5. REJOINDER SUBMITTED BY THE GOVEIZNMENT OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I><irugr<iph Page:
Introduction. ............. r 245
Part 1.-Analysis of the issues now before the Court
in consequence of its Judgment oii the question of
jurisdiction. .......... 2-14 246
The effect of the Court's previous Judgment . .
The present proceedings involve a substantive
issue,i.e. the merits of the question defined in
the previousJudgment of the Court ....
In order to establish that its claim is well founded,
the Hellenic Government must show that the
Ambatielos claim is based, i.e. founded, on the
provisions of the1880Treaty ......
Part II.-Detailed statement of the United Kingdom
Govemment's contentions and examination of the
HellenicGovemment's contentions .....
United Kingdom Contention A : There is in the
present caseno claim basedon the 1886 Treaty .
Uncertain aspectswhichwould make it inequitableto
compelthe United Kingilom Governmentto accept
arbitrationin respecO/it ........
(1)the English courtsot.........hisremedies iri
(2)There has been undue delay on the part of
the Hellenic Government in pursuing its
claim under the Declnration of 1926 ...
CONCLUSIO NN^PARTII .........
Final Submission of the United Kingdom Govern-
ment. ............. 60 266
Introduction
I.The present Rejoinder is submitted in pursuance of the Order
made by the Court on the 18th July 1952. Part 1 analyzes the
issues now before the Court :Part II examines the contentions of246 REJOIKDER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (3 153)
the Hellenic Government, and states the contentions of the United
Kingdom Government in reply.
Part 1.-Analysis of the issues now before the Court in consequence
of its Judgment on the question of jurisdiction
The efect of the Court's previozhsJudgment
2. On the 1st July 1952, the Court delivered a Judgmerit l on the
issue of jurisdiction in th<:present case (I.C. J. Refiorts 1952, p. 28),
in which it stated as its forma1 conclusion that it had " ...jurisdic-
tion to decide whether the United Kingdom is under an obligation
to submit to arbitration, in accordance with thc Declaration of
1926%,the difference as to the validity of the Ambatielos claim,
in so fur as this claim is based on the I'reaty of 1886" (at p. 46 ;
italics added).
3. A principal issue in the prescnt proceedings is, therefore,
whether the claim of the Hellenic Government is in fact based on
the Treaty of 1886 ;and this in turn raises the question of what is
the correct meaning to be attributed to the term "based" in the
present connectioii.
The firesent firoceedingsinvolve a substantive isszce,i.e. the merits of
thequestion defined in the firewiot~sJudgment of the Cozcrt
4. In consequence of its Judgment disposing of the prelimindry
objectiori put fnrward by the United Kingdom Government on the
issue of jurisdiction, the Court is now concerned with a substantive
issue, i.e. thc merits of the question defined in that Judgment. In
its statement of reasons leading up ta the conclusion quoted in
paragraph z above, the Court said (Judgment, p. 44) that it was
for it to deciiie wliether "there should he a reference to a Commis-
sion of Arbitratiori" and "whether there is a difference between the
Parties within the meaning of the Declaration of 1926". The Court
then went on to say that, should it find "that there is such a dif-
ference, the Comniission of Arbitration would decide on the merits
of the difference".
5. It is thus clear that the present proceediiigs turn on the ques-
tion whether there does in fact cxist between the Parties "a difference
....within the meaning of the Declaration of 1926". If reference is
made to the terms of that Declaration, it will be seen that it relates
(and relates solely) to "claims ....based on the provisions of the
Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of 1886", and it provides that any
'Hercinafter referred to atbï"Judgmcnt"
1.e. thc Anglo-Greek Declaration of the 16th Jul,026, for the text of which
see31.e.the Anglo-Greekt.Treaty ofCanirnerce and Savigationofthe 10th Xovem-
ber 1886. For the textsee Annexe N of the Greek Memorial, atp. 47.~4~ REJOINDER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (3 1 53)
to which the Court is requested to refer. It is submitted that theyare
factors which should be taken into acconnt in deciding whether thc
United Kingdom Govemment should now be required to submit
the case to arbitration. Since, however, theother aspects of the
case have been very fully argued in the Counter-Memorial, the
present Rejoinder is confined to the issue whether, even assuming
the Ambatielos claim to be uzellfounded as regards its basic merits,
it is a claim which can in any reasonable and legitimate sense be
regarded as "based" on the Treaty of 1886, and ta the questions
of exhaustion of local remedies and prescription which are dealt
with in paragraphs 54 to 58 below. It will, of course, be for the
Heilenic Government to establish to the satisfaction of the Court
that its present contention, concerning the applicability of the 1886
Treaty to the claim, is well founded.
In orderto establishthatils daim is me11 fozhndedt,he Hellenic Gouern-
ment must show thatthe Ambatielos claim is based, 2.e.founded,on
theprovisions of the 1886 Treaty
9. Since the remedy sought is a declaration that the United King-
dom Govemment is under an obligation to submit the Ambatielos
claim to compulsory arbitration, the Hellenic Government must
demonstrate that this claim is "based on the provisions of the
Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of 1886" (see paragraph 5 above).
That it must demonstrate this is, in effect, admitted by the Hellenic
Government in its Reply (see, for instance, paragraphs 6, 19, zo
and 23) ; and the main reason for the individual opinion of Judge
Spiropoulos was equally that the wording of paragraph z of the
operative conclusion of the Court appeared "to impose upon the
applicant State the duty of establishing that the Ambatielos claim
'isbased on a provision of the Treaty of 1886' " (Judgment, p. 55).
It is indeed clear that only on this basis can any obligation to submit
the dispute to arbitration arise ;and it can scarcely be doubted that
it was precisely for this reason (and for little other reason) that the
Hellenic Govemment, at a very late stagc:of the discussions 1, cited
this Treaty, which (as the United Kingdom Government hopes to
show in Part II of the present Rejoinder) has no real connection
with the Ambatielos claiin at all.
'The Court wi11 no doubt recollect (see IJnitedKingdom Countcr-hlemorial,
paragraph 36) that it \vas not unti,939. nearly twenty years after the events
complained of in the Ambatieloscase.and fourteen aftcr the case was first raisecl
with the United Kingdom Government, that it occurred to the Hcllcnie Govern-
ment to hring the1886 Treaty intothe inattrrIt is impossible to suppose that the
HellenicCovernment was unaware of this Treaty or of t1926 Declaration during
it as having any bearingondthe matter.In the circumstances,only onedeductioned
is possible. narnely. that the Trivaseventually cited for the purpose of reeking
to found adaim to compulsory arbitratioahich would not otherwise have had
any basis, rather thanon account of any subal<intirelevance the Treaty might
hare had to the issue. REJOIh'DER OF THE UNITED KINGDOnl (3 1 53) 249
IO. In order to show that a given claim is "based on" the provi-
sions of a certain treaty, it is clearly not sufficient simply to cite
the provisions of the treaty aiid to allege that they are relevant and
that a breach of them has occurred. Nor, so the United Kingdom
Government wishes to suggcst, is it enough to cite a numher of
provisions, and then, by the use of iinnatural, forced and artificial
constructions, seek to show that they might remotely have some
possible bearing on the issiie.
II. The United Kingdom Government in fact submits that, for
an obligation for recourse to compulsory arbitration to exist on the
score that the issf~einvolves a claim "based on" the prouisio~isof a
given treaty (and this is what the 1926 Declaration provides), the
claim must be one which finds its substantive foondation in the
treaty and not outside it. If this is correct, such an obligation can
only arise if the allegcd breach of treaty is the principal issue
involved, and forms the actual foundation of the claim-for other-
wise the claim is not based on the treaty in any real or genuine
sense, and the treaty aspect, in so far as it exists at all, is men:ly
auxiliary to a claim based on something else. The alleged breach of
treaty being the sole issuc which, in the present case, is susceptible
of obligatory reference to nrbitration, the necessary condition, i.e.
that the claim should be basedon the treaty. cannot be regarded as
fulfilled, if the alleged breach of treaty is not the actualor substantial
basis and foundation of thc claim.
12. For these reasons, the United Kingdom Govcrnment caiinot
agree with the thesis advanced at the end of paragraph 20 of the
Greek Reply, to the effcct that an obligation to submit the dispiite
to arbitration exists so long asits "lack of a basis" in the 1886
Treaty is not "apparent". Merely to show (if indeed this could be
shown) that there is not a manifest absenceof such a basis, is very
far indeed from establishing that such a basis in fact exists-that
the claim is actually, as the Declaration of 1926 requires, based on
the provisions of the Treaty.
13.-(1) The Hellenic Government must, in the submission of the
United Kingdom Government, establish two distinct propositions :
First, that the Ambatielos claim comes within the scope of the
Treaty of 1886. Here the Hellenic Government must show that,
upon the proper construction of certain specified provisions ofthe
Treaty of 1886, one or more of the items of claim (the treatment of
the Claimant by the hlinistry of Shi ping in respect of the sale,
delivery and mortgage of the ships ;tk ealleged denial of justice in
the Englishcourts :and the alleged unjust enrichment of the Crown)
are in the class of subject-matter intended to he covered by those
provisions.
Second, that, upon the assumption that the allegations of fact
by the Hellenic Government, made in support of the claim, arc250 REJOINDER OF THE UXlTED KINGDOhl (31 53)
substantially true, those alleged facts constitute a breach of
certain specified provisions of the Treaty of 1886.
(2) If the Hellenic Governnient fails to establish the first propo-
sition, then it has no cause of action, since the claim is not based
upon the Treaty'of 1886, because the Treaty has no relevance or
application to it at all. If. however, the Hellenic Government suc-
ceeds oii the first proposition in respect of any item of its claim,
it must still establish the secoiid proposition in respect of that item.
The question then is whether, if the allegations of fact made by the
Hellenic Govemment relative to that particular item were asstitited
to be true, they urouldcoiistitute abreach of those provisions which,
if it had established the first proposition, the Hellenic Government
would have shown to relate to that item. If the Hellenic Govern-
ineiit fails to establish this second proposition, then the claim is not
based on the Treaty of 1886 in the sense that there is nothing for
the United Kingdom to aiiswer, and, therefore, an order for arbitra-
tion is not necessary or justified.
14.In Part II of the preseiit Rejoinder, which is iiow to follow,
the United Kingdom Government will endeavour to show that the
Hellenic Government has not established either of these two propo-
sitions. The United Kingdom Government will also endeavour to
sho\v that, even if the test suggested by the Hellenic Government
in paragraph zo of its Reply is adopted, i.e. that it is only necessary
to establish that the contention involved is a "serious" one "deserv-
ing of examination", it fails by that test also. The United Kingdom
Government will submit in fact that, to use a term employed in the
third sub-paragraph of paragraph zo of the Greek Reply, the con-
tention that the claim is based on the 1886 Treaty is essentially
factitious l; and that, as the whole history of the case shows, this
contention is put forward, not on its merits as a substantive con-
tention, but as a procedural device, in order to found jurisdiction
for a compulsory reference to arbitration. It cannot be regarded as
amounting to a serious contention that a breach of the 1886 Treaty
has occurred on which the claim in the Ambatielos case is in any
real sense "based".
Part II.-Detailed statement of the United Kingdom Government's
Contentions and examination of the Hellenic Governrnent's
Contentions
15. The principal contentioris ivhich the United Kingdoin will
iio\rrput fonvard are :
' The French term usediiitheoriginal "!acLiceMAl1citations frothe Hellenic
(:overnrnent's Replyare taken froni the translation prepared by the Regisofy
tlic Court. REJOISDER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (31 53) 251
A. That there is in the present case no claim based on the 1886
Treaty,and that the claim put fonvard on behalf of $Ir. Amba-
tielos is not so based in the sense in which the phrase "based
on the provisions of the Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of
1886" in the 1926 Declaration ougbt properly to be under-
stood.
B. That this case has certain aspects which wonld make it
inequitable to compcl thc United Kingdom Government to
accept arbitration in respect of it, and which should lead 1:he
Court to find (in the terms iised on p.44 of its previous Judg-
ment) that the case is not "a proper case" (un cas approprié)
in which "to adjudge that there should be a reference to a
Commission of Arbitration" (potcr dire qu'il devrait y avoir
sou~tzissiorà me co+nmissionarbitrale).
United Kingdom Contention A :There is in the present case no claim
based on the 1886 Treaty
16. The principal arguments which will be advanced in support
of this contention are :
(1) that an obligation to submit a dispute to compnlsory arbitra-
tion must be clearly established, and the case must be shown
to come fairly within the terms and language of the relevant
arbitration clause according to its natural and ordinary mean-
ing ;
(2) that the arbitration clause in the prescnt case was intended,
as is shown by its language and the surrounding circum-
stances, to relate to cases involving an alleged breach of the
Treaty of 1886 ;and
(3) that the Ambatielos claim does not have this character
because
(i) the provisions invoked by thc Hellenic Government,
namely Articles 1, X, XII and XV of the Treaty, are
each concerned with a subject-matter quite distinct from
the items of the Ambatielos claim ;
(ii) even if it is held that ccrtain provisions of these specified
articles are concerned with the same subject-matter as
certain items of the claim, and it is assumed that the
allegations of fact by the Hellenic Government suppcirt-
ing these items are true, these allegations do not meet
the conditions necessary to establish a breach of those
provisions ;
{iii) in fact the Ambaticlos claim, as formulated by the Helle-
nic Goverinment, cannot be based upon any provisions of
the Treaty coiisidered in their natural and ordinary
17 252 REJOINDER OF THE UNITED KINGDON (31 53)
rneaning, and it is only by an unnatural, forced and
artificial construction of terms and concepts that these
provisions can be given a meaning that might even
remotely relate them to the issue involved in the cla;m
(iv) the Ambatielos claim is essentially based on alleged
breaches of the general rules of international law govern-
ing the treatment of foreigners, and the attempt base
it upon the provisions of the Treaty 1886 is motivated
by the desire to found obligatory jurisdiction for an
arbitral commission over a claim which has always been
manifestly so weak as not to deserve serious considera-
tion between governments.
Argument (1)inparagraph 16
17. There is no need to labour this point. The principle is well
established, and has been recognized and applied by the Court, that
the jurisdiction of international tribunals in contested cases depends
on the consent of the parties, given either ad hoc, or generally in
respect of a class of cases. In the latter event, it must he established
affirmatively that, on a reasonable and natural interpretaof the
relevant clause, the case does corne within the specified class, and
this must be established by the applicant or plaintiff State. This
principle is per se sufficient to dispose of the view, put forward by
the Hellenic Government, that the requirement that the claim
should be based on the provisions of th1886 Treaty is satisfied if
it can merely be shown tliat it is not manifest or apparent that a
basis in the Treaty is lacking. Such a thesis would give arbitral
clauses in treaties a scope and extension which in most cases their
authors could certainly never have contemplated.
Argzimt:nt(2)inparagraph 16
18.-(1 )n the present case, such obligation as may exist to
submit to arbitration arises from the Declaration of1926 , hich
the Court in its previous Judgment found to be applicable to the
Ambatielos claim "in so far" (but only in so far) "as this claim is
based on the Treaty of1886" It is, however, abundantly clear that,
in drawing up the 1926 Declaration, the Parties haaspecific, and
limited object in view. This point was fully discussed in the previous
proceedings, and the Court then in effect found that the object in
question was to ensure that claims arising under th1886 Treaty
should not, by reason of the lapse of that Treaty or its replacement
by the later1926 Treaty, be left without means of settlement. It
is, therefore, clear that the class of claims which the Parties had
in mind was that of claims arising naturally and directly from the
provisions of th1886 Treaty, and that they can have had no inten-
tion of including claims, the substantive basis of which lay outside REJOlSDER OF THE USlTED KlSGDOM (3 I 53) 253
the Treaty, or to open the door to the obligatory arbitration of
such claims.
(2) If the Court will at this point turn to.paragraphs 7 to 15 of
the Greek Reply, it will see that, on the view of the Treaty there
advanced, and on the interpretation of its provisions there suggested,
there wouid in fact be scarcely any claim on behalf of an individual
that could not be founded upon one of the provisions of the four
articles invoked by the Hellenic Government. The line of possible
claims could be extended almost indefinitely.
Argument (3) in paragraph 16
19. The point at issue here is whether the Hellenic Government
has established the tivo propositions referred to in paragraph 13
above. The question is not whether the allegations made by the
Hellenic Govemment and the substance of the Ambatielos claim
are well founded, though the United Kingdom Govemment, of
course, contends that they are not. The point at issue is whether
the 1886 Treaty is applicable to these allegations, even if true. The
United Kingdom Government will now give the detailed reasoiis
why, in its view, these provisions, and, in particular. Articles 1, X,
XII and XV (3) cited bythe HeUenicGovernment, are not so appli-
cable, and why, in consequence, the Ambatielos case does not in-
volve a claim "based on" the provisions of the Treaty.
20. It is, however,necessary to deal first with a preliminary point ;
namely, the suggestions made from several quarters that the United
Kingdom Government has already admitted that the daim is based
on the 1886 Treaty.
The United Kingdom Governmenthas never admitted, and does not
nomadmit, that the Ambatielosclaim is or calabe basedon theprovi-
sions of the1886 Treaty
21. Certain suggestions have been made that the United Kingdom
Government has already admitted that the Ambatielos claim is
prima facie to be held as based on theTreaty of 1886. Thus, Judge
Levi Carneiro, in his individual opinion (Judgment, p. 49). cited a
passage from the United Kingdom Counter-Memorial and said :
"The British Government did not reject the reasoning on the
ground that the claim was not based on the Treaty of 1886,although
it disputed theenial of justice and the inequality of treatment. On
the contrary, it admitted that the claim was,primafacie,based on
the Treaty of 1886.
Itsfirst submission was that the Court
ment that it should order the United Kingdom Government toovern-
submit to arbitration a claim by theNellenicGovernment based cin
Article XV or any other article of the Treaty of 1886'."254 REJOINDER OF THE UPIITED KIPIGDOAI (3 153)
And, in referring to a passage in the Oral Arguments, he said (Judg-
ment, p. 50) that Counselfor the United Kingdom "did not attempt
to show that the claim was not based on the Treaty of 1886".
Again, the Hellenic Government in its Reply (paragraph g) remarks
of Article XV of the Treaty of 1886 that "an admission made by
the respondent Party as to the apparent connection between that
provision and the claim of the Hellenic Government (p. 289 of the
Oral Arguments) is to be noted ....".Professor Rolin made a similar
point during the oral hearing (Oral Arguments, p. 333).
22. An examination of the United Kingdom's oral and written
pleadings will show that no such admission was in fact made. On
the contrary, the United Kingdom Government consistently main-
tained, in so far as it !irasnecessary to do so at the stage reached,
that the Ambatielos claim \vas not, and could not, be "based" on
the Treaty of 1886. First, in paragraph 1 (i) (a) of its Conclusions
(Counter-hfemorial. p. 179) to which Judge Levi Carneiro referred,
the United Kingdom Government was concerned only with the
issue of jurisdiction. The effect of the sentence is made clear by the
use of the words "or any other article of theTreaty of 1886". What
the United Kingdom Government was herc asking the Court to
find was that, even if the daim could be shown to be based on one or
more provisions of the Treaty, theCourt had no jz~risdictionin respect
of it.he words cannot, therefore, in any sense be taken asan admis-
sion that the claim was in fact based upon the Treaty.
23. Secondly, at page 292 of the Oral Arguments, to which Judge
Levi Carneiro referred, Counsel for the United Kingdom was
immediately concerned with the question whether, even assuming
that the Ambatielos claim was covered by the Treaty of 1886
(which was never admitted), it was also covered by the Declaration
of 1926. For this purpose, it was not material to consider whether
the claim could in fact be based on the Treaty of 1886, for the
United Kingdom argument was that, even if it was so based, the
Declaration did not operate to confer any jurisdiction upon the
Court in respect of the claim. Finally, on page 289 of the Oral
Arguments, Counsel for the United Kingdom referred to the
Treaty of 1886 as follows :
".... in view of the provisionsof the 1886Treaty, the only treaty
provisionswhich can be relied upon, the claim can really only be
put on the basis of the principles of general international law".
He \irenton to observe that the Hellenic Government "find a certain
difficulty in bringing the actual claim they do make under the
wording of Article 15 (3)or of any other article of the 1886Treaty".
Far from admitting that the claim was in fact based on the Treaty
of 1886, the United Kingdom Government was here showing that,
the Treaty of 1886 bcing the only treaty to which thc Declaration
of 1926 referred, it was precisely because any attcmpt to base the REJOIXDER OF THE UXITED KISGDOlI (3 153) 255
claim directly upon that Treaty failed and must fail, that the
Hellenic Government must have recourse to the general mles of
international law, and that it was on tKese rules and not on the
Treaty that the claim \vas really based. That is the view which the
United Kingdom Government has taken throughout, and the view
which it takes now.
The Ambatielos claim does not cornewithin the scope of Articles I,
X, XII or XV or any other provision of the Treaty of 1886, in that
none of the items ofthe claim arein the class of sz~bject-matintended
to becoveredby those Articles or provisions
24. Before proceeding to consider in detail the relevance of the
provisions of the 1886 Treaty to the claim, the United Kingdom
Government wishes to make one suhmission of a more general
character. At the root of the claim there is a complaint of a breach
of contract by the Crown. The Claimant alleges that late delivery
of six of the nine ships, and non-delivery of two of the ships, was
a breach of the contract of sale of July 1919, whereby he suffered
loss and damage. He further alleges that the Crown failed to comply
with the terms of the subsequent mortgage of the ships. It cannot
be argued that the alleged breach of the contract of sale or mortgage
,
was, by and in itself, a breach of any provision of the Treaty of
1886, for this would, in effect, be to say that a treaty of commerce
and navigation between two countries guarantees the observance of
every commercial contract concluded under municipal law by
traders between the two countries-a proposition which cannot
seriously be maintained. Nor does the fact that the Crown was a
party to the contract of sale of the ships alter the case;for, as the
Hellenic Government itself insists (Memorial, paragraph IZ), the
Ministry of Shipping was, for the purposes of this contract, acting
as a private trader. The obligations of the Crown under a private
law contract are wholly distinct from its treaty obligations, although
as a private trader it is entitled to the same bencfits under the
Treaty as anyone else.
25. The detailed reasons now be given why, according to the
view taken by the United Kingdom Government, the provisions
of the 1886 Treaty have no application to the Amhatielos claim.
26.-(1) This contention will be supported by a review of the
four Articles of the Treaty (paragraphs 27 to 32 below) and by
certain general considerations concerning the national and most-
favoured-nation treatment referred to iri them (paragraphs 33 to
39 below).
(2)The provisions of the 1886 Treaty said to be applicable are
Articles 1, X, XII and XV (3). In order to determine the truc scope
and meaning of these Articles, it is necessary to corisider the Treaty
as a whole. Its operative provisions faIl into two parts :Articles 1to X, which are concerned with commerce (trade) and navigation ;
and Articles XI to XVI, which contain establishment provisions.
Therefore, the Hellenic' Government, in citing Articles 1 and X,
and Articles XII and XV (3),relies on two articles relating to
commerce and navigation, and on two articles containing establish-
ment provisions.
Articles I and X
27. Articles 1 and X will be seen upon closer examination to be
concerned solely with the movement of trade between the two
countries. They are in general terms, and together confer upon the
nationals of each country the right to national and most-favoured-
nation treatment in matters of commerce and navigation in relation
to the other country. Articles II to IX explain and develop the
terms of the general Articles 1 and X, and it is only by reading ail
these Articles together, and as a whole, that it is possible to arrive
at the trne meaning of the words "commerce and navigation".
28. Article 1 provides for "reciprocal freedom of commerce and
navigation" and permits the nationals of each country "freely to
come, with their ships aiid cargoes, to al1places, ports and rivers"
in the territories of the other "to which native subjects generally
are or may be permitted to come". Article II deals with duties and
prohibitions upon the import of goods, and Article III with duties
and prohibitions upon the export of goods into and from the two
countries. Article IV provides for exemption from transit dues and
national treatment in al1 that relates to warehonsing, bounties,
facilities and drawbacks. Article V permits the import and export
of goods between the two conntries in British and Greek vessels
respectively. Article VI forbids the imposition of any port duesupon
incoming vessels of the 'two countries higher than those imposed
upon national vessels ;and Article VI1 calls for national treatment
of the vessels of each country in regard to the coasting trade, and
to the use of port and dock facilities. Article VI11 establishes rules
for warships and merchant vessels driven into port by stress of
weather or accident, and for defraying the expenses of their stay
and refit. Article IX defines British and Greek vessels for the pur-
poses of the Treaty. Article X provides that "in al1matters relating
to commerce and navigation" each country shall unconditionaüy
place the trade and navigation of the other on the footing of the
most-favoured-nation.
29.-(1) Articles 1 to X establish in some detail the régime inthe
framework of which the words "commerce and navigation" in
Articles 1 and X are to be nnderstood. As a matter of construction,
the special provisions of-4rticles1 to IX limit the meaning of these
words and make it impermissible to abstract them from their con-
text and give them a general meaning. It is also beyond dispute that REJOINDER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (3 1 53) .257
the subject-matter of the Ambatielos claim is not a matter of
"navigation" within any meaning that can be given to it in
Articles 1 and X.
(2) The régime established by Articles 1 to X relates solely to
the import and export of goods between the two countries and the
movement of ships carrying goods and passengers between them.
These Articles in fact regulate the entry of ships into ports and
rivers and their departure therefrom, the use of port, dock a.nd
warehouse facilities, and the imposition of duties and dues upon
ships and goods entering and leaving.
(3) But, even if "commerce" in Articles 1 and X means "com-
mercial activity" in the broader sense of the purchase and sale of
goods, it does not, and cannot, include the incidents of the adminis-
tration of justice.
(4) The conclusion is that the concepts of commerce and naviga-
tion on the one hand, and of the administration of justice on the
other, are quite separate concepts involving different orders of
legal ideas.
30. The above construction, which, it is submitted, is that yielded
by the plain and natural meaning of the language of Articles 1 to
X, is confirmed by the character of Articles XI to XVI, which
contain establishment provisions, and so complete the framework
within \!,hichthe nationals of the two countries are entitled to carry
on their trade and business. Article XI permits the mutual appoint-
ment of consuls and consular agents. Articles XII,XIII, XIV and
XV guarantee certain privileges for the nationals of each country
who reside, acquire property or carry on trade or business in the
other country; and it will be necessary to examine two of these
Articles (XII and XV) more closelybelow. Article XVI gives certain
rights to consuls in the recovery of deserters from vessels of their
respective countries. The remaining articles of the Treaty are
formal.
ArticleXII
31. By no stretch of the imagination can this Article be regarded
as having anything to do with the allegations of denial of justice
put fonvard in the Ambatielos case. As in-the case of Articles 1
and X, it is only necessary to read Article XII for this fact to be
immediately apparent, and the United Kingdom Government is
reluctant to spend time in trying to pro5.e-~vhere there is no burden
upon it to do so-that provisions about liberty to enter and reside,
to possess houses and businesses, and to carry on commerce, and
the right not to be subject to imposts and obligations that are
greater than those imposed upon nationals, have no bearing what-
ever on the issues involved in the Ambatielos claim. Again, quite
different orders of ideas are involved. Neverthcless, the point is 258 REJOINDER OF THE UNITED KINGDON (3I 53)
examined in the light of the Greek contentions in paragraphs 42
to 43 below.
ArticleXV (3)
32. This is the only provision of the 1886 Treaty which could,
conceivably, be regarded as having any relevance to the Ambatielos
claim. In fact it has none, because the essence of that claim is not
that the Claimant did not have access to the courts (which he
clearly did or these issues could never have arisen),or even that he
did not have access on the same terms as nationals ;but that, upon
having such access. he \vas not properly treated in the courts, \\.hich
is a wholly different question, and one not covered by this or any
other provision of the Treaty. Only if he had been discriminated
against as a foreigner could it he said that Mr. Ambatielos did not
have access to the courts on the same terms as nationals ;but this
allegation has not been made, or else has now been withdrawn.
Somegeneralconsiderations
33. The truth is that the entire case of the Hellenic Government
is an attempt to argue that the 1886Treaty incorporates the general
provisions of international law relating to the administration of
justice. How such a result can be derived from the provisions which
have been analyzed above is, however, not made in any way clear.
34. The essence of the argument appears to be contained in para-
graphs rz and 13 of the Hellenic Government's Reply. It is there
apparently contended that the conclusion of a contract is a matter
of commerce, and that, therefore, al1 subsequent "difficulties ....
such as litigation resulting from commercial contracts" are matters
covered by the Treaty.Even if this decidedly specious and sweeping
argument urere admitted, what does being covered by the Treaty
involve ? The argument put forward in thesc paragraphs (12 and
13) of the Greek Reply is that it involves a right to most-favoured-
nation treatment, and (apparently) that most-favoured-nation
treatment involves fer se a right to the benefit of the general rules
of international law governing the admiiiistration of justice (denial
of justice, minimum standard, etc.).
35. The United Kingdom Government submits that most-
'favoured-nation treatment involves and can involve no such thing.
In the first place, the very fact that these rights are general inter-
national law rights, means that States and individuals are entitled
to them in any event, irrespective of treaty. Inthe absence of express
words, therefore, no treaty is to be read as purporting to confersuch
a right, since it already exists;and this will be by virtue of general
international law and not by virtue of the treaty. The right will not
therefore be "based" on the treaty concerned. REJOISDER OF THE USITED KISGDOII (3 I53) 259
36. Secondly, and even more important, there is the question of
what is involved in the conception of most-favoured-nation treat-
ment. hlost-favoured-nation treatment denotes (asits name implies)
the treatment accorded to the most-favozrred-nation by virtue of a
specific undertaking towards it individually-not the treatment
accorded as a matter of general obligation to al1 nations by virtue
of uni\~ersally binding, and already existing, riiles of basic inter-
national law. If the latter treatment is owed to a given country,
it is not so owed by virtue of any most-favoured-nation obligation,
but by reason of the inherent obligations of general international
law. Most-favoured-nation treatment is essentially treatment that
would not be owed but for a specific undertaking to grant it. This
is not the case with treatment owed by virtue of general rules of
international Iaw.
37. It follows that a right to most-favoured-nation treatment is
quite outside, and has nothing to do with, a right to treatmcnt
according to the general rules of international law. Indeed, it coiild
more properly be maintained that the latter treatment, so far from
being implied by most-favoured-nation treatment, constitiited
least-favoured-nation treatment, since it is owed automatically to
al1 countries, even the least specially privileged. The Hellenic
Government is perfectly correct in contending that the United
Kingdom owed (asit maintains it accorded) such treatment to the
Claimant. But it was not on the basis of the 1886 Treaty that
this treatment was owed-but on the basis of the general rules of
international law ; and the most-favoured-nation (and indeed the
national) treatment clauses of theTreaty dealing with such matters
as commerce, navigation, residence, taxes, etc., had no effect on
or relevance to this obligation.
38. If, of course, parties like, by the use of express words, to
incorporate in their treaties the general rules of international law
on any matter, that is their affair. But they inust do so expressly,
and, in the absence of express words, no presumption can arise that
they intended it-rather is the presumption in the reverse sense.
39. In any case, provisions for national or most-favoured-nation
treatment cannot $er se have such an effect. In this connection the
Hellenic Government, in paragrapb S of its Reply. coupled with the
observations contained in the tmo middle paragraphs of page 223 of
itswritten Observations and Submissions on the preliminary ques-
tion of jurisdiction, apparently attempts to argue (though very
briefly and without developing the point) that the general rules of
international la\\, respecting the administration of justice must be
regarded as incorporated in the 1886 Treaty because of the provi-
sions of some old treaties concluded by the United Kingdom between
1654 and 1670 \\rith certain other countries, and \\.hich contain
provisions for the treatment of the respective nationals of the260 REJOIKDER OF THE UXITED KINGDOM (3 1 53)
country in accordance with "common right", "justice and equity",
and "love and friendship". Even if these very general provisions
were apt to relate to and cover the specific rules of general inter-
national law concerning the administration of justice (and it is
submitted that they are not), they could still not be regarded as
being incorporated in an ordinary treaty of commerce and naviga-
tion, such as the 1886 Treaty, merely by reason of most-favoured-
nation clauses which, as has already been shown, deal solely with
commerce and navigation in the strict sense, a sense which, accord-
ing to the normal use of language, cannot include the administra-
tion of justice. This point was made by Counsel for the United
Kingdom (Oral Arguments, p. zgo) when he said that, in order for
the Greek contention to be correct, "you would have to find a
provision in the Treatywhich incorporates general international law
as part of the Treaty". He then went on :
".... there is no such provision in tlie 1886Treaty ....and1 have
not found in our opponents' observations any statement that there
is such a provision, though it appears that they are searching for a
provision of the kind tlirough the most-favoured-nation clause. But
the United Kingdom contend that the most-favoured-nation clause
in the 1886 Treaty would not attract a provision of that kind in
another treatyeven if it could he found, because the most-favoured-
nation clause in the 1886Treaty is limited to matters of trade and
commerce."
Even ifthe Ambatielos claim comes within the generalscofieof any
of the9rouisions of the Treaty of 1886 and the allegationsof fact, made
by the Hellenic Government in sufifiort of the claim, are assumed to
be true, none of the facts allegedwould constitute a breachof any
firovision O!the Treaty and, in fiarticularO/ Articles 1,X, XII or
XV (3)
40. The foregoing general considerations tend, it is submitted,
to rule out a firiori the Greek contention respecting the effect of the
1886 Treaty. It is nevertheless desirable to examine more closely
how the Hellenic Governrnent puts its case.
41. Of Article 1the Hellenic Government, after apassingreference
in paragraph 8 of the Reply, merely says in paragraph 14 :
"...tlie Greek claimmay be bascd too on two other articles, Artic1e
and Article XII, which guarantee to Greek nationals the treatment
ofBritish nationals.The first ofhose provisions is, it is true, limited
in its terms to commerce and navigation, but, as has been seen in
connection with Article X, it in no way followsthat it is not appli-
cable in the present case-on the contrary."
In connection with Article X, the Hellenic Government had said
(Reply, paragraph 12) : REJOINDER OF THE UNITED KINGDODI (3 153) 261
"One must, indeed,take as heingcovered by the provisionsof the
Treaty of 1886, 'al1difficultiesarising fromcommercialtransactions,
such as litigation resulting from commercialcontracts'."
42. In paragraphs 15 to 17 of the Reply, the Hellenic Govern-
ment sets out the grounds for its complaint that the Claimant \vas
not accorded national treatment, namely, (i) alleged failure of the
Crown to meet the delivery dates but retention by it of the agreed
purchase price ;(ii) alleged non-compliance by the Crown with the
mortgage deeds of the 4th Novemher 1920 ; (iii) alleged failun: of
the Crown to produce documents and cal1 witnesses at the trial in
1922, whereby the trial judge was prevented from deciding the case
in the light of ali material evidence ; and (iv) alleged departuri: of
the English Court of Appeal from its own practice by refusing the
Claimant's application for leave to produce new evidence.
43. The United Kingdom Government contends that Article 1 is
inapplicable to al1 these complaints and in fact wholly irrelevant
for two reasons.
Firstly, on the proper construction of Article 1, which, it is sub-
mitted, is that set out in paragraphs 27 to 30 above, particuklrly
as to the true meaning of the phrase "freedom of commerce and
navigation", the alleged facts of which the Hellenic Government
complains in (i) and (ii) above could not possibly, even if proved,
constitute a breach of Article 1. Similarly, the conduct alleged in
(iii) and (iv) above could not, upon any reasonable constructiori of
the phrase, constitute an interference with the "freedom of com-
merce and navigation", or be regarded as having to do with the
movement of ships and goods into or out of the ports and rivers of
the Parties to the Treaty.
Secondly-and this reason is decisive even if the first reason urere
held to be inadequate-the Hellenic Government has not shown, or
even attempted to show, that the Claimant was accorded treatment
other or more unfavourahle than that which a British national would
have received in similar circumstances.
44. It will be convenient to deal next with Article XII, since it
is upon the undertaking to grant national treatment, contained in
that Article, that the Hellenic Government appears to rely. Of
article XII the Hellenic Government says (Reply, paragraph 8) :
"Article XII likewise provides for national treatment for the
personsand property ofnationals ofeach Contracting Party in fiscal
matters and generally exempts them from obligations of any kind
which are different from orgreater than those which are or m:iy he
imposed upon nationals."
Again, in paragraph 14 of the Reply, the Helleiiic Government
states that Article XII guarantees national treatment. REJOIXDER OF THE UXITED KINGDO31 (3 1j3) 263
Again, in paragraph IO of its Reply, the Hellenic Government main-
tains that :
"its inx.ocationof the general principlesof international law hnds a
wholly sufficient legal basis in the most-fax-oured-nationclause in
Article S of the Treaty of 1886and in the undertakings subscnbed
to by the United Kingdomin relation to other States, to treat their
nationals inconformity with equity and justice".
In paragraphs 12 and 14 of its Reply, the Hellenic Government goes
on to say that :
"One must, indeed. take as beingcoveredby the provisionsof the
Treaty of 1886,al1'dificulties arising fromcommercialtransactions,
such as litigation resulting from commercialcontracts' ",
and that Article X
"....indirectly, by the effect of the most-favoured-nation claiise.
confers upon Greek business men the benefit of treatment in con-
formity with the general principles of international law...".
47. It has, however, clearly been shown in paragraphs 33 to 39
above that the existence of a most-favoured-nation clause has, and
can have, no such effect as the Hellenic Government maintains in
these paragraphs of its pleaclings. For instance, how conld a most-
favoured-nation clause confer "upon Greek business men the benefit
of treatment in conformity with the general principles of inter-
national law" when Greek business men are already entitled in any
event to such treatment precisely because of such general rules ?
48. The real truth, surely, is that, since it is plainly not possible
to argue that the alleged breach of the contract of sale uras in itself
a breach of any provision of the Treaty of 1886 (see paragraph 24
above), and since the Hellenic Government has not attempted to
bring, and cannot bring, any evidence that the Claimant was denied
access to the courts or discriminated against by reason of his
nationality, it is obliged to resort to a plea of denial of justice, and
to attempt to bring this under the Treaty of 1886 as being contrary
to certain rules of general international law said to be imported iiito
the Treaty by the operation of Article X upon certain other treaties
to which the United Kingdom is a party. But, since the rules of
general international law ex hyfiotlzesiexist in any case and iniie-
pendently of any treaty, this argnment is necessarily misconceivi:d,
as has already been shown. Furthermore, as has been showii in
paragraph 39 above, the 1886 Treaty does not in fact incorpor:rte
or purport to incorporate these rules either in itself or by t.he
operation of the older treaties cited.
49. The United Kingdom Government fnrther contends that,
upon a correct interpretation of Article X, the expression "al1
matters relating to commerce and navigation" contained in it is
to be construed by reference to the preceding articles. The common264 REJOINDER OF THE UNITED KINGDOhl (3 153)
factor of these articles is the movement of ships and goods, and to
read the expression in Article X as extending beyond this is incor-
rect, since the establishment provisions of the Treaty cover those
aspects of commerce, such as the purchase and sale of goods within
the country, which are outside the scope of Articles 1 to X.
50. Finally, the Hellenic Government, in paragraph 8 of its
Reply, States that the third paragraph of Article XV of the Treaty
of 1886 "deals with access to the Courts of Justice and guarantees
for the nationals of each Party, in an entirely general way, national
treatment in the territory of the other Party". The interpretation
which the Hellenic Government seeks to put upon this provision
of the Treaty of 1886 and its alleged application to the Ambatielos
claim is fully examined in paragraphs 90 to 96 of the United King-
dom Counter-Rlemorial. Since the Greek Reply adds nothing in
this connection to what was said in the Memorial, it is not necessary
to repeat what has been stated in the Counter-Rlemorial beyond
saying that, for the reasons there given, the treatment alleged by
the Hellenic Government could not constitute a breach of the third
paragraph of Article XV. It is manifest that the Claimant had
access to the Courts of Justice and that he employed agents and
counsel of his own choice. Further, it was open to him at the trial
before the English Admiralty Court to call such witnesses and
prodnce such documents as he or his legal advisers deemed fit. It
is clear from the Claimant's own afiïdavit (Annex III tothe Counter-
Memorial), which is before the Court as part of the report of the
hearing before the English Court of Appeal referred to in para-
graph IO of the Greek Mernorial, that the Claimant was aware of
the existence of the letters in Major Laing's hands. He took no steps
to obtain those letters by the Court process which was available.
or to subpŒna Rlajor Laing or Sir Joseph Maclay. His legal advisers
had no doubt good reason for refraining from taking these steps
at the appropriate time before the Admiralty Court ; but it cannot
be said that his freedom of access to the courts in the presentation
of his case was infnnged either by the United Kingdom Govern-
ment, or by the Admiraity Court, or by the rules of procedure
applicable. He chose not to call this evidence at the proper stage
in the proceedings ; if th~t was a denial of freedom of access, he
denied himself that freedom.
Conclztsionson United Kingdom ContentionA
51. The United Kingdom Government submits that, in the light
of the foregoing analysis of the Greek contentions,
(1) As to three out of the four provisions of the 1886 Treaty on
which the Ambatielos claim is alleged to be based (namely, Arti-
cles 1, X and XII), it is only bp a radical misapplication of their
terms and natural purposes that they can be regarded as having any REJOINDER OF THE UNITED KIXGDOM (3I 53) 265
connection with the matter. According to any normal and ordinary
meaning that can be attributed to them, they have no sort of
relevance.
(2) As regards the fourth provision, namely, Article XV (3), this
provides for a specificright, namely, access tothe courts on national
terms, and the Claimant \vas in fact granted that right. For ali
practical purposes the exercise of this right by the Claimant stands
admitted by the Hellenic Government in its vanous pleadings and
arguments, and no genuine dispute exists about it which could or
should be submitted to arbitration.
(3) The attempt to extend the scope of Article XV (3) to cover
matters other than access to the courts is plainly illegitimate. The
distinction between access to the courts and the conduct of cases
in the courts in regard to such matters as the standards of law and
procedure applied, is a perfectly familiar one in international law,
recognized by every authority on the topic of denial of justice and
the treatment of foreigners.
(4) The attempt to argue that the Ambatielos claim is covered
by the most-favoured-nation clause of the Treaty is equally illegi-
timate, for reasons which have been fully set out : (i) the most-
favoured-nation treatment. contemplated by the relevant Article
related to matters quite different from those involved by the Amba-
tielos claim ;(ii) in the absence of express language, most-favoured-
nation clauses cannot be regarded as importing the general rules of
international law, for the whole notion of ?i~ost-favoured-nation
treatment involves a radically different legal concept from that of
treatment according to the general rules of international law, which
is aiitomatically owd to al1 nations (even the least favoured)
irrespective of treaty ;and (iii)there is no clause in the 1886Treaty
expressly, or even by implication. incorporating the general rules
of international law respecting the administration of justice, and,
even if the older treaties cited by the Hellenic Government were
apt for the purpose (andthey are not), a reference to any provisions
about justice which they may contain cannot be regarded as implied
by most-favoured-nation clauses about trade, commerce, naviga-
tion, residence, taxes, etc.
(5) The whole Grcek contention is essentially a contention that
the Claimant was the victim of a denial of justice. But the riiles
relating to denial of justice are part of the general body of inter-
national law, and a claim of denial of justice is necessarily and
pnmarily based on those rules and not on the 1886 Treaty.
(6) For these reasons, the provisions of the 1886 Treaty have no
application to the Ambatielos claim, and that claim is not based
on the Treaty but on something.quite outside it.
jz. In putting fonvard these conclusions, the United Kingdoin
Go\,ernment does not, of course, contend that the Claimant \vas not266 REJOIKDER OF THE UXITED KINGDOM (3 I53)
entitled to justice and ti, the benefit of certain standards of la17
and procedure, though it does contend that this is what he in fact
received. But it was not by virtue of the 1886 Treaty that he was
entitled ta these things, and since the obligation to submit to
arbitration exists only in respect of matters arising under the
Treaty, it follows that no such obligation exists in the present case.
The United Kingdom Government has explained elsewhere (see
pp. 279 to 284 of the oral arguments of May 1952) the reasons why,
in the absence of any positive obligation to submit to arbitration,
it feels morally justified in refusing to do so voluntarily ;but certain
of these reasons must nom be referred to specifically.
United Kingdom Contention B :The case has certain aspects which
would make it inequitable to compel the United Kingdom Govern-
ment to accept arbitration in respect of it
53. The United Kingdom Government suhmits that there are
certain elements in this case which, even if they are not directly
relevant to the question of the applicability of the 1886 Treaty,
nevertheless constitute contributory factors which the Court can
properly take into account in deciding whether the United King-
dom Government ought to be compelled to submit this matter to
arbitration. The two principal points involved are :(1)the Claimant
did not exhaust his legal remedies in the English courts ;and (2)
there has been undue delay on the part of the Hellenic Government
in prosecuting the claim.
(1) The Claimant did not exhaust his remedies in the English courts
54. The issue of the exhaustion of local remedies was ~iotdecided
by the Court in its Judgment of the 1st July 1952, as it did not
relate to the question of jurisdiction. But, as was recognized on an
earlier occasion (The Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway case, Series
A/B, No. 76, at p. zz), this issue, though not one of jurisdiction,
raises "an objection of a preliminary character". It would, there-
fore, be in order for the Court to deal with it in the present pro-
ceedings.
55. In the Finnish Shi@ Arbitration (Annual Digest of Pnblic
Internatio?zal Law Cases, 1933-34, case No. gr), the Arbitrator
.declareri that:
"...al1the contentions of fact and propositions of laiv which are
brought forward by the claimant Gorernment in tlie international
procedure as relevant to their contention that the respondent Gov-
ernment have committed a breach of international law by the act
complained of, must have been investigated and adjudicated upon
by the municipal courts up to the last competent instance, thereby
alsogivingthe respondent Go\.ernmenta possibilityof doingjustice
in their own, ordinary way" (at p. 235). REJOlNDER OF THE UNITED KINGDOhl (3 153) 267
56. That the Claimant had effective rights of appeal which lie
failed to exhaust is shown in paragraphs 77 to 79 of the United
Kingdom Counter-Rlemorial. The Hellenic Government does not
deny that the Claimant failed to prosecute his appeal from the
decision in the Admiralty Court and to appeal from the Court of
Appeal's decision on the question of evidence. It is suggested, hoxv-
ever, that these remedies were ineffective. But they were not
ineffective by reason of any defect oflaw or procedure l,or by reason
of any interference by the United Kingdom Government with tlie
process of the courts, or by reason of any existing precedents which
would have required the appellate courts to decide against tlie
Claimant. Whether the appeal would have succeeded was, of course,
a matter depending entirely on the merits of the Claimant's case.
The point is that there were substantial rights of appeal available,
and the Claimant's failure to prosecute them should operate as a
bar to relief by the International Court of Justice.
(2) Thevehas been z6ndz~d eelay on the $art of the Hellenic Govern-
ment inpirrszrirrgits claiw under the Declaration of 1926
57. The Court held (Judgment, p. 39) that the question whether
the Hellenic Government is precluded by lapse of time from sub-
mitting the claim \vas "a point to be considered with the merits".
It is not clear whether, by "the merits". the Court meant tlie
merits of the case so far as the Court is now concerned-i.e. of
the present proceedings, namely, the question whether the Amba-
tielos claim should be submitted to arbitration-or of the basic
merits of the case so far as the Arbitration Commission would be
concemed, if the matter were to reach that stage. It is believed
that what the Court essentially meant was that the question of
prescription was separate from the question of jurisdiction, which
was the only question in issue in connection with the preliminary
objection. The United Kingdom Government submits, therefore,
that the Court can and should deal with the question of prescrip-
tion at this stage.
58. The Court will find the arguments of the United Kingdom
Government, in support of the view that the claim should now be
regarded as time-barred, in paragraphs 104 to 108 of the Counter-
Memorial.
' To what ir stated in paragraph 78 of the Counter-Mernorial it may be added
that it is iveIl established that theappecourts in England will. if necessary,
interfere with the discretion exercised by the Court below, if it is plain that the
discretion was wrongly exercised. So, in Evv. Borllom [1g37]A.C. 473,Lard
Wright said (at p. 486:"The (appellate) Court must if necessary examine anew
review which may reverseorcVaryathe order" (of the Court belo;and inyLccdcrf
v. Ellir [rgp] aAll E.R. 814.the Judicial Committee of the 1)rivy Council con-
sidered and reversed on appeal a decision of the High Court of Australia on the
questionof the admission of "new evidence" not brought before the Court at trial.
18268 REJOINDER OF THE UNITED KINGDODI (3I 53)
59. The conclusions, therefore, which the United Kingdom Gov-
ernment submits to the Court on this Part of the Rejoinder are as
follows :
First,even if the facts alleged b3;the Hellenic Government
were true (which is, of course, denied), they would not con-
stitute a violation by the United Kingdom of the Treaty
of 1886, which has no application to the matter, and, therefore,
the Ambatielos claim cannot be held to be based on that
Treaty as the 1926 Declaration requires.
Second, the Claimant did not exhaust his rights of appeal
before the English courts and, therefore, is not entitled to
the further investigation of his complaint by international
procedure.
Third, the Hellenic Government is responsible for such
delays in pursuing the Ambatielos claim, prejudicial to the
conduct of the case, that the United Kingdom should not
at this stage be required to submit it to arbitr t'ion.
Final Submission of the United Kingdom Government
60. The United Kingdom Governrnent accordingly subrnits that
the Court should hold and declare that the United Kingdoni is not
under any obligation to subrnit to arbitration, in accordance with
the Declaration of 1926, the difference between the Parties as to
the validity of the Ambatielos clairn.
(Signed V)INCENTEVANS,
Agcrit for the Government of the
United Kingdom.
3rd January 1953.
Rejoinder submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland