Memorial of the Government of Israel

SECTION B.-PLEADINGS I. MEMORIALOF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'

Introduction

1. The Government of Israel has the honour to submit this
Memorial, filed pnrsuant to the Order made by the International
Court of Justice on 26 November 1957; and in accordance with
Articles 32 (2)and 41 of the Rules of Court it develops the factsand
grounds on which the claim is based.
2. The Court has jurisdiction ta determine the dispute submitted
ta it by the Government of Israel on the basis of Article 36 of the

Statute of the Court and the Declarations made by bath parties
accepting thc compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The Declaration
of Israel, dated 3 Octoher 1956, is in the following terms:
"On hehalf of the Government of Israel 1 declare that Israel
recognizes as compulsory ipso factoand without special agreement,
in relation toal1other Members of the United Nations and to any
non-member State which hecomes a party to the Statute of the
Intemational Court of Justice pursuant to Article 93, paragraph z,
of the Charter, and suhject to reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 36, para-
graph 2.of the Statute of the Court in al1 legal disputes concerning
situations or facts which may arise suhsequent ta 25 October 1951
provided that such dispute does not involve a legal title created
or conferred by a Government or authority other than the Govern-
ment of Israel or an authority under the jurisdiction of that
Govemment.
This Declaration does not apply to:
(a) Any dispute in respect ta which the Parties have agreed or
shall agree ta have recourse ta another means of peaceful settlement;

(b) Any dispute relating ta matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of the State of Israel;
(c)Any dispute hetween the State of Israel and any other State
whether or not a member of the United Nations which does not
recognize Israel or which refuses ta estahlish or ta maintain normal
diplomatic relationswith Israel and the absence or breach of normal
relations precedes the dispute and exists independently of that
dispute;
(d) Disputes arising out of events occumng between 15 May
1948 and zo July 1949;
(e) \Vithout prejudice ta the operation of sub-paragraph (d)
ahove, disputes arising out of, or having reference to, any hostilities,
war, state of war, hreach of the peace, breach of armistice agreement

'See Part IV, CorrcspondeircSection A, No. 46.46 MED~ORIALOF ISRAEL (2VI 58)
or beiligerent orilitary occupation (whether such war sball have
been declared or not, and whether an state of belligerency shall
have been recognized or not) in whicg the Government of Israel
are or have been or may be involved at any time.
The validity of the present Declaration is from 25 October 1956
and it remains in force for disputes arising after 25 October 1951
until such time as notice may be given to terminate it.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF 1, Golda Meir,Ministerfor Foreign Affairs,
have hereunto caused the Seal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
to be affixed,and have subscribed my signature atJenisalem this
Twenty-Eightb day of Tishri, Five Thousand Seven Hundred and
Seventeen. which corresponds to the Third day of October, One
Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-Six.
(Signe4 Golda MEIR.''

The Declaration by Bulgaria, dated 12 August 1921, is in the
following terms:

reconnaître comme obligatoire de plein droit et sans convention
spéciale,vis-à-visde tout antre Membre outat acceptant la même
obligation, la juridiction de la Cour permanente de Justice inter-
nationale, purement et simplement.

(Signh) S. POMENOV."
Bulgaria became amember of the United Nations on 14 December
1955. following Resolution 995 (X) adopted by the General Assembly

on 14 December 1955. when that country's Declaration became
applicable to the junsdiction of the International Court of Justice.
3. The facts out of which the dispute brought before the Court
by Israel arose are succinctly statedinragraph 2 ofthe Application
instituting Proceedings. On 27 July 1955 a cid passenger aircraft,
registered in Israelunder No. 4x-AKC,type Constellation (herein-
after referred to as "4~-AKC"), wearing the Israel colours and
belonging to El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as
"the Company"), a Company incorporated in Israel. while on a
scheduled commercial fight from London to Lod (Lydda), came
down in flames in the region of Petritch, Bulgaria (near the point

where the frontiers of Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia meet). The
aircraft wascompletely destroyed. Not one of the occupants of this
aircraft-fifty-one passengers and seven members of its crew,
fifty-eight persons ofvarying nationalities-survived the disaster:
all were killed. The Bulgarian Government, on 28 July, officially,
publicly and spontaneously announced how this had come about.
That Govemment's armed forces had shot down and destroyed the
aircraft, killinallits occupants. This was amplified and repeated
on 4 August when the Bulgarian Govemment, in the light of the
conclusions of a special Commissionwhich it hadset up to investigate
what had occurred. again gave out that its armed forces had
destroyed the aircraft,those armed forces having acted in haste and MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 47

without taking al1 the necessary measures. Moreover, in reply
to emphatic protests by a number of Governments, including the
Government of Israel, the Bulgarian Government gave certain
public assurances of its intention to prevent a repetition of such a
catastrophe and undertakings regarding the identification and
punishment of those guilty of causing it, as well as regarding the

eventual payment of compensation. Following those admissions,
assurances and undertakings the forma1 diplomatic claim for the
compensation due was presented by Israel on 14 February 1956,
since when protracted efforts have been made by the Government
of Israel to settle the claim. The negotiations with the Government
of Bulgaria reached a deadlock in October 1957after the Bulganan
Government had made a completely unacceptable, and indeed
derisory, offer to settle the claim while intimating that it did not
regard itself as being under any legal obligation arising out of the
incident itself or out of the assurances, undertakings and admissions

it had spontaneously. voluntanly and deliberately given to the
Government of Israel, and the world, in July and August 1955.
The~Co~ ~ ~s now beine a..ed to resolve the dis~ute between the
tn.o Go\,,:rniiicnts. 1)).furm;ill! declaring thnt 13ulgnri:iis r<:sponsiblc
under intcrnatioiial I;<wfor tlic destruction of the aircrnft and 1)y
determining the arnount of compensation due, MEbIORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)

Part One

Section 1.-The shooting-dowtt O/ 4X-AKC on 27 July 1955 and the
subsequentinvestigation

4. 4x-AKCleft London at 2013Z hoursl on 26 July 1955 on the

Company's schednled commercial flight Xo. 402/26 frorn London
to Lod. According to the Company's timetable in force between
15 lllay and 15 October 1955 as amended (Annex I),this flight \vas
scheduled to take off at ogooZ and to make stops at Paris and
Vienna. Owing to the late arriva1 of 4X-AKCinto London (because
of other operational requirements of the Company), the time of

departure from London was re-scheduled- to zoooz, and the
scheduled and actual timetables for this flight were as follows:

Arrive Depart
Schedule Actual Schedule Actual
London - - 2000 2013
Pans 2130 2122 2230 2246
Vienna 0130 0139 0230
- - 0253
Lod 0925 -

5. Particulars regarding the passengers are contained in the
passenger manifests out of London, Pans and i7ienna (Annex 2).
Four of the passengers who boarded 4~-AKC at London disembarked
at Vienna, while others boarded the aircraft at Paris and Vienna
with destination Lod. A consolidated list of al1passengers who were

on board 4x-AKCwhen it left Vienna, together with indication of
theirnationality, is contained in Annex 3.

6. The crew of 4x-AKCconsisted of the Captain, First Officer,
FLight Engineer and Wireless Operator as aircrew, together with
Cabin Personnel consisting of the Senior Purser, Trainee Purser
and Hostess. Particulars regarding the crew are contained iri
the Crew Manifest (Annex 4).

7. 4X-AKCwas transporting approximately 1120 kgs. of freight
covered by consignment notes and approximately 1090 kgs. of
passengers' baggage. Particulars of the freight, as contained in the

cargo manifest, are annexed (Annex 5). In addition, approximately
' In this hllemortimes are normally givein G>lT (marked "Z"), butwherï
relevant,an indicatioof the local tiiisalso given.izooZ(GRIT)is the equi-
valenttorpoA (Central EuropeanTime) in forcin Yugoslavia. t14ooR (Central
European Summer Time) inforce in Turkey, Greece and Bulgariand to i5ooC
Israel Summer Time. DIEMOKIAL OF ISRAEL (2VI 58) 49

75 kgs. of mail, according to the particulars contained in Annex 6,
were on board.
8. As stated in paragraph 4 above, 4~-AKC departed from London
and arrived at and departed from Paris at the times mentioned. It

also duly arrived at Schwechat airport, Vienna, at o139Zon 27 July
1955.
(a) In accordance with the Company's normal procedure in
regard to flights through Vienna, Jlr. Hans Weissbrod, the Station
Manager and the duly qualified despatcher of the Company at
Vienna (hereinafter referred to as "the despatcher") had, before
the arriva1 of 4x-AKC,obtained from the Austrian Meteorological

Service at that airport the relevant meteorological information
required for the landing at and take-off from Schwechat, and for
the flight from Vienna to Lod. On the basis of the information thus
obtained, and after inspection of the information available in the
NOTAI$ Office', he had prepared the Company's Short-Range
Flight Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Flight Plan") (Annex 7).
The despatcher then met qx-.~KCwhen it came to a stop on the
tarmac, and was informed by the Flight Engineer of 4x-AKCthat

no repair or maintenance work was required, as is confirmed by
an extract from 4x-AKC'S flight log book, copy of which was left
with the despatcher (Annex 6). The Captain and First Officer of
4x-AKC,accompanied by the despatcher, proceeded directly after
landing to the Jleteorological Office,where they received from the
Forecaster on duty a flight forecast. This forecast was explained by
the Forecaster in the presence of the despatcher to the Captain and
the First Officer and was discussed in generaI and in detail, after
which it was signed by the Captain. After a visit to the XOTAM

office and the briefing by the XorAniOfficer (at which the Captain,
the First Officer and the despatcher were present) and after the
Flight Plan had been checked by the Captain and the First Officer,
it was duly signed by the latter. ~X-AKC thereupon departed from
Vienna at 02532 when the Air Traffic Control (.4TC)Flight Plan,
prepared by ATC Vienna and signed by the First Officer\\.as com-
pleted by ATC. This document is the officialclearance of an aircraft
for ATC purposes. The ATC Flight Plan and the Flight Eorecast
are annexed (Annex 9).

(b) The handling of passengers, baggage, mail and freight, both
in transit and joining at Vienna (other than baggage, mail and
freight which arrived on 4x-AKCand which was not removed from
it), was undertaken by an Austrian concern known as Flughafen
Wien Betriebsgesellschaft m.b.H., Wien-Schwechat, under contract
with the Company.

' The sonri Office receives and malies available to aircrew current information
relevant to aircraft navigation questioaschangesin radio navigational faci-
aerodromes and other similar mattem.ohibited and dareas,serriceability of
See paragraph g.5O MEMORIAL OF ISRrZEL (2 VI 58)

9. Under the system of airtraffic control operated in accordance
with the arrangements established by the International Civil
Aviation Organisation, created by the Convention on International
Civil Aviation signed at ChicagoIon 7 December 1944 (Annex IO)',
certain air space used by commercial aircraft is divided into
control areas each under the control of a centre (known as ATC-

Air Traffic Control Centre). The basis of the system is that an air-
craft flying in or through a control area reports to and is under the
control of a single ATC for the given portion of the journey, that
centre being responsible exclusively for the provision of air traffic
control services within its area, particularly in regard to the avoid-
ance of mid-air collisions, provided the aircraft Captain has filed
a fight plan under instrument flying rules. (See in particular

Annex II to the Chicago Convention, on Air Traffic Services, Air
Traffic Control Service, Flight Information Service and Alerting
SeMce.) The lanes through which civilian aircraft are advised or
required to fly are control areas and are conveniently known as
ainvays or advisory routes, and are given an appropriate identi-
fication. The flight from Vienna to Lod was routed to foliow
advisory route 287, route 12, and airway Amber IOas far as Athens,
and advisory routes 372 and 373 to Lod. The relevant part of this

route for the purposes of this case is the portion of airway Amber IO
between Belgrade and Saloniki, which is indicated on the AERAD
map annexed (Annex II).This portion of the ainvay is controlled
by ATCBe!grade over Yugoslav temtory to Gevgelia on the border.
and by ATC Athens over Greek territory thereafter.

IO. It was in accordance with this standard practice that 4x-

AKC proceeded on its flight from Vienna. It was in regular and
routine communication with the appropriate ATC centres. The
first and only indication of any untoward occurrence was the
receipt at approximately 05372 by ATC Athens of ahruptly dis-
continued S.O.S. messages originating with 4x-AKC, and within
some ten minutes the information was relayed to Lod. In that way
the Israei Government and the owners of 4x-AKC first became
aware of some mishap to 4x-AKC A.t 08422 ATC Athens originated

a further message to the effect that 4x-AKC had come down iri
flames at Tsirbanovo, a place in Bulgarian territory near the Greek-
Bulgarian border. Similar information was being disseminated in
the course of the day by different news agencies and was being
reported by the Israel diplomatic and consular officesin Europe to
the Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs. At 12ooZ the Israel Minister

p.295).It is annexed to this Dlernorial for the convenience of the Members of the
Cou*. Having regard to Articq3 (1)of the Ruleof Court. it is subrnitted that
strictly spevking it isnecessarto annexit to this Mernorial: and in the light
of that Rule the Annexes to the Convention referred to herein (heing also publisbed
documents) have not been formally annexed to this Memorial. of Communications, acting in exercise of his various statutory
powers, appointed a Commission of Inquiry to enquire into the
circumstances of the bringing down of the Constellation aircraft

4x-AKCof the Company, within Bulgarian territory, on 27 July
1955. The members of this Commission were: the Director of
Aeronautical Services of the Department of Civil Aviation, as
Chairman; together with the Chief Inspector of Ainvorthiness of
the same department, an officer (captain) of the Israel Defence
ForceSIAir Force, the Deputy Director-Generai of the Company,
the Assistant Director of the Maintenance Department of the
Company, and a captain (pilot) of the Company.

II. Immediately after the appointment of this Commission of
Inquiry the Bulgarian Legation in Israel was officiallyrequested
to issue the necessary entry visas to the Commission's members.
Greek entry visas were ohtained, and at 2359Z on 27 July the
Commission departed by air for Greece. Bulgarian visas had not
yet been obtained: however the Bulgarian Legation gave to under-
stand that al1assistance would be forthcoming and that the visas
would be furnished hy the Bulgarian representatives in Athens.

During the course of the 27th, the Company's commercial represen-
tative in Athens together with a member of the staff of the Israel
Diplomatic Kepresentative in Athens tried to obtain permission
to enter Bulgaria from Greece for the purpose of reaching the scene.
No such permission was granted. The most these people c~uld do
was, in the region of the Greek frontier itself, to observe from a
distance the area in which the wreckage was strewn.

12. In Sofia the Israel Legation first received intimation of the
disaster at ~zooZ(14ooB) on the 27th in a telephone message from
the Israel Consulate-Generai in Vienna. Shortly afterwards Mr.
Avner Benhassat, Secretary-Archivist at the Israel Legation in
Sofia, was received at the Foreign Ministry by the Deputy Chief
of Protocol, who seemed to know nothing of the incident. Mr.
Benbassat at once requested permission to proceed to the site of the

disaster, but in the afternoon, no reply to this request having
been received, was informed by the Chief of Protocol that the
competent authorities were dealing with the matter. During the
course of the evening, the Bulgarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs
was twice contacted in connection with the application for visas
for the members of the Commission of Inquiry.

13. By the morning of the 28th. no reliable information had yet
been received by the Government of Israel, other than the news
of the S.O.S., and the generai news agency reports that the aircraft
had corne down in flames on Bulgarian territory. In these circum-
stances, the Government of Israel was still concentrating its efforts
on obtaining reliable news of what had occurred, and regarding the52 MEXORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)
fate of the persons on board, for which purpose enquiries were
made of the Bulgarian representatives; and more specifically on
securing the necessary Bulgarian entry visas for the Inquiry
Commission. Initially, reliance was placed on the Bulgarian Lega-

tion's undertaking that the visas would be forthcoming. However,
later in the moming a Xote Verbale (Annex 12) \vas transmitted
to the Bulgarian Legation complaining of the absence of accurate
information conceming the cause and extent of the disaster.
Surprise mas expressed that although more than 24 hours had
elapsed since the disaster, which had occurred over Bulgarian
territory, the Bulgarian authorities had furnished no information
whatsoever to the Israel Government. It was placed on record in
that Note Verbale that "eight hours after the Israel Chargéd'Af-
fairesai. in Sofia approached the Bulgarian Rlinister for Foreign
Affairs, permission had still not been granted to him to proceed
to the scene of the accident and to perform the duties incumbent
upon him in these circumstances". It was also requested that

immediate instructions be given for the necessary facilities to be
furnished to the Inquiry Commission to enter Bulgarian territory
and pursue its investigations in accordance with the normal proce-
dure.

14. In the course of 28 July 1955, the Bulgarian Telegraphic
Agency issued an official Communiqué which \vas puhlished in the
Bulgarian Press of the 29th (Annex 13). That Communiqué gave
the following account of what had happened:

"Le 27 juillet$ 7 h.35, heure bulgare, comme il a été appris
par la suite, un avion de voyageurs israéliens'est déde sa direc-
tion et dans la régionde la ville de a pénétré sans préavisdans
l'espace aérien bulgare,il a survoléles villes de StankéDimitrov
et de Blagoevgrad et il s'est dirigéversle sud dans la direction de
la viUede Pétntch.
La Défenseanti-aériennebulgare n'a pas pu reconnaître l'avion
et aprèsplusieurs avertissements a ouvert le feu la suite de quoi
l'aviona étéatteint et il est tombé aunord de la ville de Pétritch."

It went on to announcc the appointment by the Council of Ministers
of a Governmental Commission composed of the Ministers for
Foreign Affairs, Interior, National Defence and Public Health, and
the Chief Prosecutor of the Republic, "chargés d'établir les circons-
tances dans lesquelles a eu lieu i'accident". During that morning
there had taken place two conversations hetween members of the
Israel Legation in Sofia and members of the Bulgarian Foreign
ibfiriistry. In the first of these the Deputy Chief of Protocol had in-
formed the IsraelLegationby telephone that al1the occupants of the
plane had been kiiied. In the second, Mr. Baruch, Attaché, and the
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim \vas received by the Foreign Minister,

RI. Mintcho Neitchev, who, after commenting that the catastrophe DIEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 53

was al1 the greater because of the time at which it had occurred,
reviewed briefly a Bulgarian Note Verbale of 28 July (Annex 14)
which was thereafter handed over. That Note Verbale, after stating
in terms substantially, but not absolntely, similar to the Commu-
niqué of the same day that Bulgarian armed forces had shot the
aircraft down, announced the appointment of the Governmental
Commission "chargée de faire l'enquêtede cet accident déplorable

et d'établir les circonstances dans lesquelles il a eu lieu". It \vent
on to indicate the readiness of the Bulgarian Govemment ''A
prendre à sa charge la part respective des dommages matériels qui
ont étécausésaprès qu'ils auront étédûment établis". The Israel
representative thereupon requested (a) immediate permission to
visit the site of the wreckage; (b) the mounting of a guard over the
bodies and over thc tvreckagc pending the arriva1 of the Israel
Commission of Inquiry; (c)the immediate grant of entry visas for
the Israel Commission of Inquiry; (d) remission to the Israel
authorities of al1 documents, mail and baggage on board. The

Foreign Ministcr replied that instructions had already been given
regarding Mr. Baruch's visit to the site, and he suggested that
Mr. Baruch he accompanied by Mr. Molerov, an officia1of the
Bulgarian Foreign Ministry. Al1the bodies had already been trans-
ferred to the Pathological Institute in Sofia. A military guard had
been mounted over the aircraft. Following the appointment of the
Bulgarian Commission, the Bulgarian Government saw no necessity
for or possibility of a visit by a foreign Inquiry Commission. The
documents, mail and baggage mould be transferred as requested '.
Mr. Baruch proceeded to the site, as arranged, later that morning.

