Letterdated19Juue1995hm thePermanenRt epresentatef
SolomonIslandstotheUniteNation tgetherwitWntten Statementf
theGovemmenî of Solomo.IslandsREQUES BY T'FIUNITEDN-ATIONGENER~L ASSE~TBLY
FORAN ADVISORYOPINION ON "ïLEG.~ITY
OF TEETHREAT ORUSE OFNUCLEAW R EAPONS
FVIU-ITEOBSERVATIO NSB~~ED
BY THEGOVER~IENT OF SOLO~IO sLA\?)S
TO THEINTERNATION CAOURTOFJUSTICE
Gorernmen!o~v:crids?~REQ~ BYTEIEUNITED NATION GSENERA ALSSE~TBLY
FOR ANADVISORY OPNON ON TlIELEG.QLITY
OF ~f-ETHREAT ORUSE OF NUCLEAR FVEMONS
FV~N OBSERVATIO SUB~\.~D
BY THEGOVERILXL OENTOLO~\.IO1~Aii3S
TO THE INTERNATIONACOURT OF JUSTICE
Govern0.SÜ;OL-:!:rj' SOLOMON ISLANDS MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Suite 8008.82Second Avenue. New York. N.Y. 10017
TEL:(212) 5496193. FM: (212) 661-8925
His ExcellencyEduardo Valencia Ospina 19 June 1995
Registrar.
InternationalCourt of Justice
Peace Palace
The Hague
THE NETHERiANDS
Your Excellency.
GENERALASSEMBLY - ADVISORY OPINION
Bythe directionof the Ministerfor ForeignAffain. Solomon Islands, I havethe pleasurein sending
you herewith, on behalf of the Governrnent of Solomon Islands', Solomon Islands Wrilten
3bservationin respect of tbe request bythe General Assernbly for an Advisory Opinion frorn the
ntemationalCourt of Justice.
SolomonIslandsavails aselfofthe rightto subrnitthese Wrinen ObSe~ationSas a rnember of the
Jnited Nations according to which it is, ipsoa party to the Statute of the Court of Justice.
n view of the importance of the request made by the General Assembly and the nature of the
nternational legal questions arising thereunder.lornon Islands considers that it wouldbe
ippropriate for an oral hearinbeoheld in this maner.
wouldbegrateful if correspondence couldbe addressedto me atthe above address. with copies
O the Ministerof Foreigr:Affairs at: P.O.G-10. Honiara. Solornon Islands.
'lease. Your Excellency. acceptthe assurances of my highest consideration.
?exS. Horoi
irnbassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
)errnanentRepresentative of SolomonIslands
O the UnitedNations
4EWYORK SOLOMON ISLANDS MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Suite 8008.820 Second Avenue. NewYork. N.Y. 1W17
TEL (212) 5946193 - FAX:(212) 661-8925
His ExcellencyEduardoValencia Ospina 19 June 1995
Registrar,
internationalCourt of Justice
PeacePalace
The Hague
ME NETHERLANDS
Your Excellency.
GENERAL ASSEMBLY -ADVISORY OPINION
Bythe directionof the Minister for ForeignAffain, Solomon IslanIhave the pleasure in sending
you herewith, on behalf of the Governrnent of Sotomon Islands', Solomon Islands Written
Observationin respect O!the request bythe GeneralAssembly for anAdvisory Opinion from the
InternationalCourt of Justice.
SolornonIslandsavails itseif of the nghtto submitthese Written Observations as a member of the
UnitedNations according to which it is. ipso fado a party to the Statute of the Court of Justice.
In view of the importance of the request made by the General Assembly and the nature of the
internationallegal questions arising thereunder. Solomon Islands considers that it would be
appropriatefor an oral hearing to be held in this matter.
Iwouldbegrateful if correspondencecouldbe addressedto me at the above address.with copies
to the Minister ofreigr:Affairs at: P.O. Box G-10. Honiara. Solornon Islands.
Please.Your Excellency. accept the assurances of rny highest consideration.
Rex S. Horoi
AmbassadorExtraordinary and Plenipotentiary
PermanentRepresentative of Solomon Islands
to the United Nations
NEWYORK INTRODUCTION .................................... (1.11.15)
(A) Background ..................................... (1.1-1.6)
(B) SolomonIsland'sinterestin the quest................... (1.7-1.15)
PART 1 THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS COMPETENTTO REQUESTAN
ADVISORYOPiNiON FROMTHE INTERNATIONALCOURTOF
JUSTICE ONTRIS QüESïïON AND THECOURT IS COMPETENT
TO GIVE AN ADVISORY OPINIONON THE QUESTION
SUBMITTED .............................. (2.1-2.49)
(A) The Generai Assembly'srequestulfilsthe conditionsof Article96 of
theUN Cher .............................. (2.5-2.8)
(B) The GeneraiAssemblyis acting in accordancewith tUN Charter.. (2.9-2.11)
(C) The practice of the General Assemblyconfms its wmpetence over
mattersrelating tothe legalityof the threat or use ofnuclear
weapons .................................. (2.12-2.28)
General AssemblyResolutionson thelegaiity of the use of
(a) nuclearweaponsand related issue............. (2.14-2.23)
@) Gened AssemblySpeciaiSessionson nuclearweaponsunder
the aegisof disarmament................... (2.24-2.25)
(c) GeneralAssemblystudieson nuclear weapon........... (2.26-2.28)
(D) The Courtshouldgive the AdvisoryOpinionrequestedby theGened
Assembly ................................. (2.29-2.48)
(a) The reasonsof principlewhichhave ledthe Coun to decideto
give anAdvisoryOpinion ................... (2.31-2.35)
(b) Cnteria which need to be satisfiedin order for the Court to
reply to a requestfan AdvisoryOpinion ........ (2.36-2.46)
(c) ne WHO requestdoes not preventthe Coun from givingthe
AdvisoryOpinionrequestedby theGenerai Assembly .... (2.47)
(E) Conclusion........................................ (2.49) PARTII THE LEGALrrYOFTHE THREAT ORUSE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SECTION A TBE TKREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WSAPONS AND THE
INTEXNATIONAL LAW OF ARMEDCONFLICTS .. . .. .. . .(3.2-3.104)
(A) The meaningof threat ... .. . ...... . ... . .. ..... ... ... (3.3-3.11)
Theuse ofnuclearweaponsis subjectto internationallaw,includingthemles
(B) relating toarmedconfins .. . .... .. ... . .... .. . . . ... .. (3.12-3.42)
(a) The use of nuclearweapons issubject to generalinternational
law .. . .... . .... . .... . ... .. .. .. . . .. .(3.14-3.16)
@) The use of nuclearweapons issubject tointernationallaw of
armedconfiicts . .. .. . .. .. . .. . ...... .. . . .(3.17-3.21)
The use of nuclear weapons is subject to the 1977 Geneva
(c) Protowl I . ... . .. . . .. . .. ..... .... .. .. (3.22-3.35)
(d) The use of nuclear weapons is subject to the rules of
international law specifically prohibiting the use of
nuclear weapons . . .. . .. .... . . . ... . . ... . .(3.363.42)
(C) The useof nuclearweaponsis contraryto internationallawof armed
conflicts. . .. . . .... .. ... .. . . ... . .... . . . . . .(3.43-3.89)
The use of nuclear weapons violates internationallaw by
(a) reason of thequantitativeeffectsof suchweapons .. .. (3.44-3.63)
(i) Nuclear weaponsrenderdeath inevitable . .. .. .. . . .(3.51-3.53)
(ii) ' The useof evena singlenuclearweaponcouldresult in
total nuclearwar . . ... .. . . . ... . . . .... (3.54-3.56)
(iii) Nuclear weapons haveindiscriminate effects . . ... . . (3.57-3.63)
@) The use of nuclear weapons violates internationallaw by
reason of the qualitativeeffectsof suchweapons . .... (3.64-3.79)
(i) The specificconsequencesof the disintegrationof the
atom .. . . ..... . . . . . . .. .. .. . . . ..(3.65-3.74)
(ii) The effectsof radioactivefallout ... . . . ... . . .. .. (3.75-3.79)
(c) The use of nuclear weapons violates international law irrespective of the
circumstancesin which theyare used .. . .. . . .. ... . .. . .. ... (3.80)
(d) Theuseof nuclear weaponscannotbe justiîïedby internationallaw in any
circumstances . .. .. .. . .. .. . . . . . .. . .. .. . . .... .(3.81-3.89) (i) Self-defence does not justiS the use of nuclear weapons....... (3.82)
@) Reprisais do notjustify thuse of nuclear weapons ......... (3.83.3.88)
(iii) Necessity does notjustify the use of nuclearweap........... (3.89)
@) The relevant mles of international law prohibiting the use of nuclear
weapons apply to al1States ....................... (3.90.3.100)
(E) Conclusions .................................. (3.101.3.104)
SECTIONB TAE =AT OR USE OF NUCLEARWEAPONSVIOLATES
APPLICABLERULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE
PROTECTIONOFHUMA. HEALTH.THEENVIRONMENT AND
FUNDAMENTAL RZrmANRIGHTS ............. (4.1-4.49)
(A) The use of nuclear weapons is subject to international law for the
protection of human health and the environment. and fundamental
human rights .................................. (4.1-4.7)
(B) The use of nuclear weaponsviolatesinternationallaw for the protection
of human health and the environment...................... (4.8)
(a) Sovereignty and territorial integr................... (4.9.4.15)
@) The general obligation of each State not to cause darnage to human
health and theenvironmentouüide its temtory or other areassubject
to itsjurisdiction or control................... (4.16.4.20)
(c) The specific obligations not to cause damaze to human health and the
environment ............................... (4.21-4.28)
(d) The obligation not to cause massive damage to human health or the
environment anywhere ......................... (4.29-4.30)
(e) Conclusion ..................................... (4.31)
(C) The use of nuclear weaponsviolatesinternationallaw for the protection
of fundamentalhuman rights ....................... (4.32-4.35)
@) International obligations for the protection of human health. the
environment an human rights applyduring arrned conflic..... (4.36-4.49)
(a) The operation of treaties dunngmed conflict ............ (4.37-4.47)
@) Customary law .................................. (4.48)
(c) Conclusion ..................................... (4.49)SECTIONC ANY VIOLATIONBY A STATE OF TRESE OBLIGATIONSUNDER
INTERNATiONAL LAW GiVES RISE TO ITS INTERh'AîïONAL
RESPONSIBILlTY AND LIAB- .... .. .. ... .... . .... (5.1-5.4)
PARTIII SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS .. . . .. .. . ... ... ... (6.1-6.2) INTRODUCTION
(A) Background
1.1 On 15 December1995theUnitedNationsGeneral Assembly adopted Resolution49-
75 K, which requestedthe InternationalCourt of Justice ("the Court") to "urgentîy
renderan AdvisoryOpinionon the followingquestion:
'k tbe threat oruse of nweaponsinanycircumstanceprnincd underinternational
la@"
1.2 The request was made by the Geneml Assemblyunder Article 96(1) of the United
Nations Charter.Under Article65(1)of iü Statute
'theCourtmay&iveaadvimryopiniononanylegaiquesatthe nquen of wtiateverbody
may beauthorizbyor inaccordancewithe Ch&r of tUnitedNations-tomakesuch
a requen.'
1.3 By an Order of 1 Febniary1995, the Court fixed20 June 1995 as the tirnelimit
within whichwritten statementsrelatinp to the question maybe submitted to the
Court. As a memberof the UnitedNations and a party to the Statuteof the Court,
SolomonIslandsis entitledto appear before the Court in this matter and to subrnit
theseWrittenObservations.
1.4 TheseObservationsare dividedintotwoParts.Part 1addressesthecompetenceof the
General Assemblyto request theAdvisoryOpinionand the cornpetenceof the Court
to render an Advisory Opinion. Pan II, which is divided into three Sections,
addresses: the legality of the threat oruse of nuclear weaponsby reference to the
~les ofinternationallaw relatinptoarmedconflicts(A); the les of internationallaw
relatingto the protectionof humanhealthand theenvironmentand the protectionof
fundamental humannphts (B);andtheresponsibilityof Statesunderinternationallaw
for violationofthese obligations(C). Pan III summarisesthe Conclusions.
1.5 TheseWntten Observationsgenerallyiollow those submitted bySolomonIslands in
respect of the request submittedby the World Health Organizationin 1993. The
difierences relateto the discussionof the GeneralAssembly'scornpetence (infra
paras. 2.1-2.49), the questionof the "threat"of useof nuclear weap(infraparas.
3.1-3.11). and theapplicationof humannghü rulesto the questi(ie paras.4.12-
4.35). SolomonIslands reserves thenght to takeadvantageof theopportunitygranrd
by the Court to make FurtherWritten Observationsto elaborate on the difierences
betweenthis requestof the GeneralAssemblyand thatposed by the WHO.
1.6 In summary, for the reasonsset out in these Wntten Observationsthe Govemment
of SolomonIslands submitstharthe Court shouldgivean AdvisoryOpinionthat:
(A) the General Assembly iscompetent to request an Advisory Opinionfrom the international Coun of Justice on this question,and thatthe Court is competent
togive an AdvisoryOpinionon the questionsubmitted @aras.2.1 to 2.49);
(B) any use of a nuclear weapon by a Statewould violate its obligations under
intemationaliawas reflecteintherulesof internationallawconcerningmethods
and meansof warfare (ju snbello)and neutralityALTERNATIVELY that the
use of nuclear weapons mustnot vioiate applicablerules of international iaw
coneming methodsand meansof warfare (jusinbello)and neutratity @aras.
3.1 to3.104);
(C) any use of a nuclear weapon by a State would violate its obligations under
internationallawasreflectedin the rules of international lawfor the protection
of human health and the environment and fundamental human rights,
ALTERNATiVELYtheuseofnuclearweaponsmustnotviolateapplicableniles
of internationallaw for theprotectionof humanheaithand the environmentand
fundamentalhumanrights (paras.4.1 to 4.49);
0) any use of a nuclear weapon by a State would constitute a crime against
humanity, ALTERNATiVELY the use of nuclear weapons in violation of
internationallaw constitutesaime against humanity(para.3.49); and
(E) any use by a State of a nuclear weapon gives rise to its international
responsibilityALTERNATiVELYthe violationby a State of these obligations
underinternationallaw gives rise to its international respon(paras5.1 to
5.4); and
(F) any threat of use by a State of a nuclearweaponwould, by consequene of the
illegalityof actual use, be prohibitedunderinternationallaw.
(B) SolornonIslands' interest in the question
1.7 SolomonIslands is a non-nuclearStatewhichdoes not proposeto engagein nuclear
warfare or other nuclear activity. Nor does Solomon Islands anticipatebeing a
pnmary target of such activity. It neverthelesshas a great interest in the General
Assembly's request for an Advisory Opinion from the Court, perceiving as an
"innocent bystander" the senous danger to the safety and health of its people, its
economy and its..fragileenvironment from the effects of increases of radioactive
materialin the environment.
1.8 SolomonIslands is a widespreadarchipelagoof mountainousisiands and low-lying
coral atolls in the south-westPacificbetweenlatitud5sand 12 degrees South and
longitudes 155to 177degrees East (seemapafter page 5).The islandchain is some
1,500kiiometres(900miles)long,mnningin a northwesterlylsoutheasterldirection.
The total landarea is estimated a27,556 square kilornetres, comprisingover800
islands. They range from the largest (Guadalcanalon which the capital, Honiara,is located)m the very small. The populationis about 325,000. The SolomonIslands
became an independent State within the Commonwealthon 7 luly 1978. It is a
memberof, inrerdia, the UnitedNations, theWorld HealthOrganization,and the
South Pacifie Forum. The Head of State, Queen Elizabeth II, is represented in
Solomon Islands by a Govemor General. Solomon Islands is a parliamentary
democracyand respts fundamentalhumanrights.
1.9 SolomonIslandsdependsheavilyonsubsistene agriculture,foresbyandfishing.The
formal cash economy also depends largely on agriculture, forestry and marine
pnmary production. The tourist indusuy is developing and makes a signifiant
contribution to the cash economy.One of themajor attractionsof SolomonIslands
anditsprodu& is therelativeWom of itslandand seaenvironmentfrompollution.
1.10 The impact of any increases in radioactivematerial in or around the temtory. of
SolomonIslandswouldhave gravewnsequencesfor the healthof itsQtizens,for the
environment,and for the econorny.The fisheries, agncultural and tourism sectors
whichare thernainstayof the economy would besignificantlydarnaged,if not wiped
outby any radiationeffectsresultingfrom the useof nuclearweapons which affecteci
thetemtones. As thePermanent Representative of theSolomonIslands totheUnited
Nationsexplainedon24th April1995at the 1995Extenlon and ReviewConference
of the StatesParties to the Treatyon the Non-Proliferationof NuclearWeapons:
'Most ofthe population of the Solomon Islands licoanalvillages, andarereliant on
a heaitby and flourisbing environment for Our very survivd as a nation. Therefore we are acutely
awareof the need toproteandprewrve our fragile environment both for now afuture
generations.
Eighty per cent of our population useIOflavour their food. They drink water from rivers
and wells. Our major industry and food source iIfOur rain is poisoned by radioactive
failout. we cannoi drid the warer and oui crops will rnake us sick. If Our seas are poisoned, gone
is Our most bountiful source of the Atwhich we use to flavour Our food.
Thereforee mua be concerned ah..the very possibility of nuclearwar or explosionsanywhere
in the world.'
For these reasons, Solornonlslandstakes an activeinterestin the Advisory Opinion
requestedby the GeneralAssernblyfrom the InternationalCourt.
1.11 Asa rnemberof the UnitedNations,SolomonIslandshasconsistently supported those
General Assernblyresolutions(infra para. 3.36) whichcondemn theuse of nuclear
weaponsinany circurnstanceand restate internationallawasprohibiting anyuse of
such weapons. As a rnernberof the United NationsSolomonIslands supportedthe
request for an Advisory Opinion by the GeneralAssemblyin 1994.
1.12 SolomonIslands' long-standingcornmitmenttowardsminirnisingthe risks posed by
radioactivesubstances isrefiected in its participationin nurneroustreaties, includiig the 1968Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Earlier this year it
mongly supportedthe indefiniteextensionof thatTreaty in internationalnegotiations
and nowwelcomesthat indefiniteextension (NPTlCONF.1995lL.6, 9 May 1995),
together with the Prinuples and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferatioand
Dient whichwereadoptedcontemporaneously(NPTICONF.19955.5.9 May
1995).Itcommitrnenttowardsinternational humanitarianlawis reflecindthe fact
that it is a party imerdia, the 1925Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in
War of Asphyxiating,Poisonousor Other Gases,and of BactenologicalMethodsof
Warfare; the four 1949Geneva Conventionsfor the Protection War Victims;the
1976 Convention on the hohibition of Military or Any Other HostileUse of
EnvironmentalModification Techniques;and the 1966 International Covenant on
Economicand SocialRights.
1.13 SolomonIslands' long-standincommitments towardsthe protectionof humanhealth
andthe environmentis alsoreflec nedtsactive participationinUNheConferaice
on Environment and Development andthe fact that it is a Partyto manyavaries
intendedtoprotecttheenvironment.In particular, itParty,interdia, to the 1958
Conventionon the High Seas, the 1972 London Conventionon the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, and the 1992 UN
Fmework Conventionon ClimateChange.
1.14 Finally, bywayof moregeneral observation,SolomonIslandsbelievesthatthethreat
or use of nuclear weapons, especially for hostile purposes, is a matter of global
conm which affects ail people and al1StatesThis reason aione justifies the
submissionof these writtenobservations.
1.15 On 13th lune 1995Franceannounceda unilateraldecisionto resumenuclear testing
in the Pacificregion, on Mururoa Atoll, far fromits own rnetropolitanterritory but
close to that ofSolornon Islands andmore than a dozen other Pacific nations.
MururoaAtoll(FrenchPolynesia) is withinthe nuclear-freezoarea establishedby
the South Pacific Nuclearree ZoneTreaty (Rarotonga,6 August 1985). Solomon
Islands has aiready indicatedto France that it considers such tests would be
unacceptableand would violate her substantive and procedural obligations under
internationallaw, includingthe obligationtocooperateand consultindecisionswhich
arelikelytoaffectharednatural resourceswithinthePacificregion. Comingshortly
afterthe Parties to tNPT agreed by consensuson a unanirnousextension of the
1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this unwelcomeand
surpnsingly ill-timed development provides the clearest possible evidenΠof the
reasons for SolomonIslands' strong interest in the AdvisoryOpinionsought by the
General Assembly. It aiso confirrnsthe importanceof the question, thereasons for
SolomonIslands' concem,and the need for the Court to affirm therule of lin
internationalrelations. Although this AdviOpiniondoes notrelate to the testing
of nuclear weapons,it does have important implicationsfor the conductby nuclear-weapon States of nuclear activities vefar from their own home territories and
popuiations. The French action shows the casualand arrogant attitude of some
nuclear-weaponStateswith respecttoother States. If one Stateis atoact thusin
timeof peace,SolomonIslandsfeelsal1the moreconcemedabout whatwuld happen
intimeof war or armed conilict. SolomonIslandshopesthatthe testsannouncedlast
weekwillnot takeplaceeitherbeforeor after the Courtgivesthis AdvisorOpinion. PART 1
TEE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS COMPETENT TO REQUEST AN ADVISORY
OPINIONFROMTHE INTERNATIONAL COURTOFJUSTICEON THIS
QvEsTiON, AND THE COURT IS COMPETENT TO CWE AN ADVISORY
OPINlONON THEQUESTIONSUBMïiTEû
2.1 Under Article96(1)ofthe UnitedNationsCharterthe GeneralAssemblyrnayrequest
an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Just(ICI on any legal
question.Inaccordance with Article65(1) of Statuteof the ICI,thCourtmay
givean AdvisoryOpinionon anylegd questionat the requestof abodyauthorised
by the Charter.The GeneralAssembly hasaskedthCourtfor Advisory Opinionon
many previousoccasionsand on a varietyof issues. Someof these reqrelatto
specific disputeor situations,' others have invomore generaiissues2 This
Court hasnever refused to givanAdvisoryOpinion whichhas been requestedby
the General Assembly.
2.2 In making the request the General Assembly is acting in the spirit of the
recommendationset forth in its resolution 101) of 14 November 1947on the
"Needfor greater useby the UnitedNationsandits organsof the internationalCourt
of Justice",) and in thecontextof thecal1by the Secretary-GeneralBoutrin-Ghdi
'Agenda forPeace' that"UnitedNationsorgans tum to theCourt morefrequentlyfor
advisory opinion^".^
2.3 SolomonIslands considers thatthisrequestby the General Assemblygives theCourt
an opportunitytoclarifan important questionof internationallaw, to wntwibute
the work of the General Assembly (in particular in iü efforts to wntribute to
"systematicand progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weaponsglobally, with the
ultimategoal of eliminatingthese weapons", NPTICONF.1995lL.5, para. 4(to),
emphasize the relevanceof internationallaw, and to underscore the international
cornmunity'scornmitmentto the developmentand applicationof thele of lain
intemationalrelations.
I Seee.p.Conrequencesfor Baies ofrhcCoririnucdPreserAfnmfin Namibie (South
WestAfrico)nonvi~hr~aSefciuriryCouncilResoluAdv.Op..21June1971ICIRcp.
1971.
Seee.g.Comperciceofrhr Cericrnlhsenibly for rheAdnrissioriofa SrarerorheUniredNationr,
Adv.Op..3March 1950IU Rep. I95O:Rcrervotiotisrothc Convrh~rmekionand
Punishnietirof thc crimeof GAdv.Op., 30 Marc1951ICiRep. 1951.
3 A/RES1171A(II)UN.Rrpcno~ of ~heUriiredNnrioiisOvolV. Articl92-111 of tbe
Chaner.
BoutrosBoutms4hali.Age>forPence1992.p.22 The GeneralAssembly'srequestfor an AdvisoryOpinionfrom the Court relates to
2.4
a maaer which clearly lies within the scopeof its activities, and on whichit has
devotedwnsiderable effort. TheCourt'sOpinionwouldassia it in thefutureconduct
of its activities.
(A) The General Assembly's request fulfils the conditions of Article 96 of the UN
Charter
2.5 Aside from the requirementthat the request mua relateIo a legal question,Article
% is otherwise unqualifieci.The General Assembly'spower under Article 96 is
unlimitedas to subjectmatter. Further, the poweris a discretionaryone (theGenegai
Assembly"mayrequest").Havingdecidedto makethe requestthe presumptionmua
be that theGeneral Assemblyhas vaiidlyexercisedits powerin thisparticular case.
2.6 The Opinionrequestedis clearlya "legalque~tion".~ It concemsinternational legal
aspectsof the useand threatened use of nuclearweapons.Further, the subject matter
of the requestis one that the GeneralAssembly has previouslyaddressedand acted
upon in thecourse ofits activities(seei@a Part (B)). Any politicalcharactawhich
the question might also have cannot prevent the Coun from giving an Opini~n.~
Whilst Article 65 refers to "anylegal question",the Court haswnsistently affirmeci
that it "cannotattributea politicalcharactertoa request whichinvitesit to undertake
an essentially judicialtask, namely the interpretation of a treaty provision."' The
concrete legal questions which the Coun has been asked falls within the nonnal
exercise of the Court'sjuridiction, and the Coun need not wnsider the motives
which inspiredthe request. On the contrary, the Court hasaffirmedthat:
'in riniationsinwhich politicai consarerproinineitmaybepanicularlynecessaryfan
intemional organirationto obüanadvisoryopinionfrom theCounas to the legal p~ciples
applicablewith respect to the inattcr under debatc. especiathesemay include the
intcrprelatof iu conslitution'.'
2.6
The GeneraiAssembly's request hasbeen madetothe Counas the principaljudiciai
organ of the UnitedNations.The requestinvitestheCoun tocontribute, throughthe
J Condirionsof Admissionof a Srnrrro Mettrbeitrhc United Nariotu, AdOp..28th May
1948. IU Rcp. 1947-1948, p.61.
6
D.W. Bowett, ïhe Low of ltirertiarionnlIirsrirued..r1982)atp.278.
7
Cmain Expensa of the UtriredNariotu, Adv. Op.. 20 July 196IU Rep. 1962, p.155;
Condirionof Admission,AdOp.. 20May 1948. ICIRep. 1947-1948.p.61; Cornpaenrrof rhc
GeneralAssemblyfor theAdnrissioriof a Starcto rheUniredNariomOp.,.3Mar& 1950.
IU Rcp 1950. pp.6-7; Irirerpreof rhcAgreertietirof 25Mardi 1berwen the WHOMd
Egypr, Adv. Op.. 20 Decrmher 198IU Rep. 1980. p.87, pan. 33.
I Inrerprerarof thc Agreonenrof 25March 1951 berweenrhe WHOand Egypt, Adv. O20th
Dsember 1980. ICI Rep. 1980, p.87. para.33. exercise of itsadvisory role, to the effective functioning of the United Nations
system, and in particular that of the Genemi Assembly withinthat system. In
fdfdiing its judicial role, including thadvisory function, the Coun has aiways
adoptedan approach which is "volonfairemenf trèslibérale"? taking the view fhat
"the reply of the Court, iwlf an 'organ of the United Nations', represents its
participa ititenactivitiesof the Organization, and,in principle, should not be
refusedU.'O
According tothe Court the objective of the Genemi Assembly's request for an
2.7
Advisory Opinionshould be to "enlighten" it on the proper conduct of "its own
activities"." The Opinionrequestedis of realimportancefor the GenerA aslsembly
in theconduct of its activitiesrelating to the effects of the use of nucmaterials
andweapons.The Genemi Assembly takesa similarview to thatof the WorldHealth
Assembly, which has stated that the "pnmary prevention of the health hazards'of
nuckearweaponsrequires clarity about the status in intemationai law of th& use"
sine "over the 1st 48 yean markeddifferencesof opinion havebeen expressedby
Member Statesabout the lawfulnessof the use of nuclear weapon~".'~ The General
Assemblyrequest seeks toclarifythe intemationallegalcontext.inwhichitsactivities
are wnducted, and to provide a proper legal bais for the conduct of its future
activities.
2.8 Thefact that the questionaddressedto the InternationalCoun arises withinthescope
of theGeneral Assembly'sactivitiesis clear from theUnitedNationsCharterand the
Assembly'spractice thereunder. Accordingly, the General Assembly is within its
rightsand entitledto requestan Opinionon this particular questionfrom the Court.
O Nguyen Quoc Dinh.PatrickDailler. AlainPellet. Droir itrralblic (4th ed.. 1992). p.
837.Se+ alsL. GoodrichE. Hambro.A. Simons. Chnnerof rheUttiredNafiom, Commary
andDocuments (3rd. d.,rev.. 1969) p. 567.
10 Inroprermionof PenceTrearieswirhBulgnrin.HungnryntuiRumania,interimphase.Op.,
30thMardi1950, ICI R<p 1950.p.71; Rescn,nriorrrro the Conwfor the Prewmionand
Punichw~emof the Crimeof Genocide. Adv. Op., 28th May 1951. ICI Rep. 1951, p.19.
"
Reservmiom IOiheConwnriononrhePreventiomidPunishnrenofthe CrimeofGenocidr,Adv.
Op.. 28th May 1951. ICI Rcp. 1951 p.19; Legal Consequenccsfor Srmes of rhe Comind
Prerence of Sovth Africn iri Nan~ibia(South West AfricaJ norwirkranding Securiry Couna1
Rerolurion276 (1970). Adv. Op., 21st June 19IU.Rep. 1971 p.24, para. 3Wmm
Sahnra.Adv. Op.. 16thOctober1975, ICI Rep. 1975p.24, para.31;AppiicabiliryofAnicie VI,
Seaion 22. of the ConwnrOIthe Privilegondlmmuniricrof rheUniredNariom. AdOp..
15thDecember 1989IW Rcp. 1989. p. 189, para. 31.
' Resolutionof the WorHealthAssrmbly (WHA)46.40 of 14 May 1993. (B) The Ceneml Assembly is acting in accordance with theUN Charter.
2.9 The questionposedby the Generai Assemblyclearly falls within theobjectiveand
functionsof the Charterof the United Nations,which embraces a broad scope of
activitiesrelatingtointernatiopeace andsecunty, includingthe legalityof thuse
or threateneduse of force.
2.10 The Preambleto the Charter of the United Nations expressesthe determination"to
Save succeedi gengemtionsfrom the scourge ofwar". Article 2(4statesthat"aii
Members shallrefraiin their internationalrelatifrom the threat ouse of force
againsttheterritorialintegrityor politicalindependenceof state,or in anyother
manner inconsistentwith thePurposes of the United Nations".Those purposesare
cleariy expressed in the Charter. Article26 refen tothe "establishment and
maintenanceof internationalaceandsecurity withtheleastdiversionforarmameiits
of the world'shumanand economicresources". Article 55 calls for the promotion
intearliof"higherstandardsofliving,full employment,and conditionsofefonomic
and sociaprogressand development"with a view to "the creationof conditionsof
srabiliand well-being".Proposaisrelatinto nucleararms controlanddisarmament
havebeen made and discussedwithinthe frameworkof the United Nationssine its
establishment. Consequentlyt,heroleand involvementof theGeneraiAssembly,one
of themain politicalorgansof theUnited Nations, in addressinglegaspectsof the
useof nuclear weapons,includingnucleardisarmamentissues, canbe tracedbackto
the very firstdecadeof the existenceof the UnitedNations."
2.11 The specificpwers of theGeneraiAssemblyare broadlystatedin Chapter IV of the
Charter and include thepwer to "discussany questionsor any matter within the
scope of the present Charte."(Article 10).In addition, Article 11 of the Charter
authorisesthe GeneraiAssernblyto:
(a)considergeneralpnnciplesof co-operationin themaintenanceofinternational
peace and security,includingthe principlesgovemingdisarmament (Article 11
(b)todiscussanyquestions relatingto themaintenanceof internationalpeand
secunty brought beforeitbyany Memberof the UnitedNations(Article11(2)).
Consequentiy,issues pertainingto the legalityof the use of nuclear weaponsfalls
squarelywithinthe GeneralAssernbly'sexpresspowers asprovidedby its constituent
document.
13 in 1950,theGeneralAssemblyadoptzdresolutio(V)detenninin-a, to'duce to
a minimum the diversiorrmamentsof itshumanrrsourcrsfor thegeneralwelfare, withdue
regardio the nds of the underdcvelopzdareasof the world'(C) The pradice of the General Assembly confums itscompetence over matten
rekting to the legality of thuse of nuclear wûapom
2.12 Consideration of the practice of the General Assembly since its establishment
confirms that issues relating tothe use of nuclear weapons, including legality, Lie
withinitsscope of aaivity and thatthe Geneial Assemblyis competentto requestan
Opinion fromthe Coun on the legaiityof the use of nuclear weapons.
