Written Statementof the Covernrnentof the SolomonIslands Governmentof SolomonIsian&
HIGHCOMMlSSlONER FORSOLOMON ZSLANDS
HONORARY CONSULAT ESOLOMON ISLANDS
19 SpringfieRoud
London SW19 7AL
FAX +44 81 946 1744
ICJIO 9 June1994
His Excellency Eduardo Valencia Ospina
Regim, International Court of Justice
Peace Palace, The Hague, Thetherlands
Sir,
WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION - ADVISORY OPINION
By the direction of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.Solomon Islands, 1 have pleasure in
sending you herewith, on behaif of the Govemment of Solomon Islands. Solomon Islands'
Wnnen Observations in respect of the request by the World Heaith Organisation for an
Advisory Opinion from the Intemational Court of Jusrjce.
Solomon Islands avails itself of the right to submit these Wnnen Observations as a member
of the WorldHealth Organisationand as a member of the UnitedNationsaccording to which
it is, ipsofacro, a party to the Statute of the International Court of Junice.
In view of the importance of the request made by the World Health Organisationand the
nature of the international legal questionshereunder, Solomon Islands considersthat
itwould beappropnate foanoral hearing to be held in this maner.
Notingthe recent estabiishmentof a Chamber on EnvironmentalMattm at the Court, which
Solomon Islandswelcomes, it may be appropriate for the Chamber to deal with this matter,
giventhespeci naure of the issue itproximity to maners relating to the protection of
human health and the environment.
1would be grateful if correspondence could be addressed to me at the above address, with
copies to the Miniaer of Foreign Affairs at: PO Box 10, Honiara, Solomon Islands.
1remain. Sir.REQUESTBYTBEWORLD -TH ORGANXZATION
FORAN ADVISORY PINION TBELEG~
OFTHEUSE OFNUCLEA REAPONSINVIEW
OF THEIEFTECTSON
HUMANHJL4LTAND THEENVIRONMENT
WFU'ITEONBSERVATIOSUBMITIED
BYTHEGOVERNME NFTSOLOMO&NLANDS
TOTBE ERNA NATIONLOURTOFJUSTICE
GoverofSoloIsld WHOISolornonIslands'WrineObsedonr: Rn 1(bmptcnce)
andindicatethedition whichtheactivitiesof theOrganisationmusttake. TheWHO'S
requestfor an AdvisoryOpinionmust be undentood inthis context, and in the context
ofitswork as a whole.The AdvisoryOpmionwhichthe Coun hasbcen calledupon to
give, and which itshould give, on the questionrclating to the legaiity of the use of
nuclearweaponswouldallowtheWHO t ensurethatitsactivitieswerepropcrly carried
outin a mannerwhichtook fulaccountofpriorityne& of the intemationalwmmunity
and were consistentwithapplicablenoms of internationallaw.
(D) The competence of the WHO to request thiiopinion does not derogate from the
principleof speciality
2.35 Itis wellwithin thespeciaiistandtechnicalexpertiseandof the cornpetenceofthe WHO
to request an Opinionfrom the Courton the legalityof the useof nuclearweapons.
2.36 These considerationsare reflected in the debate which preceded the adoption by the
World Health Assemblyof ResolutionWHA 46.40, which led tothe request for an
Opinion from the.Court. In thatwntext cenain States challenged the request for the
Opinionon the groundsthat it felloutsidethe mandateof the WHO, takingaccountof
the specificityof that mandateand the politicalnature of the question. Cenain States
emphasised the neai to accorda grater pnority to other typeo sf activitiesin the field
of human health." During the course of the debate the kgal Advisor of the
Organisation nevenheless reminded participants that it was for the World Heaith
Assemblyto decide its competencein the contextof the Organisation'sconstitution."
Apan from the argumentsrelating to thespecialcharacter of the Organisationand its
mandate.those Statesopposingthe requestemphasisedthe burden, includingthe cost,
which wouldbe placedon the Organisationby the request.
2.37 The principleof specialityprovidesa bais for the divisionof task bsetweenthevarious
organsandSpeciaiizedAgencieswhichparticipate in the UnitedNations system. Respect
for this principlerequires that each organisation should havesufiicient competence
necessary toallowit IO carry out its functionsand objectives,as the Coun hasrecalled
on numerousocca~ions.'~
31
Seethe procu-wrbaux of CommissionB dunn: the46thWorld HcallhAssembly, A46lBISRl8. A46lBISRl9.
A46/BISR110,u wellu the 'comprcrerid'u-of 13thPle~? Sasion of theWorld Hulth AssemA46/BR113.
" A46NR113. page 13
33 Reparuriofor lnjuriu Suffcraiin rhcScrvicc of rhe UniredNAdv.nOp.,11 April1949.IU Rep. 1949.
p.174:nrrmniionalSrar~of SovlWar AJricaAdv. Op., IlJuly1950.IW Rrp.1950,p.128;Effen ofAwards
of CompensarionMadeby rhe UniredNorionsAdminirrrmiwTribunaAdv. Op..13 July1954.JU Rep. 1954,
p.47:CenainExpenru ofrheUnirrdNariom.Adv.Op.. 20July1962.IURcp. 1962,p. 15Lcgal Consequuicu
for SIUU of rhc ConrinuaiPrucnce of SourhAfica in Namibia (SouthWcrrAJnca) nowiriutanding Securiry
CouncilRuolurion 276 (1970Adv. Op.21 June1971.IU Rep. 1971.p.16. - Table of Contents
(A) Background ..................................... (1.1-1.5)
(B) SolomonIslands'interestin tquestio................... (1.61.13)
PART 1 THEWHO ISCOMF'ETEN T O REQUEST AN ADVISORYOPINION
FROM THEINTERNATIONAL C.OURTOFJUSTICEON WS
QUESTION AND THECOURT E3 CO- TO CIVE AN
ADVISORY OPINIONONTHEQUESTIONSUBMLlTED
(A) The WHO'srequestfor an Opinionfulfilsthe conditionsof Amcle
96(2)of the UN Charte........................... (2.2-2.7)
(B) The WHOis actingin accordancewith irs ConstiNt.......... (2.8-2.15)
(C) The practiceof the WHOunderiü ConSti~tionconfins its
competenceover matters relatingtoeffecton humanhealth
and the environmeofionising radiatresultingfrom theuseof
nuclearweapons............................... (2.16-2.44)
(a) TheWHOis competentto act in the fieldof environmenralprotec(2.17-2.19)
@) The WHOis competentto act in matters relatingto ionisingra.(2.20-2.25)
(c) The WHOis cornpetentto addressthe healthand environmenral
consequencesof the useof weapons.................... (2.26-2.27)
(d) The questionof the legalityof the useof nuclearweaponsis withinthe
frameworkof the WHO'Sactivitie................... (2.28-2.32)
(e) TheWHO is competenrto act on mattersconcerninpthe developmentand
applicationof internationalelatingto humanheaiand the
environment................................. (2.33-2.34)
The wmpetenceof the WHO torequestthis Opiniondoesnot derogate
@)
from theprincipleofecialit...................... (2.35-2.41)
(E) The Coun should:ive the AdvisoryOpinionrequestedbythe WHO .(2.42-2.57)
(F) Conclusion........................................ (2.58) PARTII THE LE42ALITY OFTHEUSEOFNUCLEARWEAPONS Ih'VIEW
OF THEIR EFFECTS ONRUMAN HEALTHAND THE
ENVIROh'MEhT
SEC'IION A THEUSEOFNUCLEARWEAPONSVIOLATESTHEINTERNATIONAL
LAW OF ARMEDCONFLICTS
(A) The use of nuclearweaponsis subjecttointemationallaw, including
the rules relating to med conflicts .. .. ..... . . .. . .. . . . (3.3-3;33)
(a) The use of nuclearweaponsis subjecttogeneral internationallaw . . . . (3.3-3.5)
@) The use of nuclearweaponsis subjecttointernationallaw of armed
wnflicts ...... ... ..... .. ........ . .. ... ... . . . (3.6-3.10)
(c) The use ofnuclear weaponsis subjecttothe 197 GenevaProtocol1 . (3.11-3.24)
(d) The use ofnuclear weaponsis subject tothe rules of internationallaw
specificallyprohibiting the use of nuclear weapons .. . .. . ... (33-3.31)
(e) The use ofnuclear weaponsis subject to the WHO Constitution . .. . (3.32-3.33)
@) The use ofnuclear weaponsis wntTary ;O international lawof armed
conflict . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . ..(3.34-3.80)
(a) The use of nuclear weapons violatesinternationallaw by reason of their
quantitativeeffects . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .... . .. . .(3.35-3.54)
(i) Nuclearweapons render death inevitable . . .. . . .. . . .. . . (3.42-3.44)
(ii) The use ofeven a singlenuclear weaponcould result in a total
nucl- war . . . .. . .. . . ... . ... . . . . . . . . . . (3.45-3.47)
(iii) Nuclearweaponshave indiscnminate effects . . . . . . . . ... (3.48-3.54)
(b) The use of nuclear weaponsviolatesinternationallaw by reason of their
- qualitative effectsof suchweapons . .. . . . . .. .. . . . . . . .(3.55-3.70)
(c) The use of nuclear weaponsviolatesinternationallaw irrespectiveof the
circurnstancesin whichthey are used ,. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . .... (3.71)
(d) The use of nuclear weaponscannotbejustified by internationallaw in
any circumstances . .. ... . . . .... . . ... . .. . ... . . . .. (3.72-3.80)
(i) Selfdefence does notjustify the useof nuclear weapons ... . ... (3.73)
Rcprisalsdo notjustify the useof nuclear weapons . . . .. . . (3.74-3.79)
(ii) Necessitydoes notjustify the use of nuclear weapons . .... . . . . (3.80)
(iii)
The relevant rules of internationallaw prohibiting theuse ofnuclear
(C)
weapons applyto al1States . . . . . .. . ........ . . . . . ...(3.81-3.91)
@) Conclusions . . .. . . ... . .. . ... . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . .(3.92-3.95)SECnON B THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAWNS VIOLATES APPLICABLE RULES OF
IhTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE PRO'ECI'ION OFHW HEALTii
AND THE EhXLROh-T
(A) The useof nuclear weapons is subject tointernational law for the
protection of human health andthe environment, and fundamental
human rights................................... (4.1-4.7)
The use of nuclear weapons is contointernational law for the
@)
protection of human health and the environmat, and fundamental
hurnan righ................................. (4.8-4.32)
(a) Sovereigntyand temtod integnty................... (4.9-4.15)
(b) The general obligationof each Statocausedamage 10human
health andthe environment outside its territoramsr other
subject to its juridiction or ................. (4.16-4.20)"
(c) The specificobligations not to cause damage to human health and the
environment outside its temtories oareahsubject to its
juridiction or control....................... (4.214.29)
(d) The obligation not to cause massivee to human heaithor the
environmentanywhere ......................... (4.30-4.31)
(e) Conclusion..................................... (4.32)
International obligations for the protection of human health and the
(C)
environments appl! durin: annedconfl.............. (4.33-4.45)
(a) The operation of treaties during armed ............ (4.34-4.44)
@) Customq lau. ................................... (4.45)
(c) Conclusion..................................... (4.46)
SECTION C THERESPONSIBILITS OF STATES FORVIOLATIONSOF
IhJATIONAL LAWOCCASIOh'ED BY THE USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPON ...................................... (5.1-5.4)
PART III SUMMARYOF CONCLVSIONS .................... .(6.1:62)
iii(A) Background
1.1 On 14 May 1993 the As~mbly of the World Health Oqpnmtion (WHO) adopted
Resolution WHA 46.40, which requeswd an Advirory Opinion from the International
Coun of Justice ("the Court") on the following quesrion:
"1. view of tbe buandenvironmenuleffecu. W thuu of nucievepponrby a
Statcinwar or othanne.conflictk a bmh ofifoblislflons underin~donaLW
includingtbe WHOConstitution?'
1.2 The request was made by the WHO under Article 96(2) of the United Nations Charter.
Under Article 65(1) of iü Statute
'the Coun maygive an advisoryopinionon any legai qurniona1tbe requen of wbatever
body maybe autborizedbyinaccordancewitbtbeChanerof tbe UnitedNationsto make
sucha rcquut.'
1.3 By anOrder of 13September 1993the Coun fixed10lune 1994 asthe rime limitwithin
which wrinen statements relatingto the question may be submined to the Coun. As a
member of the WHO and a pany to the Statute of the Coun Solomon Islands is entitled
to appear before the Coun in this matter and to submit these Written Observations.
1.4 These Observations are divided into twoPansP .an 1 addresses the competence of the
World Health Assembly to request the Advisory Opinion and the competence of the
Court to render an Advisory Opinion. Pan Il. which is divided into three Sections,
addresses: the legality of the use of nuclear weapons by reference to the rules of
international law relating med conficü (A); the rules of international law relating
to theprotection of human health and the environment and the protection of fundamental
humanrights (B): and the responsibility of Sures under international law for violation
of these obligations (C)Pan Ill summarises the Conclusions.
1.5 In summary, for the reasons set out in these Wnnen Observations the Government of
Solomon Islands submits that the Coun should give an Advisory Opinion that:
(A) the World Heaith Organisationiscompetenlto request an Advisory Opinionfrom
the International Coun of Justice on this question, and that the Court is
competent to give an Advisop, Opinion on the question submined(paras.2.1 to
2.58);
(B) any use of a nuclear weapon by a State would violate its obligations under
international lawas reflectedin theniles of international law concerning methods
and means of warfare (jusin bello)and neutrality, ALTERNATIVELY that the
use of nuclear weapons must not violate applicable rules of international law
concerning methodsand meansof warfare (ju inbello) and neuvality @aras.3.1
to 3.95);
(C) any use of a nuclear weapon by a State would violate iü obligations under inmational law as reflectedinthe niles ointernationalaw for the protection
of human health and the environment and fundamental human righü.
ALTERNATTVELY the useof nuclearweaponsmustnot violateapplicableniles
of international lawfor the protectiohurnan healthand theenvironmentand
fundamentalhumanrights m. 4.1 to 4.46);
any use of a nuclear weapon by a State would constitute a crime ast
(D)
humanity, ALTERNAWY the use of nuclcar wcapons in violation of
internationallaw constitute. a [email protected]); and
(E) any use by a Stateof a nuclear weapogives risetointanational rrsponsibility
ALïERNAïïVELY the violation by a State of these obligations under
internationallaw givesrise to its internationalrrsponsi@aras. 5.1 to 5.4).
(B) Solomon Islands' interest in the question
1.6 SolomonIslands is a non-nuclearState which does not propose to engagein
nuclearwarfare or other nuclear activity.Nor dws SolomonIslands anticipate
beinga primary targetof suchactivity. It neverthelesshas a great ininthet
WHO'Srequest for an Advisory Opinion from the Coun, perceiving as an
"innocentbystander"the seriousdanger to thesafetyand healthof irspeople, its
economyand its fragile environmentfrom theeffecü of increasesof radioactive
materid in the environment.
Solomonlslands is a widespreadarchipelagoof mounrainousislands and low-
lying coral atolls in the south-westPacificbeoveen latitudes 5 and 12 degrees
Southand longitudes155 to 177degrees East. The island chainis some 1.500
kilometres(900 miles)long, runninpin a nonhwesterlylsoutheasterly direction.
The totallandareaisestimated at27,556squarekilometres, comprisingover 800
islands.ïhey rangefromthe largest(Guadalcanalon whichthecapital, Honiara,
is located) to the very small. The populationis about 325,000. The Solomon
Islandsbecamean independentRealmwithintheCommonwealthon 7 July 1978,
It isa memberof,imeralia t.e UnitedNations,theWorldHealthOrganization,
and the South Pacific Forum. nie Head of State, Queen Elizabeth II, is
representedin Solomon Islands by a Govemor General. SolornonIslands is a
parliarnenmy democracy.
SolornonIslandsdependsheavilyon subsistenceagriculture,forestryandfishing.
The formal cash economy dm depends largely on agriculture, foresuy and
marine primary production. The tourist industry is developing and makes a
significantcontributionto the cash economy. One of the major amactions of
Solomon Islands and its produce is the relative freedom of iü land andsea
environmentfrom pollution.
The impactof any increasesin radioactiveaterialin or around the tenitory of
SolomonIslandswouldhavegraveconsequencesfor thehealthof itscitks, for
the environment,and for the economy.The fisheries, agriculturaland tourism
sectorswhichare the mainstayof the economywould be significantlydarnaged,
if not wiped out. For these reasons, Solornonlslands takes an active interest in WHOfSolommIslandsWrittm ObranUons: inûductiw
the AdvisoryOpinionrequestedby the WHOhm the InternationalCoun.
1.10 As a memberof the UnitedNationsSolomonIslandshas consistentlysupponed
those General~ssemblyresolutions(infrapara. 3.25)whichwndemn the use
of nuclear weapons in any circumstances and rrstateinternational lawas
prohibitinganyuseof suchweapons.As amemberof the WHO Solomon Islands
supponedthe requestfor anAdvisoryOpinionby the World Hdth Assembly
in 1993.
1.11 SolomonIslands' longstandincornmitmenttowardsminimisingtherisks posed
by radioactivesubstancesi~flectedin its parricipariinnumerousaraties.
including the 1968Tmty on Non-Prolifaation of Nuclear Weapons. Iü
commitmenttowards international umanitarianlaw irrfleaedin the factthat
it is pany to,interdia, the 1925Protocol for the Prohibitionof tUse in
Warof Asphyxiating,Poisonousor OtherGases,andof BactcriologicalMethods
of Warfare; the four 1949 Geneva Conventionsfor the Protection of War
Victims; the 1976 Conventionon the ProhibitionofMilirary or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques: and the 1966
International Covenatn Economicand Sonal Righü.
1.12 SolomonIslands'longstandmgcommitmentstowards the protectionof human
hdth andthe environment isalsoreflectein its activeparticipationinUNhe
Conferenceon Environmentand Developmentand the fact thatit ia panyto
ueaties intendedto protect humanheaithand the environment.In panicular, it
is aParty,inredia. to the 1958Conventionon the High Seasand the 1972
Convention on the Preventionof hlarine Pollutionby Durnpin~of Wastesand
OtherMatter.
1.13 Finally, by wayof more generalobservation.SolomonIslandsbelievesthat the
use of nuclear weapons,especiailyfor hostilepurposes, is a marrerof global
concem whichaffects dl people andail States. Thisreason alonejustifies the
submission ofthesewrittenobservations. WHO/SolomonIslanWriaenObservatiPin1(Comprcocc)
PART 1
TEE WORLDHEALTHORGANISATION IS COMPETENT TO REQUEST
AN ADVISORYOPINIONFROMTHEINTERNATIONAL COURTOF
JUSTICE ON THISQUESTION,ANDTHECOURTIS COMPETENT TO
GIVEAN ADVISORYOPINION-ON THE QUESTION SUBMïiTED
2.1 InaccordancewithArticl96(2)of the Charter ofUnite dations, Amcl76 of its
Constitution,and ArtX(2) of iü AgreementwiththUnite Nations, tWHO may
requestan Advisory Opinion fromthe Coonany legalquestionswithintscopeof
its activities. The WHO has previouslyexercisedthisn1980,Ithe Orffanisation
requested from the Court an Advisory Opmion on certain questionsrctotthe . ,
transferof a regionalWHO office.'The WHOnowrequestsan AdvisoryOpinionfrom '
the Courton anothermatterwhichsimilarlylies withscopeof its activitieinnd
respect of which the Court's Opinion would assist it in the future wnduct of iu
activities.
(A) The WHO'Srequest for an Opinion fulfiis the conditions of 96(2)of tbe UN
Chaner
I
2.2 The WHO'Srequest foran opinionsatisfiesthe conditionsof Article 96(2)of the UN
Charter bothrcuionepersonaand rarionemareriae. Article X of the Agreement
betweenthe UN and the &'HO.whichenteredinto forceon 10thJu1918,authonzes
the WHO "to requestdvisoy opinionsof the InternationalCoun of Justice on legal
questionsarising within the scoiüoactivitiesother than questions concemingthe
mutd relationshipsof the Organisationand the United Nations or other specialised
agencies".
2.3 The OpinionrquestedbytheWï-iOclearlyrelatestoa questionarisingwithinthe scope
of iü activities. It is a "legal q~estion"~concerninginternationallegal aspectsof the
use ofnuclear weapons. in view of the effecü on human health and theenvironment.
Any political characrer which the question might also have cannot prevent theCoun
fromgivingan Opinion:'the Coun hasconsistentlyaffirmedthat "theCoun, however,
cannotattribute a political character to a request which invites it to undenake an
'
Imnprumion of the Agreemenr cf21951Derwcenrhe WHnndEgypr. AdOp..20D-bn 1980.
IU Rcp 198p.73.
:
Conaïrioru of Admission of a Srarero Membcrship in rhc UOp.28thMayo1948ICIRep.
1947-1948,61.
D.W.Bowut,fheLw oflnrernarionalinsr(4thcd.. 198.lp.278.
4 essentiaüyjudicial task, nai~elytheinwpreration of a Watyprovision'.' According to
theCourt'spnor jurisprudencethere isno reason for theCoun not to respondpositively
to the WHO'Srequest. The concrete legal questionwhichhas been asked failswithin
the normal exerciseof the Court'sjurisdiction,and the Court should not considerthe
motiveswhich inspire-a rquest. On thewntmy: the Courthasconstanrlyaffirme. that
"m sinutions inwhichpoliticalcomi&Rtareprominentil mky patticulvly
~ecerrarforaninternationalorganimitoob& ansdviroryopiniohm tbe
Coun asu,thelegalprinciplu applicnblewitb rtothcmiOcrunder debu.
espc~y heo tbeu may inciwietbc iolerpmarion ofits ~rvtion'.'
2.4 The WHO request has been made to the Court as the principaljudicial organ of the
UnitedNations. Therequestinvites the Coun toconeibute, throughthe exerciseof iu
advisoryrole, totheeffectivefunctioningoftheUnitedNationssysternandtheactivities
of one of its Specialid Agencies. In fulfillingitsjudicialmle, includ'ingthe advisory
function, the Court has always adopted an appmach which is "volonrairemen rt
libér~l ea",ngthe view that "the reply of the Coun, itselfan 'organof the United
Nations', represents its pmcipation in the activities of the Organization, and. in
p~ciple, shouldnot be refused".'
2.5 Accordingto the Court the objectiveof the WHO'Srequest for an AdvisoryOpinion
shouldbe to"enlighten"theOrganisationon theproperconductof "itsownactivities".'
' CmainExpensu ofrhe UniredNarionsAd\. Op..20thIuly 1963.IURep. 1962.p.155: CondirionsofMmir~ion.
Adv. Op..20th May 1948.10 Rcp. 1947-1948. p.61: Comprrenceofrhc GcnArsrmb'.for rheMmirsion qf
a SratIOrhe Unird Nations. ICI Rep. 19Ad\.Op.. 3 March 1950. pp.6-7: Imcrprcraiirk AgrmneiU
of 25th Mar& 1951berwcenrhWHO andEgypi.Adv. Op..20thDecember 1980.10 Rcp. 1980. p.81. pangnph
33.
lmrrpruarion of the Agrcmicn25March 1951berweenthe WHO and Esypr. Adv. Op.. 20th Dc~ember 1980.
IU Rcp. 1980. p.87. pgnph 33.
* Nguycn Quoc Di, Patndr Dailler. Alain Pellet. Droir imcrmrion(4thcd..1992). p.837. Seal=1.
Goodrich.E.Hmbm. A. Simons. Charrcrqfrhe UniredNariom. Commeman, and Docmems (3rd cd..mv..
1%9), p.567.
Imrrpruation of Puce Treariu wirhBulparia. Hunga? and Rumanin. interimphase. 30thMuch1950.
IU Rcp. 1950,p.71; RernvarioIOrheConwnrionfor rhePrewmionand Pvnirhmem of rhe CrimeGemcidc,
Adv. Op.. 28th May 1951. IU Rcp. 1951. p.19.
' Rerervations rorhc Conwmion on the Prcwmion and Punishmem o/rhe CrGmcidc. Adv. Op.. 28& May
1951,IU Rep. 19.51p. 19;Legal Conscquencesfor Sram of the Corkence of Soioihfnm inNdia
(SoulhWerrAfnca) norwirhrrandingSecurie CouncilRerolurion276 (1970)Op..21s June1971,IO Rep.
1971 p.24. pwa.32WerrernSahara. Adv. Op.. 16th October 1IU5.Rcp. 1975 p.24. pan.31; Applic<rbbilj.
ofAnicleVlSeaion 22, of rhcConwmion on rhePnvileand lmmunirierof rhe UnirrdNations. Adv. Op., 1Sîb WHO/SolomonislandsWriuenObservatio ns:i(Cornprcoce)
The Opinionrequestedis ofiea importancefor the WHO inthe conduct ofits acOvities
relatinto the effectsof the use ofnuclemateriai snd weaponson hurnanhealth and
theavironment. TheWorldHealthAssembly hasdcdared thatthe "pnmary p~vation
of thehealthhazard osnuclearweaponsrequim clarityaboutthe Satus ininurnational
law of their use" since 'over last48 yean marked diffaences of opinionhave been
express4 by MemberStatesaboutthe lawfulnessof the use of nuclearwcapns'? The
WHO'Srequest seeks w clarifythe intanational legalcontcin which iu activitiare
wnducted, and to providea proper legalbasisfor the conduct ofits futureactivitiu.
..
2.6 Further, in making this request the WHO--is acting in conformity with the
recommendationof the UN General Assembly adQcssed toitsorgans and Specialised
Agencies. In Resolution 171A(ll) of 14 November 1947 the Gaieml Assembly
encouraged a greater use of the InternationalCourt, recommendingthat Speaalued
Agencies.should submitto the Court requens for AdvisoryOpinions on pointsof law
arisingboth withinthe competenceof the Coun and
mm'the courseof their aciivitier, ... if bey conccm questionsof principlewhich it ir
desirableio havewd.lu
It is in the spirit of the General Assembly'srecommendation,and utith a view to
enhancing thefocusand conductof iü activities, that the WHO has, as a Specialised
Agency entitled to request an Opinion, asked the Coun to provide assistanceon a
questionof significantimportanceu-ithinthe frameworkof its activities.
2.7 The factthat thequestion addressedto theInternationalCourtariswithinthescopeof
the WHO'Sactivities is clear from the Constitutionof the WHO and its practice
thereunder.Accordingly,the WHOis within ifsrightsandentitledto requean Opinion
on thisparticularquestionfrom the Court.
(B) The N'HO is acting in accordance with its Constitution
2.8 Thegeneralquestionposed b!.theKWO. whichaddresses thehealthand environmental
consquences of the use of nuclear weapons, falls within theobjective and functions
providedby itsConstitution.The WHOConstitutionembracesa broadscopeofactivities
relate- to humanhealthissues.
2.9 The Preamble sets forth a senes of principles which are stated to be "basitothe
-
Deccmber 1989.IU Rep. 1989p.189para.31.
' Resolutionof the World HcalthAssembly (46.40of 14tMay 1993.
'O Res 171A 01)'Nd for grcawerbu the United Nationsnadifsorgarsof the InternationalCourtof Justice';
Uh'. Rcpmo>y of rhUnircNariorûrgonr.Vol. V. Articles92-111 of the Charter. happiness, harmonious relations and securityof all peoples'. These indice and
mgnise the fundamentalimportanceof the protefaon and enhancementof human
heaith. ïhey also reflect the interdependenceof human health with related maners.
includinginternational peace and security. Amongsttheprincipleswhich arc pnicuiarly
relevant to the questionof the effectson humanhealthand the environmentof the use
of nuclear weapons,the following are eqecial loteworthy:
"Hcdth is a sraof cornpletc phyucal. mandmiai wcUking aod na merely the
absence of disuse or infumity.
Thec~jo~snr of tbhighenaminable rPndar df holtisone of the fuodrmenriau
of every human king witbout distinctrace.religion. political klicf. aoor
social condition.
The h4th of al1 peoples is fundameIothe auainmcnt of puce and aecunty and is
dependent upon the fullest cwpeof individuaandStates.(...)
Governrneors have a reiponsibiliry for tbe hulth of tbeir pople rvhicbcanbe hlfilled only
by the provision of adequate h4Lh and social meanires.'
2.10 The Oqanisation's objectiveis "the anainmentby al1peoplesof the highestpossible
level of heaith" (Amcle 1). To that end, the Organisationhas a numberof specific
functionsset outin Amcle2 of iü Constitution.lt isin theapplicationof thesefunctions
that the WHO has undenaken its activities. for many years. on the heaith and
environmentalconsequencesof the use of nuclear energy and matenals, including
weapons.
2.11 The functionsof the WHO include.inrerdia:
- 'to act asthe direcandcwrdinatingauthoniy on international hcalth work' (Anicle
Zia));
- to 'propose conventions. agreerncnu and rcgulations. and make recomrncndaiions in respect
of international healthrs anIOpcrform such duties asma? bearsigned thereby to the
Orgyiisation and are consiwithiuobjective' (Anicle ZR)):
- to 'mdy and repon on.inco-operation with other specialixd afcncies whcre necersary.
admininrative aod mial techniques afiecung public bcailhand medicai carc and preventive
and curative poinu of vieu. including hospiral services and social xcurity' (Anicle 2(p));
pad
-
'gentrally&t0 ail necesdry act10atlain the objective of rbe Organisation' (Anicle
Z(v)).
2.12 In directingand CO-ordinatini gnternational actionon humanhealth, and in accordance
with ~tsright to "takeal1necessaryactionto attain the objectiveof the Organisation",
the WHOhas decidedthatit wasessentialto request an Opinionfromthe Courton the
legalityof theuseof nuclearweapons,in viewof theireffecrson humanheaithandthe
environment.The WHO hasformulatediü requestso as toassistit in adoptingthebest possiblepathfor its futureactivitiinan areaof crucialinlanarionai importancewhich
clearly fails withinthscop ef iü activities.
2.13 ïhe effects of the use of nuclear enagy and materialon human hdth and the
environment,includingthoseresultingfrom the useof nucicarwcapons.is asubject that
falls squarelywithin thescop ef the WHO Constitution,evai if that instrumentdoes
not include any express referace tonuclear enagy. The WHO's legal mandate to
promoteandprotecthumanheaith, char- by apnventative approach. is direcriy
threatened by the risks posed by the use of nudear cnagy for civiland military
purposes. In its practice the WHO has- long-addressed questions rciatedto the
consequencesof the useof nuclearweaponson humanheaithand the environment.This
practice flows fromrelatedactivitiesofthe Organisationover many decades, including
in particular the relationshipbetween human heaith andthe environment; the heaith
consequencesof ionising radiationsmspective of theirsource; andthe effecton human
heaith ofthe use of conventionaiand other weapons. A findiig that the subjectof the
humanheaithand environmentaleffectsof the use of nuclear weaponsfell oursidethe
scopeof the WHO'sactivitieswould be surprisingand would conuadict the evolution
of the Organisation'spractice. It is a subjectthta no otSpecialixd Agency hasthe
cornpetenceor the expertise to address. It followsthat the question of the effects on
humanheaithand the environmentresultingfrom the use of nuclearweaponsoccup~es
a cenaal place in the activitiesof the WHO.
2.14 Further, interpretationof theConstitutionof theWHO"ingood faithinaccordancewith
the ordinary meaning ...and in the lightof iü object and purpose"" (an approach to
interpretation the importanceof which has frequently been emphasised by the
International Courtof Justice)"laves no room for doubt that theWHO Constitution
encompassesquestions relating to the hdth and environmental aspect of nuclear
weaponsuse.The studyof public heaithfroma preventivepointof view, withthe goal
of reaching the highestanainable standard of heaithfor every human being without
distinctionof race, religion,olitical belief, economicor social condition, cannbe
effectively undenakenwithouttaking account of the legal status of the use of nuclear
weaponsin international law. The importantreasons requiring the Court to give the
Opinion requestedare elaboratedbelow (infra. para. 2.55).
2.15 Morcover, itis clear that the Assembly is the comptent body to interpret the
Constitutionand determinethe policyand activitiesof the Organization. The functions
of the Assemblyas set out inArticle 18, include,inter alia,
" 1969Viema Conventioon theLaw ofTrutics(Anicle 31(1)).
'
p.184;Cprcfmnmning Righrof Naional of rhr UnircdSrauAmericain Morocm, Judgmmtof 27thAugust9.
1952. ICI Rep. 1952. pp.197Sout;h esAfriu saws.PreliminaryObjections. Judgotf 21stDecembcr
1962. IU Rcp. 1962. p.336. "(a) todeterminethepolicieroftheOrgnnirnri...]
to reviewad appmvereponr md activitofrfbeBoyd andofrbeDirectorGcneniand
(d) toinamcfthe Boardinregartomrriersuponwhichactionmdy, invMgaLioolor report
may be considereddesirabl...]
(m) touke anyotberappropriaactionto nulbertbeobjesDvttheOrginùltion"
The pradice of the WHO confiunrs itscornpetence over maners relaüng to tbe
(0
efiects on human healt and the environment of ionising radiation ~suiting from
tbeuse of nuclear weapons . ..
Anaiysisof the practiceof the Organisationsinceits establishmentwnfirms thatissues
2.16
relatingto thehealthandenvironmentaleffectsof the useof nuclearwcaponsliewithin .'
the WHO'Sscope of activity and that the Organisationis cornpetennt to requestan
Opinionfrom the Coun on the legalityof the uw of nuclearwcapons,in view of th&
effectson human hdth and the mvironment.
(a) The WHO iscornperenrIO acr in rhefield of environmemalproreuion
1.17 The protectionof the environmentcomprises an inte@ pan of the activitiesof the
WHO. Humanhealth. developmena tndenvironmentalprotectionmustbe considered as
inexmcablylinked(seeinfrn paras.4.3-4.3." Maintaininga healthyenvironment for
present and futuregenerationshas been recognised as essentiaito ensure the effective
fulfilmentof internationallegal and policy objectivesrelating to the promotionand
protectionof humanhealth.ThisisclearlyreflectedinWHO consensus texts such as the
Alma-AtaDeclarationof the InternationalConferenceon Pnmary Hdth Carel' and
the WHO'SGlobalStrategyfor Health for al1by the Year2OOO.I5
2.18 Agenda21, whichis theprogrammeof actionadoptedbyconsensusof 176panicipating
Statesat the United NationsConferenceon Environmentand Development,heldin Rio
de Janeiro in June 1992,has funher reinforcd the important roleof the WHOas the
appropnateinternational organisation to CO-ordinattehenumerous activitiesin the field
of hdth, sustainabledevelopmentand the environment.I6To address this task the
World Health Assemblyendorsedin 1993a WHO global strategy for health andthe
Il
SecOur Phner . urHeakh:Repon ojincWHO CommissiononHcakhoftheEnnroment. WHO, Geaevo.1992.
''
Dcclantion oAlma-Ata1978on Prima? HcalthCare.WHO. Gcneva1978. Thedcclaniion of rhein~cmptioonl
confcrc~cW. interaiithatthe 'promolionandprotectionof rhebuitb of thepeoesxntiatosus&cù
cconomicandsocial developmentandcontribuIOsabetterqualiryof lifeIOdworldpuce' (pan.üi).
'' WHA 34.36(1981).
l6 Sa espcially Chaplcr6 of Agcnda11. AICONF. 151/26 (1992) environment." The mategy reinforces a long-standingcommiunentby the WHO to
ensure that human health nsks resulting fromenvironmentaldegradation are properly
addresse..
2.19 Nuclearmaterialandweaponspose ,-t risksto theenvironmentand tohurnanhealth.
In the field of nsk management WHO condunt activitits which relate tonuclear
weapons,including,interalia:
"-monitoring and surveillanceof the biologiul..od ndiwrivv WntamiiiPtionof
air.waier and food,.and.periodic -meof pollutihm indusuialdcwlopment and
enerayuse; (..)
-periodicevaiuationof trends and problemsof environmenni pollution andContaminuion
of air, water and food,and of countrier'programmesfor thethesproblcmr;(..)
-developmentof nationaiand internacapviryto rrrpond to emergencieruiàng hm
industrial operations. from the use of chemicals or from the pruduction of Iuuclurl
encrgyV."
-
7he WHO iscomperentro acr in marrersrelan'ngro ionisingradiation
(bl
2.20 Since iü creation, the WHO has consistentlysoughtto reduce risks arising KI human
health fromthe use of ionising radiation. Its efforts to prevent risks arising from
exposure to such radiationhave been developedand applied irrespectiveof the source
.
of therisk, and extendto thoserisks posed by nuclearweapons.
7.11 As a result of iü activitiesin relation to ionisingradiation the WHO has entered into
associationwith the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation forEconomicCo-
operation and Development, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
InternationalLabour Organisationin adoutino. in 1982. Basic Standardsfor Radiation
of P~otection.'~The ~asicStandardsernphask thatthenorms it setsfonh are intended
to ensuothe securityand protectionof individuals,and "exigeencore une réduction du
risque poremiel collecny qui subsisre". The Basic Instrument also recommends the
maintenanceof "rouesles crposirions à des rayonnementsionisanrs au niveaule plus
bas qu'on puisse raironnablemenraxrcindre.comprcrcnudesfaaeurs économiques er
sociarrr".'O
" RcsolutioWHA 46.20, adoprcd May 1993: the Sintegywu prcparcdin rrspons1errsolution WHA 45.31
on Hcalth and Environment.
"
Ssc WHO'S Conrribvrion ro rhc Jnrcma~ionnlEffons roward Suslai~bie Dcvrlopmenr: Rcpon of the Dinaor-
Ccnerol,WHA 4211989RECll. Annrx 4.p.96.
19
Nonnesfondamenioler de radioprorenion. 1cd..Collection Sccurity No.IAEA 1983.
= Id. 2.22 Furtha, in the exerciseoIU wmptenΠinthe fieldof nuclear energy. theWHO has
mked int an Agreementwith the intanational AmmicEnergy Agency. The two
organisationshave agreed that "witha view toiâciigting the effectiveaüainmentof
objedves set fonh in their respectiveconstitutionalinnnimmts, within tgmd
frameworkestablishedby the Charterof theUnite Ndations,they will act in clCO-
operationwith each otherand willconsuieach othcr regularlyin ~gard tmam of
commoninterest" (Amcle l(1)).
2.23 The Agreementemphasisesthe recognition'by the World HealthOrganisation ihat the
internationalAtomicEnergy Agencyhasthe primary rrsponsibilitfor mcouraging,
assistingand mrdinating researchon, and dwelupmmt and practicaa lpplicationof,
atomic energyfor pceful uses throughoutthe world without prejudice the Rght
of the World Health Organisation to coneern iîseif witb promoting,developing,
arsisting, and cwrdinating international health work, includreseareb,in all its
aspects." (Anicle I(2))(emphasisadded).
2.24 -The competenceof the WHO in the field of nuclearenergy is clearreflecte td,in
tenns of this Agreement.The WHO'Sfield ofwmpetence u in no way fimitb cydthe
Agreement,butillusuatesthe Organisation's ritnlawto addressissuesrelatingtothe
use of nuclearenergy.AlthoughthisApment relatcs to thepeacefuluse of nuclear
energy, theWHO'sgeneralmandateto protecthumanhealthfrom thereleaseintothe
environmentof ionizing radiatimust be understoodto entirleit to address theuseof
nuclear energyand materialsformilitaq purposesas well. The WHO'sactivitiesof
promotion,development. assistanendCO-ordinatioonfinternationalhealthactionmust
be capableofbeingcmied out in relationto the useof nuclearenergy. irrespectiveof
whether itrelatesto civilorlitan.contexts.
In thisregarditisappropriateto recognisethaitheactivitiesof the1A!3 haveevolved
2.25
in such a way as to reflect the fact thatactivities relating to nuclear energymust
necessarilyencompassbothciviland rnilitaq aspects. In practice,activjtiesreiatingto
the applicationof nuclearsaieguards.whichwereonginallythoughtto be incidentaito
the activitiesof the IAEA. have becomeincreasinglyimportantin the wntext of the
Agency'sworkas a whole. Whatinitiallybegan asan efforito conuol thepeacefuluse
of nuclear matenai and installatiowitha view to avoiding theiruse for military
purposes, has been progressivelymsformed into the convol of the possessionand
proliferationof nucleararms." It is in this contextthat the Court shouldunderstand,
recognise,andactuponthelegitimatedesireoftheWHOtoaddressthethreatto human
health which is posed by nuclear energyia wherent and global manner. In this
regard, it is difficultto see howthe WHO mitddressthe consequencesof a human
healthand theenvironment of nuclearmaterialswithouttaking into accountradiation
resultingfrom theuseof nuclearweapons.For the Coun to derenninethatthe question
posedby the WHOin itrequestfor anAdvisoryOpinionfallsoutsidethe scopeof its
:. See1980 AnnuaRepon. InternatiAtomi:Energ)Agency.pp.4445. activitieswould have the effecî of haiting the WHO'Sefforts toprotect human health
from the use of nuclearweapons.Such an approachwouldaiso duiy the legal basisof
the extensive activities ofWHOe in this field whichhave b&n camied out so far.
(c) The WHOis comperemto address theheolth and environmemo conrequencesof
rheuse ofweapom
2.26 In the scopeof irs activitiesWHO hasfor a longtimeaddd the productionand
use of certain categories of ms,as weli as the destructionwhich such weapons can
cause. Thus, the WHO has.a long-standingconcan over the production and use of
chemicaland biologicalweapons.=
2.27 The dramaticwnsequences which the use of nuclear wcapons would have for human .
heaith and the environment has been, and mntinues to be, a maner for sustaincd
wnsideration by the WHO. Repom addressing theeffects of nuclear war on human
health and on health services which have been prepared at the request of the World
Heaith Assembly have had a significantand widespreadimpact on the international
wmmunity. Their conclusionsand recommendationshave never been ~hallenged.~'
This factprovesthatthe MemberStatesrecognizethe rightof the WHOto dealwiththe
questionof the use of nuclear weapons.
(dl Thequestionof rhelegalip of theureofnuclearweaponswirhinrheframework
of rheWHO'S acrivities
2.28 Since 1981the World Health Assemblyhasadopted a numberof important resolutions
addressingtheeffectsof nuclearweaponson humanhealthand theenvironment.In this
regard, it has been assistby the provisionof a series of expert speciaiisedrepom.
These resolutionshave formedthe basis for the conductof wide range of activitiesthe
WHOhas undertakenin relationto the use of nuclearweaponsand the legaiityof such
use.
2.29 The long-standingpracticeof the World Hdth Assemblyis reflected, in particular, in
iü ResolutionsWHA34.38. WHA36.28 and WHA40.24 on theeffecü of nuclearwar
- Se= W C publiqun mu chimiqucr ef biologiqWHO. Genéve.1970; Effa du chimiquu a
biologiqurrshrsanIc:Rappon du Direnrur ginCral. EBSll2novembre1987.
Effeas of nuclcarwar onheolrhami hcalrnscmiccrt Rcpon of rhclnrmuuio~lofapnuuninmadiai
scienceandpublichcrrlrhcrcaed by Resoluri34.38.WHO. Grneva,1984:('198WHO Report');Effeor
of nucienr war on heaadh healrh scrvic2nd cd.:Rqon Rom the WHO managemenrgroup on the
applicabilq of rcsohwn WH36.28WHO. Guieva,1987; ('1987 WHORepon')Effea ofnuclcarwu on
Wh and healrhsrrvicu: Repon ofWHOc managemetugroup ruponsiblc on rheapplicarionof Ruohion
W 36.28.A44nNF.Doc.15, =thApril1991('1991 WHO Repon').
1991WHORepon. p.7 pan.26 on human healthand hdth services. These werc each adopted by large majoritie~.~
Theresolutionsded thatithadbeen establishedandrecognizedthat nohumanhealth
service in the world had the capaEityto rrspond adequatelyto the consequenccsfor
hurnanheaithresultinghm the use of even a singlenuclearweapon.
2.30 Moreover, the reîearch towards sustainabledevelopmentwhich the World Heaith
Assembly hasched out (seee.g. Resolution WHA 42.26 on the connibutionof the
Organisationtowardsinternationaleffortssupponingsusgùrabledevelopment,as well
as ResolutionWHA 45.31 on the effects of the demon of the environmenton
human heaith)hasemphasisedthe saious adverse consequaices for the environmat
(and for humanhealth)over the shon- and long-termsof the use of nuclearweapons.
Theimpacton humanhdth andthe avironmat would be feltforgenerationstocome.
2.31 nie Repon of the DirectorGeneralon thc'effectsof nuclear weaponson humanheaith
and the environment, presented to the WorldHealth Assemblyin 1993," identifies
many of the issueswhich the WHO must address in relationto nuclear weaponsand
their use. TheDirector Generalstatedthat manyproblemsremainand newoneswert
arising:
"Fim. a large number of nucleweaponsa-cniIl in exinence and their production
worldwide ha<oot ceascd aitogether. Secondly nuclear weapons are nou. located on the
trrrimries of more countriss than bcfore. The possibilityof clandestine productionofnucla
weapons in ceruin countries basmade proliferation of great concern to world secunty.
'Ibirdly. there is the problem of the dirmanllinf and disposai of nuclear weapons and their
production facilities, bath of whicb could pore riskssafetof workers. the
general population and the environmenThe dirporal of nuclcar weapons and
decommissioning of production plans undoubledl? incrcaus the nced ior more raaioact~ve
waste disposù facilitiesand bener management. Founhly. problems aby thecerbated
facl thai the number of uncmployed nuclear weaponr? expem is growinf. which ma! lead
to undesirable dissemination of this expertise."
2.32 ThesealarmingfindingshaveledtheWHO. and in panicularits Assembly,to consider
theproperdirectionof its activitiesrelatingto theeffecu of nuclearweaponson human
healthand the environment.In the contextof iu considerationof thissubject, it has
becomeevident that itwas necessaryfor the Organisationto identifythe legalbash on
whichnuclear weapons mightbe used, under internationallaw, in order to ailou, itto
Resolution WHA 34.38 iadopted by 66-23-17) iWHA 34/19811RAC/Z): Resolution WHA 36.28 (adoprtd by 102-
12-8(WHA 3611983/REC/Z): Resolution WA40.24 (adopted by 66-13-28) (WHA 40f19871RECRisucehil
to dl thaa dscision an international organisation to escornpuenceovcr a panicular abject-matter
neuinotbe adopted unanirnoussu:Henry G.Schcmen. lnrernnrionai l~riturio~lip.203.
"
Seeme Effeas of Nuckar Weapons on Health anà rheEnvironmetu: Repon of the Direnor General. A46130.26tb
April 1993. p.3 pua.14. assessiu own activitiesin the mostefficientmanna pos~ible.~
(6) he WHO ir cornpeten!to act on maters concemingthe hedcvelopmeM nd
applicanonof inreni~~onn ilw relanngto hrmia ncoW and theenvironmm
2.33 Taking into accountthe existenceof noms of intemationaliaw. aswellas theiatmt
and the consequencesof their applic-on,are macten whichare famil i athe WHO
in itspracticein othereas.Inpractice.the applicationof principlesof internationallaw
is a subject which fquently preoccupiesthe WHO in the conduct of iu activities.
Respect for thede of law has an importantpartto playin the choia and direction
which the Organisationdecides to take in the conduct ofits activities. Bway of
example, respect for human rights law (and in particular the p~ciple of non-
discrimination) isrecognised as being of essential importance in the fmnework of
actions which the Organisationmight takein addressing the international challenges
posed by AIDS.2' No one would suggest that the hurnan nghts aspectsof AIDS
prevention and treatment do not corne within thescope of the WHO'Sactivities.
Sirnilarly, in relation to the managementof hazardouwaste, which has significant
wnsequencesfor humanheaithandthe environment,theWHO hasin iu activities taken
account of the internationallegislativeefforts whled to the adoption of thBasel
ConventionontheConaol of TransboundaryMovementsof HazardousWastesand their
Disposal.The WHOaisoparticipatedin internationalefforts Io developaninternational
Code of Practice on the msboundary movementof radioactive waste." TheWorld
Health Assembly, in many other fields, has addressedactions undertakenoutside the
framework of the WHO which nevertheless have important implicationsfor the
protection and promotion of human health. Examples include actions felating to
internationd peace and securiand threaü thereto. Thus. the WHO has rejected "any
embargoon medicalsuppliesfor politicalreasons. on account of the effecü on health
care of suchan embargo"and has appealed"in the spirit of paragra3hof Amcle 2 of
the UnitedNationsCharter. to al1MemberStatesof the United Nationsto abstainfrom
aggressionand theuseof threatsin their internationalrelations,includingthreatsagainst
medicalcentresand medicalproductionplanü. "'O
2.34 The practice of the WHO therefore demonstrates quite clearly that the actions of
preventionand protectionin the fieldsof human heaith andthe environmentcannot be
decoupledfrom those efforts whichseek to take into account, and apply, pnnciples of
internationallaw whichoverninternaiionalrelations. Suchprinciplesprovidethe basis
' RemlutioWHO 46.4of the WorlHealiAssemblyof14tMay 1993.ThisResolutiowu adopud byalarge
nujority(73-314).
Sk Re~~lulioWH0 41.24WHO 42.33.WHO 43.10 anWHO 45.35ofîheWorld Hdtb Assembly.
'P RemlutioWHO 43.3 oftheWorldHwlth Aswmbly.
ResolutiWHO 42.24oftheWorldHcalthAssemhly.
14 WHO/SolomonIslands'WnuenObscwatioprPM I(bmpience)
andindicatethedirectionwhichtheactivitiesof theOrganisation musttake.ïhe WHO'S
requestfor an Advitory Opinion must be understoodinthis context,and in the contut
of itworkas a whole.TheAdvisoryOpinionwhichtheCwn ha bea calledupon w
give, and which itshould &ive,on the question rcialingto the legality of thuse of
nucleaïweaponswouldallowtheWHO to ensurethatitsactivitiewae properlycarrie.
outin amanner which tookfullaccountof priorityneedsof theintwnationalcommunity
and were consistentwithapplicablenoms of intemationa aw.
(D) The cornpetenceof the WHOto quest îhh opinion dos not deropte frornthe
p~eiple of speciality
2.35 Itis wellwithinthespecialistandtechnicaexpertiseand ofthe cornpetaiceoftheWHO
to requestan Opinionfromthe Coun on the legalityof theuse of nuclearwtapons.
These considentions are reflected in the debate whichpreded the adoptionby the
2.36
Wodd Health Assemblyof Resolution WHA 46.40, which led to the request for an
Opinion fromthe Court. In that contextcertain Stateschallengedthe request for the
Opinion on thegroundsthatit felloutsidethe mandate ofthe WHO, takingaccountof
thespecificifyof that mandateand the politicalnatureof the question. CertaiStates
emphasisedthe needto accord agreaterprioritytoothertypesof activitiesin the field
of human health." Dunng the course of the debate the Legal Advisor of the
Organisation nevenheless reminded panrcipanü that it was for the World Health
Assernbly todecide iü competencein the contextof the Organisation'sconstitution."
Apan from the arguments relatingto the specialcharacterof the Organisationand iü
mandate,those Statesopposingthe request emphasised the burden, includingthe cost,
which wou!dbe placedon the Organisationbythe request.
2.37 Thepnncipleof specialityprovidesa bais for the divisionof tasksbetweenthevarious
organsandSpecializedAgencieswhichparticipateinthe UnitedNationssystem. Respect
for this principlerequires that each orxanisationshould have sufficient comperence
necessaryto ailowit to cany out its functionsand objectives,as the Coun harecalled
on numerous occasions."
"
Seeihe procrr-wrbaiu of CommissionB dunthe 46tWorld HealthAhsembly, A46lBISR18,A46lBISRl9,
A46/B/SR/10u wellasthe 'comp~rrendu' of 13thPlcnar).Sessionof tbeWorldHulth Asscmbly. A46/BR/13.
"
Reparafionfor Injuria SuiinrhrService of the ünired NafionOp.. 11Apnl 1949, IU Rep. 1949,
p.174; J~~wnolSrafurof Souh WcrrAfica. AdvOp..11luly 1950.1URcp. 1950. p.128: EofAwordr
of Compensation Ma&e rhe UniredNarionsAdminisrrafiw TriAdv. Op., 13 July 19IU Rep. 1954.
p.47; Cmain i2penres of rheUniredNations.Adv. Op., 20JuIU Rep.1962,p.151; LegalConsqvcncu
for Srau of rhe ConrinucdPrerence of SourhAfrica in Namibia (SourhWar AJnca) nonuirhrrandingSecuriry
CouncilResolurion276 (1970). Op..21 lune 197IU Rep. 1971. p.16.2.38 The applicationof the principle of specialitydoes not therefore mean that relations
betwegn the specialisedagencies and the United Nations should be interpreted in a
formalisticor rigid manner. PraFticeindiates that itis difficulto distinguishin a
precise manner thecornpetenceof each SpecialisedAgacy, panicularly vis-a-visthose
organisations which have genexaicompet~nce.~Momvcr, the field of activities of
each organisationhas evolved as a consequene of the nced to respond tothe broad
objectives which are escibiished by the constituent instruments of each of these
organisations. It is in this dynamic and constantly evolving wnwrt in the life of
inmational organisations thatitis appropriat e oundersrandthe basis upon whichthe
WHO has madeits requeston thequestionof the legalitof the useof nuclearweapons,
in viewof their effecü on humanhealth andtheenvironmat. Its Constitutiorequircs
ittoact for the "happiness,harmoniousrelationsand securityof all peoples'and in the
in- of "the highestanainablestandard of heaithfor every hurnanbeing".
2.39 The question of the effecü of the use of nuclear weaponson human heaith and the
environmentcannot be said to anach iwlf, a priori. to the cornpetenceof another
international organisationany more than tothe WHO'S. It is me however, in
conformitywiththeprincipleof speciality,thateachorganisationhasa particularinmt
whichis more or less specificinrelationto a genexaiquestion. It is only in relationto
those aspects of the questionwhich relate to its own activities and competencethat it
may conductactivities.
2.40 It is in thisspiritthat theWHO ha5requestedanAdvisoryOpinion from the Coun. The
WHO is not addressinp a question which touches upon the activities of any other
organisation. The WHO has not asked for an opinion on the issue of nuclear
disarmament,or the limirationof increasesinarmamenu, orgeneraldisarmamentissues,
on the prduction or proliferationof nuclearweapons.These are issuesover whichthe
United Nationshas a recognisedand unchallengedcompetence. Rather,the WHO has
asked a questionwhichrelatesonly to that aspectof the use ofnuclear weaponswhich
faiissquarelywithin itscompetence:namely.the legaiityof the useof nuclearweapons
taking into account theireffecü on human healthand the environment.In focusingon
the significanthumanhealthandenvironmenmieffecü which wouldoccurfollowingthe
use of any nuciear weapon. the WHO isaddressing a legai problem which &ses
squarely within the scope of its activitiesIdentifyingthe legai status of the use of
nuclearweapons, notablyby takingaccountof theconsequenceswhich wouldflowfrom
the useof suchweaponsonhumanheaithandon theenvironment.isa fundamentalissue
fortheWHOtoaddress,and uponwhich ineedstobeproperlyadvisedbytheprincipal
judicial organ of the United Nations.iitwishesto ensure that iü future activitiarc
properly oriented, and to ensure that such activitiesremain within its competmceas
providedby iü Constitution.
2.41 Funher, it is imponant to emphasisethat the technicalnature of many ofthe WHO'S
SΠin particularSchermen.supnote5. p.33. WHOlSolomonIslandsWrincoObsewationtParI (Compoce)
activitiesdoesnot excludethepossibilitythat legaiquhons mightbe addressedbythe
WHO in relation tothe preparationand conductof those activities." The significant
point isthat theOrganisationmusthaverecoursetothemeansnecessary toresolvesuch
issues, includinglegai issues. Clarificationof tlaw in ths am on the question
requestedof the Coun falls squarelywithinthemure of such issues.
(E) The Courtshouldgive the AdvisoryOpinion requested by the WHO
2.42 As is clear from the precedingdiscussionthWHO is entitledtorequestan Advisory
Opinion hm the Coun; howeverthe Courtis.not nquirrd,in wnfohty with Article
65 of its Statute,to reply tothe questionasked. The Couthas frequentlyinthe past
invoked the "permissive" formulation of Article 65 to conclude that "wmpeiling
reasons" could lead it to refuseto give an Advisory Opinio(see infa paras.2.47,
2.50.) TheCoun hasonlyreliedon its right to refusea requeston oneoccanon. This
wasin 1923 in theEarrernCarelia casewherethe Councilof theLeagueof Nationshad
askedthe Courtif theTreatybetweenFinlandandRussiaof 1920andits Annexrelating
to the recognitionof theautonomyofEasternCarelia,a Russianregion, was-bindingon
Russia. The Permanent Coun of Intemational Justice replied that the request
enwmpasseda disputebetweenFinlandand Russia, that Russiawas not a memberof
the Leagueof Nations,that it had not recognisedthe wmpetenceof the Courtand that
it refusedtopanjcipatein the Coun's procedure. Accordingto the Coun, thesewere
"peremptoryreasons" justifyingits refusalto givean Advisory Opinion."
2.43 That was the onlyoccasionon whichthe Coun relied upon the exception,despitethe
frequent requestsby States,since 1939,thaitshouldnoton a panicular mater give an
AdvisoryOpinion. Subsequentlyi ,n accordancewitha well-establishedjurispnidence,
the Coun hasnever refused to givean Advison Opinionon the questionposed. This
has occurred(a) for reasons ofpnnciple. andCb)on the basis of cerraincriteria which
have been fulfilled.
(a) îhe rearonsofprinclpleitrhichhaveled rhe Coun rodeciderogiveanAdvisos.
Opinion
2.44 The reasonsof pnnciple whichhaveledthe Coun to agree to givean Advisory Opinion
are the following:
-
the Opinionis no[bindin~(i);
- the Court has adopteda principleof not refusingto give an AdvisoryOpinion
(ii).
" Sa C.H.Vignes.Quaions juridiques infcrersanf!'Organisaion MonhisantéAFDI. 1963p.627.
" PCU. opinionof 23 luly 19SericB No.5, pp.27-28 (il TheOpinion is mr binding
2.45 In a caseconcehg the I~crprerarionof PeaceTrearia(1950) the Couri emphasised
that@venthe non-bindingcharacrerof theOpinionwhichit was giving - whichflowed
from "the sape amibuted by the Charterandby thesatute of the couri toan Advisory
OpionRn - no State can opposethe givingof the Opinion:
"Tbe Coun's reply is oniyuidvisov sbuostcru misb,it hmno biiing forse.It
followtbuno Se. wherheramernber of tUnitcdNationm un pmrent tbe giving
ofaoAdviwy Opinionwhicb tbUnitcdNationsconsidetok duinble in order toobtain
enlightenment asto the coofactioitshould
2.46 ïhe sameprinciplegoverns the present affair; the Opinionrequestedof the Court will -
remain, as is indicatedby its titie, purely advisoryand will not be bindingupon States'
membersof the WHO. Accordingly,the givingof the Opiniondoesnot dependon the
consent of any particularState or group of States."
(ii) InprincipierheCoun docs nor refuce10 giw Advisory Opiniom
2.47 If the "permissive"provisions'inArticle 65 ("theCourt mag givean advisory opinion")
(emphasis added))" implies that the Coun is entitled to refuse to give an Advisory
Opinion, it hasin practiceadopted an approachof replyingpositivelyto al1requestsfor
Advisory Opinionswhich are addressed to iT"where its response is intended to, and
will,enlighten in legaltermstheorganwhichhasmadethe request. AstheCoun stated
in theInferprerurion of PeaceTrean'es case (1950):
"The Coun's Opinion is fiven no1to the States. but to the organ which is entitled to requesi
itthercpiyoftheCour.wli ao 'oryan theUmtcd Nations'. rcprcscnu its panicipauon
' Judgmcnrsof the Adm. Trib. of I.L.O. von Complainrsmadeagainsrthe UNESAdv. Op.,23 October 1956.
IO Rep. 1956. p.84.
Y InrerprermioofPeace TreaiieAùv. Op.. 30 March 195010 Rcp. 1950. p.71;ApplicabiiiofAn. M. Sea.
22 of rhc Conwnrion on rhePrivileges and lmmunirierof rhe UNMaiiu CaAdv. Op.. 15 Deccmber 1989.
10 Rcp. 1989. pp. 188-189.
Y> Id.
P
Imnprnaion of Peace TrearieAdv. Op.. 30 March 195010 Rep. 1950, p.72Wurern Sahara, Adv.Op., 16
October 1975ICI Rcp. 1975.p.24.
"
Id.See al= Rucrvolionc ro rheConvenriotion rhePrewnandnPunishmenrof rheCrime ûemciàe. IU Rep.
1950. p.19Namibia Case.Adv. Op.. 21 June 1971IU Rep. 1971, p.27. intbeactiviticcof tbcOrdon.and,inprin~ipxlc,uldO:k reiuud.0'2
2.48 M& mufandis,this principle appliesto the WHO case. The WHO has becn
adddg for more than tm years the inexmcable problems relating to health and the
environment which result from any use of nuclear wcapons (supparas. 2.28crscq.).
It is therefore indispensable for the wnduniufactivities in this field that the WHO
shouldbe duly mlightened and informed of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons
(infiparas.2.562.57).
0) Crireriawhichneedrobe sanrfied inorderforthe Corn to replIO a rcquesfor
an Advisory Opinion
2.49 In order for the Coun to givean Advisory Opinion, it is necessary that tOpinion
rquested must fulfii the following criteria:
(i) the Opinion should not relattoa dispute in which one of the phes is a total
saanger to the Coun:
(i) the Coun is acting within ifsjudicial function.
(iii) the Opinion hasa practical significance.
As will be seen. in the present case these cntena are fulandlthe Coun should not
refuse toreply to WHO'Srquesr for an Advison Opinion.
/i) TheOpiniondoes nor relate ro a disputin hi chone of the punies is a roral
srrangerrothe Coun
2.50 Ln the &rem Carcliacase (1923). the Coun had said thaitcould not. in the guise of
an Advisory Opinion. deal with a dispute between two States where one had not
recognised itcornpetence. had refused to participate in the procedurwasnnot even
a member of the organisation which had asked the Opini~n.~' Since then, the Coun
has on numerous occasions declared that only "cornpelling reasons" would lead it to
refuse to reply to a request for an Opini~n.~ The "compelling reasons" envisaged by
' liurrprnarion of Pence TrAdv.Op..30 March1950.ICIRep.1950,p.71;pplicubilifAn.VI. Sec.22
of rhc Conwiuion on ihe PrInandImniunirierof rite UN. Adv.15December1989. 1U Rep. 1989.
pp186-189R:c~cwaionr ro rheConvenrionon rhePrrvcruionand Punishmeiuof rhcCrime 10 Rep.cide.
1950p.19.
' Pa. Opiniooof23 July1928Senes B.No.5 pp.27. 28.
"
Judgnuius of tAdm.Trib. of IL0 upon Complainrsmade againririe UNESCO.Adv.Octobn 1956IU
Rcp. 1956p.86;Cmain fipenses of rhe Adv.Op.,20July1962ICIRcp. 1962p.155 :mibio ae. Adv.
Op..21lune1971.IU Rep. 191.p.27. the Court haveaiways kn limitedtothe situation thatthe Court has been calledupon
toaddrest a dispute inrespect of which one of the parties thereto had not acceptedthe
cornpetenceof the Court. In the Weslem Saharo case(1975),the Court said:
.Inceruin circumsfances. tbercfoLnckof consent an inud Srstempy rcnder
the giving oanadviroryopinio incompaibleGth tbe Chut's judicid chnncurAn
innuice of thi wuldk wbenthe cirsumrrnncer dixhmpl togive a mply would have
the effect of circumventing the pmplca Suucu uot obligmd dlow iu disputto
be ~bmiaed tojudicid vuiement \niboitcopvnt if asi!aaion rbouuiu. the
powtn of the Coun under the discretion gWvRnbyM. 65. psn. 1. of the Sprue.
wwld afforsufficientlegs1metoemrc rrrpctforibcfundamenmiprincipleof consent
tojufidiction."'
2.51 Admittedly,in the present case, the questionwhich has been asked of the Coun docs
relate toan importantcontroversybetween States. Howtver, as the Coun itself has
recognised, underlying eachrequest for an Advisory Opinion there will always be a
wntroversy which has led the organisation tomake the request to theCourt:
'Difierences of view amonfn States on lefd issues have erined in practicaily cvery
adviwry proceeding: if ail were agreed. the new the Coun for advice would no:
uise.""
The mere existence of controversy does not mean that a contentious dispute exists
behveentheparties. In giving an Opinionon thelegalityof the useof nuclearweapons,
in view of their effecton hurnanhealthand theenvironment. the Courtwould resolve
a controversybut it wouldnot addressa dispute withinthe rneaningof Article36 of the
Statuteof the Court.
ne COUR, in giving irs opinion. will remain wirhin ifsjudicial funcrion
oi)
2.52 The Court has frequentlyernphasisedthat as the "principaljudicial ~rgan"~' 't should
remain faithfulto iü character:
"Thcre are cenain lirniis. howeve:. to the Coun's duty to reply to a Request for an Opinion.
It is not merely an 'organ of the United Nations'. it is eseniially the 'principal judicial
orfan' of the Orfaniution (An.92 of the ChanAn.a1 of the ~ta~t~)"."
Wcsrm Sahara. Adv.Op.. 16 Octobcr 1975IU Rep. 1975, p.3.
a
NamibiaCpte, Adv. Op..21 June 1971.IU Rep. 1971.p.24.
n
Jnrmpranrionof Pcam Tremiu. Adv. Op..30 March 1950.IU Rcp. 1950, p.71.
O Id.Judgmmu of Ihe Adm.Trib. oIL0 upon Cornplainu made againstUNESCO. Adv. Op..23 Octobcr1956,
IO Rcp. 1956. p.84.
20 AS frequentlyrecailedtheAdvisoryûpiion requestedof theCoun mustrelatetoa legai
question.
.1..inscsordaoce rvitbAh65 of irr SUIUIC.bun ungive an dviwry opinion only
on a legai quenionIf aquesion isnaïa Icgd one, Ibc Cavthrrno di~crrriointhe
maUcr: imus deciine to give the opinion rrquead."9
2.53 The fact that the questionhaspoliticalimplications is not in itselfan Obstacle to the
giving of an Advisoty Opinion: whcn the Court hasb&n askedto charannise a
particula rormof behaviourwith respect to the provisionsof trcaîyand customary law,
the Coun is performinga task which is cs~entiallyIcgal:
"II hasken argucd thu tbe queaiontotheCoun iintrmvinedwitb politid queaior&.
and tbat for this ruuon Coun hould refus togivean opinion. h is mie tbamon
intcrprelations of the Cof thUni& Nations uill have politicai siguifiunce. grut or
small. InLhenature of thinpitcould no[ be ofhennisTbe Coun. however. u~ot
amibute a political character to a requea whictnunderul;e an ervntiaily judicial
rask,aamely. the interpreraiion of provision.50
Inthepresent case. the questionaskedat the Counrelates to the compatibility oftheuse
of nuclearweaponswith theprovisionsof inremauonallaw, includingthe CO~SUNUO~
of the WHO. In asking the Courttocharacerise the behaviour (the use of nuclear
weapons)in the wntext of niles of positive law, the WHO is inviting rhe Coun, in
effect,tocany out ataskwhichquiteclearlyrelatestoitsjudiciaifunctions,namely"an
interpretativefunctionwhichfailsuithin the normalexerciseof itsjudiciaipo~en".~'
(iiT i)eOpinion will haveopracricoleflecr
2.54 The Coun doesnotgive AdvisoryOpinionsas an end in themselves:iü opinionsmust
have practicalconsequences.for exarnple by helpinga requesting organisation totake
decisionswhich willaffectitsactivitieson thebasisof theanswersgiventothe question
posedto the Coun. In the Western Saharacase (1975), the Coun had said:
"ln geneal. an opinion givby the Coun in the prerenl prŒeedinfs wfurnishtbe
ûeneral Arwmbly wiLhelcmens of a legal chamter relevant Io its funher treament of the
dccolonization of Western Sahara.
73. In any event. to what extent or degree iü opinion will have an impacton the action
of the tenerai Arwrnbly isnot for the Coun to decide. The function of10giveoun is
an opinionved on law. oncithad corne to the conclusion that the questions put to it are
relevant and have a pracitcal and contcmporary efiect and. concequently. are not devoid of
Cmain Eapcntu of rhe UN. Adv. Op.. 20July 1962.1U Rcp. 1962,p.155.
SO Id.
3,
Condirionof Admissionofa SrmeroMembcrshipin rheUnircdNorions(An. 4 ofrhc Chmer). Adv. Op..20July
1948.IU Rcp. 1947-1948.p.61:Cennin.&penser of rhc UN. Adv. Op..20 July1962, W Rcp. 1%2. p.156. WHO/SolornonWladr' WriuenObservations:1a(Compucocc)
In sum, the choices madeand the acts taken by the WHO will depend directly on its
2.55
knowingwhether theuseof nuclearweaponsisiegalor iiiegai. Thereforeit is imponant
bat the Coun shouldreplytothe question posed. Even ifthis has considerablepolitical
implications, it is nevertheless fundarnentallylegalmatter, and theCoun's repiy
would, in concreteterms, enlightenthe WHOin the condua of its activities.In thelight
of the Court'spnor jurisprudence, thereartno legal grounds for the Coun todecline
to givean AdvisoryOpinionon the questionsubmittedby the WHO. Monover, world
public opinion would find it difficult-îo undastand why the Court should refuse to
answeran imponantlegalquestionwhich hasdomi~ted international relationsfor more
than half a century, particularlywhere thequestionhas suchprofound implications for
the future of humanity.
2.56 Assumingthat the Coun was of the Opinion thatunder certainconditions theu& of
nuclearweaponscouldbe compatiblewithinternationallaw -qwd non (seeinfa. paras.
3.34 er seq.)- the WHO would then be entiti& to take specific aprion measum to
prevent and reduce the adverseeffecü of a nuclear conflict, andspecifiaposfenon
measuresto attendto theneedsof the victimsof any suchconfiict. Evenif, since 1961,
a great majontyof Stateshave&en the viewthat any use of nuclear weaponswould
be illegai under internationalla(infr pa.ras.3.25 etseq.),there remainsa minority
whichtakes theoppositeview. Itisclearly necessaryfor theWHOto knowwhetherthat
minonty is, as a matterof internationallaw, correct in order for it to be able to adopt
the preventativeand curativeprocedures necessaryto limit the number of victimsand
to limit the sufferingofosewhoare injuredas a result.Similarly,theWHOwillneed
to redouble iü efforts, together with other Speciaiized Agencies and intemational
organisations, todeterminewhatlevel of resultradiationin foodstuffs,if any, wouldbe
safefor humanconsumption,andwhatlevelof radiationin a given environment.if any,
could be safeenoughto ailow humanaccessto such areas.
-
Specificallyin regard to preventative measures, the WHO would, for exarnple, be
justified in developing a programme forthe constructionof shelters, including basic
standards for theirconstructionand the availability of foodstuffs forurvivors and
necessary survival equipment; the WHO would be entitled to develop special
programmesofpreparationandeducationfornuclearwarwhich might be madeavailable
in schools and for the public at large. lt would equally be requireto assist in the
uaining of appropriatehealthservicesand civilprotection.With regard to assistanceto
the injured, the WHO would no doubt haveto give senous study to the specificneeds
of hospitals, and to consider the means of malung appropriate ueatment available to
large numbersof victims of bums or radiation. Eitherway, the WHO would need to
take into account the panicular conditions of each State, including its health and
"
Wem Sahnru. AdvOp.. 16Oclober1975.ICI Rep. 1975.p.37. econornicconditions. Throughthe WHO new aid programmes rnight be nudied or
establishedwith a viewtoprovidingdevelopingcouriaies with the necessarymeansof
protecting itself against the wnsequences of a nuclear conflict. For a small island
wunuy witha limitedtemtory andfinancia lrsources the activerole of the-WHO,in
botha preventativeand curativcapacity,would be indispensabletoits sumval.
2.57 If, ontheotherhand,theCoundecidesthat any use ofnuclearweaponswould be illegal
under international laas this Govanment argues, thenthe WHO would be atitled
underits Constitutionto limitits policytoactiotakentovent not the effecu of a
nuclearwar but theveryuse of nuclearweapons.Withinthe fieldof activiticswhichis
its own, the WHOcoulddevoteiuelf, in fulknowledgeof the applicableinteniational
lawand its legal righttothe work which ithas alreadybeen canying out to expose
the homkng consequencesof a nuclear for human health and the environment. In
'
panicular, it wuld continueto focusthe attentionStatesof the difficulty,if notthe
irnpossibility,of treating the victims of a nuclear accident or restoring damaged
environmentsto a conditionwhich are able to sustain hurnan life. Whether legal or
illegai, the Opinion of theCoun. and theconclusionsit reaches, will determine the
'directionwhichtheWHO takesin actionandin policyin the cornin: yean in tarea.
m Conclusion
2.58 For the reasonsset outabove itis submittedthat the Coun shouldgivean Opinionon
thebasis that the WHO is cornpetentto requean Advison Opinionfrornthe Coun,
and that theCoun iswmperenr iû:ive.and should give,an .4dvison Opinionon the
questionsubrnitted. WHOlSolomoIslanWritiObsemtionr: üA (LwoArmedConfiico)
PART II
l''HELEGALlTY OF THE USEOF NüC'LEAR WEAPONS IN VIEW
OF TBEIR EFFECTS ON HUMAN HEALTH AND THEENVIRONMENT
PartIIof this Memoxandumof Lawdivideinto th= Sections. SecAiaddresses
3.1
the legality of useof nuclear weaponbynfcsaice tothe applicabrulaof
internationalofarmed wnflict @aras.3.2-3.95). mBaddressethe legalityof
the useof nuclear weaponsby reference todae of international law for the
protectionof human health and the [email protected])C briefly
addresses the responsibility of a State for the wnsequences of a violation of irs
obligationsas set forth in [email protected]).
SECTION A
The use of nuclear weapons and the international law of armed
conflict
3.1- The legality of the use of nuclearweaponsraises three issues in relation to the rules
govemingthe methodsand rneansof warfare:
what is the law applicableto the use ofnuclear weapons?
(a)
@) whatare the applicablesubstantiveniles of that law? and
(c) to whomdo those niles apply?
The submissionsmade in this pan of the Mernorandurnare that:
the use of nuclear weaponsis subject to intemationai law,includingthe rules
relatingarmed conflic(A);
thatany useof nuclear weaponsis illegalundergeneralintemationai lawand the
WHO Constitutionin parric(B)and
that the relevantrules of internationallau apply to al1States(C).
SpecificalPan A of SectionII argues thatthe rules of law of armed conflictand law
goveming friendlyrelationsprohibit the useof nuclear weaponsin any circumstances,
sinceany such use wouldviolate:
the limitationon thechoiceof meansof anackingthe enemy;
thepermanent obligationto distinguishbetweencombarantsandnoncombatants; the prohibition against atgckinciviliantargeu;
the prohibition against aaacking healsnviccs;
the prohibition againstthuseof chemical weaponsor poisons or weaponswhich
have indiscriminate effets;
the prohibitionagainstthe use of weaponswhich mder deathinwitable or cause
unnecessary suffering;
the prohibition against violating the territorial inteprity and ncunality of third
States;
the prohibition against causingwidespread, long-term and severe damage to the
mvironment;
the obligation to respect the principles of proportionality and humaniry; and
the prohibition againstgenocide or crimes against humanity.
These rules are well-established,findingtheir sourcmany of the classical instruments
governingjus in bello, includingthe 1868St Petersburg Declmuon. the 1874 Brussels
Declamtion. 1899Hague Dalaration IV. Regulationannexed to 1907Hague Convention
IV, 1925 Geneva Protocol, 1948 Genocide Convention. 1949Geneva Conventions
(A) The use of Nuclear Wûapons issubject Io International Law. including the rules relating
to amed conflict
(a) n2e use of wlear weapom issubjecr rogeneral irueniorio~l la~t
3.3 It has ben suggested that in the nuclear age the normal mles of international law have
ben suspended, or perhaps set aside aitogether, for ail maners relaung to nuclear
~eapons.~'There are no principled groundsin law or policy IO suppon this view. The
use of nuclear weapons like any other activity carried out or authorised by States, is
subjectto the general and thespeciiic rules of internationallaw, includingthose reflected
in theWHO constitution.
3.4 The use of nuclear weaponsis subjectto therule of law. The development of newforms
of behaviour, including methods and means of armed conflict, dws not bring into
question the law applicable to ir. The arrival of a new modu opcrandidoes nmodiiy
" SceE. David. 'A proposde cenainesjustiiiuiions thtàl'emploides armenucléains.Meian~ePiaa
(1984)p.349;Puc 11Aof thewrittenobscrwationiss largelybascdosnidy. the applicationor effectof themle of law. Asthe fim AdvocateGeneralof theBelgium
Military Coun stated:
"Ce n'en par à deprdhes qu'il furt rappqueriadécouvened'un nouvuu modus
oprandi en nie de commenre und infrnneopournit avoir l'effet de rendre caduque la
ICgislauonqui définitcette infniqu'a~cuneforme nouvelle de crimidit6 n'a d'effet
abrogaioire du droit po.Ytif
Accordiingly,the inventionof the machin gunor the tank has notfor& Statestoadopt
specificrules todetennine the legalityor the illegaiityof th& use?'The kw of armcd
wnflicts applies to aii fonns of weaponry. Any otha view would undennine the
internationalmle of law. It is thearms that maninventswhich oughtto adaptto existing
rules, not theotherwayround. Anyotherapproachwouldpermitthe inventionof new
weaponstocircumvent the operationof legalmles under internationallaw.
3.5 As setout herdter, the use of nuclear weaponsis subject tothe general intemational
law of med conflictand to the morespecificrules. includingthose reflect inedhe
1977Geneva 1Additionalto the GenevaConventionsof 12 August 1949,and Relating
tothe Protectionof Victirnsof InternationalAnnedConflict ("1977 GenevaProtocol 1").
(bl The ure of nuclearweaponsis subjen ro inrem'o~l law of anned conficrs
3.6 The practiceof Statesreflectsthe ovenvhelrningview that nuclear weaponsare subject
to the internationallawof armedconflict.UN GeneralAssemblyresolution1653(XVI),
which specificailyaddressesnuclearweapons.Statesin its preamblethat:
'the useof wupons of mas destruction. causing uiÿiecersary human suffcring. war in the
w: prohibitcd. a bcang contrary io the laws of humaniiy and io the principles of
inurnational lau.. by internat~onal declarations and bindinf agreementthesuch ar
Deciarat~onof SI. Pcicrsaurg of 1868. the Decharaiionof the B~ssels Conierence of 1874.
the Conventions of the Hague Pcace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. andthe Geneva
Protocol of 195. to which the majoriiy of nations are still parries".
The paragraphwasadopted bu 63 votesin favour, onevoteagainst. and 31 abstentions.
Since then, the GeneralAssemblyhas consistentlyendorsedthe approach taken by the
vast majorityof States in resolution 16530(VI)." Other organizationshave taken the
Y CilcdinA. Andries. 'Pour une penconsidintion de la wrnpiiuice desjuridictions pénalesnationales a I'Cgd
des emplois d'armes nucliairRDPC 1964. p.34 ('Andries').
Cf. JFricd.'htcmational Lw Prohibis the FirUseof Nuclear Wc~pons'RED1 1981-1982.p.37.
" mes. 2936 (XXVII).29 November 1972 (734-46). Pmmble; 351152 D. 12 Deccmber 1980 (112-19-14).
Reunble; 36/921.9 Deccmber 1981 (121-194). Pmmble: 371100. 13 Deocmber 1982 (117-17-8). Preanble:
38173 G, 15 Decernber 1983 (126-174). Prurnble; 3H.612 December 1984 (128-17-5). Plumble; 40/151
F, 16 Decernber 1985 (126-174). Prarnbl41/60 F.3 Dec+mber 1986 (132-174).Pr+imble; 42139 C. 30 sarne approach. The XxthInternationalConfemce of the Red Cross(Vienna,October
1965)adopteda resolutionby 128votes in favourand thrceabstentions(withno votes
against) solemnlydeclaringthat 'the general principlesof the law of armed wnflict
apply w nuclear weaponsand other similar weapons" (translation). Therrsolution
reflectsStatepractice, as it wassupponednorablyby non-govmmental organisations
(national organisations oftheRed Cross, Leagueof Red CrossSocides, International
Commit- of theRedCross)butalsobyStates(StatePaxtiestotheGencvaConventions
of 12August1949("1949Geneva Conventions') , hichparticipatein theinternational
Conferencesof the Red Crossin accordance with theStatute of the internationaRed
Cross (Article l(2)). ..
3.7 Militarymanualsaddressingthis issue alsostipulatethat theuse ofnuclearwcaponsis
subject w the rules of internationalhumanitarianiaw applicabletothe methodsand
meansof warfa~e.~For example,the miiitaryinstructionalmanualof the UnitedStates
of.Americastatethatthe useof nuclear weaponsis subjectto "threebasicprinciplesof
thelaw of war - militarynecessity,humanityandchivalry - that limit the discretionof
belligerentsin al]cir~umstances".~A ' t thesigning of the final Act adoptingthe 1977
Geneva Pmtocols the US representativedeclared, moreover, that even if the 1977
GenevaProtocol 1 does not regulateor prohibit the use of nuclear weapons(on this
point, see infra. para. 3.17) it is nevenheless the case that: "their use in Ume of
hostilitiess govemedbyexistingprinciplesof internationallau. "'OThe Britishmilirary
manualadoptsa similarapproach:
"liJheris noruleof imernationaIin=.dcaiingspeu;rhtheuseof nuclearweapons.
.iM
Theifux.ihereforeigovernedb?thcgeneralprincipllaidom in thisChapie.
3.8 InBelgium,duringthepreparatoryworkforParliamen- approvalof the 1977 Geneva
Protocol 1the Consei d 'Etor(legislative sectioimplicitlyrecognisedthat if thenew
rules of the Protocoldidnot applyto nuclear weapons.these were nonetheless subject
to theclassicalrules of internationallau of armedconflict:
November1987(135-17-4). Prumble:43!7E. 7 Dccember1986(133-174). Pmmble: 4-41]1C.15D&ember
1989. Prumble (134-17-4);45/59 B. 4 Dcccmbcr1990(125-17-10). Pramble; 47/53 C(126-21-21). Rwmblc;
481'7B. 16Dscmber 1993 (120-23-24). Prcamble.
" Se+UN Doc. A19215.Vol. 1.pp. 172-7: (French)
Y
Cid inR. FaikMd E. MeyrowiU.TneSrariüof NuclcarWeaponsunderlnrmtruionbu* (ronm). p84. n.114.
'O
9 June 1977. CDDHlSR.58. pan. 82: inAna de laConférencediplornariquesurlorcafzi~muuioa le
déwloppanenzdudroit inrrrnnrionalhumaniiaireapplicnbiu donsiu mmisi(Genève. 1974-7)'Acies').
Bme, 1978. 1.3e partie.p. 301.
" Ma~d OfMilitaryLw. 1958. PanIIIW. 1 13cirdin Cornmenrairudu Proiocoia nddirionekdu 7juin 1977
OJIConwntions de Gcnévcdu12 miil1949 ul.hyY. Suidoz. CSwinudÿ. B. Zimmcmun, ICRC - Mpninus
Nijboff(1986) ('Comnrenraircr').p.601. 11.33. .The co~wnarr dich v& erublirbcd on thi soin(thekt rbPlthe nepoti.tiwnre not
wncerned with the regulationof the uu or nonof nuclw wcspons] kmn the grut
nuclcarpowcn aodwhicb hasfrquently ban qdfied PI the plocing 'kmn brpckeir'
of nuclearweaponr. mm beinterprr~ePIrr&g uclusivdy 10the new CUkS in Prnmcol
1.ïhe mlts contajntd in other internrtiod .lmeninicb PIthe mue Conventionsof
1899and 1907and the &neva bumanimian wnventions of 194are wraffectcdand remin
thcY value'." (authon' translation: empbrùs dded)
3.9 The jurisprudence of wurü on the appiicabity of internationa il w to nuclcar weapon
islimited. A noteworthy exception is the 1963 decision of the Tokyo Disma Coun,
which reject the view that internationai -law did not rcgulate the use of a nuclcar
weapon on Hiroshima because of its novelty:
"the prohibitionin tbcaseis unded to include not only case wbere there is an
expressprovisionof directprohibitiondu,ttheu Acre itisnecersKily regardcdthpl
the uu of a newweapon is probibi& fromthe inurprctation andPnrlopicai applicationof
eristinp international lam and repuiations (intedoncuaomary laws and uuties).
Funber. we mus undemand mat tbe prohibitionincluddu, the uu where. in the light
of principles of international law which are the basis of the above mentioDedpositive
intemationailam and regulations.tbe cof a new mpon is admirtrto bcconuary to
the principl[...Therefore.WC cannoi regard a newweaponas legalonly bcuuw if is a
new weapon.and iiissfilri& bai a oeu.wcaponmusfbe expowd io the examinationof
positive internaiionai.."^'
At various points in the judgment the Tokyo District Coun recognised the applicability
of the classical rules of international law of armed conflict to the bombardrnent of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki by nuclear weapons."
3.10 For the great majority of international junsts there is no doubt that the use of nuclear
weapon is subject to international law. and the exarnples cited below are merely
illustrative." The amouni untren on this subject reflects the strongly held views of
6, 1. Salmon and R. Ergu. 'La pntiquc du pouvoir eauutiet IccontrOlcder chambres législatimesmatièrede
droit international' (1984-1986) RBDI. 1967. 1.noteE-D.
Tokyo District Coun.Jud~f of 7 Ducmber 1963. Jap.Ann.1.L..1964. pp. 235-36.
" Id..pp.234. 236. 241.
Y Sa E. Cam. 7he Pruenr Lw ofWar and h'eurralir(1954). pp.10647: SpaightAir Power and War Righrr,
(1947). p.276; H. LputerpachtOppcnheim'slnrnario~l Lx. 1952. 7th cd. p.347. sll6; J. Gm, ihc
Modm Lw ofLund Warfarc. (1959). p.571 citzd in M. W3itemaDipur of lmrrnarionalLaw. Washington US
GPO 1968. pp.482-83: R.E. Charlier. 'Questions juridiques soulev& par I'tvolution de la science atomique',
RCUII, (1957). vol 91. p.354: G. Schwarzcnbergerïhe Lcgali. of Nuciear Weapom. (1958). pp.434; N.
Singh:Nucicar Weapnr and lnrernarionalLon,. 1959 pp.147erseq: H. Meyrowiu. 'Ls jurism devant l'a-
nucléaire'RGDIP 1963 pp.844-848; Friuloc.cirpp.34 u seq:A. Andries 'L'emploie del'arme nucltairest
uiicrime degucm' La RevueNouvelle (Bmssels). Marcb 1983. p.320.id..Andries loc.ci~.pp.33 erseq.;J.
Ve<haegen. 'L problèmepénalde la dissuasion nucl6airc'. RDPC. 1984. pp.2û-Srarmenr on rheIlieg&yo/
NucLar Warfare. The Lyen ComMtiee on Nuclur Policy. New York 1984;Appeldu jukru mm b gvme many jurists on the subjeit of the use of nuclear weaponsand international law,
includingJudges ofthis InternationalCoun and otheriiiusmousjurists.
nus, the Institut de Droit International adopted a! iu 1969 Edinburgh session a
molution on "La distinctioentreles objectifsmilitai ertesn milirairesengénéra et
notammentles problèmesquepose l'existence des armes de desmimionmassive'. The
resolutionrecalled
'la cc~~que~cesquelaconduiteindiscrimdrrhoailit&.eparIicutièrcmentl'emploi
der armer nucltri[..peut enm~r pau lu poptJplionruvikr et pour I'humutiti
entière'
and noted the existence of mles "à observer lors de conflits armb par tout
gouvernment",notablythe prohibitionagainstattackingcivilians, the use of weapons
havingindiscriminateeffecü, and
"notamment l'emploi armesdont l'effet destresttropgrandpour avoir iue limjti l du
objectifs militairesdticrmincs ou ennincontr6kb(armer'auto~CMratnces'nipriqueder
"65
armes aveugle.
in other words, the institur has implicitlyrecognisedthe applicabilityof the law of
armedconficü to the useof nuclearweapons.
Ic) 7he use ofnuclear weaponr is silbjecro rhr 1977 Genei8a Prorocol I
3.il Theuseof nuclearweaponsisalsosubjecttotherelevantprovisionsof the 1977 Geneva
Protocol1. It is imponant to expresslydemonsuatethis. since the Protocol does not
expresslymention nuclearweapons,and further:
(i) dunng thepresentationof the drafttext toserve as abase for the discussionsof
thediplornaticconferencetheICRChaddeclaredits unwillingnessto broachthe
questionof nuclearweapon~;~and
(ii) declarationsmade by the UnitedKingdom.the UnitedStatesand France (,tthe
beginning andlorat theendof theConference), statedthatal1or pan of the 1977
nucléaire.petitiotheyBuruu Internaiional de la Paix (1987).
" Ann.l.D.1.. 1969,Vo1.53. II. p.360
'Problcms rclating to atomic. bacteno1o:ical and chemiuluwvsubjecrs of intedona~rgumairsor
negotiations by govemmuirs. 2ndin subthetidraft Additional Protocols tdoalnotinteadtobmpch
tbose problems' (innsjatioICRC.nPro]crdr Prorocolcr &dirionaur bnwmion de Gncvr du 12M&
1949. Geneva.1973.p.2. Ana. WHOISolomon Llands' Wrincn ObservatioPan M (Lw of Ar& Conflic%)
GenevaProtoc011dd not applytonuclearweapons."
fi) Noconsensuserisrson whethernuclearwpns are cowd by Proroc01 1
3.12 Whenthe law prohibits cerraincondua without spbfying al1 the ways in which such
conductrnightoccur, such silencedoes not imply tha the condua isauthorisedunder
anotherguise. The silenceof Protocol1 does not thaefore signifythai iis permissible
to use nuclear weaponsto carry out activitiesprohibited by the Protocol. It rnay be
possibletogo further in adoptingthe view ihat the Rotoml docs prohibit the use of
nuclear weapons in a quai-explicit way, since it prohibits atracks on nuclear power
plants (Art.56). As A. Andnes has written:
"IIy'aunit en effet convadicdansles termesinterdirla dcaniction des centrales
nucléaires cause des forces dangereuses qu'elles peuvent(art.56.1) mut en
n'interdisant pas la libérauondcesforces par l'explosiond'une arme nuc~éaire.~
3.13 Somewriters have concluded that a consensusexid at the DiplomaticConferenŒon
the Reaff~mationand Developmentof InternationalHumanitarianLaw Applicable in
Amed Conflicts(Geneva,1974-1977).thatProtomII didnotapplyto theuseof nuclear
weap~ns.~~This view cannot be confirmed. Many States put foward the oppositc
view, both durinp the Conferenceand afterwards. Indeed, the proliferationof viewis
so conmdictory thatit isimpossibleto identifya consensus existeo dn the inapplicability
of Protocol 1to the use of nuclearweapons.
3.14 Duringthe early sessionsof the Conference.the UK. relyinpon the lCRC Declaration,
declaredthat the Protocols
"mus: no: brmch probleins conceruih atornlc. bacteriological or chernical uarfare,
which wcreLhesubjcc:of cxisiing inierna:~onalagreementsad cunent Jclicate negotiauons
by Governments elwwhere Itwas on the arsumption tha: the drafi Protocols would not
affect lhow problems thai the United KinpdornGovernment had worked ad would continue
i70
to work towards final agrecmeni on the Protocols.
Sirnilarly,Swedenwantedtoaddresscertainwnventionalweapons,butemphasisedthat
"[tlheproposais did notcover atornic,bacterio1,ogicaalnd chemicalweapons [and]that
''
UK. 6thMarcb 1974.CDDHISR 13 pan. 36Ana V. p.130: 9th June 19CDDH. SR.58 pan.119,Aacr VI1
p.310;US. 9th June 197CDDHlSR.56. pan. SZ.Ana \'Ilp.301;Fmce 8th Junr 1977CDDH/SR 56. pun.
3.ACWJ vn p.199.
a A. Andriesloc.cir. pp35-6.
* H. Meyrowik 'L stratégienucl&ire et le Protocole additionnel 1aux Conventions de GenèRGDIP,949'.
1979 pp.915-17, 928-29. Andries bc.c;r.. pp.35-36.
6ib March 1974CDDHISR. 13 pan. 36Ana V, p.130 WHO/Solornon isiands' Wrinrn Obwwations: Pan M (Lw of Anned Conîücu)
discussion should be confined to conventionaltypesof warfare [...].""
3.15 During the same session, however, many otha States tookan altcmative view. ïhe
following are illusuativeexamples. Ghana mted that
"The uw of oew types of w+apons appured on Ihe agenda ofnvo imponaDt conferenccr
cumntiy mŒtinp in &neva and in Vienua. The mainpurposa of u iurt ooe of tbcmw-u
to liit the uw of svatsgic arms which îaildMill in tbe deaniction of al1 Und.
Consinently wirb ihe contemporarytrend poliuultboughr. the Conference shoulddech
the cornpieteprohibition of useof oew wuponr indl wnflicrr. Expcricnce hd show
bat the uu of aich weapons could affeckmceot civilianssome diarnce fmm the ara
dimUy aaacbed. Surely, preventionwas kDcribao cure..n
Accordingto Rumania:
"Nuclcar. bacteriological. cbemical and biological weapons asweil asail wrapmas of
denruction should be banned"."
A similarviewwasproposedby the People's Republicof China:
"The neu Protocols should unequivocally provide fo: the prohibiUon and deslmction of
nuclcar wcapon:I...].74
Accordingto Iraq:
"The principles that haIObe s:reswd were the proleciion of the c~\.iiianpopulation in
armed conflicu: the pronibiiion ofnuciear. b~oloficaland cncmicai wcapons ana of cenain
'5
conventional weapons of mw des:ruciior.l...]".'
For Zaire, the Conference should
"Cive paniculn~aneniion Iothc iollowinf pointl...prohibition oIhc use oi weapons
Liabi10 inflict unnii7bar) sufiering on civilians. cspecially bacieriologi:a!. cnemical and
nuclcar wupons: [...].
". 7th March 1974. CDDHISR. 14 para. 21. Acta V, p.ldi.
5th March 1974. CDDHISR.10 pan. 36. Aucs V. p.92.
" 5th March 1974. CDDHiSR.11 para. 13. Ana V. p.99.
"
6th March 1974. CDDHISR.12 pan. IE.Acta V. p.116.
" 6th March 1974. CDDHlSR.12 para. 32.Ana V. p.119.
''
11th Mmh 1974. CDDHiSR.19 para. 5. Ana V. p.189.
3 1 For Albania.
.M&ods of warh indiurirnioltcfiecoingthe ci& populirion, nicas luimic
weapoar. bombardment of civib populirionrrd deporoOon, mun k rpecificaily
prohibite.n
Itis thereforeclear that duringtheearly stages of the Confaena no consensusexisted.
3.16 The nuclear weaponsissue washardly debated again duringthe Conference,although
in 1975, the People'sDemocraticRepublicof Korea cornplainedabout the instailation
of nuclearwcaponsin SouthKorea and statd that:
"the production. tcningusedof nicwcapons shovld k pmhibilcl...)"."
In response, the US made it clear that it did not wish to address nuclear weapons.
recallingthe ICRC draft had not included anymies on nuclear weap~ns.~~
3.17 The questionof nuclear weaponsreappearedat the end of the Conference,during the
final declarations. France t,e US, and the UK declared that 197 Geneva Protocol I
did not applyto nuclearweapons.The declarations differin toneand content. France,
which proposeda mostextremeapproach:
"wisbes to makiquiteclear thiüGovernrnentcould not under aoycircumnuices permit
ibe provisions of ProiocoIO[...Iprohibihe use of an? spccific wsapon wbiil
considers necessary iüdefcncl.l...It accordinglyulsh10stress thatiünviewibe
mles of the Protocols do no: IOthe use ofnuclcar weapon.a0
ïhe US representative.whilst adminingthat the use ofnuclear weapons"is regulated
by existingpnnciples of internationallaw". stated
"IIwar his Government's understandingthat ibe niles established by the Protocol were no1
intended to have any cffcct on. and did no1 refulale or prohihit the use of. nuclcar
wcapons.-81
ïhe UK took the view thar only "the new mies" establishedby Protocol 1 would not
apply to nuclear weapons.For the UK representative
-
19th Marcb 1974. CDDHIIII.SR.8. para87. Ana XI\', p.76.
" 27th Febnvry 1975. CDDH/ïïllSR.26 para. 31Ana XIV. p.260.
" 14th Apnl 1975. CDDHIIIIISR.40. para. 113Ana. XIV, p.466.
8th June 1977. CDDHISR.56 pan. 3.Acres VII, p.199.
"
8 June 1977. CDDHlSR.58. pan. 82, Anes VII. p.301.
32 "tbe new rules introduced by tbe Rofomllintendcuihve any cffect anddid
not replateor prohibit tureof nuclur or der wn-convcnrionai ïzapons. Such
qucnionç werc rightiy tbe subjcct of aandnegosiajoaclewberc.?
In other words, as commentatonhaveemphasized,
"The British dcclaration refen ewpnew ruluead tbercfmc impiicirlywnfirms bat
ibe rulercnfimudin the Proio~1applydiarmr;' "rrnarLti-empbpUr added)
Accordingly, the only consensus between the three State is confined to the
inapplicabilityof the ner rules of the Rotocol to the use of nuclear weapons. As
between the US and Franc e,ewuld identify a consensus on theinapplicabilityof the
wholeof ProtocolI tonuclear weapons(despitethe facethat the US mgnises thatth&
use is subjectto generalrules of the law of annedconflicts:suprapara. 3.7). Butthis
view iZtakenonly by thesetwoStatesand not by the othn Mes to Rotocol 1.
3.18 It is significant that other States haveaftirmed that Protocol 1 applies tonuclear
weapons, and except for the three above-mentionedSrates, they have notbcm
contradictedon this point. Accordingly,in referring to Article 33 of the draft text
(Article35 in the final text)whichstipulatesthat Partiesdo not havean unlimiredright
as to the choiceof weapons andthat theycannotuse weaponscausingexcessiveharm
or widespread. long latin: and serious darnage to the natural environment, India
declared:
"ihat riiebacic mles conwned in ais ar..cle will apply Ioal1calegories oiweapons. nmely
nucicar. bactcriological. chernical or conveniional weapons or an' orher calegory of
wcapons'." (ernphnsisaddedi
In moregeneral terrns.accordin: toRurnania.
"Humanitanan law musi alro prohibiusehof weapons of marsive denniclion and
meihods of wariare which nmck indircrimina~ly al coand civilians a[...j
Mwy of those ah were covereb? the provisiom of Rotocol 1. incl...tbe
prohibition or restriction of the useof cenain conveniional wcapons and weapons of mvsive
dennicti~o*.~ (emphuis added)
3.19 Other SQtesdo not specificallyrefer to nuclearweapons,althoughcertaindeclarations
suggestthatProtocol 1 isapplicableto their use. Accordingto Yugoslavia, forexample,
9 lune1977. CDDHISR.58. pan. 119. Acrp..310.
Commenraircr, p.604. para. 1853
Y
2% May 1977. CDDHlSR.39. Ancs VI.p.114.
"
9tù lune 1977. CDDHiSR.58. para. 61. Aoes VII. p.296 it would be dangerous to permit, as terrain States have suggested,that:
"certain metbods and muins of eombu permiscable in 'exceptionai' circumnuIncs.
Proiocol 1. dm in other texu codifymgthe km oarmai wntiicr andin accordance
with the principle confinned by the Nümkrg Tribudthere hadken due regard for
military necesity. but Ihe new mlu du> bvcd on humanitariarcquiremenu [..If
the use of weaponsthat micause aiprtluw injury or bnve indiriminue effwas
no1 rcnounccd. or rrsviclcd in pncuce, the mlu that the Conferencw hurrfu1)y
draficdwould in fact beimpossito~pply.~~
Accordingto the GermanDemocraticRepublic,
"The unambi~uousmie prohibitingthe civiiii papulaùon king m?dethe objPmck,
the prohibitionof indiscrimatrackt,e protectionof civiiii objecu andonanual
environment form[...the are of the Rorocol. In view of the terrible exprience Ihc
civilian populationbad to endureduring the SecondWorld Waaftemrdr. uch nile
in Ihir fi-even ifionly reafnrmr existinf -is a rd progrerr."'7
Accordig to Mozambique, -
'The destructivepower of prerentday weaponsMemainlyat the civilianpopulation.ro
we congramlatethe Conferenceoiu adoption of Ihe articles relating to the protectionof
the unarmedpopulation.8
3.20 It is therefore clear that no consensus existedin Geneva as IO the applicabilityof
Protocol I IO nuciear weapons. The various declarations identified above are
inconclusive.As against the unchailengeddeclarations,of differing contentand value.
of the UK, US and France, (supra. paras. 3.14 and 3.17) one can rely on the express
declarationsof Indiaand Rumania.whichwere aiso uncontestedas well as the implicit
rejectionof weaponsof massdesuucrionreflectedin declarationsof other States.
3.21 Practicefollowingthe adoptionof Protocol1confirmsthelackof a consensus toexclude
the use ofnuclearweapons from its field of application.Suchpnctice is reflectedin the
following:
(i) One of the States themost adamantiy oppose. to the applicationof Protocol1
tonuclear weapons - France - iuelf recognised in 1984 that there was no
consensusthat the Protocolwas inapplicableto nuclearweapons.At the timeof
depositing its insuumentof ratificationtoProtocolII, Francejustifiedher refusal
to adhere to Protocol 1by refemng to
81hJune 1977. CDDHlSR.56. pan.70-71. Ana VI]. p.214,
"
8th lune 1977, CDDHISR.56. Acü. VII. p.247.
9th June 1977. CDDHISR.58, ACIS.V11.p.332 "the absencof consensu betwten the signatSutu of thefirnhocol in
whar concernr the exact obligations &sumu! byinhrespect to d'ion'
"(authors* trPnrkt-empbasisddcd).
(ii) If therehad usuallybeen a consensuson the 'setting aside' of nuclearwcapons.
it would nothavebeen necessaryfor c& States, in a~cepting Rotml 1, to
adopt reservationson iü applicabiity to nuclear weapons. However,Mous
member Statesof NATOdeciared ina broadiyunifonn manneruponratification
of Protml 1thatit applied"exclusivelytociassicalweapons"andthat itdid not
"prejudicàaucuiiaua riglededmii inîemahd applicabàed'autres ypu
d'armes.'w
Significantiy,no other Srate,including some memberStatesof NATO such as
Greece, Pomgai and I~eland,~'made this kind of declmtion upon ntifymg
Protocol1.It is thusclear thatthereis no consensuson the matter.
3.22 The junsü at the ICRC aiso take the view that there has never been a consensusto
exclude the use of nuclear weapons from the field of application of Protocol 1
"puisqu'aucunedécisionn'a été pri~e".~'Only "une entente s'estréalisép eour ne pas
discuterdes armes nucléaire^". T^'isdws not meanthat the niles of the Protocol do
notapplyto suchweapons.Thejunsrs at the ICRChaveconcluded.ontheconmry. that
if
"les principesnffirmésdIcProtocole n'inicrdisenipar l'uragedes armes nucléaires lors
d'un conflir. ils restreigneniaonc Ires s~ricusernenrcet
We will se thal the characteristicallypruoenuaiapproachof the ICRCon the legality
of theuseof nuclearweaponsis unsupponeC bu thepositivelaw. It is subrnittedthatthe
"pnnciplesreaffirmedin the Protocol" doprohibitthe useof nuclear weapons,in view
" RICR. 1984p.239.
<D ImIy in RICR, 1986 p.114: for samc ido and similai wordinseeBelgium. the Netherlands. Sv.Fedd
Germyi RepublicinRICR 1986 p.178: 1987 p.444: 1989 p.389: 1991.pp.250-51. With regard toCadz'the
niles introduŒd by RowcnlIarc dopied in ordcr to apply exclusively to wnvatwupons' and 'have no
effect wharsaver on nuclur weapons. which the!. neith:Onor prohibit'. RICR, 1991. p.82: (bis awmcot
is ambipous: by refemng to 'niles introùuislCanada refemng to al1the provisions of the Protoonlyor
those which establish naw nila?)
RICR. 1989. p.267; 1992. p.416
Commenraircr,p.603. pan. 1851: RICR. 19S7p.352: 1989. p.267: 1992, p.416.
Id..pan. 1852.
" Id..p.605, pan. 1859 of their nature and theextentof their desuuctive effects.
In conclusion, thelack of any consensuson theexpress exclusion of nuclear weapons
3.23
hm the fieldof application ofProtocol 1 suggesu that the Rotocol, and in panicular
the principlesof general internationallreaffirmedtherein,are applicable tonuclear
weaponstogetherwith al1other typesof weapons.
3.24 It remains necessary to determine whether thedeçlaxations "setting aside nuclear
weapons"which have bem made by ccrta Sittcsto pmait or iimit the applicabiiity
of Protom11 to the useof nuclear weaponsintreatyAations(asopposed to customary
law relations)of theseStates,as betweai themselveor asbetwem themselvesand the
other Parties tothe Protocol.This is consideredat pamgraphs3.90 and3.91.
(d) îizc use of nuclearweaporuis subjectto the rulesofinrernnriomllaw specijcdiy
prohibiringtheuseof nuclearweaporu
3.25 Certain rules of international lawspecificailyexpressly prohibit the use of nuclear
weapons. These are reflectedin UN General Assemblyresolutions. which have ben
consistentlysupponedby the vast ma!orityof the membersof the UN. The practiceof
that body beganin 1961with the Declarationon the Prohibition ofthe Useof Nuclcar
and Thermo-Nuclear Weap~ns,~'which declares that any use of nuclear weapons
would:
- be connary to the spirit. letter and aims of the UN and. as such. "a direct
violationof theCharterof the United nation^";^
-
be conuary to the "rulesof internationallau.andto the lawsof humanity",since
it wouldexceedthescopeof warandcauseindiscriminatedestructionto manland
and civiiizati~n;~and
consututethe commissionof a "crimeagainstmankind and~ivilisation".~'
Resolution 1653was recalled by the Generai Assemblyin 1972 and has subsequently
been recalled at each Session ofthe General Assemblysince 1980.99 In 1972, the
m
Id.pan. l(a) and (d).
Id., pan. I(d).
e>
Supranote 95. WHOlSolomon Islands' Wrinen ObrervauoPM: M (lsw of ArmcdConfico)
Gend Assembly "solemnly declared, on behalf of the States Memben of the
Organization,[...] the permanent prohibitionon the use of nuclear weap~ns."'~ In
1978, the speci aolmmissionof the 10thExtraordinarySessionof the UN Gend
Assemblydeclared initsfinal documentthat
'h armesnucléairessont celles qui menvent le plus gnvemenr I'lasurvie de
la civilirarioo'lO'
The General Assembly has frtquently invokedthis provisionor the idea mnrainedin
it.Im Alsoin 1978,the GeneralAssembly
"declared bat useof nuclear wupons wkla violation ofUNbChaner and a crime
qaipn humanity".1r.o
From 1980 (35thSession)lW to the present day (48thSession). the GeneralAssembly
has ~ted, year after year, iü condemnationof the use of nuclear weapons by
characterising such use as a "violation of the Charter" and "a crime against
humanity".'"
Furthemore. in 1981 theGeneralAssemblysolemnlydeclaredthat
"States and siatesmen tha"lmcson first to the useof nuclcar weapons uill be cornrnininf the
gravest crime afainst humanity
In 1983,the GeneralAssembly
"Rerolutely, unconditionally and for ail Limecondernns nuclm war as being contrary to
human conscience and rcason. viernos: rnonsrrous crimc agains: peoplus and
' AIRes.5. 1012. 30tJunr1978 (adopted without a vote). para.47
Scee.g. AiRes. 381183111.20th Dzc.1983 (133-1-14). prcambleP.317th Dec.1984 (128-6-12). pnunble;
401152P. 16ib Da.1985 (131-164). prcamhlc: 4111. 3rd Dcc.1986 (139-12-4). pmmble42/42 D.. 30tb
Nov.1987 (140-3-14) prumble; 431F.7th Dcc.1988 (136-3-14). prcamble.
la SΠe.g.AiRe.. 361100.9th D1c.1981 (82-1941). pan.1:371781. 9thDec. 1982(112-19-15).pmandm.
1; 38118B. 20th Dec.1983 (110-19-15). prearnblr, and para.1. WHOlSolomon klands' Wrinen Observations: Mut (Lw of Arme- Conflico)
violation of the foremon human-rthe rigtolife.IO7
Theseresolutions rais te o questions:do they constitutc rule sn,d ifso. do they bind
al1States?
3.26 Resolutionsof the UN Gened Assembly caribe a murcc of law tothe extentthat they
relatetoquestionswhich are within the competenceof the Gcneral Assembly and are
elaborated in a normative mode. The power of the Grnaai Aswmbly toadopt
remlutions on nuclear weaponsis based on Article 11(1)of the Charte wrhich stam
that:
'The General Asvmbly may corsider the gead principler of co-opedonin the
maintenance ofiniernational peaand cecwity. incldi the principles goveming
dirarmament and the regulation of armandmaymake ruonmendations with regard
Coruchprinciplek the Memberr otothe SecuriryCouncilIOboth.'
Althoughthis provision givestheGeneralAssemblyonlya power of "recommendation",
this does not preclude the Assemblyfrom exercising other powen of a normative
character. Practiceconfirm~'~this and the IU had affirmedthis in the Namibi Caare
(1971):
"For iwould no! be correct ro assume thai. becaux the General Asseinbly is in principle
vened uith recommendatory poweitis debamed from adopting. in specific cares withio
rhc framework of irscompliance. resolutions which make determinations or have operaiive
"IW
design.
Thenormativecharacterof resolutionsflowsfromtheirformulation.AstheInternational
Court has state with respectto theSecurityCouncilresolutions:
"The language of a resoluiion of the Secuni? Council should be carenilly analyzed before
a conclusion can be ma<.10 bindinf effecInview of the nature of the powers under
Articl25.the quenion wnether the? have been in fact exercised is io be deiermined in eacb
case, havinf regard ttenusof the rerolution io be interpreted. the discussion leading
lnit. the Charter provisions invo~ed and in generd. dl circumnances thin mifit assis
dercrmining the lecal conwqucnçes of the remlution of the Securiiy ~ouncil""~
(emphssis added)
'O'
AIRes.38/75B. 15th Dec. 1983 (95-19-301. pan. 1.
'- For uamples of the legal effecL'SfGcncnl Aswmbly rrsolutionssc Taoco-Cahiarir e Libya. Arbiual
award of 19 luiiur1988.ID1 1977. pp.376-79: Miiirary and Paramiiirary Aniviriu in and againrr Nicaragua.
ICI Rep.1986, pp.100 and 103. pan188 and 195.
IDO
Adv.Op. 2lst lune 1971IU Rep.1971. p.50. para. 105.
"O
NamibiaCase. loc.cir. p.53 pan. 114. WHOISolomonirlaodsWrincn Observations:PMR (bu of ASWd Conflicts)
Si-ly, the 13thCommissionof the Institutde Droit Intemational,during the 1987
sessioninCairo, propose! withregardstoresolutionsof the UN GeneralAssemblythat
"Lelibellé etlefexu d'uneMolutionàideferminLnpon& mimWve. k prirence
de référenasudmitintcrnatiod ou de formuleséquivalenteso,u l'omissiondëlibkricde
tellesréf=rensu formulessontdes indicesmaisüOa d(c*ifenwi" (Conclurion
10)
In casu,the General Assemblyresolutionsidentifiedabove a~ drafted inthe present
tense and utilise verbsin an afhnative manner acxprding to which the Assembly,
"declaresa or "imposes"pnnciples eï8unciatedin legal tams which are bascd upon
sourcesof positivelaw: nuclear weapons are "wcaponsof massivedesmictioncausing
unnecessary hm and hurnansuffering"; in this context their use is "prohibited"by
reasonof the Declarationof StPetersburg,Brussels,etc. (infa p aras. 3.38and 3.42);
rnoreover,their usageis a "violationof the Charter"and a "crimeagainsthumanity".
In refemng to theexistenceof anobligationof custornaryand treaty law imposedon
Statesnotto usenuclear weapons, an obligationtheviolationof whichwouldconstitute
an internationalcrime, theseresolutionsof the GeneraiAssemblyare of a normative
character.
Advocatesfor thelegalityof the useof nuclearweaponswouldperhapstake the view
thatthese resolutionsare contradictory, since they declare that the useof nuclear
weaponsis illegai but aiso dernand theconclusionof a ueaty prohibitingthe use of
nuclearweapons."' Altematively,theyargue thatif the useof those nuclear weapons
wasalreadyillegaiit wouldbepointlessto concludeanother ueaty on thesubject.Other
resolutionscondemnthe first use of nuclear weapons,'" which seernsto suggestthat
a second, or retaiiatory, use would be lawful, etc.'I3 These arguments might be
invokedin suppon of the view that the useof nuclear weaponsis not yetcontrary to
internationailaw.
3.28 The Inclusionof an intemationallepal obligationin a treaty does not imply that the
obligationdid notpre-date thetreaty,perhapsas aruleof custornarylawor aitematively
in anothn treaty. Manytreatyrules(forexamplethoserelatingto thelawofdiplomatic
relations,lawof ueaties, lawof these.. etc) codifypre-existingcustomarynies. Itis
quite normalin internationallaw for the rnostcornmonand the rnostfundamentainies
"' SeeA/Rts. 33/7B. 14thDE. 1978. para.2 andresolutionscinnote56.
"' Ames. 361100, 9tb Dec. 1981 (82-19-411.pAnn.l.D.11967. Vo1.6T.11 p.73
"' For a moredetailcdanalysetE. Davidben de cenninu jvrr~$mfionr rhéoriaul'mpbi du annu
nucléniru panII). La conréquenccjuridiqucr de 1'inr1olhiion&muelle de missiluumpmhing ur
EuropeBmk, cd. of theUniversityof BrusselsandB~ylant. 19erse9('Examen')arcIugely inspird
y thisstudy. WHOISolornonkhds' WrinenObrcrvuioocPanM (Lw of ArmedConflicrs)
to be reaffinned and repeatedly incorponted into aeaties; examples include the
prohibitionon the use of force, the obligationto senle disputespeacefully.The formai
re-affirmationof theserulesin a treatyclearly does not implytheir pnor non-existence
as binding obligations. Toread into the fact that certainStatescal1for the elabontion
of a treatyto expresslyprohibitthe use of nuclear weaponsa proof that their useis not
yet prohibitedillusuates the dangers oanaconnario approa cohaaty interpretation.
Used in a way whichis too general, this approachto interpretationintroducesin effect
a character of reversibility, that is to say that it could juas easily result in one
conclusion asanother. As has ben wriaen:
'Seules les règlesdont la vocatiod'cm panicuiièrc.Pinlesexceptions. les
énurnirationlriiitives. les dispositioncenpdienwllesà une interprémian
~o~nari~"~'
In thesecircumstancesthe willof theUnited Nations,as expressedin GeneralAtsembly
resolutions,to adopt a conventionprohibitingthe useof nuclearweaponsis an objstive
far too generai to lend iwlf to an a connario form of inierpretation. The Unilcd
Nation'sdesire to adopt such a conventioncould either be because the use of nudear
weaponshas notyetbeenprohibitedin internationallawor becauseit is onlyprohibiied
in a genenc manner - quod esr:a treaty would ernphasiseor reinforce an existing
prohibition.
The contextof these resolutions provesthat only the secondconclusionis compatible
withthetextof thepreambularpangraphs andthe substantivecomrnitrnenüset forth in
the resolutions,whichproclajmcategoncallyand in a perernptorymannertheillegaiiry
of any use ofnuclear weapons.
3.29 As for the fact that the General Assemblyhas genedly focused on the first use of
nuclear weapons. this again might simplv provide evidence of a narrow, juridical
approach,thanonewhichjustities the conclusionthatanythingotherthanfirst usernight
be permitted. Itis norewonhythat when the General Assemblycommendsthose Statu
which have undertakennever to makea first use of a nuclearweapon, itstipulatethat
this wnstitutes an importantfirst dep towards a reductionof the threat of a nuclear
war."' In other words, the Assembly welcomes al1actionswhich candiminishthe risk
of a nuclearwar, but evidently thisdoes not imply thatit acceptsaconrmrio anything
which might inme such risks. Itwould therefore be incorrect tofind in these
resolutions implicitacceptance of the right of recourse to nuclear weaponsin any
circumstances.
3.30 If the UN Gened Assemblyresolutionsreflecta sourceof internationallawapplicable
II4
dmir(1978). p.124.iion logiqueet systémet le postulatde ntionnaliti du Iégilateur.'inL'inriprumion en
"' Sece.g. Ames.37/78 J, 91hDu.1982 (112-19-15). pam. 1; 3B.20thDcc.1983 (11D-19-15para.1.
40 m the useof nuclearweapons, asan expressionof theopin iuk of States it is of littie
importancethat they haveonly been supponedby a majorityof States.Insofar asthey
reflga customaryinmational lawapplicable tothe entireinternationalwmmunitythey
reflectobligationsimposedon ad Sta~. As was saidby the 13thCommissionof the
In~tinitde Droit Internationalin its conclution 17infinr:
*Si une risolutionCwnce le dmiteunCPIncpeuîr Übércde ia force oblipzoire
de ce droiten cménant*XNC n.116
Whether anyState has enteredsucha resaMtion is amsiderd atparagrap 3.s0and
3.91.
3.31 In conclusion, therethereforeexistsin the iawof tUN a corpusof rulesspecifically
'
prohibiting- and characterisingas a "crime against humanity" - the use of nuclear
weapons. These rules. which are reflectedin the Declarationadopted by rrsolution
1653,"'do not, however,createnewlaw sinŒthe texü whichendorsethem are based
upon the classicalprohibitionsembodiedin the law ofmed conflicts.
The UN GeneralAssemblyresolutionsare thereforean expressionand applicationof a
pre-existingand positivelaar to nuclear weapons,nther than a sourceof newrula.
Even ifthey did constitutenew rule- quod non - the Coun is stillentitledto take
accountof the resolutionsas the GA had aireadyinvitedit to do so:
"thedevcloprneniof internationaliaw maybc afieciedby declarationsand resolutionsof the
Generalsxmbly, whicma?robat extentbt '&en intoconsidertheInternaiional
Coun oi uni ce""'
(el 7he ue of nuclcarwcapom is subjecr IOthe WH0 Cornrinuion
3.32 The use of nuclear weapons alsofails under the obligationsset forth in the WHO
Constitution. This provides,interalia, in termsof sornegenerality:
- the right to health(Prearnbularparagraph2);
- health as "fundamend condition of war peace and security" (Prearnbular
mnph 3):
- therightand obligationofGovernrnentto ensure"thehealthof their people"and
to take appropriatesocialrneasures"(Prearnbularparagnph 9);
Ann.l.D.1.1987Vol.62Il.p.75.
"' 24 November 1961 (55-20-26).
"' hcn du r6le de la C.AIRes.3232 (XXIX).12th Nov.1974 (consensus) preamble.
41 -
the objectiveof theWHOwhichis 'to rais healthof al1nationsasto the highest
possiblelevel" (Art. 1); and
- the functionsof the WHO which indude, inter dia. 'helping Govemmenu at
their requestto xinforce their healthservie (WHO Conninition, Art. 2). to
"fumish [...] inan emergencythe necessaryaid at the request of Govemmaü
and withthcir consent(Art. 2(d)).
In fact, when the WHO launchediu research programme on the affec ofsa war on
humanhealth the WorldHeaith Assemblyin~okcd"~ UN Gaeral Assemblymolution
34/58, in whichthe GeneralAssemblyconsidd
"que la paix et la ucurité sont des conditions imporrnnicret amClio&r ia
santédetoules peuples et que la cuqémtioles nuions sur les problèmes uvntiels
de Isantépeut éweune conuibuuimponante la
For its part, the World Hdth Assembly has observedthat a nuciear conflict
"qu'elles qu'enpuisse êtrela forme et I'ampleur, provoquen inevitablement une destruction
irréversiblede I'environneinent et la mon de centaines de million de personnes. et envliners
égalementdc graves conséquencespour la vie er la santé dela population de tous les pays
du rnondcas exception ainsi que pour la lesgénérationsà venir, sapant ainsi les effonr
que diploient Eiawet l'OMS pour instaurer la santé pourtous d'ici I'an 1000.'~~'
The WorldHeaith Assemblyhas also noted that docton see the risk of sucha wnflict
as "la pire des menacespour la vie et la santéde toutes les populations".'" It is in
the contextof theseviewsthat the Assemblyrequesteda studyon the consequencesof
nuclear war on life and the health of peoplesof the world. Following this snidy, the
Assembly adopted another resolutionin whichit:
"3. Endorses rhe Committee's conclus11is impossible to prepare healrh services to
deal ianysystcmatic way wirh a catastrophe resulting irom nucthanuclearre and
wupons constinitc rhe grentest imrncdiatc threat to healthand welfare of m&nd."lU
The concernis reflectedin resolutionWHA 40.24 of 15May 1987,in whichthe World
HeaithAssemblyrecalled"thecloselinksbetweenheaithandthesafeguardingof peace",
"O
Res.U'HA 34.38May 1981, prearnble.
'= A/Res.34/56. 29th Nov.1979 (wiihoul vote). prcamhle
' Res. WHA 34.38.May 1981. prcamhle.
'= Id., 6ibal.
Res. WHA 36.28. May 1983. WHOlSolomon Irlandr'Wrincn ObwrvuioParMt (Lw ofArwd Conflico)
and iu wncems aboutthe effecu of nuclear .war on health.
3.33 Asthissurveyillustrates,therecan behale doubtthatthepmtice ofthe WHO canonly
leadto theconclusion thathehumanhealthandenvironmentaleffecu resulting frornthe
useof nuclearweaponsare subjectto the rulesof the WHO, includingiu constitution.
(B) Theuseof nuclear weapon is contray to internationallaw of armed conflicts
3.34 Justas the use ofcertainconventionalweaponsisspecificallprohibitedby intemational
law becauseof their inherentcharacteristics(suchas "dum-dum" bulle^,'^'chemical
weapons,lSetc.), it is the very chancteristics of the consquences of nuclearweapons
which provides the basis for the inhnent illcgality of their use. These inhnent
characteristicsrelateto their effecton humanhealthand the environment,narnclytheir
quantitariveeffecu (a) and their qualitativeeffe@). It is by reason of both these
effecu that the use of nuclearweapons,in any wntext, violatesthe most fundamental
rules of internationallaw in relatitoboth internationaland non-internationarmed
conflict(c). Underinternationallawthereare no circumstancesjustifyingthe useof a
nuclearweapon(d).
Nuclearweaponsarechanctensed butheireffectsonhumanhealth andtheenvironment,
whichare bothquantitativeand qualitative.
(a) 7he use of nuclear wcapons violarcsimcmarioml lo~) b~ renson of rhcquaruirarive
effecr ofsuch weapom
3.35 There are three types of nuclear weapons:atom bombs. hydrogenbombsand neutron
bombs. Withoutdescendin; into the speciiic derails of hou each of these weapons
works, itis wonh notingthat the power of each of thesebombsvariesbetween:
- 1 to 75 kilotonne(1 kilotonne= 1.000tonnesof dynamite) for atomicbombs;
theminimumleveiof onekilotonne corresponds to the minimumcntical massof
fissile malerial necessaryto unleasha nuclear reaction (the bombardmentof
uranium-235atoms or plutonium-239 atomsby neutrons - when bursting
(fission)theseatomsfreeother neutronsanda greatamountofenergy).Itis now
possible to go belou the level of 1 kilotonne throughthe use of certain
"compression"techniques of fissile matenal, and it has been suggestethat
nuclear weapons u~tha powerquivalent to 10or 100tonnesof TNT rnightbe
lx Declasaiion N of the Hague.28 1899.
" Id.. IV2:GenevaProlocol of 1Junc 1923: Paris Conventionoflanwry 1993.Art1. - between several kilotonnes and several megatonnes (1 megatonne = 1,000
kilotonnes)for hydrogenbombs (thermonuclearweapons) whch comprisetwo
bombs: a thermonuclearbomb with vimially unlirnitedpower and an atomic
explosivewhichallows the necessarytempesatureof several milliondegrees to
be reached tounleash a nuclear &on whac isotop efsheavy hydrogai
(mtiumanddeutefium)unite(fusion) toaeate a heliumare. thefcbyunleashing
a vast quantity of energy; the atomic explosivewhich ûiggas the fusion is
approximately1kiiotonne,thearnountof Me materialncctssary fora nuclear
reaction; these materialarcgmerally then encascd ina mass of uranium-238
whichis more stable than uranium-235,but which as aresult of the fusionand
the intense bombbdment of neutrons irse.lfaiten the reaction (fission). The
whole process thereby comprises one of fission-fusion-fission.The maximum
powerof sucha weaponis limitedonly by limitationsrelating to packagingand
nansponation, and certain anempts have been made to create larger weapons,
although it seems that at present the majority of nuclear weapons arsenals
comprise bombs of between 'h and 1 megatonne (-me 38 to 76 rimes more
powerfulthan the bomb usedat Hiroshima);
neutron bombs from 1to severai kilotonnes:these are actuaiiy thermonuclear
bombsof limited powerwhichare not surroundedby a belt of uranium-238: the
effectof the shockwavesis lesssignificantthan other nuclearweapons.Although
neutronbombshave less of aneffect on solid objects (buildings, vehicles)they
produce proponionately more radiation and hence create greater darnage to
victimsand the environmentin relationto their actual size.12'
3.36 The destructiveeffect of these weaponsresulu from the followingphenomena:
- shockwavesor air blasu:
- thermicwavesor radiation:
- fires;
- initialnuclear radiation(ernittingneutronor gamma rays);
- residualnuclear radiationor radioactivefallout;and
lm L'Encylopeedia Unimsalisv' 'lu'uclhire (armement)':Eruded'enrcmbk du arma nuciéniru, Rappondu
krCilire ghtd, doc. ONU A1351392.11 septembre19('1980UNRcpon'). Appendix 1. p. 18pua.23;
Er& d'ensanbk du annu nuciéaircs.Rappondu Safrtüirgénéradoc. ONU A1451373.18 wplembre1990
('1990 UNfkpn'); A. Rcsibois and A. loffroy. Annu nvc:éfumé&cins disannu. B~xella. Assa.
Méd pour lPrCv.de la GuerreNucl.. 1981. pp.12-13 ('Raiboisand SoH.rFirkei. 'Elfe&biologiques
etmédicauxda explosionsnuclciaires-.in Vivreenrembie ou:k dihe nuclinire. BnueUa. Assoc.
Mid. pour laPrév.de la GuerreNucl.. 1986. pp.17-18. Theseeffecü Varyaccordin,.toa rangeof facto nscudingthenatureandpowerof the
bombused, the populationdensityof thebombarded area t,e topographyof that area,
the availabilityof protection forthe popuhion, the fodility or othmrise of the
attack,localweatherconditions,andtheheightat which theexplosion occun. Forecasts
have been prepared as to the damagewhich wouid resuit from the use of a nuclear
weaponunderdifferentscuiarios, and the prrQse dfaz will obviouslyvaryfrom one
situationtothe nut.
3.37 Without identifyingal1possible situations,it is worthrrcallingtatHiroshimaa small
bombof only 13kilotonnes was use-. This exposedsome 320,000peopletotheeffects
of the explosion.of whom 70,000thousandciviliansdied withinone month. In 1950
itwas estimatedthat 200,000 people haddied as a direct result of the use of the
bombing."' In Nagasaki, outof some280,000peopleexposedto the effectsof the 22
kilotonnes bomb,100,000people had died by 1950.'" The differencein the figures
resulü from thedifferenttopographiesof thenvocities:Hiroshimais a townsituatedon
flat landcloseto thesea, whereasdifferentpans of Nagasaa kre separatedby several
smailhills,diminishingthe shcckwaveandblowingeffecü of the explosion.lm
Other than the effecü on civilians, vinually ail health services were affected or
desuoyed.In Hiroshima onlythreeoutof 45 hospitalsanddispensariesremainedintact;
out of 1,780nurses, 1.654were killedor too seriouslyinjuredto allowthem to work:
65 of the 150dcctors were killedand most ofthe others inj~red.'~'
3.38 ' Underinternationallaw il1s clear beyondan?.doubt that the useof a nuclex weapon
againstcivilians,whateverthe natureor sizeand desuuctivepowerof theweapon,will
be renderedillegaiby vinue of the applicationof the customaryrule whichstatesthat
beiiigerantsmustalwaysdistinguishbetweencombatanüand non-combatantsandlimit
their attack only to theformer. This is an oldand well-establishedmle which has
achieveduniversalacceptance. Thefirst multilateralinstrumentto stateit was the St.
PetersburgDcclarationof 1868.the secondparagraphof whichdeclaresthat:
' 1980 UNRepon. Appcndix 1. pan.1-35:1983 WHO Repon, p.8:1987 WHO Rqon. p. 9
lx 1980 UNRepon, pans. 162-63.
'" Id.. pan163.
lm Id.. pan.162; 1983 WHO Rcpon. p.88: Britishh.lidiul Aswwiation. Ihe Mcdical Effeas of NuckarWar,
Chichester.Wilcy. 1963. pp.34.
,II
ResiboisandJoffmy. ioc.cp.9;forslightdifierentfiguwesalso T. Ok'iia. in 1983 WHORepon. p.%
(French)For estimes ofdamapcto rnulicaldhospirasiaffollowingan anrckon Londonor BostsetA.
Leaf. in198WHO Repon.. hrx 6. pp.169-70(French). "theody Iqitimau objeuwhicbSWes rbaildcndra~wrinaccomplisduringwprirto
weakeninpthemilitagyforcesof IbcCX~Y".
ïhis obligation is vted and furtha e.ia.bomtu ln diffemt forms in many
instruments,including:
- Amcle 25 of the Regulation annexcd to the 1907 Hague Convention IV
Respectingthe Laws and Customsof Waron Land, and Article 1 of the 1907
Hague Convention IX ConcerningBombardmmtby Naval Forces in Times of
Wax,to theextentthattheseprovisionsprohibitamcks on undefended areasand
undefendedbuildings;
- the resolutionof 30 September 1928,whereby the Assemblyof the League of
Nations forbade the civiliari population from being considerai a military
objective;
-
the 1949GenevaConventions prohibitingattackson militaryestablishmentsand
health transports(An 19 er seq. of Convention 1; Amcle 22 er seq. of
Convention II;Articles 14, 15, 18. 21, 22 of ConventionIV);
- UN Gened Assemblyresolutions2444 (XXIII)of 19December 1968 and 2675
(XXV) of 9 December 1970;t32
- the 1977GenevaProtocol1, Articles 12and 21 (whichprohibit attacksagainst
sanitaryuni&andhealthmspons). Anicle48 (whichrestatesthe St.Petersburg
rule), and Article 51 (whichsratesand developsthe prohibition againstatraclcing
the civilianpopulation).
The illegalityof the Hiroshimabornbings. on these grounds. was recognized by the
Tokyo District Coun in the Shimoda case in 1963.'" Itis therefore unnecessaryto
dwell on the use of nuclear weapons against civiliansand health unirs: theuse of a
nuclear weapon against civiliantargeü, or of a weapon having incidentaleffects on
civiliansin any circumstanceis rendered illegal by vinue of the most elementaryrules
of the internationallaw of armedconflict.
"' Resolution2444 provides.inrn *lia:
'b) Qu'ilest interditde lancerdesatuquescontreles populalionsckantqueicllcs;
'c) Qu'ilfauten tous tempsfaiIndistinctionentrepem~cs qui prmcnipan aux hostilités
et Lesmembresdela populationcivile ah queces dcmien soientCpargntsdans mairrla
possible'
Rcsolution 2675 hiitherdevechoseprinciples. WHOISolornoknlaD&'WriucnObrervatioPn~nM (Lw ofAmd Confiic~)
3.39 Further, it is clear that the use of a nuclearweaponagainstcivilianswould notoniy
wnstitutea "simple" violatiofinternationalhumanitarianlaw;it would alsoconstitute
a w6 crime under Amcle 85 of 197 Gencvahfocol 1,sinceit wouldconstitutean
intentionalnack on sanitary units and nansportation (Art. 85(2)), on the civilian
populationor individualcivilians(Art. 85(3a)),or the launchingof an indiscriminate
aüackaffectingthe civilianpopulationor civiliaabjectsin the knowledgechatsuchan
attackwould cause excessivelossof lifeorinjuryto civüians(Art. 85(3b)).
Moreover,the useofa nuclearweaponagainst aciviliantarga wouldconstitute acrime
3.40
againsthumanity,as definedby Articleqc) of the Stafutof the Nuremberg MiIitary
InternationalTribunal (whichdefines crimes agah humanity as ail "acte inhumain
commiscontretoutepopulationcivileavantou pendantla guerre[...lmand Article2of
the 1948 Conventionfor the Preventionand Punishmuitof the Crimeof Guiocide(78
U.N.T.S. 277). ïhe UN General Asembly has characterised as "crimes againa
humanityand civilisation"any useby a Stateof a nuclearor thermo-nuclearweapons
(supra. para. 3.25), irrespectiveof whethertheare even used qainst civilians.This
.view is shared by manydistinguishedjurists (a non-exhaustiveis set outsuprapara.
3.10 at note 64).
3.41 Funher useof a nuclearweaponagainst amiliiag targetwillalsobe illegal.This arises
from the followingwnsiderations:-
- even the use of a limited nuclear weapon with reduced power (such as a
batdefieldnuclearweapon)rendersdeathinevirablefor thosewithin therangeof
its effects (i);
-
the use of a limiied nuclear weapon with reduced power couldlead to total
nuclearwar (ii);
- the useof nuclearweapon with enhancedpower increasesthe effectsidentified
aboveandaddsindiscnminareeffectswhichcannotbe limitedtoany "permitted"
militaryobjectives(iii).
fi) Nuclcarweaponsrcnderdearh incvi~able
3.42 Even if the power of a nuclear weapon could be reduced to a fraction of one
kilotonne"'(equivalentperhapsto thesizeof the blockbusrersusedduring the Second
WorldWar, which containedapproximately10tonnesof TNT)'" itwouldnevertheless
be thecase thatsucha bombwouldnot lave thosewithinthe immediate vicinityof the
1993UNRcpon. purs. 39ciseq.(French).
'?' 1983 WHO Repon.p. 9.para.9 (Frenc1987 WHO Repon, p.10,pan.10, WiiO/Solomon Island s'rinen ObservaiooPYI M (Lw of Armed CODfiicU)
explosion with any nasonable chance of su~val.~ In addition tothe shock waves
or blowingeffect, there would ai= be thermic waveswhich, for those in the vicinity,
wouldlave no chanceof sumval; with a power of 10to 20 kilotonnes(the sizeof the
Hiroshimaand Nagasak iombs)the firebailalonewould befelt in a radiusof sorne200
metres:ln
"Dans la boule de feu et a proximitéimmétouse volauunitw fondemitI.l6
"A Hiroshimaeta Nagasaki, In tempénferatteio30004000OC a proximiti du point
zéro;elle a dipa570. OC meme a uoedisancede llW-1600 m. .139
The "eclair thermique"of a one kilotonne bombwiflcause 3rd degree bms toa penon
at600 metres distantfrornthe explosion,la and can aiso ignite wcondary fire w hich,
if occumng simultaneously,could lcad tofueballs of the type which occurrtd at
Hiroshima,"' or occurred as a result of the Aiiiedbombingsof Hamburg,Dresdenand
T~kyo."~ Many survivon of the shock waves would be kiiied by thes incendies.
Sucha consequenceviolatesthe prohibitionon the use ofweaponswhichrender death
inevitable.According tothe 1868Declarationof StPetersburg,the "leginmateobjective"
of war
"wouid beexceedcdby thecmploymenrof ms which u~lersly agrravate the suffenngs
of disabledmen. or render their deach ineriwb(emphasisadded)
3.43 The obligationreflected in the prearnbleto theSI. Petersburg Declarationrernainsin
force andapplicable today. II has ben neither abolishednor supersede.. Nuclear
weaponsare far morelethalthananyotherweapon.includingchernicalweapons(which
--
'"
1990 UNRepon, pan. 295(French).
!" 1990 UNRcpon. pan. 293.n.2 (French)
1990 UNRepon. pan. 294.
'" T.Okhita. i1983 WO Repon, p. 88 (French)A. Leaf. 1987 WHORcpon, p. 163 and note(French).
la
Rcsibois and Joffroy. cil.p.20.
141
1990 Uh'Repon, pan. 294(French)
Ic Resibois andJoffrey, op. ci24; A. Lcaf. in 1987 WHORcponMX VI. pp.163-64(French);T.A.Ponol.
'Possible Fatalitics from Superfires Followin: Nuclear Attacks in or Nur Urban Areas,' in R.Q.olornonand
Marston(eds.)TheMedicalIniplica~ioofNuclcarWar.htiNteof Medicineand National Audemy of Sciences.
Wuhington DC, National Audemy Press(1986).pp. 15 nseq.
1.1
Dn thistext sa E. David. Princidedroi~derconflirsarmés(1994)pp. 266 nseq ('Principes'). WHOlSolomon Islands'WriaenObxrvuionr:PMt (Lw of ArmcCdlic~)
do not necessarily render-death inevitable since appropriate shelter wouid provide
protection)and whichhaveben univenally wndemncd. Accordingto a group of UN
experü,
Deathis inevitablefor al1thosein the vicinityof a nuclearexplosion.
3.44 The prohibitionon the use of weapons which rentierdeathinevirablerefiecü an even
more fundamentalprincipleof the law of armed da: the obligationtominimise
hm towmbatanu. Accordimgly in its use offorceaStatemust not injure iu enemy
whenit cancapture him,or nottocauseKnous injurywhenonecauseslightinjury,and
not tokill the enemyif he canbe injured."'
The principleis reflectedin a numberof rules: the limitationon the choiceof methods
or meansof warfare (Regulationannexedto the 1907Hague ConventionIV Art. 22;
1977 Genevahotowl 1,An. 35(1));the prohibitionon declaringthat no quater will
be given (1907HagueConventionIV. An. 23;1977GenevaProtocol 1,Art. 40); the
prohibitionof theuseof weaponswhichcauseunnecessarysuffering(infia para.3.65);
theobligationtotakenecessaq precautionsduringamcks toavoidtheciviliansandtheir
propeny (1977Geneva Protocol 1,An. 57; 1907 HagueConventionIV. An. 26). This
list is merelyillustmtive,and manymoreexamplescouldbe given.
Asa resultof thescaleof thedevasrationurhichtheuseof a nuclearusea.pnwillcause.
andtheunavoidablelethaleffectswithina certainperimeter.the useofa nuclearweapon
would cenainly violatethesewidelyacceptedprinciplesand rules of internationallaw.
(ii) 7Xcuse ofevcn a single nuclear weapon could resulrin roralnuclearwar
3.45 hoponents of the use of nuclear weapons probably consider it inappropriate to
contemplatecatastrophic scenarios and maintain that a limited nuclear conflict is
possible. This view is onlyrealistic, itcouldever be called realistic,in the wntext
of the useof a nuclearweaponagainst aStalewhichdid notpossessnuclear weapons,
or whichdid nothaveallieswhichbothpossessednuclear weaponsand werewiiiingto
use them. In a conflictbetweentwo or more Statespossessingnuclear weapons the
lielihood of anescalauonis great,and wouldprobablyleadto totalnuclearwarandthe
devastationof a substanaalpan of the internationalcommunity.Thisview has been
endorsed by UN expens.I6 by independent academic~.'~'and by political
1980 UNRcpon, pan.142
'" Exunen, supra. not113pp. 20667.279. 332 and 336
'* 1980 UNRepon. para. 199 WHOlSolomon klands' Wrinen Observatio PnsnM (LnvofArwd Conflicu)
3.46 In othn words, there is a goodchance thata Sm& which made fint-use of a nuclear
weapon,even in a limitedmanner, wouldprovoke a global nuclear conflagration.It is
difficulttosee howsuchbehaviour,withthe mm possibiliiyof such consequences,can
be compatiblewith international iaw. It would vioh the obligation "to -1 and
make others respect" internationalhumanirarian la^."^ furthn enhancingthe inherent
iliegalityof the use of nuclear weapons. Even if a Statecould not have known that iu
act wouldresult in suchconsequences,it would beregardal as "an encouragement [...]
to commitactscontrary to generalprinciplesof internationalhumanitManlaw~flectcd
in ueaties' the view taken by the Court in the CprC wncerningcenain miJitory and
paramiliray ocrivinesagainsfNicaragua. lm
3.47 The fint use of a nuclear weapon, even of lirniredpower and targeted only against
rnilitaryobjectives, would therefore be illegal independentlyof any of its unavoidable
lethaieffect ïhi. arises simplyby reason of the possibility that it might lead tothe
massiveuse of nuclear weaponsand the violationof most of the mles.of the law of
armedconflict.
It is no doubt for this reason that theUN General Assernblyha$solemnlyproclaimed
that
"1. Srateand Sraiesmen thal reron firn tbeuse of nuclcar weaponwillbe
comrnininthegrovcsrcrime afains: humanit.:
2. There will neberan?)ustificationor pardon for Statesmcnwthedecision
tobeIhe firstuse nucica: wcapons";'(emphasis addedj.
(iii) Nuclearweaponshave lndl~~rlml~l~cffects
3.48 In the case of a strategic nuclea war it is conceivablethat nuclea weapons mightbe
usedagainstcombacanü with limiredsideeffectsagainstcivilians:for exarnple, an anack
againstenemyforcesin theaesen or on thehigh seas or outsidean inhabitedzone. The
''
1987WHO Report,Annex 4(c),p.127.
'"
Sa e.g. the vinvs of Lord Mountbatten: -in warfars without tmiail-out nuclzar exchange luding tothe
finaholouust ...is more and incredib... Inal1sincerity, asa miliman 1un secno usefor any nucleu
wupons which would no1end in csulation uith consquencrs that nfannconceive': citcù in British Mediul
Associationop.cirpp.26-27.
An. 1 common to the four 1949 GenevConventionsand h. l(1) of the 1977 Guieva Proto1.l
IJ' ARES 361100.9 Dccernbcr 1981 (82 in favour. 19 against. 41 abstentions) surgicalprecisionof a nuclmr atrackofthiskind ismtirely theoretical,nonvithstandiig
that even in such a circumstance, violations of gmeral intedonal law for the
protection of humanhealthandthe environmmt would occur (infia.paras. 3.52, 3.53,
4.21-4.29). As reflectedin therrport~ of the UN andWHO nfemd to frequentlyin
thew Written Observations(citedsupm atnote 126),nich a srnario is, historically,
speculativeand beyondthe realmsof possibility.Expaince with the use of nuclcar
weapons (Nagasaki,,Hiroshima).and major nuclear accidents (Chemobyl) indicates
clearlythat the effectsof radiation.oncerrleasa er,cuncontrollable.
3.49 The lirniteduse of nuclearweapons would,howeva, mon likely lead to an escalarion
into al1out nuclear war. ~ccordin~-tothe SIPH figura adoptcd by the 1990 UN
RepoR,the majontyof Russianand Americananenals comprisenuclearweaponswith
a power of 100 hlotonnes or more.lS2 Accordinglya fint use or an esdation
involvingeither or both of these States would probablyresult in the use of nuclcar y
weapons havingeipht times thepowerof thatused inHiroshima.The greaterthepower
of theweapon,the greaterthecollateal damagecausedto civilians,theirpropeny and
the environment.
Ithasbeenestimatedthatto halta classicalattackledby fourdivisions(80,000mps)
supponedby 100planesopenting out of tenairbases,it willbe necessary to have:
"some uns of weaponso1to 10kt. yield afainst imponantelemenu of the fround forces
andup IO10weaponsof ?Oto 100ktyield to reducethe opponent'sair force.
ïhe number of civilianvictimsresultingfroma limitedactionof this type, evenif it had
onlymilitay objectives,wouldundoubtedly vary considenbly accordingto the density
of the populationin the regions attacked. On the basis of median figures it is not
inconceivablethat the totanumberkilledor senouslyinjuredcouldbe 180,000civilians
(150,000 as a result of direct efiect of the explosionsand 30.000 as a result of
radioactivefallout)and 35.000 militarypersonnel(30,000 and 5.000 resp~tively).'~
The-figures could be reducedif cenain protecuve measures were taken (alens,
evacuation,shelter).
*[hlowever. thisdocs no!invaiidatcrhemostconspicuousconclusionthatcanbedram from
tbe table: even wben onlx inilitarytargersare selected. andcven if protectionis provided.
the civiiian casudtiei~routnumDerthe mililaryones.
"' 1990UA' Rcpon.Appcndix II(French)
1980UN Rcpon.g 186.
,Y Id.pan. 189.
"' Id.pan. 190. Other simulationswnfirm this prognosis. It has beai calculated that in the case of a
nuclear wnfiict in Western and Eastern h~urope in which les than 1% of the total
avaiiable nuclear wcaponry were usedl" against 470 urclusively militarytargeü (in
which 379 targets were the subjectof a singleattack of 150 kilotonnes each, and the
other 91 targets were the subjectof threeamkt of 150 kilotonnes each). the total
nurnberof dead and injured resuitinghm the shock waves, blowing effect and heat
alone would ex& 15.6 million. If you add to this figure the foresecable victims
multing in the short tenn frorn radiaactivefallout, figure of more than 100 million
dead and injure. would be reached.ln Awrdmg to other studies which wnm
limitednuclearanacks, targeting onlymilitaryobjectives in theUnited Sw or in the
fonner USSR, figuressuggest thatthenurnberof victims, depmding upongcographical
circurnstances,winds and the theoreticalmodelsud, would Vary betwcai 23 million
and 45 millionin the UnitedStates, and 54 million in the former USSR."'
3.50 In the contextof the likelihoodof escalationthe use of srnailnuclear wcaponsbecome
incrementallymore signifiant (seesupra paras. 3.45-3.47). Where the use of nuclear
weaponsin the above-mentionedcasesaffectsa large numberof non-combatanü,it will
be teen thattheir usenecessarilyhasindiscriminateeffectseven wherebelligeranuhave
soughtto lirnittheir actionsto militarytargets. Legally,any such use wouldvioiatethe
obligationtodistinguishbetweencombatantsandnon-combatantsby limitinganpanacks
to the former (supra para. 3.38) and notusingweaponswith indiscriminateeffecü (se
1977 GenevaProtocol 1, An. 51(4)-(5)).Is9With a large number of victims it is
impossibleto argue that the collateral damage was not "excessive in relation to the
concreteand direct militaryadvantapeanticipated"uithin the meaningof An. 51(5)@)
infine of the 1977 GenevaProtocol 1. Lossesof the scale indicaled above would not
only be"excessive",they wouldconsututea war crime. a crime against humanity,and
possiblyevengenocideif it couldbe shown theperson usingthe nuclearweaponhadthe
requisite element of intent (see 1918 Convenuonon the Prevention of the Crime of
Genocide, An. 2).The elementof intent for genocidecould be inferred from themere
failureof theperson usin: the nuclear weaponsto takeacwunt of itsfull effects:in such
conditions itis impossibleto say that they were ignorantas to the consequencesof use
and that thereforethey did not intend to exterminatethe victimpopulation.
Theseobservationsbecomeail the morepertinentwhenone considersthe possibilityof
any useof any nuclearweaponagainsta smailislandstate, whichwouldhavetheeffect
of wipingout the entire populationand rendering itsenvironment uninhabitable.
"
A.Ottoluigiuin 1987WHORepor;. Annex 1.C.p.130 (French).
'" Id.
'y B.Levi andF. vonHippel. in id.nncx 4.B.pp. 105n seq.(Frcnch).
" Cfr. Rinciper. oci!.pp.281et 331 (French) WHOISolomon Irkod c'riaen Obxdons: Pin M (Lw of Ard CooflM)
3.51 Anotherconsequenceof a "limitedm nudear amck would be the impossibilityfor health
services,assumingthey remainec ntact, toassure the care required for those victims
who hadnot ben killed.The burdcn placed on medical facilitiesand staff wouldbe
ovenvhelming. According W one expen:
'Le nombre de victimesque provoqoenunitee queI'utilinllon dpriepuiie des
arsenauxnucléairesd'aujourd'hui monire bienvain d'envisager qu'un quelconque
systèmede santi puisse offnr des winr médicauPalaridon.*'"
'Dtgager les blessésdes décombres. leurprkrpremiemwinr.puis les vaPrporter
hors de zonede denniclidansdes Crnblirvmenm&üuiu appropriir serait une tiche
exuimement difficile. mime en l'absence de retombéesdd'incendies violenu et
d'obnmction des rues par les décombresdes bltirnenu eI...11s'agit li d'une
siaiarion exigunt une contribution maxikapari der xrviccr midiuux dans de
nombreux domaines: sang. plasma. liquides adminiarparvoie parentinactes
chirurgicaux. antibiotiques. mins infirmiers. wins médicaux.chambres ntnles. de même
que routes les autres ressources wphistiqutes de la médIIs'agit en outre de
blessures dontcune exifc des journéesentiéresdntensif3et des remhnes ou des
mois de soinsospitaiiers. En fait, il n'existe aucun moyen de wigner un aussi grand
nombre de victime^."'^'
These conclusions,whichaddressthe consequencesof the useof nuclear weaponsin
indusuialisedcounuies,are a foniori vaiidin respectof any developingcountrywhich
mightbe subject IOa nuclearattack.
3.52 The use ofa nuclear weaponwhich affects a large number ofnon-combatanüwill
necessarilyhaveindiscriminateeffecü, evenif the actionwasintendedto be lirnited IO
rnilitarytargets.Suchuseviolatesthe obligationto distinguishbetweencombatanüand
non-combatan&t,olimitattackstocombatanü(suprapara.3.38),and not touseweapons
withindiscriminateeffecu (1977 GenevaProtocol 1.An 51(4-5)).The largenumberof
victimsresultinghm theuse ofanynuclearweapon,as evidencedby theReponscited
above, wouldbe indiscriminatein causingincidentalloss to civilianlife or objgts and
wouldbe excessivein relationto any militaq advantageanticipated(see 1977Geneva
Protocol1, An. 51(5)(b)).Suchdarnageto human healthand the environmentwould
constitue a warcrimeanda crimeagainsthurnaniryand, to theextentthat thenecessary
intentionalelement could be proved (whethersuch intention is express or could be
irnplied),genocide(supra. para. 3.40, 1948Genocide Convention,An. II).
3.53 Anothn consequenceof a "strategic"nuclearattackwouldbe the ovenvhelmingburdcn
imposedupona country'shealthservicestorespondto theneedsof victirns.Incounmes
with less highlydevelopedhealthservicesthe burdenwouldbe even greaer. The use
of a weapon which prevents health services from functioning orwhich renders any
'" A.Luf. inid. .nnex 6.p. 167 (French).
' Id.. p168(French). WOlSdomw kw Wriaen~bccrntioc Pan M bw ofArmd Gmnim)
possibiityof helpingthe injurediiiusorviolatcsintanational humanitarjanlaw. ïhus,
the 1949GenevaConvention IVprovidesthat 'the wounded and sickshaU be caredfor"
(Art.3Q), emphasisadded).As the Intanational Cour tas rtcognis ehi,provision
applics a foniori in an internationalarmed conflial T"he obligation is funhcr
developedin various provisions ofthe Geneva Conventions(1949 Gcneva Convention
1, Art.12erseq.; 1949GenevaConvention II,Art 12; 1949GenevaConvention IV,
m. 16etseq. and55erseq.). as wdl asthe 1977GenevaProtocols(Protocol1,Arts.
8, 61, 68; Protocol ïï, Art. 7 erseq.). Article10 of the 19ïî Geneva Protocol 1
provides:
l
"1. All thewounded,sickandrhipmcketoaibicheverPurytheybelong.rkPU
respectedandprotected.
l
2. In al1the circumstancesrbey&hutcd humlaely lad shll rccetorbe
fullen extent practicabwithleact possible delay. the mcdicd care and
attentionuiredby kir condition." ':1
This obligationwill be violated even where it is impossible tSave the victims of a.
"limited"nuclearconfii~t.'~~
3.54 In conclusion. theextraordinarypwer of nuclear weaponsand the enormityof their
effectson human healthand the environmentndly means that their use violates,
directiy or indirectly, those niles of the internationallaw of anned conflict which
prohibits:
the use of weaponsthat render death unavoidable:
the use of webponswhich haveindiscnminateefiects:
any behaviourwhich mightviolatethis law.
0 ne use ofnuclearweaponsviolaresimemario~l lowby reasonof rheirqualitative
eflectsofsuchweapons I
3.55 The qualitativeeffecü of nuclear weaponswhich distinguish them from conventional
weaponsare those which result (i) from the disintegrationof the atom and (ii) from
radioactivefallout. The disintegrationof the atomhas two wnsequences: the ernission
of elecûomagneticimpulsesand initial nuclearradiation.
fi) he specificconîequencesofrhcdisimegrorion of the arom
3.56 The disintegrationof the atom has two effects:
~ -
IE Miliaa.anà ParmilirapAnivirics andAgainri Nicaragua. Rep. 1986. p114,pm. 218.
161 Singh,op. nr.. p20001. WHOlSDlornon IslandWriacnObservationsRn M (Lw of Arwd bnîiicu)
- electromagneticimpulses(a); and
- inirianuclearradiation @).
Elecrromagnen impulses anàrheir conrequenccs
(a)
3.57 ïhe explosionof a nuclearweaponproduceshigh mcrgygamma rays which remove
electronsfromsurrounding matter and leave elecaicallycharged awms (ions). It is the
removal of electrons which uroduces an exeemely short and high intensity
electromagnetic impulse.lu ~'ithout going into thé technical d&ls of the
~henomenon,'~it should be rememberd that if the elmmagnctic impulsedoesnot
-km to cause direct physical damage to the human body, ~t has serious indirect
consequencesinsofaras it candamageal1the electricaland elecmnic equipmentof an
area affectedby an explosion.The electro-rnagneticimpulsemightdestroycomputers.
transistors,and integratedcircuitsto which it is msrnined through elecpomagnetic
energycaptorssuchas antennae, telephone wim, railwaylines,thealuminium fuselage
of 'lanes etc. Manv.,vstems which are essential for the life and health of civilian
populations,as wellascivilSocietyingeneral,wouldberenderedunworkable, including
electronicdevicesformedicalpurposes,telecommunicationf sorciviluse. andwater. gas
and elecmcitysupplies." Thi effectof cutringcommunications links betweenmilit&y
personnelmightalsoprecipitatea funher escalationin the use of nuclearweapons.'"
It shouldnevenhelessbe notedthattheeffecüofelectromagnetic impulsea sre relatively
negligiblein conuast tothe other effecü of nuclearweaponsdescribedabove. so long
as theexplosion takes placeat analtitudeof lessthan 10or 15kilomeues. On theother
hand, if the explosion takesplace at a higher altitude, the blowing, theimic and
radioactiveeffectshavemorelimited consequences fo thepopulationon theground,but
theelectromagneticimpulseefiectsaregreatersincetheywillreach"unevaste zone dont
les limites coincidentavec la ligne d'horizonpar rappon au point d'explosi~n".~~ ~t
hasben calculatedthat:
"L'explosion d'une bombe a une altitude de 100 km.. par exemple. produirait un effei
Clccvomafnitique sensible dm un rayon de llDOkm. Une explosion uniquea 350 km.d'altitude
produinii uneimpulsionquiioucncraitpratqiuementlaioralittde l'E.-C..ainsiqu'une
"169
pmie duCanadaet du Mexiquc.
Ih 1980UNRcpon. Appendix 1.p. 179. para. 18 (French).
'" Id.
lm
1987 WHORcpon. p. I1. para12. eseq.IFrcnch).
Id.p. 12pua. 14
la
1980UNRepon. Appendix 1.p.179.para.20 (French).
lm
1987 WHORepon, p. II. pan. 13 (French) 3.58 Electromagneticimpulseshave effects which cannot be dirested or limited. and they
affectindiscriminately:
wmbatants and civilians;
medicalsafety, healthand assistanceunits;and
third Statesandarea seyondnationaljurisdicfion.
It foiiowsthatthe useof the nuclear weaponswil. ..latethoseniles of thelawof armed
conflit%whichprohibittheuseof weaponsofindiMmwtc effecfs(supra.paras. 3.48-
3.54).Italsoviolatesthe nileosf internationalaw govaningfriendlyrelationsbetween
Stateswhichprohibiteffects of awnflia king felt by thirdParty States, narnely:
theruleprohibiting Statesfromdamaginghumanhealthor the environmentinthe
temtory of other States(i@a, paras. 4.9-4.20);
the lawsof neubality - to the extent that theyapply -accordingtowhich "[tlhe
temtory of neunal Powers is inviolable" (1907 Convention (V) Respectingthe
Riphts and Duties of Neubal Powers and Penons in Case of War on Land,
Article 1)
therulesprohibitingaggression,to theextentthatthe UN GeneralAssemblyhas
defined aggressionas "theuseof ail weaponsby a State" actingfirst "againstthe
temtory of another State".i70which arnountsto a violationof An. 2(4)of the
UN Charter.
@) 7hr initial nuclear radiarion
3.59 "initiainuclear radiation"lastsjust one or two seconds,during which tirneit has very
grave consequences for those whoare exposedto it,involvingboth shon and medium
term consequences.The effect on living organisrnsis similar to that of a genotoxic
poison (as opposedto the neurotoxicpoison unleashedby a chernicalweapon)."' The
effectsare evenmore extensivein the case of neutronbornbs. Initial nuclear radiation
only affects livingatter; actsasa poison; cornplicatesor precludes the possibihtyof
treatingthe sickor wounded;causesunnecessarysufferingand superfluousinjury;and
poses long-termgenetic risks for those who are not directly involved in the wnflict,
including the childrenof those who are directly exposed. Moreover, it is an inhcrent
characteristicof the useof nuclearweaponsand would occur in any use.
3.60 In the shon terrn, the principaleffects of radiation on the human body have been
'" Am 3314 00[D0. 14Dccember 1974An. 3@)and2 (adoptcdby wnwanis).
' Set referuicinAodricssupra. no54. a!11 commonly referred toas radiaiion sickness and have beui describedas follows:
'Tb+ severity of these yndmmes depends on tbe Mon dŒe nscived. in tbe letbai
range of doreiîmc dcg~ of rcvenrycprik recognued:(1) tbe cend Œwous syncm
syndrome. cbuacrenzed by alremLing aaier of aupor .Dd hyperexcimbiility. witb
unavoidable duth within a few days (Ibis is tbe effcct aimd atby tbe useof Œuvon
bombs): (2)the ganroinlcsunal syndrome. chvac~rivd opuul. persistent vomiting. and
hacmorrhagic diarrhŒa. with de& occumng wiîhin a week or w; ?ad 0) the
bernatopoietic syndrome. chancrerd by nwup. vomiring. cyiopenia uucmia. ad
immunity disurbances. Men the whoie body u errporaow a &on pend to dmer lur
tha 6 Gy (600 rad)the pmgnosis is dYtstlrelnrcdtoibe dnsesweivd by the bone
mou.. ft the rame dosisreteivd over a lo~gerperioofMie tbe chances of nvvivai
incrures. The risk of duth is gdy reduced if wmc boriemumw. ewn u liuieu n
Wnth.is sbielded from the radiatinntbc range of whole-body imdiation of 2dGy (200-
600 rad) sumival depends lvpely on the tberapulic mepcuresuken."ln
Accordingto their proximity to theplaceof the explosionand the power of the weapon,
victirns can either die in hours, days or weeks following their exposure to radiation:
"For an explosion similar to those over Hiroshima or Nagardü. the radiation is stmng
enough to render buman beings in tbe open unconsciout within minutes at distances up to
700 or 800 m from ground-zero. The exposed perrons. if bey survive the blast and hcar.
would die in les than one or two days from tbe radiation injury. The radiation received at
a dinancc of1.3ûC-1.600m from such anexplosion would alw befatal but de& may be
delayed up to about a month. At 1.800m or more from ground-zero feu. if an? acute
radiation injuries would be expected to occHowever. late radiation injunma? be
induced by lower radiation levels.
Shelters specifically consuucted to deal with nuclear conflicr might provide cenain
protection against initiainuclek. radiation:
.En demeurant aans ur: loca. ou dans un aorisptcialemcnt conçu. on reduirait
considtrablemen: la ciose d'lrradiaiUn bon abri diviwraii cene dose par Iûüû ou
davanrage1...1.La pro1c:lion awrtcpar une maisoc.ordinaire dépendraitde son type de
connrucoon et d'autres caractiristiaues.
Thi tsype of protection isgoin: to have a iimitedefficacy with regard to neutron bombs:
lqui wint précisémen:contues pour tue: sous I'etie: des rayonnesanssinfliger par
ailleurs trop de dcgArrd'o:igine rnccaniqueou tber-115e.
'- 1983 WHO Rcpon. p. 11. para.1E
1990 UNRcpon.p.81. pan. 197:Laf. 1967 WHO Rcpon. p. 165 (French).
'" 198) WHO Rcpon.p.12, pan. ?5 (French)
!" Rotblat. 1.ibid.,p.36. pan.45 (french). If these reduced doses of radiation arc not themselves lethal, cornbined with other
traumatic effects felt by victims, they become fatal. Radiation reduces the defence
system of the human organism by -king the immune system and consequently
inming the riskofexposuretodiseses andillnesseswhichrnightnotothenviseprove
to be fatal:
.En raisode l'effet combinédu blessureset de I'immunasIpprrssion.kuicoup de
victimesuccomkraienimmtd'ment aprèluneexplorionnucltpircb du biunirc1 ou
derinfectioquirunientétébénignedansdesckwna;iosunormd~.""~
The healthneedsof victirnswho havebeen exposedto nuclea radiationrequire a high
levelof technical,medicaland hospitalinfrastructure. The200whowereinjuredby the
accidentat the Chernobylnuclearpower plant. andthe 135.000people who had to be
evacuatedfrom a 30km exclusion zone,mobilise. "le personnel et the matériel des
services de santé de l'ensembledu pays"."" In the case of a nuclear war, evm if it
waslimited, (se thefigurescitedsupra. al paras. 337and 3.49) "les servicesde santi,
même à l'échellemondiale, ne pourraient en aucun cas faire faceà cette situation".
Developingcountrieswould bemore adverselyaffectedthan developedwunmes.
3.61 In the mediumand long term. epidemiologicalstudiescanied out on large nurnbersof
people exposed to thebombingsof Hiroshimaand Nagasaki, aswell as experiments
carried out onanimais,have showna relationshipbetweenexposureto radiation(andlor
to radioactivefallout) and theaccrued subsequentconsequences: maiignanttumours
(leukaemias.thyroid cancers and tumours of the breast, the lung and stomach, and
multiplemyelomas),cataracu, chromosornaiabnormalities,includingfor thosewho are
exposedin iuero.'7' Moreover, itis likely theuse of nuclear weaponswould lead to
a significantincrease in genetic consequences resultingfrom an? children born from
people exposedto raaia~ion.'~"
-
3.62 Experts are in agreementin recognisingthat nuclearradiationacts on organismsin the
samewayas a poison.Accordingto ProfessorM. Errera of the laboratoryof biophysics
and radiologyat the Université libre de Bruxelles,
"Iy a deux sones de poisons: lesneurotoxiqueset les génotoxiques.Les premiersson1
1%
1987 WHORepon. p.31. pan.76:Lcaf. ibidp.lBO(French).
ln Ibid.p.30 (French).
'"
ho, Hand Shigcmauu. 1.: LanCh.. Oftulal. P. 1983 WHORepon. pp. 10348.
'* Ofiedal. P.. id.. p.154. WHOISolomon islaods' Wrinen Oburvatio~Put M (LPwof Aimed bniiictr)
ppniculi~remeot le fait dci armes chimiques. les sedermescelnu~léairrr."'~
Accordhg toProfessor M.F. Lechat,of theepidemiologyunitof theCatholic University
of Louvain,andadviserto theComitéindonale d'expertsen sciencesmédicales et
santépubliquecre. by the WHO punuant toAssemblyresolution WHA 34.38."'
"On peut considérer I'anae nucléaire somme un 'poison' ndu fait des cffecu
écologiques: pqe dans Lacbaine plimenuire avec c4ocenUooon et dipOt d'isotopes
radioactifs dont l'él-162ttlente. pouvant s'étpourcurPin drs imper les plus
communs sur deannies.
Finally,accordingto annexII of Protocol iI If the Paris Accordsof 23 October1954
relating to the controlof armarnents:
"L'arm uclsiaireest définie comme toutearme qui contestcoque pour contenir
ou utiliser un combustibleaireou des isotopesradioactifs et qui. par explosionou autre
transformation nuclCairenon contmlu ou par radioactivitbdu combustible nucléaireou des
isotopes radioactifs, est capable de demuctmassive, dommages généralisésou
mipoiconnunmü massifs." (cmphasis added)la3
3.63 It shouldbe noted chatthe lethalsynergyof effects(blowing and heat combinedwith
radiation)do notoccur in the explosionof nucleardeviceswith a powerof more than
100kilotonnes
"car la zone mortelle crc& par I'efie: ae soufiie et I'efie: uitrrnique es; bien supcrieure a
celle qui résuliedu rayonncmcn:."'G
On the other hand. in the case of 2 neutronbomb
"la zone mortelle OUs'cxercen: les efieü des neu:rons et des rayons fanma cri beaucoup
.il85
plusiendue que celde I'onde de choc e: de I'onde Iherrniqur.
3.64 These qualitative consequencesbrin: nuclear weapons within the scope of those
Cid in Andriessupra.note 54. ai 21.
le'
1983 WHORcpon. p. 5.
Supra.note 178.
'O Cited id.: tintRGDIP. 1963. p. €3 (French]: OTAN Documents fondameailux Bruxelles. 1981.59.
1987 WHO Rcpon. p. 16(French).
" Id.(French). WHOlSolnmon IrlandWriuen ObservationPort (Lnvof ArmedConflinr)
intemationalrules prohibitirigthe use ofweaponswhich haveanalogousconsequmces.
Nuclear weapons can therebybe characterisedas, or have consequencesanalogousto,
chernicalweapons,the useof whichis prohibitedby intemationallaw, notably by:
s 1899HagueDeclaration2 ConŒrningAsphyxiaringGases;
1925GenevaProtom1 for the Prohibitionof the Use in War of Asphyxiaring,
Poisonousor Other Gases, and of BactmiologicaiMethodsof Warfare;
1993 Conventionon the Prohibitionof the Production, Storage and use of
ChemicalWeaponsand their Destruction.
The 1925 GenevaProtocol is noteworthybecauseit addresses "asphyxiating,poisonous
or other gases,and [. .al1analogous liquids materialsor devices" (ernphasisadded),
reflects the Parties' intention nottolimit the category of weapons in a resmctive
rnanner.Moreover, aresnictiveapproachtointerpretationis notthe rulein international
humanitarianlaw, which shouldalways be interpretedtogive the benefitof any doubt
in favour of the protectionof the victirn. This is particularlyreflected in the Manuis
clause, whichprovidesthat:
"Until a more complete code of rhe lawsof war hasbehi@iconuacting Panier
dum it expedient to declare bat. in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them.
the inhabitanu and the belliferanu remain under the prmlccoithe principles
ofthe Lawof nations. as thcyfrorthe usages esiablished among cirilired peoples.
from rhhws of humaniry. and the dictates of Lie public conscience.
3.65 Nuclearweaponshaveothercharacteristicswhichrender their useunlawful. Theyhave
poisonous consequencesand their use is therefore prohibited by the 1899 Hague
Convention2 (Anicle 23) and the Regulationsannexedto the 1907 Hague Convention
(IV).ïhey "uselessly aggravate the suffenngs of disabled men" in violationof the
principleenunciatedby the 1868SiPetersburgDeclaration,andtheycause"superfiuous
injury" in violationofimer alia1 .907Hague Convention IV Regulations(An. 23(e)),
1977GenevaProtocol 1 (An. 35(7) M).oreover. theiruse would violate the principles
ofproponionalitywhichregulatethe law ofarmed conflict.
3.66 Apartfromtheenergygeneratedbytheinitial nuclearradiation,nuclearfissionproduces
radioactive substanceswhichattach themselves to particles of the debris of the nuclear
weapon as wellas to rnatterdispersedby the explosion(if it takesplace atgroundlevel
'16 Sece.g.1907 Hague Convention IV. preamble; 1977 Geneva Prot1.An. l(2); 1981 UNConvention on
Pmbibitionsor Restrictions U= of Ccmin ConventionaWeaponsWhich May be Decmtd tobeExŒssively
Injurious or to Have IndiscrEffecü.priamble. WHOlSolornonkiands' Wrinen ObsewationRn M (Lw ofArwd Confücts)
or at a low altitude).TheseparficlesproduŒa 'rcsidual' radiationuith a iife ranging
frorna fractionof a secondto several ycars.nius,
"Two impomnt elemenn. nronuum 90and cneUum 137.for inmnce, will rcubdfof
thcir radiovtivity nfic30ay*.t and heme uvpc longtum hdth buPr&. Mon
14.which is formed from nitrinthenrmospherewhen imdlltcdwith neutron. hara
haif Lifeof about 5.8W yandwiil tbcontinuetogivedl ndion des to many
gcner;uions."'"
The falloutof radioactiveparticleswill varyaccording to their weight, the altitudeat
whichthe explosion occurred,theprevaiiingatmosphericwnditions, the natureandsizc
of the weaponusai, etc. The heavier and dmser particles rnaybe subjectto fallout
within a few minutes, althoughiighter particlu may nmain in the smtosphe~ for
months or years beforefallingto earth."'
3.67 The biologicaleffectsof radioactive falloua tre analogousto thoseof the initial nuclear
radiation,exceptthatthey cm wver infinitelygreaterareas and consequentlyaffectfar
morepeople.lt hasbeenestimatedthatfora ground-levelexplosionof a onemegatonne
bomb
"les personnesresàdecouveflpendantune longueperiode recevront desdoses monelles
sur une supeficiede prèsde Z000krn'el des doses engendrantdes lésions surune superficie
d'enviion10000km'."'19
It should also be nored tha; radioactiveparticlesaffect persons both "par irradiation
externede l'ensembleou d'unepartiedu corps"and by "irradiationinterne (Inhalation
ou ingestiond'éléments radioactif^)".'^
3.68 Given the analogouseffecrs of the initial nuclear radiation and the residual nuclear
radiationresultingfrom radioactive failout.the rules of internationallaw applicableto
the former (supra. paras. 3.64-3.65) are evidently applicable also to the latter.
Accordingly, the use of nuclear weapons doublyviolates six capiral rules of the
internationallawof med conflictsas a result of their qualitativeeffects.International
lawprohibitsthe useof weapons which:
- are chernical;
- are pisonous;
- renderdeath inevitable:
'
1980 UNRepon, p. 169. Appendix 1. para. 31 (Englishj.
Id.; saalso1980 UNRepon. pp. 61-83 (FrenchJ.Rotblatin1983 WHORepon. pp. 36-39
'" 19â3WHO Repon, p. 11. pan. 23 (French).
Iw Id.
61 - have indimiminate effecu; and
- violatethe principlesof proportionalityand humanity.
To thesesixprohibitionsthere mustbe addeda seventh. Asradioactivefailoutdoesnot
respect nationalfrontiers, third States wiil cerraùibeaffect cydfailoutand by the
residual nuclear radiation.I9'This fallout would violate the rules of internationallaw
governingfriendly relations between Statesand prohibitingany interference with third
States(infa. paras. 4.9-4.20).
3.69 Additionally,internationallaw now also regulatesthe methodsand means of warfare
with the aim of ensunng appropriateprotectionfor the environment.It establishes, in
particular,absolutelyprohibitsthe use ofweaponswhich will cause "widespread.long-
termandseveredamagetothe environment'. Article 350) of the 197 Geneva Protocol
providesthat:
"11is prohibiIOcmploy mcthods or means of warfare hare iniended. or may be
expectedIOcauswidespread. long-tcrm and severe damage tothe mmnl environment."
Article 55 of Protocol 1, which relates to theprotection of the civilian population,
provides, interaliat,hat:
"1. Care dldlbe Iaken in warfarc Io prolecl rhe nalurd environment afainst
widespread. 1or.g-1c:severdamagc. Thus proieclion includes a prohibition
of the use of methoùs or muns of uariaxe wh~h are intcnded or ma? be expected
Io cause such dainage Io the namral environmeni and thereby to prejudice the hdth
or survivalthepopulalior.."
There can be little doubt tnatan! use of nuclear weaponswould cause "widespread,
long-tem and severe damage" to the environment, engenderinga violationof Articles
35(3)and55 of hotocol 1and thecustomq obligationreflectedtherein. Asdescribeci
in thefollowingSection(infrn. para. 4.3).theChernobyl accidentillustratedthe gravity
for the environmentof a release into the atmosphere of signifiant quantiries of
radioactive material,with potentialdamageto the natural environment lastingseveral
decades.
3.70 Theapproachin the 1977 Protocol 1 follows,in generalterms, the languageusedin the
1977 Conventionon the Prohibitionof Militaryor other Hostile Use of Environmental
Techniques (ENMOD). The basicobligationof Parties. under ArticleI(i) is:
"not to engage in military or an? other hostile use of environmental modification techniques
havinf edesprud.long-la si in^ or severe effecu asthe mcam of destruction. damage or
IPI
Sac e.gthradioactive fallout anticina hypothaical atLackagainst stnugic Soviet urges in 1987iary.
WHO Repon. Annex 4.B. p. 11'. f3.(French). WHOISolornon Ldands' Wrinen ObservatiPan:M (Lw ofArwd bnflicu)
injuru,anyotherStaiep;uryV.
In thecontextof thedefinitionof "environmentalmodificationtechnique",(An. II)this
obligation leavesopen the questionof whether the use of a nuclcar weapon could
constinitethe "deliberatemanipulationof namrap l rocesw as"d leadto the violationof
the obligation under ENMOD. Nevenheless, the Convention Ugnals widesprtad
recognition of the need tolimit theuse of the environment asa weaponof war,without
dirninishin inany way thecustomaryand treatyobligationsestablishingclearnoms for
the protectionof the environmentwhichmust be foUowcd in tima of warand armed
conflict (infp aaras. 4.21-4.29). As supplementedby the moredhled and emphatic
obligationsof the 1977GenevaProt&lI, itis submitted thatENMODnowrcfiectsthe
customary obligationnot tocause "widespread,long-lastingor severe" harm to the
environment.
(C) The use of nuclear weapons violates international lau irrespective of the
cireumstances in whichthey are used
-
3.71 The majority of the rules cited in the preceding discussion apply essentially to
internationalarmed conflicts. Althoughthe possibilityremains rernote, the use of
nuclear weapons would also be unlawful in the case of a non-internationalarmed
confiict.ïhe fundamental rules whichinvalidatethe useof nuclearweapons - notably
the limitationon the rnethods andrneansto threatenthe enemyandthe obligationnot to
attack civilian- are applicabletoal1med conflicü. Thisis reflectedin UN General
Assemblyresolution2444 (XXIII)whichprovides:
"RecoEniring the necessity of appiying basic humanirainal1armed conlliitr.
- Affinns remlution XX'Viilof theXxth international Conference of Ihc Red Cross beld
al Vien~ in 1965. which laid dinrrdia. the folloning principles for observance bu
al1governmental and other authorities reîponsible for actioconflicts:
--
(a) that the rigthepanier10a conflici to means of injurinf the enemy is no1
unlimi~ed:
@) that il is prohIOlaunch amcks againsr the civilian populations as such;
(c) that distinctton musr bc made at al1 times beween permns taking pan in the
honilities and membcrr of the civilian population to the effectbehat the laner
spared as mucN possible19'lemphais added)
The 1977 GenevaProtocolII confimisandextendsthepnnciplesreflectedin resoluuon
2444, notablyby prohibitingattacksagainstnon-combatanü, thecommissionof acü of
terronsm, and orders againstgivingquaner (Arts. 4(l) and (2)(d), 7, 9, 11, and 13). WHO/SolomonIslands'WriacnObsermionr:Rn M (Lw ofhcd Connisu)
Lie Protocol 1, Protocol-II prohibits aaacks against nuclear plants (Art. 15) thus
confirmingthe appiicabiiityafonion of the prohibition on theuse of nuclear weapons
(supra para.3.12).
It is significant that the Gend Assembly gcnerally condemns the use of nudear
weapons without distinguishing betweem international and non-international armed
conflicts and qualifiesanyuseas "a crimeagaina humanity" (suprapara. 3.25). Thus
the fieldof applicationofcrimes againsthumanity isnot limitedto inknwional armed
conflicts.This is furtherefiectedin theStatuteof the internationalWar Tribunal for
Crimes commitredin the tenito rfythe fonna Yugoslavia. which mgnises the
cornpetenccof the Tribunalto judge the crimes 'committtd during an med conîlict,
whetherinternationalor interna]'(An 5).19'
île useof nuclear weaponscannorbejusrifiedby inrenianonal law inany C~KWNKMCCT
(d)
3.72 Proponenü of the legalityof the useof nuclear weaponsmightammpt to justify thcir
use underthe principlesof (i) legitimatedefence;(ii) reprisal; and (iii) necessity.None
of thesejustifications survive acareful scnitinyof the applicablemles of international
law.'"
(i) Self-dfence docs norjictrrfrheuse of nuclcar weapons
3.73 Self-defenceis an exceptionto the prohibitionagainsrthe use of force when a Stateis
subjectto an armedattack (UN Charter. An. 51). Accordingly.the self-defencenile is
-.
subjectto therulesgovemingjus ad (orcontra)bellwn. whereasthe rulesrelatingto the
use ofnuclearweaponsarise in relauontojus in bcllo. Moreover, theapplicationof jus
in bel10dws not dependon the legaiityof the defendedcausez; whetheraggressoror
victim,eachpartyis equallysubjectto thelawof armed conflictin conformitywiththe
customarypnncipleof theequaiityof belligerentsin thelawof war, a pnnciple reflecred
in the fifth prearnbularparagraphof the 1977 GenevaProtocol 1. Recourseto nucleas
weapons, prohibited by the rules of the law of med conflicts. cannot be justified
accordingto the inherentright of self-defence.
(ii) Repris& do nnrjusrrfi rhr use of nuclearweapons
3.74 Recourse to nuclear weapons by way of reprisal rnust be considered with regardto
rargeu:
'"
Tut inDoc.UN SN704.3rd May 1993. p.40 onthe field ofapplicarurionconrutiofchecrimeagaiusi
humaniiy;E. DavidPrincipes. op.cp.604.
IP~
Tbe followipnggnphs areagain hrgelinspirdbyErnmen (2 cd.loc.Cicpp. 23crscq.
64 WHOlSolomon Islands'Wrinen ObservationsM P(Lw of ArmcdConflico)
(a) which cannot be the object of repnsals: noncombatanu and non-milimy
targets;
@) against which recourse to qrisals is not categoncally prohibittd: the
combatantsand milirarymets.
(a) Repris& with regard ronon-combatam ami non-milirarymgers
3.75 During hostilities it is forbiddeto reson toreprisals against medicd installations,
msponation and units; theinjured; the infirm; civilim populations, propmy and
various categoriesof civilian propeny which are subject to specialprodon (197
GenevaProtocol 1, Arts.20, 51(6), 52(1). 53. 54(4), 55(2), 56(4)). The prohibition
appliesin respectof al1weapons,includingnuclearwcapons.This rule had previousiy
ben establishedin a generalmannerby An. 60(5)of the 1969ViennaConventionon
theLaw of Treaties(1969ViennaConvention)whichprovidesthatthenght tosuspend,
or denouncea veaty for subsrantialviolationof the latterdoes not apply
"toprovisions relating to ihe protection of the humanpemn conuined in crcatierof a
humanimian character, in panicular to provisioaayformof reprisaisvains
persons protectedby such treaties."
A similarprovisionis setfonh inpangraph 7 of UN GeneralAssemblyresolution 2675
(XXV) of 9 December 1977 on "the fundamentalprinciples [...]conceming the
protectionof thecivilianpopulationdunng an armedconflict".whichdeclaresthat
"Civilianpopulations.or individualmernbcrsthereobethe object of reprirak.
forciblc transfersor othcr arsaulrson tbeir inteEricy"(ernphacisaddcd)
The prohibitionon reprisalsin thesesituationsappearsalsoin Principle1. paragraph6
of UN GeneralAssemblyresolution2675 (XXV) on friendlyrelations.Evenif. in that
case,it relates tjus ad (or conrra)bellm rather thanjuc in bello,itis nonetheless
applicable to the second. It follows from the above that repnsals can, in no
circumstances,be lawfulagainst thiscategoryof targets.
0) Reprisais wirhregardto combaranrs and milirarytargers
3.76 The prohibitionof reprisais against combatantsand miliiary targets is not expressly
provided for in legal instnimentsbut the prohibitionof the use of nuclear weapons
againstthe formeror the latteris nonethelesscertain. Combatantsfall under thsarne
titlas non-combatants as "protectedpeople"by vime of thelawof armedwnflicu and
benefitfrom specificprotectionagainstthe useof certainformsof weaponry.ThusArt
60(5)of the 1969 ViennaConventionon thelawof ueatiesprohibitsthe useof erceprio
nonadimpleri confracfurin the case of "provisions relativetothe protectionof human
beings". In the caseof treaties of a humanitariancharacter thisrakes into account
combatantsas wellas non-combatants,withail "humanbeings"entiriedtotheminimum standardsofhumanitarianpiotectionguaranteedby internationallaw. The kt that An.
a(5) refers "in particulartoprovisionsprohibitingany form of rrprisals" (emphasis
added) does not imply that the other humanitarianprovisions - those in which the
prohibitionof reprisalsis not expresslymentioned - fal outside itsfieldof application.
since the adverb "norably" shows that the refaenΠto those provisions prohibiting
reprisalsis not intendedto be exhaustive.In this perspective, theuse nuclear weapons
by wayof reprisal, evenif exclusivelydirected against mmbatants and milira Lrayges,
would violate Art. a(5) and the general provisions of the law of arme! mnflicts
prohibitingthis use.
3.77 In a similar manner. the InternationalLaw Commission. in its Draft Amcles on the
Responsibilityof States, stressesabout Art. 30. on munter-measures, that:
"even where the inremationallywmnpfuinaquestion wwld jdfya rusuon iovolvinp
the use of force [...]. actioninthis yix ccnainly cpnnot include. for inaaace. a
breach of oblipauons of intedonahumanitanan Iaw. Such a siep could oever be
'legitimaie'and such conduct would remain wrongful.
3.78 Art. 1 common to the four 1949GenevaConventions andAn. l(1) of 1977Geneva
Protocol 1states that:
"The High Contracting Parties undenake to respect and to ensure respect for ihe present
Convention in circuinsrnnces."
Moreover. as set out in the Cornmenraireto theGenevaConventions:
"Ls mors 'en toutescirconstances' signifi1...Iune Panie contracunte ne peut se
donner aucun pretexte vnlable. d'ordre juridiqu;ne pas respecter la Conveniion
daosson enwinblc1...IL'ar:. ler. loin d'étrcune clause de style. r CtevoionIairement
revénid'un caractèreimpCrarUdoit sire pris a la lenre.
In other words, the absenceof an expressedprohibition on reprisals in the mles of
Protocol 1 relating to methodsand meansof combat dws not imply any right to use
them: independentlyof this O conrrorio approachto interpretati~n.'~t 'he obligation to
respect theProtocolin "dl circumstances"necessarilyexcludesthe rightof recourseto
reprisals.
"' Ybk iLC.1979. Vol.11.Pan 2. p. 116[§5]
Ira Lu Convernions de Genk du 12 aour 1949, Commenrairc. Genève. CICR. 1956 vol IV. pp. 21-22.
('Commenuire da Conventions').
'"
The a mnrrano argument would only be acceptable if a tex1 mube found in humanitanan Iawwhidisaid
'rcprisalarconly prohihiteci against the followiny obj... '. II would only be in thcasethai thea
cunrrario argument wuld heupheld with respect io the legaliiy of reprisls agaiwt al1ohjtctiva in1appnng
rhis list. WHO/SoiomonIslands'WrilrcnObxMtio@s: PanM (Lv,of Armed Conflint)
MoRover, the mle elaboralid in Art. 1 alsoindicatesthat reciprocity has no place in the
law of med conflicis. As indicated in thConune~uinto the Geneva Conventions:
'Enprenantd'embikcetengagementl.esPanierconmcmtu soulignentqueh Convention
n'enparseulementuncontratde ricipmitl'utunEut avecsonou ss co-wnuacuao
danslaseulemesureoùceux-cirespectentleurs prsngagementr.maispiutbtunesine
d'obligaiionsunilarCrs.olennellementassumPeh facedu mondereprknti par les
aumsPanicsconuacuates. ChaqueEtats'engagaussibiev~vis de lui-memequevis-
The principle of non-miprocity excludes afom'ori murse toreprisals in relationto
the use of nuclear.weapons, even against wrnbatants.
3.79 The draftarticle of the ICRC on the regulationof rcscrvations10 197 GcnevaRotocol
1 prohibited, interalia, any reservation relating tothe prohibitionof the use of weapons
causing supefiuous injury.IWIt was dropped by the Conference because of opposition
frorn Weswm and sociaiist Stateswho wanted the question of reservations to rernain
subject to the general rules on the Law of Treaties. The draft tex1nevertheles refiects
the importanceof the prohibitionin the eyes of the ICRC, and it is possibletoconclude
that a humanitarian prohibitionwhich cannot be subject to a reservation also cannot be
ovemdden in the name of a reprisal. In any case, to the extent that the general mles
relatinp toreservations prohibit reservations incompatible with the object and purpose
of the treaty (where the ueaty is silent. 1969 Vienna Convention, An 19(c)),
reservations relatingto useof nuclearweaponsare evidentlyincompatiblewiththeobject
and purpose of rules to protect victims of war from theexceptionailyharmful effects of
these weapons, as well as the fact that their use violates man? fundamental rules of
humanitarian law.
In practice, the very nature of nuclear weapons iexcluding vinuaily any possibility of
limiting their effects to miliw targets and avoidinga toral war) means that recourse to
nuclear reprisais would necessarily violate prohibitions for which these reprisais are
explicitly prohibited- for example the prohibitionon atÿickingcivilian populationsor
their propeny (supra para. 3.38). This is why such reprisais mus1 necessarily be
illegal.lm
(iii) Necessis does norjusrifi rhe use qf nuclear weapons
3.80 Comprornised between milira- necessities and humanitarian requirements, the law of
Commema~re du Conwnrronr.III. p14: secalso Commcnraircr. p. 37-3:rincipcloc. cirpp. 473-74
1- ICRC. Dnft AdditionalProtocol the Geneva Conventionsof 12tAuga 1949. commeniary.Guieva. 1973
pp.10648.
xm CJ vonderHeydteand Andmssy. inAnn.I.D.1..SessionoNice.1967, Vol. 52. Pt.p.45; 1.Bmwlie, 'Som
kgal Aspsts of theUseof Iriuclearweapons'ICLQ1965. p.445. WHOlSolomon Ws' Writt.cnObx~atiousRn M (Lw of ArmedConflicrc)
armed conflicts does not accept the state of nccessity except in those circumstances
whereit isexpresslyprovidedfor. Asstad by theIntemafional Law Commissionabout
itsDraftArticle 33on thestateof ne&ty asa situationprecludingiiiegaiityas a result
of a violationof internationallaw. thisexceptiondoesnot authorisea Sratetoignorethe
prescriptionsof humanitarianlaw:
"1%would beabsurdu,invoke the idcamiiiury-iIy or nccesityofwu in ordeIO
evade the dutyw comply wirh obligations designed. pwiprcvenl the neccrrities of
unr from cvrcing ntfferiag whiwasdesiredm prrvribc oncandfor di..m'
Ifhumanitarianiaw takes accountof military ndties:
i
"thew are provisions which apply wnrhecasesexprerrly providcd foAparihom 1
thew ces. it follows implicillyfrom rhe uxt of the conventions ihat they do not admit the
possibilityof invokingmilitary necenity as ajusrificationfor Sate conduci not inconfo.'1ty
mth the obligations they
i
Thejurisprudenceof coursetakesthe sameapproach. ïhus, in Von iewinrk' (aliarVon
Mmein) case: !
"Once the usages of mrhave assumed theSlaNS of laws. the? Cannobe
ovemdden by nccessity. except in those special cases where the law iuelf makcs
for that evenniality.
îhe mle is absolute:
l
"1..1the mies of international labciollowed even iresulü in the loss ofa baitle
or cven a mr.Expediency or necesrit? canno!wxran! their viI...ion1
The mie applies equally in relation to nuclear weapon~.~"In the Shimodacase the
TokyoDistrict Court, in responseto the argument thatal1meansto force the enemyto
surrenderare good, sajd:
'..1 iis Wong Io sa?thni the distinction beween rniliLaryobjective and non-military
"' YbklLC. 1980.II,Pan 2. p.46 15281.
" Id.
pl Hunburg. 19 December 1949. 16ILR 512:se alsohen Pan 2). bc.cir. p.3n.97.
US.Mil.Trib.. Nuremberg. 19thFebruary 1948. Lin. et al.. WarCriminairBc/oretheNu&g Milunry
Tribu~k. cd. by Spnrher anFricdWashington.US G.P.O .951-1953,IX,p.1272;also.id.;uremberg.3W
June 1948.Krupp. ILR15 p.628.
"'A. Andriesbc.cir.p.64. WHOlSolomonIzlandr'Wrinen Obrewuions: ParM (Lruof Arme.4Connicu)
"206
objectivehasgoneout ofexinence buaux total wa.
The relevant mles of international law prohibiting the use ofnuclear weaponsapply
(C)
to all States
3.81 The rulesof lawof armedconflictand lawgovmiing friendlyrelationswhichprohibit
the use of nuclearweapons are, notably,thosewhichesgblish:
thelimitationon thechoie of meansof attackingtheenemy (supra.paras. 3.38,
3.71);
the permanentobligation todistinguishbetwan combatantsandnoncombatans
(supra.paras. 3.38, 3.50,3.71);
the prohibition against attackingiviliantargets (supra.para. 3.38-3.39, 3.71);
the prohibition against attackinghealthservices (supra.para. 3.53);
theprohibition against the use ofchernicalweaponsor poisonsor weaponswhich
haveindiscriminateeffects (supra.pan. 3.52, 3.64, 3.65);
theprohibition againsttheuseof weaponswhichrender deathinevitableor cause
unnecessarysuffering (supra.paras. 3.44, 3.65);
the prohibition against violatingthe territorialintegrity of third States(supra.
pan. 3.58, 3.68);
the prohibition againstcausingwidespread,long-tennand severedamageto the
environment (supra,paras. 3.69-3.70);
the obligationto respectthe principlesof proportionalityand humanity (supra.
para. 3.71); and
theprohibition againstpenocideor crimesagainsthumanity (supra. para. 3.40).
Mostof theserules are set out in the classicalinsuumentsgoveming jus in bel10- the
1868St Petersburg Declaration.the 1874i3~sSe.i~ Declaimion,1899 HagueDeclaration
IV, Regulationannexedto 1907 Hague Convention IV, 1925 GenevaProtocol, 1948
GenocideConvention.1949GenevaConventions - whichare penerallyconsideredto
reflect customq law in pra~tise,~~ jurispmden~e,~~and the writings of juri~ts.~
20' Sk res.827 of =th May 1993,pan. 2.. where the Secunty Council approves the Sccretlry Grcpon'on
theStlniic of the internationalWar Tribunal for crimes wmmittul in the fornier YugoslaSecretayre the
Gend lis&the conventions which. accordiny to him. form pan of internationalcustomay law: the 1907Hague.
Stvvteof the Nuremberg Intcmational Milita- Tnhunal. 1948. Guiocide Convention, 1945, 1949doc.; in
UN S125704.3rd May 1993p.11 pn.35.
For the custom.ry chamter of the Hague RegulatioJudgmuit o30thSeplember -1stOctober 1946Pm&
dcrgrands crimineldeguerre devantIrT.M:I.. Da.Off.. Xuremberg, 1947. vol.1 p.2secai60the inlem.
Mil. Trib.fortùe Orient, Tokyo, 12thHovember 19AmDig. 1948Vol.15. pp.3é546;C. Rou9cui. kdroir
da wnfiirs mu. Paris. Pulone. 1983. p.24 and the rcfcrcnco: Germany Reichsgmcht in muten.a4th
April 192îAmDig. 1p.433. Nur.. US.Mil.Trib.. 28th October Von8Lab CIal..(Guman HighCouunand
Trial)A.D. 1948, 384 etc. WHOlSolomon IslandsWnmnObservationsP:urM (Lw of ArmedConnieu)
Someofthe applicablenilesare found inthe UN Chancr and thelawarisingthereunder.
Alrnost aiolf thosewhichariseunderthelawofarmedconflictcomewithinthe "general
principles of humanitarian law' invoked by the Intemational Court in the case
concerning MiliraryamiParamiliras. Adriries in'andagainsrNi~arogua."~
3.82 Now, whetherin relation tocustornarylaw, or tothe 1948and 1949 Conventions,or
to UniredNations law ongeneral principlesof humanitarianlaw, these rules bind ail
States or vinuallyailStates -as custom, general principles, or ratified tmties. The
questionis d,otheybind, asbetween themselvcsor benvm themselvesand thirdStates,
thoseStateswhichbelievethat the uwof nuclear weaponsis legal?
3.83 The oppositionof cenain Staw to a formal expressionof the illegalityof the useof
nuclear weapons fint occurred during the negotiationand adoption of the UNGA ..
resolutionswndemning their use. and continued during the negotiationsof Gmeva
Protowl 1.It is acardingly by reference to their activities in those contexisthat one
mustjudge whetha theseStateshave been abletoestablish.for themselves.specialiules
relatingtotheuse ofnuclear weapons,i.e. mles excludingtheapplicationof the general
-
obligationsof the lawof med conflict.
Dunng the adoptionof the UN Generai Assemblyresolutions condemning theuse of
nuclearweapons (supra para. 3.25). a cenain numberof Stateshad votedagainstthese
resolutionsor theyabstained. Totheextentthattheseresolutions represent positilaw,
abstentionsare nottobe consideredas a negative vote.Sinceinternationallawprohibiis
the use of nuclear weapons, this laupcenainly applies to States who always abstain
during the affirmationof this rule of law. To prevent the applicationof this mle by
creatinganother, its expressionmust be clearly statean abstentiondoes not provide
a clear expressionin theseterms, and is insufficient toallowa new rule to emerge for
the abstaining States. Moreover, even if an abstention were to be wnsidered as
quivalent to a negativevotethe act of abstentionwouldnot, as set out below,creatca
new mle.
-
3.84 To justify the modificationof the law prohibitinpthe use of nuclear weapons, States
favouring amodificationof a pre-existingruleprohibitingtheir useare likely to invoke
the fact thatdissuasion throughnuclearpower has ben around for fiftyyears without
it being roundly wndemned by the entire international wmmunity. The question
referred tothe Courtrelates to the legalityof the use of nuclear weapons:it dws not
touch uponthe legality of the threatened use of nuclear power. In this context its
importanttonote that the threateneduseof nuclearpower is only a matterfor a srnail
numberof countries;even iftheir practicereflectedtheir belief in the legalityof the use
of nuclear weapons,they would not be entitledto imposeit upon non-nuclearStates.
BP
Se.for exampleA. Robensand R. Guelff. Documuiu on the Law of War. Oxford.ClamdPm. 1989.
pp.30.5,44. 138-39.
''O IU Rrp. 1986p.114pan.220:se also p.112 para. andp.113 para218.
70 WHOlSolomonùlands' WriacnObxrvatio~Pm M (Lpwof ArmedConîiinr)
Non-nuclearStates do not-pnctise this kind of dissuasion,and they have consistcntly
supponedexpressionsof theillegalityunderinternationaliawincludingtheUN Charter
of any useof nuclearweapons.
3.85 Thispiacticeofdissuasioncannotthmfore modifythepmxibg rulesofinternational
law which prohibitthe useof nuclearweapons. Evmasbctwecn theproponcnüof this
practice and other States,the use of nuclear weaponsmnains illegai. Thisrrasoning
appliesalso in respectof Stateswhichvote againstUN Gmeral Assemblyresolutions
condemningtheiruse: opponenüof theseresolutionscannotimposetheirwill on States
who support them, since these Statesare restating eximng iaw. AU Statesthmfore
rernainiinkedby commonlegai obligations: ifnot by the mlutions themselves.then
throughthelaw theyenunciateaccording W theprinciplepnor in rempore pon'orinjus.
To recall,An. 41 the 1969ViennaConventionon the Law ofTreatiesstatesthat:
"1. Two or moreof thepartiestoa multmuy may concludinagreementtmodifthe
treatacbetwnn Lhemselvaaloneif:
in) the possibilityof sucha modificationis provided foroiy the treary;
(b) the modificationin questionis notprobibiid by ihc traiy and:
ii) dŒrnoiafiecttheenjoymentbytheothcrpartiesonghvcunderthe
treaiyor the periomance of tbcirobligations;
(ii) dots noi relatetoa provision.derogationfromwhichis incompatiblewith
theefiecriveexccutionof theobjcctand purposeofara wholety
I...]iempbasisadded)
In thicase, Statesto whichthisrule applies.and whowouldlike to modifyil, can do
soundercenaincircumstances. butthisnewagreement - supposing iapplies,qd non
to nuclear weapons(seebelow) - appliesonlytotheseStatesand not toothers (se eri.
34ofthe 1969ViennaConvention).The principleoftherelativeeffectof ueatiesapplies
equailyto other formsof internationallegalobligation,includingcustomaryobligations
and thosearisingby operationof generaipnnciples.
3.86 If theStateswhicharguein favourof thelegalityof the useof nuclear weaponscanthus
take advantageof a rule which would link them only in their relations asbenvcen
themselves,it is still necessq thar suchan agreementshould satisfy the obligation
reflectedinArt. 41 of the 1969ViennaConvention,and notably w those conditions
providing that the modification.bu these States, of uearies nonnally applicable to
nuclear weapons doesnot compromise:
(i) either the object or purpose of these ueaties taken as a whole (Vienna
Convention,An 41(1)@)(ii);
(ü) or the panicular rightsand obligationsthat other States partiesto thesetreaties
may rely uponor are subjectto (1969ViennaConvention,An 41(1)@)(i)). WHOlSolomonIslands'WriuenObservatioPan iiA (LwofArmed Conflicü)
3.87 It is doubtfulwhether theuse ofnuclear weapons coulbe compatiblewiththe effective
realisatioof the objectandpurposeof trcatieswithhumanitarianobjectives,sinΠtheir
objectand purposeis:
in generai,toreduce the suffering of people exposed to the director indit
effectsof warsand toprotect the victimsof suchconflicu;
morespecifically,tofulfïitheparticularobjectivesidentifiedabove(supra. para.
3.81).
It hasbeen seenthat the use of nuclear weaponsnot only increases the suffering of
victims,butnecessarilyconnavenestheprovisionsof numeroustreaties. Consequentiy,
anyagreementwhich theymighthavemadewouldntcessanly be conuary to theobject
and purpose of the above-mentionedinstrumentseven as concerns relations between
Statesadvocating thelegalityof the useof nuclear weapons.
Afonion this is the only proper conclusionwhich canbe dnwn for legal obligations
which arebased upon the protectionof victimsand notthe interestsof States, anare
beyondthe scopeof the applicationof the pnnciple of reciprocity.
3.88 In the event that applicable treatie- those whose provisions have the effect of
rendering illegal the use of nuclear weapon- establish laws which al1Srateparties
must respect, it is inconceivable thattractingparties should be able to concludean
agreementon the legalityof the useof nuclearweapons withou~ ipsfoacroviolatingthe
rights which other contncting panies have under those ueaties (1969 Vienna
Convention, An 41(l)(b)(i)). In the eventof a large-scaleuse of nuclear weaponsaU
States would, directly or indirectly, be subject to the damaging consequences (by
unwnuollable mdiation, contaminationand pollution). Accordingly,theirenjoymentof
their conventionalrights wouldbe affectedand violated.
3.89 Finally, given that the applicable treatiesestablishnitanan rules which by virtue
of their importanceare part ojlu coge~,~ any agreementconraq to these rules are
necessarilynul1and void by vinue of An. 53 of the 1969ViennaConvention.
3.90 The question remains whether theefforts by certain Statesduring the elabontion and
adoption of 19n Geneva Protocol 1 to "set apan" nuclear weapons"by adopting
declarations(supra, pans. 3.17er seq.) precludesthe applicationof that instrument to
nuclear weaponsin respectof treaty relationsas betweenthose States, and as between
themselves and third States Parties to the Protocol). Several reasons lead to the
conclusionthat Protocol1 does,oovemthe useby thoseSratesof nuclear weapons.
:" Id.1980,Vol. 2. 2ndpan. p45 Br49see a!sBarcelom Tracrion.5Febnury 1970.10 Rep.1970.p.32;
Pn'nciper.op cpp.85-93. Accordingto theWayin which they havebŒn characteriscd by their d&n.
(1)
they are only 'declarations";sm'm semu they are not reservationswithinthe
meaningof Amcle 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law ofT~ties,"~
and accordinglyother Partiesdo not havetoenter objections to them since
according to Article2(d) only se nations can have the effect of modifying
obligationsundera treay. 'These'declamions" thereforehave no lee@effecrs
as againstthirdStates.
(2) Supposing,however,that these 'declarations' did amounttoxtsmarions, they
would still oniybe effectiveand admissible if they were compatiblewith the
object and purpose of the Protocol (1969 Viauia Convention. An. 19(c)).
Moreover, as previouslynoted, nuclearweapons haveeffectson humanhealth
and the environmentwhich an connary tothe classical mlts of intemationai
humanitarianlaw. Their use wouldnegatethe entire Protocolsinceany useof
nuclear weaponswould allow a Party to circumventiü obligationsunder the
Protocolwith respectto conflict.In other words, it would notjust be "certain
provisions"of the Protocolwhich would cease to apply, but the totalityof that
instrument.Itis doubtfulwhethersuchan approachwuld becompatiblewiththe
objectand purposeof the Protocol.
(3) Having regardto the exuaordinaryeffecü of nuclear weapons.sayin2that it is
possibleu> be a Party to Protocol 1while reservingto oneselfthe right to use
nuclear weapons nullifiesthe objectiveof the Protocol. lt essentiallyallows a
Stateto unilaterallydecidewhether it wilapplythe Protocol.Sucha conditional
applicationis entirely without validiin internationallaw since itwouldallow
a Stateto disengageitselffroma treaty obligation wheneveritwished.andavoid
its obligationtocaq out iü rreaty obligationsin good faith(see1969 Vienna
Convention,Art. 26).
(4) Ifthe "declarations"do amountto reservations,the factthatotherPanies to the
Protocol have notobjectedto them could imply that they have acceptedthese
reservations(1969ViennaConvention. Art.20(5))and their compatibilitywith
the objectand purposeof theProtocol.The silenceof theParues to the Protocol
doesnot implyacceptanceof thesereservations, however,in the contextof the
annualsupportgiven by theseStatestotheGeneralAssemblyresolutiondeclaring
the illegalityof nuclear weapons(supra. para. 3.25).
(5) Maintainin: the hypothesisthat these "declarations"were resemations, they
wouldpermittheir authorsto usenuclearweaponswithoutviolatingtheProtwl.
However,theuseof rheseweaponsnecessarilyviolatesthemies of internationai
-'
AnZ(d): "rescrvations'meaasunilaieralsutement, howeverphrasedor nuncd. madSUU.awhcn sipning.
ratifying.ycepting, approving oraccuaitrcary.wherebipurpo~ to cxcludeor to mdify ~hclceffst
ofceriaiprovisionsof the treatheirapplicatitothatSuie'. humanitarianiaw, whichhave been mgniseci by the whole of the international
wmmunity asimperative.The reservationswould, in effect, bevoid ofcontent
oreffect (ViennaConvention,Art. 53).
3.91 Somemaysuggestthatthe relevantmies of inteniarionaliaw are notjus cogembecause
some States claim that certain uses of nuclear weapons might be lawful and that
consequentiyanyillegaiityper se of theuseof nuclcarweaponsunderthesemles is not
accepte bd the wholeof the internationalwmmunity of States. This seems tobe an
invertedformof reasoning:if al1Stateshave qted the impexativechamcterofa rule,
it is not possiblefor a handfulof States,actingsubsequenily,tosay that the rule is not
imperativebecausethe requiredquasi-unanimity isno longercvidat asa resultof their
lack of support. It is at the moment ofadoption andof the characterisationof the mle
i
that it is necessary to determine whether the requisite quasi-unanimityof views is
apparent. .'l
(D) Conclusions
3.92 Lnsummary, ihasbeenshownin thisSection thatthe useof nuclearweaponsis subject
to internationallau. Itoesnot followthatjust becausenuclear weaponshavedifferent
characteristicsfrom other types of weapons that internationallaw does not appiy to
hem: practice (including that of the nuclear powerStates), jurispmdence and the
writingsof jurists are clear on this point(infra.paras. 3.3-3.10).
3.93 The 197 Geneva Protocol 1 applies to the use of nuclear weaponseven ifitdws not
expressly say so. The silenceof the Protocol aboutnuclear weapons proves nothing.
since the Protocolis silentabout other foms of weapons. Their use is no less subject
to thegeneral mles of behaviour uhich are required by the Protocol. A forriori, the
specificprohibitionin the 1977Protocolsagainstattackingnuclearpowerplantsreflects
the greatwncem of Statesaboutthereleaseintotheenvironmentof radioactivematerial
andsupportsthe viewthatProtocol 1 doesapply tonuclearweapons.Astothe expressed
desireof certain Statesnot toapplyProtocol1to nuclear weapons, it comesup against
the stronglyopposing viewsof the great majorityof other States; practice consecutive
to the adoptionof the Protocolconfims that there was no agreementthat the Protocol
did not applyto nuclear weapons(infra.paras. 3.11-3.24).
If the classicai instruments govemithe lawof armedconflictdo notexpressiyaddress
nuclear weapons,the General Assemblyof the United Nations has adopted a large
number of resolutions solemnly wndemning the use of nuclear weapons in any
circumstances.These resolutionsdo not createnew law, seekingonly to dl that the
use of nuclear weapons is governedby pre-existingmles (paras.3.25-3.31).
In view of the objective and functions of the WHO, certain of its rules are ais0
applicableto and condemnthe useof nuclear weapons(int. paras. 3.32-3.33). It is the devasiatingeffectsof nuclearweaponswhichcondemnsth& use: theirpower
3.94
leads ineluctablyto the death ofrnanypeople within a cenain radius; with smtegic
weaponsthe effectpersistsalthoughit diminiinscale.Inany event. the useof even
thesrnallestnuclearweaponhas the potend tounltas a full-scalenuclearwar with
incalculableconsequences;even the usc of a stmegic nuclear wcaponwould lcto
greaterlossesarnongstciviliathanmilitarypersonnelBy maan of thesequantitative
effw alone, the useof nuclearweaponsviolatesthedes prohibitingthe inflictionof
necessKydeath for adversaries,of causingindiscriminateeffazts, and aicouragingthe
gmd rules of internationalhumanitukmlaw(Yfro.paras.3.34-3.54).
Thequalitativeeffectsof nuclearwea&ns,characMisedby the initialnuclcarradiation
andnuclear faitoutand theconsequmcesof theseeffecü, bnngs nuclearweaponswithin
the scop ef rulesprohibitingthe useof poisonousand chemicalweapons.Sincethesc
effectsbecomecumulativelygreaterwiththepowerof nuclear weapons,they leadto a
greatercertaintyof killingtheir victirns,therebyviolatingtheprohibitionausenstthe
of weaponswhich render death inevitable.Health and rescue services havibeen
desmyed or badly damaged, the use of nuclear weapons violates the immunityof
medicalcorpsandthe nghts of victimtohaveaccess tomedicalassistance.Moreover,
sincetheseeffectsrnayaffectpeopleoutsidethe scopeof the conflict,both in rimeand
geographically,the use of nuclear weapons violates the prohibition on the use of
weapons which cause unnecessary suffering, cause harm to civilians, and have
indiscriminateffects. The principlesof proportionalityand humanityare obviously
violated.And nuclear weaponsare incapableof respectingthe obligationnot tocause
widespread,severeand long-termdamageto thenaturaienvironment.or violatingthe
righü of third Statesunder the laws of neutraiityor general internatio(infra.
pm. 3.55-3.70).
These violationsare independentof the contextin which theyocc-internationalor
non-internationalarmedconflic-and theycannotbejustified by reasonof arguments
relating to legitimatedefence, repriorlstate of necessirysince the lawof armed
conflictis independentof thejconrr aellum.whichprohibitsreprisals,excludesany
possibilityof reciprocity. and already takes account of the state of n(infra.y
p-. 3.71-3.80).
3.95 Therulesidentifiedaboveare reflectedin customarylawandtreatiesbindingail States.
includingthoseproponenü of the legaiityof the useof nuclear weapons.These States
have not even managedto createinte se differentnoms than those which theare
boundto respectin their relatiwiththirdStates.Suchnoms would beincompatible
withtheobjectandpurposeofthe generalrulesapplicabletonuclearweaponsand would
violatethe nghts of third Statesand of victims.In any event, sincethesenibes may
consideredto bejus cogenr any agreementin violationof thern would bipsfacto
withouteffect(infr aaras. 3.81-3.91) SectionB
The use of nuclearweaponsviolatesapplicablerulesof international
lawfor the protectionof humanhealthand the environment
(A) The useof nuclear weapons issubject to intemationai law for the protection of
human health and the environment and fundamental rights
4.1 The use of nuclear weaponsmust also be considerd by refemce to thoserule osf
internationallaw which do not relatercctlytoarmed conflict.As setout in Section
A, the use ofnuclear weaponscan cause damageto human healthand theenvironment
in the territory of the State which uses a nuclearweapon, the target State or temtory,
third counmes, and other areas beyond national jurisdiction. Itcan also violate
fundamentalhumanrighü, includingthe right to life.
4.2 The pernicious effects of radiation on human health and the environment were
graphicallyillusmted by the accident which occurredat the Chemobyl nuclearpower
planton 26 Aprii 1986. Theaccidentmadeclearthatradiationdoesnotrespectnational
boundaries, that it can be carried for thousandsof kilometres, and that wherever it is
depositedit will cause harm to human health and the environment, with consequential
adverseeffecü onagriculture,ourisrnandotherindustrialactivities. For a smallisland
state, the consequencesof any such exposurewouldbe catastrophic.
On 27 Apnl 1986,Sweden.andthen Denmark.Finiandand Poland. detectedsignifiant
increases in radioactivity level~.~" Increased radiation levels weresubsequently
observed,inrerdia, in Ausrna, GermanDernocraticRepublic.Hungary, Italy. Norway,
Yugoslavia(29 April);Federal Republicof Germany, Switzerland,Turkey (30 April);
France (1 May);Belgium.Greece, Netherlands,UnitedKingdom(2 May);and lceland
(7 May). Low-level increases were aiso detected in Japan and the United Staw.
Significantincreasesof particulardanger to human health were observai in the levels
of Iodine-131,Caesium-134and Caesium-137immediatelyafter the a~cident.~" The
sale of the disasterbecameclearer whenthe worldleamt that in the 36 hoursafter the
accidentmore than 100.000peoplehad beenevacuated froma radiusof some 20 miles
around the reactor. The full effecü of the accident on people. propeny and the
environmentare stilldifficultto assess. In the USSRthiny-one peopledias a dimt
"'
SetSalo. 'InfornutionExchangeAkerChemobyl'.28 IAU Bullerin,No. 3, psecguierrtlP. San&.
ChrrnoklLw andCornrnunicruioT:ronrbounda~hicleAirPolluri-n 7heLepl Morerials(1988).
II. I
Sa Summary Reporto22July 1986of theWorkinf Groupon Assessrnentof WiatDoseConunilmm1in
Europdue IOthe Chemobyl Accide.otd in 2IAEABullerin.No. 3. atp.27 (1986). I result within a few weeks and a furtha three during 1987 asa result of on-site
utpos~re.~~~ The United Kingdom NationalRadiation ProtectionBoard has estimated
thatin theEEC wunmes 1,000people wiildieand 3,000 wiilconnactnon-fatai cancers
because of the accident.'16Many States,as well as the EEC. situated thousandsof
kiiometres from the accident, took measures to minimize the effects, measures
sometimescostlyin themselves(as, for uample, the pmufgve medieationunderraken
in Pohd) butwhichdsocausedlossesto dq andagricultural farmers ishand meat
producers and the tourist ind~smes.~" The effectsin the Fedexal Rcpublic of
Gemy weredescribed as follows:
.The widcsprudradioactwnPmiouion oftheauwM d d enPilcddilut d.mye
w springvegetabler:milkproducinghsdw k kep:hm pzing; rheConaimptioof
milkandotherfoodmiffhadw benipervircd:imponrrarictionskume necercay:the
fuing of stnletventionlevIdsw a chge in wusumen' uuof iodbuyiogbabiu:
tnvel agenciesPaPIpOn undenakingsspecialiringinEuteni Ebutinelm their
clicnieand finalseasonaworkersin qriculnIOSlheirjob^."^"
4.3 The legalityof the useof any nuclearweapon is subjectto thoserulesof international
lawarisingbyopention of treaty,customor act ofinternational organisation which are
intendedto protect humanhealth and the environmentfrom pollutionand toprolect
fundamentalhumanrights. Thatbodyof rulesis nowextensive.Moreover.theserules
are of "essentialimportance for the safeguardingand presenation of the human
environment"withinthemeaningof-Article1911Kd. ,. .f the ILC'sdraftAmcleson State
Responsibility,the serious breach of which may $ive rise to the commissionof an
intemational Just asthe lawsof armedconflictsprohibit "widespread,long-
term and severe damage"to the natural environment(supra. pans. ..): so generi
internationallaw now seeksto protect the environmena rnd preventdamageto human
health. The fundamend irnponance of rules prorecting human health and the
environment,andtheir interdependence with themaintenanceof peaceandsecurity,has
beenrecognisedby al1Statespanicipatingat the UN Conferenceon Environmentand
Developmentin June 1992. The Security Council. meetingat the level of head of
govemmentor head ofState.hasdeclaredthat "non-militarysourcesof instabilityinthe
"'
ntrFiMnciaiTi, 5 D~cmbsr 1987.
:'O SeeNRPB. A Relimi~- AIserSmenr of rRe Cnrrnob?.lRcacrorAccidenton rhc Popuhion of the Eumpwn
Communi~ (1987).
:" SeeIhc FinanciaTuner.II July 198at p.3622May 1987ai p.315 May 1986.at p.2nie Economirr16
August 1986ntp.28.
"' 38MB 21(1986).
:'O 1980YbkILC, Vol.II(Pan2).p.30. wHO/Solornonhd'r WrirtcObudonr: Pm ml (Law of HumaoHulm andtbcEovimment)
ecologicalfield have become threats tointernationalpeaΠand ~ecurity'.~ Earlier,
in April 1991,theSecurityCouncil had reaffirmedin remlution 68711991that lraq was
"liable under international law for anydirea los. damage, including environmuid
damageand the depletionof nahiralremm. orinjury toforcign[...]nationais"which
occurred as a result of its unlawful invasi ond occupation of Ku~ait.~~ The
protaion of humanhealth and the environment hm damage. includingthat multing
from the use of nuclear weapons,is a fundamentalobjectiveof the intemationailegal
order as reflected in these recent developrnents. They srne toernphasisethe wntext
in whichthe legalityof the useof nuclear weaponm s ustbe judged.
4.4 'Ihe practice of Statesreflects that the dual objectof human health protectionand
environmentaiprotection are interdependentand are mted in an integratcd manner.
Interdependenceis evidentfromthe discussionwnceming thecompetenceof the WHO
over healthand environmental issues(supra.paras.2.17-2.19). from Agenda21 (which
recognises the "interdependence among the !%torsof health, environment and
devel~pment"),~~and from the RIO Declaration on Environment and Development
(Principle 21 of which declares that human beings "are entitledto a healthy and
productivelife inharmony with nature")." The interdependenceof humanhealthand
environmental protection objectives is also evident from theprovisions of treaties
expressly intended to prevent damage and adverse effects to human health and the
environment from pollution.2zother treaties having more general objecti~es,~ and
from decisionsof relevantinternationalb~dies.~'
4.5 Accordingly, the Court should nor distinguishbetween human health protection and
environmental protection. The fundamend rules of international law which are
-
Note by Prrsidmt of the Sccunty Council. 31 Januan 1992.S;îJSOO.p.?(1992).
-. 3 April 1991.
- Agcndn21. Cbapler 6. para. 6.39. (AiCOSF. 151126 (1992)) citing recent analysis by the World Hulth
Organisation.
=J AICOM. 151R6 (1992). Vol. 1.
Convention on Long-Rmge Tnnsbounda~ Air Pollutton. 13 lriovember 1979. 18ILM1442(1LRTAP(1979
ConventionAfi.l(a); UN Gnvuition on the Law of the Su.10Dccembcr 1982. 21 ILM1261 (1982): An. l(4)
(1982 UNCLOS); 1992UNFnmework Convention Climau Change Convention, 9 May 199ILM1849 (1992)
Art.l(1) (1992 Climite Change Convention).
-<
Seee.g. EC Tnoty, rcquinnp Cornmunit!.envirpolit)to pursuc the objectives of 'Preserving, proming
and improving the qualiy of the environment' and 'procccting human hulrti': EC Treaty, u amendcd by the
Trcaty on Eumpua UnionAn. 130rl. 01 Ko C 191. 29.7.92. pp. 27-8.
"
Sa e.g. UN Humui Rifhb Commission dcclaraiion that the rnovemuit and dumping anddangrnus
producü endanger basic hum righb such as 'the nght 10 the highat sundard of heincludiiits
environmentVLS. 'Resolution 1990143.U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/104.6 March 1990. primarilyinunded to prot&thumanhealth dso brin: environmentaibenefitsandimpose
environmentaiobligarions;rules pnmarily inunded to protect the mvironment (oh
dtfinedas includinghuman hdth, as well as fiorafama, soil, air, water, climate.
landscape and historicalmonumentsor physical mmurcs, and the inmlationship
amongtheseel~ments).~
4.6 The intemational community has long rccopsed the inhmt danger psowd by
radioactivematnial forhumanhealthandtheenvironment. asrrflec n tdelargebody
oftreatiuwhichsŒktominimiretherisks. wonal andglobalinsnummts have ben
adoptedto, imer olio:
- ban nucleartesringin theatmospha. ocean or otherspace;"'
-
prouct worken and the publichm exposure;"
- limitthe proliferationof nuclearweap~ns;~
- regulatetransportin nuclearmatcrial;"'
- regulateor ban nanspon of nuclear ast te.;^'
- prohibitthe emplacementof nuclearweaponsin dn areas;=' and
- c~te nuclear-freezones(andprohibirthe useof nuclearweap~ns).~
4.7 II is clear from these internationallegislativeefforts, as well as those ci& in the
preceding sections, that the internationalcommunityhas acted to limit releases of
radioactivesubstancesandto use al1availablemethodsto preventany massiveincrases
whichwouldcausedamageto humanhealth andthe environment. Accordinglyt,here
can be no doubtthat theuse of nuclear weaponsis subjectto these relevantrules of
international law,which aim IO preventan? increasein the levelof ionisingradiation
--
- Sa ~.p. GnvmtiononEnvironmenul lrnpait AssessraeTruisbounda.ContextEspoo.25 Febnu~ 1991.
30LW 802 (1991). An. I(vii): ConventIheTranstaundanEffccts of lndustnal Accidenü. Helsinki. 17
March 1992. 3ILM 1330 (1992). An. 112).
TruryBanningNuclur Wuponr, Testithe Atrnosphsrc. m OSpaccand Undrr Water5Aupi 1963, 480
um 43.
IL0Gnvmtion (No. 115) Concemin: Protectioof Workers agunsr loruring Rad22tlune 1960. 431
UNZS 41.
Tw on the Non-Prolifcntion of Nuclear Wu1 July 1966. 729 UN7S 161
Convuition on tBanof Irnpon into Afna aIheControl of Tnnsboundaiy Movemeni and Management of
Hwrdous Wasu within Afnu. 29 Januan 1991. 30 ILM 775 (1991).
Trutyfor the Prohibition of Nuclcar Weapns in Latin Amenca. and Additi1and Il.14Febnvry
1967. 63UN7S 326.
3'
SouthPacifNuclur Fra Zone Tnaty. 6 August 1985.ILM 1142 (1985),
Convmtioo on the Physiul Proicction of h'uclur Macerial. 3 MaILM 1419 (1980). in the environment.
(B) The use of nudear weapons violates international kw for the protection ofbumanheab
andthe envuonment, and violates fundameniai humanrights
4.8 This de arisesfrom: (a) the obligationunda genaal intanational law for every Sm
to respectthe sovereigntyandtmitori intlgxityofotha States;(b)theobligationunda
gmd internationallaw of evay Statc~t tocausedamage tohuman health or the
environment outsideits own tmitory a;d (c)obligationsimposcd unda intemational
law(particularlytrcatiesam ofinternationaolrganisations,ndcunom) rcquiringStates
not to cause damageto human healthand the environment in iü own ttnitory. inthe
temitoryof other States,and in areas beyondnationaljurisdiction.
(a) Sovereigmy and territorialinregriry
4.9 It is a well-establishedprinciple of internationallaw that every State must respect the
territorial sovereignty andinvioiability of every other State. ïh~s is reflectedin
numerous judicial decisions and arbird awards, as well as aeaties and other
international acts. early exampleis theAwardof Max Huberin theIsland ofPaimar
Cuse,which holdsthat:
"Temiorid sovereifn..invoives the exclusive ri& rodisplay the activities of
a Sute. 'Ibis nghr basascorollary a dut>.:theIOprolecl nithin the
tenitory thrifhuof other States. in panicular the10inicgrir) and
inviolability in puce W.d togethi.735the righü which each Siate ma?
clairnfoiunationalsin foreign rerntory.
4.10 The InternationalCoun iüelf has recognisedthe principle of "every State'sobligation
not to allow knowinglyiu territory to be used for acüconw to the righü of other
Statesm.='This principle applies to any activi~ cmied out or authorisedby a State,
includingafonion the use of a nuclearweapon,and isapplicablecquallyin timesof
war or otherarmed conflict.
4.11 The obligation to respect thesovereigntyand temtoq of other Statesis a fundamenmi
principleof internationallaw. It is embodiedin theprincipleof good-neighbourlineas
setforth in Anicle 74 of the United Nations Charter. This provision reflects the
agreementof themembersof the international community thattheirpolicyandactivities
in theirownmetroplitan areas mus1takeaccountof "theinteresü and well-beingof the
rest of the world, in social. econornicand commercialmatten."
4.12 The obligationto respect sovereigntyand temtory is clearly applicableto radiohve
Z1J Petmanent Cour~of Arbitntion (Nerhev.aUS).2R.I.A.A. 829839. contamination.Anyin& of levclsof radiarionin thethtory ofa Stateor of anam
beyondnationaljuridiction resuitingfrom anyactivityof a Stateviolates this principle
of intemationaltauv. The principle was cited by Aumalia and New Zealand in the
Nuclear Tests Casesbrought by them qainn F~ana.~ Ausaalia claime. that the
carryingoutofatmosphericnucleartestsbyFrance was in violationof Aumalia'srigh~~
on three counts: Ausualia's sovercigntyova its unitor).; the right of Ausualia that
nuclear tesü shouldnot be conducred inthe ammphere and, in pmcular. not in such
a way as to lead toradioactivefall-out upon Adan thtory; and the rights of
Aumalia to the unremicted use, at aiitha. ofthe high scas and supcjacrnt air-space
for navigation,fishery and otha purposcs, fr& of physical intaference and risk of
radiarion When asked by the Rsident of the Indonal Court of
Justice, Sir HumphreyWaldock,whetha it took the view that 'everymunission by
natutal causesof chernicalor otha mam hm one state into anotherstate &'tory,
airspaceor temtorial sea automaticallycrcateda legalcauseof action in international
lawwithoutthenecdto esrablishanythingmore?',AusPaliarespondcd.interdia, that:
"wbere. as a rcsultnononna! andnaturd use by oneruceof iKlemiory. a
de~ii occun in the lcrritory of aoother. thebas no causeof complaint
unlessi~ffers more than merely nominbarmor damage. fbe use by aaîtc
of iu lcmtory for the conauct of aunosphcric nuclcar rcsrr is no1 a iormai or
nanirai use of iu temtorfhe Austraiian Governmcni dur conlcnds that thc
radioactive deparii from the French tclÿ givcs rire to more &an merely nominal
hum or damage 10Austnlia.
...
By way of elaboriit....the baric principle is thar intrusion of an. sort inio
foreigr. tenitory is an inmngcmeni of soverei&niNeedless10 ras. the
Governineni of Aunrdia docs not den?thepra-tice of staics ha inotheied
application of lhis pnncipie ln rtheintcrocpenaenccof terrilories. Il na
airudy referre10the instance of smokc drihing across mtionnl bounIlries.
concedes that thert may be no iliegaliiy in respect of cenain types of chemicai
fumer in the aDsenceoi viatypes of hum.Mat ii das cmphasisc is thai me
legaliry thus sancuob?the pmlice of states is the outcomc of the toleraiion
extended to cewn actirtt~eswhich produce these emisions. *+$ch aarcvities
genedly re~araed as narura!uses of umtory in modern indunna! uuieiy and are
ioleraird becauu. while pcrnaps producinf somc inconvertience. the! have a
communiry benefi~."~~
4.13 Inaeased Ievelsof radiationin the environmentfrom anysource, includingthe use of
nudear wcapons.is not and cannotbe tolerated by Statepractice.The preambleto the
1963Treaty BanningNuclear WeaponTests in the Aunosphere,in Outer Spaceand
Unda Water affirms the desirc "to put an end to the contaminationof man's
='
Soc NucicnrTurs (Ausmlia Y.France). Inienm Protection. Or22rlune 1973.IU Rep. 1973.p.99;Nu&
Trcrs(New trland Y. France). lnlenrn Protction. Ord22June 1973.IU Rcp. 1973.p.135.
Y Nuchr Turs Clse Austnlia Y.Fran:cj Pludings. Vol. 1.p.52.
Id..525-26. WHOlSolomon Lknd'r WrincnObwrvations:Pm IIB (Ijlof HumanHdth andthe Environment)
environment by radioactive substances", and the Treaty quim each pany
.topmhibiL toprevem. andCO: touy Oui.oy nuclur wepponrut ex~losion. an) .er
nvdest uplkon. atrnypke undcriujuridiction or wnmI:
(a) in the auaoipherr; beyond itr bisincludiig outer rpoor:
includingterritorialwaïcrror higbsus:or
inrny otherenvironmenif nuexplosioaues radioactivedcbristo bep-nt
(b) outridethetcmmriaJümiU of thSvtcuDdu dose juridiction or conml nub
explosioniconducicd.
îhe use of nuclear weapons cannot in any circumstances be considercd a "natura ulse
of tenitoryin modern industrial Society". And theuse of nuclear weapons cannot inany
circumstances be considercd toprovide a community bcnefit at "some inconvcnicncc".
In thi segard, the community must include any Fird State not involved in a wnflict
which rnay suffer in human heaith or environmentai terms, directly or indiMy, the
consequences of radioactive contamination.
-
4.14 Moreover, every Srate is funher resuained in the activities which it may cany out or
permit by virtue of the prohibition on the abuse by a State of a right it enjoys under
international law. Such an abuse will occur when a State amils itself of iü righü in an
arbinary manner in such a way as to inflict upon another State an injury which cannot
be justified by a legitimate consideration of iü own advantage.'" Any use of a nuclear
weapon, whether or not it had consquences in a third State or in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, would constitute an abuse of right.
4.15 The use of nuclear weapons bu a State in war or othei med conflict is subject to the
general obligation under international laurto respect temtonal sovereignry. Accordingly,
any use of a nuclear weapon. altematively any use which had consequences in a third
State or in areas beyond nationaljurisdiction, would violate the general obligation.
-
(bl nie general obligation of each Srare nor IO caue damage IO hwnan heaith or rhe
environmeruoursideirsrerrirop or orherarear subjeu IOifsjurisdicrionor conrrol
4.16 Flowing dircctiy from the fundamentai primary obligation described in paragraphs 4.9-
4.12 is the obligation of every State not to cause darnage to hurnan heaith or the
environment oursideiü national temtory. The general obligation under international law
to avoid uansboundan, in:luryto human health and the environment is reflected in the
award of the Arbiuai Tribunal in the TrailSmclrcrarbimtion. which held that:
* AR. I(1).
" R.Jcnningsad A.Watb (eds.)Opprnhcin1 lnrernarion,!.a*(9th ui.1992). Vol. 1. p. 4seeaiso1982
LWCLOS. An. 300. WHOlSolommIsland'sWritz.cnObxMUoat: Pm IIB bw of Hum HuW ad tbe Environment)
'Under thepriaciplesof inumtiodLw ..no stucbu the rigtouseor permit
theuu~firrumtoryio~~ba~Cr~to~~~~~jj~~by~uin~rtOthe
temtory ofanotherof thepmpeNes pcrsonrtberrin. wbcntbcuuisof urious
conrequenccandthe injuviearblishedby clex andwnvinckg evidence.1&? -
4.17 The formulationof this obligation isnow codificdin Rinciple 21 of the Stockholm
Declaralionand Principle 2 of the RioDeclamion, bothof whichprovide, in rcieant
part, thar:
'Sutesbave, inaccordancewith the Cbuscr-of theUnid Mons aadthe pnncipler of
intemarionalIaw, t...ruponsibililyconire tba! sctirwifhia thcirjuridicùon or
sonwl do wt causedmape totheenvimunent ofotheSPtu or ofprrrkyond tbe limio
of nationaljuridict.on3
In this regard, the use of the word "conuol' indicam that theobligationextends to
activitiescarriedout by States through, forexample, submarines.vesselsor aircrafi
whichmightlauncha nuclearweaponfrom an am beyond iu nationaljuridiction.
4.18 This formulationhas ben acceptedby al1Stam and reflectsa rule of cummary law.
îhc rule set fonh in Principle 21 hasben dexribed by the UN GencralAstembly as
one of the 'basicrules'poverningthe inurnationalresponsibilityof sraresin regardto
protection of human health and the en~ironment.~~It has been endorsed or
incorporatedin its entirety intothe Preambleof many~eaties;~~d 'escribedas having
the status of a "generallyaccepted pnnciple of international la^":'^ reaffirmedon
numerousoccasionsin ~nreniationas lofr la& .'" hlost rccenriy.PrincipleIl was fuiiy
-
: UnitedStorcr1.6da. 3 IUM p. 1907(1941): citing Ea:leton. ResponribilinojStmcr. 192s. p.80
" 11 iLM 1416 (1972); 31 ILM851 (1992).
"
UN Gmenl Arvmbly rrsolution 1996 (1971).27 UN GAOR(Supp. No. 30) 42
x
Sa e.p. Conventionfor the Preventionof hlannc PollutDurnpin: of W~tcs and oiher Mater. 29 Dccember
1972. 1046UNIS 120; 1979LRTAP Convention: 1985Conventionfor the Protectionof the OzoneLyer.aM6
1529(1987); 1992CLimue hpe Convention.
1985 Associationfor Soukt Astan bilons ~preement on the Conwrvation of Namrc uid Namd Rawncs.
An. 20.
Sk e.g. Cbnncr of Ewnomic Riphü andDuticsof Sum, An. 30. UNGmcnl Arsemblyrrsolution 32810.
12bmbcr 1974. Ybl:Uh'1974at 402: Final Act. Conferenceon Sccunty and CoopentEu-, Hclri.
1 Augusf 1975('ucb of the panicipatSuus. in accorduice with the principltr of inter1aw.ougbt10
urnire. ia spirit of co-opention. thai activities urricd oukmtoryfsdo noi ouu degrdation of tbe
mvim-t i.utortisr SUlc or in arcas lying beyond the linus of nalionaijuridiction' in 1. Bmwnlie. hic
Documcm onHumnn Righrs(3rd. ul.1992).p.417). WHOlSolomonkland's Wnnen ûbuwations: PM IIB (Lw of HummHcrlfhand tbe Envimrunent)
incorpowted as Article 3 of the 1992BiodivcrUryConvention." The substantiverule
set fonh in Principle21 has becn mdod ina numberof other ucatics applicableto
parficular reg~ons."~ Anicle 194(2)of the 1982 UNCLOS, which atm into force
later this year, and in any caserefiectscustomarylaw, establisha a similarobligation
specificallyto protect the marine environment.
Principle 21 has been cited with apparent appmvalby at lean one judge of the
4.19
International Codo and is considercd by many jurists to ~flect a customary
obligati~n.~' Specifically in relation toionizing xadiation, UN Gcnerai Aswmbly
resolution 1629(XVI),adopted in,1961, declam that:
The fundamental pnnciples of iniedod law impose a responsibiliv on asuies
concerninf actionsuihichmi& havebarmful biologiuil conwqucncu for the exininf and
funire genention of peoplu of othenatcr.by incruting tbe levels Of ndiwuve
nl10ut.=~
4.20 In using a nuclear weapon in war or otha armedwnflict, a State is subject to the
specificobligationunderinternationallaw toensurethat no damageis causedto human
heaith or the environmentof other States, or to human heaith and the environment in
areas beyond the limirs of nationaljurisdiction. Accordingly, any use of a nuclea.
weapon,altemativelyany usewhichhaswnsequencesin a third Stateor in areas beyond
national jurisdiction, would violate this general and fundamental obligation of
5 June 1992. 3ILM 822 (1992): the Convention was signed by more than 150States al UNCED. andentercd in10
force on 29 December 1993.1tno-,hrrmore thui fiePanies.
"'
Sere.?. Tm~y for Amuonian Co-opention. 3 July 1976. If ILM 1045 (1978). AIV.('the exclusiuseand
utihtion of namnl resoutus within their respc;ti\,e terniones 1sa right inherent in the sovereipty of cach sute
andthat the exercise of this right bcasubjecIOan? restnitions oththanthosc arising from International
Lu.'):1981Convention forthe Protution of the Manne Environment andCovAml of the South-East Pacific.
12 November 1981. IELMT981:85: An. 36) (activities mbetconducted so that 'they docnvw damage by
pollution totbm or to their environmcnt. and that pollution ansing fmm incidents or activitics under ibeir
jurisdiction or convol doesnot. asfpossible. sprud beyond the aras wberc [they] exemisc sovcrcipnïy and
juridicuon'); 1982UNCLOS.Art. 193('States have the sovercipn right Ioexploit ibeir mNni rcswrces pumumi
to tbeir eovimnmcotal policicsand in accordancewith their duty toprotcct and prryrve the marine mvim-1').
SecJudge deCrmD. dissenting. in ibe NucTusr use.(Autiralii.France), 1974IU Rcp. pp. 253.389'If
it is admilrci penl rule that there 1sa IOdeauid prohibition of the emission by neighbpropcnia
of noxious furno. ibc ~ u u i ~musr bednm. by an obvious uulogy. lhrt the Applicant is mioisl:
the Coun Io uphold iu claim thai Fnncc should put anend to the deposit of ndio-active ficmtoy'.n irr
' Sce W. Repon of the Conunitta: on Lcgal Aspccü of the Environmeni. 60rhConferencc Repon. p. 157at 163;
L Goldie. 'Gmenl View of Ininnational EnvironmenLaw -A Survey of Capabiliuts. Tmds and Limiu'.
inCollnqvcLo Huy. pp. 66-9 (1973)A.C. Kiss . L lutte contre la pollution de l'air sur le plan intcmuid'.
ColloqueLo Haye, pp. 169-174(1973).
UnitcdNaîiom Gmml Assemblyrcsolution 1629(XVI) (1961). 16 UNGAOR(1043 Plcnary Meeting)a~505-07.
UN Doc. APV.1043 (1961). WHOlSolomon IrlnndW'rncnObservation:anIIB(Lw of HumanHulrband theEnvironment)
international law.
(Q niespecific0bIig~~0~norrome domageto himiM h& and theenviron me^
4.21 The primary and general obligations describein paragraphs 4.9 and 4.17 havebeai
Mn elaborad into specificand dctaiied nms. These too would be violattd by any
use of nuclear weapons. ïhey aredcveloped by Statesthrough the adoption of a large
number of treaties and othans esgblishing mm spcific objectives for the proteaion
of human hdth and the environment, including in-parricular the protection of air
quality,khwatcr resources, oaans and seas biodivenity. and historical monuments
or physical structures of significantculvalue.
4.22 A grmt number of treaties and multilataalactsat the global and regional level have
been adopud to protect human heaith and the environment. They have rrccived
widesprcad suppon hm States, and many now aiso reflect rules of customary law
estabiishing specific obligations to protan human health and the environment, and to
prevent significant damagethereto. In many instances these des establish international
obligations which are undoubtedly of "essential importance for the safeguarding and
preservation of the human environment".='
4.23 Humanexposure to ionizing radiationalwayscausessomedamage to human health, the
protection of which is envisaged by many international agreemenü, including in
parricular the WHO Constitution and those ueaty and customary obligations which
establishspecificobligations. The Pmmble to the WHOConstitution provides that 'the
enjoyment of the highest aminable standard of health is one of the fundamental righü
of every human being without distinctionof race. religion, political belief, econornicor
social condition". The WHO Constitution commis al1 members to achieving the
objectives of the Organization. including "the aminment ailpeoples of the highest
possible levelf health" (Articl1)and the improvement of "environmental hygime"
(Article Z(i)). To that end. the World HdthAssembly adopted International Hdth
Ree"lations in1969. The Oro-nUation has also endorsed the 1990 Recommendations
estabiishing specific levels of protection from ionizing radiation adopud by the
International Commission on Radiological ProtectioUCRP), which establish annual
effectivedose equivalent limiü for rnehbers of the public of 5 MsV (0.5 rem).= Any
increase above that limit is deemed "unacceptable" on heaith grounds. The 1990
Recommendations replaceearlier ICRP RecornmendationP5 which provided the basis
for the 1982 Basic Safet' Standards for Radiation Protection adopted and published
" Supra.no1~219.
ICRP F'ubiiuti60 (1991); TabS4.
" ICRPF'ubiiutionNo. 26 WHOlSolornon kW's Wriuen ObseMiions: PuIIB (Lw ofHumin Hulth ad the Envitunment)
jointlyby the IAEA. WHO, IL0 and the NuclearEnergy Agencyof the OECD.* Thé
Standards,whoseobjectivesincludetheprovisionof "guidancefor theprotectionof man
from unduerisksof the harmfuleffectsof ionizingiadiaon", seta Iimitfor theannual
effective dosequivalent for membersof the public of 5 MsV (0.5 rem)." The me
levelofprotection,reflectingtheeariia ICRP reammendations, isapplicdin mandatory
form under the law of the European Uniofla
4.24 Human exposure to ionizing radiation will also violate basic human rights and
fundamentalfreedoms.Anyuseof nuciear weapons isah subjectto.and mustcomply
with, devant norms establishedunda -grnaai and Spcific intanariona luman nghu
law. Aside fromthe nght to heaithrcçognisedby the WHO Constitutionitsclf (supra.
para. 2.9) international law has long recognised that the quality of the human
environmentmustbe maintainedto ensure the full enjoymentof basic humanrighu.*
This approach is reflected in Principle 1 of the 1972 StockholmDedarati~n,~~~
Pnnciple 1 of the Rio Declararionon Environmentand Development."' and has bŒn
endorsed by the UN General Assembly, which has resolved that 'ail individuals are
entitiedtolive in an environmentadquate for their healthand well-bcing'?6'Pollution
by radiation which damages hurnanhealth and the environment violatesinternational
humannghts standards.as reflectedin aeacyand customaq law, including thenght to
a standardof living adequatefor health and ~ell-bein$~ and thenght to the highcst
aminable standardof health(includingimprovementof al1aspectsoi environmentaland
" Basic Sruiduds for Radiation Prot~tior.. 19s'IhE.4.Viema.
Id.pas. 10 and 416.
'W
UN GA rcs.398CXXII)(3Dcccmber 1968):UN Commission on Hum Righrs. Resolution 199014March
1990.
" 'Man hasthe fundamurta1ngIOfrculorn qualiiy and adequate wnditions of Iife in an environment of a qulity
hi permiü a bfe of digni~ and weli-being and he burs a solemn responsrbiliry to protcct and improve the
environmat for prcwnt and hmre gencrai'ons
'Hum berngs arcatthe centre of conccrns for sustainable deveThey are entitled to a hc~andy
productive linhony witn narurc.'
O"
Resolution 45/94. 14 Dccember 1990: scc also the Dulanrion of the Hague on thempizingnmr'the
fundamenul du? to prwrvethe ccosystern' and .the right to livcina viable and global envimommt.
and the wusequent duty of the wmmunity of nations vis-à-vis prssent and fut10do dl that ube
donc to prrserve the qualit? of the enviII March:1989. 2ILM 1308(1989).
Univervl Dcclnntion of Human RighUh'GA resolurion 217 (11110December 1948.Art.25;International
Covuunt on Economc. Social and Culmnl Riph= (1966 ICESCR), AMCX 10GA Res. 2200 (XXI;*-f16
Dvrmber 1966. 6 QM 360 (1967An. 1111). WHOlSolom~oIsland'sWriuenObservations:Part IBw of HunanHuW ind tbcEavimnment)
indumial hygiene)." SiAlar righü are reflectrd in the 1981 African Chaner ('al1
peoplesshall have the nght toa general satisfactoryavironmm1 favourableto their
devel~pment'),~ the 1989 San SalvadorPromol tothe 1969 Amcrican Convention
on Hurnan Righ~,~ and the 1989 ConventionConcaning Indigmous and Tribai
Peoplesin IndependmtCounmes."'
4.25 Internationallaw requires Srates topmmt damage to air quality from pollution.
including that rcsulting from the use of nudear weapons. Rtlcvant international
obligations arc sa fonh in, inter &, the 1979 LRTAP Conventiona the 1982
UNCLOS,m and various regionalmMne avironmat protection treatits,including
UNEPRegionalSeas Conventi~ns.~To the extcnt tha he use of a nuclearwcapon
causesdamagetotheozone layerand theclimatesysum violationswouldalso occur of
the 1985Conventionfor the Protectionof the Ozone Laycr (and relatai Promolri
and the 1992UN ClimateChangeConventionwhichwmmits ail Partiestomprotectthe
climatesystemfor the benefitof presentand futuregenerations .
4.26 Internationaliaw requiresStates to prevent -ffe to biodiversity(flora and fauna)
-
1966ICESCR. An. 12(l) and R)(b):Europun SŒial Charter. 18October 1961. 529 UhAn.8II: Afnun
Chaner on Hum and People's Riehts (1981 ACHPR). 28 June 1961. 21 ILM59 (An.216(1).
" 1981ACHPR An. 24
= SccAn. 11:
1 Evcpone shall have the nght to live in a hulthy environmentand to have accss to tusi: public
services.
2. The Sua Parties shall promotç the prorcciion. prcscrvation and improvemuit of the
rnvimment'.
"' Geneva. 27 Junc 1989. 16 ILM 1382(1989). Ans. 2. 3,4(1). 7(4) and 15(1)
Supra.nole 224see Arlicle 2. reflcciing ihe deiemunation of the Parties 'to protccr nun and his cnvironmmt
agatnstatr pollutionioa'enduvourIOlinutanda faaspossiblegndually reduce and prevrnl air pollution
u>cludmglong-nnge tnnrboundap air pollution'
Supra.note 224; Anicle 212, rcquinng al1 SuIOs'prevrnt. duceand wntml pollution of the marine
mvimomat. fromor thmugb rbe atrnosphere. applicable tospaceunder their sovcreipniyiovds
fiying thhgr or vcrrels or aircnft of thcir rcgistr).'.
1974 Gnvuition for the Prevcntion of Manne Pollutioo from hd-Sources. 4 June 1974. ILM 352
(1974)An. 3(c)(iv) (a unuidcd): 1974 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environmmt of the Baltic
Su Aru. 22Much 1974. 13 ILM546 (1974). Art. 2(2): 1983Pmtowl for the Proleciion of the SouIb-EaUPicific
Agkt Pollution from hd-Bascd Sources. 22 Jul? 1983, IEL.h4T.98354. An. Il(c).
tZ March 1985. 26 ItM 1529 (1967): Montrul Pmtowl on Subsunccsthu Deplue the Omne Lsycr.
16
September 1987. 26 ILM1540(1987).
-.-
Supranoie 224An. 3(1). WHO/Solomon idand' snnen ObservationParIIB(Lui ofHuman H& andthe bbhownt)
hm pollution, includingthat resultihm the use of nuclcar weapons. International
law for the protectionof biodiversityis particularlywcllutablished at the wional and
global level. The Biodivenity Convention. which cornmirs kes to 'promou the
prottftion of tcosystems, naturalhabitatsand themaintenan ofeviable populationsof
specics in naturai sur~oundings",~ supplemuiü otha global a,Orcemcnuwhich have
receivedwidespreadsupport. Of particularnote is the 1971Conventionon Wetlandsof
International Importance. Espezdly as Watcrfowl Habitat. Regional conservation
agreements have beenadoptedfor Africa;lu the ~rnaicas;" Easr Africqm South
East ~sia,~ Europe, including the EC;m the South Pa~ific;~ and the
Ca~ibbean.~ Spd protectionis providedfor many aidangercd @es who would
bedesuoyed by increasesin radiation, including migratory
4.27 internationallawrequires Statesto preventdarnageto fresbwaterrcsoums (including
vital groundwaterresources) from pollution, includingthat multing fromthe use of
nuclearweawns. Increasedlevelsof ionizinar-diation in frcshwaterresources (rivers.
lakes, groundwaten erc.)is prohibited by general internationallaw, treaties and otha
internationalacts.Apan from the specialregimes intendedtoprotect individualrivers
andriver systems(e.g. the Rhine,Zambezi,RiverPlate), regionaland globalrules also
exist. The InternationalLaw Commission'sDraft Amcles on the Non-navigationalUses
of InternationalWatercourse, which draws upon resolutions of the InternationalLaw
1992 Biodivenity Convention. supr12;.r\ni:lEidj
-- Afnun Convention on the Conservation of Nature and tiatural Rrsourtm. Alclers. 15SepUN7Ser 1966. 1001
4.
! Convention on Namm Pmwtlon and Wildlifc Preservai~on in Vi: U'estcm Hemisphere. II October 1940. 161
UNIS 193.
1985Kaimbi ProIocd wnccmrng Proiectcd Arand Wild Fauna and Flora in the hAfriun Region. 21
lune 1985. lELMT985:47.
1985 ASEAN Aprixment.supranote 246
Inninit dc Droit international. Rcsolution on International Regulations reearding the use of Inl+mntional
Walmouisa forPurposesotherthanNavigation. Madrid. 19 Aprii 1911.IPE 5702. Council Directive
791409EEC of2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild0J Ld103. 25.4.1979. p.1: Council Dimivc
92143lEEC of 21 May 1992 on the consemation of natunl habitats rnd of wild non and La206, 01
22.7.1992. p(French).
" Convention for the Protection of the biatural Rcsources and Environment of îhe South Pacific Region. Nouma.
24 Novcmber 198626 ILM 38(1987).
m
PID~DC Ooncnnin Specially PmtctuAra and Wildlife in the CaribbunRcgion. Kingston, I.ouuy
1990, 1YIEL441 (1990).
: Conventioon the Conservation of Mieraton. Spicies of Wild Animals. 23 lILM 15 (1980). Associationand the Institut de DroitInternational," providthat waurcourse Sratcs
"shaii,individuallyor jointiy, pro= and pme the ecosysremsof intemarional
waf~courses" and p~vrnr "anydeaimentai aidon in the compositionor qualitof
the waters of an intcmationalwatercoursc which rrsultsdirealyor indirectlyhm
human conduct ... that may cause apprrdable harm toother watercour~es"."~This
generalrule, whichreflecü customary law,is aisorefleaed inregionallreatie.~.~
4.28 Intemationallaw requires Statestopwmt damagetathedne uivironmeat hm
pollution, including thatresui~ghm the useof nudcar WC~~N. These noms art ..
pamcularly well-developed,and are closdy relatcdto the obligationofaU S~tcs to
respect the high seas freedoms of aU otha Se, which would be violated by
radioactivepollutionon thehighseas.Specificglobalncat ybligationsmany of which
now reflect customarylaw,aresetforthin, inre&, the 1958Grneva Conventionon
the High Seaslu and the 1982 UNCLOS.2LE 6quivaient treat oybligationarc set
forth in the various UNEP Regionai Seas conventions, which havearnacted such
extensive support thar they must, in their relevant pm, be wnsidend to refiect
customary la^.^^'
4.29 Internationallau requires States to prcventdamageto cultural and natural heritage
from pollution^including ihatresultingfrorntheuseof nuclearweapons.Underthe 1972
World Hentage Convention.whichhasreceivedwidespreadsupportacross the globe,
eachParryundertakes"notto takeanydeliberatemeasureswhichrnightdamagedirectly
or indirectly the culnrral onaturaiheri?.a,...situato ed the rerriroryof other
zc Seee.g. InstideDroit Intenutional. Resolutionon InternationalRe~ulationUweof lntcmatiod
Watmourses for hrposcs OIherIhtn Eiavigniion.Madrid. 19 April 1911. 11IPE 5702: ILA. Hclsinlii Ruleson
the Usesof the Watm of lntcmational River484(1967): ILA Ruleson Water Pollution inanIntcnutiocul
Dninape Eastn,60IL(535 (1983): ILARules on InternationalGroundu,IL.(.51(187).
2 t'la 764 (1991).
Ans.20 and 21(1)
z4
Sk e.g. Convationthe ProieclionUxd ofTnnsbounhry Watercouiws yidIntemaiiiakcs .7MarJi
1992. 3LZM 1312 (1992) An. 1(2)and 31).
Y
450 UNIS 82:M. 25(2),pmvidinp that al1Sutes must 'ceopente with compctcnt intemationin orgpnuitioas
takingmies for the prcvention of pollutisusor air space above. mltfmm any activiues with
dici-active muenrls'.
m
Supranote VSERTI. espzcially Am. 192 and 194(2).
I
Sa alstheConvention for the Protection of the Mame Environment of the Nonh-?kt Atlantic. 22 Sepiemkr
1992LDC 15fiN'F.11. rtcopiisinp the 'vitai importance to al1nauons' of the matheflonimnmcnt and
and fama it suppons and the 'inherentwonh' of the manne avironment ofAtiantic. and rs.lkng
the relevant provisions of customaq la* reflctcd in Pan XII of 198inpnrticulAnide 197. îïu obligMonnorro cause massive hmogc IO himui neabh or theenvironnunt
(d)
anywhPre
4.30 The specific obligationsdescribein p~dgraphs 4.24-4.29 arc applicableto prohibit
darnage from an activitymed out or authorised bya SQte having consequences
anywhere:in a State'sown temtoriy n;thetenitoryof mother Stateor inarcasbeyond
nationaljurisdiction.
4.31 in addition to the obligationtopro- human hcalthand phcuhr cnvironrnenral
rwurces, internationallaw requireStatesto pnvent darnagefrornradiationto cenain
geographicarea wshichare subjecttospecialnilesofprotechon. Bygmd international :
law nflected in neaties and custom, Staw are specificallyprohibited from cauiùig
damage 'm hurnanhealthandtheenvironment inareasoutsidethe territ anreyxclusive
jurisdicrion of any State, includingthe higseasand its seabed and subsoil," the
.mwn and outer ~pace,~ and the Antarctic."l Regional agreements prohibiting any
nuclear explosionwhatsoeverhave been adopted in Latin ~merica~ and the South
Pa~ific.~'
(e) Conriusion
4.32 By way of summary.general internationallaw prohibits aState from carrying out or
authorisingactivitieswhichamagehumanhealthand theenvironment orviolatehuman
righü. In usinga nuclearweaponin war or othermed conflicta Stateis subjectto the
specific obligationsestablishby the rules of general international law rcflected in
treaty and custom. Any use of a nuclear weapon, alternatively any use whichhas
consequencesina thirdStateor inareasbeyondnauonaijurisdiction.wouldviolatethese
rules of general internationallaw. Theuseof a nuclear weapon whichcausedmassive
environmentalpollutionor damageto humanhealthand so violatestheseessentialrules
" ConventionfortbeProtesiotheWorldCultunlandNaira1 Hcntage. 16Novemb1972. L!.M1358(1972)
m. 6(3).
"
Tnuy on Principla GovcmintheActiviiofsSuiesitheExplontionindUseof Ouin Splcchclding the
Moon andOtbn Glatial Bodie27 Januay 1967. 6UNTS 205(erpcially AIV): AgreementGovcming
theActivitiaSure sn theMoonad OtnerCclestBodies5.December1979.18ILM1434 (1979(esptciilly
M.7).
: AnurcticTruty1 Dtcernkr1959.JO2UhTS 71 (cspe;iaAn. V,prohibitingnuclur explosions).
" Supranote232.
Supranote233. WHO/Sdomon Irlrios'rimn ObservatioPan IIB(Lw ofHvmP D ulm andtàc Eiivimnmcnt)
wouidwnstitute an internationalcrime (slrpgp a.a.4.3). -
- International obligations for the protection ofhuman heaiîb and the environment
(0
appiy duringarmed conflict
4.33 Sincethe useof nuclearweaponsmust, primofde, occurdunng a waror other armed
conflict,it is necessato consider whethcl,and ifso towhat extent, theciisromaryand
maiy obligationsidentifiedaboveapplyduring war oranned wnf1ict:In thisregard it
is newsary to determinewhethersuch obligationsapply as betweenbtlligcrents, and
as behveena belligerentStateand thirdStatesnot involvedin the conflict. -
.
(a) 7he operaionofrredèr during amwi con-îüu
4.34 NotwithstandingArtide 73 of the 1969 ViennaConventionon the Law of Treahes,
whichprovidesthat 'the presentConventionshall not prejudgeany questionthat rnay
aris in regard toa treaty from ...the outbreakof hostilitiesbetweenStates, iisnow
generaiiyqted that theoutbreakof anarmed conflia "doesnot ipsofacf taminau
or suspend the operation of treaties in forcc betwecn the parties to the armed
confli~t".~ Moreover, a state of anned wnflict "doesnot entitlea party unilateraliy
to terminateor to suspendtheoperationof treatyprovisionsrelatingto the protectionof
the human person, unless the treaty provides other~ise,""~ and, as regards the
outbreakof anarmed conflictbetweensomeof thepartiestoa mululateraltreaty, "daes
not ipsofactoterminate orsuspendtheoperationof thattreatybetweenotherconuacting
States or between them and the States partiesto the armed confli~t."~ Treatia
establishing internationalorganizations, such as the Constitutionof the WHO, are
considerednot to be affectedby the existenceof an armedwnflict betweenany of iu
pa~tjes.'~~Accordingiy,F'rinciple24 of the 1997Rio Declaration,whichprovidesthat
-wnrfiire ts inherentlydestructtvcof suruinable developmcot.Suies shail thcrefore respect
international law providing protection for rhe environment in lime of armcd connici and
.i"F
cwperate itufunhcr aevelopmeasnecesary ,
htiNt de Dmitbhtional, Resolution of the Helsinki Session (1985). 'The effects of armed conflicts on
tnuies'.M. 2. in Tabhu daRerolurioru adoprées(1957-19(1992). pp174-75.
3' Id.,An. 4.
" Id.,An. 5.
Id.,m. 6.
za SΠaisoPrincip26of th1972 Stockholm Declaration ('Man and his environmbesparcdtheekts of
nuclearmapans and alother muns of massdrstniction'): 1982 World Chsncr for NaNre ('shllbe
secund agoion depndatiouused by warfare or other hostile activit'miliuryrctivitm domigkiw
~Nre shalbeavoided"). .. WHOISolomnnIrlaod'sWriucnOburvuions: PIIB(Lw ofHuman Henltbiodibe Environment)
mua be interpretedas rqu~ring Statestorrspect thow rules of internationallaw which
provide protectionfor the environmentintimes of med conflict(aswell as in times
of peace). This approach is consinent with the rules of environmenml protection
providedby Articles35 and 55 of 197ïGeneva ProU>colI. The support fortheviewthat
international obligatiofor theprotectionofumanhcalthand the avironment sumve
the outbreak of hostilitiefurtherrefld by the reitvant provisions of Agenda21,
which called on the internationalcommunitytoconsida measurcs in accordanccwith
internationallaw'to addrë3s; itimesof med conflict,Large-s cesm ictionof the
environment that cannot be justified undaintcrnafiona llw."" Both the UNCED
texu imply that treaties protecting-the avironmat .should,as a gencral principle,
continueto applyin timesof war and othcrarmed dct. This conclusioncanaiso be
dnwn from UN GeneralAssemblyresolution47/37, whichstrwed thatthe destruction
of the environment,not justified bmilitaryntcesuty and camed out wantonly. was
"clearly connary to internationallaw".- The General Assemblyfurther urged States
to "takeail measuresto ensurecornpliancewiththeexistinginternationallawapplicable
to the protectionof the environmentin timesofarmed wnfiict."
4.35 ln the absence of a clear gend ruleit is neverthelus appropriate to consida the
provisions of individualtreatieA. review indicatesthat the vast majorityof treaties
which aim to protect human health and the environmentare silent on the questionof
their effect dunngwar and other armed conflict. A small minorit? of such treaties
provide exceptionsto the general rule of silenceon the point, and even in respect of
thesetreatiespractice is notuniform.
4.36 Some treaties (suchas those establishingmies on civil liability for damage) include
provisions~xcludingthe operationof their provisionsto damage ycumng asa result
of war and med conflict."" Other ueaties include provisionspermining their total
or partial suspension at instigationof oneof the Panies.'" Still other mues would
"
Agenda21. Chapter 39, para. 39.6(a). AICONF.IS11 L.3.uld.39. 11June~l992.
GA Res. 47B7 on Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict. 25 November 1992
'
Convmtion onThirdPany Liability in tbc Field of Nuclur Encrgy, 29 July UNIS.251: An. 9;
Convention on Civil Liability foDimage. 29 May 1963. 106UNIS 265; An. IV(3)(a); lalemPtional
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 NovemberUKIS9,3:Ar<.In(Z)(a);
intemviod Convmtion onthe Estahlishmcnt ofanIntemationalFund for Compaiution for Oil Pollution Duiuge.
18Doxmber 1971. 11ILM284 (1972): An. 4(2)(a) (whidoesno1apply to oil from waruscon wn-
mmmerciai service); 1977Civil Liability ConventionAn. 3(3); Conventionon tbe Reylation of htnrctic Miod
Rcsourc8Activities. 2 June 3988. 27 ILM868 (18(4)(b(if no nrsonablc prcautionary musum could
haveb&o den); andILCDnft Anicles on Intemational Liabilityfor injunous Conseguences Ansing Out of Acu
not Prohibitcd by intcmational Law An. 26(l)(a).
m, latemuiod Convation for the Prevcntion of Pollution of the Su by Oil, 12 MaUN7S53. M.7
XR(1). ailowing parIOsuspend operation of whoputoof Conventionuse of war ooh hosrditics
if they consider thenselvesasa belliperent or asa neuml. upon notification to the Convation's Burcut. WHOlSolomonkland's WririrnObsewations: IiB(Lw ofHunan Hedtùand tùeEiivimnment)
appear not to apply during miliraryhosglities Nicc th& provisionsdo not apply to
cenr miliraryoperationsin psxtime options.- In the other direction, however,
are mties whichare specjficallyapplicablew certainaclivitieswhichmay beassociated
with ho~tilities.~ or which implicitly apply during ho~tilitics.~ These limited
examples(whichcovernuclcar&denu, oilpoliution.ac) may be considemi to mate
exceptional niles which expressly deviate from the general ruie identifid above,
accordingto whichmeatyland customary)obligationsto.protecthumanhealthand the-
environmentapply in peace and in war.
4.37 The silenceof the great majority-ofataties intaidcdto protect human health andthe
environment allowsthe conclusion thatthey am designcd to ensure environmentai
protection atal1 times, in peace and in war. unles expressly ~cluded.~ This
conclusionis justified alx, by the fact that these mties,by their terrns and ovdl
..
purpose,csiablishinternational obligationwhichare of "essentialimportance"for the
safeguardingandpreservationof humanhealthandthe environment (supra.para. 4.3).
4.38 In consideringthe legal effectof humanhith and environmental protectiontreaties
whenan armed conflictoccurs, it is alsoappropriateto distinguishbetweentwo types
ofconflict:thoseofan internationalcharacter,andthoseofa non-internationalcharacter.
In thecaseof theformer, itis furthernecessarytodistinguishbeoveenthelegal situation
asbenveenbelligerents,andthe legal situatiobetweenbeiiigerentsandStareswhich are
not involvedin the internationalarmedconflict.
(i) Non-imemional armed conflict
4.39 A Siatemay not invokea non-intemationalarrnedconflict toterminareor suspendthe
- applicationof atreaty. War or armed conflictare not identifiedby the 1969Vienna
Conventionon the Law of Traties as grounds forsuspendingor terminatinga treaty.
Accordingly, theuseof a nuclearweaponina civilwarwhichhadadverseconsequences
on humanheaith and the envimnrnentwouldcontinuetobe subjectto theobligationsof
1972 London Convention, supra note 215.An. V11(4)(non-appliobil~ty of Convuilion to vessels and aimafi
cntitled tosovereign immunity under international law).
XY Pmu>u>lforIhe Pmmtion of Pollution.of thMeditemun Sta by Dumping fmm Ships yid Airmfi.16
Febniuy 1976. which guimlly prohibiü dumping of murrials producal for.biologiul and chernicd wuhr.
(Amex 1. Seaion A.pim. 9): and Protocol for the Prcvention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region by
Dumping2.S Novembcr 1986. IUT 986:87A: which prohibits ~idumping permiühm bciig graucd in
rrspect of mfcriais producd for bIologIcaland chern(Art. 1W1)and (2)and Anncx1.Saciion A. pue
6).
" Inm~tiod Conventionfor the HSas Fishcries of the Nonh PacificOcMay 1952.205UHIS 65,whicb
provides that Commission dccisionsmakeuallowancc for, imn awars which my introducc temponry
dalines in fish stAn. IV(?)).
YI 1959Antarctic Trraty supra note 291, (An. J(1)); 1988 (Art.2). WHO/SalomonIsland'sWriuenObnrvWoor: Rn IIB(Lav,ofHu- Wtb andtbe Eovimnment)
-. .
--
relevant treaties, including those indicated above which specifically address the
prote-tionof humanhealthand the environment.
4.40 Moreover, internationalpracticehas tmded toadopt a restrictive apprkh in applying
the principle of rebu sic sranribus (see Article62 of the 1969 Vienna Convention).
which should not be invokedin the caseof a civil war involving theuse of weapons
which violate trcatics for the ~mteaion of human healthand the mvi&ment. This is
appropriategiv&-thenatureoi theinternational obligation inquestion(theprotectionof
human healthand the envimnment),whichestablisha nilesof protectionfor thebenefit
of individuai Stateas weii as theintemational community asa whole. It is difficultto
justify theinvokingof theclause in thecas ef a non-internationaianned confiict,other
than in the exceptionalcircumstances-provided by Article 62 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention.
(ii) Imematio~la& co@cr
4741 The 1969 ViennaConventionis also silent about the stanis and legal effect ofmatics
when an internationalarmedwnflict occurs. Traditionaily,the viewhad beai takenthat
as regards legal relationsberweenbelligerentparties their respective obligationsundcr
bilateraland multilateralueatiesin force at the outbreakof hostiiitieswere suspended,
unlw they hadbeen adoptedin considerationof that wnflict. Recently,however,there
hasbeen growingsupportfor theview that cenain categoriesof ueatyobligations.even
as between belligerents, are not suspendedduring war or armedconfli~t.~ This rule
is confkned by the writings of jurisu.'" The Institut de Dmit Internationaladopted
a Resolutionexpressing the view that a treaty will continue to apply unlessit limits
militaryobjectives:
-
"les traitis restés envigueur et dont I'exécutiondemeure. mleshostilités.
pratiquemetossible. doiventGtreobservés earle p&. LcsElau belligiranune
peuvents'eii3wspenserquedansla mesureet pourle rempscommpar lenicessitir
deIIguerres
4.42 As regards treaty obligations between parties to a conflict and third States, the
obligationsarising from bilateraltreaties are not affectedby the state of war or med
wnflict, unlessperformanceof-theobligationsthereunderis rendered impossible.This
general rule is subject to the exceptions expressly pmvided by a parucular treaty.
'D: Supra.pua.4.34.
"
L.Oppmhùn, /mmionrr[h. Vol. II.7thcd.H. hterpasht. cd.. (1952). 304; A.D. Lmuaof Trafics
(1%1).705; C.B.Hum. 'TbcEffcc.-of Waron Tnrtics'Bi72 (1924)37 u 41.
An 4.6 h.I.D.1. 587;secai.Ans. 7-11;citedin R. Tanwfsky.LegaPimtectionof theEnvironmuitDuring
lntemvional Armai Conflict'. XXIVNYIL17 (1993). at 63. WHO~Solomonhd's Wn~n.Obxwarions: PaII(Lw ofHumao Hcrltbd the Environment)
includingthose allowing for aright of unilateraldenunnation and the applicationof
clauses relatito rebussic srancibuor non rrdunp lonnrrcufusMomvn, it is
subminedthevalidiryof =riesfor theprotectionof humanhealth andtheenvironment
govemingrelationsbetweenbelligerentStatesand thid Stateswhicarenot parties to
an armed wnflicwiilnot beaffect eythe wnflict.
4.43 ïhis appmch is noaffect byapplicationof thelaw of neutral(supra.para3.58),
whichdoesnotprecludethepossibilitthatotherobligationsof the internationallawof
peac eontinuetoapply.Darnagetohumanhealthor theenvironmentofa nuitral State,
even ifit mulü from an act of warmmmittcdby a belliguentStateis rcgulatedby
obligationsof internationalforwheprotectionof humanhealthandtheenvironment
As wnfinned by the gened rules of internationallaw govming State responsibility
whichdonot allowexonerationsforarmedwnflict (iw pa.as5.1-5.3). noexceptions
apply tomiliraryactivitiesof belligerent States.
4.44 Asa generalmaner, therefore,the outbreakof war or otherarmed conflictshouldnot
.be consideredtoautomaticallysuspendor terminatethose ueaties betweenthe pames
toa wnflict whichareintendedtopmtecthumanhealthand the envimnment and which
do not excludetheir applicationin timeof war.Suchtreatieswntinue to apply where
theyare in forcebetweenon--or morepartiesto a wnflict and third States.
@) Cusrorna~law
4.45 There areno reasonstojustify a differentconclusionin respect of obligationsarising
undercustomq lawor by acts of internationalorganisatio(supra. 4.17-4.20
and4.23-4.291Certainlvasre-ardsrelationsbetweenbel-izerentStatesandthirdStates
theexistenceof a war or armedconflictwillnotlimitor otherwiseaffect the obligations
imposed by customary noms protecting human heaith and the envimnment.
4ccordingly. the customaryobligationreflectedin Principle21lPrinciple2 woube
violatedshouldtheadverseconsequencesforhumanhealthandtheenvironrnentresulting
frornthe useof a nuclearweaponbe felt in a third stateor in an area beyondnational
jurisdictionwould bein violation.
(c) Conclusion
4.46 It thereforefollowsthat. as a generalmatter.theuse of a nuclearweaponbya Statein
war or other armed conflict must comply with treatand other obligationsunder
internationalLaw.including theWHO Constitution,whichaintendedtoprotecthuman
hdth and theenvironment.Where an obligationis of "essentialimportimce"for the
safeguardingandpreservationof humanheaith andthe environmentthe applicationof
this rule becomeseven morestrict. Anyviolationbya Stateof theseobligationsunderinternational law
givesrise to its international responsibility and iiability
5.1 The useof a nuclearweaponby a State in violationof an internationallegal obligation
for the protection ofhuman heaith or the environmatgivesrise tothe international
responsibiiity of that State."' The principlethata breach of an international legal
obligationunder mty or customarylaw, or perhaps evcn gaieral principles of law,
create as further obligation, or a liability,"' w make rcparation is also well
established.As the PCU stated in the Chomw Foctory case: -
it is a principle of internationallaw, and even a general conceptionof
law, that any breach of an engagementinvolvesan obligation w make
re$uation. Injudgmentno. 8 (1927) (Pa, Sn. A,, No. 9, p.21) ...the
Coun had already saidthat reparationwas the indispensablecomplement
of a failureto applya convention,and there is no necessityfor thiIObe
statedin the conventionit~elf.~~~
5.2 A Statewhichuses a nuclearweaponin violationof its internationallegal obligationto
protecthumanheaithand theenvironmentwill beunder an obligationto makereparation
for the consequencesof the violation. Thisarises froma pnnciple of generalapplication,
and there is no reason why violations relating to human heaith and environmental
obligationsshould be subject to a different approach.The general principleis clearly
expresseciin the judgmentof the Chonow Facroty(Indemniry) case, where the PCU
statedthat
Tbe essential principle containcd in the acnanlillegal -a principle vbicb
scernw beestablisbed by internationalpractice and inpanicular by the decisionsofarbitral
uibunal- is that reparation mfa?aspossible. wipe out al1tbe consequences of the
illegai act and mstablish the situationwhich would. in al1probabiliiy. have eUncd if tbu
net had not ben commiaed. Restitutionin kiod. or. if this is no! amsuml- payment of
fomspontiing to the valuewhich a resinkind would buu;the awifneedbe.of
damyes for 10%susIainedwhich wouldnot becovercd by restitution in kind or payment in
place of i-such are the principles which shouldwsedetermine the amount of
.- - -
"O
ILC Dnft Micles onSlak ResponsibiliAn. 1. 11977II YbkiLC (UN Doc.AICN.41302).
"'
Seedm UNCLOS Article139.and UNCLOS Anicle 235 which provides htStates are 'rsponsifor tbe
hilfilmmtoftbùr international obligations concerning the protution and prrservation of the marine mvim-t.
They shllbe liablinaccordance with international Lw.'
'
1928 PCU. Serio A. No. 17. at p. 47. ~O/Solomon iJaods' WrimnObxnuionr: PanIIC(TLespo~biliry)
armpensxionducforM YI connaryIOinmuaund hw."'
5.3 Inthe eventthatthe use ofa nuclearweaponshould caus earnage tohurnanhealthand
the environment, especiallyin a third Stat eot involved in the wnflict. financd
repanrion should cover the wns associa withdmatnial darnage toenvironmental
rehurces (pureenvironmentaldamage)andconsequentialdamagetopople andpropay
(consequentialenvironmentaldamage), including rrstorationor reinstatement. This
appro&hhasbeenconfirmedbySecurityCouncil&solution68711991w , hichreaffirmed
that Ira q as liableunderinternationaliaw for,inter&, 'envimnmenraldamageand
the depletionof natutalresourw' mul~g hm the unlawfulinvasionand occupation
of Ku~ait.~"Violationsof internationaliaw arisinghm the use of a nuclearweapon
would also give rise to the responsibilityof the wncernedState, together with the
obligationto makereparation. inthe caseof anarmedwnflict resultingfromthe useof
oneor morenuclear weaponsitwillbevimiallyimpossibletoprovide adequa fieancial
reparation, providing a further compellingreason for wncluding that any use of a
nuclearweaponmust, by vinue of its effectson humanhealthand the environment,be
iilegalunder internationallaw.
5.4 Internationalresponsibilityma' alw,mgger the cnminal liabilityof a Stat (and any
person asuxiated with a decisionto usea nuclearweapon shouldbe on noticethat he
or shewillalm be subjecttocriminalIiability).Accordingto the ILC "a seriousbreach
of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and
preseyation of the hurnanenvironment.suchas thoseprohibitingmassive poliutionof
the atmosphereor of the seas" should be categonzed as an internationalcrime, or
delict.'" The use of a nuclear weaponcausingmassivedamage to hurnanhealthor
the environment aywhere would.ir is submitted. constitutean internationalcrime,and
any memberof the international communitywouldhave standingto challengethe act,
sinceit wouldinjurethenghts of al1Statesand membersof theinternationalcommunity
irrespectiveof where the damage tohuman health or the environmentwas actually
felt."' ~~..
- - --
' 1927 (PCLT)mcr A.No. 17. p47
"' SecurilyCouncilRes. 68711991of 3 April 1991. 847(1991).
"' Supranote 219.
'j6
Sa alsoILCDm? Code of CrimesAgainstîhePuceandS~curityof MuJcind,Rcponof the ILC on 43rd
session. 30 ILM1584 (1991). espefiallyDrafrAnicle 26 (sutcd toapplyinaswell asd&gcd
confiicl)provIhatanindividualwho 'wilfcauseororderstheuusing of widcspdlongunn andsevm
damageiotbenalumlenvironment'wouldbeguiltyof a crime. Dnh An22lprovidesthatanindividwh
employmcthodsormcnns of warfarc'whichareintendcdor&myexpecreiocauswidaprud. long-lcrmand
severedamageto fhe naninl environment'bcupilty oanexceptiodly seriouswar crime. WHOlSolomo rlaods'WriObservatiPnsII(Conclusions)
PARTIII -
OF CONCLUSIONS
6.1 For the reasosesout in theWrim Observations,it is submined that:
O The WHO iscompetent to requesan AdvisoryOpinion from tbe Court on the
question andthe Couiscomptent toand sbould giitsOpinion on the questio-.
(A) The WHO'Srequestfor an OpinionMils the conditionsof Article 96(2)of the
UN Chanet.
The WHOis acting in accordancewith its Constitution.
(B)
Thepracticcof the WHO undn its Constitutionconits wmpetence overnam
(C) relating to the effects on human heaith and the environment of ionising radiation
resultingfrom theuse ofnuclearweapons, since:
(a) the WHOls competentto act in the iield of environmentai protection;
l
@) the WHOis comptent to act in mattersrelaringto ionising radiation; ~
(c) the WHOis comptent to address thehealthand environmentalconsequencesof
the use ofweapons;
(d) the questionof the legalityof theuseof nuclearweaponsis withintheframework
of the WHO'Sactivities:
(e) the WHO is comptent to act on matters concerning the development and
applicationof internationallaw relatingto humanheaith and the environment;
The cornpetenceof the WHO to request this Opiniondws not derogate from the
@) principleof speci.lity
(E) The Court shouldgive the AdvisoryOpinionrequestedby the WHO.
O Any use of a nuclear weapon violates internlawof armed conflicts.
(A) Any use oa nuclearweaponis subjectto internationallaw, including then-les rciating
toarmedwnflicts:
(a) anyuse ofa nuclear weaponsis subjectto general internationallaw; WHOlSolornk olnandsWriueaObservati oms: (Co~cliuions)
(b) any use of a nucl& weapons is subject tothe international law of med
cnnfiicts;
-
(c) any use of a nuclearweaponis subject to the 1977Gmeva Protocol1;
(d) nuclearweaponsare subjecttorulesof internationallaw specificallyprohibiting
their us....nd
any use of a nuclear weapon is subject toand would violate the WHO
(e)
Constitution.
(B) Any use of a nuclearweaponvioiates theintemationallawof armed conflicts:
any use of a nucleafweaponviolatesinternational iaw by remn of iu
(a) quantitativeand qualitativeeffects. which violate the relevant rules of
intemationallaw that:
(i) limitthe rncansof anackingthe rnemy;
(ii) prohibitdirector indirectattackson civiliantargets;
(Ùi) estabiisha permanentobligationto distinguishbetwern combatanuand
non-combatans;
(iv) prohibitdirect or direct attacagainsthealthservices;
prohibit the use ofchemicalor poisonousweaponsor weaponswhich
(v-
haveindiscnminateeffects:
(vi) prohibit the use of weaponswhich render death inevitable orcause
unnecessaq suffering;
(vii) prohibit violations of the territorial sovereignty of third States;
(viii)prohibit causing"widespread, long-term and severe-damage to the
.environment";
requirerespect forthe principlesof proponionalityand humanity;and
(1)
(x)' prohibitcrimesagaina humanityor genocide.
(c) The use of nuclear weapons violates international law irrespective of the
circumstancesin which theyare used.
.
The use of nuclear wapons cannot be justified by internationallaw in any
(d)
99 circumstances,.in panicular by reason of selfdefence, reprisal, or srate of
necessity.
(C) The relevantrules-ofinternationallaw prohibitingthuse of nuclearweaponsapply to
al1States.
(IID Any use of nuclear weapons violates internationalha forthe protection of human
heaiîb and the envGonment and the protection of human rights.
The use of nuclear weaponsissubject tointemaliona law for the protectionof human
(A)
healthand theenvironment, andprotectionof fundamatal human rights. -
(B) The use ofnuclear weaponsviolatesinternationallawfor the protectionof humanhealth
and the environment,and fundamentalhumanrights, by increaUnglevels-ofradiation
in the environment which:
do not respect national bound&es and violate the sovereigntyand territorial
(a)
integrityof third States;
@)) violate the general obligation not to cause damagto human health andthe
environment outside its temtory or other areas subject to its jurisdiction or
control;
(c) violatespecificobligationsnot tocause significantdamageto human healthand
the environment anywhere. including in panicular air quality, biodivcrsity,
freshwater resources: the marine environment.nd culturalandnaturalheritage;
and
(d) violate fundamentalhuman righu.
(C) Internationallaw for the protectionof human health and the environmentand for the
protectionof humanrights is applicableduringarmedconflict.
(IV) Any use of nuclear weapons bg a State entails its responsibility under international
Lawand its iiibility to makereparation.6.2 Accodmgly, and for the rasonsset outin these Writ!.Observations it is submined
that the Inmationai Coun ofJusti chouldgivean Advisory Opmion which states:
(A) that the World Health Organisation is competent to requm an Advisory
Opinion from the International Court oJustic oethi question, and that
the Court iscompetent to and should give an Advisory Opinion on the
question submined;
(B) that any use of a nuclear weapon by a State would violate its obiigationr
under international law as reflected in the rules of international law
concerning methods and mean of warfare vus in beh) and neutrplity,
ALTERNATnTELY that the use of nuclear weapons mut not violate
applicable rules of intemational law concerning methods and mean of
warfare ÿurin beh) and neutrafiy;
that any use of a nuclear weapon by a State would violate its obligations
(O
under international lawasreflected in the rules of international law for the
protection of human health and the environnent and fundamental human
rights,ALTERNATIVUY that the use of nuclear weapons mustnot violate
applicable rules of international law for the protection of human health and
the environment and fundamental human rights;
(D) that any use of a nuclear weapon baState would constitute a crime against
humanity, ALTER!A~'ELY that the use of nuclear weapons in violation
of international constitutes a crimeinsi hurnanity; and
(E) that any use by a State of a nuclear weapon gives rise to its international
rerponsibility, ALTERh'ATIVELY that the violation by a State of its
obligations under international lan relatine to the use of nuclear weapons
gives rise to its international responsibility. Table of Annexe
-
Annex 1 Constitution of the World Health Organization ........ 1
Annex 2 Resolutions of theWHO Assernbly ................ 13
WHA13.56 (WHO activitiesin the fieldof radiaaon health)
13
WEA 13.67 (Disarmament) ..................... ~.. 14
WHA15.51 (Role of physiciansin the preservationand promotion
of peace) ........................ 15 -
WHA20.54 (Resolution 2162 @Xi) of the UN Gencral
Assernbly) ....................... 17
WHA23.53 (Chernicaland biologicaiweapons) ......... 18
WHA32.24 (Roleof physiciansin thepreservationand promotion
of peace) ........................ 19
..
WHA33.24 (Primaryhealth careandeconomicdeveloprnent) 20
WHA34.36 (GlobalStrategyforHeaithforail by theyear2000)22
WHA34.38 Che role of physiciansandotherhealthworkers in the
preservation and promotion of peace as the most
significantfactorfor theattainrnentof healtall)
.............................. 24
WHA36.28 (Therole of physiciansandotherhealthworkersin the
preservation and promotion of peace as the most
significantfactorfortheattainmentof healthforl)26
.-
WHA40.24 (Effectsof nuclearwaron heaith andhealthservices)
.............................. 27
WHA12.24 (The embargo on medicalsuppliesand iu effecu on
healthcare)....................... 28
. WHA13.25 (Hazardouswastemanagement) .......... 29
WHA45.31 (The WHO Commissionon Environrnentand Health)
.............................. 31 'WHA46.20 (WHOGlobalStrategyfor Healthand Environment)33
WHA46.40 (Heaith and Environmental Effe~u of Nuclear
Weapons) ........................ 35
Annex 3 Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services (2nded.,
I 1987) (Repon of the WHO Management Group on Follow-Up of
ResolutionWHA 36.28) ........................ 37
Annex 4 Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services: Report of
tbe-M'HO Management Group Responsible for the Application of
Resolution WHA 36.28 (1991) @oc. A/44/INF.DOC15,25th April
1991 .................................... 213
I
Annex5 Healtb and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War: Report by the
WHO Director General (A/46/30, 26 April 1993....... 222 l
1
1 Annex 6 Resolutions of the General Asembly ............ 234 -l
1633(XW (Declaration on the prohibition of the use of
nuclearandthermonucleanveapons) ... 234
2398(XXQ . problems of the human environment) . .236
l
~URX~ (Respect forhumanrighü in armedconfhct)238
I
2936mXVm (Non-use of force in international relations and
permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear
weapons) ....................... .239
2996GXViTl (International rcsponsibilityof States in regard to the
environment) ...................... 240
33171B (Non-useof weaponsand preventionof nuclear
war) ...................... ,244
34/58 (Healthasan integralpan of developrnent)245
351152D
(Non-useof weapons andpreventionof nuclear
war) ...................... ,247
36192 (Non-useof nuclearweaponsand prevention of
nuclearwar) .................. 248
3611O0 (Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe) .................. 249
(Non-useof nuclearweaponsand preventionof
nuclearwar) .................. 250
(Conventionon the Prohibition of the Use of
NuclearWeapons) ............. .25 1
(Convention .on theProhibition of the Use of
NuclearWeapons) .............. 252
(Condemnation of nuclearwar) ...... 253
(Non-useof nuclearweaponsand preventionof
nuclearwar) ................... 254
.-
(Conventionon the Prohibition of the Use of
NuclearWeapons) .............. 255
(Preventionof nuclearwar) ......... 257
(Conventionon the Prohibitionof the Use of
NuclearWeapons) .............. 259
(Conventionon the Prohibitionof the Use of
NuclearWeapons) .............. 262
(Conventionon the'Prohibitionof the Use of
NuclearWeapons) .............. 263
(Preventionof-.uci-arwar) ......... 264
(Conventionon the Prohibitionof theUse of
Nuciear ~eapons) ............. .265
(Preventionof nuclearwar) ......... 267
(Conventionon the Prohibitionof the Useof
Nuclear Weapons) .............. 268
(Conventionon the Prohibitionof the Use of
NuclearWeapons) .............. 269
(Need to ensurea heaithyenvironment-forthe
well-beingof individuals).......... 271
(Protectionoftheenvironmentintimesofarmed 47153C (Conventionon the Prohibition of theUse of
-. Nuclear Weapons) .............. 273
(Conventionon the Prohibition of theUse of
- 48176B Nuclear Wcapons) .............. 274
Annex7 Resolution 687191 of theUN Security Council ......... 278
Annex 8 Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapom: Report of the UN
Secretary General (A1351392, 12 September 1980) (Extracts:
Contents, Introductiand Chapter IV) ..............
283
Annex 9 Comprehensive Study on Nucieir Weapons: Report of the UN
SecretaryGeneral (A/45/373,18September 1990( )ExtractsContents
andChapters 1,IIand VI) .......... ........... 335
Annex 10 1972Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
- p
Environment .......................... :... 391
Annex 11 1992Rio Declaration on Environment and Development . . 397 WritteObservationsSubmittedby the
GovernmentofSolomonIslands
ERRATA
p. 77'.par4.3, line 6: For 'Articl(1)(d)of the LC'sdrafAtrticleread
"Article19(3)(d)of theXC'sdrafAtnicles".
p.JI,par. 4.3, line9: Insen "3.69and3.afte"paras".
p. 86, note2.S':For "paras. 10and418"read "paras.101and418".
p. 86, note259:For "res.23(XXïi)"rad "res2398(XXIU)".
p. 86, note262:Lastlineof the note,for 'environment"read "atmosphere".
p. 87, note 2Add thewords"adoptlawsandregulationsto" before"prevent".
p. 88, note 273:for "note224"read "note248"..
-p. 89, note286: For "[INSERT] r"ad 'note224".
Written Statement of the Government of the Solomon Islands