15. The contents of the Communiqué, beingtransmitted by the
news agencies, were known in Israel before details were received
of the Note Verbale. It was by now quite clear that what was
involved was not a mere aircraft accident in the accepted sense,
and that since the Bulgarian Government was not concealing the
fact that its armed forces had opened fire and shot the aircraft
down, the international responsibility of Bulgaria was deeply

involved. Accordingly. in the afternoon of the 28th, the Bulgarian
Chargé d'Affairesin Israel was handed the second Note Verbale of
28 July (Annex 15). In this Note Verbale the Israel Government
registered its "vehement protest at this shocking recklessness",
and considered that the action of the Bulganan forces derived from
a "wanton disregard of human life and of the elementary obligations
of humanity which should have governed their conduct". The
Government of lsrael was therefore demanding full satisfaction
from the Bulgarian Government \\.hich itheld responsible for what

' In fact, the iteweretransferred to the officiais of the Israel Legation only
ragraphg25below.)le of hours before the funeral train left for Istanbul. (See pa- MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 55
contained in the Communiquk of the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency

(Annex 13). Mr. Eytan stressed that: (a) the Israel Inquiry Com-
mission must be permitted to enter Bulgana; (b) even if the
aircraft had heen off its course, this would not have given the
Bulgarian authorities any right to shoot it down; (c) it was a
matter of amazement that the Bulgarian armed forces had not
recognized a well-known type of civil aircraft. He also made the
following oral declaration in the name of the Prime hfinister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"The Govemment of Israel has noted that the Government of
Bulgaria has admitted responsibility for the incident andormaliy
tion for the aircraft and the victimsof the disaster.lsofIsrael's
claim will be submitted to the Bulgarian Government through the
diplomatic channels. The Govemment of Israel is confident that
the Government of Bulgaria \di take al1 the necessary steps to
ascertain the personsesponsibleand to punish them '."

zo. In the early hours of the 3oth, hfr. Na11proceeded to the site
of the wreckage near the village of Petritch and there, on the border
between Greece and Bulgaria, he met with three members of the
Israel Commission of Inquiry, who reached the Greek frontier at
about og3oB. and who entered Bulgana only about two hours
later. At the site were also present RIr. Baruch, hfr. Alolerov of
the Bulgarian Foreign hfinistry, and Lt. Col. Stephenson, the
British Military Attaché. Mr. Nall informed the members of the

Commission of the Bulgarian Government's conditions for their
entry into Bulgaria. Owing to various difficulties on the Bulganan
side of the frontier, the three members of the Commission did not
reach the scene until about midday. and they had about seven
hours in which to complete their work and return to Greece before
sundown. Apart from this, their work was conducted without
interference by the Bulgarian authorities; but the refusa1 of the
Bulgarian Government to allow aii the members to visit the site
seriously reduced the scope and thoroiighness of the investigation.
The Court is accordingly invited to take note of the fact that the
Israel Commission was not permitted to make a proper examination
on Bulganan temtory, and that the conditions under which three
members of the Commission only were permitted to enter Bulgarian
temtory and proceed tothe site of the wreckage were unsatisfactory
from ail points of view, and constituted a major interference in

the Commission's work.
21. On the moming of 2 August, a meeting took place between
the Chargb d'Affaires and the Deputy hlinister for Foreign
Affairs, the Minister being engaged in the Bulgarian Governmental

Translation from the Hebrew. The çtatement was made in Hebrewwasd
translated into Russian by an interpreter.56 MENORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)
Commission. Besides discussing funeral arrangements, Mr. Nall
stated that the three members of the Israel Commission of Inquiry

were not satisfied with their investigation of the wreckage only,
and wished to examine also the persons responsible for the disaster.
The Deputy Minister promised to lay this request before the Govern-
ment, but did not undertake to give a quick reply. The necessary
permission was never granted.
22. On the evening of that day, the funeral cortège left on its
journey. The bodies of the victims were transferred hy .rail from
Sofia to Istanbul, and thence by air to Israel, where the mass
funeral mas held on 4 August. The Government of Israel would
wish to take this opportunity to place on record its appreciation

of the assistance rendered by the Turkish authorities in this con-
nection, and also of the facilities granted by the Greek and Yugo-
slav authorities to the members of the Commission of Inquiry.
23. During the afternoon of 3 August, a further meeting took
place between the Chargé d'Affaires and the Foreign Minister,
who stated that the Bulgarian Governmental Commission had
completed its work and that its Report, publication of which was
aaaiting approval by the Government, codd be anticipated in the
near future. The Foreign hlinister explained that the Bulgarian
authorities had proof that at o503Z (0703B) an anti-aerial defence
unit in the vicinity of Trn had reported that an aircraft, unidenti-

fied by it, was approaching the Bulgarian frontier from Yugoslav
territory: at oyoZ the aircraft had crossed the Bulgarian frontier
and at ogr3Z Bulgarian fighters took off, pursued the aircraft and
ordered it to follow them. But the aircraft did not obey their
instruction and continued in the direction of the Greek frontier,
upon which event lire was opened on the aircraftand it was brought
down in the vicinity of Petritch. He added that the Commission
had reached the conclusion that the Security Forces had been too
hasty, and that those responsible should be identified and punished.
In reply to a question whether the Bulgarian Government was
recognizing that it must accept full and unreserved responsibility
for the disaster, the Foreign Minister indicated that while there
\vould he a change in their attitude, they were unahle to accept
responsibility fora11the damages. He could give no further details
until the report of the Commission was finally approved: in parti-
cular he was unable ta indicate whether the Bulgarian Government
would admit full responsibility for the disaster and only reserve its

position regarding the quantum of damages. An announcement of
the conclusions of the Bulgarian Govemmental Commission would
be made the next day, after which a reply would be given to the
Israel Government's Note Verbale of 28 July.
24. On 3 August 1955 the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency issued
a Communiqué (Annex 16), the text of which appeared in the
Bulgarian press of the next day. This Communiquéin part stated: MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 57

"I. Le 27 juiüet a. c.à 7h. IO, heure bulgare, un avion de voya-
geurs quadrimoteur, type "Constellation", appartenant à la Com-
pagnie de navigation aérienne israélienne 'El Al", s'est dévié à
l'espace aérien bulgare dans la régionde la ville de Tm.vis dans
Après avoir pénétré à40 klm. à l'intérieur du paysà l'est de la
ville de Trn, l'avion a pris la direction du sud, il a survoléles villes
de Breznik, Radomir, Stanké Dimitrov et Blagoevgrad et il a suivi
la ligne au sud vers la frontière bulgaro-grecque. L'avion a survolé
le temtoire bulgare au total environ de zoo klm.

2. Le poste respectif de commandement de la défense anti-
aérienne, après qu'il a étéprévenu qu'un avion étranger, d'origine
inconnue, a pénétré dansl'espace aérien bul~are, a donné l'ordre
2.deux avions de chasse de la défenseanti-aerienne de poursuivre
l'avion étranger et de l'obligerA attemr sur l'un quelconque de
nos aérodromes.

3. L'avion a étédécouvert par les avions de diasse au sud de la
ville de Stanké Dimitrov et il a étéprévenu par les signes établis
par le Code internationalà suivre les avions de chasse pour atterrir
sur l'aérodrome qu'ilslui indiqueront. L'avion ne s'est pas soumis
à cette invitation et il a continué son vol au sud vers la ville de
fait un essai de s'enfuir par la frontière,ont ouvert leàfla suite
de quoi l'avion a pris feu et il est tombé dans la régionde la ville
de Pétritch. A cause de l'explosion ni s'est produite en l'air, l'avion
est complètement détruit et tous 'f 51 passagers et 7 personnes
de l'équipageont péri.

4. Dans les circonstances sus-mentionnées il est évident que
les causes du malheureux accident avec l'avion israélien sont les
suivantes:
a) L'avion s'est dévié de sadirection, a violéla frontière de la
Bulgarie et sans préavis-a pénétré àune grande profondeu! dans
l'espace aérien bulgare. Etant muni d'un équipement de navigation
de perfectionil n'a pas pu ne pas s'apercevoir qu'il a violé lafron-
tière d'Etat. Mêmeaprès qu'il a étéprévenu, il n'a pas obéi, mais
il a continuéson vol au sud dans la direction de la frontière bulgaro-
grecque.

bj Les organes de la défense anti-aérienne ont manifesté de la
l'avion d'atterrir."ris toutes les mesures nécessaires pour obliger

The Communiqué tlieri went on to make some generd remarks
about previous violations of the Bulgarian airspace. It expressed

the sincere desire of the Bulgarian Govemment that there should be
no repetition of such au event and its intention to identify and
punish "les coupables de l'accident". The final paragraph of that
Communiqu6 stated as follows:
"Le Gouvernement bulgare exprime ses sympathies aux proches
des innocentes victimes qui ont périi la suite de cet accident. et,

658 3IEblORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)
dans sa Note au Gouvernement de l'État d'Israël, a déclaré qu'il
est prêtde prendre à sa charge le dû des dommages-intérêta sux
familles des victimes ainsi que sa part des dommages-intérêtdses
pertes matérielies."

25. Several times in the course of the meetings between 28 July
1955 and 3 August 1955, the Israel representatives had requested
the transfer to them of al1the papers, documents, identity papers,
passports and "toute autre chose" relating to the persons on board
and to the aircraft, mail, luggage, cargo and al1 other things nor-
mally on board the aircraft, and on more than one occasion they
complained to the Bulgarian officiais of their tardiness in handing
these items over. The attention of the Court is particularly cailed
to the fact, as stated in paragraph 14 above, that the Government

of Bulgaria was specifically requested to post guards over the
wreckage pending the arriva1 of the Israel Commission of Inquiry
which would be desirous of examining the wreckage as it was. On
2 August 1955 there was handed to the Israel representatives in
Sofia a miscellaneous selection of items said to have been recovered
from the wreckage. These included a few personai identitg papers,
some unimportant persona1 effccts, and some mail (a part of the
mail had been handed over already on 29 July). This handing over
took place on z August I9j5, two hours prior to the departure of
the funeral cortège from Sofia. The items thus handed over were
recorded in a series of Protocols drawn up by the Bulgarian officials
in the Bulgarian language. These officialsinformed the representa-
tives of the Israel Legation that these were al1the items recovered
from the wreckage. Several days later there were delivered by the

Bulgarian authorities to the representatives of the Israel Legation
some documents relating to the cargo. The details of this handing
over were not recorded in any Protocol. No other aircraft papers,
including the various operational documents and log-books, nor
the instruments and removable fittings carried on 4x-AKC, have
ever beeu handed over.

26. At a further meeting with the Foreign Minister on the 4th,
the Foreign Minister stated, in reply to a request for a copy of the
Bulgarian Commission's Report, that the Communiqué which had
just been published (Annex 16) was certainly already known to
the Israel Government and it could he taken that there was nothing
more. \men Mr. NaIl objected that even assuming this to be the
case, a public Communiqué was not equivaient to the officiai
communication of the Report of the Commission to his Government,
the Foreign Minister stated that in fact the Commission had
enquired into self-evident matters and that the question of writing

reports had not arisen. The Commission had simply recorded its
conclusions and these had now been endorsed by the Government
and published in the Communiqué. While promising to hring the
Israel request hefore the Government, the Foreign Ministerrepeatedly insisted that there was nothing to be added to the
Communiqu6, as wonld undoubtedly be mentioned in a Note then
under preparation. The Court is accordingly invited to take note
of the fact that according to this statement no report was compiled
by the Bulgarian Governmental Commission; and in any event

that no copy of any such report was ever communicated to the
Govemment of Israel. As for the pending request for a further
visit by the members of the Israel Commission of Inquiry (see
paragraph 21 above), the Foreign ilfinister reiterated the previous
argument that Bulgaria, as a sovereign State, could not permit a
foreign State to carry out an investigation on her territory. Mr.
Nd thereupon cnquired whether two members of the Commission
might not bepermitted to return toBulgaria. The Foreign Minister,
while asking for a precise definition of the purpose of the visit, did
not move from his position.

27. Later on the same day, the Legation of Israel in Sofia
received from the Bulgarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs a Note
Verbale bearing that day's date-4 August 1955 (Annex 17). Here
the following account is given of what had occurred:

"Le 27 juillet a. à.7 h. IO temps local, l'avion de lacompagnie
de navigation aérienne d'Israël "El Al" a pénétrédans l'espace
aérienbulgare dans la régionde la ville de Tm, sans aucun préavis.
Après avoir pénétré à 40 km. en profondeur, l'avion a survolé
les villes de Breznik, Radomir, Stanké-Dimitrov, Blagoevgrad et
il a continuéau sud.Il a voléau-dessus du territoire -uleare environ
200 km.
Au sucl de la ville de Stanké-Dimitrov, l'avion a été intercepté
par deux chasseurs bulgares qui ont reçu l'ordre de le contraindre
à atterrir dans quelque aéroport bulgare.
Les chasseurs ont averti l'avion, conformément aux reglements
internationaux établis, d'atterrir. Malgré ce fait,ilne s'est pas
soumis, mais a continué à voler vers le sud, essayant de s'enfuir
à travers la frontière bulgaro-grecque.
Dans ces circonstances, les deux chasseurs des forces de la défense
anti-aérienne bulgare dans cette région, étonnéspar la conduite
a pris feu et est tombédans la régionde la ville de Pétritcb."tard il

The fourth paragraph, to which the Govemment of Israel draws
particular attention, includes the following:

"Adoptant la conclusion de la Commission gouvernementale
spéciale, chargéed'enquêterle cas, le Gouvernement bulgare admet
que les causes du malheureux accident avec i'avion de "El Al"
se résument dans ce qui suit:
!. L'avion s'est écarté deson itinéraire, il a violéla frontière
d'Etat de Bulgarie et, sans aucun préavis, a pénétré profondément
à I'interieur de l'espace aérien bulgare. Muni d'outillages de navi-
gation aérienne parfaits,iln'a pas pu ne pas voir qu'il avait violé60 MESlORIAL OF ISRAEL (2VI 58)

la frontièred'État bulgare. Mêmeaprèsavoir été averti.il ne s'est
pas soumis, mais a continué à voler vers le sud dans la direction
de la frontiéreulgaro-grecque;
2.Les forcesde la défenseanti-aériennebulgare ont fait preuve
d'une certaineh$te et n'ont pas pris toutes les mesures nécessaires
pour contraindre l'avioà se soumettre età attemr."

The Note 17erbale concluded with the foiiowing two paragraphs:

"Le Gouvernement et le peuple bulgare expriment une fois de
plus leurs profonds regrets pour ce grand malheur qui a causéla
mort de personnes complètement innocentes. Le Gouvernement
bulgare désireardemment que de pareils malheurs ne se répktent
plus jamais. II fera établiret punir les personnes coupables de la
catastrophe survenue avec l'avion israélienet il prendra toute les
mesures nécessairepour que de pareillescatastrophes ne serépètent
plus en temtoire bulgare.
Le Gouvernement bulgare compatit profondément aux parents
des victimes et il est prêt assumer le dédommagementdù àleurs
familles, ainsi que sa part de l'indemnitédeségàtsmatériels."
28. The Court is invited ta take note that this communication

by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, upon the instruction of the
Bulgarian Government. admits that Buigarian armed forces shot
down 4x-AKC and that the unfortunate accident to 4X-AKCwas
caused by "une certaine hâte" displayed by the Bulgarian armed
forces and by the fact that those armed forces "n'ont pas pris toutes
les mesures nécessaires pour contraindre l'avion à se soumettre
et à attemr", those armed forces being at the same time in a state
of "astonishment". Although the point may not be material to the
case hrought before the Court by the Govemment of Israel, the
attention of the Court is also invited to the fact that official com-

munications were made by the Bulgarian Govemment, in terms
identical with those of this Note Verbale, to the Governments of
other countries, nationals of which were among the victims. See,
for instance, the Note to the Govemment of the United States of
America dated 4 August 1955 and included as Annex 2 to the
Application instituting Proceedings filed by the United States on
28 October 1957, and the Note Verbale of the same date to the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and included as Annex z to the Application instituting
Proceedings filed by the United Kingdom on 22 November 1957.

29. There are a number of inconsistencies in these various
Bulgarian accounts of the catastrophe, some of which may be
mentioned :

(n) In the Communiqué of 28 Juiy 1955 (Annex 13) and in the
Note Verbale of the same date (Annex 14) the time of the alleged
penetration of the Bulgarian airspace by ~X-AKC is given as 0535Z
and about 0530Z respectively. In the Communiqué of 3 August MEM~RIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 61
(Annex 16) and in the Note Verbale of 4 August (Annex 17) the
time is given as o51oZ, a difference of zo to 25 minutes.

(b) Paragraph 2 of the Communiquéof 3August 1955(Annex 16)
states that a foreign aircraft of unknown origin was noticed in the
Bulgarian airspace; it contains no indication that this foreign
aircraft was the El Al aircraft to which the first and third paragraphs
thereof refer. No such ambiguity appears in the Note Verbale of
4 August 1955 (Annex 17) which, to the contrary, asserts that the
aircraft intercepted south of Stanke-Dimitrov was 4x-AKC. Neither
of these accounts is consistent with the Communiqué and Note
Verbale of 28 July 1955 (Annexes 13 and 14). both of which, never-
theless, in mentioning the town Stanke-Dimitrov, state that there
the interception took place.
(c) The Communiquéof 3 August 1955 (Annex 16) states that it
had been drawn up "à la base des donnéesexposéesdans le proto-

cole final de la Commission Gouvernementale Spéciale". On the
otherhand the Note Verbale of 4 August 1955(Annex 17) omits this
phrase and states: "De i'enqubte effectuée par la Commission
Gouvernementale Spécialeil a étéétabli d'une manière incontes-
table ce qui suit." That Note Verbale was also expressly written
"by order of" the Bulgarian Government.
30. On 15 August, at a meeting between Mr. Baruch and the
Chief of Protocol, the latter enquired whether the Report of the
Israel Commission of Inquiry had been received. He hoped that
this Report would be objective and that its publication would not
aggravate the situation. On 15 September another conversation
took place at a diplomatic reception in Jerusalem between the

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Sharett) and
the Minister of Bulgaria to Israel. The latter spoke freely of the
dismay and regret of himself and his Govemment forthe incident
and expressed the hope that relations hetween the two countries
would not suffer in consequence. In subsequent conversations the
Bulgarian Minister further expressed the hope that the incident
would not affect the favourable attitude traditionallyheld by
Israel regarding Bulgaria's admission to the United Nations, at
the forthcoming Tenth Session of the General Assembly then about
to convene.
31.The Israel Commission of Inquiry completed its Report on
18 August 1955. An abbreviated version was issued to the press in
Jerusalem on 25 August 1955, copies being transmitted by the

Ministry for Foreign Affairs to foreign diplomatic representatives
in Israel, including that of Bulgaria. The fuil text of the Report
was published hy the Israel Government Printer on 21 September
1955 (Annex 18). Copies of it were formally transmitted to the
Bulgarian Legation on 27 September (Annex 19). The document
was placed on sale. The Commission's conclusions, which appear
in Section XI of its Report, are:62 A~EXORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)

"CONCLUSIONS
1. On the 27th of July 1gj5, at approximately 0540 GMT., a
Constellation aircraft of Israel civil registration (4x-AKC), en
route from Vienna to Lod, was fired upon in three phases by two
Bulgarian jet fighters and in the last attack was destroyed over
Bulgarian territor)..
The first firing took place in the area of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian
border at an altitude of approximately 18,ooofeet. TheCommission
is satisfied that the aircraft did not receive any warning prior to
this firing.
Several minutes later the second firing took place over Bulgarian
territory at an altitude of approximately 8000 feet. The aircraft
was then evidently in process of descent seeking a place to land
and was showing signs of fire.Nevertheless it continued in controlled
fliaht. At the time of this attack it had covered some 17 nautical
iiifies within Bulgarian air space.
Aftcr approxi~iiatel!five minutes the third attack took plac? at
an altitude of about 2000 feet. Tlic aircraft \vas still iiiider control,
I~eadingiiortli\rard dçepcr iiito I<ulgaria anJ niaking for a forced
laiidiii~. Aj a resiilt of this lajr attack, the aircraft brokc iip in
mid-ai;.
2. The aircraft entered Bulgarian airspace being approximately
35 nautical miles off track on a course which would have brought
it to the Bulgarian-Greek border after traversing approximately
26 nautical miles (6 to 7 minutes flying) of the south-western corner
of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian statement as to the course and track
of the aircraft is inconsistent with the facts as proved.
3. In the circumstances of wind and weather on this flight, the
crew could not have been aware of the aircraft's drift from track
(see para.2 hereof). In any event, the cause of the disaster was not
this deviation but the action of the Bulgarian fighters in shooting
down the aircraft.

4. There were no survivors."
32. As appears from the Warrant of Appointment which is
printed as the introduction to the Report, the Coinmission operated
as an independent and quasi-judicial body, and its Report was

submitted to the Minister of Transport. The Government of Israel
has not, since its publication, ceased to make investigations and
enquiries (and opportunity was taken to inform the Bulgarian
Government of this, asis explained in paragraphs 41 and 42 below),
and it is now able to present the following observations and ad-
ditional information, as follows:

(i) Copies of the Certificates of Registration, Ainvorthiness and
Safety. referred to in Section III of the lieport, are annexed
(Annexes 20, 21, 22). together with a certificate regarding the
aircraft type (Annex 23).
(ii) The Company's standing instructions in force in 195j for
flying in thundery conditions and for uncontrollable decom-
pression are annexed (Annexes 24 and 25). MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)
63
(iii) An appreciation of the actual weather conditions by the
Israel Meteorological Service is contained in Annex 26. The
Government is satisfied with the findings of the Commission
of Inquiry, that along Amber IO after Belgrade 4x-AKC en-

countered bad weather conditions and winds of a significantly
higher velocity than had been forecast.
(iv) Additional information regarding the aircrew (sec Section V

of the Report):
(a) The Captain, Mr. Hinks, was an aviator of considerable
experience. Between 21 June 1954 and 18 July 1955 he had

flown over airway Amber IO eight times: he had flown this
route once in May 1955 and twice in July 1955 before
27 July.
(b) The First Officer, Mr. Ben Porat, had flown over airway

Amber IO twice in June 1955 and once in July 1955 hefore
27 July.
(c)The Wireless Operator, Mr. R. Goldman, had flown over
airway Amber IO eight times between 26 July 1954 and
21 Jnne 1955: he had flown the route once in May 1955 and
once in June 1955.

The Government of Israel considers that in addition to
being fully qualified, this was a highly experienced crew.

(v) In amplification of Sections IX and IXa of the Report, which
contain the communications to and from the aircraft and
logged at Belgrade and Athens, particulars regarding al1 the
communications to and from the aircraft after its departure
from Vienna are annexed (Annex 27). In preparing this Annex
and in checking the material it was noticed (a) that not al1
the messages logged at Belgrade and Athens are included in
Section IX of the Inquiry Commission's Report, and (b) that
not al1the translations of the messages into ordinary language

are sufficiently clear. The differenies, however, are of no
material importance. Annex 27 also includes messages between
various ground stations in connection with the flight. These
are the only known communications about this flight with
4x-ARC or between ground stations. The Government of
Israel considers that al1 the messages taken together clearly
indicate that the aircraft intended to fly and believed it was
flying according to the Flight Plan (Annexes 7 and g), and
particularly along airway Amber IO; and that until the S.O.S.
nothing unusual or untoward was apparent to the crew.