2.13 The jnactice of the GeneralAssembly has longbeen conŒmd with the legality of
the useof nuclear weapons.The extent towhichthe General Assemblyis involved
with the subjectof nuclearweapons,their effm and legalstatusisillustrateinter
dia by reference to the adoption by the General Assemblyof resolutions on the
legalityof the use of nuclearweapons(a),aswellas the Genera A ssembly's Speciai
Sessionsdevoted tothe issueof disarmament(b)and thecommissioningof various
studieson the effects of the use of nuclear weapons(c).
GeneralAssembly Resoluti onnhe legaliryof the me ofnuclear weap0n.s and
(a)
relaredissues
2.14 In its activities since the late 1950'sthe General Assemblyhas been consistently
concemed with legai aspect o f nuclear weapons. Ithas addressed imer dia the
legaiity of their use, treaty arrangements for nuclear disarmament, the legality of
testing, and the creationof nuclear-freezones in internaiionallaw. In the contextof
theseand otheractivitiestheGeneral Assembly's competenco ever thesubjectmatter
of the questionit hassent tothe Courtfor an AdvisoryOpinioncannotreasonablybe
challenged.
2.15 The GeneraiAssembly has specificallyaddressedthe issueof the legalityof the use
of nuclear weapons since at least 1961, adopting many resolutions which have
affirmecthat any use of nuclearweaponswouldbe a violationof the Charter of the
Unit& Nations, a crime against humanity and contrary 10 the pnnciples of
internationallaw. GeneraiAssembly resolution1653(XVI)of24 November1961was
the first amongmany other GeneralAssemblyresolutionswhich declared:
Uoited Nations and. asaudirect violation of the Charter of fbe United Nations;etter and aims of the
(b)ïhe use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapoos would exceed evwar ancause of
iodiwriminate suffcring and deIOrnankind and civilization and, as such, is conwary tathe
mies of international law and Io the laws of hurnanity;
(c)The use of nuclear and therino-nuclear weapons is a war anemmy or enemicsm
alone but aagainsr rnankind in general. since the peoples of iheworld nwarinvolved in such a
will be subjected Io ail evils fcnerkted by the use of such weapons;
(d) Any State using nuclear and thenno-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Cher
of ibe United Nations. asactingIOthe lawofhurnanity and as commining agaktme manufacturesuch weapons.l9This was the fint in a seriesof General Assembly
reso1utionswhich ledtotheadoptionin 1968of the Treat on theNon-Proliferation
of '~uclear Weapons 0." The Treat tself incorporates the five principles
enunciated in General Assembiy resolution 2028 (XX)?' General Assernbly
resolutionsalso note the establishment of Preparatory Comrnittees for each
Conferenceof the Parties tthe NPT.P
2.20 Otherinternationaltreaties on nuciear weaponshave been negotiatedas a result of
General Assemblyresolutioninitiatives.= By wayof exarnple, the Treat yanning
Nuclear Weapon Testsin the Atrnosphere,inOuter Spaceand under Water (Partial
Test-Ban Treat~)~w' as preceded by rnany General Assemblyresolutions on the
subje~t.~The PartialTest-BanTreaty closely followedthe pnnciples laid down in
the Declaration of Legal Principles Goveming the Activities of States in the
Explorationand Use of Outer Space, in Assernbly Resolution 1962 of
together with the associatedprinciples laid down in resolution 1884 (XVIII)in
l9 AIRES11380(XN) of 20 Novemher 1959.
See AIRES11576 (XV) of 20 December 1960. AIRES11664 (XVI) of 4 December 1961.
AIRES11665(XVI)of 4 Decernber 1961, AIRES12149(XXI) of 4 November 1966. A/RES/2153
A W) of 17 November 1966, AIRES12346A GXII) of 19 Decembzr 1967 and1VRESfî373
&XII) of 12 June 1968 (with text of Treaty annexeil)
' Gencnl Assembly remlution callin: upon the Conference of the Eighizcn-Nonion Cornmittee
Disamment to giveurgent considerationto the negotiaiion of an inKIprevcntal treaty
prolifention of nuclzar wcapons. bawd on five main principles. AIRES12028 (XX). 19
November 1965.
= A/RES13184 B (XXVIII) of 18 Duiembzr 1973. AIRES133157 of 14 Dccernber' 1978.
AIRES138n4 of 15 Dzcrmhcr 1983. AIRES143182of 7 Dccrmber 1988. AIRESA4of 9
Decernber 1992.
1967Treaty on Principles Governing the Activitics of States in the ofOu-ration anduse
Spaîe.including the Moon and other Celcstial Bodies. in force 10 Ouober 1967,
AIRESR222IXXI) of 19 Decemkr 1966. annex: 1979 Agrernmt Goveming the Actofities
Suies on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, in force IL luly 1984, AIRES134168of 1979.
amex.
" The Treaty Banning Nuclear Wzapon Tests in the Atrnosphere, in Outer Space and undn Water.
also knoun asthe PartialBanTreatywassigned on 5 August 1963and entintforce
or10 October 196UN Trcaty Series vol. 480. No. 1-6964.
SΠe.g. GAIRES11649 (XVI) of 8 Novembcr 1961 on 'The urgent neul fortobeoaty
nuclcar wcapons tests undcr effective international control" and(XW)REof 662
November 1962 on 'The urgent nzzd for suspension of nuclear and tests'.uclear 1993, theConferenceonDisarmamentgaveits Ad Hoc Committeeona NuclearTest
Ban a mandatetonegotiate a cumprehensivetest-bantreaty. The GenwalAssembly
has adoptednumerous resolutionscommending the effons of the ConferenΠon
Disarmamenton its negotiationson a Comprehensive Test-BanTreaty and urged it
to "proceed intensively"in its negotiationof a "universal and intemationaiiyand
effectivelyverifiabletreat~".~'The General Assembly has msed that pendingthe
conclusionof such a ban, nuclear weapons Statesshould "susperidall nuclear-test
explosionsthroughan agreed moratoriumor unilateralmoratorium"."
2.21 The General Assemblyhas alsolong sought toprornotenuclear-weapon-freezones,
definingthewncept in rwlution 3472 B (XXX) of 11December 1975.Tworegional
gmups have already wncluded treaties: The Treaty for the Prohibition ofNuclear
Weaponsin LatinAmenca and theCaribbean (Treatyof Tlatel~lco)~and the South
PacifieNuclearFreeZone Treaty(Treaty of Rarotonga),towhich Solomon Isiaiids
is a party." Africa Sntatesare in the process of finaiizing a draft treaty,= and
proposais havebeen madeby the General Assemblyfor suchzones inSouth AsiaU
and in the MiddleEast."
2.22 The General Assembly'srequest for an AdvisoryOpinion follows on hm other
recent efforts aimed at addressing legal aspects of nuclear weapons. In 1993 it
adopted a unanimous resolution recommending the negotiation of a non-
discriminatory, multilateraiand effectivelyvenfiable treaty banning the production
of fissileatenal for nuclearweaponsor other nuclearexplosive de vice^.^'
n
A/RESl48i70 of 16 Decemher 1993. Se also GA resolurions: AIRES1441106of 15 December
1989. 45/50 of 4 December 1990.RES146128of 6 Dzcember 1991, AIRES147146of 9
December 1992, AIRES148169of 16 Decemher 1993and AIRES149169of 9 January 1995.
'4 AIRES148169of 16 Dzcemher 1993and AIRES149169of 9 January 1995.
The Treaty for the Prohibition ofar Weapons in Latin America anCaribbean. slso
known as the Trraty of Tlatelolco. was sicnul al MexicoCity on 14February 1967and entered
inIo forw on 22 Apnl 1968; UN Treaty Series. vol. 634. No. 9068.
31 The SouthPacific Nuclrar Free ZoneTreaty. Rarotonga. Cook Islands, 6 Augun 1985. in force
11 December 1986; CD1633andCon. 1.
3: Under thelems of Gcneral Assembly rcsolution 47/76 of 15 December 199Sefmary
General wnveneù a Group of Expertsto dradraft treaty ondenuclcariratioAfica.
Mostrecently. at ils forty-ninthsession, the General Asxmhly adoptul a rethafion (491138)
cnwuragul African Statu to continuetheir effons towards fdnfi andtequesiethaf
tbetext of the trraty be submiitui ro the Generaatits next session.
3J
Resolution48/75 L of 16Decemher 1993.2.23 Ilie above examples illustratenonexhaustiveiy the General Assembly'spmtice in
relation tointernational legalaspects of nuclear weapons, including th& use or
threate nee.in the wntext of thispmctiŒthere can beno doubts as to theGend
Assembly'scampetence toask for the Advisory Opiion it has requested from the
Court.
fi) General Assembly Specinl Sessionr on ~Iear weuponr der the aegis of
diromament
2.24 In addition to wnsideration of legal issues the General Assemblyhas addressed
politicalaspects,conveningfour specialsessionson disament. The Programme
of Actionof the firstsuchspecialsession,held in 1978,%noted inter alia that:-
47.Nuclcar weaponspose tbe gruilest to mankind and to the survival of civiIi ision.
essentiai to halt and reverse rhe nracein ail its aspectsin order-to aven war danger of
involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in Lhiscontext is the complete elimination of miclcar
weapons.
57.Pcnding the achievement of this goal. for whicb negociationsshould be andorouslypuraied.
bearing in mind the dev~tating resuls which nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-
beliigerents aibe nuclear-weaponStateshavespecial responsibiliticsto undenake measuresaimed
aipreventing tbe outbreak of nwax.ar
58..Ai1Statesshould activelyparticipate inefforts tobrin6 aboutconditions in internationalrelations
among States in which a code of pcaceful conduciintemationai affairs could be agrd
and wbich preclude the use or Lhreatof use of nuclear wapons.'
2.25 . In 1982, the General Assembly convened iü second specia session devoted to
disarmament, and in 1988 its third. At its 90th plenary meeting on 15 December
1994,the GeneralAssemblydecideà toconvene,possiblyin 1997, thefourthspecial
session devotedto disarmament."
(cl GeneralAsscmbiy srudieson nuclearweapons
2.26 Finally, the General Assembly's competence is reflected in its efforts to punue
furtherlaiowledgeand understandingofthe effectsof theuseof nuclearweapons. On
the recommendationof General Assemblyresolutions a number of United Nations
studieson nuclear weapons havebeen undertakenby Groups of Experts under the
directionof the Secretary-General.By iü remlution 33/91D of 16December 1978,
the Geneiai Assembly requestedthe carrying out of the first ComprehensiveStudy
on nuclearweapons.That studywaspublishedbythe Secretary-Generalin September
)d The General Asscrnhly's Tenth Special Session devoted to DiwasnheldntNew York
from23 May to1 luly1978:GA Res. S-100 of30lune 1978.2.27 By its resolution43/75 N of 7 December 1988, theGeneraiAssemblyrequested the
Secretary-Generaltoconduct an update of the ComprehensiveStudy on Nuclear
Weapons that would "provide factuaiand upto-date informationon and wouldpay
regard to thepolitical,legaiand securityasptf: (a)nucleararsenaland pertinent
&hnological developmenu; (b)doctrinesconcerningnuclearweapons;(c) effortsto
reducenuclear weapons----.hvsical,environmental,medicalandothereffectsof use
of nuclear weapons and nuclear t&ting; (e) efforts to achieve a comprehensive
nuclear-testban; (f) efforpreventtheuseof nuclearweaponsandtheir horizontal
andverticalproliferation;(g)the questionof verificationofwmpliancewith nuclear-
arms limitationagreements."That studywas publishedin September1990."
2.28 Other United NationsExpert studieson nuclear weaponsinclude,aComprehensive
NuclearTest Ban study(May 1980)which was basedonGenerai Assembly resolution
341422 ofDecember1979. Itscontentsincludeda sectionon the negotiationsleading
to the +ai test ban treaty o, the Nuclear Non-holiferation Treaty and on
negotiations ona comprehensive testban." A study was also conducted -onthe
Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearizationof Africa,based on
General Assemblyresolution34176 B of December 1979.Amongstother manen it
consideredSouthAfrica'snuclearweapon~apability.~'
(1)) The Court should givethe AdvisoryOpinion requested by the Cenetal Assembly
2.29 As is clear from theprecedingdiscussionthe GeneralAssemblyis entitledto request
an AdvisoryOpinion fromthe Court. In conformitywith Article 65 of itsStatute,
however, the Court is not required to reply tothe questionasked. The Court has
frequentlyin thepastinvoked the"permissive"formulationof Articl65 to conclude
that "wmpelling reasons" couldlead it to refuse to give an AdvisoryOpini(se.
in@ para. 2.34) In fact, the Court has onlyrelied on its nght to refusea requeston
one occasion.This was in1923 inthe Emcm Careliacase wheretheCouncilof the
League of Nationshad asked theCourt if theTreaty betweenFinlandand Russiaof
1920and its Annex relatingto the recognitionof the autonomyoEaster Cnarelia,
a Russian region, was binding on Russia. The Permanent Coun of International
Y Comprehcnsive Study on Nuclcar Weapons: Repon of the UN SecreîarUNGDoc..
Al4.5139212 Szpternber 1980.
" Comprehensive Study on Nuclcar Weapons: Repon of the UN SecreîaryUNmDoc.,
Al45/373,1SScpternhcr 1990.
Q Al351257ofMay 1980, Justice replied that the request encompasseda dispute beiween Finland and Russia,
that Russia was not a member of the Leagueof Nations, that it had not recognised
the competence of the Court and that it refused to participate in the Court's
procedure. Accordingto the Court, these were "peremptory reasons" justifying its
refusaito give an AdvisoryOpinion."
.30 That was the onlyoccasionon whichthe Courtrelied upon the exception,despitethe
frequentrequestsbyStates, since 1949. thatit shouldnot on a paRicular mattergive
an Advisory Opinion. Subsequentiy, in accordance with a wellsstablished
jurisprudence, the Court has never refused to give an Advisory Opinion on the
questionposed. This has occurred (a) for reasons of principle, and (b) on the basis
of certaincriteria whichhave beenfulfilled.Additionally,the fact that thWHOhas
madea similarrequestshouldnotpreventtheCourtfrorngiving an AdvisoryOpinion
to the General Assembly(c).
The reasons of principlewhich hnve led the Coun ro decide ro give an Advisory
(a)
opinion
2.31 The reasons of principle which have led the Coun to agree to give an Advisory
Opinionare the following:
(i) the Opinionis not binding; and
(ii) the Court has adopteda principleof not refusing to givean Advisory Opinion
(i) The Opinion is norbindin~
2.32 In a caseconcemingtheinrerprerarionof PeoccTrcories.(l950)theCourt emphasised
that given the non-bindingcharacter of the Opinion which it was giving - which'
flowed from"the scopeattributed by the Charterand by the Statute of the Court to
an AdvisoryOpinion""- no Statecan opposethe giving of the Opinion:
'TheCourt'sreplyisonlyof an advisorycharassuch, il ha!.no bindingforce. IIfollowstha
noSute,whethera memberof the UnitedNatioornoi.CM prevenfthe giving of an Advisory
OpinionwhicbheUnitedNations consid10bedesirableinordIoobtaincnlightenmasw the
courseof action itsde.'-
4:
PCU. opinionof 23 July 1928. SeriesB No. 5, pp.27-28.
"
lvdgmet~rof rhe Adn~inisrrarr riburialof rI.LO upon Cornplairumade agaimt rhe
UNESCO. Adv.Op.. 23 Octoher 1926. IW Rcp. 1956. p.W.
Y
IrurrprerazifPcacc TrcaricAdv. Op.. 30 March1950. 10 Rep. 1950. p.71; Applidiluy
ofAm M. Secr. 22 ofrheCotii~ernn rhePrivilcgesabnmuniriesofrheUN @f&lii &c),
Adv.Op., 15 Decemher 1989. IU Rcp. 1989, pp.188-189. 2.33 The same pnnciple govems the present request by the General Assembly. Any
Opinion granteci by the Coun would be merelyadvisoryin nature and will not be
binding on StateMembers of the United Nations. Accordingly, the giving of the
Opinion does not dependon the consentof any particularState or group of States.u
(ii) Inpnnciple the Coun dm not refuseto giw Advisory Opinions
2.34 If the "permissive"provisionsin Article65 implies that the Courtis entitleditheory
torefuse to give an Advisoiy Opinion, it hasin practice adopted an approach of
replyingpositively to al1requestsfor Advisory Opinionswhich are addressed toit
where its responseis intendedto, and wiU, enlightenin legal terms the organ which
hasmadethe request.As theCourtstatedin the Inrerprerarion of Peace TremMe csase
(1950):
'ne Court'sOpinionis givenntotheStatebut totheorganwhichis entiiiedw nqum iS the
replyof theCoun,itselfan 'organoftheUnitedNations'.representsits parttheactivities
of theOrganizati, nd, in principle,shouldnotbereniwd'*
2.35 MwMs murandis, this principle applies to the General Assernbly'srequest. The
General Assernblyhas considered the issue of the legality of the use of nuclear
weapons almost frorn its creation (see supra paras 2.14-2.28). It is therefore
indispensable forthe conductof its activitiesnowand inthe future in this fieldfor
the GeneralAssernblyto be enlightenedon the questionof the legalityof the use or
threat of use of nuclearweapons (see infrapara. 2.42-2.45).
(b) Criteriawhichnccdrobe sorisfiedin orùerfor ri~cCoun roreply roo requcsrfor an
Advisoty Opinion
2.36 In order for the Court togive an AdvisoryOpinion. itis necessarythat the request
fulfilsthe followingcriteria:
(i) the Opinionshouldnot relateto a disputein whichone of the parties is a total
suanger to the Coun;
(ii) the Coun is actingwithin iljudicial function;
u Id.
* Inrerprcrarionof Pcace Trearicrff~rsrPAdv.)Op.. 30 March1950, IU Rep. 1950, p.71-
72;seealso Rerervariors ru rhcCnt~veon rhe Prcvertrioriand PunishmenrofCrime of
Genocide. ICI Rcp. 1950, p. 19;Judgerrtenrsof rhr Adni. Trib. of IL0 upn Cnudelaints
againsrrhe UNESCO, Adv. Op.. 23 October1956. ICI Rcp. 1956. p.86; CemainE~~~NCIof
the UN. Adv.Op. 20 July 1962. 10 Rep. 1962, p.155.; Applicabilify ofAn. VI.Sec. 22 of rhe
ConventiononrhePriviiegcs ard Imnrutofihc UN,Adv. Op., 15DeCernber1989,IU Rcp.
1989, pp.188-189. (iü) the Opinionhas a practical significance.
As will be shown, the present request on the legaiityof theuse or threatened useof
nuclearweaponsby the GeneraiAssernblyMs thesecriteria.The Coun shouldnot
refus toreply to the Gened Assernbly'srequestfor an AdvisoryOpinion.
(i) The Opinion does notrelatetoadispue in whichoneoftheparties ir atotalstranger
to theCoun
In the E'ern CareIiacase (1923), the Court said thatit couldnot, in theguise of
an Advisory Opinion,deal with a dispute between two Stateswhere one had not
recognisedits competence,had refused to participatein the procedure and was not
even a mernberof the organisation which had asked the Opinion." SinŒthen, the
Court has onnumerousoccasionsdeclaredthatonly "compellingreasons"wouidléad
it torefuse toreply toa request for an Opinion." The "compelling reasons"
envisagedby the Court have aiwaysbeen limitedtothe situationthat the Court has
been cded upontoaddress a dispute in respect of which one of the parties thereto
had not accepted the competenceof the Court. In the Western Sahara case (1975),
the Court said:
'In cerfaincircumnances, therrhlackof consentof an inierestedSlate may renderthe giving
ofM advisoryopinion incompatiblewith theCourt'sjudiciai charactcrofmiswouldbce
when the circumstancesdiwlow that to give a reply would bave the effect of ctheumvcnting
principlethata State is not obliged to allowibesubmincdiojudiciai seitlementwithout
iu consent. Ifsuch a sinÿuionarix.the powersof the Coun underthe discretiotoiten
byAn. 65, para. 1. of the Statute would afford suffimeamt to cnsure respect for the
fundamentalprinciple of consenttojuriwli~tion."~
2.38 Adrnittedly,in the present case, the questionasked by the General Assernblydoes
relate toan important controversy between States. However, the Coun itself has
recopnisedthatunderlyinpeach requestfor an Advisory Opinionthere willalwaysbe
a controversywhich has led the organisationromake the request:
'Differences of view ainongst Sutes on legal issues have existed in prsticrilly every advisory
proceeding; if al1were agreed. the needto remri to the Court for adaise.'%ld not
''
Eusrem Cureliafa~e,PCIJ. Opinion of 23 July 1928. SB.iNo.5. pp.27-28.
O
InrerprauzionofPeam Trearicscave. Adv. Op.. 30 March 1950. IU Rep. 1950, p.72;Judgmair
ofrheAdniinisrraiw TribunalofrhcIL0 uponConil)niaàeagaintrthe UNESCO,Adv. Op.,
23October 1956. IW Rep. 1956, p.86; Cemin Lrpefm of the UAdv. Op., 20 July 1962.
ICIRep. 1962, p.155; Legal Cofrcequsor Srara of the ConriPrerenceof SouthAfim
in Namibia(SouthWesrAfrica) rioru~irhsrSecurip CouncilResolurion27Adv. Op..21
lune1971, ICI Rep. 1971. p.27.
.9 W'esfemSahara,Adv. Op.. 16 October 1975. IW Rcp. 1975, p.25,
"
Namibia CaseAdv. Op.. 16Octoher 1975, ICI Rep. 1975, p.25. The mereexistenceof theconmveny doesnot meanthata contentiousdisputeexists
betweentheparties. In givingthe Opinionon the legalityof the use or threat of use
of nuclearweapons, the Court would not in any event be addressing any dispute
within the rneaningof Article 36 of the Statute of the Coun, but it would be heiping
toresolvea wnmversy.
(Ü) ZheCoun, in giving ifsopinion, willremainwirhinifsjudicialfwrcn+on
2.39 The Court has frequentlyemphasisedthat as 'the principaljudicial organns'it should
remain faithful to its character:
'Ibere are certain limitr. howetorthe Court's duttoreply to a Requcst foan Advisory
Opinion. It is oot meanl'organ of the United Nations', it is essentially the 'principal judicial
organ' of the Organization (An92 of the Chaner an1of the Sta~te)'~
By lending its assistance in the solution of a problem confronting the General
Assembly, theCourtwouldbedischargingiu functions astheprincipaljudicialorgan
of the United Nations. Moreover, as frequently recalled the Advisory Opinion
requestedof the Courtmust relate to a legalquestion:
'[..] in accordancemth An. 65 of irs Statute. the Couanadvisory opinion oniy on a Icgal
question. Ifa quesfion is not a lepl one. the Coun barno discretion in tmusldeclineit
to give the opinion requested.'"
2.40 The fact that the questionhaspoliticalimplicationsis not in itself an obstacleto the
giving of an Advisory Opinion:where the Court has been asked to characterisea
particularform of behaviour with respect to the provisionsof treaty and customary
law, the Coun is performinga taskwhichis essentiallylegal:
'It has been argued that the questionput to the Couri is intertwined with political questions, andthat
for this reason the Coun should refuse fo give an opinion. It is uue that most interprewions of the
Chaner of the United Nations will have political significance. gInathe nature of things
il could nobeothemise. The Coun. however. cannot anribute a political chawaa requsi
which invites it to undedean essentially judicinl task, namely. the interpretlveafyof a
provision."
In the present case, thequestion askedrelatesto thecompatibilityof the useor threat
JI Inrerpreimionof Pence TrcnricAdv. Op.. 30 March 1950,IU Rep. 1950, p.71.
" Id.,JudgmcnrsofrhcAdni. Trib.ofIL0 uponCornplnitunradengoinst~heUNESCO, Adv. Op.,
U Oclober 1956.ICI Rrp.1956. p.84.
JI
Cmain Etpenses of rhe UN. Adv. Op..20 July 1962.IU Rep. 1962, p.155.
Y Cmoin hpenres of rheUN. Adv. Op.. 20luly 1962.IU Rep. 1962, p.155. of useof nuclear weaponswithinternationallaw. In askingthe Coun to chancterise
thebehaviour(the useor threatof useof nuclear weapons)in the contextof rules of
positiveaw, the GeneralAssemblyis invitingthe Court,in effect, tocanyouta task
which faii sithin the normal exercise of its judiciai powers, namely 'an
interpretative function which falls within the normal exercise of its judicial
powen" .'=
(Ci T)heOpinion wiUhave apracricalgect
2.41 The Coun does not give AdvisoryOpinions as anend in themselves: its opinions
must havepractical consequences,for example by helpinga requestingorganisation
totakedecisionswhich willaffect its activitieson the basisof the answersgiven to
the questionposed to the Court. In the WesternSoharacase (1975).the Coun said:
'kigeneral, an opinion givenby the Coun in the presen proccehirnisbtheGeoerd
Asssmblywithelemenu of a legaicharacterreliuahifier treatmentof thedecolonhtionof
WesternSabara.
73. inanyeventowhalextentordegreiuopinionwihaveanimpacotntheactionoftheGcneral
Asssmblyis not for theCotodecide.Tùe functionof theCoun is w give an opinionbased
law. onceif badcototheconclusionthrtiquestionsp10it arerelevantandhave apractical
andconremporarefiect and.consequently,are notdevoidof objector purpose.'"
2.42 In sum, the choices made and the acts taken by the GeneralAssemblywill depend
directly on ifs loiowingwhether theuseof nuclear weaponsis legalor illegal.Even
if thihasconsiderablepoliticaiimplications, itis nevertheless fundamentallylegal
maner, and the Court's reply would, in concrete terms, enlighten the General
Assembly in the conduct of its activities. In the light of the Court's prior juris-
prudence, thereare no legal grounds for the Court toddecne to give an Advisory
Opinionon thequestionsubmittedby the GeneralAssernbly. Moreover,worldpublic
opinion would find it difficult to understandwhy the Court shouldrefuse toanswer
an important legal questiowhichhasdominatedinternational relationsfor morethan
half a century,particularlywherethe questionhassuchprofoundimplicationsfor the
future of hurnanity.
2.43 Assurningthat the Coun wasof the opinion that undercertain conditionstheuse of
nuclear weapons couldbe compatiblewith internationallaw -quod non (see infa
paras. 3.43 erseq.) -the General Assembly would thenbe entitledto take specifia
priori measures to seekto preventand reduce the chancesof a nuclearconflictfrom
arising. It couldaim to furtherstrengthenexistingintemationalanangementsrelating
to inter dia nuclear-free zones and the guarantees given to non-nuclear-weapon
"
CondirioriofAdniissioriof a SrarcroMrr>i~irhc UnircdNarioru(A4.of rhCharter),
Adv. Op., 20July1948IU Rrp. 1947-1938p.61; CcriairtExpcmes ofUN,eAdv. Op.U)
July 1962IU Rep. 1962.p.156.
24
WesternSahara, Adv. Op., 16Oclober 19IU, Rcp. 1975p.37.(c) 'Ihe WHOrequesr does nor prevcnr ~heCounfrom giving theAdvisory Opinion
requescedby theGeneral hsembiy
2.47 The WHO has madea similar, but notidentical,requesttothat made bythe General
Assembly. SolomonIslands considen that it would beappropriate for the Court to
give both organizationsthe AdvisoryOpinionsthey haverequested, since thisans
are. in which therare clearly overlappingwmpetences. Although.the competence
of the WHOis narrower, the GeneralAssemblydws nothaveexclusivewmpetence.
This is wnfmed by the factthat the GeneralAssemblyhas not expressed tothe
WHOor to the Court any disagreementwith theWHO request, whether inits terms
or in the fact of its having beenmade.
2.48 The fact that the WHO ha madeitsown requestdoes not inany wayprejudice the
General Assembly'srequest. Ifthe Courtdecidestoproceed to givean Opinion'to
the WHO then its additionalconsiderationof the Gened Assemblyrequest would,
presumably, build onthatearlier OpinionIfon the otherhand, the Court decides
not to givan Opinionto theWHO (someStatessubmittingWntten Observations in
respectof thWHO requesthavearguedthat thequestion shouldhavebeenrequested
by the General Assembly) then it would still befree to address the General
Assembly's request.Either way,SolomonIslandsdoes not see any inwmpatibility
betweenthe two requests.
(E) Conclusion
2.49 For the reasons set outabove it is submittedthat the Coun should anvOpinion
on the bais that the GeneralAssemblyis competentto requestan Advisory Opinion
from theCoun on this subject, and theCourts competentto give, and shouldgive,
an AdvisoryOpinionon the questionsubmitted. States. It rnight alu, decide tostrengthen its efforts in relatianposreriori
measurestoattend tothe needs of the victims of any such conflict. Even if, since
1961,a greatrnajonty of Stateshavetakenthe view thatany useof nuclear weapons
would be iiiegaiunder internationali(in!paras. 3.36 erseq.).there remainsa
rninoritywhichtakestheoppositeview. It is clearlynecessarytolimitthenumberof
victimsand toiimitthe suffenng ofthose whoare injureasa resultInconjunction
with the SpecialiseAgencies of theUnite Nation sschas the WHO and other
intemafionalorganisations, the GeneralAssembly woulneedtoredoubleits efforts
todetermine what levelof result radiation in foodstuffs, if any, wouldbe safe for
humanconsumption, and whatlevelof radiationin a givenenvironment,ifany, could
besafe enough toaüow human accessto suchareas.
2.44 Specifically in regard to preventive rneasures, the Generai Assernbly working
alongsideits SpecialisedAgenciesinparticular thWHO would, for example,'be
justifieinrecornmendingthe developmentof aprogrammefor the constructionof
shefters, including basic standards for their construction and the availayfbilito
foodstuffsfor survivorsand necessarysu~vai equiprnent.The GeneraiAssembly
would beentitledto recomrnendalsothat theWHO developspecialprogrammesof
preparationand educationfor nuclearwar whichrnightbe madeavailablein schools
and for the publicat large. It could equaily recomrnendthe trainappropriate
health servicesand civilprotectionand with regard to assistanceto the injtoed,
give serious study to thespecificneeds of hospitais,and to consider the rneansof
making appropnate treatment available to large numbersof victims of bums of
radiation.itherwaytherewillbe needto takeinto account the particularconditions
of each State, including iü health and economic conditions.These new aid
programmesmight be studied or establishedwith a view to providing developing
countrieswiththe necessarymeansof protectinpitselfagajnstthe consequencesof a
nuclear conflict. For a smail island country with a limited temtory and financial
resources the active role of theGeneral Assembly andits SpeciaiisedAgencies, in
botha preventiveand curativecapacity, would be indispensableto its sumival.
2.45 If, on the otherhand, theCourtdecidesthat thereare no circumstancesin which the
threator useof nuclearweapons wouldbe legalunderinternational law,as Solomon
Islands believesis thecase, thenthe General Assemblywouldbe entitledto limit its
policyto actionstakento preventnot the effectsof a nuclearwar but thevery useor
threatened use of nuclear weapons. In particular, the Generai Assemblywould be
assistedin itseffortsto contributeto therecentdecisionof the ReviewandExtension
Conferenceof the Partiesto theT to elirninateail nuclear weaponsanddefine the
terms of "effective international control" pertaining to that objective(se
NPïICONF. 1995lL.5,para. 4(c)).
2.46 Whetherlegalor illegal, theOpinion oftheurt, andtheconclusionit reaches, wiii
determine thedirectionwhich the General Assemblytakesin actionandin policy in
thecoming years in thisarea. of theinternationalcornmunitytbe a "threat"whichiswntrary tointernationallaw.
When the USSR soughtto deploy nuclearweaponsin 1962in Cuba,the UnitedStates
consideredthis tbe a "threat" of tuse of forw withinthe meaningof Article2(4)
of theUnitedNationsCharter. ButtheSecurityCouncildid not endorsethisviewand
did not vote onadraft resolutionproposed by the UniteStateswhich wouldhave
characteriad the Soviet action as a threat to internapeaceand secunty."
3.5 The useof theterm"threat" by the GeneralAssemblyin its request foan Advisory
Opinionmust thereforebe consideredtobe limiteto thesituationwhereoneor more
Statesclearly express an intention tuse nuclear weaponsagainst one or more
specifically designateStatesor populations in precisecircurnstances. It is the
iilegalityof thtype of "threat" - realand specif richer than theoretical and
general- whichshould be consideredby the Court in addressingthis requestfoan
AdvisoryOpinion.
3.6 With this understanding,SolomonIslands considersthat international law prohibits
the following"threars":
- to act in such a way as to threaten internationapeace and security (ihis
prohibitionis implicit in Articles l(1) and 39 UN thCharter);
- to threaten the use of force in violationof A2(4)lof the UN Charter;
- tomakeotherthreatsprohibitedby the UN GeneralAssemblyDeclarationonthe
Pnnciples of International Law Governing Friendly relations between States
(resolution2625(XXV), 24 October 1970).includingprohibitionsrelatingto:
- threat or useof force (Pnnciple 1, paras. 1,54and 10);and
- prohibitionon intervention(Principle3, para. 1).
