Letter dated 20 June 1995 from the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, together with Written Statement of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany

Lettadate20 June,199.hm theAmbassa dare
Federal epublicofGermantomer with~nttenStaîemenifthe
Govemmen tftheFederaRepubliofGermany DERBOTSCHAFTER The Hague,20 June 1995
DERBUNDESREPUBLIKOEUTSCHWND

To the
Registrar of the

International Court of Justice
Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina
Peace Palace
Carnegiepiein 2
2517 KJThe Hague

'b~ hx \ialt,,.La- bh 'r-4 ,
referring to your letter of February8, 1995to the Foreign Minister of Germany
respecting the General Assernbly'srequest for an advisory opinion on the
threaffuse of nuclear weaponIbegto passon toyou the enciosed statement

of the Federal Republic of Germany.The original ist accornbynaed
translation ofurtesy in English.

Sincerely yours
1 June 1995

Statementbvthe Governmentof theFederalRe~ublicof Germany

for the internationalCourt ofJustice

on therequest madeto it bytheUnited NationsGeneralAssembly foranadvisoryopinion

onthe followineauestion:

"1sthe threat oruse ofnuclearweaponsin any circumstancepermittedunder

international law?"From the standpomt ofthe Federal Government thereare wmpellingargumentsagainstthe

InternationalCourt ofJusticegivian advisoryopinionontheabovequestion.

1. The FederalGovernmentrecognka the aspectwhich, foUowinga primafacie examina--
tion of the request, rnightargue for a substantivereply: A96(1)e of the Chmer of the

Unite d arionsauthorizestheGeneraAl ssemblyto requestan opinionfiom the International
Court ofJusticeon "anylegalquestion".The Courthas made substantiverepliestalprevious

requestsfromthe GeneraiAssembJy. Ithas up to now beenrather cautiousininterpretingits
discretionundwArticle 65(1) of its Statute for dedining a request.ïhe Chastrepeatedly
stated that a substantivereplyanorgan ofthe UnitedNationsauthorlled to rnakea request

should"inprinciple"notbedeclied (1ClReport.s 1950,71; 1956,86; 1989, 189).

2. In this case, howwer, foUowinga C~OK~ examinationof the Court'sjurisprudence,a
differentconclusionsuggestsitself.

a) The Coun hasunequivocally aated that it mayonly examine-ga! questions:

"..theCourt cangivean advisoryopiniononlyon a legaiquestion.If a question isnot a
legal one,the Court has no discretionin thetter;itmust declineto givethe opinion
requested"(ICIRepom 1962, 155).

In the viewof the FederalGovernmentthe questionbefore the Court is basicallya political
one.

AlthoughtheCourt has alsorepeatedlystated that legal questionsoftenhavepoliticalaspects
andthat thisfaa shouldnothinderit initsmainlyjudicitaskof interpretinga treatyprovision

(IC I eports1948, 61; 1962, 155; 1980, 87).this requestby the Generai alernbly is a
differentmaner.Justastherequestformulatesa legalquestionmerelyat firsglancethe repiy,

too. can oniybe a seeminglylegalone.InrealitytheCourt isbeiaske do examinewhatisat
hean a highiypoliticalissue.

Nuclearweaponsare not onlya meansof warfare likeother weapons.Their mainpurposeis
political:theyare rneantto help preventany kindof war. Theiruse cannot be assessedusing

the noms of internationallaw without such an assessment tuming from ajudicial into a
politicaione. WMe the questionbythe GeneralAssemblyregardmgthe legalityof the "threator use of
nuclearweapons" isfomulated asifthe eventwiity oftheiruseinwartimeeouldbe assessed

separatelyfiomtheirmain politicalpurpose of preventingwar,this assumptionis misleadiig.
The eventualityof the use of nuclear weapons in wartime has remainecihypotheticalfor

decades. Thi r&tion has inîluencedmajor semrity poiicydecisionsbystatesand aiüances
andwiU continueto do so-infuture..isa.reaiizatio.whichcanbe.coumedamong@ebasic .,

conditionsunderlyingtherelativepoIiticstabii ininternationalrelations.

Were the Court now, againstthis background,to assess inan abstractlegal rnannerthe
hypotheticaluse of nuclearweapons,this advisoryopinionwuld only seeminglybe a purely

judicial clarificationaflegal question.The subjectof the assesment would, in the final
analysis,bekey secunt pyiicyelernentsof today'sglobalorder.Regardlessof the conclusions

such an advisoryopinionwere to reach on the matter, it wouldbe perceivedas areply toa
politicalquestion.

b) Should the Court neverthelessdecide that ithas before it an essentiallylegal question
requiringclarif~catiotwould aiIl needto decidehow to makeuse of the discretionaliowed

inArticle65 ofits Statute:

"But evenif the questionis a legal one, which the Coun is undoubtedly competentto

answer, imaynonethelessdeclineto do son (IUReporrs 1962,155).

TheCourt hasrepeatedlyemphasizedits discretion:

"Article65of the Statuteis permissive.It givesthe Courtthe power to examinewhether
the ciramaances ofthe caseareof sucha character asshouldleadit to declineto answer
theRequst" (ICIReporzs 1950,72;contirmed itqforexample,IURepm 1962,155).

The Federal Governrnentis aware of the fact that the Court has also emphasii that only

"compellingreasons"couldcause it to refuseto answera legalquestion (ZU Reportî 1956,
86; 1989, 191).The FederalGovernrnentis of the opinionthat such compellig reasonsfor

refusalexistinthis case.The"propnety"ofjudiciaiinvolvementwiththisquestionismore than
doubtfulforvariousreasons,if theCourt'sowncriteriaareused:

"..the Courthas always beenguidedbythe principlethat, as ajudicialbody,itisbound
to remainfaitfil to the requirementsof itsjudicial character evenin givingadvisory
opinions"(IUReporls 1973, 175).aa) ïhe Courtwouldbe forced tooverstepthe boundsofitsfunchonasthe "principaljudicial
organ of the UnitedNations" (Anicle92 of the Charter).Because of itsjudifundon the

Court isobligedtorespectthe law-making,inasens "legislative"prerogativeofthe states.

Rather thangiving an ab- answer to theabstmct question of the legality of nudear
weapons,the internationacommunity has chosenan entireiydifferentcourseto deai withthe
legalaspectsof the nucleari&. Ithasfor decadesmade effortsto limit.thespecinrisksof .

nuclear weaponsby eiaboratingnew internationallegainorms. in doinsoit haschosenthe
optionof wntinuaUydevelopinga specialinternationtreatkw devotedtothispurpose.

A general legal ban on nuclearweapons has never been on the agendain anynegotiatiig

forum, eventhoughvariousstatesha& longdemandedsucha ban. Therehave beentwo main
reasonsforthis:Wy, the recognitionthatnoconsensus can be reachedon sichanaim dueto

its politidy controversinatur ewndly, fearofjeopardiig what is legallyand poiiticaüy
possible, since a polarizingargumentonan unachievablegoal blocks the road tograduai
success.

Thisprocw of gradual developingtreaty law on nucleardisarment andamiscontrol has

proved remarkablysuccessful.Oneof the most importantachievements,apa fiomthe major
biiateraidisarmamenttreaties,wasthe conclusionofthe 1968Treatyon the Non-Proiiferation
of Nuclear Weapons @PT) which now has 178 rnember states and which was recently

indefmitelyextended.Thistreatybyno meansenvisagesa generaiban on nuclearweaponsbut
rather expresslypresupposesthe control over such weapons by five nuclear-weapstates,

whichare,however,pledged
l
"to punue negotiationsin good faith on effectivemeasuresrelatingto cessation of the
nucleararmsraceat an earlydate andto nucleardisarmament,andon a treaton general
and completedisarmamentunderstria and effectiveinternational control" (ArtVI of

theNPT).

On the occasion of the indefiniteextension of NPT, over ,170States Parties wn6nned

these aims by consensus on 11May 1995 and adopted the catalogue of measures entitled
"P~ciples and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferationand Disannament" (Document

NPT/CONF.1995/L.Sof 9 May 1995). This significant document underiines the above-
mentionedgraduaiapproach,i.e.to deal 6th the nuclearthreatthroughtreatiesand it con-

tainsimportantobjectivesfor the further developmentof internationaltreaty law,for example
the completionof the negotiationsona ComprehensiTestBanTreaty"nolaterthan 1996". Lnthiscontext it becomesclearwhywe are concernedaboutjeopardizingwhat is legallypos-

sible. The indispensablefocussingof al1effortsont0 the coming nucleardisannament,amis-
control and non-prolifdon ta& the signi6canceof which can wcely be overestimated,

couldloseits driveifthe Court wereto supplyan advisoryopinionon the abmact questionof
the le& of nuclear weapons. Whateverthe Court's reply, it could not fail to have

consequencesfor a sensitive,complexnegotiatingprocess which, for gwd reason, hasnever
includedthe issue nowbeforethe Court.

bb) inaddiion, werethe Courtto replyto therequesf itcouldin our view not avoid issuinga

numberof speculativestatementsgoing beyonditsjudicialfuncrion. It is true that one of the
Court's tasks is to answer absuact legai questio(ICIRepons 1948,61; 1954, 51);.it may
also rnakefïndiigs asto factualissue(IUReportr 1971,27).However,shouldthe problerns

regardiig fkt-hiimg be obvious,this maylead the Court to refuse to give an opinion(ICJ
Reportr 1975.28).

in answeringthe above request the Court wouid have to embark upona hoa of speculative

considerationsin orderto take accountof thevarietyof differingsituationsinwhich the threat
or use of nuclear weaponsrnightbe conceivable.The Court would beobligedto analyzedi-

ferent types of nuclearweaponsand to assessdiierent theories regadmg the effects of their
possibleuse. Al1thiswouldrequirethe Court to anaiyzea plethora of extremelycomplexand

at the same time mntroversial hypotheses.Thiswould no longer be judicial fact-findingbut
rather guesswork regardinghypotheticalscenanos.

cc) The General Assernbly'srequest aisoleads to the question of the Court'sintegrity, the
significanceof whichisillustratedbythe followingquotation:

"Thereare inherentlimitationson the exerciseof thejudicialfunaion whichthe Court,as
a Court of justice, cannever ignor..The Court itself,and not the parties, mua bethe
guardianof the Court'sjudiciaiintegrit(IUReports 1963,29).

This questionbecornespanicularlyrelevantinthiscase, sincethere is thedangerof a pointless
procedure.The Court hasdescribeditsadvisoryfunaion as follows:

"Theiünction of the Court isto give an opinionbased on law, once ithas come to the
conclusionthat the questionsput toitare relevantand havea praaical and conternporary
eEectand, consequently,arenot devoidofobjea or purpose" (IUReportr 1975,37).in earlierrequestsmade bythe General Assemblye,speciallyregardingconstitutionalaspects

of the Charter,the"practicalnd conternporar&ectm of the Court'advisory opinionswas
mostlynot indoubt.However,the bry of a numberof GeneraA l ssemblyresolutionson the

legalityof nudear weapons has shownthat there are highlydiient but at the.same time
extremelyhardenedopinionson thismaner and that therarenurnericairnajontiinthis con-

5ictof opinionsbutnosign wshateverofconsensus.

in other words we are dealingwith a legalissue withpoliticalimplicationswhichby its very
nature must remainpoliticallywntroversial, thusallowingfor no wmmon opinio iuris sup

portinga universallyvallegaireply.Undersuch circumstanceit is hardtseethepurposeof
an advisoryopinionsinceitcouldscarcelyserveto overwrne the merence of opinions.within
the GeneralAssembly.Wwe an op*hion nonethelessto be&en, the perceptionofthe Court's

integritmigh bteaEected.

3. In 2 a), 2 baa),bb) andcc) above the Federal Government has presented four major
aspects,any one of which shouldinits opinionlead to rejectionof the request. Shouldthe

Court failto sharethisview,theFederalGovernmentbegs to suggestthat in ancasethe sum
total of the abovereservationsis so weightythat the Court wouldbe welladvisedto exercise

itsdisnetion to rejectthe GeneralAssemblrequest.

ln case the Court enters into an examination ofthe substance of the General Assernbly's
request,theFederalGovernent rnakesreferenceto sectionïi of itsstatementofJun1994 on

theWorldHealthOrganization's questionregardingthe legalityof the use of nuclearweapons.
Thesecornrnentsaisoapply mutatis mutdis to the GeneralAssembly'sadditional questionon

the legaiityof the threat of nuclearweapons.Such a "threcan only be permissiblein the
exerciseofthe inherentrightto individualor collectiveself-defence.