INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING APPLICATION
OF THE CONVENTION ON
THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT
OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA v. YUGOSLAVIA)
REJOINDER
22 FEBRUARY 1999 TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART ONE
1. INTRODUCTION ..........................................1.......................
2. COUNTER-CLAIM IS BASED ON FACTS AND LAW ....3.
2.1. Policy Aiming at the Destruction of Serbs
as yGroup is an Element of Radical Islamism
................
2.1.1. Policy Aiming at the Destruction of Serbs
as a Group Originates in the ldeas of Radical
Islam ....................................................5...................
.....
2.1.2. The Rejection of All Offers for Peaceful
Reorganization of BiH in Accordance with the
Right to Self-Determination, by the SDA Leadership
Confirmed the Policy Aiming at the Destruction
......................................................
of Serbs as a Group
2.1.3. The Creation of Muslim Paramilitary
Formations Was the Preparation for a Forcible
lmplementation of the Policy Aiming at the
Destruction of Serbs as a Group ......................53..........
2.1.4. The Acts of lncitement to Genocide
Were the First Step in the lmplementation
of the Policy Aiming at the Destruction of
Serbs as a Group ...........................................................55
2.2. lncitement to Genocide .............................................. 57
1112.3. Killing........................................................................
.....59
2.4. Deliberate lnfliction on Serbs Conditions
of Life Calculated to Bring about Their Physical
Destruction and Causing Serious Bodily or
Mental Harm (Counter-Memorial 7.2.) ........................80.....
2.4.1. The Annex to the Final Report of the
United Nations Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992). the So-called Bassiouni's
Commission ................................................................... 86
2.4.1.2. Bihac .................................................................. 86
2.4.1.3. Brod (Bosanski) ........................................88......
2.4.1.4. Breza ..................................................................91
2.4.1.5. Bugojno ..............................................................93
2.4.1.6. Capljina .............................................95...............
2.4.1.7. Cazin ..................................................99.........
2.4.1.8. Fojnica ................................................................99
2.4.1.9. Goraide ...........................................100..............
2.4.1.10. Odiak ............................................................. 101
2.4.1.12 .Sarajevo .........................................108.............
2.4.1.13. Sarajevo - KoSevo ........................................120 2.4.1.14 . Sarajevo . Pofalici ....................................... 120
2.4.1.16. Trnovo .......................................................... 123
2.4.1.18. Travnik ...........................................126...........
2.4.1.19 . Tuzla ............................................................ 126
2.4.1.20. Visoko ............................................132...........
2.4.1.21. Zenica .......................................................... 135
2.4.1.22. Grude ........................................................ 139
2.4.1.23. Kladanj ...........................................140...........
2.4.1.24. Konjic ........................................................... 141
2.4.1.26. Livno ...........................................................153
2.4.1.28. Mostar ............................................157...........
2.4.2. Forensic Medical Expertise on the Injuries
lnflicted on the Prisoners in the Camps
throughout Bosnia & Herzegovina ......................159
2.5. The lntent to Destroy. in Whole or in Part.
Serbs as Ethnic and Religious Group ....................413...2.6. Ethnic Cleansing .......................................6............ 41
2.7. Destruction of Places of Worship .....................418.
2.8. Islamisation of Muslim-controlled Parts
of Bosnia and Herzegovina ...............................9......... 41
2.9. Evidence Proving Facts upon which the
Counter-Claim is Based ............................................... 423
2.10. Responsibility of the Applicant for Violation
of the Obligations Established by the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide ............................................ 470
2.11. Elimination of All Consequences of Violation
of the Obligations Established by the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide and Provision of Fair Compensation .......471 PART TWO
3. CLAlM OF THE APPLICANT
IS NOT BASED ON FACTS AND LAW
3.1 .Evidence and the Way of Proving .................473...
3.2. Facts Relevant for the Attribution
of Acts to the Respondent .............................532............
3.2.1. Position of the Yugoslav People's
Army in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina ......................................................... 532
3.2.1.l. The Yugoslav People's Army Was a
Neutral Force in the Period Preceding the
Armed Rebellion of the Muslim and Croat
Forces Against the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ......................532.........
3.2.1.2. The Armed Rebellion of the
Muslim-Croat Paramilitary Formations
Against the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and the Attacks on the
Yugoslav People's Army ...............................542............
3.2.1.3. Alleged Forced Mobilization
in the FR of Yugoslavia ..............................................
3.2.2. Forming of the Army of the Serb Republicof
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Repubic of Srpska) ........567
3.2.3. Final Consideration Concerning
Attribution of Acts to the Respondent .................577....3.3. Acts Alleged by the Applicant Cannot be
Qualified as Genocidal Acts or Other Acts
Prohibited by the Genocide Convention ........................
3.3.1. The Respondent Did Not Plan or
lntend to Destroy Non-Serb Population
in Bosnia and Herzegovina ................................590.....
3.3.2. The Republic of Srpska Did Not Plan
and lntend to Destroy Non-Serb Population
in Bosnia and Herzegovina ...........................598...........
3.3.3. Genocidal lntent Was Nonexistent .............600...
3.3.4. Crimes Alleged by the Applicant Did Not
Happen or Did Not Happen in the Way Alleged
by the Applicant ........................................................... 606
3.3.5. Alleged Rapes ...................................................608
3.3.6. Alleged Ethnic Cleansing in the Territory
of Yugoslavia ...............................................................633
3.3.7. Alleged Detention Camps in the Territory
of the Respondent ..................................................... 640
3.3.8. The Respondent Has Not Violated Its
Obligation to Punish under the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide ............................................................... 642 PART THREE
4. CONSIDERATION OF RELEVANT
LEGAL RULES ..............................................643.........
4.1. Attribution of Acts to the State ............................. 643
4.1.1. Perpetrator of the Crime of Genocide
and the Responsibility of the State under
the Genocide Convention .......................................... 643
4.1.2. Attribution to the State of the Acts
of An Insurrectional Movement ................................. 645
4.1.3. Attribution to the State of the Acts of
Organs Placed at Its Disposal ..................................
4.2. Definition of the Crime of Genocide .................... 652
CONCLUSIONS ...........................................660....................
SUBMISSIONS ....................................................663
LIST OF ANNEXES TO REJOINDER .............................. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Air Defence Forces
ADF
AF Air Forces
ASR Army of Republic of Srpska
BiH - B&H Bosnia and Herzegovina
CDU - HDZ Croat Democratic Union
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation
ECMM European Community Monitoring Mission
FBlS Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GO Government Organization
GS General Staff
HOS Croat Armed Forces
HVO Croat Council of Defence
HQ Headquarters
ICFY lnternational Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia
lnternational Commision for Missing
Persons
lnternationaliminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of lnternational
Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Former Yugoslavia
IHRLI lndependentHuman Rights Law lnstitute
IKM Forward Command Post
JNA Yugoslav National Army
KK Krajina Corps
KPD - PCI Penal-Correctional Institution
LBO Liberal Bosniac Organization
MAR Mixed Artillery Regiment
MBO Muslim Bosniac Organization
MCF Muslim-Croat FederationMD Military Division
MNCS Muslim National Council ofdiak
Ministry of National Defence
MN0
MTD Muslim Territorial Defence
MUP Ministry ofterna1Affairs
Non-Commissiond Officer
NCO
NDH lndependent State of Croatia
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OIC Organization of the lslamic Conference
PDA -SDA Party of Democratic Action
PKM Temporary Command Post
PL Patriotic League
PoW -PoWs Prisoners of War
RS Republic of Srpska
RTS Radio Television of Serbia
SA0 Serb Autonomous Region
SDP -SDS Serbian Democratic Party
SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SPS Socialist Party of Serbia
SR Socialist Republic
SR BH Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
SRK Sarajevo-Romanija Corps
TANJUG Yugoslav News Agency
TD - TDF -TO Territorial Defence Forces
TG Tactical Group
VJ Army of Yugoslavia
VRS Army of the Republic of Srpska
ZAVNOBiH Anti-Fascist Council of the People's
Liberation ofH
ZNG Croation National Guard PART ONE
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. This Rejoinder of the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia is filed in accordance with the Orders of the
International Court of Justice of 11 December 1998, by which the
Court extended to 22 February 1999 the time-limit for the filing of
the Rejoinder of Yugoslavia.
1.2. In the Introduction of the Reply (para. 6, p. 2) the Applicant
"is of the opinion that clariQing these issues, will not only serve
historieal purposes (..), but will also be indipensable in the
reconciliation process, which is slowly developing in the region. If
the Coud estab/ishes, and IegaLlydefines, the relevant facts and
settles the question of State responsibili~ then the fight over
these issues can stop, thus enabhg the peoples involved to take
such a judgrnent as a firrn basis on which to build and rebuild
their mutual relations."
1.3. How "the peoples involved' should "rebuild their mutual
relations'? What is the idea of the Applicant? The Applicant does
not hide its intentions and expectations. It makes them quite
clear. In the entire text of the Reply, the Applicant places the
name of Republika Srpska in inverted commas. On page 789 of
the Reply, in para. 82, the Applicant says:"ln the first place, this
entiy (Repubhka Srpska) has been created contrary to
perernptory norrns of international Iaw Ous cogens). . The creation
of Republika Srpska bas been irnposed through the use of force
and genocide. ."
1.4. So, Republika Srpska 'fias been imposed through the use of
force and genocide': i.e. it 'fias been created contrary to
peremptory norrns of international lad'. According to the
1Applicanthe, if the International Court of Justice, by its Judgment,
confirmed this, that would be the basis for "the peoples involved'
to "rebuild their mutual relationS1,i.e. to cancel Republika Srpska.
1.5. With great regret, the Respondent notes that the Applicant's
intentions to build Bosnia and Herzegovina as an lslamic State
are very much alive. "There can be no peace or CO-existence
between lslamic faith and the "non-lslamic social and politcal
institution.'."The lslamic fight continues.
1.6. But, what is the way to the Judgment of the Court?
According to the Applicant "...these declarations (i.e. declarations
of the UN organs and bodies as well as of the European
Parliament and the European Commission - the Respondent's
remark) form an authorifative source for the Judgment the
Applicant requests from the International Coud of Justice in this
case. However, these findings cannot replace such a Judgment
nor can their existence render such a Judgment supet3/uous."
1.7. There are no declarations producing legal effects that the
Applicant ascribes to them. If the mentioned declarations had
substantiated the Claim of the Applicant, the Security Council
would not have supported by its Resolution 1022 (1995) the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina initialled at Dayton (Ohio) on 21 November 1995 and
signed at Paris on 14 December 1995, that constituted Bosnia
and Herzegovina consisting of two entities: Republika Srpska and
the Muslim-Croat Federation.
1.8. It seems the Applicant believes it is not obliged to prove its
allegations. In para. 26, p.962 of the Reply, the Applicant "fully
maintains its conviction that this is not a criminal th1 and that
therefore the facts need not be proven beyond a reasonable
doubl:"
1.9. Quite the opposite. The Respondent considers that the
present proceedings concern the most serious issues of State
2responsibility and that a charge of such exceptional gravity
against a State requires a proper degree of certainty. The proofs
should be such as to leave no room for reasonable doubt.
1.10. As the Counter-Claim of the Respondent has a function to
deny the Claim of the Applicant and goes further to establish the
responsibility of the Applicant for the breaches of the Genocide
Convention, Part One of the Rejoinder refutes the allegations of
the Applicant that the Counter-Claim is not based on fact andlaw
and proves that it is. Part Two of the Rejoinder, supplementing
the arguments, contained in the Counter-Mernorial, negates factual
and legal foundation of the Claim of the Applicant. Part Three of
the Rejoinder contains the relevant legal consideration.
2. COUNTER-CLAIM IS BASED ON FACTS AND LAW
2.0.1. In paragraph 9 of the Conclusions and Submissions, p.
973 of the Reply, the Applicant states:
"With regard to the Respondent's counter-claims
the Applicant cornes to the following conclusion. There
is no basis in fact and no basis in law for the
genocidal acts have been committed
proposition that the
against Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no
basis in fact and no basis in law for the proposition that
any such acts, if proven, would have been committed
under the responsibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina or
that such acts, if proven, would be attributable to Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Also, there is no basis in fact and no
basis in law for the proposition that Bosnia and
Herzegovina has violated any of ifs obligations under the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. On the contrar- Bos& and
Herzegovina has continuously done everything within its
3 possibilitiestu adhere tu its obligations under the
Convention, and will continue to do so."
2.0.2. The above allegations of the Applicant are not true. The
acts of incitement to genocide as well as other acts punishable
under Article III of the Genocide Convention and the crimes of
genocide against Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been
committed. The obligations under the Genocide Convention
have been violated. According to the rules of international law,
these violations are considered to be the acts of the Applicant
and it is responsible for them. This assertion is based on facts
and on law. Adequate evidence has been provided.
2.1. Policy Aiming at the Destruction of Serbs as a Group is
an Element of Radical lslamism
2.1.0.1. The Applicant does not deny that crimes against the
Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been committed.
What the Applicant does deny is that those crimes are the
crimes of genocide, for "it rejects the allegation about the
existence of a policy aiming at their destruction as a group ...Y
The Applicant says:
"The Respondent bas also failed tu prove that
the alleged acts were directed against Serbs as a
group. lt refers tu a certain number of documents and
testimonies tu prove indeed atrocious acts supposedly
committed against Serbs, but fails tu place them in a
larger context and tu demonstrate that they did not
remain isolated and were the implementation of a larger
policy targeting the Serbs as a group. Actually, Bosnia
and Herzegovina dues not deny and also deeply regrets
that crimes have been committed against Serbs, but
rejects the allegation about the existence of a policy
aiming at their destruction as a group which is devoid of
any evidential ground whatsoever. " (Reply, p.964, para
29)2.1.0.2. Tha above statement of the Applicant touches upon the
essence of the dispute. Regrettably, such a policy did exist.
This question may be of relevance both for proving the
Counter-Claim and for rejecting the Applicant's Claim. That is
why the Respondent starts from this matter. The Respondent
pointed to the relevant facts in the Counter-Memorial. This has
been done in Chapter II of the Counter-Memorial, pp.134-218,
which speaks about the ascendancy of radical lslam in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The Applicant said nothing in connection with
the presented facts.
2.1.0.3. The Policy aiming at the destruction of Serbs as a group
originates in the ideas of radical Islam. The rejection of al1
attempts aimed at bringing about a peaceful solution in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, on the part of the SDA leadership, confirmed
the existence of this policy. The creation of Muslim paramilitary
formations was a preparation for a forcible implementation of that
policy. The acts of incitement to genocide were the first step in
the implementation of that policy. This policy was pursued through
the crimes of genocide committed against the Serb people in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2.1.1. Policy Aiming at the Destruction of Serbs as a Group
Originates in the ldeas of Radical lslam
2.1.1.l. The policy aiming at the destruction of Serbs as a
group originates in the ideas of radical Islam, which crystallized
into the following concept, embodied in the Islamic Declaration.
The Respondent quoted this concept in para 2.9.1.2 of the
Counter-Memorial, p. 141, which reads as follows:
"The first and the most important of these
coficlusions is definiteh the one about the incompatibilify
of lslam and non-lslamic systems. There can be no
peace or coexistence between the 'lslamic faith' and the
5 'non-lslamic'social and political institutions. The failure of
these institutions to function and the instabiliy of
regimes in Muslim countries, manifested in frequent
changes and coups d'etat are as a rule the
consequence of their a priori opposition to Islam as the
fundamental and guiding feeling of the people in these
countries. Claiming for itself the righf to regulate its own
world, Islam clearly rules out any right or possibility of
action of any foreign ideology on ifs turf: Namely, there
is no room for the lay principle and the state should be
an expression of the moral concepts of religion and
supportive of them."
2.1.1.2. The Respondent refers here to the testimonies of two
eminent Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dr Nijaz
Durakovic and Adil ZulfikarpaSic. Dr Nijaz Durakovic was the
President of the League of Communists in the Socialist
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the introduction of
the multi-party system he remained the leader of the reformed
party which changed its name and partly its programme. As a
political leader, as described above, he was a member of the
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the civil war. In
para 2.11.1.19. of the Counter-Memorial, pp. 158-159, the
Respondent pointed to the February 1995 statement of five out
of the seven members of the Presidency against Alija
Izebegovié because of his attempt to turn Bosnia and
Herzegovina into a one-party lslamic state. Dr Nijaz Durakovic
was one of the signers. Now he is one of the political leaders
in the Muslim-Croat Federation.
2.1.1.3. Dr Nijaz Durakovic drew the attention to the recurrence
of the ideas of radical Islam known as the ideas of the "Young
Muslims". He maintains that these ideas are characterized by
the use of religion for genocidal purposes. The Respondent will
quote in extenso the part of the text made public by Dr Nijaz
Durakovié in 1987: "Old ldeas of the 'Young Muslims'
ln connection with the escalation of Muslim
nationalism and the trial tu a group of its most
prominent protagonists, ('Durakovic refers tu the 7984
Sarajevo process the trial of the supporters of the
radical lslamic faction gathered around AlJa lzetbegovic;
see paragraph 2.8.7.2, p. 734 of the Counter-Memorial -
the Respondent's remark), the general public were
almost confused by the frequent reference tu the 'Young
Muslims : a terrorist, clerical-nationalist and fascism-
inspired organlzation that was at ifs height in the 7955's
and that - considering the anachronistic ideas with which
it was imbued and the obsoleteness of its aims - was
rightly believed to have left for good the inter-ethnic
scene of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Having emerged in a troubled prewar period of
time,fraught wjth nationalist passion (in March 7947), the
Young-Muslim organizatjon traded on faith as the basis
of getting together,of national security and oneness.
ln the militant strengthening of religious feelings
and organized cultural-educational activities based on
Islam and on Bosnian Muslim taditon, the organilatjon
of Young Muslims saw the only way of Muslim national
survival and realkation of concrete political objectives
embodied in the autonomy of Bosnia. Against this
background the Muslim nationalist collaborafors,
completely compromised already in the first wartime
days, saw the establishment of the so-called
lndependent State of Croatia under the fold of the Third
Reich as a welcome framework for the real~zationof the
old ideas on establishjng a separate national state in
which, according to the teaching of the ideologists of'the Muslh national renewal: the Muslims are the only
autochthonous element.
Desplte the fact that a considerable segment of
the Muslim Fifth-Column intelligentsia accepted Ante
Pavelic's ideoiogy that the Muslims are genuine Croats
or 'fhe flower of the Croatian people' who are different
only by their lslamic confession, there also existed ofher
forces within the Young-Muslim Movement which, in
case Germany and its satellite - the Independent State
of Croatia - lost the war, would quickly change sides
and stand ready militarily, politically and organizationally
for a future, new reshaoing of the map of Yugoslavia.
That is why the programme of the Young
Muslims was changed very quickly. After the apparent&
naive cultural-educational and strictly religious ambitions
within the framework of legality and the rules prescribed
by the Royal legal order, the programme began
overnight to draw new strength and inspiration from fhe
ideas of Panislamism.
ln view of the fact that al1 this was taking place
under the protection of the Reich, even with Hitler's own
blessing (there are ma~iy indications that it was Hitler
himself who had given the name to the 73th SS
Handiar (Daggerj Division), this Panislamism had an
inherent Nazi trait to it. Namely,if was above al1in the
funct~on of Nazi war conquests; of the Reich's great
dream to meet the Japanese militarists in the East and,
in that vast space, to ensure the support of the Muslim
masses that would allegedly get the chance for their
real liberation only witllin the world Nazi empire.
Therefore itis not by accident that the Jerusalem
Great Mufti El-Husseini also joined the game soon; after
the pompous reception by Hitler in Berlin, he opened
the centre, trumpeted with much fuss by Goebbelspropaganda, from which tu direct militant Panislamism;
of course in ifs German version and in line with the
Axis powers' aims.
One of the first steps in that direction was the
Mufti's visit to Sarajevo, a proving ground by no means
chosen accidentally, on which tu test the efficiency of
the new $?ad' that this time was not 10serve Allah but
the maniacal designs of the racist genocidal policy. The
more so, as the fascist military machinery began fo go
tu pieces in the Bosnian mountains and as it was
preciseh in Bosnia that a large Partisan-held liberated
territory was formed.
A bunch of dignitaries lined up as subjects of a
king, chosen from among the ranks of the Ulema and
quasi-national representatives, under the watchful eyes
of the German military officers and Ustashi captains,
with feigned religious humbleness and pompous racist
slogans, met the Great Mufti whose chief task was to
convey Hitler's wishes and orders: that several SS
divisions be formed from the Muslim religiously imbued
youth, following the classical mode1 - using the tested
brain-washing method and intensive military training, with
the camp imams as their religious tutors.
The leaders of the Young Muslims were
supporive of this profane selling out because, according
to them, the blind linking with the Reich meant the
chance for establishing an autonomous lslamic Bosnia
that was going tu flourish like an ethnically pure
paradke within the world lslamic state - 'lslamabad:
They embraced obediently the SS method of
militarization of the Muslim soldiers because it suited
their programmed long-term strategy: to /ive an ascetic
life, devoted tu God and in the spirit of the true
9principles of Islam; tu get educated and militari& and
politically organked su that, no matter who comes out
as the victor h the Second World War in the end, they
would be a powerful factor whose Say and strength will
not be ignored in the expected division of spheres of
influence or in the creation of a new stafe.
Their princ~pal motto was that the senile Ulema
ready tu make compromises, the opportunist
intelligentsia and the remaining owners of former bey
properties can no longer represent the interests of the
Muslh people and sel1 them out so cheaply as they
had done back in 7978.
Of course, the interests of the Muslim masses,
of theirworkng class and of other progressive segments
of the population were of no concern to them; they
reckoned without their host.
We do not propose tu expand on the genesis of
this organization although such an account would be
welcome tu show al1 the contradicfons, inconsistencies
and paradoxes of the existence of this organization and
to explain where treason, epigone imitation of fascism
and religious fanaticism were leading.
At this point, suffice it tu Say that the "Young
Muslims" proved tu be an extremely reactionary, clerical-
fascist organization that attempted to exploit religion for
overt nationalist, chauvinist, even genocidal aims. (bold
is added)
The remnants of the "Young Muslim" philosophy
after the war, having becorne an illegal modern terrorisf
organkation, once again linked their Utopian dreams
about the autonomous Muslim state with fore@ powersand expectations that the new Yugoslavia was inevitably
going to disntegrate. (bold is added)
The Panislamic dream about the establishment of
'Hlafet: Le. of a universal lslamic state, is increasingly
giving ground to a new phobia, where traditional
nationalism and chauvinism are supplemented by fanatic
anti-communism that was going to remain a lasting
feature of the recurrent 'Young Muslim' philosophy of
this countt-y.
The question posed in both the domestic and the
foreign press, often with surprise, in connection with the
trial in Sarajevo, is how come that these ideas, though
in a permuted but not essentially changed form, re-
emerged once again. What are the underlying reasons
of their recurrence? Foreign commentators refer mainly
to external factors. They could be summarized as
fol10ws:
'lrthe wake of the lranian revolution the interest
in Panislamism suddenly increased, in particular the
interest in lslamic fundamentalism as a social, political
and ideological movement that caught the interest of a
large part of the masses.
Organized movements appeared in various forms
in a number of countries advocating a return to the
original foundations of Islam which, in their opinion, is
the best reply to the obvious economic and cultural
domination of the West, against uncritical acceptance of
the Western way of thinking and life style.
According to those interpreters, the evident social
tension, the lack of prospects for finding solutions within
the existing, desecrated po:itical systems based on the
European model, the ideological and cultural
11sophistication and unscrupulous neocolonialism on the
one han4 and disillusionment with the existing practice
of socialism, on the other, along with the advenf of
large numbers of educated young people aware of the
harmful effects of foreign influence and unwilling to
reconcile themselves tu the wretched subordinated
position of their governments and countries, etc.; al/
these elements resulted in a sudden, growing interest in
traaïtion, in sources of the national spirit, return to one's
own cultural roots, in brie( in a fanatic turnabout and
orientation towards Islam.
ln this context, many examples are mentioned,
starting with the known developments in Iran; the
Sunnite fundamentalist movements in Saudi Arabia;
armed actions of the 'Muslim brothers' in Syria and
Egypt; the emergence of fundamentalist groups
amongst the Shiites and Sunnites in Iraq; the upsurge of
fanaticism among the young Sunnites in Kuwait up to
the militant, fundamentalist group Al-Jihad-Al lslami in
Egypt, etc,
/tis not fortuitous that many of these movements
that surely contain specific national characteristics, are
attempting tu rehabilitate precisely those princtples of the
Koran which, according to some interpretations, suggest
that action should be taken for a radical change of the
existing relations, meaning, in the final analysis, the
rehabilitation of Jihad!
Quite a lot has already been said about the
Wamic Declaration' as a new Panislamic, religious and
political programme. Made under the influence of these
ideas which we have only briefly dealt with, the
programme - despite the fact that its authors are trying
tu present it as a universal religious platform - is in
essence also a platform for eminent political action. For, how else can be interpreted the propositions abouf the
incompatibility of Islam and other non-lslamic
institutitionsabout the impossibiility of peace or
coexistence between the lslamic faith and non-lslamic
social and political institutions; and the claim that Islam
rules out any right and possibility of influence of any
forebn ideology on its turf - but as a religious war cry,
religious fanaticism and intulerance. (bold is added)
ln the same way as the "Young Muslims" in their
time linked their fate tu the expected successes of
fascist Germany and its allies, and nurtured their hopes
after the war with the expectation that the new
Yugoslavia would disntegrate, so the present-day Pan-
islamists probably proceeded from the assumption that
the present Yugoslavia, as it is today, would not last
long; that in the expected disintegration it is necessary
tu get organized, have a programme that will meet with
the support of some foreign circles and centres that set
for themselves the task of spreading the lslamic
revolution" (bold is added)
(Dr Nijaz Durakovic, Controversies of the National and the
Nationalist, Zenica, 1987, pp.158-165. (Annex No RI. pp. rl-
r5Ir6-r9).
2.1.1.4. The Respondent quotes below the parts of
conversations between Adil ZulfikarpaSic, Milovan Djilas
(Yugoslav politician, publicist and write- Respondent's remark).
and Nadeida Gace (Yugoslav journalist - Respondent's remark)
published in the book entitled "Bosniac Adil ZulfikarpaSic". The
book was published by the Bosniac lnstitute in Zurich in 1994.
The lnstitute is headed by Mr Adil ZulfikarpaSic. ln paragraph
2.3.1.18, p. 120 of the Counter-Memorial, the Respondent set
forth the text of the Agreement about the relations between the
Serb and the Muslim Peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina
proposed by Adil ZulfikarpaSic, as the President of the Muslim
13Bosniac Organization and Radovan Karadiic, as the President
of the Serb Democratic Party, that, unfortunately, was not
accepted by the radical Muslim group that led the Party of
Democratic Action. Adil ZulfikarpaSic cornes from an old Muslim
aristocratic family in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the Second
World War he left Yugoslavia and lives in Zurich, where he
founded the Bosniac lnstitute of which he is the head. In the
text below, Adil ZulfikarpaSic, who is one of the founders of the
Party of Democratic Action, together with Alija Izebegovic,
explains the reasons for breaking up the alliance with
Izetbegovic and for founding a new party, the Muslim Bosniac
Organization:
"Zulfikarpas'ic': Atthe oufset of the Party's
activities the press noted that there exists a liberal
group headed by me, which was correct and that, on
the other side, there is a religiously-minded group. My
intention was to found a middle-class, liberal
organization open to a/k a party that will not allow faith
to be exploited for po/itica/ purposes, in particular not to
be abused; to leave the khojas to their relgious duties
rather than push them to political tasks. They can be
members of the party like everybody else, but fo be
officiais, organizers, to be responsible for organizing
gatherings, it simply isn't done. / was against from the
very beginning, while Alva Izebegovic kept telling me -
Careful, Adil, Behmen (Adil ZulfiarpaSic has in rnind
Omer Behmen, Uce-President of the Party of
Democratic Action and one of its founders referred to in
para 2.8.7.2., p. 734-738 of the Counter-Memorial -
Respondent's remarkj is a man who is in direct contact
with fie hundred imams; they are going to play a major
role inorganizlig our party, they will be helpful. When we arrived in Novi ~aza?, a large crowd
of people met us; the authorities were correct, the police
as well. They met people al1 the way, from Sarajevo to
Novi Pazar. Everything was organ~zed; we were
welcomed in the streets with banners, Patrol cars saw
to the arrangements so that everything goes smoothly,
without any incident. When we came to the town, the
police withdrew from the streets - everywhere were only
PDA (Party of Democratic Action - Respondent's
remark)guards with badges showing the way and where
to make a turn. 1 came, together with AlQa lzebegovic
and some other people, to the house of Sulejman
Ugl/anin (Referred to in para 2. 73.3.7 p. 783 of the
Counter-Memorial - Respondent's remark); then
something happened at that meeting which rather
surprised me,
The meeting was organized in a fascist-like
manner. There was one Fahira Fejzic, a young divorcee,
formerly an announcer on the radio or television. She
went to Zagreb, to that ~abic. She used to Wear mini
skirts in the past, had modern hair-style and then,
suddenly, she put a scarf on her head, some
extraagant unidentifiable women3 uniform, with three
shawls of various colours - green, blue, red. But she
looked well, read very correctly at these gatherings our
proclamation and our Resolution about the Founding
Assembly. Al1 of a sudden a group of five people sat
down next to each other and chanted: - Alga, Yatherof
homeland: fghter for lslm, was in prison, did this and
that, our only leader ...And then religious banners,
hundreds of banners, fiuttering over the stadium. This
was something new, unexpected. 1realized that this was
the doing of that young cengic (Adil ZulfikarpaSic has in
-
A town in the territory of the Republic of Serbia, in the region of RaSka
(Sandiak) with the minority Muslirn population.
15 mind Hasan ~engic (Respondent's remark), one of the
founders of the Parfy of Democratic Action, suspected of
having been involved in the illegal supply of arms;
referred to in para 2.8.1.2., p. 138 of the Counter-
Mernorial), who is a right-winger in a way and who
organized al1 this. 1 thought that those were children's
diseases of a political party that should not be paid
attention. At that time the question of Bosniac orientation
was already on the agenda.
They Refused Bosniac Orientation
Prof: Mujagic of the University of Banja ~uk$
made a speech. He began by praising the Bosniac
concept as our national orientation.lzetbegovic sat next
to me. At one moment he said: 'You have a hand in
this. You taught him this'1laughed it off and said: 'You
are talking nonsense:
He said: 'God forgive me, but lI/n afraid we've
come to a parting of the ways! As soon as we arrived
in Sarajevo 1 asked for an explanation. He apologized
saying that he did not mean what he said. Then 1
warned him that the meeting was a fascist gathering;
what was the purpose of singing praises, of al1 that talk
about the father of the homelan& what kind of
personality cult is being created. He said that this was
indeed a big mistake, that he had no idea about it; that
al1 this was the doing of Hasan ~engic and Omer
Behrnen and that it would not happen again. 1paid no
attention to such things; however, 1learned subsequently
from Kasim Zoranic, in whose house things were
discussed and agreed upon (when we parted Company,
he remained on my side), that a coup had been
Administrative centre of the Republic of Srpska situated in north-western
Bosnia.
16planned against me with a view tu ensuring Ah/a
lzetbegovic's prominence in the party at my expense. 1
didn't even notice it because 1 didn't attach importance
tu it.
There was a liberal group gathered around me,
which, amng others, included Prof: Muhamed Filipovie,
Prof: Fehim Nametaù, then Prof Lamija Hadiiosmanovié,
Prof. Salih Bureù, Prof Hamza Mujagic, Prof: Kemo
Sokolija and many other Muslim liberal intellectuals who
supported a modern party. Whenever 1 attended the
meetings of the Main Board of the Party of Democratic
Action, there was always full identity of views and
opinions between us. Then 1 began tu receive
information that they were holding secret meetings - one
group of those Young Muslims, the brothers Behmen
and a clerical group that determines the course of action
of the party at these meetings. 1 also realired that the
party was rapidly heading in the direction of
fundamentall;sm and of the use of faith for political
purposes. Unexpectedly, green banners cropped up at
our gatherings. Everywhere twenty or thirty green
banners, people fluttering them; then speeches are
made in which the suras from the Koran are cited no
less than ten minutes. Also, wherever they went, there
was a large number of imams who were allegedly our
hosts, the people who organked it al/.
Su, it was a personnel recruifment board of a
sort, whose policy was that exclusively religious
functionaries and imams are eligible for membership. 1
demanded that these banners be removed on a number
of occasions. People in garments such as galabi and
caftans, never ever worn in Bosnia before by anyone on
any occasion, began tu appear. 1realized that they were
provocateurs. For example, suddenly 1 noticed the flags
of Saud Arabia, Arab garments, things that have
17nothing tu do with Bosnia. If is then quite normal that
Belgrade journalists 'rushed' towards that group of
people and took shots of them.
At that time 1 had planned and made
arrangements for Suares and the President of the
Liberal Party of Germany, Count Lambsdort fo visit
Sarajevo; also planned was the visit of a group of
bankers from Switzerland and a group of liberals from
France. A number of other leading European liberal
politicians were also tu corne. When 1saw these flags 1
cancelled al1 these arrangements. We had meetings of
the PDA with attendances of fifty to one hundred
thousand, but 1 thought: if 1 bring these people they will
be asfonished tu see hundreds of green banners; the
sight looks like some movement in northern Egypt or in
Algeria, like a religious manifestation. Things really
began tu take the shape of extremism. (bold is added)
The following day we had a meeting in Kladusa.
This was the largest meeting 1ever saw and attended in
my life. lt was claimed that three hundred thousand
people were present; some Say less than that, but to
me it was something unprecedented 1 attended large
gatherings in ltaly at which the questions of republic or
monarchy were discussed, there were large crowds of
people in Piazza Popolo square; 1 was at large 7205
gatherings in Belgrade, but 1never ever saw a gathering
like this one before. When the people were breathing
the sound was as if a tank were roaring. There were
slogans, green banners, shouting, posters: 'We are
going tu kill Vuk!' (Reference is made tu Vuk DraSkovié,
a Yugoslav writer and leader of the parfy of the Serbian
Renewal Movemenf - Respondents remark), ong Live
Saddam Husein!' Which Saddam Husein? The pictures
of Saddam Husein, some robes, hundreds of green
banners. lt was the first time that Fikret Abdié (Founder
18 of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, referred
to in para. 2.20. 7.3, p.243 of the Counter-Memorial -
Respondents remark) spoke at our meeting and
announced that he would join the PDA.
Delirium in ~ladu~a~ - Parting of the Ways
1 was to be the last speaker so fhat the meeting
would have been concluded with my speech. 1 was
astounded by the behaviour of the crowd People
screamed, clattered, became delirious after the speech
of a crazy professor from Cazin4. 1 thoughf to myseli?
this is not what 1 want, 1cannot end up in such a party.
A man like mysel( who always fought for the choice by
the individual, for respect for the human person. Deep
down 1felf that this was not my par& that this was not
what 1 stood for,. that this was not what will help rny
people tread down the right path. And 1 made my
decision then and there: either 171 get the party
transformed into a middle-class, democratic and liberal
one or /YIquit.
lt was rather late; the elections were ahead of
us, but it was of no relevance to me. lt was a difficult
decision. 1 intended to ask about a dozen people who
were politically experienced for advice. 1 remember,
Djido (Adil Zulfikarpa2ic has in mind Milovan Djilas -
Respondents remark), that 1 came to Belgrade and
asked you for your opinion which 1 h@h& appreciated.
You told me to think twice. You did not recommend that
1 leave the PDA. And al1 that you had said was well
considered, but it was quite clear to me: if 1go there, 1
will be in the minority; 1 simp& could no longer identify
mysel( physically or mental&, with a party that has
A town in north-western Bosnia
A town in western Bosniabecome conservative, religious, a parfy for the masses,
in which a small number of hackneyed slogans, religious
and nationalist, attempted tu mobilize masses sureh
expecting renewal, some changes, but perhaps
harbourhg illusions about becoming masters of Bosnia.
And on top of it al/, these people! Plots and schemes.
Lies and intrigues. lmposing of members of family,
ignorance.
When 1 returned tu Sarajevu, lzetbegovie noticed
that 1 dissociated myself and asked me for a talk at
which he confirmed the agreement reached by the top
leadership about my candidature for the presldenf, Le.
head of state; that 1 would organize the government and
the state and he would take care exclusively of party
matters, su that these duties would be separated
However, al1 this was irrelevant tu me. 1 did not believe
him any more because 1 had the previous experience
with a number of cases where he said or claimed one
thing, swore that it was the truth, and then did another.
The people making up the Main Board, with the
exception of one or two, were complete amateurs, who
had no idea of politics or the history of our country; who
had a strange outlook on the world, outlining prospects
in a curious way, making calculations. lt was obvious
that theae people were surprised at the success of the
party and already saw themselves as prime ministers,
ministers, as this or that.
Bosnia Cried That Night
Consequently, 1 scheduled a press conference in
Sarajevo Holiday Inn hotel at which 1 explained the
reasons for my split up with the fundamentalist faction
lzetbegovic-Behmen. 1 must admit that 1 did not intend
to make war with lzetbegovic. 1 thought that we were
20going to part ways, that one segment of the party would
follow him and the rest will follow me.
MBO (Muslim Bosniac Organ~zation -
Respondents remark) - The Right to a Different Opinion
Nadeida: You founded the MBO. As far as 1
know, that party was well received in some intellectual
circles in Bosnia, although there were objections and
discussions with regard to itsname. Why MBO, why not
on& the Bosniac Organkation, etc, Then you changed
ifs name, after al, lt is no longer MBO, but LBO -
Liberal Bosniac Organkation. 1sthat correct?
ZulfikarpaSic: No, the name has not been
changed This was left to be tested in practice and
discussed at the first congress. 1 consider that the
question of Bosniac orientation is the question of the
Bosnian Muslims, while the Catholics nationally declared
themselves as Croats and the members of the Orthodox
Church nationally declared themselves as Serbs. The
intellectuals who objected to the adjective 'Muslim' could
well have founded Serb and Croat Bosniac parties.
Since they did not do so, it so happened that a group
of Serbs and Croats came to me expressing the wish
that the name of the party be changed. 1said to them -
Excellent, why don? you found a Bosniac democratic or
liberal organization, you, this group of yours, then we
will unite; you Say that you have many followers, why
don Yyou found if? None of them did it. Consequently, it
was more or less an excuse, but the fact is that we
managed to found a liberal party Desimir ToSic, (former
politicalm~gre,now member of the Democratic Party of
Serbia - Respondent's remarkj who happened to be in
Sarajevo, attended the congress establishing it. He said
in Belgrade later on that he had attended for the first
time a genuine democratic manifestation, characterized
21by free discussion and at a dignified level. The fact is
that we attracted the majority of the Bosnian
intelligentsia; however, the intelligentsia is noterous
among our people. The masses, half-literate people,
mostly supported the policy of Alya lzetbegovic, so that
we remained a small, elitist political party.
We had our own newspaper. 1 started publishing
again the newspaper Bosanski pogledi' (Bosnian
views?. / had a lot of difficulties, as you know; 1did not
want to control it as a matter of principle. The
newspaper often expressed views which were different
from my own. / tolerated this;/ was a man who funded
and helped his own opposition in his own partj
publishing the newspaper more often than not critic~zing
my own policy and refusing tu support some of my
actions initiated at the time. Despite al1 this, if was the
best newspaper in Bosnia.
The fact is that the MBO managed to attract the
Bosnian intelligentsia; this fact had both negative and
positive aspects. The negative aspect is that the offcial
institutions of the authorities were bad, that the PDA
candidates in Parliament were at a low political and
moral level. The various presidents of municipaities,
deputies in the municipal assemblies throughout Bosnia
were often very shady people, incapable, speculators,
black-marketeers, careerists. Thus the structure of the
local and republic institutions suffered because the
intelligentsia remained outside the PDA and mostly
joined our party Opportunism took its toll, and this
changed. We led the opposition. While 1 was still in the
PDA, Mirko Pejanovic came up with the idea to create a
coalifon of the parties which support a sovereign
Bosnia, life together, democracy and which could
prevent possible excesses. 1 received him, together with
lzetbegovic, and we accepfed his proposal.
22 After the split in the PDA, lzetbegoviégave if up
and a coalltlon was made between PDA, SDP and CD#
(KQuiZ, Karadyic and lztebegovié). Karadiic' and K/iuiC
claimed that they requested that the MBO join their
political alliance, butetbegovié vetoed it. Had the MBO
been acquainted with the principles on which fhelr
agreement was base4 1 doubt it would have wished tu
enter such a coalition at al/. The more su, as it was
made without any political agreement that could be
made pubitc. At the beginning 1 had hopes that a
serious agreement is involved, which was acceptable tu
me, because the creatio17of a coalition of Serbs, Croats
and Muslims was in Bosnia 's favour.
1 thought at the time that it was a po/itical
success for them, that a step forward was made,
although 1 knew their structures and level and had my
doubts. However, if soon turned out that the only point
they had agreed about was to defeat the communists
together, to vote one another's candidates, so that Serbs
would vote Muslims and Croats in the Presidency, the
Muslims would vote Serb and Croat candidates and vice
versa. This was an agreement on power-sharing and
nothing else."
(Milovan Djilas, Nadeida Gace, "Bosniac Adil ZulfikarpaSic",
Bosniac Institute, Zurich,1994, Annex No R2, pp. r10-r18Jr19-
r24....).
2.1.1.5. Former Ambassador of the FR of Germany to Egypt
Mr. Heinz Fiedler, in an Article published in the German
monthly journal "Aussenpolitrik, issue No. 1/97, also pointed to
the existence of extremist lslamic elements in BiH in the
context of the threat presented by the so-called permanent
lslamic revolution to the non-lslamic surrounding and Europe. In
23this respect, the author ponted out inparcticular the activities in
Lebanon (Hizbollah), in the Palestinian areas (Hamas), in the
Sudan, in some Gulf States, and in Bosnia.
2.1.2. The Rejection ofAll Offers for Peaceful Reorganization of
BiH in accordance with the Right to Self-Determination, by the
SDA Leadership Confirmed the Policy Aiming at the Destruction
of Serbs as a Group
2.1.2.1. There exist convincing facts which demonstrate that the
radical lslamic group leading the PDA conducted a policy
aiming at the destruction of Serbs as a group. The following
facts illustrate this: in the course of 1991 and 1992 Alija
lzetbegovic rejected al1 attempts aimed at bringing about a
peaceful solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even those
proposed by the Muslim side. The radical lslamic group
proceeded to the organization of its paramilitary formations. The
members of this group committed acts of incitement to
genocide. During the civil war this group began forcible
lslamization of parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina which were
under its control.
2.1.2.2. In Iiis discussions with Milovan Djilas and NadeZda
Gace published in the previously mentioned book "Bosniac Adil
ZulfikarpaSiC",its author Adil ZulfikarpaSic describes in detail the
attempt to reach historical agreement between Serbs and
Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an attempt initiated by
himself but which failed because of the opposition of Alija
Izetbegovic. In view of the importance of this statement of Adil
ZulfikarpaSic it is carried here in extenso:
"HISTORICAL AGREEMENT
Nadeida: ln a complex and tense atmosphere in
Bosnia, at the beginning or'May you brought up the
idea of atternpting tumake agreement with Serbs su as
24to avert al1 that which happened in Bosnia later on. lt
was based precisely on the fact that you were well
aware of the situation inside Bosnia; that you knew that
the arming of the people was underway; that you were
divided between yourselves and that there was a
general distrust, indeed that there was fvar; that
because of fear you were within an ace of open conflict.
Zulularpas'/c: Well, even now 1firmly believe and
think that at that moment my agreement was the only
alternative to madness and evil and to that road which,
although perfidiously, led so unmistakably towards ethnic
and religious conflicts in Bosnia. 1 think that ln Bosnia
one must never ever play with the honour and interests
of onek neighbour. You must not offend him, you must
not ridicule or abuse bis situation. lt's an unwritten law
in Bosnia. Another unwritten law is: you must not offend
anyone's religious feelings. This is instilled deep down
even in those who are non-believers. Criticism on the
part of those of a different faith is not tolerated in
Bosnia. A Muslim non-believer, who may even be an
atheist, will be offended if a Catholic or a member of
the Orthodox Church critic~zes or derides Islam. The
same is true of Catholicism and Orthodoxy. Nobody in
Bosnia plays with these things.
lt is interesting that al1nationalist parties strongly
insisted on firrn links with their respective confessions. lt
was to be expected that they would careful/v cherish
religious feelings-the opposite happened. That is why 1
always strongly reacted whenever 1 felt that any of my
Bosniacs used abusive language about our neighbours
Croats, Serbs, that is, Catholics and Orthodox
Christi. Besides, as a liberal and a man who was
brought up in this environment, / had sympathies for my
neighbours, true sympathies. / do not conceal this. As
soon as / reached agreement, 1 spoke in a number of
25places saying that Croats are our natural allies. Croats
are a minority in Bosnia. They are the most vulnerable;
they emigrate more than any other segment of the
population; they leave the country in larger numbers
than any other people; they change occupation most
frequently,' they tend to rebuild their life mostly in
Europe and, by the nature of things, are looking for
support by Bosniacs. Furthermore, there are a number
of historical moments in which we had worked together
and shown sympathies for one another. Thirdly, 1do not
know two peoples in Europe, so similar by their
mentality but psychologically so divided, which hate and
kill one another as Serbs and Croats do. These are two
aggressive Balkan nationalisms that have been opposed
to each other a hundred years. And this, l'm not going
to say hatred, but this aversion to each other has very
deep, intertwined and complex reasons, from
irrationalism and everyday reality up to fantasy. lt is not
possible to /ive in a multi-national and multi-cultural
country and underestimate this fact at the same time. 1
considered that Croats can assume a constructive
attitude towards Bosnia if they feel that they are safe in
Bosnia. The more so, as in some thinly populated Croat
areas, karstic areas, Croats have an absolute majoriv
and it is easy for them to separate from Bosnia, in
particular in Western Herzegovina. 1 considered that our
partiality for them should be a genuine support so they
should not feel threatened in Bosnia. 1 considered that
in a future Parliament we were going to act often
together, that we should have an al& in them and vice
versa. Al1 this, but not that we should create a front
against Serbs. ln view of the fact that we were, 1 am
convinced, a little more democratic in this, more flexible,
1 tried to get the Bosniacs shape their attitude towards
Serbs so it should not go beyond the critical point at
which it is possible to offend the other side and arouse
a feeling of endangermenf. From our point of view it is
26not dangerous for our survival if Croats feel threatened
although it is not politically opportune and wise. But it is
vital4 dangerous for us if Serbs feel threatened and if
Serbs feel that there can be no life together, 1cherished
a number of inclinations towards Croats that 1 did not try
to conceal. 1 spoke about this at various gatherings. 1
had contacts with Croat political structures both in
Zagreb and in Bosnia. My attitude towards them was
very sincere and cordial. At the same time 1 fostered
with much attention similar contacts both with Serbs and
with Belgrade because 1 respected the fact that we live
together.
Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs Together
The problem of Yugoslavia was the problem of
life together - life together between Serbs and Croats
and, in our case, life together Setween Serbs, Croats
and Bosniacs.
Consequently, we had to be of necessity for 1i.e
together, we had no other alternative, Therefore, it is my
firm conviction - 1 reiterated this a hundred times - that,
if we start something here and if we begin to fight here,
there will be a terrible bloodshed; but one day, those of
us who survive, the few remaining alive will have to sit
down and talk about how to live together, after al/. 1
never believed that Bosnia could be divided, that Bosnia
could be dismembered and that this could happen on
the basis of a deal...
When the war broke out in Croatia, Croatia's
policy and Croatian polificians attempted in al1 possible
ways to get Bosnia involved in that conflict in order to
ease up their fightings with Serbs, to acquire an ally.
However, the policy was, not only mine but also that of
Ahja IzetbegoviZ, not tu entangle Bosnia in the conflict
27between Serbs and Croats. However, when it happened,
the danger of Bosnia's being involved in the war was
quite obvious and it was not possible to close one's
eyes before these facts, / said that we had tried to ease
it up and tu initiate some kind of dialogue. But these
attempts fell on deaf ears as far as the three political
parties are concerne& they remained closed in a dark
space, where everybody was singing bis own song and
telling bis own story, but no one was listening to anyone'
else nor was willing to. / realized that the situation is
indeed dramatic and extremsly dangerous and that it
was rapidly worsening. The question of arms came on
the agenda, the question of endangerment, throughout
that time we were attempting tu convince each other as
tu who is more threatened. Serbs considered themselves
threatened, putting forward some examples that were
mainly fabricated However, this is irrelevant in political
reasoning. That subjective feeling is one of the dominant
feelings because it makes up the basis of the politcal
position and the direction in which a certain collectivity
is moving.
/ wish tu emphas~zeonce again: by my political
conviction, national sentiment by al1 motives of my
activity and public work, / was absolutely in favour of
finding so/ufions for a life together. When / realized that
we were on the brink of catastrophe 1 conducted talks
with Karad2iG Koljevië, Kljuié ... On the basis of these
talks 1 concluded that the intentions of the individuals
are no longer important. They began tu heap reproaches
and insinuations upon each other. There was a feeling
of disquiet. / remember meeting Karadiic' once. He told
me that he had information that weapons were being
distributee he mentioned the places where this was
being done, also claiming that there existed arms
depots. As / assessed the situation at the time and as
far as / was informed, this was not true, but it was
28important for me that he had such information and that
he believed it to be correct...
..Once again 1 wish to reiterate that my conviction was
that this was going to be the conflict between Bosniacs
and Serbs. / gave a lot of thinking to it; how and is it
possible at al/ to prevent the conflct.
How to Prevent the Conflict
1 went to visit Ahja lzetbegovic, talked with him,
asking him openly whether he was aware that we were
heading for an open conflict with Serbs. He said that he
was. Then / asked him whether he had any guarantees
from a world power - 1 had in mind the United Nations,
NATO or the United States - from someone who is
capable of honouring those guarantees and prevent
conflits. 1 asked him whether someone was going to
defend us, He said that there were no such guarantees.
/ asked whether he had some deal with the Army,
because he told me that he was on good terms with
Kadgevic; that he had contacts with the Army, that he
meets them. His answer was again in the negative. He
said that he had no concrete agreements with the Army.
Djilas; He gave a statement at the time: 'i
believe the generals. '
ZulfikarpaSlc: That's what he said, that we
believe the Army, that it will not allow conflicts. 1
reminded him of that statement and he answered that
this was better than the ~etniks. 1 said A// right, but we
are heading for a confict! He answered.' Well, do you
know something? Why don 'tyou do something?" - 'What
can 1 possibly do?'- 'You can talk' - he says - 'i must
not do that: On one occasion he gave the known statement
that Yugoslavia would be organized as a smaller
Federation consisting of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia
and Macedonia, and a broader one consisting also of
other countries. The reaction was extremely negative,
first by the Muslims, then the reaction of his own party
and in Bosnia in general. So that he immediately
withdrew it publicW. The next day there were graffiti in
the streets that he is a Serb, that he is a lackey, etc.
The PDA thought at the time that my party had
organized that campaign against him, but we had
nothing to do wlth it.
From my point of view this was an imprudent
move. He tried to present Bosnia as a gift to Serbia
and Montenegro, distancing himself from bis natural
allies Slovenla and Croatia; in fact, they had no idea of
what that Federation was going to look like nor what its
powers were going to be. That is not the way to do
things in politics. That policy was erroneous, and 1 am
still of the same opinion.
He continued: - 'You saw how people reacted
when 1 tried to get closer to Serbs. This will not be
accepted.' l said to him:- 'Look, could we do something
together, what do you think?' He said there is a chance
in that case. - But 1 cannot talk to Serbs, they do not
believe me! He was aware of that. / said: - HI1right,
lIm going to talk to Serbs! / consider that we must
demand much more than a rump Federation; that the
minimum that we should ask for is equal status for
Bosnia vis-a-vis Serbia and Croatia. At that time Serbia
had already created a structure that already had al1 the
elements of an autonomous state - it had the ministry of
foreign affairs; their Parliament promulgated laws related
to questions that were within the cornpetence of the
Federal governrnent, questions related to customs
30procedures and a number of other fields. 1 drew
lzetbegovic's attention to this. He said: - '/can ~"lrdly
believe that we could succeed under these
circumstances, but please try:
lt was in the evening, 1 do not remember the
exact date, but it was on 13 or 14 July 7991. 1got out
of his office, went home and gave a ring to ihe Wce-
President of my paa Prof. Filipovi?, who was a deputy
of MBO in Parliament. 1briefly explained the situation to
him. He immediately took the same position. 1 said to
him: - 'i spoke with Alga. He asked me to try to do
something. What about proposing an agreement
acceptable to Bosnia and Bosniacs, what do you think?
First, Bosnia with a status equal to that of Serbia and
Croatia; Bosnia as a sovereign and autonomous state,
indivisible and without ethnically-based cantons. '
At that time Serbs had already divided Bosnla
into cantons. The idea they had in mind was to unite
with Krajina and also annex some areas to Montenegro,
so that Bosnia be disintegrated. Filipovic answered: 'i
consider that this is necessary. ' 1 said - 'Look, will you
please do it (after a//, he lived in Sarajevo al1 the time).
Give a ring to Karadiic' and ask for an urgent meeting
with him, with Koljevic and Krajidnik:
After an hour he called me back and said that
he had found Karadiic' and that he was going on a trip,
so he could see us only in three days. 1 told him that
this was too late and that we must resolve this
immediately. Then 1 rang Karadiic' persona/@ and said
'Look, we must see each other at once. The matter is
very serious' He said that he had already made an
appointment and that he must go. 1 said: - 'î think that
this is a matter of the utmost urgency. lt cannot be
delayed:
31 1 told him that /, too, had a number of
appointments made and already had bought a ticket for
a trip abroad Then he said - Al1 right, but let me first
speak with Koljeviéand Krajlsnik, '
In half an hour he rang me back and said: - Al1
right. We will be waiting for you tomorrow morning at
half past seven, in the Presidency, in Koljevic's offic'.
1 went with Fil~povic.1 said that 1 consider that
we should talk with them openly; that we should indeed
say what we think; that this is a historical moment,; the
more so, since Ah/a lzetbegovié and the PDA are
behind it and since he asked us to do this. 1 said to
Fil~ipovié:- 'Please, sfick to what we agreed while
explaining your views, so there would be no
misunderstandings between us!
The Morning of Agreement
When we entered Koljevié's office, Krajignik and
Koljevic were Sitting there. They were a little nervous
and this showed, but they were very correct. As we
were inquiring about each other's health Karadilc
arrived Speaking in the tradifional Montenegrin way he
said - 'What's up? What business brings you here?' 1
said - 'We decided to speak with you openly, to make
a proposal. We will explain the hits beyond which we
cannot go under any circumstances and after discussion
we will part as friends or as opponents. We are ready
to talk about any point in which concessions are
possible, but we wish to set forth some matters that we
cannot accept and we would like you to set out things
that are unacceptable to you. Before we proceed, 1
would like to ask a few questions. Are you aware that
32we are faced with a war and a conflict?' Jhey
answered, so to speak, /i7 unison: -'lndeed,we are' - Hre
you aware that what is involved here is a conflict
between Bosniacs and Serbs?' Jhey said: -'Yes, brother,
but a// that you proposed is against us. '
- 7sit clear to you' - 1continued - 'that it is high
time, that it is the eleventh hour?' And Koljevic retorted:
- '1think that it is too late'
/ first explained things that we cannot accept. /
said that we had evidence, which was made available to
me for ins~ght, namely about their talks with MiloSevic.
ln short, every point that / put forward was based on
that evidence. 1 said: - 'Listen, we cannot accept the
division of Bosnia, some regions, we cannot accept
Bosnia's role to be inferior to that of the other republics.
We are offering you an agreement and we wish to /ive
together in a joint state, together with Montenegro,
Serbia, Croatia, wwithal1 the existing SIX republics. We
will be advocates of this and if there are those who do
not wish tu /ive together with us, there are ways and
means to carry out secession.
We explained our principles and then there was
~scussion, Krajisnik said that it was too late; that he
welcomes this rapprochement, but that they cannot
renounce regions because it went too far. / reacted very
briefly:- 'ln that case, there is nothing to talk about; we
insist on this. Any division into regions will give rise to
conflicts; and this cannot happen in a peaceful way; if
cannot happen without engendering hostiiities. We have
come to reach an historical agreement so as to avert
these conflicts..'
ln my introductory remarks, 1 ought to mention
this, 1said that, in my opinion, the situation between us
33is clear, that there is no village in Bosnia that is
controversiac that it is known what is Serb, what is
Bosniac, what is Croat; that these conflcts of ours are
rather of an irrational and not of a real character. We
missed the chance to set the record straight after the
departure of Austria, that is, after the collapse of Turkey,
when the first Yugos/avia was created and we must not
miss this opportunity. We must make things clear, we
must roll up sleeves and work together towards the
creation of a Bosnia acceptable to al/.
Then they mentioned Krajina in Croatia and thaf
they were already negotiafing with Croats. 1 answered
that it is the sarne case with Sandiak..
Bosnia's Borders Cannot Be Changed
- Sandiak is a part of Bosnia; Bosniacs live in
Sandiak, but we are not raising the question of borders,
Nothing can be added to Bosnia and Herzegovina but
nothing can be taken from it either. Before explaining
these details, 1 said - 'Please, let's make it clear, a//
that we are talking about goes for Bosniacs and Serbs,
but also for Croats as if they were also present here.
They are a constitutive people in Bosnia. '1 must admit
that not for one moment did they hesitate to Say: - 'Of
course, we consider that Croats as a constitutive people
in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be called in question
in any way:
lt came out from our discussion that Koljevic and
KaradZic agreed with the postponement of the creation
of regions and that they accepted our position that we
could not but remain a joint state, Bosnia and
Herzegovina. We insisted that they, too, should accept
that Bosnia is an independent and sovere~gnstate. They
said they could accept this only if it remained within the
34 Yugoslav commun state. We reiterated that we consider
that the status of Bosnia must be equal to that of
Croatia and Serbia and that our starting point is the
community of six equal republics.
At the meeting someone from the Serb side
said that if is possible tu allow the separation of
Western Herzegovlha. 1refused this with the explanation
that we must take the position that the borders of
Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be changed and that
we must stand ready tu fght for these borders. 1
supported this view with the following words: - 'If you
want Krajina, we want Sandiak! But let's not complicate
things; you will solve the question of Krajina in
negotiations between Serbia and Croatia, and perhaps in
negotiations among al1of us' - 7hey said that they were
preparing unification with Croatian Krajina and its
annexation tu Bosnia, thus confirming the information 1
had. 1rose up against it immediately and said that this
was out of the question.
lt was obvious that they had Great Serbia in
mind but were hidng it. Uowever, 1 continued. - Look,
as far as the language is concerned, this is the Bosniac
language for us. ln any case we cannot tolerate it any
more because of the hegemonistic Great-Serbian and
Great-Croatian influences and regulations that this
language be called Serbo-Croatian. You may cal1 it
Serbian but tu us ifis Bosnlac.'
lt was clear tu Serbs that we will do everything
in our power to articulate our national feelings through
the Bosniac orientation. 1 do not remember exactly
whether it was Koljevic or Krajiinik, who insisted that
after our meeting we should be very careful about the
way we were going tu make public the elements of our
agreement. He said that we must be careful with oursupporters.: - 'This must not look as some kind of
capitulation of one side to the other!
After that 1 proposed that there should be a
protocol to the agreement; that this protocol should not
be made public, but that it should clearly state that
Krajina cannot be annexed to Bosnia and that, inter alia,
we agreed that our language is Bosniac.
Consequently, / demanded that two documents
be drawn up - one that will be made public and embody
the princ~ples: independent Bosnia, Lfe together,
communify of peoples, and another for interna1 use, but
clear and legally binding.
Ah~aWill Deceive You
They agreed. / immediately raised the question
of MiloSevic's position, because 1 knew about their
liaising with MiIoSevic. / said: - '/ wish to meet with
Milogevie immediately and to discuss this matter with
him. 'Karad2icgot up and called MiIoSevieby phone. He
told him that / was with them at that very moment and
that we had proposed an historical agreement to them;
he mentioned the three points: - 'We are of the opinion
that thk is good and is worth thinking about!
Then he turned to me and said: - 'MiloSevic
expects you. You may corne whenever you wish;
tomorrow if it is convenient to you. ' - Then we
discussed it, whether 1 should go immediately by plane.
1 said that 1 would go tomorrow, They immediately
offered help, began to talk, the atmosphere change& 1
wouldn? say it was a friendly one, but the tension
eased Al1 of a sudden a normal atmosphere was
created between us; they began to talk about the
difficulties they had or still have.
36 They asked me if AlJa knew about this visit. 1
said that 1 was speaking also on lzetbegovicls behalf: /
invited them to go together to lzetbegovic, so that he
would confirm this, because we were in the Presidency
buildng and bis office was, so to speak, next door. /
telephoned AlJa and he invited us. We went to bis office
imrnediately. 1explained briefy what we had agreed on.
He agreed with everything and asked Koljevic and
Fihpovic 'to put it on paper! He said that he was
leaving for America tomorrow and that upon return from
America he would sign it.
The atmosphere between them was very
unpleasant and strange to me. When he said aloud: - '!
will sign this when / corne back frorn Arnerica: Koljevic
turned to me and said: - 'He is going to let us down. '
lt was strange that he should Say this aloud to a
colleague, the President of the Republic, that he was
lyng and that he was going to let us down. As 1 acted
as chairman of the conference 1 got up and said: -
'Nikola,please, how can you Say that!'
Knowing that Ah/a is in the habit of changing bis
mind, 1 nevertheless thought that he would not do it at
this historical moment because he personally asked me
to negotiate - that bis changing his rnind was out of the
question.
Then there was argument about the trip. Koljevic
told him that it was he, and not lzetbegovic, who is in
charge of foreign policy in the Presidency: - 'How corne
you are going to America, and / don7 know even why
you are going or who you are going to meet with?' A quarrel broke out, 1 interrupted them and said:
- 'Look, this is extremely important and please have
your accounts settled on some other occasion. This is a
very serious matter: - We concluded the meeting and
lzetbegovic fully accepted what we had agreed with the
Serb side. That evening Koljevic had an interview on TV
with Dubravka KeniC. He mentioned the agreement by
saying: - 'Today 1 telephoned my wife and it is the first
time after several months that 1 am going with my mind
at ease because we did a great job: He said that he
had met with the Muslim leaders - :..with whom we
made an agreement on how best to solve the question
of Bosnia. There is no danger any more that we could
start fighting with our neighbours:
The news made a sensation in Bosnia.
Everybody was wondering who were those Bosnian
leaders they had met with. There was discussion and
already the next day there were rumours that an
agreement had been arrived at, that it was reached
between ZulfikarpaSic and Karad* that is, between
Muslms and Serbs.
When lzetbegovié came back from America the
journalists asked him: - 'Do you know about the
agreement?" - He openly answered: - 'Yes, MBO and
ZulfikarpaSic are negotiating also in rny name. That is al/
in agreement with us:
Open Talks with MiloSevic
Before 1 visited MiIoSevie, 1 had already
expressed a criticalview of him in a number of
interviews. 1one interview 1said that he is unreliable as
a partner and condemned his Great-Serbian policj hi.
tendency of having Bosnia divided, etc. Despite this, the
reception was friendly, he was very thoughtful, he said
38he knew al1about me and that he followed my arriva/ in
the country. We talked for about two hours, tete-a-tete. 1
told him that our partners in Bosnia - Koljevic, Karadz'ic
and KrajSnik were a bif hesitant about the question of
regions. He said that they had invented these regions
against us: - 'Novi that we are trying to bring about an
agreement, to discuss this matter is beyond the point
there are no regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
MiloSévic was very surprised that we were
offering agreement. He knew that we were not doing
this under pressure. He spoke immediately about
prospects for our economy, how we would be able to
work together. MiloSevic even proposed that the
presidents in the reformed state organisation should
assume office in alphabetical order: Bosnia, then
Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia and, finally,
Serbia: - 'We, Serbia, are sure& the last. Let the
presidency of the Republic begin in alphabetical order
and let a Bosniac be the first to hold the presidency, we
will entrust him with powers, to be the commander of
the Army, the president will have the greatest
cornpetences, 'he said.
After that 1 raised the question of Sandiak.
Milo&vic answered that we were going to solve the
question of Sandiak together in the future, but that he
is ready to accept immediately ifs cultural and
administrative autonomy. 1 told him that it is very
embarrassing for us to quarrel, but that there are
reprisals, that war is being waged with Croatia, that
Serbia was creating a conflict situation with Albanians.
He said: - 'Please negotiate with Croats, act as our
mediators, we stand ready to liquidate that war. We
cannot allow things that are happening to Serbs in
Croatia, that you yourself have seen. But we are ready
for a solution that would be in the common interest.
39Look, you can be our mediators, as MBO, and you
personally as ZulfikarpaSii.5, and lzetbegovic if he is
wili~ng to. As far as Albanians are concerned, 1 can
guarantee that we will set up a commission and
immediately send it, in agreement with you, in order to
find a reasonable solution also with Albanians,' 1 said to
him: - 'We are Bosniacs-Muslims, they are Muslims, we
are linked by religion, and we do not want you to
pursue such a repressive policy towards them!
Then 1 spoke about everything that gives rise to
conflicts, misunderstandings between us; 1 said that
Bosnia was half-occupied. He answered that from now
on we will pursue a commun policy: - 'You want to be
open with us, so /Y be quite open with you. Look, we
are ready to appoint Muslims as commanders of corps
in Banja Luka, Mostar, Sarajevo, Tuzla; there are no
problems in this respect, you may rest assured. You
may deal with problems of Bosnia the way you think is
the best. We on& wish tu help you there. You wish
those structures, we agree. We do not want to be left
out of account in Bosnia and Herzegovina but we do
want that you be equal there, there is no question about
it: MiIoSevie did not reject any of the points 1 raised as
a problem. To such an extent was he enthusiastic about
the fact that now, when he was waging war with Croatia
before the eyes of Europe, a people cornes to him
offering agreement, He did not hide that he saw
something very positive in if. He said: - 'You see, we
have averted catastrophe, and you showed us that ways
and means should be sought in order tu solve the
problems in Yugoslavia peacefully: He was a little
impatient as tu how and when the agreement should be
signed. He asked that this be not unduly delayed. He
inquired about the possibility of signing it in Sarajevo. 1
said that this should be agreed with Alga lzetbegovié
after his return from the United States.
40 1 know everything about Mil0.9eviéand 1 know
what the opposition thinks, but 1must admit that he was
equal tu the occasion, that is, tu the historical moment
and that he was prepared tu take al1concrete steps that
would completely change the atmosphere of tension. He
said tu me: - Please consider that from now on we can
solve any question together. '
When 1 spoke from Belgrade with Filipovic about
my talk with MiloSévic1did not know that this telephone
conversation was eavesdropped by the Ministry of
Interna1Affairs and immediately conveyed tu lzetbegov~c.
The PDA immediately demanded publicly that Muslims
be appointed as military comrnanders in Bosnia.
At a crossroads of peace and war
Nadeida: Could you today, fmm a three-year
distance, perceive some rational reasons for which AlJa
lzetbegovie refused your initiativefor signing 'the
historical agreement with Serbs' which would probably
have saved Bosnia from war, or, does it seem to you
that bis wrongful judgement or even personal vanity and
animosity he might have had towards you as the initiator
of the idea were behind the refusal?
ZulfikarpaSiC, When lzetbegovic returned from
America 1 met with him again and insisted that he
should go tu negotiate with MiloSeviC who had invited
him. As we began this together, 1 wanted that we
equally participate in it together until the end. And he
went tu talk with MiloSevic. When he returned, he told
me over the phone that MiloSevic had said nothing new:
- 'He promised a// these things tu me before, with minor
differences. He told me that there were things that wecannot get over so easiïy - we should meet to get this
straight.'
That evening / was scheduled to be on TV with
Ms Kenié, so 1 told him that / could not see him that
evening. Then he said: - 'Look Adil, let's see each other
in my office tomorrow morning, so we could definitively
take a joint position. We can go together to MiloSevic
again. ' 1 was a little disappointed that he said that
there were still problems that need to be discussed, that
we shouldn't act rashly. 1 said to him: - Alya, please,
the fate of the Bosniac people is at stake, the fate of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, we musn't drop the bal/ '
And there were already too many of my
interviews, / was literalïy being chased by the press;
people warned me that the PDA was very nervous
because the media put me in the lhelight instead of
AlPa, so 1 said to him: 'Look, Al&, 1 wouldnYdream of
taking your competences, if is up to you to sign. 1 am
not at al1 interested in signing this treaty, you are to
sign it as the president of the Republic' He said: 'No!
You, too, should sign it!' / retorted: 'But / not only donY
insist on it, l'm ready to leave Bosnia, return to
Switzerland, if you feel that this affects your authority in
any way. /lm not interested in either being the president
of that republic, the common state, nor am 1 interested
in being an official in Bosnia. l'm interested in bringing
about this agreement, because 1 see it as the only way
out; and 1 wish you to know that l'm ready to get out of
this at once and you should continue: He said: 'No way,
what are you talking about ..!'
The agreement met with a very positive reaction
of the public. /t was reached on time, not a drop of
blood was shed, There was no serious excess in Bosnia
yet. The process of democrat~zation was at the very
42beginning and the same was true of the country as a
whole. Possibilities for the solution of ourroblem were
still insight. The possibility of stopping the war in
Croatia was in the interest of both Serbia and Croatia.
The time that had elapsed showed that there could be
no victor nor was there a possibility of the war ending
with the capitulation of on& one side. My impression
was that Macedonia would have accepted at that
moment the solution offered by the agreement and that
it would have joined us. 1 am convinced that the
agreement which was, un fortunately, rejected would have
indeed opened the process of agreement-reaching
between Croats and Serbs. lt turned out later on that
agreement between Croats and Serbs is indeed
possible. This is, afterll, still in the hands of the same
people, Tuqman and MiloSevid. ln my judgement, any
talk about ending the war should have been extended at
that time to include clarification of Serbo-Croat problems.
At that moment 1had a vision of a confederation
or a union of states as a solution; it would have a
common currency, common finances, possibly even
different currencies but convertible; members of the
union would have their own armies and some special
joint forces vis-a-vis abroad, free flow of people and
ln this way we
goods in the area would be preserved
would avoid dismemberment, the creation of hostile
alliances.,al1 this was, ln my view, still possible. This
war that broke out bas on& shown, starting with
Slovenia 3 positions, that Yugoslavia cannot be
preserved by force, but also that it cannot be destroyed
without the use of force, therefore, 1 believed that the
road of talks would open a series of possibilities and
solutions that would suit the interests of individual
peoples and, nevertheless, make ifpossible to speed up
the process of democratization in a peaceful wax within
or outside of Yugoslavia.
43 His refusa1 was so much against the interests of
Bosniacs and Bosnia that even today it is not clear tu
me why he did it - why he broke his word and gave up.
He must have been aware of what that meant for
Bosniacs. Well, it did happen and one can only guess
with regret.
Nadeida: Frankly speaking, there were unclear
signals coming from your partx like the one that you
were freezing the agreement, What was that about?
ZulfikarpaSic: lt is interesting that the Serb side,
even when lzetbegovié abandoned the idea, did not give
up the agreement, but continued to propose to me that
we visit some places in Bosnia together. They organized
a large gathering in Trebinje, attended by several
thousand Muslims, but also by more than thirty-five
thousand Serbs and Montenegrins. lt was a large
people's get-together and festivity with music, dance.
First we had a caucus meeting of SDP representatives
and then a press conference; then we had a meeting at
the football stadium in Trebinje which - as a universiy
professor from Trebinje told me - attracted more people
than gathered during Duëic's Days of Poetry (Jovan
Duëic was a Serb poet, born in Trebinje - Respondents
remark) or a founding assembly of SDP. This was the
largest gathering Trebinje had ever seen. 1spoke at that
meeting. We agreed to hold a series of such joint
meetings. Some groups of Muslim girls sang Bosniac
love songs, singers of folk songs also took part, music
bands. lt was a meeting of Serbs and Bosniacs that
proved a great success. After that we held a very
interesting joint meeting in Zvornik at which several
thousand people were present, many, many more than
when we had the founding assembly, or when Serbs
had the founding assembly for their pan'y.
44 ln addition to myself; Burek, Wce-President of
the Liberal Bosniac Organization, also spoke; then Mujo
Kafed2ic, colonel and Wce-President of MBO, and a
number of other speakers. Himzo Tulic, engineer and
the president of MBO for Zvornik was also present. The
meeting was very important because the chief
representative of Serbs, Karadjié, said that Great Serbia
is a fine dream but one that cannot come true in
Bosnia; that Serbs should be aware of it, that real Ife is
rather differe,qt from objectives like this one. He spoke
rather reasonably that in those parts of Bosnia where
Serbs and Bosniacs /ive together, in one half of
municipallies the majoriw are Bosniacs, in the other the
majority are Serbs; that where Serbs are the majority,
Muslms should be protected,. where Bosniacs are the
majority, they should protect Serbs; that the on& future
is in a life together. And today, when some of the
visitors of the lnstitute look at the video from that
meeting, they Say that it is incredible to what extent
Serbs had indeed accepted that agreement and
abandoned the idea of Great Serbia for the sake of a
deal with Bosniacs. (bold is addedj
1 left for Zurich and it happened that the Wce-
President of my party, Muhamed Filipovic, stated at a
press conference that the agreement is frozen - he used
precisely the word 'freeze'- in order to givea chance to
the PDA to negotiate with Serbs. We had initiated that
agreement with the PDA, the PDA had accepted it and
that statement about the freezing misrepresented the
matter. 1 was immediately contacted by Belgrade. 1gave
a statement for TV News Programme broadcast /ive, in
which 1 said that we stick to the agreement. 1 called
Sarajevo and said tu Filipovic that the agreement should
not be called in question under any circumstances. The PDA indeed continued the talks but they
assumed quite another meaning. They were obviously
irrelevant for Serbs because they again fell into a
psychosis of mutual distrust, back to the atmosphere of
conflict which prevailed before the agreement. Many
Croat intellectuals condemned the agreement. 1 tried to
explain it to them when they visited me. But they
considered that Bosniacs should in no case go along
with Serbs. lt was obvious that at work was also fear
for their own position although 1 tried to assuage them
that there was nothing to worry about for Croats and
Croatia nor would we allow it.(. .)
Nadeida: The process of negotiations on the
agreement took about two months. The situation was in
a way confusing and, in the end, the document that you
drew up is al1 that's left of it, The blame for the failure
to sign the agreement may, after all, be put on Alga
lzetbegovic, You were, so to speak, lynched at the time.
Once again you were described as someone who works
against the interests of Muslims. 1 must Say that the
agreement was not met with approval by the opposition
in Belgrade either, because they thought, or at least
that's what the opposition leaders claimed, that you were
helping MiloSevic to survive. You did not meet with
understanding of the Croatian authorities and the
Croatian opposition either,' however, you told me in a
conversation later on that it took less than a month for
regions, that is, Serb cantons in Bosnia to begin to be
created again. You told me at the time that in fact
Great Serbia was let in by the side door, through
Bosnia. You warned that the failure to sign the historical
agreement was leading to bloodshed and your forecast
proved correct. Thus, in the 7960s in the 'Bosanski
pogledi' ('The Bosnian l4ews) in your first text, you
welcomed the creation of the United Nations forces with
the thesis that it is good because after the collapse of
46communism in East-European countries, you meant
above al1in Yugoslavia, religious and nationalist conflicts
are likely and you said that the blue helmets are
welcome; that they might corne h handy It looks as if
you have the ability to forecast things.ow do you feel
as a person who knows that something may happen,
invests a lot of efforttu prevent it in some wax and
then it nonetheless happens; how do you feel and how
do you view the situation at this particular moment?
Zulfikarpas'ic: That agreement stood great
chances. Even today if is not quite clear tu me how
lzetbegovic, as a Bosniac, as a Muslim, as the president
of the Republic of Bosnia, who knew how strong the
Yugoslav Army was, what is Serbia's potenfial, what was
Europe's attitude- who must have known al1 this, and if
he didn't, he must have been able tu judge it - how
could he have su rash4 refused this agreement and
how easily he broke his word, leaving me, su tu speak,
out on a limb and involving his people in a conflict.
When, after the talk, 1 appeared on TV tu
defend the agreement, saying that we were entering a
period of peaceful agreement-reacbing and prospects for
the development of the democratic process, in the
middle of the programme a fax message arrived, signed
by the Main Board of the PDA, stating: 'We are against
any idea of agreement-reaching with Serbs: This is, in
my view, a monstrous formulation, that someone should
be against the idea of agreement-reaching. Alva told me
later on that he had no idea of such a fa and asked
me to send it to him. 1 said: Flease, with due respect,
you are the president of the par& you sent it tu me
and now you are telling me that you know nothing
about it' (bold is added) After that lzetbego vic, Karadzic, Durakovie,
Kecmanovic, KJuic and 1 appeared jointly on TL/.After
the programme, Karad%, Alla and 1 came out of the
building together and talked Then KaradiiE said:
Listen, folks, don? play with this, let's try and reach
agreement!' (bold is added)
There are frequent situations in history when it is
possible to take this or that course, when you have the
chance to change the situation or remain on the wrong
track, heading for disaster. lt was clear to me that the
signing of the âgreement and its implementation would
be conducive to peaceful life and that it offered a
chance. That chance was real, it was feasible, the same
as the possibility of conflict was real and hovering over.
Well, this is were the element of political leadership
comes in, the moment when a political party and the
leaders called upon to pursue an active policy should
stand a test of maturitx perceive that historical moment,
comprehend if and do al1 in their power to prevent
catasfrophe, to find a peaceful solution. You see, such
moments do not happen often. If a certain course is
taken, then there is no return; if that is the road to
catastrophe, ifis irretrievable': (Annex No. R3, pp. r25-
r35/r36-r50..)
2.1.2.3. The next big chance for a peaceful solution in Bosnia
and Herzegovina was missed once again because of Alija
Izetbegovic's opposition, on 26 January 1992. The opportunity
presented itself at the session of the Assembly of the Socialist
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was held from 25-26
January 1992 and at which decision was to be made about the
holding of a referendum in connection with the independence of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Sarajevo daily "Oslobodjenje"
("Liberation"), which was under the control of the Muslim side,
informed of the event as follows: The referendum of the citizens of Bosnia and
Herzegovina on the future status of this Republic will be
held on 29 February and 7 March 1992. The decision
on referendum was adopted unanimously early yesterday
morning, after seventeen hours of discussion, by the
Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, but without the presence of the MPs of the
Serb Democratic Party and the Serb Renewal
Movement. Al1 the 730 present MPs voted: the MPs of
the Party of Dernocratic Action and the Croatian
Democratic Union, as well as the MPs of the opposition
bloc, except the Liberal Party.
The decision on referendum in Bosnia and
Herzegovina was adopted at the extended session of
the Parliament presided over by the fice-President of
the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mariofil
Ljubic. He was entrusted with this task at the request of
the Club of the MPs of the Par& of Democratic Action
which al1MPs present in the conference room supported
by voting. Before that, the President of the Parliament of
the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mom2ilo Krajiinik,
adjourned the session for the following day after the last
interruption of the session he had presided over (stating
thaf, according to the Rules of Procedure, the conditions
for the continuation of the work had not concurred).
This turnabout was due to the failure of the
three ruling parliamentary parties to agree on the
agenda supplement, i.e. the introduction of the proposal
of the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina
to adopt at this session the ,decision on a referendum of
cit~zens.Many consu/tat/ons were held because of which
the session was frequently interrupted and each time
when the session was resumed it seemed that a
solution was in sight. Particularly so in midnight hours
when the Deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia and
49Herzegovina, Muhamed cengic, proposed that first a
detailed plan of the regionalization of the Republic be
worked out and that on& then a referendum be
organized, but within a fixed period, to which the leader
of the Serb Democratic Partx Radovan Karad*, who at
one moment found himself at the rostrum together with
~engic, also agreed.
'We have never been closer to an agreement
than this time: said Karad2ic to the applause of the
MPs. The next interruption brought about another
turnaround. l4ado Pandjic, Chairman of the Club of the
Representatives of the Croatian Democratic Union, also
said that he was glad that the agreement on a
referendum was about to be reached. Only when
Radovan Karadiic' requested that the regionalization
obligation be defined in a new constitution act (first
regional~zation, and then referendum), the President of
the Pan'y of Democratic Action, Alva lzetbegovic,
rejected any conditions regarding the referendum and
said: "We stick to what we have already proposed, and
as far as discussion is concerne4 we can accept it:
Leaving the rostrum he criticked Krajsnik for the way in
which he conducted the session.
At that moment it was obvious that al1hopes for
a successful outcome of the ~arad2ié-~engicagreement
had failed. Vojislav Maksimovic Chairman of the Club of
the MPs of the Serb Democratic Parfy, said that any
further discussion was purposeless and proposed, on
behalf ofal1the MPs of the Serb Democratic Party, that
the proposa1 to take a decision on the referendum of
the citkens be forwarded to the Council for Inter-Ethnic
Equality At this point this session of the Parliament was
concluded for the MPs of the Serb Democratic Party
who, together with President KrajiiSnnik, lefthe conference room. lt was exact4 3.30 am. " (Annex No.
R4, pp.r51-r52/r53-54..)
By refusing to respect the request of the Serb MPs to
have the said Council declare itself on the question of the
referendum on independence, the Assembly of Bosnia and
Herzegovina grossly violated the constitutional provisions
contained in Amendment LXX to the Constitution of the SRBiH.
2.1.2.4. The last major opportunity to preserve peace in Bosnia
and Herzegovina was the Coutilhero plan at the beginning of
1992, which provided for cantonization of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. This plan was accepted by the leaders of the
three leading national parties, consequently, also by Alija
Izetbegovic. However, Alija lzetbegovic withdrew his consent
later on.
2.1.2.5. There was only one reason why the radical Islamic
group headed by Izetbegovic refused the agreement arrived at
between Dr Radovan Karadiic and Adil ZulfikarpaSiC, an
agreement that was about to be reached at the session of the
Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
held on 25 and 26 January 1992 and the Coutilhero plan. That
reason was the creation of independent Bosnia and
Herzegovina as an Islamic state. Precisely the idea of an
lslamic state is in contradiction with any cantonization of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and calls for unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina
with the Muslim majority. Consequently, the civil war was
necessary in order to radicalize the lslamic religious feelings of
the Muslim population and to create the absolute majority of ihe
Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To realize this
objective it was necessary to destroy Serbs as an ethnic group
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To that end an interim alliance
between the radical lslamic forces and the radical nationalist
Croat forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina was made.2.1.2.6. Although the radical lslamic group formally consented to
the Dayton structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, consequently,
to the existence of two equal entities - Republic of Srpska and
the Muslim-Croat Federation - it seems that even now the
radical group has not reconciled itself to such a Bosnia and
Herzegovina, i.e. it has not abandoned its objective of creating
an lslamic state. The Respondent notes with regret that they
abuse also these proceedings before the International Court of
Justice for the purposes of the realization of that goal. Thus, on
p.789 of the Reply, in para 82, the Applicant says: "ln the first
place, this entity has been created contrary tu peremptory
norms of international law (jus cogensj and, in the second
place ...The creation of 'Republika Srpska 'has been imposed
through the use of force and genocide," In the entire text of
the Reply, the Applicant places the name of the Republic of
Srpska in inverted commas. It is obvious that the Applicant
does not recognize the legality and legitimacy of Republika
Srpska. It is also evident that the Applicant does not consider
Alija Izetbegovic's signature on the General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina as binding.
Consequently, the Applicant is consistent in the implemantion of
its policy which is proclaimed in the key position from the
Islamic Declaration: "There can be no peace or coexistence
between fhe 'lslamic faith' and the 'non-lslarnic' social and
polifcal institutions."
From the beginning of the crisis, consequently, from
1991, the radical Islamic group denies the right of the Serb
people to self-determination, even within the framework of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The negation is a consistent
realization of the position from the Islamic Declaration:"Claiming
for itself the right tu regulate its own world, Islam clearly rules
out any r~ght or possibility of action of any forem ideology on
ifs turf" 2.1.3. The Creation of Muslim Paramilitary FormationsWas the
Preparationfor a Forcible lmplementation of the Policy Aiming at
the Destruction of Serbs as a Group
2.1.3.1. Another fact confirming the policy aiming at the
destruction of Serbs as a group is the creation of the Muslim
paramilitary formations and the preparation for a forcible
realization of that policy.
2.1.3.2. General Sefer Halilovic, (Former JNA officer and Chief
of General Staff of the BiH Army during the civil war -
Respondent's remark) in his book entitled "Shrewd Strategy",
published in Sarajevo in 1997, describes his engagement in
organizing Muslim paramilitary formations of the "Patriotic
League" in the following way:
"We got off lightly after a//, 1 concluded then and
here is why: when 1began to work in the PL, 1 first met
the late Safet HadiiC and Mirsad ~au~evic. lt was
necessary to prepare the project of the organization and
the plan of defence of the Sarajevo region, which was
going to serve as a mode1 for the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina as a whole. 1 was very disappointed
when 1 realized (the second half of October 7991) that
there is a huge people's energy unorganized militarily. 1
also learned that there is a group headed by Meho
KariSïk but concerned more with politicalthan with
military questions. At the same time, the entire miktary
organization consists of unconnected groups supervised
main& by unprofessional CO-orrnators, and on& in a
few places in B&H at that: Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla and
Goraide.
We analysed
We did not sleep the whole night.
the development of the war in Slovenia and Croatia
thinking how best to organize ourselves in B&H. The
5:3police force and the Territorial Defence were the
mainstay of the defence in Slovenia. Both systems were
well trained and arme4 well co-ordinated. Croatia was
something diferent, by national structure but also by the
intentions of Belgrade. The backbone of the system of
defence in Croatia was the police force combined with
the National Guard formed subsequently. They did not
count on TD because they were disarmed. 'What is the
situation in the police force in&H?' 1 asked. Safet and
Mirsad answered in unlson: 'One cannot count on them.
We have not yet taken control there and minister
DelimustafiE was appointed by the SDP and Abdic,
because bis appointment was made conditional on
some important political decision in the Parliament.
There are individual members there on whom we rely
and will continue tu rely but not on the police as a
whole :
Thus, we decided that / should prepare a project
of military organization and a plan of defence that will
be completely autonomous, but broad and flexible
enough to include al1 segments of defence that we
expected tu juin us in case of aggression. After a short
time the Regional Military Headquarters of the "Patriotlc
League" for the Sarajevo region, the municipal military
headquarters, territorial, manoeuvre, specia4 sabotage
and counter-sabotage units, units of branches of service,
logistic bases were created ...Already at that time
(October 7997) certain things were clear to patriots,
things that, tu many, are not clear even today. The
situationwould be far better for us if the newly formed
authorities, drawing on the experience of Croatia, had
first have dealt with the personnel question in the police
force and then made it the pillar of defence. With the
personnel proposed and appointed by the SDP that was
not possible."(Annex No.R5., pp r55-r57/r58.)2.1.3.3. In Annex 120 to the Reply the Applicant presented the
Conclusions contained in the appraisal of the situation in the
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the area of responsibility
of the Second Military District. This document was drawn up in
March 1992 and the commander of the Second Military District,
Col.Genera1 Milutin Kukanjac, sent it to the Chief of General
Staff of the JNA. It is a confidential document classified as
"military secret". On page four of this document paramilitary
organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina is described. The
document states: "Reliable data, as well as statements of the
leading personalities of the Police in B&H on TV in the past
few days, indicate that the peoples of this Republic are well
armed on a pan'y basis (Muslims have about 60 000, Croats
about 35 000 and Serbs about 20 000 men)." (Reply of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Annexes, Volume II, Annex No. 120)
2.1.3.4. Alija Izetbegovic ordered mobilization of the armed
forces on 4 April 1992. The Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina
demanded, as an ultimatum, the annulment of this order for
mobilization as illegal and illegitimate, but the Muslim-Croat
authorities refused. This fact is also confirmed by the Applicant
in para 109, p.538 of the Reply.
2.1.4. The Acts of lncitement to Genocide Were the First Step in
the lmplementation of the Policy Aimingat the Destruction of
Serbs as a Group
2.1.4.1. The fact pointing to the existence of the policy aiming
at the destruction of Serbs as a group was the incitement to
genocide. In its Counter-Claim the Respondent stated on p.349,
paragraph 7.0.1.2. the verses of a "Patriotic poem" published in
issue No.3 of the "Novi Vox" ("The New Vox") from October
1991 as an act of incitement to genocide. The verses read as
follows: "Dear mother, l'm going to plant willows,
We'll hang Serbs from them.
Dear mother, l'm going tu sharpen knives
We YIsoon fil pits again.
Dear mother, chop some salad,
And invite our Croat brothers.
When our banners unite,
Al1 the Serbs will end in graves"
2.1.4.2. In Annex 301 to its Reply the Applicant enclosed the
text from the daily "Oslobodjenje" of 2 October 1991. The
"Oslobodjenje" informs that, at the session of the Chamber of
Citizens of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Jovo Mijatovic, member of the Serb Democratic Party, protested
because the "Novi Vox" insulted the representatives of the Serb
people in an extremely rude way (he probably had in mind the
obituaries published in the same issue of the "Novi Vox",
announcing the alleged death of the leader of the Serb
Democratic Party - The Respondent drew attention to this in
paragraph 2.1 2.1.3. of the Counter-Memorial, p. 163). Jovo
Mijatovic protested in particular because the owner of the
newspaper, Senad ~ahinpasic, instigates to the genocide of the
Serb people and sits as an MP in the Parliament of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. At the same session Momcilo KrajiSnik said that it
was incredible that a newspaper should cal1 to genocide of a
people and to fratricidal war. The Ministry for Information
submitted a request to the Public Prosecutor's Office in
Sarajevo asking for its judgement as to whether there are
grounds for instituting criminal proceedings against the founder
and publisher of the newspaper "Novi Vox".
2.1.4.3. Of course not al1 members of the Party of Democratic
Action and the lslamic Religious Community shared the same
ideas with the radical Islamic group around Izetbegovic. At the
same session of the Assembly of the SR of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Abdulah Konjicija,member of the Party of
Democratic Action, dissociated himself from the writing of the
56"Novi Vox" saying that it "resembles a morbid mind and
indicates that there is the seed of fascism in society". He
proposed that the public prosecutor be charged with the task of
prohibiting the publication of the "Novi Vox" which was
supported by the Assembly.
2.2. Incitement to Genocide
2.2.1. The Applicant does not deny that the acts mentioned on
pp.349 and 350 of the Counter-Mernorial and qualified by the
Respondent as incitement to genocide have been committed. In
paragraph 36, p.907 of the Reply, the Applicant points out that
those were not the acts of the organs of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Indeed, those were not the acts of the organs of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but Bosnia and Herzegovina was
bound to prevent the commission of these acts and to punish
the perpetrators. It failed to do so, consequently, it violated its
international obligations under the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and therefore it is
responsible for them.
2.2.2. The Applicant does not deny the existence of the
"lslamic Declaration" nor that it contains the text quoted by the
Respondent and qualified as incitement to genocide. The
Applicant claims that "the lslamic Declaration has not been
raised to the level of Government polic~l'. The facts stated
above speak to the contrary.
2.2.3. As far as the "Patriotic poem" published in the "Novi
Vox" is concerned, in paragraph 38, p.908 of the Reply the
Applicant says "that there has been no relationship between the
views and the policies of the Bosnian Government and the
conduct of the editors of Novi VoA'. However, this relationship
did exist. The Applicant has enclosed as Annex to the Reply
issue No.301 the article from the Sarajevo newspaper
"Oslobodjenje" of 2 October 1991 entitled "Agreed in the
condemnation of the 'Vox"'. It can be seen from this text that
57the owner of the magazine is Senad sahinpa5ic, who used to
be a deputy of the SDA party in the Assembly of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Hence, its owner was a prominent SDA party
member and as such, he was a deputy to the BiH Assembly.
2.2.4. The article published in the "Novi Vox" was qualified at
the very session of the BiH Assembly as a cal1 to genocide of
the Serb people. In the same article, the "Oslobodjenje" daily
newspaper made public that the Ministry of Information had
requested the Senior Public Prosecutor of Sarajevo to ascertain
whether there existed elements to institute criminal proceedings
against the founder and publisher of the "Novi Vox". The
Applicant has not substantiated its assertion that criminal
proceedings were instituted against the Editor of the magazine.
However, the Applicant says itself that these proceedings have
not been completed.
2.2.5. Indeed, during the war a great number of Serbs were
murdered in Sarajevo and dumped into the Kazani pit. This was
confirmed also by the Applicant in paragraph 55, p. 916 of the
Reply. In other words, the crime of genocide was perpetrated in
much the same way as it was incited to in the "Novi Vox".
2.2.6. The Applicant does not deny that the article was printed
in the "Zmaj od Bosne" paper on 1 April 1993, in Tuzla. The
Applicant reiterates that the text does not reflect either the
positions or the policy of theBiH authorities. It says that Bosnia
and Herzegovina "deplores and refutes the author's calling for
Muslims to kill Serbs". In brief, the Applicant concedes that the
author of the text has called Muslims to kill Serbs, which
effectively represents incitement to commit genocide.
2.2.7. In paragraph 42, page 911 of its Reply, "Bosnia and
Herzegovina acknowledges that a radio broadcast of the sort
described by the Respondent took place". The Applicant states,
however, that the reproduction of the broadcast as annexed by
the Respondent to the Counter-Memorial (Annex 78) is
58incorrect. The Applicant fails to Say what was incorrect about
the reproduction of it. On the other hand, it says that the BiH
authorities explicitlyand publicly denounced the calls for
revenge and that they criticized this programme. Allegedly,
representatives of Radio Hajat were invited to the lnterior
Ministry to be informed about this position of the Government.
These assertions are not supported by the evidence presented
by the Applicant.
2.2.8. Under the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Applicant was
obliged to prevent the commission of the above-mentioned acts
of incitement to genocide and to punish the perpetrators of
these acts. The Applicant failed to comply with these
international obligations and, therefore, is responsible.
2.2.9. Two separate acts of incitement to genocide -the Islamic
Declaration and the "Novi Vox" - were, in fact, perpetrated
before the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
internationally recognized as an independent and sovereign
state. Nevertheless, these are criminal offences which are
prosecuted regardless of the Statute of limitations (prescription).
The international obligation to punish such offences, based on
the Genocide Convention, is not limited in time. Thus, the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a successor State, by
becoming party to the Genocide Convention, has taken up an
international obligation to punish the acts of incitement to
genocide perpetrated on its territory. It failed to do so, for which
it is responsible.
2.3. Killing
2.3.1. The Applicant stated the view (para. 44, p. 912 of the
Reply) that it "does not deem it necessary nor practically
possible to go into any of the allegations which are not
supported by any material or only by material which supposedly
is to be found in Belgrade". The position of the Applicant that it
59 "dues nof deem it necessarj' to go into unsubstantiated
allegations contradicts the statement contained in paragraph 23
concerning the readiness of the "government authorities" to
prosecute perpetrators of crimes even in time of war (and the
more so in peace time). It is, therefore, unclear why the
Applicant has not elaborated on whether or not their military
and police killed Serb civilians and prisoners in the events
specifically indicated, when thenames of the victims have been
provided in almost al1 the cases. Also, unclear is the "practical
impossibility" for the Applicant to go into details of the killing of
Serbs, at least in so far as the crimes committed in the territory
of the Muslim-Croat Federation are concerned. (Any government
has the "practical possibility" to determine whether or not crimes
have been committed in the territory controlled by it.)
2.3.2. As will be demonstrated further on, the Applicant
fundamentally has the same attitude towards the details of the
Counter-Memorial supported by evidence: in such instances it
denies the validity of the evidence presented. Consequently, the
Applicant refuses to admit to the crimes described in the
Counter-Memorial, although it is plain to see that such mass
crimes against victims having specific names could not have
been invented. The facts of these crimes do exist; they cannot
be obliterated simply by the Applicant'sdenial.
2.3.3. The Applicant calls "appalling" (para. 45, p. 912 of the
Reply) that the listings of the crimes against Serb civilians, as
contained in the Counter-Memorial, began with Srebrenica. The
Respondent does not consider important the order in which the
Respondent listed the crimes committed against the Serb
people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The language used by the
Applicant speaks more of itself than of the Respondent. The
crimes against Serbs in the Srebrenica region were committed
in May, June and July 1992 and only one in August of that
year, which places them chronologically at the beginning of the
Counter-Memorial. Beside, extensive abuse of the safe zoneshould be have in minde, as publicle referred to by
representatives of the Netherlands battalion.
2.3.4. The Applicant denies any importance to the annexed
photographs of crimes (para. 46, p. 912 of the Reply), "let
alone that it would provide for any objective indication that the
perpetrator of these atrocities, whoever that may have been, did
commit these as part of a campaign directed by the Applicant's
Government and aimed at the destruction of a specifc ethnic
group'! The photographs of victims are proof of the atrocities
committed and they indirectly (by showing the way in which
these were committed) indicate also the nature of the crimes.
The genocidal nature and the responsibility of the Applicant for
the commission of these crimes is inferred from the overall
circumstances: the crimes against Serb civilians were committed
the Applicant's armed forces (in two instances under 7.1.1.l.
and 7.1.1.7 of the Counter-Memorial, by the military unit
commanded by Naser Oric, which committed a series of crimes
in other territories); they were committed burning down Serb
villages and neighbourhoods and by killing ail Serbs rounded
up, regardless of their age or gender (in one instance, as many
as 38 Serb villagers were murdered). In short, people were
killed justbecause they were Serbs and the perpetrators were
the soldiers of the Applicant's army. The troops of the
Applicant, by their very nature,could not have acted
independently of the Applicant; they were under its control. The
crimes against the Serbs of Srebrenica referred to, were al1
committed within a space of four months and the Applicant did
nothing to stop the criminal actions of its military in this
community (nor in the territory of other communities). Similarly,
the Applicant did not take any action against the perpetrators,
including against Naser Oric as the most notorious figure.
Instead, t-Jaser Oric rose in the Applicant's military ranks and
was decorated with the Golden Fleur de Lis by President Alija
lzetbegovic "for extraordinary military successes in Kamenica"
(where Muslim armed forces brutally killed and mutilated at
least 11 Serb prisoners, Counter-Memorial 7.1.22.9).
61 The final conclusion about the responsibility of the
Applicant with regard to the genocide of the Serb people in
Bosnia and Herzegovina can be drawn with even more certainty
from the overall circumstances surrounding the crimes against
Serbs, which will be dealt with separately.