Asthesedifferenttypes of threat wouldbe illegal,any statedintentionto usenuclear
weaponsin supportof such threats would also beforrion unlawful.
3.7 Are thereother circumstances in which a threat to use nuclear weapons mightbe
made?In particular, would it be lawful to threatenthe use of nuclearweapons, for
example, to respondto an unlawfulact of aggression?As set forth below, Solomon
Islands considers that any use of nuclear weapons would prima facie violate
internationallaw. Althoughthe threat ouse is less serious, and would not of itself
give rise to a violationof those rules of internationallaw which proscribe theuse of
nuclear weapons by reference to their effects, SolomonIslands considers that the
threatof use of nuclear weaponswould violate generalmles of internationall(a)
and specificrules of internationall@).
Se SecuritCouncildebatu. 22-25 Octohcr 1962, 1022nd-1025thsessions.
24 PARTII
THE LEGALITY OF THE THREATOR USE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS
PartIIof these.Written Observationsof Law is dividedinto three Sections.Section
3.1
A addressesthe legality ofthe threuserof nuclearweaponsby referenctothe
applicableiles of internationallaarmed [email protected])SectionB
add~sses thelegalityof thethreator useof nuclearweaponsby referenceto therules
of intemationallaw for the protectionof human healthand the environmentand of
fundamental human rights (paras. 4.1-4.49). SectiCn briefly addressethe
responsibiiityofStatefor the wnsequen- of a violationof its obligaasset
forthinSectionsA andB (paras.5.1-5.4).
SECTION A
The threator use of nuclearweaponsandthe internationallawof
arrnedconflict
3.2 Beforeaddressing thesubstantivelaw it isappropriateto considerthe meaningof the
term "threat"assed inthe GeneraiAssembly'srequest.Thecircumstancesin which
the "use" of a nuclear weaponswill haveoccurred are self-evident.
(A) The meaning of threat
3.3 The GeneralAssembly'srequestasks "1sth117rerr use ofnuclear weaponsin any
circumstancesermittedunderinternationallaw?". In raisingthe issueof threat two
funher questionsneed to be addressed:
-
at whatpoint has a"threat"been made?and
-
when would sucha "threat"be unlawful?
3.4 There is no generallyaccepted defiof "threat" in internationallaw.beenhas
definedasa "wmmunicatedintentto inflictphysicalor other hann on anypersonor
on properties"." If States manufactureor possess nuclearweaponsit is presurnably
in the expectationthattheycould,in certaincircumstances,be used. Sincethe use of
nuclear weapons is intended toharm" rather than to do some good, it rnight
therefore bsaidthat mere possessionconstitutesa form of "threat". Statepractice
indicates that this is not the case. For half a centurya small group of Stateshave
possessednuclearweapons,andsuchpossessionhasneverben consideredbytherest
'' Le PetitRobert. ûiclio~aire alphahztiqueee la languefranpise. Pans,1973.rt,
23 (a) Generalrulesofinremarional law
3.8 Giventhat the internationalcommunitywould keat with exceptionalgravity anyuse
of nuclearweapons,any threat of use might lead toan actualuseand should aisobe
consideredto be exceptionallydangerous. A State which threatenssuch use would
threat ienernationalpeace and secunty. It would alsoviolate the general niles of
internationallaw such astheobligationto fulfilingood faith itsobligationsunderthe
United Nations Charter and the cornmitment to coopente with other States
consisrentlywith the Charter. Both these pnnciples are elaboratedin the Gend
Assembly's Deçlarationof Principles GoverningFnendly RelationsbetweenStates
(resolution2625 (XXV),24 October 1970,4t ahd7thprinciples). Theirformuhion
in thi instrumentare applicableto the threat ofuseof nuclear weapons, namely:
- in relatioto the dutyof moperaîion:
'a Statesshallco-operatewitbotherSratcsinthe maiofinternatiopeacandsecuriy;
b. Statesshcooperatin the promotionof universal forandob~e~Ztneofhumanrighi.9
l...]'
(Principle4. p2)a.
- in relation to good faith:
'Every State hasthedutyto ffoodlfaiththe obligationsas+urnedby ii in accothencewith
Chanerof thU.N.
EverStatebatheduty tofulfil ingooditobligationsunderthe generallyrecognizedprinciplcs
andrulesof internationallaw.
Every Statesthe duty to fulfil iiithitobligationsunder internationalagreemenÿ vaiid
underthe generallyrecognizedprincipiesand mies of internationallaw.'
(Principleï)
3.9 In this context it seems reasonable to conclude that threatening theuse of nuclear
weapons againstthetemtory of another Statecan hardlybe consideredascooperation
to maintaininternationalpeaceand secuntyor to ensureuniversal respectfor human
nghts, or to fulfil ingood faithobligationsarising underthe UNCharter(particularly
the pnnciples of humanityset fonh in the Martens Clause) and other international
agreements (especiallythoserelatinpto internationalhumanitarianandenvironmental
law).
3.10
In Solomon Islands view any use of nuclear weaponswould prima facie violate
internationalhumanitarianlaw. The threatof their usemust be wnsidered as totally
incompatiblewith thesolernnobligationundertaken by States undercommon Article
1of the four GenevaConventionsof 1949 and Articlel(1) of the1st1977 Additional
Protocol "10respect and ensure respect" of the four Conventionsand the Protocol.
Given theinevitabilityof thelethaleffecü of nuclear weapons,threateningtheir use
mustsurelyalso violatethenghts ofpotential victirnsasset forthin Articl40 of the 1stAdditionalProtocol, whichprovides that
"It isprohibited to order that there shallbe nc survivon, to threaten an
adversarytherewithor to conduct hostiiitieson that basis."
3.11 Insummary, the threat of the useofnuclear weaponsis clearly unlawfulwhen it is
accompanie dy athreatprohibitedby internationallawor whenit appearsin relation
tothe use of force or interventionalso prohibitedby international law. Even if the
threat touse nuclear weaponsmight be used for apparently lawful purposes, such
threais unlawfuiby operationofgenerai rules of internationallawand specifrules
requiringrespect for humanitarianand environmentalobjectives.Accordinglyin the
discussion whichfollowsreferenws totheuseof forceshouldbeconstrued to include
aiso the threat of use of force where appropnate.
(B) The use of nuclear weapons is subjectto international law, including therules
relatingtoarmed conflict
3.12 The legalityof the threat or use of nuclear weaponsraises three issuesin relation to
the niles governing themethodsand meansof warfare:
(a) what is the law applicable tothe use of nuclear weapons?
@) what are the applicable substantiverules of that law?and
(c) to whom do those rules apply?
The subrnissionsmadein this pan of the Wntten Observationsare that:
- the use of nuclear weaponsis subject to internationallaw, includingae niles
relatingto armed conflict(A);
- that any use of nuclear weaponsis illegal undergeneral internationalla(B);
and
- that the relevantrules of internationallaw apply to al1States (C).
3.13 Specifically,PanA of SectionII argues that therules of law of arrned conflictand
law governing fnendly relationsprohibit the use of nuclear weapons in any
circumstances,since any such use would violate:
the limitationon the choiceof means of attacking theenemy;
thepermanent obligationtodistinguishbetweencombatantsandnoncombatants;
theprohibitionagainstattackingcivilian targets;
theprohibition againstattacl;inghealth services; theprohibitionagainsttheuseofchernicalweaponsor poisonsor weaponswhich
haveindiscriminateeffects;
theprohibitionagainsttheuseof weaponswhichrenderdeathinevitableor cause
unnecessarysuffering;
the prohibition againstviolatingthe territorial integrity and neuhaiity of third
States;
the prohibitionagainstcausingwidespread,long-termand severedamageto the
environment;
the obligationto respectthe principles ofproportionalityand humanity;and
the prohibition againstgenocideor crimes against humanity.
These rules are wellestablished, finding their source in many of the classical
instruments goveming jus inbcllo, includingthe 1868St Petersburg Declaration,the
1874 BmsseisDeclaration,1899HagueDeclaration IV, Regulationannexedto 1907
Hague Convention IV, 1925 GenevaProtocol, 1948 Genocide Convention,1949
GenevaConventions
(a) me use of nuclcarwcaponsis suhjecrrogcneralinrernational law
3.14 It has been suggestedthat in the nuclear age the normal mies of internationallaw
have been suspended, or perhaps set aside altogether, for al1 matters relatinto
nuclear weapon~.~There are no principledgroundsin law or policy to supportthis
view. The useof nuclearweaponslikeanyother activity canie dut or authonsedby
States,is subjectto the generaland the specificmles of internationallaw.
3.15 The use of nuclear weaponsis subjectto the mle of law. The developmentof new
formsof behaviour, including methodsand meansof amed conflict,does not bring
intoquestionthe lawapplicable toit. The arrivaiof a newmodusopcrandidoesnot
modifytheapplicationor effectof themle of law. As the first AdvocateGeneralof
theBelgiumMilitaryCourtstated:
"Ce n'en paàdespénalistqu'ilfautrappelerquela ddcouvened'un nouveaumodusoperandien
vue de coinmeureuneinfractionne pourraitavoir l'effetde rendrecaduquela législationquidéfinit
" SeeE. David.'Aproposde certainesjustificationsthioriques desarmesnucléaires,'
MeiungePiaei(1984). p.34PartIIAofthewrittenobservationsis lbasecon &a &y.
27 cene infraction, ni qu'aucune fonte nodeecriminalité n'a d'effet abrogatoire du droit
positif.
Accordingiy,the inventionof the machine gun or the tank has not forced Statesto
adopt specificrulesto determinethe legality or the illegalityof their use." Tlaw
of armed conflicts applies toal1 forms of weaponry. Any other view would
undenninethe internationalmle of kw. It is the anns thatman inventswhichought
toadapt toexisting.rules,nottheotherwayround. Any other approachwould permit
the invention of new weapons to circumvent the operation of legal rules under
internationallaw.
3.16 Asset outhereafter, the useofnuclear weapon ss subjectto thegeneralinternational
law of armedconflict and to the more specificniles, includingthose refiectedin the
197'7Geneva 1 Additional tothe Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relatingtothe Protectionof Victimsof InternationalArmedConfiict ("1977Geneva
ProtocOI1").
(b) ïhe useofnuclcarwcupomis subjccrro internnrio~lIawof anncdconfrius
3.17 The practice of States reflects the overwhelrningview that nuclear weapons are
subjectto the international law of xmed conflict.UN General Assemblyresolution
1653(XVI),which specificallyaddressesnuclearweapons,statesin itspreamblethat:
'the useof weapons of inzs destmction. causing unnecrssary human suffering, was in Ihe pan
prohibiteasbeinf contrarythelaws of huintinityand to the principles of intebyational law,
internationaldeclarationsand bindingagreeinentheDeclarationof St. Petersburgof 1868,
theDeclararionof the BnisselsConferenceof 1874.theConventionsof the HaguePeaceConferences
of 1899and 1907. and the GenevaProtocol of 195. to which the majority oarestills
partiesn.
The paragraph was adopted by 63 votes in favour, one vote against, and 31
abstentions.Sincethen, theGenet-alAssernblyhaswnsistently endorsedtheapproach
taken by the vast majonty of States in resolution 1653(XVI).62Other organisations
" Cid inA. Andries. 'Pour une priseen considkation de la wmpeiuice desjumesictions
nationaleal'égarddes emploid'amisnucl&irrs.' RDPC 1984. p.34 ('Andries').
61
p.37. Fried. 'InternatLawaProhibits the First Useof Nuclear WeaRBD11981-1982.
"
AIRes. 2936 (XXVII). 29 Novernhcr 1972 (73-4-46). Prearnble; 351152 D. 12 December 1980
(112-19-14). Preamhle: 36/92 1.9 Dzccmkr 1981(121-19-5). Prcamble; 371100. 13Darmbcr
1982 (117-17-8). Prearnhlc; 38/73 G, 15 Decernber 1983 (126-174). PrearH.l12 39/63
December 1984 (128-17-5). Preamble; 4011F.16 Decembrr 1985 (126-17-6). hble;
41/60 F.3 December 1986 (132-17-4). Preamhle; 42/39 C. 30 Novernbrr 1987 (135-17-4).
Preamble: 43/76E.7 Deceruber 1988 (133-17-4). Przamhle;174C, 15 December 1989. have takenthe sameapproach. The XxthInternational Conferenceof the Red Cross
(Vienna, October 1965) adopted a resolution by 128 votes in favour and three
abstentions(with no votesagainst)solemnlydeclaringthat 'the generalpnnciples of
the law of armed cnntlict apply to nuclear weapons and other simiia~weapons'
(uanslation). The resolutionreflects State practiceas itwas supportednotablyby
non-governmentalorganisations (national organisations of the Red Cross, Leagueof
Red Cross Societies, InternationalCornmitteeof the Red Cross) and also by States
(State Parties to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ("1949 Geneva
Conventions"),whichparticipateciin the InternationalConferencesof the Red Cross
in accordancewith the Statuteof the InternationalRed Cross (Article l(2)).
3.18 Military manualsaddressingthis issuealso stipulatethat the use of nuclearweapons
is subjecttothe rules ofinternationalhumanitarianlawapplicable tothernethodsand
means of ~arfare.~~For example, the military instructional manuai of the United
Statesof America Statesthat theuse of nuclear weaponsis subject to"threebasic
principlesof the law of war - militarynecessity, humanityand chivaiq - that limit
the discretionof belligerentsin al1circurnstance~".~At the signingof the Final Act
adopting the 1977GenevaProtocolsthe US representativedeclared, moreover, that
even if the 1977GenevaProtocol 1does not regulateor prohibit the use of nuclear
weapons(onthispoint, seeinfra para. 3.28) it is nevenhelessthecasethat: "theiruse
in time of hostilitiesis governed by existing principlesof internationala^."^ 'he
Britishrnilitarymanualadoptsa sirnilarapproach:
"ltlbereis le of internationallawdealingspecitïcatheuse of nuclearweapons.Tbeir
usetherefore,ir govembythegencralprincipleslaiddownin tliis ~ha~ter".~~
3.19 In Belgium, during the preparatory work for Parliarnentaryapprovalof the 1977
GenevaProtocol 1 the Conse ilEror(legislativesection)implicitlyrecognisedthat
if the new rules of the Protocol did not apply to nuclear weapons, these were
nonetheless subject to the classical rules of theinternationlaw of arrnedconflict:
-- -
Preamble(134-174): 45/59 B. 4 Dçfernher1990 (125-17-10). Prc47/53C (126-21-21),
Preamble;48/76 B. 16Dccemher 1993(120-23-24). Prearnhle.
" Ses UN Dm. A19215. Vol.1.pp.172-73 (French)
<Y Ciied in R. Falk and E. Meyrowiihe Sfnfw of Nuclcar Wrapom under InreniariLavl
(roneo). p.84.n.114.
" 9 lune 1977. CDDHISR.58. para. 82: in Ancx de la Confirrnce diplomatique surh
riafimarion erle dCi~rlopprtrrdroiririfrr~iarl unianifaireapplicabla laconfits
am& (Genévr,1974-77)(-Actes'). Berne. 1978. 1.3e partie,p.301.
(d
Manual of Military Law. 19.58Pan III, se113 citul inConimeruaircsderRorocolcr
nddi~ionekdu 7juin 1977aur Converirionrde Goii.ivedu 12 aoüd.19by Y. Saodoz, C.
SwinarsluB. Zimmennan. ICRC -MartinusNijhoff (1986('Cornmenraira')p.6W. 11.33. 'The consensuswhich was establishedon this point[the factthatthe negobationswcreno1concerned
wilbthe replation of thuseor wn-use of nuckaurrapons]betwan the great nucle~ powersaod
wbichbasfrcquentlybecn qualifiedasthe pLsig 'betwni bracke~~'of nuclear wapons, mus k
inrcrpretoasrclathg exelucivelyto the new mies in Protocol 1. Thnilesconmincd in othcr
interiiational innnimenls, sashthe &guc Convenlionc of 1899 and 1907 and the -va
humanitarianconventions of 1949are not affected and retainthcir (authors' translation;
empharisadded)
3.20 The jurispnidenceofcourts ontheapplicabiity of internationallawto nuclearweapon
isiimited. A noteworthyexceptionis the 1963 decisionof the Tokyo District Coun,
which rejected the view that internationallaw did not regulate the use of a nuclear
weaponon Hiroshima becauseof its novelty:
"the prohibition thiscau is undentood toinclude not only tcase wbem there is an expm
provisionof directprohibition.butalsothe cauwhcrc neccssarilymgardedthathe useofa nnr
wcaponis prohibitcd fmm the istrrpretation andaoalogicalapplicationof existing intlawsai
and regulations (internationalcuaomary laws and treaties). Further. wunderstandthatthe
prohibitionncludesalsothecasewbere, in the tiat of principlesof international kw which arethe
bais of the above mentioncdpositiveintedonailaws and mgulations. the case of a ncw mapon
isadmiad tobe contrarytothe principll...ïbercforewc cannot regard anew weapon srlegal
onlybecause it is tnw napon, and it is still rifit ahnew wpon must bcexpd to the
examinationof positive international~aw."~
At various points in the judgrnent the Tokyo District Court recognised the
applicability of the classical rules of international law of arrned conflict to the
bornbardrnentof Hiroshimaand Nagasakiby nuclear ~eapons.~~
3.21 For the greatmajonty of internationaljunsts there isnodoubt that the useof nuclear
weaponsis subject to internationallaw, and the exarnplescited beloware rnerely
ill~strative.~The arnountwrittenon this subjectrefiectsthe strongly held views of
"
1.Salmonand R. Ergcc. 'L pratiqucdu pouvoirexicutiet Icontrôledeschambreslégislatives
matikrr de droit intemaiional' (1984-1986) RBDI. 1987.p.391, note E-D.
" Tokyo District Court. ludgment of 7 Dzcrmher 1963. Jcip.~~iri.l.L..1964, pp. 235-36.
W
Id.. pp.234. 236, 241.
"
See E.Cash. 7hePrere~iLaw of Warand Neurraliry,(1954). pp.206-07; Spaight. APower
and WarRighrs.(1947). p.276; H. Lauterpacht. Oppctihcini'sI~umuuionaLw. 1952.71b td.
p.347. s116; J. Graenspan. 7he Modern Law of Lad Warfnre. (1959). p.371 cited in M.
Whiteman. Digm of lnrrr»nrionalLaw. Washington US GPO 1968, pp.482-83; R.E. Charlier,
'Questionsjuridiques soulevh par l'évolutionde la scienceatomiquRCADI, (1957).vol 91,
p.354: G. Schwaruinberger. 7hr Legaliry of Nuclcar Wenponr, (1958). pp.434; N. Si&;
NuclearWenpomand1r1rerriarioriallnw1 .959pp.147et scq; H. Meymwitr, 'Lcsjuriste&vant
l'amie nuclkire'. RGDIP 1963pp.844-848; Friul 1oc.cir.pp.34 et scA. Andries 'L'emploie
de l'arme nucikaire est uncrime de guerLn'Rer.ueNouvelle(Bnissels), Maidi 1983. p.3U).
id.. Andries loc.cir., pp.33 cr seq.; 1. Verhaegen'Le pmblhme paial de la dissuasion
nucliaire'RDPC. 1984. pp.20-21: SratcmrnronrhcIlle~aliryof Nucleor Warforr,The Lawyers many jurists on the subject of the use of nuclear weaponsand international law,
includingJudgesof the InternationalCourt and other illustriousjurists.
Thus, the Institutde Droit Internationaladopted at its 1969 Edinburgh session a
resolution on "La distinction entre lesobjectifsmilitaireset non militairesen génkral
et notammentlesproblèmes quepose1'existence.des armesde destruction massive".
The resolution med
"les conséquenque laconduiteindiscrimides hodifis, et paniculièrcmentI'emploidcsarma
nucléaire[...peut entraînerpour lespopulationscivileset pour l'humanitétout entière'
and noted the existence of niles "à observer lm de conflits armés par tout
gouvemment", notably the prohibition againstattackingcivilians,theuseof weapons
having indiscriminateeffects,and
"notamment l'emploides atmes dont l'effetdestrestmp grand pour avoir iue limAtdu
objectifmilitairesdétermisudont I'effetes incon~rôlable(armes'auwgénérauicesa'insi quedes
armes aveugles."
In other words, the Institut has impliciuyrecognisedthe applicabilityof the law of
armed wnflicts to the use of nuclearweapons.
fc) Theuse of nuclcarwcaponsis subjccrrothe 1977 GrncvaProrocol 1
3.22 The use of nuclear weaponsis also subject to the relevantprovisions of the 197
Geneva Protocol1. It is importantto expressly dernonstrate this, sincethe Protocol
does not expresslymention nuclearweapons,and further:
(i) dunng thepresentationof the draft textto serve as a base for the discussionsof
the diplomaticconferencethe ICRC had declarexiits unwillingnessto broachthe
question of nuclear weap~ns;~and
(ii) declarationsmade by theUnitedKingdom,theUnitcdStatesand France, (atthe
beginningandlorat theend oftheConference),statedthatal1or partof the 19n
Cornmittee on Nuclar Policy, New York 198Ap/>eldajurisrcc ontreInguerre nuclkire.
petition btheBureau Internationalde la Paix (1987).
7,
Ann.I.D.1.. 1969, Vo1.53. II. p.360.
T:
'Problems relating to atornic. bacteriologiûll andwarfareaslsubjectsof intemational
argurnmts or negotiations by govemrneots. and in suthesrdraftAdditional Protowls the
ICRC does not intend to broach those problems' (translation). in ICRC. Projns & Pmtocoler
uddirionelrauxConw~oiondeGcnèvcdu12août 1949, Geneva, 1973, p.2, Anes. Genevahotocol 1did not apply to nuclearweap~ns.~
(i) Noconsensusexiszs on whefhernuclearweaponsare coveredby ProrocolI
3.23 Whenthe lawprohibitscertainwnduct withoutspecifyingal1the waysin which such
wnduct mightoccur, suchsilencedoes not irnplythat the conductis authonsedunder
another guise. The silence of Protocol 1 does not therefore .signify that it is
permissibleto use nuclear weapons tocarry outactivitiesprohibitedby the Protocol.
It rnay be possibletogo further in adoptingthe view thatthe Protoc01does prohibit
the use of nuclear weapons in a quari-explicit way, since it prohibits attacks on
nuclear power plants (Art. 56). As A. Andrieshas written:
"U y'aurait en effet contradiction dans les termes à interdire la dest~ction des centrales nucltairrs
à causedes forces dangereuses qu'elles peuvent libére.6.1)ttout en n'interditpriia
libérationdirecte de ces forces par l'explosion d'une anne nucléaire."74
3.24 Somevniters have concludecithat a consensusexistedat the Diplornatic Conference
ontheReaff~rmation and Developmentof InternationalHumanitarianLaw Applicable
in Armed Conflicts(Geneva, 1974-1977).thatProtocol1did not apply to the use of
nuclear weapons." Solomon Islands does not share this view. Many States put
forwardthe oppositeview, both dunng the Conferenceand afterwards. Indeed, the
proliferationof views is so contradictorythat it is impossibleto idenufy a consensus
on theinapplicabilityof Protocol 1to the useof nuclear weapons.
3.25 Dunng the early sessions of the Conference, the UK, relying on the ICRC
Declaration,declareclthat the Protocols
"muscnot broach problerns concerned with arornic. bacteriologicalor chernical wercare, which
the abject of existing international agreement< wd current delicate negotiations by Govenunenu
elwwhere. Iwas on the avurnption tharthe drafr Prolocols would no1affect those problernstha the
United Kingdom Govern~nenthad worked andwould continue Io work towafinaagreement on
the Protocoi"76
Sirnilarly,Swedenwanted to address certain conventionalweapons, but ernphasised
that "[tlhe proposais did not cover atomic, bactenologid and chemid weapons
n UK. 6th March 1974. CDDHISR 13 para.36. AcreV, p.130; 9th June1977.CDDH. SR.58
pan.119. Aacs VI1 p.310:US. 9th lune 1977. CDDHISR.58. para. 82,Aaer VU, p.301;
France 8th lune1977. CDDHISR 56. para3, Anes VI1p.199.
"
A. Andries.loc.cilpp. 35-6.
75 H. Meyrowitz: 'Lastratsgie nuclhirc leProtocole additionn1aux Conventionsde Genève
de 1949'.RGDIP. 1979 pp.915-17. 928-29. Andries1oc.cir.. pp.35-36.
6thMarch 1974.CDDHISR. 13 para. 36. Ancr V.p. 130 [and] that discussionshould bewnfined to wnventional types of warfare [...]."n
3.26 During the sarne session, however, manyother States took an alternativeview. The
foiiowingare iiiustrativeexamples. Ghana statedthat
"The us of new typesof weaponsappearedon cheagenda ofno imponant conferences currently
meeting inGeneva and in Viema. The mainpurpose ofarleaaone of chemuas tol'mittheuscof
stratrgicanns which .wuld.rcniltin the destruction of .mankind. Gnsistcntly with(he
wntemporary trendof political thougbr, the Conferaice sbould deslare the complete prohibition of
cheuse of new weaponsinal1conflicts. Expericnce had show ~hatthe use of aich wcapons covld
affectinnocentcivilians mme distahme cheana directauackfd. Surcly. pmventiowar ktter
than cure"?'
According toRiumania:
"Nuclcar, bacteriological. chemicalandbiolowpons aswella.al1wapons of mscsdesvuction
should bebanned ."
A sirnilarviewwas proposedby the People'sRepublicof China:
"The new Protocois should unequivocally provide for the prohibition and destmction of nuclcar
weapon; [...]".80
Accordingto Iraq:
"The principles fhat bad to be stressed werc the protection of the civilidn population in med
conflicü; fhe prohibition of nuclear. biologiciiland cheinicrilweapons and of cenain conventional
weapons of massdestruction: [...]"."
For Zaire. the Conferenceshould
"Give particular attentiorhefollowing poins[...prohibition of me use of weapons fiatoe
intïict unnecessary suffering on civilians. especially bacteriologic;J. chemical and nuclear weapons;
I....82
7th Mmh 1974. CDDHISR. 14 pan. 21. Anrs V, p. 141.
5thMarch 1974. CDDHlSR.10 para. 36.Ana V. p.92.
5th March 1974. CDDHlSR.11 para. 13. Ana V. p.99.
" 6îh March 1974. CDDHISR. 12 pan. 18. Ades V. p116.
8,
6th Manh 1974. CDDHlSR.12 para. 32. Ades V. p.119.
1lth March 1974. CDDHISR.19 pan. 5, Ana V. p.189. For Albania,
*Me&ods of warrâreindiscriminatelyaffccùng the civilian population. such asatomic -m.
bornbardmentof civiiianpopularionanddeponaiimus bespecificallyprohibited"."
It is therefore clear that during the early stages of the Conference no consensus
existed.
3.27 The nuclearweaponsissue was hardlydebatedagaindunng the Conference,although
in 1975,thePeople'sDemocraricRepublicofKoreacomplainedabout theindation
of nuclearweapons in South Korea andstatedthat:
'the production. tesandguse of such weaponsshould beprohib[...]..4
In response, the US made it clear that it did notwish to address nuclear weapons,
recaliing the ICRC draft had notincluded any rules on nuclear weap~ns?~
3.28 The questionof nuclear weaponsreappearedat theend of the Conference,duringthe
final declarations. France, the US, and the UK declaredthat 1977GenevaProrocol
1 did not apply to nuclear weapons. The declarationsdiffer in tone and content.
France, whichproposeda most extremeapproach:
"msbes to make itquite clear that ifs Govenunent could not under any circumstancu permit the
provisionsof Protocol1l...prohibitthuseofany spccificwenponwhichi: considers ncces%ary
foritsdefence.[..It accordinglywishes to stressthat in iis viewthe rules of thenoKourols do
applyu>me use of nuclearweapons.6
The US representative,whilstadmittingthatthe useof nuclearweapons "isregulated
by existingprinciplesof internationallaw", srated
"1was hisGovcmmeni'sundersunding that the rulesesulilished by the Prorocolwere notintended
Kobave anyeffect on, andùid no1regulate or prohibirthe use of, nuclear weapon~."~'
The UK took the viewthat only "the new mles" establishedby Protocol1wouldnot
apply to nuclear weapons.For the UK representative
"
19ih March 1974, CDDHIIII.SR.8. para. 8Ana XIV, p.76.
"
27th February 1975. CDDHIIIIISR.26 para. 3Ancs XIV. p.260.
u
14th Apnl 1975. CDDHIIIIISR.40. para. 12Ana. XIV. p.466.
8th June 1977. CDDHISR.56 para. 3Ana VII. p.199.
" 8 June 1977. CDDHISR.58. para. 82.Ancs VII, p.301.
34 "the new niles in~oduced by the Protocols were not wnhave any effect on and did not
regulatr or prohibiusehof nuclsar or other nonsonventional weapoos. Sucb questions werc
rightly the subject of agreements and negofiationselse~here".~~
In otherwords, as wmmentaton have emphasized,
"The British delaration refers expncwniles and thcrefore implicitly confirms chatthe rules
rcqjîrmcdin the Pmtocol~apwlal1arms;'R(aanslati-nemphasis addrd)
Accordingly, the only consensusbetween the three States is wnfined to the
inapplicabilityof the new rules of the Protowl to the use of nuclearweapons. As
betweenthe US and France on,ewuld identifya consensus on the inapplicabiityof
the wholeof Protocol 1 to nuclearweapons(despitethe fact that the US recognises
that theu useis subject to the generalmles of thelaw ofarmedwnflicts: supra para.
3.18). Butthisview is taken onlyby thesetwo States and not by the other Partiesto
Protocol1.
3.29 It is significantthat other States haveaffirmedthat Protoml 1 applies to nuclear
weapons, and exceptfor the three above-mentionedStates, they have not been
conwdicted on this point. Accordingly,in refemng to Article33 of the draft text
(Article 35 in the final text) which stipulatesthat Parties do not havean unlimited
right asto the choiceof weaponsand thattheycannotuseweaponscausingexcessive
hm or widespread, long lasting and senous darnageto the natural environment,
India declared:
"that the basic niles contained in ihis article will apply Io :dl calegoriesof weal>ons,nainely nuelear,
bacteriological. cheinical or conventional wcapons or an? orher catcgory of weapon~'.~ (emphasis
added)
In more generalterms, accordingto Rurnania,
"Humanitarian law mudw, prohibit the use of wtaiions of massive destmction and mehods of
warfare which nmck indiwnminately at combarnnü and civiliiw diMany of thmeaims
were covered by the provisions of Protacol 1,...the prohibition or restrictiuseof the
of cenain conventional wwpons and weapons of massive destn~ction'.~' (emphasisadded)
3.30 Other States do not specifically refer to nuclear weapons, although certain
declarations suggest that Protocol 1 is applicable to their use. According to
Yugoslavia,for example, itwould be dangerousto permit, as certain Stateshave
9 June 1977. CDDHISR.5S. pan. 119Acres.p. 310 (srn~hasis addul).
89 Commeniairer.p.604, para. 1853
" 25thMay 1977. CDDHISR.39. AcresVI. p.114.
PI 9th June 1977. CDDHISR.58. para. Ancs VII. p.296. suggested,that:
.certaimethodsandmeansof combatpermissable in 'exceptional' circumsŒInPmtocol 1,
asaisoin other texu wdifying the lawarmed conflict. and in accordance with the principle
confirmtd btheNümberg Tribunal. ihere hadken due regard for military necctrinew but the
mlcs were also based on bumanitarianrequire[...If thuseof ~~IOIISba~ mi@t -
supemuous injuryor haveindixriminatecffecaotrenounced,orcsyict edpractice, theyule
thatheConference hadsocarefullyda would in fact beimpossibleto apply."n
Acfording to the German DemocraticRepublic,
"The unambiguous nile prohihiting the civilian po%mgatmade the objcct and, the
prohibition ofindixriminate attacks.theprote~tionof civilianobjcca and of the nanirdenvironment
form[...the core of the Proroinviewof theiemble expenence the civiiii populationhadto
endureduringthe SecondWorlWarandafcenvardzcacb rulein thisf-even if itody rraffvnrs
existing l-is a real progr""s.
Accordmgto Mozambique,
.The destructive power of present-dayweapons strikes mainly at the civilian wcpulation, m
congratulatethe Conferenceon iu adoptionof the articles relatingto the protectionof the unaneed
populatio""
3.31 It is thereforeclear that no consensusexisted in Geneva as to the applicabiiityof
Protocol 1 to nuclear weapons. The various declm.tions identified above are
inconclusive.Asagainsttheunchallengeddeclarations,ofdifferingcontentandvalue,
of theUK, US and France (supra paras. 3.25 and 3.28) one can rely on the express
declarations of India and Rumania, which were also uncontested,as well as the
implicitrejection of weaponsof mass destruction reflected in declarationsof other
States.