(vi) The standard international procedure for emergency com-
munications lays down that the distress cal1 and distress
message should contain the following: (a) Distress call.
SOS SOS SOS
This is
Aircraft cd-sign (3 times),

(6)Distress message.
Repeat distress cd, as above
Position and time established
True heading

Indicated airspeed
Altitude
Type of aircraft
Nature of distress and kind of assistance required
Intentions of captain
Any other relevant information
Two ten-second dashes
Aircraft cd-sign
Over.
The S.O.S. message as recorded by ATC Athens was:

"SOS DE [this is] 4X-AKC."
This message is recorded three times, at 0j37Z, o538Z and
05392 (seeAnnex 27, messages Nos. 25, 26 and 27).
It is not possible to Say whether these S.O.S. messages were
sent when the aircraft was first hit, or at some time between the
first attack and the final explosion. It is also impossible to Say
whether the 05372 message was the first despatched. Again, it is
not possible to Say whether the radio officer, wbo most probably

sent the message, was previously ordered by the captain to investi-
gate the reason for a loss of pressurization or the location of
possible fire, or to help the cabin personnel and was thus not free
before oj37Z to transmit the message (see the Company's instruc-
tions for uncontrollable decompression (Annex 25)).
33. In the preceding paragraphs of this Memorial, the two
contemporary accounts of the flight and destruction of 4X-AKC
are set forth, that given by the Bulgarian Government in paragraphs
14. 24 and 27 above, and that reconstructed by the Israel Com-
mission of Inquiry in paragraph 31 above. The additional material

submitted to the Court in paragraph 32 and Annexes 20 to 27
inclusive does not add substantialiy to what is known of what
happened to qx-AKC:on the whole it gives greater precision to
some of the data already assembled by the Israel Commission of
Inquiry, and to that extent it may be found to constitute support
for the general account advanced by the Commission-that 4X-AKC
intended to fly and was purporting to fly along airway Amber IO
in accordance with the Flight Plan. The submission of the Govem-
ment ofIsrael is that after 4x-AKChad crashed in flameson Bulgarian
territos.,the Bulgarian Govemment was obliged to give to the MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 65
Government of Israel information of the circumstances, as known
to the Government of Bulgaria, in which that event occurred.

In the Bulgarian Notes Verbales and Communiqués of July and
August 1955 certain information was given to the Govemment of
Israel and to the world. While on the one hand the Government of
Israel does not admit any one of the allegations regarding the
flight path and actions of 4X-AKC contained therein, on the other
hand it considers that the information given to it by the Bulgarian
Governinent-that units of its armed forces intercepted 4x-AKC,
failed to identify it, opened fire on it, shot it dom, destroyed it
and al1 its occupants, were in a state of astonishment, acted in
haste, did not take al1the necessary measures to compel it to land,
that the guilty persons would be identified and punished and that
compensation would be paid-is unambiguous in describing actions
which directly engage Bulgarian responsibility and entitle Israel to
judgment in her favour. Consequently, and subject to further

pleadings, the Government of Israel will not at this stage offer any
further observations or criticism upon either of the two contem-
porary accounts which exist.

34. In reviewing the facts in this case, the Government of Israel
finds the following aspects of particular significance:
(a) Both Governments had appointed Commissions to investigate
the catastrophe and to try and establish its causes. The Bulgarian

Commission consisted of certain members of the Bulgarian Govern-
ment itself: the Israel Commission was a quasi-judicial body
composed of a number of experts qualified in their respective
fields.
(b) The two Commissions operated in complete isolation from
each other. As far as is known the Bulgarian Commission made no

request for, and did not obtain, any assistance of a factual or other
nature from the Israel Government or from the owners of the
aircraft. On the other hand, the Israel Government made every
effort to obtain from the Bnlganan Govemment the necessary
facilities to enable the Israel Commission successfully to carry
out the task imposed upon it, including (i) the facility to carry out
fully and with the necessary leisure a detailed examination of the
instruments and of the wreckage in general; (ii) the facility to
seek out and interview possible eye-witnesses, and (iii) the facility
to interview the members of the Bulgarian armed forces involved.
AU this was repeatedly and deliberately refused. The Government
of Bulgaria made a meagre concession, subject to severely restrictive
conditions, that three of the members of the Commission could
examine the wreckage only during an extremely limited period of
time (less than one working day) and could not seek for and inter-

view witnesses and other persons. This was inadequate and seriousIy
hampered the work of the Commission. It is difficult to resist the66 ~IEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 56)

conclusion that the true purposeof these restrictions was to prevent
the Government of Israel from ever learning the truc facts.

(c) The Report of the Israel Commission (Annex 18) has hecn
puhlished and copies of it communicated to the Bulgarian Govern-
ment (Annex 19). It contains hoth factual information of the kind
commonly included in reports on aircraft accidents, and the
reasoned deductions which led the Commission to its conclusions.
No report by the Bulgarian Commission has heen published or
communicated to the Israel Government. and it has heen stated
by Bulgarian representatives that no detailed report was composed,
and that the Commission contented itself with recording conclusions.
(d) The Bulgarian Government, in the Note Verbale of 4 August
1955 (Annex 17), adopted the conclusions of the Bulgarian Com-

mission.
(e) The trvo Commissions are in full agreement on the cause of
the destruction of 4x-AKC, namely, that it was destroyed after
fire had heen opened upon it hy units of the Bulgarian armed
forces. On this there is, and can he, no room for argument. The two
Commissions do not concur in their account of the circumstances
\!,hich preceded the opening of fire by the Bulgarian aircraft.
(f) The Bulgarian Government has admitted that in shooting
down 4x-AKCits forces: (i) "ont fait preuve d'une certaine hâte";

(ii) did not take "toutes les mesures ~iécessaires".In addition: (i)
the actions of the Bulgarian armed forces were punishahle, because
the Bulgarian Government undertook that it "fera établir et punir
les coupables" ; (ii) the actions of the Bulgarian armed forces were
reprehensible, because the Bulgarian Government sincerely hoped
that there would be no repetition of "pareils malheurs" and would
take "toutes lesmesures nécessaires" to assure this; (iii)the liability
of Bulgaria to pay compensation was recognized; and (iv) the
Bulgarian Government expressed its sincere regrets-and those of
the Bulgarian people-"pour ce grand malheur qui a causéla mort
de personnes complètement innocentes". According to the Bul-
garian Government, al1 these facts have been established "d'une
manière incontestable".

(g) The Bulgarian Government has never made available to the
Government of Israel the following (inte dria): (i) the log-books
and flight deck papers of qx-AKC;(ii) the various items of flight
deck equipment, such as radio, instruments and electrical panels
which had heen removed and were not available to the Israel
Commission; (iii) the evidence which formed the basis for the asser-
tions regarding the alleged course of 4~-AKCover Bulgarian terri-
tory contained in the Notes Verbales of 26 July (Annex 14) and
4 August 1955 (Annex 17). or the basis for the difference in the
assertions appearing in the two Notes Verbales: (iv) the names of
the pilots of the Bulgarian fighter planes, as meIl as of the other
persons, mhether military personnel or civilians, who gave them DIEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 YI 58) 67
their orders, and details of their identification and punishment:
(v) information and details regarding the warnings allegedly given
t0 4S-AKC.

Section II

The Israel Claim and Enszding ~Vegotiations
35. In August 1955 the Government of Israel estahlished an
inter-ministerial committee, presided over by the Attorney-

General, to receive information regarding their losses from persons
other than foreign nationals and prepare the claim for submission
to the Bulgarian Government. These losses included claims for
monetary compensation due to dependants arising from the deaths
of persons on board (passengers and crew members), loss of or
damagc to cargo on board, the losses incurred by the Company, and
al1other legitimate claims arising out of the shooting down of the
aircraft. Basing itself on the Bulgarian Note Verbale of 4 August
(Annex 17), the Government of Israel informed other Govemments
whose nationals were among the victims, of the arrangements
made for the preparation of this claim (Annex 28). In that way
CO-ordination between the potential clairnant Governments in
the preparation of the international claims was initiated.

36. (i) In order to enable the necessary steps to be taken to
establish foral1legal purposes the facts of the deaths of al1persons
on board, the Commission of Inquiry was, by Order published on
12 August 1955, given the powers of a Coroner's Court under the
appropriate domestic legislation of Israel. In pursuance of the
powers thus conferred upon it, and acting as a Coroner's Court,
the Commission of Inquiry held a special session on22 August 1955.
At that session the Attorney-General reqnested the Commission, in
its said capacity, to issue a separate verdict in respect of each
person on board 4x-AKC.A duly authorized officiaiof the Company
submitted under oath the list of passengers and crew-members
compiled on the basis of the relevant manifests, and swore that to
the best of his knowledge and belief that list contained the names

of al1 the persons on board. The list thus submitted is identical
with the lists contained in Annexes 3 and 4 of this Memorial. On
the bais of the findings contained in its Report (Annex 18), and
more specifically on the basis of its conclusive presumption that
there were no survivors, the Commission returned 58 verdicts to
the effect that the deaths occnrred on 27 July 1955 "as result of
injuries caused by shots, fire, explosion or crushing". These ver-
dicts were subsequently transmitted to the appropriate Depart-
ment of the Ministry of the Interior, which issued death certificates
of which a specimen is contained in Annex 29.
(ii) On IO November 1955 the Bulgarian Government caused
to be delivered to the Israel Legation in Sofia 58 death certificates

issued by the appropriate Bulgarian authority in respect of each68 MEM~RIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)
of the said 58 persons. According to these documents the deaths

took place on 27 July 1955 at the village of Karnalovo, in the
arrondissement of Petritch, "par la suite d'un accident aérien".
The Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs subsequently transmitted
those of the Bulgarian certificates that related to foreign nationals
to the Governments concerned. A specimen of the duly authen-
ticated translation of the Bulgarian certificate is contained in
Annex 30.
37. On 14February 1956 the Israel Legation in Sofia transmitted

to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry a Note Verbale of that date,
pntting forward the claim being made against Bulgaria (Annex 31).
After referring to the Bulgarian,Note Verbale of 4 August 1955
(Annex 17). and to the Report of the Israel Commission of Inquiry
(Annex 18), that Note Verbale placed on record the fact that the
Israel Commissionof Inquiry had not been able to make as complete
an investigation of the wreckage as it would have liked and that
the three members of the Commission who had been permitted to
enter Bulgaria had not been able to carry out sufficieut investi-
gations. The Government of Israel then took note of the fact that
in the Note Verbale of 4'August 1955 the Government of Bulgaria
had adopted the conclusions of the Bulgarian Committee regarding
the manner in which 4x-AKChad been destroyed. The Note Verbale
included the following paragraphs:

"6. Par contre, les assurances spontanément données par le
Gouvernement bulgare d'identifier les coupables pour les punir et
de prendre toutes les dispositions nécessaires pour prévenir la
répétitiondesemblables catastrophes en territoire bulgare,montrent
que lesdéfaillances- dûment admises - des forces de la dhfense
anti-aérienne bulgare étaient la cause de l'anéantissement de
l'appareil avec lesmelles pertes qui s'ensuivirent.
7. Le Gouvernement israélien se plaîtà prendre acte des regrets
formellement expriméspar le Gouvernement bulgare dans sa Note
verbale du 4 août 1955. ainsi que des susdites assurances et appré-
cierait hautement de recevoir des informations sur les poursuites
entreprises par le Gouvernement bulgare contre les coupables,
8. A la lumière des admissions aussi spontanées que nettes du
Gouvernement bulgare, qui à cet égarda fait siennes les conclusions
de la Commission gouvernementale spéciale, le Gouvernement
israélienest amené à declarer que la Bulgarie porte la responsabilité
exclusive de la destruction de l'avion qx-AKCau-dessus du temtoire
bulgare, à la date du 27 juillet 1955, et des pertes humaines et
dommages qui en sont suivis."
The Note Verbale concluded by demanding reparation in the sum
of U.S. Dollars 2,656,858 according to the details then given to the
Bulgarian Government. This claim related exclusively to losses and

damage suffered by a number of individnals, including relatives of
the victims, owners of cargo and the Company; the Government of
Israel added that in the interests of a speedy settlement itwas MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 69
prepared to waive the claim which it was entitled to put forward on
account of losses and damage suffered by it. Transmitting that Note

Verbale the Israel representative explained that various adjust-
ments might have to be made after the Israel claim had been
compared with those submitted or to be submitted by other
Governments, especially with the view of ensuring that the Bul-
garian Government would not be asked to pay the same damage
twice over. The first of such adjustments was transmitted to the
Bulgarian Government by the Israel Legation in a Note Verbale of
IO August 1956 (Annex 32).Further adjustments have since come
to light and they are incorporated in the details contained in Sec-
tion II of Part Two of this Mernorial.

38. Between 6 March and the end of June 19j6 Mr. Na11had
several meetings with various Bulgarian officials,at which explana-
tions regarding the details of the Israel claim were requested. The
basis upon which the claims had been calculated, as indicated in

paragraph IO of the Note Verbale of 14 February (Annex 31),
was tberefore amplified in these conversations. The Bulgarian
officials sought to maintain some distinction between that portion
of the lsrael Government's claim which related to the lossessuffered
by the relatives of the victims, and that portion which related to
the losses suffered by the Company. Basing themselves on the last
paragraph of the Bulgarian Note Verbale of 4 August 1955 (Annex
17) .hey argued that the determination of Bulgaria's part of the
compensation for material damages would have to be left to
Bulgarian experts, and that but for the aircraft's entry into Bul-
garian airspace the catastrophe would never have occurred.

39. At a meeting on IO May, the Bulgarian officiais indicated
that the claims in respect to individual losses appeared reasonable
and minimal: on the other hand, the Bulgarian experts considered
the claim in respect of the Company's losses to be exaggerated. It

was subsequently explained (on 27 May) that, while the Bulgarian
experts were still engaged in the examination of the Israel claim,
they would not be in a position to finalize their conclusions as long
as the claim of the United States of America had not been sub-
mitted. They were trying to establish a common denominator, on
the basis of which the Bulgarian Government could offer a fixed
sum of compensation for every claim. Regarding the value of the
aircraft, the Bulgarian experts did not find that account had been
taken of any depreciation as a result of its use. Furthermore, the
fact that the aircraft had violated Bulgarian airspace ought also
to be reflected in the claim. For these reasons the Company's
losses appeared to be exaggerated. The Israel representative could
not see any necessary connection between the claims which had
been submitted and the United States' claim. The claim for the
aircraft was based on the cost of its replacement, and the argument70 MEMORIALOF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)
that the financial claim for the aircraft could be affected by the

aüeged intrusion into Bulgarian airspace \vas rejected.

40. In the light of the detailed and technical nature of some of
the questions which had been raised in this series of meetings, and
in an effort to reach a specdy settlement of the claim on a mutually
satisfactory basis, the Government of Israel then proposed the
holding of direct talks in Sofia between duly authorizcd represen-
tatives of the tw Governments, hoping that ail outstanding
questions and differences between them could be clarified. On
3 July 1956 this proposal was conveyed ta the Bulgarian Foreign
Ministry, and on 4 July 1956, Mrs. Golda Meir, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, recalling the approaching anniversary of the disas-
ter which might well excite public opinion, suggested that the
Legal Adviser of the Israel hfinistry for Foreign Affairs (hlr.

Rosenne),accompanied by the necessary advisers, should proceed to
Sofia immediately in order ta clarify with the Bulgarian authorities
al1 outstanding problems and to speed up the settlement of the
claim. After fiirther discussion the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, on
25 July 1956, agreed to informa1 discussions ~4th %Ir. Xall and
Rlr. Rosenne. hfr. Rosenne, accompanied by Mr. G. If'angcnheim,
Manager of the Company's Insurance and Claims Department,
was in Sofia from 31 July ta 7 August 1956.

41. The first meeting took place on z August 1gj6 witli Mr. K.
Strezov, Birector of the Legal Division of the Bulgarian Foreign
Ministry. Xoting earlier s'tatements that Bulgaria's reply ta the
Israel Xote Verbale of 14 February 1956 (Annex 31) would be
ready within a short time, possibly even in August, and that this
reply might differ from the Israel claim, the Israel representatives

explained that their Government was exercised by the possibility
of a wide gap between the claim and Bulgaria's reply, a develop-
ment which might cause undesirahle political misunderstandings.
The manner in which the Israel claim had been prepared \vas
described in some detail1.The claim itself \vasminimal and reflected
only the actual lasses suffered. The Israel Government \vas willing
-as indeed it stated in the third paragraph of the Note Verbale of
14 February 1956-to forego a discussion of the facts of the disaster,
so as to avoid any possibility of mutual recrimination. However,
should tbis prove necessary, Israel would be prepared to enter into
such a discussion, xvhether through the diplomatic channel, or
through some judicial tribunal. The Israel Government \\.as not
basing itself exclusively on the Report of the Israel Commission
of Inquiry (Annex 18) and had since made a complete re-examina-

tion of the incident in the light of additional material which had

1 This descripti=.asin fact similar to that which appears in Section II of
Part Two of this Mernorial. ZIEAIORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 71
not been available to the Commission. After this fiirther study the
Israel Government remained fully satisfied that its claim was

firmly based in fact andin law. The Israel representatives requested
particulars regarding the identification and prosecution of those
responsible for the disaster and of the punishment awarded them.
ùfr. Strezov said that it \vas clear that no change had occurred in
the position of the Government of Israel and that he would transmit
the explanations received to his superiors. He added that the
Bulgarian reply to the Israel claim had been delayed by the fact
that the United States claim Iiad not yet been submitted. Through-
out this interview, which lasted two and a half hours, >Ir. Strezov
did not enter into any general or detailed discussion in regard to
the points made by the Israel representatives.

42. On 6 August the Israel representatives, at a meeting with

Mr. Milco Tarabanor, the Deputy Foreign Minister, stated that
since Mr. Strezov had not requested any explanations in addition
to those offered at the meeting on 2 August, they were assuming
that the Bulgarian authorities did not dispute what had been
said then. However, since allusion had been made to the possibility
of a gap between the Israel claim and the Bulgarian proposa1 for
its settlement, the Government of Israel.unable to understand how,
in the light of the Bulgarian communications of August 1955 ,uch
a difference \vas at al1 possible, wished them to clarify the under-
standing of the Bulgarian Govemment on the subject. The Govern-
mcnt of Israel had carefully re-examined the known facts relating
to the disaster, especially in the light of additional information
\\.hich it had been able to collect since the Israel Inquiry Com-
mission completed its work. \17ithout doubt, the cause of the

disaster lay in the admitted actions and omissions of the Bulgarian
authorities; and the fact that 4x-AKCmay have entered the Bill-
garian airspace without authorization was completely irrelevant,
since it had done nothing to invite or impel the Bulgarian forces to
fire at it and shoot it down, and even less to act in haste and without
taking al1 the necessary precautions. The shooting down of 4s-AKC
\vas riot the necessary consequence of this intrusion, and there was
no necessary and compelling connection between the acts of 4s-.4~c
and the acts and omissions of the Bulgarian forces. Even more
important than these considerations \vas the duty of the Bulgarian
forces to comport thernselves in accordance with the necessary
obligations of humanity and with due regard for the safety of the
passengers on board. Moreover, it \Iras certain that the crew of
qx-.mc did not know, and could not have known, that ~X-AKC
might have entered Bulgarian airspace;and in any event the crew

could not have foreseen the possibility of fire being opened on it
should it cross the border. That opening of fire was the exclusive
cause of the catastrophe, as had been determined by the Bulgarian
authorities themselves. \t7ithout derogating from the importance of72 ME~IORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)
considerations of this character, it had to be borne in mind that
the disaster also had come to constitute an important element in
the general political situation. On this aspect, Mrs. Meir had

instructed them to state that the Israel Goirernment did not wjsh
its relations with Bulgaria, which had hitherto been most friendly,
to be subjected to strain and serious tension. The Israel Govern-
ment had used al1its influence in order to prevent the possibility of
hostile public opinion being aroused by the incident. Assuming that
the position of the Bulgarian Govemment was similar, and in the
light of ail that had been said at the interviews, the Government
of Israel hoped that compensation for the losses suffered as a
result of the disaster, as set forth in the Note Verba14 February
1956-in so far as such pecuniary compensation was able to "com-
pensate" the persons who suffered as a result of the catastrophe-
would be paid in full and promptly. MI. Tarabanov confirmed that
his Govemment was not interested in, and did not see any reason
for, a deterioration of its relations with Israel. He did not know
whether there woidd be a difference between the Israel claim and

the Bulgarian reply. Al1that had been said in the two meetings in
the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry would be taken into account in
the determination of the Bulgarian attitude. \Vithout giving a firm
promise, Mr. Tarabanov hoped to be able to meet a request that if
in fact a difference between the claim and the reply should appear,
the Bulgarian Govemment would inform the Israel Government
before putting its views in a final written form, so as to cnable the
Israel officials to give additional explanations.

43. Between 27 August and 30 September 1956, further inter-
views took place in Sofia with various officials of the Bulgarian
Government, who intimated that the reply to the claim could he
anticipated in two or three weeks. (Inthe meantime the final claim
of the claimant Governments, that of the United States, had been
communicated to the Bulaarian Government on 22 Au~ust.) It
\\. amsplicd that sume furthvereexpl:iiintionsmiçht still bc requustcd.

and 3lr. Sall statcd that sliould this be thecase, th(: 1sraL.lauthoritics
were always prepared to give such additional explanations. Indeed,
for that very purpose a series of meetings had taken place in which
the Legal Adviser of the Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs had
participated, and it was not clear why the Bulgarian authorities
had not availed themselves of the opportunity to clarify al1 out-
standing questions.

44. The Bulgarian reply was conveyed to the Israel Legation in
Sofia in a Note Verbale dated I Octoher 1956 (Annex 33). LVhile
the Note enunciated the position of the Bulgarian Government
regarding the responsibility of that Govemment, uihich should be
shared with the Company, it also stated that the Bulgarian Govern-
ment did not consider the amount claimed to correspond to the"
dommages réellement causés". A further exchange of vie1t.sthrough
the diplomatic channel was proposed and the hope was espressed
that the Government of Israel "se chargera du règlement de la
question des dédommagements dûs aux autres pays". The Govern-
ment of Israel understands that no such suggestion was made to
other countries which had submitted claims to the Bulgarian
Government.

45. On receipt of this Note RIr. NaIl \vas recalled to Jerusalem
for consultations, folIo\\-ing which, at the end of October, he
returned to Sofia and the Israel Government's reply of g Xovember
19j6 mas delivered (Annex 34). The invitation to enter into nego-
tiationç to settle the claim was accepted. At the same time the
Note Verbale placed on record the views of the Government of
Israel regarding the legal responsibility of Bulgaria and the cal-
culation of the damages:

"2. At the same time the Israel C;overnment places on record
that it does not agree with what is stated in the third paragraph
of the Note Verbale of I October 1956.It is satisfied that theaircraft
4x-AKCcmssed the Bulgarian frontier complet el^^unknowingly,
unwillingly, and without premeditation and did not penetrate
deeply into the Bulgarian airspace. It holds this view in the light
of the Report of the Israel Commission of Inquiry ivhich was
transmitted to the Bulgarian Legation in Israel under cover of the
Foreign Xlinistry's Note Verbale No. 216799 dated 27 September
1955, and in particular in view of the meteorological conditions on
and in the vicinity of Airway Amber 10 at the tirne in question,
which establish that the crew of the aircraft could not have been
awarc uf ttieir irniiicdintc Ir,cat;ithe rzle\,:int tinic. I:urthcrnir,re,
deiptu th,: rcpc;ite<l <It.îl:ir;itions of ttie l%iilg:iri;iii(;i~\,rrnineiit
th31 tic :ircr.fr i%:is\i.iriit:~l, tlie Isr,îel Gc,\.crniii<:iitinnintaiiis
its position that the aircraft nas not warned; that even if some
warning was given it was not adequate; and that in any event the
question of the warning is irrelevant to the main issue.

3. Having regard to the above and to the various admissions
made bv the Bulear"an Govemment and in ~articular those con-
ttiinedi;ithe Sote \'crkile of 4Aiigiist iqjg. tiie lsrae('r~vernmeiit
(:oiiiidersttint111~.Hulgaritin G~\~erilmentbcars cxcliisive respon-
sibilitv for tliis reeretrnblr: incideiit niinlllossof lifzand mlte-
ri2 damage whi& ensued.

4. The Government of Israel holds to its view that the amount
claimed corresponds to the real damage caused. The method of
calculatioii of the claim has beeu fully explained to the represen-
tatives of the Biilgarian Govemment through the diplomatic channel
since the transmission of the Legation's Note of 14 February 1956.''

The suggestion that the Israel Government should represent al1
the claimants was described as "premature".

774 ME.\IORIAL OF IÇRAEL (2 VI58)
46. Between 23 November and 26 Decemher 1956 further

meetings took place, mainly devoted to the question of the meeting
which had been proposed in the Bulgarian Note Verbale of I Oc-
tober (Annex 33). In the course of these meetings, and particularly
in one of II December 1956, the Bulgarian representatives hegan
to insist on the recognition of the Bulgarian position by the Govern-
ment of Israel as the prior condition for the openinofnegotiations,
whereas the Israel position \vas that no prior conditions of that or
any other nature ought to be established for negotiations, the pur-
pose ofwhich was to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement of the
case. On 26 Decemher 1956 the Foreign Minister, Mr. Lukanov,
explained the position of his Governrnent in some detail. Since a
serious difference of opinion existed with respect to the question
of responsibility, the Bulgarian authorities were reconsidering the
problem, both from the humanitarian and from the legal aspects.

It was douhtful if the Bulgarian Government could accept the
Israel argument regarding the exclusive responsibility of Bulgaria.
It was likely that the Bulgarian Government would desire to fix
a maximum sum which, in its view, should constitute its share of
the compensation. The reply would probably not be ready before
the end of January or the beginning of February.
47. At a meeting on I February 1957 hetween Mr. Na11and the

Director of the West European and Middle East Department of the
Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, the latter said that the delay in the
Bulgarian reply had not been caused by the need to re-examine
the facts, for the claim had heen most carefully examined, but by
the Israel position of maintaining the exclusive responsibility of
Bulgaria for the disaster. The contention that the unauthorized
presence of the aircraft in the Bulgarian airspace was a factor which
had contrihuted to the disaster and that, therefore, the Company
was not free of responsibility, was repeated. Since the Israel Note
Verbale of 9 November 1956 (Annex 34) rejected this position, the
Bulgarian Government \vas compelled to re-examine the whole
question. Mr. Nd recailed that the Israel position regarding
responsibility had heen known to the Bulgarian authorities for a
long time. Having regard to the fact that a year and a half had
passed since the disaster, and more than three months had passed
since the Israel Government had accepted the Bulgarian proposa1

of I October 1956 (Annex 33) concerning a meeting with Bulgarian
representatives, and since no new factors had arisen in the mean-
time, the Israel Government regarded Bulgaria's procrastination in
replying to the Israel Note as utterly unjustifiable. The Israel
Government might take the view that this procrastination amounted
to a cancellation of the invitation for a meeting.

48. At a meeting between Mr. Nall and kir. Tarabanov, the
Deputy Foreign Minister, on 20 March 1957, MI. Nall enquired
the reason for the subsequent silence of the Bulgarian authorities. .\IEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 YI 58) 75

Mr. Tarabanov stated that a foreign plane was not permitted to
enter Bulgarian airspace and if it had nevertheless done so, the
responsibility for the consequences was to be borne by the tres-
passer, regardless of whether the trespass occurred in time of peace
or not. He referred to previous violations of Bulgarian airspace by
planes which performed hostile activities against Bulgaria. In the
view of the Bulgarian Government and of expert international
lawyers, the Company shared a substantial part of the responsibility
for the catastrophe. Therefore, the Israel reply of 9 November 1956
(Annex 34) put the Bdgarian Government in a difficult position
and compelled it to reconsider the whole problem. Mr. Nall recalled

that this problem had already been considered exhaustively in the
numerous meetings between Israel and Bulgarian representatives.
The Israel Government was unable to accept the argument that
a civil aircraft, in time of peace, acting innocently and peacefully
and without auy intention to violate the sovereignty of Bulgaria,
was doing anything to justify its being shot down without consider-
ation for the elementary obligations of humanity and for the fate
of al1persons on board. These were the circumstances in which the
catastrophe had occurred; and this despite the esisting friendly
relations between Bulgaria and Israel and despite the fact that no
Israel aircraft had ever been accused of having violated Bulgarian

airspace. Considering that a year and eight months had passed
since the catastrophe, and that al1questions had been many times
carefully considered, there existed two possibilities: the Bulgarian
Government could either-relying on the constant necessity of
giving the claim further consideration-continue its procrastination
for ever, in which event the parties would amveat a completedead-
lock, or it could adopt a practical approach and negotiate a settle-
ment of the claim asit had proposed in its Note Verbale of IOctober
1956 (Annex 33) and as had been accepted by Israel in the Note
Verbale of 9 November 19j6 (Annes 34). In this connection Mr. Nall
stressed that .throughout the conversations which had taken place
in the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry since the disaster, the Bulgarian

officiais had continuously pleaded the necessity to refer the issues
discussed ta "higher authorities". While the Director of the Second
Department explained that the problem was considered by the
Minister, the latter said that he had to bring it to the consideration
of the Government. When Mr. Nall wished ta see the Minister
again, he was once more referred to the Director of the Second
Department. Such a process had been repeated several times.
Mr. Nall enquired specifically:
(1) Was the Bulgarian Government still willing to honour its
promise contained in the Note Verbale of 4 August 1955(Annex 17) ;
(2) Was the Bulgarian Government still maintaining its proposal

-contained in the Note Verbale of I October 19j6 (Annex 33)-
regarding the settlement of the claim through the diplomatic
channels ;76 MEJ~ORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)

(3) \Iras it the intention of the Bulgarian Government to settle
the claim promptly, having regard to the fact that a year and eight
months had already passed since the tragic disaster?
When Nr. Tarabauov objected that the Israel Government was

ignoring that paragraph in the Bulgarian Note Verbale of 4 August
1955 (Annex 17). which stated that the aircraft had entered Bul-
garian airspace withoiit authorization and without any warning,
Mr. Nall ohserved that in three sub-paragraphs of that Note Verbale
the Government of Bulgaria had expressed its regrets for the
catastrophe, apologized for the haste displayed by its forces, and
had explained the circumstances in which the catastrophe had
occurred; and in the operative paragraph had expressed its willing-
ness to pay compensation. filr. Tarabanov then confirmed that the
Government of Bulgaria still recognized its responsibility. but it had
come to the conclusion that the Company bore a substantial part
of the responsibility. Although the Bulgarian Government did not
insist on prior conditions for the holding of direct talks, Israel
would have to aurait the Bulgarian reply before such talks could be

held. Furthermore, since the Israel Government had rejected the
Bulgarian suggestion that it should represent al1 the claimants,
regardless of their nationality, the Government of Bulgaria had to
decide \%rithwhom the talks should be held.
49. On 12 April 1957 a meeting took place between $Ir. Na11and
Mr. Lukanov, the Foreign Minister, and an exhaustive discussion
of the position of both parties took place.

(i) Since the meeting of 26 December 1gj6 (paragraph 46 above)
almost four months had elapsed, with no progress. Asked for the
reason for this procrastination, Mr. Lukanov made the following
points:
(a) The Bulgarian Governmental Commission had found that
the behaviour of the Israel aircraft indicated an intentional
deviation, and therefore the Government of Bulgaria had reached

the conclusion that 4X-AKC bore responsibility.
(b) The fact that the Government of Bulgaria considered the
conduct of the Bulgarian Defence Forces as negligent, involved
the responsibility of the persons concerned towards the Govern-
ment of Bulgaria. However, this responsibility of the servants
of the Government of Bulgaria towards their own Government
did not involve an automatic and unqualified responsibility of
the Government of Bulgaria towards a third party. A third party
could uot rely on the responsibility of the persons concerned,
since that was an interna1 matter of Bulgaria.

(c) RIoreovcr, also because of political considerations the Govern-
ment of Bulgaria could not recognize its exclusive responsibility
for the catastrophe. Should the Governrnent of Bulgaria accept
the view of the Government of Israel on this matter, the result MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 77
would follow that countries hostile to Bulgaria would find a
legal justification for their illegal activities against Bulgaria,
such as border violations, the dropping of leaflets, and similar

activities.
(d) The Government of Bulgaria was offended by the "frontal
attack" of the claimant Governmcnts on Bulgaria. Such an
attack \vas unjustifiable also from the humanitarian aspect, since
the claimant Governments could compensate the claimants
through insurance companies.

For al1 these reasons the Government of Bulgaria could not agree
to hold a meeting between representatives of Bulgaria and Israel
before the latter became convinced of the responsibility of the
Company for the incident. The rigid position taken by the Govern-
ment of Israel was an additional reason for the delay. As long as
Israel nas not convinced that it must bear a substantial part of
the responsibility, the Government of Bulgaria would have diffi-
culty in replying tothe Note Verbale o9November 1956(Annex 34).

(ii) In the discussion, Mr. NaIl made the following points:
(a) The Government of Israel was not in a position to make any
observations on the findings of the Bulgarian Governmental
Commission, since no copy of its report had been furnished it and
the members of the Israel Commission of Inquiry were neither
allowed to CO-operate with the Bulgarian Governmental Com-
mission, nor to observe the latter's activities. The Government

of Israel understood the three sub-paragraphs of the Bulgarian
Note Verbale of 4 August 1955 (Annex 17) as an explanation
of the conduct of the Bulgarian Defence Forces, but no1 as an
attempt to justify that conduct. Those paragraphs appeared as
an expression-on the part of a nation again applying to be
admitted to the United Nations-of sincere regret and as an
explanation of the circumstances of the catastrophe, but not as
an attempt to evade responsibility for it. Furthermore, in that
Note Verbale, the Government of Bulgaria had undertaken to
identify and punish the perçons responsible for the disaster and
to take the necessary steps to prevent the recurrence of similar
catastrophes, and to pay compensation for the losses suffered.

(b) The present attitude of the Bulgarian Government amounted
to a complete reversal of its position as stated in the Note
Verbale of 4 August 1955. To regard the negligence of the sub-
ordinates as involving solely the latters' responsibility towards
their own Government, and as a purely interna1 matter distinct
from the responsibility of the Government of Bulgaria vis-à-vis
a third party, was a refusa1 to stand by the promise made on
4 August 1955.

(c) The argument based upon arrangements with insurance com-
panies was incomprehensible and completely irrelevant. Such78 MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)

arrangements, if any, existed between the Company or any other
assured and insurers on a purely contractual basis, and none of
the Govemments concerned was a party to any such arrangements.
In reply to a question by Mr. Lukanov, Mr. Na11explained that
there was no automatic insurance of the passengers.
(d) Regardless of how the Bulgarian officials might have defined
their conditions for the holding of talks between the parties,
their latest attitude requesting prior recognition by Israel of
the responsibility of 4x-AKCconstituted, in fact, a prior condition

to the holding of the talks.
Referring to the Bulgarian Note Verbale of I October 1956 (Annex
33). Mr. Na11regretted that the Bulgarian Government, by expres-
sing the view that the talks then proposed by it could be held only
after recognition by Israel of responsibility, and hy justifying its

attitude on political grounds, had thought it proper to turn a
legal claim into a political argument. If 4x-AKChad violated the
Bulgarian airspace, such violation did not have any political
implications. He enquired whether he was to inform his Govern-
ment that the Government of Bulgaria was still'willing to keep the
promise of 4 August 1955 (Annex 17) and to convene a.meeting of
the two parties as proposed on I October 1956 (Annex 33). This
was understood as a meeting in which al1 outstanding questions
could be discussed, without prejudice ta the rights or position of
either party. Mr. Lukanov replied in the affirmative, stressing that
the Bulgarian answer to the Israel Note Verbale of 9 November
1956 (Annex 34) had been delayed, and might be further delayed,
until the Israel Government was convinced that it must recognize
its responsibility for the catastrophe.

50. No reply having been received to the Note Verbale of
gNovember 1956 (Annex 34). on 23 May 1957 another meeting was
requested by Mr. Na11 with the Deputy Foreign Minister. Mr.
Tarabanov repeated that the Company, and not the Government
of Bulgaria, was responsible for the catastrophe. Israel's inter-
pretation of the Bulgarian Note Verbale of 4 August 1955 (Annex
17) was erroneous. That Note did not deal at al1with the question

of the responsibility of Bulgaria, and certainly not with ber
exclusive responsibility. As long as Israel insisted on her position,
as expressed in the Note Verbale of 9 November 1956 (Annex 34).
there was no common basis for the meeting between the two States
and, therefore, the proposa1 for a meeting between the parties,
contained in the Note Verbale of I Octoher 1956 (Annex 33). was
no longer relevant. Bulgaria was not going back on her offer to
compensate the families of the victims, but that was an offer to
make an ex gratia payment and not legal compensation.

51. On rg July Mr. Na11 was received by Mr. Angelov, the
Deputy Foreign Minister, at the latter's invitation. Mr. Angelov MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 79
made the following proposals in the name of the Government of

Bulgaria:
(a) Without recognizing any responsibility on its part, the Bul-
garian Government was offering compensation in the sum of
56,000 transferable levas 1 for the death of each victim of the
disaster. In this way Bulgaria proposed to settle the case and to
resume her traditionally friendly relations with Israel.

(6) If both Israel claimants and claimants of other nationalities
were injured by the death of the same person, they must make the
necessary arrangements for the distribution between themselves
of the above sum.
(c) Since Bulgaria did not recognize any responsibility on her part,
and considered the Company to be exclusively responsible for

the disaster, the latter's claim was rejected in toto.
The Bulgarian Government was making these proposals despite its
previous basic view that Israel must recognize her responsibility.

Similar proposals were being made to other interested Govern-
ments. Asked by Mr. Nall whether, in view of the great difference
between the sum of the Israel claim and the Bulgarian offer, the
Bulgarian Government would agree to hold a meeting between the
two parties, Mr. Angelov replied that he could not go beyond his
instructions. He explained the difference between the sum claimed
and the sum offered on the ground that Bulgaria could not accept
the various particulars of the claims, since principles of inter-
national law were not applicable to the case, and the responsibility
of the Government of Bulgaria was not involved. The offer of the

Bulgarian Government was not a withdrawal of the assurances
contained in the Note Verbale of 4 August 1955 (Annex 17). The
undertaking to pay compensation for the material damages,
contained in that Note Verbale, could not be construed as ac- .
ceptance of an obligation to pay compensation for the loss of the
aircraft; the expression "material damages" referred to damages
for the loss of baggage and freight, and this had heen taken into
account in the sum offered. The position of the Government of
Bulgaria being that it was not responsible for the catastrophe, it

had insisted, in the previous discussions, on Israel's prior recog-
nition of the responsibility of 4x-AKCas a condition to Bulgaria's
agreeing to any settlement of the claim. But since it was the desire
of Bulgaria to make a contribution towards the settlement of the
case, the Bulgarian Government would no longer insist absolutely
on such prior recognition. In view of the present offer, Rlr. Angelov
could not go beyond his instructions and discuss the possibility
of holding the meeting proposed in the Note Verbale of I October
1956 (Annex 33). Mr. NaU thereupon informed Mr. Angelov that

Thissum umounts to88284 at the rate of 6levaper dollar, the rate which
itwas understood was contemplated by the GovernmoftBulgaria.80 hlE~1ORIALOF lSRAEL (2 VI58)
although he could not reply to the Bdganan proposal without
instructions from Jerusalem, it seemed to him extremely doubtful
whether the offer could he considered seriously by the Government

of Israel.
52. On 27 .4ugust 1957 the Israel Legation in Sofia delivered
the Israel Note Verbale of that date (Annex 35). reiterating the
request for negotiations as soon as possible between the delegations
of the two States witha view to settling the case. Nr. Na11cxplained
that although the Iatrst Bulgarian offer was a step forward in
comparison with the complete deadlock which had existed yrevi-
ously, the Government of Israel could not regard that offer as
satisfactory, and thought further negotiations, without any prior
conditions, essential for the settlement of the case. In reply,
Mr. Zivkov. a Deputy Foreign Minister, reiterated the Bulgarian

position regarding the responsibility of the Company. He asked
for the addresses of the families of the 58 victims of the disaster
in order to enable the Bulgarian Government to contact these
families with a view to settlingtheir claims directly with them.This
was refused by Mr. Nall, who said that the interests of lsrael
nationals would, as in the past, continue to be represented by the
Government of Israel.
53. On 6September, Mr. Nall \vas invited to a further interview
with Mr. Tarabanov. Referring to the Israel Xote Verbale of 27
August 1957 (Annex 35). Mr. Tarabanov stated that the Bulgarian
Government could not appoint a delegation, as requested in that

Note, but that it would be willing to hear-through diplomatic
channels-the "grievances" of the Government of Israel. ln this
way the Bulgarian Government \Iras reiterating "as always" its
proposal of I October 1956. The Government of Bulgaria was
agreeable that the talks should take place immediately with
Mr. Nd, and should the Government of Israel \vish to send some
experts to assist hlr. Xall, he did not think that the Government
of Bulgaria would raise any objection. In order to reach iinder-
standing, it \vasnecessary that a common agreed basis for discussion
should exist, and he intimated that the Government of Israel must
acct:pr tlic I5iilg:irianview regarclin;. r~yoii>il~ilit\.r~fth,: Crinipan)
for rhe di.$nsier. \Ir. Tarabano\, ~xi>re$tilisrczrtli:ittie C;<q\.crn-
ment of Israel was not willing'to represeny al1 the claimants,
regardless of their nationality.

54. The Israel Government's reply to this suggestion was
conveyed orally by MI. Na11to Mr. Zivkov, on 13 September 1957.
The Govemment of Israel \vas not interested in expressing "grie-
vances"-as proposed by Alr. Tarabanov-but was agreeable to a
meeting between representatives of the t\vo States. Such meeting
could take place in any form whatsoever, provided that its object
was exclusively to reach a reasonable compromise between the
parties and thus to settle the case. Mr. Zivkov said that the position MEMORIALOF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 81
of the Government of Bulgaria \vas that since, in its vie\\., it \vas
not responsible for the catastrophe, and since there was no reason

ahy this position should be changed, its humanitarian approach
remained the only basis for a solution. The siim offered was cal-
culated in the light of "certain treaties"'.There was no reason for a
mecting of delegations, urhether forma1 or informal. The Govern-
ment of Bulgaria was prepared ta consider, through diplomatic
channels, certain technical questions, e.g. what State was entitled
to represent a given claimant. The claim of the Company could not
be considered a technical question and the Government of Bulgaria
was not prepared to meet it. The Government of Bulgaria disputed

the Israel interpretation of the Bulgarian Xote Verbale of 4 August
195j (Annex 17). In its view, that Xote Verbale did not constitute
any acceptance of responsibility. Its last paragraph referred to a
sum which, in the abscnce of any accord between Bulgaria and
Israel, would be determined solely by the Bulgarian Government.
Compensation for material damages meant compensation for the
luggage of the passengers. By crossing the Bulgarian frontier the
aircraft became responsible for the consequences. The haste dis-
played by Bulgarian Security 170rcesexplained regrettable circum-
stanccs, and was the basis for the humanitarian approach of the

Bulgarian Government to the settlement of the claim, but not of
its legal responsibility. Bir. Nall replied rnaintaining his position
on that Xote Verbale. Having rcgard to the present position of the
Government of Bulgaria, which differed from that maintailied in
August rgj5, he would have to advise his Goveriiment that tliere
\'as no chance of holding a meeting in order to settle the case.

55. On 23 Çeptember 1957 hlr. NaIl reported a further conver-
sation, in which a Bulgarian official had indicated that there could
he no change in the Bulgarian position regarding the proposed
meeting. The Bulgarian Government would not reconsider its
offer of compensation and would not accept the claim of the Com-
pany since, in its view, the Company \$>asresponsible for the cata-
strophe. Although not prepared to consider the whole casc, it was
prepared to examinc with the Government of Israel various tech-
nical questions, such as: whether al1the individual claimants were

properly reprcsented; ancl questions regarding the currency, the
period of time, and form, of the compensation. hfr. Xall replied by
referring to a statement which had been issued by a spokesman
of the Foreign hlinistry in Jerusalem on 5 August 1957, intimating
that the latest Biilgarian offer regarding compensation uZascom-
pletely unreasonable and unacceptable to the Government of

1 Thisreferencto "certain treaties" is not clear, Governrnent oIsrael
assumes that what the GovernmentofUulgaria had in mind was the Convention
signed at \Varsaoniz October igzq (837 Leagof FationTreaty Serieç, p. r?)..4ir.
As explained ipara.ioo l~elow. this Convention is completely irrelcvant in the
prrsrnt case.s2 MEDIORIALOF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)
Israel since it was obviously aimed at relieving Bulgana of al1
responsibility. The technical questions could only be discussed
after a general agreement in pnnciple had been reached, and the
latest Bulgarian attitude was, so to speak, putting the cart before
the horse.

56. The course of the diplomatic correspondence and the lengthy
and to a large extent repetitive discussions described in this Section
of this Part of this Memorial, show a continuous and progressive
retreat on the part of the Bulgarian Government from a willing-
ness to accept the consequences of its actions, which characterizes
its Notes Verbales and Communiqués of July and August 1955 ,o
an absolute refusal to recognize any consequence therefor, as
became apparent by the middle of 1957. This progressive change
in the attitude of the Bulgarian Government has found expression
in procrastination, and in attempts to interpret away the plain
language of its own communications. The facts show that Bulgaria
is responsible for the disaster. The consequences of that responsi-
bility cannot be determined by any unilateral interpretation given
by the Bulgarian Government to its own communications. That
Government's extraordinarily unyielding and unjustified manner
of dealing with the claim put fonvard in the Note Verbaie of 14
February 1956 (Annex 31) has led to a deadlock in the negotiations

between the two Governments. In these circumstances, it appearing
that there was no alternative but to regard further diplomatic
negotiations as useless, and that nothing beyond additional
procrastination could be anticipated from the Bulganan Govern-
ment, the Government of Israel, on 16 October 1957. filed in the
Registry of the Court its Application instituting Proceedings
against Bulgana in this case. On that date a copy of the Application
was also handed to the representative of the Bulganan Legation
in Israel. Announcing this step, the spokesman of the Ministry for
Foreign Aflairs indicated that the institution of the proceedings
should not be regarded as an obstacle to a settlement out of Court,
through diplomatic negotiations, should the Bulgarian Government
be willing for such a settlement. This was repeated by the Minister
for Foreign Affairs in the Knesset (the Israel Parliament) on IO
December 1957.However, no response whatsoever has been received
from the Respondent Government.
-
57. In concluding this Part of this Memorial, the attention of
the Court is invited to the fact that nothing in the diplomatic
negotiations following the presentation of the Israel claim in
February 1956 throws any additionai light on the destruction of
~X-.+KC or, therefore, affects the question raised in this case,
namely, that of Bulgarian responsibility therefor. The circum-
stances in which 4x-AKCwas destroyed are explained in the Bul-
garian statements of July and August 19j5 sufficiently to engage
Bulgarian responsibility. Part II. THE REASONS IN LAW

Section 1.-The ResPonsibility oj Bulgaria

(a) Introduction. The ApfilicableLaw
58. The first, and principal, petition of the Application insti-
tuting Proceedings requests the Court to adjudge and declare "that
the People's Repnblic of Bulgaria is responsible under international
law for the destruction of the Israel aircraft 4x-AKCo27 Juiy 1955
and for the loss of life and property and aU other damage that
resulted therefrom". Since units of the Bulgarian armed forces
opened fire on 4x-AKC and completely destroyed it and every

human being on board, and in the light of the admissions made by
the Bulgarian Government, the Government of Israel is requesting
and by this petition requests the Court to make ageneral declaration
that under international law Bulgaria bears the responsibility for
the destruction of the aircraft and for the consequent loss of life
and other damage. The consequences of such responsibility are not
limited only to Israel: they are a matter for individual appreciation
by the Government of any other State which suffered injury as a
result of the Bulgarian action. In so far as concerns Israel, the
question of the reparation claimable by Israel-not limited only
to pecuniary reparation-is raised in the second petition of the
Application instituting Proceedings and is discussed in Section II
of this Part of this Memorial.

59. The Government of Israel accepts the position that, since
Bulgaria is not a party to the Convention ou International Civil
Aviation, signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944 (Annex IO),
that country is not contractually bound by the provisions of that
Convention or by the various international Standards and Prac-
tices ivhich have been elaborated hy the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization in the 15 Annexes which have been promulgated
and published by that Organization'. From this it followsthat the
legal position of the parties inter se is determined by the rules of
general international law. At the same time the Government of
Israel will contend that, to the extent that the Chicago Convention
restates the rules of general international law, that Convention
may be relied upon in the present case; and inasmuch as the

Convention and its Annexes contain recommendations regarding
standard international practices, the failure of the Bulgarian
Government to observe those standard international practices, or
alternatively (as is stipulated in the Convention itself) to ensure
that its own different practices are adequately conveyed to al1
foreign Govemments (including the Government of Israel), must be
See footnote on page 50 above.84 MEIIORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)
taken into consideration in determining the compatibility of
Bulgarian actions with general international law. The Chicago
Convention and its Annexes are, therefore, to the extent that they
restate the general law, employed to illustrate the appropriate

rules of international law and as a mcans for the determination
of the international standards to be obscrvcd in matters concerning
international civil aviation and especially in matters concerning
the physical safety of civil aircraft and their occupants. As statcd
in paragraph 29 (b) above, the Bulgarian authorities at least knew
tliat the aircraft, even when unidentified hy tliem, \vas a foreign
one of unknoivn origin, and for that reason they were ab initio
ohliged ta comport themselves, in their relations with that aircraft,
in accordance with the general rules of international law and
standard international practices.

(b) The Basis of BzdgariattResPonsibility

60. In this pctition the Govërnment of Israel is asking the Court
to hold that in the circumstances the opening of fire on 4x-AKC
on 27 July 1955 by units of the Bulgarian armed forces, resulting
in the complete destruction of 4~-AKC,constitutes a violation of
international law. The degree of violence used \vas quite out of
proportion ta any possible threat ta Uulgaria which 4x-AKCmay
have presented, even according ta the Biilgarian account set forth

in the Note Verbale of 4 August 19jj (Annex 17). An excess of
force is reprehensible in itself and woiild be so even without the
admission by the Bulgarian Government that in so acting its
armed forces had manifested haste (and what that Iiaste was is
uniinportant) aiid had iiot taken al1measures necessary ta constrain
the aircraftto land (andit is unimportant precisely what necessary
measure was omitted). That being so, the opening of fire on 4x-AKC
was in brcach of international law, and Bulgaria is accordingly
obligcd to make reparation therefor.
61. The basis of this contention is the rule that when measures
of force are employed to protect territorial sovereignty, nhether

on land, on sea or in the air, their employment is subject to the
duty to take into consideration the elementary obligations of
humanity, and not ta use a degree of force in excess of what is
commensurate with the reality and the gravity of the threat
(if any). In al1 systems of law, including international law, this is
the test for measuring the degree of violence ivhich may justifiably
be used ta protect rights recognized by the law, and particularly
the degrcc of violence used when performing acts by their very
nature dangerous. In the Corfz~Channel case the Court relied on
this principle as a hasis for the international responsibility of
Albania when minefields laid in Albanian territorial waters consti-
tuting an international strait caused damage to units of the Royal
Navy and death to members of its military personnel. The Court was merely applying an already existing principle of international
law to the particular circumstances of that case.

62. The Government of Israel is now contending that the same
principle is fully applicable to the present case, where fighter air-
craft, with their modern powerful armament, opened fire on and
destroyed a defenceless civilian aircraft, in time of peace and of
manifest relaxation of international tension, that civilian aircraft
openly displaying its owners' name and the colours and identifi-
cation letters of a friendly State and flying in a perfectly normal
manner. The circumstances of this case may well be almost (but
not entirely) unprecedented- and fortunately so. That does not
mean that international law is so lacking in underlying general
principles as not to be able to meet the situation thus presented to
it. Flying has inherent dangers of which every intelligent person,
and certainly the pilots of fighter aircraft and those who give them

their orders, are or ought to he fully aware. It is, therefore, the duty
of any person who seeks to interfere with the normal flying of a
civil aircraft-whether by ordering it to land at a designated air-
field or by ordering it to depart from an area prohibited to it-not
deliberately and unreasonably to increase those inherent risks, and
certainly not to provoke completely neurand unanticipatcd hazards
inevitable when modern armaments are intentionally brought
into play. The Bulgarian admissions clearly disclose that this duty
was not discharged.

63. The heart of the present case is that fire uras opened on
4"-AKCwhich, in the space of a few minutes, was callously clawed
out,of the sky and destroyed, with the death of fifty-eightinnocent
human beings. The contention of the Government of Israel is that
no rule of law, and not the most stringent interpretation of any

provision of the Chicago Convention (Annex IO) or of the rules of
general international law to which it gives expression, permits
such a degree of violence. The Government of Israel seeks from the
Court a clear decision on this basic issue which goes to the root of
the whole of the contemporary law of the air and the security of
air travel. Moreover, in the light of the circumstances of this case
the Government of Israel contends that this can easily be decided
without the necessity for entanglement in matters of detail which
can only obscure, and unnecessari- so. the real issue. III the
circumstances of this case there is seen to be no relevance whatso-
ever in such questions as where, when or how 4x-AKC came to enter
Bulgarian airspace, or in what respect the action of the Bulgarian
armed forces in opening fire on it was precipitate, ill-considered and
punishable, as the Bulgarian Government has said was the case.
The careless opening of fire on this aircraft was by its very nature so
dangerous an act that a basic principle of international law was

therehy infrjnged. Bulgaria, the State the organs of which so acted,86 MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)
hears exclusive international responsibility for the damage which
ensued.

64. In putting fonvard these contentions the Government of
Israel wishes to emphasize that the responsibility of Bulgana
derives from the very act of the Bulgarian armed forces. That act
speaks for itself, and having regard to the admissions made by the
Government of Bulgaria. the Government of Israel is contending
that this responsibility is established and can he sustained without
assertions or assumptions or findings of a pejorative character
about the individual members of the Bulgarian armed forces and
their conduct. At the same time, the undertaking given by the
Bulgarian Govemment that it would identify and punish those
responsible indicates that in the view of the Bulgarian Govemment
an element of culpahility attaches to the hehaviour of those indi-

viduals. The Govemment of Israel shares this vie\\..
65. In advancing the argument contained in the preceding
paragraphs, it is not being contended that if a violation of Bulgarian
airspace had occurred, the Bulgarian Government \vas not entitled
to take steps, provided they would not offend the principle main-
tained in the preceding paragraphs, to protect its sovereignty. This
is fully recognized in the general principles of international law
governing the territorial airspace and is repeated in the Convention
on International Civil Aviation (Annex IO).Article I of that Con-
vention postulates the rule, which underlies the whole of the modern

international public law of the air, that every State has complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
This obviously means that that "complete and exclusive sover-
cignty" may be protected hy appropriate means. Article 6 of the
Convention states that no scheduled international air service may
be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State,
except with the special permission or other authorization of that
State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or
authorization. A fortiori this rule applies in the case of Bulgaria,
which was not a party to the Convention. It is recognized that
neitlier the Company nor any other Israel airline was entitled to
operate a scheduled international air service over or into Bulgarian
territory Save with the special permission or other authorization
of Bulgaria; and no such special permission or other authorization

had been granted. But that is not the end of the matter. There is
obviously considerahle difference between operating a scheduled
international air service over or into Bulgaria, and innocently
overflying a stretch of Bulgarian territory. This type of infringe-
ment of territorial airspace is not uncommon, and at times may be
unavoidable. It ought never to he opposed hy such a dispro-
portionate degree of violence as was employed in this case.
66. When a State party to the Chicago Convention in time, of
peace encounters instances of an infringement of its airspace, such ~IE>IORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) S7
as the intrusion of international scheduled air services contrary to
Article 6,or intrusion of any aircraft into a duly established pro-
hibited area contrary to Article 9 of the Convention, it normally
reacts in one or both of two \vays. In the tirst place, if this is physi-
cally possible, it indicates to the aircraft in the appropriate manner,
and without causing an uiidue degree of physical danger to the

aircraft and its occupants, that it is performing some unauthorized
act. In taking this action that State may also, always exercising
due care. require the intruder either to bring the intrusion to an
end (Le. to return to its authorized position, mithin or without the
airspace of the State in question), orto submit itself to examination
after landing, at aplace, in theterritory ofthe State inquestion, duly,
properly and effectively indicated to it in the appropriate manner.
In the second place, and subsequently, it may deal with the infringe-
ment of its sovereignty by making the appropriate démarche
through the diplomatic channel. This practice has always been
recognized by Bulgaria, as is mentioned in the Note Verbale of
4 August 1955 (Annex 17) and as is discussed more fully in para-
graphs 84 to 86 below. This common practice is the only one which
can reconcile the right of a State to protect its sovereignty when
this is being unintentionally infringed with the undoubted duty
of every State not unnecessarily to endanger the lives of persons
\\.ho, in the words of the Bulgarian Note Verbale of4 August 1955.
are, in the nature of things, "complètement innocentes". The
opening of fire upon an unarmed civil aircraft in the circumstances

of this case, whether or not the aircraft \vas warned, or was warned
adequately, and whether or not it is true that, as alleged by the
Bulgarian Government, it was thought to be attempting to escape
over the border, is an action which itself calls for the most energetic
protest: and when that opening of fire results in the outright
destruction of the aircraft and the deaths of fifty-eight innocent
persons, a clear case of international responsibility exists.
67. From the outset the Bulgarian Government has madr grcat
play of the fact that its sovereignty was violated by the penetration
of qx-AKCinto Bulgarian airspace. The Government of lsrael does
not contest that if Bulgarian sovereignty was violated, then the
Bulgarian Government was entitled to take appropriate action

(such as is described in the previous paragraph) and if damage and
loss were caused to it by that infraction of its sovereignty, then the
Bulgarian Government is entitled to prefer an appropriate daim
for satisfaction or reparation. Although the aircraft was not an
organ of the State of Israel, the Government of lsrael would have
thought that paragraph 5 of the Note Verbale of 14 February 1956
(Annex 31) constituted adequate satisfaction to the Bulgarian
Government. which has made no claim whatsoever for pecuniary
reparation. However, if the Bulgarian Government has another
opinion, the Statute and Kules of Court contain sufficient provisions
to enable il to put its claim to judicial test, in the present proceed-88 AlE>IORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)

ings or othenvise. The Government of Israel emphatically denies
the right of the Government of Bulgaria itself to determine arbi-
trarily that because Bulgarian sovereignty may have been infringed
by 4x-AKC,the Company, as owners of the aircraft, and not the

Bulgarian Government, has to bear the responsibility for the losses
caused by the destruction of 4x-.~Kc,and that in conscquence the
Bulgarian Government is under no international duties whatso-
ever in the matter but is free to act on an e.x gratin basis exclusively.
Such a vieuxhas no justification.

68. The various Bulgarian statements of July and August 195j
taken together have another consequence. They place in correct
perspective the fact of the interception of 4x-AKCby the Bulgarian
fighters. The Bulgarian Government has given no information
whatsoever as to the prccise momcnt at which the Bulgarian

authorities, whether from the ground or from the air, came into
direct contact, visual or aurai, with 4x-AKC. However, they do
disclose that such contact, in their view at least (andtheallegations
in that regard are not admitted), took place, and that it \vas not a
momentary or instantaneous contact, but one which lasted for
quite a long time. The moment of such contact (whenever it occurred)
is, therefore, the moment at which ~X-AKC \vas intercepted. Bul-

garian responsibility began to be engaged from that moment. After
interception the organs of the Bulgarian State which were concerned
with the interception were under the legal duty of comporting
themselves in such a manner as would not cause unnecessary
danger to 4X-AKCand its occupants. It is stating the obvious to say
that opening fire, before the foreign aircraft had heen identified,
whether or not in haste, and whether or not without taking neces-

sary measures, makes it impossible to Say that the organs of the
Bulgarian State, which so acted, were, or could have been, comport-
ing themselves properly and with that degree of care and ski11
which is required of them and for which they are or ought to have
been trained, and which any intercepted aircraft, whether or not
it \vas au7arethat it had been intercepted, was therefore entitled to

expect. Keeping in mind the general legal requirements for
reasonableness, whenever armed force is being used to protect
sovereignty in circumstances of this character, the Government of
Israel is urging the Court to hold that there can be no justification
whatsoever for the fact that after the Bulgarian authonties had
intercepted 4x-AKC(and according to one variant of the story of
the Bulgarian Government. ~XTAKC flew over no less than zoo kms.

of Bulgarian territory in the hours of daylight), they failed to
identifylit as a well-known and distinctive type of civil aircraft
' It may be noted that identificatneed iiot neçessarily habeen visual or
obtvinedby radio contact with the aircraft itself. There is haveprevented
the Bulgarian ûuthoritiçfroin having enquiied of the appropriateAir Traflic
Control whether a civiliaaircraftwas flying orwas intending to flybetween
Belgrade and Saloiiiki at that time. ~~EAIORIALOF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 89
belonging to a friendly State. The Government of Israel will go
further and argue that in normal times there can be no legal justifi-
cation for haste and inadequate measures after interception of,
and for the opening of fire on, a foreign civil aircraft, clearly marked

assuch.
69. Considered in this light there can be little legal interest in
the precise circumstances in which the organs of the Bulgarian
State intercepted 4x-AKC.The Bulgarian Government has been
arguing that 4x-AKCdid not obey instructions given to it. However,
this is no more than the interpretation placed by the Bulgarian
Government on what itthinks was the reaction of 4x-AKCafter it

had beeii intercepted.
70. In attempted justification of its action the Bulgarian Govern-
ment has asserted, in the Note Verbale of 4 August Igjj (Annex 17),
that 4x-AKCwas equipped with the most modern aerial navigating
instruments and could not have failed to be aware of the fact that
it had violated Bulgarian airspace. The Israel Government has no
reason for disagreeing with the assertion that qx-~xc was fitted
with the (then) most modern aerial navigating instruments, as

indeed are specified more closely in Sections Il1 and VI11 of the
Report of the Israel Commission of Inquiry. It goes further and
admits that when 4x-AKCleft Vienna, those instruments are to be
assumed to have been serviceable. It does not follow, however,
that they were serviceable at any later period, and this is, there-
fore, not admitted. There is no evidence on this point and if any
did exist, it has been withheld by the Bulgarian Government.
The removal by the Bulgarian authorities of parts of the air-
craft wreckage before the arriva1 of the three members of the Israel
Commissionof Inquiry, as is reported in Section VI11and Appendix
D of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the one hand, and
on the other (1)the failure of the Bulgarian authorities to permit
the Israel Commission of Inquiry as a whole to pursue its exami-
nation of the wreckage of 4x-AKC,(2) the refusai of the Bulgarian

authorities to permit even the most minimal amount of CO-operation
between the Israel Commission of Inquiry and the Bulgarian
Governmental Commission, and (3) the failure of the Bulgarian
Government to make available more than the mere conclusions of
its Commission, and to return to Israel any part of the wreckage of
4x-AKC,have deprived the Israel Government of any evidence
whatsoever which might have been obtained from the wreckage as
to the state of the aerial navigation instruments at the crucial
lime. The Government of Israel also does not admit the allegation
that the crew of the aircraft could not have failed to be aware of the
fact that they had penetrated the Bulgarian airspace. On the basis
of what is known regarding the weather conditions along airway
Amber IO,andthe difference between the forecast and actual winds
on the one hand, and taking full account of the radio communi-
Y %~E~~ORIALOF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)
90
cations from qx-AKC(Annex 27) on the other, the Government of
Israel is satisfied that the crew of qx-AKChelieved that they were on
airway Amher IO, had no reason to helieve that they had departed
from airway Amher IO and could not have known of their immediate
location at the critical period of time, and that there is nothing
ahnormal about this. In this connection it has to be repeated that

qx-AKCwas not shot down merely hecause it entered Bulgarian
airspace without previous authorization but, as appears in this
Memorial, for different reasons.
71. As has already been mentioned in another connection (in
paragraph 67 ahove), in the process of interpreting away the
admissions and undertakings given in July and August 1955, the
representatives of the Bulgarian Government have since put for-
ward the proposition that the very fact that qx-AKCcrossed into
Bulgarian airspace without previous authorization exonerates Bul-
garia from legal responsihility and, leaving her free to act on a basis

of humanity and ex gratia,transfers that responsibility to the
Company. A clear example of this is seen in the meeting in Sofia of
19 July 1957 descrihed in paragraph 51 above. The circumstances
in which the Bulgarian representatives thrust tbis argument into
a fairly prominent position, and the consequences whicb they drew
from it, suggest that it is an attempt tbuttress a politicalecision
hy the Bulgarian Government not to ahide by the admissions and
keep the undertakings which it gave in July and August 1955.
72. This attitude stands in open contradiction to the views of
the Bulgarian Government expressed at that time hoth in diplo-
matic communications to the Government of Israel and in various

public announcements. Furthemore, it fails to pay any attention
to or account for the categoricai admission hy the Bulgarian
Government that its armed forces opened fire on qx-AKCin haste
and without taking the necessary measures. On this ground alone
the argument is clearly unsustainable.
73. A close reading of the documents (Annexes 13, 14, 16 and
17) clearly discloses that in1955 the Bulgarian Government never
looked upon the alleged presence of 4x-AKCin the Bulgarian air-

space as having led toits destruction. In the Note Verbale of 28July,
it is stated that after an unidentificd aircraft had been sighted
by the anti-aeriai defence, it was several times warned to land, in
conformity with the international regulations. (The details of those
international regulations have nowhere been specified.) Only after
it had not responded to those warnings, the anti-aircraft defence
opened fire, and as a consequence of that action it was destroyed.
In the Communiqué of 28 July, somewhat different reasons are
given, but again the distinction between the two stages is clearly
indicated. In that Communiqué the statement that the aircraft
had several times been warned to land in conformity with the inter-
national regulations does not appear, but instead it is stated that >IE~IORIALOF ISRAEL (2VI j8) 9'
the Bulganan anti-aircraft defence could not identify it and, after
several warnings, opened fire as a result of which it was destroyed.

In the Communiqué of 3 August which, as indicated in para-
graph 26 above, is apparently identical with the conclusions
reached by the Bulgarian Governmental Commission, it is stated,
in the third conclusion:
rrLes avions de chasse voyant que l'avion perturbateur fait un
essaide s'enfuirpar la frontière,ont ouvert le feu, suite de quoi
l'aviona pris feuet ilest tombédansla régiondela villedeétritch..

Another, different, version is contained in the Note Verbale of
4 AuguSt 1955:
u Les chasseurs ont averti l'avion, conformémentauxrèglements
internationaux établis, d'atterrir. Malgréce fait, il ne s'est pas
soumis, mais a continué à voler vers le sud, essayant de s'enfuir
à travers la frontièrebulgaro-grecque.
Dans cescirconstances,lesdeux chasseursdes forcesde la défense
anti-aériennebulgare dans cette région,étonnés parla conduite de
l'avion, ont ouvert le feu, en raison de quoi, un peu plus tard, il a
pris feu et est tombé dansla régionde laville de Pétritch.
74. Unlike the Communiqué of 3 August, the Note Verbale
of 4 August introduces a new element, the state of mind of the
pilots of the Bulgarian fighter aircraft. The documents indicate
that these persons, being in a state of astonishment, gave a certain

interpretatjon to the actions of what to them was an unidentified
aircraft (though the actions themselves are not well specified), and
they go on to state that the Bulgarian anti-aircraft defeuce units
then manifested a certain haste and did not take al1 the steps
required to compel that unidentified aircraft to ohey them and
land. The implications are that had the Bulgarian fighter pilots and
other authorities not been in that state of mind, had they not acted
in haste, and had they not onlitted the necessary measures (what-
ever the. rnight have been), they would not have destroyed qx-AKC.
Such a state of mind, leading to such action on the part of the
Bulgarian authorities and armed forces, could not reasonably have
been foreseeu.

75. In fact the Bulgarian Government has gone much further
in dernonstrating that there is no causal connection between the
actions of 4x-AKC and the actions of the Bulgarian armed forces;
and that nothing done or left undone by the owners or crew of
4x-AKC led to the catastrophe. The action of opening fire was
accompanied, according to the statement contained in the Note
Verbale of 4 August 1955 (Annex 17). with two other features,
namely, the "certaine hâte" of which the Bulgarian armed forces
"ont fait preuve" and the non-taking of "toutes les mesures néces-
saires pour contraindre l'avion à se soumettre et à atterrir". The
action of opening fire was thus accompanied by at least one act
of commission and at least one act of omission, neither of which MEDIORIAL OF ISRAEL (2VI 58)
92
was provoked by any action whatsoever of 4x-AKC,but by the
fact that the unidentified aircraft appeared to the persons who
performed such acts of commission or of omission to be doing, or
about to do, something which they had express or implied orders

to prevent. This is fully supported by other statements made in
1955 by the Bulgarian authorities. For instance, the undertaking to
identify and punish the culpable persons-with its use of the sugges-
tive words "punir" and "coupables"-given in response todemands
to that effect (see paragraph 19 above) establishes (a) the element
of punishability in the actions of individual members of the Bul-
garian arrned forces, and (b) the recognition of a legitimate inter-
national interest in the question of the identity, and eventual
punishment, of the persons concerned. In this connection, the
Government of Israel considers it desirable to state that this
element of punishability does not iiecessarily have to be identified
with criminality in the sense of municipal criminal law. It is
conceivable that the actions were punishable under a code of
military discipline in a manner not involving the criminal respon-
sibility of the individuals concerned as normally understood. This,

however, is a rnatter of detail which is not relevant to the question
here being discussed. The point is that there was no abstract
requirement on the part of the Bulgarian Government specifically
to discuss the aspect of punishability, and the recognition in an
international ilocurnent that the action was punisbahle has obvious
implications for the questions of causality and of international
responsibility.

76. Somewhat similar considerations apply to two other aspects
of the Note Verbale of 4 August 1955 (Annex 17). The first is the
undertaking of the Bulgarian Government to take "toutes les
mesures nécessaires" (an interesting repetition!) to prevent like
catastrophes in the future.If the "catastrophe" or "grand malheur"
(asit is also dcnominated) which befell 4x-AKC was caused by a

legitimate act of sovereiguty, justifiable under international law,
then this statement would not only be unnecessary, but it would be
misleading and possibly prejudicial tothe maintenance of Bulgarian
sovereignty, which the Bulgarian Government had shown itself
so zealous to uphold. But such an undertaking is fully consistent-
indeed only consistent-with the view that the impugned actions
did constitnte a violation of the rights of other States and were
therefore contrary to international law. The second aspect is the
undertaking to pay compensation. Without here cntering upon
a detailed examination of that aspect, which appears also in the
Note Verbale of 28 July 1955 (Annex 14). it is sufficient to state
that any undertaking to pay compensation "due" implies recog-
nition of liability to pay that compensation: and recognition of that
liability in turn is consistent only with the view that the impugned
actions constituted a violation of international law. ME>IORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 93

77. In this way the conclusion is irresistihle that neither the
aileged presence of qx-AKCwithin Bulgarian airspace \vithout
previous authorization or notification, nor its alleged failure to
ohey wamings allegedly given it to land on some Bulgarian airfield,
nor its alleged attempt to escape over the border, caused its de-
struction bythe Bulgarian armed forces. Those features, if they are
correct (which is not adrnitted), may explain the interception of
4x-AKCby the Bulgarian armed forces. But they did not cause or
justify (a) the degrce of the violence used hy these armed forces,
(6)the precipitate use of that violence, i.e. the haste, (c) the in-
sufficiency of the measures (none of which could have heen reason-
ahly foreseen); nor do they accord with the undertakings of the
Bulgarian Government to identify and punish the culpahle persons

nor with its undertaking to pay compensation, nor \rith its further
undertaking to prevent any repetition of such a catastrophe.

78. To recapitulate, the essence of the legai argument advanced
in paragraphs 60 to 77 hereof as applied to the relevant facts is
that, in the light of those facts-and the most prominent of them
is that Bulgarian armed forces opened fire on 4x-AKCin haste and
without taking necessary measures-the Bulgarian State and its
organs failed to discharge the duties imposed upon them by inter-
national law. Accordingly the conclusion is reached, and it is so
suhmitted by the Government of Israel, that the responsihility of
Bulgaria under international law for the destruction of 4~-AKCand
for the loss of life and property andaliother damage that resulted
therefrom, is estahlished. If the Courî upholds this argument it
would hecome unnecessary for it to consider technical and complex

questions relating to such matters as the precise direction of the
flight of 4x-AKCfrom Belgrade onwards (concerning \\,hich see
paragraph 33 above).

79. In the course of the diplornatic phase of this case a number
of questions were raised such as (i) the existence and nature of the
waming allegedly given to qx-AKC;(ii) the reievance of previous
violations (not by Israel aircraft) of Bulgarian airspace; and (iii)
matters of proof and evidence. Since mention of these aspects
appears on the record (although not aiways with the requisite
degree of clarity), the Government of Israel believes that it \\,il1
assist the Court for it at this stage summarily to state its views on
them. At the same time the order in which these questions are
discussed is not intended to suggest that they stand in any parîicu-
lar order of precedence as "principal" and "subsidiary" or "aiter-

native" contentions and submissions. At the present stage of the
proceedings it is premature to attempt to arrange the various
issue-if they should be relevant to the decision in this case-in
any such order. Furthermore, pending a more adequate formulation
of the Bulgarian contentions and submissions, both on the relevance94 IIEIIORIAL OF ISRAEL (2VI 58)

of these matters and on their substance, such discussion can only
be of a provisional character.

(c) The Question of Warning
8o:The various Bulgarian statements make the point that
4x-AKCwas warned to land in accordance with the "règlements

internationaux" (Notes Verbales of 28 July 1955 and 4 August
1955) or "les signes établis par le Code International" (Communi-
quéof 3 August 1955)~and failed to obey that warning. Nothing to
support this allegation has ever been put forward by Bulgaria and
the allegation is denied. No indication has ever been given hy the
Bulgarian anthorities as to the time or nature of the alleged warn-
ings, or regarding the manner in which they were supposed to have
been given. The Government of Israel has no knowledge of the
"Règlements internationaux" or the "Code International" which
have been cited. In document AN-WP/I~I~ issued by the Inter-
national Civil -4viation Organization on 27 Fehruary 1957, being
Working Paper on Item Number 306, signals to be used in respect of
airspace restrictions, for the4irNavigation Commission (Annex 36),
particulars are given of a Bulgarian comment on the signals
applied when an aircraft is intercepted violating Bulgarian air-

space. Perusal of that document as a whole shows two things:
first, that there is no internationally established practice for dealing
with tbis eventuality; and second, that the Bulgarian practice
therein descrihed is apparently unique. The only possible standard
international practice which may exist on the matter is that
contained in the Rules of the Air, heing Annex 2 to the Convention
on International Civil Aviation, as follows:

"By day and by night, a seriesoprojectilesdischargedatintervals
ofIO seconds, each showing, on bursting, red and green lights or
restricted, prohibited or danger area, and that the aircraft is to take
such remedial action as may be necessary.

Note: These signals can be emitted either from the ground or
from another aircraft."

The existence of a particular Bulgarian practice in this regard was
first brought tothe notice of the Israel Government with the publi-
cation of document AN-WP11614 nearly two years after the
alleged wamings were given to 4x-AKC.
81. In order to constitute a warning, the signs orthe instructions
emanating from the Bulgarian authorities must be(a) adequate and
(b) intelligible and unmistakeably convey to those intended to be

their recipients what was the "remedial" action necessary. For
instance, a warning may have been merely conveying to the pilot
that he \vas in or near a prohibited area, and tben he would have
been fully justified in interpreting the signs made to him as indicat-96 MEIIORIAL OF ISRAEL (2VI 58)
The Note Verbale went on to state that the Government of Bul-
garia had protested on several occasioiis to the Secretariat of the
United Nations Organization, but \lithout result. Clearly this has
no bearing on Bulgarian responsibility for shooting down 4x-AKC.

At the same time the Govemment of Israel wishes to make certain
observations on this statement :
(i) In the first place the Bulgarian Government has never sug-
gested that Israel planes were involved in any of these incidents
and, in fact, no instance is known to the Government of Israel of
an). actual or alleged violation of Bulgarian airspace by any Israel
aircraft.
(ii) Secondly, regarding the statement that several protests had

been made by the Bulgarian Govemment to the Secretariat of the
United Nations Organization, it is correct that the Secretariat of
the United Nations has distributed, on several occasions, circular
letters, originating with the Bulganan Government, which referred
to violations of Bulgarian airspace. Copies of such circular letters
have been received by the Government of Israel (Annex 37). The
latest of these dates from 1953. In addition to these unpublished
Notes transmitted to the Secretanat of the United Nations for
circulation to al1Member States, some notifications of violation of
Bulgarian airspace were made by the Bulgarian Government to the
Balkans Sub-Commission of the Peace Observation Commission of
the United Nations and are recorded in United Nations documents
A/CN.~/SC.I/~ and A/CN.~/SC.I/~. Some of these Notes contain
protests and warnings to Greece by the Bulgarian Government but

there is no demand for any specific action beyond a request for
their circulation to Member States.
(iii) In addition to enquiring of the United Nations Secretariat
regarding the nature of the protests made to it by the Govemment
of Bulgaria, the Government of Israel thought it desirable to
enquire if the Secretariat of the International Civil Aviation Orga-
nization had been advised of these, or other, violations of Bulgarian
airspace. A negative answer has been received from that Organiza-
tion (Annex 38).

85. The Government of Israel contends that in the context of
the Note Verbale of 4 August 1955, these references to these viola-
tions of the Bulgarian airspace are open to the criticism that they
are tendentious and lack candour. All the incidents of which com-
plaint \\.asmade had occurred many years before the incident of
27 July 1955, and the last of them was not later than 1953. By far
the overwhelming majority of those complaints related to viola-
tions of the Bulgarian airspace by Greek aircraft, entering Bulga-
nan airspace from the Greek side of the frontier to the south.
Except for one instance of complaint of violation of Bulgarian air-
space by two multi-engined bombers, al1 the other complaiuts in

which the type of intruding aircraft was specified, spoke of single MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 97
or twin-engined planes, or fighter planes, or "reconnaissance" or

"pursuit" planes. It may also be observed that most of the viola-
tions complained of concerned low-altitude flights, which tookplace
generally lower than 1000 metres (3000 ft.). None of the flights
complained of exceeded the altitude of 3000 metres (9000 ft.), and
only one flight reached that altitude. In several instances the com-
plaints stressed that the purpose of the intruding aircraft was to
reconnoitre Bulgarian territory, and explained that this was the
reason why the intruding aircraft flew at low altitudes. But as
regards 4x-AKC, according to the Bulgarian versions, 4X-AKC

entered the Bulgarian airspace from the west or from the north-
west and, in fact, flew southwards. Furthermore, it is a fact that
since 1953 the tension which had undoubtedly existed earlier along
the western and southern frontiers of Bulgaria was being gradually
diminished. The Israel Legation in Belgrade has reported in a
Despatch of August 1955, that the tension on the Yugoslav-
Bulgarian frontier had so diminished that in 1954 the frontier was
jointly demarcated, since when no incidents had occurred. Asimilar
report was received in October 1955 from the Israel Diplomatic
Representative in Athens regarding the Bulgaro-Greek frontier.

According to that report, in October 1953 the frontier was demar-
cated: later, in 1954, diplomatic relations between Greece and Bul-
garia were renewed after a break of thirteen years. On 27 July 1955.
so shortly after the Heads of Government Conference at Geneva,
there was every reason to suppose that this relaxation of political
tension would continue.

86. At the same time, it is observed that these documents have
quite another importance, for they disclose that at a period of
tension along Buigaria's own borders the Bulgarian authorities

were careful not to employ an undue degree of force even agaitzst
aircraft which they had reasonto susfiectwerehostile.Assuming they
were Greek, or that at al1 events the Greek Government was
internationally responsible for permitting infringements of Bul-
garian airspace to be undertaken from Greek territory, the Bul-
garian Government, which then was not in diplomatic relations
with Greece, employed the only diplomatic machinery available
to it, and despatched its protests to the Secretariat of the United
Nations. In the circumstances this appears to be fdlv consonant

\oitti the rc.quireineiiti <if 1ritt.rn;iti~il;i\vand the prevaillng
intrrn:~rional Lr:.~t~ ~. asISriivritioiicd in i>ÿracr;.O0lal)ovc. 'fhc
last of these protestihad been sent to the Çecietary-~Aeral of
the United Nations over turo years before 27 July 1955, and so far
as is known to the Government of Israel, no international incident
regarding the infringement of Bulgarian airspace has been brought
by the Bulgarian Government to the notice of international organs
in that interval. The existence of these earlier infringements of
Bulgarian airspace does not supply any excuse for the manner ingS lIE310RIAL OF IÇRAEL (2 VI58)
which Bulgaria reacted to the alleged presence of 4~-AKCwithin
its airspace. Rather to the contrary; the failure of Bulgaria to
announce, in July 1925, that she would no longer be following her

own earlier practice aggravates her own responsibility.

(e)Matters of Proof and Evidence
87. The refusal of the Bulgarian Government to make available

al1 information in its possession in regard to the incident, despite
tlie repeated requests of the Israel Government made since the
first Note Verbale of 28 July 1955 (Annex rz), is al1the more signi-
ficant in tlie light of the fact that as a direct corisequence of tlie
Bulgarian action, al1the persons who could give first-hand evidence
about the actions of qx-.4tic. and about how the activities of the
Bulgarian fighter aircraft appeared to qx-AKC,are dead. The only
reply wliich the Bulgarian Government has given to the Israel
Government's request for full information concerning the circum-
stances leading to the loss of the aircraft (first Note Verbale of
28 July 1955) consists of the inconsistent generalizations, unsup-
ported by any evidence, of the Bulgarian Notes Verbales and
Communiqués of July and August Igjj (see paragraph 29 abore).
Haviiig regard to the manner in which the Bulgarian Government

has responded to these requests for information, the Israel Govern-
ment is contending that the Bulgarian Government must now
accept all the legal consequences denving from the deliberate with-
holding of knowledge of material facts.The Government of Israel
is accordingly reserving al1 its rights in the matter of evidence,
including the nght to make appropriate applications to the Court
under Article 49 of the Statute and under any other relevant
provision or rule of law, should this become necessary.
88. It is to be emphasized that the present dispute hetween the
two Governmentsis not, in essence, in the words of Article 36 (2) (c)

of the Statute of the Court, a dispute concerning "the existence of
any fact which, if established, wonld constitute a breach of an
international obligation". This case can, therefore, be clearly
distinguished in this respect from the Cor/t~ Chalznel case. In this
case the manner in which the Bulgarian armed forces destroyed
4x-AKCis incontestably established, andthe Court is being asked to
hold that those established facts constitute a breach of an inter-
national obligation. In the opinion of the Government of Israel. any
lacunae in the evidence are inherent in the nature of the case, and
their presence or absence can have no effect whatsoever on the issues
upon which the Court is being asked to determine. In so far as the
death of al1the occupants of the aircraft deprives the parties and
the Court of the assistance of first-hand witnesses, the Bulgarian
Government cannot take any advantage of that; and in so far as
the Notes Verbales and Communiqués of July and August 1955
contain officialstatements of what the units of the Bulgarian anned ~IEYORIAL OF ISRAEL (2VI 58) 99
forces did or did not do, those statements, being in the nature of
admissions, are binding upon the Bulgarian Government. In so

far as the Bulgarian Government has refused, even before as \veUas
after the diplomatic claim \%.asput forward and even before the
present case \vas instituted before the Court, to make certain
materiai information available or has withheld such material
information, it is now precluded from producing such information in
Court, and from making new allegations based thereon. Inasmuch
as the Bulgarian Government hampered the activities of the
Israel Commission of Inquiry, it cannot now makc complaint of
anything contained in or omitted from its Report (Annex 18).The
Government of Israel is not putting this view forward on the basis
of any particular attitude at present regarding the position of the
onus of proof in this case. It considers that the published documents
contain al1 the elements of fact necessary to enable the Court to
decide in its favour on the principal petition of the Application
instituting Proceedings.

89. Regarding the peremptory and final character of the ad-
missions concerning the state of mind and behaviour of the units
of the Bulgariaii armed forces, contained in the Bulgarian Xotes
Verbales of July and August 1955. it is submitted that the position
is clear. International law has long recognized the conclusiveness
of admissions of this character. The general principle was clearly
stated as far back as 1856 in the well-known arbitration in the

Croft case between Great Britain and Portugal, by the Senate of
Hamburg. The arbitral award contains the following significant
passage :
"If what waç contained in the statement of the 17th November,
1851,had been expressed in a note or other diplomatic communica-
tion, addressed ta the British Government by the Portuguese
Government as its view of the case, it might then have been justly
said that the one Government had therebyof itself madean acknow-
ledgment and an admission to the other by which the latter waç
now altogether exonerated from the task of proving that the case
really stood as it waç represented there." Britishand Foreign State
Papers,vol. 50, 1288at p. 1291.

This principle, which is consonant with the general principle of
good faith as one of the bases of orderly international intercourse,
is now firmly established in international law, and has been applied
on maiiy occasions by international tribunals. For decisions of the
International Court of Justice in which it was applied, reference
may be made to the views of the Court regarding declarations made
by the Albanian Delegate in the Security Council in the Corfit
Channelcase (merits), I.C.J. Reports 1949, at p. 19; ta the Court's
attitude regarding various official memoranda by the Union of

South Africa in the Statzcsof South-WestAfrica case, I.C.J. Reports
1950 ,t pp. 134-136; and to the Court's attitude towards certain100 MEALORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)
admissions made by France to the United Kingdom in diplomatic
correspondence during the 19th century, in the A!i>lquiers and
Ecrehos case, I.C.J. Kefiorts 1953. at p. 71.

90. The Government of Israel wishes to stress this point in the
light of the tendency which has appeared in the later stages of the
diplomatic discussions, and particularly in the meeting of 13 Sep-
tember 1957 (paragraph 54 above), for the Bulgariari Government
to argue that the Note Verbale of 4 -4ugust 1955 (Annex 17) did
not constitute acceptance by it of responsibility, any contrary

interpretation being erroneous. In the vie\\, of the Govemment of
Israel, in this respect the Xote Verbale is clear enough and does
not cal1 for any sophisticated "interpretation". Acceptance of
such a view as the Bulgarian officials have been putting forward
would imply that a government would be entitled to blow hot and
cold at the same time: for purely political purposes to make state-
ments which, for their impact upon the rights of others, would be
of possibly far-reaching implications (as in the present case), and
then to be free of al1legal consequences when those whose rights
are affected seek to implement those very rights apparently once
recognized.

91. The Government of Israel is not advancing this contention
out of purely theoretical considerations, although it believes that
the principle of good faith in intemational relations is of sufficient
general importance to warrant emphatic conclusions on that ground
alone. In the present case the issue is of considerable practical
importance. The unequivocal admissions by the Governnient of
Bulgaria, which the Government of Israel is in no position to ques-
tion, prove that it was the action of the Bulgarian armed forces, and
the precipitate and inept manner in which it was carried out, which
caused the destruction of 4x-AKCand the death of dl its occupants.

The failure of the Bulgarian Govemment to make available the
evidence upon which it based its o\vn conclusions, may also have
the legai consequence of creating an estoppel and preclusion (in
so far as these notions are distinct). Furthermore, the inclusion
of the admissions in the Note Verbale makes unnecessary any
discussion of the problem of the imputability to the Bulgarian
State of the actions of the various members of the armed forces
of that country. In this connection care must be taken to dis-
tinguish between the admissions contained in the Xotes Verbales,
which are valid and binding inasmuch as they relate to the actions
of the Bulgarian Government or of members of the Bulgarian
armed forces, and mere assertions-unsubstantjated allegations
about the actions of 4x-AKC-which at best are nothing more tban
their authors' interpretations of those actions. The admissions are
subject to the general principle of indivisibility and are binding and

conclusive in themselves. The ailegations must be established in
ail their particulars. 92. The fact that the incident occurred on Bulgarian territor):
has other consequences as regards the availability of evidence to

the applicant Party. This problem also arose before the Court in the
merits of the Corfu Chanrrel case, and the Government of Israel
is invoking the principle there established in the following terms:
"It is true, as international practice shows, that a State on whose
territory or in whose waters an act contrary to international law
has occurred, may be called upon to give an explanation. It is also
true that that State cannot evade such a request by limiting itself
to a reply that it is ignorant of the circumstances of the act and of
its authors. The State may, up to a certain point, be bound to
supply particulars of the use made by it of the means of information
and inquiry at its disposal. But it cannot be concluded from the
mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its territory and
waters that that State necessarilv knew. or ou~ht to have known.
of any unlawful act perpetrated therein,'nor that it necessarily
knew, or should have known, the authors. This fact, by itself and
apart from other circumstances, neither involves prima facie
responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof.
On the other hand, the fact of this exclusive territorial control
exercised by a State within itç frontiers has a bearing upon the
methods of proof available to establish the knowledge of that State
as to such events. By reason of this exclusive control, the other
State, the victim of a breach of internationallaw, is often unable to
furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to responsibility. Such a
State should be allowed a more libera! recourse to inferences of fact
and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence is admitted in
al1systems of law, and its use is recognized by international deci-
series of facts linked together and leading logically to a singleon a
conclusion." I.C.J. Reporls 1949, 4 at p. 18.

93. It is on the basis of this rule that Bulgaria was immediately
called upon to give an explanation. The Government of Israel does

not contend that the Government of Bulgaria was legally obliged
to permit the Israel Inquiry Commission to conduct any activities
on Bulgarian territory. Article 26 of the Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation (Annex IO) goes no further than to require
that the State in which the aircraft is registered should bc given the
opportunity to appoint observers to be present at an inquiry held
in the State in which an aircraft accident occurred, and that the
State holding the inquiry shall communicate the report and findings
in the matter to the State in which the aircraft is registercd. In
fact, ho~vever, there is a common international practice providing
for international CO-operationin this matter, coiisolidated in the
Standards and Recommended Practices on Aircraft Accident
Inquiry which forms Annex 13to the Convention on Civil Aviation.
But the Government of Israel is contending that the exercise by the
Bulgarian Government of its sovereign right not to CO-operate
with the Israel Commission of Inquiry, in so far as the rights and102 XIEllORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 56)
position of the Government of Israel have been prejudiced thereby,
cannot entitle the Bulgarian Government to rely on any possible

insufficiency in the evidence brought by the applicant party.
-
94. Reference has been made in the course of the preceding
discussion to a number of technical rules of laur and evidencc. This
notwithstaiiding, the case of the Government of Israel is that under
the circumstances, the opening of fire on qx-AKCon 27 July 1955
cannot be justified under international law. It accordingly submits,
and asks the Court so to hold, thatthe elements of factand of la\v to

support a decision on this contention in its favour are sufficiently
established, and to determine that Bulgaria is responsible under
international law for the destruction of the Israel aircraft qx-Axc
on 27 July 1935 and for the loss of life and property and al1 other
damage that resulted therefrom.

Section II.- The Refiaration Due
(a) General

95. The second petition of the Application instituting Proceedings
requests the Court "to determine the amount of compensation
due from Bulgaria to Israel". Itfollows from the conclusion regard-
ing Bulgarian responsibility contained in the prcceding Section that
Bulgaria is under the obligation to make satisfaction and to pay
compensation to Israel for the damage caused to Israel as a result
of the action which has engaged the international responsibility
of Bulgaria. This consequence of an illegal act is nrell recognized
in the jurisprudence of international tribunals and in particular
in the following classic statement hy the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice in the ChorzdwFactory case, where that Court said:

illegal act-apririciple which seems to be established by internatio-
nal practice and in particular by the decisionsof arbitral tribunals-
is that reparatioti must, as far as possible, wipe out al1the conse-
quences of the illegalact and re-establish the situation which would,
in al1probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.
Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear;
the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would
not he covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it-
such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount
of compensation due for an act contrary to international law."
P.C.I.J., Serie.4, Xo. 17, at p. 47.
As the present Court stated in the COY/~C Lhangle1 case (merits):

"It follon~sfrom the establishment of responsibility that compen-
sation is due." I.C.J. RePorts 1949, at p. 23.
96. This position has been fully recognized by the Bulganan
Government. Already in the Xote Verbale of 26 July 1955 (Annex
14), which was despatched to and received by the Israel Legation dlEllORlr\LOF ISRAEL (2 VIj8)
'O3
in Sofia before the second Israel Note Verbale of the same date
(Annex Ij)\vas handed to the Bulgarian Chargéd'Affaires in Israel
(see paragraphs 14 and rj above), the Bulgarian Government
declared its readiness"à prendre à sa charge la part respective des
dommages matériels qui ont étécausés aprk qu'ils auront été
dûment établis". Furthermore, betiveen 28 July and 4 August 1gj5
the question of compensation had been discussed both in Israel

and more particularly in Sofia (seeparagraphs 17, 19 and 23 above).
The attention of the Court is particularly invited to the meeting
hetween llr. Na11 and Dr. Neitchev of 3 .4ugust 1955 (paragraph
23 above), when the Bulgarian Foreign Minister stated that in the
light of the completion of the work of the Bulgarian Governmental
Commission, there would be a change in the attitude of the Gov-
ernment of Bulgaria towards the question of the consequences
of its reponsibility. The Bulgarian Xote Verbale of 4 August 1955
(Annex 17) repeats the undertaking of that Government to assume
responsibility for the compensation due tothe families of the victims
as well as its share of compensation for material damage incurred.
It also States that the Bulgarian Government would cause to be
identified and punished those guilty of causing the catastrophe to
the Israel plane.

97. It is observed that in this respect, as in others, the Note
Verbale of 4 August differs from that of 28 July. The Note Verbale
of 28 July (Annex 14) refers in general terms to compensation for
the material damage incurred after it had been duly established,

wliereas the Note Verbale of 4 August clearly attemptsto differen-
tiate between the compensation due to the victims' families and
the compensation due in respect of material damage incurred. If
this distinction relates to the general duty to make compensation
in a case of international responsibility, it is not one known to
international law. If the international responsibility of Bulgaria
exists, as is the submission of the Government of Isracl, then the
Government of Bulgaria is legally bound to compensate for ull
the losses incurred and cannot itself decide either to whom com-
pensation should be paid, or for what losses. In theRight o/IJassagc
case (Preliminary Objections), the Court recentiy stressed that
"it is a rule of interpretationthat a text emanating from a Gov-
ernment must, in principle, be interpreted as producing and as
intended to produce effects in accordance with existing law and
not in violation of it"..C.J. Kefiorts1957, at p. 142. The Govern-
ment of Israel has always regarded the Bulgarian Government's
undertaking to pay compensation, contained in its Notes Verbales
of 28 July and 4 August 1955,in that light, and has never considered
any other interpretation to be possible. The Governmeiit of Israel

also wishes to point out that according to its information al1 the
ten Governments \\!hose nationals incurred loss and damage as a
resiilt of the destruction of the aircraft have prepared and submitted"'4 MENORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)

claims on the same basis and have all, with one exception, rejected
the offcr made to them on or about 19 July 1957, as is described
in paragraph 51above and in Annex 4 to the Application instituting
Proceedings filed in Court by the Government of the United States
of Amenca l.

98. The destruction of the aircraft and al1its occupants, together
with everything on board, caused loss or damage of a pecuniary
character nnder the following heads:
(a) Financial loss suffered by dependants of the victims(bereinafter

called the Individual Claims). Included in these individual claims
are also claims for personal belongings carried on the passengers
or as part of their free baggage allowance (up to 20 kgs.) or as
accompanied excess baggage paid for at the excess baggage rate.
(b) Financial loss suffered by owners of cargo (hereiuafter called
the Cargo Claims).

(c) The loss and damage snffered by the Company (hereinafter
called the Company's Claim).
(d) Damages or loss suffered directly by the Government of Israel
(hereinafter called the Government's Claim).

(e) Loss of Mails, for ~vhichno claim is being made.
99. The Claim submitted to the Bulgarian Government on
14 February 1956 (Annex 31). as subsequently adjusted, was

made up of al1these components. Together with that Note Verbale
there was handed to the Bulgarian Government a printed booklet
(ilnnex 39) -prepared by the Israel Ministry of Justice giving par-
ticulars of the total claim, which then amounted to U.S. $2,656,858.
(Part of the sum represents losses calculated in Israel Pounds and
converted into Dollars at the officia1rate of exchange of $1.00 =
IL 1.800. The balance of the claim was calculated in U.S. Dollars.)

Siuce the claim was submitted to the Bulgarian Government,
adjnstments have been notified in writing (Annex 32); further
adjustments have become necessary and these are incorporated in
the revised and annotated particulars of claim contained in Annex
40 (Individual Claims), Annex 41 (Cargo Claims) and Annex 42
(the Company's Claim). The Bulgarian Government has never
requested any details regarding the calculation of any particular
item included in the claim. As appears from paragraphs 38-43

above, it has, at the most, asked for a number of general explana-
tions. In the following paragraphs and the relevant annexes a des-
cription will be given of the general manner in which the different
components were calcnlated. This description is substantially
identical with that given to the representatives of the Bulgarian

1The oneexception is the GovernmeiitofSweden which. without admitting
the validityin law ofthe approach which was adopted by the Government of
Bulgaria i19.57.neverthelessfor reasonofits own, and without prejudice to the
legal positiondecided to accept tliaoffer. ~IEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) 105
Govemment in the course of the meetings between 2-6 Augiist,
1956, described in paragraphs 41-2 above.

IOO. The Government of Israel feels that it would be useful at
this stage to explain the reasons why the International Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Intemational
Carnage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 (137League
of Nations Treaty Series, p. 12) is irrelevant to this case. This
Convention govems the relations between an air carrier and its
passengers or cargo owners, and basically it establishes a limitation
of the liability of the camer as against release of the plaintiff from
a certain burden of proof. The Convention is not concemed with the

financial liability of any person, including a State, not a party to
the contract of carriage, even if such other person should hecome
liable to pay compensation following some action by that person
which resulted in damage to a passenger or cargo owner. It does not
limit the liability of a State which is under the duty of paying
compensation because that State's failure to observe the require-
ments of customary international law has placed it under the
duty, according to international law, of paying compensation. The
Bulgarian Government cannot claim the benefits of a limitation of
liability which is an express term of a contract to which it itself
nas not a party, direct or indirect.

101. In calculating the damages due, no account has been taken
of any sums which might have become payable to the claimant by
virtue of life or accident insurance policies,or by virtue of a national
insurance scheme such as is in force in Israel, or by virtue of provi-
dent and pensions funds schemes of which the deceased was a
member and from which the claimant may have benefited. The re-
lations between the deceased (or any other beneficiary) and the as-
surers, or between a member of a provident fund andthe fund itself,

are based exclusively on contractual provisions to which neither
the Government of Israel nor that of Bulgaria is party and with
which neither of these Govemments is concerned. As far as con-
cems the insurance of haggage or freight, the claim has been put
fomrard either in the name of the owner or in that of the insurance
Company as the case may be. In the course of the diplomatic ne-
gotiations the Bulgarian Govemment at one time suggested that
it was incumbent upon the insurers to indemnify the victims (see
paragraph 49 (i)above). By implying that the pecuniary 105sshould
be borne not by the Govemment which caused the damage, but
by completely extrinsic third parties who happeued to be in some
contractual relationship (unknown to the Bulgarian Government)

with the victims of the Bulgarian Government's illegal action, that
Govemment is adopting a position which has no basis either in law
or in morals.
102. Al1the claimants in respect of whom a claim has been sub-
mitted by the Government of Israel are nationals of Israel, escept

9106 ~IEJIORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)

where indicated in Annex 40. None of the persons in respect to
whom a claim has been suhmitted by the Government of Israel
is the national of a foreign country. So far as is known, none of the
prrsons for whom the Government of Israel has submitted claims
is the national of Israel and of some foreign country: altematively,
if any such person does possess dual nationality, his effective
nationality, urhich has been taken to be the nationality of the State
in which he ordinarily exercises civil and political rights, is Israel
(follou~ingArticle (2)of the Statute of the Court and theNottebohnr
case.I.C.J. Reports 1955. at p. 4). The Government of Israel con-

siders that it is justified in this case in putting forward claims in
respect of losses incurred by persons who are stateless. It may
be observed that neither in the Note Verbale of 28 July 1955
(Annex 14)nor in that of 4 August 1955(Annex 17) did the Goverii-
ment of Bulgaria purport to limit in any way by reference to
nationality the persons to whom compensation would be payable.
Fiirthermore, in the Note Verbale of I October 1956 (Annex 33)
and in suhsequent diplomatic conversations (see paragraphs 48
and 52 above) the Bulgarian Government actually requested the
Israel Government to take upon itself the representation of al1the
individual claimants. The Government of Israel submits that it is
entitled to adopt the cause of persons, whose cause is not otherwise
adopted,when the damage which those persons suffered was incurred
when the victims of the illegal action were flying in a commercial
airliner on a scheduled international flight under the Israel flag.
In the Reparation for Injuries Szrffered case, the Court stated,
regarding the "traditionai de" that diplomatic protection is
exercised hy the national State, that "even in inter-State relations.
there are important exceptions to the nile, for there are cases in

which protection may be exercised by a State on behalf of persons
not having its nationality". I.C.J. Reports 1949, at p. 191.

103. The CO-ordination of the preparation of the claim on the
inter-Governmental level has been hriefly described in paragraph
35 above, and, of course, the Bulgarian Government is fully aware
that CO-ordinationof this kind existed. One of the primary reasons
for establishing CO-ordination of this character from the earliest
stages was to prevent, so far as was possible, the Bulgarian Gov-
ernment being faced with double claims leading to the possibility
of double damages. It is a well-known mle of law that the
defendant State cannot be asked or compelled to pay reparation
due in respect of damage twice over. As the Court stated in the
Reparation for Injuries Suffered case: "International tribunals are
already familiar with the prohlem of a claim in which two or more
national States are interested, and they know how to protect the
defendant State in snch a case." I.C.J. Reports Ig49, at p. 186.
It is partly as the result of CO-ordination of this character that
adjustments have aiready been made in the Israel claim. MEMORlAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) IO7
(b) Individual Claims

104. The Bulgarian Note Verbale of 4 August 1955 (Annex 17)
purports to limit the persons on whose behalf any claim may be
made, to relatives of the deceased. The degrees of relationship are
not there specified. In some systems of municipal law-among
them the civil law in Israel-the relatives who may claim compen-
sation on the death of any person are limited to specified degrees.
In the view of the Government of Israel, the determination of
the compensation which may be claimed under international

law for pecuniary loss cannot be solely based on the degree of
relationship of the claimant to the victim, or upon the individual
mies of municipal law relating thereto. The proper test is to be
found inthe extent to which the claimant was dependent finrincially
on the victim and the extent to which the deceased was under a
legal duty of supporting the claimant in whole or in part. The
pnnciples are discussed in the Opinion, dated I November 1923.
of Umpire Parker, with whom the American and German Com-
missioners of the U.S.-Germany Mixed Claims Commission con-
curred, in the Lzlsitania case. Umpire Parker stated:

"In death cases the right of action is for the loss sustained by
the claima?zts,not by the estate. The basis of damages is, not the
hissestate, but the lossesresulting to claimants from his death. The
enquiry then is: What amount will compensate claimants for such
losses?
Bearing in mind that we are not concemed with any problems
involving the punishment of a wrongdoer but only with the naked
question of fixing theamount which will compensate for the wrong
done, Our formula expressed in general terms for reaching that
end is: Estimate the amounts (a) which the decedent, had he not
been killed, would probably have contnbuted to the claimant,
addthereto (b)the pecuniary value to suchclaimant ofthedeceased's
persona1 services in claimant's care, education, or supervision, and
also add (c) reasonable compensation for such mental sufftring or
shock, if any, caused by the violent severing of family ties, as
claimant may actually have sustained by reason of such death. The
sum of these estimates reduced to its present cash value, will gene-
raiiy represent the loss sustained by daimant.
In making such estimates there will be considered, among
other factors, the following:
(a) The age, sex, health, condition and station in life,occupation,
habits of industry and sobriety, mental and physical capacity,
frugality, eaming capacit and customary eamings of the deceased
and the uses made of suc{ earnings by him;

fatal)injury. in arriving at which standard life-expectancy tables
and al1other pertinent evidence offeredwillbe considered;

(c) The reasonable probability that the earning capacity of
deceased, had he lived, wonld either bave increased or decreased;108 MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)
(d) The age, sex, health, condition and station in life, and pro-
bable life-expectancy of each of the claimants;
(e) The extent to which the deceased, had he lived, would have
applied his income from his earnings or othenvise to his penonal
expenditures from which claimants would have derived no benefits;
(1) In reducin to their present cash value contributions which
would prohahly iave been made from time to time to claimants
by deceased, a 5% interest rate and standard present-value tables
willhe used;

deceasd may havesuffered will beconsidered as elements ofdamage;e

(h) The amount of insurance on the life ofthe deceased collected
by his estate or by the claimants will not be taken into account
in computing the damages which claimants may be entitled to
recover;
(i) No exemplq, punitive,orvindictive damages can be assessed.
The foregoing statement of the rules for measuring damages
in death caseswili beapplied hy the American Agent and the German
Agent andtheir respective counselin the preparation and suhmission
ofal1such cases.The enumeration offactors to be taken into account
in assessing damages wiil not be considered as exclusive of al1
others. When either party conceives that other factors should he
considered, having a tendeiicy either to increase or decrease the
quantumof damages, such factors will be called to the attention
of the Commission in the'presentation of the particular case."
Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. 7, at pp. 35-36.
105. In assessing the individual claims (Annex 40) the Govern-
ment of Israel was guided by these principles, and by the practice
of the Israel Courts. It is only in one important respect that a
departure from the dictum of Umpire Parker has been introduced,
in that no "reasonable compensation for such mental suffering or
shock, if any, caused by the violent severing of family ties, as

claimant may actually have sustained by reason of such death",
has been assessed or claimed. This was prompted by three con-
siderations: firstly, that mental suffering and anguish, caused by the
violent death of a near relative, were common to al1 claimants;
secondly, that such suffering did not easily allow of reasonable
assessrnent in terms of money; and thirdly and mainly, that any
scaling for such compensation would, in the nature of things, have
to depend to some extent on the measure of love and affection be-
tween the deceased andthe claimant, any inquiry into which might
work hardship and injustice; and the result of any scaling would
certaiiily give the appearance of unwarranted discrimination.
It has, therefore, been considered proper, and the Government
of Israel submits that it isjust and equitable, to suhstitute amounts
of compensation detennined beforehand according to a fixed scale,
for amounts to be arrived at after an inquiry into whether mental
anguish was suffered, what was the measure of the mental anguish MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) IOg
suffered, and what the adequate compensation therefor would be
interms of money. These claims have been styled "personal claims",
and the scale according to which they have been assessed is as
follows :

Spouses IL 10,000 each
Minor children IL 7.500 each
Parents, where no other claimants were
admitted IL 5,000 each
where other claimants were admitted IL 2,500 each
Children of age and independent means IL 2,500 each
Brothers and sisters, where the deceased

left neither spouse, nor children, nor
parents IL 2,500 each
In determining these figures account was taken of the fact that
it appeared just to provide for a larger amount of compensation
to the surviving spouse than would normaily faIl to his or her
share as heir to the estate, bearing in mind that the mental anguish
caused to him or her would be considerahly greater than that

caused to other more distant relatives. These "personal claims"
differ,on the one hand, from claims for loss of maintenance and
education and, on the other hand, from compensation payable to
the estate, no compensation being claimed where the claimants
were not very near relatives of the deceased.
106. Apart from these "persona1 claims" which are, as above
stated, not in addition to the claims allowed by Umpire Parker in
the Lusitania case, but in substitution for claims allowed by him
and not otherwise included in the claims, the compensation claimed

by the Government of Israel was calculated on the basis of the
principles laid down by Umpire Parker as aforesaid. In calculating
the amounts which a deceased would probably have contributed to
a claimant, the following principles have in general been adopted:
(a) In cases where the deceased was the sole bread-winner in the
family and expended the whole of his income for household and
personai expenses, one third of the prospective income of the
deceased has been deducted as being income referable to the
persona1 expenditure of the deceased;

(6) In cases where both the deceased and the surviving spouse
expended the whole of the joint earnings for household and per-
sonal expenses, one half of the prospective income of the deceased
has been deducted as being income referable to the personal
expenditure of the deceased;
(c) Sums paid by the deceased by way of contribution to the
support of claimants not being members of the deceased's house-

hold, have been deducted from that part of the prospective in-
come of the deceased which would, but for the said dednction,
have accrued to the benefit of other claimants;II0 MENORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)

(d) Sums paid by the deceased by way of contribution to the
support of parents-in-law were not deducted from that part of
his prospective income which would have accrued to the benefit
of other claimants, and the claims of such parents-in-law for
compensation were not admitted;
(e) In cases where no actual pecuniary contribution has in the
past been made by the deceased to the claimant, the test adopted

has been whether or not there has been a reasonable expectation
of pecuniary advantage: thus, claims of aged parents of the
deceased have been allowed in cases where the deceased, on
arrival in Israel, would have been legally liable or could have
reasonably and properly been expected to contribute towards
the maintenance of his or her parents;
(f) No claim has been included which was based on expectations
resting on facts and circumstances additional to and other than

the arrival and establishment of the deceased in Israel: thus,
claims of parents based on expectations contingent on the de-
ceased reaching majority or the parents reaching old age, have
not been included;
(g) In assessing compensation to be claimed for widows below the
age of 45, one quarter of the amount of compensation otherwise
to be claimed has been deducted on account of their prospect
of remarrying: no such deduction has been made in cases of
widowsabove the age of 45 or in cases where there was no reason-

able prospect of a remamage;
(h) In assessing compensation to be claimed for a widower who
was wholly or partly dependent on his deceased wife and below
the age of 45, three quarters of the amount of compensation
otherwise to be claimed have been deducted on account of his
prospect of remarrying: in the case of widowers above the age
of 45 and below the age of 6j, one haif of the amount has been
deducted on account of his prospect of remarrying: no deduction
has been made in cases of widowers above the age of 65;

(i) Compensation payable to minor children has been assessed for
the period up to their attaining the age of 18 years;
(j) In addition to claims for maintenance, a fixed amount of
IL ~,ooo is being claimed to compensate a minor child for the
loss of the deceased's contribution to the costs of his or her
education even after attaining the age of 18.

107. In calculating losses of future eamings the following prin-
ciples have been adopted:
(a) In cases where the deceased was a civil servant or an employee
of the Company or in similar permanent employment, there has
been taken into account, where appropriate, the fact that the
deceased had reasonable expectation of normal promotion result-

ing in increased earning capacity: in cases where the deceased hIE3IORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58) III

had already attained his highest salary grade, calculations have
been made on the footing of a decrease in eaming power;
Ib) In cases where the deceased was self-employed, calculations
have been based on his average income during the two years
immediately preceding death, and prospects of any increase or
decrease have been disregarded;

(c) It has been assumed that the earning capacity.of a healthy man
would normally end with his 65th year, and that of a healthy
woman with her 60th year (but claims by aged parents have been
calculated un the basis of their own life expectancies without
regard to the age of the deceased).

108. In capitalizing the contril>utions u.hicti \ïould have been
made bv thc dtceascci tu the claimant from tirnc to time. thc four
per ceni interest rate and standard present-value tables, &compiled
by the Israel National Insurance Authority, were used in lieu of
the equivalent five per cent tables used in the Lusitania cases. The
individual claims were calculated, of course, in January 1956, but
the Government of Israel is not proposing at present to revalorize
aiiy sums in the light of changes which may have takeii place since
the sums were originaiiy calculated. It reserves, however, the right

at a later stage to adjust these claims in the light of the then pre-
vailing officiai cost of living indices, should this become necessary.
109. The Government of Israel suhmits that in a case of this
nature, where the compensation is ultimately determined by inter-

national law, the method which it has adopted for the calculation
of damages is that required and recognized under international law.
This claim has been prepared in strict adherence to principles
of law from which the Govemment of Israel has no intention to
depart and in a faithful attempt to reach what the International
Court has described in other circumstances as the "true measure
of compensation and the reasonable figure of such compensation".
Corlu Channel case (compensation), I.C.J. Refiorts1949, at p. 249;
Administrative TribzcnalofIL0 case, I.C.J. Reports1956. at p.IOO.

XIO. The total amount of the individual claims thus caiculated,
iiicorporating ailthe requisite adjustments (see paragraph gg
above), is IL 1,064,444,corresponding to U.S. Dollars 591,357.77 at
the officialrate of exchange. Particulars are contained in Annex 40.

(c)CargoClaipns

1x1. Thc ainounts claimed in respect of the destruction and
non-delivery of cargo were calculated on the basis of evidence by
the claimant of the loss actually incurred. Details regarding the
cargo claims are contained in Annex 41.

112. The total amount of the cargo claims thus calculated,
incorporating al1the requisite adjustments (see paragraph 99 above)112 MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)

is IL zo.059 corresponding to U.S. Dollars 11,143.88 at the official
rate of exchange.

(d) TheComFany'sClaim

113. In the Particulars of Claim (Annex 39) submitted to the
Bulganan Government together with the Note Verbale of 14 Feb-
mary 1956 (Annex 31). the Company's claim was summarized
nnder fiveprincipal headings: (1)loss of aircraft;(2)administration
and miscellaneous; (3) cancelled sales; (4) training expenses; (5)
general damages. The total of this claim amounted to U.S. Dollars
2,055,491.

114. Some items included in this claim were based on an estimate
of certain losses and expenses. Since the claim was first presented
it has become possible to replace some of these with particulars
of the actual losses and expenses incurred hy the Company. The
total amount of the Company's claim thus recalculated is U.S.
Dollars 1,957,157made up as follows: (r)loss of aircraft-1,333,418;
(2) administrative expenses-13,020; (3) cancelled sales-89,087;
(4)training expenses-21,662; (5)general loss of business-500,ooo.
The details of this claim, together with explanatory notes, are
annexed (Annex 42).

(e) The Government's Claim
115. The Government of Israel has incurred direct loss as a

result of the incident. This includes the costs of the Commissionof
Inquiry, the cost of the transport of the bodies from Istanbul ta
Israel and their burial; transport of near relatives of the victims
to the burial service; and sundry other costs of which the most
important is that of accelerated pensions payable by the Israel
National Insurance Institute, and related matters. In the Note
Verbale of 14 February 1956 (Annex 31) the Government of Israel,
refqring to this head of damage, intimated that in its desire for a
speedy and amicable settlement of the incident, it was envisaging
the possibility of a waiver of this head of damage. In paragraph 3
of the Application institnting Proceedings, the right to re-instate
this head of damages was reserved since the conditions in which

the waiver had been contemplated were not fulfilled. Nevertheless,
the Government of Israel has decided not to press this head of
damages, and requests the Court to place the foregoing on record.
116. However, the satisfaction claimable hy the Government of
Israel is not limited only to pecuniary reparation. This was recog-
nized by the Government of Bulgaria in the formal expression of
regret and in the undertaking to identify and punish those gnilty
contained in the Note Verbale of 4 August 1955 (Annex 17). In the

Note Verbale of 14 February 1956 (Annex 31) the Government of
Israel took note of that expression of regret and indicated that it NEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)
113
would appreciate receiving information regarding the action taken
against the guilty persons. No such information has ever been
given to the Government of Israel despite repeated requests (see
paragraphs 41 and 49 (ii) above). The Bulgarian Government now
appears to be taking the attitude that the prosecution of the guilty
persons is iiot a matter of concern to the 'Government of Israel at
all. This is the only possible interpretation of the Bulgarian

statement of 12 April 1957. reported ii~paragraph 49 (i) above.
Apart from any other conclusions which may be drawn, the Govern-
ment of Israel accordingly asks the Court to take note of the failure
of the Government of Bulgaria to implement its undertaking to
identify and punish those guilty, but it is not pressing for any
other kind of moral reparation for the injury done to its flag. A
declaration by the Court that Bulgaria is responsihle under inter-
national law for the destruction of the aircraft would constitute
quite sufficient satisfaction for this claim of the Govemment of
Israel, and the Government of Israel formally requests the Court to
place the foregoing or1record.

117. The Government of Israel ivill also request that, having
regard for the evasiveness and dilatoriness displayed by the Bul-
garian Government in the diploinatic negotiations, the sums
determined by the Court as being due to Israel, shall bear interest
at the rate of six per cent per annum from 27 July 1955 until the
date of payment; and that payment shall be effected in Israel.

Section III.-Costs and Expenses

118. The third petition of the Application instituting Pro-
ceedings is that it may please the Court to decide that al1costs and
expenses incurred by the Government of Israel be borne by the
Govemment of Bulgaria. The Governnient of Israel intends by this
request to distinguish between the expenses which it incurred in
the preparation of the claim during the period27 July 1955 to the
filing of the Application in Court on16 October 1957 (other than
the direct claim for damages referred to in paragraph 115 above),
and legal costs incurred in prosecuting this case in Court during
the period commencing 16 October 1957 and terminating on the
date of final judgment of the Court in this case.

119. With regard to the claim for expenses, the Government of
lsrael claims that in view of the fact that the Bulgarian Govern-
ment has gone back on the promises which it made in July and
August 1955. and has displayed no genuine attempt or interest in
reaching a fair settlement of the dispute (which the Government
of Israel is convinced could easily have been done but for the rigid
attitude adopted by the Government of Bulgaria), it is entitled that

al1unnecessary expenses which it has incurred, in vain, should be
recouped from the Government of Bulgaria. In the nature of things,II4 MEalORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI 58)

many of these eapenses can only be estimated. However, having
regard to the general complexities of the case and to the fact that
it bas fuUyoccupied responsible officialsof the Ministries for Foreign
Affairs and of Justice for neady three years, and required several
lengthy joumeys which were undertaken above al1for the purpose
of CO-ordinatingthe claims with other Governmeiits and preparing
them in a fit and proper form, the Government of Israel helieves
that the sum of IL zg,ooo is a proper estimate for these expenses.
The Court is accordingly requested to award the sum of IL 25,ooo
on account of the expenses incurred in the preparation and sub-
mission of the diplomatic claim.

120. With regard tothe daim for costs, thisis a matter exclusively
within the discretion of the Court in accordance with Article 64
of the Statute of the Court. In the absence of any jurisprudence
by the Permanent Court of International Justice or the Inter-
national Court of Justice regarding the principles upon which costs
can be awarded in the international Court of Justice, the Govern-

ment of Israel will content itself at this stage with submitting that
in an appropriate case an award of costs may properly be included
in a judgment, and that this is an appropriate case. The experience
of municipal tribunals indicates that questions of costs can only be
properly argued after the written and oral pleadings have been
terminated, and indeed in some respects only after final judgment is
given. Subject therefore to such directions as may be given by the
Court at the appropriate stage in the proceedings, the Government
of Israel finds itself under the necessity of reserving, for the time
being, the presentation of its reasons in fact and in law which it
will wish to adduce in support of this request. Part III. THE SUBMISSIONS

(a) Sz6mmaryof Case

121. The principal facts and arguments advanced in this Memorial
may now be summarized.

(a) On 27 July 1955 Bulgarian armed forces opened fire on and
shot down and destroyed 4x-AKCand kiiled al1 its occupants-
passengers and crew. This occurred on Bulgarian temtory and in
explanation the Bulgarian Government freely and publicly admitted
that it has been incontestably established that its armed forces
acted in a certainhaste, and failed to take al1the necessas. measures
before they destroyed 4x-AKC,and were culpable.
(b) 4x-AKCwas a well-known commercial type of aircraft (Con-
stellation) openly flying its national colours and registration marks
and displaying its owners' name, and the incident occurred at a
time of completely normal peaceful relations between Israel and
Bulgaria and of a general relaxation of international tension.

(c) As stated in the second Israel Note Verbale of28 July 1955
(Annex 15). the armed forces of the Bulgarian Government dis-
played "shocking recklessness" and a "wanton disregard of human
life and of the elementary obligations of humanity which should
have governed their conduct". The Bulgarian action in shooting
down 4x-AKC,a civil passenger aircraft, was unjustified and dis-
played a degree of violence in no way comrnensurate with the
reality and the gravity of any possible or potential threat.
(d) Accordingly, the Bulgarian Govemment is internationxy
responsible for the actions of its armed forces in shooting down
4X-AKCOn 27 July 1955.

(e) The Bulgarian Government has failed to implement its
undertakings to the Government of Israel, and to other Govern-
ments, to identify and punish the culpable persons, and to pay the
compensation due.
(f) The Israel and the Bulganan Governments appear to hold
different opinions conceming certain circumstances preceding
and foiiowing the interception of 4x-AKCby the Bulganan forces,

including, in particular, the route alleged to have been followed
by 4x-AKC,the state of knowledge of the crew, and the existence,
nature and adequacy of any warning which the Bulgarian Govern-
ment has alleged was given to it. However, none of these disputed,
uncertain or unknown facts, the resolution of which may depend
upon evidence which the Bulgarian Government has withheld,
has any effect whatsoever upon the issue of Bulgarian responsibility
for the destruction of 4x-AKC.116 MEMORIAL OF ISR4EL (2VI 58)
(g) The financial loss suffered by Israel nationals and persons

on whose behalf this claim is preferred, is established at U.S.
Dollars 2,559,688.65. The Government of Israel is making no
claim in respect of its own direct losses, and is claiming
IL 25,000 towards the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the
claim, together with costs.

(b) The Submissions

122. On the basis of al1 the foregoing, the submissions of the
Government of Israel are:
1 On the first petition of the Application instituting Pro-
ceedings :
Whereas units of the armed forces of Bulgaria opened fire

on 4x-AKCand shot it down and destroyed it, killing ail its
occupants. as has been admitted by the Government of
Bulgaria;
And whereas the Government of Bulgaria has furthermore
admitted that in so doing its armed forces displayed a
certain haste and did not take dl the necessary measures
to compel the aircraft to land, and has stated that it would
identify and punish the culpable persons and pay compen-
sation;
And whereas such action \vas in violation of international

law;
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT,

TO JUDGE AND DECLARE.

That Bulgaria is responsible under international law
for the destruction of Israel aircraft 4x-.~KC,on 27 July
1955, and for the loss of life and property and al1 other
damage that resulted therefrom.

On the second vetition of the AvpAAcation instituti-f:
Proceedings :
II (a) Whereasthe Government of Israel has established that the
financial loss incurred bv the versons whose cause is beincr
adopted by itarnounts to'thesukof U.S. ~ollars~.55~,686.6<

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT
To give judgment in favour of the claim of the Govern-
ment of Israel and fix the amount of compensation due from
Bulgaria to Israel atU.S. Dollars 2,559,688.65.

(b) Whereas the Government of Israel has stated that a decla-
ration by the Court regarding the international responsibility
of Bulgaria, ascontained in Submission No. 1, would be
sufficient satisfaction and that it was waiving any further
claim to reparation; MEMORIAL OF ISRAEL (2 VI58) 117

And whereas, nevertheless, the Government of Israel has
asked the Court to take note of the failure of the Government
of Bulgaria to implement its undertaking to identify and
punish the culpable persons;

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT
To place the foregoing on record.

III On the third petition of the Application instituting Pro-
ceedings:
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT

(a)To judge and declare,
that the expenses incurred by the Government of Israel
in prepanng this claim, assessed at IL ~5,000, be home
hy the Government of Bulgaria.

(b)To decide,
that the costs of the Government of Israel in this case
shall be borne by the Government of Bulgaria.

IV And further to judge and declare that the sum awarded
under Submission No. II (a),with interest at six per cent
per annum from 27 July 1955 until the date of payment,
together with the expenses and costs incurred in this case,
shall be paid by the Government of Bulgaria to the Govern-
ment of Israel in Israel.

Dated this second day of June 1958.

(Signed) Shahtai ROSENNE,
Agent for the Government of Israel.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Jerusalem, Israel. Annexes to the Memorialof the
Governmentof Israel

Annex I
THE COMPANY'STIME-TABLE (SUMMER 1955)

[Not reproduced]

Anrtexa

PASSENGER MANIFESTS FOR FLIGHT qozjz6
[Nol reproduced]

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF PASSENGERS ON BOARD 4X-AKC

OUT OF VIENNA ON FLIGHT 402126
[Not reproduced]

Arlnex 4

CREW MANIFESTS FOR FLIGHT 402126
[Not reproduced]

Artnexj
CARGO MANIFESTS FOR FLIGHT 402/26

[Not reproduced]

Aurrex 6
PARTICULARS OF MAIL CARRIED ON FLlGHT 402/26

[Nol reproduced]

Annex 7

EL AL SHORT RANGE FLIGHT PLAN
FOR FLIGHT 402/26 OUT OF VIENNA 4SNEXES TO ISRAEL >lE.IlORIAL
119
Anner S

FOLIO NUMBER oo2647A FROM FLIGHT LOG BOOK
OF 4X-AKC, 26 JULY 1955

[Nol reprodtrced]

Annex 9

FLIGHT FORECAST AND ATC VIENNA
FLIGHT PLAN FOR FLIGHT 402126

[Nol reproduced]

AnitexIO
CONVENTION
ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION

SIGNED AT CHICAGOON 7 DECEMBER 1944
[Nol reproduced.SeeUnited NationsTreaty Series, Vopp.296-3631

Annex II

AERAD M.4P INDICATING AIR\t7AY .AMBER IO FROM
BELGRADE TO SALONIKI

[Aral reproduced]

Annex 12
NOTE VERBALE, DATED 28 JULY 1955, FROM THE ISRAEL
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE

BULGARIAN LEGATION, WITH CORRECTION
D.4TED 29 JULY 1955
[See AnrieI 10 Isrnel Applicati$p.,9-111

Altitex 13

COMMUNIQUÉISSUED BY THE BULGARIAN TELEGRAPHIC
AGENCY ON 28 JULY 1955

[Nol reprod~rced]120 ANNEXES TO ISRAEL hlEhIORIAL
Annex 14

NOTEVERBALE, DATED 28JULY 1955,FROMTHE BULGARIAN
FOREIGN hlINISTRY TO THE ISRAEL LEGATION IN SOFIA

[See Annex 3 to Israel Applicatip.rz]

Annex 15

SECOND NOTE VERBALE, DATED 28 JULY 1955, FROM THE
ISRAEL MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
RULGARIAN LEGATION

[See Annex z to Israel Applicatpp.,II-rz]

Annex 16
COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE BULGARIAN TELEGRAPHIC
AGENCY ON 3 AUGUST 1955

[A'ot reproduced]

Annex 17
NOTE VERBALE, DATED 4 AUGUST 1955,FROM THE
BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY TO THE ISRAEL

LEGATION IN SOFIA
[See Annex 4 to Israel Applicat$p.,13-14]

Annez rS
REPORT, DATED 18 AUGUST 1955.

OF THE ISRAEL COMMISSIONOF INQUIRY
[Not reproduced]

Annex 19

NOTE, DATED 27SEPTEIIBER 1955, FROM THE ISRAEL
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
BULGARIAN LEGATION

[Not reproduced] AKSEXES TO ISRAEL ZIEMORIAL
Annex 20

CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION OF 4X-AKC

[Not reproduced]

Annex 21

CERTIFICATE OF AIR\VORTHINESS OF 4X-AKC

[h'ol reproduced]

Anne% 22

CERTIFICATE OF SAFETY OF 4X-AKC

[Not reproduced]

Annex 23

CERTIFICATE OF AIRCRAFT TYPE

[Not reproduced]

Annex 24

THUNDERSTORM FLYING: EXTRACT FROM PART 3,
SECTION 25, PAGE IOF EL AL'S OPERATION MANUAL,
VOL. 1, DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 1952

[Not reproduced]

Annex 25

UNCONTROLLABLE DECOMPRESSION: EXTRACT FROM

PART 4, SECTION 14,PAGE g OF EL AL'SOPERATION MANUAL,
VOL. 1, DATED 24 JUNE 1953

[Not reproduced]

Annex 26

WEATHER CONDITIONS, BELGRADE TO SALONIKA,
ON 27 JULY 1955, o5ooZ TO O~OOZ
[Not reproduced] ANXEXES TO ISRAEL IEMORIAL
Annex 27

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL COJIhIUNICATIONS

[~Votreproduced]

Annex 28

AIDE-MCMOIRE, DATED IO AUGUST 1955, FROAITHE ISRAEL
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE GOVERNMEXTS
OF THE COUNTRIES \VHOSE NATION.4LS \VERE

AMOXG THE VICTIMS
[Not reproduced]

Annex29

SPECIïIIEN OF DEATH CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY
ISRAEL AUTHORITIES
[h'ot reproduced]

An~re30

SPECIMEN OF DEATH CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY
BULGARIAN AUTHORITIES
[Not reproduced]

Annex 31

NOTE VERBALE, DATED 14 FEBRUARY 1956, FROM
THE ISRAEL LEGATION IN SOFIA TO THE
BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY

[See Anne%5 to Israel Application, pp. 14-17]

Annex 32
NOTE VERBALE, DATED IOAUGUST 1956,FROM THE ISRAEL
LEGATION IN SOFIATO THE BULGARIANFOREIGN MINISTRY

[See Annex 6 to Israel Application, pp. 17-18]

Annex 33
NOTE VERBALE, DATED IOCTOBER 1956, FROM THE
BULGARIAN FOREIGN NINISTRY TO THE ISRAEL

LEGATION IN SOFIA
[See Annex 7 to Israel Applicatiofi. $9. 18-19] ANNEXES TO ISRAEL >IEMORIAL 123

Annex 34
NOTE VERBALE, DATED g NOVEMBER 1956, FROAl THE
ISRAEL LEGATION IN SOFIA TO THE BULGARIAN

FOREIGN AlINISTRY
[See Annex 8 to Israel Application, pp. 19-21]

Annex 35

NOTE VERBALE, DATED 27 AUGUST 1957, FROAf THE
ISRAEL LEGATION IN SOFIA TO THE BULGARIAN
FOREIGN MINISTRY

[See Annex 9 to Israel Application, p. zr]

Annex 36

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION,
AIR NAVIGATION COMMISSION,DOCUMENTAN-\\'P/r61q,

DATED 27 FEBRUARY 1957
[h'ot reproduced]

Annex 37

EIGHT CIRCULAI? LETTERS FROAI THE SECRETARIAT
OF THE USITED NATIONS AND ORIGINATING \\']TH THE
BULGARIAN GOVERNhfENT

No. 1, reference SCA 264/4/04 (2) DP - 20 March 1950
, 2, ,, SCA 264/4/04 (2) - 7 March 1951
,, 3, ., ,, - 25 April 1951

,, 4, ,, - 9 May 1951
,, 5 ,, Sv ,, - 23 May 1951
a# 6, ,, - j June 1951
,, 7, ,, - 21 November 1952

,, 8, ,, ,, ,, - 5 June 1953
[Not refiroduced]

Annex 38
LETTER, DATED r SEPTEhfBER rgjj, FROM THE ACTING

SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATIONORGANIZATION TOTHE ISRAEL CONSUL-GENERAL
IN MONTREAL

[Not reprodirced] ANKEXES TO ISRAEL hlEhlORIAL

An~~ex39
PARTICULARS OF CLAIMS, SUBMIlTED TO
THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT TOGETHER

WITH THE NOTE VERBALE
OF 14 FEBRUARY 1956
[Not reproduced]

Annex 40
PARTICULARS OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS, TOGETHER WITH
EXPLANATORY NOTES

[Not reproduced]

Annex 41

PARTICULARS OF CARGO CLAIMS,TOGETHER WITH
EXPLANATORY NOTES

[Not reproduced]

Annex 42

PARTICULARS OF THE COMPANY'SCLAIM,TOGETHER WITH
EXPLANATORY NOTES
[Not reproduced]