 180-181,infra, Ann. C, Attachment 1-11.)
134. On IIFebruar 1y982in an interview with the New York TimesP, resident
Reagan was asked what fom United States support to the mercenary forces
would take. He responded: "Well, 1 think what we - 1 still helieve in covert
programs where they're nezessary and where they're desirahle." (OfficialTrans-
cript, p. 182,infrAa,nn. C, Attachment 1-12,)
135. On 16Februar 1y985i,n a radio address to the nation, President Reagan
called upon the Congress to continue appropriating funds for the mercenary
forces, saying,
"These brave men snd women deserve our help. They do not ask for
troops but only for our technical and financial support and supplies. We
cannot turn from thein in their moment of need. To do so would be to
betray our centunes-old dedication to supporting those who struggle for
freedom. This is not oply legal, it's totally consistent with our history."
President Reagan said thiit the United States was supporting "over 15,000
freedom fighters" against tlie Nicaraguan Government, and that:
"Tney'refightingfor an end to tyranny and its only reliahleprod:cmielty.
They are our brothen. How can we ignore them? How can we refusethem
assistancewhen we know that ultimatelytheir fight isour figh...
The freedom fighters are putting pressure on the Sandinistas to change
their ways and live not as communist puppets, but as peaceful democrats.
We must help, Congress must understand that the American people support
the struggle for democracy in Central America. We can Save them as we
were once saved, but only if we act, and now." (OfficialTranscript,Ann. C,
Attachment 1-13.)
136. On 19 Februa1 r9y85,Secretary of State George P. Shultz, testifying
hefore the House of Representatives Foreign AKairs Committee, said the United
States has "a moral duty" to aid the mercenaries in Nicaragua. He stated,
"what we have in Nicaragua is a government that's a had-news govemment.
Now, how can that get changed? We'd like to see them change. But they
don't seem inclined to do so. So we have followed these alternatives and we
will continue to follow these alternatives." (WP 2/20/85; NYT 2/20/85.)
137. On 21Februarv 19in 85a.nationallv televised news conference, Presi-
Jenr Rragiin ünnouncid thnt the llnited ~tite, na, attcnipting IO renio\c the
Nic;ir.igwn Gi~\,crnnicnt anJ uould cuntinuc to do so unIr.$, the Ui~drdguan
Go\erninsnt chanceil itr gwlr anil ;illoweJ the "ireedom tirhrcri" into the Go-
vernment. When Lsked Ghat he meant by removal of the Nicarapan Govem-
ment, President Reagan replied: "Well, removed in the sense of the present
structure, in which it is a Communist totalitarian state, and its nota govem-
ment chosen hy the people." He was asked if that meant he was advocating
the overthrow of the Government. He responded 'bot if the present government MEMORlALOF NICARAGUA 35
would turn around and sav al1 riaht. if thev.sav.'Uncle"'. President Reaaan
again appealed Io the congr& Io continueappropriating funds for the merceniry
forces.(OfficialTranscnp~, ~. 185,infa,Ann. C, Attachment 1-14; WP2/22/85;
Tirne 3/4/85.)
138. On 27 Februarv 1985. General Paul F. Gorman. retirine commander of
the United States ~ouihern fornmand, headquartered in panaGa and including
al1United States forces in Central America. testified before the Senate Armed
ServicesCommittee that suooort for the mercenaries should be resumed. alone
u,iih other mc;isures, to Leep up cconomic 2nd polltii<ilprerrurc hccausc "the
Sandinirtas rnusi he hritught iLIreckiining". (Prcp~reilSratcmcnt. p 219,»,Jiu.
Ann C. Attachnient 11-1II Ilc told the commitiee ihat \i,ithoui a renc\val of
continued support from the~nited States "the campaign will begin to peler out,
Weardown" (NYT 2/28/85).
139. On 28 February 1985, Vice-President Bush,in a speech to the Council
on Foreign Aîiairs in Austin, Texas, repeated the Administration's cal1to the
Congress for funding, appealing for the release of "a few dollars" Io make
possible "technical, material and financial support" for the mercenaries. (Official
Transcript, p. 221,infi,Ann. C, Attachment 11-12.)
140. In February andMarch 1985, United States military forces commenced
the larges1ground and air maneuvers ever conducted by United States forces in
Central America. In February, the "Ahuas Tara (or Big Pine) III" maneuvers
began, involving 4,500 United States troops and significant military matériel,
including tanks. UnitedStates troops operated as closeas 5 kilometers from the
Nicaraguan border. Otficial United States spokesmen said that the maneuvers
would las1 approximately three months. (WP 1/29/85.) In March, Defense
Department spokesmen announced that the United States was sending 6,600
additional troops to Honduras Io participate in the "Universal Trek '85"
maneuvers. These were to las1 approximately two weeks and were to include
amohibious landines with suooort from attack helicooters and euided missile
shibs.(WP 3/22/85; NYT 3127j85.)
141. On 1 Morch 1985, in an address to the Conservative Political Action
Conference in Washington, D.C., President Reagan said of the mercenary forces:
"They are our hrothers, these freedom fighters, and we owe them our
help. I'vespoken recently of the freedom fighters of Nicaragua. You know
the truth about them. You know who they're fighting and why. They are
the moral equal of our Founding Fathers, and the brave men and women
of the French Resistance. We cannot turn away from them.. ..
Al1they need isour support ... And they need to know that the United
States supports them with more than just pretty words and good wishes."
(Otiicial Transcript, p. 4, Ann. C, Attachment 1-15;see also NYT 3/2/85;
WP 3/2/85.)
142. On II Murch 1985. in an interview with BusinessWeek maeazine. Pre-
sident Reagan was asked how he couldjustify "helping to overthro; a g&ern-
ment merely because we don't like its political coloration". He replied:
"Well. thev cal1themselves a -overnment.. . .1 think we have to ienore
thir pretensc ol'an elsciit>nthe) just held. T1,sneta government. Thi, 1s
a 1';iitionof ihc rei,oluiion ihsi h2.i iaken o31 the point of3 $un And
under ihe United U.iric>nsCh.iricr and ihc Chxrtcr or the Oraani/ltion of
American States, there is every reason for us Io bc helping th: people that
want the original goals of the revolution institute(Business Wee k111/85,
p. 69, Ann. C, Attachment 1-16;see also WP 3/5/85.)36 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
143. On 30 March 1985, in a radio address 10 the nation, President Reagan
again stated :
"United States support for the freedom fighters is morally right and in-
timately linked to Our own security. If we refuse to help their jus1 cause,
if we pull the plug and allow the freedom fighters Io he wiped out by the
same helicopter gunships the Soviets are using 10 murder thousands
of Afghans, then Our ultimate price to protect peace, freedom, and Our
way of life will he dear indeed." (Official Transcnpt, p. 186, infra,Ann. C,
Attachment I-17.)
144. On 1 April 1985, in an interview with the Washington Post, President
Reagan said :
"And so 1 think as long as the people of Nicaragua are still striving for
the goals of the revolution that they themselves fought, 1think that we're
ohligated to try and lend them a hand." (Official Transcript, p. 187, infra,
Ann. C, Attachment 1-18.)
145. On 3 April 1985, President Reagan submitted to the Congress a formal
request for the appropriation of $14,000,000 for military and pardmilitary
activities against Nicaragua in fiscal year 1985 and a report setting forth his
'~ustification" for the request - as required by the Continuing Appropriations
Act for 1985, Public Law 98-473. (See supra, para. 117.) This report, entitled
U.S. Supportfor theDemocraticResistanceMovement in Nicaragua consisted of
22oaees. 16of which were made ~ubiicand constitute Annex C.Attachment 111-5.
. u ,
The report stated that the $14,000,000 would he used to finance military and
paramilitary activities against Nicaragua for the purpose of pressuring the
Nicaraeuan Government to make far-reachinr chanres in ils own structure and
in the Tnternal Nicaraguan political system. The report called for "resumption
of aid to the Nicaraguan armed resistance al levels sufficient Io create real
pressure on the Government of Nicaragua" (NYT 4/17/85). The non-public
portion of the report specificallyadded, at this very point, "20,000 to 25,000-man
insurgent force in the north and 5,000 to 10,000-man force in the south" (NYT
4/17/85). The report also called for "additional military and naval exercises", as
part of a "continuation of strong pressure on the Sandinistas". (Report, p. 236,
infra, Ann. C, Attachment 111-5.)
146. The stated purpose was "to increase their [Le. the mercenary forces'] size
and effectiveness to the point where their pressure convinces the Sandinista
leadership that it has no alternative Io" (among other United States demands):
"acceptance of the March I Peace Proposala ... and establishment of a
legitimately pluralistic democratic political structure. ..."
147. President Reaean's reoort to the Coneress also warned that "direct av-
plication of US milits force'... mus1 realist~callybe recognized as an eventthl
option, given our stakes in the region, if other policy alternatives fail" (NYT
The "March IPeaceProoosal"demanded: invalidationof the Nicaraeuanclections
of Ko\rrnhrr 1984.dim<>l.tito nf(hi.\:ilional ,\,rembl. holdtngof nrw ';nirrnaiiun~II)
s~pcwid" ïlciiiun, lur lhc criablishmeniof x neu n~itunalIcgirl~iur~..hi;h uuuld
i- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~ ~ ~-~ ~~~~~~ ~ ~ni. I>antelOrire.!Saardri. and ilrVici-Prrridcni.
SergioRamirezMercado(both clectcdin ~ovembe;l984) couldcontinueto hold officej
disbanding of al1 neighborhood Sandinistapany committees,and other changes that
would, in eKect,dismantle the NicaraguanGovcmment and complctclyreorganizethe
interna1Nicaraguanpoliticalsystem. (WP 4/5/85;Ann. C,Attachment111-5p ..232,infro.) 148. On 4 Aoril 1985. President Reaean- - as an inducement to the Con-
mess to approve his request for the $14,000,000- proposed that the assistanceto
the mercenaries be "used for food. clothing and medicine and other support
for survival", and not directly for arms or ammunition, if the ~icaraguan
Government would negotiate an agreement with the mercenary forces within 60
days, based on the "March I Peace Proposal" put forth by mercenary leaders.
(Officia1Transcript, p. 188, Nlfra,Ann. C, Attachment 1-19.)President Reagan
explained that if the Nicaraguan Government refused to agree to those terms
within the 60-day period, he would remove the restrictions on the use of the
funds. (Ihid, p. 189,infra.) During a question and answer sessionwithjournalists
about President Reagan'sproposal, the following exchange took place:
"Q. MI. President, you've made it plain that the $14 million, you think,
is essential. But if Congress should turn you down, would you look for
some other avenues to help the Contras, some other way to continue your
desire to see a restructuring of the Nicaraguan government?
The President. We're not going to quit and walk away from them, no
matter what happens." (Official Transcript, pp. 188, 190, infra, Ann. C,
Attachment 1-19.)
149. The Nicaraguan Government rejected President Reagan's ultimatum as
unlawful intervention in Nicaragua's internal affairs. The President of the
Repuhlic of Colomhia, Mr. Belisario Betancur, after receiving from President
Reagan the United States proposal to the Nicaraguan Government, said it was
"a preparation for war". Mr. Betancur said,
"any foreign support to guerrilla groups, whatever the origin, is clearly in
opposition to the prevailing doctrine in Latin America regarding foreign
intervention in the internal affairs of Ourcontinent" (NYT4/16/85).
1511On 23 April /%>S.ihc SenciteWICJin i'd\or i~iPrc>ideniKtdgan's rcqucsi
for S14,01~0.iJliiir ihr'nierisii.iry L>IL.n fisi~l yciir 1985.The nc\i i1.iy.the
House of Representatives voted against the request; the proposa1 supported by
President Reagan lost, on the most critical vote, hy a margin of only two votes:
215-213. After the vote, President Reagan stated that he would "return to the
Congress again and again" until the $14,000,000for the mercenary forces was
approved. President Reagan has also requested an additional S28,000,000for the
mercenary forces in fiscal year 1986.The Congress is expected to vote on that
request in Septemher 1985.(WP 4/25/85.)
151. As a result of the United States military and paramilitary activities,
described above, Nicaragua has suffered three separate types of injury for which
it seekscompensation:
(i) Thekilling,womding,andkidnappingof Nicaraguannafionals,lossofproperty,
and disturbance ofpossession ofproperiy
As of 31 December 1984.a total of 2.638Nicaraeuan nationals were killedby
military and paramilitary activitiesconducted by the United States. Following Ls
a year-by-year breakdown of the number killed:38 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
The names of the victimsare set forth in Annex L.Nicaragua seekscompensation
as parenspatriae for its deceased and injured nationdls, including those killed
or injured after 31 December 1984,whose names will be provided to the Court.
Nicaraeua has not vet calculated thecom~ensationto which it isentitled for these
wrong< but will iresent the specific amount claimed, together with suppor-
ting evidence. in due course. Such amounts will also include losses of property
and losses arising from disturbance in the possession of farms and oiher-pro-
perty.
(ii)Directphysicaldamageto materials, capitalequipment and production
As of 31 December 1984,the damage caused by the United States military
and paramilitary activities amounted to $378,200,000.The year-by-year break-
down is as follows (in millionsof dollars):
Damageto Materials Damageto
and Capital Equipment Production Tora1
1981 3.9 3.4 7.3
Nicaragua will present in due course a detailed breakdown of the direct phy-
sical damage to materials, capital equipment and production during the period
1981-1984,as wellas a complete descriptionof the methodologyemployedin ascer-
taining the damage and calculating its cost. Because the military and paramili-
tary activities against Nicaragua have continued beyond 31 December 1984 -
and are continuine as of the filine of this Memorial - Nicaraeua reserves the
right to seek addzional compen&tion for damage caused aft; 31 December
1984,and to present evidence in support of such claim.
(iii)Consequeniiad l amageIo lhe Nicaraguaneconomy
It is evident that the unlawful activities of the United States have had severe
conseauences for Nicarazua's economic and social develo~ment. For examrile.
huma; and material res&rces have been diverted from ecbnomic development
to the ovemding requirement of defense. Forty per cent of Nicaragua's public
- ~
expenditures are now devoted to this ouroose. Materials and equivment needed
fo; development have beendestroyed and replacementsare unavàilable. Shortages
of key materials have developed. Farmers, other individual producers, artisans,
teachers, and other skilled personnel have been killed.The economic infrastruc-
ture has been seriouslyweakened.Nicaragua reservesthe right to present evidence
on the amount of these consequential damages at an appropriate time, to he
determined by the Court. CHAPTER 11
THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE BEFORE
THE COURT
Section 1.Purpose of this Chapter
152. The purpose of the present Chapter is to review, as succinctly as possible,
certain issues concerning the forms and methods of proof presented hy the
evidential settings of the proceedings on the merits. The aim is to assist the Court
hy means of an examination of particular aspects of the substantial body of
evidence presented in Chapter 1.
Section II. The hovisions of Article53 ofthe Statute
153. The United States has expressed ils intention not to appear in the present
proceeding. On 22 January 1985,the President of the Court received the Agent
of Nicaragua, who informed the President that his Government maintained its
Application and availed itself of the rights provided for in Article 53. Con-
sequently the provisions of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court are appli-
cable. By Order of the same date, the President fixed the date of 30 April 1985
for the delivery of the Nicaraguan Memorial on the ments, and 31 May 1985for
deliverv of the United States Counter-Memorial. Against this background the
~~~licant State intends to use its hest endeavon to aisist the Court by the prac-
tical means available 10 it.
154. The first such practical means is to furnish al1 the evidence available,
together with the relevant legal argument. The second practical means is respect-
fully to cal1 to the Court's attention the ohservations which were made on
previous occasions involving the application of Article 53 of the Statute.
155. In the FisheriesJurisdiction(United Kingdomv. Iceland) case (LCJ. Re-
ports 1974, p. 3). the Court made the following observations on matters of evi-
dence :
"15. The Court is thus confronted with the situation contemplated by
Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Statute that 'Whenever one of the parties
does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend its case, the other party
may cal1upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim'. Paragraph 2 of
that Article, however, also provides: 'The Court must, hefore doing so,
satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36
and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law.'
16. The present case tums essentially on questions of intemational law,
and the facts reauirine the Court's consideration in adiudicatinn uDon the
Applicant's claii eithrr are not in dispute or are attesied by dicumentary
evidence. Such evidence emanates in part from the Government of Iceland,
and has not heen specificallycontested, and there does not appear to be any
reason to douht ils accuracy. The Government of Iceland, it is true, declared
in its above-mentioned letter of 11 January 1974 that 'it did not accept or
acquiesce in any of the statements of facr or allegations or contentions of
law contained in the Memorials of the Parties concerned' (,mo.asis added).
But such a general declaration of non-acceptance and non acquiescence
cannot suffice to hring into question facts which appear to be established
by documentary evideice, nir can it change the position of the applicant MEMORlAL OF NICARAGUA 41
circumstances of the case the United States has had to rely on newspaper,
radio, and televisionreports for a number ofthe facts stated in the Memorial,
the high official concerned certifies that to the hest of his knowledge and
belief the facts there stated are true. In addition, after the filing of the
Memonal, and by leave of the Court, a large quantity of further documents
of a similar kind to those already presented were submitted by the United
States for the purpose of bringing up to date the Court's information
concerning the continuing situation in regard to the occupation of the
Embassy and the detention of the hostages.
13. The result is that the Court has available to it a massive body of
information from various sources concerning the facts and circumstances of
the present case, including numerous officialstatements of both lranian and
.Jnite~~~~-~~~~~uthorities. So far as new..aoer, radio and television reports
emanating from Iran are concerned, the Court has necessarily in some cases
relied on translations into English supplied hy the Applicant. The infor-
mation available. however. is bhollv consistent and concordant as to the
m:iin Tiicis;inJ iircumsianccr of the iiisc. This inljrmation. IIFwell as the
United Siatcs Mcmorial and the records 01'the oral pr<)ceedings.has aII
bccnr.ummuniciited bs the Couri io the Innian Govcrnmeni withoui h;iviny
evoked from that Goiernment any denial or questioning of the facts alleged
before the Court hy the United States. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied
that, within the meaning of Article 53 of the Statute, the allegations of fact
on which the United States bases its claims in the case are well founded."
(ICJ Reports 1980,pp. 9-10.)
158. In order to assist the Court in the discharge of its dulies Nicaragua has
provided in this case "a massive body of information from various sources"
including statements of the President of the United States and senior United
States officiais,statements and reports of Congress, and United States legislation
and newspaper and radio accounts, al1 of which is likewise "consistent and
concordant as to the main facts and circumstances of the case". In the following
paragraphs, Nicaragua presents certain aspects of this available evidence that
are of particular significance.
Section III. Express Admissionsof Responsibilityon the Part of the Government
of the UnitedStates
A. The Legul Busisof Admissihility rfEvidencein the Form ofAdmis.sions of
GovernmentO~ciuls
159. A notable feature of the actions and policies of the United States
Government in the relevant period has heen the seriesof public statements which
expressly recognize the responsibility of the United States for hostile acts aimed
at the territory of Nicaragua, ils government and ils people. In particular, such
statements have been made by President Reagan. The purpose of this portion of
the Memorial is to present the evidence of express admissions hy responsible
agents of the United States Executive, to indicate the admissibility of such evi-
dence in the context of public international law, and to examine the diferent
ways in which such evidence is relevant in the present proceedings.
160. The basic concepts and principles ofthe law of evidenceform part of the
"general principlesof law" to which referenceis made in Article 38 of the Statute
of the Court. The admissibility and relevance of express and implied admis-
sions is widely recognized in the literature of common law countries. Thus the
great classic of the Anglo-American law of evidence, Wigmore, states that "the42 MlLlTARY AND PAFXMILITARY ACTlVITlES
statements made out of court hy a party-opponent are universally deemed ad-
missible. when offeredarainst him" (Evidence. 1972. Vol. 4. oara. 1048). The
rcleianic uiadmis,ions ~.rrdigni/?d dlsoin ihs le~&ii~trig1i~li,iuthorit;es In
(~UJJ i>,l:i.riiv»<~t.isiiaicd thai "a pari)', riaicmrnir ad\er\s 10 his iare are
received as evidence of the truth of their contents in civil and criminal pro-
ceedings" (Crosson Evidence,1979,p. 518). (See also PhipsononEvidence,1982,
paras. 19-01to 19-23.)
161. The materials of public international law refer to the relevance of ad-
missions. (See Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International
Courts and Tribunais,1953,pp. 141-147; Aerial Incident of27 July 1955 (Israel
v. Bulgaria: UnitedStates of Americav. Bulgaria; UnitedKingdom v. Bulgaria),
I.C.J.Pleodings1959,Memorial of Israel,p. 45, at pp. 99-100,paras. 89-91.)How-
ever, a number of authoritative writers employ the category of "recognition",
which is applicable to the recognition both of facts in the simple sense and of
situations, including legnisituations. (See Suy, Les actesjuridiques unilatéraue xn
droit internationalpublic,1962,pp. 202-206; Rousseau, Droit internationalpublic,
1971,Vol. 1,p. 426, para. 344.)
162. In any case it is completely normal for international tribunals to give
evidential weight to the statements of government officiais and many examples
exist. (Seethe CorfuChannelcase(Merits) ,1,CL Reports 1949,p. 4, al pp. 18-19 ;
Minquiersand Ecrehoscase (FrancelUnitedKingdom), 1.CJ Reports 1953,p. 47,
al pp. 71-72; FisheriesJurisdictioncase (United Kingdom v. Iceland) (Merits),
I.C.J. Reports 1974,p. 3, at pp. 28-29, para. 65; case concerning UnitedStates
Diplomatic and ConsularStaff in Tehran(United States v. Iran), 1.CJ. Reports
1980, p. 3, at pp.9-10, para. 12; p. 17,para. 27.)
163. The decision of the Court in the NuclearTestscases (Australia v.France)
(Judgment,I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253), is of particular significancefor present
purposes. In those cases the Court held that a statement made in public hy the
French President, with the intention to be hound, had the character of a legal
undertaking. (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 267, para. 43.) The key passages in the
Judgment are as follows:
"49. Of the statements by the French Government now before the Court,
the most essential are clearly those made by the President of the Repuhlic.
There can be no douht, in view of his functions, that his public communi-
cations or statements, oral or written, as Head of State, are in international
relations acts of the French State. His statements, and those of members of
the French Government acting under his authority, up to the last statement
made by the Minister of Defence (of 11Octoher 1974),constitute a whole.
Thus, in whatever form these statements were expressed, they must he held
to constitute an engagement of the State, having regard to their intention
and to the circumstances in which they were made.
50. The dateral statementsof the Frenchauthoritieswerede outsidethe
Court. ouhliclvand ereaomnes.eventhoueh the firstof themwascommunicated
to the Govemment of Australia As wgobserved above, to have legal effect,
therewas no need for thesestatments to be addressedto a particularState,nor
wasacceptancebyanyotherStaterequired. The generalndtuÏeandcharacteristics
of th= statementsare decisivefor the evaluationof the legalimplications,and
it is to the interpretation of the statementsthat the Court mut now proceed.
The Court is entitled to presume,at the outset, that these Statementswerenot
made in van«>,but in relationto the testswhichwnstitute the veryobjectof the
present prweediigs, although France has not appeared in the case." (Ibid,
pp. 269-270.)44 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVLTIBS
oil depot, is it proper for the CIA to he involved in planning such attacks
and supplying equipment for air raids? And do the Amencan people have
a right to he informed about any CIA role?
ThePresidenr. 1think covert actions have been a part of government and
a part of government's responsihilities for as long as there has heen a
government. I'm not going to comment on what, if any, connection such
activities might have had with what has been going on, or with some of the
specificoperations down there.
But 1do believein the right of a country when it believesthat its interests
are hest served to practice covert activity and then, while your people may
have a right to know, you can't let your people know without letting the
wrong people know, those that are in opposition to what you're doing."
(OfficialTranscript, pp. 169-170,infra,Ann. C, Attachment 1-2.)
168. The nature of the question addressed to President Reagan is to be noted.
It refers to a specificsubject-matter, and to a specificsource of the attack, and
there is no indication of a justification for the action. His reaction is one of
substantial approval. No denial of the CIA connection is forthcoming. Indeed,
he shows no surprise, and is evidently possessed ofprior knowledge of "the
specificoperations down there".
169. As will he shown in detail in suhsequent chapters of this Memorial the
attack on the oil installations al Corinto involved breaches of a number of the
treatv oblieations of the United States and also hreaches of customaw inter-
n;ition;ilIüu rulei r-latin$ hoih in the uic ni ii>rcchv Stxt:> 2nd to thc prinsiple
oinon-intrrirnti<)n. \l<ireovcr, the iicti,xi ;onrtitutcd a breach of intcrn;iiion;il
law in ihat iiin\ol\rJ iniurint citii.r.ni>i bir~rtzuli wiihout any IxwiuI iu>ti-
fication, and was a seriois violation of the soverGgnty and territorial intëgrity
of Nicaragua.
170. The Presidential statement of 19 Octoher 1984,referred to above, is but
a part of a series, an entire pattern, of statements made by the President and by
other officiaisspeaking deliherately "on the record.
171. At a previous White House press conference on 5 May 1983,President
Reagan had made a series of statements concerning the overall direction and
sources of support for intervention within Nicaragua using guerrillas as the
agents for such intervention.
"-. Mr. President. can 1follow UD on somethine -.u said earlier? Did 1
understand you to say that if you were forcedto stop aid Io the Nicaraguan
.uerrillas, that you would try to funnel through other countries?
ThePresident. No, 1was sayingthat's what the Committee said, that the
Committee said we would have to go overt, and, then, in going overt, you
can only give the money to another government. And, if you did that, then
you would haveto be depending on - well,mayhe those other governments
in Central America would give that money to the freedom fighters in Nica-
ragua.
Now, if they want to tell us that we can give money and do the same
things we've heen doing - money, giving, providing suhsistence and so
forth to these people directly and making il overt instead of covert - that's
al1right with me. 1just don't want the restrictions put on il that they might
put on.
Q. You'd he willingto accept the idea of overt aid to the anti-Sandinista
guerrillas in Nicaragua?
The Presidenr. Yes, but not if they do it as one individual or more than MEMORLAL OF NICARAGUA 45
one, as suggested on the Hill - that they would do it and, then, we would
have to enforce restrictions on the freedom fighters as to what tactics they
could use.
And 1 have said that if we were to do that, then 1 would expect that
the onlv fair thine would he that the Nicaraeua-.eovernment would itself
impu,e ihc xime rcstriciion.; oii the lrecddrn tighicrr in CI Sal\&J\~r.uni? I
don'i csll ihcm frccdoni fiphiers bccüu>cihc)'~ irccd.im snd th:y'rc
fightiiig for siimcrhing cl\c. Thcy'rc lighiing ioa rcriraini on frecdiim.
Q. Can 1just - All of a sudden now we're aiding freedom fighters. 1
thought we werejust interdicting supplies into -
The President 1just used the word, 1guess, 'freedom fighters' hecause
the fact that we know that the thing that hrought those people together is
the desire, as 1 said, for the same revolutionary principles that they once
fought and have heen betrayed in. As 1Say,they have made it plain. They
want what they fought heside the Sandinistas to get. And they have heen
hetrayed. And 1 thought that the use of freedom fighters was hecause - 1
found that it seems as if there is a kind of a hias in the treatment of guerrilla
fighters. It depends on what kind of a government they are opposing. And
some are treated more kindly than others.
Now, 1think the ones in El Salvador who are fighting against an elected
government, they are guerrillas. But inreality, when wetalk about Nicaragua
and evervone savs. 'the eovernment in Nicaragua'. well.it wasa eovernment
out of thebarrer of a gui. Wedid not lift a hid for the existing government
of Nicararua, because wedid not believethat it was treatingthe people fairly.
And here was a revolution that took place that seemed-to express al1the
things we al1believe in. Well now, they have not carried out those things.
And they are there by force. And what really - other than heing in control
of the cavital, vou mirht sav, and havine a handle on al1the levers - what
nukes iheni ai;)more; le~iiimxicgovcrnmcnt ihan Ihc people oi iiiafdgua
iihi, arc ciskingfor;ichditce to soie for the kind .iig<>virnmcntthe) \\an1 !
The Press. Thank you, Mr. President." (OfficialTranscript, pp. 168-169,
infra,Ann. C, Attachment 1-1.)
172. These exchanges between the President and the press on 5 May 1983
involve a series of admissions that the United States was habitually and syste-
matically giving aid to mercenaries carrying out military operations against
the Government of Nicaragua. The element of dehate in the exchange is related
to the modalities of such aid and not to the fact of its happening or the aims
hehind the policy of giving such aid. Of particular evidential significanceis the
following question and answer:
"Q. You'd be willingto accept the idea of overt aid to the anti-Sandinista
guerrillas in Nicaragua?
The President. Yes, but not if they do it as one individual or more than
one, as suggested on the Hill - that they would do it and, then, we would
have to enforce restrictions on the freedom fighters as Io what tactics they
could use." (Ibid., pp. 168-169,infra.)
173. The general context supportsthe viewthat the President acceptsresponsi-
hility for aid to the guerrillas in Nicaragua on the existing "covert" basis, and is
also willing to move on to the giving of "overt" aid. The particular significance
of the President's replylies in the fact that it is accepted that the United States
has the means to "enforce restrictions" on the tactics of the guerrillas in46 MlLlTARYAND PARAMlLlTARY ACTlVlTlES
Nicaragua. Restrictions can only he "enforced" if there is a situation involving
the elements of direction and control.
174. In an interview given in the White House on 28 March 1984 President
Reagan used languagewhich clearlyindicated that the United States wasassisting
those who were, in the phrasing of the question to which the President was
responding, "seeking to overthrow a government that we have diplomatic
relations with". The President's reolv makes no attemDt to denv the facts -
neither the fact of giving assistance io the guerrillas nor the factSofhaving the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua. His reply includes the
followingpassage :
"And 1seeno dichotomv inour su~oortine the eovernment. the democratic
government of El ~alvad~r.and the'contrachereu- and we';e made it plain
to Nicaragua - made it very plain that this will stop when they keep their
promise and restore democratic rule. And have elections. Now, they've
finallv been oressured. the oressure's ledto them savine thev'll have an
electcon. 1 th'inkthey'& schéduledit for next ~ovekhe; BU;, there isn't
anything yet to indicate that that election will he anything but the kind of
ruhher-stamp that we see in any totalitarian government. How do you
have - there aren't rival candidates, there aren't any rival parties, and how
would they campaign without a free press?'(Official Transcript, p. 171,
infra,Ann. C, Attachment 1-4.)
175. This passage, taken with the remainder of the reply, is an unequivocal
and, indeed, forceful,confirmation of the fact that the United States Government
is the controlling agent hehind the insurgency. The mercenaries are presented as
an instrument of United States policy.When the aims of that policy are achieved,
then, in the words of President Reagan, "this will stop".
176. This series of official Presidential admissions culminated in the period
during which the present Memorial was under preparation. President Reagan, in
addition to admitting United States responsihility for mercenary activities, gave
clear evidenceofthe purpose, hoth past and present, of United States involvement
with the mercenaries. In a series of public statements he reaffirmedthe adminis-
tration's policy of giving active support and assistance to the forces attacking
Nicaragua. (See generally, Statement of Facts, paras. 133-150,and in particular
the 11 February 1985 Interview with the New YorkTimes, OfficialTranscript,
Ann. C, Attachment 1-12;Radio Addressof 16Fehruary 1985,OfficialTranscript,
Ann. C, Attachment 1-13; News Conference of 21 Fehruary 1985,OfficialTran-
script, p. 184, infra, Ann. C, Attachment 1-14,) The questions and answers
appearing on the officialtranscript of the News Conference on 21 February 1985
are of particular significance.
"Q. Mr. President, on Capitol Hill - on Capitol Hill the other day,
Secretary Shultz suggested that a goal of your policy now is to remove the
Sandinista government in Nicaragua. 1sthat your goal?
The President. Well, removed in the sense of its present stmcture, in
which it is a communist totalitarian State,and it is not a government chosen
by the people. So, you wonder sometimes about those who make such
claims as to its legitimacy. We believejust as 1said Saturday morning, that
we have an obligation to he of help where we can to freedom fighters and
Iovers of freedom and democracy, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua and
wherever there are people of that kind who are striving for that freedom.
And we'regoing to try to persuade the Congress that we can legitimately
go fonvard and hopefully go forward on a multi-year basis with the Scoop MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 47
Jackson plan for trying to bring development and help to al1 of Central
Amenca.
Q. Weil, Sir, when you say remove it in the sense of ils present structure,
aren't you saying that you advocate the overthrow of the present government
of Nicaragua?
Ihr Prrs~iknr Well. \i,hat I'm s~yingis thiit this prrxcnt governniçntna\
an clcnicnt of the re\,iiluiii;iaaiiiSomols. The CrccJonitiphterr ore other
elements of that revolution. id once victoni was attained.ihe Sandinistas
did what Castro had done, prior to their tike, in Cuba. Shey ousted and
managed to rid themselves of the other elements of the revolution and
violated their own promise to the Organization of American States, and as
a result of which they had received support from the Organization, that
they were - their revolutionary goal was for democracy, free press, free
speech, free labor unions, and elections, and so forth, and they have vio-
lated that.
And the people that are fighting them, the freedom fighters opposing
them, are Nicaraguan people who want the goals of the revolution restored.
And we'regoingto try to~help.
Q. 1sthe answer yes, Sir? 1sthe answer yes, then?
The Presidenr.To what?
Q. To the question, aren't you advocating the overthrow of the present
government? If -
The Presidenr.Nol if the present -
Q. - you substitute another form of what you say was the revolution?
The Presidenr.Not if the present government would turn around and Say,
al1right, ifthey'd Say,'Uncle'.Al1right, come on back into the revolutionary
government and let's straighten this out and institute the goals.
***
Q. Mr. President, 1wonder if we might return to Nicaragua. In answer
to Sam'squestion when he pressedyou, you said that you- or you seemed
to be saying that you wouldn't advocate the overthrow of the government,
not if the present government would turn around and Say, 'Uncle'. Well,
aren't you really saying that you want the present government out, and
secondly, Sir, should the United States be trying to influencea government
of another nation in this hemisphere?
The Presidenr.1 think what we're doing and what we have proposed
doing is within the UN Charter and within the OAS Charter and the right
of the people to do what the freedom fighters are doing. And it is - you
can Say - il's like saying, '1sthe glass half full or half empty?' Youcan
say we're trying to oust the Sandinistas by what we're saying.
We'resaying we'retrying to give those who fought a revolution to escape
a dictatorship, to have democracy, and then had it taken away from them
hy some of their fellow revolutionanes - we're saying we want them to
have a chance to have that democracy that they fought for. And 1 don't
think the Sandinistas have a decent leg to stand on.
What they have done is totalitarian. It is bmtal, cmel. And they have no
argument against what the rest of the people in Nicaragua want.
Q. Weil, Sir, what about the specific prohibitions by the United States48 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
Congress against the kind of conduct which would overthrow their govern-
ment or provide money to do su.
The Presidenr. The - what?
Q. I'm referringto the Boland Amendment, Sir. The specificprohibitions
of the Congress.
The President. 1 think that some of the proposais that have heen made
in Congress have lacked a complete understanding of what is at stake there
and what we're trying to do." (OfficialTranscript, pp. 184-185,infra,Ann. C,
Attachment 1-14.)
177. Major admissions and assertions hy President Reagan have continued
up to the time of suhmitting the present Memorial. In a series of speeches
and interviews, he has reiterated his Administration's policy of providing active
support for the mercenaries. (SeeAddress to Conservative Political Action Com-
mittee, 1March 1985,OfficialTranscript, p. 185,infra,Ann. C, Attachment 1-15;
interview with Business Week, II March 1985,p. 69, Ann. C, Attachment 1-16;
Radio Address to the Nation, 30 March 1985, Ann. C, Attachment 1-17,) On
4 April 1985, at a press conference in the White House, President Reagan put
forward what he termed "a peace proposal" that hy itself is an admission both
of United States control of the guerrillas and the purposes for which they are
used. He said :
"l'm callinz uoon hoth sides to lav down their arms and accevt the offer
of church-mziaied talks on interna<onally supervised electionsand an end
to the repression now in place against the Church, the press and individual
rights.
To members of the Democratic Resistance, 1 ask them tu extend their
offer of a cease-fire until lune 1st.
Tu the Congress, 1 ask for immediate release of the $14 million already
appropriated. While the cease-fireofir is on the table, 1pledge these funds
will not be used for arms or munitions. The funds will be used for food,
clothing, medicine and other support for survival. The Democratic oppo-
sition cannot be a partner in negotiations without these basic necessities.
If the Sandinistas accept this peace offer, 1willkeep my funding restriction
in effect.But peace negotiations must not become a cover for deception and
delay. If there is no agreement after 60 days of negotiations, 1 will lift these
restrictions, unless both sides ask me not tu." (OfficialTranscript, pp. 188-
189,infi, Ann. C, Attachment 1-19.)
The so-called "~eace oro. .al" is thus a conditional offcr - in effect an
uliiriiatuiii ;igriofund.imental ch4ngr.sin th: goi;rnnicnt 01'Nicaragu~aithiii
6U Jays or facc a rcncucd onrldught ir,,~,,the !iicr;cnxric< I'h: "pedce prupusdl"
emph.iri/es th11 the ;icii\iticrdi th: IJniteJ Siarcr in ionjiinction u.ith the
mercenarici arc .imply a p~>liiicüilnsiriinleni 1nieni1tiachieve nset uf political
~ihlecti\ej. The .iciii,iti:, ha\e no purpme coinp.itiblc uith internati.inal Isw or
with self-defense.
2. Publicstatements of othersenior Administrationoflcials
178. Apart from statements of President Reagan, other senior United States
officiais have openly acknowledged the assistance given hy the United States to
guerrillas carrying out paramilitary operations against Nicaragua. In 1981 the
then Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig, gave evidence to the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs during which, in answer tu a question, he refused MEMORIAL OP NICARAGUA 49
to give an assurance that the United States would not participate in "any effort
to overthrow or destabilize the current government of Nicaragua". (Testimony
before the Committee on Foreien ~ffairi. Ann. C. ~ttachment11-1.)
179. In 1983 the Hon. ~red-C. Ikle, under ~ecretar~of ~efense for Policy,
characterized United States policy toward Nicaragua in very clear terms. In a
public address to the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs, MI. Ikle defended
the "covert activities" program in Central America and accused those oppo-
sing such a program as voting "to establisha sanctuary for the Sandinistas", and
turning Nicaragua "into a sanctuary ...in which the US-supported forces could
not operate". (OfficialTrdnscript, p. 200, infra, Ann. C, Attachment 11-2.)In the
same speech, MI. lkle also stated that "the psychological impact from cntting
off US assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance forces fightingfor democracy in
their native land would be severe". (Ibid, p. 200, infra.) The entire speech
constitutes an open admission of United States complicity with the mercenaries
operating against the Nicaraguan Government.
180. Secretary of State Shultz, in a press conference on 20 March 1984,
said that the uolicv of the Administration was "to kee~the oressure on Nicara-
gua" (~fficial'~raiscript, p. 201, infra, Ann. C, ~ttachkent i1-3). And again on
19 Febrnaw 1985, testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee he
said :''~hai wehave in~icaya~uaisa government tbat's a bad-newsgovernment.
Now, how can that get cbanged? We'dlike to see them changed." (WP 2/20/85 ;
NYT 2/20/85.)
181. On 25 January 1985, Vice-President Bushin a speech to the Executive
Forum said that aid to the guerrillas "who are fightingthe communist Sandinistas
must go forward" (OfficialTranscnpt, p. 214, infra, Ann. C, Attachment 11-8).
182. General Paul F. Gorman, retiring commander of the United States
Southern Command, based in Panama and covering al1United States forces in
Central America, testifiedhefore the Senate Armed ServicesCommittee that aid
to the mercenaries was necessary hecause"the Sandinistas must be brought a
reckoning" (OfficialTranscript, p. 219, infra, Ann. C, Attachment 11-11).
183. Referenceto additional examplesmay be found in the Statement of Facts,
Chapter 1,supra.
3. House of Represenratives: Report of the Permanent Selecr Cornmirteeon In-
telligence
184. The Report of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Re~resentatives, published on 13May 1983, reviewsthe United States
militarv and Darami~itarvo~erations in ~icaraeua to that time (Ann. E. Attach-
ment f). It {s replete Gith'references to the &ale and purPoSe of thé United
States involvement withthe counterrevolutionary forces. The unique responsibi-
lities of this Committee gives special weight to ils statements. Under United
States law, the President is legally required to report "covert activities" to the
IntelligenceCommittees of the House and Senate(Title 50, USCode, Section413,
Ann. D, Attachment 3). The intelligence committees,in turn, are responsible for
monitoring those activities on behalf of their respective Houses, and for keeping
them generally informed on the nature and scope of those activities. The May
1983Report was issued in discharge of these responsibilities, and in support of
leeislation Dro~osedbv Coneressman Boland. the Chairman of the Committee.
thit would'haGecut off funZng for the mercenaries.
185. The following passages from the House Intelligence Committee Report
of 13May 1983are particularly striking:
"The fact of USsupport for the anti-Sandinista insurgents has had further50 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
unfortunate repercussions. Having twice sent US troops to Nicaragua in
this century, this country has once again heen cast in the role of intemention-
ist. The United States has allied itself with insurgents who carry the taint of
the last Nicaraguan dictator, Somoza. It has, in elTect,allowed the spotlight
of international opprobrium to shift from Sandinista attempts to subvert a
neighboring govemment to a US attempt to subvert that of Nicaragua. If
ever there was a formula for US policy failure in Central America, it would
involve two elements: (1) acts that could he characterized as US inter-
ventionism in Nicaragua; and (2) an alliance with the followers of Somoza.
Both characterisations can now he made. The isolation within the inter-
n311onalciimmunity thai Kicarxgud \hould iecl has bcen dimini-hsd hy this
J<>uhlyinsensitive inv<ili,emsniby the CS in Nicrrrguan ühirs
As -it watched the develo~mint of the Nicaraguan insurgency and as
memhers of the Committee Concluded that US policy was ërnplbying the
wrong means to achieve its objectives, the Committee sought alternative
solutions to achieve the same ends. It attempted restraints on the range of
activities supported hy the US. Two attempts of this kind were the language
of the fiscal year 1983 Intelligence Authorization Act which sought to limit
insurgent activity to arms interdiction, and the Boland Amendment, an
amendment to the fiscal vear 1983 Defense Ao~ro~riations Act that prohi-
hited assistance for the purpose of overthro;i& Chegovemment of~ica-
ragua or provoking a military exchange hetween Nicaragua and Hondu-
ras.
Both proved ineffective as moderate curbs on insurgent activity or US
policy. Hostilities within Nicaragua intensified. There was no discernihle
effect on the arms flow. Throughout, executive hranch officialsmade little
effort to mask US support, going so far in April 1983as to encourage media
discussion." (Ann. E, Attachment 1, pp. 244-245, infra.)
C. The ParticulorRelevanceof ExpressAdmissions on thePart of UnitedStates
Ojïcials
186. At this point it will he of assistance to the Court if the particular types
of relevance which attach to the express admissions adduced as evidence are
indicated. The types of relevance may he summarized as follows:
la) As evidence of control over the mercenaries carrvin~ out militarv o~erations
, , . - . .
in and against Nicaragua.
(b) As evidence of intentionand purpose in relation to United States assistance
and control: in particular, the exertion of pressure upon the lawful govern-
~ - - ~~ ~~a~ ~ua bv the use of force and. eventuallv. .,e violent overthrow
of that Government.
(c) As evidence of responsibilityfor particular patterns of activity, including the
overall militarv and oaramilitarv ooerations of the counterrevolutionanes,
and responsihiity fo; the minini of~icara~udn ports.
187. The weight and general credit of these various statements is enhanced hy
the following factors :
(a) They were made in the course of a public duty.
(b) They were made in the discharge of a responsihility to make a public
accounting.
(c) They weremade inpublic by senior officialsof the United States Government,
or persons authorized to make statements on hehalf of agencies of that
Government. MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 51
(d) They are matters of public record.
(e) They fonn pari of a "consistent and concordant" pattern of statements and
actions.
188. The express admissions are relevant to the following causes of action
invoked by Nicaragua in its Application:
(a) The use or threat of force by agents of the United States in the fonn of
military and paramilitary operations carried out by forces under the control
of the United States.
(6) Intervention in the interna1alTairsof Nicaragua.
(c) The mining of Nicaraguan ports in time of peace and without lawful
justification.
(d) Violation of the sovereignty of Nicaragua.
D. Oflcial Descriptionsof UnitedStates Operationsas "CovertAction"
189. The various statements contained in the documentation available con-
sistently descrihe the military and paramilitary operations against Nicaragua
as "covert action". It is not absolutely clear what the connotation of the phrase
"covert" might be, since United States involvement and responsibility for this
action has long been acknowledged. Certainly, the term refers to modalities, and
the intention and purpose behind the action remain clear and undiluted. There
is, however, one aspect of the terminology which isworthy of special notice. The
usage involves an implied admission of responsibility, since it carnes the impli-
cation that the action need not and cannot be given a legaljustification.
190. In this context it is significant that, prior to the filingof the Nicaraguan
Application in April 1984,United States oîiicials hahitually made no attempt to
invoke, let alone develop with precision, any legal justification for the use of
force against Nicaragua or the associated episodes such as aerial trespass and
the mining of ports. However, some three years after the operations hegan, a
legaljustification was belatedly invoked.
SectionIV. The EvidentialSignificanceof the Referenceto CollectiveSelf-Defense
by the United States in the PreviousProceedingsinthis Case
191. This section is devoted to a particular question arising from the Pleadings
relatine to the Reauest for Interim Measures of Protection and the Jurisdiction
.id h~mir,ihiliir i>hn\eof ihe proicrJmgi bdscd upon Nicaragua'i Applicdtion
019 April 19x4 On sr\eral ocaiion; in ihc courseoi thair' plcsdinpr the Cnilcd
Statesasserted that the operations against Nicaragua in the materid penod were
justified hy virtue of the legal category of collective self-defense.In Nicaragua's
suhmission, this assertion has considerable significancefor present purposes. The
United States is not appearing in the proceedings on the merits and is thus not
offering evidence to establish the justification of collective self-defenseon the
facts. However, matters of defense must he supported by evidence furnished by
the Respondent State before the Court, as the Court had occasion to point out
in the case concerning UniredStates Diplornaticand ConsuiarStaff in Tehrun
(I.C.J. Reoorts 1980.o. 38. nara. 182). (See also Chan. III. Sec. III.)
~ 192. ~hese assertions based on selcdèfensestand on therecord and constitute
fomal admissions that the United States is a full participant in the military52 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITAW ACTIVITIES
operations which are mounted hy forces under its control and directed against
the territory and people of Nicaragua. To assert the justification of collective
self-defense is to recognize suhstantial participation in and control over the
military operations so characterized.
193. In the oral hearings relating to the Request for the indication of pro-
visional measures, the Agent of the United States, Mr. Davis Robinson, in his
opening statement placed the following on record:
"Third and finally, Nicaragua's Application and request improperly cal1
upon this Court in the circumstances of this case to make judgments and to
impose measures potentially impairing the inherent right of States to indi-
vidual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter." (1, p. 86, 27 April 1984.)
194. The text of the Court's Order of 10 May 1984refers to the invocation of
collective self-defense in the course of argument, and also to the contention hy
the Agent of Nicaragua that neither the United States, nor the other States
referred to, had made any claim of self-defense, individual or collective, prior
to the Application (Order of 10 May 1984, LCJ Repurrs 1984, pp. 181-182,
para. 30).
195. The matter of collective self-defense was givengreat prominence in the
Counter-Memotial submitted hy the United States on the Questions of Juris-
diction and Admissibility. (See para. 6; para. 202; paras. 515-519.)The follow-
ing passages from the United States Counter-Memorial are of particular rele-
vance for present purposes:
"516. It iswell-settledthat the right of individual or collective self-defense
is an inherent right of States. The special and extraordinary nature of the
right of individual or collective self-defense is explicitly recognized in the
prescription of Articlc 51 that 'nothing in the present Charter shall impair'
that right. Article 92 of the Charter makes the Court an 'organ of the
United Nations' and further provides that that Statute of the Court is an
'integral part' of the Charter. Action taken hy the Court is therefore a
matter under the Charter, and any such action that had the eiiect of
impairing the inherent right of a State to engage in individual or collective
self-defense cannot he reconciled with the express language of Article 51,
which provides a role in such matters only to the Security Council. Article51
permits only the Security Council to take action with respect to claims of
self-defense.and a .ude-ent on the auestion hv the Court would constitute
an eniry inio th: iield of ctimpeienc: rejcr\,c10 the (.'ouncilin tliis rcgÿrd.
517 A jiidgrneni oithi' Cduri ih.it purprlried i<>Jeny ihc ~;iliilit!01'3
Siaie'sclaini to beenragcd ins:llidefcnic \hcther indii~idusll~orcdllc:ti\cly,
must necessarily 'impair' the 'inherent' right guaranteed to that State by
Article 51 of the Charter. To the extent that that State claims, as dues the
UnitedSroteshere,to be engaged in particular in the exercise of the inherent
right of self-defensehy providing, upon request, proportionate and appro-
priate assistance to third States not hefore the Court, any such judgment
would necessarilyimpair the inherent rights guaranteed to those third States
as well.The relief claimed by Nicaragua, Application, para. 26, in particular
the denial of assistance to third States. would have oreciselvthis result.
SIR. A judgnicnt of the Couri ciiulil not .xion..: he inc<~nip.iiihleuith
Ariicle 51 of ihe ('h3rir.r. ;ind binding on the p.iriie5under Ariic94 ,iitlic
Charter and Ariicle 59 oi itie Siatuic of ilic <:ouri. Siiih a coniradicior)
result could not have heen intended by the architects of the Charter, whose MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 53
clear design was to leave the resolution of ongoing armed conflict to the
exclusivecompetence of the political organs.
519. It is, moreover, unnecessary foran adjudication of a Party's Article51
claimsto oroceed to i,de-ent for that Partv'sinherent rie.t of individualand
c<illccii\.csclf.deicniiihc iiiipaircil.Thei.i<tthdt such clsims arc subjwtril
to judicial cx~miniiion in the \,en midsi oithe ~.i~nilitiÿi n\L.io ihcni
rnü\ alonc hr siit1:~ien1%)conitituiç siiili iiiin.iirmcni.T1.r>lirtiiularlville
caséwhere, as here, the Party instituting pioceedings has evidently done so
for the purpose of securingpolitical and other extralegaladvantages in order
to further its own aims in respect of the underlying conflict.An eventual
judgment in the other Party's favor could not restore the impairment that its
interestsmay have undergone inthe interim.The Court should not admit such
an abuse of the judicial process." (Emphasis added.)
196. These passages carry the message, conveyed withan absolute clarity, that
the United States actually "claims" to he engaged in the exerciseof the right of
individual or collective self-defensein accordance with Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations. (See especially paragraph 517 set forth above [p. 521.)
The assertion was repeated in the course of the oral hearings on the questions
of jurisdiction and admissihility. (See the speech of the Counsel for the United
States, III, pp. 248-250 (Professor Sohn); and ibidp .,. 252, 266, 268, 269, 271
(Professor Moore).) And in its Judgment on this phase of the case the Court
referred to this aspect of the United States argument on admissibility (I.C.J.
Reports 1984, pp. 432-433, para. 91). The claim to have acted hy virtue of the
rieht of collective self-defense is reveated in the statement made hv the State
1rtm1 II IR Jrinu~rj 198i c<inir.rntng 'liS ~ittidrnu,;ilNom the
I'rocccding\ Initiatcd by NicdrliguaIIIthe Intcrnati~iii:ilCouri uiJusiiic" IOiliciril
'1rinscriot.D 223. ttl/r<Ann C'.Aitï~hmcni 111-41
197. in ;Le submi'ssionof ~icara~ua, these statéments,al1matters of public
record and many of them made in the course of pleadings presented to this
Court, constitute important admissions of direct and substantial United States
involvement in the military and paramilitary activitiesin and against Nicaragua.
A claim by a State to he exercising the inherent right of collective self-defense
necessarily connotes participation and control of the military action referred to,
and not merely forms of indirect support restricted to funding and the supply
of arms.
198. The statements made on hehalf of the United States in the course of the
pleadings in the Jurisdiction and Admissibility phase of the present case may
also he evaluated in a different manner. In the Merits phase of the proceedings
such statements, unlessmodified in the course of argument hy the side originally
making them, have the effectof an estoppel as between the Parties. This principle
is simply an application of the principles of good faith and consistency in the
procedural sphere. In order to mount its arguments relating to admissihility,
the Respondent State placed on record repeated assertions that the defense or
justification of collective self-defensewas applicable on the facts. Nicaragua dis-
outes that the defense is aoolicable. but can still point to and relv uoon what
js admitted as a necessaryconsequénceof making the claim, namélyihe direct
and suhstantial involvement of the United States in the military operations to
which the Application of Nicaragua refers.
199. Thepnncipleof estoppelbyrecordisperfectlycompatiblewiththe principles
of judicial reasoning which form part of the general principlesof procedural law.
The general principleof consistencyand the presumption against contradiction is
recognizedin the doctrine of public international law. (See Guggenheim, Trai teé54 MlLlTbRY AND PARAMILITUiY ACTlVITlES
droit internationalpublic, 1954, Vol.II, pp. 158-159;Lauterpacht, TheDevelopment
of InternationalLaw by the International Court,1958,pp. 167-172;Rousseau, Droit
internationalpublic, 1971,Vol.1,para. 309, pp. 387-388; Dominice, En Hommage
à Paul Guggenheim,1968, pp. 327-365; Martin, L'esroppelen droit international
public, 1979,pp. 183-184,para. 68; McNair, Law of Treaties, 1961, p. 485.) As
Jude- Ammoun oointed out in his sevarate o~inion in the North Sea Continental
Slielj idse>, thç ,III~,,~<,,..~irrd11(»oulhcnJi~(t,.slii.Igçncrdl principlr'oila\\,
forniing pan ui the Ihwoi nations. (i\'<irrlizd <i~nt»ic~n~.T.rl e!/(bi,dzrul Reprihlii~
f r . I)tvi,>wrk.Ii~J~~r<Ril ~pitho. (;,,rt~rdn~. .\'~~rh~~rl..~Jiu.<l.li~,~ir~~ir.
ic.~ ~eports 1969, p. 3; at pp. izo-i21.)
200. In any event, apart from the application of the principles of estoppel
referred to in the preceding paragraphs, the consistent and affirmative use of the
category of collective self.defense has an important legal consequence in that
such conduct constitutes the acceptance of responsibility for the military and
paramilitary operations in and against Nicaragua. The matter can be expressed
in the form that the United States has publicly recognized and adopted its legal
responsibility for the activities concerned. (Cf. the Templeof Preah Vihearcase,
I.C.J. Reporls 1962, pp. 22-27, 32.) Moreover, this acceptance is a matter of
public record and has heen expressed in the face of the Court in the incidental
proceedings relating to the present case.
201. The fact that the acts of acceptance of responsihility took place in the
course of the incidental proceedings in no way affects their legal significance,
since the acts of acceptarice were the result of the voluntary decision of the
United States to enter uoon certain issues eoi-e t..the merits in the orocess of
de\.eluping 11, argi.nicnts relating io :idniissihility.
?O? 'lhcrc is a i~rihçr .~>pcctof the Ilnitrd St:iiej claim t,~ha\c hcçn h:iiiig
in ci~llçctiiescll-delinse uhich bars Linonihr ibsuej of ~ruul: dnd in r>articiilar
the weight or credibility of the c1aim:As the ~icara~ian ~~~licatiin has in-
dicated, President Reagan first authorized "covert activities" by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency directed against Nicaragua on 9 March 1981, by means of a
formal "o.esi~~n~i~~~f~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ - ~ndine -nd carrvi2e -ut of various clandestine
activities were to continue, year by year, for three full years before it occurred
to any senior officia1to offer a legal excuse for United States policies towards
~icara~ua. The first such reference - to collective self-defense- appears in an
address by the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeanne 1.
Kirkpatrick, to the American Society of International Law on 12 April 1984.
(Address. p. 206, infra, Anri. C,Attachment 11-4.)Other such references(reported
above) .o..ared in the soeeches of United States Counsel in the oral oroceedines
on intcrim mwrurei of protection and in thc \!,riilen dnd or;il proc~durc in the
Juri>diciion plii~sc.if ihc prcs:nt ci~ss.
203. The rudden and b~'13icraltrcmni to i.istiis thr miliiarv oocriitions rlinv
years afier the beginningof such operat~ns &uld have no credibility whatsoever.
During that substantial period the operations had been "covert" and, in the
course of many authoritative pronouncements from official sources, no legal
justification had been offered. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that
there has been any cntical evolution in the factual background to justify the
innovation after the date of the Nicaraguan Application on 9 April 1984. In
terms of ordinary legal logic, it was too late at that stage to offer a justification
which carries any weight or credibility.
204. The acceptance of responsihility inherent in the claim to have acted by
virtue of collective self-defense is to be placed alongside the other evidence of
adoption and approval of the military operations directed against Nicaragua
considered earlier in the present chapter. MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 55
SectionV. Recoune to Inferencesof Fact and CircumstantialEvidenee
205. In the Corfu Channelcase (Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1949,p. 4), the Court
made an important statement concerning the admissihility of indirect evidence.
The Court stated:
"lt is clear that knowledge ofthe minelayingcannot be imputed to the Al-
banian Government by reason merely of the fact that a minefield disco-
vered in Alhanian territorial waters caused the explosions of which the
British warships were the victims. It is true as international practice shows
that a State on whose territory or in whose waters an act contrary to in-
ternational law kas occurred may be called upon to give an explanation. It
is also true that that State cannot evade such a request by limiting it-
self to a re~lv that it is ignorant of the circumstances of the act and of its
author. I'hcSirte ma) up to- a certain point bc buund ti,wpply particulsri
oithc use niailc hv ii~i'thcriie~in.o;f inr<>rrn;iti.ind inquiry rt tirdisposal.
Rut itsmnot bc conslurlcd ironi the mue l'aitof the çonirol excriised b)
State over its territory and waters that that State necessarily knewor ought
to have known of any unlawful act perpetrated therein nor yet that it
necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors. This fact, by itself
and apart from other circumstances, neither involvesprimafacie responsi-
bility nor shifts the burden of proof.
On the other hand, the fact of this exclusiveterritorial control exercised
hy a State within its frontiers has a bearing upon the methods of proof
available to estahlish the knowledee of that State as to such events. Bv
rcasiln (if thir exilujive conrriil.rite0thr.r Statc, the victtni oi 2 hruch k
~ntcrndti<~n~ laIu,isolicn unahlc to iurnish dire;[ prouiui kiits giving rise
in rcirionïihilitv. Suih J Siaic hh.iulJ be aIlo\icd J more Iibcrïl r:coursç lu
inferences of fict and circumstantial evidence. This is recognired by inter-
national decisions. It must he regarded as of specialweight whenit is based
on a senes of facts linked together and leading logically to a single con-
clusion." (ICJ. Reports 1949, p. 18. Referred ta also by the Court in its
Judgment of 26 November 1984,ICJ Reports 1984, p. 437, para. 101.)
206. These Dassageswere related, as one would exuect, to the facts of the case
in haiid. llsn~evcr, .;Tdras the principle i*cuncerncd -- ihu nescssit) of ree.>urw
to inicrr.ncc\ oifdct ~ndcircum\taniial evidcnc: - thcre are inipurtani pÿrallels
with the evidential picture presented in the circumstances of-the Nicaraguan
Application. The pdÏallels include the following factors:
(a) The fact, which is a matter of public knowledge, that the United States has
major bases and operational facilities on the territory of Honduras conti-
nuously availahle for the use of its forcesand for the mounting of military
and pdramilitary operations against Nicaragua.
(6) The obvious inability of Nicaragua to have nccessto these sources of illegal
activity and the fact that Nicaragua has no sophisticated surveillance ca-
pacity.
(c) The fact that the formal authoriration and the actual planning and mounting
of the operations against Nicaragua is clandestine.
In the suhmission of Nicaragua, it follows that in the circumstances of the
present case, and within certain proper limits, recourse to indirect evidence is
fullyjustified.56 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
A. Matters of PublicKnowledge
207. It is a generally accepted principle that matters of public knowledge form
a category of admissible evidence and that in certain tvDes of situations such
evidence may have a very significant role to play. In the circumstances of the
present case the essential facts are matters of public knowledge. This is shown
hy the vast collection of reports in the press, reporting directly or otherwise
reflecting the views of United States officialsconcerning the activities of agents
of the United States directed against Nicaragua. These reports not only demon-
strate that the essential facts of United States policies and involvement are
matters of public knowledge but they fom part of the pattern of facts which
indicate the existence of a system of conduct and also go to show the coherence
and consistency of the evidence as a whole.
208. The Judgment of the Court in the case concerning United StatesDip-
lomaticand ConsularStaff in Tehran states that the essential facts in that case
were "for the most part, matters of public knowledge in the world press and in
radio and television hroadcasts from Iran and other countries". (I.C.J. Reports
1980, p. 9, para. 12.) In the present case the persistent press reports in leading
United States newspapers have the particular quality and significance that they
closely relate to, and reflect, briefings emanating from officials, and many state-
ments by officialsexpressly directed to the press. In any case the evidence of
matters of public knowledge exhibits a significant complementarity with the
other evidence presented to the Court hy Nicaragua.
B. Evidenceof a Systrm,a GeneralPolicy and a Pattern of Acrivity
209. A particular fotm of indirect evidenceis the existence of a system emer-
ging from a variety of evidential material, indicating a consistenrpattern of
intentions, purposes and acts over a long period of time. Such a consistent
pattern of evidence justifies the inference that the events are connected, are part
of a deliberate policy, and are not coincidental. In particular, the existence of a
system or pattern visible in the mass of evidence excludes the possihility of an
explanation of the activities compatible with the innocence of the Respondent
State. The drawine of inferences and conclusions from the existenc~ ~f~ ~~ ~~ svstem
or pattern of evidence may be descrihed with equal accuracy either as a recourse
to indirect evidenceoras the ordinary and necessaryprocess of judicialevaluation
of evidence.
210. The particular system or pattern visible in the present case consists, in
the submission of the Government of Nicaragua, of the following elements:
(a) The sequence and coincidence of the authorization of financing by Congress
and the subsequent practical steps taken by way of implementation.
(b) The persistent recruiting and employment of amed units based on the
territory of Honduras and paid and maintained by the United States.
(cj The carrying out of regular attacks hy such units against targets on the
territory of Nicaragua
(dl The continuous funding of such operations by the United States.
(el The intent on the part of the United States to cause damage to Nicaragua,
to exert pressure generally for political ends, and, in particular, to bring
about the overthrow of the Government of Nicaragua.
(fl The use of particular mechanisms, described as "covert action", involving
the Central Intelligence Agency and its operational resources.
(gj Prior to April 1984,the absence of any pretense or assertion of the existence MSMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 57
of any legaljustification for the activitiesof the mercenaries acting on hehalf
of the United States.
211. The evidence estahlishing this particular systemor pattern, more fully set
forth in the Statement of Facts, can he summarized as follows:
(a) In the first place the military and paramilitary operations against Nicaragua
have heen expresslyauthorized by an Act of Congress of the United States.
Section 108of the IntelligenceAuthonzation Act for Fiscal Year 1984pro-
vides:
"During fiscal year 1984, not more than $24,000,000 of the funds
availahle to the Central IntelligenceAgency, the Department of Defense,
or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence
activity may he ohligated or expended for the purpose or which would
have the effectof supporting, directlyor indirectly,military or paramilitary
operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement
or individual." (Ann. D, Attachment 4, p. 239, infra.)
(b) Apart from the original funding authorized by Congress, the Administration
has systematicallysought to increasethe levelof funding, and this persistence
is clear evidenceof a consistent policy stretching over a period of four years.
(c) The existence of a pattern of administrative practices whereby financial
assistance and logistical support were provided to sustain, control and
deploy armed units carrying out hostile operations against the Applicant
State. All the details of the arrangements are not available but the key ele-
ments are set forth in the Report of the Permanent SelectCommitteeon Intel-
ligenceof the House of Representatives, 13May 1983.(Ann. E, Attachment
1. See also, e.g., WSJ 3/4/85; WSJ 3/5/85; LAT 3/4/85 ;LAT 3/5/85.)
(d) The consistent "attitude" of the United States Government as revealed in
the express admissions made by the President and other senior oficials.
Both in the Corfu Channel case(Meriis, 1.C.J Reports 1949,pp. 18-20),and
in the case concerning UnitedStates Diplornaticand ConsularStaff in Tehran
(ICJ Reports 1980, pp. 33-35, paras. 70-75), the Court gave particular
significanceto the attitude and general policy of the State authorities indi-
cated by express public pronouncements and by general conduct.
(e) The evidence availahle in the fonn of admissions by the leaders of the
mercenarv forces. See. for examole. the statements of the Commander of
the "~ic&a~uan ~emocratic Fo;ce" reported in the press on 20 February
1985.(International Herald Tribune2120185.)
(fl ~umerous press reports set forth in ~nnex F.
Conclusions
212. The matenals set forth in the present chapter provide a guide to the
highlights and the particular qualities of the evidence presented in full in
Chapter 1.The responsihilityof the United Statesforthe militaryand paramilitary
activities of the guerrilla forces operating against Nicaragua is established on the
basis of the following forms of proof:
(a] The express admissions made by Prcsidcnt Reagan and other responsihle
officiaisof the United States Govemment.
(b) Statements authorized by agencies of the United States Government.
(c) The facts recorded in the Report of the United States House of Repre-
sentatives Permanent SelectCommittee on Intelligenceof 13May 1983,and58 MILlTARY AND PARAMILLTARY ACTIVITIES
other statements of Congressmen and Senators with responsibility in the
.....,.,.
J, The rclrrcncc ro collcciiveself-dcicnrcon ihe part of re,ponsihle i~ili~ial,of
the I'niicd SiaicsGoicrnment, dnJ. in pariicular, in the previouï procecdingr
in this case.
(e) The necessary inferences to be drawn from the indirect evidence of the
organization and funding of mercenary operations by agents of the United
States.
(f) The adoption and approval of the actions of the mercenary forces on the
part of the United States Govemment since March 1981.
(g)The fact that United States direction and control of the "covert" actions
directed against Nicaragua are matters of public knowledge.
(h) The overwhelming evidence ofa system, a general policy, and a pattern of
activity, establishing United States direction and control of military and
paramilitary activities directed against Nicaragua, and United States inten-
tions to coerce, and, if possible, overthrow the lawful Government of Nica-
ragua. PART11
THE CONVENTIONALLAW
CHAPTER II1
I HC:,\CTIOSS 01; 'I'HC:IJSITED SIA'I'ES I.:SI'AHI.ISIIED BY 'l'Hi: t.\'l-
I>C:NCt:HEFORE I'HC:COIJH'I CO\STl'I'L"I'F l'HE I'IIHEXI' AS[> IJSE
OF FORCE AGAlNST NICARAGUA IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 (4)
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, FOR WHlCH THE UNITED
STATES IS LIABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
213. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter orohibits the use of force as
ait insiruinent ui ii~rcignpolic). '1hi, prohihrtiuas ihc grcat Jepari~rc of ihr'
Charicr ïroni prctious erti~rrsio ciiablish an internuiiondl rulc oi'law Irirthe
corncr;innc or rhs n~irriiiliivcanil rnbliluliona1s)slcm ."lahlrsheJ by the C'h.tr-
ter. Itha, corne io hc rc~ogni~c~a lsju, <ogrn.r iln o\crriJrng and unniodifi-
dhle pruhibitor) nom Former Prcsidcni oi the Court Jirncnc~ilc Anvhjga hds
wntten :
"The paramount commitment of the Charter is Article 2, paragraph 4,
which prohibits the threat or use of force in international relations. This
is the cardinal rule of international law and the cornerstone of neaceful
rcl~iions ;miont: Siaie,." ("lniernaiional Law in ihc P.isi IhirJ or .t
Ccnrur)", 159 Ilagis R~rti<~il(ll)78-11p,. 87)
On the matter ofjus cogens, Lord McNair, in his authoritative work on the Law
of Treaties, says that Article 2 (4) "create[s] legal rights and duties [that] possess
a constitutive character, with the result that any member States cannot contract
out of them or derogate from them ..." (McNair, The Luw of Treatips,1961,
p. 217). Article2 (4) provides:
"Al1Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."
214. As this Chapter willdemonstrate, the evidencebeforethe Court estahlishes
overwhelmingly that the United States has violated this norm with respect to
Nicaragua - flagrantly, repeatedly and without legaljustification.
First,the United States has used force against Nicaragua within the meaning
of Article 2 (4): (a) through the octiviiiof ils own rnilitary and intelligence per-
sonnel, (b) by its actions in recruiting, organizing, training, supplyidirecting
and controllinga mercenary army making continuousand systematic depredations
into the territory of Nicaragua with theobject of overthrowing the Government,
and (c) hy adopting and rntfying the actions of the mercenary forces.
Second, this use of force was "against the territorial integrity and political
independence" of Nicaragua, within the meaning of Article 2 (4).60 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTlVITlES
Third, there is nojustification in law for these actions in contravention of Arti-
cle 2 (4).
215. The Court will be aware that these actions of the United States have
ken taken in a situation where il is nominallv at mac. wi.h Nicaragua. No -
siaic of nar exisis hciwccn the iuo ei)untrics The United Siliics rccogniics the
prcscnt govrrnmcnt of Nicaraguï as ihc icgitiniate g<li~crnmcni'fhc Iwo Siatcs
maintain full diplomaiic relations. a Nicaraguïn ambassad<ir ia arcreditcd IO
\Vdshingion.and an ambasjador of the UniirJ Staics i, in rcsidcnie in .Managua.
Yet. ïç the evidcnic shows. ihc Lniied Siatc~ hrls wilgrd a rclentlcss "corcri"
war against Nicaragua for four years
Section 1. The Actions of the United States, as Established by the Evidence,
Constitute Use of Force against Nicaragua in Violation of Article 2 (4) of the
Charter
A. Direct Action hy UnitedStatesMilitary and Civilian EmployeesIs a Useof
Forcein Violationof Article 2 (4) of the Charter
216. The evidence before the Court reveals numerous instances of direct
military action by United Statesarmed forces and by intelligenceagents, of both
United States and Latin American nationality, employed by or under contract
to the United States. In summary,
- United States intelligenceorganizations haveconducted armed actions against
Nicaraguan ports, airfields, fuel storage facilities and other targets, using
United States nersonnel and hired saboteurs of Latin American nationalities.
- United Siaies hilitary aiid inirlligcnsc pcrsonnsl h3i.eaccompanicd nicrccnary
units on armïd incursion\ inride Nicaragua.
- Uniicd Staics miliiarv aircrïft have vit~laicdNicliragua. airvuse on hundrcds
of occasions.
- armed vessels manned by United States personnel have repeatedly violated
Nicaraguan territorial waters.
217. The significanceof these direct incursions of United States personnel must
he evaluated against the background of a continuous and deliberate campaign
of intimidation by regular United States land, naval and air forces along the
borders of Nicaragua and in the seas off its Coast. This campaign has included
three major maneuvers each lasting weeks or months and involving thousands
of United States ground forces, almost continuous patrolling by naval task
forces and aircraft carrier groups, and the constmction of permanent bases,
camps and airfields for these forces. High ranking United States military officers
have reported that United States armed forces are fully prepared, from a techni-
c~ ~a~d loeiutical standno~r~. to carrv out missions aeainst Ni-araeua. The
Admini~iration has announceJ ih.11thcre mlincuters irillcontinue ihriugh ai
Iea\i 1988 'fhc purpose har not bccn hiddcn. Ai the higlicst levels. I,niicd Statc,
o~lici~lsha\,c rcpeaicdl) a\o\i,ed ihai ihc objsct oi th]\ ïcti\,iiy isIO "pu1 pressure
on" the Nisarag~iln Go\crnmcnt InJecJ. in ïn c\:iniplc 01'Ornellidn "ncws-
peak". I:niicd Staics uitirials ha\e dcnominaicd ihij aciivit! a, a rdnipaign 01'
"perception management", designed to keep the Nicaraguan Governrnent and
~eonle in fear of a direct~in~ ~ion bv officialUnited States militarv forces. These
. .
maneuvers constitute, in the words of this Court, a "demonstration of force for
the purpose of exercising political pressure". (Corfu Channel, Merirs, ICJ. MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 61
218. Direct military action against Nicaragua, conducted by military and
civilian personnel in the officia1service of the United States, is a use of armed
force under Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, for which the United
States isaccountable. The actions of military and civilianpersonnel of the United
States in the line of dutv and undcr the direction of their su~eriors is. in law.
the action of the united'states.
219. It hardly needs citation of authority to cstablish that the acts and
omissions of al1State organs or agents are attributable to the State. (See Ago,
Third Report to the International LawCommission, Yearhookofihe Inrernaii~~nal
Lniv Commission,1971,Vol.II, Part 1,p. 246.)Thus, military activitiesconducted
by members of the armed forces of the United States or by other officers or
emol.ve,~ o~ the United States~ ~ ~ ~e c~n-idered acts of the United States for
the purpose of determining its liability under international law.
220. It is sufficientto refer to somc of the many provisions in codes on inter-
national responsibility,prepared by bodies of experts and individualjurists alike,
uniformly accepting the principle that the use of force by organs or agents of a
State in violation of international law is attached to that State for purposes of
dttermining the iegal re,pon~ihiliiy of ihe Siare Ani.ing these ..<id~,~hcrn<irt
.iuthsritaiii,c is the Inrcrnationlil Law C)mmission'\ Jrsli Articlcr un St:iic
I<cspriiisihilit).prepared hy the formrr Spcciai Kipportrur. Judgc Kohcrtu Agir.
Article 5 of that draft states:
"For the purposes of the present articles, conduct of any State organ
having that status under the interna1 law of that State shall be considered
as an act of the State concerned under international law, provided that
organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question."
Article 6 continues :
"The conduct of an organ of the State shall he considered as an act of
thdt State under international law, whether that organ belongs to the
constituent, legislative, executive, judicial, or other power, whether its
functions are of an international or an interna1 character, and whether it
holds a superior or a subordinate position in the organization of the State."
(Yeurhookrfthe International Law Commission,1973,Vol. II, pp. 191-198;
ihiil., 1978,Vol. 11,Part II, p. 78.)
221. Again, Article 15of the 1961draft Convention on the International Re-
sponsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, prepared by the Harvard Law
School, providcs that the State is iiablc for
"the act or omission of any organ, agency, officialor employee ofthe State
acting within the scope of the actual or apparent authority or within the
scope of the function of such organ, agency, official or employee". (Ihid.,
1969,Vol. II, p. 142.)
222. Draft codes prepared by individual jurists contain clauses with subsran-
tially similar language. Lnthis respect, the work of the International Law Com-
mission simpiy reiterates long-standing principles of international jurispru-
dence. Asearly as 1926,for example, a draft Code of lnternational Law prepared
by Kokusaiho Cakkwai provided in ils FirstArticle that a State is liable for any
"wilful act, deiault or negligence of the official authorities in the dischargc of
their officiai functions". (Ihid, Vol. II, p. 141.) For other examples of codes
prepared by individualjurists, see Yearhookof rheInrernarionai Laiv Commission,
1969,Vol. II, page 151.
223. As might be expected, the principle that the State is liahle for the use of
force hy its officersor agents in violation of international law is fully acknow-62 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYAC~IV~IES
ledged by the United States itself. The "General Rule as to Attribution" (of
conduct to the State) given in section 169of the Resialement Secondof the Lo~v
(ForeignRelations Low of rhe UniiedStates) of the American Law Institute, States:
"Conduct of any organ or other agency of a State, or of any official,
employee,or other individual agentof the State or of suchagency,that causes
injury to an alien, is attributable to the St...if it is within the actual or
apparent authority, or within the scope of the functions, of such agency or
individual agent." (AmericanLaw Institute, Restatemeniof the Law. Second
(ForeignRelations Low rfthe UnitedStates), 1965,pp. 497 er seq.)
And indeed this rule of liability of the State for the acts of its officersand em-
ployees is routinely applied in the interna1law of the United States.
224. There is abundant evidence before the Court of direct military action
against Nicaragua by United States military and intelligencepersonnel. A fewof
the most egegious examples are summarized helow :
- The mining of Nicaraguan harbors in early 1984was a United States opera-
lion from start10finish.The operation was approved by Prnident Reagan on
the recornmendation of White House National Security Adviser Robert
C. McFarlane. The actual mines were constmcted in the United States by
the CIA and the United States Navy, and assembled in Honduras by CIA
weapons specialists. From a "mother ship" positioned off the coast of
Nicaragua, United States military and intelligencepersonnel, including Latin
American commandos from third countries hired and trained by the CIA,
deployed the mines in Nicaragua's harbors. As Senator Barry Goldwater
wrote in a Letterto CIA Director William J. Casey dated 9 April 1984,"the
CIA had, with the written approval of the President", engagedin mining the
harbors in Nicaragua. SenatorGoldwater concluded: "This isan act violating
international law. It is an act of war. For the life of me. 1don't see how we
are going Io cxplain 11."(Sec Siatemeni of I'aiir. para5 96-98.)
(1sirnilar pattern <iidirr.çi iniolrtincni of Cnirtd Siaics p+xïonnclni;~rkeda
sericsof raid, on Corinio and othcr Sicarag~an Pori\ in ihe cdrly munihs of
1984.Indccd. ihese atidcks were siagcd from tlie iamc Ïiioiher ship" uscJ
in thr mining opcraiions. During ihis period. United States military pcrsonncl
owrated helicopters incombat against Nicaraguan positions. whilesupplying
air cover for commando raids aeainst ~icaraeuan oorts. harbors. and oil
storagc kilitics. (Sec Siatemeni ci tacts. para; 99-(W.)
- L;niicd Sratti aircr3fi ha\'calso sysiem~tica11y!l~~Ia~~Jic'ir:iguanairspacc
to conduct surveillance and to carry supplies to mercenary forces. United
Nations Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick acknowledged in a Security Council
debatethat asearly as the beginningof 1983,the United States was conducting
regular reconnaissance flights over Nicaraguan territory. (See 37 UN SCOR
(2335th mtg.), p. 48, UN doc. SIPU. 2335,'corr.l (1982).) Such flights were
conducted by UH-IH helicopters. RC 135, U2, C-47, C-130 planes, and
AC-37 planes,as wellas by low-flyingUnited States SR-71 Blackhirds which
have deliheratelyheen usedto cause sonic booms to intimidate the population.
(See Statement of Facts, paras. 57, 120; Carrion Affidavit, Ann. A, Exhi-
bit A, p. 159,infra.)
225. There is thus abundant evidence of pemasive direct participation by
United States forces and employees in attacks on Nicaragua, most of it publicly
admitted by responsible officiais of the United States Government. It follows
that the rule holding a State legallyaccountable for the use of forceby ils organs
or agents is squarely applicable on the facts of this case. The record before the MEMORIAL OP NICARAGUA 63
Court therefore demonstrates inescapably the direct use of force by the United
States against Nicaragua within the meaning of Article 2 (4).
H T/K,Arruin O/ rkr Unil~JSIUIP.~ 111OrXu,z12r~~ X~.~crii,l~n~)r~<~~~llfTlyr. ,t~rn~
unil Sr,pp/).~ns .Irn~<,ilHund., iir Si,.\rvniurr,.inJC(,trrr~iuuuIini.~ir,ri,nr11i1o .\'icu-
r<~.qt<Ii <i U>r <I/fi,rïv ln Violiirr<.»<fArri~.lt,2 4. ~11'rI~Cihurr,,,
226. The evidence before the Court overwhelmingly establishes a pattern,
extending al least from November 1981 to the present, of massive support by
the United States for "amed bands" operating continuously during that period
against the territory of Nicaragua. The aggregate amount of United States
assistance 10 the mercenarv forces durine this ~enod. as admitted bv official
[Jniterl States siiurie,. iriioi lcss ihan ~76mi11ii>n A.s shown in ~h.i~Ler1.this
lissistancc bcgan u,iih the recruiimeni of the mcricnaries and cxiends IO Ihe
over~lldirrction and iuntr~~lof iheir miliiary and politic~lbiratcgy.the seleciion
of miliiiiryand pi)liti:al ledder5.training including insiruçtion in ierrorisi tliciici
.igainst Nicarogu~n iivilianï. iunsiruction and nisinienancc of blisch,logisi~c.il
and iniclligc.nce,uppori oi'iipcrstioni in4c iïic;iragua J~J planning i>ipiiriicullir
operations. ~oreo;er, the activities of the mercenary foies have beën openly
adopted and ratified by President Reagan and other high United States officiais.
227. The writingsofjurists, the actions of the United Nationsand the positions
taken bv the United States itself are in aareement that such use by a State of
a~ ~ ~~rouosof.mer~ ~anes or irreeular; to carrv out acts of armed violence
against another State violates the on the use of force contained in
Article 2 (4). The position finds support, as well, in the pronouncements of the
Court.
1. The wriringsofpuhlicisis
228. That the direction and control of amed bands by a State is attached to
that State for purposes of determining liability, is an elementary principle of
international law. Among the many authorities that could be cited for the
proposition, only a few of the most prominent are mentioned here. The principle
has been codified in draft form by the International Law Commission. Article 8
of the draft articles on State Responsibility reads:
"The Conduct of a person or group of persons shall also beconsidered as
an act of the State under international law if (a) it is established that such
person or group of persons was in fact acting on behalf of that State; ..."
(Ye-arbookofthe InternationalLa><'Commission ,974,Vol. 1,p. 152.)
Commenting on this provision in the Third Report on State Responsibility to
the lnternational Law Commission, former Special Rapporteur, Ju- - Roberto
Ago, writes:
"The attribution to the State, as a subject of international law, of the
conduct of persons who are in fact operating on ils behalf or al its instigation
(.houehuwitbout havine acauW.ed the stdtus of oreans. either of the State
iisclf or of a scp;irJic <iltici~linriiruriun providing a puhlii rerviie or pcr-
iorming a public l'unsiion)is unlinimousl) uphrld by ihc wriirrs on inicr-
nliiii>nalIau who have dcali uith ihis auesiion." Ilhid., 1971.Vol. II. Pari
. .
1,p. 266.)
Judge Ago continues:
". .. private persons may be secretly appointed 10 cany out particular
missions or tasks to which the organs of the State prefer not to assign64 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIFS
regular State officiais; people may be sent as so-called 'volunteers' to help
an insurrectional movement in a neighbouring country - and many more
examples could be given". (Ibid, p. 263.)
229. Brownlie supports this view. In International Low and the Use of Force
by Srores, he notes that although "the terms 'use of force' and 'resort to force'
are frequently employed by writers these terms have not been the subjcct of
detailed consideration". His own analysis, based on a survey of the literature,
follows :
"There can be little doubt that 'use of force' is commonly understood to
imply a military attack, an 'armed attack', by the organized military, naval,
or air forces of a state; but the concept in practice and principle has a wider
significance.The agency concerned cannot be confined to the military and
other forces under the control of a ministry of defence or war, since the
resoonsibilitvwillbe the sameifa eovernmen~ ~~~~~-~ ~ueh 'militia'.'securitv
forces',or 'phice forces' whichmay be quite heavilyarmed and may emploi
armoured vehicles.Moreover, governments mayact by means of completely
'unofficial'aeents. includine armed bands. and 'volunteers'.or mav eive aid
to groups oT insurgents on the territoryof another State." (lnrér&rional
Lowond rhe Useof Forceby Srores, 1963, p.361.)
Brownlie notes that although sporadic operations by armed groups might not
amount to armed attack
"il is conceivable that a co-ordinated and e-neral carno.ie- bv ,.werful
bands or irregulars, with obvious or easilyproven cornplicity ofa government
of a state from which they.ope.ate would constitute an 'armed attack"'.
(Ibid, pp. 278-279.)
230. Hans Wehbere -eached the same conclusion in 1951.The a~nlic..ion of
"physical" force, he maintained, is necessary for a violation of Article(4), but
pbysical force must be defined to include certain forms of indirect aggression:
"la force arméepeut étre utiliséenon seulement directement, mais aussi
indirectement, par un 'appui fourni aux bandes armées formées sur le
territoire d'un Etat et pénétrant dans le territoire d'un autre Etat'."
("L'interdiction du recours à la force. Le principe et les problèmesqui se
posent", 78Hague Recueil(1951-l), pp. 68-69.)
231. Rosalyn Higgins also takes the position that use of irregulars to carry
out armed attacks against another State is, "from a functional point of view", a
use of force. (Higgins, "The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign
States. United Nations Practice". 37 Britis YheorBookollnlernuiionol Lniu 269
(1961), p. 278.) ~hedevelo~s the historical background for the growingemphasis
on indirect usesof force in United Nations practice. At San Francisco, she points
out, the focus was on conventional methods of armed attack, but "the unhappy
events of the last fifteen years" necessitateda substantial reevaluation of the con-
cept of the use of force. (Ibid, pp. 288-289.)Thus, the "law-making activities"
of the General Assembly and the International Law Commission defining and
outlawine indirect aecression did not take olace "in vucuo". but arose from a
combinaGon of the-continuing efforts to define aggression, the Nuremburg
principles, and the stream of incidents confronting the Security Council and the
~eneral Assembly. (Ibid., p. 290.)
232. Rifaat also describes this evolving recognition of the dangers of indirect
uses of force. Since 1945, he writes, States have with growing frequency used MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 65
armed bands and other covert uses of force in an attempt to circumvent the
prohibitions of Article 2 (4).
"States, while overtly accepting the obligation not to use force in their
mutual relations, began to seek other methods of covert pressure in order
to uursue their national uolicies without direct armed confrontation.
l'hc incumpïtibilit) oc thç clss\iial cxtern;il armcd aggrcssion uith the
prcscnt ruler regul>ting iiitcrnatton.il relati.~ns, led to the dcvclopnicnt oi
other methods ni coicri or indirect ïggrsssion." (lnr~~r~~«ri~~ rlyylrzs>io~i
1979,p. 217)
These other methods include "subversion, fomenting of civil strife. aiding armed
bands or the sending of irregulars to assist rebel groups in the target state".
(Ibid) (See also the Third Resolution of the Institut de droit international,
Sessionof Wiesbaden, 56 Annuuirede I'lnsrirurde droit internurianul 1975,p. 544;
Novogrod, "Indirect Aggression", in Bassiouni and Nanda, A Treurise on
international Criminal Law, 1973, Vol. 1, pp. 199-200; Aroneanu, Ln definition
de I'apression.1958.on. 89-91: Piotrowski. "Ou en sommes-nous sur le uroblème
de I'&ression", 35'Révue de irait internorional(Sottile) (1957). p. 415.j
233. Thus, there is now a substantially unanimous modern view concerning
indirect use of force through armed groups of mercenaries or irregulars. Whatever
legal doubts may have existed prior to the Second World War were dispelled by
the events of the postwar period. If the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2
(4) was to have any meaning, it would have to cover this new and dangerous
mode of military activity by armed mercenaries and irregulars. As Novogrod
writes, "Io argue that direct and indirect aggression could no1 equally be vio-
lations of Article 2 (4) of the Charter would be to make a fetish of literalism".
(Indirect Aggressian, p. 227.)
2. Theposirion of rhe United Slu1e.i
234. The United States has consistently been among the most forceful advo-
cates of this view that the use of armed groups hy a State to carry out military
activities against another State amounts to a use of force. Again, il is sufficient
to select only a few of the most salient among a multitude of suthorities.
235. As early as 1947,United States Representative Austin, in a statement to
the Security Council, condemned the support provided to guerrillas in Greece:
"1 do not think that we should interpret narrowly the 'Great Charter' of
the United Nations. In modern times. there are manv ways in which force
can be used by oneState against the territorial integri& of inother. Invasion
by organized armies is not the only means for delivering an attack against
a country's independence. Force is effectively used today through devious
methods of infiltration, intimidation and subterfuge.
But this does not deceive anyone. No intelligent person in possession of
the facts can fail to recognize here the use of force, however devious the
subterfugemay be. Wemus1recognize what intelligent and informed citizens
alreadv know. Yu~-slavia. Bule"ria and Albania. in sun..rtine --errillas in
norihirn Grcccc. have bctn using force aga1n.t ihc territorial intcgrity and
pc)litiçalinJepcndenic ul'Grrccc. The) haw in flic1hrcn cornmitting ait, of
ihc \cw kind uhich the United N;itioni uïh dcsicned 1,pre\cnt. and havc
violated the most important of the basic principl& upon which our Organi-
zation was founded." (2 UN SCOR (147th and 148th mtg.), pp. 1120-
1121(1947).)66 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITES
236. In a study prepared for the Legal Adviser's Officeof the United States
State Department in 1965,Richard Baxter concluded:
"Although the sending of volunteers might be regarded as a form of
'indirect aggression',the conduct of the responsible State may he so blatant
that 'indirect aggression' wouldbe a misnomer. There is a spectrum of con-
duct from the departure of individual volunteers from the territory of a
neutral State, which is not a violation of the State's duty of neutrality, to
outright State participation under the fiction of volunteers. A definition of
'use of force' would haveto specify when State responsibility is engaged."
(Study of the Principlesof InternationalLaw concerningFriendly Relations
andCo-operationamongStatesin Accordancewith the Charterof the United
Nations, 1965,pp. 1-12.)
237. Again in 1969,the same viewwas expressedby John Lawrence Hargrove,
United States Representative to the Special Committee on the Question of De-
finingAggression:
"The Charter speaks in Article 2, paragraph 4, of 'the use of force' in
international relations; it does not differentiate among the various kinds of
illegal force, ascribing degrees of illegalityaccording to the nature of the
techniaues of force emdo.ed.,Articles 1 and 39 of the Charter soedk of
'apgression'; .imilarly, thcy .iltsgcihcrialli,, iI~iTcrenti:i.imi>ngkindj of
;iggrrr\i.rns on the b~sis oi ihr rncihodi of \,iolcnir \\hich .Ip.iriiciil;ir
acarr.ni>rnia\ fdvor. Therc 1,sirnulvriour<i\i\ion in ihr.Charter. l'romriari
tGfinish, whcchsuggests that a &te cab in any way escape orameliorate
the Charter's condemnation of illegal acts of force against another State
by a judicious selection ofmeans to ils illegal ends." (Statement by John
Lawrence Hargrove, United States Representative to the SpecialCommittee
on the Question of Defining Aggression, 25 March 1969, Press Release
USUN-32 (69), p. 5.)
238. The same view was espoused in 1973 hy Judge Schwebel,who was the
United States Representative to the Special Committee on the Question of De-
fining Aggression. Writing a year before the Definition was adopted, he argued
"that the Charter of the United Nations makes no distinction between direct
and indirect uses of force" and that the "most pervasive foms of modern
aggression tend to be indirect ones". ("Aggression,Intervention and Self-Defence
in Modern International Law", 136Hague Recueil (1972-II), p. 458.)
"The characteristic of indirect aggressionappears to be that the aggressor
State, without itself committing hostile acts as a State, operates through
third parties who are either foreigners or nationals seeminglyacting on their
own initiative." (Ibid, p. 455.)
Judge Schwebel confinesthe label of indirect aggression to actions involving the
use of force.It does not cover such matters as economic and ideological coercion.
3. United Notions practice
239. The consistent practice of the United Nations confirms the proposition
that substantial involvement in the activities of armed insurgent groups is a
violation of the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2 (4). As Novogrod, a
United States military otficer assigned to the International Lÿw Division of the
Officeof the Judr- Advocate General, writes:
"An examination of the practice under the Charter, it is submitted, reveals
that the proscriptions of Article 2 (4) have been interpreted, for various MEMORIALOP NICARAGUA 67
purposes and in varying contexts, to include indirect aggression." ("Indirect
Aggression", in Bassiouniand Nanda, A Treatiseon InrernarionalCriminal
Law, 1973,Vol. 1.p. 220.)
240. The United ~ations concerned itself almost from the beginning with the
definition and elaboration of the concept of "the use of force" contained in the
Charter. A series of resolutions and oiher actions defining or condemning the
use offorce and aggression show a gradua1evolution from the general characteri-
zation of support for insurgent groups as unlawful to specific condemnations
invokiug Article 2 (4). The Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States,
adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949,imposed a duty:
"to refrain from fomenting civil strife in the territory of another State, and
to prevent the organization within its territory of activities calculated to
foment such civil strife". (Article 4, Report of the International Law Com-
mission, 4 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. IO), p. 8, UN doc. Al925 (1949).)
Similarly, the Commission's Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and
Securitv of Mankind included among the enumerated offences:
"(4) The incursion into the territory of a State from the territory of
another State by armed bands acting for a political purpose.
(5) The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State of
activities calculated to foment civil strife in another State, or the toleration
by the authorities of a State of organized activitiescalculated to foment civil
strife in another State." (Report of the International Law Commission, 9
UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 9), p. 11, UN doc. Al2693 (1954).)
241. The General Assembly, too, has repeatedly condemned the use of force
hy acting through insurgent groups. In its 1950PeaceThrough Deeds Resolution,
the Assembly denounced "the intervention of a State in the interna1 affairs of
another State for the purpose of changing ils legally established government hy
a threat or use offorce". (GA res. 380 (V).)
"Wh~ic\,cr the ucap<>n.ured, an!. aggrc,ri<,n,\i,hcihcriommittcd opcnl).
or b! fonicnting ci,,il itrifc in the intcrcsi:iforcign IJoi\,cr.or ~~thcruiw,
ir thc-Cr.iicjt 311crinici againit pcd;r and bciurit!. [hr<>ugh<~thtc UCIIIJ."
(See also Essentials of Peace Resolution, GA res. 290 (IV); 1965 Declaration
on the Inÿdmissibility of Intervention of the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty,GA res. 2131 (XX).)
242. The Assembly'sposition on the use of armed insurgent groups is further
refined in the 1970Declaration on Friendly Relations and Co-operation hetween
States (GA res. 2625 (XXV)), adopted without vote on 24 October 1970.Sohn
places this act of the Assembly in the category of United Nations resolutions
that "constitute binding interpretations of the Charter". ("The Development of
the Charter of the United Nations: the Present State", in Maarten Bos (ed.),
ThePresentSrateo/lnrernarional Law and OtherEssays, 1973,p. 50.)
243. The first principleenunciated in the Declaration is the prohibition against
the use of force, cast in the language of Article 2 (4).,Subsumed under this
principle are the very forms of involvement with the activities of armed bands
that appear in this case:
"Every State bas the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the
organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for
incursion into the territory of another State.
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting
or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or
acquiescing in organized activities within itsterritory directed towards the68 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph
involve a threat or use of force."
244. According to Judge Lachs, "indirect means of attacking States were
barred" by this Declaration. ("The Development and General Trends of Inter-
national Law in Our Time", 169 Hague Recueil (1980-IV), p. 166.) Similarly,
former President Jiménez de Aréchaga asserts that the 1970 Declaration
constitutes an "important interstitial development of some of the implications of
Article 2 (4)". He finds the origins of the 1970 Declaration in the increasing
use of methods of indirect aggression since 1945,in the sense of "the sending of
irregular forces or armed bands or the support or encouragement given by a
govemment to acts of civil strife in another State". Recognizing that "these acts
may involve the use of force", he argues that the purpose of the Declaration was
simply to prevent States from doing "indirectly what they are precluded by the
Charter from doing directly". (159 Hague Recueil (1978-I), p. 93.)
245. The United Nations development culminated with the adoption in 1974
of Resolution 3314 (XXIX), a Definition of Aggression endorsed by the Sixth
(Legal) Committee, and adopted hy the General Assemhly by consensus on
14 December 1974.
246. Article 1 of the Definition defines aggression as "the use of armed force
hy a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence
of another State". Thus the Definition of Aggression is again directly and
explicitly related to the use of force prohihited by Article 2 (4) of the Charter.
Article 3 specifies certain acts that shall "qualify as... aggression", Le., that
constitute the use of force in violation of Article 2 (4). Among these, and of
specificapplication in the present context, Article 3 (g) includes:
"The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State
of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial
involvement therein."
247. The Soviet Union proposed including subparagraph 3 (g) under the
separate label of "indirect aggression". (Draft proposal submitted by the USSR,
United Nations General Assembly Special Committee on Question of Defining
Aggression, UN doc. A/Ac. 134/L 12.)In the final Definition, however, subpara-
graph 3 (g) was included without diiïerentiating it from other, more overt forms
of aggression. The Special Committee accepted the proposition that the United
Nations Charter provides no basis for distinguishing between a State using force
by acting on its own and a State using force by acting through armed insurgent
groups. (See Report of the Sixth Committee, UN doc. A/8929, p. 5 (1974); see
also Stone, Conflict through Consensus,1977, p. 89.) The Definition condemns
the sending of amed bands as a use of force on the same plane as direct invasion,
hombardment, blockade and other traditional notions of armed aggression.
(See ibid., p. 75; see also Ferencz, "A Proposed Definition of Aggression", 22
International andComparative Law Quarterly (1973), at 421 ; 1981 Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and lnterference in the lnternal Affairs of
States, UN doc. A/Res/36/103 (1981), p. 78.)
4. The criteriafor State liability
248. Subparagraph 3 (g) of the United Nations Definition of Aggression spe-
cifically covers both the sending of armed bands "by or on behalf" of a State
and "substantial involvement" in the acts of armed groups. This outcome was a
compromise between the position of the western States, led by the United States, MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 69
and the position of several Third World countries. The United States insisted
thai ihc prnhibitiori .*nly un "rending" ~med grciup, wdi t<>onarrdu (Sec
1crcii:r. DcJ;,irngIti~<rnu~ii~~uylri~\n~,t.975,Vol 2.p. 39 1An carlier uestern
Jrait uould have condcmncd 'org~nking, iuppnrting or dire<tiiig.iriiicJ bsiid,
or irregular or volunteer forces that make incursions or infiltrate into another
state". (Report of Special Committee, UN doc. A/8019 (1970), p. 60.) Similarly,
in 1972the United States proposed adding the following 10the list of examples
of the use of amed force :
-Ttic <irgani,ation hy .ISt.~ic.or enruurÿgcmcnr ui the organi/niioii ni,
or ;i,siii;inIO, irregular Lirir., or mned han& or <~thr.rrilup,, \.<~luntcer,.
or mercenaries, which participate in incursions into another State's terri-
tory or in the carrying out of acts involving the use of force in or against
another State, or knowing acquiescence in organized activities within its
own territory directed toward and resulting in the commission of such acts."
(28 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 19), pp. 22-23, UN doc. A19019(1973).)
249. Many nations of the third world, in contrast, objected to such an ex-
pansive prohibition on aid to anned bands: they sought to include in 3 (g)
only the actual sending of armed groups against another SVdtC.(Report of the
Sixth Committee, UN doc. A/9411, p. 11(1973); Ferencz, Defininginternational
Aggression, 1975, Vol. 11,p. 39.) If 3 (g) was read too hroadly, these nations
feared, it might condemn assistance to indigenous groups engaged in struggles
for self-determination against colonial powers. (See Stone, Conflict through Con-
sensus, 1977,pp. 74-75, 80-83.)
250. The final language of 3 (g) emerged as a compromise between these two
positions. (Stone, Conflict through Consensus, 1977, p. 75; Ferencz, Defining
International Aggression,1975,Vol.II, p. 40.)The definition starts bycondemning
the "sending" of anned groups. The United States language condemning "or-
ganizing, supporting or directing" armed groups was dropped. Instead, the
prohihition was extended to "suhstantial involvement" in the activities of the
anned groups.
251. As is to be exoected.hoth elements of the United Nations Definition are
hroadly supported by the writings of publicists. In addition, the Court has also
made it clear that the adoption or ratification of the acts of non-governmental
actors in itself makes those actions the act of the State
(a) Direction and control
252. It is onlycommon sense that the actual direction and control of irregular
armed hands hy a State gives rise to liahility of that State for their actions. The
proposition is fully supported by international law authorities. (See, e.g., Ago,
Third Report to the International Law Commission, Yearbookof the Internutiunul
Law Commission,1971,Vol. 11,Part 1,pp. 263-266.)
253. In discussing the activities of rebels in a civil war Brownlie writes, "If
rebels are effectively supported and controlled by another state that state is
responsihle for a 'use of force' as a consequence of the agency." (International
Law und the UseofForce by States, 1963,p. 370 (emphasis in text).)
"The use of volunteers under governmental control for launching a
military campaign or supporting active rehel groups will undoubtedly
constitute a 'use of force'.t is the question of government control and not
the label 'volunteer' or otherwise which is important." (Ibid, pp. 371-372.)70 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYAC~VITIES
This emphasis on direction or control is shared by other publicists. As Pio-
trowski writes,
"l'emploi de la force par voie d'une action organisée à l'intérieurdu pays a
l'aide de I'Etat étranger, au moyen de saboteurs, instructeurs, meneurs et
techniciens de provenance étrangèreou instniits à l'étranger,constitue bien
un casus d'agression indirecte." ("Où en sommes-nous sur le problème de
I'agression", 35Revuede droir internarional (Sottile) 1957,p. 415. See also
Aroneanu, Lu diJinirinnde l'agression 1958,pp. 91-92.)
254. Whether a State controls and directs the activities of the armed groups
depends on the facts of the particular situation. For Brownlie, proof of control
is essentially proof of agency. In discussing the factors that determine whether a
State has control over a group of alleged volunteers, Brownliecites:
"numhers, central direction, size of offensivelaunched, ... identification of
formations and divisions . . .source of equipment, the origin of the com-
mand under which the forces operate, and an absence of disavowal by
the government of the State of origin". ("Volunteers and the Law of War
and Neutrality", 5 lnrernarionaland ComparaiiveLuw Quarrerly (1956),
p. 574.)
255. Under this analysis, the United States has exercised and is exercising
control over the activitiesof the mercenary forces,and is thus using force against
Nicaragua. Each of the factors Brownlie cites is satisfied in the present case.
Although the mercenaries represent a large, well-organized force of 16,000men
(LAT 3/5/85), and their offensives often involve several hundred soldiers (see,
cg., Brody Report, Ann. 1,Attachment 2, pp. 5, 23), the central direction of the
mercenary forces kas come from Washington. (WSJ 3/5/85.) Their equipment
comes primarily from the United States, either directly or funneled through a
network of third parties. (LAT3/4/85 ; WSJ 3/5/85 ;WP 7111/84; WP 7/19/84 ;
NYT 1/13/85.)Indeed, the United States exercisesdirection and control at every
level of the mercenary army's activities, from the most minute details of the
behavior and performance of individual mercenaries, to the broadest issues of
deciding what goals to achieve and how to achieve them.
256. At the command level,the United States determines the mercenary army
leadership. In 1982the United States decided that the mercenary forces needed
new leaders to improve their political "image". Accordingly, it interviewed can-
didates, selected the new leaders, and unveiled them in a press conference in
Miami in December 1982.(LAT 3/4/85; WSJ3/5/85.)The United States told the
mercenary leaders what they should say in public in order to make a favorable
impression on Congress and the United States public. (NYT 11/1/84; LAT
3/3/85.) The evidencecontains a telegram from the mercenary forces'leadership
to the United States Ambassador in Tegucigalpa requesting the inclusion of one
person in the leadership and thanking him for his help in solving other leadership
problems. (See Carrion Affidavit, Ann. A, Exhibit B.) The United States paid
the mercenary leadersand housed many of them in Miami. (NYT 11/1/84.) For
those mercenary leaders hased in Central Amenca, the CIA devised plans to
resettle them in the United States should that become necessary. (NYT 6/27/84.)
Leaders who displeased the United States were dismissed.(WP 11/27/84.)
257. At the organizational level, the United States recruited mercenaries and
set the pay scale of leaders and foot soldiers alike. (WSJ 3/5/85.) Moreover, the
United States has regulated the size of the mercenary forces, estahlishing both
the amount and the Pace of growth. (LAT 3/5/85; WSJ 3/5/85.) Every major
increase in the sire of the mercenary forces has reflected a policy decision WORIAL OF NICARAGUA 71
made inWashington.The Reagan administration'sinitial requestfor Congressional
funding in late 1981called for a force of 500 mercenaries.(LAT 3/3/85.) In the
fall of 1982, the CIA recommended a substantial increase in mercenary force
levels. (WP 5/8/83; WP 5/5/83.) By December 1982 the mercenary army had
been expanded to 4,000 men, by February 1983 10 5,500, by July 1983 to
8,000-10,000.(WP 5/8/83; WP 7/14/83; WSJ 9/21/83.)Then during the summer
of 1983,the Administration decided to expand the size of the mercenary army
to 15,000men. (NYT 7/25/83; WP 11/23/83.)By the end of 1984the CIA had
achieved this goal. (LAT 3/5/85.) The CIA has also worked to ensure that the
mercenary army does not grow faster than the predetermined rate. (LAT3/5/85.)
258. At the operational level, the United States directs the training of the
mercenary forces hy CIA personnel. (WP 4/7/84; WSJ 3/6/85.) The United
States advisers instruct the mercenaries generally on the principles of guerrilla
warfare and specificallyon what weapons to use, how to make them and how
to use them. (See Psychological Operaiions in Guerrilla Wafare, Ann. G; see
also LAT3/3/85; NYT 12/3/84.)Through the psychologicalwarfare manual and
the CIA sabotage booklet, Annex H, the United States even sought to advise
the mercenaries on how they should behave. United States advisers help the
mercenaries plan their missions and often accompany them to supervise the
missions. (NYT 10/16/83; WSJ 3/6/85.) Finally, the United States never let
the mercenaries control their own weapons or logistics. (WSJ 3/5/85.)
259. At the tactical level,the United States has told themercenarieswhat tac-
tics to employ. The CIA originally urged the mercenaries to launch conven-
tional attacks in an attempt to seizeand hold Nicaraguan territory. (NYT4/3/83.)
Later, the United States decided that guerrilla tactics would he more effective
against Nicaragua and told the mercenaries to change their tactics accordingly.
(LAT 3/4/85; WP 4/7/84.) In addition, the CIA kas selected targets for the
mercenary raids and directed air strikes against the targets. (NYT 5/3/84; WSJ
3/6/85.) It kas also chosen which methods of violence the mercenaries should
employ. (See Psychologicul Operalions in Guerrilla Warfare, Ann. G.) In sum,
the day-to-day conduct of the war was directed by CIA personnel under the
-vc-~~~~~unervision of CIA Director Casev. (WP 12116184.1 Indeed. one adminis-
tration officialr&n&ked, "It's really caséy';war."' (lhid. j
260. At the levelof military strategy, the United States has dictated a program
of sabotage and decided upon the elass of targets it wishes the mercenaries to
attack. 11has chosen when and where the mercenaries should launch invasions
into Nicaragua.
261. At the levelof political and organizational strategy, the United States has
wo~k~ ~ ~ ~nite the onnosine factionsof mercenariesand to imnrovetheir uolitical
image. It has formulated a plan to cripple the Nicaraguan ec~nomy.It made the
decision to embark the mercenarieson a program of psychological warfare.
262. Close control over the activities of the mercenaries h& been a consistent
goal of United States policy. Administration officiaishave repeatedly assured
Congress that the United States was in control. In December 1982,for example,
one ofCIA Director Casey'saides testifiedthat the CIA had "firm control" over
the mercenary operation. (WP 5/8/83; see also LAT 3/5/85.) The United States
has taken decisive steps to maintain this control. After Argentina pulled its
advisers out of the mercenary operation, the United States decided to manage
the program directly and sent its own advisers. (WSJ 3/5/85.) From that time
on, the United States has steadily increased the numher of these advisers. (NYT
11/19/84; seealso LAT 3/3/85.) On occasions an American helicopter, flown by
United States personnel, has been used to obtain better command and control
at the operational level. (WSJ 3/5/85.) Again there are many instances of the72 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITLES
CIA threatening to withhold suppliesand training unlessthe mercenaries accepted
its advice. (NYT4/18/84.)
(b) Suhsiuntialinvolvement
263 'lhe .;econilhranch oi the ;oncepl 5>i~ggrcr.i<~cnmh<idicdin paragrdph 3
g oi the ,\ncmhl)'~ deiinitiiin lind. equally hrolid rupport. The principlc guti
~t I~ ~ ~ ~fdr b:ick ;IIihe historic Al;ih.iniaClïini, ,\rhiiration dccided in 1872.
(Moore, History and Digest of the InternationalArbitrafionstu Whichthe United
States Hus Beena Party, Vol. 1, p. 658.) There, the tribunal awarded "a sum of
$15,500,000 ingold, as the indemnity to be paid by Great Britain to the United
States". The hasis of the claim was that, during the American Civil War, Great
Britain had fitted out, armed, equipped, and supplied Confederate cruisers that
preyed on Union shipping.
264. The position is confirmed in the writings of modem puhlicists. Former
President Jiménezde Arechaga, writes, "to violate the prohibition on the use of
force it is required to organize, instigate, assist or participate 'in acts of civil
strife"'. (159 Haeue Recueil(1978-1). o.115.Seealso Schachter. "The Riaht -f
States to'use ~Aed ~orce",'82 ~iih&an Law Review (1984), p. 1641.)
265. The evidence that conclusivelydemonstrates United States direction and
control of the mercenaries' paramilitdry activities against Nicaragua shows, a
fi~rtiori,that the United States has been "suhstantially involved" at every level
of these operations. The United States intimate involvement withthe mercenary
forces is also demonstrated hy the United States role in furnishing the men,
money, material and support facilities essentialto the mercenaries'operations.
266. The United States has provided men for the mercenary movement hy
recruiting in Honduras and the United States, and training the soldiers once they
join up. (WSJ 3/5/85; WP 4/7/84.) The United States role has been even more
crucial in financing the mercenary program; the United States has allocated
more than $70 million to it from 1981 to the spring of 1984. Moreover, the
United States has supervised the expenditure of these funds to ensure that they
are not used improperly hy the mercenary officers. (LAT 3/4/85; WSJ 3/5/85.)
Each new Congressional authorization of funds for the program has resulted in
a surge in mercenary activities(NYT 1/16/84.)Conversely,Congressional refusals
to continue funding have been followed hy dire assertions that the mercenary
movement cannot survive without United States support. (See, e.g., Official
Transcript of News Conference hy President Reagan (22 May 1984), pp. 172-
173,infra,Ann. C, Attachment 1-5; WP 2/18/85; NYT 1/16/84.)
267. The matériel furnishedhy the United States ranges from helicopters and
combat planes to small arms to uniforms and boots. (See, e.g., WP9/15/84; WP
9/18/84; NYT9/19/84, 1/13/85and 3/1/85.)Military hardware that was originally
the property of the United States Air Force was transferred to the mercenaries
through the CIA. (Ibid. ;see also NYT 7/25/83.) Further, the United States has
encouraged and assistedprivate groups in funnelingwar suppliesto the mercenar-
ies. (WP 9/18/84; NYT 9/11/84.) To move the equipment to the mercenaries -
hoth that provided by the CIA itself and that furnished by private United States
groups - the United States has conducted a large lift operation involvingUnited
States Navy ships, Air Force planes, and at least one private cargo airline. (NYT
7115/84; WP 7119/84.)
268. In addition, the United States has furnished the mercenaries withsupport
facilities. In Honduras, there has heen a massive effort to improve military in-
stallations such as army bases and airfields, many of which have heen used by
the mercenaries. (WP 10/26/84; WP 1/31/85; NYT 1/13/85.) Moreover, the MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 73
United States kas put sophisticated intelligence facilities at their disposal to
conduct surveillance of the Nicaraguan forces. (Time 4/23/84; see also WP
10/26/84.)
269. Findlly, suhparagraph 3 (g) of the Assemhly'sDefinition of Aggression
says that the acts carried out hy the armed groups must be "of such gravity as
to amount to" invasion or attack, military occupation, hombardment, hlockade
of the ports or coast of a State and the like. Thus minor incidents are not con-
sidered a use of force under the rubric of subparagrdph 3 (g). (Rifaat, Interna-
tional Aggression(1979), p. 274.)There can be no doubt that the mercenaries'acti-
vities are of sufficientgravity as to fall within the prohibition of subparagraph
3 (g). To recite only gross figures, in all, the military attacks of the mercenaries
have resulted in over 2,600 Nicaraguans killed; over 5,500 maimed, wounded,
raped or kidnapped; and more than $378,200,000in property damage. Thus,
the standard of substantial United States involvementin the activitiesof the mer-
cenaries has heen fully satisfied.
(c) Adoption and ratification
270. Finally, the United States, on the highest authority, has repeatedly adop-
ted, ratified and approved the acts of the mercendry forces in and against Nicara-
gua. One of themost recentand extremeexamplesisPresidentReagan'saffirmation
in a radio address on 16Fehruary 1985,that "They are our hrothers ... [Tlheir
fight is Ourfight." (OfficialTranscript, Ann. C, Attachment 1-13,)
271. Under the jurisprudence of the Court, such adoption and ratification
constitutes still another basis for attrihuting the actions of the mercenaries to
the United States for the purpose of determining its legal liahility. In the case
concerning United StatesDiplomatie and Consular Staff in Tehran,the Court said :
"ilic poli+ thus ann<~uncr.r ly thc Ayliioll;ihKhonicini. of nidinialnirigihe
<,ccup.iiii>nui ihc t.nib;is,y anJ ihc Jcicniioii of 11siiimarcs lis hii\iïor\
the purpose of exerting pressure on the United States Government was
complied with by other lranian authorities and endorsed hy them repeatedly
in statements made in various contexts. The result of that policy was fun-
damentally to transform the legal nature of the situation created by the
occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its diplomatic and consular
staff as hostages. The approval given to these facts hy the Ayatollah Kho-
meini and other organs of the lranian State, and the decision to perpetu-
ate them, translated continuing occupation of the Embassy and detention of
the hostages into acts of that State." (ICJ.Reports 1980,p. 3, at pp. 34-36.)
272. The President's statement of 16 February 1985is only the most striking
of the many statements by senior administration officiais adopting, approving
and ratifying the activities of the mercenaries against Nicaragua. President
Reagan himself repeatedly refers to these mercenaries as "freedom fighters" and
tells the American people that it has a duty to support them. (OfficialTranscript,
Ann. C, Attachment 1-13.)
273. Indeed, these ratifications go heyond the actions of the mercenariesthem-
selves. In recent months, after the Congress had terminated further officialas-
sistance to the mercenary forces the Administration encouraged and facilitated
the activities of private parties in supplying men, money and matériel to
mercenary forces in the field. Two American citizens (one a member of the
Alabama Air National Guard) who had joined the mercenaries hy this route
were killed in a helicopter attack on Nicaraguan terntory. When challenged on74 MlLLTARYAND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlES
these matters in Congress and the press, United States officials defended and
emhraced these private actions.
274. In this manner, the United States, hy adopting, approving and ratifying
the acts of the mercenary forces and pnvate efforts to support and assist them,
has "translated" their acts and conduct "into the acts of that State". (I.C.J.
Reports 1980,p. 36.)
C The UnitedStates Use of Force,as Shown by the Evidence, 1s 'Against the
TerritorialIntegrity and PoliticalIndependence" ofNicaragua
275. The ohrase "aeainst the territorial inteeritv or the ~oliticalindeoendence
of any ~tate:'was inserted in the text of ~rticle 2i4) prec&elyto ensuréthat the
illenalityof the use of force against either of these sovereign attnbutes would he
indis~uiahle. It was intendedto safecua-d the continuedsovereign exis-ence of
~e-.~~~..~-.-~--
276. The Dumharton Oaks draft of the Charter contained no specificreference
to ~oliticalindeoendenceand territorial inteeritv as essentialattributes of national
so;ereignty. ~he omission did not go unn:ti&d. In comments suhmitted prior
to the San Francisco Conference,many of the medium and smallStates, including
virtually al1 of the Latin American States, proposed amendments designed to
ensure the explicit protection of these attnbutes in the Charter.
277. The amendment finally adopted was proposed by Australia. (6 UNCIO
doc. 382, 17May 1945,p. 303.)The Deputy Pnme Minister,Mr. Francis M. Forde,
after reviewing the substance of the proposed amendment, stated the rationale
for it as follows:
"The application of this principle should insure that no question relating
to a change of frontiers or an abrogation of a state's independence could
be decided other than by peaceful negotiation." (1 UNCIO doc. 20, 28April
1945,p. 174.)
This rationale was echoed precisely by Dr. Herbert Evatt, Minister for External
Afiairs and head of the Australian Delegation, in his suhsequent book The
United Nations.(The United Nations, 1948,p. 19.)
278. There can be no question that the use of force by the United States
appearing on the record before the Court isagainst hoth "the territorial integrity"
and "the political independence" of Nicaragua. The evidence shows repeated
armed incursions across the frontiers, hundreds of deliherate violations of
Nicaraguan airspace - many of them hy high performance aircraft for the
purpose of producing sonic booms to intimidate the population - and admitted
intrusions by armed vesselsinto Nicaraguan territorial waters. (Carrion Affidavit,
Ann. A, Exhihit A.) It is self-evident that these actions are, as a matter of law,
ohvious and flagrant assaults on Nicaragua's territorial integrity.
279. Similarly, the United States actions in supporting the mercenaries are
openly and unequivocally directed against the "political independence" of Nica-
ragua. As defined hy McDougal:
"Impairment of 'political independence' ... involves suhstantial curtail-
ment of the freedom of decision-making [of the target state] through the
effectiveand drastic reduction of the numher of alternative policies open at
tolerable cost to the officials of that state. It may further consist of an
attempt to reconstruct the process of decision in the target state, to modify
the composition or membership of the mling elite group, and, perhaps, to
dislodge that group completely and to suhstitute another more acceptable MEMORIALOP NICARAGUA 77
$14 million for funding the activities of the mercenaries during the current fiscal
year. The express premise or this campaign was that without such funding and
other forms of United States support and involvement, the United States will be
powerless to impose its will upon Nicaragua and to force it to comply with
United States demands. Staternents too numerous for citation [rom hoth sup-
porters and opponents of the additional funding reflect this basic premiseof the
funding campaign. (E.g., Statement of Facts, paras. 133-150.)
290. Indeed, the centerpiece of the campaign was the so-called "peace initia-
tive" launched hv President Reaean on 4 Aoril 1985. In it. he onèred a 60-dav
ccli\e lire h) the gucrrillac "in rciurn anr agrc,cmcnth) the Nic:iragu:in rCgimc
io hcgin a dialogue mediaicd by tlic Ri,h,,pr C<~nfcrenccof the Roman Caiholic
Churrh with thc eoal of rcstorinu dcmocraei throuah honcst clccti<ins" I>urinr!
that 60-day perigd, assistance 1; the mercinaries ;as to be restricted to no;
military items. "If there is no agreement after 60 days of negotidtions, 1will lift
these restrictions, unless both sides ask me not 10.'' (Official Transcript of
Remarks, p. 189,infra, Ann. C, Attachrnent 1-19.)It is apparent that this "peace
initiative"is a thinly veiled ultimatum. As President Betancur of Colomhia said:
"lt is no longer a peace proposal, but a preparation for war." (NYT4/16/85.)
291. It goes without saying that these purposes entirely negate the justification
of self-defense.They are diametrically opposed to any conception of self-defense
recognized by contemporery international law.
B. In Any Event, the Ju.sti/icalionofSelf-defenseCannol Be Supportcd in the
Circumstancesof This Case
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter provides:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Memher of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by Memhers in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Self-defense within the meaning of Article 51 is the only justification for the
unilateral use of force under the Charter. The use of force by the United States
against Nicaragua cannot be so justified. It followsthat it cannot bejustified at all.
1. kgal justi/ication.sfor lhe use offorce
292. The prohibition on the use of force in Article 2 (4) of the Charter is
categorical. The only exception to this prohibition, other than collectivemeasures
authorized hy the Security Council, isthe inherent right of individual or collective
self-defensein case of armed attack, preserved under Article 519.
293. The standard formulation is given in Brierly'sLaivof Nations:
"The broad effect of Article 2 (4) is, therefore, that it entirely prohibits
the use or threat of armed force against another state except in self-defence
The oneotherexception inthe provisionforthe use offorceagainstcx-enemyStates
in Articles107 and 53; howcvcr,thcsc provisionsmay be describcd as a temporary
exceptionwhichhasnowlapsed.78 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
or in execution of collective measures authorized by the Council or As-
semhly." (TheLaw of Nations, 1963,p. 415.)
This general view of the interacting relationship between Article 2 (4) and
Article 51 has the overwhelming support of international law puhlicists around
the world. We list here some of the chief sources:
Alfaro, "La question de la définition del'agression", 29 Revue de druit inter-
national(Sottile) (l95l), p. 374.
Baxter, "The Legal Consequences of the Unlawful Use of Force under the
Charter", 62 AmericanSociety of International LawProceedings(l968), p. 69.
Bentwich and Martin, A Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations,
1956,p. 13.
Bishop, "General Course of Public International Law", 115 Hague Recueil
(1965-Il), p. 428.
Briggs, The Law of Nations, 1953,at p. 964.
Brownlie, InternationalLaw and the Useof Forceby Bates, 1963,p. 113.
Chaumont, "Cours généralde droit international public", 129 Hague Recueil
(1970-1), p. 403.
Falk, "The New States and International Legal Order", 118 Hague Recueil
(1966-il), p. 47.
Henkin, How Nations Behave, 1979, p. 137.
Jiménezde Arechaga, DerechoConstitucionalde lasNacionesUnidas,1958,p. 87.
Kelsen, Principlesof IniernationalLaw, 1966,p. 54.
Lachs, "The Development and General Trends of International Law in Our
Time", 169Hague Recueil(1980-IV), pp. 159, 162.
E. Lauterpacht, "The Legal Irrelevance of the 'State of War"', 62 American
Society of International LawProceedings (1968), p. 62.
Rousseau, Le droit desconflitsarmés,1983,pp. 535-536.
Scelle, "Quelques réflexionssur l'abolition de la compétence deguerre", 58
RGDIP (1954), p. 5.
Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force", 82 Michigan Law Review
(1984), p. 1620.
Schwebel, "Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defencein Modern International
Law", 136Hague Recueil(1972-II), p. 449.
Wehberg, "L'interdiction du recours à la force. Le principe et les problèmesqui
se posent", 78Hague Recueil(1951-l), p. 70.
294. One further quotation from Sir Humphrey Waldock'sauthoritative treat-
ment, "The Use of Forcein International Law", isappropriate. He says:
"Armed reprisals to obtain satisfaction for an injury or any armed
intervention as an instrument of national policy otherwise than for self-
defence is illegal under the Charter....Thus the only question is, what is
the scope of the exception of self-defence." (81 Hague Recueil (1952-II),
p. 493.)
295. The classiccase of the use of force "as an instrument of national policy"
is the attempt to overthrow the government of another State that is for some
reason not acceptable to the acting State, or to force it to change its policies.
Whatever may he "the scope of the exception of self-defence"it cannot stretch
to cover the use of force for these purposes.
296. Even the minority of puhlicists who contend that Article 51 does not
define or limit the right of self-defense, but simply preserves the pre-existing MEMORlAL OF NICARAGUA 79
right, agree that the very concept of self-defenseis inconsistent with the use of
force aeainst the .~liti~al indeoendence of another State. Bowett. who is ~erhaos
the leaiing exponent of this ion-restrictive view of Article 51,'agrees ihat the
core of the concept is the protection of "essential nghts from irreparahle harm
in circumstances in which alternative means of prot&tion are unavailahle . . .".
(Self-Defencein International Law, 1958,p. Il.) In no sensecan the use of force
hy the United States against the political independence of Nicaragua over a four-
year period, as shown on the record before the Court, be regarded as the only
available means of protecting essential rights from irreparable ham.
297. More frequently, proponents of a non-restrictive viewof Article 51define
self-defensewith referenceto Daniel Webster'sfamous formulation inthe Caroline
case: "a government alleging self-defensemust show a necessity of self-defense
[that is]instant, overwhelming,and leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliheration".
Higgins, "The Legal Limits Io the Use of Force by Sovereign States, United
Nations Practice", 37 British Year Book of International Law (1961),
pp. 301-302.
Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force", 82 Michigan LawReview
(1984), pp. 1634-1635.
Schwarzenberger,"The Fundamental Principlesof International Law", 87Hague
Recueil(1955-I), pp. 332-333.
Waldock, "The Use of Force in International Law", 81 Hague Recueil(1952-II),
pp. 496-498.
298. Here again it is evident that there is not and never has been any threat
by Nicaragua to the United States or any other country necessitating an instant,
reRexiveresponse. In the Carolineformula there is "no moment for deliberation".
But the United States has had more than four years to deliberate about "the
choice of means" for its Nicaraeuan oolicv. After first considering the open use
oi military il>rcc IO achicv.- 11.Ccniral Anicriciin objcctiies. i11cJc<i,ion iixr
mdde ti>,>rgliniïeand ILiiincliilic rncr;cnlirier, thcio supplemcnt their clli>rir
kit11 1111ninoi harhor5 and direci ati;icks b\ CIA cnio. .ccsand Iiircdsahotc~rs
against targets inside Nicaragua, ultimately to expand the guerrilla force Io
15,000men, and to engage overall in a policy of intimidation and "perception
management". (See, e.g., WSJ 3/5/85; NYT 3130185;NYT 4/17/85.) Over this
entire period, the United States has - in a measured, calculated and deliberate
manner - steadily intensified the application of force against Nicaragua. The
Caroline formula can find no application in this case.
2. Thefactual basisfor thejustification of self-defenseis no: present in this case
299. President Reagan's press statement of 21 Fehruary far from announcing
a new policy objective, simplymarked the abandonment of the pretense that the
United States was recruiting, financing,training, supplyingand directing the mer-
cenaries over the past four years for the sole purpose of "interdicting" the alleged
flow of anns from Nicaragua to El Salvador. But it had hecome apparent long
before then that the oft-repeated interdiction claim was simply a sham:
- The very first National Security Council document accompanying the plan
initially approved by President Reagan in November 1981 included the
following statement of purpose:
"Build popular support in Central Amenca and Nicaragua for an oppo-
sition front that would be nationalistic, anti-Cuban and anti-Somoza;80 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVLTIES
support the opposition front through formation and training of action
teams to collect intelligence and engage in paramilitary and political-
operations in Nicaragua and elsewhere; work primarily through non-
Americans to achieve the foregoing, but in some circumstances CIA might
(possihly using US personnel) take unilateral paramilitary action against
special Cuhan targets." (WP 5/8/83.)
- The CIA provided military and financial support to Eden Pastora, whose
forces were hased in Costa Rica - to the south and far from any potential
weapons routes to El Salvador - and whose stated ohjective was the
overthrow of the Nicaraguan Government. (LAT 3/3/85.)
- The minine of Nicarapua's harbors in Februarv and Marcb of 1984 had
purposes Gher than Che interdiction of weap6ns traffic. Senator David
Durenberger, a memher of the Senate Intelligence Committee and until
recently astrong supporter of aid to the mercenaries, said that the decision
to undertdke the minine w.. hased on the need to steD . .D actions arainst
N1wr.igu.i "IO saine highcr Icvcl \ilth siimc rpeii.ili~cd iiai\it) th:,! u.uuld
put cconumic prcr~urc" iin the <i<~icrniiient (.Y,.itsJ~j~419 hl.)
- Similarl., iIic . .co;ir;itioii .ind ili~~cminaiionin 19x3 01 3 iiianiial-ci\i-i:
instructions for attacking and terroriring civilians and civilian targets was
evidently unconnected with the objective of arms interdiction. The manual
specifically directs the guerrillas to "kidnap ... officials of the Sandinista
government"; and to "neutralize carefully selected and planned targets"
including judges, police and State Security officials.("Psychological Opera-
lions in Guerrilla Warfare", Ann. G.)
- The many attacks carried out against civilians and a wide range of economic
targets, from cofiee harvests to oil storage facilities, bear no relation to arms
interdiction.
300. The striking discrepancy hetween the Administration's public words and
private deeds is overwhelmingly confirmed by former mercenary leader Edgar
Chamorro. The CIA officials,he said, "always told us the ohjective was to over-
throw the government in Managua. . . . They always said the President of
the United States wants you to go to Managua." (LAT 3/3/85.) At the same
time, however, these officials warned Chamorro and his fellow leaders never
to state publicly that their objective was the overthrow of the Nicaraguan
Government. (LAT 3/3/85.)
301. The evidentiary record shows conclusively that self-defense in any guise,
whether as defined under Article 51 or otherwise, was simplynot a factor in the
Administration's policy calculations. The support of the guerrillas was conceived
from the start as a way of using force to put pressure on or overthrow the
Government of Nicaragua in furtherance of United States national interests, as
defined by the Administration. Moreover, from the beginning, United States
~olicvmakers were aware that use of force for such Durnoses could not he
puhlirly julti1ic.i cicn in c~iii\cntis~i:ilpulitic~l tcrm,. much Icsas .in crcriisc
tif scli-dcfciijc iindcr the nc>rm.iii intcrnati,in31 la\: thiii the use,II'"c~>\:rt"
action.
302. Even if arms interdiction had been the United States purpose, the justi-
fication of self-defenseunder Article 51 cannot he sustained. Article 51 provides
that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs. .. ." (Em~hasis
added.) The allegations of weapons Supply hy Nicaragua to ~alvado;an iebels,
even if true, would no1 amount to "an armed attack" under this provision. EMORIAL OP NICARAGUA 81
303. The plain meaning of this article limits the exercise of the right of self-
defense to situations in which the actor is under armed attack. Henkin confirms
this analysis in the following passage:
"Of course, in the abstract, 'an armed attack occurs', does not have to
mean only if an armed attack occurs. But anyone reading the article, as a
lawyer or as a layman, would read the article as permitting an exception
onlv if an armed attack occurs. What draftsman or reader would savthat a
c1a;se which permits self-defenseif an armed attack occurs, reallyiermits
self-defensewhether an armed attack occurs or not?'
304. The restrictive interpretation of Article 51is adhered to by a majority of
publicists:
G. Badr, 10 GeorgiaJournalof Internationaland ComparativeLaw (1980), p. 6.
Bishon. "Ge-e~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Public International Law". 115 Haeue Recueilu
(i95.5-11),pp. 436-437.
Brownlie, International Lawand the Useof Forceby States, 1963,p. 278.
Henkin, How Nations Behave,1979,pp. 141-142.
JiménezdeArechaga, DerechoConstitucionaldelasNacionesUnidas,1958,p. 401.
Kelsen, The Law (J'the United Nations,1950,p. 797.
Komarnicki, "La définitionde l'agresseurdans le droit international moderne",
75 Hague Recueil(1949-II), p. 84.
Oppenheim, InternationalLuw (H. Lauterpacht, ed.), 1952,Vol. 11,p. 154.
Skubiszewski, "The Postwar Alliances of Poland and the United Nations
Charter", 53 AnzericanJournal ofInternationalLaw (1959), pp. 167,619-622.
Tdoka, TheRighl of Self-Defensein InternationalLaw, 1978,p. 126.
Verdross, "Idées directrices de l'organisation des Nations Unies", 83 Hague
Recueil(1953-II), p. 83, p. 14.
Wehberg, "L'interdiction du recours a la force. Le principe et les problèmesqui
se posent", 78 Hague Recueil(1951.1). p. 81.
Q. Wright, "The Prevention of Aggression", 50AmericanJournal ofInternational
Law (1956), p. 529.
305. In his Hague lectures, Judge Ldchs affirmed both the validity and the
importance of this interpretdtion:
" 'Armedattack' must he ascertained; it must be clearthat it waslaunched.
With the present means of verification this should present no difficulties,
but there must be no shadow of doubt, for practice has demonstrated that
false alerts may occur: and they may lead to disaster." (169 Hague Recueil
(1980-IV), p. 164.)
Although Judge Lachs is referring specificallyto nuclear weapons, the point is
equdlly valid more generally. Any circumvention ofthe armed attack limitation
endangers the peace and security of the international system, at the regional as
wellas the global level.
306. Perhaps the most striking exemplar ofthe armed attack limitation on the
right of self-defenseis to be found in the deliherate refusal of the United States
to justify its quarantine of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis in terms of
self-defense.Professor Chayes, who was State Department Legal Adviser during
the crisis,writes that "the self-defenseargument. .. was never officiallyespoused
in the Cuban aliair. On the contrary, it was repeatedly and consciously rejected."
(The Cuban MissileCrisis, 1974,p. 63.) He further explains that, although part
of the reason for the United States position was the unwillingness to set a
dangerous precedent, the larger "difficulty with the Article 51 argument was that82 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
it seemed to trivialize the whole effort at legaljustification", preciselybecause it
would have allowed the United States to he judge in ils own case. (Ibid p. 65.)
The ultimate result would be that:
"Whenever a nation believedthat interests, which inthe heat and pressure
of a crisis it is prepared to characterize as vital, were threatened, its use of
force in response would hecome permissible." (Ibid j
307. If the United States refused to regard the Soviet provision of missiles to
Cuba - nuclear warheads aimed directly at its territory - as an armed attack,
the actions charged against Nicaragua must fall far helow the requirement of
Article 51. They do not involve the use of armed forces. Nicaraguan troops or
other forces under its direction and control are not alleged to he operating
outside its horders. It is not even asserted that Nicaragua is "substantially
involved" in the rebel operations in El Salvador. All that the United States has
alleged - without producing a shred of proof - is that Nicaragua has provided
some conventional arms to the insurgents.
308. Ind~~~~,su~h evidence as has heen made nublic sunnorts t.. Nicaranuan -
position in thir idse D~tid C 3laeMvh:icl \\,asa CIA cmpl<~yccwhci for ;I
p;riod of iii,iyur, Ii.,d overall respunrihilit) iriille Agent) fiir :isi:rring rinJ
dn>l!sing üII ei,iJence oidriiis irÿtlic ihrough Niedragua. Ilc has siaicd
"The whole picture that the Administration has presented of Salvadoran
insurgent operations heing planned, directed and supplied from Nicaragua
is simply not true. .. .The Administration and the CIA have systematically
misrepresented Nicaraguan involvement inthe supply ofarms to Salvadoran
guerrillas to justify its efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan Govemment."
(NYT 6/11/84.)
309. This assertion has been substantiated by Pentagon officiais and diplo-
mats. In addition, a number of independent investigations conducted hy United
States newspapers have failed to discover any evidence of the alleged arms flows.
(Christian Science Monilor 5/2/84; BG 6/10/84; LAT 6/16/84.) It is hard to he-
lieve that if there were any suhstantial transfer of arms it could he successfully
concealed from al1these investigative efforts.
310. Moreover, the justification of self-defensefails hecause the procedural
requirements stipulated in Article 51 for the exercise of the inherent right of self-
defense have not heen complied with. The Article provides that "[m]easures
taken hy Memhers in the exerciseof thisright of self-defenseshall be immediately
reported to the Security Council ...". This requirement is not merelya procedural
formality, but rather an important additional limitation on the exercise of the
nght of self-defense.As Waldock explains:
"the exercise of the right of self-defence is made suhject to the suhse-
auent i,dement and control of the intemational communitv. The individual
Siair. nc~.e>\~rilydccidss iihciher ur nilt urz forcc In rcllidcicnce but
rhe proprici) of itjJwisiun ii a marrerfor ille Uniicd Naiioni". ("Tlic Kr.guld.
tion .><the I.'u.ui Iùrr: b\ IndividudlSr<itc~ in Inter~i>iion.ilIliu". RI IIdguç
Recueil (1952-Il), p. 495.j
311. Pursuant to this conception of the reporting requirement, when the
United States dispatched troops to Lebanon in 1958, for example, President
Eisenhower announced: "In conformity with the Charter, the United States is
reporting the measures taken by il to the Security Council. . . ." The United
States has never made the slightest effort to fulfill this requirement in the
present case. MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 83
312. Finally, it is universally agreed that the legitimate exercise of the right
of self-defense under both customarv law and the Charter is subiect to the
rcquircnicni oi pr<~ptirtionaliiy.The appliçÿii.)n orthis rcquir:mcnt io the Gcts
rhr.prcscni c~\e mould nc~-cl\:irilyIimir L1nii.dS131e)i~cttvilics11)Salvadoriln
territos.. Tbus Judge Lachs wntes:
"The counter-measures envisaged need not be identical in nature to those
against which they are directed .. .but they should be qusdem generis, are
hound to be proportionate. For example, if the attack did not amount to
incursion into the territory of another State, the same should he true of the
corresponding act of self-defence." (169 Hague Recueil(1980-IV), p. 164.)
313. Even assuming arguendo the truth of the United States allegations of
arms shipments to El Salvador, the United States response is on a completely
different scale. It comprises at least $70 million of assistance to a mercenary
anny of 15,000men operating in and against the territory of Nicaragua, a major
commitment of United States military resources for logistics and other support,
and attacks hy air, land and sea against economic targets and the civilian
population, resulting in the death or injury of thousands of innocent civilians
and millions of dollars of damage. This deliberate application of force at extreme
levelsof violence and hrutality indisputably violates the proportionality require-
ment, and as such is fundamentally incompatible with the very notion of legi-
timate self-defense.
314. Article 2 (4) was established in 1945 as an independent legal nom,
binding by its terms on al1Memhers of the United Nations. Occasionally it has
heen argued, essentially on rebussic sranfibusgrounds, that the prohibition on
the use of force has been invalidated, since the United Nations machinery for
collectivesecurityhas not operated as originallyenvisioned. However,the validity
of Article 2 (4) was never intended and has never heen seriously regarded as
contineent on the successfulworkines of the United Nations as an oreanization.
tom; Prcsidcnr Jim2nr.l dc ~r~ilh~~a,wriiing in 1<95br,iiainiain;d. on rne
contrary, ih;ii ihc .~.~3raitonof ihe Ariiclr.(41priihibition from thecniarscnicni
prdi,iiionr of Chaptcr VI1rcprcscnted <>ne of thc mlijiirsircngihs oltht (:hdrt:r:
"Este orincivio cuarto configu-a una obliraci-n entre los Estados. aue
suh>i.;teen t,,d,SU integriddd .i pciilr Je id.ilquicr dcticieniO.fracaso qilc
pueda tenrr el niccani.;mode 13sNacic~ncrU~iid.is. apcirr dc quc cl C<>nsqo
de Seguridad no adopte una decision por culpa del veto, o por cualquier
otra circunstancia. siemore continuara en vieor este Dreceo.o en.re los
FhiaJ<is,Hccuirde~cquc cl P,i~.t<R i riand-Kellogg n.iesiablcciil mciaiiisnio
alguno YC1tmiiab;ia ci>nJenxrIs guerra ) a rriiunii:ir a ella. Este pirigrafo
4 .en SI.ticnc idnia i'ucr/iicorn<el Pocio Jc l'sri,, cr niu-hl) mi, vcrlccto
desde el punto de vista técnico." (Derecho ~onsh~ucionalde las ~aciones
Unidas,1958, p.80.)
Translation provided :
"This fourth principle constitutes an obligation among the States, that
exists in al1its integrity in spite of any deficiencyor failure that the United
Nations mechanism might have; in spite of the Security Council's not
adopting a decision due to the veto, or due to any other reason, this precept84 MILITARYAND PARAMlLlTAKYACTlVlTlFS
will always continue in effectamong the States. Rememher that the Briand-
KelloggPact did not establish any mechanism: it waslimited to condemning
war and renouncing it. This paragraph 4, in itself,has as much force as the
Pans Pact, and is much more perfect from the technical point of view."
315. Twentv vears later. he found confirmation of this analvsis in the vassage
,, .
of the \.'nitcdUilti<insDecliiriitionon Principlcsof Inicrnational LJWi.nnïcrning
Frieiidlv Keldtions. whieh hc inierpretc as
"ciinlirm~ngrhe iitdepr.nJeni \alidit) aiid the continu:d force <ifthis Iundli-
iiieiitlilt~hligation[Article2(411 ilespitethe failingsand ~hortcr~ininp iiirhe
mÿchinerv cstahliihcll in the Chxrter to nuinrliin neace and seiiiritv". 1159
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~
Hague écue (il97811),p. 88.)
316. From North America, Professor Henkin likewisewrites:
"the draftsmen of the Charter were not seeking merely to replace 'balance
of power' by 'collectivesecurity'; they were determined, according to the
Preamhle, to aholish 'thescourge of war'.All the evidenceis persuasive that
they sought to outlaw war, whether or not the UN organization succeeded
in enforcing the law or establishing peace and justice. And none of the
original memhers, nor any one of the new members, has ever claimed that
the law against the use of force is undesirahle now that the United Nations
is not what had heen intended." (How Nations Behave,1979,p. 138.)
317. The Court itself has unequivocally recognized the overriding validity of
the norm against the use of force. In the now celebrated passagefrom the Cofu
Channelcase, it stated:
"The Court Cdn only regard the alleged right of intervention as the
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to
most serious abuses and such as cannot, whateverbe the presenrdefects in
infernalionalorganization, find a place in international law." (Emphasis
added.) (I C.J. Reports 1949, p. 35.)
318. Article 2 (4) remains, as it was in the heginning, the cornerstone, not
only of the United Nations Charter itself, but of the international legal system
that has heen constructed upon it. The Article was designedto estahlish the rule
of law in international affairs by disestahlishing the rule of force, and to redress
the unequal balance of power betweengreat nations and small. Without it, as
the Court has said, intervention would nccessarily "he reserved for the most
powerful States, and might easilylead to the perversion ofthe administration of
international justice itself". (Ibid., pp. 34-35.) It is significant that only in the
forum of the International Court of Justice can Nicaragua face the United States
as an equal, with the outcome of the dispute unaffected hy the overwhelming
military and economic power of its adversary. Nicaragua is asking the Court not
only to vindicate its legal nghts but again to defend the administration of inter-
national justice from perversion at the hands of the strong. CHAPTER IV
THE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES ESTABLISHED BY THE EVI-
DENCE BEFORE THE COURT ARE IN VIOLATION OF UNITED STATES
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES
Scciiun 1. l'hcUw of Force hy the United Staich againsi Sicardgua in \'iolation
of the I:nitcd Satinnr Charter15t:audll~a \'iulation of .\rtiZUnand 21 of thc
Charter of the Organi&tinn of Amrrican States
319. The United States and Nicaragua are both memhers of the Organization
of American States. As such, they have hound themselves not to resort to the
use of force, except in the case of self-defenseor as authorized hy the Organ of
Consultation of the Organization.
