Note Verbale dated 19 June 1995 from the Embassy of Malaysia, together with Written Statement of the Government of Malaysia

NoteVerbaledaîed19June1995hmthe EmbassyofMaiaysiogether
wii hnttenStaîemetftheGovemmentofMalaysia The Embàssy of Malaysia preSêntS i ts compliments to the
Registry of the Intsrnationai Court of justice and with

reference to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)

Resolürion 49/75K repesting the International Court of
Justice to provide an advisory opi~ion on the question

of the legality of the üse of threat of use of nuclear
weà-mns, has the honour to submit the faxed sta tement by

the Government of Malaysia in Su- port of the application
by tne UNGA.

The EmDcss~ .ias fXtfi2~ the ;:onocr to inform that
.. . .
1- will be s~~mirzinc r:?e srlclzcl cap- to the Reqistry
in nue coürss.

T;IS Zmlxssy of .Yalegsii z~zi15 Itself cf rCis opportüniry
ro rsneh7 zo the Rsqistr- OZ-. ?ne i.~?erzctional Cour? of

:nsticê tR2 czsür3~cês ô? izs Uig3es: consiàerction.

Ti2 Hague,

19th June, 2495

pi--;
dLL-re oi t38 .=~~~s;YEz
Ir;tarncris.~l Cscrz ô: Jüszico
Joace Palacc
2517 K.7 THE 3AGüE. STATEMENT

by

THE MVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA

in support of the

APPLICATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

for an

ADVISORY OPINION BY THE INTERVATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

on

THE LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS QUESTION PRESENTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1s the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance
permitted under international law?

BACKGROUND

On 14 May 1993, the World Health Assembly adopted Resolution
WHA 46.40, requesting the International Court of Justice to
give an advisory opinion on the following question:

In view of the health and environmental effects, would the
use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed
conflict be a breach of its obligations under international
law including the WHO Constitution?

Upon receipt of this request from the Director-General of
WHO, the Court set a tenu of 20 June 1994, later extended to
20 September 1994, for the submission of statements by member
governments. Thirty-five States submitted statements, the
majority arguing for an affirmative answer to the question
asked. In accordance with the Court's Rules, al1 submissions
were transmitted to al1 states which made submissions. The
Court has set a term of 20 June 1995 for states to comment on
each other's submissions.

On 15 December 1994, the General Assembly of the United
Nations (UNGA), by resolution 49/75/K, requested the Court to
give an advisory opinion on the following question:

1s the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance
permitted under international law?

The Court has set a term of 20 June 1995 for the submission
of statements relative to the question posed by the General
Assembly, and 20 September 1995 as the deadline for responses
to these statements.
It is expected that the Court will eventually consolidate the
two questions, but it has not yet done so.

SUMMARY

This Statement endorses the arguments already before the
Court supporting the thesis that any use of nuclear weapons
is illegal under international law. In focusing on the
question of threat, this Statement will argue that the threat
of use of nuclear weapons is illegal because the law of peace
and security, as it has evolved since the adopton of theUnited Nations Charter ,treats "threat or usen as a single,
indivisible conceptand because it is a general principle of
law that the illegality of a particularly serious offence
encompasses as well the illegality of thethreat to commit
such an offence.

1. INTRODUCTION

The possession of nuclear weapons by some states and not
others, and the genocidal nature of these weapons, has
created an unprecedented disparity of power between the
nuclear "haves" and the nuclear "have-nots". As long as the
nuclear weapon powersdo not fulfil their solemn obligation
under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Prolferation Treaty'to .
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear anus race at an early
date*, this disparity will continue to exist and to lead
eventually to the spread of nuclear weaponsand nuclear war,
which will constitute a threat to the survival of
civilisation.

This threat is reinforced by the declared intention of the
nuclear weapon states to base their security and national
the right to use nuclear weapons in responseve to a perceived
or actual threat of an attack. The very concept of deterrence
is meaningless without a credible willingness to use nuclear
weapons - hence, "deterrence"equals "threatto use".

Thus, the question posed by the General Assembly goes beyond
the jus in bello query of the World Health Assembly and
impinges on the area of jus ad bellum. But the doctrine of
jus ad bellum. as elaborated since the enactment of Article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter, leaves no room for the
legality of the threat of force under international law.
Article 2(4) categorically prohibits the threat or use of
force by one state against another.The onlyexception to
this prohibition is Article 51, which preserves "the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations". But
nothing in Article 51 sanctions a standing threat - a threat
in futuro - by one state against another, named or unnamed.
It sanctions only the use of retaliatory force once an armed
attack occurs. Its application is limited to the very brief
time span following an attack. It cannot therefore sanction
the threat of the use of force as a hypothetical matter
inherent in the military doctrine of any state.
Furthermore. the use of force in self-defenceis subject to
the rules of jus in bello. Hence, if the use of nuclear weapons is prohibited under the rubric of jus in bello, the
threat to use nuclear weapons can never be sanctioned under
the rubric of jus ad bellum.

II. THE LAW OF PEACE AND SECURITY (JUS AD BELLUM)

relations with one another..threa tr use of force in their

A. UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The United Nations Charter specifically prohibits the threat
or use of force. Under the UN Charter, Article 2(4):

Al1 members shall refrain in their international relations
from thethreat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.(l)

The prohibition on the threat or use of force under Article
2(4) has the status of jus cogens, a peremptory rule of
international law.(2) Moreover, this prohibition extends to
non-member States.(3)

The United Nations Charter permits the threat or use of force
only in individual or collective self-defence, including
Security Council enforcement measures. Under Article 51:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security ....(4)

The Charter's prohibition on the threat or use of force, with
the limited exception of self-defence, reflects a change in
the development of international law. Historically, Jus ad
Bellum, or the law of "just war". recognised the right of a
state to resort to war for "just" reasons. In 1919, the
Covenant of the League of Nations further limited a State's
right to "resort to war". (5)

(Kellog-Briand Pact, also known as the Paris Peace Pact of 27
August 1928) prohibited aggressive war "as an instrument of
national policy" and "forthe solutuion of international
controversiesn.(6)

The language of the Charter prohibits the "threat or use offorce" rather than "resort to war", as the Covenant of the
League of Nations did. The change in terminology reflects the
recognition that a State might resort to the threat or use of
force which does not rise to the level of war or resort to
armed conflict without an open declaration of war.(7)

The League of Nations Covenant did, nevertheless, recognise
the danger of threats in international.re1ation.sT .he
Covenant declared "any war or threat of war" a matter of
concern to the entire League and grounds for the League to
take action to "safeguard the peace of nations1.(%)

The principles behind the Kellogg-BriandPact and the League
of Nations Covenant provided a foundation for the United
Nations Charter.(9) Thus, Article 2(3), which requires States
to settle disputes peacefully, complementsthe prohibition on
the threat or use of force.(lO) Moreover, the Charter's
preamble calls on States "to practise tolerance and live
together in peace with one another as good neighbours". These
affirmative obligations to cooperate peacefully would clearly
be inconsistentwith a legal regime that tolerates threats
between States.

The Opening Statement by Mr Hans Corell, Under-Secretary-
General for Legal Affairs at the United Nations, during the
Congress on Public InternationalLaw in March 1995,
relations between States and that disputes should be resolved
peacefully:

..let this Congress also be a resounding appeal to those who
ultimately make the decisions that affect our destiny. To.
them, our message should be:

Yours is the responsibilityto ensure that international law
is applied and that legal advice is sought before important
decisions are made in foreign policy matters ...

And, if disputes.occur,yours is the responsibility to
refrain from the use of force and to make sure that these
disputes are resolved by peaceful means.(ll)

The preparatory work of the United States in anticipation of
the creation of the United Nations reflects a concern with
threats of force. A Mernoranduncontaining "basic ideas which
might be embodied in a constitution of an international
organisation for the maintenance of peace and security"
listed as the first among the functions and purposes of the
organisation "to prevent the use of force or of threats to
use forcen.(12)As the first of the principal obligations of
a member state, the Memorandum listed "To refrain from the'use of force or threat to use force ..." (13)

The proposals which emerged from the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference, in preparation for the United Nations Conference
in San Francisco, formed the basis of the UN Charter. At
Dumbarton Oaks, the United States proposals were accepted as
the basis for discussion and the structure they established
was generally accepted.(l4)..TheDumbarton Oaks draft of the
principle which became Article 2(4) read:

Al1 members of the Organisation shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force in
any marner inconsistent with the purpose of the
Organisation.(15)
Australia's amendment added the prohibition on threats or use
of force "against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any member or State."(l6)

B. UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS AND DECLARATIONS

Numerous United Nations resolutions and declarations have
confirmed the principle that States shall refrain from the
threat or use of force in their international relations.

The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations(l7) reiterates the
language of Article 2(4) and adds:

Such a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of
international law and the Charter of the United Nations and
shall never be employed as a means of settling international
issues.(l8)
THe Declaration of the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their
Independence and Sovereignty(l9) states: "No state has the
right to intervene ... in the interna1 or external affairs of
any other . Consequently, armed intervention and al1 other
forms of interference or attempted threats ... are
condemned." The Declaration notes that intervention is not
admissible "for any reason whatever."

THe 1987 Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness
of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of
Force in International Relations affirms the principle of
Article 2(4) and of the Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, and adds:The principle of refraining fromthe threat or use of force
in international relations is universal in character and is
binding. regardless of each State's political, economic,
social or cultural system or relations of alliances.(20)

This Declaration provides further that "States have the duty
interferenceor attempted threats against the personality of
the State or against its political, economic and cultural
elements."(21) In addition, neither acquisitionnor
occupation of territory resulting from the threat or use of
force will be recognised as legal,(22) and a treaty procured
by the threat or use of force is void.(23)

The Final Document of the First Special Session of the United
Nations General Assembly on Disarmament stated that "[State
members] stress the special importance of refraining from the
threat or use of force againstthe sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or against
peoples under colonial or foreign domination ..."(24)

Additional Declarations, which affirm the principleof
refraining from threat or use of force include: Essentials of
Peace,(25) Declaration on the Strengtheningof International
Security,(26)Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Interventionand Interference in the Interna1 Affairs of
States,(27) and Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of
Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International
Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in
This Field.(28)

C. COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATIES

A number of collective securitytreaties confirm the symbolic
nature of threat or use of force..The North Atlantic Treaty
(the NATO Treatyl(29) requires State Parties "to refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force
in anymanner inconsistentwith the purposes of the United
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (the Warsaw Pact)(30)p ,
requires Contracting Parties"to refrain in their
international relationsfrom the threat or use of force."

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe(31) requires States participatingto refrain from
the threat or use of force , repeating the languageof the
Charter. Moreover, "no considerationmay be invoked to serve
to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in
contravetionof this principle" and "no such threat or use of
force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes ...."

The American Treaty on Pacific Settlement(32) requires the
contracting parties to "...refrain from the threat or the use
of force, or from any other means of coercion for the
settlement of their controversies ..."

The Convention on the Rights and Duties of States(33) holds
that "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or
external affairs of another."

In addition,the Charter of the Organisation of American
States(34) provides:

No State or group of States has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other States. The fore-
going principle prohibits not only armed forces but also any
other form of interference or attempted threat against the
personality of the State or against its political, economic
and cultural elements.

D. THE NUREMBERG PRINCIPLES

Tinternational law recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and the judgement of the Tribunal."(35) The
principles "bave since been universally considered to
constitute an authoritative statement of the rules of
customary international law."(36) The Nuremberg offences
"correspond largely to the obligations imposed by certain
rules of jus cogens".(37)

The principles as codified by the International Law
Commission(38) define crimes against peace as:

(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances.

(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).

A crime against peace is "a culpable violation of the jus ad
bellum" .(39)

Planning and preparing for aggression are thus clearly
proscribed. In addition, the Nuremberg principles support the
crimes againstf humanity.anA war involving such crimes would bea "war in violation of internationaltreaties, agreements or
assurances".

E. OPINIO JURIS

The United Nations Charter and the treaties and resolutions
cited above do not distinguish between.the..legal.statusof
the threat to use force and that of the use of force itself.
Both are equally prohibited. Indeed, "if the promise is to
resort to force in conditions in which no justification for
the use of force exists, the threat itsef is illega1."(40)

The significance of the prohibition on threats of force
becomes apparent when one considers the implications for
previously accepted legal norms. Oppenheim'sdiscussion of '
threats of force in relation to the obligation to issue an
ultimatum before resorting to war suggests that the
prohibition on the threat of force overrides previously
accepted and codified legal standards :

In so far as the Charter of the United Nations prohibits not
only acts of force but also threats of force, the question
arises as to the operation, as between the Members of the
United Nations, of the provisions of the Hague Convention in
the matter of ultimatum and, to some extent, of declaration
of war. If it is unlawful for Members of the United Nations
to threaten another State with the use of force, how can they
properly be in a position to comply with the obligation to
issue an ultimatum prior to resorting to war? The correct
answer is probably that, as between Members of the United
Nations, these provisions of the Hague Convention, although
not directly conflicting withthe Charter, are substantially
obsolete.(41)

The prohibition of the threat of force applies even where the
threatis not carried out. As Professor Oscar Schachter
notes :
The preponderanceof military strength in some states and
their political relations with potential targetstates may
justifiably lead to an inference of a threat of force against
the political independence of the target state ....and the
applicabilityof Article 2(4) in principle can hardly be
denied.(42)

However, even though relative military strength and political
relations can create situations of threat,"curiously Article
2(4) has not been invoked much as an explicit prohibition of
such implied threats."(43) According to Schachter, this may
be due to the "difficulty of demonstratingcoercive intent" or to the widespread, though not unlimited, tolerance for
disparities of power.(44)

An alternative explanation for the underuse of the
prohibition on threat in Article 2(4) is the difficulty of
invoking it effectively. Since the authority to do so lies
with the Security Council. the failure of the non-permanent
members to exercise that authority does not so much indicate
their tolerance of implied or actual threats by the permanent
members (who are also the declared nuclear weapon States) but
rather their recognition of the realities of power
disparities and the veto power of the permanent members.

International legal scholars differ somewhat in their
analyses of what constitutes a threat of force and what the,
role of threats is in international law. According to Ian
Brownlie, a threat "consists in an express or implied promise
by a government of a resort to force conditional on non-
acceptance of certain demands of that government."(45) Romana
Sadurska regards a threat in the international arena as "a
message, explicit or implicit, formulated by a decision-maker
and directed to the target audience, indicating that force
will be used if a rule or demand is not complied with."(46)
Both experts suggest that use of force is conditional on the
target's response to the threat and that the threat might be
"implicit" or "implied", as well as "explicit" or "express".

In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case(47), a dissenting opinion
by Judge Padilla Nervo examines the nature of threats:

A big power can use force and pressure against a small nation
in many ways, even by the very fact of diplomatically
insisting in having its views recognised and accepted. The
Royal Navy did not need to use armed force, its mere presence
on the seas inside the fishery limits of the coastal State
could be enough pressure. It is well known by proferssors.
jurists and diplomats acquainted with international
by the government of a strong power to the goverment of aered
small nation, may have the same purpose and the same effect
as the threat or use of force.(48)

F. THREATS OF AGGRESSION

A threat of force alone does not constitute an "act of
aggression."under the UN "Definition of Aggression"
Resolution.(49) In fact, the Definition suggests that not al1
uses of force constitutes acts of aggression, noting in the
Preamble that "aggression is the most serious and dangerous
form of the illegal use of force."(50)The InternationalLaw Commission incorporated the General
Assembly's definition of aggression in the Draft Code of
Crimes Against PeaCe and Security of Mankind.(51)
Significantly.the Draft Code includes a separate article for
the crime of the Threat of Aggression:(52)

1. An individualwho, as leader or organiser, commits or
orders the commission of a threat of aggression shall, on
conviction thereof, be sentenced .....

2. Threat of aggression consists of declarations,
communications.demonstrations of force or any other
measures which would give good reason to the Government of
a State to believe that aggression is being seriously
contemplated against that State.

the GeneraltAssembly notes that in the context of thisde to
article, "the word 'threat' denotes acts undertaken with a
view to making a State believe that force will be used
against it if certain demands are not met by that State."(53)

The Commission was careful to link the acts of an individual,
who commits a crime against peace and security, with the
State. Only individuals "vested with the authority of the
State" have thepotential to commit this offence.(54)
However. the State is not exempted from responsibility for
the crime. Thus, although the Draft Code places the liability
directly on the individual,(55) it also provides that:

Prosecution of an individual for a crime againstthe peace
and security of mankind does not relieve a State of any
responsibility under international law for an act or
oumission attributable to it.(56)

The Commission also noted the importance of defining a crime
of threat of aggression, particularly since powerful States
have the potential to achieve improper objectiveswithout
committing an actual act of aggression.(57) Indeed, the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly, in its review of the
Commission Report, noted that "there had been many cases of
States that had lost their independence through threats and
ultimatums."(58)The record went on to note:
Contemporary internationallaw prohibited not only the use of
force, but also the threat of use of force, and thus its
inclusion in the code would affirm the position of the
international community in that regard.(59)

The Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind reflectsthe recent development of the concept of crimes against peace.

III. SPECIFIC LAW REGARDING TKE THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS

The Charter of the United Nations was adopted in San
Francisco on 26 June 1945, .sixweeksbefore the first use of
the atom bomb on 6 August 1945.(60) Had this time sequence
been reversed, the Charter might well have contained a
specific prohibition on the threat and use of nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction.

The concern of the world community with the awesome,
destructive power of the atom bomb was evidenced by the fact
that the first resolution adopted by the United Nations
dealt with the subject of atomic energy and called, inter
alia, "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic
weapons and al1 other weapons adaptable to mass
destruction..."(61)

A. TREATIES

The preamble of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons(62) calls for "the cessation of the
manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of al1 their
existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national
arsenals of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery ..."
Specifically, the Treaty prohibits the manufacture or
acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon
states,(63) and it requires nuclear weapon States to "pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
nuclear disarmament."(64) The threat of use of nucleard to
weapons is inconsistent with the general purpose and goal of
the Treaty as well as the specific requirernentsof State
parties.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty prohibits the
manufacture, acquisition, possession or control of nuclear
weapons.(65) The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America prohibits the testing, use.
manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons. directly or
indirectly, by parties to the treaty or within the region
defined by the treaty. (66)

The pattern in international law regarding weapons of mass
destruction is to prohibit not only the use but also the
manufacture and acquisition of these weapons. The treaties
discussed above seek to eliminate both the use and the threatto use nuclear weapons, but in no instance do they prohibit
the use of nuclear weapons.Similarly, treaties on other
weapons of mass destruction, namely biological weapons(67)
and chemical weapons(68), also link threat and use. The
illegality of the threat to use these weapons is.underscored
by provisions calling for their destruction.(69)

B. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

Resolution 984 (11 April 1995) gives non-nuclear states
assurances from the nuclear states that nuclear weapons will
not be threatened or used against them. Al1 of the declared
nuclear weapon states supported this resolution.

Resolution 225 of the Security Council provides that
aggression or the threat of aggression with nuclear weapons
against a non-nuclear weapon state uould require the Security
Council to act immediately.(70)

Resolutions 984 and 225 therefore implicitly recognise the
illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons against a
non-nuclear weapon state. A legal act would not require
assurances againstuse nor require a Security Council
response. (71)

C. UNITED NATIONSGENERAL ASSEMBLY, CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAbENT, AND DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

As discussed above, the framers of the UN Charter could not
be aware of the threat of nuclear weapons, but the first
United Nationsresolution addressed the eliminationof these
weapons .(72)

reaffirms the prohibition on the threat or use of force and,
in this context, calls on the Disarmament Commission to
develop comprehensiveplans providing for the "elimination
and prohibition of al1 major weapons ...adaptable to mass
destructionn(74)and, specifically, the "effective
international controlof atomic energy to ensure the
prohibition of atomic weapons ...."( 75)

The issue of assurances for non-nuclear weapon states against
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has received
overwhelming support from the international community. THe
General Assembly has passed numerous resolutions affirming
the urgency of reaching an early agreement on effective
international measuresto assure non-nuclearweapon states
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.(76) Significantly,no state has opposed the conclusion of these
assurances.

The conclusion of effectiveinternationalarrangementsto
assure non-nuclear weaponstates against the use or threat of
use of nuclear weaponshas been a key agenda item of the UN
Conference on Disarmament, and the Ad Hoc Committee
established to review this item has consistentlybeen re-
established at the start of each annual session. Most
recently, the Committee's report, adoptea by the Conference
on Disarmament,noted as follows:

Al1 delegationsreiterated that they attach particular
importance to the question of internationalarrangements to
assure non-nuclear weapon states against theuse or threat of
use of nuclear weaponsand expressed their readiness to
engage in a search for a mutually acceptable solution of the
issue.(77)

In addition, the Report of the Conference "stressedthe
necessity to recognisethe right of non-nuclearweapon states
not to be attacked nor threatened with these weapons. "(78)
It is significantthat, in referring to this right, the
Report called for its recognition rather than its creation.

The complete eliminationof nuclear weapons has been a
constant and recurringobjective of the Disarmament
Commission and the Conference on Disarmament.(79)

In addition, the General Assembly has passed over 100
resolutions stating nuclear disarmament orthe elimination of
nuclear weapons as a goal.(80) Thus, the majority of states
do not accept the necessity argumentfor deterrence. A
growing number of states have specificallyprohibited nuclear
weapons in their territory and have established,or are in
the process of establishing,nuclear weapon-free zones.

D. THE NON-DEROGABLE RIGHTTO LIFE

The United Nations Human Rights Committee,which supervises
the implementationof the InternationalCovenant on Civil and
Political Rights(81). has determined that nuclear weapons
threaten the non-derogableright to life:

The designing, testing, manufacture, possessionand
deployment of nuclear weaponsare among the greatest threats
to the right to life which confront mankind today. THe threat
is compounded by the danger that the actual use of nuclear
weapons may be brought about, not only in the event of a war,
but even through human or mechanical error or failure.Furthermore, the very existence and gravity of this threat
generates a climate of fear and suspicionbetween states,
which undermines the promotion of universal respectfor and
observanceof human rights and fundamental freedoms in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
International Covenantof Human Rights.(82)

In other words, nuclear weapons boththreaten the right to
life and contribute to the spirit of mistrust among nations,
compounding the likelihood of threats being carried out..
Moreover, the threat to use nuclear weapons conflicts with
the commitment to provide children and families with the
protection of society and the state(83,84)

The right to life is confirmed as well in the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (85). and the American Convention on Human
Rights(86). Under these Conventions, a derogation clausemay
be invoked in exceptional situations that threaten the life
of the nation. However, the right to life is one of the four
non-derogable rights which constitute the "irreducible core"
of human rights(87). A non-derogable right is one that cannot
be suspended by the State, even in times of public emergency.

Moreover, according to Judge Schwebel of the International
Court of 3ustice, matters affecting internationalhuman
rights obligations cannotbe regarded as exclusively within
the domestic jurisdiction of a particular state:

Once a state has undertaken obligations toward another state,
or toward the internationalcommunity, in a specified sphere
of human rights, it may no longer maintain, vis-a-vis the
other state or the international community, that matters in
that sphere are exclusively or essentially within its
domestic jurisdictionand outside the range of international
concern. (88)

Therefore, the manufacture, possession, deployment and threat
of use of nuclear weapons, which violate the right to life,
cannot be defended by nuclear weapon states on grounds that
they are essential for defence in times of public emergency
or as matters of domestic jurisdiction.

IV. THE THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS PROHIBITD IN
ANY CIRCUMSTANCE

A. CORRELATION BETWEENTHREAT AND USE OF FORCE:
THREAT IS USE

For purposes of the followinganalysis, it will be useful to examine briefly the meanings of the terms "threat" and
"force", both generically and within the context of the legal
instruments relevant to this discussion.

The common meaning of "force" is "strength, energy, power".
The normal meaning of "the use of force", within the context
of'Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, is the application of
physical force of a military nature by one member state
against another, as in the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.

Upon closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that
tanks and missiles. Articlea t2(4)-forbids the use of force not
only against the territorial integrity of a State, but also
against its political independence, or "in any other manner .
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." If
Article 2(4) had been aimed only at cross-border military
action, it would not have been necessary to add this further
clause.

What kind of force, then, other than military force in
action, can be used by one state against the political
independence of another, without affecting its territorial
integrity? Non-military force, to be sure, as for instance
the erection of tariff barriers or other economic measures,
but also the open or veiled promise of the use of force,
including armed force, if certain demands are not met. This
interpretation is consistent with the definitions of "force"
as "power to influence, affect or control", "persuasive
power, power to convinceW.(89)

"Threat", on the other hand, is defined as "a declaration of
an intention or determination to inflict punishment. injury,
death, or loss on some one in retaliation for, or
conditionally upon, some action or course ...".(90)

Even more relevant, for present purposes, is the definition
of "threat" in Black's Law Dictionary: "In criminal law ...any
menace of such a nature as to unsettle the mind of the person
on whom it operates, and to take away from his acts that free
and voluntary action which alone constitutes consent."

THe United Nations Secretary General, in considering what
constitutes a threat to use force, noted that "the person who
utters the threat may not intend to carry it out, and the
blackmail."(91) only a form of intimidation and

As one philosopher has noted:

Nuclear weapons are being used today and can be expected tobe used in the future. Not that they are being detonated. ..
but that it is not a requirement of their being used. A man
uses a gun when he sticks it in your ribs and demands your
money. He does not need to fire the gun. And a country uses
nuclear weapons when it makes known that it may launch them
unless certain conditionsare met, as the United States did
against the Soviet Union in the Cuban Missile Crisis, against
China during the Korean War, and against North Vietnam during
the Vietnam War. And the very threat of retaliationthat is
at the heart of nuclear deterrence is a use of nuclear
weapons, even if it is not the actual exploding of
them.(92)
Thus, the concepts of "threat" and "use" in Article 2(4)
merge into each other in most circumstances.The threat of
use is itself a kind of use.

B. THE CONDITIONAL THREAT OF FORCE IS PROHIBITED
IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCE

As has been shown above in Section II, the prohibition on the
threat of force for the purpose of altering another state's
political independence runs like a mantra throughthe entire
post-World War II laws and treaties of peace and security.
Whatever the form of these conditional threats,it is clear
that they are unequivocallyoutlawed by the United Nations
Charter, many other international instrumentsand, indeed,
the customary law of peace and security.

This being so, and considering that nuclear weapons represent
the greatest conceivable instrumentof threat availableto.
any nation, the conditional threat to use nuclear weapons is,
a fortiori, a gross violation of the law of peace and
security .

C. A RETALIATORY THREAT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS ILLEGAL
IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCE

Although no person or state may be deprived of the right to
unlimited. In exercising this right, nothiperson or state may
commit or threaten to commit a crime or illegal act.Hence,
if, as has already been argued, the use of nuclear weapons is
illegal in any circunstance,even by way of self-defenceor
reprisal, the use or threat to use nuclear weaponsmust also
be illegal in any circwnstance.(93) Although this general proposition is dispositive of the
question of the legality of retaliatory threats of nuclear
weapons, it may be useful to examine somewhat more closely
the forms which such threats may take.

1. THE THREAT OF FIRST USE

A threat of first use could include a threatened preemptive
nuclear strike against a perceived nuclear or conventional
attack or a threatened nuclear response to an actual
conventional attack. Moreover, a threat of firstuse could be
directed against developments falling short of the perception
of an immediate attack. The essence of the current doctrine
of "counter-proliferation"is that the nuclear weapon states
reserve to thenselves the right to use nuclear weapons to
discourage "rogue states" from developing, not necessarily
using, weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical
biological or other. Of the declared nuclear powers, only
China has an officia1 no-first-use policy.(94) The United
States and the United KIngdom have repeatedly used threats of
first use of nuclear weapons against both nuclear and non-
nuclear weapon states.(95)

A threat of first use of nuclear weapons is a direct
violation of jus ad bellum. The prohibition on the threat of
force under the United Nations Charter covers threats of both
conventional and nuclear weapons. The threat of first use is
inherently a threat against the political independence and
territorial integrity of another state. This is true not only
when the threat is imminent and aimed at exacting specific
changes but also, because of the unique nature of the
weapons, when it is a longstanding posture not directly
linked to specific demands. Any state, in actual or potential
conflict with a nuclear state that has a first-use policy,
recognises that the nuclear state has the weapons and the
the nuclear state. This inevitably influences thecesdecision-
making of that state.

Furthermore, as a tool of unequalled intimidationand
destruction, the first use of nuclear weapons can never
satisfy the principle of proportionality, one of the
foundations of the laws of war. since the magnitude of the
event to which a preemptive strike is being made is
necessarily a matter of speculation.2. THE THREAT OF SECOND USE
The second use of nuclear weapons and therefore the threat of
such use are not permitted under the law of reprisals, in
which reprisals " must conform in al1 cases to the laws of
humanity and moralityN.(96) "civilian populations ...should
not be the object of .reprisals..."(97)Attacks against the
civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are
prohibitedn.(98)

It is comon ground that the laws of war apply equally to al1
weapons and tactics, including those of self-defence.(99)THe
use of genocide, tortureor terrorist attacks by one state
against another does not justify the use of genocide, torture
or terrorist attacks in response. Hence, self-defence cannot
justify the threat of use of nuclear weapons in self-defence.

3. DETERRENCE

The following statements appearin the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff's 'Doctrinefor Joint Nuclear Operations',published on
29 April 1993:

"The fundamental purpose of US nuclear forces is to deter the
usè of weapons of mass destruction, particularl y nuclear
overwhelming conventional threat."gainst the emergenceof an

"Deterrence is faunded in real force capabilities and the
national determinationto use those forces if necessary."

"Deterrence is a defence posture that makes possiblewar
outcomes so uncertain and dangerous, as calculated by
potential enemies, as to remove al1 incentive for initiating
attack under any circumstance."

"US forces and command and contra1 systems must be viewed by
enemy leadershipas capable of inflicting such damage upon
their military forcesand means of support, or upon their
country, as to deny them the military option."

Thus, the doctrine of deterrence implies a readiness and
willingness:

- to use nuclear weapons;
- to inflict great damage on the enemy:
- if necessary, to inflict such damage on the enemy's
support. not simply his militaryforces and means of It is of the utmost importance to understand that the
doctrine of deterrence cannot be seen as a purely defensive
doctrine. As one analyst has noted:

needed to deliver them cannot be explained, if one insists on
defining deterrence in an essentially defensive and reactive
form. Instead, the modem concept of deterrence has evolved
into something much closer to the traditional understanding
of the role of military force in the pursuit of national
objectives. Deterrence is now seen as "flexible" or
"extended", and a "second-strike counterforce" capability is
defended as part of a deterrent on the grounds that a
credible (i.2. non-suicidal) response must be available if
deterrence fails.(100)

Another analyst makes thefollowing comment:

The theory of nuclear deterrence, far from being one of the
great advances of our time....is so little understood in its
conceptual foundations and so thoroughly confused in its
implementation as to be practically useless from the
standpoint of the rational, not to mention moral, guidance of
policy. It may, in fact, ultimately prove disastrous.(lOl)

A recent United States Congressional study on the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction discussed the
"potentially conflicting objectives" of nuclear non-
proliferation and the nuclear powers' reliance on nuclear
deterrence.(l02) The study admits that "one way to reduce the
appeal of nuclear weapons is to deemphasise the role that
they play in international relations. But to do so would mean
that the nuclear powers must rely on them less, weakening the
credibility and utility of US nuclear deterrent
threats.."(l03).

V. THE ILLEGALITY OF THE THREAT TO COMMIT AN ILLEGAL ACT

International legal instruments, opinio juris and the general
principles of law have recognised the principle thatthe
threat to commit an illegal act is also illegal.

A. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

We have already seen that treaties on weapons of mass
destruction prohibit possession, manufacture and use of these
CrimessAgainst Peace the "planning" and "preparation" of war
and the "initiation" or "waging of war" .(l05) In addition, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide(l06) renders punishable not only
genocide, but also conspiracy to commit genocide,direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit
genocide, and complicity in genocide, al1 of which might be
perceived as the threat of genocide by the human targets of
nuclear weapons.

CONCLUSION

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to
the Treaty on Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons has ended
with two results which are significant for the consideration
Of the question before the Court:

1. The nuclear arsenals of both declared and undeclared
nuclear weapon states remain intact, at a level variously
estimated at 41,000 to 45,000 warheads.(l07)

2. There is no unambiguous, binding commitment by the
declared nuclear weapon states, much less the undeclared
ones, to the ultimate abolition of ail nuclear weapons,
even in the distant future.

Thus, the subjectivethreat of use of nuclear weapons remains
as an objective threat to the survival of ail or part of the
world's present population and of generations to come. If
this threat were regarded as an epidemic of potentially
incalculable proportions,like polio or small pox in bygone
days and AIDS in the present, there would be no hestitation
to mobilise al1 the medical and scientific resources of
humanity to combat it. The only weapons available to combat
the potential of a nuclear epidemic are common sense, Our
common code of morality, and the rule of law.

In the light of the arguments presented here and in the other
Statements filed with the Court in support of both the World
Health Organisation and UN General Assembly Advisory Opinion
cases, this Court is respectfully requested to advise that
the threat and use of nuclear weapons are not permitted under
international law in any circumstance. REFERENCES

United Nations Charter, Art 2, para 4.

According to the International Law Commission, "the
great majority of international lawyers today
unhesitatingly holds that Article 2(4) together with
other provisions of the UN Charter, authoritatively
declares the moderncustomary law regarding the threat
or use of force." ILC Yearbook, 1966, vol. 2, p.247. The
International Court of Justice affirmed this position in
Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs United States), Merits, 1986 ICJ
Rep. 14, 98-101 (Judgement of June 27). In addition, the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law includes
"the principles of the United Nations Charter
prohibiting the use of force" among peremptory norms.

UN Charter art. 2, para 6 provides: The Organisation
shall ensure that states which are not Members of the
United ~ations'act in accordance with these Principles
so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.

UN Charter art. 51. The Security Council, acting within
the interests of collective security, has the authority
to determine "the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression", UN Charter,
art. 39. The Security Council is further authorised to
determine and employ enforcement measures under Article
41 (not involving the use of armed force) and Article 42
(action involving the use of armed force).

League of Nations Covenant, art. 12, para 1, states: The
Members of the League agree that if there should arise
between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture,
they will submit the matter either to arbitration or
judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Counci1,and
they agree in no case to resort to war until three
months after the award by the arbitrators or the
judicial decision or the report by the Council.

46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 2 Bevans 732, 99 L.N.T.S.57

N. Bentwich and A Martin, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 13 (1950)
League of Nations Covenant, art. 11, para. 1.

J. ~eegan, A HISTORY OF WARFARE 383 (1993) ; G Herczegh,
The Prohibition of the Threat and Use of Force in
Contemporary International Law, in QUESTIONS OF INTER- NATIONAL LAW 70 (1964).

UN Charter, art. 2, para. 3, provides: Al1 Members shall
settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a mannes that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered.

H. Corell, Opening Statement, United Nations Congress on
Public InternationalLaw, New York, 13-17 March, 1995.

Memorandum for the President, Dec. 29, 1943, in US Dept
of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945,
Publication 3580 (February 195), Appendix 33, pp.376-
81 (reproducedin R Russel, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER, App. F(1958))

Id.

E Luard, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Vol. 1, 27
(1982). See also L. Goodrich & E. Hambro, CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 6 (2nd ed.1949)
Doc. 1 (English)G/1. UNCIO Documents, Vol.111, p.3.

Doc. 2 (English)G/14(1), May 5, 1945. UNCIO Documents,
Vol.111 , p. 543.