2.3.5. Even as far as the crimes perpetrated in the territory of
the Bratunac community are concerned, the Applicant denies
the "relevance" of the submitted material (para. 47, p. 913 of
the Reply) and for one of the victims, the Chief of Police in
Bratunac says that he allegedly died in function and concludes
that the autopsy report "does not provide any objective
indication that theerpetrator, whoever that may have been, did
commit these acts as part of a campa~gn, directed by the
Applicant's Government and aimed at the destruction of a
specific ethnic group". As regards the "relevance" of evidence,
the Respondent believes that al1 evidence is judged on its
individual merits and on its interconnection. Milutin MiloSevic,
chief of Police in Bratunac, was not killed in line of duty but
together with nine other Serb civilians, including two women
(paragraph 7.1.2.11 of the Counter-Memorial). As in the case of
the Srebrenica region, crimes against Serb villagers were
committed Muslim armed forces. Again, in two instances
(described under 7.1.2.2. and 7.1.2.9 of the Counter-Memorial)
the crimes were perpetrated by Naser Oric's unit. It is
understandable that the autopsy report did not provide "an
objective indication", nor can it do so, that the crimes were
committed "as part of a campaign, directed by the Applicant's
Government". That such a campaign existed can be deduced
from al1 the circumstances. The Counter-Memorial cited the
report made on 26 January 1993 by Richard Boucher,
spokesman for the US State Department, as additional
evidence. The cited report says that Bosnian Muslim forces
from Srebrenica killed at least 60 Serbs, mainly civilians in the
villages around Bratunac. The Applicant said nothing about this.
If the victims of crimes are Serbs, then even reports by
62"independent observers" (as the Applicant calls them) are not
regarded by the Applicant as "relevant material". (To
substantiate its own claims, the Applicant refers to similar
reports as its main evidence.)
2.3.6. The Annexes to the Counter-Memorial relating to the
crimes committed in the territory of the Skelane community, are
said in the Reply (para. 49, p. 913) "to contain anonymous,
mainly hear-say witness statements" and that none of the
statements "provides any proof of the identity of the
perpetrators of the atrocities described, let alone any material
showing that the mentioned atrocities took place as part of a
we/l-organ~zedcampaign or pattern of conduci'. The Rep y has
taken out of the Counter-Memorial the statement that Skelane
was predominantly Muslim, although it failed to mention or deny
the assertion contained in the Counter-Memorial that a large
number of villages in the Skelani area were inhabited by Serbs.
The Reply then goes on to Say that the testimony of the
witness concerned "does not provide any basis for the
assumption that Muslim forces deliberately targeted Serbs living
in this towri' (Skelane). Witness statements are not hear-say,
but direct or indirect testimony on the crimes. Even indirect
testimony, especially in connection with the main facts of the
event, is valid, such as that the Muslim forces launched attacks
against some villages and that they left bodies of dead Serb
civilians in their wake. The exact data about the perpetrators
are not of key importance; the essential fact is that the
perpetrators were Muslim troops. In its Reply, the Applicant also
resorted to a distorted interpretation of tne contents of the
Counter-Memorial. According to the Counter-Memorial, only two
Serb civilians (namely two children) were killed in Skelane
villageitself and the rest of the 35 Serbs were murdered in the
villages in the Skelane area, where they happened to be at the
time of the commission of these atrocities. The Counter-
Memorial does not assert, either, that Muslim forces
"deliberately targeted" Serbs living in Skelane, except for thetwo children concerned. However, they "deliberately targeted"
Serb villagers around Skelane.
2.3.7. Concerning the section of the Counter-Memorial dealing
with the atrocities in Srbinje (FoCa), the Applicant first states
(para. 50, p. 914 of the Reply) that the Respondent renamed
the city of FoCa into Srbinje and adds that this section "is not
supported by any accessible material whatsoever", nor does it
further discuss it in the Reply. The assertion that the
Respondent renamed FoEa or any other city in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is not true. This city was renamed by Bosnian
Serbs. The cities and towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina were
not renamed only by Serbs. Thus, Bosnian Croats renamed
Duvno town into Tomislavgrad, and Bosnian Muslims renamed
Bosanski Petrovac into Muratovo (after Emperor Muratwho led
the Turkish invaders in theBattle of Kosovo against the Serbian
Mediaeval State in 1389). The Respondent recalls that the
Counter-Memorial, in its section on Srbinje (para.7.1.5.22), inter
alia, states that on 19 December 1992, on the date of Serbian
religious festival St. Nicholas, Muslim forces killed at least 51
Serb civilians in Serb villages in the Joganica valley. Among
those killed, there were 14 women, three children and 13
people over 60. The Counter-Memorial (paragraph 7.1.5.23)
goes on to cite the report from The Times of 23 September
1993 regarding the incident. This report is cited oncegain:
"The Bosnian Serbs asked the UN Commission
on War Crimes tu investigate the massacre, which they
say was one of the worst crimes committed by the
Muslims against the Serbs. They say that 57 people
were massacred in a surprise attack last Christmas on
70 villages situated in a valley near Focs in eastern
Bosnia. They also say that a// the victims, except two,
were civilians. ln Bosnia crimes like these are seldom
confirmed by the alleged perpetrators, but a captured
Muslim soldier confirmed the larger part of this story to
the BBC.
64 The attack about which there have been no
previous reports outside the former Yugoslavia was
launched in the morning of December 19 fast year in
JoSanica valley. The local Serbs, who have put together
files with photographs as evidence for the UN, say that
as many as 600 Muslims surrounded the ten hamlets
during the night.
According tu the accounts of survivors, a signal
flare was fired at ZOO am. which, the Serbs Say,
marked the beginning of a two-hour orgy of shooting,
burning and killing. They say that when it was over only
73 of the 70 inhabitants of the valley were still alive.
The BBC reporter interviewed in Foka prison
saban Kurtovic, a Muslim solder who admitted taking
part in the attack. This former securify guard insisted
that no one had forced him tu speak and that he had
been offered no deal by the Serbs. He was a member
of the Third Battalion of the First Drina Brigade
stationed at Mravinjci, a village near Goraide, and was
captured last June.
..He said that up tu 350 men had taken part in
the attack and added: 'We knew that we were going
against civilians. No one even tried tu tell us that we
were going against the Serb army or that we were
going to take some important purfion of territory!
He said that the Muslim soldiers had drunk great
quantities of alcohol en route to JoSanica, where they
then spi2 into 10 groups, each with its own target
village.During the attack the Serbs did not fire and the
Musllms had no casualties'! From the circumstances described above, it is
abundantly clear that this was a typical act of genocide
against the Serbian nation. However, the Applicant has
not found it appropriate to Say a word about the atrocity
and about the reports on it in foreign press (based on
eyewitness accounts and testimony of a prisoner). It did
not comment, either, the fact that once again a Serbian
religious festival was chosen to attack the 'Serb
occupier' for 'military tactic' reasons, considering that
'Serbian soldiers would have lowered their guard' (para.
35 of the Reply). In this way, the Applicant has
demonstrated to what extent it ignored facts and
evidence insofar as genocidal crimes against Serbs are
concerned. Muslim armed forces killed Serbs in other
villages in the same manner and with the same
genocidal intent.
2.3.8. The Applicant paid no attention whatsoever (para. 51. p.
914 of the Reply) to the assertions regarding mass killings of
Serbs in and around Konjic (the names of victims were fully
identified). It refers to a witness statement describing
"extensively the situation in, presumably the celebici camp".
The witness is said not to have provided "any, let alone
independent, material indicating that the atrocities he describes
-iftrue - form part of any well-organlzed campaign or pattern of
conduct'. The Applicant again clouds things when it cornes to
proving and identifying facts. The witness, prisoner at the camp,
may -on the basis of his observations - testify on the crimes
which occurred in it or on the persons directly responsible,
whereas the "organlzed campaign and pattern of conduci' may
be inferred from the systematic nature of the crimes committed
in al1detention camps controlled by the Applicant.
2.3.9. The Applicant is not specific either (para. 52, p. 915 of
the Reply) regarding the crimes committed against Serbs in and
around Rogatica. The submitted evidence, as in al1other cases,
is said not to contain "any material indicating that these
66atrocities took place as part of a well-organ~zed carnpaign or
pattern of conduct". The Respondent continues to hold its view
on the importance of photographic evidence and testimony as
proof of individual crimes committed. The Applicant's claim
contained in the Reply that the Serb forces returned civilians
that they took with them along the road where they had laid
mines, bears no relation to the specific crimes committed by
Muslim armed forces. In one case in point (para. 7.1.7.15. of
the Counter-Memorial), Muslim forces attacked a convoy of
Serb refugees killing 10 Serb civilians.
2.3.10. The Applicant's claim that the Annexes to the section
of the Counter-Memorial relating to the murders of Serbs in
Sarajevo "contain anonymous, rnostly hear-say witness
statementd' (para. 54, p. 915 of the Reply). Several
eyewitnesses (whose statements were attached thereto) testified
to the killing of Serb civilians in cemerno and Pofalici
neighbourhoods and to other murders. Thus, witness 718196-5
(Annex C 2618) saw the killing of Serbs in cemerno village
(identifying 21 victims by fullame). Nevertheless, the Applicant
paid no attention to the testimony of this witness or to those of
other witnesses. Some witnesses have given even the names
of the perpetrators, but they al1 specifically said that the
perpetrators were soldiers of the Applicant's army, its police
officers or the guards in the detention camps and prisons run
for Serbs. The Applicant maintains (para. 55, p. 916 of the
Reply) that "the Kazani case proves the exact opposite of what
the Respondent claims: during the years of the siege of
Sarajevo, the Bosnian authorities made every effort to prevent
the commission of atrocities by individuals on the territoryunder
their control". It is claimed that the Muslim military unit ("9th
Mountain Brigade"), which committed the atrocities, "acted
completely independently of the Bosnian armed forces and
continuously ignored the orders given by Sarajevo". The
Applicant's position that the Kazani case demonstrates quite the
opposite of what is claimed by the Respondent, is totally
unfounded. On sites at the foot of Mt. Trebevic, Muslim armed
67forces massively killed Sarajevo Serb civilians, which is an act
of genocide. The principal role in these crimes was played by
the military unit of MuSan Topalovic, alias Caco, but this unit
was not the only one. It acted within the Applicant's armed
forces and not independently of them. The Counter-Memorial
(para. 7.2.6.38.6.) states the fact that Topalovic' military unit
was visited by Alija lzetbegovic and by Mrs. Biserka Turkovic.
Both before TV cameras praised MuSan Topalovic as a
commander. This fact, which was not refuted by the Applicant,
directly contradicts theabove Applicant's claim contained in its
Reply that Topalovic's unit "continuously ignored the orders
given by Sarajevo". Praises Sung to Topalovic by "Sarajevo"
imply approval of what he and his unit did. That Topalovic lost
his life in a clash with the Applicant's police does not mean at
al1 that he acted on his own and that the Applicant is not
responsible for genocidal crimes committed by his military unit.
The mass killings of Serbs by Topalovic' men were so obvious
and could not be concealed. However, the actual trial covered
only a small number of murders of Serbs on locations at the
foot of Mt. Trebevic. For the sake of illustration, the Respondent
mentioned in the Counter-Memorial (para. 7.2.6.39.2.) the first-
instance judgment on the Kazani crimes, passed on 23
December 1994, under which the most severe penalties
(imposed only on four of the accused) were six-year
imprisonment sentences, although the victims were killed most
brutally and were mutilated.What kind of justice it is, may be
seen if it is compared to the case of Borislav Herak who had
been sentenced to death penalty. (See the Application, paras.
44H to 44N). Besides MuSan Topalovic, some other Muslim
commandants, who had committed crimes against Serbs, were
also eliminated by the end of the war. Thus, Jusuf Prazina,
who, inter alia, commanded an Applicant's unit that by
deception (after giving assurances of a safe passage)
intercepted the JNA convoy in DobrovoljaEka Street, killing
soldiers on site and later on after taking them prisoner -was
gunned down in a foreign country. This perfidious pre-war
criminal mind was also responsible for many other atrocities
68described in the Counter-Memorial. According to a TV Sarajevo
report on a news briefing, he showed to the camera a piece of
paper purporting to be a decision signed by President Alija
Izetbegovic, naming him a general and commandant of
Sarajevo (para. 7.2.6.38.4, Counter-Memorial). The Applicant's
assertions that the "Bosnian authorities made every effort to
prevent the commission of atrocities by individuals on the
territoryunder their control" is not a reply to the claims
contained in the Counter-Memorial: The Counter-Memorial
asserts that the Applicant's military and police as well as
guards in detention camps committed mass crimes against
Serbs, which means the structures controlled by the Applicant,
rather than individuals. Even the Applicant's assertion the way it
is put, is untrue because on the territories controlled by the
Applicant, individuals too could kill Serbs with impunity. Crimes
were also committed by incursions of the Applicant's military
into the territories controlled by it.
2.3.11. The assertion contained in the Reply (para. 58, p. 917)
that the section on ViSegrad is not supported by "any
accessible material" is untrue. Annexed to the Counter-Memorial
(C 2735) was the minutes of the testimony of a witness who
saw Muslim soldiers kill his two sons and set fire to his home,
where there were two women inside, one of them managed to
get out but was killed on the spot and the other was burned to
death. The Muslim soldiers failed to spot the witness and he
Iived to tell the story.
2.3.12. In the section of the Reply on Brod (paras. 59 and 60,
pp. 917-918), the Applicant States that the Croatian armed
forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (HVO and HOS) were not
controlled by the Applicant and it invokes the opinion of the
United Nations Commission of Experts as expressed in the
opening argument by the Prosecutor of ICTY in the BlaSkic
case. The statements made by the Prosecutor of the Tribunal
are not proof either in a case before ICTY or before any other
court. In the same vein, the opinion expressed by the UN
69Commission of Experts is not, either, proof in the proceedings
before a court of law. The Applicant's assertion that Croatian
armed units in BiH were not under its control, i.e. that it was
not responsible for the crimes committed by these units, is
baseless. Bosnian Muslims and Croats jointly prepared for their
secession from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
both politically and militarily; they jointly voted "yes" for the
secession in a referendum and thus went against Serbs who
were hostile to the idea of separation from the existing state. In
the ensuing war, they emerged as one joint party and Bosnian
Serbs as the other. They even established a common entity in
BiH: the Muslim-Croat Federation. At the outbreak of war,
Muslims and Croats, in conjunction and in a coordinated
fashion, committed crimes against Serbs, in particular in the
communities where al1 the three nations lived, such as Mostar,
Konjic, ~a~ljina, Livno, Kupres, etc.
2.3.13. The Applicant also denies (para. 61, p. 920 of the
Reply) the atrocities described in the section of the Counter-
Memorial on Kupres by claiming that there is no evidence to
support that these atrocities were ever committed and that the
Applicant is not responsible for the crimes which HVO and HOS
forces might have committed. It is precisely the crimes visited
upon the Serb civilian population of Kupres that show that the
Muslim and Croatian forces acted in conjunction. The
information on perpetrators, particularly Counter-Memorial
paragraphs 7.1.13.1. and 7.1.13.2., thus indicate that both
Muslim and Croat soldiers committed crimes together.
2.3.14. The Applicant's assertion (para. 62, p. 921 of the Reply)
that the person on which the post mortem was carried out "died
as soldier in the Army of the Republika Srpska" is untrue. The
person concerned was taken prisoner as a Bosnian Serb soldier
and, along with three other PoWs, was shot by Bosnian Muslim
soldiers in Jablanica (para. 7.1.14.1. of the Counter-Memorial).2.3.15. By denying that the killing of Serbs occurred in the
territory of theGoraide county, the Applicant claims (para. 64,
p. 922 of the Reply) that none of the witness statements
"provides any proof of the identity of the perpetrators of the
atrocities described, let alone any material showing that the
mentioned atrocities took place as part of a well-organized
campaign or pattern of conduct". The Applicant goes on to Say:
"Without acknowledging that any of the testimonjes given in this
section are true, the testimonies in the latter Annex show that
there was presumabiy opposition against the alleged atrocities
from, inter alia, the new head of the Gora2de police ...and
from former Muslim JNA officers, who opposed fhe liquidation of
SerbS' (Annex C 116, pp. 1178 and 1180). The Respondent
points out that the minutes of witness testimonies, as annexed
to the Counter-Memorial, section 2 on Goraide (para. 7.2.5.0),
by and large relate to Serb killings rather than to torture and
abuse only. It is unclear what proof of identity of the
perpetrators is required by the Applicant, when it transpires
from al1 these testimonies that the perpetrators were Bosnian
Muslim soldiers and policemen and that many of them were
named by name. The Applicant does not deny that at the time
when the atrocities took place, lbro Merkez was chief of police
and Hadio Efendic Chair of the Goraide War-Time Presidency.
It is not of the essence whether the names of al1 the
perpetrators were fully correct, but it is important that the
perpetrators al1 belonged to the Bosnian Muslim military and
police and that they committed the crimes in an organized
manner, on orders from their superiors. An organized nature of
the crimes is particularly evident in regard to the Serbs taken
away by police from their homes in Goraide and shot. The
same pattern was used for killing PoWs and Serb villagers. The
Applicant clearly believes only one witness (Annex C -1176 -
1189) and only in respect of a particular detail- that there was
opposition to the commission of atrocities and therefore
concludes that "there was presumably opposition against the
alleged atrocities.." So, according to the Applicant, there was
opposition to something which was not obvious but presumedat
71that. The Applicant has taken a small part out of the whole
testimony of the witness. The witness detailed the massive
round-ups and killing of Serb civilians, giving names of both
victims and perpetrators. The testimony of the witness
concerned reveals some Bosnian Muslim commanders opposed
the execution of Serbs, which was done on a large scale and
extra-judicially, and that in the wake of Zhis opposition Hadio
Efendic, Chair of the War-Time Presidency in Goraide, set up
an alleged Court Martial to cover up, by alleged judgments, the
murders of Serbs already committed. According to this witness
testimony, the transfer of Serbs into camps ("isolation centres")
and their executions were decided by Chair of the War-Time
Presidency Efendic. When the witness was taken to the
"isolation centre", the leader of the police patrol read out to him
the decision of the War-Time Presidency signed by H. Efendic,
while chief of Police 1. Merkez, who is responsible for the
murders of a great many Serbs, told the witness that he was
only carrying out the decisions of the Presidency. It is true that
the witness said that the new chief of police protected Serbs,
but he also said that even under the new chief of police the
killing of Serbs resumed. For instance, the witness stated that
immediately before UNPROFOR personnel came to Goraide
(on 24 April 1994), a number of Serb civilians were killed,
mentioning some by name. These crimes were committed by a
Bosnian Muslim military unit. That the witness mentioned that
there was opposition to the killing of Serb non-combatants is
precisely proof of the truthfulness of his testimony as a whole.
The number of crimes against Serb non-combatants and PoWs
in the Goraide area (where at least 189 Serbs were killed and
their names were stated in the Counter-Memorial), the
structures (Bosnian Muslim military and police) to which the
perpetrators belonged, as well as the circumstances in which
the crimes were committed (killing of villagers who did not
manage to flee; taking away of people from their homes in
Goraide and shooting them; execution of prisoners after having
been subjected to brutal torture) al1 clearly indicate that the
crimes were committed in an organized manner, i.e. "as part of
72a well-organized campaign or pattern of conduct". This point is
additionally supported by the fact that the Applicant did not take
any action against the perpetrators and that the one principally
responsible among them, Hadio Efendic, upon his transfer to
Sarajevo, was first appointed as Deputy Prime Minister and
then Ambassador to the Republic of Austria. Like in other cases
involving deaths of Serbs, the Applicant pays no attention
whatsoever to the documents also referred to in its own
Application. The Applicant, thus, ignores the submission of the
US Administration regarding the murders of Serb civilians in
Goraide (para. 7.1.16.4. of the Counter-Memorial).
2.3.16. In the Reply (para. 65, p. 922 and para. 67, p. 923),
the Applicant asserts that sections of the Counter-Mernorial on
the atrocities committed in Kotor Var05 (para. 7.1.17.) and
~ajni~e (para. 7.1.19.0.) do not contain proof of the identity of
perpetrators, letalone that the crimes were committed "as part
of an organized campaign or pattern of conduct". The
Respondent points out that the evidence presented indicates
that the crimes were committed by the Applicant's armed forces,
whereas the organized nature of these crimes is inferred from
the same circumstances as in al1other instances.
2.3.17. With regard to the section on Tuzla, the Applicant (para.
68, p. 923 of the Reply) States that the crimes referred to in
para. 7.1.20.2. of the Counter-Memorial were tried in 1995 (the
crimes concerned were committed in 1993). Even these
atrocities are referred to by the Applicant as "alleged" ones. Not
even these trials or the statement of the mayor of Tuzla to the
effect that the Applicant's government authorities were allegedly
bent on preserving the multi-cultural character of Bosnia and
Herzegovina are of the essence in making the final conclusion
about the massive nature and character of the crimes
committed by the structures controlled by the Applicant (military,
police, detention camp and prison personnel).2.3.18. The Applicant says nothing (para. 70, p. 924 of the
Reply) about whether or not countless crimes against Serbs
were committed in the Zvornik area (para. 7.1.22.0. of the
Counter-Memorial). It simply limits itself to challenge the validity
of the evidence submitted, in ways used in similar instances.
2.3.19. In the Reply concerning the section of the Counter-
Memorial on Kladanj, the Applicant, not answering the question
of whether these atrocities were committed or not, refutes the
evidence given and says that the fact that forensic findings
were made by an expert of the Military Medical Academy in
Belgrade shows that "local commanders of the Bosnian Serb
Army effectively disposed of direct lines of communication with
the Yugoslav military in Belgrade". The Respondent continues to
maintain that the engagement of a forensic scientist to gather
evidence on the crimes committed, does not have the kind of
importance that the Applicant wishes to attribute to it.
2.3.20. In the Reply (para 75, p. 925) concerning the section on
Visoko in the Counter Memorial, the Applicant does not broach,
either, the subject whether or not these atrocities took place. It
only challenges the validity of the evidence submitted. The
report by Richard Boucher (paras. 7.1.27.9. and 7.1.27.10. of
the Counter-Memorial), which said that Serbs Milivoje Samardiic
and BoSko Rakovic of Visoko were beaten to death by Bosnian
Muslims in the detention camp in Visoko and that Bosnian
Muslim territorial defence forces beat to death Serb Slobodan
Gogic, did not merit the Applicant's attention, either.
2.3.21. As regards the section on Prijedor, the Applicant (para
82, p. 927 of the Reply) recalls Chapter 5, section 8 of its own
Reply and attributes to the Respondent "utter disdain" for non-
Serb victims and "arrogance towards the Applicant and
eventually its contempt of this Court". The Counter-Memorial
gave al1 available information on the crimes against Serbs of
Prijedor and the Respondent replied to the above-mentioned
chapter of the Reply. By persistently ignoring thousands of Serb
74victims identified by name, the Applicant is in a position to
reflect upon its own disdain for the victims of crimes committed
by its military and police as welWas by prison camp personnel
controlled by it.
2.3.22. Not even the arrest of some leading criminals in Zenica
(para. 83, p. 927 of the Reply) has the importance that the
Applicant wishes to attach to it. This one-off action, even if it
took place alongside some other rare ones that were highly
disproportionate to the crimes against the Serb people in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, serves only to cover up the true
nature of the crimes and the responsibility of the Applicant for
them.
2.3.23. The Applicant refused to consider in the Reply (para.
90. p. 929) the section on Vlasenica as contained in the
Counter-Memorial, since it "is not supported by any accessible
material". Paragraph 7.1.42.4. of the Counter-Memorial states
that Bosnian Muslim armed forces most brutally murdered 28
Serbs captured by them during the attack on Rogosije village
(the victims were identified by name). The Counter-Memorial
also referred to the third submission by the US Administration,
dated 10 November 1992, in which they noted that an
American free-lance writer reported he had seen the mutilated
and tortured bodies of Serbs, which were displayed in a Serb
Orthodox church. "Some bodies were incinerated, others had
fingers cut off from the right arm that is used by Orthodox
Christians tu make a sign of cross; some were circumcised in
total humiliation; some had their eyes gouged out; they a// bore
stab wounds; their heads were so beaten that they were
beyond recognition; their arms and legs were broken and cut
off" Nevertheless, even this submission on the signs of horrible
deaths at the hands of the Applicantls armed units means
nothing to the Applicant. In so doing, the Applicant does not
consider its ignoring of facts about the crimes committed as its
disdain for the victims.2.3.24. Commenting on the section on Han Pijesak from the
Counter-Memorial, the Applicant (para. 100, p. 930 of the
Reply) challenges, cumulatively and in typified fashion, the
validity of the evidence without adopting a position regarding
facts as such and drawing the attention of the Court to Han
Pijesak as the seat of the headquarters of Gen. Ratko Mladic,
the Bosnian Serb commander indicted by the Hague Tribunal
and wondering why neither the witness nor the examiningjudge
"deemed it necessary to mention this as a relevanl
circurnstance". It is, therefore, odd to the Applicant that the
witnesses to the crimes committed by the Applicant's armed
forces did not mention "as a relevant circurnstance" that Han
Pijesak was the seat of Gen. Mladic's headquarters. By the
manner in which the Applicant alludes to the indictment issued
against Gen. Mladic, it seems that it is tantamount to a
judgment which went into effect.
2.3.25. With regard to the section on Mrkonjic Grad (para.
7.1.54.0. of the Counter-Memorial), the Applicant (para. 107,p.
932 of the Reply) says that it 'Yailsto see the relevance of a//
this to this case" and that due to the unsubstantiated nature of
the material provided the "Respondent further dernonstrates that
it rather uses this case as an opportunity to continue ifs usual
propaganda campaign than as serious litigatiori' . The crimes
which occurred in Mrkonjic Grad, of which the Applicant is, no
doubt, aware, will be corroborated by evidence, and the
"relevance" of the material on these crimes stems from the
simple fact that combined Croat army forces and the Applicant's
units took part in the operations inBiH in 1995, and that those
forces committed massive crimes. The Croatian regular army,
as a foreign army, entered deep into BiH territory without any
protests from, and in cooperation with, the Applicant. The
Applicant not only disregards facts about the most serious
crimes involving Serb victims, but it shows cynicism when
alleging that the Respondent uses the victims of the Mrkonjic
Grad mass crimes for propaganda. (At least 274 prisonersand
civilians, including many women, were murdered. As of
76submission of the Counter-Memorial 227 victims were identified.)
The Mrkonjic Grad killings are typical acts of genocide: PoWs
and non-combatants were murdered in large numbers simply
because they were Serbs. Among those killed, 23 persons were
over 75. (The oldest man, Ile Prolo, was 100 years old and the
oldest woman, Andja Bunjac, was 93 years old.)
2.3.26. In para. 3, page 891 of its Reply, the Applicant points
to the UNHCR map of 1 March 1994 showing BiH territories
controlled by each of the three warring parties. The Applicant
stresses that the map shows that most of the territory to which
the Counter-Memorial refers was Bosnian Serb-held. This was
so at that point, on 1 March 1994. By far the largest number of
crimes against Bosnian Serbs were committed prior to that
date, in particularuring 1992, when the territories controlled by
the three parties did not coincide with those held by them on 1
March 1994. In the first months of the war, there were no clear
demarcation lines between the units controlled by the three
warring parties. It was the crimes committed against Serb non-
combatants that were the reason for drawing clear military lines
of demarcation between the parties, in order to protect Serb
inhabitants in some regions of BiH. Accordingly, many of the
Serb villages that came under attack and where acts of
genocide were perpetrated, at the time of the attack were not
protected by the Republika Srpska Army. Additionally, many of
the crimes against Serbs took place in Bosnian Muslim- or
Bosnian Croat-controlled areas (Sarajevo, Goraide, Mostar,
Tuzla, Zenica and other towns, as well as in al1 camps for
Serbs). Lastly, part of the genocidal crimes against Serbs were
perpetrated in non-Muslim or non-Croat controlled areas by hit
and run attacks of the Bosnian Muslim and Croat military
against towns and villages and by shooting Serb civilians.
2.3.27. In the concluding part of the Reply relating to para. 7.1.
of the Counter-Mernorial (deliberate killing), the Applicant states
(para. 118, p. 934, Reply) that "the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia has not even begun to formulate a sufficiently
77supported factual basis for its counter-claims. The approach of
the Respondent apparently is just to overwhelm the Court with
hundreds of pages of listings of alleged events, not with true
and independently supported facts, neither with any beginning
of analysis. For these reasons alone, the Respondent's
conclusions, based on this particular way of proceeding, cannot
sustain its far-reaching submissions." The Respondent
formulated the factual basis for its Counter-Memorial relying on
facts of concrete crimes on which it provided evidence.
Considering that facts of reality take concrete form, the
Respondent believes that they should be presented to the Court
in a concrete form, too. This means that the names of victims
must be given in full and at least the structures to which the
perpetrators belonged and, if possible, also their identity and
details about the events, as well as other circumstances on
which the determination of the responsibility for crimes hinges.
In cases where survivors are witnesses or potential witnesses,
for the sake of their protection, their fullames are not stated,
just initials. Only facts presented in such a concrete way may
be proved or disproved. For logical and practical reasons, the
Respondent resorted to this method of presentation of facts,
constituting the basis of the Counter-Memorial, even though it is
aware that the numbers of Bosnian Serb victims are much
higher than those cited by the Respondent, on the basis of the
information and evidence gathered. Therefore, the Respondent's
approach is not to "overwhelm" the Court with "hundreds of
pages of listings of alleged events" but simply to state mere
facts of the crimes committed. The scale of the crimes has
decided the number of pages on which these facts will be
presented (in a summary fashion). By contrast, the approach
espoused by the Applicant is unacceptable to the Respondent.
The victims are mostly referred to in terms of numbers rather
than names, which is indispensable in proving any case. It is
actually the Applicant which overwhelms the Court with piles of
material that,more often than not, cannot be admitted in court
as evidence.2.3.28. The Applicant's Reply in relation to specific sections or
paragraphs in the Counter-Memorial regularly repeats the
assertion that "witness statements do not provide any proof of
the identity of the perpetrators of alleged atrocities". In
conclusion, the Respondent once again points out that in some
instances witnesses gave information on the identity of
perpetrators and that in al1 instances testimonies clearly indicate
the structures to which the perpetrators belonged - the
Applicant's military, its police or the personnel of the prison
camps controlled by the Applicant. Because of the nature of
crimes and the responsibility involved, it is essential that the
perpetrators belonged to these structures rather than who they
really were.
2.3.29. The Applicant also repeatedly asserts in the Reply that
the evidence submitted in connection with some paragraphs in
the Counter-Memorial does not provide any material to prove
that the crimes were committed "as part of a well-organized
campaign or pattern of conduct". In summing up on this point,
the Respondent reiterates that the evidence on individual crimes
is not supposed to be direct proof of an organized nature of
crimes, or to prove that the crimes occurred "as part of a well-
organized campaign or pattern of conduct". The conclusion as
to an organized "campaign" or "pattern of conduct" may be
drawn from the overall circumstances of al1 the crimes
committed -from the number of crimes committed in the wider
region, from the typical method used (the Applicant's forces
entering Serb villages and killing residents; killing prisoners after
subjecting them to torture; police taking Serbs away from their
homes in towns and their subsequent death; killing of those
detained in many camps), from the structures the perpetrators
belonged to (the Applicant's military and police as well as the
personnel of the camps and prisons controlled by the
Applicant), and from the nationality of victims (Serbs). In
repeating so often the denial of the existence of "an organ~zed
carnpaign or pattern of conduct': the Applicant might as well
have asked itself what it is that is repeated so often and '7snot
79part of a well-organized campaign or pattern of conduci'.
Moreover, had the Applicant commented on al1 Counter-
Memorial sections and on al1 paragraphs thereof, the repetition
of its assertion that there was no "campaign" of crimes would
have been much more frequent.
2.4. Deliberate lnfliction on Serbs Conditions of Life
Calculated to Bring about Their Physical Destruction and
Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm (Counter-Memorial,
Section 7.2.).
2.4.0.1. Regarding the section on ~elebici, the Applicant (para.
120, 934 of the Reply) does not acknowledge any individual
claim made by the Respondent and of the medical reports and
the submitted photographs it says that they "do not provide any
proof whatsoever of an organized campaign, directed by the
Applicant's Government and aimed at the Serbs as such".
Because of the regular repetition by the Applicant that the
submitted evidence is no proof of an organized campaign of
crimes, in its comments on the sections contained in this part
of the Counter-Memorial, the Respondent will present its view
on this at the end of the Chapter. Whatever evidence is
provided by the Respondent, the Applicant refutes any
Respondent's claim. The Applicant does not, either, comment
on Richard Boucher's statement and on the third submission
made by the US Administration of 10 November 1992 (Counter-
Memorial 7.2.1.17-19) that in the ~elebici camp, 15 to 16 Serbs
"were so savagely beaten they died". The Counter-Memorial
gave evidence that 18 Serbs, al1 named by name, were beaten
to death in this detention camp.
2.4.0.2. In response to the LjubuSki section, the Applicant (para.
122, p. 935 of the Reply) assert that "even if the alleged facts
were true", it is "not responsible for the deeds of the HVO
forces which were not controlled by the Bosnian Government".
The Respondent again points out that Bosnian Muslims andCroats acted jointly against Bosnian Serbs. For example, the
information on the perpetrators from the camp of ~elebici, as
contained in the Counter-Memorial, reveals that crimes in this
camp were committed by Muslims and Croats together.
2.4.0.3. On the Dretelj camp section, the Applicant (para. 123,
p. 935; Reply) only says that witness statements, medical
findings and the submitted photos "do not provide any proof
whatsoever of the existence of an organized campaign, directed
by the Applicant's Government and aimed at the Serbs as
such". The Applicant once again totally disregards the statement
made by Richard Boucher as spokesman for the State
Department, who said that the Croatian armed forces arrested a
Serb doctor and took her to the camp of Dretelj, where she
witnessed the torture of many male and female prisoners
(Counter-Memorial 7.2.4.25), although the Applicant itself took
such statements or reports as its main evidence contained in
the Application.
2.4.0.4. In connection with the Sarajevo section in theCounter-
Memorial, the Applicant (para. 125, p. 937 of the Reply) denies
the existence of evidence proving "that the alleged acts were
directed against victims because of their Serb origin as such".
Here again, the Applicant takes no notice of reports which it
once treated as evidence in the Application. Paragraph 7.2.6.12.
of the Counter-Memorial states that according to the fourth
report of the State Department, dated 28 December 1992, an
American surgeon from California spent some time in the
Ko5evo Hospital in Sarajevo, where he performed reconstructive
urological surgery. He disclosed that Muslim and Mujaheedin
armêd units (coming from Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia)
forcibly circumcised captured Bosnian Serb soldiers by using
primitive and non-medical means. He treated an 18-year old
Bosnian Serb who was so brutally circumcised that his whole
penis had to be removed. In August 1992, Bosnian Serb
policemen were treated in the same Hospital after the Bosnian
Muslim forces and Mujaheedin from abroad had savagely
81mutilated their organs by so-called circumcision which actually
represented maiming and caused irreversible and untreatable
injury to their body and mental scars (Counter-Memorial
7.2.6.36). This is borne out by the report of doctor Kenneth
MacNamara of the United States who, as a member of an Irish
medical organization, recorded 29 such cases of mutilation.
2.4.0.5. In response to the Counter-Memorial section on
Hadiici, the Applicant (para. 136, p. 941 of the Reply) claims
that the witnesses are "two reserve soldiers of the Yugoslav
People's Army captured ...on 25 May 1992", while in para.
147, on page 943 of the Reply (section on Srebrenica), it says
that the two victims mentioned in medical reports were "soldiers
at the time of their capture but, even more importantly, the first
victim was captured on EiH territory while serving as a reservist
in the Yugoslav People's Army". The victims concerned were
not JNA reservists at the time they were taken prisoner
because by that time, JNA had no units of its own in BiH.
Many Bosnian Serbs who served in the JNA, became soldiers
of the Bosnian Serb Army after JNA withdrew from Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
2.4.0.6. The Reply (para. 165, p. 946) referring to the Counter-
Memorial section on rapes causing serious bodily or mental
harm (7.2.46.0), the Applicant maintains that the Respondent's
allegations "are not supported by independent evidence", that
the medical findings provided "contain legally irrelevant material"
and that the enclosed photographs "do not provide any
evidence whatsoever regarding the identity of the perpetrators".
The Applicant's position on "independent evidence", in itself,
lacks clarity and is aimed at devaluing the evidence contained
in the Counter-Memorial. If victims of rape testify as witnesses
and if their testimony is supported by doctor's findings and
opinion on the gravity of bodily or mental harm, why would this
be "non-independent" evidence? There is no single reason to
challenge the legal validity of such evidence. The victims have
spoken about the perpetrators. These perpetrators belong to the
82Applicant's structures (the military, police, prison camp
personnel).
2.4.0.7. The Applicant (para. 166, p. 947 of the Reply) further
dismisses the forensic medical documentation contained in the
Counter-Memorial (para. 7.2.47.0.) as exhibits, saying that "none
of the findings contain material regarding the identity of the
alleged perpetrato,rs or any evidence that the reported injuries
were inflcted 017 the victims as part of an organized
campaign ..lt is said also that in most cases "the ethnicity of
the victims is not even mentioned'. Thus, in this case again,
the Applicant requires that the individual evidence annexed to
the Counter-Memorial also contains what they, by nature of
things, cannot contain. Forensic pathology reports contain
evidence on bodily harm done to the victims, whereas the
victims of crimes have testified as witnesses to the
circumstances and perpetrators of the crimes (mentioning also
their own ethnic origin). In ascertaining facts, al1 evidence is
judged both individually and in its inter-connection.
2.4.0.8. At the end of the Reply (para. 167, p. 947), relating to
the Counter-Memorial, Section 7.2., the Applicant invokes the
conclusions made at the end of the previous section. The
Respondent, too, basically invokes the views stated by it in the
above-mentioned paragraphs drawing attention to some other
circumstances. In replying to some of the sections contained in
this part of the Counter-Memorial (7.2.), the Applicant repeatedly
asserts that the submitted evidence (witness testimonies,
medical reports, photographic documentation, etc.) "do not
provide any proof whatsoever of the existence of an organlzed
campaign, directed by the Applicant's Government and aimed at
the Serbs as sucH1. As regards its Reply to the Counter-
Memorial 7.1., the Applicant has toughened the requirements
concerning the validity and admissibility of Counter-Memorial
evidence: Here, the Applicant demands that evidence on
individual crimes be at the same time evidence that the
Applicant's Government directed an organized campaign of
83commission of crimes against Serbs, whereas in its Reply
relating to Counter-Memorial, Section 7.1. it demanded that
individual evidence indicates that crimes were committed "as
part of a well-organized campaign or pattern of conduci'. This
is required, because some witnesses, who were detained in
camps or prisons, spoke also of the systematic mass torture of
Serbs in the camps. In other words, they spoke not only of
individual crimes but also of an organized commission of these
crimes, and in some instances of the professed genocidal
intent. To expect the surviving camp inmates to witness that the
systematic torture to which they were subjected was directed by
the Applicant's Government, is a bit over the top. The
conclusion as to the responsibility of the Applicant is drawn
from the circumstance that such massive crimes against the
Serb people were systematically perpetrated by the elements of
the Applicant's structures - the military, police and the prison
camp personnel controlled by the Applicant - rather than by
individualsoutside the Applicant's control.
2.4.0.9. Massive cruel treatment, abuse and humiliation of Serb
prisoners in many camps controlled by the Applicant were al1
aimed at physical extermination of Serbs as such or at causing
serious harm to their physical or mental health. Many of the
camp victims were literally beaten to death and some died of
injuries suffered at the hand of their torturers or sustained
irreversibleinjury to their health. These camps had elaborate
systems of physical and mental torture and humiliation, ranging
from various forms of ill-treatment, verbal abuse, hurting of the
physical and mental integrity of a person to inflicting such bodily
harm resulting in death. Sometimes, callous brutalization of
innocent people took depraved forms. Great many witnesses
testified to this and there is an extensivemedical documentation
on injuries inflicted on some of the victims. The number of
camps controlled by the Applicant as well as the massive
character of the crimes committed there by the guards
(including the camp commanders) clearly indicate that what was
involved there, was an organized commission of crimes against
84Serbs as such, i.e. that these crimes were genocidal. A
genocidal nature of these crimes and the responsibility of the
Applicant for them become even more apparent when these
crimes are viewed in the context of the crimes described in
Counter-Memorial, Section 7.1. (deliberate killing of civilians and
prisoners).
2.4.0.10. A specific form of physical and mental torture and
humiliation was the rape of Serb women. Serb women, little
girls and elderly women included, were raped in massive
numbers, either by indiviauals or by groups, in the camps or
prisons under Bosnian Muslim or Croat control. They were even
taken to the frontlines (e.g. in Bosanski Brod) to be gangraped
there by soldiers. Rapes were particularly frequent in the camps
in Dretelj, ~elebici, Sarajevo and throughout Posavina. Not only
was the kind of force commonly used in rape as a criminal
sexual act used against these women but also the kind of force
(beating up and seriously injuring victims) which is associated
with various depraved acts representing additionai physical or
mental torture and humiliation for victims, leaving them with
permanent serious consequences. Brutal, merciless torture of
victims, especially when women were gangraped, along with the
humiliation and demonstration of intense ethnic hatred, prevailed
over the forcible satisfaction of the sex instinct. Rape has thus
become a way of t.orture, serving the purpose of the destruction
of a group to whicli victims belong. 2.4.1. The Annex to the Final Report of the United Nations
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), the So-Called Bassiouni's Commission
2.4.1.1. In the text below the Respondent will quote parts from
the Annex Vlll (Prison Camps) to the Final Report of the United
Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (1992). Quoted paragraphs and pages are
indicated in brackets near names of cities. In these parts
Bassiouni's Commission discusses the camps in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in which Serbs suffered. The Respondent does not
consider these parts of the Annex to be relevant proofs. The
Respondent quotes them for two reasons. First, to point to the
partiality of Bassiouni's Commission in the presentatiton of
information on camps under Muslim-Croat control. Bassiouni's
Commission registered a large number of camps, but gave
relatively scarce information about what was happening in them;
in any case, it offers far less information about them compared to
the description of developments in the camps in which Muslims
and Croats were held. Second, in spite of this, Bassiouni's
Commission noted the existence of a great number of camps
where Serbs were victimized, which could have served as a point
of departure for the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Tribunal in The Hague. The Prosecutor did not proceed to the
verification of the information. Helshe failed to take further action
and bring in indictments except in the case of the~elebici camp.
This is a clear indication of the Prosecutor's biased attitude.
2.4.7. B2HAC (pp.58-61, paras. 438-442, 448-453)
'Vedinstvo Soccer Stadium: There are a few reports that
the Bosnian Government held Serbs at the Jedinstvo Stadium.
Apparently, as many as 900 prisoners were detained "
"BiH Governmenf-run camp in Bihac: There are also
reports from the ICRC that its representatives visited a BiH
Government-run camp in Bihac. Representatives visited this
86camp on 4 and 5 July, 75 August, 20 November 7992, and 5
June 7993. ln Juk. they saw two prisoners, in August they saw
73, in November they saw seven, and finally, in June 7993 they
saw three. "
"Unidentified Camp: Thomson Mission representatives
visited a detention facili& in Bihac on 30 August 7992. The
facility was reportedly controlled by unidentified Mus/im forces.
On the occasion of their visit, the Mission identified 30 Serbian
detainees."
"Croatian and Muslim 'Bordellos? Finally, there are
reports of bordellos operated by Musllin units. Here, Serbian
women and girls were raped by members of Muslim and Croat
forces who visited the camps in late 7997 and 7992. Detainees
who became pregnant were not permitted tu leave tu get
abortions."
'Xccording tu the Serbian News Agency, there were 75
bordellos in Bihac. Among them were those owned or operated
by the following individuals: Mustafa Vukovic, Abdulah Algagic,
Senad Hadliabdic, Rizvan Zujkic or Zjakic, Husein fipuvaCa,
Hasan Zirii Ahja Djeferovic, A/a Besic, Smajo Murtie Jasmin
Harbas, Ekrem Abazij, Hukovic, Civic, Deganovic, and Murtic.."
"The only specific information regarding these bordellos
is that 30 women were estimated tu be housed at the Vukovic
bordellu. Also, accordlig tu the information Service of the 2nd
Krajigki Corps, UN Peace-keeping forces were aware of the
activities at the L~pvaea camp. "
"Barracks, Bihac: According tu representatives of the
ICRC, a detention facility was establshed at the barracks in
Bihac. ICRC .representatives visited this facili& on 76
November 7992. No information was provided regarding the
ethnicity of theinmates or controlling parties nor the conditions
or duration of the facility at this location."
87 "Hospita4 Bihac: According tu representatives of the
ICRC, a detention facility was established at the hospital in
Bihac. ICRC representatives visited this facility on 26 November
1992. No information was provided regarding the efhnicity of the
inmates or controlling parties nor the conditions or duration of
the facility at this location.
"Militry Prison, Bihac: According tu representatives of
the ICRC, a detention facility was established ai the military
prison in Bihac. ICRC representatives visited this facility on 15
August 1992. No information was provided regarding the
ethnicity of the inmates or controlling parties nor the conditions
or duration of the facility's existence at this location."
"Prison/Penitentiary, Bihac: According tu representatives
of the ICRC, a detention facility was established at the local
penitentiary in BihaC ICRC representatives visited this facility on
7 December 1993. No information was provided regarding the
ethnicity of the inmates or controlling parties nor the conditions
or duration of the facility's existence at this location."
"Police Station, Bihac: According tu representatives of
the ICRC, a detention facility was established at the local police
station in BihaC ICRC representatives visited this facility on 14
December 7993. No information was provided regarding the
ethnicity of the inmates or controlling parties nor the conditions
or duration of the facility'k existence at this location."
2.4.1.3. BROD (BOSANSKI) (pp. 77-79, paras. 606-608,
612-616, 623, 624, 626-628)
The Commision of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (1992) refers to camps some of which are
also listedin the Counter-Mernorial (paras 7.2.0.1. and 7.2.11.O.) "Bosanski Brod Camp: This facility is reportedly a
Croatian-run camp with a sizeable containment capacity.
Sources suggest thaf, at one time, as many as 7,000 Serbs
from the surrounding area were contained here. The detainees
were reportedly beaten every day and some had broken arms
and legs as a resillt. The guards reportedly moved the severely
beaten detainees from this location when the ICRC and UN
Peacekeepers visited the camp. The ICRC visited this facility on
20 July 7992. No additional information regarding the conditions
or duration of the camp3 existence was pro vided"(S/1994/674,
Add2 (Vol. IV, 28 Dec. 7994, p. 77)
The crlmes committed against Serbs held by the Muslim-Croat
forces at the Soccer Stadlum h Brod, /i7cluding rapes, are
descriBedin more (detail.
Reportedly one incident involved the shooting death of
72 male detainees and the disposing of their bodies in nylon
bags and dumping them into the Sava River.
About 73 women were placed in the ladles' room af the
stadium. The wumen were reportedly raped. Muslim and
Croatians raped the women in a bathroom where the women
were allowed tu shower. The women were raped by as many
as six or seven men in the same night. The older women were
forced tu perform fellatio on the soldiers. The younger women
were reportedly taken off-site and raped. The victims were
returned tu the camp the following morning.
When UNPROFOR representatives came to Bosanski
Brod, the women were reportedly taken tu a kayak club on the
Sava River for three days until the representatives departed.
The detainees from the Bosanski Brod stadium were
transferred ta the Tulek Warehouse in August and later
exchanged. The rape of Serb women in Bosanski Brod is also
mentioned in para 626 of the Report under the title 'Forced
Bordels': which states that they were physicalllyabused and raped
between January and April 7992. (lbid., p.79). A certain number
of camps visited by representatives of the ICRC is also
mentioned in the Repofl.
"School Bosanski Brod: According to the list of detention
places visited by ICRC in the former Yugoslavia, a detention
facility was established at an unidentified school in Bosanski
Brod. Representatives of the ICRC visited this facility on 12
August 7992. No information regarding conditions, duration, the
ethnicity of detainees nor the identifies of the controlling parties
was provided. "
"Prison/Penitentiary, Bosanski Brod: According to the list
of detention places visited by ICRC in the former Yugoslavia, a
detention facility was established at an unidentified prison in
Bosanski Brod. Representatives of the ICRC visited this facility
on 9 July 7992. No information regarding conditions, duration,
ethnicity of detainees nor the identities of the controlling party
was provided. "
"Hospital, Bosanski Brod: According to the list of
detention places visited by ICRC in the former Yugoslavia, a
detention facility was established at an unidentified prison in
Bosanski Brod. Representatives of the ICRC visited this facility
on 9 Jully 7992. No information regarding conditons, duration,
ethnicity of detainees nor the identities of the controlling party
was provided. "
It is very symptomatic, however, that the Commission was
unable to establish the controlling parties of these camps and
who were the inmates having in mind the generally known fact
that, in the period April-August 1992 when they were visited by
the ICRC, Bosanski Brod was under the control of Muslim-Croatforces; therefore, it is obvious that the camps in question were
held by these forces and that the prisoners were Serbs. It is also
strange, although it is a pattern repeated throughout the Report,
that there is no information aboutthe conditions in which these
Serb prisoners were held or other information which is otherwise
available and very detailed when the allegedly Serb-run camps
are involved.
The same pattern is applied by the Commissionin in its
description of the T'ulekcamp: "This detention camp was located
in a warehouse at the Tulek housing estate. Detainees interned
at this location were from Novi Grad, Donja Dubica, Trnjak and
Lipik, Most of the detainees were transferred from other camps
in the area to this facility. The detainees slept on planks under
the eaves of a shed containing lime and cement."
"The male detainees were sent to the front to dig
trenches and many died. The women held in the camp were
taken to the warebouse offices and were raped. The detainees
were beaten, burned with cigarettes and brutalized. At least
one, Milan Jagodic; from Donja Dubica, died from bis injuries."
2.4.7.4. BREZA (pp. 107-108, paras. 866-877)
"This county is located in the centre of BiH, just north-
west of Sarajevo. According to the 1997 Yugoslavian census,
the population of this munic/@ality was 77,266, of which 75.6
per cent were Mu.slims, 12.3 per cent were Serbs, Z 7 per cent
were described as "other': and 5 per cent were Croatians. "
"Breza Camp: According to one report three young
women from //Jas and Wsoko were captured by 70 Bosnian
Muslims on 26 May 1992, and taken to an unspecified location
in Breza. lnitially, they were detained in a basement room of a
facility containing small windows. lt was reportedly cold, damp,
91and din'y. According tu the report, upon the women's arriva1
their captors began tu rape them. The women were repeatedly
raped at this location where their detention lasted two days.
The victims were then transferred tu another room in a different
building,apparent& a part of the same camp, wherein five other
women were interned. Conditions in the new location were
almost as bleak. There was a bathroom, but the women were
not permitted to shower or bathe. They were permitted to use
the washbasin, on occasion, but only for very brief periods.
They were fed pieces of moldy bread or macaroni, some
leftovers and soup. The women were never able tu speak to
one another as there was always a guard present. ln the new
location, the women were reportedly raped by as many as 20
men at a time, one after another. When the women fainted
from the abuse, their captors simply doused them with water to
revive them and continued the raping. The women rernained in
the room the majority of the time except on those occasions
when they were taken out to watch the male prisoners being
beaten or killed. According tu the report, the mistreatment of
the men consisted of beatings, drowning, or the 'tearing' of their
bodies Dit by bit!
"On one occasion, they tried tu make a father rape his
77 year old daughter. 60th father and daughter were beaten
when they refused tu obey. When the Muslims put a knife to
the father's throat, he relented.
'Hccording tu the witness, the male Serb inmates were
subjected tu forced labour. They were frequently taken tu
construction sites and made tu dg. The male workers were of
al1ages, there were even children among them, some as young
as five, When the men were beaten, the women were brought
tu watch. When the women were raped, the men were
reportedly also made tu watch."
"Factory: The ICRC reported the existence of a camp in
a factory in Breza. The ICRC first visited the camp on 77
92November 7993. lnformation regarding the operation or control
of the facility was not provided.
"Military Prison: The ICRC reported the existence of a
camp in the military prison in Breza. The ICRC first visited the
camp on 27 November 7992. lnformation regarding the
operation or control of thefacilify was not provided."
"Police Station: The ICRC reported the existence of a
camp in the military prison in Breza. The ICRC first visited the
camp on 3 March 1993. lnformation regarding the operation or
control of the faciïify was not provided."
2.4.7.5, BCJGOJNO (pp. 108-110, paras. 878,881,882,
892-896)
"The municipaïity of Bugojno is located in the west-
central section of BiH. According to the 1997 census, it had a
population of 46,843 prior to the war. Muslims comprised the
majorify of the population at 47.7 per cent, Croats comprised
44.7 per cent, Serhs were 78.9 per cent, and 4.9 per cent were
described as "other". One source reported that 70,000 eastern
BiH refugees and several thousand refugees from Jajce arrived
in Bugojno before the summer of 7993, the majorify of which
were Bosnian Muslims. Between 78 July and 22 July 7993, the
BiH Arrny establist7ed control over the cify of Bugojno. Al1 HV0
(Bosnian Croatian Defence Council) troops were disarmed at
that time.
"Bugojno Bordel: One report indicated that a Muslim and
Croat controlled bordel exists in the town of Bugojno, but did
not specify the location within the city. According to this source,
Serbian women are being forcibly held and subjected to
repeated sexual abuse. Those who become pregnant as a
result of the rapes are held captive at the bordel until they are
five months pregnant, and if released, are prohibited from
leaving their homes to prevent them from getting an abortion.
93According to this source, members of Muslim and Croatian units
who are infected with the AIDS virus or other communicable
diseases are deliberately brought to the bordels to rape the
Serbian women. lt was reported that 72 year-old girls have
been raped at this bordel."
"The 1st Krajina Corps in Banja Luka reported that
Serbian women of al1 ages were imprisoned and subjected to
rape in private prisons belonging to several Bosnian Muslims."
"Rostovo Ski Centre: According to a report compiled in
7992, 750 Serbian prisoners were held at the ski centre, and
30 of those prisoners were reportedly Serbian women. This
camp may be the same as the Kalin motel brothel located at
Ravno Rostovo. "
"House of Relja Lukic: According to one source, the
home of Relja Lukic, a Serb allegedly killed by Muslim or Croat
forces, was used as a concentration camp for 50 Serbian
prisoners. One report estimated that 75 Serbian women were
being held at this house. The exact location of the camp within
Bugojno was not provided. The report indicated that either the
Army of BiH or the Army of the Republic of Croatia was in
control of the camp."
"Slavko Rodic Factory: The Commission has received a
report of a concentration camp controlled by the Army of the
BiH or the Army of the Republic of Croatia, located in the
Slavko Rodic Factoty. There are reportedly 700 Serbian
prisoners being held at the factoty. According to one report, the
ICRC visited a detention facility established at a factory in
Bugojno on 28 September 7993. No information was provided
regarding numbers of detainees or the conditions then existing
at the prison" "Bugojno Gymnasium: According to a report compiled in
1992, approximatelJ/ 200 Serbians are being held prisoner in
the Bugojno Gymnasium building ."
"Coal Mine-Wlage of Braëenica: According to a report
compiled in 1992, 250 Serbian prisoners were reportedly being
held in coal mine irr Bra2enica."
2.4.1.6. CAPLJINA (pp. 113-117, paras. 914,915,919,
922-932,939-940,942)
ln the section related to the camps in the municipality of
~apljina the Commission describes SIX camps, which are also
listed by the Respondent in the Counter-Memorial (paras 22.0.1.
and 22.4.0.) describing in detail the suffering of Serbs in the
camps Gabela and Dretelj. ln the Report of the Commission the
situationln Gabela is descr~bed invokhg neutral sources, in the
fol1wing way:
"Reports indicated that the camp was overcrowded and
the inmates were physically abused and mistreated. Additionally
food was scarce and facilities for persona1 hygiene were
lacking. Many inmates reportedly suffered from malnutrition.
Bosnian Croat authorities who allegedly ran the camps admitted
to Helsinki Watch representatives that conditions at the camps
were substandard. They blamed overcrowding as the reason for
the substandard conditions. Conflicting reports of the physical
description of the camp were received. There are reports that at
any one time between 1,500 and 3,000 men were held in two
hangars. However, fhere also are reports that the prisoners
were housed in three large storage sheds and that
approximately 650 prisoners were housed in at least one of the
sheds. " The situation in the Dretelj camp was even more difficult
for imprisoned Serbs, manyof whom were killed. The Report of
the Comission,invoking neutral sources, describesthe situation as
follows:
"Reports indicated that as many as 1,500 Serbs were
detained here. Both men and women were imprisoned at this
camp. Several women initially were housed in a two by three
metre cell. After a month at the camp, al1prisoners, both male
and female, were placed in five separate hangars where they
slept on concrete floors. Available reports suggest that one of
the hangars housed approximately 400 people and another
hangar which was approximately 260 square metres-housed
approximately 540 people. Some 70 women of different ages
were reportedly housed in at least one other hangar.
The camp's physical plant was contained under tin roofs,
which became extremely hot in the warm weather months.
Several prisoners died from dehydration brought on by the heat.
Others were forced tu drink urine tu avoid dehydration.
Allegedly prisoners were also detained in four tunnels, in
complete darkness. The only light seen, crept in when the
prisoners were fed the slice of bread and the few spoonfuls of
SGUP that they received each day. Up tu 600 people were
reported tu be in each of these tunnels which were only big
enough to accomodate 170people.
lt is possible that the treatment of theinmates was not
uniform throughout the facility. Conflcting testimony concerning
whether the prisoners were fed once or twice a day was
received For some, the meals consisted of rice, beans or
macaroni, and one slice of bread. ln some cases, the inmates'
families were permitted to bring them food Deprivation of food
was reportedly also used as a form of control and punishment
(...) There are reports that the inmates were regularly beaten
and subjected tu torture. Al1 men were reportedly beaten with
96sticks, wood, rifle butts and fists upon their arriva1at the camp
and also during interrogations. Beatings usually occurred at
night. Additionally the prisoners were forced to engage in
fisticuffs, and if the beatings were not to the guards satisfaction,
the guards would intercede, imposing severe beatings.
The inmates were reportedly subjected to various forms
of torture incfuding having needles pushed under their finger
and toe nails, being burned with candles and cigarettes, having
their tongues impaled with knives, being forced to give guards
rides on their backs, and being forced to eat grass and drink
their own urine. Other prisoners were forced to lick the toilets
clean. At least tivo prisoners were reported to have been
sca@ed. Several others were reported/y made to Wear JNA
uniforms when western reporters were given access to the
camp, although witnesses report that none of the inmates were
combatants. During this visit, any prisoner with visble signs of
abuse were hidde17in separate rooms. The soldiers reportedly
threatened to kill anyinmate who refused to confess to foreign
reporters that thereason for bis imprisonment was because he
was a combatant.
Reports indicated that the women were also interrogated
and tortured. They were allegediy beaten during interrogations.
The torture included needles stuck under their finger nails and
cuts to their breasts. They were reportedly raped and forced to
watch the soldiers beat the men.
The inmates were also subjected to a varkty of sexual
abuses. Women, at least for a period of time, were raped daily
by groups of men and were also forced to engage in same-sex
sexual intercourse. The rapes were conimitted in front of the
other prisoners, including their relatives. Repon'edly, the rapes
of the female detainees stopped aeer approximately 70 days,
although the phfisical mistreatment of al1 inmates continued
throughout their detention at the facility. Male detainees were
forced to perform .same-sexsexual acts upon one another whileother prisoners watched, as well as being forced tu engage in
acts of necrophilia.
According tu one reporf, several prisoners managed to
survive detention at this facilitx although an undetermined
number of prisoners were tortured and killed at Dretelj"
"Tobacco Warehouse: Serbian women and some men
were arrested and allegedly taken to a tobacco processing
station incapma, reportedly the headquarters of the HOS. The
prisoners were subjected tu torture. Reports indicated that
women were raped at this camp and subjected tu daily abuse.
The guards placed a hot iron on at least one woman's bare
flesh. The women were forced tu walk naked in the street
where they were called Eetnik prosfitutes: Several women tried
tu kill themselves. The guards told one woman that she would
not die until she gave birth tu an 'UstaSan!
Several male prisoners were put in a hermetically sealed
ce11that was filled with tobacco dust. After a period of time, the
guards entered the room and beat the men. These men were
subsequently transferred to the Poduh tobacco processing plant
at Metkoviéand from there to several other camps."
"Police Station: According tu one report, ICRC
representatives visited a detention facilityt a police station in
~apljina on 31 July 1992. No information was provided
regarding the operation and control of this facility.
"Munitions Warehouse: Reports indicated that women
were confined in an overheated metal shed that was a former
munitions warehouse at an abandoned JNA barracks outside of
~a~ljina. The camp was allegedly run by a Major of the
Croatian Defence Association of the Party of Rights (HOS).
Another report stated that a former JNA ammunition warehousein Gabela, south of Capljina, was one of the main detention
centres in ~apljina.
2.4.1.7. CAZlN (p. 117, paras. 944-947)
"Detention Facilitx Cazin: There are reports of a
Muslim-run detenfion facility in Cazin, but no information
regarding its exact location nor dates of existence. There are
simply reports that Team Hotel of the ICRC monitored the
release of 25 Serbian prisoners held by "Muslim forces" in
Bihac' and Cazin on 3 November 1992.
"Factory: According to one report, ICRC representatives
visited a detentior7 facility at a factory in Cazin on 28 March
1992. No hformation was provided regardhg the operation and
control of this facility.
"Prison/Pervtentiary: According to one report, ICRC
representatives visited a detention facility at a prison in Cazin
on 13 August 1992. No information was provided regarding the
operation and control of this facility.
2.4.1.8. FOJNICA (p.136, paras. 11 11 -1115)
In paragraphs 1111-1115 (Vol. IV, p.136) the Commission
of Experts confirms the existence of camps under Muslim control
in Fojnica. Although the Commission's Report contains a very
brief description ofhese camps, it can nevertheless be assumed
that the same camps are involved about the existence of which
testimony has been presented in para 7.2.35.0. of the Counter-
Mernorial.2.4.1.9. GORAZDE (p.143, paras. 1158-1 161)
"ln Goraide, there allegedly are four camps for detaining
mainly Serb civilians, but the evidence only provides names for
three of the four detention faci1;t;e.s.BiH Government or Muslim
forces reportedly operated the three named facilities. Reports
indicate that atleast 480 Serbs were detained in these camps,
However, the report from the ICRC's visit tu Goraide on 2
August 1993 States that the Government of BiH held 24
prisoners. Additionally, previous Red Cross reports from 6 May
1993 and 22 June 1993 indicate that the BiH Government held
29 prisoners in Goraide.
"Caves de Ville: Muslim forces allegedly operated a
prison for Serbs at Caves de Wle in Goraide. No additional
information was provided regarding the location, operation or
conditions at this facility".
'Sa~ici Wlage: Reports indicate that BiH Government
forces detained as many as 100 Serbs in the village of Jagici.
No additional information was provided regarding the location,
operation or conditions at this facilityl'.
"Wkovici: Reports indicate that BiH Government forces
detained as many as 380 Serbs in the village of Vitkovici. One
report also alleges that Serbs detained at Wkovici were
tortured. Additionally, between 3 and 5 May 1992, Muslim
!Green Berets' from Goraide, a former waiter among them,
reportedly killed several Serbs from Vitkovici The report also
alleges that Serbian women were raped and Serbian children
were killed2.4.7. 70. ODZAK (pp.180-183, paras. 1479,1498,1500-1 506)
"Odz'akPrimary School: A primary school in Odiak was
turned into a detention centre. The Serbian residents of the
villages nearby were rounded up and taken to the school. The
men were kept in the gymnasium. The women and children
were kept in classrooms and then later interned in Muslm and
Croatian houses in Odz'ak. When the men arrived at the camp,
they were forced to run through a gauntlet of non-Serbs who
beat the Serb detainees as they entered the gymnasium.
The gymnasium was crowded Approximately 700 men
were detained at this camp. The floors were very hard and the
detainees had only coats or blankets for comfort. When
permitted, the detainees had to fine up for the toilet or a bath.
Many detainees did not bathe for four months, ln at least one
instance,prior to an ICRC vis;?,the guards brought a fire truck
in and hosed the detainees down so that they appeared clean.
Many of the detainees fell as a result of the force of theater.
The food in the camp consisted of one slice of bread and one
cup of tea per day. Occasionally, prisoners were fed macaroni.
Once, the guards forced al1 the detainees to eat spoiled, stale
macaroni. The detainees were beaten if they raised their heads
before they were finshed eating the macaroni, The detainees
suffered from dysentery as a result.
During the day, the detainees were forced to sing
UstaSésongs for two or three hours at a time. The detainees
had to greet the Croatian army or members of the paramilitary
formations with the greeting 'Ready for the Homeland!'
Some detainees were taken to the front and forced to
dig trenches for the Croatian soldiers in the areas of Bosanski
Brod and Ora5je. Many detainees were wounded or killed. On 26 May 1992, a group of Croatian National Guards
came to the camp, picked out a group of detainees and beat
them. This incident triggered the beginning of nightly beatings.
The guards beat the detainees with their feet, rifles, truncheons
and other solid instruments. The guards would appear in the
hall and single out a dozen detainees at random or cal1out a
year from 1962 to 1972 and al1 those men born in that year
would have to suffer. The guards would force the detainees to
face a wall and then they would smash the detainees' heads
against the wall from behind ln addition, the detainees were
forced to run up and bit their own head against the blackboard
or wall. If they did not do it hard enough, they were beaten in
the head with a gun. After these beatings, the detainees were
ordered to lick their own blood from the floor.
A member of the National Guards of the Republic of
Croatia would usually be the guard to order the detainees to hit
their heads agahst the wall, He also carved the letter 'U' in the
detainees' chests.
ln addition, other specific mistreatment included forcing
the detainees to hold up their fingers as if making a cross and
then beating those fingers. The guards also left detainees in
locked rooms with vicious dogs. The guards also forced the
detainees to beat each other, including relatives. Additionally,
the guards forced men to kiss each other. The guards beat the
detainees until they were too tired to continue. The soldiers and
guards who beat the detainees were usually drunk.
The guards then turned to torturing with threats. The
guards would order the detainees to pull down their trousers
and would threaten to remove their genitals. The guards would
put guns to detainees' heads and pull the trigger, however, the
guns were not loaded. Detainees who were able to give money to one of the
captors could buy a night without a beating. This captor later
confiscated a// the detainees money and jewelry.
Approximately 30 women were interned at this camp.
These women were taken to adjacent offices and raped. If they
resisted, they were beaten. The women were raped by a
different man each night. Serbian male detainees of various
ages were occasionally brought to the women's area after the
rapes and forced 1.lick the women.
ln one instance, the guards, including two women from
the National Guards of the Republic of Croatia, brought a
mental& handcapped gird to the camp and forced some
detainees to rape her. The male detainees who raped her were
promised a good dinner in exchange. The guards also forced
detainees to rape a girl who had previously worked at a
restaurant in NoviGrad
The camp guards also organked a 'wedding! They took
a woman and mar7,both detainees, and forced a false marriage
ceremony. The guards made the detainees who played musical
instruments play for the 'wedding! The detainees were then
taken to another room where as 'hewlyweds" they were forced
to perform sexual acts,"
'Yl group of pregnant women from another rape camp
were sent to Odiak. The women continued to be raped, but
when they reached an advanced stage of pregnancy the
Croatian men wc~uld leave them alone. The men allegedly
considered this respect for the growing Croatianhild.
At least some of the women were allowed to buy their
freedom. Members of the 'Black Legion' or 'Black Coats' came
to the camp and told the women that if they turned over money
or jewerly they would be freed The women who had money or
jewelry sewed in the hems of their clothes were exchanged
103 The soldiers from the lO7st Bosanski Brod Brigade,
706th Osijek Brigade, 708th Slavonski Brod Brigade also
mistreated the detainees, One individual from Donji Hasié was
infamous at the camp".
"House Arrest: The Serb residents of Donja Dubica,
Struka, Novi Grad, and Trunjak attempted to negotiate a
peaceful departure for Bosanski ~amac. lnstead they were
taken into custody,."
"The Serbian women and children from the villages
surrounding Odiak were rounded up with the men and taken to
the Odiak camp. They were then released and detained in
Muslm and Croatian homes in the area of Novi Grad. While
detained in these homes, the women's ordeals began. The
Serbian women were repeatedly raped. They were raped in the
detention homes and taken from the homes and raped at other
locations. Many of the women were raped by their neighbours.
ParamiMaries soldiers would come at night and order al1 the
women out of the detention home. The soldiers would fine them
up, shine flashlights on their faces, and choose a few of the
women to be taken away and raped. The women would be
returned in the morning, some naked. The rapists told the
women that they were to give birth to a young UstaSa."
"The women were raped by mult~plemen. A few of the
alleged rapists were identifed as the guards at the detention
facilifes at Oraqe, Donja mahala and Odiak School. The
paramilitaries 'Horses of Fire' were also identified as
perpetrators."
"Strolit Factory: Strolt Factory was a detention centre in
Odiak. 2.4.1.11. ORASJE (pp. 183-185, paras. 1510-1528)
As it can be seen from the Counter-Memorial(paragraphs
7.2.12.0. and 7.2.9.0.) some of the most monstrous torture of
Serb inmates took place in the camps in the OraSje area. The
crimes committed in the Donja Mahala camp are also described
in the Report of the Commission of Experts:
"Donja Mahala: Donja Mahala was a Croatian run camp
located in the Bosanska Posavina region near OraSje. The
camp was a school before the hostilities.Detainees were
Serbian men from the surrounding regions and captured Serbian
militia. Many of the detainees had been previously interned in
camps located in Odiak, Bosanski Brod, and Slavonski Brod.
Donja Mahala bas been described as 'the death camp! The
camp operated from at least May 1992. On 9 December 1992,
ICRC delegates found 161 detainees af the camp. The
detainees were fed the same food as the guards, however, they
got on& one meal every one or two days.
The detainees were kept in groups of approximate(y 15
people in different rooms at the camp. The detainees
designated one room as the 'solitary confinement cell!
Detainees that were moved into this room were killed. ln the
solitary ceIl, the detainees received only a cup of tea and a
slice of bread a day.
The detainees ai Donja Mahala were routine4 tortured and
executed. To muffle the screams of those beaten, the guards
would stuff rags in their mouths. An inmate at the camp
described various instances of torture that he endured. One
perpetrator burned the inmates beard off his face and drove
screwdrivers through bis bands onto a board. Another
perpetrator beat him with a heated rod, a wooden oar, stabbed
him in the back, and drove a power drill into bis head. Still
another tied the inmate's testicles with wire and then beat bis
genital region. Yet a fourth crushed bis fingers su that the
105inmate would not be able to make a cross in religous services.
The inmate considered himself fortunate compared to other
detainees at Donja Mahala.
ln another account, the guards removed skin from one
detainee's head every day so that he had only bloody wounds
instead of hair. This detainee also had bis right band broken.
The detainees were forced to clean up the blood from
the floors, tables and walls after the beatings. The guards
furtherpunished the detainees if any blood was found.
While in the camp, some detainees were forced to dig
trenches at the front for the regular army of the Republic of
Croatia and for paramiMary Ustage formations. Fifieen men
were killed while digging trenchesat the front. At the front, the
detainees were forced to climb out of the trenches and shout
abuse at the Serb soldiers. ln addition, the detainees pulled out
dead and injured members of both armies. The Serb trench
diggers were forced to watch as the Serb soldiers' bodies were
mutilated. ln one report, the guards killed a PoW when he was
too weak to dig a trench; he had been denied food for 73
days.
Detainees were also beaten on the head, knifed in the
legs, arms, and back, and burned with cigarettes. On occasion,
one of the perpetrators allowed a detainee to see a doctor
concerning injuries sustained from a harsh beafing, however,
the guards would confiscate the medicine given to the detainee.
Among those particularly brutaked were Serbian militia
from Vukovar, including their commander and depufy
commander. The deputy commander died on the torture table.
Only eight of the Vukovar militiamen survived the camp. The
guards pulled wire through the PoWs earlobes and hung heavy
wooden boards on the ends of the wires. The guards alsoslashed the tongue of one Pou While the men were tortured,
the guards laughed.
Some of the detainees were moved to Donja Mahala
when the Croatians pulled out of an area. Approximately 700
men were moved to the camp when the Serbs took over
Bosanski Brod When the detainees arrived, they were met by
one of the captors and then taken to the yard where they were
beaten al1 day. These detainees were not allowed water or
toilet facimes. Some of the men were beaten in the genjtals.
The guards told them they looked best as corpses floating
along the Sava River.
To further I7umiliate the detainees, the guards relieved
themselves on the detainees' boots and refused to allow the
detainees to rernove the boots. As a result, at least one
detainee had open wounds on his feet that subseguently turned
into gangrene."
"On the Orthodox Christmas, six or seven members of
the Croatian National Guard arrived at Donja Mahala to further
victimke the detainees. The Croatian soldiers lined up the
detainees and beai them. The soldiers forced 'the detainees fo
admit to killings and rapes of Croatian and Muslirn people! The
soldiers had the detainees repeat the forced confessions to
German reporters. "
The Respondent singles out in particular the part of the
Report from whicti it can be seen how the media were
manipulated and how a distorted picture of the real developments
during the war in BiH was created. As it can be seen from the
part of the Report quoted below - and it is only one of the many
similar examples - Serb civilians imprisoned in the Donja Mahala
camp were forced by the camp authorities to confess before the
reporters to the alleged crimes which they had not committed. "The guards also coerced some detainees tu confess tu
certain crimes tu reporters from Globus and Reuters and to
English, Australian, and German reporters by offering an
exchange for the confession."
Further in the text of the same pari of the Report there is
a description of another two out ofseveral camps in OraSje, in
which Serbs were held, tortured and killed while women were
raped on a mass scale.
"Orage School: Civilians were detained in a school in
Oraqe while they waited for prisoner exchanges. Some of the
detainees had been previously interned in different camps.
"Rape Camp: From at least April tu October 7992, a
detention centre housed women in Oraqe. The women interned
in this camp were repeatedly raped by Muslim militiamen. Many
women who were raped became pregnant and suffered further
as a result of their experiences. Women sought abortions or
adoptions at a number of hospitals and women's clinics.
2.4.7.72 SARAJEVO (pp.281-291, paras 2382-2421, 2423-
2426,2428,2435-2440)
"There were reportedly many humanitarian law violations
at the-private detention facilities. Some of these small facilities
were allegedly 'bordellos: or sites where women were kept and
raped and sexually assaulted for the gratification of the soldiers,
Many of these allegations were very general, though some
sources identified specific sites which were reportedly used for
such purposes. "
"Premises at Danila Ozme Street: The BiH Government
allegedly detained Serb women here for the purpose of rape.
There is no information on when the site was opened, how
many detainees were there, or what the conditions were, but
the site was closed at the end of August 1992.'"
108 "Premises at ~engic Wla: The BiH Government alleged(y
detained Serb women here for the purpose of rape. There is no
information on when the site was opened or closed, how many
detainees were there or what the conditons were".
"Railway Station: Serbian girls were reportedly held here
and raped. The submitting source stated that Muslims ran the
site as part of a plan tu get rid of al1 Serbs. There is no
informaion on when the site was opened or closed, how many
detainees were there, or what the conditions were'!
"Primary School Petar Djokic: Serbian girls were
allegedly held here and raped. The source stated that Muslims
ran the site as part of a plan tu get rid of al1 Serbs. There is
no information on when the site was opened or closed, how
many detainees were there, or what the conditions were':
"Sports Centre Skenderia: Serbian girls were allegedly
detained here and' raped. The source stated that Muslims ran
the site as part of a plan tu get rid of al1 Serbs. There is no
information an when the site was opened or closed, how many
detainees were there, or what the conditions were'!
"The Hotel Zagreb: The BiH Territorial Defefice allegedly
ran a 'bordello' for Serbian girls and women here. ln a separate
submission the same source stated that Muslims ran the site as
part of a plan tu gef rid of al/ Serbs. There is no information on
when the site was opened or closed, how many detainees were
there, or what the conditions were."
"The Hotel Evropa: The BiH Territorial Defence allegedly
ran a 'bordello' for Serbian girls and women here. Muslhs
reportedly took one identified girl here in July 1992 from Breka
after they killed her mother and father. There is no information
on when the site was opened or closed, how many detainees
were there or what the conditions were."
109 "The Mladen Stojanovic Dormitory or Youth Hostel on
Radiceva Street: This site was located near the Sarajka
department store. lt was allegedly converted into the Security
Service Centre Department in Sarajevo and was the first step
for prisoners on the way tu either the Viktor Bubanj barracks or
the Central Prison. BiH Government forces reportedly operated
the facilitx where Serb women were allegedly detained and
raped. According tu one source, the Muslims strategic plan was
tu rid the area of al1 Serbs. There is no information on when
the site was opened or closed, how many detainees were
there, or what the conditions were. "
"School of Civil Engineering: The Republika Srpska
identified a man who ran a camp here where 100 Serb women
were allegedly detained and raped. "
'Herodrom: Women were allegedly detained, raped, and
killed here. No additional information regarding control or length
of the facility's existence was made available"
"Student Hostel in Vraca: Women were allegedly
detained and raped here. No additional information regarding
control or length of thefacilii'y's existence was made available"
"Houses in Sokolac: Women were allegedly detained
and raped here. "
"Other small prisons housed both men and women. ln
these, the detainees were allegedly beaten, some killed, and
some women were raped. There is little information on many of
these sites."
"Premises on Oktobarske Revulucije Street: According tu
a statement by two named witnesses, Serbian men were held
here, one identified Serbian man was beaten tu death with a
mallet, and prisoners were used as /ive shields"
110 "Basement of Apartment Building at Trg Zavnobih-a: A
named Bosnian Serb witness stated that there were prison cells
at this location two metres wide by 20 metres long. ln one ce11
were 57 prisoners, 17 of whom were women. They lay on
wooden pallets along the wall. Some reportedly had broken
limbs and ribs, bruken teeth, or head wounds. The witness
stated that he was beaten because he was from Pale. During
the day, he stated ,that dogs were brought in and torced to bite
the prisoners. The witness identified two of the men who beat
the prisoners as Senad and 'KruSko! "
"Mladost, Tl-g Zavnobih-bb: According to a witness, in
April, about 20 Serbs allegedly were arrested, mistreated, and
tortured at a detention facility established in this public building.
Two identified mer;, were allegedly killed The witness stated
that the commander of the Territorial Defence in Sarajevo, was
one of the perpetrators."
"Cafe Borsalino: According tu one source, a detention
facility was established in this Sarajevo cafe. This facility was
reportedly run by the Bosnian Muslim commander of the
Territorial Defence in Sarajevo. lndividuals detained here were
allegedly tortured and denied food and water."
"School of Electrical Engineering: A witness stated that
after being brought here, the guards confiscated his documents
and al1 of his money. He reportedly later learned that Green
Berets were found on zut mountain with al1 of his personal
documents. "
"Unidentifiea'basement prison: A named witness
reported that he was arrested 6 May 7992 by Muslim Green
Berets, He recalled witnessing the torture and forced confession
of a fellow detathet?. The witness stated that the prisoner was,
thereafter, killed by an identified man. There were reportedly
other Serbs presenl: who were also physically abused. "
111 "Unidentified facility on Tetovska Street: ln October
1992, a woman was allegedly taken from ber home tu a
basement, which had been transformed into a containment
area, in Tetovska street. During ber detention, the woman was
reportedly interrogated and raped by members of the Muslim
army. She became pregnant and received an abortion in March
1993, inber 22nd week of pregnancy. '"
"Unidentified military prison: According tu Francois Didier
of Paris' Daily Liberation: Serbian prisoners, who appeared to
be civilians,were kept at a military prison for exchange. They
reportedly had visibleinju,,-ies.Another account involved a Serb
man who saved a Muslim lmam during an attack on
DobroSeviéi and Ahatoviéi h June of 7992. This man stated
that he was arrested by Territorial Defence Forces on 29 June
7992, and taken tu this prison. He stated that he told the
people who arrested him that he had saved the lmam, but he
was taken to the military prison anyway. He gave no further
details'"
"Unidentified School: A witness reported that ber son's
school in Sarajevo was now a prison and a bordello. She said
that she never saw women, and could not Say if Serb or
Muslim women were held there. She stated that she saw
members of the Muslim army enter the school and heard
screams of womer~and men."
"Ramiz Saltin: According tu one report, representatives
of th2 ICRC visited a detention faciliw in Ramiz Saltin. The
facility was established in a localrison/penitentiary and was in
existence on 27 December 1993. No information was provided
regarding the operation and control of this facil'"y.
Yl~paSino Polje: There was at least one site of
detention in this area in Sarajevo. Three Bosnian Serb male
witnesses describe events occurring at 'the prison at AlipaSino
Polje: indicating that there may have been only one. The fourth
112report states merely that Serbian women were raped by BiH
Government forces on premises in this area. Because the other
witnesses do not allege that women were raped at the prison
where they were held, this may be another site."
"The three witnesses each state that they were held in
a prison run by the Muslim Territorial Defence Forces of BiH.
The facilify was reportedly used primariïy for housing Bosnian
Serbs. They also reported that both women and men were held
there. One stated that there were 72 inmates. The witnesses
did not describe conditions at the prison, but al1three described
beatings and kilbngs, One man stated that he witnessed Muslim
guards kill three men and saw guards interrogate another young
man about weapons. When the young man replied he knew
nothing about weapons, the guards allegedly tied him to a table
and worked bis anus over with a rasp. The witness stated that
he saw the young man later in a pool of his own blood, still
alive"
"The most detailed testimony was from a Serb man who
said he was detained in a basement prison called 'block Br for
eight days. He claimed he was imprisoned for being a Serb. He
said he was interrogated and beaten. The prison inspector
questioned the witness about the names of other 'Cetniks!
When the witness stated that he knew a man with a particular
name, he was beaten for 12 hours. The prison inspector
reportedly watched the beating from a bed, rising from time to
time to participate in the beating, The witness stated that he
was put in a stralght jacket twice and beaten with boards and a
wooden stick. When he lost consciousness, the guards threw
water over him. The witness also reported that the prison
inspector urinated on bis head and tried to force the witness to
perform fellatio on him. When the witness refused, the prison
inspector threatened him and took a stick, forcing it in and out
of the witness'mouth, saying that this was what he did to Serb
women with his penis. The witness stated that he was beaten
again, and when returned to the other prisoners, was unable to
113move for three days. The witness was called two days later to
sign a written statement. He wrote bis original story and was
beaten again. The prison inspector reportedly carne to hirn,
saying that he would be relezsed if he would tell who
collaborated with the 'ietniks: The prison inspector also said
that many people were interceding on behalf of the witness
including the management of the firm where he was employed.
After eight days, the commander of the Territorial Defence
came to the prison. He called out the narnes of each of the 72
detainees, one by one, and released them. The witness
identified five guardswho beat prisoners, and two guards he
said did not beat prisoners"
"Electrotechnical School, Buëa Potok: This prison was
allegedly located at the Electrotechnical school inBuëa Potok,
on Prvomajska Street. The prison was reportedly run by
members of the Bosnian Muslim paramilitary group the Green
Berets and the Territorial Defence of BiH. There were eight
male detainees, seven of whom were Serb and one of whom
was a Muslim, who allegedly intended to give a Serb a list of
Muslims who should be killed.
The sole account of this detention facility was provided
by a Serb male. He stated that he was arrested on 17 May
7992, beaten and taken to the school. He recalled that there
were some 30 armed individuals positioned in front of the
facility. They reportedly ordered the prisoners to stand facing
the wall, after which they were beaten. The witness and the six
others arrested with him were taken to the basement. They
were reportedly the only detainees there. The detainees were
accused of owning radio transmitters and guiding Serb shells.
One man, between 75 and 80 years old, died after being
beaten for half an hour. Another man, about 75 years old, was
brought in and killed by being beaten for an hour. The bodies
of these two men were put into a sewer which emptied into the
MiJacka river. The witness reported that the perpetrators stated
they were from Foza, Goraide, and Zvornik. The witness also
114stated that he overheard beatings of other prisoners by what
sounded like elderly women. The witness did not describe other
conditions at the p,rison, nor did he describe hi. release."
"Central Prison (National Prison): This prison was
allegedly run by an identified man. An actor reportedly helped
manage the prisor?, though he left at the beginning of August
1992 The commander of the fifth floor, where women were
allegedly held, was also named. Ten other guards were
identified. Finally, one source added that the commander of the
Territorial Defence visited the prison. The reports regarding this
site state that Serb detainees were held here from May 1992
until at least July. 1992, One source stated that part of the
prison was opened in September 7992 for inspection by
humanitarian orgariizations. 60th men and women were held at
this site, and one report stated that even children were detained
here. There is no indication of how many civilians and PoWs
were held here, or whether the detainees, whose statements
were provided, were civilian or military prisoners. However, one
report stated that a witness was kept in one room witb 30 other
Serb prisoners.
Hygienic conditions were described as terrible. One
report stated that detainees were fed tea, bread and a little bit
of pasta. Another report stated that detainees were fed only
once per day. Aiiegedl' detainees were given one litre of water
every four days. One witness, who was held in solitary
confinement, reported that toilet facilitiesconsisted of an
outhouse outside. lt was open and had no water. The same
witness stated that he received no medical attention for wounds
from beatings.
Detainees were reportediy beaten and tortured. Several
reports state that Green Berets, Mujahedh warriors, police
officers, and criminals were allowed to enter the prison and
beat the detainees. Women were allegedly rape6' there. One
report alleged that the commander of the wumen's fluor extorted
115jewelry under the threat of rape. Another report stated that
women were raped every night. Some detainees reported that
they were forced to sign false confessions saying that they
were cetnik' sympathizers or snipers, and some said they were
forced to testifj on Sarajevo television. One report stated that
every night five to six Serbs died, and more were brought in to
take their place. One man was allegediy abducted and taken to
the Central Prison because bis brother was willing to exchange
700 Muslim prisoners for him.
According to another report, representatives of the ICRC
visited a detention facility in a prison in Sarajevo. The report
notes the existence of this faciliw as late as3 March 1993. No
additional information regarding operation or control of the
faciliw was provided in the report."
"Ciglane: There were two places in this area of Sarajevo
where people were detained. One was allegediy a 'bordello'
holding Serb women and girls as young as 10 to 12 years old.
The oniy account of this location came from a Serb woman
who was held there. She stated that drunk Croatian and Muslm
forces came to the site and raped the girls there. She alleged
that many young girls were gang raped, and that none of the
detainees were allowed to talk to each other. A former
schoolmate of the witness brought her to this location. He had
kidnapped ber in Livno and brought ber along when he was
transferred to Sarajevo."
"Unidentified Tunnel: Another site in this area where
people were allegedly detained was an unidentified tunnel. At
this tunnel, Serbs were reportediy detained by Muslims
beginning in mid May. The site was run by an identified
commander. He is suspected by the Government of FRY to be
involved in crimes committed at the camp. The Government
does not specim what these crimes were." "Detic: On 7 July 1992, Muslim and Croat forces
allegedly attacked the village of Presjenica. Some were killed,
and about 50 were taken prisoner. They were taken to a
Musllin-run camp in DeCic and held for two months. A Serb
witness alleged that there was malnutrition, beatings,
humiliations, and threats to kill. Younger women were allegedly
taken away for forced prostitution and rape. The witness was
exchanged in Kalhovik, 31 August 1992, through the Yugoslav
Red Cross. She stated that five Muslims were exchanged for
every Serb. ."
"Dobrinja: There were allegedly several sites of detention
in this section of Sarajevo. The Republic of Serbia reported that
in mid-June, there were mass arrests of Serbs, beginning with
the intellectuals, The prisoners allegedly were first taken to the
Territorial Defence Staff or to theilitary Police Staff and then
put into basement prisons in the area. "
"Sunce Storehouse, Dobrinja: One of these prisons was
Sunce Storehouse, located under Privredna Banka. The site
was reportedly run by the Territorial Defence forces and housed
Serb men and women. One report described the prison as
three cells and a guard room. A witness stated that there were
63 men and women kept there in one room, There was a lack
of food and light, and detainees were reportedly heavily beaten.
One witness stated that the commander of the prison was a
Muslim man, identified by nickname. Some prisoners were
reportedly moved from this location to the l4ktor Bubanj
barracks or Central Prison."
"Unidentified Basement Prison, Dobrinja: There may
have been another basement prison h this area of Sarajevo. A
witness described his detention in a basement prison with about
700 other Serbs. He stated he was arrested on 23 June 1992
by the Territorial Defence and put into an unidentifed
basement. He was interrogated, beaten, and forced to throwtwo Molotov cocktails at Serb houses in Nedianci He identified
the commander at the site, and also identified two guards,
'Ytomic shelter, Dobrinja: Serbs were also allegedly held
at an atomic shelter in the area for three months, The Serbian
Government identified a Muslim man named Barakovic from
Trebinje as an alleged perpetrator at unnamed private
prisons.'"..)
"Unidentified shelter Camp: One report alleged that in
August 7992, a Serb woman was taken by members of the
Muslim army to a camp in a sheltec set up to detain Serbs.
This woman was detained for five days during which she was
beaten, humiliated, and raped by three members of the Muslim
army. She became pregnant and gave birth to a child in
Belgrade in May 7993. "
"Had2ici frison: The ICRC visited this place of detention
on 77 April 1993. No information was provided regarding
conditions, treatment of detainees or length of detention"
"Grude Prison, Hadjici:. Despite the forced expulsion of
Serbs from ~elebici on 22 April 7992, Muslim and Croat forces
reportedly found 73 Serbs who refused to leave. The Serbs
were imprisoned h Konjic for a period of two days during which
they were beaten and mistreated On 8 May the Serbs were
taken to Grude prison. The prison was reportedly a Croatian-run
facilty. The Serbs were allegedly tortured on arriva4 a
consequence of which, one Serb was reported to have lost bis
life'"
"Bordellos' in HadiiC: ln late 7997 and 7992, Muslim
and Croat forces allegedly ran bordell loh^ousing Serb women
and girls as young as 72. These women were reportedly kept
in the 'bordellos' until the fifh month of pregnancy, and they
were detained, but apparently not raped, after that to prevent
118abortions. Additionally, men with infecfious diseases including
AIDS were allegedly 'deliberately allowed' to rape the women.
This source further alleged that over 1,000 Serb women were
exposed to this in seven counties.'"
"Hrasnica Prison: According to the Special Rapporteur to
the Human Rk~hts Commission, the BiH Interior Minister
admitted that this site was controlled by the government and
held men of al1 ages and backgrounds. The men were
reportedly forced tc)do dangerous work Me digging trenches on
the frontMe. Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats were allegedly
at particular risk of this detention because they could be
exchanged for Bosnian Muslim prisoners of war. "
'Ygman, Hotel Famos: This site was described by one
witness as a temporary camp. The witness, a Serb man, was
arrested in Konflc wifh 13 friends by members of the Croatian
and Muslim army, The witness stated that they were taken to
the Hotel Famos at Mount lgman. The soldiers beat the
detainees at the hotel entrance. The soldiers ordered the
prisoners to lie on the ground and beat them with boots, pistols
and feet. The soldiers then took the prisoners to an unlit
concrete cellar. Etght soldiers followed the prisoners and beat
them again in the cellar. When the prisoners lost
consciousness, the soldiers allegedly threw water on them to
wake them up. The next day, the prisoners' bands were tied,
and they were forced to walk between two lines of soldiers,
who beat the prisoners with shovels, blunt objects, iron pipes
and rubber truncheons. The prisoners were taken to the Sillos
at Tarëin."
"lgman Prison: The ICRC reported that it visited this
place of detention on 27 May 1993. No information was
provided regarding the treatment of inmates, the length of the
facility's existence nor its exact location." 2.4.7.73. SARAJEVO - KOSEVO (p. 292, paras. 2449-
2451)
"KoSévoHospital: One witness alleged that his father
was held by Muslm authorities for nine months in the hospital.
There are no other accounts of people held in the hospital.
Accordng to another reporf, ICRC representatives visited a
detention facilify at a hospital in Sarajevo, No information was
provided regarding conditions or prisoner treatment at this
facilit".
"KoSevostadium: The information regarding this camp is
somewhat conflicting. Two sources reported that 6,000 Serbs
were detained in this camp in 7992. Most were allegedly
released, but some may sti/l be held there. One source alleged
that the Muslm police responsible for the detention were under
orders of the BiH Presidency. Though conditions at the camp
were not described, one source alleged that in July, members
of the Bosnian Muslim paramilitary group, the Green Berets,
threw live Serb children into the cages of wild animals at the
zoo."
2.4.7.74. SARAJEVO - POFALICI (p. 292, paras 2449-2451)
'%faLéi unidentified cellar: An identified 20 year-old
Serb woman alleged that she was held in a private prison in a
basement in Pofaliéi for 25 days in the spring or summer of
7992, The private prison was allegedly run by an identified
man. The witness stated that she was abducted on the way
home from work by four Green Berets. She was faken tu a
cellar. lt was a small hall, partitioned with wood. There were no
windows or ventilation. She was placed in a very small room
with another woman, 76 years-old This other woman had been
there for two days before the witness, and her father was a
colonel. The room held only a blanket and a spotlght on the
ceiling. it was only a little larger than the witness was tall. The
120guards brought in chairs when they needed them, such as for
oral sex. The first night the witness was raped by 12 men in
black coveralls and the commander. Among the men was a
man identified by nickname.The commander raped her first that
night, both orally and vaginal&. The witness was raped every
nwt. She stated that she heard cries of other women in the
adjoining spaces, She was released through the intervention of
a Muslim friend. The commander advised ber to forget what
had happened. "
"Pofal/ci House of Correction: Another site where people
were allegedly detained was the basement of the House of
Correction inPofaliéi.A witness testified that hewas held there
for three days and two nights. He stated that he was
interrogated and beaten by two members of Special units. They
beat him with their bands, feet, sticks and rifle butts. They also
allegedly called him a 'Cetnik' and asked how many Muslim
women he had raped at zut mountain. An identified man was
allegedly a guard at this site."
"Pofalici Cultural Centre: One report states merely that
a great number of' Serb wom are held at this site.
2.4.1.15. TARCIN (pp. 298-299, paras. 2490, 2492-2498)
There are a number of reports of camps in Tarein, the
largest among them located in the local grain silos. Some
reports described only "a camp" or "the camp': in Tarein.
Regardless, the camp or camps were allegedly run by the BiH
Government. ln the Spring of 1992, armed Musims from the
village of Tarëh attacked their Serbian neighbours. Some of the
Serb villagers were taken to the silos. The armed groups were
allegedly led by a retired police officer, anda military school
student. The arrested villagers were allegedly tortured and
beaten before they were taken to the camp. Bradina, Konjc
was attacked 25 May 1992. The men were reportedly taken to
121camps at Tartin and ~elebi~i, while women and children were
imprisoned in the primary school buildng or sent tu the Sports
hallMusala.
"Tartin, Silos: This camp was a concrete grain silos with
77 small compartments 25 to 35 square metres each. Between
each compartment were walls about four metres high and about
one half metre to one metre wide. Guards walked along these
walls. There was a long corridor between the cells, and there
were no sanitary faciliieswater or light. The camp was
encircled by barbed wire. The detainees slept on the concrete
floor, The guards called each other only by their last names.
Theirplace of command was a small '@remise"within the Silos.
The commander was a named Muslim, and four of the guards
were identifiedTwo witnesses were at the camp at about the
same time, in early June 7992. One stated that the camp was
full and that bis ce11had 75 other Serb males in it, al1 from
Konjic. This witness also stated that Serbs were brought in
every day, after having been beaten at the Health centre
nearby. This witness was transferredtu ~elebici on 4 June. The
other witness stated thatis ce11contained about seven or eight
Serb males from TarCin.A fourth witness did not state when he
was at the camp. He was transferred with 73 others from the
Hotel Famos at Mount lgman. He stated there were about 50
Serbs imprisoned there. There were about 75 men in over 12
small, damp filthy cells. The witness stated that three tu four
Muslim guards took each Serb one by one for interrogation.
The Serbs were beaten during this interrogation, especially by
the four named guards dscussed above. After only a day at
this site, the witness and24 others were taken tu ~elebiéi ln
the second half of August, 20 to 25 prisoners from the silos
and Krupa were taken out and killed The prisoners were local
Croats and Serbs. The murders were organ~zedby a Bosnian
Hill Brigade Commander, a Tartin HP Commander, and the
Konjïc Civil Police Commander. The murders were committed by
an identified man. The men were killed in the middle of the
night at a slaughterhouse owned by Red20 Baciri, on theTarein-Kresevo road The bodies were disposed of between the
slaughter bouse and the river. "
"Other reports of the area of Tartin did not specify to
what camp they referred. Several sources just stated that there
was a camp at TarCin. Three reports alleged that women were
detained at the camp. One of these alleged that girls and
women were raped there. The ICRC allegedly visited a camp in
November of 7992, and found it lacking in heat, with insufficient
coverings for detainees. Finally, a camp was still allegedly in
operation in late 7993."
"Health Centre h Tartin: Accordng to one report Serbs
were severely beaten by Muslim soldiers at the health centre
which was located some 200 metres from the silos. Many of
those mistreated at the health centre were reportedly taken to
the grain silos. No additional information was made available
regarding the duration of prisoner internment, nor the conditions
attendant at the facilit."
2.4.7.76. TRNOVO (pp.299-300, paras 2500-2504)
"Trnovo: This area was generally used as a point of
exchange of prisoners. Two witnesses reported that they were
taken to Trnovo for unauthorized exchanges. One witness
stated that he had been imprisoned by joint Muslim and Croat
forces at celebici camp in May 7992 and was transferred to the
Sports hall in Konjic in August 7992. He stated that on 6
November 1992, he and about 29 other Serbs were taken to
Trnovo for an informal exchange. The detainees were kept in
stores next to the police station for two months, during
negotiations. The guards did not beat the prisoners, but some
prisoners of war were killed. Additionally, the witness alleged
that the detainees were required to do physical labour. The site
where the witness was kept was a bare space with wooden
pallets for sleeping. When the witness was finally exchanged,
123 10 prisoners remained. Three from Konjic were exchanged later,
and the witness did not know what happened to the remaining
seven from Kalinovik. He stated that there was a constant
turnover in Trnovo because prisoners from Konjic were sent
there for exchange regularly.."
"Wktor Bubanj Army Barracks: This site was formerly a
prison for 5th Army Division soldiers. lt was turned into a camp
housing both Bosnian Serb men and Bosnian Serb women, al1
civiïians, though some were accused of informing or signalling
the Serb army. lt was allegedly also called Vuka's Prison'! lt
was run by a local army official. However, another report stated
that the camp was run by a man identified by nickname. The
population was estimated at over 200, the men housed in 72
cells and the women in seven cells. The main foreman for the
women was identified by only one name, Some of the women
were allegedly wives of former or current JNA rnembers. One
report alleged that four captured Serb soldiers were brought to
this camp in September of 1992 and executed in front of other
detainees. One part of the prison was allegedly in better
condition for visits by journalists and theCRC. Also, detainees
were allegedly forced to make false staternents to journalists.
Prisoners were beaten, and denied medicaf assistance, and
women prisoners were raped. One witness was arrested by
Green Berets and taken to the prison. She was put into a small
roorn with seven other women, some young and some elderly.
More women arrived later. The floor was covered with a
mattress and blankets, The witness was interrogated, beaten,
and raped. She stateo' that the other women were raped
frequently also, but each by the same, Muslim man - one man
for each woman. The women were raped in front of each other,
and a small roorn next door was used only for oral sex. The
witness was helped by a Muslim woman, who supplied her with
contraceptives, Other women became pregnant, -and were
allegedly told they could receive abortions if they testified that
Serbs had raped them. The witness became pregnant when the
Musïim woman could no longer supply ber with contraceptives.
124The witness stated that several people were killed, and the
guards performed mock executions. The witness escaped in
mid-December with the help of an identified person."
"The Thomson Mission visited this Muslim-run faciliv on
1 September 1992. Mission representatives located some 727
Serbian detainees, eight of whom were young to middle aged
women. Male detainees ranged in age from early 20's to well
over 60 years. The vast majority claimed to be innocent
civilians, including an oral surgeon who was arrested as an
alleged threat to BiH peace and security. Two among them said
they were members of Karad23 SDS. Health related
conditions appeared to have been satisfactory, although there
was evidence of head and body lice infection among the
inmates. The detainees were reportedly held here for close to
three months. "
2.4.1. 1Z TESANJ (p.307, paras 2553,2554)
"MiktaaryPrison, Tes'anj.. The /CRC reported that their
representatives visjted a detention facility at the military prison
in TeSanj on 24 November 1992. No information was made
available regarding the length of detention or conditions at this
facility.
"Hospital, Tesanj: The ICRC reported that their
representatives visited a detention facility at the military prison
in TeSanj on 24 Novernber 1992. No information was made
available regarding the length of detention or conditions at this
facility. 2.4.7.78, TRAVNIK (pp.313-314, paras. 2610,2611)
"Travnik Barracks: The ICRC reported that it visited a
place of detention at the Travnik Barracks on 7 December
7992."
"'Bratstvo' Factoty: Serbian prisoners are allegedly held
in large tanks at a chemical factory in Novi Travnik. Prisoners
must climb to a ladder leading into the tank to avoid falling into
the chemicals below, The tanks are covered and locked so as
not be seen by the public.'"
2.4.7.79. TUZLA (pp. 315, paras 2617-2633,2635-2643)
The situation in Tuzla,as well as the situation of the Serb
population in this town and the municipality of Tuzla are
described in the Counter-Memorial (paragraphs 2.13.4., 7.1.20.0.,
7.2.19.0. and 7.3.3.0.). In addtion to the early preparationsof the
Tuzla SDA leadership for military operations in this municipality
and in the wider territory ofiH, lay-offs of Serbs and murders of
Serb civilians, the Counter-Memorial also describes torture and
killings of Serbs in the camps in Tuzla which were under the
direct control of the Government of BiH. The existence of these
camps has also been confirmed in the Report of the Commission
of Experts in the following way:
'Yîccording to the ICRC, as of 5 November 1992, 797
prisoners were reportedly held by the Bosnian government,
According to another ICRC report, 783 prisoners were held by
the BiH government as of 5 April 7992.'"
"'Dr. Mustafa Mujbegovic" Hospital: A report was
received which alleged that wounded members of the JNA were
imprisoned in this Tuzla hospital before being transferred to the
Tuzla Prison. According to two reports JNA forces leaving the
126 'Husinska Buna' barracks in Tuzla, evacuating soldiers and
equ~pment in accordance with a prior agreement, were
ambushed by BiH Territorial Defence Forces on 75 May 1992.
A reserve lieutenant was wounded in the leg as he drove one
of the JNA trucks. He and two members of the JNA were
wounded when the truck veered off the road. They were
captured by members of the Territorria Defence. The wounded
men were reportedly beaten al1 the way to the hospital. The
report indicated that other members of the retreating JNA forces
were captured and beaten by members of the Territorial
Defence as they were being transported to the hospital. An
identified physician allegedly tortured JNA prisoners at the
hospital. JNA prisoners were placed in various departments of
the hospitals along with wounded members of the Territorial
Defence Forces. This arrangement reportedly gave the
Territorial Defence members an opportunity to take out their
persona1 vendettas against the JNA soldiers. The JNA soldiers
were later transported to the Tuzla Prison where they were
tortured by a named man. He allegedly stated that bis greatest
pleasure was to 'kill Wach babies in cradles! Another guard
identified only by nickname from the eastern part of Tuzla,
allegedly tortured the JNA prisoners also.
"Military Hospital: ICRC representatives reportedly visited
a detention facility at amilitary hospital on 14 March 7994 in
Tuzla. No information regarding treatment of prisoners, identity
of prisoners nor length of detention was provided."
"Hospital: ICRC representatives reportedly visited a
detention facility located in a hospital in Tuzla on 70 August
7993. No additional information regarding treatment of prisoners,
identity of prisoners nor length of detention was provided.
"Tuzla Prison: A report was received that Serbian
prisoners have been detained in the Tuzla prison. Serbians
from the village of Stupari were allegedly detained without trial.
Two Serbian prisoners interviewed in the Tuzla prison reported
127that they had been detained in an unidentified building by
authorities inStupari on 28 May 7992. These prisoners stated
that they were never informed of the legal justification for their
detention. They were reportedly transferred to Tuzla in February
7993 and tried and convicted for illegal possession of weapons.
A judge sentenced the prisoners to one year's imprisonment
beginning on 77 Februaty 7993. During sentencing, the judge
informed them that he was unable to take into consideration the
9 months they had spent in detention because no records
existed of their detention."
"The Serbian civihans in Tuzla were subjected to forced
mobilkation into the Bosnian government army. Those who
refuse to be drafted were reportedly tried and sentenced to
three to 70 years in prison. Serbian civibans from the
surrounding areas who refuse to respond to the draft,
particularly those from Banovic6 were allegedly mobilized by
force and taken to the front fines to dg trenches,"
"Members of the ICRC reportedly visited a detention
facility in Tuzla on 28 May 7993. No addifional information
regarding the operation of this facility nor the duration of its
existence was provided "
"ln an open lettec Serbian orthodox Bishop VasilJe of
Tuzla asked the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church to
protest the treatment of Serbs in Tuzla on 77 March 7993. The
letter reported that 300 Serbs were imprisoned in the main
prison and that the Tuzla Serbs were subjected to physical
abuse and forced conscription into the Bosnian army. The letter
also reportedly stated that trials were rigged and that many
Serbs had been sentenced to 75 years hard labour. Most
prisoners were allegedly executed shortly after imprisonment,
and others were so debilitated from physical and psychological
torture and starvation that it took them several months to
recover." "Barracks: Members of the ICRC reportedly visited a
detention facility in a barracks in Tuzla on 15 September 1993.
No addifonal information regarding the operation of this facility
nor the duration of its existence was provideci"
"MiMary Prison: Members of the ICRC reportedly visied
a detention facility at the military prison in Tuzla on 23
September 7992. No additional information regarding the
operation of this facifity nor the duration of its existence was
provided "
"Private Muslim Prisons: A report concerning the
existence of Muskm prisons in the town of Tuzla was received,
The BBC reported that Serbian sources reportedly had
information concerning the owner of private prisons for Serbs
who is also allegedly in control of a private Muslim militia in
Tuzla. According to Vojislav DjurkoviC, head of the State
Commission of the Serbian Republic of BiH, another man
allegedly ordered the execution of many Serbian famifies in
Tuzla working in conjunction with the man who owned the
private prisons. Also accordhg to Djurkovié, Tuzla3 Mayor
allegedly organized a training centre for lslamic terrorists in
Tojsié near the town. Djurkovic' accused the Bosnian Muslim
authorities ofblocking the delivery of humanitarian ai'"
"Tuzla Brothels: A report was received concerning the
existence of Muslim and Croatian run brothels in Tuzla. Another
source reported that 'bordellos' for Serbian women were
reported in Tuzla inlate 7997 and 7992, The BBC reported that
Serbs who escaped from Tuzla reported that young Serbian
women were forcibly taken to brothels by Muslim soldiers. ln
his letter, Bishop Vasilie stated that the Muslim soldiers had a
'schedule' for kidnapping the Serbian women."
'A separate report indicated that members of Croatian
and Muslim forces were sexually abusing Serbian women in
Tuzla brothels. The women were captured by soldiers and
129allegedly imprisoned at the brothels until their fifth month of
pregnancy. After release, they were reportedly kept under house
arrest to prevent them from obtaining abortions. The report
estimated that more than 7,000 Serbian women were
imprisoned in such brothels. The report also alleged that
members of Muslm and Croatian forces that had contracted
AIDS or other communicable diseases were purposely sent to
the brothels t~ rape the women."
"TuSanj Stadium: A report that 4,000 Serbian civilians
were imprisoned at the stadium was received. This rather
astounding figure, while cited inseveral other reports, bas not
as yet been corroborated. "
"Sloboda Football Stadium: A report was received which
suggested that a detention facility existed at the Sloboda
Football stadium in Tuzla where at least 25 to 30 women were
held. The women were raped in front of an undetermined
number of other prisoners."
"Secondary School Brothel: A report was received
indicating that 700 Serbian women were held in a brothel in the
Tuzla Secondary School. No additional information was made
a vailable regarding this faci"ity,
"Private House: A report received indicated that 15
Serbian women were imprisoned in a private house located on
the road towards Srebrenik, near Previla. The report did not
provide the dates that the women were imprisoned or the
identity of the owner of the home."
"Tunnel Prison: A report was received containing
testimony from a Serbian woman held taken to a prison in the
ci@ of Tuzla and imprisoned for five months in what she
described as a tunnel. The witness was a peasant farmer from
the village ofBretje on Mount Majevica. She stated that Muslim
soldiers attacked ber village in early June 7992, taking 36
130Serbian children and dividing the women and girls into groups.
During the attack on the village some of the women were
reportedly raped outside their homes. The witness reported that
one Serbian man committed suicide when his wife and daughter
were raped outside their home. The soldiers were reportedly
armed and wore green patterned disguise uniforms. The
soldiers killed village residents and robbed their homes. The
witness reported that the soldiers separated the men and
women and then loaded the prisoners into covered trucks that
resembled vans. The reporting witness and other female
prisoners were transported to a camp in the city of Tuzla where
she was confined in a 'dark tunnelr with nine other women.
During five months of imprisonment, the witness reported that
the women were riever taken outside. They were fed and given
water in plastic bowls. She stated that none of the female
prisoners were allowed tu take showers or wash their clothes.
She stated that the guards separated the girls from the women
and allegedly subjected the women tu rape. The guards
reportedly concealed theiridentity while committing the rapes by
blindfolding the victims. The women were allegedly subjected to
repeated sexual assault and on some occasions were gang
raped by the guards. The witness reported being subjected to
interrogation concerning the location of her husband and
children by guards in camouflage uniforms. She was allegedly
told that Serbian women would no longer bear Serbian children,
only Muslim and Croatian. The witness was released in late
October in a prisoner exchange at Piper."
rrCellarsin Tuzla: ln an interview, a Serbian psychiatrist
reported that Serbian women were imprisoned in some type of
cellars controlled by Muslims in the town of Tuzla and
subjected tu repeated rape for the purpose of forced
impregnation. The physician worked with Serbian women who
had allegedly been imprisoned in a dark room. Three tu five
men entered the room on a daily basis tu rape the women.
According tu the patients who related their stories of
imprisonment tu the reporting physician, the Muslim soldiers
131intended tu impregnate the Serb women. The men reportedly
told the women that the Koran stated that a child is a Muslim if
the father is a Muslim. The women were generally released
after the third month of pregnancy and, because of their
advanced state, had tu obtain the approval of the psychiatric
commission for an abortion."
"ln a separate report, the same Serbian psychiatrist
reported examinations of four Serbian women who had allegedly
been raped by Muslim and Croatian soldiers while imprisoned in
a cellar ln Tuzla. According tu these reports, the women were
raped on a daily basis and later released in advanced stages of
pregnancy, JNA prisoners were reportedly beaten about their
heads with the vacuum-cleaner hose which was used to clean
the sewer daily."
2.4.7.20 VlSOKO (pp. 327-328, paras 2721-2723,2725,2727-
2729,2731,2732)
Visoko is another municipality with a majority Muslim
population, in which from the very outset of the conflicts mass
pogroms of Serb civilian populationwere carried out by the forces
under the BiH Government control (see paragraphs 7.1.27.0,
7.2.29.0. and 7.3.13.0. of the Counter-Memorial).The majority of
the Serb population was expelled from the area of this
municipality and those who were not killed were imprisoned in
camps. Some of these camps are very briefly described also in
the Report of Bassiouni's Commission:
"In one report, a Serb recalls being the firsf, and for a
short time, the only prisoner detained by Muslms at the local
barracks. According tu the reput-( the Serb male was captured
il7the basement of bis home by Muslim forces on 6 June 7992.
He was taken tu the military barracks and placed in a chair
with bis arms tied behind bis back with ropes. He was
reportedly beaten and interrogated by soldiers and police for
132four hours. According to bis statement, whenever he lost
consciousness, the police threw water on him to revive him and
then continued the interrogation. He recalled that after some
time, the inmate population grew to 750 individuals al1 of whom
were detained in two rooms. The witness recalled watching as
two inmates were beaten to death by the camp guards with the
parficpation of the camp commander. The report suggests that
in addition to camp guards administering beatings, Muslim
civilians from Zenlca and Wsoko were also permitted to enter
the barracks and beat the prisoners."
lAccording to another report, on the first day of the
conflict, SIX individuals were detained at this facility,
Approximately three weeks after the fighting began, the facili7y's
population swelled to more than 750 individuals. Interrogations
were initial& severe and disorgan~zed Following the
appointment of an investigator, the physical mistreatment was
discontinued and the general conditions at the facility improved.
Al1 interrogations were conducted in the office of the
investigator. Those inmates who were deemed guilty of some
crime were transferred to Zenica white the others continued
their detention in Wsoko. One witness described bis
containment facility as one measuring approximately 70 square
metres. There were some 750 other inmates sharing the same
space. The detainees were put on work detail and used as
forced labour to dig trenches around the facility. The report
suggests that women were detained at other area facilities
includlng a camp in the village of HlapCevici"
"Kasarna Camp: According to one report, between May
and December 7992, Serb men, women and childen were
taken from their homes by Muslim forces and detained in what
was reportedly described as a prison camp. The inmates were
subjected to severe physical rnistreatment lncluding beatings
with mallets, hammers, iron rods, and au handles. The inmates
were reportedly not permitted to bathe or shower for two
months. Food was also in rather meagre supply. Two to three
133inmates were forced to share one bowl of soup per day. The
report alleges, additionally, that at one point Muslim territorial
defence forces had shelled the camp, resulting in the death of
two prisoners and the wounding of 14 others."
"Various Homes: According tu one repon: several Wsoko
residents were detained in their homes behind locked doors.
The resident-inmates were subjected to regular shell-fire. The
report suggests that the residents' detention appears to have
been sanctioned and, perhaps even, instituted by the BiH
government. "
"Veterinarian's Ofice: According to one report, a young
Serb male and his parents were arrested and detained on 20
June after Muslim forces had surrounded their home. They
were collected in a group with some 200 siMarly situated
Serbs, and approximately 30 individuals from among the group
(including the witness and bis father) were taken to a
veterinarian's office. The witness was aggressively interrogated
and then shot through both arms. Following the receipt of his
injuries, he was transported to the hospital and thereafter
transferred to the former JNA barracks."
"Hospital: The ICRC reported the existence of a camp in
the Wsoko hospital. The ICRC reportedly first visited this facilip
on 4 June 1993."
"Prison/Penitentiary: The ICRC reported the existence of
a camp - in the Prison/Penitentiary in Vïsoko. The ICRC
reportedly first visited a detention facility at this location on 6
August 7992. No addihona1information was provided regarding
the conditions at this location.2.4.7.2 ZE.NICA (pp. 336-341, paras 2813-2818,2821-2826,2834-
2840)
Zenica is a typical example of prison-cities (see paragraph
1.3.5.29. of the Counter-Memorial) in which the Serb population
was forcibly held so the BiH Government could demonstrate
before the world its alleged wish to preserve a "multi-national
BiH". What the fate of Serbs in the municipality of Zenica under
the Muslim authorities' and Muslim military forces' control was
really like is described in paragraphs 7.1.35.0. and 7.2.31.0. of
the Counter-Memorial. The existence of some of the camps in
Zenica in which Serbs were tortured and killed was also
corroborated by the Commissionof Experts' Report.
Tt is reported that several camps or detention facilities
are located in the Zenica viciinity. ln general, the camps are
administered by the BiH Government or Bosnian Muslim forces.
Nine locations have been identified as detention centres, and
estimates place the total number of persons held over i>,UUU;
although ICRC figures are much lower and some reports claim
that there are only five or six detention centres with
approximately 450 detainees. Al1 identified detention centres are
reportedly under Bosnian Mush control. The following places
have been identified as camps: The Zenica Prison, the Zenica
Music School, the Bila Stadium, the Coal Mines in Zenica, as
well as unidentified facilities in Bilmisce, Zening, Graëanica,
Arnautl; and Begov Han. There is no information regarding the
possible relationship between these camps and there is little
indication that prisoners are moved between facilities. One thing
that is clear, however, is that the Zenica Prison is the largest
detention faciliw and the greatest amount of available
information concerns this facility. ln fact, in tracking the number
of prisoners in Zenica, the Zenica Prison is the only faciliw
identified by the ICRC." "Zenica Phon: The most prominent detention facility in
the Zenica area is the Zenica Prison (also referred tu as the
Correction Centre, KP Dom Prison, KPD and the House of
Corrections). The facilty is under the control of the Muslim
Territorial Defence (MTD) forces. The prison is occupied by
Croatian and Serbian civilian and military prisoners. The majority
of prisoners are likely Serbs. The prison is divided into five
pavilions. Each of these pavilions contains cells rneasuring five
metres by three tu four metres. Pavilion fïve is referred tu as
the "concentration camp" is used tu hold military prisoners and
is seemingly the on& part of the faciMy that is visited by the
ICRC. The prison also has a hospital where prisoners are
treated Some prisoners claim to have been subjected tu 'il
treatment' by prison guards while in the hospital. Prior to the
outbreak of war, this facility was used as a maximum securify
prison for hard cure felons. Even during the war, one of the
prisons pavilions (Pavilion four) continues tu house criminals
that were incarcerated before the war. Reports in the
Commission's possession indicate that the camp was in
operation before the war began as a correctional facility The
prison probably began its operations as a PoW facility in June
7992. Operation seems to have been continuous until at least
June 1993; one witness reports that he was released from this
facilitx in a prisoner exchange on 5 September 7993. It is
unclear whether the camp is still in operation."
"Estimates of the number of prisoners Varygreatly. The
ICRC has indicated a fair4 consistent population of 200-300 in
the prison. But one report states that while the ICRC visited the
facility seventimes from June-December 7992 the ICRC was
only permitted tu visit Pavilion 5 (where military prisoners were
kept). It has also been estimated that 300 Bosnian Serbs have
been detained in Pavilim 5. This figure is consistent with claims
that the ICRC was only allowed tu visit Pawlion 5. Most of the
other prisoners, mainly the civilian non combatants were in the
other pavilions. The number of prisoners in the Zenica Prison
can be summarized as fol10ws, "
136 "On 37 July 7993, Bosnian Serb officiais maintained that
270 Serbian were being held in the Zenica Special Jail: lt is
assumed that this in the same facility as the Zenica Prison
discussed herein. Prisoners in the camp are both civilian and
military. According to one report, af7er a group of Serbians was
capture4 women and children under 70 were not taken to the
prison. It is not at al/ clear whether women and children are
detained at this facility. Noxplicit mention is made of a female
detainee."
'Y Tanjug news agency reporter who was confined in
the prison for 80 days reported that the camp conditions were
horrible. Cells were generally damp and there was a lack of
sheets and blankets. He also noted that the food was poor.
Prisoners are given one kilogram of bread every day to be
shared by 78 prisoners. Some days the prisoners were given
tea, and it is alleged that the guards would put detergent in the
tea."
"Torture and beatings were routine occurrences at the
Zenica Prison. According to a Tanjug news agency reporter
who was detained there for over 80 days, almost al1 of the
prisoners (90 per cenf) were subjected to torture. He asserts
that combatants were subjected to the worst beatings.
According to another report, every other day, two or three
prisoners would be taken by groups of fïve to SIXMuslim men.
The men were typically young and were often drunk. The
prisoners were handcuffed to metal rings on the floor and were
then beaten and kicked A United States Department of State
report contains the allegation of a 29 year old Serbian civilian
who claims to have been beaten every 70 minutes for 96
hours; he also claims that the food was deliberately
contaminated. "
"Addiional allegations concern mistreatment in the
Prison hospital committed by guards. Final& it bas been
137alleged that an unconfirmed number of Serbian prisoners were
taken from the prison to an iron mil1 factory. These prisoners
were allegedly thrown into the furnace at the factory. Very little
information is available regarding the individuals who ran the
camp and committed violations. The commander of the prison is
a named man of the MTD. He is not alleged to have taken part
in any beatings or torture, but he was often present and a
witness to the beatings. It is also alleged that Muslim refugees
in Zenica (from Jajce or Travnikj would come to the prison and
verbally harass and physically assault Serbian prisoners."
"Bila Stadium: The Association of Serbs from BiH has
identified the Bila Stadium as a camp for Serbs. They claim the
camp is under the control of the Croatian Armed Forces, the
Croatian Army, or paramilitary Muslim forces. No other
information is available concerning this facilit."
'Z'enica Coal Mines: One report states that PoWs were
moved from Bugojno to Zenica ivhere they are imprisoned in
coal mines, No other information is available concerning this
facihty.
"Other Zenica Locations: Other locations in the Zenica
area have been identified as places of detention. Apart from
this mere identification, no other information is available. The
locations are Bilmisce, Zening, Graeanica, Arnauti and Begov
Han; the retirement home in Zenica; and the Zening Building
and Nemila are both identified as j~ossible' locations."
"Factory: According to one report, ICRC representatives
visited a detention facility at an unidentified factory in Zenica.
The existence of the camp was confirmed on 24 September
1992, No additional information was made available regarding
the identities ofinmates, the conditions of their detainment nor
the length of the facihty's existence." "Hospital: According to one repofl ICRC representatives
visited a detention facility at an unidentified hospital in Zenica.
The existence of the camp was confirmed on 26 April 1993. No
additional information was made available regarding the
identities ofinmates, the conditions of their detainment nor the
length of the faciMy's existence."
"School: According to one report, ICRC representatives
visited a detention facility at an unidentified school in Zenica.
The existence of the camp was confirmed on 76 May 7993. No
additional information was made available regarding the
identities of inmates, the conditions of their detainment nor the
length of the facility's existence."
"Military Prison: Accordng to one report, ICRC
representatives visited a detention facility at the military prison
in Zenica. The existence of the camp was confirmed on 78
February 7993. No additional information was made available
regarding the identities of inmates, the condifions of their
detainment nor the length of the facilify's existence"
24.7.22 GRUDE (p.145, paras. 1180-1183)
The existence of camps under Muslim-Croat controlin the
locality of Grude in which Serb civilians were held as described in
the Counter-Memorial (paragraphs 7.1.6.0., 7.1.25.2., 7.2.0.1,
7.2.30.26.) is confirmed also in the Report of the Expert
Commission as follows:
"Farm: According to reports, a farm in Grude was used
as a camp to detain male and female individuals from the
region. No additional information regarding this facility was
made available, consequently, the identity of witnesses, victims
and perpetrators as well as conditions existing during detention
remain unknown. " "Garage: The Commission bas received reports that
approximately 300 Serbs were detained in a garage in Grude.
The camp was operated by members of the Croatian-Muslim
armed forces, The ICRC visited the Grude camp on 76
September 7993 and reported that no PoWs were found At
least one Serbian man, Aleksa Janjic reportedly died as a result
of injuries incurred while detained at this camp."
2.4.7.23. KLADANJ (p.752, paras. 7239-7247)
Discussing the camps under Muslim forces' control in the
municipality ofKladanj in which Serbs were held, the Report of
Bassiouni's Commission refers only to those in the village of
Stupari, while the Counter-Memorialcontains also others
(paragraphs 7.2.0.1 and 7.2.18.0)
"The Commission received a report that stated that 95
Serbian civiians and one child were imprisoned since May 7992
in the village of Stuparl; eight kilometres north of the town of
Kladanj. The report quoted the Mayor of Kladanj, stating that
the prisoners were being held 'for their own security, to protect
them from retaliation by the Muslim population.' A team from
the ECMM reported that they visited the three buildings in the
town of Stupari where the pnsoners were held. According to the
report, theprisoner's homes had been burned by Muslim forces.
The prisoners were guarded by five armed soldiers who allowed
them to go outside for one hour a day. The prisoners
sometimes were not given anything to eat for three days. The
prisoners reported that guards were frequently violent toward
them and that no medical care was provided The ICRC
reported that the prisoners appeared to be ~sychologically worn
out and very weak!"
"Stupari Elementary School: ln early August 7992,
Serbian prisoners who had been exchanged in Malinjk,
reported that approximately 7,000 Serbs from the villages of
140Lupoglava, Matueviéi Majdan, and Kokajeviéi were defained in
the Stupari Elementary School. Conditions in the camp were
reportedly very poor. According to the report, an identified
physician forcibly took blood from the Serbian prisoners for
wounded Muslims and Croats. "
2.4.7.24. KONJIC (pp. 154-164, paras. 1266-1293,1297-
1306,1307-1308,131 1-1315,1317-1324,1334,1335)
In the following accounts, the first 16 camp descrip:ions
detail those locations cooperatively controlled by Croatian and
Muslim forces. The subsequent 11 accounts describe facilities
controlled solely by Muslims, and the two remaining locations
fall under undetermined authority. There are also several reports
that allege the existence of a camp or camps in Konjic without
supplying enough detail to determine the exact location or by
whom they were controlled.
"~elebiéi Camp: ln May 1992, following the withdrawal
of the JNA from ifs barracks in the village of i'elebicd Croatian-
Muslim forces assumed control of the barracks and transformed
them into a detention centre for Serbian prisoners. lmmediate&
after its creation or7 4 May 7992 and continuing through to the
suspension of operations in December 7992, camp ~elebici
interned several hundred cifizens from the municipality of Konjic,
The number of detainees changed regularly. Men and women
were separated, witb men interned in several locations including
a concrete tunnel called hangar Number 9, a sheet metal
hangar called Number 6, a depot called Number 22 and, on
occasion, in concrete manholes believed to be oil storage sites.
Women were imprisoned either in an administrative building,
located at the camp entrance, or in a shaft excavated in the
ground next to the tunnel at hangar Number 9."
"The detainees were brought to celebiéi from al/ corners
of Konjic. On 22 May 1992, Croatian and Muslim forces
141allegedly attacked the Serb villages of B/elovtina, Cerici, and
Donje Selo. Reportedly al1 surviving members of the Serb
population in these villages were taken fo camp ~elebici ln
another report, members of the "TU B-H invaded the village of
Brdjani on 75 June 7992 and ordered al1the men tu surrender.
Forty-eight Serbian prisoners were put on trucks and taken tu
Celebici. Some 200 individuals from Bradina were already in
residence when they arrived"
"ln another report, a Serbian resident from the village of
Bradina recalled that he and some 50 other men were
instructed by Croatian and Muslim forces to report to
headquarters in Podoragac. Upon arrival, the witness and others
were loaded onto a tarpaulin-covered truck and transported tu
~elebici concentration camp. "
'Hccording tu several reports the conditions at the camp
were deplorable. Hangar Number 9, which was an abandoned
atomic shelter/ventilation tunnel, measured approximatefy 720
centimetres in width, 30 metres in length and 2.5 metres in
height. Air entered through a small glass window in the door,
and there was absolutely no illumination. Reportedly, because
of the construction of the tunnel, it was impossible for an
individualtu stand upright."
"The 50 or su detainees in the tunnel defecated in a
bucket thaf was emptied infrequenfly. Human waste
accumulated up tu 70 centimetres at one end of the tunnel.
The detainees were not permitted tu wash during the first 20
days of their internment, and for the first three days they were
not provided wifh food. Accordng tu one inmate, throughout the
first one and a half months of detention, the inmates were fed
small pieces of stale bread and some vegetables three times
daily. ln the two months that followed, they were fed only
bread. He recalled that the men had no choice but to perform
al1 bodily functions in one corner inside the hangar. Muslim
soldiers often placed the prisoners food in the same locations
142and often times dropped the plates, spoons, or bread into the
excrement. "
"The several reports detailing the initialacts of
mistreatment suffered by the inmates at the hands of their
captors appear to be in agreement. Upon arriva1 at ~elebi~i,
Muslim solders we,relined up at the entrance in two rows. The
detainees were made to pass between the rows of soldiers with
theirhands clasped behind their necks. As the inmates passe4
the soldies beat /hem with blunt objécts, iron bars, shovels,
pickaxes, thick electric cables, and rubber truncheons."
"The prisoners were then placed in manholes for several
hours at a time. These manholes were former4 oil storage
reservoirs. The lids were replaced on the manholes serving to
cut off the flow of air. As a consequence, men collapsed from
suflocation."
"For those inmates ass~gnedto hangar Number 9, once
removed from the manholes they were subjected to additional
beatings at the entrance to hangar Number 9. ln one report,
the guards beat 25 inmates with shovels so severely that 12
shovels were broken in the process. After a period of time
spent in Number 9, the inmates were then transferred to
Number 6. ln solne cases, due to the space limitations in
hangar Number !3, some detainees were sent direct4 to
Number 6. "
"For those assigned to hangar Number 6, the guards
came and collected al1 the valuables from the inmates. The
inmates were then taken in groups of 70 to a nearby buildng
called "the Command - which was so-called because the JNA
command had previously been located there. Once inside the
Command, the prisoners were ordered to stand on tlp-toe facing
the wall with their hands raised high above their heads. Muslim
soldiers then conducted interrogations regarding alleged cetnikt
activity, strategy and weapons locations."
143 "Fol1wing the initial, somewhat routine abuses, the
spscific scts of mistreatment appear from the reports, to some
degree, tu be haphazard. The variation on the rnethods of
mistreatment included beatings with batons, wooden clubs,
truncheons, chains, iron rods; imprisonment in drainage shafts;
scorching and cutting by hot knives pressed to the inmates'
faces, bodies arid chests; spraying with gunpowder and setting
alight; binding male genitals with low-burning fuses, the
breaking of ribs, arms and legs; and the cutting off of ears and
fingers. Some inmates report being detained in manholes filed
with water for 24 hour periods, Occasionally, using their feet,
the Muslim guards forced the inmates under water and held
them there to near suffocation.'"
"The inmates detained in the sheet metal hangar,
Number 6, noted that in August 7992,when the day's heat was
at its worst, the doors and windows of their containment facility
remained closed. Temperatures reportedly reached 50 degrees
Celsius or 748 degrees Fahrenheit. "
ln another report, two male detainees had their trouser-
legs--below the knee-doused with a flammable liquid and then
ignited. As the men's legs began to burn their Muslim captors
reportedly forced them to sit down and forbade them to
extinguish the flames."
"Reports also suggest that al1 imprisoned women were
systematically raped. Women were usually raped by more than
one guard. Serbian women were reportedly housed in or near
the Command building and ushered to the appropriate locations
when required. Male prisoners were also sexually molested by
forcing them into same-sex anal intercourse or oral sex."
"The entire ~elebiéi facility was initially controlled by
Croatian forces and manned by Muslim guards. Due to shifting
political winds,Muslm forces later assumed control. However,
144before this change, Croatian, 9: was the commander of the
camp, and 'C:a Muslim, was bis deputy. A number of reports
suggest that c' was directly responsible for the mistreatmenf,
torture and murder of a great many of the inmates. Prisoners
were abused or killed on the orders of deputy commander 'C!
'C'ordered prisoners tu fight each other. If 'C'did not feel
satisfied that the blows were severe enough, he ordered the
guards tu beat both prisoners. Reportedly, prisoners were
forbidden tu sleep.'Crselected one prisoner tu keep the others
awake. If 'C'found anyone asleep the prisoner in charge was
severely punished."
''ln another report, a female prisoner at i'elebici alleged
being raped by e! She alleged that she was beaten and
kicked during several interrogations regarding the whereabouts
of ber son and husband. Additionally, the witness alleged that
she was str~ppednaked by young men who held knives tu her
throat and held lit cigarettes tu ber eyelashes, burning ber
eyelids when she screamed. She was subjected tu multij~le
rapes by a variety of men, many of whom she was unable tu
recognize because of the dark night. She alleged that she was
taken tu an office where the rapes lasted from tbree tu four
hours at a time. The witness stated that she was detained in a
roorn near hangar Number 9. She recalled that some 39 men
were held there, and she witnessed the men being beaten,
kicked and torturecf She recalled that the tunnel was poorly lit
and poorly ventilated, She stated further that she witnesse'C;'
kill one of the inmates. lt was ber understanding that raped
every woman bro~lght into the prison. She alleged that some
720 women were raped by e! Women were reportedly set
aside solely for bis pleasure."
'Several reports note that although'Crwas notorious for
bis cruel actions, a young guard called9' was worse. He was
said tu have partjcipated in al1 the murders and a great many
of the rapes in the camp. 9' reportedly beat prtsoners with
baseball bats and made them kneel while he beat them about
145their breasts and çtomachs. 3' is noted for wrapping slow-
burning fuses around the legs or waist of inmates, putting
another end between the inmate's legs or in bis pants and then
l~ghting the fuse. The burning fuse which was wrapped in
plastic, clung to the victim's body as it melted. The victim's
family was usually forced to watch this torture.."
"Another inmate rias made tu Weara gas mask with the
air fiter sealed so that he-was unable to breathe. 'S'forced him
tu Wear it for an hour while standing in the hot summer heat,
Consequently, the victim collapsed se veral times"
"ln still another report prior tu a visit by an Arab TV
crew, 3' selected three prisoners tu tell about their 'crimes'
against Muslims. One among them was ordered tu Say that he
had killed fduslims and Croats in Mostar and burned down their
homes. When the man refused, 3' beat him with a soldier's
belt until he bled. -3' reportedly doused the prisoners with gas
and gunpowder and then set them ah@[ causing severe burns
and wounds. "
"Lnanother incident, 3' s~bjecteu' two young brothers to
severe mistreatment. He reportedly deformed their faces, then
put gas masks over their heads and closed the air filers.
Thereafter, he compelled the brothers tu engage in oral sex
with one another and also tu strike each other about the
genitals."
"in one report a detainee frorn i'elebici witnessed c'
and 'S'beat 15 or 76 Serbs tu death. Another witness reported
that the two ordered inmates tu run away. When the inmates
complied and attempted tu escape, they were beaten. If an
inmate continued running after receiving the beating, he was
killed.
In addition to the crimes against the Serb population at
the Celebici camp, described by the Respondent in paragraphs
1467.2.0.1.-7.2.1.17. of the Counter-Memorial, the Report also refers
to other camps under Muslim control, in which Serbs were
victims. The same camps are also referred to by the Respondent
in the Counter-Memorial (paragraphs 7.1.6.0.-7.1.6.4., 7.2..,1
7.2.2.0.-7.2.2.4., 7.2.43.0.). The Expert Commission collected
information on these camps from numerous sources and
described them in its Report as follows:
"Poke Station: According to one report, an elderly
Bosnian Serb fartner was arrested on 9 May 7992, in his
village of ldbar near Konjic, He was taken to the police station
in Konjic where he was detained for 27 days. Thereafter, he
was removed to the camp at Celebici, some six kilometres
away. No additional information was available regardhg his
treatmenf, the facility nor its operation or control.
"The ICRC reported the existence of the camp in the
Police Station in Konjic. The camp was first visited by the ICRC
on 4 November 7992. ."
"Ministry of Infernal Affairs (MUP) building: Although al1
relevant reports agree that this facil;& was controlled by Muslim
forces, there is considerable disagreement regarding the inmate
composition. According to one report, a// arrested Bosnian Serb
civilians from Kor7jiCand Bradina were taken to this location
and later transferred to the camp at ~elebiéi. Another source
suggests that on& in some cases were detainees brought to
this facil;& beaten, and then transferred to designated detention
facilities. Another report suggests that only women, children,
and the elderly were interned at this location."
"Kllage of Donje Selo: Reports suggest that on 22 June
7992, Croat and Muslim authorities transformed the village info
a prison camp for Bosnian Serbs. Guards were set up aror~nd
the periphely of the village to discourage Serb detainees from
leaving the area. The reports suggest that although men were
resident prisoners at this location, women and children wereeither interned in greater numbers or abused in greater
numbers. While no specifc numbers were made available, the
vast majority of the documented accounts of atrocities have
been offered by or concern women and children. These sources
suggest that women were raped on a daily basis"
"One report from a male detainee at Donje Selo reveals
that men were subjected tu considerably less abuse and
mistreatment than women. Each night the Muslim soldiers
arrived in groups and barged into the homes containing women,
raping al1the women and girls. According tu the witness, during
the day the guards did nothing more than walk around
'monitoring' the situation.uite frequently ex-camp inmates were
re-arrested and sent back tu one of the camps in Konjic without
warning or provocation. Prisoner swapping of some Donje Selo
inmates occasionally took place in the village of Trnovo. Other
reports also alleged the existence of a detention facility in the
village ofDonje Selo."
"Devetka Tunnel in Bradina: Bradina was reportedly the
largest Serbian village in the Konjic area with 750 inhabitants.
Following the taking of this village on 25 May 1992 by Croat-
Muslin forces, the village was renamed Donji Repovci and a
great many of the Serbs were expelled Many of the Serbs who
steadfastly remained were reportedly either killed by paramilitary
forces or interned in various detention camps. One of the
largest Serb inhabited detention facilities in the Konjic area was
located at the Devetka Tunnel. According to reports, sorne 3,
000 Serbs were detained at this location. The Serbs were
reportedly lined up against the wall, made tu remove their
clothing and then tortured and beaten for several hours at a
time. The detainees were reportedly forced tu partic~pate in
Muslim prayer and song and tu learn the Koran. Those who
refused were beaten and in some cases killed Although no
dates were provided, several reports suggest that the facility
was eventually closed and the prisoners were released. Another
report also alleges the existence ofthk camp."
148 "Musala ("Sportska sala=) sports centre: According tu
several reports, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat prisoners were
detained at this facilityReports suggest that as few as 770
and as many as 770 Serbs were detained at the sports hall
beginning in May 7992. On 75 June 7992, 73 Serbs were
reportedly killed and 72 wounded when Muslim forces from the
bills above Prevalj shelled the sports hall.The attack on these
prisoners was reportedly wilful"
"Sources suggest that conditions at the sports hall were
insufferable. The prisoners were pour4 fed, some even went
without food for weeks at a time. When they were fed, one
report suggests that half the meal of one Muslim guard was
used to feed as many as eight inmates. There were no beds.
The prisoners were made to sleep on carpets that originallly
belonged to the gym, ."
"There are also reported incidents of rape at the facility.
One report states that on the n~ght of 27 May 7992, Muslim
soldiers raped five young women. According to one report on
the night of 29 May 7992, 70 girls and women imprisoned in
the camp were raped. ln other report, on 37 August 7992, a
Serb man and woman were forced to engage in sexual
intercourse while as many as 75 prison guards looked on. ln
still another repori,a 25 year-old woman was brought to the
camp and raped repeatedly by some 15 Muslims. Her captors
apparent4 fhen led ber, naked, up and down the camp, drew
'lilies' on ber breasts and stomach with a lit cigar, chopped off
ber hair, disfigured ber and then forced another male inmate tu
rape ber and shove a rifle barre1into ber vagina."
'Zvonimir Belisa Nono, Elementary School, Bradina: The
detention facifity at this location primarily housed women,
children and the elderly. Several reports allege that female
Serbian inmates were regularly subjected fo rape. One report
states that on 13 July 7992, 75 women were raped by Muslim
149Green Berets. Reports also state that Muslim and Croatian
forces subjected inmates to 'severe mistreatment' and threats of
death."
"Brothels: Reports suggest that Croat and Mush-run
brothels have been established throughout Konjic. Reports
allege the existence of a brothel in Buturovic Polje and another
at the Hmadeus' Cafe. Serbian women reportedly were forcibly
brought to and detained in these facilities. The women are
irnpregnated and held captive until the fifth month of their
pregnancy and then not permitted to leave the area. One report
suggests that 'mernbers of Muslim and Croatian units who have
contracted AIDS and other communicable diseases are
deliberately sent to brothels to sexually abuse Serbian women'
and young girls.."
"House in Diepa: According to one report, a house in
the village of Diepa in the municipality of Konjic was turned
into a rape camp operated by Muslh Green Berets. Women
were reportedly tortured at this facility and forcibly impregnat"d
"Unidentified facility, Ljuta: Following the attack on the
Serb village of Bradina on 25 May 1992 by Muslim forces, a
great many Serb cit~zens were captured One Serbian male
reported that he was taken to Ljuta and that some 50-100
uniformed men came to interrogate him and those detained with
him. According to the witness, two or three of the detainees
were pushed to the ground and beaten. Thereafter their Muslim
captors screamed verbal abuses and insults at them. Next their
bands were tied behind their backs with wire and they were
made to walk four to five hours to Trnovo. Each prisoner
reportedly had one guard, with the remaining 50 to 700 men
following. Upon arriving at BjelaSnica mountain, they were put
into two trucks and driven to the Muslim village of~abici"
"School in ~abici: According to one report Serb civilians
were detained in a school in ~abici. The report alleges that the
150Serbian inmates were insulted and humiliated by the Muslim
guards. From there, they were transferred tu Hotel Fms in
Bjelas."
"Hotel "Famos'? According tu reports, civilian prisoners
from Bradina were transported tu the hotel located in Bjelas.
They were beaten and interrogated in a room in the basement
of the hotel by both uniformed and civilian Muslms and Croats.
The detainees were forced tu admit that they were cetniksi
'registered' and then forced tu walk through a path with
approximately 20 men on either side. As the detainees passed,
the men beat thern with rifle butts. The detainees were then
placed on trucks with their hands tied behind their backs and
transported tu ~elebici. They were reportedly interned at this
location from June through 37 August 7992. According tu
another report, upon the arriva1 of Seri detainees at the hotel,
they were made tu lie on the fluor in a line and beaten and
kicked with the soldiers' heavy bouts and pistol butts. Some
detainees had guns shoved into their mouths and had their
lives threatened. Following the beatings, they were taken tu
some sort of dark concrete cellar, where they were beaten by
Muslim and Croat guards. When they lost consciousness they
were revived and beaten again. The next day, the prisoners
hands were again bound, they were blndfolded, and loaded
onto trucks. As they boarded the trucks, they received beatings
with shovels, blunt objects, iron pipes, or anything that their
captors could find. They were then transported tu Tarc/n.
"Buturovic Polje Prison: Serb civilians were reportedly
defained by Croat-Muslim forces at this location. The report
does not, however, provide additional information regarding
either the conditions or the operation of the facility. Other
reports alleged the existence of a detention faciliw in the village
of Buturovic Polje."
"Technical High School in Koniic: According tu one
report, Serbian civilians were detained in the gymnasium of the
151high school. The facility was reportedly controlled by Croat-
Muslm forces. The report does not provide additional
hformation regarding either the conditons or the operation of
the facilty."
"Hrasnica: Reports of the existence of a Muslim run
camp in this village were not supplemented by information
regarding the specific location or duration of existence. The
camp was reportedly composed of Serbian prisoners."
"Konjic Hospital: One report cites the existence of a
Muslim-controlled facility at this location as of 77 April 7992,
However, no additional information was made a vailable
regarding conditions or operations at this facility. This detention
facilitys also alleged tu exist in another ICRC report. The
ICRC first visited this place of detention on 4 November 1992."
"Koniic Mditary Police: One report cites the existence of
a Muslim-controlled facility at this location as of77April 1992.
However, no additional information was made a vailable
regarding conditions or operations at this facilify.."
'Sora6ko Jezero: One report alleges the existence of a
detention facility at this location. No information regarding
operation, duration, prisoner composition, or control was made
available. Other reports also alleged the existence of a camp at
this location.
"New Residential Suburb, Konjc: Reports alleged the
existence of a detention facilify h the new residential suburb of
Konjic holding approximately 7,500 Serbs. "2.4.7.25. LISTICA (p. 168 paras. 1377)
"LiStica Camp: Reports were received which indicated
that a camp was established in LiStica, approximately 20
kilometres west of Mostar. Apparently one of three jails in the
town was run by Muslim militia and the HUS."
2.4.7.26. LlVNO (pp. 168-170, paras. 1382-1387, 1389-1394)
Yarge Luxurious House in Livno: ln April 1992, a
Bosnian Serb woman was taken from her home tu a home in
Livno by members of Alga's Warriors. Accordlng tu the witness
she was the exclusive servant of one soldier, who happened tu
be her former classmate. The witness noted that there were
several other women detained at this location. They ranged in
age from 78 tu 40 and al1 were Serbian except one, who was
Ruthenian. According tu the report, very young girls were raped
by seven or eight Muslim soldiers at one time. The witness was
transferred withber former classmate when he was assigned tu
new locations. Each time the Muslim front moved, she moved.
Accordng tu her statement, she was final& sent tu a brothel in
the Ciglane area where she was again reserved solely for her
former classmates purposes".
"Police Station: According tu one report, Croatian
paramilitary forces were in control in the Livno area in ApriL
The forces allegedly forbade Serbian citizens tu leave the area.
Several citizens were reportedly detained at the police station in
three rooms which were overcrowded and lacked heaf as well
as other basic necessities. The report states that official
sources acquired evidence that the detainees at this location
were being beaten. The ICRC also reports the existence of a
camp in the Livno Police Station. The camp was first visited by
the ICRC on 76 May 1992. Evidence of this camp's existence
was also corroborated by members of the Thomson Mission
who visited this location on 7 September 7992. Mission
153members found 40 Serbian detainees in this Croatian controlled
facility The detainees had an average age of 55 and most had
been detained at this facility for several months. Mission
members saw signs of beatings and abuse."
"Livno School: According to one report, this location was
the site of the military interrogation centre. Some 39 Serbian
men and one Serb woman were detained and interrogated
here. According to testimony from former detainees at the
police station, the conditions at the Livno school were severe.
The ICRC also reports the existence of a camp in a school in
Livno. The camp was first visited by the ICRC on 9 September
1993. Another ICRC repori also mentions the existence of a
camp in the Livno school.
"ln another report, over 500 Serbs including women,
children, and the elderly were being mistreated and tortured by
Croatian paramiMary units. The report suggests that these
paramiïitary groups detained the individuals at a camp in Livno
and another camp in Tomislavgrad. The ICRC reported that on
16, 19, and 21 July ICRC delegates supervised the
simultaneous release h Celebidi and near Tuzla of some 800
persons detained in Batkovié, Kamenica, Livno, Tuzla and
elsewhere. "
"Livno Wlage: The ICRC reported the existence of a
camp in Livno village that was first visited by the ICRC on 4
September 1992. There are no details concerning this camp.
Many different reports provide differing numbers of people in
detention at various times. These people are said to be 'in
assigned residence 'or under 'house arrest! "
'Iivno Hospital: The ICRC reported the existence of a
camp in the Livno Hospital. The camp was first visited by the
ICRC on 7 April 1992.
" "Livno Prison/Penitentiary: The ICRC reported the
existence of a camp in the Livno Prison. The camp was first
visited by the ICRC on 8 November 7992."
"Livno Fortress-old Town: If was reported that about 950
Serbs were held in a fortress in the old town."
"Livno Brothel: lt was reported that information provided
by the 1st Krajina Corps in Banja Luka indicates that a brothel
in which Serbian women are held exists in Livno. "
2.4.7.22 LJUBUSKI (p. 171, paras. 1399-1403, 1405)
"LjubuSki Police Station: A camp reportedly exists at
LjubuSkl approximately 25 kilometres south of Mostar. If is one
of three jails run by Muslim militia and the HOS. The detention
facility was described in one report as the prison at the
LjubuSki police station. Conflicting testimony concerning the
camp commander were received Either a man from Mostar or
a Croat was the commander of the jail. If is unclear whether
these men were in power at different tims or whether one
acted as deputy commander to the other. Another source
indicated that a man from ~itluk was the warden of the prison
as well as other detention facilities in BiH,'"
'Apparently there were 12 celfs at LjubuSki camp, and
up to 80 Serbs have been detained there allegedly awaiting
trial. However, when the ICRC visited the LjubuSki camp on 10
June 1993 on& SIX prisoners remained Before the arriva/ of the
ICRC, the guards dressed the Serbs in JNA uniforms so that it
would appear that only soldiers were imprisoned here. However,
many of the defainees were reportedly civilians."
"Reports were received indicating that the guards did not
abuse the inmates and that medical treatment was available for
155the prisoners. However, statements from several witnesses
indicated that they were subjected tu beatings. At least one
witness reports that guards would corne at night at 10:OOp.m.
and 3:00 a.m. and beat the prisoners. Another witness claimed
that he was beaten five or SIX times upon his arriva1 tu the
detention facility. The guards made the prisoners lie down on
top of one another tu form a pyramid and beat the prisoner on
top so those under him would feel the weight of those above.
The prisoners were also forced tu sing 'Usta.3e1songs and
salute by raising the right hand and shouting 'Ready for the
homeland! The prisoners were exercised almost every day,
allegedly in a humiliating manner such as behaving like
animals. They were also forced tu write statements that they
had taken part in massacres and killings.Reportedly inmates
were also forced tu work, The inmates received food in mess
kits that went unwashed for months.
'ZjubuSki Prison: ln may 7992, a witness was captured
as a JNA soldier, he and other members of the JNA were
taken tu the prison at Ljubugki and held for three weeks. The
witness was beaten while in custody with truncheons and
umbrellas. He also claimed that he was kicked and punched.
The prisoners allegedly received no food for several days and
were forced tu kneel for hours in the sweltering heat. They
were reportedly beaten every time they left the ce11tu go tu the
toile".2.4.7.28. MOSTAR (pp. 173-178, paras. 1442-1447,
1450,1451,1466,1467)
'~anticeva Street Jail: There is a report that at one tirne
the HOS operated a prison on ~anticeva street. This jail
previously was used tu house commun criminals. The HOS
soldiers reportedly dress in black uniforms with their own
insignia. lt is alleged that during the night guards sornetirnes
beat the prisoners. The prisoners were reportedly also
mistreated upon arrival at this camp, lt was reported that the
women kept in the ~antiéevajail were raped and abused by
their HOS captors. The prisoners are provided three meals a
day but do not receive any meat. According tu the source,
three female detainees remained incarcerated at the jail in
~anticeva Street at the time the report was prepared."
"University: There is at least one account that prisoners
were also detained at a university in Mostar. Upon arrival there,
they are said to have been beaten. One woman reported that
the guards at this facility ordered three male pusoners to rape
her. She was almost raped second time but one of the
commanders came in and prevented this."
"District Prison: According tu one source, approximately
300 Serbs were held here in November, 1992."
'Xircraft Factory: ln May 1993 outside observers allowed
into the camp estimated that between 1,500 and 2,000 men
and women were imprisoned here. The prisoners for the rnost
part are from Mosfar and are Serb civilians.They include
University professors, doctors, journalists, and students.
Howevec there also are people from some of the surrounding
towns imprisoned here. The camp consists of four buildings.
The prisoners are held in a former milifary prison and two
adjacent gymnasium buildings. The women and children are
housed separately from the men and no comrnunication
between the groups is allowed The women are kept downstairs
157and the men are kept upstairs. The conditions af the camp are
poor particularly for the male inmates. Up to 60 people are held
in one room usually without mattresses or blankets to sleep on.
Some rooms in the men's quarters have insufficent space for
the men to sleep fully outstretched There are allegations that
some of the detainees are being held underground and tortured
However, no investigation of this has been possible.
"Lipno Detention Facilty: A detention facility was
reported to exist in the village of Lipno and at least one
individual was detained between 7 May 7992 and 77 May 1992.
A retired JNA soldier was arrested in his apartment, location
unknown, in May 7992, by a Muslim and taken tu Lipno. There
he was detained in an old school and beaten by the same man
who arrested him and HOS members. He was punched, kicked,
and beaten with truncheons and rifle butts. Cigarettes were
extinguished on bis body, and he was forced to eat plaster
from the wall and cigarette butts. His hair was set on fire and
he was forced to perform fellatio on one of hi. guards."
"Former Illiitary Dispensary: A report stated that a Serb
female was detained in the former military dispensary in Mostar
between 21 July 1992 and 24 July 1992. She was incarcerated
in the basement of the building in a three by 3.5 metre room
with five orsix other women. On the first nlght of her detention
she was taken for interrogation at 2100 am.. The interrogator
cursed her and threatened her with a knife. The next night she
was taken to the same interrogator and he asked ber if she
would be his mistress. She declned and was transferred to the
Dreteg detention faci/@.'" 2.4.2. Forensic Medical Expertise On the Injuries lnflicted on
the Prisoners in the Camps throughout Bosnia & Herzegovina
2.4.2.1. On the following pages of the Rejoinder the
Respondent will supplement medical evidence annexed to the
Counter-Memorial with photographs of injuries
2.4.2.2. The injuries, marked by letter(s) and number(s) have
been inflicted by genocidal acts described in related paragraphs
of the Counter-Memorial:
BlIB11 7.1.24; 7.3.20
B7 7.3.20.1
B8 7.2.9.0; 7.1.46
BI0 7.3.20
BI5 7.1.24.1;7.3.25
BI 6 7.3.25; 7.1.46
B22 7.1.46; 7.3.3.3; 7.1.25
BI 9 7.1.20.5; 7.3.25
B6 7.1.46.3
B9 7.3.25; 7.3.3.3
BI15 7.3.19.2.1-4
518 7.2.10.1.1; 7.2.10.1.4
515 7.2.10.1.1; 7.2.10.1.4; 7.1.24
513 7.2.10.1.1; 7.2.10.1.4;
7.1.12; 7.1.24
511 7.2.10.4; 7.2.10.1.6;
7.2.10.1; 7.2.10.2.1
56 7.2.10.1.1; 7.2.10.1.4
~81~5 7.2.10.1.5; 7.2.10.1.11;
7.2.10.2.1;7.2.10.4
52 7.2.10.1.1; 7.2.10.4
57 7.2.10.2.1; 7.2.10.4
s4 7.2.10.1.3; 7.2.10.1.9; 7.2.10.2.1
51/85 7.2.10.1.1; 7.2.10.1.4
Bgl O 7.3.25; 7.1.46.1-6
Bg22 7.3.19.2.1-4; 7.2.10.1.4
159 Bg28 7.2.6.38.9
Ml 7.2.10.4; 7.2.10.1.1
M2 7.2.10.2.1; 7.2.10.4
M6 7.2.10.2.1; 7.2.10.4
M7 7.2.10.4; 7.2.10.1.1
M9 7.2.10.2.1
Ml 4 7.3.19.0; 7.3.20
Ml5 7.3.19.0
Ml6 7.3.19.0; 7.2.10.1.4
Ml7 7.2.10.1.4
M30 7.2.10.2.1; 7.2.10.4;
7.2.10.1.5; 7.2.10.1.15
M35 7.2.10.2.1; 7.2.10.1.17
M38 7.2.10.2.1; 7.2.10.4
M39 7.2.10.2.1
Derl 7.1.39.2
Der3 7.1.39.7; 7.1.39.8
Der4 7.1.39.1-7
Der5 7.1.39.6
Der6 7.1.39.8; 7.1.39.6
Der8 7.1.39.6; 7.1.39.8
Derl O 7.1.39.4; 7.1.39.7
Der12 7.1.39.1-7
Derl 3 7.1.39.7; 7.1.39.6
Der15 7.1.39.7; 7.1.39.6; 7.3.18
Derl 9 7.1.39.6
Z1 7.1.22.7; 7.3.3.3
Z6 7.3.25; 7.2.0.3
B4 7.1.20.5
KV1 7.1.17.6
Ts2 7.3.3
Ts3 7.3.3
Ts4 7.3.3
Ts5 7.1.9.14
Bg2 7.2.6.3; 7.2.6.38.5
Bg8 7.1.23
Bg9 7.1.1; 7.3.10; 7.2.0.1.377
Bg12 7.1.28
Bg14 7.3.11; 7.1.50.3
Bg19 7.2.0.3K. M., male, 37 years old when captured. Captured as a civilianon
4 May 1992. Confined in two camps - in OraSjeand Donja Mahala,
till 4 September 1992. Permanently beaten, either singled outor
within a group of camp prisoners. Beaten with fists, truncheons,
baseball bats, butts, al1 over his body, but especially over his
head, neck and genitals; cigarettes were extinguished on his
hands, his neck was used as a target for shooting with anair rifle;
his beard and his toe nails were pulled out with pliers; he was
forced to eat cigarette butts and to watch other butts camp
prisoners have homosexual intercourse; he was forced to dig
trenches on the front line; deprived of water and food; given false
information on the death of dear persons; witnessed the torture
and murder of other camp prisoners; forced to give false
testimonies, forced to fight other camp prisoners. Besides,he was
also permanently shoutedat, cursed, and insulted invarious ways.
He fainted several times from the battering, he also vomited and
relieved himself in his pants. Prosecuted and sentenced to8 years
of imprisonment "for armed insurrection".
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following
consequences, which are the result of injuries inflicted in the
camps, have been found in this examinee: deformity of Adam's
apple, scars (callus) where the ribs were broken, scarson the skin
caused by projectiles fired from an air rifle, and scars from
extinguished cigarettes.Picture No.1 Scar on the neck, injury from air rifle projectiles
163 Picture No. 2 Scars on the hand,
injury from extinguished cigarettes
Picture No. 3 Scars on the shoulder,
injury from extinguished cigarettesPicture No. 4 X-ray -Scars (callus) where ribs were fractured
165M.N., male, 53 years old when captured. Captured as a civilianin
his house in OraSje on 11 June 1992. Taken first to the camp in
OraSje, and then to the camp Donja Mahala, from which he was
exchanged on 17 January 1993. From the very beginninghe was
beaten with various objects al1 over his body. He was mostly
tortured alone. He weighed 120 kg when captured and was 80 kg
when released. Besides being beaten, he also had to standstill in
the hot Sun for hours, and also suffered by thirst and hunger. He
was forced to dig trenches on the front line, and on one occasion,
after an explosion of a shell, his hearing was impaired. His right
arm was shot at from point blank range, and his forearm had to
be amputated. He had surgery in the Croat Military Hospital;
however, there had to be a re-amputation because of the wound
infection. He now has prosthesis. He lost consciousness several
times while being beaten with various blunt weapons, and he
bled. He witnessed and also heard others being tortured, and he
saw the bodies of dead camp prisoners beingtaken away from the
camp.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following
consequences, which are the result of injuries inflicted in the
camps, have been found in this examinee: right hand and forearm
missing, but he has a phantom pain in the amputated region.
Bilateral hearing impairment found, accordingto the case history
most likely the result of many detonations in his vicinity. Since the
right hand and forearm have been amputated and because of
bilateral hearing impairment there is a severe reductionof general
and vocational performance of this examinee.Picture No.1 Prosthesis of the right hand which was amputated
167Dj.N., male, 54 years old when captured Captured as a civilian on 9 May 1992. First
taken to the camp in Bosanski Brod, and later on transferred to the camp "Rasadnik".
He was exchanged on 28 May 1992. He was beaten al1over his body with ail sorts of
things from the moment he had been captured. He was beaten 2-3 times a day,
suffered hunger and thirst, and he slept on the concrete floor al1the time. He was forced
to stand in the hot Sun for a long time. He stated that six of his teeth in the maxilla and
one in the mandible had been knocked out, and that his right hand finger was fractured
with some tool. He experienced "stereo blows" over his ears, and one staged execution.
He was often beaten at night to be prevented from sleeping. He was told that several
dear persons had been killed. He witnessed the torturing of other camp prisoners.
Almost strangled several times, during which he was shouted at, cursed and insulted in
various ways. He fainted several times during the torturing. He vomited, urinated, and
once defecated in his pants because of the the battering. He often bled from the nose
and mouth because of the injuries.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric examinations, and also
according to the X-rays, the following consequences, which are the result of injuries
inflicted in the camps, have been found in this examinee: ankylosis in the right hand
fingers and damaged nerve in the elbow; al1teeth in the maxilla are missing; overall,
this has moderately reduced his vocational and general capacities.
PictureNo. 2 A bump in the baseof the 3rd righthand fingerand ankylosis
of the right hand 4th finger last phalanxPicture No. 1 A bump in the base of the 3rd right hand finger
Picture No. 3 No teeth at al1in the maxilla
169R.S., male, 45 years old when captured.Captured on 4 May 1992 as a civilian inOraSje
while he was in a town shelter. He was held in two camps, in OraSje and in Donja
Mahala, till 9 January 1993, when he was exchanged. Hewas mostly mentally tortured.
He wasn't beaten becausethey knew he was a teacher and"they were rather considerate
towards him", since there were many of his former pupils among the guards. While inthe
camps, besides being cursed at, shouted at, and insulted in various ways, they would
often wake him up with false news about the deathof some dear person.They forced him
to witness thetorturing of other camp prisoners.They made him dig trenches on the front
line, and his arm was injuredonce by a shell fragment. Whilein the camp he urinatedin
his pants once, out of fear, and once there was blood in his stool.
On the basisof medicalrecords,forensicmedicaland neurological-psychiatrie cxaminations,
and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences, whichare the result of
injuries inflicted inthe camps, have been foundin this examinee:scarson the right forearm,
and scar (callus) on the right elbowbone, witha foreign metal body in the vicinityof this
callus, as well as a clinical diagnosisof a medianusdefect, the resultof an injury by the
fragments of an explosivedevice (shell fragments).The n. medianus in this examinee is
permanently damagedwhich has moderatelyreducedhis general andvocationalcapacities.
Picture No.1 Scaron the right forearm, the result of an injury
caused by a shell fragmentPicture No. 2 X-ray showing a foreign metal body in the soft
tissue of the right forearmS.S., male, 49 years old when captured. He was captured as a civilian on 9 May 1992
in his house in the village of Bukova Greda, near Orasje. The Croats captured him.
From there he was taken to the camp in Donja Mahala and was exchanged on 29
January 1993. His two brothers, sister, and two nephews were it the camp, too. His
brother was battered to death in the camp, and his sister died in Vinkovci of
consequences of the battering in the camp. lmmediately after being captured he was
beaten with al1sorts of things over his whole body, mostly over his chest, and he was
also trampled on. He said that a single blow had broken four of his lower jaw teeth with
a pistol butt, and that his ribs had been broken. The beating went with cursing, shouting,
and with various insults. They would frequently wake him up at night and tell him lies
about the death of someone dear to him. He had to witness the torturing of other camp
prisoners. Several times he was forced to dig trenches on the front line. They also made
him curse his patron saint and his patron saint day. A number of times, because of the
beating, he lost consciousness, vomited and urinated in his pants. He bled from the
nose, mouth, and anus.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences, which are
the result of injuries inflicted in the camps, have been found in this examinee: a scar on
the right side of the chest, the result of a surgery after release from the camp, by which
the suppurating collections in the rightside of the chest were removed.
Picture No. 1 Scar on the right side of the chest, the reofla surgery
172V.B., male, 44 years old when captured. Captured on 8 June 1992 as a soldier of the
Republic of Srpska Army in the village of Ulice. He was then taken to the camp MaoCa,
where he was till 9 September 1992. He was tortured both singledout and in a group.
He was tied when tortured, no matter whether this took place in the camp or in the
streets. He was mostly beaten with blunt weapons over his head andchest, espscially
at the time when he had been captured. Once, when hit in the face, his tooth was
broken. He was suffered thirst and hunger; they didn't let him sleep, and they shouted,
cursed, and insulted him in various ways al1the time. Several times he was forced to
dig trenches on the front line. He lost conscious, vomited, and bled from the nose and
mouth several times during the torturing and beating.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric examinations, and also
according to the X-rays, the following consequences, which are the resultof injuries
inflicted in the camps, have been found in this examinee:a scar on the left auricle, the
result of the skin being ruptured and crushed by a blow with some blunt mechanical
weapon.
Picture No.1 Scar on the left auricle
173A.S., male, 35 years old when captured. He was captured on 1
February 1993 as a soldier, and was first taken to the camp Ulice,
and then !O Gornji Rahici. After that he was transferred to the
camp in Tuzla, from which he was released on 21 July 1993. From
the beginning he was beaten and tortured in various ways. He
was kicked and punched with fists, rifle butts, etc. He spent 58
days in the solitarycell in Tuzla. He explained .in detail one of the
tortures from the camp in Tuzla, called "cat walk: with their hands
tied on their backs, and in a squatted position, he and the other
camp prisoners had to go about a dozen times from one end to
the other of a 100 m long corridor. Not even once were they
allowed to stand up, otherwise they would be beaten. During the
interrogation he would be kept squatted under the table for about 6
hours. They often brought him false news about the deaths of dear
people, and also told him lies about the "situation on the front".
They extinguished cigarettes on his body; he lost 6 teeth from
blows in the face. All the time he was cursed, shouted at, and
insulted in various ways, etc. They cursed his saints and patron
saint day. He fainted, urinated, and bled from the nose several
times because of the injuries. He was sentenced to 9 years of
imprisonment for "the destruction of a mosque and for raping
Muslim women".
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following
consequences, which are the result of injuries inflicted in the
camps, have been found in this examinee: teeth missing, both in
the mandible arld maxilla, scars on the head and left hand, a
chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, psycho-somatic disorder,
and severe mental pain, which have altogether caused a severe
reduction in his general and vocational performance.Picture No.1 Scar on the forehead and missing teeth in the upper jaw
175Picture No. 2 Missing teeth in the lower jaw
176Picture No. 3 Scars on the left hand, the result of burns,
caused by lit cigarettesR.M., male, 23 years old when captured. On 13 May 1992 he was
captured as a soldier in the villageof Donji Rahic and he was first
taken to the camp Rasadnik, and then to the camp MaoSa, in
Tuzla, from which he was releasedon 21 July 1993. All the time in
the camps he was tortured either separatelyor within a group. He
was mostly beaten over his head. He was tortured in many ways:
beaten with various objects, kicked, punched, they shot from
firearms near his head, extinguished cigaretteson his body, "broke
his nose", he underwent the "stereo torturing", he suffered thirst,
hunger, cold, he was "cut and poked with a knife", he was several
times led out for staged executions, they didn't let him sleep, he
witnessed the torturing of other camp prisoners, he was forced to
fight other camp prisoners, had to lick the floor smeared with
excretion and blood, and al1this was accompanied by beating and
cursing. He was beaten several times for a whole day and night.
On the day when he had been captured he was beaten from 5
a.m. till 2.30 p.m. He fainted, vomited, and he couldn't hold his
urine and faeces because of the beating. He stood a trial, but they
had.no witnesses, so he wasn't sentenced. Whilein Tuzla he both
witnessed and overheard the raping of female camp prisoners.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following
consequences, which are the result of injuries inflicted in the
camps, have been found in this examinee: deformityof the nasal
bone, outgrowth found on the right arm, scars on the chest, back
and limbs, which are the result of injuries caused by blows with
blunt objects, lit cigarettes, tip and blade of a mechanical weapon;
he also has nightmares in the second partof the night, followed by
insomnia, which have altogether caused a severe reduction inhis
general and vocational capacities.Picture No.1 Bump on the right side of the chest
179 Picture No. 2 Scar on the chest, the result of a cigarette burn
Picture No. 3 Scar on the chest, the result of both a stab and a cigarette burnPicture No. 4 Scars on the flanks, caused by the tip and blade of a mechanical weapon
Picture No.5 Scars on the left foot, caused by the tip and blade
of a mechanical weapon
181G.R., male, 59 years old when captured. He was captured as a
civilian in his house on 1 May 1992. He was confined both in the
camps MaoCa and Gornji Rahic and was exchanged on 15
September 1992 in BrCko. His wife and sister were also in the
camp. He was beaten from the first day, mostly over the head and
kidneys. He suffered thirst and hunger. For some timehe was held
in a refrigerator truck, with no toilet, water, light or air. His teeth,
both in the upper and lowerjaw, were broken by the beatings, so
he had to have put prosthesis when released. He was led out for
staged executions several times. They forced him to stand for
hours in the sun or cold; he witnessed the torturing and killingof
other camp prisoners. He had to dig trenches on the front line
every day. While beaten he fainted several times, vomited,
urinated, and relieved himself in his pants. His injuries and wounds
would bleed from the blows.On the basis of forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatricexaminations, and also accordingto the X-
rays, the following consequences, which are the resultof injuries
inflicted in the camps, have been found in this examinee: scars
(callus) of multiple rib fractures, scars on the right shin, the results
of blows with blunt objects, and an extensive anxious-depressive
reaction, which has severely reduced his general and vocational
capacities.Picture No.1 Scars on the right shin and where the skin was ruptured
183R.B., male, 46 years old when captured. He was captured as a soldier on 3 August
1993 and was first taken to the camp in Maoéa,and then to the camp in Tuzla. He had
been in the camps till 29 October 1995, when he was exchanged. He was beatenwith
bats, rifle butts, and other means al1over his body, so that he was al1bruised. In the
first 4 months in the camps he said "he had seen the sunlight only for three hours". He
was held for a long time in a solitary cell. They hit him with various things, and forced
him to stand still, both in the cold and scorching heat. They would extinguishtheir
cigarettes on his foot soles, feet, hands, and flanks. He was once led for a fake
execution. He was often told lies about the deathof people dear to him. They made him
lick the floor smeared with blood and faeces and hehad to do that under permanent
beating. The first 15 days he was beaten al1the time. The beatings were accompanied
with curses, yelling, and with all kinds of insults. He fainted several times while being
beaten, and a number of times he vomited and urinated, and once relieved himself in
his pants during the beating. The battering almost always resulted in the bleeding from
the nose and mouth. He was forced to sign false testimonies, because of which some
people from the Hague and Boston visited him, andbecause he had signed this false
testimony he stood trial.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatricexaminations the following
consequences, which are the resultof injuries inflicted in the camps, have been found in
this examinee: scars on the head, a post-traumatic stress disorder, and major chronic
depression, which have altogether caused a severe reduction in his general and
vocational capacities.
PictureNo. 1 Scarsand atrophicchangeson the left foot
184L.Lj., woman, 37 years old when captured. She was captured on 8 May 1992. She and
the other Serb women from that area were imprisoned in the houses of the Muslims and
Croats living in Odiak and in the surrounding villages, while the men were taken to the
camps. She had been detained in the Muslim houses until she was released on 15 July
1992. She is not sure about the exact date when the following event took place: A
group of Croats, members of the group "Blazing Horses", who had been her neighbours
before the war, arrived one night. She was beaten first over her head; then they told her
to take off her clothes. Five of them raped her, i.e. she knows about five, because she
later fainted. When she regained consciousness they cursed her Cetnik mother and
said: "Fuck your Cetnik mother, you have endured the 15 of us, so we shall let you go".
They let her go home. After this event her husband left her. He had been a camp
prisoner in Odiak and Slavonski Brod, and people Say that he changed mentally, that
he "turned nuts" in the camp.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric examinations, and also
according to the X-rays, the following consequences, which are the result of injuries
inflicted in the camps, have been found in this examinee: scars on the head, a post-
traumatic stress disorder, and a major chronic depression, which have altogether
caused a severe reduction in her general and vocational capacities.
Picture No. 1 Scar on the vertex,the resultoa blow
with a blunt mechanicaol bject M.R., male, 51 years old when captured. He was captured on 8
May 1992 and taken to the camp in Odiak (elementary school
building), where he was held for two months. He was then
transferred to the camp in Bosanski Brod, where he was another
two months, after which he was taken to the camp in OraSje. He
was beaten daily in the camps in Odiak and Bosanski Brod,
mostly kicked with boots, punched and beaten with rifle butts.
They had to dig trenches on the front line and he was once injured
when a shell "had struck a nearby tree and tore off a branch,
which fell on his head". He had been taken, unconscious, to the
Slavonski Brod hospital and had a surgery there. The treatment
lasted for 40 days, after which he was exchanged on 24
December 1992.
The medical report from the hospital in Slavonski Brod proves that
he was admitted "on 13 November92 because his right side of the
body way paralyzed when a heavy branch had fallen on his head.
Status: from the nose, oriented, critical condition.
Picture No. 1 Deformation-depression of the parietal bone, left side
186 Neurological: medium hemiparesis, right, and hyperesthesia. The
computerized tomography shows an impressed fractureof the
parietal bone left, because of which he was operated on.
Cn the basis of medical records, forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatric examinations, it has been found that this
examinee has a deformity on his scull, in the form of a depression
on the parietal bone, left side. He cannot move his right foot toes,
the whole right leg has reduced sensibility,so he has difficulties in
walking, and finally he is disfigured. All this has causea severe
reduction in his general and vocational capacities.
PictureNo. 2 Scar on the deformation- depressionon the vertex,left side
187D.Lj., male, 52 years old when captured. He was captured on 8
May 1992. and taken to the camp in Odiak, where he was keptfor
2 months. After that he was transferred to the camps in Bosanski
Brod, Slavonski Brod, Donja Mahala and to the camp in OraSje.
On 27 October 1992, while digging trenches he was wounded in
the right arm by a shell fragment. He was taken to the hospital in
Slavonski Brod, from where he was exchanged on 5 November
1992. He was beaten in al1the camps and harassed in many
ways. He was punched, kicked, and beaten with bats. They
"enjoyed" the most in beating the camp prisoners with rubber
truncheons over the top of their head. Once,they forced him to put
his hand over a protruding nail on a plank, after which a guard hit
the camp prisoner's hand with his fist,so that the nail went through
the hand. He lost about 10 kg in the camps.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatric examinations, and also according to theX-
rays, the following consequences, which are the resultof injuries
inflicted in the camps, have been found in this examinee: there is
a scar (callus) on the right humerus with impaired sensibility in the
right arm, muscle atrophy in the right armwith limited extension of
the right arm; there are scars on the right upper arm, and al1this
has moderately reduced his general and vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Scar on the lefî-hand palm, the result of a stab
with a sharp mechanical weaponS 13
K.B., male, 79 years old when captured. He was captured on 8 May 1992 and taken to
the camp in Odiak, where he was held for about two months. He was then transferred
to the camps in Novi Grad, Bosanski Brod, Slavonski Brod, and to the camp in Donja
Mahala. He had been wounded there on 20 October 1992, while digging trenches, and
was taken to the Slavonski Brod hospital. He had a surgery of his right leg and left
shoulder. From there he was transferred to the Military Hospital in Zagreb, where his
whole right leg was amp~tated. From this hospital he was transferred to the prison
KuneScak, in Zagreb, then to the camp Lora, and from Lora to LjubuSki, where he was
released by exchange in mid August 1993. He said that he had been beaten with al1
sorts of things in al1the camps. He can't decide where the beating was the worst. In
August 1992 his hip was stabbed with a bayonet in the Bosanski Brod camp, and bled a
lot.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatrie
examinations the following consequences, which are the result of injuries inflicted in the
camps, have been found in this examinee: amputated whole right leg, scars above the
left shoulder blade and on the right thigh which have greatly disfigured him. Besides,
this examinee has developed a depressive - neurotic reaction, and al1this has caused a
severe reduction in his general and vocational capacities.
PictuceNo. 2 Scars above the left shoulderblade, the result of an injury
caused by a shell fragmentPicture No. 1 Status afïer a high amputation of the lefï leg
191 M.L., male, 29 years old when captured. He was captured on 8
May 1992 and taken to the camp in Odiak from which he was
transferred to the camp in Bosanski Brod. In late October he was
again transferred, this time to the camp in Donja Mahala, where he
was held til8 November 1992, when he was injured. Because of.
the injury they sent him to the hospital in Slavonski Brod. He was
released by exchange on 12 January 1993. He said that he had
been beaten in al1the camps with ail sorts of things. They had
forced him to dig trenches on the front line, during which his head
was hit by a shell fragment and he lost consciousness. Three days
later he regained it in the hospital when he was told that he had a
surgery and that he had lost his right eye. When released he was
immediately transferred to the MMA in Belgrade for further
treatment. He now haç prosthesis instead of the missing eye.
Picture No.1 Deformationon the right side PictureNo. 2 Deformationof the right side
of the face, the result of an injury by a shell
cf the face,the result of an injury by a shell
fragment fragment (semi-profile)
192On the basis of medical files, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatricexaminations,
and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences have been found in this
examinee: major deformationand disfigurementof the face, rightside, the loss of the right
eye, followed by impaired eyesight. There are also large and uglyscars - which have
caused major disfigurement and have developeda chronic depression, a tiysthymia; al1
this has caused a severe reduction in his general and vocational capacities.
Picture No. 3 X-ray - the arrowsindicatethe fracture of the maxilla,right side,
which hashealed improperlyC.J., male, 35 years old when captured. On 18 May 1992 he was
taken to the camp in Donja Mahala, where he was held till 22 June
1993. He was then transferred to the camp in LjubuSki,where he
was till exchanged on 19 July 1993. He was almost daily beaten
al1over his body: with fists, with boots on, boxers, bats (rubber
ones and also with the wooden baseball bats), planks, chains, etc.
His genitals were beaten and this was the "favourite sport" of the
camp guards. They also forced the camp prisoners to beat each
other. Once they stabbed his right knee with a knife; they also
stapled his auricle several times. The most terrible experience was
when they forced him to beat his own brother with abat. His skin
on the chest was slit with a piece of broken glass.
Picture No. 1 Scars on the leftauricle,the resultofthe stapling
194On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following
consequences have been found in this examinee: scars (callus)
where the ribs were fracturecl, ncimerous scars on both auricles,
scars on the face, chest, back and right knee. Ha also has the
post- traumatic stress disorder and secondary alcoholism, which
altogether have caused a severe reduction in his general and
vocational capacities.
PictureNo. 2 Scarson the right earlobe,from thestapling
195Picture No. 3 Scar on the chin, the result of a blow
with a mechanical weapon
196Piciure No. 4 Scars on the back, the resultof injuries inflicted by blows
with blunt mechanical weaponsM.K., male, 30 years old when captured. He was captured on 8 May 1992 and was held in
the camps till 20 July 1993, when he was exchanged. He was first held in the camps in
Odiak, then in Novi Grad, Bosanski Brod, Slavonski Brod, Zagreb and in Lora. According to
his statement the most terrible torturing was in the camp in Odiak, where he spent about 2
and a half months, and where three of his teeth were knocked out, and then next in this range
was the camp in Novi Grad, where he was held for 3 days, and the camp in Zagreb. He was
beaten almost daily with fists, feet, rifle butts, planks, truncheons; they extinguished lit
cigarettes in his ears, on his back and arms. On oneoccasion his left shoulderwas dislocated
by a blow with a rifle butt. Several times his genitals were kicked with boots on. His left arm
was cut with a knife in the camp in Zagreb (the doctors later put clips on this wound). When
he was in the camp in Bosanski Brod the camp prisoners were forced to dig trenches. Once,
while forced to do this, he tread on a mine which exploded and ripped away his whole left leg,
and fractured his right leg below the knee. After that accident he was transferred to Zagreb,
where the doctors treated the wounds, from where he was returned to the prison as an
invalid. After this event the camp guards didn't beat him very much.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatricexaminations
the following consequences have been found in this examinee: status after amputationof left
leg, scars on the right shin, with difficulties in walking, limited extension in the left arm, with
muscular atrophy in the upper arm, many scars on the left forearm and hand - which caused
major disfigurement, psychosomatic disorder and generalised anxiety disorder, which
altogether have caused a severe reduction in his general and vocational capacities.
Picture No. 1 Scars on the right shin, the result of injuries caused by shell fragments
198D.J., male, 52 years old when captured. He was captured on 8
May 1992 and transported to the school in Odiak, where he was
kept till 9 July 1992. Then he was transferred to the camp in
Bosanski Brod from which he was released by exchange on 7
October 1992. He said that he had been beaten in both camps
with al1sorts of things: hands, feet, wooden clubs. On 4 October ,
1992 they even bit off his left auricle.
PictureNo. 1 The uvulaof the left earlobe, whichwas bitten off,
and is now missing
199C.V., male, 53 years old when captured. He was captured on 8
May 1992 and taken to the school in Odiak. He was later
transferred to the camp in Novi Grad and then to the camp in
Bosanski Brod, from where he was exchanged on 24 August 1992.
After the exchange he joined the Republic of Srpska Army units
and was once again captured on 20 October 1992 and deportedto
the camp in OraSje.He was there till exchanged on 10 May 1993.
He was mostly beaten in the camp in OraSje. He was beaten
every day al1over his body with fists, boots,bats, etc. They pulled
some wires through his auricles and then hung planks ont0 the
wires. On one occasion he was stabbed in his back. They pushed
lit cigarette butts into his nostrils and ear canals. They tied his
genitals and testicles with wire and then pulled the wire. He ofteri
urinated blood after the beatings. His ribs were broken, as well as
several of his teeth. They sprayed something in his eyes, after
which he would be "blind" for some time. They burnt his beardwith
the flame of a lighter. He lost about 40 kg in the OraSje camp.
Once they "nailed" his hands with a screwdriver.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following
consequences have been found in this examinee: scars (callus)
where the ribs were broken, scars on the skin, on the left auricle
lobule, on the back and limbs, as well as post traumatic stress
disorder and psychosomatic disorder, which have altogether
severely reduced his general and vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Scar on the right cheekbone, the result of a blow
with a blunt mechanical weaponPicture No. 2 Scar on the left cheekbone, the result of a blow
with a blunt mechanical weaponPicture No. 3 Scar on the left shoulder blade region, the result of a stab
with sorne pick or blade of a rnechanical weapon
Picture No. 4 Scar on the back, the result of an injury inflicted
by a blunt rnechanical weapon
203T.N., male, 52 years old when captured. He was captured on 8 May 1992 and deported
to the camp in the school in Odiak, where he was held till 9 July 1992. Then he was
transferred to the camp in Bosanski Brod, from which he was released by exchange on
25 August 1992. He was beaten in the camps al1over his body with al1sorts of things.
One of his teeth was broken; his ribs, right humerus and left elbow were broken when he
was beaten with a rifle butt. They didn't want to take him to a doctor when they broke his
arms. However, when the Red Cross representatives from Geneva had arrived, they sent
him to a hospital and his arms were put in cast. lmmediately after being released he
visited the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade, where he was treated for two months
and had a surgery of his right arm. In March 1993 he had a surgery of his left elbow.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric examinations, and also
according to the X-rays, the following has been found in this examinee: there is limited
mobility in the left arm elbow and scars (callus) on the right humerus, which have
caused a severe reduction in general and vocational capacities.
Picture No. 2 X-ray showing the scar (callus) on the left humerus, superior,
after surgery of the fracturePicture No. 1 X-ray showing the scar (callus) on the right humerus
after surgery of the fracture
205P.B., male, 38 years old when captured. He was captured as a
civilian in the village of Bukova Greda on 9 May 1992, and was
transported to the camp in Donja Mahala. He was held there till 22
June 1993. After that he was transferred to the camp in LjubuSki,
from which he was released by exchange on 20 July 1993. In the
first six to seven months of confinement in the camp in Donja
Mahala he was beaten al1over his body "with everything one can
imagine": with planks, chairs, baseball bats, fists, feet, etc. His
entire body was swollen and "black". The worst was when they
pushed the baseball bats into his larynx, after which he was
incapable of speaking or swallowing anything for a long time. He
was also stabbed with a bayonet in his right elbow. Seven of his
teeth were broken. His ribs on the rightside, his left humerus, and
the left-hand bones were broken. During the beating with a bat
some of his skin was torn away, and today there is no hair
growing where that skin had been.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatricexaminations, and also according tothe X-
rays, the following consequences have been found in this
examinee: deformation of the left upper arm with limited mobilityin
left shoulder joint because of improper healing of the humerus,
scars (callus) where the ribs and left hand bones were broken,
scars on the head and right arm, as well as post traumatic stress
disarder, which altogether have caused a severe reduction in his
general and vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Scar on the top of the head, the result of an injury caused
by a blow with a blunt mechanical weaponPicture No. 2 Linear scar on the right elbow, the result of a stab
with a pointed and sharp mechanical weaponPicture No. 3 X-ray of a scar on the bone (callus) where the lefthumerus
was fractured, whereby the vertical axisof this bone is distortedT.V., male, 36 years old when captured. He was captured on3 June 1992 as a soldier.
After being capturedthey weretaking him from one village to another and showing him to
the Muslims as a "~etnik. All this time they were kicking himand beating him with clubs,
mostly over his neck and the back of his head. They also poked him with picks and
needles between his fingers and toes, and on his head. On one occasion they fractured
his left humerus. His hands and legs had been tied those first four days, and whenhe
waç later untied he was crucified to a shelf. After sometime he fainted from the beating,
and when he came through he saw he had been lying on someconcrete. He found a
piece of glass there, with which he tried to cut the veins on his left forearm. A guard
noticed this,called the doctor,who later on sewed up 'rhewound. When captured he was
also forced to drink a solution of water and soap powder.After that he was taken to the
camp in Donji Rahic, wherehe and 10 other camp prisoners were shutfor 31 days in a
chamber used for the ripening of fruit - an air tight premise without any windows. In
Picture No. 1 Scar on the middlefingerof the right hand,the resultof a cut
with the bladeof a mechanicalweaponthe first month he lost about 40 kg. Then they transferred him to the camp in the village
of MaoEa, where he was held till exchanged on 22 August 1992. He was beaten in the
camps with al1 sorts of things, but mostly with some wooden clubs and kicked with
boots. His ankles were beaten most of all, because of which they were very swollen and
black. One Muslim cut a piece of his flesh from his left thigh, posterior, and then forced
him to eat his own flesh. They extinguished cigarettes on his flanks. They also made
cuts on his stomach and buttocks with the tip of a knife.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurologicâl-psychiatric
examinations the following consequences have been found in this examinee: many scars
on the face, abdomen, back and limbs, there is a hemiparesis on the left side, hearing
disorder in right ear, organic disorder of personality, post traumatic stress disorder, which
have altogether caused a severe reduction in the general and vocational capacities.
Picture No.2 Scar on the right elbow,interior,which is the result of a suicide
attemptwith a sharp mechanicalweaponN.H., woman, 47 years old when captured. She is not married.
She was captured on 29 June 1992 in the village of KobaS,
Croatia, where she haa been working as a cleaning lady, while on
her way to work. Croats had captured her and they took her to the
camp in the sports hall in Bosanski Prod. She was held there till 8
October 1992, when she was transferred with the other camp
prisoners to the camp in Slavonski Brod. She was held there till
exchanged on 5 November 1992. The first three days and nights
of detention in the camp in Bosanski Brod she was constantly
beaten until she accepted to sign some statement, which they liad
dictated. They were beating her with bats and rifle butts, and they
kicked her with their boots on; they also cut and poked her with a
knife on her left foot big toe and the right footll toe. After she
had.signed the testimony they stopped beating her, but then the
period of frequent rape began. She was raped almost every night
in the camp in Bosanski Brod. She and the other women were
always raped as a group, 4-5 men at a time, and she remembered
that there were sometimes even 9 soldiers that raped her in one
night. They sometimes forced male camp prisoners to ra$e her
and the other female prisoners, during which the guards would
watch and do to them whatever they wished.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations tha following consequences have been found in this
examinee: scars on the face, chronic post traumatic stress
disorder, and major depression, which have altogether caused a
severe reduction in her general and vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Scars on the nose and upper lip, the result of an injury inflicted
with a blunt mechanical weaponK.L., male, 53 years old when captured. He was captured as a
civilian in his house on 29 May 1992 and taken first to the camp in
the 'Silo, and then transferred to the camp in TarSin. He was
exchanged on 13 December 1992 through mediation of the
International Red Cross. He hadn't been beaten in the camptill 4
June 1992, after which they beat him regularly. He had received a
blow with a rifle butt in the backof his head, and this wound later
festered and had Wormsin it. There was a dispensary in the camp
but they didn't treat him ther-they only bandaged his head once.
When he had received the blow in his head he fainted, after which
his left hand andchest were injured. In the first 45 days their daily
meals consisted of a slice of bread (a 750 gr. loaf was shared by
12 camp prisoners) and some cooked meal (each camp prisoner
could take 5 spoonfuls of it). When the camp prisoners started
dying of the starvation the quantities were redoubled. The camp
prisoners were usually beatenat night, and the screamingof those
that were beaten was terrible to listen to. This is his most vivid
memory. There was a bucket in the cell for them to urinate, and
another for them to defecate. The guards used the former bucket
to "wash the camp prisoner's faces" and to splash the camp
prisoners. Once they splashed his head too, aswell as the injury
on it, with the urine from the bucket. They would force 2-3 camp
prisoners to take off their clothes and to fellate each other or to
have anal sex. He was forced to do this 4 times, while some
others had been forced to do this even more times than he. They
forced them to do this until they had al1faded and "turned skin and
bones". The strongest camp prisoner would be given a club with
which he was to beat the other camp prisoners. Not once in the 6
and a half months was he allowed to wash, shave, or change
clothes. When he left the camp he weighed58 kg. When captured
he weighed 95 kg.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following
consequences have been found in this examinee: deformityof the
right hand middle finger and post traumatic stress disorder, which
have altogether caused a severe reduction in his general and
vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Scar on the back of the head, left side. The result of an injury
caused by a blow with a mechanical weaponK.M., male, 40 years old when captured. He was captured as a
wounded soldier in Novi Grad on 8 May 1992. They immediately
took him to the camp in Odiak, after which he was transferred to
the camps in Slavonski Brod and Orasje, where he was held till
exchanged on 5 November 1992. He was beaten with rifle butts,
bats, chains, poles, kicked, and punched. They beat his whole
body, but especially the elbows and knees. He suffered hunger
and thirst. His teeth were knocked out. They forced him to lick the
blood off the floor of the room where he had been beaten; they
tied his legs and sank him into water, leaving only his headove
its surface; they forced himto graze grass and eat paper. He was
forced to fellate the genitals of the other camp prisoners and to
rape his relatives.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatric examinations, and also accordingto the X-
rays, the following consequences have been found in this
examinee: bilateral scars (callus) where the ribs were fractured,
scars on the head, face, trunk and limbs, as well as traumatic
enduring paralysis in the right leg and Raynaud's syndrome, which
have altogether caused a severe reduction in his general and
vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Scar on the right side of the forehead, the resultof an injury
caused by a blow with a blunt mechanical weaponPicture No. 2 Deformation in the region of the right rib arch, the resultof improper
healing of the fractured ribsPicture No. 3 Scar on the riglht knee, the result of an injury caused by a blow
with a blunt mechanical weaponPicture No. 4 Scar on the left knee, theresult of an injury caused by a blow
with a blunt mechanical weaponPicture No. 5 A bump in the region of the coccyx bone, the result of an injury
caused by a blow with a blunt mechanical weaponJ.V., male, 32 years old when captured. He was captured as a
soldier in ModriEa on 29 May 1992. They first held him for two
days in the camp located in the Silo, after which they transferred
him to the camp in Slavonski Brod, where he was only for one
day, and then to the camp in Odiak, where he was till 28 June
1992 when he was exchanged. He was beaten with al1sorts of
things from the moment he had been captured. They beat his
head every two hours with electric truncheons, they "washed" him
with the fire engine water jet, they beat his whole body, because of
which he fainted several times. They broke his nasal bone.He had
huge bruises on his body, especially when he was given blows
with bags filled with sand.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatricexaminations, and also according to theX-
rays, the following consequences have been found in this
examinee: a deformation of the nose, many scars on the body and
limbs, as well as a post-traumatic stress disorder, which have
altogether caused a severe reduction in his general and vocational
capacities.Picture No. 1 Nose deformation because the nasal bone fracture, which was
caused by a blow with a blunt mechanical weapon, healed improperly Picture No. 2 Scars on the right shoulder, the result of injuries caused by blows
with a blunt mechanical weapon
Pi:ture No. 3 Scars in the buttocks region, the result of injuries caused by blows
with a blunt mechanical weaponPicture No. 4 Scar on the left thigh, the result of an injury caused by a blow with
a blunt mechanical weaponPicture No. 5 Scar on the right thigh, the result of an injury caused by a blow
with a blunt mechanical weaponPicture No. 6 Scars on the left knee, the result of injuries caused by blows
with a blunt mechanical weaponT.z.', male, 24 years old when captured. He was captured as a
soldier on 8 May 1992 in Odiak, and was taken first to the camp
in Odiak, where they held him for two months, after which he was
transferred to the camp in Bosanski Brod, and then to the camp in
OraSje, from which he was exchanged on 24 December 1992.
From the moment he had been captured he was beaten with bats,
planks, and he was kicked with boots on, because of which his
whole body was bruised. They especially beat his hands. He was
forced to dig trenches on the front line near OraSje,during which
he was injured in the leftthigh, because of which he had a surgery
and was treated in the hospital in Odiak.
The original medical records (discharge note from the hospital
"Tolisa") prove that he was treated in the period from 27
November 1992 to 1 December 1992, because his left thigh had
been injured and his left femur bone fractured.It is also stated in it
that he was wounded while digging trenches asa camp prisoner.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following
consequences have been found in this examinee: limited mobility
in the left knee, scar (callus) on the left femur, inferior, with metal
particles in the surrounding tissue, and scars on the left thigh,
which have altogether caused a severe reduction in his general
and vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 X-ray showing a scar (callus) on the left femur bone, inferior,
with metal particles in the surrounding soft tissue
229T.B., male, 27 years old when captured. He was capturedas a soldier in Novi Grad on
8 May 1992 and taken first to the camp in Odiak, where he spent 58 days.After that he
was transferred to the camp in Novi Grad, where he spent 3 days, then to the camp in
Bosanski Brod, where he was till 6 October 1992. After that he was taken to the camp
in Slavonski Brod for two days and then to the camp in OraSje, from which he was
exchanged on 5 November 1992. He was beaten al1over his body with "al1sorts of
things" from the moment hehad been captured. When he was in the camp in OraSjehe
was stabbedwith a knife on the rightside of his back. While diggingtrenches on the front
PictureNo. 1 Scarson the right shoulder,the result ofinjuries
inflictedy shell fragmentsline, as a camp prisoner of the Bosanski Brod camp, he was wounded in the head, right
arm and in both legs by shell fragments. They had taken him to the hospital in Bosanski
Brod, where the shrapnels were taken out, and he was returned to the camp only 3
days later.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatricexaminations the following
consequences have been found in this examinee: manyscars on the head, body and
limbs, enduring arthropathy in the left knee, which affects gait, and paralysis of muscles
in the region of the right peroneal nerve, which have altogether caused a severe
reduction in his general and vocational capacities.
Picture No. 2 Scars on the right side of the chest, the result of injuries
inflicted by shell fragmentsPicture No. 3 Scars on the right shin, the result of injuries
inflicted by shell fragmentsPicture No. 4 Scars on the left shin, the result of injuries
inflicted by shell fragmentsL.D., male, 28 years old when captured. He was captured as a
soldier on 8 May 1992 and exchanged on 19 July 1993 from the
camp in LjubuSki.As soon as he had been captured he was taken
to the camp in Odiak, where they held him for two months. From
there he was transferred to the camp in Bosanski Brod, where he
spent 10 days, from there to the camp in Slavonski Brod, where
he spent 2 days, then he was sent to the camp in Osijek, for 4
days, from where he was sent to the prison hospital in Zagreb, to
be treated for 6 and a half months for tuberculosis of lungs. From
there he was transferredto the prison in KuniScak,where he spent
4 months; from there he was sent to the camp Lora, where he was
1 and a half months, and from there to the camp in LjubuSki,
where he waited 19 days to be exchanged. His whole body was
beaten with bars, truncheons, kicked and punched, from the
moment he had been captured. He also suffered thirst and
hunger. They forced him to fellate the genitals of other camp
prisoners. He got tuberculosis in the camp, and as soon as the
disease partly healed he was sent back to the camps and was
beaten again.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations numerousscars have been found in this examinee.Picture No. 1 Scar on the flanks, the resultof injuries inflicted
by a blunt mechanical weaponP.S., male, 38 years old when captuïed. He was captured on 12
May 1992 and taken to the camp in Odiak, where he was held for
2 months. He was transferred from there to the camp in Bosanski
Brod, where he spent about2 months, and from there to the camp
in OraSje, where he was held for 4 and a half months and from
which he was exchanged on 5 February 1993. He was beaten in
al1 the camps but he remembers the most the battering in
Bosanski Brod, during which they hanged him by his left leg and
then beat his whole body with al1sorts of things. While he was in
Bosanski Brod his whole body was "non-stop as black as coal"
from the battering. He fainted many times while being beaten and
he later discovered that his ribs had been broken too.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatricexaminations, and also according to the X-
rays, the following consequences have been found in this
examinee: çcars (callus) on many ribs, the results of them being
fractured, deformationof the rib cage, traumatic gonarthrosis in the
left knee, çcars on the back, and post-traumatic stress disorder,
which have altogether caused a severe reduction in his general
and vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Deformity of the rib cage, right side, the result of impi
healing of fracturesB.S., male, 39 years old when captured. He was captured on 8
May 1992 in Novi Grad and taken first to the school/camp in
Odiak, where he was held for two months, from which he was
transferred to the camp in Novi Grad, where he was held for 3
days, and from there they took himto the camp in Bosanski Brod.
While being in this camp he was forced to dig trenches, during
which he was wounded by shell fragments on 2 September 1992.
They took him to the hospital in Slavonski Brod, where he had
surgery, but he was transferred the following day to the hospitalin
Bosanski Brod, from which he was sent to the camp in Slavonski
Brod on 4 October 1992, and was exchangedon 7 October 1992.
He was beaten with al1sorts of things from the moment he had
been captured. They even smashed school benches on him, and
he remembers in particular the battering with wooden clubs,during
which he fainted several times. He used to faint more often in the
second stage of his imprisonment when he was exhausted by
hunger and the beatings. He suffered hunger, and he lost30 kg in
the camps. They also cut his back with knives.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following
consequences have been found in this examinee: many scars on
the back and lower limbs because of which he is disfigured.Picture No. 1 Scar on the back, the result of a cut
with the blade of a mechanical weaponPicture No. 2 Many irregular scars on the lower limbs skin, the result
of injuries inflicted by shell fragmentsPicture No. 3 X-ray showing metal particles in the soft tissue of the thigh
241T.M., male, 21 years old when captured. He was captured on 8 May 1992, after which
he was taken to the camp in Odiak. He was held there till 10 July 1992, when he was
transferred to the camp in Bosanski Brod, where he was held for 2 months; and from
there he was sent to the hospital in Slavonski Brod, because he had been wounded by
a shell explosion while digging trenches on the frontline. He spent about a month in the
hospital and states that they had operated on him without giving him any anaesthetics.
He was exchanged on 7 October 1992. While he was a camp prisoner he was beaten
al1the time.
Picture No. 1 Scars on the left thigh, the rest f injuries
inflictedy shell fragments
242On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences have been
found in this examinee: reduced mobility in the left hip joint, scars on the left forearm,
left thi~h and left flank, which have altogether caused a severe reduction in his general
and vocational capacities.
Picture No. 2 Scar on the left forearm, the result f injuries
inflicteby shell fragments
243P.P., male, 39 years old when captured. He was captured on 8
May 1992 in Novi Grad and first taken to the camp in Odiak,
where he was held for about 2 months. From there he was taken
to Novi Grad, for 3 days, and then to the camp in Bosanski Brod.
He was wounded on 8 August 1992 and taken to the hospital in
Slavonski Brod, but after two weeks they sent him back to the
camp in Bosanski Brod. On 8 October 1992 he was wounded
again and again sent to the hospital in Slavonski Brod. He had
surgery the following day, after whichhe was transferred, two days
later, to the prison hospital in Zagreb. From there he was
transferred on 7 January 1993 to the hospital in Kerestinac, where
he remained till May 1993. From there they sent him to the camp
Lora, and from there to the camp in LjubuSki,where he was held
for 2 weeks to be returned back to Lora. He was exchanged on 28
July 1993. He was beaten withal1sorts of things from the moment
he was captured, and this was the case in al1the camps. Even
while he was in the military hospital in Zagreb he was beaten. The
most severe battering was in the camp Lora.90th times he was
wounded while forced to dig trenches on the front line. The first
time his legs were wounded by shell fragments, and the second
time the fragments struck his back and leftarm. Although he had
been wounded, the guards that were escorting him from the
hospitals to the camps used to beat him "having no mercy to him".
He lost 40 kg in the camps.
On. the basis of medical records, forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatricexaminations, and also according to theX-
rays, the following consequences have been found in this
examinee: irregular scar (callus) on the left humerus, total
immobility of the left arm and left shoulder joint, followed with
muscle atrophy in the left arm, signs of traumatic damage of
brachial plexus, as well as many ugly scars on the head, back,
and limbs, which have altogether caused a severe reduction in his
general and vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Deformity of left upper arm, the result of a wound and of
improper healing of the humerus fracture and of the skinPicture No. 2 Scar on the back, the result of injuries
inflicted by shell fragmentsPicture No. 3 Scars on the right knee, the result of injuries
inflic:ted by shell fragmentsPicture No. 4 Scar on the left thigh, the result of injuries
inflictedby shell fragmentsG.z., male, 24 years old when captured. He was captured on 8
May 1992 in Novi Grad and was taken to the camp in the school in
Odiak, where he was held for 58 days. He was released by
exchange on 5 July 1992 in id. He was beaten with al1sorts of
things from the very first day, but mostlywith rifle butts and school
table legs. He frequently fainted during the beatings. They also slit
his neck, chest, and arms with a knife.
Picture No. 1 Scar on the right forearm, the result of a slit made
with the blade of a mechanical weaponOn the basis of medical records, forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatric examinations the following consequences
have been found in this examinee: many scars on the head, chest,
back and limbs, and a chronic otitis in the right ear, with hearing
disorder, which have altogether caused a mild reduction in his
general and vocational capacities.
Picture No. 2 Scar on the right thigh,the result of an injury inflicted
with a blunt mechanicalweaponM.LJ., male, 27 years old when captured. He was captured on 8
May 1992 in Novi Grad. They took him to the school in Odiak
where he was held till 12 July 1992. He was then transferred to
Slavonski Brod, from where he was exchanged on 7 October
1992. He was beaten with al1kinds of things from the very first
day, so that he was al1bruised and black. He was mostly beaten
with bats and boots. They brokeseveral of his teeth in the upper
jaw right, and his lowerjaw was dislocated by a blow in the chin.
They once slit the skin on his right arm with a knife.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations it has been established that the examinee nowhas
scars on his right hand.Picture No. 1 Scar on the right hand, the result of a cut made
by the blade of a mechanical weaponD.B., male, 22 years old when captured. He was captured in Novi Grad on 8 May 1992.
They first took him to Odiak for a day, then to the camp in Novi Grad, then to the camp
in Bosanski Brod, and in the end to the camp in Slavonski Brod. After that he was
transferred to the camp in Donja Mahala, from where he was exchanged on 29 January
1993. lmmediately after being captured he was beaten with bats, feet, shovels, rifle
butts, and truncheons. He was forced to dig trenches on the front line, during which he
was injured in his right thigh by shell fragments (on 17 December 1992). He fell il1of
lung tuberculosis in the camps. Because of the leg injury he had surgery in Slavonski
Brod. In tne initial period he lost consciousness several times because of the beating.
Picture No. 1 Scar on the right buttock,the resultof an injury
inflictedby shell fragmentsOn the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, thefollowing consequences have been
found in this examinee: X-ray shows shell fragmentsin the soft tissue of the right leg,
half of the right foot big toe is missing, and scars on the lower limbs. As a result of the
severe physical trauma experienced in the camps there is hypertrophy and weakness in
the right thigh, both thighs and shins are disfigured by scars, andhe has developed
major and enduring mental suffering. All this has moderately reduced his general and
vocational performance.
PictureNo. 2 Scar on the right thigh,the resultof an injury
inflicteby shellfragmentsPicture No. 3 Scar on the left buttock, the result of an injury
inflicted by shell fragmentsPicture No. 4 Amputated right foot toe, the result of an injury
inflicted by shell fragmentsPicture No. 5 Scars on the thighs, the result of surgery after an injury
inflicted by shell fragmentsL.M., male, 32 years old when captured. He was captured in NoviGrad on 8 May 1992.
They took him to the school in Odiak, where he was heldfor about 2 months, and then
transferred him first to the camp in Novi Grad, for 2-3 days, and then to the camp in
Bosanski Brod. He was there till 25 August 1992 when he was exchanged. He was
beaten will al1sorts of things from the day when he had been captured:with bars, clubs,
chairs, rifle butts, boots. He was alr bruised and black. On 8 August 1992 he was
injured by shell fragments while forced to dig trenches on the front line; his face, right
shoulder and left leg were woundedon that occasion. After the injury they sent him to
Slavonski Brod, where he had surgery, after which he was sent to the Bosanski Brod
dispensary. He remainded there till exchanged. They didn't beat himafter the blast
injury.
PictureNo. 1 Scarson the noseand left cheek,the resultof injuries
inflictedy shell fragmentsOn the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric examinations, the
following consequences have been found in this examinee: many scars on the face and
limbs, and as a result of major physical and mental trauma experienced in the camps,
and because he has been disfigured, he has developed a chronic depressive syndrome,
which has caused a severe reduction in his general and vocational capacities.
Picture No. 2 Scar on the right shoulder,anterior,the result of injuries
inflictedby shell fragmentsPicture No. 3 Scar on the right shin, the result of injuries
inflicted by shell fragmentsPicture No. 4 Scars on the right ankle, the result of injuries
inflictedby shell fragmentsPicture No. 5 Scars on the left shin, the result of injuries
inflicted by shell fragmentsPicture No. 6 Scars on the left ankle, the result of injuries
inflictedby shell fragmentsDer 1
P.L., male, 36 years old when captured. He was captured as a soldier on 26 April 1992
in cardak. They first took him to the JNA Club, and after three days they transferred
him to the camp "Rabic", where he was about two months, and then to the camp
"Polje", from which he was transferred two weeks later to the camp "~eravac". After two
days they again transferred him, this time to the camp Tulek, near Bosanski Brod, and
after a month they took him to the secondary school center in Bosanski Brod. He was
exchanged on 10 September 1992. He stated that he had been beaten with "al1sorts of
things" (punched, kicked with boots, beaten withbaseball bats, planks and rifle butts;
they extinguished cigarettes on his right hand; they slit his skin on the right side of his
body, and they especially kicked his shins with their boots on) al1over his body, from
the time he was captured, because of which he was al1bruised and black. He was
Picture No.1 Scar on the nose, the result of an injury
inflictedby a blunt mechanicalweapon Der 1
battered the most in the camps in Rabic and Tulek, so that he was incapable of walking
but had to be carried out. He thinks he was so severely beaten because they "had an
eye on his family": his father had been slaughtered in front of his house on 30 April
1992, although he was a 70 years old man and an invalid without his right leg. By the
way, his father'sntire family was killed in the concentration camp Jasenovac in WW II.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations the following consequences have been found in this examinee: scars on
the head, nose, lips, stomach, and limbs; Raynaud's syndrome has also developed, as
well as a psychosomatic syndrome in the form of the somatic dysfunction of the
cardiovascular and superior gastrointestinal tract, which have altogether caused a
moderate reduction in his general and vocational capacities.
Picture No2 Scar on the lowerlip, the result of an injury
inflicted by a blunt mechanicalweaponPicture No. 3 Scar on the right forearm, the result of an injury
inflicted by a lit cigarette Der 1
Picture No. 4 Scar on the right wrist, the result of an injury
inflicted by a lit cigaretteDer 3
J.S., male, 44 years old when captured. He was captured as a civilianin Derventa on
25 April 1992. He was first taken to the local school and then to the JNA Club in
Derventa, and he spent a day in each. From there they took himto the hospital in
Derventa because of the injuries inflicted by the battering.He was discharged from the
hospital on 17 June 1992. From the hospital he was transferred to the camp Polje,
where they held him till 14 July 1992, when he was exchanged. His whole body was
beaten from the moment he had been captured (hewas punched, kicked, beaten with
boots on, truncheons, "boxer", etc.). His nasal bone and maxilla had been fractured, and
because of this he was sent to the hospital for treatment. They forced him to drink
petrol, pouring it into his mouth, and they lit the quantities that were spilt on his hands;
they extinguished cigaretteson his chest, and they stabbed his buttocks with a bayonet.
They put a helmet on his head and then beat it with bats, because of which he fainted.
He lost about 20 kg in the camps. When he was to be discharged from the hospital he
tried to commit suicide by cutting, with a pocket knife, his veinson his left arm, but the
attempt was thwarted anc! a surgeon sewed up the wound.
The medical records of the "Surgery Department" within the Medical Center in Derventa
prove that the examinee was admitted to the hospital a day after he had been captured,
and that he was treated in the hospitalfor a month and a half (from 26 April -17 June
1992) with the diagnosis: "Contusio capitis et thoracis sin; luxatio dentis et maxillae
sin.; conjunctivitis ac. bill." The medical records from the period immediately after he
was released from the camp prove that, because of the injuries, his 1st tooth in the
maxilla, left side, had to be extracted by surgery. Accordingto the length of his stay and
treatment (which was a month and a half) in the hospital in Derventa, andtaking into
consideration that he was a camp prisoner at the time, one might conclude that J.S.
was treated for major injuries of the chest, that his ribs and head had been fractured
(which was established later by the X-ray of the rib cage), his first tooth in the maxilla,
left side, was dislocated, and his nasal bonewas broken (which was established later
by the X-ray), which were followed by concussion of the brain. Altogether, these
presented a major injury. The medical records have stated bilateral "conjunctivitis"
(inflammation of the conjunctiva in both eyes). This wasn't a caseof inflammation, as
the doctors in Derventa had put it; it was an injury in the form of haemorrhage of the
conjunctiva caused by the fracture of the nasal bcne. Such conclusions are based on
the nature and type of the injury because of which he had been treated a month and a
half in this hospital.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences have been
found in this examinee: scars (callus) on the left ribs, scars on the chest, arms and
buttocks, Raynaud's syndrome, non-psychotic post-contusion psycho- organic
syndrome, chronic major depressive disorder, psychosomaticdisorder (duodenal ulcer)
and post-traumatic stress disorder, which have altogether caused a severe reduction in
his general and vocational capacities. Der 3
Picture No. 1 Scar on the chest, the result of a burn
with a lit cigarette
Picture No. Scars on the right hand fingers,
the result of burns with a lit cigaretteDer 3
Picture No. 3 A linear scar on the left wrist, interior,
the result of a suicide attempt Der 3
Picture No. 4 Scar on the left buttock, the result of a stab wound
inflicted with the tip of a mechanical weaponDer 4
K.M., male, 34 years old when captured. He was captured as a company commander
on 26 April 1992, in the quarter ~ardak. Prior to this he was wounded in his right leg
and left shoulder. They first took himto the JNA Club in Derventa,then to the camp in
Polje, after that to the camp in Rabic, andthen to the bowling alley in Slavonski Brod.
He was exçhanged in July 1992. From the moment he was captured he was given a
"special treatment" because he had been a company commander. He was kicked,
punched, beaten with truncheons, baseball bats, and cables. In the camp in Slavonski
Brod he was tortured with low voltage electricity,during which they spilt water over him;
his chest, stomach, arms, and tongue were burnt with some red-hot object. They
extinguished cigarettes on his tongue so he couldn't eat. They pulled out his toenails.
He starved because they gave him very little food. When he was given somethingto eat
it was usually salt and hot peppers; while he was in the camps he lost .about 40 kg.
They poked and slit his skin with a knife. He was given no medical treatment in any of
the camps, and because of this his leg was in infection. Two of his teeth had been
loosened by the blows, so he had to have them pulled out after he was released from
the camp.
On the basis of forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatrie examinations,
and also according to the X-rays, the
following consequences, which are the
result of injuries inflicted in the camps,
have been found in this examinee:
toothlesness, scars (callus) on the left
ribs, scars on the face, chest and limbs,
as well as tinnitus (buzzing in the ears),
Hypacusis (impaired hearing),
Raynaud's syndrome, post- traumatic
stress disorder, which have altogether
caused a severe reduction in his
general and vocational capacities.
Picture No.1 Scar on the left auricle,
the result of a cut with the bladeof a
mechanicalweapon Der 4
Picture No. 2 Scars on the left shoulder, the result of injuries inflicted by a "metal wl
275 Picture No. 3 Linear scars on the left hand fingers, with a part of the right
hand thumb pulp missing, the result of cuts with a blade of a mechanical weapon.
Picture No. 4 Linear scar on the left foot, the result of cuts
with a blade of a mechanical weapon Der 4
Picture No. 5 Deformity of the toenails, the result
ofthe nails being "pulled out"N.S., male, 37 years old when captured. Captured on 26 April 1992 in Derventa as a
member of the army medical corps. He was first taken to the JNA Club in Derventa,
where he and the other camp prisoners were beatenfor 8 hours continuously. They
were beaten with truncheons and kicked with bootson; he was forced to swallow salt,
after which he was in a state when he didn't even feel pain. His head and supra-orbital
arch were injured by this battering. After three days he was transferred to the camp
Rabic, where they held him for about 2 months, and from there he was taken to the
camp Polje, from where he was exchanged on 27 June 1992. He was beaten al1over
his body in al1the camps. There were times whenhe was given no water or food for 2-3
days. He lost about 10 kg in the camps. He was given no treatment in any of the
camps, except for the treatment by the doctorswho were also camp prisoners.
Picture No. 1 Scar on the forehead,the resultof an injury
inflictedwith a blunt mechanical eapon Der 5
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatricexaminations the following
consequences have been found in this examinee:scars on the face and head, elements
of enduring change of personality after the catastrophic event, which have altogether
caused a moderate reduction in his general and vocational capacities.
Picture No.2 Scar abovethe right eyebrow, theresultof an injury
inflictedwith a blunt mechanicalobjectDer 6
K.D., male, 36 years old when captured. He was captured as a civilianon 5 May 1992
in the streets of Derventa. He was first taken to the JNA Club in Derventa, where they
held him for 7 days, after which he was transferredto the camp Rabic, where he stayed
till 26 June 19.92.From there they took him to the camp in Slavonski Brod, from which
he was exchanged on 9 July 1992. He was beaten every daywith "al1sorts of things":
with rifle butts, wooden poles, truncheons, kicked with boots, punched etc. Hewas
beaten the most in the camp Rabic. They poked him with a knife, burnt himwith lit
cigarettes on his forehead; forced him and the other camp prisonersto kick each other.
His ribs were broken by the battering in the camp in Slavonski Brod, when "for three
days he didn't know for himself". They forced them tofellate each other. They trampled
on his body and abdomen so he defecated in his pants. By beating him they forced him
to sign various documents. He said that he had fainted three times because of the
beatings.
Picture No. 1 Scar under the chin, the result of a cut
inflicted with the blade of a mechanical weapon Der 6
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences have been
found in this examinee: scars (callus) on the left ribs, scars on the face, lips and limbs,
as well as elements of enduring change of personality after the catastrophic event,
which have altogether caused a mild reduction in his general and vocational capacities.
PictureNo.2 Scar on the left cheekbone, theresultof an injury
inflictedwith a blunt mechanl eaponDer 6
Picture No. 3 Scar on the lower lip, the result of an injury
inflicted with a blunt mechanical weapon Der 6
Picture No. 4 Scar on the left upper arm, the result of a stab
inflicted with the tip of a sharp mechanical weaponV.Z., male, 27 years old when captured. He was captured as a soldierin Derventa, in its
quarter ~ardak on 26 April 1992. He was first taken to the JNA Club in Derventa and
was later transferred to the camp Rabic, in whichhe was held for about 80 days; from
there he was taken to the camp Polje, and in July 1992 he was exchanged.He was
beaten al1over from the time he had been captured: with baseball bats, kicked with
boots on, beaten with planks and al1things at hand. They put a bayonetto his throat to
force him watch some Azra while shewas slaughtering a camp prisonercalled Blagoje
DuraS. They forced him to eat salt and to stand on one leg the whole day long. They
were given water and food irregularly, and there were times when they were given a
liter of water to share among 30 men. His hands, which he had to hold on a bench,
were beaten with bats and electricity cables.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatrieexaminations, and also
according to the X-rays, the following consequences havebeen found in this examinee:
scars on the face and right hand, hypacusis (hearing impairment), post- traumatic stress
disorder, which have altogether caused a severe reduction in his general and vocational
capacities.
PictureNo. 1 Scar on theforehead,the resultof an injury
inflictedwitha blunt mechanicalweapon Der 8
--
Picture No. 2 Scar on the right upper arm, the result of a cut caused
by the blade of a mechanical weapon
Picture No.3 Scar on the right knee, the result of an injury
inflicted with a blunt mechanical weaponDer 10
M.B., male, 33 years old when captured. He was captured as a soldier in Derventa, in
its quarter~ardak on 26 April 1992. He was immediately taken to the JNA Club in
Derventa, then to the camp Rabic. From this camp they took him to the camp ~eravac,
where he spent only two and a half days. From there he was taken to the camp Polje,
and then to Tulek. On 7 July 1992 he was exchanged. As soon as he was arrested they
tied his hands behind his neck in such a manner that every movement of his hands
would cause him to choke. They beat him from the moment they had captured him, and
they poured into his mouth boiling coffee and freezing water, one after the other. He
was beaten al1the time and he fainted several times because of the battering. He was
beaten with al1sorts of things: he was punched, kicked, beaten with bats, rifle butts,
cables. and kicked with boots on.
On the basis of medical records,
forensic medical and neurological-
psychiatric examinations, and also
according to the X-rays, the following
consequences have been found in this
examinee: scars (callus) on many ribs,
scars on the head, lips, left auricle and
upper limbs, as well as a chronic neuro-
vegetative dysfunction in the form of
Raynaud's syndrome, which have
altogether caused a moderate reduction
in his general and vocational capacities.
Picture No.1 Scar on the back of the
head, the resultof an injury inflicted
with a blunt mechanicalobject. Der 10
Picture No. 2 Scar on the forehead, Picture No.3 Scar on the lower lip,
the result of an injury inflicted the result of an injury inflicted
with a blunt mechanical object. with a blunt mechanical object.
Picture No. 4 Scars on the palms, the result of burns inflicted with lit cigarettes
287Der 12
B.N., male, 45 years old when captured. He was captured as a soldier in Derventa,in
its quarter Cardak on 26 April 1992. On that occasion his wife was killed. He was first
taken to the JNA Club in Derventa, then to the camp Rabic and from there he was
taken to the camp Polje. From this camp they transferred himto the camp ieravac for
only 3 days, and he had spent 3 days in a truck. From there he wastaken to Bosanski
Brod, where he was exchanged on 9 July 1992. He had been wounded by a shell
explosion when they had captured him and he was unconscious. The other camp
prisoners later told him that the soldiers had thought he had died, and they threw him
out, through the JNA Club window. On the third day,when he was in the camp in Rabic,
he regained consciousness, after which they started to beat hirn every day and every
night. He was beaten al1over his body, but mostlyon his head, with al1sorts of things:
he was kicked, punched, beatenwith bats, rifle butts, etc. Sometimes he was beatenby
one man, sometimes by a group.
Picture No. 2 Scars on the left side of the chest and abdomen,
the result of stabs caused by the tip and blade of a mechanical weaponOn the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences have been
found in this examinee: scars (callus) where many of the ribs were fractured, scars on
the head, trunk and limbs, the lumbar-sacral syndrome and hypacusis (impaired
hearing), which have altogether caused a severe reduction in his general and'vocational
capacities.
Picture No. 1 Scars on the left upper arm, theresult of stabs
caused by the tip and blade of a mechanicalweaponDer 13
c.I., male, 48 years old when captured. He was capture3 as a soldier in Derventa, in its
quarter Cardak on 25 April 1992. He was first taken to the JNA Club in Derventa, then
to the camp Rabic, where they held him for about 2 months. From there he was taken
to the camp Polje, where they held him 2-3 days, and from this camp they transferred
him to the camp ~eravac, where he spent only a day and a night, and from there he
was taken to the camp in Bosanski Brod, where he remained till 5 July 1992, when he
was exchanged. Before he was captured he had been wounded in his head by a bullet,
and from the time he came through they beat his whole body with al1sorts of things.
They also forced him to eat two handfuls of salt, and he was forced to do the same the
following day in the JNA Club in Derventa. They slit the skin on his back and "carved"
Picture No.1 Scar on the head, theresult of an injury
inflictedby a blunt mechanicalweapon Der 13
crosses on it. They fractured his 5th right hand finger with a truncheon, Other camp
prisoners told him that the soldiers had extinguished cigarette buts on his hands while
he was unconscious.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences have been
found in this examinee: scars (callus) where the left metacarpal bones were fractured,
scars on the left hand and head, cervico-brachial syndrome, lumbar-sacral syndrome,
hypacusis (hearing impairment), Raynaud's syndrome, major depressive disorder and
post-traumatic stress disorder, which have altoaether caused a severe reduction in his
general and vocational capacities.
PictureNo. 2 Scars on the leftback of the hand,
the result of burns made witha licigaretteDer 15
V.S., male, 42 years old when captured. He was captured as a
soldier in Derventa, in its quarter~ardak on 26 April 1992. He was
first taken to the JNA Club in Derventa, then to the camp Rabic,
where they held him for about 2 months. From there he was taken
to the camp Polje, where they held him 2-3 days, and from this
camp they transferred him to the camp ~eravac, where he spent
only two days, and from there he was taken to the camp in
Bosanski Brod, where he remainedtill 14 July 1992, when he was
exchanged. He was beaten al1 over his body, with al1 sorts of
things, from the time he had been captured, and because of this
he was al1bruised and swollen. He was beaten in al1the camps,
though the most in Rabic and Bosanski Brod. They kicked him on
the head with their boots on, beat him with baseball bats, clubs,
rifle butts, and "everything they had at hand. They broke his left
ribs and the 4th right hand finger. They poked his right shin with a
knife and burnt his skin on the left forearm and right shin with lit
cigarettes.
On .the basis of medical files, forensic medical and neurological-
psychiatric examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the
following consequences have been found in this examinee: scars
(callus) on the ribs that were broken and on the right hand
metacarpal bones, scars on the lips and limbs, as well as tinnitus
(buzzing in the ears) and post traumatic stress disorder, which
have altogether severely reduced his general and vocational
capacities. Der 15
Picture No. 1 Deformity in the right hand 4th finger, the resultof an injury
inflicted by a blunt mechanical weaponL.N., male, 36 years old when captured. He was captured as a
soldier in Derventa, in its quarterrdak on 25 April 1992. He was
first taken to the village of Zelenika, where he was detained for 2-3
days, and was then taken to the JNA Club in Derventa, where he
stayed till 9 May 1992, and from there he was taken to the camp
Rabic. From there he was taken to the camp Polje, and from this
camp they transferred hirn to the camp ~eravac, holding hirn and
another 100 camp prisoners for 2-3 days shut in a bus, without
being given any water or food. From this camp they transferred
hirn to the camp in Bosanski Brod, where he remained till 10 July
1992, after which he was taken to the secondary school center,
from where he was exchanged on 25 August 1992. He was beaten
from the moment he had been captured, and they beat hirn in
every camp, but the most in Rabic ar;d Tulek. They beat hirn with
various objects, but in Tulek they beat hirn the most with baseball
bats. He received blows over his head and body, and once, in the
camp in Rabic, he fainted after receiving a kick with a boot in his
chin: after this blow he felt pain "below his ears", after whick his
hearing was significantly reduced. He also mentioned that while he
was coming through he felt as if some "construction machine was
rumbling nearby". They forced him to be their "live shield" while
they were on the front line, forced to dig trenches. On one
occasion a shell exploded nearby and wounded hirn in both legs.
Because of this he was taken first to the hospital in Bosanski Brod
and then transferred to the hospital in Slavonski Brod, where he
had surgery the same day and was immediately returned to the
Bosanski Brod hospital. Having spent one night in that hospital he
was sent back to the camp in Tulek.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatric examinations the following consequences
have been found in this examinee: severe loss of hearing, scars
on the lower limbs, and post contusion psycho-organic syndrome,
which have altogether severely reduced his general and vocational
capacities. Der 19
Picture No. 1 Scar on the right thigh, posterior, whichis the result of an injury
by a shell fragmentPicture No. 2 Scar on the right thigh, anterior, the resultof an injury
by a shell fragment
296 Der 19
Picture No. 3 Scar on the left shin, posterior, which is the result of an injury
by a shell fragmentK.J., male, 36 years old when captured. He was captured as a
civilian in his flat in Tuzla, where he was recovering from the
injuries sustained in combat. He was first taken to the JNA Club in
Tuzla, where they held hirn for three days shut in its ticket office,
which was the size of only 1 sq.m. After three days they gave hirn
for the first time something to eat - a piece of bread and a slice
from a can of pressed meat. From there they transferred hirn to
the central military prison in Tuzla, where hewas shut in a cell on
the second floor. On 26 June 1992 they let hirn go home, and he
lived there until on 24 December 1994 he bribed the Muslimsto let
hirn and his family leave the town. He received the worst beatings
in the first three days, when they punched and kicked him, beat
him with rifle butts, truncheons, broke some armchair elementson
him, trampled on him, poked his arms with a knife, fractured his
ribs and left pelvic bone. They knocked out his 2nd tooth in the
maxilla, left side, by a kick. Every day he would faint several times
from the battering.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following
consequences have been found in this examinee: scars(callus) on
the ribs that were broken, scars on the lower lip, chest and upper
limbs, as well as post-traumatic stress disorder, partial deafnessin
the right ear and bilateral tinnitus, which have altogether severely
reduced his general and vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Linear scar below the lower lip, the result of an injury
inflicted by the blade of a mechanical weapon Picture No. 2 Linear scar on the left band Picture No. 3 Linear scar on right hand 5th
4th finger nail bed, the reçult of an injury finger, the result of an injury inflicted by the
inflictedy the blade of a mechanicalweapon blade of a mechanical weapon
Picture No. 4 Linear scar on the left hand index finger,
the result of an injury inflicted by the blade of a mechanical weaponPicture No. 5 Linear scar on the right forearm, the result of an injury
inflicted by the blade of a mechanical weaponE.M., male, 39 years old when captured. He was captured as a
civilian in his flat in Banovici on 22 June 1992. He was taken to
the camp of "the railways" but was released on 13 July 1992, with
an order to be in house detention with restricted movement. After
10 days they took him to the camp StreliSte, in Tuzla, and after
two months he was again returned home and put in house
detention. He was releasedlexchanged on 8 November 1993. As
soon as they had captured him they beat al1 over with pipes,
truncheons, and kicked him. When he was captured he weighed
105 kg, when exchanged he weighed 69 kg. They would beat him
"from head to toes" because of which he was al1bruised, and he
also faintedseveral times. His whole legs were in haematoma and
were so swollen that he couldn't walk. On the basis of forensic
medical and neurological-psychiatric examinations, and also
according to the X-rays, the following consequences have been
found in this examinee: scars where the ribs were fractured,
bilateral, scars on the limbs, as well as post-traumatic stress
disorder and psycho-somatic disorder, which have altogether
severely reduced his general and vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Scar on the left forearm, the result of an injury
inflicted by a blunt mechanical weapcnG.J., male, 46 years old when captured. He was captured as a civilian in his house in
Banovici on 6 June 1992. He was taken first?O the Railways Main Office in Banovici,
where he was held for 10 days, and then to Tuzla. His brother-in-law was held in the
sanie camp. He was kept there till 21 July 1993. He was tortured while alone. They
used to hit him with blunt weapons. Once they fired from a firearm near his body. He
also suffered thirst and hunger. They didn't let him sleep for almost three months. He
was beaten with al1sorts of things. Several times he had to stand for a long time in the
sun. They knocked out two of his teeth. He experienced the "stereo torturing" several
times. He was stabbed and cut with a knife several times. Once he had to stand still, at
attention, the whole day. During the torturing he was always yelled and cursed at. He
witnessed the torturing and killing of some other camp prisoners.
PictureNo.1 Deformity inthe right wrist
304He was forced to fight with other camp prisoners, to give false testimonies, and they
forced him to walk in the squatted position with his hand on his back, up and down a
100m corridor 15 times. He was forced to dig trenches on the front line twice. He fainted
several times during the torturing, and he also vomited, urinated, and bled several
times. He stood trial and was given an official defense counsel.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric examinations, and also
according to the X-rays, the following consequences, which are the result of injuries
inflicted in the camps, have been found in this examinee: deformity in the right wrist,
scars on the right leg, the teeth that supported the dental prosthesis in the maxilla are
missing.
Picture No.2 Knockedout teeth in the maxilla
305S.R., female, 31 years old when wounded. On 17 September 1992 she was at home in the
village of Serdari. Her father-in-law, mother-in-law, sister-in-law, husband, aunt and her two
daughters and her uncle's daughter were in the house, too. The village was attacked in the
early morning hours by the Muslims, who made a massacre in the village and then
retreated. In that raid they killed her father-in-law in front of the house, and in the house
thvy killed her mother-in-law, sister-in-law, uncle's daughter, aunt with her two daughters (5
and 11 year old girls). S.R. was five months pregnant withher youngest daughter. Shewas
in the house at that time and was hit first by shell fragments in the stomach and then by
another explosion - in the legs. These injuries dazed her and she fell to the floor. Then the
Muslims arrived; they entered the house and opened burst fire, which wounded her in the
right upper arm and both breasts. When she regained consciousness she saw that
everyone had been killed, except for her aunt and herself. She was later found, put in a car
and driven to the Banja Luka hospital where she had 2 surgeries. She had a third surgery
later in the Military Medical Hospital-of a nerve. Regardless of al1the injuries, she carried
out the pregnancy and gave birth to a healthy girl in Banja Luka.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric examinations, the following
consequences have been found in this axaminee: deformity the right upper arm, many
scars on the right upper arm, breasts, abdomen and right leg, aswell as a damaged ulnar
and ischiatic nerve, which result in disfigurement and have moderately reduced her general
and vocational capacities.
Picture No. 1 Scar on the right upper arm, the resultof an injury
inflicted by a shell fragment
306 Picture No. 2 Scars on both breasts, the result of injuries
inflicted by shell fragments
Picture No. 3 Scar on the right breast, the result of an injury
inflicted by a shell fragmentPicture No. 4 Scar on the left breast, the result of an injury inflicted by a shell fragment
Picture No. 5 Scars on the abdomen, the result of injuries
inflicted by shell fragmentsPicture No. 6 Scars on the right thigh, the result of injuries inflicted by shell fragments
Picture No. 7 Scars ori the right knee and right shin, the result of injuries
inflictedby shell fragments
309D].P., male, 44 years old when captured On2 or 3 September 1993, when two Muslims
barged into his house and started to harass him. First they took off his clothes and then
started poking and cutting him with a knife. Then they forced him to fellate them and
then they both raped him. After that they tied his arms and legs with some rags and
socks, covered him with clothes, and set the clothes to fire. All this was happening in
his house. Some of the neighbours noticed the fire coming from his house, ran in,
released him, called an ambulance which arrived soon, and tookhim to the hospital. He
was treated for 7 months in the TeSanjhospital. When dismissed from the hospital,his
neighbours nursed him. He remained in TeSanjtill 15 July 1996, when he was brought
to the IFOR checkpoint and handed to the Serbs in Teslic.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric examinations the following
consequences have been found in this examinee: major scsrs on the face, chest,
anterior and bilateral, back and arms, which have disfigured his body,as well as an
enduring change of personality after the disastrous experience, which have altogether
severely reduced his general and vocational capacities.
Picture No. 1 Scar on the back, Picture No. 2 Scars on the face,
the result of a stabnjury the result of burnsPicture No. 3 Scars on the chest, Picture No. 4 Scars on the chest
the result of burns and right shoulder, the result of burns
Picture No. 5 Scars on the left side of the thorax, the result of burns
311A.M., female, 52 years old when captured She is married and has three children. She
was raped in her own house in front of her husband. During the night of 9 September
1993 three soldiers entered their house. She knew two of them. They asked about her
sons, who were at that time in the theatre of operations. As soon as they entered her
house they gave her a blow across her mouth by which some of her teeth in the upper
jaw were broken. Then they started to beat her husband. After that they stripped off her
clothes and while one of them was raping her, the two others were forcing her husband
to watch it. The following day her brother-in-law informed the police about the event and
they were protected by the police for some time. The police even wrote a report about
the event. The following days they were afraid to go home and they were hiding in the
houses of others. However, when they finally went home they saw that the house had
been looled and things in it broken. The only thing they could do is to flee to Teslic
where their son was living. Her husband never recovered from that event, "he changed
mentally" and he hanged himself.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatricexaminations the following
consequences have been found in this examinee: teeth missing in the upper jaw,
enduring change of personality because of the traumatic experience, psychosomatic
disorder (psycho-dermatosis), which have altogether severely reduced her general and
vocational capacities.
Picture No. 1 Changes on the hands Picture No.2 Changes on the hands
(psycho-dermatosis) as a mental (psycho-dermatosis) as a mental
reaction to the experienced torture reaction to the experienced torture
312K.M., male, 42 years old when captured. He was captured in June 1992. He was first
taken to the camp ~eher and then to the camp ~epca to dig trenches on the front line.
He managed to escape and was in hiding for some time. However, they captured hirn
again, interrogated hirn and let hirn go home. He was not allowed to leave the house.
On 9 December 1992 the Croats came and took hirn to ~epëa, where he was held 21
days in the camp. He was SC)heavily beaten there that he had blood in his sputum al1
the time. The first 18 days he was beaten day and night with bats, with boots on, and
rifle butts. They hit his head against theall; forced hirn to hold his arms up in the air
for hours while they would beat hirn in every possible way. He lost consciousness
several times and they woulcl splash hirn with water to come through. He was led for
staged execution several times. All this was done to hirn by his former neighbours. He
was exchanged on 28 April '1993.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric examinations, the
following consequences have been found in this examinee: he kas scars on his head
and functional psychosomatic disorder, which have altogether mildly reduced his
general arid vocational capacities.
Picture No.1 Scars on the forehead,the result of injuries
inflictedwith a blunt mechanicalweaponR.D., male, 60 years old when the event took place On 7 July 1997 he and his wife
went to VeleSce, where they had a summer cottage and vegetable garden, to plant
some vegetables. They spent the night in their cottage. The following day, on 8 July
1992, they were invited to lunch by the StriSevic family. While they were at the table
three Muslims barged into the house and started to shoot at them with burst fire. Six
people were killed by this shooting, amongst which his was wife, while he was
wounded. The Muslims left immediately after having shot the bursts of fire. Although
wounded in the chest, left hand and left leg, he managed to leave the house. A man
found him and drove him to the hospital in Sarajevo, where he was treated for 18 days.
When dismissed he returned to his cottage in VeleSce, since he couldn't reach his flat in
Grbavica any more. He managed to reach his flat only on 6 March 1995 and on 15
March 1996 he left Sarajevo. It has been written in his discharge note that he had been
wounded by shell fragments. However, the forensic medical expertise has found that he
had shot wounds, the result of small arms bullets.
On the basis of medical
records, forensic medical
and neurological-
psychiatric examinations,
and also according to the
X-rays, the following
consequences have been
found in this examinee:
scars on the neck, chest,
back and left hip, and as
result of the experienced
catastrophic event, he
has developed, a chronic
depression, which has
severely reduced his
general and vocational
capacities.
PictureNo. 1 Scar on the left shoulder, anterior,
the result of a shot woundPicture No. 2 Scars on the left shoulder, posterior, the result of shot wounds
Picture No. 3 Scar on the right side of the chest, the result of a shot wound
315Picture No. 4 Scar in the right shoulder blade area,
the result of a shot woundPicture No. 5 Scar on the left thigh, the result of a shot wound
317M. O., male, 52 years old when captured. He was captured in his house in Sarajevo on25
April 1992. They first took hirn to the community office, andfrom there to some container for
storingfruit (refrigerator) wherethey beat hirn with truncheonson the head and the whole body.
He had been battered to such an extent that he fainted twice. Then they turned on the
refrigerator, with him inside, to the "freezing" position andlefi him in there for 2 hours. In the
periodfrom 25 April 1992 to 7June 1992he was put in housedetentionin the home of a Croat.
Fromthere they took hirn to Hrasnica, where theydeprived hirnof the 10,000 DEM, 10,000SFr
and 10,000,000 dinars he had on him. Then they led him under some school staircase in
Hrasnica, where he found 22 other Serbs. During the first night he and six other men were
taken to a room - something like a torturing room. They tiedtheir wrists with a noose and
suspended them. Then one of the camp guards took some very heavy bag, as if full of lead,
that was also hangingfrom the ceiling, and swungit so that it would hitthe camp prisoners.He
was the fourth on turn to be hit by the bag and after some time he fainted. He regained
consciousness whenthey poured a bucket of water overhis head, and they commented:He is
still alive! Then they hanged hirn again and repeated everything.After they had put hirndown
they started beating hirn and hitting hirn withsome bar, and broke his right leg in three places.
They hit his hands and nails with a hammer and pushed pricks under his nails. He fainted
again. He came through a day or twolater.The camp prisonerstook some planksand rags and
bound his broken leg. After that they took hirn to a garage. He stated:..My only wish at the
time was to be dead. They put 7-10 men in each garage (there were about 10 garages) where
there was only the concretefloor. Hereceivedno medicalcare. Every 24 hours a 600-gr.loaf of
bread was given to 21 camp prisonersto share. Heremembered(he starts to cry when talking
of that) how a camp prisoner used tocome to his leg to eat the clotted bloodon it. After having
spent three monthson the concrete floorof the garage he was taken to the hospitalin Hrasnice,
where they put plaster on his foot. His ribswere broken by the beatingtoo. Forsix months he
urinated blood. However, thegreatest trauma to hirn was the camp prisoner eating his clotted
blood. After breaking his leg they didn't torture him any more. But, the other camp prisoners
were permanently tortured andsexually harassed in "al1possible ways". After 40 days a man
came to take off his plaster cast and he said that he would be exchanged. After the rib and
shinbone had been fractured many pieces of bone were protruding from his skin,which he
would pull out with a nail clipper. He was transferred from Hrasnicato Sarajevo on 2 August
1994 (where he had some kind of "trial"). He was exchanged on 13 June 1994.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatricexaminations,
and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences have been found in this
examinee: scars (callus) on the right shin, where it wasfractured, whereby the fractures have
deformedthe right shin andknee becauseof which he walks with difficulty,he limps,and al1this
has disfigured him; scars where the ribshad been broken, fourth right hand finger cannot be
completely extended, whichis the result of the medial phalanx fracture; ugly scar on the right
shin. As a result of the physical and mental trauma experiencedin the camps a post traumatic
stress syndrome, hemiplegiain the lefi side of the body, hearing disturbance and buzzingnoise
in his ears, which have altogether severely reduced his general and vocational capacities. Picture No. 1 X-ray (anterior-posterior) Picture No. 2 X-ray (from the side) shows
shows a scar (callus) on the tibia, superior major scars (callus) on the right tibia,
superior, whereby this bone has a
thickening the size of a male fist. Its vertical
axis is arched so that the arch opening is
turned interior. This (callus) has a hollow in
it, the size of 3 x 1 cm (pseudo-cistitis)
319S.D., girl, 14 years old when the event took place. She is a
student, not married, has no children. She is now living with her
sister. Her father and mother were killed on 2 August 1993, in
~eravice, when the Muslims had attacked that village. On that
same occasion her left forearm had been wounded and the
soldiers captured her, while her elder sister managed to escape.
They first took her to Kladanj, where she spent one night, andthen
to Tuzla, to the orphanage, where there were only Muslim children.
She was 14 years old at the time and she saw the Muslims burn
Serb houses and take from them whatever was valuable. While
she was in Kladanj she was almost beaten just because she is
Serb. She was alone there. Then they took her in an ambulance
car to have her wounds treated, after which they took her to the
police station to question her, and from there they took her to
Tuzla. The police again questioned her there and she was
exchanged on 21 August 1993. The Muslim children in the
orphanage harassed her coristantly. They intimidated her, saying
they were going to hang her, kill her, atc. The time spent with the
orphans was even worse than the time spent with the soldiers.
Shv was mostly harassed verbally,she wasn't physically abused.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations the following consequences havebeen found in this
enaminee: Scars on the left upper arm.Picture No. 1 Scar on the left forearm, the result ofa shot wound.
321A.M., male, 15 years old when captured. A student. His parents
and sister were killed in the village of Kravica, while he was
captured on 13 December 1992 at PotoSara, which is near
Srebrenica. He was captured by Muslims, who took him to the
camp in Guber Banja, near Srebrenica. They held him there for
two and a half months, after which he was exchanged. He was
beaten in the camp with al1sorts of things: he was punched and
kicked, and beaten with rifle butts. They also knocked him down,
by which his right hip was dislocated, they alsoslit the skin on his
face and neck, saying they were going to slaughter him. He wasn't
raped nor was he burnt with cigarettes. In the end of his stay in
the camp when they started to slaughter him he fainted. He
doesn't know what had happened after that; he only remembers
the events after he came through, which was in the MMA hospital
in Belgrade. He was treated in this hospital for a year and 5
months. Because of the right hip injury he spent many months
lying in a plaster cast, and he also had surgery of his face and left
eye.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations the following consequences have been found in this
examinee: deformity of face followed with neurological deficits,
improper bite, major loss of sight, scars on the right side of the
forehead, and right cheek, along the right branch of the mandible,
on the right side of the neck and right knee. As a consequence of
the severe physical and mental trauma experienced in the camp
the examinee is disfigured, and there is an enduring change in his
personality after the catastrophic experience; there is a non-
organic sleeping disorder, with nightmares in the second part of
the night, somatic dysfunction of the vegetative nerve system,
atrophy of the left eyeball, bilateral impairment of sight, paralysis of
the oculomotor nerve, paresis of facial nerve and paresis of the
tongue and pharynx, which have altogether severely reduced his
genera.1and vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Deformity of face, the result of an injury
inflicted by a blunt mechanical weaponPicture No. 2 Scars on the right side of the Picture No. 3 Scars on the right side of the
face, the result of injuries inflicted by a face, the result of injuries inflicted by a
blunt mechanical weapon, as well as scars blunt mechanical weapon, as well as scars
on the neck, the result if an injury inflicted on the neck, the result if an injury inflicted
by the blade of a mechanical weapon by the blade of a mechanical weapon Picture No. 4 Scars on the right side Picture No. 5 Scars on the right knee,
of the face, the result of injuries the result of injuries inflicted
inflicted by a blunt mechanical weapon by a blunt mechanical weaponV.S., male, 33 years old when captured. He was captured as a
soldier on 30 May 1994 in alman n ogether with another
combatant. He was taken to the prison in Bugojno, where he was
held for 5 days, and where he was beaten day and night with bats
and some planks, during which he was forced to sing. He was
beaten by everyone -in the morning hours he was beaten by the
soldiers and in the afternoon hours the locals wouldcome to beat
him. In his presence they battered to death his colleague Zoran
Danilovic, a.k.a. "Pigi", who died on 6 June 1994 just after they
had been transferred to the camp in Travnik. Theyslit the skin on
his face and they pulled out with pliers, and without any
anaesthetics, a tooth that was loosened by the blows.He had a
large wound on his head from the blows, which was treated by
some doctors in Bugojno. While he was in the camp in Bugojnohe
was handcuffed al1five days to a manhole lid and al1 the time
there was cold water running from twohoses into his boots. When
he was transferred to the camp Travnik he wasn't even "touched",
not to mention beaten. He was exchanged from the camp in
Travnik on 27 July 1994.
On the basis of medical files, forensic medical and neurological-
psychiatric examinations the following consequences have been
found in this examinee: scars on the face and head, atrophic
changes in both shins and ankles,enduring change of personality,
lumbar sacral syndrome, which have altogether severely reduced
his general and vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Scar on the left cheek, the result of an injury
inflicted by the blade of a mechanical weaponP.B., male, 42 years old when captured. He was captured as a civilian in his firm on 20
May 1992 and taken to the village of TreStenica,where they held him for several days.
Then he was transferred to the school in the village of Bakovici, and after 3-4 days he
was taken to the "bathroom" of the railways in Banovici, which had been transformed
into a camp. He was in this camp till 12 June 1992, when they transferred him to the
camp in Tuzla, and 19 days later he was returned to the "bathroom", where hewas till 2
November 1993, when he managed to escape while forcedto dig trenches. He was
beaten with poles, rifle butts, and he was kicked from the moment he had been
captured. He was beaten constantly for 24 hours when he was returned from Tuzlato
the railways "bathroom", and on this occasion he was beaten with truncheons and rifle
butts. He was al1black from the bruises. They beat him the most over the head and
body, and on that occasion he had his leftelbow dislocated. He never fainted during the
beating but he did feel sick and vomited.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatricexaminations the following
consequences have been found in this examinee:scars on the back and limbs.
PictureNo. 1Scar belowthe left shoulderblade,the resultof an injury
inflictedby a blunt mechanicalweaponPicture No. 2 Scar on the right shin, the result of an injury
inflicted by a blunt mechanical weaponG.I., male, 23 years old when captured. He was captured as a
soldier between Ozren and Vozuca on 21 July 1995. He was alone
when he was captured. They had taken him to the camp in the
village of Gostovic, where he was beaten for 34 days, from the
very moment he arrived. They beat him with various things: they
kicked him with boots on, beat him with rifle butts, poles, with
wooden club. They broke his nasal bone and ribs, and knocked
out 11 of his teeth. All the time his hands and legs were tied with
wire and chains, and he now has scars as a result. On 23 August
1995 they transferred him to the House of Correction in Zenica,
from where he was exchanged on 10 January 1996.
On the basis of medical records and forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatric examinations the following consequences
have been found in this examinee: scars on the left wrist, and a
post traumatic stress disorder which lasted for about a year, and in
this period it severely reduced his general and vocational
capacities.Picture No. 1 Linear scar on the left wrist, the result of wires that were "cut into the skin"
331K.R., male, 20 years old when captured. On15 May 1992, while he was doing his
regular military duty, he was captured as a JNA soldier at the time when the JNA was
withdrawing from Tuzla. He had been wounded in both legs and right arm, andwas
captured as a wounded soldier. He and many other soldiers were injured while they
were being driven in the trucks from the town. After they hadbeen injured most of the
wounded soldiers were killed as soon as they were captured. They first gave hima
punch in his face and then fired a shot into his mouth. After that he and some other
soldiers were taken to the hospital in Tuzla where he had surgery of the mandible and
of the injuries on his legs and arm. He was dismissed from the hospitalon 9 June 1992
and sent to the prison in Tuzla, where they heldhim till 18 May 1993, when he was
exchanged. While in prison he was also mentally harassedduring the interrogations.
Picture No.1 Scar behind the right ear, the result of a shot wound
332The original discharge note form the Ear, Nose and Throat Department of the Medical
Center in Tuzla, registered under No. 2131493, proves that he was treated in this
hospital with the diagnosis: shot wound on the base of his tongue and cheek, v4:h
fractures of the mandible, shot wound in the left forearm and both thighs ("Vulnus
sclopetarium faciei et baseos oris et linguae. Defecti mandibulae in regio 3-3. Vulnus
sclopetarium antebrachi I.dex. et femoris ant.billU) He had been operated on in this
hospital and when his condition improved he was discharged. The case history, which
was signed by.a doctor and also by the head of the ENT department (by Dr. Fuad Brkic
and by the head Prof. Dr. B. Hajdarovic), it is written that the patient is "sent to the clinic
for maxillo-facial surgery of the MMA in Belgrade"; however, the anamnestic data and
the date when he was released from prison, as well as the date when he was admittsd
to the MMA hospital in Belgrade prove that what was stated in the discharge note is not
true. Namely, K.R. was not sent to the MMA in Belgrade for further treatment but was
sent to the prison in Tuzla.
Picture No.2 Scar under the chin, the result of surgery
on the tongue afterinjury by a bulletOn the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences have been
found in this examinee: there are scars on the head and limbs, and there is an enduring
change in his personality after the ferrible experience, which have altogether severely
reduced his general and vocational capacities.
Picture No. 3 Scar on the right forearm, the result of a shot wound
334Picture No. 4 Scar on the right thigh, the result of a shot wound
335R.S., male, 30 years old when captured. On 7 May 1992 some
neighbour shot his father in the stomach while the latter was in his
gzrden. He put his father in his car and staïted in the direction of
the dispensary in Breza. From tkere his father was taken in an
ambulance to Pale. However, after they had passed the Sarajevo
airport in Butmir someone started to shoot at the ambulance car
from the Muslim-held positions. His father, who had already been
wounded, was killed by this fire, while the examinee was wounded
in the stomach. The driver wasn't wounded and he managed to
reach on foot the Serb-held positions. Being wounded he had
been captured by the Muslims, and they took him to some flat in
Sarajevo ,where they harassed and beat him, during which they
poured salt on the inflicted injuries on his back. After that some
journalists with cameras arrived, forcing him to give a statement
how the Serbs had shot him. In this entire period he wasn't given
any medical treatment; they just put a sheet over the wounded
stomach. He was exchanged the following day in Dobrinja, and he
was then driven to the hospital iri Pale, where he was given
medical treatment for the first time. The following day he was
transported to the MMA in Belgrade.
The original medical records prove that he was admitted to the
hospital in Pale immediately after being exchanged, with the
diagnosis of severe small arms shot wounds in the abdomen and
abdominal organs, rhe abdominal cavity already severely inflamed.
Because of this he was transferred to the MMA for further
treatment immediately after the scrgery in this hospital.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatrieexaminations, and also according to the X-
rays, the following consequences have been found in this
examinee: many major scars on the abdomen, which have
resulted in the weakness of theabdonen muscles and the forming
of the "hanging belly".PictureNo. 1 Scar on the leftflank,the result ofa shot wound
337Picture No. 2 "The hanging belly", the result of shot wounds,
and the subsequent necessary surgeryPicture No. 3 X-ray showing metal foreign bodies in the soft tissue of the pelvis
339Nj.B., niale, 53 years old when captured. He was captured as a civilian in his flat in
Sarajevo on 1 May 1992 by the Green Berets of Juka Prazina. They took him to some
"private prison", which was in fact a camp, where they held him for three days. They
bâttered him so much that they thought he was dead, so they dumped him between two
contai~ers. When he came through at dawn he manaçed to reach Ilidia, which was the
Serb territory. While he was in that camp he was beaten over his whoie body and head.
They lticked him with their boots on and beat him with rifle butts, metal bars, some
metal tubes, and "who knows with what they hadn't". There were 15 men imprisoned in
that camp. He didn't see any female camp prisoners. After he had fled to the Serb
territory he was accommodated in the hotel "Terma", in Ilidia, where his injuries were
regularly treated. His nose and right hand index finger were fractured by the battering,
his head was "broken" and his lips "cut".
Picture No. 1 Scars on the lower lip, the result of an injury
inflicted by a blunt mechanical weaponOn the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric examinations, and also
according to the X-rays, the following consequences, which are the result of injuries
inflicted in the camps, have been found in this examinee: deformity in the nasal pyramid
because of improper healing of the nasal bones, deformity in the right hand index finger,
scars (callus) on the parietal bone, scars on the head and lips, as well as a non-
psychotic post-contusion organic psycho syndrome, which have altogether severely
reduced his general and vocational capacities.
Picture No. 2 Deformityin the right hand index finger, the result of an injury
inflictedby a blunt mechanicalweaponD.S., male, 19 years old when he was captured. He was captured as a soldier in the
NikSicka highland on 5 August 1994. He was captured after he had been wounded by
small arms and shell fragments (right knee, right hip, stomach, lungs). Two Muslims nad
approached hirn and then one of them put a pistol barre1into his mouth, cursing his
Serb mother and saying he was going to kill him. Then he fired two shots in his already
injured left shin, and fired anotherbullet into his neck, from the left side. They put hirn
on a canvass and they dragged hirn on it to the village of Brgole. When they reached it
they came across some 10-12 elderly men who approached hirn and started to beat hirn
with rifle butts, to kick him, and punch him. He also received a blow with the butt in his
head, but he didn't faint from it. Then they put him into a car, tied his right arm, and
started to question hirn about the disposition of the Serb forces. He was so worn out he
could neither speak nor see. Then they gave hirn an injection in his vein and took him in
an unknown direction. He fainted. As he was coming through he could see some
spotlights (surgery in the hospital in Zenica). He could hear some voices and he saw a
doctor sewing his intestine. Then he fainted again. As he was again coming through he
could hear someone Say "the ~etnik is coming through". Then three doctors arrived,
one of them being from Virginia (USA) and said he is one of the "doctor sans
frontieres". He was told that he had been in a coma for 7 days and that not once did he
regain consciousness. On that day they had decided to take hirn off the machines
(having concluded that he was clinically dead). They transferred hirn to a room with 8
beds, with Muslim patients lying in it. Four of the seven Muslim patients could walk, and
during the night they would come to his bed and give hirn blows in the stomach where
the stitches were. Because of these blows the sutures snapped. This happened three
times, and each time he was sewn again. He cannot tell how long he was in that
hospital. However, when he was discharged he was transferred to the prison in Zenica.
In that prison they once took hirn to a room with bars on its windows, where they put
hirn on a table and tied hirn to it, and then they started to torture him: a Muslim turned
on a drill 5 cm above his forehead, and another one turned on a motor saw over his
genitals, while the third man hammered nails with wires into his shin bones. Then one of
them took some kind of a truncheon, spilt some liquid on the tiles on the floor, and then
brought that bat to the liquid on the floor, and he could see blue sparks coming from it
(electric truncheon).All that time he was naked. Then one of the men approached hirn
saying "well, you won't be able to aim any more" and he reached out to poke out his
eye. Then the examinee fainted. When he came through he was back in the cell. The
following day some foreigners had arrived and he was transferred to Sarajevo. He was
on the stretchers al1the time (he had an external fixture and a dislocated left hip). When
they had reached the military hospital in Sarajevo they didn't want to admit him there,
because he was a "~etnik", so he was sent to the hospital in KoSevo, where he was
guarded by 4 guards. One of them would give hirn blows, the other one spat on him, the
third relieved himself on him. They molested him with hunger by immediately throwing
out through the window the meal that the nurse had brought him. When admitted to the
hospital doctor Faruk Kulenovic told him that the doctors inuzla hadn't put the fixturesHe shouted at him and then he and the typist started to create his minutes. In one
moment, in a burst of rage, he stabbed a pencil into the examinee's right hand. He said
he would be sentenced to 10 years of prison, but he was never handed the sentence.
He was exchanged on 21 September 1994 on a bridge in Sarajevo.
The medical records from the hospitals in Zenica and Sarajevo prove that he was
treated in these hospitals for shot wounds in the left shin and for inflammation of the
bones, as well as for the injuries in the abdomen and abdominal organs inflicted by shell
fragments.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatrie
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences have been
found in this examinee: he is disfiguredbecause of a major deformation of the left shin,
because the fracture hadn't healed properly, accompanied with paresis of the tibia1and
peroneal nerve, many scars on the face, neck, stomach, lower limbs and right hand,
and as a result of the severe physical and mental trauma a post traumatic stress
disorder has developed, which have altogether severely reduced his general and
vocational ca~acities.
Picture No.2 Scar on the backof the right hand, the result of a stab
with thepoint of a pencilPicture No. 3 Deformity of the left shin and Picture No. 4 X-ray showing improperly
many scars on it, the result injuries inflicted healed fracture in the left shin
by shell fragments and bullets
345M.R., male, 44 years old when captured. He was captured as a civilian in the streets of
Lukovac on 23 July 1992. They took hirn to a deserted slaughterhouse near Lukavac,
which had been transformed into a camp. There were other camp prisoners in it too.
After being held there for three months he was transferred to the camp in Tuzla, where
they interrogated hirn for a day. After that they released hirn (on 14 October 1992). They
were beating hirn constantly, especially in the first 20 and the last two days. They beat
hirn with al1 sorts of things, with boots on, truncheons, bats, rifle butts, and with
everything at hand. He was black from the bruises and he fainted at least twenty times
from the battering. They tortured hirn by bringing a lit cigarette to his eyeball, during
which he had to keep his eyes open (a Muslim woman did this to hirn). They slit the
skin on his left arm and left ear with knives. They tied his legs with chains, then they
raised hirn upside down, and while he was hanging they beat him. They fractured his
nose, ribs, and right hand. When released he got the hernia of the testicles.
Picture No.1 Deformityand a rough scar on the left auricle,
the result of a cut with the blade of a mechanicalweaponOn the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences, which are
the result of injuries inflicted in the camps, have been found in this examinee: deformity
of the nose, the result of improper healing of the nasal bones, many scars (callus)
where the ribs were broken, scar (callus) on the right radial bone, many scars on the left
auricle and upper limbs, and as a result of the severe physical and mental trauma, an
enduring change of personality has developed from the experiences in the camps,
which have altogether severely reduced his general and vocational capacities.
PictureNo. 2 Deformityand a rough scar on the left auricle,
the result oa cut with the bladeofa mechanicalweaponPicture No. 3 Scar on the right forearm, interior, the result of a cut
with the blade of a mechanical weapon
Picture No. 4 Scar on the right forearm, exterior, the result of a cut
with the blade of a mechanical weaponPicture No. 5 X-ray showing a scar (callus) on the right radial bone
349G.N., male, 36 years old when captured. He was captured as a
civilian in his flat in Sarajevo on 1 May 1992. They first held him in
house detention in his flat, after which they took him to some
basements that had been transformed into campsfor Serbs. They
held him in these camps for 3 months, after which he was
transferred to the camp in the military "Viktor Bubanj" military
barracks, where they held him for 51 days, after which he was
exchanged. He was beaten non-stop from the moment he had
been captured. He was first beaten in his flat for about 20 days,
and the beatings continuedin the basements. While he was in the
barracks they beat him from time to time, but he did witness other
camp prisoners being beaten to death. They kicked his whole
body, beat him with metal tubes, truncheons, and with everything
at hand, because of which he was al1black. He was hanged for
his hands several times so that only his toes were on the ground,
and he was battered in that positional1the time. He fainted many
times during the battering. They knocked out several of his teeth.
They broke three of his ribs, broke his head, and left knee. Once,
while he was in the barracks, a doctor dressed his left hand where
his skin had been ruptured by blows with metal tubes.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatrie
examinations the following consequences have been foundin this
examinee: scars on the head and limbs, as well as non organic
disturbance of sleep with nightniares in the second stage of the
sleep, which have mildly reduced his general and vocational
capacities.~icture No. 1 Scar on the left side of the forehead, the result of an injury
inflicted by a blunt mechanical object.
351s.B., male, 38 years old when captured. He was captured as a
soldier near Visegrad, on 16 October 1992. He was taken to
Mededa and shut in some basement, where he spent two and a
half months. Two of his friends were also camp prisoners in that
camp, and on 25 December 1992 they were al1transferred to the
basement of a deserted house in Goraide. They were exchanged
from there on 8 June 1993. They were beaten more in Goraide,
especially in the first 15 days. Later they were beaten less. They
were beaten with everything at hand: mosily with wooden and
rubber bats, with rifle butts, and they were punchedand kicked. In
the entire imprisonment (4 and a half months) their hands were
tied on their backs, and they were untied only when they were
occasionaily given food. He was permanently black from the
bruises. His left side of the chest and the sternum hurt him the
most. They slit his skin and now he has scars there. Helost about
50 kg while in prison, because they were very scarcely given food.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations the following consequences have been found in this
examinee: scars on the chest and back, damaged ischiatic nerve,
Raynaud's syndrome, which have mildly reduced his general and
vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Scars on the back, the result of the skin being slit
with the blade of a mechanical weapon.
353R.N., male, 41 years oid when captured. He was captured as a
soldier on 24 September 1992. He was taken to the camp in
Srebrenica, where they held him for 24 days, and was exchanged
on 14 October 1992. They held him in the police station in
Srebrenica ,and from the moment he had been captured he was
beaten at least once a day. His whole body was beaten, especially
his limbs, chest, and stomach. He was beaten with bars,
truncheons, rifle butts, punched and kicked. They poked his chest
with knives and extinguished cigarettes on his legs. He was also
hanged upside down and his body was then beaten. They broke
al1his teeth.
Picture No. 1 Scar on the left sidof the thorax,the result of a stab
with thetipand blade of a mechanical weapon On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following
consequences have been found in this examinee: scars (callus)
where the ribs were broken, bilateral, al1teeth missing, scars on
the chest and legs.
Picture No. 2 Scar on the right shin, the result of a burn with a lit cigarette
355s.v., male, 54 years old when captured. He was captured as a
soldier on 24 September 1992 while defending his village. In the
attack his son and brother were killed. They first took him to the
camp in Srebrenica, where he stayed till 16 October 1992, when
he was exchanged. As soon as he had been released he was
taken to the hospital in Zvornik, and from there he was sent to
Milici to recover. As soon as he was captured he was stoned,
beaten with rifle butts, and kicked, but he experienced the worst
battering in the camp, where he was beaten almost every night.
The Chief of the police station beat him the most, and he was the
one who broke his ribs on both sides of the rib cage. He was
beaten with al1sorts of things, but especially with steel cables over
his flanks and legs, and with metal bars over his head and body.
His skin was burnt with lit cigarettes, he was tortured with
electricity, and the conductors were connected to his genitals,
which caused terrible pain. Very often he fainted during the
beatings, when they would splash water over him for him to come
through, after which they would continue to batter him. Seven of
his teeth were knocked out.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following
consequences have been found in this examinee: many scars
(callus) where ribs were fractured, bilateral, scars on the limbs.Picture No. 1 Scars on the back of the hands,
the result of burns with lit cigarettesPicture No. 2 Scar on the left knee, the result of an injury
inflicted by a blunt mechanical object.
358Picture No. 3 Scar on the right shin, the result of an injury
inflicted by a blunt mechanical tool.c.G., male, 40 years old when captured. He was captured as a
soldier in LuSici on 3 May 1995 and was exchanged on 27
January 1976. They first took him to Krupa and then to the camp
in Bihac, and from there to the prison for civilians in Bihac. They
had beaten him al1the time with rifle butts and truncheons. They
forced him to play "Russian roulette"; they put three rounds in the
magazine and then forced him to put the pistol barre1in his mouth
and to trigger. Since he refused to trigger, he was stabbed in the
abdomen with a knife. On one other occasion of the "Russian
roulette" they forced another camp prisoner to trigger the pistol
pointed at his head. He was beaten with handcuffs tight around his
wrists - which often bled after the beating.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatrie
examinations the following consequences have been found in this
examinee: scars on the stomach and around the wrists, and he
has nightmares followed by insomnia, which have altogether mildly
reduced his general and vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Scar on the stomach, the result of a stab wound
361S.S., male, 27 years old when captured. Captured as a policeman
on 25 May 1995 near GrmuSa. He was first taken to the
headquarters and then to the basement of the motel "Unski
Dijamant", where he was held for 4 days. From there he was taken
to a wagon for livestock at the railway station Srbljani, where he
was held for 40 days. Then he was returned to the basement of
the motel "Unski Dijamant" where he stayed till 18 October 1995,
and from there he was taken to the camp in Bihac, from which he
was exchanged on 23 December 1995. He was beaten for the first
time in the livestock wagon, which was followed with interrogation.
He was beaten with truncheons and kicked. He wasn't given food
and water (it was summer and the heat in the wagon was
unbearable. The real torture started when he was taken to Bihac,
where he was under investigation. He wasn't convicted. They beat
him so fiercely that his skin kept rupturing from the blows. That is
where his already impaired hearing deteriorated.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations the following consequences have been found in this
examinee: scars on the back, cervical-brachial syndrome with
limited mobility in the left shoulder joint, lumbar- sacral syndrome
and chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, which have altogether
severely reduced his general and vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Scar on the back, the result of an injury
inflicted with a blunt mechanical weaponR.B., male, 57 years old when captured. He was captured as a civilian on 8 April 1992
while travelling on the road~apljina - Stolac. He was first taken to Metkovic, where he
was held for three days, and from there he was taken to the camp "Loran, near Split,
where he remained till 26 April 1992. From there he was transferred to the camp in
Duvno and from there he was transferred to the camp in LjubuSki,where he was till 18
August 1992, when he was exchanged. He mentioned that he had been beaten in al1
the camps, with al1 sorts of things (kicked with boots on, punched, beaten with rifle
butts, bowling pins, etc.). He was beaten the most in Metkovici, where he had been
blindfolded for three days. Besides being battered he was also threatened that his eyes
would be gouged out. While he was in LjubuSki he once fell in a coma. He was given
three meals a day, some thin stew of mashed stuff, and in the last month he was given
only one meal a day, as a penalty after the escape attempt of one camp prisoner.
PictureNo.1 Scar on the left elbow,the result of the skin being ruptured
364On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences, which are
the result of injuries inflicted in the camps, have been found in this examinee: scars
(callus) on the ribs, scars on the head, chest, left elbow, and in the region of both
ankles, as well as post-traumatic stress disorder, which have altogether severely
reduced his general and vocational capacities.
Picture No.2 Atrophicchangesin the right foot, the resultof injuries
365B.M., male, 43 years old when captured. He was captured as a police inspector in the
streets of Mostar on 4 May 1992. He was immediately taken to the University of Mostar
where he was held till i4 May 1992. From there he was transferred to ~elovina in the
~anticeva St., from there he was taken to the camps in Duvno and Lora and spent two
days in each of them. After that he was sent to LiStica and was exchanged on 18
August 1992. He was beaten with "al1sorts of things" in al1the camps (with baseball
bats, fists, cables, etc.) and especially with bats over his foot soles and palms. He was
forced to eat lit cigarettes. His left arm was "slit" with a knife, after which they sewed the
wounds without giving him any anaesthetics.
Picture No.1 Scars on the forehead, the result of the skin
being ruptured with a blunt mechanical objectHe was often hanged with handcuffs to heating pipes, with his legs separated. He was
permanently black from the battering, and he also urinated blood. His left ribs were
fractured. His teeth were broken and they dislocated his left shoulder.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiâtric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences have been
found in this examinee: toothlessness in both jaws, scars (callus) on the head and
limbs, as well as post-traumatic stress disorder, which have altogether severely reduced
his general and vocational capacities.
Picture No.2 Scar cin the left forearm, the result of the skin being slit
367B.M., male, 26 years old when captured. He was captured as a
soldier in ~ujeva Gruda, near Stolac, on 13 May 1992, and taken
to Metkovic, where he was held for two days. From there he was
transferred to Lora, where he was till 14 August 1992, when he
was exchanged. His whole body was beaten with "al1 sorts of
things" (kicked, punched, beatenwith baseball bats and rifle butts,
etc.), but the camp commander had forbidden the camp prisoners
to be beaten on their heads. He was beaten singled out and in a
group, and al1the time he was black from the bruises. In Metkovic
his arms and the arms of the other camp prisoners were pulled
through the fence and tied with handcuffs on the other side, and
then their backs were beaten with al1 sorts of things. The
handcuffs cut into his wrists and he now has scars there. While in
the camp Lora he was tortured in a special way - his ears were
connected to the field telephone inductoror rectifier under voltage.
He was shut in block "CMin Lora, and he was given a meal every
5-6 days, which was "something cooked", for which he thinks
contained cabbage. Sometimes they were givena piece of bread.
On the basis of forensic meàical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations the following consequences have been foundin this
examinee: scars on the back and left hand.Picture No.1 Scar in the base of the left wrist, the result of handcuffs
that were cut into the skinT.L.,male, 62 years old when captured. He was captured as a civilian in his flat in Mostar
on 18 April 1992. He was first taken to the camp "Bijeli Breg", near Mostar, where he was
held till 9 June 1992., and was then transferred to elo ovin Hae.was exchanged by
mediation of the Red Cross on 18 August 1992 in Stolac. As soon as he was captured he
was beaten and he fainted, so lie can't tell what were al1the means he had been beaten
with. He was threatened to be killed. Since the battering, while he was unconscious had
fractured his left shin, he was admitted to the surgery department of the hospital in Mostar.
Picture No.1 Deformity in the left shin, with many scars
and atrophic changes on the skinOn the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric examinations, and also
according to the X-rays, the following consequences, which are the result of torture,
have been found in this examinee:
Picture No. 2 X-ray showing scars (callus) on the tibia, both
on its superior and inferiorend, afterbeing treated by a surgery.
371z.v., male, 32 years old when captured. He was captured as a
soldier on 22 March 19992, near Orlov Kuk, in Popovo Polje.As
soon as he following morning he was transferred from it to the
camp Lora, where he was till 12 August 1992. From there he was
taken to Kerestinac, and two days later, on 14 August 1992 he
was exchanged. Very often they would sit on him and "poke him
with a knife", and while he was in Lora they would connect his
ears, which they had previously pierced, to a low voltage power
source (they called this "earrings"). .He was also beaten with
baseball bats over his limbs, and especially over his legs and
knees, he was kicked and punched. They would usually tie his
eyes, and then they would beat him "with al1sorts of things". Lit
cigarettes were extinguished in his nose and mouth. Many times
he was threatened to be killed; he was forced to sign some
papers, he was taken for staged executions (a pistol would be put
into his mouth), he was permanently spat on, forced to sing
Ustashi songs. "Periodically" they were given some slops as a
meal.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatric examinations the following consequences,
which are the result of injuries inflicted in the camps, have been
found in this examinee: Scars on the limbs and left ear, a psycho-
organic syndrome has developed, which altogether have severely
reduced his general and vocational capacities.Picture No.1 Scar on the left ear, the result of the uvula being pulled
373Picture No.2 Linear scar on the right forearm, where the skin was slit
374Picture No. 3 Scar on the left knee, where the sin was ruptured
375B.B., male, 51 years old when captured. He was captured as a civilian on 12 June 1992
in his flat in ~apljina. He was first taken to the camp in Dretelj, where he was till 17
August 1992, and from there he was transferred to the camps in Grabovina, LjubuSki,
Lora, and then again to LjubuSki,and RodoC.He was exchanged on 31 October 1992.
He was beaten with "al1sorts of things". He says he will never forget when he was
forced to eat food that was mixedwith his own blood. His whole body was beatenwith
rifle butts, pistols, he was kicked with boots on and punched, cigarette butts were
extinguished on his neck and in his mouth and nose. He was beaten for no reason
together with other camp prisoners, but also singled out. He was permanently
threatened he would be executed, and he was several times taken for staged
executions, just to be intimidated. The International Red Cross registered him onlyon 7
September 1992.
Picture No.1 Scar on the neck, anterior, the result of a lit cigarette on it extinguished
376On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatricexaminations the following
consequences, which are the result of injuries inflicted in the camps, have been found in
this examinee: scars on the head, neck and hands, as well as a post traumatic
syndrome with suicida1ideas, which altogether have severely reduced his general and
vocational capacities.
Picture No. 2 Scar on the right hand finger, the result of a lit cigarette on it extinguished,
and scar on the left-hand finger, the result of a cutZ.Z.,male, 35 years old when captured. He was captured as a civilian on 26 May 1992, and
taken to the sports hallin Konjic, where he wasimmediately battered. Thatsame night he was
transferred to the campin celebi~, into the tunnel,where he was held till 28/29 May in 1992,
and from there. he was returned to Konjic and again taken back to celebit, to the No. 6.
Because of the injuries inflicted by the battering he was admitted to the Medical Center in
Konjic. In late September 1992 he was released and ordered not to leave his village (al1the
time he was surrounded by Muslims and Croats). He was captured for the second time and
taken to the camp located in the sports hall in Konjic, where he stood trial. He was there till 9
March 1993, when he was taken to Butmir, near Sarajevo,when he was exchanged. From the
time he was captured his whole body was beaten with "al1sorts of things", but especially his
head, arms, and shins.He suffered hunger ("they onlygave me enough grass to graze").He
was beaten with some "electric bats" overhis back, shutinto manholeswhere there was no air,
during which he was observed, and whenhe would startlosing consciousness the lidwould be
raised. The 200 camp prisonerswere given 2 minutes to go and urinate, and if anyone would
be late he would be battered.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric examinations the following
consequences, which are the result of injuries inflictedin the camps, have been foundin this
examinee: scars on the head, legs and right auricle,as well as posttraumatic stresssyndrome,
which have altogether severely reducedhis general and vocational capacities.
Picture No.1 Scar on the head where the skin was ruptured by a blunt mechanical weapon
378Picture No.2 Scar on the right auricle where the skin was ruptured by a
blunt mechanical weaponP.L., male, 45 years old when captured. He was captured on 16
June 1992 and was immediately taken to the village of
Svinjarevina, where he spent a day. From there he was taken to
Mostar, then he was transferred to the camp in Metkovic, where
he was till 25 June 1992, and from there to the camp in Lora,
where he was till 10111 August 1992. From there he was
transferred to the prison Kerestinac, where he was till 14 August
1992, when he was exchanged. His whole body was being
battered from the very beginning, day and night, withoutany order
or system, and he was battered to the very last day. He was
beaten with bats, rubber truncheons, rifle butts, wires, and kicked
with boots on. Cigarettes were extinguishedon his skin, a rubber
hose with water running from it was put into hismouth. Each camp
prisoner was forced to drink a glass of salty water and then they
forced them to stand in the Sunfor 5-6 hours, naked, not allowed
to move at all. His nose and fingers, or genitals and nose were
connected to a low voltage power source, etc. He was forced to
"telephone", by connecting himtoa power source, during which he
had cramps, and after this torture he was forcedto stand stil3-for
4 hours.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatricexaminations, and also according to the X-
rays, the following consequences, which are the resultof injuries
inflicted in the camps, have been found in this examinee: scars
(callus) on the maxilla, followed by a bumpin the soft tissue on the
left side of the face, scars on the ribs, scars on the head and right
shin, as well as post-traumatic stress syndrome, which have
altogether severely reduced his general and vocational capacities.Picture No.1 Scars on the right shin, where the skin was ruptured by a
blunt mechanical weapon
381T.D., male, 35 years old when captured. He was capturedas a
civilian near MuminovaCa,while driving a car, on 8 April 1992. He
was taken to the camp in Metkovic, andthen to the camp in Lora,
to Stopanici, near Duvno, andhe was exchanged from the campin
Ljubuski on 18 August 1992. His whole body was beaten with
bars, bats, and it was kicked and punched several times a day,
from the moment he had been captured. He was mostly beaten
over his head, hands, flanks, stomach, and legs. Lit cigarettes
were extinguished on his body, his hands were stabbed with a
knife, and then the injuries were sewn withouthim being given any
anaesthetic. His beard was burnt, he was forced to eat salt,
crushed stone and sand; he had to suffer hunger and thirst (on
one occasion he was punished with 15 days of starvation); he was
forced to "drive" the chair, as if it were a truck, on whose edges
were pikes on which he would prick himself; onseveral occasions
his ears and nose, or his nose and genitals would be connected to
a low voltage power source; he was forced to bark asa dog in
front of the others; he was threatened and insulted every day. His
right upper arm was shotat from point blank range froma pistol,
and his left hip and left upper arm were shotat with a shotgun. He
was told that his daughters had been raped and roastedin the
crypt in Prebilovci. Hehad to suffer thirst and hunger. Several
times a day he was forced to swallow a handful of salt without
being given any water.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following
consequences, which are the result of injuries inflicted in the
camps, have been found in this examinee: deformities in fingers
on both hands as well as many scars on the body and limbs,
which have caused disfigurement,as well as post-traumatic stress
disorder, which altogether has severely reducedhis general and
vocational capacities.Picture No.1 Deformity in the 4th and 5th right hand fingers,
the result of a shot wound in the right upper arm
(by which the ulnar nerve was damaged),as well as
injuries of the fingers inflicted by a blunt mechanical weapon Picture No.2 Deformity in the 4th and 5th left-hand fingers, the result of a shot
wound in the left upper arm, as well as injuries of the fingers (on the palm side),
inflicted by a blunt mechanical weapon
Picture No. 3 Deformity in the 4th and 5th left hand fingers, the result of a shot
wound in the left upper arm, as well as injuries of the fingers (on the back of the hand,
inflicted by a blunt mechanical weapon Picture No. 4 Linear scar on the right palm, the result of cuts
Picture No. 5 Scar on the left upper arm, the result of a shot wound
385Pictui'e No. 6 Scars on the left groin, the resultof injuries inflictedby buckshot
fired froma point blank range
386Picture No. 7 X-ray showing buckshot in the soft tissue
near the left thigh bone, superior
387M.K., female, 46 years old when captured. She was captured as a civilian in her flat in
M<xtar on 5 July 1992 and she was taken to another flat where she found another
captured Serb. She was held in that flat till 14 July 1992 and was then taken to the
priison in Mostar, where other Serb women had also been taken. She was held in this
prison for about 10 days and was then taken back to the flat. In August she managed to
escape from this flat and pass to theleft bank in Mostar, where her flat was. She found
17!r flat completely looted. In late August she was captured again and was handcuffed
tothe old bridge in Mostar. After being tied like thiseveral hours she was taken to
Picture No. 1 Linearscar on the right thighwhere her skin was slit
388the camp located in the Mostar university, in ~anticeva St., and from where she was
transferred to Lora. She was exchanged on 31 October 1992. She was beaten and
tortured everywhere, but she was treated the worst in the prison in Mostar. Several
times they led her for staged executions, during which they would fire beside her. One
night she was raped by ten men, after which they battered her. They tortured her by
burning her skin with red-hot bars, and they slit her skin with a knife; she was trampled
on, especially her shins. They poked her left shin with a knife, and on one occasion her
left thigh was beaten with some kind of a whip, after which it was bleeding.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric examinations the following
consequences have been found in this examinee: scars on both hands, left and right
shin, as well as post-traumatic stress disorder, which have altogether severely reduced
her general and vocational capacities.
Picture No. 2 Scars on the left kneewhere she wasinjured
with a blunt mechanicalobjectDj.S., male, 67 years old when captured. On 12 July 1992 he was
led out of his house with his wife and neighbours, and they were
taken first to the camp in Konjic. They were beaten there, after
which he was taken to the camp in ~elebici. His wife and son had
been released immediately, but they were both killed when they
returned home. His ear was cut off in the camp in ~elebici with
some object, and they also wanted to slaughter him and to gouge
out his eye. He was released in late 1992. His two sons were also
in the camp in Celebici, but they were not shut in the same cell.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations the following consequences have been found in this
examinee: the superior part of the left auricle is missing, since it
was cut off, as well as chronic depression and psychosomatic
disorder, which have severely reduced his general and vocational
capacities.Picture No. 1 Superior part of the left auricle is missing
because it was cut offD.O., female, 36 years old when captured. Married, three children. Taken from her
office on 05.05.1992 by soldiers. She was taken to Dretelj barracks, which later became
the camp. She was there until 17.08.1992 andthen she was transferred to a camp in
LjubuSki,from which she was exchanged on 18.08.1992. In Dretelj she was first taken
to a room where she was the only one and they started beating her. Theysaid that they
will rape her and beat her face and body by fists. Then she was returned to the
common cell. In the evening came their colonel Blai Kraljevic and there was also a
certain Sejo from Crikvenica (commander of these barracks) and they started
questioning her. Nothing happened that night.On 06.05.1992 she was raped for the first
time, by the commander Sejo and one soldier. Tomorrow the raping continued, by
certain VranjeS, called >,Cikoja<<and the next day by certain Salko. The rape was
always carried out in a separate room, without the presence of other prisoners in the
camp. Next days they continuedto rape her. They raped her 5-6 days in a row and then
they were beating her, thretened her by knives and humiliated her in every other way.
She was always raped by two or three of them at a time, sometimes even by 4 to 5.
))They could do to Serbs and to her ,,whatever their imagination allowed thein«, ,,that
did not exist even in the movies<<W. hen the soldiers from Mostar came the women had
to fully undress and, threatened by the gun, they had to insert battons in own vagina, or
to do it one to another. ,>Knifealways at your throatas a threat was a usual procedure.
The women were beaten, ill-treated, needles were stuck under their nails, they were
raped, they even raped a women 70-yearsold, they burned their hair, cut it etc. It al1
happened daily, until mid June 1992. Particularly active were Mediae lvan from Donji
RadiSici near LjubuSki, then Se~elj ~eljko, SeSelj Luka, BjeliS Zvonimir and a certain
American "Joe" and there was also some man from Australia, an emigrant called
"Didon". PetruSic lvan was the commander of their militia and "investigator".
She would be sitting nakedon a chair and one of them would question her, the second
would write and the third would stuck needlesunder her nails and hit her hands by
batons. Then they would take her to be raped: oral, vaginal, anal rape took place.For
her it lasted one month and a half continually. After that they would stop. There was no
washing. For the said month and a half she lost about 16 kilograms. Before she was
taken to the camp she had a spiral inserted, so she did not become pregnant. She did
not react to verbal insults, as if ''they become benumbed to everything". She thinksthat
about 80 women and 120 men were in the camp at that time.
On the basis of forensic and neurological-psychiatricexamination it was establishedthat
presently there are: scars on the right back of the hand, radiculopathy, cervicalgia,
lumboischialgia, somatic dysfunction of the vegetative system and an enduring change
of personality after the catastrophic experience which heavily reducedher general and
vocational capacities.Picture No. 1 Scar on the right dorsal part of the hand from an injury
inflicted by obtuse end of a mechanical tool
393K.J., female, 66 years old when captured. She is a housewife
without children, who had lived in Mostar since 1950, and was
captured in that town on 9 May 1992 in her flat. She was first
taken to the prison in Mostar, where she was held for 27 days,
and from there she was transferred to the camp Dretelj, where her
leg was fractured by a blow. She was exchanged on 18 August
1992. From the moment she had been captured she was beaten,
and in the prison her head was beaten, because of which her right
eye was "closed". She was beatenal1over her body and she was
"al1 black" when exchanged. In the prison in Mostar two golden
dental bridges and 8 teeth, that had a gold cup over them, were
pulled out. She was cursed at and threatened and they didn't
believe her when she said she had no children. Every night
drunken soldiers would come to the camp from LjubuSki to beat
the male camp prisoners that were in the room nextdoor ("every
morning they would carry away those that had been killed by the
battering") and they would throw them in some reservoirs, which
the .JNAhad used for storing fuel, and burn the bodies there. She
was given medical treatment for the first time in Trebinje, aftershe
had been exchanged. After the camp she got diabetes.
On the basis of forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following
consequences have been found in this examinee: gait disorder, as
a result of limited mobility in the left ankle which was fractured,
which has mildly reduced her general and vocational capacities. Picture No. 1 X-ray showing scars (callus) of the fractures of the
left shin bone, inferior, which were later operated on Individual Cases
395D.G., male, 35 years old when the event happened. He was wounded in an ambulance
car in the verycenter of Prijedor, on 30 May 1992 at about 04.00 hours. He was driving
an ambulance of the Red Cross, which was appropriately designated. This happened
when the Muslims launched on attack on Prijedor. His left and right upper legs, as well
as his right upper arm, left forearm, right shoulder, chest and left hand were injured. He
was first transferred to the hospital in Prijedor, then to Banja Luka, and the same
evening he was transported by helicopter to Belgrade, where he was treated for about
18 months altogether.
Picture No.1 Scar in the right shoulder bladeregion,the resulof
an injury inflictedby a shell fragment
396On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences have been
found in this examinee: majorand numerous scars on the body, limbs, limited mobility in
the right shoulder joint, gait disorder,paresis of the right ulnar and right ischiatic nerve,
which have resulted in disfigurement, and which have altogether disfigured him;
because of this he has non-organic insomnia and severely suffers mentally.
Picture No. 2 Scar in the right shoulder blade region, right upper arm
and thorax, the result of an injury inflicted by a shell fragment
397 .Picture No. 3 Scar in the right shoulder bladeregion, posterior,
the result of an injury inflicted by a shell fragment
398Picture No. 4 Scar in the right forearm arm, the resilt of
an injury inflicted by a shell fragment
399Picture No. 5 Scar in the right thigh, the result of an injury inflicted by a shell fragment
400Picture No. 6 Scar in the left thigh, the result of an injury inflicted by a shell fragment
401Picture No. 7 X-ray showing a scar (callus) on the superior part of the right humerus,
which had been fractured and was operated on, with metal foreign bodies
(shell fragments)seen in the surrounding soft tissue
402Picture No. 8 X-ray showing a scar (callus) on the left thigh bone,
which had been fractured and was operated on, withmetal
foreign bodies (shell fragments) seen in the surrounding soft tissue
403T.B., female, 27 years old when the event took place. Marriedand has one child. On 10
June 1992 her village, cemerno, was attacked and every "living being in it" was killed.
On that occasion 32 villagers were killed, and her father, mother, brother,aunt with her
two sons, and sister-in-law,who were in the house with her, were among the killed.She
and her relatives hid in the basernentof her house when the soldiers approached it and
ordered everyone inside to come out. As they were leaving the house they were killed
with burst fire. When she had left the basement she flung herself on the ground as they
started to shoot at her and she was injured only inthe legs. She pretended to be dead
and was thus saved. Her uncle found her that very same day and he first hid her behind
a rock, and the Serb forces later arrived and transferred her to the hospital in Pale.
Picture No. 1 Scar on the left thigh, the result of shot wounds
404The original medical records provethat she wasadmitted to the hospital in Palethe very
same day, where she had surgery of the shot wounds in the pelvis and in both legs.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and neurological-psychiatric
examinations, and also according to the X-rays, the following consequences, which are
the result of injuries inflicted in the camps, have been foundin this examinee: major
scars in the region of the hips and in both legs, which have disfiguredher, as well as an
enduring change of personality, which have severely reduced her general and
vocational capacities.
PictureNo. 2 Scar on the right thigh, theresuofshot wounds
405Picture No. 3 Scar on the right thigh, the result of shot wounds
406Picture No. 4 Scar on the right shin, the result of shot wounds
407D.N., female, 32 years old when the event took place. Married, a
housewife with two children. On 29 July 1992, at about 13.00
hours, she was in her house in F. when her sister in law told her
that she had seen some "bandits" roaming around the village. The
two of them started towards the river to get the children,who were
bathing in it, and on their way there they were ambushed by the
Muslims. One of the men grabbed her by the head across her
eyes, while another one fired several shots in her legs. At that
moment Serb soldiers, who were in the other end of the village,
retu'rnedthe shooting, after the Muslims fled and let her go. From
there she was transferred to Sanski Most, where she was treated
medically, and from there she was sent to Banja Luka, where she
spent 15 days in hospital. From this hospital she was sentto the
Orthopaedic Clinic in Banjica, Belgrade, whereshe was treated for
4 and a half months. They were shooting at her legs while she
was down. She wasn't beaten nor did she receive any blows inher
head.
On the basis of medical records, forensic medical and
neurological-psychiatricexaminations, and also accordingto the X-
rays, the following consequences have been found in this
examinee: deformity of the left shin with scars (callus) on her
bones and with many ugly scars on her skin, coupled with gait
disorder and disfigurement, as well as chronic depression, which
have altogether severely reduced her general and vocational
capacities.Picture No. 1 Deformity of the left shin with many scars on the skin (anterior)
409Picture No. 2 Deformity of the right shin with manyscars on the skin (anterior)
41OPicture No. 3 X-ray showing irregular scars(callus) on the left
shin Victims which have no bodily scars
411 2.5. The lntent to Destroy, in Whole or in Part, Serbs as Ethnic
and Religious Group
2.5.1. Numerous testimonies of witnesses and other evidence
annexed by the Respondent proves the existence of the
genocidal intent. The genocidal intent of the crimes against
Serbs stems not only from the circumstances of these crimes,
but it was very often also expressed by their perpetrators. A
Serb prisoner of the ~elovina jail in Mostar was told that it
would be much worse for Serbs in 1992 than it was in 1941
(when Ustashi perpetrated a mass genocide of Serbs in and
around Mostar). In the camp of Dretelj a witness, a former
inmate, was told by his torturer that it served him right since he
was a Serb and repeated the WWll Ustashi watchword: that a
third ofal1 Serbs will be converted to Catholic faith, a third will
be killed and a third expelled. He said that Serbs had "emptied"
the pits so that they may be thrown there again (alluding to a
tardy burial of the remains of WWll genocide victims). Ante
Golubovic, chief torturer in the camp of Odiak, used to Say that
he was going to complete the designs of Ustashi ideologists.
Association of the perpetrators of crimes against Serbs in the
prison camps with Ustashi was manifested in various ways:
They demanded the inmates to address them as "Mr. Ustasha",
to salute them back with "Za dom spremni" (Ready to die for
the homeland), to sing Ustashi songs with them while the
guards wore black uniforms with Ustashi insignia, etc. Judging
by the way in which the crimes were committed (throat slitting,
throwing victims off the cliffs, burning them to death, mutilation
and maiming, subjugation to brutal torture and humiliation) as
well as by an intense ethnic and religious hatred, the crimes
against the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina represent a
repeat of the genocidal "practices" from the times of the Ustashi
fascist state, the so-called lndependent State of Croatia (in
World War II) which also comprised Bosnia and Herzegovina.2.5.2. People were killed simply because they were Serbs. The
genocidal intent is indicated in particular by the fact that elderly
people, women and children were killed. Civilians were killed on
religious holidays; three fingers on their right hands serving them
to cross themselves as Orthodox Christians were cut off; carving
the Christian cross on the bodies of victims; the victims were
circumcised Muslim-style; victims were forced to show their
respect for the Ustashi symbols under which the genocide of
Sarbs was perpetrated during World War Two; victims were
forced to curse their saints - al1 these are facts confirming the
existence of the genocidal intent.
2.5.3. In paragraph 35, page 906 of the Reply, the Respondent
is said to have mentioned as one of the allegations repeated
many times that "non-Serbs had a strong preference for Serb
religious holidays tu strike back tu the Serb occupier". There is
no reference to any "striking back to the Serb occupie? in the
Counter-Memorial. This manipulation with the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, where Serb victims in BiH (living in their
ancestral homes) were labelled as "occupier" and where crimes
against them were seen as "striking back", is below the
minimum fair treatment in a matter before a court. However, the
Applicant reluctantly admits "that sometimes, Serbian religous
holidays were chosen tu attack the Serb occupier". This was
explained by the fact that on these dates, "Serb soldiers would
have lowered their guard'. The Applicant again, by a blatant
disregard for facts, brands the Serbian people of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as the occupier. The events described in the
Counter-Memorial relate to the attacks against Serb civilians
and to their killing, whereas the choice of religious festivals for
the commission of crimes means not only sacrilege of holy
days but also symbolizes the intent to destroy in whole or in part
a religious group. Furthermore, the qualification of the Serb
people in Bosnia and Herzegovina as occupier is a specific
confirmation of the Applicant's genocidal intent.2.5.4. Paragraph 5 of the introductory remarks allows for the
possibility that some "people" from Muslim or Croat-controlled
areas "might have tried to break into Serb-controlled areas" and
that "in a struggle against starvation, indeed, if necessary then
by the use of armed force, robbed the Serb occupier of cattle
and crops". They were not the hungry "people" but the soldiers
of the military units controlled by the Government of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Had the purpose of these
"breaks into" been the robbing of property, Serb civilians, who
had not managed to flee, would not have been killed. The
statement that "the Serb occupier" was robbed of cattle and
crops illustrates precisely the Applicant's bias and its denial of
true facts. For the Applicant, the aggressors were also Serb
farmers rearing livestock and working the fields on their
ancestral properties. Because an armed action aimed at the
expulsion and destruction of the occupier is legitimate and legally
permissible. Indeed, if the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina were
occupiers in that Republic, their destruction would not mean
genocide but a legitimate action.
2.5.5. In para. 23, page 900 of the Reply, the Applicant
repeats the claim that many "non-Serbs acted on their own in a
struggle for survival' and that the Applicant "does not exclude
the possibility of these people having committed crimes, maybe
even war crimes, in these situationS1. It goes on to Say that
"throughout the war, the government authorities did whatever
they could' to "prevent atrocities" and to "prosecute the
perpetrators whenever that was, again given the circumstances,
possible". In other words, the Applicant is not at al1 aware that
"non-Serbs" committed any crimes; it simply does not preclude
such a possibility. This "ignorance1' of the Applicant is equal to
cynicism, taking into account the very large number of crimes
that the Muslim and Croatian forces committed against Serbs in
BiH (many of the victims, perpetrators and armed unites of the
Applicant have been named by name in the Counter-Memorial).
In its denial of facts which are not in its favour, the Applicant
has for a moment lost sight of facts which it acknowledges -
415the killings of Sarajevo Serbs and the throwing of their bodies
into the "Kazani" pit. Upon expressing its readiness to
prosecute al1 perpetrators, the Applicant was in a position, in
the period (several months) between the submission of the
Counter-Memorial and the submission of the Reply, to find out
whether some of the victims identified by name in the Counter-
Memorial were murdered or tortured by "non-Serbs". As a
matter of fact, it is the duty of the Applicant (as it is of any
government) to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of
crimes.
2.6. Ethnic Cleansing
2.6.1. In the Reply to the Counter-Memorial Chapter on "Ethnic
cleansing", the Applicant (para. 169, p. 948, Reply) says that
the Respondent, "without taking any legal position regarding this
issue, leaves if to the Court to find out whether the alleged
facts would or would not meet the criferia of the Genocide
Conventiori'. The Applicant's claim that the Respondent has not
taken a legal position on ethnic cleansing, is not true. The
Respondent has explicitly stated (Counter-Memorial, para
7.1.3.1.) that forced expulsions of the population cannot be
qualified as genocide, as defined under the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide of 1948. But the
Respondent does not know how the Court understands the
prcvisions of the Genocide Convention. The Respondent has
stated the facts related to the ethnic cleansing of Serbs in case
the Court considers the facts about the ethnic cleansing relevant.
2.6.2. Commenting on the section concerning the ethnic
cleansing in Tuzla (para. 173, p. 948, Reply), the Applicant,
denying the validity of the evidence submitted, fails to make a
reference to the report of Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki (Counter-
Memorial, para. 7.3.3.4.) on to the situation of Serbs in Tuzla,
where he described "their situation as desperate" and
416mentioned a report in a local paper "Zmaj od Bosne" (a text
printed in it says that"each Muslim must name one Serb and
vow to killhilrl'). The Applicant regularly refers to similar reports
as evidence elsewhere in the text and whenever it suits it.
2.6.3. The Applicant displays the same attitude of ignoring
facts contained in the Counter-Memorial, even when these facts
are obvious, in its Reply (para. 178, p. 949) regarding the
Counter-Memorial section on Mostar, capljina and Jablanica.
The Applicant claims that the report of Tadeusz Mazowiecki
saying that as a result of the ethnic cleansing of Serbs in
Mostar, Serb residents were reduced from 30,000 to only 400,
"does not in any way support the Respondent's allegations".
The Applicant attributes to the Respondent the misquoting of
Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki's report, where he also said that
the ethnic cleansing of Mostar was first directed against the
Serbs and then against the Muslims and that "Serbs in the
eastern part of the civ do not appear to be the victims of any
form of individual discrimination by the Muslim majoriw'. The
Special Rapporteur's report does not Say who "emptied" of
Serbs eastern Mostar, which was Muslim-controlled at al1 times
and in which most of Mostar Serbs lived, or how many of the
remaining 400 Serbs live in that part of the city. The Applicant
does not want to Say it, either. Therefore, according to the
Applicant, the fact that "it appears" that part of the remaining
Serbs are not being discriminated against, cancels out the
ethnic cleansing as such, i.e. forced expulsion of some 30,000
Serbs of Mostar followed by arrests, torture and killing of Serbs.
These practices were carried out both by Muslims and Croats.
2.6.4. The Applicant "emphatically denies" that any ethnic
cleansing was practised under its control or authority. However,
it gives no explanation as to how Mostar, Konjic, Goraide,
Tuzla, Zenica and some other towns and villages in the Muslim-
Croat Federation and the largest part of Sarajevo were totally
or almost totally "cleansed" of Serbs. This situation has not
changed to date.
417 2.7.Destruction of Places of Worship
2.7.1. The Applicant (para. 196, p. 953, of the Reply) has
formally found the reason for its total disregard for facts
contained in the Counter-Memorial, section 7.4. (destruction of
temples belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church): the
supposedly unclear position of the Respondent concerning the
legal significance of the alleged facts or the content of the
Counter-Claims ("it is clear that it cannot be expected that
Bosnia and Herzegovina would have to defend itself against a
case, which supposedly it needs first to construe itseli. ."). In so
doing, the Applicant only quoted the second sentence from the
Counter-Memorial, para. 7.4.1. but not the first one. 130th
sentences contain the Respondent's clear view: destruction of
places of worship, as defined in the Genocide Convention of
1948, does not constitute a crime of genocide; however, the
Respondent states facts about the destruction of Serb religious
buildings in case the Court takes a different legal opinion.