320. Article 21 of the Charter constitutes an unamhiguous prohihition on the
use of force. It provides:
"The American States bind themselvesin their international relations not
to have recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defensein
accordance with existingtreaties or in fulfillmentthereof."
This sweepingprohibition is reenforced by Article 20, which emphasizesthat the
territory of a State is to held sacrosanct:
"The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be theobject, even
temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by
another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial
acquisitions or special advantages ohtained either hy force or by other
means of coercion shall he recognized."
321. Thus, since the provisions of the OAS Charter prohihiting the use of
force are coterminous with the stipulations of the United Nations Charter, the
violations by the United States of its obligations under the United Nations
Charter, demonstrated in Chapter III of the Memorial also, and without more,
constitute violations of Articles 20and 21 of the OAS Charter.
Scciion II. l'hr l'rc of <:~)crci,c~lcasurc~hy the L'niicdSialrb again51Sicaragua
Io Force It10Change lis Gi~trrnmcntor I'nlitics Cnnrtituics Intrr~ciiiiunin the
Intrrnal and t:xternal AlTainof Sicdraaua in \'iolalion of .\rriclc 18 uf the OAS
322. Because of the historic Latin American concern with "intervention", the
Charter of the Organization of American States addressesthat problem expressly.
Article 18 of the Charter provides:
"No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the interna1or external affairs of any
other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also86 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
any other fonn of interference or attempted threat against the personality
of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements."
The provision is reenforced by Article 19 of the Charter, which prohibits, "the
use of coercive measures" of any kind "to force the sovereign will of another
State and obtain from it advantaees of anv kind". The article aooears at first
gÏ&Ce to he superfluous in that the acts it'prohihits are already yroscribed by
Article 18. The very existence of Article 19, however, indicates the importance
the draftsmen pla&d on ensuring that the prohibition on intervention was fully
comprehensive.(Garcia-Amador (ed.), TheInter-AmericanSystem: Treaties,Con-
ventions andOther Documents,Vol. 1,Part 1,1983,p. 921°.)
323. There is no douht that the swee~ine. -.hihition of these two articles
cdniprehenJ~ the id. ,iithe UniteJ Stxie, in Ki'i~.arapu.ltis plain mïaning 1:to
prcsludr intervention >ihether ithc hy one Sialcor ni.>rr'thxn one Stciic: ihether
direcil, or inrlirectI\: u,hether in ille intcrn~l i~rthe e\terii~l .in0rr3 Si;ite
whethérby force & any other means; and whether against the personality of
the State or against its political, economic, or cultural elements. No exceptions
are permitted other than self-defense as provided in Article 21 and collective
action as directed hy the Organ of Consultation under Article 22.
A. TheHistoricalBackground of the Non-InterventioA nrticlesof the OAS Charter
324. The inclusion of Articles 18 and 19 in the OAS Charter have a special
significancefor this case. They marked the climax of a long struggle hy the Latin
American States to secure guarantees of non-intervention from "the colossus of
the north". This extreme concern of the Latin American States with the ~rohlem
of interieiition1%r<~i~iei,l niore than ceniur) iiiiinhsppy histor). the Jcfining
lc;itiirc oru,hichw~i rcpcatcd UniteJ Siaie, intcnention hy miliiar) and othcr
means.
325. The storv heeins in 1823.when President James Monroe of the United
States enunciatei the~onroe Doctrine, in which he said that any attempt by a
European Power to reassert itselfin the Western Hemisphere wouldbe considered
as "dangerous to Ourpeaceand security" and the "manifestation of an unfriendly
disposition toward the United States". (Richardson (ed.), Messages and Papers
ofthe Presidents of the United States, 1897, pp. 776-789; Moore, A Digest oj
InternationalLaw, 1906,Vol. VI, p. 401.)
326. In ils original context the Monroe Doctrine was a stdtement of the
principle of non-intervention, directed at the European powers. As such it was
received very favorably by many Latin Americans. (Antokoletz, Tratado de
DrrecholnternacionalPuhlico.1951.Vol.II. n. 31.)Thev weresoon disao~ointed.
As lime went on, the ~nited tat téinte6;eted 'the Doctrine as auth0rizing a
ver7 hroad range of unilateral United States intervention in the anairs of Latin
~merican countries, whether in response to European involvements or conflicts
among Latin American States themselves or interna1 developments thought
inimical Io United States interests. Secretdry of State Olney in 1895 descrihed
the United States position with respectto Latin America:
"Today the United States is practically sovereignon this continent, and
its fiat is law upon the suhjects to which it confines its interposition. Why?
It is not because of the pure friendship or goodwill felt for it. It is not
simply hecause of its high character as a civilizedstate, nor because wisdom
loThis languagewascarried ovcr into the provisionsof the UnitedNationsGc,neral
Assemblyresolutions on interventionin 1965and 1981.88 MlLlTARY AND PARAMlLITARY ACTIVITIES
330. In an Additional Protocol to the Convention, done at the 1936 Con-
ference -
"The High Contracting Parties declare[d] inadmissible the intervention of
any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the
interna1 or external affairs of any other of the Parties." (Additional Pro-
toc01 Relative to Non-Intervention (Buenos Aires, 1936); compare OAS
Charter, Art. 18.)
331. The adoption of the OAS Charter, in the post-war years, came at a lime
the United States felt itself increasingly in need of the collective support of the
Latin American countries against purported threats to its own secunty from
outside the hemisphere. It, therefore, once again, formally and in the rnost
solemn manner, unequivocally hound itself to the principles and norms of non-
intervention that had been elahorated over the earlier years. This United Scates
commitment to non-intervention is recoenized as the consideration for the
eridor,emcnr h) the other Latin Anisriilin Siatei ai thc principls of hcniisphcris
ciillecii\~erccurity.r<irtrongly urged h! the Unitcd Statci Açcording 1,)C'<,:Ir
Se~ulved.3.the ex-\le;inof the Ldu School ~flllc Aulilndnloui Udlla~nrilUniveriil)
of~exico, the prohibition against al1intervention other than that authorized by
the OAS was the quid pro quo of Latin Americdn participation in regional
organization. ("The Reform of the Charter of the Organization of American
States", 137 Wdgue Recueil (1972-III), pp. 81, 96. See also Fenwick, "lnter-
vention: Individual and Collective", 39 American Journal ofIniernafiona1 Law
(1945), pp. 653-659.)
B. Legal Aulhuriries as to the Meaning of "Intervention" in rhe OAS Charler
332. In light of this history, it is not surprising that there is almost universal
consensus among American publicists, North and South, as to the sweeping
nature of the non-intervention provisions of the OAS Charter. Ambassador
David Castro of El Salvador, the Chairman of the Special Committee, stated
that they -
"condemn [ ] every action or attempted action that tends to force a State,
in spite of its sovereignty, to adopt any attitude which the State helieves
contrary to its interests". (Annals of the Organization of American Slales,
1949, Vol. 1, p. 28.)
333. The distinguished Latin American puhlicist, former President Jiménezde
Aréchaeau holds that the essence of "intervention" is "dictatorial interference".
(l:'II>t,rt,<hI,rrrr~id~~!~~tziilntc,~irp~iru~~I,.U. pp. 177-138 1This ided oi iiiler-
vrintion a, "dict~toril interiïrïnïe' highliglit> the ?lïmcirt common IO niost
Anicrisin deliniti<~nioi intercentit~n the iiitcnti<>cocrze anothcr Si.iie Il1s
th~sürp:cr tnter\erition thdi m;ikes interteiitiiin uhully inc~>mpatiblciiith the
sii\,ereignt) of iiidependent St;ite". Amt~ngthe iiidiiyi\meric;in autli~iritiei a'hi,
iupport thir detiniiii~nof "interi,ention" uc Iirrthe ii~llouiiig
" Evenbeforethe incorporationof theprincipleof non-intcwentioninto conventional
Inter-Amencanlaw, thc great mdjority of Latin Americanjurists held that intervention
was inconsistentwith national sovereigntyand independence, and so was a violationof
generalinternationallaw.Amongthe mast notableadvocatesof a comprehensivcprohi-
bition have becn: Antokoletr, Trntadode Derecho InternocionalPublico, 1951,Vol. II,
pp. 15-16:Bello,PrincipiodeDerecho Inrernncionul, 883,Vol.1,pp.52K; Calvo, Le droit
iniernotionol rhéoriqueet pratique (Rousseau, ed.), 1896. Vol. 1, p. 267; Podesta
Costa, Manu01 de Derecho InternacionalPublico,1947,pp. 51ff. : rsua, Derecho Inter-
noeionnlPublico, 1938p,p. 153.154:Yepes,47 Hague Recueil (1934-l),pp.745-748. MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 89
Antokoletz, Tratado de Derecho Internacional Publico, 1951,Vol. II, pp. 15-16,
Cisneros, DerechoInternacional Publico, 1966, Vol.1,p. 505.
Jiménezde Aréchaga."International Law in the Past Third of a Century", 159
Hague Recueil(1978-I), p. 115.
Podesta Costa and Ruda, DerechoInternacional Publico, 1979,p. 97.
Sierra, Derecho Internacional Publico, 1963,pp. 182.183.
Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention, 1956, p. 72; and The Organization of
AmericanStates, 1963, p. 160.
Wright, "Recognition, Intervention and Ideologies", The Indian Yearbookof In-
ternational Affairs, 1958, Vol. VI1, pp. 89. 99-100, quoted in Whiteman,
Digest of InternationalLaw, 1965, Vol.5, pp. 452-453.
334. The Court has also recognized that the principle of non-intervention is
"one of the most firmly established traditions of Latin America". To reiterate
the language of the Codu Channel case, language that might be applied to the
present situation :
"The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to
most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in
international organization, find a place in international law. Intervention is
perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would take here; for,
from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful States,
and might easilylead to perverting the administration of international justice
itself." (IC. J. Reports 1949, pp. 34-35.)
C. The Positionof the UnitedStates
335. Since 1948, United States officiais have repeatedly recognued the obli-
gation of the United States under the constituent instruments of the Inter-
American system, and have reaffirmed its commitment to the principle of non-
intervention. Indeed, in 1943, well hefore the adoption of the OAS Charter,
Under Secretary of State Wellesstated:
"At two inter-American conferences - Montevideo in 1933and Buenos
Aires in 1936 - al1the American republics solemnlyoutlawed intervention
by one country in the affairs of another.
Pursuant to the spirit of these obligations, the last vestiges of United
States intervention have been liquidated:
Every marine has been withdrawn.
Al1fiscal supervision inother American countries has been eliminated.
Everytreaty hy which the United States was granted the right to intervene
in other republics of this hemisphere, for whatever purpose, has been abro-
gated." (Address to the Rotary Club of New York, 15April 1943,quoted
in Whiteman, Digest of International Lw, 1965,Vol.5, p. 420.)
336. The Report of the United States Delegation on the OAS Charter gave
special attention to the stipulation in Article 18 that the pnnciple of non-
intervention "prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of
interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against
its political, economic, and cultural elements". It snid that the sentence "had
universal significanceand was a reaction to fear of types of indirect aggression
such as those to which certain eastern European countries have been subjected".
(Reportof the Delegationof the UnitedStates of Americata theNinth International
Conferenceof American States, 1948,p. 38.)90 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARY ACIIVITIES
337. Throughout the 1950sand 1960s,indeed, the United States exploited the
non-intervention principle in aid of its own policies.
President Eisenhower in 1953recognized:
"Any nation's right to a form of government and an economic system of
its own choosine is inalienable.Anv nation's attemot to dictate to other
nations their f& of government is indefensible.;' (Emphasis added.)
(Quoted in Whiteman, Digest of InternationalLaw, 1965,Vol. 5, p. 452.)
338. On 20 May 1958Secretary ofState Dulles responded to a newscorrespon-
dent saying :
"As you know, one of the cardinal doctrines for this hemisphere, which
is affirmed and reaffirmed on every occasion by the American Republics, is
the doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries.
Their economic and political interdependence with the United States is such
that to a peculiar degree - a greater degree than probably any other area
in the world - if we attempted to adjust OUI relations according to our
appraisal of their government, we would become involved in their internal
affairs." (Quoted in ibid.,p. 497.)
339. Secretary of State Herter called non-intervention the "most important
foundation stone" of Inter-American relations and stated:
"The United States has acceuted this ~rincide and with the vears kas be-
iiimc increasingly con\,inced of ils impurtancc 16)ihc entire ~ntcr.American
relattonship. The non-inicr\ention priniiplr 1.csiential to conlidenie hmong
the 21 membrr rovernnients of thir Organi~ation, and thal conlidcncc 1s.in
turn, essential to creative effort and progress in the collective achievement of
the great purposes set forth in the charter of our Organization." (State-
ment at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Aflairs
of the American States, Santiago, Chile, 13 August 1959, quoted in ibid.,
p. 562.)
340. Perhaps the most succinct account of the current status of the Monroe
Doctrine was President Kennedy's response to a suggestion that it might be used
to justify the unilateral use of force againa Cuba during the missilecrisis: "The
Monroe Doctrine," he snapped, "what the hell is that?'(Quoted in Chayes, The
Cuban MissileCrisis, 1974, p.23.)
341. In the face of a changing world, of the growing importance of foreign
trade, and of the increasing need for the cooperation of the other nations of the
hemisphere, the United States had gone from the adamant refusal to accept any
limit on its right to intervene unilaterally in Latin American affairs 20ycÿrs
before, to an agreement to adhere to the principle of nonintervention. In exchange
the United States benefited [rom the acceptance of collective responsibilityfor
security in this hemisphere.
342. At the same Santiago conference, Secretary Herter expanded on the
United States understanding of the meaning of the prohibition:
"Some of these movements [that are receivingarms from officialsources
in other countries despite public declarations of policies 10 the contrary]
have been justified before the public on the grounds that they were
undertaken for the purpose of establishing more democrÿtic régimes in
certain countries and that thereby they helped to fulfill a principle of the
charter of the OAS. 1do not wish to speculate on what the motives may
have been behind thew interventionist activities. Yet, whether or not they MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 91
ucrc csnimcnd~blc. WC cJnnot conduçt Our intrr-Amcrican rcl3tions on the
thc.>rythat the cndjustifics the melin, and thai the charter and other tre.itics
may he flouted at will.
As vou well know. the United States vie,dst~ ~o~countrv in its dedication
to democratic principles ... We are convinced that this'form of political
progress can and must go forward and that it deserves the moral support
of &o~Ies of America. -
WC ire equally convinced, however, that the basis for the soundest and
most durable growth of democratic institutions within a country stems from
the people themselves.History has shown that attempts to imposedemocracy
upon a country hy force from without may easily result in the mere
substitution of one form of tyranny for another. ..." (Quoted in Whiteman,
Digest of Inlernutir~nulLaw, 1965,Vol. 5, pp. 562-564.)
343. The United States has, time and time again, invoked the prohibitions
against intervention in the OAS Charter to rallv Latin American countries
aiainst activities ilsaw as threatening to its securit; interests. It described those
activities in tenns that fit precisely withthe facts of this case: the use of irregular
forces. o.ganized, armed and directed from outside. to overthrow the established
govemment of an American State. (See, cg., Speech of United States Secretary
of State Dean Rusk at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, 31January 1962,Punta del Este, Aclas y Documenros, para. 122,
at pp. 125-126; Statement of United States Sccretary of State Herter at the Fifth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 12 August 1959,
Santiago, Chile, Department of State Bullefin, Vol. XLI, pp.301, 302-303,
quoted in Whiteman, Digest of International Law, 1965, Vol. 5, pp. 562-564.)
To hold the United States liable in the present case for intervention in the
alTairsof Nicaragua in violation of Article 18 of the OAS Charter is no more
than ta hold it to the standards that it has repea-dly sought to impose on
others ".
344. The Inter-American community chose to regulate "collective self-defense"
closely, hecause it was fully aware of the danger of collective action against the
sovereimtv of another State. It was for this reason that the ~rohibition on
intcrvsnti<;nwas cxpandcd uhcn incarp~rlitcd into the OAS ~h;;rtcr IO inJude
intr.r\cntioii h) "li\taie or yn.i<p <.j sruri.<"(Garcia-Anladur (cd.), 1A,, 1111r.r-
.4»ar;'.,inS, rl~!~ Irru~,~:,: L-trn,f~nlioni n</ OI/I<>II)o<'a,»<~nlV.ol 1, 1'~rt 1,
p. 91.) The court cannot permit the United States to evade these regulations to
serve what it deems in its own unreviewahle judgment, ta he the proper political
solution to the problems of Central America.
Conclusion
345. The OAS Charter represented a special law for the American States,
colored hy their history and tailored to their nceds. Viewed in the abstract, the
Charter's prohibitions of intervention and the use of force may seem only Io
reiterate universal norms of international law. However,seenagainst the backdrop
" The United Statescould no1rely on the exceptionsin the OAS Charter for self-
defenreIo justifyits unlawfulinterventionin and igainst Nicaragua. The right to seIr-
dcfensein Anicle 21 or thc OAS Charter is coextcnsivcwith that in Aniclc 51 of the
justificationfortheactionsor the UnitedStatestihat arethe subjectof thiscasc.idcs no92 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
of the history of the Western Hemisphere, they tdke on a pointed meaning and
a particular relevance for this case.
346. To he sure, these Charter provisions were to be applicable to al1 the
parties.History shows, however, that they were drawn with a particular eye to
the United States, "the most powerful republic of the hemisphere". II was use
of force by the United States and intervention hy the United States thdt the
others chiefly feared and against which they sought protection. The actions
showri hy the evidence in this case are the very actions hy the very State that the
OAS Charter wds intended to prevent.
347. The United States was well aware of the concerns of its treaty partners
when it accepted the obligations of the Charter. It knew the history and knew
the attitudes of ils Latin American neighbors. It knew that it was itself the
principal ohject of the prohibitions of the Charter. Yetil accepted them freely
and willingly, knowing that the United States, in exchange, would henefit from
the participation of its neighbors in the Organization of American States.
348. It is this self-denvineordinance. freelvundertaken. that the United States
has undeniably breachéd by ils use if force and intervention in and against
Nicaragua. The Court should have no hesitation in so adjudging. CHAPTER V
TIIE .\1CI:I Il.A'l'k:HAI.'I'HEATYHESk:HV,\TIOS (I'WO\'ISO (C)) 'IO 'I'IIE
CSI'IEl>SI'SI'ES I>ECI.AH,\I IOS ,\CCEI"l'ISC THE JUHISI)ICTIOS 01.'
'l'HECOCHI HAS SO APPI.ICSI'IO\ 'l'O I'HISCASI.:
349. In the procecdings on jurisdiction and admissibility, the United States
invoked the reservation in proviso (c) of its Declaration accepting thejurisdiction
of the Court(the "multilateral treaty reservation" or "Vandenberg Amendment").
In its Judgment, the Court concluded that this objection
"does not possess,in thecircumstancesof thiscase,anexclusivelypreliminary
character, and that conseauentlv it does no1 constitute an obstacle for the
Court to entertain the proceedi& .. .".(Judgmenr,para. 76.)
As a consequence of the United States decision not to participate further in the
case. thisobiection has not been renewedin the Dresentohase of the oroceedines.
~evérthelesS,in viewof the attitude Nicaragua ias taken as to its re~ponsibili~es
under Article 53 of the Statute of the Court (sceChap. II, supru), it will address
the issuc of the Vandenberg Amendment in this Memorial
Section1. The Admissionsof the UnitedStates as to the PurposeofIts Actions,
Made alter Its Withdrawalfromthe Proceedings,DestroyAnyPossibilityof
ApplyingProviso (c) Here
350. As with other issuesin this case,developmentssincethe Court's Judgment
of 26 November 1984 have fundamentally transformed the legal situation with
respect to proviso (c). The proviso, it will be recalled,states that the acceptance
of the Court's jurisdiction shall not entend to - "disputes arising under a
multilateral treaty, unless (1) al1parties to the treaty afïected bythe decision are
parties to the case before the Court...".
351. In the preliminary phase, the only plausible argument the United States
could make that the decision of the Court would "affect" absent parties to the
relevant treaties was that the adjudication of a potential United States justifica-
tion of self-defensemight somehow limit the right of collective self-defenseof
Nicaragua's neighbors. But, as we have shown, the United States has now
abandoned al1pretense that its military and paramilitary activities inand against
Nicaragua are for the purpose of "collective self-defense"or the interdiction of
an alleged flow of arms to rebels in El Salvador. (See Chap. II; Chap. III, Sec.
III.suoru.1 Since 18Januarv 1985.President Rearan and other senior oficials
of his'administration have Publicli and repeatedlyasserted that the purpose of
these activities isto overthrow the present Nicaraguan Government. These state-
ments have bccn oresented in extenso in earlier sections of the Memorial. It will
sufficehere to rech only the most salient.
352. Inhis nationally televised newsconferenceon 21 12ebruary1985,President
Reagan announced that the objective of Unitcd States policy is the "removal"
of the Government of Nicaragua "in the sense of the present structure" unless
"the present government would turn around and say al1 right, if they say
'Uncle'".
353. The consequence of this unqualified admission as to the true purpose of
the United States activities is that the issue of self-defense has been removed94 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlES
from this case. (See Chap. III, Sec.III (A); and seegenerally Chap. III, Sec.III.)
This precludes the application of proviso (c) of the United States Declara-
tion.
354. The United States argument for the application of the proviso, to repeat,
was based on the premise that the activities complained of in Nicaragua's
Application were undertaken hy the United States for the purpose of "col-
lectivc sclf-defense" with one or more of three other Central American States:
El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras. Accordingly, the United States
argued that a decision by the Court that restricted the United States in con-
ducting these activities would necessarily "affect" the other States by limit-
ing their right to participate with the United States in their "collective self-
dcfense".
355 Wiih the elimination of the claim thai ihe Uniicd Siates aciiviiie. in and
againai Niçarag~a are for the purpùsc 01'"si>llr.ctivewlf-deienw". ihc argument
thai FI Salvador. Costa Rica or I-limduras would be "aifectcd" bv a Jecision of
ihe Court rcqui~tng the United Siaier io ccdsc and desist from;ush ïriii.itics
rintply rvaporÿtes There ir ihereforc no bssis fiir ihc ÿpplicaiion <ifproviso [cl
in this case
SectionII. Nicaragua's ArgumentsMade at the Jurisdictional Phase Likewise
Precludethe Applicationof the Proviso Here
356. In the Jurisdictional phase, Nicaragua made three arguments showingthat
proviso (c) was inapplicable :
Firsl,the proviso, properly understood, simply restated portions of Article 36
of the Statute of the Court. 11was inserted out of an abundance of caution and
had no independent significancein limiting the United States Declaration.
Second, neither El Salvador, Costa Rica, nor Honduras would he or could he
"affected" by a decision in this case, since no legitimate rights or interests of
those States would be prejudiced by an adjudication of Nicaragua's claims
against the United States.
Third, in any case, claims based on general and customary international law
are not covered by the proviso and so are hefore the Court for determination.
It is not necessary to repeat these arguments at length here. They were fully
developed in the Memorial and oral hearings in the Jurisdiction and Admissibility
phase. (Memorial, 1, pp. 429 ff. ; Verbatim Record , October 1984, 111,pp. 61-
64; 17 October 1984, ibid.,pp. 274-280.) Nicaragua maintains its position on
these points in al1 respects and reiterates the arguments in support of these
conclusions made in the earlier phase of the case. At this stage, it is necessary
only to emphasize certain salient points.
A. TheJudgmenrofrhe Court of 26 Nowmber 1984 Esrablishes[hotNicaragua's
GeneralandCusromaryLaw ClaimsandIls ClaimsunderrheTreafyof Friendship,
CommerceandNavigarionof1956 AreProperlybefore rhe Courtfor Adjudication
on the Merirs
357. In its Judgment of 26 Novemher 1984 [I.C.J. Reporrs1984, p. 3921,the
Court held that Nicaragua's claims under general and customary international
law were not harred by proviso (c) :
"lt may first he noted that the multilateral treaty reservation could not
bar adjudication by the Court of al1Nicaragua's claims, because Nicaragua, MEMORIAL OP NICARAGUA 95
in its Application, does not confine those claims only to violations of the
four mul~i~ ~ ~ ~ conventions referred to above (o..a. 681.On the contrarv.
Nicaragu~ invokcj L numher of principles <)l'cusiom;iryand gcncral inirr-
n~iional Iau ihat. according to thc Applicaiion, ha\.e bccn viiilatcd by the
ljniied Siatei. The Court rannot disniiss the rlaim, of Nii~rarua uniier
principles of customary and general international law simply beiause such
principles have been enshrined in the texts of the conventions relied on hy
Nicaragua. The fact that the above-mentioned principles, recognized as
such, have been codified or embodied in multilateral conventions does no1
mean that they cease 10 exist and to apply as principles of customary law,
even as regards countries that are parties to such conventions. Principles
such as those of the non-use of force, non-intervention, respect for the
independence and territorial integrity of States, and the freedom of navi-
gation, continue Io be hinding as part of customary international law,
despite the operation of provisions of conventional law in which they have
been incorporated. Therefore, since the claim hefore the Court in this case
isnot confined to violation of the multilateral convention provisions invoked,
it would not in any event he barred by the multilateral treaty reservation in
the United States 1946Declaration." (Judgment, para. 73.)
358. The foregoing pronouncement represents the law of this case. It is a
conclusive determination by the Court that Nicaragua's claims under general
and customary law are properly hefore the Court for adjudication. Likewise,the
claims under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, which is a
bilateral treaty between Nicaragua and the United States, are unaffected by
proviso (c) on any interpretation of its meaning.
B. The Inapplicabililyof Proviso (c) in This CuseHas No Bearingon the Inter-
pretarionof Reservations Suchas Thoseoflndiu, El Sulvadorundthe Philippines
359. The multilateral treaty reservations of India, El Salvador and the
Philippines, although perhaps suggested hy the Vandenberg Amendment, are, in
fact fundamentally different from the United States reservation in proviso (c).
These reservations, of which India's istypical, exclude from the State's acceptance
of the compulsory jurisdiction -
"disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a multilateral treaty
unless al1 the parties to the treaty are also parties to the case before the
Court .. .".
360. By their plain, unambiguous terms, these reservations deprive the Court
of compulsory jurisdiction in respect of any Application in which claims are
asserted under a multilateral treaty and not al1 the parties to the treaty are
parties to the case. By contrast, proviso (c) of the United States Declaration
requires a determination that treaty parties no1 hefore the Court would be
"affected hy" the decision. Both the United States and Nicaragua are in full
agreement that proviso (c) applies only to "afected" parties to the treaty and
not to al1 parties. Thus any interpretation of proviso (c) holding it inapplicable
in this case could have no hearing on the multilateral treaty reservations of
India, El Salvador or the Philippines. As President Nagendra Singh observe* in
his separate opinion on jurisdiction and admissihility :
"lt will aooear from the wordine of the reservations of lndia and the
Philippines iiiat they hoth c~earl~maintain their essentially preliminary
character and would therefore unambiguously act as a bar to the jurisdiction96 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
of the Court at the very start. This would be so hecause their meaning is
clear and the application is simple and straightfonvard, as opposed to the
Vandenberg reservation of the United States type which poses several
prohlems conceming the determination of 'States affected by the decision of
the Court'." (Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 449 (separate opinion of
Judge Nagendra Singh).)
361. Only two States, Pakistan and Malta, have reservations worded similarly
to that of the United States. But even as to these two, any interpretation of
proviso (c) in this case would have little bearing. It would be heavilyconditioned
hy the facts of the present case, in particular the peculiar legislative history of
the proviso in the United States Senate. As such, it would have no direct
application to other similarly worded reservations.
C. The UniredStotes Argumentsfor theApplication of the Proviso Are Unfounded,
Even Apartfrom the Recent Admissionsof the United States as 10 the Purpose of
11sActions
362. The United States argument for the application of the proviso to this
case is summarired in its Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction and Admissibility:
"Nicaragua's Application comes directly within the terms of the multila-
teral treaty reservation and gives rise to al1of the concerns that underlie the
reservation. Adjudication of Nicaragua's claims: (1) may prejudice the
United States hy hinding the United States to a decision of the Court
without similarly hinding the other treaty parties involved in the regionwide
disnute in Central America: (2) mav2also ~ r ~ ~ , ~he United States bv
deiermining the United ~taieS-&hts and duties in the absence of direct6
relevant facts and documents that are in the sole oss sessioo f absent States;
and (3) mav nreiudice the riehts of other Cintra1 American States bv
dctcrniiriing. in thcir .ibscnw. the Ihuiulncrr rcrpon,cr 1,) tiicar~gii~'r
;irnicd atiack.i .igii~~istthem. incliidiiig thtir inhereiit righi, etig:ige in
self-Jcicn\c aiid id rcuuc\t United Statc, rls,ijtrln;c in rc,icl-n8 tili~-a~~9's
attacks." (Counter-~émorial, p. 254.)
Ali of ihcre srgum:rils arc unioun<led
363 As Nicar:tgiu pointcd .>ut ai th? <ird he~rlnp on juridiction anJ
.idriiis~ihiliis.thelei>noihinc"sh;its.ic\cr in the icht ~iipriniio ii or in the
prcpdrator) \i<irk 1,)iuggcst that Ln) oi ihcsc "~onicrns' ~llùtivdlcJlhc driilter~.
Hùuc\cr. evcn a\iuniirig Jrgucndo thal the pr<~\iso\i,iisintendcd Io rcll~,clthesc
";onccrnr" dnd ihai II\h<>uldhe inicrprcteJ ~ic~ordiridy. iliI.>csnot bar xilju-
dication of Nicaraeua's claims.
364. The first 07 these "coucerns" is irrelevant to the circumstances of this
case. No interest of the United States could he prejudiced by the adjudication of
Nicararua's claims in the absence of other Central American countries, hecause
those ciaims arise from a bilateral dispute between Nicaragua and the United
States.
365. The United States has never suggested how it could be prejudiced by an
adjudication of Nicaragua's claims in these circumstances. The only situation
where the United States might he prejudiced would be where the interests of the
absent States are in some way adverse to those of the United States. In such a
case, adjudication might expose the United States to a series of identical suits,
should the other States later decide to seek redress in the Court. Or the United
States might he prejudiced by an adjudication that would bind it, leaving the MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 97
absent States free to act at the exnense of the United States. whose hands would
be tied by the Court's judgment.
366. None of these possibilities exists here. According to the United States
itself. there is no adversitv of interest between it and the absent States. Rather it
is in'the interests of thoie absent States that the United States claimed to be
acting. The only State adverse to the United States is Nicaragua, and Nicaragua
is present before the Court and will be bound by its judgment.
367. It also bears emphasis that Nicaragua asserts no claims against any State
that is not a party to the case. Relief is sought only against the United States.
To adjudicate Nicaragua's claims, the Court must determine only whether the
United States has committed international legal wrongs against Nicaragua. As
Judge Ruda ohserved in his separate opinion on jurisdiction and admissihility :
"It is true that there is a complex and generalized conflict among Central
American countries, but not the whole conflict, with al1ils economic, social,
political and security aspects, is submitted to the Court, only the claims
of Nicaragua against the United States. Nicaragua has uot presented any
claims against Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica.
In my analysis there are two disputes: the first, Nicaragua v. United
States, and the second, involving the grievances of El Salvador, Honduras
and Costa Rica against Nicaragua. A decision of the Court in the first
dispute will no1 affect the reciprocal rights, duties and obligations of these
Central American countries. Whatever conduct, if any, that the Court would
impose on the United States, such a decision would not debar the rights of
these three countries vis-à-vis Nicaragua.
For this reason, 1 tbink that the present situation is not the one provided
for in proviso c, where a situation is foreseen, in which the United States,
as a defendant, would be obliged to follow a certain course of action and
the other parties to the dispute would be free. . . ."(Footnote omitted.)
(Judgment (separate opinion of Judge Ruda), paras. 24-26.)
368. As to the availahility of facts, il is the absence of the United States, hy
its own choice, and after jurisdiction over it had been lawfully determined, that
prevents it from trying to make a factual record in support of its position. As
noted in Chapter II, supra, however, this difficulty, for wbich the United States
is responsible, can be overcome under the terms of Article 53 of the Statute of
the Court.
369. It is wholly unlikely that proviso (c) was enacted to protect the interests
of third parties. Very rarely do States act from such altruistic motives when
arranging for judicial settlement of disputes, and no example of such behavior
has heen called to the attention of the Court. But even on the unlikely assumption
that proviso (c) was intended to protect tbird States from prejudice to their
interests hy an adjudication in their absence, it would still be inapplicable here.
The supposed interests of these absent States are plainly beyond the scope of
any decision the Court could render in this case.
370. 1t need hardly be said that El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica do
not have, either separately or "collectively", a legal right to request that the
United States overthrow Nicaragua's Government, or mine Nicaragua's ports,
or carry out other military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua
for that purpose. Nor bas any of these States, in its communications with the
Court.~c~aimed such a rie"~.or re~resented that it bas reauested the United States
10ciigagc in .iu~.ha.'ti\,itic,. CI$~l\.id~r 'in.1Hondur-5. in ihcir ctiniiliuriicntioni
IO iI:cC'o.iri.c\prci<eil only thc dc,irr ihat no ticilon bc i;ikzn thsi uoulJ curtdil
ihcir right1,)rccciic niilitÿry ;ind <>cheir.ribian<e li-oiiithe Cnitc<lStatci C'.>sri98 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYA~IVITIES
Rica has not even expressed the limited concerns to be round in the communi-
cations of the other Iwo States.
371. For example, in El Salvador's Declaration of Intervention, filed on 15
August 1984, the stated concern is that there he no preclusion of the economic
and military "support and assistance from abroad", including the United States.
(Para. 12.) Nicaragua's A~oiication does no1 dace in issue El Salvador's rieht
to receive'sucb aGistance'from the United ~iates or elsewhere. El ~alvad&'s
rights in this respect will not he affected by the Court's decision even if the Court
grants al1relief Nicaragua has requested.
372. The letter of Honduras to the Court, submitted by the United States as
Exhibit III, Tab S, to the Counter-Memorial. states only that it -
"views with concern the possibility that a decision hy the Court could aKect
the security of the people of the State of Honduras, which depends to a
large extent on the bilateral and multilateral aereements of international
co&ration that are in force, puhlished and duly registered with the Office
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations".
It is quite obvious that an ajudication in this case could not lead the Court
"indirectly or unilaterally" to "limit these agreements". Nor does Nicaragua's
Application cal1on the Court to limit the right of Honduras to receive military
or other assistance from the United States or any other State. It follows that the
Court's decision cannot affect the concerns put forward hy Honduras in
any way ".
Conclusion
final analysis, the Ilnitcd Si31is argumeni ihat absent Siairs w,iuld
373. In ihc
hc alTccicdb) a dccisiun in ihi, caw riduccd iisclf to the scll-delense argument
the contention ihai ihc Iiçiiuns of the United States arc heing cimducicd in the
exercire of the supposed righi of collective self-dcfcn~cof those abscnt Siateb in
rcsponsc Io an allegcd "armed atiask" hy FIiçaragua againsi ihem. and thar any
dccision by the Court iin ihi 13ufulncss of Cnited Siates conduci uould aiTcci
the right 0.1self-defense of the otber States. This argument is wholly undermined
by the evidence now before the Court. It demonstrates irrefutably that the
United States actions against Nicaragua are for the purpose of overthrowing
the Government, and that they are not now nor have they ever been for the self-
defense of any absent State.
374. Although this unlawful purpose was always implicit, the United States,
after its withdrawal from these proceedings on 18 January 1985, dropped al1
pretense and fully admitted that its purpose is and has heen to overthrow the
Nicaraguan Government. It needs no argument that mining Nicaragua's ports,
" Furthemore. as the Court observed,al1three absent Stateshave amplemeans of
protectingany intereststhey may think are implicatedin this case.AI1three have madc
to prcscnlan Application against Nicaraguacunder AnicleC36r(2) if theyhaveany claimre
againstil.They are also freeto employthe incidental procedureof intervention:
"Thcre is thereforeno question of these Statesbeingdefencelersagainstany conre-
quence ihat may anse out of the adjudicationby the Court, or of thcir necdingthe
para.c74.) of the multilateraltreaty rescrvationof the United States." (Judgment, MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 99
invading its air space, and carrying out military and paramilitary activities in
and against Nicaragua for the purpose of overthrowing its Government cannot,
under any circumstances, he hrought within the rubric of legitimate self-defense.
The absent States have no right to engage in such conduct or to have the United
States do so on their behalf. (SeeChap. III,Sec.III; Chap. IV,supra.)Therefore,
no legitimate interest of these States could be affected by a decision of the Court
that would cause the United States to terminate its unlawful activities.
375. This same pretext served as the principal basis on which the United
States sought to avoid an adjudication of Nicaragua's claimsby the Court. The
Judgment of 26 November 1984put the United States in a position in which it
would have to substantiate its claims of legitimate self-defenseagainst armed at-
tack. Rather than attempt to do so, the United States withdrew from further
participation in these proceedings. Accordingly, even if the United States inter-
pretation of proviso (c) were accepted, it has become unmistakeahly clear that
it has no applicability in these proceedings. CHAPTER VI
UNITED STATES VIOLATIONS OF ITS OBLIGATIOXS UNDER THE
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION OF
21 JANUARY 1956
Section 1. Object of the Chapter
376. In its Judgment of 26 November 1984on questions of jurisdiction and
admissihility, after having examined the arguments of the Parties concerning the
,~ri~ ~~ ~~nal h~ ~ ~con~ ~tuted bv the Treatv of Friendshio. Comm.,ce and
Navigation concluded hetween the United States and Nicaragua on 21 January
1956 and entering into force on 24 May 1956 (Ann. K, Attachment I), the
Court held:
"[Tlhere cdn be no douht that in the circumstances in which Nicaragua
hrought its Application to the Court. and on the basis of the facts there
asserted, there is a dispute between the Parties, inier alia, as to the
'interpretation or application' of the Treaty ... Accordingly, theCourt finds
that, to the extent that the claims in Nicaragua's Application constitute a
dispute as to the interpretation or the application of the Articles of the
Treaty of 1956 ...,the Court has jurisdiction under that Treaty to entertain
such claims." (Judgment, para. 83.)
377. AllegeJ \iolations of thc 1956 'lrcaiv ihus çonsiiiuie valid cause5 ul'
action As u.111 hc c<iahlirhrd murr fully in the followingpardgraphs. the military
and paramilitary activiiics of thc Ijnitcd Staics in and agïinst Nic.iragua
- deprive the Treaty of its ohject and purpose, and
- are in direct violation of numerous specificprovisions of the Treaty.
Before turning to an analysis of the various violations of the 1956Treaty, it
is important to understand the scope of the Treaty.
Section II. The Scope of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigationof 1956
378. In the written and oral proceedings on Jurisdiction and Admissihi-
lity, the Parties disputed the very nature of the Treaty of 21 January 1956.
The United States purported to understand this Treaty as a purely commer-
cial instrument which, as such, could have no relevance 10 the present case.
(Counter-Mernorial of the United States, II, pp. 52K.) For its part, Nicaragua
contends :
(a) that the 1956Treaty is much more than a simple Treaty of Commerce and
regulates the relations hetween the two States over a broad spectrum of
activities,
(b) that any other interpretation would contradict the "general rule of interpre-
tation of treaties" in international law, and MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 101
(c) that al1 the provisions of the treaty, including those which do not have a
purely commercial scope, are equally applicable to the Parties.
A. The 1956 Treaty 1s a Treaty of Friendship
379. lndependent of the fact that some of the claims of Nicaragua allege
United States violations of its spcific obligations with regard to freedom of
navigation and commerce, rupture by the United States of the friendly relations
between the Iwo countries and the consequences of this rupture remain at the
heart of the present dispute. The Treaty of 1956isintended preciselyto guarantee
and to regulate such friendly relations, exactly as expressed in the first word of
the Treaty's title.
380. There is no doubt. and Nicaraeua does not sueeest otherwise. that the
1956Treaty includes man; provisions ofa commercial nature. ~everthe'less,even
the word "commerce", as it is used in the 1956Treaty, must be understood in a
very broad sense. As an eminent American specialisthas explained:
"The single label 'commercial'as applied to the type of hilateral treaty
under consideration is perhaps misleading, for the scope of the subject-
matter commonly included comprises far more than provisions concerning
the exchange of goods." (Robert A. Wilson, "Postwar Commercial Treaties
of the United States", 43 American Journal ofInternationalLaw (1949),
p. 264; see also Herman Walker, Ir., "The Post-War Commercial Treaty
Program of the United States", 73 Political Science Quarterly (1958),
pp. 57-58.)
381. If il is a treaty of commerce, lato sensu,the Treaty of 1956 isalso much
more than that. It is impossible to disregard the title, the preamble, and the
manv nrovisions which havenothine to do with the ius communicationiseven
understood in ils hroadest sense and including commerce laro sensuas well as
navigation. The Preamhle of the Treaty attests to the Treaty's broad purpose:
"The United States of America and the Republic of Nicaragua desirous
of strengthening the bonds of peace and friendship traditionallv enisting
between-them and of encouraging closer economicand culturai relations
between their peoples ... have resolved to conclude a Treaty of friendship,
commerce and navigation.. . ."
382. Just as it is impossible to disregard the word "friendship" inthe title of
the Treaty, it is equally impossible to ignore the purpose of the Treaty, solemnly
enunciated and reaffirmed in the body of the text. Thus, paragraph 3 of Arti-
cle 11States :
"For the purpose of strengthening the friendlyrelations and understanding
between the two countries hy encouraging mutual contacts between their
peoples. .. ."
Kot on]) JO thcri \ii>rJs Ita\.s \ignific,#nx in dnJ oi ihcriircli.cr that ni",[
hr.;i~.Lno~lcJgcJ.but tlieyalhiicvablish ;iiramcuiirk iur unJcrrraniltng ths iull
iniport oinumcroiis pr<i\,iriiinsdithc Trtdt\, a hi~hdd no1i.111 c\~liisii:liriithin
either commerce - however defined - ornavigation.
383. It is not possible to confer an exclusively commercial construction on
Article 1,which provides:
"Each Party shall at al1limes accord equitable treatment to the persons,
property, enterprises and other interests of nationals and companies of the102 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTlVlTlES
The broad ambit of this Article is echoed in numerous other provisions of the
Treaty, such as:
- Article II, paragraph 2. which safeguards the rights of the citizens of each
State while traveling in the territory of the other State, guaranteeing an
unrestricted rieht of deoarture and return, and freedom of conscience. of
-
rcligi\>n.of expression and of communiialiori;
- ,\rti:lc II, pdragraph 3. uhich pro\ides t'ortic encouragement of iourirm:
- Articlc Ill. ,rhi~.hcuarantecj the seiuritv iifthe citiren.:i~ihoih Stiiics .in*
includes provision<regarding the treatment of such citizens in case of im-
prisonment ;
- Article V, paragraph 1, which provides access hy the citizens of each Party
to the courts of the other Party; and
- Article XI, paragraph 2, which concerns precisely those "nationals of either
Party who are neither resident nor engaged in trade or other gainful pursuit
within the territories of the other Party".
384. The objective of al1these provisions is the promotion of good relations
between the two States, which will, in turn, reinforΠcommercial ties. Inter-
national commerce - which the Treaty is designed to promote and which
the United States affirms is the sole object of the Treaty (Counter-Memorial of
the United States, II, pp. 52K.), is inconceivable in the absence of relatively
trusting and amicable relations. The simultaneous use in the title of the Treaty
of the words "commerce" and "friendship" is not simply a matter of style. The
Iwo conceots reinforce one another. and are in fact interdeoendent: the streneth-
ening of commercial ties is one means of promoting friendship between the ywo
States, and, conversely, friendly relations hetween the Parties are a necessary
condition for the growth of commerce.
385. This broader purpose was recognized in an oblique but distinct manner
by Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs, dunng hearings held by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
United States Senate regarding FCN treaties with the Netherlands, Nicaragua
and Iran :
"Although the principal immediate incentive in the negotiation of these
treaties lis the desire to hel~ create conditions favorable to foreign riva te
investmcnt],the treaties have a broader purpose whichisto establisia general
legalframework for the maintenance of ewnomic and orherrelaiions between
the parties to the treaties." (Emphasis added.) (Commercial Treaties with
Iran, Nicaragua and the Netherlands: Hearing before the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.2 (1956).)
386. There can be no doubt that in striving to conclude a large number of
treaties of this type, the United States essentially sought to guarantee the
protection of the commercial or, more broadly, economic and financial interests
of its nationals abroad. However, it secured the agreement of its treaty part-
ners by offering, in return, certain commercial advantages - such as the Most
Favored Nation clause or the standard of national treatment - within a
framework of more elobal arraneements which. in soirit. were likelv to counter-
balance the advantaies conferrez on United ~Gtes économicintereits.
387. In the case of Nicaragua, a small country, poor and underdeveloped,
nothing would have heen gained from the adoption, without some quidpru q~io,
of "purely commercial" provisions, such as are contained in the followingarticles :
- Article VI, paragraph 1, and Article VII, paragraph 1, relating to the pro-
tection of investments of nationals of one Party in the territory of the other MEMORIALOF NICARAGUA 103
(Nicaraguan investments in the United States were and are virtually non-
existent) ;
- Article X, paragraph 1, relating to the protection of patents and trademarks
(the flow of commerce was and is in this regard totally one-sided);
- Article XI, notably paragraphs 1 and 4, relating to the privileges and im-
munities accorded to persons and companies engaged in scientific, educa-
tional, religious or philanthropie activities (this could only benefit United
States citizens living in Nicaragua); or
- Article XII, paragraphs 1 and 2, relating to capital transfers and foreign
exchange restrictions (issues which would have importance primarily for
potential investors).
388. As is ta he expected in conventional relations, the counterpart existed, at
least over the long term, in the reinforcement of friendly ties with the major
power in the region, and the accompanying prospect of United Statescooperation
in the development of Nicaragua. It suîïices in this respect to refer to the pro-
visions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article X, according to which:
"2. The Parties undertake to cooperate in furthering the interchange and
use of scientific and technical knowledge, particularly in the interests of
increasing productivity and improving standards of living within their
respective territories.
3. Neither Partv shall unreasonahlv im.ede .ationals and comoanies of
tlic othcr Parr). ir<>mobtainirig ,in cquitahlc tcrms throufh normdl c<immcr-
cisl ih~nneli. the c.ipital, akill,. art, an4 rr.ihnologitnccrlsior iis ccononiic
development."
These undertakings, particularly the first, go far heyond a simple regulation of
exclusivelycommercial relations.
389. The close relationship between the three terms in the title of the Treaty -
and particularly between "friendship" and "commerce" - is further confirmed
by the history of FCN treaties in general. Treaties of friendship, commerce and
navigation effectively constitute an ancient category and in fact are interna-
tional instruments concluded in order to regulate simultaneously, as Fiore wrote
at the beginning of this century, "les relations commerciales et les bons rapports
d'amitié des Parties contractantes" (Le droit inrernafional codifiéet sa sanction
juridique (1911, para. 854, p. 422), these two aspects heing inseparahle. This
point is well established, for example, by Professor Verzijl, who shows that
commercial treaties have usually contained political provisions, jus1 as peace
treaties and treaties of alliance have alwayscontained provisions of a commercial
nature. (International Law in Historical Perspective, 1973,Vol. VI, pp. 425ff.)
390. It follows from the foreeoune c-nsiderations that the Treatv concluded
bctuccn the ParIlcl iin ?I J:inury 1956iovers no1only cunini:rciitl matrcr\. hul
3150 niiltrers oi l'ricndhhipin ï niuzh Iarger rensc. Only ihii Intr.rprct;iticincan
givei'ullcifcct1,)the proviiitin.. oit'he Trcïty.uhich niiist hc applicrl in ihij spirit.
R The Trcor) i,jlIj6 .lfi<$rRc I,,t~rprt~ti~riln Ci,n/i~rnru~iiirh "Th? (;enr,rul
Hali,i,IInr~~rr>rt,i<rl~iLn>~~<rhlf< ht<dttrrr,t<irii~I./<rb>,
391. Contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the FCN Treaty, the presen-
tation given by the United States is completely incompatible with the general
rule of interpretation codified in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties of 23 May 1969,which provides:
"1. A Treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their content and
in the light of ils object and purpose."104 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTIES
(SccxI,o Ariicle I ofihc Kcsolution adopted hy the Institut Js droit international
on Il)April 1956. Anniduire, 1959. p.365.)As the Court has repatcdly sidted:
"The Court considers it necessary to Saythat the first duty of a Tribunal
which iscalled uoon to interoret and aoolv the ~rovisionsof a treatv. is to
endeavour to give eiïect to (hem in th&; naturd and ordinary meaning in
the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their naturdl and
ordinarv meaninr make sensein their context, that is an end of the matter."
(cornPeienceof &e GeneralAssemhlyfor theAdmissionof a Srale 10 the
UnitedNarions.AdvisoryOpinion,I.C.J. Reports1950, p. 8; see also,Inter-
pretation of Peace Treurieswirh Bulxaria, Hungury and Romuniu,Second
Phase,AdvisoryOpinion,I.C.J. Reports1950, p. 221, at p. 227; Temple I$
Preah Vihear,PreliminaryObjecrionsJ , udgmenf,I.C.J. Reporrs1961, p. 32.)
392. It is not possible to adhere simultaneously to this cardinal rule of inter-
pretation of treaties and to see in the Treaty of 1956a simple commercial ac-
cord. Such a nosition fails to take into account the words actuallv used. the
context in whi'chthese words occur, and those Treaty provisions which cannot
be consideredwhollycommercial; it deorivesthe Treaty of ils ultimaie purpose -
the reinforcement of friendlv lies hetween the oeoolesof the contractina States.
393. In the previous phaie of the present Fase,'the United States, instead of
advancing a global construction of the Treaty, isolated a small number of
provisions on which it based the followingconclusion:
"There is simo. .no relationshio between these whollv commercial pro-
\ir!olis :ind iiicarag~?'; xllegaiionr in il\Appl~r'ation. . " (C3unir.r-
4lcniuri.tl of the CniicJ Statei. II. p. 53.)
This method is not in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.
cited above, which requires a rcading of the terms of a treaty "in their context".
As stated in paragraph 2 of this Article:
"The context, for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty, shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamhle and annexes ...,
the collateral instruments which, where necessary,may have heen concluded
between the Parties."
See also, Article 1, citedabove, of the Resolution at the Grenada Session of the
Institut de droit international, which invokes the "context as a whole" of the
treaty. (Compefence of the IL0 case (Advisory Opinion), SeriesB, Nos. 2 and3,
p. 23;and Diversionof Warerfrom theMeuse(Netherlands v.Belgium),Judgment,
1937,SeriesAIE, No. 70, p. 21.)
394. In this regard, the provisions of the Preamhle assume a pdrticular im-
portance. Moreover, it is very significant in this regard that the lnternational
Law Commission,endorsing the opinion of its specialRapporteur, Sir Humphrey
Waldock (Third Report on the Law of Treaties, Yearhook c~fthe Inrcrnuri~nal
Law Commission, 1964,Vol. II, p. 5, al 57), has stated categorically:"That the
preamhle forms part of a treaty for purposes of interpretation is too wellsettled
to require comment." (Report of the International Law Commission, ihid,
p. 173,at 203.)This position wasapproved hy al1the memhers of the Commission
who spoke on this point, in particular Judge Ruda, Rosenne, and former
President Lachs, who stated that :
"The preamhle of a treaty was extremely important for the interpretation
of a treaty as a whole. Ina great many treaties, the object and purpose were
indicated solely in the preamble, and the preamhle was consequently essen- MEMORlAL OP NICARAGUA 105
tial for a purpose of a wider interpretation of a treaty." (Summary of the
Sixteenth Session, 11 May to 24 July 1964, ibid., Vol. 1, p. 285. See also,
e.g., Charles De Visscher, Prohlèmes d'interprétationjudiciaire en droit
internativnalpuhlic (1963), p. 61 ;Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties(1961),
p. 486; Charles Rousseau, Droit internationalpublic, Vol. 1, Introduction et
sources, 1971,p. 87.)
395. It is not disputed that the terms of a preamhle do not always have an
obligatory juridical value in and of themselves. (See South West Africa cases,
Second Phase, ICJ. Reports 1966, p. 34.) However, the situation is diiierent
when the terms of the preamble confirm and illustrate the provisions inthe body
of the treaty - as is the case with the FCN Treaty. Further, when negotiated at
the same time as the body of the text, the preamhle constitutes the authentic
expression of the scope, the goal and the purpose which the parties intended to
confer on their accord.
396. Intemational jurisprudence is wellestablished on this point and the Court
frequently relies on the preamble to determine the sense and the scope of
conventional undertakings of the parties. (See, e.g., Competence of the ILO,
P.C. I.J., Series B, Nos. 2 and 3, p. 23;Acquisition of PolishNationality, Advisory
Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 7, p. 14; Interpretation of the Convention
of 1919 concerningEmploymenf of Women during the Ni&, Advisory Opinion,
1932, P.CI J , Series AIE, No. 50, p. 375 ; Diversion of Waterfrom the Meuse,
Judgmenr, 1937, PCIJ, Series AIE, No. 70, p. 21 ; Asylum, Judgmenf, ICJ
Reports 1950,p. 282; Application of the Conventionof 1902 Governingthe Guar-
dianshipof Infants, Judgmenf, 1CJ Reports 1958, p. 67.)
397. In the same spirit, it is interesting to note that United States courts also
rely on the preamhles of treaties to determine their scope. (See enamples cited
by Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1944,Vol. V, p. 245, citing Todok v.
UnionSfate Bank of Harvard, Nebraska, 281 US 448,445 (1930); Cook v. United
States, 288 US 102, 112(1933).)
398. The words "peace", "friendship", "equitable treatment", "friendly re-
lations", "the most constant protection and security", which, among others,
occur in many articles of the Treaty (Preamhle,Arts. 1; II, para. 3; III, para. 1 ;
and V1, para. 1) have an "ordinary" sense and must he given the full effect
which the customary definition implies.
399. To brush aside the ordinary and natural meaning of these words in
currently accepted usage, specific and compelling reasons are required. (See
Conditionsof Admission of a Sfate 10 Membership in the United Nations (Article 4
of Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948,ICJ Reports 1947.1948, p. 57, at p. 63;
see also, Interpretafion of the Convention of 1919conceming Employment of
Women during the Night, Advisory Opinion, 1932, P.CL J, Series AIE, No. 50,
p. 365,at p. 373.)And it is the party who contests such a standard interpretation
who bears the hurden of showing that this meaning should be disregarded. (See
Decisionofthe British-AmericanClaims Commission(President, H. Fromageot),
in the Motter of the David J Adams Case, 1921, 16American Journal ofInrer-
national Law (1922), p. 319; on al1these points, see Lord McNair, The Law of
Treaties, 1961, p. 369 and Charles Rousseau, Droit international public,Vol. 1,
Introduction et sources, 1971, -~. 281K.) No such showing has heen made
here.
400. A reading of the FCN Treaty of 1956 shows without doubt that the
United States and Nicaragua intended that this Treaty encompass a much larger
scope than the regulation of their commercial relations. It follows that there is
no reason to deprive the noncommercial provisions of their juridical eKect.To106 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
reason to the contrary would contradict the clearly expressed intention of the
Parties and generally accepted principles of international law.
C. United Sroies Procrice Recognizesthe Legol Significanceof the Non-Commer-
cial Aspectsof FCN Trearics
401. lifpcr~encc hac conrirmcd thc "\ignilicant" ihar~cter 01'the non.com.
mcrcial pro\,ision$of FCK treaties. 2nd hüsilemonsirated tlic undersiünJing (ii
Statcr. anJ würtiiularlv the CnitcJ Statrr. (ifthe ciTc~ti\cand o-.iraton. ihar~ctcr
of these and of the general'obligations which they impose on the
contracting States to conduct "friendly" relations.
402. Inclusion of the word "friendship" in the title of a treaty cannot be re-
earded as ourelv nominal in lieht of the fact that certain treaties of commerce
and navigation ho not include"friendship". The practice of the United States,
moreover, attests that it concludes treaties of friendship with full awareness of
the potential juridical consequences.
403. It is neither "by inadvertence" nor "by chance" that, since 1966, the
United States has no longer concluded FCN Treaties; it has decided, since 1982,
to promote the replacement of such treaties with "bilateral conventions on the
encouragement of investments". The model for these conventions, adopted in
May 1982 and modified in January 1983, is distinguishable from the "FCN
model" precisely by virtue of the fact that the new conventions are entirely and
exclusivelydevoted to the regulation of economic questions. Their preambles do
no1 mention "the reinforcement of friendly ties" between the contracting States.
Nor do they contain general provisions concerning the protections of persons.
(Ann. K, Attachment 3.)
404. That such a change has juridical consequenceswas suggested by the Su-
preme Court of the State of Washington in 1934. In Lukich v. Dept. of Labor
and Indusrries,29 P. 2d 388 (1934) (Ann. K. Attachment 2), the Court declined
to extend equal treatment to a nonresident on a worker's compensation claim,
since ber claim for such treatment was founded on a bilateral "Convention of
Commerce and Navigation" and not on a treaty of "Friendship, Commerce and
Consular Rights." l4
405. The United States confirmed its oosition that the eeneral orovisions
contained in FCN ~reaties have an "ope~ationrl" character -in ils piesentation
to the International Court of Justice in the case concerning United Stores
Diplomoric and Consulur Staz Ni Tehran". Mr. Civiletti, Counsel for the
Government of the United States of America, stated in the hearing held on
10 December 1979:
"Finally, the United States relies in this case upon a hilateral treaty, the
1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between
the United States and Iran. This Treaty is in a sense even broader than the
three multilateral conventions to which 1 have previously referred [the
" Tireimportof thisdecisionirnard by Raben Wilson, one of theforemost Amencan
specialiston questionsrelatingto FCNtreatics:"A decisionbytheSupremeCourtof the
State of Washingtonin 1934 brought out that omission of the word 'friendship'may
have important legal consequcnces."US CommercialTreoliesond Infernoriono1Low,
1960,pp:2-3.
''Problernrrclating10 FCN treatieshad been submittcdIo this Court on two pnor
Occasionsi:n thecase of theTemple of PreahViheor and in thecaseconccming Righfs of
Nationalsqlthe UnitedSintesof Americoin Morocco (Froncev. UniredSfofes).Judgmeni,
ICJ. Reports1952, p. 176. MEMORlAL OF NICARAGUA 107
Vienna Conventions on diplomatic relations (1961) and consular relations
(1963) and the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons]. Under Article II,
paragraph 4, of the Treaty of Amity, each Party has a legal obligation to
ensure that within its territory, the nationals of the other Party shall receive
'the most constant protection and security'." (United States Diplumatic
and ConsularSlafl in Tehran,Memorial of the United States,p. 24 (January
1980).)
406. In its Memorial, the United States invoked the same provision and as-
serted that it gave to the citizens of both parties a "broad guarantee of security
and protection". (Ibid., p. 179.)The United States argued:
"The eflect of the Treaty is Io translate these generally and extensively
applied principles of international law into a concrete and explicit set of
bilateral obligations." (Ibid., p. 180.)
Thus, the United States:
- relied on a provision drafted in the same manner as that in Article III of the
Treaty of 21 January 1956;
- intemreted this orovision in its most eeneral sense: and
- used'thisarguméntnot only on behdllof the righisoiits i.insular persi>nncl-
the Cirn\cntion iii1963 \rus ;iinply suilicir.ntfor this purpii-c hut alrii on
hchalf ni t\ro of LIS citi,enswh~ itiuld niit hcncfit irom diplnniatic or çon-
sular status.
The Court fully acceded to this request :
"So far as concems the Iwo private United States nationals seizedas hos-
tages hy the invading militants, that ... entailed, albeit incidentally, a
breach of its obligations under Article II, paragraph 4, of the 1955Treaty
of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights which, in addition to
the obligations of Iran existing under general international law, requires the
Parties to ensure 'the most constant protection and security'to each other's
nationals in their respective territories." (I.C.J. Reports 1980,p. 32.)
407. Just prior to this passage, theCourt clearlyspecifiedthe scopeit attributed
to such a Treaty:
"The very purpose of a Treaty of Amity, and indeed of a Treaty of
Establishment, is to promote friendly relations between the two countries
concerned, and between their Iwo peoples, more specially by mutual under-
takings to ensure the protection and security of their nationals in each
other's territories. It is precisely when difficulties arise that the Treaty
assumes its greatest importance. .. ."(Ibid., p. 28.)
What was tme in 1980remains true in 1985.The Treaty of 21 January 1956, is
thus without douht a treaty of friendship which imposeson the Parties the obli-
gation to conduct amicable relations with each other.
SectionIiI. The UnitedStatesHas ViolatedandContinuesto ViolateNumerous
Provisionsof theTreaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1956
408. That "every Treaty in force is hinding upon the parties Io it and mus1be
performed by them in good Faith" (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,108 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlES
23 May 1969,Article XXVl - pacta sunrservanda),is a fundamental principle
of international law, so well established that it needs no comment. However, it
is necessary Io emphasize that a State party to a treaty is bound not only to
respect the letter of the provisions of such treaty, but also to refrain from any
act incompatible with the object or the purpose of the Treaty 16.
409. The actions of the United States at issue in this proceeding are both
incomoatible with the obiect and oumose of the FCN Treatv and directlv vio-
late a humber of its speckc provisions, particularly those reliting to freedom of
communication and equitable treatment of Nicaraguan citizens. These violations
cannot be justified.
A. The UnitedStates Has Deprivedand Continues 10Beprive rhe1956 Trearyof
Ils Object and lis Purpose
410. Nicaragua has established in the preceding sections that the FCN Trcaty
of 21 January 1956 must be understood in its totality and in light of the full
range of intentions expressed by the parties. So understood, the Treaty imposes
a legal obligation of "friendship" between the parties. Whatever the exact
dimensions of the legal nom of "friendship", there can be no doubt of a United
States violation in this case. By the use of armed force, by the support given
to groups of armed mercenanes, by the continuing violation of the territorial
sovereignty ofNicaragua, by attempting to paralyse al1economic activity in Nica-
ragua, to hinder (and at times to prevent) foreign trade, and to destroy the
productive capacity of the country al1described more fully in the Statement of
Facts and preceding chapters, the United States has violated the broad purpose
of the 1956Treaty and deprived it of al1substance.
411. Furthermore, Dursuant to oaragraphs 2 and 3 of Article X of the Treaty,
the parties assumed an obligation io cio@rate in scientificand technical matters
in order to ameliorate standards of livinginboth countries. Thisend iscompletely
incom~atible with the facts that have been developed in the evidence before
the Court.
412. Not only has the United States effectively ceased al1cooperation with
regard to the social and economic development of Nicaragua, but it has adopted
as a specific policy objective the destruction of the economic potential of the
country. The most salient facts in this regard are:
- The United States suddenly halted its economic aid to Nicaragua on 1 April
1981.This aid had been $118million during the previous 18 months. (NYT
4/2/81 ;see also United States Counter-Memorial. p. 86.)
- In Mav 1983.the United States susoended 90 Dercent of Nicaragua's sugar
quota.'(~:nitrd States Presidcntiltl ~r<iclamaii~R51W,Ann. K. ~iGchmenC4.
N YT7 3 83)Thisabrupt cul-oITua5a brcach ofthe 1977GA'~I'Intrrnaiiunal
Sugar Agreement - 10 which hoih Siate, are p~rticr - and of Pre,identiaI
provisionI10ethis eiïectin itr draft c(Yenrbook O/mrhelnrernorionoDl iw Commission,
1964,Vol. 1.pp.25,30 and 171ff. ,iird repon of Sir HumphreyWaldock) (id.Vol.II,
p.3) but finallydecidedagainst il, notbecause ilsmemben had any doubt as to the
existenceof this mle, but because il seemedimplicitlybut n-sarily includedin the
principlpacrosunrservondo(.Ibid, Vol.1,p.245and Vol.II, p. 185.)Seealso,separate
opinionof SirHerschLauterpachtin the caseconcemingthe Admissibilirof Heu* O/
Periiionersby rheCommirreeon Sourh Werr Africo. AdviroryOpinion.ICJ Reporls1956,
p.25at 48. MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 109
Proclamation 4941 of 5 May 1982(Ann. K, Attachment 4). (A GATT panel
ruled on 2 March 1984that this decision was a violation of the international
obligations of the United States under the Agreement.) (SeeUnited States -
Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua: Report of the Panel, General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, 2 March 1984; "US Economic Measures Against
Central America". Central American Historical lnstitute Update; Vol. 4,
No. 9, 1 April 1985,Ann. K, Attachment 5.)
- The United States has opposed the provision of loans and credits to Nicara-
gua in international lending and development institutions. In March 1985,it
prevented the grant of a loan of $150 million to Nicaragua from the Inter-
American Development Bank. (WP 3/8/85; see Letter of Secretary of State
George P. Shultz to the Honorable Antonio Ortiz Mena, President, Inter-
American Development Bank, Ann. C, 11-9.)
- The armed activities which the United States is directine in and aeainst
Nicaragua have consistently aimed at economic objectives; koreover, Ünited
States plans to destabilize the Nicaraguan Government, and the training
given to the mercenary forces, clearly express these objectives. (See Carrion
Affidavit, Ann. A, Exhihit A.)
413. These acts not only render the realization of the objectives fixed in
Article X of the 1956 Treaty illusory, they in fact seek to accomplish precisely
the opposite objective: not the economic development of Nicaragua and the
amelioration of the standard of livine of ils citizens. b~. ~ ~her. its,ec~n~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
strangulation. This purpose cannot, under any interpretation of "friendship", be
found to be compatible with the general structureof relations estahlished between
the two countriei hy the 1956~Feat~.
Article 1of the 1956Treaty provides:
"Each Party shall at al1times accord equitahle treatment to the persons.
property, enterprises and other interests of nationals and companies of the
other parties."
Placed at the beginning of the Treaty, this article is evidently of primary im-
portance.
414. Unlike Articles III, paragraph 1, and VI, paragraph 1, hy which each
Party undertakes to protect the persons and property of the citizens of the other
party residing in the first party's territory, the scope of Article 1is not subject to
a territorial limitation. Article 1constitutes a general undertaking on the part of
each OCthe two States with regard to the persons, property, enterprises and other
interests of the citizens of the other party wherever these persons or interests
may he found.
415. It would not he useful here to enter into an extended discussion on the
exact meaning of the expression "equitahle treatment". Whatever meaning is
accorded to this exnression. it necessarilv nrecludes the Government of the
I!niir.il Staicr irom r.ng.igirigIn ihr..ictiiities &tailcd in the Siatemcni ,>fI;;icts.
ihai 1s. ir<m killing, u<i~nJing JI kidii:ipping ciii~cnior Vic.ir~gu:i.;inJ. mitrr.
eenerallv. from thrëatenine ~~caraeua- citizens in the intemitv-.f their Dersons
Orthe safety of their property.110 MILITARYAND PARAMlLlTARYACTlVlTlES
C. The UnitedStates Has Violatedand Continues 10 Violatethe Provisionsof the
1956 Treaty relaiing 10 theFreedomof Communication
416. ArticlesXIX and XX of the FCN Treaty provide, in general and absolute
terms, for the freedom of communications between the two States:
Article XIX, paragraph 1:
"Between the territories of the two Parties, there shall he freedom of
commerce and navigation."
Article XX :
"There shallbe freedom of transit through the territory of each Party hy
the routes most convenient for international transit:
(a) for nationals of the other Parties, together with their haggage;
(b) for other persons, together with their baggage, en route to or from the
territories of such other Parties; and
(c) for products of any origin en route to or from the territories of such
other Party."
417. The Court in its Judgment of 26 November 1984noted that freedom of
navigation constitutes an ohligatory principle "as part of customary international
law" (ICJ. Reports 1984, p. 424). Nicaragua will show in the following chap-
ter that the United States has indisputably violated this customary rule. (See
Chap. VII, Sec. 5.) But this customary law principle has been both reaffirmed
and expanded in the 1956 Treaty: Article XIX, paragraph 1, of the Treaty
includes, in an ahsolutely gencral manner, freedom of navigation in the ports of
the other Party, not just on the high seas.
4-~. The Permanen~ ~ourt~of International Justice. in two notable decisions.
definedwith great precision the freedoms of navigation and commerce, indicating
that they could not be disassociated from one another:
"The conceot of naviea-ion includes. orimarilv and essentiallv.the conceut
of the movement of vessels with a view to the accomplishment of voy-
ages. . . .Freedom of navigation is incomplete unlessshipping can actually
reach the ports under the same conditions. . ..
The second idea which the concept of navigation comprises is that of
contact with the economic organization and with the medns of communi-
cation of the country reached hy navigation. Ports are precisely the means
of estahlishing such contact." (Jurisdictionof the EuropeanCommissionof
the Danube,Advisory Opinion,1927, P.CI.J., Series B. No. 14, pp. 64-66.)
"According to the concept universally accepted, the freedom of naviga-
tion ...comprises freedom of movementfor vessels,freedom to enter ports,
and to makeuse of ulants and docks. to load and unload eoods and to irans-
port goods and pa&engers.
From this point of view, freedom of navigation implies, as far as the
business side of maritime or fluvial transport is concerned, freedom of
commerce also." (OscarChinn,Judgment1934, PCIJ, SeriesAIE, No.63,
p. 84.)
419. The Permanent Court further defined the freedom of commerce as
follows :
" 1he riglit. in principlc unresiricied.IO engage in aiiy zonimeriirl aciiiity.
uhcihcr ilis conxrned with ir'tding propcrl) si>-called.thai is ihc purchcise MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 111
and sale ofgoods, or whether it he concerned withindustry, and in particular
the transport business; or, finally,whether it is carried on inside the country
or hy the exchange of imports and exports with other countries." (Ibid ;see
also, Corfu Channel, Merirs, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p.98 (dissenting opinion
hy Judge Azevedo).)
420. This conceotion finds suo..rt in the doctrine (see Jules Basdevant. ed..
Dr<li<#linürrdrilu rc~r11iiti~~ll1~dr>~rlinr~r~r~rtr~~n~1l.261.in ihe juri\pruJr.nie
<II'intcrn;iiiun.iI irihunal,. .ind in the praitior. ihr. L'nitcd Siaie, 'l'hui. for
enamplc, in II\interpretaiion <,ith: '1rciity of C<immcric:ind N.ivigation con-
r.1udr.diin 21 l:cbru~ry 1911 heiirr.cn tlic United Si31c<itnd Japan. the Supr:nic
Coiiri of the I.'nirr.iISiaies ilcarlv accr.prr.ilthis propositi~~n:
"While in a narrow and unrestricted sense the terms 'commerce' or
'commercial', and 'trade' may he limited to the purchase and sale or
exchange of goods and commodities, they may connote, as well, other
occupations and other recognized forms of businessenterprise which do not
necessarily involve trading in merchandise. . . .And although commerce
includes trafic in this narrower sense, for more than a century it has heen
iudiciallv recoenized that in a broad sense it embraces everv ohase of
commer~ial and business activity and intercourse." (Jordan, Seketary of
Srare of Cal~yorniav. Toshiro,278 US 123,127-128(1928).)
421. These principles still hold. They have not heen respected hy the United
States. There is no doubt that the mining of Nicaragua's ports by the United
States violated the freedom of navigation and, in consequence, the freedom of
commerce, as wellas the freedom of transit.
422. The mining of the ports of Corinto, Puerto Sandino and El Bluff- the
principal Nicaraguan ports which together handle almost al1 of Nicaragua's
trade - decidedon, organized and effectedby the CIA caused significantdamage
to shipsentering and leavingthese three ports. (Statement of Facts, paras. 96-98.)
Several third-State merchant ships of vanous nationalities were seriously
damaged. (Ibid, para. 98.) As a result, certain companies cancelled scheduled
deliveries (notahly of petroleum) and pickups (of Cotton in particular). (Ibid.)
Similarly,numerous Nicaraguan merchant ships and fishingboats weredamaged
or destroyed while traversing the mined waters or while engaging in mine-
sweeoine ooerations. llbid J
42j. SinCethe ~nited tes bas intensified its military and paramilitary acti-
vities in Nicaragua, marine insurance companies have significantly increased
the price of insuFancein order to cover the risk of war for t;ansports to or from
Nicaragua. Even before the mining, Lloyds of London, whose rates provide a
benchmark for other insurers, had increased its "War Risk Rates" applicable
to maritime operations with Nicaragua fivefold. (See LloydsLisr and Shipping
Gazerreand Related Documenrs.Ann. K. Attachment 6.) As a result. Nicaragua -
I<nom ilaj,ified a\ d mdximuni rirk for shipping opr.r;iiorj. ai ihc \Amr.Ikvelas,
for cr.iruple, Iran. ,\rir.r ihe niining. fren~h inurancc rater ior irpcrdtion, ii,iih
Nicaragua - which are generally set independently from the rates in other
Western countries - increased dramaticallv first on 8 March 1984. and then
again on 13April 1984.(Ann. K, ~ttachmint 7.)
424. These facts constitute an independent violation of the Treaty, in light of
the provisions of ArticleXVII, para&aph 3:
"Neither Party shall impose any measure of a discriminatory nature that
hinders or prevents the importer or exporter of products of either country112 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
from ohtaining marine insurance on such products of companies of either
Party."
The military and paramilitary activities of the United States in and against
Nicaragua have had the direct eliect of preventing and rendering more dificult
and costly the ohtaining of marine insurance for buyers of Nicaraguan products
or for Nicaraguan importers.
425. There can be no douht that the mining of the Nicaraguan ports hy the
United States constitutes a manifest violation of the freedom of navigation and
freedom of commerce guaranteed hy Article XIX, 1, of the 1956Treaty. And,
although the mining of the ports and its consequences constitute one of the more
Aagrant violations of the 1956Treaty, the mining is only part of the ensemble
of military and paramilitary activities conducted hy the United States in and
against Nicaragua, al1of which are violative of the 1956Treaty. Since the word
"commerce" in the 1956Treaty must be understood in its hroadest sense, al1of
the activities by which the United States has deliherately inflictedon Nicaragua
physical damage and economic lossesof al1types, violate the principle of freedom
of commerce which the Treaty estahlishes in very general terms.
D. The Violaiions of rhe1956 Trearyhy the UnitedSiaies CannofBe Jusifid
underAny Circumsrances
426. There can he no douht that the United States has violated the FCN
Treatv of 21 Januarv 1956. The resnonsibilitv of the United States for these
violaiions can nciiherbe aiienuated nor excureciun thc hasisof anv ciinsicier;itions
which under oihzr iircuriisidnccs might oihcnvi,e jusiify 11sactions
427. Possiblc iu~til'\inrcircumsiances h1I inin tut>iateyurics. I'irsi. there arc
. .-
the ch<>neratingcduscs iraciiiii~nallyrecogni~ed ~nder <U,lilmd? inrernationiil
Iau anil cnumerrted in Chopter V of ihe Jraft articlisriiihe IIC conccrning
Sixir rc~r>onsibilti\,'1hc Ilnited S1:ii~sinioked one of thew cause, in ils Coiinicr-
~emorial during the first nhase of the orcsent case: legitimate self-defense.
(~ounter-~emonal of the Cnited States, pp. 219R.) ~icaca~ua has estahlished
elsewhere that there is no hasis to any such assertion. (See Chap. III, Sec. III;
Chap. IV, Sec. Ill and Sec. VII.)
428. Second, within the Treaty itself, the two Parties reserve the right to
implement certain measures that might otherwise violate the provisions of the
Treaty. Article XXI, paragraph 1, provides:
"1. The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures:
..........................
(c) regulating the production of or trafic in arms, ammunition, and
implements of war or trafic in other materials carried on directly or
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(d) necessary to fulfill the obligations of a Party with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or
necessary to protect its essential security interest;."
429. In its Counter-Memorial the United States invoked this provision as
follows:
"Any possible doubt as to the applicability of the FCN Treaty to Nica-
ragua's claim is dispelled hy Article XXI of the Treaty, paragraph (1) (d).
Article XXI (1) (c), moreover, excludes from the FCN Treaty's cover-
age measures relating to the trafic in arms or other materials carried on MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 113
directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment."
(Para. 179.)
430. One party to a treaty, however, cannot absolve itself of al1responsibility
for violations of the provisions of the tredty by simply invoking an exculpatory
provision. It is for the Court and not for the Parties to determine the validity of
such assertions. The Court "is entirely free to estimate the value of statements
made by the Parties". (Certain Cermanlnlerestsin Polish UpperSilesia(Cermany
v.Poland), Merits, JudgmentNo. 7, 1926, P.CI.J., SeriesA, No. 7, p. 73)".
431. The circumstances of the present case clearly do not fulfillthe conditions
estahlished in subsection (c) or suhsection (d) of Article XXI, paragraph (1).
of the 1956 Treaty. With regard to "traffic in arms, ammunition and imple-
ments of war or traffic in other materials", such traffic must be for the purpose
of supplying a military establishment, which the United States cannot allege to
be the case here. A fortiori, the training, financing and directing of guerrilla
groups cannot be brought within the compass of this provision.
432. Similarly, Article XXI (1) (d) cannot be invoked to justify the activities
of the United States. This provision refers implicitly to the provisions in the
United Nations Charter relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security. Nicaragua has shown in Chapter III of the present Memorial that the
military and paramilitary activities conducted by the United States in and against
Nicaragua are completely incompatible with these provisions of the Charter.
433. It is well-established in international law that a State's violations and its
conventional obligations constitute international delicts for which such State is
responsible.
"lt is a principle of international law that the hreacb of an engagement
involvesan obligation ta make reparation in an adequate fom. Reparation
therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention
and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself."
(Faciory al Chorzow (Germon)' v. Poiand). Jurisdiction,JudgmentNo. 8.
1927. P.C.LJ.. SeriesA, No. 9, p.21.)
As Nicaragua has shown above. the United States has violated numerous oro-
visions of-the FCN Treaty of'21 January 1956, violations which const;tute
breaches of international law and oblige the United States to makecompensation.
In addition. these violations, given their simultaneitv and coniunction.constitute
an independent internationi~de~ict and clearly atteit to the iact that the United
States has completely deprived the Treaty of ils object and its purpose, which,
in itself, is a supplementary heading of responsibility
" In ilsJudgment of 26 November1984,theCourt follawcdthisprinciplewithregard
to the "VandcnbergReservation":"Cenainly the determination of the State 'aiiccted'
individual opinionofPresidentNagendraSingh.by the Coun." (Para. 75.)Sm alsothe PART III
THE CUSTOMARYLAW
CHAPTER VI1
BREACllES 01.' OBI.IC;ATIOXS ;\KISINC; LSDER CUSIO\I,\KY OR
C;F.VER.\I. ISI'EKSA'I'IOSAI. [.A\\' FOR \\'HICH TIIE I'SI'I'EU SI'A'I'I~.S
Section 1. Purpose of the Chapter
434. The content of the prexnt chapter Rows naturally, like that of the
previous chapter, from the substance of Nicaragua's Application of 9 April 1984.
The claims of Nicaragua are to a very considerable extent based upon well-
recoenized ~rinci~les of customarv or reneral international law. The ~ertinent
clai& and iauses'of action will h&res&ted systematically inthe order'in which
they appeared in the Application, together with the appropriate indications of
thëevidence sup~. .ini "ach cause of action. In a case which rests upon the
çun<:pi oI'Siatc rcsponjibilit) and ~ni,~ilvcs\crious brca~hciof inicrnaiion.il Iau.
the ~Jentifirationi>irhc prczibcpround.: on which ilic çI31mir haird becumcs a
matter of considerahle importance.
435. As the Court recognized in the ludgment in the lurisdiction phase of the
present proceedings, the principles of customary and general international ldw
invoked in the Application continue to be operative autonomously in spite of
the fact that they have heen codified or incorporated in various multilateral
conventions. (I.CJ. Reports 1984,pp. 424-425,para. 73 ;and seeChap. V,supra.)
In this context is it necessary to point out that in certain cases the rule of
customary law willnot necessarilybe identical incontent and mode of application
to the conventional rule.
436. The legal bases of the claim of Nicaragua relating to customary and
general international law will now be examined one by one.
SectionII. Violationsof the Sovereigntyof Nicaragua
437. The evidence, including the Affidavit of Commander Carrion dated
21 April 1985, reveals a substantial numher of violations of the sovereignty of
Nicaragua by United States forces and other forces under the control of the
United States. (Ann. A, Exhibit A.) The violations take various forms but al1
involve trespass into the territory, territorial sea or airspace, of the Republic of
Nicaragua.
438. The violations of Nicaragua's sovereignty include the following forms:
(a) Armed attacks against the territory of Nicaragua by land, sea and air
(b) Incursions into Nicaragua's territorial sea.
(c) Trespass hy military aircraft into Nicaragua's airspace.116 MlLlTARYAND PARAMlLlTARYACTlVlTlES
439. Particular episodes of violence and sabotage include an attack by two
Cessna aircraft on Managua Airport on 8 September 1983,and a comhined sea
and air attack, which destroyed fiveoil storage tanks in the Port of Corinto, on
10October 1983.(Statement of Facts, paras. 84,87.) Asdetailed in the Statement
of Facts, the pattern of armed attacks hy guerrillas aimed at the population of
the countryside. the administration, and economic targets, is well-attested by the
documentary evidence. Responsibility for these military and paramilitary activi-
ties is accepted by the United States. (See Chaps. 1and II, supra.)
440. The evidence of substantial and DersistentUnited States involvement in
and legal respunrihility for the numerous violations of so\crcignt) h3s hccn
diwussed 31 lcngth in Chaptcr II. Itincludes the foll,~uing
(u, Lcgislation of Congress. (Ann. Dl
(hl Congrr.ssion;llreporii and, in particular, the Kcpori of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intellieenceoithç Ilourc of Kcnrcsentaiii~es.of 13Mav 1983.
(Ann. E, ~ttachmenï 1.)
(c) Expressadmissionsmade hy the Presidentand other senior officiaisappearing
on the public record. (Ann. C.)
(d) Admissions made by the leaders of the mercenary forces. (Statement of
Facts, paras. 53, 69, 81.)
(e) Numerous press reports. (Ann. F.)
(J) The evidence ofa system, a pattern of activities, indicating a general policy
on the part of the United States in respect of the campaign of "covert
action" directed against Nicaragua.
441. Many of the violations of sovereigntycovercd by Nicaragua's claim,and
~robablv the maio.itv .f instances. involvethe use of armed force. However, the
appliïaiion of the concept of a violation of sovereignty, for example, tu case. of
acridl trcspass, is legallyjusIllied uhethcr or no1 the p~rtliular viiilaiion can bc
said IO invo1i.ea ujc of forcc or resort to arnied force. Thur althourh thr cI.iim
hased upon violations of sovereignty overlapswith other causes of action relating
to the use of force, it does not simply coincide with those other causes of action
and consequently plays a significant independent role.
442. There can he no doubt whatsoeverbut that the violation of the sovereignty
of a State constitutes a cause of action recognized by customary and general
international law. In a recent work on State responsibility the "violation of the
sovereigntyof a State by specifiedacts" is descnbed as one of the "fundamental
causes of action". (See Brownlie. Svsfemof the Lrrw of Nations: Sfafe Res-
ponsibility,Part 1, 1983,pp. 84-85.) '
443. In the CorJuChannel case (Merits, ICJ Reporls1949, p. 4), the Court
cbaracterized the action of the British Navyon 12and 13Novemher 1946as "a
violation of Albanian sovereignty". (I.C.J. Reporrs1949, pp. 32-35; and see the
Dispositif,p. 36.) With regard to this operation, which involvedthe invasion of
Albanian territorial waters hy a lar~e force of naval vessels, the Court stated
that: "Between indenendent ~tates.>es~ect for territorial sovereiantv is an es-
sential foundation oi internati~inal relaiions" (Ihr~l.p. 35 ) ~nd-in.ihç Judg-
ment ionrcrning the Juri\diction phasc of the presnt use. the Court noted
that "rrswct for ihe indewndence and territorial inteariir. 01'Siaie<" formed n
part of c;stomary internaiional law. (Judgment, para. 73.)
444. The principle of responsihility for violations of sovereignty is generally
accepted in the practice of States. See, for example, the Australian Application
in the NucleorTests cases (1.C.J. Pieadinas,Nuclear Tests. Vol. 1.D. 14.nara. 49:
and pp. 335-336,paras. 45i-455); canaZan claim against the USSR fo; damagi
caused by the Cosmos 954 satellite, Canadian note of 23 January 1979 and MOR RIALOP NICARAGUA 117
Statement of Claim (18 International Legal Materials (1979), p. 899). The
Canadian Statement of Claim includes the following passage:
"The intruriwi oi the Ci>>nio>954 ratcllitc inio C.in.iil~'3air .pasc and
the iIr,p<i\ii<inC<riiadisnterritor) oI'huard(1ur r~dio:rctiic dcbri, liim thc
cllitc nttc a a n ui n i srnty This violation is
estahlished hy the mere fact of the trespass of th;satellite, the harmful
consequences of this intrusion, being the damage caused ta Canada hy the
presence of hazardous radioactive debris and the interference with the
sovereie- rieht of Canada to determine the acts that will be ~erformed on
irs i:rriror). Intcrnxriiin~lprrïcrlcnis r~wgnisc ihst ;i ii<)13ti<of s~vcrcignty
girer ri,c io oii oblig~iion 1%)pli).c<impcnuiion." iI/>i~/p. 9117.pJrli. 21.1
445. The absence of lawfuljustification for the activitiesconstituting violations
of Nicaragua's sovereignty will beshown in Section VI1of the present Chapter.
Section III. Breachesof the Obligation NO;to Use Forceor the Threat of Force
446. There is an extensive pattern of evidence of breaches on the part of the
United States of the customary law obligation not ta resort to the use or threat
of force against the political independence or territorial integrity of other States.
It is cogent in detail and forms overall evidence of systemdtic activity. Much of
the evidence is summarized and presented in authoritative form in the Report of
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives,
13May 1983.(Ann. E, Attachment 1.) The use of force by mercenaries operating
under the control of the United States is chronicled in this Report. Reference is
made to the "hostilities" (ibid., p. 245, infra), and to "direct or indirect support
of military or paramilitary activities in Nicaragua" (ihid). Since the Report is
concerned with an amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act for the
Fiscal Year 1983, it necessarily describes the purposes of existing funding and
policies as the background to the attempt to place constraints upon "United
States support for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua". (See ihid,
headnote.)
447. The use or threat of force directed against the political independence and
territorial integrity of Nicaragua has taken the following fonns:
(a) Armed attacks against the territory of Nicaragua by land, sea and air.
(h) Incursions hy military and paramilitary forces into Nicaragua's territorial
sea.
(c) Trespass bymilitary aircraft into Nicaragua's airspace.
(dl A eeneral and sustained nolic. of f,rce. nubliclv ex~ou.ded. intended to
iniiniid;iir.the I.i\iiuI (iiiternnicni oi Tiicaraguain[<>üiicpting thc politi;~l
Jcni;ind, of the IJnii~d Si.itcs Go!crnmcni. and rcriilting in <uh\tïnii<rl
infringements of the political independence of Nicaragua.
(e) The setting of mines in Nicaraguan harbors.
448. The facts concernine the enisodes of violence directed aeainst Nicara-
gua arc rcr iorili in ihc .4iKila\ii <;I. <immonJcr C.,irriOnJlitcJ Ï7 Apr11IJb5
(,Inn. A]. anJ ;il,u. \rith rcfcrenic, io the wpporiing c,iilcncc. in ihc Si.ircrnsni
oi ts;i5. vupnr The c\idcnic ~p~~citi:all\r~ claicd io thc mininc -.port5 \\,IIIbc
indicated in'section~ ~he~ ~ ~ .
449 The c\,iilcncc i>r uhriantiül aiid persistent I.niicd Sistes invol\emcnt in
and Icr.il r~~spon;ibilit~fc>rthe numr.ri>u,hrc.i:hcs in iht Icgiila>hlip.rii>riinoi IG
resortio theue or t&eat of force includes the following:118 MILITARYAND PAMMILITARY ACTlVlTlES
(a) Legislalion of Congress. (Ann. D.)
(b) Congressional Reports and, in particular, the Reporrof rhePcrmanenrSelccr
Cornmitteeon Inielligenceof the Houseof Represenratives ,f 13 May 1983
(Ann. E) as well as statements of individual memhers ofCongressional In-
telligenceCommittees. (Statement of Facts, paras. 70-75, 107, 110,116.)
(c) Express admissions madehy the Presidentand other senior officiaiappearing
on the public record. (Ann. C, Attachment 1-1to 1-21and 11-1to 11-11.)
(d) Admissions made by the leaders of the mercenaries. (Statement of Facts,
paras. 53, 69, 81, 128.)
(e) Numerous press reports. (Ann. F.)
(f) The evidence of a system, a pattern of activities, indicating a general policy
on the part of the United States, in respect of the campaign of "covert
action" directed against Nicaragua. (See Chap. II, supra.)
450. In the context of the use of force the public admissions made by
mercenary leaders are of particular relevance. The following leaders have made
statements to the press describing the involvement of the United States, and
more particularly the CIA, in leadership selection and in the determination of
the overall strategy and tactics of the mercenary attacks:
(a) Edgar Chamorro. (See, e.g., WP 11/27/84; WP 9/29/83.)
(b) Enrique Bermudez. (See, e.g., lnrernarionalHerald Tribune, 2/20/85; WP
2/28/85.)
451. The statements made by such individuals, the public statements of the
President, and the various Congressional documents, are replete withthe vocabu-
lary of military action and coercion. The following examples are typiçal: Presi-
dent Reagan's 21 February 1985statement of a purpose to change "the present
structure" of the Nicaraguan Government, and to make them "say 'Uncle'"
(Ann. C, Attachment 11-14); his Octoher 1983 defense of the use of "covert
actions" in response 10a question about "recent rehel attacks on a Nicaraguan
oil depot" (Ann. C, Attachment 1-2); and the frequent references inPresidential
statements to the mercenary forces supported hy the United States as "freedom
fighters" (see, e.g., Ann. C, Attachments 1-12,1-15,1-17, 1-21). Inaddition. the
Reporrof the PermnnenrSelectConmtitteeon Inielligenceof ihe Houseof Repre-
sentatives,13May 1983(Ann. E, Attachment 1)and in other Congressionalstate-
ments contained in Annex E, include such terms as "insurgent a-tivity" and
"hostilities".
452. Of high evidential significanceis the helated appearance since April 1984
of United States claims to have acted hy virtue of the right of collective self-
defense recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Such claims -
which are not justified on the facts and which the United States is unwilling to
substantiate by offeringevidence - necessarilyinvolvean admission of suhstan-
tial United States direction and control of the forces engaged in the military
operations against Nicaragua. The relevant sources are set forth in Chapter 1
and Chapter 11of this Memorial.
453. There is very substantial authority for the view that the principles
contained in Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter form part of general
international law. This position is taken hy the United States Counter-Memorial
on Jurisdiction and Admissihility, paragraphs 313-319.There is good reason to
helievethat Article 2 (4) was declaratory of the position in general international
law in 1945.Indeed, this position was relied upon hy the Allied prosecutors in
TheTrial of Major GermonWar Crinlinais by the International Military Tribunal,
and the Judgment of the Tribunal refers 10 the legal effect of the General MEMOUAL OF NICARAGUA 119
Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 1928. (See Annual Bigesi and Reports
of Public Iniernationol Low Cases, Vol. 13, p. 203, a1 pp. 208-209; United
Kingdom, HMSO, Misc. No. 12(1946), Cmd. 6964, pp. 38-41(complete text).)
454. The same view is expressed by Lord McNair, a former President of the
Court, in his work The Law of Trearies, 1961, pages 209-210, 216-217 and
576-577.The key passage is as follows:
"This treaty, the Chaner, now [June 19611acceptedby no lessthan nine!y-
nine States, is the nearest approach to legiskationby the whole community
of States that bas yet been realized. Our submission is that those of its
orovisions which oumort to create leeal riehts and duties oossessa constitu-
;i\e or >cmi-legisiati;echararitr. wzh th; resuli that a;) mrmber St~tes
cann.>tsiintract out ofthem or Jtrog.tie irom them bytreÿties made bstueen
them and that any treaty whereby they attempted to produce this elïect
would be void. Many of these rights and duties are binding upon member
States not only as between themselvesbut also as between each ofthem and
the United Nations, for instance, the two paragraphs of Article 2 quoted
above; paragraph 4 certainly and paragraph 3 probably are binding upon
members, whether the other State which is the victim of force,threatened
or used (paragraph 4), or which is involved in the dispute, is a member of
the United Nations or not. It is, indeed, very probable, having regard to the
provisions of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 1928and
to the development of the rules of customary law referred to above that an
international tribunal would now hold that the provisions of the two para-
graphs of Article 2 referred to above are declaratory of customary law
and bind al1 States, whether they are members of the United Nations or
not." (The &IV of Trearies,p.217.)
455. The status of the rule prohibiting the use or threat of force as a part of
customary or general international law is confirmed in the following sources
(which are inteided to be exemplary and not exhaustive):
(a) The Judgment of the Court in the Jurisdiction phase of the present case
(Judgment, para. 73).
(b) The International Law Commission in its Report Io the General Assembly
(Yearbookof theInternaiionalLaw Commission, 1966,Vol. II, p. 169).
(c) Judge Baxter (129 Hague Recueil (1970-1), p.31,at p. 71).
(d) Judge Mosler (TheInternarionalSocietyasa LegalCommunity, 1980,p. 277).
(e) President Jiménez de Aréchaga (159 Hague Recueil (1978-l), p.9, at
pp. 87-88).
(fl Professor Tunkin (95 Hague Recueil (1958-1). p. 5, at pp. 14-15).
456. It may be pointed out that the phrase "use of force" in the provisions
of Article 2 (4) of the Charter is broad in scope, and thus comprehends al1
applications of armed force. (See Whiteman, Digestoflnternutionul Law, 1965,
Vol. 12.00. 3-7.)
451. ~rcsideni JimCne, de Aréihaga. giving ihc Gcncral Course ai the Hagur
Acadcmy, ha5oll'ereda uscfulcommenidry on the conccpi of a "ihrcai of force".
In his words:
"Article 2,paragraph 4, bars not only the use but also the threat of force.
A threat of force is, for instance, the previous announcement of an act of
violence.such as an ultimatum announcine recourse Io militarv measures if
certain demands are not accepted. ~threaÏ of force could alsibe implicitly
conveyed by certain acts such as 'a demonstration of force for the purpose
of exercising political pressure', the sudden concentration of troops in a120 MILITARY AXD PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
border area in a situation of existing border dispute, or a display of force
by means of warships close to the coasts of another State. A general
mobilization could, in the context of a serious dispute, constitute a threat
of force. On the other hand, an intensification of armaments, in general
might not be looked upon as such a threat." (159 Hague Recueil(1978-l),
p. 88. The quotation in the tex1is from the Judgment of the Court in the
Co$u Channelcase, Meriis, 1CJ Reports 1949,p. 4, at p. 35.)
The continuous United States military and naval maneuvers adjacent to Nica-
raguan borders, officially acknowledged as a program of "perception man-
agement" falls readily within this description. (NYT 3/30/85.) Similarly, Presi-
dent Reagan's "peace proposal" of 4 April 1985was, in reality, an ultimatum
announcing recourse to military measures if certain demands are not accepted.
458. The absence of lawfuljustification for the activitiesconstituting violations
of the rule prohibiting resort to the use or threat of force will be shown in Sec-
tion VI1of the present chapter.
Section IV. Breachesof thePrincipleofNon-Intervention
459. A universally recognized principle of customary or general international
law prescribes a duty not to intervene in the internal ahirs of other States, and
this particularly when the means of intervention involve the use or threat of
force. (See Oppenheim, International Law (Hersch Lauterpaçht, cd.), Vol. 1,
1955,p. 305; O'Connell, IniernarionalLaw, Vol. 1,pp. 299-300; Rousseau, Droit
international puhlic, 1980, Vol. IV, pp. 37-39, paras. 25-27; Tunkin, Theory of
Iniernaiional Law (Butler Translation), 1974,pp. 115-116, 437-440; Jiménezde
Aréchaga,159Hague Recueil(1978-1), p. 9, at pp. 111-116.)
460. In 1948the Secretary-General of the United Nations published a study,
prepared for the use of the International Law Commission, entitled "Preparatory
Study concerning a Draft Declaration on the Rights and Dulies of States", New
York, 1948(doc. AlCN.412). Article 5 of the draft Declaration provides: "No
State has the right to interfere in the internal or external anairs of another
State." (lbid, pp. 62-65.)
461. Inthe CorJi1Channelcase (Merits,ICJ Reporrs 1949,p.4), the Judgment
of the Court characterized the British action known as "Operation Retail" in
terms which in effectcreated a presumption against the legality of intervention.
(I.C.J. Re~oris 1949. o. 35.) Sir Hersch Lauteroacht has commented that the
relevant passage affiGs "thé right ofsovereign tate toesmmunity from inter:
vention on the part of other States". (The Bevelopmeni of lniernarional Law
by the lnternational Couri, 1958,p. 317.) Moreover, in its Judgment in the Juris-
diction phase of the present case, the Court stated that the principle of non-
intervention formed part of customary international law (I.C.J. Reports 1984,
p. 424, para. 73).
462. The evidence of the breaches of the orinciole of non-intervention for
which the United States bears legal responsibil~tyis éssentiallyidentical with the
evidenceindicated previouslyin relation 10violations of sovereigntyand breaches
of the obligation not to resort to the use or threat of force. ~ia consequence it
is not necessary to repeat those indications. However, although the relevant
evidential materials mdy be identical, it cannot be said thai the principle ofnon-
intervention has no autonomous role to play as a basis of claim.
463. In the first place, the authorities emphasize that the principle of non-
intervention is more extensive than the concept of the use of force. (See
O'Connell, Inrernutional Law, 1970, Vol.1, p. 299.) O'Connell quotes General MEMORlAL OF NICARAGUA 121
Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) of 1966.The key formation of that resolution
is reproduced in the important Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly as
resolution 2625 (XXV). The relevant part of the Declaration of Principles
provides as follows:
"The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the
domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter.
No State or erouo of States has the rieht to intervene. directlv or indi-
rectly, for any reason whatever, in the interna1or external aiïairs of any other
State. Consequently, armed intervention and al1other forms of interference
or attemnted~threa~saeainst the oersonalitv of the State or aeainst its oo-
litical, eionomic and ciltural eleients, are in violation of international law.
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any
other tvDeof measures to coerce~another State in order to obtain [rom it
the su66rdination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from
it advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment,
finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrons1 or armed activities directed
against the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in
civil strife in another State.
The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes
a violation of their inalienable rights and of the principle ofnon-intervention.
Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic,
social and cultural systems, without interference in any fonn by another
Silitc.
Noihing in ihe ii,rcg<iingpirdgraph* shall bc ioiistrued di drl'eiiingthe
relevant pr~visionrof ihc Charter rclaiing to ihr msintçn~nceoiinternat1~1n~1
peace and security."
It is of interest that the language of the first two operative paragraphs quoted
above is largely drawn from the Charter of the Organization of American States,
Articles 18and 19.
464. On the same subject - the ambit of the concept of intervention - Presi-
dent Jiménezde Aréchagaoiïers the following analysis:
"As to the argument concerning Article 2, paragraph 4, il is true that
much of the classic conception of non-intervention has been absorbed by
the prohibition of the threat or use of force contained in that provision.
The threat or use of force represents the most ohvious and extreme fonn of
intervention; it is precisely for this reason that a specific prohibition has
been inserted in Article 2 (4) and special measures have been established in
the Charter to deal with such a serious violation. But there are, however,
other acts of 'dictatorial interference' whichcannot be qualified, or might
not be conveniently described, as an 'armed attack', and 'aggression' or
even 'a use ofor threat of (armed) force'and yet are equally in violation of
international law. Despite the fact that the word 'intervention' is used with
another meaning in ils Statute and Rules, the International Court of Justice
found it necessary to resort to this tenn to describe an act where a State
had used warships in a unilateral action carried out in the territorial waters
of another State (Operation Retail). Finally, the exclusion of economic and
~olitical nressure from the conceot of force in the elaboration of Article 2
i4) madeit al1the more necessaj to retain as a separate principle the duty
of States no! to intervene in the affairs of another State." ("International122 MlLtTARY AND PARAMILITARYACTlVtTlES
Law in the Past Third of a Century", 159 Hague Recueil (1978-l), p. 9,
at p. 11.)
465. ï'hc considerati~~nthat the idnccpt orinier\cntion ii inore dmhliious
tlian that of the uhcof forcc istu hc rci ali>ngiidcanother faitor <~l'dirTrrcntiation.
The cld\siial purposc of inter\rntiiiiithe ovcrihrow or subsi;intial niodilication
~ithcgovcrnmcnt oi the prci,ailingpoliticalsysieminthe iargct Statc. z\pcrusïl of
tlic rcle\,ant doiumrniary e!idcncc in the prrsent cïsc rc\cals thai elTccti\,elyal1
of ihc militan and paramilitan. ditiv~iir~aimcd ai th? Cioi,crnmcnt and woplc
of ~icara~uahave one of two purPoses, which are compatible and can exkt and
beimplemented in combination:
(O) The actual overthrow of the existing lawful Government of Nicaragua and
its replacement by a government acceptable to the United States; and
(b) The substantialdamaging of the economy, and theweakeningofthe political
system, in order to coerce the Government of Nicaragua into the acceptance
of United States policies and political demands.
466. The absence of lawfuljustification for the activities constituting breaches
of the principle of non-intervention will be shown in Section VI1 of the present
chapter.
SectionV. Breachmof the ObligationNot to Infringethe Freedomof the High
Seas or to Intermpt Peaceful Maritime Commerce
467. The Applicant State complains that the United States is responsible for
violations of obligations arisinghy virtue of customary and general international
law not to infringe the freedom of the high seas and not to interrupt peaceful
maritime commerce. The violations have taken the form of the mining of the
Nicaraguan ports of Corinto, Puerto Sandino and El Blutï, and of attacks on
merchant vessels in these ports by sea and air, with the result that access to and
from the high seas had been restricted and safe passage endangered.
468. The orinciole of freedom of maritime communications was invoked bv
the Court, aiong with other principles, in its Judgment in the Corfu ChanneIca&
(Meriis, ICJ Reporls 1949,p. 4). In the words of the Court:
"From al1facts and observations mentioned above, the Court draws the
conclusion that the laying of the minefield which caused the explosions on
October 22nd. 1946,could not have been accomplished without the know-
ledge of the Albanian Government.
The obligations resulting for Albania from this knowledge are not dis-
puted between the Parties. Counsel for the Alhanian Government ex-
pressly recognised that [translation] 'if Albania had been informed of the
operation before the incidents of October 22nd. and in lime to warn the
British vesselsand shipping in general of the existence of mines in the Corfu
Channel, her responsihility would he involved. .. .'
The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in
notifying, for thebenefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefield
in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British
warships of the imminent danger to which the minefieldexposed them. Such
oblieations are based. not on the Haeue Convention of 1907. No. VIII.
whiLhisapplicable in iime of war,but & certain general and well-recognised
principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more
exacthg in peacethan in wari the principle of the freedomand maritime
communication; and every State's obligation not to allow knowingly ils MEMORLAL OF NICARAGUA 123
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States."
(I.C J.Reporrs 1949, p. 22.)
469. Princinles of essentiallv the same kind had been invoked in the British
Note of 9 ~ecember 1946delhered 10the Albanian Government following the
incidents which ledto the proceedings before the Court.The following passages
from that Note are worthy of the attention of the Court:
"18. Ever since the attack on H.M.S. 'Orion'and 'Superb', theAlbanian
authorities havc maintained a close watcb on al1 ships making use of the
North Corfu Channel. Thus in lune of this vear merchant shi~s ~assinr
through the Channel were fircd on, and duringthe p<rssageof Hi\ ~iijesl~'i
ships on 22nd Ociobcr. the cwiistalbaticries urrc seen to be rnanned Itir
certain ihÿt no mine-fieldcould havc becn laid in the Channel uithin 3 few
hundred yards of the Albanian batteries without the connivance or at least
the knowledge ofthe Albanian authorities.
19. His Majesty's Government must accordingly conclude that the
Albanian Government either laid the mine-field inquestion or knew that it
had heen laid. The Albanian Government has thus committed a Ragrant
breach of International Law. Under Articles 3 and 4 of the 8th Hague
Convention of 1907any Government layingminesin war-time, and a forriori
in peace, is bound to notify the danger zones to the Governments of al1
countries. (This obligation in fact applies even if the zones in question are
not normally used by shipping.) Not only have the Albanian Government
never made any public notification of this minefieldbut they have also made
no comment on the continued issue of the relevant Medri charts and
pamphlets. They have thus endorsed a clear stÿtement by the recognised
international authority concerned to the shipping of the world that the
Channel was safe for navigation. As a result, two of His Majesty'sships
have been seriouslydamaged and forty-four innocent lives have been lost.
Moreover, this conduct on the part of the Albanian Governrnent menaced
with destmction shipping of any kind using a Channel which is a normal
and recognised route for international navigation.
20. His Majesty'sGovernment demand that an apology be made to them
in respect of the unprovoked attacks upon the Royal Navy, which took
place on 15th May and 22nd October, and that they receiveassurance that
there shall be no repetition of this unlawful action. They further demand
that reparation bc paid for the damage suffered hy His Majesty's ships on
22nd October and that full compensation be paid to the relatives of the
forty-four officers and seamen of the Royal Navy wbo lost their lives in
consequence of action on the part of the Alhanian Government whicb was
an undouhted breach of International Law, constituted a menace tn inter-
national shipping, to the safety of which the most callous indifference was
shown, and must, in view of their knowledge that His Majesty's ships
habitually used the Channel and claimed the right to do so under Inter-
national Law he regarded as a deliberately hostile act against His Majesty's
Government.
21. As this matter is of such importance frorn the point of viewof safety
at sea and of the issues involved, His Majesty'sGovernment mus1ask for
an immediaic rç.l<. ~ ~~--~~~~îactorv reolv is receivedwithin fourteen davs
of the delivery of this note, His '~a'jeSt~'sGovernment will have no
alternative but to brinr the matter hefore the Security Council of the United
Nations as a serious Ïhreat 10, and a breach of, international peace and124 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
çecurity,showing criminal disregard of the safety of innocent seamen of any
nationality lawfully using an international highway."
470. The complete text of the British Note is set out in Whiteman, Bigesrof
InrernaiionalLnw, 1965,Volume4, pages 447-452.
471. The Court's formulation of the relevant pnnciples in the Corju Channel
case is commonly rcferred to with approval by the authorities. (See Colombes,
ThelnrernuiionalLow of rheSeo, 1967,p. 134; McDougal and Burke, The Puh-
lic Order of rhe Oceans, 1962, pp. 204-208; Fitzmaurice, Briiish Year Book of
InrerriaiionalLow, 1950,Vol.27, p. 1,at p. 4; Waldock, 106Hague Recueil (1962-
II), p. 5, at p. 63. See also Barabolya el oL, Monwl of InrernolionalMoririme
Low, 1966(Translation, United States Department of the Navy, January 1968).
pp. 79-81.) The importance of the freedom of the high seas is recognized by
the provisions of the High Seas Convention of 1958, to which the United
States is a party and which provisionsare stated in the Preamhle to he "generally
declaratory of established principlesof international law".
472. Apart from the statement of principle hy the Court in the Corfu Channel
case, it has been long recognized that infringement of the freedom of the high
seas, for example, hy interference with the passage of vessels, constituted a
specificbasis of claim. For rcferenccsseeBrownlie, Sysremofrhe Law of Nuliuns:
SrareResponsihility ,art 1,page 69. Thus the Australian Application in the Nu-
cleor Tesrscases included the following claim:
"(iii) The interference with ships and aircraft on the high seas and in the
superadjacent airspace, and the pollution of the high seas by radio-active
fall-out, constitute infringements of the freedom of the high seas."
(I.C.J. Pleadings,Nuclear Tesls cases (Aulralia v. France), Vol. 1,para. 49;
and see also pp. 337-338,paras. 457-460.)
473. Finally, it may be recalled that in its Judgment in the Jurisdiction phase
of the present proceedings the Court characterized the pnnciple of freedom of
navigation as part of customary international law (1 CJ. Reports1984, p. 424,
para. 73).
474. Evidence concerning the mining of Nicaraguan ports by agents of the
United States takes two forms. As with the other causes of action put fonvard
in this Chapter, there is the pattern of indirect evidenceand evidencein the form
of express admissions which established the substantial and persistent United
States involvement in and responsihility for the campaign of "covert action",
including military and sabotage actions, directed against Nicaragua. (See paras.
14K.. suoro.)
475. in addition to such evidence ofthe general intention of the United States
and the pattern of operations, there is cogent evidence directly relating to the
mining of Nicaraguan ports in March 1984.
476. Early in April members of Congress received reports of the mining of
Nicaraguan harbors and Senator Goldwater sent his famous letter of protest to
CIA Director William J. Casey dated 9 April 1984. (Ann. E, Attachment 9.)
This letter makes orecise and emohatic reference to the minine of harbors in
Sicarapua. In ~aceof this ~cll-~;hlicii.ed protest thc Adminisihtion niade no
dticmpt lu dcny the Tactsand nu attenipt IO oikr iilsgal jusiification.
477. Indeerl.such oliicial commeni as \ras mdde wa, in rfici an iidmirsion of
CIA direction and contrul. Thir oicurred in thc stiiiçmcnt marlcon hehalfof ihe
CIA hy ihc Agcncy's jpokssmiin, George I.auder. un 16 April 1984where ihe
following passagesappear : MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 125
"During the 13 January 1981 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
hearing on the nomination of Mr. Casey to the Director of the C.I.A.,
Mr. Casey said:
'1 intend ta comply fully with the spirit and letter of the Intelligence
Oversight Act. 1intend to provide this Committee with the information it
believesil needs for oversight purposes.'
MI. Casey helieves the record will reflect that he and his staff have kept
that pledge. A chronology of briefings of the Congressional oversight com-
mittees in connection with events in Central America reveals that from
Decemher 1981 through March 1984,either the director or deputy director
hriefed the Congressional committees 30 times on Central America.
Moreover, from 16 Septemher 1983through 2 April 1984,other officials
of C.I.A. briefed either the committees or the committee staff 22 times on
Central American developments. Since the/irst of thisyear, the subjectof
miningof Nicaragrranportsbasbeendiscussed wiihmembersor staffersof the
Commi1tee.a sndother members of the CongressII times. (Emphasis added.)
(Ann. C, Attachment 11-5.)
478. This statement constitutes an express admission of the responsihility of
the United States for the mining operations in Nicaraguan waters. United States
officials have no1 sought to qualify or to deny the statement made on behalf
of the CIA on 16April 1984.Moreover, during the proceedings on Nicaragua's
Request for the Indication of ProvisionalMeasures the facts relating to the mining
remained undisputed.
479. In its Order of 10 May 1984the Court unanimously indicated, as a pro-
visional measure of protection, that
"the United States should inimediately cease and refrain from any action
restricting,locking or endangering access to or from Nicaraguan ports
and, in particular, the laying of mines". (Para. 41 (B) (l).)
480. In response to the Court's Order of 10 May, the State Department
spokesmdn said on 10 May 1985 that "nothing contained in the measures
indicated hy the Court is incondstent with the current United States policy on
activities with respect to Nicaragua". (Ann. C, Attachment 11-6,p. 209, infra.)
When asked whether this meant that "as a matter of simple fact, the mining has
stopped?'ihe spokesmdn replied :
"As you know, we have not responded to questions relating to mining
and alleged covert activity, but 1 think you might read the statement
concerning current activity in conjunction with allegdtions that have been
made." (Ibid.pp. 4-5.)
Taken in the context, the spokesman's reply is an officialadmission of responsi-
bility for the mining, including oontrol over its beginning and ending.
481. The damage caused to foreign merchant shipping by the illegal mining
o~erations resulted in a numher of diplornatic protests addressed directlv to the
~overnment of the United States. ~his, in repli to a question, the ~arlidmentary
Under-Secretdry of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Officeproduced the
following written answer :
"WChave made clear to the United States Government that we are com-
mitted to the principle of freedom of navigation and deeply deplore the
mining of Nicaraguan ports." (Hansard,H.C. Debs, Vol. 58, Wntten Ans-126 MILITARY AND PAKAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
wers, Col. 470, 13 April 1984.A number of other Governments also pro-
tested. See,e.g., NYT 4/9/84; WP 4/10/84.)
482. Two recent articles in the Wall Street Journal, among others, provide a
detailed account, hased on both United States officiaisand counterrevolutionary
sources, of the precise organization andmodusoperandi of the mining operation.
(WSJ 3/5/85; WSJ 3/6/85.) This account reveals that the mining operation was
but a part of a general program of armed attacks in Nicaraguan waters intended
to scare off foreign commercial shipping.
483. The absence of lawful justification for the mining operations in Nicara-
guan waters will he shown in Section Vil of the present chapter.
SectionVI. Breaches of the Obligation Not to KiU,Woundor KidnapCitizensof
Nicaragua
484. The Application of Nicaragua invokes the obligation of customary inter-
national law according to which a State has a duty not to kill, wound or kid-
nap the nationals of other States. This duty is normally stated in respect of
the treatment bv a State of foreien nationals nresent within its~t~~~~,,rv. but the
duty is equally~applicahle to foreign nationais harmed outside the territory of
the Respondent State. The key to this basis of claimis the absence of any lawful
justification for the harmful acts.
485. The cause of action can be expressed, quite simply, as the killing,
wounding or kidnapping of the citizensof Nicaragua without lawfuljustification.
The legal bases of such a claim consist of a wealth of jurisprudence of claims
commissions and instances of State practice. The Court's attention is respectfully
drawn to the following materials:
(a) On the extensivepractice of claims commissions(seee.g., Feller,The Mexi-
can Claims Commissions1923-1934, 1935, Chapter 7; Verzijl, Interna-
tionalLaw in Hislorical Perspeclive , ol. VI, 1973,pp. 647 K).
(b) For the practice of States, including the practice of the United States (see
Whiteman, DigesrofInternationalLaw, 1965, Vol.8,pp. 850-906; Répertoire
suissede droit international publi1975, Vol.III, pp. 1710-1722.)
(c) The viewsof qualified publicists,including Jiménezde Aréchaga (159 Hague
Recueil(1978), pp. 267ff.; Oppenheim, InternationalLaw (H. Lauterpacht,
ed., 1955),Vol. 1,pp. 357-364; O'Connell, InternationalLaw, 1970, Vol.II,
pp. 941-952; Jiménezde Aréchaga, in Sirrensen (ed.), Manual of Public
International Law. 1968. DD. 533. 544-547: Gueeenheim. Traité de droit
internalional,1954, Vol.11:'pp.1-11 ;~mer,can Law lnstitute, Restatement
(Second)Foreign RelationsLaw of the UnitedStates, 1965,paras. 164-168).
486. There can be little douht that the obligation of customary law not to kill,
wound or kidnap the nationals of other States applies to such persons not only
when they are present within the territory of the Respondent State but also when
they are outside the territory. This assumption lies hehind the claim presented
to the British Government by the United States in the Caroline incident (see
Jennings, 32American Journao l fInternationalLaw (1938), p. 82).The application
of the duty in respect of aliens outside the territorial jurisdiction is recognized
bv O'Connel1 (InternationalLaw. 1970.Vol. II. n.950).
.
'487. The b&ad application of the dut; isevident ih the cases relating to the
destruction of civil aircraft. It may be that the uosition of the aircraft is relevant
to an issue of excusable error, b"t there can be no douht that the duty not to
use force against civil aircraft is not conditioned by the position of the aircraft MEMORIALOF NICARAGUA 127
inside or outside the territorial airspace of the Respondent State. In such cases
the Respondent State is liable for the killing and wounding of the passengers
and crew. (See, for example, Whiteman, Digest of InternationalLaw, Vol. 8,
pp. 885-906.) The same principle appears in the practice of States concerning
harm to nationals caused bv frontier -uards. (SeeItalian Yearbookof.nternational
Law (1977), Vol. III, pp. 435-437.)
488. A further legal consideration relates to the force and relevanceof the fun-
damental noms pritecting human rights. which must apply equally to foreign
nationals, whether they are harmed within or without the territory of the Res-
pondent State, provided that the State is responsible for the death, injury or
kidnapping. In the case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company,Limited (Belgiurnv. Spain) (Second Phase)(1.C J. Reports 1970,p. 3),
the Court referred in its Judgment to "Obligations erga omnes",which included
the "principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person,
including protection from slavery and racial discrimination". (I.C.J. Reports
1970.,.~--2. r.ra-~ ----4.)
489. Of considerable s&nificanceis the fact that Whiteman's Digest, an official
United States publication, includes a series of prescriptions concerning human
riehts in the section devoted to "State resoonsibilitv for injuries to aliens". (See
vil. 8, p. 697, at pp. 904-906.) The prescriptions s& forth by Whiteman incfude
the right to life, liberty and security of the person.
490. In the suecificcase of unlawful detention of aliens. there is a considerable
qii:intit) <>lmdt:rixetidcncing the dpplic.iti<~n<>ithe inicrndiiuiial ohligdrion to
caser of uronghl detcnti,>nhy qents oithe Statc (Sec, ior example, Whitcrn~n,
Drwrsl <.rIfi~rr~i<iciiLi~l. VJI 8. nn. 863-885 aiid the I.irihtcnitcin Annli-
carion in the Nottebohm taie (~iechie.nsteinv. &atemala), Preliminary 0bjec-
fions,1CJ. Reports 1953,p. 111,at pp. 112-113 ;and see also ibid, SecondPhase,
Judgmenr,ICJ. Reports 1955,p. 4, at pp. 6-7.) In the case concerning United
States Diplomatic and ConsularStaff in Tehran(I.C.J. Reports 1980, para. 3,
at pp. 67-69), the United States Memorial refers to the "generally recognized"
principles of international law concerning the treatment of aliens.
491. One final observation on the legal aspects of the claim for the killing,
wounding and kidnapping of Nicaraguan citizens is called for. Such acts must
surely fall within the concept of the use of force which is prohibited hy the nom
of general international law reflected in Article 2 (4) of the United Nations
Charter. In this connection it may he noted that the United States Application
in the United States Diplomatic and ConsularStaff in Tehrancase invoked the
provisions of that Article. (ICJ Reports 1980,pp. 5-6.)
492. The evidence of the breaches of the obligation not to kill, wound
or kidnap the citizens of Nicaragua, for which the United States is respon-
sible, is substantially the same as the evidence indicated previously in relation
to violations of sovereignty and breaches of the obligation not to resort to
the use or threat of force. Consequently, it is not necessary to repeat those
indications.
493. However, certain aspects of the evidence have special significance for
present purposes. In particular, the references in the documents to the United
States purpose of desfabilizing the Government of Nicaragua are important.
The tactics of this process include the spreading of terror and danger to non-
combatants as an end in itselfwith no attempt to observe humanitarian standards
and no reference to the concept of military necessity. The same process links up
with the iactics of disrupting normal economic life in the countryside generally,
and of the deliberate killing of key personnel, including school teachers and
administrators. (See Statement of Facts, paras. 125-128.)128 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
494. Certain items of evidenceprovide direct proof of the tactics adopted by
the contras under United States guidance and control. Such evidence includes
the following:
(a) The public admission by Edgar Chamorro, then a leader of the mercenary
group known as the Nicaraguan Democratic Forceoperating against Nica-
ragua, in an interview given in October 1984. In this interview Mr. Cha-
morro made the following statement :
"Frankly, 1admit we killed people in cold blood when we found them
guilty of crimes. We do believe in the assassination of tyrants. Some of
the Sandinistas are tyrants in the small villages." (NYT 10/21/84.)
Ib) The revelation. in mess reDons. of the existence of classifiedDefense Intel-
ligence Agencyreport acc8rding to which "US-backed Nicaraguan guerril-
las were committing political assassinations as early as 1982". The same
report contains the following:
"The weekly defense intelligencereports are widely distributed among
intelligence officialsand the one first mentioning assassination, dated July
1982,has heen circulated among government agencies.
The document, a copy of which was obtained by TlzcNew York Times,
says the rebels' activitiesin the spring of 1982included 'attacks by small
guerrilla bands on individual Sandinista soldiers and the assassination of
minor government officiaisand a Cuhan adviser'.
Asked Friday if the president or his top advisers knew of the report, a
White House spokesman, Larry Speakes, said 'No'.
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a Democrat of New York, who is
de~utv chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelliaence, said
saiurday that the word 'assassination' printedin the report 'should have
flashedoffthe page' whenthe report wasfirstpublished." (NYT 10/21/84.)
(c) The preparation and distribution by the CIA of a primer or guide to tactics
for use by forces carrying out operations under the control and guidance
of the United States. The work was entitled Psycholr,~iculOperutions in
Guerrilla Warand contained adviceon the tactics of terror. Edgar Chamorro
acknowledged that the CIA primer was well known to United States per-
sonnel working with the mercenaries in Honduras. He said further that
mercenary leaders had deleted two pages with which they disagreed, but
added that the sections dealing with "neutralizing" selected publicofficials
were left intact. (NYT 10/20/84,NYT 10/21/84.)
495. The original provenance of the primer was not the mercenaries but the
CIA itself. President Reagan himself admitted, in his nationally televiseddebdte
with former Vice-President Mondale on 21 October 1984,that the manual was
a CIA product. (Ann. C, Attachment 1-7,p. 177,infra.) Sec also Report of the
House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (98th
Congress, 2d Sess., Rept. No. 98-1196 (2 Pan. 1985), Ann. E, Attachment 17).
for a further officialacknowledgment that the CIA had produced the manual.
496. A report entitled Attackby the Nicaraguan "Contras"on the Civilian Popu-
lation of Nicaragua (Ann. 1, Attachment 2), provides detailed reports, sup-
ported by eye-witness affidavits,of numerous attacks on civilian coiïee pickers,
farms and villagesand civilian vehicles.It alsogivesreports, similarlydocumented,
of individual and mass kidnappings, as well as rapes. (See also Ann. 1,
Attachment 3.)
497. The absence of justification for the killing, wounding and kidnapping of
Nicaraguan citizens will he shown in Section VI1below. MEMORIAI. OF NICARAGUA 129
SectionVII. Obligations Arisingunder Customary International Law: the
Question of Justification for Breaches
498. Nicaragua affirmsthat there is no lawful justification for the hreaches of
the obligations of customary and general international law for which the United
States is responsihle. Allegations made by the United States about the conduct
of Nicaragua, unsupported by evidence, "do not provide a basis on which the
Court could form a judicial opinion on the truth or otherwise of the matters
there alleged". (See the Judgment of the Court in the UniredStates Dipiornatic
and ConsularStaff in Tehrancase, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3, al p. 38, para.82 in
finfine.)
499. In suite of the fact that Nicaragua does not hear the burden of proof,
and there is'no case to meet concerning~ustification, certain pointers existwhich
may be of assistance to the Court.
500. The first pointer is the very sudden and very belated appearance, in April
1984 after the filine of Nicaraeua's Aoolication. of reference hv United States
officiaisto collectiv~self-defen&. (See&ap. II, sec. IV.) The co~clusion reached
there is, in substance, that the sudden and belated attempt to justify the military
operations three years after the beginning of such operations could have no
credibility whatsoever, and that, in ordinary legal logic, il was tao late al that
stage to offer a justification. This conclusion is further supported hy the suh-
stantial disappearance of self-defense assertions after the United States indica-
ted its intention not to participate further in these proceedings.
501. The other pointers are fairly ohvious and can be expressed quite briefly.
The hypothesis of collective self-defensecan be measured against certain factual
elements which are clearly estahlished by the abundant evidence availahle. When
this is done the following compelling conclusions are reached:
(a) In the case of the mining operations, no concept of self-defensecould apply
since such operations are hy definition indiscriminate, affecting shipping
generally.
,bi,The ohiective of overthrowine or destabilizine the lawful eover-ment of
~icaraba has nothing in comkon with self-dzense.
(c) The actions directed against non-combattantsdo not fall within a legal con-
cept of self-defense
Conclusion
502. The foregoing discussion conclusivelyestahlishes that the United States,
by the activities of its own officersand agents and through ils support, direction
and control of the mercenary forces, has repeatedly acted in total disregard of
its obligations to Nicaragua under general and customary international law. The
delicts of the United States include breaches of the most fundamental principles
of law goueming relations hetween States as well as the principles concerning
treatment of persans and basic human rights. These breaches are abundantly
supported by the evidence. The Court should so adjudge. PARTIV
RELIEFREQUESTEDAND SUBMISSIONS
CHAFTER Vlll
THE RELIEF REQUESTED OF THE COURT BYTHE GOVERNMENT OF
NICARAGUA
Section 1. Introduction
503. Prior to setting forth the Submissions in which the relief requested of
the Court by the Government of Nicaragua will be specified, it is neces-
sary to indicate certain considerations to which Nicaragua attaches particular
importance.
Section II.The ContinuingViolations
504. The serious violations of international law for which the United States is
responsible are continuing as this Memorial is suhmitted. Armed mercenaries
for whose activities the United States kars responsibility are continuing to kill,
maim, rape and kidnap nationals of Nicaragua, and to-inflict severe eionomic
damage upon the country. Accordingly, Nicaragua considers il necessary to
request hoth a declaration that the conduct of the United States is illegal, and a
declaration that its illegal activities should be terminated.
505. In the case concerning United States Diplomulicand ConsularSioff in
Tehran (ICJ Reports 1980, p. 3), the Dispositifof the Judgment includes a
declaration in the form of an injunction calling upon the Government of the
lslamic Republic of Iran to take specificmeasures to terminate the illegalconduct
there in question.(Ibid.pp. 44-45.)Further, as the Court stated in ils Advisory
Opinion concerning Namibia in 1971 :
"A binding determination made by a competent organ of the United
Nations Io the eifect that a situation is illegal cannot remain without
consequence. Once the Court is faced with such a situation, it would he
failing in the discharge of ils judicial functions if it did no1 declare that
there is an obligation, especially upon Members of the United Nations, to
bring that situation to an end. As this Court kas held, referring to one of
its decisions declaring a situation as contrary to a rule of internationa: law
This decision entails a legal consequence, namely that of putting an end of
an illegal situation(I.C.J. Reports1951, p. 82)." (Leyal Consequencefs or
Sraresof the ContinuedPresenceof SouthAfrica in Nomibia (South West
Africa) notwilhsrandingSecurity Council Resolurion276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion,I.C.J. Reports1971, p. 16, at p54.)132 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITICS
Because of the continuing nature of the illegal actions by the United States,
Nicaragua reserves the right to present additional evidence to the Court with
respect to such actions.
SectionIII. Assessrnentof the Quantum ofDamages
506. In ihc circum~iancc, 01'ihc prcjeni c~sc 'licaragua requcsis ihai ihe
Couri makç ;idccl;ir;iiion as to the liahiliiy 01'ihc Uniicd Siaics io pay ium-
mniïtii~n for the violations of international Iiw s~ccificd in ihis Memori~I,
and, further, to receive evidenceand to determine, inasuhsequent phase of these
proceedings, the amount of damage 10he assessed. The Court has givcn express
recognition of the propriety of a request in this form. (See the FisheriesJuris-
diciion case (Federal Republic of Cermany v. Icelond). I.C.J. Reports 1974,
p. 175,at pp. 204-206,paras. 76-77.)A similar request presented by the Applicant
State in the case concerning UnitedStates Diplomaricand ConsularSiafin Teh-
ran (I.C.J. Reports 1980,p. 3, at pp. 6-8), was granted by the Court. See the
Disposiri/at page 45 (decision No. 6). Moreover, in ils Judgment in the United
Sraies Diplomatic and Consular Staffin Tehrancase the Court placed particular
cmphasisupon the fact that Iran's breachesof itsobligations werestillcontinuing.
In the words of the Court:
"On the hasis of the foregoing detailed examination of the merits of the
case, the Court finds that Iran, by committing successive and continuing
breaches of the obligations laid upon it by the Vienna Conventions of 1961
and 1963 on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, the Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955,and the applicable rules
of general international law, has incurred responsibility towards the United
States. As to the consequencesof this finding, it clearly entails an obligation
on the part of the Iranian State to make reparation for the injury thereby
caused to the United States. Sincehowever Iran's brcachesof ils obligations
are stillcontinuing, the form and amount of such reparation cannot be deter-
mined at the present date." (Ibid., pp. 41-42, para. 90.)
SectionIV. Submissions
507. The Republic of Nicaragua respectfully requests the Court to grant the
following relief:
First: the Court is reauested to adiudre and declare that the United States
hÿi vi<>lateihc obl~~;~t~&osf internaiionil lau indicaicd in ihis Mcmorial. and
thai in partirular rcspccis the Lniicd States is in coniinuing i,iolaiion uf thme
obligations.
Second: the Court is requested to state in clear terms the obligation which
the United States bears to bring to an end the aforesaid breaches of inter-
national law.
Third: the Court is requested to adjudge and declare ihat, in consequence of
the violations of international law indicated in this Memorial, compensation is
due to Nicaragua, both on ils own behalfand in respect of wrongs inilicted upon
its nationals; and the Court is requested further to receive evidence and to
determine, in a suhsequent phase of the present proceedings. the quantum of
damages to be assessed as the compensation due 10 ihe Republic of Nicaragua.
Fourih: without prejudice to the foregoing request, the Court is requested
to award to the Republic of Nicaragua the sum of 370,200,000 United States MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 133
dollars, which sum constitutes the minimum valuation of the direct damaees.
iiith thc crceptiùn oi Jarnagcs Iltr killing national\ oi'iii~iriigu~. rcsuliir,)iii
ihr \iirlaiii~noi internationdl Iau indicaicd in ihc \uh\tancc ihi, hlcmuri.il.
508. With reference to the fourth request, the Republic of Nicaragua reserves
the right to present evidence and argument, with the purpose of elaborating
the minimum (and in that sense provisional) valuation of direct damages and,
further, with the purpose of claiming compensation for the killing of nationals
of Nicaragua and consequential loss in accordance with the principles of
international law in resoect of the violations of international law eenerallv. in a
subsequent phase of tLe present proceedings in case the Court &des to the
third request of the Republic of Nicaragua.
30 April 1985.
Respectfully suhmitted,
(Signed)Carlos ARGÜBLLG OOMEL,
Agent for the Republic of Nicaragua.136 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
December 4, 1981 - Approximately 60 mercenaries invaded the community
of Asang, kidnapping and later killing 2 members of one family. They also
robbed the local ENABAS1 warehouse of 600 quintales of rice and 35,000
cordobas in cash.
December 8, 1981 - Armed mercenaries coming from Honduras invaded the
community of La Esperanza, ordering the inhabitants to cross over to Hon-
duras and threatening with dcdth those who refused. They also threatened
those who worked for govcrnment agencies.
December 14, 1981 - fielve memb&s of the border patrol were kidnapped
near San Carlos and then assassinated. Four days later, 3 other Nicaraguans
were ambushed and killed in the same area.
December 21, 1981 - Mcrcenaries seized the community of San Carlos,torturing
and killing 8 members of the Nicaraguan armed forces.
December 28, 1981 - Approximately 15mercenaries invaded the community of
Bilwaskama, kidnapping 4 people, including a woman doctor, Myrna
Cunningham, and a nurse, Regina Lewis. The mercenanes look the women 10
Honduras, where they were gang-raped.
December 31, 1981 - Approximately 25 mercenaries kidnapped a citizen from
the community of Andres Tara. He was later found dead, his throat cul and
the eyes removed from their sockets.
January 2, 1982 - Approximately 60 mercenaries attacked the town of Kaiti,
Zelava Norte. from Honduras, killine 3 Nicarapuans.
1;a separate attack, a goup of 4$ mercenanes armed with shotguns, rifles
and pistols invaded Limbaica, Zelaya Norte, stealing 2 vehicles, 2 boats, and
various items of ea. .ment. Later the same gro-p bu~ned a bridge at Alami-
kamba.
January 5, 1982 - Mercenaries invaded the community of Tuskrutara, Zelaya
Norte, kidnapping a reservist and his wife.
February 4, 1982 - Mercenaries assassinated an activist in the CDS al Kuskawas,
Matagalpa.
February 5, 1982 - Forty mercenaries proceeding from Honduras attacked the
border post at Las Brisas, Nueva Segovia, killing 3 guards.
February 22, 1982 - Mcrcenaries attacked the border post al Mata de Platano;
the attack was repelled by border guards.
March 3, 1982 - Approximately 25 mercenanes assassinated a judge in Paiwas,
Matagalpa.
March 9, 1982 - In the community of Umbla, 20 mercenaries assassinated two
children, aged 6 and 7 years, and wounded a campesino.
March 14, 1982 - Mercenaries blew up the bridge over the Rio Negro near
Somotillo, completely destroying it. On the same day, an explosion damaged
the bridge over the Rio Coco al Ocotal.
March 18, 1982-At La Ermita, 60 mercenaries attacked the building used by
-
' Variousacronymr for privatcand govcrnmcntalorganizations arc cmployedin this
chronology.The mort common of these. with their denotations in English,are: CDS.
Sandinintaneighborhoodcornmitlees;CEP, populareducationcornmillees;CEPAD,the
EvangelicalCommittee for Aid and Develapmcnt; ENABAS.the Statc grain trading
campany;ENCAFE,thc Statc coflcetrad~ngcompany;INE, the Stateclfctriccompany;
INRA. thc Ministryof Agrarian Refortn; IRENA, the Ministryof Natural Rcsources;
MLCONS,the Ministryof Construction;TELCOR, the State telecommunicationscom-
pany;TGF,the borderpatrol; UNAG,the NationalAssociationof Famers and Ranchers;
YODECO, theStatclumbcrCompany. ANNEXES TO THE MBMORIAL 137
the local militia, killing2 civilians, including a 5-year-old girl. Three people
were wounded.
March 19, 1982 - Mercenaries invaded Walike, burning 5 buildings at a
MICONS installation and looting nearby stores.
March 21, 1982-At Las Cuatro Esquinas, mercenaries robbed the ENABAS
post of 21,000cordobas.
March 23, 1982 - Mercenaries invaded the town of Walana, burning the
schoolhouse and robbing the commissary.
April 4, 1982 - In the district of La Ceiba, Somotillo, 20 mercenaries armed
with rifleskidnapped 22 campesinos, including 7 women and 9 children.
April 5, 1982 - In the district of Banco de Siquia, Zelaya Sur, 10 mercenaries
armed with riflesand grenadesattacked the localco-operative, killing 1civilian,
beating the leader of the local militia and burning his house.
April 6, 1982 - In the district of La Danta, Zelaya Sur, 60 mercenaries
armed with rifles and shotguns attacked and burned the house of the leader
of the local militia, killiug 3 civilian memhers of the militia and kidnapping
4 others.
April 12, 1982 - Twenty mercenaries kidnapped 3 civilian memhers of the
militia at San Francisco, Nueva Segovia, killing 1and wounding the others.
April 14, 1982 - Thirty-five mercenaries ambushed a caravan of INRA vehicles
at Rio Wilika, killing 1civilian.
April24, 1982 - Twenty-fivemercenaries invadedthe district of Yali,Matagalpa,
robbing and burning the command post of the local militia and injuring a
civilian member of the militia.
April27, 1982-Six armed mercenanes assassinated 2 voluntary policemen and
2 civilian membersof the militia in the town of La Fonseca.
May 16, 1982 - Eight mercenaries attacked the ENABAS post at Wanawas,
killing 3 Nicaraguans and carrying off al1 of the merchandise and 6,000
cordobas in cash. One person was wounded.
June 2, 1982 - On the Kukra River, near Bluefields,mercenaries attacked a
boat carrying civilian workers, killing 1.
June 19, 1982 - Two employees of the Ministry of the lnterior were killed in
combat with mercenaries at Salto Grande.
July 4, 1982 - Near Seven Bank, Zelaya Norte, 14 soldiers from the Popular
Sandinista Amy were killed incombat with mercenaries.
In a separate attack, 40 mercenaries kidnapped 16 Nicaraguans, including
2 women, at Ubu, Zelaya Sur, killing 3 of them and raping one of the women.
The mercenaries also robhed a store of 155,000cordobas.
July 7, 1982 - At Wina, Jinotega, approximately 60 mercenaries ambushed
and killed 10 members of the Popular Sandinista Army. One person was
wounded.
July 16, 1982 - Approximately 60mercenanes seizedthe town of San Fernando,
killing I civilian, kidnapping 4 others, and burning government officesand a
private house.
July 17, 1982 - Some 40 mercenaries attacked Limbaica, Zelaya Norte, killing
11members of the Popular Sandinista Army.
July 24, 1982 - Fourteen Nicaraguans were killed,8 werekidnapped and 4 were
wounded when mercenaries supported by heavy artillery attacked the border
posts of San Francisco del Norte and Guayabillo. Many of the victims were
also tortured. Later, 4 more Nicaraguans were killed and 4 were wounded in
combat with the mercenaries who had attacked San Francisco del Norte.
In a separate incident, 80 mercenariesattacked La Presa del Salto, killing 7
members of the army and militia and injuring 1 woman.138 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTlVITlES
August 4, 1982 - Twenty mercenaries attacked the headquarters of the militia
at San Francisco de Kukra Rivers, Bluefields,killing 1civilian member of the
militia and kidnapping 10others.
August 8, 1982 - 17mercenaries assassinated the CDS CO-ordinatorat Apatillo
del Sabalar, Matagalpa.
August 11, 1982 - At Musawas, mercenaries assassinated 3 teachers, tortured
several other Nicaraguans, and burned foodstuKs.
August 11, 1982 - In the community of Malakawas, mercenaries assassinated
an adult education worker.
August 14, 1982 - Twenty-fivemercenaries assassinated a woman member of
the local CDS at Las Pampas, Nueva Segovia.
August 24, 1982 - Twelve mercenaries armed with rifles and pistols kidnapped
2 civilians in the El Trapiche district.
August 29, 1982 - Approximately 70 mercenaries blew up the MICONS
installation at lyas, Matagalpa, killing one civilian and destroying 31 trucks,
several pieces of construction equipment, a workshop and other facilities
valued at a total of 12million cordobas.
September 11, 1982 - Twenty mercenaries kidnapped and assassinated an adult
education worker at Los Chiles.
September 19, 1982 - A band of 13 mercenaries invaded the Tawa district,
attacking 3 houses of local residents and raping a woman.
September 22, 1982 - At San Nicolas, Nueva Segovia, a band of mercenaries
ambushed and killed 2 INRA technicians and wounded 5 other persons.
October 3, 1982 - Twenty-five mercenaries kidnapped, tortured and killed a
campesino at El Sanzapote, heating and tying up severalmembers of his family.
Octoher 10, 1982 - Mercenaries ambushed a pick-up truck of lNRA at Jalapa,
killing one Nicaraguan and wounding 3 others.
October 14, 1982 - At La Estancia and Siuce, Nueva Segovia, a band of 40
mercenaries killed 3 Nicaraguans and kidnapped another.
October 15, 1982 - Twelvemercenaries invaded the La Providencia farm in the
Saiz district, kidnapping 3 Nicaraguans.
October 26, 1982 - Approximately 25 to 30 mercenaries kidnapped 5 farm
workers in the El Quemazon district.
Octoher 28, 1982 - Mercenaries assassinated 5 members of the military in the
community of La Frangua, including a father and his son.
October 28, 1982- Approximately 14mercenarieskidnapped 3 INRA employees
at Haulover: thev also robbed the local commissarv of 5.000 cordobas.
foodstuKs and a boat and motor.
November 6, 1982 - Ten mercenaries tortured and killed a civilian memher of
the militia at El Pantasma, Jinotega.
November 9, 1982 - At 2:00 in the moming, 30 armed mercenaries kidnapped
42 workers from 3 farms in San José de LasManos, Nueva Segovia.
November 9, 1982 - At Cerro Campo Hermoso, east of lalapa, some 20
mercenaries set oK an explosion in an electric generating plant, causing a
blackout in lalapa.
Novemher 16, 1982 - In Ciudad Antigua, Nueva Segovia, a band of some 50
mercenaries kidnapped 3 campesinos from the Ramon Raudales CO-operative.
Their bodies were found the next day.
November 16, 1982A mercenary military unit kidnapped 60campesinos from
a farm at Rio Arriha, Jalapa. Also kidnapped were 2 children of a man who
worked for State Securitv.
November 21, 1982-In the community of Buena Vista, Jalapa, Nueva Segovia,
30 mercenaries intercepted and assassinated 3 campesinos. ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 139
November 22, 19112 - A band of approsimately 80 to IOUmercenarie.?armed
with Ml.. 13%and M-16 riflesinvadcd the distr~ctul'CI Pantasma. kidnapping
a mcrnkr of the FSLN and his 16-vcar-olddauehtcr-
Novernbcr 22. 1982 - r\ group of 21 merccnarier arrned u,iih riflesand rcvol\,er\
kidnappcd 5 pcople ai El Cairnitu.
No\eniber 24. 1982-A hsnd oi25 incrçcnaries sssaj\in.itcd a CNAC; dclcraie
and an officer of the Popular Sandinista Army at Buena Esperanza, on'the
Okawas River.
November 25, 1982 - A group of mercenaries sabutaged a gasoline tank
belonging to the border patrol and burned a bridge at Musuli, Jalapa.
November 29, 1982 - At El Carbon, Nueva Segovia, some 60 mercenaries
attempted to seize the observation post maintained by the border patrol
(TGF), cutting the throat of the TGF member al the post. One soldier was
also killed.
November 30, 1982 - Mercenaries using heavy weapons shot down one
government helicopter and damaged another in the area of La Golondnna
farm, near San Joséde Bocay.Two Nicaraguans were killedand 2were injured.
December 4, 1982 - At the San Ramon farm in the El Bambucito district, 2
members of the local CDS, a man aged 45 and a woman aged 54, were
assassinated by mercenaries.