3.32 Practice following the adoption of Protocol 1 confirms the lack of a consensus to
excludethe use of nuclear weaponsfrom its field of application. Such practice is
reflectedin the following:
(i) Oneof the States the most adarnantly opposedto the applicationof Protocol 1
to nuclear weapons - France - itself recognisedin 1984 that there was no
consensusthat the Protocolwasinapplicableto nuclear weapons.At the timeof
depositingitsinstrumentof ratificationtoProtocolII, France justified herrefusal
to adhere to Protocol 1by refemng to
92 801lune 1977. CDDHlSR.56. para.70-71Acres Vil. p.214.
93 8thJunr 1977. CDDHISR.56. Ac=. VII, p.247.
9. 9th lune1977. CDDHISR.58. Acts. VI1,p.332.
36 'theabseseofcome~ benuecnthe signatoryStatesofimProtocoliwbatconcemsthe
exact obligationscd by them in rrspetodisniasion' "(authors' vans-aempbasis
addcd).
(iiI )fthere had usuallybeen a consensus onthe"settingaside"of nuclearweapons,
it would not have been necessaryfor certain States, in acceptingProtocol 1,to
adopt reservationson its applicabilityto nuclear weapons. However, various
rnember StatesofNATO-declaredin.abroadlyuniformmannerupon ratification
ofhotoc011 tha t applied"exclusivelytoclassicalweapons"andthat itdid not
"préjudiéeaucuneau* règlede droit internationalappld'auîretyped'armes.*
Significantly,no other State, including some rnember States of NATO such as
Greece,Portugaland ce land, " adethiskindofdeclarationupon ratifyingProtocol
1.It isthus clear thatthere is no consensus onthe matter.
3.33 Thejunsts at the ICRC also takethe viewthat therehas never ben a consensusto
exclude the use of nuclear weapons from the field of applicationof Protocol 1
"puisqu'aucunedécisionn'a été prise".98 Only "une entente s'estréalis poer ne
pas discuter des armes nucléaire^". ^^his does not mean that the rules of the
hotocol do not apply tosuch weapons.Thejurists at the ICRC haveconcluded, on
the contxary,that if
"les principes ratïirmésdans le Protocole n'interdisentpas l'usage des armes nucléaires lors d'un
conflitrmé,ils restreignentdonctrèssirieusernentcet usage.'"="
Wewillsee thatthecharacteristicallyprudentialapproachoftheICRCon thelegality
of the useof nuclear weaponsis unsupponedby thepositivelaw. Itis submittedthat
the "principlesreaffirmedin the Protocol" do prohibitthe use of nuclear weapons,
" RICR. 1984 p.239.
P6
Italy inRICR, 1986p.114; for the same id- and similarseeBelgium, the Nclbcrlaods,
Spain. Federal Grmw Rrpuhlic in R1986p.178; 1987p.444; 1989p.389; 1991, pp.ZSiM.51.
With regard to Canada: 'the niles introducul by Protocol 1 are adopted in order toapply
exclusivrly townventional weapons' and'have no effet whatsoever on nuclear weapons, which
they neither apply to nor prohihit'. RICR. 1991.p.82: (thisstatement is arnbiyous: by refcning
to'niles introùuced' is Canada rcfemnp toal1the provisionsof the Protocol or only thosewhich
establish new niles?)
97 RICR. 1989. p.267; 199p.416
" Comme~uairer~, .603, para. 1851;RI.1987p.352: 1989. p.267; 1992, p.416.
W Id., para. 1852.
lm Id., p.605. para. 1859. in view of their natureand the extentof their destructiveeffects.
3.34 In conclusion,the lackof any consensuson theexpressexclusion ofnuclearweapons
from thefieldof applicationof Protoc011suggeststhatthe htoco1,and inparticuiar
the principlesofgeneralinternationallawreaffirmedtherein,areapplicabletonuclear
weapons together withal1other typesof weapons.
3.35 It remains necessary todetermine whether the declarations "setting aside nuciear
weapons"whichhave been madeby certainStatestopreventor limitthe applicability
of Protocol 1 to the use of nuclear weapons in treatyrelations (as opposed to
customary law relations) of these States, as behveen themselves or as between
themselves and theother Parties to the html. This is wnsidered at paragraphs
3.99 and 3.100.
(d) ïk useofnuclear weapomis subjcctto the rulesofiruenuuionullaw spec@cal&
prohibiringtheuseofnuclearweapons
3.36 Certain rules of internationallaw specificallyexpresslyprohibthe use of nuclear
weapons. Theseare reflectedin UN GeneraiAssernblyresolutions,which have been
consistentlysupportedby the vast majorityof the mernbersof theUN. The practice
of that body began in 1961 with the Declaration on the hohibition of theUse of
Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weap~ns,'~'which declares that any use of nuclear
weaponswould:
- be contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the UN and, as such, "a direct
violationof the Charterf the United Nations";'"
-
be contraryto the "niles of internationallawand to the lawsof humanity", since
it wouldexceedthescopeofwarand causeindiscnminatedestructiontomankind
and civili~ation:'nd
- constitutethe commissionof a "crimeagainst mankind and civilizationn.'@'
Resolution 1653 was recalledby theGeneralAssernblyin 1972 and has subsequently
been recalledat each Sessionof the General Assernblysince 1980.IM In 1972,the
'O1
A.Res.165 3VI). 24Novemher 1961(55-20-26)
'
Id.para.](aand (d).
'" Id.,para.I(b).
lm Id., pan.I(d).
'" Supru. note101. General Assembly "solernnly declared, on behalf of the States Members of the
Organiation, [...] the permanent prohibition on the use of nuclear weap~ns."'~
Ln 1978,the special Commissionof the 10thExmordinary Sessionof theUNGened
Assemblydeclaredin its final document that
"Ls armes nucléairessont celles qui menacent le plus gravement l'humet lasurvie de La
civilisation""
The GeneralAssemblyhasfrequentlyinvokedthis provisionor the idea contained in
it.'" Also in 1978, the General Assembly
"declarethar the use ofnuclear weaponswill be a violationof the UN Charter and a crimeagaiaa
humanity".109
From. 1980 (35th Se~sion)"~to the present &y (48th Session), the Gened
Assembly has rqeated, year after year, its condemnationof the use of nuclear
weapons by chara,cterisingsuch use as a "violationof the Charter" and "a crime
against humanity"."'
Furthemore, in 1981the General Assemblysolemnlydeclared that
"Stateand statesmenthat reson first to the use of nuclear weaponswill be coinminingthe gravesi
crime againstburnanity""'
In 1983, theGeneralAssembly
"Resolutely, unconditionallyand al1rime condemrisnuclearwar asbeinp contrary to huma
conscienceandreason,astheinostmonstrouscritnagaiiipeoplesand asa violationof the foremon
lm AJRes.2936 O[XVII), 29 Nov. 1972(73-4-46). para. 1.
,m Ames. 5. 1012, 30th June 1978 (adoptul without a vote). para.47.
lm
SŒe.g. AIR-. 381183M.20th Dur.1983 (133-1-14). preamble; 391148 P. 17thDeE.1984(128-
6-12). preamble; 401152P, 16thDcc.1985 (131-16-6).prearnble;41160 1.3rd Dec.1986(139-12-
4).preamble;42/42 D., 30th Nov.1987(140-3-14) prramble; 43/F. 7îhDec.1988 (136-3-14).
preamble.
111
Supra,note 103.
"'
See e.g. AIR-. 361100.9th Dec.1981 (82-19-41). para.]: 37/78 J, 9th Dec. 1982 (112-19-15).
preamble.and para. 1; 381183B.20th Dcc.1983 (110-19-15). preamble, and pan.1.
3 9 human right-the rifiIOLife .13
These resolutionsraise two questions: dothey constitute rules, and ifso, dothey bind
al1States?
3.37 Resolutions of the UN General Assembly can be a source of law totheextent that
theyrelate toquestions which are withinthecornpetence of the GeneralAssemblyand
are elaborated in a normative mode. The power of the General Assemblytoadopt
resolutions onnuclearweaponsis basedon Article 11(1) of theCharter which States
that:
'The General Asembly may consider (be general principlesof cc-opention in the maintenance of
international peace and security, includiig the principles governing dirannament and the regulaviw
of annaments, and may make recommeodationswiib regardto aich princtolthe Membersor to
the Sccurity Counciltorbath."
Although this provision gives the General Assernbly only a power of
"recomrnendation",thisdoesnotprecludethe Assemblyfrom exercisingotherpowers
of a normative character. Practice confirms'" this and the ICI had affirmed this in
the Namibia Case (1971):
"For it would wbt correct to assume that. because the General Assemblyis investcdwith
recommendatory powers. it is debarred from adoptinf. in specific cases within the framework of iu
compliance, resolutions whmake determinations or haveopemrive design.'"'
The normative character of resolutions flows from their formulation. As the
International Court has stated with respect to the SecurityCouncilresolutions:
"The language of a remlution of the Security Council shouid be carehilly anaiyzed before a
conclusion can be made asto irs bindingeffect. In viewof the nature of the powers under ANcle
25. the question whether they have been in faci exerciwd is to be detennined in each case. having
regard Cothe lems of the rrsolution Io be interpreted. the diaur.ion Ieading to it. the Charter
provisions invoked and inenerd. dl circurnsrances that might assis1 in determining the legal
consequences of the resolution of the Securiry~ounc(einphasis added)
Sirnilarly,the 13thCommissionoftheInstitutde DroitInternational,duringthe 1987
session in Cairo, proposedwith regardsto resolutionsof the UNGeneral Assernbly
- ~p
II3. AIRes. 38/75 B. 15thDu. 1983 (93-19-301,para. 1.
"'
For examples of the legal effrctUNf General Assernhly resolutions Tcrnco-Ca&uiaic v.
Libyn A.rbitral award of 19 January 1988/DI 1977. pp.378-79;Militaryand Paramihry
Aainries inand agninri Nicaragua.ICJ Rrp. 1986. pp.100and 103,paras. 188and195.
II) Adv. Op. 21st June 1971.IU Rcp. 1971. p.50. para. 105.
116 Nnmibia Cm. bc.cir.p.53. pan. 114. that
"t libelléeletexted'unerécalutiaident déterminerapontc normative. La présencede
référencesu droit internalionalou de formuleséquivalentes, ou l'odilib6réede teilcs
référencesou formulessonts indices utilesmaisnondécisifsen soiC (Conclusion10)
In caru,the GeneraiAssemblyresolutionsidentifiedabove are drafted in the present
tense and utilise verbsin an affïrrnativemanneracmrding to which the Assembly,
"declares"or "imposes"principlesenunciatedin legai tms which are based upon
sources of positive law: nuclear weapons are "weapons of massive desinction
causing unnecessary harrn and human suffenng"; in this context their use is
"prohibited"byreasonof theDeclarationofStPetersburg,Bmssels,etc. (infro paras.
3.47 and 3.51); moreover, their usage is a "violationof the Charter" and a "crime
against humanity ".
In refer~g to the existenceof an obligationof customaryand treaty law imposed
on States not touse nuclear weapons, an obligationthe violation of which would
constitutean international crime, these resolutionsof the GeneraiAssernbly are of
a normative character.
3.38 Advocatesforthelegaiityof the useof nuclearweaponswouldperhapstakethe view
thatthese resolutions are contradictory, sincethey declare that the use of nuclear
weaponsis illegaibut aix, demandthe conclusionof a treaty prohibiting theuse of
nuclear weapons."' Alternatively, they que that if the use of those nuclear
weapons was aiready illegai it would bepointlessto concludeanother treaty on the
subject. Otherresolutionscondemnthe firstuseof nuclear~eapons,"~which seems
to suggest that a second, or retaliatory, use would be lawful, etc.Il9 These
argumentsmightbe invokedin supportof the viewthat the use of nuclear weapons
is not yet contrary to international law.
3.39 The inclusionof an internationallegal obligationin a treaty does not irnplythat the
obligation did not pre-date the treaty, perhaps as a rule of customary law or
aitemativelyin another treaty. Many treaty niles (for examplethose relating to the
law of diplomaticrelations, law of treaties, law of the sea,etc) codifypre-existing
customary niles. It is quitenormalin internationallaw for the mostcommonand the
most fundamentalrules to be reaffirmed and repeatedly incorporatedinto treaties;
exarnplesincludethe prohibitionon the useof force, theobligationto settledisputes
"' See AIRS. 33/71 B.14th De. 1978. para. 2 andresolutionsci14 in note 62.
'19
For a more derailul analysszcE. DavidLrn>r~e~di cenaines justifrcarionsthioriqyc~ a
1'emploider armesnucléaires(PariII).inLescoméqueticcjruridiquesde 1'itrOlrnrvelLn
de missiles mise er pershing et1 Europe. Brussrk, ul. of the University of Brussels and
Bmyiant, 1984pp.15el scq('Examen') are largeinspirdby thisstudy. paxfully. The formalre-affirmationof theserules in a treatyclearlydoes not imply
their pnor non-existence asbindingobligations. To read into the factthat certain
Statescal1 for the elaboration of a peaty to expressly prohibit theuse of nuclear
weaponsas proof that thw use isnot yet prohibited illustfates the dangers oan a
contrarioapproach totreaty interpretationUsed in a way which is too general, this
approach to interpretationintroclucesin effect a character of reversibility, thto is
say that it wuld justas easily result in one conclusion as another. As has been
wntten:
"Seulesles règlesdontla vocatestd'êtreparîiculi.insiles exceptions,les énumérations
limitives,les dispositionsonse prêtentzlsune interprétatioancontrarionim
In these circumstancesthe will of the United Nations, as expressed in General
Assemblyresolutions, toadopt a conventionprohibitingthe use of nuclear weapons
is an objectivefar too generalto lend itsetoan a conrrario form of interpretation.
The UnitedNation'sdesireto adoptsucha conventionwuld eitherbe becausethe use
of nuclear weaponshas notyet been prohibited in internationallaw or because it is
only prohibitedin a genericmanner -quod est: a treaty wouldemphasiseor reinforce
an existing prohibition.
The contextof theseresolutionsprovesthat onlythe seccnd conclusionis compatible
withthe textof thepreambularparagraphsandthe substantivewmmitments set forth
in the resolutions, which proclaim categoncally and in a peremptory manner the
illegalityof any use of nuclear weapons.
3.40 As for the fact that the General Assemblyhas generally focusedon the fint use of
nuclear weapons, this again might simply provide evidence of a narrow, jundicai
approach, nther than one whichjustifies the conclusionthatanythingother than first
usemight bepermitted. It is notewonhythatwhenthe GeneralAssemblycommends
those States which haveundenaken never to resort first to the use 0f.a nuclear
weapon, it stipulatesthatthis consututean importantfirst step towardsa reduction
of the threatof a nuclearwar.lZ1In other words, theAssembly welcomes al1actions
which can diminish therisk of a nuclear war,but evidently this does not imply that
it acceptsa contrarioanythingwhich might increase such risks. It would therefore
be incorrectto find in these resolutionsimplicitacceptance of the right of recourse
to nuclear weaponsin any circumstances.
3.41 If the UN General Assembly resolutions reflect a source of international law
applicabletothe useof nuclear weapons,as anexpressionof the opinio jurisof States
19 F. Ost, 'L'intépretalogiqueet systématiqet le postulatde rationdu I6gilateur.'in
L'imepretarionen droir (1978). p.124.
"' See e.g. AIRes37/78 J. 9thDec.19(112-19-15),par1;381183B, 20thDec.1983(110-19-
15). para1. it isof little importancethatthey haveonly been supportedby a majority of States.
Insofar as they refiect customary international law applicable to the entire
internationalcommunitytheyreflect obligationsimposedon al1 States. As was said
by the 13thCommissionof the Institutde Droit Internationalin its conclusion 17 in
fine:
"Si une résolutionénoncele de?.isgnunétalne put w libérerde la force obligdecere
droit en eméaantune &me".122
Whetherany Statehas enteredsucha reservationisconsideredat paragraphs 3.99 and
3.100.
.42 In conclusion, there therefore exists in the law of the UN a corpus of rules
specificailyprohibiting- and characterisingas a "crime againsthumanityu -the use
of nuclear weapons.Theserules, whichare reflectedin the Declarationadoptedby
resolution 1653,lZdo not, however, create new law sinΠthe texts whichendone
them are based upon the classical prohibitions embodied in the law of armed
conflicis.
The UN GeneralAssemblyresolutionsare thereforean expressionandapplicationof
apre-existingandpositivelawto nuclearweapons,ratherthana sourceof newmles.
Even if they didconstitutenewruls - quodnon - the Courtis stillentitledtotake
account of the resolutionsas the GeneralAssemblyhad alreadyinvitedit to do so:
"the developrnentof international Inwmay beaffectedby declarations and resolutionsof the General
Assembly. whichay IOthat extenl be tk);en in10 consideration by the International Coun of
Justic12'
(C) The use of nuclear weapons is contrarg to international law of anned conflicts
3.43 Just as the use of certain conventionalweapons is specifically prohibited by
international law because of their inherent characteristics (such as "dum-dum"
bullets,I3 chemical weapon~,~~~ etc.), it is the very characteristics of the
consequencesof nuclear weaponswhichprovidesthe bais for the inherent illegality
of their use. Theseinherentcharacteristicsrelate totheir effecton human healthand
'= Ann.1.D.I.. 1987Vo1.62 p.75.
In 24 November 1961 (55-20-26).
'"
Eumen du rilede laC.I.J.AiRes. 3232 (XXIX). 12th Nov.1974 (consensus) preamble.
'
Declaration IV of the Hague. 28 July 1899.
lm
Id..IV. 2: Geneva Protocol of 17th June 1925: Paris Coof 13thJanuary1993,Ar(1.
43 the environment,narnelytheirquantitativeeffects (a)andtheir qualitativeeffecu (b).
Itis byreason of both theseeffectsthat the use of nuclear weapons,in any context,
violatesthe most fundamental niles of international law in relation to both
indonal and non-intemationaianned conflict(c). Under internationallathere
arenoNcumstances justifymgthe use of a nuclear weapon(d).
Nuclear weapons are characterisedby th& effects on human heaith and the
environment, which arebothquantitativeand qualitative.
(a) 17reuceof nuclearweaponsnolm inrerMtionallawby reasonof the q~ononve
effecaofsuch weapons
3.44 ïhere arethree types ofnuclearweapons:atombombs,liydrogenbombsandneutron
bombs. Without entering into the specific details of how each of these weapons
works, iis worth noting thatthe power of eachof thesebombsvaries between:
- 1to75 kilotonnes(1 kilotonne= 1,000 tonnesof dynamite)for atomicbombs;
theminimum levelof one kilotonne correspondsto the minimum criticamass
of fissile materialnecessaryto unleasha nuclear reaction (the bombardment of
uranium-235 atoms or plutonium-239atoms by neutrons - when bursting
(fission)theseatomsfreeotherneutrons anda greatarnountof energy).Itis now
possible to go below the level of 1 kilotonne through the use of certain
"compression"techniquesof fissile material, and it has ben suggested that
nuclearweaponswith a powerequivalentto 10or 100tonnes ofTNT mightbe
constnicted;
-
between several kilotonnesand several megatonnes (1 megatonne = 1,000
kilotonnes)for hydrogenbombs (thermonuclearweapons)which comprisetwo
bombs: a thermonuclearbomb with vinually unlimitedpower and an atomic
explosivewhich allowsthe necessary temperatureof several milliondegreesto
be reached to unleash a nuclear reaction where isotopesof heavy hydrogen
(tritiumand deutenum)unite(fusion)tocreatea heliumcore, therebyunleashing
a vast quantity of energy; the atomic explosivewhich triggers the fusion is
approximately 1kilotonne, theamountof fissilematerialnecessaryfor anuclear
reaction;these materialsare generally then encasedin a mass of uranium-238
whichis more stable thanuranium-235,but whichas a result of the fusionand
the intense bombardment ofneutrons itself enters the reaction(fission). The
whole process thereby comprises one of fission-fusion-fission.The maximum
powerof sucha weaponis limitedonlyby limitationsrelatingto packagingand
transportation,and certainattempts have ben made to create larger weapons,
although it seerns that at present the majority of nuclear weaponsarsenais
comprise bombs of between 55and 1 megatonne(some 38 to 76 times more
powerfulthan the bombusedat Hiroshima); - neuhun bombs hm 1 to several kilotonnes:these are actually thermonuclear
bombsof limitedpower whichare notsurroundedby a bel1of uranium-238;the
effectof theshockwavesis lesssignifiant thanothernuclearweapons.Although
neutronbombs have less of an effecton solid objects(buildings,vehicles)they
produce proportionatelymore radiation and hence create greater darnage to
victims andthe environment inrelationtotheiractd size.In
3.45 The destructiveeffectof theseweaponsresults fromthe followingphenomena:
- shockwaves or air blasts;
- thermicwavesor radiation;
- fires;
- initialnuclear radiation(emittingneutronor gammanys);
- residd nuclear radiationor radioactivefallout;and
- electro-magneticimpulses.'28
Theseeffectsvary accordingto a range of factors, includingthenatureandpower of
the bomb used, thepopulationdensityof thebombarded area.thetopographyof that
area ,heavailabiiityof protectionfor the population, theforeseeabilityor othenvise
of theattack, localweatherconditions,and the height atwhichtheexplosionoccun.
Forecastshave been preparedas to the damagewhichwould result from theuse of
a nuclear weaponunderdifferentscenarios,and thepreciseeffectwillobviouslyVary
from one situationto the next.
3.46 Withoutidentifyingal1possiblesituations, itis wonh recalling that at Hiroshimaa
small bomb of only 13kilotonneswas used. This exposed some320,000people to
the effects of the explosion, of whom70,000 thousandcivilians died withii one
month. In 1950 it was estimatedthat 200,000 peoplehad died as a directresult of
the use ofthe b~mbing.'~~ In Nagasaki, out of some280,000 peopleexposedto the
effecü of the 22 kilotonnes bomb, 100,000 people had died by 1950.130 The
12 L'Encyclopaedia Ur~iversalii.''Nucléaire (armement)'; Etde d'enremble dcr amau
nucléaira. Rappon du Secritaire géndoc..ONU A1351392.12 xptembre 1980('1980 UN
Repan'). Appendix 1, p. 180, para. 23; Er& d'cfrrcdercarmer riucléairRappor~du
SecréraireM6ral.doc.ONUAI451373. 18 srptemhre 1990('1990 UNRepon'); A. Rsibois
and A.Joffroy, Armer nuclini:les niidecirrr dksonnk. BnixeAssoc.Midpour laMv.
de la Guerre Nucl.. 1981. pp.12-13 (-ReandoJoffroy'); H. Firket. 'Effets biologiques et
médicauxdrs explosions nucléaires', in Vivre er~en~bleou m:ule dilmmc nucléaim,
Bnuelles,Assoc.Md. pour la Prtrv. de la Guerre Nucl.. 1986, pp.17-18.
1980 UNRcpon. Appendix 1, paras. 1-35; 1983 WHORepon. p. 8; 1987 WHORepon, p.9.
8%
1980 UNRepon. paras.161-63
Id.. para. 163 differenceinthe figures resulthm the different topographies of the fcities:
Hiroshima isatownsituated on flaland closeto the sea,whereas differentparts of
Nagasak aie separatedby severai small fis, dirninishing the shock waveand
blowing effectof the explo~ion.~"
Other than the effects on civiiians, virtuaily al1 hserviceswere affected or
destroyed. In Hiroshima onlythreeout of 45 hospitais and dispensaierernained
intactout of 1,780nurses,1,65 w4ere killeor tooseriouslyinjuredto aiiow them
tawork; 65 of the150 doctorswere kiliedand most of the others injured.In
3.47 Underinternationallaw it is clear beyondanydoubt that the useof a nuclearweapon
againstcivilians,whateverthe naturor sizeand destructivepower of the weapon,
wilbe renderedillegaibyvirtueoftheapplicationof thecustomaryrulewhich States
thatbeiiigerentsmustaiwaysdistinguishbetweencombatantsand non-combatantsand
limittheir atrackonly to the former. Thisanold and well-establishedrule which
hasachieveduniversaiaqtance. Thefirst multilateralinstrumentto statwas the
St. PetersburgDeclarationof1868 the secondparagraph of which declares that:
"tbody legihate objcctwhichStatesshouldendmvourto accoiaplishdtoweakcning
tbmilitaryforcetheenemy".
This obligation is repeated and further elaborated idifferent forms in many
instmments, includin:
- Article 25 of the Regulation annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV
Respectingthe Laws and Customsof Waron Land, and Article 1 of th1907
Hague Convention IX Concerning Bombardmentby Naval Forces in Times of
War, totheextent thattheseprovisionsprohibitattackson undefendedareasand
undefendedbuildings;
- the resolutiono30 September 1928, whereby the Assemblyof the hgue of
Nations forbade the civilian population from being considered a military .
objective;
- the1949 GenevaConventionsprohibitingattackson rnilitaryestablishmentsand
health transports(Art 19 er seq. of Convention 1; Article 22 erseq. of
Convention II ;rticles14,15, 18,21, 22 of ConventionIV);
' Id., para. 162;1983 WHORcpon. p.88: BritishMulical Association. Efle'eofarl
Nuclear War.Chichester.1.Wilcy. 1983.pp.3-4.
132
RrsiboisandJoffroy, loc.cir., p.9; forslighlly diffcrcntT.Okihita.in 1983
WHOReporT.p.95 (French). Foratimaies of datomedicaland hospitstafollowing
anattack on London or BostonA.rLeaf n 1987 WHORcpon.. Annex 6,pp. 169-70
(French). - UN GeneralAssemblyresolutions2444 (XXïiI) of 19December 1968and2675
QCW) of 9 December 1970;lU
- the 19n GenevaProtocal1,Amcles 12and 21 (whichprohibitattacksagainst
sanitaryunits andhealthtransports),Article48 (whichrestatesthSt.Petersburg
de), andArticle 51(whichsta- anddevelopstheprohibitionagainstattacking
the civilianpopulation).
The iüegaiityof the Hiroshimabombings,on these grounds, was recognizedby the
Tokyo DistrictCourt in the Shimoda case in 1963.' I"is therefore unnecessaryto
dweil on the useof nuclearweaponsagainstciviliansand health units: the useof a
nuclear weaponagainst civiiiatargets, or of a weaponhaving incidentaleffects on
civiliansinanycircumstanceisrenderedillegaiby virtueof themostelementaryrules
of the internationallawof armedwnflict.
3.48 Further, it is clear that theuseof a nuclear weapon against civils ouldnot only
constitute a "simple" violation of international humanitarianlaw; it would also
wnstitute a war crime under Article 85 of 1977GenevaProtocol 1, sinŒit would
wnstitute an intentionalattackon sanitary units and transportation(Ar85(2)), on
the civilianpopulationor individualciviliansAn. 85(3a)), or the launchingof an
indiscriminateattack affecang the civilian population or civilian objects in the
knowledgethat suchanattackwouldcause excessivelossof lifeor injury tocivilians
(Art. 85(3b)).
3.49 Moreover, theuse of a nuclearweaponagainst a civilian target wouldwnstitute a
-crimeagainst humanity,as definedby Anicle 6(c) of the Statuteof the Nuremberg
Military InternationalTribunal (whichdefinescrimes againsthumanity as ail "acte
inhumaincommiscontretoute population civila evant oupendantla guerre [...lan,d
Article2 of the 1948Conventionfor the PreventionandPunishmentof the Crime of
Genocide 08 U.N.T.S 27.7). The UN General Assembly has characterised as
"crimesagainst humanity andcivilisation"anyuse by a Stateof a nuclearor thermo-
nuclear weapons (supra para. 3.36). irrespective of whether they are even used
againstcivilians.This viewis sharedby many distinguishedjurists (a non-exhaustive
listis set outsupra para. 3.21 at note 70).
'" Resolution2444 providinrcalia:
Qu'ilest interditde lancerdes attaquescontreles populationsciviles en tantque telles;
'c) Qu'il faut en tous temps faire la distinctionentre les personna quiauxennentpan
hostilitiset les memhresde la populationcivile atin queces dernierdsansnt épargn&
toutela mesure possible;'
Resolution675 furtherdevelopsthose principls3.50 Further use of a nuclear weaponagainst a military targetwill alsobe illegalThis
ariseshm the foilowingconsiderations:-
- even the use of a iimited nuclear weapon withreduced power (such as a
battlefieidnuclear weapon)renders death inevitablefor those within the range
ofitseffects(i);
- the use of a iirnited nuclear weaponwith reduced power could lead to total
nuclearwar(ii);
- theuse of nuclear weapon with enhanced power increasesthe effects identified
above and addsindiscriminateeffectswhichcannotbelimitedto any"permitteda
military objectives (iii).
(i) Nuclearweaponr rendcr death inrvirable
3.51 Even if the power of a nuclear weaponcould be reduced to a fraction of one
l~ilotonne"~(quivalent perhaps to the size of the blnckbusren used during the
SecondWorld War, which containedapproximately10 tonnesof TNT)'% it would
neverthelessbe the casethat sucha bomb wouldnot leavethosewithinthe immediate
vicinityof the explosion with any reasonable chance of sur~ival."~ In addition to
the shockwaves or blowing effect,there would also be thennic waves which,for
those in the vicinity, would leaveno chance of survival; with a power of 10 to 20
kilotonnes(the size of the Hiroshimaand Nagasakibombs)the fireballalonewould
be felt in a radius of some200 metres:13'
139
"Dansla boule de feuet a proxiiniidimmddiate.toutse vol~tiserai.ou fonderait
"A Hiroshimaet a Nagasaki, iatempéreatteint3M10-4000OC a proxiinitkdupointzéro:elle
adépassi570' OCmemr aunedistancede 11W-1600in.''.'4"
The "eclair thermique" of a one kilotonne bomb will cause 3rd degree bums to a
'" ' 1990 UNRepon. paras.39CIsrq. (French).
1983WHO Repon. p. 9,pan.9 (French)1987 WHO Repon, p.10.para. IO.
"' 1990 UNRepon. pan. 295 (French).
" 1990 UNRepon, para.293.n.2 (French).
' 1990 UNRepon. para.294.
'O T. Okhiuiin1983 WHO Rrpon. p.8(French);A.Leiif1987 WHO Repm. p.163andnotes
(Fmch). person at 600 metres distant from the e~plosion,'~a 'nd can also ignite secondary
fires which, if occumng simultaneously,could lead to fireballsof the type which
occurred at Hiroshima,'" or occurred as a result of the Allied bombings of
Harnburg, Dresden and ~okyo.'" Many suwivors of the shock waves would be
killed by theseincendiaries.Sucha consequenceviolatesthe prohibitionon the use
of weaponswhich render deathinevitable. According to the1868Deflaration of St
Petersburg, the "legitimateobjective" ofwar
'would beexccededby theernploymentof anns hich uselevly aggnvatc the sufferingsof disabled
men. or render(bùr deab iaevitab~e'.'~ (crnphasisadded)
3.52 The obligationreflectedin theprmble to the St. PetersburgDeclarationrernains in
force and applicabletoday. It has ben neither abolishednor superseded.Nuclear
weapons are far more lethal than any other weapon, includingchemicalweapons
(which do not necessarilyrender death inevitablesince appropriate shelter would
provide protection) andwhich have been universaliywndemned. According to a
group of UN experts,
"There istherefore no target sfrong enough to restheintense effects of nuclear ~pons
n 145
I...]
Deathis inevitablefor al1thosein the vicinityof a nuclear explosion.
3.53 The prohibitionon the useof weaponswhichrender death inevitablereflectsan even
more fundamentalprincipleof the lawof armedconflict:the obligationto minimise
harm to combatants. Accordinglyin its use offorce aStatemust notinjureitsenemy
when it can capture him, nor cause senous injury when it cancause oniy Jight
injury, and not kill the enemy ifhe can be injured.14"
I</
Resibois andJoffroy.op. cir.p.20.
1990 UN Repon. para. 294 (French).
"' Resibaisand Joffreyop. cil.. p.24; A. Leaf. in 1987WHO Rcpon Annex VI. pp. 163-64
(French); T.A. Postol. 'PossibleFakalilies frorn Superfirrs Following NuAiear in or
Near Urban Areas.' inF. Solornon and R.Q. Marston (4s.).7he Medical Implicnriom of
Nuckar War. Instituteof Mulicinc and National Academyof Sciences. WashingtonDC,National
Academy Pnss (1986). pp.15 cfseq.
On this text saeE. David. Principes de droir dos coflirsannér (1994). pp.266 n sq
('Princip').