2.7.2. In spite of ignoring the facts contained in the Counter-
Memorial, section 7.4., the Applicant, however, 'acknowledges
that in the course of the armed conflict, Serb religious property
may occasionally have been damaged and sometimes even
destroyed'. Nevertheless, the Applicant 'do deny that this has
ever occurred systematically, on the basis of Government
instructions or instructions from other official, civil or military,
authorities'.till, the Applicant lis not aware' once again that the
destruction of Serb religious property has ever occurred. It only
'acknowledges' that this 'may' have happened 'occasionally'. The
Counter-Memorial cited a great many Serbian churches and
other religious property damaged or destroyed, which leads one
to conclude that the destruction of Serbian places of worship
was done systematically and simultaneously with the other
crimes against the Serbian people. 2.8. Islamisation of Muslim-controlled Parts of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
2.8.1. The Applicant insists on various statements of the
'Bosnian Government' and its officiais on the need to preserve
the 'multi-ethnicstate'. It says that Bosnian Serbs, too,
participated in the work of the Presidency chaired by President
lzetbegovic and that there were also Serbs among the generals
of the 'Bosnian Army' (General Divjak). The justification of the
Counter-Claims cannot be judged on the basis of the
statements of the 'Bosnian Government' but on the basis of
facts relating to crimes committed by the 'Bosnian Army' and
police as well as by the personnel of the prison camps
controlled by the 'Bosnian Government'. It is also irrelevant that
individual Serbs, in very few cases and for various personal
motives (including fear for their own life), served in the 'Bosnian
Army' or worked for the 'Bosnian Government'. The true
practice of the Applicant with regard to the 'preservation of the
multi-ethnic state' was in contrast to those statements. This is,
among other things, proved by the renaming of streets in
Sarajevo. The names of streets after famous Serb historical
figures, scientists, writers or artists have been changed into
Muslim or other names. The following streets have thus been
renamed:
- Djura JakSic st, now Adija Mulabegovic st.;
- Djuro Djakovic st., now AlipaSina st.;
- Jova Jankovic st., now Amir Krupalija st.;
- Slavko Rodic st., now Atifa Karalic st.;
- SlaviSa ~ajner-cita st., now August Braun st.;
- Dimitrije Tucovic st., now Avdaga ~ahinagic st.;
- Grujo Novakovic st., now Bajram Zenuni st.;
- Olga Ivkovic st., now Behaudin Selmanovic st.;
- Sava Jankovic st., now Behdiet Mutevelic st.;
- Nemanjina cikma, now cekalusa Cikma;
- Svetozar Markovic st., now ëemerlina st.;
419- Brace Savic st., now ~amil Sijaric st.;
- Danilo Djokik st, now Dr Fetah Becirbegovic st.;
- Aleksa Bojovic-Brka st., now Dr Mustafa DeniSlic st.;
- Stevan Sindjelic st., now Diemal Celic st.;
- Mirko Jovanovic st., now ~adii-Sabanovic st.;
- Spasenija-Cana Babovic st., now Hakija Turajlic st.;
- Branko RadiEevic st., now Hizeta st.;
- Nadeida Petrovic st., now HumaEka PloEa;
- Iso Jovanovic st., now Husref Rediik st.;
- Ivan Milutinovic st., now Ibrahim PeSevija st.;
- Slobodan Princip st., now Kulovica st.;
- Stevan Hristic st., now Meho Smailagic st.;
- BoriSa KovaEevic st., now Mehmed Spaho st.;
- Kosta AbraSevic st., now Mithat Begic st.;
- Jovan Popovic st., now Muhamed Ridianovic st.;
- Hajduk Veljko st., now Musa Hazim Catic st.;
- Vuk Karadiic st., now PehlivanuSa st.;
- Sava KovaEeviCst., now Reis Diemaludin ~au~evi~st.;
- Jug Bogdan st., now Rizah tet tist.;
- Jova Jankovic st., now Safet lsovic st.;
- Milo5 Obilic st., now Safet Beg BaSagic st.;
- MiSko Jovanovic st., now Secir Sikirica st.;
- Branislav NuSi6 st., now TahrniSEina st.;
- Petar KoEic st., now Telale st.;
- Milutin DjuraSkovic st., now Topal Osman-paSa st.;
- ~ikica ~ovanovic-~panac st., now Vahid Maglajic st.
The former city by-pass has been renamed into Put
mladih Muslimana (Young Muslims Road).
The stated facts show that even the streets named after
Vuk Karadiic (1787-1864), reformer of the Serbian literary
language, a historian and collecter of popular narrative art and
tradition, one of the most prominent figures in the history of
Serbian science and culture - has not retained its former name.
The streets which used to bear the names of famous Serb
writers or artists such as Branko RadiEevic, Petar KoEic
420Branislav NuSic, Nadeida PetroviC, Stevan Hristic and others,
have not kept those names. Even the streets named after two
heroes from the Kosovo cycle national ballads (the battle of
Kosovo fought against Turks in 1389): Milo5 Obilic and Jug
Bogdan, as well as those named after historical figures who
came into prominence when Serbs began their liberation
struggle against Turks at the turn of the 19th century (Stevan
Sindjelic, Hajduk Veljko) -were al1 taken off the list of streets.
Also, the names of 20th-century Serb historical personalities,
including veterans of the last war (fought against Nazi-fascism),
were al1 removed from street names. In the Muslim-Croat
Federation, communities where Muslims form a majority (e.g. in
Sarajevo), are building a society based on Muslim tenets, as
witnessed in the life-style of the population. It is unclear,
therefore, how the Applicant views a multi-ethnic society (and
state) if it is built to suit Muslims only, while any trace of Serb
existence and creativity is being wiped out in the territory of the
Muslim-Croat Federation (which is but one of the two entities in
Bosnia and Herzegovina).
2.8.2. The Respondent has also presented other facts in its
Counter-Memorial, bearing witness to the forced Islamisation of
Muslim-controlled parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this light,
it pointed to the participation of Mujaheedin forces in the civil
war there. This participation was also confirmed by the
Bassiouni Commission in the following way:
"447.Mqaheedin, or "ho& warriors': is a generic term for
Muslim volunteers fighting in the former Yugoslavia.
Many Mujaheedin originate from Muslim countries
outside the former Yugoslavia. lt was reported that the
Mujaheedin began arriving in BiH as early as June
1992. Reports on the number of Mujaheedin forces
operating in BiH Vary, but it is unlikely that the
Mujaheedin forces have made a significant military
contribution to the BiH Government's war effort. The
Mujaheedin forces came from Muslim states and many
of them were veterans of the Afghan war. (..)
42149. Mujaheedin forces were actively involved in military
operations in seven counties throughout BiH. The dates
of reported activity range from 3 June 7992 through
June 7993, with the heaviest activity reported in Travnik,
Zenica, and Konjic.
50. Several reports indicate that the Mujaheedin were
placed under the command of the BiH Army. The
Mujaheedin forces were closely associated with the 5th
Corps, the 6th and 7th Zenica Brigades, the 7th Travnik
Brigade, and 45th Muslim Brigade which belongs to the
6th Corps in Konjic of the Army of BiH. They also
allegedly fought alongside the Muslim Police, the
Krajiska Brigade from Travnik, units of Kosovo Muslims,
Albanian soldiers, and paramilitary groups such as the
'/GreenLegion" and the "Black Swans".
57. Reports also indicate that the Mujaheedin had the
support of President lzetbego vic and his go vernment.
This was demonstrated in the Bihac pocket, where the
Mujaheedin joined BiH forces loyal tu lzetbegovic.
Together, these forces battled separatist forces who
eniered into a separate peace treaty with Bosnian
Serbs.
(d) Allegations of war crimes
52. Reports submitted to the Commission of Experts
alleged that the Mujaheedin have been responsible for
the mutilation and killing of civilians, raping, looting, the
destruction of property, and the expulsion of non-Muslim
populations, The deputy commander of the BiH Army,
Colonel Stjepan Siber, bas said, it was a mistake tu let
them (the Mujaheedin) here ..they commit most of the
atrocities and work against the interests of the Muslim
people. They have been killing, looting and stealing.
422 (e) Summary of reported paramilitary activiiy
53. ln Zenica, between 37 August and 2 September
7992, 250 Mujaheedin troops allegedly came to BiH
from Turkey, Qatar, Bahrain and Iran. These troops
worked alongside the Green Legion and HOS
paramiMary groups stationed in Zenica. The Mqiaheedin
allegedly also operated at a camp at Arnauti lt was
reported that a unit of the Mujaheedin, called the
"Guerrilla", particlpated in the 76 April 7993 attack on
Ktez and attempted to exchange
70 HVO hostages for
foreign prisoners held in HV0 prisons.
(Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, Volume 1,
SI19941674lAnnex III.A, pages 17 and 18)"
2.9. Evidence Proving Facts upon which the Counter-Claim Is
Based
2.9.1. The Applicant explains its view on the inadmissibility of
witness statements supporting the Counter-claim contained in
the Counter-Memorial (para. 26, p. 903 , and para. 27, p. 904,
Reply) by saying that they "usually contain anonymous witness
statements given before a Serb legal authority" and that the
Applicant "is not at al1 able to verify the background of these
presumably legal authorities, nor is it able to assess the quality
of the presumably legal proceedings in the course of which,
agâin presumably, the statements were delivered"; that "the
witnesses were never cross-examined nor have they been
interrogated by a neutral, independent authority". The Applicant,
knows full well why witness testimonies are "anonymous": to
protect witnesses, their names were removed from copies of
testimony records (their initials are only stated), while the
reference numbers appearing on these records serve to identify
witnesses concerned. Testimonies were not given before any
423"Serb legal authority", as such authorities are nonexistent. There
exist only the legal authorities of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (and of its constituent Republics) and the legal
authorities of Republika Srpska. A reference to the "background
of these presumably legal authorities" (before which testimonies
were given) serves only to cloud things and its real purpose is
unclear. Witnesses were al1 heard in accordance with the
applicable rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure which does
not recognize the institution of "cross-examination", although the
Code allows a witness to be asked questions after he has
spontaneously given his testimony. By claiming that witnesses
were not "interrogated by a neutral, independent authority", the
Applicant actually suggests that they should have been heard
by the legal authorities other than tnose in the FRY and
Republika Srpska. (Does the Applicant stick to this when it
comes to gathering evidence to support its own claims?) The
Applicant should not be bothered by this. The Respondent will
request the Court to summon the witnesses whose written
statements were enclosed, so that the Applicant will be able to
cross-examine them.
2.9.2. The Applicant drew the attention of the Court (para. 28,
p. 904, of the Reply) that some witnesses were heard by the
investigating judge of the District Court in Belgrade and
objected that the Respondent "fails to clarify" whether such
procedure relates to al1 possible crimes committed in BiH
territory or is only confined to cases where Serbs were victims
and persons suspected of these crimes are non-Serbs. The
Respondent has nothing to "clarify" regarding the gathering of
evidence on crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
crimes did not occur in the territory of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. Therefore, the Respondent is not under the general
obligation to investigate and prosecute these crimes. The
interest of the FRY to gather evidence on the factual basis of
the Counter-Memorial, is fully legitimate, and the evidence has
been obtained fully legally.2.9.3. The Applicant noted (para. 29, p. 904, Reply) that the
records of witness testimonies, given before the investigating
judges in Republika Srpska, invoke the same articles of the
Penal Code as those provided by the Respondent. This makes
the Applicant conclude that "Bosnian Serbs had organized their
judicial system not only separate from that of BiH, but as,
alternatively, their own system and as part of the legal system
of Yugoslavia". Republika Srpska, in its Constitutional Law to
implement the Constitution of RS ("Official Journal of RS", No.
21/92), has decided to apply the laws and other regulations of
the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
former Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina pending
the passing of appropriate laws. It is, therefore, abundantly
clear why the records of the investigating judges of courts in
Republika Srpska refer to the same articles of the Penal Code
as in the case of records of the investigating judges in
Yugoslavia (the crime of genocide and war crimes were
punishable under the federal Penal Code), and the Applicant's
claim that "at least part of the Bosnian Serb legal system
functioned as an integral part of the Federal legal system of
Yugoslavia" is devoid of any meaning. To set the record
straight, the Applicant itself took over the provisions of the
Penal Code of the SFRY by the Decree taking effect on 11
April 1992 ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina", No. 2/92).
2.9.4. Paragraphs 30 and 31, on page 905 of the Reply Say
that only four records of witness testimonies relate to genocide
(as defined under Article 141 of the Penal Code of Yugoslavia),
and that most of the other records refer to articles of the Penal
Code defining other criminal acts against humanity and
international law.It is therefore "remarkable", in the opinion of
the Applicant, that the Respondent has used such records of
witness testimonies to support the allegations of genocide.
Paragraph 32, page 905 of the Reply says: "The Respondent
has failed to explain why, then, a// the annexed witness
statements would serve to support its counter-daims. Bosnia
425and Herzegovina concludes that also for this reason, there does
not exist any legally relevant basis for Respondent's counter-
claims". The Applicant's view is totally unacceptable. Witnesses
were heard in connection with facts and circumstances relating
to the commission of crimes and it is absolutely irrelevant which
crime qualifications were invoked in the records of testimonies,
in particular because these crimes involved several related
crimes against humanity and international law. Under the
Yugoslav Code of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor, in issuing
his indictment, qualifies theriminal offence concerned. In doing
so, the prosecutor is not bound by the qualification given by the
investigating judge hearing a witness. The committed crimes (as
facts) form the basis of the Counter-Claim, while the conclusion
as to the genocidal nature of these crimes and the
responsibility of the Applicant is drawn from al1 the
circumstances. Records of witness testimonies transmitted to
ICTY are relevant as evidence of facts. Legal qualifications of
crimes made prima faciae by an investigating judge are not
binding on a domestic prosecutor nor are they binding on the
International Court of Justice.
2.9.5. The Reply (para. 33, p. 905) draws attention to the
autopsy reports (attached to the Counter-Memorial) saying that
they were made at theUMilitary Medical Academy, Pathology and
Forensic Institute, Belgrade", whereas the autopsies were
carried out in BiH territory at the request of Bosnian Serb
authorities, which "once also attests to the entirely integrated
structures of Republika Srpska and the Respondent'. It is true
that experts from the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade
performed post mortems at the request of RS authorities,
implying no integrated structures of Republika Srpska and the
Respondent. It is absurd to claim in the Reply that such
"integration" is also proved by the fact that some medical
examinations of victims were carried out in RS at the request of
the Committee for gathering information on crimes against
humanity and international law, based in Belgrade.2.9.6. Medical examination reports (para. 34, p. 906 of the
Reply) are said to contain "case histories" or statements of
witnesses which are often "copies" of their testimonies and that,
on account of this, they cannot be used as evidence on the
circumstances in which injuries were sustained or on the
"identity" of"alleged" perpetrators. Finally, the Applicant says
that these reports and photos attached thereto "do not provide
any proof of the existence of an organized campaign aimed
against the Serbs as such". The normal "case histories" serve
as proof of the cause of injury and should be judged along with
the testimony of the injured witness.(It is not expected that the
information contained in the case history should coincide with
the testimony of the injured.) True, medical reports and
photographs of injuries, taken in isolation, are not direct proof of
the existence of "an organized campaign aimed against the
Serbs as such". However, this evidence should be judged
together with al1 other evidence, and indirectly (as proof of the
bodily harm and the harm done to the mental integrity of the
person as well as that of the method of infliction of injuries)
they are proof of the genocidal nature of the crimes committed
against the Serbs.
2.9.7. Due to the circumstances related to the size and
complexity of the tasks facing the Respondent in gathering
evidence and in having al1 this material translated into English,
the Respondent was not able to transmit to the Court some
witness testimonies, on the basis of which the Counter-Claims
were prepared, within the time-limit set for the submission of
the Counter-Memorial. In view of the Applicant's refusal to
comment on the facts presented in the Counter-Claims but on
which no evidence was submitted, the Respondent now
presents it as annexes to this Rejoinder.
2.9.8. The following annexes related to the marked paragraphs
of the Counter-Memorial are added:- Annex No. RCI related to paragraph 7.1.8.3. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC2 related to paragraphs 7.1.2.8. & 7.1.2.9. &
7.2.0.1. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC3 related to paragraphs 7.12.94. & 7.3.16.1.
& 7.2.0.1. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC4 related to paragraph 7.2.19.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC5 related to paragraph 7.1.5.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC6 related to paragraph 7.1.24.1. & 7.2.12.3. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC7 related to paragraphs 7.1.49.2. & 7.1.49.11.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC8 related to paragraph 7.1.54.2. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC9 related to paragraph 7.1.1.2. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC10 related to paragraph 7.1.21.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC11 related to paragraphs 7.1.14.1. & 7.2.34.1.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC12 related to paragraphs 7.2.0.1. & 7.3.13.0.
in Counter-MemorialAnnex No. RC13 related to paragraphs 7.3.7.0. & 7.1.6.0. in
Counter-Mernorial
Annex No. RC14 related to paragraph 7.1.17.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC15 related to paragraph 7.1.37.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC16 related to paragraph 7.1.39.2. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC17 related to paragraph 7.1.36.8. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC18 related to paragraph 7.1.37.1. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC19 related to paragraph 7.1.38.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC20 related to paragraph 7.1.39.2. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC21 related to paragraph 7.1.39.3. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC22 related to paragraph 7.1.40.5. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC23 related to paragraph 7.1.39.4. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC24 related to paragraph 7.2.8.11. in Counter-
Mernorial- Annex No. RC25 related to paragraph 7.2.11.1.4. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC26 related to paragraphs 7.2.11.23. &
7.2.12.1.13.in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC27 related to paragraph 7.2.3.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC28 related to paragraphs 7.2.11.4.1. &
7.2.11.4.4. & 7.2.11.4.5. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC29 related to paragraph 7.2.3.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC30 related to paragraph 7.2.3.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. SC31 related to paragraph 7.2.19.4.3. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC32 related to paragraphs 7.2.7.3. & 7.2.3.2. &
7.1.26.1. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC33 related to paragraph 7.2.3.2. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC34 related to paragraph 7.2.3.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC35 related to paragraph 7.2.8.15. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC36 related to paragraph 7.2.3.2. in Counter-
Memorial-
Annex No. RC37 related to paragraph 7.1.11.14. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC38 related to paragraph 7.1.11.17. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC39 related to paragraph 7.1.11.16. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC40 related to paragraph 7.1.11.12. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC41 related to paragraph 7.1.37.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC42 related to paragraph 7.1.11.17. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC43 related to paragraph 7.1.11.1 3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC44 related to paragraph 7.1.11.17. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC45 related to paragraph 7.1.12.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC46 related to paragraph 7.1.11.14. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC47 related to paragraph 7.1.12.1. in Ccunter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC48 related to paragraph 7.1.12.1. in Counter-
Mernorial- Annex No. RC49 related to paragraph 7.1.1 1.13. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC50 related to paragraph 7.1.12.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC51 related to paragraph 7.2.40.0. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC52 related to paragraphs 7.3.14.0. & 7.1.38.1.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC53 related to paragraphs 7.2.0.1. & 7.3.14.0.
& 7.2.6.8. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC54 related to paragraphs 7.3.14.0. & 7.2.6.3.
& 7.1.38. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC55 related to paragraph 7.3.2.4. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC56 related to paragraphs 7.2.11.3. & 7.3.19.0.
& 7.2.10.1.11. & 7.2.10.2.2. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC57 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.4.3. &
7.2.11.0. & 7.2.11.5. & 7.3.19.0. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC58 related to paragraphs 7.2.12.3.2. &
7.3.19.0. & 7.2.10.1.5. & 7.2.10.2.2.h Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC59 related to paragraphs 7.3.19.0. &
7.2.10.1.3. & 7.2.10.2.2. & 7.2.10.4. & 7.2.11.5. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC60 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.2.2. &
7.2.10.4. & 7.2.11.0. & 7.2.11.3. in Counter-Memorial-
Annex No. RC61 related to paragraphs 7.2.11.O. & 7.2.11.5.
& 7.2.2.13.1. & 7.2.10.2.2.in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC62 related to paragrapns 7.2.11.0. &
7.2.11.6.5. & 7.2.12.1.14. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC63 related to paragraph 7.2.12.1.4. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC64 related to paragraph 7.2.10.2.2. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC65 related to paragraphs 7.2.1 1.1.2. &
7.2.10.1.l. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC66 related to paragraph 7.2.10.4. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC67 related to paragraph 7.3.19.1.2. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC68 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.1 .l. &
7.2.10.4. & 7.2.11.3. & 7.2.11.5. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC69 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.1.17. &
7.2.10.2.2. & 7.2.10.4. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC70 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.2.2. &
7.2.10.4. & 7.2.11.3. & 7.2.11.5. & 7.3.19.0. & 7.2 10.1.3. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC71 related to paragraphs 7.2.1 1.O. &
7.2.10.2.2. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC72 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.1.12. &
7.2.10.4. & 7.2.11.5. & 7.2.12.1.14. & 7.2.12.3.2. &
7.2.12.3.3. in Counter-Memorial
433- Annex No. RC73 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.2.2. &
7.2.10.4. & 7.3.19.0.in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC74 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.3.7. &
7.2.10.2.2. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC75 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.2.2. &
7.2.11.5. & 7.2.11.6.7. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC76 related to paragraph 7.1.39.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC77 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.4. & 7.2.11.O.
& 7.2.11.5 & 7.2.12.3.2. & 7.3.19.0. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC78 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.4. & 7.3.19.0.
& 7.2.10.1.15. & 7.2.10.2.2. in Counter-Mernorial
-
Annex No. RC79 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.4. & 7.3.19.0.
& 7.2.10.2.2. & 7.2.11.O. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC80 related to paragraphs 7.3.19.0. &
7.2.10.2.2. & 7.2.10.4. & 7.2.11.3. & 7.2.11.5. 6 7.2.12.3.1.
& 7.2.11.O. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC81 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.1.17. &
7.2.10.2. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC82 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.1.19. &
7.2.10.1.20. & 7.2.10.3.6. & 7.2.11.5. & 7.2.10.1.3. in
Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC83 related to paragraph 7.2.10.1.18. in
Counter-Memorial- Annex No. RC84 related to paragraph 7.2.1.14. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC85 related to paragraph 7.2.1.14. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC86 related to paragraph 7.2.10.1.6. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC87 related to paragraphs 7.3.19.0. &
7.2.10.1.3. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC88 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.1. & 7.2.0.1.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC89 related to paragraph 7.2.10.1.5. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC90 related to paragraph 7.2.10.4. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC91 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.22. &
7.2.10.4. & 7.2.11.0. & 7.2.11.3. & 7.2.11.5. & 7.2.12.1.14.
&7.2.12.3.1.&7.3.19.0. inCounter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC92 related to paragraph 7.2.10.1.8. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC93 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.4. & 7.2.0.1.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC94 related to paragraph 7.2.10.19. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC95 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.4. & 7.2.11.3.
& 7.2.10.1.l. in Counter-Memorial- Annex No. RC96 related to paragraph 7.2.10.1.6. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC97 related to paragraph 7.2.10.1.4. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC98 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.4. &
7.2.10.1.l. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC99 related to paragraph 7.2.10.3.1. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC100 related to paragraph 7.2.10.1.l. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC101 related to paragraph 7.1.1 9.1.in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC102 related to paragraph 7.1.20.2. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC103 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.1.6. &
7.2.11.2.3. & 7.3.19.0. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC104 related to paragraph 7.2.10.1.18. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC105 related to paragraph 7.1.24.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC106 related to paragraph 7.1.24.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC107 related to paragraph 7.1.15.6. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC108 related to paragraph 7.1.18.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC109 related to paragraph 7.1.27.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC110 related to paragraph 7.2.10.3.2. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC111 related to paragraph 7.3.19.0. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC112 related to paragraph 7.1.19.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC113 related to paragraph 7.1.27.5. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC114 related to paragraph 7.1.15.8. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC115 related to paragraph 7.1.19.4. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC116 related to paragraph 7.2.27.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC117 related to paragraph 7.1.24.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC118 related to paragraph 7.1.17.5. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC119 related to paragraph 7.1.19.2. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC120 related to paragraph 7.1.13.12.2. in
Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC121 related to paragraph 7.1.17.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC122 related to paragraph 7.1.27.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC123 related to paragraph 7.1.27.3. in Counter-
Mernorial
-
Annex No. RC124 related to paragraph 7.2.1.14. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC125 related to paragraph 7.2.1.14. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC126 related to paragraph 7.1.36.11. in
Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC127 related to paragraph 7.1.36.11. in
Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC128 related to paragraph 7.1.36.11. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC129 related to paragraphs 7.1.57.1. &
7.3.24.0. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC130 related to paragraph 7.2.0.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC131 related to paragraph 7.1.9.12. in Counter-
Memorial-
Annex No. RC132 related to paragraph 7.1.40.2. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC133 related to paragraph 7.1.39.6. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC134 related to paragraph 7.1.40.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC135 related to paragraph 7.1.40.4. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC136 related to paragraph 7.1.39.8. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC137 related to paragraph 7.1.39.6. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC138 related to paragraph 7.1.40.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC139 related to paragraph 7.1.39.6. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC140 related to paragraph 7.1.39.4. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC141 related to paragraph 7.1.39.7. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC142 related to paragraph 7.1.39.8. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC143 related to paragraph 7.1.39.8. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC144 related to paragraph 7.1.39.8. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC145 related to paragraph 7.1.40.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC146 related to paragraph 7.1.40.2. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC147 related to paragraph 7.1.39.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC148 related to paragraph 7.1.39.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC149 related to paragraph 7.1.39.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC150 related to paragraph 7.1.39.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC151 related to paragraph 7.1.39.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC152 related to paragraph 7.1.39.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC153 related to paragraph 7.1.39.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC154 related to paragraph 7.1.39.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC155 related to paragraph 7.1.39.1. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC156 related to paragraph 7.1.39.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC157 related to paragraph 7.1.39.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC158 related to paragraph 7.2.13.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC159 related to paragraph 7.1.11.5. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC160 related to paragraph 7.2.3.9. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC161 related to paragraph 7.2.6.4. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC162 related to paragraph 7.2.6.27. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC163 related to paragraph 7.2.6.28. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC164 related to paragraph 7.2.6.38. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC165 related to paragraph 7.2.17.5.4. in
Counter-Memorial
-
Annex No. RC166 related to paragraph 7.2.15.9. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC167 related to paragraphs 7.1.16.1. &
7.1.16.3. & 7.2.5.6. in Counter-Memorial-
Annex No. RC168 related to paragraph 7.2.15.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC169 related to paragraph 7.2.5.8.6. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC170 related to paragraph 7.2.5.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC171 related to paragraphs 7.2.17.5.2. &
7.2.17.5.3. & 7.2.17.5.5. & 7.2.17.5.6. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC172 related to paragraphs 7.2.17.5.1. &
7.2.17.5.3. & 7.2.17.5.4.& 7.2.17.5.5. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC173 related to paragraphs 7.2.17.5.7. &
7.2.17.5.9. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC174 related to paragraph 7.2.17.5.6. in
Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC175 related to paragraphs 7.2.17.5.2. &
7.2.17.5.3. & 7.2.17.5.4. & 7.2.17.5.5. & 7.2.17.5.9. &
7.2.40.0. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC176 related to paragraphs 7.2.17.5.1. &
7.2.17.5.2. & 7.2.17.5.3. & 7.2.17.5.4. & 7.2.17.5.5. &
7.2.17.5.8. & 7.2.17.5.9. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC177 related to paragraphs 7.2.6.38. & 7.2.6.3.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC178 related to paragraphs 7.2.4.29. &
7.1.25.1. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC179 related to paragraphs 7.2.30.27. &
7.2.4.1. & 7.2.4.3.2. & 7.2.4.4. in Counter-Memorial
442- Annex No. RC180 related to paragraphs 7.2.15.2. &
7.2.15.7. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC181 related to paragraph 7.2.15.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC182 related to paragraph 7.2.5.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC183 related to paragraph 7.2.5.8.12. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC184 related to paragraphs 7.2.17.5.1. &
7.2.17.5.2. 7.2.17.5.3. & 7.2.17.5.4. & 7.2.17.5.5. &
7.2.17.5.8. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC185 related to paragraph 7.2.17.5.6. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC186 related to paragraph 7.1.22.9. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC187 related to paragraph 7.1.24.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC188 related to paragraph 7.1.24.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC189 related to paragraph 7.1.24.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC190 related to paragraph 7.1.1.9. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC191 related to paragraph 7.1.19.2. in Counter-
Memorial
443- Annex No. RC192 related to paragraph 7.1.13.5. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC193 related to paragraph 7.1.26.2. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC194 related to paragraph 7.1.13.8. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC195 related to paragraph 7.1.13.10. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC196 related to paragraph 7.1.13.4. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC197 related to paragraph 7.1.22.9. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC198 related to paragraph 7.1.21.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC199 related to paragraph 7.1.24.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC200 related to paragraph 7.1.21.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC201 related to paragraph 7.1.24.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC202 related to paragraph 7.1.24.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC203 related to paragraph 7.1.13.6. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC204 related to paragraph 7.1.24.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC205 related to paragraph 7.1.22.9. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC206 related to paragraphs 7.2.1.16. & 7.2.1.0.
& 7.2.2.0. in Counter-Memorial
-
Annex No. RC207 related to paragraphs 7.2.1.16. & 7.2.1.O.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC208 related to paragraph 7.2.1.14. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC209 related to paragraph 7.2.6.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC210 related to paragraph 7.2.1.14. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC211 related to paragraphs 7.2.12.3. &
7.1.24.0. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC212 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.2. &
7.2.10.4. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC213 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.2.1. &
7.2.10.2.2.in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC214 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.2. &
7.2.10.4. & 7.2.11.5. & 7.2.12.1.14. & 7.2.10.1.3. &
7.2.10.1.5. & 7.2.10.11.6. & 7.2.11.3. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC215 related to paragraphs 7.2.4.3.2. &
7.2.4.17. & 7.2.4.22. in Counter-Memorial- Annex No. RC216 related to paragraphs 7.2.4.15. &
7.2.30.7. & 7.2.30.28. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC217 related to paragraph 7.2.1.14. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC218 related to paragraph 7.2.32.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC219 related to paragraph 7.2.1.16. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC220 related to paragraph 7.2.1.16. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC221 related to paragraph 7.2.1.14. in Counter-
Memoria
-
Annex No. RC222 related to paragraph 7.1.7.12. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC223 related to paragraph 7.1.5.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC224 related to paragraph 7.1.7.15. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC225 related to paragraph 7.1.5.20. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC226 related to paragraph 7.1.7.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC227 related to paragraph 7.1S.1. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC228 related to paragraph 7.1.5.19. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC229 related to paragraph 7.1.5.19. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC230 related to paragraph 7.1.5.19. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC231 related to paragraphs 7.3.25.1. &
7.1.45.0. & 7.1.46.1. & 7.1.46.2. & 7.1.46.3. & 7.2.13.1.8.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC232 related to paragraph 7.3.20.3.2. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC233 related to paragraph 7.3.19.0. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC234 related to paragraph 7.3.19.0. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC235 related to paragraph 7.3.19.2.1. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC236 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.0. &
7.2.10.1. & 7.2.12. in Counter-Memorial
-
Annex No. RC237 related to paragraph 7.1.33.0. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC238 related to paragraph 7.1.33.0. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC239 related to paragraph 7.1.33.0. & 7.2.10.0.
in Counter-Memorial- Annex No. RC240 related to paragraph 7.1.4.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC241 related to paragraph 7.1.5.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC242 related to paragraph 7.1.7.6. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC243 related to paragraph 7.1.4.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC244 related to paragraph 7.1.4.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC245 related to paragraph 7.1.4.3. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC246 related to paragraph 7.1.4.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC247 related to paragraphs 7.1.6.4. &
7.2.1.14. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC248 related to paragraph 7.2.6.25. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC249 related to paragraph 7.2.1 1.1.8. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC250 related to paragraphs 7.2.11.4.1. &
7.2.11.4.3. & 7.2.11.4.5. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC251 related to paragraph 7.2.11.3. in Counter-
MemorialAnnex No. RC252 related to paragraph 7.2.6.19. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC253 related to paragraph 7.1.6.4. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC254 related to paragraph 7.2.11.1.5. in
Counter-Mernorial
Annex No. RC255 related to paragraphs 7.2.11.4.2. &
7.2.11.4.3. & 7.2.12.2.1. & 7.2.11.0. in Counter-Mernorial
Annex No. RC256 related to paragraph 7.2.6.37. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC257 related to paragraphs 7.2.11.1.7. &
7.2.11.3. in Counter-Mernorial
Annex No. RC258 related to paragraph 7.2.22.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC259 related to paragraph 7.2.22.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC260 related to paragraph 7.2.22.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC261 related to paragraph 7.2.22.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC262 related to paragraph 7.2.39.1. in Counter-
Mernorial
Annex No. RC263 related to paragraph 7.3.3.3. in Counter-
Mernorial- Annex No. RC264 related to paragraphs 7.2.13.1. &
7.2.13.1-3. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC265 related to paragraph 1.3.3.12. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC266 related to paragraphs 7.2.13.1.8. &
7.2.13.1. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC267 related to paragraph 7.2.13.1.5. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC268 related to paragraph 7.2.13.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC269 related to paragraph 7.2.13.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC270 related to paragraphs 7.1.23.0. & 7.2.0.1.
& in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC271 related to paragraph 7.2.13.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC272 related to paragraphs 7.2.13.1.8. &
7.2.13.2. & 7.2.13.2.1. & 7.2.13.2.2. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC273 related to paragraphs 7.2.20.1. &
7.2.20.2. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC274 related to paragraph 7.2.21.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC275 related to paragraphs 7.3.19.0. &
7.2.10.2.2. &7.2.10.4. & 7.2.11.5. in Counter-Memorial- Annex No. RC276 related to paragraphs 7.2.3.2. & 7.1.54.2.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC277 related to paragraph 7.2.18.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC278 related to paragraph 7.3.12.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC279 related to paragraphs 7.2.21.5. &
7.2.21.6. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC280 related to paragraph 7.2.43.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC281 related to paragraphs 7.2.21.3. &
7.2.27.6. in Counter-Memorial
-
Annex No. RC282 related to paragraph 7.1.8.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC283 related to paragraph 7.1'9.4, in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC284 related to paragraph 7.1.8.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC285 related to paragraph 7.1.11.9. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC286 related to paragraph 7.1.11.8. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC287 related to paragraph 7.1.8.3. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC288 related to paragraph 7.1.11.IO. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC289 related to paragraph 7.1.9.4. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC290 related to paragraph 7.1.9.4. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC291 related to paragraph 7.1.11.10. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC292 related to paragraph 7.1.11.10. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC293 related to paragraph 7.1.11.10. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC294 related to paragraph 7.1.9.11. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC295 related to paragraph 7.1.9.4. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC296 related to paragraph 7.1.7.20. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC297 related to paragraph 1.3.3.13. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC298 related to paragraph 7.1.9.12. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC299 related to paragraph 7.1.9.7.36. in
Counter-Memorial-
Annex No. RC300 related to paragraph 7.1.11.4. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC301 related to paragraph 7.1.9.4. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC302 related to paragraph 7.1.9.16. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC303 related to paragraph 7.1.9.9. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC304 related to paragraph 7.1.11.l. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC305 related to paragraph 7.1.13.7. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC306 related to paragraph 7.1.1.9. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC307 related to paragraph 7.1.1.5. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC308 related to paragraph 7.1.1.5. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC309 related to paragraph 7.1.1.5. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC310 related to paragraph 7.1.1.6. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC311 related to paragraph 7.1.1.6. in Counter-
Mernorial- Annex No. RC312 related to paragraph 7.1.1.6. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC313 related to paragraph 7.1.1.IO. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC314 related to paragraph 7.1.1.9. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC315 related to paragraph 7.1.2.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC316
- Annex No. RC317 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.2.2. &
7.2.10.4. & 7.2.11.0. & 7.2.11.5. & 7.2.11.6.2. & 7.3.19.0. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC318 related to paragraph 7.1.22.10. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC319 related to paragraph 7.1.8.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC320 related to paragraphs 7.1.9.13. & 7.2.6.8.
& 7.2.6.14. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC321 related to paragraph 7.1.4.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC322 related to paragraph 7.1.2.11. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC323 related to paragraph 7.1.2.1. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC324 related to paragraph 7.1.2.1. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC325 related to paragraph 7.1.13.5. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC326 related to paragraph 7.1.2.1 1. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC327 related to paragraph 7.1.1.5. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC328 related to paragraph 7.1.1.5. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC329 related to paragraphs 7.2.6.38.9. &
7.2.17.5. & 7.2.17.5.1. & 7.2.17.5.2. & 7.2.17.5.3. &
7.2.17.5.4.& 7.2.17.5.5.& 7.2.17.5.7.& 7.2.17.5.8.&
7.2.17.5.9. in Counter-Memorial
Annex No. RC330 related to paragraph 7.1.2.11. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC331 related to paragraph 7.1.1.l. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC332 related to paragraph 7.1.7.19. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC333 related to paragraph 7.1.7.24. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC334 related to paragraph 7.1.1.3. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC335 related to paragraph 7.1.9.0. in Counter-
Memorial
455- Annex No. RC336 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.2.2. &
7.2.10.4. & 7.2.11.5. & 7.2.12.1.14. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC337 related to paragraphs 7.1.16.0. &
7.1.16.1. & 7.1.16.3. & 7.1.16.4. & 7.2.5.18.14. in Counter-
Mernorial
-
Annex No. RC338 related to paragraph 7.2.6.23. in Counier-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC339 related to paragraphs 7.2.6.37. &
7.2.6.38.4. & 7.2.6.38.6. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC340 related to paragraph 7.2.10.1.4. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC341 related to paragraphs 7.2.11.2.3. &
7.2.12.1.13. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC342 related to paragraphs 7.2.12.3. & 7.2.9.0.
& 7.2.12.1.2. & 7.2.12.1.12. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC343 related to paragraphs 7.2.12.1.2. &
7.2.12.3. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC344 related to paragraphs 7.2.11.1.2. &
7.2.11.4.2. & 7.2.11.4.4. & 7.2.12.2.1. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC345 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.1.4. &
7.2.10.4. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC346 related to paragraph 7.2.10.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC347- Annex No. RC348
- Annex No. RC349 related to paragraphs 7.2.1.16. & 7.2.2.0.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC350 related to paragraph 7.2.19.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC351 related to paragraphs 7.2.9.0. &
7.2.12.1.2. & 7.2.12.3. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC352 related to paragraphs 7.2.3.2. & 7.2.7.0.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC353 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.1.5. &
7.2.30.24. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC354 related to paragraph 7.2.30.20. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC355 related to paragraphs 7.1.39.2. &
7.1.39.5. in Counter-Memorial
-
Annex No. RC356 related to paragraph 7.2.12.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC357 related to paragraphs 7.2.27.2. &
7.2.21.3. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC358 related to paragraphs 7.1.24.1. &
7.2.12.0. & 7.2.12.1.5. & 7.2.12.3. & 7.3.20.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC359 related to paragraphs 7.2.4.1. &
7.2.4.3.2. & 7.2.4.27. in Counter-Memorial- Annex No. RC360 related to paragraphs 7.2.7.2. & 7.3.2. &
7.2.8. & 7.2.7.0. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC361 related to paragraphs 7.2.12.3. &
7.3.20.3.6. in Counter-Memorial
-
Annex No. RC362 related to paragraph 7.2.12.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC363 related to paragraph 7.2.30.12. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC364 related to paragraphs 7.2.30.23. &
7.2.4.16. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC365 related to paragraphs 7.2.4.1. & 7.2.4.2.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC366 related to paragraphs 7.2.4.28. &
7.2.30.13. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC367
- Annex No. RC368 related to paragraph 7.2.12.2.2. in
Counter-Memorial
-
Annex No. RC369 related to paragraph 7.1.38.9. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC370 related to paragraphs 7.2.4.1. & 7.1.25.0.
& 7.3.8.0. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC371 related to paragraph 1.3.3.13. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC372 related to paragraph 1.3.3.13. in Counter-
Memorial
458-
Annex No. RC373 related to paragraph 1.3.3.13. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC374 related to paragraph 7.1.29.1. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC375 related to paragraph 1.3.3.12. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC376 related to paragraph 1.3.3.12. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC377 related to paragraph 1.3.3.12. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC378 related to paragraph 1.3.3.13. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC379 related to paragraph 1.3.3.13. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC380 related to paragraph 1.3.3.13. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC381 related to paragraph 7.1.13.10. in
Counter-Mernorial
Annex No. RC382 related to paragraphs 7.2.12.1.IO. &
7.3.20.1. in Counter-Memorial
Annex No. RC383 related to paragraph 7.2.7.1. in Counter-
Memorial
Annex No. RC384 related to paragraphs 7.2.12.1.IO. &
7.3.20.1. in Counter-Memorial-
Annex No. RC385 related to paragraph 7.2.32.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC386 related to paragraph 1.3.3.13. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC387 related to paragraph 7.1.62.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC388 related to paragraph 7.1.11.5. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC389 related to paragraph 7.2.6.37. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC390 related to paragraphs 7.2.3.2. & 7.1.13.0.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC391 related to paragraph 7.1.11 .l. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC392 related to paragraph 7.1.8.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC393 related to paragraphs 7.2.4.2. & 7.2.4.18.
& 7.2.0.1. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC394 related to paragraph 7.1.36.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC395 related to paragraph 7.1.36.4. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC396 related to paragraph 7.1.32.4. in Counter-
Memorial-
Annex No. RC397 related to paragraph 7.1.34.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC398 related to paragraph 7.1.35.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC399 related to paragraph 7.1.35.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC400 related to paragraph 7.1.36.6. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC401 related to paragraph 7.1.36.8. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC402 related to paragraph 7.1.35.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC403 related to paragraph 7.1.33.4. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC404 related to paragraph 7.1.35.8. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC405 related to paragraph 7.1.36.5. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC406 related to paragraph 7.1.35.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC407 related to paragraph 7.1.34.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC408 related to paragraph 7.1.36.7. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC409 related to paragraph 7.1.35.5. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC410 related to paragraph 7.1.33.4. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC411 related to paragraph 7.1.35.7. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC412 related to paragraph 7.1.36.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC413 related to paragraph 7.1.32.5. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC414 related to paragraph 7.1.35.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC415 related to paragraph 7.1.36.5. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC416 related to paragraph 7.1.35.6. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC417 related to paragraph 7.1.35.5. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC418 related to paragraph 7.1.35.2. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC419 related to paragraph 7.1.32.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC420 related to paragraph 7.1.36.1. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC421 related to paragraphs 7.2.7.0. & 7.2.0.1.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC422 related to paragraph 7.2.27.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC423 related to paragraph 7.2.3.2. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC424 related to paragraph 7.1.56.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC425 related to paragraph 7.1.56.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC426 related to paragraph 7.1.62.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC427 related to paragraph 7.1.56.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC428 related to paragraph 7.1.62.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC429 related to paragraphs 7.2.10.1.3. &
7.2.10.1.5. & 7.2.10.1.19. & 7.2.10.1.20. & 7.2.10.3.6. &
7.2.11.5. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC430 related to paragraph 7.2.10.1.4. in
Counter-Memorial
-
Annex No. RC431 related to paragraph 7.1.26.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC432 related to paragraph 7.1.56.1. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC433 related to paragraphs 7.2.6.38.7. &
7.3.18.0. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC434 related to paragraph 7.1.27.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC435 related to paragraph 7.2.6.10. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC436 related to paragraphs 7.1.54.2. &
7.2.6.38.9. & 7.2.17.1. & 7.2.17.5. & 7.2.17.5.1. &
7.2.17.5.4. & 7.2.17.5.5. & 7.2.17.5.6. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC437 related to paragraphs 7.1.44.2. &
7.2.6.37. 7.2.6.38.4. & 7.2.6.38.6. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC438 related to paragraph 7.2.6.26. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC439 related to paragraph 7.2.6.38.6. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC440 related to paragraphs 7.1.38.9. &
7.1.33.0. & 7.1.43.0. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC441 related to paragraph 7.2.11.5. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC442 related to paragraph 7.1.32.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC443 related to paragraph 7.1.31.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC444 related to paragraph 7.1.31.1. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC445 related to paragraph 7.1.30.3. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC446 related to paragraph 7.1.30.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC447 related to paragraph 7.1.30.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC448 related to paragraph 7.1.30.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC449 related to paragraph 7.1.30.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC450 related to paragraph 7.1.30.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC451 related to paragraph 7.1.27.9. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC452 related to paragraph 7.1.27.6. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC453 related to paragraph 7.1.27.6. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC454 related to paragraph 7.1.27.6. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC455 related to paragraph 7.1.27.6. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC456 related to paragraph 7.1.27.6. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC457 related to paragraph 7.1.27.6. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC458 related to paragraph 7.1.27.6. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC459 related with paragraph 7.1.4.2. &
7.2.28.1. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC460 related with paragraph 7.1.4.3. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC461 related to paragraph 7.1.49.2. & 7.1.49.3.
& 7.2.23.2. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC462 related to paragraph 7.1.13.11. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC463 related to paragraph 7.1.19.4. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC464 related to paragraph in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC465 related to paragraph in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC466 related to paragraphs 7.1.9.11. & 7.2.6.1.
in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC467 related to paragraphs 7.1.16.3. &
7.2.5.8.9. & 7.2.5.8.10. in Counter-Memorial
-
Annex No. RC468 related to paragraph 7.1.4.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC469 related to paragraph 7.1.49.2. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC470 related to paragraphs 7.1.39.4. &
7.1.39.8. & 7.2.0.1. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC471 related to paragraph 7.1.35.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC472 related to paragraph 7.1.19.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC473 related to paragraph 7.1.4.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC474 related to paragraphs 7.1.41.O. &
7.1.41.l. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC475 related to paragraphs 7.1.27.9. &
7.1.35.9. in Counter-Memorial
-
Annex No. RC477 related to paragraph 7.1.45.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC478 related to paragraph 7.1.19.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC479 related to paragraph 7.1.4.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC480 related to paragraph 7.1.19.3. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC481 related to paragraph 7.1.47.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC482 related to paragraph 7.1.47.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC483 related to paragraph in Counter-Memorial
467- Annex No. RC484 related to paragraph 7.2.3.8. & 7.2.3.12.
& 7.2.4.2. & 7.2.4.12. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC485 related to paragraph 7.1.13.11. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC486 related to paragraph 7.2.30.26. in
Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC487 related to paragraph 7.1.4.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC488 related to paragraph 7.1.4.9. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC489 related to paragraph 7.2.16.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC490 related to paragraph 7.1.62.0. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC491 related to paragraph 3.1.3.1. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC492 related to paragraph in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC493 related to paragraph in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC494 related to paragraph in Counter-Memorial
-
Annex No. RC495 related to paragraph in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC496 related to paragraph in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC497 related to paragraph in Counter-Memorial- Annex No. RC498 related to paragraph in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC499 related to paragraph in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC500 related to paragraph in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC501 related to paragraphs 7.1.39.7. &
7.1.39.8. & 7.2.0.1. in Counter-Memorial
- Annex No. RC502 related to paragraphs 7.2.1.0. & 7.2.2.0.
& 7.2.6.38.9. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC503 related to paragraphs 7.2.5.8.9. &
7.2.5.8.10. & 7.2.6.38.9. in Counter-Mernorial
- Annex No. RC504 related to paragraph 7.1.9.16. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC505 related to paragraph 7.2.4.2. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC506 related to paragraph 7.2.4.20. in Counter-
Mernorial
- Annex No. RC507 related to paragraph 7.2.4.26. in Counter-
Mernorial
-
Annex No. RC508 related to paragraph 7.2.4.19. in Counter-
Mernorial
-
Annex No. RC509 related to paragraph 7.2.4.21. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC510 related to paragraph 7.2.4.8. in Counter-
Memorial- Annex No. RC511 related to paragraph 7.2.4.9. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC512 related to paragraph 7.2.4.10. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC513 related to paragraph 7.1.10.1. in Counter-
Memorial
-
Annex No. RC514 related to paragraph 7.2.4.7. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC515 related to paragraph 7.2.4.10. in Counter-
Memorial
- Annex No. RC516 related to paragraph 7.2.30.15. in
Counter-Memorial
2.10. Responsibility of the Applicant for Violation of the
Obligations Established by the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
2.10.1. Pursuant to Article 5 of the Genocide Convention, the
Applicant was obliged to take necessary legal measuresto give
effect to the provisions of the Convention, and in particular to
provide for effective penal sanctions against persons guilty of
genocide or any other crime referred to in Article 3 of the
Convention. It appears that the Applicant has been late in
complying with this obligation. It was bound to do so from the
date it became party to the Convention. According to the ICJ
Judgment of 11 July 1996, that date is defined as the time
when armed conflicts began in Bosnia and Herzegovina.The
Applicant, in its Decree going into effect on 11 April 1992
("Official Journal ofBiH", No. 2/29), took over the Penal Code
of the SFRY which included the crime of genocide as an
470indictable offence. In reality, fighting broke out in Bosnia and
Herzegovina even before that date.
2.10.2. In accordance with Article 1 of the Genocide
Convention, the Applicant was bound to prevent this crime from
being committed. It however failed to do so. The Applicant not
only failed to prevent this crime from being perpetrated, but its
organs-armed forces have actually perpetrated it.
2.10.3. Under Articles 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention, the
Applicant was bound to punish the perpetrators of the crime of
genocide, as well as to punish direct and public incitement to
committing genocide. The Applicant failed to do so. This failure
on the part of the Applicant constitutes a violation of the above-
mentioned obligation.
2.10.4. The Applicant is responsible both for the actions and
omissions of its authorities. Given that the armed forces of
Bosnian Croats have been incorporated into the constitutional
structure of the Applicant, the actions and omissions by these
forces are also attributable to the Applicant, in accordance with
the rules of international law governing the responsibility of
states. The assertions of the Applicant that some military units,
like the 9th Mountain Brigade in Sarajevo, escaped control and
acted contrary to orders, are irrelevant from the point of view of
their attributability to the Applicant.
2.11. Elimination of All Consequences of Violation of the
Obligations Established by the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and Provision of
Fair Compensation
2.11 .l. In paragraphs 10 and 11, on page 958 of the Reply,
the Applicant claims that the Respondent has not proven that it
suffered any economically assessable damage susceptible of
being compensated. The Applicant, therefore, believes that the
Respondent is entitled only to satisfaction, as a form of
471compensation for moral damage. The Respondent, however,
suffered huge material damage caused by the violation of the
Applicant's obligations under the Genocide Convention. The
Respondent did not elaborate on this issue in its Counter-Claim,
because it was premature. PART TWO
3. CLAlM OF THE APPLICANT IS NOT BASED ON
FACTS AND ON LAW
3.1. Evidence and the Way of Proving
3.1.1. In para 26, p.962 of the Reply, the Applicant "fuI/y
maintains its conviction that this is not a criminal trial and that
therefore the facts need not tu be proven Beyond a reasonable
doubt"!
3.1.2. The Respondent considers that the present proceedings
concern the most serious issues of State responsibility that it is
possible to imagine and the standard of proof should, as a
matter of the good administration of justice, be appropriately
rigorous. In relation to the allegations of Yugoslav collusion with
Albania in the Corfu Channel Case (Merits) it is useful to recall
that the Court required 'conclusive evidence', and remarked that:
'A charge of such exceptional gravity against a State would
require a degree of cerfainfy that has not been reached here!
(I.C.J. Reports, 1949, paras 16-17, p. 17).
3.1.3. In the same Judgment the Court stated that: 'The proof
may be drawn from inferences of the fact, provided that they
leave no room for reasonable doubt!(l.C.J. Reports, 1949,
p.18). (emphasis in the original). In general the Court in the
Corfu Channel case adopted a policy of considerable caution in
relation to reliance upon circumstantial evidence. For present
purposes such caution is of particular significance because,
unlike the situation in Albania, after early March 1992, the locus
in quo did not form part of Yugoslavia and was not under the
control of Yugoslavia.3.1.4. In the Reply the Applicant uses as proofs for its claims
mostly Annexes to the Final Report of the Commission of
Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780
(1992), indictments brought in by the Prosecutor before the
lnternational Tribunal for the Prosecution of Perçons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since
1991, decisions of the Tribunal based on Article 61 of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, a Judgment of the Tribunal
in the Tadic case, submissions by individual governments to the
Security Council, reports of individual non-governmental
organizations, as well as newspaper articles and books by
individual publicists.l these materials are of dubious evidential
value.
3.1.5. The Respondent quotes below the text about the sources
of documents and the appraisal of the documentation and
reports contained in Annexes to the Final Report of the
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), presented by Bassiouni's Commission
itself in its Report. The text reads as follows:
"SOURCES OF DOCUMENTS
'5. The documentation centre received documents from
governments, United Nations bodies, GOs, NGOs, and
other sources. Many of these documents were obtained
through the Commission, but over half were obtained
independently by IHRL1 (Independent Human Rights Law
lnstitute). A large number of the documents obtained by
the Commission and IHRLI are now in the public
domain. Some Commission documents vtere not
forwarded to IHRLI for confidentiality reasons.
"7. IHRLI received many documents in languages other
than English, particularly in Serbo-Croatian. IHRL1 relied
on volunteer translators to translate these documents
474into English for entry into the database and for analysis
by IHRLI attorney-analysts.
'Y. Submissions by Governments
'8. The following governments submifted reports and
materials tu the commission pertaining tu the large-scale
victimization that bas occurred in the former Yugoslavia:
Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, Columbia, Croatia,
Denmark, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, France,
Germany, Iran, ltaly, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway,
Russia, Republic of Serbia, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of
America and Venezuela.
"9, A number of reports received from governments
provided data relating tu specific occurrences which, if
supported by evidence, would constitute Lqrave breaches '
of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of
international humanitarian laW. The Governments of
Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, France, Germany,
Norway, Sweden, Switlerland, the United Kingdom and
the United States of America were among the
Governments which provided information that pro ved
useful tu the work of the Commission and ultimately will
prove useful tu the Prosecutor of the ICTFY Several of
the above-mentioned Governments made mult@le
submissions.
"70. Other submissions by governments ranged from
general letters expressing support for initiativesaken by
the United Nations, tu re-publications of media reports,
and tu investigative studies and reports alleging or
documenting Qrave breaches ' of the Geneva
475Conventions and other violations of international
humanitarian law. Some of this documentation consisted
of general background information.
"11. Of the submissions described above, some were
incorporated into formally submitted UN documents and
are therefore in the public domain; other documents
were submitted directly to the Commission only, and are
therefore not in the publicomain.
"B. Submissions by the 'warring parties' not recognized
as States
"12. The following parfies also submitted relevant
information through mult~ple submissions: Hrvatska
Zajednica Herceg-Bosne (Croatian Communify of
Herceg-Bosnia), Republika Srpska Krajina (Republic of
Serbian Krajina), and Republika Srpska (Serbian
Republic).
"C. Information received from United Nations bodies
"13. The following UN bodies were a source of
information to the Commission: United Nations Centre
for Human Rights; Committee on the Rights of the
Chile Special Rapporteur on ExtrajudiciaL Summary or
Arbitrary Executions; Special Rapporteur on Arbitrary
Arrest and Detention; Special Rapporteur on the
Situation ofHuman Rights in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavla; United Nations Commission on Human
Rights; United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organizaion (UNESCO); United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF); United Nations Human Rights
Committee; United Nations Program for Development;
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR' United
Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial
476Discrimination; United Nations Department of Public
Information; and World Health Organization (WHO).
"D. Submissions by lGOs
"74. The following lGOs have submitted reports or
provided information to the Commission, or published
material which the Commission consulted: Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Council
of Europe, European Community Monitoring Miss;on
(ECMM), European Parliament, lnternational Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), lnternational Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), North Atlantic Treaty
O(ganization (NATO), and Organization of the lslamic
Conference (OIC).
"75. Some IGOs, because of their limited mandates and
missions, did not provide al1 of the information to which
they had access. The lnternational Committee of the
Red Cross, for instance, did a great deal of work in the
prison camp, but only provided information which it
published and which is in the public domain.
'% Submissions by NGOs
"76. Tne reports received from a number of non-
governmental and humanitarian organizations proved to
be very useful in enabling the Commission to gather
pertinent, substantial data. The extent of the
investigationsgiving rise tu these reports, and the level
of their analysis, demonstrated an effort and
cornmitment on the part of many NGOs to produce
verifiable facts. The accounts published in the reports of
some NGOs, particularly those received from Human
Rights Watch Helsinki, were detailed and most closely
resembled the type of data the Commission needed to
assess responsibility for grave breaches' of the Geneva
477Conventions and other violations of international
humanitarian law. NGOs from which the Commission or
IHRf I received information are listed in Annex 1.Cbelow.
"7Z NGOs did not, however, provide the Commission
with their supporting documentation, usually for fear of
breaching confidentiality agreements endangering the
lives of their sources of information.
"F Other sources
"18. While governments, the UN bodies, IGOs, and
NGOs provided most of the documentation to the
Commission, other sources yielded some useful
information. Private individuals submitted persona1
accounts of victimization, videotapes, photographs, and
other relevant information. IHRL1 also gathered valuable
information frorn print and electronic media, including
reports based on searches of the LEXIS/NEXlS and
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) databases.
'711,ASSESSMENT OF REPORTS RECEIVED BY THE
IHRL1DOCUMENTA TION CENTRE
"79. The Commission and the Rapporteur experienced
mked results in their efforts to gather data and evidence
of alleged violations of international humanitarian law.
Many of the reports prepared by governments, UN
bodies, IGOs, and NGOs consisted of general
allegations which did not contain evidence. However,
these sources were complemented by information
provided by the warring parties' state war crimes
commissions, other national organizations, media
sources, and privafe individuals.
'720. The reports received establish the large scale
victimization that has taken place in the former
Yugoslavia, but frequently did not contain the leg.
478 'Evidence' necessary to bring criminal charges under
international criminal law or under the domestic criminal
law of states in whose territory those were committed.
Some reports, however, contained specific information
supported by evidence, such as affidavits,witness
statements, photographs, maps, etc.
'221.Since the submitting sources did not always provide
sufficient information to support their allegations, the
incidents reported and entered into the database
frequently lacked necessary information. Difficulties in
data entry and analysis occurred because of the
following common problems of the reports received: 1)
sources upon which reports were based were usually
not verifiable because many reports did not disclose
orignal sources; 2) spellings of narnes and locations
were often inconsistent, due to translation into the
reporting language; 3) locations were difficult to pinpoint,
due to a lack of specific geographical information; 4)
reports of the same incident sometimes varied
significantly in important details; 5) property damage
reports rarely included more than the type of properfy
affected, and often lacked specific locations; 6) numbers
of victirns or other variables were often reported within
large ranges; 7) names of victims, witnesses and
perpetrators were often intentionally omitted from the
reports; 8) reports often failed to idenfi@ the specific
military ur7its involved in alleged incidents; and 9)
important details, which may not have seemed relevant
to the reporter, were often omitted. " (SI19941674lAnnex
I.A pp.4-7)
3.1.6. Bassiouni's Commission was quite explicit: " The reports
received establish the large scale victimkation that has taken
place in the former Yugoslavia, but frequently did not contain
the leg. 'Evidence' necessary to bring criminal charges underinternational criminal law or under the domestic criminal law of
states in whose territory those were committed".
3.1.7. There are serious reasons for doubt about the
correctness of the legal findings and views of the lnternational
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of lnternational Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991, concerning facts and
law, for the following reasons.
3.1.8. Extreme insufficiency of legal regulations on the basis of
which the Tribunal functions leaves ample room for political
abuse. The whole areas have been left legally unregulated and
only parts of certain international conventions containing the
obligation of the contracting States to incriminate certain acts by
theircriminal law have been incorporated into the Statute of the
Tribunal although it is known that these provisions cannot be
directly applied without violating the basic principles of criminal
law. The Statute of the Tribunal contains only 34 articles, most
of which deal with the regulation of organizational matters and
hardly a dozen contain rudimentary penal law provisions .
3.1.9. The entire area of the General Part of criminal law,
without which the application of criminal law is inconceivable,
remains completely unregulated. It was only during the work of
the Preparatory Committee for the Permanent lnternational
Criminal Court that there was a realization about something that
is commonplace in criminal law regarding the importance of the
General Part. Wise rightly insists on the importance of the
principle of legality also in international criminal law, not only
with regard to specific criminal acts but also with regard to the
General Part of criminal law, which would practically cal1 for a
complete penal code. (E.M. Wise, General Rules of Criminal
Law. In: The lnternational Criminal Court: Observations and
Issues before the 1997-98 Preparatory Committee; and
Administrative and Financial Implications, 13 Nouvelles Etudes
Penales, AIDP, 1997, pp.271-273).
4803.1.10. All the three basic principles of criminal law have been
violated: 1. nullum crimen sine lege (total absence of the
General Part and violation of the postulate lex certa in the
Special Part); 2. nullum poena sine lege (a system of
completely undefined punishments has been adopted - and in
the Rules of Procedure the penalty of deprivation of liberty for
life has been added, something which could hardly be
prescribed by a procedural provision); and 3. nullum crimen
sine culpa (no general conditions for criminal responsibility have
been defined). Presumed culpability has been introduced with
regard to command responsibility in Article 7, para 3 of the
Statute, which is unacceptable as a matter of principle, and in
particular in respect of genocide because of genocidal intent as
its constitutive element. Command responsibility is a form of
objective responsibility, and at best it can be a case of
negligence. The intention of Article 86 of the Additional Protocol
I to the Geneva Conventions is that states, in case of failure by
the commanding officer to take measures to prevent war
crimes, should make provision for his criminal or disciplinary
responsibility, i.e. incriminate it as a specific criminal act of
negligence committed by omission. There are no grounds
whatsoever in the Geneva Conventions or in the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide for extending it to
include genocide.
3.1.11. In the area of process law, too, there is a departure
from the usual standards, and many important questions are not
regulated at all. With regard to the policy of prosecution, as an
illustration for extreme flexibility, Rule.1 of the Prosecutor of
the ~ribunal' may be mentioned, a rule by which the Prosecutor
prescribed his own procedure in connection with the institute of
nolle prosequi (an institute that exists in Anglo-saxon law, but
1
Prosecutor's Regulation No.1 of 1994, as amended 1995,
Tribunal Basic Documents, 1995.
481is applied restrictively and under certain conditions). According
to this rule the Prosecutor has the option of non-prosecution
and non-accusation of perpetrators of even the gravest crimes if
they testify against another perpetrator. But, even such a rule is
superfluous because the Prosecutor is not bound by anything in
assessing whether or nct proceedings will be instituted before
the Tribunal and against whom. The Prosecutor has unlimited
powers in this respect. The Prosecutor decides not only against
whom an indictment will be brought in but also against whom it
will not be brought in despite the existence of numerous proofs.
The officiais of the Tribunal Prosecutor's Office occasionally
tend to justify this attitude by the lack of funds or by alleged
insufficient cooperation of certain states, which cannot serve as
true arguments for not bringing in indictments in connection with
the known events and criminal acts. Having in mind that the
Tribunal's Trial Chambers cannot decide on actions and acts for
which no indictment has been brought in, the work of the
Tribunal must of necessity result in selective justice. However,
in the case of an international judicial institution, selective
justice has far more serious consequences than in the case of
national institutions. The result of selective justice is in this case
reflected as harm to peoples and states and not to individuals.
In the concrete case before the International Court of Justice,
the effect of selective justice of the InternationalCriminal
Tribunal's Prosecutor may affect the equality of parties to the
dispute.
3.1.12. As it is known, the Prosecutor may also bring in secret
indictments, which is not allowed in the criminal proceedings of
any civilized country. The explanation offered to the effect that
this is resorted to by the police worldwide is completely
unsustainable. Namely, what is involved here are preliminary
actions which are as a rule kept secret for the sake of more
efficient detection and gathering of evidence; or, possibly,
investigation is involved, but in no case the phase of
accusation. The procedure of bringing charges against a person
is, in modern criminal proceedings, a public procedure and the
482indictment as such is an act which contains, as its compulsory
constitutive, even central element, the accusation of a certain
person of a certain criminal act.
3.1.13. As a negative example of newly introduced institutes,
the so-called principle of rotation provided for by the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence (Rule 27) should be mentioned;
besides being basically unacceptable it is also in direct
contravention of the Statute of the Tribunal. What the Tribunal
has done with the relationship between the Trial Chambers and
the Appellate Chamber through the above-mentioned principle of
rotation constitutes not only the direct violation of its own
Statute (Art. 14, paragraph 3) but also the abandonment of at
least some kind of distinction (even though within the same
court) between the two levels of trial. Apart from grossly
violating one of the basic principles, and directly violating the
Statute, the principle of rotation also creates problems in
practice, because it already happened that the same judge sits
both in the Trial Chamber and the Appellate Chamber. For the
time being. different cases are in question, but even so, it is
hardly acceptable not only as matter of principle but also from
a practical point of view that in one case one judge sits in the
first-instance court and in another, in the appellate court, while
his colleague is in the opposite roles in the same two cases.
Many fundamental questions which have been solved in the
same or similar way are not regulated in criminal process law,
have not been regulated and are controversial. The absence of
legal security is best illustrated not only by the fact that the
Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence are brought by the
Tribunal itself, but also by the fact that it often changes them,
and the amendments become effective immediately, i.e. without
previous publication; furthermore, they may also be applied to
the proceedings which are under way (Rule No. 6 C).
3.1.14. Whatever the real motives for establishing the Tribunal,
the approach to it has been one of improvisation; the basic
principles of criminal, and also international law have been
483violated. The Tribunal cannot dissociate itself from the way in
which it was established: it remains to be a special auxiliary
organ of the Security Council. Considering the legal grounds for
its establishment, the set objectives and rudimentary law being
applied, it can be said that we are dealing here with the
disciplinary commission of the Security Council and not with a
criminal court. The Security Council was not a neutral party in
adopting decisions in connection with the crisis and armed
conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The
establishment of the Tribunal, too, is one of its "disciplinary
measures" against Serbs. (See M.P. Scharf, A Critique of the
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal. In: The International Criminal
Court: Observations and Issues before the 1997-98 Preparatory
Committee, 13 Nouvelles etudes penales, AIDP, 1997, p.265).
3.1.15. The proceeding under Rule 61 of the Tribunal's Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, on which the Applicaiît heavily
relies , in particular in connection with the indictments against
Karadiic and Mladic, is no trial at all. Thus, in the "Rajic" case
(IT-95-12-R61) the Tribunal states: "A Rule 67proceeding is not
a trialin absentia. There is no finding of guilt in this
proceeding': The position in the "Nikolic" case (IT-95-2-R61) is
cited in the same way. In that proceeding not even the defence
counsel of the accused may participate, nor any other
representative of the accused. It has thus been decided in
theMKaradiic and Mladic" case (IT-95-5-R61lIT-95-19-R61).
Finally, the defence counsel of the accused has no right to
lodge any, not even preliminary, objections. Thus, on 24 July
1996, in connection with the above-mentioned indictments
against Karadiic and Mladic, Trial Chamber I brought Decision
Rejecting the Application presented by Messrs. Medvene and
Hanley III Seeking Leave to File Briefs Challenging the Fairness
of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Therefore, the Applicant's position of principle on the nature and
significance of this proceeding expressed in para 40, p.47 of
the Reply is completely wrong.3.1.16. It is clear that the indictments are not a proof per se
that a criminal act has been committed. This is true in particular
of the indictments of the International Criminal Tribunal. In the
Tadic case, out of a total of 34 charges, Trial Chamber I found
only 11 counts justified, among which gravest charges remained
unproven. In the process, the Prosecutor failed to prove the
most serious accusations relating to alleged killings and rapes.
On the quality of evidence used by the Prosecutor speaks also
the Decision of the USA Court in Laredo (Texas) of 17
December 1997 which refused to extradite the accused
Elizaphan Ntakirutimana to the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, inter alia, because the submitted evidence was not
convincing. (In the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas Laredo Division in the Matter of Surrender of
Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Misc. No. L-96-5, Annex No. R6, pp.
r59-r71)
3.1.17. The unbalanced attitude of the Tribunal towards the
three parties to the conflicts in&H is reflected in the followifig
facts: 1) a large disproportion in the number of accused Serbs
in comparison with that of accused Muslims, as well as in the
number of investigations under way; 2) inconsistency in the
qualifications of criminal acts with which persons of Serb
nationality are charged compared to the qualification of acts
committed by Muslims andlor Croats; 3) unequal application of
Article 7(3) - command responsibility with respect to accused
Serbs andlor Muslims.
3.1.18. Disproportion in the number of accused Serbs in
comparison with the number of Muslims against whom
indictments have been brought in is obvious and is in
contradiction with the real situation of committed crimes. The
International Criminal Tribunal has brought in indictments
against 59 persons of Serb nationality so far, while only one
indictment has been brought in against 3 Muslims in the
~elebici case which will be discussed in more detail later on.
485This disproportion points to the unbalanced and biased
approach of ICTY.
3.1.19. Of al1 current investigations conducted by the
Prosecutor's Office of the Tribunal in 1998, only one relates to
a case where victims were persons of Serb nationality, and the
location is in the territory of Croatia. According to unofficial
information the Prosecutor's Office has at its disposal a total of
ten investigating teams, out of which six teams investigate
alleged crimes against Muslims, three investigate crimes against
Croats while only one team is charged with the task of
investigating crimes against Serbs. This is considered
confidential information and, conseqently, it is not possible to
supply any document.
3.1.20. Exhumations of mass graves are a part of the
investigations in course and, according to the published data,
since 1996 work is underway on more than 14 sites none of
which is related to investigation associated with Serb victims.
3.1.21. On a number of occasions during the meetings between
the highest representatives of the ICTY Prosecutor's Office and
the Yugoslav officiais from 1996 to date the Yugoslav side
called attention to the unbalanced approach of the Prosecutor
when investigations of cases where victims are persons of Serb
nationality are in question. The only answer of the Prosecutor
and hislher representatives has been that the ICTY does not
dispose of adequate funds for the purpose.
3.1.22. A comparative analysis of the indictment in the ~elebici
case on the one hand, and the indictments against persons of
Serb nationality on the other, has shown the following
inconsistencies in the ICTY approach when qualification of the
same or similar criminal acts is in question.
3.1.23. When compared with the general allegations in the
indictments brought in against Serbs it can be noticed that the
486general allegations in the "~elebici" indictment, in the section
entitled "Background", contain a very brief description of the
general circumstances and events in the municipality of Konjic.
Moreover, the Prosecutor mentions some irrelevant data in this
part, obviously with the aim of scaling down the crimes against
the Serb population in the region so as to avoid stating that
crimes against Serbs were of a systematic character,
widespread and of mass proportions. In order to enable this
comparison to be made quoted below is the integral text of the
part of the indictment entitled "Background", which is followed
by the statements of the Prosecutor during the trial.
"BACKGROUND
1. The Konjic munic~pality is located in central Bosnia
and Herzegovina. ln the 1991 census, the population of
Konjic municlpalit~ which includes Konjc town and
surrounding villages, including ~elebici, was
approximately 45,000 persons, with the ethnic distribution
being approximately 55 per cent Muslim, 26 per cent
Croatiav and 75 per cent Serbian. Konjic was of
significance because it contained a large factory for
arms and ammunition, as well as several rnilitary
facilitiesand because it was a transportation link
between Mostar and Sarajevo.
2. Beginning in the latter part of May 1992, forces
consisting of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
attacked and tuok control of those villages containing
predominantly Bosnian Serbs within and around the
Konjic municlpality, The attackers forcibly expelled
Bosnian Serb residents from their homes and held them
at collecfion centres. Many of the women and children
were confined in a local school or in other locations.
Most of the men and some women were taken to a
former JNA faciliw in celebic~ hereafter referred to as
~elebi~i camp. There, the detainees were killed,
487 tortured, sexually assaulted, beaten, and otherwise
subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment. The majority
of detainees were confined at i'elebiéi from
approximately October of 7992, though some remained
until December 7992. Detention facilities within the camp
included a tunnel, a hangar, and an administration
building. After their confinement ini'elebiél the majorify
of the detainees were moved to other detention camps,
where they were imprisoned for periods of up to 28
months. "
(Annex 2: ICTY, Indictment, Prosecutor v. Delalic & others
("~elebici camp"), Case No. IT-96-21-1,21 Mar. 1996, pp.1-2)
3.1.23. In the "~elebici" indictment, in contrast to al1indictments
brought in against Serbs, there is no claim on the part of the
Prosecutor that the committed acts or omissions were part of
the widespread, mass or systematic attacks against civilian
population, a fact which is further on reflected in the
qualification of the acts. Namely, for this reason the acts cannot
be qualified as crimes against humanity. However, the
Prosecutor, when necessary, for instance in his concluding
remarks in the "~elebici" case (Annex 3: "Sentencing
submissions of the Prosecutor", Case No. IT-96-21-T, of 1
October 1998, pp.10-13), in proposing to the Chamber to take
as an aggravating circumstance, in meting out the punishment,
precisely the gravity of the accusations, describes, inter alia, the
circumstances indicating that the attacks on civilian population
were widespread ("The Konjic municipality and surrounding
villages"), mass scale and systematic (suffering of the entire
Serb population over a long period of time), although here
again, the same as in the indictment, the mentioned terms are
avoided:
'!..lt is also clear that the treatment of the detainees in
celebici was part of a wider pattern of mistreatment in
Konjc area. Both the Prosecution and the Defence
488witnesses referred to the general conditions for Serbs in
Konjic, and how they were in danger and victimized
physically, emotionally, and materially. (See. for example,
T: 6097, 72271, 77676). Many of the victims lost first
their jobs and then their property. (See, for example, T
7363, 2005, 6799-6200, 7607). Many of the victims, who
had fled to the woods after their villages were attacked,
were brutally beaterl before they were brought to
i'elebi~i (See, for example, T. 7775, 4 730, 4710). Many
of the victims also had family members outside the
camp who were killed or massacred. (See, for example,
7:557, 4397, 7005).
When victims finally were released from ~elebiél they
could not stay in Konjic, and, almost without exception,
the detainees then became refugees. As refugees, they
had no residences, no property, and little chance of
obtaining employment. ln contrast to the families of the
detainees who, according to the Defence evidence, have
been supported by the SPA (T: 15287), these refugees
have received nothing. (See, for example, 7: 6204,
7674-75). A large number of the witnesses who testified
now have moved to parts of North America or
elsewhere, where they do not speak the language, and
where they are far away from their homes and extended
families. Professionally, the refugees, both those in
North America and those in the former Yugoslavia, can
rarely obtain employment comparable to the jobs they
performed in Konjic. (See, for example, T 6377). On the
contrary, many have been transformed from independent
and self-sufficient citizens to refugees dependent on the
largesse of others. Almost none of the victims from
i'elebici has returned to Konjic"
"Another factor that must be considered in evaluating
the gravi& of the Offence is long-standing nature of the
crimes. "
4893.1.24. In view of such an unbalanced approach of the
Prosecutor's Office, when the description of the general situation
is in question, further inconsistencies concerning the qualification
of acts follow. The most obvious example is the comparison
between the description and qualification of rape in the
"celebici" case with the same act in the "Omarska" case.
As can be seen from the attached parts of the
indictments (ICTY, Indictment, Prosecutor v. Delalic & others
("celebici camp"), Case No. IT-96-21-1, 21 Mar. 1996, pp.7-8
and ICTY, Indictment, Prosecutor v. Meakic & others ("Omarska
camp"), Case No. IT-95-4-1, 13 Feb. 1995, pp.8-IO), due to the
policy of double standards of the Tribunal's Prosecution, the
same acts are qualified differently. The description of the acts
allegedly committed by the Serbs is considerably more detailed
in comparison with the really more serious acts of Muslim
perpetrators. For the fivefold rape of the same person M. Radic
is indicted of a total of 10 counts, five of which are qualified as
a crime against humanity, while for multiple rapes of two
persons under extremely humiliating conditions (group raping,
rape in the presence of other prisoners', anal intercourse) H.
Delic is accused under four counts of the indictment, none of
which relates to the crime against humanity. Also, it should be
borne in mind that the responsibility of H. Delic is greater
because he was the deputy commander and commander of the
celebici camp and M. Radic only the head of a guards' shift in
Omarska camp.
3.1.25 The Respondent notes that the alleged rapes of which
Serbs are accused under al1 indictments, like in the mentioned
case ("Omarska"), are also qualifiedas a crime against
humanity. In the only case where Serbs appear as victims
("celebici") the same acts are qualified solely as grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions for the protection of the
victims of war, and a violation of the laws and customs of war.
For this reason rape in the "celebici" indictrnent is classified as
490torture and cruel treatment, although this same act could be
directly characterized as rape (Article 5(g) of the Statute of the
Tribunal) had the act been qualified as a crime against
humanity.
3.1.26. The Respondent will present here a comparative
account of indictments in the "Omarska Camp" case and the
"~elebici Camp" case.
3.1.27. The "Omarska Camp" indictment (Indictment ICTY, IT-
95-4-1 of 13 Feb. 1995) of al1 concrete crimes describes only
one case of murder, fivefold rape of the same person and
participation in willfully causing serious injury to body or health
of 6 detainees. These alleged crimes are qualified in the
following way:
- ~eljko Meakic (commander) is charged with committing
genocide (Article 4) for complicity in killing, torture and creating
unbearable conditions of life. As can be seen in the part of the
indictment quoted below, there is not a single concrete detail
about any of the crimes listed:
'%HARGES:
ACCUSED: ~eljko Meakic
18.1. ~eljko Meakic, intending to destroy, in whole or in
part, the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat people as
national,ethnic or religious groups, was complicit with
other persons in the killing of Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats from the opstina Prijedor at the
Omarska camp, thereby committing genocide, a crime
recognised by Article 4(a) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
18.2. ieljko Meakic, intending to destroy, in whole or in
part, the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat people as
national, ethnic, or religious groups, was complicit with
491 other persons in causing serious bodily or mental harm
to Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat people from the
opstina Prijedor at the Omarska camp, thereby
committing genocide, a crime recognised by Article 4(b)
of the Statute of the Tribunal.
78.3. ~eljko Meakic, intending to destroy, in whole or in
part, the Bosnian MusLim and Bosnian Croat people as
national,ethnic, or religious groups, was complicit with
other persons in the deliberate infliction of conditions of
life on Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat people from
the opstina Prijedor at the Omarska camp calculated to
bring about their physical destruction, in whole or in
part, thereby committing genocide, a crime recognised
by Article4(c) of the Statute of the Tribunal." (lbid p.5)
With regard to other acts under Articles 2,3 and
5 of the Statute of the Tribunal, 2. Meakic is charged on the
grounds of command responsibility. He took part personally only
in two alleged crimes - beating up of detainees on the occasion
of their bringing to the Omarska camp (there are no data about
the alleged victims) and a case of light bodily injury.
M. Radic (head of a guards' shift) is charged on
the grounds of command responsibility, and with fivefold raping
the same person.
M. Kvotka and D. Prcac (deputy camp
commanders), as well as M. Kos and M. Gruban (heads of
guards' shifts) are charged exclusively on the grounds of
command responsibility.
D. Kneievik and Z. iigic are charged with the
murder of one and with beating four persons. D. Kneievic is
also charged with one more beating on the same grounds.
There is no identity of the victims.3.1.28. At the same time the "~elebici camp" indictment relates
to the following crimes according to the responsibility of the
perpetrators:
- Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic and Hazim Delic were in
positions of superior authority to al1camp's guards and to those
other persons who entered the camp and mistreated detainees.
The accused failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent or to punish the perpetrators.
The accused are accordingly responsible for the crimes
allegedly committed by their subordinates:
- murder of at least 14 detainees;
- at least 7 acts of torture, including 2 rapes;
- at least 5 cases of causing great suffering or serious
injury;
- at least 3 cases of inhumane acts, including forcing
persons to commit fellatio on each other;
- unlawful confinement of the detainees in inhumane
conditions.
- Hazim Delic is also individually responsible for his
alleged direct participation in:
- 4 murders;
- 5 acts of torture, including 2 rapes;
- 1 case of causing great suffering or serious injury;
- the use of a device emitting electrical current to inflict
pain.
- Esad Landio is individually responsible for his alleged
direct participation in:
- 5 murders;
- 4 acts of torture;
- 1 case of causing great suffering and serious injury;
- subjecting detainees to inhumane conditions.
The charges read as follows: COUNTS 7 AND 2
Klling of~cepo GOTOVAC
76. Sometime around the latter part of June 7992, Hazim
DELIC, Esad LANDZO and others selected &epo GOTOVAC,
aged between 60 and 70 years. Hazim DELIC, Esad LAND~O
and others then beat &epo GOTOVAC for an extended period
of time and nailed an SDA badge to bis forehead. Scepo
GOTOVAC died soon after from the resulting injuries. By their
acts and omissions, Hazim DELIC and Esad LANDZO are
responsible for:
Count 7. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(a)(wilful
killing) of the Statute of the Tribunat and
Count 2. A Wolation of the Laws or Customs of War punishable
under Article3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and recognised by
Article3(7)(a)(murder) of the Geneva Conventions.
COUNTS 3 AND 4
Klling of ieljko MILOSEVIC
7Z Sometime around the middle of July 7992 and continuing
for several days, ~eQko M LOSEVIC was repeatedly and
severely beaten by guards. Sometime around 20 July 1992,
Hazim DELIC selected ~eQko MILOSEVIC and brought him
outside where Hazim DELIC and others severely beat him. By
the next morning, ~eQko MILOSEV~C had died from bis injuries.
By hi. acts and omissions, Hazim DELIC is responsible for:
Count 3. A Grave Breach punishable under Article Z(a)(wilful
killing) of the Statute of the Tribunal; and
Count 4. A Wolation of the Laws or Customs of War punishable
under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and recognised by
Article 3(7)(a)(murder) of the Geneva Conventions. COUNTS 5 AND 6
Kihg of Simo J~VANOVI~
78, Sometime in July 7992 in front of a detention facilik a
group including Hazim DELIC and Esad LANDZO over an
extended period of time severely beat Simo JOVANO VIC. Esad
LANDZO and another guard then brought Simo JOVANOVIC
back into the detention facility.He was denied medical
treatment and died from bis injuriesalmost immediately
thereafter. By their acts and omissions, Hazim DELIC and Esad
LANDZO are responsible for;
Count 5. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(a)(wilful
killing) of the Statute of the Tribunal; and
Count 6.A Violation of the Laws or Customs of War punishable
under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and recognised by
Article3(7)(a)(murder) of the Geneva Conventions.
COUNTS 7 AND 8
79. Sometime in July 7992, Esad LANDZO beat a number of
detainees from Bradina with a wooden plank. During the
beatings, Esad LANDZO repeatedly struck Bogko
SAMOUKOV~C, aged approximately 60 years. After BoSko
SAMOUKOVIC lost consciousness from the blows, he was
taken out of the detention facility and he died soon after from
bis injuries. By bis acts and omissions, Esad LANDZO is
responsible for:
Count Z A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(a)(wilful
killing) of the Statute of the Tribunat andCount 8. A Vïolation of the Laws or Customs of War punishable
under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and recognised by
Article3(1)(a)(murder) of the Geneva Conventions.
COUNTS 9 AND 10
Killing of person with surname MILJANIC
(Withdrawn 21 April 1997)
20. Sometime around the latter part of July 1992, Esad
LANDZO entered a detention faciliv and selected a detainee
with the surname MILJANIC, aged between 60 and 70 years.
Esad LANDZO then used a baseball bat to beat the detainee to
death. By bis acts and omissions, Esad LANDZO is responsible
for:
Count 9. A Grave Breach punishable under Article Z(a)(wiIful
killing) of the Statute of the Tribunal,' and
Count 10. A Violation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(1)(a)(murder) of the Geneva
Conventions. COUNTS 77AND 12
Kiling of Slavko SUSIC
21. Sometime around the latter part of Juh, or in August 1992,
a group including Hazim DELIC and Esad LANDZO repeatedly
selected Sla vko SUSIC for severe beatings. Hazim DELIC,
Esad LANDZO and others beat Slavko SU^ with objects,
including a bat and a piece of cable. They also tortured him
using objects including pliers, lit fuses, and nails. After being
subjected to this treatment for several days, Slavko SUSIC died
from bis injuries. By their acts and omissions, Hazim DELIC
and Esad LANDZO are responsible for:
Count 77. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(a)(wilful
killing) of the Statute of the Tribunal; and
Count 12. A Vïolaton of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(l)(a)(murder) of the Geneva
Conventions.
COUNTS 13 AND 14
Responsibility of Superlors for Murders
22, With respect to the murders committed in Celebici camp,
including: themurder in June 1992 of Milorad KULJANIN, who
was shot by guards, one of whom said they wished a sacrifice
for theMuslim festival of Bairam; the murder of ~eljko CECEZ,
who was beaten to death in June or July 1992; the murder of
Slobodan BABIC, who was beaten to death in June 7992; the
murder of Petko GLIGOREVIC, who was beaten to death in the
latter part of May 1992; the murder of Gojko MILJANIC, who
was beaten to death in the latter part of May 7992; themurder
497of ~eljko KLIMENTA, who was shot and killed during the latter
part of July 1992; the murder of Miroslav VUJICIC, who was
shot on approximately 27 May 1992; the murder of PERO
MRKAJIC, who was beaten to death in July 1992; and including
al1 the murders described above in paragraphs sixfeen to
twenty-one, Zejnil DELALIC, Zdravko MUCIC and Hazim DELIC
knew or had reason to know that their subordinates were about
to commit those acts or had done so, and failed either tu take
the necessary and reasonable steps to prevent those acts or to
punish the perpetrators. With respect to those counts above
where Hazim DELIC is charged as a direct participan4 he is
also charged here as a superior. By their acts and omissions,
Zejnil DELALIC, Zdravko MUCIC, and Hazim DELIC are
responsible for:
Count 13. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(a)(wilful
killings) of the Statute of the Tribunat and
Count 14. A l4olation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(l)(a)(murders) of the Geneva
Conventions.
COUNTS 15 TO 17
Torture of Momir KULJANIN
23. Sometime beginning around 25 May 1992 and continuing
until the beginning of September 1992, Hazim DELIC, Esad
LANDZO and others repeatedly and severely beat Momir
KULJANIN. The beatings included being kicked tu
unconsciousness, having a cross burned on bis band, being hit
with shovels, being suffocated, and having an unknown
corrosive powder applied to bis body. By their acts and
omissions, Hazim DELIC and Esad LANDZO are responsible
for:Count 75. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(b)
(torture) of the Statute of the Tribunal;
Count 76, A Violation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a)(torture)of the Geneva
Conventions; or alternatively
Count 1Z A Violation of the Laws or Custorns of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a)(cruel treatrnent) of the Geneva
Conventions.
COUNTS 78 TO 20
Torture and Rape of Grozdana CECEZ
24. Sometime beginning around 27 May 1992 and continuing
until the beginning of August 1992, Hazim DELIC and others
subjected Grozdana CECEZ to repeated incidents of forcible
sexual intercourse. On one occasion, she was raped in front of
other persons, and on another occasion she was raped by
three different persons in one n@ht. By his acts and omissions,
Hazim DELIC is responsible for:
Count 78. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 20
(torture) of the Statute of the Tribunat
Count 19. A Vïolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(l)(a)(torture)of the Geneva
Conventions; or alternatively
Count 20, A Wolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(l)(a)(cruel treatment) of the Geneva
Conventions.
499 COUNTS 2 7 TO 23
Torture and Rape of Witness A
25. Sometime beginning around 15 June 7992 and continuing
until the beginning of August 7992, Hazim DELIC subjected a
detainee, here identified as Witness A, to repeated incidents of
forcible sexual intercourse, including both vaginal and anal
intercourse. Hazim DELIC raped ber during ber first
interrogation and during the next six weeks, she was raped
every few days. By his acts and omissions, Hazim DELIC is
responsible for:
Count 27. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 20
(torture) of the Statute of the Tribunal,.
Count 22. A Vïolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a)(torture)of the Geneva
Conventions; or altematively
Count 23. A Vïolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a)(cruel treatment) of the Geneva
Conventions.
COUNTS 24 TU 26
Torture of SpasojeMILJEVIC
26. Sometime beginning around 75 June 7992 and continuing
until August 7992, Hazim DELIC, Esad LANDZO and others
mistreated Spasoje MILJEVIC on multiple occasions by placing
a mask over bis face so he could not breathe, by placing a
heated knife against parts of bis body, by carving a Fleur de
Lis on bis palm, by forcing him to eat grass, and by severely
500beating him using fists, feet, a metal chain, and a wooden
implement. By their acts and omissions, Hazim DELIC and
Esad LANDZO are responsible for:
Count 24. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(b)
(torture) of the Statute of the Tribunal;
Count 25, A Wolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a)(torture) of the Geneva
Conventions; or alternatively
Count 26. A Wation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a)(cruel treatment) of the Geneva
Conventions.
COUNTS 27 TO 29
Torture of MirkoBABIC
27. Sometime around the middle of July 7992, Hazim DELIC,
Esad LANDZO and others mistreated Mirko BABIC on several
occasions. On one occasion, Hazim DELIC, Esad LAND&, and
others placed a mask over the head of Mirko BABIC and then
beat him with blunt objects until he lost consciousness. On
another occasion, Esad LANDZO burned the leg of Mirko
BABJC. By their acts and omissions, Hazim DELIC and Esad
LANDZO are responsible for:
Count 27. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(b)
(torture) of the Statute of the Tribunat
Count 28. A Wolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a)(torture) of the Geneva
Conventions; or alternatively
501Count 29. A Violation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a)(cruel treatment) of the Geneva
Conventions.
COUNTS 30 TO 32
Torture of MirkoDjordjiE
28. Sometime around the beginning of June 7992 and
continuing to the end ofAugust 7992, Esad LANDZO subjected
Mirko DjorQic to numerous incidents of mistreatment, which
included beating him with a baseball bat, forcing him to do
push-ups while being beaten, and placing hot metal pincers on
bis tongue and in bis ear, By bis acts and omissions, Esad
LAN&'O is responsible foc
Count 30. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(b)
(torture) of the Statute of the Tribunal;
Count 31. A Violation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a)(torture) of the Geneva
Conventions; or alternative&
Count 32. A Aolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a)(cruel treatmenf) of the Geneva
Conventions. COUNTS 33 TO 35
Responsibility of Superlors for Acts of Torture
29. With respect to the acts of torture committed in belebici
camp, including placing Milovan KULJANIN in a manhole for
several days without food or water, and including those acts of
torture described in paragraphs twenty-three to twenfy-eight,
Zejnil DELALIC, Zdravko MUCIC, and Hazim DELIC knew or
had reason to know that subordinates were about to commit
those acts or had done so, and failed either to take the
necessary and reasonable steps to prevent those acts or to
punish the perpetrators. With respect to those counts above
where Hazim DELIC is charged as a direct particbant, he is
also charged here as a superior. By their acts and omissions,
Zejnil DELALIC, Zdravko MUCIC, and Hazim DELIC are
responsible for:
Count 33. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(b)
(torture) of the Statute of the Tribunal:
Count 34. A Violation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a)(torfure)of the Geneva
Conventions; or altematively
Count 35. A Wolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a)(cruel treatment) of the Geneva
Conventions.
COUNTS 36 AND 37
Causing Great Suffering or Serious lnjury to Nedeljko
DRAGANIC
30. Sometime beginning around the end of June 7992 and
continuing until August 7992, Esad LANDZO and others
503repeatedly rnistreated Nedeljko DRAGANIC by fying him tu a
roof beam and beating him, by striking him with a baseball bat,
and by pouring gasoline on his trousers, setting them on fire
and burning his legs. By his acts and omissions, Esad LANDZO
is responsible for:
Count 36. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(c) (wilfullly
causing great suffering or serious injury) of the Statute of the
Tribunal; and
Count 32 A Vïolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a)(cruel treatment) of the Geneva
Conventions.
COUNTS 38 AND 39
Responsibility of Superiors for Causing Great Suffering or
Serious Injury
37. With respect to the acts causing great suffering committed
in ~elebi~i camp, including the severe beatings of Mirko
KULJANIN and Dragan KULJANIN, the placing of a burning
fuse cord around the genital areas of Vukagin MRKAJIC and
Dugko BENDO, and including those acts causing great suffering
or serious injury described above in paragraph thirt~ Zejnil
DELALIC, Zdravko MUCIC, and Hazim DELIC knew or had
reason to know that subordinates were about tu commit those
acts or had done su, and failed either to take the necessary
and reasonable steps to prevent those acts or to punish the
perpetrators. With respect to those counts above where Hazim
DELIC is charged as a direct participant, he is also charged
here as a superior. By their acts and omissions, Zdravko
MUCIC and Hazim DELIC are responsible for:Count 38. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(c) (wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury) of the Statute of the
Tribunal, and
Count 39. A Wolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3((7)(a)(cruel treatmentj of the Geneva
Conventions.
COUNTS 40 AND 4 7
Causing Great Suffering or Serious Injury to MiroslavBO^
(Withdrawn 19January 7998)
32. On approximately 7 December 7992, after having been
accused earlier that day by Hazim DELIC of belonging to an
enemy military unit, Miroslav BOZIC was selected and then
severely beaten by a group of guards for approximately 30
rninutes. Hazim DELIC, who was then Commander of ~elebiéi
camp, observed the beating, and at one point after initially
stating that Miroslav BOZIC could return to bis cell, Hazim
DELIC ordered him back against the wall, where the beating by
the guards continued for another ten minutes. ln additkm to bis
responsibility as a direct participant in this incident, Hazim
DELIC knew or had reason to know that persons in positions of
subordinate authority to him were about to comrnit those acts,
or had already committed those acts, and failed either to take
the necessary and reasonable steps to prevent those acts or to
punish the perpetrators after the acts had been committed. He
is also charged as a superior. By bis acts and omissions,
Hazim DELIC is responsible for:
Count 40. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(c) (wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury) of the Statute of the
Tribunal: andCount 41. A Vïolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a)(cruel treatment) of the Geneva
Conventions.
COUNTS 42 AND 43
lnhumane Acts lnvolving the Use of Electrical Devlce
33. Sometime beginning around 30 May 1992 and continuing
until the latter part of September 1992, Hazim DELIC used a
device emitting electricalcurrent to inflct pain on many
detainees including MilenkoKULJANIN and Novica DORDIC, By
his acts and omissions, Hazim DELIC is responsible for:
Count 42. A Grave Breach punishable under Article
Z(b)(inhurnan treatment) of the Statute of the Tribunal,. and
Count 43. A Vïolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(l)(a) (cruel treatmenfj of the Geneva
Conventions.
COUNTS 44 AND 45
Responsibility of Superiors for lnhumane Acts
34. With respect to the incidents ofnhumane acts committed in
~elebiic/ camp, including forcing persons to commit fellatio- with
each other, forcing a father and son to slap each other
repeatedly, and including those acts described above in
paragraph thirfy-three, Zejnil DELALlé, Zdravko MUCIC, and
Hazim DELIC knew or had reason to know that subordinates
were about to commit those acts or had done so, and failed
either to take the necessary and reasonable steps to prevent
those acts or to punish the perpetrators. With respect to those
counts above where Hazim DELIC is charged as a direct
506participant, he is also charged here as a superior. By their acts
and omissions, Zejnil DELALI~ Zdravko MUCIC, and Hazim
DELIC are responsible for:
Count 44. A Grave Breach punishable under Article
Z(b)(hhumane treatment) of the Statute of the Tribunal; and
Count 45. A Wolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(l)(a)(cruel treatment) of the Geneva
Conventions,
COUNTS 46 AND 47
lnhuman Conditions
35. Between May and October 1992, the detainees at i'elebici
camp were subjected tu an atmosphere of terror created by the
killing and abuse of other detainees andtu inhumane living
conditions by being deprived of adequate food, water, medical
care, as well as sleeping and toilet facilities, These conditions
caused the detainees to suffer severe psychological and
physical trauma. Zdravko MUCIC, Hazim DELIC and Esad
LANDZO directly partic~pated in creating these conditions.
ZejnilDELALIC, Zdravko MUCIC, and Hazim DELIC also knew
or had reason tu know that persons in positions of subordinate
authoritytu them were about tu commit those acts resulting in
the inhumane conditions, or had already committed those acts,
and failed eithertu take the necessary and reasonable steps tu
prevent those acts or tu punish the perpetrators after the acts
had been committed. By their acts and omissions, Zejnil
DELALlc Zdravko MU CI^ Hazim DELIC, and Esad LANDZO
are responsible for:
Count 46. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(c)(wilfullly
causing great suffering) of the Statute of the Tribunal; and
507Count 47. A Wolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
recognised by Article 3(7)(a) (cruel treatment) of the Geneva
Conventions.
COUNT48
Unlawful Confinement of Civilians
36. Between May and October 1992, Zejnil DELALIC, Zdravko
MUCIC, and Hazim DELIC partic@ated in the unlawful
confinement of numerous civilans at ~elebici camp. Zejnil
DELALIC, Zdravko MUCIC, and Hazim DELIC also knew or had
reason to know that persons in positions of subordinate
authorityto them were about to commit those acts resulting in
the unlawful confinement of civilans, or had already committed
those acts, and failed either to take the necessary and
reasonable steps to prevent those acts or to punish the
perpetrators after the acts had been committed By their acts
and omissions, Zejnil DELALIC, Zdravko MUCIC, and Hazim
DELIC are responsible for:
Count 48. A Grave Breach punishable under Article
2/gl(unlawful confinement of civilians) of the Statute of the
Tribunal.
COUNT 49
Plunder of Private Property
37. Between May and September 1992, Zdravko MUCIC and
Hazim DELIC participated in the plunder of money, watches
and other valuable property belonging to persons detained at
~elebici camp. Zdravko MUCIC and Hazim DELIC also knew
or had reason to know that persons in positions of subordinate
authorityto them were about to commit those acts resultiflg in
the plunder of private property, or had already committed those
508acts, and failed either to take the necessary and reasonable
steps to prevent those acts or to punish the perpetrators after
the acts had been committed. By their acts and omissions,
Zdravko MUCIC, and Hazim DELIC are responsible for:
Count 49. A Wolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3(e)(plunder) of the Statute of the
Tribunal.
19 March 1996
Richard J. Goldstone Prosecutor
(The Indictment, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Zejnil
Delalalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic, Esad Landio, Case No
IT-96-21)
The difference in criminal qualifications of acts in ~elebici case
and in Omarska case is obvious.
3.1.29. With regard to the credibility of the allegations contained
in the indictments of the Tribunal's Prosecutor, suffice it to note
that some of them were amended in the meantime, after their
review and confirmation by the judges, and even during the
trial. Namely, 11 persons from the "Omarska camp" indictment
were acquitted with the explanation of the Prosecutor that:
"This decision was taken in an attempt to balance the available
resources within the Tribunal and in recognition of the need tu
prosecute cases fairly and expeditiously " (1CTY Press Release
CClPIUl314-E, 8 May 1998). In this way 3 charges for rape, 2
charges for murder and 1 for beating were dropped, al1of them
also qualified as a crime against humanity. However, the
Prosecutor did not make public the indictment amended in this
way, therefore reference by the Applicant to this indictment is
completely groundless.
3.1.30. A similar procedure was applied in the case of D. Tadic,
where the Prosecutor, during the trial, dropped the charge of
alleged rape. However, in the sentence itself the Trial Chamber
509states that the Prosecutor dropped three counts from the
indictment during the trial, without specifically mentioning which
ones, and precisely these three counts relate to the charge of
alleged rape. In the sentence, paragraph 5 of the indictment,
which contains these three counts of the indictment in
connection with one part of the rape, is not mentioned at all;
however, in annexes to the sentence (Annex 1) the text of the
indictment from which the above-mentioned paragraph 5 has
not been removed is enclosed.
3.1.31. In the above-mentioned Press Release the Tribunal's
Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, claims, inter alia, that the 11
perçons in the "Omarska camp" case have not been acquitted
due to lack of evidence. However, three of them - Gruban,
Mirko Babic and Predrag Kostic are charged only with the
alleged rape of one "Fu, qualified also as a crime against
humanity. However, Tadic has been acquitted of the charges of
alleged rape of the person "F" for lack of evidence. In view of
the Prosecutor's withdrawal of al1 these charges for rape, it
follows from it that the Prosecution has not a single proof of
rapes in the Prijedor municipality (except in the case of Radic -
rape of the lorry-driver Suada Ramic, who unconvincingly
testified in theadie case, but was not cross-examined; and the
Keraterm case), let alone proof of mass and systematic rapes.