December 6, 1982 - In La Tronca, Matagalpa, some 15mercenaries kidnapped
8 members of one family, including 4 members of the militia.
December 6, 1982 - Mercenaries burned the offices of ENCAFE at Bulbul,
Matagalpa.
December 13, 1982 - In the district of Las Penitas, Jinotega, a band of 90
mercenaries burned the building used by the local militia and assassinated a
carnuesino and a member of the Armv.
Drccmhcr 13. 1982 -- In ihs cinnm~nities of ICIN;iip. and Naniwai. 5 arrncd
rnrrcenaries kidnapped and Iatcr asi~siin;itcd 2niemberr oithe military rescrve.
I>cccrnber 18. 1982 - A band of rncrccnaricr apwarcd ai the El Jicaru iarm in
theSaiz diStrict, kidnapping a father and one'of his sons. The other members
of the family were beaten.
Januaw 1. 1983 - Mercenaries kidnavved 7 veovle, including - children, in the
haq quit sector near the ond dur aorde;.
In separate attacks, a band of 30to 40 mercenaries armed with riflesinvaded
the town of San Rafael, kidnapping 67 people (10 families). Also, at La
Sabana, near Somoto, some 30 rnercenaries blew up an electric transmission
post with plastic explosives, leaving the town without power.
January 3, 1983 - Seven rnercenaries armed with shotguns, rifles and pistols
invaded the community of Labu, Siuna, killing a 65-year-old woman who
headed the local CDS and a man who helonged to the Popular Sandinista
Army. The bodies showed signs of torture, and their throats had been cut.
The mercenaries also kidnapped 2 members of the military rcserve.
January 5, 1983 - Thirteen mercenaries seized the rnilitia post in the district of
Wana Wana, killing 2 brothers who were members of the militia and burning
the house of their father, a CDS member. The mercenaries also hurned a
schoolhouse which served as a command post. Two people were wounded.
January 7, 1983 - A band of approximately 40 mercenaries assassinated 2
members of a brigade of volunteers organized by the Managua CDS who were
harvesting coiTee at the El Amparo farm in the sector of Cerro Helado,
linotega. One person was wounded.
January 8, 1983 - At 4:30 in the morning, a group of 15 mercenaries armed
with rifles, grenades and mortars invaded the San Francisco sector south of140 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
Jalapa, kidnapping 2 sons and a daughter from one family. The kidnapped
woman was the co-ordinator of the local center for popular education. The
mercenaries also kidnapped an employee of the same family.
January 10, 1983 - A mercenary unit invaded the Santa Julia fam in the
community of San Gregorio, kidnapping 3 memhers of a Sandinista youth
organization who were taking part in volunteer work brigades for the coffee
harvest. It is not known where they were taken.
January 11, 1983 - At Las Cruces, a group of 60 to 100mercenaries hurned 3
vehicles, including a MICONS truck. On the same day, at Hacienda San
Roque, Asturias, a band of 200 mercenaries amed with rifles and grenade
launchers humed another truck belonging to MICONS.
January 12, 1983 - Mercenaries amhushed an INRA pick-up truck in the Punta
Mico sector, killing 2 INRA technicians and wounding another. A Master
Sergeant in the Popular Sandinista Amy was also wounded.
January 13, 1983 - A group of 20 mercenaries armed with riflesand grenade
launchers ambushed a military truck and an INRA pick-up truck in the
Francia Sirpi sector, killing 3 people and wounding 4 others.
January 16, 1983 - Mercenanes armed with rifles and mortars amhushed a
State truck in the Namasli sector, killing 2 boys, aged 11and 12, residents of
Jalapa. Eight people were wounded.
January 21, 1983 - In El Amparo valley, near Yali, a group of mercenaries
armed with rifles and grenade launchers amhushed a pick-up truck in which
civiliansand soldiers were traveling, killing 4 civilians (one of them an 8-year-
old girl) and 2 soldiers. Six people were wounded.
January 24, 1983 - Five mercenaries armed with rifles appeared at a house in
Las Quebradas, stating that it was their intention to kidnap a certain memher
of the Auxiliary Forces. Not finding him at home, they kidnapped his wife
and held her for four days while they interrogated and raped her. They then
released her, threatening her with death if she denounced them.
January 29, 1983 - A band of mercenaries attacked the headquarters of the
militia at Walakawas, killing 7 people and wounding 1. One woman was
missing. - .. -
February 3, 1983 - Some 60 mercenaries invaded the community of BellaVista,
Nueva Segovia, kidnapping 21 residents of the community.
February 7, 1983 - A group of 60 mercenaries armed with rifles and heavy
machine guns kidnapped 11 coffee cutters in the sector of El Ural. The
mercenaries retreated toward Honduras.
February 10, 1983 - A group of 20 mercenaries armed with pistols and rifles
kidnapped 2 campesinos at Santo Domingo, near Jalapa, taking them toward
Honduras.
February 19, 1983- A mercenary militas. unit invaded the zone of Santa Mana
de los Cedros, kidnapping 3 people who worked for the officeof State Security.
One woman who was kidnapped was raped by more than 60 mercenaries.
February 23, 1983 - At Santa Elena. Nueva Segovia, mercenaries ambushed a
truck carrying members of the military reserve, killing 9 and wounding 3.
February 24, 1983 - At Rancho Grande, a mercenary military unit captured 2
civilian memhers of the militas. reserve and assassinated the head of the local
militia squadron.
February 26, 1983 - A group of approximately 100 mercenaries armed with
rifles, grenade launchers, and mortars invaded the district of Canada La
Castilla, Jinotega, kidnapping 20campesinos from one co-operative and killing
the leade~ ~f the~ ~cal militia.
1-'ebruar) 27, 1983 - Appr<ix~mdtel)200 mcrcenxriesdrtiied uilh rifles,machine
gun-. mortars, xnd grenxrlclaunchers aita:Led the militia po,i ai San JosG de ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 141
las Mulas, killing 20 civilian memhers of the militia and wounding 10. Most
of the casualties were memhers of a Sandinista youth organization. Before
retreating the mercenaries also hurned the schoolhouse and a health center.
March 1, 1983 - A group of 100 to 150 mercenaries attacked the anny com-
mand post al San Joséde Las Mulas with rifles,heavy machine guns, grenade
launchers, rocket launchers, and mortars, completely destroying it. Sixteen
soldiers were killed and an undetermined numher were injured.
In separate attacks, a group of mercenaries invaded the Escambray sector,
kidnapping 2 campesinos. Also, mercenaries kidnapped 2 residents of San Jose
de Las Manchones.
March 4, 1983 - Two hundred mercenaries invaded the zone of Cerro Colorado,
hurning the Santa Rosa State farm and kidnapping 3 civilian members of
the militia.
March 5, 1983 - Eighty mercenaries seired the San Carlos farm near Muy-
Muy, Matagalpa, hurning the farmhouse and kidnapping the farm manager.
Later they kidnapped 2 campesinos at the Santa Rosa fann.
March 6, 1983 - Some 150 mercenaries armed with machine guns, rifles, and
rocket launchers seired the community of Kaskita, Zelaya Norte, for 3 hours,
kidnapping 4 people. In the ensuing combat, a civilian memher of the local
militia was killed.
March 10, 1983A group of mercenaries amhushed a jeep at Puente Rio Viejo,
Matagalpa, killing 8 people, 5 of them campesinos from the El Castillo Co-
operative.
In a separate attack, a group of 200 to 300 mercenaries hurned 2 MICONS
trucks near Rio Blanco, Matagalpa.
March 11, 1983 - A group of mercenaries kidnapped 31 memhers of the
community of Esperanza, Zelaya Norte.
March 12, 1983 - A group of 150 mercenaries assassinated 5 members of a
popular education committec who were meeting in a school in the El Jicaro
district.
March 14, 1983 - Mercenaries kidnapped 4 CDS memhers at San Francisco,
department of Boaco.
March 15, 1983 - Five mercenaries assassinated 2 campesinos in the sector of
Valle Datanli, near Jinotega. ln a separate attack, in the community of El
Cuje, a group of 25-30 mercenaries armed with rifles and grenade launchers
burned an INRA pick-up truck and kidnapped the local CDS co-ordinator
and 4 civilian members of the militia.
March 18, 1983 - Mercenaries intercepted and hurned an INRA pick-up truck
near San José de Los Remates, Boaco; its 3 passengers are missing. In a
separate attack, approximately 300 mercenaries invaded the locale of El
Achiote, Yaoska, kidnapping 2 people who worked with the FSLN.
March 21, 1983 - Near ValleEl Naranjo, 60 well-armed mercenaries kidnapped
7 people, including 2 employees of the National Development Bank.
March 23, 1983 - A pick-up truck belonging to the Stdte enterprise "Filemon
Rivera" was amhushed in Las Canarias, municipality of Limay.Two memhers
of the Popular Sandinista Army were killed and 5 were wounded.
In a separate attack, mercenaries hurned a warehouse in the El Chaquiton
complex at Puehlo Nuevo, Esteli, resulting in lossesof up to 1million cordobas.
March 26, 1983 - Two hundred mercenaries attacked the district of Rancho
Grïnilc niih niorrar tirc. killing 2 mcmhers <ii'ihcmiliiis. ? oiher Nicir.iguari
ci\~lr.insanil .iI'rr'ncliJuçiur. Sc\.cntcin pziiplc i\.crc i\.oundcrl. inclu.iing 7
childrcn anJ 3 Miniiiry oCInicri~r uarhcrr. On rhcir rciredi the mercenarici
hurned a house in canada La Castilla.142 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
March 27, 1983 - Thirty mercenaries ambushed an ambulance of the Modesto
Agurcia Hospital near San Fernando, Nueva Segovia, killingthe driver.
In senarate attacks. mercenaries kidna~~ed7 camnesinos from Buena Vista
de ~enianilla, near ~iwili. The followi& day anot'hergroup of mercenaries
kidnapped 6 campesinos from the nearby La Pita district.
Also, 40 mercenaries appeared at the community of El Carbon, Ciudad
Antigua. Falsely identifying themselvesas members of the Popular Sandinista
Amy, they kidnapped 3 memhers of one family.
March 28, 1983 - Mercenaries kidnapped 3campesinos in the Las Canas sector.
March 30, 1983 - Mercenary forces attacked Nicaraguan troops who were
guarding the community of Santa Clara, killing 12soldiers and wounding 11.
Two were listed as missing.
In a separate attack, mercenaries attacked the Quinta del Camen State
farm near San Juan de Rio Coco, killing 3 civilian memhers ofthe militia and
wounding another.
April 6, 1983 - The body of Adilia Martinez Alvarez, an official of the Vice-
Ministry for Adult Education, was found near Boaco. She had hecn kidnapped
by mercenaries 17days previously.
April 7, 1983 - The Statc Security post at Bana was attacked; 4 people were
killed and 4 werewounded, ail ofthem employeesof that agency. IÏnaieparate
attack, 12campesinoswerekidnapped by mercenaries inthe sector of Mozonte,
Nueva Segovia.
April 8, 1983 - Mercenaries attacked the State farm at Los Laureles, Jinotega,
killing the manager and burning 2 trucks and a jeep. In the ensuing battle, II
Nicaraguans (including 4 civilians)were killed and 19were wounded.
In separate attacks, 60 to 80 mercenariesamed with riflesrobbed the health
center at La Movil of al1of the medicinesil contained. Also, a detachment of
mercenaries attacked the town of Ciudad Antigua, Nueva Segovia, with rifle
fire and rocket launchers. Three people were wounded and the local health
center was partly destroyed.
In another attack, 12mercenaries broke into a campesino's bouseat Cano
Wilson, near El Rama, raping his sister and beating him and his parents.
April IO, 1983-A group of 10mercenaries attacked a boat used for the "lnter-
Terrestre" canal project near Bluefields,Zelaya Sur, assassinating 2 people and
kidnapping 3 others.
April 11, 1983 - A group of 90 to 100mercenaries amed with rifles,mortars,
grenade launchers and machine guns attacked the La Colonia State iarm near
La Presa Mancotal. After burning the farmhouse to the ground, they kidnapped
a woman teacher (aSalvadoran national) from nearby Santa Isabel.
April 12, 1983 - Mercenaries destroyed the Rural Infants' Servicecenter at the
La Colonia State farm; a campesino family that lived in the center is missing.
April 13, 1983-A group of mercenaries intercepted a vehiclein which the chief
of the police suh-station at Palacaguina was riding, killing him and wounding
a campesina.
In separate attacks, 60 mercenaries burned two INRA vehicles in the Los
Ranchos sector, and 30 mercenanes burned a bridgc at Salnmanji, Nueva
Segovia.
April 14, 1983 - In El Cocal, Zelaya Sur, a group of mercenaries seized an
INRA motorboat, kidnapping 5 people, including the zona1 administrative
manager for INRA and an administrative assistant.
In a separate attack, mercenaries ambushed a civilian truck in the Achuapa
sector, killing 2 people and wounding 2 others. They also burned 3 State
vehicles. ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 143
Also, in La Pedrera, Zelaya Norte, a group of approximately 35 mercenaries
ambushed a pick-up truck, killing 4 civilians.
April 16, 1983 - Mercenaries assassinated the manager for UNAG at El
Pantasma, one day after he was kidnapped.
April 17, 1983 - In combat with mercenary forces in the La Flor sector, 6
Nicaraguan Government soldiers were killed and 3 were wounded.
April 18, 1983 - Sixty mercenaries invaded the sector of Chusli, near Jalapa,
kidnannine a member of the Pooular Sandinista Armv and 2 camnesinos.
Ar I Y Iùurieen mercenarie, armril uiih riflÎs xnd rockéi13uiicliers
invadcJ ihc VaJi>,\ncho ,cilor. iLtting the throat of .I~ivili~nmcmhcr iiiihc
miliiia ;and kidna..inr- 12 .>ther~ivili3ns..imiinr:-them 4 hcalih-cürc uorkers
and 5 children.
In a separate attack, mercenaries kidnapped 30 campesinos in the Monte
Frio sector, near Jalapa.
April 21, 1983 - In the vicinity of Cerro El Toro, near Wina, a group of
mercenaries kidnapped 3 people who worked as technicians at the Siuna mines;
they also burned the vehicle in which they had been travelling.
In a separate attack, approximately 200 mercenaries surrounded 35 Nica-
raguan troops in the area of Cerro Chachagon, killing 12 and wounding 5.
Two soldiers were listed as missing.
April 22, 1983 - Approximately 80-100 Miskito mercenaries armed with rifles,
rocket launchers. mortars a~d o~ ~ ~ ~anons attacked the town of Slilmalila.
Zelaya Norte, kidnapping a group of IRENA technicians and damaging thé
facilitiesof INRA, IRENA, the medical dispensary, and the OfficeofTransport
of that community.
April 24, 1983 - A group of 200 mercenaries burned a MICONS tmck and
assassinated the driver in the Las Canas sector, near Wiwili.
April 25, 1983 - Mercenaries from the Benito Bravo task force ambushed a
pick-up truck at La Belleza,near San Juan de Rio Coco, killing the local head
of the Fam Workers' Association.
April 28, 1983 - Sixty mercenaries kidnapped 8 tractor drivers between Las
Uvas and Las Mercedes, 4 of whom managed to escape.
April29, 1983 - In the district of Cruz Verde, 5 armed mercenaries robbed and
kidnapped Alberto Rodriguez, the local UNAG CO-ordinatorand ENABAS
manager.
Avril 30. 1983 - Mercenaries ambushed~3 ~ICONS vehicles. killine 16neoole.
'includ;ng8 civilians. One of the civilians killed was a Cieman docfor wio Lad
been makina his services available to the Nicaraguan people. Also killed was
a member of the Jinoteea r- -onal FSLN commctee
3) 2 Y In Achudpd. 3 group iii100mcr;cnarics 1r.dh) fornier ii:itiunal
Gu;irdini;in hld*iin<iXldrin intcr:cpicJ 9 vzhi~.lz>k ,iilnappcd 47 pcoplc u tiu
Mercridinr in them. and hurncrl 2 vchiclc\ hclonain~ io IRI:iYA III .I,ciidrare
attack, s'ambulance of the Popular ~andinGta'~rm~ was ambushed at
Macarali, Nueva Segovia; 2 people were killed and one was wounded.
May 5, 1983 - In the Zacateras sector, mercenaries killed 6 members of the
Popular Sandinista Amy and kidnapped 9 civilians. In a separate attack, a
group of 15mercenaries killed 2 campesinos in the Kuskawas sector.
May 6, 1983 - Approximately 200 mercenaries invaded the El Galope State
fam near Rancho Grande, assassinating the TELCOR service manager and
kidnaoo..e ..camvzsinos. Thev also burned a TELCOR vehicle. a tractor and
3 earehousr' uiih 3 Idrge quaniii) oi io<>l<In 3 \cpdr:ite :itt.ickin 1;i D~lia,
Jinoicga, 6U nicriendries ~mbushcrl a '1ELCOR jccp, killing the arsisiiiiit
niaridgcr tif the TELCOR projr'ri in th:it ;.one.144 MlL1TAP.YAND PARAMlLITARY ACTlVlTlES
May 7, 1983 - In Totogalpa, near Ocotal, mercenaries attacked the granary
and destroyed a grain storage tank with a rocket. The command post at
Macarali was also attacked; 10soldiers were killed.
May 8, 1983 - A group of approximately 60 mercenaries armed with rifles,
mortars and machine guns attacked the militia unit at Las Papayas, killing 2
civilian members ofthe militia and wounding another. They also took away
18 other members of the militia with their equipment and 60 other persons,
together with 80head of cattle.
May 9, 1983 - In the district of La Laguna, Nueva Segovia, a hand of
approximately 30 mercenaries kidnapped 17 campesinos and took them to
Honduran territory.
May 12, 1983 - A group of 15 mercenaries kidnapped 6 campesinos from the
district of El Ocote.
May 17, 1983 - Fifty mercenaries kidnapped 20 campesinos in the Las Canas
sector. Also, in separate attacks, 20 mercenaries invadedthe Cerro las Torres
sector, Nueva Segovia, burning a tractor belonging to the State, and two
campesinos were kidnapped from the San Pablo de Kubali fam in the
jurisdiction of Waslala.
May 21, 1983 - Nicaraguan troops hattled a force of 1,000to 1,200mercenaries
in the vicinity of Jalapa in combat lasting until May 23, 1983.Twenty-three
Nicaraguans were killed and 51 were wounded.
May 22-24, 1983 - Thirty mercenaries kidnapped 4 campesinos a1 Bilwas,
among them a member of the local CDS. They also burned the building used
by the local Reserve Battalion.
May 25, 1983 - In the Las Tiricias sector, on the Rio San Juan, a boat cdrrying
3 WestGerman journalists was attacked hy mercenaries. All 3journalists were
kidnapped (one of them wounded) and 2 members of their military escort
were killed. Four soldiers were wounded.
lune 1, 1983 - Approximately 120mercenaries invadedthe communities of Las
Barandas, Guavabo, Kaskita, Platano, and Puerto Cahezas, kidnapping 7
campesinos and a member of the Popular Sandinista Amy.
June 2, 1983 - Twenty-three mercenaries armed with rifles, machine guns and
grenade launchers kidnapped a family of 9 at Las Carranzas, near Somoto.
June 4, 1983 - A hand of 45 mercenaries armed with rifles and machine guns
invaded the community of Sarawas, kidnapping 3 persons.
June 5, 1983A detachment of mercenaries invaded the State farm of Lisawe,
Pio Blanco, Matagalpa, kidnapping 3 civilian members of the militia from
that sector. On their retreat the mercenaries hurned and looted the State farm
there; the lossesare valued at over 1 million cordohas.
In separate attacks, a mercenary military unit kidnapped 60 campesinos
from the Pita del Carmen zone, and mercenaries attacked the town of
Teotecacinte, killing3 people, injuring 3 others, and destroying 8 houses.
Also, a force of 500-600mercenaries seized the El Porvenir sector after a
15-hour hattle, taking 50 Nicaraguans with them to Honduras. Nineteen
people were listedas missing.
lune 6, 1983 - Mercenaries dynamited the bridge at Salamanji, Nueva Segovia,
completely destroying it. In a separate attack, a group of approximately 60
mercenaries armed with rifles, grenades, and machine guns, invaded the
community of Kuikuinata, kidnapping 3 people.
lune 8, 1983 - Between 7 a.m. and 4:20 p.m., Nicdraguan troops hattled
mercenaries in the sectors of El Porvenir, El Suice, Murupuchi, and
Teotecacinte. Five Nicaraguans were killedand 14were wounded; in addition,
the mercenaries hurned the sawmillat Santa Clara, near Teotecacinte. ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 145
In a separate attack, mercenaries blew up 2 electrical transmission posts at
Maderas Negras, Chinandega.
June 10, 1983-A group of 50mercenaries intercepted a pick-uptruck belonging
to the State lumber Companyand an IRENA jeep at a bridge on the Dipilto
highway. They hlew up the pick-up truck on the bridge with C-4 explosives,
damaging the bridge and completelydestroying the truck. Theyalso kidnapped
7 .eo.,e. includin- a woman nurse and two IRENA emolovee.. ,
June 11, 1983 - Approximately 150-200mercenaries supported by mortars and
rifle fire attacked the town of Ciudad Antipua, Nueva Segovia, kidnaouinr 4
persons and hurning a store, the health ceiter, and the Leadquarteri of The
militia. They also cul the electric and telephone lines.
June 12, 1983 - In the La Pita sector, a group of 13mercenaries ambushed a
pick-up tmck in which 7 civilians and a soldier were traveling. One civilian
was killed and the other occupants were wounded.
June 18, 1983 - Mercenaries burned 48 trucks in the MICONS installation at
lsla del Gato. They also looted the storehouses, destroyed equipment, and
painted FDN slogans.
June 25. 1983 - Mercenaries kidnanned the manaeer of the La Patriota farm
near Matiguas, Matagalpa. .. -
July 2, 1983 - Mercenaries ambushed a jeep from INE, killing I person and
woundine 2 others.
"
July 3, 1983-A group of 100to 120mercenaries divided into two groups and
armed with rifles.heavvmachine -uns. mortars. and -renade launchers attacked
the cdmrnunit) <iiSinsin and ihr'bridge thers. One group placcd an cplori\e
charge on one of the columns supporting the pli\,crncni. d~maging il.The
sccond arourr atiackcd ihc cornmunith ni Sinsin ~tscll:killi-r an olJ man 2nd
woundi& 3Children under 5 years of age.
July 4, 1983 - At Kiwa, Zelaya Central, a group of 60 mercenaries armed with
riflesand hand grenades ambushed 15people who were traveling on two hoats
on the Rio Grande, killing 5 people. Three soldiers were kidnapped and 7
were wounded. The mercenaries took away the hoats and the bodies of the
people they had killed.
In a separate attack, a group of 70 mercenaries kidnapped 18 campesinos
from Ovote, de~artment of Madriz, and look them to Honduras.
Jul) 5, 1983 A group orapproximatcly 40 to 6U mercendrir'siiss:isrinaicd?
iivili~n mr'mbcrsof the inilitis a3dmeniher of ihc border p;itrol31 Macueliïo.
near Ocotal.
July 6, 1983 - Mercenaries attacked the port of Santa Isabel, Zelaya, damaging
the electric plant and an aircraft of the Nicaraguan air force.
July 10, 1983 - Mercenaries ambushed a boat at Boca Tapada, Zelaya Sur,
killing4 people including the boat's captain. One woman was injurcd.
July 11, 1983 - A group of 40 mercenaries burned 2 trucks belonging to the
State at El Cerro El Toro. Two military people who were riding on the trucks
were kidnapped.
July 16, 1983 - A group of mercenaries blew up 3 electric transmission towers
between San Juan de Limay and Pueblo Nuevo, Esteli, leaving Condega,
Pueblo Nuevo, Somoto, Limay, Ocotal and Jalapa without electric power.
July 20, 1983A group of 30mercenaries raked an INE vehicle withautomatic-
weapons fire, killing the driver, an electric-company employee.
In a seoarateatiack. at El Carmen. near San Juan de Rio Coco. mercenaries
kidnappZd the motherof the head ofthe local militia and burned afarmhouse.
July 21, 1983-A group of about 20mercenariesburned the State farm at Daraili.146 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
July 23, 1983 - A group of mercenaries invaded Pena delJicote, Chinandega,
kidnapping 9 persons and taking them toward Honduran territory.
July 24, 1983-A group of mercenaries intercepteda truck and a jeep near Las
Manos, Nueva Segovia- kidnapping .. - 3 civilians and taking-them toward
Honduras.
July 28, 1983 - Mercenaries kidnapped 4 campesinos in the sector of El
Aguacate, near Ococona.
July 29, 1983 - Three hundred mercenaries assassinated 2 civilians who were
memhers of the militia.
July 30, 1983 - Government forces fought approximately 15to 20 mercenaries
in the district of La Escalera. On their retreat the mercenanes kidnapped 8
campesino families from the area.
July 31, 1983 - A group of mercenaries hurned the school and hermitage of
Aguas Calientes, near San Joséde Bocay.
August 2, 1983 - In Region 1of San Rafael del Norte, a group of mercenaries
amhushed a vehicle of the Ministry of the lnterior from Esteli. Two people
were killedand 3 were wounded.
In a separate attack, 30 mercenaries ambushed an INRA jeep between
Telpaneca and Los Ranchos, Nueva Segovia, killingan INRA technician and
wounding 4 people, includinga woman and a child.
August 3, 1983 - A group of 20-30 mercenaries amhushed memhers of the
border patrol at Santa Emilia, killingone Nicaraguan and kidnapping another.
August 7, 1983 - A group of mercenaries kidnapped a campesino in the sector
of LasCanas; later, they kidnapped 2other Nicaraguans inthe El Limonsector.
August 9, 1983 - A group of mercenaries ambushed a MICONS tractor near
Morrillo, assassinating a worker and kidnapping 25 people.
August 10, 1983 - A group of mercenaries amhushed a pick-up tmck used for
public transportation at Valle Los Cedros. Of the 18 people riding on the
August 12, 1983re -ssaA group of mercenaries hurned 2 MlCONS trucks at La
Flor. Later, the same group amhushed a truck carrying government troops; 3
were killed and 2 wounded.
August 14, 1983 - Approximately 60-80 mercenanes ambushed government
troops at Sairinlaya, Zelaya Central, killing 18 soldiers, wounding 12 and
beating 7.
August 15, 1983 - At San Rafael del Norte, the headquarters of the Sandinista
Police wereattacked. One person was killed and I was wounded. In a separate
attack, 2 people werekidnapped in the La Lama district.
August 16, 1983-A group of mercenarieskidnapped 2campesinosat El Lecher.
August 18, 1983 - A g-.ui, of 18 mercenaries kidnappe..11 campesinos from
Cos Caracoles.
August 22, 1983 - Mercenanes destroyed the bridge at Wilikon, on the highway
connecting Siuna with Rio Blanco.
August 29, 1983 - A large group of mercenaries invaded the community of
Uhu, hurning an electric plant, 2 tractors and 6 other vehicles, 18 harrels of
fuel. desks. documents. and other eauioment helongine to the COREXSA
~om~G~installation there. They al~o'~;intedslogansaliuding to the mercen-
ary task force "San Jacinto".
August 30, 1983 - Mercenary forces attacked the town of San Pedro de Potrero
Grande with mortars. riflesand heavv machine euns- Two veoole.we.e killed
and . .. .. . .. . .~~~
In a separate attack, a group of 60-80 mercenaries hurned 11 houses at the
Santa Fe farm near San Carlos and kidnapped 1I campesinos who workedAugust 31, 1983 - Three mercenariescame to the house ofa citizen ofNegrowas,
kidnapping 2 of his children, aged 7 and 15 years.
In a separate attack, a group of 80-120mercenanes attacked the State farm
at Abisinia, killing 2 people.
Also, mercenaries kidnapped 10 campesinos at Ohriwas and later killed 4
of them.
September 1, 1983 - Mercenaries supported by 60mm mortars and 75mm
cannons fought Nicaraguan troops at Barra Rio Maiz, killing 9 soldiers and
wounding several others.
September 3, 1983 - In the district of El Guayo, mercenaries kidnapped and
then cut the throats of 18 campesinos; among the victims was a teacher for
the Evaneelical Committee for Aid and Develonment (CEPAD)\ Thev also ,
burned 2Thouses.
September 8, 1983-A Cessna 402 aircraft coming from the south dropped two
250-kilogram fragmentation hombs on Nicaraguan air force facilities, partly
destroying air hase offices and the Aeronica hangars. The aircraft finally
crashed into the tower of the Augusto Cesar Sandino Airport after being hit
by Nicaraguan anti-aircraft fire.
September 9, 1983 - Two T-28 aircraft fired 2 rockets at Shelltanks containing
flammable chemicals.Two tanks, one containing acetonc and another hexane,
were ruptured by shrapnel.
September 11, 1983 - A group of 20 mercenaries attacked the co-operative at
Chalmeca, Zelaya Sur, killing a civilian member ofthe militia and kidnapping
3 other persons. One person was wounded.
Septemher 13, 1983 - Mercenanes sahotaged the oil pipelineat Puerto Sandino;
they also used explosivesto damage part of the oil terminal used for tanker
coupling.
Septemher 15, 1983 - Twenty mercenaries burned a cofïee farm and a private
house in El Zaoote.
Septemher 17, 1983 - Mercenaries assassinated 2 campesinos at Aguas Rojas.
September 21, 1983 - In the district of El Tabaco, mercenaries assassinated 4
campesinos who were members of the local militia. On the same day,
2 campesinos were kidnapped in the Paiwata sector.
In a separate attack, 150mercenaries killed6 people and wounded 6 others
at the Ouipo co-operative in Siuna.
September 23, 1983 - Mercenaries attacked the Yakalwas co-operative in the
jurisdiction ofQuilali, killing 4 people and wounding 7 others.
In a separate attack, 60 mercenaries amhushed Nicaraguan troops at El
Chamorro, killing 10soldiers. Twenty-four others were reported missing.
Septemher 25, 1983 - In Las Hatillas, a bus carrying a goup of merchants
from Managua was ambushed. Some of the passengers were beaten, and 2
immigration workers werereported missing.
In a separate attack, at Ocotal, mercenaries attacked members of the militia
who were guarding a bridge south of the city and the facilities of IRENA.
Two civilian members of the militia were killed and the bridge was partly
damaged by an explosivecharge placed by the mercenaries.
September 27, 1983 - Approximately 100 mercenaries invaded the town of
Ciudad Antigua, Nueva Segovia, cutting the telephone line, burning govern-
ment offices,and painting FDN slogans.The town was defendedby 16civilians
who were members of the militia, 1 of whom was killed and 1 wounded in
the attack.
Septemher 28, 1983 - Approximately 80.100 mercenaries attacked the frontier
posts of Penas Blancas and La Boca del Sapot with rifle and mortar fire.148 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
Three people (one immigration worker and 2 memhers of the border patrol)
were killed and 9 were wounded. The customs offices and dutv-free port at
Penas Blancas were also destroved,
Ocinber 2. 1383 - Approxim~irly 200-2% riicrccnaric.:anib~slicJ a carivan of
5 irusks carrying MICO'IS uorkeri at C'crriiF.1C:hile,hidiiapping 19 people.
includine a Dclcedic iur ihc l'SDN in ih~i zone.
Octoher 3,-1983 /A group of mercenaries amhushed an INRA pick-up truck
at Cerro Blanco, near San Juan de Rio Coco, killing INRA technical workers.
In a separate attack, mercenaries kidnapped a group of campesinos at
Terreno Grande, near Palacaguina.
October 9, 1983 - Nine soldiers were killed and 4 were wounded in combat
with mercenaries at Santa Pita, near Ouilali.
In a separate attack, 8 mercenaries ambushed a pick-up truck carrying 12
persons in the Yolai sector. One person was killed and 2 were wounded.
Octoher 10, 1983 - A speedboat armed with M-50 machine guns and a
20-millimeter cannon fired on the fuel tanks at the Port of Corinto, setting 1
on fire. The fire spread to the diesel tanks at the port. A Korean tanker
anchored at the Port was also fired on in the attack. A Korean seaman and a
woman in the port area were injured.
In a separate attack, a group of mercenaries kidnapped a woman civilian at
El Tablazon.
October 14, 1983 - Mercenaries kidnapped two people in the community
of Balsamo.
Octoher 18, 1983 - Beginning at 5:00 am., 400 mercenaries supported by
60-mm mortars attacked the town of Pantasma, killing 29 civilians and 18
soldiers. One person was reported missing. Alsodestroyed were 2co-operatives,
8 tractors, 2 trucks, and the offices of INRA, FNCAFF, the National
Development Bank, and other agencies.
October 18, 1983-A group of upto 40 mercenaries kidnapped 4 workers from
the La Flor farm near Penas Blancas.
October 20, 1983 - A group of approximately 50 mercenaries attacked the
"Heroes and Martyrs" Co-operative of San José deBocay, killing 2 people,
amonr them a civilian member of the militia, and wounding 4 others.
In ~&~araie311ichs. 3 ~pecdbuiitarn~eduith c.innon lire2 conthe doAs at
Puerto Cabcriis. hitting a ship ai dnihor and uounding II civili.ii19.smiong
ihcm 3 cliildrsn. AI\,,, merccnaric\ hurned ille Ci<ilileaiirni .ilGuapin<~land,
near the town of Somotillo. mercenaries usine C-4 exolosives dëstroved a
tractor belonging to INRA.
October 29, 1983 - Three bundred mercenaries invaded the community of
Siawas, Zelaya Sur, kidnapping 2 popular-education co-ordinators.
Octob~ ~ ~ ~.-~83 - An.~rx~~~~-lv 100-150mer~~naries burned t~~ State farm
at Las Delicias, wounding a civilian memher of the militia.
November 2, 1983 - Mercenanes kidnapped 9 campesinos from the locale of
Macuelizo.
November 10, 1983 - A group of approximately 30 mercenaries kidnapped 2
reservists at Las Palmitas Campuzano.
November 14. 1983 - In the district of El Oioche, 150 mercenaries attacked a
militia .ost. kidnanoine several civilians
Decemher 2, 1983-in cino Dipina, Matagalpa, approximately 300mercenaries
attacked the local army command post, killing 17 pe~ple. - -undetermined
numher were missing as a result of the attack.
December 5,1983 - Mercenaries burned a warehouse on the Monte Cristo farm
of INRA at Yasica Sur, Matagalpa. ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 149
In a separate attack, 4 "Piranha" speedboats, supported by 3 aircraft,
apparently Super Mystères, attacked 3 units of the Nicaraguan MGS in
Nicaraguan waters 5 miles north of Punta Consiguina, killing 1 person and
wounding 4.
December 11, 1983-A group of 100-150mercenariesattacked the facilities at
Playwood, in Cano de Agua, burning equipment and completely destroying
the physical plant.
In a separate attack, mercenaries ambushed a boat near Barra Punta Gorda,
Zelaya Sur, killing 3 people and wounding 5.
December 16,1983-A group of mercenaries attacked the collectiveat El Valle
Los Cedros, killing 8 people, burning 8 trucks, and kidnapping a woman nurse
and 4 campesinos.
December 17, 1983 - A group of mercenanes invaded the encampment of
INRA near the Punta Gorda frontier DOS,kidna~~ina al1of the oersonnel
ihcrc .. -
Dcccmhçr 18, 1983 - Appr<iximatcly300 mcrccnarics aiiacked ihr sciilcmeni
oiRio Coco. killing 16cii,ili;inmembers of the mil~iiaand ioially dcsiroying
the settlement.
In a seDarate incident. 200 mercenanes attacked the town of Wamblan.
killing 5 &ople.
Also, 7 members of the militia and 4 other civilians were killed in combat
with a mercenary task force in the San Bartolo sector.
December 19, 1983 - In the sector of Los Perdenales, 21 people were killedin
combat with memhers of a mercenani task force.
In a separate attack, mercenaries burned the Santa Ana farm near the Colon
frontier post and kidnapped the entire family.
Decemher 20, 1983 - Some 500 mercenaries attacked the district of El Cua,
killing 9 people and wounding 16.
In a separate attack, mercenaries kidnapped a large number of people from
the town of Francia Sirpi, near Tronquera. Among those kidnapped was a
priest, Salvador SchaRer.
December 23, 1983 - Approximately 30 mercenaries ambushed a civilian pick-
up truck in Las Playitas, kidnapping 2 workers for ENCAFE.
December 25, 1983 - Eighty mercenaries kidnapped 20 campesinos in the El
Rosario sector and took them IO Honduras.
January 3, 1984 - Mercenary forces ambushed 12 people who were goingby
boat on the Torsuany River south-west of Bluefields.Two Nicaraguans were
killed. 2 wounded and~3~missin~~-
~dnuar~'5,1984 - At I2:41Jani. .piranha" boatj iircd on I>ucrioPoioii. killing
cii,ilian mcniber oi ihc niililidand \ruundine? oihr.r\. Two çuitiims uorkerl
were also wounded.
January 9, 1984 - Approximately 20 mercenaries mined the highway between
Mozonte and San Fernando. One of the mines destroyed a civilian truck,
killing the driver.
January 12, 1984 - Approximately 30 mercenaries kidnapped 12 campesinos
from the locale of Tito Izaguirre.
January 15, 1984 - Approximately 60 mercenaries kidnapped 2 Nicaraguans
north-west of Dipilto.
January 25, 1984In the Wilikesector, approximately 20mercenariesambushed
a pick-up truck from the Ministry of Constmction, killing 2 civilians and
wounding 8.
January 30, 1984 - Approximately 60 mercenaries invadedthe town of Pueblo
Nuevo, jurisdiction of Atlanta, Zelaya Sur, kidnapping 5 civilians who were
members of the militia.150 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITES
February 2, 1984Six A-37and Push and Pull airplanes penetrated Nicaraguan
air space and fired rockets in the vicinity of the Casita volcano. One of the
rockets detonated some barrels of fuel, killing 3 soldiers and injuring others.
Febmary 7, 1984 - Approximately 50 mercenaries ambushed a civilian truck
near La Azucena, injuring 9 civilians,including two pregnant women.
Fehruary 14, 1984 - Mercenaries invaded the community of Waspado, kidnap-
ping 5persons.
February 16, 1984 - A fishing boat (El PescasaNo. 22) exploded 2 mines set
opposite the Pescasa dock. Three of the 5 crew members were wounded and
2 were missing.
In a separate attack, approximately 35 mercenaries kidnapped 10 workers
north-east of Atlanta.
February 20, 1984 - Approximately 30 mercenaries kidnapped 5 campesinos at
Playa Hermosa and El Cedro.
February 21, 1984-A group of mercenaries kidnapped 30 campesinos at Cano
La Cruz.
February 25, 1984 - Mercenaries burned a warehouse of ENCAFE in the
vicinity of Chachagon hill.
March 2, 1984 - Mercenaries assassinated 2 workers in the Ruben Dario
district, cutting out their hearts and feeding them to dogs.
March 4, 1984 - Approximately 50mercenaries kidnapped 5campesinos in San
Pedro, near San José de Bocay.
March 5, 1984 - A group of mercenaries assassinated a member of the FSLN
south of Nueva Guinea.
March 8, 1984The Panamanian ship Los Caribes hit a mine in the Port of
Corinto, injuring 3 persons and seriously damaging the ship.
March 9, 1984 - In Cano Mollejones, a group of mercenaries assassinated 5
campesinos.
In separate incidents, mercenaries kidnapped 25 civilianswho were traveling
in a MICONS boat in the Siwas canal near La Cruz de Rio Grande. Also,
mercenaries kidnapped 3 civilian members of the militia in La Pedrera.
March 11, 1984 - Approximately 100 mercenaries hurned houses in Copapar
and killed 3 civilians in Perro Mocho.
March 11, 1984 - Approximately 60 mercenaries assassinated 5 campesinos in
Fila Los Mojones.
March 12, 1984 - Fifty mercenaries invaded La Cuesta El Guayabo, killing 2
people, kidnapping 4 others, and huming a truck.
March 16, 1984 - Seventy mercenaries kidnapped 3 civilians in San Ramon,
and later kidnapped 13civilians from the Las Hatillas sector.
March 18, 1984 - A group of mercenaries kidnapped several campesinos from
San José, near SanJuan de Limay, and retreated to Santa Martha, where they
kidnapped 11more campesinos.
March 19, 1984 - In the Chaguiton sector, a group of mercenaries ambushed
and killed 15reservists.
In a separate attack, approximately 150mercenaries ambushed Government
troops at El Plantel, near San Sebastian de Yali, killing 16 soldiers.
March 20, 1984 - The Soviet tanker Lugansk was damaged hy an explosion
caused by a mine set near the buoys at Puerto Sandino. Five people were
injured.
In a separate attack, 2W mercenanes kidnapped 2 civilians at La Patriota,
Matagalpa.
March 24, 1984 - Fifty mercenaries invaded Quebrada El Agua, kidnapping an
adult-education worker. ANNEXES IO THE MEMORIAL 151
March 25, 1984 - A group of mercenaries ambushed a MlCONS truck in
Cuesta Las Brisas, kidnapping al1of its occupants.
In a separate attack, approximately 100 mercenaries killed 5 people and
kidnapped 13others at the Las Brisas CO-operative.
March 26, 1984-One hundred mercenaries attacked the State farm at El Arco,
near San Sebastian de Yali, killing 23civilianswho weremembers of the militia.
March 26, 1984 - Sixty mercenaries ambushed 3 trucks in which government
troops were traveling, killing 21 soldiers and burning the 3 trucks.
March 28, 1984 - The British merchant ship Inderchaser,which was carrying a
cargo of molasses from the Port of Corinto, was damaged hy a mine. Later,
the ship Aracely Perez, which was sweeping minesat that Port, hit another
mine and was also damaged.
March 29, 1984 - Approximately 300 mercenaries attacked the border post at
Sandy Bay, kidnapping 80 residents of the town, killing 4 people and
wounding 8.
March 30. 1984 - The fishine boat Alma Sultanriexoloded an obiect of
-
undetermined manufacture as it was carrying out minesweepingduties between
buoys 1 and 2 of the Corinto channel. The hull and other parts of the boat
were damared, and it sank com~letelvafter beine towed to the dock.
Also, anexplosion damaged ihe ~a~anesemechant ship Terushioas it was
entering the Port of Corinto escorted by two vessels which were sweeping ~ ~
for mines.
April 1, 1984 - Approximately 35 mercenaries attacked the Serrano district,
killing the local police chiefand kidnapping the head of the local CDS.
In a separate attack, 60 mercenaries attacked the Colonia Fonseca, near
Nueva Guinea. killine 2 Nicaraeuans and woundine II.
April 2, 1984-A gro;p of mercenaries burned 2 hovusesand killed a child at
Santa Cmz, near Quilali.
April 3, 1984 - Approximately 300 mercenaries simultaneously attacked the
town of Waslala and 2 nearhy bridges. At least 16 Nicaraguans were killed
and 14wounded. Fifteen people were missing.
April 4, 1984 - Some 150 mercenaries armed with rifles and machine guns
attacked and burned the State farm at La Colonia. near San Rafael del Yali.
killing 6 Nicaraguans.
April 5, 1984-A group of mercenaries ambushed 3 State tmcks near Kusuli,
kidnapping the civilianoccupants of the vehiclesand hurning the trucks. They
also hurned the school at Kusuli.
In a separate attack, mercenaries assassinated a civilian memher of the
militia and kidnapped 30 campesinos from Laguna Verde. They retreated
toward El Morado hill. where thev assassinated an adult education teacher.
April6, 1984 - Approximately 30mercenariesburned houses and health centers
in Valle El Guadalupe sector.
April 7, 1984 - A specialized gr ou^ of mercenaries blew UP 2 electrical
?ransmission towers ai the ~anta~osa farm, near Chinandega.
April 8, 1984 - Mercenaries invaded the community of Maniwatla, kidnapping
15 people.
April 9, 1984 - A group of mercenaries kidnapped 12campesinos a1 La Pita.
April 10, 1984 - Mercenaries kidnapped 15campesinos near ValleEl Cua.
In a separate attack, mercenaries attacked the ENABAS post in the Kurin-
was sector, near Nueva Guinea, assassinating 4 memben of a co-operative,
kidnapping one person and taking 500,000cordohas.
April 13, 1984 - Mercenaries sahotaged telephone transmission posts with C-4
explosivesat Chaguite Grande.152 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
In a separate attack, approximately 10 to 15 mercenaries blew up electrical
transmission posts in the district of La Fonseca.
April 16, 1984 - Approximately 150 mercenanes kidnapped 25 civilians at
Teocintal hill.
In separate attacks, 40 mercenanes burned a State farm located at San
Gabriel Hermitage, near San Sebastian de Yali. Also,30mercenaries ambushed
a MICONS truck 4 kilometers south of Munukuku, killing 2 civilians and
wounding one.
In addition, 70 mercenaries attacked the settlement of Los Chiles, killing 3
civilian memhers of the militia and wounding 2 other people.
April 17, 1984 - Approximately 400 mercenaries kidnapped 7 campesinos at
San Joséde Kilamhe.
In a separate attack, 300 mercenaries attacked the settlement of Sumubilia
with mortar and rifle fire, killing two policemen and kidnapping 27 civilians.
The mercenaries also destroyed the headquarters of the Sandinista Police, the
Health Center, the machinery of the cacao project and the INRA warehouses.
April 18, 1984-A group of mercenaries kidnapped 21 families at Wamhlancito
and took them toward Honduran territory.
April 19, 1984 - Fifty mercenaries destroyed the State farm at La Paz, near
San Sebastian de Yali.
April 23-24, 1984 - Three mercenary task forces fought government troops in
the La Rica District, killing 15 soldiers, kidnapping 3 campesinos, and des-
troying the local medical station, the militia headquarters and 2 houses.
April 24, 1984 - Twenty mercenaries burned State farms at San Luis and
Buena Vista.
Apnl 25, 1984 - Approximately 20 mercenaries ambushed an ENABAS truck
south of Nueva Guinea, killing the driver and an assistant.
April 29, 1984 - Seventy mercenaries hurned the CO-operativeand a house
located in Valle Santo Domingo.
May 1, 1984-Croups of mercenaries burned State farms at Las Brisas and La
Esperanra.
May 2, 1984 - The State-owned fishing vesse1 Pedro Aruuz Pulacios was
destroyed by a mine in the Puerto Corinto access channel.
In a separate attack, four mercenaries dressed in uniforms of the militia
invaded the community of Cano Azul, kidnapping Ycampesinos, including
2 minors.
May 4, 1984 - Approximately 50 mercenaries kidnapped 9 campesinos at
Colonia La Providencia, near Nueva Guinea.
In a separate attack, 60 mercenaries ambushed and burned a truck at the
Sapoa bridge on the Limhaica highway, killing 3 Miskitos and wounding 2.
May 5, 1984-A group of mercenaries burned the State farm at Castillo Norte,
killing 8 people.
In a separate attack, 8 mercenaries kidnapped 14 persons in the sector of
Jocomico and took them toward Honduran territory.
May 7, 1984-One hundred mercenaries armed with rifles,machine guns, and
mortars, attacked the border post and settlement of Pa10de Arco, kidnapping
40 civilians. In addition, 6 civilians were killed and 3 were wounded when the
mercenaries threw a grenade into a shelter.
In a separate incident, mercenaries attacked positions of the Sandinista
Army at Palo de Arguito, killing 4 civilians, including 2 children. Also, mer-
ccnaricr kidndppcd ~rarnpcsiii.>ai I.:iC~hcccrs.
hlay Y. 1981 SI\ merccnaric, kidnappcd ? ~~~ilianme~iihcr\ of the riiiliiin
the Qur.brdJd Lm l'11;issccti>r.Iaier ds,.irrin.iring oiic oiihcni. ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 153
May 12, 1984 - In San José,near Quilali, mercenaries hurned a State farm.
Mamembers of the militia.mercenaries attacked the Jorgito district, killing 15
In a separate attack, 400 mercenaries burned the La Ventana Co-operative
in El Jilquero. One person was killed and 10were missing.
May 14, 1984 - A group of mercenaries attacked the Los Alpes State fann,
killing 4 members of the Patriotic Military Service.
May 16, 1984 - Approximately 500 mercenarieshurned houses in the Rohledor,
Los Planes, and San Jeronimo sectors.
May 20, 1984 - Forty mercenaries invaded the Suni Valley, assassinating a
member of the voluntary police and kidnapping the local police chief.
May 23, 1984-A group of mercenaries attacked the El Carroho co-operative
ncar Waslala, burning 10houses.
In a separate attack, 60 mercenaries kidnapped 1I families in the Tumarin
sector, Zelaya Central.
May 24, 1984 - Approximately 30 mercenaries kidnapped 2 members of the
reserve at Cano Serrano.
May 26, 1984 - A group of mercenaries kidnapped 4 campesinos in the Colonia
La Providencia.
May 28, 1984 - Approximately 250 mercenaries hurned the Moises Herrera
co-operative near San Joséde Bocay, later killing one civilian and kidnapping
7 others in the Bocaycito district.
In a separate attack, 100 mercenaries invadedAlamikamha, kidnapping 6
members of the militia and 40 other civilians and assassinating one member
of the militia. They also attacked the local ENABAS post, from which they
took 15,000cordobas, and fired on 2 IRENA pick-up trucks.
Also, 300 mercenaries invadedValle La Union, kidnapping 3 campesinos.
May 29, 1984 - Sixty mercenaries invadedthe Rapida La Cuitarra community,
Zelaya Central, assassinating 6 members of the military.
June 1, 1984 - Mercenaries attacked the town ofOcotal, killing 16Nicaraguans
and wounding 27. In addition, the mercenanes burned the State lumber yard,
the electric Company building, the silos of ENABAS, the radio station, and
other buildings.
In a separate attack, at Limbaica, mercenanes burned State facilities and
kidnapped several civilians.
June 2, 1984 - A group of mercenaries attacked the district of El Pajaro,
kidnapping 3 people.
In a separate attack, mercenaries ambushed 2 tmcks in the Las Brisassector,
killing 2 civilians, wounding 1, and kidnapping 3 others. In addition, the
mercenaries burned 150quintales of grain.
June 5, 1984- Mercenarieskidnapped 63people inthe localitiesofAlamikamha,
Sumugila, La Agricola and Lapan.
In a separate attack, IOmercenaries kidnapped 4 civilians at Brujil.
June 10, 1984 - Mercenaries attacked a co-operative near Waswalita, killing2
people and wounding 3.
June 11, 1984 - A group of mercenanes attacked the border post at Wasla,
Zelaya Norte, and kidnapped a civilian from the INRA farm there.
June 15, 1984 - Approximately 30 mercenaries burned the "Oscar Benavides"
Co-operative at El Cacao, near Sebaco; 6 vehicles werealso burned.
June 16, 1984 - Mercenaries kidnapped 30 campesinos in the Valle San Juan
sector, near San Jose de Bocay.
June 20, 1984 - In the district of Ara Central, Zelaya Norte, 12 mercenaries
kidnapped 8 Nicaraguans.154 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
June 25, 1984 - C-4 explosives were placedon 2 railroad cars coming from
Honduras which were transporting agricultural machinery for cotton. The
explosives were detonated in the cotton mdchinery when the cars were,
respectively, across from the Somoto granary and the El Espino Park. As a
result the machines were partly destroyed and one person was injured.
June 29, 1984 - A group of 100 mercenaries intercepted an INRA truck in
Ocote Quipo, kidnapping 10people.
June 30, 1984 - Some 90 mercenaries took over the town of El Tortuguero,
killing 8 civilians, including an old woman and a child. Seven soldiers were
killed, with 5 wounded and one missing, and the local Health Center and
officesof the National Development Bank weredestroyed.
In a wparate attack, mercenaries coming from Chachagua invaded 1.a
Bujona, kidnapping 15people.
In addition, 250 mercenaries ambushed a truck in the El Barro sector, nesr
Wiwili,killing 3 people and wounding 5.
July 1, 1984 - In the sector of San Martin and San Ramon, a group of
approximately 20 mercenaries amhushed a pick-up truck, killing4 people. One
person was wounded.
In seoarate attacks. mercenaries kidna~oed 3 civilians from the farm of
~rancisio Herrera, incano Tomas, and 36 mercenaries kidnapped 6 people
at Cano El Guaydbo.
Also, in San Juan de Karahola, a group of mercenaries amhushed a boat
which was on a ~roiect for INRA. Two veovle were killed and 4 were
wounded. . . . .
In another attack, a group of 10 mercenaries invaded Brown Bank, as-
sassinating Pedro Sambolas, who was the local schoolteacher and head of
the militia.
July 2, 1984 - Some 300 mercenaries ambushed a truck in the El Guale sector,
near San Rafael del Norte, killing 13people and wounding 9.
July 3, 1984 - Approximately 250 mercenaries ambushed 3 MICONS tmcks
between Kubali and Puente Zinica, killing 3 people, wounding 3 and kidnap-
ping 6.
In a separate attack, mercenaries invaded San Pedro de Asa, kidnapping
19 people.
July 5, 1984 - Thirty mercenaries kidnapped 40 people in the town of Minisola.
In a separate attack, a group of mercenaries kidnapped 65 civilians.
July 6, 1984 - Four hundred mercenaries kidnapped 9civilians in Vigia Sur.
luly 7, 1984-Mercenaries ambushed government troops a1ValleLas Condegas,
killing 18soldiers and wounding 6 others.
In a separate attack. 70mercenaries amhushed a truck at El Powenir, killing
7 people and wounding 4. Two were reported missing.
July 8, 1984 - A group of mercenaries invaded Las Conchitas, kidnapping 8
campesinos.
In a separate attack, 40 mercenaries amhushed a boat carrying troops
toward Brown Bank, killing 7.
Julv 10. 1984- Mercenariesambushed an IRENA truck in ElJocote. kidnao~inn .. -
one Civilianand wounding another. In the sector of Los Alpes,the same group
kidnapped 4 campesinos.
In a separate attdck, mercenaries ambushed a pick-up truck south-east of
Nueva Guinea, assassinating 4 civilians and wounding 4-others.
July 12, 1984-One hundred mercenaries attacked the settlement of Columbus,
killing 2 members of the militia. They also kidndpped 6 members of the mi-
litia and 32 civilian young people and looted the shops and warehouses of
ENABAS. The lossesto ENABASalone werecalculated at 27.346.25cordobas. ANNEXES TO THE MEMORLAL 155
In a separate attack, mercenaries kidnapped 4 civilians in the El Jiguero
sector. Also, in the El Achiote district,-a gr~up of-~pproximately 30mercenaries
kidnapped 3 civilians.
Julv 13. 1984 - A erouo of mercenaries kidnaooed .. carnoesinos from the
;icinLy of San ~ebistian de Yali.
In a separate attack, 250 mercenaries hurned the La Perla co-operative at
Miraflor; one person was killed and another vas reported missing.
In addition, mercenaries kidnapped a numher of people from the settlement
of Tasba Pn.
July 14, 1984 - One hundred mercenaries kidnapped 3 campesinos in the zone
of Fila Teocintal.
July 17, 1984 - Approximately 180 mercenaries kidnapped 17 civilians and a
second lieutenant at Helado hill, near San Sebastian de Yali.
July 19, 1984 - Eighty mercenaries ambushed a truck in El Guabo, killing 3
citizens and wounding 10.
In a separate attack, mercenaries ambushed several military and civilian
vehicles in the Paiwata sector, killing 4 people and wounding 5 others, and
also sabotaged the electric and telephone lines.
July 20, 1984 - Approximately 120mercenaries ambushed a civilian tmck with
passengers and a pick-up truck of INRA in the sector of Fila Posolera, near
Waslala, killing 4 people and kidnapping another.
Julv 21. 1984 - Mercenaries assassinated Noel Rivera. a farmer from Mataealna. .
In d scpdrdie 3iliick. nier;cnlirics arnhu\hed a citilidn jeep in the scçior oi
El 'I<)r<i. io I3lanîi)Ct~pdldrhightiliy. killing4 civilidnsdi~duounrling 1. III
addition the) 2drricJ olT .ilarge qudniii) ai ratile.
Also. IRmr~rccnarie,attdck~~tJhcdislrici oiGuddaldpc, kidnapping 4people.
In aJJiiion. nicrîcn<irirrdnibujhcd a truck ;ilSan I'dblode K~bdli. killint!
4 members of the militia and kidnapping 3 campesinos, including an'~-~ea;
old boy.
July 23, 1984 - Two hundred mercenanes attacked the town of San Martin
with mortars and rifle fire, kidnapping 2 civilian memhers of the militia. Six
others were missing. The mercenaries also burned the Martha Quezada
co-operative.
July 25, 1984 - A group of mercenaries assassinated 6 memhers of the Lopez
familv in Rio Yaoska.
In a separate attack, mercenaries killed 1woman and kidnapped another at
Salto Grande.
July 26, 1984 - Sixty mercenaries invaded the town of Tapasle, killing 8
campesinos. Nine others were missing.
In a separate attack, a truck which was distrihuting fresh produce hit a
mine placed by mercenaries at Bismona. Three soldiers were killed and 4 were
wounded.
July 27, 1984 - A group of mercenaries ambushed a vehicle in the Wilikon
sector, wounding 3people, among them the secretary of a localvoting precinct.
July 28, 1984 - A group of some 15 mercenaries attacked 6 people who were
transporting voter registration documents in the sector of Santa Cruz; the
mercenaries carried off the documents.
In a separate attack, 20 mercenaries amhushed 7 people who were trans-
nortine documents of the voter reei-tration orecinct in La Viei-. the mercenar-
les tao% thed&uments.
In addition, ap. .ximately 20 mercenanes kidnapped 5 people -n -he zone
of Las Valles.
August 2, 1984 - Thirty mercenaries invaded the settlement of Monte Creek,
kidnapping 3 civilians.156 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
In a separate attack, 30 to 40 mercenaries kidnapped 6 people from the
INRA encampment at Parra Punta Gorda.
August 3, 1984 - Approximately 5 mercenaries kidnapped 10campesinos from
El Ojoche.
In a separate attack, 30 mercenaries kidnapped 5 people at Pijibay. Among
those kidnapped was Santos Jose Vilchez, President of the voter registration
officethere.
August 4, 1984 - In the Layasiksa sector, some 150mercenaries kidnapped 10
people, including 4 women.
August 6, 1984 - Mercenaries penetrated the town of La Frangua, wounding
Siriaco Tercero, a member of the militia, and carrying off 60 of his cattle.
August 7, 1984 - Fifty mercenaries invaded El Morado, where they kidnapped
10 campesinos. They also took away voter registration cards and threatened
to kill those who tried to vote in the elections.
August 12, 1984 - Eighty mercenaries kidnapped 12 campesinos from the
district of Quebrada El Agua.
In a separate attack, 200mercenaries kidnapped 12campesinos in California
Valleyand San Jeronimo.
August 13, 1984 - A group of mercenanes attacked the El Paraiso co-operative,
killing 2 members of the co-operative and kidnapping 3 others.
August 15, 1984 - A group of mercenaries kidnapped 5 families at Waspuk,
Zelaya Norte.
August 21, 1984 - In the sector of Central Waspuk, a group of mcrcenaries
kidnapped 9 Nicaraguans.
August 23, 1984 - At the Jacinto Baca Co-operative at Santa Elena, 60
mercenaries killed 3 Nicaraguans and kidnapped 4 others.
August 24, 1984 - Approximately 80 mercenaries ambushed a jeep in the
Quebrada sector, kidnapping 6 people.
In a separate attack, 300 mercenaries kidnapped 15 campesinos in the El
Guava sector.
August 25, 1984 - A group of mercenaries kidnapped 14 merchants at
Laguna Verde.
Septemher 1, 1984- Groupsof mercenariesambushed pick-up trucks of CEPAD
and TELCOR, killing 8 people and wounding 4 others. They also amhushed
a truck from the Popular Sandinista Amy which went to give assistance to
the wounded; the driver of that vehicle was injured. Behind that vehicle was
a truck with 15 soldiers wbo werecoming as reinforcements. One of them was
killed and 2 wounded.
In a separate attack, 8 mercenaries ambushed 2 unarmed militia members
at the "Camilo Ortega" co-operative, killing one of them.
September 4, 1984 - One hundred mercenaries kidnapped 5 campesinos at El
Refugio. The next day the same group kidnapped 3campesinos at Buena Vista
de Ventillas.
September 5, 1984 - Mercenaries intercepted a boat which was in transit from
Karawala to Laguna de Perlas, kidnapping Ray Hooker, FSLN candidate for
the National Assemhly, and Patncia Delgado, Zonal Secretary of the FSLN
for Laguna de Perlas.
In a separate attack, in the El Granadino district, a group of mercenaries
kidnapped 7 civilians, including 2 memhers of the militia.
September 6,1984-A group of approximately 60mercenariesstopped a civilian
pick-up truck in the La Laguneta sector, kidnapping 7 civilians and burning
the vehicle. ANNEXES TO TEE MEMORlAL 157
Septemher 7, 1984 - Twenty mercenaries amhushed a boat with 4 memhers of
the militia on board at Cano Negro, killing 3 and injuring 1.
In a separate attack, 20 mercenaries kidnapped 4 civilians from INRA at
Monkey Point, south of Bluefields.
Also, 60 mercenaries invaded the Santa Rosa district, kidnapping 19
campesinos.
September 8, 1984 - Forty mercenaries kidnapped 6 campesinos at Mina
San Alhino.
Septemher 9, 1984 - Mercenaries kidnapped II civilians from the district of
Guayaculy.
Septemher 10, 1984 - A group of 80-100 mercenaries kidnapped 9 people at
El Tule.
September 11, 1984 - Mercenaries kidnapped 7 people from ValleLa Esperanza.
Septemher 14, 1984 - Thirty mercenaries attacked a sector of the district of San
Martin, killing a memher of the FSLN and kidnapping 2 civilians, including
the president of the local voting precinct.
Septemher 22, 1984 - Three civilian workers for the State farm in Palo de
Arguito were kidnapped hy mercenaries along the border as they repaired
wires there.
Septemher 23, 1984 - In the San Esteban sector, mercenaries ambushed a ttuck
in which mothers and family memhers of participants in the Patriotic Military
Service (SMP) were traveling, killing 8 people (including 5 civilians) and
wounding 19.
September 26, 1984 - A group of 120 mercenaries kidnapped 3 campesinos
from the Canta Galoo co-operative.
October 4, 1984A group of some 250mercenaries amhushed and bumed two
trucks hetween Venencia and Santa Gertrudis. One man was killed, and 7
people, including a woman teacher, are missing as a result of the attack. The
mercenaries also hurned 3 other vehicles.
Octoher 5, 1984 - Mercenaries attacked the Las Llaves co-operative, killing
a civilian.
October 6, 1984 - Mercenaries stopped a civilian vehicle at Mata de Guineo,
near San Rafael del Norte, killing 1 person and kidnapping another.
ln a separate attack, 60 mercenaries kidnapped 3campesinos near Valle El
Cua. suhseauentlv killine 1of them.
-
of approximately 50-60 persan is,the Bambu sector.
Also, mercenaries attacked the Juan Pahlo Umanzor Co-operative near San
Rafael del Norte, killing 5 members of the co-operative and wounding
two others.
Octoher 11, 1984 - Seven Nicaraguans were killed and 2 wounded in combat
with mercenary forces at Guapino, near Wiwili.
Also, 300 mercenaries attacked the town of Suscayan, killing 3 civilian
memhers of the militia and wounding one.
October 12, 1984 - Eighty mercenaries amhushed an INRA truck in Rio Saiz,
wounding 10civilians, 5 of them seriously.
October 14, 1984 - A group of mercenaries kidnapped 40 campesinos and
hurned the State farm at Namaji.
In addition, mercenariesattacked Las Plavitas, killing8 Nicaraguan soldiers.
Octoher 17, 1984-A group of some 50 mercenaries helonging to the MISURA
organization kidnapped 17 civilians and 9 infantiy reservists at Campo Uo,
near Siuna.158 MILITARV AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
October 18, 1984A group of 20 mercenariesinvaded the Kurinwacito district,
killing 4 campesinos.
October 19, 1984 - Mercenaries looted a co-operative in the Poza Redonda
district, kidnapping 2 civilians, including 1woman.
Also, 8 Nicaraguans were killed and 4 wounded in combat with 300
mercenaries near Esteli.
October 21, 1984 - A group of approximately 100 mercenaries kidnapped 25
campesinos in the El Jocote Valleysector.
October 22, 1984 - A group of 50 mercenaries amhushed 3 MICONS trucks
and a pick-up truck from the Ministry of Health in the Las Cruces sector,
killing one civilian and wounding 3 others. Six soldiers were also wounded.
October 23, 1984 - At 5:00 in the morning a group of approximately 60
mercenaries attacked the William Baez co-operative at La Paila, killing 2
civilians and wounding 5 others.
October 24, 1984 - A group of 150 mercenaries kidnapped 14 campesinos at
Siapali, near Quilali, later killing 2 of them.
October 27, 1984 - Eighty mercenaries ambushed a truck carrying Nicaraguan
troops at Coyolar, killing 8 and wounding 15.
October 28, 1984 - A group of 80 mercenaries kidnapped 30 campesinos 30
kilometers north-east of El Sardinal.
October 29, 1984 - Mercenaries attacked the town of San Gregorio, 10
kilometers north-east of Jicaro, killing 6 children and wounding 6 others. Two
people weremissing as a result of the attack.
In a separate attack, mercenaries amhusbed an INRA vehicle in the El
Saraval sector, killing 6 persons.
October 30, 1984 - A group of mercenaries kidnapped 18 campesinos in the
Casa de Tabla sector.
In a separate attack, a group of up to 150 mercenaries killed2 persons at
Santa Elena.
November 2, 1984 - Approximately 250mercenariesambushed a Toyota "Jeep"
in the district of El Cedro, killing a womau teacher, a political officerof the
El Cedro garrison, a CDS member, and 2 others.
November 4, 1984 - Three hundred mercenaries kidnapped 100 civiliansat La
Vigia, near Wiwili.
November 5, 1984 - Mercenaries attacked the ULI co-operative near Siuna
with mortars and heavy machine guns, killing a soldier and 4 civilians.
November 7-9, 1984-One hundred mercenaries kidnapped 5 civilian memhers
of the militia and a woman from the Las Lajas Co-operative near San Joséde
Achuapa. They also looted the nearby El Lagartillo Co-operative.
November 10, 1984 - A group of up to 200 mercenaries attacked the Kurinwas
district, kidnapping 4 civiliansand killing the local ENABAS manager.
In a separate attack, mercenaries kidnapped 17 campesinos at Las Canas,
Rio Coco.
November 14, 1984 - A group of mercenaries attacked the La Sorpresa
Co-operative, killing 14, injuring 4 (including 2 children), and burning the
food store, a pnvate house, and a common building.
In a separate attack, a MICONS truck was ambushed in the district of
Planes de Vilan. The vehiclewas machine-gunned after it hit a mine; 2 civilians
were killed and 3 injured.
November 15, 1984 - The director of the National Development Bank (BND)
for Jinotega and 1 other civilian were killed and 4 civilians were wounded
when a mercenary group ambushed 2 jeeps 20 kilometers north-west of
El Tuma. ANNEXES IO THE MEMORlAL 159
In a sena~ate attack~-.~rc~n~ries kidnanoed..5 civilians in the district of
Asadin, near Siuna.
November 16, 1984 - Approximately 150 mercenaries hurned the Bernardino
Diaz Ochoa co-ooerative. killine 6 of its members.
November 19, 196 - ~our e<ployees of the State electric Company were
kidnapped by ~ppr~ ~mately 60 members of MISURA in the community of
~asbaIPaunie.
November 21, 1984 - Mercenaries kidnapped 45 campesinos from the La
Pita district.
November 25, 1984 - Mercenaries amhushed an agricultural transport truck in
the district of Posolera, burning the truck, killing 6 persons and kidnapping
10others; one other person was missing.
Novemher 28, 1984 - A group of up to 100mercenaries kidnapped 20 civilians
in the El Diamante district.
November 30, 1984 - A group of 17 mercenaries kidnapped 7 civilians in the
district of El Sueno; they also carried off an undetermined number of cattle.
Violationsof NicaraguanAir Space '
During the first ten months of 1984,some 996 violations of Nicaraguan air
space by aircraft of various types were detected, including (among others)
RC-135, U-2, C-130, C-47, Cessna, and AC-37 aircraft. Some of these aircraft,
such as the RC-135s and U-2s, realized reconnaissance missions against Nica-
ragua; others were obsetved carrying out aerial resupply of mercenary forces.
Exhibil B
Translation
MEMORANDUM
January 23, 1984
To: Embassy of the United States of America, Tegucigalpa,
Honduras, CA.
From: Task Force Commanders of the FDN and MISURAS.
Channel: Coronel Raymond.
Subject: Request for an Operational Advisor.
1. Bymeans of this letter werequest that considerations be made with regards
to the possibility of operationally incorporating MI. Gustavo Villoldo in our
project, who has been a very important factor in the recently-occurred crisis,
and, whom we know and admire because of his successful background in the
anti-communist struggle.
His identification with us, and his capabilities, willprovide us with what could
be the decisive elementin this venture given that his good relationship with the
leaders of the Anti-Sandinist Movement will facilitate an eventual unity that will
help achieve the common objective.160 MlLITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTIES
2. As an additional point we want to deeply thank the Government of the
United States of America for its great interest taken in the solution of the recent
problem, whicli WC hope will correctly culminate in the near future. We are
willing to CO-operatewith you always - until the last consequerices- hoping
that once the solution to the problem which is only partially affecting us is
finalizedwe can reach a greater level of efficiencyin our actions.
[Signaturesno1reproduced]
[Spanish text not reproduced] ANNEXESTO THE MEMORIAL
Annex B
AFFIDAVI OTFMIGUEL D'ESCOTO BROCKMANN,
FOREIGN MINISTER OF NICARAGUA
April 21st, 1984.
1, Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann, certify and declare the following:
1. 1 am Foreign Minister of the Republic of Nicaragua. My official duties
include overall responsibility for conducting and monitoring relations between
Nicaragua and other countnes.
2. 1am aware of the allegations made hy the Government of the United States
that my Government is sending arms, ammunition, communications equipment
and medical supplies to rebels conducting a civilwar against the Government of
El Salvador. Such allegations are false, and constitute nothing more than a
pretext for the US to continue its unlawful military and paramilitary activities
against Nicaragua intended to overthrow my Government. In truth, my
Govemment is not engaged, and has not been engaged, in the provision of ams
or other supplies to either of the factions enga-e~ in the civil war in El Sal-
vador.
3. Since my Government came to power on July 19, 1979, its policy and
practice has been to prevent our national territory from heing used as a conduit
for arms or other military supplies intended for other governments or rehel
erouus. In fact. on numerous occasions the securitv forces of mv Govemment
-.
h.~\.cinicrccptcd cl~n<lc>iincdrills shipmcnt,. 3ppdrcntly dcstincd ior El SüIv;i-
ili)r. :ind ~.onfiicatcdthcni. In onc 5pccidllynoi~hlc in:ideniiiur \cc.iritr iorccc
intercepted a private passenger bus - from the Costa Rican bus line
"TICABUS' - with a false hottom loaded with arms in ~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~ Salvador~ ~
The arms were confiscatedand the delivery was prevented.
4. Very difficult ohiective conditions notwithstandinr, mv Govemment has
and will Continue to make the greatest efforts to prevenithe ;se of our national
territory for arms smuggling. Nicaragua's frontier with Honduras, to the north,
is 530 kilometers long. Most of it is characterized by rugged mountains, or
remote and densejungles. Most of this border area is inaccessible hy motorized
land transport and simply impossible to patrol. To the south, Nicaragua's border
with Costa Rica extends for 220 kilometers. This area is also characterized by
dense and remote jungles and is also virtually inaccessible hy land transport. As
a small underdeveloped country with extremely limited resources, and with no
modern or sophisticated detection equipment, it is not easy for us to seal off our
horders to al1unwanted and illegal traffic.
5. Another complicating factor has been the presence of armed mercenary
bands alone both our northern and southern horders. These bands. num~-r.n~
more than Ï0,000 men in the north and more than 2,000 in the south - recruited:
armed, financed and directed by the United States - have made it almost
impossible for my Government to adequately patrol its horders to prevent illegal
arms trafficking.My Government has heen compelled to devote al1of its military
and security resources to defending Our national territory from attack by these
mercenaries. Since 1981,more than 1,400of Our people have been killed in this
fighting and more than 3,000 others have heen wounded or kidnapped. We162 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
simply do not have the luxury of being able to divert our security forces to the
interception of arms traffic. Nicaragua thus has sought 10complement its own
efforts with regional co-operation.
6. For these reasons, my Government has actively sought verifiable inter-
national agreements for halting al1 arms traffic in the region. Commencing in
May 1981, myGovernment proposed to the Government of Honduras that joint
measures be taken to eliminate the flow of arms across Our common horder. In
particular, my Government proposed joint horder patrols, composed of military
and security forcesof both countries, to police the border. On May 13,the Head
of State of Honduras accepted the proposal in principle and agreed with the
Nicaraguan Head of State ta follow-up with a meeting of Our two Ministers of
Defense. but this meetine never look dace because Honduras unilaterallv
withdrew from the negotiaïions. In ~~ri1.1982,my Government again initiale2
a dialogue with Honduras in an effort to terminate the flowof arms and attacks
by armed bands in the horder area. Our proposal, consisting of seven specific
points, was rejected hy Honduras on April 23, 1982. In May 1982, another
meeting of our respective Chiefs ofStaff took place wherein Nicaragua sought
agreement on ajoint horder patrol. Honduras refused. In August 1982,Nicaragua
proposed another meeting of Chiefs of Staff, together with Foreign Ministers.
Honduras rejected such a meeting and bilateral efforts to reach a solution on the
arms problem came to a halt.
7. Thereafter, Nicaragua sought. and continues to seek, a multilateral agree-
ment to eliminate arms traffic in the region. In September 1983,Nicaragua was
the first of the five Central American States to accept and ratify the 21-Point
Declaration of Objectives promulgated by the Contadora Group (Colombia,
Mexico, Panama and Venezuela). lncluded in these points were provisions 10
eliminate arms traffic to rebel or mercenary groups seeking to overthrow
established governments in the region. The Contadora Group asked each of the
fiveCentral American countries (Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala
and El Salvador) to prepare and present draft treaty proposals addressing al1of
the 21 Points set forth in the Declaration of Objectives,including those relating
10elimination of arms traffic.
8. In October 1983, Nicaragua prepared and presented 10 the Contadora
Group, to the other Central American States, and to the Government of the
United States, a package of four proposed treaty agreements, collectivelyentitled
"Juridical BasesIo GuuranreePeuceand InternationulSecurilvfor the Cenrral
AmericanSrales". These proposed treaties would require each central American
State to adopt al1possible measures ta prevent its territory from being used for
the traffic in arms or other supplies to armed groups seeking 10overthrow any
estahlished govemment of the region, and would require each State to prevent
any such armed groups from operating or seeking sanctuary in its national
territory. Under Nicaragua's proposals, the Contadora Group would act as
-uarantor of these urovisions. and would have the uower to conduct on-site
inrprciionc inthe icrriti>ryul'any St;itç .iccusedof iolsrliiing or supporiarins
trallic or the preicnce of drmed rebel gr<,ups In ihc çsw of a i~iolationihr.
Ct~ntadorilGroup uould bçcmpowcrcd tu direct thc ulrending Sutc to tçrm\natç
its im. .oer conduct and to ~av.co,oensation to anv other State or States
lnjurïd lisiireruli of such ii>nduci Nv~raguï announced ils readinesi Io sign
and ratify thex propose4 treÿtici immzdi~tely.or to cniertatn counicrproposals
l'romthe othcr Central American Stater or from the Ilnitcd Sldtes. The Cnited
States has refused to respond in any way. Nor have the other Central American
Statesaccepted Nicaragua's proposal or responded with specificcounterproposals ANNEXES TO TEE MEMORIAL 163
9. 1 submit that the foregoing demonstrates Nicaragua's commitment to
eliminating unlawful arms trafficking in Central America - a plague, it is
important to bear in mind, of which Nicaragua itself is the primary victim -
and refutes the false accusations that the Govemment of the United States has
made against Nicaragua. It is interesting that only the Government of the United
States makes these allegations, and not the Government of El Salvador, which
is the supposed victim of the alleged arms trafficking. Full diplomatic relations
exist hetween Nicaragua and El Salvador. Yet, El Salvador has never - not
once - lodged a protest with my Government accusing it of complicity in or
responsihility for any traffic in arms or other military supplies to rebel groups in
that country.
(Signed) Miguel d'Escoro BROCKMANN,
Foreign Minister
Republic of Nicaragua.
[Sponish certificationnot reproduced] MILITARYAND PARAM1I.ITAKYACTlVlTlES
Annex C
STATEMBN OP UNITED STATEP SRESIDEN RTONALD REAGAN AND SENIOR OFFICIALS
OF HIS ADMINISTRATIO AND, OPPICIAL DOCUMENT OSP AGENCIFS OP THE US
GOVEKNMENT
Arrachments
1. Sraremenisof PresidenrRonaldReagan
1. Remarks of the President in interview with reporters George Condon of
Copley News Service, Bruce Drake of theNew YorkDuily News, Sara Fritz
of US News andWorldReporr, Carl Leubsdorf of theDallas Morning News,
Chris Wallace of NBC and Steve Weisman of the New York Times, May 5,
1983(Transcript, Officeof the Press Secretary 10the President).
2. News conference by the President, October 19, 1983(Transcript, Officeof
the Press Secretary to the President).
3. Statement issued on behalf of President Ronald Reagan, March 8, 1984
(Officeof the Press Secretary to the President).
4. lnterview of the President by the New York Times, March 28, 1984
(Transcript, Officeof the Press Secretary ta the President).
5. News conference by the President, May 22, 1984(Transcript, Officeof the
Press Secretary to the President).
6. lnterview of the President by Brian Farrell of Irish Television,May 28, 1984
(Transcript, Officeof the Press Secretary ta the President).
7. League of Women Voters 1984 Presidential Debate between the President
and former Vice President Mondale, October 21, 1984(Transcript, Officeof
the Press Secretary to the President).
8~ ~ ~ar~ ~ ~ ~ ~~Pr~ ~dent ta the Pressat the home of John Wavne.November
3, 1984(Transcript, ~fficeof the Press Secretary ta the ~resideni).
9. News conference hy the President, November 7, 1984(Transcript, Officeof
the Press ~ecretary-10the President).
10. Statement by the President, November 9, 1984 (Officeof the Press Secretary
to the President).
II. lnterview of the President by theWu11Sireer Journal, February 7, 1985
(Transcripl, Officeof the Press Secretary ta the President).
12. lnterview of the President by the New York Times, February 11, 1985
(Transcript, Officeof the Press Secretary to the President).
13. Radio address of the President to the Nation, February 16. 1985(Transcript,
Officeof the Press Secretary to the President).
14. News Conference by the President, Fehniary 21, 1985(Transcript, Officeof
the Press Secretary to the President).
15. Remarks of the President to the 12th Annual Conservative Political Action
Conference, March 1, 1985(Transcript, Officeof the Press Secretary to the
President).
16. lnterview of President Reagan bBusinessWeek, March 11, 1985.
17. Radio address of the President to the Nation, March 30, 1985(Transcript,
Officeof the Press Secretary ta the President).
18. lnterview of the President by Washington Pos r,pril 1, 1985(Transcript,
Officeof the Press Secretary to the President). ANNEXES TO THE MEMURIAL 165
19. Remarks of the President on Central American Peace Proposal, April 4,
1985(Transcript, Officeof the Press Secretary Io the President).
20. Radio address of the President to the Nation, April 6, 1985 (Transcript,
Officeof the Press Secretary to the President).
21. Remarks of the President at dinner for Nicaraguan Refugee Fund, April 15,
1985(Transcript, Officeof the Press Secretary Io the President).
II Sfatementsof SeniorAdminisfrationosfcials
1. Review of US Foreign Policy. Hearing hefore the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session, November
12, 1981.
2. News release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Aiiairs),
Remarks prepared for delivery hy the Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Io Baltimore Council on Foreign Aiiairs,
Baltimore, Maryland, Monday, Septemher 12, 1983.
3. Press conference by the Honorable George P. Shultz, Secretary of State,
Tuesday, March 20, 1984.
4. Address hy Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, United States Permanent
Reoresentative to the United Nations. a1 the American Societv of
~ntérnationalLaw, April 12, 1984.
5. Text of statement hy CIA, April 16, 1984,New York Times,April 17, 1984.
6. Excerpt from noon Press Briefing,May 10, 1985 - Spokesman John Hughes.
7. Press briefingby Larry Speakes, May 25, 1984.
8. Excerpts from remarks hy Vice President George Bush to the Executive
Forum, Washington DC, Friday, January 25, 1985(Transcript, Officeof the
Press Secretarv to the VicePresident).
9. Prepared sta&ment of the ono or ab Llnghorne A. Motley, Assistant
Secretaryof State for Inter-American Affairs,before the Western Hemisphere
Suhcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Repre-
sentatives, January 29, 1985.
10. Letter of the Secretary ofState, Washington, to the President, Inter-American
Development Bank, January 30, 1985.
II. Prepared statement of General Paul F. Gonnan.
12. Excerpts from remarks hy Vice President George Bush, Austin Council on
Foreign Aiiairs, Austin, Texas, Thursday, February 28, 1985 (Transcript,
Officeof the Press Secretary to the Vice President).
III. US Governmenrdocuments
1. National Security Council Document on policy in Central America and
Cuba, April 1982,New YorkTimes,April 7, 1983,p. A-16.
2. CIA War in Central Amenca, Counterspy,September-November 1983.
3. CIA interna1report details US role in contraraids in Nicaragua last year.
4. Statement of United States Department of State, January 18, 1985. US
withdrawal from the proceedings initiatedhy Nicaragua in the International
Court of Justice.
5. US support for the democratic resistance movement in Nicaragua. Un-
classified excerpts from the President's report to the Congress pursuant
to section 8066 of the Continuing Resolution for FY 1985, pl 98-473, the
White House, Washington.
- MlLlTARY AND PARAMlLITARY ACTIVITIES
AttachmentI-1
May 5, 1983
REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT IN INTERVIEW WlTH REPORTERS GEORGE CONWN OF
COPLEY NEWS SERVICE BRUCE DRAKE OF THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, SARA FRITZ
OF US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT ,ARL LEUBSDORF OF THE DALLAS MORNING NBWS,
CHRIS WALLACE OF NBC AND STEVE WEISMAN OF THE NEW YORK TIM35
The Oval Office
Ouestion:Mr. President. movine on to another tooic, before this sessionheaan,
yo; asked why you should not be scolding ~embers of the House committee
that voted yesterday to stop funding for overt operations against Nicaragua. Do
you really see any consequences of that action? Does that vote stop you from
doing anything, or hinder anything your administration is doing?
The President: It is in a committee. And there is the Senate yet to go on this.
And 1would hope that, maybe, we could do hetter there.
It, also, had an element in it that looked at partisanship, since the vote was
on straight party lines. And 1do not helieve that that reflects the thinking of a
great many Democrats, because many of them spoke up right after my speech.
Quesrion:Does this vote indicate that you failed in your objectives in that
speech?
The President: No, as 1say, because 1 know that there are still a great many
Democrats who have been quite outspoken, including some of the leadership in
the House of their party, in support of what 1 had proposed - of making this
a hipartisan approach, and even heing critical of some of their memhers who
did seem to sound partisan.
The thing that needs telling about this whole situation in Nicaragua - 1
thought 1 had covered this suhject but, mayhe, 1 did not cover it enough the
other night. And that is that, right now, these forces that have risen up in
opposition to the Sandinista government are - under what you might say is a
sort of a group - a controlling body that formed in the northern part of
Nicaragua. There are about seven leading memhers to this kind of committee.
Most of them were former anti-Somoza people. They are people who simply
want this Government of Nicaragua to keep its promises.
If you remember, the Organization of American States asked Somoza to resign
at that time. And Somoza, his reply to them was that if it would henefit his
country, Nicaragua, he would. And he did resign.
The Organiration of American States also gave four points to the Sandinistas
that they, the Organization of American States, would support them if their goal
was these four [sic] things: of promoting democracy, of immediate elections, of
a concern for human rights and the Sandinistas acceded to that and said yes,
those were their goals and they would keep those four provisions or promises.
And they haven't. They never made an effort to keep them. They violated al1
of them.
Now. this is what makes me sav that there's a zreat hvo..risv there of the
~andinista government protesting what ishappening-in its own country and from
oeople who were once a part of its own revolution at the same time that they
areiupporting people in ànother country wbo are seeking to overthrow a duly
elected government of the people. ANNEXES IO THE MEMORIAL 167
Question: Mr. President, you - in referring to these groups, you seem to
suggest that these groups are seeking a change in Nicaragua itself. And how
does that statement square with your saying that we're not violating the law in
aiding groups who seek the overthrow of the Nicaraguan Govemment?
The President:Well, do they? Or are they asking that government - or that
revolution of which they themselves werea part - asking it to go back to its
revolutionary promises and keep faith with the revolution that the people of
Nicaragua supported.
Many of these people are businessmen whosebusinesses have heen taken over.
They are farmers whose land was seized hy this government, farmers whose
crops were - they were forced to seIl them to the government at less than the
cost of production. And they're protesting this violation of what had made them
support the revolution to hegin with.
But the whole purpose of the Sandinista government seerns to be not only
with El Salvador but the export of revolution to their other neighbors, to
countries that are already democracies. Honduras has taken that step; Costa
Rica, the oldest democracy of all. And al1of them are plagued hy radicals in
their midst who are encouraged hy the Sandinista government.
Question: Mr. President, I'd liketo go hack to what the committee actually
did yesterday in voting the cutoff. CIA Director Casey is reported to have said
it would lead to a bloodbath for the guerrillas inside the country. Do you agree
with that? And how seriously do you take what the committee does? How had
would it he if that cutoff of covert aid went through?
ThePresidenl: Well, I'rn saying if - well, if that hecame the policy, 1think it
would set a very dangerous precedent. The executive branch of government and
the Congress has a shared responsibility, as I pointed out in my speech, for
foreign policy. And we have - we each have a place in formulating foreign
.olicv,but we each have a res~onsibilitv also. And 1 think that what 1said about
thih tt13.th31 II!\,as\Cr? irrcsponrible. And itwas - IIIitcrallywaï iaking aua)
ihc nbiliiy of thç cwcu1ii.e hranch r61csrr) iiui iii~onitiiuiional responsibiliiics.
Oi<r<iru,i Dti v<,uhelici,e ihat ii i\,,>uldlc~,l io the bloodb~ih ih'it ihe C'lA
~iktor talked about?
The President:Well, 1haven't heard his entire remark in connection witb that
term or how he descrihed it or what he meaut with it. i'll rnake it a point to find
out. 1once used a bloodbath term as Governor of California, and one individual
reversed it in the press and had it saying the opposite of what 1had intended it
to say and 1never did quite get the situation cleared up.
Question:Well,what - 1 don't understand. What'swrong with the committee's
position? What difference does it make if instead of giving covert aid to the
guerrillas in Nicaragua, you give overt aid to the countries of El Salvador and
Honduras to stop the flow of weapons through their countries, which is what
you say you want in the first place? What's wrong with that?
The President: Except then the only help that you cdn give is through other
governments. And 1 don't think that - 1don't think that's an effective thing to
do, and how do you know that the other governments would want to themselves,
then, participate in helping the people that need the help? In other words, we'd
he asking some other government to do what our own - what our Con-
gressional - or OurCongress has said that we can't do.
Question:Many memhers of the administration say that our commitment must
he, in El Salvador, must he a sustained one and that it could take seven to ten168 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
years to turn things around. 1 think Amhassador Hinton suggested as much
recently. 1sthat your view?
The Presideni: 1 think that he, 1 mav be wronn, but 1 think that when he
made that statement he was talking with regard to-a more limited way that WC
have heen trying to perform there. 1know that guerrilla wars - that lime is on
the side of the guerrillas, and they aren't something that is instantly resolved,
just as terrorism isn'tsomething that can he curbed just by normal police actions.
These are very diiiicult things. The hit-and-run tactics of guerrillas are similar to
terrorist activities. It's, 1suppose, based on an extension of the same principle
that you can't ever totally eliminate crime.
Question: But do you think if the, if this aid package were approved by
Congress, that it would be suiiicient to turn things around there this year. Your
own proposal calls for less aid next ycar, and it seems to suggest that this surge
of aid would do the trick.
The Presideni:Well, the surge we're asking for nght now is a restoration of
what we asked for in the first place. And, as 1 Say, it's hetter than two to one
economic aid. The prohlem with a country like El Salvador and what ils problems
are right now that requires military aid in the sense of more training, so far only
having trained one-tenth of the army - more training that we could oiier, more
military supplies and ammunition and so forth - we must do is, when you've
got a government that is trying to reverse the course, the history, of the country
and bring about democracy and human rights and things of that kind, and you
have guerrillas that are making it impossible to function, or for those programs
to function, what good does it do to have a land reform program and givc land
to the peasants if the peasants can't go out and work the land for fear of heing
shot by the guerrillas? What good does itdo to try and improve the cconomic
standards of a people if they're out of work simply hecause someone has shut
off the power and the factory can't operate or transportation has hroken down
so that the supplies that are needed and the products from whatever they're
working on cannot he transported, hecause of the bridges and so forth that are
blown up.
When a third of one area of the country - a third of the year, they were
totally without power, then you have to Say, "If we're going to make this
economic improvement work, we'vegot to stop that conflict". We have to stop
those people that are preventing the economy from moving with their fireanns
and their murders and so forth.
And this is what. it seems. that sometimes the dehate in the Congress, they
seem to be ignoring.
Quesrion:Mr. President, can 1 follow up on something you said earlier? Did
I understand you to say that if you were forced to stop aid Io the Nicaraguan
guerrillas, that you would try to funnel through other countries?
The Presideni: No, I was saying that's what the Committee said, that
the Committee said we would have to go overt, and, then, in going overt,
you can only give money to another government. And, if you did that, then
you would have to he depending on - well, mayhe thosc other govern-
ments in Central America would give that money to the freedom fighters in
Nicaragua.
Now, if they want to tell us that we can give money and do the same things
we'veheen doing - money, giving, providing suhsistence and so forth to these
people directly and making it overt instead of covert - that's al1right with me.
1just don't want the restrictions put on it that they might put on.
Quesrion:You'd he willingto accept the idea ofovert aid 10the anti-Sandinista
guerrillas in Nicaragua? ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 169
The President: Yes, but not if they do it as one individual or more than one,
as suggested on the Hill - that they would do it and, then, we would have to
enforce restrictions on the freedom fighters as to what tactics they could use.
And 1have said that if we were to do that, then 1would expect that the only
fair thing would be that the Nicaraguan Government would itself impose the
same restrictions on the freedom fighters in El Salvador, only 1don't cal1them
freedom fighters because they'vegot freedom and they're fightingfor something
else. They're fightingfor a restraint on freedom.
Question: Can 1just - All of a sudden now we're aiding freedom fighters. 1
thoueht we were iust interdictine suo~liesinto -
TG ~resident:'~just used the word, 1guess, "freedom fighters" because the
fact that we know that the thing that brought those people together is the desire,
as 1 said, for the same revolutknary principles thaï thëy once fought and have
been hetrayed in. As 1say, they have made it plain. They want what they once
fought beside the Sandinistas to get. And they have been betrayed. And 1thought
that the use of freedom fighters was because - 1 found out that it seems as if
there is a kind of a hias in the treatment of guerrilla fighters. It depends on what
kind of a government they are opposing. And some are treated more kindly
than others.
Now, 1 think the ones in El Salvador who are fighting against an elected
govemment, they are guerrillas. But in reality, when we talk about Nicaragua
and everyone says, "the govemment in Nicaragua", well, it was a government
out of the barre1 of a gun. And, true, we favored it before 1 got here. We did
not lift a hand for the existine-"overnment of Nicaraeua.-,ecause we did not
believe that it was treating its people fairly.
And here was a revolution that took place that seemed to express al1the things
that we al1 helieve in. Well now, thefhave not carried out ihose things. ~<d
they are there by force. And what really - other than being in control of the
capital, you might say, and having a handle on al1the levers - what makes
them any more a legitimate government than the people of Nicaragua who are
asking for a chance to vote for the kind of government they want?
AttachmentI-2
October 19, 1983.
NEWS CONFERENCE BY THE PUSIDENT
The East Room
Question: Mr. President, regarding the recent rebel attacks on a Nicaraguan
oil depot, is it proper for the CIA to be involved in planning such attacks and
supplying equipment for air raids? And do the American people have a right to
be informed about any CIA role?170 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
The Presideni:1 think covert actions have been a part of government and a
part of government's responsibilitiesfor as long as there has been a government.
I'm not going to comment on what, if any, connection such activitiesmight have
had with what has been going on, or with some of the specificoperations dom
there.
But 1do believein the right of a country when it helievesthat its interests are
best served to practice covert activity and then, while your people may have a
right to know, you can't let your people know without letting the wrong people
know, those that are in opposition to what you're doing.
Aftachmenf1-3
March 8, 1984.
STATEMENT ISSWD ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN M,ARCH 8, 1984
(OETIC OEF TH!PRESS SECRETARYTO THE PRDIDENT)
The President today requested the Congressto provide $21million inadditional
funding for fiscalyear 1984for activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.The
request will provide funds necessary to continue certain activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency whichthe President has determined are important to the
national security of the United States. The appropriate committees of the Con-
gress have beenthoroughly briefed on these classified activitiesand will be fully
briefed on this request.
Atlachment 1-4
March 29, 1984.
The Oval Office
Question: Why don't - I'd like to ask the final question about Central
America, Mr. President. 1 wonder if 1 could ask you to explain or justify how
the United States can go about assisting people who are, as you cal1 them,
freedom fighters who are seeking to overthrow a govemment that we have
diplomatic relations with? And answer, if you could, critics who are worried that
this is increasing Our involvement inCentral America. ANNEXKSIO THE MEMORIAL 171
7%~ Pri,,idt,nlWcll.the anri\.cr10 ihat is.firsiofall. thi, psriiculir goi,crnnient
oi'Nic.iragud 1s x g<>i.ernmcntih31was set up h) ioric oiarm~. Ihc people hate
never chosen it. It's a revolutionary government. And that government, in
violation of its pledge to us at a time when it was a revolutionary force trying
to become a government, had promised that it would not aid the guerrillas in El
Salvador who are attempting to overthrow a duly-elected government and a
democratic government. And they have violated that. The guerrillas are literally
being directed from bases near Managua. They're heing supplied by that
government. And, the other factor with regard, and why 1have referred to them
on occasion as "freedom fighters" is hecause many of them are elements of the
same revolution that out the Sandinista eovernment in force.
The revolution against the Somoza dictatorship - and Our Government,
under the previous administration. sat back and never lifted a finger in behalf of
Somoza. And then when the fighting was over, did start to give financial aid to
the revolutionary government, to help it install itself. And had to cancel that
when it discovered what that government was doing. During the revolution
against Somoza, the revolutionaries appealed to the Organization of American
States. of which we'rea memher also. And aonealed to that Oreanization to ask
~omoia to step down and end the bloodshed.'Ànd the 0rganiz2ion of American
States asked for a statement of what were the goals of the revolution. And thev
were provided: democracy, a pluralistic government, free elections, free ]ab&
unions, freedom of the press, human rights observed - those were the goals of
the revolution, submitted in writing to the Organization of American States.
After they got in, they followed the pattern that was followed by Castro
in Cuba.
Those other elements that were not Sandinista, other groups who wanted -
and they thought al1 the same thing, democracy - to rid themselves of a
dictatorship. Those elements were deniedparticipation in the government.Arrests
were made. There were some who were exiled.There were some, I'm afraid, were
executed. And, many of the people now fighting as so-called "contras" are
elements of the revolution. And it is less an overthrow that they're fightingfor
as it is a demand that they be allowed to participate in the government and that
the government keep its promises as to what it had intended for the people.
And 1 see no dichotomy in Our supporting the Government, the democratic
Government of El Salvador, and the contras here - and we'vemade it plain to
Nicaragua - made it very plain that this will stop when they keep their promise
and restore a democratic rule. And have elections. Now, they've finally been
pressured, the pressure's led to them saying they'll have an election. 1 think
they've scheduledit for next November. But, there isn't anything yet to indicate
that that election will be anything but the kind of rubber-stamp that we see in
any totalitarian government. How do you have - there aren't any rival candi-
dates, there aren't any rival parties, and how would they campaign without a
free press? MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlES
May 22, 1984.
NEWS CON1:ERENCEBY THE PRESIDENT
The East Room
The President: Good evening. 1 have a statement. We have an important
visitor in Washington, Jose Napoleon Duarte, the President-elect of El Salvador.
The President-elect and 1yesterday issued a joint statement in which we agreed
on three major objectives for Central America: The strengthening of democratic
institutions, the improvement of living standards, and increased levels of US
security assistance to defend against violence from both the extreme left and the
extreme right.
The election of Jose Napoleon Duarte is the latest chapter in a trend toward
democracy throughout Latin America. In Central America, El Salvador now
joins Costa Rica and Honduras in having a democratically elected government.
Democracy in Central America is a fundamental goal of our policy in that
region. But, continued progress toward that goal requires our assistance.
Most of our aid, three-quarters of il, is economic assistance. But security
assistance is essential to help al1those who must protect themselvesagainst the
expanding export of subversion by the Soviet bloc, Cuba and Nicaragua.
Also, as 1said in my speech to the nation on May 9th, we mus1support the
democratic aspirations of the people of Nicaragua, and oppose the Sandinista
aggression against their neighbors and who seek genuinelydemocratic elections
in Nicaragua, as the Sandinistas promised the OAS in 1979.
Peace can only be achieved inCentral America ifthe forces of democracy are
strong. We strongly support multilateral efforts toward peace, especially the
Contadora orocess. However, no lasting Wace settlement through the Con-
tadora pro&ss can he achieved unless théri is simultaneous implementation of
al1the Contadora objectives, including genuinelydemocratic elections in Nicara-
gua.
The Freedom Fighters in Nicaragua have promised to lay down their arms
and to participate in genuinely democratic elections, if the Sandinistas will let
them.
Our Congress facessome historic decisions this week. Those who stmggle for
freedom evervwhere are watchine to see whether America can still be counted
upon io support ils own idcals The people of El Salvador are waiching, and the
freedom fighiçrs of Nicaragua are watching. Nicaragua's ihrelilened neighbors
are watchiig, and the enemies of freedom aÏe watching as well.
Our balanced policy can succeed if the Congress provides the resources for al1
elements of that policy as outlined in the bipartisan recommendations of the
Kissinger Commission. But if the Congress otTerstoo little support, it will be
worse than doing nothing al all. This excessivecommunism in Central America
poses the threat that 100 million people from Panama to the open border on
our south could come under the control of pro-Soviet régimes.We could face a
massiveexodusof refugeesto the United States.The Congresshas the opportunity
to rcaflirm our comm~mcnt IO braw people risking ihiir lives for ihrcause of
libertyand democracy inCcnlrdl Amcrica.The Congrcsr also has the opporiuniiy
to reaffirm our hipartisan iradiiion which will lell ihr world thai we're uniied
when our vital inierests are at stake. I'm asking the Members of the Congress
to make that commitment. ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 173
And now, tonight's first question will be from Maureen Santini. And inciden-
tally, this is a double first for Mauree- her first question in her new role as
theAP's chief White House correspondent. Maureen?
Quesrion: Mr. President, you've said American vital interests are at stake in
Central America. What willwe have to do if the Congress does denq that securitv
assistance to stop this threat of Soviet-sponsored ;&$mes taking over al1 th;
countries right up Io our Southern borders?
The Presideni: You say what do we have to do to -
Quesriun: Yes. Suppose the Congress did not vote the money that you need
for the freedom fighters, as you cal1them? What, then, would we be required to
do Io prevent this scenario from developing?
The Presidcnr: We'd be in a very difficult situation and so would thcy. But 1
have great hopes that after President Duarte's visit here and meeting with as
many of the Congress as he did that there's some reason for optimism.
Yes, Andrea?
Quesriun: Mr. President, there are reports that the administration has gone
around Congress and continued to increase military and intelligenceactivitics in
Central America by channeling money through accounting tactics, tricks of
accounting, through the Pentagon to the CIA. While you can't discuss covert
activities, can you al least assure the American people that you have not had
this administration go beyond the will of Congress, by increasing the spending
for military activities in Central America?
The Presidenr: Andrea, we've followed no procedures that are any diîTerent
from what has been done in pas1 administrations, nor have we done anything
without the knowledge of the Congress.
Quesrion: So, can you explain then, Sir, we were told, Congress was told about
a month ago that if Congress didn't appropnate the money, the CIA-supported
coniras would run out of money by now.
Now, Congress has been told that the CIA has enough money to get through
the rest of the summer. How is that possible without their getting secret funds?
The Presidenr: Unless they guessed wrong on the first statement - 1thought
that they were closer to being out of money than they apparently are. But 1
don't think any - Well, nothing of that kind could take place, that- without
the knowledge of Congress.
Quesriun: Mr. President, you have said in the past that you have no intention
of sending US troops into combat in El Salvador, and President-elect Duartc
said yesterday that he has no intention of asking for US troops to go thcre. But
despite these dcnials, the doubts linger. Walter Mondale insists that your policy
will lead to US involvement down there.
Can you say unequivocally tonight that you would not send troops down to
El Salvador, even if it appears that without them El Salvador might fall to the
communists.
The Presidenr: First of ail‘President Duarte made it plain that they would
never request American troops. We have never had any consideration of doing
that, or any thought of doingthat a1all. The - 1don't know how 1can convince
anyone of that, but al1you'd have to do is look at al1our friends and neighbors
in Latin America, and prohably as a holdover from the past. We'dlose al1those
friends and neighbors if we did that. They want our help. They know they have
to have our help, economically, and in the manner in which we're giving it in174 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
military support - hy training, supplies and equipment and so forth - but,
they don't want American manpower there.
............................
Attachment1-6
Tuesday, May 29, 1984.
INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT BY BRIAN FARRELL OF IRISHTELEVISIO MNAY 28, 1984
The Lihrary
............................
Question: MI. President, as you know, there are people in Ireland who are
ohjecting already to your visit. In particular they feel that your stand on Central
Amenca has not supported justice sufficiently. How do you feel about the
likelihood of those protests?
The President: 1 feel that they're misinfonned. We know that Cuba and the
Soviet Union have vast, worldwide disinformation machineries - or machines -
in which they can give out misinfonnation to the media, to organizations and
groups and so forth. I'm sure that many of those people, if there are - people
demonstrating on this issue - I'm sure they're probahly sincere and well-
intentioned. But 1 don't think that they know the situation. Now, we've had a
case here in which, with the three elections that have taken place, hipartisan
groups of Our Congress and others have gone down there, in addition to the
Bipartisan Commission 1 appointed under Dr. Kissinger, to go down to Cen-
tral America.
When they come hack from viewing those elections - many of these
Congressmen have gone down openly admitting they're likethose people that
would want to demonstrate, they think we're on the wrong side - they have
come hack completely converted by what they saw.
We've got a situation where, for decades and decades or even centuries, in
Central America and Latin America, generally, we've had revolutions in which
it's simplyone group of leaders being overthrown by another group of leaders
who want to take over and be in charge, and the dictators. Some years ago,
there was an overthrow of a military dictatorship in El Salvador. And, the
government that was set up then became kind of the same type of military thing.
And then, a man named Duarte, who was President after that first overthrow,
was exiled, was - well, iüst was imprisoned, was tortured, was exiled - even
though he'd been chosen as President. He has now retumed and the people,
ovenuhelmingly, have elected him as their choice for President.
Now, how anyone could not believe that he is going to be determined to
enforce civil rights, and if there -s well, first of all, he's picking up something
that has already heen vastly improved under the existing Government already
there, which was elected by the people. We'vehad three elections in 26 months
there. And in each one of them, more - a greater proportion of their people
turned out for that election than turns out for an election in the United States.
Question: But, of course, it's mandatory to vote.
The President: Not really. As a matter of fact, they had something like about
a $20 fine if you didn't vote - but these teams of obsemers of ours went ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 175
down - they couldn't find anyone that - (laughter) - that even worried about
that, or that thought that would ever he enforced - whether they did or not.
But, they did find an overwhelming enthusiasm on the part of the people.
When a woman stands in the line for hours, waiting her turn to vote, and
has been wounded by the guerrillas whose slogan was, "Vote today, and die
tonight", and she refused to leave the line for medical treatment of her bullet
wound until she had voted - she wouldn't take the chance of missing the
opportunity to vote.
Now these, the guerrillas - the Government offeredamnesty. TheGovernment
offered for them to put down their guns and come in and participate, submit
candidates for officeand al1 - in the electoral process. And the guerrillas turned
that down. By the same token, in Nicaragua, the Sandinista govemment -
which is as totalitarian as anything in Cuba or the Soviet Union - indeed, they
are the puppets of Cuba and the Soviet Union. That government, the so-called
"freedom fighters" there - or, if they prefer to cal1them guerrillas - they are
former revolutionaries who were aligned with the Sandinistas in the revolution
to overthrow the authoritarian government of Somoza.
And, once they were in, the Sandinistas, which is, as 1 say, the totalitarian
element, communist element, they got rid of their allies in the revolution, and
have broken every promise that the revolutionaries - when it was still going
on -made to the Organization of American States, as to free elections, human
rights, freedom of the press, freedom of religion.
The present government of Nicaragua - right now, the Catholic Bishops are
protcrting as I;iÏ ;itshe) c~n, di thr ri;k d'grr.i persr.~.utioii- thcy emharÏasscJ
one Ilirhop by pdrdding him ihrough the strccir cii thc c~pital nakcil Noii, the
Archbishup ciiS.in Salvador h.is bcen qu<)rrd h) ihi, diiinforniatiuii nçiw<>rk
here and there as heing one who wants America to stop lending aid, military
aid. to the Government of El Salvador. He has refuted that. He has denied that
and said no. He knows that the others - the guerrillas - are getting outside
support, and he knows from whence it comes, and he has said, no, he does not
wdnt us to leave.
So, the program we have is one in which three out of four dollars will go to
help estahlish a democratic economy and society in El Salvador, and only $1 is
going in military aid. You can't have socialreforms in a country while you're
getting your head shot off by guerrillas.
Quesrion:But your critics, Mr. President - your critics here in the United
States, your critics in Europe, your critics in Ireland - don't see necessarily
Nicaragua and El Salvador quite in the same way. There are those who'vecome
hack and who've said Nicaragua isn't as repressive as it looks. There are those
who say American aid going in to the guerrillas there strengthens and toughens
that government.
The Presidenf: How do they explain, then, the Miskito Indians which, even
under the Somoza authoritarian government, were allowed to have their own
communities, their own culture and religion and so forth, and almost upon
taking office, the Sandinista govemment marched its forces into those Miskito
villa-.s. burned their cro.s..burned their homes - their villaees - and then
confined as many as they could in concentration camps? But thiusands of them
fledacross the borders. Now, weknow an awful lot about some of those Miskitos
because some of Our medical personnel in Our military are helping taking care
of them where they are in refugee camps in Honduras.
Al11 can suggest to some of these people who are saying this in Europe and
who have evidently heen propagandized is - and 1 don't mean this to sound
presumptuous - but is there any one of them that has access to al1 the176 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
information that the President of the United States has? I'm not doing this
because I'vegot a yen to involve ourselves or spend some money, but 1do know
that when the Sandinista - well, the revolution won in Nicaragua, the previous
administration immediately set out to help them - financial aid to that
government.
And it was onlv a few davs before mv ~ ,~~irat"on when that administration
had irrefutable ehdence that the Nicaraguan government was supplying arms
and material to the guerrillas in El Salvador, attempting to overthrow a duly-
elected government chat was trying to be a democracy.~nd he put a hold on
any further help.
Now, we came into office a few days later. And we still had to find out for
ourselves; we thought if there is a possibility of negotiating some kind of a
settlement - And, so, on that basis, we renewed the aid - financial aid that
was going to them and tried to deal with them. By Apnl, we had Soundout that,
no, there was no honor, no honesty, they were totalitanan but more than that,
they openly declared that their revolution knows no houndaries, that they are
only the heginning of what they intend to he further revolution throughout al1
of Latin America.
QuestioW nould that, nevertheless, justify mining ports?
ThePresident: Those were homemade mines that couldn't sink a shin. But let
me ask you this: Right now, there is a Bulgarian ship unloading tanks and
armored personnel carriers at a port in Nicaragua. That isthe fifth such Bulgarian
ship in the last 18 months. Just a week or two ago, there were Soviet ships in
there unloading war matériel.Now, the Nicaraguan government - the Sandinista
government - is funneling this through to the guerrillas in El Salvador. Indeed,
the headquarters for the guerrilla movement in El Salvador is only a few miles
from the capital of Nicaragua, in Nicaragua where the strategy is planned and
the direction of their revolution is taking place.
Now, it seems to me that if you're goingto justify people trying to hring this
present Nicaraguan government hack to the original promise of the revolution,
to modify its totalitarian stand. And you're goingat the same time - and one
of the reasons we were offering help is to interdict those arms and weapons that
were goina to the El Salvador auerrillas. But vou know that a flood of that
matérreliscoming in through the ports heing unloaded. But you're goingto try
to think of a way to interdict that.
And those were homemade mines, as 1 Say, that couldn't sink a ship. They
were planted in those harbors where they wereplanted by the Nicaraguan rebels.
And 1think that there was much ado about nothing. ANhWES TO THE MBMORIAL 177
Octokr 21, 1984.
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS 1984 PRESIDENTIAL DEBATE B~TWEEN THE PRESLDENT
AND FORMER VICE PRESIDENT MONUALE
Kansas City Convention Center, Kansas City, Missouri
............................
Question: Mr. President, in the las1few months it has seemed more and more
that your policies in Central America were beginning to work, yet just at this
moment we are confronted with the extraordinarv storv of the CIA euerrilla
manual or ihc linii.Sanilinist~sr<.nrrurwhom ue .ire hscking. ahi~.h ;idioc~tes
noi imly a,ras,in;iiions of Snndinistas. bui ihe hir~nguf iriminals to ass;is%inais
the gu&rillas we are supporting in order to create martyrs. 1s this not in effect
our own State-supported terrorism?
The Presidenr: No, but I'm glad you asked that question because 1know it's
on many peoples minds. 1 have ordered an investigation. 1know that the CIA
is already going forward with one. We have a gentleman down in Nicaragua
who is on contract with the CIA advising supposedly on military tactics, the
conrros. And he drew up this manual. It was turned over Io the agency head in
the CIA in Nicaragua to k printed and a number of pages were excisedby that
agency head there, the man in charge, and he sent it on up here to CIA where
more pages were excised before it was printed. But some way or another there
were 12 of the orieinal co~ies that ~ot out down there and were not submitted
for this printing process b; the CIA~NOWthose are the details as we have them.
And as soon as we have an investigation and find out where any blame lies for
the few that did not get excised or changed, we certainly are going to do some-
thing about that. We'lltake the proper action at the proper time.
1 was very interested to hear about Central America and our process down
there and 1thought for a moment that instead of a debate, 1was going to find
Mr. Mondale in complete agreement with what we're doing, hecause the plan
that hc has outlined is the one we've been followine for auite some time.
including diplomatic processes throughout Central ~mehca and working closely
with the Contadora Group. So, 1can only tell you about the manual - that
we're not in the habit of assigning guilt before there has heen proper evidence
produced and proof of tbat guilt, but if guilt is establish-d whoever is guilty,
we will treat with that situation then and they will be removed.
Quesrion: Mr. President, you are implying then that the CIA in Nicaragua is
directing theconrrasthere. I'd also like to ask whether having the CIA investigate
its own manual, in such a sensitive area, is not sort of like sending the fox into
the chicken coop a second time.
The Presidenr: I'm afraid 1misspoke when 1said a CIA head in Nicaragua.
There's not someone there directing al1of this activity. There are, as you know,
CIA men stationed in other countries in the world, and certainly in Central
America. And so it was a man down there in that area that this was delivered
Io, and he recognized that what was in that manual was in direct contravention
of my own Executive Order in Decemher of 1981, that we would have nothing
to do with regard to political assassinations.
Question: Mr. Mondale, your rebuttal.
Mr. Mondale: What is a President charged with doing when he takes his Oath
of Office? He raises his right hand and takes an math of OfficeIo take care, to
faithfully execute the laws of the land. A President can't know everything; but a ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 181
Question: It sounds as though you are saying that the objective is entirely new
government in Nicaragua. Would that be fair to conclude?
The Presidenr: Well, when you answer a question that simply, though, and
you come back, then, you see, you get into the thing - well, are you talking
about individuals or are you talking - you're talking about the governmental
fom. Now, if that governmental fom van come by way of the people who are
presently in that government and who then will be willing to stand for elections
at appropriate times, that's fine. But that's what it's really al1about, is getting
the revolution the people fought for.
February 12, 1985.
INTERVIEW OP THE PRESIDENT BY THE. NEW YORK TIDfB, FEBRUARY 11, 1985
The Oval Office
Question: Could we talk about Nicaragua, 1guess, MI. President? There seems
to be a real stalemate there. You're not providing aid to thecontras now. There
are no negotiations that are going on now. What are you planning to do in the
wav2.f nolicv to trv to zet somethine--oine-that mieh- hrinz -bout the kind of
Nicaragua that woid like?
The President: I'm going to continue to ask the Congress to let us, in al1of
Latin America, go forward with the kind of program that was horn of the
Kissinger-led Commission down there in which 75 per cent of the help we offer
is going to be in social and economic aid to try and make these countries more
self sufficient, to eliminate theeat uovertv in so manv of those countries bv
simply helping them become mire viable economically,-and, at the same limé,
givingthem help for security, so that they'renot victimsof subversion,particularly
from outside their own countries.
With regard to Nicaragua, 1think that we should continue to offer support to
the people of Nicaragua who have been betrayed in the revolution that they,
themselves, supported.
That revolution was supposed to be - result in democracy. And there was
the - the assurances were given hy the people who were fightingthe revolution,
and leading it. Then the Sandinistas did what Castro hefore them had done in
Cuba. Once the revolution was successful, they ousted from the government or
any participation in government, al1 the other factions that were dedicated to
democracy, and have instituted a totalitarian régime.
And what the Nicaragua people want is the revolution they fought for. And 1
think they're entitled to havc it.
Quesrion: So support to the people of Nicaragua 1s support to the conrras?
O-~what7
The Presidenr: Well, they certainly are part of the people, and they were part
of the revolution in many instances. The thing that so many people that are182 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
arguing against this don't seem to be aware of - is a dilierence between, for
example, Nicaragua and El Salvador. El Salvador now, after several elections, is
a Government that is striving for democracy, that was chosen by the people.
And the people trying to overthrow it, the guerrillas in El Salvador, are trying
to overthrow a Government that the maiori* .of the ~eo. .elected.
In Ni'iiaragu3.ihr.so-called Sdndinlsia governrnent is a govrrnmeni that sci2r.d
pouw oui of ihe barrcl oia gun - II'sncver bcen chi>icnhy the peuple. And il
has dircctlt contr~venrd the nrinci~lcsof the rei~olutionthat ihcv wcrc fiehiine.
And 1think there's everyr&son for the contras to be represeniing tho; w6
continue to strive for the democracy that they fought a revolution to get.
Quesrion: Well,are you talking about a fundamental change in the Nicaraguan
government, or can they do things incrementally? Can they, for example, ease
up on press freedom, or can they provide more press freedom, or can they
provide certain steps that you migbt think would be acceptable without making
a fundamental change in their government?
The President: Well, Jerry, 1 don't know what - when we talk about thir,
are we talking about the people that are in the government or the form of
government? If it's the people, obviously those who have grabbed power are not
going to want to give il up. That's typical of totalitarianism. But, as to the other
part - al1the Sandinistas would have to do is go back to what they, themselves,
participated in promising to the Organization of American States that they
wanted - democracy. They wanted free voting, they wanted free labor unions,
they wanted a free press and al1- and subject themselves, or submit themselves,
1 should Say, and anyone else who chooses to - to the will of the people by
way of elections and voting.
Question: Sir, let me ask you, on thcontras question, what form of aid should
this take in tems of helping the contras? 1 mean, how do we propose to help
the
conrras?
The President: Well, 1 tbink what we - 1 still believe in covert programs
where they're necessaryand where they're desirable. And so once you Saythat.
then there are some limits as to what you can specify.
Aftachmenf1-13
Februdry 16, 1985
RADIO ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDEPiTTO THE NATION
Rancho del Cielo
The President: The true heros of the Nicaraguan struggle, non-communist,
democracy-loving revolutionanes, saw their revolution betrayed and look up
arms against the betrayer. These men and women are today the dcmocratic
resistance fighterssome cal1theconrras. We should cal1them "freedom fighters". ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 183
Sandinist.~pr.rprgandii Jenounces them as "nicr~cnaries" aiid former Ndiionÿl
Gusrdsmen oi ihc Somora Jiiiatdrjhip Hui ihis isd lie 'hc ireedtim Iighicr>
are led hy those who opposed Somoza, and their soldiers are peasants, farmers,
shopkeepers and students, the people of Nicaragua. These brave men and women
deserve our help. They do not ask for troops but only for our technical and
financial support and supplies. We cannot turn from them in their moment of
need. To do so would be to betray our centuries-old dedication to supporting
those who struggle for freedom. This is not only legal, it's totally consistent with
our history.
............................
And now the free people of El Salvador, Honduras and, yes, of Nicaragua
ask for our help. There are over 15,000 freedom fighters struggling for liberty
and democracy in Nicaragua and helping to stem subversion in El Salvador.
They're fighting for an end to tyranny and its only reliahle produce: cruelty.
They are Our hrothers. How can we ignore them? How can we refuse them
assistance when we know that ultimately their fight is our fight? We must
remember that if the Sandinistas are not stopped now, they will, as they have
sworn, attempt to spread communism to El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras
and elsewhere.
The freedom fighters are putting pressure on the Sandinistas to change their
ways and live, not as communist puppets, but as peaceful democrats. We must
help. Congress must understand that the American people support the struggle
for democracy in Central America. We cdn save them as we were once saved,
but only if we act, and now.
Attachment 1-14
February 21, 1985.
NEWS CONPERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT
The East Room
............................
Question: MI. President, on Capitol Hill - on Capitol Hill the other day,
Secretarv Shultz suaaested that a goal of vour oolicy now is to remove the
SandiniGa governm&t in Nicaragua. 1sthaiyour goal?
The President: Well, removed in the sense of its present structure, in which it
is a communist totalitarian State, and it is not a governrnent chosen hy the
people. So, you wonder sometimes about those who make such claims as to
its legitimacy. We helieve, just as 1 said Saturday morning, that we have an
obligation to be of help where we can to freedom fighters and lovers of freedom
and democracy, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua and wherever there are people
of that kind who are striving for that freedom.
And we're going to try to persuade the Congress that we can legitimately go
fonvard and hopefully, go forward on a multi-year basis with the Scoop Jackson
plan for trying to bring development and help to al1of Central America.184 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
Question:Well, Sir, when you Sayremove it in the senseof its present structure,
aren't youthen saying that you advocate the overthrow of the present government
of Nicaragua?
The President:Well, what I'm saying is that this present government was an
element of the revolution against Somoza. The freedom fighters are other ele-
ments of that revolution.
And once victory was attained, the Sandinistas did what Castro had done,
~rior to their time. in Cuba. Thev ousted and manaeed t- rid themselves of the
other elements of the revolution and violated their own promise to the
Organization of American States, and as a result of which they had received
support from the Organization, that they were - their revolutionary goal was
for democracy, free press, free speech, free lahor unions, and elections, and so
forth, and they have violated that.
And the people that are fighting them, the freedom fighters opposing them,
are Nicaraguan people who want the goals of the revolution restored. And we're
going to try to help.
Question:1s the answer yes, Sir? 1sthe answer yes, then?
The President:To what?
Question:To the question, aren't you advocating the overthrow of the present
government? If -
The President:Not if the present -
Question: - you suhstitute another form of what you Saywas the revolution?
The Prestdent: Not if the present government would turn around and Say,al1
right, if they'd Say, "Uncle". All right, come on back into the revolutionary
government and let's straighten this out and institute the goals.
Question:Mr. President, 1wonder if we might return to Nicaragua. In answer
to Sam's question when he pressed you, you said that you - or you seemed to
be saying that you wouldn't advocate the overthrow of the government, not if
the oresent government would tum around and sav. "Uncle". Well, aren't vou
realiy sayingthat you want the present government out, and secondly, Sir,should
the United States he trying to influence a government of another nation in this
hemisphere?
The President: 1 think that what we're doing and what we have proposed
doing is within the UN Charter and within the OAS Charter and the right of
people to do what the freedom fighters are doing. And it is - you can Say -
it's like saying,"1s the glass half full or half empty?' You can say we're trying
to oust the Sandinistas hy what we're saying.
We're saying we're trying to give those who fought a revolution to escape a
dictatorship, to have democracy, and then had it taken away from them hy some
of their fellow revolutionaries - we're saying we want them to have a chance
to have that democracy that they fought for. And 1don't think the Sandinistas
have a decent leg to stand on.
What they have done is totalitarian. It is brutal, cruel. And they have no
areument aeainst what the rest of the oeoole in Nicaraeua want.
-Qrti~<rr~,nU\~cSlilr.. wha~hhout the Spc~~fic prohihiih>n. h) the L.n~tcJStxtci
Congress .tgaiiiri ihc kinil di~.onJii~.iwhich rroulil u\crthrov thcir goi'crnnicni
or pÏovide money to do so?
The President:The - what?
Questiun:I'mreferring to the Boland Amendment, Sir.The specificprohibitions
of the Congress. ANNPXES TO THEMEMORIAL 185
The Presidenr:I think that some of the proposais that have been made in
Congress have lacked a complete understanding of what is at stake there and
what we're trying to do.
March 4, 1985.
REMARKSOF THE PRESIDENT TO THE 12~~ ANNUAL CONSERVATIVEPOLITICAL ACTION
CON~RENCE MAFCH 1, 1985
The Sheraton-Washington Hotel
Now, 1 am against sending troops ta Central America. They are simply no1
needed. Given a chance and the resources, the people of the ared cdn fight their
own fight. They have the men and women. They're capable of doing it. They
have the people of their country behind them. All they need is our support. All
they need is proof that we cdre as much about the fight for freedom 700 miles
from Our shores as the Soviets care about the fight against freedom 5,000 miles
from theirs. (Applause.)
Arrachment1-16
March 11, 1985.
INTERVIEW OP PRESIDENT REAGAN BY BUSINESSWIZR
Question:To turn Io foreign afiairs, you say that the US will keep pressure
on Nicaraeua until the lefti-t aovernment there-aerees 10 ~ower-sha-ine. How
cariwejustify helping to overthrow a government merely because we don't like
ils political coloration?
Amer: Well,they cal1themselvesa govemment. This is one faction of a revo-
lution that overthrew a dictatorshio. But then. iust as lPrime Minister Fidell
Castro had done in Cuba, one factkn got in and muscled the others out. ~omé
of them are jailed, some driven into exile. Some are leading the [anti-Sandinista]
freedom fighters now. 1think we have to ignore this pretense of an election they
just held. This is no1a government. This is a faction of the revolution that has186 MILIT~RY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
taken over at the oint of a eun. And under the United Nations Charter and the
Charter of the o&anization-of American States, there is every reason for us to
he helping the people that want the original goals of the revolution instituted.
Attachment 1-17
March 30, 1985
RADIO ADDRESSOf THE PRESIDENT TO THE NATION
The Oval Office
......................
Rieht now, Havana and Manarua are waeine a cam~aien of disinformation
to ccver up their deeds and reaslure the ~AerTcan peOple with soft words of
peace. A secret Nicaraguan memo leaked to the WallStreet Journaland reported
yesterday revealed how the communists have used propaganda to smear their
opponents, tighten censorship, and confuse the outside world.
There are other examples of the régime'strue intent. On March Ist, exiled
Nicaraguan leaders, representing a broad pro-democracy movement, met in San
José,Costa Rica, and made this offer. The freedom fighters in Nicaragua would
agree to a cease-fireif the communist régimewill negotiate, permit free elections
and genuine democracy. The answer came hack quick, loud and clear - forget it.
US support for the freedom fighters is morally right and intimately linked to
our own securitv. If we refuse to helo their iust cause. if we oull the lue and
allow the freedom fighters to be wiped out Gythe same helicopter gunihics the
Soviets are using to murder thousands of Afghans, then our ultimate price to
protect peace, freedom and our way of life will he dear indeed.
Nearlv 24 vedrs aeo. President Kennedv. warnine aeainst communist Denetra-
tion in our hémisphirésaid, "1 want it clé&lyunders&od that this ~ovérnment
will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are to the security of
our nation".
\\'ciliiir my part. I want itcle,irl) undcrstood today ihdt ifu: i~ili<i meet
this ohligdriun, ihen hi,tcrry uill hold ils iully acc<~untablcfor the ccinscquenccs
For u,c will ieiid an unniirt;ikablc simal ihii ihr'~rcdtcit piiw:r in ihc uorld 13
unwilling and incapable of stopping iommunist aggressionin our own hackyard.
............................ A~XES TO THE ~ORIAL 187
Attachment I-18
Apnl 2, 1985.
INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT BY THE WASHINGTON POST , PRIL 1, 1985
The Oval Office
Question:MI. President,you'vecaused - often givenyour viewsof Nicaragua
and called it "a war machine" and said it poses a threat to ils neighbors and
ultimately to our security, but the Sandinistas appear to he firmly in control,
and there are a few signs that they're changing.What - looking back on your
policy over the last four year- has il actually accomplishedas far as Nicaragua
is con~~-~~~~~
ThePresiüenr:Yes,I think there are more people who are opposing the régime
right now in Nicaragua than actually fought in the revolution against Somoza.
~nd it seemsto be Sowing, the unhappinëss of the people, the Lyou only have
to look at the flood of refugees that are escaping from Nicaragua to realize that
the people of that country are not happy with that totalitarian régime.
Question: With what final result will i- will that-
The President: Well. 1know the Contadora is still trvine to find an answer of
that kind. The conlras'themselveshave offered to lay dowgweapons and go into
negotiations in an effort to have what they had fought the revolution for, and
that is a democracy. And so 1think as long as the people of Nicaragua are still
striving for the goals of the revolution that they themselvesfought, 1think that
we'reohligated to try and lend them a hand.
Question: in this country, even though your popularity remains very high, on
the issue of Nicaragua, polls show that there are many Americans opposed to
your policy there, and the Congress shows very little inclination to give you the
$14 million you'veasked. Do you have any new proposals or ideas that would
change this view in Congress?
The President: Nothing that 1can talk about here. But let mejust say, 1know
this about the - what the polls show, and 1 know what happens up on the
Hill. But we'vebeen subjected in this country to a very sophisticated lobbying
campaign by a totalitarian government, the Sandinistas. There has been a dis-
information program that is virtually worldwide, and we know that both the
Soviets and the Cubans have such a disinformation network that is beyond
anything that we can match. And, of course, 1don't think the people have heard
the - actually, the thing that we'retrying to explain of what is going on.
People go down, sorne people, to Nicaragua and claim they come back now
with views that are favorable to that totalitarian governrnent. But why don't
they go to some of the neighboring countries and talk 10 the thousands and
thousands of refugeesand ask them why they fled Nicaragua?
Question: 1s there anything that you can do as President - that your
administration can do to help the conrrasand their supporters, if Congress does
not vote this money?
ThePresident: 1don't know.That's something I'd have to face if they do this.
We'renot alone in helping them. As a matter of Tact,in spite of the polls, there
is more and more private support for the contras. MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVlTlES
April 4, 1985
REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
ON CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACEPROPOSAL
The BriefingRoom
......................
1want to announce today a proposal for peace in Central America that can
enahle liberty and democracy to prevail in this troubled region and that can
protect the security of our own borders, economy and people.
On March Ist, in San José, Costa Rica, the leaders of the Nicaraguan
Democratic Resistance met with a hroad coalition of other exiled Nicaraguan
democrats. They agreed upon and signed an historic proposal to restore peace
and democracy in their country. The memhers of the Democratic Resistance
offereda cease-firein return for an agreement hv the Nicaraeuan réeimeto beein
a dialogue mediated hy the ~isho~sConferencé of the ~oian ~atlholic~hu;ch
with the goal of restoring democracy through honest elections. To date, the
~icaraeu~n répimehas rehsed this ofier
I'hc?cniral;\mcriran counirie, iniluding Kirdrapa hdvr agrccd thdi iritc,rnal
rcc~~ncili.itionir inJi~pcni:iblc io rcgi.inal pcdcc. Hui \i,tknou ihdt, unliks
Prcsidcni Duartc of 1-1SaI\,ad<>r who ~ccks 3 ~IJI<>EU uith his opponent>, the
communists in Nicaragua have turned, at least up uitil now, a coldshoulder to
appeals for national reconciliation from the Pope and the Nicaraguan hishops.
And we know that without incentives, none of this will change.
For these reasons. ereat numhers of Nicararuans are demandinr - change and
iaking up arms 16)iight for ilic riolcn pr<~mi,cof i'rr'cdomsnd dr'rnocrii~Over
15,OiJOFdrmcr,, imall nicrshanrs, \<hite>.bl'icksand Mi\kiro Indiüns Iia\.çuniicd
to struggle for a true democracy.
We supported democracy in Nicaragua before and we support Nicaragua
today - democracy today. We supported national reconciliation hefore and we
support it today. We believe that democracy deserves as much support in Nica-
raeua as it has received in El Salvador. And we're moud of the heln that
w2ve given to El Salvador.
You may recall that in 1981,we were told that the communist guerrillas were
mounting a final offensive, the Government had no chance, andour approach
would lead to greater American involvement. Well, our critics were wrong.
Democracy and freedom are winning in El Salvador. President Duarte is pulling
his country together and enjoys wide support from the people. And al1of this,
with America's help kept strictly limited.
The formula that worked in El Salvador - support for democracy, self-
defense, economic development and dialogue - will work for the entire region.
And we couldn't have accomplished this without hipartisan support in Con-
gress, hacked up hy the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America,
headed by Henry Kissinger. And that's why, after months of consulting with
Congressional leaders and listening carefully to their concerns, 1am making the
following proposal: I'm calling upon both sides to lay down their anus and
accept the offer of church-mediated talks on internationally-supervised elections
and an end to the repression now in place against the church, the press and
individual rights. ANNEXESTO THE MEMORIAL 189
To the members of the Democratic Resistance, 1ask them to extend their offer
of a cease-fireuntil lune 1st.
To the Congress, 1 ask for immediate release of the $14 million already
appropriated. While the cease-fire offer is on the table, 1pledge these funds will
not be used for arms or munitions. These funds will be used for food, clothing
and medicine and other sup~ort for survival. The Democratic oppositio..cannot
he a partner in negotiationiwithout these basic necessities.
If the Sandinistas accept this peace offer, 1will keep my funding restrictions
in effect. But peace negotiations must not become a cover for deception and
delay. If there is no agreement after 60 days of negotiations, 1 will lift these
restrictions, unless both sides ask me not to.
1 want to emphasize that consistent with the 21 goals of the Contadoran
Process, the United States continues to seek: One, Nicaragua's implementation
of its commitment to democracy made to the Organization of American States.
Two, an end to Nicaragua's aggression against its neighbors. Three, a removal
of the thousands of Soviet Bloc, Cuban, PLO, Libyan and other military and
security personnel. And, four, a return of the Nicaraguan military to a level of
parity with their neighbors.
Now, later today, 1 will he meeting with Arturo Cruz, Adolpho Calero and
Alfonso Robe10 to discuss my proposal.
Democracv is the road to Deace.But if we abandon the brave members of the
Democratic Resistance, we willalso remove al1constraints on the communists.
Democracy can succeed in Central America. But Congress must release the
funds that can create incentives for dialoeue and oeace. if we orovide too little
help, Ourchoice willhe a communist ~ent;al merk k w ith communist subversion
spreading southward and northward. We face the risk that 100 million people
from Panama to Ouropen southern border could come under the control of pro-
S~ ~e~ réeumesand~ ~ ~aten the ~ ~ - ~States ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ence.economic chaos and
a human tidal wave of refugees.
Central America is not condemned to that dark future of endless violence. If
the United States meets its obligations to help those now striving for democracy,
they can create a bright future in which peace for al1Americans will he secure.
So, in the spirit of Easter, let us make this so. 1look forward to working with
the Congress on this important matter in the coming weeks.
Question: What's theincentive for the Nicaraguan government, Mr. President?
The Presideni Well, to end the bloodshed that is going on, to end the great
economic crisis that is growing evermore worse in the11country because of what
they've done.
Question: Mr. President, Tip O'Neill said that this is a dirty trick, that you're
trying to hoodwink the American public into thinking that it is humanitarian
aid but it really is a secret plan to proceed militarily.
The President Well, 1don't think he's heard this particular plan yet - has
been consultations, but if he'scalling this a dirty trick, he'sgot a funny definition
of dirty tricks.
Question: MI. President, if Congress should turn you down -
Question: What makes you think that this will make Congress more likely -
The President: Go ahead, Andrea.
Questiun: - to accept your aid?
The President: Well, hecause Congress, in al1 of their eiTorts to hinder Our
continued aid to the contras and to democracy down there, have emphasized the
need for a peaceful and political solution and a solution of the kind we'vetalked
here thai would result from discussion between the parties.190 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
C)ui,,tion.Slr. Pre,ident, wriulrl)ou a\k
guvit;~in Mr Prcsidciii, )iiu've ni;i<le it pldin ihai ihe SI4 iiiilli<in.sou ihink,
1sesicntilil. Hui if Congrc.s .hould iurii you doirn. irillyrouIiit~kior \.>nieothcr
avenue to help the contras, some other way to continue your desire to see a
restructuring of the Nicaraguan government?
The Presidenf: Well, we're not going to quit and walk away from them no
matter what happens.
Question:Would you contemplate any military action against Nicaragua? You
seem to he offenng either-or, and the threat is the $14 million. 1s that really
enough to overthrow the Nicaraguan govemment?
The President:In - i think - it isn't a case of overthrowing, it is a case of
returning to the goals of the revolution that hoth the contrasand the Sandinistas
fought for. And as Faras Ourmaking war or anything, that has never heen Our
intention. And we'vemade that - we'verepeated that over and ove1again.
Question: Mr. President, if there is a cease-fire and there are talks but they
don't produce anything, what does money - the $14 million -go for, then? 1s
that to purchase weapons for the conrras?
The President:1said after 60 days, if no agreement can be reached, and unless
both sides ask us to continue the same process, then 1would think that we could
use that $14 million to help the contrasin any way.
............................
Question:One more question, if you get this would you agree to bring home
al1 of Our troops from al1 of the countries in South Amenca - in Central
America?
The President:The only troops that we have down there now are troops that
are on various maneuvers and training exercises -
Question: That's right. That's right. But they are in danger, especially some
that have iust eone down there to Honduras -
The ~riside;: NO.
Question: - with their Rackjackets and ammunition. And they know they're
in daneer.
~heÏ'resident: No, they're -
Question:There are men and women down there, Sir, who are in danger. Will
you promise to hring them al1home?
The President: If you'll look back through history, you'll find out that we
traditionally have used among Ourneighbors for jungle training exercises of this
kind. And they're not, as some loud voices up on the Hill have said, they're not
down there as a threat to anyone. They're down there as we're training new
enlistees in our Amy to have a well-trained military that can fight any place
that might be required. And this has heen done in Honduras repeatedly before.
And that's al1it is. So, we're not - we don't have any occupying forces down
there. We'vegot 55advisors - 1think the number stillremains - in El Salvador. ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 191
April 6, 1985.
RADIO ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT IO THE NATION
Rancho del Cielo, Santa Barbara, California
............................
Now, let me give you the encouraging news about our proposa1 for peace and
democracy in Nicaragua. Asyou know, we'veasked both sides - the communists
and the democratic resistance - to lay down their arms. We've endorsed the
proposal made by the democratic resistance, the contras,that the Catholic Church
serve as mediator to restore freedom and ensure internationally supervised
elections. And we've asked Congress to release $14 million for those freedom
fighters - aid tbat will go immediately for medicines, food and clothing, and
other support to help these men and their families survive.
We have made this proposal in a sincere effort to start a dialogue aimed at
true interna1 reconciliation which can bring peace and liberty to Nicaragua.
You know, the federal government these days spends $14 million every few
minutes. So we're asking Congress for just a few minutes-worth of help for the
democratic forces of Nicaragua. $14 million means very little to us. But it's a
whole world to them.
Attachment I-21
April 16, 1985.
REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT AT DINNEX FOR NICARACUAN REFUGEE PUND,
APRIL 15, 1985
J. W. Marriott Hotel, Washington, D.C.
TIR,Prr<i<l<ti(l uilnt to hr.ginhy ~)irig ihat I'mhondred Io hr.in ihr prcrcncc
ol'ih<~sewho ;ire hcrc Ir<iniNic;ir;iguadnd al1rhc rc,t oiyou. too. M;iny CI;)ou
h;i\c bcen drivrii I'roiiithe IanJ <>I'y<uirrth) .I\.id turn of hisiory. but )oii'\r.
reiusJ io forgr.1vour huni:13nJ or shanrlon your fclli>wKi:aragu;ini. AnJ liir
thir, you clc,cri.cand yoii haie. hoth our Iiigh rcgard and uiir ih;ink>.
Six years ago. many of you were part of the fight to overthrow an oppressive
régimethat had ruled your country for decades. You succeeded, the régime fell.
And many rejoiced, knowing that true freedom and true democracy would finally
rise to take its place.
But the new régime becamenot a democracy but a dictatorship. Communism
was embraced and Nicaragua moved into the Soviet orbit. The hest of the
revolution, members of the original revolutionary government who had fought
for high ideals left the country. In all, more than a quarter of a million souls192 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIFS
fled Nicaragua, and they're Aeeingstill. Many of the refugees are the poorest of
the poor, lndians and peasants and tenified mothers and children. All of them
need Our help. But even more, perhaps, they need the attention of the world.
After nearly six years, attention must be paid.
There's so much I want to discuss tonight, from the plight of the refugees to
why they're Aeeing. I want to talk about what is at stake in Central America,
what is at issue and what it means to al1of us in this room, in this country and
in the West.
1'1start with Nicaragua now, Nicaragua on April 15, 1985.
As you know, the Sandinista dictatorship has taken absolute control of the
government and the armed forces. It is a communist dictatorship. It has done
what communist dictatorships do, created a repressive State security and secret
uolice oraanization assisted bv Soviet, East German and Cuban advisors:
harassed,&d in many cases, exPunged the political opposition and rendered the
democratic freedoms of speech, press and assemhly punishable by officially-
sanctioned harassment and imprisonment or death.
But the communisis are not unopposed. They are facing great resistance from
the people of Nicaragua, resistance from the patriots who fight for freedom and
their unarmed allies from the pro-democracy movement.
There is growing evidence of Sandinista brutality. We'verecently learned that
10or II members of the Social Christian Party have been rounded up and jailed.
The Sandinistasare trying to get them to confessto being counter-revolutionaries.
And you might be interested in knowing one way the communists are coercing
these confessions. Thcy have also arrested more than a hundred relatives of the
political prisoners. And according to Our most recent information, the Social
Christian Party members are being held in the dark in small, over-heated cells.
Prisoners are served meals at irregular intervals, aiter 12hours, for instance, and
then the next in another two. The purpose is to disorient them and Wearthem
down. Where do they gel that idea? This same method has been used against
political prisoners in Cuba.
Now, we do not know the exact number of political prisoners in Nicaragua
today. But we get an indication from the testimony of José Gonzalez, aformer
Vice President of the Social Democratic Party. Gonzalez told Pope John Paul II
there were about 8,000 political prisoners in 1981. He also told the Pope the
Sandinistas practice "repression and torture". Gonzalez, as you know, was
arrested when he returned from Rome. He left Nicaragua and now livesin exile.
But the most compelling evidence of Sandinista brutality and of why people
are Aeeingis the Sandinistas scorched-earth ~o.icv.,
\\'cknow ths EinJinistas hli\,s.irJcred and srs i~rrying sut ~hciorccd rslriidti<in
of tcni of ih<)u\lind,of puslints. \\'c h~\c report, iha?O.IIiIpc;is.inlshate kcn
moved in the past two months from their homes to relocation camps. Peasants
who have escaped cal1 themselves "hostages" and cal1 the relocation camps
"concentration camps".The communists themselveshad admitted they'reengaged
in the forced resettlement of an estimated 65,000 people.Peasants and joumalists
tellof entire villaees.homes. storesand churches beine burned to the eround. Thev
tell of animals slaughtered,crops burned and village&taken away aÏ gunpoint
government tmcks. Why are the communistsdoing this? Massed forcedrelocations
are a common featureof modern communisttyrannies. But there areother purposes
here, for the people ofmany villagesare supporting, activelysupporling the freedom
fighters, and so the communists have decided to put more and more of the people
of Nicaragua into closely-guardedpens, and that wayit willbeeasier for the régime
to stalk the freedom fightersin the countryside. A Sandinista security chief has
explained, "Anyonestill in the hills is a guernlla". ANNEZS TO THE MEMORIAL 193
While al1this is terrible, it can hardly come as a surprise to those who know
what was done to the Miskito Indians.
As you know, the Miskitos supported the Sandinistas against Somoza. But
shortly after taking power, the Sandinistas attempted to indoctrinate the Miskitos
in Marxist dogma and the lndians resisted. The Sandinistas tried 10 put their
own people in as leaders of the Miskito community and the Indians resisted, so
much that the Sandinistas labeled them "bourgeois", and, therefore, enemies of
the people. They began to arrest Indian leaders. Some were murdered. Some
were tortured. One Miskito leader told our AFL-CIO that Thomas Borge and
other leaders of the Sandinistas "came to my celland warned me that Sandinismo
would be estahlished on the Atlantic Coast even if every single Miskito lndian
had to be eliminated".
Well, the Sandinistas came close. There were massacres. Eyewitnesses said
some Miskitos we~e ~ ~ ~d ali~e. Ten thousand Indians were force-marched to
relocation camps. Miskito villages were burned down. Thcy're still being burned
down. Miskito villages werebombed and shelled.And they are stillheing bombed
and shelled. In the name of humanitv. these atrocities must he stowed.
Twenty thousand Indians are kn&n to be incarcerated in rel&âtion camps.
About half are currently heing held at the Tasba Pri Relocation Camps. Tasba
Pri, by the way, means "free land". Well, above one "free land" camp, a New
York Timesreporter noted a sign that said, "Work that unites us is a revolution-
ary force".
In all, tens of thousands of Miskitos have been forced to flee Nicaragua, to
flee the land they lived on for over a thousand years. Many now live as refugees
in Honduras.
Unfortunately, it's widely believed outside Nicaragua that the Sandinistas
enjoy the support of the people inside. But you know this is completely untrue.
We know this from many sources, even recently, the American press.
A few months ago, the New Republiccarried a report by Robert Leiken, who
had long been sympathetic to the Sandinistas and who had fonnerly testified in
Coneressaeai"st aid to the contras. He wrote. "One of the most common means
oisusiiiining ihc myih ofpopul,~r riippori isihc Sandini.;ias'urc oi ihc riitioning
sy\icm JI II leter H;iiii>n~3rd~drc iL~niis<;iied for non;iiienJancc ai SrnJini-
r1.i mcciinx~" And irlk ,if iiiilniion i, br.inilr.ila5 "iiiuiitr.rrc\oIi.i~onarv ploi".
Svmoathvmith th~ ~~ ~ ~~~ he said. is more and nervasive. In fact. the oeisants
now'call;hem "Los ~uch&ho", the affectionate ierm they once uskd enclusively
for the Sandinistas. And what do they now cal1the Sandinistas? Well, the latest
workers chant is "the Sandinistas and Somoza are the same thing".
In spite of al1 this, the Sandinista government retains ils defenders in this
country and in the West. They look al al1the evidence that the Sandinistas have
instituted a communist régime,al1 the pictures of dictator Ortega emhracing
Castro and visitine -~sco~ ~ ~ ~he Soviet-Bloc advisors and al1the Sandinista
votes in the ÜZed ~ations: such as their decision in line with the Soviet Bloc
to refuse the credentials of Israel, they look at this and they say, "The Sandinistas
aren't communists, or aren't real communists. Why, they're only nationalists,
only socialists."
But these defenders admit there is a problem in Nicaragua. The problem, they
Say, is the freedom fighters. Well, just a few weeks ago, the whole world was
treated to a so-called "indeoendent investieation" of charees that the freedom
fighters have committed atkcities. It spoke of these so-cafied "atrocities" in a
rather riveting manner. And the report received great attention on television and
in leading newspapers and publications. The report ignored communist brutality,
the murder of the Indians and the arrest, torture and murder of political dis-196 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
of the countryside. And, as for their level of support, there are now three times
as many freedom fighters fighting the Sandinistas as there were Sandinistas
fighting Somoza. (Applause.)
There are those who say America'sattempt to encourage freedom in Nicaragua
interferes with the right of self-detemination of the Nicaraguan people. Self-
detemination, you wonder what the ghosts of the Miskito Indians would say to
that. You wonder what the iournalists who cannot ~rint the truth and the
pulili~il pri,oncrs uho c~nnois~sdk !i uoiild vil).ibo.it s:lf-dctemiiiiatiori aiid
the SdnJini\id\. (Applaure.~1ihink ihr.).woulrl .a!.rhat whcn 3 small c<>mmuni>i
clique seizes a country there is no self-detemination, and no chance of it.
1 believe that a vote against this aid is more than a reiection of the freedom
fighters. It is a rejection if al1the forces of moderation from the church to the
Contadora countries, which have calledfor freedom and democracy in Nicaragua. -
(Applause.)
1 believe one inevitable outcome of a rejection of this aid would be that it
would remove al1pressure on the Sandinistas to change. And if no constraints
are put on the Sandinistas, 1believe the brutality and abuse they already aim at
their own country and their neighbors may well be magnified a thousandfold.
1 truly believe- the history of this century forces me to believe that to do
nothing in Central America is to give the first communist stronghold on the
North American Continent a green light to spread its poison throughout this
free and increasingly democratic hemisphere. (Applause.) 1 - thank you. Thank
you. 1 truly believe that this not only imperils the United States and its allies,
but a vote against this proposal is literally a vote against peace because it invites
the conditions that will lead to more fighting, new wars, and new hloodshed.
This vote - (applause) - this vote is more than an appropriation of money.
Through this vote, America will declare her commitment to peace. And through
this aid, we will say to the free people of Central America, "We will not betray
you. We will not leave you. And we will not allow you to hecome victims of
some so-called historic inevitahility." (Applause.)
No evil is inevitahle unless we make it so. We cannot have the United States
walk away from one of the greatest moral challenges in post-war history. 1
pledge to you that we will do everything we can to win this great struggle.
(Applause.)
And, so, we're hopeful. We will fight on. We'll win this struggle for peace.
Thank you for inviting me.
Viva Nicaragua Libre. Thank you, and Cod hless you. (Applause.)
And, now, 1 want to help Ambassador Davis, who 1 believe is going to give
the first ever "Nicaraguan Refugee Fund Humanitarian Award". And it goes
this year to the Executive Director of "Friends of the Americas", Diane Jenkins.
(Applause.) ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 197
Atfuchmenf11-1
REVIEW OP US FOREIGN POLICY. HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
AWAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIV NEIN,ETY-SEVENC TOHNGRESS FlRST SESSION,
Mr. Studds: 1couldn't possihly support anythingthat soundsthat multisyllahic
and horrible, no.
Secretary Haig: That is the first real compliment 1have had from you.
Mr. Srudds: Let me ask you this, having failed with that one. As you know,
rumors persist throughout Central America that the military in Honduras may
not permit the elections that are scheduled in that country for November 29 to
be held or that they might not sanction the results ofthose elections.
The United States, quite properly in my judgment, supports those elections.
Are you willing, as Secretary of State, to say that in the event that the military
in Honduras should prevent the elections or should fail to recognize their results,
the United States would seriously reexamine its increasingly close relationship
with the Honduran military?
Secretary Haig: 1am not prepared to make that statement today, Mr. Studds.
Mr. Studds: OK, let me try Nicaragua. We have heen criticizing Nicaragua
for building up its military. You yourself have done so. Nicaragua, as you know,
says that they fear a direct or indirect attack from the United States as well as
destabilization efforts aimed at the current government from exiles in Honduras
and in Florida, among other places.
Can you provide this committee and this Congress with an assurance that the
United States is not and will not participate in or encourage in any way, directly
or indirectly, any effort to overthrow or to destabilize the current govemment of
Nicaragua?
Secretary Haig: No; 1 would not give you such an assurance, but that must
not be interpreted by mischievous inquisitors to represent an articulation of a
policy one way or the other. Just merely it would be a self-defeating statement
by a responsible executivehranch official.
Mr. Studds: We couldn't have that. 1would take the reference to mischievous
inquisitors Io he reference to the press and not the memhers of the committee
who are asking.
Secretary Haip: If the shoe fits, it can he worn.
Mr. Studds: 1will try it on. My point, 1guess, is pretty ohvious. It seems to
me that the failure of the United States to respond clearly and directly to, for
example, the three illustrative and straightforward questions which 1just posed
to you is contributing directly to a growing tension in Central America. 1simply
asked you to reaffirmthe support of the United Statesfor principles ofdemocracy,
for peaceful resolution of conflicts, for nonintervention in the affairs of other
States, and in each of those instances-
Secretary Haig [interrupting]: That 1have no trouble -
Mr. Studds: 1 know you haven't. At that level of generality it is fine, but in
each of the three specificinstances which 1asked you that, you declined to give
me explicit assurance.
Secretary Haig: It seems to me, MI. Studds, that you should be concerned
about the mounting evidence in Nicaragua of a totalitarian character of the
Sandinista régime.Now, if you are espousing policies that would support that
trend, then 1would be rather concerned about your -
Mr. Studds: MI. Secretary, 1 am not espousing any policies. 1 am trying to
elicit what the policies of my Government are. In my own judgment, if it is198 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTIV~TIES
material, many of the actions by the current Govemment of Nicaragua are
indefensible.
Secretary Haig: 1am glad you -
Mr. Sludds [interrupting]: But 1mus1ask if you have seen the cartoon where
a patient is talking to a psychiatrist and he says, "Doctor, what do you cal1il
when you think everybody is after you and they are?'
And it seems to me -
Secretary Huig [intermpting]: Probably he lives in Washington.
Mr. Studds: Yes; 1do believethat we ought to take a careful look al our own
unwillingness to clearly state that we will not intemene, we will not destabilize,
we will not continue to fuel violence.That we support unconditional talks aimed
at a peaceful resolution of a tragically violent conflict.We are asking the region
of Central America to choose between Fidel Castro and Ronald Reagan, and 1
submit to you that we are making MI. Castro look a lot better than he deserves
to look.
Secretary Huig: 1 probably agree with that under any set of circumstances,
but 1 hope, MI. Studds, that you understand that the policies we are pursuing
in this hemisphere, both with respect to Mr. Castro and the increasingly
totalitarian régime in Nicaragua are designed to preclude the outcome of
totalitarianism. and to esDouse and further the basic values of the American
people.
Now, the fact that you dilïer as an individual with how best to accomplish
that is, of course, your prerogative, but 1 can assure you that if motives are
being questioned you are on the wrong track.
Mc Studds: Let me just Say motives are not being questioned, but if ilis the
judgment of this administration that our policiesin El Salvador reflect the values
of the American people, then 1mus1submit that 1have a very dilïerent picture
of those values.
Secretary fialoin:You know as well as 1 that on two occasions in the very
recent pasi we have discussed this issue with the Nicaraguan Government, and
in the wake of those discussions, which included the potential for complete
normalization, economic support, and a dialog of a constructive character, that
they have responded by flaunting the actions that 1outlined here in response to
an earlier question, and that is a fact. That is a fact, and 1am shocked that you
haven't evenmade reference to those efforts. which vou know about.
Mr. Studds: My lime is up.
Mr. Founiain: Mr. Barnes.
Mr. Bornes: MI. Secretary, 1 want to follow up on Mr. Studds' questions. 1
chair the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, and 1have been meeting on
a regular basis with representatives of the Government of Nicaragua, and the
Cubans having been around to see us.
As you know, there has been a lot of speculation in the press that we are
about-to engage in some military action. Most of us have been assuring them
that that was extraordinarily unlikely, and we have had briefings by your
subordinates suggesting that that was extraordinarily unlikely. But based upon
your responses this morning to questions from MI. Fountain, MI. Lagomarsino
and Mr. Studds, if 1 were in Nicaragua 1 would be building my bomb shelter
this afternoon.
Secretary Huig: 1would hope you would be pluralizing your site.
Mr. Barnes: 1would hope they would do that as well, MI. Secretary. Certainly.
as you know, Our subcommittee and members of this committee have expressed
Ourconcern with resoect to someof the oints vou have raised todav. S~ecificallv,
most of the member; of this committee~oined&e in sending a cabléto Nicaragua
recently expressing Ourconcern with respect to arrest and sentencing - ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 199
Secretary Haig [interrupting]: 1 compliment you on that.
Mr. Barnes [continuing]: of the private sector leaders. But nonetheless your
response to questions this morning certainly fuels the speculation and concerns
throughout the Western Hemisphere about possible military action hy the
United States.
- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
rcr Il 1 rncs 1 recelv ; l r the da? bchrc, sxL.u,e
me - thc Prcsideni if the L'niiedStaicj addrcsscd ihis issue,aiid hr.uncquivocall!
stated to the American people that there are no plans for the employment of
American forces anywhere worldwide, and 1think that answer should stand here
today, and 1wonder what you are trying to drive at.
Mr. Barnes:Well, there are rumors just rampant throughout this town - and
vou ooint out it is~ ~ t~wn that is alwavs full of rumors - that we are seriouslv
,~ . ~
contemplating, if we have not alreadidecided, to institute a military blockadé
in the Central American region aimed at Nicaragua. Would you he prepared to
state this mornine that we are not. that we havenot vlanned to do that and we
are not going to do that?
Secretary Haig: 1 am not prepared to say anything. 1think the President has
addressed the issue. and 1think vou know that, and 1think if vou are trvina to
create circumstances to reassure choserégimeswho have thus fa; heen undëteÏred
in their drive towards estahlishing a totalitarian régime inthis hemisphere, why,
1question whether or not we are on a sound course.
Mr. Bornes: MI. Secretary, in your opening statement you make some very
constructive points with respect to the need to have the resources to carry out
our foreign policy, and 1certainly want to salute that. 1am concerned, however,
that in specific instances we are going in precisely the wrong direction. 1 am
informed by everyone who is close to the situation that Costa Rica, for example,
is going bankrupt and has a very short time hefore it goes over the hrink.
My perception is that it seems to be a matter of indifference to this adminis-
tration whether what is a bastion of democracv in this reeion. verv close to the
Ilnitcd Stsies. \uri.ii,cï ai .IIIe:ononiically The ;idniinirtr;tion h.ijpropored 110
FSt it~rCi>si.iKICJ.and h;is iui dcvelopnicni ïsjisi;inic lor ihai coi.nir) by d
magnitude that is exceeded in percentage terms only hy the cuts for Nicaragua.
Why is this happening?
Here is a country that stands for everything we believe in, that has been
helpful to us in the international organizations time after time, that is in desperate
financial shape, and we ought to he responding not tomorrow, but yesterday.
What is going on? MII.rIARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTlVlTlES
Affachmenr 11-2
September 12, 1983.
NEWS RI3Ll?ASE, OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRbTARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLICAFFAIRS),
REMARKS PREPAREU FOR UllLlVERY BY THF. HONORABLE FRED C. IKLE, UNDER
SECRETARYOF DEFI!NSI! FOR POLICY TO BALTIMORE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
BALTIMOR EARYLAND
............................
Another bit of fiction: that the Sandinista réeimein Nicaraeua would have
d~~cl~~cd inIo plur~l!sricdemoirisy. had IInci becn for ihc ÜS intervention
The faci is th31 thc Sindinist;is, onliifc\r uccks aftcr the) Carneiniii pouer.
reneged on their promise for early -elections, began to atkck the democratic
trade unions, and invited Cuban military and security personnel in steadily
growing numbers. Yet, during the first 18months of the Sandinista régime,the
United States provided more than $120 million in direct aid and endorsed over
$220million in Inter-American Deveiooment Bank aid - more than the orevious
Somoza régimein Nicaragua had recéivedfrom the United States in i0 years!
Clearly. it was not US interference that drove the Sandinistas to link up with
Fidel Castro - unlesr economic aid is regarded as "interference".
The Sandinista régimein Nicaragua is determined 10create a "second Cuha"
in Central America. Ever since they seized power, the Sandinistas emharked on
a major military huildup. Today, they have a much larger army than Somoza
ever had, and they have expressed the intention to build the larges1 force in
Central America. Nicaragua is building new rnilitary airfields, and is irnporting
Soviet tanks, helicopters, arrnoredvehiclesand other equipment.
This "second Cuba" in Nicaragua would be more dangerous than Castro's
Cuha since it shares hard to defend horders with Honduras and Costa Rica. The
Sandinis~as~have alreadv started terrorist activities in both these countries. In
addition, Nicaragua provides essential support for the insurgency in El Salvador.
Even after the insurgency in El Salvador kas been brounht under control,
Nicaragua - if it concnued on its present course - wouldbe the bridgehead
and arsenal for insurgency for Central America. And once the Sandinistas have
acquired the military strength that ihey have long been planning for, they might
well use that strength for direct attacks on their neighbors to help speed up the
"revolution without frontiers" that they promixd us.
Congressional legislation to deny US support to the democratic resistance
forces in Nicaragua would turn Nicaragua into a sanctuary from which the
nations of Central America could he safely attacked, but in which US supported
forces could not operate. This would enable the promoters of totalitarianism -
while being supplied and replenished hy Cuha and the Soviet bloc - to attack
neighhoring countries indefinitely, and always with impunity. Hence, it would
deprive the Marxist groups in El Salvador of any incentive to compromise.
Indeed, if such legislation were passed, the Sandinistas and Cubans might well
find it safe toincrease their assistance to the insurgents in El Salvador and 10
steo uo the destahilization of Honduras and Costa Rica. This. after all. would
be'fuliy consistent with their presently declared objectives; and the guaranteed
sanctuary would render such escalation almost risk-Cree. ANNEXESTO THE MEMORlAL 201
Attachment 11-3
March 20, 1984.
No. 82
PRESS CONE'ERENCE BY THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ ,ECRETARYOF STATE
Secretary Shultz: In San Salvador a few weeks ago, 1 minced no words in
saying that death squads and terror have no place in a democracy. The time has
come to he equally hlunt about what needs Io be done here in Washington to
prevent new Cubas in Central America. This Administration, the last Admi-
nistration, and a 12-member Bipartisan Commission, which studied Central
America for five months, have al1concluded that important US interests are at
stake. If régimes responsiveto Moscow and Havana, and hostile to the United
States, are installed in Central Amenca, we will pay a high price for a long,
long time.
The irony is that the price to avoid new Cubas is still relatively small, and
that we can still pay it by supporting a policy that is fully consistent with our
ideals and with a search for political solutions.
The people of El Salvador vote Sunday for president and vice president. The
choices are real, and the balloting will he fair. The outcome is not a foregone
conclusion. Whoever takes office in June will have the legitimacy of proven
support from the people of El Salvador. We and everyone else will have to
recognize that fact in evaluating our policies and interests.
The election, however, is not being fought just among candidates who have
agreed to support the voters' decision.It is being violently opposed hy a guer-
rilla minority that refuses to put its program to the test of the ballot box. The
guerrillas have pulled some spectacular raids, but the army has been doing what
counts - protecting the cities, the hamest, and the peoples' right to choose.
Despite an upsurge of guerrilla terrorism against elected officiais,civilian deaths
from al1political causes for the month of Fehruary were the lowest in several
years - less than one-third those of February a year ago, and one-tenth those
of three to four years ago.
There is nothine unexoected about the need for more aid to El Salvador. We
knew, and the ~o&ressi<new, that the assistance authorized las1fall would run
out this spring. It was understood that we would reevaluate our needs after the
Bipartisan Commission had made its findings.
In January, the Bipartisan Commission recommended unanimously that we
provide El Salvador "significantly increased levels of military aid as quickly as
possibl -e" that's underlined on my sheet here because it's underlined inthe
report. In Fehruary, the President sent Congress a supplemental request for El
Salvador as part of his comprehensive program to implement the Bipartisan
Commission's recommendations. It is now ohvious that Congress will not act on
this legislation before June at the earliest, and deliverieswill take time after that.
Events in Central America simnlv.w,ll not wait that lone. There is a eau -.
bciu,ecn uh;it is nccded on tlic groiind .ind ilic pacc of tlic Ir.gisI~calcnJdr.
So WC idcniified \i,liat is iiesded n16hclp El Sal\dd.ir c<)ntinue<in iirchown
path to democracy, and to keep the pressure on Nicaragua to negotiate.
The national interest is clear. 1 cal1upon the Congress to approve the $93
million in emergency security assistancefor El Salvador so that its armed forces
can protect the people and the leaders they choose. And 1 also cal1upon the
Congress to recognize the validity of the struggle of those Nicaraguans who are202 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
resisting totalitarianism. To delay these funds is to hinder prospects for peace
and negotiations, to prolong suffering, and 10 strengthen the hand of Our
adversanes.
............................
Question:1 would like to ask about El Salvador. The armed forces are con-
tinually on the defensive against the guemlla troops. There continue to be
charees that the officiais are linked to the death sauads there. In Nicararua the
çont~nuedresistancc still hïs made only what the ~tÿie Depïrimcnt salls '~ariiçal
changes" in the Sandinirta'r hehaviur.
Whai ei,idcncedo \ou ha\.? thït xdditional moncv will hs spent more etfc~.tivrl)
or will achieve the &als you have in mind for thaï region? '
Secretary Shultz: 1 think the Salvador armed forces are effective and have
been basically doing a better and better job. One recent piece of evidence of a
different sort than is usually cited is that of some 260, 1think it is, municipalities
where ballot boxes will he placed for the election, for a while it was thought that
there were 70 places where you couldn't guarantee the security of those, due to
guerrilla activity. That estimate is now scaled down 10 around 20, due to the
efforts of the armed forces to secure secunty for this election. And 1might say
those 20 are in lightly populated areas and provisions are being made so that
people there can vote.
But 1think it is the case that the Salvador armed forces are e-vine a credihle
account of themselves and will do hetter and better if they gel Our support. We
have to recognize that, granting al1of the düïïculties they have, il's still the case
that we have a oroces; here in our su~uor..for them of creatine a ki-d of
maximum of unceriainty in thcir minds ahoui whai the flou of resourccs 8sgtiing
to hr, and ihat çÿu,cs grcat dificultics in planning And take ihc <iiuation riglit
now - they have to make a choice. Do we take the resources we have and
operate at a very meager, lowlevel so as to stretch them out, or do we say we
have to go al1out to protect this election and spend what we'vegot to do it and
take the chance on simply running out? And that's not a good position to place
them in.
So 1think they're givinga much better account of themselves than the nature
of your question implied.
Question: MI. Secretary, to follow up on that, if the Congress refuses to
act in a timely fashion on the Administration's request, is the Administration
prepared to use its emergency powers, 506 determination, Section 21d, in order
to provide aid for the Salvadoran military?
Secretary Shuitr: Well, our effort is to get the Congress to vote for this
money - it's needed- and that is our concern, and 1think that it is something
that the Congress ought to step up to and step up to promptly, and that's where
we'regoing to place our emphasis. And we will proceed in a fashion that - in
which we expect to get favorable votes on that money. ANNEXESTO THE MEMORlAL 203
Arrachmenr11-4
ADDRESS BY AMBASSAOOR JEANE 1. KIRKPATRICK UNITED STATES PERMAPiENi
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN1W.D NATIONS AT THE AMERlCAN SOCIETY OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAWW , ASHINGTOD NC,,APRIL 12, 1984
............................
Writing in New York magazine last September, after a visit to Nicaragua,
journalist Michael Kramer wrote:
"Those who dismiss the Sandinistasextraterritorial revolutionary rhetoric
are deluding themselves. When Commandante Bayardo Arce says, 'Wewill
never give up supporting our hrothers in El Salvador', he means it. And
Sandinista Defense Minister Humherto Ortega is equally serious when he
says, 'Of course, we are not ashamed to be helping El Salvador. We would
like to help al1revolutions'."
"ln practice, such words," Kramer continued, "have translated into supplying
Salvadoran guerrillas with whatever they need."
The question of whether there is or is not a pattern of armed attack, a
consistent determined pattern of armed attack by Nicaragua against her neigh-
bors. is onethat has been definitivelvanswered hy the evidence whichis availahle
in ihc u,orld ioda?.IIpublic as \i,cila, ihr~>ughintelligcncesourccs Alrcad) by
Iaic 1979, ;ila rime whcn the C;iricr ,\Jminiriration uah proi,iding Uicar;igu;i
uith I;irpcanioiiliis oi ciunumii assisiance. th2 S.inJiniriai haJ already iniiiaied
the huild-uo of a militarv machine vastlv suoerior to that of anv other country
in ihc regiiin I niight jusi remind you ihat the Unitcd Siaics pro~i~cd~hcrégimi
of ihc govcrnmcni of Kicaragua more cconomir a\sijtancc in the lirsi iuo )cars
oi'its Iiie ihan did ans oihcr countr, I might reniind )ou furihcr that ihc Cniicd
States su..orted. in international fiscal irÏstitutions. successful N-caraeuan loan
applications, more economic assistance for the government of Nicaragua than
the Somoza government had received from those same international fiscal insti-
tutions inthépreceding 20 years.
To build this machine, the Sandinistas shunted aside offers of modest security
assistance from allies in theegion and instead established military lies with the
Soviet Union and invited thousands of Cuban military, security and intelligence
advisers to help in the establishment of the new system.They sought and received
massive infusions of Soviet military equipment, and now boast that they have
acquired an armored brigade and an artillery brigade. Much of this equipment
arrived hetween 1979 and 1982 - when no significant armed opposition
whatsoever existed, and when in fact many of those who are now in active
opposition to the Nicaraguan government themselves occupied positions in the
Sandinista government. The most dramatic examples of that probably would he
Alfonso Robelo, Eden Pastora and Arturo Cruz.
In lune 1980. the Sandinistas invited the Salvadoran guerrillas to set up
command and control headquarters in the Managua area, and Nicaragua
and Cuba beean at that time their full-scale sumort of El Salvador's FMLN,
inrluding ihcïraining and provision of arms aniiuppli~s. This cummand cenier
for thc gucrrilla irar againsi the G<)vcrnmcnini El Salvador coniinuei to opcratc
in and frum h'icurdzua Confronicd wiih rc~c~tcddcnials byihc povernmcni ul'
Nicaragua that a ommand and control Eenter from which coÏmmunications
Jircciing ihc gucrrilla uar in lil Sal\adur cxisicd, in July 1982.the UniieJ Si+ics
Govcrnment onércdIo scnd a ieihnical redm Io .Van<iguaIo hclp thc Sandinista
government locale the center. The offer was ignored204 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
In 1980 and 1981. Nicaragua-and Cuba eneaeed iu -assive airlifts of arms
and supplies IO S;iliador's gucrrilliis from Papalon Airfield in 'licar3gwa. \+iih
ihc ~ibjcctivcorprcparing the gucrrillas liir a large-rcalr J~nudry 1'181i)l~r.nrivc.
In aJJiii<in. ol'iourse. the irb<>iarr atiack iin Il<>psnxo,\irticld in El SaI\,ador.
which destroyed El Salvador's miitary air capabiiiti& at the time, was planned
in Cuba, and Cubans and Nicaraguans were the principal, technical help for
carrying out that attack and continue to be the main source of support for the
guerrillas.
In early 1981,the Sandinistas hegan aggressivelyto violate Costa Rica's treaty
rights to use the San Juan River, which divides Nicaragua and Costa Rica on
their Canhhean Coast.Sincethen Costa Rican ships have been harassed, stopped,
sometimes seized, on the Rio San Juan.
In 1982,the Nicaraguan government initiated activities designed to destahilize
and intimidate the Costa Rican Government. On July 4, 1982, for example,
Nicaraeuan aeents were directlv involved in the hombine of the offices of a
Costa Rican Zrline in San José:Two Nicaraguan diplom& were subsequently
expelled from Costa Rica for their involvement. The Nicaraguans also kidnapped
an Argentine diplomat, forced him to make false statements regarding the anti-
Sandinista movement and subsequently assassinated him.
In June 1983, the Sandinistas infiltrated into Honduras a 100-man guerrilla
force trained in Cuba and Nicaragua as a first step toward destabilizing the
Honduran Government. This force was interceoted bv the Honduran militarv.
whichcaptured numetous documents and diaries'oftheguerrillas, clearly showing
the intent of the operation, as well as the Cuban and Nicaraguan.involvement
in it.
Earlier, the Honduran Government had catalogued wellover 100cross-border
incidents between September 1981, and June 1982, which had been initiated hy
the Sandinistas, ranging from indiscriminate firing on Honduran border posts to
the entry of Sandinista troops well within Honduran territory to steal cattle,
kidnap campesinos and terrorize the border population.
In December 1983(1 am choosing some examples almost at random), a group
of some 2,000 Miskito Indians lied their concentration camps - and it is not
too much to cal1them that - at Francia-Sirpe, Nicaragua, and took refuge in
Honduras at the Mocoron Refugee Camp. The Nicaraguan government strafed
the refugees from airplanes to prevent their escape. Having failed to halt the
refugee column, they then sent armed troops into Honduras in an effort to bring
back at least some of the refugees. That effort also failed, but the Sandinistas
had again violated Honduran soil.
Durine 1984. Nicaraeuan troons have moved the international houndan,
markersUsepar&ing ~i&ra~ua frhm Honduras from their rightful places in
Honduran territory by as mucb as a third of a mile, after which Nicaraguan
troops then occupied the new border area.
There are many other examples, including some in 1984, of such Nicaraguan
activities and threats. During the months of February and Marcb, 1984, the
inhabitants of the eastern Honduran towns of Matadenguello, Porfordedonda,
Padreas and Pueblo Nuevo were forced to abandon their houses hecause of
coniiani harasameni froni ihc Sïniiiniiiai. who cien uscd a Hondurzin school
building as a ienipordr) g~rrison lividcnce thai Uicaraguan forces ;ire reloc:iiing
border markers in the area souih of ihc I.;iferirinid;id and lil I:j~irio crossing
oints have multiolied. In some cases the border markers have bien ~laced
;iiuch as oiic kll~meter in>idc Ilonduran territor). ,\i wih a point ~andinibiü
miliiar) I;~rcr.suill eitahlish an i>h+er\ati<ni>sion a hill in Honduran terrilor)
and lire on Honduran civilians in the area fÏom across the border. ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 205
On March 23, Daniel Ortega warned Costa Rican President Luis Alberto
Monge that other Central Amencan ports might be mined by insurgent groups
acting in solidarity with Nicaragua.
As of this time, there is not a scintilla of evidence to suggest that any of the
Nicaraguan activities in support of armed attack against her neighbors, especially
El Salvador, have ceased. Continued Nicaraguan oppression and forceable
relocation of the Miskito. Sumo and Rama Indians in eastern Nicaraeua has led
~ ~. ~ ~
Io the continucd Ilight<~I'th.)u~anil si Indians, of coursc, initi Ilondura,. rlncu
-.oup ciimore than I,llO~iInilians :irri\:d inIlonduras onl, icn da,s agi,, ai ac
were, in fact, discussing Nicaragua's complaint against the-~nited-States in the
Security Council.
The supplies from Nicaragua for the Salvadoran insurgency arrive by air, by
sea and by land. They arrive by small planes, such as Cesnas, which land on dirt
roads and fields and oiï~loa~ ~ ~ir arms. Bundles of matérielare droooed fro..
thcic imall airçraft IO insurgcnis opcr;itinp in El Sal\adnr's rural arcda wherc
thcre arc no fieldsor ;ilrstrip, or ruiid, auilable. Small hiiaihand dugoui canner
:irc u,ed Io fcrrv arms from Punta <:uïicuina in Nisaracua across the Ciulf of
Fonseca to El ~alvador and further up tfie coast. LtdrgeÏquantities of weapons
and supplies load and leave from Nicaragua's now lamous Westcoast ports on
ocean-going vessels for movement north; lighter and smaller craft land along El
Salvador's Pacificbeaches. Byland, munitions and matérielhave been intercepted
during transit during the shortest distance between the northwest Nicaraguan
and southeast Salvadoran borders, by way of Honduras, and so forth and so on.
There isample evidencefrom a number of sources,including Salvador guerrillas
who deserted or were captured, including al1the kinds of intelligence available
in the contemporary world, that the Sandinistas continue to provide a regular
supply Row to the Salvadoran insurgency: arrns, ammunition, food, medicine,
clothine- whatever.
Ihe evidcncc ihai Nicaragua is in\,olvcd in promoiing armcd insurgency in El
Salv:iJor ir iruly hcyund dispute. l.;ist M:i) 13.ihc Permanent Select C<~mmiticc
on Intelligcn~cof the Hiiu~c Rcpreicniati\c\ isrued a rcpori \rhich coniluded
"The Sandinistas have steooe..uo their suooort ..r insureence in Hon-
duras anil the Cubcin-'li;:irag~aii aid ig)rinsurgcnce ri~n~iiiuici ;icl~ir pi:-
t.irr'of ;ictiic promoiion iur rcv<~lutionii,iihi~litirontiers throughùiit Cciitr:il
America hy Cuba and Nicaragua."
The same House Committee also reiterdted ils earlier finding that the guerrillas
in El Salvador are "well-trained. well-eauiooed with modern weaoons and suo-
plies, and rely on the use of sites in ~i'ca;&ua for command and control aid
for logistical support". The House Committee said, "the intelligence supporting
these judgments provided to the Committee is convincing".
Just last week. a democra~ic~member of the Senate Intellieence Committee
stated that it was the Committee's judgment that "~icara~ua's involvement in
the alïairs of El Salvador, and to a lesser degree its other neighbors, continues".
Soecificallv. arms and materials still Row from the communist bloc throueh
~icara~uato the insurgents in El Salvador. What the House intelligence
Committee stated last May is still true. The insurgency in El Salvador, then,
depends for its life blood, arms, ammunition, financing, logistics, command and
control. communication uoon outside assistance. in a oattern of armed attack
from ~'icara~uaand Cuba:
It is worth noting in this context that the National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America concluded unanimously "that Nicaragua is a crucial stepping
stone for Cuba and Soviet efforts to support armed insurgency in Central206 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITILS
America". Recently, the military assistance provided by Nicaragua to the
guerrillas in El Salvador has been used by the guerrillas to sabotage the
democratic political process taking place in that country. Since the beginning of
the year, Nicaraguan-supported terrorists in El Salvador have assassinated three
members of the Constituent Assembly,a militaryjudge and a campaign organizer.
Under the slogan "Electoral Farce, No; Popular War, Yes", the armed
insurgents in El Salvador did everything possible to disrupt the March 25election
and to reduce voter turnout. That included, of course, mining roads, threatening
dnvers and gas station owners for selling fuel, and setting off bombs and
threatening further bomhs. On election eve, soldiers stationed in Teguetepeci
were killed and inhabitants prevented from voting. Guerrilla sabotage caused
about 80percent of the country to be blacked out for over 12hours immediately
preceding the opening of the polls. This loss of electrical power severelydismpted
the final sorting and dispatch of voting materials and obviously had a part of
the desired effecton the timely arriva1of voting materials to some polling places.
In spite of al1of this, as everybody knows, some nearly one-and-a-half million
Salvadorans, over 75 per cent of the eligible voters, actually cas1their ballots in
what~a~-~~ombian~deleeatiun called an "imnressive demonstration of the will of
ihs SaI\.adurdn people to iind a Jcmocraiic suluiion"
Thc \carch for a dcmocraiic pcdceïul rolution is not shared hy the govrrnmrnt
of Nicarxgua. The n;iiure of the conflict in Central ,\mcri~i 2nd the ci>nsiquenccr
JI'the piitiern of. anJ ci>mmitmcntto. arnied ütiack irreflscicJ in the coniriisiinà
p<>licicrs>l'the'Iicaragudn anJ SaIi,adtir~nG~i\eriinientstoward the pariicipdiiuii
of armed opponents in their election processes. In response to a declaration by
the armed opposition - the so-called contras in Nicaragua - that they were
prepared to lay down arms if they could participate in a peaceful political
competition for power and help settle Nicaragua's political question tbrough the
ballot box. the eovernment of Nicaragua announced that such oovonents would
not be peAitte2 to participate unde; any circumstances and &uld instead be
tried in ubsenriu as criminals. The Government of El Salvador look exactly the
opposite position and actually invited the armed opposition to participate in the
election on condition only that they lay down their arms and agree to peaceful
political competition.
It seems perfectly clear, therefore, that to portray Nicaragua as a victim in
the current situation is a complete Orwellian inversion of what is actually hap-
pening in Central America. There can be no question by reasonable persons that
Nicaragua is engaged in a continuing, determined, armed attack against its
neighbors, and that under the Charter of the United Nations, if not according
to the laws of the class struggle, those neighbors have the right of individual or
collective self-defense.For Nicaragua, the party that has initiated the violation
of international law through the use of violence against its neighbors, to seek
recourse before the International Court of Justice amounts to nothine more or
less than a cynical effort aimed at influencing world opinion, ong gr es si on al
votes, and performing al1 the other functions of propaganda. Nicaragua seeks,
in short, to~usethe court in a blatantly propagandistic manner.
The orohlem. reallv.,i. what we can and should do about this oattern of
action. Obviously, if international law is to have relevance in the contemporary
world, it mus1 be protected against those who would subvert its fundamental
purposes by using -it as an instrument to legitimate aggressive violenceand to
delegitimate the use of force in self-defense. These problems were not really
foreseen by the authors of the Charter of the United Nations, and yet versions
of these same problems confront those of us who try in fact to work in the
United Nations and through the Charter on a continuing, almost weekly basis. ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 207
1would like to discuss briefly some less sensational aspects of these problems
now, and begin with an aspect of US participation in the United Nations which
has received less attention than it desemes. 1 will begin in 1962, when the
International Court of Justice had just decided in the so-called "Certain Expenses
Case", in whichthe Court held that the United Nations' peacekeeping operations
in the Congo were a legitimate expense of the United Nations and that the Soviet
Union therefore could not lawfully refuse to pay its share of the expenses. Now,
the Soviet Union at the time chose deliherately to ignore that judgment of the
Court and to this day refuses to pay its share of any United Nations' peacekeeping
operations, which are, of course, part of its assessed budget. Soviet refusa1 to
comply with the ruling of the World Court and the inahility of the United
Nations to do anything about it caused many in Congress at that lime to urge
US withdrawal from the United Nations. Many in Congress could no1 bear the
idea of a double standard whereby the United States would continue to foot a
maior oortion of the United Nations' bills while the Soviet Union was free to
dis;egard its obligations.
Faced with this prohlem, which might have led to the hreakup of the United
Nations. Justice Arthur Goldberg was ~ersudded to leave the United States
supreme Court for two reasons: to save ihe United Nations from this crisis and
to help extricate us from Vietnam. In his first move as US Ambassador to the
United Nations in 1965,Justice Goldberg succeeded in achievingan understdnd-
ing with Congress in what has come to be known as the "Goldherg Reservation".
That declaration, contained in the President's 1965 Report to the Congress on
US Participation in the United Nations, States:
"If any Member can insist on making an exception to the principle of
collective financial resuonsibilitv with resuect to certain activities of the
Organi/ation. the I'nited Stütçs rtscrvcr the sdme sption to rnakrc.xccptiiins
tu thc priii~iplr.soi collc~ti\: tin~n~ualrcïpiinrihility if in iiur situ, rtroiig
and comuelliÏngreasons exist for doing so. There can be no double standard
among the ~ekhers of the ~r~dnizd~on."
In this regard, 1 will say a few words about the matter of the US decision to
modify its voluntary decision to accept the jurisdiction of the World Court.
Much like the recent US veto at the United Nations, it is not the United States
which has abused adherence to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The
vast majonty of nations, some two-thirds of them, do not even submit to the
voluntary jurisdiction of the Court. And even in cases where others have agreed
to the Court's jurisdiction, many States have attached reservations and others
have not complied with the decisions of the Court.
On this suhject, it is interesting and instructive to look at the list of nations
which have in fact agreed to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court
and also those among them, approximately 50 out of 158memhers of the United
Nations, which have filed reservations. 1might just mention a few; I've got the
list. Among the countries which have entered reservations are: Australia,
Barbados, Botswana, Canada, Colomhia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
El Salvador, Finland, Gambia, India, Israel, Japan, Kampuchea, Kenya, Liberia,
Liechtenstein, Luxemberg, Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Nonvay, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Somalia, Sudan, Swazi-
land, Sweden,Switzerland,Togo, Uganda, United Kingdom and the United States.
And 1don't think that's an exhaustive list, b, the wav.
The point is that here, as in so many other cases involvingthe United Nations,
it is suagested that the United States be held to standards to which other nations
do noisübmit themselves and to which there is little serious suggestion that they208 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
he held. In fact, the United States has complied with decisions ofthe Court even,
generally speaking, when we have not regarded the decision as in our hest
interest. The selectivity of the application of standards in the United Nations,
unfortunatelv. has s~read to most of its bodies.
Last weeki'in vetoing the resolution of the United Nations, which condemned
mining in El Salvador, the United States made the following statement:
"The United States would have no prohlem with this resolution, if it were
concemed with al1of the violence in the region, if its ohject were respect for
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of al1 countries in the region and
not simply Nicaragua. But this resolution expressesno concern for the many
attacks on El Salvador, or on El Salvador's electoral process, or the
continued violations of that country's sovereignty and territorial integrity
hy Nicaragua's continuing shipment of arms to El Salvador. Surely, the
international community has its interest in these . ..The resolution hefore
us last week [we said] expresses no concern for the repeated violations of
the horders of Honduras or Costa Rica, but surely the United Nations
Charter applies to those."
New York Times, April 17, 1984.
TEXT OF STATEMENTBY CIA
Washington, April 16 - Following is a statement today by George Lauder,
the Central Intelligence Agency spokesman, on behalf of the agency conceming
its efforts to keep appropriate committees of Congress informed of CIA covert
operdtions:
During the 13January 1981 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing
on the nomination of Mr. Casey to he Director, CIA, MI. Casey said:
"1 intend to comply fully with the spirit and the letter of the Intelligence
Oversight Act. 1 intend to provide this committee with the information it
helievei it needs for oversight purposes."
MI. Casey helieves the record will reflect that he and his staff have kept that
pledge. A chronology of briefings of the Congressional oversight committees
in connection with events in Central Amenca reveals that from December 1981
through March 1984,either the director or deputy director briefed the Congres-
sional committees 30 times on Central America.
Moreover, from 16 Septemher 1983 through 2 April 1984, other officiais of
CIA hriefed either the committees or the committee staff 22 times on Central
American developments. Since the first of this year, the subject of mining of
Nicaraguan ports has heen discussed with memhers or staffers of the committees
and other members of the Congress 11times.210 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTlVlTlES
America, including Nicaragua, is through serious negotiations in the Contadora
Process. We hope that the Govemment of Nicaragua will respond to the Court's
decision by making a serious effort to advance the regional negotiating process
in CO-operationwith the Contadora Process
That's al11have for you.
Question: John, you've left me confused, which may have heen your intention,
but what you're sayingis that the only thing you believe the Court dealt with
today was the US decision to remove itself from jurisdiction for two years?
Answer: It has not mled instantly on the matter of jurisdiction, that is. It is
obviously going to consider that in due course, we hope speedily.
Question: It was my understanding that when you made that announcement
that you were removing yourself from jurisdiction for two years on decisions
involving Central America, it was a unilateral decision not to be dealt with hy
the Court but an announcement that the United States would no1 accept juris-
diction?
Answer: Well,wewere notifying the Courtofthat action, and weare taking -
have taken Our case to the Court and are going to continue to argue that with
the Court.
Question: And what you're sayingis that the only issue which was dealt with
today was that jurisdiction?
Answer: There were these provisional measures indicated. And, as I said, we
do not consider that those are inconsistent with current United States policy and
activities with regard to Nicaragua.
Question: John, isn't- the decision said that the US should stop essentially
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~a. 11'sa sort of restraint order. Isn't that the thrust of it?
Ansiver: Well, theu- lrefer you to the Court and statement. As 1 say, we've
seen what you have. We don't have the full text. I understand it'sabout 40 pages
Question: There's nothing in that restraint order -
Answer: That we consider to he inconsistent with current United States policy
and activity with regard to Nicaragua.
Ouestion: With resoect to that. John. the first unanimous iudrment savs. and
I &oie. ..'lhe I nitcd States ciiAnicric'i jhould inimcdiaie~ cylir.and.refrain
frùni any action rcsiricting hli~ckinor cndang-ring-acccsstoor from Niiaraguan
ports", etc.
1 take what you just said as meaning that the United States is in no way
pursuing activity that is inconsistent with that at the present time. And my
question is, if that correction - if that interpretation is correct- my question
is. will the United States abide bv that ruline-.endinr t-e settlement of the
jurisdiction issue at least?
Answer: As 1Say,we haven't seen - we wanted to give you some provisional
and early respon&, and we haven't seen the full tex;, and we want to take a
look at it. But 1 think that Our words speak for themselves. I've told you the
United States respects the Court and the rule of law and intends to act
accordingly. 1think that statement is quite clear.
Question: John, you're accepting,then, that judgrnent?
Ansiver: 1think Ourwords are quite clear.
Quesrion: Yes. Let me jus1 - I'm sorry. So, in other wofds, even though you
said that, in your initial statement to the Court, that you did no1want Io accept
any Court ruling on Central American issues -
Ansiver: Well, wehave taken Ourcase on jurisdiction 10the Court.
Question: Yes. So (inaudible). ANNEXESTO THE MEMORIAL 211
Answer: It is not a question of saying we don't accept jurisdiction or not
making that case for the Court.
Question: You're not saying, whatever they decide, you're not going to
carry out?
Answer: I'rn not saying that, no.
Question: John, are you stressing the fact that the mling is not inconsistent
with current US policies in regard to Nicaragua because, as a matter of simple
fact, the mining has stopped?
Answer: As you know, we have not responded to questions relating to mining
and alleged covert activity, but 1think you might read the statement concerning
current activity in conjunction with allegations that have heen made.
Question: 1sit consistent to continue to seek additional funds for the contras?
Answer: Yes, it is.
Question: John,are you saying that if the Court decidesthat it has jurisdiction,
that vou will then ahide hv its decision?
~nswer: i'm saying that we respect the Court and the rule of law, and we
intend to act accordingly. And what we'regoing to do now is press for resolution
on the matter of jurisdiction.
Question: John, when did the phrase "current policy and activities" begin?
Can you give us a date of what "current" means - when that started? We
understand that means today, but -
Answer: 1can't. This is today's statement and speaks for itself.
Question: So, it's at least as of today, but you're not making any comment as
to how much hefore today the US policy was consistent with the mling?
Answer: No.
yi<<~vri~~Johii. dn thc question dfjuri~dictlun, ar',)ou sa)ing in thal ridtr~rncnt
thai the UnitcJ Stotcs nom rcc,igiii/es thc \V<i~Court's riglii13rciu~c 1,)acccpt
the iiiiil~icrïl stsieni~tit nide pre\iously hy the L'nitcdStster"
Answer: What we're saying is that we are arguing the case on jurisdiction
before the Court, and we fully expect that that argument will proceed expe-
ditiously.
Question: And by arguing it in the Court itself, is that not implicitly accepting
the Court's right to accept or reject the US unilateral statement?
Answer: We respect the Court and the rule of law and we expect to act
accordingly.
Question: Do you still reserve the right to ignore the Court, John, to ignore
the Court's findings?
Answer: 1will leave you with our statement concerning r~spe~t for the Court
and law.
Question: 1have a question which perhaps you should clarify with respect to.
1 think it was Barrie's question. He asked you, is it consistent with seeking
additional funds for the contras, and your reply was, "Yes". Do you want to
stick with that statement?
Answer: There is no change in the Administration's request for funds in
connection with that particular activity. There is no change in that.
Question: Another area.
Quesfion: Wait a minute. The Court ruling today used the phrase "paramilitary
activity" in connection with Nicaragua. 1sit your - I'rn not sure i'm phrasing
the question properly here - but is it your view that your statement about
consistent US policy covers, and the continuing to seek money for these activities
that you just mentioned is consistent with that phrase, "paramilitary activity"?
Answer: Yes. Well, what I'm saying is - what 1 do not want to do here is
argue the substance of the case which clearly may or may not he argued212 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
somewhere else. But the fact is, 1just refer you to arguments that have heen
used, position that has been stated in terms of collective self-defensein the past,
and 1 would jus1 reiterate Our statement that our activities and policy are not
inconsistent with what the Court is asking.
Question: John, do you have any idea at al1as to how long it will take hefore
the Court decides the jurisdictional issue- any notion?
Answer: 1 do not have an idea, but we certainly intend to proceed with dis-
patch, and we think there is a clear obligation on the part of the Court to proceed
vcry expeditiously.
Question: If the Court decides that it does have continued jurisdiction despite
the US statement, you will then accept the further judgments of the Court on
the substance of the issue?
Answer: Well, 1 think that statements we have made in the past tend to lead
one in that direction, and I'm going to ask you to stand with the language that
we have offered you today, namely that we certainly respect the Court and the
rule of law, and we intend 10act accordingly.
1 cannot outline a scenario that would take place under every conceivahle
possihility, but 1think that is the thrust of what we're saying.
Question: But your earlier statement last month was that you would not
acce.- iud-ents bv the Court in the area of Central Amenca for the next two
years.
Answer: Well, 1don't think that's correct. 1think what we were talking about
was jurisdiction. That doesn't mean that we're not prepared to argue the case
for jurisdiction and, hopefully, win it.
Question: John, how do you feel about the fact that the Court has come up
with this interim finding hefore resolving the jurisdiction issue?
Answer: 1guess we'llhave to leave that for the international jurists to analyze
and comment upon.
Question: John, would you say you're backing off your previous position on
this?
Answer: Not at all.
Question: What diference does it make any more if you're saying you're going
to act in accordance with the rule of law and that you respect the Court?
Answer: Uh-huh.
Question: Why hother to go ahead and argue the jurisdictional issue?
Ans~ver: It's an important one.
Question: It's an important one because it deals not- in the way itdeals not
with Central America, but in the way il deals with future -
Answer: Well, we're arguing itin this particular case, but il's an important
one in general; but certainly, in this particular case it's important.
Question: John, when you announced this last month, you cited the example
of other nations that have done similarly in the past. Do you have any
information as to how those cases came out and whether the countries which
did that accepted the Court's rulings?
Answer: 1 don't. I'm sure that's a matter of record, but 1 don't happen to
have it with me.
Question: I'm sorry - one more lime: Would it he possible to, when a reading
is availahle and you have read the full text, to put up some guidance or have a
briefing which would go over the four judgments that were accorded in the
Court's summary today?
Answer: Carry that request to the appropriate folks, sure.
Question: Thank you.
Answer: 1mean 1don't know what the outcome will he.
............................ ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 213
Question: John, can we have a copy of that World Court statement?
Answer: Sure.
Question: John, could 1 just go hack to the World Court to make sure I
understand this? Are you saying that if you lose the case for jurisdiction, and
the Court comes up with a ruling that is unfavorable to the United States, still
the United States is prepared to ahide by that ruling?
Answer: Well, I'm saying once again that we respect the Court and the mle of
law, and we intend to act accordingly; and certainly, everything in that statement
tends to support the conclusion you're directing.
As 1 say, 1 cannot totally rule out or foresee every possible scenario, but 1
wouldn't quarrel with the deduction that you're making.
Question: What is the next step from now on, John, in terms of procedures?
1sthe Court -
Answer: Tomorrow we talk to the Court about scheduling, and we move
from there.
Question: Let's say the Court decides against the United States on this
jurisdictional matter. 1sthere any appeal? 1sit possible to appeal it? What is the
procedure?
Answer: An appeal of that -
Question:- of that decision on junsdiction?
Answer: I don't know. You'vegone beyond my expertise.
Questiorr:1just wanted to have an idea of how much time it is going to take.
Answer: As 1 say, we think the jurisdictional question should be disposed
of rapidly.
............................
Question: The President, in his speech last night about Central America,
repeatcd a theme which has heen sort of central in - somehow about the PL0
involvement in Central America or Nicaragua, and they said it was last year in
a paper put out by some organization here in the - it had some association
with the White House - that the PL0 is involved in training and other things
in Nicaragua and Central Amenca and other areas.
Can the State Department or this Government specificallyput out a White
Paper about the PL0 involvement in Central America, to put to rest al1of these
charges, whether it's from the President or the State Department or other areas,
to show that there is real involvement there. It concerns so many people in the
Arah world to know if they are really involved or they just, you know, are
hearsay or some charges which are not justified?
Answer: Okay.
Question: Can you look into this?
Answer: 1don't know about a White Paper, but let us look and see whether
there's anything that we might he able to- MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
Allachment 11-7
May 25, 1984
PRESS BRIEFING BY LARRY SPEAKES
Mr. Speakes' Office
[Nol reproduced]
Altachment 11-8
Friday, January 25, 1985
EXCWPTS FROM REMARKS BY VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH TO THE EXECUTIVT
FORUM, WASHINGTO DN,
We did not come al1this way to watch country after country fall to Marxist,
totalitarian ,vran,v. We have oromis~ ~ ~ stand wit~ t~ ~ ~ ~nds of f~ ~ -~-and
democracy wherever they are, and particularly in this hemisphere. Ours must be
the hemisphere of the human spirit, democracy's hemisphere.And that means
our support for those in ~icaragua who are fighting the-communist Sandinistas
must go forward. The world is starting to understand that the Sandinistas have
hetrayed their own revolution, and that those called the contras are the true
champions of freedom and democracy. We must not abandon the contrasnow.
Altachment 11-9
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LANGHORNE A. MOTLEY ,SSISTANT
SECRETARYOF STAIE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS ,EFORE THE WFSTERN HEMIS-
PHERE SUBCOMMITiEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFTAIRS ,S HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATI WANUARY 29, 1985
1984in Nicaragua confirmed diiTerentbut equally important lessons from the
Bipartisan Commission's report. The key lesson: that dictatorship, no matter the
rhetoric, leads to repression, civil war and foreign entanglements. (That in 1984
Ortega had himself "elected" as Somoza had had himself "elected" in 1974only
underscores the point.) ANNEX~ TO THE MEMOR~AL 215
But 1984 also confirmed another critical lesson: that the Sandinistas can
change their ways if the pressure to do so is clear. Throughout 1983and inIo
1984, a variety of pressures.- military exercises, naval maneuvers, internal
opposition (hoth armed and unarmed), falling international prestige - did
produce some change, at least rhetorically, in Sandinista behavior. There were
renewed promises of free elections and continued negotiations within the
Contadora Process. But then something happened.
By the end of 1984,the Sandinistas were again acting as if they had no per-
suasive reason to compromise with their neighhors, with their own dissident
political force- or with the United States. It is reasonahle to assume that the
Sandinistas concluded both that their opponents internal support would not he
matched externally and that they themselves could propagandize their way to
"legitimacy" through a sham election. If those judgments hold, it would imply
a US failure in terms of both friends and principles.
In the Contadora process, the nations of Central America have agreed that
for any regional peace agreement to last, open political systems must he not just
an ideal or a legal commitment, but a practical reality. They know that their
future depends on working together and not allowing the pendulum to swing
hack - and on their not allowing outside powers to impose a new dictatorship
in their midst.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, 1 believe that the Administration and
the Congress have reason to conclude that thepoliciesivehavebeenfollowingihe
last/our yearsare succeeding and that the besioption/or the nextfour yearsis
firm, bipariisancontinuiiy.
The lessons from the recent past and the guidelines for the near future can be
condensed into an assertion and a warning: The skepiicsiverewrongaboui El
Salvador,they were wrong aboui Crenada,and theyare wrong aboutNicaragua-
andal1for thesamereasons.
There is one issue, however, on which considerable controversy still reigns:
Nicaragua.
On that issue. as on others. we must be realistic. Realism means standing
firmly on principles and with o"r friends. And it also means understanding how
to go about it in the real world - where clear alternatives and easy choices are
as Ïare as practicing democrats among the cornandantes.
Both Ourcommitments and our interests can best he served hy the conclusion
of a workable, comprehensive and fully verifiable regional agreement based
solidly on the 21 Objectives the Contadora Process has set for itself. Our
diplomacy must continue to support that outcome.
On behalf of the Contadora countries, Mexico suggested that we initiate direct
talks with the Sandinistas. Secretary Shultz travelled to Managua las1June Io
propose such talks, making clear publicly, and privately, Io Daniel Ortega, that
our purpose was to support and facilitate the Contadora Process. As a result of
the Secretary's initiative, nine meetings have now been held hetween Special
Envoy Shlaudeman and Nicaraguan Vice Minister Tinoco. These have been
useful in permitting each side to present its concerns, but they have made no
substantive progress. Next month a new and most important round of nego-
tiations will begin in the Contadora Process. With that in view, and in order to
avoid any impression that the Manzanillo talks could in any way replace or ANNEXES IO THE MEMORIAL 217
And, finally: Ifpre.s.sureand negotiations fail and the problem continu-es as
is possible, if not necessarily likely, in the case of Nicaragua's Sandinistas -
thenthe alternatives will surelybe lessdesirable and for more expensive . et us
be specific:
- the Sandinistas have global ties and plans for Nicaragua and the rest of
Central America that are contrary to US interests;
- they will not modify or bargain away their position unless there is some
incentive for them to do so;
- the only incentive that has proved effectivethus far has been opposition from
other Nicaraguans (remember what happened after the 1980emergency sup-
plemental for Nicaraguan reconstruction?);
- if pressure is taken away, the Sandinistas will have no reason to compromise;
- if the Sandinistas have no reason to compromise, Contadora will surely
fail; and
- if Contadora fails, the long-run costs to the US in terms of money and lives
will be much greater.
The perceived US relationship to the Nicaraguans who have taken up arms
against those who cheared them of the goals of their revolution against Somoza
has been controversial. However, the fact that the Nicaraguan armed resistance
has heen able to sustain, and in some respects even increase, its operations in
recent months reflects its suhstantial indigenous as well as hemispheric support.
Realisticallv. nart of the dehate over the future should focus on what Nica-
ragua woufd 6e like withoutpressure from the armed opposition, which short of
changes in Sandinistas behavior, is the only interna1obstacle to consolidation of
an undemocratic régimeat home providing military support to Marxist revo-
lutions throughout Central America.
US policies must also consider the consequences of any failure to induce
the Sandinista govemment to allow political pluralism. Contras. to their own
pronouncements, the Sandinistas may he content Io be left alone to build
Marxism in one country. But the burden of proof should lie on those who
proclaim that the Sandinistas are interested in doing their thing totally within
Nicaragua. Neither the Cuban orecedent nor the Sandinistas' behavior to date
fit that-proposition. And if a long-term policy of containment were to become
necessary, both the US and its friends in Central America would pay the price,
in resources dearly needed for other purposes.
Nicaragua's freedomfighters deserve the solidarity of the West no less - some
would say more, hecause of the imperative of proximity - than the Afghan
rebels or the Polish Solidarity movement. Shall we always wring our hands when
a country suffers from Soviet or Marxist dictatorship but fail to help those who
~..~.~i~ ~ ~
The identity of the resistance fighters has heen clouded hy Sandinista propa-
randa denunciations of them as "murderers, marauders and rapists". They are
said to be merc~~~nes and most~ ~~~rmerNational Guardsmen who remain ioval
to Somoza. In fact, al1you have to do is count the numhers through; there are
far more resistance fightersthan there ever were members ofthe National Guard,
even at its peak in ~omoza's last days. The freedom fighters are peasants, far-
~ ~ ~~.~onkee~ers and vendnrs. ~-e~r leaders are without exceution men who
, .
opp,~.rrl soi no?^ And u.hiit ,.nitr.\ thcm to cach oihcr dnd to ihc thousdnds of
Ni:.<rdzuanr $3ho rc%i ~\,I~~uuI :irm.:15 d~~~lius~onni~n nltth Sandin~siilabusr.,
corruotion and fanaticism. The mvth that if Somoza was bad. the Sandinistas
have to be good was exploded long ago for most Nicaraguans.218 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY AC~VITIES
Let us be clear: It is partly because our adversaries are intervening on behalf
of totalitarianism in Central America that so many of Our friends are involved
in interna1 opposition to dictatorship. The Nicaraguan resistance was labelled
"contras" by the people who wanted to deny them legitimacy. But the historical
fact is that they are more "for" than "against": they are for democracy, for
national independence and for the original promises of the anti-Somoza revo-
lution. What they are against are the suhverters of those ideals. The Nicaraguan
democratic resistance clearly has a principled claim on Our support. These are
friends who merit Our standing with them - and indeed can be frustrated if
they are denied our help.
Aitachment 11-10
January 30, 1985.
LElTER OF THE SECRETARY OF STATEW , ASHINGTON TO, THE PRESIDENT I, TER-
AMERlCAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
Dear MI. President:
1write today to express my Government's strong concern over the possibility
of earlv Executive Board consideration of a nrouosed $58 million agricultural
crcdit 1;vanior iliiar~gua. I unJcrstÿnd ihaihr.p;oposed loan would Lro.oiiïeom
the lhnk's <,rdinary c:ipiiaI resource5 and uould hr. u\cd is suppt~rtr.xp;indiJ
production of coffee, cotton, grain, sugar and other crops.
The United States onooses a renewal of lendine to Nicaraeua b-,the Inter-
American ~evelo~meni Êank at this time for seveyalreasons.
Nicaragua is not creditworthy. It is seriously in arrears to the international
financial ;nstitutions. As of mid-~anuar~, ~icaraguan arrearages to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and World Bank were each in the $7 million range.
The Nicaraguan Government bas not been able Io convince either institution
that it has a strategy to eliminate these arrear1.understand that Nicaragua did
bring ils arrears with the IDB current in October of las1year, but interpret this
effort as merely a temporary expedient to allow it to become technically eligible
for further Bank lending. According to the Officeof the US Executive Director
at the Bank, Nicaragua bas since missed some repayments due, again entering
into arrearages.
More broadly, the United States continues to be concerned over the focus
and direction of Nicaragua's macroeconomic policiesand questions whether that
government can generate the economic growth and foreign exchange revenues
needed to repay the proposed loan. Hence, approval of the loan could, over
time, weaken the Bank's financial position and creditworthiness. As has been the
case with other vrooosed loans bv the international financial institutions to ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 219
We are also concerned about the possible misuse by Nicaragua of the proceeds
from such a loan. As you are aware, money is fungihle; monies received from
the Bank would relieve financial pressures on the GON and free up other monies
that could beused to help consolidate the Marxist régimeand finance Nicaragua's
aggression against its neighbors, who are members in good standing of the Bank.
1believe that we must also consider carefully the reaction of the United States
Congress and the Americau public should this proposed loan to Nicaragua be
approved. We are al1 too well aware of the increasing difficulties involved in
gaining Congressional appropriations for the international financial institutions,
such as the Inter-American Development Bank. There is little douht that Execu-
tive Board approval of the proposed agricultural credit loan for Nicaragua
would make our efforts even more dificult. In a hroader sense, our joint long-
term goal of strengthening the Inter-American Development Bank and expanding
its resource base would be undercut by Board approval of this proposed loan.
For the reasons noted above, 1hope that the Bank's management will he able
to defer the release of the documentation for this proposed loan to a more
opportune time in the future.
Sincerely yours,
George P. SHULTZ.
The Honorable Antonio Ortiz Mena.
President,
Inter-American Development Bank,
Washington, DC.
PREPARED STATEMENTOF GENERAL PAUL P. GORMAN ,SA COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
US SOWKERN COMMAN DO,THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTE 2E7FEBRUARY
1985
Concerning diplomacy, 1 am one soldier who strongly approves of efforts to
find a neaotiated settlement to the conflicts in Latin America. In anv way 1have
been able, 1 have supported the work of Ambassadors Stone and ~hla"deman,
and 1 have encouraged our allies in their search for a workahle formula in the
Contadora Process. 1applaud our diplomats' insistence upon verifiable arrange-
ments which provide equitahly for al1 parties to the conflict, including the
Nicaraguan freedom fighters. 1 am not unfamiliar with the difficulties our
diplomats face, having spent two years in Paris engaged in negotiations with the
North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. 1 agree thoroughly with Amhassador
Motley that the Nicaraguans do not come to the negotiating table hecause they
admire it asa piece of furniture. There would be no dialogue, no negotiations
with the Nicaraguans were il not for the freedom fighters, and were it not for
the US military presence in Central America.
Somehow, the Sandinistas must be brought to a reckoning. When they came
to power in 1979, their government included responsible men, moderate respect-220 MILITARYAND PARAWILITARYACTlV1TlF.S
commitments they made to the OAS for elections, genuine non-alignment, and
respect for the sovereignty of their neighbors. These men included Arturo CNZ,
Alfonso Rohelo, Adolfo Calero and Alfredo Cesar. The presence of men like
these among the Sandinista leadership convinced the United States to become
the principal foreign supporter of the new government. Through mid-1981, we
~oured in more than $117 million in direct aid, makine Nicaraeua the hiehest
per c,iplta rciipicni oi CS c2onuiiiic ;i,sirtïn<r during thir pcriod. -
In ,\ugust 1981.the IJniteJ Stïtcs undertook six m<>nthiof diploni3tic ctt;>rt\
1.)rwerse ihc Sandinista course, iclliiipthc Conio~i<luntsït if thcs \vould cca,e
their support for the Salvadoran g;errillas, we would both gÏarantee their
security and co-operate with their economic development. Those negotiations
came to naught. And hy that tirne it was clear that the men we admired had
been saueezed out of oower. or had left in diseust. and that the remainine
<.ùnt<indunrivwçrc sirongly cornniittcd boih Io ~ibanization and ti,\upport
suhvrrbion in El Salvxdi)r. Hundurar and Cosia Rica. Thcrcaficr. we have iakcn
steps to shore up these threatened neighbors, and to provide serious incentives
for the Sandinistas to reconsider.
The men 1 named - Cruz, Robelo, Calero and Cesar - became leaders of
the freedom fighters. Today, there are 10,000Io 15,000armed followers openly
resisting the Sandinistas. Tragically, the Sandinista Cornundunieshave plunged
recklessly onward toward the goals dictated hy their doctrine. Under constant
Cuban tutelage, they have:
"Altered fundamentally the amis balance in the region, increasing their
armed forces six-fold over a period of four years, fielding an armored
brigade strike force of over 300 tanks and armored personnel carriers, 70
large artillery pieces, numerous multiple rocket launchers, anti-aircraft and
anti-tank guns, and a profusion of motor transport. The recent addition of
modern attack helicooters. the MI-24 HlND hunter-killer used bv the
Sovieir against the fih ha irnedom fighters. is ol'particular conccrn io311
in thc rcgion. 1 hai,c atiîchcd a dctailcd compïrison oi ihc miliixry ii~rccs
in Central America, a portrayal of growing, destabilizing imbalance.
Trained pilots to fly high-performance fighters, and allowed Cubans and
other foreigners to install intercept radars and to build air bases in
Nicaragua - one of which, Punta Huete, willsoon be capable of supporting
both jet fighters and the heaviest transports in the Bloc inventory.
Continued to support armed subversion against Costa Rica, Honduras
and El Salvador, and have played host to numerous terrorist organizations
from around the globe, providing an operating hase for subversion through-
out the Western Hemisohere.
lmposed universal cinscription and raised armed forces of over 119,000,
keeping more than half on active duty. Recently the draft has been extended
to men through age 30, and the Cornandanles are talking about putting
100,000 men in the field to defeat 10,000 freedom fighters. The cynical
cannon-fodder use of untrained Sandinista militia has already prompted
violent protests among the citizenry in lowland towns, and prompted an
unorecedented flood of Nicaraeuan refueees into Honduras and Costa Rica.
~uined the Nicaraguan ecinomy, &coming ever more dependent on
Soviet dole, and trafficking in cocaine sales in the United States to generate
hard currency."
..... ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 221
EXCERFTS FROM REMARKS BY VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE: BUSH, AUSTIN COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN AVPAIRA S, STINT,EXAS T,HURSDA YEBRUARY 28, 1985
............................
When I watch the debate over Nicaragua, 1sometimcs wonder if theopponents
of aid to the freedom fi-hters have been listenine to what the Communist rulers
in Nicaragua thcmscl\,c, hoic becn saying - bsi:iu,e the Sandinirias arc uiien
quite open ;ihuut thcir intcnii<~nsand purporcs. and uiicn dirccily ci~ntradictthe
excusesmade for them by misguided iympathizers in this and other countries.
For instan~ ~ ~ome still insist t~a~ ~he Marxist-Leninists in Nica".eua Doseno
ihre~l Io their denioiratis ncighbors Ycs, the Ntcaraguan arm) is \[ronger and
bciter e~ui~~edthan al1the other xrmics of Ccniral Amcricd ionibincd: hut. sa!
~icaragÜa's'defenders, these Marxists have no extraterrito"a1 ambitions. BU-1
Tomas Borge, Nicaraguan Minister of the Interior, has stated from the beginning,
"This revolution goes beyond our borders. Our revolution was always in-
ternationalist."
Or listen to Humberto Ortega, the Sandinista Defense Minister, who openly
said, "Of coursc we are not ashamed to be hclping [the guerillas in] El Salvador.
We would like to help al1revolutions."
Or Nicaragua's Foreign Minister, Miguel d'Escoto, who described how the
Sandinistas view Central America: "You [the US] may look at us as five
countnes, six now with Panama, but we regard ourselves as six different States
of a single nation, in the process of reunification."
Tomas Borge once descnbed the final process of that reunification when he
called Costa Rica "the desert". What he meant was that tiny Costa Rica, a long-
standing stable democracy that keeps no army, would be completely vulnerable
to armed aggression - a piece of cake, as it were. Nicaragua's ambassador to
Costa Rica spelled it out more clearly. He said that the Costa Ricans, should
they cal1on the OAS to help them in the event of an invasion, would no1 have
time to convoke an OAS meeting, because "by that time they would have been
occupied".
This is the voice of bullying and intimidation and blatant contempt for
international law. It is the voice, often hcard before in history, of tyrants bent
on conau.st. It is the verv clear vo~.e. for al1 who choose to listen. of the
F\'icardgu;ltiSandinisld riilcrs
'Th?Sandinist;isiamr iu poircr pr<imi,ingto ciiïhli,h a Jeniiicratir govcrnmcni
chossn hv ïrst clectiiins. ;ind u,c helicved ihcir riromires And >u, ihe United
States &ve the ~icaraglan revolutionaries unp&cedented aid - $120 million
from 1979to 1981, plus support for $240 million more in funds from the Inter-
American Development Bank. We gave more aid than any other nation. But
even whilewe were givingaid, the hard-line Communists were already breaking
their promises.
So, in Nicaragua we see rhat the Sandinistas have nearly extinguished freedom
of the press. Independent labor unions have been harassed, tbeir leaders beaten
and arrested. Leaders of the business community were arrested simply because
they issued a statement criticizing official policy. Following the Cuban model,
the Sandinistas set up a network of informers and thought-police spying on
families and communities. Already the Nicaraguan jails are filled with political
prisoners, some 3,600 by the latest estimate.
But of course the biggest obstacle to the Sandinistas' complete domination is
the church, which kas been hdrassed mercilessly.In a country of deeply religious222 MlLlTARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
people, the government doesn't hesitate to have priests beaten, arrested and
exiled. Holy Week servicesand the hishop's weeklyhomily have been censored.
Government-inspired mobs even insulted and mocked the Holy Father when he
visited that country. Protestant sects, including evangelicals,have been attacked,
and the Sandinista militarv has burned over 50 churehes.
Amazingly,we stillhearthe libelrepeated that the Nicaraguan freedomfighters
are made up largely ofex-followersof Somoza.
In fact, ex-members of Somoza's national guard account for only a tiny
handful of the 15,000armed resistance fighters.The entire political leadership of
the freedom fighters- Alfonso Robelo, Aldolfo Colero of the FDN and Eden
Pastora - were prominent political opponents of Somoza.
Both Robelo and Pastora, the famous Commander Zero, partieipated in the
revolution and were members of the original revolutionary government. They
only look up arms again when it became clear to them that the hard-line com-
munists had seized al1 power and were, as Eden Pastora says, selling their
country out to the Soviet Bloc.
Arrachment111-1
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT ON POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND
CUBA, NEW YORK TIMES ,PRIL 7,1983, P.A-16
[Nol reproduced]
Arrachment 111-2
CIA WAR IN CENTRAL AMERICA,COUNTERSPY,SEITEMBER-NOVEMBER 1983
[Nol reproduced]
Arrachment111-3
CIA INTERNALREPORTDETAILSUS ROLEIN COh'TRAMIUS IN NICARAGUA LASTKEAR,
WALLS~REETIOURNAL, MARCH 6, 1985
[Nor reproduced] ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 223
Attachment111-4
STATEMENT OF UNITRD STATES DEPARTMBNT OP STATE JANUARY 18, 1985. US
WITHDMWAL FROM THE PROCEEUINGS INlTlATEU BY NICARAGUA IN TH13 INTER-
NATIONAL COURT OP JUSTICE
The United States has consistently taken the position that the proceedings
initiated hv Nicaraeua in the International Court of Justice are a misuse of the
Court for Political Purposes and that the Court lacksjurisdiction and competence
over such a case. The Court's decision of November 26, 1984,finding that it has
jurisdiction, is contrary to law and fact. With great reluctance, the United States
has decided not to participate in further proceedings inthis case.
US Policy in Central America
United States policy in Central America has been to promote democracy,
reform and freedom; to support economic development; to help provide a
security shieldagainst those- like Nicaragua, Cuba and the USSR - who seek
to spread tyranny by force; and to support dialogue and negotiation hoth within
and among the countries of the region. In providing a security shield, we have
acted in the exerciseof the inherent right of collective self-defense,enshrined in
the United Nations Charter and the Rio Treaty. We have done so in defense of
the vital national security interests of the United States and in support of the
peace and security of the hemisphere.
Nicaragua's efforts to portray the conflict in Central America as a bilateral
issue between itself and the United States cannot hide the obvious fact that the
scope of the problem is far broader. In the security dimension, it involvesa wide
ran-e of issues: Nicara-ua's hue- buildun of Soviet arms and Cuban advisers,
ils cros,-border ~iiilickssnd promi>tionof insurgçncy uithin \irious niitionr of
ihe regian. and the ;iciiviiiss of in<ligcnspposition groups uithin Nl:JrJgua.
11is JISOclcar thxtsri<clfort 1'stop tlrcfiehtinr in the rcdion iv<>.be fruiiicss
unless it were part of comprehens.iveapp&acb to political settlement, regional
security, economic reform and development and the spread of democracy and
human rights.
The Role of lhe Inlernalional Courrof Juslice
The conflict in Central America, therefore, is not a narrow legal dispute; it is
an inherently political problem that is not appropriate for judicial resolution.
The conflictwill be solved onlyby political and diplomatic means - not through
a judicial tribunal. The International Court of Justice was never intended to
resolve issuesof collective securityand self-defenseand is patently unsuited for
such a role. Unlike domestic courts, the World Court has jurisdiction only to
the extent that nation-States have consented to it. When the United States
accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in 1946,it certainly neverconceived
of such a role for the Court in such controversies. Nicaragua's suit against the
United States - which includes an absurd demand for hundreds of millions of
dollars in reparations - is a blatant misuse of the Court for political and
propaganda purposes.
As one of the foremost supporters of the International Court of Justice, the
United States is one of only 44 of 159 Member States of the United Nations
that have accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction at all. Furthermore, the
vas[ majority of these 44 States have attached to their acceptance reservalions224 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIFS
that substantially limit ils scopc. Along with the United Kingdom, the United
States is one of only Iwo permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council that have accepted that jurisdiction. And of the 16judges now claiming
to sit in judgment on the United States in this case, Il are from countries that
do not accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
Few if any other countries in the world would have appeared at al1in a case
such as this which they considered to be improperly brought. Nevertheless. out
of its traditional respect for the rule of law, the United States kas participated
fully in the Court's proceedings thus far, to present its view that the Court docs
not have jurisdiction or competence in this case.
The Decisionof November26
On Novemher 26, 1984, the Court decided - in spite of the overwhelming
evidence before il - that it does have jurisdiction over Nicaragua's claims and
that it will proceed to a full hearing on the merits of these claims.
This decision is erroneous as a matter of law and is based on a misreading
and distortion of the evidence and precedent:
- The Court chose to ignore the irrefutahle evidence that Nicaragua itselfnever
accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. Allowing Nicaragua to sue
where it could not be sued was a violation of the Court's basic principle
af reciprocity, which necessarily underlies our own consent to the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction. On this pivotal issue in the November 26 decision -
decided hy a vote of 11-5 - dissenting judges called the Court's judgment
"untenable" and "astonishing" and descrihed the US position as "beyond
doubt". We agree.
- El Salvador sought to participate in the suit Io argue that the Court was not
the a..ron.iate forum to address the Central American conflict. El Salvador
dcclarcd that IIwar under armcd attïck b) Kicïr~gua mi. incxcrcisc 11s
inhercnt rightof self-deknse, had rcqucstcd a\ri>tlinccfrom the Uniicd States.
'lhc Court rqecicd t.1 Salvador'r lipplication s~nimarily - tvithoui giving
rcasonr and uithout cven griinting 13Salvador a heliring. in \,iol3tion of KI
SaIi,ador's righi 3nd in disrcgïrd or the Court'ç own rulcs.
The Court's decision is a marked depdrture from its past, cautious approach
to junsdictional questions. The haste with which the Court proceeded to a
judgment on these issues - noted in several of the separate and dissenting
opinions - only adds to the impression that the Court is determined to find in
favor of Nicaragua in this case.
For these reasons, we are forced to conclude that Ourcontinued participation
in this case could not hc justified.
In addition, much of the evidence that would establish Nicaragua's aggression
a-ainst its neiehbors is of a hieu , sensitive intellieence chara~ ~~. WC will not
rirk IiS n:irion;xlsciuriiy hy prcsenllng rii~hscn>~ii\:ni;itcrial In puhlic or b:Core
a Court ih;it iniliidc, iw<>judgc:. (rom H'iir,iu I'aci natioiis. Thi, prohlcni only
ionlirms the realitv that ,uch isiuci arc not huitcd ii>rthc intcrnatiunal Court
of Justice.
Longer-TermImplications of the Court'sDecirion
The Court's decision raises a basic issue of sovereignty. The right of a State
to defend itself or to participate in collective self-defenseagainst aggression isan ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 225
inherent sovereign right that cannot be compromised by an inappropriate pro-
ceeding hefore the World Court.
We are profoundlv concerned also about the long-term implications for the
Court itseif. The décision ofNovemher 26 represents an overr~achin~ of the
Court's limits, a departure from its tradition of judicial restraint, and a risky
venture into treacherous political waters. We have seen in the United Nations,
in the last decade or more, how international organizations have become more
and more politicized against the interests of the Western democracies. It would
be a tragedy if these trends were to infect the International Court of Justice. We
hope this will not happen, because a politicized Court would medn the end of
the Court as a serious.,reso.cted institution. Such a result would do erievous
harm to the goal of the rule of law.
These implications compel us to clarify our 1946 acceptance of the Court's
~om~ulsor~jurisdiction. important premises on which oucnitial acceptance was
hased now appear to he in douht in this type of case..We are therefore taking
steps to clarify our acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in order
to make explicit what we have understood from the beginning, namely that cases
of this nature areno1Drooer for adiudication bv the Court.
We will continue to's~~~ort the91nterndtional Court of Justice where it acts
within its competence - as, for example. where specific disputes are hrought
hefore it hy specialagreement of the parties. One such example is the recent case
between the United States and Canada before a special five-memher Chamber
of the Court to delimit the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine area.
Nonetheless, because of our commitment to the rule of law, we must declare our
finn conviction that the course on which the Court may now he embarked could
do enormous harm to it as an institution and Io the cause of international law.
Ariachment III-5
April 10, 1985.
US SUPPORT FOR THI! UBMOCRATICRESISTANCEMOVEMENTIN NICARAGUA
Unclassified Excerpts from the President's Report to the Congress Pursuant Io
Section 8066 of the Continuing Resolution for FY-1985, PL 98-473.
Contents
1. US goals in Central America
11. Nicaragua's role in Central American conflict
A Sïndinisia <)bjcciivcsand stratcgy
13 Nicaraguan rniliiary buildup and xlignmeni ii,iih the So\,icHli>s
C. Siipport for iirmed insurgcncy in El Siilrïdor and othcr xti\ilies
against other Central American Governments
D. lnternal consolidation226 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
III. Efforts to resolve Central American conflict
A. US obiectives toward Nicaraeua
13 13llaterhand regional diplom~cs. 1979-1982
C Contadora and !vIanranillo. 1983-1'185
IV. Policy alternatives and US national interests
V. Presidential determination
A. Description of proposed program
B. Justification
I US Goalsin CenrralAmerico
United States policy toward Nicaragua must be viewed in the overall Central
American content, where we have a fundamental interest in the development and
preservation of stable societies able to sustain social, economic and political
change without coming under the sway of the Soviet Union or ils allies. As the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America stated, "Central America
is both vital and vulnerable and whatever other crises may arise to claim the
nation's attention, the United States cannot afford to turn away from that
threatened region". A hostile or destabilized Central America close 10Ourborder
would pose an unacceptable threat to Our vital interests in Mexico, the Panama
Canal and the Caribbean sea lanes.
Because of the importance of Central America and the complexity of the
problems there, US policy toward the region has centered on four interrelated
objectives:
- support for democracy, reform and human freedom in each country, including
genuine national reconciliation, full respect for human rights and popular
participation in the political proce-s as demonstrated by open, fair, genuine
elections;
- renewal of economic development and growth in the region Io address the
root socio-economic causes of turmoil and conflict and to provide increased
oonortunitv and better conditions of life for al1seements of societv:
- &urity fo; the democratic governments of cent& America, to &lp shield
them from guerrilla warfare or externally-supported subversion as they
develop more equitable, humane and stablesocieties; and
- support for a political solution to the conflicts in Central America, via
peaceful dialogue within and among the countries of the region and for a
comprehensive, and verifiable, regional settlement as outlined in the Conta-
dora Document of Objectives.
These four objectives of the United States are consistent with the strongest
ideals of the American nation and, we are convinced, reflect clearly the wishes
of the vast majority of the people in Central America and throughout this
hemisphere.
Progress has been made toward achieving these objectives in El Salvador and
elsewhere in Central America. In Washington, the Administration and the Con-
gress have demonstrated the broad consensus that now exists in the US on
the need for increased aid to Central America by passing major economic and
security assistance legislation for fiscal years 1984 and 1985. The Contadora
Process, helped by Ourbilateral efforts at Manzanillo, has also made progress in
some areas, despite major remaining obstacles. The basic problem of Central
America remains unaltered: a dedicated Marxist-Leninist régimein Nicaragua,
armed and backed forcefully hy Cuba, the Soviet Union and its allies, bent on ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 227
a massiveweapons acquisition program and continuing activesupport for armed
insurrection and subversion in neighboring countries. threatens the stability of
democratic governments and fundamental US interests in Central America.
II Nicaragua's Role in Central AmericanConpicl
A. Sandinista objecrivesand straregy: Since the FSLN's nse to power in July
1979, real political power in Nicaragua has rested in the hands of the FSLN
National Directorate. Comoosed of nine comandantes - three reoresentatives
from each of the three ~andinista factions - it determines and cooidinates over
Nicaraguan objectives and strategy. Theiudiciary and the national aswmbly are
fully subservieit to this exec~tiv~authork~.
While we know there are persona1 dilierences among the nine, as well as
diFerences on tactics, al1nine comandantes are Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries
committed to radical social chance and the exuort of revolution, disdainful of
democratic-capitalist régimes,ancÏdistrustfu1 of the United tat tes:
Having sufferedfrom discord in the pst, the FSLN takes great care to present
a common front, although it has used rumors of disagreement to play on foreign
interest in sunoortine so-called "moderate" elements. Inneed of Westernecono-
mic support,ihe FS~N attempts to hide the most glaring evidenceof its Merxist
and dictatorial tendencies. As a result and as an outgrowth of the "tercerista"
strateev that succeededaaainst Somoza. it followsa flexiblestrateav under which
the pr?vaie sccior is per&ttcd to cxist (albeit undcr \y\teinlitic ~(~~li~rïtiand
increaiing Staie restriction,),3 politi~ïl opposition iÿn operïtc in IimiieJ arcas
(undrr thr tirhi watch of I'Sl.l\' and GON control inrirument,) and clcctions
are carried oit (under conditions assuring FSLN control of the outcome, via
control of the media, political assembly and the basic necessitiesof life). It is a
strategy dedicated to the long-term survival of the Sandinistas' grip on power
and Marxist-Leninist ideal behind a façade of moderation.
Bascd on the experience of the past five years and on several key Sandinista
policy statements not intended for publication (for example, the September
1979 "72 Hour Document" which set forth the goals of the revolution, and
Comandante Bavardo Arce's Mav 1984 confidential soeech to the Socialist
Party - both O? which have been acknowledged as aGhentic by Nicaraguan
senior officiais),the FSLN has the following overriding objectives:
- the political/economic transformation of Nicaraguan society along Marxist
lines, marked by redistribution of income, confiscation of private property,
and an expanded State role in the economy;
- the establishment and maintenance of complete Sandinista control within
Nicaraeua (demonstrated bv the intimidation and restriction of the oooo-
sitiiin; cniourïgcnir.nt oi idetions ch;illengingliuthcntic opporition groupr in
Iïhor. politic~l p;irtics, thc prebs. human rights and orgdnizcd r!ligion: the
Je\,elonmcnt of S;iriJ~nisiniïss orclinvati<~nr":4nJ thecontr<il01 :ilruverii.
- -
ment institutions by the FSLN);
- the development of closer ties with the Soviet Blocand Cuba (shown by the
GON's redirection of trade, ils voting pattern in international bodies, ils
acceptance of 2,500-3,500 Cuban military and 3,500-4,000 Cuban civilian
advisers, and its military purchases and identification withCuban and Soviet
Bloc goals in the region); and
- extensive matenal support for "fraternal revolution" in Central America
(evidenced by ils pattern of support for the Salvadoran guerrillas as well as
similar groups in Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica).228 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
It is clear from the historical record that the Sandinistas entered officewith these
basic objectives described above, which have not changed during their period
of power.
B. Nicurayuunmilitury buildup unduliynmentwith the Soviet Bloc: As the
Sandinistas took control of Managua on July 19, 1979,Somoza's National
Guard disintegrated, leaving the Sandinista guerrillas as the only significant
armed group in Nicaragua. With most of the Guard members captured or fleeing
Nicaragua, there was little military threat to the FSLN within or without
Nicaragua. Nevertheless, long before ils opposition took up arms against il, the
GONIFSLN had begun an impressive military buildup far beyond its defensive
needs. The guerrilla army - which was renamed the Popular Sandinista Army
(EPS) - grew from an estimated strength of 6,000troops in July 1979to about
16,625 by year's end, and to about 23,750 (army plus activated reserves and
militia) by January 1982, when the armed opposition carried out its first major
operations. In 1980the CON announced a voluntary militia program, which
Defense Minister Humberto Ortega boasted would eventually he 200,000strong.
The Sandinista military establishment nowhas over 62,000men on active duty
and another 57,000 reserveand militia - a total of 119,000,many by now with
combat experience. In contrast, Somoza's National Guard usually numbered
6,000 to 7,000 (and peaked at aboui 14,000during the 1978.1979insurrection).
Of Nicaragua's immediate neighbors, Honduras' armed forces number about
18,000and Costa Rica has no army.
The number of Cuban military and security advisors in Nicaragua grew in a
similar pattern. About 200 Cuban military advisors were reported in Nicaragua
in 1979,and an estimated 600 were present by the end of 1980.By the begin-
ning of 1982,the estimate of Cuhan military and security advisors in Nicaragua
had nsen to 1,500-2,000.In 1983and 1984,the number of Soviet Blocadvisors
increased, reaching about 2,500 to 3,500 Cuban military and security personnel
and about 200 Soviet, other Bloc, Libyan, and PL0 military advisors and tech-
nicians.
The growth of Soviet Bloc arms deliveries to Nicaragua lagged somewhat
behind the increase in EPS troop strength and the Cuban prcsence, although
orders were accepted as early as 1979. Soviet Bloc military deliveries totalled
about $5 million in 1980, but rose 10 about $45 million in 1981, and to
approximately $90 million during 1982.
In late 1979, East Germany agreed to supply Nicaragua with 800 military
trucks (1,000 wereeventually delivered). During 1980,Nicaragua also reportedly
signed a secret defense agreement with Cuba. It also sent about 100personnel
for MiG pilot and mechanic training in Bulgaria, the first in a series of steps to
acquire advanced fighteraircraft. In 1980and 1981,the CON sent major missions
to the Soviet Bloc to discuss military assistance. Following the August 1980
visit to Managua of Yasser Arafat, the PL0 provided military instructors to the
CON. In mid-1981, the CON received its first 25 Soviet T-55 medium battle
tanks (it received about 25 more during 1982, and now has about 110 such
tanks, along with about 30 PT-76 light amphibious assault tanks).
Following the onset of organized insurgent activityin Nicaragua in early 1982,
the Sandinista militarv continued to erow in number of troons. .ua.t.tv and
quality of u,e;iponsand in the overilllie\,çl~~I.So\t IOSariisiance SOVIC; Iiloc
niilitary deliveries uçrç aboui SI15 million in 1983and ïbout S25Umillion in
1984 The cumulali~çamount l'rom1979Io ihc prescnt reachcd o\er SSOU niillioii.
This ii,eïpiinr> u,as increasingly sophtstic;~teIn addition IO Jrlivering more
1-55 tanks. the Sov~ct, lntroduccd the PT-76 Iighi amphihi\~urtank. muliiple
rockci 1aun;hcrs. hcavy ;~rtillery.helicoptcr, (iniluding the 111-24Hind ~vïult ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 231
postponing clcctions fivcycdrs until the I.SLN hsd full political control and
uas ;iblc io cnscrr. Iiiurnblc rcsults,
actnc h;ir;issmeniuf ihc political opposiiiun through pressccnsorsh~p.dcnial
of permits for rallies, arbitrary confiscation of property and arbitrary price
and credit policies;
- support of rival, pro-Sandinista factions within al1 opposition parties, the
media, organized religion, labor and non-partisan organizations; and
- extensive utilization of Soviet Bloc military and other cadre whose loyalty is
toward consolidation of Marxist-Leninist system.
Hlaming FI>K ;ictii.itics in early 1982. the govcrnmcnt dcclarcd a "5tatc ili
cnicrgcnc)" thai fiirthcr airidilcd civillibcriicsand rcsiricicdopposition ;icii\i1ir.s
'l'hr FSL'I alho stcnncd un CDS hloçk commiiir: xciiunï acdinsi pi>liiic<iJlis-
sidents, including individuâls, political parties, labor unions,-the phvate sector,
the media and organized religion.The institution of a drdft, further expansion
of the Nicaraguan military and increased receipt of major amounts of Soviet
~lo~ ~ea~or~v e,e-~~~~.ncreased the FSLN's caoabilitv to control national life
and intimidate the opposition.
Havine taken advantage of its accessto GON funds and resources, and of the
fact thaton~osition forces had heen weakened bv vears of re~ression under
Somoza and'then the Sandinistas, the FSLN announkd electionsfor Novemher
1984.The flawedelectoral process - during which the FSLN rejectedopposition
requirements for minimal guarantees to allow fair participation - demonstrated
that the FSLN was no1 prepared to risk its own political power. From the
FSLN's standpoint, however, the elections gave it a hasis Io institutionalize its
control over Nicaraguan society.
Events followine-the elections indicate the FSLN will use ils control of the
Prc~iJcncyand ihc neu N<iiionalAssemblyto proi,irlcthe inslilulii)n<ilframework
fur coniinucd Sandinista domination This currcnr phasc of FS1.K consolidaiion
includes continuation of political and media controls, aggressiveuse of the draft
as a device for mobilization and social control, rejection of armed and unarmed
opposition calls for church-sponsored dialogues and proposal of a National
Assembly statute that would severelylimit rights of most opposition members.
The unfair electoral arraneements and subseauent efforts to stifle oolitical
opposition in Nicaragua we; taken after the S'andinistashad announced on
Septemher 20, 1984,their willingnessto accept the draft Contadora treaty which
contained extensive commitments to respect political rights and ensure a demo-
cratic political system.
SandinistaRejectionof Dialogue:The Nicaraguan armed and unarmed oppo-
sition have consistently emphasizedthe goal of genuine democracyin Nicaragua,
and have repeatedly offeredto engage in dialoguewith the Sandinistas. Significant
armed opposition proposais weremade hythe Revolutionary DemocraticAlliance
(ARDE) on February 18, 1984, and by the Nicaraguan Democratic Force
(FDN) on February 21, 1984.The unarmed opposition put forth a nine-point
orooosal in Januaw 1984:and refinedthis orooosal in September 1984to address
iheconditions necéssaryfor opposition p.&ticipationin ihe November elections.
More recently, the unarmed opposition leadership in Managua issueda February
22, 1985,proposal for a national dialogue.
In a separate declaration signed in San Joséon March 1-a major opposition
milestone that received wide attention - the externally-based opposition (in-
cluding representatives of the FDN, the Miskito group MISURA, ARDE and
prominent democratic civilian leaders such as Arturo Cruz) proposed a national
dialogueto bemediated by the Nicaraguan Catholic church, offeringto implement232 MILITARY AND PARAMlLtTARY ACTlVlTlET
a mutual in situceasefire and acceot Daniel Orteea as President until such lime
as the Nicaraguan people decided'onthe matter ïhrough a plebiscite. They also
endorsed the minimum requirements established on February 22 by the internal
unarmed oopo..tion to beiin - national dialogue. In addition to the sus~cnsion
of ;irnicd ;ict~vitioand thc e,iablishment da cen,etirc. thc~ includcd the lifting
of the statc 01'emcrgenry; shsoluie ïrccdom oi rxprersiiln; a gsncral ;imncity
and pardon for political crimes; a fullrestoration of constitutionalguarantees and
the right of habeas corpus; guarantees of the safety of members of the resis-
tance movement whoparticipate in the dialogue; and the implementation of these
measures under the supervision of guardntor governments. The foregoing are
not unreasonable demands of abdication, but rather the minimum rights of
people in a democratic society.
When Arturo Cruz attempted 10 fly to Managua on March 7 to deliver this
proposal to the Nicaraguan government, the government prevented his return,
and refused to resoond to either oooosition orooosal. On March 22. the Nica-
rrguan C~tholic çh~rrh hierarchy '(~~isco&l i.onfcrcnL.c) 1ssuc.J ;isommu-
niquCrcitcrilting ils support for a nationrl dialogue and dcclaring itiwillingnsss
~ ~
to act as a med~ator.
III Eflorts to ResolreCentralAmericanConflicl
A. US objecrivesroivurdNicaruguu: United States policy toward Nicaragua
since the Sandinistas' ascent to power has consistently sought to achieve changes
in Nicaraguan government policvand behavior. Wehave not sought Io overthr6w
the Nicaragua; government n6r to force on Nicaragua a spëcific system of
government. The changes we seek, listed below,are essential if Central America
is to achieve peace and stahility:
- termination of al1forms of Nicaraguan support for insurgenciesor subversion
in neighboring countries;
- reduction of Nicaragua's expanded military/security apparatus to restore
militar, balance in th~~r~ -~n: .
- severance of Nicaragua's military and security ties to the Soviet Bloc and
Cuba and the return to those countries of their militarv and securitv advisors
now in Nicaragua; and
- implementation of Sandinista commitment 10 the Organization of American
States to political pluralism, hurnan rights, free elections, non-alignment and
a mixed economy.
These goals are supported by al1of Nicaragua's neighbors, theyare consistent
with the original goals of the anti-Somoza coalition and Sandinista pledges to
the OAS. and thev are containcd in the Seotember 1983Contadora Document
of Ob~citiic~.iihirh iïii:iragu:i .igncd tiigr.i'hr.rwith the ather Cenir;il Anicri~tn
St:ite>. Ihs Iiiii>fthc :ibo\s oblciti\c, hs~bccn stresscd by hoih the Cdriçr and
Reagan Administrations. It is directlv related to both the internal situation in
~icara~ua and Nicaragua's relation; with its neighbors, especially unarmed,
neutral and democratic Costa Rica, which sees the realization of this objective
as a guarantee of its own security.
B. Bilateral and regional diplomucy.1979-1982: United States negotiations
with the Sandinistas began before they arrived in power July 19, 1979. Our
efforts to strengthen the moderate opposition to Somoza succeeded in obtain-
ing from the Sandinistas their July 12, 1979,letter to the OAS and their Basic
Statute, in which they made the commitments to democracy, human rights and
non-alignment cited above. ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 233
During 1979 and 1980, the Carter Administration made a major effort to
achieve good relations with the Nicaraguan government. Total authorized
hilateral assistance reached $117.2 million, and the US strongly supported
Nicaragua in multilateral aid institutions. Our central objective wasto encourage
evolution of a democratic system inNicaragua. Diplomaticcontacts werefrequent
and at a high level,including Secretary Vancein Quito in August 1979,a Carter/
Ortega meeting in September 1979,a US visit by Comandantes Wheelock and
Tirado in Decemher 1979, Assistant Secretary Bowdler's visit to Managua in
January 1980,and ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Check'svisit in Septemher
1980. As late as October 1980, still seeking constructive relations, the Carter
Administration certified that Nicaragua was not assisting international ter-
rorism.
But hy December 1980, the intelligence revealedthat the Sandinistas were
supporting the Salvadoran guerrillas, that 600 Cuhan military advisors were in
Nicaragua and that pilots had been sent abroad for MiG training. The military
buildup had begun and interna1 repression was apparent in the stacking of the
Council of State in May and the murder of private sector leader Jorge Salazar
in November. Dishursements of AID and PL-480 sales were suspended and
military assistance to El Salvador resumed. Economic assistance was fomally
ended by a Presidential Detemination April 14, 1981,that Nicaragua was assis-
~ ~--~~lv~~~ ~n "~~rril~ ~.
This Administration, nevertheless, made two major attempts to reverse the
deterioratinr relations in 1981-1982.Assistant Secretary Enders visited Managua
in Aueust 1981.and oresented an offer. includin- renewed economic assistance.
for anrcnd i~S;indiiiisi;isupport for &ucrrill;is;inJ rcJurr.d Ir.\cli i>fNi~.ar.igua's
militar).iapabiliiy and iorcign ;iJ\,isori The GON ncvcr respondcd to dur iillcr.
Niriraeuan Amhassador to thc CS Ariuro Cru/ rcsirncd shortlv thcreafter in
frustracon over these developments. In April 1982,-we made an eight-point
proposal reiterating the August lems and emphasizing international verification
of ams limitations and reaffimation of Nicaragua's earlier commitments to
support pluralism, frce elections and a mixed economy. A series of exchanges
became increasingly sterile and concluded in August 1982. We then joined a
multilateral effort of eight democracies of the region in October -98the San
Jose Declaration - which outlined the essential conditions for restoring Wace.
These governments designated Costa Rican Foreign Minister Volio Co-carry
the declaration to Managua. The Nicaraguan government,however, refusedto re-
ceive him or enter into dialogue on the San Joséprinciples.
C Cù»ro<lur<und .\4<inrun>llo.IYX3-19XSColi1mbia. I'anama. Mehiio and
Vrnç/uela bcgan in Januq 1983,ni Coniador;~,Panania. in mediatc a regii~ndl
scitlcmcnt \lcrtindr smi~nethe li\e Central Amcric.in;indihcscfdur "Coni;iJor;i
Grouo" eovernm&ts led 70 aereement in Seotemher 1983 on a Document of
0bje;iv&. This identified21 pilitical, securit; and social-economicgoals whose
verifiable implementation would meet our concerns. We have consistently sup-
ported efforts to develop the Document of Objectives into a comprehensive and
verifiableagreement.
By April 1984, the Contadora Group had developed recommendations for
implementing the Document of Objectives and proposed a draft agreement in
June 1984.This first draft was accepted as a hasis for further discussions bythe
Central American States. The Sandinistas made it clear that they would not
accept any element to which they had not previously agreed. The other Central
Americans made suggestions for its improvement and called for direct nego-
tiations with Nicaragua.234 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlES
The Contadora group presented a second draft on September 7. Nicaragua's
insistence on prohibition of military maneuvers was accepted; timing of security
commitments~of interest to Nicaragua was tied to signature; but commitments
on foreignadvisors and arms reductions were leftfor later negotiation. Verification
was extremely weak.
Nicaragua conditionally accepted the draft on September [. . .] other Central
Americans. however. had strone miseivines. Honduras. El Salvador and Costa
Rica devcl';ipcrla ;ries of propi>icrl amr.ndmçnis th~ u.cre prescntcd ii>the
Coniador~ Group on Ociohcr 20, 1983 Informlil diicu~sions within Contlidi>ra
since last 1~1have focuscd on recoiiciliiigthcsc lu0 drilfts o4 ..final sprccmeni".
Whcn thc Contad~rs Procesr rssunies April 11-12.therc drdlis - and elTt~rts16)
sirengihcn verilic.itiir- uill be the iocus of Jiscusiion.
Manzanillo discussions : urine a June 1. 1984. visit to Manaeua. Secretarv
Shultz proposed direct discussi&s between Nicaragua and the Üs. We madé
clear from the outset that this process was designed to facilitate the Contadora
negotiations and contribute to ihe goal of a comprehensive, regional settlement.
US Special Envoy Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman held nine meetings witb
the Nicaraguans between June and December 1984, al1but one in Manzanillo,
Mexico. We made specific proposals for a comprehensive step-by-step solution
to the oroblems identified bv botb sides. But Nicaragua used the talks as a
\,chicle io iy IO rcsolve iis most intmediatc bilateral s~curiiyconcrrns withoui
addressing ruch Ci)ntaJi)ra ohjrctivc\ ar rcgiunal armi rcduciionr, or reincorpor-
ation of iis insureents into civil societv under democratic conditions. Followina
Nicaragua's con&tioncd acccpiancc ut the Septcmbcr 7 Coniadora draft agrceI
ment, ihr Unitrd States attempirrl 1,)iniiiate ionsrrie Ji~cu~sionson the puinis
stilllitissue in the draft. 'The Nicaraguan delegaiion w;ls unwillina io consider
this approach, seeking instead Io "ëxplore" iecurity issues on17 outside the
Contadora content.
Nicaraguan diplomacy throughout the six years of Sandinista rule has thus
been characterized bv an effort to bilateralize neeotiations. makina a compre-
hensive settlement i&possible. It has at the sametirne engaged iLgrandsÎand
diplomacy by making public statements inconsistent with its real negotiating
position and bv ar>mals to the US public and to various international fora in
Searchof propigaida advantage.
In sum, it is apparent that the Sandinistas use the negotiating process Io
advance their more serious objectives:
- buy time for internal consolidation;
- ease external political, economic and military pressures by presenting the
appearance of reasonableness and flexibility; and
- obtain explicit or implicit guarantees against US unilateral military inter-
vention and preclude neighboring countries from supporting Nicaraguan
democratic opposition.
By the same token, it is clear that, despite lip service to the democratization
aspects of Contadora, the Sandinistas are unalterably opposed to any internal
changes that would jeopardize their control of political life in Nicaragua.
IY. PolicyAlrernativeand US Narionallnreresrs
The foregoing sets (orth in detail Our objectives regarding Nicaragua and the
enormous obstacles to realizing them posed by Sandinista ideology, geo-strategic ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 235
aims and intransigence. We have considered the possible alternative approaches
to achieving our policy ohjectives for regional stahility. In doing so, we have
mled out courses of action that would amount to acceptance of Sandinista goals
and abandonment of Our own objectives, and direct application of US military
force.
We are left with reliance uvon an arrav o...olicv instruments. short of direct
I:S militar) action, iu aJ\ÿncc our obje~ti~cs;ind den) ihe aiiaiiiiiieni <>fthore
of tlirSdndini,rar and iheir c<)mrnunisimentors In ihr.hroaJe.;i iernis. ne ha\c
two options:
- first, we can seek through effective pressure to modify Sandinista behavior
while we help strengthen the political, economic and military capabilities of
the countries directlv threatened: or
- second, we can forego pressure and concentrate on seeking to contain the
effects of Sandinista behavior through assistance to neighboring countries.
The~s~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ese ootions. containment. would seek to counter the exvan-
sionist activities of the Soviet union, Cuba and Nicaragua in Central ~mérica
by, interalia, a major buildup of the security capabilities of the countries directly
threatened.
It would mean providing Honduras advanced combat aircraft, anti-tank and
anti-air defense systems and undenvriting a military force increase from about
18,000 to perhaps 35,000. In the case of El Salvador, it would mean more
resources and major drives to slow the guerrillas before the Sandinista pipeline
picks up again. Costa Rica would have to decide whether to develop new secudty
capabilities (it now has no army) and host US exercisesor other measures.
To assure that these countries would have the will to resist an environment of
incredsing Nis~r:igudnmilitan di>rnin.in~.ei,he I:S ii,ould prt~hahl) hsi,c io oll'cr
firm pu3ranrerr tirr resi\iing Nicaraguan aiiack. including Slic~r~gu~in ;i&grcsjion
through unconventional warfare.
US military and naval exercises prohahly would increase. The intelligence
services of each country would have to be expanded. Additional economic
assistance (a doubling of 1984/1985levelsor more) would be needed to offset the
impact of Soviet/Cuban subversion and political action. We have not attemp-
ted to cost-out this option, but total assistance to the area could rise from
the $1.2 billion per annum level of FY 84/85 to $4-5 billion per year for the
immediate future.
In tenns of full realization of our ohjectivestoward Nicaragua, the containment
approach is obviously deficient in that it is passive and does not contemplate
changes in Sandinista hehavior. We do not see such changes occurring under
this scenario even if the stepsoutlined above are coupled with economicsanctions
and other measures to isolate Nicaragua. Moreover, there are fundamen!al
obstacles to implementing this strategy in a way that will achieve its defensive
goals. First is the question of whether Congress would support the long-term
increases in US material assistance that would he necessary. A half-hearted
"containment" response, or one that lasted for only a year or two would only
serve to prolong the Central Amencan conflict without altering its ultimate
outcome. Second, we must face the fact that definitive removal of US support
from the anti-Sandinistas will have, in its own right and apart from any com-
pensatory measures, a demoralizing effect on Our friends in the region. This,
in turn, will tend to make them more susceptible to Sandinista intimidation
and101negotiation initiatives, and less confident in future security relationships
with us.236 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
The flaws in the containment approach, especially measured against the long-
term commitment of the Sandinistas and the assurances of political and military
support they enjoy from the Soviet Bloc,would appear to dictate eventual success
of Sandinista-insnired insureen-, throuehout the reeion.
Our conclusion is that continuation if strong on the Sandinistas is
the only effectivecourse of action that will safeguard our security and those of
our friends. Under this strategy, we foresee the following:
- resumption of aid to the Nicaraguan anned resistance at levels sufficient to
create real pressure on the government of Nicaragua;
- US economic and security assistance to other countries of Central America;
- continued US insistence on strengthening democratic institutions, respect for
human rights and refonns;
- additional military and naval exercises; and
- active encouragement of a negotiated political solution to regional problems
based on our four objectives and the 21-point Contadora Document of
Objectives.
The justification for our proposed approach -the strategy of strong pressures
comhined with a negotiating channel to encourage a political solution - is
treated in Section V below, in terrns of specific objectives such as halting
Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran guerrillas and encouraging the removal
of Cuban and Soviet advisors. Of the various aooroaches. this has the hiehest
chance of achieving a negotiated solution. It req;kes far liss US resources'ihan
a containment policy and a hetter chance of heing effective.The resources are
now in nlace but should the amed oooosition be dismantled or break avart, it
could n&the put hack together again $thout enormous effort, if at all. 1" effect,
this option would be lost - placing us in an "accommodationist-or-military
response" dilemma at some later date, when the threat to US interests hecomes
more obvious and when the only effective response would be on a larger scale,
or in less favorable circurnstances.
V PresidentialDeterminarion
A. Description of proposed program: Assistance provided to the Nicaraguan
democratic opposition forces will be structured so as to increase their size and
effectivenessto the point where their pressure convinces the Sandinista leadership
that it has no alternative to pursuing a course of moderation, to include:
- cessation of support to insurgent movements in other countries;
- reduction in their amed forces;
- withd~awal ~ ~foreien -dvisors: and
-- .i<scptiiriseof the hl~rch 1 Pc3ic Pr<~p~>s2i< nI errabli,hriicnt of;, Iegitiniaicly
pluralistiç dcmocr3iic p.>liiir.~lrtruciurc whiih u.ill;assure ih.11iXicar.tguliuill
not continue activitie~threatenin~ to their neighhors.
/R Jit,ii/>mrt<,,/ '1he Ilnitcd Sidte, h3s a clcar, undeni:ible rnardl impcraiire
not to 3b~ndon th«,c hrÿvc men rnJ \tomen in thcir fight to cst.iblish ilcmocrscy
and respect for human rights in Nicaragua. It isa traditional imperative stemming
from more than 200 yëars during which, time and again, Le have lent oui
support - moral and othenvise - to those around the world stmggling for
freedom and independence.
It is not simply a matter of the $14 million before the Congress that is the
issue. The greater issue is one of the United States trying to help people who ANNEXES TO THEMEYORIAL 237
have had a communist tvrannv im.osed.on them bv force. deceution and fraud.
M'ecannoi ion,ign ihe iiic~rxguan pople ti>a c<)mmuniitdictatorship sith no
po,sibility- IChistory 1% an). :uide -- of re.~lizingthe ircediim. or democr~tii
e.ial5 set iorih11ihcir San Jose uniiy Jecl;ir;ition. Our rcrponiihilii, Ircleiirwc
mus1give them our full bipartisan sbpport MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
Airachmenis
1. War Powers Resolution. Title 50. US Code. Sections 1541-1548
2. Statutes relating to ~on'gressionil Oversighi of Intelligence~ctivities, Title
22, US Code, Section 2422 and Title 50, US Code. Section 413.
3. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1984, Public Law 98-212,
December 8. 1983(Section 775).
4. Intelligence'~uthohzation ~A'for Fiscal Year 1984, Public Law 89.215,'
December 9, 1983(Section 108).
5. Continuing Appropriations, 1985, Public Law 98-473 [H.J.Res. 6481,
October 12, 1984(Section 8066).
6. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, Public Law 98-525,
October 19. 1984(Section 1540).
Aiiachmenr1
WAR POWERS RESOLUTIO NILE 50, US CODE, SECTIONS1541.1548
[Nor reproducedl
Ariachmeni 2
STATUTES RELATING TO CONGRESSIONAL OVERSICHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
TITLE 22,US CODE ,ECTION 2422 AND TIT1.E50,US CODE ,ECTION 413
[Nor reproducedl ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 239
Sec. 775. During fiscal year 1984, not more than $24,000,000 of the funds
available to the Central Intelligence Agency,the Department of Defense, or any
other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may
he obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of
supporting, directlyor indirectly, militaryor paramilitary operations in Nicaragua
by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.
Allachmeni 4
Sec. 108. During fiscal year 1984, not more than $24,000,000 of the funds
available to the Central Intelligence Agency,the Department of Defense, or any
other aeencv or entitv of the United States involved in intellieence activities mav
be obligated or expéndedfor the purpose or which wouldhave the effect if
supporting, directly or indirectly, militaryor paramilitary operations in Nicaragua
by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.
Allachmeni 5
Sec. 8066. (a) During fiscal year 1985,no funds available to the Central In-
telligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity
of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be ohligated or
expended for the purpose or which would havethe effect of supporting, directly240 MILITARY AND PARAMII.ITARY ACTIVITIES
or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation,
group, organization, movement, or individual.
(b) The prohibition concerning Nicaragua contained in subsection (a) shall
cease to apply if, after February 28, 1985 -
(1) the President submits to Congress a report -
(A) staiing ihliiihc Gotcrnnicni of Niiarxpux IS pro\,iJing nixir:ricl
or moneiary sdpport in anii-go\crnnieni Iorceaengügcdin miliiary
or ~arilmiliiür. i>.>eraiionïin CI SdI\;iJor or othcr Ccniral
American countries;
analyzing the military significanceof such support;
stating that the President has determined that assistance for
military or paramilitary operations prohibited by suhsection (a)
is necessary;
(D) justifying the amount and type of such assistance and describing
its objecïives; and
(E) explaining the goals of United States policy for the Central
Amcrican region and how the proposed assistance would further
such goals, including the achievement of peace and security in
Central America through a comprehensive, vcrifiable and enfor-
ceable agreement based upon the Contadora Document of Ob-
jectives; and
(2) a joint resolution approving assistance for military or paramilitary
operations in Nicaragua is enacted.
(c) (1) For the purpose of subsection (6) (2), '?oint resolution" means only
a joint resolution introduced after the date on which the report of the President
under subsection (h) (1) is received by Congress, the matter after the resolving
clause of which is as follows: "That the Congress approves the obligation and
cxpenditure of funds available for fiscal year 1985 for supporting, directly or
indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua."
Sec. 1540.(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during fiscalyear
1985,the Secretary of Defense may transport on a space available basis, at no
charge, to any country in Central America goods and supplies which havebeen ANNEXESTO THE MEMORIAL 241
furnished by a nongovernmental source and which are intended for humanitarian
assistance.
(b) (1) The President shall institute procedures, includingcomplete inspection
prior to acceptance for transport, for determining that -
(A) the transport of any goods and supplies transported under this section
is consistent withforeign policy objectives;
(B) the goodsand supplies to he transported are suitable forhumanitarian
purposes and are in usable condition;
(C) there is a legitimate humanitarian need for such goods and supplies;
(D) the goods and supplies will in fact he used for humanitarian pur-
poses; and
(E) there are adequate arrangements for the distribution of such goods
and supplies in the country of destination.
(2) Goods and supplies determined not to meet the criteria of paragraph (1)
may not be transported under this section.
(3) It shall he the responsibility of the donor to ensure that goods or supplies
to be transported under this section are suitable for transport.
(c) Goods and supplies transported under this section may he distrihuted by
an agency of the United States Government, a foreign government, or inter-
national organization, or a private nonprofit relief organization. The Secretary
of Defense may not accept any goods or supplies for transportation under this
section unless verification of adequate arrangements has heen receivedin advance
for distribution of such goods and supplies.
(d) Goods or supplies transported under this section may not he distributed,
directly or indirectly, ta any individual, group, or organization engaged in mili-
tary or paramilitary activity.
(e) No later than 90 days aiter the date of the enactment of this section, and
every 60 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall report to the Congress
concerning the origin, contents, destinations and disposition of al1 goods and
supplies transported under this section. MILITARYAND PARAMlLlTARY ACTlVlTlES
Annex E
Arrachmenrs
1. Report of the US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, 98thCongress, 1st Session,Rept. No. 98-122,Part 1(May
13. 1983).
2. ~étter f;om US Senator Barry Goldwater, Chairman, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, to Mr. Gilbert Gude, Director, Congres-
sional Research Service, The Library of Congress, June 27, 1983 (with
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~,
3. Dcbatc in thc US Housc of Reprcscniatives. 98th Congrchs. I\iScssion.
July 27. 1983(129 C;,ngre.nio~~aRlecord115720-5762)
4 I)cbalc in the US Iloi.se of Kc~rcsînt~tivcs.98th ConerWs.. 1st Sessi<in.
July 28, 1983(129 congressionaiRecord ~5819.5882).
5.Debate in the US House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 1st Session,
October 20, 1983(129 Congres.siona R1ecordH8389-8433).
6. Debate in the US Senate, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, April 4, 1984(130
CongressionaR l ecordS3742-3796).
7. Debate in the US Senate, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, April 5, 1984(130
CongressionaR l ecordS3848-3898).
8. Dehate in the US Senate, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, April 10, 1984(130
CongressiunaR l ecordS4192-4205).
9. Letter from US Senator Barry Goldwater, Chairman, Senate Select Com-
mittce on Intelligence, to US Director of Central Intelligence William
J. Casey, April9, 1984,as reprinted in thWashington Posf,April 11, 1984.
10. Debate in the US House of Representatives, 98th Congrcss, 2nd Session,
April 12,1984(130 CongressionuR l ecordH2878-2940).
II. Statement by US Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Vice-Chairman,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,Apnl 15, 1984.
12. Debate in the US House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session,
May 24, 1984(130 Congressional Recor d 4796-4806).
13. Dehate in the US Senate, 98th Congress, 2nd Session,June 18, 1984(130
CongressionaR l ecordS7499-7517).
14. Debate in the US House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session,
August 2, 1984(130 CongressionuR l ecordH8264-8284).
15. Debate in the US Senate, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, October 3, 1984
(130 CongressionaR l ecordS12857-12879).
16. Transcript of remarks of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Vice Chair-
man, Senatc SelectCommittee on Intelligence,on ABC News "This Week
With David Brinkley", October 28, 1984.
17. Report of the US House of Representatives Permanent SelectCommittee
on Intelligence,98th Congress, 2nd Session, Rept. No. 98-1196 (January
2, 1985). ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 243
REPORT OF THli US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT COMMllTEE ON
INTELLIGENC 98,~~CONGRESI SS,TSESSION, REPT.NO.98-122, PART I (MAY13,
1983)
Mr. BOLANDf,rom the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted
the followingreport together with additional, minority, and additional dissenting
views
I'hcPermanent Srlret Commiiicc on Intclligcncc. 10 whom \vas rcfcrrcd the
bill(HK 2760) IO amcnd the IntelligcnseAuthoriïsiion Asi for FisciilYcar 1983
to vrohihit United States suvport for militaw or varamilitary operations in
~iiara~ua and to authorize aisktance, to be oienly provided t~.~o<ernmentsof
countries in Central America, to interdict the supply of military equipment from
Nicaragua and Cuba to individuals,groups, organizations, or movementsseeking
to overthrow governments of countries in Central America, having considered
the same, report favorably thereon and recommend the bill do pass with
amendments.
Amendmenrs
The amendments adopted by the Committee are as follows:
On page 2, line 15,strike "or against".
On page 2, line 17,after "(h)", strike everything through line 18 and insert
in lieu thereof the following:
"This section shall take effectupon the date prescribed in the classifiedannex
to the Committee report accompanying this bill."
On page 3, line 14,after "ragua", insert the following: "or any other country
or agents of that country."
On page 3, line 21, after "a", insert "friendly".
Overview
The Committee's action on HR 2760comes at a time when US foreign policy
towards Central America is al the forefront of discussion in the Congress and
tbroughout the nation. Attention kas been focused on events in that troubled
region not only because of their daily depiction in news reports but hecause
of the President's April 27 address to a joint session of the Congress. As the
President so forcefully noted, Central America has a strategic importance to the
United States, yet some Central America nations friendly to the United States
are now under attack. The danger of a broader regional conflict looms.
The focal point of United States efort in Central America is of course El
Salvador. There a strong insurgent coalition threatens the elected Government
supported by the United States. El Salvador's many troubles have their root
cause in the serious economic, social and political shortcomings of the long-
entrenched Salvadoran social order. US eid to El Salvador is weighted towards244 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIV~TIES
helping to restructure Salvadoran economic, social and political models, but it
is a sad fact that such reforms are imoractical in a climate of unrest and denial
of basic services.00th arc cduscd by the aiti\,itics or Sal\aJordn inrurgcnts u,h<).
unu,illing io Iimit their ailaiks to milii;in targcts. have launchcd iuccessrul and
very damaging attacks on the power, water and transportation infrastructure of
El Salvador.
The success of the insurgents in El Salvador has not been matched by poli-
tical victories. It is not popular support that sustains the insurgents. As will be
discussed later, this insurgency depends for its life-hlood- arms, ammunition,
financing, logistics and command-and-control facilities - upon outside assis-
tance from Nicaragua and Cuba. This Nicaraguan-Cuhan contribution to the
Salvadoran insurgency is longstanding. If began shortly after the overthrow of
Somoza in July 1979. It has provided - hy land, sea and air - the great hulk
of the military equipment and support received by the insurgents.
No US security assistance to El Salvador can ignore this chain of support.
However. neither El Salvador nor its close neiehhors oossesses the caoabilitv to
interdict arms supplies reaching the insurgents ~hesénations have ieithe;tbe
financial resources, the knowhow, nor the trained personnel to conduct effective
interdiction activities in their own territorv
US poliiy has no1 hccn dirccicd ai pr~\tidingihese nations u.iih the neçessdry
interdiction capability. Kather encouragrment and suppori bas hccn providrd io
Nicaraguan exiles to foster insurgency within Nicaragua. The end ouruose of
this suiport has heen stated to be ihe interdiction of arms flowi& ihrough
Nicaragua into El Salvador. It has also been explained as an attempt to force
the Sandinista régimein Nicaragua to "turn inward" - away from its support
of the Salvadoran insurgency. Later, other goals- "hringing the Sandinistas to
the bargaining table" and forcing the scheduling of "promised elections" were
added as ends to be achieved.
Those ends have not been achieved. Rather, entirely opposite results have heen
produced. Sandinista commitment to the Salvadoran insurgents has strengthened.
The Salvadoran insurgents themselves have become more, not less, militarily
active and may have increased in number. Their activities are well supplied and
often well coordinated. More ominous is that the Sandinistas have steooed ..
their support for insurgents in Honduras.
In Nicaragua itself, as military clashes hetween insurgents and government
forces have increased, even domestic opponents of the Sandinistas have come to
support the government in the face of a US sponsored threat. The Nicaraguan
government has declared a state of siege and assumed martial law powers. This
situation only promises to continue. The prospect for real elections seems dim.
Throughout these developments, US diplomacy has been unable to find a
formula for discussing with Nicaragua the problem of ils attempts to export
revolution. First bilateral and now multilateral approaches have failed to hring
the Sandinistas to ooint of even admittinr its arms traiiickinr activities. Those
negotiations which'offer some present prospect of hope for ëither bilateral or
multilateral talks emphasize strongly the unproductive and indeed counter-
productive nature of outside sponsored insurgencies on the peace process. An
observation that seems called for is that if Nicaraguan/Cuban-sponsored insur-
gents will not force the Salvadoran Government to negotiate with the insurgents,
the same will he true in the case of a US-sponsored insurgency and the Nica-
raguan government.
The fact of US support for the anti-Sandinista insurgents has had further
unfortunate repercussions. Having twice sent US troops to Nicaragua in this
century, this country has once again been cast in the role of interventionist. The ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 245
United States has allied itself with insurgents who carry the taint of the last
Nicaraguan dictator, Somoza. It has, in effect, allowed the spotlight of inter-
national opprohrium to shift from Sandinista attempts to subvert a neighbonng
eovernment to a US attemot to subvert that of Nicaraeua. If ever there was a
formula for Ü~polic~ failupein Central AieriCa, it wozd involve two elements:
(1) acts that could be characterized as US interventionism in Nicaragua; and
i2j an alliance with the followers of Somoza. 00th characterizations can now be
rnsde. I'hc isolati<~nmithin the interndtional cornmunit' thdt Nic;iragua vhould
ici.l ha, bmn d,nliniih~ul b) this <louhl).in~r,nsiliic iniolirvnrni by the IiS in
Nicaraguan aiïairs.
As it watch~ ~ ~e develooment of the Nicaraeuan insureencv..nd ,s members
of the Commitrcc ;<iiicludcJ th;it IIS polizy uaj crnploying the tirong mcan 10
a~.hicveits ubi:cii\ej, the C<>miiiittr.souchr olttrnaiiic solutions icidihie\c the
same ends. li attempted restraints on thérange of activities supported by the
US. Two attempts of this kind were the language of the fiscal year 1983
Intelligence Authorization Act which sought to limit insurgent activity to arms
interdiction. and the Boland Amendment. an amendment to the fiscalvear 1983
Defense ~p~ro~riations Act that pro&hited assistance for the p"rpose of
overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange
between Nicaragua and Honduras.
00th proved ineffectiveas moderate curhs on insurgent activity or US policy.
Hostilities within Nicaragua intensified. There was no discernable effect on the
arms flow. Throughout, executive branch officiaimade little effort to mask US
support, going so far in April, 1983,as to encourage media discussion.
Faced with these circumstances, the Committee met several times in April 1983
to consider alternatives. What emerged from these discussions was a strong
consensus on US security interests in Central America and agreement on US
goals for the region fully consistent with those later enunciated by the President
in his April 27 address. The Committee supplemented its discussions by hearing
from Secretary of State Shultz and CIA Director Casey. Some members met
with the President.
Followineut~ ~ ~ ~ident's address. the Committee amended and then adonted
~~2760. The bill is a twofold approach G~theproblem of ams shipments f;om
Nicaragua to the Salvadoran insurgents. It would deny funding now and in the
nent fiscal year for any direct or Indirect support of military or paramiiitary
activities in Nicaragua. Support could continue for a period o time following
enactment of the bill, but for the purpose of permitting insurgents who wished
to make an orderly withdrawal from Nicaragua. The time period specified is a
time certain but remains classified for the protection of those who choose to
withdraw.
The second part of the bill proposes an alternative approach to amis interdic-
tion. $30 million in fiscal vear 1983and $50 million in fiscalvear 1984would be
authorized tobemade aviilable to friendly nations in ~entral~merica to develop
programs or establish the capability to prevent the use of their territory, or
international territory, for shipmentof militdry equipment to insurgents in any
Central American country. These funds would grant assistance in addition to
that already requested for military aid to nations in this region. Assistance
necessary to establish capabilities to interdict ams also could require the use of
US military trainers or advisors. No assistance provided under this part of the
bill could be transferred to insurgents seeking to overthrow or destabilize any
government.
HR 2760is a comprehensive approach crafted to fit within existing US policy
initiatives,by directly countering the threat of Nicaraguan and Cuban ams246 MLLITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
support to the Salvadoran insurgents. 11addresses the most basic securityconcern
listed by the President - preventing the export of revolution from Nicaragua
and Cuba - as it returns US policy to a position from which it can assail this
activity without fear of cnticism. It thus would turn the tables on the Sandinista
réeime inNicaraeua. It is t~e~~~~~-~nrt for revolution that would then bear the
bGnt of internatio scrultiny andr&erenewed criticism of their Latin neighbors.
It would place additional pressure on Nicaragua to negotiate within the frame-
work of one of the severai reeional oro~osal~now beint!uut forward. With the
cessation of outside support f8r insu&e;ts, it would onceagain allow the interna1
focus in Nicaragua to shift to political, social and economic problems - and to
the accounting that the Sandinistas must give to the people of Nicaragua.
In adopting HR 2760, the Commitiee did not seek to usurp the President's
duties as director and expositor of foreign policy. It sought only to change the
means of achieving the President's goals - with which it was in agreement. The
Committee recognizes that its proposal for arms interdiction assistance is a new
variation of US security assistance, and that the program envisioned by HR
2760 is an expensive one. Nunetheless, HR 2760 is the only comprehensive
solution on which the Committee could agree that addresses both the problem
of Nicaraguan and Cuhan aggressioii and an end to US policy failures in
Nicaragua.
Acrivilies of Cubaand Nicaragua
The Committee has reeulaLlv re,~~wed voluminous intellieence m"terials on
N~c;iriiguil~ainJ C~ihrlniuppori for leilis1in,urgcncie>sincc tlic 1979SinJini\i:<
\licIur! in Yicliragua. 'l'hcConiniiitce's ret icimas indicdicd not only hcc~uvcof
ilic impiirirlnc- i>fCcnirlil .\rnerii~n is,uc, for US foreign polic!. hut be~liiiriii
ilccijionj iihich ihc C<ingrc\s %,as calleai upon IO ni.ike on queiti~ins oi ~ii1 IO
ct>unirie, IIIthe region. 'l'heCoinnilitce hss cnci>~rligcd;inJ riipp<~ricd A full
range of intelligence collection efforts in Central America.
Full discussion of intellieence materials in public reports would Dose serious
securityrisks to intelligence'Sourcesand methods. ~ecesiaril~, therefope,the Com-
mittee must Limitits trcatment of Cuban and Nicaraguan aid for insurgencies
to the judgments it has reached. Such judgments nonetheless constitute a clear
oicture of active oromotion for "revolution without frontiers" throuehout Central
-
,\meric~ hy Cuba alid Yi<rlr.tgua.
'l'heC'oniriiiiisehas niit :<>nienewly idils judgmcni~.On hl.irch -1.1'182,siicr
a nirllur hriclini: conccrnin~ ilic situaiion In El Sli1v~dOr.thc chliirmlin oi ihe
Cornkittee made the follow'ingstatement:
"The Committee has received a briefing concerning the situation in El
Salvador, with particular emphasis on the question of foreign support for
the insur-.ncv. The insureents are well trained. well eauioned with modern
weapons and supplies, ancïrely on the use of sitésin Nicaragua for command
and control and for logistical support. The intelligence supp. .ing these
judgments provided to the ~ommitfee is convincing.-
There is further persuasive evidence that the Sandinista government of
Nicaragua is helping train insurgents and is transferring arms and financial
support from and through Nicaragua to the insurgents. They are further
providing the insurgents hases of operation in Nicaragua. Cuban involve-
ment - especially in providing arms - is also evident.
What this says is that, contrary to the repeated denials of Nicaraguan
officials, that country is thoroughly involved in supporting the Salvadoran AN NE^ TO THE MEMORIAL 247
insurgency. That support is such as tu greatly aid the insurgents in their
struggle with government forces in El Salvador."
On Se~tember 22. 1982. the Committee released a staff renort of its Sub-
committée on 0ver&ight and Evaluation entitled "US ~ntelii~encePerform-
ance on Central America: Achievements and Selected Instances of Concern".
That report noted:
"The intelligence community kas contrihuted significantly tu meet the
needs of policymakers on Central America. Over the las1two years perhaps
its greatest achievement lies in determining with considerable accuracy the
organization and activities of the Salvadoran euerrillas. and in detectine the
ashance given tu them by Cuba and other c&nmunist countries. ~lthou~h
amounts of aid and degrees of influence are difficult 10 assess, intelligence
has been able tu estabiish heyond doubt the involvement of communist
countries in the insurgency."
At the time of the filing of this report, the Committee believes that the
intelligence available tu it continues tu support the following judgrnents with
certainty:
A major portion of the arms and other material sent by Cuba and other
communist countries tu the Salvadoran insurgents transits Nicaragua with
the permission and assistance of the Sandinistas.
The Salvadoran insurgents rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua, some of
which are located in Managua itself, Torcommunications, command-and-
control, and for the logistics tu conduct their financial, material and
propaganda activities.
The Sandinista leadershipsanctions and directly facilitates1of the ahove
functions.
Nicaragua provides a range of other support activities, including secure
transit of insurgents tu and from Cuba, and assistance tu the insurgents in
planning their activitiesin El Salvador.
In addition, Nicaragua and Cuba have provided - and appear tu continue
providing - training tu the Salvadoran insurgents.
Cuhan and Sandinista political support for the Salvadoran insurgents has been
unequivocable for years. The Committee concludes that similarly strong militdry
support has been the hidden compliment of overt support. As the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Afiirs, Thomas O. Enders, stated (April
14, 1983)tu the Committee on Foreign Affairs:
"ln 1980(just as in 1978Castro had brought the three main Sandinista
factions together in Havana), Cuban agents brought fiveguerrilla factions
from El Salvador together in Managua, worked out a unity pact among
them, then set up a joint command and control apparatus in the Managua
area and organized logistic and training support on Nicaraguan soil. Since
that time, the great hulk of the arms and munitions used by the insurgents
in El Salvador have Rowedthrough Nicaragua."
Another area of serious concern tu the Committee is the significant military
buildup going on within Nicaragua. The President and other executive branch
officiaishave addressed this suhject puhlicly and exhaustively. Considering the
small ~o~ulation of Nicara~ua - two-and-one-half million peo~le - and ils
weakekd economic status 1 such a buildup cannot be explained away as solely
defensive.Within the Central American isthmus, it poses a potential threat tu its248 MII.ITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTLVITIES
neighbors. The suhstantial Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran insurgents
oilers no assurance that the Sandinistas will constrain their growing military
might within Nicaragua's own borders.
Such a conclusion can he extrapolated from those discussions hetween the
United States and Nicaragua about Sandinista support for the Salvadoran
insurgents. Accordingto Mr. Enders'April 14testimony, threesuch discussions -
in August, 1981; in the spring of 1982; and in October 1982 - have already
rendered fniitless US eilons to end Sandinista support for the Salvadoran
insurgents. While the Committee has reason to question certain elements of the
US negotiating posture, it is certainly clear that Nicaragua, backed fully by Cuba,
has committed itself to continue full support for the insurgency in El Salvador.
US PolicyResponse
The President, in his April 27 address, outlined the basic goals and elements
of US policy for Central America. The Committee also has elicited descriptions
of US o.licv,in the reeuon. The basic thrust of that oo.icv,,as exolained to the
Committee over a two-year period, is to stop the spread of communism by
revolution. The threat of communism is embodied in the efforts of Cuba, Nica-
ragua, and less openly, the Soviet Union itself.
Specific US eilorts to defeat communist expansion in Central America are
directed at certain changes in regional conditions, but they focus on El Salvador
and Nicaragua. By lrying to bring Nicaragua into regional negotiations with ils
neiehhors. US oolicv seeks to realize: reeional imorovements in democratization:
rc~o\,al ui al1;orciin militar) adviior;: an enJ io cross-border \ubvcrsion anJ
acq~isition of hcavy wcapons from outside ihe region. and internationîl monilor-
ini of frontiers.
-Congress and the public are more familiar with other US programs of economic
and security assistance to Central American nations. El Salvador has been the
nation most threatened by insurgency and ils military and socio-economic
troubles are the most familiar points of concentration in debate about US policy
for Central America. There has been a hidden program of Central American
policy, however, which has important consequences for the viability of the public
aspects of the policy. This hidden program is the nominally covert provision of
US support and training to anti-Sandinista insurgents.
The Committee is cognizant of the grcat amount of news reporting and
speculation about the nature of this covert program. The Committee is con-
strained in addressing these stories, some of which are accurate. Because of
security constraints, this report can contain no further information about the
actual facts of the program. A report on the program is required in order to
understand the recommendations of the Committee embodied in HR 2760. The
C<~mmitte:h.is Jetermincd thai. in ordcr 10 protcii intcllig~.nier<>urccsaiid
mr.thi~<lasnd the Iivr.\of thoie ini,iili,edin the 1irogr.m. such a rçp<>rtshould he
gitcn hythe Committee in a secret sessionuithc Ilouse. The un;ininious Jeci,ion
of the Committsc IO requcd suçh a secret se.,sion in ihc ncar iuture, mu51
prohahly in cunneciion with Ilouse consideration uf HK 2760. While this rcpuri
therefore cannot describe the program further, il can provide some outline of
the Committee's con~iderati~n~ofihe program and thë conclusions reached in
connection with the Committee's recommendations.
CommiireeOversighl
From the Committee's first briefing, in December 1981, on the program to
support anti-Sandinista insurgency, serious concerns were expressed by mem- ANNEXES TO THE MEMORtAL 249
bers of the Committee. These concerns went to the number and tactics of the
insurgents to be supported, whether these insurgents would beunder US control
and the possibility ofmilitary clashes between Nicaragua and Honduras.
Five days after this first briefing,the Chairman of the Committee reiterated
these concerns in a letter to the principal executivebranch briefer. He emphasized
that the concerns were shared by memhers of both parties and asked thdt they
be addressed bv senior ~olicvmakers. Sienificantlv...e indicated that the Com-
mittee would iequire briefings on the p;ogram a1 regular intervals, a require-
ment consideredimportant withintheCommitteebecauseof uncertainties expressed
in this letter.
In Avril 1982.followine several such briefines. the Commit~e~ c~ ~idered the
fiscal yéar1983'intelligen&authorization budgei bill. At a mark-up of the bill
on April 5, 1983,the Committee considered, but reiected, motions to strike al1
fundi for the program. Instead, the Committee adopied language in the classified
annex to the report accompanying the bill that limited the uses to which funds
authorized for the program could be applied. The program was to be directed
onlv at the interdiction of arms to the insurgents in El Salvador. Funds in the
program were not to be used to overthrow-the government of Nicaragua or
provoke a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras. The Committee
insisted upon these restrictions in conferencewith the Senate on the authorization
bill and they were retained, with modifications. Responsible executive branch
officiaiswere knowledgeable of, and participated in, these revisions. The confer-
ence report on the fiscal year 1983 intelligenceauthorization bill was filed and
approved by both Houses in August 1982.
Throughout the penod following its April budget mark-up, the Committee
received additional briefings on this program. Then, in December 1982,an
amendment in the House was oflèredto the FY 83 Defense appropriations bill
which would have Drohibited anv form of suDvort for the anti-Sandinista
..
insurgents. Not without somemisgiving,thechainnan of the Committee proposed
a substitute Io that amendment prohibiting support "for the purpose of over-
throwing the government of NicaÏagua or p;ovoking a military exchangebetween
Nicaragua and Honduras", a restriction identical to that contained in the
classified annex 10 accompany the conference report on the fiscal year 1983
intelligenceauthorization act.
The substitute amendment referred Io above was adonted bv the House bv a
vote of 411-0.In offenng the amendment, the Chairman of thekommittee nGed
that it was the duty of the Intelligence Committee to insure that activities
involving lethal force did not get ouïof control.
The eiïect of the amendment adopted by the House - and subsequently
acceptcd in the conference on the fiscal year 1983continuing resolution - was
to reinforce the restrictions of the fiscalyear 1983 intelligenceconference report
while permitting continuation of the program. At the time of the adoption of
the Committee, there was still a belief by the majority of members of the
Committee that the program could be restrained within acceptable limits.
Followinnthe enactment of the continuine resolution. the Committee increased
the irequcn>).of II,bnctings on the program By the lime ol'the lirsisuch hncfing.
howcver.C.?mmittecriieiiibcrsuere cxpressing rcncred dirtrcss iiihc numkr of
insurgentssupported by the program, the seriousnature of fightingthen occurring
within Nicaragua, and the lack of successin meeting theprogram's goals. In this
period also, executive branch briefers discussed other goals and gave diiïerent
emphases to the program than those originallydescnbed to the Committee.
By the beginning of Apnl 1983, pressaccounts of the program's contribution
to the anti-Sandinista insurgency, which had been occurring for more than ayear, had greatly unmasked any pretense of the program's covertness. Some of
these accounts may have been deliberately encouraged by executive branch
officiais.
By this time also, the question of whether the program was complying with
legislaiivedirections was fully before the Committee. In exploring this question,
and in reviewing thoroughly the 17 months of the program's operation, the
Committee heard from the Secretary of State and the Director of Central
Intelligence.A forerunner draft ofHU 2760 wascirculated within the Committee
in mid-April. In two meetings of the Committee concerning the program, votes
or determinations were deferred, in the last case in order to hear the President's
April 27 address to the Congress on Central America. A meeting scheduled the
day following this address was also adjourned without decision on HU 2760.
Finally, on May 3, 1983,the Committee met and ordered reported HU 2760, as
amended.
Considerarion of Amendnlenrs
The Committee adooted several amendments. The first amendment struck
from section 801 (a) the words "or against", thus rendering the prohibition on
the expenditure of funds in that section a ban on either direct or indirect support
for m~litaryor paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, instead of "in or against
Nicaragua". The Committee did not adopt this change to lessen the ekct of
section 801 (a), but rather to remove any doubi that the section could be read
to prohibit acts hy a recipient of section 80(h) aid within its own territory or
international territorv to indirectms. no matter what the nationalitv of the
ürnis ir.illirkcri. The ;inienJmrnt alsii .;cr\cd Io rem<)ir thc drgumeni thai ihc
section ~uuld prohihit the crillcction h) thc CnitcJ Stair, .,f intclligencc abi)ut
Nicaragua and its provision to any recipient nation. The amendmint did not
"water down" the orohibitions of section 801 la) because the words "directlv
or indirectly" still apply to the ban on militaiy 'or paramilitary operations in
Nicaragua. Thus activities outside Nicaragua which have the effectof supporting
militaj or paramilitary operations inside that country are not perm-itted by
section 801 (a).
The Committee also adopted an amendment which sets a time pcriod from
the enactment after which the provisions of section 801 (a) take eiiect. This
neriod is set forth in the classified annex to this reoort. The ouroose of this
amendment was to provide for as orderly a withdiawal as ;ss;ble of anti-
Sandinista insurgents within Nicaragua without providing Nicaraguan forces
with the exact timetable for such a withdrawal,
The Committee also adopted an amendment providing that grant security
assistance authorized by section 802 (b) could be provided to friendly Central
American nations io interdict arms shipments from or through countries other
than Cubaand Nicaragua. Lastly,the Committee adopted a clarifyingamendment
correcting a drafting error.
The Committee considered two other amendments, the iirst of which would
have made the eiiective date of section 801la. hin-e on the end of Sandinista
;irins. train!ng. ci>mm;inJ-:ind-control or logistic:il rupport li>r the S;iIiaJorxn
insurgcnrr. Ihc sc;ond ;imendmcnt niodificd ihc lirri in ni;ikc111:cil'ccii\cdate
oi'xct16>n801 (u, depend <inihc Sandiniitas a-rccment Io 3 \erifiÿble -rrccmcnt
to cease such su~oori.
This second amendment was debated fully by the Committee. In rejecting it,
the Committee did not reject negotiations to stop the export of revolution. The ANNEXESTO THE MEMORIAL 251
Committee fully supports negotiations - regional or hilateral or both - which
seek this end. What it was unwilling to do was to condition an end Io support
for the anti-Sandinista insurgency upon possible negotiations of the kind which
the executive branch has been reluctant to enter into with Nicaragua. The
Committee has heen disturbed by a lack of vigor in those diplomatic exchanges
that have occurred. The Committee douhted the likelibood of Sandinista aeree-
ment in the face of what they consider an effort Io overthrow them. ~emhers
of the Committee made this observation hased on the effect this program had
had on Sandinista conduct to increase, rather than decrease, suppoÏt for the
~a~vadoran insure-n- ~ ~ - ~
Memhers of the Committee also questioned the willingness of the executive
hranch to reach agreement with Nicaragua on the issue of a verifiahle end to
arms shipments. Ëased on frequent presentations to the Committee, it seemed
unlikely that the executivebranch would limit iü demands to an end of Sandinista
support for the Salvadoran insurgents. Present policy also seeksto force internal
Nicaraeuan ~olitical chanees and militarv reductions. The record of failed
dialogle with the ~andinisG régimeis a long one, and although the cornmittee
hesitates to criticize executive branch handling of US diplornatic relations in this
area. it must observe that the record sugrests-a reluctance to modifv in anv wav
the present executive branch view of optimal Central ~meriian soLtio;.
International perception of US intransigence has further limited US negotiating
efforts.
The Committee rejected the amendments in question in the helief that con-
tinued support for the anti-Sandinista insurgency is contrary to US interests. It
strengthens internal and international support for the Sandinista régime;under-
mines the reputation of the United States abroad hy calling into question US
support for the principles of international law; and polarizes this nation on
foreign policy. This makes it very difficult to gain support for funding a strong
US posture in Central America, particularly in El Salvador, the real cockpit of
action in the region.
CornmirteeJudgments
Although the Committee must curtail severely its discussion, judgments con-
cerning the program of support for the anti-Sandinista insurgency are neces-
sdryas a base from which to discuss the recommendations of HR 2760.
In its final review of the program, the Cornmittee asked three questions:
1sthe program consistent with the law and with the direction of the Congress?
1sthe program a wise one?
1sthe program successful?
While individual memhers give different emphasis to each of these questions,
the following answers can be given.
As to the first question, the law says that the program may not have the
purpose to overthrow the government of Nicaragua or provoke a rnilitary
exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras. The fiscal year 1983 intelligence
authorization conference report directs that funds may be used only for the
purpose of the interdiction of ams. The Committee has reached the point where
it is unwilling to assure the House that the present program meets hoth these
requirernents. The reasons for this judgment are as follows:
The dïtii~iiiesand purpoicr oi Ihc anli-%ndinirtii insurgcnib ~iliimatclyshspr:
ihc program. Thcir upenly ackn<,uledgcd goal iif o\erthro\i,ing the S~ndinistar.252 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
the size of their forces and efîorts to increase such forces, and finally their
activities now and while thev were on the Nicardeuan-Honduran border. ooint
net to arms inrrrdirtion. but to miliiar) conli-ontalion. A, the iiumbcrs and
çquipnicnt of the anti-Sandinista insurgsntr hnve incrcaaed, the violence or ihcir
aiacks on targets unrelated to arms interdiction has grown, as has the intensity
of the confrontation with Sandinista troops.
These groups are not controlled hy the United States. They constitute an
independent force. The only element of control that could be exercised by the
intention of doing.ation of aid, is something that the executive branch has no
There are certainly a number of ways to interdict arms, but developing a
sizablemilitary force and deploying it in Nicaragua is one which strains credibility
as an operation only to interdict anns.
Finally, and most importdntly, the program kas no1 interdicted arms. While
this goes as much to whether the program is effective - the third question posed
by the Committee - it also bears on compliance, if only because the only real
results have been a challenge to the régime and heightened tensions with
Honduras. In 18months the Committee has not seen any diminishment in arms
flow to the Salvadoran guerrillas, but rather repeated border clashes followed
recently by heavy fighting well inside Nicaragua. In the process, innocent lives
have been lost.
The second question is - is this wise? The Committee is forced to respond in
the negative. lniïicting a bloody nose on nations achieves a purpose no diiïerent
with nations than witb individuals. It tends to instill a deep desire to return the
favor. The Sandinistas are no difîerent. Their policies have not softened. They
have hardened. Eden Pastora, the former Sandinista "Comandante Zero", and
now an opponent of the Sandinistas, has said that this program helps the
Sandinistas in power. It tends to bind the Nicaraguan population - even those
with little enthusiasm for the Sandinistas- torcther aaainst the threat of attack.
It is the best guarantee thdt the free elections theexecutive branch says it
wants will not take place, and that the Cuban influence it seeks to diminish will
grow.
Besides that. however. this is no loneer a covert ooeration. The oublic can
reüd or hçar about IIdailS. ~nti-~andinistï leade;i acknowledge US aid.
Exccuiii,e brinch <~tficiïls- in hoth omcial and unonicisl rtiitemcntr - ha\c
made no secret of the elements of the program.
Finally, the Central Intelligence Agency, which until rccently had a right to
feel that it had regained some of the public confidence lost during the period of
the mid-70s, is once again the subject of public scrutiny. It is being asked to
continue an action whose principal elements are known to al1 the world. This
again ofîers much food for propaganda to the Sandinista régime.It hurts the
CIA, which is merely executing policy. It has put CIA witnesses - who do not
make oo.icv , - in the increasin-.v uncomfortable oosition of trv.nn-10 seIl the
program to an increasingly skeptical Congress.
The last question is- kas this operation been successful? Some reasons listed
above go to why the Committee believes the program has been counterpro-
ductive - why it achievesthe veryresults the executivehranch seeksro prevent -
but the acid test is that the Salvadoran insurgents continue to be well amcd and
supplied. They have grown in numbers and have launched more and longer
offensives.All this requires an unintenupied flow of arms.
What also have increased. of course. have been even laree- and more serious
military exchanges bet\rccn the pdramilitary groupr and Nicariguan furcer 'l'hc
Commitier Joej not vieu thcsc exchanges a':havtng impcded the ;irmi flow. In ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 253
fact, as they increase, there is an exponential growth in the loss of innocent life
and the added possibility of clashes between Honduran and Nicaraguan troops.
Neither results are legitimate nor justifiable.
A closing but timely note to these judgments can be made from the report of
the Senate Select Committee to Studv Government Oneration with Reauest to
Intelligcnie r\ciivities (the Cliiirch Cornmiitccj. In115 dis~ussionoi paramiliiary
pn>grams Iike the one that ii the ruhjsit of this report, the Church Comniittes
observed:
"There are two principal criteria which determine the minimum success
of paramilitary operations: (1)achievement of the policygoal; and (2) main-
tenance of deniability. If the first 1snot accomplished, the operation is a
failure in any case; if the second is not accomplished, the paramilitary
option offers few if any advantages over the option of overt military inter-
vention. On balance, in these terms, the evidence points toward the
failure of paramilitary activiiy as a technique of covert action."
The above discussion sets forth how the Permanent Select Committee on
Intellieence answered the auestions it has nosed. but a solution is also called for.
Nii mrnitrcr of the ~ummiitre helievssthaicndi~g ~upport for the anti-Sandinisa
iniurgcn~.) aill hy ~lsclfinduce ;i correjponJing end in SünJiniia ruppurt Ibr
the Sûlv;iddr;in in\urrcntr. The Conimittee d,>c> net uish to imoose a unilateral
restriction on US poÏicy. Rather, it seeks to end an ineffectiveprogram which
does real harm to the image of the US as a defender of democratic, peaceful
change. That ineffective program must be replaced by a scheme of security
assistance with direct US varticioation. o..nlv oi.eredand received. that aims
to create a capabiliiy amo& friehdly nations where none now exists.'
The Committee has been told that an end to the program of support for the
anti-Sandinista insuraencv could cause a cataclvsriic Ïeorientati6 of nations
ïriendly icithc unitcd ~iitcs. Thore nations. th& Cornmiitec kas bcen u~rncd.
would scck acci>mmoJdtion with Nicaragua and Cuba in the face ul'a lailure <if
uill hv the L'nited States. FIi~iid~tif rciurecs i,oulJ liuik to the Ilnitcd States
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Committee'~ ~ ~~~~ ~ ~ ~o~ ~
The Committee finds these arguments lacking in merit, for its recommendation
would replace the present "covert" program with open commitments, backed hv
substantial amouni of aid. to ~rovide i&friends in the reaion the means to keeu
their horders secure. ~hat is'a reaffirmation - and a &ronger one - of US
commitment than conducting a secret war. The United States has a substan-
tial stake in Central America, which the Presidcnt bas set forth to the nation.
For the orice of a somewhat lareer securitv assistance oroeram. US foreien
policy cah regain the high, firm g&nd it mukt maintain 10 h;ng the scrutinyof
world opinion upon Nicaraguan and Cuhan adventurism in Central America.
Such schtiny and its selfrinterest in strong economic relations within a pros-
perous Central America - are what will hring Nicaragua to the hargaining
table.
The Committee, of course, can only recommend the favorableadoption of the
security assistance program proposed by HR 2760. That power lies with the
Committee on Foreign Alïairs, which must reconcile the bill with the full US
range of assistance in Central America. The Committee feelscompelled to note,
however. that Sandinista sunnort for the Salvadoran insurcents continues to be
important for the continuation of that insurgency. To ignore this key link is to
provide an important military edge to these insurgents. Ending the US program
supporting anti-Sandinista insurgency will not alone change this aspect of254 MILITARY AND PARAMII.ITARY ACTIVITIES
Sandinista policy. The Committee agrees with the executive branch that US
commitment to its friends in Central America must be seen as strong and
enduring. Such commitments balanced by economic assistance and political
reform, and coupled with one or more of the peace initiatives now being advanced
within the region, offer the only real prospect of preventing the export of
revolution. The United States must therefore cease orovidine ils adversaries the
specter of another "Bay of Pigs", of renewed iatin iniervensionism, and
restructure its support for democracy in Central America. The discussions now
sponsored by the~contadora group of nations presently offer the hest framework
for restructuring the US approach Io Central America along these lines. Such an
effort should be encouraged and then implemented.
Seclion-by-Section Analysis
Section801 (a)
This subsection prohibits the obligation or expenditure of any funds appro-
oriated in either fiscal vear 1983or fiscal vear 1984 to the Central lntellirence
&nc) or an) oiher of the United ~1atr.rGo\,crnnient in\.olvcdin iniclli~cnce
asti\iiies intended iur. or resuliingIn.dirc~tlyor indireitly, support li~rmiliiÿry
or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any foreign country or by any group,
oreanization. movement. or individual. Because the orohibitions aoolv to anv
objigÿtii>nhor c\pcndit"reï uhich dirccily or indirectly suppori miliiars or
pîraniiliiîr) operaiions hy those enliiies in Nicaragua, ir prohihiis bupport of
cniiiics IocateJ ~~ut\iJch'i2îrJwuliwhich<iwrale w~ihinihc icrriiow of Nieararua.
Even indirect support, such as training,'which is provided exciusively ouGide
Nicaragua, but which is given in preparation for military or paramilitary activity
in Nicaragua, is prohibited.
At the same time. section 801 la) does not orohibit the collection. oroduction.
tiran~l)sis of inielligcnic hl ~S'i~ielli~enccélrrnrnts. nor the provi;ion of juch
inirlligcnçe io ïricndly foreipn countrles, as long as such aciivity docs nui suppori
military or paramiliiary operations in Nicaragua by any foreign nations or
other entity.
In time of war, or in the case of a commitment of US military forces during
a period covered bya report from the President under the War Powers Resolution,
support for military or paramilitary operations to complement those by US
forces may be appropriate. Such might be the case if Honduras or Costa Rica
were attacked by Nicaragua. In such an event, the President would no doubt
request a relaxation of the strictures on foreign insurgencies.Such an adjustment
undoubtedly would be accomplished expeditiously.
It is also important to note that this section in no way limits the ability of the
United States to provide assistance - under section 802 or any other provision
of law - which would help any friendly Central American nation in policing its
sovereign territory. Thus, US military or other assistance to any such country
could be used witbin its borders or in international territory to defend that
country or to prevent the use of its territory by those who seek to illegallytrans-
ship ams or materially support uprisings against it.
Section802 (b)
This subsection provides that subsection (a) shall take effectat a time certain
after the date of enactment of the bill. The period of lime is set forth in the
classified annex accompanying the bill. The time period is estimated by the ANNEXES IO THE MEMORIAL 255
Committee to be a reasonable time for the orderly withdrawal of forces whose
logistical support would be cut ofl by the action of subsection (a). The specific
time period is classified so as to forestall hostile military action against such
forces during or towards the end of the period in question. Thus, it is hoped
that withdrawal can be accomplished in a less vulnerahle fashion than might
result if the withdrawal period were known publicly.
Secrion802 (a)
This subsection States that it is the finding of Congress that, absent a state
of war, providing military equipment to entities seeking to overthrow Central
American governments is a violation of international law, including the Char-
ters of the United Nations and the Oreanization of American States.and the Rio
Treaty of 1949;and lhat cuba and N&aragua are engaged in such actions, which
threaten the independence of El Salvador and threaten to destabilize al1 of
Central America; and that Cuba and Nicaragua refuse to stop such actions.
These findings are borne out hy the facts set forth in the body of the report.
Secrion 802(b)
This subsection authorizes the President to ~rovide to anv fricndlv Central
American country grant security assistance specifically designed to Gsist such
country to acquire the capahility to prevent the transfer of military equipment
from or through Cuba or Nicaragua or any other country or its agents which
the President decides is intended ta be used to overthrow that or anv other
Central Amcrican go\,ernmcni. Ihc Prcsidcni icts the irrms anii conditioris of
such asiistancc :in11 ~i also requirrrl Io dcterniinc which entities or indii,iduiils
seek to overthrow the eovernment of anvCentral American nation. The President
may delegate his rcs$nsibilities unde; this subsection. The Committee would
expect that the Secretary of State would be the appropriate official should the
President do so.
The grant assistance authorired bv this subsection must he ooenlv nrovided.
It is, as-such, another form of US sécurityassistance, although berhais unique
in ils purpose. Such assistance therefore should be administered and reported Io
Cong;css[ as Caras oossihle. in the same manner as other US securitv issistance
-
program5 The sub>eition speciii:~lly prohibiti aitciiipts ti)c<~nceal I;S sponsor-
,h!p of ihc assistancc programs c~~ntemplatedby ihis bill.
l'hi.Conimiiiec undcritand~ ihat thc typcs or grmt asrisi;incc uhiih rould
be oikred under this subsection cover a b&ad spëctrum. Such assistance may
include, but is not limited to, support for detection, tracking, blocking or
preventive action by recipient nations to help prevent arms trafficking through
their territory or international territory. In the firstcategory- detection eflorts-
would be includedthe ~urc.ase ~~~~-nsors. surveillance or reconnaissance eaui~ ~ ~. r
ment, training in their use, and the operation of such equipment.
The second category - tracking cilorts - could embrace the purchase of
radar or other intefiigencecollection equipment, training or advice on its use or
in other tracking eilorts, as well as operations involving implementation of this
equipment and training.
The third caterorv - blockinr eiiorts - could include erection of barriers or
other engineering ievices, and advice or training in the erection and use of
such devices.
The las1category - preventive action - would take into account any border
patrol or interdiction-type missions, training or advice in the development of
such techniques, and any military, police, customs, or other activities that serve256 MILITMY AND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlES
the purpose of preventing arms rrafficking.This category could also include any
eKo~ts~ ~ suo,.~t mu~ ~lateral or bilateral. verifiahle. and recioracal aereements
IO bring about a kali in thc fighiing in Cc"irdl Amc;ica.An c;aniple ihis Iîst
area might hc ihc kind uf~ntcrnîtional policing force rccently rcquehicd by Costa
Rica rrom the Ornini7îtion of :\meriean Si:iics CS assistancc undcr thir suh-
section could be Lsed by Costa Rica to defray the cos1 of maintaining such
a force.
The Committee feels that such agreements offer the best hope for curbing
externally-supported insurgencies and wishcs to endorse and encourage the
concept of a regional peace initiative.
A friendly foreign country is understood hy the Committee to be a country
considered by the President to he a country friendly to the United States at the
time the President decides to furnish assistance under this subsection to that
country.
The Committee exDectsthat rnuch of the assistance - ~articularlv trainine.
tcchnical as.;iitance or ddvice provided under the authorit) of this subsection
co~ld in\i>l\c the use of CS inilildry personnel. It should hc empkdsiicd ihat.
since the program of assistance cnvisioned hy this subsection 1s intended to
supplement other types of security assistance, any outstanding restrictions on the
numbers of US military advisors permitted within a recipient country would
constrain significantly the eliicacy of that program. Accordingly, any such
restrictions should bereviewed by the Committee on Foreign AKairs with this
in mind.
The Committee is also compelled to note that the Secretary of Defense has
indicated that. in his view and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. the goal of
providing CriendlyCcntrÿl American n3tions with the cspÿbility which thcy
would tlien exerriic to eli'cçiivclyinirrdici the Niraraguan Cubsn armi ilow
throuah thrir tcrrltors s~>ntempl.itcdhy ihis jiibseiii<~nrnî) be %en,Jilliiult Io
achieie. ~onctheless,-the aim .of the programs to be estabiished by subsection
(hl is to provide - through initial training, assistance, and advice - recipient
nations with the capability to eventually do the task of arms interdiction on their
own. This is whv the bill authorizes funds onlv for fiscal vear 1983and fiscal
)car 1934 The ~~>mrniiteciiiiendi that this progr.ini hc rci.i;iicd hciiirc continu-
ation in later ycars so that questions Iikc the numbcr ~nd need for LS niilitar)
advisorr çan bc rei,isiicd by thc Conrrcss. In other irordr. the Conimittrc vic\is
the capabilities transfer auihorized by this bill to be a transfer process which will
at some point in the forseeahle future no longer require direct US assistance
or training.
Secrion802 (c)
This subsection conditions the provision of any US assistance to any friendly
Central American nation upon the stipulation of that country that it will not use
any such assistance to destabilize or overthrow the government of any other
Central Amencan nation or provide any such assistance to another nation,
individual, or entity that seeks to destabilize or overthrow the government of
another Central American nation.
The Committee wishes to emphasize that activities hy any recipient nation
within its own territory to defend itself or prevent the use of such territory for
the transfer of military equipment intended to be used to overthrow any Central
American government does not fall within the concepts of destabilization or
attempting to overthrow another government. Rather, such activity, or actions
clearly incidental thereto, is self-defenseor the exercise of a police power which ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 257
is the right of any sovereign nation. This is true even if the individuals affected
hy such defensive or policing actions are nationa-s even military personnel-
of another nation.
efforts are todefend itself and its territorv, it cannot he considered to ben's
attempting to destabilize or overthrow another country's government. Rather,
its efforts would be aimed at the defeat of another country's military forces, not
the overthrowing of that country's government. Numerous modern examples -
Turkish action in Cvorus. Israel's incursion into Lebanon. and Britain's recoverv
of the Falkland lslifid- serve to reinforce this point. The Committee intend;,
in short, that this subsection be interpreted in the same vein as are comparable
provisions of the Foreign ~ssistanc~ Act and the Arms Exoort Contril Act.
'l'iicrcf~)rc.uhcri que,tii>nh aridr Io the nsiurr. <if sct~vilies or anticip3ir.d
a~iiiities engageciin b! r:cipicrit narioris. (ribtcallcd iiir arc coniult~iionr
aiid cl;iriliiaiion\ uiih rs:ipicnt nalion,. The rcports oi'any IJSarl\.isorr iniol\,cd
in assistance programs contemplated by this bal can assisi in such discussions.
Section 802 (d)
This subsection would require the President to provide to Congress an un-
classified ~eDort descrihi.e the nature of assistance.~~.~osed to he ~rovided
Io a particul~r I;irr.ignmunir) under suhrs.'iion h Such rcporis ;ire rr.quircd
to hz providcd .ttIcasr15 da>s priur io ihc act.131ProXisions>fvuchIissistiinic.
thus ailowing for congressional hquiry about the pÏoposed aid.
While the report required by the subsection is the only one stipulated by the
bill, the Committee expects that the Committee on Foreign Affairs will from
time to tirne require information from the executive branch so as to review the
progress and accomplishments of assistance programs in recipient countries.
Such oversight, as well as reviews hy the Committee on Appropriations, is
necessary to ensure successful implementation of arms interdiction assisvance.
justification materials similar to those provided for other security assistance
programs.
Section 802 (e)
This subsection authorizes appropriations in fiscal year 1983 of $30 million
and in fiscalvear 1984of $50million for the provision of the assistan.e .roposed
by the bill.
Two aspects of these figures require comment. First, the Committee recom-
mends the sum of $50 million in fiscal year 1984 principdlly on the basis of a
full vear's comvarable ex~enditures in a numher of related areas. This estimate
alsoallows for inflation and a modest margin of unforeseen cost escalation. Thus
the figure represents the Committee's rough estimate of what a comprehensive
arms interdiction assistancerogram would cost, but ishased upon what ongoing
comparable efforts would amount to in fiscal year 1984.
While the Committee's cost estimates are rough ones, it is clear that some
endeavors appropriate for amis interdiction in the rough jungle terrain of Central
America will be expensive.Two such approaches the Committee feelshave merit
are radar and barrier fencing.
Much of the arms now flowing from Nicaragua to El Salvador has in the past
gone via small planes or helicopters. The necessary radar equipment to acquire
and track such air traffic is exoensive. For instance. the TPS-13. the radar svstem
nou in l1undiir;is. i, the same radar iiscd hy thc Argentine iorïei ai I'i>rtStanley
during thc Fdlkland IjldnJ, ionllir.i. Thal sc;ir.,hand siirvcillance radar. iviih an258 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACI'IVITIES
effective range of 300 miles,costs $10 millionwith necessary support equipment
and requires 20 trained personnel for its operation.
In the area of fencing, it is apparent that in discrete areas where such barriers
can be effective.it willtake miles offencine to cordon off kevland suoolv routes.
The Cornmittic doe, nui contemplale i'encingeniirc borders ~o~;ihelecs. a
single fcncc Iine con,trucierl in the United States ciin sort Slbh.iJ00per mile on
Ir\,el cround: ihc co\i oi'a double fcncccould escalaie IO 5221..00r>.rmile.Thc
cornmittee would anticipate that costs for similar fencing in the often rough
terrain in Central America could be similarly expensive.
For the fiscal year 1983figure,the Committee has estimated that a half yîar's
effort would be nrovided. assumine unor..al of the bill within a reasonable time.
The .drlitionaI S? millionrepresentsan r'stim:itc<iiup-front Iogi,tisal. cquipnicni.
and iran\port;ition CO114 that Iikely sould arisc with thc initiation of such a
program in fiscal year 1983.
The second point to be made is thal the Secretary of Defense has indicatod 10
the Committee that an effectiveinterdiction program in Central America may be
more costly than contemplated by the bill. The Committee, as of the time of the
filingof this report, was attempting to seek further clarification of this statement.
Further details of the cos1estimates in fiscal year 1983and fiscal year 1984,
as well as the letter of the Secretary of Defense, are included in the classified
annex to this report.
CommirreePosition
On May 3, 1983,the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, a quorum
being present, approved the bill with amendments and ordered it favorably
reported by a recorded vote of 9 to 5
OversightFindings
With resnectto clause 2(~),,3),\Al,~f Rule XI ofthe House of Renresentatives. ,
the ~ommlttee has held extensive briefings,hearings and meetings;egarding the
nature and conduct of intelligence activities that would be affected by this
legislation.This reviewand the;ecommendations ofthe Committee are summar-
ized in the body of this report and its classified annex and will be further
amplified in a secret session ofthe House of Representativcs at an appropriate
time in the future.
Fiscal Ycor COSIProjecrions
With respect to clause 2 (1) (3) (R) of Rule XI of the House of Representa-
tives and section 308 (a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this Iegis-
lation does no1 provide new budget authority or tax expenditures. The Com-
mittee estimates, pursuant to clause 7 (u) (1) of Rule XII1 of the House of
Representatives, that the outlays which will occur in fiscal year 1983 will no1
exceed $30 million and that outlays which will occur in fiscalyear 1984will no1
exceed $50 million.This bill does no1authorize expenditures beyond fiscalyear
1984 and the Committee would anticinate that additional leeislation would be
required if expenditures beyond fiscal' year 1984are necessiry. The executive
branch has not submitted any bud~et estimates with which the Committee can
compare ils own estimates. ANNULES 'IOTHE MMEMORIAL 259
CongressionalBudget O@ceEsrimate
With respect to clause2() (3) (C) of Rule XI ofthe House of Representatives,
the Committee has received no report from the Congressional Budget Office.
Recommendurinnof rhe Committee un GovernmentOperarions
With respect to clause2(1) (3)(D) of Rule XI of the House of Representatives,
the Committee has not received a report £rom the Cornmittee on Government
Operations pertaining to the subject of the bill.
Inflalionary Impacr Srarement
Pursuant to clause 2 (1) (4) of Rule XI of the House of Representatives, the
Committee has attempted to determine the inflationary impact of the hill.
The Committee finds no adequate method to identify the inflationary impact
of the bill. Further, the bill does no1 provide specificbudget authority but rather
an authorization for appropriations. Hence, any inflationary impact would de-
pend on the amounts actually appropriated and the strain that short supplies
of matenals, production capacity, or other economic resources would place on
industrial capacity or financial markets.
Chunge.~in E.xisling Law Made by the Bill, us Reporred
In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIll of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, changes in existing law made by the hill, as reported, are shown
as follows (new matter printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
Intelligence Aurhorizarion Acr for Fiscal Year 1983
TITLE 1 - INTELLIGENCE ACTlVlTlES
PROHIBITION ON COVERT ASSISTANC OR MILITARYOPERATION IS NICARAGUA
Sec. 801. (a)Nonc (frhe funds appropriatedfor~scolyear 1983or 1984for the
Central Inrelligence Agency or any orher deparrmenr, agency, or enrity of the
Unired States involved in intelligence uctivities may be obligaied or e.rpendedfor
the purpuse or wlrich would have rhe eflecl of supporting, direcrly or indirecrly,
miliiary orparamilirury operarhns in Nicaragua by any narion. group. organizalion,
movemenr,or individual.
(b) This sectionsliall rake Gecr upon thedoreprescribed in the cIassiJïedannes
io rhe Commirreereport accompanying rhis bill.
Sec.802. (a)The Congress/Nldsrhat -
(1) in IIIEabsenceof o stale of declured iisur, /he provision of mili~a~y
equipmenr ro individuuls, groups, organizafions, ur movements seeking ro260 MILITARY A~D PARAMILITARY A~IVITIES
overrhrow governmenrsof countries in Cenrral America violares international
rreuty obligurions, including rhe Charrer of rlie Unired Nations, the Charter
of rhe Organizarion of American Srares.and rl~eRio Treaty of 1949: and
(2) such acrivities bv rhe Governmenrsof Cuba and Nicarapua threofen
ihose aciiviiies.
(b) The Presidenr is authorized to furnish assisrance,on such rerms and con-
dirions as hemay determine. ro ihe governmenrof anyfriendly country in Central
America in order IO provide such counrry wiih rhe abiliry ru preveno use of
its rerrirory. or rhe use of internaiional ierritury, for rhe transfer of milirary
equipmenrfrom or ihrough Cuba or Nicaragua or any orher counrry or ogenrsof
rharcounrry Io any individual, group. organizarion, or morementwhich thePresideni
derermines seeks ro overthrow rhe governmeni of suchfriendly counrry or rhe
governmeni ofany orher counrry in Cenrral America. Assisiunceunder this section
shall beprovided openly, and shall no1bepruvirled in a manner which artempls tu
conceal Uniied Stares involvemenr intheprovision ofsuch assistance.
(c)Assistancemay be provided ro afriendly foreign counrry under this se<:tion
only i/ lhuf counrry has agreed rhar it will no1 useany assistanceprovided by rhe
United States under this section, the Foreign Assisiunce Act of 1961, or the Arms
Es~orr Conrrol Act ro desrabilize or overrhrow ihezover"ment of an" a ,nrrv in
Central America and will no1 make an)' such ussisianceavailable to any narion.
individual, grou~, or-qunizatron,or movenzentwhichseeksrudestabilizeor overrhrow
any suchgovernmenr.
(d) Ar leasr 15 days before providing assisrance io a foreign couniry under
rhis section, rhe Presidenr shall submit an imclassijied reporr which describesihe
proposed assisrance IO rhe Speaker of the House of Represenrarivesand IO the
chairman ofrhe appropriate cornmirteesof rhe Senare.
(e) There is uuthorized to be appropriated ro the Presidenr ro carry out ihis
secrion.S30.000.OW for rhefiscal year 1983and$50,000,000for rhefiscalyear 1984.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. DAVE McCURDY
There is a compelling case for continued American involvement in Central
America, and I fully support President Reagan's request for additional military
and economic aid to our allies there. At the same time. 1am seriouslv concerned
about lhc direction Our prescnl involvernent ii taking. The ~dmini~tr~lion has
been Jisingcnuous in rnaintaining ihat the sole purpmrcOC 11,covert asstbiance is
to halt thellow of weavons into Nicaraeua. In doiG so. it has seriouslvdamaeed
-
prospects for congressional approval Ofovert as will 4s covert aid. -
Covert activity should be a tool of overall policy, not a substitute for it. But
it has not been demonstrated to me that Ourgovernment has a well thought out
policy with respect to Nicaragua. As a supporter of the President on much of
his defense posture, and as one who helieves that the President is our chief
national spokesman on foreign affairs, 1was willing to give him the benefit of
the doubt throughout the Committee's deliberations on this bill. Had hc bccn
willineto imoose reasonable restrictionson covert onerations within Nicaraeua u -
in order Io preirnt iniliscriniitiatc atiackj on ci\ilian and economtr targels. for
exi~niplc - and had hc shi>u,nsome good Iaith eiTort, in negoiiating with thc
~icaraguan government, it might have been possible to deverop an alternative ANNEXESTO THE MEMORIAL 261
IOihc Committcc bill On ihrce ieparatc occasions, howcvcr. the highcst otficials
in the i\dministr;ition rc~cctcdJircci offer, of iumprornisc Jus1one wcck after
hc iold a Joint Sessionthat "Conrrrss sharcs both the Douer and the reïnonsihilit\
for Ourforeign policy", the ~resi'dentpuhlicly reiteraied his refusal to iccept any
conditions on US assistance.
Valid obiections can be made arainst the first section of the Committee hill,
which prohibits covert action wiïhin Nicaragua. The Sandinista governmen~
poses a clear threat to the security of its neighbors and to the United States.
With help from the Soviet Union and Cuba, it is supplying aid and ams to rebel
factions in El Salvador, and isattempting to export Marxist revolution throughout
Central America. These considerations, however, are not sulficient to warrant
giving the Administration carte blanche for the unlimited arming and equipping
of thousands of anti-Sandinista troops whose aim is to overthrow their country's
government. At hest, it is hypocritical for us to condemn subversion in El Sal-
vador and encourage it in Nicaragua. The recent slayings of a West German
physician and twelve of his helpers near the Honduran border prove al1 too
convincinelv that such activi~, ~s not beine restricted to militarv-~~~eets.
\Vcshoild ha\e Icarncd ïrom our cxl*.rycniein Southc;ist Aiia that \r.iihi>.~at
clcdrlydcfincd policy. uithoui publi; support for that poli;?, and \vithout rcalisti:
limits on the use O? force, we can casily he sucked into a bottomless pit. As
Machiavelli wrote, "Wars are begun at will but no1 ended al will". Anti-San-
dinista leaders thernselveshave said that a point has been reached, or soon will
he, at which there is no turning back and the war cannot be stopped.
1hope the overt interdiction assistance outside of Nicaragua that is authorized
in the second section of the Committee hill will help reduce the risk of open war,
but it is no1a solution to the underlying prohlem. Wemus1begin serious regional
talks to find that solution. More than one-quarter of a billion people live in
Latin America; Nicaragua, a nation of fewer than three million people, cannot
stand alone. Regrettably, the United States bas los1what leverage it may have
had with the present régimein Nicaragua. Nevertheless, we should continue to
urge the Nicaraguan government Io cal1for free elections and a Creepress, aWC
must continue to encourage the growtb ofdemocratic institutions in El Salvador
and other countries in the region. We should he under no illusion that these
goals cdn be accomplished quickly, or by economic assistance alone.
Unless the President and Congress cdn work together, we risk damaging our
relations with other Latin American countries. Regardless of the Pate of this
~articuldr lepislation. 1urge the President to make eood on his cornmitment to
"lay the fouidation for aBipartisan approach to scstain the independence and
freedom of Central America".
Dave MCCURDY.
ADDITIONAL VlEWS OF HON. LOUIS STOKES
Alth<iugh I support fully the rccommrnd~iiun of section 801 to CUI oiTany
funds for military or paraniilitary acti\,ity in 'licaragua. Ihavescr~ousrescrvÿtions
about the Conimiticc's ailviceIOthe Comniittcc on Forcirn Atlairs thaiIIshould
authorire additional foreign assistance funds for arms izerdiction hy nations in
the rcgion.
1 understand that the thrust of HR 2760 is to provide a comprehensive
approach Io the question of Nicaragua, hoth its efforts Io arm the Sdlvadoran
rebels and the insurge~~cwhich our country has supported against Nicaragua. 1262 MII.ITARY AND PARAMlLlTARY ACTIVlTlES
agrec uith ihe pi>iitii,e.hipartisan spirit th31 undçrlics [hi\ approach Where I
part conipan) uith the iipproach 01' IIR 27611 ii in the judgnient undcrlging
section 8U2. that niore forci-n a\sitlincc funds will be~ ~~he~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~lnful
to the peoble of the region.
My expectation, and that of my colleagues supporting HR 2760, is that the
orincioal recioients of interdiction aid are likelvto be El Salvador and Honduras.
il isuic~ear10me that these nations, utilizingborder patrols or evensophisticated
detection and surveillance equipment, will stem the flow of arms through the
extremely rugged terrain along much of the Honduran-Nicaraguan border. The
activity of the Salvadoran insurgents hasn't been stopped by efforts to date and
there is no reason to expect they will be appreciably aflected by the as-yet-un-
defined efforts contemolated bv HR 2760.
More importanily, hoth El ~ÿlv~dorand Ilondurlis are unde*rving recipienis
uf the signilicant amounts ofÿid proposed. In the cd.* of tl Salvador, the abuse
of human rights gocs on. The mort helpful sian to which thc adminiriration clin
point at preient an abatement in the-numbérsof murders in that country.
The Salvadoran judicial system is not known for meting out justice. Its
accomplishments lie inprotecting from the reach ofjustice those who abuse jus-
ticeand deny it to others. Underlying thisaspat of Salvadoran societyseemsto be
a gcnuine apathy to an incredible, harrnful profusion of killings and torture -
no1jus1 of US citizens - but of thousands of fellow Salvadorans.
The Salvadoran military today poses as real a threat to the hoped-for rein-
slitution of democratic government as it ever has to the rebels. Salvadoran
officersare running a 9-to-5 war in which the momentum is shifting to the rebels
because of the way the military treat innocent bystanders and civilians. Oftcn
army units terrorize the population in a way that the rebels never do.
Finally, Salvadoran commitment to basic social and economic justice can also
be questioned. The land reform program does not present as rosy a picture to
Salvadoran peasants as President Reagan paints.
If El Salvador were to receive additional aid under HR 2760, it would go to
the military. In light of what 1believe the situation to be at the moment, the use
of which the Salvadoran military will put this money will not help solve the
problems which 1enumerate. Until they begin to do so, 1will not support new
military aid to El Salvador.
In 1-londuras,it is US policy to encourage the nascent return to democratic,
civilian rule. Already the tension caused by the insurgency launched from the
Honduran territorv aeainst Nicaraeua. while threatenine ou r ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~he Iwo
countries, seems to iGrease daily tlheStrength and influence of the military.
1am concerned that the emergingdemocratic forces in Honduras could become
overwhelmed by the military if Ge pump in more military aid. 1 fear more
security assistance will not further strengthen Honduran democracy, but only
the military who so long have ruled this country.
Bccausc1believethat HR 2760represents a sincereand comprehensive attempt
to answer the prohlems posed by Nicaraguan support for Salvadoran rebels, and
because 1know the bill would go to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1voted
for the bill. 1commend Chairman Boland and my colleagues who support the
bill but 1urge mv colleagues who serve on the Committee on Foreign Anairs to
most carefuïiy wéighthe-questions 1pose and those that will occur-to others as
they examine this proposal.
Clearly, the most important part of the bill is endinr covert assistance to in-
surgents~seekingto overthrow Chegovernment of ~ica&~ua. Nicaraguan prob-
lems are their own and the United States has no business bullying them into
compliance with a US version of democracy. The United States should move ANNEXE TO THE MEMORIAL 263
slowlyin thisregion and with a full realiration of the memories Central Americans
have of past US intervention and the pitfalls that lie in the modern versions of
that same course.
Louis STOKES
MINORITY VIEWS ON HR 2760
The oroblems which confront Central America are extremelv com~lex. There
:ire noah). answer. and thcrc 1. no pana;c.ttiith: region'. pr<>hlcrn..Mc are ,II
rhc ~>pinit>nhat HK 2760 dues not 3dcqii.1tclyaddress thcse .onipleiitics
In recent days focus on a few areas of disagreement may have overshadowed
a most important and significant point about which this Committee finds it-
self in substantial, if not total, agreement. First, we wish to strongly associate
ourselves with the findings in the Committee report regarding the activities of
Nicaragua and Cuba. There is incontrovertible and convincing evidencethat Nica-
ragua is aiding the efforts of guerrilla insurgents to overthrow the Govern-
ment of El Salvador. We agree wholeheartedly with the Chairman's statement
of March 4, 1982,
"that there is further pervasive evidence that the Sandinista government of
Nicaragua is helping train insurgents and is transferring arms and financial
support from and through Nicaragua to the insurgents (in El Salvador).
They are further providing the insurgents bases of operations in Nicaragua.
Cuhan involvement especiallyin providing arms is also evident."
Additionally, the Chairman stated that:
"contrary to the repeated denials of Nicaraguan officiais, that country is
thoroughly involved in supporting the Salvadoran insurgency. That support
issuch as to greatly aid the insurgents in their struggle with the government
forces in El Salvador."
Weare in absolute agreement with the conclusion of the Committee report with
regard to the actions of Nicaragua and Cuba. We, too, are convinced -
that Nicara-ua is exoortine. revolution in Central America and contrihu-
ting to the destahilization of the entire region;
that tbere is a disturhing and significantmilitary buildup goingon in Nica.
ragua;
that Nicaragua poses a serious threat to al1 its neighhors in Central
Amenca; and
that the substantial Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran insurgents
offers no assurance that the Sandinistas willconstrain their growing military
might within Nicaragua.
It should be abundantly clear to even the most skeptical of individuals that
the Sandinistas consider their commitment to Cuba farmore important than
their commitment and promises to the Nicaraguan people.
COMPLIANCE WITH THE (BOLANA DMENDMEN LT)
WC fcel11sliuiild bc ii,~icdtliat. Iiwic\cr wcll inicnded, rlic .)riginaiion di IIR
2760w;isprcJi;icd un thtarrumpti<>n rh:u the Administrari<inwar nul i<~mpl)ing264 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
with the soirit and intent of the Boland Amendment. Concerned about this
allrgsii<~n,wchave rci,iewerlthe Ci>mmittzïtranssripis and the legislaiivehistory
creaied on ihc llousc iloor and are convinccd ih3i ihere has been no violaiion
nf the 13- 1'1ri1the Hnuse roicd on a ~ro~or~lwtiich would have dented funds
for the purpose of carrying out milita6 aciivities in or against Nicaragua. That
proposal was defeated. Secondly, the House voted on a proposal which would
have denied funds to groups or individuals known by the United States to have
the intent of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government. That, too, was defeated.
There should be no douht that the House ohjected to a prohibition of funds
hased on the intent of the groups or persons receiving the funds. Lnthe other
body, a similar amendment was rejected which would have prohibited funds in
support of regular military forces or paramilitdry groups operating in Central
America. If either of these proposais had heen adopted, US aid to the anti-
Sandinistas would have heen illegal. However, neither amendment prevailed. The
suhstantially different language proposed by Chairman Boland was approved by
a vote of 411to O.We hope to share with the House in a secret sessionadditional
classified documentation reflecting the Committee's understanding of the conse-
quences of the Boland language. The wording of the Boland amendment on its
face, in our view, clearly allows aid to the anti-Communist guerrilla forces in
Nicaragua for purposes other than overthrowing the Sandinistas, which the other
amendments would have barred. The Boland amendment was a compromise
which did not contemplate a total prohibition against Our US presence in Cen-
tral Amenca.
One may wish to argue with the US policy determination in this matter
or wish Io change Our policy altogether but we think one should begin with the
premise that the President kas not violated either the spirit or the lettcr of the
law.
NEGOTIATIONS
The United States' relations with the Sandinistaflicaragua government
had tenuous heeinnines. Desoite the initial miseivines. the United States and ~ ~
Nicïragua reL.oGiïsd ïhe mui;al benefiisof good relations and significani clfiiris
ai negoiralion, hart heen made. The Carter Admini~traiion adopied a policy
of "ïricndlv si>-i)ucrati(~n"and included ihc oro\,ision of "efleciive and iimelv
assistance'< The previous administration ur&d that the Nicaraguan revolutiok
should be judged byils actions and that the change in government was a matter
of loss of confidence in the former incumhent government rather than the work
of the Cuhan-Soviet hased intervention. Based on that assumotion fr~m Julv~to ~ ~
September 1979the US provided a total of $24.6million in emergency reliefand
recovery aid to Nicaragua. ByJanuary 1981.direct US assistance to the national
-overnment of ~icaraëua toialed $If8 million and. in that timeframe. multila-
teral lending instituti&s also provided an additional $262 million in 'aid from
the Inter-Amencan Development Bank. The last Administration had hoped that
through Ourencouragemeni and economic assistance the Nicaraguan government
would transforrn itself from a revolutionary exporter to a free and democratic
society by using the US aid to holster the pnvate sector.
In September 1980President Carter certified to Congress that Nicaragua was
not su~~ortine violence or terrorism in Central America. thus meetine the re-
quirekints of-section 533 of the Foreign Assistance Act. AI that poiniin time,
several Members of Congress asserted that in making the certification, the
President was ignonng ou; intelligence reports which indicated that the Nica- A N N ~ TO THE MEWORIAL 265
rac-an eo-ernment was assistine the leftist Salvadoran euerrilla~~~~~~-~~several
months of reviewing the facts,-the Carter ~dministrazon reversed itself and
decided that evidence warranted the cutoff of the remaining aid and quietly sus-
pended disbursement of the funds in late 1980.
Thi\ Adminisir<iti<)n,follouing on the hccls of the prcvious Adniinisiraiion'i
a~.tion\, rci,icucd th15.iiiuxtion onsc ag;iin prier io retoking ihc ieciion 533
iinding Onlv aftcr ucll-iliisumcntcd cvidcncc iii Nic~riruan djsistdncs 10 ihr.
Salvadoran guerrillas did this Administration suspend &sbursemenl of funds.
On April 1, 1981,the US claimed that the Nicaraguans were providirig political
and logistical help Io the Salvadoran guerrillas. Because of the deterioration of
the relationships of the two countries, in August of 1981Assistant Sccretary of
State Thomas O. Enders visited Nicaragua in an attempt to negotiate with the
Nicaraguans. This Administration conveyed to the Nicaraguan govrrnment at
that time that the US was willing to resume aid if certain conditions were met;
the most basic of these conditions heing that the Nicaraguan leaders cease their
support of guerrillas in El Salvador. Also discussed at that time was the United
States' desire that Nicaragua stop ifs militas. buildup and guarantee political
pluralism. The Sandinista government made no substantive response IO the
American overture and, after a very hrief period, the Sandinista government
revealed their answer in continuing suppori for the Salvadoran guerrillas.
On March 23, 1982,Honduras presented a six-point regional peace plan calling
for, among other things, a halt to the arms trafficking and mutual pledges of
nonintervention. Nicaragua made no substantive response. Again, April 1982,
US Amhassador Anthony Quainton delivers an eight-point proposal to reduce
tensions which included a joint pledge of non-interference and called for the end
Io Nicaraguan support for insurgencies. The Nicaraguan government responded
but did not address the US plan. Again, October 4, 1982, in a multilateral cal1
for negotiations, eight regional democracies set forth the essential conditions for
peace in Central America. Nicaragua refused to discuss conditions. On February
24, 1983,Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala oil'ereda meeting
of regional foreign ministers, including Nicaragua, to discussresolution of conRict
in Central America. The five other Latin States would also attend the meetine
as observers and the US was not to be a participant. Nicaragua did not responz
Finally, in late April al1five Central American countries, including Nicaragua,
attended a meeting sponsored by the Contadora foreign ministers (Mexico,
Panama. Venezuela and Colomhial. Nicar,eua~ ~ ~s-d to n~ ~ ~ ~ate in anv
multilateral negotiations.
During the period in which hilateral and multilateral negotiation attempts
were initiated, Ïhe anti-Sandinista opposition groups were al& trying to open a
dialogue with the Sandinista government. There have been numerous other
attempts, public and no1 so public, Io hring the Nicaraguans to the negotiation
table without success. There should be no doubt that this Administration and
other Central American governments have endeavored, and will continue to
endeavor, in good fairh to negotiate a peaceful cessation of the hostiliries in
Central America.
It has only heen recently, and partially due to Oursuccessfuletiorts to interdict
arms supplies from Nicaragua and to force the Nicaraguans to turn internally
and seek solutions to their own problems. that we have been successful in
cornmunicatinp. to the Nicararu-ns that we are serious about Our commitment
iu suppori siable. pexcful governmcnts in the rcgion Our uillingnes, iu makc
the point thai ihr Nicdraguiin CubJn intluenscd govcrnmcni u.111 no1 hc allorrcd
to operate freely in imposing their will upon other countries, now offer some
real and present prospect of hope for either hilateral or multilateral talks.266 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLlCl
As we stated earlier, we are of the opinion that HR 2760 docs not adequately
address the myriad of complex issues any effective Central American foreign
policy mus1 address. This bill would depnve the executive branch of authority
to conduct a critical and effectiveelement in ils policy to thwart the emerging
threat of Cuban/Nicaraguan sponsored insurgencies in Central America. The
President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have al1clearly
articulated the need for this program to counter the Cuban-sponsored insurgen-
cies. The bill restricts the options availahle to thc President in comhating hostile
activities directed at peaceful American States. As the President so clearly
expressed in his April 27, 1983,address to Congress, the UnitedStates seeks:
(1) a reciprocal and verifiahlewithdrawal of foreign military and security
advison and troops;
(2) a verifiable reciprocal agreementamong Central American nations on
the renunciation of support for insurgencieson neighbors'territory;
(3) a verifiable reciprocal agreement onthe non-importation of offensive
weapons into Central Amenca; and
(4) to encourage full participation in the political processes of the Central
American nations.
This bill does not further the accomplisbment of any of thcsc critical objectives;
rather, the legiskation poses additional dangers both to human lives and the
credibility of present and future American commitments.
In establishingthe interdiction fund - does the Committee suggestthat, rather
than attempting to disarm or neutralize Nicaragua, we mus1 endeavor to arm
every friendly country in Central America to the point that they can protect
themselves against invasion? What about Costa Rica, which has no standing
army? This isnot consistent with the President's goalto seekreciprocalagreements
among Central American nations on the renunciation of support for insurgencies
on neighbors'territories. There are also those who may feelthat increasing military
arms to a country strengthens the hand of the militaiy and could conceivably
discourage full participation in the political processhy encouraging a stronger and
more repressive military presence in any small Central American nation. This too
is not in accord with the President'spolicy goals.
HR 2760 estahlishcs an overt interdiction assistance program to he made
available to friendly nations in Central America to develop programs or estahlish
the capability to prevcnt thc use of their territory for the shipment of military
eauioment to insurecnts in anv Central American countrv. Bv d, ,nition. these
finds would grant lassistance ;n addition to that already requested for military
aid to the nations of the region. This does not support the President's policy
aeainst the importation of offensiveweaoons into central America. In addition.
the Cornmiltee rcport suggesls lhdt dddllliindi lisrlrtan<c mliy bc nc;csiiiry Io
arcompli\h 2nd cillihlish ihc c<ipahilitics t<iinierdict arms I)oes the Commitiec
mean to suggest that in order to prowde "adequate" arms interdiction assistance
that additional US militarv advisors have to be committed in Central America?
This is inconsistent with he goal expressed hy the President to seek reciprocal
and verifiahle withdrawal of al1foreign military and security advisors and troops
in Central America. .
The US cannot attempt to protect the Sandinista government from the people
of Nicaragua absent US support for anti-Sandinistas. Thcre are no assurances
that the people of Nicaragua will not continue to fight an oppressive Marxist ANN'XES TO THE MEMORIAI. 267
government. A majority of the memhers of the Commiitee may believethat their
approval of HR 2760 reflects an act of highest statesmanship, committing the
United States to a policy of peace. Nothing could be furthzr from the truth. In
handing the Sandinistas a legislativelyengineered victory, we can only assure the
American people that in the long run a higher pricewillbe extracted in increased
human suffering and loss of lire in Central America.
The Committee report gives the impressiv that the presence of antidandi-
nista insurgents in Nicaragua has not heen successful. To the contrary, given the
limited goals and the operational objectives, the program has in fact been
successful. This program has only been in place for little over a year and as
referred to bv the Joint Chiefs of Staff. the nroeram is a successfulone. Also. in
.
rnaking the statcmeni thai the prograni ha, no1 intcrdistcd arms. one shoulJ
look ai the definition oiihr u,i)rd'-interJici". lGh.irr,r;~$'e,Lolirgtoiz 1)trrtonory
Jelines "interdid" as -10 forbid in a fornial or authoriiativc mannïr; to Je,tr<>v.
cut or damage, as in enemy line of supply, by firepower; tn stop or hamper in
enemy". This does not necessarily carry with it the connotation that actual arms
munitions should be seized and be in the possession of the interdiction force.
The question of "how many bullets have you interdicted?" is totally inconsistent
with the nature of the action. Deterring arms shipments or imposing an increased
difficulty in transporting anns shipments is successfulinterdiction.
Another question wbich haî been asked is: "1s this action wise?' Our country
has a nearly 2,000-mile long unfortified border with Mexico, whose southern
border could well be engulfed in the conflagration emanating from the neighbors
to its south in Central America. Two-thirds of our foreign trade in petroleum
nasses throueh the Caribbean Io reach Eurooe. In the even~ ~f~ ~ ~ ~. half of our
;upplies Io ciur NAT0 allies mur1 pa\s ihr&h ihe Caribbean Ilostile conirol
ol the region rhrough ilicni .Marxi,t Siatrs coulJ give them the power to choke
the United States' cconomv and diminish ciur iibiliiv iu asrist Our NATO ~llier.
A secure, stable, and democratic Central America .is critical to the security of
the United States.
The Committee report rejects the notion that "floods of refugeesmay Bock to
the United States hecause of the Committee's recommendation". We submit that
it will not necessarily he what the Committee has done but what the Sandinistas
will do that hrings refugees to the United States. Presently 10 per cent of the
entire El Salvadoran population resides in the United States and Nicaragua's
immediate neighhors must also feel some ambivalence toward the spillover of
Nicaraguans. Approximately 6,000 Nicaraguans are presently living in exile in
Costa Rica. In Honduras the flow of refugees from Nicaragua continues to rise.
Last vear some 15.000 Miskito Indians fled to Honduras rather than accent
fi)rcedrel<,caiionby ihc Nicaraguan go\,crnnient Additionally. there arc appro;i-
ni~tely 20 Io 30 ihousand Nicaraguans in relugrr camps in .Mexico;il this very
moment. The dcfection of Ceniral Amcrican relucees kas stradilv incrcascd in
our border states of Texas, Arizona and ~alifornic~his trend wilicontinue and
escalate unless there is a cessation of the hostilities in Central America.
During consideration of HR 2760, we look the position that it was not
unreasonable to insist that the effective date of the ooera.iv~ ~rov.sion of the
bill hingcs on the Sandinista> ending their armi iraining. iummand conirol. or
I<igisiicalruppuri for the Salvïiloran insurgcnts. During i~~n,iJcrsiiun 01'the
other major amendment, we did not think il unreasonable to request that
Nicaragua crase the export of arms and revolution to other Central American
countries prior to Committee action to unilaterally restrict US conduct without
regard to the Nicaraguan behavior in Central America. Adoption of either of
the previously mentioned positions:268 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYAC~VITIES
would have been beneficial in protecting any of our friends in Central
America against Nicaraguan/Cuban backed insurgenciesin their countries;
would not have deprived the United States of an important tool to thwart
Cuhan insurgencies inCentral America;
would have provided an incentive for the Nicaraguan government to
negotiate an end to the hostilities;
would have provided maximum flexibility for al1 parties involved and
would no1 have provided a sanctuary for the NicaraguanICuban based
guerrillas who could then strike out with impunity against their neighbors.
The Sandinista Nicaraguan government marks the first foothold of Marxism
on the mainland in our western hemisphere. At this point in time, with only a
modicum of help from the United States, democracy can Aourish in Central
Amenca, as demonstrated by the democratic nations of Costa Rica, Honduras,
Belize, and hy the positive steps already taken in El Salvador and Guatemala.
Some of us, having had the opportunity to travel to Central America and talk
to the leaders of these govemments, can reflect firsthand their fears that if
America does nothine and oermits the Marxist and. more im~ortantlv. the
Cuban-influcnccd g<>vcrnmeit hacked h) Ni-aragua io crciic' havoi ,111LI
Siilvadur, that subversion uill takc placc in thcir oun ~.ouniricjnc.%i.Whcn thc
Sandinistar betriivcd the DurDoseofa revulution and turnctiCuba. the u,anine
insurgent movements in ~f Salvador and Guatemala were revived. If those
countries should fall to the left, il is probable that frail Honduras, with its
indefensihle borders, and Costa Rica, with no amy of ils own, would be next
on the euerrilla hit list. We wonder what will be the thouehts and the concerns
of the fiondurans and the Costa Ricans if u,c J~.cidrd io irci,eni furtherioid
anti-Sandinisia pliramiliraq Croups. We have grave conccrns that wilh ihc stakcs
so high and wfth the uncezainly of US resilve, the governments in Central
America would be unwilling to work with us in the overt program to reduce the
flow of external support to the Salvadoran guerrillas.
1.K. ROBINSON.
G. William WHITIIHURST.
C. W. Bill YOUNG.
Boh STUMP.
Bill GOOULING.
ADDITIONAL DISSENTING VlEWS ON HR 2760 BY CONGRESSMAN
C. W. BILL YOUNG
HR 2760 was reporled out by the House Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence on May 3, 1983, by a partisan vote of9 to 5. Its purpose is to pre-
vent US support for paramilitary activities against the government of Nicara-
gua. Originally presented as a response to alleged US Government violations
of the Boland amendment, that issue was soon bypassed by events. On
April 12, 1983, Senator Goldwater, Chairman of the Select Committee on In-
telliaence. issued a statement makine it clear that the Boland amendment had
not-kenviolated. The Boland amendment prevents the US from engaging in
activities for thepurpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or
intended to cause a war between Nicaraguaand Honduras.
Despite the fact that the Boland amendment was not violated, newspaper
stories claiming such violation were the impetus for the developmeni of HR ANNEXESTO THE MEMORIAL 269
2760. The bill which would prevent American support for paramilitary opera-
lions in Nicaragua fails to address the major problem in Central America -
Nicararuan involvement in the oaramilitar<activities aeainst ils neiehbors. This
~lclirspdan in\ol\,emeni is Pari'~fihe ~ubin ~o!crnm;ni's prograi io support
insurgeniies ihroughout Ccntr~lAnierica aimcd ai o\rrthrowing the governmcnts
in that area. The purposes of the United States are: to convince thëeovernment
of Siiraragud io iea\e supplying a.;sisiance to insurgcnciçs in ihc nçighhoring
couniries; and IOkecp the proniises the) made iciihe Orgïniraiioii of Anierican
Siales that ihcre would bc ïrec ele~tions and a ~luralis~icsocieiv in Nicararua.
The insure-,cv in Nicararua aids onlv the first herican . .osé.It heloscGate
a situiiii<)nu,hsre the Niiar~~uan government iici)mpclled IO recognile that it
iino1 immune from rctaliation uhzn 11 supports insurgencics in ihc neighhorinl:
States. At the same lime the insureencv is a~meansof convincine the ~icaraeuai
régimethat it is necessary for itÏo corne to the bargaining table to settle the
disputes in Central America peacefully.
US support to some of those fighting in Nicaragua has had the desired eRect
of interfering with the Nicaraguan ability to supply arms to the insurgents
fighting against its neighbors. It has also encouraged oiher groups within Ni-
caragua to take up arms against the Sandinista dictatorship. None of the
rroups. howcver. those suooorted bv the United States and those who have
Laken up arms i~depcndcnily. are siton& cnough io orrrthrow ihc Nicaragu;~n
guvçrnmeni. Hui. the combinaiion of furces has forccd the Nicaraguan govern-
meni Io "look inwdrd" and has reduced 11sübilitv IO ~rovidcsu~plirs 10 bç used
in violence aeainst ils neirhbors. That. of cours; is what interdi'ctionmeans -
preventing the flow of ~u~~liesT . hose bho try toquantify interdiction based on
couniing capfured arms simply do no1understand the term. What theyare sayin~
is like asking a man who-ikes his vitamins everyday, how many coldi hé
orevente~ ~a~ ~ ~car.
All of the &up fighting in Nicaragua have had the experience of getting
substantial support from the local populace. This is true on the east coast where
Iwo ~e~arate-~roups of Miskito 'lndians are fighting against the Sandinista
régime, inthe northern and central areas of the country where the FDN is
fighting and in the south where Pasiora's ARDE group is fighting.The only area
of Nicararua untouched bv the insurrencies has been the Westcoast. oarticularlv
the area Gound !4anagua: l3olh thc;nsurgcnis and neu,smen who hîve been i;
Nicaragua with insurgeni l'orccsrrport the widcspread support l'orthosc forces
in the local villages, and the large~numbers of people volunteering to serve in
the insure-nt forces. A withdrawal of American suooort .. those fiehters uho
receivc itu,(iuldrc,ull no1only in iheir dem~~raliration,but in the demoraliraiion
ofolher g..-ps fiyhting the Siindinislÿdicratorrhi~. Thç nçi rrsuli i)iihat uould
be the severe pcrsecu<on of those peasants and villagers who have provided
support to the insurgent groups by the dictatorship. The persecution will result
in either a blood bath or large scale exodus of refugees or both. Large numbers
of Central American refugees from communism would further destabilize that
area. There would also be substantial numbers of refugees trying to enter the
United States.
The arguments made by the majority in the section of the report entitled,
"Committee Judgments" are neither logical nor are they consistent with the
information that has been provided to the Committee by the intelligence
community. On the three questions asked: (1) 1s the program consistent with
the law under the direction of the Congress? (2) 1s the program a wise one?
(3) 1sthe program successful?The answers Io al1three are, yes.
The argument is made in regard to question (1), that since the FY 83270 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
Intelligence Authorization Conference Report States that the funds may be used
only for the purpose of interdiction of arms, therefore, the US government is in
violation of the law, this is simply incorrect. As pointed out above, interdiction
of arms does not mean merelv c,otur.ne ar-s. it means interferinr wit- the
~hiliiyiiithe gorernment 01'Niearagu3 io send the armr IO the terrorisis and
iniurgenis in the ncighhi>ringcounirier. This, in faci, i, u,hat has been happening.
Therefore, the answer to question (3) is also, yes, since the program has
successfullyinterfered with the ability of the Nicaraguan government to provide
supplies and logistics to insurgent groups in neighboring countries.
In regard to question (2) the majority answers that the program is not wise
because it has hardened Sandinista attitudes. In fact, this has not happened. The
persecutions inflicted by the Sandinista dictatorships on the Miskito Indians and
the Catholic clergy as well as their suppression of freedom of press, religion and
speech began long before this program was put into effect.The Sandinistas have
not increased their violations of human rights, they have simply continued their
program of suppressing the people of Nicaragua and violating their promises to
the Organization of American States.
The maioritv also uuotes Eden Pastora as savine that this nroeram helos keeo
the ~andikist& in power. Pastora did believe thaÏat one time Ghen th&e we;e
hit-and-run raids by the FDN. He no longer believesil. The insurgent forces are
now o~eratine deeo inside Nicaraeua. The oolitical leadershio of Pastora's erouo.
ARDE, has made'p~blic statements indicaÎing that they wiih IO CO-opera; wiih
the FDN forces. In an interview over Panama City Radio Continente broad-
cast on April 19, 1983, Alphonso Robelo, the leader of Pastora's Nicaraguan
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), and a former member of the
Sandinista government Junta was asked about the FDN. He answcred,
"Yesterday I had a magnificent opportunity to fly from San José to
Mexico with Newsweek reporter, James Le Moyne. He had been in
Nicaragua with the FDN. He lived and shared with them for a period of
seven days. He is a very serious objective man, a graduate of Harvard
University, etc. He said that among the forces with which he coexisted -
some 400 men - there were 12former national guardsmen or 3 percent of
the FDN combatants that be saw. 1honestlv believe that the FDN includes
a minoriiy of the pcoplc formerly cunnecre~ uiih the Narionlil Ciulird.The
o\er\\,helming majority are peiisiints and small farmers who have seen how
Nicaragua isbeini enslavedand thev have either gone to Honduras or have
risen iiarms in Nicaragua. They are the ones figiting."
In answer to as whether there is CO-operationbetween ARDE and FDN, Robelo
answered,
"The FDN, the organization that has infiltrated al1 the troops into
Nicaragua, has a new political directorate which includes six civilians and a
former military man. As leader member of the ARDE Revolutionary
Directorate, 1have already held talks and contacts with the civilians. They
have been personal and pnvate contacts, but a line of communication
already exists; it mus1be gradually developed."
On April 26, Panama City Circuito RPC television broadcast an interview
with Adoloho Calero. a director of the FDN. Calero stated in answer to a
question about Eden I'asior~'~proup. "Commander Ccro, rn) lr~end Piisiora.
lcddsihe Democraiic Rcvoluiionary Alliance, ARDE. ue are no1yeicoordinaicd.
but we have the same goal. 1 bope that we will reach an understanding very
soon." While ARDE and FDN are clearly of diiïerent political tendencies, both ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 271
support a democratic solution in Nicaragua as do a numher of the other, smaller,
fighting groups. While none of them, or al1of them together, would he strong
enough 10 overthrow the Sandinista government, they are capable of creating
enough problems for that government to force it to negotiate with its neighhors,
perhaps even to cease repressing its own people. The fact that the forces fighting
agdinst the Sandinista régimeare not capable of overthrowing it was recog-
nized even by Ortega of the Sandinista National Directorate. In a broadcast over
Managua Radio on March 21, 1983, he said, that the anti-Sandinista forces
"fighting in the interior of Nicaragua ...do not have regular combat weapons,
such as, artillery, tanks and armored personnel carriers. They only have a few
infantry weapons . . ."He went on to say, "this prevents ihem from carrying
out even medium-scale military actions on a regular battlefield. They are prac-
tically restricted to fighting an irregular mountain war."
If the insurgents should force the Sandinista government to negotiate on free
elections and the democratic rights of the people of Nicaragua, this would he
consistent with one of the suggestions of the Linowitr Commission in its
pamphlet, "The Americas at a Crossroads", puhlished in April 1983,which said,
"we bvor dialogue: between the governments of El Salvador, Nicaragua and
Guatemala and the respective opposition movements in those countries".
An end to al1 the fighting in Central America, not only in Nicaragua, is the
goal of al1Memhers of this Commitiee. That goal could hest be achieved not by
simply ending US support to those fighting in Nicaragua but in forcing the
Nicaraguans to the conference table to solve the problems of the region. In April
1982, the US Government proposed an eight-point program to Nicaragua for
solving the problems of the region. Nicaragua ignored il. Those points were:
1. The cessation of Nicaraguan support for i~surgencies in neighhoring
countries. In addition to an end to arms traficking, training, and other
support for Salvadoran guerrillas, this would include the closing of the
FMLN command and control center in Managua.
2. A US statement pleading to enforce Our laws forbidding the training
activities of exile groups that might attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan
government.
3. A joint Nicaraguan-US statement pledging non-interferenn in each
other's affairs or in the affairs of others in then, and pledgingadherence
to the OAS and UN Charters and to the Rio Treaty.
4. A regional han on the importation of heavy offensiveweapons. Foreign
military advisors would be reduced within the region, and military and
securitv forces would he reduced.
5. International verification of the arms limitation proposal. This would
includevisitsto Nicaraguan airports, military installations, ports and borders
by representatives of the OASor other regional organizations.
6. The resumption of US aid to Nicaragua, and additiondl trade con-
cessions such as the Carihbean Basin Initiative.
7. The exchange of artists, musicians, basehall teams and other cultural
groups in order to improve the climate of hilateral relations. The opening
of a hi-national center in Nicaragua, and the provision of scholarships for
Nicaraguan students who wish to study in the US.
8. The reafirmation hy the Nicaraguan government of ils previously
stated commitments to pluralism, free elections, and a mixed economy.
Ijuring the I-loiiseI'ernianent Select Coniniittee on Intelligence niarkup on
11R 2-60, ihis Congrcs,man (C. W. RiIIYciung).suggcstcd .III~mcn~lmcntihat
\i,iiuld h:tve rcsultzd in the cc%ration,,i hortiliiicr in h1csr:igu.i aiter272 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
"a verifiableagreement is reached that the government of Nicaragua ceases
activities to provide arms, training, command and control facilities or
logistical support to military or paramilitary operations in or against any
government in Central America".
This amendment was defeated by a party-line vote. I intend to introduce it again
during the floor debate on HR 2760. It is an equitable and fair solution to the
problem. The ending of al1violence in the area is what al1of us want. Simply
ending the violence in Nicaragua while allowing it to continue in El Salvador
will encoura-e the Nicar-auans to increase the violenc- aeainst their-neiahbors.
An! other u~lutiiin\vilonl) rehdlt in Nicdrdgua hcing cnc<~urager<Isiiniinuc
iis pr,>grdmIOdc~iahilizr.Centrd1Anieriw Ihr.rr.\uliani hloo.l,hr.J 2nd reiugcc
problems must be avoided. The pattern of Cuban support to insurgencies is
consistent throughout Latin America. The Cubans insist that the small terrorist
groups? many of them having received Cuban training in the past, mus1 unite'
before they can receiveCuban support to engage in a full-scaleinsurgency. This
pattern was successful in Nicaragua and is now in use in El Salvador and
Guatemala and most recently in Honduras.
Havana Radio's international service in Spanish of February 12, 1982,com-
menting on the alliance of the Guatemalan guerrilla groups, said,
"the history of Our Americds' revolutionary struggle shows tbat unity is a
key factor for victory. Unity, as has heen justifiably said, does not merely
mean thejoining of forces,but also the multiplication of forcesin the noble
goal of the national liberation of Our fatherlands."
The commentary goes on to say the case of El Salvador "also confirms the
importance of the people's unity in the just and necessary struggle".
The President of Honduras, President Suazo, in a speech on April 2, 1983,
over Tegucigalpa Voz de Honduras Network said,
"if weconsider the fact that if the Salvadoran guerrillaswin, Nicaragua will
be free to give logistical support to subversives here,then the Salvadoran
guerrillas might $rengthen ihis country's subversives, perhaps with the
support of the USSR and Cuba. If Central America falls, Mexico will
follow, and then the problcm belongs to the United States. We have
maintained, and wewillcontinue to maintain, closerelations with the United
but in other countries as well."t defends democracy, not only in America,
This public statement by President Suazo is similar to the private statements that
he and other Honduran and Salvadoran government leadersmade to a delegdtion
of Members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence which
visited theircountries in April 1983.The countries of the region fear Cuban and
Nicaraguan supported insurgenciesand hope that the United States will provide l
them with the support needed to resist these threats.
The leaders of the government of Nicaragua have made no secret of their
intentions. Ernesto Cardenal, now the Minister of Culture in Nicaragua, said in
a broadcast over Havana Radio July 30, 1978,"a singlerevolution is on the way
in America, and Cubais at the vanguard". Cuban, and now Nicaraguan, support
is a maior factor in Central American insureencv. The flow of arms. a secure
commaid and control center, and a privileg&dsanctuary are al1needédby the
insurgents, Nicaragua provides these things on bebalf of Cuba and the Soviet 1
Union ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 273
Beïore Cuban support was provided to the insurgency in Nicaragua that
creatcd the Sandinistic government that exists today, the Cubans insisted that
the various factions of the Sandinista movement must be united into one
insurgency. When this wasaccomplished, they received the support needed to
overthrow the Somoza régime.Shortly after their victory, the same pattern was
followed in El Salvador. On December 16. 1979.the small terrorist erouos in El
Salvador united with the El Salvador ~or&nuniStParty at a meetingin Havana,
Cuba, to organize the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front. In a letter addressed
to Comrade Fidel. the leader of the various groups that came together in
Havana wrote,
"Today we can tell you, Fidel, that thanks to your help, to the help of
your party comrades, and to the inspired example of the revolutionary
people of Cuba, we have undertaken a transcendental step by signing an
agreement with very solid bases upon which we begin building the coordi-
nation and unity of Ourorganizations."
Guerrilla documents captured in El Salvador show that regular reports on
their progress are made to Manuel Pineiro, the headof the American Department
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba. Pineiro, former
head of the Cuban intelligence service,the DCI, runs the American Department,
which is the covert action arm ofthe Cuban apparatus and is responsible for
support to insurgencies throughout Latin America. The role of the Nicaraguan
régimein this activity can be seen in the documents captured in El Salvador. On
January 26, 1981,then-US Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert E. White, wrote
to then-President Duarte and provided him with an analysis of the captured
documents. Ambassador White's letter and analysis follow:
[Ambassador White's letter:]
Embassy ofthe United States of America,
SunSolvadur.Jonuory26, 1981.
His ExcellencvIne. Naooleon Duarte
Presidente de'la ~Gnta
Revolucionatia Gobierno,
San Salvador.
Dear MI. President: Please find attached a summary of the documents we
discussed at my house today, January 26. The summary deals with the question
of foreign involvement in supply of the insurgency.
1hope this summary is useful to you. With warm regards.
Sincerely,
Robert E. WHITE,
Ambossador.
Attachment
SUMMARY
"Esmeraldo's"role.
DRC lugi3ticsreprcsentaii\,c in Ni'iiaragu~(code nlimc "Vliidimir"l, reporting
io DRU. No\.cnibcr 1. indiciited ihat some 30U Io400 tons of miliidry rupplie,
\i,ould haie arrited in "E\meriildii" (Cuba) b) ihc follo!ring ucek and would274 MILITARYAND PARA.MILITARY ACTIVITIES
soon he arriving in "Lagos" (Nicaragua). This was in addition to the more than
109tons of military supplies that "Vladimir" said had already reached "Lagos".
In a separate document dated Septemher 26, 1980, reporting on a DRU Joint
General Staff (EMGC) meeting, an ERP representative (code name "Jonas")
indicated that there were 130 tons of military supplies stored in "Lagos"
(Nicaragua) - or a sixth part of the matérielthat had becn committed by others
to the DRU.
In addition to being logistics transit point and font of political advice, "Es-
meralda" helped plan guerrilla militaryoffensive.Undated. unsignedreport of trip
to "M." (clearly a Managua visit in midJuly 1980in viewof context) indicates
that Salvadoran insurgent Joint General Staff (EMGC) delegation would de-
part soon for "la H." (Havana) to have "specialist" put finishing touches on
plans for guerrilla ofinsive. In separate Septemher 26 document, ERP represen-
tative "Jonas" indicates that "Comrade Ramon" was unahle to eive re-
port to EMGC on progress of planning offensive since "written materials"
had been left in "Managua and Havana". (Comment: This is rare occasion in
which plain language place names appear on these documents.) The same report
indicates that EMGC itself was located for some time in "Cuba".
Role of FSLN
Literally dozens of references in captured documents indicate definitely that
code name "Lagos" - transit point of arms for Salvadoran insurgents - is, in
fact, Nicaragua. The documents point to the initially wavering, but later heavily
involved participation of the FSLN in the supply effort by "C. de Frent." (com-
rades of the Frente) without specifying names.
FSLN role in early part of 1980, according to documents, was largely faci-
litative. lune 17 DRU report from Managua indicated that one "Gustavo" of
FSLN (may be identical with "G." identifiedin another document as assistant
to "Comrade Bayardo") arranged contact for insurgents with Panamanian
arms traffickers in March. As late as midJuly, ERP visitor indicates that FSLN
appeared to be reluctant to foward arms or to allow arms pick-ups from Nica-
raguan Coast. On July 23, 1980, however, "Comrade Bayardo" (presumahly
FSLN directorate member Bayardo Arce) told visiting Salvadoran insurgent
Joint General Staff(EMGC) delegation that urgent guerrilla ammunition request
had been approved, meeting had been set up with FSLN "military commission",
and that, if insurgents would be receiving help through Nicaragua, FSLN had
given thought to possible "triangular" arrangement in which arms from "social-
ist" countries would be absorbed by Sandinista army (EPS). Nicaragua in turn
would pass its Westcrn-manufactured arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas. (Com-
ment: Note that at time of this meeting Fidel Castro was in Nicaragua.)
By the heginning of November 1980 (after the FSLN renewed shipments
followine the one-month susoension). the Nicaraeuans beean oushine more
u u u . =
supplies on ihe injurgcnts than the I:itter could h~ndle. Code nanic "Kodrigo",
rcporting io ihc DRI: in carly S<i\emhcr I'làO. indiraicd ihlitNicaragusii
dcli\erics ucrc c\ceedine 1)Kb recr.iiiii>ncanïhilitics and thai Nicardcuïn. were
sending dangerously ocerloaded boats. (J;dging from documents, large-scale
deliveries also hegan to move in Novemher from Nicaragua hy trailer-truck
through Honduras and hy air.) "Rodrigo" travelled to "Lagos" to ask for better
FSLN coordination and supervision of shipments. In the meantime, DRU
logistics representative in Managua, "Vladimir", pointed out to Salvadoran
insurgent leadership. Novemher 1, that it was necessary to enhance DRU
capahilities to receive and distribute deliveries since not only does the FSLN
regard the arms as a "hot potato" but also, ANNEXES TO THE MfiUORIAL 275
"... al1 the countries of the socialist camp have dug deep to help us with
al1the reauests we had made and some doubled the oromised helo. This is
ihe fir\t Ldiin Amcrirdn rei,<iluiiunuh~chthcy haie ~nconditionally mo\eJ
IO hclp beforr.ii(the rcvolitii~n) has takcn piluer"
Vladimir urged the DRU - the "las1 link" in the supply "chain" - to step up
its absorption pace.
Sourceofsupply
One of captured documents (minutes of DRU meeting of August 30, 1980,
prepared by ERP representative, code name "Ana Maria") provides listing of
arms and non-weapon assistancecommitments provided by Vietnam and other
communist nations (Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, GDR, Hungary and Ethiopia)
during June-July 1980overseastrip of Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS) Chief
Shafik Handal. This separate, independent, account confirmsShafik's ownreport
of communist assistance commitments. Accountof DRU meeting indicates that
Vietnamese arms (and possibly othcr communist assistance) were supposed to
arrive in "Esmeralda" on September 5.
Whutis "Esmeralda"?
Previous analyses have speculated that references Io "Esmeralda" in earlier
captured documents may have related to an Ecuadorean port. New documents,
however, suggest that "Esmeralda", in fact, is code name for Cuba: (a) report
Io DRU sent hv "Marcial" (code name for Salvadoran FPL leader Cavetano
Carpio), ''~ona2'and "~duàrdo", August 31, from "Lagos" (code name for
Nicaragua) indicates that FARN organization, at that lime defecting from DRU,
was asking "management of Esmeralda" to convoke meeting Codiscuss its
differences with rest of DRU. Marcial and company indicate that they also
would inform "Esmeralda" directly of a problem with FARN. A "Comrade
Mart." (presumably a representntive of Cuban CP Central Committee Americas
Department) indicatedto "Marcial" that "Chief of thisdepartment in Esmeralda"
wanted to cal1 September 4 meeting Io discuss problem of split. Subsequent
October 8 letter from Marcial openly addressed to Manuel Pineiro, Chief of
Americas Department of Cuban CP Central Committee, thanks Cuban for his
advice and suggestions following FARN defection; (b) Minutes of DRU meet-
ing of September 24, 1980, indicate that "Marcial", dunng visit to "Lagos"
(Nicaragua) in previous months, met with "Comrades of Esmeralda",
"Esmeraldan" comrades visiting Nicaragua are listed as follows: "C.M. and
Abr" (Letters "b" and "r" are lower case - we believe this refers to Comnide
Manuel Pineiro and Abren, respectively Director and Central American
Department Chief of Americas Department of Cuban Central Committee), "C.
Br." (we presume this refers to a Cuban functionary visiting Nicaragua in
company with Castro), and "C en P." (word "en" is in smallcase. This probably
refers to Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro - the Cuban leader's formal title).
On Morch 4. 1982.the House Permanent Select Committee on Intellieence u
rcccived 311exlensivcbr~clingcgincrrningthe sliuÿilon in b.1Sal\,ador. Suhstqucnt
io ihc briefing, Committer Chairmin Eduard P. Roland niade the follouing
statement to the press:
"The Committee has received a briefine concerning the situation in El
Salvador, with particular emphasis on thequestion o'iforeign support for
the insurgency. The insurgents are well trained, wellequipped with modern276 MILITARV AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIU
weapons and supplies, and rely on the use of sitesin Nicaragua for command
and control and for loeistical suooort. The intellieence suo..rtine these
judgments provided to the ~ommi'tieeis convincing;
There is further persuasive evidence that the Sandinista government of
Nicaragua is helping train insurgents and is transferring arms and financial
support from and through Nicaragua to the insurgents. They are further
providing the insurgents bases of operation in Nicaragua. Cuban involve-
ment - especially in providing arms - is also evident.
What this says is that, contrary to the repeated denials of Nicaraguan
officials, that country is thoroughly involved in supporting the Salvadoran
insurgency. That support is such as to greatly aid the insurgents in their
struggle with government forces in El Salvador."
Chairman Boland's statement was very carefully written to make the facts
clear concerning Cuban and Nicaraguan support to the Salvadoran insurgency
and at the same time to protect the very sensitivesources that were then and are
continuing to provide US intelligence with information on the Cuhan and
Nicaraguan role. That kind of careful handling of sensitive information has not
always heen true in the executive hranch. In 1980, while this Committee was
being told by CIA that al1of the information concerning the shipment of arms
from Cuba to Nicaragua was so sensitive that it could not be revealed puhlicly,
executive branch officials were revealing the information to the Nicaraguan
government. One of the documents captured in El Salvador consists of a report
from one Salvadoran guerrilla leader to another dated Septemher 30, 1980,
concerning his conversations in Nicaragua with officials of the Nicaraguan
government. He reported,
"1-ari 27 Scpicmbcr. a mccting uiih Gusi.i\o mas hrld in uhich hr.
inîormcd us of ihc front's (S;indiniii;i N;iiion;il I.iberdiion 1;roni) de~.ision
io buspend shipments during a perii~di>fapproximatel) one month They
brought up a security probiembeginning with a meeting which they say
they had with one James Cheek, a representative of the North Amencan
Department of State. They Say that he manifested knowledge of shipments
via land through Nicaragua; in small vehicles, and that we carried out
îiicnipis bysel Thcy rai& the quciiion of possiblc bad manîgcment of ihc
iniormation on ihc pari ol ihc personnel working on ihis and ihat ihey are
going Io cdrry oui ;in in\eslifaiion."
The congressional oversight provisions of the National Security Act of 1947give
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intellieence resoonsibilitv toeether
with the executive branch to protect the sensitive<ource information that the
US government receives. The minority memhers have given full support to the
actions of theChairman of the House Permanent SelectCommitteeon Intellieenc-
to ensure the protection of that information.
On August 22, 1982,Honduran authorities raided a Salvadoran insurgent safe
house in Honduras. Among the Salvadoran guerrillas captured was Commander
Alejandro Montenegro, an important official of the Salvadoran insurgency. A
major campaign was undertaken by the Salvadoran insurgents and their sup-
porters in neighboring countries to secure the release of Montenegro. In a
broadcast over
Liheration Forces, the largest of the guerrillan groups united in the Farabundo
Marti Liberation Front. The announcement of her murder was hroadcast on the ANNEXESTO THE MBMORIAL 277
night of April 6, 1983, hy Managua radio. The revelation that one of the top
leaders of the Salvadoran auerrillas was living in Manaeua created serious
problems for the ~icaraguan government. On April 8, a press conference was
called hy lnterior Minister Thomas Borge and the Chief of State Security Lenin
Cerna. Borge announced that the Sandinista police and securitv oraanizations
had been or2ered to use al1their resources to investigate the death ofAna Maria
and that Lenin Cerna had heen placed at the head of the investigations.
According to Borge the death of Ana Maria
"could place Nicaragua in a Jiiliculi shiuaiion, heraurc we uould hai,c Io
admii ihai a membcr of the FN1.N Dirccioraic resideil in llanagw. as ai
heing said in al1the media, in order to accuse Nicaragua of supp6rting the
Salvadoran revolutionaries".
Borge accused the CIA of murdering Ana Maria and said, "1 do no1 need to
present specific proof. 1 do not need to say: 'Here is the murderer, because
everyone knows who the murderer is'." The accusation that the CIA was the
culprit in the murder was also made by the FNLN United Revolutionary
Directorate in an April 7 broadcast over Managua's Radio Sandino which stated,
"This treacherous crime committed hy the sinister hands of the US Central
Intelligence Agency,CIA, shows in a tangible way the desperation of imperialism
which is attacking our peoples." The funeral services for Ana Maria were
addressed by the leader of her faction of the Salvadoran insurgency, Cayetano
Carpio. Carpio admitted that at the time of the murder he was at a far away
place - in Lihya - and he immediately rushed hack to Managua for the funeral
service. He said, "the Central American ~eo~lesstrueele is one sinele strueele
... when we achieve victory we will be a;m in am and struggling f;>rthe t;>ïal
liberation of Central America".
On April 21, Managua radio released a statement of the Nicaraguan Ministry
of the lnterior in which thevannounced that thev had solved the murder of Ana
Maria. It was no1the CIA ihat did il. ~ccording to the Nicaraguan secret police
authorities, a group of Salvadorans had been arrested for the murder, and the
mastermind of the crime was "a member of the central command of the People's
Liberation Forces, FPL of El Salvador, where he held a top position very close
to Companero Salvador Cayetano Carpio, Commander Marcial, top leader of
that revolutionary organization." According to the Nicaraguans, as a result of
the revelation that thereal culprits were his close associates, Carpio committed
suicide. However, there are those who believe that he was "suicided" as part of
the internecine struggles of the Salvador insurgents. The deaths of Carpio and
Ana Maria brought to public notice the fact that the entire leadership, the
command and control structure, of the Salvadoran insurgency, is no1 in El
Salvador but in Managua, Nicaragua - that is, when leaders are not on visits
to Lihya. On April 25, 1983, five Members of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intellieence met in Manaeua with Boree and other leaders of the
Sandinista régime w<o denied that the Salvador ~ommand and Control head-
quarters was in Managua. This Member (Cong. Young) oiiered to take them to
the site. Thev changed the subiect
Thc "uniiy" arrigrmcnts ihai rere succcsslùl in Nicariigua and arc surrcnily
being cmploycJ in El S;ilvador are alwi undcrwa) in Ciua~cmala.On February
10, 11>8?H. nvïna raJii1 anniiunicd ihat ihe rucrrilla arodris in Cuaicmala had
united to form one "patriotic national revoluGonary unity front of Guatemala".
On Fehruary II, 1982,a meeting was held in Havana with the participation of
the diplomatic representatives of the communist countries and Latin American278 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
revolutionary movements.At that meeting the Guatemalan insurgents reaffirmed
that they had united the various groups into one insurgency. At the meeting
Oscar Gonzalez, speaking for the Salvador insurgents, said that the Central
American revolution is a united one and that the victory of one country is a
victory of all. He stated that Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras would al1
have their hour of liheration and that the revolution in Nicaragua was the first
flamein that process.The military attache of the government of Vietnam pledged
firm support for the Guatemalan struggle. For over a ycar the Guatemalan
insurgents have engaged in armed clashes with the police and military and have
eneae-d in numerous terrorist actions.
On April 8, 1983,Managua radio announced that the same kind of "unity"
had beencreated in Honduras. According to Managua, "four Honduran political-
military organizations announced the creation of the United Revolutionary
Coordinating Board to go ahead with the struggle in Honduras". Communiqués
of the Honduran insurgency have heen hroadcast over Radio Managua and
have appeared in the Sandinista newspapers, El Nuevo Diuriu and Barricadain
Mnnnzun. The Anril 21. 1983.issue of Barricada carried a Honduran insureent
-
annciunsement that, "the dcmosratis paths of the peuple'\ struggle ha\,ing hwn
e\haurted. ne declare a pcoplc'sre\olutiunary u,ar on the military-pxudo libcral
dict~turship. ils puppct xrmy and North American imperialism". Ilondurah, Iikc
El Sahador, ha, a dcmocrïtically elected gi)\crnmcnt. 'Theinsurgcncics in cach
rasr suppiiried b) the Niiurag~lini are intcnded tciovrrthrou those ~icmoiratis
governments.
Even in peaceful and democratic Costa Rica, the police have confiscated
weapons and explosives in the homes of Communist Party functionaries and
memhers of the smallterrorist groups supported by the Cuhans and Nicaraguans.
One exam~le of this was the announcement which anneared in the San José
newspape< La Nacion of March 28, 1983,that the go;e&nent had confiscated
M-14 and M-l rifles,ammunition and grenade-launchers in the possession of the
brother of a communist parliamentarian. The newspaper statedi
"According to reports these weapons only represent the small part of the
arsenal which the ~ur~l euurd has heen ~n~ble to confiscate desoite its
meritorious and patriotic work. While Nicaragua is preparing aggression
against Our country, its local accomplices are trying to destahilire the
Government as Dartof an overall vlan aeai-st Costa Rica that was launched
by international communism several months ago."
The President of Costa Rica. Luis Alberto Monge. was auoted on San Joséradio
on April 24. 1983.;is refcrring Io the ~~r~~eateduï~gress~uan gainst ihc nation's
,ovcrrignty by the Sicarapuan\". And he said. "l Gel ihat ihc constant viulaiions
of Costa Kicïn trrriiorv ,v .he Sandinists arc unlauful. harntful and thercfore
unaiceptahlc" The international prcs rcported on Msy 3 ihat Presidcnt )longe
h3J ;i,ked for anOAS pc.a.xkccpingforccon the Costd Rican hiçaragu'in border
to prevent further Nicaraguan incursions against this country.
HR 2760 will do nothing to stop this CuhanINicaraguan assault on Central
America. 1oppose this billin its present form and willwork to amend or defeat it.280 MILITAKYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
military covert action program based upon formulation of a new Presidential
Finding.
None of the funds authorized or available to the Central Intelligence Agency
in Fiscal Year 1984 or beyond, may be used for the purpose of any covert
paramilitary operations in Central America, or support thereto unless:
1.The Committee has been informed, in advance, of the specific goals,
and risks associated with the proposed covert paramilitary action; and
2. The Committee has specificallyapproved the covert paramilitary action
by majority vote, confirmedin writing to the DCI by the Chairman and the
Vice Chairman.
DEBATE IN THE US HOUSE OF REPRFSENTATIV 98~,~CONCRESS I, TSESSION J,LY
27, 1983(129 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ~5720-5762)
[Nor reproduced]
Arruchment 4
[Nor reproduced]
-
[Nol reproduced] ANNEXES TO THE MEMORlAL
Attachment 6
DliBATE IN THE US SENATE, 98~~ CONGWSS, ND SESSION, APRlL 4, 1984 (130
CONGRFssrONAi. RSCORD ~3742-3796)
[Nor reproduced]
DBBATE IN THE US SENATE, 98~~ CONGWSS, ND SESSION, APRlL 5, 1984 (130
CONGRESS~ONALRECORD ~3848.3898)
[Nor reproduced]
Arrachmenr 8
DEBATli IN THE US SENATE, 98~~ CONGRESS, ND SESSION, APRlL 10. 1984 (130
CONGRJ~SFIONALRECORD ~4192-4205)
[Nat reproduced]
Arrachmenr Y
LBTI'ERPROM US SENATOR BARRYGOL.DWATZR, CHAIRMAN, SBNATIIS1II.ECTCOMMITI'EE
ON INTELLIGENCE, TO US DIRGCTOR OP CENTRAL INTELLIGBNCB WII.I.IAM 1. CASEY,
APRIL 9, 1984, WASHINGTON POST, APRIL 11, 1984
The rexr of o lerier,dared April Y and made available yesferday, from Sen.
Barry Coldwarer (R-Ariz.), chairman of the Senare Iniel(igenceCommirree, ro
CIA Direcior William J. Casey:
Dear Bill:
All this pas1 weekend, I've been trying to figureout how 1 can most easily tell
you my feelings about the discovery of the President having approved mining
some of the harbors of Central America.
It gels down to one, littlesimple phrase: 1 am pissed of!282 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
1understand that you had briefed the House on this matter. I've heard that.
Now, during the important dehate we had last week and the week hefore, on
whether we would incredse funds for the Nicaragua program, we were doing al1
right until a member of the cornmittee charged that the President had approved
the mining. 1strongly denied that because 1had never heard of it. 1found out
the next day that the CIA had, with the written approval of the President, en-
gaged in such mining, and the approval came in February!
Bill,this is no way Io run a railroad, and 1find myselfin a hell of a quandary.
1am forced to apologize to the members of the IntelligenceCommittee because
1did not know the facts on this. At the same time, my counterpart in the House
did know.
The President has asked us to hack his foreign policy.Bill, how can we back
his foreign policy whenwe don't know what the hell he is doing? Lebanon, yes,
we al1knew that he sent troops over there. But mine the harbors in Nicaragua?
This is an act violating international law. It is an act of war. For the life of me,
1don't see how we are going to explain it.
My simpleguess is that the House is going to defeat this supplemental and we
will not be in any position to put up much of an argument after we were not
given the information we were entitled to receive; particularly, if my memory
serves me correctly, when you hriefed us on Central America jus1 a couple of
weeks ago. And the order was signed before that.
1don't like this. 1don't like it one bit from the President or from you. 1don't
think we need a lot of lengthy explanations. The deed has been done and, in the
future, if anything like this happens, I'm going 10raise one hell of a lot of fuss
about it in public.
Sincerely,
Barry GOLDWATBR,
Chairman.
Ailachmeni 10
DEBATEIN THE US HOUSE OP REPRESENTATI9 V8E7S~, CONCRES2SN, DSESSION. APRlL
12, 1984(130 CONGRESSIONAL R~?CORD ~2878.2940)
[Nol reproduced]
AtrachmenrII
April 15, 1984.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN (D.-N.Y.ON HIS RBSIGNATION
AS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECTCOMMITIEE ON INTELLIGENCE
1 have announced today that 1 will resign as Vice Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence. ANNEXES TO THE MTMORIAL 283
This appears to me the most emphatic way 1 can express my view that the
Senate Committee was nor properly briefed on the mining of Nicaraguan harbors
with American mines from an American ship under American command.
An Employee Bulletinof the Central Intelligence Agency issuedApril 12states
that the House Committee was first briefed on 31 January, but the Senate Com-
mittee not until 8 March. Even then, as Senator Goldwater has stated, nothing
occurred which could be called a briefing. The reference isto a single sentence
in a two-hour Committee meetine- and a sin-,larlv obscure sentence at that.
This seniencc uiis subhianti.~llyrepe~icJ snmeeting on Xldrch 13.
Inno evcnt u,as the hriefing "full". "currcnt". or "prior" as requircd by ihe
IniclliecnceO\,crsirhi Aci of 198- 3 meajure 1helped wriie
If tiis action wG important enough for the ~residéntto have approved it in
February, it was important enough for the Committee to have been informed in
February.
In the public hearing on the conlirmation of John J. McMahon as Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence 1 remarked that with respect to intelligence
matters the
"oversieht function necessarilv involves a trust relationshi~ between the
commitÏee and the communiti because we cannot know what we are not
told, and therefore must trust the leadersof the community to inform us".
1 had thoueht this relationshio of trust was securelv in lace. Certainlv the
, .
rarcer scrvice g~\c ri,ery suçh inili~.aiioii.I:i.en so. rtimeihing ucnt arong. and
ihr \criousners of [hi, musi bc erprerscd.
1 uill suhmii niyrc\ignaiion whenSenaior Golduarcr rciurns (rom ihc Far Casi.
DEBATEIN THE US HOUSE OF REPRESEh'TATI9 VE~S,CONGRESS. 2h?> SESSION M,AY
24, 1984(130 CONGREFSIONAL CO RD ~4796.4806)
[Nor reproduced]
Arruchment13
DEBATE IN TllE US SENATE9,8~11CONGRESS , U SESSION, JUNE 18,1984 (130
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ~7499-7517)
[Nor reproduced]284 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
DEBATE IN THE US HOUSOPREPRESENTATIVES,98~~CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION, AUGUST
2, 1984(130CONGR~SFIONAL RECORD ~8264.8284)
[Nor reproduced]
Aitachmeni15
DEBATE IN THE US SENATE,98~~ CONGRESS, ND SESSION, OCTOBER3,1984 (130
CONGR~IONAL RECORD SI2857.12879)
(Nor reproducedj
TRANSCRIIT OP REMARKS OP SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN.VICE CHAIRMAN.
[Nor reproduced]
Arrachmenr 17
REPORT OF THE US HOUSE OP REPRESEhTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT COMMITIEE ON
I~LLICENCE, 98m CONGRUS, 2m SESSION, REPTNO. 98-1196(JANUARY 2, 1985)
[No: reproducedl ANNEXESTO THE MBMORIAL
Annex F
1. "U.S. Halts Economic Aid to Nicaragua", New YorkTimes,2 April 1981.
2. "Haig Won't Rule Out Anti-Nicaragua Action", Washington Post,
13November 1981.
3. "Reagan Authorizes Plan to Counter Cuban Presence in Nicaragua",
WashingtonPost, 14February 1982.
4. "U.S. Approves Coverl Plan in Nicaragua", WmhingtonPost, 10 March
1982.
5. "Nicaragua Denounces U.S. Planes' Intrusion", Washington Posi,
11 March 1982.
6. "US. Reportedly Sending Millions to Foster Moderates in Nicaragua",
New York Times, II March 1982.
7. "Senators Conducting Independent Probe of Latin Unrest", Washington
Post, 13 March 1982.
8. "Reagan Backing Covert Actions, Officiais Assert", New York Times,
14March 1982.
9. "C.I.A.'s Nicaragua Role: a Proposa1 or a Realityl", New York Times,
17March 1982.
10. "Nicaragua Says U.S. Violated 11s Airspace", New York Times,
18March 1982.
II. "A Lot of Show, but No Tell", Time. 22 March 1982.
12. "U.S. BackingRaidsAgainstNicaragua",Nov YorkTimes,2November1982.
13. "A Secret War for Nicaragua", Newsweek, 8 November 1982.
14. "Fears of War along the Border", Time, 6 December 1982.
"U.S. Bankrolling Sandinistas' Foes", Miami Herald, 19December 1982.
15.
16. "C.I.A. Quietly DogsSandinistas",Balh TimesHeraLI,22 Dsember 1982.
17. "Congress Reviews Curbs on Actions against Nicaragua", New York
Times, 22 December 1982.
18. "Nicaragua: Hill Concern on U.S. Objectives Persists", WashingtonPost,
I January 1983.
19. "CIA Chief Said to Confirm Raids", Baltimore Sun,10January 1983.
20. "Nicaraguan Aid Called Not Vital to Salvadorans", Washington Posr,
21 February 1983.
21. "War on Nicaragua", New YorkTimes, 28 March 1983.
22. "U.S. Ties to Anti-Sandinists Are Reported to Be Extensive", New York
Times, 3 April 1983.
23. "Washington's Role Troubles Congress", WashingtonPost, 3 April 1983.
24. "Rebels Want U.S. to Declare Support Openly", Washington Post,
4 April 1983.
25. "Nothhg Ragtag about NicaraguanRebels", WmhingtonPost,6 Apd 1983.
26. "State Dept. Aides Said to Question Rolein Nicaragua", New YorkTimes,
7 April 1983.
27. "Covert Actions: Debating Wisdom and Morality", New York Times,
8 April 1983.
28. "President Admits Aiding Guerrillas against Nicaragua",WashingtonPost,
15Aoril 1983.
29. "~o;ert Assistance May Be Eliminated", WashingtonPost, 27 April 1983. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlES
"Point Man Soeaks Out about C~~tral America". New York Times.
2 May 1983.
"Panel VotesHalt of Covert Aid for Nicaragua Rebels", WashingionPost,
4 Mav 1983.
"~eagan Defends Nicaragua Role", WashingtonPost, 5 May 1983.
"President Calls Nicaragua Rebels Freedom Fighters", New York Times,
5 Mav 1983
"U.S.-Backed ~icaiaeu-n Rehel Ann~Swells to 7.000Men". ~ashineron "
Pest, 8 May 1983.
"Sandinists Curbed on U.S. Sugar Sales", New YorkTimes, II May 1983.
"U.N. Trade Parley Attacks U.S. Move against Nicaragua", New York
Times,3 July 1983.
"CIA Planning to Back More Nicaragua Rebels", WoshingronPosr,
14July 1983.
"lsrael Said to Aid Latin Aims of U.S.". New York Times. 21 Julv
, ,
1983.
"Maneuvers Part of New Latin Plan", WashingronPosr,22 July 1983.
"U.S. Seeks lncrease in Covert Activity in Latin America", New York
Times,25 July 1983.
"'Finding' Backs Covert Action", Washington Posr.27 July 1983.
"Muskie, Rusk, Vance Urge Hill to Cu1 Off Covert Aid in Nicaragua",
WashingionPosl, 27 July 1983.
"House Votes to Cut Off Covert Aid", Washington Posr,29 July 1983.
"Salvador Rebels Reported to Get Little Arms Aid", New York Times,
31 July 1983.
"New Reagan Strategy for Covert Activities in Nicaragua Likely to Clear
Senate Panel", WallSrreerJournal,21 September 1983.
"CIA Orders Said to Guide Nicaraguan Rebels' Sbift", WashingronPost,
29 September 1983.
"C.I.A. 1s Said Io Resupply Rebels in Nicaragua from Salvador Base",
New YorkTimes,2 October 1983.
"Nicaragua Evacuates 25,000 from Port Raided by Rebels", New York
Times, 13October 1983.
"U.S. Officiaissay C.I.A. Helped Nicaraguan Rebels Plan Attacks", New
YorkTimes, 16October 1983.
"Reagan Defends U.S. Right to Use Covert Activity", WashinxronPost,
20 October 1983.
"Challenges Rise to CIA Support for Latin Rebels", WasltingronPost,
20 October 1983.
"House Votes to End Rebel Aid in Nicaragua", Wall Streer Journal,
21 October 1983.
"President Cites Mixup on Manual", WashingronPosr,22 October 1983.
"Nicaragua Curbs Energy Use FollowingOil FacilityAttacks", Washington
Pusi, 25 Octoher 1983.
"Ex-U.S. Intelligence and Military Personnel Supply Anti-Nicaragua
Rebels". New York Times. 8 November 1983.
"Ex-Sandinista Warns ag.ainst U.S. Intervention in Nicaragua",
WashingronPosr, 16November 1983.
"Covert Aid to Nicaragua Rebels Approved", Washingron Posr,
19November 1983. AN^ TO THE MBMORIAL 287
60. "Applying Pressure in Central America", Washingron Posr ,3 November
~.83.
61. "Nicaraguan Rebels Predict Success with U.S. Aid", New YorkTimes,
16January 1984.
62. "CIA 1s Said to Use Bases in Honduras", Washington Post ,9 January
19x4
.>- ..
63. "Nicaragua Reports Raids by Planes at Border Post", WashingtonPost,
4 February 1984.
64. "Nicaragua Reports 33 Dead Troops in Offensiveby US.-Backed Rebels",
WashingronPost, 28 March 1984.
65. "Leftists Getting Salvadoran Weapons", Washingron Posr ,8 March 1984.
66. "Nicaragua Reports More Rebel Attacks on Ships", Washingron Posr,
1April 1984.
67. "Mines in Main Port Imperil Nicaraguan Economy", Washingron Posr,
2 Avril 1984.
68. ''~La~an Snubs World Court over Nicaragua", Wall Street Journal,
6 April 1984.
69. "U.S. Role in Minine Nicaraeuan Harbors Re~ortedlv 1s Lareer t-an
First Thought", ~allkreer fo;rnol, 6 April 1984.
70. "CIA Helpedto Mine Ports in Nicaragua", Washington Posr,7April 1984.
71. "U.S. Said to Draw Latin Troops Plan", New YorkTimes, 8 April 1984.
72. "Americans on Ship Said to Supervise Nicaragua Mining", New York
Times, 8 April 1984.
73. "Latin Debate Refocused", New York Times, 9 April 1984.
74. "U.S. Voids Role of World Court on Latin Policv".. .New York Times.
9 April 1984.
75. "Nicaragua Asks Court to Order Raids' End", Washingron Posr,
IOApril 1984.
76. "CIA Views Minelaying Part of Covert 'Holding Action"', Washington
Post,10April 1984.
77. "Democrats' Reaction: Outrage and Dismay", Washington Posr 1,0April
1984.
"Rebels Report Push against Nicaragua", Washingron Posf, 10 April
1984.
"Senate, 84-12, Acts Io Oppose Mining Nicaragua Ports", New York
Times, Il April 1984.
"Ambiguities on Goals", New York Times, II April 1984.
"President Approved 'Harassment' Plan", Washingron Posf,11April 1984.
"Senate Votes, 84-12, to Condemn Mining of Nicaraguan Ports",
WashingtonPost, II April 1984.
"U.S. Says Port Mining Has Ceased", WashingtonPost, 12April 1984.
"Mining to Continue, Rebel Chief Says",New YorkTimes, 12April 1984.
"House Committee, Echoing Senate, Opposes Mining", New York Times,
12April 1984.
"U.S.-Backed Anti-Sandinista Rebels Use Helicopters to Evacuate
Wounded", WashingtonPost, 12April 1984.
"2 Shipping Concerns Stop Calls in Nicaragua", New York Times,
12April 1984.
"Mrs. Kirkpatrick Chides Latin Critics"New YorkTimes, 13April 1984.
"Nicaragua Minelaying Said to Ham U.S. Goals", Washingron Posr,
13April 1984.
"CIA Funds Run Short for Covert Operations", Washingron Posr,
13April 1984.288 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARY ACIIVITIES
91. "Mexico Hits U.S. for Barring Court in Minings Case", WashingronPosl,
14April 1984.
92. "House Unit Says Report on Mines Arrived Jan. 31", New York Times,
14April 1984.
93. "Mexican Official Condemns Mining of Nicaragua's Ports", New York
Times, 14April 1984.
94. "How Congress Was lnformed of Minirig of Nicaragua Ports", New York
Times, 16April 1984.
95. "Moynihan tu Quit Senate Panel Post in Dispute on C.I.A.", New York
Times, 16April 1984.
96. "Covert Aid SalvageTry under Way", Washingron Posr,16 Apnl 1984.
97. "Moynihan Resigns Intelligence Panel Post, Assails CIA", Washingron
Posr,16April 1984.
98. "Oct. 10 Assault on Nicaraguans 1s Laid tu C.I.A.", New York Times,
18Aoril 1984.
99. "CIL Directly Oversaw Attack in Octoher on Nicaragua Oil Facility",
lVashingtonPosr, 18Apnl 1984.
100. "Why CIA 'Put the Heat On'", Newsday, 19April 1984.
101. "Ways Eyedtu Fosfer Latin Aims", WashingronPost, 20 April 1984.
102. "Key C.I.A. Rule Seen in Barring of Nicaraguan", New York Times,
20 April 1984.
"Reagan Urged tu Go tu Amencan People on Nicaragua Issue", New
York Times, 20 April 1984.
"Explosion over Nicaragua", Time, 23 April 1984.
"A Furor over the Secret War", Newsweek, 23 April 1984.
"U.S. Source Tells of Spy Flights over Nicaragua", WashingronPost,
27 April 1984.
"U.S. Aides Say U-2's Have Flown over Nicaragua on Photo Missions",
New York Times, 29 April 1984.
"No Proof of Sandinist Arms in Salvador: US Officials", ChrisrianScience
Moniror, 2 May 1984.
"C.I.A. Said Io Direct Air Raids in Nicaragua", New York Times,
3 May 1984.
"Pressure for Latin Aid Rises", WashingronPost, 9 May 1984.
"Reagan Campaigns for Latin Policy", New York Times, 9 May 1984.
"Aid tu Salvador Stalled hy Clash on Nicaraguans", NEWYork Times,
24 May 1984.
"Reagan Hints Veto of Any Bill Ending Nicaraguan Rehel Aid",
WashingtonP,~sr,24 May 1984.
"Contras' Resources Expected tu Last", Washington Posr, 26 May
1984.
"C.I.A. Plans tu Stay in Nicaragua", New York Times, 30 May 1984.
"Officials Say C.I.A. Made Mines with Navy Help", New York Times,
1June 1984.
"Proof of Arms Smuggling into Salvador Lacking", Boston Globe,
10June 1984.
"ln from the Cold and Hot for Tmth", New York Times, II lune 1984.
"Ex-C.I.A. AnalystDisputes U.S. Aideson Nicaragua", WashingtonPosr,
13June 1984.
"U.S. Fails tu Offer Evidence of Nicaragua Arms Traffic", Los Angeles
Times, 16June 1984.
"Aid Phase-Out 1s Seen for Foes of Sandinistas", New York Times,
27 June 1984. ANNULES TO THE MEMORIAL 289
"Private Croups in U.S. Aiding Managua's Foes", New filrk Times,
15July 1984.
"House Votes to Deny Help to Nicarag.an Insurgents", New YorkTimes,
3 August 1984.
"Nicaraguan VillagersReport Rebels Killed Noncombatants", Wosl~ington
Posi,7 August 1984.
"Mexico Tenns 4th Session of U.S.-Nicaraguan Talks 'Substantive"',
Washin~tonPosl. 18Aueust 1984.
"New eounteri"surgen& Exercise Begun by U.S. Army in Honduras",
WashingtonPosi, 22 August 1984.
"Incident Raises Issue of US-Built Airstrius". Washinnion Posi.
5 September 1984.
"2 Americans Assert U.S. Assisted Private EKort Against Latin Left",
Neiv York Times,6 September 1984.
"U.S. Army OfficersHelped Private Croup in Salvador",New YorkTimes,
7 September 1984.
"Letting Citizens Cive Rebels Aid Was U.S. Policy", New YorkTimes,
II ~eptëmber 1984.
"CIA Cited as Supplier for Planes Used by Nicaraguan Rebels",
WashingtonPosi, 15September 1984.
"CIA Sent Planes to Rebels, Sasser Says Files Show", Wasl~inglonPosi,
18Se~tember 1984.
"Pentagon Hedges on Planes' Tie to Latin Rebels", New York Times.
19September 1984.
"Concern on CIA Manual 1s Dismissed by Reagan", WashingtonPosi,
8 October 1984.
"C.I.A. Said to Produce Manual for Anti-Sandinistas"New York Times,
15October 1984.
136. Article by Joel BrinkleNew York Times, 17October 1984.
137. "C.I.A. Linked to Comic Book for Nicaraguans", New York Times,
19October 1984.
"Nicaraguan Rebel Disputes U.S. Aide", New YorkTimes, 20 October
138.
1984; "Legislators Ask If Reagan Knew of C.I.A.'s Role", New York
Times,21 October 1984.
139. "Alleeed Autbor of CIA Manual Said to Be Ex-CI", WashinprunPosi,
-~ ~ -~~~~~
"Playing by the Wrong Book on Nicaragua", New York Times,
21 October 1984.
"C.I.A. Aides Dispute Reagan on Primer", Neiv York Times, 23 October
1984.
"U.S. Said Planning More Exercises forLatin America",WushingionPost,
26 October 1984.
"Private Contra Aid Gets Limited Favor", WashingtonPosi, 27 October
19x4
"A CIA Bombshell", Newsweek, 29 October 1984.
"C.I.A. Manual 1s Linked to Vietnam War Guide", New York Times.
29 October 1984.
"C.I.A. Manual: A Policy 1s Undermined", Neiv York Times, 30 Octo-
ber 1984.
"CIA Manual Based on Vietnam", Washington Post, 30 October
1984.
"Manual Said Aimed at Contra Abuses", WashingtonPosi, 31 October
1984.290 MlLlTARY AND PARAMlLlTARY ACTlVlTlES
149. "Pledged Help in War against Sandinistas",New YorkTimes, 1 Novem-
ber 1984.
150. "25 U.S. Warships in the Caribbean"New YorkTimes, 9 November 1984.
151. "Reagan Signs Bill Expanding EPA Authority", Washington Posi,
10November 1984.
152. "Sonic BoomsShake Cities in Nicaragua for the Fourth Day", New York
Times, 12November 1984; "Sonic Booms Continue over Nicaragua; Ship
Leaves", Washington Posr ,2 November 1984.
153. "Managua 'Designs' on Neighbors Seen", WashingtonPost, 14 Novem-
ber 1984.
"New U.S. ExerciseSeen in Honduras", New York Times, 19November
154.
1984.
155. "Nicaraguan Rebels Step Up Raids in Colïee Areas as Harvest Nears",
New York Times, 23 November 1984.
156. "Ex-Rebel Leader Alleges CIA Vow to Aid Overthrow in Managua",
Washingron Posr 27 November 1984.
157. "Rebel Training Book Linked to Casey Visit to Honduras", New York
Times, 3 December 1984.
158. "Latin Manual 1s Linked to CIA 'Psy-War' Plan", WashingronPosi,
3 December 1984.
159. "New Use Reported for C.I.A. Manual", New York Times, 7 December
1984.
160. "Balloons Took CIA Manuals to Nicaragua", CVashingioPnost,7 Decem-
ber 1984.
161. "Nicaragua 'Secret War' Raises Unease in CIA", Washingron Posr,
16December 1984.
162. "Army Said to Run Secret Latin Flights", BalrimoreSun, 16 December
1984.
163. "Shadow of Somoza Haunts Rebels' Image", Washington Posr ,7Decem-
ber 1984.
164. "CIA Employes Fought Nicaraguans", Washingron Posf ,0 December
1984.
165. "Nicaragua Rebels Accused of Abuses", New York Times, 27 December
1984.
166. "Nicaraguan Contras Hit on Human-Rights Faults", WashingronPost,
30 December 1984.
167. "Nicaragua Rebels Reported to Have New Flow of Ams", Nelu York
Times, 13January 1985.
168. "U.S. Considers Alternatives for Aid to Nicaragua Rebels",New York
Times, 26 January 1985.
169. "New U.S. Maneuver 1s Set for Honduras", Wa.~hin~toPnost,29 Janu-
ary 1985.
170. "Congress 1s Urged to Resume Anti-Sandinista Aid", New YorkTimes,
30 January 1985.
171. "Halt Urged to Exercisesin Honduras",Washingron Posi,31January 1985.
"Nicaraguan Rebels to Float Bond Issue", WashingionPosr, 1 February
172. 19x5
"Reagan Denounces Sandinistas, Urges Funds for Rebels", Washington
Posr, 16February 1985.
"President Calls Sandinista Foes 'Our Brothers"', New York Times,
17February 1985.
"Shultz Says Nicaraguan People HaveFallen 'Behindlron Curtain"',New
York Times,20 Febmary 1985. ANNBXESTO THE MBMORIAL 291
"Shultz PressesAid to 'Contras"', WashingtonPost, 20 Fehruary 1985.
"Nicaragua Rebels Curtail Fighting, Leader Says", lnrernarionalHerald
Tribune,20 Febmary 1985.
"Reagan Seeks Ouster of Sandinistas Unless Contras Share Power",
Washingron Post ,2 February 1985.
Article hy Bernard Gwertzman, New York Times, 23 February 1985.
"Honduras Wary of U.S. Policy", Washington Post ,4 Fehruary 1985.
"Contras Squabble over Aircraft Bought with Disputed Funds",
Washington Posr ,4 Fehruary 1985.
"Nicaraguan Rehel Keeps Command as Shifts Bufiet His Forces",
WashingronPost, 28 February 1985.
"U.S. General Says Nicaragua Rebels Cannot Win Soon", New York
Times,28 February 1985.
"Leaders of Anti-Sandinistas Fonn Alliance Urged hy U.S.", New York
Times, I March 1985.
"Reagan SaysU.S. Owes'Contras' Help", Washington Posi,2 March 1985.
"Reagan Terms Nicaraguan Rebels 'Moral Equalof Founding Fathers"',
New York Times, 2 March 1985.
"Contras andCIA: a Plan Gone Awry", LosAngelesTimes, 3March 1985.
"The Contras: How U.S. Got Entangled", Los AngelesTimes, 4 March
1985.
"Sandinistas Called a 'l.'actionWashingtonPosi, 5 March 1985.
"CIA Mining of Harbors 'a Fiasco"', Los AngelesTimes, 5 March 1985.
"Why the Covert War in Nicaragua Evolved and Hasn't Succeeded", Wall
StreetJournal, 5 March 1985.
"CIA Intemal Reoort Details U.S. Role in Contra Raids in Nicaraeu-
Last Year", Wall StreetJournal,6 March 1985.
193. "How CIA-Aided Raids in Nicaragua in '84Led Congress to End Funds",
Wall Street Journal6 March 1985.
194. "Nicaragua Rebels Accusedof Abuses", New YorkTimes, 7 March 1985.
195. "Frontal Assault Set to Gain Latin Funds", Washingron Post ,2 March
.,"*.
196. "C.I.A. and the Rebels: a Tangled History", New York Times, 18 March
1~.5.
197. "U.S., Honduras Planning Their Largest Exercise", WashingronPost,
22 March 1985.
198. "Army Cames Due with Hondurans", New YorkTimes, 27 March 1985.
199. "Nicaraguan Army: 'War Machine' or Defender of a BesiegedNation?",
New ïr~rkTimes, 30 March 1985.
200. "Reagran Launches New Initiative for 'Contra' Aid", WashingronPusr,
- ~ r~~ 19x5
201.
"Reagan Plan'sReal Goal 1sPeacein Congress,No1Nicaragua", Washing-
ion Parr,5 April 1985.
202. "Nicaragua Scorns Reagan Proposal for Rebel Talks", New YorkTimes,
- ..r...1985
203. "President Keeps Pushing 'Contra' Aid", WashingtonPost, 7 April 1985.
204. "Reagan Peace Plan for Nicaragua Gets Only Cool Support in Region",
New York Times, 12April 1985.
205. "Colombian Opposes U.S. Aid to Nicaraguan Rebels", New York Times,
16April 1985.
206. "Reagan Campaigns for Latin Package", New YorkTimes, 16April 1985.
207. "A Larger Force of Latin Rebels Sought by U.S.", New YorkTimes,
17April 1985.292 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIIS
208. "How Region ViewsPlan", New York Times, 17April 1985.
209. "_14 Million for Guemllas: What Could It Buy?', New York Times,
17Apnl 1985.
210. "Nicaraguan Rebels Cut Military Operations", Washingron Posf,
18Apnl 1985.
211.
"US. Program in Honduras Helps Families of Nicaraguan Guerrillas",
New York Times, 19 April 1985.
212. "Vatican Disputes Reagan Statements", WashingtonPosr,19April 1985.
213. "President Drops '85 Request for 'Contra' Arms", Washingron Posr,
19April 1985.
214. "House Votesdown 'Contra' Aid Plans", WashingionPosr,25 April 1985.
215. "Excerpts from Pleas by Reagan", New York Times, 25 April 1985.
[Nor reproduced)ANNEXESTO THE MEMORIAL
AnnexG
[Nol reproduced]
AnnexH
[Nor reproducedl MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
Annex 1
Attachments
1. Annual Human Rights Report, 1984,of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,
January 1985. [Nor reproduced ]
2. "Attacks by the Nicaraguan 'Contras' on the Civilian Population of Nica-
ragua", Report of a Fact-Finding Mission, September 1984-January 1985
("Brody Report"), March 1985. [Seepp. 299-364, infra.]
~. ~ ~ ~t of Donald T. Fox. Esa. and Professor Michael J. Glennon to the
ln&rn;iional Human ~i~h;s LX;, Group and the Washingionoffice on Laiin
Americ~ conccrning Abuses against Civliians by Countcrrrvoiulionaries
Operating in h'icür~gua.April 1985.[Sc? pp. 365-369. ini'ra.] ANNEXES TOTHE MEMORlAl
AnnexJ
Atrochments
1. "The Mining of Nicaragua's Ports",Central AmericanHistorical Institute,
Vol. 3, No. 13, 5 Apr1984.
2. Reports of Damage to Vesselsin Nicaragua's PortLloyd'sList andshipping
Gazette,March 1984.
/Nol reproduced] MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlES
AnnexK
Attachments
1. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States
and Nicaragua, signed 21 January 1956, 367UNTS 3.
2. Lukichv. Department of Labor and Industries,29 P. 2d 388 (Supreme Court
of the State of Washington, 1934).
3. Draft Bilateral Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Pro-
tection of Investment, Law and Policy in International Business,Vol. 15,
No. 1, 1983.
4. US Presidential Proclamations 5104 (23 September 1983, Federal Register,
Vol.48, No. 188, pp. 4057-4058) and 4941 (5 May 1982, Federal Regisler,
Vol.47, No. 89, pp. 19661-19664),Modification of Country Allocations of
Quotas on Certain Sugars, Sirups and Molasses.
5. "US Economic Measures Against Nicaragua", Central American Hisforical
lnstitule Update,Vol.4, No. 9, 1April 1985.
6. Lloyds List and ShippingGazette and Related Documents.
7. Tarifications Facultés Waterbornes, Novemher1983-April1984.
[Nat reproduced]ANNEXES TOTHE MEMORIAL
AnnexL ATTACKS BY THE NICARAGUAN "CONTRAS" ON THE
ClVlLIAN POPULATION OF NICARAGUA
REPORT OF A FACT-FINDING MISSION,
SEPTEMBER 1984-JANUARY 1985
March 1985
For thepas1three years, counterrevolutionary armed forces,commonly known
as contras, have carried on a guerrilla war in Nicaragua. Although unable to
capture or hold any sizeable town or populated area, the conlroshave inflicted
numerous casualties and caused substantial damaee to the Nicaraeuan economv.
That much has been widelyreported. Recently, however, accountshave surfacéd
with increasing regularity, and from a variety of sources, that thecontras are
directing their attacks againstcivilian targets- such as workers in the nor-
them provinces attempting to harvest the coffee crop - and that these attacks
have resulted in assassination, torture, rape, kidnapping and mutilation of civi-
lians.
To probe the veracity of thex repens, a fact-findingteam, led by an American
lawyer who volunteered bis time, spent from Septenber 1984to January 1985in
Nicaragua. The team set out to locale victims and other eyewitnessesto contra
attacks throughout northem and north-central Nicaragua - including Nicaraguan
peasants and workers, as well as US priests, nuns and lay pastoral worken -
interviewthem, and obtain sworn allidavits recounting in their own words what
they had seen or experienced.This report contains the results of this investigation.
The report is divided into 28 chapters, each one devoted to one incident, or
10a series of incidents in the same vicin,iv o~ ~ ~ ~e same nature. Each incident
included in the report is substantiated by the eyewitness testimony of at least
one, and usually several, affiants, and specific citations to the sources of each
account are ~rovided. The sworn affidavits themselves - 145 in al1- are
contained in a separate Appendix '.
The investigation wasstructured to be as objective and professional as possible.
A rigorous standard was applied: the report would include only those nicidents
and events that could be substantiated bv reliable evidence of a kind that would
be legally sufficient in a court of law. T~US,al1of the facts presented here are
based on direct eyewitness testimony. Each witness was reminded of the impor-
tance of relatine~onlv what he or she oersonallv saw or exoerienced. and~not
what he had heard or read in the newkpapers.i~arish however, were
allowed to testify generally about incidents they knew of in their parishes.) Each
witness was challenged by the interviewer with questions designed to confirm the
witness' personal knowledge of the events he related ("Did you actually sec
that?" "What color were their uniforms?')). Inmost cases, the account of one
'Not submittcd.[Nore bythe Regkrry]300 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
witness wascorroborated by the similar accounts of as many as 15others. Where
the credihility of a witness was considered doubtful for any reason, the statement
was excluded from the report.
Each witness'statement has been sig-ed under oath. In somecases, the witness'
testimony was initiallytape-rccorded and a transcription then typed and prexnted
to the witness for signature at a second meeting. In other cases, the interviewer
wrote down the testimonv bv hand, and presented the handwritten transcript for
signature. In each case, ihé afidavit was carefully rcad hy (or to) the alfiant,
who made any corrections needed before swearing to its truth and signing il. In
some instances the witness signed the aiiidavit despite his fear that il would
expose him to the danger of retaliation hy the contras.
Each affidavit completely identifies the affiant by name (both patronymic and
matronymic surnames), age and location, and in most cases also by place of
birth and complete mother's and father's names.This ensures that the authenticity
of the statement can he subject to further venfication.
The interviews were conducted during several trips to the areas of Nicaragua
where the coniru attacks have been heaviest. In the northern provinces of Esteli,
Madriz and Nueva Segovia, the investigating team visited several individual
towns and farms that had been attacked. In the provinces of Matagalpa and
Jinotega, the ongoing attacks made it impossible to travel outside the provincial
capitals, so refugees and others from the outlying areas who could be found in
the capitals were interviewed.In the northern Atlantic Coast region, for the same
reason, the interviews were conducted with people in the provincial capital of
Puerto Cabezas, with the exception of those conducted during a visit to the
Miskito resettlement town of Sumubila. Still other witnesses were brought to
Managua by their parish priests and were interviewed there, when il was
impossible to visit the site of the incident.
After arrivine in an area in which contra attacks were reported to have
occurred, the ilvestigators located survivors and witnesses thriugh discussions
with local religious people, localoficials, health workers and chance acquaint-
ances. The Nicaraguan government was helpful in issuinc:travel pennits, provid-
ine transoortation'io remote or embattled a&as where necessarvand. on occasion.
indi.'dtlng\\herc rriinc,ssr ~iiighlbc found The Fiicdraguan g<>vcrnmcnJ iid nui,
h<~ucver,inicrfcre in an).u~y 111ihc sclcciion of uitneirci iir thr intevieti procsr,.
All witnesses were selectedsolelv . .the investigative team (with the exception
of one instance, noted in the text); al1 interviews were conducted ourside the
presence of government or party officiais.
This report is not intended to he exhaustive: because attacks on the civilian
population of Nicaragua appear to occur frequently, this report hy necessitycan
only cover a small sampling of them. Even in the localities to which an entire
chapter is devoted, the investigotors could not attempt to inquire into every
incident of which thev were made aware. let alone interview everv witness.Those
incidents that have bien investigated, however,reveal adistinct pattern, indicating
that contra activities often include:
- attacks on purely civilian targets resulting in the killing of unarmed men,
women, children and the elderly ;
- premeditated acts of hrutality includingrape, beatings, mutilation and torture;
- individual and mass kidnapping of civilians - particularly in the northern
Atlantic Coast region - for the purpose of forced recruitment into the conrra
forces and the creation of a hostage refugee population in Honduras;
- assaults on economic and social targets such as Parms, cooperatives, food
storage facilities and health centers, including a particular effort to disrupt REPORT OP A FACT-PINDING MISSION 301
the coffee harvests through attacks on cofee cooperatives and on vehicles
carrying volunteer coffeeharvesters;
- intimidation of civilians who participate or cooperate in government or
community programs such as distribution of subsidizcd food products,
education and the local self-defensemilitias; and
- kidnapping, intimidation and even murder of religious leaders who support
the government, including priests and clergy-trained lay pastors.
Following are some excerpts from the affidavits themselves (page numhers
refer to pages in the text):
- Digna Barreda de Ubeda, a mother of two from Esteli, wds kidnapped by
the contrasin May 1983:
"[Flive of them raped me al about five in the evening . . .They had
gang-raped me every day. When my vagina couldn't take it anymore, they
raped me through my rectum. 1calculate that in 5 days they raped me 60
times." (p. 135.)
She also watched conrroforces beat her husband and gouge out the eyes of
another civilian hefore killing him. (p. 134.)
- Doroteo Tinoco Valdivia, testifyingabout an attack in April 1984 on his
farming cooperative near Yali, Jinotega:
"Th<.yhaJ alrcady destroycd aIIthxi \$,a,ihc c<>operaiivc;a ci1lTccdrjing
machine, the iuo dormituries l'orthe cotieçcutters. thc elcclricityg.ncral~irs.
sevencows, the plant, the food warehouse.
There was one boy about 15-years old, who was retarded and suffered
from epilepsy. We had left him in the bomb shelter.
When we returned . . we saw . . that they had cut his throat, then they
cut open his stomach and left his intestines hanging out on the ground like
a string.
They did the same to Juan Corrales who had already died from a bullet
in the fighting. They opened him up and took out his intestines and cut of
his testicles." (p. 70.)
- Roger Briones, 15, one of the survivors of a December 4, 1984,amhush on
a tmck carrying volunteercoffee-pickerswhich was set afire hy conlraforces:
"1 could hear the cries and laments of those who were burning alive." (p. 6.)
- Mirna Cunningham, a Black Miskito lndian doctor who is now the govern-
ment's Minister for the northern Atlantic Coast, descrihing how she and a
nurse were treated after being kidnapped by the contrasin December 1981 :
"During those hours we were raped for the first lime. While they were
raping us, they were chanting slogans like 'Christ yesterday, Christtoday,
Christ tomorrow . ..' And although we would cry or shout, they would hit
us, and put a knife or a gun to Our head. This went on for almost two
hours." (p. 138.)
- Mana Bustillo viuda de Blandon told of how her husband, a lay pastor, and
her five children were taken from her home near El Jicaro one night in
Octoher 1982; when she found them the next day: "They were left al1cut
up. Their ears were pulled off, their throats were cut, their noses and other
parts were cut of." (p. 57.)
- Sister Lisa Fitzgerald, an American nun, testifying about the aftermath of a302 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
mortar attack on a tohacco farm near Jalapa in April 1983, in which two
women and three children were injured in their homes:
"All five were filled with shrapnel, pa~icuiariy the backs of the women
who had knelt over the children to protect them. The skull and chest of the
one-year-old hahy weredotted hy shell fragments which 1and another sister
picked out by hand." (p. 39.)
- Mauricio Gonzales, a Miskito Indian, testifying about the April 1984 coniru
attack against the resettlement village of Sumubila:
"They shot my mother [age 641 in the leg. 1opened the door and seeing
that they had surrounded the house, 1said to them that if we had arms like
theirs, we would avenge the hlood of my mother.
Then they shot me in the head, on my patio, and 1fell. After that, 1don't
remember anything." (p. 25.)
- Inocente Peralta, a lay pastor, went out looking for seven peopletaken in an
attack on a Jinotega cooperative in April 1984.He describes the condition in
which the bodies were found; for example:
"We found [Juan Perez] assassinated in the mountains. They had tied his
hands hehind his hack. They hung him on a wire fence. They opened up his
throat and took out his tongue. Another hayonet had gone in through his
stomach and come out his hack. Finally, they cut off his testicles. It was
horrible to see." (p. 66.)
- Carmen Gutierrez descrihed the death of her four-year old daughter Suyapa
in a June 1983mortar attack on her border town of Teotecacinte:
"When we were al1in the [homh] shelter, my mother asked if any of the
children were missing,so we called them by their names. Only Suyapa wds
missing. 1went out . . Then 1remembered that 1had seen her playing with
a hen. 1went there and saw her dead. Her facewas hlown away but 1didn't
realize it, 1didn't even notice the mortaring. 1picked her up and ran away
like mad. Then I realized that part of her face was missing. I went back to
look and found the piece of her face." (p. 41.)
- Orlando Wayland, a Miskito teacher who was kidnapped by the contras in
December 1983, testifying to tortures applied to him and eight others in
Honduras:
"ln the evening, they tied me up in the water from 7 pm until 1am. The
next day, at 7 am, they began to make me collect garhage in the creek in
my undenuear, with the cold. The creek was really icey. 1was in the creek
for four hours . ..
Then they threw me on the ant hill. Tied up, they put me chest-down on
the ant hill. The [red] ants bit my body. 1 squirmed to try to get them OR
my body, but there were too many.
I was on the ant hill 10minutes each day . . .
They would beat me . . .from head to heels . . They would give me an
injection to calm me a little. Then they would heat me again." (p. 121.)
- Abelina Inestroza, a mother from Susucayan, testifying about events of the
previous day in Decemher 1984:
"They grahhed us, me and my sister . . .and raped us in front of the
whole family. They turned out the lights and two of them raped me and
two othersraped my sister. They told us not to scream because they would REPORT OF A FACT-PINDING MISSION 303
kill us. They threatened us with their bayonets. They pointed their guns at
the others in the house." (p. 141.)
- Maria Julia Ortiz was hiding under the bed when the contras broke into her
house near El Jicaro in Octoher 1984and killed her husband:
"They grabbed my husband and they beat him and broke his neck with
a rifle.hen they took him out of the room by one of the doors which was
destroyed and they bashed in his head with a rifle and look out his eye.
Then they threw him on the Boor and they tied his hands and they cut
his throat with a bayonet. He screamed and fought .. .and said that he
didn't do anything wrong, but they wouldn't let him spcak and put a green
cloth in his mouth." (pp. 60-61.)
- Martin Piner,a Miskito pastor, describinghis treatment after being kidnapped
by the conrras and taken to Honduras in July 1984:
"He grabbed me by the neck and put me head down in the water. When
1 couldn't take it anymore, he picked me up and put me back in the watet
again. It was like that for half an hour.
They took me from there and tied me to a pine tree in the camp for three
days.
After 3 days, they untied me. 1hadn't eaten for 5days." (p. 127.)
- Noel Benavides Herradora, telling of the December 1982abduction of Felipe
and Mery Barreda, prominent church leaders from Esteli:
"Mr. Felipe Barreda ...was bleeding heavily. He was being beaten and
had blood al1over him. [His wife]was also being beaten. They lied them. 1
was walking ahead, he was tied behind me, and she was tied further behind.
He could hardly walk. 1had to pull on the rope to help him along, because
the pain prevented him from making it through some ravines, steep hillsides,
over boulders and thick vegetation. He kept slipping and falling. And every
time he fell they struck him and threatened Io gel rid of him right there so
that he would stop being a burden. Then he would kneel and ask to be
allowed to pray an Our Father . .. But they just beat him, kicked him,
slapped him in the face and cursed him." (pp. 11-12.)
The Barredas were later tortured and killed. (p. 15.)
The members of the investigative team were:
ReedBrody. (Team leader and report author.) Mr. Brody, an attorney, is a
member of the New York bar. A 1978 graduate of Columbia Law School, he
was associated witb the New York law firm of Weil, Gotshal and Manges and
then spent four years as an Assistant Attorney Generdl in the State of New
York. He has taught at the Law School of the University of Paris (Pantheon-
Sorbonne) and authored Latin America: The Freedomtu Wrire (PEN American
Center. 1980).
SisterSandra Price. Sister Sandra isa nun of the Congregation of Notre Dame
de Namur. She has been in Nicaragua since 1981 and in Siuna, in Nortbern
Zelaya province, since 1982. Sister Sandra collected affidavits in the Siuna
region only.
JamesBordelon. Mr. Bordelon is a student at the Antioch School of Law in
Washington, DC. He will receive his law degree in June 1985.304 MlLlTARY AND PARAMII.ITARYACTIVITIES
The idea of an independent investigation was conceived by the Washington
law firm of Reichler & Appelbaum, which represents the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment. The uartici~ation of two of the members of the team. M-r. Brodv and
MI. Bordelon, wa; arranged by the firm. The participation of sister ~andra~rice
was arranged by MI. Brody alter he arrived in Nicaragua. The tram members
received no compensation for their work and no reimbursement for expenses.
Each paid his or her own travel and living expenses except that. during part of
their stay in Nicaragua, Mr. Brody and Mr. Bordelon lived in a house owned
by the government. While they were in Managua, Mr. Brody and MI. Bordelon
were furnished office space at the government-funded Comision Nacional de
Promocion y Proteccion de los Derechos Humanos. Typing of the report was
done by Reichler & Appelbaum.
Nicaragua is an agricultural country whose foreign exchange earnings depend
in large pan on its annual colfee harvest. During the harvest season - from
November to February - civilian volunteers from al1over Nicaragua (and many
from abroad) travel to the colfee-growingareas and help with the labor-intensive
task of picking the coffee beans. For the past three harvest seasons, thconrros
have staged direct attacks on these volunteers.
January 18, 1983
On Januarv 18. 1983. several truckloads of civilian volunteers setout from the
northern citiof Jalapa to pick coffee in nearby Namasli close to the Honduran
border. The last truck to leave Jalapa, at about 8am, belonged to Abraham
Reyes. Standing in the open-air back of the truck, which had iide walls as tall
as they, were some 25-30 volunteers. Two children, Guadalupe Ruiz and Pedro
Cruz, both about 13,were riding on top of the driver's cabin. All were civilians,
although at least two of them were carrying arms for their defense. (Affidavits
of Francisco Louez Ramirez. Elba Bucardo Blandon and Dina Aracelv Padilla.
Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.) The vdunteers went along "with high spirits, si&ing and
shoutina slogans". (Affidavit of Dina Aracely Padilla, Exhibit 3, para. 5.)
~ccoÏdinito one'volunteer :
"When we were entering the farm where we were going to pick, in
Namasli, about 12 kilometers from Jalapa, 1 saw 2 counterrevolutionaries
in a coiïee field on the left of the road. They hegan to shoot and we al1
threw ourselves on the floor of the truck.
1 saw the blood flowing and 1 asked my friend Francisco, 'Don Chico,
are you OK?' 'No,' he said, 'they got me in the foot.' 1became nervous.
The child Pedro Cruz, who was traveling on top, fell on my legs . . .He
didn't dieright away, but later.
The girl Guadalupe Ruiz fell on my back, and los1 the crown of her
forehead. She died immediately." (Id., paras. 6-9.)
Elba Bucardo, 44,was riding in back: REPORT OF A FACT-I'INDING MISSION 305
"We heard shots . . .The companeros told everyone tu hit the floor . . .
1did and listened tu the firing.
. . Emilio, about 16or 17,was wounded in the arm and I gave him my
scarf . . .
.. . 1saw Guadalupe Ruiz almost dead . . .[and] Pedro Cmz, dying. 1
got up tu gel a little more comfortable and 1 saw Pedrito lying there, face-
up, full of hlood.
Then 1 felt a hlow in the back of the head as if 1 were hit with a fistful
of dirt. 1 felt back and saw blood on my hands and felt that the wood of
the truck had fallen on me." (Affidavit of Elba Bucardo Blandon, Exhibit 2,
paras. 4-8.)
Francisco Lopez, 46, a farmer, was on the floor of the truck when he received
a shot in the fout, which broke it. "They fired 12-inch rockets which landed
inside the truck, but did not go of." (Affidavit of Francisco Lopez Ramirez,
Exhibit 1, para. 7.)
When the truck with the injured driver reached the farmhouse, the wounded
and dead were immediately taken tu a hospital in Jalapa. Pedro Cruz, one of
the young boys, died in a hospital in Managua. (Id., para. 6.) Francisco Lopez
was taken tu hospitals in Ocotal and then La Trinidad where he stayed seven
months on crutches; he can no longer work in the fields. (Id., paras. 9-10.) Elba
Bucardo was taken to Ocotal where they removed shrapnel from her finger but
were unable tu remove it from her head because it was too deep. She still has
frequent headaches and goes tu a hospital in lalapa. (Affidavit of Elba Bucardo
Blandon, Exhibit 2, paras. 9-10.)
2. TELPANECA
December 4, 1984
On I>cccnihcr 4. IYal, .i <i,>i~rit,;isk I;~rcc3nihu1h:J;itruck ctirrying \<)lun-
rccr a>ircc-ptckers frsni the \tate <aimmunicaiioni conip;in) (TELCOR] nrar
'I;.lplinccüin the Dc~artmcnl iii\13dri?. Tweniy-oneiivili;inr. includinp-a m<ithcr
and her 5-year-old child who had hitched a ride, were killed.
The group had assembled in Condega, in the Department of Esteli, and set
off from there on December 4, headed for Telpaneca. Four of the pickers piled
into Toyota Land-Cruiser pick-up truck and the rest into a dump-truck. (Affidavit
of Jorge Luis Briones Valenzuela,Exhibit 2, para. 14.) Of the 32 people in the
group, no more than 13 were given rifles for their protection in the event of a
cuntraattack. (SecAffidavitof Jorge Luis BrionesValenzuela,Exhihit 2, para. 13 ;
Affidavit of Santos Roger Briones Valenzuela, Exhibit 7, para. 8; Affidavit of
Lucio Rodriguez Gradis, Exhibit 3, para. 7.) The group left al 7.45am, stopping
tu pick up several hitch-hikers including a woman and her 5-year-old boy.
(Affidavit of Santos Roger Briones Valenzuela,Exhibit 1, paras. 9, 18; Affidavit
of Jorge Luis Briones Valenzuela, Exhibit 2, paras. 15, 17.)
A few miles outside of Telpaneca, a conrra task-force was waiting. It let the
pick-up truck pass and then opened fire on the dump-truck from about 20yards,
with a machine-gun, rockets, grenades and riiie fire. (Affidavit of Santos Roger
Briones Valenzuela, Exhihit 1, paras. 11-12; Affidavit of Jorge Luis Briones
Valenzuela, Exhibit 2, para. 18; Affidavit of Lucio Rodriguez Gradis, Exhibit 3,
para. II.) The dump-truck tried tu keep going but, after about 100 yards, a
rocket destroyed one of its tires. (Affidavit of Santos Roger Briones Valenzuela,
Exhihit 1, para. 13.) REPORT OF A FACI'-FINDING MISSION 307
Ramon Gallo Bravo, Exhibit 2, para. 17.) Among the volunteers were Felipe
Barreda. 51. and his wife Mana I"Merv2'lBa,r.da. 49.
The Lkidlis uerc uell-knorrn citizens of ~stcli Dceply religii~us,they ucre
Delegale\ <>l'theN'ord (Ili)p;irtorsl and nienibers of the Pastoral i~~unciloi the
I>i.~cerr.f Fsteli.Irith: laie IY6lisand e;irl, 1970% the\ haJ iire~ni7edChristian
l.'aitiil)biovenient retrsats, taughi i.~urseri>nChris~ianityand helpcdforni )outh
groups and ii><iperliiii,cs.I>uring the inrurreçtion againsi Scimoda. ihc) had
uorkcd with the Sandinistii l:roni ;inJ helriedhuild Chri.tilin basc communiiies
in Esteli. Followine the revolution. Merv Ëarreda becam~~ ~me~b~r~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
City Council, and both she and he; hushand began to work in the poor "Omar
Torrijos" neighborhood, promoting literacy and health, organizing a brick-
making coooerative and continuine their courses on Christianitv.
iheir neighborhood to Gin the coffeeharvest on ~e&mber 24 meant
thal the Barredas would miss the Christmas holiddy. They helieved, however,
that Nicaragua's earnings from the harvest would mean more to their poor
friends. Before lcaving, Mery wrote ta the people of the Omar Torrijos neigh-
borhood :
"We have been awaiting this Christmas with real joy. Since we came to
liveamong you, you have hecome a part of Ourlives.Weloveyour children,
your streets, your problems - in short, everything that is you. The hest
Christmas gift the Lord could give me would he to share this Christmas
with you, and 1 was wondering what gift 1 could give you. But then 1
suddenly had the chance to give you a very fine present, although it means
that 1will not be with you at Midnight Mass. It is the chance to pick coffee
for ien days. The little bit that 1 will pick will he transformed in10 health
care, clothing, housing, roads, education and food for our people - that is
why 1 am enthusiastic about going. In every coffee bean 1 pick, 1will see
each of your faces . . ."(Quoted in Teofilo Cabestrero, "Dieron La Vida
por Su Pueblo" ["They Gave Their Lives for Their People"]. El Tqcun,
Nicaragua (1984). pp. 36-37.)
The group the Barredas had joined reached one farm, Oro Verde, on the 24th
and was then moved twice in three days. On Decemher 27, 1982,they reached
the Agronica farmnear Honduras where, on December 28, they began 10pick
coffee. (Affidavit of Alicia Huete Diaz, Exhibit 2, paras. 2-5; Affidavit of José
Ramon Gallo Bravo, Exhihit 2, paras. 6-12.)
At about 1I am, one of the pickerscame running, crying "Get down, gel down
right away, the onrras are coming". (Affidavit of AliciaHuete Diaz, Exhibit 2,
para. 6.) At that point, they began to hear intense firing of mortars, rockets,
machine-guns, rifles and grenades. (Affidavit of Noel Benavides Herradora,
Exhibit 3, para. 2; Affidavitof Jose Ramon Gallo Bravo, Exhibit 2, para. 14.)
The pickers headed out on the only road from the farm, running parallel to a
creek. As the road was elevatedand the creek more orotected. the erouu followed
the creek until it turned off toward Honduras. (~ffidavit of José- amo Gaono
Bravo, Exhibit 2, paras. 15-18.)At that point. those who could climbed back up
to the rad. (Id., para. 18-20.)
Upon reaching the road, José Ramon Gallo, 36, was receivedby machine-gun
fire. As the attackers had the road surrounded from above (id.,para. 20). he hid
in a ditch from where he could hear voices, "Grah that son-of-a-bitch. Don't let
anyone escape, especiallyno1the women". (Id., para. 21.)
The Barredas, older, lagged behind along with a few others. As that group
helped edch other up onto the road, they, too, came under fire. (Affidavit of
Alicia Huete Diaz, Exhihit 1, para. 7.)308 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACnVlTlES
Gallo, who had been raised by the present Bishop of Esteli and had known
the Barredas since participating in their Christianity course in the 1960s, saw
Felipe make it to the road where the pickers' Toyota Jeep was parked. Felipe
started operating the Jeep's radio to seek help when an explosion rocked the
vehicle,destroying its hood and windows. (Affidavitof JoséRamon Gallo Bravo,
Exhibit 2, paras. 22-23.)
While many of the pickers had made it past the contras before they closed
their circle (id., para. ZI), many others remained trapped. Gallo and two otbers
hid for hours in a ditch as the contras fired. (Id., paras. 28-30.)Even after the
firing stopped, the contras kept yelling for those in hiding to come out.
(Id., para. 1.)
Alicia Huete walked the road, where "(b)ullets were raining on us from al1
sides". (Affidavit of AliciaHuete Diaz, Exhibit 1,para. 9.)So she and those she
was with got behind a hill and stayed there for hours. From there, she could see
one of the contras with a machine-gun, looking down, who apparently did no1
see them. (Id.)
When the shooting stopped, at about 5pm in the evening, the contras came
down to about 100 yards from where Huete was. She could hear them saying
"son-of-a-bitch, we're not going to leave even one of those son-of-a-bitch rabid
dogs. We'regoing IOkill them all". (Id)
But the attackers did leave, and Huete and Gallo and most of the others made
it back safely. Although 30 pickers were originally missing, little by little al1but
six showed up - four young men and the Barredas. (Affidavit of JoséRamon
Gallo Bravo, Exhibit 2, para. 39.)
Noel Benavides, one of the men who did not return, was hiding about a
kilometer south of the farm when the contras spotted him. They tied him up,
put on steel handcuffs and blindfolded him. (Affidavit of Noel Benavides
Herradora, Exhibit 1, para. 13.)Then, when they took him and three otbers 10
a point further on,
"Mr. Felipe Barreda and his wife were already there. He was bleeding
heavily. He was being beaten and had blood al1 over him. She was also
being beaten. They tied them. 1 was walking ahead, he was tied behind me,
and she was tied further behind. He could hardly walk. 1had to pull on the
rope 10 help him along, because the pain prevented him from making it
through some ravines, steep hillsides, over boulders and thick vegetation.
He kept slipping and falling. And every time he fell they struck him and
threatened to get rid of him right there so that he would stop being a
burden. Then he would kneel and ask to be allowed to pray to Our fatber
before they killed him so that he would no1 die jus1 like that, but that he
wanted to pray to the Lord. But they just beat him, kicked him, slapped
him in the face and cursed him." (Id., para. 4.)
That evening they reached a post where Honduran guardsmen were mixed
with contrus. One of the soldiers said to leave Mery there. They insulted her and
told her sbe would be raped by the whole troop, and she was left there. (Id.,
para. 5.) The others continued walking until, at three in the morning, they were
presented to another Honduran guard post. There,
"They started insulting us, threw us lace-down on the ground and began
beating us. One of the guards said that he would be the one to kill those
dogs, to jus1 leave it to him. He kicked us and said: 'Turn right-side up,
take their blinds off.' They pulled Our blindfolds off and placed their nfle-
butts on our foreheads and fixedtheir bayonets. But one of the counterrevo- REPORTOF A FACT-FINDINGMISSION 311
wouldn't leave any si.ns .hen the time came to show them on televi-
sion . . .
That night they were hoth taken outside nude so they would spend the
night under the rain. The next day [the television] inte~iewed them. After
that, El Suicida [El Muerto's superior] told me Io kill the Barredas and 1
carried out the order shooting them in the head with the help of Juan and
Tapir." (Id., pp. 10-11.)
4. LA SORPRESA
November 14, 1984
On Novemher 14, 1984,a contra force of approximately 400-600men attacked
the state farm "La Sorpresa", 45 kilometers north of Jinotega, killing 17 of its
memhers - al1civilians - kidnapping others and destroying most of ils facili-
lies.
Like other farms in these fertile hills. La Sororesa was oreoarina itself for the
coKeeharvest. A week later, it would h&e been ihe tempok jhomi for hundreds
of volunteer pickers who came to the Matagalpa-Jinotega region to help with
the coKeepicking, and that morning the members of the cooperative were at a
meet~~ ~ ~ ~oordinate the u~comine harves-. (Affidavit of Salomon Rivera
Alaniz, Exhihit 1, 3.) '
The head of the farm, Luis Amado Morles, left in a tractor to hring wood
from nearbv El Saraval. As he aooroached his destination he was told that the
contras we& in the vknity and hé'retumedto the farm to warn the others. (Id.,
para. 4; Affidavit of Julio Cesar Torrez Perez, Exhibit 7, para. 3.)
The farm was defended hy only 20 resident civilian defenders who look up
positions as the contras attacked with 79 millimeter grenades, hand-grenades,
mortars, RPG-2 and RPG-7 and rifle fire. (Id., Affidavit of Salomon Rivera
Alaniz, Exhibit 1, para. 12.)The attackers quickly surrounded the farm, killing
10 of the milicianos (Affidavit of Julio Cesar Torres Perez, Exhibit 7, para. 10;
Affidavit of JoséRuiz Martinez, Exhihit 6, para. 6), including Jamilet Sevilla, a
pregnant 17-year old mother (Affidavit of Salomon Rivera Alaniz, Exhihit 1,
para. IO; Affidavit of Julio Cesar Torres Perez, Exhibit 7, para. 14), and forcing
the others to flee.
Julia Picado Gonzalez was in her house with 6 of her 8 children when the
attack started. She grabbed the milk for her 18-month-old baby and Aedas the
contras entered, yelling, "If we find the women of the rabid dogs in their houses,
we'llcut their throats with the whole family". (Affidavitof Julia Picado Gonzalez,
Exhibit 5, para. 10.) As they left, the conrras shot at them and they continued
their retreat by crawling up a hill to a coffeeplantation. From there she watched
as t~ ~ ~ ~~ ~s~ shot her hushand in the shoulder. then hit him with a grenade -
which destroyed his hiad. (Id.)
When the conlrus overran the farm, they finished off the wounded and dying
with bayonets, rifle shots and grenades. (Afidavit of Salomon Rivera Alaniz,
Exhihit 1, para. 18.)Jamilet Sevilla was Paterfound with a bayonet hlow in her
pregnant belly. (Affidavit of Mana Helena Ferufino, Exhihit 4, para. 5; Affidavit
of Julio Cesar Torres Perez, Exhibit 7, para. 15.)
The women and children Redthe day care center where they had taken refuge.
The conrras shot at them, killing Telma Gonzalez and her 16-month-old hahy
José Rodolfo Ruiz, as well as another 4-year-old child, Carlos José Mejia.312 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITB~S
(Affidavit of Julia Picado Gonzalez, Exhibit 5, para. 21 ;Affidavit of Salomon
Rivera Alaniz, Exhibit 1, para. 26; Affidavit of Marta Ruiz Jimenez, Exhibit 2,
paras. 4-5.)
Santos Gonzalez was in her house when she heard the firing. She threw herself
on the ground and watched from the cracks in the wall as the contrassurrounded
and then entered the farm. Her son, JoséAlejandro Pineda, was in front of the
house. "They grabbed him alive, struck him on the forehead with a machete and
his brains spilled. Then they burned him." (Affidavit of Santos Gonzalez,
Exhibit 3, para. 7; see also Affidavit of Salomon Rivera Alaniz, Exhibit 1,
para. 19.)
As the contrus retreated, they ordered two of their captives, Benito Talavera
and Nicolas, to burn the bouses. Benito went to the houses warning those still
in them to "leave, because I'm going to set the house on fire". (Affidavit of
Santos Gonzalez, Exhibit 3, para. 14; Affidavit of Salomon Rivera Alaniz,
Exhibit 1, para. 17.)
The attackers were able to destroy the coffee plant, 600 pounds of coiïee. the
coffee pulping machine, three dormitories, the offices, the kitchen, the houses
and the food warehouse where beans, rice and fertilizer were stored, as well as
the dormitories for the seasonal workers and the ~ickers. Onlv a few houses.
two motors, the miIl and the electric generator werenot destroyéd.(Affidavit of
JoséRuiz Martinez, Exhibit 6, para. 12; Affidavit of Salomon Rivera Alaniz,
Exhibit 1,para. 14.)
The nearby Los Andes hacienda was also burned, including the main house
and the kitchen. (Affidavit of Francisco Ernesto Toruno Rodriguez, Exhibit 10,
para. 12.)
The contras took several captives as they left. Omar Gutierra was forced to
carry a chain saw and Nicolas Molina, the hm's accountant, two backpacks.
Some Miskito lndians who had been resettled on the farm were also taken, and
one was forced to carry two dead conrras roped on to his back. (Affidavit of
Julia Picado Gonzalez, Exhibit 5, para. 23.)
Meanwhile, the 17 dead bodies of the victims of the attack were taken to
nearby Abisinia. Luis Amado, the head of the farm, had his feet, his hands and
his testicles cut uo. (Affidavit of Julia Picaso Gonzalez. Exhibit 5. oara. 20.)
Mundo Cruz had 'baionet wounds in his face and his testicles cul off.i~ffidavii
of Julio Cesar Torres Perez, Exhibit 7, para. 16.)Pedro Ortiz's head was smashed
in and bis testicles werealso cut off (Id.)
Also among the dead were three Miskitos, including a teacher, and two chil-
dren: Elida and Renee Torres. (Affidavit of Julia Picado Gonzalez, Exhibit
5, para. 22.)
According to the New York Times account of this attack, after that Wednesday,
the contras:
"set an ambush along a nearby road for any relief column that might try to
reach the devastated farm. The first vehicle that passed, however, carried
Evenor Castro Ibarra, an official of the National Development Bank who
was returning to the town of Jinotega after visiting several remote coopera-
tives. The rebel commandos killed him, left his body beside his jeep, and
remained in wait for others.
On Thursday morning, two top Sandinista officiaisfrom Jinotega, Ronald
Paredes and Denis Espinoza, set out by jeep to assess the damage al La
~ ~ ~esa. Amone ~-e seven ~e.ol. accomoan.ing, uem were a bank official
concerned about Mr. Castro Ibarra's disappearance and a reporter from
Barricada, 34-year-old Juan Bautista Matus Lopez, a longtime Sandinista.314 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
"He told me that theyhad taken him.nie firstgroup let him go. The group
that came aftenvards told him 'you're coming with us'. They look him
under a bridge and lied his hands hehind his back . . .They asked him
where Chico Caceres and Armando were and who was in charge of health
and the CDS [Sandinista Defense Committee]. He said he didn't know.
They told him if he didn't speak they would shut him iip for good. They
gave him a blue poison orally. He said that when they attacked him he
didn't feel anything and when they gave him the first blow of the bayonet,
he fell,got up and fell again and they left him for deqd." (Id.,para. 23.)
They also stole 3,000 cordohas he had in his pocket. Margarito was taken to a
hospital in Managua, where he died several weeks later. (Id., paras. 29-39.)
Ali of thesefamiliesleft La Estancia after this incident, but whena resettlement
cooperative ("asentamiento") was huilt there, they and other refugees from La
Estancia and other regions went to live in the cooperative.
April 17, 1984
There are five communities on the road hetween Puerto Cabezas and Rosita,
in Northern Zelaya province, to which Miskito lndians livingalong the Honduran
border were resettled in 1982.
The larges1of the communities is Sumubila, with some 3,200 Miskitos living
in single-family woodenhouses to which they haveheen giventitle.
On March 19, 1984. contra soldiers in the Misura Military instruction Center
(CIMM) in Honduras were told by "Chan", a former member of General
Somoza'selite EEBl unit, that, on the orders of Miskito contraleader Steadman
Fagoth, a force of 500 contras would leave the center to kidnap residents of
Sumuhila. Other troops were simultaneouslyordered on other missions, including
a nrouu of 30 which was to attack the militari base in Puerto Cahezas as a
diversi6nary action. Another six men went to Ësperanza, on the Rio Coco, to
receive the kidnapped. (Affidavit of Orlando Wayland Waldiman, Exhibit I to
Francia Sirpe chapter, paras. 53-54.)
On April 17, 1984,at about 4.30am, the contra force began a surprise entry
in10 Sumubila. They attacked the settlement from three sides with mortars,
rockets, grenades and rifle-fire,easily overwhelming local resistance. (Affidavit
of Raul Davis Arias, Exhibit 1, para. 41 ;Affidavitof Francisco Calix Romero,
Exhibit 8, paras. 6-7; Affidavitof SilvestreTaylor Mendoza, Exhihit II, para. 4.)
Cristina Atoya, a nurse who was five months pregnant, was in the health
center with her sick daughter when she heard the first shots, and hid with the
child under the bed. Then she heard the contras draw closer, and shots entered
the health center. One of the bullets ruptured the oxygen tank, setting the center
on fire. There were four patients hooked to intravenous tubes. Ruth Gramm,
the nurse on duty, unhooked them and they al1Red the hurning health center,
crawling until they got to a pit on a nearhy hill where they lay face-downfor
hours until the shooting was over. (Affidavit of Cristina Atoya Gonzalez,
Exhihit 6, paras. 1-9.)
Along with the health center, the advancing contras set fire to the senior
citizens' artisanry center, the cacao warehouse, the electricity plant, the settle-
ment's onlyambulance, the agrarian reform osce and the fumigation center.
(Affidavitof Francisco Calix Romero, Exhihit 8, para. 14; Affidavit of Silvestre REPORT OF A FACT-PINUINC MISSION 315
Taylor Mendoza, Exhibit II, paras. 5 and 7; Affidavit of Father Antonio
Sandoval Herrera, Exhibit 13,para. 7.)
A truck driver on his way from Puerto Cabezas to Matagalpa had parked his
truck for the night in the settlement. Thcontrasshot him and then stahbed him
four times with their bayonets, killing him. His truck was destroyed as well.
(Affidavit ofFrancisco Calix Romero, Exhibit 8, para. 14; Affidavit of Silvestre
Taylor Mendoza, Exhihit 11,paras. 13-14.)
Mauricio Gonzales was in his house with his 64-year-old mother:
"We had never heard firing like that day, so my mother got up to run
[rom the house. 1grabbed her and sat her on the bed.
They shot by mother page641in the leg. 1opened the door and, seeing
that they had surrounded the house, 1said to them that if we had arms like
theirs, we would avengethe blood of my mother.
Then they shot me in the head, on my patio, and 1fell.After that, I don't
remember anything," (Affidavit of Mauricio Gonzales, Exhihit 10,
paras. 2-4.)
When Gonzales' niece, Cristina Atoya, returned after the attack, she found
Gonzales and his mother lying on the floor. "My grandmother was bleeding,but
she was already dead. Only [my 5-year-old daugher, crying] covered with blood
and hugging my grandmother, was alive there." (Affidavit of Cristina Atoya
Gonzalez, Exhibit 6, para. IO.) Gonzales had to be taken to the hospital in
Rosita but did not recover consciousness until he reached the hospital in Puerto
Cahezas, from which he was transferred to a Managua hospital. He remained
there for two months. (Affidavit of Mauricio Gonzalez, Exhibit 10,paras. 6-8.)
A bullet entered the house where Julio Ohando, 55, lived with his wife and
eight children, and hit him in the side, killing him on the spot. (Affidavit of
Rosalia Ralp Obando, Exhihit 3, paras. 24.) Other hullets wounded Candida
Lopez, 28, in the mouth and cheek, sending her to the hospital for four months.
Affidavitof Estela Lacayo Smith, Exhibit 12, para. 6.)
As some of the contrasdefeated the outnumbered local defense, others went
from house to house pulling people out. Avelino Cox watched them:
"One of the conirascame [rom another neighborhood, telling the others
to get al1 the young people out. 1 could see through the corner of my
window that they already had a lot of youths [rom my neighborhood . ..
concentrated, under their pointed guns.
The first people they took from my neighborhood were two of my
brothers-in-law, Ricardo and Eduardo Coleman. To date, we haven't heard
anything from them. Eduardo was pretty sick, very weak." (Affidavit of
AvelinoCox Molina, Exhibit 2, paras. 10-11.)
After an informer pointed out that Cox worked forthe agrarian reforrn ministry
(MIDINRA) and had a pistol:
"3 contras came, aiming their heavy arms at my house, saying that if 1
didn't come out they would setmy house on fire. Since 1saw that the other
houses that had been pointed out were burning, 1was scared, but 1didn't
come out. A sister-in-law came out of her house and said 'my brother-in-
law isn't here'. But[the informer] said no, 1had come in a19 pm.
Faced with that, 1 had to come out, my hands in the air as they had
ordered. They shoved me and look me to a group they had kidnapped -
approximately 10or 15others, al1youths." (Id., paras. 12-13.]
The contrascame fourthes lookingfor Evaristo Waldan, whohad hid in a treetmnk. They finallycaught up with him there and. aimingtheir riflesat him,grabbed
him and tied him up. (AffidaMtof Evaristo WaldanChico. Exhibit 5,paras. 9-10,)
In other cases, the whole family was first takcn out of the house. Raul Davis,
21, was taken out with his father-in-law and al1of his father-in-law's children.
They were taken to where the conrras were holding a group of 200-300 people,
including children and older people. Davis was then ordered to join a smaller
group of youths who were being held on the baseball field. (Affidavit of Raul
Davis Arias, Exhihit 1, paras. 9-12,)
Thegroup of captives also included a 12-year-oldboy, Orlando Sosa (Affidavit
of Colombina Lacayo de Sosa, Exhibit 4, paras. 3 and 6; Affidavit of Rcmigio
Manzanares O'Meer, Exhihit 7, para. 16); the local doctor, Roberto Valle: the
administrator of the health center,Jorge Ibarra (Affidavit of Avelino CoxMolina,
Exhibit 2, para. 16; Affidavit of Evaristo Waldan Chico, Exhibit 5, para. 16);
and five women (Affidavit of Evaristo Waldan Chico, Exhibit 5, para. 16),
including Mercedes Thomas, a pregnant woman who was taken along with her
husband. (Affidavit of Laura Hammer. Exhihit 9. oara. 8.) In all. more than 35
pcoplc ue;e taken (.St.Allidlii,itoflivsrist<>~';ildÿn~hict,. I-xhihit 5p3r.t II ;
Ailidïiit oi 1-aihcr Antonio Sïndoval Ilcrrcra. lixhibil 13. para II j \Yhcn ihr
group was al1 together, one of the contras got on his walkie-talkie and said:
"We'vecaptured the population of Sumubila and we'retaking the people away."
(Affidavit of Avelino Cox Molina, Exhibit 2, para. 23 ; Affidavit of Raul Davis
Arias, Exhibit 1,para. 15.)
The contras commanded their captives, "March, civilian sons-of-bitches"
(Affidavit of Raul Davis Arias, Exhibit 1, para. 16; Affidavit of Avelino Cox
Molina, Exhibit 2, para. 23), and took the group off into the mountains. As
they went along, thc confrus ordered their captives. "Run you sons-of-bitches.
You're happy in your houses with your women and we're in the mountains
fighting for you, to Save you from communism". (Affidavit of Avelino Cox
Molina, Exhibit 2, para. 24.) When the wifeof one of the hound captives, whose
8-year-old child was also being taken captive, asked to have her hushand untied
so that he could walk better, a conrra replied, "Eat shit bitch, I'm not your
brothcr". (Id., para. 25.)
As the hostages were taken away by one contra group, another continued the
attack. They took the volunteer police station, killing one man, Maximo Cano,
and woundinganother. (Affidavit ofFrancisco Calix Romero, Exhibit 8, paras. 8-
10; Affidavit of Remigio Manzanares O'Meer, Exhibit 7, para. 16.) With the
heln of somecommunications comDanvworkers. the residents were able to retake
thLpolice station. (Affidavit of ~en&io Manzanares O'Meer, Exhibit 7,paras. 17-
19; Affidavit of Francisco Calix Romero. Exhihit 8, para. 9.) Then planes the
residents had reauested came from Puerto Cabezas and the contras set off back
into the hills. (Àtfidavits of Remigio Manzanares O'Meer, Exhibit 7, para. II ;
Francisco Calix Romero, Exhibit 8, para. 21; Silvestre Taylor Mendoza,
Exhibit II, para. 19.)
Among the dead werea 12-year-old boy (Affidavit of SilvestreTaylor Mendoza,
Exhibit II, para. 16) and a one-year-old child (Affidavit of Laura Hammer,
Exhibit 9, para. 6). As the health center had been destroyed, there was no
medicine with which to treat the wounded, who were al1 taken to the mining
town of Rosita. (Id.)
The flight of the planes also caused disarray in the contra group taking thc
hostages, allowing Raul Davis and Avelino Cox to escape. The contras fired at
them as they lied and thcn chased aftcr them, but they were able to make their
getaway. After spending the night in the hills, they made their way back to
Sumuhila. (Affidavit of Raul Davis Arias, Exhihit 1, paras. 24-37; Affidavit of RIPORT OP A FACT-PINDIN MGISSION 317
Avelino Cox Molina, Exhibit 2, paras. 31-34.)The crlnlrucontinued on with the
others, beating some of them (Affidavit of Evaristo Waldan Chico, Exhibit 5,
oara. 16) and warnine-them not to trv to escane..id.. .ara. 18). After about 10
da)\ Jorgc Ibarra and Roberto Valleucre ablc to ebidpe. as uas E\,arisio Waldlin
the fdlli>u,ingday. (Id.. paras. 23-J4Waldan spent IOdays ivalkingthrough th<
mouniaini heforc finding his uay back IO Suinabila (Id. par3 ?5 )
August 1981-November1984
The remote mountainous region of Bocana de Paiwas, in Central Zelaya -
the geographical center of Nicaragua - is divided into 33 small, isolated,
townships. With the exception of Paiwas, these townships are accessible onlyby
river or mountain path. There is no telephone system and no electricity. Lacking
adequate protection by the regular army, the villagers have been subject to a
series ofconrra attacks.
According to Father James Feltz, an Amencan, who is the area's parishpriest,
the conrras
"have tried to intimidate people who are working with the grassroots
organizations. The greater the individual's contribution to the community,
the more likely he or she will be singled out as a target by the FDN [the
Nicaraeuan Democratic Force. the main Honduras-based conrra groupl.
These Gciims hate includcd aduli edurati,>nworkers. wgar distribut~~rs ;inh
co<irdinatorsof siniperatives" (Aflidavit of Father Jameï Fclt~.Erhihit 1.
para. 3.)
The first major attack in this area occurred in August 1981.Four campesinos,
apparently singled out because they had joined a local militia unit, were
assassinated in the township of Santa Rosa. (Id., para. 4.)
On March 3, 1982, a conrra band surrounded and then entered the small
church in Copolar, where Father Robert Stark and Father Feltz were meeting
with thelocal pastoral leaders.After rounding up the participants and questioning
them individually about whether they had everparticipated in the local militias,
the leader warned everyone not to participate in the militia or education or
health care, and not to report the incident to the authorities. Then he announced
that his band had just shot someone on the road for encouraging people to
participate in health, education and self-defense.The priests set out in search of
the victim. Father Stark testified:
"Less than a kilometer from the chape1we found Emiliano [Perez's]body
face down . . .[H]e was still struggling to breathe despite the blood
beginning to hemorrhage from his mouth and nose. He had obviously been
shot in the chestlheart area at least twice with blood also coming from his
side and arm as well as the back of his head." (Affidavit ofFather Robert
Stark, Exhibit 2, paras. 12-13.)
According to Father Feltz, Perez,who died from the wounds,
"was one of the leading citizens of the community of Paiwas. Perez had
worked closely with the parish for many years, serving as a Delegate of the
Word [lay pastor] for the previous 12years. He was also a local judge and
a father of ten children. The conrra had long threatened to kill him . .
The murder . . . made it more difficult to recruit students for adult318 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITICS
education and volunteers for health brigades. The contra had expressly told
the people of Copolar that Emiliano's death should be taken as a waming
to anyone who participated in the grassroots organizations." (Affidavit of
Father James Feltz, Exhihit 1,paras. 5-6; seealso affidavitof Susana Castro,
widow of Perez, Exhibit 6.)
Other participants in local organizations received similar messages. Felipe
Oporta was coordinator of the Sandinista Defense Committee (the Sandinista
neighhorhood association) in El Jorgito and ran a store there selling sugar and
soap - two important products in rural areas. When a townsman was stopped
by the contras and identifiedhimselfas coming from El Jorgito, he was reportedly
questioned at length about Oporta - because he was on their list. "What did
he do?' "To whom did he seIlhis products?'The man was reportedly told that
they already had a lot of information on Oporta and would continue investigating
his behaviour. (Affidavit of Felipe Oporta Solano, Exhihit 7, para. 4.) Later,
Oporta's son-in-law, who also sold basic products, was murdered and his body
was found covered with bayonet wounds. (Id., paras. 5, 7.)
In August 1982,and again in January 1983,the coniras attacked the Flor de
Pifio Cooperative in Malacaguas. In the first attack, they hroke in, late at night,
to the home of Fausto Sanchez, the coordinator of adult education, killing him
and wounding his brother. In the second attack, they decimated the cooperative,
killing eight members and forcing the others to flee. (Afidavit of Father James
Feltz, Exhibit 1,para. 8.)
In late August 1983, a band said to he composed of 350 contras and 150
kidnapped civilians entered the Paiwas mountains and launched attacks on four
townships in the region: El Anito, El Guayabo, Las Minitas and Ocaguas.
In El Anito, the contras killed six unarmed civilians. After shelling the town,
they forced the villagers to go to the chapel and lie face down while their houses
were burned. Valentin Velasquezand Aristina Cerda, a married couple with 10
children, testified about the attack:
"[The contras arrived] at Our house. We were al1 on the Roor because
they had mortars and gunfire. They stayed about an hour in the house,
taking everything. When they finished that, they look us to the chapel along
with the other persons of the community. They raid they wanted to free the
people from communism and that they didn't like the Russians. They were
very proud of the arms that they received from Reagan, saying that the
arms that the Sandinistas had weren't good. They asked for gasoline and
burned down the houses. includine the ENABAS warehouse leovernmen.-
tenter for distribution of'basic products] which we ran.
They left us naked in the street . . They also killed six people from the
community : Felipe Amador, an outstanding 15-year-old who &vc classes;
Emilio Sotelo, an evangelist who was waiting for the boat; Tomas Mendez,
the CDS leader who also had a sugar store - they heat him, broke his head
and tortured him as an example to us; Roberto Mendez, Tomas's nephew;
Geronimo Espinoza. who committed the error of saying that the 'compas'
[Sandinistas] were good people and for this had his head cut oiT; and
Natividad Ojera, also beheaded.
In addition to the deaths, they left us to beg for food and clothing . . .
The destruction of the ENABAS store left many children suîïering from
malnutrition - about 2,000 people used the warehouse . . .
.. . And there is always the fear that they will return." (Affidavit of
Valentin Velasquezand Aristina Cerda, Exhibit 3.) REPORT OF A FACT-FINDING MISSION 319
Augustin Sequeira Rivas was the head of the local Sandinista Defense
Committee in El Anito. When he heard the conirasentering the town, firing and
shelling mortars, he fled and spent eight days in the mountains hefore arriving
in Bocana de Paiwas. When his wife and five children were able to join him,
they told him what had happened. (Affidavit of Augustin Sequeira Rivas,
Exhibit 5, paras. 1-5.)
According to his wife,the contrassurrounded, then entered, their house. After
interrogating his wife, they stole 15,000cordobas (about $500). food and medi-
cine, and then locked her up in a room while they ate and slept. The next
morning they let her out, told her that they had killed Augustin, look some
mules to ride and carry their supplies, and burned the house down. Like Valentin
Velazquez, and Aristina Cerda and Felipe Oporta, Sequeira and his family are
among the many people who have taken refuge in Bocana de Paiwas. (Id.,
paras. 6-9.)
Father Feltz visited El Anito and the other sites shortly after the attack. In El
Guayabo :
- n~ ~ ~eo~'ehad heen killed:
- a 14-year-old girlhad heen raped repeatedly and then decapitated;
- three women were forcedto lie in the mud while the conrraslook shots at
them, killing one and wounding another;
- a woman was raped ;
- IO-year-old Cristina Borge, who witnessed the killing of two uncles and
another woman, was used as target practice and received four hullet wounds
before being left for dead. Miraculously, she survived.
- Four houses were hurned.
(ARidavit of Father James Feltz, Exhihit 1, paras. 10-11.)
In Ocaguas, three campesinos had been killed. One wasstabbed to death afler
his eyeshad heen gougedout. Another was found hung from a heam in his own
house. (Id., para. 15.)
In Las Minitas. the conrrasburned six houses and killed two local leaders. A
Delegate of the Word (lay pastor) who escaped told Father Feltz that one conira
threatened to cul off his head so that they could dnnk his hlood, while another
suggested that they "hang him until his tangue sticks out Io punish him for not
telling us where his sons [militia memhers] are". (Id.,para. 16.)
After touring the area Father Feltz calculated that 20 civilianshad been killed,
2 women wounded, 3 women raped, 18 houses hurned Io the ground and 144
refueees forced to fleeto the town of Paiwas. (Id. vara. 17.)
. .
0; Chri,tmas c\,c. 1983. a band of 20 ;~~unterrevoluti'~~n~e ricsred the
comarra orCalderon. At about 4cini,ihc attacker\ surroundcd and rntsrcd the
houbeu,herc Juliu Ccsar Oriir, 19,Iivcd \i,ith hii uitc, t\v,childrcn and in-lass.
Thcy niddc Orti~Iicfdcc-d0u.non the noor and dcnianded ihai hc tell thcm hciw
many men ircre in the niilitia pi~rtand what kinJ ui xrms they had. H'hcn he
rcfuscd. the" made him and anothcr man acsomv~ns . .m to the pot. (Allida\,ii
of ~uis~rtiz Martinez, Exhihit 4, paras. 4-5.)
About IO0yards from the post, they made Ortiz and the other man lie face
down again while they unsuccessfullyattacked the post. Returning to where the
two lay, they said "Since we couldn't find your father [a miliciano],you're going
to pay" and shot Ortiz in the head, killing him. They also shot the other man in
the back of the neck and left him for dead, but he did not die. After leaving the
town, they killedJosefa Molinarez, theothcr man's wife.Like the others, Ortiz's
family are now refugees in Bocana de Paiwas. (Id., paras. 6-13.) They have no320 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
work. Ortiz's father said, "we receive food and clothes. The small children and
we are living hard times." (Id.,para. 14.)
The next major attack in the area took place in El Jorgito on May 13, 1984,
when a conlra band armed witb mortars, hand grenades and machine guns
surrounded and attacked a house where a group of unarmed civilian militia
members were having a party with their wives and children. According to
witnesses, the contrus lobbed hand grenade after hand grenade, 30 in al], killing
5 women, 9 children and 20 adult men. Some bad their throats slit or faces
peeled. (Affidavit of Father James Feltz, Exhibit 1, paras. 18-24.)
On about Octoher 15, 1984, the conrras attacked two cooperatives in the
township of La Paila. In one, they killed Iwo elderly men and a child, and
seriously wounded one woman. They burned three houses and forced 48 people
to Ree. In their attack on the second cooperative, they were repulsed. (Sup-
plemental Affidavitof Father James Feltz, Exhibit 1, paras. 2-5.)
In Septemberand Novemher. 1984,the contras stole about 1,500head of cattle
in the region, including some800 from Iwo state hrms in El Toro. (Id., para. 8.)
July 1982-June1983
The "beak of Jalapa" is an area of Nicaragua that juts into and is surrounded
on three sides by Honduras. Only an old dirt road connects its rich plains with
the rest of Nicaragua.
Because of its geographical situation, this rural area appears easy to isolate.
One captured contra leader, Pedro Javier Nunez Cabezas, "El Muerto", of the
FDN, said,
"[Our] principal objective was the zone of Jalapa, to declare il a liherated
zone and install a provisional government and ask for military aid from
friendly governments such as the United States, Honduras and Argentina."
(T. Cabestero, "Dieron la Vida por su Pueblo", El Tayacan, 1984,p. 8.)
Before July 1982, the region consisted of 120 villages scattered through the
mountains and valleys.The town of Jalapa had a population of roughly 9,000,
one-fourth of the over-al1 population of the region. (Affidavit of Sister Lisa
Fitzgerald, Exhibit 5, para. 4.)
According to Sister Lisa Fitzgerald, an American nun, who worked in Jalapa,
in July 1982:
"[llncursions by 'conrra'bands from Honduras began to make trips into
the mountain areas very dangerous. We could no longer travel without an
armed escort. After August of that year, travel was made impossible.Several
months later, al1of us, each nun and priest working in lalapa, were named
on the 'conrra'radio station and threatened if we continued to participate
in the national literacy program." (Id., para6.)
Thercaftcr. aitacks cime uith increaring frcqucncy. Baed on incidents she
and ihe oihcr nuns and prie.[<in Jalapa had uiinersed ihemsel\,csor could \.eriiy
b, sne~kinr uith survii,ors ihev kneu wrsonltllv. Sihier I,isa icrrif10dsomc 01'
the éventsyna Iwo-month per;od in 1982:
"September 22. A veterinarian and accountant, both employees of the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform, were amhusbed near Santa Clara at 5pm in
the afternoon on the road between Jalapa and Ocotal. 'Contra' forces cut REPORT OP A FA^-PINDING MISSION 321
their throats.A second vehicle wasamhushed minutes later. Five farm
workers were wounded. All seven were unarmed.
October 8. Two small store owners were killed in San Jose. The samc
group of 'conrra'forces cut off the arm of Angel Valcnzuela,a tractor driver
in San José,when herefused to surrender his tractor to them. All three were
unarmed.
October 15.Cruz Urrutia, a farmer in Siuce,was dragged from his home
and his body found a day later, tortured, mutilated and his throat cut. He
had been the community's Delegateof the Word, their health worker, and
promoter of adult education. His family identifiedthe 'conrra'band who
took him.
October 28. Lconilo Marin, a worker, was kidnapped by 'contra'forces
and found later the same day, his throat eut, near his home in German
Pomares.
November 15. Celso Meiia, Mauro Meiia, lsidro Meiia and Mateo
Calderon, al1 farmers, were iortured, shot id their headsblown off hy a
grenade in front of their cntire community of La Ceiha which wasforceably
assemhled by a group of 'conrras'.
Novemher 19. Pedro Carazo, Delegate of the Word for hiscommunity,
was taken from his home in San Pablo by a group made up of 'conrra'
forces. His body was found a day later on the path towards Jalapa on the
outskirts of San Pahlo; his throat wascut and the body half-eaten by dogs."
(Fact Sheet Attached to Affidavit of Sister Lisa Fitzgerald, p; see alsoLa
Estancia chapter.)
During the last two months of 1982, "roughly 400 persons (men, women and
children) were forcibly taken Io Honduras from the communities of La Ceiba,
San Pablo, Las Filas, Zacateras, Terredios, Marcalali, Ojo de Agua and Las
Pampas". (Id., p. 2.)
Asa result oftheseattacksand raids, "[nlearly al1ofthe mountain communities
on the western side of [the]. . region were abandoned by the campesinos, most
of whom fled into the town of Jalapa". (Affidavit of Sistcr Lisa Fitzgerald,
Exhibit 5, para. 7.) By June 1983,the cxodus swelled the population of Jalapa
from 9,000 to approximately 20,000 as the number of communities in the area
shrunk from 120to fewer than 30. (Id., para. 8.)
Sister Lisa and the other members of the pastoral team in Jalapa kcpt a
journal of conrru attacks they witnessed or could verify during the first six
months of 1983.She summarized itscontents:
"Three of the largest tobacco farms were totally destroyed. Others were
partially destroyed by mortar rounds or arson. On two different occasions
in April and May I was visitingfamiliesof tobacco workcrs at famis whcn
shelling hcgan. On a third occasion (April 8),1 was visiting the hospital in
Jalapa when two women and three children wcre rushed in by jeep; they
were the family of a tobacco worker at El Pomenir .. .Their homes had
been mortared two hours earlier. All fivewere filledwith shrapnel, particu-
larly the backs of the women who had knelt over the children to protect
them. The skull and chest of the one-year-old bahy were dotted by shell
fragments which 1and another sister picked out by hand.
There were 337 abductions from mountain communities or as a result of
road ambushes. Of these. 37 DCISonS esca~ed. 1 interviewcd five of them:
al1were forced to carry equipment for the .'contras'Thcy reported some of
their friends were shot immediately alter they were abducted and others
were taken to Honduras322 MILiiARY AND PARAMILITARYACiIVITISS
Ambushes on the road to Ocotal increased in number and frequency. On
severaloccasions,al1the passengersfrom the ambushed buses wereabducted.
In May a group of journalists were ambushed on this road. Since the
hospital was over-crowded, we treated the lightly wounded in our home.
Four were Americans. Several were European. One Nicaraguan journalist
was severelywounded. The attack was by mortar from both sides of the
road and took place without warning two miles from the center of town."
(Id.; seealsoNamasli chapter.)
The town of Teotecacinte, population 2,500-3,000,sits on the northern edge
of the Jalapa valley, a half mile from the mountains of Honduras. There, from
May 22-25 and June 5-22, 1983,the coniras, shelling the town from two sides,
staged an intense attack.
The coniras were able to take and temporarily hold the border post of
Munipuchi and the small border town of El Porvenir and from there "they fired
al1 day, every day" on Teotecacinte. (Affidavit of WenceslaoUbeda Rivera,
Exhibit 4, para. 5.)
"They attacked with heavy artillery, mortars of 81, 106 and 120 [mili-
meters]. We calculate that there were about 1,000[attackers] . . they fired
about 100 mortars each day." (Affidavit of Antonio Valladares Duarte,
Exhibit 1, para. 6.)
The town was defended by the resident civiliandefense force of 74 plus the 25
army border guards until an irregular fighting batallion could be called up. (Id.,
paras. 5 and 8.)
During the battle, those who stayed in "Teote" and were not fighting spent
their days and nights in the bomb shelters, while food was shuttled in from
Jalapa. (Id., para. 9.)
Carmen Gutierrez, mother of fiveincluding4-year-old Suyapa, who was killed
on June 9, testified as to the events of that day:
"[The day] began calmly. They had been mortaring for about eight days
in a row, but it seemedlike nothing was going to happen. At around II am,
the girl was playing in the patio. Wewereconfident and let her play becduse
they had spent so many days in the bomb shelter.
Al1of a sudden, mortars started falling nearby, shaking Our wooden, tile
roofed, house. One mortar fell near where she was playing . . .Another
completely destroyedthe latrine. When 1 heard them, 1said to my mother
'gather up the little ones, they'remortaring'. She ran with them to the shelter
which was a few meters from the house. When we were al1 in the [bomb]
shelter, my mother asked if any of the children were missing, so we called
them by their names. Only Suyapa was missing. 1 went out . . .Then 1
rememberedthat 1had seen her playing witha hen. 1went there and saw her
dead. Her face was blown away but 1 didn't realize it, 1 didn't even notice
the mortaring. 1 picked her up and ran away like mdd. Then 1realized that
part of her Pacewas missing.1went back Io look and found the pieceof her
face." (Afidavit of Carmen Gutierrez Castro, Exhibit 2, paras. 3-4.)
Loencia Corea Canelo, who had moved withher husband and seven children
to Teotecacinte in 1983 when the contrasattacked their farm in Guanzapo, also
lost a daughter to the mortars:
"1 was making tortillas with my 8-year-old daughter, Concepcion Ubeda
. . .to send to [the other children] who were in the shelter. When 1heard
the mortaring, 1took her by the rubber tree and huddled with her. REPORT OP A PACT-FINDING MISSION 323
A mortar fell behind the ceibo trees . .. and knocked the rubber tree
down on the child." (Affidavit of Leoncia Corea Canelo, Exhibit 3,
paras. 3-5.)
The child never recovered.
"After three days, she douhled up on the floor . . .1 took her 10 the
command post but she died . . [that day] she was bleeding from the mouth,
the nose, the ears." (Id., para. 4.)
As the seige continued, the people of Teotecacinte fled to Jalapa. Numerous
houses were destroyed and many still remain pock-marked with grapefruit-sized
holes. By June 15, the entire population, with the exception of about 60 fami-
lies, had fled to Jalapa. (Journal attached to Affidavit of Sister Lisa Fitzgerald,
Exhibit 5, p. 2.)
9. OCOTAL
June 1, 1984
Located near the Honduran border, Ocotal is the provincial capital of Nueva
Segovia and, with a population of approximately 21,000, the larges1 city in
. . ~~
n6thern Nicaragua.
On June 1, 1984, between 4.15 and 4.30am, conira forces operating out of
Honduras began an assault on the city. The Nicaraguan government has
estimated that the force was made up of 500-600,coniras divided into different
commando units, some of them with special training. They were heavily armed
with automatic rifles, mortars, rockets and incendiary materials.
The following description of the attack on Ocotal is based not only on the
affidavits of several of the residents of Ocotal who were victims and witnesses,
but 2150 on thc allidavits of Amcriclin mçmberr of Witnesl for PSJLT. 3 Lis-
based Chrisiran Face org3nization which maintains a pcrrnancni prcscnic in ihc
conflict Iones oi Nicaracua. Sevcritl memhers or Wiincrs for Pc3i.rwho uerc in
Jalapa at the time of tris attack went to Ocotal immediately after the attack,
and, along with some American Catholic nuns living in Ocotal, interviewed
victims and prepared their own report. Their findings are contained in the
affidavits of Witness for Peace members Sharon Hostetler and Peter Olson,
Exhibits 1 and 2 hereto, and in the "Fact Sheet" attached to Peter Olson's
affidavit.
One of the points of entry into Ocotal was Barrio Sandino, on the road to
Jalapa. Maria de los Angeles Montalvan, who lived in Barno Sandino, was
awakened by the firing at 4 am. Then mortars began 10 fall. As she cradled her
seven-month-old boy, Ezekial de Jesus, in her bed, a bullet ripped through the
wall of their wooden shack, shot into her nght ankle, exited further up her leg
and then entered the baby's leg and lodged in his hip. (Affidavit of Maria de los
Angeles Montalvan, Exhibit 5, paras. 2-4.) Because of the attack they could no1
be evacuated for one-and-a-half hours and, when they were, the truck taking
them to the hospital was fired upon, as was the hospital. (Id., paras. 6-9.) She
was hospitalized in La Trinidad for 43 days, and was only able to walk on
Octoher 11, with crutches. (Id., paras. 15-17,) Her son had to be taken to a
hospital in Managua where the doctors were finally able to extract the bullet.
Ezekial was left with a 5-inch scar. (Id., paras. 11-14:)
Juana Maria Carcamos also lives in Barrio Sandino. A mortar exploded in324 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
her backyard, destroying the outhouse, killing chickens and felling a tree. Three
pieces of shrapnel from the blasl lodged in her hack. Thus Carthe doctors have
been unable to extract the shrapnel. (Affidavit of Juana Maria Carcamos,
Exhihit 3.)
Once inside the town, the conrra forces set about destroying its key civilian
and economic installations.
The stÿte-owned lumber mil1and processing plant in Barrio Sandino, which
produced an estimated 14,000 feet of processed wood daily, was attacked with
machine guns, mortars and grenades. Incendiary bomhs were then used to set
fire and destroy a plane, the saw and conveyor belt, the forklift, the lathe, and
the mechanic shop including a small truck, a pick-up truck, two caterpillar
tractor motors, one tractor, the electrical system, the welding apparatus and the
stock of tools. The total economic damage was estimated at hetween 10and 15
million cordobas and an estimated 250 persons were left jobless. (Fact Sheet
attached to Affidavit of Peter Olson, Exhihit 2.)
Two days later the remains of the miIl were still smoldering and hundreds of
bullet jackets were found among the remains. (Id.)
At about the same time, administrative offices and a generator of INE, the
state-run electricity Company, were attacked hy a conrra force using heavy
artillery. The offices were destroyed but the generator was not. (Id., and
photographs 1-3attached to Affidavit of Sharon Hostetler, Exhibit 1.)
At 4.45am the contras entered the Pedro Altamirano coKee drying and
processing plant across from the INE, using mortars and heavy-gun fire.
According to a report given by the security guard at the plant, his work partner,
"Eusehio Quadra, 55-year old, was attacked by gun fireas he ran towards
the office buildine. He exited from the hack of the office but died almost
immcdiaicly. ~cïefi a prcgnani wife and eight rhildren ;is u,clli~joiher
dcpndcnis 'Theothcr accuriiy guard uas lnjured bui sun,ii,ed " (1-as1Sheet
atiaihed to Ailidavit of Pelcr Olson. lirhibii 2J
The contras completely destroyed the office building, the machinery, nearly
two tons of coffee and a part of the cement court used for drying coffee. (Id.,
and photographs 4-7. attached to Affidavit of Sharon Hostetler, Exhibit 1.)
At about 4.30 am, the contrasattacked the officeshousing Radio Segovia, the
Sandinista Youth and the local Sandinista Defense Committee (CDS) in a
residential area near Ocotal's central plaza.
Genaro Paguaga Reyes, a watchman on duty at the radio, was about 25 meters
from the officeswhen he heard shooting. He ran towards the radio where he saw
about 25 armed, hlue-uniformed FDN men in front of the offices. I:our of the
men turned at him and started firing, yelling "Long live the FDN". Paguaga
was able 10 dive into a nearhy discotheque and make his getaway later in the
ensuing crossfire.(Affidavii of Genaro Paguaga Reyes, Exhibit 7.)
Ramon Gutierrez was already in the broadcast booth with his colleague
Edmundo when they heard firing first in the streets and then in the adjacent
offices.While the other radio employees were able to flee through the rear, they
stayed in the booth, unseen by the contras, while the intruders set fire to the
building. Whcn the cabin itself caught fire, Gutierrez and Edmundo were forced
to evacuate it but were able to leave without being seen. (Affidavit of Ramon
Gutierrez, Exhibit 6.)
When ihe contras had retreated, the radio installations had heen destroyed,
including microphones, tape recorders and typewriters. (Affidavit of Genaro
Paguaga Reyes, Exhibit 7, para. 7.) Workers returning to the smoldering radio
station also found the burned and mutilated bodies of 19-year-oldJuan Carlos REPORT OP A I:ACT-FINDING MISSION 325
Mendoza of the Sandinista Youth and Julio Tercero of the CDS, whose body
had its entrails and liver cut out.(Id.,para. 8.)
Osmar Amaya, a dental technician whose home and office face the radio
station, was four blocks away when he heard the shooting. Racing home, he saw
that the station was in Ramesand the contras were movingin. As he climbed up
to enter his house, the contrus fired on him. A bullet entered througb his back
and went out his thorax, hreaking four ribs and entering his lung. He lay by his
door unconscious for almost two hours until neighbors could evacuate him to
the hospital. He was then taken to the hospital in La Trinidad where he spent
one month. He still has shrapnel in his forehead wbich the doctors were unable
to remove. (Aîlidavit of Osmar Amaya Morales, Exhibit 8.)
The contras also attacked six grain storage silos on the outskirts of town.
These silos were the principal storage sites for the department of Nueva Segovia
and contained nearly 1,500tons of rice, beans, corn and sorghum.
The members of Witness for Peace who visited the affected sites in the days
following the attack, made the following report on the granas., based on their
interviews with eyewitnessesand an on-site inspection:
"A conrru force entered the granary at about 4.30am. They sbot one of
the watcbmen on duty, and then launched a fierce attack on the silos and
installations. After al1 six silos were destroved thev set fire to the-grains.
The \duc uf ihc deitro!ed silos. augerr and iiini,eyors uüs approximately
onc-;ind-2-h~lrr>iillior..>rdi~bds.ruin. ihai ucrr I,hi.corn b.Y.50qiiint;slcs:
hesns 1.65U q~iniales, ricc 2.475 ~uinial:s: burghum. 3-3 quinialci. ,\ls<i
l~~t were 150 ouintales of oowdeked milk. and small amounts of soao.
cooking oil and'salt. ~ccordin~ to CEPAD [~van~elicalCommittee for c id
and Development], at least 10 houses in the surrounding harrio were
seriouslv affectedbv the attack." (Fact Sheet atlached to Affidavit of Peter
Olson, Éxhibit 2; See ais» photoiraph 8, attached to Affidavit of Sharon
Hostetler, Exhibit 1.)
The religious team also reported these other incidents:
"Marvin José Lopez, the director of IRENA (Ministry of Natural
Resources), was shot hy confru forceswhile driving through the town in the
early morning to pick up workers who were going to plant trees in the
reforestation project. The contras fired at the truck, killing Lopez and
shatterine the elass and tires. The three woman workers in the back of the
truck surv~vcdihe rtr;ick. susiaining rnirior;ihr:isitinj JO>?Lope/ Icli hchind
ü uiie and thrcc yi>ungihildrcn.
At the orticcsof IKKA (.\linisiry of Arrariaii Keigirm)tuo ir~cks wcrc
completely destroyed by bullets and shrapnel.
According to a nurse who was on duty at the Ocotal hospital during the
attack, the coiifras fired at the hospital and several bullets entered the
nursery and women's ward. This report was verified by a patient in the
women's ward. Pictures were taken of the bullet holes in the windows and
door. No one was wounded." (Fact Sheet attached to Affidavit of Peter
Olson, Exhibit 2.)
Before leaving Ocotal, the contras left hehind "Freedom Fighter's Manuals",
subtitled "A practical guide to CreeNicaragua from oppression and misery by
paralyzing the military industrial complex of the traitorous and sell-out Marxist
state without using specialtools and with a minimum of risk for the combdtant."326 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
(Affidavit of PeterOlson, Exhibit 2, para. 13and Exhibit B.) The comic book-
style manual, which US intelligencesources and the FDN have identified as
p;oduced bythe CIA, gives suggestions on ways in which people can sabotage
the Nicaraguan economy, such as by leaving lightsand faucets on, makingphony
reservations. breakina windows, cuttina wiresand sabotagina roads and vehicles.
Instructions are pro;ided on how t~-~uncture tires, cÜt eïectrical wires, plug
toilets and destroy roads. ("CIA Linked to Comic Book for Nicaragua", New
YorkTimes, Oct. 19, 1984, p.A-8.)
Another pamphlet was left showing pictures of FDN leaders and urging the
people to join them. (Affidavit of Reyna Isabel Umanzor, Exhibit 4, para. 5.)
The attack lasted several hours, trapping most residents in their homes. When
the conrros finally retreated, at about 10am, seven civilians had been killed and
many more wounded. (Fact Sheetattached 10Affidavitof Peter Olson, Exhibit 2.)
10. RANCH0 GRANDE
March 25, 1983
Dr. Pierre Grosjean, a French physician, came 10 Nicaragua in August 1982
as part of a cooperation agreement between a French medical school and the
medical school in Leon, Nicaragua. His participation was financed by the French
Foreign Ministry. (Affidavit of Zino Bisoffi, Exhihit 2, incorporating "Pierre
Grosjean Medicin au Nicaragua" [Bisoffi,"Grosjean"], p. 22.)
After teaching a course in tropical medicine in Leon, studying malaria among
workers and miners, and conducting an evaluation of the tuberculosisvaccination
program in Chinandega, Dr. Grosjean went to the Matagalpa region to study
lesmianosis, or mountain leprosy, a discose endemic to the colTeepickers of the
zone. (Id., p. 19.)
On March 24, 1983, Dr. Grosjean arrived in Rancho Grande, a small town
on the road between Matagalpa and Waslala, to begin his research along with
William Morales and ldalia Castro, microbiologists from the University ofLeon,
Maria Felisa de Solan, a French-Argentine docior in charge of epidemiology for
the Matagÿlpa-Jinotega region, and Zino Bisoffi,an ltalian doctor. (Affidavit of
Maria Felisa de Solan, Exhibit 1, para. 3.)
On the morning of March 25, the doctors
"were already awake but on Our matresses when at 5.30am we began to
hear shots and shoutine like militarv orders. Later. the oeode told us that
the contrashad entered; yelling 'Geiout, we're to buri the town' but
1didn't hear that." (Id., para. 6.)
The doctors dressed hurriedly in tbeir wooden house in the local officeof the
national coiïeeCompany,and layon the iloor. (Id., para. 3.) Dr. Solan remembers
that when the attack was at the heaviest,
"Pierre [Dr. Grosjean] said to me 'You assured me that we would be out
of danger here'. It's true that 1told him tha- that in Rancho Grande we
would be as safe as in Matagalpa, because that's what 1 believed." (Id,
para. 9.)
According to Dr. Bisoffi:
"At about twenty to six we heard a very, very loud noise, like a bomb
which shook the whole house. When it was over - il only lasted an REPORT OF A FACT-PINDING MISSION 327
instant- 1eot uo to see the others. to soeak with them a little. to see whdt
had happcnc~d ~;>rtui, or three minui& we didn'i rcîlirc thai Picrrî had
been hi1 hy cibullci : hc reii~hinedlying ihere, hr'didn'i hudge; ue thought
IIu,as ior slifclv reasons. ihai he uas îfraid After rhree minute-. Idalla sliw
blood, and we>umped to see what was wrong. We look his puise, and we
could still feel it, but it was very weak and it soon stopped." (Bisoffi,
"Grosjean", Exhihit 2, p. 3.)
Dr. Grosjean was not the only casualty of the attack. When the firing stopped
at about 7.30 or 8, the doctors went out and saw that much of the town, totally
built out of wood, had been destroyed and that four others had died, including
the leader of the local chapter of the national women's organization. Seventeen
people were injured including seven childrenand four women. One of the children
had IO have his leg amputated. (Id., and Affidavit of Maria Luisa de Solan,
Exhibit 1, paras. 14and 18.)
The doctors set up a makeshift hospital in the local store, a building which
offered some securitv. and gave first aid with the little medicine thev had broueht
or round-on hand. (ji para. 16.)An hour later, an army battalion arrived from
Waslala - too late. The soldiers carried the wounded OR to Waslala and
Mataealoa. Then heliconters arrived to take Dr. Grosiean's bodv and the most
se"o&l; wounded 10 ~Anagua. (Id.,para. 17.)
Dr. Bisoffiremembers:
"Although [the townspeople] had their dead and wounded, they were
extrernelvsad over Pierre's death. it was incredible. We wereal1wellknown.
Pierre particularly. . they were al1sorry, everyone in the village came to
console us, while theyad their own dead and their own wounded." (Bisoffi,
"Grosjean", ExhibitZ, p. 6.)
11. EL COCO
December 18, 1983
One of the first resettlement cooperatives established in Nicaragua was the
Augusto Cesar Sandino cooperative, known to most people as "El Coco",
along the upper Rio Coco about 13 miles south of Quilali in the province of
Nueva Segovia.
El Coco was founded in 1980 on land formerly owned by General Anastasio
Somoza. (Affidavit of Carmela Gutierrez, Exhibit 1, para. 3; Affidavit of
Wenceslao Peralta Herrera, Exhihit 2, para. 3.) Its 680 acres, in a fertile valley,
were well suited for the growing of basic products - corn and beans - and
provided good land for the formerly landless peasants of the area. (Affidavit of
Carmela Gutierrez, Exhibit 1, paras. 2 and 4; Affidavit of Wenceslao Peralta
Herrera, Exhibit 2, paras. Z and 4.) The houses of the cooperative were built
with roofs donated by the Bishop of Esteli. (Affidavit of Carmeld Gutierrez,
Exhibit 1, para. 6; Affidavit of Wenceslao Peralta Herrera, Exhihit 2, para. 6.)
After the cooperative received legal status in 1982,the rnajority of the people
who came to live there were refugees from conira attacks further north, by the
Honduran border. (Affidavit of Carmelo Gutierrez, Exhibit 1,para. 5; Affidavit
of Wenceslao Peralta Herrera, Exhibit 2, para. 5.)
Throughout December 1983,the residents "knew that the c<~niruswere in the328 MII.ITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTlVlTlllS
zone. They had a permanent presence and we didn't feel at ease." (Affidavit of
Carmela Gutierrez, Exhibit 1, para. 7; Affidavit of WenceslaoPeralta Herrera,
Exhibit 2, para. 7.)
At 9.30am on December 19. the contrascrossed a sorehum field and beean
attacking the cooperative. (~ffidavit of Carmela GutierrG, Exhibit 1, para_8;
Affidavitof WenceslaoPeralta Herrera, Exhibit 2, para. 8.)
Carmela Gutierrez, the bead of the local women's organization, was in her
house preparing food when the attack came. She picked up her rifle and went to
the trenches that had been prepared by the membersof the cooperative to protect
themselves against such attacks. (Affidavit of Carmela Gutierrez, Exhibit 1,
para. 9.) Her husband, Wenceslao, didthe same. (Affidavit of WenceslaoPeralta
Herrera, Exhibit 2, para. 9.) The children of the cooperative, together with many
of the women, ran Io the bomb shelters where more than 100of them huddled.
(Affidavit of Carmela Gutierrez, Exhibit 1, para. 10: Affidavit of Wenceslao
Peralta Herrera, Exhibit 2, para. 9.)
The contras, mortaring from a nearhy bill, surrounded the cooperative on
three sides. (Affidavit of Carmela Gutierrez, Exhibit 1, para. II; Affidavit of
WenceslaoPeralta Herrera, Exhibit 2, para. 10.)Carmela Gutierrez testified:
"The mortars flewas if they were Stones.They began to infiltrate into the
cooperative shouting for us to give up, saying that they were going to eat
us alive." (Affidavit of Carmela Gutierrez, Exhibit 1, para. 12.)
After local resistance by civilian defenders was overcome, and those in the
shelters Red, the conrrus entered the cooperative and killed 14 people. One
eyewitness, the evangelist Arturo Marin, told Carmela Gutierrez that Juana
Maria Santos Ramirez, age 15, was raped as was Maria Cristina Espinoza, age
16 or 17. (Affidavit of Carmela Gutierrez, Exhibit 1, para. 14.) This was
confirmed by a captured contra leader. (Affidavit of WenceslaoPeralta Herrera,
Exhibit 2, para. 14.)The evangelist Marin also reported that an elderly woman,
Julia Sanchez Hernandez, and Marco Antonio Mendieta, a doctor from Leon,
were literallycul to pieces.(Affidavit ofCarmela Gutierrez, Exhibit 1, para. 14.)
Two girls, Petronila Ramirez Zavala, 12,and Juana Francisca Ramirez, who
were hiding under their bed, were shot when the cunrras entered their house.
(Atiidavit of Wenceslao Peralta Herrera, Exhibit 2, paras. 12 and 13.) Their
grandmother was shot in the arm but survived. Altogether, six people from the
Ramirez family died.(Id., para. 13.)Aurelio Espinoza Sanchez,60, hiswifeJulia,
and their two sons were also killed. (Id., para. 19.)
When the survivorsreturned, they found that the cooperative had been totally
destroyed, including the food warehouses, the machinery and the tractors.
(Affidavit of Carmela Gutierrez, Exhibit 1, para. 17; Affidavit of Wenceslao
Peralta Herrera, Exhibit 2, para. 15.) In addition, each of the 12 abandoned
bomb shelters had been mortared and destroyed. (Affidavit ofCarmela Gutierrez,
Exhibit 1, para. 18.)
After the attack, the families look refuge in Quilali, in the school and the
Baptisi church. Others live in nearby San Bartolo, where they have been given
some land. (Affidavit of Carmela Gutierrez, Exhibit 1, para. 19; Affidavit of
Wenceslao Peralta Herrera, Exhibit 2, para. 18.)
The attack on El Coco is also reported in the Arlunra Consrirurion,April 18,
1984, p. IA (Nesmith, "Conrras Bring Terror to Valley inNicaragua"). This
report, based on interviews with survivors, recounts in detail the killing. rape
and mutilation of civilians and destruction of the cooperative decribed above. It
also reports that oficials of the FDN "acknowledged that their men attacked
and destroyed the cooperative". (Id.,p. 38A.) REPORT OF A l'ACT-FINDINGMISSION
October 1982-October1984
The northern region of El Jicaro-Murra, covering three towns and hundreds
of small mountain communities, has been the scene of numerous conrru attacks
since 1982.
"The results of these attacks," says Father Evaristo Bertrand, an American
parish pries1 in the region, "have been hundreds of deaths and thousands of
displaced people, including those who were taken off to Honduras as well as
those who were forced to move to larger or safer places because of attacks or
the danger of attacks." (Affidavit of Father Evaristo Bertrand, Exhibit 2,
para. 34.)
One of these incidents occurred on October 28, 1982, whenfive armed men
dressed in blue FDN uniforms hroke down the door of the house where Maria
Bustillo, 57,was livingwith her husband, Ricardo, a Delegateof the Word, and
fiveof their children. (Affidavit of Maria Bustillo Viuda de Blandon, Exhibit 3,
paras. 3-5.)The intruders ordered everyone to the floor, face down, and warned
that whoever moved would he killed. After striking Ricardo and kicking the
children, they tied them up two by two and led them away, telling Maria,
"Cÿreful you old bitch, you're goingto find out tomorrow". (Id., paras. 6-11.)
When Maria went out the next morning to look for her family, she found her
five children dead, about 50 yards from the house. "They were left al1cut up.
Their ears were pulled off, their throats were cut, their noses and other parts
were cut off." (Id, para. 14.)Her husband Ricardo was found dead in a nearby
town along with another man, Raul Moreno. "They werealso left broken up.
He had false teeth and they took them, his arms were broken and his bands
were cut up." (Id., para. 16.)
After the massacre, Maria look refuge in El Jicaro. (Id.)
The town of El Jicaro itself was attacked twice, on April 21, 1983 and
August 24, 1983.During the first attack, the contrasfired 87 mortars but were
unable to penetrate the town, though one farmer had his throat slit, others were
wounded and one man was kidnapped. (Afidavit of Father Evaristo Berlrand,
Exhibit 1, paras. 6-12.) The attack occurred while mass was being held in the
church. and many town residents spentthe night there. (1d.J
The second attack on El Jicaro began at 5.15am with mortar fire.One resident,
Marco Sevilla,a father of eight, upon hearing the firing, tried to leave his house
to help in the town's defense, but his îamily would not let himgo. Telling them
that he would not let thecontras kill him disgracefullyin hishouse unarmed, he
went out the back way toward the command post to get his gun. (Affidavit of
Aracelis Torres Aguilar, Exhihit 4, paras.6-7. Before he could gel Carfrom the
house, however, the contruscaught him and cut his throat with a bayonet. (Id.,
paras. 9-10.) One other man, Chilo Toruno, from Jalapa, was killed. (Afidavit
of Father Evaristo Bertrand, Exhibit 2, paras. 14-19.)
Straddling the intersection where the main Segovias road from Ocotal and
Santa Clara to Quilali forks oiTto El Jicaro is the town of Susucayan. In the
early morning of October 11, 1984,the contras attacked the town with mortars,
machine guns and rifle fire. (Afidavit of Lucio Rodriguez Gradis, Exhibit 3,
in Telpanaca Chapter, para. 35; Affidavit of Emelina del Carmen Merlo,
Exhibii 8, para. 3.)
Emelina del Carmen Merlo, a health worker, hid in her houx. When the
attack died down at about 6.40am, she tried to get to the health center to attend
any dead or wounded but the firingbegan again and she look refuge in a private REPORT OF A FACT-FINDING MISSION 331
cooperatives("asentamientos") around El Jicaro, where they weregivenland and
fieldsto plant. One of thesewoperatives, LasDantas, wasitselfrepeatedlyattacked
in the firstpart of 1984,however.(Affidavitof Father EvaristoBertrand, Exhibit2,
para. 24; Affidavit of Mana Soza Valladares,Exhibit 14, para. 2: Affidavit of
Aurelia Ortiz Chavarria, Exhihit 15, para. 2; Affidavitof Josélnez Castellano,
Exhihit 17,para. 2; Affidavitof PresentacionPicardo Garcia, Exhibit 1,para. 2.)
Most of the families were therefore forced to move again, Io the Santa Julia
cooperative, justoutside the community ofSan Gregorio.
On Octoher 29, 1984,the refugeeswereattacked yet again. In an early morning
attack on the Santa Julia cooperative, the contras launched a mortar which
landed in the cooperative's headquartcrs where three familieswere living.Maria
Soza Valladares was sickin bed, but al1her children were in the middle of the
room "as if they werewaiting for the mortar" - whiçh killed Martha Azucena,
Il-years old, Carmelita Azucena, 5, and Ronald Miguel, 3.Another child, Alexis,
8, was severely injured and died on the way to the hospital. (Affidavit of Maria
Soza Valladares, Exhibit 14, paras. 9-16.) Maria Soza, herself injured, tried to
rescue her dead and dying childrcn, but it was too late. Her daughter Maria, 6,
covered with hlood, walked al1 the way to the health center in San Gregorio
through the ensuing crosstire, despite the wounds she had al1over her body.
Eventually, she and her mother spent almost a month in the hospital, where she
was operated on twice. (Id., paras. 11-12, 17.)
Aurelia Ortiz, eight-months pregnant, was also in the room with her children
when the mortar exploded, killing Jose Rodolfo, 5, and Maura de Jesus, 7.
(Affidavit ofAurelia Ortiz Chavarria, Exhibit 15, para. 5.) A month later, she
gave birth to a still-born child. (Id., para. 7.) Not including the stillhorn, six
small children died from the mortar.
Kidnappings continue Io oicur Crequenily.1-aiher Btrirand testiticd thai il
uould th .impos\ihle" io kccp traik ol'a11ol'them. (Alfidavii ofFdther I'\,ari,ii>
Bertrand, Exhibit 2, para. 34.)
"The people in my area are now accustomed to the war. Theyare cautious
as night cornes on and as dawn breaks, but they have learned to live with
it. They participate in their own defense because they know its not play. As
a rule, we don't go from town at night." (Id.,paras. 35-36.)
13. JACINTO HERNANDEZ CWPERATIVE
Decemher 16, 1983
On Decemher 16, 1983, at 4.45am, the conrras launched an attack on the
cooperative Jacinto Hernandez in El Cedro, hetween San Josédel Bocayand El
Cua in Northern Jinotega. The cooperative was just getting undenvay, on land
that had been abandoned. It had over 100people, but wasstillmostly pasturcland
and cows. (Affidavit of Maria Aneela Diaz Monteneero. Exhibit 1.oaras. 9-10.)
When thèattack came, ~n&akiaz ~ontcne~rowas'at home $th her eighi
children. Some months earlier she and her family had corne to the coo~erative,
abandoning the 17 acres of land they had bought, because of constani threats
against her hushand, a local civilian leader, and fear for the safety of her young
children. (Id., paras. 4-8.) Angela's 16-year-old daughter and 13-year old son
grabhed guns to try to repel the attackers whileAngela and the younger children
joined two other families in the homb shelter near the house. When the contras
entered the cooperative, however, the familiestook off, half-naked, for the hills
nearby. (Id., paras. 12-16.)332 M~LITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
From the hills, they could see and hear the conrras, using machine guns and
mortars, take the cooperative against the defense ofonly 12coop members. (Id.,
paras. 18, 21.) In their hiding place, one of the attackers' bullets struck and
killed Angela's Il-year-old daughter Marta Rosalba. (Id., paras. 19,21.) Rather
than attending to the dead child, Angela tried to calm the others so that they
would not scream and attract the conrras' attention. Even after the one-hour
battle was over, the contras continued firing in the direction of the family.
(Id.. oara. 20.)
~hen they could, the family headed toward a neighbor'shouse. There Angela
learned that her two children who had been fightinr - her 16-year-olddaurhter
and 13-year-oldson - were dead, along with fiveothers from the cooper~ive.
(Id., para. 27.) The contras, she was told, had also burned down her house, as
wellas severalother houses, the health center, the warehouse for basic foodstuffs.
a tractor, two trucks and several animals. (Id., para. 29.) Two women from the
cooperative were kidnapped but thereafier returned. (Id., paras. 30-31.)
Angela and her surviving children took refuge in El Cua, but four days later
that town was attacked as well. As the Parnilieslook refuge in the church, the
conrras were fought off. (Id., para. 37.)
Angela now lives in Jinotega but says she is tormented by those attacks.
"Every noiseI heard, 1thought was gunfire. The Frente [Sandinista] sent
me to sec a doctor in Managua because 1 couldn't eat or sleep, thinking
about what happened. 1wasgoing crazy ...Now I'mbetter, only sometimes
1 get a case of nerves when 1 hear that someone died or that there was
combat." (Id., paras. 34-35.)
14.NORTHERN JINOTEGA
January 1982-November1984
The mountainous area in the north of Jinotega province - the municipalities
of El Cua, Bocay,Yali and Wiwili - has been a principal area of contra activity
since the beginning of the war. This chapter describes just a few of the many
attacks on civilians in this area. (Sec also the chapters on Jacinto Hernandez
Cooperative, El Castillo Norte, La Sorpresa and Ambushes in Cua.)
One cooperative alone, "German Pomares Ordonez", near Las Delicias, has
bcen the target of eight attacks. (Atiidavit of lnocente Peralta Zamora, Exhibit 1.)
One such attack took place in mid-April, 1984.A Nicaraguan helicopter flying
over the cooperative was attacked by the advancing cuntras, tipping off the
townspeople, but the conrras were able to take away several members of the
cooperative. (Id.. para. 22.) lnocente Peralta, 58, a Delegate of the Word (lay
pastor), was one of those who went looking for the missing:
"We found [luan Percz] assassinated in the mountains. They had tied his
hands behind his back. They hung him on a wire fence.They opened up his
throai and look out his tongue. Another bayonei had gone in through his
stomach and come out his back. Finally, they cut off his testicles. It was
horrible to sec." (Id., para. 22.)
Peralta was told that six others had been found in similar condition, including
one whose heart was cul out. (Id., paras. 23-24.)
Other attacks in this area over the las1three years include the following:
- On lanuary 12, 1982,in the area of Lÿs Colinas, Jeronimo Lop~z'sprivate
vehicle with15civiùanpassengerswas ambushedby a group of about 100counter- REPORT OP A l'ACT-FINUING MISSION 333
revolutionaries.Eight of the passengen,includingan eight-year-oldgirl,werekilled.
(Affidavitof TerenciodelJesus Flores Hernandez,Uiibit 4, paras. 3-5.)
- On January 22, 1982,a group of about 80 conrras staged a 5am attack
near La Pavona, surrounding several houses. One Isndowner, Manuel Alfaro
Palacios, was taken out of his house and led to a nearby creek wherethe contras
sat him down and shot a bullet into his head. Another man, Norherto Mairena,
was killed bya grenade. The residents fought hack but when the battle was over
three campesinos were dead, and many others were forced to leave their homes.
(Id., paras. 7-16.)
- One nieht in May. 1982.the coniras came to the house in Guaoinol where
i\dnan l:crru>no mal i,;,iiingTomai HueIr.;and his Faniily.Hucic, had'no poliliüd
pihi1ii)nhui \r:~uorking Io build ;iwhool and bnng 2 icachcr10 hi>iommunity.
(AtIida\ii of Adnün I'crrufinoSilcs.Exhihii2. mra. 7.i'l'heinimdrr\ knockedai ihc
door and sÿid that if Huets did not open up; they kould shoot. (Id., para.3.) As
Hueteswent to open thedoor, Fen-uiinoslippedout the back. Fromthere he could
see the conrrastyingup Huetes,and he ran funher away.(Id, para. 4.)
When Ferrufino returned in the morning, he found Huetes' dead body, its
tongue cut up, its eyes cut up, three stah wounds in the chest. (Id., para. 5.)
Huetes' wife, who was in a state of shock, told Ferrufino that the contras had
done al1of that in front of her and the children and that when she pleaded with
them to leave him alone, they told her, "Shut up you bitch. We'regoing to kill
you too because this son of a hitch is a rahid dog." Although she insisted that
he was not a Sandinista but a simple campesino, they killed him and threatened
her that if she told anyone what had happened they would kill her and her
children. (Id., para. 6.)
Later, when Fernifino hecame active in the distribution of basic products and
in school construction in his community in Penas Blancas, the contras began to
look for him as well. Once they told a campesinothat they were looking Torhim
to kill him (id.,para. 9), and they twicecame to his house looking for him (id.,
paras. 10.11). As a result, he was forced to move to Jinotega, and has left his
farm in the care of a friend. (Id., paras. 11-12.)
- On April 25, 1983,in the zone of Villagual, north of Yali, a group of 500
counterrevolutionaries swooped down on Terencio de Jesus Flores and Fermin
Valenzuela, two organizers of the National Union of Ranchers and Farmers
(UNAG) who were working in the zone. They captured Valenzuelabut Flores
escaped. (Affidavit ofTerencio de Jesus Flores Hernandez, Exhihit 4, para. 18.)
The next day, Flores returned to the spot: "Wefound Fermin dead with his eyes
gouged out as if with a hayonet and a stah wound in the throat and with a
liquid in the face which left himhurnt." (Id., para. 19.)
- In September 1983,some 200 counterrevolutionaries attacked the town of
Bana, killing five people including an 18-month-old girl who was in her house
when a bomb landed. (Affidavitof Augusto Cesar Barajona Valladares,Exhibit 3,
paras. 6-8.)
- The [own of Wamblan was attacked in the early morning of December 19,
1983, by a group of over 400 conrras. Although the attack was repulsed hy
border troops in the town, two women and two children were killed when a
grenade landed in the unfinished bomb shelter in which they had hidden. (Id.,
paras. 10-11.)
- In February, 1984,the contras attacked the cooperative in Mollejones, less
than two miles from the Honduran border, killing five people and wounding a
13-year-old boy witha bullet in the eye. (Id., para. 12.)Also in Fehruary 1984,
the coniras attacked the cooperative Georgino Andrades al 3 am, leaving three
dead and fivewounded. (Id., paras. 14-15.)334 MILITARY AND PARAMlLlTARY ACTIVITLES
- On March 23, 1984, the contras burned the house of Irma Pineda, and
killed her son, in the La Rica sector. The same day, they killed Manuel Gomez
and bumed his house, as well as the house of Jesus Mendoza and a truck
carrying food estimated to be worth 1.5 millioncordobas. (Affidavit ofTerencio
de Jesus Flores Hernandez, Exhibit 4, paras. 30-32.)
- On April 8, 1984, the contras attacked the Las Colinas coffee growing
cooperative, some 8 or 10 miles from the town of Yali. The farmers could not
hold off the 400 contras, who came with mortars, grenades, rifles and machine
guns. (Affidavit ofDoroteo Tinoco Valdivia, Exhibit 5, paras. 4-8.)
The attackers soon had the cooperative encircled and, after Iwo hours, they
sent in one Company to take it by assault. (Id., para. II.) As the cooperative's
defenders retreated, three of them were killed,but the others were able to make
their way out, as were most of those in the bomb shelter. (Id., paras. 11-13.)
When the army arrived, at about 9 am and the people returned to the
cooperative :
"They [the contras] had already destroyed al1that was the cooperative; a
coffee drying machine, the two dormitones for the coffee cutters, the
electricity generators, seven cows,the plant, the food warehouse.
There was one boy, about 15-years old, who was retarded and suffered
from epilepsy. We had left him in the bomb shelter.
When we returned .. .we saw . . that they had cut his throat, then they
cut open his stomach and left his intestines hanging out on the ground like
a string.
They did the same to Juan Corrales who had already died [rom a bullet
in the fighting. They opened him up and took out his intestines and cul off
his testicles." (Id., paras. 13-16.)
- On September 15, 1984, Nicolas Chavarria, 15, and Marcelino Herrera
were killed.According to their neighbors, they were taken from where they were
working and brought Io Villagual where they were killed. (Affidavit of Terencio
de Jesus Flores Hernandez, Exhibit 4, para. 26.)
- On October 9, 1984, in La Pavona, near Yali, the contras killed Nortie
Torres, JoséNavarrete Cruz, 30, Miguel Navarrete Cruz, 15, JoséHerrera and
lnocencio Mejia, al1 campesinos. Their throats were slit and they had stah
wounds in their bodies. (Id., paras. 22-23.) At the same time seven others were
kidnapped. All of the kidnappees escaped and reported that they were lied up
and beaten on the head. (Id., paras. 24-25.)
- On November 7, 1984, 15campesinos, including girls of 11-and 12-years
old, were kidnapped seven milesfrom the town of Yali. Sevenof them, including
the girls, have escaped. (Id., para. 28.)
As a result ofthese attacks and many others, numerous producers in Northern
Jinotega have been forced to abandon their lands and move in to the town where
theycould livein greater safety.(Affidavitof Terenciode Jesus Flores Hernandez,
Exhibit 4, para. 30; Affidavit of Augusto Cesar Barahona Valladares, Exhibit 3,
para. 17; and Affidavit oflnocente Peralta Zamora, Exhibit 1, para. 4.)
15. BERNARUIN0 DIAZ OCHOA COOPERATIVE
November 18,1984
The Bernardino Diaz Ochoa Cooperative was 16 kilometers from Waslala.
in the province of Matagalpa. On July 19, 1984,a truck from the cooperative, REPORT OP A FACT-FINDIN MCISSION 335
carrying 40 unarmed members, was ambushed near Guabo. The shooting lasted
an hour-and-a-half, unttl an army unit came to chase the attackers away, and
by the time it was over, Josefina Picardo, 29 and pregnant, Ricardo, 17, and
José Perez, 6, were killed, and 14 people were injured. (Affidavit of Balbino
Garcia Lopez, Exhibit 5, paras. 3-10.)
On November 18, the cooperative itself was attacked at 5am by a group of
about 250 conrrus armed with machine-guns, rockets, mortars and rifles. (Id.,
paras. 13, 15.) As the women and children fled to the road, the 12 civilian
defenders in the cooperative tried to hold OR' the attrckers. (Id.,paras. 13, 16.)
The conrras look the village about 500 yards from the cooperative, and went
from house to house burning them down. (Id.,para. 16.) Then they began to
take the trench where the defenders were, killing thrce of them, before the rest
were able to retreat. (Id.,paras. 18, 19.)
The next day, when the people returned to their coop, they round three
children burned to death in their house: Josefina, 6, Kosealba, 4 and Albertina,
2. All the houses of the village were burned as was the whole cooperative
including the main house, the machines and the animals. (Id.,paras. 21-22.)One
woman, Elda, 18, had been taken away by the contras. (Id., para. 25.) As a
result, the members of the cooperative have had to move to another coop.
(Id.,para. 24.)
16. SIUNA
August 1982-November1984
The rural zone of Siuna, in Northern Zelaya, bas about 25,000 inhabitants,
most of whom live and farm in the hills. In1981, the area consisted of 58
communities. There are now only 47, however, the remainder having been
attacked bv the contras and destroved. (Affidavit of Father Enriaue Blandon
~asconcel&, Exhibit 1, para. 2.) . ,
Father Enrique Blandon Vasconcelos, the area's parish priest, testifiedabout
some of the attacks in his parish:
- In August 1982, the contras attacked the Umbla cooperative of 40
families, killing one child and wounding three and causing the coop to shut
down. (Id.,para. 5.)
- In March 1983, 130 contras invaded a cooperative of 90 families in
Kaskita. Thev asked the leader. Mieuel Martinez. to talk to them. but shot
him in the back and head. They then gathered the familiesand threatened
them if they continued to work in the coop. As a result, al1those families,
too, left for safer places(Id.,paras. 6 and%.)
- In August 1983,the contras attacked the El Ocote cooperative, killing
six people including three women, Iwo men and a child. They then robbed
the cooperative and destroyed the school and the community house. (id.,
oara. 9.)
- A: the end of January, 1984,Candido Jarquin Jarquin of Kurrin was
killed.(Id.,para. 10.)
- At the same time. the lav pastor Bernardino Sanchez of Los Baldes
was kidnapped, managi'ngto escape after 15days. (Id.,para. II.)
- On February 8, 1984,the catechist Fcrmin Cano was detained and his
life threatened.(Id.,para. 12.) REPORT OF A FACi-FINDING MISSION
337
When Sister Sandra got tu the community of Umbla, a commando unit of
about 50 contras arrived and questioned her at length about Father Blandon,
accusing her oflying when shesaid he was not with them. Finally, the commando
lest. (Id., paras. 13, 14.)
Then a second commando unit came and look away a young married couple
accompanying the Sister tu Siuna. When Sister Sandra objected, the leader said
that if the couple did not go voluntarily, he would have them tied up and taken
away. They never returned. (Id., paras. 15and 16.)
A few hours later, after the Sister had lest town, fourcontras Sromthe same
group caught up with her and this lime took away the catechist who was
accompanying her. He never returned. (Id., para. 18.)
In Cuicuina Grande. a river village, yet another commando unit Sorcedthe
Sister and the two campesinos who had joined her tu disembark in a house and
held them there al1night. The leader interviewed the Sister and hoasted of al1
the aid that the United States had airlifted tu them. (Id., para. 20.) In the
morning, the Sister was released but the fate of the two campesinos is unknown.
(Id., paras. 21 and 24.)
Florencio Godinez, a Delegate of the Word in Trignitara, had long received
threats for having worked in literacy programs and for forming a credit and
servicecooperative. In June 1984, whenthe contrus began to operaie in his zone,
he learned that a iamily was forced tu give them the names of church and
cooperative leaders, including his. Some friends then advised him tu leave the
area, and he did su on July 3. (Afidavit of I.'lorencioGodinez Perez, Exhibit 5,
paras. 2-4.)
The next day, the contras came tu Godinez' house. They held his daughters
and daughter-in-law there for a day before leaving, promising tu return. The
whole family then decided tu leave, giving up the cows, pigs, chickens and 17
acres of land they held. (Id., para. 4.)
On July 24, the coniruswent tu the house USGodinez' married daughter in
Salto Verde and grabbed her husband. When the two tried tu flee, Godinez'
daughter was shot and killed. (Id., para. 5.) (Godinez was not an eye-witnesstu
these two incidents; his daughters described them tu him.)
CirilloJarquin, a Delegateof the Word, waswalkingnear his home in Coperna
on June 23, 1984,when he crossed paths with four contras.(Alfidavit of Chillo
Jarquin Mejia, Exhibit 4, para. 4.) "You're coming with us", they said. The
leader added, "Rahid dog, you're not going tu escape. They cal1us beasts and
it's true. We don't have pity for any rabid dog." (Id., para. 7.) Although he was
warned that "the slightest move" he made tu escape, "[he would bel blown into
the air" (id., para. 15), Jarquin was able tu run away after spending a day with
his captors.
The Siuna region wasparticularly hard-hit during October and November 1984.
On November 20, ten contras arrived at night, firing, at Gregorio Davila's
house in Coperna Abajo. Davila's son Danilo, age 4, and his six-day-old haby
boy were sleeping. Another son, 8, was with his father. Upon hearing the
shooting, Carmen, the mother, hid under the bed. Twelve-year-old Luz Marina,
who clung tu a wall, testified:
"The first shot hit my father and the same hullet entered my 8-year-old
brother's leg.Another bulle1killedmy 4-year-oldbrother in bed. My mother
was wounded in the head . . Two conirusentered the house and demanded
that my father give up his gun but he hadn't one in the house. They shot
Eulalia Cano Obando, 18 [my uncle Porfirio's girlfriend], . . The contras
grabbed my father and my uncle [Porfirio]. They shot my father 4 limes338 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
and when he didn't die they cut his throat. My uncle died from one shot.
Another contra came in and said of Eulalia: 'That fuck is the sister of the
rabid dog Mariano Cano', and shot her again." (Affidavit of Luz Marina
Davila Valle, Exhibit 12,para. 2.)
The contrasthen left. Luz Marina's wounded mother sent the survivingchildren
to an uncle's house. When they retumed the next morning, their mother was
dead. They went back to their uncle's house but, when they returned to their
house that afternoon, the bodies were no longer there. (Id., para. 2.)
Three days later, the bodies of their father, uncle Porfirio, Eulalia, four-year-
old brother and mother were found in the river. Their mother's facewas skinned
and she and Eulalia were left naked. (Id., para. 3.See also Affidavit of Father
Enrique Blandon Vasconcelos, Exhibit 1, para. 25.)
Other incidents in those months included:
- O~ Oc~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a eroun of about 45 contras came at 7 am to Valeriano
Polanco's basic products post in the community of Fonseca and stole sugar,
boots and other ~roducts. (Affidavit of Valeriano Polanco Lopez, Exhibit 6.)
Thev then took ~Olancoandiorne 30other camoesinos with them. Thev marched
al1day until they arrived near Siuna's landing:strip where, after night fell, the
contras fired on the nearby homes with rifles and mortars. (Id.)
Douglas Spence, an American working with Witness for Peace, United States-
based Christian peace group, was in Siuna when the firing began. He testified:
"We heard hundreds of rounds of automatic gun-fire, answered by slightly
more distant fire. The shooting lasted about half-an-hour culminating in
three loud mortar rounds.
. .. The four of us huddled on the living-room floor waiting to see what
would happen next." (Afidavit of Douglas Spence, Exhibit 3.)
Two days later, Spence visited one of the affected neighborhoods:
"We saw the holes in the zinc roofs where people told us hullets had
entered the night of the attack. we also saw three mortar craters, one within
50 feet of a little house, where thcontra rounds had landed.
Fortunately, no one was injured or killed in the attack". (Id.)
- In the community of Uly, 50 contras surrounded a house on October 23,
taking away six people on a three-day trek to Comenegro. (Affidavit of Pablo
Perez Landeros, Exhibit 8.) Pablo Perez Landeros, who escaped, saw 200 other
hostages who, the contras said, were being taken to Honduras. (Id.)
- On October 28, ten contras arrived at the house of Pablo Perez Tercero in
El Corozo. They tied up Perez Tercero and his brother and took them to where
they are already holding their father and two other brothers. (Affidavit of Pablo
Perez Tercero, Exhibit 9.) After being handed over to another contra group, and
held for 20 days along with ten other hostages, he began to run away. Realizing
that he was Beeing, the contras fired upon him, but he made it safely out of
danger. One of his brothers also managed to escape but they have not heard
from their father or the other two brothers. (Id.)
- On October 28, in the community of El Dorado, the contras captured
Leontes Velasquez,President of the local Electoral Board, and Eladio Rodriguez,
Board Secretary, who had arrived in town by mule for a meeting held in
preparation for the November 4 elections. The two were taken to where the
contrus were holding 40 others from El Dorado and then on to Monte de Oro,
San Pablo de Asa and Lawas-Corozo. There, while the guard was not watching, REPORT OF A FACT-PINUINC MISSION 339
Rodriguez escaped by throwing himself into the river. (Affidavit of Eladio
Rodriguez Flores, Exhibit 10,para. 2.)
- On the night of Novemher 4, two contras, pretending to he Nicaraguan
soldiers, came to Cristohal Grenado's house near Uly and told him and a friend
that they had to go to guard the nearby cooperative. By the time they realized
the trick, they were already being taken to a hill where they were made to spend
the night. At 5am there was an attack on the cooperative and at 9 am the
contras brought the two down to the cooperative where other captives were being
held. After walking seven hours they were held under surveillance for 22 days,
with little to eat, before Grenado and a friend were able to escape into the
mountains. (Affidavit of Cristohal Grenado Perez, Exhihit II.)
- On November 26, the cooperative in Floripon was attacked by a contra
force of aboui 120 with niortars. rockets. machine-euns and rif~~~- Ae~ ~ ~the
125wumen and childrcn oi the iooper;iii\'c took refuge in the shelters the). had
built in casc of atiack. only <)nesooperiti\c mcmbrr. a ri\.ili<inJeirndcr. dicd in
the fighting. After the contras left, however, an unexploded grenade was found
and mishandled. It exploded, killing one woman and injuring 13. (Ailidavit of
Felix Arauz Mendoza, Exhibit 7.)
17. SAN J8RONiMO
May 16,1984
In the valleys of a mountainous region 30 kilometers northeast of Condega,
in the Department of Esteli, lie numerous small farming villages. Until May 16,
1984, many of the residents of these valleys were organized in the agricultural
cooperative "Heroes and Martyrs" of Canta Gallo near the village of San
Jeronimo.
On May 15, 1984,some campesinos from the valley noticed "something very
strange - an airplane passed overhead iiying very low . . . and dropped
munitions to the contras". (Affidavit of lsmael Cordoba Centeno, Exhibit 12,
para. 2.)
The next day, acuntra task force invaded the valleys,attacking the cornmunities
of Santa Ana del Ojoche, Los Planes, Buena Vista, La Montanita, Robledalito
and San Jeronimo.
In each communitv the storv was similar: the outnumbered civilian defenders
oiTered that resistan& they could while the population was evacuated. When
they were overcome, the contras entered the community and burned down
the houses.
At about 6 am, the contras attacked Los Planes. The local residents fled on
foot to the community of La Laguna. (Ailidavit of Angela Zamora Aguirres,
Exhihit 13, paras. 2-3.) According to the local offices of the Sandinista Front,
when the contras entered the town they hurned the houses of Juan Simon
Herrera, Maximo Monzon, Prudencio Herrera, Alejandro Artela, Loaquin Artela
and Amado Rodriguez. (ElNuevo Diario, May 23, 1984.)
At around 9 am, the contras look positions on the hills around El Robledalito.
The familieswere notified to leave hecausethe village wasnot prepared to defend
itself against such an attack. Filemon Zavala Cruz had the responsibility of
moving the families out of the community and toward San Jeronimo. Frorn San
Jeronimo, the families lied to La Laguna. (Ailidavit of Filemon Zavala Cruz,
Exhihit 3.)
Once again, the contras set fire to the houses- this time 17 of the 20 houses340 MILiiARY AND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlES
were burned. (Affidavits of Filemon Zavala Cruz, Maria Sabina Galeano and
Maria Anita Hernandez de Martinez, Exhibits 3, 7 and 11.)These included the
houses of Victor Obregon, Carmelia Olivas, Cosme Cardenas, Visitacion
Martinez, Luis Galeano, NicomedesGaleano, Santos Cardenas, Filemon Zavala,
Rene Martinez, Luis Martinez, Pedro J. Zavala, Isabel Galeano, Macano Rivera,
Manuel Ortez, Marceliano Martinez and Luis Alfonso Cardenas, as well as the
school. (ElNuevoBiario, May 23, 1984.)The local priest, who visited the village
after the attack, testified: "in Roblcdalito, the only thing you can see now is
burnt rubble. burnt cans". (Affidavit ofFather Enrique Alherto Oggier Rufiner,
Exhibit 10,para. 9.)
La Montanita vas attacked shortly thereafter. Jose Ramon Castillo was
working, getting the corn ready for planting, when he heard that the contras
were coming. He got his rifle in case there was to be any attempt to defend the
town. But the contras were advancing from two sides and he and his fnends saw
that they were vastly outnumbered and that any defense was hopeless. They
concentrated instead on getting the people out of the village to El Bramadero.
(Affidavits of Jose Ramon Castillo, Filemon Zavala Cruz and Eusebia Matey
Lopez, Exhibits 2, 3 and 5.)
When the contras had left La Montanita, "the houses and everything having
to do with corn were left burned". (Affidavitof JoséRamon Castillo, Exhibit 2,
para. 9.) The burned houses belonged to Juan Flores, Angelica Flores. Dcmetrio
Galeano, Marcelino Cruz, Humberto Flores, Antolin Galeano, Reynaldo Perez,
Estanislao Castillo, San Flores, Rosalio Flores, Modesta Cruz and Francisco
Corrales. (W NuevoBiario, May 23. 1984).
Finally, the contras attacked the main cooperative Canto Gallo in San
Jeronimo, which provided work for many of the people of the valleys. The
cooperative - which, according to the managers, produced 120,000pounds of
cotïee in the last year, as wellas cat-le"was lefttotally destroyed. Only ashes
remained. It was a very important cooperative for the people of the zone,
especially the poor." (Affidavit of Father Ennque Alberto Oggier Rufiner,
Exhibit 10,para. 10.)
In one day, hundreds of valley residents became refugees. Tbat night, some
600homelesspeople, mostly women and children, arrived in the town of Condega
where they slept on the floor of the parish's communal house. They wcrc then
moved to the grammar school where they stayed another week. (Id., paras. 5-7:
Affidavit of Angela Zamora Aguirres, Exhibit 15, para. 4; Affidavit of Maria
Sahina Galeano, Exhibit 7. para. 6; Affidavit of Maria Anita Hernandez de
Martinez, Exhibit II, paras. 4-5.)
Today, many of the families live in overcrowded conditions with friends or
relatives in Condega, having lost their land and possessions. In her crowded
house in Condega, Angela Zamora says "We never went back to see Our house
[in Los Planes]. They told us it was burned. We had animals, chickens, turkeys,
pigs. We had corn. The riches of the poor." (Affidavit of Angela Zamora
Aguirres, Exhibit 15, para. 6.)
lsmael Cordoba Centeno, also living in Condega, had 60 acres of land, but
now "the beans, coffee,rice and everything we had is gone". (Affidavitof lsmael
Cordoba Centeno, Exhibit 12,paras. 1, 5.) Maria Espinoza Zavala, whose son
was kidnapped in Febmary 1984,had 17acres of land in Santa Ana del Ojoche.
Her family's houses there and in Los Planes were burned. (Affidavit of Maria
Espinoza Zavala, Exhibit 14, paras. 2, 6.)
Flora Cordoba Ccnteno's house was not burned, but she is afraid to go back
even though she needs the corn that was left in Los Planes. (Affidavit of 1210ra
Cordoba Centeno, Exhibit 13, para. 4.) Mana Anita Hernandez had "a little REPORT OF A FACT-FINDING MISSION 341
land [in Robledalito] but it was enough to support ourselves". Now she and her
hushand and 12 children are staying with a family in Condega. (Affidavit of
Maria Anita Hernandez, Exhibit II, paras. 3, 6.)
In nearby Los Pofreros, the conlras broke into the home of Maria Guadalupe
Rodriguez and Etemina Rodriguez on June 19, 1984,stealing a radio, clothes
and 2,000cordobas. Later that day, the conrraskidnapped sevenpeople, including
their brother and sister. The sister was released immediately, but the brother did
not return for a month. The same day, the conrras killed Reynaldo Olivo and
Laureano Flores, for whom the new cooperative isnamed. (Affidavits of Etemina
Rodriguez, Exhibit 4, and Maria Guadalupe Rodriguez, Exhihit 1.)
These refugees wzre dealt another hlow in mid-August. The lumber miIl in the
valley community of El Bramadero, where wood was being cut and prepared to
build new houses for the refugees, was destroyed hy the conrras. "With this
burning, we have another delay, and the people will have to wait much longer
[for new housing]." (Affidavit of Father Enrique Alherto Oggier Rufiner,
Exhihit 10,para. 12.)
The hurning of the valley communities was the worst attack in the region,
but there have been others. At the end of Septemher, the huge grain silos in
Palacaguina - which, according to the government, stored 90,000 pounds of
rice, 180,200pounds of corn, 27,400pounds of beans, 17,400pounds of sait and
50 crates of soap (Barricada, September 24, 1984) - was "totally destroyed by
the counterrevolutionaries. I visited il the next day and saw how the people were
trying Io gather up the little that remained." (Affidavit of Father Enrique Alberto
Oggier Rufiner, Exhibit 10,para. 13.)On other occasions the conrras have raided
towns and kidnapped civilians. (Id., para. 3.)
Says Father Oggier,
"The people of my parish are afraid. 1am afraid, too. They tell me that
1should not go out alone, only with a soldier. 1don't go out al night to
visit the communities, 1always retum earlier. At night 1stay in my house."
(Id., para. 14.)
18. ELCASTILLONORTT~
May 15, 1984
After the 1979 revolution, many farms under government control (fonnerly
the property of General Somoza) were consolidated into state farms ("Unidades
de Produccion Estatales", or "UPEs") or cooperatives. These farms, which
often serve as social service centers in their zone, have been frequent targets of
conrra attacks.
One such attack took place on May 15, 1984, against the UPE El Castillo
Norte. 65 kilometers north of Jinoteea. It was a small farm with onlv 60 adults
and their children. At approximately71 am, a band of about 300 coni;us invaded
the farm, overwhelming the 14civilian defenders, and killina 20 people, kidnap-
ping others,destroyingihe farm and its facilitiesand forcingthe survivors to flee.
When the attack hegan, most of the unarmed members of the fann ran for
the shelter they had built. As the battle raged, however, the shelter, too, was
attacked by mortar fire. An 87-year-old woman, Vicenta Castro, was killed hy
one of the mortars, and the others fled. (Affidavit of Lucilia Echevarrid Lanza,
Exhibit 7, para. 5; ARidavit of Olivia Benavides Mela, Exhibit 2, para. 2.)
Rosa Sobalvarro, a 15-ycar-old, three-months prcgnant civilian defendcr, wasshot. She lay on the ground pleading for water and begging her fleeingmother
not to leaveher. Her mother was unable to help, however,and whenshereturned
the following day, Rosa's "breasts were cul to pieces, her throat was cul. The
poor girl was destroyed." (Affidavit of Cristovalino Sovalbarro, Exhibit 4,
para. 5; see also Affidavit of Olivia BenavidesMeza, Exhihit 2, para. 3.)
Lucilia Echevarria Lanza, a mother of four who los1one son and one cousin,
and whose father received a shrapnel wound, recounted what she saw after
fleeingthe shelter, helping her father and Ramon (Moncho) Castro, an injured
civiliandefender :
"When we got to the front of the store, they werechopping up a 'compa'.
They had ripped out a bone and were tearing him apart. Whcn we go1
closer, one of them grabbed a piece of his flesh and threw it in my face,
saying, 'Maybe you're the mother bitch'.") (Affidavit of Lucilia Echevarria
Lanza, Exhibit 1, para. 6.)
They passed by Francisco Castro, Moncho's brother, who
"was filled with stab wounds . . They hit him and blood flew and he was
left standing as if lifeless.Then they killed him with a stick in his mouth."
(Id., para. 7.)
Another civiliandefender, Rene Amador, "was carried of. . .They broke his
arms and tortured him to death." (Id., para. 8.) Another, Jesus Hernandez,
"Chuno", who had heen kidnapped previously but had escaped, was killedand
then chopped up and burned. (Id., and Affidavit ofAbrahan Castro, Exhihit 3,
oara. 6.1 Another was castrated. (Affidavit of Olivia Benavides Meza.Exhi-
bit 2, 3.)
As Lucilia was helping Moncho, one of the contras hit him with the hutt of
his gun, then cul him with his hayonet and began to suck his blood, saying
to Lucilia :
"'Look bitch, this is thirst, this is the water we drink, the blood of these
rabid dogs sons of hitches' . . Then he look the hlood and smeared it on
me [saying]'auntie, how tasty,bitch'. He shoved it in my mouth and made
me drink il. Then he bathed the head of a little boy 1was leading with the
hlood." (Affidavit ofLucilia Echevarria Lanza, Exhibit 1, para. 9.)
Lucilia was then separated from Moncho, who was killed, and she Red with
her father and daughter, but not before heing bathed in gasoline (id., para. 12),
as well as threatened and taunted (id). When the battle was over, the entire
farm was burned and destroyed, including the store, the office, the children's
center, the center where the food was stored, the land and al1 the houses.
(Affidavit of Abrahan Castro, Exhibit 3, para. 9.) Other coop memhers were
killed, and some were kidnapped (see id. and Affidavit of Lucilia Echevarria
Lanza, Exhibit 1, para. 16.)
Lucilia Echevarria was relocated to the UPE La Colonia. but she is not well.
"1 can't sleepwith the light off.. .because 1seeeverything" that happened that
day. (Id., paras. 17-18.) She also lost al1 her possessions: "We had our own
house in the UPE. WChad pigs. chickens, everything. The children ale. Now we
have what people can give us." (Id., para. 19.)
Like Lucilia, some of the survivors were relocated in La Colonia. Others were
taken to nearby Abisinia and others to the farm La Fondadora. Maria Castro,
who lost her mother Vicenta in the attack on the shelter, as well as her three
sons, Francisco, lsmael and Ramon (Moncho), now lives in a shack on the
outskirts of Jinotega with her daughter and her sole surviving son. Her house REPORT OF A FACT-FRIDIN MISSION 343
and adjacent land were burned, along with about 4,400 pounds of corn. beans
and colïee. (Affidavitof Maria Castro, Exhibit 6, paras. 3-4; Affidavitof Carmen
Castro, Exhibit 5, para. 4.) "Before, food was never lackin- we gave ifaway.
Now, without my sons, without the land, we hardly have anything." (Affidavit
of Mana Castro, Exhibit 6, para. 4.)
19.SAN JUAN DE LIMAY
(Sister Nancy Donovan)
January 8, 1985
The town of San Juan de Limay in the province of Esteli has been the scene
of numerous conrra attacks in late 1984 and early 1985. Nancy Donovan, an
American Maryknoll nun, who is a missionary assigned to the town, testified
that between mid-December 1984 and middanuary 1985, almost 40 civilians
were killedin the attacks. "The attacks have been made on civilian, not military,
targets and they have been increasing." (Statement of Sister Nancy Donovan,
attached to her afiidavit, Exhibi1,p. 5.)
On January 8, 1985,Sister Nancy herself was detained and held captive by a
group of conrros.
That morning, at about 6 am, she left town to attend a clergy meeting of the
Diocese of Esteli whichhad been called by the Bishop. To gel there,
"1 had to search for a ride in a orivate vehicle since the town's onlv bus
had been burnt by counterrevoluti~nary forces on Dec. 9th and now-there
is no public transportation. 1found a ride with a refugee family whichhad
been displaced bya counterrevolutionary attack ona villageon the outskirts
of Limay on Dec. 27th. This family was transporting their few belongings
to Esteli. An 18-year-oldboy also had asked Io be taken in the same pick-
up truck. Al1were civiliansand unarmed." (Id., p. 1.)
After driving four miles, they sawa tractor in the middle of the road.
"Five armed men in blue counterrevolutionary uniforms with FDN
marked on their uniforms came from behind the tractor and stopped Our
tmck. They made us leave the vehicleand wejoined about 25 civilians who
were being held in a gully by the side of the road. After about 10 minutes
they told uswe could continue on our way." (Id.)
After traveling another two-and-a-half miles, Sister Nancy decided to return
to Limay via back paths to warn departing vehicles of the danger. She got out
of the car, which continued on towards Esteli. After walkinga little over a mile:
"1 was stopped on the path by 2 armed men in FDN uniforms. They
asked me where 1 was going and 1 told them to Limay. They spoke on
walkie-talkies for some moments and then told me 1 could go no further
and mus1stay in their custody. They directed me 10a Stonewall where there
were more armed, uniformed men, about 20 in al1 . . 1was held there for approximately 3 hours. During that time 3 or 4 peasants and a woman and
child also were stopped on the path and held with me. At about 8am 1
heard some gunfire from the old road where we had initially heen stopped.
There was a long wait of over an hour. Then 1heard very loud automatic
machine-gun fire and heavy artillery coming from Loma Atravesada which
is further along the road to Estel1.prayed for the livesof those who were
involved." (Id., p. 2.)
The conlras then separated Sister Nancy from the three civilians, whom she
never saw again. Despite her requests to leave, they marched her for another five
miles, joined by 20more conrras, until they came to a group of still 20 more.
There she was held for almost an hour while the contras "were boasting about
the success they had had in the ambushes on the road". (Id., p. 3.)
The 60 men who were now holding Sister Nancy
"were well armed and equipped. One of the men wore an arm patch which
said 'Soldier of Fortune, Second Convention'. Another had 'US Army'
written on the front of his uniform. They showed me their new knapsacks
and told me they had received new equipment recently. They told me that
their supplies are dropped hy planes which 'flyvery quietly at night'. They
hope that they would be receiving new supplies that night IO replenish the
ammunition they had used that day." (Id., p.4.)
Sister Nancy again attempted to leave and was again prevented until four
FDN leaders showed up.
"These 4 men began to interrogate me about my work and identity. They
searchcd my belongings and hegan 10 read my address book. After some
lime of discussion among themselves on the walkie-talkie they told me that
1could go. I estimate that this was about 3.30pm." (Id)
After returning to Limay on horseback, Sister Nancy
"quickly found out that 14civilians had bcen killed hy the FDN forces in
different amhushes along the roads to Limay that same day. Nine were
construction workers ambushed in Loma Atravesada, 2 workers from the
Ministry of Natural Resources, 2 young coffeepickers, and a tractor driver
were killed along the road to Pueblo Nuevo. 1 saw 4 tractors which were
destroyed. At least 10 persons were kidnapped, but there may be more. 1
also found out that the original vehicle in which 1 had been traveling had
been stopped again by the FDN forces after 1had left it to walk back to
Limay. The 18-year-oldyouth, Frcddy Castellon, had been kidnapped.
We spent that night and the next day washing the bodies of the dead,
comforting families and praying with them, and burying the dead from
Limay." (Id., pp.4-5.)
20. CBPAD/TELCORAMBUSH
September 1, 1984
On September 1, 1984, Jorge Barrow, an agronomist with the Evangelical
Committee for Aid and Development (CEPAD), a private religiousdevelopmental
agency, left Puerto Cabezas in Northem Zelaya in the organization's Toyota
pick-up truck 10 drop off five workers in Sumuhila. They picked up about 10 REPORT OF A FACT-PINUING MISSION 345
hitch-hikers, including a pregnant woman and some children. (Affidavit of
Federica AlvarezJohnary, Exhihit 1,para. 5 ;Affidavitof Jorge Barrow Vicente,
Exhibit 2, para. 3.) Barrow, Federica Alvarez and her 45-day-old child, and a
nurse rode in the front and the others in the back. Everyone in the pick-up was
a civilian and no one was armed. (Affidavit of Federica Alvarez Johnary,
Exhibit 1, paras. 4-5; Aflidavit of Jorge Barrow Vicente, Exhibit 2, para. 4.)
As they passed a telecommunications Company (TELCOR) pick-up, parked
where men wereworking on the line, they heard a homb and then rockets and
machine-gun fire from the left of the road. (Affidavit of Federica Alvarez
Johnary, Exhibit 1, para. 5.)
Federica Alvarez had just finished breast feeding her baby and was burping
her when the shots destroyed the window of the truck and covered them with
shrapnel. (Id., para. 10.) Barrow, the driver, kept going, driving with one hand
as he tried to gel glass out of his eyes with the other. (Affidavit of Jorge Barrow
Vicente, Exhibit 2, para. 6.)
Heavy firelanded in the back of the pick-up, lifting it off the ground. Barrow,
looking in the rear viewmirror, saw everyone on the floor and thought they had
al1heen killed. (Id.. Daras. 8-9.) In the cabin. the bahv was bleeding -nd the
mother crying. (ld.,para. 8.) '
They kept going until they reached the entrance to the Columbus settlement.
(Affidavit of Federica Alvarez Johnary, Exhihit 1, para. 1I ;Affidavit of Jorge
Barrow Vicente, Exhihit 2, para. 10.) When Barrow was told that one of those
in the rear, Alfredo Bushie,had been shot but was still alive, he drove on tu the
health center in Sumuhila. (Affidavit of Jorge Barrow Vicente, Exhibit 2,
uara. II .There. Busbie. aee 20. died immediatelv. (Id.. vara. 12.)
The haby and her mitKer wfre sent to the hoipitai in ~osila but the car
taking them there los1control and Federica's sister-in-law,who rode with her to
hold the blood serum, was injuredas well.(Affidavitof FedericaAlvarezJohnary,
Exhibit 1, para. 12.) The three were then transferred to Puerto Cabezas and
ultimately sent to Managua. There, two dclicate operations were performed on
the haby, one on her intestines which had been pushed into her stomach by the
impact of the shrapnel, and a week later another on her lung where the larges1
piece of shrapnel was lodged. After 26 days in the hospital, she was left with
large scars and is in constant pain, unable to eat or sleep well. (Id., para. 15.)
The mother still has shrapnel wounds, and her right hand, which often falls
asleep, cannot exert force. (Id., para. 16.)The sister-in-lawis still inthe hospital.
(Id., para. 17.)
The conIras also killed six or seven of the TELCOR workers (Affidavit of
Federica AlvarezJohnary, Exhibit 1,para. 13[6dead]; Affidavitof Jorge Barrow
Vicente, Exhibit 2, para. 17["about 7-1). Barrow saw the bodies when they were
hrought to the Sumubila health center. "Some had their heads bashed in, another
had its forehead bashed in, one boy had his intestinesout, others had their arms
as if ground up." (Affidavit of Jorge Vicente Barrow, Exhibii 2, para. 17.)
21. AMBUSHES IN EL CUA
Octoher 1984
In October 1984, Anibal Gonzalez, the alternate president of the Zonal
Electoral Council for the Cua region for Nicaragua's Novcmber 1984elections,
suffered two ambushes while on electoral duty. The first the, he was traveling
in a military truck from San Joséde Bocdy,wherethere had been a conrra attack346 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
the day before, to El Cua, when 80contras ambushed the truck, killing one man
and wounding three others. (Afidavit of JoséAnibal Gonzalez Lopez, Exhibit 2,
paras. 5-9.)
Eight days later, Gonzalez was traveling from El Cua to San Joséde Bocay
to drop off ballot boxes, ballots and other electoral material. He was riding in
an ambulance, along with six others, as part of a caravan including four trucks
from the Ministry of Construction that were going to drop off provisions in
Bocay. (Id., para. 11.) Almost everyone in the caravan was armed. Gonzalez
testified, "1 want to emphasize that 1am a civilian. If 1go armed it's hecause in
my zone, that's howone has to go." (Id., para. 20.)
When they got to Frank Tijerino Valley, some 100 contras ambushed them
with machine guns, mortars and rifle fire from a distance of only 50 yards. (Id.,
para. 12.) Everyone leaped from tbeir vehicles. Gonzales tried ta get the
ambulance driver, who had been shot in the head, rear and am, out of the line
of fire, but in doing so Gonzalez himself was shot in the ankle. He fell but was
able to crawl to the hills with the ambulance driver. (Id., para. 13.)
Seven of the passengers wereinjured in the attack and one was killed before
reinforcements came to drive the contras away. (Id., para. 19.)Gonzalez had to
spend 22 days in hospital and was replaced in his electoral functions by Brigido
Vargas Herrera. (Id., paras. 15and 18.)At the end of October, however, Vargas
was kidnapped in the Valley of Los Angeles while attending his daughter's
funeral. (Id., para. 19.)
PARTIV. KIDNAPPINGS
A. IndividualKidnappings
22. SIX EXAMPLI'S
This chapter describessix individual casesof civilianskidnapped by the contras
and taken to or toward Honduras in an attempt to forceahly recruit them into
the contra forces.
William Santiago Vasquez
William Santiago Vasquez is now 13-yearsold. He was 12in December 1983,
when hewas kidnapped together with hisfather, Gregorio Vasquez,as they were
leaving Ciudad Antigua, Nueva Segovia, where his father taught a course. A
band of 170contras came to the town that day. One part of the band attacked
the town while the otber kidnapped William and his father along with two other
men. The four were taken to a hill where William wasseparated from the other
three. (Affidavit of William Santiago Vasquez, Exhibit 1, para. 6.) William later
learned that al1three, including his father, were killedthat day. (Id.)
The next day, William was taken to the contra camp "La Union", still in
Nicaragua, where he was kept for 15 days. There were about 400 men there,
including 5 other kidnappees. William worked there as a cook's aide. (Id.,
paras. 8-9.)
Next he was taken 10 kilometers by foot to the "La Lodoza" camp in
Honduras :
"There were about 800 men there and about 50 people who had been
kidnapped, men, women, old people,children, who were familieswhich had REPORT OF A FACT-FINDING MISSION 347
been kidnapped from Chinandega, Matagalpa and other villagesand towns.
There were about 100 Honduran soldiers there, they were the ones who
eave the orders.
" ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~
Iu;is thcrc about a rniintli. 1ucis triincd by ihc Ilondurdni. Thcrc uerc
alro Niwra>?u~nsthcrc whii uerc kidndpped and shi, wrrc nou par1ol'thc
'Guardia' [so-called because a numberof contra leaders once belonged to
Somoza's National Guard].
1 was trained in how to use a rifle and heavy artillery, then in arnbush
and counter amhush. The training was dreadful; if you didn't participate,
you didn't gel any food that day.
Sometimes 'gringos' wouldcome to take pictures, they would corneas
civilians.About five gringos came." (Id., paras. 10.13.)
After about a month, William was able to escape along a river and, after
walking three days, made il back to Nicaragua. He now lives in Ocotal. (Id,
paras. 14-18.)
Antonio Espinoza Morales
On October 23, 1984,two armed men entered the house near El Jicaro where
Antonio Espinoza, a 32-year old farmer, was sleeping. They ordered him to
leave: "You're goingto march. We'rethe FDN." (Affidavitof Antonio Espinoza
Morales, Exhibit 2, para. 5.) When Espinoza told them he wds sick - with a
bad heart and nerves - they told him to gel moving and added that they had
medicine for him. (Id., paras. 6-7.)
The two men and their prisoner then joined a group of 30 or 35 other contras
who had seven or eight other captives, and were taken on a march of five to six
days to Honduras, through the hills, sleeping outside and eating little. (Id.,
paras. 10-11.) The hostages were made to carry the contrus' cargo. Espinoza
carried a back-pack with ammunition. (Id., para. 12.)
When theyarrived at the Las Vegasbase in Honduras, where there wereabout
1,000 men, the captives were split up. Espinoza stayed about two kilometers
from the hase, sometimes helpingthe cook with chores. (Id., paras. 15-17,)
After 43 days, Espinoza and some 34 others were sent back in10 Nicaragua,
and he was given a hlue FDN uniform and a rifle which he did not know how
to use. (Id., paras. 23 and 24.) On the way back, he was able to make his escape
hetween the guards while the group was sleeping.(Id., para. 26.)
Espinoza testifiedthat he will continue to work his fieldsbut is moving closer
to El Jicaro where he feelssafer. (Id., para. 30.)
Ernesto Pineda Gutierrez
Ernesto Pineda Gutierrez, a 43-year-old coffee farmer, has heen kidnapped
twice. The first time, in Septemher 1983, ten armed men came at 1am to the
house in La Pavona, Jinotega, where he and his family were sleeping.They said
they had orders to take Pineda and his niece Julia to their leader, hecause they
supposedly worked with the army and had guns in their house. Pineda denies
this. (Affidavit of Ernesto Pineda Gutierrez, Exhihit 3, paras. 4-6.)
The two were taken about three kilometers to a house in the mountains where
the contras were holding another 20 kidnapped campesinos. There, the leader
told them that "they were going to kill us, that they weren't goingto waste
bullets but would hang us". (Id., paras. 7 and 8.) But they let Julia go and, after
an eight-hour march through the mountains, with Pineda protesting his "inno-
cence", they let him goas well, telling him that "this lime they would let us go
but if we went around talking, they would hehead us, hang us". (Id., paras. 9-
13.)Some of the other campesinos never returned. (Id., para. 14.)348 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
The next lime, on October 28, 1984,Pineda was running an errand with his
hrother when he ran into a group of 80-100armed men leading 15kidnappees.
"They ordered us to go with them, without telling us why they were
taking us. They only told us that they had orders to kidnap people, whoever
they might be, hecause they hadorders from their leaders." (Id, paras. 15-18.)
The group, with 23 kidnappees in all, including women, children and older
people and Pineda's 14-year-oldnephew and two cousins, went to a farm where
they met other contra groups, 300 men in all, holding other hostages. From
there, the diFeren1 groups set out separately on the same road, telling their
captives, "We're not letting anybody go, and don't try to escape because if
someoneescapesand wefind that person, we'llcul his throat". (Id., paras. 20-22.)
Pineda's group walked three days through the mountains, with the captives
carrying the contras'backpacks, until they reacheda mountain house where they
stayed locked in for two days.
"They told us that they were taking us directly to Honduras for train-
ing . . They said that there in Honduras there were guards to train us and
that we would return armed to Nicaragua to kill and kidnap more people.
They told us not to say that we were forced to go because they would kill
us in Honduras if we said that." (Id., paras. 23-28.)
After another day's walk,Pineda decided to try to escape. The next morning,
while the contrus were awaking, he and his nephew wentout as if to urinate and
were able to iiee unnoticed. (Id., paras. 29-31.) His cousins still have not been
heard from. (Id., para. 32.)
Because the coniras threatened to kill the deserters, Pineda has moved to
Jinotega where he feels safer. There he has no work and is receiving support
from cousins. (Id., paras. 33-34.)
Moise Fajardo Sambrana
Moise Fajardo was at his mother-in-law's house near Zungano, in Nueva
Segovia, on September 2, 1984,when three armed contras came to the door and
asked him 10guide them hecause theydid no1know the area. When he said that
he did not know it either, they told him that he had to come with them anyway.
(Affidavit of Moise Fajardo Sambrana, Exhibit 4, para. 3.)
Joining up with a larger group of about 30 contras,they made Fajardo carry
a heavy backpack on a 28-day trek through the hills towdrds Honduras,
threatening that if he tried to escape, he would be killed. (Id., paras. 4-12.)
Fajardo was able to escape before the group go1to Honduras, however, and
after a three-day walk found his way hack home. (Id., paras. 13-15.)He is afraid
to live there now, however, and says he willmove 10a safer place. (Id., para. 16.)
Joséde la Lu?:Padilla Rojas
At midnight on August 17, 1984, an armed contra, leading four kidnapped
civilians,three with their hands tied, entered Joséde laLuz Padilla Rojas' house
in Las Minitas in the Paiwas region and forced him out at gun-point. "When 1
left the house, he told me to get with the lied-up people and not to move. He
told me that if 1 moved, or ran, he would shoot me." (Affidavit of Joséde la
Luz Padilla Rojas, Exhibit 7, para. 3.) They were joined by three other contras
who had burned two other houses and were leading three other kidnappees,
including Padilla's two adopted sons. Each of the contras unloaded a magazine
(20 shots) in the air by the hostages' heads "until we were deaf" (id., para. 6),
and then led them out of the town. When one of the men whose hands were tied REPORT 01' AFACT-FIPITIN MISSION 349
stumbled. and Padilla tried to helo him. one of the contras threatened him with
his bayonet. (Id.,para. 9.)
That night the group stayed in the house of a campesino. The next morning,
after one Ïnan wai relëased, they continued on to a house where more captives
were picked up and then to another where 15 kidnappees were already waiting.
The contra leader took Padilla, a Delegate of the Word, out for questioning,
taking out a notebook that already contained his name. He told Padilla
"'l'm going to let you go hecause you're old. What we need are people
30 and younger. You can go but watch out.' He told me that 1should stop
being involved in organized things." (Id.para. 15.)
Padilla was released but he has had no news of his two adopted sons Jorge,
23, and Valentin, 24, or of the others who were taken by the contras.(Id.,
paras. 16and 17.)
Amado Gutierrez
On October 15, 1984, Amado Gutierrez, 23, was in Waspuko in the Siuna
region to pick up some cows. On the pretext of taking him to see the animals, a
contra collaborator took him instead to where 50 contras were waiting. They
accused Gutierrez of being a miliciano, which he denied, and burned his birth
certificate and identity card. They beld bim there for 15 days as many other
contras arrived, then took him on a day's walk to Copawas. (Affidavit of Amado
Gutierrez Diaz, Exhihit 6, para. 2.)
Gutierrez tried to gain their confidence sa he would be able to escape, and in
Copawas they gave him a weapon, telling him, "We're going to collect people to
liberate Nicaragua". Some of the group left and later returned with about 60
captives from San Pahlo de Asa, Monte de Oro and Aserrin, including pregnant
women and small children. The contras took the new group toward Waspuko,
saying they would be taken to Honduras. (Id.)
Gutierrez stayed with the contras through hattles in El Dorado, Monte de Oro
and San Pablo before escaping on December 6 along with another hostage, as
their captors slept(Id.,para. 3.)
B. Mass Kidnappingson theAtlantic Coast
A recurring c\,cni on Nic~ragua'ssparsely-populatcd Ailaniis Coast ha3 bcen
the misr kidnapping IO H<~ndurasoicntire Miskito Indian village\ hy countcr-
rc\,,lutiondrv fi,rccr. N'hileman, M~skiioshave ihosen. iiir a varictv ol're~\oiis.
to resettle in Honduras, in a nimber of instances armed contra invaders have
entered Miskito villages in Nicaragua and Sorced the entire populations to
accompany them to Honduras. While some people in these villagesundoubtedly
wanted to accompany the contras,many others did not. All were ohliged 10
leave, however.
In contra training camps in Honduras, new soldiers are given instructions on
how to kidnap. One Miskito Indian, who had himself been kidnapped into the
conrra army and later escaped, testified:
"They told us that, arriving in a community ta kidnap, we had to first
surround the village and then shoot off our weapons to scare the people so
they get out of bed, and not to let even one person escape, and to always
do it at night." (Affidavit of Baudilio Rivera, Exhibit 1 ta Sukatpin chap-
ter, para. 17.)
As the chapters that follow illustrate, this tactic kas been used repearedly by
the contras.350 M~LITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
[Note: The chapters on Slimalila, Set Net Point and Sukatpin are based on
the affidavits of witnesseswho were located, at the investigative team's request,
by the Nicaraguan government. While this was a deviation from the team's
.olic. of selecti-a each witness itself. the team suent over 12 hours with these
witnesses - outside the presence of any government representatives - and is
convinced of the veracity of their testimony.]
One example of mass kidnapping occurred in the northern reforestation center
of Slimalila where,on Apri123, 1983,a contra task force look away an estimated
1,500people, mostly Miskito Indians.
As it does each night, the village's electricity wentout at IOpm. About half-
an-hour later, the residents began to hear shots and then mortar fire. As the
town was defenseless(Affidavit of Juan Bustillo Mendoza, Exhibit 5, para. 8),
the contras were easilyable to enter.
Juan Bustillo Mendoza was at home with his wife and his sick mother when
the firing and mortaring began. A mortar fell about four or five yards from his
house. As the invaders shot indiscriminately, the family threw themselveson the
floor and prayed. (Id., paras. 5-7.) Bustillo tesrified:
"After about an hour-and-a-half, they hegan to yell for everybody ta get
out and 1 went to the window and saw that several houses were already
burning. They mortared the iron water tank which made a great noise.
Fifteen minutes later, we heard steps coming towards the house, they
knocked al the door about three times. 1 didn't answer and they broke
down the door and seven people entered with a flashlight into the room
where I waswith my wife,my brother and my nine-year-old sister. My sister
started crying and they told her Io shut up. My mother asked why she had
Io shut up, that she was very Young.Then they threatened my mother with
a hayonet and told her they were going to kill her. My mother asked why,
if they cal1themselvesChristians, they did such things and they told her to
shut up or they would shoot her. They said that if they killed, they did so
in the name of Cod, and not because they wanted ta.
Then they told us to gel out, hecause they were going ta hurn the
bouse. . They put a pistol to my mother's rihs and said that if 1 ran away,
they would shoot her." (Id., paras. 9-13.)
Hereherto SilesMartinez. a non-Miskito who was in charee of the warehousc.
was al home with his wife'and four-year-old girl. On he;ing the firing, the;
threw themselveson the floor and covered themselves withmattresses.
"About a half-an-hour later, they began to bang bard on the door,
shouting in Miskito. We were scared - we didn't know what ta do because
we didn't understand. 1don't know how they realized it, but they began ta
shout in Spanish, telling us to get out or else they would setus on fire right
there. We understood and opened the door.
With a shove, they pushed me out, the same with my wife. 1asked them
if they would give me the time Io get a blanket and some pants because we
didn't haveanything ready and they said they were taking us away. They
refused." (Affidavit ofHereberto Siles Martinez, Exhibit 6, paras. 5-6.) REPORT OP A FACT-PINOING MISSION 351
Nicolas Chan, 49, a half-Miskito, half-Chinese radio technician, was alone in
his house as his family was in Puerto Cabezas. Crouched on the floor,
"1 couldn't even raise my head because the bullets were flyingnear the
roof. They passed by yelling in Miskito for everyone to get out of their
houses . . .
They said they weregoing to burn the houses.
Some of the contras came and baneed on mv win.ow. telline me t- pet -
out, that they weregoing to burn the8ouses.
In the dark, 1was able to grab a mosquito-net, somepants, a shirt, and
1went out.
They told meto walk towards Yulnata and not to take one step backwards.
1saw that they were burning the houses and the woods. First theyburned
by the workshop, the general offices." (Affidavit of Nicolas Chan Irias,
Exhibit 4, paras. 4-9.)
Two of the affiants give the number of people taken as 1,500. (Affidavit of
Rosalia Gutierrez Lopez, Exhihit 1,para. 12; Affidavit of Nicolas Chan Irias,
Exhibit 4, para. 14.) (In its report "Trahil Nani", at p. 37, the Centro de
Investigaciones yDocumentacion Sobre la Costa Atlantiea, a government-funded
research institute, gives an estimate of 1,250.)Of these, about 15 or 20 were
people who apparently were expecting the attack (and may have helped prepare
il), as they had al1their belongings ready for the march. (Affidavit of Nicolas
Chan Irias, Exhibit 4, para. 14.) Many of the others, who had nothing with
them, were crying as they were taken away. (Id.)
That nieht the o',nle were made to walk until dawn. In the dark. thev had to
cross a dizy river. SlicolasChan ~nd Hereherio Siles fell in. and urre forçed io
coniinue on uct. (,\thdavit of Nir<)l.isChan Irias. Exhibit 1. pard 12: Allidavit
of Ilcreberto SilesMariiner. lixhibii 6. nsra. 8.1Ai 7 ani thr ncxt niorninc. iher
came to the Rio Ulan and sbent al1day hiding'in the hills because of thePlanes
flying overhead. (Affidavit of Rosalia Gutierrez Lopez, Exhibit 1, para. II ;
Affidavit of Nicolas Chan Irias, Exhibit 4, para. 15.)
That evc~~ne the eru . set off aeai"~ walkine until 6 am the next mornine
ihrough a pin~forcsi. 'I'hçgroup had no.food. aA the childrcn and ulJcr
ucrc having s dillisuli timc. I.'rom6am io II sni ihey u,alkeJ ihrough the hillr
unid the\ reachcd ihc Rio Co~co(.Altidavti of Kasalta Ciuiicrrcz 1.0~~7. Exhibir 1.
paras. 15-16;Affidavit of ~ichofas Chan Irias, Exhihit 4, paras. 5-15:)
That first day, lnnocente Tinoco's wife gave birth. After she rested for jus1
one hour, they had to continue marching and it was only the next day, in
Honduras, that they were givena nurse to cut the umbilical cord. (Affidavit of
Innocente Tinoco Diaz, Exhibit 3, paras. 11-13.)
When they got to the river, the contras shot into the air as a sign. From the
other side, the sign was returned and canoes began to take the group in crossings
that lasted al1day. (Affidavitof Juan Bustillo Mendoza, Exhibit 5, paras. 17-18.)
Once in Honduras the group, which had gone three days without eating, was
taken to a camp called Kiwastara where they were fedand allowed to rest for
three days. (Affidavit of Rosalia Gutierrez Lopez, Exhihit 1, para. 18.)
They were then forced to march on, for one-and-a-halfdays,toward Srumlaya.
On the way, they passed through a provisional conrra hase where the contras
took a census, separating out those men 15-20years old, 20-25 years old and so
on up to 40, tellingthem that they would be sent on to a central base for military
training and return to Nicaragua to fight against the "communists". (Id.,
paras. 20-24.) There, a helicopter marked "USA" dropped off munitions 10the352 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACT~VIT~ES
contras, as well as military boots which were then given to the ones who had
been selectedto fight. (Affidavit ofJuan Bustillo Mendoza, Exhibit 5, para. 24.)
In Auka. the erouD was received bv soldiers of the 5th Militarv R,eion.of
Ilonduras. (~nid;,,ii'of Kovïlia ~utic;rer Lope?, I.xhibii 1. para. 25 ) Ai I am
the group continuerl on 10 the abandonrd hamlet oI'Tdp3mlaya,whcre ihry wcre
toldto choose houses from amonr those that had ~reviouslv been homes 10
-
other refugees. (Id., para. 28.)
There, the conrras separated out some 100-120fighting-age menand took them
away forceably. Only a few - "less than five per cent" according to one
witnessseemed to want to go. (Id., para. 30.)Gregorio Winter, 29,a technician,
was not sent to fight because of his educational level:
"One of the commanders told me that 20 of the boys in the line-up aren't
worth what I'm worth and that its really difficultto bring educated people
from Nicaragua and that 1 would bc with them in their central office with
the 'old man' - Steadman Fagoth. They even gave mea paper to present
to the council of elders so I'd be sent to the central base." (Affidavit of
Gregono Winter, Exhibit 2, para. 4.)
The remainder were then gathered together in a small Moravian church where
they were told that foreignjournalists and officiais of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) would becoming, and that the captives
were not to tell them that they had heen kidnapped.
"They said that the 'gringos'and thejournalists were communists like the
Sandinistas and that we had to say that we had come of our own free will,
and that the Sandinista military had thrown us out of town, werepersecuting
us and that there was no freedom in Nicaragua. They said that if we didn't
they would punish us, they would cut our tongues and make us swallow
water by dunking our heads in the river." (Affidavit of Rosalia Gutierrez
Lopez, Exhibit 1, para. 31.)
When the UNHCR arrived, they heard the story that the captives had been
ordered to give. (Id., para. 33.)
After 15 days, the people weremoved, in Honduran army trucks, over four
nights, to the town of Mocoron. They were told that the transfer was carried
out nocturnally so that the role of the Honduran army would no1he discovered
by the UNHCR. (Id., paras. 34-37.)In Mocoron, where the refugeesagain lived
in abandoned houses, they were again warned Io tell the UNHCR and the many
journalists who arrived that they were Reeingthe Sandinistas. (Id., paras. 40-43.)
Indeed, the people usually intewiewed by the journalists were actually contras
dressed in civilian clothes. (Id., paras. 41-43.)
In Mocoron, Juan Bustillo and Hereberto Siles and their families left the
group and managed to find work with a Companyconstructing a militas. hase
in Dursuna where contras would come and go. Once they saw United States
advisors as well. (Affidavit of Juan Bustillo Mendoza, Exhibit 5, paras. 28-29.)
During their five months there, the contra leaders would often bring in tied-up
coniras who had tried Io escape. (Id., para. 30.)
There were many Nicaraguans working a1 the base, and one day a conrra
leader came to announce that they would al1have to come, whether they liked
it or not, to fight with them in tbeir "final offensive". (Id., paras. 31-32.) Bustillo
and Siles, who with their entire families had contracted malaria, then planned
and executed a 17-day escape through the hills and rivers hack to Nicaragua.
(Affidavit of Juan Bustillo Mendoza, Exhibit 5, paras. 33-43.)
After 15 days in Mocoron, on May 29, 1983, the remainder of the hostage REPORT OF A FACT-FINDIN MGISSION 353
group, some 500, marched for a day-and-a-hall to Wampu Sirpe where, after
receivingeight days'worth of rice and beans from the UNHCR, they were taken
to a hill where most of them still live. There, as the rainy season hegan, they
started to build their own houses of trees and leaves. (Affidavit of Rosalia
Gutierrez Lopez, Exhibit 1, paras. 47-49.)
In Wampu Sirpe, the refugccs, almost without exception, began to fall sick
with conjunctivitis, diarrhoea and malaria. (Id., para. 50.) With only 28 malaria
pillsforthe 500who werethere, virtually everybodycontracted malaria, including
Rosa Gutierrez, Gregono Winter and their two children (id.) and Nicolas Chan,
whoalso had conjunctivitisand boils. (Affidavit of NicholasChan Irias, Exhibit4,
para. 18.)In all, 13people died in the first year the community lived in the hills.
(Afidavit of Rosalia Gutierrez Lopez, Exhibit 1, para. 54.)
The 500of Slimalilawere not alone. On the neighboring hills,aLleast 13other
Nicaraguan Miskito communities, including Santa Clara and Tasba Pain, lived
in similar conditions. (Id., para..)1
The conrras had left one "coordinator" to keep watch over the refugees (id.,
para. 56; Supplemental Affidavit of Nicolas Chan Irias, Exhibit 4, para. 7),
making sure that they continued to tell journalists that they were livingwell
(Alfidavit of Rosalia Gutierrez Lopez, Exhibit 1, para. 56). Similarly, when
officiaisof the Red Cross came Io see if the captives wanted to write to their
families, the coordinator warned them not to. (Id., paras. 57-59.)
The conirasalso raided the refugeecamp four times looking for the remaining
men to take them to fight. (Id., para. 61.)
Escaping was dificult. Nicolas Chan tried to escape twice. The first lime,
traveling with localresidents, he madeilas far as Sir Sir, a one-and-a-half day's
walk, when he was intercepted by three dagger-wielding contras who asked him
where hewas going. When he said he was going to Puerto Lempiras, Honduras,
to look for work, they told him that refugees did not have the right to work.
They accompanied him half way back to Wampu Sirpe and told him that if they
saw him again they would kilt him. (Supplemental Affidavit of NicolasChan
Irias, Exhibit 4, para. 6.) The second time, after a day's walk withthree other
refugees, he was intercepted and sent back by the Honduran Amy. (Id.,
paras. 10.14.)
Subsequently, after his two Failedattempts, Chan smuggled a letter to the
United States. Four months later, after 14 months in Honduras, his family
arrived in Tegucigalpaand wasable Io arrange his return to Nicaragua. (Affidavit
of Nicolas Chan Irias. Exhihit 4, paras. 19-28.)
Rosalia Gutierrez and her family and Innocente Tinoco and his family, al1
malaria-ridden, made their escape by spending almost a month on river boats,
in hiding and on foot before arriving in the Honduran capital of Tegucigalpa.
There. they were given food and lodging hy the UNHCR but had to wait
four more months before heing repatriated to Nicaragua. (Afidavit of Rosalia
Gutierrez Lopez, Exhibit 1, paras. 62-72.)
The majority of those taken to Wampu Sirpe, however, still live there.
24. FRANCIA SIRPE
December 19, 1983
On December 19, 1983,a force of about 500 conrras entered the town of
Francia Sirpe, in Northern Zelaya (Alfidavit of Orlando Wayland Waldiman,
Exhibit 1, para. II ; Affidavit of Otto Borst Conrado, Exhibit 2, para. 12),354 MlLlTARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIBS
"shooting like crazy. with incendiary bullets". (Affidavit of Orlando Wayland
Waldiman, Exhibit 2, para. 7.) When the people did no1 come out of their
houses, the contras went "from house to house, taking al1 the people out with
rifle-blows,and many old people,women, childrenand young people werecrying
out of fear, they didn't want to leave their town". (Id., para. 8.)
Lucio Vargas, a 44-year-old health worker, wasin his house with hiswifeand
children when it was surrounded by about 20 contras. "They said that if I didn't
come out, they would machine-gun the house." (Affidavit of Lucio Vargas
Hooker, Exhibit 3, para. 5.) When they went out, they were grabbed. Vargas
was separated from his family and taken away at gun-point. (Id.) He managed
to gel away, however, whenthe contraswere not looking. (Id., para. 9.) He spent
the night in the mountains with three others who also were able to flee. (Id)
Otto Borst, 50,who is half-German, half-Miskito, washiding above his general
store when the concrus banged on the door demanding food. He gave it IOthem
and then went hack into hiding, but another group came and, breaking the
window, dragged him offto one of their commanders. (Affidavit of Otto Borst
Conrado, Exhihit 2, paras. 16-17.)Borst pleaded withthe commander to let him
go, saying that his wife was sick in the hospital. The commander, who called
himselfLuisAguilera, responded, "Brother, il'swar-lime, march". (Id.,paras. 17-
18.) Nevertheless, Borst, too, was able to escape back to his house when the
commander turned away. (Id., paras. 20-21.)
The contrm concentrated the population in the middle of town. (Affidavit of
Orlando Wayland Waldiman, Exhihit1,para. 9; Allidavit of Otto Borst Conrado,
Exhibit 2, para. 19.)There, Richard Thomas, who worked in popular education
and with the volunteerpolice,tned to mn away but wasgunned down in the back.
(Affidavit of Orlando Wayland Waldiman, Exhihit1, para. 9; Allidavit of Otto
BorstConrado, Exhibit2,para. 14.)The contrasthen sentout twogroups, including
civilians, one to ransack JoséZuniga's store and the other to steal from Otto
Borst'sstore. (Affidavitof Orlando Wayland Waldiman, Exhihit2, para. 13.)
The group that had been sent out, including one of the commanders, began
to ransack Borst's store, to which he had been able to return. They look away
most of the merchandise he had on hand for the Christmas season (worth
185,000cordohas), as wellas 68,000cordobas in cash and a radio. (Id., paras. 20-
21.) Although they warned him that they would burn the house if he did not
come out, Borst was able to make it out the back exit, and he hid in his out-
house al1night. (Id., paras. 21-23.)
Among the people gathered up hy the contras was Monsignor Salvador
Schlaffer, the Catholic Bishop of Zelaya province, who had arrived in Francia
Sirpe that day. When the Bishop protested that he wanted to go hack to Puerto
Cabezas hecause he was infirm with arthritis, thcontras responded that it would
not be possible because the road bock to Puerto Cabezas had been mined.
(Affidavit of Otto Borst Conrado, Exhibit 2, para. 29.)
When another woman complained that she was sick and did not want to leave
with her fivechildren, thecontras shot in the air ahove her head and responded,
"You want to stay as a communist spy, but you're coming with us". (Affidavit
of Orlando Wayland Waldiman, Exhibit 1, para. 14.)
Those in the town who worked with the government, including Orlando
Wayland who supervised the educational program and eight others who worked
in health, education and welfare, had their hands tied behind their backs.
(Affidavit of Orlando Wayland Waldiman, Exhihit 7, para. 10.)
The people werethen moved out to the nearby village of Wisconsin.The men
made the three-hour march on foot while the contras used the Bishop's Jeep to
transport the women in several trips. (Id., para. 15.) REPORT OF A FACT-FINDINGMISSION 355
The next morning, as those few residents of Francia Sirpe who had hid or
werespared came out, they found a ghost town. Only 18of Francia Sirpe's 1,250
people were left. (Affidavit ofOtto Borst Conrado, Exhibit 2, para. 27; Affidavit
of Lucio Varga Hooker, Exhihit 3, paras. 10-15.)The doors of the houses were
al1 broken in. (Affidavit of Otto Borst Conrado, Exhibit 2, para. 28.) lose
Zuniga's store was as empty as Otto Borst's (id.) and the road Io La Tronquera
had been mined. (Id., para. 31.)
In Wisconsin, the road ended, and the conrras and their captives began to
mar~ ~alone - muddv tr,il. The contras. who had been eetti-e dr-nk from the
çtiilcn Iiquor. hegan to firc iheir \rcJponiogci the peciplc,u,ho ucrc rcrîaming
;ind cr\ina, to mu\e idstcr. (AltiJ~vil of Orl<indo\V;iylxnJ M'xldimxn,L'xhibii1,
para. i7.) In the group, in addition to the ~isho~ and other priests, was a
journalist who identified himselfas American. (Id., para. 20.)
After camping for the night, the group marched onward when they heard
fighting behind them. The leader of the conrragroup, Juan Solorzano, a former
member of Somoza's National Guard now using the pseudonym Juan Blanco
(id., para. II), ordered the people to run, and they did until they reached the
mountains (id., para. 22). The next day, at 3am, they again marched al1 day
until they got close to the Rio Coco. That day, two women gave hirth. Their
umbilicalcords werecut and theywerethen forcedto march on. (Id.,paras. 23-24.)
The nex day they reached Esperanca, on the Rio Coco, where Steadman
Fagoth, the Miskito contra leader, was waiting for them. Upon seeing the dead
and wounded conrrasfrom skirmishesalong the way, he told the nine government
workers "for these dead, you will pay". (Id., paras. 25-26.) They were then
handcuffed and thrown down three or four yards to the river hy contra
commander "Evil Face". Orlando Wayman testified:
"[Hle grabhed me by the hair and picked meup and began to drown me
in the water. When 1 began to lose consciousness, he took me out, and 1
was left deaf, deaf. Then he began to beat both my ears and water came
from my mouth and my nose." (Ici..,para. 26.)
The other government workers received similar treatment. (Id., para. 28.)
Everyone in the group, including the nine government workers, wasthen taken
across the river in small boats and Fagoth told them that the boys were going
to be recruited and the others would be sent to refugee camps in Wampu Sirpe
(like the people of Slimalila). About 40 were taken to fight. (Id., para. 30-31.)
Once'in Honduras, the others were taken toward Mocoron, on the way 10
Wampu Sirpe, while the government workers were taken to a military camp.
(Id,, paras. 32-33.)
In the military camp, the government workers were kept in a four-foot high,
poorly covered, muddy pig sty. (Affidavit of Orlando Wayland Waldiman,
Exhibit 7, paras. 33-35.) Orlando Wayland testified as to what their captors
did next :
"The nextday, the tortures began . . They drowned me in the water in
the morning. In the evening, they lied me up in the water rrom 7pm until
1am. The next day, at 7am, they began to make me collectgarhage in the
creek in my underwear, with the cold. The creek was really icey. 1 was in
the creek for four hours . . .
They they threw meon the ant hill. Tied up, they put me chest-down on
the ant hill. The [red] ants bit my body, 1squirmed to try to get them off
my body, but there were too many. REPORT OF A FACT-FINDINC MISSION 357
the people of the town were willing Io go with the contras, his family "didn't
want to go Io Honduras". (Affidavitof Otto Borst Conrado, Exhibit 2, para. 38.)
He has not heard from them since, except via a letter from a niece in the United
States, who told him the family wrote to her stating they are unable to leave
Honduras. (Id.) In the ransacking of his store he lost everything he had,
"everything 1had fought to earn. 1have 10children and my salary isn'tenough
to make ends meet." (Id., para. 35.)
Lucio Vargas los1his wife,five children, fivegrandchildren, his sister and her
six children, and orher family members. (Affidavit of Lucio Vargas Hooker,
Exhihit 3, paras. 11-12,20.) He has received a note from his wife through the
Red Cross that they are in Mocoron along with his mother, who had been
kidnapped from Andres with a brother and sister and their families,and with a
brother who was taken from Santa Clara. (Id.,para. 17.)The note also said that
one of their children had died, but it did not say how. (Id.) Like Otto Borst, he
has written letters to try to get his family back, but thus far in vain. (Id.,
para. 19; Affidavit of Otto Borst Conrado, Exhibit 2, para. 39.) Both Vargas
and Borst now live in Puerto Cahezas.
June 19,1983
On the evening of June 19, 1983,a small contra band in a fishing boat landed
in the Southern Zelaya fishing village of Set NetPoint. (Affidavit of Father
Martin Piner Miranda, Exhibit 1, paras. 1-4, 10.)As the people were leaving a
service in the Moravian church, the contras grabhed them and began to take
them to the boat, which some residents identifiedas having been stolen from the
village of Monkey Point. (Id., paras. 5, 10.)
One of those taken was Martin Piner, the Miskito Moravian pastor. The
contras searched him. look his identification naoers as well as the card the
~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ r ~ ~~-~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
government issuesto priests for their protection, and pushed him on to the boat.
"1didn't want to go .. .but 1didn't have anv choice. They said thev were roin- -
to throw me in the ocean." (Id., para. 8.)
In all, 107 people were taken on the boat, the entire town except for five
families that managed to flee. (Id., para. 9.) According to the pastor, "Some
in the community wanted to go, but the others didn't want to go but were
forced . . The majority were not in agreement." (Id., paras. 6, 10.)Caught by
surprise, the people wereunable to bring their helongings. (Id., paras. 12-15,)
After sailing 18hours, the boat reached Puerto Limon, Costa Rica, where the
oeoole were met and eiven oaoers hv Costa Rican immieration. (Id.. oaras. 12-
. . - .. . ..
15.) I;roni thcre, a bus nixir.sr.veral.trips io iakc ihcm tg Pucblo Nucvu. Coji;i
I<!r.a.wlicrc thc Pamilicruerc disirihutcd tu varioui houws. (Id.. piirai. 16-17.)
'lhcv iilived in Pucbl.>Vucto. liach i1.1t.ihc Coit;i Kican author1t8cja'oulJ
take <hem.to a kitchen to eat, while costa Rican soldiers surrounded their
settlement. (Id., para. 18.) "We felt like prisoners there, hecause they said we
couldn't leave." (Id., para. 19.)
After 29 ddys, Father Piner was given permission to go huy cigarettes and,
meeting a contra, he asked to be taken to their base. There he met Brooklyn
Rivera, a Miskito contra leader. As a way to get hack home, Piner asked Rivera
if he could go back to Nicaragua with them. Rivera agreed and Piner was given
a rifleand sent with eight others on an outboard motorhoat towards Nicaragua.
(Id.,paras. 20-25.)358 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACIIVITIES
After two-and-a-half days, the boat landed in Walpdsixa in North Zelayd.
There, while the others were sleeping, Father Piner managed to escape. (Id.,
paras. 24-26.)
Father Piner's encounters with the contras were not over, however. After
reporting to the Nicaraguan authorities he went 10 live in the village of Sisin,
where, as a result of his experience withthe contras,he decided to work with the
army, giving it information on contra movements. "As a pastor, 1 wanted to
avoid more deaths." (Id.,paras. 27-32.)One day, in June or July of 1984,on his
way to his father's farm, he was stopped by two armed contras who, pointing
their guns at him, led him to a hill where 36 others were stationed. There, the
leader told him that they had been looking for him for some time. (Id.,
paras. 33-35.)
From there. he was marched for several davs io the Rus Rus contra base in
Honduras where hc war prescnted io~!c;idman Fagoth. another \li\kiio n~nrra
leader. whoshowcd him a Iistor"S:indinlsta rpier" on uhich his n3mcappeared.
(Id.,paras. 36-39.)
Father Piner's head wasthen shaved and he was left for three days with no
food. (Id.,paras. 40-41.) Next he was taken to a river, where "Jimmy", one of
the conlrm:
"grdbbed me by the neck and put my head down in the water. When 1
couldn't take it anymore, he picked me up and put me back in the water
agdin. It was like that for half an hour.
They look me from there and tied me to a pine tree in the camp for 3
days.
After 3days, they untied me. 1hadn't eaten for 5days." (Id.,paras. 42-43.)
Father Piner then agreed to work with the contras,and they began to givehim
training. Each night, he was also given guard duty, but he oîten fell asleep and,
fiveor six limes, was punished with a similar water treatment. (Id.,paras. 44-45.)
Father Piner was trained for 19ddys. While most of those in the camp were
Miskitos, there were also four oriental men in the camp who spoke no Spanish
and who twice forced Father Piner to eat snakes. (Id.,para. 47.) Father Piner
could not take the rigorous training and began to vomit blood. After spending
six days in a clinic,he asked Fagoth to beallowed to preach. Fagoth agreed and
sent him to Tapamlaya, Honduras, where he spent three months preaching to
Nicaraguan Miskitos. (Id.,paras. 49-51.)
At that point, Father Piner, along with eight others, secretly made their way
to and across the Rio Coco into Nicaragua, and, on November 30, 1984,they
reported to the Nicaraguan authorities. (Id.,paras. 59-60.)
Father Piner is afraid to go back to his community, and now lives in Puerto
Cabezas. (Id.,paras. 61-62.)
October 1983
In October 1983approximately 200 armed contras entered the Miskito town
of Sukatpin in Northern Zeldyd and occupied it for six days, preventing the
inhabitants from leaving. (Affidavit of Baudilio Rivera Perrera, Exhibit 1,
paras. 3-4.)
After six days, the young people of the town, some 200, were taken away.
Baudilio Rivera, 19,had tried to hide in his house but was given away by contra RBPORT OF A FACT-FINDIN MGISSION 359
sympathizers. As a result, he was beaten in the back with a stick and dunked in
the water as the contras led him and the rest of the -Aouo awav. (Id.. oara. 6.1
Rivera testifiedthat there were those in the town who supportei thç coiiras bui
that the majority did not. (Id., para. 5.)
For two weeksthe group marched, sleepingin the mountains, eating raw yucca
and bananas, until they crossed into Honduras and reached Srumlaya. (Id.,
paras. 9-12,) After three days there, the group moved to Auka, thcn Rus Rus,
then to the Misura Military Instruction Center (CIMM). (Id., paras. 12-14.)
There, the group rested for scveral weeks bccause many of them had become
sick on the journey. (Id., paras. 15-16.)
In the CIMM, those in the group were given blue FDN military uniforms and
began to receivetraining - exercises, howto ambush, how to blow up bridges,
how to kidnap people. (The instructions Rivera received on kidnapping are
described inthe Slimalilachapter.) The captives receivedtheir instructions from
non-Miskitos who spoke only Spanish. Honduran soldiersalso came to the base,
as did English-speakers who were identifiedhy the commanders as Americans.
(Id., para. 18.)
After two months of training, a group was equipped and sent back towards
Nicaragua intending to kidnap the people of Sandy Bay. (Id., para. 19.)
They crossed the Rio Coco into Nicaragua at the village ofAndres. After two
days of marching, four of the captives escaped at night. (Id., para. 22.) When
they got close to Sandy Bay, Rivera escaped as well while on guard duty. (Id.,
para. 24.) He now works in Puerto Cabezas as a tractor driver with the
Construction Ministry. (Id., paras. 2, 26.)
December 11, 1984
On December 11, 1984, contra forces began an evening attack with gunfire
and mortars against the Miskito resettlement village of Sangnilaya, about 40
kilometers north of Puerto Cabezas near the Wawa River. (Affidavit ofJohnny
Briman Lopez, Exhibit 1, para. 6.)
After the firine sto~oed. "The contras went from house to house. collectine
young people. They were well-anned, in olive-green and blue unkorms and -
rubber boots." (Id., para. 9.)
Johnny Briman, an auxiliary nurse who was substitutine for the vacationine
regular nurse, hid in a back room in a neighbor'shouse when he saw the conir;
taking away the youths. (Id., paras. 8-10.) Thecontrasyelledto the owner of the
house in which Johnny was hiding, "Are youready, let's go",calling him "son-
of-a-bitch" and telling him he had to go. "Cet a shirt and pants and let's go.
Hurry up. Cet your identificationcard, too." (Id., para. 11.)When he could not
find his identification card, tcontras told him to light a match.
The man's wife was going to light a match but her husband stopped her,
fearing it would give Brimanaway. The contrassaid "so, there'sanother boy"?
but were apparently satisfied by the family's denial. Finally the owner of the
house found his card and the contras started to take him, but his wife and step-
mother put up such a fuss that, after hitting him with their rifles, they let him
go. (Id., paras. 15-16.)
The contras took 30 people that night, however, 28 men and two women.
Some were taken away tied up, others were beaten. To one boy, whose mother360 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
was crying, they said, "If we don't defend this country, who will, even if your
mother is crying". (Id.,paras. 17-19.)
The next moming, the mothers and relatives of the hostages got together,
ciying over their lost children. In the afternoon the Nicaraguan army came, but
it was ton late to help. (Id., paras. 22-23.)
Digna Barreda de Ubeda
Digna Barreda de Ubeda of Esteli, a mother of two, is the niece of two well-
known religious leaders, Felipe and Mery Barreda, who were tortured and killed
by the contras [see chapter on Agronica Farm]. On May 3, 1983,Digna and her
husband, Juan Augustin, were visiting the land they had received under the
agrarian reform program in the village of Zapote, near Susucayan, Nueva
Segovia. (Affidavit of Digna Barreda de Ubeda, Exhibit 1, paras. 1-2.) The
couple was staying there with her uncle, who, it turned out, was collaborating
with the contras and who had denounced the couple as Sandinista spies.
That evening after dinner, five contras came to the house, beat up Juan
Augustin, stole a gold chain and watch Digna was wearing, and lied their hands
and look the Iwo of them away along with a one-eyedman from Managua. (Id.,
paras. 6-11.)
Three of the men went hack to talk to the uncle. Upon returning,
"They beat my husband hrutally . . And then, the three who talked with
my uncle raped me so bnitally that 1still have scars on my knees. They put
me face down. Thev raoed me throueh mv rectum ton. And al1this in front
-,
of my husband." (id., para. 12.)
The captives were then taken further on where they met a group of 55 conrras.
There they were interrogated and beaten and Digna was again raped in front of
her husband. (Id., para. 14.)
Two more campesinos were brought in, their hands tied, and the group
continued on until they reached a safe house in the mountains. (Id., paras. 15-
18.)After eating, they continued on until at 4 am they reached a camp of tents
marked "made in USA. (Id., para. 20.) There, while some of the conrras slept,
others interrogated Digna, "torturing me, pressing my eyes, separating my toes
and raping me brutally again". (Id., para. 20.)
Juan Augustin, who still was tied up, asked the contrristo kill him, but he was
told that they were going to take him Io 1-Ionduras,heating him on the way,
where "Benito Bravo", a contra leader, was waiting to kill him, and they "kicked
him and heat him again and again". (Id., paras. 21-22.)
The contras said that they were with the FDN. (Id., para. 23.)
On the fourth day, Digna promised her captors that she would collahorate
with them if they would let her go. After discussing it with the leader and
returning Io talk to Digna's uncle, the conrras agreed, but did not free her yet.
(Id., paras. 25-32.)
That dav. the contras called one of the hostaee", Juan Vallada~e~ ~~ . ~ ~~d
him if he'ioved Tomas Borge (one of the Sandinista commanders) anad the REPORT OF A FACT-FINDING MISSION 361
revolution. When Valladares replied that he did, "they laid himdown on the
ground and they gouged out his eyes with a spoon, then they machine-gunned
him and threw hinl over a cliff". (Id.,paras. 33-34.) At the same time, the one-
eyed man escaped. (Id.,para. 35.)
On the fifth day :
"five of them raped me at about five in the evening . . .They had gang-
raped me every day. When my vagina couldn't take it anymore, they raped
me through my rectum. 1calculate that in fivedays they raped me 60 limes."
(Id.,paras. 37-38.)
That day they Ict Digna go, helieving that she would collahorate with them,
but not before the contra who was assigned Io lead her back to the road raped
her. (Id.,para. 43.) On her request, the contras untied her husband's hands,
which had been bound for fivedays. He wasnot freed,however. (Id.,paras. 39-40.)
Back in Esteli, Digna reported to the authorities on these events and on the
participation of hcr uncle, who had oflèred her a bribe not to do so. (Id.,
paras. 44-47.) She was taken to the hospiial where she was treated and her
vagina was cleaned. Her husband escaped during a battle 15 days later. (Id.,
paras. 48 and 51 .)
Her difficultieswere not over. however. Her house in Esteli was set on fire and
she waj forceclio niovc. (Id..para. 52. 11-lerfdiher :in1st) hrothers u,crcrohbed
and kiclnap(x.d.One <iiihr hrothcr, rïturncd aftcr having beentaken to HoiiJur;is
while the other is still missing. Another camvesino wasalso kidna~ued.w.th her
brothers, and reportedly his ienis was cut off. (Id.,paras. 53-56.)
Marta Arauz de Ubeda
Marta Arauz de Ubeda, 19, from Jinotega, was returning from Pantasma on
September 24' 1984, with her sick mother and her two-and-a-hall-year-old
daughter. They got a ride in a truck which was also taking five young teachcrs
and several other people. (Affidavitof Marta Arauz de Ubeda, Exhibit 2,paras. 1
and 3.)
When they got to Las Cruces, their truck was attacked by 500 armed and
uniformed men. The attackers took the passengers out one-by-one, robbing them
of their belongings. They were particularly severewith the teachers, calling them
"the sons of hitches, teaching communism to the children". (Id.,paras. 4-9.)
One of the contrus recognized Marta because her husband had worked with
the Sandinista Front in Pantasma.
"[He said] 'Gct that woman down. She's a hitch, rahid dog.' 1 said 1
wasn't. Then about eight of them pointed their rifles at me. 1yelled to my
mother 'marna. mama, they want to kill me'.My mother jumped out of the
truck and said 'why are you going Io kill my daughter? They answered
'you old bitch, you're not the one who decides, we are'." (Id.,para. Il.)
The contras brought Marta up close to where they were burning a heer truck,
and the Rames hurned her. She tried to get away but they would no1 let her.
Then they took off her shoes and forced her to march along with the teachers.
"They made me walk about four hours through the mountains, 1was harefoot
and they made me carry sugar cane. The teachers were tied in a single file." (Id.,
paras. 12-15.)
During the march they pointed their guns al her, threatened to kill her, and
asked her if she wanted to kill the teachers. (Id.,paras. 15-17.)The group finally
arrived at the house of a collahorator where they spent the night. (Id.,para. 18.)
"There, outside of the house they undressed me and wrestled me to the362 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTlVITlES
ground. They took me by force and raped me . . 1heard the screams of
the other women and i'm sure they wereraped too.
1couldn't sleep. 1spent the night outside with them. They asked me if 1
wanted to go 10 Honduras, if 1 wanted 10 be their woman. They told me
they would take me to the United States and Honduras. . 1 cried.
We were there until morning, the teachers tied up. It was windy and the
mosquitos were biting us." (Id., paras. 19-22.)
In the morning, when the group was leaving, Marta snuck into the house,
telling the woman of the house that she had been told by the leader to wait
there. Marta was able to hide in the house while the group left, and until the
Nicaraguan army arrived and rescued her an hour later. (Id.,paras. 23-27.)
Mima Cunningham
Mirna Cunningham, 37, is a half-Miskito and half-Black doctor who, in 1984,
was named government Minister for Special Zone 1,Zelaya Norte.
On December 28, 1981, she was returning Io Waspam from a hospital
inspection in her home town of Bilwascarma, with a driver, a nurse and the
hospital administrator, Oscar Hudson.
"About 600 meters from the hospital gate, the car was attacked by a
group of around 20 armed people who started shooting al the car. When
the shooting stopped, the hospital administrator was able to jump out and
run into the hush. He got shot in the leg, one of his leg- two shots. The
rest of us, we were taken out of the car and beaten with rifle hutts al1over
Ourbodies. And after that they made us gel into the car again. They forced
the driver to go back into the villageat knife point." (Interview attached to
Afidavit of Mirna Cunningham, Exhibit 3, pp. 19-20.)
They look the captives to a house on the Rio Coco where:
"They lied us up, and said they were going to kill us, and they continued
to hit us. They held us for several hours. Later they took two of the other
doctors who were at the hospital; they were dragging them down to the
river. also tied up and hitting them. When it got dark, they separated the
doctors, and they took the nurse and myselfto a hut, a little house near the
river.
At this house. they had us there for seven hours. During those hours we
were raped for the first time. While they wereraping us, they were chanting
slogans like 'Christ yesterday, Christtoday, Christ tomorrow'.
. . .And although we would cry or shout, they would hit us, and put a
knife or a gun to Ourhead. This went on for almost two hours." (Id.,p. 20.)
The hostages were then taken across the river to a training camp in Honduras.
There thev weretold that thev had been kidnappe..because they worked for the
governme&. (Id., p. 20.)
Their captors, including Miskitos and former members of General Somoza's
elite EEBl unit, told them that they had other bases and were receivingtheir
equipment from Washington. (Id., pp. 20-21.)
"They also said that they had Americans who came in and trained them
for these camps that were deeper in Honduras. They said that they received
help from the Honduran army. That they would come and help them
transport their things. They were very proud of the help that they were
receiving from the United States Government. They offered us Camel
cigarettes, for example, as a proof that they were smoking good cigarettes. REPORT OC'A FACT-FINDIN MCISSION 363
And they said they were getting canned food, good clothes and things like
that, as a way to tell us why they were fighting." (Id., p. 21.)
After two or three hours in the camp,
"They told us that they were going to kill us, but they wanted to kill us
in Nicaragua to leave Our bodies as an example to the other people who
work with the Nicaraguan government.
They made us walk to the river again and cross the river, on Our way
back we were raped again, by al1the ones who were taking us 10the village."
(Id., p. 22.)
In the village the captives were released, but they were told that they should
leave the Atlantic Coast because the contras did not want doctors there. (Id.,
p. 23.)
When they got back to the hospital:
"[Wle round Oscar Hudson in the bush with two shois in his leg. We
were able to save him. We were al1bruised for several days, bleeding. The
nurse who went through this also was very disturbed emotionally.
The hospital had to be closed also, because counterrevolutionaries went
in the hospital. They stole instruments, medicine, things were broken and
they terrorized the patients, and the other health workers, who were afraid
to continue working there. So we had to close the hospital." (Id., p. 23.)
Mileydis Salina Azevedo and Ermelina Diaz Talavera
In October 1984,10 armed contras arrived at the Salina house in SanJeronimo
de Chachagua, Nueva Segovia province, and told Mileydis Salina, 15, that she
had to come with them. She and her mother pleaded with the intruders, but they
insisted. (Affidavit of Mileydis Salina, Exhibit 4, paras. 3 and 4.)
The conrras also went to the nearby house where Ermelina Diaz, 14, lived,
and told her that she was coming with them. "1 told them 1didn't want to go, 1
was very afraid. They told me I had to go, they didn't say why." (Aiïidavit of
Ermelina Diaz Talavera, Exhibit 5, para. 4.)
When the contras al1joined together, there were about 100of them, and they
had taken three other hostages in addition to the girls. (Affidavit of Mileydis
Salina Azevedo, Exhibit 4, para. 3; Affidavit of Ermelina Diaz Talavera,
Exhibit 5, para. 6.) After walking al1day, they told the girls that they would
both have to çhoose one of the contrris to sleep with, or they would al1 take
them. (Affidavit of Mileydis Salina Azevedo, Exhibit 4, para. 6 and Affidavit of
Ermelina Diaz Talavera, Exhibit 5, para. 7.)The girls did choose, "because that's
what had to be done" (Affidavit of Ermelina Diaz Talavera, Exhibit 5, para. 8),
and for the next 55days they slept with the men they had been forced to choose.
During that time, the band participated in nine combats, most of them with the
Nicaraguan army, although on one occasionthey ambushed a civilianpick-uptmck,
killingsome of its passengers.(Id., para. 12.)Although the girlshad rifles,they did
no1 fight, but camed backpacks with munitions. (Afiidavit of Mileydis Salina
Azevedo, Exhibit 4, paras. 10,20; Affidant of Ermelina Di;v.Talavera, Exhibit 5,
paras. 10, 11.)They received little to eat. (Affidavit of Mileydis Salina Azevedo,
Exhibit 4, para. 20; AEdavit of Ermelina Diaz Talavera, Exhibit 5, para. IO.)
Among the group were five soldien who said that they were not Nicaraguan.
(Affidavitof Mileydis Salina Azevedo, Exhibit4, para. 20.)
The girls were finally able to escape while the group was resting, and they
made it home the same day. (Id., paras. 21 and 22; Affidavit of Ermelina Diaz
Talavera, Exhibit 5, paras. 13 and 14.) Both plan to move to Murra because364 MILITARYAND PARAMII.ITARYACTIVITIBS
they feel it is saler, and they had been warned that if they escaped and were
caught, they would not get away again. (Affidavit of Mileydis Salina Azevedo,
Exhibit 4, para. 23 and AAdavit of Ermelina Diaz Talavera, Exhibit 5, para. 15.)
Josefina Inestroza and Abelina lnestroza
On December 18, 1984, at 7pm, six armed, blue-uniformed, conrras entered
the lnestroza house in El Horcon, jus1outside of Susucayan. They said tbai they
came to take away one of the boys, Purification, because he was a miliciano.
When they could not find him, they turned on Josefina, 24, and Abelina, 20,
both mothers. Testifying the next day, Abelina recounted:
"Tbey grabbed us, me and my sister . .. and raped us in front of the
whole family. They turned out the lights and two of them raped me and
two others raped my sister. They told us not to scream because they would
kill us. They threatened us with their bayonets. They pointed their guns at
the others in thehouse." (Affidavit of Ahelina Inestroza, Exhihit 7, para. 6;
seealso Affidavit of Josefina lnestroza de Reyes, Exhibit 6, para. 6.)
Before leaving, the conrras told the family that they would return at 8am the
next morning "for coffee". (Affidavit of Josefina lnestroza de Reyes, Exhibit 6,
para. 7.) Early in the morning the whole family left the house for Susucayan
where they gave this testimony. Even though they left cverything in their house,
they will not go back there but will move to Ocotal. (Id., para. 8; Affidavit of
Abelina Inestroza, Exhibit 7, paras. 8-9.) STATEMENT OF DONALD T. FOX AND MICHAEL J.GLENNON
March 7, 1985
Last weekend we returned from Nicaragua. We spent the preceding week,
from February 23Io March 2, in that country at the request of the International
Human Rights Law Croup and the Washington Officeon Latin America. Our
sponsors had received, among other matenals, a detailed report prepared by
Reed Brody, a New York attorney, which described extensiveabuses committed
by the contrai. against the civilian population. Our sponsors asked that we
investigate allegations that the "contras",or counterrevolutionarics, had violated
the nghts of Nicaraguan civilians or engaged in acts contrary to standards
established by international conventions applicable IO interna1 conflicts for the
protection of persons not or no longer taking an active part in hostilities. In
addition we were asked to determine whether the material in Mr. Brody's re-
port is reliable. We will filea full report in about ten days; this statement sum-
marizes our inquiry'smethodology, scope, findings,conclusions and recommenda-
tions.
Our investigation was limited to the FDN (Frente Democratico Nicaraguense)
group of the contra,which makes incursions into northern Nicaragua from bases
in Honduras. The military leaders of the FDN, which has received support from
the CIA, are former memhers of the National Guard of Anastasio Somoza, the
late dictator of Nicaragua. In seeking to assess the accuracy of allegations made
concerning the FDN, we traveled Io Ocotal, Jalapa, Condega, Mozonte, Esteli
and neighboring communities, where we interviewed over 30 individuals. Some
had been interviewed previously byMr. Brody; many had not. We took only
first-hand statements; we did no1 interview persons who had not seen or heard
personally the events they described, except for background information or for
leads to other, first-hand witnesses.
In addition, we spoke with relevantofficialsof the Department of State, both
in Washington and in the United States Embassy in Managua. We met in
Managua with Nicaraguan government officials,representatives of human rights
organizations, and church leaders, including Archbishop Obando y Bravo. We
also asked conlru representatives in the United States that we be allowed Io
meet with military commanders at conrra bases in Honduras. Our request was
not ura~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
We emphasize that Ourmission was carried out without the direct or indirect
assistance of either the Nicaraguan or United States governments. Wesourht to
conduct our inau. . as indeoendentlv and obiectivel;,as o.ssible. We foind it
nccrsrary Io iriivcl1,)areas of Yiciiriiguÿ that Siate 1)epartment oliirials h~d
rcci>mrnendedthiit u,ea\,oid for reiisons of safcty.
I3cc~ujea serious shortagc oi'gilsa~l~cAISISthr<iugh<)utN~iarapua. me hircJ
an unniarked vehicleand Jrii,cr irom ihc hicaraguan Minisir) of Foreign AiTJirs.
for u,hichWC paiJ a[ regular market r;ites ï'he Miniiiry ofthc Interior, uarning
that Our safety could not be guaranteed, gave us a telephone number which we
were asked to cal1in the event an emergency arose. We believed, however, that366 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
ta accept any further assistance from the government of Nicaragua would taint
the credibility ofOur findings.
Accordingly, wedid not reveal Ouritinerary, which was, indeed, revisedseveral
times along the way. We went where we wanted ta go, when we wanted to go
there. We spoke with whomever we wished. Our interrogations were conducted
in accordance with standard procedures of cross-examination tu determine
probable veracity. Furthemore, to the extent possible, we cross-checked among
sources, hoth individual and documentary, tu assure objectivity.
No governmental consent was required for any interview (with the exception
of the former head of intelliaence at the FDN base Pino Uno. from which
incursions inio nririhcrn Nicaragua arc launchcd Ilc 1scurrcnily incaruratcd at
ihç .Model<iPrison ai Tipitapa). The only Iimits on where we could go or who
we could meet were Ourown schedule and endurance. We did not interview any
one who was brought to us hy the Nicaraguan government. (In one instance,
one of Our contacts, unable tu find a person we wished to interview, went to a
local Sandinista official to help locate the person; we decided not to include the
person's statement in Our report.)
We I<~okedprimarily ai \i<>laiionriif ;ivili<inrighir by the<.i>t!rrü,\lihough
u.2 aïkcd regularly ahilut \iolations b) the Sandiniitli,, ue ackni,u,lcdgc rhai Our
inquiry focuscd. by the direction of our sponsors, principally upon ihc ion1ru.i
\Vcbclicvcthai this focus wasjustified. Iluman rights violations by the Sandinisi;is
already have kcn inveitigated in dcpth h) such gri~upsa\ the Intcr-Amcrican
Commission on Human Rights and Americas Watch
Officiaisof the Department of State who asked not to be identified told us
that they are not aware of the validity of "any or all" of these allegations
regarding conrra abuses. "We have no firm knowledge ofwhat's goingon in the
field", they said. These officialstold us that the intelligence community has not
been "tasked" ta find out, Le.,that it has not been directed ta gather intelligence
on the issue. Thus the Department, for reasons that were not fully specified,
has remained in what the officials described as "intentional ignorance" of the
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Despite the State Department's profession of ignorance, a fairly clear pattern
emeraed from conversations with the individuals we interviewed in the war zone
alongthe Honduras border.
State Department officials had told us that the conirus' two objectives are
"debilitation of the Nicaraguan economy" and "killing Nicaraguan soldiers".
Yet we found that a substantial number of conrra attacks in the Department of
Nueva Segovia wereassociated with actions that went heyond limits estahlished
for the protection of non-combatants.
The conirus attack "economic" targets such as lumber yards, coffee processing
olants. electrical eeneratine stations and the like. Thev also attack individuals
heemed to be co~rihutor~to the country's economy or tu its defense, such as
telephone workers, coffee pickers, teachers, technicians and members of the
civiiian-based militia.
But suhstantial credible evidencc exists that conrru violence is also directed STATEMENT 367
with some frequency at individuals who have no apparent economic, militdry,
or political significance and against persons who are hors de combat. A few
examples, based on our interviews, follow.
One 28-year-old woman from El Jicaro described a conrraattack on her house
that occurred on October 24, 1984,about 4.30 am. The conrrasbroke down the
door with the butts of their rifles, she said, grahhed her husband, knocked him
unconscious with their weapons and lied him up. With their three children
watching, one conrrathen took out a bayonet and slit her husband's throat. As
he lay bleeding to death, their little girl ran up to her father and said: "What's
happening to Daddy ?' A conrrathen grabbed the mother and said "Corne with
us!" and tried to pull her from her children. When she resisted, he hit herand
she fell unconscious. When she woke up on ber col, the contrus were going
through their belongings, "taking what they wanted". When they finished, a
conrruwho had been giving instructions from outside her house asked those
inside, "Did you do what you were supposed to do?'
Why, we asked, bad her husband been killed? She did not know. "He never
got involved in anything. He was a carpenter. He was not in adult education, or
anything like that." Was he a communist? "1 don't know what they are. 1am a
Catholic. We went [to Mass] every Sunday together."
A 28-year-old woman from the municipality of Quilali in Nueva Segovia
descrihed a contruattack that occurred on her villace on December 18. 1983. At
about 9 am, she said, she heard gunfire whilefeeding her six children breakfast.
She gathered them together and look them to a shelter. "The conrrashot up the
whole village and al1the houses", she said.
"They grabbed a 15-year-old girl and took away her gun - she was in
the militia.1 was about [30 yards] away. She was screaming. There were
about 50 contrasaround her. One of them raped her. The same person then
took his bayonct in his hand and cut ber throat. Wben 1saw her throat cut
1 decided 1should run away because they would do the same to me. They
shot at us, but we went into a gully and escaped. As we did, they hegan
firing [burning] houses. About 17 of 23 houses were hurned. Twelve militia
were killed, and two little girls. Among the militia were two brothers and
my father."
A 21-year-old man told of riding las1December in a Ministry of Construction
truck when it was hit with a rocket. The conrrassoon had the truck surrounded,
and after machine-gunning some survivors and cutting the throats of others,
they set the truck on fire. "There were people alive inside the truck", he said. "1
could hear the cries of those people. One was a cbild, about fiveyears old." The
man. who was wounded, survived hy playing dead, he said.
A 53-year-old man from Condega described driving to Jinotega on
December 26, 1984,following his son's wedding. Suddenly the pick-up tmck was
bit hy machine-gun fire. The truck stopped; every one inside dropped to the
floor. When the shooting stopped, men in uniforms that said "FDN" came up
Io the truck. Although wounded in several places, he liftedhimself up, and saw
that six of the ten people in the truck had heen killed, including his wife and
new daughter-in-law. "Look what you've done!" 1said. "You've killedwomen
and children! Look what you've done! We don't even have guns!" They said
nothinp. Thev,-ust walked awav.
II,\\on uas iilm intervieweci "Aiier ihe actions of ihese .freedom fighterr'."
hc x~id."1 ~.rau,leJfrom the vehicle and found 3 f;irm uorker to gel help." "1
hocc ihat thesr.uurdr willJu sumethinr-b~ckin the Ilnitcd Sistes". hezoncludrJ.
"~e just want to live in peace."368 MILITARVAND PARAMLLITARYACTIVITIES
Another category of alleged contra actions consists of kidnappings. Credible
evidenceexiststhat. with some freauencv, teenaeed bovsand others are kidnapwd
and taken to Honduras. On occaiion, Chekidnappings appear to comprise fa-irly
large groups. Some of the victims are compelled to join the contra. Others are
required to perform various services.Others are simply interned.
A 28-year-old telephone Company technician in Esteli told us of his own
kidnapping. It occurred on December 28, 1982. He had gone with about 100
people to a farm in Urales, about one kilometer from the Honduran border, to
pick coffee.The group consisted of professors, doctors, technicians and a variety
of different specialists. About 11.30am, while they were in the fields, mortar
shelling began along with machine-gun fire. The conrras surrounded the farm,
capturing him and a number of the others, including Mery and Felipe Barreda.
The Barredas werethe highly-respectedheads of the Christian-based Communities
... -. .. .. .
This witness,who managed to escape, related indetail the tortureand execution
of the Barreda couple. His testimonv is confirmed bv the bishop of Esteli, who
issueda communiquecondemning thk "inhuman actXiofkidnapPing and murder.
Many of the incursions during which these violations occurred involved
numbers of FDN troovs laree en-ueh to warrant the oresence of a command
structure Smallcr gruups wrre allegrd IO he equippcd wiih communicaiions
equipmeni ihlii kepi theni in contact wiih oiher elemenis of ihe Fl>N. Thuh. the
violations do not~a~~. . to result from individual abberations: nor do thev
app.<rr iu be cumiiiiitcd by isolated mariuders
II is pussiblih~i somc of the siaicmrnis u,e iook are l'alseor exaggcraied. WC
intend to exclude from Our report the two or three we doubt. But given the
number of oersons interviewed. the varietv of sites at which the interviews took
place, the multiplicity of contacts by which the witnesses were identified,and the
cross-checking that was on occasion feasible, the preponderance of the evidence
indicates thaïthe contras are committing serious abuies against civilians.
We believe that suiliciently reliable evidence is now available to place the
United States government on notice with respect to the actions for which its
assistance has been and would be used.Although we were not able to investigate
al1 of the ailidavits on which Mr. Brodv', reoo.t is based. most that we did
investigate appear accurate in al1 material respects. The weight of probative
evidence indicates a reasonable basis to believethat the contras engage in acts of
terroristic violence aeainst unarmed civilians. To the extent that iiis reasonablv
foreseeable that theywill continue to engage in such acts, any provision of aid
to the contras, directly or indirectly, by the government of the United States
would render our government responsible for their acts.
The United States eovernment cannot hide behind a veil of intentional
ignorance. Alihough th: evidencc of frcquînt (onrra aburçs may hç rcbuitable
by an afirmative effori of the United Staics go\ernment. ah of ihii dlirc. no sueh
effort has been made.
In the absence of anv showine t" the contrarv. the evidence now extant of
grievou, contru violdtion~of the righis of proiected persons under inir.rnd11onal
Idwmu\i hc prc.umed prima iàcie \alid The burden (if~içr\uasiunhds elfs~ti\elv
shifted to those who assert that the contras have conducted themselves in a
manner that permits the support of the United States. Unless it can be established
to a reasonable certainty that the contras do not engage in such acts of illegal STATEMENT 369
terroristic violence, regardlesr of any other considerations, further support by
the United States is indefensible.
RECOMMENUATIO?I
We recommend that the appropriate committees of the Congress investigate
fully and completely acls of violence committed by the contras. Congress should
not approve further assistance to the conrrus unless it detemines that the conlras'
acts do not exhibit a consistent pattern of violation of the nghts of persons who
are not or are no longer taking an active part in hostilities. In the absence of
contrary evidence, we recommend that the Congress prohihit any form of
assistance, direct or indirect, to the contras.
We further recommend that the appropriate committees of the Congress
investigate whether relevant executivedepartments and agencies have remained
"intentionally ignorant" of these serious abuses committed by forces supported
by the United Statcs.
Mr. Donald Fox is a senior partner in the New York law firm Fox, Glynn
and Melamed. He graduated from New York University Law School in 1956
and also studied Iÿwin France at the University of Paris. He is a member of the
New York State Bar and currently serves as Treasurer for the Bar of the City of
New York.
Mr. Fox is a membcr of the execuiive committee of the American Association
for the International Commission of Jurists. He is the author of a 1979report
on Human Rights in Guatemala and the editor of a 1979 study entitled The
CornhodianIncursion - Lego1Issues.
Professor Michael Glennon teaches International and Constitutional Law at
the University of Cincinnati Law School. He graduated from the University of
Minnesota Law School in 1973.
From 1973until 1977, Professor Glennon worked in the Senate Office of the
Leeislative Counsel. and from 1977until 1980.he served ~ ~le~ ~ coun.el ~o ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~
sr.&ic t'nrc~gn~cl;;i,unr Cummit1r.r..I>rnfcr.;orGlennun Ih:irwriiicn cxicnsivcly
on i,rue, of law 2nd forcign pulic). and 1.ihe ci>-:tuthor(uith Pr<>lbs>o'rl'hoiii:is
M. I-r:inck) of a fic-\uliime ui>rk. Uni~c<l.51ali,.ifi>rl,;yn X~,/UIIOII.u,< SUPPLEMENTALANNEXES TOTHE MEMORIALOF
NICARAGUA
SupplementalAnnexA
CHRONO~.OGIC ACLCOUN TF MILITAR AYND PARAMILITA ARCTIVITIEIS AND
AGAINST NICARAGUA A,RIL-AUGUS 1985
In its Memorial of April30, 1985,Nicaragua presented a detailed chronological
account, hased on evidence before the Court, of the facts establishing the use
and threat of force hy the United States against Nicaragua from March 1981to
April 1985.(See Memorial of Nicaragua of April 30, 1985,pp. 9-37, supro.)The
following is intended to supplement the account set forth in the Memorial,
coveringeventsfrom April 1985through August 1985.Among the most significant
of these events were:
- The appropriation by the United States Congress, and the endctment into
domestic United States law, of an additional $27,000,000 for military and
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaraguaring the fiscal years 1985
and 1986;
- Repeated statements by President Reagan, authoritative officials of his
Administration, and senior members of the United States Congress that the
'ursose of United States ~. >cv in Nicaraeua is to remove or chanc- the
government of Nicaragua;
- Disclosures hy senior United States government officialsthat the United
States has been directly managing and controlling the military and political
activities of the "Nicaraguan democratic resistance forces" that were created,
armed, equipped and trained by the Central IntelligenceAgency; and
- A new militarq onènsivehq these United States-directedforces,penetrating
deep into ~icara~~an territory-and expressly aimed at seizing terriiory in the
most densely populated zones of the country and bringing about political
destabilization.
On Aprtl2.7. IY?ihc IJniirJ Sr;itcsSenaie debaicd President Reagan'srequesi
for S14.OU0.000IO continuc miliiary and p;ir;iniiliiary aciiviiics in and againsi
Nicaraeud in Tircal\car 151icniiinc Sciiicmhc30. 19851.Durine the debaie
on thiFmeasure, sénator ~atnck ~eah~: Vice chairmanof the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, which exercises oversightof al1United States-directed
"covert operations", including the military and paramilitary activities against
Nicaragua, stated that the United States was:
"su..orti-e a secret war aeainst Ni-,raeua. m-.aeed bv the CIA. financed
hy the American taxpayer<and aimed at overthrowing a nation with which
we maintain normal diplomatic relations". (131 Cong. Rec. S.4581 (April
23, 1985), Suppl. Ann. C, Attachment 1.) SUPPLEMENTALANNEXESTO THE MEMORIAL 371
Senator Leahv added that discussions of memhers of this committee with senior
officiaisof théReagan Administration, aimed at reaching a compromise policy
not seeking the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government, had proven fruitless:
"After those hours and hours of talks, the bottom line of the Admini-
stration never really changed. 1 frankly do not helieve the President will
ever change his view that we cannot live with Nicaragua and we must
overthrow the Sandinistas." (131 Cong.Rec. S.4582(Apri123, 19851,Suppl.
Ann. C, Attachment 1.)
Similarly.Senator Iliigleton.iinothcr member <il'ihcScnate SelectCommittee on
Intclligcnce,aCtc'rnoting thlit "the CIA conçeived. pliinnd and initi3tca ioscrt
war" against Nicaragua, stated:
"The Administration tells us that to continue support of the contras is
the only way to maintain pressure on the Sandinistas to change, but one
cannot help but wonder what change the Sandinistas could make short of
signing their own death warrants which will satisfy the Administration."
(131 Cung. Rec S.4539(April 23, 1985).Suppl. Ann. C, Attachment 1.)
At the conclusion of the dehate, the Senate voted in favor of the $14,000,000
appropriation requested by President Reagan.
On April 23-24, 1985, the United States House of Representatives debated
President Reagan's requestfor the $14,000,000. Likethe Senate, the House of
Representatives was also advised hy senior memhers of ils intelligencecommittee
(known in the House of Renresentatives as the Permanent Select Committee on
lntellipence)that the ob)ecti;c of the United Silites-dirçctedmilitary2nd paramili-
13r) licti\,itic\ sgainst Nicarÿgu;~uar to o\crthrow the N~cliragulingo\ernment.
Concressm.in L..cH~milton.Chairnian ,>t'thelloure Pc'rniancniSelectC~niiiiiitee
on ~~telli~ences,tated :
"The President has elevated the struggle to change the Sandinista govern-
ment through military force to one of the highest priorities of his adminis-
tration. On Fehruary 21, President Reagan said that it was United States
policy 10 seek to remove the Sandinista government unless it changed its
goals and present structure and allowed the contras into the government.
He said 'you can say we're trying to oust the Sandinistas hy what we're
saying'.
Since 1981,various purposes have heen advanced for the covert action
against Nicaragua;
First, the United States sought to interdict the flow of arms from
Nicaragua to El Salvador;
Then. to force Nicaraeua to turn inward:
~hen; to hring ~icarGua to the negotiating table;
Then, to bring plurdlism and free elections to Nicaragua;
Then, to ousithe Sandinistas.
Todav United States oolicv statements on Nicaraeu". .e~.eciallvthose b~,
the ~reiident, no longe; emihasize the external conduct of ~iciragua but
the removal of the Sandinistas. The President savs we do not advocate the
overthrow of the Sandinistas if they 'would turn around and . . say uncle'.372 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
That phraseology is surely tantamount to requiring their removal." (131
Cong Rec. H.2358-59(April 23, 1985), Suppl. Ann. C, Attachment 2.)
At the conclusion of the debate, the House of Representatives voted 215-213
against President Reagan's request. Spokespersons for President Reagan com-
mented that they were heartened by the closeness of the vote in the House of
Representatives, that President Reagan would continue his efforts to obtain
continued funding for military and pararnilitary activitiesagainst Nicaragua, and
that the President was confident he would ultimately persuade the Congress to
approve such funding. President Reagan himself said on April29, 1985:
"1 have not given up on the conrra. . the opponents in the Congress of
ours who have opposed our trying to continue helping those people, they
really are voting to have a totalitarian Marxist-Leninist government here in
the Americas, and there's no way for them to disguiseit. So we'renot going
to give up." (Suppl. Ann. B, Addition, OfficialTranscnpt, p. 397, in&.)
On Muy 1, 1985, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey,the head of
the CIA, delivered a speech in New York in which he stated that the United
States would not be satisfied bv a treatv with Nicaragua barnng Nicaragua from
acts of external aggression, and that the objective ofUnited tat tepsliG was to
prevent "further consolidation of the régime".He stated:
"The increasingly united Democratic Nicaraguan Opposition, hoth in-
ternal and external, is the major obstacle to Sandinista consolidation.
The armed resistance. o..ula.lv known as the contras. is a vital oart of
ihis moiçmcnt. ïogether. ihese groupr encourage ihc crinion of sup~<)rtior
ihe Sandinistas, crcatc unecri~iintiesahoui the future of ihe rCgimc;chal-
lenge its claims of political legitimacy; and give hope to the Nicaraguan
,~nl, - . . .
The growing and unitcd opposition can incruse the pressure uniil the
Sdndinisla support has croded ~utticientl) Io Iclive thcm n<)optigin iithcr
than modif\i,e uheir reiccii<>n i>fintcrnal rcci)nriliaiii>nand lilli~w-nefor ihc
sniiie proccss of dcinocr~ti,atiail th21 is takiiig place in the rest oi Centr.11
Amcrica 181occur in Nic3rdgua." ('DCI Kemlirks". Metropulitan Cluh oi
NewYorkCily. May 1.1985.pp 9.11,Suppl. Ann 13.Pari Il,Aitiichment I 1
Also on May 1,1985, President Reagan announced the imposition ofeconomic
sanctio~s~ae&.nst Nicaraeua" The mcasur~s ~ ~luded a total embareo on tr-de
wiih Nicaragua. and suspcnbion of servie Io the tinited Stalcs by Nilii3raguan
dirline, and \~c,scls.Simuli;ineou,ly. the Ilnitcd Siales notifieil Nic;iragua of II)
~ntcntiunto tcrrninaic the 1950Trcxi\, I:ricnJ~hili.Cornmer<: and Navie:ttion
between the two countries, upon th; expiration Ôf the one-year notice Period
provided in the Treaty. (Executive Order, May 1, 1985, and accompanying
Message to Congress, Suppl. Ann. B, Part 1, Attachments 2-3.) In his ac-
companying message to Congress, explaining the purpose of these sanctions,
President Reagan stated: "1 have long made clear that changes in Sandinista
hehavior must occur if Face is to he achieved in Central America." President
Reagan specificallycited, as one of the principal "changes" sought by the United
States, that Nicaragua "respect, in law and practice, democratic pluralism and
observance of full political and human rights in Nicaragua". A Statement to the
Press issuedby the Officeof the President further explained that :
"The President remains convinced that the church-mediated dialogue
betweenthe government of Nicaragua and the unifieddemocratic opposition,
as called for by the resistance on March I and in the President's April 4 SUPPI-EMENTAL ANNEXESTU THE MEMURIAL 373
peace proposal [sec Nicaragua's Memorial on the Merits, p. 37, supra]could
make a major contribution to resolution of conflict in the region. The
President continues to believe that direct pressure presents the only effective
means of moderatine Nicaraeuan hehavior and is usine the means available
to him toward that end. ~e;r~es al1Members of theUcongress to support
future requests for assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. He
has also made it clear that the embargo does not apply to those goods
destined for the organized democratic resistance." (Statement lssued on
Behalf of President Reagan by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary Io the
President, in Bonn, 1 May 1985,Suppl. Ann. B, Part 1,Attachment 3.)
On Muv 10. 1985. durine a news conference in Lisbon. Portueal. President
Reagan réiterated that the Purpose of ~nitedstates polici towa;d Nicaragua,
including the militas. and paramilitdry activities against the Nicaraguan govern-
ment and the recentlv .mvo.ed tradc embareo. -as to force inteÏnal Üolitical
changes in Nicaragua :
"All we have ever sought is that they, as one factio- when 1say 'they',
1mean the Sandinista government. That Sandinista government has never
been legitimized by the people. It is one faction of a revolution that
overthrew a dictator. And they stole that revolution away from the other
factions which we now cal1the contras.And the leaders of the coniraswere
leaders in that revolution also.
And in doing that, we have felt that what we - what we are seeking and
trying to pressure them to do is to come toeether aeain in discussion and
negoGations to restore the promises they, thCmselves;had made as Io what
the goals of the revolution were. And in doing tha- and as 1say, to refute
their charges that we were somehow threatening them with aggression, and
if you'll rernemher, there was a time when Mr. Ortega had us, every other
week, landing the Marines in Nicaragua and we never had any intention to
do such a thing. So we maiatained Our embassy there and continued our
trade to show that - what we really wanted to do.
And then, in this recent vote in the Congress, we found - Congressmen
justifying their position on the grounds that how could we still be doing
business and yet wanting to aid these - other faction of the revolution.
And we have decided that Dressureis needed to brine them to the realization
that they should restore théoriginal goals of the rev$ution." (Suppl. Ann. B,
Part 1, Attachment 4, OfficialTranscript, p. 383, infra.)
On Mav 23. 1985. Secretarv of State Georee Shultz. in a sneech to the
Americ:in.l<ar Associat~on. cniizi,c,i ihc onG Ge l,,r ï~ilin~IO :ippropriaic
ailditional hnJ~ for rniliidr) 2nd p.ir~11111iiaraycti\it~cs .ig:iinjt Yi~;ir~gu:i.
Serretan Shulil warned thnt, if IJniicJ Siair., obircti\cs in Nicdrsxua could no1
be ~ccomplisheJ through ihc rnrrçenary furir.5 ;iipp<>ried2nd dGccted by the
CIA. thr IJniied States ivould have io cijnsider 'the use of American iumhat
tr<>opr".,\:coriling tu Sccretar). Shulil. "rriti:, of L'nitcd Siaie, milltary ;,id to
the ~icaraeuan f6edom fiehters would hold back the most effective kver we
have on thecommunist réghe". He continued, "by refusing to help the freedom
fighters, even with humanitarian aid, they are hastening the day when the threat
will grow and when we will be faced with an agonizing choicëabout the use of
American combat troops". (Reprint of Department of State Bureau of Public
Affairs, Suppl. Ann. B, Part 11,Attachment 2, pp. 393-394,infra.)
On May 30, 1985,President Reagan continued to encourage private individuals
and businesses in the United States to donate funds and supplies Io the CIA-374 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTIES
directed mercenary forces hy sending a letter of support to the Nicaraguan
Freedom Fund, a private group engaged in such fund-raising activities. United
States policy had heen to ohtain funds from private sources, as a supplement to
officialfunds, sincemid-1984. [SeeNicaragua's Memorial on the Merits, pp. 28-
29, supra]. President Reagan's letter expressed his "wholehearted" support for
the group's activities, and said that although private aid "cannot take the place
of open, direct support from the United States Government", it would "comple-
ment" officialassistance. "Only officialaid from the United States can make the
all-important symholic point that we stand behind the forces of freedom and
democracy around the world and against tyranny", President Reagan declared.
(Suppl. Ann. B, Part 1,Attachment 5; see also Miami Herald, June 16, 1985;
June 24, 1985.)
On June 4-5, 1985, in extensive interviews withthe Neiv York Times, United
States military and intelligenceofficersand other officiaisstated that the United
States is fully prepared for a military invasion of Nicaragua. One intelligence
officialsaid that if such an invasion became necessary, it could be accomplished
so easily that it would be "like falling ORa log". The execution of such an
invasion, according to these accounts, would be carried out through the United
StatesSouthern Command, headquartered in Panama, usingairfieldsin Honduras
as staging areas. These facilities would includePalmerola air base, home for a
special United States military unit known as Joint Task Force Bravo,which was
estahlished in 1983to train Honduran arrned forces, build and maintain shared
facilities,organize war games and assist American military missions in that area.
The United States military and intelligence officersreported that an expansion
of these activities had taken place in recentmonths, as had the improvement of
intelligence-gathering facilities including electronic eavesdropping posts in the
Gulf of Fonseca near Nicaragua. In addition, the officers reported, the United
States was sending 1,800troops Io Honduras to construct a road to the airfield
at San Lorenzo and practice paratrooper attacks against guerrillas. The United
States Joint Task Force Commander in Honduras, Colonel Pearcy, said these
exercises were intended, among other things, to remind the Nicaraguans of
United States resolve. (NewYorkTimes,June 4, 1985; June 5, 1985.)
Also on June 4-5, 1985, President Reagan publicly called upon the Congress
to reconsider its reiection of additional funds for CIA-directed militarv and
paramilitary activitiésagainst Nicaragua. He requested a total of $38,000,00010
fund these activities in fiscal years 1985and 1986.On June 4, he said: "il may
he Ourlast opportunity to persuade the Sandinista government to negotiate with
the contras". (Washing.ronPust,June 5, 1985.)The nextday, during an appearance
in Atlanta, Georgia, President Reagan said, "we must lend Oursupport 10those
freedom fightersstruggling for democracy in Nicaragua". (Suppl. Ann. B,Part 1,
Attachment 6, Official Transcript, p. S.) Later that day, in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, President Reaganmade another public appeal for "a meager $14 mil-
lion for the freedom fighters in Nicaragua". (Suppl. Ann. B, Part 1, Attach-
ment 7, OfficialTranscript, p. 385, infra.)
On June 7. 1985.the Senate voted in favor oî President Reaean's reauest and
authoriml ~38.011~.00i1n, lunds Corthe CIPI-ùirectedmcrscn3r& Cortiicil )cira
1985and 1986 (131 Cong Hcr S 7648.Suppl Ann. C, Attachmçnt 4.) Prcsidcnt
Kîagan puhlisly 3pplauded the Scnliir.for it,action. On Jllnt.X, in Iiis ucckly
radici addrcss10 the nxtion. Prssidcnt Ke~gdn said iif thc nicriendri:,. 'The
Scnatc h3s wen th31thcir strugglr. 1s ours. th31thcy nccd and ile.erve i)ur help".
He then urged the House of Representatives to approve a measure, introduced
in that chamber of the Congress, calling for $27,000,000for military and para-
military activities against Nicaragua. President Reagan stated that peace would SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXE5TO TiIE MUlORIAL 375
not come to Nicaragua until the Nicaraguan government "reconciles" with the
mercenary forces, and until its interna1policies satisfy the United States:
"It is essential that this hipartisan amendment be passed without any
weakening of its provisions in order for us to have a hope for peace,
democracy and reconciliation in Nicaragua.
The legislation willprovide $27million worth of assistance to the freedom
fighters, and that's not much compared to the hundreds of millions the
communists are spending ta prop up their Nicaraguan dictatorship.
The solution to the tragedy in Nicaragua is the vcry same the Congress
has supported in El Salvador: liberty, democracy and reconciliation.
In El Salvador, we've worked with Congress and stood fimly behind
President Duarte and the democratic forces. We seek the same goals in
Nicaraeua. As in El Salvador, the United States stands with the democratic
irnator - Srnate, I should s;iy - againsi the cncm!ebof libcrtv on boih
lefi and right And the frccdorn lighicri qharç Ourgi>alsfor demucrac).
Onc of ihcir Ie~den. Adoifo Calero. raid thla ueek. 'U'e11fthc Nisaragu3n
democratic resistance believethat true peace can only came with demockcy,
and that democracy is a precondition for peace - not the other way
around'.
To seize this opportunity before us, to seize this second chance now
offered, the Congress and the Executive Branch mus1embark on a bipartisan
course for the negotiated political settlement, national reconciliation, democ-
racy and genuine self-detemination for the people of Nicaragua . . ."
(OfficialTranscript, p. 399, infra, Suppl. Ann. B, Addition.)
On June 11, 1985, President Reagan sent a letter to Representative Dave
McCurdy, one of the legislative sponsors of the proposal for $27,000,000 in
further assistance to the mercenary forces, "to express [his]strongest support"
for this proposal. This assistance was needed, according to President Reagan:
"to enable the forces of democracy to convince the Sandinistas that real
democratic change is necessary. Without the pressure ol- a viable and
democratic resistance, the Sandinistas will continue to impose their will
through rcpression and military force, and a regional settlement based on
the Contadora principles willcontinue to elude us". (Reprinted at 131Cong.
Rec. H4093 (June 11, 1985), Suppl. Ann. B, Part 1,Attachment 8.)
On June 12, 1985, the House of Representatives debated the $27,000,000
proposal. During the debate, the legislators were again advised that the purpose
of the activities that would he funded hy the $27,000,000 wasthe overthrow of
the Nicaraguan government. Representative James Wright, Majority Leader of
the House of Representatives and memher ex oflcio of the IntelligenceCommittee,
reminded his colleagues that:
"[President Reagan] said jus1 a few weeks ago that he wanted to force
them [the Nicaraguan government] to say 'Uncle'.All of us know what that
means. It is a term of physical surrender. That is the cry of the van-
quished when overcome by superior force. Its utterance is the price of letting
a defeated foe get up off the ground . . .(131 Cong. Rec.H4152 (June 12,
1985), Suppl. Ann. C, Attachment 5.)
According to Representative LeeHamilton, Chairman of the IntelligenceCom-
mittee:
"The United States policy of trying to change the government of Nica-376 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVIIIES
ragua, or acting in such a manner as to persuade Nicaragua that we demand
their overthrow, makes the United States unwilling to negotiate with
Nicaragua and makes Nicaragua unwilling Io negotiate with the United
States. The United States cannot fund the contros whose purpose it is to
overthrow the Sandinistas and claim to support, and persuade others that
it does support, a negotiated settlement with the Sandinistas." (131 Cong.
Rec. H4173-74 (June 12, 1985), Suppl. Ann. C, Attachment 5.)
At the conclusion of the dehate, the House of Representatives voted in favor
of the $27,000,000appropriation. The only limitations were: that the funds could
not be administered by the CIA or the Department of Defense, but had to be
administered hy another agency of the United States governrnent; and that
although the funds were to be used 10support military and paramilitary activities
against Nicaragua, they could not be used to purchase "lethal" objects. Thus,
the funds were euphemistically called "humanitarian assistance". (131 Cong.
Rec. H4200-4201, Suppl. Ann. C, Attachment 5.) Since the versions of the
legislation approved by the House of Representatives diiiered from that approved
by the Senate, a Conference Committee - composed of delegates [rom both
chambers met for the purpose of resolving the diiierences and agreed upon a
common version to submit to the President for signature by him into law. This
was soon accomplished.
On Jiine17.1985,in an inte~ew with USNews & WorldReport,CIA Director
William Caseyreiterated United Statessupport for the mercenaries, and indicated
that if they fail to bring about changes in the Nicaraguan government, the
United States would have to consider sending its own combat troops into
Nicaragua. Mr. Casey claimed that the government of Nicaragua is not a
"leeitimate eovernment" and that "everv United States President since Franklin
~oosevelt has authorized support of rebélsopposing an oppressive or illegitimate
government". The interview continued as follows:
"Question:If doing something about the Sandinista government is in this
country's interest, doesn't il follow logically that United States military
intervention in some form becomes a clear possihility if the contras are
~~ ~ ~ to~d~-~~e i,~ ~hemselves?~ ~
Answer: 1would only refer you to what Secretary of State George Shultz
said on that. He said that if we fail to induce the Sandinistas to reform bv
backing the rebels, we may face a question of whether we could have to do
it rnilitarily.
Look, if indeed what you have here is a second Cuba, this time on the
American mainland, and wedon't want to accept that permanent impairment
of Our security. the easiest way to do it is helping the people who want to
resist il on the ground. If that fails and the Sandinistas consolidate, then
it's a tough decision." (US News & World Report, June 17, 1985, Suppl.
Ann. B, Part II, Attachment 3.)
On Aueust 8 and Aueust 16. 1985. President Reaean siened into law the
appropriation of $27,000,000foi the mercenary forces-in fiszal years 1985and
1986,as ultimately agreed upon by the Senate and the House of Reprcsentatives.
This was accomplished through Iwo separate enactments, one &overingeach
fiscal year. The ncw law stated:
"(e) HUMANlTARlAN ASSISTANCE FOR NICARAGUAN DE~O- ~ ~ - -~ ~-
CREIC RESISTANCE - (1) ~iiective upon the date of enactment of
this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated $27,000,000 for humani-
tarian assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. Such assistance SUPPLE.MENTAL ANNUES TO THE MEMORIAL 377
shall be provided in such department or agency ofthe United States as the
President shall designate, except the Central Intelligence Agency or the
Department of Defense.
(2) The assistance authorized by this suhsection is authorized to remain
available for obligation until March 31, 1986." (Conference Report on
S.960,amending the Foreign Assistance Actof 1961,Sec.722 (g), published
at 131 Cong Rec. H6721 (July 29, 1985), Suppl. Ann. C, Attachment 7.)
The new law, unlike enactments covering previous fiscalyears, did not prohihit
the CIA from using its discretionary funds to supplement the $27,000,000
appropriation contained in the law, and this made it possible for the CIA to
provide additional assistance to the mercenaries. (131 Cong. Rec. H4153-54
(lune 12, 1985), Suppl. Ann. C, Attachment 5.) Moreover, as explained in the
Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference responsible for
formulating the final language of the legislation, although the CIA and Defense
Department were prohibited from directly administering the $27,000,000appro-
priated for the mercenary forces:
"Nothing in the provision restrictseither agency from providing to other
agencies ofthe United States government advice, information, or intelligence
which wouldhe useful to the implementation of this assistance." (131 Cong.
Rec. H6742 (July 29, 1985), Suppl. Ann. C, Attachment 7.)
Suhsequently, the Reagan Administration announced the establishment of a
special office within the State Department to administer the $27,000,000appro-
oriated to the mercenarv forces. (WashinptnnPost. Aueust 29, 1985: New York
Fimes, August 30, 1985:) " . -
Reinvigorated and reinforced by the appropriation of these funds, the mercen-
ary force; launched another major military offensive,attacking townsand villages
deep inside Nicaragua. Their stated objective wasto carry the war to Nicaragua's
population centers, to take and hold territory, and to hring about the political
destahilization of the country. At least 2,500 mercenaries participated in this
oliensive. Many Nicaraguan government soldiers,and an even bigher number
of civilians, were killed.In an attack on the town of Cuapa, the mercenaries
followed instructions contained in the psychological warfare manual prepared
for them by the CIA, and sought out Sandinista officials in the town to be
"neutralized". They took 12 local militiamen and officials prisoner, marched
them out of the city, and executed 11of them, throwing the bodies in a nearby
ditch. This pattern was repeated in other towns and villages, including La
Trinidad, where mercenary forces went from house to house killing persons
suspected of belonging to the Sandinista Front. The mercenaries' offensive
continues at the lime of this writing. (WushingtonPust, August 8, 1985; Los
AngelesTimes,August 3, 1985.)
In August 1985, senior officialsof the United States government continued to
state puhlicly that the objective of United States policy was to change the
government of Nicaragua, and they revealed further details about the United
States government'smanagement of the mercenary forcesand the conduct of the
military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua.
On Augusi 17, the Assistant Secretdry of State for Inter-American AfFairs,
Elliott Abrams, said that no agreement hetween Nicaragua and the United States
could be achieved unless the government of Nicaragua is changed:
"Whv do we insist on internal reconciliation lbetween the-eovernment of
Nicaragua and the amed forces opposing it]? Because the only guarantee
that security agreements that are made will stick is internal democrac. . .378 MILITARY AND PAMMILITARY A~VITIB
It is preposterous to think wecould sign a deal with the Sandinistas to meet
Our foreign policy concerns and expect it to he kept." (New York Times,
August 18, 1985.)
On August 27, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American
Afiairs, Nestor D. Sanchez, reiterated that peace in Nicaragua could no1 be
achieved in the absence of "changes inthe makeup" of the Nicaraguan govern-
ment. According to MI. Sanchez,
"[tlhere will have to he some changes in the hehavior and politics of some
of the rulers, and there may have to he changes in the ones who do not
want to change - they will have to be changed themselves". (Wushingron
Times, August 27, 1985.)
Other authoritative United States officials revealedthat United States Marine
Corps Lt.-Col. Oliver L. North, a senior memher of the staiï of the National
Security Council - who, as Deputy Director for Political Military Aiïairs serves
as an aide to National Security Advisor Robert C. MacFarlane - was, since
1984, providing direct "assistance" to the mercenary forces in military tactics
and operations, including the selection of "targets" to attack inside Nicaragua,
as well as in raising funds. LI.-Col. North also facilitated the supplying of
logistical helpto the mercenariesafter the CIA- which had previouslymanaged
almost every aspect of their activitie- was prohihited by the Congress from
continuing to do so. (New York Times, August 8, 1985; WushingronPosr,
August 9, 1985; WashingronPost, August 11, 1985.)One senior Administration
officialsaid,
"when the Agency [CIA] was pulled out of this program, these guys didn't
know how to buy a Band-aid. They new nothing of logistics, the CIA had
been doing al1of that." (New York Times,August 13, 1985.)
Another senior White House official said LI.-Col. North had detailed know-
ledge of the mercenaries'weapons procurement eiïorts, and confirmed that after
the CIA ceased to he involved hemade frequent trips to mercenary camps in
Central America, in a United States government airplane. (New York Times,
August 10, 1985.)L1.-Col.North also caused various mercenary factionsto form
a united military command, according Io Administration officials. (Time,
August 19, 1985; WushingronPosr,August 14, 1985;New YorkTimes,August 13,
1985.)National SecurityAdviser MacFarlane, explaining LI.-Col. North's activi-
ties after they were disclosed in the press, said, "we had a national interest in
keeping in touch with what was going on, and second, in not hreaking faith with
the freedom fighters". (WushingronPosr,August 11, 1985.)Commenting on these
disclosures, Representative Anthony C. Beilenson, a member of the House
Permanent SelectCommitteeon Intelligence,said "[iltjust makes it unmistakably
clear that it's Our war. They are waging itin every way except withAmerican
troops." (New York Times, August 1985.) SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL
SupplernentalAnnexB
STATEMEN OPSPRESIDEN RTONALD RFAGAN AND SENIOR OFFICIAL OF HIS
ADMINISTRI\TION
1. STATEMENTSOP PRESIDBNTRONALDREAGAN
AttachmentI
ExecutiveOrder of President Ronald Reagan Prohihiting Tradeand Certain Other
Transactions lnvolving Nicaragua, May 1, 1985
-, ..~.authoritv v..~~- ~ ~ ~. ~~--~ ~ ~ent hv the Constitution and laws of
the United States of America, including the ~nt&atjo"al E&ergency Economic
Powers Act (50 USC 1701erses.), the National Emergencies Act (50 USC 1601
erseo.).chaiter 12 of Title 50 if the United States cide (50 USC 191 el sea.)...
andkltion 301 of Title3 of the United States Code,
1,RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, find that
the policies and actions of the government of Nicaragua constitute an unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United
States and herehy declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.
1herehy prohibit al1imports into the United States of goods and services of
Nicaraguan origin; al1exports from the United States of goods to or destined
for Nicaragua, except those destined for the organized democratic resistance,
and transactions relating thereto.
1herehv ~rohihit Nicaraeuan air carriers from enea--ne -n air trans~ortation
io or rra,; ;oint, in the tiiiied Siarei and rran.;asiionr relriringthcrrt<;.
In addition. I hcrchy prohihii i,csscls ol' Nicaraguin rcgistry l'rom cnlering
into United States Dorts.and transactions relatine thereto
The Secretary of ihe Treasury isdelegated and Cuthorized to employ al1powers
granted to me by the lnternational Emergency Economic Powers Act to cary
out the purposes of this Order.
The prohibitions set Forth in this Order shall be effective as of 12.01am,
Eastern Daylight Time, May 7, 1985,and shdll he transmitted to the Congress
and published in the FederalRegister.
(Signed) Ronald REAGAN.
The White House,
May 1, 1985.
Attachment2
Message of President Ronald Reagan to the Congress of the United States
concerning Trade Sanctions against Nicaragua, May 1, 1985
Pursuant to section 204 (b) of the lnternational Emergency Economic PowersAct, 50 USC 1703,1herehy report to the Congress that 1 have exercisedmy statu-
ioiy authonty Io d~liire a niiioniil em~rgcn!~and to prilhibii: (1) al1 impons
into ihr Uniied States of gooJs and w-n~asof Nicar~guanongn: (2) iiIc.xp<>ns
from the C'niicdSidicsi~l'goods IOor destincd liir Kic~rügusc\upt ihow ilcitined
for the organized democratic resistance; (3) Nicaraguan air carriersfrom engaging
in air transnortation ~~ or from wints in the United States: and (4) .e,xls of
~icaraguan;egisu~ from entering'into United States ports.
These prohibitions will become effective as of 12.01am, Eastern Daylight
Time, May 7, 1985.
1 am enclosing a copy of the Executive Order that 1 bave issued making this
declaration and exercising these authorities.
1. 1have authorized these steps in response to the emergencysituation created
hy the Nicaraguan government's aggressiveactivities inCentral America. Nicara-
gua's continuing efforts to suhvert its neighbors, its rapid and destahilizing
military buildup, its close military and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union
and its imposition of communist totalitarian interna1 rule have been descrihed
fully in the pas1several weeks. The current visit by Nicaraguan President Ortega
to Moscow underscores this disturbing trend. The recent rejection by Nicaragua
of my Face initiative, viewed in the light of the constantly rising pressure that
Nicaragua's military huildup places on the democratic nations of the region,
makes clear the urgent threat that Nicaragua's activities represent to the security
of the region and, therefore, to the security and foreign policy of the United
States. The activities of Nicaragua, supported by the Soviet Union and its allies,
are incom~atihle with normal commercial relations.
2. In taking thex steps, 1note that during this month's debate on United States
policytoward Nicaragua,many MembersofCongress,both supporiersand opponents
of my proposais,calledfor the arly applicationof economicsanctions.
3. 1 have long made clear that changes in Sandinista behavior must occur if
peace is to he achieved in Central America. At this time, 1 again cal1 on thc
Government of Nicaragua:
- to halt its export of armed insurrection, terrorism, and subversion in neighhor-
ing countries;
- to end its extensive military relationship with Cuba and the Soviet Bloc and
remove their military and security personnel;
- to stop its massive arms huildup and help restore the regional military
balance; and
- to respect, in Iaw and in practice, democratic pluralism and observance of
full political andhuman rights in Nicaragua.
4. United Statesapplication of thesesanctions should be seenhy the government
of Nicaragua, and hy those who abet it, as unmistakable evidence that we take
seriouslythe obligation to protect OUI xcurity interests and those of Ourfriends. 1
ask the government of Nicaragua to address rriously the concerns of its neighhors
and its own opposition and to honor its solemncommitments to non-interference,
non-alignment, respect for democracy, and peace. Failure to do so will only
diminish the prospects for a peacefulsettlement in Central America.
(Signed R)onald RIUGAN.
The White House,
May 1, 1985. SUPPLEMIINTAL ANNPXES TO THE MEMORIAL 381
Statement lssued on Behalfof President Reagan by the Principal Deputy Press
Secretary to the President, in Bonn, May 1, 1985
sanctions against the government of Nicaragua under authority granted by the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act and other authorities. The
sanctions include a total embargo on trade with Nicaragua, notification of United
States intent to terminale ils Treatv of Friendshio. Commerce. and Navieation
with Nicaragua, and the suspension'of serviceto the United ~tat'esby ~ica&uan
airlines and Nicaraguan flag vessels.A report on these actions is being sent today
to the Congress.
The President authorized these steps in response to the emergency situation
created by the Nicaraguan government's aggressiveactivities in Central America.
Nicaragua's continuing efforts to subvert ils neighbors, ils rapid and destabilizing
military buildup, its close military and security lies to Cuba and the Soviet
Union, and its imposition of communist totalitarian interna1 rule have been
described fully in the pas1 several weeks. Since the House of Representatives
failed to act on the President's peace initiative,there have been further indications
of this disturbing trend:
- the new ties hetween Nicaragua and the Soviet Union announced by Tassin
connection with Daniel Ortega's current trip to Moscow;
- the recent apprehension in ondu du ra sevin agents of the Nicaraguan state
security service, who admitted that they have traveled to Honduras from
Nicaragua in order to aid and assist Honduran insurgents;
- delivery las1 week to Nicaragua by the Soviet Union of additional MI-8/17
helicopters;
- the delivery last week by East Germany of a large shipment of military
transport equipment to Nicaragua; and
- the rejection by Nicaraguan leaders of any possible church-mediated dialogue
with the democratic opposition of Nicaragua.
These events and the recent Nicaraguan rejection of the President's peace
initiative, viewed in the light of the constantlyising pressure that Nicaragua's
military buildup places on the democratic nations of the region, makes clear the
urgent threat that Nicaragua's activities represent to the security of the region,
and, therefore, to the security and foreign policy of the United States. The
activities of Nicaragua, supported by the Soviet Union and ils allies, are
incompatible with normal commercial relations.
During the month-long debate on United States policy toward Nicaragua,
many Members of Congress, both supporters and opponents of the Admini-
stration'sorooosals. called for the earlv a~~lication of economic sanctions. 11
should he uiderstood, however, that. the' President does not consider the
imposition of these sanctions to be a substitute for United States assistance to
the unified democratic opposition.
The Administration has long made clear that changes in Sandinista behavior
must occur if peace is to be achieved in Central America. In making this
announcement, the President again calls on the government of Nicaragua:
- to hall its export of armed insurrection, terrorism and subversion in neighhor-
ing countries;
- to end ils extensive military relationship with Cuba and the Soviet Bloc and
remove their military personnel;382 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
- to stop its massive ams buildup and help restore the regional military
balance; and
- to respect, in law and in practice, democratic pluralism and observance of
full political and human rights in Nicaragua.
The Administration has repeatedlyurged the Government of Nicaragua to respect
ils 1979 commitments to the OAS and more recentlv to the 1983 Contadora
Document of Objectives, whose lems closely parallel.ow own basic objectives.
Heretofore the Sandinistashave ignored or reiectedal1such appeals.The Amencan
Embassv in Managua has iust renewed wifh the aovenunent of Nicaramia the
t>res~d&t'isirong cndorsem~ntCorintcrnaldiÿlogueind reiteratedhi, firmiGeniioii
io punue Uniisd SLlre,inicnsts and national objcciii,esin Ccntral Amcriw In this
reaard, it should be noted that the measuresbeina instituted bv the President are
e6ilv iescindedif Nicaraeua acts to relieveour coicerns.
~ke ~resideit remains convinced that the church-mediated dialogue between
the governmerit of Nicaragua and the unified democratic opposition, as called
for bv the resistance on Much 1 and in the President's A~ri1-4oeace nrooosal.
couli make a major contribution to resolution of conflict in ihe region. The .
President continues to believe that direct pressure presents the only effective
means of moderating Nicaraguan behavior and is using the means available to
him toward that end. He urges al1members of the Congress to support future
requests for assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. He has also
made it clear that the embargo does not apply to those goods destined for the
oreanized democratic resistance. Nor will it ao~iv Io donations of articles such
as-food, clothing and medicine intended to be'iséd to relieve human suffering.
In the meantime, United States application of these measures should be seen
by the aovernment of Nicaragua, and bv those who abet il. as unmistakahle
ciiden& that we take serious6 the obligation to protect Our security interests
and those of Our fnends. The President calls again on the government of
Nicaragua to address seriously the concerns of its neighbors and its own
democratic oo~osition and to honor its solemncommitments to non-interference.
non-alignmeni, respect for democracy and peace. Failure to do so will only
diminish the prospects for a peaceful settlement in Central Amenca.
Altachmeni 4
News Conference by President Ronald Reagan, in Lisbon, May 10, 1985
(Transcript, Officeof the Press Secretary to the President)
Questiun: Yes, Sir. Almost everywhere that you went in Europe, the foreign
leaders opposed the Nicaraguan trade embargo and we now hear that Costa
Rica has opposed it. Why is il, Sir, that some of your closest allies don't back
you on this and don't seem to feel that Onega and the Sandinistas are the threat
that you think he is?
The President: 1don't think there's any question, Chns, that they don't agree
with us about the threat- they do. They know what Nicaragua is. On the other SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 383
hand, we're running into a kind of a philosophical diiierence here, 1think, with
regard to sanctions. We did a lot of soul-searchina about il ourselves. There are
a number of people and certainly a number orgovernments who jus1 don't
helievein that as a legitimate weapon.
On the other hand, when we were trying to gel aid for the people of Nicaragua
in their struggle for democracy and against totalitarianism, many of Our own
people in the Congress brought up the fact of how could we be doing this at the
same lime that we continued to maintain relations. Well, we had continued to
maintain relations, and even including trade relations, with them as a refutation
of their charge that we were seekingtheir overthrow.
AllWC have eversought isthat they, as one factio- when 1say "they", 1mean
the Sandinista government.That Sandinista govemment has never been legitimized
hy the people. It is one faction of a revolution that overthrew a dictator. And they
stole that revolution awayfrom the other factions which we now cal1the conrras.
And the leadersof the contraswere leadersin that revolutionalso.
And in doing that, we have felt that what we - what we are seeking and
trvine to oressure them to do is to come toeether aeain in discussion and
négozatiois to restore the promises they, themselves, had made as to what the
goals of the revolution were. And in doing that - and as 1Say, to refute their
Chargesthat we were somehow threatening them with aggression, and if you'll
remember, there was a lime when Mr. Ortega had us, every other week, landing
the Marines in Nicaragua and we never had any intention 10 do such a thing.
So we maintained Our emhassy there and continued Our trade to show that -
what we really wanted to do.
And then, in this recent vote in the Congress, we round - Congressmen
justifying their position on the grounds that how could we still be doing business
and yet wanting to aid these - other faction of the revolution. And we have
decided that pressure is needed 10bring them to the realization that they should
restore the original goals of the revolution.
Quesrion: In recent days, Mr. Gorbachev bas had some rather harsh things to
say about the United States and about you. If there is a summit meeting, what
would you have to talk about and what do you think that such a meeting could
reasonably produce in the current climate?
Letter from President Ronald Reagan to William Simon, Chairman of the
"Nicaraguan Freedom Fund", May 30, 1985 (Reprinted in the Washingron
Times, June 5, 1985)
The White House
Washington
May 30, 1985.
Dear Bill :
When 1returned from my ten-day trip to West Europe, 1was very moved to384 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
learn that you are heading a bi-partisan effort to provide humanitarian assistance
to the latest victims of communism's continuing inbumanity : the Nicaraguan
Resistance, thcir families, and the refugees. 1 am not surprised. You and your
colleagues, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Michael Novak and Midge Decter represent the
noblest instincts of America - to help those in need and to confound the
enemies of liberty and peace.
Your private efforts to help have my wholehearted support, but 1 know you
agrec that your food, and clothing, and medicine cannot take the place of open,
direct support from the United States Government. They must complement each
other. Only official aid from the United States can make the all-important
symbolic point that we stand behind ,the forces of freedom and democracy
around the world and against tyranny. You can feed their bodies, but only the
Congress can feed their souls.
Accordine-,. in the davs ahead. 1 shall oncc a-ain ask the House and Senate
IO griini assistanuIO the Democratic Rc\isian.c in Ni:ÿr;igu.i 1hopc thcir \,<itc
u,illmakc mr 2s proud 2% your own rlforri have donc.
Sincerely,
Ron.
The Honorable William Simon.
330 South Strïet,
Morristown, New Jersey 07960.
Supportfrom the Top
Former Treasury Secretary William Simon, chairman of the Nicaraguan
Freedom Fund, recently received this strong letter of support for the fund from
President Reagan. Establishment of the humanitarian aid fund was announced
May 8.
Arrachment6
Remarks of President Ronald Reagan in Atlanta, Georgia, June 5, 1985
(Transcnpt, Officeof the Press Secretary to the President)
[Not reproduced]
Ailachment 7
Remarks of President Ronald Reagan in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, June 5,
1985(Transcript, Officeof the Press Secretaty to the President)
............................
Congress can no longer ignore the obvious: the Soviet Blocnations and their SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXES TO THE ~ORIAL 385
terrorist allies are pouring in weapons and ammunition to establish a beachhead
on Ourown doorstep. Top defectors from the El Salvadoran guerrillas have given
us detailed information about the guidance, the training, the funds and the
ammunition that thev r,ce~ ~ ~rom the communists in Nicaraeua to uverthrow
the lil Sal\.idiir;inI>crnocr.iii: go\crnincnt ihat the) have fin'illyachicicd II
u,as a J~rk da) li>rlicedom whcti. aiicr the Saticr C'iiion,pcnt SSltllmillion to
impose communism in Nicaragua, the United States congre&. could not support
a meager $14 million for the freedom fighters in Nicaragua who were opposed
to that totalitarian government.
............................
Ariachmenr8
Letter of President Ronald Reagan to US Representative Dave McCurdy,
June 11, 1985(Reprinted at 131 Cong.Rec H4093, June 11, 1985)
Presidenrsupportshiparrisonproposa1roassisrforcesof democracy in
Nicaragua
(Mr. McCurdy asked and was given permission to address the House for
I minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)
Mr. McCurdy: Mr. Speaker, 1 insert in the Record a letter 1 received from
President Reagan today, and I would like to highlight a couple points that the
President made when he addressed this letter 10me. He said:
"Dear Congressman McCurdy: 1 am writing to express my strongest
support for your bipartisan proposal to assist the forces of democracy in
Nicaragua .. ."
He said :
"My Administration is determined to pursue political, not military,
solutions in Central America. Our policy for Nicaragua is the same as for
El Salvador and al1of Central America: to support the democratic center
against the cxtremes of both the right and left, and to secure democracy
and lasting peace through national dialogue and rcgional negotiations.
We do not seek the military overthrow of the Sandinista government or
to put in ils place a governmcnt based on supports of the old Somoza ré-
gime. . .
We oppose a sharing of political power based on military force rather
than the will of the people expressed through free and fair elections . . It
is also the position of the Nicaraguan opposition leaders, who have agreed
that executive authority in Nicaragua should change only through elec-
tions . . ."
President Reagan also indicates he rakes seriously my conccrn about human
rights. He says:
"The US condemns, in the strongest possible terms, atrocities by cither
side. We are committed to helping the democratic resistance in applying
strict rules regarding proper treatment of prisoners and the civilian popu-
lation . . ."386 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
MI. Speaker, the text of the President's letter is as follows:
"The White House,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Dave McCurdy,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Congressman McCurdy, 1 am writing to express my strongest
support for your bipartisan proposal to assist the forces of democracy in
Nicaragua. It is essential to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Central
America that the House of Representatives pass that proposal, without any
weakening amendments.
My Administration is determined to pursue political, no1 military, solu-
tions in Central America. Our policy for Nicaragua is the same as for El
Salvador and al1 of Central America: to support the democratic center
aeainst the extremes of hoth the rieht and left. and to secure democracv ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
and lasting peace through national Zalog and regional "egotiations. We do
not seek the military overthrow of the Sandinista government or to put in
its dace a government based on suooor..rs of the 61dSomoza réeime.
fu.1 3% U; suppc~riPrcsiJeni I>uarie in hir efforir to achicve rec&cili3iiun
in El Sïlv;iJor. we;il50endorse ihr unifiedJcmiicratic oppurilion's March 1.
1985,San Jos? I~ecl.ir~tioniihich calls for naiional reconçiliaii(>nihrough
a chirch-mediated dialoe. We oooose a sharine of oolitical oower hased 6n
military force rather thi the wjli of the peopi exbressed through free and ~
fair elections. Thatis the position of President Duarte. It is also the position
of the Nicararuan oooosition leaders. who have aereed that executive
authorit) in ~ir..ir;i~uaihould cliangc imly rliriiugh el~ctions.
II is ihc guerrillai in tl Salvador - and thcir meniors in XIdnagua,
Ila\,ana and MI)K.OW - uhu demand power sharing without elections. And
itisihs Sÿndinistas in Kicarngua uho siridenil? reject national reconîiliatiiin
through dcm<icracticprxsr.;c,. Our assi~i3nccha\ been cruci<iltu enruring
ihai dcmocraiy has borh ihc sirengih and uill in worh in El Siilvador In
Nicaraeua. ou; suooort is also needed to enable the forces of democracv to
convince the ~an&iistas that real democratic change is necessary. ~itiout
the pressure of a viable and democratic resistance, the Sandinistas will
continue to imposetheir will through repressionand militaty force, and a re-
gional settlementbased on the Contadora principleswillcontinue to elude us.
1 understand that two 'perfecting' amendments will he offered that will
seek to nullify the intent of your proposal. One, supported by Ed Boland,
would prohihit the exchange of information with the democratic resistance
and pemanently deny even humanitarian assistance becauseit would 'have
the effect' of supporting 'directly or indirectly' the military efforts of the
resistance. The other, supported by Dick Gephardt, would prohibit humani-
tarian assistance for at least six months and then continue the prohibition
until Congress votes yet again.
The Boland amendment is clearly intended to have the same effectas the
Barnes amendment that was reiected bv the House in Avril. If the Boland
pruhihiiioii5 arc cnactcd. the onl! a,d) hunidn~iarian ajsistance co~ld he
prui,iJcd would hc for ihe recipienta io abandon thcir strugglc and becomc
rcfugecs.Thc Gephardi proposdl. xuaranteeinj! ihe Sandinistas sixaddiiional
months without-effective would seid a signal of irresolution to
friends and adversaries, while denying the democratic resistance help that it
so desperately needs. These amendments would prevent us from providing
humanitarian assistance and exchanging information to sustain and preserve SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXFS TO THE MFMORIAL 387
the Jen1ocr;itic rcristïnce Thq tvould elfc~ti\ely rcmii5.cthe rc,isrance ai a
source 01'pressure Lir dialog dnd internal rïr.iinciliïtion Ii those jtruggling
for democracy are not supported, or worse, forced to hecome refugees, the
Sandinistas will be encouraeed to oress their militam advantaee-and the
prospects for a pea&fulresoïution \;il1 be diminished.'
1take very seriously vour concern about human rights. The United States
condemns. in the stionee-. oossible terms. atrocitks bv either side. We
arc uimm;ited io hclping ihr. Jcmocraiic rrïiriance in applsing .trici r~le,
regarding proper treatmcni of prisuners and thc civililin populîiion. And
we urge iheir leaders to investigate allegations of uast human -ights abuses
and take appropriate actions to prevenifuture ah;ses.
1 recognize the importance that you and oihers attach Io hilateral talks
between the United States and Nicaragua. Il is possible that in the proper
circumstances, such discussions could help promote the internal recon-
ciliation called for hy Contadora and endorsed hy many Latin American
leaders. Thercfore,1 intend to instruct our special Ambassador to consult
with the governments of Central America, the Contadora countries, other
democratic govemments, and the unified Nicaraguan opposition as to how
and when the United Statescould resume useful direct talks with Nicaragua.
However, such talks cannot be a suhstitute for a church-mediated dialog
hetween the contendine factions and the achievement of a workable
u
Coniador~ ïgrçemcni I'hcrçlurc. I will hdve our reprçscnrativc mcct again
with reprcjcntatives ol'h'ic~ragulionly whcn 1Jeiermineihdtsuch a metlin&!
would be helpful in promoting theseends.
Experience has shown that a policy of support for democracy, economic
opportunity, and security will hest serve the people of Central America
and the national interests of the United States. If we show consistency of
purpose, if we are fim in our conviction, wecan help the democratic center
prevail over tyrants of the left or the right. But if we abandon democracy
in Nicaragua, if wetolerate the consolidation of a surrogate state in Central
America responsive to Cuba and the Soviet Union, we will see the progress
that has been achieved in neighboring countries hegin to unravel under the
strain of continuing conflict, attempts at subversion, and loss of confidence
in our support.
There can be a more democratic. more orosoerous. and more oeaceful
Central America. 1willcontinue to dévotemi energiestoward that end, but 1
also need the support of the Congress. 1hope the House will support your
legislation.
Sincerely,
Ronald REAGAN."
-
Remdrks of President Ronald Reagan to the American Bar Association, July 8,
1985(Transcript, Onice of the Press Secretary to the President)
And finally there is the latest partner of Iran, Libya, North Korea and Cuba
in a campaign of international terror - the communist régime inNicaragua.388 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACIIVITIES
The Sandinistas not only sponsor terror in El Salvador, Costa Rica and Hon-
duras - terror that led recently to the murder of four United States Marines,
two civilians, and seven Latin Americans. They provide one of the world's prin-
cipal refuges for international terrorists.
Memberr of the ltalian government have openly charged that Nicaragua is
harboring some of Italy's worstterrorists. And when we have evidence that in
addition to Italy's Red Brigades, other elements of the world's most vicious
terrorists groups - West Germany's Badder-Meinhoil'Gang, the Basque ETA,
the PLO, the Tupamaros, and the IRA have found a haven in Nicdrÿgua and
support from that country's communist dictatorship.
In fact, the communist régimein Nicaragua has made itself a focal point for
the terrorist network and a case study in the extent of its scope.
Consider forjust a moment that in addition to establishing strong international
alliances with Cuba and Libya, including the receipt of enormous amounts of
arms and ammunition, the Sandinistas are also receiving extensive assistance
from North Korea. Nor are they reluctant to acknowledge their deht to the
government of North Korea dictator Kim Il-sung. 60th Daniel and Humherto
Ortega have recently paid official and State visits to North Korea to seek
additional assistance and more formal relations.
So we see the Nicdraguans tied to Cuba, Libya and North Korea. And that
leaves onlv Iran. What about ties to Iran? Well. ves.,onl. recentlv the Prime
Minister of Iran visited Nicaragua hearing expressions of solidariiy from the
Ayatollah for the Sandinista communists.
Statement hy President Ronald Reagan, August 16, 1985(Transcript, Officeof
the Press Secretary to the President)
1have signed H.R.2577, the Supplemental Appropriations Act for 1985.The
act orovides additional fundinn for a numher of irnoortant oroerams. includine
economic aid to several nations in the Middle ~asc, essential Lmanitarian ai:
to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, funding for improving security at our
embassies and facilities abroad, and start-up funding for.severdl watcr pro-
jects.
H.R.2577 provides funds that 1 requested to support the Nation's foreign
policy. II will contribute significantly to Ourability to provide urgently required
aid to our friends in the Middle East and will su..ort our efiorts to brin-.neace
IO the rcgion. I uould note in p~rticiil~rthe iuiid, iiappropriaies ior hoih I5rsr.l
and Egypt. as wcll as for Jordan AI1thrcc <~i'ihcreiiatitins hare 3 vital rolc IO
play if there is to be peace in the Middle East.
Moreover. the act contains $27 million in fundinr for humanitarian assistance
to the ~ickaguan Democratic Resistance. ~hile-the program that has heen
approved ismore modest than 1believenecessary, wehave clearly won bipartisan
support on this verycritical issueas wellas recognition and humanitarianiupport
for those fighting the Sandinista dictatorship. This is an important element in SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 389
Our overall effort to assist neighboring countries to defend themselves against
Nicaraguan attack and subversion. Unfortunately, the provision unduly and
unnecessarilyrestricts efficientmanagement and administration of the program.
Nevertheless, 1willcontinue to work with the Congress to carry out the program
as elïectively as possible and will take care to assure that the law is ~dithfully
executed.
II.STATEMENTSOF SENIOR REAGAN ADMINISTRATION OFFLCIALS
Alluchmeni I
Remarks of Director of Central Intelligence WilliamJ. Casey, Metropolitan
Club of New York City, May 1, 1985
In Nicaragua, the communist government killed outright several hundred
Somoza supporters during the summer of 1979. In 1982, itforcihly relocated
some 15,000Miskito lndians to detention camps, forced many more 10 Aeeto
refugee camps in Honduras, and burned some 40 Indian villages. Last month,
the Sandinistasannounced plans to forcibly move 40,000campesinos from areas
closeto the Honduran border.They have already movedsome20,000campesinos
from the southern border area and along the east Coast, hurning homes and
killing cattle.
The American Intelligence Community over recent months unanimously
concurred in four National Estimates on the military buildup, the Marxist-
Leninist consolidation, and the strategic objectives of the Soviets, the Cubans
and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. If 1were to hoil the keyjudgments of those
estimates down to a singlesentenceit would he this. The Soviet Union and Cuba
have established and are consolidating a beachhead on the American continent,
are putting hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military equipment into it,
and have begun IO use it as a launching pad to carry their style of aggressive
subversion into the rest of Central America and elsewherein Latin Amenca.
Let me review quickly what has already happened in Nicaragua. The
Sandinistas have developedthe bcst-equipped military in the region. They have
an active strength of some 65,000and a fullymobilized strength includingmilitia
and reserves of nearlv 120.000.These forces are eauiooed with Soviet tanks.
armored vehicles, state of the art helicopters, palroi hoats and an increasingl;
comprehensiveair defense system.This givesthe Sandinistas a military capability
~ ~
far beyond that of any other Central American nation.
- In addition to this military hardware, there are now in Nicaragua an
estimated 6,000-7,500Cuban militas. and civilianadvisors and other communist
and radical Arab totaline several hundred. assistine the"réeimeiu its militarv ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
buildup and ils consolidaïion of power.
- Under Cuban direction and guidance, the Sandinista security servicehelpsthe régimeestablish control over the media, create and spread propaganda and
disinformation mechanisms and neutralize or expel those who oppose the
Sandinista totalitarianism.
Today, we see Managua becoming to Central and Latin America what Beirut
was to the Middle East since 1970 when the PL0 was expelled from Jordan
and Lebanon became the focal point for international and regional terrorists.
Managua's support for training of Central American subversives is well docu-
mented - thev suooort Salvadoran communists. Guatemalan communists.
radical leftists i'nchita Rica, and are attempting'to increase the numher of
radical leftist terrorists in Honduras. More recent evidence indicates Nicaraguan
support for some South American terronst groups and growing contacts with
other international terrorist groups.
Yet,just last week the American Congress refused to approve $14million for
people resisting communist domination of Nicaragua, on the very day that a
Soviet ship unloaded about $10 million worth of helicopters, trucks and other
military cargo at Corinto, the principal port in Nicaragua. On the very next day,
Soviet Union to make $200 million availahle to him to consolidate a Leninist-
Communist dictatorship across a stretch of land which separates South America
from North America.
A worldwide propaganda campaign kas been mounted and carried out on
behalf of the Sandinista régimeand Salvadoran guerrillas which would not have
been possible without the capabilities, the contacts and the communications
channels ~rovided hv the Soviet Bloc and Cuba. The Sandinistas themselves
have shu& rrmÿrkablc ingenuiiy and skillin projcîiing s lis informatiointo ihc
IJnitcJ Siaie\ ir~cll Pcrhiips the hesi cumplc of thiithe sysicmatir.campïign
to deceivewell-intentioned members of the western mediaand of western re.inious
institutions.
There are many examples of Nicaraguan deception. The Sandinista press,
radio and government ministry have put out claims that the United States used
chemical weapons in Grenada, that the United States was supplying Nicaraguan
lreedom fi-hters with dr-es. and that the United States-ieh- eive th..o~~osition
bacteriological weapons.
The debate in the Congress last week disclosed few who think that what is
wiih avo2ing a possihly permanent impairment of Our national secunty'and aomoatihle
serious deterioration in the American geopolitical position in the world.
There are some who will he content with an agreement that the Nicaraguans
will now forego further aggression. Our experience in Koreÿ and lndochina
provides some lessons on the value of agreements with communist governments.
North Korea started to violate the Korean Armistice within days of the
truce signing.
We believe the Sandinistas main objective in regional negotiations is to buy
time to further consolidate the régime.History and the record and purposes of
Marxist-ieninist réeimesin e-neral and the Sandinistas in ~articular lead us to
hr.licvcih3i unlerï Siwr'igua hai implemcntcda gcnuinc Jcmocra<y. ss promiscd
IO the OAS. ihcir asiurances could not be adcquatcly vcriîicd and u.<>uldno1 bc SUPPLEMENTALANNEXES TO THEMEMORIAL 391
complied with. Cuban officiaishave urged the Salvadoran communist guerrillas
to slow down their attacks aeainst the Duarte eovernment in order to fortifv
and consolidate the ~icara&n revolution. ~e-believe that Cuba has assure2
the Salvadoran communists that it might take as long as five to ten years, but
as long as the Sandinista régimein Nicaragua remains, that countrvwill serve
as a bise for communist expansion in the àrea and the ~alvadoran~insur~enc~
will be renewed once the Sandinistas have been able to eliminate the armed
resistance in Nicaragua.
Todav, the Cuban and Nicaraguan militarv forces are toeether four times the
sile oiihw oi \lcxi~.o and are &uippcd wiih vlisily sunerior ucapuns. Today.
with armed fiirres larger and bctter cquippcd th~n lhc re.1 oiCentral Amcrisa.
Nicaragua co~ld walk ihrou~h Costa Kicd. which has no armv. tu Panama. and
Cuba cin threaten our vitalsea lanes in the Caribbean.
The increasingly United Democratic Nicaraguan Opposition, both internal
and external, is the major obstacle to Sandinista consolidation. The armed
resistance, popularly known as the contras, is a vital part of this movement.
Together, these groups encourage the erosion of support for the Sandinistas;
create uncertainties about the future of the régime: challenge its claims of
political legitimacy; and give hop to the Nicaraguan people.
The largest anti-Sandinista insurgent group, the FDN, is still providing strong
military resistance despite cutoff of United States aid almost a year ago. Popular
sympathy for the insurgents appears to be increasing inthe countryside, and the
FDN continues to receive significant numbers of new recruits.
The growing and united opposition can increase the pressure until the
Sandinista support has eroded sufficiently to leave them no option other than
modifying their rejection of internal reconciliation and allowing for the same
process of democratization that is taking place in the rest of Central America to
occur in Nicaragua.
Arrachment2
Address by Secretary of Statc George Shultz before the American Bar
Association, May 23, 1985
Follo~i'inigs an addressby Secrelary Shultzbefore the AniericanBar Association,
Washington, D.C, May 23, 1985.
.....................
UnitedStaies Policy in Central America
This bnngs me to Central America. Here, too, there is really a deep and broad
measure of consensus in this country about Our nation's goals.
We have broad bipartisan agreement that United States policy in Central
America should foster democracv.,e.onomic oro.reus. social reform. and reeional
security. Wealso agree on the underlying economic and socialcauses of inst&lity
in Central America. In the past four years, 77 per cent of our aid to the region392 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVlTlES
kas been econornic, not military. At the suggestion of a giant of bipartisanship,
the late Senator Henry Jackson, President Reagan in 1983appointed a distin-
guished commission to find a basis for a bipartisan policy for the region.
Headed by Henry Kissinger,the commission included three leading Democrats:
Robert Strauss, a former party chairman; Lane Kirkland, president of the AFL-
CIO; and Mayor Henry Cisneros of San Antonio. As recommended by the
commission, we have requested enactment of an $8 billion aid program over 5
years. Congress has approved $1.8 billion, and the authorization of the balance
is in the foreign aid bills now pending. The Caribbean Basin Initiative to give
countries of that area open accessto the United Statesmarket is another example
of bipartisan cooperation.
Thanks to the support of Congress, we are starting to achieve Ourgoals in El
Salvador, whiçh bas held four fair elections in three years. Under President
Duarte, the army's performance is improving, human rights violations are down
sharply, and the roots of democracy are growing. The guerrillas are weaker, and
President Duarte is seekine a dialogue with them.
In al1but one of the other counGies in Central America, democracy is taking
hold. Nicaragua is the one exception. Our policy toward that country has been
hindered, to some extent, by misconceptions and-confusion about our policies -
not confused policies, but confusion about them. Political partisanship, 1 am
compelled to say, also has burdened Ourtask.
In truth,Ourpolicy today toward Nicaragua and the Central American region
as a whole is grounded squarely in the ideals and inieresis that have guided
postwar American policies. We seem to have general and growing agreement
that the Nicaraguan communist régime posesa threat to the security of the
region. We have general and growing agreement that, rather than fulfill the
democratic nromises of the 1979revolution. the Nicarae-an leaders are increasineu
repression. ~e also seem to have general and growing acceptance that their huge
military buildup and the large presence of foreign communist military advisors
in the country are obstacles Coa peaceful settlemënt. The dispute in tGs country
is about some of the tactics for addressing the problem.
AddresvingtheNicuruguunProblem
One criticism sometimes heard is that we should negotiate rather than resort
to force in resolving Ourdifirences with the Nicaraguan communist régime.We
have, in fact, givenwong support to the Contadora-nations that are a6empting
Io negotiate a comprehensive solution to the crisis. Indeed, this country bas
made a major effort to cooperate with Nicaragua from the outset. When the
Sandinistas look power in July 1979,until 1981,we gave Nicaragua $118million
in aid - more than they received from any other country. The Carter
Administration initially halted Our aid because of the Sandinistas' atternpts to
subvert El Salvador. Thereafter, we made major attempts to resolve Our diiïer-
ences in August 1981and April 1982,olTeringto restore aid if they would reverse
their policies. The régime refusedboth times.
More recently,we held nine rounds of direct negotiations,wnducted on Ourside
byAmbassadorShlaudeman.Nicaragua'sRoman Catholicbishopsand itsdernonatic
resistancehave called rewatedlv for an interna1dialo-nieand a cease-fire.F'resident
Kwwn h~r>uppond tiir call: ihe Si~..trdgii.in cornmunirli haie rciuxd.
A rc~ondiirguinent occa~ii)n;ill, hcdrd is ihaur. arc Jri\.iitliç'1i;ar~gudns
into the arms-of the Soviets. ~he fact that some were surprised by ~aniel
Ortega's journey to Moscow - bis third in the past year - and to Eastern
Europe the day after Congress voted against any kind of aid to the democratic SUPPLEMENTAI. ANNEXES TO TH8 MEMORIAL 393
resistance shows that we have a wideinformation gap, which needsto be closed.
The record demonstrates that the Nicaraguan leaders are already dedicated
communists aligned withthe Soviet Union.
- From the bcginning, Nicaragua aligned itself with the Soviet Bloc in the
United Nations. Only five months after taking power, when our aid was still
Rowing in, for example, the Nicaraguan government refused to condemn the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nicaragua has voted against us - and lsrael-
on every issue.
- In March 1980, whenOur aid was still Rowingin, Mr. Ortega made his
first visit to Moscow, where he signed apolitical cooperation agreement with the
SovietCommunist Party. This was like the party-Io-party agreements the Soviets
sign with foreigncommunist parties.
- The régime'sinterna1 policies of censorship, oppression of the Roman
Catholic Church, hostility to the private sector, its massivemilitary buildup, and
wideningcontrol of the population add up 10an effort to consolidate totalitarian
control. The régimeis also connected with drug traficking and terrorism.
- The large influx of communist military personnel began in January 1980,
only months after the revolution. Today there are 50-75Soviet military and 150
civilianadvisersin the country.There are 2,500-3.500Cuhan military and security
uersonnel and 3,500-4.000 civilian advisors. as well as ~ersonnel from other
communist countries, Libya, and the PL0 [Palestine ~ibe;ation Organization].
- As documcnted in thc House IntelligenceCommittee report of May 1983,
the Salvadoran communist guerrillas have their command-and-control center
outside Managua and receivevital logisticssupport from Nicaragua. Documents
captured with a guerrilla leader in April provide extensivenewevidence ofNica-
raguan support for the Salvadoran communists.
- Comandante Bayardo Arce, the régime'schiefideologist, in May 1984gave
a secret speech, revealedlast July, in which he said, "[tlhe Nicaraguan people
are for Marxism-Leninism". Arcc cxplainedthe Nicaraguan strategy ofneutraliz-
ing American opinion by hiding hehind a façade of progressive rhetoric. This is
similar10the policyof the late Maurice Bishop'srégime,as revealed indocuments
we captured in Grenada in 1983.These documents are highly illuminating in
what they reveal of communist tactics to manipulate our media and our demo-
cratic ideals.
1 understand the desire of Our critics to find a peaceful accommodation. 1
share their dcsire. But the critiçs err in failing to see the Nicaraguan communists
for what they are. Mr. Ortega is a man who, in Warsaw on May 9, described
our policiesas "kscist" and said he suspectedthat during World War II President
Reaean "had Hitler'sDortrait haneine in his room". Even the Polish eovernment
kit ii ncctswry io withhold ruch eommcnts from gcner~lcirculation Two days
later. aiilpressconicrenic in Mddrid. Mr. Ortega again cuinpared our Prcrident
tu Hitlcr ISp~nishl Prime Slinister Ciorirdle~h.td Io remind hi, eut,! ihat the
United ~tàtci had iiberated Eurone from the Nazis.
Critics of United States militari aid tothe Nicaraguan freedom fighterswould
hold back the most effective lever we have on the communist rt~ime. In fact.
some oppose the use of econornic sanctions or any other lever. They seem to
think that aid to refugees, as the Barnes-Hamilton amendment in the House
would have provided,is a bargaining lever.All this woulddo is turn the freedom
fighters into refugees.
Some say thcy wouldfavor thc military option if al1else fails and a real threat
cornes. But by refusingto help the freedomfighters, even withhumanitanan aid,
they are hastening the day when the threat will grow and when we willbe faŒd394 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTLVITIGS
with an agonizing choie about the use of American combat troops. That is not
Ourpolicy,and 1 am sure it is not their intention. Wewant a negotiated settlement,
but like al1 adherents of the postwar bipartisan consensus, we understand that
neeotiations. esoeciallvwith communists.cannot succeedunlessbacked bv streneth.
Further, a failure <Oaid the freedom fighters endangers the progrels thatlhas
been made in El Salvador. President Duarte said he is "very concerned" by
Congress' action last month. How paradoxical that those whopurport to hack
President Duarte are, at thesame time, giving the Nicaraguan communists a free
hand to undermine him.
A third argument is that in helping the freedom fighters we are supporting the
Sumocistas. In truth, the opposition is led hy former opponents of Somoza,
many of whom fought or worked with the Sandinistas to overthrow Somoza.
Arturo Cruz, who served on the revolutionary Junta and in 1981as Ambassador
to the United States. was the oresidential candidate of the unified oooosition last
November, alihough he war Aoi ~rniiiicrl 10 run; Alfonro RobeIo, hcad of thc
Dcmocrïiic Rcvuluiiunar) ,\lliance, was one ol the original fi\,cnicrnbcrs01'ihe
Juniii in 1979;Adolfù Calero. aimmanrlcr inchieiui'the Nicarii~uan l>cniocraii:
Force (FDN), the largest resistance group, was once imprisoned by Somoza for
directing a general strike.Five of the six leaders of the FDN were long-time
civilian opponents of Somoza. 1could go on.
The so-called contras,along with others, are, in fact, the democratic resistance
of Nicaragua. They comprise about 15,000men and women - many peasants -
in a country of only 2.9 million. That would he equivalent to over I million
Americans under arms; clearly, it is a popular revolt.
When communist countries back communist guerrillas against democratically
elected governments, as in El Salvador, should not the United States back
democratic forces fighting for their freedom against a communist régime?How
is it that we can al1 aeree on our ohlieation to aid the freedom fiehters in
Afghanisian or the ant~nmmunirt guerlllas in Canibodia, but arc s; di\,ideJ
owr ;iiJing frecdùni fightersnear nur i'c~ horderh?There isno lopiîal disiinciion
Thus, we face a situation nearby where communists exploit poverty and
oppression to try to impose a police state allied to Cuba and the Soviet Union.
We at first extended the hand of friendship and have oKered repeatedly to
negotiate, but Ouroffers have been spurned. The freedom fighters, ofcourse, are
not perfect- 1can tell you from personal experience that no one in war is. But
recent history- notably in Vietnam and Iran - has abundantly demonstrated
that the side we back has been far, far preferable to the communist or other
revolutionarv alternative. Can anvone doubt what would be the remonse of
President ~iuman, Senator ~andenberg, General Marshall, ~ecretar~'of State
Acheson, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, or Senator Henry Jackson - al1
champions of a hipartisan foreign policy?
Obstaclesro a BipartisanForeignPolicy
Our ~olicvto foster Deace.freedom, and economic and social iustice inCentral
meri id, including NiCarag"a, cannot succeed in a climate of bitter partisanship
here at home. Members of Congress have every right to travel to Nicaragua to
review the situation, but we cannot conduct a successful policy when they take
trips or write "Dear Cornandante" letters with the aim of negotiating as self-
appointed emissaries to the communist régime.
Bipartisanship must include the recognition that we have only one President
at a time. Under the Constitution, the President alone conducts foreign nego-
tiations. In addition, al times he has to make critical decisions quickly and SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXliS TO THE MEMORIAL 395
decisively. Bipartisanship should mean an acknowledgment of the burden that
rests on the President's shoulders. In October 1983, after news of the Grenada
rescue mission wasannounced, several Members of Congress took the Roor to
denounce our action even before 1 went up to Capitol Hill that day to brief
them. A few even proposed impeaching the President for the mission. But when
they learned the facts that the President had and saw the ovenvhelming support
of the American - and Grenadian - people for the operation, many came to
regret their criticism.
The cynical, obstructionist brand of party politics has no rightful place in
national security policy. America would do better Io recover the cooperative
spirit of Senator Vandenberg and the other great Americans - of both parties -
who built the security and prospenty of the postwar world.
Conclusion
These great Americans who forged our bipartisan foreign policy 40years ago
set an example of patriotism and devotion to the national interest that should
inspire us today. The need for such a policy is as great today as it was then.
Indeed, with the growth of Soviet power, it is even greater. We - and other
peoples - have paid a heavy price for past divisions in this country.
The American people are in broad agreement on the ideas, ideals and interests
that define America's role in the world. Naturally, there will be legitimate
disagreements on specific issues. But we have made a good start on rznewing a
bipartisan consensus. We have more work ahead of us as we endeavor to restore
fully, in principle and practice, the bipartisan conduct of foreign policy that so
successfully saïeguarded peace and freedom in the postwar era. The President
and 1are ready to play our part. We ask al1Americans to join us.
Interview of Director of Central Intelligence William S. Casey in US. Newsund
WurldReport, lune 17, 1985
Question: in Nicaragua, do you think that the contrus have a chance either to
overthrow the Sandinista government or to force it to accommodate political
opponents?
Answer: The rebels have kept the Sandinistasfrom consolidating a totalitarian
régimeand establishing a base from which their neighbors could be threatened
militarily. Now, whether that's going to succeed, how long that's goingto prevent
consolidation or whether it will change the government, we don't know. We
know that a comparable insurgency in Angola has been going for 10years and
is an important force.
Question: Isn't there a danger that the United States support for an enterprise
like tbis can get out of control?
Answer: 11doesn't have Io. It can be turned off when circumstances require
it. Nobody's plunking in their troops except the Soviets in Afghanistan and
Vietnamese in Cambodia. That's quite diiïcrent from providing supply, advice,
that sort of thing.396 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlES
Ouesriun: If doine somethine about the Sandinista eovernment is in this
country's interest, doesn't it fofow logically that unitedstates military inter-
vention in some form becomes a clear possibility ifthe coniras are unable to do
the job themselves?
Answer: 1would only refer you to what Secretdry of State George Shultz said
on that. He said that if we fail to induce the Sandinistas to reform by backing
the rebels, we may Facea question of whether we could have to do it militarily.
Look, if indeed what you have here is a second Cuba, this lime on the
American mainland, and we don't want to accept that permanent impairment of
our security, the easiest way todo it is helping the people who want to resist it
on the ground. If that fails and the Sandinistas consolidate, then it's a tough
decision.
Quesrion: In the absence of any more American aid, are the conrrus going to
evaporate, or can they hang on?
Answer: It's amazing how people can continue to resist. They've heldon very
well. Congress terminated support effectivelymore tban a year ago, and they're
still tbere. They're as active as they've ever been. They'vehad problem- some
things they had to learn to do for themselves, but they've learned it. So you
can't discount wbat these people can do.
Quesrion: When we go in with support for a group like the conrrus,don't we,
in effect, assume a moral responsibility for their ultimate fate?
Answer: Well, 1think you do assume some responsibility. But, you know, life
isn't easy. If you want to do things, you've gotto assume responsibility.
Quesrion: What are the consequences of cutting them loose?
Answer: Very bad for Our reputation, for the willingness of other countries
who rely on our commitments. 11'svery bad in terms of our reliability.
Question: Does our action imply similar responsibility to Honduras, which
~rovides an active base of sumort 10the conlras?
Answer: That's a matter if'geography. The consequences of letting it go are
the impairment of our security, probably a diversion of our attention. We have
to worry about our immediate backyard.
Exoeriencetells us tbat when the communists take over one of these countries.
peopie leave the country by the millions. Large numbers of refugees will almosi
certainly come here if the perception is that communists are roine to take over
ADDITION TO SUPPLEMENTALANNBX Il
Inicrview of I'rrrideni RonalJ Reagan by Tclci,isiiinJ<>urnalists.April?Y. 1985
Il'ran>cripi. Oflicor the I'rcs, Secrïiary in ihc Prcsidenij
Quesrion: Your aides Say that you're veryupbeat as you move towards this
summit. Yet, il's not been a good week for the person we'vecome to know as SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 397
the Great Communicator. 1sthere any sense, particularly thinking of the contra
vote and the confusion about Bitburg, is there any sense in which you feel
something's happened to the Great Communicator in the last 10days or so?
The President: No. I've had four years of fighting with the recognition that
one House of Our legislature is of the opposing party - as a majority of the
opposing party. And your parliamentary systems - you don't have such things.
The party and the individual are the samc. But, then, 1 had the experience of
seven out of eight years as governor of California having a hostile legislature,
and yet we managed to accomplish a great many things. I have no1 given up on
the contra.The - our position, and the problem in Nicaragua, the vote up there
and the debate, whether theyadmitted it or not, is simply, do they want another
totalitarian Marxist-Leninist government, like Cuba's, now on the mainland of
the Americas, or do they want the people of Nicaragua to have the democracy
that they're willing to fight for, and that they did fight for in overthrowing the
Somoza dictatorship?
And whatever way they may want to frame it, the opponents in the Congress
of ours who have opposed Our trying to continue helping those people, they
really are voting to have a totalitarian Marxist-Leninist government here in the
Americas, and there'sno wayfor [hemto disguiseit. So we'renot going to giveup.
As for the budget, we'vejust started that fight, and I'm detemined that we're
going to cdrry through with a plan that puis us back on a course that ends
deficit spending.
But no, 1don't feel I've beendestroyed.
Quesrion: . . What is the position of the United States vis-à-vis Nicaragua at
the present? Do you rule out the use of force, the use of American troops?
ThePresideni; Yes.
Question: - in the area?
The President: I've never considered it. What we have in Nicaragua is a
revolution that was fought and literally with Ourapproval. The United States -
1 wasn't herethen during the fighting of that revolution, but the United States
stayed back. And anytime there's a revolution, there are various factions, al1of
whom were opposed to the government that they're rebelling against. and they
joined together.
They promised al1the other countries in the Americas -Canada, the United
States. al1the Latin American countries - the. .romised that their -oal was a
democratic go\,crnment, with free cleciii~ns.pluralism. frce Iabor unions, human
righib ohservrd, irccdom of speech .ind rcligis>n,And sa)li~rth.
Whrn the revoluii<>nw;isovcr, ihi,iuuntry. under the DreviuiisAdministration,
immediately went with aid, more financial aid to ihe new government of
Nicaragua than had been given in 40 years to the previous government of
Nicaragua; but then saw them do exactly what Castro did in Cuba after he
won the revolution - his people won the revolution. The one faction, the
Sandinistas - that faction eliminated al1the other participants in the revolution.
Some were exiled. Some had to flee the country. Many were jailed. And they
drove them out and then they made il plain, as Castro did in 1959, that they
intended a Marxist-Leninist State. And they violated every promise they'd made
to the Organization of American States.
Now, the people that are so-called coniras that are fighting against this are
veterans of the revolution. They are not remnants of the previous government
trying to get a dictatorship back in power. These are the people - many of398 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIFS
them were imprisoned themselves by the previous dictator. And they're de-
manding a restoration of the democratic goals of the revolution. And we feel
obligated to give them support.
But the plan that we've asked the Congress to adopt is one in which those
contras,themselves, have volunteered to lay down their weapons and ask them
to be allowed to negotiate with their former companions in the revolution, the
Sandinista government - negotiate how to restore the democratic goals. And
they've askedthat it be mediated by the church.
Well, we have advanced that plan here and have said to the Congress, we will
use whatever money is appropriated for food and medicines, and so forth; not
for military weapons. And we have the support of their allies- 1 mean, of their
neighbors. Honduras and Costa Rica and Guatemala and El Salvador. The
President of El Salvador has said that this is the right idea at the right time.
And this is what we'veasked of Ourown Congress and it's what we want.
We'renot even seeking an overthrow of the present government. As a matter
of fact, Ourplan says that while these negotiations goon, the present government
stays in power. But it is simply for them to adopt the principles for which they
said they were fighting in the first place.
ADDITION TO SUPPLEMENTALANNEX B
Radio Address by President Ronald Reagan, June 8, 1985(Transcript, Officeof
the Press Secretary to the President)
ThePresideni: My fellowAmericans, today 1 want to giveyou some encourag-
ing news about the opportunities for liberty, democracy and peace in Central
America, particularly in Nicaragua. This hope is based on a renewed chance for
the United States to provide support to those who struggle against totalitanan
communism on the mainland of this hemisphere.
We're heing given something very precious - a second chance to do what is
right. Recently on April 4th, 1 met here in Washington with Adolfo Calero,
Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo, the three principal leaders of the Nicaraguan
democratic opposition. 1 asked these three brave men to extend their offer of a
cease-fireand a church-mediated dialoeue with the Sandinista réeimein Manaeua.
Those exiled patriots and their folloLers made this proposal San José,~ista
Rica, on March I in a declaration of unity, common cause and democratic
purpose. Unfortunately, their proposal was immediately rejectedbythe Sandinista
communists who similarly rebuffed Our April 4th endorsement of this realistic
peace proposal.
Shortlythereafter, OurHouse of Representatives voted not to provide assistance
to the Nicaraeuan freedom fiehters. The Sandinistas and their cohorts believed
the way was Zear for the con;olidation of their communist régime.Nicaragua's
dictator raced to Moscow and the Bloc capitals of Eastern Europe to seal closer
relations with these communist tyrannies.
And, now, the Nicaraguans are not only continuing to import offensive SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXESTO THE MEMORIAL 399
weapons, they have stepped up their attacks on neighhoring Honduras and
unarmed Costa Rica.
But, as 1said, we have a second chance to do what is right. On Thursday, the
United States Senate, in a show of bipartisan support, voted to aid the freedom
fighters struggling for liberty and democracy, in Nicaragua. The Senate has seen
that their struggle is ours, that they need and deserve our help.
In the House, some claim that the United States plans to become militarily
involved in Central America. Well, no such plan exists. That charge is simply a
distraction from the two paramount questions that must be faced by every
member: Will you support those struggling for democracy? Will you resist the
Soviets'brazen attempt to impose communism on our doorstep - or won't you?
There's a bipartisan proposai in the House to keep alive the dream of freedom
and peace in Nicaragua. It will be put forward next Wednesday hy Republicans
Bob Michel of Illinois and Joe McDade of Pennsylvania, and Democrat Dave
McCurdy of Oklahoma.
It is essential that this hipartisan amendment he passed without any weakening
of its provisions iri order for us io have a hope for peace, democracy and
reconciliation in Nicaragua.
The legislation will provide $27 million worth of assistance to the freedom
fighters, and that's not much compared to the hundreds of millions the commu-
nists are spending to prop up their Nicaraguan dictatorship.
The solution to the tragedy in Nicaragua is the very same the Congress tias
supported in El Salvador: liberty, democracy and reconciliation.
In El Salvador, we'veworked with Congress and stood firmlybehind President
Duarte and the democratic forces. We seek the same goals in Nicaragua. As in
El Salvador, the United States stands with the democratic senator- Senate, 1
should say - against the enemies of liberty on hoth left and right. And the
freedom fiehters share our eoals for democracv.
One of ïheir leaders,A~OI S Olero, said this week, "We of the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance believethat true peace can only come with democracy, and
that democracv is a mecondition for oeace - not the other wav around":
'1.bsci7~!hi. oPP&;r~~ni~bYefor~ 11;IO selleI~ISsecond chaicc nou i~ITereJ.
the Congre\.; and the Execuii\c Branîh musi embark on a bipartiian course for
a negotiated political settlement, national reconciliation, democracy and genuine
self-determination for the people of Nicaragua.
Just six years ago, the people of Nicaragua - students, labor unions,
businessmen and the church - fought for a democratic revolution, only 10 see
it betraved bv a handful of Soviet-backed communists.
Wc musi n;it>iiby uhilç ihe h'ic~rdguanpoplc are ,liddled u,iih a communii
dictatorship thlit thredtcns ihir eniire hemispAertlouse voie Corhumaniiarin
sid to ihr. frecdom fighters will san5trona hiriariisan mrrragc ihal we will noi
tolerate the evolution of Nicaragua into anothër Cuba, nor w;ll we remain with
our heads in the Sandwhile Nicaragua becomesa Soviet clientState with military
installations constructed for use by the Soviet Bloc.
A Soviet base in Nicaragua would give the Russians a foothold on the
American mainland. America's proudest moments have come when Democrats
and Republicans united for the cause of democracy. That is the path which is
succeeding in El Salvador, and that is the path that will succeed in Nicaragua,
too, if we support the bipartisan proposai to aid the freedom fighters.
Until next week, thanks for listening, and God bless you. MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlFS
SupplementalAnnex C
UNITED STATI<CSONGRESSIOND AELBATEAND ENACTMEN 'TS
Attachment I. Debate in the United States Senate, 99th Congress, 1st Session,
23 Apnl 1985.(131 Congressii~naRlecordS4527-4624.)
Attachment 2. Debate in the United States House of Representatives, 99th
Congress, 1st Session, 23 April 1985. (Congressional Record
H2310-2428.)
Attachment 3. Debate in the United States House of Representatives, 99th
Congress, 1st Session, 24 April 1985.(1CongressionaRl ecord
H2442-2495and H2518-2527.)
Attachment 4. Dehate in the United States Senate, 99th Congress, 1st Session,
6-7 June 1985. (131 CongressionalRecord S7587-7651 and
S7726-7798.)
Attachment 5. Dehate in the United States House of Representatives, 99th
Congress, 1st Session, 12 June 1985. (1CongressionaRl ecord
H4115-4201.)
Attachment 6. Debate in the United States House of Representatives, 99th
Congress, 1st Session, 18July 1985. (13Congressional Record
H5900-5907.)
Attachment 7. Conference Report on S. 960, amending the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961,published at 131CongressionaRl ecorH6702-6748
(29 July 1985)(SeeSec. 722 (g),at H6721.)
'Not reproduced. SUPPLEMliNTAL ANNEXES TO THE KEMORIAL 401
SupplernentalAnnex D
PRESS Dtsc~osu~~s' RELA'rlNG TO UNITEDSTATEM S ILITARY AND PAMMILITARY
Ac~ivirissIN AND AGAINSI.NICARAGUA
1. "Reagan, Declaring 'Threat', Forbids NicaraguanTrade and Cuts Air and
Sea Links", New York Tintes, 2 May 1985
2. "President Orders Halt to Trade with Picaragua", WarliingronPosr,2 May
,,,"<
3."Leaders Say Nicaraguan Rebels Are Filtering Back to War Zone",
Wushingron Posr,2 May 1985
4. "Private Groups Step Up Aid to 'Contras'", WashingronPosl, 3 May 1985
5. "Sanctions: a Policy by Default"Washingron Posr 8,May 1985
6. "A Defecting Nicaraguan Contra's Tale", Wasl~ingroPnOSI,8 May 1985
7. "U.S. Ex-Officiaikad 'Contra' Fund Drive", Washington Pos t,May 1985
8. "Shultz in Warning on Combat Troops for Latin Region", New YorkTimes.
24 May 1985
9. "President Shifts on Aid for Rebels"New YorkTimes, 4 June 1985
10. "U.S. Military 1sTermed Prepared for Any Move against Nicaragua", New
York Times.4 June 1985
II. "~icara~uaand the U.S. Options: an Invasion 1sOpenly Discussed", New
York Times,5 June 1985
12. "President Pleads for Contra Aid",Washingron Posr 5,June 1985
13. "Reagan CriticizesNicaragua Anew". New York Times, 6 June 1985
14. "Senatc Refuses to Add Strings to Contra Aid, Votes U.N. Fund Cut",
WusliingronPost, 8 Iune 1985
15. "Senaiors Modify Billon Rebel Aid", New YorkTimes, 8 June 1985
16. "Reagan Pressures House on Contra Aid", WashingionPusr, 9 Iune 1985
17. "Nicaragua Rebels May Issue Charter", New York Times, 9 June 1985
18. "Sources: U.S. Close 10 Grouus Aidine C"ntras". 'A~ ~nra Constitution.
10June 1985
19. "Hill Tensions Risc on Nicaragua", Wushingrun Post,II June 1985
20. "Contra Chieftain Seeking to Share in Any New U.S. Aid", Washingion
Posr,12June 1985
21. "Reagan Letter Presses Latin Rebel Aid",New York Tintes, 12June 1985
22. "House Reverses Earlier Ban on Aid to Nicaragua Rebels; Passes $27
Million Package", New YorkTimes, 13June 1985
23. "House Votes to Aid Contras", WashinjironPosr,13June 1985
24. "Contra Aid Vote Presages Renewed U.S. Role", Washingron Posr ,4June
IOP5
25. "Nicaraguan Rebels Relieved After House Votes Aid, Washington Posr,
14June 1985
26. "Hill, Administration Ponder How to Distribute Contra Aid", Woshinaron
Posr,19June 1985 -
27. "U.S. Found to Skirt Ban on Aid to Contras", Miami Herald, 24 lune
..--
28. "Latin Targets Studied for RetaliationMiami Herald, 16Iuly 1985
-
'Not rcproduced.404 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
Supplemental Annex E
PREFACE
This is the eiehth Americas Watch reoort on Nicaraeua. It d-aws on Our
iindingb frm! numcr<>uimii>i.>n>io ihai 2oLnir" sincc 1982,in~ludingi\ra 1985
rcporis ihai dedl with aburcs b! boih rides in the arnicd conilict Iialso draiis
on Our previous research into State Dcpartment methodology of human rights
reporting, whieh has heen puhlished in Ourannual Critiques of the Department's
Country Reports on Nicaragua, and in Our individual Nicaragua reports.
INTRODUCTION
"The Nicaraguan peopleare trapped in a totalitarian dungeon." (President
Reagan, July 18, 1984l.)
"Some would liketo ignore the incontrovertible evidenceofthe communist
religious persecution - of Catholics, Iews and Fundamentalists; of their
campaign of virtual genocide against the Miskito Indians." (Prcsident
Reagan, June 6, 1985'.)
"The United States willcontinue to viewhuman rights as the moral center
of Our foreign policy." (President Reagan to UN General Assembly,
September 24, 1984 ',)
The Reagan Administration, since its inception, has characterized Nicaragua's
revolutionary government as a menace to the Americas and to the Niearaguan
people. Many of its arguments to this eKect are derived from human rights
"data", which the Administration has used in turn to justify ils support for the
conrra rebels. The Americas Wateh does not take a position on the United States
eeooolitical stratew in Central America. But where human riehts are concerned
we find the ~dmiGstration's approach to Nicaragua decePtive and harmful.
This report is addressed to the deception and harm done when human rights
are manipulated. Allegations of human rights abuse have become a major focus
of the Administration's camoaien.touoverthrow the Nicaraeuan eover"ment. u~
Such a concerted campaign to use human rights in justifying military action is
without precedent in United States-Latin Amencan relations. and its elTectis an
unpreeedented debasement of the human rights cause.
This debasement of human rights contradicts President Reagan's professed
commitment to such rights. Far from being the "moral center" of United States
foreign policytoward Nicaragua, the human rights issue has been utilized in the
service of a foreign policy that seeks to advance other interests. Whether or not
'0~oi1.J in"Yeu kiiori1,),\idNi:~r.iguînRchcla". .\'t,Yiirh Iimr.JJI) 1.11084
'"Kcmark, ul ihr.I'rcriJrnliu 1:~ndr~iringLunchconlor S:niii<>r Jir~.m~ahI>enion".
Ilirminghrimr.\l~b;<mÿJunc6. 1985
'"\lu4 3111S \'<:ornmsndT~lk ".rhinqain I'o>rScpirmber 25. 1984 SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXPS TO THE MEMORIAL 405
those interests are legitimate is not the province of the Americas Watch; what is
of concern to us is an attempt to proclaim a false symmetry hetween promoting
those interests and promoting human rights.
The Administration has disregarded the noms of impartial human rights
reporting when it deals with Nicaragua. The Administration's accusationsagainst
Nicaragua rest upon a core of fact; the Sandinistas have committed serious
abuses, especially in 1981and 1982,including arhitrary arrests and the summary
relocation of thousands of Miskito Indians. Around the core of fact, however,
United States officials have built an edifice of innuendo and exaggeration. The
misuse of human rights data has hzcome pewasive in othcials' statements to the
oress. in White House handouts ~n~ ~ ~raeua. in the annual Counfrv Reoorron
kic~ra~uiin human righi, prep~rcd by the ?talc Dçpsrtmeni. ;inJ musi nut;ibly.
in the Pre\ideni's ou,n remarkj. Whcn insonvenient, iindings of the IJniieJ States
Embassy in Managua have been ignored; the sarne is true of data gathered by
independent sources.
In Nicaragua there is no systematic practice of forced disappearances, extra-
judicial killings or torture - as has been the case with the "friendly" armed
forces of El Salvador. While orior censorshio has been imoosed bv emereencv -.
legislation, debate on major s8ciai and political questions is robust; outspoken,
even often strident. The November 1984 elections, though deficient, were a
democratic advance over the past fivedecades of Nicaraguan history and compare
favorably with those of ElSalvador and Guatemala and do not suffersignificÿntly
by comparison with those of Honduras, Mexico or Panama. The Sandinista
Party ohtained a popular mandate, while the opposition parties that chose to
oarticioate secured some 30 Der cent of the seats in the Constituent Assemblv.
Nor has the government pr&ticed elimination of cultural or ethnic groups, as
the Administration frequently claims; indeed in this respect, as in most others,
Nicaragua's record is hy no means so bad as that of Guatemala. whose
governient the ~dminisiration consistently defends. Moreover, some notable
reductions in abuses have occurred in Nicaragua since 1982,despite the pressure
caused by escalating external attacks.
The Nicaraguan government must be held to account for the abuses which
continue to take place, like restrictions on press freedom and due process. But
unless those abuses are Pairly described, the debate on Nicaragua ceases to
have meanina.
lnflammalor) ternis. looscly uscd. arc of p~riicrilarionccrn Prcsidcnt Reagan
hÿs described Nic~mgua'sclccied Prcsideni. Daniel Ortega. as "a Iiitle dictatrir"
and has termed the Nicaraguan government's recent relocations of civilians a
"Stalinist" tactic'. Such epithets seek to prejudice public debate through distor-
tion. Perhaps most harmful in this respect is the term most frequently used by
President Reagan and Administration officials to denounce the Nicaraguan
CnmcanTatarsard washsalinhumancrharhalfof thcmtingtdiedSin the orocess.Anvoccornoansone
withNicaraguanrclocaiionprdcticesisentirelyspecioua.The~iiarapuan &vcrnnienthas
hwn iriiic./i<hy i\mençir H':iichTorproiidingin~Jcqu.ttinatice iRnidiaj ;are,.and ihi.
procrrrof rclocaiionhas br~n physlcallyand rrnoiionallydllticulilur ihWr,un, alTiiirrl.
iherctsnor.!idcnîc.houcvrr.ihat the ruvcrnrnrntha, u~d rrlui;liidJIa odnirhrnini 01'
anysocial or cthnicaroup. no; thatevazccs rrom war zoneshavc been treatedinhumanel".
\\'ial\<n<>icih~iP&<l<ni Kcaganh~ oppnrrd monimicuinriionsig~in<iSo~ihAlnia 1
uhcrr 15 rnllltoh~rc hcsnrcloï.iiz,linincp.isi?O )r.irrTorre:i,onrh.i\ingnoihing lodo
nith milii,irvncccr,ii,tnJ 2nullion nixe.iri.,chc~lu~ ~~r I~r;:~ r~.loi:<tin h-i hr.Ii:i,
appliedecoAomic saGions =gains;~icaraguacitingtherelocationsas one ;ason:406 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARVACTIVITIE$
government - that is, "totalitarian". This is a misuse of the term and it
misrepresents the situation in Nicaragua.
In a totalitarian State, the State- or an institution such as the party or the
military that etiectivelyexercisesthe power of the State- destroysal1independent
associations and silences al1independent voices. Churches, labor unions, news-
papers, academic institutions, political parties, business organizations and pro-
fessional associations are forced to hecome organs of the State, or subservient
to the State, or they ceaseto exist.A certain amount ofcriticism may be tolerated
in a totalitarian State, but certainly not criticism that challenges the legitimacy
of the State, or its governing bodies, or its leadership. Moreover, such limited
scope for dissent as may be tolerated in a totalitarian State tends to disappear
entirely when the State considers itself to he threatened.
This description of a totalitarian State bears no resemblance to Nicaragua
in 1985. The Catholic Church and several Protestant denominations not only
operate independently in Nicaragua but they are outspoken in expressing their
viewson religious matters and also on every conceivable secular issue; similarly,
businessand professional associations and lahor unions are not only independent
but are unhesitatingly critical of the government and ils leaders. Politicalparties
representing a wide spectrum of views not only operate, but have elected
representatives who debate issues in the Constituent Assemhly.The parties that
chose to participate in the 1984national elections - from which no party was
banned - were free to he as strident as they chose in attacking the Sandinista
Party and its leaders, and frequently exercised this right on television and radio
time provided to them without cos1to conduct this campaign. An independent
human rights commission maintains professionally staffed offices in Managua,
prints and distributes - both nationally and internationally - detailed monthly
reports on human rights abuses by the government, and does not seem to
circumscribe itself in denouncing those abuses. A newer human rights group
operates without restraint in seeking redressfor Miskito lndians who have been
victims ofhuman rights abuses.
Any Nicaraguan and any visitor to Nicaragua can walk into a score or more
of officesin the country's capital and encounter the officers and employees of
various independent institutions who will not only voice their opinions freely in
criticism ofthe government and its leaders, and even challenge the legitimacy of
the State. but will also do so for attribution. Some will hand out literature
expressing ihosc upiniiins. This is insonccivablc in any Siîtc approprilityly
dc~crihcdas 1iiialii~ri.tn.Moreo\.er. 1115 inconcci13blr'in mm) <> irc couniric.:
\icorouils supportcd hy ihc United States \Vhilc ;i\.isiior io nctirh) t.1Sal\;idor,
~Üatemaia, oiHaiti for example, may encounter criticism ofthe government, if
it is criticism that is as strong as one regularly encounters in Nicaragua, the
speaker will ordinarily request anonymity. Similarly, it is impossible 10 find
independent institutions speaking so freely in more distant allies of the United
States such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Zaire, Morocco - to name just
a few.
To point out that dissent is expressed openly and robustly in Nicaragua, is
not to-denv that manv of those exDressinedissent have leaitimate erievances. We
helievethai the abuse; that ledto those gr&vancesshould Gecarefufy documented
and condemned vigorously. In our previous reports on Nicaragua, and in the
body of this report, we discuss such abuses as restrictions on expression and
association: denials of due orocess of law in manv cases in which defendants
ha\.<bccnxcuscd of sccuriiy-rclatcdLuimcs.the g~~\,rrnmeni'f,ailurc 10;iiknou-
ledge dcicniions prt~mptlyand thc rcl~tionship of ihal Tailurc 1i1iither ahures
agznst detaineesi the mktreatment of prisoneks; the violent abuses against the SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXES TO THE MEMORlAL 407
Miskito lndian minority that took place in late 1981 and 1982; and the abuses
that have accompanied forcible relocation of thousands of Nicaraguans from
wa~ ~ ~es.
It is, of course, extremely difficult to asscss to what degree liberties have been
restricted in Nicaragua because of the United States-sponsorcd effort to overthrow
its eovemment. The difficultv in assessine what miebt have been is al1the ereater
because the Reagan Administration has argued, at least implicitly, that such-
openness as prevails in Nicaragua today reflects the eiïort of the Sandinistas to
international sup~ort for iheir effort to resist the contras.
According to this.l&ic, it is becausc of the contra war, rather than in spite of
the conrra war, that Nicaragua maintains some of the charactenstics of an open
socicty. (There is. of course, a contradiction between acknowlednnent that there
is some openncss in Nicaragua and the allegation that it is a totalitarian State;
this contradiction is occasionally resolved by the suggestion that il is the
totalitarian tendency of the Sandinistas that is objectionable.)
If it were true that the openness in Nicaragua is a consequence of the contra
war, this would, of course, contradict everything that is known about the way
that nations behave when they are at war. Even the freest nations radically
circumscribe liberties under such circumstances'. At the very least, sucb use of
human riehts areumcnts to iustifv militarv interference should be reearded with
skepticism. ~iv& the ion~~~ue&es of the United States policy to Nicaraguan
civilians, thatskepticism may justifiably become concern.
For the past two years the most violent abuses of human rights in Nicaragua
have heen committed by the contras. Here too the Administration has substitutcd
rhetoric for a clear look at the facts. Alter several on-site investigations into
conrra practices, we find that contra combatants systematically murder the
unarmed. includine medical oersonnel: rarelv take onsoners: and force civilians
into collaboration. These abuses have become a rallying point inside Nicaragua.
Indeed, Sandinista rhetoric on these questions is often almost as heated as the
Administration's, such that the cont&s are officially referred to as "beasts",
'Consider,forcxample,theexperienceofthc UnitedStateswhichfoughtfour majorwars
duringthe twentieth century- the First WorldWar,the SecondWorldWar,the Korean
Warand theVietnamWar - but whichdid no1endureinvasion or seriousihrcatofbeing
ovcrthrownduringanyofthosewars. The testriciioon libertyduringthe FirsiWorldWar
wcrc the most sevcrein our historyand includcdsome 1.900federalprosccutionsfor thc
peacefulexpressionof opinion; an untald numberof state prosecutions;thc cloringand
banningfromthemailsofvariousperiodicals;and a war-limehysteriathatpersistedfollow-
hundredsin thc raidsoncalienrand suspectedleftistsledby AttorneyGeneralA. Mitchell
Palmerand his aidcJ. Edear 1-loovcr.Durine the SecondWorldWar. Amcricanswere
almostcntirelyunitcdinsufport of thewaret~trt,but the warwasneverthelessmarkedby
ihe fcirciblrC\:,custi<.inJ inirrnmrnt in <Icirniidncaniproi rumc 1l?.OiiiJapanrsi
,\menan,. and by ihr sndcimcniof ihr Sniiih ;\ci dndby the pro,rvut,unof29 mcnih,rr
ol the SocisltsiWurkcnI'anv anJ thc imnnldnmcnt <>lIS ofthcm ior viuhiineil,nr<>h~bi-
rionsagainstadvocacyand&nspiracy.~heKoreanWarwasmarkedbytheri&of'&nator
ductcdby McCarthyand severaloihers; by thc impnsanmcntof scoreswho declinediefsco10
namc narnes; and by loyaltyoaths and loyalty-securitytests foremploymcntthat cos1
thourandstheirjobs. TheVietnam War wasmarkcdbythe impnsonmentof thousandsfor
resistingthe draft; thcjailingoftcnsof thousandsfordemonstratingagainst thedraft and
thc war; and by an enomous cscalationin spying on peacefulpolitical activitiesof
AmcricansbytheCIA,theFBI,thcAmy, severalotherfederalagencies,andstateandlocal
policedcpartmentsal1 over the country; and by suchprograms asCOINTELPROwhich
wcrcusedbyCovernmentagencies (inthh casethe FEI) to dcstroyorganirationscngagcd
inpcaccfuldisscnt.408 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
"mernnaries", and, even though a numher are disillusioned supporters of the
revolution, thzy are invariably labelled as "Somocistas": al1civilians who leave
Nicaragua with the contras are considered "kidnapped", although there is
evidence that many go voluntarily.
This report attempts to put the rhetoric in10 perspective. Wehave selected
representative United States allegations - and, where we have found them,
Nicaraguan oliicial statements on the same subjects - and compared them with
the facts we have gathered in fouryears of monitoring Nicaraguan conditions. We
have not atteinuted to cover everv facet of Nicaramian life in detail. but have
taken our guidance (rom the hdminisiration's own ihu~n iheiiics Thcr arc: the
issue OCrç,pect TorIife and pcrsonal inizgrity: Nicaraguan govcrnmeni relations
with the opposition press, religious constituencies, and human rights monitors;
the Miskito Iridians: the November 1984national elections: number of refueees-
as an index of repression; and the character and practices of theconirris.
The Americas Watch has published seven previous reports on Nicaragua'. We
have evaluateù Administration evidence in each of thoie revorts, but our focus
has been on investigating at first hand and on working clo&ly with Nicaraguan
human rights investigators. Our purpose here isto offera guide to the Nicaraguan
case, supplemental to our more detailed reports, and to present that case in a
manner free of rhetoric. We are convinced that onlv neutral reoortine can
encourage improvements by either side in ~icaragua. The ~ea&n ~d;nini-
stration, by forsaking neutrality on human rights, bas done damage both to the
cause of h&an righis generally and to Nicariguans in particular.
SUMYARY
A. In examining the Reagan Administration's treatment of human rights in
Nicaragua, we findthat :
1. Far from being "the moral center" of policy toward Nicaragua, human rights
has heen used to justify a policy of confrontation;
2. to that end, human rights data have been distorted in the annual State
Department Country Reports on Nicaragua, in White House informational
handouts on Nicaragua, in speeches and public statements by senior oRcials
and most notablv. in the President's own remarks on Nicaraeua:
3. such misuseof h&an rights tojustify military interference is & ~nited States-
Latin American relations, an unprecedented debasement of the human rights -
cause ;
4. of particular concern is the Administration's constant - and inaccurate -
use of the tenn "toialitarian" to characterize Nicaragua.
B. With respect to actual human rights conditions in Nicaragua, we have
examined the Administration's claimsin the areas whereUnited Statesaccusations
are most forceful (and have also compared the facts to Nicaraguan government
claims, where we have found them), and find that :
'Our previousreportsare:
1. Violationsof the Lawsof War by Both Sidesin Nicaragua - 1981-1985- First
Supplcment(June 1985); 2. Violationsof the LdwsofWar by BothSidcsin Nicaragua -
1981-1985 (March1985); 3.Freedomof ExpressionandAssemblyinNicaragudduringthe
1984);o5.cHumanRighiscr1in4~iiiragua-skiApril 1984;6. &man1-1Rightsin ~icard~ua;
Novcmber1982Updatc; 7.On HumanRightsinNicaragua - May1982. SUPPLE.UENTAL ANNULES TO THE MEMORIAL 409
1. There is not a policy of torture, political murder, or disappearances in
Nicaras?. While such abuses have occurred, principally in 1981and 1982,
the government has acted in some cases to investigate and punish those
responsihle, although we continue to urge a full accounting of 70 Miskito
disappearances from 1982and 1983 and of the deaths (totally 21 Io 24) in
the Leimus and Walpa Siksa incidents of 1981and 1982.
2. The Administration has misrepresented the denial of press freedom in
Nicaraeua. attemotine to convcv the im~ression that former freedoms were
eliminzed'by the Sagdinistas. on the oiher band, serious problems of cen-
sorship persist and censorship should be ended except to the cxtent strictly
necessary to deal with the national emergency.
3. The issue of relieious ~ersecution in Nicaraeua is without substance. althoueh
it is evident thai the Political conflict bet&en the Catholic Church and the
government bas included cases of clear abuses, such as the expulsion of ten
Foreignpriests. There is not a policy of anti-Semitism, nor areChristians -
Catholic or Protestant - persecuted for their faith.
4. The Miskitos, who have become this Administration's favored symbol of
alleged Sandinista cmelty, sufïered serious abuses in 1981and 1982. Since
t~~~~~~,e~e"vern~ ~ ~~~ ~cord ~f ~elations with the Miskitos has imoroved
dramatically, including an amnesty, ellorts at negotiations and the beginnings
of reoatriation, while the contras' treatment of Miskitos and other lndians
has become increasinelv more violent.
5. The November 1984-~icara~uan national elections, though deficient, rep-
resented an advance ovcr pas1 Nicaraguan experience and a positive step
toward pluralism, resulting -insignificanl representation of opposition
in the Constituent Assembly. Nicaragua should be prodded to take additional
steps to advance a democratic process.
6. There is no evidence to support Administration claims that a United States
failure to interfere in Nicaragua would generate waves of "feet-people".
7. To state the above isnot to disregard or in any way to diminish thc importance
of abuses that bave taken place in Nicaragua. A newspaper, such as La
Prensa, openly proclaims its opposition character, but it suffersheavy-handed
.rior censorshio: some leaders of business associations and of labor unions
haw endurcd ,.iilingr ii~rlheir pidcriul activit~e,. ten ii~reignprieiis wcrc
cxpcllcd fr,m NI~J~J~UX I;>rtaking pari itia p:~ceiiil dcmon~traiion ihdt the
go\crnmcnt conhldercd illcgïl; cr.~pt Juring ilic I9Rl clection~.ihc politic<il
plrriier have not bccn perniiitcd to ionduci outdoor rsllizs; and therc have
been 3 nuniber 01' oxasi~inr whcn it<rh(rs(niohs) prcsumïhly conirollcd hy
the government or hy the Sandinista Party have been used to intimidate those
expressing opposition views. Perhaps most disturbing of all, since the revo-
lution succecded in 1979,there has been an interlocking relationship between
the Sandinista Party and the State so that, for example, it is the Popular
Sandinista Armv that defends the State and it is Sandinista-svonsored
organirations th& choose Iwo of three members of the tribunals tbattry those
accused of a variety of security-related ollenses.
C. Witb reso.ct~ ~~the human rieht-.oractices of the cuniros. we have examined
the Administration's claims for the moral character of these insurgents and find,
to the contrary, that the cuniras have systematically engaged in the killing of
riso on erand-the unarmed. includine medical and relief-oersonnel: selective
:iti.iiks on ci\ iliaiis:<nJindiscriniinate ~ii~zks;torture and othcr OLtrïgcbügrllnst
prw>ii31 digniiy . :andihc kirlii.tpping. and hiir<is\mciiiui reiugcc, \\ILlind thiil
the mort \~iilcniabuwi of humm rights in N~~~~lrgutd ~iJïy are bcingiommittcd410 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACI'IVITIES
by the contras, and that the Reagan Administration's policy of support for the
contras is, therefore, a policyclearly inimical to human rights.
"As you know, the Sandinista dictatorship kas taken ahsolute control of
the government and the armed forces. It is a communist dictatorship, it has
donë what communist dictatorshi~s do: created a re~ressive State Securitv
and secret police organization asshed by Soviet, ~a;t German and cubai
advisers - harassed and in many cases expungcd the political opposition
and rendered the democratic freedoms of speech, press and assembly,
punishable hy officiallysanctioned harassment, and imprisonment or death."
(President Reagan, April 15, 1985l.)
"Il is against a background of numcrous acts of aggression of al1kinds,
including military aggression, that the government Junta for National
Reconstruction has made consistent efforts peacefully to achieve the recon-
stmction, development and political economic, social, moral and cultural
transformation of Nicaragua and to set up a democratic system, based on
justice and social progress, in a pluralist society which guarantees, to al1
inbabitants. full em~lovment and exercise of human riehts in the broad
rense, wiihùut dirc;ini;nation oi any kind.'' (Report 2 tlie Nicaraguan
govcrnrncnt to the Unlied Y<iiioniHunian Righi5Cummitt~c. h4arL.h1982')
A. Individual righrs: life and personal securiry
Torture
"There were credible reports of physical abuses of prisoners during
interrogation and assertions that torture is practiced in the El Chipote state
security detention center. There were also credible reports of secret prisons
throughout Nicaragua, where prisoners are tortured."
This accusation. in the 1981 Country R.uort.on Nicaraaua3. was the State
Ikpürtment', op-ning 5alvo in a continumg ctrort to pr<>i.c Ïhat the Nicdr~gusn
gu\.ernmsnt cond.incr and d~rccts a p<~I~cy 01 torlurc. The clüiin ha, becn
reiter~ted in Ci>unrri Xcpnrrr for 1983and 1984. It has no1 hsen pru\,en 21 iiny
point, however. ~he go;ernment of Nicaragua in fact has pros&uted securiti
agents and soldiers for human rights abuses in a number of cases - something
which has not occurred in El Salvador (except when the victims have been
Amencans), Guatemala or in any other militdry-run country in Latin America4.
'White House Press rclease,"Text of Remarks by the Presidental the Nicaraguan
RefugeeFundDinner".
'CCPR/C/14/Add.2;10August1982,p. 1.
'P. 485.Thcdincerningrcadcrwillnotcthatnospsific cases arconcred,nor a spsific (or
generic)sourceforthe"crediblereports".
'InFebmary 1984,the governmentof Nicaraguaappainted a specialprosccutorto filc
and othcrabusesby govcrnmentagentsin the arca of Pantasma,Jinotcga.In late March,ers
thcseactionsrcsultcd inthe convictionof 13 militaryand civiliaofficiaito prisonterms
rangingfrom 4 to 19years,and inchargesinstitutcdagainst31othcrs; someof themwcrc
acauitted.othen have no1 been arrestedvet. In Mav 1984.IwoArmvsublieutenantsand
onéprivatcweresentcncedto long~"ronierms for ~nnine.a tnick inioan EasterCatholic
pro<c>\icmanJ killing12p:r*<,n\.l"the\>niemonih, ;<nÀÏy ,ublicuicn;iiu;i>-r.nirnceJ
lu IL) in priwn for r.ipi.!\ll<kii~u~mln inihciunn oiI.apan, %cld)a.in thicour,~
4 dnAmy swc~p ~npursu11 di~n~rgcnt,. SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 411
Moreover, the Administration's chargesdo no1square with the findings ofeither
Americas Watch or Amnesty International. The Permanent Commission on
Human Rights (CPDH), a private Nicaraguan group that monitors human rights
violations, initially stated firmly that torture was not practiced hy the Sandinista
government. In late 1982,CPDH hegan accusing the Nicaraguan government of
ene-- -e in such a oractice: the cases that CPDH kas documented reAect the
application of psych810gicalPressure during interrogation and some instances of
physical mistreatment. Americas Watch has published several reports in which
we-have descnbed cases in which prisoners have been mistreated and in which
we condemn the abuses that they have sufkred. The cases we know of and that
have been documented, however, do not constitute evidence of a pattern of
deliberate infliction of extreme physical sufering that is generally associated with
the word torture.
In March 1982, Americas Watch sent its first delegation to investigate the
status of human rights in Nicaragua. The team was particularly interested in the
accusation included in the 1981 Cowztry Report which had been puhlished only
a few weeks earlier. They asked the State Department for the source of the
allegation and its evidence, and were referred to an officialat the United States
Embassy in Managua and to the Executive Coordinator of CPDH. Neither of
those sources supported the claim; both told us that there was no evidence for
it and that in their view, the Sandinista government did no1 engage in torture.
Americas Watch then tried unsuccessfully to obtain the initial report by the
embassv in Manaeua which had heen the basis for the section on Nicaraeua in
the 198i Countryieports, in an effort to establish where and how the misrepresen-
tation hdd taken place. The State Department blocked our Freedom of
Information Act re~uests. both administrativelv and in federal court, on arounds
that disclosurc of this document could jeopa;dize United States foreigi policy
pursuits.
Americas Watch and other human rights organizations have reported on the
use of harsh interrogation tactics in the course of pre-trial investigations, such
as deprivation of light for several days, interrogation for long and irregular
hours, depnving prisoners of sleep, and even threats against pnsoners and their
families. In some cases, most notably with Miskitos arrested in 1982, prisoners
have heen beaten during interrogation. International human rights organizations
such as Americas Watch have called on the Nicaraguan government to eliminate
incommunicado detention or to regulate it so that it will not constitute a pro-
pitious condition for abuse of pnsoners. The Nicaraguan government should
also allow visits by international monitors to the pre-trial detention facilities,
particularly regular visits by the lnternational Committee of the Red Cross, in
the same manner in which the facilities of the Nicaraguan penitentiary system
are open to those visits.
The Administration, however, goes beyond these facts. Failing to present
credible findings by human rights organizations with regard to torture, the
Administration kas resorted to misrepresentation. The 1984 Country Report
contains the statement that "On May 30, 1984,Amnesty International reported
in a press releasc that it hadconfirmed that some prisoners have been tortured
or ill-treated in Nicaragua'."'The quotation is taken entirely out of context.
The Al press release opens with the sentence:
"Amnesty International has received few concrete allegations of torture412 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
or ill-treatment in Nicaragua, although prisoners' detailed descriptions of
detention and interrogation procedures have heen reaularly received and
assessed." - -
In addition, the sentence quoted in the CounrryReport is immediately clarified
in the AI press release:
"Protests of ill-treatment by individual prisoners or by domestic and
international organizations have been followed by intemal military and
police disciplinary hearings, as well as public hearings by criminal courts
and military court martials against police. Amnesty International kas
confirmed cases from different areas of the country in which police and
military personnel have been detained and put on trial after allegations of
torture or ill-treatment were made."
The Amnesty International press release is, indeed, further evidence that
Nicaragua's government does not direct or condone torture of prisoners.
Poliricalmurder
Misrepresentation has also served the Administration witb respect to alleged
political murder by the Nicaraguan government. Speaking to a meeting of
Central Amcrican conservatives in March 1985, President Reagan made the
claim that the Sandinistas "summarily execute suspected dissidents" '.
With somewhat more restraint. the Co~inrrvReoort for 1984cited six oolitical
murders. But CPDH, the State ~e~artmeni's sipposed source for thit infor-
mation, included no1 six, but two cases of detainees dying in custody in its
monthly reports for 1984. ~ -
International human rights investigators have learned of two instances of
group political killings inNicaragua, both more than three years ago. The OAS
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), in ils May 16, 1984,
revort, cited the 1981Leimusincident. inwhich Miskitos werekilledbv Sandinista
sa>\dieriin;ireinotr villagea> ihe solewbr ihat the Caimmi<sionhÿd ~orumentcd.
(This ra\r u~s first reporred by Amerii;ii \\'aich inMay 1982.and ;iccorJing 18)
Our inl~>rni.iticin,eiucen 14 snd 17 pn.rs\ins\icrcLillcd)'lhc An>cnca\ Witc'h
has learned of one othcr incident. dirine 1982 in Waloa Siksa. involvine the
deaths of seven Miskito youths. (~his caseLas also first répoied by the me ri cas
Watch.) The government has investigated the Leimuscase but has not published
its findinas: it is therefore not ~ossibie Io know for certain how thoroueh an
investigation took place, or whether appropriate punishments were imposed, and
this remains a matter of concern. As to the Walpa Siksa case, we understand
that the officerresponsible for the action was executed by orders of his superiors
in the field. 60th incidents occurred in remote, conflicted areas, and there is
no evidence that what took place was direïted or condoned hy the central
govemment.
This conclusion applies also with regard to the isolated deaths in years previous
to 1984: CPDH has gÿthered evidence on killings in real or supposed confron-
tations or following arrests by security forces; these deaths have often occurred
under circumstdncesin whichpolitical motivation could not be clearlyestablished,
-
' "Remarks ofthe Presidenttocentra1Amencan Leaders",March25,1985, lransniptby
White HousePrcssOffice. SUPPLEMENTALANNEXES 'IOTHE MEMORIAL 413
or in remote areas of active conflict '.In some cases the government has moved
to investigate and to punish those responsihle. Again, the evidence does not
demonstrate a deliberate, centrally sanctioned pattern Io these deaths.
With respect to captured cnnrro combatants, the treatment by and large is as
described above. Although contra spokesmen have frequently alleged that the
government kills fighters placed hors de combar, neither CPDH nor Americas
Watch has found evidence in any specific case. Conditions of confinement of
these prisoners are the same as those for non-combatants accused of security-
related offenses.Those cnnrros who have chosen to accept the government's offer
of immunity for those who surrender2, have not been confined or mistreated
afterward, according to al1available evidence.
Disappearances
The CPDH kas recorded "disappearances" through 1984, using the term in a
looser fashion than it is applied elsewhere in Latin America. What CPDH has
called disappearances have occurred, for the most part, in remote rural areas
and consist of detentions carried out without informing family members, or
transfers of detainees to new places of detention without informing family
members; most of these detainees have heen located in custody at a later date,
and therefore are said to have "reappeared". Elsewhere in Latin Amenca the
majority of those who disappear are not heard from again. CPDH puhlishes a
year-end listing of disappearances, which updates monthly reports by noting
only those cases that remain unresolved. CPDH kas also informed the Americas
Watch of cases that were resolved by the location of the disappeared after they
were listed in a year-end report.
Such background is necessary to understand how the Administration has
portrayed disappearances in Nicaragua. Both the 1983and 1984 CounrryReports
vastly overstate the incidence of this abuse. In 1983il is possible thar the State
Department's published figure (167) was arrived at by totaling CPDH monthly
figures and that, in error, the State Department overlooked CPDH's year-end
report (showing a total of 31, later reduced to 28). This error was pointed out
in reports published by AmericasWatch. In 1984a repetition of the same mistake
is difficult to imagine; yet, again, theCounrryReport misrepresenfs the CPDH
findings, through a manipulation of methodology. The Report States:
"ln 1984 the CPDH documented 60 cases of disappearances in which
security forces were implicated. In some of those cases, though reported in
1984, the individuals had actually disappeared in earlier years3.'"
The number 60 is offered as the sole referrent on disappearances for 1984,
although "some" among that number were missing some "years" earlier. Why the
circumlocution? Because CPDH in fact reported eighrunresolved cases of missing
'The bcst-knowncaseof aooliticaldeath isthe Navember1980killineof a wcll-known
and popularbusincssleader, orge Salazar.AccordingIo a book(soont<be published)on
Ni;aragu3by rr.piinrShirle!Chisiian. SaIuaru3.i"rganwing a miliinr).cir"rt ag3insiihc
Sandaniriagovcrnmsnt He uii,killedbySiaIcSLÏU~IY Agen16'1heruci circum\i.inccsarc
nor zledr The eotrrnnlcni claimcdrlIISili,dr v:is killiiicrolrliri xhcn.iiinir>3n>on
opened Tirewhxeresistingarrest.Salazar'sfamilysaysthat hewasexecutedby the agents.
thekillingandcnoonewaspunishedhasforil.eenpossible.The govemmcntdidno1investigate
First oiferedin Fcbniary 1984,but excludingleadersand thosewhotook moneyfrom
foreignsources.Expandedin January 1985by the newlyinstalledConstituentAssembly.
eliminatingthoseexclusionsandwithnotimc-limitation.
'P.611.414 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
persons for 1984; in Iwo of those cases CPDH "documented, Le., had some
evidenceof,an arrest by security forces. Accordingly, those two cases are properly
referred to as disappearances; no other cases warrant this label. Temporary cases
of missing persons reported by CPDH during 1984, but which were eventually
resolved by the location of the person reported missing,amounted to 35 cases.
The State Department may have picked up the figur oef 60from a repon hy the
United Nations Working Group on Disappearances,a body of the United Nations
Commission on Human Righu, and erroneouslyattrihuted it Io CPDH. The Working
Group report, issuedinJanuary 1985,stated that during 1984the Group had reŒived
60 cornolainu of disaooearances.but minted out that in 59 (no1"some") of thor
cases ,he presumeda%st had takm incarliery-, and onein 1984,'Whatever
the sourcesused, the referencesto disappearancesin the State Depanment Cumrry
Repurr on Nicaragua for 1984amount to outright deception.
Equally deceptive are pronouncements made hy Administration officiais in
dehates and public meetings. At a New York University Law Schoolsymposium
in March 1985,a deputy coordinator in Secretary Shultz's office,John Blacken.
told the audience that the Sandinistas were resoonsible for more than 1.000
. ~ ~
disappesrances (Amcricas \\'atch vice-chaiman Arych Neicr. <in ihc sym-
posium's panel wiih I3lrcken.challcnged and refuted the I,OUO figure, but Hlackcn
did niit uithdrau, it. Neither did hr.cite ei,iJence I;>it IConitanrinc Menecs of
ihc National Sccur,ty C'ounciltold a groLp of New ~<;rkIawycr\ ai ahoit the
\amc iimc that the rigurr &,as2.000.The irre~ponsibilii) of such charges i~typical
of the Administration's entire approach to human rights in Nicaragia.
Disappearance cases are never closed, on the other hand. There remain, for
example, 69 cases of Miskitos who disappeared in 1982 and one in 1983 for
which the government must account. The authorities also should do more toward
devisine a svstem for communicatine ori-.ners' whereabouts to relatives in the
provinGa1ïieas. ;iithe iailureIO do so causcs enormous anxiety and complicaies
the u,urk i~floral hum;in-righis in\eitigaiors. The governmcni did insiiiuie such
a i,,ir.ni in landr ru^ in 19x2.which ha. h;id a n<>\itis,eslfect.
i'he three categories of ab& examined abo;e provide a sample of the Ad-
ministration's tendency Io exaggerate abuses of individual rights in Nicaragua.
A more complete discussion, heyond the scope of this report but availahle in
other Americas Watch reports, would take account of mixed performance in
other areas of individual rights.
Amnesty International, Americas Watch, and other human rights groups,
relying in part on CPDH and in part on their own independent invcstigations,
have expressed concern about conditions in Nicaragua's overcrowded prisons,
about trial delays, about cases of incommunicado detention which in some
instances has lasted for several weeks after arrest, and about the procedures used
by the "special tribunals" set up in May 1983to try security-related cases'. The
'Wiih "~1 LL>ihil1.1KY ior,umpl: "Si~ragi~i.Kcr<>l.it~iisJusi~w" i.npnl 1485
repon h) ihc huyers Cummiilm fdr Intrrnaiiund1Iuni.inRiair Amcncu H'hichh;idpw-
blou*lye\pnsud lumnri'rn,siih the ur 01 u,um oi sprud ~undiciiiintiryuruniy-mlÿicd
ulTlnrr. hwuc iheJkvion, ii,ud hy ihosccounr ;irnoireil~wahlbcy Siwr~gw', tndcpoi-
Jtni ~~Jtu-iry~.nbru~re ihcnon-la\r)errn~mkrr ri1ihrv :km ;hum h) ih;SanJlniii:i-
unmial ppuhr orginiwlioiü In oLr Apnl 13X4 n~tl. uc wlhd for th: nholiiiooC lhx
iuum.mJihrrinmpthrning ofihcrcgubr judirriq WC havealwiniimd ihrïoni~nurru l rol
insiimrnuniwdd ocitmiioti?ihouirlwr reguhior)ninetion>. and diegu\crnincni'\m-rioxtiu
Jmg au>\ hg ~iiipdni~n~~iiii~io pr:-ind dtiirit;,n wnichWr. klic\i ihwsid hi ,?rio.\
human <nnJ iruhlrm\and ut wll on th:!ilcimgun go\ernmrniiocumi ihcm. WC belicr:.
houïrrr.ihiiI~LWL~UYJ. JOnoi juiifyihrKw~n A~minislr~uon u'r.<,fihm ininIlammius
rhctmi iijuiiihiiuiri,r>na*pniihr%ndintrw kgni:. SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXI~S TO THE MEMORIAL
415
state of emergency declared in March 1982 limits the nghts of defendants and
detainees, including, in practice, the efectiveness of habeas corpus . t the same
time the ordinary courts operate with a medsure of independence, and harsh or
unwarranted sentences have frequently been overturned on appeal. The death
pnalty does not exist in Nicaraguan law. In addition, as noted above, the
government has prosecuted security oficials who have committed abuses.
B. Freedomof expressionand religion
"(T)he Sandinistas are attempting to force Nicaragua into a totalitarian
mold . . . suppressing internal dissent, clamping down on the press,
persecuting the Church, linking up with terrorists of Iran, Libya and the
PLO, and seeking to undermine the legitimate and increasingly democratic
govemments of their neighbors." (Secretary of State Shultz, February
1985'.)
The Administration has been forceful in condemning what it has called the
characteristics of "totalitarianism" in Nicaragua - in particular the government's
tense relations with the opposition newspaper Lu Prensa and with the Bishops'
Conference, and alleged anti-Semitism on the part of the authorities. In a typical
résuméof Nicaraguan history, President Reagan portrdys the Sandinistas as
having forcibly silenced their critics as part of an ideological plan, immediately
after coming to power in 1979:
"Functioning as a satellite of the Soviet Union and Cuba, they [the new
Sandinista government] moved quickly to suppress internal dissent, clamp
down on a free press, persecute the church ..~.~'."
Similarly, the then-director of the White House Outreach Group on Central
America. Faith Rvan Whittlesev3. has claimed that Nicaramia's eovernment
-
"dti.ickcd the ~ath;>licChurch. &os1Protej1;int churchts and y forccd \.iriually
the entirr Jruish populaiion [if 'licaragua into exile4"
Thcse characr are uordcd to misltad. The Sandinistas did not "clanio doun
on a free pres;", for under the Somozas a free press did no1 exist The &urches
are no1 under "attack", but rather, embroiled in debates which have divided the
religious community itself. And the charge of anti-Semitism, including words
like "force", "exile", and "entire population", is evidently calculated to cause
outrage but avoid the Pacts.We examine the substance of the issues below.
'"Amenca and the Stmcclefor Freedom".Addressbefarethe CommonwealthClubof
C:*!iforni~k.bruary 22, 19r5.p Y tasprcp.irrdl'orlr.li\er)j
-[:rom ihr 13rc\iJcnt'wcekl!radiorpesch oiFehnisry 16.19RS:qui,i:d ii1.0" Cinnon.
"R :~gan I>cnounrr,S~ndiniriar. IJrgr,I:unds [orRehil,". Ilir>l,inh.ri,nAtebru.<r) 17.
1985.p. A4.
'Mrs. Whittlcseyhas becnreplaced.and hcr successorai the White Housc hascancelcd
ihr. WurkingGr.,$ In iiJaj ihr pr<,gra~ i.iinhai ihc .\'ri< Yur/'zrnialled 3.Shau-
<:iniralAmcricmficure,ly-ona maioniv\01ihcmswakineondkr ihi.ciil01iNtcarseu:i.ciÿlsand
'Introduciory rcmarks,olticia14ra~script",ssech by~nhbishop Roman~yrietaofSan
Jasé,Costa Rica, Beforethe White House OutreachWorkingCroup on CentralAmcrica,
.~~Octohr ~7 19x4"
'Under théGazas, the editorof Ui Prenso war,al variouslimer,imprisoned,intem-
ally cxiled, prohibited fromtravel, and eventuallymurdered. Aside from censorship.
Anastasio Somozaal timcsrequired La Prenso to publisharticlesthatwerc favorableto
him - illustratcdbyhisphatograph - to whichthenewspaperwasgivennorightto rcply.
Towardstheendof theSomozapenod, Lo Plensa wassubjectedta bombingsandmachine-
gun attacksand. cventually,Somoza's NationalGuard burnedit io theground.Ln Prensa
re-opencd aflcrtheSandinisiascameto power.416 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
The Press
There are three major newspapers in Nicaragua, one of which isthe Sandinista
Front organ, Barricada; one of which is the privately-owned El Nuevo Diario,
which supports the government; and a third, Lu Prensa, which supports the
opposition. Radio, which isowned by private companies, offerssome independent
news. Television is State-owncd and managed. While the Reagan Administration
calls La Prensa "the independent press", the Nicaraguan government calls it
deliberately provocative. In the pro-Sandinista press, LAPrensa'scomplaints of
inordinate censorship have bcen dismissed as "loud-mouthed" attempts to gain
attention from foreign news agencies '.
The issueof Œnsorshioin Nicaramia-involvesthe nov-rnment'sclaim that it mav
Iimitcertain irn'domsdunng a nationaltmrrgnçy under ihc pnn~iplcofdrriigaiion.
contcmpl~trd iithe applicable intcniational hunuti nghts dgrwnienis Acci>rilingl).
Prnidcni [>anel Oncra has rxiintrrl Io the Unit~rlStales-fundcJ cilnlruuar 3s the
cause of the eniergens. and, iherefore, the reason for censorship:
"If Mr, Reagan really wants the full restoration of political and civil
rights, he need only stop the war. My government is committed to lifting
the state of emergency and restoring full press freedom and other rights as
soon as that occurs2."
Sporadic censorship under the Sandinistas began in 1980,but it was not until
March 1982, with the imposition of the state of emergency to deal with the
United States-sponsored contra threat, that La Prrnsa faced prior censorship.
Since then, the paper has never heen closeddown by the government, but rather
has susoended ~ublication for davs at a tirne to orotest soecific censorshio
<Iccisions.Rut neiiher ha>the governmcnt di Yi:;iragu;i rt:iyeJ a,ithin the Iiniii
ol'its own 198?emergency Icgislliiion,uhich III1984was replaccd h) Icgirlation
restrictinc cen>urshio 1s milii;ir~ly.hcnsiti\.rmïttrri. The amcndmeni ilseIr. it
should hi noted. wis a nositive sien: and since mid-1984. censorshio has heen
less severe thaii breviousiy. (The exiebtion was a brief period in mid:~ovember
1984during the national hysteria over an anticipated United States invasion that
accompaniëd the false reports, emanating from the United States, that Nicaragua
had acquired MiG jets from the Soviet Union.) Nonetheless, even during the
relatively relaxed period prior to the November 4, 1984,national elections, items
censored from La Prensa included a variety of non-military stories, such as
coverage of campaign meetings of an opposition coalition, Coordinadora
Dcmocratica, and reporting on pro-government demonstrations that disrupted
those meetings. AsAmericas Watch noted in our report on freedom of expression
during the elections3, LAPrensa refused to publish on October 22 after heing
prevented rrom reporting on one party's decision to withdraw from the race.
There is little dispute as to the political missionof La Prensa. Like many Latin
American newspapers, it is highly partisan, such that the giant final rally of the
Sandinista candidates in the 1984 election campaign was simply ignored. (The
Reagan Administration is an enthusiastic supporter of LAPrensa and, as such,
it was given a grant of ~100,000 by a United States Government-established
and -financed agency, the National Endowment for Democracy. No such grants
'Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), January 15, 1985, p.13; from
Barricoda,January 10,1985.
'"Freedom of Expressionitandr"Assemblyin NicaraguaDuringrchthe3EleciionPniod",
AmcricasWatch (New York, December1984), p. 6. SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXESTO TIIE MEMORIAL 417
have been made available to newspapers in Chile, Haiti, Paraguay or other Latin
American countries where even more severe censorship has been practiced.)
Whatever the newspaper's motivation or quality. however, its right to publish
non-security-related information has been abused on frequent occasions. The
Administration does no service to honest advocates of free exoression. in and
outside Nicaragua. by falsely implying that the prc-~andinista press was free.
The government, on the other hand, should end censorship that is not strictly
necessary to meet the emergency caused by the contra conflict.
Tite churches
"Because they do no1 rcalize the totalitarian direction of the Sandinistas,
there are even some Catholic Bishops in the United States who are still
supportive ofthe Nicaraguan régime."(White House Digest, October 31, 1984.)
This quotation takes an inflammatory assumption ("totalitarian direction")
and then seeks to discredit a hypothetical group ("some" United States bishops)
for failing to support it. The paper from which the statement is taken - a White
-~~~~ docu-~~~~titled "~~at Central -~encan Bishoos Sav About Central
America" - offers numerous comments from Nicaraguan Catholic Church
figures as evidence for the premise that, in Nicaragua, the confrontation between
cburch and State is relevant to the ~dministratbn's backine of contru rcbels
The paper begins by dismissing "critics of Administration policies in Central
America rwhol oftcn cloak their criticism in the mantle ofthe Catholic Churchn-
thus claiming ihe Churcb's implied reulposition as ils own.
The issue is certainly an important one. With the exception of the conrras'
identity and practices, perhaps no issue in Nicaragua arouscs so much cmotion
as the debate between the Catholic Church hierarchy and government, which
has involved both substantive issues and heated rhetoric on both sides'.
Archbishop (now Cardinal) Miguel Obando y Bravo of Managua bas been
called a "reactionary political ideologue" and the "spiritual lcader of the entire
riebt wine" bv members of the eovernment's too leadershio'. Obando in turn
hys mm3drjirong ÿni.-~andinista~~~ommcni~ liih<;meand sbrw~d '.Thc Kcagan
Adminisiration ha5 ihardc~~ri/e~lthc~e tensic>nras niclining ihat the Church. ;ir
an institution, is supprcssed in Nicaragua, because it stands for human rights
and ae-inst Marxism. When the Administration charees. as i-.does freaucntlv. ..
that former opponents of Somoza have now turned against the revoluiionary
government, if is refernng in part to such figu.es as Obando and other bishops,
who criticized the Somozÿ régime.
Some 80 per cent of Nicaraguans are at least nominally Catholic. There are
significant differences of opinion within the church as to whether and how much
' Ldtin Amcricanhistoryis replctewith far more sevcrcconflictsbctweenchurch and
Statc,such asthcmurdcrousviolenceinMexicointhe 1920sand 1930s;theconflictbctween
the governmcnt ofPrcsidentJuan Pcron inArgcntinaand thechurchinthemid-1950s;the
murdcrs alpricstsand nunsin ElSalvadorthÿtincludedthemurderof fourUnitcdStates
churchwomcnandofArchbishopRomeroin 1980;and the murdersofpriestsinGuatemala
thai Icdto the claringof thedioceseof ElQuichein 1981and themurdcrof Fr. Augusto
RamirerMonasterio inAntigua,Gudtemala.inNavembcr1983.
rcmarksdiaretattributcd, respectively,to Intcrior MinistcrTomas Barge and VicePrcsi-
dentSergioRamirez.
'"ConRictwithSandinistasCited in ChurchBid for ForeignFunds", New York Times.
Augus14,1984.ArchbirhopObsndohad viritedNew York thepreviousmonth.A business
exccutivewithwhomhe methad quotedObandoas sayingthat helpingthe churchwasthe
bestwayto fightMarxism-Lcninism inNicaragua.418 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITII!S
to support Sandinista policies. Similarly, there are differences of opinion about
the church among Sandinistas. Nicaraguan officiais frequently point IO the
presence of four priests in high government posts as evidence of Sondinisrno's
bonds with the church, while the public offices held by these priests have been
one of the church's orincioal erievances aeainst the eovernment. While some
. u - -
Çanilinista rlcmcnts rrgard religion :ir arihaii. the ollicial FSLU communiquc
on religion, originall) publishcd in Oiioher 1980 and sincc realfirmcJ. staics ihat
"Thc 131.9 hai a profciund respect for a11rrligious cclchr:itions and iraditions
oi <)Urpeople". Ihe communique, iisclf iontrover,ial. ii considered by sonte xs
an intrusion inio private maiicrs. whilr oihers rcgard it as evidcnçe 01'Sandinisix
flexibilitvand <iradenarture froni iradiilonal Ivlarxistaiiiiudes io\i,ards relirion '
But the Conflictbetwkenchurch and State in Nicaragua centers less on
of religious freedom than on political differences. Eventhe State Department's
Country Reports on Nicaragua do not clairn that Catholics are persecuted for
their faith. The church hierarchv. su,~ort.. hv manv ithouah ..t all) clerrv. . -,
has as\unicd the rsle ,if gddfly , hy 2nd Ihrg the gowrnnicni ha. noi attempted
ici rehlrain 11l'romdoing so. Thc major exception Ir the sxpulsion of ien forcign
nricsts in J~lv 1984.Thc ~ricsts werr cxwlled after v~riici~atinr in a mxih IO
;upport another priest, accused hy the government Of channeliig munitions to
the contras. Here the issue was freedom of speech and assembly, not religious
freedom. (The Americas Watch, like many other organizations, has called on the
government to reissue visas to these priests.)
The episode that has corne 10symbolize the conflict between church and State
in Nicaragua is the March 1983 incident in which some Sandinista militants
heckled Pope John Paul II during a public speech that he delivered on a visit to
Manaeuu. The Pone h~r~called o~~Catholics to rallv behind th, bishoos and
<ipparenilyangcrerl part of the croud hccause he Ciilcdio condemn the ;ittaikj
on iïiiaraguan\ h) ihc <i,>itrti.Thiiush tho\c usho interriipicd ihc Pope might
iii.1bc crit1ci7edior their rudcnrss 1;ind.hl, more ~oohistiraird o.iriisani of ihc
Sandinistas, for injuring their own cake)'th& episode ;iid not invilve an intrusion
on religious freedom2.
An exarnple of the complex church-State relationship in Nicaragua - and the
Reagan Administration's misuse of the issue for its own purposes - is the
bishops' Easter pastoral letter of 1984.The bishops' letter created controversy
by calling upon the government to open direct negotiations with the contras and
by failing to note contra abuses of human rights. At the same time, the lettcr
pointedly opposed intervention, stating:
"Foreign powers take advantage of Oursituation to encourage economic
and ideological exploitation. They sec us as a support for their power,
without respect for Our persons, Our history, Our culture and Our right to
decide Ourown destiny."
'Sw. "Kepon oi I>clrgtii<>nio Inir.riig;iti.Rzligi~u~Pcr\ccuiion In Ni;,tr~$u~".
ha1iun.JCoun;il .>Ch~rchc, i>fChriri in ih~.US.\. Koternhïr ?. 1984. p II, and Ccur
Jersr.SJ. 'ïhrC'huri.honcl ihs Yiiurukwon Rr<<ilurwC n.athuli: insiiiuti in1 Iniern~iiunal
~elaiioni(London,19841 ,D.15-16, '
:r\lih<>ughulfici~lrof ihi Kc*g;inAdminirirdii<>p nuni io debaie, hciuccn rhurch
ofiikl, in Si.srdgu~ :xnd +,ternnir.nt.iiliri.tircr quï>tidn\ <ipubli:p<il.cy e,~mplc>
dI rinrsriion01'relteion.ihr ,\dmini<iraiioninxucr inanaloeousdrhdics wiih ihurchcs in
theGnitedStates F& exam~le,thcout~oine~ .ssi~tant~nretani of SiateforInier-Arnerican
AiYalrsr.rvrnllyc~iiiioc<clhurchrrin ihcUiiicdSiair\ foropG\ing Un~icJSiaierpultcy in
Ccnir;tlArne6ci. 'Rrligtou\prrsonl \hould no1 u\r ihc crcJihtlti1hi.yïnjo). tu rn~rkei
iheirpcr\.~n.%pl.hiluioplsi~iland pulii>;21kli:i\". .iiil\tuilcg Ih. l~~t~h~t~~!~~t~~,!,
Juiie10. 1985 SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAI. 419
In the Administration's hands, this statement becamc an argument against
only one foreign power. The White House Digest quoted above included the
comment :
"Some observers see in this statement a reference to criticism of the
Sandinistas' tics to Communist countries, especially Cuba. This is a logical
assumption . . ."
But it is not logical. Whatever "some observers" may see, the statement is even-
handed; it opposes intervention from al1quarters'.
With similar zeal the Administration has portrayed the Protestant churches of
Nicaragua as persecuted on religious grounds. In 1984,it widely publicized the
United States visit of a Pentecostal, Prudencio Baltodano, who stated that he
had bcen brutally treated by Sandinista soldiers during a military operation; one
of Baltodano's ears was cut off. Baltodano's experience, while certainly evidence
of an abuse of power, does not appear to bave heen due to his faith, as the
Administration charged '.The Administration kas claimed, however, that several
Protestant groups have been victimized, including the Seventh-Day Adventists,
Mennonites, Jehovah Witnesses, Mormons and Moravians.
A high-level delcgation from the National Council of Churches visited
Nicaragua in November 1984 specifically to investigate charges of religious
persecution. They found the charges entirely without substance. The growth of
the Protestant community since 1979 (from 80,000 10 380,000) would tend to
support this finding. The delegation reported that al1 the Protestants it inter-
viewed - including members of the Moravian Church, which has played a
delicate role in the coniiict between its Miskito constituency and the govern-
ment - stressed that their greatest concern was conrro attacks. The delegation
also reported that its sources had criticized the Catholic hierarchy for "transfers
and forced isolation of priests and communities who openly sympathize with the
Nicaraguan political process". "
Theissueofunli-Semili~m
In mid-July 1983, the then-ambassador to Nicaragua Anthony Quainton
cabled to the Department of State that he knew of "no verifiable ground" for
accusing the Sandinistas of anti-Semitism4. Four days later, however, on July 20,
at a meeting of the White House Outreach Group with Rabbi Morton Rosenthal
of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL), President Reagan himself
stated that anti-Semitism was a consistent policy of the Sandinistas: "The
Sandinistas seem alwavs to have been anti-Semitic .. . After the Sandinista
takcovcr the rr.rndinini~e\i,s werc terrori/cd into Ic~\,ing"'
Thcse remarks wcre struck ïrc~mthe White Ilousc »t~t:~tof the mccting an
unusual move, explained to the press later as having been taken because the
'For a detailedand lucidcritiqueof the White House paper.sce Thomas E. Quiglcy.
"WhenResearchMasquerades", Common~vml, 5April,1985.
"'Miraculouslyhe survivedand innowin the UnitedStateswitnessingro thesad tmlh
of rcligiouspersecutionand torture", wrotc Faith Ryan Whittlcseyin a letter to the
Wm'"Report ofsthc Delegation...",op. ritp.4.
'Cable of July 16, 1983,as quoted by Robert Parry, Associalcd Pressdispatch,Sep-
tcmbcr 20,1983.
'Quoted byCynthiaArnson,in one ofthrcearticlesthat compose"Nicaragua:ASpecial
Report", Momenr, Octobcr1984issue,p. 21.Thespecialreport,whichalsocontainsartictcs
by Robert Weisbrotand RabbiMorton Roscnthal, is anexcellentsummary ofthisdebatc
and ilsbackgroundinthe Nicaragua"contert. SUPPLEME~AL ANNEXES TO THE ~ORIAL 421
Obando's homily of October 7, 1984, as printed in Lo Prensa, contains unmis-
takeable references to Jews as the slavers of Christ. for examr>lel.
But Jews remaining in Nicaragua worship without restrictions and sunèr no
discrimination. While the property of some has been confiscated, this has not
been true for Jews as a nrouo: no; does it aooear to relate to the fact that thev
are Jews. While a few 6rom;"ent Jewish bishessrnen have been charged with
crimes under the Somoza régime,their family members have not been affected.
The case about which the ~dministration has made most complaint, that of
the confiscated Managua synagogue, is typical of the distortion surrounding the
issue. The synagogue was indeed confiscated after the 1979 Sandinista victory;
it was converted into a children's association headquarters. (Foreign visitors
reuort it was not defaced or otherwise attacked.) But althoueh the svnaeoeue
had bclongcd to the Jrriish communii) as a \vholc (not. ai Nicar~guan iitliiials
lirst claimcd. tilpro-Somord exile). thlit community hiid ah~ndoncd ilprior to
ihc Sandinisrï \,iciory. the huilding war unused. Whcn the go\,crnmcnt III1983
ofircd to rcturn the building. inJ m;idc plan> IO niotc the children's a\sociation
elicu.hcrc. M:inagua's rcni;iining Jcws st:itcd thdi ihc" c,,uld noi ïIT.>rdto kcep
it up. It may be put to another use supp..tive of the Jewish community if funds
cari-be raised.
What the ADL and other American Jewish organizations do agree upon, as
Rabbi Rosenthal has stated, is that in Nicaragua there is no official policy of
anti-Semitism2. The problems which do remain, demand sensitivity on the part
of Nicaraguan officiaisand citizens alike. They also require cool appraisal in the
United States, so that the moral weight of the issue is not used irresponsibly in
the service of a confrontational military policy.
DomesricHuman Righrsmonitors
The Hesgsn r\dminirir;ition :ind ils ;illics contini.iill!. ;tic the Cumi~ioii
l'ermancntc de I>errrhos Humanos (CPI>H Ji, tlie ultimate source i,iiniorniaiii~n
on human rights violations attributcd to ihe Nicaraguan government. Almost
invariably, however, CPDH is cited for figures that are higher than those it had
actually published. Often, these misleading quotations are accompanied by
statements to the effect that CPDH conducts ils work under serious threats and
harassment from the authorities. The Country Report for 1984, for example,
alleges: "The independent CPDH suflered continued harassment from the
government in 1984,including the detention of ils workers and interference with
the distribution of its reports3." In fact, no! a single incident of that sort took
place in 1984.
The most difficult lime in CPDH's relations with the Nicaraguan government
was in 1981, when the security forces arrested José Esteban Gonralez, who was
then national coordinator for CPDH, and held him incommunicado for a few
days. Simultaneously, the officesof CPDH remained closed for a week by official
'". ..the leadersof lsrae... mistreatcd[theprophcts],beat them,killedthem.Finally
as supremcproof of his love, Cod sent his DivineSon; but they . . .also killed him,
cmcifyinghim." "The lewskilledthcprophetsand linallythe Son ofCod .. .suchidolatry
callsforththesky'svengcance."
'"Nicaragua: A SpccialRepart". op. cilp. 22.Rabbi Rosenthalfurtherclarifiesthat
thcADL didno1daim that such a policyexints.
'P. 623.Nosuchcriticisrnappeared inthe Coun1r.vReporrdealingwithElSalvador,even
lhough severalemployccsand oficersof human rightsorganizationshave becn killedor
have"disappeared". Nor has suchcriticismappearcdin the Cowtrry Reporton Guatemala
thecountry.s been too dangerous for any human rights organizatian to operaic within422 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTlVlTlES
orders. After his release, Gonzalez made critical statements abroad and, upon
his return to Nicaragua, was met by angry crowds at the airport, possibly
organized by the government or the Sandinista Party. In early 1982, when he
was out of the country, a member of a contru group apprehended by the
government accused him of participation in a plot to blow up an oil refinery and
a cement plant. Gonzalez was tried and convicted in absentia and has remained
in exile since then.
By that time, Marta Patricia Baltodano, a vigorous and outspoken staff
attorney with CPDH, had replaced Gonzales in the position of national coordi-
nator, which she still holds. In July 1982, a member of the staff was arrested
wbile distributing CPDH material and sentenced to two months in prison on
misdemeanor charges for allegedly treating a police officer with disrespect. In
spite of international complaints, including by Americas Watch, the employee
served out his two-month term.
Since 1982there have been no similar officialactions against the organization,
though relations with public officiaisare alwaystesty. Many government agencies,
including courts, refuse to recognize the legal existence of CPDH and will
conduct business with CPDH members only if they intervene in their private
capacities and not as representatives of the institution. In the meantime, CPDH
has continued to publish widely circulated monthly reports on human rights
violations - often including very condemnatoty information and language -
without any repercussions.
Another private human rights organization has been active in Nicaragua since
1983. The Moravian Church has established an Association of Jurists of the
Atlantic Coast that provides the services of lawyers and other professionals,
mostly to the Miskito population. In addition to ils casework, the Moravian
Church has hecome bv far the most reliable source of information on events in
the Atlantic Coast regon, and a powerful advocate for changes in governmental
policies towards the lndian minorities. Their public denunciation of the violent
activities of thecontras. however. makes them an inconvenient svmbol for the
Reagan ~dministration; this may explain why Country ~e~o;rs and other
Administration pronouncements ignore their existence.
An important factor in prote&ng human rights in Nicaragua is that the
International Committee of the Red Cr~s- maintains a l~r~e~ ~ ~ ~tive nroerr ~ ~ -
within the country, visiting prisoners, tracing rnissing persons, and providing a
variety of services to the displaced. The ICRC suspended prison visits in
~ovember 1983 when the ~icaiaeuan authorities attem~ted to restrict its access
IO specilied arcas of the prisc>ns:this dirpuie ua, rejo1~i.Jslier re\eral urck, by
thc iYic3raguan govcrnmeni'n agreement Io pri>vi,lethe ;icccss ta)prironers in
their sells souehl bv ihc ICKC. and rhr ICKC resumed visilinp.the Drirons.The
section of the- tat t~epartment's Country Report on ~icaragua fir 1984 that
deals with non-governmental investigation of human rights makes no mention
of the ICRC. In contrast,the Country Report on Guatem~la misleadingly asserts
that a Regional Delegate of the ICRC visited Guatemala in March 1984, but
fails to mention that the ICRC is prohibited from carrying out ils program in
Guatemala tbough, for the most part, it is able to carry out its program in
Nicaragua.
C. The Miskitos
"1 am a Jew in a world still threatened bv anti-Semitism. 1am an Afghan.
and 1 am a prisoner of the Gulag . . .1.am a Laotian, a Cambodian, a-.
Cuban and a Miskito Indian in Nicaragua. 1, too, am a potential victim of SUPPLEMENTALANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 423
totalitarianism." (President Reagan, Remarks outside Bergen-Belsen Con-
centration Camp, May 6, 1985.)
The Administration's rhetorical campaign against Nicaragua kas found ils
most effectivemetaphor in the Miskitos. An lndian minority of 100,000-120,000,
many of whom traditionally live on the eastern ("Atlantic") Coast near the
Honduran border, the Miskitos have become the President's favored symhol of
the alleged cruelty of the Sandinistas.
Yet, as the selectivity of the Bergen-Belsen remarks would indicate, the
Miskitos have been regarded by this Administration in a geopolitical rather than
a national or cultural context. Accordingly, Jeane Kirkpatrick, then United
States ambassador to the United Nations. could tell a Senate Foreien Relations
subcommittee in March 1982thst ~andin;std abuses of the ~iskitos-were "more
massive than any other human rights violations that I'm aware of in Central
America today" '.ignoring the far more widespread and immeasursbly more
hmtai treatment of Guatemalan lndians hy the "friendly" militdry of that
country and the murders of some 13,000civilians hy the armed forces and death
squads of El Salvador during the previous year. And the then-Secretary of State
Alexander Haig, who accused the Sandinistas of penocide. could present a
C'ongrcs>ionülsiimmittcc with photogniphs hc idcnti~cd iis \li,kiio \;ll:iec, ,ci
ïfllimc hy the Sicar~guan guternment, although the) Iiiirr proted IO bc noihing
"f...- ...-. .
In his landmark May 9, 1984, televisedspeech on Central America, the Presi-
dent drove homehis version of the Nicaraguan human rights situation by amsing
the Sandinistas of
"an attempt to wipe out an entire culture, the Miskito Indians, thousands
of whom have been slaughtered or herded into detention camps where they
have heen starved or abused".
The picture thus created is terrifying. It is also no1 accurate, althougb the
President has repeated these charges, almost in the same words, as recently as
June 1985 There has never been evidence of racially motivated or widespread
killine of Miskitos. In Mav 1984. the Inter-American Commission on Human
R~ghts.aftcr i thiirough in\csiigation of ihc Mirkiio issue. round one incidcni
in irhich ü gritupof \li>kitojiiüs killcil hy SüitJiiii~ia force, (ihe 1981 Leimus
rarcl; ,\nicricas \\'aich hili evidçncc on one othcr 1982iniidcnr ai \Vülr>xSikili.
involving seven deaths. Both cases occurred in war zones. There is no'evidence
that they were directed or condoned hy the central government, though the
central government never met ils responsibility to disclose publicly the results of
any investigations il carried out and detnils about the punishment of those
officiais who were responsible. The relocations of January-February and
Novemher 1982 - the events to which the President wasapparently referring in
his television speech - were no1 aimed al the Miskito culture or people as a
'"UN Envay Says ~;caraguan's'Assault' on Miskitos1sMassiveRights Violation",
Washingi on , Marcn L,iraL.
'The photographshad befn taken by the lntcrnationalCommitteeof the Red Cross
(ICRC) and actuallyshowedihc corpsesof Nicaragua"civilianskilled by Somoza's
NationalGuard; thebodieshadbccnburnedbytheICRCitsclftopreventinfection.
'In a speech in Birmingham,Alabama, on June 6, the Presidentstatcd that the
Indians".as arc conducting "a campaign of virtual genocidc against thc Miskitowhole; in fact some 10 per cent of the Miskito population was affected (about
11,500 total) and the policy was clearly prompted by military considerations'.
The Miskitos living along the border area were moved to clear the most violent
conflict zone of civilians; some 60 persons had already been killed in conrra
attacks. Also, the Nicaraguan government undoubtedly feared thai some of the
Miskitos in the area would aid the con1ra.s and relocated them to make the
border areas easier to defend. And while organizations such as Americas Watch
were critical of the manner in which the relocations were carried out, with
inadequate notice, transportation or compensation for destroyed homes and
belongings, and without an opportunity to participate in the decision, there is
no serious dispute as to the military justification of the move; both the IACHR
and the Nicaraguan Conference of Bishops have recognized its necessity. Investi-
gations of the relocation settlements, moreover, have shown that they bear
no resemblance to "detention camps". At the outset, there were some loosely
enforced restrictions on the movements of those who were resettled. During the
las1 three years, however, residents have been able to enter and leave freely,
even permanently relocate elsewhere so long as it is not in the war zone; the
government has provided assistance with crop development, housing, health care
and jobs; while most Miskitos wish to return to their original land and homes,
many acknowledge that the housing and land available to them in the new
settlements is frequently superior to what they had before.
That the Sandinistas did mistreat Miskitos during 1981 and 1982 has been
extensivelv documented bv Americas Watch. amone others. In the cour~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
military iweeps in the bo;der area during 1981 and-1982, government soldiers
often carried out arbitrary arrests. In so far as Miskitos were ioining the two
lndian conira groups, Misura and Misurasata, the Miskito communi6 as such
was regarded as unfriendly to the government. From 1982 there remain 69
unresolved cases of Miskito "disappearances", for which the government must
be held to account.
lmprovements in this area, on the other hand, have been dramatic. Since 1982,
we are aware of one Miskito disappearance. According to Moravian Church
sources,working closely with the Atlantic Coast communkies, government troops
no longer arrest without probable cause and now display a more sensitive attitude
toward the civilian population, as do appointed local representatives of the
central government.
The Nicaraguan official response to criticism about the Miskitos was, early
on, to request that the IACHR mediate a "friendly settlement" with the Miskito
community. In February 1982, only one month after the first relocation, the
government invited the IACHR to conduct an on-site investiration. The rovern-
ment's position, with regard to the relocation, was expressa in a ~ebr;ary 24
note to the IACHR :
"Our government has been obliged to defend Our country's sovereignty
and at the same time protect the Miskito population from Somocista bands
by relocating them in a safe place . .. In the Miskito settlements the most
basic of al1 rights, the right to life, is fully protected. The government of
'Therearc,of course,certain analogiesbetweenthe forciblerclocationin Nicaragua and
the lorciblerelocatioof ihcJapancsc-Americansfromthe WestCoastduringWorld War
II.Thedilierencesare: that the UnitedScatesforciblyrclocatcdonlythosclrom one racial
acieddcspitethe fact thatiwasnot invadedwhcrcasNicaraguaacicdonlyalter therehadates
been iïghtingin the rcgion aKectcd:and the Unitcd States interned112,000Japanese-
Americansforthedurational the war whereasthe Miskitoswcrc never interned. SUPPLEMENTAL mm TO THE MEMORIAL 425
National Reconstruction and the Sandinista Front for National Liberation
carries out integral programs to improve and lend dignity to their living
conditions, especially with respect to health, education and housing '."
In response to an IACHR recommendation, the government in December
1983declared an amnesty for al1Miskitos detained on security-related charges.
Under that amnesty, and a second one in May 1985, al1 Miskito political
prisoners have becn releascd, including thosc convicted of serious ofinses. Also
at the IACHR's urging, the government in 1984 began talks with Brooklyn
Rivera, leader of the Indian contra group Misurasata. As part of the process,
Rivera visited Miskitos inside Nicaragua to discuss hases for a possible political
settlement of their grievances over land and cultural rights. (At this writing,
a settlement has not heen achicved and does not seem to be imminent. Americas
Watçh is not sutficientlyknowlcdgeable about the matters thdt remdin in dispute
to express a judgment on them.) The government further has pledged to the
relocated Miskitos that they may return to their homes on the Coast when
hostilities end. Indeed, the process of returning has started. More than 900
Miskitos - members of nine communities that in 1983were relocated to a place
called Sangni Laya - al1returned to their places of origin in early 1985.At least
one community, callcd Bismuna, which had heen forced to leave the border area
in January 1982, has been allowed to return to the Bismuna lagoon neÿr Capc
Gracias a Dios.
But the Administration's most serious human rights document, the Country
Report, persists in purveying an outdated and exaggerated version of the issue.
The 1984Co~intryReport stated, in its introductory summary:
"There are continuine credible renorts that the securitv forces have
iortureJ and kille<l~irkno Indian, ah havc confiscaicJ or Je.ir<yc~ ihcir
iood ,upply and priipcriy '.'
Such "credihle reports" do no1exist with regard to the ycar to which the report
refers, 1984. The accusations coming from contra spokesmen have not been
substantiated by independent investigators, either in the Moravian Church or in
CPDH. As if to manufacture credibility the Country Report selectively quotes
the IACHR's May 1984report on Nicaragua ("hundreds of Miskitos have been
arbitrarily arrested . .") without ciarifying that the IACHR statemcnt refers to
1982and that the practice has ended.
As much as il ienores oositive develo~ments. the Administration has also
ignorcd evidencethat. I;>rihe pas1 IWO ycdrs. ihc mixi icriour ahuwr of hlishitos'
rights hiivcbccn r..>mmiitcdhy ihc <o,,tr'igroupr. princip~llySteadman I'agoth'j
Misiir;i. Section IIoi ihi, rcport Jc~lr tiith thc <v,tztri<\h'um.in riahis Dr;ictiLr.,
-.
in some detail: il is sufficient here to note the Misura nractice of recruitine ~-
Miskitos by force, and the fact that, in Honduras, coniras'intimidate those who
are unwillingto remain involved in their activities. Miskitos have been kidnapped
from Nicaragua by contra forces, but when witnesses have visited the unitcd
States to expose the facts, the Administration has treated them as unreliable.
'Th< impli.;,iiiin1h;iirc1o;aiionmigal,okjultifirdbya Jcsircin pro1n.iihi\Il~kiiii.
ihsm>cl\crui, rcjc;icdh) hnlcricd~H~i.'h Kclu:iiiriiiulpcuplcag:ilnilihctrucml iml)
exiitcd.iiih) irnp~.r;iiiiii.lii;ncvc,\ll).inour bicu Iriihiic.i.c.ih:iju~ilii.'aiii,n
'P. 609.426 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
This was the case with three Miskito witnessesto the April 1984 Misura attack
on Sumubila, a resettlement camp1.
Converselv. whenthe Nobel Laureate and human riehts activist Adolfo Per~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Esquivelpubficizedan attack on Miskitos in ~ondura; the Administration took
the incident as ammunition - althouah Perez Esquivel did not accuse the
Nicaraguan government, but the on fur an army. The incident, which took
place at Kiwas Tara, Honduras, in January 1984, resulted in eight Miskito
deaths; vanous versions have emerged, and none bas been proven. Nonetheless,
the 1984 Counrrv Report flatlv states that "On Januarv II. 1984. a Nicara-
guan Amy patr61crossed intL~onduras and killed II ~icar&uan '~iskito In-
dians . . ." . Perez Esquivel'sallegations, hased on interviews in Honduras,
are completely omitted.
Selecliveidentification with the Miskitos on the part of the Administration -
the use of Miskito grievancesonly when it suits the Administration's larger goals
in Nicaragua - makes the President's Bergen-Belsen statement ring hollow
indeed. Were this Administration truly to sympathize with the Indians of
Nicaragua, its spokespeople should acknowledge that the Miskito community is
asdivided in ils attitude toward the conrrus as it has been toward the government;
and that, of the two forces, the government in recent years has shown the greater
sensitivity. This partially explains why, as the New York Times reported on
April 9, "Miskito Indian rebels fighting the Nicaraguan Amy are disenchanted
with their leaders and have largely stopped their guerrilla operations in recent
months".
B. Po~iricalparricipulion:rheNovember1984elecrion
"The Sandinista government has never been legitimized by the people."
(President Reagan, News Conference, Lishon, May 10, 1985.)
"The electionswere an important step in themselves.The results open the
way for further steps in the transition from dictatorship to the institutionali-
zation of a democratic system of government. This process of transition is
far from over. but the o~enine. in the form of a eenuinelv reoresentative
national ~ssembly and the commitment to regula;electio~s in the future,
already exists." (Parliamentary Human Rights Croup3.)
Before the Sandinistas came to power in 1979, they promised the country
elections. Some opposition elements balked at the holding of elections immedi-
ately after the Sandinistas'immenselypopular victory over Somoza. Bycommon
agreement, if the elections had been held inthe immediate aftermath of the
revolution, the Sandinistas would have triumphed overwhelmingly.
The Sandinistas did not hold elections immediatelybut announced that they
would he held in 1985.This decisionwas portrayed by the Reagan Administration
as evidence that the FSLN refused to share power and was, instead, building a
Ir\ Miwra idniinpcnl~ii~rkrdihai \Ii<kiio rciilcmcni on r\pril 14. indi~;rim~n~ie
rockri rirï apainri houiri and ihcrcbyklllingsix prsrins, includlnik<>childrrnand oiic
mr.r.iinhiu~r..ihri,unIrrih:n lor;cJ ri\idr.ni\ <>uiinitilh: 5irCci5I ho<cuho \iur~8th
ihcgo\crnmeni\rercslnglcd OLI anJ k~rln3ppJ.incluJingihr rciilcmtni'r ~nlyph),icun
So?c addiiinnalrcsidcni,;,ppsar idhavele11uiih lhc <.i>nrrio1uni:inl)
- 1' 610
'"Kcpun "fa HriiishP~rlixmeniq I>r.lcgaiton io Sic;irngua10 oburc thr Prc\idcnii~l
dnJSaitiinil Ai~r.mblyclcciionr.4So\.cnibr.r1964" p 27 Thc PHRG drlcg.ti,onçoniisirrl
O< \Il's rtprcscniingihr.S,,:wl D~m<iir~ilPdri!..ihr.C<>n,cr\~ii\cl',rislid ihrL~hiiur
I'd,i> SUPPLEMENTAI. ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 427
totalitarian State. Yet, when the Nicaraguan government announced in early
1984 that elections would be moved up ro November of that year, Presideni
Reaea- denounced them as "Sovie-~st~,e sham elections"' at a time when
negi)ti.iiions on rlcitorsl proccdurcr and p;irlicipliiion uerc pst hcginning.
l'or a brief period the ,\dmini>iration'r atliiudc torvard the elcctions coniiiincd
contradictioni. On Februarv II. for exam~le. President Reaean stated that the
Sandinistas should "subjec<themselves, o;suhmit themselves, 1 should say . . .
to the will of the people, hy way of elections and voting"'. A few days earlier,
however, Secretary Shultz had addressed the Nicaraguan situation with the
remark: "An election just as an election doesn't really mean anything . . there
are elections in the Soviet Union '."Thedominant line, however, quickly became
one of condemnation. In two unusual special reports on human rights in
Nicarap-.. ~ublished in the second half of 19844. the Administration tried to
Jiwredit the r.lector~lproctis. contending ihat ihc Jpcomtng \oie wlisrnerçly an
enilrt Iliimprùvc the S~ndinista'i iiitcrnati.inal imdgc.
At the same time, the Administration put pressure on moderate and conserva-
tive Nicaraguan politicians to withdraw from the electoral process. The United
States press has since disclosed the extent of that pressure. As the New York
Times quoted a United States official, with regard to the candidate of one oppo-
sition group :
"The Administration nevcr contemplaied letting Cruz stay in the race. . .
hecause the Sandinistas could justifiably claim that the elections were
legitimate, making it much barder for the United States to oppose the
Nicaraguan govemments."
In thismanner, the Administration sought to catch the Nicaraguan government
in a no-win situation: without elections it vas "lotalitarian", but the elections it
held were dismissed well in advance as a propaganda exercise, with consider-
able United States effort put to limiting their effectiveness. Nonetheless, the
Administration's own Country Report for 1984 - while calling the elections
"ilawed" and emphasizing the decision of several parties to withdraw - noted
that "Many foreign observers reported that the balloting appeared Io be orderly
and honest "6.The elections were, clearly, a complex matter.
In the voting on November 4, the FSLN won 63 per cent, while opposition
parties of moderate-conservative views won most of the remainder and 7 per
'"Weekin Review", New YorkTimes, July22, 1984.
'"Transcript of lntcrvicwwith the Preridenton a Rangeof Issues", New YorkTimes,
February12,1985.
'"ShulLzCrilicizs NicaraguaDelay", New YorkTitrres,Februury 6, 1985.
4"Broken Promises"and "Resource Book: SondinistaElcciionsin Nicaragua". The
Administration arguedthat clectianrin Nicaraguawereintendedto satisfythe Contadora
requiremcntforfretandfairelectionsinal1CentralAmcricancountries.The Administration
occurredduringtheperiods ofContadorüdiscussions.mala or El Salvador,whichalso had
'Octobcr 21, 1984,"US Role in NicaraguaVoteDisputcd", New York 7ïmpr.Thefact
lhat Cruz did not participaie narrawed the choiceavailablcta Nicaraguanvoters and,
ihereby,diminishedthe significanccof the elections.Hisrefusalto takepart cameaRerthe
failureof prolongednegotiationswith the FSLN over such questions as thc date of thc
clcctionsand presscensorship.Bothsidcs in the negotiationschargd the other sidewith
bad faith.mcricasWatchhasexpressednoopinion onthesecharges. Wc wcrcnotprescnt
ai the negotiationsand couldonlyspeculateabout the motivationsof thc ncgotiatorsand
theP.n622.uenciesto whichtheywereresponsible.428 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTlVlTlES
cent of votes were invalid'. These results gave the opposition some 30 per cent
of the seats in a new legislative and constituent assembly - enough to challenge
Sandinista policies. Several parties that chose not tu participate have joined a
"national dialogue" with the government, in which they have freely voiced their
dissent and grievances.
The Americas Watch studied two aspects of the electoral process: the exercise
of press freedoms and the right tu free assembly during the election period. We
concluded that incidents of excessive censorship of La Prensa did Lake place,
and that free assembly was restricted in a number of cases. The Americas Watch
report noted that in early August 1984, the state of emergency was amended,
easing restrictions in Nicaraguan territory not directly affected by the military
conflict. After the amendment, according tu the editor of La Prenso, censorship
was markcdly reduced; nonetheless, we found that the ongoing censorship went
beyond the provisions of the law, as in regard to articles reporting opposition tu
the draft. At the same lime, La Prensa was permitted tu publish extensive
coverage of opposition campaigning, including speeches harshly critical of the
government. As tu freedom of assembly, there were five serious incidents of
disruptions of opposition rallies by FSLN supporters. In no incident were there
serious injuries; the police prevented violent contact, although they did not
prevent disruption. Opposition spokesmen claimed the "mobs" demonstrating in
this fashion were organized by the government; Nicaraguan officiais denied this
and indeed several called on FSLN svmohath. .rs tu resoect the oooosition'..
rifht Ioi4nip:iign. The Suprcme I?ls<ior:ilC'ouniil. in nJJition. liled mi~rleme.ini>r
shdrgcs :ifAinsi the ilemi>n~trators iiicaih of there incident.; Iti, uurth iiuting
ihat such a Ic\el or disrupti~in ~iccurred in 1ii.cinstances out of ximc 250 rallies
during the campaign period; that is, it did not constitute a pattern of activity,
but was, rather, the exception.
In sum, the Americas Watch report found that "opposition voices could be
heard and important issues could be discussed. In that respect, the election
period represented an advance for freedom of expression in Nicaragua." It also
stated that "Further advances are needcd""
While the Americas Watçh's own investigations were limited tu matters of
speech and assembly, other responsible organizations endeavored tu monitor the
electoral process as such; their findings are relevant tu the Administration's
claims, and often contradict them outright. The Latin American Studies
Association (LASA)' delegation of observers reportcd, for example:
"The record shows that both before and dunne the camoai-n. the . -
Slindinistas made niiijor concesriuns tiiiippo.iiion forces on ne:irly al1point,
of coniention Thc national voter regivration effort wlis rçm;irkahly iue-
cessful, considering that it was conducted under wartime conditions. The
Nicaraeuan electiins of 1984 orovided a broad arrav of orotections tu
assure fair access, procedural honesty and accurate vote count . . The vote
was truly a secret ballot, and was generally perceived as such by voters4."
'Thc clectianswcrecontestcdby threeparticsto the right of the Siindinisiasand three
par+ 10 the left of them- not, asthe Administrationkas repeatcdlychargcd,only by
lefttstelementssupponivc ofthe FSLN.
'"Frecdom of Expression and Assembly in Nicaraguaduring ihc ElcctianPcriod, op.
czr.p I J.
' I.ASi\1, ihiprincipil <>rg.inw.iiiol Cni<r.r,iiPrui~.n<>r .nJ .>ihcr,rh<ilarin ihe
Uniiid Siair.\cng.lgedinlaiin ,\mcricdnsiudlcr
'Summarv ol l.indincs. "I'hr liltvt~~~Pr<)c-.i ~nSiiar.ieua I>onir.<ti.nd Inter.
nationallnfliiences",~aci~mcrican StudiesAssociation~ , ovekbcr 19:1984 SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXESIO TIID MEMORIAL 429
The LASA report noted that the FSLN "look substantial advantage of its
incumbent position and, in some ways, abused il"'. On the other hand, it
characterized the nature and extent of the abuse ascomparable to that committed
by incumbent elsewhere, including the United States. It concluded that
the "unprecedented relaxation of political controls" surrounding the elections
and the dialogue begun with the opposition, were "developments [which] augur
well for the future of political pluralism in Nicaragua"'.
The Parliamentary Human Rights Group, a multi-party British organization
that includes more than a hundred members of both Houses of Parliament and
that has extensiveexperiencein monitoring elections, reachedsimilar conclusions.
11sreport noted that the Nicaraguan government provided funds and free media
time to opposition candidates - noting that British parties receive no such help
from their government. Thirty minutes a day of prime television time were given
over to political party broadcasts, as well as 45 minutes a day on radio. (The
State Deparunent's Country Report for 1984mis-states this as 30 minutes and
45 minutes a week, respectively, thus giving the false impression that the access
to media was severçly limited, and does not clarify that the time was given frce,
thus implying that this was the total media lime available to the opposition. In
fact, additional lime could be purchased.)
As to the Sandinistas' use or abuse of their incumbency, the PHRG conclu-
ded :
"The advantages which the Sandinistas enjoyed as the incumbent party
and as a ruling revolutionary movement cannot be disentangled from their
genuine popularity . . [Tlhe guarantees provided hy the electoral law and
the law of political parties, and the independence of the Supreme Electoral
Commission and the FSLN's desire to consolidate a pluralist political
system, of which periodic elections are a part, were sufficientfor a genuine
election'."
By the same token, while the Country Report for 1984stated that "the Nica-
raguan people were denied a broad range of opposition parties for whom to
vote"', a report by the Washington Office on Latin America and the Inter-
national Human Rights Law Group (the latter heing an organization that
has received USAID funds precisely to monitor elections) found: "The range of
parties participating in the electoral process provided voters with meaningful
choices," and that "parties were for the most part able to communicate their
messages to voters, despite a few unfortunate incidents of press censorship4."
It is oerha~s instructive to comoare the Nicaraguan elections - and the
Reagan ~dmiinistration's attitude toLard them - wichthe elections in Uruguay,
which also took place in November 1984. Hailed by the Administration as a
triumphant return to democracy, the Uruguayan elect~onshad repressivefeatures
absent in Nicaragua: the most popular presidential candidate was in prison;
another popular presidential candidate remained proscribed from political
activity; at one major rally, thousands of Blanco Party members were threatened
by police with water cannons. That election, set alongside Uruguay's strong
'Summaryof Findings, "The ElectoralProcers in Nicaragua: Domcstic and Inter-
nationalInfluencer", LatinericanStudiesAssociation,November 191 ,984.
=pp.20-21.
'P. 622.
ber 4,1984".InternationalHumanRighisLawporI aGroup andarWashingtonOfficefonoLatin
America, Dccembcr11,1984, p.51. SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXESTO TIIE MEMORIAL 431
.-Y
100-
V>
0
0 50-
w>
0 m.----.
- m-mT----=-
a:
-50-
-100- .
rn~sgg~gagnn,
ggg??
En,mzLDzn,,,
Six-rnonthperiods
Fig. 2. RefugeeFlows from Nicaragua: 1978to 1984
an unpopular draft- Nicaragua kas absorbed more former refugees than it has
created new ones.
(The chart above is reproduced from "Central American RefugeeFlows: 1978
to 1984", a March 1985 paper by Linda S. Peterson, United States Bureau of
the Census. It was submitted as testimony on behalf of the Bureau of the Census
on June 27, 1985, hefore the Census and Population Suhcommittee of the
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, United States House of
Representatives. The bars Io the left of the line"O"rrepresent net refugee
outflow from Nicaragua; the bars to the right of the line m"O"erepresent
net refugee return to Nicaragua.)
II.HE CONTRAS' RI!CORD
"Contrary to propaganda, the opponents of the Sandinistas are not die-
hard supporters of the previous Somoza régime.In fact, many are anti-
Somoza heroes . . .Now they have been denied any part in the new
government because they truly wanted democracy and still do." (President
Reagan, Address to Joint Session of Congress, April 27, 1983.)
"1 love killing; 1 have been killing for the pas1 seven years. There's
nothing 1 like better. 1could, I'd kill several people a day." (Chief of
Misura's Military Operations, to a United States journalist, August 1984l.)
When referring to the insurgents who are fighting the Nicaraguan govemment.
the Reagan Administration and its suporters have committed such rhetorical
excessesthat they may have hurt their own cause.
'Remarksmade 10Jon LM.Anderson,associatofJackAnderson,and quotedin Jack
Anderson,"CIA Joins with Extrcmirtsin NicaraguaWar", WosholgronPost, Sep-
tember30,1984.432 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIBS
The President himselfhas called the contras "freedom fighters", "our hrothers"
and "the moral equal of Our Founding Fathers". The State Department kas
issued several o..rs ~ur. .tine t- siow that the "Nicaraeuan de-ocratic
resistance" consists of a wide spectrum of respectable democratic forces and
individuals. According Io Secretary Shultz in a February 1985speech:
"The new fighters for freedom include peasants and famers, shopkeepers
and vendors, teachers and professionals. Whal unites them .. .is disillusion-
ment with Sandinista militarism, corruption and fanaticism '."
These eiïorts are no more than self-conscious attemots at evadine t"o b~ ~
ing matters of Tact: that the United States-sponsored insurgency engages in a
deliberate and systematic pattern of violations of the most fundamental inter-
national standards e-idin; the conduct of armed conflict: and. that desoite the
support [rom somr promincnt anii-Somocistli le;iderr. niajor responsibility Cor
military opcrÿii<miof ihc ci,,irrconiinues to resi in the han& orlormcr mcm-
bers of Somoza's National Guard.
Both facts are well known to the Administration, since the CIA has heen
intimately involved with the day-to-day operations of the insurgents, pursuant
to a Presidential directive, ai lest since 1981. In response Io the issue of the
composition of these forces,the Administration hasnot pressed for disengagement
of the Somocista leaders, but instead has hailed the creation of a token and
ineiïective civilian leadership, labeled as the "political military command",
consisting of more acceptable non-Somocista figures.
Similarly, the exposure of persistent human rights violations by the contras
has led the Administration not to pressure contra leaders to enforce international
codes of conduct, but to drown United States public opinion with praise for the
"freedom fighters", and Io attempt to discredit al1reports of their violations as
inspired bycommunist or Sandinista propaganda. Alternatively, critics of United
States policy and practice with regard to the contras have beeu dismissed as
merely ignorant and incompetent. In response to British and French official
criticism of the CIA's mining of Nicaraguan harbors, then-United Nations
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick stated: "The Europeans have never been very
expert in Latin America. That they shouldn't share Our perceptions doesn't
bother me. . .""
Worse, in 1983the CIA hired a contract worker to write a handbook for the
contras that was published and distributed to combatants under the title of
OperacionesPsicologicasen la Guerra de Guerrillas ("Psychological Operations
in Guerrilla Warfare") '.This instruction manual actually solicits the commission
of crimes and other violations of accepted noms of warfare. When the manual
became known to the American public, shortly before the November 6, 1984,
Presidential elections, the Administration promised a thorough investigation.
After the landslide Reagan victory, the CIA announced that it would only
"reprimand" sixunnamed staiïmembers. In statements to the press and Congress,
CIA Director William Casey and President Reagan himself tried to downplay
the manual's importance. The President said it was "much ado about nothing".
According to this view, the most offensiveof its instructions, on how thecontras
should "neutralize enemies", actually had a benign interpretation: Reagan said
'US EnvoyDisrnisscsAllies'Criticism","WoshingionPosi.
'An Englishtranslationhas been publishedin the United Statesby Vintage Books,
New York, 1985,with essays by Joanne Ornangand Aryeh Neicr. See this book for
rcfcrencesto theCLAManualand cornrnents about itthai follow. SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXS 'IOTHE MEMORIAL 433
that "to neutralize" meant Io tell a local authority that "you are no1 in charge
any more". In fact. "neutralizing" is a CIA term of art; il means murder. Any
abiguities in meaning, moreover, are easily resolved by context: the reference in
the manual is to "selective use of violence" to neutralize opponents.
When public outrage about the CIA manual vas al ils peak, unnamed
Administration snokes~ersons. in a feat of convoluted reasonine. tolduthe oress
ihdi FI)N violaiii,ii\ of human righis haJ m;idr IInrscsïiiy iu Jr;ift a >ri (if
siandards io guidc ci!tilru actions. t\n ardent suppporlcr of ihc Adminisir;ition.
Scn:iior \lalcolm \\'alliin IKcr>ublicanfrom \\'vuminc ;ind mcmbcr oiihc Scn;iic
Select Committee on ~nielii~eice)said: "~aken as a &hole, the manual is a code
of conduct of which the United States need not be ashamed'." If a code of
conduct were needed, the Administration should have insisted on respect for the
limitations imoosed bv Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
This isihc niininluni iiaiid:ird spplicahl10 :irmr.dci~nilici~ni>td'sri intcrnational
naiurc. :incl IIis legdly blnding on ihr. I'niicd Siair.>hecause of this c<,untry's
accession to those-treaties. The CIA manual instructs the contras to violatc
Common Article 3 in several resoects. Moreover it instructs them to violate
United States domestic law as weil, notably the soland Amendment which was
in cffect until 1985,prohibiting the use of United States funds for the overthrow
of the Nicaraguan governmeit, and the Presidental directive of December 4,
1981,prohibiting United States involvement in assassinations.
AI1 of this was taking place at the same tirne as the Administration was
embarked on a crusade against international terrorism. Secretary of State Shultz
and other high-ranking officiais have made important policy pronouncements
advocatingtough measures to counter the actions or threats of action by terrorists
throughout the world. (II appears that the measures proposed included permitting
United States aee-ts and allies to fieht terror with terror. as in the March 1985
incident II~liiih .i I.ch.tnr.,c group supportcd h) the CIA hut rcporicdl) Acting
on iir oun. killcd \<,me80avilian, in an unsu:ccssful htinibing aiiciiipi io kill a
\luslini Ic~dcrsus~ciieJ of bcinr I-nked iu thc aiiack un United States marines
in Hcirui j In C,>ngrr.'\ionalhearingc ahoui his prupos~l,. Shult~2rgur.J ih;it ihc
Nlcaraguiln ci),11,~1a5rc noi terr,>ri,i.. m.ikingil clr.dr thai the ,\Jministrüti.in's
condemnation of terrorism does not include those who take up ams to overthrow
tyranny in their own countries. This is a troubling distinction, not only because
it hinges o? one's own particular definition of tyranny, but more importantly
because, according to this reasoning, terrorism is defined by the tcrrorist's
professed goals and no1 by the means he employs. In that sense, any action is
permissible if it is intended to overthrow, destabilize or otherwise harass an
enemy of the United States (enemy status as defined by the United States), but
conversely, similar actions, including murder, indiscriminate attscks against
civilians and outraees aeainst oersonal dienitv constitute terrorism onlv when
performed by the enemi& of democracy (aïso as defined by the Uniied States).
Dr. Kirkpatrick's emphasis on international law as a maiter of "perceptions";
Secretary Shultz's delicate adiustments in the definition of terrorism: the
president's notions of brotherhood - such casual revision of reality is backed
up by officialState Department publications such as the booklet Misconceptions
Aboi11Uniied Srares Policy ToivardNicaragtra. In seeking to portray the conrrav
as a responsible force, this booklet takes on the "misconception" that "the
-
'Quoicd in asay by Joünne Omang,Viniagecdiiion of ''PsychologicaO l peraiions"
Handbook, op cil.p. 30.434 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlES
United States is supporting former Somocistas who are spreading terror in
Nicaragua" '.Its argument is a mixture of falsehood and blameshifting.
"[Tlhe Nicaraguan amed opposition has attacked very few economic
targets and hassought to avoid civilian casualties. Tragically, the Sandinistas
have adopted a practice of mixing civilian government workers with troops
in truck convoys, and civilians have been killed when these convoys are
attacked '."
The first sentence is completely false: no1only do the con1ra.sattack economic
targets - and indeed, the FDN has confirmed this as its priority - but an
already vast body of testimony indicates the contras routinely, and as a matter
of policy, murder civilians. The second sentence places blame on the victims. In
fact the contras have frequently attacked medical, relief agency and other
obviously civilian vehicles. The booklet continues: "It is more likely that the
Sandinistas through use of heavy weapons . . .have inflicted far more civilian
casualties than have their onoonents'."
The discerning reader wiil'note the word "likely", which conveniently avoids
the issue of demonstrated facts. There is no concrete evidence that the Sandinistas
have inflicted civilian casualties through use of heavy weapons, such as artillery
or gunships. There is, however, evidence that the contras target civilians and
have killed many. The Administration is engaging here in a serious, considered
effort to ignore the contras' actual conduct of the war and to discredit reports
of human rights violations for which they have been responsible3.
The President himself responded to reports of human rights abuses by the
contras by asserting:
"The truth is, there are atrocities going on in Nicaragua. But they are
lar-.lv the work of the institutionalized crueltv of the Sandinista eovern-
mcnt - cruelty that 15 ihr nliiurlil exprcbiionor a communisi ~ovcrnmcnl.
;ic~cliy thlit 11<1wniaiurlilly from the hclirt of ~otalit;irianis8..
The Americas Watch has published two reports that include detailed accounts
of contra violations of humanitarian law. What follows is a summary of Our
findings. Even so brief a treatment underscores the extent to which this
Administration has departed from a concern for human rights in sponsoring
the contras.
A. Taking ofprisoners
The most important of the contra forces has almost never taken prisoners in
'State DeDarIrnentbooklct.March 1985... 12
'Ihid, p.i3.
ils prcviousdecisionand to provide 527 millionin aidto the contras,tPresident Reagane
sent a leltcr Io ConeressmanRobert Michel.Reoublicanleaderin the House.whichwas
circulaicdto thecn&c House. Itcontainedihc President'sfirstacknowledmnentthat the
r.<»zrrmi! haï r.~mm~iirJ.ihu\er Thr I'rc<tdcnturotc thai ..I i:ikc$r.r)-scri3!uar
r<>nrr.r&nhou1hum~nnghis Th? I.'niicdSI&!*c (onJernns.in ihs iirongcstporribl2iinns.
airocliteb\ e~ihcrride Wearccomm8iiid IJ hclnini.theJrmurr;iilcrc,i\ianclia..l,in-
strict niler.regardingproFr treatmentof prisoicr;and thc civilianpopulation.And wc
urge thcirleadersto investigatcallegatiofspas1humannghtsabusesandtakeappropriate
actions taprevcntfutureabuses."Shortlythereaftcr,the politicalspokesmen forthcconrras
announcedthat theywouldinvestigaleallegalionsofabuses. No information on procedures
wan"'Reagan Campaignsfor Latin Package", New YorkTimes, April 16,1985. SUPPLEMBNTAL ANNEXFS TO TllE MEMORlAL 435
combat '. In response 10 inquiries about this, leaders of the Fuerza Democratica
Nicaraguense claim that when enemy soldiers surrender or are caught wounded,
FDN troops disam them, invite them 10join the FDN, and if they refuse, they
are released. FDN combatants, however, have repeatedly admitted to foreign
correspondents that their practice is to torture the enemy soldier who has heen
placed hors decombm in order to obtain information, and eventually to execute
him2. Similar publi6 adniissions have been made hy chiefs and soldiers of Misum,
one of the two Miskito-hased amed organizations, and the one that is closely
allied with the FDN. As columnist Jack Anderson reported last September:
"My associate was told hy a Misura lndian commander that his units
routinely execute prisoners- after first torturing thetaobtain information.
He explained in grisly detail how the hapless prisoners of war were finished
offand said: 'For the killing of prisoners we use our youngest boys, 14 and
15 years old. They are the hest for this because they are too young to have
a conscience' )."
The other conrru organizations, Misurasata and the Alianza Revolucionaria
Democratica (ARDE), have been known 10 take prisoners and 10 release them
through international mediation. There have been several cases of these ex-
changes, without reports of mistreatment. In the most recent case, however,
prisoners released in Costa Rica by the ARDE faction led by Eden Pastora,
complained that they had been tortured while in custody of their captors4.
B. Selecrivearrackv on civilians
'l'hrodghc~utthe c.inili~t. 8o~irrd,haiccngaged in 3 \yztcitiltt: and dclihcrütc
praciice of targetting indtviJuals thry idcnlify uith the S:indiniit<ipoivcr slructurc.
either hecause they hold political appointments in certain areai, or they work
for government agencies, or they are outspoken in their support for the
Nicaraguan governinent and active in the different political organizations con-
frolled hy the Frenfe Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional. (Such targetting was
recommended hy the CIA manual for the contras.)When confronted with
allegalions of this practice, Colonel Enrique Bermudez, the military commander
of the FDN, has told foreign correspondents that his comhatants target only
members of the amed forces and of State security. He also, however, has said
that al1 active Sandinista supporters and al1 government workers are members
of the security apparatus of the government.Steadman Fagoth, leader of Misura,
admitted in the presence of international visitors that he had drawn up a list of
12 persons to be executed, and that 6 of them had already been executed5.
Testirnonies gathered by Americas Watch and hy other organizations descrihe a
'Amcricas Watch is aware of onlyonc case in which the FDN has ofîcred to turn
publiclyannouncedthatteilwaswillingto rcturncapturedNicaraguan governmensthtoldiers
through ihe lntemational Cornmitiezof the Red Cross.This announcerneni came a few
daysaftcrAmericasWatchpublishcda reportchargingthe FDN withno1takingprisoncrs.
Internationalcorrespondentswereallowedta interviewthe prisonersat the FDN campin
Las Vegas.Honduras. In the course of the conversation,the prisaners said they had
decided !Pjoin thc FDN.
lSee, First Supplcment:Violationsor the Laws of War by Both Sidcsin Nicaragua
1981-1985"A. mericas Watch J,unc 1985,pp. 1-4.
'"GIA Joins with Extremislsin NicaraguaWar", by Jack Anderson, Woshingron Pusl,
Sunday,September 30, 1984.
'FBISI2A, 2May 1985p , P-2.
Times,tApril 19,1985.Thensiatemcntwasimadeg toatgroupbofJScnatesas.ne, New York436 MILITARYAND PARAMII.ITARY ACTIVITIES
great number of cases in which unarmed civilians have been dragged from their
homes, physically abused and summarily executed, often in front of many
witnesses, hy contingents of the FDN or Misura. At other tirnes, public
transportation vehicles have been stopped by the conrrasand individuals riding
in them have heen killed after thconrrasidentified them.
C. Indi.scriminuiaffacks
The FDN operates in the most populated of Nicaragua's rural areas, whereas
Misura and Misurasata operate exclusively in the Atlantic Coast region, and
hoth factions of ARDE conduct their activities in the south, close to the border
with Costa Rica. an area that was soarsel,.oo.ulated 10 be-in with. and is now
almost totally without population d;e to both spontaneous and forced displace-
ment caused by the war. Most acçounts of indiscriminate attacks arainst the
civilian populilion relate 10 incidents in the mountainous north.- Between
Novemher 1984and March 1985,the main objective of the FDN was to disrupt
the harvest of coffeeand other crops, in order to deny the Nicaraguan government
the income derived from their export. Under the laws of war, this stratcgy is
legitimate; military targets are defined as anything that can contribute, even in
indirect ways, 10 the enemy's war effort. The only economic objectives that are
prohibited arethose likelyto cause catastrophic damage to the civilianpopulation.
Even if this is a legitimate tactic, it does not follow that any means can be
employed to attain those objectives.
The FDN routinely attacks fams, whether owned by private farmers, coopera-
tives or the State. Many of these farms are defended hy workers organized in
self-defense militias. Their presence also rnakes the place a legitimate military
target, but in any event, the attacking forces are always bound by their duty to
rninimizeharm 10the civilian population as much as possible. FDN contingents
have often failed to comply with this obligation. They direct rocket and mortar
fireagainst these farms, and once they subdue the amed resistance, they hurn
such structures as schools, houses and day care centers that play no role in the
productive proccss. On many occasions. they have directed their Tireagainst
civilianseven after al1resistance wasover, so the ensuing civilian casualties could
not possihly he considered collateral to an otherwise legitimate attack. Misura
and Misurasata are active in areas where the population is generally sympathetic
to them, and there have heen few reports of indiscriminate attacks against
civilians.On April 14, 1984,however, Misuraattacked the settlement of Sumubila,
one of four locations known collectively as Tasba Pn, where the Miskitos from
the Rio Coco border area were relocated after their forccd evacuation in carly
1982. The Misura contingent fired at random at houses, killing at least six
civilians, then set fire to a health center, an ambulance and two other buildings,
and kidnapped more than 30 persons.
There have been few reports of indiscriminate attacks by ARDE; as stated
above, ils forces operate in a territory that is largely unpopulated. Still, there
have bcen raids by ARDE against farm cooperatives near the border with
Costa Rica.
D. i?~riure;oirrragesagainsipersonaldigniry
There have been many cases of torture and cruel and degrading treatment
against orisoners taken bv thconirasboth of enemv soldicrsand amone civilians.
~he bohies of persons <idnapped by the insurgents have been round showing
marks of torture. There have been many cases of women ahducted and rawd by
contras,including recent cases in which the women were abused in the presenci
of memhers of their families. As stated earlier, FDN and Misura soldiers readily SUPPI.I!MENTAI,ANNEXES TO TH8 MEMORIAL 437
admit that it is standard practice to torture prisoners, whether militaryor civilian,
in order to obtain information about the enemy. The CIA manual instructs the
contrus Io "shamc, ridicule and humiliate the 'personal symbols'of the govern-
ment of repression in the presence ofthe people and foster popular participation
through guerrillas within the multitude, shouting slogans and jeers".
E.Neurralityof medicalandreliefpersonnel
Vehiclesof the International Cornmittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have been
able to penetrate ateas of conflict in the Atlantic Coast region and in the north
and south to provide relief assistance to displaced and isolated persons, without
being disturbed. Other clearly marked vehicles belonging to the Ministry of
Welfare or to private relief agencieshave on numerous occasions been attacked
or forced to return to the cities. Physiciansand health care personnel have been
murdered by the insurgents, including two Western European doctors rendering
services to peasants in the Jinotega area in 1983. A Nicaraguan doctor and
another health professional were kidnapped in the course of the attack on
Sumubila rnentioned above; they managed to escape from their captors two
weekslatcr. In January 1985,a Nicaraguan doctor, a dentistry student and other
volunteers serving the Rama Indian community in the island of Rama Quay
were kidnapped by a Misurasata contingent. In turn, ARDE forces that respond
to Eden Pastora's command took them ovcr by force from Misurasata a few
weeks later. In late April, Pastora turned the prisoners over to Costa Rican
authorities at the border, at which lime two of them said they wanted to join
ARDE and three others complained that they had been tortured.
F Kidnapping andharassmentof refugees
A favored tactic of al1conrra forces is to force the civilianpopulation to march
with them into Honduras and Costa Rica, or to their camps in Nicaraguan
territory. There is no question that many of these people go with the contras of
their own free will, or because they feel they do not have any choice, or because
the" fear thev will be seen bv th~ -ovemment a~ ~ontra ~,mn.thizers after the
insurgcntr h.;\.e \isiir.il thcm..Hut ihirrslso ahundiint tcjtimon) to thc clTcci
that niany pcrjonr arc ph)sically f»rccil io march u,iih ihii>tirrttu hclp c:irri
equipment,-and eventualiy to be persuaded to join the insurgency, or io join
members of their families who have alrcady joined. Americas Watch kas
interviewed many persons who testify that they were forced to go with their
captors, and later escaped or found ways of returning to Nicaragua from the
neiehborine countries.
A reiated phenomenon is the harassment and manipulation of the refugee
~opulation in Honduras. The FDN and Misura maintain strong presence in
iefugee camps, even those run by neutral international organizaÏions. Misura
has been particularly cruel in using threats and intimidation, as well as manipu-
lation of relief aid, to force young Miskitos and Sumus to join Misura and to
force iheir relativesto move closerto the border where the" can vrovide l-nistical
support to ihc war cfiri. l'he LiniicJ Siarcs Curtgrrsi hai contrihuir.d io ihis
manipulatiiin of rciugcc. hy (iss\ing an aiiir'ndnicntprop3xd b) Kcprchcntatii,c
Kobcri I.i\ingiton. in pro\ide 57.5 millicinin aid10 bc di%tribiitcdonl, h, con-
servative private organizations allied to Misura. It remains to be seeRwhether
the funds most recently voted by Congress to support contras will be used for
similar purposes.
In sum, we find that the contras are pursuing their military campaign by
systematically violating the basic rights of Nicarÿguan civilians. The Reagan
Administration's financial,moral and political support for thecontras nies in the438 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
face of United States law as well as the Administration's stated commitment to
human rights. It is a policy which achievescoherence only if the facts about
conrra orictices are obscured and the Nicaraeuan eovernment is oortraved as
the more serious h~man right~violaior Our investigations indicaic thïi such a
portra)al i, no1jusiificd,and ihai the United States policy thereforijfundamen.
ially inimical to hurnan rights.
III.RBWRITING HlSTORY
"The 1111th is Somoza was bad, but so many of the people of Nicaragua
know the Sandinistas are infinitely worse." (President Reagan, April 15,
1985 '.)
"And finally there is the latest partner of Iran, Libya, North Korea and
Cuba in a campaign of international terror - the communist régimein
Nicaragua . .. [They are] a core group of radical and totalitarian govern-
ments, a new international version of Murder, Inc." (President Reagan,
July 8, 1985l.)
It is beyond the scope of this report to try to recapitulate the abuses of human
riehts committed bv the Somozas durine the 45 vearsthat thev ruled Nicaraeua.
the oihrr hand.;r \h<>uldncitbr iorg<;itcniha;their rr:gimc\;~~\cxirïi~rdin~ril)
corrupt and ihat thes ruihlesslr aticmpted IOcliminaic their poliiical opponcnts
throueh torture and assassination. ~&e than 40.000~icarakans were killed in
1978and 1979 during the civil war that led to ihe overthrGw of the Somozas.
Few werecombatants. The great rnajority were killedin indiscriminatebombings
and artillery barrages against the civilian population by Somoza's National
Guard, or they were young people summarily executed by the National Guard
because it was thought that they were sympathizers of the Sandinistas.
The conrras presently number many more comhatants than the Sandinistas
ever reached whenthey werc fightingagainst Somoza. The failure of the conrras
to succeed, however, has been due to their inability to inspire a popular
insurrection such as the one that overthrew Anastasio Somoza Debayle. During
the four years that the current conflict has been undeway, the death toll has
been about 10,000. As in the 1978-1979civil war, many of those killed [rom
1981-1985have been civilian non-combatants, though not nearly so high a
proportion as during that earlier war. During the current civil war, the great
maioritv of the civiliannon-combatants who have died werekilledbv the conrras.
AS t6 the President's accusation that the Nicaraguan governmekt is engaged
in a "campaign of international terrorism", the evidence for this is lacking. To
the best of our knowledge, Nicaragua has no1 been involved in any airplane
hijacking, or kidnapping, or seizure of hostages. Nor, so far as we know, has
Nicaragua assassinated its political opponents abroad, as for example the
government of President Pinochet of Chile has done (including the assassination
of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in Washineton. DC). thoueh Chile was
no1 incluiled in thc t'rcsidcni'r lisi nt. outl;iii n;itons t'rior to th: President's
ipccch. the I>epariiiicniof Stdtr'di$101inilude Sicar~gwaOnthe lis1uicounlric,
that are involved in international terrorism.
On the other hand, the United States has engaged in terrorism against
Nicaraguans. Aside from organizing, training, financing. equipping and cham-
'Excerptslrom Presidcnl'Address. New York Tintes,Apd 16.1985.
'Excerptsfrom thePresident'sAddressAccusingNationsof "Actsof War", New York
Times,July9,1985. SUPPLEMEmAL ANNEXFS IO THE MEMORIAL 439
pioning thecontraswho have practicedterror, CIA personnel directlyparticipated
in mining the harhors of Nicaragua. Also, the CIA published and disseminated
a manual that instructs the contras in terrorist techniques under such chapter
headings as "Selective Use of Violence for Propagandistic Efïects", "Armed
Propaganda Teams", and "lmplicit and Explicit Terrer".'
PUBLICATIONSLIST
Americas Watch
1982.1985
Central America
(1) Human Rights in Central Amenca: A Report on El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras and Nicaragua - April 1983. 27pp.
(2) Human Rights in Central America: A Report on El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras and Nicaraya - Octoher 1983,37pp.
(3) Hurnan Rights in Central America: A Report on El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras and Nicaragua - Sune 1984,26pp.
Argenlina
(1) CELS Report on Argentina - November 1980-Fehruary 1982,46pp.
(2) Human Rights During the Falklands/Malvinas Crisis - July 1982, 15pp.
(3) Human Rights in ArgentinaICELS - March 1983,25pp.
(4) Argentine Military lunta's Final Document - May 1983, 12pp.
(5) Human Rights in ArgentinajCELS - September 1983, 16pp.
(6) The State Department Misinfonns: A Study of Accounting for the Disa-
ppeared in Argentina - October 1983,44pp.
Chile
(1) Report on Recent Human Rights Developments in Chile - Sanuary 1982,
(2) Human Rights in Chile - Fehruary 1982.
(3) Human Rights in Chile - Decemher 1982,22pp.
(4) Chile Since the Coup: Ten Years of Repression - August 1983, 137pp.
(5) Report on Human Rights in Chile - October-November 1984, 19pp.
(6) Report on Human Rights in Chile - December 1984-January1985, 19pp.
Colombiu
(1) Human Rights in the Two Colombias: Functioning Democracy, Militarized
Society - October 1982,35pp.
(2) The MAS Case in Colomhia: Taking on the Death Squads - July 1983,
25PP.
Cuba
The Trcatment of Political Prisoners in Cuba and the America Response -
Septemher 1983,51pp.
El Salvador
(1) Report on Human Rights in El Salvador - January 1982,312pp.440 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITI~
(2) US Reporting on Human Rights in El Salvador: Methodology at Odds
With Knowledge - lune 1982,75pp.
(3) Supplement to the Report on Human Rights in El Salvador - July 20,
1982,272pp.
(4) Second Supplement to the Report on Human Rights in El Salvador -
January 1983, 122pp.
.5. Third Supplement to the Report on Human Rights in El Salvador - July
1983,91 Pp.
(6) As Bad as Ever: Report on Human Rights in El Salvador - January
1984,74pp.
(7) Protection of the Weak and Unarmed: The Dispute Over Counting Human
Rights Violations in El Salvador - February 1984,51pp.
(8) Free Fire: A Report on Human Rights in ElSalvador- August 1984,148pp.
(9) "Draining the Sea . . .": A Report on Human Rights in El Salvador -
February 1985,81pp.
Gualemala
(1) Human Rights in Guatemala: No Neutrals Allowed - Novemher 1982,
133pp.
(2) Creating a Desolation and Calling it Peace - May 1983,47pp.
(3) Guatemala: A Nation of Prisoners - January 1984, 260pp.
(4) Guatemalan Refugees in Mexico 1980-1984 - September 1984, 100pp.
(5) Little Hope: Human Rights in Guatemala - February 1985,47 pp.
Haiti
(1) Report on a Human Rights Mission - August 1983,24 pp.
(2) Election 1984: Duvalier Style - A Report on Human Rights in Haiti Based
on a Mission of lnquiry - March 1984, 17pp. (also available in French
translation).
(3) Journalists in Jeopardy : The Haitian Reality - October 1984, 13pp.
Ilonduras
(1) Human Rights in Honduras: Signs of the Argentine Method - December
1982,41 pp.
(2) Honduras: On the Brink. A Report on Human Rights Based on a Mission
of lnquiry- Febmary 1984,71 pp.
Nicuragua
(1) Human Rights in Nicaragua - May 1982'87 pp.
(2) Human Rights in Nicaragua - November 1982 Update, 41 pp. (also
availahle in Spanish translation).
(3) Human Rights in Nicaragua - April 1984,51pp.
(4) The Miskitos in Nicaragua, 1981-1984 - November 1984, 60pp.
(5) Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua, 1981-1984 -
March 1985,97 pp.
Paraguay
Rule by Fear :Paraguay After 30YearsUnder Stroessner - January 1985,104pp.
Peru
Abdicating Democratic Authority: Human Rights in Peru - October 1984,
162pp. SUPPLBMENTAL ANNEXESTO THE MEMORIAL 441
Surinanle
Human Rights in Suriname - March 1983,7pp.
General Publications
(1) Annual Report, June 1981-June 1982, 13pp.
(2) Annual Report, June 1982-June 1983,27pp.
(3) Activities Report, July-December 1983, 17pp.
(4) Annual Report, June 1983-June 1984,27pp.
(See publicationsof Helsinki Watch for reports on United States Foreign Policy
published jointly.)
MMBERS AN0 STAFFOF THll AMERlCAS WATCH
Members
Orville H. Schell,Chairman; Aryeh Neier, ViceChairman; Peter Bell, Robert
L. Bernstein, Jonathan Bingham, Patricia Derian, Drew S. Days, III, Adrian
DeWind, Tom J. Farer, Robert Goldman, Alice Henkin, Anne Johnson, Russell
Karp, Stephen Kass, Jeri Laber, Margarct Lang, Dorothy Marshall, John
B. Oakes, Michael Posner, Bruce Rabb, Richard Salomon, Giorgio Solimano,
M.D., George Soros, Alfred Stepan, Svetlana Stone, Rose Styron, Hector
Timerman.
Siaf
Aryeh Neier, Vice Chairman; Juan Mende.?, Washington Office Director:
Holly Burkhaltcr, Washington Representative; Susan Osnos, Press Director;
Linda D. Long, Sue Nestel, Annette O'Donnell, Alita Paine, Karen Sirker,
Associates.
Board of rheFund for Free Expression
Robert L. Bernstein, Chairman; Aryeh Neier, Vice Chairman; Alice Arlen,
Joan Baez, Tom Bernstein, GeoffreyCowan, Patricia Derian, E. L. Doctorow,
Theodor S. Geisel,Nat Hentoff, Pam Hill,Joseph Hofheimer, Lawrence Hughes,
Anne Johnson, Mark Kaplan, Winthrop Knowlton, William Koshland, Jeri
Laher, John Leonard, Anthony Lewis,William Loverd, John Macrae III, Nancy
Meiselas, The Rt. Rev. Paul Moore, Jr., Arthur Miller, Marc Miller, Geoffrey
Cobh Ryan, Orville H. Schell,Alan U. Schwartz, Jerome Shestack, Rose Styron,
Marietia Tree, John Updike, Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Gregory J.Wallance, Morris
West; Sophie Silberberg, Executive Director. MILITARAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
Supplemental AnnexF
COMMUNICATD IANTED17JULY1985DELIVERE TO THEGOVGRNM~ NPT
NICARAGU AY THEAMBASSAD OPTHE UNITED STATEIN MANAGUA A,I]NOTE
VERBALEDATen18JULV1985 BY THEGOVWNMEN OFNICARAGU IAREPLY
LETTER DATED22JULY 1985FKOMTHE CHARG I'AF'FAIRA.IOP THE PERMANENT
MISSIONOP NICARAGUA TOTHEUNITEDNATIONSADDKESSEDTO THE SECRCTARY-
GEhZRAL
1have the honour to write to you in order to transmit a copy of the commu-
nication dated 17July 1985which was deliveredto the Government of Nicaragua
by Mr. Hamy Bergold,Ambassador of the United States of Americain Managua
(see Annex 1). 1am also attaching a copy of the Note Verbale dated 18 July
1985by which the Government of Nicaragua replied to the communication (see
Annex II).
The serious accusations and threats in the communication of the United States
Embassy in Managua are clear evidence of the State terronsm practised by the
current United States Administration against Nicaragua and the decision of the
United States Government to strike and intervene militanly against Ourcountry
on the basis of pretexts as absurd and outlandish as those to be found in the
aforementioned officialcommunication. In the context of other acts of aggression
and steps to block the regional peace initiatives, these new and unfounded
accusations and threats of the United States Government against my country
amount to an extremely grave situation and a serious endangerment of inter-
national peace and security.
1should he grateful if you would arrange for the present note and its annexes
to be circulated as a document of the thirty-ninth session ofthe Geueral Assem-
bly, under agenda item 25, and of the Secunty Council.
(Signed) Julio ICAGALLARD,
Ambassador,
Chargéd'affairesai.
Annex 1
Communication Dated 17July 1985 Deliveredto the Government of Nicaragua
by the Ambassador of the United States of America in Managua
Citizens of the United States and of our friends and allies increasinglyhave
been the targets of international terrorist activity. The patience of the United
States Government and of the American people has grown short.
A recurrencc of any incident such as the brutal murder of six United States
citizens in El Salvador on 19June 1985,will have serious repcrcussions. In the
case of El Salvador, we and the Government of El Salvador have reacted strongly SUPPLEMEhTAL ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 443
against the PRTC. We are well aware of Nicaraguan Government support for
and influence with the PRTC and other elements of the FMLN. The Nicaraguan
Government should use ils influence to discouraee attacks aeainst United States
persi)nnel, persi~nnclwho arc nui. as they knowrini,ol\,ed in-e<,mb:it.
\Ve nuu hai,e indications that prepxttions are undrr sray tu introduce a
program uf Ierriiri,t i~ltack~aga~iiit United Siale\ pcrwnncl in Ilonduras.
~e are aware that the Govirnment of ~icara~ua supports those involved in
these prepardtions and we believc that the Government of Nicaragua may be
directly involved.
Weconsider it of utmost importance that the Government of Nicaragua clearlv
and full? understand thdi anj, Si~iraguan-rupported icrrorihm ait;i~%>againsi
United States pcw<~nnciln Honduras uould be uieu,cdas the direct rcsponsibility
of the Ciovcrnmcnt of Nicarapua. and thai the Uniicd Staie5 should hr cxpeçicd
to react accordine-.
Ii ,huulJ be understood JIXIihat uhile ihij warning li aJdrc,scd Io poiriblc
.~ctsof tcrrorism againsi Cniircl Statc, c.itixeniin Ilunduci hrcause 01'>pccific
available intellieence. United States reaction IO terrorist acts in other countries
of Central ~mërica, or elsewhere, will be based upon the same principles. A
repetition anywhere in Central America of the 19June murders of United States
citizens in El Salvador will have serious consequences for the perpetrators and
for those who assist them.
Note Vcrbiiled;iieJ 18July 1985by whiih the Guvcrriment iiiNic;iragua Rcplied
io the Communic;ition Uated 17July 1985of the Cmb.iaryuf the Ijniied Staies
of America in Managua
The Ministry of Foreign AlTairsof the Republic of Nicaragua is writing Io the
Government of the United States of America in order to state the following:
Yesterday, 17 July, in the afternoon, the Ambassador of the United States of
America to Nicaragua, Mr. Harry Bergold, delivered a communication to the
Government of Nicaragua containing very serious threats against our country.
Nicarae-a eateeoricallv-2eiects the content and form of that communication.
which contains false accusations and intolerable threats and represents a breach
of the practice and law prevailing in relations between States.
Nicaragua wishes firsi to confirm its strong and total condemnation of al1
forms of terrorism, particularly State terrorism of the kind which the United
States Administration sponsors and finances againa Ourcountry.
This policy of State terrorism has claimed a total of 12,146 victims in
Nicaraeua. includine dead. iniured and abducted versons. and kas left more than
-
7.500childrcn orphanr. Ilmav hc reçïllcd ih:ii the mcihods and ariiunjempl<~)c<l
in th15pt~licyof Staie terrorism agsinsl Nicar:igu;i inslude
(a/ the mining of Nicaraguan ports;
(b) the attack against fuel storage facilities at the port of Corinto, which
rendered necessary the general evacuation of the population of that port;
(c) the systematic murder and abduction of peasants, elderly persons, women
and children by mercenary bands financed by the United States Government;444 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
(d) the criminal assault on a passenger aircraft belonging to Aerolineas
Nicaragüenses in Mexico:
(e) the explosion in the baggage claim area of Sandino Airport, which caused
the death of four airport workers;
(f) the manual entitled Psycholo~icuO l perurionsin GuerrilluWurfare produced
by the Central Intelligence Agency, whichisa guide and an apology for terrorism.
It should be siaird in ihis ronnection that communicrtiiins such as the unc
triinsmiiled yesterday b) Ambassiidor Ilergolil to the Government of Nirar~pu:i
are in themselves evidenceof political Stace terrorism.
The Government of Nicaraeua iu not and ncver ha~ ~ ~n i~volved in anv tvnc , ~.,
of action c<>ntrar) ti)the norm, and priniiples of iniernatiunrl la*. The Sandinist
Front itself, in 11slong.itrugy.. ÿga-nst diciator,hip. ncver resoricil to terri,rist
methods.
Nicaragua rejects al1responsibility for the cvents which took pbaceon 19June
al San Salvador and will no1 accept responsibility in any similar situation that
may arise in El Salvador or another~counlry. It neiiher perpetrates nor encourages
that type of action.
The absurd attempt by the United States to hold Nicaragua responsible for
future acts of violence and terror that either United States diplomatic personnel
or citizens may endure in Central America or elsewherecan only be understood
in the context of the United States decision to fabricate the necessary pretext, as
in the case of the Gulf of Tonkin, as a means of creating conditions to justify
direct military aggression against the Nicaraguan people. No other interpretation
can be given to the illogical and illegal threat 10take reprisals against Nicaragua
for possible actions whose nature and origin will be determined by the United
States Government itself.
This new threat is made in the context of nrevious acts of aeeressUUn aeainst U
Nicaragua, such as the trade embargo, the approval of new funds for mercenary
forces and the adoption of the Foley amendment, which emhodies the necessary
pretext for direct aggression againsi Nicaragua.
As the threats to the security of United States citizens in other countries of
the region are the result of the United States Government's policies towards the
Central American crisis, it would bchove that Government to take a responsible
attitude by not stepping up its dangerous threats against a small nation like
Nicaragua and, instead, sincerely engaging in the current pesce efforts, in
particular by ending the boycott of the Contadora negotiating process and
agreeing to resume the Manzanillo talks, which were unilaterally suspended in
lanuary of this year.
Should the policy of threats of further and morc serious acts of aggression
against the region, and against Nicaragua in particular, persist, this could only
lead to a worsening of the situation and heightened secunty risks for al1 the
parties involved.
Moreover, Nicaragua considers that if the United States Administration has
convincing proof of the alleged Nicaraguan support to terrorist organizations,
then the International Court of Justice has full competence to hear those accu-
sations. Nicaragua calls on the Unitcd States to submit its cornplaints to the
supreme world tribunal either within the framework of the case currently before
the Court, or separately in a new application to the Court to be filed by the
United States Government.
The Ministry of Foreign AiTairsreiterates to the Government of the United
States the assurances of ils highest consideration. SUPPLEMllNTAL Ah‘NllXEIS THE MEMORIAL 445
SupplementalAnnex C
APPIDAV IF EDGAR CHAMORRO
City of Washington
District of Columbia
1,Edgar Chamorro, being firstduly sworn, depose and say the following:
1. 1am a citizen ofNicaragua. 1was horn in Granada, Nicaragua, on July 23,
1931.1 presently reside in the United States of America with my wife and two
children, at 640 Allendale Road, Key Biscayne, Florida. 1 have applied to the
Government of the United States for permanent resident status so that 1can live
permanently in the United States. 1 am currently awaiting final action on my
application. 1have been advisedhy my attorneys that 1should not travel outside
the United States until my application for permanent resident status is formally
approved; travel outside the United States at the present time, according to my
attorneys, could prejudice my application and result in my heing permanently
excluded from the United States. Since 1am unable to appear in person before
the International Court ofJustice, 1am submitting my testimony to the Court in
wntten fom.
2. 1will begin by describingmy background. 1was raised in Nicaragua. At the
age of 19. 1joined the Jesuit order of the Roman Catholic Church, and sub-
sequently hecame a Roman Catholic priest. 1 studied at the following Jesuit-
affiliatedinstitutions: Catholic University inQuito, Ecuad;St. Louis University
in St. Louis, Missouri; and Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 1
later served as full professor and Dean of the School of Humanities at the Uni-
versity of Central America, a Jesuit-afiliated institution in Managua, Niçar-
agua. 1left the priesthood in 1969,but continued mycareer in education. In 1972,
1receiveda Master's Degree in Education from Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
3. 1returned Io livein Managua, and went into private business. 1worked for
an advertising agency calledCreative Publicity. 1developed an expertise in adver-
tising,public relations and mdsscommunications. In 1977,I wasappointed by the
Nicaraguan government to be a member of the Mission of Nicaragua to the
United Nations in NewYork. I served in that capacity for one year, after which 1
returned to Nicaragua. In June 1979,l look up residence withmyfamilyin Miami,
Florida. At that time, there wasa full-fledgedinsurrection against the government,
and the Guardia Nacional ("National Guard"), the Nicaraguan armed forces
loyal to the President, General Anastasio Somoza, were bombing residential
neighborhoods and shooting innocent civilians in the streets. 1did not wish to
remain in Nicaragud under such conditions.
4. On July 19, 1979,the insurrection succeeded in overthrowing the Somoza
government and a newgovernment of National Reconstmction wasestablishedin
its place. The new government was Ied hy the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion
Nacional (Sandinista National Liheration Front) or "FSLN", which favored
broad social and economic change in Nicaragua. 1traveled back to Nicaragua in
Se~temher 1979 to learn about the new eovernment first-hand. and 10 decide
whether to move back to Nicaragua with-my family. ~lthou~hl, too, favored
social and economic changes in Nicaragua, 1felt then- and still fe-l that the446 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
policies;ind programs oCthc I:SL?\Iwcrcand arc ioo radical. and thlii 1could niit
lrnd my supp<>rt IO ligovcrnnicni dominaicd hy that polli~calpiiriy. I dccidcd tu
remain in Miami.
5. Toward the end of 1979 1hegan to work with a group of Nicaraguan exiles
living in Miami who, like me, opposed the policies of the new government.
In 1980 we constituted ourselves as the Union Democratica Nicdraguense
(Nicaraeuan Democratic Union). or "UDN". Our nrincinal activitv was to write
ictters io nismberb of the unitcd States ~on~ress'urgi"~ thcm to viite ag;iin\t
linanclal asairtancc ior the Nicaraguïn go\,crnmcnt. Wr also held politic;il meei-
inaj anJ r;illicsu,ith .ithcr Iike-mindcd Nirarae~dn cxilcr inMiami. and u,e ict uo
reëional cornmittees in other cities of the unitcd States where substantial numhets
of-~icaraguans were residing. The leader of our organization, with whom 1
worked closely,was José FranciscoCardenal. Cardenal had served brieflyas Vice
President of the Council of State. the leeislature of the new ~icaraeua" eovern-
ment, but had resigned hispost and lefï~icaragua hecause of his &sagreements
with the newgovernment's policies.
6.In 1981,the UDN underwent a transformation. Durine the first half of the
,ear.,Cardenal was contacted bv re~,esen.atives of the ~'nited States C~~ ~al ~~ ~ ~
Intelligence Agency, and he began to have frequent meetings wiih them in
Washington and in Miami. He also beaan to receive monetary oavments..rom.
these people. He was told that the ~ni?ed States Government was prepared to
help us remove the FSLN from power in Nicaragua, but that, as a condition for
receiving this help, we had to join forces with the ex-National Guardsmen who
had fledIo Honduras when the Somoza government felland had been conducting
sporadic raids on Nicaraguan border positions ever since.Cardenal was taken to
Honduras hy his CIA contacts on several occasions to meet with these
Guardsmen. The UDN. including Cardenal, initially opposed any linkage with
the Guardsmen. The CIA, and high-ranking United StatesGovernment officiais,
insisted that we merge with the Guardsmen. Lt. General Vernon Walters, then a
special assistant to the United States Secretary of State (and formerly Deputy
Director of the CIA) met with Cardenal to encouraee him t- acceot the CIA's
proposal. WCucre ucll a\r.;iri.oiihc irimer ihc GuarJ\mcii had committed ligainst
the Sicsrliguan people u,halein the scrvlce of Prcridcnt Soniurï. ancl WC nantcd
nothing 10 do with them. However, we recognized that without help from the
United States Government we had no chance of removing the Sandinistas from
power, so we eventually acceded to the CIA's, and General Walters', insistence
that wejoin forces with the Guardsmen. Some UDN memhers resigned hecause
thev would not associate themselves withthe National Guard under anv circum-
stances, but Cardenal and 1and others believedthe CIA's assurances th& we, the
civilians, would control the Guardsrnen in the new organization that was to
he created.
7. At that lime. the ex-National Guardsmen were divided into several small
hiinds opcraiing along the Uicar~guÿ-Hoiiduras border. The largesi or the bands.
hcadcd by Enrique Hcrniude~.a fornier Colonel. wascalled the Ijih of Scptcmbcr
Legion. The bands were poorly armed and equipped, and thorough& disor-
ganized. They were not an eflectivemilitary force and represented no more than a
minor irritant to the Nicaraguan government. Pnor to the UDN's merger with
these people, General Waltershimselfarranged for al1of the bands to be incorpor-
ated within the 15th of September Legion, and for the military government of
Argentina to send several anny otficers 10 serve as advisors and trainers. The
merger of the UDN with the 15th of Septemher Legion was accomplished in
August 1981 at a meeting in Guatemala City, Guatemala, where formal docu-
ments were signed. The meeting was arranged and the documents were prepared SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXES TO THE MEHORIAL 447
hy the CIA. The new organization wds called the Fuerza Democratica
Nicaraguense ("Nicaraguan Democratic Force") or, by its Spanish acronym,
FDN. Itwas to be headed by a political junta, consisting of Cardenal, Aristides
Sanchez (a politician loyal to General Somoza and closely associated wiih
Bermudez) and Mariano Mendoza, formerly a labor leader in Nicaragua; the
political junta soon estahlished itself in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, taking up resi-
dence in a house rented for it by the CIA. Bermudez was assigned to head the
military general staff, and il, too, was based in Honduras. The name of the
organization, the members of the political junta, and the members of the general
staff were al1chosen or approved hy the CIA.
8. Soon after the merger, the FDN began to receive a substantial and steady
flow of financial, military and other assistance from the CIA. Former National
Guardsrnen who had sought exile in El Salvador, Guatemala and the United
States after the fall of the Somoza government were recruited to enlarge the
militarv comoonent of the oreanization. Thev were offered reeular salaries. the
funds for whkh were supplied-by the CIA. ~rainin~was provided by Argentinian
military officers,two of whom - Colonel Oswaldo Rivero and Colonel Santiago
t il lei-as 1eot to know auite well: the Areentinians were also miid bv the CIA.
A skial ust was created for sabotage, Gpecially dernolition;; it ;as trained
directly hy CIA personnel at Lepaterique, near Tegucigalpa. Ams, ammunition,
equipment and food were supplied by the CIA. Our first combat units were sent
into Nicaraeuan territom in December 1981.orincinallv to conduct hit-and-run
raids. The &st military &cesses of the organtalion came in March 1982,when
CIA-trained saboteurs blew up two vital bridge- in northern Nicaragua- - at Rio
Negro and Ocotal.
9. 1982 was a year of transition for the FDN. From a collection of small,
disorganized and ineffectual bands of ex-National Guardsmen, the FDN grew
into a well-organized,well-armed, well-equippedand well-trained fightingforce of
aonroximatelv 4.000 men caoable of inflictine ""eat ham on Nicaraeua."~his was
d;é entirely<O the CIA, wh;ch organized, armed, equipped, trained and supplied
us. After the initial recruitment of ex-Guardsmen from throughout the region (to
serve as officers or commanders of militarv units). efforts wëre made tirecruil
.'looi solJier\" for the f<iric(rom insidc ?4iL:aïinia.ome Niiaraguans joincd the
ii~rie voluniarily. c~thcrhec~useof d~\~aiisf~ciii>n with ihc Ni;araguan g<>vcrn-
iiieni. famil! tics u,ith Ic.idi>ithe iorcc, rir<>mises>iii)<iJ.cloihinr. houis and
weapons, o; a combination of these reasons. Many other members-of the force
were recruited forcibly. FDN units would arrive at an undefended village,as-
semble al1the residents in the town squareand then proceed to kill- in full view
of the others - al1Dersonssusuected of workine for the Nicaranuan eovernment
-
or the t'S1.N. inclu(ling p<ilice.local miliiia mrmhcrs. pariy mcnibcr,, health
workcrs. teachcrs and Parmersfrom govcrnmcni-spunr<iredcoopcraii\.es In ihi,
ainiosphcrc. iiu135nui d~ITieuI i0 ~crsuade ihosc ahlr-bodied mcn Iclt alive tu
return-with the FDN units 10their base camus in Hondurasand enlist in the force.
This sas. unioriunately, a wide>prr.adpr;i.tirc thai dccounicd for many recrulis.
The I;DN rcceivçd al1of iiiuedpons froni thc CIA. In 1982,the CIA provided
MI. rifles IO al1FDN comhaiants. These werc;icauircJ used fr,~mihc llonduran
army, which found these rifles expendable after ihe United States Government
reequipped the Honduran army with American-made M-16 rifles, thus enabling
the CIA to purchase the FALs for the FDN. (Later, in 1983,the CIA acquired
AK-47 assault riflesforthe FDN.I
'1raining ont,nucJ unJer ihr.Jircciion ofArgcniinisn miliiq 011ir.r.iilihough
gradually the Argcniinians werercplaccdanJ Clil personnel ptrformcd dl1niiliiar)
training themxlvcr. Hy thc end of 1982.we wcrc rclidy io IiiunchJur firbimajor448 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITISS
miliiar) olTcnrivcdcjlgnerl in iakc ;ind hold Sicdrdgu~n territor). uhich the CIA
WJS urging us IO do Our pnnc~paluhject~vesas ihc torn of Jalapa. in northern
Nic~r;igua.Mi>rcth;in I.illl~lofoiirtighicrsucre iniolveJ. and ive~5r.JIight;irtiller)l
(nioriars. supplied hy thc CiAl in comhai for the iirst timc Alihough \te iitflicted
casualiieson the Sandinista.;and cauwd subsiantial destrurticrnin Jalapa and other
neighboring towns, our offensive was repulsed and we were forced to retreat to
Honduras and regroup without having accomplishedour objective.
10. My specificjob during the first year after the creation of the FDN was to
serve as staff person to the political junta. 1 was based in Miami, where 1 did
oolitical . .-aranda work. wrote letters. oraanized rallies. set UD committees in
;arigiu, parts <>fthe United States and gene&lly uorkcd ai huil~in~support for
our 13US within ihc United Staics. During ihis pcriod Cardenal grer incrc;isingly
unhappy o\.er his lack uiinflucncc u,ithin the FD'I lle had fre~u6ntconflictswith
the C~Aoersonnei who were suoervisine and directine the FDN'S oolitical and
military ictivities and found thai he hadno control o;er ~ermudez'or the other
members of the FDN aeneral staff. who answered only to the CIA. Eventually he
quit the organization, returned to Miami and entered ihe insurance business.
II. In November 1982 1 was approaçhcd by a CIA agent using the name "Steve
Davis" and asked to become a member of the "political directorale" of the FDN.
which the CIA had decided to create as a substitute for the "political junta". (1
am able to refer to "Davis" hy name because 1 know that it is a pseudonym;
United States law makes it a criminal offense to reveal the real name of any
undercover CIA operative.) 1 had lunch with "Davis" at a restaurant near my
home in Florida. "Davis" told me he wassoeakine in the name of the President of
the United States, who wanted "to get rid Ofthe Sandinistas". "Davis" explained
to me that the FDN had a had image in the United States. and particularly among
members of the Congress, becausë it was perceived as an organization of ex-
National Guardsmen. He told me that in order to maintain the support of the
Congress for the CIA'sactivitiesit was necessaryto replace the politicaljunta with
a group of prominent Nicaraguan civilians who had no ties with the National
Guard or the Somoza eovernment. "Davis" left without askine-me to make a
conimitment. Ile told nie Iu<)uldbecontacicd again in the ncdr futiirc.
12.Laicr thdi month. "Dai,is" ielephoncd meand asked me to hate dinncr \ilth
him in his hotel suite ai ihc IluliJay Inn in Zlimni. When I arriicrl. "Davis"
iniroduccd mc to anotlier CIA man. uho ubcd the nanie "Ttinv I:cldman".
"t'cldman" ras iniroduccd ar "I>a\is'" >upi.riorir<im\\'~stiiiigtiin,aiid he acted
as ihouch "Davi," rorkcd for hini "Feldman" iold me that ihc CIA had rlec~dcrl
on a seien-member political directorate for the FDN, hecause any larger group
would he unmanageable. He said that I had been selectedas one of the seven, and
he asked me to accept. He told me that the United States Govemment was
oreoared Io eiveits fullbackine to the FDN so that. bv the end of 1983.wewould
be marchinginto Managua 10-take over the ~icara~ian government. '1was glad
to see that the United StatesGovernment was committed enough to our cause to
be taking such an active role, and 1 agreed to join the directorate they were
creatine.
13 0,c.r the neYi seicral d;iys 'l:eldnian" look conirol of ihc operütion and
motcd thr.hca<lqiidrtcrï IO ihr.I?iur ,\niba,sadori IlotcI. al,o in Iidnii. whcre u,c
met ionsiantl,. "lèldm3n" and his assi>tanti disrusicd with mc possihle andi-
d~~~ ~for t~e ~-ectora~e~ ~ ~ it was ohvious t~a~ the" had~,lread; decided who
ihcy winicrl. '1he rntisr imporidnt thing. "l'eldman" emphasizcd. ua, thai rhc
dire,.toraic bs fornicd immr.diatcly.tlc told me ihat the CIA uas uorricil ihüt the
C<incrcssmicht enact leciilïiion to orohibil the useof United Siairs funds for the
purpose of &erthrowing the ~icara~uan government, and that the creation of a SUPPLEMENTAL ANNEXES 70 THE MEMORIAL 449
political directorate composed of prominent, respectable civiliansmight persuade
the Congress not to enact such legislation.
14.The pressconference was heldthe next day, December 8,1982, at the Hilton
Conference Center in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. WCfiled in and introduced our-
selvesas the directoratc of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), and then I
read our statement of principles and goals. A CIA officernamed "George" had
rewritten our original version of the statement, and 1had to read his words. In
January 1983, at the instruction of CIA agent "Thomas Castillo", we put out
a 12-point "peace initiative" drafted by the CIA, which essentially demanded
the surrender of the Sandinista government. 1 thought this was premature,
but "Castillo" insistedthat it be done to get the FDN favorable publicity. Also at
this time, anoiher Nicaraguan civilian - Adolfo Calero - who had just Ieft
Nicaragua, was added to the directorate. Calero had been working for the CIA in
Nicaragua for a long time. He served as, among other things, a conduit of funds
from the United States Emhassy to various student and labor organizations.
"Feldman" had told me chat the CIA was bringing him out of Nicaragua, where
he had run the local Coca-Cola dis tribut ors h1.0serve on the FDN's ~olitical
Jireci<,r,itc I>c,piie thc,c puhlic relsiidns clT<>rtst.he IJnitcd Siaie, Congre,,
cnxcted cipruhibiiion on ClA cll'uris IO orcrihrou, ihe Nicïragu;in go\crnmr.nt.
alihourh il ;ipriro~rialr.dmillioiis 61idollaIO Ihc CIA for rlandc\tine niiliiars
and paramiliiary activities against the Nicaraguan government. Before this
hibition was enacted, the CIA agents we worked with spoke openly and confi-
dently about replacing the government in Managua. Thereafter, the CIA
instructed us that. ifasked. we should sav that Ourobiective was to interdict arms
;uppii,cJI) bcing ,mugglcil irom Kiciragu.t IO hl SJ\ador. liany oi'u. cter s:iid
anything puhlicly aboui o\crihrou,ing ihc Niexrag~an gii\,crnmeni. ive \voulJ he
visiicd immcdixilcv by .CI,\ oflicialu,hu would UV, "Thai'\ no1ihc I~nruacc ue
want you to use". Éui our goal, and that of the CIA as well(as wewerercpeGedly
assured in private), was to overthrow the government of Nicaragua, and to replace
the Sandinistas as a government. It was never our objective to stop the supposed
flow of arms, of which we never saw any evidencc in the first place. The public
statements hy United States Government officiaisabout the arms Row,we were
told by the CIA agents with whom we worked, were necessary to mainiain the
support of the Congress and should not he taken seriously by us.
15.From Sanuary 1983through June 1984,l worked for the FDN full lime and
remained a member of the political directorate until November 1984.The CIA
paid me a salary of $2,000 a month to support myself and my family, plus
expenses. Similar arrangements weremade with the other FDN "directors". 1was
put in charge of public relations for the FDN. We wanted to set up highly visible
headquarters in a shopping center or officebuilding, but the CIA did no1 like the
idea. They said it would become a target for dcmonstrations or violence. They
insisted that wetake an elegant suite at the David Williams Hotel in Coral Gables,
Florida, which the CIA paid for.
16. At the end of Sanudry 1983, 1was instructed to relocate to Tegucigalpa,
Honduras, to cstablish and manage the FDN's communications office.The CIA
station in Tegucigalpa, which at that time included about 20 agents working
directly with the FDN, gave me money, in cash, to hire several writers, reporters
and technicians to prepare a monthly bulletin called "Comandos", to run a clan-
destin~ radio station and to write orcss releases. I was also eiven monev bv the
CIA to rent a house, officespace and automobiles and to obtain offi~e'su~~lies
and communications equipment. 1also received money from the CIA to bribe
Honduran journalists and~broadcasters Io write and speak favorably about the
FDN and to atiack the government of Nicaragua and cal1for its overthrow.450 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES
Approximately IS Honduran journÿlists and broadcasters were on the CIA's
payroll, and our influence was thereby extended to every major Honduran news-
paper and radio and television station. (1 learned from my CIA colleagues that
the same tactic was employed in Costa Rica in an effort to turn the news-
papers and radio and television stations of that country against the Nicara-
guan government.) 1 worked very closely in al1 of these matters with several
CIA agents based in Tegucigalpa, but most closely with one of the deputy
station chiefs, named "George", who had drafted the FDN's first press statement
in Miami and was then transferred to Tegucigalpa to continue working with us.
Toeether with "Georee". and suhiect to his a..rovdl. 1~ianned al1the activities
of;, comniunisatio~s (,kre and ~rcpsred a budget. The hudgei u,dsre\iewcd hy
the CIA stdtioii in'lcgucigdlpaand. ifapproird, ,en1to Wahingion I<Ii>biainthe
necessarvfunds. which werealwavs or&ided to me in cash
17. 1kas noi the only memh& of the directorate to prepare a budget in this
fashion. lndalecio Rodriguez, who was put in charge of "civilian affairs", which
meant assistance for Nicaraguan refugeesin Honduras or family memhers of our
combatants. worked with his CIA "advisor" in the same manner in which 1
worked uilh ..George". AJolfo Calcro dnd Enriquc IlcrmuJe/ u,ork<J im ihc
nilliiary and logi\tics burlgei.This budgci wds niJias large ai onc mighi iuppu,c.
l'he FDS nevcr re.wi,ed money tipurchare arnir. ammunition or miliiiirycquip-
meni. The\e were acquired iùr u. dnd Jclitered dircctly Io us hy ihe CIA. Onc df
the rnior agents ai the ClA'sTcgucigalp~ siiition. known IO us as "ihe Colonel",
was an expert in these matters, and he, together with his assistants, determined
what we needed and obtained it for us, including: arms, ammunition, uniforms,
boots, radio equipment, etc. As long as 1was in Honduras (until June 1984), the
FDN never acquired its own arms, ammunition or other military equipment. We
were jus1 the end receivers. The main items in the military and logistics budget
that Calero and Bermudez worked on were things that could be acquired locally,
such as food for our men, for which money had to be obtained from the CIA.
Calero and Bermudez were our main links with the CIA. They met constantly
with the CIA station chief (whose name 1cannot reveal here because 1am uncer-
tain whether i, ishis real name or a pseudonym) and his principal deputies.
18.Most of the CIA operatives who worked with us in Honduras weremilitas.
trainers and advisors. OUI trooos were trained in euerrilla warfare. sabotaee.
dcm<ilitionsand in the u>eof a \aricly of WCdpOIIS -. cluding assault rifles. ma-
chine gLns. mortarh. grenade I;iii~ichcrïand ei;pli~si\~crs.uch a.; Clo)more niine..
WC iicrc alsu iraincd in lield communicÿiioni. and thc CIA tauehi uh hou io uie
certain sophisticated codes that the Nicaraguan government forces would not be
able to decipher. This was critical to Our military operations because it enabled
various units, or task forces, to communicate with each other, and 10coordinate
their activities, without being detected by the Sandinistas. Without this communi-
cations capacity, Ourforces inside Nicaragua would not have beenable to coordi-
nate their activitieswith one another and they would have been unable to launch
effectivestrikes at the designated targets. Even more critical to our military activi-
ties was the intellueence that the CIA orovided to us. The CIA. workine witu
Cniied Siatcs military pcrsginncl.opcraieil i,ari<iu\clccironic inierccption \iaiionr
in 1Ionduras Corihe purpow OCinierceptiny,r;idioand telrphonic commJnicati<m,
among Nicaraguan goCernment miliÏary Ünits. By means of these interception
activities, and by breaking the Nicaraguan government codes, the CIA was able
to determine - and to advise us of - the precise locations of al1 Nicaraguan
government military units. The information obtained hy the CIA in this manner
was ordinarily corroborated hy overflights of Nicaraguan territory by United
States satellitesand sophisticated surveillance aircraft. With this information, our SUPPLOMENTAL ANNIiXOS IO TIlE MEMORIAL 451
own forces knewthe areas in which thev could safelv ooerate free of eovernment
troop,. II'uur unit*uere injtrucicd IO di) haitlc u,ith'ihGgo%,crnmcntÏroops, ihey
kncu whcrr id jet up anibushci. her.duscihi CIA tnfdrmcd ihcm oi the prc;i,r.
routes the government troops would take.This type of intelligence wasinvaluable
to us. Without it, Ourforces would not have heen able to operate with any degree
of effectiveness inside Nicaragua. The United States government also made it
possible for us to resupply our troops inside Nicaragua, thus permitting them to
rernain loneer inside the countrv. Under cover olmilitarv maneuvers in Honduras
during 198?,Unitc(lStates armed I;>rccspersonnel consirucicd airsiripi. including
rhc one 31 Agudisie. ihat. aiter the Cl/\ provided us uith dirpldncs. wrre instru-
mental in resu~..v.ne-urtrooDs
19. lhe C1A u,~saIw Jire~ily involvd in our niilitüry iaciic, Thr ügency
rcpciiiedlyordcred u\ IO rn0i.e<,.Itroopr in>idcUicaragua and Io kecp ihcm iherc
as long a\ pojsiblc. Aiiçr our oll'cn~ivcai Ihcend of 1982\i,dsturned h~ik. almust
al1of 6ur iroons were in Honduras and Ourown officersbelievedihat thev needed
morc tr~ining and more iimc hcîore thcy \iould he rad? IO return IO Nicaragua
The FI>N oficers iierc o\crr~led hy the CIA, hoiic\cr. Tlic agcncy iuld ui th.ii
wehad to rnoveour men back into ~icaraeua and keen fiehtine.~Wehad-no choice
but in ohry. In 198. the CIA insiructed Üsnui IOde;trdy ramis or crups txcaurc
thai rvouldhc politicall) counlcrpr~>Ju;ti\~c.In 1984 hoii,e\,er,ue wrrc instructed
to destroy export crops (especially coffeeand tobacco), and to attack farrns and
coooeratives. Accordinelv. wechaneed our tactics in 1984.
20. In July 1983, we%e visited-in Tegucigalpa hy Duane Clarridge, the CIA
official, based in Washington. who was in charge of the agency's military and
paramilitary activities aginst Nicaragua. At thil time we~we~eintroduced Io
Clarridee as "Maroni". (1 am free to state his real narne because his identitv has
alreadybecn puhlicly disclosid in the ~njted~tatesl)~~urin~ a meeting with the
political directorate, Clarridne told us that the CIA had decided that sorne-
ihine mus1 he done to cut O@ Nicaraeud's oil suoo..es. because without oil the
NicxrJgwn miliiar). ~~~oulb dr irnniobili/cd and 115capaciiy IO rcsisi Our furces
uuul<lhe drdslic~iiyrcduccd. ClarriJge spokc ori;irious alicrniiti\es tlc sdid the
Agcncy wasc<in>iJcringa plan "IO sink ships" bringingoil 16)Ki'icdrgua.hut that
one prohlcni u,iih this plan was ih~t if a ship helonging IOihc Soviet Union u,crc
vunk itcould triggcr .Iscrious inicrnliiion:il incidcnt. Cliirridgcs~iiiihat the C'IA
was also considering an attack on Nicaragua's sole oil refinery. located near
Manaeua. Accordine to ularridee. houever. the refinerv was located in a denselv
populaicd arcd. and thr ii\,illsn casualiics rcsulting (rom suih ;in attark uould hc
piiliii:aIly ciiunterproilucti\c. Finally. Clarridgc .aid ihdt ihr Agcncy hxd decided
on a plan IO 3iisik ihc oil ninclinc 21 Pucrio Siindino. on Uicararua'i I'arilic
~oast; where the oil tankers deiiveringoil to Nicaragua discharge thCr cargo.
21. In Septernher 1983,the CIA blew up the pipeline at Puerto Sandino, jus1as
Clarridge had advised us it would. The actual operatives were Agency ernployees
of Hispanie descent, referred to within the Agency as "Unilaterally Controlled
Latino Assets" or UCLAs. These UCLAs, specially trained undenvater demo-
litions experts, were despatched frorn a CIA "mother ship" that took them to
within striking distance of their target. Although the FDN had nothing whatso-
ever to do with this ooeration. we were instru~ ~ ~hv the CIA to ouhli~lv d~im , ~ ~ ~
responsjbility in order'to cov; the CIA's involvement. We did. In October, CIA
UCLAs attacked Nicaragua's oil storage tanks at Corinto, also on the Pacific
Coast. This was a combinëd sea and air attack involvine the-use of rockets. It was
a cornplcic succehr. al1uiihc ianki werr dcstroycd and enormou%quantitics (ifoil
\i,crec<insume~l h) firc Again, the CIA inrirucicd ui tiipublicly ilaim rc5ponsi-
biliry. and wc did Lciicrin Octohcr, ihcrc uds aridilier L'C1.Astiack dn I'uerrd452 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACIIVITIES
Sandino, which again resulted in the demolition of the oil pipeline. We again
claimed responsibility per instructions from the CIA. Subsequently, the UCLAs
attacked Nicaraguan government military facilities at Potosi and radio antennas
at Las Casitas. We,again, were told to claim responsibility and wedid.
22.Wehad a second visit fromClarridge in October 1983.Clarridge told us that
the Agency had decided that the FDN needed a single spokesman in order to
more effectivelypersuade the Congress to continue supporting the CIA'sactivities
aeainst Nicaraeua. andthat Calero should be the one. He asked usto make Calero
tKehead of the political directorate and we did so without objection. Clarridge
also told us that the Agency wanted us to launch another major offensivewith the
obiective of seizine and holding Nicaraeuan territorv. no matter how small. He
said thai 3,soon as our hùld on that tc~riioryiras skure~. wc rhould cstlihlishJ
provisional govrrnmcnt. which ihe LinitedSi;itcsand itiCentral Anicrican allicr
would promptly recognizeas the legitimate government of Nicaragua.
23. The offensive was launched at the end of 1983. aiter the Coneress had
appropriated - openly for the first time- %24,000,000to the CIA fo ; ilitai
and paramilitan. activities in and against Nicaragua. While our forces inflicted
-rrater casudlties on the e-vernment's trooos aid on civilians. and destroved
more propcriy ihan in pre\.ious aitack,, we ncverihclcr, failed to iakç or hold any
Ki'ii~raguanrcrriior) and the ma~.iri~y olour rroops wrc foricd I<Irctiirti)ihcir
bases in Honduras.
24. On January 5, 1984,at 2 am, the CIA deputy station chief of Tegucigalpa,
the agent I knew as "George", woke me up at my house in Tegucigalpa and
handed me a press releasein excellent Spanish. 1was surprised to read that we -
the FDN - were takine-credit for havine-mined several Nicaraeua- harbors.
"Gïorgc" ti>IJme IOru.h IO Ourrlandcsiinc radio station and read (hi\ announie-
ment bcl;>rethe Sandini,t;is brtikc thc iic\ir. The tru1,th~t WC pla)c,l no r<~lin
the iiiinina of the h;irhori IlWC did lisin,iructcd and hro~dcari thecoriimunioué
about thekining of the harbors. Ironically, approximately Iwomonths later, aiter
a Soviet ship struck one of the mines, the same agent instructed us to deny that
one oF"ourn mineshad damaged the ship to avoid an international incident.
25. In Mav 1984the United States Coneres- voted not Io orovide more assist-
ancc IOthe CIA Corniilitary ;inJ paraniilit;iry actit iticr ag.iin,t Uiwr.igua. Mliny
of us bcsamc u,,irricd aboui rcccivingc<~ntinucdsupport irom the Lnited Siatcs
Government and we exoressed these concerns Io oür CIA colleaeues in Teeu-
cip~lpa. Wc acre rcpe;iiedlg .is.ured by ihe ,laiion chicf and hi; dcpiitic~.-in
the strongc\i po,~ihlcicrrtis.thai wewould no1bcahaniloncd and ihdi the IJnited
StatesGovernment u,ould find a way to continue its support. At around this time
we were visited by Ronald F. Lehman II, a Special Assistant to the President of
the United States who was serving then on the National Security Council.
Mr. Lehman assured us that President Reagan remained committed to removing
the Sandinistas from oower. He told us that President Reaean was unable at that
iiiiieIO publi~lycxprcrs the iull crient oi hir iommitnicnt- 161us bccdu\c oi thc
upcoming preridcntiiil cleciionsin the Ilnitcd Siatc.;. nui. Mr lchman iold us. as
soon as the elections were over, P~esident Reagan would publicly endorse Our
effort to remove the Sandinistas from oower and see to it that we receivedal1the
support that u,ar nccr5sary for ihat purpose. \\'e rccei\,eda similar assurance oi
continuc.l Unit~.dSiatcs üu\crnnicnt support. noiu,iihstanding ihc riliisal of thc
C'onrrcs, IO ar>or<>nriJtcmore fiinds. ironi 1.1.Colonel OIi\.:r Korth. anuthcr
officFalof the ~ational Security Council.
26. It was still important to these officiais,and to the CIA, to obtain additional
appropriations of funds from the Congress, and they had not ahandoned hope
that the Congresscould be persuaded to resume funding Ouractivities. Our CIA454 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlES
ledeed to a newsnaver reoorter that our troons had~~ ~ ~ ~some civilians and
ex&uted some pr;s/ners, though 1tried to explain thee practices as best 1could.
Calero told me 1could no longer work in Honduras and 1was reassigned to the
local FDN committee in ~iaii. 1 was given nothing to do and 1nolonger had
much interest in working forthe FDN, or to be moreaccurate, for the CIA.
30. When 1agreed to join the FDN in 1981, 1had hoped that it would be an
orranization of Nicaraeuans. controlled bv Nicaraeuans. and dedicated to Our
ou7nob~c~~tivw eshiçh we<iursclteswoulJ dciermine. i,<iinedon thc underbtanding
ihot the United States Gavernmcnt would suppl) u, wiih the mean; nezesïr) IO
dcfe3r the Sandinisias 2nd rc.~l;i;cihrni as a rovernnicnt. but 1helie!ed th21 WC
would be our own masters. 1iurned out to bemistaken. The FDN turned out to
be an instrument of the United States Government and, specifically,of the CIA.
It was created by the CIA, it was supplied, equipped, amed and trained by the
CIA. and its activities - both oolitical and militarv - were directed and con-
irolled by the CIA Thosr ~icar~~u;tnswho u,crcchoren (h? the Clh) lor Icader-
ship piijitions within ihc drp:ini/stion- n.lmely, Calera and Bcrmudez -- ricre
those who ber1demonstr;itcd thcir u~illinrnes.;io unauotioninclv lollou thr in-
structions of the CIA. They, like the organization iiself, becare nothing more
than executioners of the CIA's orders. The organization became so thoroughly
dependent on the United States Government and its continued support that, if
that sun..rt were terminated. the orea-ization would not onlv be incaoable of
conducting any milii~ryor paramiliiïry activiticsagainsi Sicarïgua. but itu,oulJ
immcJi:itel) bcgin I<I<Iii~ntegrarc.II ;oiildnet c~iri withtiut the siipp<>rtand
direction of the United StatesGovernment.
31. 1 became more and more distanced from the FDN in the second half of
1984.1had, for al1intents and purposes, ceased to be a part of the organization.
Finally, on November 20, 1984,1receiveda letter stating that the political direc-
torate-had decided to relieveme of mv duties. 1made no Ürotest.
32. My oppositicin ro the Sicaraguan governmcnt iontiriues. I oppose II,poli-
iies and programs and I uould Iike IO secit rcmo\cii or replliccd I'his\houlJ he
accomplished, however, by the Nicaraguan people themselves, and not by the
United StatesGovernment or bv ils instruments. includine the FDN. which follow
its dictatesand serve itsinteresk instead of those of the~icaraguan people. My
presentation of this testimony to the International Court of Justice is not an
exoression of sum..t or svr,.athv .or the nresent Nicaraeua- eovernment or ils
rase ;igainit the Cnitcd Statrs. II isa rcsult i~fm) cornmitmeni Io tell the iruih. id
al1interc\tc.i pdriics. about my pers<inale\perienie, in the l'DI\'.Sinrc I left ihc
orrani~ation ai the end of 1984.1have so<>ken oubiiçlv in ihc United States about
ni; e\pr.ricnïcs and 1 hïtc niadc myreif amiiahle icijournalists whenever the?
h4i.crequcitcd inrer\ieus. When Ni~aragiia'sattorneys ;ippr(ia~hedineand arkcil
if 1would present testimony about my experiencesto the International Court of
Justice,1 decided todo so. This decision isconsistent with my practice of speaking
openly and honestly about my experiencesbefore any interested body or forum.
Whatever the best solution for the Nicaraguan people may be, 1am convinced
that itcan only come about on the basis oftruth, andthat those of us with relevant
personal experience are under a moral obligation to make the truth known.
(Signed) Edgar CHAMORRO.
Subscribed and sworn to before methis 5th day of September 1985.
(Signed) Hildred A. Carney,
Notary Public. SUPPLEMENTALANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL 455
SupplementalAnnexH
The Department of State refers to the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation between the United States of America and the Republic of Nicaragua,
signed at Managua on January 21, 1956.
In view of the policies and actions of the government of Nicaragua against
the peace and security of the Central American region in violation ofthe Charters
of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States, and the con-
sequent state of relations between Nicaragua and the United States, a situa-
tion has for some time existed which is incompatible with normal commercial
relations under a trcatv of friendshio, commerceand navieation. The eovernment
<ifthe Unircd Sr.irei hcrcb) glves n;~lir.c.purruantIO ~rt~lc XXV. Gcigraph 3.
<iitermination OCiliis Trcîty, clTcciiveilnryçlir ïrom the Jaie of iliis noie.
Department of State,
Washington.
Memorial of Nicaragua