MEMORIALOP THE GOVERNMENT OFTHE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MÉMOIRE DU GOUVERNEMENT
DES ÉTATS-UNID'AMÉRIQUE PART 1
INTRODUCTION
This case-the case of the American hostages in Tehran-now rcachesits
second phase before the Court with the submission of this Mcmorial on thc
meritsof the clairnsof thc UnitedStatesof Americaagainst the IslamicRepublic
of Iran.
To recapitulaie the essentials of the history of the case, the Unitcd States
Ernbassy in Tehran and various United States nationals, nearly al1 of them
diplornatic agents, staffand consular officers,wereseizedby an iranian mob on
4 Novernber 1979,and havesincebeen heldcaptivewith the fullapproval of the
Government of lran; an 29 Novembcr 1979, the United Statcs filed an
Application in this Court alleging that the conduct of the Govcrnrncnt of the
lslamic Republic of Iran violated Iran's international legal obligations to the
United States under four governing treatiesto whichthe twoStatesare party; on
the same day, 29 Novcmbcr 1979,the Unitcd States requested that thc Court
prornptly jndicatc proviçionalrneasurcscallingupori Iran forthwith to clear the
Embassy, relcascthc hostages,and protect themfrom further unlawfulconduct;
on 9 December 1979,the Govcrnment of Iran submitted a leiter to the Court
asserting that forvarious rcasons the Court should not take cognizancc of the
case, butthe Govcrnment of Iranappointed no Agent toappear at the hearing
on the United States' request for an indication of provisional measures; the
hearing took place bcfore the Court on 10 December 1979,at which time the
Court heard oral argument on behalf ofthe United States (but not on behalf of
Iran); on 15Decernber 1979,the Court entered an Order indicatingprovisional
rneasures(as further set forth in Part II of this Mernorial);and on 24 Decernber
1979,the Court entered a further Order which fixestirne-limitsfor the written
proceedingsand whichrcquircsthe Unitcd Statcs to filethe presentMcmorialon
15 January 1980.Under the samc Order lran isro submit iis Counier-Mernorial
by 18February 1980.
As to the statiis of thedispute as it existsof this writing, il should also be
noted (1) that the Governrnent of Iran has oficially rejected and failed to
comply with the provisional measutes indieated by the Court on 15 December
1979; (2) that the Amcrican hostages and Embassy in Tchrlin continue to be
held captive in violation of those provisional measures and of Iran's inter-
national obligations; and (3) that the Government of lran has given no in-
dication of an intention toappoint LinAgent, to filea Counter-Mernorial, or to
contest in any wüy the claimsof the United States which ace beforcthc Court.
Before turning to thc hcts undcrlying thosc clairns, it may be useful to
sumrnarize the provisionsof thcfinaljudgment nowsought by the UnitedStates.
In essence the United States on the rnents seeks a judgmcnt, the full tcms of
which appear in the las1Part of this Mernorial,declating:
{a) that aspects of the conduciof the Government OF the lslarnic Republic of
Iran relating to theizureof the United States Embassyand United States
personnel violate the international legal obligiitions owed by Iran to the
United Statesas provided by various provisions of the Vienna Convention
on Diplornatic Relations (spccificallyArticles 22, 24-27,29, 31,37,44 and
47), of the Vicnna Convention on Consular Relations (spxifically Articles
5, 27, 28, 31, 33-36, 40 and 72), of the Treaty of Amity, Economic
Relations, and Consular Rights Betweenthe United States of Americaand124 DIPLOMATICANI3 CONSULARSTAFF
Iran (specificallyArticles 11(4),XIII, XVIIl and XIX), and of the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Inter-
nationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatie Agents (specifically
Articles 2, 4 and 7);
(6) that pursuant to the foregoing international legalobligations:
(i) the Government of the Islamic Republic of lran shall immediately
ensure that the premiscsof the United States Embassy,Chanccry and
Consulates are restored to the possessionof the United Statesuthori-
ties under their exclusivecontrol, and shall ensure their inviolability
and effectiveprotection as provided for by the treatiesin forcebetween
the two States, and by general international law;
(ii) the Government of the Islamic Republic or lran shall cnsure the
irnmediate release,without any exception, of al1 persons of United
States nationality who are or have been held in the Ernbassy of the
United States of America or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Tehran, or who are or have been heldashostagcselsewhere,and afford
rotection to al1such persons, in accordance with the treatiesin force
Eetween the two States, and with general international faw;
(iii) the Governrnent of the Islamic Republicof lran shall, as frorn that
moment, afford to al1the diplomatic and consular personnel of the
United States the protection, privilegesand immunitieçto which thcy
are entitled under the treaties in force between the two States, and
under general international law,including immunityfrom any form of
criminaljurisdiction and freedornand facilitiesto leavethe territory of
Iran;
(iv) the Government of the lslamic Republicof lran shall, in afïording the
diplornaticand consular personnelof the United States the protection,
privilegesand immunities to which they are entitled, including im-
munity from any form of criminal jurisdiction, ensure that no such
personnel shall beobliged to appear on trial or as a witness,deponent,
source of information, or in any othcr role, at proceedings, whether
formal or informal, initiated by or with the acquiescenceof the Iranian
Government, whether such proceedings be denominated a "trial",
"grand jury", "international commission" or otherwise;
(v) the Governrnent of the Islamic Republic of lran shall submit lo its
competeni authorities for the purpose of prosecution, or extraditc to
the United States,those persons rcsponsibleTorthe crimes committcd
against the personnel and premisesof the United States Ernbassyand
Consulates in Iran;
(c) thatthe United Statesof Americaisentitled to the payment to it, in itsown
right and in the exercise its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals
held hostage, of reparation by the lslamic Republic of lran for the
violations of the above international legalobligations which it owesto the
United States, in anmount to be determined by the Court at a subsequent
stage of the proceedings. PART II
STATEMEhT OF THE FACTS
'
The Factual Staternent which follows is, to the best of thc knowledge and
belier of tlre Government of the United States, accurate and complete. ln the
governing circumstanccs, however, in which the United States is unablc to gain
access to irsdiplornatic and consulnr rcprcsentatives in Iran, or to ils Embassy
and consular prcmises in Iran and to the fileswhich thcycontain, the Court will
appreciate that certain hctual details, particuhrly those relating to thc current
condition of United States personnel in Tehran, arc unavailable to the United
States Government at this time'.
A. The Attnck
Ai aboui 10.30a.m., Tehran time, on 4 November 1979,during thecourse ofa
dcrnonstration of approximatcly 3,000 persons, the United States Embassy
compound in Tehran was overrun by sevcral hundred of the demonstrators.
Under then existing security arrangemcnts the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran normally maintained 10to 15uniformed policemen outside the
Embassy rompourid anda contingent of "Pasdaran", Revolutionary Guards,
nearby. On 4 Novernber 1979, however, these security personnel made no
apparent effort to deter or discourage the dernonstrators from seizing the
Embassy's premises. According to at least one press report, the sccurity forces
simply dis~ippearedfrom the scene2.
The invading group gained access to the compound and the Chancery
building by cutting chains and rcmoving bars from a Chancery basernent
window, and they seizcdcontrol of the firstRoor of theChancery. ln thc process
the invaders took hostage the Ernbüssysecurity officer,who had corne out of the
Chancery [O ncgotiate with them, and four of the Embassy's Marine Guards.
Thereaftcr a Iürgegroup of Embassy pcrsonnel, non-American staRand visitors
took refuge on an upper floor of thc Chancery. Over two hours after the
beginning of the attack, and aftcr the invaders had attcmpted to set fire10the
Chancery building and to CU; through the upstairs steel doors with a torch, they
gained entry to the upper floor and seized the remaining personnel, with the
exception of Il American staff rnernbers who held out in the main vault for an
additional hour. They also seized thc other buildings on the compound and the
personnel located in them, including consular oficers of the Embassy. They
seized the various residences on the compound, including the residence of the
Chargé d'Affaires,and put thcm to useas placesof confinement for the hostages.
During thc assault of more than thrcc hours, repeated callsfor help weremade
from the Embassy to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and repcaicd efforts to
secure help from the lranian authoritics were also made through direct
discussionr; at the Foreign Ministry by the United States Chargé d'Affaires,
Bruce Laingcn, who made contact wilh the Prime Minister's office and with
Unlesssome othcr sourceiscitedherein, vcrificationthefacts isprovidcdby the
dectaraiionafUnder SecretaryofStatcDavid D. Ncwsom or 1I January 1980submitted
with this Mcrnurial.
Wmhington Stiir.10Nov. 1979,p. A7(~nn. 1).126 DlPLOMATlC AND CONSULARSTAFF
Foreign Ministry officials. Despite these repeated requests, no lranian security
forces were sent toprovide relief and protection to the Embassy. No attcmpt was
made by the Iranian Government to clear the Embassy premises, to rescue the
personnel held hostage, or to persuade thc invaders and demonstrators, via
radio broadcasts, emissaries, or otherwise, to teminate their action against the
Embassy. In fact, the Iranian Governrnent's spokesman, in an interview the
following day, stated that the Revolutionary Guards were sent to the Embassy
as a result of Laingen's appeals, but not to release the Embassy and hostages
from the invaders. According to his staterncnt of S Novcmber,
"... yesterday the American Embassy Charge d'Affaires immediately
contacted the Foreign Ministry and stated he lacks security and thai he
would need protection. So, on orders of the governmcnt, the Revolution
Guards entered to prevent clashes there. Last night the brothcrs who arc
occupying the Embassy thanked the guards for their presence and for
rnaintaining security there3."
The same morning, 5 November, only hours after the Embassy seizure, the
United States consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz were also seized, but again the
Iranian Government took no protective action4. The Revolutionary Guard
corps of Fars Province immediately announced its support for the Shiraz
takeover, and, according to an announcement issued on 6 November, they
actually shared control over the United States Consulate there with the
"students" 5.
'Telephone interviewwith Sadeq Tabatabai, Tehran Domestic Service, II40 GMT, 5
Nov. 1979,as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service(FBIS), Daity Reporr,6
Nov. 1979,pp. R14, 16(Ann. 2). In an interview publishcd I December in Beirut, the
occupation of the United States Embassy, rcplied:about the role of the guards in the
"As a matter of fact, weplayed no role in the occupation of the embassywhichwas
occupiedby studentssupporting Imam Khorneini.The guards role was to protect the
safety of the hostages and secure the area. There werc signs of a serious plot to
explode [sic]the situation around the embassy. Our task was to protect the safety of
both the hostages and the students." (Interview with Abu Sharif, undatA.7-Sujr
(Beirut), IDec. 1979, as reported in FBIS, Daily Report, 4 Dec. 1979, p. K40
(Ann. 3))
Operations al these consular posts had been suspendeas a resultofthe attacks in
February 1979,and no United States personnel wereat these posts when the 5 November
attacks occurred. (Responsebythe United States, fl Dec, 1979,to a question presented by
the Court on 10Dec. 1979,repnnted in Selected Documents, No. 2.)
'Announcernent issued by the "Corps of Guardsmen and students stationcd at the US
Consulate", Shiraz Domestic Service,6 Nov. 1979, as reported in FBIS, Daily Rcporr. 7
Nov. 1979, p. R2 (submitted to the Court in Declaration of 6 Dec. 1979, of ovid il.
Newsom, App. C, Item 17, hereinafter cited as "Newsom Declaration", reprinted in
SelectedDocuments, No. 1).
Ttie failureof the Covernment of Iran on 4and 5November to protect the United States
Embassyand consular premises,and its apparent complicityin the attack at lcast rrom the
moment of sending theRevolutionary Guard to assist the invadersrather than protecl the
Embassy, directly violated assurances provided earlier by that Government that United
States premiseswould be protected. It was also in contrast to Iran's priorconduct. When
the United States Embassy was attacked on 14 February 1979, the Government of Iran
acted quickly and eff~cientlyto try to deal with the attackers and to remove them.
Embassy expressing deep regret at the incident, its readiness to indemniry the United
States for the damage.caused to its premises "by anti-revolutionary élemcnts",and its
assurance that the Governrnent "have made arrangements to prevent seriously the
repetition of such incidents(See Response of the United States, 12Dec. 1979, to a MEMORIAL
B. The Roleof the Iranian Authoritits
The Government'srolein the attücks may besaid to havebeguncvenbefore4
November. On 28 Octobcr, in a speechat Qom, Ayatollah Khomeini,then de
jùcto Chief ofState of Iran, stated:
"Ali the problems of the East stem from theseforeigners,from the West,
and from America at the moment. Al1Ourproblems come from Amcrica.
Al1thç problems of the Muslims stem from Anicrica ...6"
In the early morning of 1Novemkr, in anticipation of a demonstration in the
vicinity of the United States Embassy, the Embassy reported to the State
Department that the normal complement of policewas outside the compound
and that the Embassy feltconfident that it could get more protectionif needed.
Thirty minutes later ChargéLaingenreported that several,hundred demonstra-
tors wcre niarching back and forth in front of the Embassybut that the police
detachment had been strcngthcncd, providing "rnorc than enough for now".
Thc Chief of Policecame to the Ernbassypersonallyand met withMr. Laingen,
who infornied Washington that the Chief was "tiiking hisjob of protecting the
Embassy very seriously". Mr. Laingen reported that the prayer leader at the
main demonstration in another location in the city. the Ayatollah,Montazcri,
had repeatedan announccment on the radio that the peopleshoutd no1go to the
Embassy.The number of demonstrators at the Embassy varicd during the day,
up to 5,000or more, but protection wasmaintained by Iranian security forces.
That evening, as the crowd dispcrsed, both the Chierof Protocol and the Chief
of Policeenpressedrelief to Chargk Laingen that everythinghad gone well.
Howcver, incitement against the United States continued to corne from the
highestgovernmentülauthority in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini-incitement which
apparently led to the4 Novcmbcr attack on the United States Ernbassy'. In an
intcrview on 5 Novcmber, a person identified as a "student" involvedin the
Embassy tilkeoverexplained the genesisof the action as follows:
"The need to do something was felt more than ever, which is quite
evident inthe speechesof Ihelmam [Ayatollah Khomeini]in the past week
or couple of weeks. The Imam during this period had talked to al1those
receivedby him about the problem of America. In hislast messageon the
occasion of 4 Novcmbcr he addressed message to students and al! the
strata of people, especiallypupils, students and theological students, and
asked them to extendand strcngthentheir attacks againstthe United States.
That waswhythe Muslimstudent believersin the way ofthe lmam decided,
with regard to al1of thc above, to take a revolutionary step in the right
channel, that is to say against America and its interests... Thus, the need
to do something wüs fclt simultaneously in two universities,and students
from several facultics agreed on the plan tooccupy thc Embassyand take
thestaff of the EmbassyhostageB."
The influenceof Ayatollah Khomeini'sspeeches was also indicated by a
questionprtsentedby JudgcGros on II Wec.1979, re rintedinSelcctedDocuments,No.
3.)On at le;isttwo furtheroccasionspriorto 22 OctJer, ündon one occasion aftthat
date, Chargéd'AKaireçLaingcndiscussedthe security situation withIranian Foreign
MinisterYazdi who assurcdMr. Laingcn that thï Goveinment ofIranwould fulfil its
inteTchran Domestic Services,2030 GMT, 28 Oct. 1979,as reportedin FBIS, Baily
Re ort,29 (kt. 1979,p.R2, R3 (Ann. 4).
'~ee, cg.,Statcrnentof AyÿtollahKhorneini,I Nov. 1979,asreportedin FBIS,Dai+
-Re ori,2 Nov. 1979,pp. RI-R2(Ann. 5).
{Newsorn Dedaration.App. C, Item6.128 DlPLOMATlCAND CONSULARSTAFF
statement issued on 5 November by a group which identifieditselfas "Student
Followers of the Imam's Policy". The statement noted that it was Ayatollah
Khomeini "who cried out that it is up to the pupils, universitystudents and
theologystudents to extcnd their aitackç upon the United States" so as to force
itto meet lranian demands. The statement continued:
"And so, in followingyour [AyatollahKhomeini's]orders, and with faith
in thepursuit of your path which is the path of god, WC decided to take a
step, srnülas it was, by occupying the Embassy of the US mercenariesin
Iran and voiceyour divinewrath. ...[W]evow to you that, hand in hand at
your command, we willcontinue the fight to the total destruction of lheir
sovereignty'."
The "student" statements of 5 November indicate that a largc number of
personswereinvolvedin the advance planningand executionof the 4 November
attack-so largeas tomake itquestionable whether the lranian Government did
not know of the plans in advance. Whiledenying any such advance knowledge,
SayyedAhmad Khomeini,son of and adviserto the Ayatollah Khomeini,stated
in an interviewon 20November that he had beenin contact with the organizing
group pnor 10the attackl0.
Whether or not the lranian authorities' responsihility for the attack was
initiallylimitedto incitementand specificfailure to deter, prevent and terminate
the action, it became evidentwithin hours aftcr the attack that the Government
was giving the action its endorsement, CO-operationand full support; at teast
from that point on, the Government was an accompliceand participant in the
continuing holding of the Embassy and the hostageç.
On 4 November, the day of the attack, the invadershcld a pressconferenceat
the Embassy and announced that Ayatollah Khomeini, acting as "guide of the
TranianRevolution", had telephoned the Embassyto expresshisagreement with
the "students"' aciion'l. No deniai of this announcemcnt was made by the
Government of Iran.On 5 November other Iranian authorities expressed their
support of the action of the "students". For examplc, the commander of the
Revolutionary Guards, whose troops apparently had been sent in by the
Governrnent'samler to protect the invaders, sent a messageto the "students"
characterizing their action as "a brave and god-lovingstep", regretting his own
inability to participate in their "gathering", and pledging that the corps of the
Revolutionary Guards "are ready to serve you with al1their force and rnight
and, holding their livesin their hands, arc prepared to shed to the last drop of
the blood and to undertake your protection to the lasttate of vict~ry"'~.On the
same day, 5 November, a public statement was made that the "staff of the
central officeof thc publicprosecutor ofthe Islamicrevolution,the researchstaff
and the judiciary announce their support for the Muslim fightingstudents who
have occupied the US Ernbas~y"'~.Foreign Ministcr Yazdi, while recognizing
that "according to international regulations the Iranian Government is duty-
bound to safeguard the lire and property of foreign nationals", stated: "The
action of the studentsenjoys the endorsement and support of the government,
because America herself is responsible for this incident"14.
Statementof the"StudentFollowersoftheImam'sPoticies",TehranDomesticService.
1030 GMT, 5 Nov. 1979. as reportedin FBIS, Dai. .e~ort, 6 Nov. 1979,.p- R3-R4
(Ann. 6).
Reyr,hr21 Nov. 1979,p.rR2 (Ann.07).T 20 Nov. 1979,as reported in FBIS, Duiiy
Newsom Declaration, pp. C, ltem 1.
l2Ibid., lte7.
l3Ibid.ltem 8.
l4Ibid.,Item 1. Ayatollah Khomeini hirnself publicly justificd and supported the Embassy's
seizure and refused to cal1upon the students to withdraw from the Embassyis.
Since 5 November lranian officiaihave continucd to support the holding of
hostages and to participate in their continucd dctcntion16.
This support and participation by the tranian auihorities had been a critical
factor in tiic continucd holding of the Embassy and of the hostagcs". Foreign
Minisler Gotbzadeh sunirned it up succinctly in late December: "The fact islhat
thc scizure of the embassy was approved by the lmam and, consequently by the
peoplc. As Fdras 1am concerned", he said, "1 willdo whatever 1have to do1'."
Those holding thc United States Embassy have also made clear that they will
obcy the ordcrs of Ayatollah Khomeini. For example, they have consistently
identified ihemselves as the "Student Followers of the Imam's Policics". In a
statement issued by them on 5 November, they not only declared that their
action was taken pursuant to Ayatollah Khomeini's orders, thcy alço told
Ayatollah Khorneini that they would continue to fight "at your ~ornmand"'~.
On 10 November Ayatollah Khomeini ordercd the "students" to admit the
Papal envoy, Annibale Bugnini, to the EmbassyZoand the "students" promptly
cornplicdwith the orderissued by "the leader of the Iranian Revolution, His
Exccllcncy Imam Kh~rne~ni"~'. In a statemcnt on 14 November the "sludent
Followersof thc Imam's policy" statcd thal the leadership of their action against
the United Stütcs "is in the hands of the able and great leader of the Islamic
revolution in Iran, lmam Khomeini; and it is only the viewpoints or the
leadership which determine the general direction of and measures rclatcd to this
move" *
On 17' November Ayatollah Khomeini issued ;i decree, addressed to the
"students" at the Embassy, stating:
"The centre of espionage and conspiracy called the American Embassy
and thosc people who hatched plots against our lslamic movement in that
place do not enjoy international diplornatic respect."
l5 lhid.iem 12.
Ib By contrast, whenthe lraqi Consulatcin Tchran wasseizedon 5 November,the
aiithoritiesundertook negotiationswith the invadcrwho wererequested by Ayatollah
Khomcinito leavethe building. The invadersannounced: "We willfollowinstructions
from the orriceor thc Imam." Theyclcarcdthe lraqi Consulate, apparentlyleavingits
angrycrowdunprotestcdinfrontof thEmbassyp.oftheSoviet Union.onr1January,1980,and
againon 3Januaq against theSovietUnionactionsin Afghanistan,the Governmcntor
Iran provided armedsecurityforceswhicheffcctivclyprotected the Embassy Cromthe
demonsirators.
"The üssessmentof Bani Asadi, former Deputy Prime Minister in the Bazargan
Governrnent, was reportedin a Decemberinterview:
"If thcAyatollah decidestoend the occuparion,hesays, thenthe occupationwill
be endcd.All Khomeinihas 10 do, accordingto BaniAsadi, isto stop broadcüsting
newsabout the American Embassy on Irüniantelevisionand radio and thestudents
wiilrapidly beccimeisolated."(I'BIS, BuilyReporl,Supp. 39, 13 Dcc. 1979, p. 8
(Ann. S).)
l8 Interviewith E.rcelsicorrespondentVictorPayan, ExcelsiorMexicoCity, 26Dix.
19Iq,Footnotci9,sicpro,p. 128.States translation(Ann. 9).
MessagefromImamKhomeini'sofficeinQom,TehranDomestic Service, 16GMT,
10Nov. 1979, as rcportedinFBIS, Duil~lReport.13Nov. 1979,p. RIS (Ann. 10).
''Staicment No. 28 of the "Student Followersof iheImam'sPolis.", ibid.
22 "Student" StatementNo. 32.TehranDomesticService.1030 GMT. 14Nov. 1979.as
reportedin FBIS, Dail-vRcport, 15Nov. 1979,pp. R5-R6 (Ann. 11).130 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULARSTAFF ,
The decree dirccted the "students" to:
"hand over thc blacks and the women, if it is proven that they did not spy,
to the Ministryof Foreign Affairsso that theymay be immediatelyexpelled
from Iran. The Noble iranian nation willnot give permissionfor the release
of the rest ofhem. Therefore, therest of them willbe under arrest until the
American Govcrnment acts according to the wish of the nationz3."
That sarne day the following announcement was issued in the name ofthe
"Student Followersof the imam's Policy":
"Following thc orders of the great leader of the revolution, Imam
Khomcini, about releasing the women and blacks who are among the
hostages and whose acts of espionage have not been proved, we have
acted irnmediately and according to the orders of the Imam those indi-
viduals whosc acts of cspionage have not been proved witl be handed
overto the Ministryof ForeignAffairssothat theymay beexpelledfrornthe
country.. . . The rest of the hostages and the premisesof the centre of es-
pionage, as ordered by the Imam, will be al the disposal of you, valiant
nation . .24"
By 20 Novernber 13of the hostages had, in fact, been released.
During an interview with a United States televisionnetwork on 28 December,
when askeddirectly if the remaininghostages would be releasedupon the order
of Ayatollah Khomeini, the designated s okesman for the "students" holding
the Embassy replicd that they would be2 .P
C. The Statusof the Hostages
At least 62 Americans and a number of non-American hostages were seized
when the Embassy was invaded. Thereafter an American businessman was
added to the group being held at the Embassy. It appears that al1of the non-
American hostages have subsequentlybeen released.Thirteen of the American
hostages were retcased by 20 November pursuant to the order of Ayatollah
Khomeini, who also ordered the continued detention of the remainder-whom
he described as being under arrest in connection with allegations of espionage
pending Unitcd States compliancewith Iran's demands.
The available evidence rnakesclear that those who have been held by Iran
under this form of "arrest" have been subjectedto a harrowing 0rdea1~~A . t the
outset some were paraded blindfolded, hands bound hchind their backs before
hostile and chanting crowds. At least during a substantial period of their
captivity, it appcars that the hostages were kept bound, hand and foot, and
frequently blindfolded; forced to remain silent for extended periods of time;
denied mailz7; denied the right to communicate with each other, with their
captors (exceptas to basic requests),and with theirown govcrnmcnt;subjected
to interrogation, some apparentfy intensivelyand rcpeatedly; threatened with
23 DecreeofAyatollah KhomeinT i,ehranDornestiService,0930 GMT, 17Nov. 1979,
as reportedinFBIS,20 Nov. 1979,p. RI1 (Ann. 12).
24 "Student"StatementNo. 32,Tehran DomesticService,1053GMT, 17 Nov. 1979.as
re ortedin FBIS,Dnily Report,19 Nov. 1979,pp.R15-16 (Ann. 13).
26Thefactsset forth in the ensuingparagraphwerederived frorn reportsreceived
thfoughthepress and frompersonswho have been in the Ernbassyornpound sinceils
seizure.
27 Christmascardswereapparently allowedto reachsomeof the hostages.criminal trials; threatencd wiih death in the event of a United States rescue
atternptZ8;and some dircctfy threatened with weapons.
The threat of criminal trials for al1the remaining hostages, with a possible
death penalty, has been madc repeatedly by both lranian officiaisand by the
''Studcnt Followers of thc Imam's Policies". 0i1 IS Novernbcr the Ayatollah
Khomeini saidthai "whatour nation has done isto arresi a bunch of spies,who,
according to the norrns, should be investigatcd, irietl andtreated in accordance
with Ourown laws". He raised the possibilityof trials of the hostagesevcn ifthe
United States cornplicd with Iran's demands, saying that, if the hostages werc
then released "it will be becausc we have been Ienient". Asked if the hostages
would never be killcd undcr any circumstanccs, Khorncini indicated that, if
Iran's dcniands were no1 met, the hostages would definitely be tried and
whatever the court decidcs would be acted upon". The trial threat was
reiterated in a 17-point resolution issued by the "Student Followers of the
Imam's Policy" on 21 ~ovember and was cxprcçslyconvcyed to the hostages
by their captors3'. ln an intcrvicw published 6 Deccmbcr Ayatollah Khalkali,
head of Iran's revolutionary "courts", repeated the trial threat, said that he
would be pleased to presidc over the court, and thrcatened the firing squad for
those found guilty, whileexprcssingthe hope someniight be found innocent and
rüising the possibility of a pardon by Ayatollah Khomeini for the others3'.
Ayatollah Khalkhali was latcr reported as prornising that the hostages would
not be put to death even if tried33, and as expressing his belief that they were
innocent and should be rclcasedJ4.On 22December, however, hewas reported
as having denied such staternents and as having repeated the death penalty
threat for those hostages who rnight be proven guilty3*.
Sharia Magistrate Ayatollah Gilani, during a discussion with newsmenon 18
Decernbcr, made the following statcmcnt:
"The trial of the hostages will take place whcn permission isreceived
from Imam Khorncini. It will be held under thc supervision of the Shar'
rnagistrate and the lslamic Revolution Council, in accordance with the
prcceptsof lslarn and in obscwance of the noble verses of the glorious
Koran, and they will bc treated with justice. Ilowever, pseudo-diplomats
and spies fall outsidc this rule. In Islam, spicsarc considered to be 'ayyun'
[eycs],for which the Islamiclawprescnbes the severestpunishment, and the
imam of the Muslims rnay even kill spies or tui'nthem into slaves. ...The
imam rnay kill them, or pardon them. or even detail them to work in the
court as slaves, as our workers and slaves. This depends on the imam
personally 36."
28"And should the Uniicd States and ils hatefulagents in Iran resort to the leasi
conspiratonalrnavernent.rnilitaryor otherwise,toreleasïthe hostages,al1the hosiügcs
will be destroyed andresponsibilityfor thiswill liedirectlywiih the US Government."
"Studeni"SiatementNo. 15, Newsom Declaration,App. C, Item 15.
29 Newsom Declaration.App. C, Iteni31.
30 Rcsolution,paragraph7, Tehran Domestic Service, IO16GMT, 21 Nov. 1979,as
reportedin FBIS, Doib Repurr.21 Nov. 1979, pp. RI 1-13 (Ann. 14).
l1 tntervi-,~with"student le~dcrsA ",P, 23 Nov. 1979, as rcportedin FBIS, Dai-
Re art,26 Nov. 1979, pp. 13-14(Ann. 15).
InterviewwithAyatollahKhalkhali,undated,La Stu~npu,6 Dec. 1979,asreportedin
FBIS, Baily Rcporr,Supp. 39, 13 Dec. 1979,pp. 31-34(Ann. 16).
33 BBC,Idondon,12Dec. 1979,as reportedin FBIS, Daily Kcport, 13Dec. 1979,Supp.
39'f. 8 (Ann. 17).
The Times, London.21 Dcc. 1979,pp. 1,6 (Ann. 18).
" AFP. Tehran.22 Dec. 1979. asreportedin FBIS, Duil. Rep.rt, 24 Dec. 1979,...
17-18(Ann. 19).
36 Discussion wiihShariüMagistrates,Eitela'ar, 18 Dcc. 1979, as reporied inFBIS,
Doily R~port,Supp. 45, pp. 30-31(Ann. 20). .132 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULARSTAFF
Asked about the hostages' right to defcncecounsel in these trials, Ayatollah
Gilani reportedly replied that "the spies may engage lawyers conversant with
lslamicprecepts, but the crimeof theseindividualsissoevidentthat no informed
human being will agree to defend such criminals3'".
A somewhatdifferentthreat wasalso developed-narnely, to usethe hostages
as part of an effort to put the United Statesitself on trial. In a speechon 10
December former Foreign Minister Yazdi set out the suggestion, stating that
Ayatollah Khomeinihad accepted il3'. Foreign MinisterGotbzadeh formulated
the concept in tcms of an international tribunal or grand jury before which
the hostages would te~tify~~.Ayatollah Khomeini's forma1 instruction to
Foreign MinisterGotbzadeh ta form the "international investigatingcommit-
tee" was issued on 13 Deccmberbo. By late December, however, leading
international figureshad made clear that they would not participate in any such
investigation while the hostages remained in custody, and little has since been
hcard of the international committec approach. As the possibility of United
Nations sanctions against Iran has developed, theearlier idea of a trial of the
hostages themselveshas re-emergedas a counter-threat against SecurityCouncil
action4'.
D. Violations of the Embassy'sArchives and'~ocurnents
From the outset those Embassyfiles,records and documents which werenot
destroyed bythe Embassystaff during the 4 November attack were ransacked.
Thcir purported contents have been interpreted and disseminated by the
"studcnts" (in a series of so-called "revelation statements") and by the
govcrnmenl-controlled media. The day following the takeover the "students"
affirrnedthat the documents would beconsidered,reportcd to the public, and, if
necessary, dclivered to KhomeiniQ2. Embassy documents were apparently
compiled in dossiers for use in dcciding on the release of the 13 hostages in
Nov~rnber~~ and an interrogation of the hostages;apparently it is also intended
that thcy willbe usedas evidenccifthe hostagesare tried44.Thus the "students"
have announccd that the documcnts will be "exposed and simplified" in the
and Foreign MinisterGotbzadeh has also stated that thesedocuments
would be usedbefore the planned "international grand ASearly as 8
November the Iranian Government spokesman was secking to justify the
" Ibid.
38TehranDomestic Service, 1630GMT, 10 Dec. 1979, as reportedin FBIS, Duily
Report, Supp.37, Il Dec. 1979,pp. 7-8 (Ann. 21).
Interviewwith SadeqGotbzüdeh,Tchran, in English to Europe, IO Dec. 1979.as
reported in FBIS,DoiIy Reprr, Supp. 37, pp. 10-1(Ann. 22).
'O InstructionissuedbyAyatollah KhomeiniT, ehranDomestic Service13Dcc. 1979,as
reportcdin FBIS, Dnily Report, Supp. 39, 13Dec. 1979,p. 11(Ann. 23).
4' Announcementby Foreign MinisterGotbzadeh, Tehran DomesticService,28 Dec.
1979.as reportedin FBIS, Daily Repart, Supp.49, 28 Dec. 197p.4 (Ann. 24).
42 Inte~iew with "Students",TehranDomestic Semice,2030 GMT, 5 Nov. 1979, as
r4'oAhmad Khomeini Interview, T,ehranDomesticService,1135GMT, 19Nov. 1979.as
reportedin FBIS,Daily Report, 20 Nov. 1979,pp. R2-3(Ann. 26).
44 Ahmad Khomeini Interview T,anjug, Belgrade,6 Dec. t979, as reportedin FBIS,
Doili*RcoartSUDD 41. 17Dec. 1979. no.21-22(Ann. 271.
45"~l;den't"pkss interviewat th; ÜS ~rnba&, ~ehkinin Englishto Europe, 1930
GMT. l Dec. 1979, p.R27(Ann. 28).
'6See Ann. 22. -continuing hostage situation on the basis of documents found in the Embassy 47,
an attempted justification which was to become standardd8.
E, Lackof Accessto the Wostages
During this cntire timc, despite repeated requests both by tclcphonc to the
"students" at the Ernbassy and through thc Embassy of lran in Washington, al1
contact between the hostagcs and United States Government officiais, even by
telephone, has been prohibitcd with the apparent approval of Iranian authori-
ties. Non-lranian outside obscrvcrs have been allowed only thc most inter-
mittent and lirnitcd acccss to the hostages, most recently a visit by three
American clergymen and onc Algerian priest on 25 December. By resolution
dated 31 December 1979, the United Nations Seeurity Council requested the
Secretary-General of the United Nations to visit Tehran in an cffort lo find a
way of resolving the crisis, and although the Secretary-Gencral sought leave to
see the hostages during hiç visit of 31 December to 3 January, he was not
permitted to see them.
The clergymen reported seeing 43 hostages. The "studcnts" holding the
hastages claini that there is a total of 49 at tlie Ernbassy, whcreas the
informatiori of the UnitedStalcs Government is that 50of the American citizens
who were taken captive havc not been released. Thc Forcign Ministcr of lran
said on 26 Ilecember that he would invesdgate the numbcr of hostagcs4', but no
clarification of thc discrerilincv has bcen issued. The conditions of al1visils have
apparcntly becn çloscly Cont~ollcdby the captors, with limitations put on the
tvDeof communications allowcd and with monitorine of al\ contacts. Those who
Gtinue to be held at the Ernbassy, or who are belie;ed to be so hcld, include 48
mcmbers of the diplomatic, administrative and technical staffs of the Embassy
and 2 private Amcrican citizcns.
F. The Status of the UnitedStates Chargé d'Affaires
In addition to thosc hcld at the Embassy, threc members of the diplomatic
staff of the Embassy, including the United States ChargC d'Affaires, Bruce
Laingen, hiive becn confincd to the lranian Foreign Ministry since thc üttack.
Since 4 November ihey havc been denied access to senior lranian officiaiand
permitted only limited and intermittent visits from their diplomatic colleagues
from other ernbassies in Tehran. They have, however, been permitted to
communicatc on an irregular basis with the'united States.
On 6 Novcmber thc "studcnts" dcmanded the surrender of Mr. Laingenso.
On 7 November thc Forcign Ministry issued a statement acknowledging the
Government's lcgal duty to protcct thcse United States diplornais, staiing that
47 SadeqTabatabai Interview,Tehrün,in Englishto Europe,1930GMT, 8 Nov. 1979,
as reportedin FBIS,Daily Repmr,9 Nov. 1979,p. RI1 (Ann. 29).
da See,e.g.,Anns. 22and 27.
49 Interview4th Frtnich iclcvisionAFP, 21 Dcc. 1979, as reportedin FBIS, Daily
Report, Supplement 48, 27 Dec.1979,p. 9 (Ann. 30).The las1visitto the hostageby a
non-lranianobserverpriorto 25 Decemberwasmade on 25Novemberbya UnitedStates
Congressrnailon a privatevisitwhoreported seeing20 ofihe hostages.Other biefvisits
occurredon 10 November by thc Ambassadorsof Aigeria,France, Swedcn and Syria
jointlyand on IINovember bythe PapalNuncio and,sep;tratelyby theAmbassador of
the FedoralRepublic of Germany.
j0"Student" StatementNo. 13,Tehran DomesticService,1030GMT, 6 Nov. 1979a,s
reportedin FBIS, Baity Repart,6 Nov. 1979, p.RI2 (Ann.31). 134 DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF
they were, in fact, under the protection of the Government at the Foreign
Ministrysl. On 8 November the "Student Followers of the Imam's Policy"
announced their view that Mr. Laingen was "a plotting spy" and, therefore, a
hostage with no right to leave the Foreign Ministry. They announced that "a
special team will be sent to the Foreign Ministry to guard hims2. On 30
November Foreign Minister Gotbzadeh stated that Mr. Laingen and his two
colleagues were free to leave lran when they wishcd, although it would be
difficult to protect them on route to the airport, but on 1December the students
replied that the thrcc di iomats at the Foreign Ministry were their hostages and
undcr their surveillancee'. Ina 2 December interview the Foreign Minister said
the three were free to wait al the Foreign Ministry, where they would be
protected, but that "we" are no longer responsible when they leave the
~inistr~~~. And in another interview reported the next day the Foreign
Minister stated that Mr. Laingen and his colleagues had sought and been
granted asylum. He added, however:
"Therefore, as long as they remain in the rninistry 1 am personalfy
responsible for ensuring that nothing happens to thcm, but those men too
have no doubt cornmitted crimes. So as soon as they leave the ministry
precincts they will hll back into the hands of justice, and then 1will be the
first to demand that they be arrested and tried55."
Although the United StatesGovernment has not characterized Mr. Laingcn
and his two colleagues at the Foreign Ministry as hostages, the restrictions on
their freedom make clear [hat they are hostages as well,although confined in leçs
inhumane conditions than their colleagues at the Embassy. The uncertainty of
their situation was emphasized by "student" demands early in January that Mr.
Laingen should be transferred to the custody of the Embassy's captors for
questioning 56.
G. The lranian Government'sStated Justificationof the Seizureof the Embassy
and theHostages
While the Government of lran has notcommunicated officially to the United
States, or to the Court, its rationale for the seizure and ransacking of the
Ernbassy, the holding of the hostages, and the threats to try them, a nurnber of
lranian statements have been made purporting (Ojustify the actions in legal
terms. As noted above, fonner Foreign Minister Yazdi, while acknowledging
Iran's legal duty of protection, asserted that the United States itself was
responsible for the 4 November attacks because of its own prior misdeedsS7.
The "supervisor" ofthe Foreign Ministry, Mr. Bani-Sadr, issued a statement on
12 November attempting 10justify the action on the theory that the Embassy
was not an ernbassy but a centre of "governmenl interference in trivial and
. ''Foreign MinistryAnnouncement, 7 Nov. 1979,TehranDomesticService, asreported
in FBlS Duily Report, 8Nov. 1979, p. RI4(Ann. 32).
"Student" Statement No.20,TehranDomesticService, 1030GMT, 8 Nov. 1979,as
reportedinFBIS. Dailï Report. 9 Nov. 1979p.R3 (Ann.33).
53AFPTehran, I DA., asreportedinFBIS, Daily Repori.3Da., pp.R2O-21 (Ann. 34).
'4Intewiewwith Paris radio,Paris DomesticService,1200GMT. 2 Dec. 1979. as
reportedin FBIS,Duily Repor!.3 Dec. 1979.pp.R37-38 (Ann.35).
''Le Figuro.Paris4 Dec. 1979, asreportedin FBIS. Dnily Reports, 6 Dec. 1979. pp.
R29-30 (Ann.36).
56"Student" Statemcnt,unnumbered,Tehran DomesticService. 1124GMT, 4 Jan.
1980as reportedin FBIS. Duily Report4 Jan.1980, p.10 (Ann. 37).
57NewsomDeclaration,App. C. Item 11.major affairs and of ~spionage"~'. Ayatollah Khomeini,when questioned by
reporters about holding hostagesin violationof international Iaw,rcspondedon
18Novembcr that ambassadors or chargéswho spy are subjectto king takcn
hostagc. Hc argued that lran had not violated international noms but that the
United States had done so by admitting the Shah to the United States and
refusing to extradite him to Iransy. On 19 Novemher Sadeq Gotbzadeh, then
lranian Revolutionary Councilspokcsman and Minister of National Guidance,
asserted thc invalidityofthe lawof diplomatic immunity. He said that the basis
of diplomaticimmunity had been shattcred; that "these lawshave beenmadeto
guarantcc the crimes that the representativesOFthe big powers have committed
in the svall countries"; that "al1 nations which have never been independent
accepted them"; that "diplomatic immunity does no1 guarantee the act of
espionage, the crimes and whatever you have"; and that this "was no1 the
American Embassy,ii was a centre of espionage ..
In an interviewpublishedon 29 NovembcrAyatollah Behesti,Secretaryof the
Revolutionary Council, asserted a direrent thcory. He adrnitted that, if spics
are discovcrcd in a Foreignembassy, it isstandard procedure to expel them
but not to takc themas hostage. Hcsaid, howcver,that it is"standard proccdure
but not rcvolutionary. If weweretalkinghcreiihout diplomatic traditions,then I
would say you are righi. But we have a rcvolution. And they have laws ofthcir
own. Beingrcvolutionaries,wesupport the youth becausethis action is the only
way to makc the world familiar with their ideas, goals, and feelings of
revengc 61."
An explanation for Iran's actionwas givenin a newsdispatch from Tchran
published on 30 November:
"Scyyed Hoseyn, Imam Khomeini'sgrandson and adviser explained to
us on Monday 26 November: 'The occupati(in of the US Embassy is
particiilartyprofitable bothin the Third World iind inlran iiself.'Hoseyn's
thcory, whichisas well-arguedas Mc.Reni-Sadr's,couldbe summarizedas
follows:
1.Thc blowsdealt against US impcrialisrnhave absorbed al1the interna1
conflicts which wcrcundermining the IslamicRcpublic,and have united the
entirc population, regardless of class and political leanings, under the
Imam'sbanner. The embassy'soccupation is the most popular evcnt that
has occurred since the monarchy was overthrown. 'Ithas enabled us to
open the door to a strategic alliancebctwcenthe lslamiemovementand the
secularand left-winggroupsand to a tücticalalliancewith the Soviet bloc',
SeyyetlHoseyn told us in particular.
2. "TheThird World and Musiim peoples, especially the Arabs now
regard the lranian Revolution as their own.' 'Theoccupation of the US
Embassy has been seen by them as an exciting challenge to the most
powcrrul of the two superpowers. 'We hiivc therefore liberated thcsc
peoples from fcar, from "psychological occiipation", which is more efic-
tivc thün any other, to which US irnperialistn subjected them' Seyyed
Hoseyn stated. The seizure of dipiomats as hostages is not regarded by
Third World populations as a violation of intci-nationallaw about which,
moreovcr, they understand vcry little. 'Tlie poor and underprivileged
Nov. 1979.as rcportedingFBIS,Daily Reporl, 13Nov.a1979,p.aR37m(Ann. 38).ice,12
s9Newsom DeclarationApp. C, ltcm 31.
Ibid.,Item33.
6'Srern, Harnburg,29 Nov. 19?9,in German,informal United States translation
(Ann. 39).136 DIPLOMATICAND CONSUMR STAFF
despisc the legal and meddlesome minds of the rich and powerful', Seyyed
Hoseyn added and he is considered to beas 'radical' as his grandfatherb2."
W. Efforts of the UnitedStatesto Negotiate the Dispute
From the first days of the crisis the United Statcssought to open discussions
with the Governmcnt of lran but was flatly rebuffcd; lran later simply barred al1
officialcommunication on the subject of the hostages.
On 7 Novcmber the Secretary of State requested a former Attorney-Gcneral
of the United States, Ramsey Clark, and an assistant 10travel to Iran to deliver a
message frorn the President of the United States to the Ayatollah Khomeinib3.
Although thc message protested the actions of the Government oT lran and
called for releasc of the hostages, Mr. Clark also was authorized to discuss al1
avenues for resolution of the crisisb4.The Iranian Government initially agreed to
recetve Mr. Clark in Tehran, but shortly after Mr. Clark landed in Istanbul,
where he was to change planes, lranian authorities reversed themselves and
stated that Mr. Clark and his colleague could not corne to Iran. Tehran radio
broadcast a message from Ayatollah Khomeini stating that it was "not possible
undcr any circumstance for the special represcntatives to mect with him", that
"the rnembers of the lslamic Revolutionary Council under no circumsiances
should meet with them", that "none of the responsible officiais has the right to
meet with them", and that "the way to talks would be opened" only if the
United Statcs met specified lranian demandsb5. Shortly thercafter Iranian
authorities indicütcd that they would have no direct contact with representatives
of the Unitcd Statcs Government concerning the holding of the ho stage^^^.
The United StatesGovernment has persisted in its efforts to open communica-
tions with the Governmcnt of lran. Beginning with a request on 4 Novembcr for
assistance in ending the Embassy seizure, the United States has communicated
positions on various matters relating to the crisis to the Iranian Charge
d'Araires in Washington; it has asked him Tor Iran's comments on spccific
matters from time to time. The Chargé,however, has not been able to respond to
questions relating to the release of the hostages6'.
The United States Government has also attempted to establish cornmunica-
tions with the lranian representative al the United Nations, but he and the staff
of the lranian Mission have dedined contact with United States represcntatives.
Whilerherc had been some hope thaf lran would foHowthrough on itsplcdge to
send a rcprcscntative from Tehran 10 participate in the Security Council
meetings in November, thus providing an opportunity for dialogue, lran did not
participate in the meetingba.
Chargé Laingen, heid in custody in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Tehran, has had regular contact with the Ministry's Chief of Protocol but
has been denied access to any senior officers of the Ministry and has not been
62 ieMonde. Paris30 Nov., pp. 1, 3.as reportedinFBIS. Daily Report. 3Dec. 1979.
r. - - -------.-,-
6AResponseby UnitedStates toquestionpresenied by the Court on 10Dec. 1979.
''Newsom kclürution. vara.3 and AVD. C. Item20.
66 NewsomDcclüration,para. 3. 13uringLainnterviewon 18Nov. AyatollahKhomeini
üssertedthat hewouldevenrefuseto meetwithPresidentCarter. Hestatedthat, if"Mr.
Carterwantsto makeus stepdownfromour demsnds... itisout of thequestion".Irhe
rneetsthedemand,"then, there willbe nopoint inour meeting.Therefore, 1am not willing
to meethim". NewsomDectaraiion, App. C, Item31.
67 Newsom Declarütion,para. 3.
Ibid. MEMOBIAL 137
permitted to engage in any conversations of substance rcgarding the release of
lhe hostages6'.
In addition to these efforts at direct communication, there have been a
number of efforts made by leaders of other governments and by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations to intercede with the authoritics in lran to secure
the releaseof the hostages and the resolution of the crisis70,the latest of these
king the Secretary-General's personal visitto Iran ai Ihe behest ofthe Securiiy
Council in theperiod 31 December-3 January. As ol'ihe date of this Memorial
al1such efforts have been rebuffed.
The United States has sought to provide a basis for reachingan end to the
crisis. It has said ihat, after the releaseof the hostages, Iran's cornpfaintsagainst
the government of the Shah might be presented 10 an appropriate forum. The
United States would not oppose such a process. In addition. the United States
has made it clear that the American judicial system would be avaifable to the
Iranian authoritieswho wishcdto pursue Iran's daims to the assets of the Shah.
There has been no substantive response from Iriinian authorities to these
suggestionsfor a means of endingthe crisis,althocigh Iranhas initiated a lawsuit
in a United States court to recover claimed asseis.
1. Protestsby the Governmentof the United States
From the onset of the attack upon the United States Embassy in Tehran, the
United States has protested totheGovernment oflran the attack and the seizurc
and detention of the American hostages. As noted above, Mr. Ramsey Clark
was dispatched to Iran to prcsent a formal protcst (and to negotiate toward the
release of the hostages) but he was prevented from entering the country.
However, senior oficers of the Department of State, including Under Secretary
of State Newsom, were infrequcnt telephone contact with Iranian authoriiies in
Tehran during the first halr of November until furthcr such contacts were
prohibited by the Ayatollah Khomcini. In these communications the Depart-
ment officiais protested in the strongest terms the illegal and continuing
deten~ionof American personnel and discussed possiblemcans of securing their
rdease. These officialsalso made approaches to the lranian Chargéd'Affairesin
Washington protesting the situation in Iran. Other communications, including
protests, were made through private intermediaries and through foreign embas-
sies in Tehran, acting on behalf of the United States Government.
J. Resortto theUnited Nations andto theCourt
From an early stage of the crisis the United States has persistcntly sought
peaceful resolution OPthehostage dispute with Iran through the UnitedNations.
By letter dated 9 November 1979, from the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, the United States requcsted that theSectirityCouncil urgentlyconsider
what rnight be done 10sccure the rclease of the American hostages and restore
"' Ibid.
Inan interviewithEuropeancorrespondents inlateNovemberA, yatollahKhomeini
staied:"Probably not aday passeswithout(messages)king received by Our Foreign
Ministry from abroad, frornvariouscountries towhom they[the UnitedStates]have
appealed.They keep appealingto us toreleasethe hostagesand so forth." Tehran
DomesticService.0125 GMT, 29 Nov..as reportedinFBIS, Duily Report, 30 Nov. 1979,
p. RB (Ann. 41).138 DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF
the sanctity of diptomatic personnel and establishments7'. In response the
Presidentof the Security Council, speakingin the Council's name, appealed on 9
November 1979forthe immediatereleaseof the ho stage^^^ .he Presidentof the
General Assemblyhas similarly calledfor the releaseof the hostages7j.
On 25 Novcmbcr 1979, in the exercise of his exceptional authonty under
Articlc99of the United Nations Charter to bring to the attention of the Security
Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of
international peace and security, the Secretary-General of the United Nations
requested that the Security Councilbe convened urgently in an effort to seek a
peaceful solution to the hostage crisis.
In hisaddress to the Council on 27 November 1979,the Secretary-General
declaredthat the situation in Iran "threatens thepeaceand stabilityofthe region
and could well have very grave consequencesfor the entire ~orld"~~. On 4
December 1979, the Security Couneil adopted unanimously resolution 457,
urgently calling upon the Governmcnt of Iran "to release immediately the
personnel of the Ernbassy of the United States of America being held in
Tehran, to provide them protection and allow them to leave the country"75.
That resolution also rcqucsted the Secretary-Generalto lend his good officesto
the immediate implementation of the resolution and to take al1 appropriatc
rneasurcs to that end. The efforts of the Secretary-General have not yet
succeedcdin their statcd purposc. .
On 29 November 1979,the United Statesfiled'withthe International Court of
Justice an Application institutingproceedingsagainst Iran. It concurrently filed
a Request for tnterim Measures of Protection. On 29 November Sccretary of
StateCyrus Vanccalsowrotc a lettcr to the Presidentof theCourt rcquestingthc
Courtto indicateappropriatc intcrim measures withindays, and suggestingthat
the President ofthe Court request the Governrnent of lran to ensure that no
steps bctaken to inflameopinion against the hostages,to heightenthe danger to
whichtheyareexposed,or to placethemon trial. The iiextday, in the exerciseof
the power conferred on hirn by Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rulesof Court,
the Prcsidcntof thcCourt addressed a telegramto the Governments of lran and
the United States caHingattention to the need to act in such a way as would
enable any subsequent Order of the Court to have its appropriate effects.
On 15 December 1979,following a hearing on the request for provisional
measures, theCourt unanimously indicatedthe following provisional measures
pending its finaldecision in the case:
"A. (i) The Government of the Islamic Republicof lran should immedi-
ately ensure that the premises ofthe United States Embassy,Chancery
and Consulates be restored to the possession of the United States
authorities under their exclusive control, and should ensure their
inviolabilityand effectiveprotection as provided for by the treaties in
force bctweenthe two States, and by general international law;
(ii)hc Governmcnt of the Islamic Republicof Iran shouldensurc the
immediate release without any exception, of al1 persons of United
States nationality who are or have been held inthe Embassy of the
Unitcd States of America or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Tchran, or have been held as hostages elsewherc, and afford full
protection toal1such persons, in accordance with the treatics in forcc
betwecn the two States, and with general international law;
71 Ann. 42.
72 Ann. 43.
73 Ann. 44.
74 S/PV.2172(27 Nov. 1979)(Ann. 45).
75 Ann. 46. MEMORIAL 139
(iii)The Government of the lslamic Republic oflran should, as from
that moment, afford to al1the diplomatic and consular personnel of
the United States the protection,pnvilcges and immunities to which
they areentitled undcr the treatiesin forcetweenthe two States,and
other general international law,includingimmunity from any form of
criminaljurisdiction and freedomand facilitiesto leavethe territory of
Iran;
B. The Government of the United Statesof Amencaand the Government
of the lslamic Republicof Iran should not take any action and should
erisure that no action is taken which rnay aggravate the tension
betweenthe two countries or render the existingdispute more difficult
of solution76."
The response of the Governrnent of Iran was prompt and unambiguous: in
an interview on 17 December the Iranian Foreign Minister stated that the
"prefabricated verdict of the Court was clear to us inadvance; for this reason
Iran's Chargé d'Affaires at The Hague was ordered to oficially reject the
decision of The Hague Court"77.
At the request of the United States, the United Nations SecuriiyCouncil met
again in late Decemberto considermeasuresto betaken to induceIran to comply
with its international obligations. At the Council's meeting of 29 December
Secretary of SvateVance noted that "the United States Government has, with
determination, persistenceand patience,pursuedeverypeacefulchannelavailüble
to On 31 December 1979,the Security Counciladopted resolution 461:
"TheSecurityCouncil.
Recallingits resolution 457 (1979)of 4 Dczernber 1979,
Recallingnlso the appcal made by the President of the SecurityCouncil,
on 9 November 1979(S/13616), which wasreiterated on 27November 1979
(5113652),
Cravety cconcernedover the increasing tension bctwecn the lslamic
Republic of lran and the United States of Arnenca caused by the seizure
and prolonged detention of persons of United States nationality who are
king held as hostages in lran inviolation of international law, and which
could have grave consequencesfor international peace and security,
Tokingnole of the letters frorn the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Islamic Republic of Iran dated 13 November 1979 (Sl13626) and 1
Deceniber 1979(SI13671) relating to the grievancesand statemcnts of his
Government on thc situation,
Recallingalso the letter dated 25 Novernber 1979frorn the Secretary-
General (S/13646)stating that, in hisopinion, the present crisisbetweenthe
Islamic Republicof Iran and the United Statesof America poses a serious
threat to international peace and security,
Takinginfouccounrthe Ordcr of the International Court of Justiceof 15
Deceniber1979callingon the Governrnentof the lslsrnicRepublicof Iran to
ensuretheimmcdiaterelease,withoutanyexception,ofal1personsof United
Statesnationality, who are beingheldashostagesin Iran (SI13697)and also
calling on the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the IslamicRepublicof Iran to ensurethat no action istaken
by them which will aggravate the tension betweenthe two countnes,
76UnitedSlares BiplonrafandConrufu SrtufinTehron ProvisioM nealsure.O?rcr of
1577Tehran Domestic Service. 1030GMT. 176-1Dec. 1979.as reportcdin FBIS. Daily
Refrr, 18 I3ec.1979,p. 3 (A&.47).
Statement by Secretary oî Slate Vance, 29 D1979(Ann.48).140 DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF
Further taking into accouni the report of the Secretary-Gcneral of 22
December 1979on developments of the situation (S/l3704),
Mindfil ofthe obligation ofStates to settle theirinternational disputes by
peaceful means in such a manncr that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered.
Conscious of the responsibility of States to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations,
1. Reafirrnsits resolution 457 (1979)in al1aspects;
Council resolution 457 (1979)and the Order of the International Court ofy
Justice of 15December 1979 (SI13697);
3. Urgenflycalls, once again, on the Government of the lslamic Republic
of Iran to releaseimmediatelyal1persons of United States nationalit being
held as hostages in Iran, to provide them protection and to allow tiem to
leave the country;
4. Reiterafesits request to the Secretary-General to lend hisgood offices
and to intensifyhiseffortswith a viewto assistingthe Council to achievethe
objectives calledfor in this resolution, and in this connection takes notef
his readiness to go personally to Iran;
5. Requesrs the Secretary-General to report to the Council on his good
officesefforts before the Council meets again;
6. Decidesto meet on 7January 1980in order to rcviewthe situation and,
in the event of non-cornpliance with this resolution, to adopt effective
measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter of the United Nations."
To date lran has not complied with the foregoing resolution.
K. Other RcsponsiveMeasures of the United States
The United Stateshas taken the followingadditional measures in responsc to
the actions for which iiholds the Government of the Islamic Republic of lran
responsible. On 10November 1979.President Carter directed Attorney-General
Civiletti to identify lranian studenis in the United States who are not in
compliance with the terms ortheir entry visas,and to take the necessarysteps to
commence deportation proccedings against those who are in violation of
applicable immigration lawsand regulations. On 12 November 1979,President
Carter ordered the discontinuation of al1oil purchases from lran for delivery to
the United States. On 14 November 1979,President Carter acted to block al1
official lranian assets in the United States, including both deposits in United
Statesbanks and deposits in roreign branches and subsidiaries of United States -
banks. (The order was entered in response to reports that the Government of
lran was about to withdraw its funds.) On 12December 1979,the United States
informed the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires in Washington that the number of
personnel assigned to the lranian Embassy and consular posts in the United
States would be limited to a maximum offifteen at the Embassy and fiveat each
consular post. Compliance with such restrictions was, i~ general, to be com-
pleted within five days (but in fact was not). The limitations will be in force as
long as United States nationals are held hostage in Iran. PART III
THE JURlSDlCTlON OF THE COURT
The jurisdiction of the Court in this case is based LiponArticlc 36, paragraph
1,of the Statute of the Court' and the followingprovisions ofireaties in force to
which the United States and Iran are parties, each of which provides an
independent and sufficicnt basis for the Court's jurisdiction:
(1) Article 1of theOpiional Protocol concerning the Cornpulsory Settlement of
Disputes, 500 UNTS 241, accompanying the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations ol 1961,500 UNTS 95;
(2) Article 1of the Opiional Protocol conccrning the Compulsory Settlernentof
Disputes, 596 UNTS 487, accompunying thc Viennri Convention on
Consular Relaiions of 1963,596 UNTS 261;
(3) Article XXI, parügraph 2,oftheTreaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights bctwcen the Unitcd Siaies and Iran, signed on 15August
1955,784 UNTS 93; and
(4) Article 13,paragraph 1,of the Convention on the Preveniion and Punish-
ment of Crimes Against Internaiionally Protected Pcrsons, Including
Diplomatic Agcnls, donc at New York, 14Decernber 1973, TIAS No. 8532.
A. The Optional Protucolsto theVienna Conventionsun Diplomatic and Consular
Relations Affordthe Court Jurisdiction
The United Statc5 and Iran are both parties IO ihe Vicnna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and to the nccompanying Optional Protocol
concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. Article 1of the Optional
Protocol reads as follows:
"Disputes arising oui of thc interpreiation or applicatiof the conven-
tion shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an
application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present
Protocol."
Thc United States and Iran are also partics to the Vienna Convention on
Consulür Relations or 1963 and tc,ils accoinpanying Opiional Protocol
concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. Article 1 of the latter
Protocol is identical in its tcrms to Articlc 1of'the Optional Protocol to the
Conventioii on Diplomatic Relations. Indeed, the two Optional Protocols are
identical throughoui save for necessarychanges in titles and dates. 11is therefore
convenient to discuss thc two protocols togethet, always bcaring in rnind,
however, that each provides an independent bais fi>rthe Court's jurisdiction.
'Article 16 (1) of thCourt's Statuleprovidesthat the jurisdictionothe Court
encompasses "almattcrsspcciallyprovidedfor... in ireaiandconventionsin force".
TheUnitcdStates and Iran are, MembersoftheUnitedNations,partiesto theStatute.142 DlPLOMATlC AND CONSULAR STAFF
Article I is truaymode1compromissory clause providing, as the Court noted
in paragraph 17 of its Order of 15 Decernber 1979,"in the clearest manner for
the compulsory jurisdiction" of the Court over any dispute arising out of the
interpretation or application of the Vienna Conventions2.
1. PREREQU~ SITTEESCOURT' JURISI>ICTION
There are only two prerequisites to the Court's jurisdiction under Article 1:
(1) there must be a "dispute";
(2) the dispute must arise out of the "interpretation or application" of the
Convention to which cach of the Optional Protocols respectively relates.
If these two conditions are satisfied, either party to the dispute may confer
jurisdiction upon the Court by simply filing a unilateral application.
There can be nodoubtof the existence of a "dispulc" in this case. Asheld by
the Permanent Court of International Justice in MavrornmatisPalestine Conces-
sions,JudgmentNo. 2, 1924,P.C.I.J., SeriesA. No. 2 at p. II, "A dispute is a
disagreement on a point of fact or law, a conflict of legal views or of interests
between two persons". The facts in the instant case dramatically demonstratc
the existence of such a disagreement or conflict between the United States and
Iran+As set forth in the Statement of the Facts, from the very hour when the
United States Embassy was attacked, the United States has repeatedly de-
manded that lran protect the Embassy, preserve the inviolability of Embassy
personnel, and take such other action as is required of receiving States under the
Vienna Conventions. A îormal protest of Iran's conduct was to have been
presented by the special envoy of the President of the United States, former
Attorney-Gcneral Ramsey Clark, but he was denied entrance to Iran.
Iran has continued to refuse to conform its behaviour to the requirements of
the Vienna Conventions and general international law. The Government of lran
actually has endorscd, approved, and sought advantage îrom the continuing
violation of the rightsfthe United Statesundcr these Conventions, in the tecth
of the publicly reiteratcd protests of the Government of the United States. There
can be no doubt that on 29 Novernber 1979, when the United States filed ils
Application instituting proceedings before this Court, there existed a "dispute"
between the two States within the meaning of Article 1 of the Optional
Protocots. That dispute persists to this day.
Moreover, the dispute plainly anses, in part, from the "interpretationor
application" of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.
The United States claims that Iran's conduct violates Articles 24, 25,26, 27,
29, 31, 37, 44, and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and
Articles 5, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, and 72 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. If Irün had disputed these claims, there would obviously be
TheclarityandprecisionofArticlidenvesfrom itsorigininthe workoftheInstitule
of InternationaLaw under the leadershipof the late Professor Paul Guggenheim,
Rapporteur for the Insiiiute'sCommissionon Draftinga Madel Clause Conferring
CompulsoryJurisdictionon the InternationalCourtofJusticc.Article1,rollowingin ihis
LawpofthetSea.isdrawndirectlyrromthe textrecomrnendedtby9the Instituteat 1956
sessioninGrenada. Sec Annuoirede /'Insiilutde DroirIrtrernnrSessionde Grenade.
1956,Vol.46.ai360-62,365-67.Thetext oftheOptionalProtocolto the 1958Lawofthe
SeaConventionsmaybe found at 450UNTS 169; thedebt,owedby the 1958Optional
Protocolto theworkof the lnstitutewasacknowledgedexplicitbythe Swissdelegation
whichproposed thetext. SeeUnitedNationsConferenceon the,Lawof the Sea,Oficial
Records,Vol. IIUN doc. A/CONF.13/38at 111,A/CONF.l3/BUR/L,3, reprintedas
Annex 1to AICONF.131L.24. MEMORIAL 143
a "dispute" as to the "interpretation or application" of the two Conventions.
The faci that Iran hris not made any atternpt to justify its conduct as lawful
under the C:onventionsdoes not deprivethe dispute of its characier asa dispute
cirising frotn the "interpretation or application" of the Conventions. Whilc
Iran's apparent failurc to advance any plausible alternative construction of the
relevant treaty provisions is further token of the flagrantJdisregard by the
Government of that country for its international obligations ,the fact remains
that the present dispute arises directly from Iran's refusai to carry out its
conventional obligations and is thus within thc scopeof Article 1of the Optional
Protocols. The Pcrmancnt Court of International Justice observed that not only
is "application" a "wider, more elastic and less rigid term than 'execution', but
also 'execution'...isa form of 'application'". (Foctory ai ChorzBw,Jurisdiction.
JudgmentNo. 8, 1927,P.C.J.J., Series A, No. 9,at p. 24.)Nor does the fact that,
in Iran's view, thc prcsent dispute bears some rclation to alleged gricvanccs of
Iran against the Unitcd Statcs remove the present dispute from the scopc of the
Optional Protocols. In paragraph 25of its Order of 15 Dccember 1979 thc Court
itself characterized the prcsent dispute as one:
". .. wfiichconcerns diplornatic and consular prcmises and the dctcntion of
internationally protcctcd persons and involvestlreinterpretation or applica-
tion of multilureral conrentions codifiting the international lan*governittg
diplonluticand consulurrelations ..."(italics added).
While the Court's dccision of 15 Dccember does not, of course, prcjudge the
question of the Court's jurisdiction to rule on the merits, the validity of the
Court's charactcrization can hardly be contestcd.
The two prerequisites to the Court's jurisdiction under Article I of the
Optional Protocols having been satisfied-i.e.. that there is a "dispute" bctwccn
the Parties over the "intcrptetation or application" of the Vienna Conven-
tions-the United Statcs was and isentitled, under the expressterms of Article i,
io invoke the jurisdiction of the Court in the present dispute by unilateral
application. The Application of the United States was filed in conlomity with
havingjurisdiction over the dispute, Iraniwill be bound by any judgment of the
Court upon it. As Professor Briggs has written in rclation to Article I of the
Optional Protocols:
"The excellence of thc clause that certain disputes 'shall lie within
(relevtlnt de)the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice', to which States parties to the OptioncilProtocols agrecin Article 1,
lies in the fact that it clearly establishes thc jiirisdiction of the Court in
relation10 a respondentState which has becornebound bysuch a clauseif
an application is filed against it." (H. Briggs,"The Optional Protocols of
Gcneva (1958) and Vienna (1961, 1961) concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes", in Reczreild'Eiulies de Droit International en
Hommugeà Paul Guggenheim,p. 628 at p. 634 (1 968).)
The Court müy thus proceed to considcr the rncrits of the Unitcd States
case against Iran in so far as it relates to the Viennii Conventions of 1961and
1963.
' To theextentthat any of theIranianstaternentquoted in thepreviousPart may be
taken toadvance aconstructionof theseprovisionsalvariancewiththat advanccdby the
UnitedStates,thechüractcrof thepresentdispute üs one involvingtheinterpreiationor
applicationtithe Conventions isonly emphasized.144 DlPLOMGTlC AND CONSULARSTAFF
2.THE NATURA LND ORDINARM YEAKIN OGFTHE OPT~ONA PL OTOCOLS
As indicated above, the United States is of the view that the case for the
Court's jurisdiction under Article 1of the Optional Protocols is clcar, simple,
and unanswerable. The natural and ordinary rneaning of the terms of A1ofcle
the Protocols being clear, this Court should give effect to them. As the Court
declarcd in Cornpetenceof ~heGeneralAssemblyfor ~heAdmissionoj'a S~UIPto
the UnitedNalions, AdvisnryOpinion,I.C.J. Reports 1950p. 4 ap. 8:
"The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a tribunal
which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to
endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in
the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their natural and
ordinary meaning make sense in thecontext, that is an enthematter ...
When the Court can give effect to a provision of a treaty by giving the
words used init their natural and ordinary meaning, it rnay not interpret the
words by seeking to give them some other meaning."
3. POSSIBLA RGUMENT AGAINSTTHE COURT JS RISDICTI ONDEK THE
OPTIO NL PROTOCOLS
It rnay behelpful to theCourt, in the light of the provisions of Article 53of the
Statute, for this Mernorial to address certain argumentwhich might con-
ceivably be raised against the Court's jurisdiction under the various titles of
jurisdiction upon which the Unitcd States relies4.
The principal argument against jurisdiction would probably be, in essence,
that the United States Application was prematurely filed, that the Court is
without jurisdiction for that reason, and that the case should therefore be
dismissed. Such an objection would have to rest on an interpretation of Articles
II andIII of the Optional Protocols to the effect that no application to the Court
rnay bc made before the expiration of a period of two months frorn the datc on
which one party notifies the other that a dispute exists5. Under this interpreta-
tion, it would be contended that during the specified two-month periothe
parties are obligated to explore the possibility of resort not to the Court, but
instead to arbitration (Article II) or conciliation (Article III);and that the Court
lacks jurisdiction over a dispute within the literal terms of Art1cif the
application instituiing proceedings is filedprior to the expiration ofthe said two-
In viewof the disadvantageunderwhichthe UnitedStateslaboursin attempting to
anticipateunarticulatedargumentswhich mightadeagainst theCourt'sjurisdiction,
the UnitedStateswouldrespectfullyrequestthat, beforethe makesa decisionon
any groundno1addressedinthis Mernorialor addressedin a mannernot satisfactoryto
the Court. the Court permitthe UnitedStatesthe opportunity toaddressthat ground,
eitherby wayof aritten submissionor oral presentationto the Court.
ArticleIIprovides:
"The partiesayagree,withia periodoftwomonthsafter oneparty hasnotified
its opiniontheother that a disputeexists,to resortncitto the InternationalCourt
ofJusticebut to an arbitral tribunal.Afterthe expiry ofthed, either party
may bring the disputebcftheCourt byan application."
ArticleIIprovides:
"1.Within the same priod of two months, the partrnayagree to adopa
conciliationprocedurebeïoreresortingto the InternatiorialCourt of Justice.
2.Theconciliationcammissishallmakeitsrecomrnendationswithinfivemonths
aftcr its appointment.If its recommendationsare not acceptedrtiesto the
disputewithin twomonthsftertheyhavebeendelivered.eitparty rnabringthe
dispute before theCoubyan application." MEMORIAL 145
month period. Under this approach the application would have tobedismissed
even if(aspredictably willbe true here) the two-month pcriod has in Faetexpired
before the case is heard by the Court and notwithstanding the failureof the
parties to agree on-or even discuss-any other rnethod of settling the dispute
during that period.
In its specific application to the instant case the argument woutd be that,
inasmuch as the Application of the United States was filed on 29 November
1979,prior to the expiration ofwo months from the eariiest date, 4 Novernber,
on which itmight be held thüt the United States notified Iran of the existence of
a dispute, the Application was premature and should be dismissed, notwith-
standing the uncontesied facts (a) that al no time prior to 29 Novernber or
indeed to date has Iran indicated a willingness to subrnit the dispute to
arbitration or conciliation, (b) thai lran has in fact çontinually refurodhave
any direct contact with represcntatives of the United States airned at resolving
the dispute, and (c) that, by thc time the case is ready for hcaring by the Court
in accordance with the schcdule set in the Court's Order of 24 December 1979,
more than two months willhave elapsed from the Iartsfdate, 29 Novcmbcr, on
which it conceivably might bc held that the United Statcs notificd lran of the
existenceof a dispute.
Each step in the forcgoing argumcnt resls on fallacious premises.
ArticlesII and II1do not rcquirc a two-month waiting period prior to resort
to the Court under Article 1. Instcad, these articles simply point out to the
parties the possibility,{fthey mutually so desire and agree, of resorting to
arbitration or conciliation in preference to submission of the dispute by
unilateral application tothc Court. The critical clause of Articles 11and III is
purely permissive-"the parties muy agreeM-and contains no mandatory
element. This is language which empowers, not language which obligates. The
esscntial purpose which emerges rrom the language and structure of Articles 1,
II, and III was thst of makidgclcar that a party which in good hith exploresthe
possibilityof resort to arbitration or conciliation, or eaeparty which accepts
such an approach in principle subjeci to the negotiation of an acceptable
coniprunlis,docs not thereby waive itsnght to apply to the Court iT final
agreement on a conlpromis is not reacbed. As Mr. Ruegger has written in
connection wilh the Optional Protocols:
"Ce protocole est souplc-dans l'esprit de la résolutionde l'Institut-il
prévoit l'arbitrageiacôtédc la juridiction et fait Cgalcmcnlune place aux
autres méthodeséprouvéesde règlementde diffdrends. Mais, ce qui est
i'essenliei, il est vruinient obligu~oirelaissantaucune ichuppatoire de
procédure." (Ruegger, "Clauscs arbitrales et tie juridiction," in Recueil
dëtud~s de droit internariotirilen hommageà Paul Cuggrnheim, at pp. 687,
695 (1968)) (Italics added.)
This purpose isconfirmcd by .the relevant historical contexAs has already
been mentioned, theOptional Protocols to the Vienna Conventions of 1961and
1963were rnodetlcd after the 1958Optional Protocol to the 1958Conventions
on the Law of the Sea. Thesc conventions werc arnong the first of the
codificationconventions adopted undcr United Nations auspiccs,and there was,
in this context, a particularsignificance to defining the role of the Court in
relation to these conventions. There had been a considerable body of opinion,
expressed for example by some membcrs of the Institute of International Law
during the course of the Institute's work on a mode1 clausc conferring146 DlPLOMATiCAND CONSULAR STAFF
compulsoryjurisdiction on the Court6, that the International Court of Juslice,
as the principaljudicial organ of the United Nations, should be the soleforum
for the settlement of disputes relating to the interpretation or application of
general multilateral conventions. This point of view did not prevail, it being
considered that the interest of the international community in the uniform
interpretation or application of thesetexts did not justify such an extraordinary
limitation on the right of the parties mutually to agree to settle their dispute
resorting to other fora. Against the background of this debate, it is not at al1
surpnsing to find that the Optional Protocols includeclauses expresslypreserv-
ing freedom of choice of the parties. By making clear that a party which had
been engaged for two months in an effort to agree finaliy on arbitration or
conciliation nonetheless retained itsnght toapply to the Court in the eventsuch
efforts did not reach fruition, the Protocols closed a possibleloophole in their
comprehensive systemof third-party dispute settlement. Clausesof this intent
clearlydo not have the effectof limiting the right conferred in unqualifiedterms
in Article1.
The loregoinganalysis-which, ithe viewof the United States,conclusively
establishes the jurisdiction of the Court under the Protocols to the Vienna
Convention-is reinforced by two further considerations. First, the Preambles
to the Protocols demonstrate the intent of the Protocols to make recourseto the
Court unconditional and not dependent upon joint piirsuit by the parties of the
options of arbitration or conciliation.They provide:
"Expressieg their wishto resortinal1matters concerning them in respect
of any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the
Convention to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice,unlesssome orherform of se!flcmenf has been agreed uponby the
parties withiriareasonable period ..." (Italics added.)
In this case the United States waited more than three weeksfrom the lime the
dispute arose before filingan Application in this Court-surely a "reasonable
period" given the circumstances. Second, the texts of the Protocols in iheir
officiallanguagesother than Englishcorrespond to the plain meaning whichthe
English imports, thus demonstrating, perhaps even more pointedly than the
English itself,that recourseto arbitration or conciliationisa mereoption subjcct
to mutual agreement. (The French, Spanish, Russian and Chinese texts are
reproduced in Annex 49.)
The legislativehistoriesof the twoOptional Protocolsof Vienna,as in the case
of the Optional Protocol of Geneva, contain further demonstration that there
was no intent to require an automatic waiting period of two months prior to
resort to the Court.At each of the conferenceswhichadopted theseProtocols, a
See,e.g.,theviewsexpressedduringthe 1956 sessionofthelnstitutby Mr. Giraud,
Annuaire de l'lnsrirurde droit inlernaiiSessiondeGrenade, 1956,atp. 185;by Mr.
Hambro, ibid.atp. 190;byMr. Rolin,ibid.at pp.199-200;andprior tothe 1954session
by Mr.Jenks, Annuairede I'lmri~urde droit inrernarSessiond'Aix-en-Provenc e,54,
at p. 376.
Thedesirabilityordraitingaclauseinsuch a mannerasto preservethefiexibiliof the
NationsConferencedvontDiplornaticIntercourseand ImmunitiesO,ficiul Records,Vol. 1,
UN doc. A/CONF.20/14at p. 220 (MT.Hu, China);UnitedNationsConference on
ConsularRelations O,flciaiRecor Vdol.I,UNdm. A/CONF.25/16 at254(Mr.N'diaye,
Mali);UnitedNationsConference on the Law of the SeaOficial Records,Vol.II,UN
doc. A/CONF.13/38at 8 (Mr. Ruegger,Switzerland); ibid.at p. 9 (Mr. Verzijl,
Netherlands). MEMORIAL 147
proposa1 was prcsented which woutd clearly have required an attempt to
arbitrateor conciliate thedispute pnor to resort to theCourt, and in each case
the proposal was rejected,as indicated below.
At the \rienna Conference on Consular Relations in 1963,the following
proposal was prcscnted by Switzerland:
"Any disputc betweencontracting partics coricerningthe interpretation
or ao~lication of this convention which cannoi. be settled bv neeotiation
shali be submitted to arbitration al the request of one of the parties. If
within the six rnonths which followthe date of the request for arbitration
the partiesdo notsucceedin agreeingon thc organization of the arbitration,
any one of them may submit the dispute to the International Court of
Justice by rnaking an application in conforrnity with the Statute of the
Court." (UN doc. A/CONF.25/C.l/L.161, reprinted in United Nations
Confererice on Consular Relations, Oflcial Records. Vol. II, UN doc.
A/CONF.25/ l6/Add. 1,at p. 72.)7
The contrast io ihc tex1finallyadopted could not bc clearcr.
It is particularly significantnot only that the Swiss twas rejected,but also
that one of the text'sfeatures singledout for criticismby severaldelegates was
the requireinent of sixmonths' delay prior to the Mingof an application to the
Court 6.
The histary of the OptionalProtocol ta the Vienna Convention on Diplornatic
Relations revcals risimilar story. The Internütional Law Commission draft
articleson diplomatic relations, which werebefore the 1961Vienna Confercnce
on Diplornatic lntcrcourse and Immunities, included in the body of the
proposed convention a proposed Article45 on the settlemcntof disputes which
likewisemade obljgatory a prior attempt to resolvethe dispute by arbitration or
conciliation:
"Any dispute bctweenStatesconcerningthe intcrpretation or application
of this Convention thatcannot besettled throueh didomatic channels shafl
berefeicd to conciliation orarbitration or, fail& th, shall,at the request
of either of the parties, be submitted to the International Court of Justice."
(UN doc. A/CONF.20/4, reprinted in United Nations Conference on
Diplornatic Intercourse and Immunities, Oficiu Rlecords, Vol. II, UN doc.
A/CONF.Z0/14/Add. f al p. 7.)
A,Japaneseamendment to the Commissiontext would have further emphasized
the requirement of a prior attempt to arbitrüte or conciliate the disputeg.
' Paragraph2 of theSwissproposalreadas follows:
"2.Anycontrüctingparty maya ,tthetirneofsigningorratifyingthisconventioor
oracceding thcrcro, dcclateat it doesnotconsideritselfbounby paragraph I of
witharespst Ioanycontractingpartywhichhasformulatedundsuchahresemation."ph
TheSwissproposalwas,thus,a disputesettlementclauseof thc"opt-out"varietyrather
than the "opt-in"typefinallyadopted.
A/CONF.IS/16tiats255I(statemeniof'MI.Evansla(United Kingdom),Mr. Ericey O'Shea.
(Sgain),Mr. Bartos(Yugoslavia)).
Acceptanceofthe Japaneseproposa1wouldhavercsultcd in thefollowingtext:
"Any disputcbetweenStatesconcerning theinierprctationand applicatiof this
conciliationrtarhitratioIf thedisputeshouldnot besettledby thesaidmeans,dit
shall,atthe requestîcitherofthepartiesbesubmittedto thelnternationalCourtof
Justice."148 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULAR STAFF
(A/CONF.20/C.1/L.307/ NReiverlof)these versions, however, was actu-
ally adopted. Although the major question in relation to dispute settlement was
whether 10 includc a cornpulsory dispute settlemcnt provision in the body of the
Convention or instead to adopt an Optional Protocol, the Conference clearly
would have had no difficulty in devising language which, if included inthe
Optional Protocol, would have required a prior aticmpt to resolve the dispute by
arbitrationor conciliation. Against this background, the absence of any such
requirernent in the text actually adopted in the Optional Protocol takes on
compelling significanceLO.
The records of the 1958United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sca are
also instructive inhis regard. As already noted, the Optional Protocol adopted
in 1958 was expressly recognized to be the mode1 for the Optional Protocols of
Vienna of 1961, A/CONF,20/C .jL.316 and Add.1 (joint proposai ofIraq, Italy,
Poland, and the United Arab Republic), reprinted in United Nations Confer-
ence on Diplornatic Intercourse and Immunities, Oficia Records, Volume II,
UN document A/CONF.20/14/Add.l at 46;which inlurn was the mode1 for the
Optional Protocol of 1963, A/CONF.25/C. l/L. 162 (proposa1 of Belgium);
A/CONF.25/C.J/L (o1n63proposal of Ghana and India),both reprinted in
United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, Oflcial Records,Volume II,
UN document A/CONF.25/16/Add.l at 72. The history of the 1958 Optional
Protocol highlights in particularly illuminating fashiothe absence of a man-
datory waiting pcriod in the text finally adopted oin those rnodelled upon it.
Among the proposals before the Conference was a very detailed proposal by
the Netherlands providing for resort to the Court or alternatively to arbitration
al the option of rither of the parties1Of particular importance in the present
context is thelangulige contained in paragraph 3 of the Dutch proposal:
'O It should be noted, rnoreover,that the United States proposed an amendment to the
Commission text which would have deleted the sequeniial feature of the original,
unadopted draft article. (UN doc. A/CONF.2O/C.l/L.299, reprinted in United Nations
Conferenceon Diplornatic Intercourse and ImmunitiOfici Ralcords. ol.II, UN doc.
A]CONF.20]14)Add.l at p. 43.)China, too criticizedthe pnority givenin the Commission
text to conciliation or arbitration overjudicial settlement.(United Nations Conferenceon
Di lornatic Intercourse and Immunities,Vol. 1,UN doc. A/CONF.20/14at p. 220.)
P TLhe ter1 of this proposal (A/CONF.13/BUR/L.6), reprinted in United Nations
p. 112,was in pertinent part as follows:cords, Vol. Il, UN doc. A/CONF.13/38, at
"1. Ifa dispute arisesbetweentwo contracting parties concerningthe interpretation
or application of this convention which crtnnot be settled through the diplornatic
channel, cither of them rnay either refer the dispute to the International Court of
Justice by unilateral request in conformity with the Stüttitç of the Court, or submit it
to arbitral settlement by a tribunal composed of fivemembers,only twoof which may
be appointed by the parties.
arbitration, it shallbebound to designateitsarbitrator whcn notifyingthe other party
of such prcference. In this case, the other party shall be bound to accept arbitration
and to designatc ils arbitrator within a period of onemonth.
3. Ifacontracting party intends to apply to the Internütional Court of itstice,
shall give the other party one month's advnoticeof thatintention in order ~har
the latter may have an opportunity of expressing ils preference for recourse to
arbitraiion. Should that other party prefer recourse Ioarbitraiion, it shallbebound to
designate its arbitrator when indicating such preference. If the defending party does
not designate the arbitrator within the specifiedtime, the plaintiff party may submit
the dispute to the International Court of Justice by unilaleral request. Should!
however, the defending party duly designate its arbitrator, then the plaintiff party
shall be bound, within a further period of one rnonth. likewise to designate an
arbitrator." MEMORIAL 149
"If a contracting party intends to apply to the lnternational Court of
Justice,it shall give the other party one monih's advance notice of that
intention inorder that the latternayhave an opportunity of expressingits
preference for recourse to arbitration. Should that other party prefer
recouix to arbitration, it shall be boundIO dcsignate its arbitrator when
indicating such preference. 1f the defending party does not designate the
arbitriitor within the spscified time, the plaintiff party rnay submit the
dispute to the International Court ofJusticc by unilateral request."
This Dutcl~langiiagcwould have made it crystal clear that aparty would have
no right to bnng a case before the lnternational Court until the expiration of the
specified timc pcriod. But the Dutch proposal, prcscnted for inclusion in the
body of one or morc of the Conventions, failed to be adopted, the Conference
prererring inslead to adopl an optionat protocol as proposed by Switzcrland.
(United Nations Confcrenceon the Law ofthe Sea, Oficial Records,Vol.II,UN
doc. A/CONF.13/38 at pp. 33, 35.)While it was natural enough that the Swiss
draft served thercaftcrasthe basis of the Drafting Cornmittee'swork (UN doc.
A/CONF.13/L.40), the Committec made no use of the foregoing language from
the Dutch proposa!, language which sureiy would havecommended itselCto the
committec had the idea of a mandatory waiting period bcenconsidered desirable
by thc Confcrcncc. Instcad, the Conference adopted s text whichprovided in
Articlc 1for an unqualificd right to resort to the Court and which physically,as
well as conceptually, scparated this right from thc time periods specificd in
Articles II and 111.In so doing, the Conference was fàithful to the spirit of the
lnstitute of International Law, which prepüred thc lcxt which became ArticleI
of the Optional Protocols and whose purpose w;is to draft
"une solution qui ktablissela compétence dcla Cour internationale de Jus-
tice aussiompléiementet aussi rapidement quc possible. .."(Annuairede
f'lnstifiir de droit international, session d'Aix-en-Provence, 1954,Vol. 45,
at p. 314 (Report of Professor Guggenheim).)
For al1of the foregoing reasons the United States maintains that procredings
in this Court mny bc unilaterally institured under Article 1of the Optional
Protocols at any lime after a dispute of the appropriate character fias arisen.
Moreovcr, cven if this compclling construction of the Protocols were not
acceptcd by thc Court, the United States conicnds, as sct forth below, that
jurisdiction would nevcrthelcss existnder the Protocols in the circumstancesof
this case.
As indicated above, aparkyseekingto deîeai khisCourt'sjurisdiction in this
case would presumably argue that Articles II and III of the Optional Protocofs,
when read together with Article 1,create a required twa-month waiting period;
the theory wauld bcthat in a dispute between A and B, if A wanted to file an
imrnediateApplication to this Court and B preferred arbitration or conciliation,
Articles II and 111would preclude A from filing its Application until the two
months' waiting period had expired.
in suchopiisituiition the potential applicant would retain the right to rcject
arbitration or conciliation and thus the right to insist upon proceeding in this
Court. Tfiat bcing sa, the only right enjoyed by his opponent undcr such an
interpretation of the Optional Protocols is a right, existing for a maximum of150 DlPLOMATlCAND CONSULARSTAFF
two months, to try to convincethe potential applicant that he should agreeto
arbitration or conciliation in preference to resort to the Court. That is, if the
potential respondent reallywishesin good faith to proceed by wayof arbitration
or conciliation, he should be given, orguendo, a two-month opportunity to
pursue that goal. It by no means followsthat the sarneright should be enjoyed
by one who has no inierest whatever in either arbitration or conciliation. Quite
the contrary, it would be cornpletelyanornalous to allow such a party to insist
upon a two-month waiting period and to scck dismissal of a premature
Application on the ground that the applicant should have afforded the
respondent a two-month opportunity to pursue agoal inwhich the respondent
in fact had no interest whatever. Such a rule would allow every violator of
international law an automatic period of freedorn frorn litigation without any
justification whatever and totally without regard to the urgency, if any, of the
applicant's need for judicial relief.
For these reasons itcould not justifiably be contended here that lran was
entitled to a Iwo-month period of grace before the United States filed its
Application. The fact is that lran was made aware of the existence of adispute
betweenthe parties as early as 4 November 1979.On ihat date the Government
of Iran knewof the seizure ofthe Embassyand its personnel and was obviously
aware that if it permitted their detention to continue, a dispute with the United
States wouId necessarllyexist. On that date also the United States, through its
Chargéd'Affaires in Tehran, made repeated efforts to persuade responsible
Iranian officiais to protect the Embassy and its personnel and voiced repeated
protests against thcirfàilure to do so, thus clearly givingnotice of the existence
of the dispute. On 7 November 1979, the President of the United States
dispatched a special emissary to Tehran with instructions to deliver a formal
protest to Iran's failure to protect the Embassyand its personnel, and although
the protest could not actually be delivered (because the authorities in lran
refused to receive the special ernissary), Iran clearly knew a protest was
contemplated. The United States regards as indisputable the proposition that
Iran was on notice of the existence of a dispute at least as early as 7
November '2.
Thereafter the United States permitted more than three weeks to elapse
-weeks of extraordinary anxiety regarding the safety and well-being of the
hostages-before filingthe Application instituting procc~dingsin this case. The
United States thus allowed Iran more than a reasonable timc, pnor to the filing
of the Application, to givenoticeof a desirefor arbitration or conciliationif any
such desire existed. In fact, however,at no point during that three-weekperiod
did the Governrnentof Iran evincethe slightestinterest in resolvingthe dispute
by arbitration, conciliation or any other means. Indeed, lhroughout the entire
period from 4 Novernber 1979throughthedate of the lilingof this Mernorial the
12Two daysIatcr,Iranreceived direct,wntten noticeby meansof a communicationto
the Presidentof the SecuriiyCouncil,circulate10 al1United Nations Members. On9
November 1979, the Permanent Representativo ef the United Statesof Americato the
UnitedNations addressedthe followingletterto thePresidentof the SecurityCouncil:
"On4 November 1979,the Amencan Embassyin Tehran was occupicdand the
AmericanDiplornaticpersonnelon its premisesweretakenand heldby a groupof
Iranians.l1 elforts to securetheir release,includingan offer of discussions with
emissaries,haveso Pir beenunavailing.
This actionand the supportithas receivedstrikeal the fundamentalnoms by
wof internationalpeaceand securityandofcomitybetweenStates. tWe consequently
requestthat the Securiiy Council urgenonsiderwhai mightbedone tosecurethe
releasc of ihc diplomatic personnel being heldand to restorc the sanctity of
diplomaticpersonnel and establishments.(UN doc. S/13615.) MEMORIAL 151
Governrnent of Iran has made it continuously clear that it has no interest
whatever in the remediescontemplated by Articles II and III of the Optional
Protocols, and in such circumstancesIran could scarcelybe heard to argue that
the Court iswithoutjurisdiction becausethe Unitcd States failedto giveIran an
opportuniiy to pursue a remedy in whichit has admittedly hadno interestat any
tirnc.
Moreovcr, Iran's refusal to consider conciliation or arbitration-ornegotia-
tion, cnquiry, judicial settlement, or othcr paccful means of the parties'
choice-conflicts with its obligation under Articles 2 (3) and 33 of the United
Nations Charter, namely, to seille disputes by peaceful rneans.The holding of
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorz6w Factory case
accordingly is in point:
"It is, morcover, a principle generally sccepted in the jurisprudence of
international arbitration, as well as by municipal courts, that one Party
cannot avail himsclf of the fact thüt the other has not fulfilled sorne
obligation or has not had recourseto sornemeans of redress, ifthe former
Party has, by sornc illegal act, preventcd the latter from fuIfilling the
obligation inquesiion,or from havingrecoursc to the tribunal whichwould
havc becnopen to him." (Factory ut Chorzhiu.Jilrisdicfion,JudgmentNo. 8.