145 1980 UN Report. pan. 112.
le Examen. supra.note 119. pp206-07. 279. 332 and 336. The principle is reflectedin a number of rules: the limitation on the choice of
methodsor meansof Mare (Regulationannexedto the 1907Hague Convention N
Art. 22; 1977GenevaProtocol 1, Art. 35(1)); the prohibitionon declaring that no
quarterwill be given (1907Hague ConventionIV, Art.23; 1977GenevaProtocol1,
Art. 40); the prohibitionof the use of weaponswhich cause unnecessary suffering
(infa para.3.74);the obiigationto takenecessaryprecautionsdunng attacksto avoid
the civilians and their property(1977 Geneva Protocol 1, An. 57; 1907 Hague
Convention IV, Art. 26).This list is merely iiiusûative, and many more examples
could be given.
As a result of the de of the devastationwhich the use of a nuclear weapon will
cause, and the unavoidablelethal effects within a certa i nrirneter, thuse of a
nuclearweaponwould certainlyviolatethesewidelyacŒptedprinciplesand niles of
internationallaw.
(ii) îhe useof evena singlenuclenrweaponcouldresulrin roralnuclearwar
3.54 Proponents of the use of nuclear weapons probably consider it inappropriate to
contemplate catastrophicscenarios and maintain that a limited nuclear conflict is
possible. Thisviewis onlyrealistic, ifit couldever be dled realistic, in the wntext
of theuseof a nuclearweaponagainsta Statewhichdid notpossessnuclearweapons,
or whichdid nothave allieswhichbothpossessednuclear weaponsand were willing
to usethem. Inaconflictbetween twoor more Statespossessingnuclearweaponsthe
likelihoodof anesdation is great, andwouldprobablylead to total nuclear war and
the devastationof a substantialpart of the internationalcommunity.This view has
been endorsed by UN expert^,'^b'y independent acadernic~,'~~ and by political
figures.Ib9
3.55 In otherwords, there is agood chancethat a Statewhich madefirst-use of a nuclear
weapon, evenina limitedmanner, wouldprovokea global nuclearconflagration.It
is difficult to see how such behaviour, with the mere possibility of such
consequences, can be compatible with international law. It would violate the
obligation "to respectand make others respect" internationalhumanitarian law,Iso
further enhancingthe inherent illegalityof the use of nuclear weapons. Even if a
'" 1980 UN.Rrp~rt,pan.199
10
1987WHO Report,AMex 4(c), p.127
I*)
See e.g.the views of LorMountbatten:'in warfarcwithout triggeringan all-out nuclcar
exchangeleadingto the finalholoca. .. is moreand incdihl.. .In alsinceritasa
militarman 1can se nouse for anynuclearweaponswhicwould not end iescaLatiwitb
consequeocesthatno onecanconceive'; citd in BritishMedicalAssociation.op.cir. pp.26-27.
'"
Art. commonto thefour1949GenevaConventions, ndAr<.l(1) of the 1977GmeProbwl
1. Statecould not have hown that itsact wouldresult in suchconsequences,it would
be regardedas "an encouragement[...] tocommitacts contraryto generalprinciples
of internationalhumanitarianlaw reflected intreaties" the viewtaken by the Court
in the CPre concerning cenain military and paramilirary acriviries agoinrr
Ni~aragua.~''
3.56 The fmt use of a nuclearweapon, even of limitedpower and targetedonly against
militaryobjectives,wouldthereforebeillegalindependentlyof anyof itsunavoidable'
lethaleffects. Thisarisessimplyby reasonof the possibility thatit mightlead tothe
massiveuse of nuclear weaponsand the violationof mostof the niles of the law of
armed wnflict.
It is nodoubtfor thisreasonthat theUN GeneralAssemblyhassolemnlyproclaimed
that
"1.StatesandStatesmenthatresontotheUY of nucleweaponswill becomminiq thegrow
crimeagainstbumanity;
2.Therewill neverbeanyjustificationorpardonforStatesmenwhotakethedecisionfmtethe
tousenuclea~eapons";~ (~mphasisadded).
(iii) Nuclearweapons haveindiscriminatecffecrs
3.57 In thecase of a strategicnuclearwar it is conceivable thatnuclearweapons might be
used against combatantswith limitedside effects againstcivilians: for example, an
attackagainst enemy forcesin the desen or on the high seas or outsidean inhabited
zone. The surgicalprecisionof a nuclearattackof this kind is entirely thwretical,
notwithstanding that evenin such a circumstance,violationsof general international
lawfortheprotectionof humanheaithand theenvironmentwouldoccur(infra paras.
3.61-3.62, 4.21-4.28). As reflectedin the reportsof the UN referred to frequently
in these Written Observations (cited supra at note 127). such a scenario is,
historically,speculativeand beyond thereaims of possibility. Experiencewith the
use of nuclear weapons (Nagasaki, Hiroshima) and major nuclear accidents,
(Chemobyl) indicates clearly that the effects of radiation, once released, are
uncontrollable.
3.58 Thelimiteduse ofnuclear weapons would, howeverm , ostlikelyleadto anescalation
intoan al1out nuclearwar. Accordingto the SIPRIfiguresadoptedby the 1990UN
Report, the majorityof Russian and Amencan arsenals comprise nuclear weapons
witha power of 100kilotonnesor more.ls3 Accordinglya first use or an escalation
'" IU Rep. 1986. p.13para. 256.
152
ARES 361100, 9 Decemher 1981 (82in favour, 19 against,41 abstentions).
131
1990UN Repon. AppendixII(French).
51 involvingeither or both of theseStates wouldprobably result in the use of nuclear
weaponshaving eight times the power of that usedin Hiroshima. The greater the
power of the weapon, the greater the collateml damage caused tocivilians, their
property and the environment.
It has been estimated that to hait a classical attackled by four divisions(80,000
mps) supportedby 100planesoperatingout of ten airbases, it will benecessaryto
have:
"somecensof weapoosof m 10k. yield againnimportantelementsof the grouadfandup
to10weapons of20 to 10Inyield toreducetheopponcnt'sairforce."'"
The numberof civilian victimsresulting frorn a lirnitedaction of this type, even if
it had onlymilitaryobjectives,wouldundoubtedlyVaryconsiderablyaccordingto the
density of the populationin the regions attacked. On the basis of medianfigures it
is not inconceivablethatthe totalnurnberkilledor seriouslyinjured wuld be 180,000
civilians (150,000as a result of directeffect of the explosionsand 30,000as a result
of radioactive fallout) and 35,000 military personnel (30,000 and 5,000
re~pectively).'~' hese figures couldbe reduced if certainprotective masures were
taken (alerts,evacuation,shelter),
"[hlowever,this does not invalidatethe most conspicuousconclusionthatcanbe drawnfrom the
table: evenwhen onlyrnilirarywfeu are selecievenaif protectionis provided.thecivilian
casualtiesmry faroutnulnberthemiliraryone~."'~~
Other simulationsconfirmthis prognosis. It has been calculatedthat in the case of a
nuclear conflictin Western and Eastern Europe in which less than 1% of the total
available nuclear weaponrywere usedts7against470 exclusivelymilitary targets (in
which 379 targets werethe subjectof a singleattack of 150kilotonnes each,and the
other 91 wgets were the subjectof three attacks of 150kilotonnes each), the total
number of deadand injuredresultinpfrom the shockwaves, blowingeffect and heat
alone wouldexceed 15.6 million.If you add to this figure the foreseeablevictims
resultinginthe shortterm fromradioactive fallout,a figureof morethan 100 million
dead and injured would be ~eached."~ According to other studieswhich concem
limited nuclearattacks, targetingonly military objectivesin the United States or in
the former USSR, figures supgest that the number of victirns, depending upon
'Y
1980UN Rcpon, para.186.
'" Id., para. 189.
Id.. para. 190.
ln A. Ottolrnghi.1987 WHO Rcpon. Annex 4.C.p.130 (French).
Id. geographicalcircumstances, winds and the theoretical models used, would Vary
between 23 millionand 45 millionin theUnite States, and54 millionin theformer
USSR.IS9
3.59 In the wntext of the likelihood of esdation, the use of srnail nuclear weapons
becomeincrementallymore significant (seesupraparas 3..54-3.56).Wherethe use
of nuclear weaponsin the above-mentionedcases affects a large number of non-
combatants,it will be seen that th& use necessarilyhas indiscriminate effectseven
where belligerentshave soughttolimit their actionto militarytargets.~egally, any
such use wouldviolate the obligation to distinguishbetween combatants and non-
combatantsby limiting any attackstothe former (suprapara. 3.47) and not using
weapons withindiscriminateeffects(se1 e977 GenevaProtocol 1, Art.51(4)-(5)).'"
With a large numberof victimsit is impossibletoargue that thecollateraldarnage
was not "excessive in relation to the wncrete and direct military advanrage
anticipated"withinthe meaningof Art.51(5)(b)infine of the 1977 GenevaRotowl
1. Losses of the swie indicatedabove would not only be "excessive", they would
constitutea warcrime, a crime against humanity,and possibly even genocideif it
could be show that the penon using the nuclearweaponhad the requisiteelement
of intent(see1948 Conventionon the Preventionof the Crimeof Genocide, Art. 2).
The elementof intent for genocidecould be inferred from the mere failureof the
Denon usine.the nuclearweawns to takeaccountofits fulleffects:in suchconditions
It is imposs~blto saythatthéy were ignorantas to the consequencesof useand that
therefore theydid not intend to exterminatethe victimpopulation.
These observationsbecomeal1the morepertinentwhen oneconsiders thepossibility
of any useof any nuclearweaponagainsta smallislandstate, which wouldhave the
effectofwipingout theentirepopulationandrendenng itsenvironmentuninhabitable.
3.60 Another consequenceof a "limited"nuclear attack woiild be the impossibilityfor
health services,assumingtheyremainedintact, to assure the care required for those
victims who had not been killed. The burden placedon medical facilitiesand staff
would beovenvhelming.Accordingto oneexpen:
"Le oombredevictimesqueprovoqueraitneserait-cequel'utilisationd'unepetitepartiedesarsenaux
nucléairesd'aujourd'huimontrebien qu'ilest vain d'envisagerqu'unquelconsantéystèmede
puisse offrirdes soins mkiicauxàla ~iiuation.'"~'
"Dégagerles blessésdes dicotnhres. leur prodiguerles premierssoins, puislde transporterbors
la wne de destniction dans des itablissements mgdicauxappropriésserail une tiche emémemea
difficile. mimeen l'absencede retoinh<csradioactives.d'incendies violentsel d'obstructiondes rues
" B. Levi anF.von Hippel. id..-ex 4.8. pp.105erscq. (French).
lm Cf. Principer, oci:pp.281 et 331 (French)
161
A. Leafin id.. Annex 6. p.167 (French) UN GeacrJ AucmblylSdomIrlds'WnucnObprvaiionRn UA (LwofAmicdConfliar)
parles décombredes bâtimentseffondr....il s'agitlà d'une sitexigeantunecontribution
maximalede lapartdessemices mCdicaudansde nombreuxdomaines:sang. plauna,autreliquides
admiaisPlbles par voie parentiraactes chimrgicaux, antibiotiques. soinsinfirmiers. soirs
médicaux c.ambresstériles,de mêmeuetoutesles autrr-rces sophistiquéeselamideîim
moderne. IIs'agiten outrede blessuresdontchacuneexige desjouentiSresde soins intensifs
etdesscmainesou des mois desoins hospitaliers. En fait, il n'existeaucunmoyende soignerun
aussigrandnombrede victimes."'"
These conclusions,whichaddressthe consequencesof theuseof nuclearweapons in
indusmalised counmes, are a fomori valid in respect of any dweloping country
which might be subject toa nuclearattack.
3.61 The use of a nuclear weaponwhich affects a large numberof non-combatants wiii
necessarilyhave indiscriminateeffects, even if the action was intended tobe iirnited
to rnilitartargets. Suchuseviolatesthe obligationto distinguishbetweencombatants
and non-combatants,to limitattacksto combatants (suprapara. 3.47), and not touse
weaponswith indiscriminateeffects(1977GenevaProtocol1,Art 51(4-5)).The large
nurnberof victimsresultingfrom the useof anynuclear weapon, as evidencedby the
Reports cited above, wouldbe indiscriminatein causingincidentallosstoQvilian.iife
or objectsand would be excessivein relation to any militaryadvantageanticipated
(see 1977 GenevaProtocol 1, Art. 51(5)(b)). Suchdamageto human health andthe
environmentwould constitutea war crime and a crime againsthumanityand, to the
extent that thenecessaryintentionalelementcouldbe proved(whethersuchintention
is express or could be irnplied), genocide (supra para. 3.49, 1948 Genocide
Convention, An. II).
3.62
Another consequence of a "strategic" nuclear at tack would be the overwhelming
burden imposed upon a country'shealth servicesto respond tothe needsof victims.
In countries with less highly developed health services the burden would be even
greater. The use of a weapon whichprevents health servicesfrom functioning or
which rendersanypossibilityofhelpingtheinjuredviolatesinternationalhumanitarian
law. Thus, the 1949Geneva Convention IV providesthat "thewounded and sickshaii
be Fed for" (Art. 3(2), emphasisadded). AstheInternationalCourt hasrecognised,
this provisionapplies afoniori in an internationalarmed conflict.16' The obligation
is furtherdevelopedin variousprovisionsof the Geneva Conventions (1949 Geneva
Convention 1, An. 12 crseq.; 1949Geneva Convention II, Art. 12; 1949 Geneva
ConventionIV, Arts. 16cf scq.and55 crscq.), aswell as the 197 GenevaProtocols
(Protocol 1, Arts. 8, 61, 68; Protocol II, An. 7 cr scq.). Article 10 of the 1977
Geneva Protocol1provides:
"I.AIlthewounded.sickand shipu~reckaiowhicneverPany theybelons, shallbe respectcdand
proiecred.
tb: Id., p168 (French).
'" Milirayand Paran~iliranAcrir,iirnndAgninrr Nicaragua.IU Rep. 1986, p.114, pua. 218. 2.In althecucumaances they shabe malcd hurnaneland shall rcceiKItbe fullecxunt
practicableawitb leapossibldelaythemedicaGareandatrcntiorcquiredbythccandition."
This obligation will be violatecieven whereit is impossibleto Savethe vicumsof a
"limited"nuclear confli~t.'~
3.63 Zn conclusion,the extraordinarypowerof nuclearweapons andthe enormityof their
effecisonhumanhealth andtheenvironmentnecessafilymeansthattheiruseviolates,
directly or indirectly, thoset les of the internationallaw of armedconflict which
prohibiis:
the use of weaponsthatrender deathinevitable;
the use of weaponswhich have indiscriminateeffects;
any behaviourwhichmight violatethis law.
(b) ïk use of nuclearweaponsviolarcsiruerwrnMon lal by remonof the qualirm've
effects ofsuchweapons
3.64 The qualitativeeffectsof nuclearweaponswhichdistinguishthem fromconventional
weaponsare those whichresult (i) from thedisintegrationof the atom and (ii) from
radioactive fallout. The disintegration of the atom has two consequences: the
emissionof electroma,oneticimpulsesand initiai nuclearradiation.
fi) 7hespecificconscquenccs ofrhrdisinrrgrarion ofthearorn
3.65 The disintegrationof theatom has two effects:
- electromagneticimpulses(a); and
- initialnuclk radiation (b).
la) Elecrromagneriic mpulsesandrhcirconsequcnccs
3.66 The explosionof a nuclearweaponproduceshighenergygammanys whichrernove
electronsfrom surroundingmatter and lave electricallychargedatoms (ions).It is
the removal of electrons which produces an extremely short and high intensity
electromagnetic impulse.16'Without going into the technical details of the
phen~rnenon,'~i ~t shouidbe remernberedthat if the electro-magneticimpulse does
not seernto causedirect physicaldamageto the humanbody, it has senous indirect
consequencesinsofar as itcan darnageal1the electncal and electronicequipmentof
IM
Singh.op. cil.. pp.tM)-Oi
'
1980 UNRepon. Appsndix1. p.179. para. 1(French).
lu Id. an are. affected by an explosion. The electro-magnetic impulse might deswy
computers, transistors, and integrated circuits to which it is transmined through
electromagneticenergycaptors suchas antennae, telephonewires, railway lines, the
aluminiumfuselageof planes etc. Many systemswhich are essentialfor the lifeand
health of civilianpopulations,as well as civil society in general, woulbe rendered
unworkable,induding electronicdevices for medical purposes, telecommunications
for civiluse, and water, gas and electncity supplies.'* The .effect of cutting
communications linksbetween militarypersonnel might also precipitate a further
escalationin the use of nuclear weapons.'"
It should neverthelas be noted that the effects of electromagnetic impulses are
relaavely negligiblein contrast to the other effects of nuclear weaponsdescribed
above, so long as the explosiontakes place at an altitude of lessthan 10 or 15
kilometres. On the other hand, if the explosiontakes placeat a higher altitude, the
blowing, thennic and radioactiveeffects have more limited consequences for the
populationon the ground, but the electromagneticimpulseeffects are greater sine
they wiUreach "une vaste zonedont Ieslimitescoincidentavecla ligned'horizon par
rapport au point d'explosi~n".'~It has ben calculatedthat:
"L'explosion d'une bombë une altitude de 10km., par exemple, produirait un effet
ilectromagnétiqeensibledansun rayonde 1100km. Une explosionunàq350 km.d'altitude
produirauneimpulsionquimucherapratqiuemetktowlitddel'EuropeoudE.-U. a,nsiqu'uot
paNe duCanada etduMexique.ai170
3.67 Electromagneticimpulses haveeffectswhichcannot bedirectedor limited, and they
affect indiscriminately:
combatantsand civilians;
medicalsafety, health andassistanceunits; and
third Statesand areas beyondnationaljurisdiction.
It followsthat the use of the nuclearweaponswill violatethose mies of the law of
armed wnBicts whichprohibit the useof weapons of indiscriminateeffects (supra
paras. 3.57-3.6 3talso violatesthe mies of internationallaw goveming fnendly
relations betweenStateswhich prohibit the effects of a confiictbeing felt by third
Party States,namely:
167
1987 WHO Repon, p.11,para. 12ciscq.(French).
Ica Id.p.12. para14.
169 1980 UN Repon. Appendix1.p.179. para. 20 (French).
lm 1987WHO Rrpon. p.]1,para. 13(French).
5 6 the rule prohibitingStatesfrom damaginghumanhealth or the environmentin
the territory of other States (inpans. 4.9-4.20);
the laws of neutrality- to the extent that they appl- according towhich
"[tlheterritorof neutraiPowersisinviolable"(1907Convention (V) Respxting
the Rightsand Duties of Neuhal Powers and Personsin Case of War onLand,
Amcle 1)
therulesprohibitingaggression,tothe extent thattheUN GenexalAssembly has
definedaggression as "theuseofail weapons bya State"actingfint "againa the
tenitory of another State",'" whicharnountsto a violationof Art. 2(4)of the
UN Chaner.
@) ïîaeiniti nuclcarradiation
3.68 "Initiainuclear radiation"las&just oneor twoseconds,dunng whichtimeit hasvery
gravewnsequencesfor thosewhoareexposedtoit, involvingboth shortand medium
term wnsequences. The effecton livingorganismsis simiiar to that of a genotoxic
poison (as opposed to the neurotoxic poisonunleashed by a chernical weapon).IR
The effecü are even more extensivein the case of neutronbombs. Initial nuclear
radiation only affects livingatter; actsasa poison; complicatesor precludesthe
possibiiity of treating the sick or woundd; causes unnecessary suffering and
superfluousinjury;and poseslong-termgeneticrisks for those who are not directiy
involved in the conflict, includingthe children of those who are directly exposed.
Moreover, it isan inherentcharacteristicof the use of nuclear weaponsand would
occur in any use.
3.69 in the short term, the principal effectsof radiation on the human body havebeen
wmmonly refend to as radiationsicknessand have b&n describedas follows:
"The severity ofthese syndromes depends on the radiation dose received. in the lethai rangeofdows
three degrees of wverity can be recognired: (1) the central nervous systein syndrome. characterized
by alternating Statesof sNpor and hyperexciÿibility. with unavoidable de(thisithin a few days
is the effect aatby the ure of neutron b(2the gncvointestioal syndrome. characteriscd
by nausea. persistent vomiting. and haemorrhagic diarrhoea, with deatweekormng within a
Iwo; and(3the haematopoietic syndrome. chnractaauseavomiting. cytopenanaemia,
and immunity dismrbances. When the whole body is expowd over a shon perithanodoses lcss
6 Gy (600 rad) the prognosis is directly related to the doses remarrow.It the bone
same dose is received over a longer period of time the chances of sTberidrofncrcases.
dcath is greatly reduced ifsoine bone manow. even aslittleasa tenth, is shielded from the dion.
In tbe range of whole-body irradiation of 24Gy (200600 rad) survivai depends largely on the
"' AIRES 3314 (XXIX). 14 Dzcemher 1974. AR. 3fi)2an(adoptai hy wnçensus).
IT. Sec reference in Andrsupra.not60.at21.
57 Accordmg to their proximity to the place of the explosion and the power of the
weapon, victims can either die in hours, days or weeks followingtheir exposure to
mikition:
"For an explosion similatothose over Hirashima or Nagasaki. the radiation is enough to
rcnder human beings in the open unconsciwithi minutes at distances up to 700800 m fmm
ground-zero. The exposai pemns, if tbey survive the blasth*u.would die inlesthaD one or
nuo days from tbe radiation iojury. The radiation ratadistance of 1.300-1.400 m from aich
an explosion wouldso be fatabut d& may be delayedup to about a month. At 1.800 m or more
fmm ground-zero few if any acutc radiation injuries would be expected to occur. Howlate.
radiation injuries may be induced bylower radiation le~els.""~
Shelten specifically wnstructed to deal with nuclear conflict mightprovide cd
protecaon against initial nuclearradiation:
"En demeurant dansun localou dansun abrispécialementconqu. on réduiraitconsidérablemlat
dow d'irradiation. Un bonabri diviserait cene dose par 1000 ou davanl...].La protection
assuréepar une maison ordinaire dépendrait de son type de construction et d'au-
caractéristiques.5
This type of protection is goinp to have a limited efficacy with regard to neutron
bombs:
"qui sont précisémentonques pourtucr sous l'efietdes myonneinenis .sansintliger parailleurs trop
,1176
de dégâtsd'origine mscaniquc ou heriniquc.
If these reduced doses of radiation are not themselveslethal, combinedwith other
traumaticeffects felt by victims, they becomefatal. Radiationreducesthe defence
system of the human organism by attaclringthe immune systemand consequently
increasingthe risk of exposureto diseases and illnesses whichmight not otherwise
prove to be fatal:
"En raison de l'effet combini des blessures ei de I'iininunosuppression, beaucoup de victimes
succomberaient immidiaieinent aprésune explosion nuclzaire ë des blessàdes infectionsqui
auraient ét6benignes dans des circonstances norinales.
' 1983 WHO Rcpon, p. 12. para. 28.
Il. 1990 UN Repon. p.81, pan. 297: Leaf .987 WHO R<,pon. p.165 (French).
"'
1983 WHO Rcpon. p.12. para.25 (French).
' Rotblat,J..ibid..p.36,para. 48 (French).
In 1987 WHO Rcpon. p.31. para. 76:Leaf. ibid.p.180 (French). The health needsof victimswho have been exposed to nuclear radiationrequirea
high level of technical, medical and hospital infrastructure. 200 who were
injuredby theaccidentatthe Chernobylnuclearpowerplant, and the 135,000people
who had to beevacuatedfrom a 30krnexclusionzone, mobilised"lepersonneletthe
matérieldes servicesde sant ée l'ensembledu pays".'" In thecase of a nuclear
war,even ifit waslimited(se thefiguresated supra atparas. 3.46 and 3.58)"les
service se sant méême àl'échellemondiale,ne pourdent en aucun cas fairface
à cett situation". Developing countries wouldbe more advenely affecte. than
developedcounmes.
3.70 Inthe mediumand long term, epidemiologicalstudies carrieout on large numbers
of people exposed to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as
experimentscamed out onanimais, have shown a relationshipbetweenexposure to
radiation (andior to radioactive fallout)andaccmed subsequentwnsequences:
malignanttumours(ieukaemias,thyroid cancersand tumoun of thebreast, thelung
and stomach, and multiple myelomas), cataracts, chromosomal abnormaüties,
including forthose who are exposed in ~rero.'~Moreover, it is likely tuse of
nuclearweaponswouldleadto a signifiant increaseingeneticconsequencesresuiting
from any childrenbom frompeople exposedto radiation.'"
3.71 Experts are in agreementin recognisingthat nuclear radiationacts on organismsin
the same way as a poison. According to Professor M. Errera of the labontory of
biophysicsand ndiology at the Universitélibre de Bruxelles,
"U y a deux sortes de poisons: les neurotoxiques et les g6notoxiques. Les premiers sont
particulièrementle fait desarmes chimiques. les seconds celui des armes nu~liaires."~'
According to Professor M.F. Lechat, of the epidemiologyunit of the Catholic
Universityof Louvain,andadviser tothe Comitéinternationaled'exp& en sciences
médicaleset santépublique created by the WHO pursuant to Assemblyresolution
WHA 34.38.'"
'On peut considirer l'arme nucl<aire comme un 'poiso~i'surtoutdu fait des effeccs écologiques:
passadanslachainalimentaireavec concentrationet dépbid'isotopes radioactifsdontl'élimination
'" Id.. p.(French).
'"
KatoH and Shigernat1.:Land.Ch.. OtiuiP..1983WHORcpon. pp. 10348.
'0 Ofidal,P..id... 154
111
Citein Andries. supra.60.at21
Iê
1983WHO Rcpon, p.5 estlente, pouvant s'étagerpour certainsdes isotopes les plus communssur des années.
Fdy, according to annex Il ofProtowl ILioftheParis Accordsof 23 October 1954
relating tothe wntrol of arrnaments:
'L'arme nucléaiestdéiïniewmme toute arme qui contienesconçue pour contenir ou utiliser
un combustible nucléaireou des iu>radioactifs et par,explosion oautrettansformation
nucléairenonwntr8lŒ ou par radioactivitédu wmbustible nucldesrisowpesradioacticsf
capable de desuuctiw massive. dommaggénéralissu empomnnementcmassifs.' (emphasis
added)lS
3.72 It shouldbe notedthat thelethalsynergyof effects@lov:lngand heatwrnbined with
radiation)donotoccur in the explosionof nucleardeviceswith a powerof more than
100 kilotonnes
"carla zone monelle créée parl'effetde souffle et l'effet thermique est bceUe quirieure
resulte du rayonnement.5
On theother hand, in the case of a neutronbomb
"la zone monelle oii s'exercent les effets des neutrons et des rayons gamina est beaucoup plus
étendueque celle de l'onde de choc et de ).onde ther~ni~ue.'"'~
3.73 These qualitative consequencesbring nuclear weapons within the scope of those
international rules prohibiting the use of weapons which have analogous
consequences. Nuclear weapons can thereby be characterised as, or have
consequences analogousto, chernicalweapons, the use of which is prohibited by
international law, notablyby:
1899HagueDeclaration2 Conceming Asphyxiating Gases;
1925 GenevaProtocol for the Prohibitionof the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonousor Other Gases,andof BacteriologicaiMethodsof Warfare;
1993 Convention on the Prohibitionof the Production, Storage and use of
ChernicalWeaponsand their Destruction.
ID Supra.note 179.
'
Cited id.: lextRGDIP. 1963. p. 825 (FrenchOTAN Documents fondamentaux Bmxeilcs,
1981.p. 59.
1987 WHORcpon. p. 16 (French).
'" Id. (French). UN <icirAunnblylSolomonindrWriitcn ObmiioluRn M (Lw ofAmxd Conflic&)
The 1925 Geneva Protocol is noteworthy because it addresses "asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, and [..] al1 analogous liquids materials or devices"
(emphasisadded), reflectstheParties'intentionnot to iimit the categoryof weapons
in arestrictive rnanner.Moreover,a restrictiveapproachto interpretationis not the
mlein internationalhumanitarianlaw, whichshouldalwaysbe interpretedtogivethe
benefit of any doubt JIfavour of the protection of the victirn. This is particularly
reflectedin the Martensclause, whichprovidesthat:
'Until a more complcte code of tbe lwaroha$been isued. the hi& conuactiPartiedeem
it expedient to declarctheareno: includcdin the Regutarionsdopied by thuinhabitants
and the belligerants rcmain under rbe protectionand the nile of the p~ciples of the bw of nations.
as they renilt from ihe usages establisbedmong civilùed pcopleslawsof humaniy,and
tbe dictates of tbe public consci~ace."'~~
3.74 Nuclear weavonshave other characteristicswhich render their use-unlawful.Thev
havepoisondusconsequencesandtheiruseis thereforeprohibitedby the 1899 ~a~&
Convention 2 (Article23)and theRegulationsannexed to the 1907Hague Convention
(IV).They "uselesslyaggravatetheSufferings of disabled mennin violationof the
principle enunciated by the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration, and they cause
"superfïuous injury" in violation of, inter alia, 1907 Hague Convention IV
Regulations(Art. 23(e)), 197 GenevaProtocol I (An. 35(2)). Moreover, their use
would violate the principles of proponionality which regulate the law of armed
wnflict.
lii) 7he eflecrsof radioacrivefaliour
3.75 Apart from the energy generated by the initial nuclear radiation, nuclear fission
producesradioactive substances whichattach themselves to particlesof the debris of
the nuclear weapon as well as to matterdispersedby the explosion(if it takesplace
at ground levelor at a low altitude).These particlesproduce a "residual" radiation
with a life rangingfrom a fractionof a secondto severalyears. Thus,
nTwo important elemenu. strontium 90 and caesiuin 137, for instance. will retain half of their
radioactivity afier about 30 years. and hence cause long ttrm healrh hazards. Cisbon 14, which
formed from nitrogen in the atinospherewhen irradialed with neutron. ha a ha5,800fe of about
yearsand will thus continue to give small radiation dosesto inany generations.
The fallout of radioactiveparticleswill vary accordingto their weight, the altitude
at whichtheexplosionoccurred,theprevailingatmosphericconditions,thenatureand
--
In See e.g.1907 Hague ConventionIV.prearnble; 1977 Geneva Protoc1,,W. l(2); 1981 UN
Convention on Prohibitions or RestrictionsUse of Cenain ConventionaWeaponsWhich
May beDeerned IobeExcessively lnjurious or to Have lndiscriEffecu.preamble.
"
1980 UNRcpon. p.169. Appcndix 1, para. 31. size ofthe weapon used, etc. The heavier and denser particles may be subject to
faiioutwithi anfewminutes,aithoughlighterparticlesmay remainin thestratosphere
for monthsor yean before falling to ea~th."~
The biological effecü of radioactive failout are analogous to those of the initial
3.76
nuclearradiation,except thatthey &in coverinfinitelygreater areasand consequently
affectfar more people. It has been estirnatedthat fora ground-levelexplosionof a
one megatonnebomb
-lapemow rrstanrdécouverptendantunelongupériodfccenont desdovs rnontUusuune
supcficiede prèsde2000k&etdes dosesengenddu lisioussurunesuperficie d'en10000
bz,.190
It shouldaiso be noted that radioactiveparticlesaffectpersons both "par irradiation
externe de l'ensemble ou d'une partie du corps" and by "irradiation interne
(Inhalationou ingestiond'éléments radioactif^)".'^'
3.77 Given theanalogous effecu of the initial nuclear radiation and the residual nuclear
radiationresultingfrom radioactivefallout, the rules of internationallawapplicaùle
to the former (supraparas. 3.73-3.74) are evidentlyapplicable aiso to the latter.
Accordingly, the use of nuclear weapons doubly violates six capital rules of the
international law of med conflicts as a result of their qualitative effets.
Internationallaw prohibitsthe use of weaponswhich:
- are chernical;
- are poisonous;
- renderdeath inevitable;
- causeunnecesrary suffering;
- haveindiscriminate effects;and
- violatethe principlesof proponionality and hurnanity.
To thesesix prohibitions there mustbe addeda seventh. As radioactivefalloutdoes
not respectnational frontiers, third States willcertainlybe affected by failoutand by
the residualnuclear radiation.'"This falloutwouldviolate the rules of international
law govemingfriendlyrelationsbetweenStatesand prohibitingany interferencewith
thid States (infr paras. 4.9-4.20).
II9
Id.seealso 1980 UN Rrpon. pp.81-83 (French):1. Rotblat.in 1983 WHOReporr,pp.36-39.
Iw 1983WHO Repon. p. 12. para.23 (French)
19' Id.
'"
Se e.gthe radioactifalloutanticipa<&ina hypothuicaiattackagainststrategicSoviel targets
inFebwry. 1987 WHORrpon. Annex 4.B. p.122, fi€3. (French). 3.78 AdditionaUy,internationallawnow aiw,regulatesthe methodsand meansof warfare
with the aim of ensuringappropriateprotectionfor the environment.It establishes,
in particular, an absolute prohibition on the use of weapons which will cause
"widespread,long-termand severedarnagetotheenvironment". Article35(3)ofthe
1977GenevaProtocol providesthat:
"Ilis prohibitoemploymethodsor meansof warfae whicbareintendecl.or maybeexpcted.
m causewidespread,long-unnandsevere damatothenaniralenvironment."
Article 55 of Protocol 1, whichrelates tothe protection of the civilian population,
provides, imer dia, that:
"1.Careshallbe takenwarfanIO proreetthnanirenvironmentagainstwidespread,long-<cm
andseveredamage.Thusprotectionincludesaprohibof theuseof methodsmeam ofwarfarr
whicbareintendedor maybeexpecttocausesucbdamageto thenanirdnvironmentandrbereby
toprejudicetbebcaltbor airvivalof the population."
There can be littledoubt thatany use of nuclearweaponswouldcause "widespread,
long-tm andseveredarnage"to the environment,engendennga violationof Articles
35(3) and 55 of Protocol 1and the customaryobligation reflected therein. As
describedinthe followingSection(infa para. 4.3), the Chemobylaccidentillustrated
the gravity for the environment of a release into the atmosphere of significant
quantitiesof radioactivematerial,with potentialdamage to the naturalenvironment
lastingseveral decades.
3.79 The approachin the 1977 Pro~ocol1follows,ingeneral terms, thelanguageused in
the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or other Hostile Use of
Environmental Techniques (ENMOD). The basicobligationof Parties,underArticle
I(i) is:
"nottoengagein mililaranyother hostileuseof cnvironineiiinlrnodtechniqueshaving
widespread.long-lastinsevereffecrasrheineansofdestruction.damageor injurytoany other
State
In the wntext of the definitionof "environmental modification technique", (Art. II)
thisobligation leavesopen thequestionofwhetherthe useof a nuclearweaponwuld
wnstitute the "deliberatemanipulationofnaturalprocesses"andleadtothe violation
of the obligationunder ENMOD. Nevertheless,the Conventionsignalswidespread
recognitionof the need to limit the use of the environment as a weapon of war,
withoutdiminishinginanywaythecustomaryandtreatyobligationsestablishingclear
noms for the protectionof theenvironment whichmust be followedin timesof war
and armed conflict (infraparas.4.21-4.28). As supplemented by the moredetailed
and emphaticobligationsof the1977 GenevaProtocol 1,it is submittedthatENMOD
now reflects the customary obligation not tocause "widespread, long-lasting or
severe" harm to the environment.(C) 7lle use of nuclcar weapons violarcs iruernarionalhw irrcspccfiw of the
circutnstancainwhichtheyare used
3.80 The majority of the rules cited in the preceding discussion apply essentially to
internationalarmedconflicu. Althoughthe possibility rernainsrernote, the use of
nuclear weapons wouldalso be unlawful in the case of a non-international med
conflict. The fundamental rules which invalidatethe use of nuclear weapons -
notably the limitation on the methods and means to threaten the enemy and the
obligation not to attack civilians- are applicable to al1 armed wnflicts. This is
reflectedin UN General Assernblyresolution2444 WII) whichprovides:
"RecogBjzingthe necessity of applying basic humanitariaina1armedlconflii,
- Anirms resolutiXXVm of the Xxtb InternationalConference ofCmhe beld atV~e.nna
in 1965whichlaid dom, inrcr alin, tbe follomng principler for by dlgov-enta1
andother authorities responsible forin mednconfiicts:
(a) rhat the right of the panies toIOadopt means of iriiurinpthe enemy is no1udiled;
@) that it is pmbibited tolaunch anach againn the civilian populationsassuch;
(c) that distinction musr be made at ail times betwedn persons taking part andthe hoditics
members of the civilian populationthe effccl the latter bsparedas mucb as
possib~e"'~'(emphasis added)
The '1977 Geneva Protocol II confirms and extends the pnnciples reflected in
resolution 2444, notably by prohibiting attacks against non-combatants, the
commissionof acts of terrorisrn, and orders againstgiving quarter(Arts. 4(1) and
(2)(d),7, 9, 11,and 13).Like Protocol 1,ProtocolII prohibitsattacksapainstnuclear
plants(An. 1.5)thus confirrningthe applicability oforrieri of the prohibitionon the
use of nuclear weapons (supra para. 3.23).
It is significantthat the General Assernblypenerally condernnsthe use of nuclear
weapons without distinguishing between internationaland non-internationalarmed
conflictsand qualifies any use as "a crime against humanity" (suprapara.3.26).
Thusthe field ofapplicationof crimesagainsthumanityis not limitedto international
armed wnflicts. This is further reflected in the Statute of the International War
Tribunal for Crimes committed in the temtory of the former Yugoslavia, which
recognisesthe cornpetenceof the Tribunaltojudge thecrimes "committedduring an
armed conflict, whether internationalor intemal" (Art S).'"
'" 19Decemkr 1968.adopted unanimously (111 votes)
1% Textin Doc. UNSi25704.3rd May 1993, p.40 on the field of application rruione cvnreni of îhe
crime against humaniE.:David. Priricipes. opp.604. ïk use of nuclear weapons cannor be jusfr$cd by inremionai law in any
circ~~~rances
Proponentsof thelegalityof the useof nuclearweaponsnight attempttojustifytheir
use under the principles of (i) legitimatedefence; (ii) reprisal(Yinn)aessity.
None of thesejustifications survive a careful smtiny of the applicablerule of
internationallaw.I9'
SeIf-defence&doesnorjuna the useofnuclearwcapons
Selfdefence is anexception to theprohibition against theuseof force whena State
is subject toanarmed attack(UN Charter, Art. 51). Accordingiy,the selfdefence
rule is subject to the rules governijur ad (orcontra)bellwn, whereas theniles
relatingtothe useof nuclearweapons &se in relationtjus inbello.Moreover,the
applicationof jusin belIo does not'dependon the legalityof the defendedcauses;.
whether aggressoror victim,eachpartyis equallysubjecttotheiaw of armed confiid
in wnformity withthe customaryprincipleof the equalityof belligerentsinthe iaw
of war, a principlereflected in thefifth preambularpgraph of the 197ï Geneva
Protocol1.Recourseto nuclearweapons,prohibitedbytheniles of the lawof armed
conflicts, cannotbejustified accordingto the inherent rightof self-defence.
Reprisalsdo nor jmfi rhcuse ofnuclearwcapons
Recourseto nuclearweaponsby way of reprisal mustbe considered withregard to
targets:
(a) whichcannotbe the objectofreprisals:non-combatants andnon-rnilitarymgets;
@) againstwhichrecourse toreprisalsisnotcate_ooncallpyrohibited:thecombatants
and militarytargets.
Repris& wirhregardronon-combaranr asndnon-miliraryrargcrs
Dunng hostilitiesit is forbiddento reson to reprisals againstmedical installations,
transportationand units; the injured; the infirm; civilianpopulations,propeny and
various categoriesof civilianpropeny whichare subjectto specialprotection(19'77
GenevaProtocol 1,Arts. 20, 51(6),52(1),53,54(4), 55(2),56(4)). Theprohibition
appliesin respectofl1weapons, includingnuclearweapons.Thisnile hadpreviously
been establishedin a general rnannerby Art. 60(5)of the 1969Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (1969 ViennaConvention)which provides that the righto
suspend, or denouncea treatyfor substantialviolationof the latter does not apply
"to provisionsrelatinf to theprotectionof the huinnnpersonconofa humaaitarians
'% The following paraxraphsareapain larrely hyfimcn (2 edloc.cirpp. 23O seq.
65 charaster.in panicularto provisionsprohibitinpany formof reprpersanspmrecrcdby
suchueaties."
A similarprovision is setforthin paragraph 7 of UN GeneralAssemblyresolution
2675 QOX) of9 December 1977 on "the fundamentalprinciples [..] concemingthe
protectionof the civilianpopulationduring an armedconflict", whichdeclaresthat
"Civilianpopulations.orindividualmemberstbercof;shbetheoobjectof reprisais.forcible
lransfersor orberarsaultson theirintegrityg (empbasisadded)
Theprohibition on reprisais inthesesituationsappem also in Principle1,paragraph
6 of UN General Assemblyresolution 2625 (XXV) on friendly relations.Even if, in
that case, it relates tojus ad (or contra)bellwn nther than jus in bello, itis
nonethelessapplicable to the second. It followsfromthe above that reprisalscm,.in
nocircumstances,be lawfulagainst this categoryof targets.
(b) Reprisaùwirhregardrocombaranr snd milirarytargcrs
3.85 Theprohibitionof reprisalsagainstcornbatantsand rnilitary targetsis not expressly
providedfor in legal instruments,but the prohibitionof the use of nuclear weapons
againstthe former or thelatteris nonethelesscertain. Combatantsfallunderthesame
titleas non-combatants as "protectedpeople"by vinue of the law of armed conflicts
andbenefit from specificprotection against the use of certain forms of weaponry.
ThusArt 60(5)of the 1969 ViennaConventionon thelaw of veaties prohibitstheuse
of erceprionon adinplcri conrracrus in the case of "provisions relative to the
protectionof hurnan beings". In the case of treatiesofa humanitariancharacterthis
takesinto accountcornbatants as well as non-combatants,with ail "hurnanbeings"
entitled to the minimum standards of humanitarian protection guaranteed by
internationallaw. The fact that An. 60(5) refers "in particular to provisions
prohibitingany form of reprisals" (emphasisadded) does not imply that the other
humanitarianprovisions - thosein which theprohibitionof reprisalsis notexpressly
mentioned - fall outside its field of application, sincethe adverb "notably" shows
that the reference to those provisions prohibitingreprisals is not intended to be
exhaustive.In this perspective,the useof nuclear weapons byway of reprisal, even
if exclusivelydirected against cornbatantsand military targets, would violate Art.
60(5)and the general provisionsof the law of armed conflicts prohibiting thisuse.
3.86 Ina sirnilarrnanner, the IntemationalLaw Commission,in its Draft Articles on the
Responsibilityof States, stressesabout An. 30, on counter-rneasures,that:
"evcnwheretheinterna~ionnyronfful acrin questionwouldjustify a.mtion involvusethe
of forI...actiontakeinthisguisecenainly cannorinclude.for instance.a brcacbof obligations
ofiniemaiiod humanitarilaw.Sucha stcpcoulneverbe 'legitimate'andsucbconductwould3.87 Art. 1wmmon to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and Art. l(1) of 1977Geneva
Protoc01 1 sratesthat:
"The Hi@ ConbactingPhes undenalte w respectand toenaire respect for the prcsentConvention
in alcircumstances."
Moreover, as set out in the Commentaire tothe GenevaConventions:
"Les mou 'en toutes circonstances' signifien..] une Partie wnüactanne peutsedonner
aucun prétexte valable. d'ordre juriouqautreà ne pas respectela Conventiondans m.
ensemble [..]L'an. ler, loin d'éueune clause de style. a été volotevêtud'un caract&rc
impératifIIdoit êmprisà la ~enre."'~
In other words, the absenceof an expressedprohibitionon reprisals in the rule sf
Protocol 1relatingto methodsand meansof combatdoes not implyany right to use
them: independentlyof this a comrario approachto interpretati~n,'~' the obligation
to respect the Protocol in "al1circumstances"necessarily excludes the right of
'recoune to reprisals.
Moreover, the rule elaboratedin Art. 1 also indicates thatreciprocityha no place
in the law of armedconflicü. As indicated in the Cornmenraire to the Geneva
Conventions:
"En prenant d'embléecet engagement. les Parties contractantessoulignent que la Convention n'es
pas seulement un contrat de riciprocite liant un Eut avec son ou xs cosontractanü dansla seule
mesure où ceux-ci respectenl leurs propres engageinents, mais plutôt une série d'obligations
unilatirales. solennellement assuàéla face du monde représenté par les autreParties
contractantes. Chaque Etat s'engageaussi bien vis-à-visde lui-inéineque vis-à-vis des autres.
The principle of non-reciprocityexcludesa forrio rriourse to reprisalsin relation
to the useof nuclearweapons,evenagainstcombatants.
'"
mk LC, 1979, Vol. II. Partp..116. para. 5.
'"
Les Conwruiotu de Genèvedu 12 noir 1919, ConinieriraGrnSve,CICR, 1956volN, pp.21-
22.('Commentaire des Conventions').
'" The a conirariargument would only be acceptable if a textbeufound in humanimian Iaw
which said 'reprisals are only prohibitcd againsr the following...'.Ir wouldonlybe
inihacasethatthea cotirrararzumrnt could be upheld with respect to the legreprisals
against al1objectives nor appzaring in this list.
lw
Cornmenrairedes ConwnriorrrIII, p.24; seealCotntrret~raipp.37-38; Principes loN.
pp.473-74.3.87 Art. 1 common to the four 1949 GenevaConventionsand Art. l(1) of 1977Geneva
Protoc01 1 nates that:
-TheHigb ContractirtgPanies undertaketo rrspect and toensure respect for thepresent Convention
inal1circumsiances."
Moreover, as set out in the Cornmenfair eothe GenevaConventions:
'Le s ors 'en toutes circonstances' sigqu'1..t.IunePartie contractantene pescdonner
aucun prétextevalable, d'ordre juridiwueaune, à oepasrrspster iaConvention dansson
ensemble [...1L'an.ler. loind'ëtre une clausede stétévolontairementrevêtud'uncaractère
impératif.U doit êtrepràsla leare.5'7
In other words, the absenceof an expressedprohibitionon repnsals in the rules of
Protocol 1relatingto methodsand meansof combatdoes not implyany nght to use
them: independentlyof this a contrario approach to interpretati~n,'~the obligation
to respect the hotocol in "al1 circumstances" necessarily excludes the right of
'recourseto reprisals.
Mormver, the rule elaboratedin An. 1 also indicates thatreciprocity ha no place
in the law of armedconflicts. As indicated in the Cornmemoireto the Geneva
Conventions:
'En prenant d'embléecet engagement.les Panies contractantessoulignent quela Conventionn'est
pas seulementun contrat de rçciprocitc!liant un Etat avec sonou ses CO-contractantsdans la seule
mesure où ceux-ci respectent leurs propres engagements. mais plut6t une série d'obligations
unilatérales,oleonellement assuméeà In face du monde représentépar les au- Parties
contractantes. ChaqueEut s'engageaussi bien vis-k-visde lui-inilne que vis-à-visdes autres.
The principleof non-reciprocityexcludesa forriorr ecourse to reprisals in relation
to the use of nuclearweapons,even againstcombatants.
'"
YbkEC, 1979, Vol. II. Part 2. p. 116. para. 5
1-
Les Convenrionrde Genéwdu 12 aoür1919, Conrr~iortnirGenève, CICR. 1956vol IV. pp.21-
22. ('Commentaire des Conventions').
1s ihe a contrarioargument would only bt acceptable if a textbeufoundin humanitarian law
which said 'reprisals are only prohibitul against the followingo...'.It would only be
in chatcasethat ta co~irrariar;ument could bcupheld with respect to thelegality of repnsals
against al1objectives not apprinin this list.
1x9
Commentairedes Conwnrioru. III.p.24;se also Cornmer~taircrpp.37-38;Principesloc.cii.
pp.473-74. itfoUw implicillyfrom theiextof theconventionsthat theydo not admitthe passibilityof invoking
militanyZn7csitas a justificationfor Smte conduct not inconfonwiththe obligationsîhey
imposc.
Thejurispmdenceof coursetakesthe sameapproach. Thus, in Van Lewinrki (aiipî
Von Mamein) case:
"Once theusagesof .w have.arsumed thestk of laws, they caunot beoverridden by neccuity.
except inthose special csherethe law itselfmakesprovisicn rbatevennialit"'O1
The mle is absolute:
"[ ..the mles of internationallaw muscbe followedevrn if if resulrs inabalde or even
a war. Expediencyor necessitycannotwarrant their vio[...]nQ5
The rule applies equally in relationto nuclearweap~ns.~ In the Shimodo case the
Tokyo District Court,in responseto the argument thatal1meansto forcethe enemy
to surrender are good, said:
'...if is wrontosay that thedininction berweenrnilitaryobjectiveand non-miliraryobjectivehas
goneout of exinence becauseof totalwa.207
(D) The relevant niles of international law prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons
apply to al1States
3.90 The mlesof thelawof armed conflictand thelawgoverningfnendly relationswhich
prohibitthe use of nuclear weaponsare, notably,thosewhichestablish:
thelimitationon the choiceof meansofattackingthe enemy(supraparas. 3.47-
3.80);
thepermanentobligationtodistinguishbetweencombatantsand non-combatants
(supra paras. 3.47, 3.59, 3.80);
theprohibition againstattacking civiliantargets(supraparas. 3.47-3.48, 3.80);
theprohibitionagainst attackinghealth services(suprapara. 3.62);
* Id.
s" Hamburg. 19 Daiember 1949. 16ILR 512; seealso finrr~ert(Pari 2), 1oc.cir. p.38 0.97.
xa US.Mil.Trib.. Nuremberg. 19thFebniary 1948, List, eral., Triok of War CriminalsBrhcre
NurembergMilitary Triburinkui. hy Sprecher and Friul. Washington, G.P.O .951-1953,
IX, p.1272; alw.id., Nuremberg.30th lune 1948. Krupp. ILR 15 p.628. it follom implicitlyfrom thetextof thewnvcntions thatlheydo notadmit the pmsibiliiyof invoking
miütarynccessiryas a justification for State conduct not inconwiththe obiigationsthey
impose.m
The jurisprudence of course takes the sameapproach. Thus, in VanLewinski (da
Von Manstein) case:
'Once theusagesof.w bave.arsumed thstaaisof lam. they sannot beovemdden by wcssity.
excepiin the specialcases wherc tlawirvlf makesprovisicn ftbafe~enluality."~
The rule is absolute:
"[...the rules of internationallawbefollowedcvenif it resulu in the los of a bauie or even
a war. Expediencyor necessitycanot warranttheir violaI...)20s
The nile applies equally in relation tonuclear weapons.= In the Shimod caase the
Tokyo District Court,in response to the argument thatal1means to forcethe enemy
to surrender are good,said:
Il...it is wontosay that the distinction betweenrnilitaryandenon-mililaryobjectivebac
ii201
goneoui of exinence becauseof totwar .
The relevant rules of international law prohibitinp the use of nuclear weapons
(Dl
apply to al1States
3.90 The rulesof the lawof armed conflictandthe lawgovemingfnendly relationswhich
prohibit the use of nuclear weaponsare, notably,those whichestablish:
the limitationon the choiceof meansof attackingthe enemy (supra paras. 3.47-
3.80).~
thepermanent obligationto distinguishbetweencombatantsand non-cornbatants
(supraparas. 3.47, 3.59, 3.80);
the prohibitionagainstattacking civiliantargets (supra paras. 3.47-3.48, 3.80);
the prohibitionagainst attackinghealthservices (supra para. 3.62);
'O, Id.
=
Hamburg, 19 Decernber 1949. 16 ILR 512;sep.alsoLmneri (Pari 2). loccir. p.38 n.97.
US.Mil.Trib.. Nuremberg. 19thFcbniary 1948. List. eral., Triak of CriminaLsMore the
NurembergMilirary Tribunak. 4. hySprccher and Friul. Washington, USG.P.O. 1951-1953,
IX. p.1272; also. idIrjuremherg. 30th June 1948. Krupp. ILR 15p.628. States, thoseStateswhichbelieve thatthe use ofnuclear weaponsis legai?
3.92 Theopposition ofcertainStates toa formalexpressionof the illegalityof theuse of
nuclearweapons kt occurredduringthenegotiationand adoptionof theUN General
Assemblyresolutionscondemningtheir use,andwntinued duringthe negotiationsof
Geneva Protocol 1.It is accordi--lvb- referenceto their activitiesin those wntexts
thatone mustjudge whethertheseStateshavebeenableto establish,for themselves,
special mles relating to the use of nuclear weapons,i.e. rules excluding the
applicationof thegened obligationsof the law of armed conflict.
During theadoptionof the UN Gened Assemblyremlutions condemning theuseof
nuclear weapons (suprapm. 3.36), a certain numberof States had voted against
these resolutionsor they abstained. To the extent that these resolutionsrepresent
positive law, abstentions are not to be considered as a negative vote. Since
internationallaw prohibits theuse of nuclearweapons,this law certainlyappliesto
States whoalwaysabstaindunng the affirmationof this rule of law. To preventthe
applicationof thisrule by creatinganother, its expressionmust be clearly statean
abstentiondoes notprovide a clearexpressionin thesetems, and is insufficient to
allowa newrule toemerge fortheabstainingStates.Moreover,even ifan abstention
were to be considered as equivalentto a negativevote the act of abstentionwouid
not, as set out below, create a newrule.
3.93 Tojustify the modificationof thelaw prohibitingtheuse of nuclearweapons,States
favouringa modificationof a pre-existingrule prohibitingtheir use are likely to
invokethefact that dissuasion through nucleaprowerhasbeenaroundfor fifty yean
without it being roundly condemnedby the entire international community. The
questionreferredtotheCoun relatesto thelegalityofthe use ofnuclearweaponsand
thmtened use. However, itis importantto point outthat the general approach to
dissuasionpractisedby a smallnumberof Statesdoesnot constitutethethreatof use
of forceandthat accordinglythepracticeof dissuasiondoes not bear onewayor the
otheron thelegaiityof the useor threatof use of nuclear weapons.
3.94 This practice of dissuasion cannot therefore modify the pre-existing rules of
internationallaw whichprohibit the useof nuclear weapons.Even as between the
proponentsof this practiceand other States,the use of nuclear weapons remains
illegal.Thisreasoningappliesalsoin respectofStateswhichvote againstUN General
Assemblyresolutionscondemningtheir use: opponenü of these resolutionscannot
imposetheirwill onStateswhosupportthern,sincetheseStatesare re-statingexisting
law. Al1Statestherefore remain linkedby commonlegal obligations:if not by the
resolutionsthemselves,thenthroughthelawtheyenunciateaccordingtotheprinciple
pnor in lemporcpolior injus. To recall,Art. 41 the 1969ViennaConventionon the
Lawof Treaties states that:
"1.Two or more ofthe pa1a inulrilatcraltreaiyinayconcludea afreeinentto modiFytheme*
as betweenthemselvesalnnii: (a) thepossibiiityof aumodificationis providedbythemay; or
(b) the modificationin quenionis notprohibitedhy and:ueaty
(i) does naffecthe enjoymentby the oiberpanies of tbeirrighü undtnaty or the
pcrformauceof theirobligations:
(ii) does not retoa provision,derogationfrom which is incompdb1e with the effective
executionof the objectandpurofthetreas% a wboleI...](ernphaàsadded)
In ,~s case,Statestowhich this rule applies, and who wouldlike tomodify it,can
do sounder certain circumstances,but thi new agreement - supposingit applies,
quod non to nuclear weapons (see below) - applies only totheseStates and not to
others (se Art. 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention). Theprinciple of the relative
effecl of treaties appliesequallyto other forms of international legal obligatign,
includingcustornaryobligationsand thosearisingby operationof generaiprinciples.
3.95 If theStateswhichargue in favourof the legaiityof the use of nuclear weaponscan
thusrakeadvantageof a nile whichwould link themonlyin their relations as between
themselves,it is still necessarythat such an agreement should satisfy the obligation
reflectedin Art.41 of the 1969ViennaConvention,and notablyto those conditions
providing that the modification,by these States, of treatiesnormally applicable to
nuclearweaponsdoes not compromise:
(i) either the object or purpose of these treaties taken as a whole (Vienna
Convention, Art 4l(l)(b)(ii);
(ii) or the particular rights and obligations that other States parties to these
treaties may rely upon or are subject to (1969 Vienna Convention, Art
41(l)(b)(i)).
3.96 It is doubtful whether the use of nuclear weapons could be compatible with the
effectiverealisationof theobjectandpurposeoftreatieswithhumanitarianobjectives,
sincetheir objectand purpose is:
in general, to reduce the suffenng of people exposed tothe direct or indirect
effectsof wars and to protect the victimsof such conflicts;
more specifically,to fulfil theparticularobjectivesidentifiedabo(supra para.
3.90).
It has ben seen that the use of nuclear weaponsnot onlyincreases the suffering of
victims, but necessarily contravenes the provisions of numerous treaties.
Consequently,any agreement which they mighthave made wouldnecessarily be
contrary to the object and purpose of the above-mentionedinstruments even as
concems relations between States advocating the legality of the use of nuclear
weapons. Afom'ori, thisistheonly properconclusionwhich canbe drawn forlegal obligations
whichare baseduponthe protectionof victimsand notthe interestsof States,and are
beyond the scop ef the applicationof the pnnciple of reciprocity.
3.97 In the event that applicable treaties- those whose provisions have the effect of
renderingiiiegaltheuse of nuclearweapons - establishlawswhichal1State parties
must respect, it is inconceivablethat contractingparties shouldbe able to conclude
an agreement on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons without ipso faco
violatingthe rightswhich othercontractingparties have under those treaties (1969
Vienna Convention, Art 41(. ..~(~...In the event of a large-scale use of nuclear
weapons al1 ~tatk would, directly or indirectly, be subject to the damaging
consequences (by uncontrollableradiation,contaminationandpollution).Accordingly ,
their &joymentof their conventionalrights wouldbe affectedand violated.
3.98 Finaily, giventhattheapplicabletreatiesestablishhumanitarianruleswhichbyvirtue
of their importanceare part ofjus ~ogens,~~ any agreementcontrarj to thesedes
are necessarilynul1and void by virtue of Art. 53 of the 1969ViennaConvention.
3.99 The questionremainswhether theeffortsby certain Statesduringtheelabontion and
adoption of 1977Geneva Protocol 1 to "set apart" nuclear weapons byadopting
declarations (supra,paras. 3.28 erseq.) precludestheapplicationof that instrument
to nuclear weaponsin respect of treaty relations as between those States, and as
between themselvesand third StatesParties to the Protocol.Severalreasons lead to
theconclusionthatProtocol 1doesgovemtheuseby thoseStatesofnuclear weapons.
(1) Accordingto theway in which they have been charactensedby their drafters,
they are only "declarations";srricrosensu they are not reservations withinthe
meaningof Article2 of the 1969ViennaConventionon the Lawof Treaties,zi3
and accordinglyother Parties do not have to enter objectionsto them since
according to Article 2(d) only reservationscan have the effect of modifying
obligationsundera treaty. These "declarations"therefore haveno legal effects
as againstthirdStates.
(2) Supposing, however,that these "declarations" did amountto reservations,they
would still only be effectiveand admissibleif they were compatiblewith the
object and purpose of the Protocol (1969 Vienna Convention, Art. 19(c)).
"'
Id., 1980, Vol.2. 2nd part.pp&449: sa alsBnrcelonoTrornnio5rt,hFebruary1970ICI
Rep. 1970,p.32:Principcrop ci,pp. 85-93.
211
.Art.Z(d):"rcsewations' meanunilateralstaiernent.howevrrphrdor named. madebya
Star. whensigning.ratifying.acccpting.approvingor accedingtoa treaty,wherebyit purports
to excludortomodiQ the lepacffect of cenainprovisionsof thetreatyin theirapptocation
thal Sute". Moreover, as previously noted, nuclear weapons haveeffefts on human health
and the environment which are wntrary to the classical rules of international
humanitarianlaw. Their use would negatethe entire ProtocolsinΠany use of
nuclear weapons would aiiow a Part yo circumventits obligationsunder the
Protocol with respect townflict.In other words, it would notjustbe "certain
provisions" ofthe Protocolwhich would ceas toapply, but the totalityof that
inmument. It is doubtfulwhethersuch an approachwuld becompatiblewith the
object andpurpose of the Protocol.
(3) Having regard to the extraordinaryeffefts of nuclearweapons, sayingthat it is
possibleto be a Pany to Protocol 1while rese~ng to oneself the right tuse
nuclear weapons nullifies the objective of the Protocol. It essentiallyailows a
Stateto unilateraüydecidewhetherit willapply theProtocol. Sucha conditional
applicationis entirely withoutvaiidiin internationallaw sinŒit wouldaiiow
a Stateto disengageitselffroma treatyobligation whenever t ished,andavoid
ifsobligationtocary out its treatobligationsingood faith (see 1969Vienna
Convention, An. 26).
(4) If the "declarations"doarnountIOreservations,the fact that otherParties to the
Protocol have not objectedto them could imply that they have accepted.these
reservations(1969 ViennaConvention,Art. 20(5))and their compatibiiitywith
the objectand purposeof the Protocol.The silenceof the Partiesto the Protocol
doesnot implyacceptanceof these reservations, however,in the wntext of the
annual support given by these States to the General Assembly resolutions
declarinp.the illegalityof nuclear weapon(suprupara. 3.36).
(5) Maintaining the hypothesis that these "declarations" were reservations, they
wouldpermittheir authorsto usenuclearweapons withoutviolatingthe Protocol.
However,theuse of theseweaponsnecessarilyviolatesthe rulesof inteiational
humanitarianlaw, whichhavebeen recognisedby thewhole of the international
wmmunity as irnperative.The reservationswouId,in effect, be void of content
or effect (Vienna Convention,Art.53).
3.100 Some may suggest that the relevant rules of internationallaw are not jus cogem
becausesome Statesclaim that certainuses of nuclear weaponsmightbe lawful and
thatconsequentlyany illegaliper se of theuseof nuclearweaponsundertheserules
is not accepted.bythe whole of theinternationalcommunityof States.This seemsto
be an inverted formof reasoning:ifal1Stateshaveacceptedthe imperativecharacter
of a rule, it is notpossiblefora handfulof States,actingsubsequently,to saythatthe
rule is not irnperativebecausethe requiredquasi-unanimityis no longer evidasta
result of their lack of support. It is at the moment of adoption and of the
characterisationof the rule thaitis necessary to determine whether the requisite
quasi-unanimityof views is apparent. O Conclusions
3.101 In summary, it has been shown in this Section thatthe use of nuclear weapons is
subjecttointernationallaw. It doesnot foilowthatjust becausenuclear weaponshave
differentcharacteristicsfrom othetype sf weaponsthat internationallaw does not
applytothem:practice (icluding thatof thenuclearpowzrStates),jurisprudenceand
thewritingsofjurists areclear on this poin(supraparas. 3.14-3.21).
3.102 The 1977 Genwa Protocol1appliesto the use of nuclear weaponsevenif it doesnot
expressiysay so.The silenceof theProtocolabout nuclearweaponsproves nothing,
sincethe Protml is silentabout otherformsof weapons.Their useis noless subject
to thegeneralmles of behaviourwhich are requiredby the Protocol.Afom.ori, the
specific prohibitioin the 1977Protocols against attacking nuclearpower plants
reflects the greatconcem of States about the release inm the environment.of
radioactivematerial and supports the view that Protml 1 does apply to nuclear
weapons. As tothe expressed desire of certain Sratesnot to apply Protocol 1 to
nuclear weapons, it wmes up against the suongly opposing views of the great
majorityofother States;practiceconsecutivetotheadoptionofthe Protocolconfirms
thattherewas noagreementthattheProtocoldidnotapply tonuclearweapons (supro
paras 3.22-3.35).
If theclassicalinstrumentsgovemingthelaw ofarmedconflictdo notexpressly
address nuclear weapons, the General Assemblyof the UnitedNations has
adopteda large numberof resolutionssolemnlycondemning theuseof nuclear
weaponsin any circumstances. These resolutionsdo not createnewlaw, seeking
only to rd1 that the use of nuclear weaponsis governedby pre-existingrules
(supra paras. 3.36-3.42).
3.103 Itis the devastatingeffectsof nuclear weaponswhichcondemnstheiruse:theirpower
lads ineluctablyto the death of manypeople withina certain radius;with strategic
weaponsthe effect persistsaithoughit diminishesin scale. In any event, the useof
eventhe smailestnuclearweaponhasthe potentialto unleasha full-scalenuclear war
withincalculable consequences;venthe useofa strategic nuclearweaponwouldlead.
to greater losses amongst civilians than military personnel. By reason of .these
quantitative effectsaione, the use of nuclear weaponsviolatesthe rules prohibiting
theinfliction ofcessarydeathforadversaries,ofcausingindiscriminateeffects, and
enwuraging the generalniles of internationalhumanitarianlaw(supra paras. 3.43-
3.63).
The qualitative effectsof nuclearweapons,characterisedby the initial nuclear
radiationand nuclearailoutandthe consequencesoftheseeffects,bringsnuclear
weapons withinthescopeof mles prohibitingtheuseof poisonousand chemical
weapons. Since these effecü become cumulativelygreater with the power of
nuclear weapons,they lead toa greater certaintyoflcillingtheir victims,thereby
violating the prohibitionagainst the use of weapons which render death inevitable.Healthand mue senices havingbeendes.. . alor badly damaged,
theuseof nuclearweaponsviolatestheimmunityof medical corps andthe rights
of victims tohaveaccesstomedicalassistance. Moreover, sine these effens
rnay affect people ouhde the scopeof the conflict, bath in time and
gwgraphically, thew of nuclearweaponsviolatesthe prohibitionon the useof
weapons whichcause unnecessarysuffering, cause hm tocivilians, and have
indiscriminate effects. The principles of proportionality and humaniare
obviously violated. And nuclear weapons are incapable of respecting the
obligationnot tocauswidespreads ,evereand long-termdamage tothe natural
envifonment,or violatingthe rights of third Statesunder the lawsof neutrality
or general internationall(supraparas.3.64-3.77).
These violations are independent of the wntext in which they occur -
internationalor non-internationalarmedconf-iand they cannobejustified'by
reason of argumentsrelatingto tegitimatedefence, reprisals or stateof necessity
sincethe iaw ofmed wnfiict is independentof the jus contrabellwn, which
prohibits reprisals, excluany possibility of recipmity, and alreadytaka
accountof the stateof necessi(supraparas.3.78-3.87).
3.104 The rules identified above are reflected in customary law and treatiesbindal1
States, including those proponentsof the legality of the use of nuclear weapons.
These States have not even managed to createintersr different normthan those
whichtheyare boundto respectintheirrelationswiththird States. Suchnorms would
be incompatiblewith thebjectandpurposeof the generalrules applicableto nuclear
weapons andwould violate the rights of third States and of victiIn anyevent,
since theserules rnaybe consideredto bjur coyns, any agreementin violation of
therw nouldbe ips o actowithouteffect (suproparas. 3.88-3.98) SECTIONB
The useof nuclearweaponsviolatesapplicablerulesof international
law for the protection of human health, the environmentand
fundamental humanrights
(A) The use of nuclear weapons is subject to internationaiaw for the protection of
human health and the environment and fundamental human rights
4.1
The use of nuclearweaponsmust also beconsideredby referenceto thoserules of
internationallawwhichdo notrelatedirectlytoarmedconflict. Asset outin Section
A, the use of nuclear weapons can cause damage to human health and .the
environment intheterritoryof the Statewhichusesa nuclearweapon,the targetState
orterritory, thirdwuntries, and otareas beyondnationaljurisdiction. Ican also
violate fundamentalhumanrights, includingin particular the nght to life.
4.2 The pemicious effects of radiation on human heaith and the environment were
graphicallyillustratedby theaccidentwhichoccurredat the Chemobyl nuclearpower
plant on 26 Apnl 1986. The accident made clear that radiationdoes not respect
national boundaries,that it can be carried for thousands of kilometres, and that
wherever it is depositedit willcausehm to humanheaithand theenvironment,with
consequentialadverseeffects on agriculture,tourismand otherindustrialctivities.
For a small island State, the consequences of any such exposure would be
catastrophic.
On 27 April 1986, Sweden, and then Denmark, Finland and Poland, detected
significant increases in radioactivity le~els.~" lncreased radiation levels were
subsequentiyobsewed, inrcralin,inAustria,GermanDemocraticRepublic,Hungary,
Itaiy, Nonvay, Yugoslavia (29April); Federal Republicof Germany, Switzerland,
Turkey (30Apnl); France(1 May);Belgium,Greece, Netherlands,UnitedKingdom
(2 May); and lceland(7 May). Low-ievelincreases were also detectedin Japanand
the United States.Significantincreasesof particular dangerto human health were
observed in the levelsof Iodine-131, Caesium-134and Caesium-137immediately
after thea~ident.'~' The scaleof thedisasterbecameclearer whenthe worldlearnt
thatin the36 hoursafter the accidentmorethan 100,000peoplehad ben evacuated
from a radiusof some20 milesaround the reactor. The fulleffectsof the accident
:ci SeeSalo. 'Information Exchanzc After ChernJAEA"Bullefiri.No. 3, p.18 see86);
genenlly. Sands. ChernoLnw:alid Conrmuriicar: rarrrboundayNuckar Air Pollution
- 7heLqal Marcrials(1988).
"' SeeSummary Repon of 22 July 1986of the Working GrAssesmentof RadiatiDose
Cornmitmentin Europedue to the Chernohyl Accident,1.45Bulletin, No. 3, at p.27
(1986). on people, property and the environment are still difficulttoassess. In thUSSR
rhiq-one peoplediedas a directresuit withina fewweeksanda furtherthree during
1987 as a resuit of on-site expo~ure.~'~The United Kingdom National Radiation
ProtectionBoard hasestimated thaitn theEEC counrries1,000 people wiii die and
3,000 will con- non-fatalcancen because of the a~cident.'~' Man y States,as
well as theEEC, situatedthousandsof kilornetresfmm the accident, tookmeasures
torninimizethe effects, measuressometimescostly in themselves(as, for example,
theprotectivemedicationundertakenin Poland)but which alsocausedlossesto dauy
and agriculturalfarmen, fish and meat producersand the tourist industrie^.^"The
effectsin theFederal Republicof Germanywere describexi asfollows:
-The widesp~d radioactiveconramioof theair.mter andsoi1entaileddirecttospring
vegeiables;'milk-producinshadto be kept fromgrazing;the coiwmprion of mik andother
foodsluffshadtobesupewired;impm restricicamenccessary;thefixingniuintervention
levels ito a change in wnsumers' eating and buying habits; travel agencia and vanrpon
undenakingsspecialisinginEern EurbusinessIOStIheirclientele;andfindlyworkusonal
inagriculturelos their
4.3 The legality of the use of any nuclea. weapon is subject to those rules of
international law arising by operation of treaty, custom or act of international
organisation whichare intendedto protect human healthand the environmentfrom
pollution and to protect fundamentaihuman nghts. That body of rules is now
extensive.Moreover, theserules are of "essentialimportancefor thesafeguardingand
preservationof the humanenvironment"withinthe meaningof Article 19(3)(d)of the
ILC's draft Articles on StateResponsibility,the seriousbreach of which maygive
rise to the commission of an international Just as 'the laws of armed
conflicts prohibit "widespread, long-term and severe damage" to the naturai
environment (supra, paras. 3.78 and 3.79). so general internationallaw nowseeks
to protect the environmentand prevent damage to humanhealth. The fundamental
importance of mles protecting human health and the environment, and their'
interdependencewith the maintenanceof peaceand security,has ben recognisedby
al1States participating at the UN Conferenceon Environmentand Developmentin
June 1992. TheSecunty Council, meetingat thelevelof head ofgovernmentor head
of State, hasdeclared that "non-militarysourcesof instabilityin the ecologicalfield
116 TheFinartcial7Nner.5 Dzccrnher1987
211 See NRPB. A Prelirftinn- Asscssrofrhe ChrrtiohylR<!ar ccirloiron rhePopuhion of
rheEuropeanContniwrin.(1987).
2,s See?hcFinoticiol'lir11cJUIF1986. at p.36: 22 May 1987.atp.3; 15May 1986.aIhc.2;
Econonlisr,16 August 198aip.28.
=a 1980Ybk ILC.Vol. I(Pan 2). p. 30. IIhGcd ~ucmbly1SoiomLlindWrineOburvaiianr: Wn <Lw of Hum Hullh. Lirininmem.nd Hvmn Righu)
have bemme threatsto international peace andsecurity"."' Earlier, in April 1991,
theSecuntyCouncil had reaffirmed inresolution68711991that Iraq was "liableunder
internationallaw for any direct loss, damage,includingenvironmentaldamageand
the depl&ionof natura lesources.or injury toforeign[...] nationais"whichoccurred
as a result of its unlawfulinvasion and occupationof K~wait.~ The protection of
humanhealth andtheenvironmenthm damage,includingthatresultingfrom theuse
of nuclear weapons,is a fundamentalobjectiveof the internationallegal order as
refiec tetheserecent.developments.They serveto emphasisethecontext inwhich'
the legalityof theuse of nuclear weapons mua be judged.
4.4 Thepracticeof Statesreflectsthat thedual objectivesof human healthprotectionand
environmentalprotectionare interdependentand are treatedin an integratedmanner.
Interdependenceis evidentfrom Agenda 21 (whichrecognisesthe "interdependence
arnongthe factors of health, environment and development")," and frorn the Rio
Dedaration on Environment and Developmen( thinciple 21 of whichdeclares that
human beings "are entitied to a healthy and productive life in harmony with
na~ure")."~The interdependence of human health and environmental protection
objectives is alsoevidentfromthe provisionsofeues expresslyintendedm prevent
damageand adverseeffectsto human health andthe environment fromp~llution,~
other treaties having more general objective^,^^and from decisions of relevant
internationalbodie~.~
4.5 In the wntext of nuclear weaponsuse there is no basis for distinguishingbenveen
=I
Note by Prrsident of the S~urit). Council. 31 lanuary 1992, UN Doc. S113500,p.2 (1992).
,=
3 April 1991.
23 Agefrda21.Chapter 6, para. 6.39. (AICONF. 151126(1992)) ciring recent analysis by the World
Health Organisation.
AICONF. 151126(1992). Vol.1.
5 Convcntion on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. 13 Novemkr 1979LW18 1442
(1979) (1979LRTAP Convention) Art.Ka); UN Convention on theLaw of theSn. 10
Decembrr 1982. 21 iLM 1261 (1982); An. 1(4)(1982 UNCLOS); 1992 UN Fnmnvork
Convention Climte Chanp Convention. 9 May 1992, 31iLM 849 (1992) Art. l(1) (1992
Climale Change Convention).
-6
See e.g. EC Treaty. requiring Community environment policy to pume the objectiva of
'Preserving, protecting and improving the qualiiy of the environment' and 'pmtecting human
health': EC Traty. as arnendul hy the Treaty on Europw Union. Art. 130rl. OJ No C 191.
29.7.92, pp. 27-8.
"7 Sece.g. UN Human RighlsCommission declaration that the movementand dumptoriand
dangerous products endanger basic hurighls sucas 'the right to the highest standardof
health, includingits environmental aspects. 'Resolution 1990143.U.N. Doc. EICN.411990194at
104. 6 March 1990. human health protection and environmentd protection. The fundamental niles of
internationallaw whichare primarily intended to protect human healtalsobring
environmentalbenefitsandimposeenvironmentalobligations;rulesprimarilyintended
toprote chtehnment (oftendefinedasincludinghumanhealth, aswell asflora,
fauna,soil, air,water, climate,landsca aned historical monuments or physical
sauctures,and the interrelationshipamong these elemen~).~
4.6 The international wmmunity haslong recognised the inherent dangers posed by
radioactiveaterialfor humanhealth andthe environment, as reflectedin the large
body oftreaties whichseekto minimizethe nsks. Regionaland global instruments
have beenadopted to,inte ah:
- bannuclear testingin the atmosphere,oceanor otherspa~e;~~~
- protectworken and the publicfrom expos~re;~
- .limit theproliferationof nuclearweapons;"'
- regulatetransporin nuclearmaterial;z32
- regulateor bantransp ofntuclear wa~te;~'
- prohibitthe emplacementof nuclearweaponsin certain areas;= and
- createnuclear-fm zones (andprohibit the useof nuclear weapon~).~~
4.7 It is clear from these internationallegislativeefforts, asasethose citedinthe
pding sections, thatthe international community haacted to limit releases of
radioactive substances and to use al1 available methods to prevent any massive
increases which would cause damage to human health and the environment.
Accordingly,there can benodoubt that theuseof nuclearweaponsissubjectto these
Se+e.g. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessrneni in a Transhoundary Context, Espoo,
25February 1991, 30 ZLM802 (1An.)I(vii); Convention on the TranshEffe.of
iodustrial Accidents. Hzlsinki, 17 MarcILM91330(1992). An. l(2).
-O
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tesis in the Atmosphere. in Outer Spa<*:and Under Watcr,
5 Augusl 1963, 4UNTS43.
IL0 Convention (No. 115)Concerning the Protection of Workers against I22izing Radiation,
June 1960. 431 UNTS41.
Tmty on thNon-Pmliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 luly 1UhTS 161.
ZC
ConventionotheBan of lmpon into Africa and the Control of Tiansboundary Movermit and
Managemat of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, 29 January 1991. 30 ILM775 (1991).
33
Treaty for the Prohihition of Nuclcar Weapons in Latin America, and Aaridional Protocois 1
1I14February 1967, 6UNTS 326.
SouthPacific Nuclear Frce Zone Treaty. 6 Aupst 1985, 24 1.W 1142(1985).
Y
Conventionon the Physical Protection of Nuclear Malerial. 3RMa1419 (1980). relevant niles of internationallaw, whichaim to prevent any increasein the level of
ionisingradiationin the environment.
(B) The use of nuclear weaponr violates international law for the protection of
human heaith and the environment
4.8 This de arises from: (a) the obligationunder general international law for every
State torespect-.the sovereignty.andtemtoriai integnty of other States; @) the
obligation under general internationallaw of every Statenot to cause damage to
hurnan health or the environment outside its own territory;and (c) obligations
imposed under international law @articularly treaties, acts of international
organisations,and custorn)requiringStatesnot to causedamageto humanhealthand
the environment in its own tenitory, in the tenitory of other States, and in areas
beyond nationaljurisdiction.
4.9 Itis a well-establishedprincipleof intemationailawthat everyStatemust respectthe
territorial sovereignty andinviolabilityof every other Smte. This is reflected in
numerous judicial decisions and arbitral awards, as well as treaties and other
international acts.An early exarnpleis the Award of Max Huber in the Island of
Palmas Case, whichholds thar:
"Territorialsovereig..involvesthe exclusive rightto displaythe activiti'Thisrightate.
basas corollarya dury:the obligationio protectwirhinthe territorythe rigStatesinher
paniculartheirnghIOintegrityandinviolabilityin peacewar.togetherwith the riwhich
cachStatemay claimfoilsnationalsin foreifn territory.
4.10 TheInternational Counitselfhasrecognisedtheprincipleof "everyState'sobligation
notto allowknowinglyits territoryto be usedfor actscontraryto the rights of other
State~".~' This principleappliesto any activitycarried out or authorisedby a State,
includingafonion the use of a nuclear weapon,and is applicableequaily in times
of war or other armed confiict.
4.11 Theobiigationto respectthe sovereigntyandterritoryof otherStatesis a fundamental
pnnciple of internationallaw. It is embodiedin theprinciple ofgood-neighbourliness
as set forth in Article74 of the United NationsCharter. Thisprovision reflects the
agreement of the members of the international community that their policy and
activitiesintheirownmetropolitanareas musttakeaccountof "theinterests and well-
beingof the rest of the world, in social, economicand commercialmatters."
36
PermanentCoun of Arbitrati(Ncrhcrlativ.US). 2R.I.A.A. 829, 839.
Zi? Co& Channelcax (UK v.Albaxia), Judgemrnto9 Apri! 1949ICI Rcp. 1949pp. 4,22.4.12 Theobligationto respect sovereigntyandterritory is clearlyapplicabletoradioactive
conramination. Any increase of levels of radiationin the temtory of a Stateor of an
area beyond nationaljurisdiction resulting from any activity of a State violatesthis
principleof internationallaw. The principle was cited by Austraiiaand New Zealand
in the Nuclear Test Csases brought by them against France." Austdia claimed
that the carrying out of amosphenc nuclear tesu by France was in violation of
Ausoalia'srights on tJuee wunts: Austmlia'ssovereigntyover its tenitory; the right
of Auda that nuclear tests should not be wnducted in the atmosphere and, in
particular, not in such a way as to lead to mdioacti~e failsut upon Austraiian
territory; and the rights of Australiato the unreshicted use,at al1times, of the high
seas and superjarnt air-space for navigation, fishery and other purposes, free of
physicalinterferenceand risk of radiationp~llution.~ When asked by thePresident
of the International Court of Justice, Sir Humphrey Waldock, whether it took the
viewthat 'every transmission bynatural causesof chemid or other matter hm one
stateinto another state'stenitory, air spaceor territorial seaautomaticaiiy creat ed
legalcause of action in international lawwithout the need to establish anything
more?', Austraiiaresponded, inrerdia, that:
"whcn, asa mit ofa oormal and nanid use by one mte of iu temtory. a deposit occurs in me
remtory of anotber. the lanenocause of complaint unlesuffen more than merenomioal
harm or damage.The use bya sÿuc of iu tenitory for the conduct of atmosphcrtestsisear
nos a formai or natural use of iu terriThe Australian Governinent also contends that the
radioactive deposit from the French tests fives rise to inore than merely noininal hann or damage to
AuNalia.
...
By way of elabontin...the basic pnnciisrhat intrusion of any sort into forcign anmtory is
infinfernenof sovereigntyNcedless to Say. the Govcrnment of Australia doesnot deny that tbe
practice of srales has modifird the application of this princi(ile in respect of the interdependence of
temtories.lthas already referred to the instance of sinoke drifiinf across natioItl boundaries.
concedes that there may be no illefality in respect of cemin types of chcinical fumes in the absence
of special types of harm. ildoes empharise is that the lefality thus sanctioncd by the practice
of States is the outcome of the toleration extended to ceruin activities which produce thew emissions,
which activities are fenerally refarded as natural uses of territory in modern industrial society and
are tohratedbecause. while perhaps producinf soinconvenience. they have a community
be~efit."~~~
4.13 lncreased levels of radiation in the environment from any source, includingthe use
of nuclear weapons, is not and cannotbe tolerated by State practice. The preamble
tothe 1963 TreatyBanningNuclearWeaponTests in theAtmosphere,in OuterSpace
n8 Se Nuciear Test(Australia v. France). lnterirn Protection, Junr1973.IURcp. 1973.
p.99; NuclcoTests(New Zralandv.France). lntenrn Protection. O22eJune 1973.IURcp.
1973, p.135.
30
NuclcarTas Case. (Australiv.FranceP)lwdings. Vol. 1p.5U.
Id..525-26. and Under Water affirms the desire "to put an end to the contaminationof man's
environmentbyradioactive substances",and theTreaty requires each party
"toprohibit,to prevcand not toe~y out anynuclar wcapon leaexplosion. or snyo<her
mclear explasionatanyplaceunderitsjurisdictionorcnnuol:
(a) in theatmosphere;beyondits limia. inouterspace;or underwater.includingtemtorial
watersorhighseasor
@) inany otberenvironnentif nich explosioncasadioactivedebristo bepnscnt outbede
temtorial liaisof ibeSfatC under whose juridiction or conwl such explosiois
conduc~ed."~~'
The useof nuclearweaponscannotinany circumstancesbe considereda "natural use
of tenitory in modem industrialsociety". And the useof nuclearweapons cannot in
any Ncumstances be considered to provide a conmunity benefit at "some
inconvenience".In this regard, the communitymust include any third Stat neot
involved in a conflict which rnay suffer in humanheaith or environmentalterrns,
ditly or inditly, the consequencesof radioactive contamination.
4.14 Moreover, everyState is furtherrestrainedin theactivitieswhichit maycarro yutor
permitby virtueof the prohibitionon the abuseby a State of a nght it enjoysunder
internationallaw. Such anabuse willoccur whena Stateavaiis itselfof its rights in
an arbitrary marinerin sucha way as to inflict uponanother State an injury which
cannot be justified by a legitimate considerationof its own ad~antage.~~A ~ny use
of a nuclearweapon,whetheror not it had consequencesin a third Stateor in areas
beyondnationaljurisdiction, wouidconstitute an abuseof right.
4.15 The useof nuclearweaponsby a Statein war or other armed conflictis subjectto the
general obligation under international law to respect temtorial sovereignty.
Accordingly, any use of a nuclear weapon, altematively any use which had
consequences ina third Stateor in areas beyond nationaljurisdiction, wouldviolate
the generalobligation.
Ib) The general obli~atibn ofeach Srarenor ro cause damage ro humanhcalrh or the
environmcnrauside irs rerriroryor orhcrareas subjccrro irsjurisdicrionor conrrol
4.16 Flowing directlyfrorn the fundamend pnmary obligationdescnbed in paragraphs
4.9-4.12 is the obligationof every Statenot to causedamageto humanheaithor the
environment outsideits nationaltemtory. The generalobligationunderinternational
Y,
An. 1(1),
212 R.JenningandA. Watts(uls. ).ppcrihri'It~rcrti<irilnw(9thul..1992). Vol. 1.p. 407;
seealso 1982UNCLOS. An. 300. law toavoid transboundaryinjury to human heaith and the environmentis reflected
in theawardof the ArbitralTribunal in the TrnilSmelrer arbihation, whichheld that:
"Under the principles of intcrnaxiawd...no cra~h~asthe n@i touseor permit the useofits
temtory in sucb a manneras rncause injury by fuma in or ro Qe temlory of another of rhe
properriesor persocrstherein, whencauis of wrious consrquençandthe injurisestablishcd
by clearand convincingevidenee.43
4.17 The formulationof this obligationis now codified in hinciple 21 of the Stockholm
Declarationand Pnnciple 2 of the RioDechation, bothof whichprovide, in relevant
part hat:
"Srareshave, in accordancewiththe ChartetbeUnitedNaUom and meprinciplesof internacionai
law. the..responsibilitIOensure thai activitics Wthin their jurisdiction or notVcqu~
damage t1 244 environment of othcr Sfatcs or of anas beyond the limilsof nationai
jurisdictio.
In this regard, the use of the word "control" indicatesthat theobligation extends to
activitiescmied out by Statesthrough, for example,subrnarines,vesselsor aircraft
which mightlaunch a nuclearweaponfrom an area beyondits nationaljurisdiction.
4.18 This formulationhasbeenacceptedby al1Statesand reflectsa ruleof customarylaw.
The rule setforth in Pnnciple 21 has ben descnbed by the UN General Assembly
as oneof the'basicrules'govemingthe intemationairesponsibilityof statesin regard
to protection of hurnan health and the en~ironment.~~I 't has ben endorsed or
incorporated in its entirety into the Preamble of many treatie~;'~~described as
having the status of a "generally accepted principle of intemational la^";^^'
reaffirmed on numerous occasions in international soft la^.^" Most recently,
- - - --- --
"' UnitedSratesv.Co~iadn, 3RIAA p. 1907(1911); citinf Eagleion. Rcrpo~uibiofSrder. 1928,
p.80.
2.d
11 ILM 1416 (1972); 31 ILM 851 (1992).
"' UN General Assemhly remlution 2996 (1972). 27 UN GAOR (Supp. NO.30) 42.
Scee.g. Convention for the Prcvention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastcs and 0th-
Mancr. 29 Decernkr 1972. 1046 UATS120; 1979 LRTAP Convention: 1985 Convmtion for
theProieciion of the Ozone Layer, 2ILM 1529 (1987); 1992 Climate Change Convmtion.
2.7
1985 Association for South East Asian Nations Apramen03 the Conservation of Naturand
Natural Resources, An. 20.
See e.g. Chaner of Economic Rizhts and Dulies of Stalu. An. 30. UN Gmenl Assembly
rewlution 3281 (XXIX). 12 Decernkr 1974. mkUN 1974 at 402; Final Act, Confemce on
Securiiy and Cooperation in Europe. Helsinki. 1 August 1975('eactheparticipahg States.
inaccordancewiih the principles of international law.10rnsuir. ina spiritof wprrtion,
thatactivitirs camd out oiü remtory do not cause degradation of the environment inanok Principle 21 was fully incorporateri as Article 3 of the 1992 Biodiversity
C~nvention.~'The substantiverule set forth in Principle 21 has been endoned in
a numberof other treaties applicableto particular reg ion^.^ Article 194(2)of the
1982 UNCLOS, which enters into force later this year, and in any case reflects
customary law, establishes a similar obligation specificailyto protect the marine
environment.
4.19 Principle 21 has ben cited with apparent approval by at least one judge of the
International Cou#' and is considered by many jurists to reflect a customary
obligati~n.~~Specifically in relationto ionizingradiation, UN General Assembly
resolution 1629(XVi), adoptedin 1961,declaresthat:
The fundamental principles of international law impose a responsihilityon al1 siates connrning
actions whichmighthaveharmful biologicaiconsequencesfor the existingand haire gencrationof
peoplesof othertates,by increasingthe levelsof radioactivefallo~t.~'
SW or in areaslyingbeyond thelimits of nationaljuriuliction'in 1.BrounlDoaunuure
on Human Righrs (3rd. ed.1992). p.417).
" 5 June1992. 31 ILM 822 (1992); the Conventionwas signal by mon than 150 Statesai
UNCED. and entered into force on 29 Dwemher 1993. It now hasmon thafiftyParties.
= See e.g. Treaty for Amazonian Co-Operation. 3July 1978ILM71045 (1978).Art.IV ('the
exclusive use andtilization of naniral resources within their respective teatrightis
inherent in the soverrignty of each state and that the exercise of this right s10ll no1be-abject
any restrictions other than those arisinf fmm International Law'); 1981 Conventionfor tbe
Protection of the Marine Environment and CoastalAr- of the South-East Pacific. 12 November
1981.IElMT 981:85; Art. 3(5) (activities mus: beconductd so that 'thcausedamage
by pollution to ohen orIOtheir environment. and that pollution arising from incidents or
activities under theirjuridiction or control dozs not. as fasprearbeyond theares
where [they] exercist sovereignty andjurisdiction'); 1982UNCLOS. Art. 193 ('States have the
sovereign right to exploit their naniml rrsources punuant to their environmental policies and in
accordanw cicbtheir duty to proirct and presme the manne environment').
SeeJudge de Castro. dissenting. iNuclcarTerr cau.(Ausrralii:France), 1914ICIRcp.
pp. 253, 389: 'If itis admittd as a general rule that then: is a right to demand prohibition of tbe
emission by neighbouring properties of noxious fumes. the conqmus: bedrawn, hyan
obvious analogy, chatthe Applicant is entitld Io askthe Court to uphold ils claim that France
should put an end to the deposit of radio-active fall-oul on its temtory'.
SeeILA. Repon of the Cornmitte on Legal Aspects of the Environment, 60rh Conference
Repon. p. 157 at 163L. Goldie. 'A General View of International Environmental-LAw
Surveyof Capabilities. Trends and Limits', in CoLnoHaye. pp. 66-9 (1973); A.C. Kiss,
'La lutte contre la pollution de lleplan international". ColloquHaye, pp. 169-174
(1973).
United Nations General Assemhly resolution 1629(XVI) (1961)UN1GAOR(1043 Ple-
Meeting) at 50507. UN Doc. AIPV.1043 (1961).4.20 In using a nuclear weaponin waror other armedwnflict, a State is subject tothe
specific obligation under intemational lto ensure that no damage is causedto
human health or the environment of other States,or to human health and the
environmentin areasbeyondthe limitof nationaljurisdiction. Accordingly,any use
of a nuclear weapon,altemativelyany use which hasconsequencesin a th?d State
orin area s eyondnationaljurisdiction, would violate this general and fundamental
obligationof internationallaw.
4.21 The primaryandgeneralobligationsdescribedin paragwphs4.9 and 4.17 have been
furtherelaboratedinto specificand detailed noms.These toowould be violatedby
any use of nuclearweapons. They are developedby Statesthrough the adoptionof
a large numberoftreatiesand otheactsestablishingmore specificobjectivesfor the
protectionof humanhealthand theenvironment,includinginparticulartheprotection
of airquality, freshwater resources, oceans anseas,biodivenity, and historical
monumentsor physicalstructuresof significantculturalvalue.
4.22 A great numberof treatiesand multilateralacts at the globaland regional level have
been adopted to protecthuman health and the environment. They have received
widespread supportfrom States, and many now also reflect niles of custornaryhw
establishingspecificobligauonstoprotect humanhealth andtheenvironment,and to
prevent significant damage thereto. In many instances these mles establish
international obligationswhich are undoubtedly of "essential importance for the
safeguardingand prese~ation ofthe human en~ironment".'~
4.23 Humanexposureto ionizingradiationalways causessomedamageto human health,
the protection of which is envisagedby many international agreementsand those
treaty and custornaryobligationswhichestablish specificobligations.The Preamble
to theWHO Constitutionprovides that "the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of health is one of the fundamentalnghts of everhuman being without
distinctionorace,religion,politicalbelief, economicor socialcondition".WHO
Constitutioncommitsal1membersto achieving the objectivesof the Organization,
including "the anainment by al1 peoples of the highest possible level of heaith"
(Article 1) and the improvementof "environmental hygiene"(Article 2(i)). To that
end, the WorldHealth Assemblyadopted International.HealthRegulations in1969.
The Organizauonha alsoendorsedthe 1990Recommendationsestablishing specific
levelsof protectionfromionizingradiation adoptedby theInternationalCommission
on RadiologicalProtection(ICRP), which establishannualeffectivedose quivalent
limits for mernbersof the public of 5 MsV (0.5 rem).u' Any increase above that
'Y Supr~.note 220.
Y
ICRP Publication(1991)TablcS-4 lirnit is deemed "unacceptable" on health grounds. The 1990 Recommendations
replace earlier ICRP Recommendation? which provided the basis for the 1982
Basic SafetyStandards forRadiationProtectionadoptedandpublishedjointly by the
LAEA, WHO, IL0 and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD." The
Standards,whoseobjectives inciudethe.provisionof "guidancefor the protectionof
man from undue risksof theharmfu elffectsof ionizingradiation", seta limit forthe
annual effectivedose quivalent for membersof the publicof 5 MsV (0.5 rem).2."
Thesame.levelofprotection,.reflectingthe earlier ICRP recommendations,isapplied
in mandatoryform under the law of the European Uni~n.~
4.24 Internationallaw requires States to prevent damage to air quality from pollution,
includiig that resulting from the use of .nuclear weapons. Relevant international
obligations areset forth in, inrerdia, the 1979 LRTAP Conventionm the 1982
UNCLOS,26a 1ndvarious regionalmarineenvironmentprotectiontreaties, including
UNEP RegionalSeas Con~entions.~~ To the extentthat theuseof a nuclearweapon
causes darnage tothe ozonelayer andthe climatesystemviolationswouldalso occur
of the 1985 Convention for the Protection of the Owne Layer (and related
Protoc01)~~a ~nd the 1992 UN Climate Change Convention which commits al1
Parties to "protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations".2M
ICRP Publication No. 26.
Basic Standardsfor Radiation Protection. 1982 Edition. IAEA.
Id..paras.101and 418.
Directive84/467/Euntom. OJ No L 265.1.10.1984.
Supra, not72.5 seeArticle 2. mflecting the determinniion of the Parties 'Io protect manand
his environment againsl air polluandnto 'endzavour to limand. as faras possible,
gdually reducand prevent air pollution including long-range transbounùary air pollution'.
Supra. note 225: Anicle 212. rquirinp al1 States tlawsand replations10'prevmt,
reduce andcontrol pollution of the manne environment, from or Ihrough the atmospbere.
applicablIOthe air space under their soversignty and to vesxls flying thsir flag or vessels or
aircrafi of their registry'.
1974Conventionfor the Prevention of Mann* Pollution from hd-Sources. 4 June 1974.
13 ILM 352(1974). An. 3(c)(iv) (asamendzd); 1974Conventionon theProtection of tbe Marine
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area. î2 March 1974, 13 ILM546 (197Art.2(2); 1983
Pmtocol for theProtection of the South-EastPacific Against Pollutionfrom Land-Bawl Souras,
22 July 1983,IUT. 98354. An. Il(c).
22 March 1985,26 ILM1529(1987); Montrcal Protocol on Substancesthat Deplete tbe Ozone
Layer. 16 Septernber 1987.ILM 1540(1987).
Supm note 225: An. 3(1) UN CitimlAaemblylblomonkladWrhn ObPrvuioiRn:UB (bw ofHum Ha. EmimnmrnludHum Righü)
4.25 International lawrequires Statesto preventdamageto biodiversity (fiordand fauna)
frompollution,includingthatresultingfromthe useof nuclearweapons. International
iaw for theprotection of biodivenity is panicularly well-establishedat the regional
and global ievel. The Biodivenity Convention, which commiu Partiesto"promote
the urotection of ecosvstems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable
popuiations of species- in n&ural surr~undings",~~.s 'upplements other global
agreementswhich have receivedwidespread support. Of particular note is the 1971
&vention on Wetlands of international ~mÏ&tance, -€specially as Waterfowl
Habitat. Regional conservation agreements have been adopted for Afiica;= the
me ri cas;^'E^ast Afri~a;~ South East A~ia,~@ Europe, including the EC;"
the South Pacifi~;~~and the Ca~ibbean.~ Special protectionis provided for many
endangered species who would be destroyed by increases in radiation, including
migratory ~pecies.~
4.26 International law requires States tb prevent damage to frgshwater resources
(includingvitalgroundwaterresources)from pollution, includingthat resultingfrom
the use of nuclear weapons. Increased levels of ionizing radiation in freshwater
resources(rivers,lakes, groundwaters etc.is prohibitedby generalinternational law,
treaties and other internationaacts. Apart from the special regimes intended to
protect individualrivers and river systerns (e.g. the Rhine, Zambezi, River Plate),
1992 Bidiversity Convention. supra note 249. Article S(d)
African Convention on the Conservation of haturc and Natural Resources, Algiers, 15September
1968. 1001UNïX 4.
Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlik Prcsemation in the Western Hemisphere. 12
October 1940. 161 UhTS 193.
1985 NaimbiProtocol conceming Protectul Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the Eastern
African Region. 21 Junr 1985. lELMT985:47.
1985 ASEAN Agreement.supranote 247.
Lnstinit de Dmit International. Resolution on International Regulationuseeofrtjing the
iaternational Watercourses for Purposes other than Navigation, Madrid, 19JPEnl 1911, 11
5702. Council Directive 791409lEEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation oOJwLld birds,
103, 25.4.1979. p.1; Council Directive 92143lEEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of
natural habitats and of wild flora a0J L 206. 22.7.1992. p.7 (French).
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific
Region. Noumea, 24 Novemher 1986, 26 ILM38 (1987).
Prolocol Concerning Specially Protectul Arcas and Wildlife in the Wider Caribbean Region.
Kingston. 18January 1990. 1 YlEL441 (1990).
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Spccies of Wild Animals. 23 aMne 1979, 19
15 (1980). UN G-nl AucmblylW-n Mar,&WlincnOburvatioRn W (Li=orHum Huhh. tnimrÿnmiandHunvn Ri*)
regional and global rules also exist. The International Law Commission'sDrafï
Articles on the Non-navigational Usesof InternationalWatercourse, which draws
upon resolutions of the International Law Association and the Institut de Droit
Inte~national,~~provides that waterwurse States "shall, individually or jointly.
'protectand preserve theecosystemsof internationalwatercourses" and prevent 'any
deo-imentalalteration inthe compositionor quaiityof the waters of an international
watercourse which results directly or indirectly frorn human wnduct ... that may
cause appreciable harm to other waterwur~es".~ This general rule, whichreflects
customarylaw, is du, reflected inregionaltreatiesn6
4.27 internationallawrequiresStatestopreventdamageto themarine environment from
pollution, includingthatresultinghm the useof nuclea-weapons. These noms are
particularlywelldeveloped, and are closelyrelate. to the obligationofailStatesto
respect the high seas freedoms of aü other States, which would be violated-by
radioactivepollution on the high seas. Specificglobal treatyobligations, many of
which now reflect customary law, are set fonh in, inter alia, the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seasm and the 1982 UN CLOS.^ Equivalent treaty
obligationsare set forth inthevariousUNEP RegionalSeasconventions,whichhave
attractedsuchextensivesuppon that they must,in their relevantparts, be considered
to reflect customary
4.28 InternationallawrequiresStatesto preventdarnagetocultural and natural heritage
frornpollution, includingthat resulting frornthe use of nuclear weapons.Under the
1972 World HeritageConvention,whichha receivedwidespreadsupport acrossthe
globe, each Party undedes "not to take any deliberate rneasures which rnight
76
Seee.g. Institutde Droit International. Resolutionon International RegulUseonsRegardingthe
of International Watercourw for Purposes Other than Navigation. Madrid. 19April 1911. 11
IPE5702: ILA. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of InternationIL4R484rs. 52
(1967);LA Rules on Waier Pollution in an International DrainageIL4535 (1983);
ILA Rules on International GroundwateILI251 (187).
11, 2 YIEL 764(1991). AN. 20 and 2l(l).
116 Seee.g. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transhoundary Watercounzs and International
Lakrs.17 March 1992. 3ILM 1312 (1992) Art. l(2) and 2(1).
'"
450 UNTS 82; Art. 25(2). providing thatal1Statesmus 'co-aperate with comptent international
organizations in îaking masforthe prevention of pollutionseasor air space above,
resulting from any activitia with radio-active materials".
'R Supra note 225. especially Arts. 192 and 194(2)
~4 Seealso the Convention for the Prolution of the Marine Environmentof Atlantic,-East
22 September 1992. LDC ISIINF. 11, recognising the 'vital importance to al1nations' of the
manne environment and the fiora and fauna it supports and the 'inherent woith' of the marine
environmeut of the North-East Atlantic. and recalling the relevant provisions of custom~y law
reflected in Part XII of 1982UNCLOS. and in panicular Anicle 197. UN ~encnlAtumbiylSolomonW WriücnObuniiiom: RII(Lw oHumun HW. EnvhmmcnI ad vmnRighu)
damage directiy or indirectiy the cultural or natural heritag... situatedon the
tenitory" of otherParties"ZBo
(d) he obligarionnot to causemsiw damagero human health or rheenvironnem
whew
4.29 The specificobligationsdemibed in paragraphs4.24-4.28 areapplicableto prohibit
damage from an activitcarried out or authorised bya State having consequences
anywhere: in a State's own territory; in the tenitory of another State; or areas
beyond nationaljurisdiction.
4.30 In addition to the obligationtoprotect humanhealth and particular environmental
resources, international law requires Stateto prevent darnage hm radiation to
certa geongraphicarea shich aresubjectto specialrules of protection. Bygend
internationallaw reflected in treatiesand customStatesare specificailyprohibited
from causing darnage to human health and the environment in areas outside the
temtory and exclusivejuridiction ofany State,includingthe highseasandits seabed
and subs~il,~~'the moon and outer space?" and the Anta~ctic.~ Regional
agreements prohibitingany nuclearexplosion whatsoever havebeen adopted inLatin
Amena2" and the SouthPacifi~.~~'
(e) Conclusion
4.31 Byway of summary,generalinternationallawprohibitsa State from carryingout or
authorizingactivitieswhich damagehuman health and the environment. In using a
nuclear weapon in war or other armed conflict a State is subject to the specific
obligationsestablishedby theniles of general internationallawreflectedin treaty and
custom. Any useof a nuclearweapon,alternatively any usewhich has consequences
in a third State or in areas beyondnationaljunsdiction, wouldviolate theserules of
general international law. The use of a nuclear weapon which caused massive
a0
ConventionfotheProtectionof WorldCulturaland NaturalHeritage. 16 November 1972,
IIEh' 1358 (1972) Art. 6(3).
"' 1982 UNCLOS. An. 194.
" Treaty on Principls GoverninptheActivitiStatein tlie ExplorationaUseof Outer
S-. Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 27 January 1967. 610 UhTS 213
(qeciallyAn. IV);AgreementGoverning the Activitizs of Siates on the Moon and 0th-
Celestial Bodies. 5 Decernhcr1979. 18 ILM 1434(1979) (rispzciallyArt.7).
" Antarctic Trary. 1 Decernher 19402 UMS 71 (espccially An.V, prohibitingnuclar
explosions).
S< Supra note233.
'dJ Supra note 234. environmentalpollution ordamageto human health and so violates these essential
niles wouldwnstitute an internationalcrime (suprapara. 4.3).
(C) The use of nuclear weapons violates international law for the protection of
fundamental humanrights
4.32 Human exposure toionizing radiation will also violate basic human nghts and
fundamentalfreedoms. Any use of nuclear weapons is also subject to. and must
comply with, relevant noms establishedunder general and specific international
humannghts law. Internationallawhaslongrecognisedthat thequalityof thehuman
environment must be maintained toensure the full enjoyment of basic human
rights.= This approach is reflected in PrinQple 1 of the 1972 Stockholm
Declarati~n,~" Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Devel~prnent,"~and has bm endorsed by the UN General Assembly, which has
resolved that 'dl individualsare entitledto live an environmentadequatefor their
health and ~ell-being'.~'~
4.33 Poilution by radiation which damageshuman health andthe environmentviolates
international human rights standards, as reflected in treaty and customary law.
includingthe rightto a standardof livingadequate forhealth and well-beingmand
the right to the highestattainablestandardof health (including improvementof aii
aspects of environmental and industrialh~giene).~~S'imilar nghts are reflected in
the 1981AfricanCharter ('alpeoplesshall have the right toa general satisfactory
UN GA rs. 2398(XXIII)(3 Decemher 1968); UN Commission on Hurnan Rights. Resolutioo
1990141.6 March 1990.
m 'Man har the fundamental rifht to frrulom. quality and adquate conditions of life. in an
environment of a quality thatils n life of dignity and well-king. and he hrarsa solemn
responsibility to protcct and improve the environment for present and future generations.'
s
'Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainahle development. Thto are entitled
a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.'
Resolution 45/94. 14 December 1990; seealso the Duilanlion of the Hague on the
Environmmt, recognizing 'thefundamentalduty to prewwc the ecosystern' andtoiiveright
in dignity in a viable and global environment. and the consequent mmmunitythof
nations vis-à-vispmnand future grnerations to do cantbedonc to prrserve the quality
of the atmosphere': 11 March 1989. 28 1LM1308 (1989).
2w Universal Dedaration of HumanRights. UN GA rsolution 217 (III) of 10 Dtcember 1948,Art.
25; Internaiional Covenant on Econonic. Social and Cultural Rights (19hexICEtoR).
GA Res. 2200 (XXI) of 16Dccemhcr 1966. ILM 360 (1967). Art. 11(1).
29, 1966ICESCR, An. 12(l) an(Z)(hE);ropean Social Charter. 18October 1961,529 UNTS89.
An. 11;Afncan Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981 ACHPR). 28 June 1ILM.21
59 (1982) An. 16(1). environment favourable totheir development')," the 1989 San Salvador Protocof
to the 1969 American Conventionon Hurnan Right~,~~and the 1989 Convention
ConcenllngIndigenousand Tribal Peoples in IndependentCountrie~.~
4.34 In this regard SolomonIslands notesthe views of the Human Rights Committee as
set forthina General Commentit adopted in 1984on the Right to Life and Nuclear
~eapons.~ The Committee associated itself with the growing. concem of the
internati com mlunity at "the development and proliferation of increasingly
awesomeweapons of rnassdestruction, which not only threaten humanlife but also
absor esourcesthat couldotherwise beusedforvital economicand sociapurposes.
particularly for the benefit of developingcounmes.ana thereby for promotingand
securingthe enjoymentof human rights for
4.35 The General Commentwasadopt& by consensus andStates,in unambiguousterms,
that-the
'use of nuciearweaponsshouldbe prohibitedandrecascrimesagainsihumanit297
SolomonIslands shares and fully endorses this view.
0) International obligations for the protection of hurnan health, the environment
and hurnan rights apply during anned coni'iict
4.36
Since the use of nuclear weaponsmust, primafaàc,occur during a war or other
me. conflict, iisnecessary to consider whether, and if so to what extent, the
customaryand treatyobligationsidentifiedaboveapply dunng war or armedconflict.
In thisregard it iscessaryto determinewhethersuch obligationsapply as between
belligerents, anas betweena belligerent Stateand third States not involvedin the
conflict.
- -
x
1981 ACHPR Art.24.
'PI SeeAR. 11:
'1. Everyone shall have th<riphtto aihealthyenvironmcand tohaveacccsIs basic
publicervices.
2. The StatePanirs shall prornote the protection. prscrvation and improfethet
environment'.
ru Geneva. 27 June 1989, 28 ILM 1382 (19A&..2. 3,4(1)7(4)andlS(1).
"' GenC 14123.repralucul inM.Nowak UNCovctintOICiid aliPoliricalRighrs(19p.861. UN GencnAucmbS/Solanonl*u inn' ObwivatimRn W Bru,of HvmnHuhh. LmmnmcntandHumn Righx)
(a) îk operationof treariesduringarmedconficl
4.37 Notwithstandinp.Article73 of the 1969ViennaConventionon the Law ofTreaties.
which providesthat 'thepresentConventionshallnotprejudgeanyquestion that mG
ariseinregard to amaty from ...theoutbreakof hostilitiesbetweenStates,it is now
generally -accepted thi the outbreak of an armed conflict "does not ipsofm
terminateor suspend the operation of treatiesinforce between the parties to the
armed wnfli~t".~ Moreover, a-state of armed conflict "does not entitieparty
uniiaterallyto terminateor tosuspendthe operationof treat provisionsrelatingto
the protection of the humanperson, unlessthe treat p rovides othenvi~e,'~ and,
as regards the outbreak of an armed conflict between some of the parties toa
multilateraltreat ydoesnot ipsofnrto terminateor suspend the operation of that
treat benveenother contractingStatesor betweenthemand the Statesparties tothe
armed ~nflict."~ Treaties establishinginternational organisatiare considered
not to be affected by the existence of an armed conflict between any of its
pa~ties.~' Accordingly, Principle 24 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, which provides
that
"Warfare is inherently dennrctive of sunainable development. States srespectereforc
international law providingprotection for the environinent in rime of armed conflict and cmperaïe
in iis further development. as ne~essary"~~~,
must be interpreted as requinng States to respect those mles of internationallaw
which provideprotectionfor the environmentin times of armed conflict (as welas
in times of peace). This approach is consistent with the rules of environmental
protection providedby Articles 35 and 55 of 1977Geneva Protocol 1.The support
for the viewthat internationalobligationsforthe protectionof human heaithand the
environment survivethe outbreak of hostilitiesis further refiected by the relevant
provisions of ~genda 21, which called on the internationalcommunityto consider
measuresinaccordancewithinternationallaw"toaddress,in timesofarmedconflict,
large-de destmctionof theenvironrnentthatcannotbejustified underinternational
-48 Institut de Droit International. Remlution of the Helsinki Session (1985). 'The effuts of armed
conflicts on trcAn.e2, in TahlcaudesRcsoluriotu Mloprees(1957-1991).(1992). pp. 174-
75.
" Id..An. 4.
XC
Seealso Principle 26 of the 1972 Stockholm Declrration ('Man and his envbeonment ma
spared the effuts of nuclar wcapons and al1other masssdestmction'); 1982 World
Charfer for Nature ('Nature shall be against degradation causal by warotheror
hostile activities*, and 'military activities damaginbeavoided').shall la^."^ Both the UNCED tex& imply that ueaties pmtecting the environment
should, as a general pnnciple, continueto apply in times of war and other armed
conflia. This conclusion can also be drawn from UN General Assembly resoiution
47/37, which strd that thedestructionoftheenvimnment,notjustifiedby military
neasity and &ed out wantonly, was "clearly contrary to international iaw".-
The General Assembly funher urged States to "rake al1 rneasures to ensure
conpliance with the existing internationailaw applicable to the protection of the
environment in times of arrnedconflict."
4.38 In the absence of a clear general rule it is neverthelessappropriate to consider the
provisionsof individualtreaties. A reviewindicatesthatthe vast majorityof treaties
whichaim to protect humanhealthand the environmentare silenton thequestion of
their effect dunng war and other armed conflict. A small minonty of such ueaties
provideexceptionstu the generalnile of silenceon thepoint, and men in rmt of
thesetreaties practice is not unifonn.
4.39 Sometreaties (such as thoseestablishingniles on civil liability for damage)include
provisions excludingthe operationof theirprovisions todamageoccumng as a result
of war and armed confli~t.~ Other treaties include provisionspennitting their total
or partial suspensionat the instigationof one of the partie^.'^Still other treaties
would appear not to apply during militaryhostilities since their provisions donot
apply to certain military operations in peacetime operations.'"' In the other
direction, however, are treatieswhichare specificallyapplicableto certain activities
- ~ ~
Agenda 21, Chapter 39. para. 39.6(a), A/CONF.ISI! L.3.odd.39. II June 1992.
*
GA Res. 47/37 on Protection of the Environment in TiArmulfConflict, 25 November
1992.
Convention on Third Pany Liahility in the Field of Nuclar Energy. 29 JulyUNIS0, 956
251; Art. 9; Convention on Civil Liahility for Nuclear Damagc. 29 May 1963. 1063 UNLT265;
Art.IV(3)(a); International Convention on Civil Liahility for Oil Pollution Damage, 29
Novernber 1969, 973 UNiS 3; An. 111(2)(a);International Convention on the Establishment of
anInternational Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Darnage. 18 DccernaM 1971, 11
284 (1972); Art. 4(2)(a) (which also does not apply to oil from warships usrdon non-
commercial service); 1977 Civil Liability Convention Art. 3(3); Convention on the Regulation
of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities. 2 June 1988, 27 ILM8Art. 8(4)@)(if no
-riable preuutionary mesures could have kn taken); andILC DraftArticlesw
international Liability for lniurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts no1 Pmhibited by
intemational Law An. 26(I)(a).
"
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sza hy Oil. 12 May 1954, 327
Uh'7S3. Art.XIX(1) a.lowing parties to suspend operation ->fwhole or pan of Convention in
çaseof war or other hostilities if they consider themszlvzs affect& asa belligerent or as a
oeutral, upon notification to the Convention's Burzau.
1972London Conventionsupranote 245, An. VII(4)(non-applicabilityof Convention to v-1s
andaircraft entitled to sovereign immunity under international iaw). which may be associated with ho~tilities,~ or which implicitly apply during
h~stilities.~These limitedexamples(whichcover nuclear accidents, oil pollution,
etc)may be consideredtocreateexceptionalruleswhichexpresslydeviate from the
general rule identifiedabove. accordingto which treaty(and customary)obligations
toprotect human healthand the environment applyin peace and in war.
4.40 The silenceof thegreatmajonty of treat intendedtoprotect humanhealthand the
environment ailowsthe conclusionthat they are designedtoensure environmental
protection at ail times, inpeace and in wa., unless expressly ex~luded?'~ This
conclusionis justifiedaiso by thefact chatthesetreaties,by their tems and overall
purpose, esiablish internationalobligationswhich are of 'essentiai importance"for
the safeguardiig andpreservationof humanhealthandthe environment (suprapara.
4.3).
4.41 In considering thelegaleffect of humanhealthandenvironmentalprotection treaties
whenan med conflictoccurs, itisaisoappropriateto distinguishbetween two types
of conflict: those of an internationalcharacter, and those of a non-international
character. In thecaseof the former,it isfurthernecessaryto distinguishbetweenthe
legalsituationas betweenbelligerenu,andthelegal situation between belligerentsand
States whichare noi involvedin the internationalarmedconflict.
(0 Non-inremional arrnedconficf
4.42 A State maynot invokea non-internationalarrnedconflictto terminateor suspendthe
applicationof a treaty. War or armedconflict arenotidentifiedby the 1969Vienna
Conventionon the Lawof Treatiesas grounds forsuspendingor terminatinga treaty.
Accordingly, the use of a nuclear weapon in a civil war which had adverse
consequenceson humanhealth andthe environmentwouldcontinueto be subjectto
theobligationsof relevanttreaties,nciudingthoseindicatedabovewhichspecifically
address theprotectionof hurnan healthand the environment.
4.43 Moreover,internationalpracticehastended toadopta restrictive approachinapplying
theprinciple of rebussic sronribus(see Article62 of the 1969ViennaConvention),
P" Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the MeSeatby Dumping from Shipsand
Aimafi. 16 February 1976. which generally prohibits dumping of matenals pfored
biologicaandchemical warfare (hex1. Section A. pard. 9); and Protocol for the Prevention
of Pollution of the South Pacific Region by Dumping. 25Novemkr IELMT 986:87A,
which prohibiü sprcial dumppermiüfromking grantul in respect of materials produced for
biologicaandchemical warfare (Art. 10(1)and (2) and Annex 1, Section A, para. 6).
International Convention for the High Sas Fisherizs of the NOcean,9iMay 1952,
205 UN7S 65, whichprovidcs thatCommissiondecisions should make allowimae dia,
wars which may introduce tcrnporary declines in fishstocks (Art. IV(2)).
310
1959 Antarctic Treasuprnnote 283, (Art. l(1));CRAMRA, (Art. 2). which shouldnot be invokedin the caseof a civil war involvingthe useof weapons
which violate freatiesfor the protectionof humanhealth and the environment.This
is appropriate givem the nature of the international obligationin question (the
protectionofhuman health and theenvironment),whichestablishesrulesof protection
for thebenefitof individualmtes as wellas the internationalcomrnunity asa whole.
It is difficuto justify the invokingof the clause in thecase of a non-international
armed conflict,other than in theexceptionalcircumstancesprovided by Article 62 of
the 1969 ViennaConvention.
4.44 The1969 Vienna Conventionis also silentabout thestarusand legaieffect of treaties
when an international armed conflictoccurs. Traditionally, the view habeen taken
thatas regardslegai relationsbetweenbelligerentpartiestheir respective obligations
under bilateraland multilateraltreaties in force at the outbreak of hostilitieswere
suspended,unless they had been adopted in consideration of thatconflict. Re~entiy,
however,there has ben growingsupport forthe viewthat certaincategonesof treaty
obligations,even as betweenbeuigerents, are not suspendeddunng war or med
~onflict."~This rule is confmed by the wntings of j~rists."~ The Institut de
Droit International adopted a ResoluUonexpressing the view that a treaty will
continue toapply unlessit limitsmilitary objectives:
"Lestraites renen vigueur el dont I'exicuiion demeure, malgr; les hostilitis, pratiquement
possible.doivent Gtreobservdscommepar la pasEusLbellifiran~çne peuvents'en dispenser
que dansla mesure et pour letempscornmandispar les ndclaguerres013
4.45 As regards treaty obligations between parties to a conflict and third States, the
obligationsarising frombilateraltreaties arenotaffectedby the stateofwaror armed
conflict, unlessperformance of the obligations thereunder is rendered impossible.
This general rule is subject to the exceptions expressly provided by a particular
treaty, including those ailowing for a right of unilateral denunciationand the
application of clauses relating to rcbussicsrunrib ousnonadimplericonrrmus.
Moreover, itis submitted the validityof treaties for the protectionof humanhealth
and the environmentgoverningrelations betweenbelligerent Sratesand third States
whichare notparties to an armedconflict will not be affected by the conflict.
31:
L. Oppenhcin.Inrerr~ario»lon,.Vol.II.7thul. H. Lautrrycht.al..(1952).3W; A.D.
McNair. hw of Trcnrie(1961). 705C.B. Hurst.'TheEffcct of War oTreaîies',2 BYlL
(1924).37 at 41.
' Art 4.6 Ann.l.D.1. 587: xc also Ans. 7-1 1;in R.Tarasofsky'LegalProtectionothe
EnvironmentDuring InternationalAnnd ConflicXXlV NYIL 17 (1993). at 63. 4.46 This apprcad ii not affectedby application of the law of neutraiity (suppara.
3.67) ,hich does not preclude the possibility tha: other obligations of the
international law ofpeace continue to apply. Darnage tohuman health or the
environmentof a neutralState,even if it results from anact of war committedby a
beïiigerentState, is regulatedbyobligationsof internationallawfor the protectionof
humanhealthand theenvironment.As confirmedbythegeneralniles of international
lawgovemingStateresponsibilitywhichdo not allowexonerationsforarmedwnflict
(in* paras.5.1-5.4), no exceptionsapply to militaryactivitiesof belligerent States.
4.47 Asa generalmatter, therefore,theoutbreakof war or otheanned conflictshouldnot
be consideredto automaticallysuspendor terminatethose treatiesbetweenthparties
to a wnflia which areintendedto protect human heaith and the environmentand
whichdonotexcludetheirapplicationin time of war. Such treatiescontinuetoapply
where theyare in force betweenone or more partiesto a conflictand thirdStates.
(oI Cus~omary law
4.48 There are noreasonstojustifya differentconclusionin respectof obligationsarising
undercustomarylawor by acü ofinternationalorganisations(supraparas. 4.17-4.20
and 4.23-4.28) Certainly as regards relations betweenbelligerent Statesand third
Statesthe existenceof a war or armed conflictwiilnotimit or othenviseaffect the
obligationsimposed by customary noms protecting human health and the
environment. Acwrdingly, the customary obligation reflected in Principle
21lPrinciple2 would be violatedshould the adverse consequencesforhuman health
and the environrnent resultfromthe useof a nuclear weaponbe feltina thirdstate
or in anareabeyond nationaljurisdiction.
(cl Conclusion
4.49 It therefore followsthat. as a generalmatter, the useof a nuclearweaponby a State
in war or otherarmedconflictmus[cornplywith treaty andother obligationsunder
internationallaw whichare intendedto protecthurnanhealthand the environmentand
fundamentalhuman rights. Wherean obligationis of "essential importance"for the
safeguardingand preservationof hurnan health, the environmentand fundamental
human righü the applicationof this mle becorneseven more stric.. UN Gsncni -lylSolamon LludsWririeObrmiiios: Pan nC (Rcqmnribitity)
SECTIONC
Anyviolationbya Stateof theseobligationsunderinternational law gives
riseto its internationalresponsibilityand liability
5.1 The use of a -nuclear weapon -by a State in .violatio2of an international legal
obligation for the protection of human health or the environmentgivesnse to the
international responsibiity of that State.'" The principle that a breach of an
internationallegal obligationunder treatyor custornarylaw, or perhaps wen gened
principles of law, create a further obligation, or a liabiiity,3" to make reparation
is alsoweli established. As the PCU stated in the Gïwnow Foctory case:
itisa principle of internationai law, and even a geiirrralconception of law. thatanny breash of
engagementinvolves an obligatiomake reparation. Injudgment 8(1927)(PCU. Scr.A., No.
9, p.21...the Court bad already thatreparation wasthe indispensable complement of a failurc
toapplya convention. and there is no necessity foà?tstated in the convention itself?"
5.2 A State whichusesa nuclear weaponin violationof its internationallegal obligation
to protect human health and the environmentwill be under an obligation to make
reparation for the consequencesof the violation. This &ses from a principle of
general application,and there is no reason why violations relatingto human heaith
and environmentalobligationsshouldbe subjeçttoa differentapproach. The general
principle is clearly expressed in thejudgment of the Chonow Facroryflndemniry)
case, where the PCU stated that
The essential principle containcd in theactualaiillegal acr -a principle which webes
esîablisbed by international practice and in piiilicular by the decisions of-ais that tribunals
reparationus. asfar as possible. wipeout al1the consequencesof the illees1aci and reestablish the
siruauon wbicbwould, in al1probability, haveexisted ifthatacr had no! been commined. Restitution
inkind. or, if this is not possible payment of a suin corresponding to the value which a restitution
inkind wouldbcarthe award if need be. of damages for los sustained which wbccovercd
by restitution in kind or payment in plait-such are the principles which should serve to
determine the amounr of compensation due foran acr contrary to intla^.^^'
3Ii ILC DriftArticles oStateResponsihilityArt.1. 1977II Ybk1LC (UN Doc. AICN.41302).
"' Se alsoUNCLOS Article 139,and UNCLOS Article 235 which provides that Stateare
'rrsponsible for the Fulfilment of their international obligations theprotection and
preservation othemarine environment. They shalhe liahleinaecordancrwith intemational
law.'
"6 1927 PCU, SeriesA. No. 17.at p. 475.3 In the event that theuse of a nuclear weaponshouldcause damageto humanhealth
and theenvironment,especiailyin a thiudStatenot involvedin thecontlict, financial
repation should cover thecosts associatedwith materiaidamageto environmental
resources (pure environmentaldamage) and consequentiai damage to people and
properiy (consequentiai environmental damage), including restoration or
reinsmment. This approach has been confirmed by Security Council resolution
68711991, which reaffvmed that Iraq wasiiable under internationallaw for, inter
dia, 'environmentaldarnageand the depletionof natumi resources'resulting hm
the unlawful invasi ond occupationof Kuwait."' Violalions of internationallaw
arisingfrom the useof a nuclearweaponwouldaiso giverise to theresponsibilityof
the concernedState, togetherwith the obligationto makereparation. In the caseof
an armed conflict resultingfrom the use of one or more nuclear weaponsit willbe
virtuaiiy impossible to provide adequate financiai reparation, providing a further
compellingreason for wncluding that any use of a nuclear weaponmust, by virtue
of iü effectson humanhealthand the environment,be illegaiunderinternationallaw.
5.4 International responsibilitymayaiso triggerthe cnminal liabilityof a State (andany
penon associated with a decisionto use a nuclear weapon shouldbe on notice that
he or shewiii aiso be subjectto criminalliability). Accordingto the ILC "a serious
breach of an internationalobligationof essentialimportancefor thesafeguardingand
preservationof the humanenvironment,suchas thoseprohibitingmassivepollution
of the atmosphereor of the seas"shouldbe categorizedas an international crime,or
deli~t."~ The use of a nuclear weaponcausing massive damage to human health
or the environmentanywhcrcwould,it issubmitted,constituteaninternational crime,
and any memberof theinternationalcomrnunity would havestandingtochallenge the
act,since it would injure the rights of al1States and members of the international
communityirrespectiveof wherethe,damageto humanhealthor theenvironrnentwas
actuallyfek3*O
'" Ssurity CouncilRes. 687119913fApril1991.30 ILM847 (1991).
'19 Supra.note220.
'"
See alsa ILC DraftCodeof CrimesAgainstthePace andSzcurityof Mankind,Reportof the
ILConils 43rdsession. 30 ILM1584(11rspsially DrafiArticle26 (solapp1yintimes
of peacaswellas duringarmul conflict)providesthat anindividualwho 'causesor
orden the causingof widzspread.long lem and severe darnageto the naturalenvimnment'
wouldà: pilty oa crime. DraftArticle22 providesthatan individualwhoemploys meth&
ormeansof warfare'whichareintendzdormayhcexpectultocausewidzspread,long-termand
severedamagetothenaturalenvironmeni'wouldheguiltyof anexceptionallwarrcrime. (B) Any threat or use of a nuclear weapon violates the international law of armed
conflicîs:
(a) any use of a nuclear weapon violates international law by reason of its
quantitative and qualitative effects, which violate the relevant rules of
international law that:
6) lirnitthe means of anacking the enemy;
prohibit direct or indirect attacks on civilian targets;
(ü)
(üi) establish a permanent obligationto distinguish between cornbatantsand
non-combarants;
(iv) prohibit indirect or direct anacks against health services;
prohibit the use of chernical or poisonous weapons or weapons which
(v)
haveindiscriminate effects;
(vi) prohibit the use of weapons which render death inevitable or cause
unnecessary suffenng;
(vii) prohibit violations of the territonal sovereignty of third States;
(viii) prohibit causing "widespread. long-term and severe darnage to the
environment":
(ix) require respect for the pnnciples of proponionality and hurnanity; and
(x) prohibit crimes against humanityor senocide.
(c) Thethreat or use of nuclear weapons violates international law irrespective of
the circurnstances in which they aresed.
(d) The threat or use of nuclear weaponscannot bejustified by international law in
any circurnstances, in panicular by reason of self-defence, reprisa], or state of
necessity.
The relevant rules of international law prohibiting the threat or use of nuclear
(C)
weapons apply to al1States.
(III) Any threat or use of nuclear weapons violates international law for the protection
of human health and the environment and the protection of human rights.
(A) The threat or use ofnuclear weaponsis subject to intern~tionallaw for the protection of humanhealth and the environment,and protectionof fundamentalhumanrights.
(B) The threator use of nuclear weaponsviolatesinternationallaw for the protectionof
human health and the environment,and fundamentalhuman rights, by increasing
levelsof radiationin the environmentwhich:
(a) do not respect national boundaries and violate the sovereigand temtorial
integrityof thiStates;
@) violate the general obligation nottocause damage to hurnan health andthe
environment outside itterritoryor otherareas subject to its jurisdictorn
contml;
(c) violatespecificobligationsnot cause significantdamagetohuman healthand
the environment anywhere, including in particular air quaiity, biodiversity,
freshwaterresources; themarineenvironment,andculturaland naturalheritage;
and
(d) violatefundamentalhurnanrights.
(C) Internationallaw for the protectionof humanhealth andthe environment andfor the
protectionof hurnanrightsisapplicableduring arrnedconflict.
(M Any use of nuclear weapons by a State entails its responsibility under
international law and its liability to make reparation.
6.2 Accordingly,and forthe reasonsset out in theseWrittenObservationsit is submined
that the InternationalCourtof Justiceshouldgive an AdvisoryOpinionwhichStates:
(A) that the General Assernbly is competent to request an Advirory Opinion
from the International Court ofJustice on this question, and that the Court
iscompetent to and should give an Advisory Opinion on the question
submitted;
(B) that any use ofa nuclear weapon by a State would violate its obligations
under international laa as reflected in the rules of international law
concerning methods and mean of warfare (jus in bello)and neutraiiiy,
ALTERNATIVELY that any use of nuclexr weapons mus1 not violate
applicable rules of international law concerning methods and mean of
warfare (jusin belloand neutrality;
(Cl that any use of a nuclear weapon by a State would violate its obligations
under international lawasreflected in the rules of international law for the
protection ofhuman health and the environment and fundamental human
rightsALTERNATIVELY that the use ofnuclear weaponsmust not vioiate applicable rules of international law for the protection of human health and
the environment and fundamental human rights;
(D) that anyuse ofa nudear weapon bya State would constitute a crime against
humanity, ALTERNATTVELY that the use of nuclear weapons in violation
of international law constitutes a crime against humanity; and
(E) that anyuse by a State of a nuclear weapon gives rise to its international
responsibilityALTERNATWELY that the violation by a State of its
obligations under international law relating touseof nuclear weapons
givesrise to its international responsibility; and
O that any threat of use by a State of a nuclear weapon would, by consequence
of the iliegality of acuse,be prohibited under international law.
Letter dated 19 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Solomon Islands to the United Nations, together with Written Statement of the Government of Solomon Islands