Written Statement of the Governmentof Australta REQUESTFORAN ADVISORYOPINION
BYTHE WORLDHEALTHORGANIZATION
ORDEROF THE INTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTICE
OF
13SEPTEMBER1993
WRITTEN STATEMENT
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA REQUEST FOR ANADVISORYOPINION
%YTHE WORLD HEALTH ORGAMZATION
ORDEROF THE INTERNATIONAL COURTOFJUSTICEOF
13SEPTEMBER 1993
WRIïTEN STATEMENTOF THE GOVERNMENTOF AUSTRALIA
1. Lnresolution WHA46.40,adopted on 14May 1993.the World Heaith
Assemblydecidedto requestthe Intemationai Court of Justice to give
an advisoryopinion ontheoiiowingquestion:
'Inview of the health andenvironmentaleffects, would the use
of nuclearweaponsby a State in war or other armed conflictbe
a breach of irsobligationser internationallaw includingthe
WHOConstitution?'
The following observations aresubmitted by the Government of
Australia in response totheder of the Court of 13September 1993
fixing the time-limit within which written statementsins to the
question may be submitted to the Court by the World Health
Organizationand thoseof itsmember stateswhoareentitled to appear
beforethe Court.
Australiais a non-nuclear weapon statethat is completely committed
to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Australia is-amongst
the most active states inremationaliy in promoting these objectives.
Apart frorn its strong support and encouragement for nuclear
disarmament negotiations (includingthe unilateral and bilateral
arrangementsof therecentpast betweenthe UnitedStates ofnerica
and the former SovietUnion and Russia), the Australian Government
strongly supportsdefmiteextensionof the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT)and thestrengtheningof the Treaty's operations. It has
longtaken a leading role in the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Australian Government supports current
negotiationson arrangementswhichseek toimitto the greatestextent
possible the use of nuclear weapons (Negative Securiry Assurances)
and on theconclusionof a Convention providingfor the cut-off of the
productionof fissionableterialfor weaponspurposes.3. Given its strongcornmitmentto nuclear disarmament,evidenced by its
promotion of these practical measures. the Australian Government
understands very wellthe motivation of the proponents calling for an
advisory opinion on the legality of theuse of nuclear weapons.
However, the Australian Govemment has grave concerns that the
giving of an advisory opinion by the Court on this question would
have an adverse, rather than a positive. effect on these efforts to
advancethe process of nuclear disarmament. It submits that a number
of considerationslead inevitablyto the conclusion that there aremajor
reasons why the Court should, in the exercise of its discretion. find
that it is inappropriate to give an opinion (Part A below). The
Australian Govemment also submits that the Court should consider
and decide issues of jurisdiction and appropriateness prior to and
separatefrom any proceedingsrelated to the substanceof the question
(Part B below). This is particularly desirable in this matter given the
strong arguments related to appropriateness and the fact that
submissionsfrom other states may also have raised significant
jurisdictional arguments. Such a procedure is consistent with the
Statuteand Rulesof Court.
4. The Australian Government therefore makes no submissions in
relation to the substance of the question. On this aspect Australia
reserves itsposition.
A. JUDICIAL DISCRETION
5. Article 65 of the Statuteof the Coun confers on the Court a discretion
asto whetherit should give an advisory opinionon any legal question,
even if it is lawfully requested by a body authorised by or in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a
request (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania (First Phase), Advisory Opinion,ICJ Reports 1950.p. 65, at
p. 72; Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the IL0 upon
Complaints Made against UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports
1956. p. 77, at pp. 86, 111-112 (sep. op. Judge Klaestad); Certain
Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2,of the
Charter), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1962, p. 151, at p. 155:
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution276 (1970), Advisory Opinion,ICJ Reports 197 1.
p. 16(hereafter 'the Namibia Advisory Opinion'), at p.27). In the
Western Sahara AdvisoryOpinion,the Court said: 'Arricle65, paragraph 1, of the Statute, which establishes the
power of the Court to give an advisory opinion, is permissive
and. under it, that power is of a discretionary character. in
exercisingthis discretion,the internationalCourt ofJustice, like
the Permanent Court of InternationalJustice. has alwaysbeen
guided by the pnnciple that, as a judicial body. itis bound to
remain faithfulto the requirementsof itsjudicial charactereven
in giving advisory opinions. If the question is a legal one
which the Court is undoubtedly competent to answer, it may
none the less decline to do so. As this Court has said in
previous Opinions, the permissive character of Article 65,
paragraph 1, gives it the power to examine whether the
circumstancesof the case are of such a characteras shouldlead
it to decline to answerthe request.(ICJ Reports 1975,p. 12at
p.21).
6. Australia considers that decisiveand compelling reasons existin this
case why the Court should, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to
give the opinionrequested.
(a) The subiect matter of the auestion is unsuitable for
adiudication. as itclearlv ooes bevond a definahle field of
iudicial enauirv and enters into the wider realms of uolicv and
secuntv doctrinesof States.
The facts and issues of this case raise matters different frorn any
previous requestfor an advisory opinion. The opiniondoesnot relate
to the powers of a United Nations organ or specialized agency or
involve the construction of a constituent instmment. Nor does the
request relateto the dischargeof particularunctionsby the requesting
organ or specialized agency. It is a requestthat ispurely abstract and
removed entirely frorn any factual or legal context which couldgive
the Courtanymanageablefrarneworkin which toanswerthequestion.
The request does not relate toany actual use of nuclear weapons, nor
does it arise from an imminentor perceived threat of their actual use.
While an abstract question rnay lend itself to an advisory opinion
(Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United
Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports
1947-1948,p. 57, at p. 61; Effect of Awards of Compensation Made
by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion,
ICJReports 1954,p. 47, at p. SI) it must be possibleto appreciarethe
question asked in some particular factualor legal context, ratherhan
in a situation where only speculative and hypothetical facts are available to provide a context. The essence of thejudicial function
consists of the application of general principles andnoms of law to
specific situations. To detemine the existence of a general nom of
internationallaw in the absenceof even a hypotheticalfactual context,
as the Court is asked to do in this case, is akin to a legislative
function, and would be inconsistent with the judicial nature of the
Court.
8. Furthermore,it would not be feasible for the Courtto seek to ascertain
the relevantfacts, in order to givan advisory opinion inthat context.
The precise circumstances of any use of nuclear weapons are
unknown, while the possibilities as to the manner of their use are
many and very diverse. Unlike the Nuclear Tests case, ICJ Reports
1974, p. 253, where the declaration sought by Australia as to the
legality of atmospheric nuclear tests clearly affected existing legal
relations and concemed specificconduct in relationto which evidence
was available, the present request does not relate to any actual or
defined use of nuclear weapons in relation to which evidence is
available and in relation to which the Court would be able to give an
opinion compatible with its judicial character. The Court has
recognised that the lack of adequate evidence is a reason of judicial
propriety why it should declineto give an advisory opinion: Western
Sahara Advisory Opinion. ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12 at p. 28. The
question is framed in such a way that it transcends a definable field of
judicialinquiryand enters into thewider realmsof policy and security
doctrinesof states.
9. The question of the possession and use of nuclear weapons rests on a
set of very complex strategic judgements which go beyond the
traditional competenceof a body such as the Court. This issue is one
to be resolved by national security judgments rather than legal
opinion. Mostpertinent to thesejudgements are individualcountnes'
assessments of their security position in the world. and the likely
future shape of the intemational security system. Withthe end of the
Cold War. many countries are in the process of reviewing their
security strategies, includin~. in the case of some nuclear weapon
states,their nuclearstrateries.
(b) An advisorv ouinion on this question could adverselv affect
im~ortantdisamament necotiations. (Set out in the Annex is a
sumrnaryof themost importantof these negotiations.) 10. The international cornmunityis now engaged in an intensive process
of developing security noms and frameworks. through the United
Nations,regional dialogues and bilateral arrangements. In respect of
nuclear ams control, there is a range of negotiations taking place
currently. Encouraging progress is being made in the context of
START,in the Conferenceon Disannament and in a nurnber of other
multilateral and regional forums. An advisory opinion of the Coun
has not been a precondition for this progress. Rather, this progress
has been made possible by fundamentalchangesin the global balance
of poweroverthe lastfive years.
The view of the Australian Govemment is that an advisory opinion
could pre-emptthe outcome of these important negotiations in which
states are themselves developing noms on the development and
possession of such weapons. The Australian Govemment, together
with many other governments, considers the objective of such
negotiations to be the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear
weapons, because of their abhorrent nature. Such negotiations take
rime, however, and require dialogue and the building of trust and
confidence among al1the parties concerned. A vital element of this
process is the development and implementation of effective
verification measures. An advisory opinion of the Court on the
question of legalitycannot substitute for this process and is likely to
significantlycomplicateit.
12. If the Court wereto advise that theuse ofnuclear weapons Kas
in some circumstances. this would have potential necative
implications for the global non-proliferation noms. Such a finding
could complicate the delicate process of extending the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. If, for example, the Court
concludedthat nuclear weapons could beused in self-defence açainst
nuclear aaack, this could lead to proliferating states claiming such an
opinionasdoctrinalsupportfor a regionalnucleararmsrace.
13. If the Court were to advise that nuclear weapons could be used in
response to a conventional attack, or even if there were a strong
dissenting opinion to this effect, the future of the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) negotiations on strengthening Negative Security
Assurances(NSAs),and thepotential contribution that theycanmake
to non-proliferation. coube jeopardised.
14. Conversely, an opinion in whichthe Court concludedthat al1uses of
nuclear weapons were could create problems in the
disarmament process,which will necessarily be negotiated carefully by the nuclear weapon states in the context of their own security
perceptions. In order to manage the possessionbut non-use of nuclek
weapons until such disarmament is achieved. the Australian
~ovemment has supposed the principleof stable deterrence - that is,a
deterrence based on the perception that any first use of nuclear
weapons wouldbemet with a sufficiently large retaliation asto render
unattractive such a first strike. Obviously, supportfor that principle is
premised upon acquiescence to possession and the threat of use of
nuclear weapons, providedthat such possession andthreat of its use is
directed to the purpose of deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons by
another state.
15. While supporting stable deterrence, Australia and many other
countries do so only as an interim measure -ie. until a total ban on
nuclear weapons,accompanied by substantial venfication provisions.
can be achieved. An advisory opinion that pre-empted this
development and found al1uses of nuclear weapons illeçal would be
in contradiction to the current stated doctrines of al1existing nuclear
weapon states and, as such, would be unlikely to have any effect in
practice on their approaches to nuclear disarmahent. This result
would undermine the authority of the Court at a tirne when that
authorityhas neverbeen more badlyneeded.
(c) An advisorv opinion on this auestion would be 'devoid of
obiect or vuruose' within the rneaninr of the Western Sahara
AdvisorvOpinion
16. The Court has frequently affirmed that itmust act as guardian of its
judicial integrity. (See Northern Cameroons case, ICJ Reports 1963,
p. 15,at pp. 29-30; NuclearTests case, 1CJReports 1974,p. 253, at p.
271. See also Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, PCU Ser.
B. No. 5 (1923). p. 29: Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and
the District of Gex. PCIJ Ser. AB, No. 46 (1932). p. 161.) As a
judicial body, the Court rnust 'rernainfaithful to the requirements of
itsjudicial character even in giving advisory opinions' (Constitution
of the Maritime Safety Cornmittee of the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports
1960,p. 150,at p. 153:Northern Cameroons case, ICJ Reports 1963,
p. 15, at p. 30; Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the
United NationsAdministrativeTribunal, ICJ Reports 1973,p. 166,at
p. 175). As was saidin the Nuclear Testscase, the Courtdeclines 'toallow the
continuance of proceedings which it knows are bound to be fmitless'
(ICJ Reports 1974,p. 253. at p.271). Thesarneprinciple is applicable
to advisoxyopinions. h the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, IU
Reports 1975,p.12. at p. 37, the Court descnbed its advisory function
to be 'to give an opinion based on law, once it has come to the
conclusionthat thequestionsput to it are relevant andhave a practical
and contemporaryeffect and, consequentiy,arenot devoid of objector
purpose'. (See also Northern Cameroons case, ICJ Reports 1963,p.
15,at p.38.)
18. In the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, the Court rejected
arguments that the advisory opinion that had been requested by the
General Assembly would be devoid of purpose, in view of the
responsibilities of the General Assembly under the United Nations
Charter for issues of decolonisation and in view of the fact that the
General Assemblyhad referred to its intention to continue discussion
of thequestion of Western Saharain the light of the Court's advisory
opinion. By way of contrast, it can be seen that while the World
Health Assemblymay have authority to seek an advisory opinion on
this question,and while the World Health Organization clearlyhasan
interest in the health effects of the use of nuclear weapons, the
question concerns in reality not health issues but peace and
disarmament issues,for which the World Health Organizationhas no
special responsibility. Its not evident how any purpose or object
related to that interest could be served by seekinç to answer the legal
question submitted, apartfrom the fact that it might be hoped that an
advisory opinion would contribute generally to the clarification and
development of the rules of international law in a difficult and
uncertainarea.
19. However, as has been indicated above, any advisory opinion which
the Court mightgive would not be likelyto contnbutepositively to the
developmentof applicable internationalrules in this area, and indeed,
would have an adverse effect on the major disarmament and arms
control negotiations at present taking place outside the World Health
Organization. The issues involvedgo to the veryheart of the security
policies pursued by certain states which are carefully linked with
similarpolicies of other states, such that theprocess of disarmament
can only be advanced by a process of negotiation and agreement
between states. For this reason, an advisory opinion of the Court is
alsounlikely to contribute to greater observanceof or to clarification
of theprincipies of humanitarian law applicable in any particular
armed conflict. The differences of view on nuclear weapon matters between many non-nuclear weapon states and the nuclear weapon
states, for example in the context of the negotiation of the 1977
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (where the nuclear
weapon states entered reservations on the applicability of
humanitarian law to the use of nuclear weapons), attest to the
unlikelihoodthat the Courtwould be able to give a categoricalanswer
to this question, letlone that an answer could influence significantly
the conductof states in relationto such matters.
20. The fact that the opinion might afford moral satisfaction, or serve
some demand from public opinion that states be seen to be doing
something, does not amount to a basis for giving an effective legal
opinion (Northem Cameroons case, ICJ Report 1963. p. 15,at p. 107
(sep. op. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice)). The Australian Government
therefore submitsthat an advisory opinion on this question would
have no 'practical and contemporary effect' and would be 'devoid of
object orpurpose'(see paragraph 17above).
21. That the provision of an advisory opinion on this question would be
without object or purpose would be sufficient reason for the Court to
conclude that it should exercise its discretion not to give an opinion,
particularly in view of the fact that the World Healthrganizationhas
no responsibilityfor issues of nuclear weapons or disamament. That
the giving of an advisorv opinion might actually have a detrimental
effect on thenegotiations-king constnictivelycarriedout elsewhere in
relevant forums and through bilateral arrangements should, in
Australia's respectfulsubmission,makethis conclusion inevitable.
B. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
22. In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court has the power to
make questions relating to its jurisdiction and other questions of a
preliminary nature the subject. of independent preliminary
proceedings.
23. Article 68 of the Statute of the Court provides that 'Inthe exercise of
its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by the
provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases to
the extent to which irecognizesthem to be applicable.'
24. Article 102(2)of the Rules of Courtprovide that in the exercise of its
advisory functions under Article 65 of the Statute, 'The Court shall
also be guided by the provisions of the Statute and of these Rules which apply in contentious cases to the extent ro which it recognizes
-
them to be applicable'.
25. In contentious cases,under Article79 of the Rules of Coun, the Court
givesjudgment on preliminary objections in separate proceedin~s
before the oral proceedings on the merits of the case. Further
proceedings are then only necessary if the Court rejects rhe
preliminary objection, or declares that it does not possess an
exclusivelyprelirninarycharacter.
26. inthe Narnibia AdvisoryOpinion, ICJ Reports 197 1,p. 16. at p26,
the Court indicated that the Rules of Court as then in force did not
require the Court in the exercise ofts advisoryjurisdiction to adopt a
procedure analogous to that followed in contentiousprocedure with
respect to preliminary objections. Nevertheless, the Court tacitly
acknowledgedthat in appropriatecases such a coursemight betaken,
since it emphasised that the Rules were not intended to impair 'the
flexibility which Articles66,paragraph 4, and 68 of the Statute allow
theCoun so that it may adjust its procedure to the requirements of
each particular case'.
27. Commentators have also recognised that the Court may follow a
forma1preliminary objection procedureinthe exercise of its advisory
jurisdiction (see Dharma Pratap, The Advisory Jurisdiction of the
International Court (1972).p. 121; Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and
Practice of the International Court(second revisededition. 1985).pp.
727-728). Althoughthe Court has never previouslyfound itnecessary
to take this course, the appropriateness ofsuch a procedure has been
supponed in some dissenting and separate opinions (see Namibia
Advisory Opinion. ICJ Reports 1971.p. 12.at pp. 325-326 (diss. op.
Judge Gros); Western SaharaAdvisory Opinion,ICJ Reports 1975,p.
12,at pp.104-105, 107,111-1 12(sep.op.Judge Petrén)).
28. It may oftenhave beenfor larsely practical reasonsthat theCourt has
so far declined toadopt such aprocedure. It has beenobservedthat in
practice the Court usuallyhas to renderthe opinionbefore the date of
the next reçular annual session of the United Nations General
Assembly or other orpan or organization concerned, in which case
there would usually be insufficient time to hold two separate sets of
proceedings whichmight thereby become necessary. (SeeSir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Coun of
Justice (1986).vol. 2, pp.564-565.n. 6.) Thus, intheWestern Sahara
Advisory Opinion, one reason which the Courtgave for not dealing
first with certain issues in interlocutory proceedings was that this'wouldhave caused unwarranted delay inthe discharge of the Court's
functions and in its responding to the request of the General
Assembly' (ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12. at p.17). However, this
consideration would not-appear tobe compelling in the present case,
since the World Health Assembly has already held a further amual
session since requesting the advisory opinion. Furthermore,Australia
observes that, whether or not two separate sets of proceedings are
held, it does not seem likely that an advisory opinion could be
delivered beforethe foilowing annual session of the Assembly in May
1995.
One comrnentatorhas suggestedthat the questionwhether the Court in
the exercise of its advisoryjurisdiction should introduce a formal
preliminary objection procedure should depend on the circumstances
of the particular case. This writer has suggested that in cases where
the prelirninaryquestion relatesnot tojurisdictionbut to the propriety
of the Court's giving the requested opinion, 'the solution is to be
sought inthe circumstancesof the case itself,and notin the superficial
nature of the objection'(Roseme, op. cit.,pp. 728-729).
The previous approachof the Court appears to be consistent with this
observation. In the Namibia Advisory Opinion.the Court did not Say
that in principle a preliminary objection procedure would be
inappropriate in the exercise of the Court's advisory functions.
Rather, the Court observedthat in that particular instance, adoptionof
such a procedure 'would not have dispensed with the need to decide
on the request for the appointment of a judge ad hoc as a previous.
independent decision, just as in contentious cases the question of
judges ad hoc must be settled before any hearings on the preliminary
objections may beproceeded with'. Furthermore.the Court foundthat
in that particular instance the proposed preliminary decision under
Article 82 of the Rules of Court as then in force would notnecessarily
have predetermined the decision which itwas suggested should have
been taken subsequently under Article 83. (ICJReports 1971. p. 12,
at p. 26.) Similarly, in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, in
which it was submitted that the Court should adopt a preliminary
objection procedure in relation to certain issues, the Court found it
'impossibleto accept' that these issues were 'of apurely preliminary
character' (ICJ Reports 1975, p.12, at p. 17),suggesting that such a
procedure might have been appropriate in the case of genuinely
prelirninary issues.
Australia submits that the correct conclusion is that the answer to the
question whether a preliminary objections procedure should be adopted by the Court when exercising its advisoryjurisdiction will
depend, as the Court said in the Namibia Advisory Opinion, on 'the
requirements of each particular case' (ICJ Reports 1971. p.12, at p.
26).
32. The Court as ajudicial body is bound, in the exercise of its advisory
function,to remainfaithfulto the requirementsof itsjudicial character
(see paragraph 16above). It could be seen as inconsistent with the
judicial character of the Coun for its processes tobe used as a forum
for the debateby states and organizationsof a broad and abstract issue
which the Court itself may then decline to answer, either on grounds
of lack of jurisdiction or because of reasons of judicial
appropriateness. This would be al1the more so. if in the present
instance a significantnurnberof states were toraiseargumentsthat the
Courtlacksjurisdiction or that for reasonsofjudicial appropriateness
the Court should not answer the question. Because the question on
which the opinion has been requested is of such an abstract nature,
and removed entirely from any factual or legal context, this is nota
case in which issues relating tosubstancemay themselves be relevant
in determiningissues ofjurisdiction andjudicial appropnateness. The
latter aregenuinely preliminary. Unless there are particular reasons
whyquestionsofjurisdiction and appropriatenessshouldbe dealt with
in the proceedingson the substanceof the question.it isthe respectful
submissionof theGovernmentof .4ustnlia thata procedure analogous
to the preliminary objectionsprocedure in contentious casesshould be
adoptedin this instance. NUCLEARDISh%MiliMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION:
ACHIEVEMENTSAJTER TBE COLD WAR
With the end of the ColWar, bilateranrisconkol a-gmmenrs beriveenrhe
UnittdStarcs of Americaandthe forma SovietUnionandRussia havecreated
positive conditions for wradrilaternegotiationson nuciear disannament
andnon-proliferarion. Thesenegotiarionsandreagmmmts complementthe
nmous m' am01 agreements conclu& dining theCold War, mnstiy
betweenthe Unite Statesof AmmicaandtheUSSR.
Mzmbers of the intsnarional communityare currently involid impomnt
ddard negotiations,notabinthe38-naaonConferenceon Disannamentin
Geneva, on nuclear disarmamen and non-prolifmaon issues.Nuclev
disarmamenrand non-pmïiferationissues are also subjannuaideclarations
and deliberaûveconsiderational ram throughreIevanorgana sndbodie sf
the Unird Nations. ïhere are ais0 ongoingregionai and bilaterd negoktions
ht coqlement rhesemultilard efiorrs.
CURRENTNEGOTIATIONS
Nncieat Non-ProliferationTreîry: prcpxrto~ meetings for the
Conferenceofal larties to h?YTia htsy!995on extension otheTresry.
Airsualiatoge& with a nilmbrrof counrics, suppons rile Tmty's
indeMite extension.
-
thesenegociaaonshave ben bolswd by P~I accession tnme
NPT by France andOùna as nuclev weapon states. and by
accession tohe NPT by Belanis and Kazakhstaasnnon-nucl-
weapon states
Eissile MateriforWeapons Purpcses: consulrationstheConfaence on
Disarmament (CD) on a non-discriminatoq, mltilateral and efkctively
verinabIITxsty barrnins the producrion of fimaterialsfar nu-
weaponsor otberexplosivenuc!eu devices - existinnepative.securityassurancesby thenuclearwespon stites
-
negotiationin the CD on the question of effective intrmarional
arrangementsto assure non-nuclearweapon stamagainst useor
threat useof nuclearwtspons
- S&ry Council Resolutio(SC Res.255, 1968) pro~ldes positive
assuranceto the non-nuchweaponStates
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: negotiarionsithe CD of a universai.
dtilady and effectively verifîable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CïBT). Austtaüa is committedto earlyconclusiaCïBT.
. Testhg Moratoria: a moratori unmnucleartesüngiseffec8vely being
observedbyfour of the five nuclear weaponsrates.nameUnitedStates,
theRussian Fhtion, Franc and theUnite dingdom Ausualia,dong
with many other countries. has been urgin; China tnjoin theother nuclear
wezpon Statesin &larina testingmoratorium
mcan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone: crgotiarionsby regioncounmes on
adraf Traq to createa nuclex we-pon fie zoin;cfrica
Sonth East Asian NucIear Weapon Free Zone: negotianonsbyregional
counmes tomtl anuclw weaponkee zen= in Southht ASia
CONCLUDED SINCE 1989
1991 US-USSR Strategic ib-ms Rediidion Tah(START 1)Agreemat: to
reduce number sf nuclear weapons. (AU parties have now ratifïed
START, butthe agement willnotenterintforceuntilUkraineaccsdes
rotheNuclearNon-ProLiieratiTreaty(NPT).)
1991 Cartagena Agreement by the hnh Group of States t:omounce
weapons of ms desmiction.
1992 Lisbon Probcol: rmhg Ukraine, Kazakhstaand Beb partieto
START I. and cornmittingthem itratiiication, as well asto don
to theNPT.1993 US-Riissian START II Agreement: ro reec the rotai nue ai
suategicnuclex warheds on =ch sidetoberwen 3.000and 3.500and tn
eiiminateland-bas roul~plewarfiesdmissile (s.PLRT II ailno<enter
into forcunnl tùe 199STARSTmry entersintoforce.)
1994 riogeements pnrsiiant tSTXRT 1:agresnenü between the US. Russia
and Ukraine requiring the transferof ail former Soviet weapins
Ukraine to Russia for diunuitlemenf tdetargeEngof Rusian andUS
suategc nuclear missiles. ad the provkion of appropriatescirrity
Oouaratees to Ulcrainnceit becomesaparrto theNPT as anon-nuclear
weaponsrate.
1994 UK-Russian Agreement on d-targe8ng of nuclear stmtegjc offensive
missiles
CONCLUDED DURING THE COLD W.4R
1957 The InternationalAtnmic Energy .igency (MA) was set uundcr its
own statutewith thenvin purposes of promotingthpeaceÏd usescf
aromicenergyand ensuringthat nuch acriviticsarcnoused tofurthcr
my militarypurpose. Subsequently,theusks of LGA cere extended
toincludz safeguardacribltiesuLL-~PT.
1959 rinîarctiTreaty: prohibiriag inr!lc,nucim explosionsand disposal
ofradioactivewastcin t.^intir:axa. (Ener:ci into fore: 1961)
1x3 US-USSR "Hot Line Agreement": COesmbiiisdira communicationsto
reduce dangerof accidentalnuclwu. (Enrereintoforce: 1963)
1963 PartialTest Ban bty: banning nuclear weapons tests in ihe
atmosphme,outerspaceand underwaxer.(Entami into forc1963)
1967 Outer Space Treaty: prohibiting,inaria.the empIacementof nuclesr
wmpons in orbit arountheesth andsran'oninof such weaponsin outex
spaceinany mnnri~r(Enrsedintofore: 1967)
1967 TreaQ of Tlatelolco: establishinanuclear weapon fre cone in Latin
Amaica; subsequentaccession to Protocolby di five nuclev weapon
sues. (The Tmty is not coqlerely in force, althou& sutes whave
ratiKed it have waived article 28(1)bringiuit into forcfor those
stares.)1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty 0:
m prevent the sprsd of micleu
weapons and dng for.stepto end the nuclesarmsrace. (Enter itd
fore: 1970)
1971 Seabed Treaty: banning the emplacmt of nuclev weapons andother
weapons of mars dcsuucnon (B'MD)on the seabed. (End into forct:
1972)
1971 US-USSR Agreement on the Preventionof Acadental Nudear War.
incorporajng confidence building muresin 1973 m reduce theri& ai
nuclearwar through accident or misunderstanding. (Similar aperxnts
mncluded berwen USSR and France (1976) and USSR and UK (1978).)
(Entered into fore: 1971)
1972 US-USSR Anti-BallisticMissile (ABM) Treaty, liinitingdeployrnenof
US and Soviet ABM systems. Ag& to as part of the Snategic Ams
-LimitationTak (San L (!2neredinro force 1972).
1974 US-USSR Threshold Test Ban Tresty: 1Emibngunderground nuclear
wapon teststo yielÇof 150kilotons.(Enered inm for=: 1990)
1976 US-USSR Peaceful Nnclesr Explosions Treaty: kbg undengound
nuclear explosions for pe3c.M pqosrs to a >leidof 150 kilotons.
(Entered into forcc 1990)
1979 US-USSR Strategi.kms Limitatio Tallcs(SALT) IZApment: to
impose a crilingon srraegic nuclw delivery vehicles anLimitterrain
new gound-lzunched nuckar missik. (SALT II was signecibut not
raMed and evennisliy ovenakenby STARTnegotiations.)
1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material:
establishingstandard mesnires of pnysiul procecrionfor nuciear material
nanspomxi benveen counmes. (Entered intforce: 1987)
1985 Treaty of Rarotonga: establishina nuclear freezone in the South
PaMc; subsrquenr accession itsProtocols II and Iii (3inaand the
Russian Federarion.(Enteredinto for=: 1986)1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF)Treaq: rinilting icbe
eijminationby 1991 of inrermedi3reranse gound-launchcd nuclear
misdes fiom me arsenaloftheUS and theformerSoviet unio(Enccd
into force: 1988)
1987 Agreement on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centreesubiishingnvosuch
cames in Washington and Moscow for improved communimrion and
inforniarionexchange on nuclear misdeme centres weropnedin
1988.)
1988 US-USSR Agreement onBailisticblissiTestNotification: pro\l&
forpnor noriricsnonof sutests(Entereinto force: 1988)
Written Statement of the Government of Australia