1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No.9,p. 31 .)
To hold ~hat in the instant circumstances an application filed before the
expiration 01'the two-month penod is premature ivould be to adopt an
interpretation which rewards unlawful coercion and penalizes respect for the
procedures of peacefulsettlement.
Even il thc Court wcre inclined to interpret Articles 1, II, and III of the
Optional Protocols as requiring a two-rnonth waitingpcriod for the benefitof a
respondent whogenuinelydesired arbitration or coiiciliation,adherence to thal
interpretation would not cal1for dismissal of the United States Application at
this stage of the proceedings-for reasans made clear in the decision of the
Permanent Court in thc Mavrommatiscase.There the Court rcjected a challenge
to its jurisdiction evcn though one of the instruments necessary to found
jurisdiction had not yet becn ratified whenthc GreekApplication in that case
was filed.'Theinstrument in question, Protocol XII of the Treaty of Lausanne,
was ratificd and cntered into force between the date the Application was filed
and the date the Court's judgment was rendered. The Court spoke in Lems of
direct relevanccto the present case:
"ln the same connection it must also be considcred whcther thevalidity
of the institution of proceedingscan lx disputed on the ground that the
application was filed before Protocol XII had becorneapplicable. This is
not the case. Evcn assuming that before thüt time the Court had no
jurisdiction because the international obligation referred to in Articl11
was not yet cffcctive.if wouldalways havebeenpossiblefor the applicont ru
re-submit hi.upplicationin thesame ternisufter the comingintoforce oJthe
Trelrtynj"I~lusunne ,nd inthal case,~henrgirr)tt?nitnquestion could not have
been~idvlincecl.venifthegrounds onwhichtheinstitu~iunofproceedingswas
based iveredefecri Jovrrthe reason sratecl.this wciuldno[be an adequate
reasoifor thelii.smissalf theapplicanlSsuir.The Court, whosejurisdiction
is international, is not bound to attach to matters of form the samedegree
ofimportancc whichthey mightpossessin municipallaw. Even.therefore,
the upplicutionwercpremature because /lie Treutyof Lousonnehadnoi yer152 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULAR STAFF
been ratified, this circumstance would now be covercd by the subsequent
deposit of the necessary ratifications." (MavromniatisPalestineConcessioris,
JudgmentNa. 2. 1924,P.C.I.J.,Series A, No. 2, p. 34.) (Italicadded.)
By parity of reasoning, even if the United States Application in this case were
prcmature because filcd prior to the expiration of two months [rom the date on
which notice given to Iran that a dispute existed, this temporary defcct has now
been rectified by the passage of time. Since Iran, as already shown, was
effectivelygiven nolicc of the existence of a dispute as early as 7 November, two
monthç have alrcüdy elapsed, and any ar uFble defect intheCourt's jurisdiction
on this account has alrcady been cured1 .
B. The Treaty of Arnity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Affords the
CourtJurisdiction
Article XXI (2) of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular
Rights between the United States and Iran provides:
"Any disputc between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpreta-
tion or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by
diplomacy, shall be submitted to the Interriational Court of Justice, unless
the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific
means."
The United States contends that this Article provides the Court withjurisdiction
over al1 claims of the United States arising under the Trcüty of Amity.
Moreover, thc case for the Court's jurisdiction under Article XX1 (2) is, if
anything, even clearer than under Article 1 of the Optional Protocols.
There arc four simple prerequisites to the Court's jurisdiction under Article
XXI (2):
(1) that there be a "dispute";
(2) that the dispute relate to the "interpretation or application" of theTreaty of
Arnity;
(3) that the dispute be one 'hot satisfactorily adjustcd by diplomacy"; and
(4) that there be no agreement to settlement of the dispute by some other
pacific means.
theexistenceofandisputeon 29Novemberevbywthefilinofnthe Application, thercsultwould
be the same. Inaccordancewith the scheduleset by the Court'sOrder of 24 Dccember
1979,morethan twomonlhswillhave elapsedfrom 29 Novcmbcr beforethiscase isready
for hearingby the Court. Hcnce,any action by the Court on the meritwillneccssanly
follow thecxpiry of thetwo-monthperiod.
Nothinginthe PermanentCourt'sholding inthe caseconccrningElecfricityConipanof
Sojaand BulgariawcakenstheauthorityoftheMovrommuiiscaseinthis regard. It itrue,
of course. that inElec~riciryComponv, the Court held thai itIackedjuflsdiclion in
circumstanceswhere lwil rcmedics hadnot beenexhausted priortothedateonwhichthe
applicationwasfiled.eventhoughsuchremedies had been exhaustedprior tothe Court's
reTworiconsideritionscrucialto the Courtin that casewerenot presentinMavromniatk
and arcnot presenthere.First,thelocalremediesruleisa rulehavingsignificancebeyond
that of a mere rule of procedure. Second, andeven more important, the instrument
conferringjurisdictionon theCourthad expiredvalidlyinacîordancewithits termsprior
to thedate on whichlocal rcmedieshad beenexhausted. Eltcrricity Companyof Sofiaand
Bulgoriu,Preliminary Objection, 1939,P.C.I.J., SerAIE, No. 77,p. 80. MEMORIAL 153
The first rcquircment need no( detain the Court. It has already been
demonstra~ed, if dcmonstration were necessary in the present circumstances,
that on 29 Novcmber 1979,there was a dispute betwcen the United States and
Iran and that the dispute persists IO this day. Nor is it necessary to dwell on the
requircrnent that the dispute relate to the interpretation or application of the
Treaty.
The United Statesclaims that Iran's conduct since 4 November has violated
its obligations, under Articles 11(4) and XIX of the Treaty, to ensure that US
nationals in Iran shall receive "the mosl constant protection and security", that
such naiionals shall, if placed in custody, receivc reasonable and humane
treatment, that thc United States shall havc the full opportunity to safeguard the
interests ol'such dctained nationals, and that suçh riationals, while in custody,
shallhavc fùllücccss to United Statcs consular oficials and scrviccs.ln addition,
the United States claims that the conduct of the Governmcnt of lran has
violated its obligations under Articles XII1 and XVIII ofthe Treaty pertaining
to consular rights, privilcges and immunities.
As prcviously pointed out with respect to the Vienila Conventions of 1961and
1963,if thc Govcrnment of Iran had made some contention in this Court that
the United States interpretation of the Treaty wiis incorrect or that the Treaty
did no1 apply 10 Iran's canduct in the manner suggested by the United States,
the Court would clearly be confronted with a dispute rclating to the "interpreta-
tion or application" of the Trcüty. That being so, the situation is obviously not
altercd by Iran's silence, and the sccond prerequisitc for jurisdiction is
necessarily met 14.
Cornphancc with the third and fourth prerequisites is equally clear. It is
indisputable that the pending djspule is one "no1 satisfàctorily adjusted by
diplornacy" and that the parties have made na agreement to settlcthe dispute by
other pacific means. All of the prerequisites to the Court's jurisdiction under
Article XXI (2) are ihus satisfied.
1tis,of course, truc that the text of Article XX(2)does not providcinexpress
terrns thateither party to a disputc.may bring the case to the Court by unilateral
application. II is. however, evident thai this is what the Parties intended. The
text of Articlc XXI (2) follows the text of similar clauses in 17 of the 21
commercial trcaiics concluded by thc United Statcs sincc the Second World
WarL5a ,nd this standard text haç ülwaysbeen understood by the United States
and its trcaty partncrs to confer a right of unilateral resort to the Court. Thus, in
connection with the United States Senate hearings on the first treaty containing
such aclausc, the Dcpartment ofStatcsubmittcd a niemorandum explaining the
clause and making clear that the clause confcrs a right unilaterally to resort to
the Court '6. Sirnikirexplanations have been given in connection with subse-
quent treaties containing this clause, and the Treaty with lran has bcen cited
"applicaiioti"lrom the textand that the UnitedStatessuccessfullyresistedthat sugges-
tion, precisely bccause the United Siatcs winted to avoid any narrowing of the
jurisdictioniprovision.(See Annex 50 IOthis Memorial.)
l5A cornpletelis1of treiiies of friendship,commerce,and navigationor comparable
agreementsto which the UnitedStatesisa partyandwhich containsuchclausesissetforth
inAnnex 51 to thisMemorial.Foursuchtreatieseithercontaina variationof theclauseor
do not reîerto thclntcrnationalCourt of Justicie theirdisputesettIcmcntprovisions.
'$The tex1 of this memorandumis includcd as Annex 52 to this Mernonal. The
Memorandiim isalsn printed inHeurin~s on a Treuty of Frienkhip, Commerce, und
Nur~iguiionI>etw.cthe UnilcdStale.sofAmr~ricundthe R<yublicof China,torelhertvith u
Pro~ocol~htsrcto.igned ai Nanking on Novemher4, 1946 Beforea Suhcommittr~of the
SenüreConrniitree oiForeignRelalion?;,80thCong., 2d Sess.,pp. 29. 30(1948).154 DlPLOMATlCAND CONSULAR STAFF
specifically as one of the treaties conferring sucha right ". Moreover, the other
parties to treaties containing such a clause have shared this understanding. For
example, during the course of negotiating the treaty with the Netherlands, the
Dutch Foreign Ministry requested confirmation of its understanding that the
clause provided a right of unilaterat resort to the Court. The United States
Ernbassy was authorized to respond in the following lems:
"Our understandingaccords with yours: namely, thatthe dispute referred
to in Article XXV paragraph 2 may be brought before the Court either by
the notification of a special agreement or, in the absence thereof, by
application of one of the PartiesIB."
It should be recalled that this Court has given weight to the intention of a
State-as it happens, Iran-in construing the scope of its adherence to the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36 (2). See Anglo-iranian Oil Co..
Jurisdic~ion.Judgmenr, I.C.J. Reports 1952, pp. 93, 104-107.
Iran is not, of course, bound by any understanding between the United States
and third countries. However, the fact that a single interpretation has been
uniformiy given to a particular form of words indicates that the interpretation is
the natural and authoritative meaning of the words, and this is plainly true of
Article XXI (2) of the Treaty of Amity. In fact, a construction which required
the agreement of the parties to submit a case to the Court woutd be contrary to
the sense of thetext,which speaks ofthe agreement of the parties only in relation
to alternative methods of peaceful settlement. Moreover, such a construction
would deprive the text of al1 meaning in violation of a basic rule of treaty
interpretation. It is thus clear that the Court has jurisdiction over this dispute
under Article XXI (2) of the Treaty of AmityL9.
l7See,e.g.,Departmentof State Mernorandumon Provisionsin CommerciatTreaties
relatingto theInternationalCourtofJustice(submittedinconnectionwithhcaringsonthe
treatieswith Belgiumand Vietnam), S. EXEC. REP.No. 9,87th Cong.,1stSess. 7-8.This
memorandumis reprinted as Annex 53 to this Memorial.
During the Senatehearinp on the treaty with Luxembourg, thefollowingexchange
took placebetweenthe Chairman of the SenateForeign Relations Committee and the
repreçentativeof the DepartmentOC State:
The Chairman: It[the disputessettlcmentclause]is a specificundertakingby this
country,inthe caseofa disputethat cannotberesolved,to aaepl thejurisdictionof
the Court.1sthat right?
Mr. Trezise:Yes.
The Chairman: Inthis casewearesayingthat in regardto thelimitedfieldcovered
by thistreatyweagreein advanceto submit unsettled disputesto the Court. 1sthat
right?
Mr. Trezise:Yes.
S. EXEC. REP. No. 7, 87thCong.,2d,Sess.,at p. 6(1962).
lBThe correspondencerclating to thisquestionisset out at Annex 54.
l9The Treaty of Arnityis today andwason 29 Novembera "treaty or conventionin
force"withinthe meaningof Article 36 (1)of the Court's Statute. Notwithstandingthe
undeniably poorstate of relationsbctweenthe UnitedStatesand Iran, neithersidehas
terminationwoutdrmnottbeheffectiveuntil one year after notice ofterminationhad been
given.Seealsothe ViennaConventionon the Law ofTreaties,Article 54.Anyatternptto
terminatethe Treaty would be without effecton the present proceedings,which were
institutedwhilethe Treatywasstillin eKect.SeeRighi ofPassage over InllianTerrilory,
PrefùninuryObjection, Judgmenr. I.C.J. Reporrs 1957, p. 125 ai p. 142; No~iebolini,
PreliminaryObjection.Judgmenr. I.C.J. Reporis 1953.p. IIIatpp. 122-123. MEMORIAL 155
C. The Conventionon thePrevenîionandPunishmentof Crimes Against
InternationallyProtectedPersons,IncludingDiplomatic AgentsA , ffordsthe
CourtJurisdiction
Jurisdiction also existsin the circurnstanccsof the instant case under Article
13,paragraph 1,of theConvention on the Preventionand Punishmentof Crimes
Against lnternationally Protected Persons, includingDiplomaticAgentsz0.The
United States concedes that Article 13-unlike, and by way of instructive
contrast with, the Optional Protocols or Article XXI (2)of the Treaty of Arnity
-gives priority to arbitration and ordinarily perrnits resort to the Court only if
the parties have been unable 10 agree on the org;~nizationof the arbitration
withina pcriodof sixmonths from the requestfor arbitration. The United States
contends, however,that this limitation on the Court'sjurisdiction can have no
applicatioii in circumstancessuch as these,where the party in whosefavour the
six months' rule would operate has by its own policy and conduct made it
impossiblcas a practical matter to have discussionsrelated to the organization
of an arbitration, or, indeed, even to communicate a direct forma1request for
arbitration. It is subrnitted that when such an attitude has been manifested, an
applicatiori ta the Court may be made withoui regard to the passageof time. It
wouldsirnplybeanomalous to hold that in a casewherejudicial reliefis urgently
neededby the applicant and the respondent has refused to allowany cornmuni-
cation between the parties, the latter is neverthelessentitled for six months to
hold off alljudicial redressbyreferringto another mode of settlementin whichit
has no intcrest whatever.
D. TheCaurtHasJurisdictionTo Grantthe ReliefSought by the United
State
Since.in the instant case,there isa dispute betweenthe United Statesand Iran
arisingout of theinterpretation or application of the four treaties on whichthe
United St:ites relies, sincc the Court has jurisdiction under those,treaties to
render judgment on sucha dispute, and sincethe remediessought by the United
States are appropnately addressed to the violations of those treaties by the
IslarnicRepublic of Iran, the United States respectfullysubmits that the Court
has jurisdiction to grant the reliefwhich itnow seeks.
20The full iext of Article 13 is as follows:
"1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation
request ofoneof them, be submitted to arbitration. If within sixmfromsthedatet the
of the request forarbitration the parties are unable to agreeon the organization of the
arbitrai.ioany one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court
of Justiceby requestinconformity with the Statutof the Court.
2. Each State Party rnay at ttime ofsignature or ratification of this Convention
or accession thereto decfare that it does not consider itselfbound by para1ofph
this article. The other States Parties not be bound by paragraph1of this article
with respect to any State Party which has madeuch a resewation." PART IV
THE CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES
TheGovernment of the lslamic Republicof Iran, through the actsof omission
and commissiondescribed in the foregoingStatement of the Facts, has violated
its international legalobligations to the United States in multipleand profound
respects.Thc violations arc of specificobligations undertaken in the following
treaties to which both lran and the United States are parties:
(1) the 1961Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,500 UNTS 95;
(2) the1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 596 UNTS 261;
(3) the 1973Convention on the Prcventionand Punishment of Crimesagainst
lnternationally Protectedersons,including Diplomatic Agents,TIAS8532(the
New York Convention); and
(4) the 1955Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
between the United States and Iran, 284UNTS 93 (the Treaty of Amity).
The violations involved are described in the sections that follow. Where
appropriate, the customary internationalawcodifiedby the transgressed treaty
vrovisions is summarized. However. before turnine to a statement of the
Obligations of Iran and the rcspccts in which those obligations have bcen
breached, the question of the rcsponsibilityof the Government of lran for the
conduct challenged in this caseill be addressed.
A. TheResponsibilityof lranfor theActsof Omission and Commissionof Which
the UnitedStates Cornplains
In the view of the Government of the United States, the violationsof
international lawwhichhave beencommitted by theGovernmcnt of the lslamic
Republic of Iran,and with respectto which its international responsibility has
been engaged, areof two kinds.
Thc Governmcnt of lran is rcsponsiblc, first, for its failures of omission.as
described in the Statementoc the Facts and sections that follow, which have
occurred irrespective ofany attribution to that Govcrnment of the conduct of
the "students" at the Embassy.Thus at the very onset of the hostage crisis the
Governmcnt of lran failed to take appropriate steps to protect United States
nationals and diplornatic and consular premisesfrom attack. As set forth in the
Statement of the Facts,Iranian security personnel at the Embassy compound
made no effortto deter the seizure;despite repeated, urgent requestsfor help, no
lranian sccurity forces were sentto provide reliefand protection, nor wercany
efforts made to rescue the personnel or to dissuade the invaders from thcir
actions. Moreovcr, at no pointsince the initial attack has the Government of
lran made any effort to secure thc protection and ensure the immunities of
United Statcs nationrils and prcrnises. It has taken no steps to enforce the
Embassy's right of frec communication, to facilitate departure of the official
personnel, to CO-operatein the prevention of the continuing crimes bcing
committed at the Embassy,or to apprehend the perpctrators ofuchcrimesand
to submit them to competent authorities for prosecution. The Government of
lran is rcsponsible forsuch omissions, whether or no1 it may also bc hcld
responsiblcfor the separate actions taken by the "students".
The United States Government also submits, however,that the internationalresponsibility of the Government of Iran is cngaged at yet anothcr levelas well.
The International Law Commission, in its draft articles on State responsibility
and in its conimcntary on those articles, has recognized that under certain
circumstances a Stütc rnay bear international responsibility for the conduct of
persons or groups of persons who do not constitute an organ of the State as
such. Article 8 of thc draft articles providcs as follows:
"The conduct of a person or group of persons shall ülso bc considered as
an act or the Stüte under international law if
(a) it is cstablished that such person or group of persons was in fact
acting on behalf of that Statc; or
(b) such pcrson or group of perçons was in fact exercisingclcmentsofthe
governmentiil authority in the absence of the official authorities and in
circunistanccswhich justifcd thc cxcrcise of those elements of authority."
(II Yecirbookof the Interna~ionuLl aw Corn»tiwion1974,Part One, p.283.)
The facis of ihis case are such that subsection (0)-and the principles of
customary international law which ilcodifies-may properly be invoked.
The principle expressed in subsection (u) is "practically undisputed" and
"unanimously upheld by the writers on international law who have dealt with
the question". (ILC Commentary on 1974 draft Article 8, ibid., p. 284.) As
expressed in the Commentary, thc subscction "refers to persons or groups of
persons who have committed certain acts whcn in fact prompted to do so by
organs of the State ..." (ibid., p. 283).The principle includcilsesinwhich the
organs of the Statc supplement their own action bythe action of private persons,
who thus act as "auxiliaries" of the State while remaining outside its official
structure. Sincc Lhiscase involves a form of abduction, it is also relevant that,
according to the Commentary, State practice with respect to abduction evi-
dencesa gcncral recognition ofthe principle that "if the person in questioncould
be proved to havc acted in concert with and at the instigation of the organs of a
State, the nction of abduction must bc rcgarded as an act of that State" (ibid.,
p. 284). The facts must establish "thüt the person or group of persons were
actually appointcd by organs of the State to discharge a particular function or to
carry out aparticular duty,that thcy pcrformed a giventask at the instigation of
those organs" (ihid., p. 285). In al1such cases the acts of the othenvise private
persons must "be rcgarded under international lawas acts of the State: that is to
Say, as ücls which may, in the event, becorne the source of an international
responsibility incumbent on the State" (ibid p. 283).
It is subrniitcd ~hatthe facts of this case show thal from and after a point in
time shortly after the attack and scizure, ir not before, the "students" havc
in fact becn acting on behalf of the Governrnent of Iran. Their persistence in
holding the hostages has been prompied by the governmcntal authorities who
have sought throughout the crisis to utilizethe "students" as "auxiliaries" in the
State's cfixt to coerce the United Statcs into meeting certain officia1Iranian
demands. The Government of Iran has, in cffeçt,"appojnted" the "students" to
discharge certain functions in pursuit of a foreign policyobjectiveof the lranian
Government, and the students have clearly acted "in concert with and at the
instigationor'the govcrnmental authority.
Atthough thc particular facts which lead to thcse conclusions have been
detailed abovc. ~hcymaybe brieflysummarized here.The continucd detention of
the hostages is and has been continuously stimulated by the numerous expres-
sions of i~ficial support, endorsemcnt and encouragement. The Ayatollah
Khomeini. the Revolulionary Guards, the public prosecutor, thejudiciary-al1
have openly and consistently supportcd the "students", and Khomeini has
rcfused to cal) upon the "students" to desist.The Foreign Minister has slated
that the documents seized by the "students" would be uscd bcfore a planned158 DlPLOMATlC AND CONSULARSTAFF
"international grand jury", a statement by a high government officiaiwhich
could only serve to prompt further violations of the archives and documents.
Indeed, the Revolutionary Guards-an organ of the Government-have
apparently on occasion gone beyond words and actually engaged in action
of a supportive nature, serving to protect the "hrothers" occupying the
Embassy and sharing control with the "students" over the United States
ConsulateinShiraz. At the sametime itisclcar thatthe "students", acting undcr
thecontrol of Khomeini,de foc10 Chjef of State, are being usedasan instrument
to realize one or more objectivesof lranian foreign policy. Indecd, Ayatollah
Khomeini has ordered the continued deteniion and arrest of the hostagesby the
"students".
In suchcircumstances,it is submitted, the Government of Iran has not sirnply
commiited acts of omission for which it is responsible; it must also take
responsibilityfor affirmativeactions taken by the "students" on behalf of the
Government of Iran itself '.
B. The Governmentof lran Has Violated, and Continues to Violate, Its Inter-
national LegalObligationto Ensurethe Inviolabilityof UnitedStates Diplomatic
Agents and Members of the Administrativeand Technical Staff of the United
States Embassy .
Pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations2
lhe Government of lran is under an international leeal obli~ation ta the United
States to ensure that the perçons of Unitcd States Qiplorniiticagents "shall be
inviolable" and that suchindividualsshall not be fiableto "any form of arresi or
detention". The Governrnent of Iran is obligated to treat everysuch diplomatic
agent with "due respect" and to take "al1appropriate stepsto prevcnt any attack
on his person, freedomor dignity". Article 37of the sameConvention provides,
subject to limitcd exceptionsnot here relevant, that the privilegesand immuni-
tics specified for diplomatic agents in Article 29 shall also be enjoyed by
mernbers of the administrative and technical staff of a diplomatic mission as
'There are indicationsthat the abilityof ~heAyatollah Khorneiniand thc Government
mayhave diminished in recentdays. The Government of the United States is unable tohran
predictwhetherthat situation, ifit exists,willcontinue or whethertheGovernmentof lran
willsoon bein a position(e.g.,after the rorthcomingelecofa newPresidentofIran) to
reassert the control which the Ayatollah Khomeiniand the Government of Iran exerted
overthe "students" for the firtwomonths of thecrisis. Aany rate,since it is factually
clear (asdemonstrated in the text) that the Ayatollah Khomeini andthe Governmcnt of
lran exertcdpractical control ovcr thc "siudents" for the firsttwo months of the hostage
crisis,theGovernment of Iran plainlybearsrcsponsibilityforthe actions ofthe "students"
dunng lhat period of time. Moreover, if it should become cleainthe future that the
responsibility for the actions of the "students", because throughout Novembcr andbear
Deoember 1979the Government knew or should have known that the "student" group
which it wassupporting and nurturing could easilyget out of control.
*Article 29 provides:
formof arrest or detention. The receivingState shali treat him with due respectand
shalltake al1appropriate steps to prevent any attacon his person, freedom or
dignity."wellas by the farnilicsof diplomatic agents and of administrativeand technical
staff3.
Article 79 was intended to confirm the principlc ofcustomary international
Iawof persona1inviolability of diplornatic agents. (ILC Commentary on 1958
draft Article 27, 11Yearbookof ilieInfernarionuli~w Commission1958,p. 97.)
The principle bas been called"the oldest establishedand the rnost fundamental
rule of diplomatic law". (E. Denza, DiplornoticLaw: Commentaryonthe Vicnnn
Conventiotion DiplornaticRefarinns,p. 135 (1976); seealso, Satow's Guide to
Diplornutic-Praclice,p. 120,5thed., edited by Lord Gore-Booth (19791.1As this
Court staied in paragraph 38 of its Order of 15 December 1979 indicating
provisional measurcsin this case,
"therc: is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations
betweenStatesthan thc inviolability ofdiplorneticenvoysand cmbassies,so
lhat throughout hislory nations of al1creeds and cultures havc obscrved
reciprocal obligations for that purpose; ... thc obligations thus assumed,
notably those for assuring the persona1 safety of diplomats and their
freedom from prosecution, are essenlia),unqualified,and inhercnt in their
reprcsentative character and their diplomütic function. . .".
Indeed, thc principleof persona1inviolabilityhas bccnviewedas the fundamen-
ta1 principle from which have been derivedal1diplomatic privileges and im-
munitics. (Harvard Research in International Law, Comment on Article 17of
Draft Convention on Diplornatic Privileges and Imrnunities, 26 American
Journal oj InfernotionolLuiu,p. 91 (Supp. 1932);G. E. do Nascimenlo e Silva,
Diplontucyin InternatirinulLaw. p.91 (1972).)
The ruic of the inuiolabiliiy of the diplomatic envoy, codifiedin Articlc 29,
was followed in early civilizations and was firmly established as a rule of
customüry international law whcn the first treatises on diplomatic law wcre
published in the sixteenth century. (E. Denza, op. cil.,p. 135. SC~~ISO C. E.
Wilson,DiplornaticPrivilegesand Immunities,p. 46(1967)) Theextensionof the
privilcges and immunities enjoyed by the head of a mission to the mission's
diplomütic staff was also wcll recognizcd undcr international law before
adoption of the Vienna Convention on Diplomütic Relations. (ILC Commen-
tary on 1958draft Article 36, 11Yearbook ofrhe InternulionalLaw Commission
1958. p. Ilil.) Asthe Commissiod'sCommentary makes clear, immuniticsof the
administrative and tcchnical staff equally are justified by the fact that it is the
function of the mission as a whole, rather rhan the work donc by each person,
that isdetçrminative. Many such persons "perform confidentialtasks which,for
the purposes of the mission'sfunction, may be even more important than the
tasks entriisted to somernernbcrsof the diplomaticstaff. .. Suchpersonsequally
need protcction of the same order against possible pressure by the receiving
State" (ihid.,p. 102).
Articlc37 in its peftincntparagraphsprovides:
" 1.Thernernbcrosf thchmily of a diplomatic agent formingartofhishousehold
shÿll, iTthcy arenot nationals of the receivingState, enjoy the privilcgcsand
immunitiesspecifiedinArticles29 to 36.
2. Membersof the administrative and technicastlaof themission,togetherwith
rnembersof theirhmilies formingpartof theirrespectihouseholdss,hall,itheyare
noi nationalsof or permanentiyresidentin the reccivingState, enjoy the privileges
and immunitics specifieinArticles9 to 35,except that theimmunityfrom civiand
administrativejurisdictiof ihcreceivinStatespecifiedinparagraphI of Articl31
enjoy the privilegesspccifiedrticte36,paragraph1,inrespectof articlesimported
at the timeof first installation." 160 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULAR STAFF
The inviolabilityrule restson the recognition that the ruleitselfis essential in
order to allowthe diplomaticenvoyto perform his functionswithout hindrance
from the governmentof the receivingState,its officiais,or evenprivate persons.
(B. Sen,A Diplnmat S IfandbookofIrilernationalLawundPractice,p. 90 (1965).
See also Satow, op. ci!., p. 120; M. Ogdon, Juridicnl Bases of Diplumutic
Immunity, pp. 8-30 (1936)) The rule has been considered to be of such
importance that one leading authority has stated that "[dliplomatic envoys are
just as sacrosanct as heads of States".H. Lauterpacht, I Oppenheim'sInterna-
tionalLaw, p. 789 (8th ed., 1955).)The universal acceptance of the pnnciple is
evident [rom the fact that "from the sixteenthcentury until the present one can
find virtually no instances where a breach of a diplomat's inviolability was
authorized or condoned by the Government which receivedhim" (Satow, op.
cit., p. 120).In the celebraied de Mathveof case in 1708, in whichthe Russian
Ambassador had been arrested with some violencc in London, the Queen
accrediteda specialambassador for the purpose of conveyingto Peter the Great
at a public audience theexpressionof the Queen'sregret for the insult offereto
his ambassador (Satow, op. cir., p. 121).
ThisCourt fiasstated, in the quoted paragraph of its 15DecemberOrder, that
the obligations assurncd by States with regard to the inviolabilityof diplomatic
envovs are "essential.unuualified.and inherent" (italicsadded). The Comrnen-
tary of the 1nternational'~aw Commission on the co~n~rehensivecharacter of
the dialornat's inviolabilitv is instructive as to the narrowness of the few
except~onswhich, in its vieb, could possiblybe admitted. The Commentary on
the1958draft Article 27 reads:
"This article confirmsthe principle of the persona1inviolability of the
diplomatic agent. From the receivingState'spoint of view,~hisinvjolability
implies,as in the casc of the mission's premiscs,the obligation to respect,
and to ensure respect for, the person of the diplomaticagent. The receiving
Slate must take al1 reasonable steps to that end, possibly including the
provision of a special guard where circumstanccs so required. Being
inviolable, thediplomalic agent is exernpted from measures that would
amount to direct coercion.This principledoes not excludein respectof the
diplomatic agent eilher measures of self-defenceor, in exceptional circum-
stances, measuresto prevent him from committing crimes or offences."(iI
Yearbookof the InfernarionalLaw'Comn~ission 1958. p. 97.)
In the current case before the Court there-hasbeen no showing whateverof facts
upon which such argiiable exceptions mightproperly bc invoked. Moreover,
evenifsome such factswerepresentedin this case(as theyare not), the right oa
person to defend himselfagainst physicalassault by a diplomat, or the right of
the host State to prevent (forexample) a diplomat from engaging in robbery,
could not possibly justify the measures of arbitrary seizure and prolonged
detention which have been visited upon United States nationals in this case.On
the facts of this case, the prccisc term applied by the Court is the correct term:
the inviolability to which the Embassy's hostages were and are entitled is
"unqualified.
Article29ofthe 1961ViennaConvention alsospecifiesthat the receivingState
"shaH" cake al1appropriate steps to prevent any attack on the person of a
diplomatic agent (an obligation which equally embraces members of the
administrativeand the technicalstan). Appropriate steps under Article29would
include the provision of adequate police protection for an embassy and its
personnel and special precautianüry measures as ncedcd. (See, e.g., the Com-
mentary of the International Law Commission, II Yearbookoflhe International
Law Commission1958. p.97, and B. Sen, op. cil., pp. 91-92.) A State is in any
case bound to take reasonable steps to bring offendersto justice. and failure todo so would amount to ü brcach of duty for which reparation may beclaimed.
(B. Sen, O~J.cit..p. 91; sce also Harvard Research, op. cit. p,. 95-96; G. E. do
Nascimento e Silva, op. cil., p91.)
Given the clarity of the foregoing legal principles, itis indisputable that the
Government of lran has vioiated, and continues to violate, its legal obligations
through its failure, wilfullyand cornpletely,io ensure irrviolabilityand freedom
from arrest and detention fcr United States diplomatic agents and rnembers of
the United States Embassy'sadministrative and lechnical staff in Tehran. It has
failed to treat thesc persons with duc respect and to take al1appropriatc steps to
prevent üttacks upon thcir person, frcedom and dignity. Indeed, as noted
elscwhere, far from prcventing the attacks which oçcurred, the Gavernment of
lran has gravelycompounded and magnificd this failurc of omission by ils acts
of commission; it has in fact approved, supported, adopted and made these
attacks its own.
C. The Grivetnmentof lranHas Violate Cdontinu- to Violate andThreatens
Further ImminenV t iolation of Its International1,egal Obligation to Ensure
Immunityfrom Prosecutionfor UnitedStates DiplomaticAgentsand Mcmbers
of the AdministrativeandTechnical Staffof the UnitedStates Embassy
Pursuant to Article 31 ofthe Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the
Government of Iran is under an international len:il obligation to the United
States to ensure that United States diplomiiticagcn?sshüll Ge immune .'from the
criminal jurisdiction" of Iran (para. 1) and shafl not be "obliged to give
evidence" as wiincsses in any proceedings (para. 7)4. Article 37 extcnds this
immunity, with exceptions not here relevant, iomembers of the administrative
and technical staff of the United Statesdiplomatic rnission in Tchran as well as
A~ticle31prmidw
"1. Adiplornalic agent shaHenjoy immunity îrom the criminal jurisdiction of the
receiviii~ State. Heshallalso enjoy imrnunity rroin ils civil and administrative
jurisdiction. except in the case of:
(a)a realaction relating to pnvate immovablc property situated in the tcrritory
of the receiving Statunlesshe holds ilon bchalî of the sending Stüte Torthe
purposes of thc mission;
(h) an action rclating to successinwhiçh the diplomatic agent is involved as
executor,administrator, heior legateeas a privatc person and not bchcilof the
sen(c) an action relating toany professional or commercial activity exercisedby the
diplomatic agent in the receivingState outside his oficial functions.
2. A diplornittic agent isnot obligcd 10give evidenceas a witness.
3. No measures ofcxecuiion may be taken in respect;diplomatic agent except in
the cassscoming undcr subparagraphs (a),(b) and (r)of paragraph1of this Article,
and provided that the measures conccmcd an bc taken without infringing the
inviolability ofis pcrson or of his residenec.
4. The immunity of a diplomatic agent from thçjurisdiction the receivingState
does not exempt him [rom thejurisdictionofthe sending State."162 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULARSTAFF
to the families of diplomatic agents and of members of the administrative and
technical staff5.
The immunity from criminal jurisdiction is,as the International Law Commis-
sion put it, "complete" (ILCCommentary on 1958draft Article 29,II Yearbook
of the In~ernarional Law Comnrission 1958, p. 98). Here again this Court, in
paragraph 38 of its Order of 1.5December, specifically described the obligation
to assure freedom from prosecution as "essential, unqualfied, and inherent"
(italics added). (See also B. Sen,op. cit..p. 106;H. Lauterpacht, op. cit..p. 790;
G. E. do Nascimento e Silva, op. cil..p. 120.)This complete immunity from
criminat jurisdiction is reaffirmed and emphasized by Article 41 of the Vienna
Convention; instating the duty of personsenjoying pnvileges and immunitiesto
respect the law of the receiving State, Article 41 expressly notes thai the duty is
"[wlithout prejudice to their pnvileges and immunities".
In the absence of an appropriate waiver of immunity by the sending State,
expulsion from the receiving State is the latter's sole remedy as against a
protected person who has engaged in improper conduct; in no event can such
person be tried or punished6. A lcading authority has very recently stated that
no case canbecited whcre, without consent, a diplomatic agent has been tried or
punished by local courts (Satow, op. cit.,p. 124).Thus:
"History records many cases of diplomaticenvoys who conspired against
the receiving States, but nevertheless were not prosecuted. Thus in 1584the
Spanish ambassador in England, Mendoza, plotted to depose Qucen
Elizabeth; he was ordered to leave the country. In 1587 the French
ambassador in England, L'Aubcspine, conspired against the life of Queen
Elizabeth; he was simply warned not to commit a similar act again. In 1654
the French ambassador in England, De Bass, conspired against the life of
Cromwell; he was ordered to leave the country within twenty-four hours."
(Lauterpacht, op. cil..p. 791.)
See also Genet, 11 Traité de riiplorna~ieet de droit dipiornatique. pp. 473-477
(1931).
The Commentary of the International Law Commission cited above makes
equally clear that, in amordance with paragraph 2 of Article 31,there can be no
The immunityof an ambassadorfrom thecriminaljurisdiction of the receivingState
was originallyregardedusan aspectof inviolabilityand was, arterthe principle ofinvio-
labilityitself,theearliesibe establishedof the basicrulesofdiplomaticlaw (E.Den=,
op.cil.p. 149).Theprincipleofimmunityofdiplomaticenvoysfrom thecriminaljurisdic-
tionof the receivingStatewas thus firmlyembeddedin customaryinternationallawwell
before the adoption of the Vienna Convention on Diplornatic Relations. (See H.
Lauterpacht, op. cil.p.790; J. L.Bricrly,TheLaw of hintion.q ,. 213(5thed., 1955); 1.
Brownlie, Principlesr,Puhlic InîcrnationalLnwp.. 34(2nd ed., 1973)P;.Cahier and L.T.
Lee, ViennoConventionson BiplumaticandConsul~rRelatiuns. p. 29(1969); M. Hardy,
ModernDiplornalieLaw, p. 56 (1968).)The exemptionor diplornutic agents[rom the
givingofevidencewas also aprinciplehavingwidesupport in Statepracticeand among
Wilson,aop.oci!.pp. 100-101;G. E.ado Nascirnento.e0Silva,op.cit.. p127..p. 124;C. E.
Article9 of the ViennaConventionon DiplornaticRelations provides:
"t.ThereceivingStatemayat anytimeand withouthavingtoexplainitsdecision,
staffof the missionipersonanongrata orththat anyother rnemberof thestaffof the
missionis not acceptable.In any such case,the xnding Staic shall,as appropriate,
eitherrecallthe personconcernedor teminate his functionswith the mission. A
personmaybedeclared non Erata or notacceptablebeforcürnvingintheterritory of
the receivingState.
2. If the sendinSiaterefusesor failwsithin a masonabte aeriod to carrv Ourits
obligations unde;püragraph I of this Article, the recïivinpState may refuse to
recognizethe personconcerned as amember ofthe mission."obligation on a diplomatic agent, or other protccted person, to testify or
otherwise give evidence as a witness. The rule is expressly stated in the
Commentiiry as deriving from the diplomatic agent's inviolability. The inter-
national Law Commission determined that its draft provision should not even
state exceptions forthose instances in which a diplornatic agent is not immune
from the civiland administrativejurisdiction of the reccivinState;the givingof
evidenceniay be required only when authorized consent has been given.During
consideration of this provision at the United Nations Conference at which the
Vienna Convention was concluded, the representative of the United Arab
Republic cxpressed the view that the rule on providing evidence was"a well-
established rule of international law and a very ncccssaryone in the interests of
the proper lunctioning of diplomatic missions" (O$Tci alcords,Vol. 1, UN
doc. A/CONF.20/14, p. 168).
The Government af Iran has threatened, and conlinues to threaten, imminent
violationof ilsobligations under Article31:it has repeatedlystated an intention
to place ~he American hostages on trial or to require them to serve as
"witnesses" before some sort of international tribunal or"grand jury". In fact,
given the lranian Govemment's endorsemeni of criminal charges against the
hostages, its approval of and complicity in iheir detention and interrogation,
and its assertion that theostageswillbe put on trial or cornpelledto testify,the
Government of Iran appears alrcady to stand in violation of its obligations
under Article 31 to assure the hostages' immunity from Iran's criminal
jurisdiction and from giving evidçnce.
D. The Governmentof Iran Has Violated, and Continuesto Violate, Its
InternationalLegal Obligation to Ensurethe Inviolabilityof United States
Diplomatic Piemises
Pursuant to Article22of the ViennaConvention on Diplomatic Relations,the
Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United
States toensure that United Statesdiplomatic premisesin Tehran, including the
residenceof the head of the mission, "shall be inviolable" and "immune from
search" and that agents of the Government of Iran shall not enter the premises
"except with the consent of the head of the mission". This Article places the
Governmcnt of Iran under a "spccial duty to takcilIappropriate steps ta pro-
tect the premiscsof the missionagainst any intrusion or damage and to prevent
any disturbance of the peace of ~hemission or impairment of its dignity" 7.
The inviolabilityisabsolute; it may notbe infringed under any circumstances,
even if mission premises wereto be used in a m;inner incompatible with its
functions (ILC Cammentary on 1958 draft Article 40, 11 Yearbook of the
InternationulLaw Commissio n958,p. 104;P. Cahier and L. T. Lee,op. cir.,p.
'Article22 provides:
"1. 'Thepremisesof the missionshallbeinviolableThe agentsof the receiving
Statemaynot enterthem,except with theconsentof thehead ofthemission.
2.ThereceivingState iunder a specidutyto tükcal1appropriatestep10 protect
disturbanccof thepcaceofothemissionor impairmentofditsdignity. prcvent any
3.The premisesof thcmission,their furnishings adtherpropcrtythereon and
the mçans of transportof the missionshatlbe immune from search, requisition,
attachment orexecutioa."164 DlPLOMATlCAND CONSULARSTAFF
21(and note 40);M. Hardy, op,cir.,p.44).This Court, in paragraph 38of its 15
Decernber1979Order,spifically induded the inviolabilityof embassiesamong
the most fundamental of prerequisites for the conduct of relations betwcen
States,noting that obligations in this regard are, again, "essential, unqualified.
and inhercnt" (italics added), The International Law Commission has inter-
preted the principle as expressed in its draft article not only as preventing rhe
serving of judicial writs within the mission prerniscs but cven as enabling a
sendingState to prevent a receivingState from usingthe mission's[andin order
to carry out public works (ILC Commentary on 1958 draft Article 20. 11
Yearbook ofthe Infernational Law Commission 1958,p. 95).
In considering this article, theInternational Law Commission determinedto
make no reference,eithcr in the article or in the commentary, to the issue of
entry upon the premises in cases of extreme emergency. It was concluded that
any such reference could introduce controversial interpretations which might
weaken theparamount principleof inviolability. In this regard the Commission
members from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom,
and Syria expressedmost strongly the viewthat the principleof inviolabilityof
premisesmust take precedenceover al1othcr considerations (1 Yearbook of the
InternarionalLaw Commission 1958, pp. 127-134).Similarly,although proposcd
amendmentsto this articlewereintroduced at thc ViennaConferencein order to
qualify the inviolability in exceptional cmcrgency circumstances, al1 such
proposrrlswerewithdrawn. Themajorily of delegaiions wereof theviewthalit
would be dangerous ta allow a receivingState to determine when "exceptional
circumstances"existedand that it was preciselyin timesofextreme urgencyrhat
it was most necessary to preserve an unqualified principlcof inviolability of
mission premises.The delegatesfrom Bulgaria,Yugoslavia,the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, France, Argenlina, Colornbia, Turkey and Iran wcre
qualified in any way. Theidelegate from Senegal stated that he considered the
articletobc themost important of the entireconvention(Oficiai Records,Vol.1,
UN In order to fulfil its special duty to protect diplomatic premises, as the
Commentary of the International Law Commissionon the 1958draft Article20
states, a receivingState musi "take special measures-over and above ihosc it
takes to discharge its general duty of çnsuring order" (II Yearbook of the
InternationalLaw Commission 1958,p. 95). Protection must be proportionalc to
the risk or threat to the premises(Satow, op. cil.. p. Il 1).Inadequate protection
engages theresponsibilityof the receivingState (P. Cahierand L.T. Lee,op. cir.,
p. 24). Moreover, the high duty of protection is reflected in the modern
legislation of many countries. Some prcscribe particularly severe penalties for
trespassor actsof violenceto mission premiscs,whileothcrs prohibit certain acts
undertaken within a prescribed distance from mission premises (see E. Denza,
op. cit.p. 80).The importance of the specialduty of protection was underscored
in especially strong terms at the Vienna Conference by the delegates [rom
Sweden,Norway and Belgiurn,al1ofwhommade absolutelycleartheirviewthat
a receivingStatemust bc held fullyanswerablefor any failurein its obligationto
protect the premises of a diplomatic mission from violation (ClficialRccords,
Vol. 1, UN doc. A/CONF.20/14, pp. 135-143).
The Government of Iran has violated, and continues to violate,its obligations
under Article 22 in that it has faited absolutely to ensure the inviolability,
including freedom from seürch and unauthorized cntry, of United States
diplomatic premises in Tehran. Quite the contrary, that Governrnent has
approved and encouraged the prolonged occupation of the Embassyby persons MEMORIAL 165
who, de jai.in,act as agents of the Governmcnt of Iran. It has donc so with the
acknowlcdged purposc of holding hoslagc both United Statcs dipfomatic
personnel and private United States nationals-an act which, as the Court
pointed out in paragraph 19of iis Order of 15 Decembcr 1979, fallswithin the
prescriptions of inviolabilityor the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Rela-
tions and on Consular Relations. The Govcrnment of lran could not more
plainly haveviolated its spccial duty to take al1appropriate steps to protect
United States diplomatic premiscsagainst intrusionor damage and to prevent a
disturbancc of the peace of the missionor impairmcnt of its dignity.
E. TheCovernmentof IranHas Violated,andContiiiucsto Violate,Its Interna-
tionalIdegaiObligations toEnsureInviolability of Diplomatic Archives t, Accord
Full Diplomatic Facilities,to Accord Freedomof Movernent, to Permit Free
Communicationt,o PrecludeDiscriminationa , ndto FacilitateDeparture
(a) The Obligafion
PursuarittoArticle 24of the ViennaConvcritiorion DiplomaticRelations, the
Governrncnt of lran is under an international legal obligation to the Unitcd
States 10 ensure that "the archives and documents" of the United States
diplomatic mission inTehran "shall be inviolabfe ut anytirneand whereverrhey
muy heMa (italicsadded).
Inviolabilityof archivesand documents is at leüstpartly encornpasscdwithin
the principleof inviolabilityf missionpremisesbut was includedas a separate
provision in the International Law Commission'sdraft articles because OCthe
importancc of archival inviolability to the functions of the mission (ILC
Cornmentary on 1958draft Article 22, 11 Ycurhnnkofthe InlernurionalLaw
Contmivsicir1r958,p. 96). Although therehave heen some historical instances in
which documents not on mission prcmiseshave bcen used as evidence by a
rccciving Sute (a circumstancc in any case no(rclcvant here), itis tobe notcd
thai Article 24 of the ViennaConvention on Diplomatic Relations establishesa
newand higherstandard in this andother respectsthan had previouslyexisted in
customary international law (E. Dcnza, op. rit., p. 110).The importanceof the
principle asnow established iscvidenced in the breadth of its covcrage.
The inviolabilityprinciptccmbodied in Ariiclc24 extendsto documents other
than archives. The referencc to "documents" as wcllas archives was added to
the textby the International Law Commission with a viewto including matter
such as mernoranda in draft form (sec 1 Yenrbookof the In~ernurionaLl aw
Conznris.~io i958,p. 135).The Vienna Conference broadened theInternational
Law Commission's draït article still further by accepting an amendment as
proposed by the French and ltalian delegations, extending proteclion to such
materials at al1times and in al1places.
(b) The Breuch
The Government of lran has violated,and continues to violate,itsobligations
under Article 24 in that it has failed to ensurc the inviolabilityof archivesand
documents located at the United States missionin Tehran. On the contrary, the
Government of Iran has approved the seizure, ransacking and publication of
documents of the United States diplomatic mission and has endorsed their
threatened use as "evidence" insome sort of purported legal proceeding.
'Article24 provides:"Thearchivesand documentsof themission shallbe inviolaate
any limeand whereverthey may be," DIPLOMATICAND CONSULARSTAFF
(a) The Obligation
Pursuant to Article 25of the ViennaConvention on Diplomatic Relationsthe
Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United
Staics to "accord full facilities for the ~erformance of the functions of the
mis~ion"~.
Under this articlea receivingState must not simplyrefrain from impeding the .
normal operation of a mission; on the contrary, the receivingState is under an
affirmative duty to furnish alf reasonabIe assistance required by a dipfomatic
missionand tomake every effortto provide the missionwith al1facilitiesfor the
purposc. (ILC Commcntary on 1958 draft Article 23, II Yearbook of ~he
lrrfernationalLaw Commission 1958,p. 96. See also M. Hardy, op. cit., p. 32.)
The principle was apparently considered to be so widelyrecognizedand sound
that the article was adopted at the Vienna Conference without debate or
amendment.
(b) The Breach
The Government of Iran ha5 violated, and continues to violate,its obligations
under Article 25 in that it has failed to permit the United States to have
continucd access to its compound in Tehran and to enjoy the full facilities
neccssary-or even the minimal facilitiesnecessary-for the performance or the
functions of its diplomatic mission.
(a) TheObligation
Pursuant to Article26of the ViennaConvention on Diplomatic Relations, the
Govcrnment of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United
States to ensure that, subject only to limitations on entry into national security
zones, al1 members of the United States mission shall have "frccdom of
movement and travel in its [Iran's] territory"".
In introducingbeforethe International LawCommissiona provisionconccrn-
ing frecdomof movement, Sir Gcrald Fitzmaurice cxpressedthe viewthat until
recently such a provision wouldnot have been necessary. "It had always becn
traditional and regarded as axiomatic that members of diplomatic missions
enjoyedfullfreedomof movementon the territory of the receivingState, subject
to a fewminor exceptions in thc case of fortified zones to which entrance was
prohibitcd on straregicgrounds." (1 Yearbook of lhe Inier~~ntiona Llanl Comtnis-
sion 1957, p. 85.Seealso P. Cahier and L. T. Lee, op. cil.p. 33;M. Hardy, op.
cit., p34.) The possibilitythat the members of a diplomatic mission, far from
enjoying frcedom of movement, wouldbe confinedin theit violated diplomatic
premises as hostages, was not within the arnbit of the Commission's imagina-
tion.
Frecdom of movement is an essential requirernent for the adequate perfor-
mance of the functions of a mission. Afthough movement may be lirnited or
Articlc 25provides: "The receivingStaie shall accord full facilitiesfor the performance
of the functions othemission."
'OArticle 26 provides:
"Subject tots lawsand regulations concerningzones entry into which is prohibitcd
or regulated for reasons of national security,the receiving Staie shalltonal1e
members of the mission ïrcedom of movement andtravel iits territory."prohibitcd in national security zoncs, the Commission's Commenlary on 1958
draft Article 24 rnakes clear that frccdom of diplonlatic movement and travcl
may not bc rcndered "illusory" (II Yearbook ofthe InternationalLaw Commis-
sion 1928.p. 96).
(b) TheBreoch
The Government of Iran has violated, and continues to violate, its obligations
under Article 26 in that il has failed, wholly without justification, to ensure
freedom of movement and travel to mernbers of the United States mission in
Tehran. Tiicrc could be no more blatant and more illegal restriction upon
freedom of movement than thiit which has been irnposed upon United Statcs
personnel hcldhostage in Iran.
ci)TfreObligation
Pursuant to Article 27of thc Vicnna Convention on Diplornatic Relations, the
Gor~ernmcnt of Iran is under an international lqal obligation to the United
States to "pcrmit and protcct free communication" on the part of the Unitcd
Statcs mission for al1official pur oses and to ensure the inviolability of "official
corrcspondence of the mission" Pl.
Article 27encompasses al1communicütions for oficiül purposes, whether with
the government of the sending State, with officiaisand authonties of that
govetnment, with missions and consulates of other govcrnments, with interna-
tional organizations,or with thenaiionals of the sending State.In communica-
ting wilh the scnding government or its missions and consulates wherevcr
located, al1 appropriate mcans may be used, including couners and code
messages (ILC Commentary on 1958 draft Article 25, 11 Yeurbook of the
Internarirml Luw Commission 1958,p. 97).
From thc pcrspcctivc of effcctivc daily functioning OSa diplomatic mission,
free and cc~nfidential communication between thc mission and the sending
government has been describcd as "probably the most important of al1 the
privileges and immunities accorded under international law" (E. Denza, op. cil..
p. 119; sec also Satow, op. cil., p.116). The essential character of Cree
communication was recognizcd by both the International LawCommission and
the Viennli Conference, both of which accepted the principle as laid down by the
first sentence of paragraph 1of Article 27, with virtually no controversy: this
"generally recognizcd freedom . . . is essential for. the performance of the
mission'stunctions .." (ILCCommcntary on 1958drafi Article 25, IlYearhook
of the InrernutionnlLaw Cornnrissim, p. 97). Indecd, at the Vienna Conferencc
the delegatc frorn Iran referred to the inviolability of diplomatic bags, also an
aspect of Article 27, as "sacrosanct", cven in the face of misuse by the sending
State (Ofici 0ecords, Vol. 1,UN doc. A/CONF.20/14, p. 163).
" Article77 in pertinentpart provides:
" 1.Tlie rccciviStateshall permit andprotecfreecommunication onthe part ol
the missionforal1officialpurposcs.Incommunicatingwith theGovernment and thc
rnayremployal1appropriatctmeüns,hincludingdiplomaticrcouriersanddmessagesiin
codeor cipher.However, the missionmayinstalland ilsea wirelcsstransmitteronly
with thc consentofthe receivingState.
2. Thçofficialcorrespondenceof the missionshabcinviolable.Officialcorrespon-
dencemeansal1correspondcncerclstingto the missionand itsfunctions."168 DIPLOMAT AICD CONSULAR STAFF
(b) Tlie Breach
The Government or Iran has violated,and continuesto violate,ils obligations
under Article27 in that it has failedto protect, and has denied, freecommunica-
tion forofficialpurposes on the part of the United Statesdiplomatic missionin
Tehran, and has failed to ensure the inviolabilityof officia1correspondence of
the mission.Not only havethe hostages been heldessentiallyincommunicadoin
the Embassyand confidentialcommunicationsviolated, but the Governrnenl of
Iran has denied means for confidential communication bctween the United
States Government and the United States Embassy officiais al the lranian
Foreign Ministry and has severely limited the ability of these oficials (who
include the United States Chargé d'AFdires) to comniunicate with their diplo-
matic colleaguesin Tehran.
(a) TheObliguiion
Pt~rsurintto Articlc4ofthe VieniiiiChnvcniion oriDiploniaticRclntions,ihc
Governmerit ol' Iranis uiidcr an international Icgul obligation Io ihc Uniied
States to prccludc discrimination in the applicatron of the provisions of the
Convention exceptincertain instancesinvofvingreciprocityor more favourable
treatmentl*.
The ruleof non-discrimination as expressedin this article was stated by the
International Law Commissionto bea gencral rule flowingfrom the equality of
States (ILC Commentary on 1958draft Article 44, 11Yearbaokof the Interna-
tionalLaw Comn~issinn 1958,p. 105;seealsocomment ol the delegatefrom ltaly
during the Confcrence considerationof thc Article,Oficia R ecords.Vol. 1,UN
doc. A/CONF.20/14,p. 218).
(b) TheBreach
Other diplomatic missionsin Tehran happilyare not bcingtrcated in the same
way as the United States diplomatic mission, The discriminatory action of the
Government of lran is not based on restrictivetreatment applied by the United
States and manifcstly does not constitute more favourable treatment. Indecd,
despite the actions of the Government of Iran, the United States continuesto
accord Iranian diplomats in the Unitcd States iheir normal immunities, thuç
providing treatment strikingly more favourabte than that which is currently
accorded the United States diplomatic mission in Tehran. The Government of
lran has thereforcviolated,and continues 10violate,its obligation under Article
47 in that it has applied,without justification, adverseand flagrantlydiscrimina-
tory treatment to the United Statesdiptomatic mission inTchran.
Articl47 provides:
"1. Intheapplicationof the provisionsof the presentConvention,the receiving
Stateshall notiscriminatas betweenStates.
2. Hoaevcr,dixriminationshall notbe regardedas takingplace:
(a)wherethe receivingSiate appliesany of' the provisions of' prescni
missionin thesendingState;seof'arestrictiveapplicatinfthatprovisionto its
(6)where bycustom oragreementStatesextendto eachothermorefavourablc
treatmcntthanisrequired bytheprovisionsofthepresentConvention. (a) The Ohlignrion
Pursuant to Article44 of thc Vienna Convention on Diplornatic Relations, the
Government of Iran is under an international leeal oblieation to the United
states ;;facilitate the departurc from Iran of p&ons e$oying privilegës and
immunitics, and their ramilies, "at the earliest possible moment". Moreover,
Iran "must, in particular, in case of need, place at thcir disposal the nccessary
meüns or transport for themselvesand their property". The receivingStale is so
bound "even in case oîürrncd conflict"; oforriori it isso bound in the absence of
h~stilities'~.
Thc obligation to facilitate departure of protectcd persons assumes special
significancein the case of deteriorating relations between sending and rcceiving
Siaiesi a point alluded 10 by the delegate from Romania at the Vienna
Confcrcncc (Oficial Recorrls,Vol. 1, UN doc. A/CONF.20/14, p. 215). As an
example of State practice, after the outbreak of the Second World War, the
United States took special protcctive measures, which included securing ladging
in resort hotels, in order to ensure that enemy diplomatic personnel remained
safc pending completion of arrangements for departure (see Henring befire ~he
Submmmittee oftheCommiiiec ailForeign Relutions,United States Senale, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3.5-36(1965)). So clear was the obligation that the
International Law Commission, in its Commentary on 1957draft Article 35,
simply statcd that "[tlhis artide requires no cornmcntary" (II Yeurbook of ~he
tniernaricmolLaw Conrniissioii1957,p. 143).
(b) TheBreach
TheGovernmeni of lran has violated, and continiies to violate, ils obligation
undcr Article 44 in thiit it has failed to facilitatc the dcparture from lran of
United States personnel entillcd to the enjoymcnt of privilegesand immunities.
Far from meeting this obligation, the Govcrnnient of Iran has cncouraged,
endorscd and associated itsclf with the deliberatc, prolonged and forcible
detention of such American personnel.
F. The Covernmcnt of Iran Has Violated, and Continues to Violate, Its Inter-
national Imgal Qblieations to Res~ectand Protect CainsularPremiscs.to Accord
Full Facilit6s, to ~kord FreedomaofMovernent,to Permit Free communication,
ta Permit Contact With UnitedStates Nationals and to Preclude Discrimination
In addition to its tcmporarily closed consulates in Tabriz and Shirüz, which
wcreitlsoattacked inearly November 1979,the United States maintaincd scveral
consular staff mcmbers, currcntly held hostage, ainong the personnel of its
diplornatic-mission in Tehran. Article 3 of the Vicnna Convention on Consufar
Relations contemplates the excrciseofconsular functions bydiplomatic missions
in accord~iicewith that Convention. Article 70 speçifiçallystatcs that the Con-
" Article44 provides:
"The receivingStatcmust.even incaseolarmcd cunflicigrantfacilitiinorderto
cnable personsenjoyingprivilegesand imrnunitjcs.other ihan nationülsof the
rcccivin_etate,and membcrs of the familiesofsuch personsirrespeciiveof their
nationality't,o leaveat theearliestpossiblemarneItmust, inparticular,incasof
need,placeat theidisposalthenecessaryrneans oftrüiisportforthemselvcand their
property."170 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULAR STAFF
vention shall also apply "so far as the context permits" to the exercise of
consular functions by a diplornatic mission. As Article 70 provides, when
members of a diplornatic mission are exercising consular functions they are
entitled to the full protection afforded by the Vienna Convention on Diplornatic
Relations.
In nurnerous respects, however, the actions of the Government of lran
constitute additional distinct violations of the provisions of the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations. As this Court observed in paragraph 40of ils Order
of 15December 1979,"the unirnpeded conduct of consular relations, which have
also been established between pcoples since ancicnt times, is no lessimportant in
the context of prescrit-day international law, in promoting the development of
friendly relations among nations, and ensuring protection and assistance for
aliens resident in the territones of other States ...".
(a) The Obligation
Pursuant to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the
Government of lran is under an international legal obligation to the United
States to "respect and protect the consular prernises, together with the property
of the consular post and the consular archives" in the event of the temporary or
permanent closure of a consular post14.
The obligation to respcct and protect consular premises is of such importance
that under Article 27it applies both in the case of severance ofconsular relations
and even in the case of armed conAict between States, thus advnncing beyond
customary international law in this regard (L. T. Lee, ViennaConventionon
Consular Relalions,p. 97 (1966)).The importance of preserving the inviolability
of consular premises and archives generally is emphasized in Articles 31and 33
of the Vienna Convention on ConsuIar Relations1'. The inviolability principle
Article27 provides:
"1. In the eventof the severanceof consular relationsbetween twoStates:
(a) the receivingStateshall,evenin caseof armedconflict,respectand protect
the consular prernises,together with the property of theconsular post and the
consular archives;
(b)the sendingStatemayentrustthe custodyof the consularpremises,together
with the aromrty contained therein and the consular archives,to a third State
accephbl~t6 thércceivingState;
(c)the sendingStatemayentrust the protectionof itsinterestsand thoseof its
nationalsto a third Stateacceptableto the receivingState.
2. In the event of the temporary or permanent closuro ef a consular post,the
provisions ofsubparagraph(a) of paragraph 1of this Article shall apply.
In addition,
(a)if the sendingState, although not representedin the receivingState by a
diplomaticmission,has another consularpost in the territoryof that State, that
consular post may be entrustedwith the custodyof the prernises ofthe consular
post whichhas beenclosed,togetherwith the property containedthereinand the
consular archivesa,nd, withtheconsent of the receivingState,withthe exerciseof
consularfunctionsin the districtof that consular post; or
thereceivingState,theprovisionsof subparagraphsand(b)oandr(c)sofparagraph 1of
thisArticle shallapply.
l5Article 31 provides:
"1. Consularpremisesshall beinviolableto the extentprovideciin thisArticle.
2. The authoritiesof the reccivingState shall not enterthat part of the consular MEMORIAL 171
has support in international practice apart from the Convention (L. T. Lee,
Consulur Law and Praclice, p. 241 (1961); ILC Commentary on 1961 draft
Article 32, OficicrlRecords. Vol. II, UN doc. A/CONF.25/16/Add.l, p. 22;
Ahniad, L 'ïns~ilulioconsulaireet le droit internarional.pp. 104-114(1973)).
(b) The Breoch
The Governmcnt of Iran hasviolaieci,and continues to violaie,ils obligations
under Articles27.31 and 33of the VicnnaConventionon Consular Relations,in
that it has failed to respect and protcct the United States consular premises in
Tabriz and Shiraz,as wcllas United Statesconsular prcmisesintegrated in10the
United States Embassyin Tehran.
(a) The Obligarion
Pursuani to Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the
Governmerit of Iran is under an international legül obligation to the United
States to "accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the
consular pos~"'~-an obligation which is considercd "indispensable to the
creation and maintenance of consular relations" (L.T. Lee, ViennaConvention
on Consulur Relations .. 81). As noted expresslyby this Court in paragraph 19
of itsOrder of 15December 1979, under Article 5 of the VicnnaConvention on
Consular Relations the consular funciions for the performance of which full
facilitiesare to be accorded
"include the functionsof proteciing,assistingand safcguardingthe interests
of nationals; .. . the purposc of these functions is preciselyto enable the
sending State, through ils consulates, to ensure thai ils nationafs arc
accorded the treatment due to them under the gçneral rulesof international
Iüw as aliens within the tcrritory of the foreign Statc".
Obviously any obstruction of the performance of consular functions prejudices
the ability of the United States to assist and srtfeguard the interests of United
States nationals in Iran, particularly those privatc Unitcd States nationals
currently being held hostage at the Embassypremiscs.
premiscs which is used exclusjvclyfor the purpose of thc work of the consular post
excepi ivith the consent of the hcüd or the consular post or of his designeeor of lhc
head of the diplornatic mission or the sending State. The consent of the head of lhc
cnnsulür post may, however, be üssumed in case of lire or olher disaster requiring
prompt protective action.
3.Subject tothe provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, the receiving Stüte is
undcr aspcial duty to take al1appropriate sicps Io protect the consular premises
against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance othepeace of the
consular post or impairment ofitsdignity.
4. The consular premises, thcir furnishinthe property of the consular post and
itsmeaiis of triinsport shall be immune from any form of requisition for purposçsof
possiblcstepsshall be taken to avoid impeditheperformance of consular functions,al1
and prarnpt,adrquate and effectivcompensation shall bepaid tothe sending Statc."
Article33 provides: "Thc conylar archives and docunicnts shall be inviolable at al1
limes and whcrcver they may be.
'"Article 28 provides "The rcceiving State shall :iccord full facilities for the
performance of the functionsof the consular post."172 DlPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF
(b) TheBreach
The Government of lran has violated, and continues to violate,its obligation
under Article 28 in that it has in effectcompletely depnved the United States
consular officers at the United States diplomatic mission in Tehran of their
ability to perform their consular functions. The violation, as noted. is
particularly serious becauseit affectsthe intercstsof al1United States nationals
still in Iran. Indeed the seizureand detention of United States nationals at the
diplomatic mission, particularly thosewho are not membersof thc mission,itself
frustrates the proper performance ofconsular functionsunder the circumstances
described.
(a) The Obligation
Pursuant to Article 34 of the ViennaConvention on Consular Relations, the
Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United
States to ensure "freedom of movement and travel in ils territory" to United
States consular ofticers, subject only to valid exceptions based upon national
scc~rit~'~.
Aswith purelydiplomatic oficers, freedomof movementfor consular officers
is a prerequisite for the adequate performance of their consular functions. A
consular ofFicerin particular is expecied to maintain contact with nationals of
the sending State in order to further and protect their interests, and for this
purpose free movement is essential (see B. Sen, op. cit.p. 256).
(b) TheBreach
The Government of lran has violated, and continues to violate, its obligation
under Article 34 in that it has failed to ensure any freedom of movement
whatcvcr for United States consular ofliccrs al the United Statcs diplornatic
mission inTehran. This violation adverselyand seriouslyaffectsthc intcrestsof
other United States nationals inlran.
" Article 34 provides:
"Subject to its Iawsand regulations conccrningzones entry into which is prohibited
or regulated for reasons of nationalcurity, the receivingState shall cnsure îrcedom
of movernent and travel in its territory to al1members of the consular post."
Article35 in pertinent part provides:
part of the consular post for ail officiai purposes. In communicating with thehe
Governrnent, the diplornatic missionsand other consular posts, whereversituated. of
the sending State. the consularpst may employ al1appropriate means. including
diplomatic or consular couriers, diplomatic or consubags and messagesin code or
cipher. However, the consular post may insiall and use a wireless transmitter only
with the consent ofthc receivingState.
2. The officia1correspondence of the consular post shall be inviotable. Ofiicial
correspondence means al1 correspondence relating to the consular post and its
functions.
3. The consular bag shall bc neither opencd nor detained. Nevcrthelcss, if the
competent authoritiesof the receivingStatehave seriousreason to believethat thebag
contains something other than the correspondencc, documents or articles referred to
in paragraph 4 of this Article, they may rcqucst that the bag be opened in their
by the authorities of the sendingState,the bag shall beretumcd toits placeof origin."sed MEMORIAL
{a) TheOb/igatiorr
Pursuani to Article 35 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the
Covernmerit of Iran is under an intcrnational legal obligation to the United
to "permit and protcct freedom of communication on the part of the
consular p»st for al1officia1purposcs" and to ensurc that "official correspon-
dcnce of the consular post shall be inviolable".
Theprinciple ol'freedomofcommunicationbetweeiiconsularofficersandother
officialsof the sendingState, whilesubjectto certain exceptions,wasnevcrtheless
rooted in international practicerior to the Consular Convention (sceL. T.Lce,
Comular Laiv crntlPrrrcrice,pp. 270-274). Such frecdom of communication is
"essential for thc discharge of consulür functions?'and rems pari of "thc
foundation or allconsular law" (ILC Commentary on 1961draft Article 35,
Ofic.irr/Rccord.~,Vol. II, UN doc. A/CONF.25/16/Add.l, p. 23). As the
Commission'sCommcntary also makes clear, this protectivc principle cncom-
passesofficialconsularcommunicationsofal1kinds,whethertheybecommunica-
tions with thegovcrnmcntor officialsof the sendingState, withother missionsor
consulates, or with international organizations. In comrnunicating with the
sending governmentor itsmissionsand consulateswherevcrlocated,theconsular
post istobepermitted to employanyappropriate means,includingcourierç,bags,
and codemessages.lt hasbeenstatcdthai any obstruc~ion tofreedomof commu-
nicationwouldrcridcrmeaninglessthcinviolabilityofconsulat-archivesanddocu-
ments and, rnost irnportantly, would derogate from the rundamental principle
that the receivinglate shiillaccord fullîacilitiesfor the pcrforrnanceofconsular
functions (L. T. Lcc, ViennaConven~ionon CunstriurR~~larionsp,p. 99-100).
(b) The Breach
The Government of Iran has violütcd,and continuesto violate,itsobligations
under Article 35 inthat it has failedto protect and bas dcniedfreecommunica-
tion for oflicialpurposes on the part of United States consular officersüt the
United Statcs diplornatic mission in Tchran, and has failcd to ensure and has
infringcd the inviolabilityof officialcorrcspondencc. This violation constitutes
another serious inîringement of the interests of the United Statcs and ils
nationals in Iran.
(a) TheOhligurion
Pursuant to Articlc 36 of the Vienna Convention un Consular Relations, the
Government of Iran 1sunder an international legal obligation to the United
States toensurelhat United Statesconsular ofticers-'shallbe free to comrnuni-
caiewiih.naiionals of ihe sendingSlaie and to have accessto them", that United
States nationals in Iran "have thesame îreedom with respectto communication
with and accessto consular oflicersof the sendingState", and that United States
consular oficers have the rjght to visit United Statcs nationals who arc in
"prison, custody or dctention" la.
l8Article36 provides:
"1. H'itha viewio facilitatingthe exerciszof consulür functionrelalingto
nationalsofthe scnding State:
(a) consulürofficersshabe freeto communicare withnationafsof the sending174 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULARSTAFF
The right of consular officers in pcacetime to communicate freely with co-
nationalshas been described as implicit in the consular office,evenin the absence
of trcaties(L. T. Lee, ConsularLaw and Praclice, p.269;B.Sen, op. eit., p.257;
Satow, op. cir.,p. 218). As Article 5 of the Convention makes plain, a principal
function of the consular officer is to provide varying kinds of assistance to
nationals of the sending State, and for this reason the channel ofcommunication
between consular officers and nationals must at al1times remain open. Indeed,
such communication is so essential to the exercise ofconsular functions thal its
preclusion would rcnder meaningless the entire establishment of consulac
relations (1 Yearbookof the InternalionafLangCornmimion1961.pp. 32-38;L. T.
Lee,ConsufarLawand Practice. p. 269).Article 36establishes rights not only for
the consular officer but, perhaps even more importantly, for the nationals of the
sending State who are assurcd access to consular oficers and through them to
othcrs.
(b) TheBreach
The Government of Iran has violated, and continues to violate, its obligations
under Article 36 in that it has failed to ensure that the United States consular
officersat the United States diplornatic mission inTehran may communicate with
or have access to other United States nationals in Iran, including those Unitcd
Statesnationals who are currently held hostagc. It has also failed to ensure that
such other United Statesnationals in Iran may communicatc with or have access
io theseconsular officcrs.Itbas encoursgcd and supporied a situation in which,in
kt, United States nationals are held esscntially incornrnunicado in the grosscst
violation of consular noms and acccpted standards of human rights.
(a) TheObligation
Pursuant to Article 72 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the
GovernmentofIran isunder an international legalobligation to the United Statcs
to prcclude discrimination in the applicationof the provisions of theConvention,
Stateand tohaveaccessto them.NationalsofthesendingStateshallhavethesame
Creedornwithrcspcctto communicationswithand acccssto consularofiicersof ihe
sendingState;
(b) if he so requests,the competent authoritiesof the receivingState shall,
without delay,informthe consularpost ofthesendingStateif, withinitsconsular
district,nationalof ihat Stateis arrestcdor committedto prisonor to custody
pnding trialor isdetainedinanyoihermanner.Anycommunication addressed to
ihe consular posty thepersonarrestcd,inprison,custodyor detentionshallatso
informthe personconcernedwithoutdelayof hisrightsunderthissubparagraph;s shall
(c) consularofficersshallhavethc rightto visia nationalof the sendingSiate
whoisinprison,custodyor detention,toconverseand correspondwiih himand io
arrange for his legal representation.They shall alsohave the rightto visitany
nationalof the sendingStatewhoisin prison, custodyor detentionintheirdistrici
in pursuanceof a judgrnent. Nevertheless,consular oficers shall refrainfrom
takingaction on behalfof a nationalwhois inprison, custodyor detention iThe
cxpresslyopposessuchaction.
2.The rights rcferred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shalbe exercisedin
conformitywiththelawsand regulationsofthereceivingStatc,subjecttothe proviso,
however,that the saidIawsand regulationsmustenablefullelfeci IObe givento the
purposesfor whichthe rights accordedunderthis Articleare intended.".excePtin certain instances involving reciprocityor more favourable trcatmentig.
As with tiiplomatic relations, the general rulc of non-discriminationasapplied
to consulür relations has bcen described as derivingfrom the principle of the
sovereign equality of States (ILC Commentary on 1961draft Article 70, Oficial
Records. Vol. II, UN doc. A/CONF.25/16/Add. 1,p. 40).
(b) The Breoch
As in the case of the Vienna Convention on Diplornatic Relations, thc actions
of the Government of lran cannot be regarded under Article 72 as justified in
any way. In fact thc Govcrnment of Iran has violated, and continues to violate,
its obligation under Articlc 72 in that it has applied, without justification,
adverse and flagrantly discriminatory treatment to tlie performance of consular
functions by the United States in Iran.
C. The Government of lran Has Violated, and Continues to Violate, Its Inter-
national I.cgal Obligations regiirding the Prerention and Punishment of Crimes
.4gainst Internaliotially Protected Prrwns, Induding 1)ipJomaticAgents
Conccrned with the grave problcm of thc use of tei,rorisrnagainst intcrnation-
allyprotccicd persons, includingdiplomaticagents, the United Nations Gencral
Assembly in 1971requcsted the International Law Commission to prepare a set
of draft articles addresscd to the protection and inviolabjlity of diplomatic
agents and othcr pcrsons entitled to specialprotection under international law
(resolution 2780 (XXVI)). The comments of numercius States were transmitted
to the International Law Commission and reficcted the General Assembly's
depth of concern. Among thcm, the Governmcnt of lran stated:
"1. Consideration of the question of the protection of diplomats ...has
madc it possible to rcailirm thc importance of the basic rule of diplomatic
law,niimelythat conccrning the inviolability ofdiplomatic prcmiscsand the
respect due to the pcrson of the diplomat.
2. Dernonstrations of violence against diplomats might parülyse the
smooth operation of inter-State relations. In order to perform his runctions,
thc diplomat must bc protected from any hostile act by any person
whirtstiever.
3. The imperial Government of lran endorscs the idea that the Interna-
tional Law Commission should prepare a draït international convention
dcsigned to strengthen the means of protection provided for undcr inter-
national instruments now in force." (II Yc~nrhook of the internaticinalLaw
Cornmisirion 1972, pp. 337-338.)
In presenting its draft articles to the General Assembly in 1972, the Interna-
tional Law Commission noted that
"[vliolent attacks against diplomatic agents and other persons entitled to
special protection undcr international law not only gravelydisrupt the very
mechanism designcd to cffcctuate international CO-operationfor the safe-
''Article 72provides:
"1. In the applicationof the provisionsof the prcseniConvention the receiving
Stütcshallnot discriminütcas betweenStates.
2. However,discriminationshallnot be regardedas takingplace:
Conventionrereslrictivelybecauseofa restriciivcapplicationofthatprovisitoeits
consular postsin thesendingState;
(6)where by custom oragreementStatesextendtocachothermorefavourable
trçatmentthan is requircdby theprovisions afthe presentConvention."176 DlPLOMATlCAND CONSULAR STAFF
guarding of peace, the strengthening of international security and the
promotion ofthe generalwelfareofnations but also~reventthecarrvinnout
and fulfilmentofThe purpose and principles of the Charter of thé~iited
Nations." (II Yearboo oftheInrernationalLow Commission 1972.p. 3 12.)
On 14 December 1973 the General Assembly adopted by consensus the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internation-
ally Protected Persons, lncluding Diplomatic Agents(the New York Conven-
tion).(Resolution 3166 (XXVIII).) In the rcsolution of adoption the General
Assemblyalso noted the "serious threat to the maintenance and promotion of
friendly relationsandCO-operationamong States created by the commission of
suchcrimes". It re-emphasizedthe importance of principles ofinternational law
concerning the inviolability of, and special protection to be aflorded to,
internationally protected persons and the obligations of States in that regard.
The Preamble to the Convention thus States that "crimes against diplornatic
agents and other internationally protected persons jeopardizing the safety of
thesepcrsonscreate aserious threat to the maintenance of normal international
relations" and that "thcommissio o f such crimesis a mattcof graveconcern
to the international community ...".
The importance attributed by States to the New York Convention is evident
from the statements made at the General Assemblyin explanation of vote after
adoption of the Convention. Many of those statements explicitly reflect the
understanding that the Convention expresses firmlyestablished principles of
international law and furthcr strengthens these principles by providing a
mechanism for their reinforccment. Thus the representative of Canada stated
that thepurpose of the Convention was to "rcafirm this very important rulc of
inviolability inxpiicit terms and to provide strong and specificremcdies to
ensure that it is observed" (UN doc. AlPV.2202,p. 100).The representative of
Italy stated that the ltalian Government "wclcomes the fact that the new
Convention confirms and restates the principles incorporated in the Vienna
Conventionsand codifies rules aimed at making them rnorceffective"(UN doc.
AlPV.2202,p. 106).The representativeof the United Kingdomdeclaredthat the
Convention "is clearly founded on the acceptanccby al1parties of the comptete
illegality,without qualification, of such attacks" (UN doc. AlPV.2202p. 1II).
The representative of Portugal stated that the Convention unequivocally
reaffirms the principle that a diplomat cannot be attacked regardless of the
motives invoked to justify such an act" (UN doc. A/PV.2202, p. 129). The
representativeof Spainexpressedthe viewthat the Convention was "a matter of
strengthening rules ernbodiedincustomary international law,whichare already
contained in various multilateral conventions"(UN doc. AlPV.2202, p. 141).
The actions of the Government of lran constitute serious violations of the
New York Convention in the followingrespects.
(a) The Obiigation
Pursuant to Article4 of the NewYork Convention, the Government of lran is
under an international legalobligationto the United Statesto "CO-operatein the
prevention of the crimes" set forth in Article 2 of the Convention2". Those
l0Article2 provides:
"1: The intentionalcommissionof:
internationally protecperson;ther attackupon the person or liberty of an MEMORIAL 177
crimes include the "intentional commissionof: (a) ü murder, kidnapping or
other attack upon the person or liberty of an intcrnationally proiected person;
(h) a violentattack upon the officialpremises, the privatc accommodation or
the mcans of transport of an internationally protectedperson likelyto endangcr
his person or liberty; (c) a thrcat to commit any such attack; (4 an attempt to
commit any such attack; and (el an act constituting participation as an
accompliccin any such attack .. .". The obligationof the Government of Iran to
CO-operatcin the prevention of these crimes specificrtllyincludcs the taking of
"al1 practicable measures to prevent preparations in [its] terrilories for the
commission of those crimes" and "exchanging information and CO-ordinating
the iaking of adniinistrativc and other measures as appropriate to prevent the
commissionof thosc crimesn2'.
The rcquircment of prevcntive measures. as rcferred to in Article 4, is
consistent with the principles of customary international law and the more
spccial rcquirements to ensure inviolability and protection as set forth in the
Vjenna Convcntions on Diplomatic Relations and Consular Relations (ILC
Commentary on 1972draft Article 3, 11 Yearbook r$ the In~ernarionu law
Conrrnissinti1972, p. 317).The United States represcntative, in explaining his
vote on the resolution of adoption, stated that the "United States understands
this obligation to refer to doing thc utmost to prevent attcmpts to commit such
crimesor crinspiracyto commit suchcrimes" (UN doc. A/PV.2202, p. 135).The
prevcntivc measures required wouldVarywith the situation and would include
police or judicial action as the circumstances might demünd. Moreover, the
obligation to iake such measures is too important to bow to considerations of
cost: eventhough "the host or receivingState might haveto devoteconsiderable
resourccs to preventive rneasurcs ... it is its clear duty to take al1 necessary
(b) a violent attack upon the officiaipremiscs, thc privaie accommodation or the
mcans of transport of an intcrnationally protectcderson likely to endanger his
pcrson or liberty;
(cl a threat to commit an)' such attack;
Id) an atternpt to commit any such attack; and
(c) an act constituting participation asan accomplicc in such attack shall be
made by each State Party a crime under its internat law.
2. Eaçh Statc Party shitll makcthesccrimes punishable by appropriaie penalties
which iakc intoaccount thcir grave nature.
3. Pamgniphs I and 2 of ihie article in no way deroga~e fromthe obligations of
StatesPorties underinternational law to take dl appropriate measures to prevenl
othcr attacks un the person, frccdom or dignity of an internationally protcctcd
pcrson."
Article 4 provides:
"Statcs Parties shall CO-operinethe prevention ofthccrimes set forth in Article 2,
particul;irby:
(LI taking al1 practicablc measuresiopreveni preparÿtions in iheir respective
territories Torthe commission or those crimes withiOFoutside their territories;
(b) exchanging information and CO-ordinatingthc iaking of administrative and
other mcasures as appropriateto prevent the commission of those crimes.''
Z' Thc catcgory of "internationally protected persons" includcs, under Articlç 1,
paragraph 1(h). any representativc or offici:ilState who, al ihc tirne when and in thc
place where:icrime against him or his officialprcmiscs iscommittcd, isentitled pursuünt io
international lawto special protection from any attack his person, freedom or dignity.
The category clcarlyencompasses persons whoareentitledtothe bcnefits ofArticle 29orthe
Vicnna Convention on Diplomaiic Rcluiions. See Wood. "Thc Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents", 23 Infernufionnlund Comporafive Luii.Quarrertv,p.801(1974); ILC
Commcntary on 1972draft Article 1.II Yearbook of rhlnierno~ionaLow Cornmirsion1972.
p. 314.178 DlPLOMATlCAND CONSULAR STAFF
protective measures" (ILC Commentary on 1972drafi 'rticle 3, II Yearbook of
the InrernarionalLaw Commi~sion 1972, p. 317).
(b) The Breach
The Government of Iran has violated,and continuesto violatc,the provisions
of Articles 2 and 4 of the New York Convention. The events which have
occurred at the United States diplomatic mission in Tchran to date include the
intentional and knowing commissionof attacks upon the persons and liberty of
internationallv ~rotectedpersons, violentattacks UDOn the officia1oremisesand
the private kcommodat'ions of internationally prcitected pcrso'os likely to
endanger their persons and liberty, threats to commit further such attacks, and
actsconstituting participation asaccomplicesin suchattacks.Theseactionscould
not be excused even if the worthiest of motives were involved.Far from co-
operating in the prevcntionof thesecrimesand taking "al1practicablemeasures"
to Dreventtheir ureuaration. theGovernment of Iran has actuallvs~onsoredand
endorsed their cbrnkission. In factit has approved and praised ih&e crimesand
insisted on their prolongation in an effort to achieve political advantage. In
addition, the events in Tehran indicate a continuing disposition to permit or
commit still further attacks upon the persons or libcrty of internationally
protected persons-specifically. the threatened continued detention and punish-
ment of the hostages. Again, far fromCO-operatingin preventingtheseproposed
new crimes, the Government of Iran officiallythreatens their commission.
(a)TheObligafion
Pursuant to Article 7 of the New York Convention the Government of Iran,
being wellaware of the crimes which have been committed against theofficial
premisesand staff of the United Statesdiplomatic missionin Tehran, is underan
international legalobligation to the United States to submil the case against the
offendersto compelent lranian authorities for the purpose of prosecutionz2.
Article 7 has been described as the key provision of the cntire Convention.
(Wood, op.cil.,p. 810.See also ILC Commentary on 1972draft Article 6. II
Yearbaokof rhe InfernationalLaw Commission1972, p. 318.)Although Article7
allows the prosecutorial authorities to decide for themselveswhether or not to
prosecute (as the Cornmentary cited above makes clear), that determination
must be made in utmost good faith in the light of al1the circumstances. The
standard undcr Article 7 surely can be no less rigorous than that relating 10a
denial of justice through a failure or refusal to punish persons committing
offencesagainst another State's nationals.
(b) The Breach
The Government of Iran has violated,and continuesto violate,this obligation
in thatil has taken no stepswhatsoeverto apprehend those who have committed
the crimes at the United States diplomatic mission in Tehran or to submit the
case against such pcrsons to competent authorities for the purpose of prosecu-
tion or extradition. Indeed, the Government, including apparently the public
prosecuior's stan and the judiciary, have expresslystated their support for the
criminal activities involved.
'* Articl7 provides:
"The StatePartyinwhoseterritorytheallegedoffenderis piesenishallifitdoes
not extraditehim,submit, withoutexception whatsoeve rnd withoutunduedelay,
the case to its cornpetentauthoritiesfor the purposeof prosecution,through
proceedings inaccordance withthelawsof thatState."H. The Goizernmentof lran Has Violated, and Continues triViolate, Its Obliga-
tionsunderthe 1955 Treaty of Amity, EconornicRelations,and ConsularRights
to ProvidetheMost Constant Protection and Securityto UnitedStates Nationals,
andto ProvideReasonable andHumane Treatment to United States Nationals
inCustody,in Iran
In Article II,paragraph 4, of the Treaty of Arnity, Economic Relations, and
Consulür Rights between the United States of Arnerica and Iran of 1955, the
Governrnent of Iran pledged that United States nationals within its territory
would reccive "the most constant protection and sec~rity"~~.
This broad guarantec of security and protection is made more specific in the
Treaty wiih respect to nationals of one party who are incustody or detained in the
territory of the other party. Thus Article II, paragraph 4, of the Treaty requires
lran to provide "in everyrespect .. reasonable and hurnane treatmcnt" to United
States nationals in custody in Iran. Moreover, Articles II and XIX provide
unambiguously that any such detaincd national is entitled Io cornmunicate with
his own government to avail himsclf of the services of his consular officialsZ4.
23 Article II,paragraph 4, provides:
"Nationals of either High Contracting Party shall reccive the most constant
protection and security within the territories of the other High Contracting Party.
Whenany suchnational is incustody, he shallin every respectreceivereasonableand
humane treatmcnt; and, on his dcmand, the diplornaticor consular representativeof
hiscountry shall withoutunnecessarydelaybenotifiedand accorded fullopportunily
tosafcyard his interests. Meshall he promptly inforsnedof the accusationsagainst
him, allowcdal1Cacilitiesrcasonablynecessaryto hisdefenceand givena prompt and
impartial dispositionof his case."
24 Article XIX provides:
"A consular officer shall have the right within his district to:(ri)interview,
communicate with, assist and advise any nationals of thesending Sliite; (h) inquire
into any incidents which have occurrcd affectingthe interests OCany such national;
and (classist any such national in proceedings before or in relations with the
authorities of the receivingStateand, wherenccessary,arrange Corlegalassistanceto
which he isentitled.A national of the sendingStatçshallhavethe right al al1limesto
communicate with a consular ofhcer of his country and, unless subjcct to lawful
detenlion, to visit him at the consular office."
The Treaty ol Amity cantains the followingfurther consular provisions of pertinence to
this case:
Article XII1 provides:
"1.C:onsularrepresentativesof each High Contracting Party shüllbepcmitted lo
residein the territory of theother HighContractingParty at theplaccswhereconsular
oficers orany thirdcountryarepemitted toresideandat otherplaccsbyconsentofthe
other I-ligh Contracting Party. Consular oficers and employces shrill enjoy the
privilcgesand immuniiies accordedto officersand employees ofthçirrank or staius by
gcncralinternational usageand shall bepermittedto exerciseallfunctionswhicharein
accord;in~ withsuchusage;in uny cventtheyshallbetreated.subjectto reciprocity,in
a manner no lessfavourableihan similaro&cersand employeesOCany third country.
2. The consular ofices shall nobe entered by the policeor olher local suthorities
without the consentof the consular oficer, except that in the caseoffire or other
diwstei., or if the local authorities have probable caus10 believethat a crime of
violencshas beenor is about to becommitted in the consular office,consent to entry
shallbepresumed.ln no case shall theyexamineor seizethe papcrs ihere deposited."
Article XVIIl provides:
"Corisular oficers and employeesare not subjectto localjurisdictionforacts done
in thcir oficial character and within the scopeof their authority. No consular officer
or crnployeeshall be required to prcsent his officialfilesbcforc the courts or to make
declaration with respectto their contents."
It is plain that the actions acquicsccdin or cncouragedby the Government of lran are180 DlPLOMATICAND CONSULAR STAFF
These treaty provisions, which are standard formulations and appear in other
similar treaties of the United States and other countriesZ5, reflect a long-
establishedz6 and well-developed body of international law concerning the
treatment of alicnsZ7. The effect of the Treaty is to translate these generally
recognized and cxtensively applied principles of international law into a concrete
and cxplicit set of bilateral obligations.
(a) The Plain Meuning oJ the Provision
On its Cacc, and as hpplied to the facts of this case, the rneaning of the
undertaking of Iran-that United States nationals within its territory "shall
receive the most constant protection and securityW-is plain and peremptory.
Although the breadth of this language ieaves room for interpretation, itis clear
that, whatevcr the precise meaning, Iran is failing in itspresciibed duty in
pcrmitting United States nationals to be held hostage by a volatile rnob for a
period of months.
In other words, the precise content ascribed to the phrase "the most constant
protection and security" may well depend on thc circumstances of any particular
case, but if this provision of the Treaty means anything at al1 (as it must), il
precludes the Government of Iran from acquiescing in the: holding of United
Statesnationals hostage at the United States Embassy. That acquiescence plainly
has not given those nationats "the most constant protection and security" under
any possible reading of thosc words. Indeed, the very act of taking hostages to
extort concessions from a foreign State has in recent days ben recognized by the
United Nations General Assembly to be illegal and crirninalZ8.
inconsistent with these provisions. United States consular officershave been deniedtheir
privilegesand immunities, have not been permitted 10 cxercisetheir functions, have been
treated in a discriminatory fashion and have been threatened with subjection to local
jurisdiction: and United States consular onices have becnentered without the consent of
the cansular officerand papers deposited there have been seized.
"Sec, cg., United States of Amenca-Federal Republic of Gerrnany Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1954.Articles 1,III, and V; United Kingdom-
Iran Treaty of Commerce, Establishment and Navigation of 1959,in particular Article 8
(i) which s eaks of "constant and cornplete protection and security".
'6Sec, 8oebçt. ''The international Responsibility of States TorInjuries Sustaincd by
Alienson Account of Mob Violence,Insurrectionsand CivilWars", 8AmericanJournul I$
Interna~ionulLawp ,. 802(1914),whichtracestheoriginsof this bodyofinternational Iawto
the concept of Gaslrecht or "rights of hospitality" which existed between early teutonic
tribes.
27Seegenerally, 8 M. Whiteman, Digesrof InrernnrionalLaw. pp. 697 er seq. (1967):5
G. Hackworth, Digest of International Laiv, pp. 471-851 (1943); 6 J. B. Moore,
fnrernotionafLaw, pp. 605-1037(1906); 2 C. C. Hyde, International Law, pp. 871-1012
(2nd ed., L945)E ;. Borchard, Diplomaiic Prorection of Cirizens Abroad (1915): A.
Freeman. InternationalResponsibiliiyof Sratcsfor Dcnialof Justice (1938);C. Rousseau,
Droit IniernationalPublic,pp. 119ciseq. (1973);J.C. Castel, InternaiionalLaw. pp. 1069
et .scq(1976);D. P. O'Connell, Internu~ionalLaw, pp. 941 PIseq. (1970);S. Oda, "The
individualin International Law", in Sorensen, Munualof Public InrernarionulLaw. pp.
469, 483,485 (1968); A. von Verdross and K. Zernanek, Volkerrecht,at p. 292 (4th cd.,
1959);L. Sohn and R. Baxter, "Convention on the lntcrnatictnal Responsibilityof States
for Injuries to Alicns", Article 5, in F. V. Garcia-Amador, L. Sohn, R. Baxter, Kewnt
CodrJicurinn($the Law of State Responsihilityfor Injuriesro rlliens.pp. 179erseq. (1974).
28On 17December 1979,the GeneraI Asscmblyadopted by consensusthe Convention
against the Taking of Hostages. It recognizes"that the taking of hostages is an act which
endangers innocent human livesand violates human dignity", and binds States Parties to
submit for prosecutionor to extradite any person whoviolatesthe Convention byan act of
hosfage-taking. The texi of the Convention is found at Annex 55 of this Memorial. (6) Provisionf)r Consrant Profection und Securify lmpurfs theMinimum
Simdard of Treotment Due to All Aliens
It seems indisputable that the duty to afford "the most constant protection
and security" to nationals of anothcr State involves an affirmative obligation to
take appropriate measures to ensurc that alicns so protcctcd are treated in a way
that would guarantee io them at least that minimum standard of treatrnent
which is rccognized by the international comrnunity as due to all aliens. That a
State has such a responsibility under international law, independent of any
specific treaty commitment, is rnanif~st~~.As was stated in the Neerscase, "The
propriety of governmental acts [with respect to the treatment of aliens] should be
put to the test of international ~tandards"~'.
So mensurcd, the obligation to afford the most constant protection and
security must mcan no less than thai treatment of an alien is unlawful if it
"amount[s) to an outrage, to bad hith, to a wilful neglect of duiy, or to any
insufficiencyof govcrnmcntal action so farshort of international standardsthat
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency" 31.
The applicability or such an internationally recognized minimum standard of
treatment" was rccognized by the Court in its Order of 15December 1979when
it stated ttiat "the purpose of [Article 5 of the Vienna Convention of 19631is
precisely to cnablc the sending State, through ils consulates, ta cnsure that its
nationals arc accorded the treatment due to them under the general rules of
internatiorial law as aliens within the territory of the foreign State" (para. 19).
It is not neccssary for the purposcs of this case to definc precisely what is
required by an intcrnationally recognized minimum standard of treatment.
Whatevcr thc outer limits of the Iawmay be, it is wellestablished that, at its core,
it means that aliens are entitled tobe frcefrom arbitrary or discriminatory arrest
and dctcntion and must not be treated in a cruel, inhuman or degrading
manner
l9 See.inier aliutheB. E. Chatiin Cuse(Uni~edStaresojdrnericu v. Mexico), Opinions
ofihe Commi,îsionc?r[19271 p.422; RéckumutionB srirunniquesDuns Lu Zone E.~pagnokdu
Muroc (Accord Anglo-Espagnol du 29 Mai 1923, "Rapport surles responsabilités de
t'Etat dans les situations viséespar les rkclamationsbritanniques"), II Recueil des
Sentenc~sArbiirulc.~.pp.613, 639.
30 L. F.6. Necr and Pouline E.Neer (UoiiedStutrs ofAmerica v.Mexico), Opinions of
the Commi.ssicitte[1927],pp. 71, 73.
3' Areer.op.ci!.at p. 73.
Opinion.7of the Cn?imLr.rioners.119271.sp.l42nwhere the tribunal statcd rhat M"itcnot
ir;frequentiyhappensthat undertheruies'ofinternationallawappliedto controversiesof
an internationalüspccta nation isrequircdio accord to aliensbroiidcrand moreliberil
treatment thüiitaccordstoits owncitizensunderitsmunicipallaws".Seealso, The Harry
Roberts Ckiini (United Sfnies Americu v. Me.rico), (7pinion~ r.f!lie Commissiuners
[1927],p. 100,inwhichthetribunalrejectedthe argumentthat theclaimant was entitledto
no morethan national treatrnent.Thetribunalhcld, "...equality[oftreaimcnt]isnot the
ultimateicsiof the praprietyof the acts orauthoritiesunderinternationallaw.The test,
broadlyspeiiking. iswhetheraliensare ireated in accordancewiihordinarystandardsof
civilization."See generalry.E. Borchard, "The Minimum Standard ofTreatmentof
Aliens". 38 Michigun hiv Reriew, p. 445(1940).
33 On Frccdomfromarbitraryarrest and dctention,seeChartin, op.cil.and,generally,1
M. Whiteman. Damages in International hw, pp. 287 fitseq. Whiteman recordsand
catalogues numerouscases in which a State was held responsiblefor acts constituling
arbitraryarrcstand detention.On crueland inhurnane treatment,see The Harry Roberts
Claim.op. cil.and I M. Whiteman. Damuges inInternurianal Law.TheCourt rccognized
in the Co(fi Chitnn~l Crtsr. Merirs, JudgntcntI.C.J. Reports 1949. p. 4 at p. 22. thal
"elementaryconsidcriilionsof humanity, evcn more exacting in peace than in war"
belonged IO lhc"generaland well recognizedprinciples"creatingobligationsunderinier-
nationallaw.Seealso A. vonVerdrossand K. Zemanek, Volkerrecht.p. 81(4thed..1959).182 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULAR STAFF
(c) Provisionfor Constant Protecrion and Securiry Imports Fundamental
Standards of Human Righls
It has been and remains the established position of many States, including the
United States, that States have an international legal obligation to observe
certain minimum standards in their treatment of aliens. It is the position of the
United States in this case that Iran's commitment to afford United States
nationals in Iran "the most constant protection and security" obligates Iran, at
the very least, to comply with those minimum standards.
In urging thelatter position upon the Court, theUnited Statcs recognizes that,
as pointed out by Garcia-Amador, the question whether such minimum
standards oftreatment for aliens exist as a matter of customary international law
has been a subject of some controver~~~~.It has been argued that no such
standard can or should exist, but such force as that position may have had has
gradually diminished as recognition of the existence of certain fundamental
human rights has sprcad throughout the internationalcommunity. The existence
of such fundamental rights for al1human beings, nationals and aliens alikc, and
the existence of a corresponding duty on the part of every State to respect and
observe them, are now reflected, inter alia, in the Charter of the United
Nations3', the Universal Declaration of Human RightsJ6 and corresponding
portions of the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights3', regional
conventions and other instruments defining basic human right~~~, and
the international law relating to acts of terrorism, including the taking of
ho stage^^^.
In view of the universal contcmporary recognition that such fundamental
human rights exist for nationals and aliens alike, Iran's obligation to provide
"the most constant protection and security" to United States nationals in Iran
includes an obligation to observe those rights-and yet it is indisputable that the
Government of Iran has violated that obligation. For example, a host of States,
includin Iran, are parties to the lnternational Covenant on Civil and Political
~ighis~~,and Articles 9 and 10 of that Covenant provide as rollowr:
"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
...........................
Al1persans deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person."
By allowing and endorsing the arbitrary and inhumane detention of United
States nationals in Tehran, the Government of Iran has plainly violnted these
fundamental principles, which today are principles not only of customary
international law but of the modern, conventional law of human rights. As
observed by this Court in ils Order of 15 December 1979,the conduct of the
34F. V. Garcia-Amador,"State Responsibiiityin the Light of the New Trends of
lnternationalLaw", 49 American JolournaollnternationaLaw,pp. 339,343.
36UniversalDeclarationNorHumanRights.Seein particularArticles3, 5, 79, 12 and
13.
3'lnternationalCovenant on Civiland PoliticalRights.Seein particularArticles7, 9
and 12.
3ESee,forexample,the Charter ofthe Organizationof AmericanStatcs,Article 5:the
1948 American Declaration or the Rights and Duties of States; the 1955 European
Convention forthe Protectionof Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
39See,for example,the United Nations Conventionagainst the Taking of Hostages,
Annex 55 to this Mernorial.
4aThe United Statesis asignatory. MEMORIAL 183
Government of lran has exposed and isexposingthe United States nationals in
Tehran "to privation, hardship, anguish and evendanger to lifeand hcalth and
thus to a scrious possibilityof irreparableharm" (at para. 42).That beingso, it
necessarifylollowsthat Iran has violated its treaty obligation to provide United
States nationalsn lran with "the most constani protection and securiiy".
2. IRAN'OBLIGATI OONTREAT THOSE UNITED STATE S ATIONA LS
CUSTOD YN A HUMANE AND REASONABM LEANNE RND PROVID TE~EM WlTH
Acc~ss TO CONSULA SERVICES
As Hackworth States, "The rule of international law is well settledanhat
alicnwho has beentaken into custody by the authorities ofa State isentitled to
receive from those authorities just and humane treatment, regardless of the
offencewith whichhe is~har~ed"~'. The cornmitmentspelledout in Article II,
paragrriph4,and ArticleXIX oftheTreaiy of Amiiy,EconomicRelations, and
Consulür Rights is a reflectionand emphatic reiteration of thisell-settled
ruf~~~.
As previouslyexplained,the facts of this case compel the conclusionihat the
treatmentof the hostagesnow beingheld at thc United States EmbassFallshr
belowwhat could bc describedas humant andreasonabletreatment. Moreovcr,
the facts cstablish beyond any doubt that the Government of lran has not
permittedthe hostagesto communicatewith theirGovemment or to haveaccess
to United Statcsconsular officials.
Thus, in these vital respects as well it is clcar beyond dispute thai the
Governmeniof [tanstands inflagranviolatioofitsinternationaobligat/onsas
those obligationsare prescribedbycustomary international law and specifiedby
the tcrmsof theTreaty of Amity, Economic Relations,and Consular Rights.
4'5 G.tlrickworth,Digest olnicrnu~ionLuw, 606.
42See,in ihis regard, the Universal Dccofbuinan Kights,supra, in pürùcular
Articles 5, 7, and 9; International CofCivil andPoliticRights, in particular
Articles7.!),a10;seealso UN General Assemblyresolution(XXX), "Declarition
on the Protection of AI1 Persons fBeingSuhjccted to Torture and Other Cruel,
InhurnanorDegradingTreatrnent or Punishment". inpariicular Article4;and,3 and
the United Nations Standard Minimumesfor the Tretitmentof Prisoners,adopted by
the First Unitcd Nations Congress on the Prevcnlion of Crime and the Trcatment of
Offenders. A/CONF/6/1, Annex 1A. Notalsothe Drart Body of Pnnciples for thc
Protection or All Persans Under Any Form of Dcirlmprisonmentadopted by the
Economic~indSocialCouncil on IOMay 1979,resolution 1979134. PARTV
IFIRANWERETO ALLEGETHATTHE UNITEDSTATES ITSELF HA$
VIO1,ATED THE TREATIES UPON WWICH THE UNITED STATES
RELIESIN THIS CASE,SUCHALLECATIONSWOULDNOT DETRACT
FROMTHE CLAIMSASSERTEDBYTHE UNITED STATES
Various lranian spokesrnen havestated or implied that some of the rnembers
of the United States Embassy in Tehran may have been engaged in functions
(specifically,nformation-gathering or intelligencework) thal are not contem-
plated byArticle 3of the ViennaConvention on Diplomatic Relations'and that
such actions, and the use of Embassy premisesfor such purposes,justify Iran's
failure to accord inviolabilityto United States diplomatic agents and premises
under Articles22and 29-35of the ViennaConvention on Diplomatic Relations.
But evenif-contrary to fact-the Govcrnment of lran had proved to the Court
that in one or more respects the United States or the members of its Embassy
had vioiatcdone or more obligations under the ViennaConvention, there would
be no ground for finding that such violations excuse Iran from the legül
obligations previouslydescribed in this Memorial.
It may bc noied at the outset that rcliance on Article 3 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations as a cornprehensivecatalogueof functions
of diplomatic missionswould not be justified. The introductory phrase of that
Article, which includes the words,"inrcr alia", rnakes plain that Article 3 was
not intended to list exhaustively ail propcr diplomatic functions or to siate
definitivelimitations on diplomatic activity.
Conceivably lran might neverthelesspoint to the fact that Artic3 (1)(4 of
the Convention lists,among the functionsof a diplornaticmission,"ascfrtaining
hy al1luwful means conditions and developments in the sending State" (italics
added) and argue on that basis that, if any United States diplomatic agent in
Iran had gathercd information by means which werenot lawful under lranian
law, suchconduct would have violatedArticle 3 (1) (d) and would now providc
justification for Iranian violations of othcr provisions of the Convcntion.
Such an argument wouldsufferfrom two vitiatingdeficiencies.First, there are
absolutely no facts bcfore this Court suggestingthat any United States national
violatcd any lranian law. Secondly, and even more importantly. even if,
argucndo.such facts were before the Court, it is clear asmatter of customary
international law-which in this respect is codifiedand rcfiecledin Article9 of
'Articl3 provides:
"1. The functions of a diplomaiic mission consistdia,in:
(u) representingthe sendingState in the receivingState;
(h) protecting in the receivingState the intcrestsof the sendinoftits and
nationals, withinthe limitçpermitted hy international Law;
(clnegotiaiingwith the Governrnent of the receivingState;
receivingState, and reporting thertothe Government of the sending Statc;e
(t.promoting friendly relations betwccn the sending State and the receiving
Statc, and developing their economic. culandascicntificrelations.
performance of consular functions by a diplomatic mission."as preventing thethe VicnnaConvcntion on Diplornatic Relations2-that the sole remcdy avail-
able to lran as against such supposed unlawful activitics by foreign diplomatic
agents would be to notify the United States that the accused pcrsons were
persont] non grara and thus to require their recall to the United States3. No
matter whiit evidence the Governrnent of lran may believeit possesses as against
any Unitcd States diplomatic agent, member of thc administrative or technical
staff, or consular oficer, such evidence could not possibly juçtify the lranian
conduct which has taken place at the United States Ernbassy in Tehran.
On a rclated theme Iran might also argue that if United States personnel
violatcd the laws of Iran, such conduct violated Article 41 of the Vienna
Convcntion on Diplomatic Relations-requiring respect for "the laws and
regulations of the receiving State" and non-interference in its "intcrnal affairs"
-and thcrcby excused Iran rrom its treaty obligations to respect the inviolabi-
liiy of such personnel and of the premises of the Embassy4. The legislative
history of Article 41 conclusivelyshows, ho\vcvcr, that even if, argiiendo,Iran
could prove such violations to the Court, Iran could not properly rely on that
Articlc to excuse it from performance of thc obligations imposed by othcr
articles of the Convention. Paragraphs (1) and (4)of thc authoritative commen-
tary of thc Internaiional Law Commission on the text of Article 41 cxplain that
the introduciory phrase of paragraph I of that Article-"Without prejudice to
their privilcgcs and immunities"-means that "ïuilure by a diplomatic agent to
Culfilhis obligations docs not absolve the receiving State from its duty io respect
the agent's immunity". Similarly, paragraph 4 of the Commentary statcs that
îailurc to fulfilthe duty laid down in paragraph 3 of Article 41 "does not render
Articlc [22] (inviolability of themission's prcmiscs) inoperative ..."'.
Article9 providcs:
"1.ThereceivingSiütemayat any timeand withou~havingtuexplain itsdecision,
notifythe sendingStalcthai theheadofthemissionoranymemher ofthe diplomatic
siaffol'the missionispersonanunRrala or that anyothermemberOSthestaKof the
missioiiisnot acceptable.In anycase, the sendingState shall.as appropriate,either
recallthepersonconcernedorterminatehisfunctionswiththemission. A personmay
be dcclared nongruiu or not acceptableberorearrivinginthetemiory of ihc receiving
Slaie.
ohligii~ionsundcr parügraphusIof this Article, thc receivingStatc may refuse to
recognizethe pcrsonconcerncd as amembcr ofthe inission."
00th thc United Statesand Iran itself have rollowcd the prexribed procedurein
the past. 1111956,for example.a Sovietmilitary attachéin Tehran was suspectedof
espionagcnctivity. and the Government OC Iran, recognizingthe atiachk'sdiplomatic
status,expelledhim. C. E.Wilson, Biplomaric Privilege.and Immunitics.p. 63. n. 115
(1967). Similarly,in 1978 the United States declared a Sovietdiplomat persona non
grata in ri~ughlysirnilar circumstances. Unired S1arc.7v. Enger. 472 F. Supp. 490
(D.N.J. 1978).
Article41provides:
"1.Withoutprejudiccto thcirprivilegesandimrnunities, iisthedutyof XIIpersons
cnjoyiiigsuch privilegcsand immunitiesto respectthe lawsand regulationsof the
recciving State. They ûlso haveaduty not ta intcrferein the internaanairsof that
Slatc.
2. Al1ofiçial businesswith the receivingState cnlrusted to the mission by the
scndingState shallbcconducicdwithor throughthe Ministryfor ForcignAfTairsof
ihe receivingStateorsuchoiher ministry as may be agreed.
3.The premises of the mission mustnot be used inanymanner incompatiblewith
thefunctionsor themission as laiddownin theprcsentConventionor by otherrules
ol'gencralinternationaltawor by anyspecialagreementsinforcebetwecnthe scnding
and thc receivingStatc."186 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULAR STAFF
It is accordingly clear that alleged violations by the United States of its
obligationsunder the relevant treaties would not-even if provedaetract from
the governing obligations which Iran owes to the United States in this case. Nor
would such alleged violations in any way mitigate the multiple, profound and
proven violations of those obligations by the Government of the Islarnic
Republic of Iran. Thc consequent responsibility of the lranian Government
under international law to the Government of the United States will bc
addressed in the next Part ofthis Mernorial. PART VI
THE RELIEFSOUCHT BY THE GOVERNMENTOF THE UNITED
STATES
Thc United States respcctfully rcqucsts that the Court grani the relief specified
bclow.
A. The Proposed Declaration bythe Court of Iran'sViolations of the kgal
Obligations ItOwes to the UnitedStates
The multiple and profound violations by the Islarnic Republic of Iran of its
intcrnationlil obligations to the Unitcd States, under ihe four trcaties on which
rcliancc has been placed, has bccn dcmonstratcd in Lhcforegoing Parts of thiç
Mcrnorial. The Court is accordingly rcquested to adjudge and declare that Iran
has violated and is in continuing violation of thcse internalional obligations.
Thc purpose of such a dcclaration is to "ensure recognitionof a situation at
law, once and for al1and with binding force as bctween the Parties, so ihat the
tcgal position thus cstablished cannot again bc called in question in so Faras the
Icgrilcffcctsensuing therefroni are concerned". InlerliretntionofJudgmcnts Nos.
7 cinrl8(Factnry UICliorzriw),Jutkmeni No. f /,1.927,P.C.I.J..SL'T~LA.S'O.13,
p. 20.
B. The ProposedDeterminationbythe Court that Iran 5hal1Perform Its
Spccitic Legal Obligsfiunstowards the UnitedStates
A dcçlatation by thc Court as to the applicability of the rclcvani treaty
provisions to the conduct involved will remove any uncertainty as to the lcgal
status of that conduct. but it cannot of itsclf constitiite appropriale satisfaction
in :icasc of thiskind. In this rcspcct the present case contrasts withthevery
diffcrcnt circumstanccs of thc Corjir Channel cusc (Merits, Judgment. I.C.J.
Rep(~r(.s1949, p. 4 at p. 36), wherc this Court held that its declaration ofa
violation of Albania's sovereignty constituted in itsclf appropriatc satisfaction.
In that case the United Kingdom had conducted a mine sweeping opcration in
'IhcCorfu Channcl aftcr two British dcsrroyerskad sstruckmineswith consider-
ablc loss of lifc. Bcforc the mineswceping operatiori took place, the Albanian
Govcrnmeiit statcd ihat "it did not consider it inconvcnient that the Britfleet
should undertake lhc swceping of ihc channel of navigation" but maintained
that any swecping without its conscnt would bc a "deliberate violation of
Albaniün tcrritory and sovereignty". It was accordirigly clear that Albania had
sustaincd rio actuül damage from thc mineswccping operation and that, in
circumstances wherc no further iiiinesweeping was contcmplaied, the declara-
lion by the Court that "the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of
Albanian sovereignty" did indeed constitute "appropriatc satisfaction" (ihid.,
pp. 33, 35,36).
In thc cxtraordinary circumstanccs of this casc,howcver, Iran is cngaged in
continuing, damziging, illcgal conduct, of an irreparablc charactcr, and it is
khereforeincumbcnt on the Court to prescribe.in a judgment on the merits
binding upon Iran, the specificsieps which Iran niust take to cease its violations188 DlPLOMATlC AND CONSULAR STAFF
of its international: obligations. This Court should declare not only that the
cxisting situation is illegal, but that lran rnust bring that situation to an end-
and at once. As the Court held in its Advisory Opinion on the Lcgnl
Consequencesfur Stores of the ContinuedPresenceof South Afiica in Nanrihia
(South West AfricaJ not~vithsrunding Security CouncilResolutinn276 (1970).
Advisory Opinion,I.C.J. Reports 1971. p. 16al p. 54:
"A binding dctermination made by a cornpetent organ of the United
Nations to the effect that a sjluation is illegal cannot remain withoui
consequencc. Once the Court is füced with such a situation, it would bc
failingin the dischargeofits judicial functions ifdid not dcclare that thcrc
is an obligation, especiallyupon Members of the United Nations, to bring
that situationto an end. As ihis Court has held, referring to one of iis
decisions dcclaring a situation as contrary to a rule of international law:
'Thisdecisionentails a legalconsequence, namely,that of putting an end to
an illegal situation (I.C.J. Reporls 195p. XZ)'."
The Court's reference was to itsjudgment in the Haya de la Torrecase, I.C.J.
Reports 1951,p. 71 at p. 82, where, having found that Colornbia had grantcd
asylurn irregularly, the Court held that it was "bound10 tcrrninate it". No lcss
can the Government of Iran be bound here to terminate its illegülholding of the
hostages and its occupation of the premises of the United States Embassy in
Tehran.
The steps which Iran must take are in factclearly and esscntially set forth in
the Order of the Court of 15December 1979,and in the repcated resolutions of
the Security Council, particularly thatr 31 December 1979.They are specificd
in fullparticularity in the final conclusions of this Mernorial.
C. The Proposcd Determinationby the Courtthat theUnitedStates 1sEntitlcd
tothe Pavment of Reoarations bv lran for Violationsof theInternationalLeeal
~bli~a'tionwshich~ran Owes to the UnitedStateç
The United States further requests that the Court adjudgeand declare that ihc
United States is cntitled, in ils own right and in the exercise of its right of
diplornatic protection of its nationals, to the payment of reparations by Iran
the latter's violationsof the international legal obligations which it oto ihc
United States in respect of the seizure of ils Ernbassy and Consulates and the
holding of its nationals as hostages.
The Court's jurisprudence establishcs that "the breach of an engagement
involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate Tocm.Reparation
thereforeis the indispensablecomplement of a failureto apply a convention and
thereis no neccssityfor this to be stated in the convention itself." (Facrorya!
Chorzbw,Jurisdiction,JudgmentNo. 8. 1927.P.C.I.J.,SeriesA, No. 9, p. 21; sce
also Repararionfor InjuriesSufered intheService of the UniiedNations.Advisory
Opinion 1,C.J.Reports 1949, p. 174,atp. 184.) ndeed,in thc COI& Ctilianneciase
(Merits,Judgment.I.C.J. Reports 1949.p.4 at pp. 23-24),this Court stated that it
followsfrom theeslablishment of the rcsponsibilityof a Stateforthe breachofan
international obligation "that compensation is due".
Reparation must, as far as possible, "wipe out al1 the conscquences of thc
illegal act and re-establish the situatio~ which would, in al1probability, have
existed if that act had not been comrnittcd" (Factory ut Cf~orzhrr,M, erils.
JudgmentNu. 13. 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47). Though the darnage
suffcredby individuals inay serveasa convenient scale for the calculation of thc
reparation due to the State, the damage sufferedby the Statc itsclfrnust also be
considered (ibid.. ~itp. 28).
In thc case bcfore the Court, thc United States asserts its right to hll MEMORIAI. 189
çompcnsation for thc injuries sufiercd both by the United States as a State and
by iis nationals as victims of Iran's untawfui actions. It may be notcd that, in
rcspcct of the rule of thc nationality of claims, ail thosc for whom the right of
diplornatic protection is asserted wcrc nationals of the United States üt the time
of their scixure and remain so.
It may also be noted ihat in this case, involving a direct violation by a Stateof
trcaty obligations which it oives to anothcr State, therc cün bc no proper
suggestion that the United Statesnationals involvcd should havc cxhausted local
rcincdics. Since direct injury to United States interests is involvcd, the cxhaus-
tion rule is no1 applicable. Artlordcgthe Arhitruliori CUWBetwcw~the Govern-
mcnrcij'tilcUnited Sruks clJ'Americarind[lieCvi~ertrntenorf His Mujesty theKing
qfEupi c~~ncertzititghe Claim of George J. Sulein. 2 Reports ($ Infernational
Arbitral Aivarc~s,p. 1194;Swiss Contfiderritiot~v. Federol Ropuhlicof Ccrn~uny.
InternurionalLaiif R~~orrs,Vol. 25, 1958-1,pp. 33, 42; Cose cunccrning~heAir
Services dgreenien! rfl27 Mnrch 1946 (Utiireri States of Arriericn V. France),
Arhitrrrl Aivard of Y Becerrtb~r1978. paragraph 30 (unpublishcd); T. Meron,
"Thc Incidence of thc Rulc of Exhauslion or Local Rcmedies", in 35 British
Yeur Rook ~Jf~nternatiflrirli.UMpp.. 83-84(1959);A. Frccman, TheInternutiunui
Respnrr.sihili!yoj'StcrtesjOr Betziar$ Justice, pp. 404-40s (1938).As the then
Profcssor Roberto Ago, the International Law Commission's Spccial Rappor-
tcur on Stlite Responçibility, stated concerning cases wherc both the rights ofa
Statc and the nghts of private pcrsons have bccn involved, "il was gcncrally the
infringerncntaTthe rightsof the State which took precedcncc"'. Moreover, the
rule of the exhaustion ol'local rcmedies is not :ipplicable hcrc bccause, quite
obviousiy, in Iran today thcrc arc no lociil rcmedies to exhaust.
In viewof thc continuing charactcr of Iran's urilawful activitics, it is not now
possible to asscssal1 of thc cicmcnts, still Icssthe full extent, of thc reparations
duc io thc United Slütcs and iu nationals. The Unitcd States accordingly
proposes to rescrve to a latcr siagc of the proceedings the prcsentation of
documentation and argumentation in respect of the elemenis. dimensions, and
cvaluation of its claims.
At this time, howcvcr, ii is appropriate for thc Court to adjudge and declare
theprinciplc thai repiralion is due to the Unitcd States in this case, onits own
bchaIf and on behalf of its nationals. Thc FisheriesJuri.sdictioncase (Federal
Rclprrbliruj"Grrm~itz~v. I~el~nd),Mtlriis. Jitr(rment,I.C.J. Reports1974, p. 175
titpp. 203-706,indicatcs that, under propcr circumst;~nces,such a rcqucst will be
grantcd. Thcrc the Cour1 stated thai "[ilt is possible to rcquest a generül
dcclaraiion estüblishing the principle that compensation is due, providedthc
clairnant asks the Court to rcceive cv~dcnceand to determine, in a subsequent
phasc of the sameproceedings, the amount of damage to bc asscsscd" (ibid., at
p. 204). This is exactly what the United Stütcs proposes in the present case.
Enunciation of ~hcright 10 compensation in this case would not tica truism or
nsuperfiuous act. This Court can best uphold the rulçof law in ihc international
community by emphilsizing that scrious brcnchcs of international law are not
without consequencc. Affirmation of cntillcmcnt to rcparation willserve, though
not satisfy. this purposc. When the prcscnt crisis has passed with the freeing of
the hostages, the Unitcd States hopcs to begin early discussions with Iran on the
rcsoluiion of outstanding disputes. To faciliiaie the commcnccmcnl of ihese
discussions and their progress toward a mutually satisfactory rcsoluiion of al1
claims. thc United Sttitcs rcquests the Court to confirm that thc United States
must bc made wholc with respectto a11injuriessuffertd by it and its nationals for
whiçh Iran isinternationally responsible. DlPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF
D. Final Conclusions
For the foregoing reasons, the Govcrnrnentof the United States respectfully
requests that the Court adjudge and declare as follows:
(a) that the Government of the lslamic Republic of Iran, in permitting,
toleraii~g,encouraging,adopting, and endeavauring tu exploit,as wellas in
failingto prevent and punish, the conduct describedin the Statement of the
Facts, violated its international legal obligations to the United States as
provided by:
- Articles 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 37, 44 and 47 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplornatic Relations;
- Articles5,27,28, 31, 33,34,35,36,4 and 72of the ViennaConvention
on Consular Relations;
- Article II (4), XIII, XVlll and XIX of the Trealy of Amity, Econornic
Relations, and Consular Rights betwecn the United Statcs of America
and Iran; and
- Articles2.4 and 7 of the Convention on the Preventionand Punishment
of Crimes against lnternationally Protected Persons, including Diplo-
matic Agents;
(6) that, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations;
(i) the Government of the lslamic Republic of Iran shall immediately
cnsure that the premisesof the United States Embassy, Chancery and
Consulatesare restored to thc possessionof the United States authori-
ties under their exclusivecontrol, and shall ensure their inviolability
and effectiveprotection as providcdTorby the treaties in forcebetween
the two States,and by general international law;
(ii) the Government of the Islamic Republic of lran shall ensure the
irnmediate releasc, without any exception, of al1 pcrsons of United
States nationülity who are or have bcen heJd in the Embassy of the
United States of Arnerica or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Tchran, or who are or have been hcld as hostages elscwhere, and
aford full protection to al1 such pcrsons, in accordancc with the
treatiesin force betweenthe two States,and with generalinternational
law;
(iii) the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall as from that
moment, afford to al1the diplomatic and consular personnel of the
United States the protection, privilegesand immuniticsto which they
generalinternational law,includingirnmunityfromanyformofcriminaler
~urisdictionand freedornand facilitiesto leave the territory oIran:
(iv)the Government of the Islamic Republicof lran shall, in afTordingthe
diplornaticand consular personnel of the United States theprotection,
privilegesand irnmunitiesto which theyare entitled, includingimmu-
nity frorn any form of criminal jurisdiction, ensure that no such
personnel shall beobligedto appear on trial or as a witness,deponent,
source of information, or in any other role, at any proceedings,
whether formalor inforrnal,initiated by or withthe acquicscenceof the
lranian Government, whether such proceedings bc denominated a
"trial", "grand jury", "international commission" or otherwise;
(v) the Government of the Islarnic Republic of lran shall submit to ils
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, or extradite to
the United States,those persons responsiblefor the crimescommitted
against the personnel and premisesof the United States Embassyand
Consulates in Iran;(cj that thc United States of America isentitled to the payment to it, in its own
~ighland in thc cxcrciseofils rightof diplornutic protection orils nationals
held hostagc, of rcparation by the Islamic Kcpublic of Iran for the
violations of the above international legal oblig:itions which it owcs to the
United States, in sum to be determined by thc Court ata subsequent stage
ofthe procccdings.
(Signeci)Roberts B. OWEN,
Agent for the Govcrnrnent of
the United States of America.
12January 1980.
STATEMENTOF VERIFICA'TION
1, David D. Newsom.certify and dcclare the following:
1. Iam Undcr Sccrctary for PoliticalAAàirs,ofthe United States Department
of Siate.1have bccn vcstcd by thc Sccrctary of Statc with overall rcsponsibility
within the Depürtmcnt for mattcrs relatingto the crisis in Iran.
2. In this capacity,1have closcly rnonitored events since the üttück on the
Unitcd States Embassy in Tehran bcgan. In the circumstanccs of thiscase'the
United Stares has had to rely on ncwspaper, ~clevisionand radio reports for a
numbcr of the hcts statcd in the Mcmorial. The fucts statcd in the Memonal of
the Unilcd States10 the Court arc. to the best olmy knowledgeand bclicf>true.
(Signi~d) David D. Nirwso~.
11January 1980. ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL
Annex 1
ByHenry S. Bradsher, Washington Star Staff Writer
The Iranian Government promiscd three times to protect the US Embassy in
Tehran, a US officia! says, but when militants attacked it last Sunday the
promised help failed to arrive.
American diplomats and Marine guards held out in the main ernbassy
building for almost three hours bcfore being captured. lranian protective forccs
were stationed just five minutes away, the oficial said.
His brief account was given to reporters yesterday in dcnying charges that the
US Government was unprepared for trouble in Tehran. Later, other sources
supplied additional details of the situation leading up to the taking of some 60
American hostages.
Aftcr an initial period of uncertainty when the Embassy fefl, the Carier
administration now has taken a number of initiatives to try to obtain the
hostages' release. It has Ratly rejectcd the militants' dernand for the rofurn
dcposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
Thc initiatives will caketime to producc results, the sources said. 11is siill ioo
early to tell which ones might be productive.
These sources, familiar with the background to the hostage situation, süid the
administration had been aware of a probably hostile lranian reaction to
admitting the Shah to the United States. When the ;idrninistration dccided 10
acccpt thc advice of his doctors that he needcd rnedical treatinnNew York,
the subject was discussedwiththeGovernment of lranian Prime Minister Mehdi
Baziirgan.
The US Chargéd'affairesin Tehran, L. BruceLaingen, discussed the situation
with Bazargan'sforeign minister, Ibrahim Yazdi. Twicebefore the Shah arrived
in New York, October 22, and once again later. Laingen received assurances
that the Governmcnt would carry out the internationally recognizcd obligation
to prolect foreign embassies.
Bazargan's governrnentwasalrcady lookingshaky. Fruslrated by his inability
to control the situation in Iran and repcated conRictswith religiousauihorities,
he had several times offered his resignation to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
who has dominated Iran since the Shah fell in January.
But Yazdi had been aclosecolleague of Khomeini'sand was rumoured to be
on his shadowy Revolutionary Council, so Yazdi'sword sccmed to carry weight
frorn the religious as well as the governmental authonties. And Yazdi was the
man who had intervened with militants to freethe US Emb!ssy staff whenit was
captured once berore, on February 14.
The staff numbered around 1,000 just before the Shah fell. After the
February incident, it was slashcd to 80. By last Sunday, 73 Americans wcre
assigned. MEMORIAL 193
Sccuriiy plans wcre carcfullymade for them so they could dclay any attackers
until hclp arrived. But US officialshave rcpcatedly emphasized this weekthat no
cmbassy can bccomc a Cortress io hold OR amed attuck on its own. Its
protcction must ultimatcly dcpcnd on thc foreign governmcnt in which it is
locatcd.
Thc Staie Departmcnt fclt during thc spring that the situation in Iran was
stabilizing. It toldUS businessmen who had lcft during the riois against the
Shah that rhey could rcturn (O iran if neccssüry.(They werc edvised Mondny
nighi to gel out agüin.)
Sccrctary of Statc Cyrus R. Vance mct Yazdi at the Unitcd Nations in
Scpicmbcr and discussed bcttcr relations. Ai othcr levelsCO-opcrationbetween
thc lwo Governrncnts was improving.
Then came the Shah's arriva1 in New York. Khomeini began broadcasting
hürshly rinti-American siatcmcnts.
A large tlemonstration against the US admission of the Shah was scheduled
for Thursday, Novcrnbcr 1. Laingcn wüs ripprehensivc of an üttack on the
Embassy then. Uut thc dcmonstrators wcrc kept in anothcr part of Tchran, and
policc riround thc Embassy wcre strengthcncd.
Thc Slate Departmcnt rclaxed a bit-until it rcatl the ncxt day a staternent
issued by Khomeini. He called for studcnts "to cxpand wiih all thcir rnight their
atlacks against thc Unitcd States".
On Sunday, a working day in Moslcm countries, Laingcn. ihe embassy's
sccurity officer and s political officerwcnt to the Foreign Ministry on routine
business. While they wcre thcrc, students or oihers claiming to be students
marchcd on the cmbassy.
A~reigrzcrsoursirlri raivihe policefurlerric-clThc attackcrî poured into the
27-acrc compound. Thc Arncricans and somc foreigners working for them
rcircatcd according to plan to the two-story officebuilding and locked its heavy
doors and barred windows. Someone in thc building telephoncd thc operations
ccnirc at the Statc Dcpürtmcnt. For almost thrce hours a running account of
cvcnts was relaycd hcrc.
At 3.11 a.m. Sunday, as the seriousncssof thc situation bccamc apparent, thc
' assistant secrctary orstalc for the arca, HaroldH. Saundcrs, was tclcphoned at
hornc. Vance was later phoned, and oihcr offficials around iown were also
patched into the cal1from Tehran.
Thcy listcncd to the action: thc attackcrs had broken inio the büscment, the 13
Marine guards had bccn forccd to abandon the firstfloor, closing the steeldoors
to the sccond floor-the guürds had becn told not to use thcir fircarms-and
finally the sccond floor had bccn perietrated.
Diplomais and secrct:iries were busily shrcdding and burning embassy files,
although stimewcrccapturcd. No lirearms werc used,and thc Marines had used
tcar gas only outdoors. for fear of worscning the situation.
Elnally. thc person on the phone dcscribed Amcricans being rounded up and
marchcd out. He spokc quictly, trying not to bc noticed. Thcn hc put the phone
down.
With the line stillpen. officialshere could hear shouting in the background.
Thcn thc linc went dcüd. It was 4.57 :\.m. hcre,inidday thcrc.
The State Departmcnt had gotten through to Laingen ai the Foreign
, Ministry. Wherc was thc promised protcction? The ministry scemcd to bc
powcrlcss.
Somcthing that is still unclear herc had happened to the authority of
Bazargan'sGovcrnmcni. On Tuesday he offcrcd his resignation ugain. This timc
Khomcini accepted it.194 DlPLOMATlCAND CONSULARSTAFF
Annex 2
EXCERPT FROMTBLEPHOIN NETERVIEW WITHSAUEQ TABATABAF 'I.IS,DAILY
REPORT 6,NOVEMBE1R 979,PP.R14, Ri6
TABATABA'I ON OCCUPATION OF EMBASSY, BAZA RGAN
ALGIERS VISIT
LD051328Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1140GMT, 5 Nov. 79 LD.
[Text] Sadeq Tabataba'i, the government spokesmanina telephone inter-
view with the Voice of the lranian Islamic Republic, has provided some
cxplanations regarding the primeminister'svisit tosand his mcctingwith
Brzezinski.He also spoke about the occupation of the American Embassy. WC
draw your attention to this telephone interview: [beginrecordingj.
[Question Since the occupation of the Embassy by those following the
Imam's policy, has there been any contact between Americaniciaisand the
Governrnent?
[Answcrj 1have no knowledgeof this, but yesterday the American Ernbassy
chargéd'affaire'simmcdiatelycontacted the Foreign Ministry and statcd that he
lacks security and that he would necd protection. So, on orders of the
Government, the Revolution Guards entered to prevent clashes there. Last night
the brothers who are occupying the Embassy thanked the guards for thcir
presence and for rnaintaining secunty there [end recording].
Annex 3
NC031330 Beirut AS-SAFIR in Arabic, 1 Dec. 79p. 10NC.
[Interview in Tchran with Abu Sharif,operations commander of the Iranian
Revolution Guardsdate not given.]
[Quesiion]What was the Revolution Guards Corps' rotein the occupation of
the US Embassy?
[Answerj As a matter of fact, we played no role in the occupation of the
Embassy, which was occupied by students supporting Imam Khomeini. The
guard's role was to protect the safety of the hostages and securethe area. There
wcre signs of a serious plot to explodsiliraliaround the Embassy. Our
task was to protect the safety of both the hostages and the studcnts.
Annex 4
EXCERPF TROMSPEECH UYAYATOLLAK HHOMEINF I.BIS, DAILREPORT,
29 OCTOBE1R 979,PP.R2, R3
LD282400Tehran Domestic Servicein Persian, 2030GMT, 28 Oct. 79 LD.
[Speech by the Imam Khomeini to rnembers of the Islamic Association ofStudents of the Mofidi Collcge of Translation in Qom on 28 October-
recorded.]
[E.rcerpfs/ In the name of Ciod, the compassionate, the mercirul:
1am not rcferring to the Arnerican nation. 1mean the American Governmcnt.
So you cin sechow thesupcrpowers treat us, and yct wearc stillbowing to thcm
in humilily and working îor theni. Let the pens that work I'orthem be broken!
Let thc loiigues that speak in their favour be cut off! Just think it:They arc
sending drugs they do not allow in their country to the Third World. To hcll
with what happcns to us as long as they get their rnoney! This has been the
statcof a@airsright from the siart. They never gave us anything that was useful
10 US.
All the problems of the East stem Frornthesc Foreigners.from the West, and
from Americü 31 the moment. All our problems corne from America. All the
problerns of the Muslims stem from America-from an Americü that has
strengthencd Zionism to such an cxtent and is strengthcning to such an extent
that it is niassacring our brothers in their multitudes.
Annex5
LDOIZZ>O Tchran Domcstic Service in Persian, 2030GMT, 1 Nov. 79LD.
/ Tex11 WChave just rcccivcd thc following statcment issucd by the officeof
Imam Khomcini in Qom:
ln the namc of God, ihe mcrciful, the cornpassionate. Four Novemberis the
annivcrsaryof theday when the hated régimeattttcked the Universityof Tehran
and massacrcd our dear students.
The régime.opposed to a11manifestations of civilization and progress in thc
country, one day attackcd the Feyziyeh theological school [in Qom] and othcr
Islamicschools throughoui Iran, and another day it attacked Tehran University
and collcges and universities throughout Iran, the centres of knowledge and
scholars.
Now, with the anniversary of thc ~ttack on the University, it is necessary for
üIIthe great spiritual figureor Qom,Tehran and iither towns ncar Tehran to
take part in a ceremony to hc hcld ai Tchran University to bring the turo
thinking niinds closer togethcr. As for the spiritual figures in other cities, they
should also takc part in similar ccremonies held in othcr universities to mark
the day and. thus. by their prcsence, foi1the divisivc plots aimed at these two
gigantic rcirccs.Thesc spiritual figures should join pupils, studcnts and profcs-
sors irorder to achieve this goal. Our cncmies use everyopportunity, espcciülly
on this day, to hntch al1sortsof plots. Thcy are dctcrmincd to use any pretcxto
disturb our peoplc's pcüce. 11is, thcreforc,up lo thc dcar pupils, students and
theolngical studcnts to expand with al1 their might thcir attacks against the
Unitcd Statcs and Israel, so thcy rnay force the United States to relurn the
deposed and criminal Shah,and to condcmn this great plot. It is also up to our
dear universily students and univcrsity staB and thcological students and
university staff to maintain their unity with everything in their power and
support thcsc two fronts wiih al1their might. Cod bless you all.
[Sigir~dj Ruhollah Mosavi Khomeini.196 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULARSTAFF
Annex6
MESSAG FROM MUSLIM STUDENT FOLLOWE OR SHE IMAM'P SOLICY F.BIS,
DA~LYREPORT , NOVEMBE 1R79, PP.R3-R4
LD051554Tehran Dornestic Servicein Persian, 1030GMT, 5 Nov. 79 LD.
[Message from the Muslirn Student Followers of the Imam's Policyto the
leader of the lslamic revolution of Iran-reby announcer.]
[Textj On numcrous occasions you have shouted out that westernization is
the cursc of our intellcctuals. Now, with a hundred regrets, we are witnessing
that westernized, liberal intellewho,lat the topof many executiveorgans of
the country, havelcft open the way for the influence of the United States and
Israel.
How can we tolerate this, when the responsiblc officiaissit around one table
with American wolves, while you angrily shout that the United States is the
major enemy of the Muslim and oppresscd masses. However, it seems natural
forgovernment oficials who believein the step-by-step poascan extension of
their record forhe past eight rnonths-record that allows the Government to
si1around one table with the murderers of our [word indistinct] martyrs and
hold talks with the great conspirators about the safcguarding the [word
indistinct]intcrests of the martyrs. The same person [presumably Bazargan] who
does not consider the principal step of the revolution to be the elimination of the
economic, cultural and political sovereignty of the West has left open the way
for the infiltration and propagation of dependent capitalism and the decadent,
Western moral standards.
Yes, Imam, wecould not tolerate this any more. It was you who cried out that
it is up to the pupils, university students and theology students to extend their
attacks against the United States and Isracl, with fi111strength, to force the
United States to extradite the deposcd, crirninal Shah.
And so, in following your orders, and with faiinthe pursuit of your path
which is the path ofd, wc decided to taka step, small as it was, by occupying
the Embassy of the US mercenaries in Iran and voiceyour divine wrath and that
of our Muslim nation, the wrath of the nation which cannot tolerate the
existenceofthe USspy lair and the centreof CIA conspiracies in the heart of her
revolution. The wrath of the nationoes not accept the lack of revolutionary
decisiveness in her government regarding the extradition of the Shah by the
United States, the wrath of the nation which cannot accept al1 the delain
exposing and abrogating the diplomatic, military and economic contracts
between Iran and the United States.
Now, on the anniversary of the martyrdom of our martyrs who, while
chanting Allaho Akbar [Cod 1s Great], becarne the targets of US and Israeli
bullets,we vow to you that, hand-in,hand and at your command, we will
continue the fight against international criminals, headeii by the United States,
to the total destruction iheir sovereignty. .
Imam, your path is being pursued.
[Signedj The Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy.
Annex 7
[See SelectrdDocument I, Appendix C, No. 34, pp. 97-98, supra] uniil the
words "to contact thcm": line0. Annex 8
t~rr:avrirWi.i.1BANIASADI.FBIS, DAIL. YI:I~ORTS,UPPLEMI3 C9, T
13 Dr:ce~ita~1979,P. 8
LD130236 Hilversum in English to Ccntral and Wcst Africa, 2030GMT, 12
Dec. 79 LD.
[Te.rt/ Thc students who have been occupying the American Embassy in
Tehran for 35 days now are practising Musliins but they use coarse and
unflcxible rnethods. These arc the words of Hoseyn Bani Asadi, the former
deputy prime minister in Bazargan's government and the first person who has
bcen able 10 provide some background informalion on the people who arc
holding 50Americiins hostage. Our Middle Eastcorrcspondent (Jamcs Dorscy)
sent us this report (rom Tehran:
Rani As:idi knows thc Ernbassy occupiers personally and says thcy arc
bciwccn 20 and 25 ycars old and thai mosi of tlicm are engineering studcnts.
During the months prior to the Embassy takcover, the students had been
working on an lranian Government-lînanccd development project for which
Bani Asadi was rcsponsiblc. The former deputy priine rninister rcmarkcd that
~hcsiudenis werc pariicula~ly active in orgünizing oppositioio the Govern-
ment. They accuscd the Government of bcing bureaucratic and of sticking
stubbornly to rulcs and rcgulations. The studcnts wanied the govcrnment to
continue financing thc dcvelopment project without meddling with or stipulaiing
the substance ol'the programme.
Mr. Bani Asadi hclicvcsthat thc root of tlicconflict lies inthe oppoçing vicws
of the Ayatollah Khomcini and former Primc Ministcr Mchdi Bazargan. Mr.
Bazargan wasprirnarily conccrned about giving thc Iranian revolution a strong
foundaiion. whilc the Ayatollah andthe sludcnts wünted above aIIta broadcn
the basis of the revolution. Mr. Bani Asadisccsthcse two approachcs as two
sidcs of thsame coin, pointed out thrit evcry individual and every socicty must
grow in orticr to exist, but must also cxist in oIOcgrow.
Thc former deputy prime minister says thot the students occupying the
Embassy have failed to understand lhat point. Mr. Bani Asadi does not ügrce
with the assuniption that the students willnot listcn to Khomeini now that thcy
have tastcd power. Ir rhc Ayatollah decidcs ro cnd the occupation, he says, then
the occupation willbccndcd. AllKhomeini hostn do. accordingto Rani Asüdi,
isto stop broadcastingncws about the Amcrican Embassy on lranian television
and radio and the studcnts will rapidly bccomc isolatcd.
Annex 9
(Ry Excclsiorcorrcspondcnt Victor Payan)
[Te.rt] Tchran, 25 Dcc. (PL+Foreign Minisier Sadeq Gotbzlideh said this
üfternoon thai if the United States continues10 pressure the lranian nation,
therc will be no need for an international tribunal to judge the hostages at the
US Embassy in this capital; things wibe handfed in a manner rotally different
from the prescnt cordial mannw. The Foreign Minisier addedthat thin$ have
gone beyond what the Iranians can stand, and thcy are no longer willing to
tolerate the arrogance ofthe United States. Thcreforç, the Foreign Minister said
he will meet with the Imam Khomeini tomorrow or the next day to ask hirn to198 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULAR STAFF
deal more vigorouslywith this matter, in viewofthe seriousproblems the Uniied
Statesis causing.
Gotbzadeh, who is considered be the lslarnic Government's most contro-
versial official and who recently hadserious conflict with the students,
threatcned to take vigorous measures regarding the future of the hostages who
have bcen inside the US Embassy for the past 51 days.
During an interview with local newsmen and two Foreigncorrespondents,
William Haak of Sao Paulo de Brasil and the Excelsior correspondent, the
Foreign Ministeraid ihere isno reason forthisnation to continue tolerating the
boldness of the US Covernment. The United States is doing everything possible
to bring about an econornic bloekade and causeinds of problems.
"We have the hostages and we should not care if Carter continues to bark.
Thc only thing Cartcr wants is to usethe hostages to be re-elected.Thus, Carter
continues to try to discredit us in everyone'seyes whileweare showingc
world what the US Ernbassy is like. Dcspite this, we are behaving like hunian
beings and have even allowed the hostages to celebrate Christmas with
clergymen invitcd espcciallyfor this purpose."
The Foreign Minister alsoid the Iranians are sick and tired of the forcign
press, whichonly servesperialistinterests and distorts the truth about whüt is
happening in this country.
"This is not talk for its own sake", said Gotbzadeli. He added that the bcst
example of the ncws media'sdistortion of the facts is thc statement reccntly
attributed to him sayingwanted the hosiages to be releasedwithout a trial of
any kind. This is totally untrue."
The Foreign Ministersaid angrily that this lie could have caused serious
damage.The media tried to deceivethestudents with the liethatthe hostageswill
bereleasedwithout beingcharged. There was,headded, another distortion or the
truth when the Western information media said the students were against me.
He was asked for his viewpoint on the students and knew their political
bclicfs and party. He responde"1 know only a few of the students, and 1
cannot answer this question because their political party or who they trust docs
not matter.
"The ract is that the seizingof the Ernbassywas approved by the lmam and,
consequently,ythe people. Asfar as I am concemed?1willdo whatever 1have
to do."
Annex 10
MESSAG FROM IMAM KHOMEINI 'FFIC IE QOM AND STATEMEN NT.28 OF
THE MUSLIM STUDIZN FOLLOWE XFTHE IMAM' SOLICY.FBIS,DAILY
REPORT 1, NOVEMBE 1R79,p.R15
LD101722Tehran Domestic Servicein Persian, 1630GMT, 10 Nov. 79 LD.
[IONovember message from Imam Khomeini's officein Qom to Hojjat ol-
Eslam Seyyed Mohammad Mosavi Kho'ini; stationed in the "US spy nest",
followingmeeting betweenpapal envoy andmam Khomeini-read by announ-
cer.]
[Texl] in His exaltcd name; dear fighiing brother, Hojjat 01-EslamSeyycd
Mohammad Mosavi Kho'ini,this bureau hereby notifiesyou that, accord10g
lmam Khomeini's order, it is necessary to admit His Excellency Annibale
Bugnini, the Vatican's esteemedenvoy to Iran, so that he may prepare a report
on the conditions thcre for His ExcellencyPope John Paul II.
WC praytoCod for the successof the untiring strugglesof you and thc othcr
brothers and sisters.
Imam Khomeini'soffice; 10November 1979. MEMORIAL 199
Li3101727Tchrün Domestic Service in Persian, 1630GMT, 10Nov. 79 LD.
[Statement No. 28 of the Muslim Student Followcrs of the Imam's Policy
"occupying the US spy hase in TehranU-rcad byalinouncer.]
[Te-rfJ Irthe nnme of Cod, the merciful, the compassionate: His Excellency
Annibale Bugnini, the esteemed Vatican rimbassador to the lslamic lranian
Republic, on thc basisofan order issued by the leader of the lranian revolution,
His Excellency Irnain Khomeini, you arc hereby invited to corne to the place
where US hostiigcsarc bcing keptiison Ayato1l;ihTalcqüni SI. and used to be
called theLISEmbnssy. You are invited to visit and see for yourself the place
and the hostagcs and subsequcntly rcpori to His ExccllencyPope John II.
[Si~ned] The Muslim Studcnt Followers of the Imam's Policy.
Annex 11
EXCERPF TKOM STATI:;MK NXT.32 OF THE MUSI.IMSTUUEN FTOLLOWER OFS
THE IMAM' PSoLIcY.FBIS, DAILYREPORT, 15 NO~IMIII:1R979,PP. R5-R6
[Statement No. 32 of the Musljm Siudent Followcrs or the Imam's Policy
stationed at thc "den of American espionageY.-read by announcer.]
[Tcxf] In thc name ol' Cod, the Cornpassioriatc, the merciful, addressed
humbly to thc cntirc awiirc and fighting lranian nation at homc and abroad:
Your revoliitioniiiy movc against the great Sof'the age, world-devouring
America, has rcvivcd thc hopc of freedom froin the clnwsof this criminal in the
hearts of al1opprcsscd on carth. The cries of "Death tAmerica!" by brave
Muslim lranian youth are revcrberating in al1corners of the globe and teaching
a lesson on fibcrty. Panic-siricken America, in ordcr 10extricate itself from its
most scvereimpasse and 10save itself frardefinitc political death, is resorting
to any mearis, no rnattcr how insignificant it might bc, including publishjng and
putting outvarious viewsof individuals, parties and groups, as wcllas viewsof
certainofficiaiorthe country, in such a way as to make the direction of this
rnove and rcvolution look ambiguous to public opitiion at home and abroad,
and, by cx;iggcrating thc instances of diffcrcnofsvicws between political
target of this move isnoi clear and that it will, therclorc, come to nothing.
For this rcason. in order to ncutralize this kind of Amcrican plot, we deem it
necessaryto reniiiid you of the following points:
1. Thegrcal divincmovc, whichisin process against Amcrica the plunderer, is
the continuation and continuitof theIsiamic revoliition lian.
2. It belongs to al1lhc various strata of thc lranian nation; it is not dependcnt
upon any particular party, organization or group; its leadership is in the hands
of the able and grcat lcadcr of the Islamic revolution of Iran, lmam Khorneini;
and il is only the viewpoinis ofthe leadership which dctermine the general
direction of and mcrisuresrelated to this movc.
Annex 12
LD171017 Tchran Domcstic Servicein Pcrsian, 0930 GMT, 17Nov. 79 LD.
[Decree issucd 17 Novembcr by lmam Khomeini, addrcssed 10 Hojjat ol-
Eslam Mosovi Kho'ini-read by announcer.]200 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULARSTAFF
[Text] ln the name of God, the compassionate, ~hcmerciful.Your Excellency
Hojjat 01-EslamMosavi Kho'ini and the respected brothers and sisters,students
stationed in the centre of espionage: The centre of espionagenspiracy
called the American Ernbassy and those people who hatched plots against our
Islamic movement in that place do not enjoy international diplornatic respect.
The extensive threats and propaganda of the American Government are not
of the slightestnificanceto our nation; nor is their inilitary threat wise, nor is
their economic embargo significant. Carter is making one mistake and thüt is
that he thinks that al1governments are standing with their cyesclosed to do his
bidding. Thisgreat mistake willalso soon be madeto him, and its first signs
can already be seen. The Iranian nation has arisen so that these dens of
espionage willnot be able to continue their shameful dceds. The den of
espionage and those professional spies willrcmain as they are until Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi is returnetobc tried and until hc has returned al1that he has
plundered. Wowever,because Islam has a special respectfor women and blacks
who have spent agesnder American pressure and tyranny and who might have
come toIran under pressure, thereforc, we willmitigatc their casesif it is proved
that theyhave not committed acts of espionage.
Dear students, please hand over the blacks and the woitis provcn that
they did not spy, to the Ministryf Foreign Affairs so that they may be
immediately expelled from Iran. The noble lranian nation will not give
permission for the release of the rest of them. Therefore, the rest of tfiem will be
under arrest until theAmerican Government acts according to the wish of the
nation. Greeting be upon you.
[Signedl Ruhotlah Mosavi Khorneini, 17 November 1979.
Annex 13
STATEMEN NOT,37OF THE MUSLIM STUDENF TOLLOWE OF ~m IMAMP 'SOLICY
[See Se-cted Document1, AppendixC, No. 30,p.88, supra]
Annex14
RESOLUTI OF~m MUSLIM STUDEN FOLLOWER OF THEIMAMP 'SOLICY.
FBIS,DAILY REPORT 2, NOVEMB1 E979.PP.Rl 1-R13
LD211320 Tehran Domesiic Servicein Persian, 1016GMT, 21 Nov. 79 Ln.
[Resolution issuedby Muslim Student Followers of theImam's Policy; read by
unidentified speaker ai demonstration outside US Embassy in Tehran-live.]
[Sumnzarjtj "1.The Iranian nation regards its Islamic revolution, under
Imam Khomeini's leadership, at lhis junclure in hisasran ali-embracing
struggle against world-devouring America.
2. The Iranian nation regards the American Governmcnt, this mother of
corruption of the century, as its enemy No. 1, and will continue its relentless
struggle against it until final victory.
3. The Iranian nation does not regard Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as a political
refugee,and, as witnessedby al1freedom-lovingpeople in the world, regards this
filthy creature as a professional criminal and a fugitive murderer.
4. The granting of sanctuary of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the condemned
and fugitivecriminal of Iran, by the American Government is an act contrary to
international law, andhus the Iranian nation regards the American Govern-
ment as guilty and strongly denouncit.
5. The American Government, now that it has in its hands the fugitive
murderer and thief of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, is dutybound in
accordance with international law, before it is too late, to hand over this MEMORIAI. 201
condcmncd criminal io ihc lranian nation and io return io lran al1thc asscts he
has piundcicd from Iran.
6. The Iranian nation docs no1regard the US Einbassyasa base ofdiplornatic
activiiy; ratfier, based on proof, circumstanriül cvi(lence and definitive docu-
mcntç, it regards itas abase OC cspianage and conspirücy against thc Iranian
lslamic Rcpublic and against the region, and thus regards the occupation or this
dcn of cspionage by the Muslirnstudcnts following the Imam'spolicyas 100per
ccnt, lcgal itna revolutionary act.
7. The American hostagcs must bc tricd in Irün. and after exposure of thcir
trc:ichcries committed on ordcrs from the Americün Government, they mus1be
punishcd, iinlcssthe Amcrican Government hmds ovcr the deposed Shah to the
Iranian nation, in whichcase they will bc cornmutcd by one degrec las heard],
thcir trialillbeCoregoneand they will be expclled[rom Iran."
8. Amcrica'sthrcâiof economic blockade or militurythrcal willhave no efTect
upon thc resolvc of the Iranian nation.
9,Thc Iranian nation praises ihe American black clergy in supporting the
Irünian position.
10.The lranian nation strongly dcnounccs Ihcrcs:strictionismposed on Iranian
students in the United States.
II.Wc denounce the distortion and lies sprcod by the US media against the
lranian IsliirnicRcvolution.
12.All governments rnust know that giving sünctuary to the Shah wiH be
flagrant opywsitionto Iran's revolution and thal thcy willbe responsiblc for such
act.
13.The Iranian nation bcars no hostility toward the Arnerican nation.
14.The Iranian nation supports the Revolulion Council's rneasures so far in
cutiing offticswith the United States.
15.The lranian nation will declarc a boycott or US good~.
16.WCcal1upon al1 lslamic countries 10 wagc a struggle against the grcat
Satan, Amcrica.
17.Wc demand strugglc againsl oppressors Icd by the United States.
[Signedj The Muslirn Student Followers of the Imam's Policy.
INTI~KVIIW ~WITH"STUIIIINL .EAIIERSF ". IS, DAILYREPORT2 ,6 NC)V~IMRF:R
1979, rr.RI3-R 14 (italics adtlcd)
NC232045Paris AFP in English, 2040 GMT, 23 Nov. 79 NC.
[Hy Bcrnard Estrade.]
/Tc.rr] Tehran. 23 Nov. (AFP)-Trying US hostages for espionage will
amount to putting impcrialism on trial, the leaders of the militant lranian
sludcnts occupying the Amcricün Embassy said today.
"WC would prefer to try thc Shah himsclf, and, if he is turned overWC will
rclease the hostages. Othcrwisc, we will try them"a group of them said in an
intcrvicw with AFP inside thc occupied Embrissybuilding.
A halî dozcn young Iranians, scrious and unshavcn in appearance, met with
two AFP correspondenis laie today in wha~uscd io bc one of ihe Embassy's
"invcstigaiion unit" officcs.
Acccssto the officcisthrough an armourcd door that had plainly bccnopened
with a blow torch. Despite thc soundproofing 01'the Ernbassy, the slrangcly-
rnumed voicesof Iranian speakcrswho incessantly hürüngue the crowdsin front
of the Embassy could bc hcrird.
The student leaders sccmcd surpriscd by the ilucstion, "Do you think
Presidcnt Carter will givc in and turn over the Sh:ihS!"202 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULAR STAFF
"It is not impossible.It is even probable", they replied. "In Ourideology,we
believethat if an entire people wish for something, theyobtain it."
Asked about various compromise formulas bcing worked on, the studcnts
[words indistinct]of views that of the (Ayatollah Ruhoolah Khomeini), and
we follow onlyhim. It has been decidedthat the Shah must be turned over."
They scem to reject-publicly at least-anthought of mediation. Acting
foreign Minister Abolhassan Bani-Sadr has bcenattempting to organizc a
mediation effort, but he does not have Ayatollah Khomeini'ssupport.
No date has been set for the trial, and the studcnts refuse to Sayif they have
decidedhow longit wille before the trial starts. Whenasked about the possible
sentencesif the accusedare found guilty,the students repliedsimplythat, "therc
are degrees of espionage and degreesin the sentences.They are set byc
law."
The student leaders, who are enrolled inan's engineeringand technical
schools, denied that the hostages werc subjected to "intense psychologiçal
pressure".
"Our ideology States that prisoners of war should be treated in a humane
manner, and they are" theysaid.
They suid that the hostages huvebeen told they beltried. The hostages
includc women (although the occupiersrefuse to say how many) and two non-
diplomat American citizenswho happencd to be inthe Embassyat the timc of
the take-over.
Do thc hostagesknow what theyare accusedof? "They know better tus".
is thc response.
The students said they released (?five) Asian-origin embassy employees
because "their guilt was not proved". They claimed tha"no more" non-
Amcricans rcmainamong the hostages,a statement disputed by othcr reports.
As for theirhreats that the Embassy would be blown up in the case of an
Americanmilitaryintervention, theysaid, "tcchnically,everythingis rcady" but
would add no more.
Annex 16
EXCERPT FROM INTERVIE WWITH AYATOLLA KHALKHAL FI.IS, DAILY
REPORT SU, PPLEME3 N9, 13 DECEMH 19R79PP. 31-34
LD071371Turin Lu S~Q??I~ iQitaîian, 6 Dec. 79, p. 3 LD.
[Igor Man undated interview in Tehran with Ayatollah Khalkhali:
"Khomeini's Hangman Speaks".]
[Textl Tehran-"One must be inflexible.Many, too many, counter-revolu-
tionaries have infiltrated into the centres of powcr to soften the revolutionary
process. But thcy will notevail. We must be tough, in accordance with the
teachingsofLenin, FidelCastro, Mao and Ho Chi Min-and 1willalso includc
Simon Bolivarand Allende."These thundcring remarks were made by Ayatol-
lah Khalkhaii, bursting into the room wheread been waiting for 2 hours.
Small, thick-set, with n ferret-iike glance shielded by horn-rirnmed spcctaclcs
and a wcll-groomcdbeard, the terrible hangman had just returned from Qom,
whcre the Imam rcccivedhim at length "with the usual affection".
[Question] Somebodyhad describedyou as the Robespierreof the Khomeini
revolution. Do you accept thernparison? (The Ayatollah did not know who
Robespierre was and1 had to explain it to him.)
[Answer] 1have setmyselfonlyone objective,namelyto Savethe people fromthe scoundrcls who have oppressed them, who have degraded our country. Do
not heed frilsepropaganda; 1 am ncither Hitler nor Mussolini, but an impartial,
calm and fairjudgc.
[Ques~ion] But it is said that you had two entirely innocent Kurdish
messengers shoi und ihai when you realized the mistake you comrnented:
"Never mind, we will have two more martyrs."
[Ansii*er/ Rubbish.
/Quesrion f It isalso said that apart from haviagcertain defendant shot, you
also had his brothcr, who supporied hirn,shoi. (Thistime hi:did no1answerand
indicated with apcremptory gesturc of his gnürled hands that 1continue.) Who
appointed you top judge of the rcvolutionüry tribunal?
[Ansiver] I owe the post to the benevolenceof the holy Imam.
[Question] How many people have you senienced Io deaih?
[Answerf 1 do not reniember, 1havc lost counl.
[Quesrion] Have you never had nny hesitation, a moment of doubt, before
passing sentence?
[Ansiver] Never. My revolutionary spirit is inspired byIhc sacred principles
of Islam.
He continucd: "1 have reached the conclusion that ÜIIthe world's ills stem
from the CIA, SAVAK, and the Zionist sccrct servicc. Some agcnts have fallen
into our hands, but how rnany others thcrc arc at large? And thc newsagencics
such as AP and Keuters, with their distortions, conrribute to helping Carter in
hisplan to opprcss the peoples.Carter isan agent of Zionism: that is whyhe has
granted asylum 10 a false invalid, a criminal who has killcd al least 150,000
innocent Persians. 1 would class with him Kissinger and Rockefeller, who for
filthy financial concerns persuaded Carter to host the assassin Reza."
[Queslionl Do you like so many others, bclieve that the Unitcd States will
eventually allow thc Shah to be extradited?
[Answer] No, it would lose face.Now they havc taken him 10 San Antonio:
Do you know why? Hccausethey know that armed groups seni by us want 10kill
him.
[Question f So they will ncver givc you the Shah: What, then?
[Ansiver] WC will be forced to try ihc hostages, as long as no gravcr cvents
occur first (carricd out by the hostages).
[Ques~ion] Who might lry them: You, pcrhaps?
[Ansiver/ If the Imam ordcrs me to 1willbe very pleascd to preside over the
court, 1believe that lhis task might be assigned to me because I am impartial,
firrn and just and 1am thoroughly acquainted with the laws.
[Question] If you know the laws you are wellawarc that one cannot occupy
an embassy and Lakehostages.
(Anslver] Of course embassiesarc sanctuaries, but the Amcrican Ernbassy is
an excepticinal case:It was a nest of spiesand led the uprisingsin Kordestan and
Baluchistan. Ihavc seen the documents.
[Ques~iorr/ Have you also seen the hostages?
(Ansrrver]1have seen them and discovered thcy had a dossier on me.
/Queslion/ If you had tojudge the hostagcs how would you setabout doing
so?
[Ansn~er] Wiih the enlightened spirit of justice. t hope that some of them
might be acquiticd, indced many of them.
[Question] What about the others?
[Anstverj Thc firing squad.
[Question] Do you not see any chance of thern being pardoned?204 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULARSTAFF
[Ansiver] After the verdict has baen passed and only then, the Imam could
pardon thcm. Hc can even pardon a murdcrer.
[Qucsliunj Of the many prisoners whohave passed through your hands, who
imprcsscd you the most and why?
[Answcr] Hoveyda. He behaved like a wretch, crying, begging for mercy,
saying he repented and denying his master. Then general (Khosrodad), chief of
the famous "immortals". He was a disgusting man who wet his pants. Finally
general (Bidabadi), who was in charge of martial law inTabriz. Hc told"11:
isright that you are killing me, wedid the sarne." As he waikcd to the gallows hc
thought of his children and said: "Goodbye children."
[Question] Let usrecap: The United States does not hand over the Shah, you
try the hostages, sentence them to dcath and US reprisals start. What then?
[A~~sioer ] hat reprisals? Carter cannot go against the wholc Western world
which isthirsting for oil and anxious to work withWhat war? It istechnically
impossiblc, and, in any event, would inflame the world.
[Queslionj So it is an insurmouniable crisis?(Khalkhati) hadpurplr wuul
blankct brought and wrapped it round himself stretching out on the rugs. Thcn
he said: "Therc could be a solution, as 1havealready suggested. If Farah wercto
kill her husband in hisleep everything would be solved as if by magic. Above
al], Farah would bcable to return to Iran. We would give her a luxurious home
and would even be able to find her a good husband", he said, breaking into
hearty laughter in whichal1the 12 faithful Sitting round us joined.
The final question was: Do you not fear for your life?1am told that you go
around with a Spanish pistol on your belt and under a heavy armed guard. "The
pistol was givcn to me by the pasdars to thank me aftcr the scntcncing of
Hoveyda. It is a very precious mcrncnto, but if anybody attacks mc cithcr 1
would kill him or the pasdars which the Imam has given me would see to it.
However, 1do not fear anything: I am ajus1 man, an cnlightcncd judge and a
faithful servant of the revolution. Okay, right?Anhe dismisscd me.
Annex17
VIEW SF AYATOLLA KHHALKHAL FI. IS, DAILYREPORTS,UPPLBME3 N9,
13 ûlrcr:~wi:1979,P. 8
LI3122214London BBCTelevision Networkin English,2100GMT, 12 Dec.79
LD.
/Te.rtj The Ayatollah Khomeini in a fresh attaek on the United States
accused them tonight of creating diversion to stifle Iran's anti-American
campaign. This was seen as a referencc 10 Washington's attempts to solve the
hostages crisis through the United Nations, the International Court and Mr.
Cyrus Vance's tour of Europcan capitals.
But Iran's leading revolutionary judge, SheykhKhalkhali, a closefriend ofthe
Ayatollah, promised todaythat none ofthe hostages willbc scntcnccd to death,
even irthcy wcrc put on trial as spics. ThcOureguesls, he said, and wedon't
likc treating guests this way.
LD121952London BBCTelcvision Ncfwork in English, 1920GMT, 12Dec.
79 LD.
/Te.ri/ Sheykh Khalkhali, Iran's lcading revolutionary judge, has said that
none of the Amcrican Embassy hostages will be sentenced to death even if they
are put on trial as spics.
And Sheykh Khalkhali said hc wanted the 50 hostages released soon. But
there has bcen no word from the students at the Embassy. MEMORIAL 205
Annex 18
/Ttsi) Qom, 20 Dec.-Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali was sitting on the floor of
hisgucst-ruom surroundcd by Revolutionary Cu;irds who had bccn wounded in
Kordestan. One of thcrn had taken offhis sock to show hip his s~ollcn lcft foot
where a bullet had cut thc nerve. Another cxcrciscd an artificial hand, crcaking
and clicking his stcel fingers as the Ayatollah cxprcsscd his sympathy.
It was hot in thc littlc roorn and the bespcct:iclcd divine was wcaring only
pyjamas aiid a white apron. "You are from The Titnesof London?", hc asked,
glancing in my direction. "Wcll, look at thesc men." He paused and thcn bcgan
to gigglein a high-pitchcd voicc:"The rebclsdid this. 1willpull thcm out by the
roots-1 will kill rilof thcrn."
As chicfjusticc in Iran's Islarnic Courts, Ayatcillah ~halkhali'is in a position
to do just that. Hc has pcrsonaliy ordcrcd thecxecution ofmore than 200former
members of the Shah's régime,including Amir Ahbas Hoveyda, the longest-
serving prime ministcr in the imperial govcrnmcnt. His supporters cal1him "the
wrath of Cod" and his critics-who are legion-iincharitably claim that he not
only enjoys his work bui has maintained a lifclong habit of strüngling cats.
Ayatollah Khalkhali does not look thepart. Hc is a s~naltman with a pointed
bcard and a kindly smilc which hc exhibits whcn niaking inüppropriatc jokcs.
Asked by a rcportcr two' wccks ago how hc felt now that the numbcr of
cxccutions in lran was decrcasing, hc rcplicd ivitha chuckle:"1 fecl hung-." It
would bc a serious mistake, however, to imüginc that Iran's rnost rcarcd judge
does not take his vocation seriously.
"If an Islamicjudgc rcalizes that someonc is guilty of corruption on carth or
of waging war against God", he said, "the judgc willcondemn the accuscd, cvcn
if he claims he is innocent. Most important thing in lslarnicjustice is the wisdorn
of thejudge. . ..Even ifa man denies the chargcs ügainst hirn, itmeans nothing
ifthc judge decides othcrwise."
Ayatollah Khalkhali has no time Torreporters who ask why so many lranians
were exec~itedartcr thc rcvolution. "The people who were executcd were the
principal retaincrs of thc previous hated régime",hc said. "They had cxploited
this nation. They had becn responsible for killings, tortures and unlawful
imprisonmcnt. 1am surpriscd that you ask suçh questions."
Ayatollah Khalkhali displays cqually little palicnce when askcd if his much-
publicized determination to engineer the assassination of the ex-Shah ~iccords
with the principles of Islamicjustice. "Weknbw that America willnot return thc
Shah", he said. "So wc have to kill him-thcrc isno other choice. If it was
possible to bring him hcrc and try him WC would kill him afterwards. But since
wccannot try him-and since we arc surc that hc should be executed-WC will
kill him ariyway. No one tried Mussolini. And who tricd the Frenchmcn who
were cxccuted for collaborating with Hitler's soIdiers in the Second World
War?"
Hc said todvy that hc had already ordcrcd LIr:ommando squad to go tu
Panama tcikill the Shah and his family. "I do not know if they have lcft lran
yct", he said, then brokç into that familiür chueklc as he vcntured into Spanish.
"They al1have pistolas."
Since the murdcr of the Shah's nephew in Paris almost two wceks ago,
European and American police forccs have paid a good deal of attention 10 the
threats of Ayatollah Khalkhali. INTERPOL-and the Ayatollah's intcnded
victirns-would thercfore probably pay somc ;ittention to the namcs whieh
Judge Khalkhali includcd in his assassination list today.
"Since the most important agents of the formcr régimeareno longer present206 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULARSTAFF
someofs thesepeople. Weare looking for Sharif Emani (former prime minister),
General Palizban, Hushang Ansari (formcr rninister of finance), Ardeshir
Zahedi (former ambassador in Washington), Gholamali Oveysi(former martial
law administrator),arabaghi (former chief of staff inthe Shah'sarmy), Farah
(the Empress),Hojabr Yazdani (former banker), Valian (former rninister of
agriculture), Jamshid Amouzegar (former prime minister) and Shahpur
Bakhtiar (forrher prime ministcr). We also want the Shah and his brander
Ashraî (the Shah's twin sisker).Whereverwe can find these people, we will kill
them."
Unashamed at publicly narning his own "hit list", the Ayatollah takes an
unexpectedly moderate attitude towards the 50 Arnerican Ernbassy staff held
hostage in Tehran.
"1 regard thesepeopleas innocent", hesaid without hesitation. "They areour
guests.1want thern to be releasedand go back to their homes. Even ifthey are
spies,that isnot enough reason to keep them. Everyernbassyhas spiesin it. We
cannot executeany spieaccordingto IslarniclawTheywill only beexecutedif
they are directly responsiblefor ordering a murder. Even if wetry the hostages,
we do not want to condernn them. We want to condemn Carter and the
American Government."
Annex19
AYATOLLAHKHALKHALI'S VIEWS F.BIS, DAILY REPORT SUPPLEME4N 6,T
24 DECEMRE 1979,PP. 17-18
PA 221435Paris AFP in English, 1408GMT, 22 Dec. 79 PA.
Meanwhile,,theAyatollah Khalkhali in Qom denied sayingthat the hostages
would be freed. "If it is proven that spics who worked against the Islamic
Republic are arnong them, they willsentenced to death."
Annex 20
Drscussio~ WITH SHAR'MAGISTRATE FB.IS, DAILYREPORT SUPPLEME4N 5,T
2I DECEMB E979,PP.30-3I
LD211221Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian, 18 Dec. 79, p. 2 LD.
[Unattnbuted report: "HostagesTrialTo Take Place Under Supervision of
Shar'-religious law-Magistrate and Revolution Council".]
(Te.rt/ A group of foreign correspondents held a discussion withShar'
magistrates and IslamicRevolution Court judges at Evin prison yesterday
afternoon.
In this discussion,Shar'gistrate Ayatollah Mohammad Gilani firstspoke
of the training whichjudges ofesecourts receiveat the theologicalseminaries,
then continued:
"The trial of the hostages will take place when permission is received
from Imam Khomcini. Itwillbe held under the supervision ofthe Shar'
magistraleand the lslarnic Revolution Council, in accordance with the
precepts of Islam and in observance of the noble verses of the glorious
Koran, and they will be treated with justice. However,dodiplornats
and spies faIloutside this rule. In Islam, spiesare considered to be 'ayyun'
[eyes],for whichthe lslarniclawprescribestherestpunishment, and the imam of the muslirnsmay cvcn kill spieorturn them into slaves. In any
event,it isup to the imam ofthe Muslirnsto make thefinaldecision,and he
may even pardon or free thcm."
Replyingto a questionput byonc of'the corrcspondentson the engagementof
dcfencc lawyersfor the American spics. the Shar' niagistrate said:
"A court of Islarnicjustice will bcformed for these 'eyes'and ssoes,
that they can defend their livcsthcmselves.Of course, it is unclear whether
theseindividuals includeany hardcned enemiesof the Islamicstate, and it is
possihlcthat there are somc innocent pcoplc among them."
In rcply toa question frorn a corrcspondcnt about certain sessioof the
rcvolutionary courts being heldEümcra, the Shar'magiîtratesüid"Although,
according to therulcs, the prcsidcnt of the court bas the authorjty to declare
sessionsin camera, wehave convenedopcn courts only. and up to now nobody
has bcenconvicted ina secret court".
A question waç then askcd aboutthcdctcntion of individualsimprisonefor
distriburing pamphlets in supportof a political party. The Shar' magistrate
rcplied:
"We do not put on trial or imprison individuals who have distributed
pamphlets,but individuals,such as membersof the Forqan group, accuscd
of rniirdering great intcllectulil~like Ayatollah Motahar thc martyr and
brother 'Eraqi."
In replyto a questiofrom another correspondent asto the différencebetween
common law and lslamic law, the Shar'magistrate replied:"Common law is thc
product ol'the human mind, while lslamic law is divinely inspired and is thus
more felicitousfor human beings."
Another correspondent asked:"1sthere any objection to anyonecoming from
Al-Azhar [lslamic univcrsity in Cairo] to defeizdthe spies?"
The Shar' magistrate rcplicd:
"Tlis spiesmay engagelawycrsconversant with lslamicprecepts, but the
crime of these individualsis so evident that no infomed human being will
agrce to delend such criminals. Howevcr, if the highest authorities of Al-
Azhar certify that these lawycrs are well-versedin Islarnic law,Islam will
accept thcm."
In conclusion, Ayatollah Mohammad Gilani replied to another question,
which was whether the spies would bc executed ifconvicted. In reply, he said:
"The individuals rnay receivcthe Imani's pardon. As I indicated previ-
ously. ihree punishrnents are possible,depending on the Imam personally.
The Imam rnaykill them, or pardon thern, or evcndetail them to warkin
the court as slaves, as Ourworkerand slaves. This depends on the Imam
pc<sonally."
Annex21
SPEECH BY FORME FORIIIG MNl~lsrtiYAZDI. FBIS, D~LY REPORT,
SUPPLEME 37T,11Dli~fi~lli1979, PP.7-8
LD101832Tehran Domestic Service inPersian, 1630GMT, 10 Dec. 79 LD.
[Te.rf/At the invitation of the lslamicAssociatiothefPars News Agency
today Mr. Ebrahim Yazdi took part in a meeting of employees of this
organizaiisin.In a speech at the meetinghe staied in connectionwiissueof
the hostages and occupation of the former Amcrican Embassy in Iran: In the208 DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF
event the deposed Shah leavcs America, in my view, we should put the 50
Americanhostages on trial. But our aim should not bea personal trial of these
50 hostüges,for if this is the case, we willface defeat; the aim should be to put
Amcrica on trial. Thisis the first incidence in the history of anti-imperialist
struggles thaa coup-making country is being dragged to trial in the country
where the coup has taken place.
He said: Iran's relationswith Americaafter the revolution were coolina
statc ofecline,but the deposedShah's trip toAmericamarked the beginning of
a ncw phase in Ourrelations with America. When.1Sayrelations,1mean mcre
relationsregardless of their being good or bad. Amenca admitted the dcposed
Shah, and it did not have to do so.
Yazdi then described his proposed plan for setting up a tribunal for trying
Amcrica in Iran and said: 1have proposed that on the one handa committee
should be commissionedby the lmam to collect evidenceand documents from
America itself, and on the othcr hand, a book should be opened for the
registration of names of people who havegiven martyrs or wounded since 19
August [presumably 19531so that these individualscan participate as witnesses
at the tribunal.
Similarly,prior to the formation of the tribunal, the 50hostagesof the rormer
American Embassyshould bc informcd of the date of thcir trial so that each of
thcm may obtain an attorney Tor themselves. Even if America prevcnts the
appointment of an attorney, the familiesof these individuals would force
America to send attorneys. Dr. Yazdi said: If we wishto give this tribunal
international dimensions,then to Saythat 10or more of thesehostages are CIA
mcrnbers is not sufficicnt.Now that we are situated in an epoch-making time
dimension,we can hold sucha trial.Thc subjcct ofthe trial should bc US foreign
policy, and the world mass media willever be able to censor this trial.
He added: If we managed to hold the tribunal in this rom, we would win a
victory; this wouldbe the firsth move in the world, which would be a great
victory for the whole nation.
Yazdi said at the end of his speech1 have discussed with the lmam my ,
proposal regarding themanner in whichthe tribunal should be set up for trial.
He has accepted it and has also issued instructions.
Annex 22
EXCEKPF TRSOM INTERVIEW WITH SADEQ GOTBZADEH F. IS, DAILYREPORT,
SUPPLEME3 N7T,11DECEMBE 1R79:PP. 10-12
LD102200Tehran in English to Europe, 1930GMT, 10 Dec. 79 LD.
[Te.ut] Followingis the press interview ofMr. SadeqGotbzadeh,the foreign
ministcr of the lslamic Republic of Iran, with ABC reporters, one slationed in
Tchran and the (?others)by satellite.(?Weare) broadcasting the fulltext of the
interview.We should warn you (?of the faulty taping) of some pieces of this
interviewwhile being (?relayed)by satellite. However, we'regoing ahead with
the full text. Althoughame questions are not audibly discernible,we'resure
that you can get the gist of the questions by the (?reply) that is given [begin
recording].
[Answer] WeU,my proposilion was very simple. First of awe,aregoing tu
investigatethe American foreignpolicyin the last25yearsin Iran in whichthose
Americans who have been here will testify berorthe grand jury of what they
have done and, second,some of them are engagedin espionageand wehave the
documents.
[Quesrioj [Words indistinct.]
[Answer] Well we have the documents here. That is for the internationalgrand jury to dctermine. WC have thc documents. (Throughout) they have
cngaged in cspionage. And, secondly, thc hct that if therc arc in future limes
ccrtain amoulit [words indistinct] or thcm are not really guilty of anything, that
given thc circumstances (?and) evcrything is right and thc Unitcd States stops
this type of'(?rhctoric) and the act of vengeance and trying to incite hatred in the
Amcrican pcoplc. wemay consider releasing those hostages who arc no1engaged
in cspionage. This is what I'vc said Canyway).
[Qucsriciii][Words indistinct.]
[Ansii,er/Wcll, let'sestablish this international tribunal first and then see the
result ihat's coming up.
/Quesrimi/ Mr. Foreign Ministcr, I'm not an attrjrncy but it sccms as if you
say some of thc Amcricans are alrcndy guitty of spying, but WC haven't had the
trialyei.
[Ansiivr] Wcll.you're no1exactly-you'rc not an attorney, bccausc ifyou wcrc
an attorney you would ccrtainly understand the terms. I say we have some
documents, that thcy have beenengagcd in cspionügc and 1also said this is what
always happcns-the documentsare prcscntcd to the grand jury and the grand
jury detcrniincs what would bethe case. 1didn't pronounce the narne guilty yet.
[Ques~ion] Lcime ask you this: 1sit more important to put the Amcricans on
trialor are wc talking about trying American foreigri policy?
[An.sii7erWcll, these Americans hcrc havc been instruments of the American
policy in the piist few years that thcy havc been liere and it is prcçisely the
Amcrican Sorciynpolicy here which is going to be on trial. Only to show-and 1
should cmphasirx: that vcry clearly-only tu show that our dcmand Cor the
rcturn of the Shah as a symbol of thc crimes and sis an Amcrican puppet is
justifiable io thc whole world. And you will sec that will be thc case.
[Qucstioti/ (Words indistinct.]
[A~isicer]I hopc as soan as possiblc WC rire going to hold that and 1hope the
next tcn days will come with ccrtain (?definite answers).
/Que.stinrr/[Words indistinct.]
[Ansiver] Wcll, wcare contempiating to hiive some inlernational jurists or the
people who havc the reputation ofdignity and integrity and work Torthe justice
as wcll as sonic lranians will be in ihc tribunal.
[AIISII.P~Oh absolutely! Whatever the Ayatollah decides in the final analysis
no one in Iran will resist it andeven thai ncws tha1have been hearing from you,
your station. concerning Tabriz (?and the rest) [words indistinct] as usual and
Ayatollah is in fullcommand or the country and he's sortor givingthcdirectives
to us and wc arc applying his policy.
[Questir~ti/[Words indistinct.]
fAnsii.er/No. 1havcn't sccn thcm but 1didn't need to sce them. Somcof those
pcople whom 1trust-thcy havc sccn thcm and thcy told me ihat they are well
and al1riglit and WC also have decided to havc an international sort of tcam to
see the hostagcs and report to the whole world that nothing has happened to
them. And I am sure you will sec ihem in that investigation team and you'll
rcalize tha~thcy havcn't donc ünything to thcm so far.
[Question] Mr. Foreign Minister, do you think at this point after 37 days of
the ArneR9ns bcing held-yoii arc stating your point tirne aftcr tirnc that you
are still going to get the Unitcd States to givc up the rormer Shah?
(AJIsI~.P~] CII.that position is ccrtainly unchangeable and that is what I'rn
trying to convey this message ovcr and ovcr. Apparcntly thcrc has beénsome
misundcrstanding about my statcments, thai I iim making thc process of his
rcturn possible Ior the Unitcd States Govcrnment, that thcy savc their face and
we are helping ihe United States Govcrnrncnt to s;ive face. The return of the210 DIPLOMATl AND CONSULA STAFF
Shah is the basic demand and that has not been changed definiiely [words
indistinct].
Thank you, Mr. Gotbzadeh.
Annex 23
INSTRUCTIO JNSUE DYAYATOLLA KHOMEIN FB.IS, DAILREPORT,
SUPPLEMENT 39, 13DECEMBE1R979,P.II
LD131058Tehran DornesticServicein Persian, 1030GMT, 13Dec. 79 LD.
["lnstruction" issucd 13 Dccember by Imam Khomeini, the leader of the
lranian Islamic Revolution-readannouncer.]
/Te.rr] In the name of God, the compassionate, the rnerciful. Your Exccl-
lency,SadeqGotbzadeh, the Foreign Ministerof Iran: It isesscntialthat as soon
as possible you form an international investigating cornmittee in consulta-
tion with the Revolution Council to review the aggressive policyof the
Government in Iran, particularly during the period of the rule of the deposed,
traitorous Shah, and cxposc it to international public opinion so that the
internationalorganizations which, USinfluence,havecondemned Iran, as
it were,becornebetter acquainted with the US Government's crimes againstOur
deprivedpeople. Likewise, in otocounter the adverse aaggrcssivUS
propaganda iegarding the hostages in their den of espionage youmiy invitean
indeoendeni international defeatavisit them. And mace be uDonvou.
lj December 1979[~ignedjRuhollah Muçavi ~homéini. . .
Annex 24
EXCERP TROM ANNOUNCEME BNFOREIGN MINISTE R OTBZADE FBIS,
DAILY REPORTS ,UPPLEMEN 4T,28 DECEMBE 1R79P.4
LD281158Tchran Domestic Servicein Persian, 1030GMT, 28 Dcc.LD.
[Texil At the conclusion of last night's Revolution Councilsession, Sadcq
Gotbzadeh announced at a meeting withestic and foreign correspondents:
If an economic boycott is imposed on Iran by thecurity Council, the
hostages at the US Ernbassy in Tehran will be put on trial.
He accusedthe United States of inierpreting thegood wil1shown by Iran as a
sign of weakness. Gotbzadeh said: The continuation of US pressures on Iran,
particularly plansfor imposing an economic boycottthrough theurity
Council, willdestroy thechancesof forming an international jury to investigate
Iran's cornplaintsagainst the United States ofa. Gotbzadeh said: By
coniinuinguch pressures the formation of an international jury willbc uselcss
whilcthe chancesfor formingan ordinary court forthe trial of twillostages
improve.
Annex25
LD052356Tehran Domestic Servicein Persian, 2030GMT, 5 Nov. 79 LD.
The students said: The US Embassy'simportant docurncnts were destroyed
during the Embassyoccupation by the Embassystaff, and otherdocumentsandmatters that have becn obtained will be reported to the nation after considera-
tion and, if necessary, the documents obtaincd will bedelivercd to the Imam.
Annex26
EXCERPT FROM ~N~~~RVIEWW~TH AHMAD KIIOSIEIN FBI.ISDAILY REPORT,
20NOVEMB ER79,PP.RI-R3
LD191809[editorial report LD]Tehran Domcstic Servicein Pcrsian at 1135
GMT on 19 Novcmbcr broadcasts a 20-minuic rccording of an interview
granted by Seyyed Ahmad Khomeini, Ayatollah Khomeini's son, to a Tehran
Radio reporteral Mchrabad airport on thc rnorning of 19Novembcr.
Ahmad Khomcini was then asked:
"The Imam, in his order,used this phrasinso Taras 1can rcmcmber:
Those whose spying activities have not ken proved yet, and the second
[word indistinct] is that the plawas not ;in embassy but a nest of
espjonage. But therc arc different aspects of espionage, there are those who
are directly involvcd in spying activities and those who provide servicesso
that the spics crin çarry on with their work. Docs the meaning of this
sentence andthc investigations and sclection made by Ourstudcnt brothcrs
in the den of espionage include those who provided servicesand were not
dircctly involved in spying actjvities, or is it to be taken to mean ihat
enough evidence has not becn acquired yct to show thai they are spies?"
Khomeini answercd:
"You sec. that placc was clearly noan ordinary embassy. Whcn the
studeiits eniered the building, the equipment there showed that it was the
centre of CIA activitics in the Middle East. 'That is to say that a huge
amount of cquipmcnt worth millions of iornnns was found, with somc units
worth upto 300or 400 million tomans. 1-lowcan an embassyjustiîy having
such equipnient'?lt is obvious thaiwas no1 an embassy, but a dcnof
espionage."
Khorneini went on:
"Flow about thc poini that those who arc being rcleasedonthc ordcr of
the lmarnare only those whose spying activities have not bcen proved. the
evide~icefound in there shows thüt somc of these people arc formal
rnembers of the CIA. They will demonstriate this point in their rcvclation
stütements. What actiuiticç were caroutdin this embassy, for exarnpte,
the embassy dccidcd on the kind of sabotage to be carried out in Kordestan
and Khuzestan, decided on the closure of schorilsand what should bc don.
to closc the schools and decided on the kind of'demonstratibesheld,
evcn those in dcfcncc oAyandegan, Peyghuni-eEmruz and a few other
newspapers which 1do not remember now, and Tehran Mosarlar.
Thcse ail show that what kind ofpeople hridcontacts with them and what
activities thcy carricd out to insure thcir own interes&. Thetefore, wc are
surethat thisis notan ordinary embassy, but wasa den ofcspionagc, and
those who have been released now arnol spics. We are invesiigating the
dossiers of thosc others who will, God willing, be released by this evening,
who rnight number as many asIO."212 DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF
Annex 27
Excii~~~sFROM INTERVIEW WITHAHMAD KHOMEINF I. IS, DAILYREWRT,
SUPPLEME N1, 17DECEM~C 1R79,YY.21-22
Li3162312BelgradeTanjug in English,2026GMT, 16Dec. 79 LD.
[Text] Tehran, 16 Decembcr Tanjug-Bombs have been plantcd in the US
Embassyin Tehran. In caseof attack the Embassywillbeblown up. Americans
being held in the Embassy are not hostages, they are people awaiting trial.
Ayatollah Khomeini alone can decide on their possible liberation.
Thcse are some of themain stands expressedby Ayatollah Khomeini'selder
son, Ahmad, in an interviewto the ltalian magaziPanorama.
Ahmad Khomeinimaintains that Iranian students have discoveredsome very
important documents on the basis ofwhichthe 50-oddAmericansheld in the US
Embassywillbe triedThe documents-secret reports, assessmentsand plans of
inierveniion in Iran-were round in Ihe Embassy's"leadchamber". The special
devicewhich wasto have destroyed them was only partially succcssful.
The prisoners wereconfronted wiihhe documents, Ahmad Khomeini stated.
Many of them were in contact with people closeto the Shah and the US
Embassy [asreceived].Everythingwillbe revealedat the proccss,and those who
have had contact with "thisroup of spies" wilbe tried in court, if they are
caught [as rcceived].
Khomeini'sson does not believethat Khomeini will order the releaseof the
prisoners.He has told us that at this moment when we have evidenceinOUT
hands, it isnotimportant whether the Shah (?isdead)or alive,or whether hewill
return toran or remainin the United States. Inany case, the spieswillbeput on
trial, Khorneini'snstated."
Annex 28
LD020141Tehran in English to Europe, 1930GMT, 1 Dec. 79 LD.
[Text] Ina pressinterviewheldthis afternoon with foreigncorrespondents at
the former United States Embassy in Tehran, students following theth of
Imam revealed the followingdocument [begin unidentifiedspeaker recordingl:
The Muslirnstudents followingthe path of Imam Khomeini. In the name of
Cod, the beneficent,the merciful.To the people of the world. AOisinfinite
occans of humans. From the leader of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Imam
Khomeini.
[Wordsindistinct]sonlya singleexampleofdocuments proving the facts that
this Embassy has not conformed to the normal duties of an embassy. For it
participated in acts of espionage appliedagainst the will of the Iranian nation.
The rest of the documents will exposed and simplifiedin oficial courts. The
cmbassy in Tehran was a centre for CIA. Plans were monitored against our
people and we feel strongly that nations have a right to oppose any foreign
involvement in their interna1affaiWe. also believestrongly that the normal
peopleof theworldand specificallythe peopleof AmeRcahave beendelibcratcly
kept uninformedtowards the realities.They have not been properly informedof
the nature of their government. We believethat the realization of these truths
willbring about an awakening in ihe American nation. Weknow that when theAmcricans find the reality thcy willsupport Ourjust cause and dernand that the
ex-Shah lx sent back to Iran for open trial an(?judgment).
Annex29
LD082037Tchran in Englishto Europe, 1930GMT, 8Nov. 79 LD.
[Text ] Gover~irncntspokcsrnanSadeq Tabataba'i, today in an interview with
Radio Luxembourg, saidthat 60,Americans who were takcn hostagcs in the
American Embüssyarc not innocent. Tabataba'i added: Thc documents found
in the Embassy show that thc US Governrnent has (?a) hand in Kordestan's
crisis. He added that the hostages are trcated well. Tabataba'i strcsscd that
negotiations will start releasc the hostagesjust when the United States sends
the depased Shah bückta Iran.
Annex 30
NC261517 Paris AFP in English, 1512GMT, 26 Dcc. 79 NC.
lTcxt] Tehran, 26 Dcc. (AFP)-lranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh
said today that he did not know exactlyhow many hostages werecurrently being
held at the occupied United States Embassyhere.
In an interviewwith French Statc televisioMT. Gothzadeh s;ijd:."Al1know
about the number of hostages is what I've learned frornthc media." "The US
State Department doesn't know exactly how many (hostages) thcre are, and
personally I'venever triedto find out. lt's a matter 1'be looking into", he
added.
(In Washington yesterdaya State Department spokesman rcitcrated that the
figureof 50 hostügeswas ihc correct one, despite an eariier statcment from four
Christian clergymen allowcd into thc Ernbsssy to conduct Christmas Eve ser-
vicesthat they had secn onty 43 American hostages.)
Annex31
LD061106Tehran Domestic Servicein Persian,1030 GMT, 6 Nov. 79 LD.
[Staternent No. 13 of the Muslim Students Following the Imam's Policy-
read by announcer.]
/Te.rt] In the name of Cod, the cornpassionate, the mcrciful: Here is a
warning to the fugitivc charglr d'affaires of the American Embassy. Wewam
you, chargéd'affairesof the American Embassyas a spy who has bccn directing
America's espionüge house in Iran, to surrender to the Muslim students
stationed at the Embüssyrissoon as possible. Rest ;~ssuredthat your prolonged
telephone contact with Washington yesterday from:in unknown place inTehran
will achieve no solution for you, for the will of oiir nation is no plaything in
political relations and will notso, and the nation willstand firm until its truc
demand is achieved.214 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULAR STAFF
Muslirnbrothers and sisters,certain individuals or groups, on the pretext of
trying to arrest the chargéd'affaires ofthe American Embassy,may attack
certain embassies or rninistry buildings. We warn you that this will be a
deviationist move, whose objective isnothing other than to divert the revolu-
tionary action of the occupation of America's house of espionage, which is
supported by al1the Iranian nation.
Annex 32
LW80428 Tehran DomesticService inPersian;0330GMT, 8 November 1979
LD.
[Announcementissued 7 November by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-read
by announcer.]
[Te.rt] In His Exalted narne:Followingthe conlacts and the queriesthat have
been made, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the lslamic Republic of Iran
wishes to announcc that as of 1100 on Sunday, 4 November, the chargé
d'affaires of the American Embassy in Tehran, together with two of his
companions, was inthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, as the protection of
foreign nalionals is the duty of the lranian Government, he is staying in this
ministry.
The matter was immediately brought to the attention of the prime minister,
His Eminence the Ayatollah Montazeri, Mr. Bahonar and Dr. Beheshti,and
then the Revolution Council.All of themwithout exceptioncmphasizedthat the
protection and securityof thesepeopleis among the religiousand legaldutiesof
the Government and should be carried out. Therefore, the armed forces of the
cornrnitteeshave been asked to insure greater security for them.
The US State Department announced las1night that the representatives of
American PresidentJimmyCarter-who are carryinga messagefor the leaderof
the lslarnic revolution of Iran, lmamKhomeini-after the broadcast of Imam
Khomeini'smessage to the effect that no lranian officialhas rhe right to meet
Jimmy Carter's reprcsentatives, stopped thcir journey at midpoint in Istanbul
and will not corne to Iran.
Annex33
LDOXI143Tehran Domestic Service in Persian,1030GMT, 8 Nov. 79 LD.
[Text] Statement No. 20 of the Muslirn student followers of the Imam's
policy has bmn issued as follows:
ln the narne ofGod, thecompassionate, the rnercifuIn the lightof revelation
statement No. 2 and of other documents captured, Bruce Laingen, chargé
d'affaireof theArncricanEmbassy inTehran, isa plottingspya,nd in viewofthe
fact that the said person has ignored our prcvious warning and has not
surrendered thisisto declarethat with effectfrom8 Novernber,that is today, the
fugitivechargéd'affairesin Iran, who is staying at the Foreign Ministry,willbe
regardedasoneoftheAmerican hostagesand has na rightwhatsoeverto leavehis
place. Thus, ü special leam wiIbe sent to the Foreign Ministry toguard him. MEMORIAL
Annex 34
STAT~CMI ~NFFOS REIGMNINISTEG ROTBZAWE FB.IS, DAILYREPORT,
3 DECEMRE1 R979,PP.R20-R21
LDOl1121Tehran Domcstic Service in Pcrsian,1030GMT, 1Dec. 79 LD.
/Texrj Intcrvicwcd by a corrcspondcnl of thc Voiccand Profileof the lslamic
Republic ofIran, Sadeq Gotbzadch said: I have riçversaid in any interview that
the chargCd'affairesof the US Embassy and two of his companions could leave
Iran. Rather, ii has been announced thai, if ihc US Embassy'schargéd'affaires
and his iwo cornpanions, who have sought asylum inthe lranian Ministry of
Forcign Aflairs. should leave this ministry, the rninistry would not acmpt any
responsibiliiy for thcm.
NC011045 Paris AFP in English, 1044GMT, lDec. 79 NC.
/Te.utJTchran, 1Dcc, (AFP)-The militant Irariian siudents occupying the
US Embassy hcre said today thür thc Amcrican chargé d'affairesHrucc
Laingen, and iwo other US diplomats thought to be in the Foreign Ministry
building wcre thcir hostages.
The Islamic studcnts, who spoke to the AFP by telephone, said that Mr.
Laingcn and thc other diplomats were under thcir surveiliance.
lranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadch said during a press confcrencc
yesterday that Mr. Laingen and thc otheIWO werc "frceto leave thc country
when thcy wishcd". But he added it would be difficult to protect them on the
route froni thc rninistry building to the airport.
Annex 35
LD021410 Paris Domestic Servicein Frcnch, 1200GMT, 2 Dec. 79 LD.
[Intcrvicw with lranian Forcign Minister Sadcq Gotbzadch by Paris radio
reportersYvcs Mourousi in Parisand Yves-Paul Vincent in Tehran-livc.]
/Moirrou.siSo you are ready to wind up the affair ifthe Shah is handcd back
to you. And tell me, are you going 10hüihclhrec diplomats who areatyour
place to ihc studcnts, so that they join thc oihcr hostages at the Embassy?
[Co~bi~hh] AS 1 said very clearly yesterday, thcy have corious at the
Ministryor Foreign ARairs and they are thernow. They are free.
[Mourousi] In their movements. . . .
[GotbzurlehfFree to wait there; we arc going tr,insurc their safsafctyhcir
therc, but thc moment they go away, thc moment thcy leave the Ministry of
Foreign AEdirs,WC are no longcr responsiblc. So thcy are there, they arc safe.
Annex36
LD051655Pliris Le Figaro in French, 4Dec. 79,p. 3 LD.
[Spccial correspondent Thierry Desjardins undiited Tehran interview with216 DlPLOMATlC AND CONSULAR STAFF
Iranian Forcign Minister Gotbzadeh: "Sadeq Gotbzadeh: 'The Hostages Wili
BeTried By the S~udents'".]
(Te.r-f]Tchran-"The bal1is in the Americans' court. We have done al1 wc
can." It is 0800. Sadeq Gotbzadeh, the Ayatollah's foreignminister, receivesme
in hisofficeon the1Ith floor of radio house. WChad three hours sleeplast night,
but this man, "built like a tank", is firmas a rock.
He lights his pipe and goes on: "As soon aswc Icarned that the Shah was
benefitingfrom US asylum we did al1 WC could to avoid any escalation. Firwe
asked fortwo Iranian doctors to bc allowed to examinethe Shah to seeif he was
really sick, so that we could at least explüin the US attitude ta Ourown public.
The Washington administration categorieally rcfused. Then the embassy aFair
began. We tried to sort things out by proposing a legal process whichwould
have permiltcd the Shah's extradition. The American response was 10 stop
buying our oil (which is rather to Our advantage in any case). Then the
Americans turned theirattention to lranian students living inthe United States.
WChavc formal reports stating that some peoplc have died. Young Iranian men
have bcen killed and Iranian girls raped over there, and al1 in the narnc of
humanity. Well, not one American has been struck in the streets here, you can
bear witness to that. Our public'sreaction to al1this has been very sobcr. And
then WC bcgan to think that our effortsto dcfusethe crisiswerebeing interprcted
in the United Statesas a signof weaknesson Ourpart and that the United States,
likea spoiledchild, wanted to get al[its own way.Then nothing waspossibleüny
longer.And now it is up tu the Americüns to make a move."
"Send Backthe Shah."
[Quesfiunj But what can Carter do?
[Answer] Basically,send back the Shah.
[Ques~iun]He cannot do that, and you well know it.
[Ansrver] Thal is his problem.
fQyrionj Would the opening of the fileson the Shah's fortune defuse the
crIsIs.
[Answer] It could ease the atrnosphere but would not resolve the problem.
[Quesfionj So the hostages will be tried?
[Answer] Yes.
[Quesriunj By whom?
(Ansn.er/ By the students thernselves.
[Ques~ion]When?
[Ansir7crj1don't know.
(Quesfiunj As regards the chargé d'affairesand his twocolleagueswho are at
the Foreign Ministry, you reccntlysaid yourselfthat they are freeto go, which is
difficultfor international public opinion to believe.
[Answer] No. There was a misunderstanding. 1said, and 1repeat, that those
thrcemenaskcdto begranted theright ofasylumat theministry.Thatasylum was
granted. Thcrefore, as long as they remain in the ministry 1 am personally
responsiblefor insuringthat nothinghappens to them,but those mentoo havcno
doubt committed crimes.So as soon as they lcavethe ministry precinctsthey will
fa11back into thehands ofjustice, and then 1willbe the first to demandthat ihey
bc arrcsted and tried.
Anncx 37
LD041140 Tehran Domestic Servicein Persian, 1124GMT, 4 Jan. 80 LD.
[Statement issued by the Muslirn Student Followers of the Imam's Policy MEMORIAL 217
in connection with the summonirig of the "former" US Embassy chargé
d'affaires-read by announccr.]
[Text] In the namc of God, the merciful, the compassionatc. The lslamic
Republic of Iran Foreign Ministry. It is necessary to notify Mr. Bruce Laingen,
the chacgi: d'affairesof the US espionage den in Tehran, to report to the
espionagc den, in ordcr tocxplain the discovered intclligcncedocumcnts. It is up
to the Foreign Ministry to takc rcsponsibility for his transfer to thc espionage
dcn.
[Signe# The Muslim Studcnt Followers of Irnarn'sPolicy.
[Dated] 4 January 1980.
Annex 38
LD101237Tchran Domcstic Serviccin Persian, 1030 GMT, 12Nov. 79 LD.
[Message from thc "supervisor" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Islarnic Rcpublic of lran to the "US Nation"-read byannounccr.]
(TCXI f (3Americans, sinccthcdriywhen the students entcrcd thc US Embassy
it would be hettcr ifwc said one ofthe important US administrative and
espionage centres in the world-the propagsnda machincs have bcgun the
disseminai.ionof constant propaganda aimed at decciving you Amcricans and
thc people: of the world to thc cffcct that undcr an lslamic govcrnment no
standard or law is rcspcctcd, that a tradition which for ccnturics has cnjoyed
respect by mankind has bccn violated, and that an cmbassy which is part and
parcel of Sour country's soi1isattrickcd and those who enjoy political jrnmunity
are taken as hostages.
However, they do not tell you Americans that the Embassy of your
Covernment in lran bears no resemblance to an embassy. Despitc the fact that
prior to and followingthc fall of your last puppet the majority of the documents
were taken away frorn thc Embassy, the remaindcr of thc docurncnts were also
burncd in three hours, despitc the fact that al1the cornputer scts wcrc generally
destroyed, the scts lcfi behind and the capturd documents lcavc no room For
doubt thal the Embassy wüsthc realcentreof power in lran during the era ofthe
former Shah and that Iran's rcal court was yoiir governrncnt Embassy in
Tehran. Now ask your Govcrnmcnt whether it pcrmits other countries to turn
their cmbiissiesin~hcUniicd Spatesinto centrcs ofgovernmcnt and intcrfcrcnce
in trivial and major aîï~irs and of espionage in the country and in the rcgion?
Annex 39
[Stern) lt is understondable that the Persians wish to bring the Shah back to
Persia to put him on trial herc. Yct the extraterritorial status of an embassy is
something like a basic law in the civilizedrelations between pcoplcs. Have the
laws of civilization becn rendercd invalid in the Irlin of ihe mullahs and
ayaioilahs?
[Beh~shtif It was not the government which stormed the Embassy.
/Srerrr/ But itapprovcd illater...
[Behrshiij .. .WCapprovcd it because this isthe understandablc reaction ofa
long oppressed socicty agiiinsta supcrpowcr. We have not trcated üny other218 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULAR STAFF
country this way. Take Great Britain. When a group wantcd to occupy the
British Embassy it was prevented from doing so by anotherroup. What was
involved inthe caseof theS Embassywas athrust against a great enemyof the
Iranian people.
(Stern] But the "enemy" is not sitting here in the Embassy but at best in
Washington.The people whomyou are holding hostagesare not the "murderers
of your youth", as you are saying time andgain.
[Beheshtij But they supported the murdcrers and spied for them.
[Sfern] if spiesare discoveredin a foreignembassyit isstandard procedure to
expel them but not to take them as hostages.
[Beheshfi] It is standard procedure, but not revolutionary. If wewere talking
hereabout diplomatic traditions,hen 1would Sayyou are right. But we have a
revolution. And they have laws of their own.ingrevolutionaries we support
the youth because this action is the only way to make the world familiar with
theirideas, goals and feelingsof revenge.The world must understand that.
[S~ern] Dr. Beheshti, you have lived in the West for many years. You are
familiar with thenentality of the Western people. Do you really believethat a
superpowerlikethe United Statescan afford to extradite a fatally il1former ally
without losingface?
[Beheshti] The US Governrnent did not accommodate the Shah after his faIl
-why did it have to do so now?
(Stern] I told you: for humanitarian reasons.
[Beheshti] Sir, this is a point which our people do not understand.
Humanitarian reasons! An enemy of humanity cannot be treated in a
humanitarian way.
[Stern] We must rcpeat the question: Do you really believethat the United
Statcs will extradite the Shah?
[Beheshti] Everything is possible in this world. We understand that the
Americanscondemnthe taking of hostagesand describeit as inhuman. But kcep
in mind that our courts calledon the Shah to stand trial before them, but hedid
not come.Now heis in the hands of the US Government. Does theinternational
custom whichyou just cited not command that the Shah be turned over to those
who are entitled to legal prosecution?
[Stern] There is,after all,no extradition agreementbetweenthe United States
and Iran.
[Beheshti] The fact isthat by their refusalto extradite the Shahthe Americans
were the firsto violate the commandment of humanity. We only paid back in
kind.
[Stern] What does the Koran have to Sayabout this primitive wayof revenge
thinking?
[Beheshti] It allows it, but it also says that forgivingis better.
[Stern] And yet, you want toput the hostageson trial-with the chance that
they might besentenced to death.
[Beheshfi]Whoeverreallyhasengagedin espionagewillhave to answerfor it.
fStern] Do you have proof ofespionage?
[Beheshfi] Everybody knowsthat, aftcr all. There will be proof indeed.
Annex 40
INTERVFE WWITH SEYYEH DOSBYN F.BIS, DAILYREPORT 3, DECEMRE 1R79,
P.R 19
LD030901 (Editorial report] Paris Le Monde in French, 30 Novemher,
publishesonpages 1und3 a 1,400-wardEric RouleauTehrandispalch ou~lining
thecircums~anceosfIranianForeignMinisterBani-Sadr'sdismissalanddiscussingthe policy n.lriclrfornie foreign minisrcrhadfolfotwd. Rouleoupoints oui thal
Butii-Sadrrhouighi!lie hosrages aflliicnuld fead fa the coffapseoJ the Islamic
republic-o vieiviloshared by the "Qom srrarcgisrr".
"Seyyed Hoseyn, Imam Khomeini's grandson and adviser to us on
Mondüy, 26 November: 'Theoccupation of the US Embassy is particularly
profitable both in the Third World and in lran itself.' Hoseyn's theory,
which is as well-argucd as Mr. Bani-Sadr's, could be summarizcd as
follows:.
1.The blowsdealt against US impcriülismhave absorbed al1the interna1
conflictswhichwcrcundermining the Islamic Republic,and have united the
cntire population, regardless of class and political lesnings, under the
Imam's banner. The Embassy'soccupation is the most popular event that
has occurrcd since the monarchy wris overthrown. 'It has enablcd us to
open the door to a strategic alliance bctweenthe Islarnicmovemcnt and the
secular andleft-winggroups and to a tactical alliancewith the Soviet bloc',
SeyyedHoseyn iold us in particulür.
2. 'The Thjrd World and Muslirn pcoples, cspecially the Arabs now
regard the lranian Rcvolution as thcir own.' 'ïhc occupation of the US
Embassy has been sccn by [hem as an exciting challenge to the most
powerful of the two supcrpowcrs. 'WC have therefore Iiberated thcsc
pcoples from fear, from "psychological occupation", which is more effcc-
tivcthsn any other, to which US imperialism subjected them', Seyyed
Hoseyn stated,the scizurcof diptomatsas hostagesisnot regarded byThird
World populations as a violation of intcrnutional law about which,
morcover, they understand very little. 'The poor and underpnvileged
dcspise the legal and meddlcsonie minds of the rich and powerful',Scyycd
Hoseyn added and hc isconsidcred to bc as 'radical'as his grandfathcr."
Annex41
LD300350 Tehran Domcstic Scrviccin Pcrsian, 0125 GMT, 30 Nov. 79 LD.
[Interview of Ayatollah Khomcini by "Europe;in correspondents" on 29
Novembcr in Qom: qucstions in English-recordcd.]
[Excerpts] [Announcer] Radio and Europerin press correspondents arc hcrc,
sorneof whom come from such smallcountries as Belgium,Spain, Italy, Greccc,
and who previously (?spentsomc tirnc)in Iran. They were here last year during
thc rcvolution [words indistinct].
IKhorneini] ln the narne of God, ihc compassionate, the merciful. What 1
cxpcct froin the corrcspondcnts is that what 1 have to say should not be
confuscd: It should be published just us I say it, without adding to it or
shortcniiigitTheyshould not bring in thcir opinions on whathave wrilten and
should not to fall undcr the inilucncc of cvil prcipaganda. Thcy should rcflcct
Iran's problemsjust as I state thcm.
/Quesrion] WCcome from small Europcari çountrics and (?weshould know
about) the American yokc [words indistinct]. After the last few dayç, Your
Emincncc, it appedrs evident that American intervention in lran will have
serious consequences for world pcacc. Your Eminence, do you think ihai ihc
Amcricans are taking the risk just to prolcct thc criminal Reza Pahlavi, or do
you think they havc sorne othcr aims as wcll?
lAirsii.er]It is possible that they may have entertüined other objectivessince220 DlPLOMATlC AND CONSULAR STAFF
we do no1sec such humanity in Carter and those who are in charge of affairs
that they would be prompted by a love of mankind in refusing to return
Mohammad Reza. The reason is simply that even inthis issue, if these people
were philanthropists they wouldnot Say:WC,for the sake of a few men, will
either subject 35millionpeople to an economicblockade so that-as they think
-thcsc peoplewillperish frorn hunger. Nor would they Say:We willstart a war
-whcrcby thcy woulddraginto blood and dust thcircountry, our country and a
great many othcrs. Ali this makes one think that the issue is not one of
philanthropy. Thcre are other issuest work and one might possiblybe stronger
than others, that is, that they know what crimes they have committcd through
the agencyof that corrupt person. Theyarc aware of ihis. Perhapsa grcat müny
of the crimcsperpctratcd by Mohammad Rczawcrcsuchthat no one elsebut he
and the Presidentsknewanything about them; pcrhapsnot even the governmcnt
apparatus-neither ours nor theirs.These could be secrets.These crimescould
be secrets kepi by the President at the time and hy Mohammad Rem. it
appears IO us that Mr. Carter is afraid of this. He is terrified now that il
Mohammad Reza is put on trial and if we try him, besides his crimes which
would bcproved, other people's crimes,the crimesof the Presidentsof this tirnc,
particularly Mr.Carter, the latest President, thesepeople's crimeswould also be
provcd.
And just as we have demanded-are demanding-the trial of Mohammad
Reza and, God willing,wewillyet tryhim, then we willalso demand thetrial of
the Presidcnts, thosewho were partncrs in these crimes, no matter what post
they occupy-whether they beCarter, Nixon, Johnson or anybody else.Wewill
demand their trial. And the fear which Carter now has is preciselythis. He is
afraid that hiscrimesrnightbeproved and that wcmight prosecute himforthosc
crimesand that hemight losehischanceof beingPresident,which hecovets. For
this reason he is in a state of panic.
He isthereforespanng no effort. He isresorting to any means.Probably not a
day passes without (?messages) beingreceived by our Foreign Ministry from
abroad, rrom various countries to whom they have appealed. Thcy kecp
appealing to usto releasethe hostages and so forth. Consequently, Mr. Carter's
motive is not humanitarian, of that we arc almost certain. He has become
panicky, and rightly so, for traitors are normally in a statc of panic. He was
under the illusion that by staging certain manoeuvers he could acquire sornc
prestigein America.Al1heisconcerned about isgettingre-elected.That is al1he
wants.
The thing is that Mr. Carter has not had a divine upbringing [tarbiyut-e
asmani]. When you hear that during the past fewdays he has gone io church
once in order to pray for the releaseof thesc hostages,you must realizethat his
prayers are like those of Mohammad Reza, who used io go to Mashhad for this
purpose. This is preciselywhat one of Ourscholars, Ubeyd Zakan, used to süy,
that: Surprise, the cat is repenting.
This is thc thing. Consequently, the possibility that he may be doing
sornething for Moharnmad Reza, on humanitarian grounds, is rather rernote.
So, this is entirely up to him; it is up to him to rccognizcthe situation. 1she io
conclude that in order to gel re-electedhe should srart a war and ruin his own
country? 1sthis howheassessesthe situation-that heought to start a war? Ifso,
hc willbc dereated. There is no possibilitythat he ought to adopt a rational linc
and rcturn this criminal who cornmitted many crimesin this country for more
than 50 ycars, who has killed Ouryoung people and plundered and wasted all
our rcsources.should he decideto hand him over to us, then afterwards, if they
[presumably Shah and associates] are found guilty, which they are for wc
consider them as guilty-anyway, oncc he rcturned thcm and also returns our
property, then we rnightconsider leavingthern be /mn mozayeqehnadarim keh
inharu rarkeshan konimj. Annex 42
LFITB RA~D 9 NOVI:MR 1979RFROM THEPERMANER NIIPR~S~INTAT OFVEllE
UNITED STATE OF AMIZRIC TA THE UNITED NATION ASDL>RISSITOITHE
PKESII)~:OF THESECURITY COUNCIL
Annex43
S/13616.
9 November 1979.
On 9 November 1979, ~ollowingconsultations among the membersofthe
Security Council, the Prcsidcnt of the Security Council madc the following
Sutement:
"Fo!lowing consuliaiions among the members of the Securily Council, 1
am aiithorized as Prcsidcnt of the Council to cxprcss the Council's
profound concern over therolonged detentian of Arnericün diplomatic
personnel in Irun. SpcciiiPresident of the Security Council on behalf
of the Security Council and, while not wishing to interfere in the interna1
aKairsof any countr1musi emphasize that the principlc of the inviolabil-
ity of diplomatic personnel and establishments be respectcd in al1CasCsin
accordance with intcrnationally acceptcd noms. There1urge in the
strongcst terms that thc diplomatic personnel binnIran be released
withoiit delay and providcd protection. 1furiher urge the Secrctary-General
to continue to use his good officesto assist towards this objcciive."
Annex44
CiA16076.
9 Novcmbcr 1979.
A spokcsman madc the rollowing statement today on behalfof thc Prcsidcnt
of thc General Assernbly, Salim A. Salim (Unitcd Republic of Tanrinia):
"The Prcsidcni has becn followingthe develolimentsin Iran with greatest
conccrn. Heis vcrmuch conccrned at the siifetyand scofAmerican
personnel now hclds hostüges.
He has been inconsultaiion with a numbcr of delegaiions, including the
chargCd'affaires of Iran.
He is scheduled to meet ihe chargéd'affaires agüin today p.m.2.30
The President is scnding a personrtl message to the Ayatollah, appealing
for thc release of the hostagcs." DlPLOMATlCAND CONSULARSTAFF
GAI6096
20 Novcmber 1979.
The followingstatement on behalf of the Presidentof the General Assembly,
Salim A. Salim (United Republicof Tanzania), was made today:
The President wishesto expresshii;personal gratification and appreciaaton
the releaseof the 13Arnericanhostageswhichtook placeyesterday.At the same
time, however,he reiterates his deep concern at the continued detention of the
remaining diplomütic personnelat the Embassy. In this respect, the President
recallsthe appealhe had addressed 10Ayatollah Khomeinion 9 November 1979
thatal1the hostages bereleased immediately.The President wishesto reiterate
this appeal and to expresshis particular concernthat the remaininghostages be
releasedwithout delay.
The President is convinced that the cal1 for the rclçase of the hostagcs
representsthe collectiveconcern of the internationalmunitywhoclearlyfcel
strongly that the sanctity of diplomatic prerniscsand diplomatic personnel must
be respected,without any exceptions,atal1times. It is the fervent hope of the
Prcsidentthat the actiony the Iranian authorities to releasethe 13hostageswill
be followedwith the release of ail the other hostages.
between the United States and Iran, it is crucial that internationlawoandoncern
practice governing the treatrnent of diplomatic missions and their agents be
scrupulously observed.
Annex 45
SIPV.2172.
27 November 1979.
Hetd at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 27 November 1979,at 3 p.m.
Prcsident: Mr. Palacios de Vizzio (Bolivia)
Mernbers: Bangladesh Mr. Kaiser
China MF.Chcn Chu
Czechoslovakia Mr. Hulinsky
France Mr. Lepretle
Gabon Mr. N'Dong
Jamaica Mr. Mills
Kuwait Mr. Bishara
Nigeria Mr. Clark
Norwliy Mr. AIgàrd
Portugal Mr. Futscher Pereira
Union of Soviet Socialisr Republics Mr. Troyanovsky
United Kingdom of Great Bntain
and Northcrn lreland Sir Anthony Parsons
United States of America MT. McHenry
Zarnbia Mr. Lisaka
This record contains the original texof speeches delivered in English andinterprctations of speeches in thc other Isnguages. The final tex1will beprintcd
in the Oficia Rlecords oj the Security Council.
Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be
sent under the signature of a member of the delegaiion concerned, within one
week, to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, Department of
Conference Services,Room A-3550,Alcoa Building, 866United Nations Plara,
and incorporated in a copy of the record.
Adoption ofthe Agenda.
Theagenda LVQSadopted.
Letter dated 25 Novembcr 1979 from the Secreiary-Gcneral addressed to the
Presidcnt of the Security Council (SI13646).
The President(intcrprctation from Spanish): I wish to inform members of the
Council that 1have rcccivcd lciters from the representatives of lran and Sri
Lanka in which they requestto be inviteto participate in thc SecurityCouncil's
discussion of the item on its agenda. In accordancc with the usual practice 1
propose, with the conscnt of the Council, to invite those rcprcsentatives to
participate in the discussion without thc righ10 vote, in accordance with the
rclcvant provisionsofthe Charter and Rule 37of the Council'sprovisional rules
of procedure.
There being no objection, il is so decided.
At rhe invitationo/ rlrPrcsirlent.Mr. Salamarion (Iran) look a plue ut the
Council ~nble;Mr. Fernrrndo(Sri Luflka) look theplace rwervedjbr him ut the
side ofthe Councit Chaniher.
Tlie Presidcnt (interpretation from Spanish): The Security Council will now
begin its consideration of the item on ils agenda.
The Security Council is mceting today in response to a rcquest by the
Secretary-General containcd in a letter dated 25 November 1979 from the
Secretary-General addrcssed to the President of the Security Council (S113646).
1wish to draw the attention oîmembcrs of the Council to document S/13650,
which coniains the text of a lettcr dated 27 November 1979from the Chargé
d'Affairesof thePermanentMission of Iran to the United Nations addressed 10
the Presideni of the Sccurity Council.
1now cal1on the Sccretary-General.
TheSecretary-General:Mr. President, may I first al1express my apprecia-
tion to you and to themcmbers of thc SecurityCouncil for having convened this
highest orgin of the Unitcd Nations for international pcace and sccunty in
responsc to my lctter 01'25Novembcr. Thisdemonstratcs clearly thc ovcrriding
concern of the Council to findü peaceful solution ol'the crisis which has arisen
bctween the United States and Iran.
As mcmbers of thc Council arcaware, within the past three weeksI have been
continuously involved in efforts to find means of resolving ihis vcry serious
problern. Similar efforts have been made by you, kir. President, as welas by
many governments. I take this opportunity to expressrny sincere appreciation
for these efforts.
We al!know the basic clcrnentsof the problem before us. TheGovcrnment of
the United States isdeeplyconcerned at the seizureof itsembassy in Tehranand
the detention of its diplomaiic personnel, in violation of the rclcvant interna-
tional conventions. Thc Govcrnment of lran seeks redress for injustices and
abuse of human rights which? in its view, were committed by the previous
régime.
A major concern, of coursc, musi befor the fate of the individuals involved.224 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULARSTAFF
Butapart fromthe humanitarian, legaland psychologicalaspectsof the problcm
there can be no question that the international community has become
increasingly disturbed at the dangcrous level of tension arising from this
situation.This threatens the peaceand stabilityof theionand couldwellhave
very grave consequencesfor the entire world. In the prevailingcircumstancesit
becameclear tome that the effortsi have mentioned,which wereconducted with
good faith and determination, could not for the time being overcome the very
difficultobstacles with whichwe were faced. Although at times in the past few
days agreement seemed close,in the end the gap appeared to be 100 widc tobe
bridged at this stage.
11wasin the lightof thesedevelopmentsand of the escalalionof tension that 1
concludedthat thc presentcrisisposesa seriousthrcat to international peaccand
security. Accordingly,in the exerciseof my responsibility under the Charter, 1
asked for the urgent conveningofthe SecurityCouncil.1may mention herethat
this move was supported and welcomed by the Governrnents of Irün and the
Unitcd States. As you are aware, Mr. Prcsidcnt, it was also unanimously
supported by the members of the Council in the consultations whichtook place
yesterday.1 earnestly hope that this Council can be of assistance in heiping the
partiesto find waysand rneansto reconcile theirdifferences. Inthisconnection 1
was pleased to have confirmation today that the Foreign Ministerof Iran will
corne to New York to participate in our deliberations.
Although in the pas1 weeks we have discussedvarious formulae whichmight
prove useful in resolving this very serious crisis, 1do not think it would be
appropriate for me to make any detailed proposais at this time. 1am sure that
the parties concerned are as anxious as anyonc to sce an end to the present
deplorable situation and 1 would urge them to make every effort to avail
ihemselvesof the opportunities offeredby the machineryof the United Nations.
In the meantirne Iappealed tothem to exercisethe maximum reslraint and to
avoid any actions which could further inflame the situation.
I bclicvcthat the Security Councilcan be of great assistancein thesedificult
days and that it has a right and a duty to assist in resolving asituation which
posesgrave dangers to the structure of international peace. 1am confidenthlit
the Council willmake everyeffort to do this, gutdcd by the principlesof justice
and international law.
Beîore concluding, Mr. President,1 wish to pay a tribute to you personally
and to the members of this Council for your very helpful and responsible
handling of the preparalory consultations. We al1realize the very delicate and
unusual nature of this situation. 1 wish to say hou. grateful1 am for your
constructive response.
The Presiden 1w:ould like to thank the Secretary-Generalfor his statement.
1wishto referto the letter of the Secretary-Generaldated 25 Novcmber 1979
(S/13646), on the basis of whichthe Council is meeting and which reads as
follows:
"1 wish to refer to the grave situation which has ariscn in the relations
betweenthe United States and Iran. The Governrnent of the United States
isdeeplydisturbed at the seizureof its Ernbassyin Tehran and the detention
of its diplomatic personnel, in violation of the relevant international
conventions.TheGavernment of Iran seeksredressfor injusticesand abuse
of human rightswhich,in its view,werecommitted by the previousrégime.
The international community is increasinglyconcerned that the dangerous
levelof tensionbetweenthese two countries threatens peaceand stability in
theregion and coutd have disastrous consequences for the entire world.
ln my opinion, therefore, the present crisis poses a serious threat to
international peace and security. Accordingly, in the exercise of rny
rcsponsibility under the Charter of the United Nations, 1 ask that thc MEMORIAI.
Sccurity Council bc convened urgently in an effort to seek n peaceful
solution or the problcm in conformity with thc principles of justicc and
internationalIriw." (S/13646.)
1also wish to rcrcr to the letter dated 27 Novcmbcr 1979from thc Chargé
d'Affairesof the Permanent Mission of lran to thc United Nations addrcssed to
mc (S/13650), by which he requested that îormal dcliberations of thc Sccurity
Council be postponed out of respect for the most holy days of Tassua and
Ashura, days highly revered and cornmernoratcd for-centuries in many Islarnic
countries, particularly Iran, and in ordcr to cnablc UisExcellencyMr. Abolhas-
San Bani-Sadr, the Forcign Ministcr of Iran, to arrivc in New York so as to be
able to parlicipütc iri fulldebatc by the Sccurity Couticil asof Saturday evcning,
1Dccember 1979.
After coiisultütions, the Council hiis'Ihcreforc, agreed to adjourn its mccting
until 1 December 1979 at 9 p.m., subjecî to thc understanding that it will
rcconvene bcforc thcn if thc situation demands it.
1also wish to draw the attention of thc Sccurity Council to the facl that on
9 Novernber 1979, following consultations among mernbers of the Sccurity
Council, 1 issued the following statcmenl on behalf of the rnembcrs of the
Security Council, urgently asking for the release and protection ol Arncrican
diplornatic personnel who have been dctaincd in lran since 4 Novembcr 1979:
"Following consultalions among the mcmbcrs ol the Security Council,
I am authorizcd as President of the Council to express the Council~s
profound conccrn ovcr the prolonged delention of Amcrican diplomütic
personncl in Inin. Spcaking as Presidcnt of the Security Council [on] behalf
of the Sccurity Council, and while not wishing to interferc in the interna1
affairs of Linycountry, 1must emphasize thrit thc principle of the inviolabil-
ity of diplomatic personnel and establishmentsbe respected in ail cascs in
accordance with internationally accepted norms. Therefore, 1 urgc in the
strongest tcrms that the diplomatic personriel beingheld in Irün bcrclcascd
withoiit delay and provided protection. Ifurthcr urge the Secrctary-General
to continue to usc his good officesto assist towards this objective."
On bchalf of the Sccurity Council, I strongly rcitcrate this appeal.
In view of the çerious threat to international peacc and security, the Sccurily
Council will not rclcnt in its urgent efforts to scck a peaceful solution of the
problem in conformity with the principlcs of justice and internation;il law.
(conrinurd in Spuni.slz)
The Security Council will reconvene on I Dcccmbcr 1979, ai 9 p.m., to
continue its considcration or the item on its agenda.
Annex 46
TheSecuriiy Cnu!~cil,
Having c.oirsideretlthe letter dated 25 November 1979 from the Sccrctnry-
General (S!13646),
Deeply roncerncd at the dangcrous fevel of tension between lran and the
United States of Amcrica, which could havc grave consequcnccç for intcr-
national pcacc and sccurity,226 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULAR STAFF
Recalling the appeal made by the President of the Security Council on 9
November 1979 (S/13616), which was reiterated on 27 Novembcr 1979
(S/13652),
Takingnoreof the letter dated 13November 1979from the Foreign Minister
of lran(S/t 3626)relative to the grievancesof Iran,
Mindfulof the obligation of States to scttle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manncr that international peace and security, and
justice, are notndangered,
Conscious of the responsibility of States to refrain in their international
relationsfrom the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
politicalindependenceof any State, or in anyother manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations,
Reuflrrning the solemn obligation of al1States parties to both the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961and the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations of 1963to respect the inviolabilityof diplomatic personnel
and the premisesof their missions;
1.Urgently callson the Government of Iran to release immediately the
personnel ofthe Embassyof theUnitedStates oîArnerica king hefd in Tehran,
to provide them protection and to allow them to leave the country;
2.Furrher calls on the Governments of lran and of the United Statcs of
Americato take stepsto resolvepeacefullythe rernainingissuesbetweenthemto
iheirmutual satisfaction in accordance with ihe purposes and principles of the
United Nations;
3. Urges the Governmcnts of lran and of the United States of Arnerica to
exercisethe utmost restraint inhe prcvailingsituation;
4.Requests the Secretary-General to lend his good officesfor the immediate
implementation of this resolution and to take al1appropriate measures to this
end;
5.Decides that the Council will remain actively seized of the matter and
requests theecretary-Gencralto report urgently to it on developmentsregard-
ing his efforts.
Annex 47
EXCERP FROM AN INTERVIEW WITHFORI!IG MNINISTB GROTBZADEH F.BIS,
WAILY REPORT1 ,8DECEMBE1 R979,Pi'2-3
LDt71430 Tehran Domestic Servicein Persian, IO30 GMT, 17Dec. 79 LD.
[Textf Sadeq Gotbzadeh, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of. the Islamic
Republicof Iran, yesterdayafternoon, Sunday, answeredquestions by reporters
about the verdict of The Haguecourt and also the issueof the study of the
aggressive policyin Iran in an interviewheld at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Inreplyto a question regarding the verdict ofThe Hague court on the release
of the US hostages and the handing-over of the US Embassy, the Minister for
Foreign Affairsaid: We frankly announced in the communiquéwe sent them
that the issueof thestages is part of a grcater issue;thai is, the crimes of the
Shah in lranuringhisshamefulreignand the enforcementof the aggressiveUS
policy in Iran during the past 25 years. Therefore, if this issue wereto be
appraised,al1of its parts should be appraised. Hence, we do not recognizethe
legitimacyof the courtn appraisïng one part of the issue.
The prefabricated verdict of the court was clear to us invance; for ihis
reason Iran'scharge d'affairesat The Hague was ordered tofficiallyrejectthe
decisionof TheHague court. Of course, the United Stateswillpursue the cfccts
of this verdict and will takc it to the United Nations and the Security Council
and will try to threaten us andbjecl us to economic sanctions. The United States willcontinue thegamesit has beenplaying,whichofcourse
has no effect on our will. we have done so far, what we bclievciwe will
continue ta do and will advance (100th and nail).
STATCME NPTSECRI~TA ORYSTATE VANCE BEFOR EHE SKCURIT COUNCIL,
29 DECEMBE 1R79
WCmeel tonight at a moment when the principlcs upon which this great
international body rests are beingrply challenged in Iran. Morc than eight
weekshave passed sinccour Embnssy wasseizedand our peopleand those from
other nations weretaken hostagc in Tehran. On three separatc occasions, this
Councilhas unanimouslyexpresscdthe willof theinternational community that
the hostages be released imrnedilitely.
From the outset, the Sccretary-Gcnerel, with the full CO-opcrationof the
United States,bas labourcd unceüsinglyfora peacefulsolution. The Presidentof
the General Assembly has twice urged Iran to rclcase the hostages. The
International Court of Justice has spoken, clearlyunanimously. Govcrn-
ments and world leadersof varying political andreligiousfaiths have appealed
for the release ofOurpeoplc.And the US Govcrnment has, with dctcrmination,
persistcnce.and patience, pursued every pcaceful channel livailableto us.
The responsc of those who pcrpctuate this crisis-tterrorists who have
invaded our Embassy and the Government of Iran which supports them-has
been defiancc and contempt. They have placcd themselvesbeyond the world's
law and bevond the moral imperaiivesthatare comrnon to the world'scullures
and religions.
At the heart of this rnatter are 50 menand worncn-still cautive. still isolated.
still shbjecred the most sevcrcstrüins. The World couri in its unanimous
decision expressedconcern that continuation of these conditions of imprison-
ment "exposes the human bcings concerncd to privation, hardship, anguish
and even danger to lifc and health and thus to a serious possibility of
irreparable harm". Claims thnt the hostages are well ringhollow, for the
international community has bccn denied either consistent or comprehensive
accessto them.
But let usbc clcar: it is not only 50 Arnericanmcn and womenwho arc held
hostage in Iran. It is the international community. This is far more than a
conflictbetweenthe United Statesand Iran. lran has placeditselfinconflict with
thc structure of Iaw, with thc machinery of pace al1of us have painstakingly
built.
The time hascomc for the worldcommunity to act, firmlyand collectivcly,to
uphold international law and preserve international pciiçeWC mus1 give
practical rneaningto the principles and purposes of our Charter.
Aslong as lran reniainsindiffcrtothe voicesof reason and mercythat have
been raised from cvcrycorner of the world, as long as it refusesto recognizethe
common riilesof international behaviour, it must accept the consequencesof its
deliberate actions.
On 25 November the Secrctary-General, acting under Article 99 of the
Charter, took the extraordinary stepf requesting an urgent meeting of the
Council todeal with this crisis, stating that "the present crisasserious
threatto international peaccand sccurity". The Council'sresolu(4571of 4
December, adopted unanirnously,expressed the Council's deepconcern at the
dangerous level of tension and spoke of possible grave consequences for
international peace and security.
These statements, along with the many statements of concern by member
States, makeclear thejudgment of the international community that Iran's act228 DlPLOMATlCAND CONSULAR STAFF
of taking and holding hostages representsa violation of the law of nations and
threatens international peace and security. If Iran continues to hold the
hostages, alter the Council and the world community have unanimously called
for their releasc.action against Iran under Chapter VI1of the Charter isnot only
justified but rcquired to promotc a peacefulsolution of this crisis,
11istherefore incumbent upon al1of usas membersof this Council to take the
steps necessary to insurc that the Council's earlier unanimous decision is
implerncnted. My Govcrnment thercfore seeks a resolution which would
condemn Iran's failure to comply with earlier actions of the Security Council
and of the International Court calling for the imrnediate release of al1 the
hostages. The resolution would further provide for two additionat steps: ,
First, request the. Secretary-General to intensify his good ofice's efforts,
noting his readincss to go personally to Tehran and to report back to the
Council by a specifieddaic;
Second,decidethat, if the hostages have no1been released when thc Council
meets again at the early specified date, the Council will at that timc adopt
specificsanctions undcr Article 41 of the Charter.
We believethat thc continued solidarity of the international community will
serveto dcmonstrate that an carly resolution of the problem is to the bcnefrtof
all. Theprolongation of this crisis iin no one'sinterest.
We arc not unmindful of the grievances of the Iranian people. WCrespcct
Iran's sovcreigntyand independence and the right of the Iranian peoplc to
decide thcir own form of govcrnment. As we have repeatedlyemphasized,once
the hostagcsarc rcleasedunharmed. weare prepared, in accordancewith the UN
Charter, to scek a resofution of the issues betweenus.
With the hostages' rclease, the way will be clear for Iran to present its
grievances in any appropriate forum. The United States, however, cannot
respond to claims of injusticewhile our citizens are heldin unjust captivity in
violation of the rcsolutions and orders of the world's primary peacekceping
institutions.Asa great American President,Abraham Lincoln-a man of deep
compassion and understanding-once dectared: "There isno grievancethat isa
fitobject of redress by mob law."
Our patience and forcbearance have been severelytested in thesc past weeks.
Theyare not unlimited.Wehave madeclear [rom the beginningthat weprefera
peaceful soluiion to the other remedies that are available to us undcr interna-
tional law. It isin theterestof sucha peacefulsolution that today wecal1upon
this body to act.
Let us act now to preserve the web of mutual obligation which binds us
together and shields us rrom chaos and from disordcr. For there can be no
evasion of thisccnlral point: if the international communityfail tsact when its
law is flouted and its authority defied, we not only diminish thepossibility for
peace in this crisisWC belittle this institution of peace itself.
Effective action by the Security Council can breathe new lire into thc
provisionsof the Chartcr and the decisionsof this Council. It can remind al1of
us,nowand in the future, orour solemn obligationto heedthejudgments of this
body and to prcscrvcits central place in the maintenance of international peace
and security.
Lct us move togethci-,in a münncr that is clear and convincing, to dcmon-
strate that the rule of Iaw has meaning, and that our machinery of peace has
practical relevancc. Let us protect, as we must, the basic process that permits
nations to maintain civilizedrelations with one another.
Through the dccisionwe urge on this Council, wetogethercan hastcn the day
when this order is resotved.And through out dernonsiratcd commitment to the
purposes of Our Charter, we will strengthen both the principles and the
institutions that serve world peace and protect us all. Annex 49
&a1 Eiatiprtlie rundiint PmW.oola 4t L lr Cmratiw 1t
VieMe nit lei i..l.tleni d$~lsoitiaW'i, ol-iprli dhodi
Coarentlon", qui fi 4t4 dopWi pu ID Canf4i.oae di* Iat$ooi Wei
tenu* A tlsiai In 2 ms# on 14 irril 1961,
-fimant 1-r 44i1~ d* riwufiri pour O. qui lie oo8*amm8 k
1. Juriâlotloa obli&itoirr di lmCaur Intimi~lmdi Li hotlei prru1.
~l~rim difffirind~ buohrat ~'larirprlterim w l*ipplsm+aai
Le 1. Cant.ntlrrn, L mina QU'U utri ode de rlgl-t I'LLS 4U
worpti d'un a- baoord pu 1ii Putlir dmi a iiillririiecanabli,
Sontoonrmui b.i blapoiltiani nilvmtai t
hi biff4nndi mlitifi & l'lt~rpr4tatioe au A I'.pplioitioi di
le Comiiition mlbriit di la ooapitaaoi obll~r~lir 4. la Eour
latrrnationrle di Jurtioi, gui, & oe tltn, pour* @tri ddl prr iw
irpulk de toute pukii u kiifirnd qui iirb illcdr ?utle pi
pd.4nt Pro(oao1i.
fitl0l4 11
Li putiii p-t aŒvmnir, dmii ua 44l.i de d- mii @i
roritloetlm p4r uae putii A I'uitirqu'Li dit4 & ig di mm ,
Iltlfl, dl&piir d'un 00- woord. iu liri du moouri 1. Ooiu
iii*ri~iti&i di Jwtim, tni prad4uri Iihat iu tri-
I*ubitry.. 0. dlîU 4tmt hl4, abïpoi prtii pmt, * mi*
de i.pilk, idmir A4 Ooiu du Lifi&i.iid.
&liol* 1p
1. hi partiai puriot 4mlŒent bonrrair d'un w- iiwrd, luis
1i dm 611.1 di diru ml*, di rraourâr 1 un* prpddurr de ~oiliitâŒ
ricnt d'm appeler A le Cwr lntim*iiodi di Jnitiai.
2. Ir Wialon de oonolllition km loiulir iim rmounàatlour
hi Irr oiap wli niivuit sa oonrtitutioa. Il ul&ii-01 a, ioot pu
Wiptlii p.r'lii putlai ui IIkip huis I'iip&ai ii &ru wii &pdi
1- 4noao4, ohwu* partie meri libre d* i&iiir 1. Cwr du àîifimd
pu nile de ripubte. DIPLOMATlCAND CONSULARSTAFF
b b
yai wbrm Iiliolonmr Dlpladtl~i, qui a diluite a iiti b-to
mmI.ooriarr4 -14 Ooaiaolbm*, wrobrb. pot la hnfmrada 4. lu Lamw
Bibr ailmb=b a VlŒn ail O 4m mr~ rl 14 dm ibril 4- 1961.
&rmmrnao ou 4nro de m r 4 lm midiooih mbli@arli 1. la
Qrti latmrpioloari de Jumtloir r bl. 14 sui lai saidirsi nqwc &
lu obatwririlii orl~radai por la Fo4uproSiafh l .pliaaiL 1i1.
ODmaeidi, a iaoi mi Ira putu byu io-W Ir riba nirli, 49-
4i a plmm -bl*, dm oI~ hm 4a -ar
btro 48 un piw 1i 1.4 rioi, Iiapubi dr XI mtlfiouib go?
iiu a otra di lu phi. 1mqui, i m $uiiio, idik u lili~ol 4atm
pod.r& wadr 6 mr a ia tri- & uMwe o rr 1i -
rdt la hrtm Lat-mi4 dm Juitioia. B. riri trramarril. u
pluo, rurlgulin &e 1.0 p-ii pdrl #te 1. Œntnrirda . L.
rai.aii mn d a
2. Ir ooriiidn di wnoiliaoidn bib-l foxmulu wi reoommnbidmim don-
tro da loi aisw ~mmmimi&ulat*i i m oomrtituolbn. Il me re-b-
oloamm ao hiirui raiptdae par lai putao m lltido datro k i pl-
di &i imami 4mmp4i dm bbmr iib Ib-ldaa, dpulim de lu wtri
pobil ioutir il litido 4 1i Cers* Wliatiu duadi.MEMORIAL DIPLOMATICAND CONSULARSTAFF
&~~tAB-%+-+r~=siwR+wB&flcW
$4&44~QB~&&t&~îhikkqft.,iLf (~dffl#"
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Annex50
UN~TES UTATERSESPON SE IRANIANDHAFTINSGUGGFSTIO REGARDINC THE
1955TR~ATYOF AMITYE, CONOMR IELATIO NSDCONSULAR RIGHTS
Sent to: AmErnbassy,Tehran954.
1/9/54.
Treaty ArticleX11I-2.Viewestablishedpracticcmany nationsof usingterrns
"interpretaiionpplication"inclausesproviding for adjudby Interna-tional Court, dclction "application" might scriously curtail mcans scttlcmcnt
disputes undcr US-Iran Treaty. Iran hüs subscribed to following agrecmcnts
containing both trrms: Sweden-Iran commercial air service agreement signcd
Tehran 3l Ociober 1949:Convention on Privilegesand Immunities of UN, 1946;
Treaty of I'cücewith Japan, 1951; Protocol limiting cultivation poppy plant,
etc.,1953.Usc or both terms standard inUS hitriteral and multilateral treaty
provisions rclating Io Court.
Adjudication cascs under proposed trciity hlls under paragraph 1 of Ariicle
36 of Staiuie (mattcrs specially providcd Torin treaties) rather than paragraph 2
(compulsory jurisdiction). Contrary toAbdoh'ssiütcment, however,püragraph
2 conîers jurisdiction on Court in legal disputes on matters othcr ihan
interpretation. the following pertinent hcrc: existenceany fact which if estab-
lished would constitute breach international obligation; nature and extcnt
reparation for breach international obligation. However, paragraph 2 noi
applicable ia this ircaty because Iran has not recognized compulsory jurisdic-
tion.
Issue raiscd in proposcd delction fundamcntal, arid if Iran persists solution
appears very difficult. Consideration ctiuld possibly be given as last resori to
provision for some procedure for effective ;irbitration as substitute TorCourt
clause; thc zirbitration would nccd to covcr, however, "interprctation or
application".
Annex 51
BelgitrniTrcaty of fricndship, establishment and navigation. Signed at Brusscls
21 Fcbruary 1961. Entered into force 3 Oçtober 1963. 14 UST 1284; TlAS
5432; 480 UNTS 149.
Repuhiic r!/Cliino, Treaty of îriendship, commerce and navigation, with
protocol. Signcd ai Nanking 4 Novcmbcr 1946. Entered into forcc 30
Novembcr 1948.63 Stat. 1299; TIAS 1871:25 UNTS 69.
BetinirirkTreaiy of friendship, commerce and navigation, with protocol and
minutes cf inicrpretation. Signcd at Copcnhagen 1October 1951.Entered into
force 30 July 1461. 12 UST 908; TlAS 4797;421 UNTS 105.
F~~IIIIC'o,iivcntion of establishment. protocol, and declaration. Signcd al Paris
25 Novcmbcr 1959.Enieredinto force21 Deccmber1960. 11 UST2398; TIAS
4625; 401 UNTS 75.
Grwre, Treaty of fricndship, commercc and navigiition. Signed at Athcns 3
August 1951. Entered into force 13Octobcr 1954. 5 UST 1829; TlAS 3057;
224 UN7S 279.
Irrrn,Trcaty of amily. cconomic relations, and coiisular rights. Signedal Tchran
15August 1455.Entcrcd into forcc 16June 1957.8 UST899; TIAS3853; 284
UNTS 93,
IrclrinrTrcaty of îriendship, commcrcc and navigation, with protocol. Signed at
Dublin 21 January 1950,Entered in10 forcc 14Scptcmber 1950. 1 UST 785;
TIAS 2155;206 UNTS 269.
Isrnel. Trenty of friendship. commcrcc and navigation, with protocol and
exchadgc of notes. Signed at Washington 23Aiigust 1951.Entercd in10force 3
April 1954. 5 UST 550; TIAS 2948; 219 UNTS 237.
Itrrlj, Treüty of friendship, commerce and navigation protocol, üdditional
protocof, and cxchange of notes. Signcd at Rome 2 February 1948. Entercd
inio forcc 26 July 1949.63 Stat. 2255;TIAS 1965:79 UNTS 171.234 DIPLOMATICAND CONSULAR STAFF
Japan,Treaty of friendship,commerceand navigation, protocol, and exchange
of notes of 29 August 1953.Signedat Tokyo 2 April 1953.Entered into force
30 October 1953.4 UST 2063; TIAS 2863;206 UNTS 143.
Korea,Treaty of friendship, commerceand navigation, with protocol. Signedat
Seoul 28 November 1956.Entered into force 7 November 1957.8 UST 2217;
TZAS3947;302 UNTS 281.
Luxembourg, Treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation. Signed at
Luxembourg 23 February 1962.Entered into force 28 March 1963.14UNST
251; TIAS 5306;474 UNTS 3.
Netherlands,Treaty of friendship, commerceand navigation, withprotocol and
exchangeof notes. Signedat The Hague 27 March 1956.Entered into force 5
December 1957.8 UST 2043; TIAS 3942;285 UNTS 231.
Nicaragua, Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, and protocol.
Signed at Managua 21January 1956.Entered into force24 May 1958.9 UST
449; TIAS 4024; 367 UNTS 3.
PakLFranT,reaty of friendshipand commerceand protocol. Signedat Washing-
ton 12 November 1959.Entered into force 12 February 1961. UST 110;
TIAS 4683;404 UNTS259.
Togolese Republic,Treaty of amity and economic relations. Signed at 8omé
February 1966.Entered into force 5February 1967. 18UST 1;TIAS 6193;
680 UNTS 159.
Viet-Nam,Treaty of amity and economic relations. Signed al Saigon 3 April
1961.Entered into force 30 November 1961. 12 UST 1703;TIAS 4890; 424
UNTS 137.
Annex52
RELATIONS OHFPRTICLX EXVII OF THETRBATB YETWEE THE
UNITED STATES AND CHINAS , IGNE4 NOVEMBE 1946,TO SENATE
RF~LUTIO1 96 OF 2 AUGUST 1946
ArticleXXVII of the trcaty provides that any dispute between the govern-
ments of the two high contracting partieas to the interpretation or the
application of this treaty, which the high contracting parties cannoto-
rilyadjust by diplomacy,shall besubmitted to the International Courtof Justice
unlessthe highcontracting parties shall agreeto settlcmentbysomeother pacific
means.
Senate Resolution 196of 2 August 1946is the resolution by whichthe Senate
gave its advicc and consent to the deposit with the Secrctary-General of the
United Nations of a dxlaration under paragra2of Article 36 of the Statutc
of the International Court Justice recognizingas compulsory the jurisdiction
of the lntcrnational Court of Justice in al1lcgaldisputes arisingc(a)erning
the interpretation of a treaty; (6) any question of internation(c)the;
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation; and the nature or extent of the reparation to be
made for the brcach ofn international obligation.
In giving itsadvice and consent to the deofsthe declaration, the Senate
qualified the agreement to accept compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by
adding aproviso ihat the declaradon should no1apply to (a) disputeswhichthe
parties might,pursuant to existing or future agrccrnents entrust to other
tribunals; (b) disputes with regard to matters which are essentiallywithin the
domesticjurisdiction of the United States as detcrmined by the United States;or MEMORIAI. 235
(c) disputes arising under a multilateral trcaty cxccpt under certain spccified
conditions. It was further provided in thc rcsolution that the declaration should
rcmain inforce for a pcriod of fiveycarsand thercafter until the expiration of six
months aftcr notice or tcrmination.
The negotiatioris which resulted in the signing of the present treaty began in
February 1946. In May the present text of Articlc XXVlII was discussed
informally by officcrsof the Department of State wilh the then chairman and
other members of thc Forcign Relations Commitice. This fact isreferrcd to not
for the purpose of suggcsting ihat there isany permanent commitment by those
Senators in favour of the language of this artictc but as indicating that the
Dcpartmcnt was thcn sccking to dcvelop 3 soiind and generally acceptable
cornpromissary clause for treaties of this typc. The text of the articlc was
submitted to the Chincse ncgotiators on 6Junc and no question of its acceptancc
by China was raised in thc ncgotiations. Sen~itcResolution 196was adopted 2
August, and the ircaty was signed 4 Novcmber 194(i.
Jiwould appear that ~hconly part of ihe resolution which is significant in so
Fdras Article XXVIll of this treaty is concerncd is item {b) of the first proviso,
which states that the dcclaration accepting campulsory jurisdiction of the Court
shall not apply to disputes with regard to matiers tirhichare esçcntiallywithin the
domcstic jurisdiction of thc United States as detcrmined by thc United Statcs.
There is. of coursc. no provision sirnilar to this in the treaty. The Depürtrncnt of
State feelslhat questions arising under this treaty are maiters which the United
Svates would wish to sec subrnitledto the International Court of Justice, and
that it would bc in thc public interest for the United States to be able tu bring,
withoul restriction, bcforc that Coiirt üny disputes arising bccausc of the
intcrprctation or application by China of the provisions of this treaty in such a
way as to hc detrimental to the intcrcsts of the Unitcd Statcs.
Ii is thought thar Articlc XXVIIIof the trcaty is no[ in canflict with theintcnt
and purpose of Senatc Resolution 196.11isto be noted that the exception in item
(h) applies with respect to the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction as to four
e~rensivecitiegorics of questions al which thc intcrpretation of a treaty is only
one. In this broad contcxi, ihe exception stands as a possible protcction against
this country's bcing citcd before the Court by any one of a largc nurnber of
States, someof which might conceivably try to bring before the Court, as rclatcd
to a question of international law, questions such as Our policy as to immigra-
tion, the continental shclf, or some other domestic matier.
The conipromissory clause (Article XXVIII) ol' the treaty with China,
however, is lirnitcd to questions of thc intcrprctation or application or this
treaty; i.e.. it is a spccial natgeneral compromissory clause. It lipplies ta a
trcaty on thenegotiation ofwhich there isvoluminous doiumentation indicating
the inient of the parties. This treaty deals wiih subjcrts which are common to a
largc numhcr of trcatics, concluded over a long pcriod of time by ncarly al1
nations. Much of the gcneral subject-rnatter-and in somecasesalmosi idenlical
language-has beeniidjudicated in the courts of this and other countries. The
authorities for the intcrpretation of this trelity are, thercforc, to a considcrable
cxtent estabfished and wcll known. Furthermorc, certain important subjects,
noiably immigration, trattic in military supplies, and the "csscntiül intcrcsts of
the country in timc of national emergency", are spccificallyexccptcd from the
purview of the trcaty. In viewof the above, it isdifiicult to conceive how Article
XXVIIl could rcsult in this Government's being impleaded in a mattcr in which
ii mighi be emharrüsscd.
It may be addcd, in conclusio nhat thcrc isal lcastone preccdent forihis type
of compromissory provision. It is containcd in Articles 84 and 86 of the
International Civil Aviation Convention (Treraricx ciilO~herInternarionnl Acts,
Series 1591), which was ratified by ihe Prcsideni 6 August 1946. lt would also
iippear that thc jurisdiction of the Court in questions arising under the236 DlPLOMATlC AND CONSULAR STAFF
constitution of the International Labour Organisation (Treary Series,No. 874)is
not limited by any conditions such as are estüblished in Senate Resolution 196.
Annex 53
Article XIX, paragraph 2, of the treaty with Relgium and Article XIV,
paragraph 2, of the treaty with Viet-Nam provide that differences as to thc
intcrpretation or application of those trcatics, if not resolved by diplomacy, are
to be submitted to the International Court of Justice unless the parties agree to
settlernent by some other pacific rneans. In total, provisions relating to the
International Court of Justice appear in 20 postwar commercial treatics.
Provisions identical or nearly identical withhosc of the treaties with Belgium
and Viet-Nam are to be found in 15 other trcatics of this general type signcd
sincc the end of World War II, each of which has received Senate approval:
China (19461, Dcnmark (1951), Ethiopia (1951), Iran (1959, Ireland (19501,
lsracl (1951), Italy (19481,Japan (19531, Korea (1 956), Netherlands (1956),
Nicaragua (1956), Pakistan (1959), and Uruguay (1948). All of these trcatics
except that with Uruguay have entered into force. Similar provisions appear in
treatics with Colombia (1951)and Haiti (1955),upon which the Senate has not
actcd.
The only variations from the policy of including a provision in postwar
commercial treaties in this form and wording occur in conncction with the
treaties with the Federal Republic of Gcrmanyand the Sultanate of Muscat and
Oman. Article XXVII,paragraph 2, of the former provides that disputes as to
interpretation or application of the treatyno; adjusted by diplomacy or some
other means shall besubmitted to arbitration, or upon agreement of the parties,
to the International Court of Justice. This provision, however, isquülified by
paragraph 24 of the protocol to the treaty, which stipulates that when thc
Federal Republic of Germany becomcs a rnember of the United Nations or a
party to thc Statute of the Court, the requirernent of prior agreement by the
parties become inoperative and disputes arising out of the treaty shall bc
submitted to the Court if not settled by diplomacy or some other agrecd mcüns.
Thc Foreign RelationsCommittcc notcd in ils report on thetreaty (Ex. Rcpt. 10,
84th Cong., 1st sess.) that it did not sccm appropriate to insist upon giving
priority to thejurisdiction ofthe Court, whileGermany was not a rnemberof thc
United Nations or a party to the Statute of the Court but that when it attained
such status the normal practice would bc followed.
The lreaty with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman is the only treaty of 21 of
this generd type signed since 1945frorn which the International Court of Justice
provision has been omitted. The Sultan of Muscat refused to consent to any
provision that would involve adjudication by a third party. His attitudc is
believed,as thecommitteenoted in its report on the treaty (Ex. Rept. No. 1,86th
Cong. 1st sess.) to stem from dissatisfaction with the arbitration of his dispute
wilh Saudi Arabia over coritroldlhe BuraimiOasis.
The Firsttrcaty in which the International Court of Justice provision appcars
is that with thc Republic of China signed in 1946. Pt-iorto its inclusion in that
trcaty, Senator Connally, then chairman of the Conimittee on Forcign Rela-
tions, and othcr mcmbers of the committec wcrc consulted regarding such a
provision. All of them expressed approval.
The provision was discussed during hearings on the treaty (80th Cong., 2d
scss., 26 April 1948).At that time the Department of State submitted a papcr in
explanation of the provision. This paper is reprinted in the hearings andsummarized in the committec's report on that treaty (Ex. Rcpt. No. 8, 80th
Cong., 2d scss.) and on the treaty with ltaly (Ex. Rept. No. 6, 80th Cong., 2d
sess.).
This papcr indicatcs that thc provision in qucstion is intendcdfilthe need
for an agrccd meihod of settling diFfcrcnccsarising out of treatics of this type,
that would bc both sound and generally acceptable. It points oui a number of
the fealures which in jtsview make the provision satisF~ctory frorn this
standpoini. Thcsc include the fact thai the provision is limite10 differences
arising immediatcly from the specific trcaty concerncd, that such treaties deal
with familitir subjcct-maiter and arc thoroughly documcnted in the records of
the ncgotiation. that an established body of interpretation alrcady exists for
much of ihc subject-matterOF such ircatics, and thatSLIC~ purcJy domeslic
mattcrs asimmignirion policy and military sccurjty ;ireplaçcd oulside the scopc
of such ircaiics by spccific exceptions. Thc papcr indicatcs the Departmcnt's
view not only ihai such a treaty provision would not opetütc in a manner
detrimental to US intcrests but thaiis in thc interest of the Uniied Staies to be
able to havc rccourse to the International Court of Justice in case of treaty
violation.
The International Cour1of Justice provisionwas not whollyan innovation ai
thc tirneof ils inclusiinthe trcaty wiih China, for a comparable provision had
already bccn incorporated in thc Intcrnational CivilAvi~itionConventio(TIAS
1591);ancl likc provisions havc bccn includcd in a considcrable number of
aereemenis cntcrcd into since that timc. Among thcsc arc the Trcaty of Peace
wiih Japan (TiAS 2490),Ihc Universal Copyright Convention(TIAS 3324),and
the Slatutc of'the International Atomic EncrgyAgency (TUS 3873). It may bc
noted that no casc has arisen undcr a cornrncrçialtreaty, or for that matter undcr
any of the agreements mentioned above, which has occasioncd submission of a
dispuic io the Inicrnatiunal Courl.
Annex54
COKI<IISIJOKI)IINKELATINGTO .I.IIII~ISPUI'ISITTLHMEP NR'OVISION
INCOMMERCI TARIIAT Y l~llTHE NETHEKI.ANIIS
Dcsp. No. 89.
SI July, 1953.
From: AmEmbassy, The Hague.
To: Thc Dcpartmcnt of Statc, Washington.
Rek EEmhrissy dcspalchcs 1419, 5 lune; 1433,Y Junc; 1412,15 Junc; 1522,25
Junc 1953.
Subjcct: FCN Draft Trcaty: Articles 1, 18, 19,21, and 23 through 26.
The "first run" of al1articles and the Protocol of the proposed Draft Treaty of
Friendship, Commcrcc and Navigation hüs beeneffectedandinformal conversa-
tions have bccn hcld with thc Ministry of Foreign Affairs on some of the
Departmcnt's rcplies to qucrics çontitincd in Embassy despatchcs relating to
Netherlands obscrvlitions on various ariicles the Draft Treaty.. . [Portionsof
textoihcr ihan ihosc dcaling with disputes sctilçment clausc arc omitled.]238 DlPLOMATlC AND CONSULARSTAFF
...viewsor instructionsofthe Departrnent with referenceto the observations,
suggestionsor questions of the Netherlands on the items herein.
Approved by:
William H. BRAY,
Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs.
For the Arnbassador:
Harold H. RHOD~~S,
First Secretary of Embassy.
Enclosures:
(1) Article 19, "Navigation".
(2) Article 18, "Cartels and State Business Practices".
(3) Article 21, "Gencral Exceptions"; Article 1, "General Equitable Treat-
ment". Article23, "Territorial Application".
(4) article 24, "Settlement ofDisputes".
(5) Article 25, "Termination of Existing Agreements"; Article 26, "Ralifica-
tion and Termination".
Original, mat and copy to Departrnent
FCN ARTICL2E 4, "Settlement ofDisputes"
Encl. No. 4, Dcsp. No 89, 7/21/53.
FROM THEHAC~UI:.
The Ministry said that it would prefer to leave oui paragraph 6 of Article 12
which it thought appeared superfluous in viewof Article 24, but that it had no
particular objection tots retention (see Enclosure 4 to Embassy despatch 1472
of 15June 1953).The Ministry then added that it "woufd liketo adapt para-
graph 6 of Article 12to the Draft FCN Treaty along the linesof paragrap4 of
Article12of the US Danish FCN Treaty". The Ministry'sdiscussion oCArticlc
24 and referenceagain to paragraph 6of Article 12indicated somcvacillation of
views. 11sdesire regarding paragraph 4 of Article 12 of the US-Danish Treaty
however was indicated as relating only to the last sentence of that Article. In
other words, it would prcfer to substitute the sentencefor paragraph 6of Ariicle
12of the US-Netherlands Draft, if the psragraph is retained.
A legaladvisor of the Ministry said that paragraph 2 of Article24 lcavessorne
doubt in the minds of Netherlands legal experts as to thc question of
"compulsion". He stated that thc Netherlands has always preferrcd the cornpul-
sory concept. The idcahe wished to convey wasclarified in a discussion among
rnembers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the represcntativc of ihc
Ministry of Economic Afiairs prescni. They said that some wording such as
"shall be submitted at the request of one of the parties"might be desirable.
They, however, did not specificallypropose the wording.Although the wording
"shall be submittcd" in lineasnoted theywerenot certain ihat "compulsion"
was clearly impliediçithcr party wereto rnake a request. Thcirspokesman said
that they woutd like to know the US viewson the subject.
NO.:A-52 4 Augusi 1953.
Subject: FCN ireaty. Embassy despatch 89 of 21 July with enclosure.
To: The Amencan Embassy, The Hague. Department commcnts follow:
ArticleXIX, parci.2....[Portions of text othcr than those dealing withdisputes
settlement clause are omitted.1
***
Arficle XXIV,paro. 2. In the Department's vicw, the "compulsion" idea is
right, after the cxhaustion of normal diplomacy10hring the case to thc Court;e
and the other Party isobligated in that event toniii to thejurisdiction of the
Court.
Desp. No. 516.
22 Decembcr 1955.
Frorn: AmEmbassy, The Hague.
To: The Department of Siatc, Washington.
Rcf: Embdesp. 515,21 December 1955.
Subjcct: Trcaty of Fricndship, Commerce and Navigation.
Transmitted as Enclosures Nos, 1 and 2 arc two letiers from the Nctherlands
Ministry of'Foreign Affairs rcquesting writtcn interpretrition of specificaspects
of theFCN Trcaty hctwcciithe Ncthcrlands and the United States. Instructions
arc rcquestcd.
(1) Lctter No. 174.354(Enclosure No. 1) rclatcstothc rcferral of disputes to
thc Intcrnationül Court of Justice (ArticXXV).
(2) Letier No. 173.761(Enclosure No. 2)asksfor an interpretation of the terrn
"costfree access to the courts" as used in Protocol, paragraph No. 6 (10becomc
No. 5). [Lcttcr No. 173.761and response not includcd in this Anncx.]
For the Ambassador:
Howard R. COLTAM,
Counsclor of Ernbiissyfor Economic ANairs.
Enclosures:
1. Letter îromM. A. Bcclacrtsvan Bloklünd to Howard R. Cottam datcd 20
Deccmber 1955(No. 174.354).
2. Letter fromM. A. Bcclaertsvan Blokland to Howard R. Coitarn datcd 20
December 1955(No. 173.761).
MlNlSTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Page 1.
Desp. No. 516.
20 December 1955.
174.354.
DEA
Frimdship Treufy
Dear Howard:
During the course of the negotiations which have led to the draft Treaty of
Fricndship, Commcrcc, and Navigation whiçh will be signcd before long240 DlPLOMATlC AND CONSULAR STAFF
between our Iwo countrics, it was agreed upon by both Delegations ihat
ArticlcXXV, second paragraph, should be takcn to mean that the dispute
referred to therein may be brought before the Court, eithcr by the notification
of a special Agreement or, in the absence thereof, by application of one
of the Parties. Though this interpretation is in accordance with the generally
accepted meaning of a provision as worded in Our Trcaty, I would like, in
order to avoid any misunderstanding, to have this intcrprctation confirmed
by letter.
Sinccrely yours,
M. A. BI:ELAEK'BVAN ~LOKLAND.
Mr. Howard R. COTTAM,
Acting Dircctor of the I.C.A. Mission,
Benoordcnhoutseweg 7,
The Hague.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION
UNCLASSIFIEU
2505.
No.: A-121, 30 Dcccmbcr 1955.
Subjcct: Trcaty or Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.
To: The Amcrican Embassy, The Hague.
Rcfcrence ismade to Embassy'sdespatch 516 of 22 Dcccmber transmitting
copies of two letters (174.354 and 173.761) dated 20 Dcccmbcr from Mr.
Beelaertsof the Dutch foreign officeto Mr. Cottam regarding interpretation of,
respectively,Article XXV (2) and Protocol paragraph 5 (old 6) of the subject
draft treaty. Mr.Cottam, in hiscapacityasCounsclor of Embassy for Economic
Affairs,is authorizc10 reply in kind. The substantive passage to be ineluded in
each replyisset out below.It is presumed that thiscorrespondence, inasmuch as
itonly confirms or clarifiesmutual understanding or ihe treaty's terms without
alteration thercof by cither subtraction or addition, would be in the nature
merely of negotiating record rather than of formalagreement annexed to the
pubtished textor the treaty.
1.In answer to letter 174.354, itmay be stated:
"Our undcrstanding accordswith yours: namely,that thedispute referred
to in Articlc XXV, paragraph 2, may be brought bcfore thc Court either by
the notification of a spccialagreement dcfining thc question to be decided
or, in the absencehcreof, by application of one of the Parties. Since this
interpretationeflcctsthe meaning which would normally be atiributed to
ihe language of the provision, 1 assume it is agreed to omit from the
Protocol the paragraph to thesame efïect which was under consideration
earlier in the ncgotiation."
2. In answer to lettcr 173.761,it may be stated:
. . .pext omitied.]
DULLES.
Wesp. No. 534.
3 January 1956. MEMORIAL
From: AmEmbassy, The Hague.
To: The Departnicnt of State, Washington.
Rcf.: Dept's. A-121, 30 Dcccmber 1955, Embdcsp. 516, 22 Deccmbcr 1955.
Subject: Treaty of Fricndship, Commcrcc and Navigation.
In accordancc with the Department's A-121 of ?O Dccernber 1955, two (2)
letiers werc sent toJhr, M. A. Beelaerts van Blokland from Mr. Howard R.
Cottam. Counsclor of Embassy for Economic AKairs, as follows:
"(1) This is a rcply to your letter No. 147.353dated 20 Decembcr 1955.
Our undcrstanding accords with yours:nnniely,that thedisputc rcferred to
inArticle XXV.paragraph 2, may be brought bcforc thc Court cithcr by the
notification of a spccial agreement dcfining the question to be decidcd or, in
the alisençe ihcrcof, by application of one of the Parties. Since this
intcrprctationrcflccislhe mcaning which wouldnormally beattribuicd tothe
languagc of ihc provision, Iassume it isagrcto omit from the Protocol the
paragraph to the samc cffcct which was undcr consideration earlicr in the
ncgotiation.
(2) In reply to your lctter No. 173.761diited 20 December 1955,1offcrthe
following explanatory note for your record of the FCN negotiations:"
.vext omittcd.1
For thc Arnbassador:
Howard K. COTTAM,
Counselor of Emb;issyfor Econornic Affairs.
THE UNITI:I)NATIONC SOSVES'TIO ACN;AISST THETAKING OF
HOSTAGES
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
The Stcites PrrriiIIIrhisConi~ention.
Hnving in iwinli~hcpurposes and principlçs of the Charter of the United
Nations concerning thc maintenancc of international pcace and security and the
promotion of fricndly relations and CO-operationamong States,
Recngizi;iiigin particular that cveryonc has the right to life, liberty and
securiiyofperson, as scioui in the Universal Declar;iiion of Human Rights and
the International Coveniint on Civil and Political Rights,
Reafirmirig the principle of equal rights and self-determinrition of peoples as
enshrined in the Chartcr of the United Nations and the DecIaration on
Principles of intcrna~ional Law concerning Pricndly Relations and Co-opcra-
tion among States in accordancc with thc Chartcr of the United Nations. as wcll
as in other relevant rcsolutions of thc Gcncnil Asscmbly,
Considering that thc taking of hostagcs isan olfcticc of gravc conccrn to thc
international community and that, in accordancc with the provisions of this
Convention, any pcrson committing an act of liostage taking shall bccither
prosecuted or cxtraditcd,
Beiizg canrinccd that it is urgently ncccssary 10 devclop international co-
operation between States in devising and adopting effective measures for the
prcvention: prosccution and punishmeni of al1 acts of taking hostages as
manifestations of intcrnational terrorism,
fhve agreerlas follows:242 DlPLOMATlC AND CONSULAR STAFF
Article i
1. Any person who seizes or detains and thrcatens to kill, to injure or to
continue to detain another person (hereinaftcr refcrred to as the "hostage") in
order to compel athird party, namely, aState, an international intergovcrnmcn-
ta1organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or
abstain from doing any actas an explicitor implicitcondition for the releasc of
the hostagccommits the offenceof taking of hosisges ("hostage-taking") within
the rncaningof this Convention.
2. Any person who:
(a) attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking, or
(6) participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits or attempts to
commit an act of hostage-taking
likcwisecommits an offencefor the purposes of this Convention.
Article 2
Each Statc Party shall make thc offcnc~sset forth in Article I punishablc by
appropriate penalties whichtakeinto account the gravenature of those offences.
Article 3
1.The Slatc Party in the territory of which the hostage isheld by the ofïendcr
shall take al1 measures it considers appropriate to ease the situation of the
hostüge, in particular, to secure his releascand, after his release,to hcilitlitc,
when relevant,his departure. .
2. If any object which the offender has obtained as a result of the taking of
hostagcs comcsinto the custody of a State Party, that State Party shall rcturn it
as soon as possibleto the hostage or the third party referred to in Article 1.as
the case rnay be, or to the appropriate authoritics thercof.
States Parties shall CO-operatein the prevention of the offencesset forth in
Article 1, particularly by:
(a) taking al1practicable measurcsto prevcnt preparations in their respective
territorics for thc commissionof thoscoffcnccswithinor outside thcir tcrritorics,
including rneasures to prohibit in thcir territories illegal activities of pcrsons,
pcrpetration ofniacts of taking of hostages;instigate, organize or engage in the
and other mcasuresas appropriate to prevent the commissionof those ofïençcs.
Article 5
1.Each Stafc Party shall fakc such mcüsurcsas rnay be necessaryto establish
its jurisdiction over any of the offences set forth in Article I which arc
committed:
(a) in ils territory or on board a ship or aircraft registerein that State;
(bj by any of its nationals or, if that Statc considers it appropriate, by thosc
stateless pcrsons who have their habitua1rcsidenccin its territory;
(c) in ordcr 10compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act; or
(dl with respect to a hostage who is a national of that State, if that Stiitc
considcrs it appropriate.
2. Each State Pirty shall likcwisetake such mcasurcs as rnay be necessaryto MEMORIAL 243
establish ilsjurisdiction over the offcnccsset forth in Article I in cases where the
allcged offender is present in its territory and it does not extraditc him to any of
the States mentioncd in paragraph 1 of this article.
3.This Convention docs not cxclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with intcrnal Iüw.
Article6
1.Upon beingsatisficdthat the cirçumstances sowarrant, any Statc Party in the
tcrritory ol'whichthcallegcd offendcrispresent shall,inaccordance wiih itsliiws,
iake him intocustody or takc othcr measures to ensurc hisprcscncc for such time
as isnecessary to cnablc any criminal or extradition ~~roceedings to be institutcd.
That State Party shall immcdiately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts.
2.The custody or othcr mcasures rcfcrred to in paragraph I of this article shall
be notified without dclay dircctly or through the Secretary-Gcncral of the
United Nations to:
(a) the State where lhc oRcncc was committed;
(h) the State against which compulsion has bcen directed or attemptcd;
(c) the State of which the natural or juridical person against whom
compulsion has becn dirccted or attempted is a national;
((1)the State of which thc hostagc isa national or in the territory of which hc
has his habitual residcncc;
(e) the State of which the allegcd offender is a national or, iThiiis a stateless
person, in thc tcrritory of which hc has his habitual residcnçc;
(J) the international intcrgovernrncntal organization iigainst which compul-
sion has been directcd or sttcmptcd;
(g) ail othcr States concerncd.
3.Any pcrson regarding whom thc mcasures rererred to in paragraph I of this
article are being takcn shall bc cntitled:
{a) to communicatc without dclay with the ncarcst appropriatc rcprcscntative
of the State of which he is a national or which is othenvise cntitlcd to cslablish
such comn~unication or, if hc is a stateless person, the State in the tcrritory of
which he has his habitual rcsidcnce;
(h) to be visitcd by rtreprcsentative of that Statc.
4. The rights referred to in paragraph 3 of this article shall bc exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the State in the tcrritory of which
the alleged offender ispresent, subject tothe proviso, howevcr, that the said laws
and regulalions must cnablc full enéct to be given to the purposcs for which the
rights accorded under paragraph 3 of this article are intendcd.
5.The pr~ovisionsof paragrüphs 3and 4 of thisarticlc shall bc without prejudice
to the right of any State Party hüving a claim tojurisdiction in accordance with
paragraph 1 (b) of Articlc 5 to invite the International Cornmittcc of the Red
Cross to communicatc with and visit the allegcd ollènder.
6.The State which makcs thc prcliminary inquiry contcmplnted in paragraph
I of this article shaIl promptly report iis findings to the States or organization
refcrred to in paragraph 2 of this article and indicate wheihcr it intends to
exerciscjurisdiction.
The Staie Party whcrc the allcged offender is prosccuted shaH in accordance
with its lawscommunicatc thc finaloutcome of the proceedings to the Sccretary-
General of the United Nations, who shall transmit the information to the other
States coocerned and thc intcrnational intergovernmental organizations con-
cerned.244 DlPLOMATlC AND CONSULAR STAFF
Article 8
1.The StateParty in the territory of which the allegcd offender is found shall,
if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and
whether or not the offencc was committed in its tcrritory, to submit the case to
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in
accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities shall take their decision
in the same manner asin the case of any ordinary offence of a grave nature under
the law oflhat State.
2.Any person rcgardingwhom proceedings arc bcing carried out inconnection
with any of the offcnccsset forth in Article 1shall be guarantccd fair treatmentat
al1stages of the proccedings,includingenjoyment of al1the rights and guarantees
provided by the law of the State in the territory of which he is present.
Article 9
1. A request for the extradition of an alleged offender, pursuant to this
Convention, shall not be granted if the requested Stiite Party has substantial
grounds for believing:
(a) that the requesi for extradition for an oflence set forth in Article1 has
been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of
his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion; or
(b) that the person's position may be prejudiced:
(i) for any ofthe reasons mentioned in subparagraph (u) of this paragraph,
or
(ii) forthe reason that communication with himby thc appropriate authoritics
of the State entitled to exercise rights of protection cannot be effected.
2. With respect to the offences as defined in thisConvention, the provisions of
al1extradition trcaties and arrangements applicable betwcen States Parties are
rnodified as between States Parties to the extent that they are incompatible with
this Convention.
Article IO
1. The offences set forth in Article 1 shall be deemed to be included as
extraditabte offences in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties.
States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offencesin every
extradition trcaty to be concluded between them.
2.If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a
treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it
has no extradition trcaty, the requested State may at its option considcr this
Convention as the lcgal basis for extradition in respect (ifthe ofièncesset forth in
Article 1. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the
law of the requested State.
3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditionalon the existence of
a treaty shall recognize theoffences set forth in Article i as extraditable offences
between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the
requested State.
4. The offenccs set forth in Article 1 shall be treriled, for the purpose of
extradition bctwecn States Parties, as if they had been cammitted not only in the
place in which ihey occurrcd but also in the territories of the States required to
establish their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1of Articlc 5.
ArficIcII
1.States Parties shall afford one another the greatest mcasure of assistance in
connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offences set forthin Article 1, includingthc supplyof al1evidcnceal their disposal neccsçary for
the proceedings.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this article shall not affect obligations
concerning mutual judicial assistanceembodicd in tiny other treaty.
Inso far as the GcnevaConventions of 1949for the protection of war victims
or the Additional Protocotl osthose Conveniionsarcapplicable io apürticular
act ofhostage-taking. and in so far as States Ptirties to this Convention are
bound under those conventionsto prosecuteor hand overthe hostage-taker, the
prcscnt Conventionshall not üpplytoan act of hostagc-takingcommittcd in thc
course of armedconflictsas defined in the Gcncva Conventions of 1949and the.
Protocols thcrcto. includingarmedconflictçnicntionedin Article 1,pciragriiph4,
of Additional Protocol 1of 1977,in whichpcoplcs;ire fightingagainst colonial
domination and alicn occupation and against racisi régimesin the excrciseof
thcir right OC sclf-dctcrmination as enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation amoiig Staies in accordancc with the
Charter of thc Unitcd Nations.
Arficle13
1
This Convention shall not apply whcrc thc offcncc is committed within 3
singleStatc. thc Iiostngcand the allcgcdoffcndcrarc nationals of that Statcand
the allegedoffcndcr is round in thc territory of that State.
Nothing in thisConventionshall beconstrucd asjustifying the violationof the
territorialintegrity or political independenceofiiState in contravention of the
Charter of the Unitcd Nations.
Article15
Thc provisions of this Convention shall not siTcetthe application of the
Trcatics oii Asylum, in forcc at the date oftlic adoption of this Convention, as
betweenthe Statcs which are parties to thosc Trcatics; but a Statc Party to [his
Convention may not invokcthoseTreaties with rcspcctto another State Party to
this Convention whiçh is not a party IO those treaties.
1.Any dispute betwecntwo or more States Particsconcerningthe intcrprcte-
tion or application of thjs Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall,
at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months
from the date of thc request for arbitration the partiesare unable to agree on the
orgünizatii~nof the arbitration, any one of thosc pariies mayreferthc dispute ta
the 1ntcrn:rtionalCourt of Justice by requesi in conformity with the Statute of
the Court.
2. EachStatc may at the timeof signatureor ratificationof thisConvention or
accession thcrelo dcclarcthat it docsnot considcritsclfbound by pafiigraph Iof
this article. The otherStatcs Partics shall not bc bound by paragraph fof this
article withrespect to any State Party which hasmade such a reservation.
3. Any State Party which has rnadc a reservation in accordance with
paragraph 2 of this articlcrnay at any timc withdraw chat rese~vation by
notification to the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations. 246 DlPLOMATlCAND CONSULAR STAFF
Article 17
1.This Convention isopen for signature by al1States until31 December 1980
at United Nations Hcadquarters in New York.
2. This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. This Convention is open for accession by any State. The instruments of
accession shallbe deposited with the Secretary-General of the Unitcd Nations.
1.This convention shallenter into forceon the thirtieth day following the date
of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession with the
'Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of
the twenty-secondinstrument of ratification or accession,the Convention shall
enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit such State of ils instrument
of ratification or accession.
Article 19
1. Any State Party may denounce this Convention by written notificationto
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on which
notificationis received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 20
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English,
French, Russian and Spanish textsare equally authentic, shall bedeposited with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies
thereof to afl States.
In wirness whereoS,the undersigned, beingduly authorized thereto by their
respectiveGovernments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at
New York on. .. SELECTEDDOCUMENTS EARLlER SUBMITTED
1. Declarationof David D. Newsom,UnderSecretary ofState,of6 Decernber
1979,with Appendices
2. Responseby the Unitcd Statcs,1i Dcccmber1979,to questions presented
by the Court on 10Deccmbcr 1979
3. Respcinseby the UnitcdStatcsto a qucstionprcsentedbyJudgeGros on II
December 1979
[See pp43-119, supra]
Memorial of the Government of the United States of America