G.A. Res. 2625 (XXXV 1970)

Id., para. 1

G.A. Res. 2131 (XX) (1965)

G.A. Res. 42/22 (XLII),para.2.

Id. para.7

Id. para. 10

Id. para. 11.

First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarm-
ament 1978, Final Document, para. 26.

G.A. Res. 290 (IV). Paragraph 3 calls upon every nation
"to refrain from any threats or acts, direct or
indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence
or integrityof any State.. ."
G.A. Res. 2734 (XXV). Paragraph 5 provides that the
General Assembly: Solemnly reaffirms that every State
has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity and political
independence of any other State...and that every State Session, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp.(No.lO) at 246, (1976) 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n (Pt. 2) at 104.

Report of the International Law Commission, 2ndSession,
5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) 11, U.N. Doc.A/1316(1950),2Y.
2Y.B. Int'l L-Comm'n 374, U.N.Doc.A/Cn.4/SERA/1950/Add.l
H-McCoubrey and N-White, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT 334 (1992).

Brownlie, INTERNATIONAL LAW AM) THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES (1963), p.364 (citing L.Oppenheim,INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A TREATISE, Vol. II, 7th Ed (Ed.H. Lauterpacht,
1952); U.K. MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, part iii (1958),
para. Il).

L.Oppenheim, INTERNATIONALLAW: A TREATISE, Vol. II, 297
(7th ed., H-Lauterpacht,ed. 1952).

O.Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1625 (1984).

Id.

Id. Schachter notes further that: A blatant and direct
threat of force, used to compel another state to yield
territory or make substantialpolitical concessions (not
required by law), would have to be seen as illegal under
Article 2(4) if the words "threat of force" are to have
any meaning.
Brownlie, supra note 40, at 364.

R-Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
239,242 (1988). Sadurska argues that threats "may not be
detrimental, indeed may even be beneficial, to the
preservation of international order" but admits that
"this is a precarious game" and that "anenvironment in
which threats of force are regularly used is likely to
be very unstable." Id., at 239-240,247,250,n.54.

United Kingdom v. Iceland, 1973 ICJ Rep. 3 (Judgementof
2 February ).

Id. at 47

G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX 1974). Article 1 of the Definition
States that: Aggression is the use of armed force by a
State against the sovereignty, territorial integrityor
political independenceof another State, or in any other
manner inconsistentwith the Charter of the United
Nations ... has the duty to refrain from organising, instigating,
assisting or participatingin acts of civil strife or
terrorist acts in another State.

G.A. Res. 36/103. Paragraph 2 provides that: "The
principle of non-intervention and non-interference in
the interna1 and external affairs of States comprehends
the following rights and duties ...including, under II(a)
the duty of States to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force in any form
whatsoever ... to disrupt the political, social or
economic order of other States ..."

G.A. Res. 43/51, Preamble:
Reaffirming the Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law ConcerningFriendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations ...and the Declaration on the

Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of
Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in
InternationalRelations,

Recalling that it is the duty of States to refrain in
their internationalrelations from military, political,
economic or any other form of coercion against the
political independence or territorial integrity of any
State.. .

63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 4 Bevans. 828, 34
V.A.T.S. 243 (1949) art.1.

219 U.N.T.S. 3 (1955) art.1.

14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975). also known as "the Helsinki Final
Act", Section II, Refraining from the Threat or Use of
Force.

Also known as the "Treaty of Bogota", 30 U.N.T.S. 55
(1948) Chapter 1, Art.1.

Also known as the "Treaty of Montevideo", 49 Stat.3097,
T.S.No.881, Bevans 145, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (1933) art. 8.

2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (1948)
art. 15.

G.A. Res. 95(1), 188 U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.l (1946).

F.Boyle, The Relevance of InternationalLaw to the
"Paradox"of Nuclea- --terr~nce. --, -. N-.. U.L. Rev.1407~ ,
1416 (1986) (citing 1-Brownlie, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 154-213 (1963).

Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, 28th 68 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on Their Destruction, opened for signature in
Paris on 13 January 1993. A United Nations Treaty
Series registration number will be assigned once it
enters into force. Article 1.1 provides: "Each State
Party to this Convention undertakes never under any
circumstances (a) to develop, produce, otherwise
acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons ...
(b) to use chemical weapons ...."

Article II of the Biological Weapons Convention and
Article 1.2 of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

S.C. Res. 255 (1968). The relevant text reads as
follows: The Security Council ...recognises that
aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such
aggression against a non-nuclear weapon State would
create a situation in which the Security Council, and
above al1 its nuclear weapon State permanent members,
would have to act immediately in accordance with their
obligations under the United Nations Charter.

Supra note 5.

See supra notes 60 - 61 and accompanying text

G.A. Res. 704 (VII) (1953)

Id. para. 2(a)

Id. para. 2(c).
E.g. G.A. Resolutions 49/73 (1991), 48/73 (1993),
47/50 (1992). 46/32 (1991), 45/54 (1990), 44/111
(1989). 43/69 (19881, 42/32 (1987), 41/52 (1986),
40/86 (1985), 39/58, 38/68 et al. Al1 these
resolutions bear the name "Conclusion of effective
international arrangementsto assure non-nuclear
weapon States against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons ."
77 Report of the Conference on Disarmament, 49 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No.27) (Agenda Item 33) at 130-131, U.N. Doc.
A/49/27 (1994).

78 Id.

79 E.g. Report of the Disarmament Commission, 49 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 42) (Agenda Item 4) at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/49/42; Report of the Disarmament Commission, 48 U.N.
GAOR Supp.(No.42) (Agenda Item 4) at 4 U.N. Doc.
A/48/42; Report of the Conference on Disarmament,
supra note 39, (Agenda Item 2) at 1: Report of the
Conference on Disarmament, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.27)Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, Report of the Commission of the General
Assembly on the work of its 43rd session, 1991 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n vol II, part 2, art. 15, U.N. Doc.
A/CN/4/SER.A/l99i/Addd1(part 2).

Id. art. 16.

1989 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, vol. 2, part 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1989/Addd(part 2), p. 68.

1989 Y.B. Int'l L.Comm'n.vo1. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1989, p. 296.

Article 3, Responsibility and Punishment.

Article 5.

1989 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, vol. 1, supra note 51, at
294, para. 11 (statement of Mr Beesley).

U.N. GAOR Sixth Committee (31st mtg.) at 15, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/44/SR.31/ (1989) (statement of Mr Gondra).

Id.

Herczegh, supra note 9, at 88.

G.A. Res. 0101, Establishment of a Commissionto Deal
with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic
Energy, adopted unanimously, para. 5(c) (1946).

21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 7
I.L.M. 811 (1968).

Id. art. II.

Id. art. VI.
Also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga. 24 I.L.M. 1440,
(19851, art.3.

Also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 22 U.S.T. 762,
T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 6 I.L.M. 521 (1967). art.1.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Developrnent,
Production. and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological)and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, U.N. Res. 2826 (XXVI 19721, 26 U.S.T.583
T.I.A.S. No. 8062, 11 I.L.M. 309 (1972). Article 1
provides: "Each State Party to this Convention
undertakes never in any circumstances to develop,
produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain"
biological weapons. (Agenda Item 2) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/47/27.

See Appendix A.

999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). Entered into
force on March 23, 1976. Article 6, para. 1 reads:
"Every human being has the inherent right to life. This
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprivedof his life."

Report of the Human Rights.Committee,General Comment
14(23) on Article 6 of the Covenant, 2 November 1984:
U.N. GAOR (40th Session) Supp. (No. 40). Annex VI, 162,
U.N. Doc. A/40/40.

ICCPR, art.24.

ICCPR, art.23.

213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 (1950), art. 2.

O.A.S. Officia1 Records OEA/SER. K/XVI/1.1 Doc. 65,
Rev. 1, Corr.1, 9 ILM 101 (1970). 65 A.J.I.L. 679
(1971), art. 4.

J.Oraa, HUMANRIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN
INTERNATIONALLAW 96 (1992).

J.TRANSNAT'L L.945 (1991). the World Court, 24 VAND.

Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Third
Unabridged Edition.

Id.

Secretary General ofthe United Nations, Report on the
Question of Defining Aggression,U.N. Doc. A/2211 at 51
(Oct. 3, 1952) para. 368. (Reprinted in Henkin, Pugh et
al., INTERNATIONALLAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 894-896
(Third ed., 1993).

R.L.Holmes, ON WAR AND MORALITY 8 (1989).

Brownlie, supra note 40; Oppenheim, supra note 41.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY Appendix 1,
U.N. Sales No. E.91.IX.10 (1990).

Daniel Ellsberg, Cal1 to Mutiny in THE DEADLY
CONNECTION: NUCLEARWAR AND US INTERVENTION, American
Friends ServicesCommittee, 1983.Art. 86, Manual Published by the Institute of
International Law (Oxford Manual), 1880.
Schindler and Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflict,
p.48.

Par. 7, G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), 1970, Basic Principles for
the Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed
Conflicts, adopted by 109 votes to none, with 18 States
abstaining or absent.

Art. 51(6), Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva
Conventions.1977.The Protocol also prohibits reprisals
against civilian objects (Art. 52[l]), cultural objects
to the survival of the civilian population (Art.spe54[4[),
the natural environment (Art.55[2]) and works and
installations containingdangerous forces, namely
dams, dykes, and nuclear generating stations
(Art.56[4] ).

"Whatever may be the cause of a war that has broken out,
and whether or no the cause may be a so-called just
cause, the same rules of international law are valid as
to what must not be done, may be done, and must be done
by the belligerentsthemselves in making war against
each other." U.S. v. Wilhelm List et al. (Hostage
Case), 11 Trials of War Criminals 1247 (1950). The
quoted statement was made by international lawyer
L. Oppenheim and adopted by the tribunal.

A-Krass, Deterrence and Its Contradictions, in TOWARD
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND GLOBAL SECURITY 219 (B.Weston,
ed., 1984).

Holmes. supra note 92, at 259

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing
the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government PrintingOffice, August 1993) pp. 25-29.

Id. at 28.

Supra Section 1II.A.

Supra Section 1I.D.

78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948)

The Center for Defense ~nformation,Nuclear Weapon
Facts, 1995. If the Treaty on the Reduction and
Limitation of StrategicOffensive Arms II (START II) is
fully carried out, the estimated number of warheads in
the year 2003 would be 20,000 to 22,000. APPENDIX A

RESOLUTIONS STATING NUCLEAR DISAWA!!ENT OR

THE ELIKINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AS A GOAL
(Listed in chronological order)

Establishment of a commission to deal with the ~roblems raised by
the discoverv of atomic enersy, G.A. Res. 1, l(1) U.N. GAOR at 9,
U.N. Doc. A/64 (1946) tunanimous[.

Princiules sovernins the seneral resulation and' reduction of
Arnaments, G.A. Res. 41, l(2) U.N. GAOR at 65, U.N. Doc A/64/Add.l
(1946) junanimousl.

Reuorts of the Atomic Enersv Commission, C.A. Res. 191, 3(1) U.N.

GAOR at 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) -40 in favor - 6 OP DOS^^ - 4
abstention).

Prohibition of the atomic weapon and reduction bv one-third of the
armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security
Council, G.A. Res. 192, 3(1) U.N. GAOR at 17, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) 1 1 .

Essentials of Deace, G.A. Res. 290, 4 U.N. GAOR at 13, U.N. Doc.
A/1251 (1949) min favor - 5 ou~osed - 1 abstentionL.

Peace throuah deeds, G.A. Res. 380, 5 U.N. GAOR at 13, U.N. Doc.
h/1775 (1950) (50 in favor - 5 ODDOS~~ - 1 abstention).

International control of atomic eneray, G.A. Res. 496, 5 U.N. GAOR

Supp. (o. 20) at 80, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950) 147 in favor - 5
o~~~seà - 3 abstentions).

Seculation. limitation and balanced reduction of al1 armed forces
2nd al1 armaments: international control of atomic eneroy, G.A.
Res. 5C2, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/Zi19 (1952)
142 in favor - 5 o~~osed - 7 abstentions).

Reoulation, limitation and balanced reduction of al1 armed forces
an6 a?: arnaments: re~ort of the Disarmame:~t Commission, G.A. Res.
704, 7 U.N. GAOS Supp.- - (No. 2OA) at 3. U.N. Doc. A/2361/Add. 1
(1953) 152 in favor - 5 O-DD~S~~ - 3 abstentionsr.

Reculation. 1 imitation and balanced reduction oi al1 armed forco
and al1 armanents: report of the Disarmament Commission, C.A. Res.
715, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953) [54

in favor - none ouuosed - 5 abstentionsl.

ileoulstion. knitation and halanced reduction of al1 armed forces
and al1 armsnien:s: reoort of the Disarmament Commission: Conclusion
Of an international convention itreatv) on the redustion of
arr.ernents anra&'e urohibit ion of atomic, hvdrosen and orher weauons
of mas5 destruction, G.A. Res. 808, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at
119, C.N. Dg-z. A/2890 (1954) LunanimousL.Declaration on the ~rohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-
nuclear weaDons, G.A. Res. 1653, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 4,
U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961) 155 in favor - 20 ODDosed - 26

Non-~roliferation of nuclear weaDons, G.A. Res. 2028, 20 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 14) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) 193 in favor - none
ODDosed - 5 abstentionsl.

Question of convenina a conference for the DurDose of sianina a
convention on the Drohibition of the use of nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons, G.A. Res. 2164, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 12, U.N. Doc A/6316 (1966) (80 in favor - none ODDosed - 23
abstentionsl.

Conclusion of a convention on the Drohibition of the use of nuclear
weaDons, G.A. Res. 2289, 22(1) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 14, U.N.

Doc. A/6716 (1967) 177 in favor - none ODDOS~~ - 29 abstentidnsl.

puestion of aeneral and complete disarmament, G.A.-Res. 2342, 22 (1)
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967) 1113 in'
favor - none o~~osed - 1 abstentionl.

Treatv on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Wea~ons, G.A. Res. 2373,
22 (2) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16A) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/6716/Add. 1
(1968) (94 in favor - 4 ODDOS~~ - 21 abstentionsl.

Guestion of oeneral and coa~lete disamament, G.A. Res. 2454(B), 23
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 12, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968) (109 in
fevor - none ODDOS~~ - 4 abstentionsl.

Confere~ce of Fon-Nuclear-h'eawon States, C.A. Res. 2256 (A), 23 U.N.

GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 13, u.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968) (103 in favor -
7 ODDOS~~ - 5 abstentions).

Conference of Non-Nuclear-Wea~on States, G.A. Res. 2456(B), 23 U.N.
GAO3 Supp. (No. 18) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968) (98 in favor -
none ODDOS~~ - 16 abstentionsl.

Question of aeneral and comlete disarmamel>t, G.A. Res. 2602(E), 24
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969) (10.4 in
fsvor - ncne ODDoSed - 13 abstentionsl.

Declaration on the Strenathenina of International Securitv, G.A.
Res. 2734, 25 U.H. GAOR Supp. (No.
28) at 22, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1570) (120 in favor - 1 o~oosed - 1 abstentionl.

Econoxic and social cansecuences of the annaments race and its
extreinelv harxful effects on world peace and security, G.A. Res.
2831, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 35, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971)
(111 in favor - 1 o~~cst rl - 3 abstentions).

world Disarmament Cor '- .-, G.A. Res. 2833, 26 U.N. GAOR Eupp.
(No. 29) at 4, U..N. DL .. A/8429 (1971) fado~ted bv acclamationl. k'orldDisarmament Conference,C.A. Res. 2930, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 30) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972) J105 in favor - none
ou~osed - 1 abstentionl.

Non-use of force in international relations and Permanent
prohibition of the use of nuclear weaDons, G.A. Res. 2936, 27 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972) 173 in favor - 4
oouosed - 46 abstentionsl.
Declarationand establishmentof a nuclear-free zone inSouth Asia,
G.A. Res. 3265(A), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (Xo. 31) at 29, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974) (104 in favor - 1 ODDosed - 27 abstentionsl.

Declarationand establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia,
G.A. Res. 3265(B), 29 U;N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 30, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974) (96 in favor - 2 o~~osed - 36 abstentionsl.

Economic and social conseauence; of the armaments race and .its
extrenelv harnful effects on world peace and security, G.A. Res.
3462, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975)
(sdo~tedwithout a votel.

General and com~letedisarmament,G.A. Res. 31/189 C, 31 U.N. GAOR
Sfavor(-onone o~~osed. -133aabstentions).c. A/31/39 (1976) 195 in

Review ofthe im~le~entationof the reco~mendations and decisions
adocted bv the General Assenblv at its tenth suecial session,G.A.
Res. 33/71 B, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (NO. 45) at 48, U.N. DOC. A/33/45
(1976) 1103 in favor - 18 ODDOS~~ - 18 abstentionsl.

Ge?eral and com~letedisarmenent,G.A. Res. 32/87 G, 32 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (hjo. 45) at 55, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977) 1134 in favor - 2
oDDosed - no abstentions)-.

General and con~letedisarmament,G.A. Res. 33/91 C, 33 U.N. GAOR
OEDOS~~No- 10 abstentions).Doc. A/33/65 (1976) (127 in favor - 1

General and comu!ete disarnanent,G.A. Res. 33/91 H, 33 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 45) at 62, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1976) (108 in favor - 10
=sed - 16 abstentionsl.

Xeview of the in~lementationof the recomnendationsand decisions
adocted bv the General Assemblv atits tneth suecial session,G.A.
neS. 34/83 J, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (NO. 46) at 57, U.N. DOC. A/34/46
(1979) (120 in favor - 2 o~D0Sed - 19 abstentions).

Corclusion of an international convention to assure the non-
weauons, C.A. Res. 34/85, 34 U.II.GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 59, U.N.
DOC.A/34/46 (1979) 1120 in favor - none ODDOS~~ - 22abstentions).
G.A. Res. 35/152(D), 35 U.N. G-.7 Supp. (No.48) at 69, U.N. Doc.
A/?5/48 (1380) (112 in favor - -. oo~osed - 14 abstentionsL.Conclusion of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-
weaDon States aaainst the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,
C.A. Res. 35/155, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 74, U.N. Doc.
A/35/48 (1980) JI21 in favor - none ODDOS~~ - 24 abstentionsl.

Review of the imulementation of the recommendations and decisions
ado~ted bv the General Assemblv at its tenth suecial session
(NUCLCARWEAXNS INW ASFTCE) ,G.A. Res. 36/92 E, 36 U.N. GAOR SUpp.
(No.51) at 62, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981)JI18 in favor - 18 OPDosed
- 5 abstentions).

Review of the im~lementationof the recommendations and decisions
ado~ted bv the General Assemblv at its tenth s~ecial session (Na-
USEOF NUCLEARhXUWS Am PREVEKI?O OF NUCLEARWEAA3NS), G.A. Res. 36/92
1, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (NO. 51) at 64, U.N. DoC. A/36/51 (1981) (121
in favor - 19 OP DOS^^ - 6 abstentionsl.

Conclusion of effective internationalarranaements to assure non-
nuclear-wea~onStates aaainst the use or threat of use of nuclear
wea~ons, G.A. Res. 36/95, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 68, U.N.
Doc. A/36/51 (1981) J145 in favor - none o~uosed - 3 abstentionsl..

Review of the im~lementationof the reconnendations and decisions
adopted bv the General Assenblv at its tenth special session
(:TùCr-EX( kWS ALL ASECIS), G.A. Res. 37/78 C, 37 U.N. GAOR SUD.-
(h'o.51) at 60, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982)1118 in favor - 19 ODDOS~~
- 9 abstentionsl.

Review of the imulementation of the recommendations and decisions
a-sated bv the General Assenblv at its tenth s~ecial session
(?xmaIi?o?i OF ?HE ~VCLEAR hTm), C.A. Res. 37/78 E, 37 U.N.
GAO2 Supp. (No. 51) at 61, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982)181 in favor -
14 ODDOS~~ - 52 abstentions).
Review of the im~lementation of the recommendations and decisions
zàcoted bv the General Assembly at its tenth s~ecial'session
(I!PLnhTATIONOF 'IKE -TICXS AND DECLSIONÇOF IIHETPrM SPEZI?L
SESSION),G.A. Res. 37/78 F, 37 U.N. GAOR Çcpp. (No. 51) at 61, U.N.

Doc. A/37/51 (1982) (134 in favor - none o~posed - 12 abstentionsl.
F<e\,iiof zhe icaleinentation of t3e recîmmendations and decisions
zàcczeribv the General Asse~blv zt its zenth s~ecial session (NW-

L'SOF NUCW? WES AND %WON OF NüCLEARWAR) ,G .A. Res. 37/78 J,
37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 64, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982) (112 in
f2'dor- 19 ODDOS~~ - 15 abstentionsl.
Conclusion of effective internationalarranaements to assure non-
z'iclear-wes~on States aaainst the use or threat of use of nuclear
WeaDons, G.A. Res. 37/81, 37 U.N. GAOR Sap. (No. 51) at 66, U.N.
Doc. A/37/51 (1982) (144 in favor - none o~uosed - 3 abstentionsl.

General and cornulete oisarmament (Pm i:.it?ONOF IIHE DRIELDRiEXP, FR3DXiTON, SrCCXPILSN AGND USE OFRAûIOZDGICAL I*-W), G.A. Res. 37/99
C, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 77, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982)
faoooted without a vote) .

General and comolete disarmament (REMkl OF AND ?O 'ME
~ S N E SrUDY OF ?IiE puEsI?ON OF mm-m-FREE ZC89S m W I?S
ASPKE), G.A. Res. 37/99 F, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 79, U.N.
oc. A/37/51 (1982) 1141 in favor - 1 o~~osed - 2 abstentions).

Review and im~lementation of the Concludino Document of the Twelfth
S~ecial Session of the General Assemblv (FEEZE ON NUCLEAR hm),

G.A. Res. 37/100 A, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (NO. 51) at 82, U.N. DOC.
A/37/51 (1982) 1122 in fav0r - 16 oo~osed - 6 abstentions).

-.v-.w a~d irplenentation of the Concludina Document of the Welfth
Special Session of the General Assemblv (NUUEAR-ARIS FXEZ), G.A.
Res. 37/L00 B, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 83, U.N. Doc. ~/37/51
(1982) 1119 in favor - 17 ODDOS~~ - 5 abstentionsl.

Reviex and im~lementation of the Concludino Document of the Twelfth
S~ecial Session of the General Assembly (CWWfiTON ON 'IHE FKHIBTION

OF lïE USE OF NUCL69R kiS), G.A. Res. 37/100 C, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 51) at 83, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982) 1117 in favor - 17 oooosed
- 8 abstentionsl.

Conclusion of effective international arranoenents to assure non-
nuclear-wea~on States aaainst the use or threat of use of nuclear
XeaDons, G.A. Res. 38/68, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 59, U.N.
Doc. A/38/47 (1983) 1141 in favor - none o~~osed - 6 abstentionsr.

Xevieï and inolementation of the Concludinq Document at the Welfth
S~ecia? session of the General Assembly (mE ON NUCLUiR EVC+iS),

G.A. Res. 38/73 5, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 64, U.N. Doc.
A/3&/47 (1983) 1124 in favor - 15 ODPOS~~ - 7 zbstentionsl.

Revieï and im~lementation of the Concludina Document at the Twelfth
S3ecial Session of the General 'Assembly (rOMIENIION ON 'IHE PTalKIBII?ON
O? ?XE üÇE OF WCE4! iv-3PX.S) , G .A. Res. 38/73 G, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 47) at 67, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1983) (126 in favor - 17 oooosed
- 6 aSstentionsL.

Csnciennation of nuclear war, G.A. Res. 38/75, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(NO. 47) at 69, U.N. DOC. ~/38/47 (1983) (95 in favor - 19 ODDOS~~
- 30 ehstentionsl.

Revie;r of the im~lenentation of the reconmendations and decisions
adzoted bv the General Assernblv at ics tenth special session (NON-
VSE OF hucrcw WAWS L?iD?FE-ON OF PJUFSk? W), C.A. Res. ;8/183 B.
38 U.N. GAOR supp. (NO. 47) at 73, U.N. DOC. A/38/4, (1983) (110
in favor - 19 o~posed - 15 abstentionsl.peview of the imolementationof the recommendations and decisions
adooted by the General Assemblv at its tenth s~ecial session
(MI- WEAXS Dl W ASPEE), G.A. ReS. 38/183 D, 38 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 47) at 73, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1983) il08 in favor - 19
ODDOS~~ - 16 abstentions).

Review of the implementationof the recommendations and decisions
adoute3 b~ the Generzl Assenblv at its tenth saecial session
(LsPiBE?l!!!ONOF TiE V O N Ç Am DECISIONÇOF THE 'IIIIHSECïï
SESSION),G.A. Res. 38/183 M, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 79,
U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1983) 1133 in favor - 1 oooosed - 14
abstentions).

Review and imolementationof the concludina Document of the Twelfth
S~ecial Session of the General Assemblv (FREEZEON NüïCCARWEAFWS),
G.A. Res. 39/63 G, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 70, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984) (127 in favor - 11 opoosed - 11 abstentionsl..

Review and im~lementationof the Concludins Document of the Twelfth
Soecial Session of the General Assembly (CCNVENRMICN THEPSMHIBITION
OF ?HiUÇE OF NUCTUB WF), G.A. Res. 39/63 H, 39 U.N. GAOR S?ipp.
(No.51) at 70, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)JI28 in favor - 17 oooosed
- 5 abstentionsl.

Review of the im~lementationof the recommendations and decisions
adooted bv the General AssenSlv at its tenth s~ecial session
(hhJ~ k-m ïN AU ASTECIS), G.A. Res. 39/148 C, 39 U.N. GAOR
SU?p. (NO. 51) at 77, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) 1102 in favor - 19
ODDOS~~ - 13 abstentionsl.

Revlew of the i?.ulenentation of the recolnnendations and decisions
adooted by the General Assemblv at its tenth s~ecial session (NON-
USFOF NüCLEARWrfLFQiAh?)FTSmGN OF NUCZi;oSïiAR)G.A. Res.39/148 D,
39 V.N. GAOR Supp. (No.51) at 78, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (101 in
favor - 19 o~~osed - 17 abstentionsL.

Review of the imolementation ofthe recomrnendations and decisions
admted bv the General Assemblv at its tenth soecial session
CSSATiON OF ?HF NUCLç4R-AWS RACE Am NUCLES? DI-) , G.A. Res .
39/?48 K, 39 U.N. GAOR Su??. (No. 51) at 83, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984) (124 in favor - 13 ODDosed - 9 abstentionsl.

General and complete disarmament D NU^-^ mE), G.A. Res.
39/151 D, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(198r) (104 in favor - 18 ODDosed - 8 abstentions).

nuclear-uea~onStates aoainst the use or threat of use of.nuclearn-
.JeeDons,G.A. Res. 40/86, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 71, U.N.
Doc. A/40/53 (1985) (142 in favor - none opposed - 6 abste:Wons).

Bil?teralnuclear-arms necotiations,G.A. Res. 40/18, 40 U.N. ÛAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 65, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985)176 in favor - none
oo~osed - 12 abstentions).

peview of the im~lementationof the recommendationsand decisions
ado~ted bv the General Asçemblv at its tenth s~ecial session (NON-
USEOF NUCZEARWE4FCNSAM) FSVDViON OF NUC3EARW), G.A. Res. 40/152 A,
40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 92, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985) (123in
favor - 19 ou~osed - 7 abstentionsl.

Review of the implementationof the recommendationsand decisions
ado~ted bv the General Assemblv at its tenth special session
(BIïAl%VL NUCEAR-AWs AND SPACE-AFW N5XmXnONS) , G.A. Res. 40/152 B,
40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 93, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985) (107 in
favor - none ODDoSed - 40 abstentions).
Review of the implementationof the recommendationsand decisions
adooted bv the General Assemblv at its tenth s~ecial session
(NUCLEN?WEUVNS IN AIL ASPECIS),G.A. Res. 40/152 C, 40 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 53) at 93, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985) 1117 in favor - 19
0~00Sed - 11 abstentionsl.

Review of the implementationof the recommendationsand decisions
ado~ted by the General Assemblv at its tenth s~ecial session
(CSSATLON OF 'IHENU-9 ARC3 RA= AND NUCLEARDI-). . .G.A. Res.
40/152 P, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 102, U.N. Doc. A/40/53
(1985) j131 in favor - 16 ODuOsed - 6 abstentionsl.

Conclusion of effective international arranaements to assure non-
nuclear-vea~onStates aaainst the use or threat of use of nuclear
'-'eaoonsG,.A. Res. 41/52, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (NO. 53) at 67, U.N.
Doc. A/41/53 (1986) (149 in favor - none oauosed - 4 abstentions).

General and conolete disarnament (NU- DISARX&&R?T),G.A. .Res.
41/59 F, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at -- U.N. Doc. A/41/53
(1986) fP.do~tedvithout a vote).
C.A. Res. 41/86 F, 41 U.N. GhOX Supp. (No. 53) at --, U.N. Doc.
A/41/53 (1986) (130 in favor - 15 ouposed ..
5 abstentionsl.
Conclusion of effective international arransements to assure non-
nuclear-weaoonStates aaainst the use or threat of use of nuclear
-e=Dons, G.A. Res. 42/32, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49)at 66, U.N.
Doc. A/42/49 (1987)1151 in favor - none op~osed - 3 abstentionsl.

~oneral and com~lete disarmment (NU- DI-), G.A. Res.
F2/38 H, 52 U.N. GAOR SUpp. (No. 49) at 77, U.N. Doc. A/42/49
(1937) ihdontedwithout a votel.

'cncics ion of ef:eccive ir.ternationa1 arranaenents on the
.tresctherino 3f the sec~ritv cf non-nuclear-wea~onStates aaainst
he use or tnreat of use of nuclear weaDons, G.A. Res. 43/68, 43
.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 69, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988) 1117 in

(vii)favor - 17 oo~osed - 16 abstentions)-.

Conclusion of effective international arransement to assure non-
a
weaDons, G.A. Res. 43/69,43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 69, U.N.
Doc. A/43/49 (1988) 1152 in favor - none ODDosed - 3 abstentionsl.

General and comalete disarmament (NU- D-), G.A. Res.
43/75 E, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp; (No. 49) at --, U.N. Doc. A/43/49
(1988) /Ado~ted vithout a vote) .

Review of the imolementationof the recommendations and decism
ado~ted bv the General Assemblv at its tenth s~ecial session
(CÏSSTiON OF ZHE NUCLEAR-ARSRACE AND NUClEAR ~ --~-~~- ,. G.A. Res.
43/78 E, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 95, U.N. Doc. A/43/49
(1988) 1135 in favor - 13 opoosed - 5 abstentionsl.

General and complete disannament (BI- NUCüIR-mm NEGTUTI&) ,
G.A. Re§. 45/58 B, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 63, U.N. Doc.
A/45/49 (1990) 1131 in favor - none oo~osed - 22 abstentionsl.

General and comoletedisennament (CONVENI?ONADI-) , G.A. Res.
45/58 C, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 63, U.N. Doc. A/45/49
(1990) (Adootedvithout a votel.

General and com~lete disamament (NUCLEARD-), G.A. Res.
45/58 D, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (NO. 49A) at 64, U.N. DOC. A/45/49
(1590) IAdouted without a vote).

Review en3 im~lementationof the Concludins Document of the Twelfth
Szecial Session of the General Assembly (-ON ON PIE FFGXIBITION
OF 'BE USE OF NUCLEARETAKNS).~G.A. Res. 45/59 B. 45 U.N. GAOR SUD--
(No. 49A) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990) 1125 in favor - 17
ODDOS~~ - 10 abstentions).

Review and imolementation ofthe Concludina Document of the hrelfth
Soecial Session of the General Assembly (NUCLG9RAFMS FREE2E),G.A.
Res. 45/59 D, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 72, U.N. Doc. A/45/49
(1990) (126 in favor - 14 ODDOS~~ - 12 abstentions).

Conclusion of effective international arransementsto assure non-
nuclear-weauon States aqainst the use or threat of use of nuclear
weepons, G.A. Res. 46/32, 46 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49, Vol. 1) at
63, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991) (152 in favor - none ODDOS~~ - 2
abstentions) .

Review and inclenentationof the concludino Document of the Twelfth
SDocial Session of the General Assembly (COEiVWI?O ON DIE PFWJBITSCN
OF TE US.?OF WESWS), G.A. Res. 46/37 D, 46 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 49, Vol. 1) at 78, U.N. Doc A/46/49 (1991)1119 in favor - 18
ouoosed - 23 abstentions). Conclusion of effective international arranaements to assure non-
nuclear-wea~on States aoainst the use or threat of use of nuclear
WeaDons, C.A. Res. 47/50, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49, Vol. 1) at

60, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992) (162 in favor - none O~Dosed - 2
abstentionsi.

Review and irn~lementation of the Concludina Document of the Welfth
SDecial Session of the General Assembly (CaNEfPION CN l'HE ma3HIBmON
OF 33 USE OF NUCLEAR WEAFONÇ) , G;A. Res. 47/53 C, 47 U. N. GAOR Supp.
(NO. 49, Vol. 1) at 70, U.N.. .DoC. A/47/49 (1992) JAdo~ted without
a vote).

Review and implementation of the Concludina Document of the helfth

Sr>ecial Session of the General Assenbly (NXEAR AR'S F;(ïZE) G.A.
Res. 47/53 E, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49, Vol. 1) at 70, U.N. DOC.
A/47/49 (1992)- (Ado~ted without a votel.

Conclusion of effective international arranaements to assure non-
nuclear-wea~on States aaainst the use or threat of use of nuclear
weaDons, G.A. Res. 48/73, 48 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. --) at --, U.N.
Doc. A/48/-- (1993) 1166 in favor - none o~posed - 4 abstentionsi.

(BILkTGLU NU--A% NEZUTIATIONS AND NUCLEAR DI-) , G .A. R~s .

48/75 a, 4s U.N. GAOR supp. (NO. -- at -- , U.N. DOC. ~/48/--
(1993) (Adopted without a vote).

Reviev of the irn~lementation of the recomnendations and decisions
sdo~ted bv the General Assernblv at its tenth soecial session (REKIFCC
OF DISARWEEKT CCWESSION), G.A. Res. 48/77 A, 48 U.N. GAOR SUpp.
(NO. --) at --, U.N. Doc. A/48/-- (1993) (Adouted without a vote). Amendment of the Treatv Bwa Nuclear Wea~on Tests in the
Atmos~here.in Outer Suace and Under Water, G.A. Res. 49/69

Establishmentof a Nuclear-Wea~o nFree Zone in S o u , G.A.
Res. 49/72
Conclusionof Effective Internat-ents to Assure non-
Fuclear-Wea~onStates Aaainst theUse of Threatof Use Q
WeaDons, G.A. es 49/73 U U L

Stev-bv-Ste~Reductionof the NuclearThreat, G.A. Res. 49/75/E
. .
Nuc1 r Disarmm ent W'th a View to the Ultimate Euat ion of
Nuclear Weapons,G.A. Res. 49/75/H

BeauestE
Justice on the Leaalitv of the Threat or Use of Nuclear WeaDom,
G.A. Res. 49/75/K
Bilateral-NuclearArms Neaotiationsand NuclearDisarmament,G.A.
Res. 49/75/L

Conventionon the Prohibitionof the Use of NuclearWeaDow, G.A.
Res. 49/76/E

Consolidationof the Reaime Established bv the Treatv for the
Prohibitionof Nuclear Wea~ons in Latin Americaand the Cu ibbean
(Treatvof Tlatelolco~G.A. Res. 49/83

'TheSouth AtlanticReqion as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, G.A. Res.
49/84