NoteVerbaledated19June1995 hm theEmbassyofItaiy,togetherwith
WnttenStatemen tftheGovemmeno t fItaiy A'IBASCIATA D'ITALIA
L' AJA
VERBAL NOTE
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The Ehbassy of Italy presents its compliments to the
InternationalCourt of Justice and with reference to its letter
95588 of 8 February 1995 regarding the request for advisory
opinion transmittedto the Court under the United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 49/75K of 15 December 1994 concerning the
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, has the honour
to enclose the writtenstatementof the Italian Government.
The Italian Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to
renew to the InternationalCourt of Justice the expression of its
hest consideration.
Hague, 19 June 1995
5 THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
TE HAGUE &&derina resolut.ion 45/75 K, adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on December 15, 1994,
whoreby the hsseinlly addressed the Court cf Justice a
reges: frr cc eav~s-ry spicion on the folloxinq natter:
,tic -ie -b-
- . -..-est or usr of n~zietr we2prr.s ir, e!:y
ci-cuxst~nco per~ittéà under international lav?'';
Co~sicerlnq rhe Court order of February 1, IOOS,
es=e-lisi..ino zi?~ eordline 3: Züne 20, 1995, fcr the
-!2r€ssi,rîzizr! zc zL,e ZCÏ~; cf \,.ritzen o8srrvs=i.?ns, in
.----.... . .
- ; ........-Ci; =.'-.. . i?.,-. ---.-,..--.. LI --? ---r --CL- ..-,
ur.der?ined ci int~rr.azian+l a i es, anci custonary
laws in particular, pverning :ho use or the threat to use
nuclear weapons.
The fact that numerous UN General Assembly
resolutions have been adopted on this subject (1653/XVI,
2396/22, 2444/22, 2936/271 2996/27, 3314/29, 33/71Bt
34/58, 35/152D, 36/92, 36/100, 37/78J, 37/100C, 38/73G,
38/75, 38/183B, 39/63H, 39/148P, 40/151F, 41/60F, 42/39C,
42/42D, 43/78F, 44/117C, 45/59B, 45/94, 47/37, 47/53c,
48/72B) is at the same time an evidence and a consequence
of this situation, and this is even more clearîy
demonstrated by the circumstance that the above UN
resolutions were ail adopted with a majority vote. It
should hardly be noted that only if resolutions limiting the use or the threat to use nuclear weapons had been
adopted by consensus, it would have been possible to speak
about the beginning of a process of international
prohibitive or linitative customary rules, compared to
wkirh those tesolxtions shculd be considered as opfcio
juris, alreziy Weil cofined àn2 capable of originating the
i.i=r=,-~~ ,-,---,,*:---.. ,-z -:-...1+r a=?itudes (diuturritas).
-ne provisiras qcated in knis connecrion
(>:rtic'e I of =hg ccr.-.~~n=inr. Prckibitinq 15iLi:zry
.. . .
Sc::?~icriei =r O=k-r 5:,=c;:il=iss Irü--inc - I<~$irico=i-n~ te
-:_ . . , 1.5 :.t . :: y ---, ! > y 55, .;r,ri 5, cf
' "' .__..-. A.. ..------.. - ...-..- .-_..-. -,c =.:.: ..;.;-\c-
.-.,. ... ^.. - ..- .., , -. . ..,.. S .
--..- . r..; -- -:y: : i... --. - . ... '' - r.ii ci...; ..,.--..
. . r
.-- , Le..:+: =>; r.!.e-:=i=n 0- pk:::cy~&rdy
dznçsrous ever.:s - s-szifir=ll- iirctified is each one cf
rhen - cennot Se exzen5ed ar.5 i>?:ied t3 the threat ro use
nuc lear weapons .
In the light of the above, it is impossible to
consider the above-mentioned provisions as the source of
juridical limitations on the subject of the threat to use
or the use of nuclear weapons.
2. The opinion of those who consider that the
provisions of the conventional war law on the limitations
to the use of conventional weapons can by analogy be
applied to the use of nuclear weapons, rests on even les6
sound foundationa.
An argument against this use of analogy is the
evident impossibility to concede that the proviaions
conceived to regulate the use of weapons having an at least relatively reduced destructive scope do have a so
wide ratio legis that their application to the resort to
and the use of nuclear weapons is functionally correct and
adequate. The validity of this opinion is specifically and
positivsly confirned by the slow, but relentless building
of a sperific corpus of rules bound to be applied nst ocly
znd 3 SC zucn =O the nzcufactcrirq enci ÿse of zass
<cs=r-rzi==. ~ies=c~s, a1s3 âne ebove al1 to the
.~~zcie=ï-ring -se of objezrs h-vir.., tkso
ch.zra:reris:ics, arid thcs cf rules pursueing the cûnr>?ex
aaC dslicate objective 3f 2isarnament.
it is :ira: cf a:! tc be noted that some of
-..esé c>ny?sntic:el ~z=~~i~io?.s C-T. 5~ lis;! k.irh~'<t
. . Ir ::i -.---
-----.A-.-. .... -- L.-- .. -, cf <~s=rïctiûr. yc=c.c;?:c.
....---.-...C 2: ......... -z-z. ? ...: .. --.. ..2 >.,-,--..-c-2
-..- ,...........- ........... .- - . - - > ..-.. -...... ...... -.
.: i --,.. :.. - .............. r--i.. :-25:::
..-_e=_-. r. ..- --..,. - -, -.: . . -:... ,..*-, an5 : CZ.~.:
=F.~~S:LE~ bo&ies ; = 6 cf =.t..i. Trca-,y 22 C-tsr
Spac~, of jamary 21, 156Ï!, La-- c e (the Tl?.tflolc~
Treaty of FeSruary , 1917) ând tris Sûuthern PacFiir
(Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of August 6, 1985).
Moreover, conventions have been concluded which
can spacifically be applied to the manufacturing and
detention of individual epecies of weapons that can be
defined as mass destruction weapons, aiming at
establishing international controls on their cornpliance
(such as the Protocol on the Prohibition to Use chernical
Weapon~ of 1925, the Convention on their Ban of 1993, as
well as the Convention on Biological and ~acteriologicai
Weapons of 1972 ).
The above situation clearly shows that a process
of gradua1 development of international rules on
disamament 1s undemay, aiming at working out ~01le~tf~econventions 'tackling and solving - with no forced
interpretations - the whole set of problerns linked to the
manufacturing, testing, detention and use of those
weapons. Thus, adequate solutions are taking shape, which
teke intc account th€ specific nature of ezch individual
cztepry îf riea?o.?, EVS~ froz th2 gcint of vierv of zheir
zc-z=rci.
. . - ...
. c: . ;; : - - - - 7..... fLzcily EL:;=:: p, i3
-.-- ~c.~.f:~r:c-ss cf = ter-A-.--.. --- ,:i~cl.+rr E-ESÏ~ELS, i<
-
l~sst b:,- ss;;..~S:Z=EE. LG s ~1~3 be u~.d~rl;i?t2 thst
tn= sc5ject cf zhe thrîe: ts iiss ziiclear wespn?s givas
rise to delicate ques=ior.s, affecting - in particular -
national defense and international policy strategies which
can only be affected by ad hoc rules, to be conventionally
defined. Therefore, it is the international community as a
whole which shnuld proceed in the direction of a global
discipline of the whole. subject, within the context of
nuclear disarmament negotiations - which, on the other
hand, were already launched a long time ago.
The above observations lead to the unavoidable
conclusion that - wfthin the limitations impoaed by the
NPT - the manufacturing and detention of nuclear weapons
by certain States should be considered, for the time
being, as legitimate , because rhey are notpohikited. The validity of this conclusion cannot be
effectively questioned, also considering that such a
stance should nct hinder or slow COW~ the process leadin-
zs nucle+r 5iscrr-âzs.t, whose repia and poricive
,~.--Plc- ' 1s v =":.icr=e? r ir=-ri.e=iznl
3--
cs.--!~ziz\: 2z 2 i,:531e.
...-- c~nclcsicr! coeç nst ~15.51: ::. z!?~
---yIr:=; -L., >f ~3=2(3~1;-, ;:A*:;-i>: z>i,~z-z. =izsL~;- LE i:zie
-.
c: .cc- prl~ci.;?~ cf :;?z rczszgcr 53: civil p~ulatior.~,
gensrslly aefine* by tne 1 C-ensva Conve~tion of Aupst
12, 1959, and by article 22, point e, of the Hague rules
of 1989, according to which - on the basis of the
principle of prcportionality - the exercise of armed
violence should be carried out so as not to bring about
unnecessary, and thus superfluous or useless sufferings.
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For the Italian Goverment
Note Verbale dated 19 June 1995 from the Embassy of Italy, together with Written Statement of the Government of Italy