However, due to the skillful manoeuvring of the Prosecution, as
described above, and to a superficial review of the indictments
referred to by the Applicant, it comes out that numerous rapes
are in question.
3.1.32. An equally unbalanced approach of ICTY can be noticed
also in the proceedings conducted so far. In the Tadic case the
Prosecution, with the approval of the Trial Chamber, considered
in great detail the so-called general circumstances. Summoned
by the Prosecution, 16 so-called policy experts testified in
connection with this question for a whole month (from 7 May to
7 June 1996). Among those policy witnesses there were a few
party officials of the Party of Democratic Action, as well as
51OJerko Doko, Minister of Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the period from 1 February to 13 August 1992,
whose place would be among the accused rather than among
the witnesses, if the provisions of the Statute of ICTY on
command responsibility were consistently applied. Their
testimonies were not confined only to the general circumstances
in the Prijedor municipality at the specific time of relevance to
the indictment, but dated back to the historical descriptions from
the 7th century on and had to do by and large with the
establishment of the "causes and creation" of the Yugoslav
crisis, as well as with the events in Slovenia, Croatia and other
places in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the civil war. In the
process, a series of untrue historical assertions were put
forward, or events were presented one-sidedly - taken out of
general context. The defence counsel of Tadic, Dutch advocate
M. Wladimiroff, engaged very little or not at al1 in refuting the
assertions of the Prosecution and its witnesses testifying to
these issues because he based his defence on proving Tadic's
alibi,i.e. that Tadic had not stayed at the time in places where
the alleged crimes he is charged with under the indictment
were committed. Besides, the Trial Chamber declined the
request of Dr Milan Bulajic, Yugoslav historian and expert in
international law, to testify in the Tadic case on general
circumstances in the capacity as amicus curiae.
3.1.33. At the same time the Prosecutor, in the "~elebici camp"
case, prevents his witnesses, victims of crimes, to testify to the
mass scale and systematic character of attacks on Serb
civilians in the Konjic municipality, where theelebici camp was
only one of 29 camps under Muslim or Croat control (Annexes
to the Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), Volume IV
- Annex VIII, p.20, para 114), the existence of which resulted,
inter alia, in the number of Serbs in the Konjic municipality
being reduced from prewar 7,700 to about 200 at present. Also,
in this proceeding the Prosecutor, in contrast to the Tadic case,
summoned only three policy experts and, paradoxically, with a
511view to proving the existence of "the state of international
armed conflict and partial occupation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina" and, in particular, the responsibility of Serbs for
such a situation. The policy experts invited by the Prosecutor
claim, inter alia, that Bosnian Serbs (in this case victims whom
the Prosecutor is expected to protect) acted as agents of
another State. Such a conduct of the Prosecutor resulted in the
refusal of many Serb victims from the ~elebici camp to appear
and testify before the Tribunal at all. It is clear that the Defence
of the accused did not even try to refute the views of these
experts because they were in favour of the accused.
3.1.34. Another inconsistency of the ICTY, also to the detriment
of Serb victims, has to do with the application of Article 7(3) of
the Statute of the ICTY and of unequal criteria used in
establishing command responsibility of the perpetrators of
alleged criminal acts of Serb nationality vis-a-vis the
responsibility of Muslim military officers and political leaders.
3.1.35. At this point quoted will be the interpretations of Article
7(3) of the Statute of the ICTY -command responsibility, as set
out by the Prosezution in its submission "The Prosecutor's
Response to the Pre-trial Briefs of the Accused", without
entering on this occasion into the consideration of its validity:
"Firstly, the link between the accused and the
perpetrator need not be direct. lt can, as stated in the
Prosecutor's pre-trial brief; be indirect, in that the
subordinates need not be directly subordinated to the
superior for the superior to have a duty to act under
Article 70.
Second&, the level of control required does not
have to arnount to total control over al1 functions in
relation to the accused. Cornrnand and control can be
exercised in a variety of ways, As stated in the
Prosecutor's pre-trial brief; sorne of the types of
512 command that could exist include: operational command,
tactical command, occupying a position of influence, and
the role of an adviser. Accordingly, a superior could still
be responsible for the acts of subordinates in
circumstances of partial control, if the superior bas not
employed al1 the means available to prevent or punish
these acts. "("The Prosecutor's Response to the Pre-trial
Briefs of the Accused ~elebici case, No. /T-96-27-7; 78
April 7997, p.2)
3.1.36. In spite of these criteria, the Prosecutor summoned in
the same "~elebici" case as his witnesses also generals of the
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina -the late General Arif PaSalic,
former Chief of Staff of the Army of the Federation of B&H. At
the time relevant to the indictment he was the commander of
the Fourth Corps of the Army of B&H and was directly and
indirectly the superior to the accused persons and obviously at
least "knew or had the possibility of knowing that his
subordinates were connected with the perpetration of the crime
or that they committed if,and the superior (the Prosecutor's
witness) failed to take necessary and reasonable meâsures tu
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators" (Article 7(3) of
the Statute of the Tribunal). Also, in the same proceeding the
Defence of the accused summoned as witnesses the persons
who at the time to which the indictment relates occupied the
most senior military and civilian positions in the Konjic
municipality - for instance, the testimony of Dr Rusmir
Hadiihuseinovié, president of the Municipal Assembly of Konjic,
of the War Presidency of Konjic and president of the SDA of
the Konjic municipality.
As the Respondent noted, among policy witnesses in
the Tadic case, as a witness of the Prosecutor appeared also
Jerko Doko, Minister of Defence of the Republic of 3&H in the
period from 1 February to 13 August 1992, whose place, as
well, would be among the accused and not among thewitnesses if the provisions of Article 7(3) and the above-
mentioned criteria of the ICTY were consistently applied.
The Respondent notes that persons of Serb nationality
in similar or, which is more frequent, in much lower positions, in
the municipalities which are the subject matter of other
indictments of the Tribunal, were accused al1 together to the
last man, on the grounds of the so-called command
responsibility (Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal) of
alleged crimes against humanity - for example, Blagoje Simic,
member of the civilian branch of the "Crisis Centre" of the
Bosanski ~amac municipality ("Bosanski Samac case"), and
even of genocide - Milan Kovatevic, who was a member of the
civilian branch of the "Crisis Centre" of the Prijedor municipality
("KovaCevic and Drljata" case).
3.1.37 The extent of legal effects of reports of non-
governmental organizations, referred to by the Applicant, is
defined by the Helsinki Watch document (Prosecute Now!
Volume 5, Issue 12, 1 August 1993, Annex 7, Part 2 of the
Annexes to the Memorial) in which it is said that "these cases
summaries alone may not suffice for criminal indictment ... ".
3.1.38. Information contained in the reports submitted by
individual governments originates in most cases from unknown
sources. These governments probably obtained such information
mostly from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina or in
some other indirect unreliable way. Some governments made a
selection of the information at their disposal and presented it in
line with their political interests which more oftenthan not were
not in agreement with the criteria of objectivity and impartiality.
3.1.39. Newspaper articles and books submitted by the
Applicant were not written in the majority of cases by witnesses
to the events described. These newspaper articles and books
were written on the basis of information and materials gathered
by the authors from various sources. With full respect for the
514journalist profession, the assessments and views of journalists
concerning relevant legal questions associated with the subject-
matter of this dispute surely cannot be of any particular
significance.
3.1.40. Some foreign journalists visited the Republika Srpska.
Colonel Milovan Milutinovic was the Head of Information Service
of the First Krajina Corps and of the Main Headquarters of the
Republika Srpska Army during the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Col. Milutinovic describes Roy Gutman's reporting
on the events in the Republika Srpska in the following way:
"The first news about the camps for
Serbs run by Croat and Muslim armed formations was
broadcast by the Information Service of the First Krajina
Corps on 23 June 7992 after the liberation of villages
around Derventa. Udeo materials were taped showing
camps in which Serbs were imprisoned and tortured,
mah& men, but some cases of imprkoned and
victimized women and children were also registered.
Camp prisoners described the cruel treatment to which
they were subjected by enemy soldiers, in particular by
themembers of HOS (Croatian Armed Forces). A doctor
and a group of medical staff held in a camp near
Derventa were left for days without food and water and
the Croat soldiers made them graze grass in places
where the former relieved themselves. Their statements
and testimonies offered to Eurovision through RTS and
TV Banja Luka were not accepted. Much more detailed
information about camps for Serbs and about rapes of
Serb women was broadcast by the Press Centre after
the liberation of Odiak on14 Ju/y 7992.
GUTMAN IN BANJA LUKA - FIRST TIME; Fightings
with numerous armed Muslim groups continued in Max
June and Ju/y 7992 throughout Krajina. At the end of
July 7992, several foreign journalists arrived in the Banja
515Luka area. Among them was the US 'News Day'
journalist Roy Gutman. 1 remember him introducing
himself as a Jew, a man who was the correspondent
from Belgrade for a number of years and who cherishes
special sympathies for Serbs.
1 received him polite& in the Press Centre in
Banja Luka and explained to him the military-political
situation in considerable detai7. 1 showed him the
documents about the engagement of the Croatian Army
in the Posavina (the Sava River Valley). He listened
carefully and made notes. From time to time he asked
some very precise questions. 1 also informed him of the
orders of the Muslim leadership from Sarajevo for the
attack on Serbs and the taking over of control in
munic~palities. 1 admit now that 1 spoke to Gutman in
great detail, hoping that being a Jew he will understand,
about the camps for Serbs in the Posavina. 1 offered
him statements by raped Serb women from Brod He
was surprised to learn about such data and expressed
understanding for the anger of the Serb people.
Gutman was also interested to know the attitude
of the Serb authorities and the Serb Army towards the
non-Serb population that would be imprisoned and
subject to invest~gation. He expressed interest in
Manjaca, Omarska and Trnopolje asking for more
details, so 1 explained that al1 those who were found
with arms were detained there. The Manjata prison is
under the Army control while Omarska and Trnopolje
are under the control of the civilian authorities. 1 also
said that the Muslims were put up there for their own
protectionagainst unnecessary risks in the fightings,
1 spoke with my superiors and made some
observations about Gutman. 1 said that in asking
questions Gutman resembles more an investigator than
516a journalist, lt was jointly decided that 1 should make
arrangements for bis visit to Manjata and tell him to
request permission from the civilian authorities for visits
to Trnopolje, Prijedor and Omarska.
The next day Gutman came up with 'a lot of
new information' obtained from international organ~zations
about the situation on the ground According to his
reaction during the conversation 1 concluded that he
understands Serbian well althougb he spoke through an
interpreter al1the time.
Befor leaving for Manja2a 1 took with me a
cameraman and a photo reporter. Gutman was among
the firstforeign journalists to visit that prison for PoWs
ln which there were about 3,000 members of the Muslim
armed formations and other men found with arms in the
area of military operations. We made a tour of al1
faclïifies. Gutman spoke with about a dozen PoWs, a
Muslim doctor, with the staff and with cooks. According
to the words recorded on video tape of the Press
Centre in Banja Luka he was satisfléd with the way the
Serb Army treated captured Muslims and also pointed
out that the prison staff fully complies with the Geneva
Conventions.
While expecting the approval to visit Prijedor,
Trnopolje and Omarska, Roy Gutman spoke with local
people and was also received by the mayor, Predrag
Radié.
The approval did not arrive. He established
contact with representatives of the SDA party which
pursued its activities legitimately at the time. They spoke
to him about the 'abhorrent acts of Serbs' and about
'camps in which Muslims are subjected to unseen
tortures: With their help Gutman illegally visited the
517village of Kozarac which was completely destroyed, but
he could not speak with anyone there because the
people found refuge in Trnopolje. He soon finished his
visit to Banja Luka. Before leaving he expressed his
thanks for the hospitality and help.
lmmediately after hi. departure, on 2 and 5
August 1992 the 'News Day' newspaper (and later on
'Der Spiegel' and other newspapers) published
insinuations about concentration camps forMuslims run
by Serbs.
ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRUTH IN
BOSNIA: After these texts there was an avalanche of
accusations in the world media against Serbs. Roy
Gutman was awarded the Pulifier Prize for these
insinuations about the Serb people. Disinformation about
the concentration camps organ~zed by Serbs had a
strong impact on al1 anti-fascist forces in the world and
provoked a turnabout of Jewish lobbies in the United
States and in Western Europe.
Such abuse in the anti-Serb propaganda has
been admitted to also by the director of the American
Public Relations Agency 'Rudder & Finn: James Hart in
an interview given to Jacques Merlino, author of the
book 'Not Al1 Yugoslav Truths Are To Be Told: Merlino
spent a few days in Banja Luka and compiled a story
that was broadcast on French TV. ln the book 'Not Al1
Yugoslav Truths Are To Be Told' he says: 'Harf who
considers himself a professional explains: the terms
ethnie cleansing and concentration camps appeared and
the emotional charge was so strong that nobody could
resist it.' However, when asked: Did they check the
information about the existence of Serb-run concentration
camps, Mr. Harf curtly replied that 'it is not their job to
check information but to speed up the spread of the
518information which is in their favour! Asked whether he
feels responsible for what he is doing, Mr. Harf
answered ?bat he is not paid to moralile' and added ?f
you wish to prove that Serbs are poor victims, go
ahead. '
PENNY MARSHAL ON GUTMAN'S TRACK The huge
media campaign after these fabrications without
precedent brought about horrendous pressure on Serbs
to dissolve the 'concentration camps! The attempts to
convince the world that such camps simply do not exist
fell on deaf ears, Radovan Karadiic' invited from
London, where he was at the fime, al1 foreign agencies
to go to the spot and see for themselves that there are
no camps.
Already the following day more than tbirty foreign
journalists from the leading world agencies arrived in
Banja Luka together with the Minister for lnformation,
VeliborOstojic. 1 was called by Ostojic and told to come
to the "Bosna" hotel the same evening. He asked me to
make arrangements for foreign journalists to visif
Pryedor, Trnopolje, Omarska and ManjaCa. 1 said that 1
could take upon myself the obligation to organ~zea visit
to ManjaCa which is under military control and that the
staff of the Ministry for lnformation should make
arrangements for the rest. He did not accept the
explanation saying that it was President KaradX's order
and that 1 must proceed accordingly. At the same time
he promised to request from the authorities in Priedor
to receive the journalisfs and to enable them to visit the
indicated places.
1 informed my superiors accordingly pointing out
that it would be a great mistake if such a large number
of journalists returned without getting their jobone. The
next morning 1 held a briefing for foreign journalists and
519proposed a visit to Manjata. The majority refused the
proposal pointing out that Manjaea is a prison for PoWs
and that, according to available information, fheir
treatment by the Army is extremely correct and in the
spirit of the 'Geneva Convention and international laws
of war:
1 tried to get in touch with Velibor Ostojic, who
took upon himself to get the authorities in Prijedor to
make arrangements for the visit, but he could not be
reached. The foreign journalists were becoming nervous.
Many already claimed that Karad* lied and that the
camps were being hidden from the public.
Then 1 spoke on the phone with those
responsible in Pwedor in order to arrange the visit. Al1
of [hem categorically refused because they were
indignant with the international public presenting Serbs
as barbarians. Some representatives of the civilian
authorities even threatened. 1 did not wish to take any
risks, so/ tried to contact other influential personalities.
After a few hours of persuasion, the chief of
police in Prijedor, Simo Drljata, informed me that we
should corne to the Municipal Assernbly in Prijedor. On
a hot day in August, around noon, a coach packed with
foreign journalists with bullet-proof jackets on thern,
cameras and fim cameras arrived in Prijedor. A rather
long press conference was held in the Assernbly
building; aafferthe conference the journalists escorted by
the police set off for Omarska.
A few kilometres away from Omarska, in a
wooded part of the road, there was a sudden arrned
skirmish with an armed Muslim group. The skirmish took
some time and, after consultation with the journalists, we
returned to Banja Luka.
520 The following day the journalists paid a visit to
Trnopolje, organized by the Secretariat of the lnterior
from Priedoor, and spoke wifh the escaped Muslim
population which found shelter at the elementary school
and the local cultural centre.
The British TV journalist from ITN, Penny
Marshal, said:"'llm frightened of these people and we
are going take shots of them behind this fence: she
entered the fenced-off space formerly a building material
depot and took snap shots of the Muslims through the
barbed-wire fence around the depot. There was no
barbed-wire fence around the reception centre.
Aware of the possible manl;oulations 1 requested
that the ITN immediately stop taking shots and come
out of the building material depot. They got out quickly
and set off for the centre of the camp. 1 personally
warned Penny Marshal of the need to behave
responsibly and not to abuse our hospitality. She said
that nothing was fimed and that any abuse is out of the
question. There exists videotaped material of the TV
crew from the Press Centre about this incident.
The journalists freely circulated around the
reception centre, spoke with people there and with Red
Cross representatives. The Muslims declared that they
had fled from their homes looking for shelter because
their villages were being shelled. They said that they
freely go to their homes and bring food and vegetables
and that there were no problems with the Serb
authoritiessecuring the camp. They requested greater
engagement of the International Red Cross in providing
relief assistancebecause food was in short supply. Yet, the following day the leading world TV
stations broadcast ITN shots made in the building
material depot. The shots Lonfirmed to the objective
world public' that Serbs were running 'concentration
camps !
What can one Say after al1 that happened? At
the beginning of military operations the Serb side
al10wed visits to Lontroversial places : but the world
media houses failed to visit throughout the four wartime
years or to take shots of a single camp for Serbs run
by the Muslim or Croat side. Why the winner of the
Pulitzer Award, Roy Gutman, never took any interest in
it?
Al1 sorts of disinformation were employed during
the war. For example, the Serb side was accused by
international circles for a long time of running two
camps in Banja Luka for Croats and Muslims. ln fact,
there were no such camps. The truth is that there are
two army barracks in Banja Luka known under the
name of "Small camp" and "New camp" which were
called so by foreign representatives, including the
International Red Cross. The accusations concerning the
camps in Banja Luka ceased only after a group of
UNPROFOR Generals accompanied by General Mladlc
and by foreign journalists made a tour of the barracks
known under these names for dozens of years, ie. the
Small Camp and the New Camp.
GUTMAN IN BANJA LUKA, SECOND TIME: After this
campaign we made an analysis and established that the
first texts and information about 'concentration camps'
were, after al( published by Roy Gutman. 1 requested
that the data be checked. We learned that Roy Gutman
was indeed a correspondent from Belgrade and thatthere is reason tu believe that he is a US Navy
intelligence officer.
And - in mid-September 7992, accompanied by
representatives of international organizations, Roy
Gutman arrived in Banja Luka again.
1 received him again. During the conversation 1
pointed out that his writings were contrary tu what he
had said on departure from Banja Luka. He was
surprised to hear that, in view of very poor
communications, we managed tu obtain his texts. He
tried tu find excuses saying that it was not exactly like
this and that the editors of 'News Day' altered his texts.
lt was clear tu me that he had corne to define new
broadlines of propaganda activiw.
1 objected seriously tu hi. smearing and
satanizing a whole people who, kke the Jewish people,
suffered su much throughout history. 1stressed the word
Vewish : if (you are of Jewish background at al/' 1 said
He made excuses once again saying that it was a
misunderstanding. 'You are very skillful in gathering
inforrnation and in exploitingit; it is a pity you are not a
journalist: 1 said. He claimed that he 7s only a journalist
and nothing else! 1pointed out tu him that 1 know that
he is a US naval officer. He denied, of course. 1 thought
about asking him tu leave the country.
Once again 1 explained the military-political
situation and the situation on the ground in great detail.
He seemed to be interested, like the first time. He
insisted on a visit tu Priedo6 Omarska and Trnopolje,
because he had inforrnation that there are problems
there with regard tu the civilian population. He pointed
out that the RS Army treats the prisoners in Manjata
very correct&, in the spirit of the Geneva Convention
523and that he did not wish to go there again. ln
agreement with the civilian authorities 1 helped him tu
visit Prijedor, Omarska and Trnopolje. He had a series
of talks with people and with representatives of the
authorities and acquainted himself with the situation in
detail.
Precisely during his visit to Banja Luka, Muslims
brutally murdered 78 men, women and children in the
village of Serdari, near Kotor Varog, on 77 September
7992 (para. Z 7.7Z6.of the Counter-Mernorial -
Respondent3 remark). Many of them were burned in
their homes, which was an unseen crime in our country
until then. 1 sent there Gutman, as well as Francis
Harris of the Dai4 Telegraph (Britain) and photo
reporters Boris Gayleri from the 'Gaff' (Germany) and
Steve Pagani from Reuters (Britain). Upon return from
Serdari they did not conceal their consternation. Yet, as
/ could have expected, there were no reports or pictures
in their newspapers about Serb sufferings. So, that was
Gutman3 way of doing things.
However, it was at that moment that a flurry of
reports about rapes of Muslim women began. ln mid-
October 7992 the German magazine 'Stern' carried a
large article about the alleged rape of nearly 60,000
MuslNn women. The figure increased daily,
Disinformation filed leading world media.
On& then groups of journalists began to arrive in
Krajina in order to shed more light on the alleged mass
rapes. According to 'Stern: in a text authored by
Alexandra Stiegelmayer, correspondent from Zagreb, the
former UNPROFOR commander, Canadian General L.
Mackenzie, abused minor Muslim girls N7a house in the
area of Doboj. The German journalist from Zoller Film
Production, Martin Letmayer, came to Banja Luka in the
524wake of this report. We gave him an escort and he left
for Doboj. He found the indicated address. No, the story
was not correct. This bas nothing tu do with reality; so
much SU, that it was even established that General
Mackenzie had never been in Doboj.
The journalist checked the story at other
addresses as well. He found Muslims in those houses
who confirmed that stories published in 'Stern' were
fabrications. Letmayer recorded it with TV camera. He
offered bis findings tu the German TV and some world
TV houses. But none of them accepted. A long time
afterwards the Swiss newspaper 'Die Weltwoche'
published his testimony. Much later, when the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina was finished, bis texts and
recordings were presented tu the German public.
According tu our analyses, it was precisely Roy
Gutman once again who takes great responsibility for
the spreading of disinformation about alleged rapes of
Muslim women. During the second visit tu Banja Luka
he devoted bis journalistic research to the rapes of
Muslim women in the 'camps: pointing out in particular
those that were allegedly committed by Serb policemen
in Omarska.
Later on German General Manfred Opel, rnember
of the Social-Democratic Party, spoke openly about the
manipulation of the news about rapes. He said that only
three women in Germany claimed that they had been
raped in Bosnia, while the figure reached 750,000.
However, as Ope1says, subsequently it was established
that al1 the three Muslim women, who gave statements
tu Western media, had German passports obtained long
before. Nonetheless, this did not prevent German
politician Stephan Schwarz, member of the Christian-
Democratic Union, from claiming on German TV that
Serbs performed medical (biologicaJ experiments on
Muslim women like the Nazis had done before them. He
claimed ?ha( for example, a dog's embryo is implanted
in women! This news caused disquiet of the German
and world public and further intensified anti-Serb
feelings.
GUTMAN IN BANJA LUKA, THIRD AND LAST TIME: A
new campaign in connection with ethnic cleansing began
in the world media when Roy Gutman arrived in Banja
Luka for the third time towards the end of the year. No,
he did not feel ashamed. He is just doing his job. We
talked again. He attempted to justify himself; that he
wrote a text about Serdari, about the crime committed
by Muslims, but the text was not endorsed by the
editors of bis newspaper. 1 just laughed it off: Once
again 1 thought about whether or not he should be
expelled. 1 felt thatuch an act would only make things
worse.
Once again we talked for hours. 1 asked hi.
how much money he gets for propaganda effects that
he fabricates about Serbs. This time it was he who
grinned.
He insisted on hearing my view on 'ethnic
cleansing! 1 said that this does not exist as a
programme in the territory of the Republika Srpska, but
that migration of the population in the whole area of
B&H is evident. 1 also drew bis attention to the large
number of Serb refugees from the Travnik, Sarajevo,
Zenica and Bihac regions. Suddenly he requested information about the
crime committed by the policemen from Prijedor on the
KoriCanske rocks on the occasion of the transport of the
prisoners to Travnik. AAllegedly785 Muslims were killed.
/ knew nothing about it. He explained to me that there
were 10 policemen in the group and that the Army is
quite clean because it did not participate. He told me
that he had information that after the disclosure of the
crime the Muslim victims were burned in the canyon of
Ugra. 'You have plenty of information like a genuine
intelligence officer: / said. And he continues: 'The crime
did take place, three Muslims survived!
After a long and strenuous talk he insisted on a
visit to the Koricanske stene locality. 'lt is not possible
because it is the area of military operations. Fierce
fghtings have been going on for days there and there is
a large number of casualties on both sides. ' He was
surprised. 'Since when are the operations under wzy?'
he asked. For a couple of days now, but the journalists
are not allowed into the zone of military operations''Not
even escorted by you?: he asked me so naively,'You
are a military man, so you know that instructions and
orders must be obeyed: 1 said. Gutman smiled and
stopped insisting.
He asked me to arrange contacts for him with
the chiefs of public security centres in Banja Luka and
Prijedor, Le. Stojan ,&pljanin and Simo Drljata. 1
suggested that he himself approach the Public Security
Centre in Banja Luka. He accepte& not a word fell from
bis /@S.ln the meantime, he visited Banja Luka Catholic
bishop Komarica, representatives of the International
Red Cross and UNHCR.
The next day 1 was invited to the "Bosna" hotel
by Stojan ~upljanin and Simo Drljata, who asked me
527 what kind of journalist is in question. 1 told them. They
decided to take him to lunch, have a drink and talk
things over. Gutman repeated to them his old story
about Serb bravery, about the similar fate of the Serb
and Jewish peoples. They had a long talk about a
variety of questions in a pleasant atmosphere.
And - a report on ethnic cleansing appeared, in
which ~upljanin and Drljata were occasionally quoted.
On the whole, it had little to do with the talk they had
together, The text boded down to an accusation of
Serbs of engagement in ethnic cleansing.
A little later the 'Dnevnik' daiïy published in Novi
Sad and 'RevJa 92' magazine carried texts pointing out
the dubious activity of US naval officer Roy Gutman,
who is casually engaged in journalism. ln 1993 the
Federal Ministry for Information banned Gutman from
visitiirlg Yugoslavia. Hisadvocate took legal action
against some Yugoslav newspapers because of
publishing texts about his espionage activities but this
court dispute never came to an end. Thus Serbs parted
ways with their 'tested friend: (Milovan MilutinoviE ,
"Work and Image of Roy Gutman: NIN (Weekly
Informative Magazine), issue No, 2497, 5 November
7998, pp.57-59, Annex No R7 pp.r72-r74/r75-r82 )
3.1.41. In para 27, p.940 of the Reply, the Applicant states
that the witnesses whose testimonies are referred to by the
Respondent were not cross-examined or questioned by a
neutral, independent authority. That is correct. That is why the
Respondent will request the Court to hear the witnesses and
the Applicant will have the opportunity for cross-examination.
The Respondent expects and requests to have the same
possibility, i.e. to question the authors of the information
referred to by the Applicant.3.1.42. In paras 26 and 28, pp.475-477 of the Reply, the
Applicant presents the alleged telephone conversations
obtained through tapping on the part of the Ministry of Interna1
Affairs. In para 30, p.478 of the Reply the Applicant says that
the Respondent did not deny in his Counter-Memorial one of
the presented telephone conversations. This is not correct. In
para 1.3.17.1., p.102 of the Counter-Memorial the Respondent
denied the correctnes of the Applicant's allegations regarding
both telephone conversations.
3.1.43 The Applicant very rarely refers to the statements of
witnessess. He presents the alleged statements of General
Djukic, as Annex 140 to the Reply. In question are a few
additional remarks to the statements allegedly given by General
Djordje Djukic after he had been arrested. General of the RS
Army Djordje Djukic was arrested in Sarajevo on 30 January
1996. From the presented records it is not visible to whom and
when General Djukic gave his statements. There are convincing
reasons to believe that some parts of the statements presented
by the Applicant are falsified. Namely, General Djukic allegedly
stated that, by theorder of the Federal Secretariat for National
Defence, signed by General Blagoje Adiic, the Main
Headquarters of the RS Army was formed comprised of:
Commander Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic, Chief of Staff of
the Army of the Republika Srpska, Major-General Manojlo
Milovanovic, etc. This information is not correct. The Assembly
of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at its session
held on 12 May 1992, brought the Decision on forming the
Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in
Article 3 of the said Decision, Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic
was appointed commander of the Main Headquarters of the
Army of the Serb Republic. The Decision was signed by the
President of the Assembly of the Serb people of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Momkilo KrajiSnik, MA. The Decision was
published in "The official Journal of the Serb people in Bosnia
and Herzegovina", No. 611992, 12 to 17 May, p.219 (Annex No.
R 8, pp r831r84, r85). General Blagoje Adiic, Chief of General
529Staff, submitted his resignation on 8 May 1992. The resignation
was accepted the same day. The Assembly of the Serb People
in Bosnia and Herzegovina brought its Decision on forming the
Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 12
May 1992 and appointed General Ratko Mladic Chief of the
Main Headquarters. It follows from the above-mentioned data
that the allegation in the statement of General Djordje Djukic to
the effect that, by the order of the Federal Secretariat for
National Defence signed by General Blagoje Adiic, the Main
Headquarters of the Army of the Republika Srpska was formed,
is untrue. It is not possible that General Djukic did not know
how this matter had really happened. Therefore, the
Respondent requests the Court to invite the Applicant to submit
the originals of the given statements, aswell as the information
about the circumstances of the testimony.
3.1.44. In Annex 257 to the Reply, the Applicant enclosed the
alleged summons to Nemanja Crnogorac to the Army of the
Republika Srpska, sent by the Secretariat for lnternal Affairs in
subotica2. The summons is dated 28 June 1995. In the bottom
left corner of the summons there is the signature containing the
clearly legible abbreviation "kap.", which indicates that the
person who signed the summons has the rank of captain. This
was not possible. In June 1995 the members of the Ministry of
lnternal Affairs did not have ranks. The ranks were introduced
by the Law on the Ranks of Members of the Ministry of lnternal
Affairs, published in "The Official Journal of the Republic of
Serbia", No.53195 of 28 December 1995 and effective from 5
January 1996. Before the coming into force of this Law the
members of the Ministry of lnternal Affairs could not have
ranks, consequently, not on 28 June 1995. The members of the
Ministry of lnternal Affairs could have ranks only after 28 March
1996 because they acquired them on the basis of the
Subotica is a town in the northern part of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
530Ordinance relating to the evaluation of the performance of, and
the acquisition and loss of ranks by, the members of the
Ministry of lnternal Affairs, brought by the Minister of lnternal
Affairs on the basis of the said Law, published in the "Official
Journal of the Republic of Serbia", No. 15/96 of 28 March
1996.
3.1.45. Due to the limited time available to the Respondent for
the preparation of the Rejoinder and other restricting
circumstances, it was not possible to check al1 allegations and
to authenticate al1documents submitted by the Applicant. Some
of the allegations have not been commented as quite irrelevant
to the subject-matter of the dispute. There are some forgeries
of the Applicant so obvious that they need no special comment.
For example, the replacement of the word "peace" with the
word "space" in the statement of the Government of the
Republic of Serbia of 6 May 1993 (para. 371, p. 687 of the
Reply). Anyhow, the absence of comment on any allegation or
document submitted by the Applicant cannot be understood as
consent of the Respondent. 3.2. Facts Relevant for the Attribution of Acts to the
Respondent
3.2.1. Position of the Yugoslav People's Army in the Socialist
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
3.2.1.l. The Yugoslav People's Army Was a Neutral Force in
the Period Preceding the Armed Rebellion of the Muslim and
Croat Forces Against the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
3.2.1.1.l. The Applicant enclosed to the Reply as evidence the
assessment of the situation and problems in the area of the
Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, prepared by the
commander of the Second Military District, Colonel-General
Milutin Kukanjac and submitted to the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The document is dated 20 March 1992. In Annex 20 to the
Reply the Applicant set out the conclusions contained in the
said assessment.
3.2.1.1.2. In para. 54, p.495 of the Reply, the Applicant says
that Colonel-General Kukanjac describes himself and the
Yugoslav People's Army on the first pages of this report
(Assessment) "As a more or less neutral force". The Applicant
says: " This was also the official stance until the first genocidal
acts were committed in the spring of 7992." The Applicant
immediately corrects himself and continues: "This neutrality was,
of course, just a facade intended to confuse the outside world
and facilitate the execution of RAM'. The above-mentioned
document is classified as "military secret, strictly confidential'
and contains the following remark: "You are kindly requested to
return documents upon having been used. For some really
justified reasons, we propose that documents are approached
532only by really closest circle of people." If the said document
was of the indicated character, if it was classified as "military
secret, strictly confidential" and if was intended for the most
restricted number of perçons, it is completely unclear why
Colonel-General Kukanjac would have reasons to mispresent
himself and the Yugoslav People's Army as a neutral force.
Judging by para. 58, p.498 of the Reply, the Applicant encloses
this document as proof of the existence of a certain plan RAM,
i.e. of a plan of genocide of non-Serb population in the
Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, in the
enclosed document there is nothing whatsoever that would
confirm the existence of such a plan. On the contrary, this
document evidences quite the opposite.
3.2.1.1.3. The document contains nothing that would indicate
the offensive or even genocidal intentions of the Command of
the Second Military District, which was based in Sarajevo and
which covered the territory of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. On the contrary, the document describes the
defensive measures of the Command of the Second Military
District.hus, the Command proposes the dislocation of some
ammunitions and material supplies depots from the areas of
Bosnia and Herzegovina with the majority Croat or Muslim
population to locations with the majority Serb population or to
locations outside the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The Command draws attention to certain problems
in connection with the dislocation. Thus, on page 8 of the
enclosed document (Annex 120 to the Reply), it is stated that
the chances for the dislocation of supplies in Konjic are small
because the local guards and lookouts of the Muslim-Croat
paramilitary formations continuously and closely watch the
depots and keep their superiors informed accordingly.
Consequently, already in March 1992 the Command of the
Second Military District informed about the anti-Army activities
of the Muslim-Croat paramilitary formations. Two months later a
camp for the Serb population was organized in ~elebici in
which crimes of genocide will be committed (para. 7.2.1.0,
533p.743 of the Counter-Memorial). This proposal for the
dislocation of military effectives of the Yugoslav People's Army
was motivated by the growing hostility demostrated by the
Muslim Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic
Union towards the Yugoslav People's Army, mobilizing the
Muslim and Croat population against the Yugoslav People's
Army and forming paramilitary formations. The Command of the
Second Military District obviously did not wish to use force in
order to remain in the areas in which the majority of the
population was motivated against it.
3.2.1.1.4. Inorder to avert conflicts with the Muslim and Croat
population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Command of the
Second Military District proposes in the same document that the
civilian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as
citizens be warned not to take measures against members of
the Yugoslav People's Army that might provoke reaction and
even conflicts. Therefore, the intention of avoiding conflicts is
quite obvious.
3.2.1.1.5. On page 10 of this document the Command informs
that al1the units in the Second Military District have been given
precise tasks concerning the protection and defence of military
facilities and members of the Army. This confirms the defensive
intentions of the Yugoslav People's Army.
3.2.1.1.6. To be able to understand the position and attitude of
the Yugoslav People's Army in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina al1 circumstances should be borne in mind.
The Command of the Second Military District sets forth in the
above-mentioned document, on pages 3 and 4, its view of the
attitude of individual parties and peoples in the Socialist
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the JNA in the
following way:
"The state in the field and JNA:(a) The HDZ leadership relations tu JNA are more and
more hostlïe every day; one gets an impression that
every single Croat in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been
given a task tu speak about our Army always and
everywhere the worst things su called 'YugoArmy which
has brutal& killed Croats and destroyed their houses: 'lt
is Serbo-Chetnics army: etc.; the estimation is, that any
talks on eventual remaining of the Army at the Croats'
areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and any kinds of
cooperation simply have flot any chances in a situation
like this; the role of the Army preventing bloodshed in
Sarajevo on 3rd and 4th March 1992 has strongly
echoed among the cit~zens of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in a positive wax the leaders of the party on al1 levels
are trying tominimize the role of the Army in the stated
night and they are rather successful.
(b) Thankful tu strong anti-army campaign run by the
SDA leadership, mass media and some other
institutions, a substantial part of Muslim people has
rather hostile attitude relatedu our Army; however, the
role of the JNA during the mentioned night bas
considerably retreated confidence of Muslim people in
the Army; the District Cornmand has received most
telegrams, letters and telephone calls fromMuslims as a
sign of gratitude that we have prevented the bloodshed;
we have information, that SDA and some other parties
leaderships are considering the plan on how to turn the
Muslim people against JNA: they have no success for
noW.
(c) Looking in the whole, the SDS leadership and the
Serb people are accepting the Army, they are protecting
it wherever it is actually possible, they are responding to
calls for war and volunteer units, they are fully
cooperative with the commands, they are rather
accuuntable with RMS, etc.; it is quite normal, because
535 the Serb people is actually endangered here and
analogously we are protecting the people's interests;
notwithstanding, there are some occurrences and
beha viours which are not corresponding to generally
known and accepted princ~ples and attitudes (like some
critics of the Army in the Assembly of the Serb people,
appearance of the Chetnics and warnings that we are
not to touch them, estimations of some our offcers,
etc.).
ln this respect, the commander of 2nd MD is soon
going to talk to the front leaders of the Serb people
(Karadyic, Koljevie, Plavsic, KrajSnik, Djuk"c).
3.2.1.1.7. The Serb people in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina was indeed objectively in jeopardy. This was
shown by the subsequent development of events when this
people was exposed to the crimes of genocide, which is the
subject matter of the Counter-Claim. The reasons for the
assessment of the objective threat existed also at that time, in
March 1992, as well as earlier, in the course of 1991. The
Respondent drew attention to these reasons in chapter two of
the Counter-Memorial, on pp.lll-245 and in chapter one of the
Rejoinder in the part about the policy aiming at the destruction
of Serbs as a group. In the course of 1991 the Serb people in
the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina had serious reasons for
considering itself threatened and that is why it looked for
protection by the Yugoslav People's Army.
3.2.1.1.8. The Assembly of the Serb people in Bosnia and
Herzegovina requested the Yugoslav People's Army, on 11
December 1991, to protect the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina with the majority Serb population.
3.2.1.1.9. The association of Serbs from Bosnia and
Herzegovina in Serbia addressed a letter to the Federal
Secretariat for National Defence (Federal Ministry of Defence)
536and to the Chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav People's
Army, on 22 January 1992, requesting that the Army protect the
Serb population in the Kupres municipality. The Applicant
submitted this letter as Annex 124 to the Reply and the
Respondent presents it here in the form presented by the
Applicant in para. 74, pp.506-507 of the Reply:
"Municipality of Kupres lies at the farthermost south of
Bosanska Krajina (region in the northwest of Bosnia and
Herzegovina) and it is surrounded by the municipalities
populated by Catholic and Muslim population: Bugojno,
Duvno and Livno. ln the 2nd World War neighbouring
muslim and catholic population attempted to commit
genocide over the Serbs, but, fortunately they
succeeded only partly. By such attempt the number of
Serb population was reduced, and after-war colon~zation
in Vojvodina (north Yugoslavia) contributed tu their
reduced number as well. By the beginning of this
century 70 per cent of population of Kupres were Serbs,
while today there are only 57 per cent of them. The
overall population is some 77,000. High percentage of
the presence of Catholics and Muslims in the very
munic~palitx its encirclement by such communities as
well as close vicinity of catholic West Herzegovina,
speaks in favour of the necessity to protect the Serb
population in the munic~pality of Kupres. By the
protection of Kupres, the care for the periphery villages
in the munic~palities of Livno, Duvno and Bugojno,
populated by the Serbs would be provided for, because
this population suffered a lot during the second world
war.
Strategic position of Kupres Plateau
The lowest peak on this plateau is 7,200 m above the
sea level. The communication which links Split with
central Bosnia goes through il. According to the plans of
NDH (Independent State of Croatia), this communication
537 is of vital importance for future Croatian state. By taking
control over this part by paramilitary troops of Croatia
and Herzegovina, they would gain control over dominant
peak, overlooking the neighbouring Serb territories in
Bosanska Krajina. (..)
Reception of troops by the local Population
Shorter stay of a miliary unit in this area in 1991
showed that the villagers of the Serb villages received
our troops with delight. ln addition, they provided thern
the best food and drink at their homes.
Relationsh~pwith the local authorities
At the last elections, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS)
won in Kupres, it bas the most influence in local
authorities, and from that point of view the JNA could
completely legally set up a garrison in this territory,
before al! because Kupres voted in favour of its linking
tu the Serb Krajina.
The intentions of HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) in
Kupres are tu exclude from the Serb Krajina villages
with a Catholic population, su we think that soon
presence of the Army would disturb such plans and
defer ever more present aggressiveness of pararnilitary
units from neighbouring catholic municipalities from West
Herzegovina. "
3.2.1.1.10.The Applicant comments on the above quoted letter
in para. 74, p.507 of the Reply in the following way:
"The requested placement of a new JNA unit in the
Kupres area was thus justified on two grounds. Firstly,
the JNA troops had tu be deployed tu defend the Serb
population, which in the view of the author of the
538 request was threatened with genocide, just like the one
that had allegedly taken place during the Second World
War. Secondly, the 'Kupres Plateau' was supposedly of
primary strategic importance."
3.2.1.1.11. The request addressed to the Yugoslav People's
Army was fully justified. In paras. 7.1.13.0.-7.1.13.12.2, pp. 447-
454 of the Counter-Memorial the Respondent stated the facts
about the crimes of genocide of Serbs that had been commited
at the beginning of April 1992. It would be important for this
dispute if the Applicant would inform the Court how many Serbs
there are now in the municipality of Kupres.
3.2.1.1.12. The president of the Assembly of the municipality of
FoEa addressed a letter to the Chief of General Staff of the
Yugoslav People's Army on 17 March 1992 requesting that the
units of the Yugoslav People's Army be located in Fota. The
Applicant attached this letter as Annex 125 to the Reply and
the Respondent will quote it here as presented in para. 75,
pp.508-509 of the Reply:
"Considering the evolution of the situation in B&H and
munic~pality of Foëa, the Serb Assembly discussed the
possibilify of placement of a garrison in Fota. Relying
on the general feeling of exclusively Serb population
who make 50 per cent of the overall population of the
munic~pal area, as well (as) on the fact that a JNA
garrison had been located in Foëa until 1976, we think
in advance that this request is justified.ln the town
itsell: there are some facilities which are property of the
JNA and which, according to our estimate, could serve
for placement of a unit of some 400 men. It is also
possible to take over the most contemporary equipped
building constructed for the needs of women's jail with
al1 its adjuncts, where some 500-600 men could be
placed. The building is some 2 km away from the town
and it is located in the area exclusively populated by the
539 Serbs. Pursuant to our request, we have made some
previous agreements and submitted necessary
documentation to the Bilece Corps HQ, so you can
make a// necessary consultafions in this regard with the
above mentioned Corps HQ. We are ready to provide
men necessary for manning of units, who are presently
being trained in the Garrison in Kalinovik.
Please, be so kind to consider this request at your
earliest convenience and, if possible, inform us about
theresult"
3.2.1.1.13. The Respondent stated the facts of the crime of
genocide of Serbs in this municipality in paras. 7.1.5.0.-7.1.5.23,
pp.372-382 of the Counter-Mernorial. The request for the
protection of Serbs in this municipality was not made without
reason.
3.2.1.1.14. The above mentioned circumstances determined the
conduct and attitude of the Yugoslav People's Army. In para.
3.2.1.1.6. the Respondent quoted the assessrnent of the
Command of the Second Military District concerning the attitude
of the three national parties of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina towards the JNA in which, inter alia, it is
stated:
'!.the role of the Army in preventing the bloodshed in
Sarajevo on 3rd and 4th March 1992 has strongly
echoed among the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in a positive way; ...the role of the JNA during the
mentioned night has considerably retreated confidence of
Muslim people to the Army, the District Command has
received most telegrams, letters and telephone calls
from Muslims as a sign of gratitude that we have
prevented the bloodshed,"'. It is a reference to the
putting of roadblocks in Sarajevo which followed in the
wake of the shooting at a Serb wedding party on the
day of the referendum for an independent and sovereign
540 Bosnia and Herzegovina held on 1 March 1992 (para.
2.13.2.10, p.179 of the Counter-Memorial). On that
occasion, thanks to the intervention of the Yugoslav
People's Army, the conflict between the three sides was
prevented.
3.2.1.1.15. When considering the engagement of the Yugoslav
People's Army in protecting the Serb people in the Socialist
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, sight should not be lost of
the following parts of the assessment of the Command of the
Second Military District, which the Applicant attached as Annex
120 to the Reply:
" - some SDS leaders - on al1levels, by various
channels are asking for weapons from the JNA and
MIYO of Serbia and this is their way to ensure their
dominance which results with disagreements and lack of
uni@ with people;
- some SDS leaders are pleading for dissociation
from the JNA and creatjng some other army, which may
cause negative consequences for the JNA, especiaLv in
terms of enlistment of the units with manpower,
- there are occurrences that some activists,
some operating bodies in regions and various SA0
(Serb Autonomous Area) Assemblies are setting up
conditions- ultimatums fo the Army, pleading for putting
the Army under their commands at limited areas, etc.
(this is particularly outstanding at the region of Ozren).
- due to the mentioned events, tangible
rneasures have been undertaken, but these issues will
soon be discussed with SDS leaders in Sarajevo, in
order to prevent more serious consequencrs as a result
of escape of the volunteer units out of controî".
It is obvious that the Yugoslav People's Army was
careful that the Serb side should not be the one to provoke
conflicts in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
541 3.2.1.2. The Armed Rebellion of the Muslim-Croat Paramilitary
Formations Against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the Attacks on the Yugoslav People's Army
3.2.1.2.1. The disturbance of and the attacks on the Yugoslav
People's Army in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina began as early as September 1991. They grew
into an armed rebellion in April 1992. The Respondent wishes
to draw attention to some cases of attacks on the Yugoslav
People's Army.
3.2.1.2.2. A characteristicxample is the attack on the military
column of the Tenth motorized brigade on the Duvno-PosuSje
main road near Studena Vrela. On 18 September 1991, at
about 1.00 p.m., the said unit was returning from a bivouac to
Mostar and mord was sent an time to the authorities of the
Ministry of Interna1Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (hereinafter MUP) about its arrival. The MUP
patrol, comprised of Ante MiSkovic and Petar Ivankovic,
escorting the convoy, abandoned its duty after the column got
out of Duvno and left in an unknown direction while the column
was ambushed by Croat terrorists. On the scene of the ambush
a tank-truck with number plate MO 113-142, owned by the
Bauxite Mine from Posusje, was placed across the road. Fire
from automatic weapons was opened on the soldiers who got
out of the vehicle and Sergeant Vojko ~eh, father's name Jozo,
born in Novo Meesto, Slovenia, in 1963, was killed on that
occasion; private Vojislav Miletic, born in 1972, residing in
Belgrade, was seriously wounded. On the scene of the ambush
the body of Ludvig Pavlovic (1951) from the village of Vitina,
municipality of LjubuSki, with residence in Zagreb, notorious
Ustashi terrorist-member of the group "Feniks-72" ("Feniks-72" is
a group of Ustashi terrorists which illegally entered the territory
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1972 and
committed several terrorist acts). He was sentenced to 20 years
542in prison and was pardoned in 1991. The circumstance that
the Ministry of lnternal Affairs patrol escorting the military
column had left before the beginning of the attack, as well as
the fact that no investigation was conducted after the attack nor
were the terrorists identified points to their collusion with the
Ministry of lnternal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
3.2.1.2.3. In October 1991 the following facilities of the
Yugoslav People's Army were attacked: Bihac and Mostar
airfields, "KrepSic" (BrEko), BusovaEa and ManjaCa depots, the
Derventa army barracks, the columns in Bosanska Dubica and
capljina and the "Slavko Rodic" military factory in Bugojno. The
attackers were armed members of the SDA and the HDZ
(CDU). They planted a bomb in the military factory in Bugojno
which went off and killed the chief of military control. On 17
October 1991 an armed group of citizens blocked the passage
across the bridge in capljina and threatening to use arms
forcibly took a large quantity of armaments and military
equipment.
3.2.1.2.4. In November 1991 the following units and facilities of
the Yugoslav People's Army were attacked: military columns on
the roads Vitez-Busovata and ~ostar-~apljina, airfields Bihac
and Mostar, the army barracks in BrEko, "Brigec" depot near
Mostar and the military factory "Bratstvo" in Novi Travnik. The
attacks were made by armed men of Croat and Muslim
nationality. A group of armed civilians forced its way to the
grounds of the military factory "Bratstvo" in Novi Travnik,
opened fire on the guards and forcibly took their weapons and
ammunition. One soldier was wounded on that occasion. On the
road Vitez-BusovaCa five armed perçons in Ministry of lnternal
Affairs uniforms forcibly took a truck belonging to the military
factory "Slavko RodiS" from Bugojno, which was transporting the
capsules and fuzes for tank cannon projectiles.3.2.1.2.5. In the village of Gabela near ~apljina the HDZ
extremists planted antipersonnel and antitank mines around a
military depot and the members of MUP of Bosnia and
Herzegovina from Bihac planted mines on the railway line near
Bosanska Krupa at the end of November 1991 in order to block
the passage of military transport. In the course of December
1991 and in January and February 1992 armed members ofthe
SDA and the HDZ opened fire 14 times on military facilities
(Mostar, Bihac, ~a~ljina, Bijeljina, BusovaEa, Sarajevo) and one
officer and twosoldiers were wounded.
3.2.1.2.6. In this period a large number of physical assaults on
members of the Yugoslav People's Army (Mostar, Sarajevo,
Doboj, GraCanica, Rajlovac, Tuzla, Derventa...) were registered
and several serious or light bodily injuries were inflicted on
them. Muslims and Croats who responded to summons for
mobilization to the Yugoslav People's Army were also exposed
to physical violence on a mass scale. In Mostar and in other
places there existed groups for liquidation of members of the
Yugoslav People's Army.
3.2.1.2.7. In para.88, p.520 of the Reply the Applicant says
that Bosanski Brod was the first town to have been attackedby
the Yugoslav People's Army, on 27 March 1992. In para.
3.1.3.4., p.252 of the Counter-Memorial the Respondent stated
that the Croat armed formations as well as the Muslim Green
Berets attacked the territorial defence units in Bosanski Brod
and that the town was shelled from Slavonski Brod situatedon
the other side of the river Sava in Croatia. The Applicant did
not comment on this assertion of the Respondent but attached,
as a proof of the alleged attack of the JNA on Bosanski Brod,
an article by Dessa Trevisan and Tim Judah carried in "The
Times", as Annex 129 to the Reply. The Applicant says:
"Their artic!e marked the beginning of the
genocidal campajgn in Bosnia and Herzegovina'! However, the article referred to by the Applicant
indicates something quite different. The Respondent quotes
below the text presented by the Applicant in para. 88, pp.520-
521 of the Reply, which reads as follows:
"Mortar and artillery shells rained down yesterday on the
north Bosnian town of Bosanski Brod, on the border
with Croatia, as Serbs announced the constitution of
theirOwn republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yugoslavia jets
circledabove, but a spokesman at the town's Muslim-
Croat crisis centre denied a Croatian police report that
they had rocketed a factory.'"
ln a ceremony in Sarajevo, local Serb leaders said they
were 'laying the foundations of a fourfh Serbian state in
Yugoslavia (Republika Srpska; the others are: Serbia,
Montenegro, Srpska Republika Krajina)! The declaration
came as Muslims and Croats on the Bosnian presidency
sent a message to the United Nations appealing for
military observers to help bring calm to the republic and
accused Serbs of terrorism. Yesterday Bosnia sent three
leaders to check reports that civilians had been killed in
the continuing fighting in Bosanski Brod. Three people
were injured by an explosion in a cafe in Mostar and
Serbs accused Croats and Muslims of killing ten
civilians. Armed clashes and shooting incidents threaten
to destroy hopes that a Bosnian civil war could be
avoided or that UN peace-keeping troops could be
deployed in Croatia."
It is not clear from the article who shelled the town. The
Respondent reiterates that the town was shelled from Slavonski
Brod on the Croatian side. It is clear from the article that the
fighting was going on in the town itself and that three leaders
were sent to check the reports on civilian casualties. It can also
be seen that three people were injured in an explosion in a
cafe in Mostar and that Serbs accused Croats and Muslims.
545The two journalists conclude that these armed clashes and
shooting incidents threaten to destroy hopes that a civil war
could be avoided in Bosnia.
3.2.1.2.8. On 4 April 1992 the army barracks "Jajce" in
Sarajevo was attacked and the facade was damaged on that
occasion but there were no casualties. Military buildings were
repeatedly attacked. The Decision of the Presidency of the SR
of B&H on mobilization of the territorial defence (TO) further
complicated the already tense situation. Armed paramilitary
formations freely move across the territory, block passage on
roads and check motor vehicles and individuals.
3.2.1.2.9. On 5 April 1992 the members of the Green Berets in
Sarajevo opened fire on flats and buildings in which live JNA
officers, the army barracks "Jajce" and on the Second Military
District Command building and attempted to take over control of
Butmir airport.
3.2.1.2.10. On the same day 10 130mm artillery pieces were
pulied out from the Technical Maintenance Service in Novi
Travnik and deployed in the area of the village of BuEici on the
road Travnik-Vitez. The artillerypieces were pulled out by the
members of HOS (Croatian Armed Forces).
3.2.1.2.11. In para. 109, p. 538 of theReply, the Applicant says
that the fighting in Sarajevo began on 5 April 1992 on the eve
of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the European
Community, at which the decision was to be adopted on the
recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state.
The clashes broke out after 2.00 p.m., after the expiry of the
deadline set by the Serb leaders for retraction of the decision
on full mobilization of the Republic Territorial Defence and
Police Reservists where Croats and Muslims had the dominant
role. The order for the mobilization was issued by Alija
lzetbegovic (The Applicant does not Say that the order was
issued by Alija lzetbegovic but this is stated in para. 54, p.152,
546Annex VI to the Final Report of the Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1991)
referred to by the Applicant). By the Order on mobilization Alija
Izetbegovic formalized the armed rebellion against the SFRY.
There were no legal grounds for the president of the
Presidency of the Republic - federal unit to issue such an
order. In para. 58, page 153, Annex VI of the said document it
is stated that after theoutbreak of these hostilities in Sarajevo
on 5 April 1992, Radovan Karadiic, Alija lzetbegovic and
Miljenko Brkic, leader of the HDZ, agreed on a total cease-fire
in the Republic. Also present during the talks in TV Studio
Sarajevo, when the cease-fire was agreed upon, were Colonel-
General Milutin Kukanjac, commander of the Second Military
District and European Community monitor Antonio Santos. The
role of General Kukanjac was much more important than the
mere presence at the talks of the three national leaders in
Sarajevo TV studio. The talk was organized on the initiative and
with a great engagement of General Kukanjac.
3.2.1.2.12. The document of the Second MilitaryDistrict
Command of 7 April 1992 attached by the Applicant as Annex
131 to the Reply confirms the fact that the fighting around
Bosanski Brod was between the Croatian forces and the forces
of the TerritorialDefence. This document contains the
information on the dislocation of armed formations in individual
regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
"7.Zone of combat activity Kupres
7.7. Enemy Deployment
- up to one reinforced platoon at the saddle
KupreSka Vrata;
- Ratakovine, Poljike p.e. 7296, force about one
Company;
- v. Osmanl~el v. Cevicd force about one
Company;
- p.e 7720, graveyard Magarica, force of about
one platoon;
547 - v. Straibenica, p.e. 7787 Kuk, force of about
one Company;
- in the town of Kupres force of about one
platoon;
- in the region of v, Vrila,v. Kure, force of about
one platoon;
- in the region of v. GluScevina, p.e. 7096
Rajkovaca, an artilery battery;
- in the region of p.e. 7277 Batoglav
reconnaissance post;
- in the region of v. D & G. Ravno, force of one
reinforced platoon;
- in the region of Livno a ZNG* hrigade
deploye&
- in the region of v. G.Runjani, v. Listani, force
of one reinforced company,
- in the region of v. Ljubunc'ic'i,force of about
one Company;
- in the region of Suica there is a HOS* unit of
some 300 men;
- ZNG* - Croatian army;
- HOS* -Croatian voluntary troops
7.2 Deployment of Our Forces
- along the line: Doline @.e. 7752) - v,
Straibenica - 3rd battalion of the 77thpartisan brigade;
- along the he v. Zlosela (p.e. 7 720) Kupresko
Polje - a tactical company with voluntary platoon frorn
~@ovoand v.Zlosela;
- along the fine v. Zloselo (p.e. 7756) - v. Olovo
- 2nd batt. of the 73thpartisan brigade;
- along the fine Biïi Potok - v. Lovrica Dolina
(p.e. 7289)- 3rd batt. of the 73thpartisan brigade;
- mortar unit in the region of v, Suhova;
- howitzer 705 mm in the region of v. Blagaj;
-2/5th combined artillery regiment in the region of
v. Mrdenovci, p.e. 7754, church p.e. 7730 Novo Selo;
548 - in the region of Koprivnica, Carev Min 7 -
79/30partd (partisan division);
- in the region of v. D & G. Vukovsko, TO
detachment Vukovsko;
-major part of the town of Kupres is held under
the control of TO company Kupres;
2. COMBAT OPERATION ZONE BOSANSKI
BROD
2.7. Enemy deployment of the 708th ZNG brigade
- in the region of Bos. Brod forces in the
strength of two battalions of ZNG at the confrontation
line school Bos. Brod - Grda - Mecelj channel, p.e.
87, crook Cacavica, v. Kolbe Gornje (north of church)
and G.Maja (p.e. 90).
- in the region of v.Hrastovaca p.e. 90 (north of
channel), v.Ukvinari, v.~ardak (north for 7 km), v.Lug,
force of about one battalion;
- in the region of v,Bge/o Polje, v.Bos. Duboeac
force in the strength of about one battalion;
-artillery in the region of v.Potoeani
2.2. DEPLOYMENT OF OUR FORCES
- TO detachment Bos.Brod eastern part of
Bos.Brod region of Greda;
- TO unit "iLije5ée"in the region of v.LQes'ée;
- 7/327 rntbr. with 1st company of TO in the
region of v.Kolibe Gornje;
- tactic cornpany/327 mtbr in the region of
v.Nareci;
- 2, armoured batt./336 mtbr in the region of
v,ZboriSte, v.Bos.Luiani;
- batt.TO Prnjavor and company TO "Trstenica"
in the region of v.KalaCka,Pavlovo Brdo; - P00d- 7 (7-1/17 anti-tank artillery regirnent in
the region of v,Bjalas);
- bVBR/77rnap (cornbined artillery regirnenf) in
the region of v. olje (p.e.799)
- b/had-337 mtbr. in the region of v.Sokici;
- 4327 rntbr. in the region of v.Glogova2a;
-comrnand of 327th rntbr. in Derventa;
- 2497 eng. regirnent in v,Betnja Mala, v. olie;
- cornrnand post of the 1st operative group/77th
Corps in v.Podnolje (p.e.179).
3. ZONE OF COMBAT ACTIVITIES IN
BIJELJINA
3.1. Enemy Forces
- there are sorne 400 rnernbers of the SDA
(most of thern are now disarrned);
- there are some 200 mernbers of the SDA in
the village of Janja.
3.2. Our Forces
- Command of the 38th partisan (infantry)
division, 77th cornbined art~lleryregirnent
- rnult~plerocket launcher battery/77th cornbined
artillery regimef,howitzer battery/77th cornbined
artilery regiment deployed in BQeljina;
- 2 arrnoured battalion/453 motorized brigade in
the village of Janja;
- 1/17 partisan brigade deployed in the region of
Bos,Ra&, Galistok, v.Brodare;
- 2/17 partisan brigade deployed in v~.~e~ak
(Zvornik);
- 3/77 partisan brigade deployed in the region of
Trpo vaeka Grda, Lukavac, v.O. Crnev#e vo;
- command post in the village M.Obarska;
- rnortar batteryl38 partisan division deployed in
the village ofLjesnica;
550 - 22nd partisan brigade deployed: 1/22 part.br, in
the region of the village of ~elopek;
- 2/22 partbr. in the village of Bogatovo Selo;
- 3/22 partbr. in the village of D,Trnova;
- command post in the village of Ugljevik.
4. ZONE OF COMBAT OPERATIONS
SARAJEVO
4.1. Enemy
- green beret forces have strength of some
3,000 men
4.2. Our Forces
- 49th motorised brigade deployed at the
fol10wing positions:
-region of Vratnik - tenk platoon;
- region of Butmir airport - reinforced tank
platoon;
- region of Mojmilo Brdo - reinforced tank
platoon;
-4th combined an'ilery regiment in the region of
Koran;
4th combined anti-tank artilery regiment in the
region of the village of Mokro;
-346th light artillery regiment of air defence in
the region of Treltevié;
-276th rnountain brigade in Han Puesak;
- detached command post of the 4th corps in
v.D.Zlati3te.
This document confirms that significant Croatian forces were
stationed in the zone of Bosanski Brod. The document also
shows that important Crcatian armed forces, as well as
paramilitary Croat-Muslim formations were deployed in other
parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Commenting on the document
of Colonel Zekanovic, which contains the information about the
551deployment of armed formations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Applicant, in para. 92, p.526 of the Reply, states that it is an
illustration of the fact that the JNA was not a neutral force
because it refers to disarmament and enemy. It is clear that in
a situation when the Army has been attacked, it cannot be
neutral vis-a-vis the attackers.
3.2.1.2.13. On 7 April 1992 an armed attack by the formations
of the "Green Berets" in police and camouflage uniformswas
made on the City Headquarters of TO Sarajevo and the District
Headquarters of TO Sarajevo; complete equipment and
weapons were seized.
3.2.1.2.14. The same day, 7 April 1992, Croat paramilitary
formations from West Herzegovina, unprovoked in any way,
made an artillery-mortar attack on Mostar airport and several
soldiers and officers were wounded.
3.2.1.2.15.On 8 Apnl 1992 the membersof the Ministryof lntemal
Affairs SR B&H and HOS memberskilled 7 conscriptsfrom the 5th
Corps. (para..1.36.1.of the Counter-MemonaTi.)heillingtook placeat
the approachto Jajcefrom the diredon of Banja Luka. The conscripts
travelled from their unit having obtained leave, bypublic transport
coach.(para. .1.36.1of the Counter-Memonal)
3.2.1.2.16. On the basis of the Decision of the rump Presidency
of SR B&H al1 former paramilitary formations were included in
the Bosnia army "Territorial Defence" B&H; in this way further
arming of these paramilitary formations was continued.
3.2.1.2.17. On 9 April 1992, at about 11.00 a.m., a column of 4
motor vehicles with 14 soldiers set off from Bosanski Petrovac
in the direction of BihaC with the task of taking over the
equipment in the "27 July" army barracks. At the entry to Bihac
an ambush was set up by Muslirn paramilitary formations, with
strength of about 30 men, armed and in camouflage uniforms.They stopped the column, disarmed the soldiers and seized
their weapons.
3.2.1.2.18. In the whole territory of SR B&H mobilization of
the nebvlyproclaimed Bosnian army (Army - TO) was underway,
in which were incorporated al1 Muslim-Croat paramilitary
formations of B&H. Under the Decision of Alija Izetbegovic, al1
HOS units, the Green Berets, the HDZ and the Ministry ot
lnterior Affairs were placed under the command of TO BiH and
will operate under an integrated plan.
3.2.1.2.19. In para. 98, p.530 of the Reply the Applicant refers
to the document of the Command of the 17th Corps of the JNA
dated 10 April 1992, attached as Annex 132 to the Reply. In
this document the commander of the 17th Corps requests
support by light combat aircraft inorder to neutralize the forces
attacking JNA units defending the bridges on the river Drina. It
is clear from the document that in this case, too, the JNA was
attacked. It was exposed to attacks of Muslim paramilitary units.
The "Combat and Operative Report" dispatched by the Second
Military District operativeeam on duty to the General Staff of
the SFRY Armed Forces on 26 April 1992 states the relevant
circumstances. This report is attached as Annex 133 to the
Reply of the Applicant. The report begins with the statement
that in the course of 26 April 1992, the enemy violated cease-
fire in twelve cases. In the afternoon hours the enemy shelled
the barracks of the Derventa garrison from the villages of
Plehon and Piskavica and opened fire on the same barracks
from infantry weapons from the village of Babino Brdo. Section
2 of the report deals with combat capability in the Second
Military District.t is said in the report that the pulling out of
supplies and materiel from the Command building and transport
to the army barracks in Lukavica was continued during the day,
as well as from the depots in Visoko, Ilijas and Semizovac. All
command units are intensively engaged in raising the level of
combat capacity, protection of facilities and control of the
territory. In section of the report the situation in the territory is
553described. It is stated that: "The situation in the territory is
becoming ever more complex, in particular in the area of
responsibiliv of the 77th Corps, Central Bosnia and Cazinska
Krajina region. Erection of roadblocks and the prevention of
movement of JNA units are characteristic of the situation in the
ci@ of Sarajevo and on other roads. The garrison in Travnik
has been in total blockade for some time now ...to secure the
Vogosca crossroads a Company from the 276th mountain
brigade has been brought with the task of securing the "Pretis"
factory. ..Activities of paramilitary formations in preparation of
armed struggle and resistance to the JNA continue." In regard
to the 17th Corps the following information has been presented:
'24part of the units bas been engaged for securing the principal
communications in the zone of Kupres, execution in combat
operations in the area of Zvornik and in defence operations in
the area of Bosanski Brod and Derventa. The situation in the
territory is becoming ever more complex with a tendency of
further deterioration.lnter-ethnic intolerance threatens with the
outbreak of new conflicts in the territories where the situation
was calm so fart! Section 5 of the report is related to the
security situation.It is said: "Blockade of military facilities has
been intensifed, including threats with attack and se~zure of
supplies and materiel. On a certain number of crossroads in the
ci@ of Sarajevo obstacles made of concrete have been placed
Al1 movements are being strict& watched and controlled and
some motor vehicles are being impounded. Passage and
transportation are on& possible if combined with physical
securify measures and with demonstrated readiness for
defence". Section 8 of the report informs about the activities of
the EU monitoring mission teams. It is said: "The departure of
the EU monitoring mission team for Odiak has been agreed
upon and realked with a view to securing the evacuation of
threatened Serbs from villages in the vicinity of Odiak. " Is there
anything at al1here suggesting genocidal intentions or genocidal
operations of the Yugoslav People's Army? There is nothing of
the kind at all. Quite the opposite, this document attests to the
defensive character of JNA combat operations and to the fact
554that the JNA was exposed to attacks in the whole territory of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3.2.1.2.20. Despite the fact that in the course of March and in
particular in April 1992 intensive negotiations were conducted
on the status of the Yugoslav PeopleNOs Army in the Socialist
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Ministry of National
Defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
adopted on 10 April 1992 a Platform for negotiations with
representatives of the JNA on the status of the Yugoslav
People's Army in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina), the newly established Headquarters of the
Territorial Defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina issued, on 14 April 1992, the Directive for the
defence of the sovereignty and independence of the Socialist
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by which the Yugoslav
People's Army and the Territorial Defence of the Serb
autonomous regions were termed enemies and war was
declared on them (order was issued for mobilization, forming of
combat units, taking over of depots and blockade of the
barracks of the Yugoslav People's Army, capture of members of
the Yugoslav People's Army, etc.). Furthermore, on the basis of
the Decision of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Headquarters of Territorial
Defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
issued orders under No.02/145/1 of 29 April 1992 for the
blockade of facilities and units of the Yugoslav People's Army
and for the preparations for the launching of combat operations
in the whole territory of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
3.2.1.2.21. In the course of 12 April 1992 the attack on the
"FaletiC" depot near Sarajevo was continuous and the defenders
were demanded to surrender. At 7.00 a.m. Butmir airport was
attacked and the attack was made by the "Green Berets".3.2.1.2.22. On 16 April 1992 Muslim-Croat paramilitary
formations attacked a JNA unit in the area of Bosanski Brod by
opening fire from mortars and infantry weapons. Nine JNA
members were killed and 16 were injured.
3.2.1.2.23. In para. 105 on p.536 of the Reply, the Applicant
quotes the text of the Extraordinary Report dispatched by the
Second Military District operative centre to the General Staff of
the Armed Forces of the SFRY on 17 April 1992. The
extraordinary report as presented by the Applicant on page 536
of the Reply reads as follows:
"Extraordinaty Report
The 77th Corps HO reported that it took control over al1
vital objects in Bosanski ~amac in the night of
76/7Z04.7992.
Intervention came as a result of numerous conflcts and
excesses on ethnic grounds, preceded by the attempt of
the Croatian Army to cross the bridge on the Sava river.
A part of these troops together with paramilitary troops
from the Bosanski ~amac area made an attempt to
attack the forces of the 17th Corps along the fine Prud-
Bosanski ~amac. This attack was repelled and losses
inflicted to the enemy. ln the operations of taking control
over the vital objects in Bosanski ~amac, the 77th
Tactic Group troops together with the troops of the ,Serb
TO (Territorial Defence) and the Serb milifia took part.
The situation in the town is relatively calm. lndividuals
who were opening the fire at our troops and citkens
were isolated. There have been some cases of moving
out of the population, while a substantial number of the
municipal leadership fled to Croatia.
The establishment of the civilian authorities is under
way. There are some indications that the enemy might
556 strike again. Necessary measures tu unable any further
attacks and tu disarm the remaining enemy's troops are
undertaken. "
It can be seen from this document that the Yugoslav People's
Army was attacked by the armed forces of the Republic of
Croatia as well as by paramilitary formations from the
municipality of Bosanski ~amac area.
3.2.1.2.24. On 17 April 1992, at 3.30 a.m., members of the
"Green Berets" and Ministry of lnternal Affairs made an armed
attack on the "Pretis" military factory in VoaoSca with the
intention of taking with them finished products. The security
service managed to repel these attacks.
3.2.1.2.25. The same day, late in the afternoon, the forces of
Ministry of lnternal Affairs BiH and paramilitary formations
blocked the military depot in Konjic with the intention of taking
control of the facility.
3.2.1.2.26. From day to day the personal security of the
members of the JNA and that of their families was increasingly
threatened as a consequence of intensified arrests and bringing
in to the police. Attacks ând provocations on military flats, in
particular in Sarajevo, became ever more frequent. Members of
the "Green Berets" often broke into flats taking away and
harassing the occupants.
3.2.1.2.27. On 21 April 1992, at 6.55 a.m., the military hospital
Sarajevo was hit by a mortar shell.
3.2.1.2.28. As a result of the agreement between T. Ajanovic
and the top leadership of Croatia, military advisers from the
Croatian Army arrived in the village of Kozarac near Prijedor to
organize the population militarily.3.2.1.2.29. On 22 April 1992 paramilitary formations inflicted
damage on the Second Military District Command building: a
total of 11 motor vehicles owned by the JNA and 20 privately
owned motor vehicles were damaged. Window panes on the
building were shattered. During the morning hours and in the
evening attacks on the army barracks in Derventa were
repeatedly made by fire from mortars of various calibres.
3.2.1.2.30. On 24 April 1992 Muslim-Croat paramilitary
formations and armed groups of citizens stopped a column of 5
motor vehicles and one armoured vehicle in the suburb of
KovaEi on Vratnik near Sarajevo. The soldiers were disarmed
and captured.
3.2.1.2.31. The same day paramilitary formations of Muslims in
Sarajevo made an attack on the Second Military District
Command building by mortar fire.
3.2.1.2.32. On 25 April 1992, Lieutenant-Colonel Krsmanovic,
one soldier driver and a motor vehicle were captured near
ZlatiSte, Sarajevo. After interrogation in the Ministry of Interna1
Affairs and maltreatment, the officer and the soldier were
released while their weapons and the motor vehicle were
seized.
3.2.1.2.33. The same day 25 soldiers securing the JNA "Miro
Popara" barracks in ~apljina were captured during the attack on
the barracks by the HVO (Croatian Defence Council) and other
paramilitary formations.
3.2.1.2.34. The Applicant has attached as Annex 130 to the
Reply a copy of the decision for engagement in combat
operations sent by Major-General Milan Nedeljkovic, commander
of the 17th Corps of the JNA, to the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of the SFRY and to the Second Military District
Command. The Applicant refers to this document in para 89,
p.521 of the Reply, partly quotes it but omitting some very
558important parts of the document. From section 1 of the Decision
relating to the objective, the following part has been omitted:
'By defence operations of the forces in the area of Bosanski
~amac, Gradatac, Oraije and Brtko prevent (probably the army
of the Republic of Croatia, initial letters of the abbreviation that
bas been used are not clearly legible on the copy) forced
crossing of the river Sava and, by various operations, break up
attacks of anti-aircraft formations, those of infitrated sabotage-
terrorist groups, prevent inter-ethnic conficts, perform combat
control of the territory and keep under control communications
in one's own zones." The quoted part of the document
describes the objectives of combat activities.They were:
prevention of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia to
cross the river Sava and to reach the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, elimination of terrorist groups which were active in
that area, as well as prevention of inter-ethnic conflict. The
objective was to prevent inter-ethnic conflict. This is clearly
stated in the document attached by the Applicant.
3.2.1.2.35. On 26 April 1992, between 9.00 and 9.30 p.m., an
attack was made on the security guard post of the Second
Military District Command from the direction of DobrovoljaEka
Street. The attack was made by the members of the "Green
Berets".
3.2.1.2.36. On 27 April 1992 the members of TO BiH
ambushed two JNA vehicles from Dubrave airport (Tuzla) in the
region of the village of LjubaCa near Tuzla. Captain Refik Miftari
was killed in the attack and two soldiers were slightly wounded.
Tha attack was organized by Vahid Karavelic, commander of
the Regional HQ of TO for North-Eastern Bosnia, formerly a
JNA captain who deserted at the beginning of January 1992.
He was deprived of liberty at the time. He pointed out in his
statement that already as a member of the JNA he got in touch
with the illegal SDA crisis centre at the end of November 1991;
that he worked on illegal organizing of Muslims militarily in the
area of north-eastern Bosnia and made preparations for military
559actions against the JNA and the Serb people. On that occasion
original documents (various receipts, certificates,
ackowledgements, etc.) were found with him, from which the
role of the Ministry of Defence of Croatia in arming Muslims
and Croats in BiH can be seen.
3.2.1.2.37. On 29 April 1992 Colonel Hasan Efendic,
commander of TO BiH, issued Order on implenîentation of the
Decision of the Presidency of the Republic of BiH, No.02-11-
337192 of 27 April 1992, which reads:
ltem 7.Put roadblocks and obstacles everywhere on al1
roads in the territory of BiH used by units of the former
JNA for pulling out technical means and materie6 this
should be done in close coordination with MUP.
ltem 2. Impose blockade of the broader area of military
facilities from which attempts are being made to remove
technical means and materiel, by using various regular
and natural barriers and obstacless with which TO units
of the Republic of BiH and MUP should be supplied.
ltem 3. Prevent the exit from the barracks and
communication on the territory of the Republic of BiH to
unannounced columns of the former JNA and which are
not escorted by MUP.
ltem 4. Make plans for and initiate combat operations on
the whole territory of the Republic of BiH.
3.2.1.2.38. On 1 May 1992 the forces of Ministry of Interna1
Affairs BiH attacked the VlaSic military facility with a view to
taking control of it. In the attack two soldiers were killed by
sniper fire and one soldier was seriously wounded.3.2.1.2.39. From 1 May till the morning hours of 3 May 1992
the Second Military District Command building in Sarajevo was
continuously shelled and fired at from infantry weapons. In that
period, on 2 May 1992, the JNA Club building in Sarajevo was
attacked. The attack was ied by Jusuf-Juka Prazina, notorious
criminal and one of the chief leaders of Muslim military
formations - the "Green Berets" - and perpetrators of attacks on
military facilities at the time.
3.2.1.2.40. Despite the fact that agreement was reached to
evacuate the Second Military District Command from Sarajevo
to Lukavica, under the escort of UN forces, the column was
attacked in the course of 3 May 1992, in the afternoon hours.
The attack on and brutal crimes against the members of the
JNA were under the direct command of Jovan Divjak, former
JNA Colonel deserter, through ~eljko Zagi, commander of one
of TO headquarters in Sarajevo, Jusuf Prazina and Emin
~vrakic, notorious criminal. The orders were issued directly by
Ejup Ganic, member of the rump Presidency of BiH. During the
attack the abhorrent crime was committed against the JNA
members who were shot at from the back, forced to stand
against the wall, stripped naked and shown around the city,
where the population spat at them and humiliated them, while
the captured officers were brutally maltreated in the Central
Prison in Sarajevo. All this was done before the eyes of the
UN representatives. Reporting on that event the Paris
newspaper "Liberation" wrote that this massacre will enter into
the annals of the war in BiH as "a barbarian act without
precedent". In confirmation of that assessment it quoted Marc
Goulding as saying that he was shocked to learn of the way
the members of the JNA had been liquidated. In the attacks in
Sarajevo on 2 and 3 May 1992 a total of 28 members of the
JNA were killed (9 officers, 1 NCO, 1 civilian employed in the
JNA and 17 soldiers).
3.2.1.2.41. On 15 May 1992, at about 3.30 p.m., the army
barracks in Tuzla was attacked and, between 6.00 and 7.00
561p.m., after it had been agreed that the unit in question leave
Tuzla, on the crossroads BrClanska Malta a part of the column
(about 20 vehicles) was cut off and attacked. That time, too, a
ferocious crime against the JNA members was committed. A
large number of soldiers were killed and about 20 injured. The
attack was planned and organized by ~eljko Knez, former JNA
Lieutenant-Colonel - deserter and Sead Delic, former JNA
Major, also deserter, both of whom held important posts in the
District T6 Headquarters Tuzla. That al\ had been planned in
advance is attested to also by the fact that the massacre was
filmed by TV camera of the local TV studio FS-3.
3.2.1.3. Alleged Forced Mobilization in the FR of Yugoslavia
3.2.1.3.1. In para. 405, p.711 of the Reply the Applicant,
claiming that there was forced mobilization in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia for the needs of the Republika Srpska
Army , inter alia, says: "The Responden f forcibly mobilized those
people, mostly but nof exclusively refugees from Bosnia and
Herzegovina, for the Army of Bosnian Serbs.
In the further allegations in the Reply the
Applicant expands on the thesis that forced mobilization was
carried out by the members of the Ministry of Interna1Affairs of
the Republic of Serbia, describing in detail the manner in which
this was done, "corroborating" its allegations exclusively by parts
from newspaper articles, without offering a single proof of its
assertions that would be valid in the eyes of the law. In this
way the Applicant endeavoured to create the impression that
widely known facts are involved which need not be proved.
3.2.1.3.2.All the assertions of the Applicant associated with the
alleged forced mobilization in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia are completely denied by the Respondent because
the allegations stated are simply not true. No mobilization of
Serb refugees from the Republika Srpska took place in the
562Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Even if such a mobilization did
take place, and it did not, would it be logical to expect from the
forcibly mobilized persons to commit genocidal acts on behalf of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republika Srpska.
This aspect of the alleged mobilization of Serb, "but not
exclusively" Serb, refugees (which means that among mobilized
persons there were those of other nationalities), the Applicant
deliberately fails to take into account so as not to compromise
its thesis about the genocidal behaviour of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia.
3.2.1.3.3. The truth is that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the Republic of Serbia, in the period referred to by the
Applicant in its Reply, took intensified measures aimed at
checking the place of residence or temporary abode of a huge
number of refugees who found themselves in the territory of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and that these persons, only
when it was absolutely necessary, were brought to police
stations to establish their identity, which was carried out
legitimately by the authorities of internal affairs on the basis of
the relevant regulations in force in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
3.2.1.3.4. According to the regulations in force, the internal
affairs' authorities are not authorized to carry out mobilization,
but only to discharge duties within their competence, i.e. those
related to the protection of life, personal security of citizens and
security of their property and, in this connection, to the
application of regulations concerning registration and
cancellation of place of residence or temporary abode andlor
registration of change of address.
3.2.1.3.5. In para. 425, p.722 of the Reply the Applicant
attempts to illustrate the allegation that the state authorities of
the Republic of Serbia carried out forced mobilization of
persons born in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, during
the summer of 1995. To that end the Applicant refers to the
563case of one Nemanja Crnogorac born in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, who was allegedly mobilized by being served, on
29 June 1995, a summons which read: "Nemanja Crnogorac is
called upon to join the Army of Bosnian Serbs" In Annex 257
t9 the Reply the Applicant offered the "proof" in support of the
this allegation, in the form of a photocopy of the described
summons.
3.2.1.3.6. As far as the photocopy of the summons to Nemanja
Crnogorac to report to the Secretariat for lnternal Affairs in
Subotica for the purpose of joining the Republika Srpska Army
is concerned, in the subject matter: "persons subject to military
conscription in BiH', involved here is a clumsy forgery and here
is why:
In the bottom right corner of the summons, as previously
referred by the Respondent, there is a signature containing a
clearly legible abbreviation "kap" which means that the person
who signed the summons has the rank of captain; this was by
no means possible because in June 1995 the members of the
Ministry of lnternal Affairs had no ranks. The ranks were
introduced subsequently by the Law on ranks of the members
of the Ministry of lnternal Affairs published in the "Official
Journal of the Republic of Serbia", No.53195 of 28 December
1995 and effective from 5 January 1996. Before the coming into
force of this Law the members of the Ministry of lnternal Affairs
could not have ranks, consequently, not on 28 June 1995
either. The members of MUP could have ranks only after 28
March 1996 because they acquired them on the basis of the
Regulations relating to Evaluation of Performance and to
Acquisition and Loss of Rank by Members of the Ministry of
lnternal Affairs, brought by the Minister for lnternal Affairs on
the basis of the said Law and published in the "Official Journal
of the Republic of Serbia", No.15196 of 28 March 1996.
3.2.1.3.7. In the part of the Applicant's Reply relating to the
alleged forced mobilization in the territory of the Federal
564Republic of Yugoslavia there are unfounded accusations and
contradictions which only contribute to the impression that the
Applicant does not dispose of reliable information about the
alleged mobilization in question, based on proofs. Quoted below
are some examples:
In para. 418, p.718 of the Reply the Applicant states that: "Until
the summer of 7995, new passports could only be issued to
women and men - under the age of 76 or over 60." But in
para 425, p.724 of the Reply it is claimed: "The person in
question, Nemanja Crnogorac, was born in Bosnia and
Herzegovina but was in possession of a passport issued six
months before by the Ministry of Infernal Affairs in Subotica
(passport, Nemanja Crnogorac, 74 January 7995. Annex 258)':
A "reliable" piece of information of the Applicant about the
number of persons who allegedly were forcibly mobilized is
stated in para. 419, p.718 of the Reply: "Women in black, the
formerly mentioned non-governmental organization, estimate that
the covered number of refugees was between 6000 to 20000.
This estimate is based on the figures published in the magazine
"Vreme" (Time).
3.2.1.3.8. In para. 438,p.730 of the Reply the Applicant quite
erroneously interprets the sentence of the District Court in
Belgrade and says: "This was also, which is very interesting,
the opinion of the District Court in Belgrade, which decided, on
27 February 1998, that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is
accountable for the physical and mental damage suffered by
Serbs who had been forcibly recruited to the army of
"Republika Srpska" and "Republika Srpska Krajina".
Firstly, in the sentence of the District Court in Belgrade the
Republika Srpska or the Republika Srpska Army are not
mentioned at al1 for the simple reason that this was not the
subject matter of this court dispute.Secondly, on the basis of the appeal, the District Court in
Belgrade altered the sentence of the First Municipal Court in
Belgrade in the part of the sentence relating to the mobilization
of the plaintiff for the needs of the Army of the Republic of
Serbian Krajina, having adopted the position that "the Republic
of Serbia was not passively rendered accountable for some
other damage suffered by the plaintiffs in connection with the
question of mobil~zation and possible consequences thereof; a
matter to which the appeal justifiably drew attention."(Excerpt
from the sentence of the District Court in Belgrade
Gz.No.6024197 of 15 October 1997 is in quotation marks and
not of 27 February 1998 when the sentence was transmitted to
the authorized representative of the plaintiffs).
Finally, the Applicant persists, this timeagain, in his conviction
that newspaper articles are the most reliable piece of evidence
and did not even try to trace the original text of the sentence
of the District Court in Belgrade, quoting as proof only a
newspaper article, tailored for the purposes of this Reply.
3.2.1.3.9. In paras. 431 and 432, pp.727 and 728 of the Reply
relating to the activities of the Bureau of the Republika Srpska
in Belgrade the Applicant also stated that: "One of the main
tasks of that Bureau, referred to earlier in this section, was in
fact to dynamize mobilization. "
It is important to note that not in a single piece of evidence
offered (nor in the statement of General Djordje Djukic, Annex
140 of the Reply) is it possible to find anything about the
involvement of the authorities of interna1 affairs of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republic of Serbia in the possible
activities of the Republika Srpska Bureau in Belgrade
associated with the mobilization of persons from the territory of
the FR of Yugoslavia.
3.2.1.3.10. In paras. 434-437, p.729 of the Reply the Applicant,
instead of evidence, offers its own arbitrary assessment of
566"perfect harmony" and "close cooperation" between Belgrade
and the Serb authorities in the Republika Srpska.
3.2.2. Forming of the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (Republic of Srpska)
3.2.2.1. The Assembly of the Serb people in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, at its session held on 12 May 1992, brought the
Decision on Forming the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, on the basis of Art.70, para 2 of the
Constitution of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This Decision was published in the Official Journal of the Serb
people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, No.6 of 12-17 May 1992, p.
219.(Annex No. R8, pp. r83lr84-r85) The former units and
headquarters of the TerritorialDefence were renamed as
command units of the Army. The organization and formation of
the Army, pursuant to Art.2 of the Decision, is determined by
the President of the Republic. By Art.3 of the Decision
Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic was appointed commander of
the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Art.4 provides for that the Army of the
Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Wear uniforms and
grade insignia as were worn by the members of the Yugoslav
People's Army and Territorial Defence. The Serb flag is the
basis of cap ornaments and, on the left forearm, the Serb flag
on a round base with the inscription "Army of the Serb
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina". Later on the provision
relating to uniforms and grades was changed.
3.2.2.2. In para. 159, p.566 of the Reply the Applicantuotes a
part from the book by Borisav Jovic, former President of the
Presidency of the SFRY, and attached this part of the book as
Annex 15 to the Reply. In that part of the book Borisav Jovic
describes the talk between the leadership of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the leadership of Bosnian Serbs
567which took place on 30 April 1992 and related to the withdrawal
of the JNA from BiH. It was agreed that within a period of
fifteen days the members of the JNA who are citizens of the
FRY be withdrawn from Bosnia. It is also said in this text that
the Serb leadership of BiH can take political control over the
soldiers who remain in BiH. This clearly reflects the position of
the then leadership of the FRY regarding political control over
the future Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
3.2.2.3. 60th political and military control over the Army of the
Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was in the hands of
the Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina(1ater Republic of Srpska). The relations of
command in the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina are regulated by the Law on the Army of the Serb
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina published in the Official
Journal No. 7 of 1992. Decisions of the President of the
Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
were brought on the basis of this Law. On the basis of the
same Law the President of the Presidency of the Serb Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina brought the Decree on the
Application of the Rules of International Law of Armed
Conflicts to the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina published in the "Official Journal of the Serb
people in Bosnia and Herzegovina", No. 9 of 13 June 1992.
(Annex No. R9, pp r86-r87lr88) In para. 1 of this Decree it is
said: "The Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Serb Ministry of Interna1Affairs shall apply
and observe the rules of international law of armed conflicts in
armed conflict." Under the rules of international military law the
Decree understands: international treaties signed or ratified or
acceded to by the former SFRY, rules of international
customary law of armed conflicts and the generally recognized
principles of international law of armed conflicts.The SFRY is a
contracting Party to al1four 1949 Geneva Conventions. In para.
2 of the Decree it is said: "Commanders of the Army at al1
568levels and every member of the Army or other military formation
taking part in combat operations shall be responsible for the
application of the rules of international law of armed conflicts.
Against persons violating the rules of international law of
armed conflicts proceedings for pronouncing sanctions
prescribed by the law shall be initiated by the cornpetent
commander." Chapter 16 of the Penal Code of the SFRY
defines criminal acts against international law and crimes
against humanity incriminating the violation of law of armed
conflicts and international humanitarian law. It has already been
noted earlier in this document that the Republic of Srpska
accepted and applied the Penal Code of the SFRY. Para. 3 of
the Decree authorizes the Minister of Defence of the Serb
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to prescribe the instruction
on the treatment of PoWs. Para. 4 provides for training for
familiarization with the rules of international military law, on a
regular basis.
3.2.2.4. The Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, at its session held on 13 June 1992, brought the
Decision on Prohibition of Forming and Activities of Armed
Groups and lnciividuals in the Territory of the Republic, which
are not under the Unique Command of the Army or Militia,
published in the "Official Journal of the Serb people in BiH"
No.10 of 30 June 1992. (Annex No. RIO, pp. r89lr90 ) Art.1 of
this Decision prohibits the forming and activities of self-
organized armed groups and individuals in the territory of the
Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pursuant to the
same Article 1 the existing groups and individuals are boundto
place themselves within 3 days under the unique command of
the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or of
the Ministry of Interna1Affairs of the Serb Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. In Art.2 of this Decision the Presidency of the
Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina dissociates itself from
groups which continue to operate autonomously and orders
sanctioning of their existence and activities with the most
severe measures provided for by the law. Art. 3 of the Decision
569says that subordination to the unique command of the army or
militia also implies strict compliance with the provisions of
international law.
3.2.2.5. Djordje Djukic, General of the Army of the Republic of
Srpska, arrested in Sarajevo on 30 January 1996, in his
statetment given to the authorities of the Applicant, defines the
objectives of the Republika Srpska Army in the following way:
"The Army, formed on this way, had a task to
ensure the territory for the Serbian people in the RBiH.
From the early beginning, there were not discussions
about mechanical connection to the Republic of Serbia.
The best indicator for that was development of the
relations between two ruling parties (SPS and SDS) in
the following period. The idea was: in case that Serbian
Republic could not become a part of Yugoslavia as a
Federal unit (if the World forbids that),an it must have
its State territory and other attributes or must function as
independent unit within the BiH Federation. The Army of
the Serbian Republic never got the marked borders of
the future Serbian State, because the politics never
elucidated that. The conviction that Serbian Republic
does not need integral RBiH was permanent& laid open.
lt was emphas~zed that the best solution was to
separate Serbs from Muslems, and if they had to live
together than they could live as neighbours in two
States. Momtilo KrajiiSnnik,PlavSic, Ostojié and than
Karadiic' were the most determined regarding that
opinion. Army thought that it was possible to /ive
together and mingled, assuming that Serbian entity had
its State and as well as Muslems. ln such territories,
rnutual life was possibl".
3.2.2.6. General Djordje Djukic communicated the following
about the preparation and carrying out of combat operations by
the Main Headquarters of the Republic of Srpska Army:
570"During the preparations and planning for the carrying
out the military actions, Main HQ of the ASR gave
directives to the subordinated units.
The first ofhose directives was for the operation
Bosanski Brod. Although the operation was carried out
by the units of the 1st Krajina Corps (1 KK), the Main
HQ of the ASR made the Directive and engaged, beside
1KK the Air Force and Air Defense Forces. The aim
was to take over Bosanski Brod and to expel Croatian
Army from this territory across the river Sava. The
operation lasted about 10 days, and it was carried out
in June 1992. The above mentioned Directive was the
first written document on the military operations made by
the Main HQ of the ASR. Regarding the Logistics, the
mentioned Directive regulated on& that the 14th Logistic
base was in charge for the logistical support. Regarding
the fact that the Directive did not imply the concrete
tasks, /, as the Assistant Commander, was in charge to
give more concrete obligations in special orders and to
provide tasks which would ensure complete and
adequate support to the coming military actions. Having
in mind al1 that, / demanded from Commander of the
14th Logistic base, Colonel ~kondric Milàn, to make
plans for the Logistic support, to concrete and organize
frontal bases for supply, technical support, teams for
pulling out the military technics. From the first step of
the real~zation of this idea, we considered it to be the
introduction for the offensive in which the corridor would
be broken through and connection of the 1st KK and
East-Bosnian Corps established.
The 1st KK was designated to be the conveyor
of the offensive military operations and it got the order
to make plan and to choose the units that would be
engaged. For the accomplishment of the task, the Air
571Forces (AF) and Air Defence Forces (ADF) were put on
disposa1and they could be used as the Commanders of
the 1st KK, AF and ADF agreed.
The Main HG?ASR made the second Directive
for the breach of the Corridor. The 1st KK was
appointed the conveyor of the operation, and beside the
units of this Corps, the units of the East - Bosnian
Corps, brgades of the Ministry of lnterior of the
Republic Serbian Krajina, Air Force and Air Defense
Forces of the Serbian Republic were also engaged.
The special Police brigade of the Serbian
Republic took part too. The structure of the forces was
not completely known to me, but 1 knew that following
brigades took part: 7st Armored brigade, 5th Kozara,
Gradisce brigade, Prnjavor brigade, and frorn the East-
Bosnian Corps: 1st and 2nd Posavina brigades. Beside
the support of the combined Artillery Regiment, Air
Forces and Air Defense Forces of the Serbian Republic
were also engaged The operation was completed on
26th or 27th of June, 7992. The Directive regulated that
74thLogistic Base provide Logistic support for al1forces
from the west. Any particular analysis of the operation
was not done. The Commander was General Talic, the
Commander of the brigade of the Ministry of lnterior of
the SRK was Milan Martié, The operation was not totally
completed when the Command of the 7st KK got the
order to continue military operatlons with a part of the
units towards Gradaëac, after the breach of the Corridor.
The Army was ordered to cease fighting after taking
over of this city and to fortify the positions. lt was left
over to the 1st KK to make plan and determine the
required forces. The Command of the AF and ADF got
the order to arrange with the Commander of the 1st KK
the use of the Air Forces. The miliary operations were
prolonged and when the units reached the suburbs of
572GradaCacit was already the winter and on suggestion of
the Commander of the 1st KK, the units dug in along
the reached positions and 1 think that the situation was
not changed fil1the Dayton Agreement.
Beside the 1st Armored brigade, the following
brigades were also engaged: Prnjavor brigade, Trebava
brigade and 1 think some parts of the Police, 1 cannot
recall if Srbac brigade or some of its parts took part.
During 7993 Directive was made according to
which al1 units of the ASR were completely engaged
The goal was tu improve the tactical positions in sorne
psrts. This referred especially tu Drina Corps and area
Cerska Konjevic Polje - Bratunac. Beside this area,
BrCko region was also pointed out as priority. The
intention was tu broaden the Corridor. The deployment
of the forces was not assumed and done, except for a
brigade from the 1st KK which was transferred in zone
of the Drina Corps and engaged in the area of Cerska
and Konjevic Polje. This Directive implied to the East -
Bosnian Corps tu improve ifs positions on Majevica and
in the area of Teotak. The First Krajina Corps had to
possibly conquer Tesanj or the Communication Doboj -
Teslic. If 1 remernber well, the Sarajevo - Rornanija
Corps had a task tu capture Mojmilo hiIl, tu extend the
areas around Ilidia and tu repeal forces in the zone of
VogoSCa tuwards Kobilja Glava. Herzegovina Corps
focused its operations towards Konjic in order, if
possible, to conquer it.
The special preparations on the Military level
were not done.
As the supply of the material means was equal
in al1bases, the maneuver of them was not done.
The conveyors of the Logistical support for those
573operations were al1 four bases for the units within their
zone of responsibikty. Beside Drina Corps, which
expanded its zone, 1 do not remember that there were
any other considerable results, although the military
operations lasted longer on al1 front lines. lt was not
always easy tu motivate soldiers tu conquer a new area.
lt could be heard from a Commander of the Corps or
HQ personnel who were on the spot, that soldiers on
the question why they did not go further answered that
there was no need for casualties when that area
belonged tu the Muslems anyway.
1 think that the Main HQ ASR made both
directives for the attack on Goraide, lgman offensive
and offensive on Bihac at the end of 7994. 1 was not
present in the Main HQ when the Directives were done,
except for the last one. But it did not make any
difference, for the decision and plan for actions or
operations were not discussed in the HQ.
ln such occasions, General Mladic would
emphasize that it would be necessary tu undertake a//
activities regarding the task which he discussed namely
with the Chief of the HQ and the conveyor of the
operation.If he had discussed this subject with someone
before that,nobody knew. lt was possible that he asked
one of the Commanders, whom he planned tu engage,
about the situation in the Corps and if one of bis plans
could be carried out. 1 think that he always consulted
General Tolimir Zdravko, if he was present. If 1 was
present, he would tell me tu check if the bases work
properly and depending on the extent of the action or
seasons tu see if there were enough fuel, shoes or
some pairs of clothes,
When the Decision for Bihac operation was
made in the late autumn of 1994, 1 was on my
574 Command place in Han Pijesak. At that time, 1 was
asked to come to the main command place Crna Rijeka
because, as it was stated, President Radovan Karad*,
Momeilo Krajisnik, Koljevic, KoziC, and as far as 1 can
remember, the Minister of Defense, but 1 am not sure,
were coming. The reason for this was the Offensive of
the 5th Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
3.2.2.7. The method of commanding as described by General
Djukic is confirmed by the document "Amendment to the
Command on Execution of Operation" No.14193 of 3 November
1993 attached by the Applicant as Annex 152 to the Reply.
This document, as quoted by the Applicant in para. 192, p.588
of the Reply, reads:
"The Command of SRK (VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps)
NO. 20/75- 7409
74/93 dated 03.11.1993
Amendment to the Command on Execution of Operation
OP No. 74/93 dated 03.11.1993,
Copy: Commands of al1 brigades, TG (Tactical Group)
Vogosca, 4th MAR (M~xed Artillery Regirnent), /KM
(Forward Command Posf), PKM (Temporary Cornmand
Pos 0, SRK (Sarajevo-Romanija Corps)
Attn. of the Commander personally
1. According to the amendment of directive No.6 GS
(General Staff) of VRS (Bosnian Serb Army) DT No.
02/2-1014 of 74.72.7993 and decision of the highest
leaderships of the Serb people of 14.12.7993 SRK
(Sarajevo-Romanija Corps) with strengthening forces (1
brigade from the first KK (VRS Kra/ïna Corps), 1brigade
from the RK MUP (Ministry of Interior) forces up to the
size of the battalion- 500 people, special forces of VJ
575 (Yugoslav Army) up to 120 people and department of
helicopters), by main forces with crucial defense at
larger front area to prevent the outbreak of the enemy
from the central Bosnia and Goraide towards Sarajevo,
partly by the forces in the regions of Trebevic, Mojmilo,
Vojkovici and llidia (towns, villages, hills southwest of
Sarajevo). Carry out smaller effective actions with the
aim of (illegible) the enemy. A part of the forces
together with other organ~zational units to carry out
attack in the direction: Vogosca - ~uë Pofaliki -Lukavica
- Hrasnica (towns and suburbs surrounding the city of
Sarajevo) with the task to break Muslim forces at the
directions of the attacks. To inflct them as more losses
as possible, take the bills of ~uë, Orlic and Hum
(strategic hills overlooking Sarajevo) under control and if
possible Mojmilo as well, and in this way create
conditions for undisturbed work of the factories Famos:
'Orao: and 'Pretis' (important military factory in VogoSca,
(nnrthwest of Sarajevo)). Cut Muslims communication
between Sarajevo and lgman (large hi11 Overlooking
Sarajevo airport) and further to central Bosnia, prepare
conditions for partition of Sarajevo into two parts.
The operation is to be executed in two stages:
- in the first stage fake the hills ZU~, Orlic and Hum
under control
- in the second stage take areas of Hrasnica and Butmir
under control
Readiness for the attack: 19.12.1993':
The Applicant quotes this document as evidence of the
participation of the Army of Yugoslavia in armed conflicts in
Bosnia and Herzegovina also after its withdrawal from Bosnia
and Herzegovina. However, this document proves something
quite different. It is true :hat mention is made in it of the
participation of the special forces of the Army of Yugoslavia, but
it is clear that they participate under the command of the Main
576Headquarters of the Republika Srpska Army and that the whole
operation is carried out on the basis of Directive No.6 of the
Main HQ of the Republika Srpska Army and on the basis of
the Decision of the top leadership of the Serb people in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Consequently, the special forces of the Army
of Yugoslavia do not take part in the operation under the
command of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, if
they participated at all, but under the command of the Main
Headquarters of the Republic of Srpska Army. This is a
fundamental difference concerning the attribution of acts of
these special forces. Besides, the military operation for which
order was issued has nothing to do with alleged genocide.
3.2.3. Final Considerations Concerning Attribution of Acts to
the Respondent
3.2.3.1. The position of the Respondent is that the acts alleged
to constitute genocide are not attributable to the Respondent
and the relevant circumstances are elaborated in Chapters 2,3
and 5 of the Counter-Memorial.
3.2.3.2. Three distinct elements cal1 for examination: (a) The
loss of control of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the
JNA in March 1992. (b) The appearance of the Republic of
Srpska as an independent state in the period beginning 28
March 1992. (c) The absence of control of the Republic of
Srpska by the Government of Yugoslavia.
3.2.3.3. The secession of the Former Yugoslav Republics from
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia produced a critical
situation in which the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) found
itself, without warning, a visitor on the territory of hostile
secessionist entities. No orderly transition was agreed and the
public order situation was exacerbated by the appearance of
armed militias. A three-sided civil war emerged within Bosnia
and on 12 and 23 April 1992 the leaders of the three sidessigned two successive cease-fire agreements. The three sides
were the Serbs. Muslims and Croats of Bosnia.
3.2.3.4. In face of these rapid developments, involving the
premature recognition of new Republics, with disastrous
consequences for BiH, the competent authorities of the
Respondent decided on 4 May 1992 that the JNA should
withdraw from Bosnia. Once that decision had been taken, it
was carried into effect as expeditiously as circumstances
allowed. There is simple evidence that the Respondent made a
significant effort to arrange a peaceful transition and this is
confirmed by the Secretary-General's Report of 30 May 1992.
3.2.3.5. The Bosnian Reply constantly distorts the actual
cicumstances. Given the political reordering of the region then
under way, JNA personnel who were associated with the
different ethnic groups within Bosnia remained behind and
joined the newly formed territorial armed forces. Commanding
officers of Muslim and Croat formations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina were former officers of the Yugoslav People's
Army.
3.2.3.6. The evidence available confirms that the JNA was no
longer in general control of Bosnia in March 1992, when Muslim
and Croat military formations commenced attacks on JNA units
in Bosnia and Herzegovina: see the Counter-Memorial, pp.251-
8.
3.2.3.7. As the Counter-Memorial has shown, the foundations of
an independent Serb state were laid on 28 February 1992:
Counter-Memorial, pp.122-5, paras. 2.4.1.1.-2.4.1.15. Whether or
not the new state was recognised, it satisfied the legal
conditions of statehood and the withholding of recognition was
based on political ratherthan legal considerations.
3.2.3.8. The independent status of the Republic of Srpska was
effectively acknowledged as a consequence of its participation
578in the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and
the resulting Agreement Relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina
signed on 30 January 1993: Counter-Memorial, Ann. 137,
pp.1063-4.
3.2.3.9. In any event, in the context of attribution, the precise
legal status of the Republic of Srpska is not decisive. What is
decisive is that, commencing in early March 1992, significant
areas of Bosnia were under the control of the armed forces of
the Republic of Srpska and not under the control of the JNA.
As a matter of final legal analysis, it does not matter whether
the Republic of Srpska constituted a State, a State in statu
naseendi, a belligerent comunity, or an insurrection. The
Republic of Srpska had its own armed forces and was not
subordinate to Yugoslavia.
3.2.3.10. As the Counter-Memorial points out, the Secretary-
General's report of 30 May 1992 recognised the independence
of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska: Counter-Memorial,
pp. 129-30, paras. 2.6.1.1.-2.6.1.3.
3.2.3.11. The Reply of the Applicant places very considerable
reliance upon the decisions of the ITCFY, but this general
policy of reliance is not applied with any real consistency.Thus
the Opinion and Judgement of 7 May 1997 in the Tadic case
are played down and quoted, if at all, on a very selective basis.
3.2.3.12. In the Tadic case the Trial Chamber, with Judge
McDonald dissenting on this issue, held that the Republic of
Srpska was not a de facto organ or agent of the Yugoslav
Government: Tadic, Opinion of 7 May 1997, pp. 213-28, paras.
584-608. In making this determination, the Trial Chamber relied
upon the criteria laid down by the Court in the Merits phase of
the Nicaragua case, I.C.J. Reports, 1986, p.14. The key
passages from the Judgment in that case are as follows: "What the Court has to determine at this point is
whether or not the relationsh~p of the contras to the
United States Government was so much one of
dependence on the one side and control on the other
that it would be right to equate the contras, for legal
purposes, with art organ of the United States
Government, or as acting on behalf of that Government.
Here it is relevant to note that in May 7983 the
assessment of the Intelligence Committee, in the Report
referred to in paragraph 95 above, was that the contras,
konstitute (d) an independent force' and that the bnly
element of control that could be exercised by the United
States' was kessation of aid: Paradoxically this
assessment senles to underline, a contrario, the
potential for control inherent in the degree of the
contras' dependence on aid. Yet despite the heavy
subsidies and other support provided to them by the
United States, there is no clear evidence of the United
States having actually exercised such a degree of
control in al1 fields as to justify treating the contras as
acting on its behalf"(lbid., p. 62, para. 709). So far as
the potential control constituted by the possibility of
cessation of United States milifary aid is concerne4 it
may be noted that after 7 October 7984 such aid was
no longer authorised, though the sharing of intelligence,
and the provision of 'humanitarian assistance' as defined
in the above-cited legislation (paragraph 97) may
continue. Yet, according to Nicaragua's own case, and
according tu press reports, contra activity bas continued.
ln sum, the evidence available to the Court indicates
that the various forms of assistance provided to the
contras by the United States have been crucial to the
pursuit of their activities,but is insufficient to
demonstrate their complete dependence on United
States aid. On the other band, it indicates that in the
initial years of United States assistance the contra force
was so dependent. However, whether the United States
580Government at any stage devised the strategy and
directed the tactics of the contras depends on the extent
to which the United States made use of the potential for
control inherent in that dependence. The Court already
indicated that it has insufficient evidence to reach a
finding on this point. lt is a fortiori unable to determine
that the contra force may be equated for legal purposes
with the forces of the United States. This conclusion,
however, does not of course suffice to resolve the entire
question of the responsibility incurred by the United
States through its assistance to the contras.' (lbid, pp.
62-63, para 170).
"115. The Court has taken the view (paragraph 770
above) that United States participation, even if
preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organising,
training, supplying and equ~pping of the contras, the
selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the
planning of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient
in itself; on the basis of the evidence in the possession
of the Court, for the purpose of attributing to the United
States the acts commifted by the contras in the course
of their military or paramiïitary operations in Nicaragua.
Al1 the forms of United States participation mentioned
above, and even the general control by the respondent
State over a force with a high degree of dependency on
it, would not in themselves mean, without further
evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the
perpetration of the acts contrary to human rlghts and
humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State. Such
acts could well be committed by members of the contras
without the control of the United States. For this conduct
to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it
would in princ~ple have to be proved that that State had
effective control of the military or paramilitary operations
in the course of which the alleged violations were
committed.
581 "776. The Court does not consider that the assistance
given by the United States to the contras warrants the
conclusion that these forces are subject to the United
States to such an extent that any acts they have
committed are imputable to that State. lt takes the view
that the contras remain reponsible for their acts, and
that the United States is not responsible for the acts of
the contras, but for itsOwn conduct vis-a-vis Nicaragua,
includng conduct related to the acts of the contras.
(lbid,, pp.64-65)
3.2.3.13. The evidence presented on behalf of the Applicant
State in respect of attribution is completely inconclusive. Media
sources predominate. There is a general failure to apply
relevant legal criteria and no reference is made to the key
determinations of the TrialChamber in the Tadic case, although
there is selective quotation from the Opinion of the majority.
3.2.3.14. The Applicant invokes the arrangements for the
Dayton Conference as evidence of an alleged Yugoslav control
over the Republic of Srpska: Reply, pages 465-6, para. 23. The
assurances given by President MiloSevic were of a political
character and their character is in no way incompatible with the
separate existence of the Republic of Srpska. Indeed, the
assurances could only make political sense if it be assumed
that the Republic of Srpska was a separate entity.
3.2.3.15. The Dayton Accords themselves confirm the political
reality of aseparate and independent Republic of Srpska which,
it was agreed, would become a part of a new State. Within this
framework the Republic of Srpska in its own capacity signed a
series of trilateral agreements as follows:
Annex 7-A: Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace
Settlement
Annex 7-B:Agreement on Regional Stabilization
582 Annex 2: Agreement on lnter-Entity Boundary Line and
Related Issues
Annex 3: Agreement on Elections
Annex 4: Constitution
Annex 5: Agreement on Arbitration
Annex 6: Agreement on Human Rights
Annex 7. Agreement on Refugees and Displaced
Persons
Annex 8: Agreement on the Commission to Preserve
National Monuments
Annex 9: Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina Public
Corporations
Annex 70: Agreement on Civilian lmplementation
Annex 7 7: Agreement on International Police Task Force
3.2.3.6. The outcome of these various trilateral agreements
was the General Framework Agreement for Peace concluded in
Paris. The basis of these complex arrangements was the
assumption that the Republic of Srpska was an independent
and viable contracting party to the eleven trilateral agrements
listed above.
Besides, the Applicant overlooked the provision in the Preamble
of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina which reads:
"Noting the Agreement of August 29, 7995, which
authorized the delegation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia toSI@, on behalf of the Republic of Srpska,
the parts of the peace plan concerning it, with the
obligation to implement the Agreement that is reached
strictly and consequently'!
Such an agreement implies the existence of two independent
and equal entities, namely, that one entity authorizes the other
to do something on its behalf. This fact speaks convincinglyabout the relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the Republic of Srpska.
3.2.3.18. As far as the Applicant's allegation in para. 3, p.465
of the Reply that 'Defore initialling the Dayton Accords, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia provided written assurances to
the negotiating Parties that it would 'ensure that the Republic of
Srpska fuliy respects aild complies with the provisions' of the
Agreement" is concerned, the Applicant failed to draw attention
to the letter which the delegation of the Republic of Srpska,
comprised of Momcilo KrajiSnik, Nikola Koljevic and Aleksa
Buha, submitted on 20 November 1995 to the delegation of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, published on pp.124-5 of the
document Al501790, SI19951999 and which reads as follows:
"Mr. President, we are addressing you in connection
with the peace agreement and documents which should
be initialled at the end of the peace negotiations in
Ohio. ln view of the fact that in a series of documents
which have been prepared for adoption it is requested
that the FR of Yugoslavia should be the guarantor of
the obligations assumed by the Republika Srpska in the
peace process, you are kindiy requested to take upon
yourself; on behalf of the FR of Yugoslavia, the role of
the guarantor that the Republika Srpska shall fulfil al1
the obligations it has assumed."
Consequently, the obligation of guarantee has been assumed at
the request of the delegation of the Republic of Srpska.
3.2.3.19. The Applicant complains, at considerable length, that
the JNA and the Yugoslav Government distributed arms and
equipment to Serbs living within Bosnia and Herzegovina: see
pages 466 to 498, paras. 7-58. The Respondent will confine
the analysis which follows to the legal implications of the facts
as alleged by the Applicant.3.2.3.20. It goes without saying that in the period before Bosnia
and Herzegovina became independent, it was perfectly lawful
for the Yugoslav Government to provide its armed forces with
weapons and ammunition, more especially as the secessionist
irregular forces appeared and began to attack both the
Yugoslav forces and the Serbian communities established for
centuries in the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is
necessary, in face of the historical distortions in the Bosnian
pleadings, to recall that in 1910, the population of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was 43.5 per cent Orthodox in religion, such
element being exclusively Serb: United Kingdom, Naval
Intelligence Division, Geographical Handbook Series, Jugoslavia,
October 1944, Vol. II, p.57.
3.2.3.21. In any event the arms available to the Serb population
came for the most part from local sources: Counter-Memorial,
pp.102-5, para. 1.3.17. In so far as the political upheavals of
the year 1991 involved the redistribution of arms between the
various groups involved, this did not involve the breach of any
principle of international law and certainly did not constitute
evidence of any plan to commit genocide. In this period of rapid
destruction and change the various ethnic groups tended to
separate out and to arm themselves.
3.2.3.22. After the Republic of Srpska appeared as an
independent political unit in February and March 1992, even on
the assumption that arms and equipment were received from
the Yugoslav armed forces, this would, as a matter of law, not
establish the necessary control by Yugoslavia for purposes of
attribution. There is the respectable decision to the effect that
the provision of logistical supportoes not constitute a basis for
attribution: theecision of the Court in Nicaragua case.
3.2.3.23. A further thesis of the Reply is that the withdrawal of
Yugoslav armed forces was somehow unreal. The facts have
been reviewed very clearly in the Yugoslav Counter-Memorial,
Chapter III, pages 246 to 269. The evidence is overwhelming
585and in May 1992 the problem was not the failure of Yugoslavia
to withdraw its armed forces but the problem described in
United Nations documents as 'deblocking', that is to Say, the
obstacles to withdrawal created by attacks mounted by Muslim
and Croat forces, and in some cases, Serb irregulars opposed
to the withdrawal.
3.2.3.24. The Applicant deals with these events by a process of
extended obfuscation. The primary element (see the Reply,
pages 503 to 505, paras. 70 to 73) is to insinuate that the
presence of Yugoslav forces outside Serbia was illegal even
when the process of secession and political disintegration was
stilltaking place. A further development is the playing of a
game with the chronology, referring to events in 1991 when in
fact Yugoslavia still exercised sovereignty and control in Bosnia.
3.2.3.25. The Applicant also complains that in late 1991, as the
war in Croatia ended, the Yugoslav armed forces were then
redeployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, then still part of
Yugoslavia: Reply p.504, para. 71. What was exceptional about
this? Where were the Yugoslav forces supposed to go?
3.2.3.26. Another element alleged to be relevant to the question
of attribution is the measures alleged to have been taken in
July 1991 by the Yugoslav Government to prevent and to
counter secessionist activities then developing in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: see the Reply, pp.472-473, para. 21, quoting from
the Tadic Opinion, Trial Chamber, 7 May 1997, p.39, para. 107.
Such activities could involve no breach of international law and
provide no evidence relevant to the issue of responsibility for
genocide.
3.2.3.27. The question of attribution is a legal question and
involves legal rather than political analysis. It is thus particularly
inappropriate for the Reply to rely to a considerable extent upon
press reports and the assessments of journalists.3.2.3.28. Journalists dealing with the Yugoslav crisis have been
persistently and mindlessly anti-Serb, and have been heavily
influenced by political opinion. The lack of fairness and the
absence of even minimal objectivity on the part of the media
were especially apparent in the case of the Croatian invasion of
the Krajina in August 1995 and the resultant ethnic cleansing,
the biggest episode since 1945. The only consequence of this
episode was the prosecution of the Krajina Serb leader, Milan
Martic, (for firing a rocket at Zagreb (as a response to the
invasion)). The media expressed no disapproval of these
proceedings and the double standards involved.
3.2.3.29. In the same vein, the Reply gives prominence to the
diary of a member of the Serb political party (SDS) in Bosnia:
Reply, pp.478-482, paras. 31-36. The diary relates to the period
12 January 1991 to 24 January 1992. The diary is adduced to
establish that in this period the lawful Government of
Yugoslavia was, at the request of groups of Serbs living in
Bosnia who felt threatened by potential developments, willing to
supply weapons. There is not the slightest hint in the material
quoted by the Bosnian Government either that the requests for
arms, or the decision to supply arms, had any connection with
a plan involving genocide in any form.
3.2.3.30. These defensive preparations involve reference to
specific places: namely, Kalesija and Tuzla. As the Yugoslav
Counter-Memorial shows, Muslim attacks in the Kalesija
municipality began on 2 May 1992: pp.627-630, para. 7.1.51 .O.
Many atrocities were committed in the Tuzla region, beginning
in May 1992: Counter-Memorial, pp.500-504, 927-932, and 995-
998. Reference is also made to people from Zvornik seeking
arms. In the Zvornik commune Muslim armed forces first
attacked in January and April 1992: see the Yugoslav Counter-
Memorial, pp.505-513, and 897-898.
3.2.3.31. It is thus apparent that the desire to acquire means of
defence in 1991 reflected an objective threat. And it also
587becomes clear that the concerns of the Serb leaders did no
more than reflect the justified fears of the Serbs living in
Bosnia.
3.2.3.32. The chapter on the question of attribution in the Reply
puts emphasis on a series of captured Yugoslav military
documents relating, according to their dates, to the period 13
December 1991 to 20 March 1992 (pp. 484-498, paras. 40-58).
These documents, it is asserted, prove the JNA's 'massive
involvement in the distribution of arms' (p.484).
3.2.3.33. The importance of these documents is difficult to
perceive. They tend to confirm the account of the period of
transition described in the Yugoslav Counter-Memorial, Chapter
111, pp.245-258. After the loss of Croatia and the clear
indications of secessionist tendencies in Bosnia, the JNA was
involved in various forms of cooperation with the Serb
communities in the relevant areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
None of these activities involved any preparation for activities
contrary to principles of international law and, it is necessary to
recall, Bosnia and Herzegovina did not become independent at
that time. The documents relate exclusively to activities which
were lawful and, in al1the circumstances, perfectly reasonable.
3.2.3.34. A substantial section of Chapter 8 of the Bosnian
Reply is concerned with the military involvement of the JNA in
Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to the withdrawal of the JNA: see
pp.498-572. In this connection it may be recalled that as a
matter of fact the JNA was no longer in general control of
Bosnia by March 1992, when Muslim and Croat military
formations began attacking JNA units in Bosnia. The final
withdrawal of the JNA began in the first half of May 1992.
3.2.3.35. This lengthy section in Chapter 8 of the Reply calls
for very cautious evaluation. In particular, the following factors
will be found to render the material either irrelevant or seriously
unreliable.
5883.2.3.36. The account fails to accept that by March 1992 the
Yugoslav Government no longer had controi of Bosnia as a
whole. And, according to the Reply, 'the genocidal conflict' did
not erupt until April 1992 (p.501, para. 67). The Report by
General Kukanjac, dated March 1992, shows that the JNA was
already withdrawing from the Muslim and Croat areas of
Bosnia: Reply, Annex 120.
3.2.3.37. The entire period of the secession of the former
Yugoslav Republics is caricatured. Every reaction of the JNA to
the crisis, which had been engineered externally, is represented
as a form of aggression and every redeployment of the JNA is
portrayed as a threat. In reality, the JNA was throughout
reacting to initiatives,liiical and military, taken by others.
3.2.3.38. There is no evidence of any preparation for genocidal
acts as the Bosnian Reply admits:
"The main aim of the JNA was, after al( the profecfion
of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
location of the JNA forces was fo be adjL/sted
accordingly."(Reply, p.505, para 73).
In the light of subsequent developments, this policy was fully
justified.
3.2.3.39. The various accounts given in the Reply of military
activities by JNA units (see pp.518-541, paras. 84-113) relate to
episodes in a civil war and nothing more. The numerous
documents advanced by the Bosnian Government in this section
of the Reply contain no evidence of genocidal intent. In light of
the fact that these appear to be official documents of the JNA
they constitute direct evidence of the absence of genocidal
intent. As the documents make clear, they are concerned
exclusively with 'combat activities'; see, for example, the
document dated 7 April 1992, pp.524-525, para. 91. The hostile
589documents quoted from non-Yugoslav sources refer to 'Muslim
resistance forces': see the Reply, p.530, para. 98. The
commentary itself constantly refers to 'military operations'.
3.2.3.40. Episode after episode recounted in the Reply relates
to the military activities of the JNA in the chaotic period in April
1992 when the Yugoslav forces were on the defensive and
were on the point of wilhdrawal. In the television interview with
a former JNA Commander invoked by the Reply, the key point
is that the interviewer, speaking on behalf of Bosnian Serbs, is
upbraiding Kukanjac for the failure of the JNA to provide
adequate protection to the Serb residents of Sarajevo: Reply,
p.540, para. 113.
3.3. Acts Alleged by the Applicant Cannot be
Qualified as Genocidal Acts or Other Acts Prohibited by the
Genocide Convention
3.3.1. The Respondent Did Not Plan or lntend to
Destroy Non-Serb Population in Bosnia and Herzegovina
3.3.1.1. In para. 6, p.956 of the Reply the Applicant says:
! The jurisdiction ratione materiae of the Court is
strict& defned by the Genocide Convention and covers
only State responsibility for genocide and for the ofher
violations related to genocide, as provided by the
Convention. Notably, the Court bas no jurisdiction to
decide on disputes concerning war crimes or crimes
against humanify as such, which are beyond the scope
of the Genocide Convention. War crimes and crimes
against humanity (as many other kinds of criminal acts)
could corne under the jurisdiction of the Court by virtue
of Article IX of the Genocide Convention only when -
and in so far as - it is argued that they are elements of
a genocidal pattern of conduct, as part of a plan intending 'tu destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial orligious group."
3.3.1.2. What makes the crime of genocide different from other
similar crimes is the genocidal intent. The C,pplicant speaks,
however, of 'i~eenoidalpattern of condtict as part of a plan
intending tu destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial orreligious group'! The Applicant is seeking to prove that
there existed a plan to destroy non-Serb population in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. According to the Applicant this plan was
allegedly called RAM. Consequently, the Applicant is attempting
to prove the existence of some plan under the name of RAM,
whose purpose is the destruction of non-Serb population in
Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of creating Great Serbia.
3.3.1.3. The Applicant is trying to prove the existence of this
plan by referring to various press reports and publicist works,
as well as by pointing to some alleged facts. The Applicant is
unable to prove the existence of a plan whose essence is the
destruction of non-Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina
for the simple reason thatsuch a plan did not exist.
3.3.1.4. The existence of this plan cannot be proved by any
direct evidence. Although the Applicant has come in posession
of a large number of documents of the former Yugoslav
People's Army and documents of the Republic of Srpska, none
of these documents contains indications of the existence of
some plan for the destruction of non-Serb population in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
3.3.1.5. In the absence of direct evidence, the Applicant refers
to certain views of journalists, publicists, alleged researchers,
etc., who wrote about the existence of a plan under the name
of RAM. Thus, the Applicant refers to the writing of one Tim
Judah, journalist and author from London. In the book "The
Serbs, History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia", hedevoted one section to the plan RAM which he describes in the
following way: (para. 11, p.469 of the Reply)
"(...) The purpose of the Plan was the organization of
the Serbs outside Serbia, taking control of the fledging
SDS (Serbian Democratic Parties) parties and the
prepositioning of arms and arnmunitions."
3.3.1.6. However, it remains mysterious how Tim Judah had
come by the information about the existence of the alleged plan
and about its contents. In para. 24, p.474 of the Reply, Judah
refers to a small group of people which met at a dinner to
discuss its plans. This group of people was allegedly known as
"military line". Judah writes:
'3n the words of one source, it was: Ilet's arm our
people first in Croatia, then Bosnia, so if Croatia and
Slovenia want to get out, we won? let thern take what
we take before thern:"
Consequently, Judah does not assert that he was personally
present at the dinner nor does he Say who is the source of this
information.
3.3.1.7. Bassiouni's Commission, too, mentions some project
under the name of RAM. In para. 13, p.470 of the Reply the
Applicant quotes the relevant part of the report of Bassiouni's
Commission as follows:
"There is evidence, however, that the JNA, the Republic
of Serbia and Serbs in Croatia and BiH were preparing
for war as early as 7990. lt was then that the Yugoslav
military began providing arms to Croatian and Bosnian
Serb groups and encouraging unrest in Serb-populated
regions of Croatia and BiH. ln a project (operating under
the acronym "RAM'I) coordinated from Belgrade,
thousands of weapons were reportedly delivered to
592 Serbs in Bosanska Krajina in the north-west (of Bosnia
and Herzegovina), Herzegovina in the south-west, and
Romanua, a mountainous area east of Sarajevo. "(United
Nations, Final Report of the United Nations Commission
of Experts, Sl19941674lAdd.2 (Vol. l), 28 Dec. 1994,
Annex IV, "The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing", p.27, para.
140).
Bassiouni's Commision does not indicate the evidence that
confirms the existence of this project.
3.3.1.8. In para. 14, p.470 of the Reply the Applicant refers to
the writing of Misha Glenny and his book "The Fall of
Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War", London, 1992. Misha
Glenny does not Say in what way he came by the information
about the existence of the plan RAM and about its contents.
3.3.1.9. In para. 15, p.470 of the Reply the Applicant alleges
that the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army issued in
the summer of 1991 the order for disarming of the Territorial
Defence forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, the
Applicant says: "This order is very significant, as it deprived the
authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the
necessary military means to defend themselves and the future
state,"Similarly, in para. 16, p.470 of the Reply the Applicant
says:
"The order given in the summer of 7997 is an important
step in the execution of the RAM plan. lt was described
by Dr. Milan Vego in his February 1993 contribution to
the authoritative Jane3 Intelligence Review:
'The legaliy elected government in Sarajevo formaliy
controlled the main staff and subordinate district and
communal staffs of the Territorial Defence Forces (JDV.
However, in the operational chain of command, these
forces were subordinate to the General Staff of the
593 former federal army in Belgrade. Because the Serbian-
dominated General Staff wanted to deny the Bosnian
government any means of effective defence, it ordered
in June 7991 that al1 the weapons of the TDF be put
under the federal army's control. As a result, the major
part of the 200,000 small arms in the custody of the
TDF was returned. The exception was the weaponry of
the TDF's staffs in the Croatian-populated western
Herzegovina; these elements largely Unored the General
Staff'sorder.'! This fact is also mentioned by the ICTFY
in its 1996 Review of the lndictments of Radovan
KaradZic and Ratko Mladic: "lt appears that during 1991
some of the units of the Territorial Defence, composed
of reservists which were under the partial command of
the authorities of the federated Republics were obliged
to surrender their military equipment to the JNA, which
allegedly deprived the non-Serbian populations of their
traditionaleans of defence. "
3.3.1.10. It is not true that the General Staff of the Yugoslav
People's Army issued the order for disarming the Territorial
Defence Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina nor is it true that in
this way it deprived the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina of necessary means of defence. Neither is it
true that the Territorial Defence was predominantly used for the
defence of the republic to which it belonged. The year 1991 is
in question, that is, the time when Bosnia and Herzegovina was
still within the legal system of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and when the Constitution and laws of the SFRY
were binding upon it. Consequently, to assess the legal status it
is necessary to consult the Constitution of the SFRY and the
laws in force. According to the Constitution of the SFRY, Article
240, para. 2, the Armed Forces of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia make up a unified whole and consist of
the Yugoslav People's Army , as the common armed force of
al1 the nations and nationalities and of al1 working people and
citizens, and of Territorial Defence, as the broadest form of
594organized total national armed resistance. The Presidency of
the SFRY is the supreme body in charge of the administration
and command of the Armed Forces of the SFRY in war and
peace (Article 313, para. 3 of the Constitution of the SFRY).
The quoted provisions clearly show that the armed forces of the
SFRY are unified, consequently, that they include the Territorial
Defence and that they are subordinate to the Federal State,
that is, to Yugoslavia, and not to any republic in particular.
Accordigly, the TerritorialDefence was no republic army
intended for the defence of a particular republic, nor did it
belong to the republics. It was an integral part of the armed
forces of the SFRY, under the command of the Presidency of
the SFRY and intended for the defence of the SFRY. This is
even more apparent from the provisions of the Law on Total
National Defence of the SFRY, in particular Articles 106, 113
and 115. These articles provide for that the Presidency of the
SFRY discharges the affairs of administration and command for
the armed forces as a whole, including the Territorial Defence,
that the commanders of the Territorial Defence are accountable
to military leaders for their work, combat readiness, the use of
units and institutions. Also, the Presidency of the SFRY
establishes the bases of the plans of development of the armed
forces, establishes the bases of armament and equipment of
the armed forces, determines the military-territorial division of
the country. Finally, the mobilization of the armed forces,
consequently, total mobilization, including the Territorial Defence,
is ordered by the Presidency of the SFRY. Accordingly, the
TerritorialDefence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not
established to be used for the defence of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. It was established to be used, as an integral part
of the armed forces of the SFRY, for the defence of the SFRY
and, within the framework of the SFRY, also of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
3.3.1.11. The maintenance of public peace and order was within
the competence of the republics, more specifically within the
competence of the republic authorities for interna1 affairs.
595Therefore, the function of maintenance of internal peace and
order and of the protection of the authorities of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was performed by the members of the republic
ministry ofinternal affairs.
3.3.1.12. The assertion that non-Serb population was deprived
of traditionalmeans of defence is inappropriate. The weapons
of. the Territorial Defence were not intended to be usedfor the
defence of one ethnic group in Bosnia and Herzegovina against
another ethnic group. Precisely because of the possibility of
usurpation of authority to use these means, which belonged to
the Territorial Defence and of their use against one's own
Federal State, the competent bodies of the SFRY brought
decision, in a fully legitimate way, to ensure full control over
these means. But these means were not appropriated, but were
only placed under unified control, while their use at any
moment was ensured in compliance with the Constitutionof the
SFRY in force. From the material presented by the Applicant it
follows that only the units of the Territorial Defence in western
Herzegovina with predominantly Croat population did not return
the weapons. All the others did, consequently, also those in
areas with predominantly Serb population. This fact points to
the intention of the Presidency of the SFRY to prevent by this
measure the use of the weapons of the Territorial Defence in
possible inter-ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3.3.1.13. The general legal principle is that illegally obtained
evidence cannot be used in court. In para. 26, p.475 of the
Reply the Applicant refers to the alleged telephone conversation
between the President of the Republic of Serbia and the
President of the Serb Democratic Party of May 1991. This
conversation was allegedly tapped by the Ministry of Interna1
Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This piece of evidence not
only has been obtained in an illegal way but is also falsified.
3.3.1.14. The Applicant has not supplied a single valid piece of
evidence that would confirm the existence of some alleged plan
596whose purpose was genocide of non-Serb population in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Even the materials which the Applicant has
submitted and which refer to the alleged RAM plan do not Say
that the aim of this plan was the genocide of non-Serb
population in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3.3.1.15. Being unable to supply direct evidence of the
existence of the alleged plan, the Applicant attempts to prove
the existence of this plan indirectly, by inference. In doing so,
the Applicant relies on a certain number of points. Firstly,
disarmament of the Territorial Defence units in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Secondly, the alleged arming of the Serb
population in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the authorities of the
Respondent. Thirdly, the Applicant points to the links between
the leaders of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the authorities of the Respondent. In the process, the
Applicant's approach to the facts is selective. The Applicant
chooses its facts on which to build its thesis, but skips the
facts which speak to the contrary. However, from the accountof
facts reduced in this way which the Applicant attempts to adjust
for its thesis it is not possible to draw the conclusion about the
existence of some plan devised by the Respondent for the
purpose of genocide of non-Serb population in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
3.3.1.16. The Applicant's accusation that the Respondent
planned the creation of Great Serbia, ethnically pure, is absurd
now that the FR of Yugoslavia alone remains a state with a
very heterogenous ethnic pattern, i.e. with a high percentage of
inhabitants who are not Serbs or Montenegrins, and when the
Muslim-Croat Federation, as well as Croatia, have become
territoriesalmost without Serb population. It is true that the
Serb population in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina
resisted the secession of these republics from the SFRY and
that it wanted to remain within the SFRY. The reason for this
demand was not the wish to create ethnically pure Great
Serbia, but the justified concern at its own destiny in
597independent states of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.The
facts show that this concern was not without foundation.
3.3.1.17. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia actively supported
the conclusion of the General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It supported the new state structure
of Bosnia and Herzegovina comprised of two entities. Even
before the outbreak of armed conflicts in Bosnia and
Herzegovina the leadership of Bosnian Serbs proposed, as an
alternative solution, regionalisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the creation of several state units within it. These proposals
were almost identical with those accepted in Dayton in 1995.
Had the Muslim side accepted them before the outset of armed
conflicts they would surely not have happened.
3.3.2. The Republic of Srpska Did Not Plan and lntend to
Destroy Non-Serb Population in Bosnia and Herzegovina
3.3.2.1. In para. 3.2.2.3. of the Rejoinder the Respondent drew
attention to the fact that the President of the Presidency of the
Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the basis of the
Law on the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, issued the Decree on Application of Rules of
International Law of Armed Conflicts to the Army of the Serb
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, published in the "Official
Journal of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina" N0.9 of
13 June 1992. This Decree is attached in Annex No. R9, pp.
r86, r87lr88. The Decree orders the Army of the Serb Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Ministry of Interna1
Affairs to apply the rules of international Law of Armed Conflicts
to armed conflicts and to observe them. Military leaders
responsible for the application of therules of international Law
of Armed Conlicts were appointed. Also, the proceedings for
punishment of violations of the rules of international military law
were provided for. Under this Decree the Minister of Defence of
the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was authorizedto
prescribe the Instruction for Treatment of Captured Persons.
598Consequently, necessary measures were taken to comply with
the rules of armed conflict law by the armed forces of the Serb
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact contradicts any
allegation about genocidal intent of the Republic of Srpska.
3.3.2.2. In the Counter-Memorial the Respondent pointed to
the fact that a large number Muslims and Croats was treated in
hospitals in the Republic of Srpska. The documentation
confirming this assertion has been attached thereto.
3.3.2.3. That the Republic of Srpska was not intent on
becoming an ethnically pure Serb territory is also attested to by
the fact that persons of non-Serb nationality were elected to the
bodies of the Republic of Srpska. The Decision on the Election
of Judges of the Higher Court in Banja Luka, brought by the
Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at
its session held on 20 July 1992, on the basis of Articles 70
and 71 of the Constitution of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Article 5 of the Constitutional Law for the
enforcement of the Constitution of the Serb Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, as well as Article 10 of the Decision on the
Bases of the Organization, Seat and Area of Jurisdiction of
Regular Courts, persons of non-Serb nationality were elected to
various posts. Thus, Muslims Suada Kotlo, Zehra Kerenovic,
Asima Krupic and Zinaida Karic were elected judges of the
Higher Court in Banja Luka. This Decision was published in the
"Official Journal of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina", No.13 of 10 August 1992. (Annex No. RI 1,
pp.r91-r93/r94-r97)
3.3.2.4. Persons of Serb nationality were tried before the courts
of the Republic of Srpska for criminal acts committed against
Muslims and Croats. 3.3.3. Genocidal lntent was Nonexistent
3.3.3.1. The Applicant did not prove in any way whatsoever the
existence of genocidal intent. The Applicant tried to prove the
existence of the allegedly genocidal plan which it attributes to
the Respondent but failed in this undertaking. The Applicant
reiterates in many places in the Reply that there existed a
pattern of acts but does not explain what it implies under this
term. However, the pattern of acts, mass scale, gravity, the
number of victims are not facts sufficient to draw the conclusion
of the existence of genocidal intent. What is necessary are
facts which show that a punishable act was committed against
certain persons because those persons belong to a certain
ethnic or religious group, with intent to destroy this group, in
whole or in part.
3.3.3.2. In spite of the very voluminous documentation
submitted to the Court by the Applicant so far, hardly any
relevant information has been furnished on alleged specific
crimes. Neither this small number of pieces of information
indicates anything about the genocidal intent and, if they Say
something at ail about the motives of or reasons for the alleged
crimes, then such assertions do not confirm the existence of
the genocidal intent.
3.3.3.3. The material on which the Applicant relies points mainly
to the motives of and reasons for violations of the rules of
humanitarian law, which are quite different from the genocidal
intent.
3.3.3.4. Thus, in the introductory part of the Commission's
Report relating to detention facilities under Serb control (Final
Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992),
Volume IV -Annex VIII, S/1994/674/ Add.2, p.14), it is said: "46. A large number of the Bosnian Serb-confrolled
camps appear to have served as screening stations for
the purposes of interrogation and decisions as fo how
individual prisoners would be disposed of: Interrogation
almost always consisted of questions relafing to military
and strafegic information (including the location and
possession of weapons), political affiliation, and political
belief: Captors a/so interrogafed detainees concerning
the persona1 wealth and family connections of other
detainees. Interrogations were commonly accompanied
by brutal conduct and humiliation and, in some cases,
by torture and killing. Confessions were often forcibm
extracted from prisoners and used as a reason for fheir
detention and treafment. The forced confessions on
many occasions described some sort of offence or
hostile act.
47. Reports indicate that upon arrival at the larger
camps, prisoners were regularw subjected tu random
beatings. Reprisals appear tu have been carried out
against the prisoner population for Bosnian Serb
setbacks in battle. Such reprisa1 activities included
beatings, severe torture and killings.
Apparent& one motivation for the punishrnent of inmates
was retribution for supposed Serb casualties suffered in
battle."
It can be seen from the quoted part that the
main purpose of Serb-controlled detention facilities was to
detain those who took part armed actions against Serb civilian
population and Serb forces. Upon arrival prisoners were
interrogated, which is commonly done in al1 detention facilities
also in peacetime. Even if there was violence, as claimed in the
Report, the reason for this was retribution. Such a motive for
detention and holding of detainees, as well as the fact thatthere were also Serbs in these facilities, only confirm that no
genocidal intent existed.
3.3.3.5. Further in the text of the same chapter the Commission
states:
"56. There appears to have existed a certain degree of
acknowledgement by Bosnian Serb authorities that
camps were maintained. The camps appear to have
been maintained and operated by a mix of former JNA
officers and soldiers, Bosnian Serb Army personnel,
various Serb paramiliaries, local volunteer Serbs, local
impressed Serbs, members of the various Serb police
forces and at least some Montenegrins, There also
exists information that civilian Serb polificians were
intimately involved with the operation of such places of
detention.
57. Bosnian Serb authorities often expressed the belief
that the above described detention facilities were
legitimate, The reasons stated included the necessity of
protecting civilians from the dangers of combat, interning
those who threatened the security of the detaining
forces and detaining those responsible for criminal
activify.'"FinaReport of the United Nations Commission
of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), Volume IV - Annex VI//,
S/7994/674/Add.2, p. 75)
The statement of the Commission that there was '2
certain degree of acknowledgement by Bosnian Serb authorities
that camps were maintained': as well as the explanation that
detention facilities were used because of "the necessity of
protecting civilians from the dangers of combat, interning those
who threatened' the securify of the detaining forces and
detaining those responsible for criminal activify) indicate that
there did not exist any genocidal intent whatsoever. The fact
602that there was a mix of those who maintained and operated
detention facilitiesshows that there did not exist firm
organization in al1 this established beforehand, still less any
plans made in advance. Furthermore, the fact that Bosnian
Serb authorities expressed the belief that detention facilities
were legitimate shows not only that any genocidal intent was
nonexistent, but they were not even aware that they were
committing any kind of criminal act.
3.3.3.6. In paras. 313-319, p.200-204 of the Reply, relating to
detention facilityBatkovic, the Applicant, according to
established pattern, combines extracts from the reports of
Mazowiecki, US Department of State and those of the
inevitable, abundantly quoted American journalist Roy Gutman,
as well as parts of the Repoort of the Commission of Experts.
However, the conclusions drawn from the quoted parts are
contradictory. Namely, the alleged statement by Colonel Petar
Dmitrovic, commander of detention facility Batkovic, reported by
Gutman that only civilians were held there is in contradiction
with the statement of a detainee who "claimed that PoWs
received worst treatment, whereas civiïïan prisoners were not
treated as badly." (SI19941674 (Vol. IV) Add.2, 28 Dec. 1994,
p.63, para. 471).
It can be seen from the same paragraph of the
Commission's Report that detained PoWs were mainly abused
by soldiers going to or coming from the front, as well as that
most harshly were treated those prisoners from areas in which
Serbs had suffered losses. According to Bassiouni's Report
(SI19941674 (Vol IV), 28 Dec. 1994, p.63, para. 472) out of a
total of 20 persons who died in Batkovic, allegedly 13 persons
succumbed to such beatings. The cause of these deaths, if
they happened at all, is obviously revenge and genocidal intent
can by no means be attributed to the perpetrators. Besides, it
can be seen from the Report of Bassiouni's Commission that
Batkovic was some kind of a collection centre for north-eastern
Bosnia where PoWs and a certain number of civilians were
603brought for prisoner exchange. In para. 475 (Ibid., p.63) listed
are the dates and the number of persons taken from Batkovic
to be exchanged.
3.3.3.7. In para. 90, p.523 of the Reply the Applicant presents
information about the events in Bijeljina in early April 1992, in
which it is stated:
"350. A number of reports stated that Arkan's troops
harmed residents and property after capturing the town.
According to one reporf, Arkan's men roamed BJeflina
after it fell, shooting young men suspected of carrying
arms. Yugoslav army troops at the local barracks did
not intervene. They later issued a statement that they
had received no orders from Belgrade to do so. One
report says that citizens of B#e(ina phoned Sarajevo
radio to say that Arkan's people were terror~zing the
town, breaking into apartments, searching for arms and
robbing and harassing cit~zens. ln another report,
residents of Bijeljina said that in the first week of April
7992 Serbian paramilitary troops belonging to Arkan and
Jovic harassed the town'spopulation.
351. lt was reported that sporadic gunfire continued on
4 April 7992." United Nations, Final Report of the United
Nations Commission of Experts, SI19941674lAdd.2 (Vol.
l), 28 Dec. 1994, Annex III.A, "Special Forces", p.136,
paras. 344-351, emphasis added."
Assuming that this information is correct, it can be said to
speak against the existence of genocidal intent. According to
the information there existed two motives: neutralization of
military adversaries and forced, unauthorized taking of property.
This is by al1means a criminal act but not genocide.
3.3.3.8. In paragraph 113, p.540 of the Reply the Applicant
quotes the text of the statement of General Kukanjac given to
604radio television of the Republic of Srpska. In the interview
General Kukanjac says that it is no problem to destroy Sarajevo
but it is not humane to destroy urban settings. This statement
speaks precisely against the existence of genocidal intent.
3.3.3.9. In paragraph 214, p.600 of the Reply the Applicant
invokes the testimony of Fikret Kadilic, commander of the militia
station in Prijedor until 1991, who was allegedly arrested in
Prijedor on 24 May 1992 and taken to the militia station. He
testifies to having seen people being brought to the militia
station and heard their screams. At the same time he also
heard curses of those who beat the arrested men; it can be
understood from these curses that the reason for beating was
that the men brought in were considered enemies by those who
beat them and that the latter believed them to be associated
with the Ustashi, which precludes genocidal intent.
3.3.3.10. Some other cases pointed out by the Applicant such
as, for example, in paragraph 215, p.600 of the Reply, show
that violence was resorted to selectively, only towards men who
could be or were potential military enemies.
3.3.3.11. In paragraph 267, p.626 of the Reply the Applicant
refers to the Opening Statement of Grant Niemann, Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Tribunal in the Tadic case, who
says:
"The terror served to intimidate and discourage
resistance and tu compel non-Serbs tu leave the area."
If this is correct, it rules out the existence of genocidal intent. 3.3.4,Crimes Alleged by the Applicant Did Not Happen or Did
Not Happen in the Way Alleged by the Applicant
3.3.4.1. The pieces of information about detention camps
alleged by the Applicant are substantially different from one
another and some are contradictory.
3.3.4.2. In paragraph 301, p.191 of the Reply, under the title
"Camps", the Applicant lists the alleged camps maintained by
Serbs. Thus, in para. 301 of the Reply, the Agricultural School
in Bijeljina is mentioned as an alleged camp reported by the
European Community. Referring to the same source Bassiouni's
Commission also mentions this school treating it as a camp,
although the Report itself says:
"481. Agricultural School ,BgeQina:.On Tuesday, 6 July
1993, 48 Muslims were taken from Doboj to Bijeljina.
They had volunteered to be exchanged in order to be
reunited with their families. They were fed and well
treated in an agricultural school on the outskirts of the
town, where they spent three to four days. They were
locked up only at night and were guarded by policemen
during the day. Those who could afford to spend the
night in a hotel were allowed to do so. " (S/1994/674
(Vol. IV,)Add.2, 28 Dec. 1994,p.64, para. 487)
In paragraph 78, p.104 of the Reply the Applicant claims that
only a few prisoners from Omarska and Keraterm survived and
in support quotes a part from the Final Report of the
Commission of Experts: "Since only 7,503 were moved to
Manjaëa camp ...a limited number transferred to the Trnopolje
camp and almost none released, it may be assumed that the
death fol1 was extremely high. " (SI19941674 (Vol.l), 28 Dec.
1994, p.41, para. 170). In the same Report, in the part directly
relating to ManjaEa, the mass transfer of prisoners from
Omarska in July and August 1992 is described in the following
way:
606 "A subject who had been at Manjata from June through
the end of 1992 reported that on the evening of 79 July
7992, 1,200 Muslims from the Omarska area were
brought into Manjata by bus and parked outside the
perimeter. The next morning the captives were unloaded
and formed into groups for processing. ."(S/1994/674,
Add.2 (Vol. IL/), 28 Dec. 1994, p.45 para. 324)
"Mow are summaries of reports which allege that there
was a mass transfer of prisoners frorn the Omarska
camp to Manjata during the period from 6-8 August
1992. There was also a smaller transfer of Ornarska
prisoners to Manjata in late August 7992". (lbid., p.42,
para. 316)
'Hnother subject reported that on 6 August 1992
approximately 7,000 prisoners were transported from
Omarska to Trnopolje and that another 1,300, including
the subject, were transported in 17 buses to Manjata. "
(lbid., p.43, para. 3760)
"One subject who was included in the fransfer reported
that on 7 August 1992, 2,300 prisoners were transferred
to Manjata from Omarska. He said that Manja2a camp
offcials had what appeared to be a compuferized list of
the incoming prisoners' names when they arrived. He
stated that further 2,000 of the prisoners were admitted
and that an additional 300 were taken elsewhere. "(lbid.,
p.44, para.376(f)
Consequently, in one part of the Report (Vol. 1) it is stated that
"only 1,503 " persons were transferred from Omarska to
ManjaEa while from another part (Vol. IV) it could be calculated
that there were about 6,500. In Vol. I it is said that /'a l/inifed
number (were) transferred to the Trnopolje camp': and in Vol.IV
of the same document, that about 1,000 persons were
607transferred from Omarska only in one day. Finally, although the
figures mentioned in the quoted parts of the Report should be
taken with great reserve, it is not possible at al1 to draw the
conclusion from these data that there is only a small number of
survivors. In any case, it is clear that the figures quoted in the
Report, which the Applicant uses to corroborate its allegations,
are extremely unreliable and that the conclusions drawn are
unfounded, because the figures mentioned in one part of the
Report are quite different from those contained in another part
of the same Report.
3.3.4.3. A similar "arithmetic" and play with numbers in the
Report of the Commission of Experts are also applied when the
dates are in question. For example, when referring to the first
ICRC visit to ManjaEa in para 287 (Vol. IV), it is stated thatt
took place on 14 July 1992; only two paragraphs later, in para.
289, 19 July 1992 is mentioned and in para. 333 of the same
Volume it is stated that the first visit took place in August. A
less harmless play with the dates is applied in the case of
alleged rapes in ManjaEa. With a reserve that there are only
two reports on the presence of women in ManjaEa, in para. 393
(Vol. IV) an alleged rape is referred to, which took place
between 12 and 18 April 1992. However, the fact is that
ManjaEa was turned into a detention facility only in the middle
of June 1992 and that is why there are no data anywhere in
the Report, except the one about alleged rape mentioned
above, which would indicate that ManjaEa was operated before
June.
3.3.5. Alleged Rapes
3.3.5.1. The Applicant compares the data in para. 20, p.379 of
the Reply, obtained by statistical research into the number of
abortions by a medical team (Mazowiecki) in Sarajevo
(redoubled number of abortions), inferring from this that involved
here is the consequence of the increased number of rapes.
Furthermore, it it claimed, without any data in support, that the
608situation in Belgrade and Zagreb remained unchanged in
comparison to the prewar period.
However, if follows from the text that research was
undertaken only in Sarajevo, which was under Muslim control,
therefore the blame for the alleged increase in the number of
rapes can in no case be placed on Serbs. Also, a logical
conclusion is that the number of abortions had increased
primarily because of the feeling of insecurity caused by war
operations.
3.3.5.2. In para. 38, p.384 of the Reply the Applicant states as
authoritative documents the indictments of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia which, inter alia,
relate to rapes and in which Serbs are accused. The acts
(amongst others, rapes andlor sexual abuse) with which Serbs
are charged under these indictments are qualified as genocide,
crime against humanity, grave violations of the Geneva
Conventions for the protection of the victims of war and as
breach of the laws or customs of war. All alleged acts of rape
are qualified, when Serbs are in question, also as crimes
against humanity. The indictments of the Tribunal represent but
unproven assertions of the Prosecutor, i.e. unconfirmed
assumptions. Also, until the moment of the submission of the
Reply not a single trial has taken place (except the D. Tadic
case) on the grounds of the indictments mentioned above.
3.3.5.3. The credibility of the indictments is sufficiently illustrated
by the fact that some of them have been changed in the
meanwhile and that many of the accused have been acquitted
("Omarska" and "Keraterm" indictments). Namely, eleven
persons from the "Omarska" indictment have been acquitted,
while five persons from the "Keraterm" indictment have also
been acquitted. Among others, three persons originally accused
under the "Omarska" indictment, i.e. Gruban, Mirko Babic and
Predrag Kostic, have been acquitted precisely ofthe charges of
rape of one "Fu, which was qualified also as a crime against
609humanity. It is also indicative that the Prosecutor should resort
to withdrawal of charges from the indictments drawn up as long
ago as 1995, precisely at the time when the beginning of the
trial is pending because of the arrests of some perçons
accused under these indictments, carried out only in 1998.
3.3.5.4. Out of al1 the indictments mentioned in para 38, p.384
of the Reply only lndictment "Gagovic & others - FoEa"
describes several acts of rape and other sexual abuses. The
other indictments either do not mention rapes and sexual
abuses (Indictment "Nikolic & others"), or describe only one
case of sexual abuse each (Indictments "Sikirica & others" and
"Miljkovic & others"), or rapes are mentioned only in the generai
description of the responsibility of the superiors (Indictment
against Karadiic and Mladic, lndictment against Drljata and
Kovacevic), while only lndictment "Meakic & others" relates,
inter alia, to the case of fivefold rape of the same person.
3.3.5.5. It is interesting to note that the Applicant mentioned in
this chapter lndictment against and Judgement passed on D.
Tadic, while it is known that the Prosecutor withdrew the
charge against Tadie for the rape of "F" referred to above,
qualified, inter alia, also as a crime against humanity. This has
probably been done because the final version of the indictment
has never been made known. Also, it is only stated in the
indictment that the Prosecutor withdrew three charges from the
indictment, without specifically mentioning them, and precisely
these three charges relate to the alleged rape. Only paragraph
5 of the indictment, which contains these three charges in
connection with one act of rape, is not mentioned anywhere in
Judgement. The Respondent wishes to draw attention to the
fact that in annexes to Judgement (Annex 1)attached is the text
of lndictment from which paragraph 5 referred to above has not
been omitted either.
3.3.5.6. A comparison of the allegations in the indictments listed
by the Applicant in this paragraph with the only indictment of
610the Tribunal in which Serbs are the wronged party ("~elebici")
leads to the conclusion that these documents of the Tribunal
can by no means be accepted in the sense of any
corroboration whatsoever of the Applicant's allegations, first and
foremost because of the obvious lack of objectivity and the
acceptance of a policy of double standards on the part of the
Tribunal's Prosecution. The most eloquent example for this
assertion, especially when acts from Chapter VI1 of the Reply
(rapes and sexual abuses) are in question, is the comparison of
the description and qualification of criminal acts when wronged
Serbs are in question (Indictment "~elebici" - the accused H.
Delic) with the description and qualification of criminal acts
when Muslims (Indictment "Omarska - the accused M. Radic)
are involved. Although it is not proposed to merely quote the
indictments of the Tribunal, the Respondent has singled out the
following strikingexample:
"INDICTMENT 'OMARSKA "'
THE PROSECUTOR VS, "., Mladen RADIC, .."
22.1. During June and July, 1992, Mladen RADIC
repeatedly subjected 'Yi A"to forcible sexual intercourse.
The first occasion was on or about the night of 25 June
7992. Mladen RADIC took 'HA"to a room downstairs in
the administration building, forced her on a table and
subjected her to forcible sexual intercourse. Two or
three nights later, RADIC again called 'HA"out of the
room where she slept and again subjected her to
forcible sexual intercourse. On at least three more
occasions during June and July 1992, Mladen RADIC
called 'Y" out of the room in the administration building
where she slept and subjected ber to forcible sexual
intercourse. These crimes are charged separately below: First lncident
22.2. Around 25 June 1992, Mladen RADIC wilfully
caused '3" great sufferig by subjecting her to forcible
sexual intercourse, a GRAVE BREACH recognised by
Article2(c) of the Statute of the Tribunal or;
22.3. Alternatively, around 25 June 7992, Mladen
RADIC subjected 'YA"to cruel treatment by forcible
sexual intercourse, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR
CUSTOMS OF WAR recognised by Article 3 of the
Statute of the Tribunal and Article 3 (7)(a) of the
Geneva Conventions.
22.4. Around 25 June 7992, Mladen RADIC raped Y':
a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY recognised by Article
50 of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Second Incident
22.5. Around 27 June 7992, Mladen RADIC wilfully
caused 'Y" great suffering by subjecting her to forcible
sexual intercourse, a GRAVE BREACH recognised by
Article20 of the Statute of the Tribunal, or;
22.6. Alternatively,around 27 June 1992, Mladen
RADIC subjected 'YI" to cruel treatment by forcible
sexual intercourse, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR
CUSTOMS OF WAR recognised by Article 3 of the
Statute of the Tribunal and Article 3(7)(a) of the Geneva
Conventions.
22.7. Around 27 June 7992, Mladen RADIC raped 'A ':
a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY recognised by Article
50 of the Statute of the Tribunal. Third Incident
22.8. During July, 1992, Mladen RADIC wilfully caused
'YI" great suffering by subjecting ber to forcible sexual
intercourse, a GRAVE BREACH recognised by Article
20 of the Statute of the Tribunal, or;
22.9. Alternatively, during July1992, Mladen RADIC
subjected 'Y" to cruel treatrnent by forcible sexual
intercourse, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR
CUSTOMS OF WAR recognised by Article 3 of the
Statute of the Tribunal and Article 3(l)(a) of the Geneva
Conventions.
22.10. During July, 1992, Mladen RADIC raped 'YI ':a
CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY recognised by Article 5(g)
of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Fourth lncident
22.11. During late July 1992, Mladen RADIC wilfully
caused 'YIA"great suffering by subjecting ber to forcible
sexual intercourse, a GRAVE BREACH recognised by
Article2(c) of the Statute of the Tribunal, or,
22.12, Alternatively, during July, 1992, Mladen RADIC
subjected 'YI" to cruel treatrnent by forcible sexual
intercourse, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR
CUSTOMS OF WAR recognised by Article 3 of the
Statute of the Tribunal and Article 3(7)(a) of the Geneva
Conventions.
22.13. During late July 1992, Mladen RADIC raped 'A ':
a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY recognised by Article
5(gl of the Statute of the Tribunal.
613 Fifth Incident
22.74. During late July 7992, Mladen RADIC wilfullly
caused 'A" great suffering by subjecting her to forcible
sexual intercourse, a GRAVE BREACH recognised by
Article(c) of the Statute of the Tribunal, or;
22. 75. Alternativelyduring late Ju(y 7992, Mladen
RADIC subjected 'A" to cruel treatment by forcible
sexual intercourse, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR
CUSTOMS OF WAR recognised by Article 3 of the
Statute of the Tribunal and Article 3(7)(a) of the Geneva
Conventions.
22.76. During late July 7992, Mladen RADIC raped 'A
a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY recognised by Article
5(g) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
(1 Inaïetment, Prosecutor v. Meakié & others
("Omarska camp'?, Case No. IT-95-4-4 73 Feb. 7995)
INDICTMEN T EL EBICI'
PROSECUTOR VS. ZEJNIL DELAL16, ZDRA VKO
MUCIC, HAZIM DELlé, ESAD LANDZO
COUNTS 78 tu 20
Torture and Rape of Grozdana CECEZ
24. Sometime beginning around 27 May 7992 and
continuing until the beginning of August 7992, Hazim
Del2 and others subjected Grozdana CECEZ to
repeated incidents of forcible sexual intercourse. On one
occasion, she was raped in front of other persons, and
614on another occasion she was raped by three different
persons in one night. By his acts and omissions, Hazim
DELIC is responsible for:
Count 78. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(b)
(torture) of the Statute of the 7iïbunat
Count 79. A Vïolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal
and recognised by Article 3(7)(a) of the Geneva
Conventions; or alternatively
Count 20. A Aolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal
and recognised by Article 3(7)(a) (cruel treatment) of the
Geneva Conventions.
COUNTS 27 to 23
Torture and Rape of Witness A
25. Sometime beginning around 75 June 7992 and
continuing until the beginning of August 7992, Hazim
DELIC subjected a detainee, here identified as Witness
A, to repeated incidents of forcible sexual intercourse,
including both vaginal and anal intercourse. Hazim
DELIC raped her during ber first interrogation and during
the next SIX weeks, she was raped every few days. By
his acts and omissions, Hazim Delic is responsible for:
Count 27. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 20)
(torture) of the Statute of the Tribunat
Count 22. A Aolation of the Laws and Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal
and recognised by Article 3(7)(a) (torture) of the Geneva
Conventions; or alternatively
615 Count 23. A Vïolation of the Laws or Customs of War
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal
and recognised by Article 3(7)(a) (cruel treatment) of the
Geneva Conventions. "
(ICTY: lndictment, Prosecutor v. Delalic & others
("~elebici camp'l), Case No. IT-96-27-/,27 Mar. 7996)
3.3.5.7. From the quoted example it follows clearly that, due to
the policy of double standards of the Tribunal's Prosecution
mentioned above, the same acts are qualified differently and
that the description of the alleged acts of Serbs is considerably
more detailed in relation to the really more serious acts of
Muslim perpetrators. (For fivefold rape of the same person M.
Radic has been charged with a total of 10 counts, five of which
have been qualified as a crime against humanity, while H.
Delic, for multiple rapes of two persons under extremely difficult
circumstances (group raping, raping in front of other prisoners,
anal intercourse), has been accused of four counts under the
indictment (none of which relates to the crime against
humanity). Also, it should be borne in minci that the
responsibility of H. Delic is greater because he was the deputy
commander and later on commander of ~elebici camp.
3.3.5.8. The Respondent also wishes to note that the alleged
acts of rape of which Serbs are accused under al1 the
indictments referred to by the Applicant, the same as in the
quoted case ("Omarska"), have been qualified also as a crime
against humanity, while in the only opposite case where Serbs
appear as victims ("~elebici") the same acts have been
qualified only as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions for
the protection of victims of war and as violations of the laws or
customs of war.
3.3.5.9. In para. 58, p.392 of the Reply the Applicant quotes a
part of the United States reports of 5 November 1992 relating
616to the alleged rapes and sexual abuse of "several" men in five
detention centres in the region of Bosanski Samac. However,
lndictment "Miljkovic& others", which also relates to the alleged
acts committed in these detention centres describes only one
case of sexual abuse of prisoners committed in the Secretariat
of Interna1Affairs building in Bosanski ~amac.
3.3.5.10. In para. 59, p.393 of the Reply the Applicant quotes a
part of the Final Report of the UN Commission of Experts:
"Male prisoners were forced to rape women and each other" in
Omarska. It is strange that no such case has been described in
the Tribunal's lndictment "Meakic & others" which relates
exclusively to alleged crimes committed precisely in Omarska.
This lndictment describes only the already mentioned fivefold
rape of the same, female, person (see the part of lndictment
against Radiéfor alleged rape of "A quoted above).
3.3.5.11. In para. 61, p.394 of the Reply the Applicant quotes
the statement of Christine Cleiren who appeared before the
Trial Chamber of the Tribunal in the capacity as amicus curiae
during the Hearings in the KaradiiC and Mladic cases.
However, in the same statement C. Cleiren expresses some
reservation:
':.. ln this Commission some tasks were shared,
and that often with regard to that tasks it is useful to
Say here that 1 was not explcitly responsible for the
sexual assault investigation or sexual assault studies.
On the contrary, most of that responsibili~ for the
sexual assault investigation was with the Chairman,
Professor Bassiouni, and the only responsibility 1had for
this special team, this special subject, was the legal
study that is part of the annexes of the final report of
the Commission. ..."
o.. 1 will present you the patterns of rape and
sexual assault which, according to the Commission's
617Final Report, can be identified by these findings, and
the common threads run through the cases reported and
the systematic character of at least part of these cases,
but not before expressing some reservation and some
caution with regard to these findings.
ln the first place, the Commission did not have a
complete view on the full extent of sexual violence for,
among others, the following reasons, The Commission
did its work while the conflict was ongoing, Second, we
al1 know that reporting sexual violence is difficult and
this problem is exaggerated in war where there is a
breakdown in law and order and perpetrators are often
soldiers. The victims may have little confidence in
finding justice and many seem to be reluctant to report
their experience. Vïctims and witnesses fear the
attackers. They are ashamed and humiliated by what
happened and many of them do not dare to talk fearing
the traumatic experience of passing through again.
Another reason for being cautious is that the
information the Commission received contained
allegations. However, the reliability and the credibilifv of
reports and testirnonies could not be verified by the
Commission caused by various reasons.
Consequently, one must be extremely careful to
draw conclusions based on individual cases, among
others, for the following reasons. lndividuals, as well as
groups, may be driven by political or persona1 revenge
or by encouraging groups to report sexual violence.
Second, as time goes by, it becomes
increasingly difficult to sort out the true stories from the
false ones. lt is well known phenomenon and also
occurred in the Yugoslavian case that some people
identified themselves that extreme with victims of sexual
618 violence that they state de auditu-stories as their own
experience.
There are indications that sexual violence was
reported by the parties in the conflict as an element of
propaganda. The information in the reports was second
or third han4 and much of this of it was very general.
II
...
'!.THE PRESIDING JUDGE Before / go tu the
Prosecutor, / would /fie to ask you two or three
questions: you were not there on the site yourselt were
you, not in the case of the rapes; is that correct? Were
you actually there ?
A. Sorry, can you repeat?
Q. Yes. As / am preparing my question, / wanted tu be
quite sure you were not on the site to carry out the
investigation yourself: Were you actually there carrying
out the investigations?
A. No, / was not there. 1 was present at part of the
investigation that was held by the Commission in Zagreb
and / was present at several testimonies, testimonies
also from the rape cases, but / did not do it myself. So
/ was there on& -- my task there was only, let us Say,
to protect the rules that the Commission made before
and to see if al1 things were OK and tu represent the
Commission in Zagreb and in Split. ..."
(ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Karadiic and Mladic,
Cases No. IT-95-5461 and IT-95-18-R61, Testimony Cleiren, 2
July 1996, pp.7,8,9,19,20)
3.3.5.12. In para. 66, p.396 of the Reply the Applicant points
out that rapes have been reported in many detention camps
619and quotes the following: Omarska, Mrakovica, Trnopolje,
Keraterm, Luka, SuSica, Penal-Correctional Institution Fota.
However, an insiçht into the indictments of the Tribunal has led
to the conclusion that in the PCI FoSa ("Milorad Krnojelac") and
in SuSica ("Nikolic & others") there were no cases of either
rape or sexual abuse; that in Luka ("G. Jelisic & others") and in
Keraterm ("Sikirica & others) there were no rapes, but one case
of sexual abuse of male prisoners in each has been described,
while the alleged crimes in Trnopolje are mentioned only in
general terms in lndictment "KovaEevic", without any description
of a single concrete case of crime, victim or perpetrator. Also,
alleged detention camp Mrakovica is not mentioned in any of
the indictments or in the proceedings conducted before the
Tribunal, although it is located in the area of Prijedor, and it is
known that four indictments of the Tribunal's Prosecution are
related to thisarea.
3.3.5.13. In para. 71, p.400, para. 98, p.410, para. 144, p.423
and para. 165, p.431 of the Reply the Applicant uses the
allegations from Judgement passed on D. Tadic by the Tribunal
to confirm alleged rapes in Trnopolje camp. It should be noted
that the Prosecution used the testimonies on alleged rapes in
Trnopolje to prove the so-called systematic character and mass
scale of attacks on the civilian population; that the advocates of
D. Tadic decided on the defence based on alibi, and that from
the moment D. Tadic was acquitted of the charge of rape the
advocates did not enter into cross-examination of these
witnesses at ali, which resulted in the Trial Chamber's
acceptance of the assertions of the Prosecution.
3.3.5.14. In ccnnection with the quoting of the information from
the Report of Bassiouni's Commission in para. 72, p.400 of the
Reply, it is indicative that the Tribunal's Prosecution, despite the
very extensive investigations in the area of Prijedor, which
resulted in lndictments "Meakic & others" - Omarska, "Sikirica &
others" - Keraterm, "Tadic & Borovnica" and "KovaCevic &
DrljaCa", did not opt for bringing in indictment also for alleged
620acts in Trnopolje, because only on the basis of a large number
of materials used by the Applicant in the Reply it could be
concluded that he had sufficient evidence for doing so. The
Respondent is of the opinion that the Prosecution gave up such
an intention precisely because of the problems arisen during the
said investigation, that is, because of the lack of evidence that
the alleged crimes in Trnopolje had indeed been committed.
3.3.5.15. The case described in para. 74, p.401 and para. 85,
p.404 of the Reply relating to the alleged fivefold rape of the
same person is the only charge of rape under lndictment
"Meakic & others" - Omarska. The person involved testified in
the Tadic case, but because of Tadic's advocates' strategy
mentioned above that person was not cross-examined. Yet, the
Trial Chamber establishes in its Judgement passed on Tadic,
on the basis of that testimony alone, that: "Women who were
held at Omarska were routinely called out of their rooms at
night and raped."
3.3.5.16. The Respondent notes that the event described in
para. 75, p.401 of the Reply represents the only case of sexual
abuse referred to in lndictment "Miljkovic & others" - Bosanski
Samac.
3.3.5.17. As the Respondent has already mentioned, alleged
detention camp "Mrakovica" referred to by the Applicant in para.
78, p.402 of the Reply is not mentioned in any of the Tribunal's
indictments relating to the area of Prijedor nor in its Judgement
passed on D. Tadic.
3.3.5.18. It is surprising that not a single one of the extremely
grave crimes described in paras. 94-117, pp.408-415 of the
Reply found a place in any of the indictments of the
International Criminal Tribunal. The Respondent believes that
the Prosecutor would by no means miss the opportunity to
include at least some of these "charges" in some of the existing
indictments, or even to deal with them in separate indictments.
621This is especially confirmed by the Applicant's concrete
allegations relating to the areas covered by the Tribunal's
indictments.
The case described in para. 99, p.410 of the Reply is
not included in lndictment "Meakic & others" relating precisely
to Omarska;
The case described in para. 101, p.411 of the Reply
has not found a place in lndictment "Miljkovic & others" not
relating precisely to Luka camp;
The case described in para. 103, p.412 of the Reply
relating to Luka camp is not described in lndictment "Miljkovic&
others" either:
The event described in para 108, p.413 of the Reply is
not mentioned in lndictment "Sikirica & others" relating precisely
and exclusively to events in Keraterm.
3.3.5.19. lrma Oesterman is certainly not an expert who could
offer a professional answer to the question of the consequences
of rape referred to in para. 141, p.422 of the Reply nor did she
act in the capacity as a court expert but as an officer of the
Prosecutor's office (investigator).
"Q: Before 1ask you to tell us about your findings, 1 wwill
ask you what did you do previously to corne tu our
Tribunal?
A: 1 worked for 14 years as police officer in the
Netherlands. Before 1 joined the Tribunal 1 was a
general investigator''
(ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Karadiic and Mladic,
Cases No. IT-95-54761 and IT-95-18-R61, Testimony
Oosterman, 2 July 1996, p.24)
6223.3.5.20. The conclusion of the Applicant: "..., showing that rape
and sexual assault were an integral part of the overall policy
..':stated in para. 154, p.427 of the Reply, is vague, because
not a single case of rape is mentioned in this indictment, but
only one case of alleged sexual abuse (Indictment "Miljkovic &
others" - Bosanski ~amac). The fact that the Prosecutor of the
Tribunal, obviously in a biased way, refers also to sexual
abuses on the basis of only that single alleged case in the so-
called general part of the indictment only shows the endeavour
of the Prosecutor to ascribe also this case, when accused
Serbs are involved, to the allegedly widespread and systematic
attacks on civilian population in order to ensure grounds for
qualifying even such an alleged act as a crime against
humanity. For a better understanding of this view of the
Respondent suffice it to compare this case with the already
mentioned qualification of multiple rapes of several persons and
sexual abuse (as well as of al1 other committed acts) in
lndictment "~elebici" (where Serbs are victims and Muslims and
a Croat accused) as only grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and violations of the laws and customs of war. For
these reasons the Prosecutor in the proceeding under
lndictment "~elebici" makes it impossible himself for his
witnesses, victims of crimes, to testify to the mass scale and
systematic character of the attacks on Serb civilians in the
municipality of Konjic, where ~elebici camp was only one of 29
camps under Muslim or Croat control (Annexes to the Final
Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), Volume IV - Annex VIII,
para. 114, p.20), whose existence resulted, among others, in
the reduction of the number of Serbs in the municipality of
Konjic from 7,700 in the prewar period to about 200 at present.
At the same time, in this same proceeding the Prosecutor of
the Tribunal exerts himself to prove the existence of "a state of
international armed conflict and partial occupation of BiH" and
the responsibility of Serbs for that situation, while the "experts"
invited by the Prosecutor assert, among others, that Bosnian
623Serbs (in this case victims, supposed to be protected by the
Prosecutor) acted as "agents of another state". Such a conduct
of the Prosecutor caused the refusal of many Serb victims from
~elebici camp even to appear and give testimony before the
Tribunal. Furthermore, in this proceeding the Prosecutor invites,
as his witnesses also Generals of the Army of BiH (General
Arif PaSalic and General Jovan Divjak) who, at the time to
which the indictment relates, were direct superiors of the
accused and obviously at least "knew or had the possibility of
knowing that their subordinates were connected with
perpetration of the crime or that they perpetrated it, and the
superiors (the Prosecutor's witnesses) failed to take necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent such acfs or to punish
perpetrators of such acfs" (Article 7(3) of the Statute of the
Tribunal). Also, in the same proceeding the Defence of the
accused freely invites as witnesses persons who, at the time to
which the indictment relates, occupied the most senior military
and civilian posts in the municipality of Konjic (for example, the
testimony of Dr. Rusmir liadiihuseinovic, president of the
Municipal Assembly of Konjic, president of the War Presidency
of Konjic and president of the SDA of the municipality of
Konjic). The Respondent notes that persons of Serb nationality
who held similar or lower-level posts in municipalities - the
subject of other indictments of the Tribunal - were
indiscriminately accused, on the grounds of the so-calleci
responsibility (Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal), of
alleged crimes against humanity (for example, Blagoje Simic -
"Miljkovic & others" - Bosanski ~amac), and even of genocide
(Milan KovaEevic - "Kovacevic & Drljaca").
3.3.5.21. The Applicant's allegations contained in paras 157-160,
pp.428-429 of the Reply are quotations from various rulings of
the Tribunal brought on the basis of Rule 61 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. The Respondent explained earlier that
during this proceeding there was no cross-examination because
the Defence of the accused could not participate in it. In the
above cases referred to by the Applicant there was a certain
624competition between the Prosecutor of the Tribunal and the
Judges of the Tribunal in who will accuse more the suspected
person of Serb nationality or in who will accuse him of more
serious crimes.
3.3.5.22. In para. 162, p.430 of the Reply the Applicant
concludes that "The fact that the goal was the destruction of
the group ...':supporting this assertion with the example of
alleged crimes in Jajce. However, it is indeed strange that
these horrible examples found by the Applicant in the Report of
Bassiouni's Commission, in Mazowiecki's reports and from other
sources have not found place in any of the Tribunal's
indictments, a fact which cannot but lead to the conclusion that
there is no evidence for these alleged crimes.
3.3.5.23. The Applicant's allegations in paras 173-186, pp.434-
437 of the Reply are completely illogical; moreover, they are
contrary to common sense (para. 180) and are indeed the
result of the media campaign pursued against Serbs at one
time. Some of the authors referred to by the Applicant admit
that their assertions are illogical (Beverly Allen, para. 180),
although even for this they try to find an even less logical
explanation. Namely, the Applicant claims that the raped Muslim
women were released from alleged Serb camps in an advanced
stage of pregnancy with the intention of changing the "ethnic
character of the population" and in order "to give birth to
Serbian babies". However, the children born in such
circumstances, if there were any at all, besides the fact that
they can by no means be "Serbian babies", they would certainly
not be brought up in the Serbian spirit, at least because of the
fact that they were born after their mothers' release, i.e. on the
territories on which Serbs had no control. The children born in
such circumstances could be brought up either under the
influence of their mother's customs, i.e. Muslim, or (in case of
being abandoned by their mother) under the influence of their
adoptive parents, who would very probably not be Serbs.
Unless of course the Prosecutor of the Tribunal, the same as
325the Applicant, believes that the Serb culture is conveyed via
genes. This example shows that the Applicant and the
Prosecutor of the Tribunal tend to rashly advance their
accusations.
3.3.5.24. In connection with the claim that "rape is not a minor
part of the genocide ...,but a major component of an overall
policy ...'contained in para. 203, p.443 of the Reply, the
Respondent wishes to stress that out of a total of forty (40)
accused Seïbs from BiH, thirteen (13) are accused of having
committed sexual assaults, of whom as many as eight (8)
under lndictment "Gagovic and others" - Foca. If the eight (8)
accused under this indictment ("FoEa"), which is obviously a
separate case, are excepted, there remains a total of five (5)
persons of Serb nationality who are indicted on charges of
concrete sexual assaults. Because of the Applicant's claim that
these acts confirm its allegations, a brief description of al1 of
these acts from the Tribunal's indictments is given below:
lndictment "Sikirica & others" - two indicted Serbs on a
charge of forcing three prisoners to fellatio.
However, another four (4) persons (commander of the
detention camp and al1 three commanders of guards' shifts)
have been accused of these alleged acts, on the basis of
command responsibility.
lndictment "Miljkovic & others" (Bosanski ~amac) - one
perçon indicted on a charge of sexual abuse.
Another person - the president of the municipality of
Bos. ~amac - has been accused of this act on the basis of
command responsibility.
lndictment "Jelisic& cesic" - one person indicted on a
charge of sexual abuse of two prisoners. lndictment "Meakic & others" - one person indicted on a
charge of fivefold rape of the same person.
Another five persons (commander of the detention camp,
his two deputies and two commanders of guards' shifts) have
also been indicted for the same act.
The Respondent notes that a total of 17 persons of
Serb nationality has been indicted under the Tribunal's
indictments on charges of sexual assaults, on the basis of
command responsibility; some of them in the above described
way and others on the basis of general accusations, without
any description of acts at all. All these acts, when accused
Serbs are involved, are qualified as a crime against humanity,
and even genocide.
3.3.5.25. In regard to the Applicant's allegation contained in
para. 208, p.444 of the Reply "... that the rapes were carried
out in a way which would have particularrly destructive effects
on the group.': supporting it with the example from Omarska:
"the women raped in Omarska were intellectuals and prominent
members of the community': the Respondent notes that
lndictment "Meakic & others" relating exclusively to detention
camp Omarska describes only ths rape of one Suada Ramic
(case of fivefold rape mentioned above several times; the
alleged victim is identified as witness "A"), who testified in the
case of the accused D. Tadic and who is a driver by
occupation.
"Q, Was your occupation a driver and conductor for
Auto Transport Priedor?
A. Yes.
Q. How long did you work for Auto Transport Prijedor?
A. From 1978 to 1992, until 1992.
Q, Did you know a man by the name of Dule or DuSko
Tadic?
A. ln passing.
627 Q. You knew this man tu recognise him when you saw
him?
A. Yes.
Q. ln 1991 did you perform dufies as a Reserve Police
driver and drive to areas that were within a few
ki/ornetres of the confrontation lines with Croatia?
A. Yes.
(ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
Testimony Ramic, 18 July 1996, pp.2461, 2462)
3.3.5.26. In connection with the Applicant's allegations contained
in paras 209-212, pp.444-445 of the Reply, the Respondent
points out that not even the International Criminal Tribunal
which, since its establishment, has brought in indictments
against 13 persons of Serb nationality on charges of sexual
assault, as mentined above, has sentenced any person so far
on these grounds.
3.3.5.27. Regarding the Applicant's allegations .in paras 213-
216, pp.445-446 of the Reply, ("lntent - the existence of orders
to rape") the Respondent notes that not a single indictmentof
the ~ribunal mentions any case of the order for performing rape
or other form of sexual abuse.
3.3.5.28. lndictment "Meakic & others" invoked by the Applicant
in paras 223-224, pp.448-449 of the Reply, as well as other
indictments of the Tribunal have been drawn up in an arbitrary
way in the opinion of the Respondent. Namely, as already
noted by the Respondent before, the indictments are compriseci
of introduction, generalized allegations and concrete charges. In
this context, the Respondent points out that the Applicant
throughout this part mainly sets forth the so-called generalized
allegations in which the Prosecutor of the Tribunal claims that
acts have been committed, among others, in the way described
by the Applicant (among which also are listed sexual assaults).
However, in concrete charges under these same indictments
' 628there is no description of such acts. This is quite obvious in the
example given by the Applicant itself. Namely, in the general
allegationss it is mentioned, among others, in very general
terms that "During the operation of the Omarska camp, camp
guards and others who were subordnate fo ~eljko Meakic (..)
regularly and openly (..) raped However, in concrete charges
the rape of only one person is mentioned, which is also stated
by the Applicant (para. 224), but which cannot in any case
serve to confirm the views of the Tribunal's Prosecutor
contained in the general allegations of the indictment. The
others mentioned in the same paragraph by the Applicant
(Gruban, Kostic, Babic) have been acquitted of the charges.
The Respondent's impression is that the arbitrary charges in
the general allegations serve the Tribunal's Prosecutor solely to
introduce through the side door the thesis about the systematic
character, mass scale, etc., of alleged crimes in order to qualify
these acts as crimes against humanity; however, as can be
seen from the indictments themselves, the Tribunal's Prosecutor
himself denies general allegations when describing acts in
concrete charges, acts which are either non-existent or are very
rare indeed.
3.3.5.29. In para. 226, p.450 of the Reply the Applicant also
refers to lndictment "Sikirica & others - Keraterm" under which
D. Sikirica is accused of genocide. As far as acts of sexual
crimes are concerned, the same indictment contains only a
case of forcing three prisoners to fellatio.
3.3.5.30. In connection with the Applicant's allegations stated in
paras 227-229, pp.450-451 of the Reply which are related to
lndictment "Nikolic & others", the Respondent notes that this
indictment does not contain a single case of any sexual crimes.
With respect to the suggestions of the Trial Chamber, contained
in the Decision based on Rule 61, in which the Trial Chamber
proposes to the Tribunal's Prosecutor to extend Nikolic's
charges so as to include rapes, and to qualify the acts he is
charged with as genocide, the Respondent points out that from
629October 1995 when this Decision was brought to the present
day the Prosecution has not amended the indictment. Which
only speaks about the quality of alleged proofs offered at the
time (October 1995) to the Chamber, i.e. about the lack of
evidence in support of amending the indictment.
3.3.5.31. Regarding the Applicant's allegations contained in
para, 231, p. 452 of the Reply, the Respondent emphasizes
that the second indictment issued against Radovan Karadiic
and Ratko Mladic makes no mention of any sexual crimes.
3.3.5.32. As for the "KovaEevic and DrljaEa" indictment to
which the Applicant refers in para. 238, p. 454 of the Reply,
the Respondent states that Simo DrljaEa was killed during the
operation to arrest him, whereas Milan KovaCevic died in the
UN Detention Unit soon after his trial opened in the Hague.
This brought the proceedings instituted against the two men to
an end. The Applicant, however, makes references in the
above-mentioned paragraph to those parts of the indictment
concerned, relating to alleged rapes and other sexual assault.
For the sake of straightening things out, the Respondent points
out that the two individuals were indicted, on the basis of their
command responsibility, for alleged crimes committed by their
"subordinates", rnainly in the detention camps of "Omarska",
"Keraterm" and "Trnopolje". However, separate indictments were
issued for alleged crimes committed in Omarska ("Meakic et
al.") and Keraterm ("Sikirica et al.") which, as previously stated
by the Respondent, refer only to one rape case (in Omarska)
and to a fellatio imposed on three prisoners (in Keraterm).
Moreover, as in the trial ofDuSan Tadic, the Prosecutor affirms
that the largest number of rapes and sexual abuse occurred at
Trnopolje and, more importantly, that this detention camp
specifically served to commit rape. Consequently, it is not clear
why the Prosecutor did not draw up a separate charge sheet
for Trnopolje only, in the light of the most serious nature of
alleged crimes committed there, as transpiring from the
generally-worded indictments. The Respondent believes that the
630reason for such a conduct on the part of the Prosecutor is not
only the lack of evidence, but also the evidence to the contrary
which has been gathered in the meantime. Namely, some
eyewitnesses testifying at the trials of DuSan Tadic and Milan
Kovaëevic said themselves that Trnopolje was an open-type
collection point.A video of Trnopolje, which was suggested as
an exhibit by the prosecution, shows that what the Prosecutor
describes as a detention camp had no perimeter fence
whatsoever and that civilians freely moved in and out. This part
of the Respondent's Rejoinder is also relevant to many other
paragraphs of the Reply dealing also with Trnopolje and which
are, because of the sources used by the Applicant, even more
serious, thus further questioning the authenticity of the sources
(e.g.70 rape victims at Trnopolje, etc.).
3.3.5.33. The Applicant refers again in para. 241, on page 456
of the Reply, to an excerpt from C. Cleiren's testimony before
the Tribunal. However, the Applicant fails to quote the sentence
immediately following the passage quoted by it, which reads as
follows:"For the general conclusions of the Commission on this
subject, 1 will cite some elements of paragraphs 257 and
253:"Rape has been reported to have been committed by a//
sides to the conflict. However, the largest number of reported
victirns have been Bosnian Muslims, and the largest number of
alleqed perpetrators have been Bosnian Serbs. There are few
reports of rape and sexual assault between members of the
same ethnic group".
(ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Karadiic and Mladic,
Cases No. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18461, Testimony Cleiren, 2
July 1996, p. 13)
The Respondent here has in mind that the Bassiouni
Commission and other sources cited by the Applicant (in para.
243, Reply) were evidently under pressure from some
international factors aiming toroject a certain picture of events
in BiH, portraying Bosnian Serbs as the chief villains of the
631piece. The same goals were pursued in a campaign, conducted
simultaneously, in the media of alleged detention camps and
rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the Tribunal usedas a
basis for its "investigations" related to events in Serb-controlled
areas. This has resulted in the double standards already
mentioned above and in their subsequent artful use by the
Applicant in para. 245 and elsewhere in the Reply.
3.3.5.34. In paragraph 249, on page 458 of the Reply, the
Applicant refers to "five patterns of rape" as described in the
Bassiouni Commission's Report. In describing each of these
alleged "patterns", the author cites examples of horrible sexual
crimes. It is odd, however, that the indictments issued by the
Tribunal, whatever they are, are empty of such graphically
described crimes. Meanwhile, more significantly, the Prosecutor
vacated the indictments of al1 sex crime charges. In fact, the
accused Tadic, Gruban, P. Kostic and M. Babic of the "Meakic
et al" indictment were successively acquitted of these charges.
It is indicative that in this case, al1 the four accused were
charged with statutory rape of the same person, a certain "F"! a
witness protected by the prosecution.
3.3.5.35. UNSC and UNGA Resolutions to which the Applicant
refers in paras. 250-254, pp. 459-461 of the Reply, either do
not relate to rape and sexual assault or, if they do, they
generally refer to the occurrence ofsuch crimes without blaming
any of the parties to the conflict.
3.3.5.36. The Respondent has affirmed that the indictments
issued by the Prosecutor cannot be taken as evidence. The
Respondent has used them in this section relating to alleged
rapes just to show how dubious and little credible are other
sources of information on which the Applicant relies. 3.3.6. Alleged Ethnic Cleansing in the Territory of
Yugoslavia
3.3.6.1. With regard to the allegations made by the Applicant
in para. 477. p. 754 of the Reply, concerning the alleged tragic
plight of Bosnian refugees in Yugoslavia, it is pointed out that
from the outbreak of war in BiH to the signing of the Dayton
Agreement, a number of Bosnian Muslims voluntarily left BiH for
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, primarily those avoiding
call-up and fleeing fighting. These people enjoyed refugee
status in the FRY under the applicable international standards
and, accordingly, they were provided appropriate housing and
food in reception centres, and they were conferred on the other
rights available to them as refugees.
3.3.6.2. All Muslim refugees wishing it, were, in the relevant
period, allowed to leave the FRY territory to go to a new
country of residence of their own choosing. This was also true
of a number of combatants from iepa and Srebrenica areas,
who were part of Muslim armed forces and who are believed to
have committed war crimes.
3.3.6.3. Indeed, the report submitted by Special Rapporteur of
the Commission on Human Rights Elizabeth Rehn, which the
Applicant invokes, is uneven-handed, biased and to a large
extent inaccurate, being only based on information provided by
SDA party radicals Sulejman Ugljanin and Rssim Ljajic.
3.3.6.4. A separate report on minorities, as submitted by
Special Rapporteur Rehn, to which the Applicant refers in para.
478, p. 754 of the Reply, describing the predicament and abuse
of the human rights of Sandiak Muslims following the secession
of former Yugoslav republics - relies entirely on the statements
made by Sulejman Ugljanin and ~efko Alomerovic, Chairman of
the Helsinki Human Rights Committee for Sandiak.3.3.6.5. On 1 September 1993, the lnterior Ministry of the
Republic of Serbia filed charges with the District Public
Prosecutor's Office in Novi Pazar against Sulejman Ugljanin and
26 other Muslims for the criminal offence of undermining
territorial integrity, as punishableer Article 116 of the Penal
Code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in connection with
Article 138 of the Code, namely preparation for this criminal
offence. On the basis of these charges, the Prosecutor's Office
issued an indictment on 18 October 1993 against 24 perçons
for the criminal offence mentioned above. Four of the accused
inciuding Ugljanin himself were tried in absentia. O11 October
1994, the District Court of Novi Pazar, acting as the first-
instance court, sentenced them to imprisonment ranging from
one to six years. On 25 March 1996, the Supreme Court of
Serbia, upon the appeal lodged by the counsels for the
defence, quashed the judgment of the District Court on grounds
of violation of theriminal procedure provisions and referredthe
case back to the first-instance for a re-trial.
For the reasons stated above, the information presented in
Elizabeth Rehn's report is one-sided, unverified and
unsubstantiated.
3.3.6.6. Paragraph 478, p. 754 of the Reply, also arbitrarily
states that the Yugoslav authorities systematically terrorizedthe
Muslims of the RaSka region. This assertion is in total
contradiction with the data on the amount of weapons
confiscated from Muslims in the RaSka region. This amount is
disproportionate to the number of those prosecuted and
sentenced on illegal possession charges. Thus, for instance,
from May 1993 up to now, 1,842 various weapons, including
1,117 long-barrelled and 725 side weapons as well as 100
hand grenades, were confiscated from Muslims in the RaSka
area. Only in 53 cases were charges pressed against 56
individuals, including 24 Serbs, for an offence under Article 33,
paragraph 3, of the Law on arms and munitions (i.e.
unauthorized acquisition, possession, holding, manufacture,
634transfer or sale of a firearm, munitions or an explosive). This
action was taken because the vast majority of RaSka Muslims
armed themselves, being intoxicated by the propaganda
launched by the leaders of the SDA party of Sandiak and by
the militants of SDA top leadership and of the Islamic core in
BiH.
3.3.6.7. Large quantities of weapons reached the RaSka region
frorn BiH and partly from Croatia even before war broke out.
3.3.6.8. Allegations contained in paragraph 479, p. 755 of the
Reply, based on the report of the Helsinki Hurnan Rights
Committee of May 1994, Annex 270, concerning the
responsibility of the FRY for the horrors visited upon the
Sandiak Muslims prior to the publication of the report - are
totally unfounded and untrue. This is unequivocally confirmed by
the fact that apart from these 24 Muslim extremists there were
no other incarcerations.
In contrast, this period witnessed an intensified secessionist
activity of the SDA leadership of Sandiak, directed from the
very establishment of this party on 29 July 1990, by the top
SDA leadership in BiH and under the direct influence of Alija
lzetbegovic and his positions expressed at some point in the
"lslamic Declaration".
3.3.6.9. Following the example of the BiH Patriotic League,
Ugljanin initiated, on 11 May 1991, the establishment of a
Muslim National Council of Sandiak (MNCS), a para-statal
formation, entrusted with the task of acting as the Government
and "Presidency of Sandiak", and Sulejman Ugljanin was
elected President of that presidency. At a press briefing held on
19 May 1991, Ugljanin proclaimed a MNCS declaration, thus
unilaterally suspending the legitimate authorities in the RaSka
region. The Declaration defined the MNCS as the sole
legitimate representative of the Muslirn people in the RaSka
region, competent to make decisions on the status of "Sandiak"
635in a future Yugoslavia, and 'Yn case Yugoslavia disintegrates,
MNCS will declare self-rule for Sandiak, which was suppressed
on 29 March 19450
3.3.6.10. On 25-27 October 1991, MNCS and its president
Ugljanin held an illegal referendum in RaSka to decide on a full
political and territorial autonomy forSandiak", whereupon the
MNCS informed international institutions that more than 95 per
cent of Muslims voted in favour.
3.3.6.11. lmmediately after the referendum was held, a
"Constitution of the Republic of Sandiak" was drawn up,
containing al1 common statehood attributes. Article 2 thereof
provides that the "Republic of Sandiak shall be a sovereign
statei "tfie sovereignty of the Repub/ic of Sand! shall be
inviolable, indivisible and non-transferable': while the territories
of the "Republic of Sandiak include the following areas: Novi
Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin, Prijepolje, Nova VaroS, Priboj, Pljevlja,
Bijelo Polje,Roiaje, Berane, Plav and Andrijevica. During the
course of 1992 MNCS also adopted para-statal symbols: the
flag and the coat-of-arms of the so-called Republic ofSandiak.
3.3.6.12. On 15 August 1992, the MNCS assembly decided to
recall SDA deputies from the Assemblies of Serbia and
Montenegro and to cease al1official contacts with the authorities
in Serbia and Montenegro, which was done. The MNCS
assembly also announced the adoption of a "Memorandum on
the establishment of a special status for Sandiak", which was
endorsed in June 1993. Under the Memorandum, power
structure of the "State of Sandiak" is divided into legislative,
executive and judicial, and respective Ministries were set up,
among others, the Ministries of Defence and Police.
3.3.6.13. Parallel with this, SDA leaders acted to organize the
Muslims of RaSka into para-military and para-police forces, with
a view to seceding Sandiak from the FRY. In addition to a
stepped-up arming of al1 its members and supporters, the local
636SDA set up main Crisis Staffs for the defence of Sandiak,
comprising SDA party members, rnainly former JNA officers.
Similar Crisis Staffs were established in communes, towns and
local communities. A global defence plan was put together, as
a result of numerous pre-war contacts on BiH territory of SDA
extreme elements with the commanding officers of the Bosnian
Muslim Army, who prepared the final version of the plan. Hajriz
KolaSinac was appointed Commander of the Supreme
Headquarters and Soko Ahmetovic his deputy. In these
capacities, they both visited Sarajevo on several occasions and
talked with former commander of the Bosnian Muslim Army
Sefer Halilovic (also coming from "Sandiak") and with other
serving command staff of that army.
Also, the SDA of Sandiak established a department of security
as a forerunner of law enforcement authorities, which played a
large role in arming SDA and other para-military units.
3.3.6.14. According to the global defence plan, besides the
main headquarters, each town in Sandiak had to set up its
own defence headquarters with sub-divisions in local
communities and villages. These headquarters were tasked to
organize medical corps, rear departments consisting of 10-15
persons each of al1 professions, scout service departments
comprising 10 persons, communications departments, infantry
units, dispatch service, evacuation departments, etc.
Apart from para-military units, the so-called IO-plus-1nits were
formed to perform law enforcement duties and to protect
property and people at a given moment.
3.3.6.15. At the instance of the Supreme Headquarters,
sabotage groups were also formed under its immediate
direction. Members of these groups were trained around Novi
Pazar. By January 1993, SDA sent through its local
communities Muslim young men abroad to receive specialized
military training there.
6373.3.6.16. The Applicant's objections as to the existence and
alleged cruel treatment by Serbian para-military groups in
RaSka, as contained in para. 480, p. 755 of the Reply, are
untrue and without any foundation whatsoever. Such groups
never existed in this region, nor was there any ethnic friction at
the time. Quite the contrary. According to the statistical
indicators provided by the Serbian lnterior Ministry, from 1991
onwards the RaSka region has seen, in terms of percentages,
fewer criminal offences and violations of public order and peace
than the rest of the Republic of Serbia.
3.3.6.17. The Applicant's claims, also contained in this
paragraph, that the Yugoslav authorities allowed armed Bosnian
Serbs to cross over freely into Yugoslavia, are unsubstantiated
and baseless, considering that such crossings did not take
place at al1
3.3.6.18. Also untrue is information about the intent and
participation of Serbian authorities in the ethnic cleansing of the
RaSka region which borders on Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is
true only that as a result of the fighting in the immediate
neighbourhood (Sjeverin), the residents of several villages in the
border areas with Bosnia moved away for reasons of personal
safety, but they returned to their homes soon after the
cessation of hostilities. These facts may be checked by looking
into the records of local state authorities. Only a fraction of
these inhabitants have taken advantage of the situation to seek
residence and work permits in Western Europe. They, however,
frequently corne to visit their relatives or to build family homes
on the territory of RaSka.
3.3.6.19. As pointed out earlier, there were no armed conflicts
in the RaSka region in the period under review. Therefore, the
Applicant's claims in para. 481, p. 756 of the Reply, that "the
participation of the Yugoslav police became more open as the
conflict went on", are absurd.
638The assertion that the Yugoslav authorities targeted Muslim
political leaders in RaSka, who were allegedly arrested and
harassed, is not true either. Thiscan be proved by the fact that
within the legal measures taken to stop the activities of SDA
para-military and para-police units and to disarm local Muslim
populations, criminal proceedings were only started against
Sulejman Ugljanin as a political leader. Besides him,
prosecution also included commanding officers of SDA para-
military and para-police forces for the criminal offence of
undermining the territorial integrity of the country,under Article
116, para. 1 of the FRY Penal Code in connection with Article
138 thereof (preparation).
3.3.6.20. In view of the above, the allegations made by the
Applicant in para. 481, p. 756 of the Reply, that the Yugoslav
police transported some of the arrested leaders across the
border, where they were allegedly subjected to torture until they
were transferred back into custody in Montenegro - are
completely arbitrary and absurd. According to verified
information, the Helsinki Watch Report, to which the Applicant
refers in para. 482, p. 757 of the Reply, and according to
which Yugoslav authorities conducted a campaign of ethnic
cleansing in the RaSka region, was based entirely on the report
of the Chairman of the Sandiak Helsinki Human Rights
Committee ~efko Alomerovic, who made unsubstantiated
allegations that were not verified at all.
3.3.6.21. The allegations contained in the paragraph above that
due to the violence by Yugoslav authorities 60,000-80,000
Muslim inhabitants have left the region, are wholly untrue and
arbitrary. As a matter of fact, in terms of percentages, far more
Serbs than Muslims have left in the reviewed period. From 1
January 1989 through 1 December 1995, 4,185 Muslims settled
in the region of RaSka and 4,888 Muslims moved to other
areas. In comparison, during the same period 913 Serbs settled
there and 2,443 left. It is worth noting that Serbs chiefly
639migrated out of the area while al1Muslim migrations were within
the area.
3.3.6.22. The public sector in the region employs 12,436
perçons, including 8,961 Muslims and 3,475 Serbs, whereas the
cultural sector in local towns with a Muslim majority (e.g. Novi
Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin) employs 54 Muslims and 32 Serbs. On
the other hand, the ethnic structure of health workers is as
follows: of a total of 989 employed, 568 are Muslims and 421
Serbs. Also, out of a total of 2,953private companies 2,811 are
owned by Muslims, 122 by Serbs and 20 by ethnic Albanians.
It needs to be pointed out as well that in communities where
Muslims constitute a majority, over 80 per cent of al1educators
and staff in the administration of justice are Muslims. This
shaws that Muslims in the FR of Yugoslavia are equal citizens.
3.3.7. Alleged Detention Camps in the Territory ofthe
Respondent
3.3.7.1. The Applicant's allegations on reported detention camps
on the territory of the Respondent, in which the genocide of
Muslims or of any other populations was perpetrated, are
entirely without foundation. These allegations are purely and
simply untrue. The Applicant has based them on the Bassiouni
Commission's reports. Herein earlier, it was pointed out that
such reports could not be regarded as reliable evidence. The
Applicant affirms that the relevant parts of Bassiouni's reports
are based on independent sources, namely the ICRC and
foreign governments. The Applicant has not, however, enclosed
the relevant ICRC reports, nor has it said anything about how
foreign governments have come into possession of information
on detention camps in the FRY, where the alleged genocide
has taken place. The Respondent has done what it could by
submitting the report of the OSCE mission which visited the
sites or most of the sites of alleged detention camps and which
was unable to confirm their existence. The Respondent has
suspended its cooperation with the OSCE not to prevent a new
640mission of the Organization from locating any possible detention
camps, but because of its reluctance to accept in its territory
any long-terrn or ad hoc missions of an organization which
denies the Respondent the exercise of its rights as a member.
3.3.7.2. Information about the location of alleged camps in the
territory of the Respondent where alleged genocide has been
committed, has most probably come from the Applicant itself.
The Agent for the Applicant, Mr. Sacirbay, in his capacity as
Head of the Applicant's Mission to the United Nations in New
York, wrote a letter to the Security Council, which he read out
at a press briefing on 26 February 1998 and in which he
accused the Respondent of holding 40 of the 50 missing
residents of Srebrenica in custody in the Sremska Mitrovica
penitentiary, on the territory of the Respondent. Mr. Sacirbay
once again invoked two independent sources (Annex No. R12,
p. r98-rl01).
3.3.7.3. The Respondent encloses herewith a copy of the letter
from the head of the ICRC delegation in Yugoslavia to the
Serbian Justice Minister, dated 25 May 1998, which reads:
"Your Excellency,
As you are aware, the international Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) bas been involved in the question of
persons missing in connection with the conflicts on the
territory of the former Yugoslavia. Allegations regularly
appear about persons being held in fiidden detention:
ln order to follow up on such allegations and tu ease
the doubts of the families of missing persons the ICRC
bas obtained from the h~ghestauthorites of the relevant
countries the possibili(y to make unannounced detention
visits, in addition toits regular visits, in the concerned
countries. ln as far as the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) is concerned, the agreement for such
visits was given by H.E. President Slobodan Milo5evic in
his meeting with the President of the ICRC Dr. Cornelio
641 Sommaruga, in June 7997. The agreement was publicly
re-confirmed by H.E President MiloSéviéduring the visit
of the Internaticmal Commission for Missing Persons
(ICMP) chaired by Senator (ret.) Robert Dole in January
7998,
Three such unannounced ICRC visits have now taken
place in penitentiary institutions of the Republic of
Serbia. The concerned penitentiaries are those of
Sremska Mitrovica, Po2arevac and NiS. The ICRC had
free access to any premises or persons it wished to
visit, as well as to the prison registers. Private tafks with
expatriate translators were held with detainees of the
ICRC's choice. ln none of the mentioned prisons were
the allegations of hidûen detention confirmed" (Annex,
No. R73,pp. r702-r703/r704-r705)
3.3.7.4. The Respondent reiterates that no camps of genocide
against any persons ever existed in its territory.
3.3.8. The Respondent Has Not Violated Its Obligation to
Punish under the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
3.3.8.1. In para. 69 and the ensuing paragraphs on pages 845-
865 of the Reply, the Applicant expounds its assertions that the
Respondent has failed to punish those responsible for the
commission of the crime of genocide and other crimes
prohibited by the Genocide Convention. All these claims are
groundless. The Respondent is not able to fulfil its obligation to
punish under the Convention. The said Convention obliges the
State on the territory of which genocide or another prohibited
act was committed, to punish the perpetrator. Whereas such
acts were not committed on the territory of the Respondent,
there was no obligation in this respect.3.3.8.2. The claim of the Applicant, contained in para. 74, p.
855 of the Reply, that the hearing of DuSan Vuckovic before
the Respondent's Court in sabac on war crime charges was
adjourned indefinitely, is not true. The truth of thetter is that
the accused DuSan VuEkovic was found guilty of war crimes by
the District Court of sabac and sentenced on 8 July 1996 to
seven years' imprisonment. Dissatisfied with the length of the
term, the District Public Prosecutor appealed on8 October 1996
to the Serbian Supreme Court, asking for a more severe
punishment.
PART THREE
4.CONSIDERATION OF RELEVANT LEGAL RULES
4.1. Attribution of Acts to the State
4.1.l. Perpetrator of the Crime of Genocide and the
Responsibility of the Stateunder the Genocide Convention
4.1.1.l. In para. 19, page. 960 of the Reply, the Applicant
says:
"Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot but declare to the
Court its strong surprise of being accused by the
Respondent of acts of genocide, when one of the bases
of the Respondent's defence in Part One of its Counter-
Memorial is precisely that 'kccording to the 7948
Genocide Convention a State cannot commit genocide
and other punishable acts': (see Counter-Mernoriai, pp.
308-372, Section 4-70.) As it was clearly explained ln
the previous pages of this Reply (See above, Chapter 2,
Section 4; and Chapter 6, Section 4), Bosnia and
643 Herzegovina does not accept this latter interpretation,
3ut it considers that such blatant contradiction in terms
between the response to the Applicant's clam and the
counter-claims reveals with absolute clarify, once again,
the evident mata fides of the Respondent in the whole
proceedings of this case and how the only real purpose
of ifs counter-claims is the intent to delay the procedure
and cloud the entire issue at stake. By doing su, by
blowing hot and cold in the same written pleading, the
Respondent is scorning the most basic principles of
good faith which should inspire the behaviour of the
parties inal1proceedings before the Court and serve the
interests of the proper administration of justice."
4.1.1.2. The Applicant's reaction is over-exaggerated. The
matter is pure and simple: Under Article 4 of the Genocide
Convention al1 persons who have committed an act of genocide
or any other act referred to in Article 3 shall be punished,
regardless of whether they are governors, officiais or ordinary
citizens. The Convention has thus named individuals as
possible perpetrators of the crime of genocide and other
punishable acts. The Respondent challenges the Applicant to
quote the provisions of the Genocide Convention referring to
the State as the perpetrator of genocide or of any other
punishable acts.
4.1.1.3. The responsibility of a State is quite another matter.
The State is bound to fulfil its obligations under the Convention
and it is doing so through individuals having the status of
organs. The State is responsible for the acts committed by its
organs, for their acts or omissions. According to the
Respondent's understanding of the Genocide Convention and
the rules governing the responsibility of the State, the State
cannot be the perpetrator of the crime of genocide, but it can
be responsible if its organs failed to prevent the commission of
this crime in its territory or if they committed it themselves.4.1.1.4. This difference in the understanding of law between the
Respondent and the Applicant is not so important as to merit
the Applicant's building upon it its thesis "that such blatant
contradiction in terms between the response to the Applicant's
claim and the counter-claims reveals with absolute clarity, once
again, the evident mala fides of the Respondent in the whole
proceedings of this case and how the on& real purpose of its
counter-claims is the intent to delay the procedure and cloud
the entire issue at stake"
4.1.2. Attribution to the State of the Acts of An
lnsurrectional Movement
4.1.2.1. The International Law Commission, in its draft rules
concerning an internationally wrongful act as a source of
international responsibility of State, noted the existence of a
customary rule on the attribution to the State of the acts of a
successful insurrection, which reads as follows:
'Attribution to the State of the act of an insurrectional
movement which becomes the new movement of a
State or which results in the formation of a new State.
7. The act of an insurrectional movement which
becomes the new government of a State shall be
considered as an act of that State. However, such
attribution shall be without prejudice to the attribution to
that State of conduct which would have been previously
considered as an act of the State by virtue of articles 5
to 70.
2. The act of an insurrectional movement whose action
results in the formation of a new State in part of the
territory of a pre-existing State or in a territoryer its
645 administration shall be considered as an act of the new
State." (Report of the International Law Commission on
the work of its thirty-first session, 14 May-3 August
1979, page 242)
4.1.2.2. Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur on the subject,
summed up in his report, containing an analysis of State
practices, the views of scholars and previous sets of unofficial
rules regarding the responsibility of State, in the following way:
'211. We have just said that international scholars most
uniformly extol the principle of the responsibility of a
State endowed with a government resulting from a
successful revolution forthe act committed by organs of
the revolutionary movement before the finaltriumph of
the latter. We might specify that those who have gone
most deeply into the question do not hesitate to speak
explicith and righth of 'httribution to the State" of the
acts of the insurrectional movement or, at least, imply
that they view the situation in that light, since, in one
way or another, most of them assimilate, a posteriori,
the organs of the insurrectional movement which has
become successful, to organs of the State. There is no
doubi, therefore, thai, with a few exceptions, the aufhors
of the theoretical works on international law generally
subscribe to the idea that the acts in question are to be
regarde4 retroactively, as "acts of the State". We do not
feel thatit is necessary to reverf, on this subject, to the
question of the 'justifications" for thatdea; we have
already hdcated above, the justifications most frequently
invoked and the comments which they cal1for.
212. Basis of discussion No. 22 (c) drawn up by the
Preparatory Cornmittee for the 7930 Conference, has
been considered above. Apart from that text, the
question of the attribution to the State, as a source of
responsibility, of the acts of organs of insurrectional
646 rnovements which have subsequently become the
government of a State bas been explicitly taken into
consideration in five codification drafts: the two
emanating from Harvard Law School, that of the lnter-
Arnerican Juridical Cornmittee reflecting the concept of
the United States, and the two drawn up by Garcia
Amador for the International Law Commission. The
Harvard draft of 7929, that of the Inter-American
JuridicalCornmittee of 7965, and that of Garcia Amador
of 7958 speak in general of State responsibilify for the
acts of a successful insurrection. The Harvard draft of
7967 expresses more precisely the idea of attributing to
a State the acts of organs of an insurrectional
movement which has subsequently become the
government of that State. Only Garcia Amador's revised
draft of 7967 departs inexplicably from the others, since
it seems to try to bit - in very obscure terrns,
rnoreover - the attribution to the State of the acts or
omissions of revolutionaries during a civil war, even
where the revolution is successful, to cases in which
there has been neglgence on the part of the 'Yegitimate"
organs of the State.
273. On the basis of the analysis made in the preceding
paragraphs, we can now apply ourselves to the
definition of the rule governing the situations examined
in this section. The principle to be established is clear;
al1 that remains is to find a sufficiently precise formula
to encornpass the different situations likely to arise in
the context of the success of a revolutionary or
insurrectional movement: (a) the installation, or even
merely the participation of the said movement in the
governrnent of the State, whose continuify is not
affecte6 (b) the establishment of a new State within the
sarne territoria/ boundaries as the pre-existing State; (c)
the establishment, following a successful insurrection, of
a new State in part of the territory formerly under the
647sovereignty of the pre-existing State. If rn@htbe useful,
h order to avoid any possible confusion, to adopt a text
consisting of two separate paragraphs. lt is also
necessary to ensure that the wording of the rule shows
that there is no other condition for attribution to the
State, as a potential source of international
responsibilitx of the conduct of organs of the
insurrectional rnovement than the rnere existence of that
rnovernent. lt is in no way required, although such is
frequently the case, that the movernent in question
should possess international personality. Accordingly,
attribution to the State is retroactive to the very first
moment of the rnovement'ç existence. Lastly, it appears
essential to indicate explicitly thaf, where a subversive
rnovement on& achieves the installation of a new
government of a State, whose identity does not in itself
change, the retroactive attribution to that State of the
conduct of organs of the rnovernent in question in no
way precludes the parallel attribution to that State of the
conduct engaged in during the sarne period by organs
of the government which was then regarded as
"legitirnate? (Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1972, Volume II, pp. 150-151)
214. ln the light of the foregoing, we believe that we
may suggest the adoption of the following text:
"Article 13- Retroactive attribution to a State of the acts
of organs of a successful insurrectional rnovernent
1. The conduct of a person or group of persons who, at
the time when such conduct was engaged in, were
organs of an insurrectional movernent whose structures
have subsequently become the structures of a new
State constituted in al1 or part of the territary former&
under the sovere~gnty of the pre-existing State is retroactiveiy considered to be an act of the newly
constituted State.
2. The conduct of a person or group of persons who, at
the time when such conduct was engaged in, were
organs of an insurrectional movement whose structures
have subsequentiy been integrated, in whole or in part,
with those of the pre-existhg State is retroactively
considered to be an act of that State. However, such
attribution does not preclude the parallel attribution to
the said State of the conduct of a person or group of
persons who, at the aforementioned time, were organs
of the movement which was at that time considered to
be legitimate (Yearbook of the lnternational Law
Commission, 1972,Volume II, pp. 150-151).
4.1.3. Attribution to the State of the Acts of Organs
Placed at ItsDisposal
4.1.3.1. The International Law Commission, in codifying the
rules governing responsibility of the State, has come up with
the following wording for the rule of customary law of attributing
to the State of the conduct of organs placed at its disposal by
another State or by an international organization:
"The conduct of an organ which bas been placed at the
disposa1 of a State by another State or by an
international organization shall be considered as an act
of the former State under international law, if that organ
was acting in the exercise of elements of the
governmental authoriîy of the State at whose disposal it
bas been placed." (Report of the lnternational Law
Commission on the work of its thirty-first session, 14
May -3August 1979, page 241)
4.1.3.2. In his report on the aforementioned rule, Robert Ago
pointed out the following:
649"799. Jhere is one point which must first be elucidated
in order to make it quite clear what we are discussing.
The situations we have in mind are those in which a
State or an international organization places one of ifs
organs, whether individual or collective, at the disposal
of another State in order that that other State may use
it within ifs own system to perform in conjunction with ifs
own machiner- a specific public task or function or to
provide a public servke for which ifs own organization is
not suitably or sufficiently equ~pped. There is tberefore a
clear distinction between sifuations of tbis kind and
situations in which organs of a State are performing
some of their own functions which, eeitherin the ordinary
course of events or exceptionally, have to be exercised
in foreign territory. Functions of that kind are, and
continue to be, functions of the State to which the
organs belong, and there is therefore no connexion
between these organs and the machinery of the State in
whose territory they are acting.
Once this bas been clear, it is easy to envisage
200,
possible instances of organs being "lent" by one State
to another State or by an international organization to a
State. A State may place at the disposal of another
State a contingent of its police or armed forces so that,
together with the forces of the beneficiary State, it may
assist that State in putting down an insurrection or
resisting foreign aggression. lt may send to the other
State a detachment of its health, hospital or other
services to provide assistance when there is an
epidemic or other natural disaster. lt may authorize
some of ifs officiak to administer in the territory of a
third State a service of another State in cases where
the officials of the other Sfafe are unable for one reason
or another fo do so. lt may second specialists from its
administration to help another State to organize or
650reorganize a service, tu install a plant and put into
operation a structural reform, and su forth. Obviously,
assistance of this nature may be provided not by
another State but by an international organization or
institution; and it goes without saying that situations of
this kind are likely tu become increasingly frequent in
the widening framework of bilateral or multilateral
assistance programmes.
274. Consequently, irrespective of whether an organ is
"ient" or 'Yransferred" by one State tu another, by a
State tu an international organization or by an
international organization tu a State, only one principle
can be applied: the beneficiary of the "loan" or '?ransferU
must be held responsible for any violations of
international law committed by the organ placed at its
disposal, when the acts of that organ are genuinely
performed in the name and on behalf of the beneficiary
and in accordance with orders issued by the beneficiary
alone. As we have seen. if this princ~@leshad not been
confirmed by international practice, it would have to be
applied for reasons of legal logic, effectiveness and
equiw. ln view of the increasing number of cases in
which it may have tu be applied in future, especially in
relations between States and international organ~zations,
tu formulate the principle more clearly will contribute tu
the progressive development of international law. Our
task now therefore is tu find a definition which
expresses the criterion adequately and indicates clearly
the essential requirement which must be fulfiled before
it is possible tu consider as acts of another State, the
acts or omissions of a persan belonging tu the
apparatus of another State or, more generally, of
another subject of international law. ln the light of the
various elements which have to be taken into
consideration, we envisage the fol10wing formulation: Article 9. Attribution to the State, as a subject of
internationallaw, of the acts of organs placed at its
disposal by another State or by an international
organization
The conduct of a person or group of persons having,
under the legal order of a state or of an international
organkation, the status of organs who have been placed
at the disposal of another State, is considered to be an
act of that State in internationalaw, provided that those
organs are actually under the authoriw of the State at
whose disposal they have been placed and act in
accordance with its instructions. (Yearbook of the
InternationalLaw Commission, 1971, Vol. II, Part One,
pp. 267-274)
4.2. Definition of the Crime of Genocide
4.2.1. The United Nations Diplomatic Conference to establish
the lnternational Criminal Court, held in Rome in 1998, changed
nothing in the definition of genocide as set forth in the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court reads:
"For the purpose of this Statute, Qenocide' rneans any
of the following acts cornmitted with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killling mernbers of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to mernbers
of the group;
(c) Deliberateiy intïicting on the group conditions of life
calculated fo bring about its physical destructon in
whole or in part;
652 (d) lmposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group."
4.2.2. The Applicant's assertions contained in the Memorial
(paras 5.5.1.l. - 5.5.6.5., pp. 235-242) on alleged progressive
development of the definition of genocide have not been
confirmed. Quite the opposite. Had the definition of genocide
developed progressively, that would have naturally resulted in
its modification, which has not been the case. Consequently,
not even the practices of two ad hoc criminal tribunals have
had an effect on the definition itself.
4.2.3. Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court contains the following definition of crimes against
humanity:
"1. For the purpose of this Statute, 'crime against
humanity' means any of the following acts when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack::
(a)Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d)Deportation or forcible fransfer of population;
(e)lmprisonrnent or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international
law;
(f)Torture;
(9) Rape, sexual slaver- enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sferilzation, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gra viw;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,
653religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other
grounds that are uni!/ersally recognized as imperrnissible
under international law, in connection with any act
referred tu in this paragraph or any crime within the
juïsdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(i/ The crime of apartheid;
(kj Otber inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or to mental or physical health.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 7:
(a) Httack directed against any civilian population'
means a course of conduct involving the multiple
commission of acts referred to in 9aragraph 7 against
any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a
State or organized policy to commit such attack,.
(b) 'Extermination' includes the intentional inflictjon of
conditions of life, inter alia, the deprivation of access to
food and medicine, calculated tu bring about the
destruction of part of a population;
(c) 'Enslavement' means the exercise of any or al1 of
the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a
person and includes the exercise of such power in the
course of trafficking in persons, in particular wornen and
children;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population' means
forced displacement of the persons concerned by
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which
they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted
under international law;(e) 'Torture' means the intentional infliction of severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a
person in custody or under the control of the accuse&
except that torture shall not include pain or suffering
arisng only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful
sanctions:
(0 Forced pregnancy ' means the unlawful confinement,
of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or
carrying out grave violations of international law. This
definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting
national laws relating to pregnancx
(g) Persecution' means the intentional and severe
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international
law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivify,
(h) 'The crime of apartheid' means inhumane acts of a
character similar to those referred to in paragraph 7,
committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of
systematic oppression and domination by one racial
group over any other racial group or groups and
committed with the intention of maintaining that regime;
(/jl 'Enforced disappearance of persons' means the
arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of; a State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons,
with the intention of removing them from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time.
3. For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that
the term Qender' refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of sociefy. The term Qender'
does not indicate any meaning different from the above. "
4.2.4. An essential element of the definition of crime against
humanity is that the act is "committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population'!
The facts constituting ''a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population" are not sufficient to
draw a conclusion about the existence of a genocidal intent,
because in that case no distinction would be made between
genocide and crimes against humanity. Therefore, the assertions
contained in para. 40, p. 362 of the Reply, do not hold.
4.2.5. 'Fersecution against any identifiable group or collectivi~
on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as
defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court" is a kind of crime
against humanity. This precludes the Applicant's assertion as
contained in para. 43, p. 363 of the Reply, that "the constitutive
intent of the crime of genocide may be inferred from the very
gravity of those discriminatory acts." If not, there will be no
distinction between the crime of genocide and crimes against
humanity.
4.2.6. Of importance also is the provision defining the term
"extermination" which reads as follows: "Extermination includes
the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia, the
deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring
about the destruction of part of a population." Indeed, acts
constituting the crime of genocide and a crime against humanity
can be very similar or identical. There is just one essential
element which distinguishes the two and that is genocidal
intent.
4.2.7. Professor Shaw noted as follows:
656 "lt is clear that the weight of the definition in the
Convention is upon the factor of intention. Actual
physical destruction is not required; what is essential is
the need to demonstrate the subjective element. ln the
context of the bureaucratie and often diffuse character of
the modern State apparatus this will often be rather
diffiultto do. Few regimes are likely to be as clear and
open as the Nazi regime in ifs elucidation of motives
and intentions. Objective facts may be selectively easy
to verify; ascertaining the subjective intent to destroy is
much barder to accomplish. lt could, of course, also be
argued that a State having indulged in group homicidal
activities may too easily refute genocidal behaviour by
asserting the absence of the necessary element of
intention. lt was with the aim of dealing with this very
real problem that attempts were made during the
debates in the UN S~xthCommittee to replace the words
committed with the 'intent to destroy' the phrase 'aimed
at the physical destruction of groups: This, however,
was not accepted. The major reason for this was the
valid contention that without clear reference to the intent
criterion, the distinction between genocide and ordinary
murder would be eroded, as well as that between
genocide on the one band and wars and crimes against
humanity on the other. "
(Essay in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, 1989, p. 797 at p. 805).
4.2.8. It is also relevant to recall the text of two of the
understandings which accompanied the US ratification of the
Genocide Convention in 1988:
''(7) That the term intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such"
appearing in article Il means specific intent to destroy, in
whole or in substantial part, a national,ethnical, racial or
religious group as such by the acts specified in article II.
6.J
657 (4) That acts in the course of armed conflicts committed
without the specific intent required by article 11are not
sufficient to constitute genocide defined by this
Convention'!
This emphasis on the specific nature of the intention is to be
found in the Message to the Senate of President Truman, 16
June 1949; Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. XI, p.
851 at p. 854.
4.2.9. This understanding accompanying the US ratification of
the Genocide Convention was justifiable. The suffering of the
civilian population in armed conflicts is a highly complex legal
and factual issue. Civilians enjoy protection in armed conflicts,
but they lose it if they find themselves in or near a military
installation or next to a military unit. Furthermore, they enjoy
protection as long as they are not directly involved on the
enemy side.
4.2.10. Concerning the element of intent, the International Court
of Justice said:
"Some States also contended that the prohibition
against genocide, contained in the Convention of 9
December 1948 on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, is a relevant rule of customary
international law which the Court must apply. The Court
recalls that in ArticleIl of the Convention genocide is
defined as "any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group
(6) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group(c) Deliberately inflcting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part
(d) lrnposing rneasures intended to prevent births w~thin
the group
(e) Forcibly transferring children ofthe group to another
group. "
lt was rnaintained before the Court that the nurnber of
deaths occasioned by the use of nuclear weapons would
be enorrnous; that the victims could, in certain cases,
include persons of a particular national, ethnic, racial or
religious group; and that the intention to destroy such
groups could be inferred frorn the fact that the user of
the nuclear weapon would have ornitted to take account
of the well known effects of the use of such weapons.
The Court would point out in that regard that the
prohibition of genocide would be pertinent in this case if
the recourse to nuclear weapons did indeed entai1 the
elernent of intent, towards a group as such, required by
the provision quoted above. ln the view of the Court, it
would only be possible to arrive at such conclusion after
having taken due account of the circurnstances specific
to each case." (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996,~.240) CONCLUSIONS
5.1. The Counter-Claim is based on facts and law. The acts of
incitement to genocide, the other acts enumerated inArticle III of
the Genocide Convention and the crimes of genocide against
Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been committed. These
acts are attributable to the Applicant in accordancewith the rules
of international law. By the acts or omssions of its organs, the
Applicant has violated its obligations established by the Genocide
Convention and it is therefore responsible.
5.2. The policy aiming at the destruction of Serbs as a group is
an element of radical Islamism. It can be inferred from the idea
"there can be no peace or coexistence between lslamic faith and
the non-lslamic social and political institutions", expounded by the
lslamic declaration; fromrefusal of Alija lzetbegovic to accept any
offer for peaceful arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so
that the basic interests of Serbs, Croats and Muslims be
protected; from denying the rights of the Serb people to self-
determination, within the framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
from the creation of paramilitary units of Muslims; from incitement
to genocide; from acts of genocide; and from disregard for the
basis of the new Dayton Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5.3. In some cases the intent to commit genocide was verbally
expressed by the perpetrators. In other cases the intent to commit
genocide can be inferred from the killings of civilians done on
Serb religious holiday days, by cutting off three fingers of the right
hand with which Serbs cross themselves, by carving in a cross
symbol of Christian faith on the bodies of Serb victims, by
circumcising Serbs according to Muslim customs, forcing Serb
victims to salute Ustashi symbol under which the Serb people
suffered genocide in the Second World War in the so-called
lndependent State of Croatia, by forcing victims to curse their
own saints.
6605.4. The Respondent has proved the existence of al1elements of
the crime of genocide: killing of Serbs, causing serious bodily or
mental harm to Serbs, deliberately inflicting on Serbs conditions of
life calculated to bring about their physical destruction, in whole or
in part as well as that al1 these acts were committed with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Serb ethnic and religious
group as such.
5.5. The Respondent has proved the existence of acts of direct
and public incitement to commit genocide, as well as other
punishable acts under Article III of the Genocide Convention.
5.6. The Respondent has proved that the Applicant has breached
its obligations establishedunder the Genocide Convention, i.e. it
has not prevented commission of acts of genocide and other acts
punishable under Article III of the Genocide Convention, nor has
it punished the perpetrators of the mentioned acts. Quite the
opposite, its organs have committed these acts. The Applicant is
responsible for the breaches of the obligations established under
the Genocide Convention.
5.7. Accordingly, the Applicant is obliged to punish persons
responsible for acts of genocide and other punishable acts under
Article III of the Genocide Conventioi~. It is obliged to take
necessary measures so that the said acts would not be repeated
in the future. It is obliged to eliminate ail consequences of the
violations of obligations established by the Genocide Convention
and to provide adequate compensation.
5.8. The Applicant has not supported its Claim with sufficient
concrete information. The allegations of the Applicant are general
in such a measure that they are not suitable for legal test
imposed by the Genocide Convention and the subject-matter of
the dispute. lt is quite inadequate that the Applicant quotes in a
Chapter of its Reply documents on alleged numbers of killed
people or raped women and that it quotes in another Chapter
661documents on alleged involvement of the JNA in some events in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. lnstead of this, the Applicant should
prove commission of a concrete act prohibited by Articles II or III
of the Genocide Convention, the existence of an intent as defined
by Article II of the Genocide Convention and that the act has
been committed on the territory of the FR of Yugoslavia or that
the act can be attributed to the FR of Yugoslavia pursuant to the
rules of international law.
5.9. The Applicant has not proved its allegations. The submitted
evidence is not a source of reliable information nor did it support
the Applicant's allegations.
5.10. The acts alleged by the Applicant cannot be qualified as
crimes of genocide or acts punishable under Article III of the
Genocide Convention because they were not committed at al1nor
were they committed in the way alleged by the Applicant, or
because they were not committed with a genocidal intent.
5.11. No organ of the FR of Yugoslavia has committed any act
of genocide or any other act punishable under Article III of the
Genocide Convention on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5.12. No act of genocide or any other act punishable under
Article III of the Genocide Convention was committed on the
territory of the FR of Yugoslavia.
5.13. Even if any acts of genocide or any of the acts enumerated
in Article III of the Genocide Convention were committed against
non-Serb groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such acts and any
relevant breaches of the obligations established by the Genocide
Convention cannot be imputed to the FR of Yugoslavia.
5.14. Therefore, the Respondent is not responsible in terms of
the provisions of the Genocide Convention and related rules on
State responsibility. SUBMISSIONS
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the International
Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
1. In view of the fact that no obligations established by the
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide have been violated with regard to Muslims
and Croats,
- since the acts alleged by the Applicant have not been
committed at ail, or not to the extent and in the way alleged by
the Applicant, or
- if some have been committed, there was absolutely no
intention of committing genocide, andlor
- they have not been directed specifically against the members
of one ethnic or religious group, i.e. they have not been
committed against individuals just because they belong to some
ethnic or religious group,
consequently, they cannot be qualified as acts of genocide or
other acts prohibited by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, andlor
2. In view of the fact that the acts alleged by the Applicant in
its submissions cannot be attributed to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia,
- since they have not been committed by the organs of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,- since they have not been committed on the territory of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
- since they have not been committed by the order or under
control of the organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
- since there are no other grounds based on the rules of
international law to consider them as acts of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia,
therefore the Court rejects ali the claims of the Applicant, and
3. Bosnia and Herzegovina is responsible for the acts of
genocide committed against Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and for other violations of the obligations established by the
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide.
- because it has incited acts of genocide by the "lslamic
Declaration", and in particular by the position contained in it that
"there can be no peace or coexistence between 'lslamic faifh'
and 'non-lslamic 'social and political institutions",
- because it has incited acts of genocide by the "Novi Vox",
paper of the Muslim youth, and in particular by the verses of a
"Patriotic Song" which read as follows:
"Dear mother, l'm going to plant willows,
Weyl bang Serbs from them.
Dear mother, l'm going tu sharpen knives,
WeYIsoon fil pits again'!
- because it has incited acts of genocide by the paper "Zmaj
od Bosne", and in particular by the sentence in an article
published in it that "Each Muslim must name a Serb and take
oath tu kill hirrl';
664 - because public calls for the execution of Serbs were
broadcast on radio "Hajat" and thereby acts of genocide were
incited;
- because the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well
as other organs of Bosnia and Herzegovina have committed
acts of genocide and other acts prohibited by the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (enumerated in Article III), against Serbs in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, which have been stated in Chapter Seven of
the Counter-Memorial;
- because Bosnia and klerzegovina has not prevented the acts
of genocide and other acts prohibited by the 1948 Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(enumerated in Article III), against Serbs on its territory, which
have been stated in Chapter Seven of the Counter-Memorial.
4. Bosnia and Herzegovina has the obligation to punish the
perçons held responsible for the acts of genocide and other
acts prohibited by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
5. Bosnia and Herzegovina is bound to take necessary measures
so that thesaid acts would not be repeated in the future.
6. Bosnia and Herzegovina is bound to eliminate al1 the
consequences of violation of the obligations established by the
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide and to provide adequate compensation.
Agent of the FR of Yugoslavia
Ambassador Milan Grubic
Co-Agent of the FR of Yugoslavia Rodoljub Etinski
(signed)
665 LIST OF ANNEXES TO REJOINDER
- Annex No. RI, Dr Nijaz Durakovic - "Kontroverze O
nacionalnom i nacionalistiSkom" 1 Dr Nijaz Durakovic
Controversies of the National and the Nationalist, Zenica,
1987, pp. rl -r5/r6-r9
- Annex No. R2, Milovan Dilas, Nadeida Gace - "Adil
ZulfikarpaSic BoSnjak"1Milovan Bilas, Nadeida Gace,
"Bosniac Adil ZulfikarpaSic", Bosniac Institute, Zurich, 1994,
pp. r10-r18lr19-r24
- Annex No. R3, Milovan Dilas, Nadeida Gace - "Adil
ZulfikarpaSic BoSnjak"1Milovan Bilas, Nadeida Gace,
"Bosniac Adil ZulfikarpaSic", Bosniac Institute, Zurich, 1994,
pp. r25-r35lr36-r50
-
Annex No. R4, Sarajevske dnevne novine "Oslobodenje"/The
Sarajevo daily "Oslobodenje" ("Liberation"), pp. r51-r52/r53-
1-54
- Annex No. R5, Sefer Halilovic - "Lukava strategijaU/Sefer
Halilovic "Shrewd Strategy", pp. 1-55-r57lr58
- Annex No. R6, The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, Laredo Division, r59-r71
- Annex No. R7, nedeljni magazin "NIN", broj: 2497, od 05.
novembra 1998. - "Delo i lik Roja Gatmana"r'Work and
Image of Roy Gutman", NIN Weekly Informative Magazine,
issue No. 2497, 5 November 1998, pp. r72-r74lr75-r82- Annex No. R8, Sluibeni glasnik srpskog naroda u BiH,
Odluka O formiranju Vojske Srpske Republike Bosne i
Hercegovinenhe Decision on Forming the Army of the Serb
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. r83lr84-r85
- Annex No. R9, Sluibeni glasnik srpskog naroda u BiH,
Naredba O primeni pravila medunarodnog ratnog prava u
Vojsci Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovinenhe Decree
on the Application of the Rules of International Law of
Armed Conflicts by the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, pp. r86-r87lr88
- Annex No. RIO, Sluibeni glasnik srpskog naroda u BiH,
Odluka O zabrani formiranja i delovanja naoruianih grupa i
pojedinaca na teritoriji Republlike koje nisu pod jedinstvenom
komandom vojske ili policijenheDecision on Prohibition of
Forming and Activities of Armed Groups and lndividuals in
the territory of theepublic, which are not under the Unique
Command of the Army or Militia, r89-r90
- Annex No. RI 1, Sluibeni glasnik Srpske Republike BiH,
Odluka O izboru sudija ViSeg suda u Banja Lucinhe
Decision on the Election of Judges of the Higher Court in
Banja Luka, pp. r91-r93/r94-97
- Annex No. R12, Press Conference by Permanent
Representative of Bosnia and Hercegovina p. r98-r101
- Annex No. R13, kopija pisma Sefa delegacije Medunarodnog
Crvenog Krsta republiëkom ministru pravdel A copy of the
letter from the head of the ICRC delegation to Yugoslavia to
the Serbian Justice Minister, dated 25 May 1998, pp. r102-
rl03lrl04-rl05
- Annex No. RC1, svedoëenje TMItestimony TM, pp. rcl-
rc51rc6-rc9- Annex No. RC2, svedotenje MNItestimony MN, pp. rclO-
rcl6lrcl7-rc23
- Annex No. RC3, svedotenje ~Sltestimon~ BS, pp. rc24-
rc31Irc32-rc37
- Annex No. RC4, svedotenje MNItestimony MN, pp. rc38-
rc43lrc44-rc47
- Annex No. RC5, svedotenje VBItestimony VB, pp. rc48-
rc49lrc50-rc51
- Annex No. RC6, svedotenje SVItestimony SV, pp. rc52-
rc55lrc56-rc61
- Annex No. RC7, svedotenje SDItestimony SD, pp. rc62-
rc64lrc65-rc67
- Annex No. RC8, svedotenje DRItestimony DR, pp. rc68-
rc74lrc75-rc79
- Annex No. RC9, svedotenje ZMItestimony ZM, pp. rc80-
rc83lrc84-rc86
- Annex No. RC10, svedotenje GSItestimony GS, pp. rc87-
rc901rc91-rc93
- Annex No. RC11, svedotenje VMItestimony VM, pp. rc94-
rc95lrc96-rc98
- Annex No. RC12, svedotenje TSItestimony TS, pp. rc99-
rcl04lrcl05-rcl08
- Annex No. RC13, svedotenje KRItestimony KR, pp. rc109-
rcl18lrcl19-rc126
- Annex No. RC14, svedoEenje DSItestimony DS, pp. rc127-
rc132lrc133-rc135- Annex No. RC15, svedotenje KPItestimony KP, pp. rc136-
rc138lrcl39-rcl41
Annex No. RC16, svedotenje LPltestimony LP, pp. rc142-
rcl46lrcl47-rcl51
Annex No. RC17, svedotenje MNtestimony MA, pp. rc152-
rcl54lrcl55-rcl56
Annex No. RC18, svedotenje BPItestimony BP, pp. rc157-
rcl59lrc160-rcl62
Annex No. RC19, sluibeni izve3tajlofficial report, pp. rc163-
rcl64lrcl65-rcl66
Annex No. RC20, svedotenje PRltestimony PR, pp. rc167-
rcl71 lrcl72-rcl75
Annex No. RC21, svedotenje GSItestimony GS, pp. rc176-
rc178lrc179-rc181
Annex No. RC22, zapisnik O uvidaju, foto-
dokumentacija/investigation report, photographs from the file,
report, pp.rc182-rc2001rc201-rc218
Annex No. RC23, svedotenje BTItestimony BT, pp. rc219-
rc221lrc222-rc225
Annex No. RC24, svedotenje MCitestimony MC, pp. rc226-
rc227lrc228-rc230
Annex No. RC25, svedotenje S~ltestirnon~ ST, pp. rc231-
rc232lrc233-rc234
Annex No. RC26, svedotenje ~~ltestimony CV, pp.
rc235lrc236- Annex No. RC27, svedoEenje OWtestimony OK, pp. rc237-
rc239lrc240-rc243
- Annex No. RC28, svedotenje Z~ltestimony ZS, pp. rc244-
rc246lrc247-rc249
- Annex No. RC29, svedoEenje JVItestimony JV, pp. rc250-
rc252lrc253-rc255
- Annex No. RC30, svedoEenje MWtestimony MK, pp. rc256-
rc259lrc260-rc264
- Annex No. RC31, svedoEenje MRItestimony MR, pp. rc265-
rc266lrc267-rc269
- Annex No. RC32, svedoEenje BMItestimony BM, pp. rc270-
rc273lrc274-rc278
- Annex No. RC33, svedoEenje OVItestimony OV, pp. rc279-
rc285lrc286-rc292
- Annex No. RC34, svedotenje DWtestimony DB, pp. rc293-
rc303lrc304-rc314
- Annex No. RC35, svedocenje VRltestimony VR, pp. rc315-
rc322lrc323-rc329
- Annex No. RC36, svedoeenje MPltestimony MP, pp. rc330-
rc337lrc338-rc344
- Annex No. RC37, svedoEenje VMltestimony VM, pp. rc345-
rc347lrc348-rc350
- Annex No. RC38, kriviEna prijava, izjava SM, sluibena
zabeleska br. 02-230-2611, sluibena zabeleska br. 03-230-
2611, zapisnik O spoljnjem pregledu IeSaIcriminal report,
statement SM, official notice No. 02-230-2611,officiai notice
No. 03-230-2611, minutes on external examination of a corpse, pp. rc351-rc358, rc359-rc360, rc361, rc362, rc363-
rc364lrc365-rc371, rc372-rc373, rc374, rc375, rc376-rc377
- Annex No. RC39, svedotenje ZTItestimony ZT, pp. rc378-
rc380lrc381-rc383
-
Annex No. RC40, zapisnik O uvidajuldescription of the crime
scene, pp. rc384-rc389lrc390-rc397
- Annex No. RC41, svedoëenje KSItestimony KS, pp. rc398-
rc399lrc400-rc401
- Annex No. RC42, reSenjeIdecision, pp. rc402-rcl.O3/rc404-
rc405
- Annex No. RC43, svedoEenje DMItestimony DM, pp. rc406-
RC407Irc408-rc410
- Annex No. RC44, sluibena zabele5kalofficial notice, pp.
rc411lrc412
- Annex No. RC45, svedotenje SLjItestimony SLj, pp. rc413-
rc416lrc417-rc420
- Annex No. RC46, poseben izveStaj, kriviëna prijava,
sluibena zabeleSka, izjava VN, izjava SP, izjava KR, izjava
VM, izjava DM, nalaz i miSljenje lekara specijalictelspecial
report, criminal report, official notice No. 02-230-11193,
statement VN, statement SP, statement KR, statement VM,
statement DM, findings and opinion of physician, pp. rc421,
rc 422-rc423, rc424-rc425, rc426-rc427, rc428-rc429, rc430-
rc431, rc432-rc433, rc434-rc435, rc436-rc437lrc438, rc439-
rc441, rc442-rc443, rc444-rc445, rc446-rc447, rc448-rc449,
rc450-rc451, rc452-rc453, rc454-rc456,
- Annex No. RC47, svedotenje MMItestimony MM, pp. rc457-
rc459lrc460-rc462- Annex No. RC48, svedotenje SMItestimony SM, pp. rc463-
rc465lrc466-rc468
- Annex No. RC49, svedotenje C~ltestimon~ CD, pp. rc469-
rc470lrc471-rc472
- Annex No. RC50, svedotenje RMItestimony RM, pp. rc470-
rc473lrc474-rc478
- Annex No. RC51, svedotenje KKItestimony KK, pp. rc479-
rc487lrc488-rc494
- Annex No. RC52, svedotenje MRItestimony MR, pp. rc495-
rc507lrc508-rc519
-
Annex No. RC53, svedotenje MMItestimony MM, pp. rc520-
rc525lrc526-rc530
- Annex No. RC54, svedotenje OMItestimony OM, pp. rc531-
rc541Irc542-rc552
- Annex No. RC55, svedotenje DRItestimony DR, pp. rc553-
rc557lrc558-rc561
- Annex No. RC56, svedotenje MWtestimony MK, pp. rc562-
rc565lrc566-rc568
- Annex No. RC57, svedotenje MDItestimony MD, pp. rc569-
rc572lrc573-rc574
- Annex No. RC58, svedoCenje MGItestimony MG, pp. rc575-
rc578lrc579-rc580
- Annex No. RC59, svedoeenje ATItestimony AT, pp. rc581-
rc584lrc585-rc586
- Annex No. RC60, svedoSenje i~ltestirnon~ ZT, pp. rc587-
rc591lrc592-rc594- Annex No. RC61, svedotenje TTItestimony TT, pp. rc595-
rc598lrc599-rc600
- Annex No. RC62, svedoEenje GPItestimony GP, pp. rc601-
rc603lrc604-rc605
- Annex No. RC63, svedotenje S~ltestimon~ ST, pp. rc606-
rc607lrc608
- Annex No. RC64, svedotenje LMItestimony LM, pp. rc609-
rc613lrc614-rc617
- Annex No. RC65, svedotenje JDItestimony JD, pp. rc618-
rc628lrc629-rc636
- Annex No. RC66, svedoëenje BMItestimony BM, pp. rc637-
rc638lrc639-rc640
- Annex No. RC67, svedotenje PSItestimony PS, pp. rc641-
rc642lrc643-rc644
- Annex No. RC68, svedotenje NJItestimony NJ, pp. rc645-
rc648lrc649-rc652
- Annex No. RC69, svedoëenje RBItestimony RB, pp. rc653-
rc655lrc656-rc657
- Annex No. RC70, svedoEenje NTItestimony NT, pp. rc658-
rc662lRC663-rc665
- Annex No. RC71, svedoëenje MOItestimony MO, pp. rc666-
rc668lrc669-rc670
- Annex No. RC72, svedotenje RPItestimony RP, pp. rc671-
rc676lrc677-rc680
- Annex No. RC73, svedoëenje BSItestimony BS, pp. rc681-
rc683lrc684-rc685- Annex No. RC74, svedotenje LjGltestimony LjG, pp. rc686-
rc689lrc630-rc691
- Annex No. RC75, svedotenje SGItestimony SG, pp. rc692-
rc695lrc696-rc698
-
Annex No. RC76, svedoEenje GMItestimony GM, pp. rc699-
rc701lrc702-rc704
- Annex No. RC77, svedotenje MSItestimony MS, pp. rc705-
rc708lrc709-rc712
-
Annex No. RC78, svedoEenje ~Gltestimony ZG, pp. rc713-
rc716lrc717-rc720
- Annex No. RC79, svedoCenje DUtestimony DL, pp. rc721-
rc724lrc725-rc728
- Annex No. RC80, svedoEenje i~ltestimony ZT, pp. rc729-
rc732lrc733-rc735
- Annex No. RC81, svedotenje LjMItestimony LjM, pp.
RC736-RC738lRC739-RC741
- Annex No. RC82, svedoEenje DUtestimony DL, pp. RC742-
RC755lRC756-RC771
- Annex No. RC83, svedoEenje DDItestimony DD, pp. RC772-
RC773lRC774-RC775
- Annex No. RC84, svedoëenje VWtestimony VK, pp. RC776-
RC783lRC784-RC790
- Annex No. RC85, svedoEenje MMItestimony MM, pp.
RC791-RC795/RC796-RC799
- Annex No. RC86, svedoEenje TBItestimony TB, pp. RC800-
RC801lRC802-RC804- Annex No. RC87, svedoëenje T~ltestimony TZ, pp. RC805-
RC806lRC807-RC809
- Annex No. RC88, svedoëenje KPItestimony KP, pp. RC810-
Rcai 1IRC~I Z-RC~I4
- Annex No. RC89, svedoëenje PGItestimony PG, pp. RC815-
RC816lRC817-RC819
- Annex No. RC90, svedoëenje ~~ltestimon~ CM, pp. RC820-
RC822lRC823-RC825
- Annex No. RC91, svedoëenje DKItestimony DK, pp. RC826-
RC831lRC832-RC836
- Annex No. RC92, svedoëenje DMItestimony DM, pp. RC837-
RC839lRC840-RC842
- Annex No. RC93, svedoëenje ~~ltestirnon~ SM, pp. RC843-
RC844lRC845-RC846
- Annex No. RC94, svedoëenje ~~ltestimon~ BZ, pp. RC847-
RC849lRC850-RC852
- Annex No. RC95, svedoëenje GMItestimony GM, pp.
RC853-RC8551RC856-RC858
- Annex No. RC96, svedoëenje TDItestimony TD, pp. RC859-
RC860lRC861-RC862
- Annex No. RC97, svedoëenje MMItestimony MM, pp.
RC863-RC865lRC866-RC868
- Annex No. RC98, svedoëenje TBItestimony TB, pp. RC869-
RC872lRC873-RC876
-
Annex No. RC99, svedoëenje ~zltestimony GZ, pp. RC877-
RC879lRC880-RC882- Annex No. RC100, svedotenje JDItestimony JD, pp. RC883-
RC885lRC886-RC889
- Annex No. RCI 01, krivitna prijava, sluibena zabeleSka,
izjava ZJ, izjava LM, lcriminal report, official note, statement
ZJ, statementLM, pp. RC890-RC891, RC892, RC893-RC894,
RC895-RC897lRC898-RC899, RC900, RC901, RC902-
RC903
- Annex No. RC102, svedotenje JDItestimony JD, pp. RC904-
RC908lRC909-RC913
- Annex No. RC103, svedotenje IMItestimony IM, pp. RC914-
RC916lRC917-RC919
- Annex No. RC104, svedotenje DDItestimony DD, pp.
RC920-RC923lRC924-RC926
- Annex No. RC105, svedotenje PCItestimony PC, pp.
RC927-RC929lRC930-RC932
- Annex No. RC106, svedotenje CPItestimony CP, pp.
RC933-RC940lRC941-RC950
- Annex No. RC107, svedotenje Plltestimony PI, pp. RC951-
RC954lRC955-RC957
- Annex No. RC108, svedotenje SSltestimony SS, pp.
RC958-RC962lRC963-RC967
- Annex No. RC109, krivitna izjava, sluibena
zabeleSka,lcriminal report, official report, pp. RC968-RC969,
RC970-RC971lRC972-RC973, RC974-RC975
- Annex No. RC110, svedoëenje NDltestimony ND, pp.
RC976-RC977lRC978-RC980- Annex No. RC111, svedotenje DZltestimony DZ, pp.
RC981-RC984/RC985-RC989
- Annex No. RC112, kriviena prijavalcriminal report, pp. rc990-
rc992lrc993-rc995
- Annex No. RC113, svedoCenje ~~ltestimony ZN, pp. rc996-
rc997lrc998-rcl000
- Annex No. RC114, svedoEenje Mlltestimony MI, pp. rc1001-
rcl003/rcl004-rcl006
- Annex No. RC115, zapisnik O uvidajulreport-investigation on
the site of the crime, pp.rc1007-rc1009lrc1010-rc1012
- Annex No. RC116, svedoEenje GSItestimony GS, pp.
rc1013-rc10191rc1020-rc1025
- Annex No. RC117, svedoEenje SAItestimony SA, pp.
rc1026-rcl027lrc1028-rcl030
- Annex No. RC118, kriviEna prijava, izvod iz matiEne knjige
umrlihl criminal report, death certificate, pp. rc1031-rc1032,
rcl033lrcl034-rcl035. rcl036
- Annex No. RC119, zapisnik O uvidajulreport-investigation on
the site of the crime, pp.rcl037-rc1038lrc1039
- Annex No. RC120, kriviEna prijavala criminal report, pp.
rcl040lrcl041 -rc1042
- Annex No. RC121, kriviEna prijava,/a criminal report, pp.
rc1043-rc10481rc1049-rc1055
- Annex No. RC122, svedoEenje RBItestimony RB, pp.
rc1056-rc10581rc1059-rc1061- Annex No. RC123, svedotenje c~ltestimony CM, pp.
rcl062-rcl065/rc:l066-rcl068
- Annex No. RC124, svedotenje DRItestimony DR, pp.
rcl069-rcl072lrcl073-rcl076
- Annex No. RC125, svedotenje AMltestimony AM, pp.
rcl077-rcl084lrcl085-rcl093
- Annex No. RC126, svedotenje MMltestimony MM, pp.
rc1094-rc10981rc1099-rc1102
- Annex No. RC127, svedotenje LMltestimony LM, pp.
rcl103-rc1106lrc1107-rcl109
- Annex No. RC128, svedotenje MMItestimony MM, pp.
rcl 1O-rcl116lrclll7-rcl121
- Annex No. RC129, svedotenje MWtestimony MK, pp.
rcl122-rc1127/rc:1128-rcl132
- Annex No. RC130, svedotenje DKltestimony DK, pp.
rcl133-rc1135lrc1136-rcl138
- Annex No. RC131, svedotenje TTltestimony TT, pp. rc1139-
rcl144lrcl145-rcl149
- Annex No. RC132, krivitna prijava, sluibeni izveStaj1criminal
report, official report, pp. rcl150-rc1150a, rcl151-
rcl152lrcl153-rc1154, rcl155-1157
- Annex No. RC133, svedotenje NSltestimony NS, pp.
rcl158-rc1161lrc1162-rcl164
- Annex No. RC134, krivitna prijava broj: 15-7102-39193,
krivitna prijava broj: 15-7102--40193,rivitna prijava broj: 15-
7102--41193,krivitna prijava broj: 15-7102-38193, lcriminal
report No. 15-7102-39193,criminal report No. 15-7102-40193, criminal report No. 15-7102-41 193, criminal report No. 15-
7102-38193, pp. rcl165-rc1166, rcl167, rcl168,
rcl169lrcl170-rc1171, rcl172, rcl173, rcl174-rc1175
- Annex No. RC135, krivitna prijava broj: 15-1102-KU-26/94,
foto dokumentacijalcriminal report no. 15-1102--KU--26194,
photographs from the file,pp. rc1176-rc1177, rc1178-
rcl183/rcl184-rc1185, rcl186-rc1191,
- Annex No. RC136, svedotenje ZVltestimony ZV, pp. rc1192-
rc1196lrc1197-rcl201
- Annex No. RC137, svedotenje KDItestimony KD, pp.
rc1202-rcl205lrc1206-rcl209
- Annex No. RC138, krivitna prijavalcriminalreport, pp.
rcl210-rc1212lrc1213-rcl216
- Annex No. RC139, svedotenje PMltestimony PM, pp.
rcl217-rcl220lrcl221 -rc11224
- Annex No. RC140, svedoEenje BMItestimony BM, pp.
rcl225-rcl228lrcl229-rcl1233
- Annex No. RC141, svedotenje VDltestimony VD, pp.
rc1234-rc12361rc1237-rc1239
- Annex No. RC142, svedoSenje RGItestimony RG, pp.
rc1240-rcl243lrcl244-rc1248
- Annex No. RC143, svedokenje JSltestimony JS, pp. rc1249-
rc1252lrcl253-rcl256
- Annex No. RC144, svedoEenje APltestimony AP, pp.
rcl257-rcl259lrcl260-rcl1262
- Annex No. RC145, svedoCenje MMltestimony MM, pp.
rc1263-rcl266/rc1267-r~1270- Annex No. RC146, kriviCna prijavalcriminal report, pp.
rcl271 -rc1273/rcl274-rcl275
- Annex No. RC147, obdukcioni nalaz, le5 br. llautopsy
report, corps No. 1, pp. rc127511 -rc1275/3 1 rc127514-rc1278
- Annex No. RC148, obdukcioni nalaz, le5 br. 2lautopsy
report, corps No. 2, pp. rc1279-rc1281lrcl282-rc1285
- Annex No. RC149, obdukcioni nalaz, le5 br. 3lautopsy
report, corps No. 3, pp. rc1286-rc1288lrcl289-rcl292
- Annex No. RC150, obdukcioni nalaz, le5 br. 4lautopsy
report, corps No. 4, pp. rc1293-rc1295lrcl296-rc1299
- Annex No. RC151, obdukcioni nalaz, le8 br. 5lautopsy
report, corps No. 5, pp. rc1300-rcl302/rc1303-rc1306
- Annex No. RC152, obdukcioni nalaz, le8 br. 6lautopsy
report, corps No. 6, pp. rc1307-rc1309lrc1310-rc1313
- Annex No. RC153, obdukcioni nalaz, le5 br. 7lautopsy
report, corps No. 7, pp. rc1314-rc1316lrc1317-rcl320
- Annex No. RC154, obdukcioni nalaz, le8 br. 8lautopsy
report, corps No. 8, pp. rc1321-rc1323/rc1324-rcl325
- Annex No. RC155, obdukcioni nalaz, le5 br. 9lautopsy
report, corps No. 9, pp. rc1326-rc1327lrcl328-rc1329
- Annex No. RC156, obdukcioni nalaz, le5 br. 10lautopsy
report, corps No. 10, pp. rcl1330-rcl1332/rc1333-r~1334
- Annex No. RC157, obdukcioni nalaz, le5 br. Illautopsy
report, corps No. 11, pp. rcl335-rc1336lrc1337-rc1338
- Annex No. RC158, svedoCenje PAItestimony PA, pp.
rcl339-rcl341 lrcl342-rcl345- Annex No. RC159, reSenjeIdecision, pp. rcl346-
rcl347lrcl348-rcl349
Annex No. RC160, svedocenje KMItestimony KM,
rcl358lrcl359-rcl373
Annex No. RC161, svedocenje RBltestimony RB,
rcl380/rcl381 -rc1388
Annex No. RC162, svedoeenje z~ltestimony ZR,
rcl398lrcl399-rcl409
Annex No. RC163, svedocenje SWtestimony SK,
rc1412/rc1413-rc1416
Annex No. RC164, svedoeenje JSItestimony JS,
rc1466lrcl467-rcl526
Annex No. RC165, svedotenje ~~ltestimon~ CM,
rc1533lrc1534-rc1538
Annex No. RC166, svedotenje SWtestimony SK,
rcl542Jrcl543-rcl545
Annex No. RC167, svedocenje DBltestimony DB,
rc1548lrcl549-rcl552
Annex No. RC168, svedocenje PNItestimony PN,
rcl556lrcl557-rcl561
Annex No. RC169, svedoeenje UNJtestimony UN,
rc1564lrcl565-rcl567
Annex No. RC170, svedocenje RMItestimony RM,
rcl570lrcl571 -rc1573, (paragraph )
Annex No. RC171, svedocenje KSItestimony KS,
rc1576lrcl577-rc1 579- Annex No. RC172, svedotenje MDDItestimony MDD,
rcl580-rcl582/rcl583-rcl585
- Annex No. RC173, svedotenje MZItestimony MZ, rc1586-
rcl588lrcl589-rcl592
- Annex No. RC174, svedoëenje C~ltestimony CM, rc1593-
rcl597lrcl598-rcl603
- Annex No. RC175, svedotenje S~ltestimony SD, rc1604-
rc1612lrc1613-rc1620
- Annex No. RC176, svedotenje KZItestimony KZ, rc1621-
rcl627lrcl628-rcl633
- Annex No. RC177, svedotenje ZWtestimony ZK, rc1634-
rcl637lrcl638-rcl641
- Annex No. RC178, svedotenje BTItestimony BT, rc1642-
rc1650lrc1651-rc1659
- Annex No. RC179, svedoëenje MB/testimony MB, rc1660-
rcl673lrcl674-rcl686
- Annex No. RC180, svedotenje MUtestimony ML, rc1687-
rc1691lrc1692-rc1697
- Annex No. RC181, svedotenje RBItestimony RB, rc1698-
rcl703lrcl704-rcl710
- Annex No. RC182, svedotenje SMItestimony SM, rc1711-
rc1715lrc1716-rc1720
- Annex No. RC183, svedotenje SRItestimony SR, rc1721-
rc1723lrc1724-rc1726
- Annex No. RC184, svedotenje MWtestimony MK, rc1727-
rcl730lrcl731 -rc1734- Annex No. RC185, svedotenje VAltestimony VA, rc1735-
rcl737lrcl738-rcl740
Annex No. RC186, svedotenje PDltestimony PD, rc1741-
rc1744lrcl745-rc1747
Annex No. RC187, svedoëenje PBItestimony PB, rc1748-
rc1750lrc1751-rc1753
Annex No. RC188, svedotenje DGltestimony DG, rc1754-
rcl755lrcl756-rcl758
Annex No. RC189, svedotenje TBItestimony TB, rc1759-
rcl761 lrcl762-rcl764
Annex No. RC190, svedotenje TRItestimony TR, rc1765-
rc1769lrcl770-rc1 772
Annex No. RC191, svedotenje TVItestimony TV, rc1773-
rcl775lrcl776-rcl778
Annex No. RC192, krivitna prijavalcriminal report, rc1779-
rc1780lrcl781 -rc1782
Annex No. RC193, svedotenje PSItestimony PS, rc1783-
rc1786lrcl787-rcl789
Annex No. RC194, krivitna prijava, svedoëenje SSIcriminal
report, statement SS, rc1790-rc1791, rc1792-rc1793lrcl794-
rcl795, rc1796-rc1797
Annex No. RC195, krivitna prijavalcriminal report, rc1798-
rc1800lrc1801-rc1804
Annex No. RC196, kriviëna prijava, svedotenje DZ, sluibena
zabele5kaJcriminal report, testimony KM, official note,
rc1805-rc1807, rc1808-1810, rc181l Irc1812-rc1815, rc1816-
rcl818. rcl819- Annex No. RC197, svedotenje KRItestimony KR, rc1820-
rc1823lrcl824-rc1827
- Annex No. RC198, krivitna prijava, zapisnik O
uvidaju/criminal report, investigation report, rc1828-rc1829,
rcl830-rcl8314lrcl832-rcl833, rc1834--rc1836
- Annex No. RC199, svedotenje JBItestimony JB, rc1837-
rcl839lrcl840-rcl843
- Annex No. RC200, kriviEna prijava, zapisnik O
uvidajulcriminal proceedings, on site investigation report,
rcl844-rcl845, rcl846-rcl847lrcl848-rc1850, rcl851 -rc1852
- Annex No. RC201, svedotenje SVltestimony SV, rc1853-
rcl856lrcl8.57-rcl859
- Annex No. RC202, svedotenje SSltestimony SS, rc1860-
rc1863lrcl864-rc1866
- Annex No. RC203, krivitna prijavdcriminal report, rc1867-
rc1868lrc1868-rc1870
- Annex No. RC204, svedotenje MCItestimony MC, rc1871-
rcl873lrcl874-rcl876
- Annex No. RC205, svedotenje TRItestimony TR, rc1877-
rc1879lrc1880-rc1881
- Annex No. RC206, svedotenje NGItestimony NG, rc1882-
rcl890lrcl891 -rc1906
- Annex No. RC207, svedotenje VRltestimony VR, rc1908-
rc1925lrcl926-rcl939
- Annex No. RC208, svedoCenje GSltestimony GS, rc1940-
rc1943lrcl944-rc1947 - Annex No. RC209, svedotenje MBItestimony MB, rc1947-
rc1955lrc1956-rc1962
- Annex No. RC210, svedotenje GGltestimony GG, rc1963-
rcl974lrcl975-rcl983
- Annex No. RC211, svedotenje SVltestimony SV, rc1984-
rcl987lrcl988-rcl992
- Annex No. RC212, svedotenje STltestimony ST, rc1993-
rcl995lrc1996-rcl998
- Annex No. RC213, svedotenje VDltestimony VD, rc1999-
rc2003/rc2004-rc2008
- Annex No. RC214, svedotenje DNItestimony DN, rc2009-
rc2012lrc2013-rc2016
- Annex No. RC215, svedotenje SMltestimony SM, rc2017-
rc2029lrc2030-rc2039
- Annex No. RC216, svedotenje DGltestimony DG, rc2040-
rc2045lrc2046-rc2050
- Annex No. RC217, svedotenje BBltestimony 66, rc2051-
rc2054lrc2055-rc2058
- Annex No. RC218, svedotenje MVltestimony MV, rc2059-
rc2064lrc2065-rc2069
- Annex No. RC219, svedotenje MDItestimony MD, rc2070-
rc2073lrc2074-rc2077
- Annex No. RC220, svedotenje RWtestimony RK, rc2078-
rc2083lrc2084-rc2092
- Annex No. RC221, svedoSenje SZItestimony SZ, rc2093-
rc2103lrc2104-rc2113- Annex No. RC222, kriviëna prijavdcriminal report, rc2114-
rc2115/rc2116-rc2117
- Annex No. RC223, svedotenje GJItestimony GJ, rc2118-
rc2119lrc2120-rc2121
- Annex No. RC224, svedoEenje IRItestimony IR, rc2122-
rc2125lrc2126-rc2128
- Annex No. RC225, kriviëna prijavdcriminal report, rc2129-
rc2131lrc2132-rc2133
- Annex No. RC226, svedotenje KSItestimony KS, rc2134-
rc2136lrc2137-rc2138
- Annex No. RC227, svedocenje VBItestimony VB, rc2139-
rc21401rc2141 -rc2142
- Annex No. RC228, svedoëenje JDItestimony JD, rc2143-
rc2145lrc2146-rc2147, (paragraph 7.1.5.19.)
- Annex No. RC229, svedotenje MJItestimony MJ, rc2148-
rc21501rc2151 -rc2152
- Annex No. RC230, svedoEenje Elltestimony El, rc2153-
rc2155lrc2156-rc2158
- Annex No. RC231, svedoëenje SBItestimony SB, rc2159-
rc2161Irc2162-rc2163
- Annex No. RC232, svedoEenje SKItestimony SK, rc2164-
rc2165/rc2166-rc2168
- Annex No. RC233, svedoEenje GBItestimony GB,
rc21691rc2170,
- Annex No. RC234, svedoeenje PDItestimony PD,
rc2171Irc2172,- Annex No. RC235, svedoEenje LUtestimony LL, rc2172-
rc2173lrc2174-rc2176
- Annex No. RC236, svedoCenje DVltestimony DV, rc2177-
rc2178lrc2179-rc2181
- Annex No. RC237, svedoSenje LjBltestimony LjB,
rc2182lrc2183-rc2184,
- Annex No. RC238, svedocenje RRItestimony RR,
rc2185lrc2186-rc2187,
- Annex No. RC239, svedoEenje ~~ltestimon~ SB,
rc21881rc2189,
- Annex No. RC240, svedotenje VMItestimony VM, rc2190-
rc2196lrc2197-rc2200
- Annex No. RC241, svedoeenje BMItestimony BM, rc2201-
rc2202lrc2203-rc2204
-
Annex No. RC242, prikupljena obavestenja od strane MUP-a
Republike Srpske, Uprava KriminalistiSke Policije-
Bijeljina/collected information by Republika Srpska-Ministry of
Interna1 Affairs, Criminal Police Departmant-Bijeljina,
rc2205lrc2206
- Annex No. RC243, svedotenje Illtestimony II, rc2207-
rc2213lrc2214-rc2219
- Annex No. RC244, svedoCenje DMltestimony DM, rc2220-
rc2224lrc2225-rc2227
- Annex No. RC245, svedoEenje JZ/testimony JZ, rc2228-
rc2231lrc2232-rc2234- Annex No. RC246, svedoSenje SMltestimony SM, rc2235-
rc2238lrc2239-rc2240
- Annex No. RC247, svedotenje MMItestimony MM, rc2241-
rc2251lrc2252-rc2259
- Annex No. RC248, svedoSenje VDItestimony VD, rc2260-
rc2269lrc2270-rc2274
- Annex No. RC249, svedoEenje MAItestimony MA, rc2275-
rc2279lrc2280-rc2282
- Annex No. RC250, svedotenje HNItestimony HN, rc2283-
rc2288lrc2289-rc2291
- Annex No. RC251, svedotenje BMItestimony BM, rc2292-
rc2296lrc2297-rc2300
- Annex No. RC252, svedotenje BBItestimony BB, rc2301-
rc2305lrc2306-rc2308
- Annex No. RC253, svedotenje DZ/testimony DZ, rc2309-
rc2315lrc2316-rc2320
- Annex No. RC254, svedotenje MKItestimony MK, rc2321-
rc2323lrc2324-rc2325
- Annex No. RC255, svedoSenje DMItestimony DM, rc2326-
rc2329lrc2330-rc2332
- Annex No. RC256, svedoCenje JBItestimony JB, rc2333-
rc2335lrc2336-rc2337
- Annex No. HC257, svedotenje CG, ustaski logori smrti u
Brodu, pesma "Logori smrti", pesma "lvo je polizao noi",
novine "Narodna rijeë", broj 1-UstaSki logori smrti u Brodu,
novine "Narodna rijeë" broj 2-UstaSki logori smrti u Brodu,
novine "Novosti"-Garda proSiruje iupanijultestimony CG, poem "Camps of death", poem "lvo licked the knife",
newspaper "Narodna rijeë" issue No. 1-Ustashi death camps
in Brod", newspaper "Idarodna rijeë" issue No. 2-Ustashi
death camps in Brod, newspaper "Novosti" the Uuard
expands iupania, rc233.71- 1rc2337/5, rc2338-rc2340, rc2341-
rc2343,rc2344,rc 2345-rc:2346,rc2347-rc2348, rc2349lrc2350-
rc2352, rc2353-rc2355, rc2356,rc2357-rc2358,rc2359-r~2359-
rc2360, rc2361-rc2362,
- Annex No. RC258, svedoëenje NVltestimony MV, rc2363-
rc2366lrc2367-rc2371
- Annex No. RC259, svedoCenje EMltestimony EM, rc2372-
rc2381lrc2382-rc2393
- Annex No. RC260, svedoEenje SSItestimony SS, rc2394-
rc2400lrc2401-rc2408
- Annex No. RC261, svddoëenje MSltestimony MS, rc2409-
rc2415lrc2416-rc2423 ,
- Annex No. RC262, svedotenje TSltestimony TS, rc2424-
rc2429lrc2430-rc2436
- Annex No. RC263, svedotenje BJltestimony BJ, rc2437-
rc2445lrc2446-rc2456
- Annex No. RC264, svedotenje BNltestimony BN, rc2457-
rc2460lrc2461-rc2466
- Annex No. RC265, svedoëenje LMltestimony LM, rc2467-
rc2469lrc2470-rc2474
- Annex No. RC266, svedotenje MVItestimony MV, rc2475-
rc2477lrc2478-rc2481
- Annex No. RC267, svedoëenje DNAestimony DN, rc2482-
rc2484lrc2485-rc2487- Annex No. RC268, svedoCenje Slltestimony SI, rc2488-
rc2490lrc2491-rc2495
- Annex No. RC269, svedoCenje MPItestimony MP, rc2496-
rc2497lrc2498-rc2500
- Annex No. RC270, svedoCenje GVItestimony GV, rc2501-
rc2503/rc2504-rc2507
- Annex No. RC271, svedoCenje SAItestimony SA, rc2508-
rc25101rc2511 -rc2514
- Annex No. RC272, svedoCenje BVItestimony BV, rc2515-
rc2516lrc2517-rc2519
- Annex No. RC273, svedoCenje ~sltestimony MS, rc2520-
rc2524lrc2525-rc2530
- Annex No. RC274, svedoEenje RTItestimony RT, rc2531-
rc2536lrc2537-rc2543
- Annex No. RC275, svedotenje BDItestimony BD, rc2544-
rc2547lrc2548-rc2551
- Annex No. RC276, svedoEenje ZMItestimony ZM, rc2552-
rc2556lrc2557-rc2564
- Annex No. RC277, svedoEenje VDltestimony VD, rc2565-
rc2567lrc2568-rc2569
- Annex No. RC278, svedoëenje BDItestimony BD, rc2570-
rc2576lrc2577-rc2583
- Annex No. RC279, svedoEenje SMItestimony SM, rc2584-
rc2587lrc2588-rc2592
- Annex No. RC280, svedotenje MPltestimony MP, rc2593-
rc2595lrc2596-rc2598- Annex No. RC281, svedotenje DGItestimony DG, pp.
rc2599-rc2602lrc2603-rc2607
Annex No. RC282, svedotenje TVltestimony TV, pp. rc2608-
rc2612lrc2613-rc2617
Annex No. RC283, svedotenje VDltestimony VD, pp.
rc2618-rc2621lrc2622-rc2624
Annex No. RC284, svedokenje RPItestimony RP, pp.
rc2625-rc2629lrc2630-rc2634
Annex No. RC285, svedotenje MGItestimony MG, pp.
rc2635-rc2636lrc2637-rc2638
Annex No. RC286, svedotenje DSItestimony DS, pp.
rc2639-rc2641lrc2642-rc2644
Annex No. RC287, svedotenje ARItestimony AR, pp.
rc2645-rc2647lrc2648-rc2650
Annex No. RC288, kriviena prijavalcrirninareport, pp.
rc2651-rc2652/rc2653-rc2655
Annex No. RC289, svedotenje RPItestimony RP, pp.
rc2656-rc2660lrc2661-rc2664
Annex No. RC290, svedotenje TBltestimony TB, pp. rc2665-
rc2668hc2669-rc2673
Annex No. RC291, krivitna prijavalcriminalreport, pp.
rc2674-rc2675/rc2676-r~2677
Annex No. RC292, svedotenje PMItestimony PM, pp.
rc2678-rc2679lrc2680-rc2681
Annex No. RC293, krivitna prijavaicriminalreport, pp.
rc2682-rc2683lrc2684-rc2686- Annex No. RC294, svedotenje ~Sltestimony ZS, pp. rc2687-
rc2694lrc2695-rc2701
- Annex No. RC295, ratni dnevnik SDiIwar diary SDZ, pp.
rc2702-rc2714lrc2715-rc2721
- Annex No. RC296, zapisnik O uvidajulreportof the
investigation, pp. rc2722lrc2723-rc2724
- Annex No. RC297, svedoSenje VGltestimony VG, pp.
rc2725-rc2726lrc2728-rc2729
- Annex No. RC298, svedocenje PMItestimony PM, pp.
rc2730-rc2733lrc2734-rc2737
- Annex No. RC299, zapisnik O uvidajulinvestigation report,
pp. rc2738-rc2745lrc2746-rc2754
- Annex No. RC300, svedoEenje TMltestimony TM, pp.
rc2755-rc2756/rc2757-r~2758
- Annex No. RC301, svedotenje EMItestimony EM, pp.
rc2759-rc2762lrc2763-rc2766
- Annex No. RC302, svedotenje KDItestimony KD, pp.
rc2767-rc2769lrc2770-rc2772
- Annex No. RC303, kriviSna prijavdcriminal charges, pp.
rc2773-rc2774 / rc277411-rc2775
- Annex No. RC304, svedotenje DSltestimony DS, pp.
rc2776-rc2778lrc2779-rc278 1
- Annex No. RC305, krivitna prijava, svedoCenje MM,
sluibena zabeleSkdcriminal report,testimony MM, official
note, pp. rc2782-rc2783, rc2784, rc2785lrc2786-rc278711,
rc2788-rc2789. rc2790-rc2791- Annex No. RC306, svedotenje VMItestimony VM, pp.
rc2792-rc2797lrc2798-rc2801
- Annex No. RC307, svedotenje NSItestimony NS, pp.
rc2802-rc2805lrc2806-rc2808
- Annex No. RC308, svedoSenje MMItestimony MM, pp.
rc2809-rc2814lrc2815-rc2818
- Annex No. RC309, svedotenje MMltestimony MM, pp.
rc2819-rc2825lrc2826-rc2830
- Annex No. RC310, svedotenje VMItestimony VM, pp.
rc2831-rc2834/rc2835-rc2837
- Annex No. RC311, svedotenje i~ltestimony ZN, pp.
rc2838-rc2843lrc2844-rc2847
- Annex No. RC312, svedotenje JSltestimony JS, pp. rc2848-
rc2851lrc2852-rc2854
- Annex No. RC313, svedotenje NRItestimony NR, pp.
rc2855-rc2862lrc2863-rc2867
- Annex No. RC314, svedotenje SVItestimony SV, pp.
rc2868-rc2871lrc2872-rc2874
- Annex No. RC315, svedotenje IRItestimony IR, pp. rc2875-
rc2878lrc2879-rc2881
- Annex No. RC316, sluibena zabeleSka/official memo, pp.
rc2882lrc2883-rc2884
- Annex No. RC317, svedotenje clt tes timo VC,^ pp.
rc2885-rc2889lrc2890-rc2893
- Annex No. RC318, svedotenje JZItestimony JZ, pp. rc2894-
rc2897lrc2898-rc2900- Annex No. RC319, svedoEenje TMItestimony TM, pp.
rc2901-rc2905/rc2906-rc2908
- Annex No. RC320, svedoEenje KDItestimony DG, pp.
rc2909-rc2919/rc2920-r~2926
- Annex No. RC321, svedotenje PVltestimony PV, pp.
rc2927-rc2931lrc2932-rc2935
- Annex No. RC322, svedoEenje SDltestimony SD, pp.
rc2936-rc2939lrc2940-rc2942
- Annex No. RC323, svedoEenje MBltestimony MD, pp.
rc2943-rc2945lrc2946-rc2947
- Annex No. RC324, svedoEenje PNItestimony PN, pp.
rc2948-rc2950lrc2951-rc2952
- Annex No. RC325, foto dokumentacija lica mestalphotos
from the site, pp. rc2953-rc2957lrc2958-rc2959,
- Annex No. RC326, svedocenje MRltestimony MR, pp.
rc2960-rc2962lrc2963-rc2964
- Annex No. RC327, svedotenje MMItestimony MM, pp.
rc2965-rc2969lrc2970-rc2973
- Annex No. RC328, svedoEenje BMltestimony BM, pp.
rc2974-rc2979lrc2980-rc2983
- Annex No. RC329, svedoEenje PRltestimony PR, pp.
rc2984-rc2999lrc3000-rc3005
- Annex No. RC330, svedotenje MMltestimony MM, pp.
rc3006-rc3009lrc3010-rc3012
- Annex No. RC331, svedotenje LPItestimony LP, pp. rc3013-
rc3015/rc3016-rc3017- Annex No. RC332, svedoëenje NJItestimony NJ, pp. rc3018-
rc3020lrc3020-rc3022
Annex No. RC333, zapisniklminutes, pp. rc3023-
rc3024lrc3025-rc3026
Annex No. RC334, svedoëenje PSItestimony PS, pp.
rc3027-rc3032lrc3033-rc3036
Annex No. RC335, svedotenje GMItestimony GM, pp.
rc3037-rc3042lrc3043-rc3046
Annex No. RC336, svedotenje BRItestimony BR, pp.
rc3047-rc3050/rc3051-rc3053
Annex No. RC337, svedoëenje HNItestimony HN, pp.
rc3054-rc3061lrc3062-rc3066
Annex No. RC338, svedotenje SJltestimony SJ, pp. rc3068-
rc3072lrc3073-rc3076
Annex No. RC339, svedoëenje VMItestimony VM, pp.
rc3077-rc3087/rc3088-rc3095
Annex No. RC340, svedotenje MMItestimony MM, pp.
rc3096-rc3098lrc3099-rc3100
Annex No. RC341, svedoëenje ~~ltestimony VC, pp.
rc3101Irc3102
Annex No. RC342, svedoëenje VMItestimony VM, pp.
rc3103-rc3107lrc3108-rc3112
Annex No. RC343, svedoëenje BPItestimony BP, pp. rc313-
rc3117lrc3118-rc3122
Annex No. RC344, svedotenje DMItestimony DM, pp.
rc3123-rc3126/rc3127-r~3130- Annex No. RC345, svedoëenje MMltestimony MM, pp.
rc3131-rc3134/rc3135-rc3138
- Annex No. RC346, svedoëenje PDItestimony PD, pp.
rc3139-rc3143/rc3144-r~3147
- Annex No. RC347, svedoëenje ~~ltestimon~ SS, pp.
rc3148-rc3149 1 rc3150-rc315011
- Annex No. RC348, svedocenje VDItestimony VD, pp.
rc3151-rc3153/rc3154-rc3156
- Annex No. RC349, svedoëenje RB, regenje O sprovodenju
istrageltestimony RB, decision to initiate an investigation, pp.
rc3167-rc3182, rc3183-rc3186lrc3187-rc3201, rc3202-rc3206
- Annex No. RC350, svedoëenje MNItestimony MN, pp.
rc3207-rc3212lrc3213-rc3216
- Annex No. RC351, svedoëenje MVltestimony MV, pp.
rc3217-rc3223lrc3224-rc3229
- Annex No. RC352, svedoEenje HBItestimony HB, pp.
rc3230-rc3233lrc3234-rc3238
- Annex No. RC353, svedoCenje BSltestimony BS, pp.
rc3239-rc3243/rc3244-r~3248
- Annex No. RC354, svedotenje KBltestimony KB, pp.
rc3249-rc3257lrc3258-rc3264
- Annex No. RC355, svedoëenje LPItestimony LP, pp. rc3265-
rc3269lrc3270-rc3274
- Annex No. RC356, svedoEenje SVItestimony SV, pp.
rc3275-rc3277lrc3278-rc3280- Annex No. RC357, svedotenje MJltestimony MJ, pp
rc3281-rc3289/rc3290-rc3297
- Annex No. RC358, svedotenje S(R)J/testimony S(R)J, pp.
rc3298-rc3305lrc3306-rc3314
- Annex No. RC359, svedotenje BSItestimony BS, pp.
rc3315-rc3321lrc3322-rc3329
- Annex No. RC360, svedotenje NK, izvegtaji lekara, uverenje
O stalnom mestu boravkaltestimony NK, medical reports,
certificate, pp.3330-rc3336, rc3337-rc3342, rc3345lrc3346-
rc3350, rc3351-rc3358, rc3358
- Annex No. RC361, svedotenje KPItestimony KP, pp.
rc3359-rc3361lrc3362-rc3364
- Annex No. RC362, svedotenje RSItestimony RS, pp.
rc3365-rc3367lrc3368-rc3370
- Annex No. RC363, svedotenje MWtestimony MK, pp.
rc3371-rc3375/rc3376-rc3379
- Annex No. RC364, svedotenje JDItestimony JD, pp. rc3380-
rc3382lrc3383-rc3385
-
Annex No. RC365, svedotenje JJltestimony JJ, pp. rc3386-
rc3389lrc3390-rc3392
- Annex No. RC366, svedotenje DPltestimony DP, pp.
rc3393-rc3395lrc3396-rc3397
- Annex No. RC367, svedoCenje MKltestimony MK, pp.
rc3398-rc3404lrc3405-rc3409
- Annex No. RC368, svedotenje JBltestimony JB, pp. rc3410-
rc3414lrc3415-rc3419- Annex No. RC369, svedotenje KBItestimony KB, pp.
rc3420-rc3422lrc3423-rc3425
-
Annex No. RC370, svedotenje JWtestimony JK, pp. rc3426-
rc3429lrc3430-rc3433
- Annex No. RC371, svedotenje LSItestimony LS, pp. rc3434-
rc3436lrc3437-rc3438
- Annex No. RC372, svedotenje BSItestimony BS, pp.
rc3439-rc3440lrc3441-rc3446
- Annex No. RC373, svedotenje l~ltestimony IZ, pp. rc3447-
rc3448lrc3449-rc3450
- Annex No. RC374, svedotenje SRItestimony SR, pp.
rc3451-rc3453/rc3454-rc3456
- Annex No. RC375, svedotenje NEItestimony NE, pp.
rc3457-rc3459lrc3460-rc3462
- Annex No. RC376, svedotenje AMItestimony AM, pp.
rc3463-rc3464lrc3465-rc3466
- Annex No. RC377, svedotenje ZSItestimony ZS, pp. rc3467-
rc3468lrc3469-rc3470
- Annex No. RC378, svedotenje BR/testimony BR, pp.
rc3471-rc3472/rc3473-rc3474
- Annex No. RC379, svedotenje MZItestimony MZ, pp.
rc3475-rc3476lrc3477-rc3478
- Annex No. RC380, svedotenje Zlltestimony ZI, pp. rc3479-
rc3483lrc3484-rc3486- Annex No. RC381, zapisnik O uvidaju, sluibene
zabeleSke1investigation report, officialnotes, pp. rc3487-
rc3490, rc3491-rc3492/rc3493-rc3497, rc3498-rc3501
- Annex No. RC382, svedoëenje MNItestimony MN, pp.
rc3502-rc3508lrc3509-rc3513
- Annex No. RC383, svedoëenje NSItestimony NS, pp.
rc3514-rc3522lrc3523-rc3530
- Annex No. RC384, svedoëenje MNItestimony MN, pp.
rc3531-rc3535/rc3536-rc3539
- Annex No. RC385, svedoëenje MVltestimony MV, pp.
rc3540-rc3545lrc3546-rc3550
- Annex No. RC386, svedoëenje SRItestimony SR, pp.
rc3551-rc3553/rc3554-rc3556
- Annex No. RC387, svedotenje TWtestimony TK, pp. rc3557-
rc3559lrc3560-rc3562
- Annex No. RC388, kriviëna prijava, nalaz i miSljenje lekara
spesijaliste,luibena zabeleSka, svedoëenje BM, nalaz i
miSljenje lekara specijaliste/criminaIcharges, report of
specialist physician No. 1, official record, testimony, report
of specialist physician No. 2, , pp. rc3563-rc3564, rc3565,
rc3566, rc3567, rc3568lrc3569-rc3570, rc3571, rc3572,
rc3573, rc3574, rc3575
- Annex No. RC389, svedoëenje RMItestimony RM, pp.
rc3576-rc3583lrc3584-rc3589
- Annex No. RC390, svedoëenje PRItestimony PR, pp.
rc3590-rc3593lrc3594-rc3598
- Annex No. RC391, svedoëenje IRItestimony IR, pp. rc3599-
rc3600lrc3601-rc3603
699- Annex No. RC392, svedoEenje SSItestimony SS, pp.
rc3604-rc3608lrc3609-rc3612
- Annex No. RC393, svedotenje VAItestimony VA, pp.
rc3613-rc3617lrc3618-rc3621
- Annex No. RC394, krivitna prijavalcriminalreport, pp.
rc3622-rc3624lrc3625-rc3628
- Annex No. RC395, izveWajIreport, pp. rc3629-rc3630lrc3631-
rc3632
- Annex No. RC396, zapisnik povodom utvrdivanja uzroka
smrti, zapisnikO uvidaju, kriviEna prijavalreport on the cause
of death, minutes of investigation, criminal charges, pp.
rc3633-rc3635, rc3636-rc3637, rc3638-rc3639lrc3640-rc3641,
rc3642-rc3643, rc3644-rc3645
- Annex No. RC397, svedotenje SCItestimony SC, pp.
rc3646-rc3648lrc3649-rc3651
- Annex No. RC398, svedoEenje RMItestimony RM, pp.
rc3652-rc3654lrc3655-rc3657
- Annex No. RC399, svedoEenje RCItestimony RC, pp.
rc3658-rc3661lrc3662-rc3664
- Annex No. RC400, sluibena zabeleSka1official report, pp.
rc3665-rc3666lrc3667-rc3668
- Annex No. RC401, krivitna prijava, sluibena
zabeleSka/criminal report, official report, pp. rc3669-rc3670,
rc3671lrc3672-rc3673, rc3674
- Annex No. RC402, svedotenje NBItestimony NB, pp.
rc3675-rc3680lrc3681-rc3685- Annex No. RC403, svedoëenje MUtestimony MK, pp.
rc3686-rc3688lrc3689-rc3691
- Annex No. RC404, svedotenje MAItestimony MA, pp.
rc3692-rc3695lrc3696-rc3698
- Annex No. RC405, izvestaj, foto dokumentacijdreport, photo
documentation, pp. rc3699-rc3700, rc3701-371Olrc3711-
rc3713. rc3714-rc3715
- Annex No. RC406, svedotenje LSItestimony LS, pp. rc3716-
rc3717lrc3718-rc3720
- Annex No. RC407, svedoëenje Rlltestimony RI, pp. rc3721-
rc3722lrc3723-rc3724
- Annex No RC408, kriviëna prijavdcriminal report, pp.
rc3723-rc3727lrc3728-rc3731
- Annex No. RC409, svedoëenje GP, reSenje prema
optuienimltestimony GP, decision concerning the accused,
pp. rc3732-rc3734, rc3735-rc3736lrc3737-rc3739, rc3740
- Annex No. RC410, svedoëenje GKltestimony GK, pp.
rc3741-rc3743/rc3744-rc3746
- Annex No. RC411, svedotenje DMItestimony DM, pp.
rc3747-rc3749lrc3750-rc3752
- Annex No. RC412, svedoëenje BE, sluibena
zabele5kdtestimony BE, official report, pp. rc3753-rc3756,
rc3757-rc3758lrc3759-rc3761, rc3762-rc3764
- Annex No. RC413, kriviëna prijava, sluibeni izveStajIcriminal
report, officialreport, pp. rc3765, rc3766-rc3767lrc3768-
rc3769, rc3770-rc3772- Annex No. RC414, Elanak objavljen u listu "Oslobodenje",
Clanak objavljen u listu "Ekspres politika"1article published in
newspaper "Oslobodenje", article published in newspaper
"Ekspres politika", pp. rc3773-rc3775, rc3776lrc3777-
rc3784.rc3785-rc3787
- Annex No. RC415, kriviEna prijava, sluibena
zabeleSka/criminal report, official report, pp. rc3788-rc3789,
rc3790lrc3791-rc3792, rc3793-rc3794
- Annex No. RC416, svedorienje SSItestimony SS, pp.
rc3795-rc3798lrc3799-rc3801
- Annex No. RC417, svedoEenje SMItestimony SM, pp.
rc3802-rc3804lrc3805-rc3807
- Annex No. RC418, svedoCenje BVItestimony BV, pp.
rc3808-rc381Olrc3811-rc3813
Annex No. RC419, kriviEna prijava, foto dokumentacija,
izve5taj O kriminalistiEko-tehniEkorn pregledu lica mesta,
sluibeni izvestaj, zapisnik O uvidajulcriminal report, photo-
documentation, report on criminalistic-technical inspection of
scene of crime, official report, minutes of investigationpp.
rc3814-rc3815, rc3816-rc3825, rc3826, rc3827-rc3828,
rc3829-rc3830lrc3831-rc3833, rc3834-rc3843, rc3844, rc3845-
3847, rc3848-rc3849
- Annex No. RC420, svedoëenje NZItestimony NZ, pp.
rc3850-rc3852lrc3853-rc3856
- Annex No. RC421, svedoCenje KBItestimony KB, pp.
rc3857-rc3861lrc3862-rc3866
- Annex No. RC422, svedocenje MJItestimony MJ, pp.
rc3867-rc3875lrc3876-rc3883- Annex No. RC423, svedotenje ZZItestimony ZZ, pp. rc3884-
rc3888lrc3889-rc3892
- Annex No. RC424, svedotenje SDltestimony SD, pp.
rc3893-rc3896lrc3897-rc3899
- Annex No. RC425, svedotenje SPltestimony SP, pp.
rc3900-rc3903lrc3904-rc3907
- Annex No. RC426, svedotenje PKltestimony PK, pp.
rc3908-rc3913lrc3914-rc3916
- Annex No. RC427, svedotenje SPItestimony SP, pp.
rc3917-rc3924lrc3925-rc3930
- Annex No. RC428, svedotenje MKltestimony MK, pp.
rc3931-rc3934/rc3935-rc3938
- Annex No. RC429, svedotenje DLjltestimony DLj, pp.
rc3939-rc3952lrc3953-rc3977
- Annex No. RC430, svedotenje MMItestimony MM, pp.
rc3978-rc3984lrc3985-rc3991
- Annex No. RC431, izveStajIreport, pp. rc3992-rc4007/rc4008-
rc4026
- Annex No. RC432, svedotenje RDItestimony RD, pp.
rc4027-rc4029lrc4030-rc4032
- Annex No. RC433, svedotenje ~~ltestimon~ KZ, pp. rc4033-
rc4043lrc4043-rc4051
- Annex No. RC434, svedotenje MSItestimony MS, pp.
rc4052-rc4056lrc4057-rc4060- Annex No. RC435, krivitna prijava, sluibena zabeleSka
broj: 17-9102-17192, izjavelcriminal charges, official memo
No. 17-9102-1 7/92, statements, pp. rc4061-rc4065, rc4066-
rc4068, rc4069-rc4078lrc4079-rc4081, rc4082, rc4083-rc4092
- Annex No. RC436, svedocenje BBItestimony BB, pp.
rc4093-rc4104lrc4105-rc4114
- Annex No. RC437, svedotenje VMltestimony VM, pp.
rc4115-rc4125lrc4126-rc4133
- Annex No. RC438, kriviena prijava, svedotenje JN,
svedotenje KN,/criminal charges, testimony NJ, testimony
NK, pp. rc4134-rc4138, rc4139-rc4140, rc4141-
rc4142lrc4143-rc4144, rc4144-4145, rc4145-rc4147
- Annex No. RC439, osnivanje i uloga tzv. Muslimanske
Patriotskeligelfounding and the role of the so-called Muslim
Patriotic League, pp. rc4148-rc4156lrc4157-rc4163
- Annex No. RC440, svedotenje NVltestimony NV, pp.
rc4164-rc4171lrc4172-rc4177
- Annex No. RC441, svedotenje RMItestimony RM, pp.
rc4178-rc4181lrc4182-rc4184
- Annex No. RC442, krivitna prijavalcriminal report, pp.
rc4185lrc4186-rc4187
- Annex No. RC443, krivicna prijavalcriminal report, pp.
rc41881rc4189
- Annex No. RC444, svedoCenje RSItestimony RS, pp.
rc4190-rc4196lrc4197-rc4203
- Annex No. RC445, svedoCenje HEItestimony HE, pp.
rc4204-rc4209lrc4210-rc4214
704- Annex No. RC446, svedotenje VDItestimony VD, pp.
rc4215-rc4217lrc4218-rc4220
- Annex No. RC447, svedotenje FBItestimony FB, pp. rc4221-
rc4223lrc4224-rc4226
- Annex No. RC448, svedoeenje DRItestimony DR, pp.
rc4227-rc4237lrc4238-rc4245
- Annex No. RC449, krivitna prijava, sluibena
zabeleSka/criminal report, official report, pp. rc4246,
rc4247lrc4248, rc4249
- Annex No. RC450, zapisnik O uvidaju/records of the on-site
investigation, pp.c4250-rc4251lrc4252-rc4253
- Annex No. RC451, svedotenje RBItestimony RB, pp.
rc4254-rc4267lrc4268-rc4277
- Annex No. RC452, svedotenje SBltestimony SB, pp.
rc4278-rc4282lrc4283-rc4286
- Annex No. RC453, svedotenje VKltestimony VK, pp.
rc4287-rc4290lrc4291-rc4294
- Annex No. RC454, svedotenje BVltestimony BV, pp.
rc4295-rc4299/rc4300-r~4303
- Annex No. RC455, svedotenje PMItestimony PM, pp.
rc4304-rc4306/rc4307-rc4308
705- Annex No. RC456, svedotenje PDItestimony PD, pp.
rc4309-rc4313lrc4314-rc4317
- Annex No. RC457, svedoëenje KNItestimony KN, pp.
rc4318-rc4321lrc4322-rc4324
- Annex No. RC458, svedotenje UVItestimony UV, pp.
rc4325-rc4329lrc4330-rc4333
- Annex No. RC459, svedoëenje MSItestimony MS, pp.
rc4334-rc4338lrc4339-rc4345
- Annex No. RC460, svedoëenje JZItestimony JZ, pp. rc4346-
rc4349lrc4350-rc4355
- Annex No. RC461, svedoëenje LUtestimony LL, pp. rc4356-
rc4358lrc4359-rc4364
- Annex No. RC462, svedotenje GJItestimony GJ, pp. rc4365-
rc4369lrc4370-rc4376
- Annex No. RC463, svedoëenje IDItestimony ID, pp. rc4377-
rc4378lrc4379-rc4382-
Annex No. RC464, svedoSenje DMItestimony DM, pp.
rc4383-rc4385lrc4386-rc4390
-
Annex No. RC465, svedotenje Dlltestimony DI, pp. rc4391-
rc4396lrc4397-rc4405
-
Annex No. RC466, svedotenje ~~ltestimony ZS, pp. rc4406-
rc4413lrc4414-rc4426
- Annex No. RC467, svedotenje ~~ltestimon~ MC, pp.
rc4427-rc4428lrc4429-rc4432
- Annex No. RC468, svedotenje MMItestimony MM, pp.
rc4433-rc4437lrc4438-rc4445
- Annex No. RC469, svedotenje LNItestimony LN, pp. rc4446-
rc4448lrc4449-rc4451
- Annex No. RC470, svedotenje MKItestimony MK, pp.
rc4452-rc4460lrc4461-rc4473
- Annex No. RC471, svedotenje ZMItestimony ZM, pp.
rc4474-rc4478trc4479-rc4485- Annex No. RC472, svedotenje TVItestimony TV, pp. rc4486-
rc4488lrc4489-rc4493
- Annex No. RC473, svedotenje DMItestimony DM, pp.
rc4494-rc4498lrc4499-rc4504
- Annex No. RC474, svedotenje JSItestimony JS, pp. rc4505-
rc451Olrc4511-rc4515
-
Annex No. RC475, regenje Okruinog Vojnog suda u
ZeniciIMotion-District Military Court in Zenica, pp.
rc45161rc4517
- Annex No. RC476, svedoSenje MMItestimony MM, pp.
rc4518-rc4519lrc4520-rc4521
- Annex No. RC477: svedotenje KZItestimony KZ, pp. rc4522-
rc4524lrc4525-rc4527
-
Annex No. RC478, svedoEenje ~Zltestimony JZ, pp. rc4528-
rc4530lrc4531-rc4533
- Annex No. RC479, svedotenje MMltestimony MM, pp.
rc4534-rc4537lrc4538-rc4540-
Annex No. RC480, svedotenje MKltestimony MK, pp.
rc4541-rc4542/rc4543-rc4544
-
Annex No. RC481, svedotenje MBltestimony MB, pp.
rc4545-rc4549lrc4550-rc4554
- Annex No. RC482, svedotenje SDItestimony SD, pp.
rc4555-rc4560lrc4561-rc4566
- Annex No. RC483, svedotenje VTItestimony VT, pp. rc4567-
rc4570lrc4571-rc4574
- Annex No. RC484, svedotenje BSItestimony BS, pp.
rc4575-rc4578lrc4579-rc4584
- Annex No. RC485, svedotenje PMItestimony PM, pp.
rc4585-rc4591lrc4592-rc4597
- Annex No. RC486, svedoCenje SO/testimony SO, pp.
rc4598-rc4602lrc4603-rc4607
- Annex No. RC487, svedotenje PVltestimony PV, pp.
rc4608-rc4612lrc4613-rc4616- Annex No. RC488, svedotenje SMItestimony SM, pp
rc4617-rc4620lrc4621-rc4624
- Annex No. RC489, svedotenje SDltestimony SD, pp.
rc4625-rc4626lrc4627-rc4629
- Annex No. RC490, svedoEenje DSItestimony DS, pp.
rc4630-rc4634lrc4635-rc4639
-
Annex No. RC491, svedoEenje GOItestimony GO, pp.
rc4640-rc4641lrc4642-rc4644
-
Annex No. RC492, svedoEenje SS, potvrda O privremenom
oduzimanja predmetdtestimony SS, receipt on temporary
taking the objects, pp. rc4645-rc4646, rc4647lrc4648-rc4649,
rc4650
- Annex No. RC493, svedotenje KM, potvrda O privremenom
oduzimanju predmetdtestimony KM, receipt on temporary
taking the objects pp. rc4651, rc4652lrc4653-rc4654, rc4655
- Annex No. RC494, svedocenje KH, potvrda O privremenomm
oduzimanju predmetaltestimony KH, receipt on tempporary
taking the objects, pp. rc4656, rc4657lrc4658-rc4659, rc4660-
Annex No. RC495, svedotenje VDiItestimony VDi, pp.
rc4661-rc4662/rc4663-rc4665
- Annex No. RC496, svedotenje HOltestimony HO, pp.
rc4666lrc4667-rc4668
- Annex No. RC497, svedotenje BMItestimony BM, pp.
rc4669-rc4671lrc4672-rc4675
- Annex No. RC498, svedotenje IMItestimony IM, pp. rc4676-
rc4677lrc4678-rc4679
- Annex No. RC499, svedotenje MRItestimony MR, pp.
- Annex No. RC500, svedotenje DiNltestimony DiN, pp.
rc4684-rc4686lrc4687-rc4688
-
Annex No. RC501, svedotenje DPItestimony DP, pp.
rc4689-rc4693lrc4694-rc4698
- Annex No. RC502, svedotenje D~ltestimon~ Ds, pp.
rc4699-rc4705/rc4706-r~4712- Annex No. RC503, svedoëenje RDItestimony RD, pp.
rc4713-rc4717lrc4718-rc4721
- Annex No. RC504, svedoëenje KDItestimony KD, pp.
- Annex No RC505, svedoëenje LMItestimony LM, pp. rc4728-
rc4732lrc4733-rc4738
-
Annex No RC506, svedoëenje clt tes tim TC,np^p. rc4739-
rc4744lrc4745-rc4751
- Annex No RC507, svedoëenje LRItestimony LR, pp. rc4752-
rc4759lrc4760-rc4769
- Annex No RC508, svedocenje CSItestimony CS, pp. rc4770-
rc4775lrc4776-rc4780
-
Annex No RC509, svedoëenje RDItestimony RD, pp. rc4781-
rc4785lrc4786-rc4790
- Annex No RC510, svedoëenje ilt tes tim o n,pp. rc4791-
rc4798lrc4799-rc4805
- Annex No RC511, svedoëenje BB/testimony 66, pp. rc4806-
rc4813lrc4814-rc4822
-
Annex No RC512, svedocenje JM/testimony JM, pp. rc4823-
rc4825lrc4826-rc4828
- Annex No RC513, svedoëenje MEItestimony ME, pp.
rc4829-rc4832lrc4833-rc4836
- Annex No RC514, svedoëenje MWtestimony MK, pp.
rc4837-rc4840lrc4841-rc4844-
Annex No RC515, svedocenje SFltestimony SF, pp. rc4845-
rc4847lrc4848-rc4850
-
Annex No RC516, svedotenje PSItestimony PS, pp. rc4851-
rc4854lrc485411-rc4856
-
Annex No R14, Presuda Osnovnog suda u
PrijedorulJudgement, Basic Court in Prijedor, pp. rc4857-
rc4860lrc4861-rc4867
- Annex No R15, Zakon O odbrani1DefenceLaw, pp. rc4868-
rc4894lrc4895
- Annex No R16, Zakon O vojsci1Lawon the Army, pp.
rc4896-rc4957lrc4958-rc4959
- Annex No R17, Uputstvo O postupanju sa zarobljenim
licimnhe Guidelines for the threatment of PoWs, pp.
rc4960-rc4966lrc4967-rc4969
Rejoinder of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia