Memorial of Mexico | INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Document Number

8272

Document Type

written_pleading

Case

128 - Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America)

Incidental Proceedings

Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Date of the Document

Fri, 06/20/2003 - 12:00

Document File

8272.pdf

INTERNATIONAL COURT üSTICE

CASECONCERNING AVENAANDOTHER MEXICANNATIONALS

(MEXICv.UNITEDSTATOFAMERICA)

MEMORIAL OF MEXICO

20 June2003 Table ofContents

1. INTRODUCTION .........................................1....................

II. JURISDICTION ..........................................8.....................

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................11..............

A . The Purposeof ConsularAssistancein CapitalCases .........1

1. Mexican ConsularOficers Ensurethe General
Fairnessof Proceedings ...............................13..............
MexicanConsularOfficersServeas a "Cultural
2. 17
Bridge"For Their DetainedNationals ...........................
a. Vulnerabilityto Interrogation.....................20........
b . Plea Bargaining ..................................25...............

c . Rroviding a Bridge to Defense Counsel ...........28....
3. Mexican ConsularOfficersEnhancethe Quality
of Legal RepresentationAt Trial ..................................

a . Monitoring Trial Counsel ........................29...........
b . (GatheringEvidence ..............................33..............

c . PreservingInternational Legal Issues .............34.....
4. Mexican ConsularOfficersAssistinAmassing
Vital Mitigation Evidence .............................3........

B. The United States'sFailureto NotiQ Mexican
Nationals of TheirRightto ConsularAssistance ..................

1. Fifty-fourCases ofNon-CornplianceWithArticle
36 ....................................................38.....
.......
2. César RobertoFierro Reyna ...........................4.......

3. Carlos Avena Guillen .................................4........

C . Municipal Law Bars ........................................7.........

1. Default Doctrines.....................................48........
a. StateProceduralDefaultRules ...................49.....
b. Federal ProceduralDefaultRules .................49.......

c. Non-Retroactivity: Teaguev .Lune ................9.. 2. Denialof Rights-Based Remedies ...........................

a. No Individual Rights ...............................1......
b. No FundamentalRights ...........................51...........

3. Prejudice Requirement ........................................

D. Mexico'sJudicial andDiplornaticEfforts ...................5....
1. Effortsby MexicoBeforeJudicialAuthoritiesof

the United States .......................................6........
2. Diplornatic Démarches ................................57..............

3. Action in the Inter-AmericanCourtof Hurnan
Rights ..................................................4........
..

E. UnitedStates's ContinuingViolationsof Article36 of
the Vienna Convention ..............................................

IV. VIOLATIONS OFTHEVIENNACONVENTIONBY
THE UNITED STATES ...................................................

A. By Failing toNotiQ MexicanNationalsof Their
Article36 Rights WithoutDelay,The United States
ViolatedArticle36(1)of the ViennaConvention. ...............

1. Article 36(1)ObligatedtheUnitedStates to
Noti@MexicanNationa1softheirRightsUnder
The Vienna Convention"Without Delay,"
Meaning BeforeTakingAnyActionPotentially
PrejudicialTo the Rightsof the ForeignNational. .........
70
a. The Travaux Préparatoires and U.S.Practice
ConfirmThat"Without Delay" 1sa
Functional Expressionof Irnmediacy. ....................

b. Specifically, WithoutDelayMeansBefore
Interrogationof the Foreign National ..............78.....
c. The Vulnerabilityof Foreign Nationals in
Custody Requiresthe Definition that Mexico
Urges. ........................................................

2. The United States DidNot Providethe Requisite
Notice Without Delay To Anyofthe Fifty-Four
Mexican Nationals. ...................................8........B. ByApplyingItsMunicipalLaw in a MannerThat Fails
ToGiveFull Effect ToThe Purposeof Article36,the
UnitedStateshas Violated,andContinuesto Violate,
Article36(2.)ofthe Vienna Convention. .........................

1. The UriitedStates WasObligated toGiveFull
Effect to thePurposesof Article 36 in its
Municipal Law ToEnablethe Effective
Enforcementand Meaningful VindicationatLaw
of ThoseConsularRights .............................8........

2. The UnitedStates Has ViolatedArticle36(2)by
ForeclosingLegalChallengesto Convictions and
Death Sentencesof MexicanNationalsResulting
from ProceedingsThat Failedto RespectArticle
36(1)oftheConvention. ..............................93..............

3. C1emt:ncyReviewDoesNot Give Full EffectTo
The PurposeOfArticle 36And DoesNot Provide
Uniform,Fair OrMeaningful "ReviewAnd
Recorisideration."....................................98.................

a. "TheNature of ClemencyReview .................101....
b. ClemencyProceedingsFailto Provide
1Vecessary Procedural Safeguards.................106....

c. 'Violationsof the Vienna ConventionAre
GivenNo Weight In ClemencyReview.. ..........11
d. [Clemency AuthoritiesPay Little OrNo Heed
ToThe DepartmentOf State.. ....................113......
TheShortcomings of Clemency Review
e .
PrecludeMeaningfulReview and
Reconsideration. ................................115.............
4. The UnitedStatesDidNot EnjoyUnlimited

Choi.ceofMeansBut Was Obligedto Choose
Meansthat Give "FullEffect"to the Purposesfor
Article 36...........................................116..................
a. The MeansChosenmustbe Designedto
Achievethe Result andmustAchievean
..............................................
Effective Remedy 117
b. IfNecessary,the UnitedStateswasRequired
to Changeits DomesticLawto Conform Fully withitsInternationalLegal
Obligations....................................121................

V. THEBREACHESOF ARTICLE36 RESULTED IN
FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIRCRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS .........................................4........

A. The Deprivationof ConsularNotification and
AssistanceRendersCriminalProceedings
FundamentallyUnfair .....................................6........

1. ConsularNotification1sNecessaryto Ensurethe
ProceduralEqualityof Foreign Nationalsinthe
CriminalProcess....................................127................
2. ConsularNotificationEnsurestheEnforcement of

OtherEssential DueProcess Guarantees ................0.
a. Rightto be ProtectedAgainstSelf-
Incrimination....................................1.......

b. Effective Assistance of Counsel................133......
c. The Rightsto Present aDefenseandto
Collectand Present Evidence ....................3.....

B. ConsularNotification Has Been WidelyRecognizedas
a Fundamental DueProcess Right and,Indeed,A
HurnanRight .............................................6..........

1. ConsularNotificationHas BeenInternationally
Recognizedas anEssentialElementof Due
Process.............................................36..........
2. ConsularNotificationUnderArticle36is an

Essential DueProcessRightand,Hence,a Human
Right................................................2.........

VI. MEXICO IS ENTITLED TO FULLREPARATIONSFOR
THE UNITED STATES'S VTOLATIONSOFTHE
VIENNACONVENTION ...............................6....... A. Mexico1sEntitledto a Declaration ...........................9....

B. Mexicois Eintitledto Restitutio inIntegrum ..................0.
1. Restitutio in lntegrumRequires Re-establishment
ofthe ,StatusQuoAnte.. ...............................150...........

2. To Re-EstablishtheStatus QuoAnte, the United
StatesMust Ensurethe Vacaturof the
Convictionsand Sentences, Ensurethe Exclusion
of EvidenceIllegally Obtained,and Prevent the
Applicationof MunicipalLawBars ......................3..

a. hlIexico1sEntitledto Vacaturofthe
C:onvictionsand Sentencesof ItsNationals ..........3
b. R4exicois Entitled inAny FutureCriminal
ProceedingsAgainstItsNationals to the
E;xclusionof Evidence Obtainedin Breach of

kirticle36..........................................8.......
c. Fdexicois Entitled toan Order Prohibiting
Application of MunicipalLaw Bars .....................

3. The Re-establishmentof theStatus QuoAnte 1s
Not RdateriallyImpossibleand1sProportionateto
the InjuryCaused. ....................................164..............
a. Re-establishment of theStatus QuoAnte 1s
Possible...........................................6........

b. No Burden Outof Proportionto the Benefit
Derivingfi-omRestitutionInsteadof
Compensation. ...................................165.............

C. The UnitedStatesMustCeaseItsUnlawfÙlConduct
and OfferMexicoGuaranteesofNon-Repetition.. ..........166.

1. The'UnitedStates Has RegularlyViolated and
Cont.inuesRegularlyto ViolateMexico's Article
36RightsandThoseof ItsNationals. .........................
2. Mexico1sEntitled to Cessationand Guaranteesof
Non.-Repetition. ......................................169...............

VII. SUBMISSIONS ..........................................174....... INTRODUCTION

1. ByApplicationdated9January 2003, Mexico instituted
proceedingsbeforethisCourt againstthe UnitedStateson claims
concemingfifty-fourMexicannationalswho have beenconvictedand

sentenced todeath in criminalproceedingsthat violated theprovisionsof
Article36 ofthe ViennaConventionon ConsularRelations. By Order
dated 5 February2003,theCourtorderedthe United Statesto take al1
steps necessaryto enisurethat thethree nationalsin mostimminent
dangerof executionwerenot executedbeforethe Court rendered
judgmenton Mexico'sclaims. Todate, no executiondate hasbeen set

for anyofthe Mexicannationalswhoare the subjectof thisproceeding.

2. Thus,this casecomesto the Court in a tùndamentallydifferent
posturethandidLaGrand, and forthe most basicof reasons: while the
nationalswhowerethesubjectof Germany'sapplicationhadbeen
executedpriorto the rendering ofthe Court'sjudgment,the nationals
that Mexico hereseeksto protect remainalive. InLaCrand, the Court

had occasionto providea definitive interpretationof the substantive
rights ofthe sendingStateand itsnationalsunderArticle 36, and the
corresponding ob1ig;ationsfthereceiving StateunderthatArticle. As a
result, Mexico'scaserestson thesubstantivefoundationlaidby the
CourtinLaCrand. Buthere, theCourtwill alsohaveanopportunityto
prescribethe fullrangeof relief towhich a Staieaggrievedby Article36

violationsis entitleti,in a situationin whichthe nationals whoare the
subjectof the proce:edingremainin a position tobenefitfiomthat relief.

3. Put simply,Mexico contendsthat when a Stateactsto take
humanlifethroughtheapplicationof law in a criminalproceeding,it
shouldscrupulousl~c ~onformitsown conductto the dictatesof legal
noms towhichitl-lasconsentedto be bound - including,as here,Article

36 of the Vienna Convention.Andwhen the Statefailsinthat obligation
- as here,the UnitedStateshas - it shouldprovidefullyeffectiverelief
in the fonn ofnewproceedingsthat conformto thosedictates.

4. Likethe UnitedStates,Mexico attaches great importance to the
consularassistanceandaccessrights codifiedin Article 36,particularly
inthe caseofnationalschargedwithcapitalcrimes. Overtime, Mexico

has created a comprehensiveprogramof consularassistanceto its
detainednationalsinthe UnitedStateswho facethe deathpenalty.Mexicanconsularofficersact to ensure fair treatmentof theirnationals
in U.S.criminalproceedings,providethe nationalwithan understanding
ofthe U.S.criminalsystemand his legal rights, closelymonitorjudicial

proceedings,advocatebeforejudges and prosecutorsr,egularly
communicatewiththe detained nationaland his relatives,assistin the
thorough investigationof facts,arrangeand fund experttestimony,and,
wherenecessary,providefundsfor theretentionof morequalified
defensecounsel.

5. The rightofconsularnotificationand assistanceis a necessary

andessentialproceduralsafeguardfor detained foreign nationals. As the
draftersof Article36recognized, the foreign national facingcriminal
charges standson a different footingthan a nationalfacing thesame
charges. And it is thecriminaldefendant'sstatusas foreignnational,
ratherthan simplycriminaldefendant, towhichthe rights guaranteedby
Article 36 are addressed.

6. Theright of consular notificationand assistance therefore
constitutes afùndamentalcomponentof due process. The assisting
consularofficercanbringto bear professional expertiseand local
knowledgethatcanbe used toprotectthe foreignnationalfromthe
vulnerablepositionhe or she occupiesin the receiving State. Further,
consularnotificationand assistanceserve to ensurethe effective

enforcementof al1otherdue processguarantees. For a detainedforeign
national, the rightto be infomed of the prospect of consularassistanceis
thenecessaryprerequisiteto aknowingdecisionregarding whetherto
exerciseor waive the rightagainstself-incrimination,to the effective
assistance of counsel, andto the opportunityto prepare a defense. As a
result,the fundamentaldue processcharacterof the rightto consular

accesshas beenrecognized ininternationalinstruments,tribunal
decisions,statepractice,and scholarlywritings.

7. Given thecriticalrole of the right of consular notification, a
criminalproceedingthat hasbeen tainted by a violationof that right - as
inthe case of eachof the fi@-four Mexicannationalsbeforethis Court -
cannotyielda substantivelyacceptableconvictionor sentence. This

principle applieswith special forcein capital proceedings, which,given
the irreversible characterof the death penalty, requirethe mostrigorous
enforcementof proceduralsafeguards.

8. Yetin eachand every oneof the fi@-four separatecapital
casesthat formthe basisof this action,the United StateshasviolatedMexico's rightsand the rightsof its naîionalsunderthe Vienna
Convention, which Mexicoassertsinthe exerciseof its rightof
diplomaticprotection. As in LaGrand, the United Stateshas breached
two separateprovisionsof Article36.

9. First, as this Court authoritativelydeterminedin theLaGrand
case,the interlocking subsectionsof Article36(1)of the Vienna
Conventionestablishia systemof consularprotection predicatedupon the
requirement that conipetentauthoritiesofa receiving statenotify,
withoutdelay, a detainednationalofa sendingStateofhis rightto
consularcommunica.tionand assistance. To beeffective, notification
"without delay"requiresthat thecompetentauthoritiesprovide the
contemplated consularnotification priorto anyact potentially

detrimental to therightsof the foreignnationals,suchas interrogation.

10. This functionaldefinitionis supportedbythe objectand
pwpose of the Viema Convention,the well-documented vulnerabilityof
foreignnationalsin custodyto abuseduringinterrogation,andthe United
States's own practicewith regardto the protectionof U.S.nationals
detained in other stiites.

11. In the cases offifty-oneofthe Mexicannationalssentenced to

death whose casesjormthe bais ofthis proceeding,the United States
madeno attemptto complywithArticle36(1)of theVienna Convention,
eventhough the coinpetentauthoritieshadreasonto know of the
detainee'sMexican nationality. Inonlythree cases didthe competent
authoritiesmake an effort toprovidenoticeto the detainedMexican
national, butinthosecases,the noticewaseithernot conveyedin fullor
not conveyed"witfioutdelay,"as theConventionrequires.

12. Second, the UnitedStates violatedArticle36(2)by invoking

municipal lawbarsto preventMexicannationalsfkomchallengingtheir
convictionsand deathsentencesonthe basisof violationsof Article 36.
InLaGrand, this Courtheld that Article36(2)requiresthat municipal
lawsand regulatioilsbe appliedin a mannerthat allows"full effect" to
be given to "thepurposesfor which therights accordedunderthis Article
are intended." A receivingstateviolatesthe Conventionwhen its laws
preventthe municipal courtsof that State"fromattachingany legal

significanceto the fact..[oflthe violation."

13. The United Statesemploysmunicpal lawbars thatdo not
allowthe attributionof Iegalconsequencesto the failure of competentauthoritiesof the UnitedStatestoprovidetherequisite Article36
notification. UnitedStates courtshaveapplied procedural default
doctrinesto holdthat wherea Mexican nationalhas not raisedhis Vienna
Conventionclaimduringthe prescribedphaseof the criminal

proceeding,he isbarredfromraisingit subsequently. For example,
wherethe nationalhas notraised the claimduringthe courseof trial,he
maynotraise it on direct appeal. Likewiseifthe nationalfailsto raise a
claimon direct appealor in statepost-judgmentproceedings, hemay not
raiseit in any subsequentfederalhabeas corpusproceedings. Thus,state
and federal default doctrinesbar review andreconsiderationof Vienna
Convention claims,even wherethe failureofthe defendant toraisehis

Vienna Convention claimsisa directresultof the UnitedStates'sown
failureto providethe required notification.

14. United States courtshave also heldthatpursuantto anon-
retroactivity doctrine,Mexicannationals are barredfiom anyjudicial
relief for acknowledged ViennaConventionviolationsin federalhabeas
corpus proceedings. Finally, evenwhereMexicannationals' claimshave

not beendefaulted,UnitedStates courtsrefuseto providejudicial
remediesfor theviolations, on the groundthatthe Vienna Convention
doesnotcreate individualor fundamentalrights,or that, in anyevent, the
defendantMexicannationalhas notshownprejudicefromthe United
States'sfailureto abideby its obligationsunderArticle36.

15. The continuedapplicationofthesemunicipallaw doctrines
violatesnot onlytheplaindictatesofArticle36(2),butthe equallyplain

mandateof LaGrand, in whichthisCourt heldthat in cases implicating
severe punishment,the UnitedStateswasrequiredto permit review and
reconsiderationof impairedconvictionsandsentencesthat take account
ofthe ViennaConventionviolation.

16. In an attempt tomeetthatmandate,the UnitedStatestakes the
positionthat stateclemencyprocessesprovidethe requisite reviewand

reconsideration. Tothe contrary,the ViennaConventionconfersrights
bothon the sendingState anditsnationals. Review and reconsideration
that takes accountof the ViennaConventionmustthereforetake account
of the deprivationof a right and,it follows,providea rights-based
remedy. Clemency,by contrat, isjustthat: a discretionaryactof
executivegrace,to whichno applicanthasa right,andthe gant ofwhich
cannotbe assurednomatterhow egregiousthe violation that the

applicantmight show. Moreover,asconducted,clemency processesare
generallystandardless,secretive,andimmunefiomjudicial oversight.Clemency processescannotserve to fulfillthe UnitedStates' obligation
to givefiil1effectto the purpose for whichthe rights affordedunder
Article 36 are intended.

17. To remedythe UnitedStates'violationsof Article36(1)and
(2) in thecriminalproceedingsinwhich theMexicannationalswhoare

subjectto this proceeding havebeen convictedof capital crimesand
sentencedto death, Mexicois entitledto fullreparations. Mexico seeks
no monetarycomperisation.Nor does it seeka blanket pardon or any
other formof reliefl.hatwouldpreventtheUnitedStatesfromretryingor
resentencingitsnationalsin proceedingsthat comport withArticle36.

18. Mexico seeks, instead, onlythatreliefwhichis essentialto
ensurethat anyof itsnationalswhoare put injeopardyof theirlivesin
capitalcriminalproceedingsinthe UnitedStates receive the procedural

safeguardsthat,by its adherenceto the ViennaConvention,the United
Stateshas agreedto provide. Specifically,Mexico seeks reparationsin
the formof appropriate declarations,restitutioin integrum,anorderof
cessation,and guaranteesof non-repetition.

19. The remedialstartingpoint isrestitutio in integrum. As the
primaryformof reparation available,restitutio in integrumseeks tore-
establishthe situationthat existedriortothecommission ofthe

intemationallywrongfulact. Torestorethestatusquoante inthe
circurnstancesofthis case, the United Statesmusttakeseveralseparate
and independentsteps.

20. First, the United States musttakeal1stepsnecessaryto ensure
the vacatur of the convictionsandsentences ofthefifiy-fourMexican
nationals, sothat anysubsequentcriminalproceedingscan be undertaken
in conformitywith international law. Theannulmentofjudicial

decisionsis a well-recognizedformof restitution,andisespecially
compellingwhere, as here, criminalproceedingshave beentaintedby
violationsof fundamentaldue process.

21. Second,theCourt should requirethat theUnitedStatestake al1
stepsnecessary toensurethe exclusion of evidence obtainedinvblation
of Article 36. Therule excludingfiom usein criminalproceedings
evidence obtained illegallyis a generalprincipleof lawunderArticle
38(l)(c) of the Court'sStatuteand,in thecircumstanceshere,requires

that prosecutingailthoritiesbe barredfromusingin evidence statementsand confessionsobtained priorto the time aforeign nationalis informed
of his consular notificationrights.

22. FinalZy,restitutiorequires that courtsin the UnitedStatesbe
prohibited from applyingany municipallawdoctrine that prevents a
court fiom attributinglegalsignificanceto an Article36violation
because of a foreignnational's failure timelyto raisethe Vienna

Conventionclaim where the competent authoritieshavefailed intheir
obligationto apprisethe national ofhis rights,or anydoctrinethat
preventsthe Court fiom providing aremedyforan Article36violation,
or anydoctrinethat requires a defendantto makean individualized
showing of prejudiceas a prerequisite to relief.

23. SinceLaGrand,and contraryto the sanguineassertionsof the
United Statesabout itseducationandtrainingprogram,competent

authoritiesin the United Statescontinueregularlyto violatethe Article
36 notification provisions ofthe Vienna Convention, including in capital
cases or other cases involving severepenalties.Forexample,Mexico
has been apprisedby its consulatesof overone hundredcasessince 27
June 2001involving severe penaltiesin which the UnitedStates has
failed toprovide the requisite consularnotification.

24. As a result, Mexico seeksordersfromthe Courtthatthe United
Statescease its ongoingviolationsofArticle36and, atthe sametime,

provide Mexico withspecificguaranteesthat its competentauthorities
will regularlycompiywiththeir obligationsunderthatArticle. The
United States shouldbe required toemploy whateverlegislative,
executive,orjudicial means are necessaryto achieve that result.

25. This case is thethird in which aStatePartyto the Vienna
Conventionon ConsularRelationshas soughtrelief on thebasis of
violationsby the United StatesofArticle36 in criminalproceedings that

ledto the death penalty. Paraguayobtainedan orderof provisional
measuresbaning the executionof its national pending theCourt's
judgment onthe merits,but then withdrewthe caseafterthe United
States, in violationof that order, allowedthe executionto go forward.
Germany, too,saw its nationalexecutedin violationof an order of
provisionalmeasures,but carriedthe case throughto ajudgment that
allowedthe Courtto provide a definitivetreatmentof thesubstantive

mandate of Article36. 26. Mexico is the third Stateto fileand to obtainan orderof
provisionalmeasures. Thus far,the UnitedStateshas complied with that
order. Mexicohoper;that, by prescribingthe fùllrange ofreliefthat
Mexico seeksin these proceedings, theCourt will providea definitive
treatmentof the remedial dimensionof the ViennaConventionand

therebycompleteits work on that instrument. Equally,Mexicohopes
that that work will iricreasethe respect forand compliance withlawthat
is the surest safeguairdof internationalpeace andjustice. JURISDICTION

27. The Court'sjurisdictionisbasedon Article1ofthe Optional
Protocolto the Vienna ConventiononConsularRelations,onwhichthe

Court baseditsjurisdiction in ~a~rand.' Article1oftheOptional
Protocolprovides that

[dlisputesarising out ofthe interpretationor application ofthe
[ViennaConventionon ConsularRelations]shallliewithin the

compulsoryjurisdiction ofthe InternationalCourtof Justiceand
may accordinglybe brought beforethe Courtbyan application
madeby anyparty to the disputebeing a partyto the present
rotoc col.

28. Article 1establishestwo requirements for theCouritohave
jurisdiction. First, the Applicantmustbea partyto theOptional
Protocol. Second,there must be a dispute "arisingout ofthe
interpretationor application" ofthe Vienna Conventionon Consular

Relations. According to thisCourt'slongstandingjurisprudence,these
jurisdictionalrequirementsmustbemet as of the dateofthe filingofthe
Application,which isthe criticaldate for theCourtto determineits
jurisdiction. Both requirementsaremet here.

1 LaGrand (Germany v. United States ofAmerica), Judgment, I.C.J.Reports
2001, paras. 42, 128(1).

2 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Conventionon Consular Relations concerning

the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes,24 April1963,596UNTS487, Article
1.

Arrest Warrant ofIl April2000 (DemocraticRepublic of the Congo v.
Belgium), Judgment of14 February 2002, para. 26Questions of Interpretation
andApplication of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Z.C.J.,Reports 1998, p23-24, para. 38;

Questions oflnterpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
arisingfrom the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriv. United 29. First, on 9 January2003,when the Applicationwas filed,
Mexicoandthe UnitedStatesof Arnerica werebothpartiesto the Vienna

Conventionon ConsularRelationsand tothe OptionalProtocol. The
United Stateshas beena party to boththe ViennaConvention and toits
OptionalProtocolsirice24 November 1969.Mexico,in its turn,has
been a partyto the ViennaConventionsince 16June 1965,and acceded
to the OptionalProtocolon 15March2002. Neither ofthe two parties

made anyreservatioristo the Optional o roto col.^

30. Second,oni9 January 2003,there existed between Mexicoand
the UnitedStatesa dispute "arisingout ofthe interpretationor
application"of the ViennaConvention. Priorto the filingof the
Application, Mexico undertookconsiderablediplomaticand legal efforts

to vindicateits rightsandthose of itsnationalsunderArticle 36 of the
ViennaConventionandhas sparedno efforttopersuadethe United
Statesto complywith itsobligationsunderthe Viennaconvention.' Al1
ofthese effortsfailed. It is clear that Mexicoandthe UnitedStateshold
irreconcilableviews aboutthe mandateof the Vienna Convention,

includingfundamentaldisagreementsabouttheremedyto which the
sending Stateand it:;nationals are entitledin the eventof a breachofthe
Conventionin a proceedingthat leadsto the death penalty.

31. Mexico hasconsistentlyarguedthatthe UnitedStatesmust
restore thestatus quoante, that is,re-establish the situationthat existed

at the timeofthe detentionand beforethe convictions andsentencesof
Mexico's nationalsasa result of proceedingsthat violatedthe United
States'obligationsirnderthe Vienna Convention. To date,the United
Stateshas madeno effortto provide any remedyotherthan repeated
apologies, whichthis Court deterrnined clearlyin LaGrand are

States of America), Preliminary Objections,JudgmentI.C.JReports 1998, p.
129,para.37.

List of Participants.,Optional Protocol to the Vienna Conventionon Consular
Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, mailable at
http://untrea~.un.or;q/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbi~t

y33.asp (last visit16 June 2003).

See infra Chapte1II.D.inadequate, anddiscretionaryreviewsby executiveofficiais,which
Mexico maintainsare equallyinadequate.7

32. As thisCourtheldin LaGrand, "a disputeregardingthe
appropriateremediesforthe violationof the Convention ...is a dispute

that arisesout ofthe interpretationor application ofthe Conventionand
thus is withinthe Court'sjurisdiction.

33. The Courtthushasjurisdiction to entertain Mexico's claims.

6
LaGrand (Germany v.UnitedStates ofAmerica), Judgrnent,I.C.J. Reports
2001, para.123.

See infra Chapter IV.B.4.

8LaGrand (Germany v.UnitedStates ofAmerica), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports2001, para. 48; see also ViennaConvention on ConsularRelations
(Paraguay v. UnitedStates ofAmerica), Provisional Measures, Order of 9April
1998, para.31. STATEMENTOFFACTS

34. For manydecades, Mexicanconsular officershave been
dedicatedtothe protectionof Mexicannationals incarceratedabroad. To
thatend, Mexico hm; establishedan extensiveand sophisticatedprogram
of consularassistanceforits citizensincarcerated in the United ta tes.^

35. Ever since capital punishment was re-introducedin the United
States in1976,Mexico hasclosely monitoredthe casesof Mexican
nationals facingthe death penalty. Mexico's cornmitmentto the defense
of itsnationalshas been consistentand unwavering for morethan

twenty-fiveyears. As the nurnbersof Mexicannationalson deathrow
haveincreased, however, Mexico hasdevotedmore resourcesto their
defense,and has become increasinglyconcerned over repeated violations
of Article36 in their capitalmurderprosecutions.

36. Thus, in September2000, Mexico forrnedthe ground-breaking
MexicanCapitalLegal Assistance Prograrn,which to date constitutesthe

sole capital legal assistanceprogram establishedby a foreign govemment
in the United States. TheProgramis staffedby a network of ten lawyers,
al1of whomare experiencedcapitallitigators.I0 Theselawyers,inturn,
provideexpertadvice to consularofficersand defenselawyers

representingMexican nationals.ThePrograrnhas made a qualitative
differenceinthe legal representationprovidedto Mexicannationals, and
hasenhancedthe servicesalready providedby Mexico'sforty-five
consulatesinthe United States. The Programalso seeksto increase
awarenessof and c~ompliance withinternational law."

Mexico's historyofconsular assistance in the United States dates back to the
turn of the century. ,Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hemandez, paras.
12-23(detailing historical assistance), Annex7.

'OSeeid

" SeeDeclaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernhndez, para. 30, Am7. 37. Among other services,Mexicanconsular officers ensurethat

detainednationals understandthe U.S. criminaljustice systemandtheir
legalrights; closely monitorjudicial proceedings;advocatebeforejudges
andprosecutors;regularly communicatewith detained nationalsandtheir
relatives;provide interpretersand translationservices;provide fundsand

logisticalsupportto assist defense counselin obtainingdocurnentary
evidenceand conductinginvestigationsin Mexico; retain bilingual
experts and investigators; assistin the thoroughinvestigationof facts;
arrangeexpert testimonywherehelpful;and, where necessary,obtain

morequalifieddefense counselfor their nationals.I2

38. Throughthe combined efforts ofconsular officers and the
Programlawyers,Mexico has playeda decisive rolein preventing the
impositionof the death penaltyin at leastforty-fivecases in lessthan

three years.'3 Inthat sametime, Mexicohas filed sixteen amicus curiae
briefsin U.S. courts,has provided funds forinvestigatorsand expertsin
at leasttwenty-twocases, andhas offeredimportantlegal assistanceto
defensecounselin sixty-sevenother cases.14

39. Consularassistanceto nationalsdetained on criminal charges
canbe brokendown into fouressentialservices. First, bytheir very
presencein the courtroomor at the policestation, consular oficers
ensurethat localauthoritiestreat their nationals fairlyl5Second,

consularofficersspeak to their nationalsin a languagethey understand,
andensurethe provision of adequate interpreters. Third, consular
officersexplainthe detainee'slegalrightsand facilitatecommunications
withdefenseattorneysand otheractorsin the criminaljustice system,

acting,in effect,as a "cultural bridge" forthe detained foreignnational.
Fourth,consularofficersenhancethe qualityof the detainee'slegal

l2Seeid.,paras.4-17.

l3Seeid.,para. 31. In thirty-eight ofthose cases, prosecutors agreedto waive
the deathpenalty prior to trial. In four cases, defendantswere sentencedto life
imprisonrnentafterjury trials. And in three cases, the defendants' sentences
werecommutedto lifein prison.

l4See id.para. 32.

l5See L. Lee,ConsulaL raw andPractic (2ded. 1991),p.124.representationby providingcompetent counsel,gatheringdocumentary

or otherevidencekoin the home state, andapprisingcourts and counsel
of internationallegalarguments. l6

1. MexicanConsularOfficersEnsurethe GeneralFairness
of Proceedings

40. Mexican consularoff~cers,at theveryminimum,ensure by
theirverypresence thata foreignnationalis treated with faimess in the
detainingstate'sjudicial system. l7 Innumerablestudies have shown that

raceand ethnicitypliaya significantrole inthe administrationof the
death penalty inthe Unitedstates.I8 Mexicohas docurnentednumerous

l6See Lee, supra, at pp. 133-35, 166; United States State Department, Pub. No.
10518,Consular Notijication and Access: instructions for Federal, State and
Local Law Enforcement and Other OfficiaisRegarding Foreign Nationals in the
UnitedStates and the Rights of Consular ofJicersto Assist Them(released Jan.
1998)at 42; J.Sims &.L. E. Carter, Emerging Importance of the Vienna

Convention on Consu,larRelations as a Defense Tool, The Champion, Sept./Oct.
1998at p. 30 ("Consular officers have a strong interest in the well-being of their
nationals who are visiting or living in a foreign country.. .Al1governments want
to monitor the criminal prosecutions of their nationals to ensure fair

treatment."); S. A. Shank& J. Quigley, Foreigners on Texas'sDeath Row and
the Right of'Access tcla Consul, 26 St.Mary's Law J. at pp. 719, 720-2 1(1995)
("[Tlhe mere involvement of a consul may encourage local government to
follow procedural noi-msand minimize discrimination against a foreigner.").

l7 See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez, para. 9, Annex 7; C. Cooper, Foes of
Death Penal~ Have a Friend Mexico, Sacramento Bee, 26 June 1994, at Al
(noting Mexico's intervention in Kentucky and California capital cases where
death penalty avoideld);A. Mendieta, Mexico WillAid Nationals in US; Fund

will Help 45 Death h!owInmates, Chicago Sun-Times, 6 October 2000, at 18
(describingcreation oflegal assistance program to defend the rights of Mexican
nationals sentenced t.odeath in the United States and bolster recognition of
rights under the VierinaConvention).

" See, e.g., Department of Justice, Survey ofthe Federal Death Penalfy System
(1998-2000) (concluding that federal prosecutors seek the deathpenalty more
often for Hispanics and other minorities than whites; and noting that in

Pennsylvania, proselrutorsare three times as likely to seek the death penalty
against Hispanics); ,FinalReport of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee
on Racial and Gender Bias in the Justice System, Chapter 6: Racial and Ethnic
Disparities In the Iniposition Ofthe Death Penalty (2003); R.Paternoster et al,cases in whichMexicannationalshave beensubjectedto discriminatory
treatment. At times, authoritiesare overtlyhostileto Mexican nationals,
many ofwhomarepoor laborers who haveimmigratedillegallyto the

UnitedStatesin searchof work. In some communities,Mexican
nationals are describedas "wetbacks," "illegalaliens," and other
disparagingterms. As onecommentaryhasobserved,

Mexican immigrants cometo the UnitedStates tofacegrossly
incorrectperceptions, negative stereotypes,bothmalignantand
benign prejudices,hostility,and antipathy. l9

41. Theseattitudes,not surprisingly,can affect theauthorities'
decisionsto seekthe death penaltyagainst a Mexicannational,as well as

thejury's willingnessto impose it.20

An Empirical Analysis of Maryland's Death Sentencing System ivith Respect to
the Influence of Race and Legal Jurisdictio(2003);U.S. General Accounting
Office,Report to Senate and House Cornmittees on theJudiciary: Death Penalty

Sentencing 5 (Feb. 1990);Baldus,Woodworth, Zuckerman, Weiner, & Broffitt,
Racial Discriminationandthe DeathPenalty in the Post-FurmanEra: An
Empirical and Legal Overview, With Recent Findings fromPhiladelphia, 83
CorneIlLaw Review (1998)at p. 1661;D. Baldus,et al., Reflections on the
"Inevitability"of RacialDiscriminationin Capital Sentencingandthe

"Impossibility"of Its Prevention,Detection, andCorrection, 51Washington &
Lee Law Review (1994) at p. 365; S.Gross& R. Mauro, Death &
Discrimination: Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencin151(1989); D. Baldus
& G. Woodworth, Race Discrimination in America's Capital Punishment System
Since Furman v. Georgia (1972): TheEvidence of Race Disparities and the

Record of Our Courts andLegislatures in Addressing ThisIssue (1997) (report
prepared forthe AmericanBar Association); T. Keil & G. Vito,Race and the
Death Penalty in KentuckyMurder Trials: 197&1991,20 American Journal of
Criminal Justice(1995)at p. 17;J. Jackson,Legal Lynching: Racism, Injustice
and the Death Penalty (1996).

l9J. Palerm, B.R. Vincent, andK. Vincent, "MexicanImmigrants in Courts," in
Joanne Moore,ed., Immigrants in Courts (1999) at p. 96.

20See J. G. Connell, III and ReneL. ValladaresCulturalIssues in Criminal

Defense (2003) atxxiii-iv [hereinafterConnell and Valladares](describinjury
deliberations in which manyjurors made ethnicallybiased comments regarding
the defendant, such as "If a Mexicanhas a gun, hemust be guilty.") 42. Mexican consularofficersare keenlyaware of the overt and
subtle waysin which Mexicannationalscan be treated differently,based
upontheirnationality. Throughtheir vigilant presencein courtrooms,
jails, and lawyers'offices,theycan detectthe presence ofunfairbias,
andtake steps to expose it. In acapitalmurderprosecution, Mexican

consularofficers wouldraisesuchconcernswith the appropriate
authorities,and if need be,with thecourt2'

43. But whereconsularofficersare absent,the defenselawyeris
ineffective,and the Mexican defendantis isolated,there is oftenno

effectivewayto prevent discriminationfromtaintingthe fairnessof the
proceedings. Unfortunately,thereare manyexamplesof this
phenomenon. ThecaseofMexicannationalJose TrinidadLoza,

convictedand sentencedto death in thestateof Ohio, is ill~strative?~
The lead policedetectivein Mr. Loza'scase has admittedthat he referred
to Mr. Lozaas a "wetback" - an exceedinglyderogatoryethnicslurused
to describerecent Mexican immigrants - throughouthis investigation.
This same officerniadethe decisionto seekthe death penaltyagainst

Mr. Loza. Indeed,the prosecutionof Mr.Loza was infusedwith racial
animus and police rnisconduct.In addition tothe lead detective,other
lawenforcementofficersinvolvedin the investigationadmitted that they
used the term"wetback" with someregulariîy. Someofficersagreedthe

term was inappropriateandcouldcompromise an investigation,but
others saw nothing wrong withit or wereuncertainabout the proprietyof
using sucha tem~.~'

44. Mr.Lozawas neverinformedof his rightsto consular

notificationand assistancebythe competentauthorities. Had Mexican
consular oficers beennotifiedof Mr.Loza'sdetention,they would have

21 See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, par9, Annex 7.

22 Case No. 52 in Mexico's Application. See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez
Hernandez, Appendix A, paras. 334-350(detailing case),Annex 7.

23 See Declarationof Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, Appendix A, para. 336
(citin Ggingerich Dr:positionat 13,27 (okay if said "jokingly among the guys"),

at 14 (term is neither racially insensitive or derogatory), Sulfstead Deposition at
24 (did not know if iuseof term was racially insensitive or derogatory)), Annex
7.beensensitiveto theethnicbiasthat pervadedthe Middleton, Ohio police

department,and would have educated trial counsel regarding the
derogatoryuseof the term"wetback." Consularofficerswouldalsohave
broughtthe matterto the attentionofthe prosecutorandlorthe trial court

in an effortto ensurefairtreatrnentfor Mr. Loza.

45. Incertain cases,Mexico hasobservedthat Mexicannationals

are singledout forthedeathpenalty,whenother,equallyculpable
defendantsreceivelessersentences. Forexample,Juan Caballero

Hernandez,whowas sentencedto deathin the stateof ~llinois~~ was the
onlyMexicannational amongfourcedefendants, was 18at the time of
the crime,andhad no recordof violence. He received a death sentence,

but a cedefendant who hadan appallingcriminalhistory,andwas
accusedof instigatingandcommittingtwo of the murders, received alife

sentence.

46. In othercases, prosecutorshaveencouragedjurors to sentence
a Mexican nationalto death,basedinpart on the defendant's

immigrationstatus. Inthe case of Hector Garcia~orres?'forexarnple,
the prosecution emphasizedMr. GarciaTorres's statusas an

undocumentedalienas one of thejustifications for the imposition of a
death sentence.26Defense counsel failed to objectto theprosecution's
irrelevantand inflammatory referencetso Mr. GarciaTorres's

immigrationstatus,andMr.Garcia Torreswas sentencedtodeath.27

- - - - - - -
24 Case No. 45 in Mexico's Application.

25 Case No. 31 in Mexico's Application.

26 See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernhndez, Appendix A, para. 186,
Annex 7.

27 Prosecutors used similar tactics in the case of Ricardo Aldape Guerra, a

Mexican national (not included in Mexico's Application) who was wrongly
convicted of capital murder and spent 15years on death row before he was
exonerated. There, prosecutors encouragedjurors to find Mr. Aldape Guerra
posed a danger to society, because he had entered the United States without

proper documentation. Following Mr. Aldape Guerra's sentencing proceeding,
the Ku Klux Klan demonstrated outside the courtroom, carrying signs saying
"Houston will not tolerate illegal alien crimes." The evidence of discrimination
in Mr. Aldape Guerra's trial was raised on appeal inamicus curiae briefs filed 47. Naturally,.theexamplescitedabovearenotexhaustive. And
foreignnationalsin general,as well as Mexicannationalsin particular,
are vulnerable todisparatetreatrnent.

48. When theyhave learnedofa national's incarceration well

before trial,Mexicariconsularofficershavebeen ableto bringevidence
of disparate treatmentto the attentionofthe court,withpositiveresulg
One exampleis the case ofMexicannational FelipePetrona Cabaiias,
who was charged withthe murderof a policeoficer inArizona.

Althoughhe was only seventeen at thetimeof the offense,prosecutors
soughtthe death penalty. Atthe timeofhis arrest,nurnerousmedia
reportshighlightedhis unlawfulimmigrationstatus. Moreover,Mexico
discovered thatArizonahadonly executed two juvenileoffendersin 120

years, andbothwere of Mexicanheritage?9Armed withthesedisturbing
facts, Mexicosubmittedan amicus curiae briefto the trialcourt,arguing
that Mr. PetronaCabaiiasshould notbe sentencedto death. Thecourt
subsequently sentencedhimto life imprisonment.

2. Mexican ConsularOfficersServeasa "CulturalBridge"
ForTheirDetained Nationals.

The UnitedStatesStateDepartmenthas describedtheright of
49.
access to a consularofficerasan invaluable"cultural bridge,"which
"[nlo one needs...niore thanthe individual...whohas beenarrestedin a

by Mexico, as well a:$several non-govemmental organizations. A federal

district court eventually granted relief and vacated Mr. Aldape Guerra's
conviction,concludiilg that the police and prosecutors in the case had
intimidated Mexican witnesses and engaged in other forms of misconduct that
tainted the fairness of the proceedings. See GuerCollin 9s, F.Supp. 620
(S.D. Tex. 1995).

28Mr. Petrona Cabaiias is not included in Mexico's Application.

29One of the juvenile offenders currently sentenced to death in Arizona is also
Mexican - Martin Raul Fong Soto, who is Case No. 48 in Mexico's Application.
In addition, as of this writing, the state of Arizona is seeking the death penalty
against yet another ldexican national who wasonly 16years old at the time of
the offense.foreigncountry."'0 Arrestedforeign nationalsinthe UnitedStatesare
often isolatedfromfamilyandfriends,speakEnglishasa second

languageor not at a11,and failto understandtheirrightsunderthe U.S.
criminaljustice stem.^ T'heymayalso sufferfromunwarrantedfears
aboutthe consequencesof assertingtheir legal rights,suchas the fearof
deportation.32

50. In or&r to makeinformedandcriticaldecisionsabout his case,
a foreign national mustunderstandthe basic elementsof the criminallaw
of the detaining tat te.A^^the Governmentof Canadahas observed:

[Thetypical detainedforeignnational,]whoisnotrelatively

sophisticated,or who lacksstrongconnectionsinthe arresting
cornmunity,is especiallyvulnerableto makingdangerously
uninformedchoicesinexercisingeventhe rights of whichthe
arrestingauthoritiesdo informhim. He isthereforealmost

certainto be unableto availhimselfof rightsof which the
arresting authoritiesailto informhim. Finally,withno oneto
explainhis predicamentinthe contextofthe morefarniliar
systemof his homecountry,a detained foreignnationalis at a

considerabledisadvantageinestablishing adefen~e.~~

30See U.S.Dep't of State, ForeignAffairs Manual 400,401 at
<http://foia.state.gov/FAMDir/masterdocs/07fam/O7m0 O.pdf>.

31See J.Palerm, et alsupra, at p. 73 ("In additionto problemsof language,
Mexican immigrantsare likely to know nothing aboutthe proceedings: who is
in charge,what the roles ofthe various personsare, and whatis happening.")

32See, e.g., iat 95 (Mexican immigrantsmay abandon legalrights because
they fear exposure oftheir own or familymembers'illegal statuUnitedStates
v. Beraun-Panez, 812F.2d 578, 580-81(9IhCir. 1987)(policeofficerstook
advantage of the defendant's insecuritiesabouthis alien statusbymentioning
the possibility that he would bedeportedandseparated from hisfamily).

33See Lee, supra,at166.

34See BriefAmicus Curiae of the Governmentof Canada inSupport of an
Application for the WritfHabeas Corpus inthe Case ofEx Parte Joseph
Stanley Faulder,at 10,Annex 30. 51. Unlike other local participantsin a state'scriminalsystem,
consular officers locatedin the detainingstate areuniquelysituatedto
translate the often complex and unfamiliarlegalconcepts intotermsthe

foreignnational carireadilyunderstand.

52. As the ForeignAffairs Manuelof the U.S. Departmentof State
acknowledges:

Legal systems Varygreatly. . ..U.S.citizensarrestedabroad
often have an imperfectunderstandingof Americancriminal
procedure ;mdrnayhave absolutelyno understandingofthe legal
proceduresof the country inwhichtheyare detained. Thus,it is
essentialthat eachmission(or where variationsin local

conditionswarrant, eachconstituentpost) prepare informational
material for deliveryto each arrestedU.S.citizen regardingthe
judicial processthe arresteeis likelyto face. Postsshould
prepare a packet of information covering initial arrest,remand

procedure, trial procedure,appeal process,and penal conditions
and rules.

The purposeof thismaterialis not to usurpthe functionof legal
counsel or encourage a "doit yourself' approach. Rather,it

serves the purpose of helping arresteesunderstandwhatis
happening to themandprovidesa yardstickagainst whichthey
can measure an attorney'sperformance.35

53. Mexican consularofficersare specificallytrainedin United

Stateslaw to provide informationthat could prevent a detainednational
fiom waiving importantlegalrightsand fiom makingpoordecisions
with adverse legal conseq~ences.~~ Bytakingthe timeto explain

35See U.S. Dep't of State,7ForeignAfSairsManual407at
<http:llfoia.state.gov/FAMDir/masterdocs/07fadO7m0410.pdD; see,e.g.,
Judge P. J. DeMuniii, "Introduction," in Joanne Moore, eImmigrants in
Courts (1999)at p.:i(describing case of wrongly convicted Mexican national
who was Mixtec Indian, and who didn't speak Spanish or English proficiently,
yet was only provided a Spanish interpreter at trial); Declaration of Duefias
Gonzalez, paras. 35-36, Annex 4.

36See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, para. 5, Annex7.thoroughlythe applicableproceduralrules, the rolesof variousactorsin
the criminal prosecutions,andthe rights guaranteed the national at each

phaseof the proceedings,consularofficers can overcome thenational's
culturally-rootedmisconceptions ofthe criminaljustice system.

54. Such servicesarevital forrecent Mexican immigrants,as well
asthose who have lived in the United States forseveralyears. Mexican

nationalsoften remain deeplyimmersedin Mexicancultureafiertheir
immigrationto the United tat tes. ^^menever leam English, evenafier
livingin the United States for decades. Moreover,Mexican nationals
facingthe death penalty sufferthe multiple impedimentsof foreign

culture,poverty, and extremelylimited education. TheaverageMexican
nationalon death row has completedless than sevenyearsof school.
Sevenof the Mexican nationalson death row havegoneto schoolfor
lessthan three years.38Manyotherssuffer fiomcognitiveimpairments
stemmingfiom mental retardation,brain damage,and mentalillne~s.~~

55. The consular officer7srole as a "culturalbridge" isparticularly
importantin relation to fouraspectsof a capitalmurderprosecution:
interrogation,plea bargaining,the role of the defense attorney,andthe

establishment of a defense.

a. Vulnerabilityto Interrogation

56. Consular assistanceis invaluablein orderto compensatefor
the well-documentedsusceptibilityof a detainedforeignnationalto a

misunderstandingof his rightsduring interrogation.40Languagebarriers,

37
See Declaration of DuefiasGonzalez, para9-10,Annex 4.

Hector Garcia Torres, Ramiro Ibarra Rubi, Virgilio Maldonado, Abelino
Manriquez Jaquez, Juan Ramon Sanchez Ramirez, Ramiro Hemandez Llanas,
and Rafael Camargo Ojeda.

39See Declaration of Ambassador Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, pa6,Annex
7.

40See,e.g.Amnesty International,SaudiArabia -Alone,afraidandabused,AI
Index:MDE 23/08/00,available at
<http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/saudi/issues/migra nlsthistld>
April 15,2003) ( "[Arrested foreign nationals in Saudi Arabia] may be deceived
or coerced into signing a confession inic, a language they may notaswell as the detainedforeignnational'sunfarniliaritywith the legal
process,leavehim particularlyvulnerableto deceptionor coercionby

standardpolice interrogationtechniquesinto waivinghis rightsand
confessing fal~el~.~'Moreover,becausean indigentMexicannational
willnot receive an attorney to advise him during interrogation,unlesshe

specificallyrequestsoneP2consularoficers are ina unique positionto

understand."); Amnesty International, Japan: Ill-Treatment ofForeigners in
Detention, AI Index: ASA 22/09/97, page 1,November 1997,available at

<http:l/web.amnesty.orgllibrary/index/engasa220091997> (last visited June 10,
2003) ("[Arrested foreign nationals in Japan ] have been beaten, denied access
to interpreters and lawyers [and] forced to sign statements in languages they did
not understand.. ."); Human Rights Watch, Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights
Abuses of Post-Septe.mber 11Detainees, Vol. 14No. 4(G) August 2002, pp. 33-

46, available at <http:l/www.hnv.org/reports/2002/us9 1llUSAO802.pdP (last
visited June 10,2003) (notingthat some foreign nationals detained in the United
States were informeclof their rights only after lengthy interrogation, while
others waived those rights by signing documentsthat they did not understand);

UnitedStates v. Short, 720 F.2d 464,469 (6thCir. 1986)(noting that German
defendant, whose English was limited, "apparently had no knowledge of the
American criminal justice system" and had not knowingly and voluntarily
waived her legal rigl'itsat the time of interrogation).

41This is precisely aihat happened in the case of Mexican national Omar
Aguirre, who was wrongly convicted of murder and sentenced to fifty-five years
in prison. In 1997, Mr. Aguirre was charged with the torture and murder of a

Chicago store owner. He was interrogated and beaten over the course of three
days. Hespoke littlt: English and believed the confession he eventually signed,
which was in English, was a release for him togo home. In December 2002,
federalprosecutors released Mr. Aguirre, who was entirely innocent of any

wrongdoing. See David Heinzmann and Jeff Coen, Jailed by Lies, Freed by
Truth, Chicago Tribune, December 22, 2002.

42 Under Davis v.U,ilitedStates, an attorney will only be provided to an indigent

detainee during interrogation if he clearly requests one. See 512 U.S. 452,459
(1994). As some commentators have noted, "this rule disadvantages those who
are unfamiliar with the American legal system or those whose first language is
not English because they may not know how to communicate an unequivocal

request." Connell and Valladares, supra, §4.5(b); see also Davis at 460
(Kennedy,J., dissenting) (recognizing that the Davis nile will disadvantage
defendants with a "lack of linguistickills").adviseand assistnationalsfacingpolice interrogation,beforethe
appointment of anattorney. 43

57. Mexicanconsularofficershave repeatedly observed that

Mexican nationals, manyof whom are poor, uneducatedlaborerswho
speaklittle~n~lish)~will sign confessionswrittenin English,without
understanding whattheyare ~i~nin~.~I ~n the caseof Mexican national
GabrielSolacheRomero,for example,police officersin Chicago, Illinois

interrogatedhim withoutnotiQing him of his Article36 rights.46
Mr. Solachedid notspeak Englishat the time ofhisarrest,butsigned a
confession writtenin Englishafler undergoingfortyhoursof

interrogation without aninterpreterandduringwhichhe wasphysically
abused. Hisconfessionwas subsequentlyintroducedas the primary
piece of evidence againsthim at histriaL4'

58. WhenMexicanconsularofficersarepromptlynotified of a
suspect'sdetention, theycan alleviatethese misunderstandings,andcan

43Although the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees

defendants a right to an attorney, that right typicallys not attach until the
national makes his first appearance in court. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S.
171, 175(1991) (quoting UnitedStates v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984))
("[The right to counsel attaches] at or after the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings-whether by way of forma1charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information orarra ignment.") .

44 "Compared to other immigrant groups, Mexican immigrants are distinguished
by being young and having low educational levels, high labor participation, low
family and per-capita income, and large household sizes. Mexican male
immigrantsare on average 17 years old, and Mexican females, 23 years old. ..

More than 60 percent of the adult Mexican-immigrant population have no more
than an elementary education." J.Palerm, et al., supra, p. 73.

45See Declaration of Duefias Gonzalez, paras. 35-36, Annex 4.

46 Case No. 47 in Mexico's Application.

47 Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hemandez, Appendix A, para 2993 12,
Annex 7.deterpolice abuseof detainee?-a point theUnitedStatesconceded
longago. 49 Had Mexican consularofficersbeenimmediately notifiedof
Mr. Solache's detention,they wouldhave advisedMr. Solacheofthe
implicationsof signinga confessionunderU.S.law. Theywouldalso

have advisedhi-and the properauthoritie~f the need foranofficia1
interpreterto transkiteMr. Solache's statementsduringhis interactions
withthe auth~rities.~~

59. Consularofficerscanalsoadvisetheir nationalson the critical
differencesbetweeriU.S. lawandMexican law regarding statementsto
law enforcementauthorities. UnderMexican criminallaw,a confession

obtained froma criminaldefendantis admissible againstthat defendant
at trial onlyif the confessionwastaken before the prosecutor
("MinisterioPublico")orjudge and in the presenceof counselor "person

of confidence"to the defendant.5'Unlikeinthe United States,
statementsgiven to thepoliceduringan interrogationconductedoutside
the presence ofdefensecounselcannot beused againstthe defendant at
Further,unlikein the UnitedStates, Mexicanlawgreatlyreduces

48See S.A. Shank & J.Quigley, supra, at 719,720-21 ("A foreigner may also
be particularly vulnerable to deception used by police detectives as a standard

interrogation technique.. .If properly implemented, the right of consular access
can significantly conipensate for the difficulties confronting an accused
foreigner.").ee also Declaration of Michael Iaria, para. 9, Annex 6.

49See U.S. Citizens :Imprisonedin Mexico: Hearings before the Subcommittee

on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on
International Relations, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976)58(Statement of Hon.
Leonard F. Walentynowicz, Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular
Affairs, Department of State) ("Immediate consular access, in [the Department
of State's]opinion, still rematherestraining factor preventing abusive
treatment [in prison]"), and6a(Statement of Hon. William H. Luers, Deputy

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Department of
State) ("immediate consular access" offers the best hope of effective deterrence
of abuse during the interrogation").

50See id.

51
See Declaration of Adrian Franco, par8,Annex 3.

52See id.the relianceon a confessioninthe trialand conviction of a defendantby
minimizingits evidentiaryvalue.53

60. Mexicannationals,particularlyif theyhave hadno prior
contact with theUnitedStates' criminaljustice system, areunlikelyto
understandthisdistinction - evenwhenadvisedby the police of their

Miranda ~i~hts.'~Mexican nationalArturo Juarez ~uarez?'throughhis
Spanish interpreter,told policeduringhis interrogationthat he "doesn't
understandanythingabout the [U.S.]justice ~~stern."'~Likewise,Felix

Rocha Diaz,whospokeno Englishandhad a fourth-gradeeducation,
testifiedat apre-trialhearingthathe didnot understandthathe had the
rightto have an attorney presentduringhis interrogation,nor did he
understandthe meaningor implicationof "waiving" his legal~i~hts.~'

BothMr.JuiirezSuirez andMr. RochaDiaz gave incriminating
statementsto the a~thorities.~'In Mr. Rocha Diaz'scase,his statement
was virtually theonlyevidencethat connectedhim to the rime.'^ As is

theirpracticein al1cases,had consularofficersbeen notified of their
detentionirnmediately uponarrest,theywould have advised bothmen
notto speakto the police without firstseekingthe adviceof a lawyer,

53 See id.

54 SeeDeclaration of Duefias Gonzalez at para24-34, Annex 4. In Miranda v.
Arizona, the United States Supreme Court indicated that a defendant must be
informed of certain constitutional rights prior to interrogation. The Court
provided, however, that a defendant "may waive effectuation of these rights,

provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligen384."
U.S.436,444 (1966).

" Case No. 10 in Mexico's Application.

56SeeDeclaiation of Roberto RodriguezHernandez, Appendix A, para. 54, n.
45,Annex 7.

57SeeDeclaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hemandez, Appendix A, para. 265,
Annex 7.

''See id. ,aras.53,266.

59See id. ,ara.270.informedthemabout the implications ofa confessionunderU.S. law,

and insistedon the provisionof a neutral,qualifiedinterpreter.

b. PleaBargaining

61. Inthe United States,a "pleabargain" is an offerto a defendant

by a prosecutorof a reduced sentencein exchangeforthe defendant's
pleaof guilty. The resolution of criminalcasesthroughthe plea
bargainingprocessiisverycommoninthe United tat tes. ^ 'e

ArnericanBarAssociationhas recognizedthat in a capital case, one of
defensecounsel'sprimaryobligationsis vigorouslyto pursue such a
negotiatedsettlemeilt,sinceit is oneof the most importantmeans of
protectinga defendantfromthe impositionof the deathpenalty. 61 As

described below,Mexican consularofficerscanprovidecritical
assistanceinthis process.

62. In manylJ.S.jurisdictions,the prosecution willaccepta fonnal
profferof evidencein support of mitigationof a possible sentencebefore

decidingwhether to seekthe deathpenalty.62Thestrengthofthis

60S. Gross, Lost Livi:s: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 6 Law &

ContemporaryProblems (Autumn 1998)at p. 142 ("eighty to nearly ninety
percent of convictions result from guilty pleas."). The vast majority ofnal
prosecutions in the United Statesare resolved without trials. As Mr. Gros
observes, most criminal casesare resolved pre-trial, "by the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion to dismiss, reduce charges, or recommend or agreeto a
particular sentence.Id. (citations omitted). See also Santobello v.New York,
404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (U.S.Supreme Court called the practice of plea

bargaining "an essential component of the administration of justice" in the U.S.).

61See generally American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 10.9.1
(revised edition, 2003,Annex 66. As one of the most prominent capital
litigators in the United States has observed, "[dleath is different because

avoiding execution iij,in many capital cases, the best and only realistic result
possible." K.McNaYly,Death is Different: YourApproach to a Capital Case
Must be Different,Too,The Champion, Mar. 1984, at 8, 15. As a result, plea
bargains must be aggressively sought by defense counsel in al1capital
prosecutions. Id.

62See ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.9.1(Commentas.) ,Annex 66.presentation, alongwith other factors,canplay a substantialrolein

persuadingtheprosecutionto waivethe death penalty.63In some
jurisdictions, thisdecisionmaynot beconditionedon the defendant's
acceptance ofguilt,but inmanyStates,the prosecution will only agree to
waivethe death penalty ifthe defendantpleads guiltytomurder and

acceptsa lengthytermof irnprison~nent.~~

63. Consularofficersplaytwo criticalfunctionsin the delicate,
ofienprotracted negotiationsthat lead to a plea bargain. First, consular

officersmeetwithprosecutors,or presentwritten submissions,that
containcrucialmitigating evidence. Ofien,consular officerswill have
gatheredthis evidencethemselves,in Mexico, after leaming of the
defendant'sdetention. The consulatecommonlysearchesal1archives

and databasesin Mexicoto determinewhetherthe defendant hasa prior
criminalrecord,andprovidesdocumentationof that searchto defense
counsel. Other times,consularoficers willobtain schooland hospital

recordsthatprovideproof of a defendant's mentalor physical
condition. 65 Sometimes,consularofficerscan explaincultural factors
that mitigate thedefendant'sculpability. 66

64. Throughthese efforts,Mexicanconsularofficershave playeda
vital role in persuadingprosecutors towaivethe death penaltyin at least
thirty-eightcases inthe last three years a10ne.~~

63 See id; see alsW. S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital
Cases: The EvolvingStandardof Care, 1993 Universis, of Illinois Law Review
(1993) at pp. 328-29.

64 See ABA Guidelines,Guideline 10.9.1(Commentas.) ,Annex 66.

65 See Declarationof Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez,para. 11,Annex 7.

66 See A.D. Renteln,Raising Cultural Defenses, in Conne11and Valladares,
supra, at 7-20(describing case of Mexican national who killed a manin
response to a deeplyoffensive insult, and explaining howhis culture influenced
his response).

67
Declaration ofRobertoRodriguez Hernandez, para. 31,Annex 7. See also
Declaration of MichaelIaria, para. 6 (describing the case of Mexican national
Nicolas SolorioVasquez) , Annex 6;L. Lafay,VirginiaIgnores Outcry, The 65. Second,consularofficersassist in explainingthe plea
bargainingprocessto the defendant. It is criticalthat defendants
understandthisconcept,sinceit mayprovidethe onlymeansby which

they canavoid possible execution. Mexicanlaw,however, doesnot
allow for plea bargaining forseriousfel~nies.~~Consequently, Mexican
nationalsunfamiliarwith thepleabargainingprocessmay not understand
the benefits thatderivefiomthis practice. Defense counsel's effortsto

explainthe processare oflenunavailing,since Mexican nationals
frequentlymistrustcourt-appointedattorneysprovidedby the
governmentthat is seekingto incarcerate

66. Mexican nationalsmayalso failto comprehendthat unless

there is a specificagreementto provideleniency,their pleaof guiltywill
not guaranteea les,serpunishrnent. For example,in at leasttwo of the
cases listedin Mexico'sApplication,nationals enteredguiltypleas
without anynegotiated sett~ement.~'In neither case didthe defendant
obtain any concessionfiomtheprosecution inexchangeforhis guilty

plea. Both received the death penalty.

67. In severalcases, Mexicanconsularofficershave playedan
instrumentalrole in explainingtheadvantag of accepting aplea bargain.
One exampleisthe caseof FranciscoGonzalezReyes, whowas accused

of a triplehomicideinthe stateof Florida. In early2002,the prosecution

Roanoke Times, 6 July 1997,at C1(noting that Mexican consulate negotiated
plea bargains onbetialfoftwo Mexican citizens facing the death penaltj

68 See,e.g.,Declaration ofMichael Iaria, para. 7, Anne6

69~ee Declaration of Adrian Franco,para. 7, Annex 3.

70 See J. Palerm,et ;al.,supra,atp. 93("If there is a high risk involved inthe

situation, Mexican immigrantsmayrefuse to divulge information to anyone in
authority- attorney,judge, or counselor.").

" Daniel Angel Plata and CarlosRene PérezGutiérrez (casesNo. 40 and No. 51
in Mexico's Application, respectively). Mr.Pérez Gutierrez entereda secalled
"Alford" plea, under which hetechnically admitted no guilt;the practical effect,
however, is exactlythe sameas a guilty plea. Thedefendant is convicted, and
deemed to be guiltyof the crime.See NorthCarolina v.Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970) (allowing plisaof guilty evenwhere defendantmaintains innocence).offeredMr.GonzalezReyesthe optionof pleadingguilty, andreceiving
three life sentences.The evidenceof his guiltwas ovenvhelming. Mr.

GonzalezReyes,however,would notacceptthe offer.

68. None ofthe doctorswhohadevaluatedMr.GonzalezReyes,
eitherforthe defenseor theprosecution,spoke Spanish.The courtwould

not authorizefundsfor anout-of-stateexpert, so Mexico retained Dr.
AntonioPuente,a bilingualneuropsychologisttoevaluateMr. Gonzalez
Reyes' mental status.Accordingto defensecounsel,Dr.Puente"quickly
built a rapportwith Francisco," andas a result,Mr. Gonzalez Reyeswas
more forthcominginproviding informationrelating tohis mentalhealth.

The expert concludedthat Mr.Gonzalez Reyeswas mentallyretarded.

69. Arrned withthisknowledge,consularofficerstookextracare
in explaininghis legalrghts. In addition,the consulate explained the

situationto Mr. GonzalezReyes'family,who alsospoke tothe
defendantand encouragedhimto acceptthe offer. Finally, on23
January 2003,Mr.GonzalezReyesaccepted the prosecution's offer,and
was sentenced tolifeimprisonment.72

c. ProvidingaBridgeto Defense Counsel

70. Typically,poorMexicannationalsdistrustindividualsin a
position of authority,andlackfaithinthe ability ofthe legal systemto

protectthem.73Theirdistrustfi-equentlyextendsto theirowndefense

72In addition, if defense attorneys do not speak Spanish, they may not spend
enough time explaining key concepts to their Mexican national clients. This is
particularly important when the prosecution offers to resolve the case through a
plea bargain. The intervention of a Spanish-speaking consular officer or
attorney, in these cases, is often critical in helping the national understand his
rights. For instance, Mexican national Carlos Jahuey Carillo, who was facing

the death penalty in Arizona, was offered a plea bargain by prosecutors that
called for life imprisonment in lieu of the death penalty. He repeatedly rejected
the offer, until Mexico retained a Spanish-speaking lawyer to explain the terms
and conditions of the agreement, as well asthe consequences of rejecting the
agreement. On 18 December 2002, he accepted the prosecution's offer, and was
sentenced to life imprisonment.

73See Declaration of Adriin Franco, para5,Annex 3;see generally J.Palerm, et
al,supra, at p. 92. These attitudes areprevalent among other foreign nationals
in the legal system, as well.eJ. Bauer,Speaking of Culture: Immigrants inlawyers,whornthey viewas beingpart ofthe legalsystem. 74 Consular
interventionis critical to explainthe role ofdefensecounsel, and
encouragemeaningfulandopen communicationbetweenlawyersand
their Mexicannational clients.

71. It is not imcommonforMexicannationalsto developa
relationshipof tmsi;with consularofficersthat simplydoesnot extendto
their defenseattorneys. Consular officersspeak theirlanguage,
understandMexican slang,and offerthe solidarityof a fellow
countryman. Consularofficerscan also detect symptomsof cognitive

impaiments that oAengo undetectedby lawyerswho do not speak
Spanish, andcannot hear the verbalcuesof mentalillness. Some
attorneysattribute oddbehaviorto culturaldifferences,when inreality,it
is a signof mental illnessor mentalretardati~n.'~

3. Mexican ConsularOfficersEnhancethe Quality ofLegal
RepresentationAt Trial

a. Monitoring TrialCounsel

72. It is certainlyno exaggerationto observethat the singlemost

important factorin determining whether a capitaldefendant livesor dies
isthe qualityof his trial attorney. As theArnericanBarAssociationhas
explained,

The qualityof counsel's"guiding hand"in modem
capital irasesis crucialto ensuringa reliable

determinationof guiltand the impositionof an
appropriatesentence. Today,it is universallyaccepted
that the responsibilitiesofdefense counselare uniquely
demancling,both inthe highlyspecializedlegal

theAmerican Legal System, in Joanne Moore, ed., Immigrants in Courts (1999),
at p.18;Conne11and Valladares, supra, a1-7 (describing El Salvadoran
witness' tendency to defer to prosecutor's questions by answering "norecuerdo"
(1don't remember) when she actually meant "no").

74See J. Palerm, et al., suprap. 92.

''See Declarationof Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, para.7,Annex 7 knowledge thatcounsel must possessandin the
advocacyskillshe or she mustmaster. At everystage of
a capital case,counsel mustbe awareof specialized and

frequentlychanginglegalprinciplesandr~les.~~

73. Yet it is by nowcomrnonplaceinthe UnitedStatesthat
indigentdefendantsarerepresentedby untrained,unqualified,or under-
hded attorneys. As one leadingexperton capitalpunishmenthas

observed,it is often:

abysmallyineffectual lawyers - chronically under-
remunerated; oftenyoungandinexperienced,patently

unqualified andincompetent,unethical, orbar-
disciplined; sometimesdrug-impaired, drunken,
comatose, psychotic,or senile; veryoftengrossly
negligent; andnearlyalwaysout-gunned--who

represent capital defendantsinmost deathpenaltyStates
aroundthe country. 77

74. It has been persuasivelyshownthat in importantrespects "this
counselsituationis worse in capitalthan in noncapital cases" inthe

United tat tes. ^^nited StatesSupremeCourtJusticeRuthBader
Ginsburghasbeen quotedas statingflatly: "People whoare well
representedat trial do not get thedeathpenalty,"and "1haveyet to seea
deathcaseamongthe dozenscomingto the SupremeCourton eve-of-
execution stayapplicationsin whichthe defendant waswell-represented

76ABA Guidelines, Guideline 1.1(Commentas.) ,Annex 66.

77J.Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100ColumbiaLaw Review (2000)
pp. 2102-06;see also Alabama v. Shelton, 1S. Ct. 1764, 1772(2002), quoting
United States v. Cronic, 4U.S. 648,656 (1984) (indigent counsel often fail to
subject the government's case to "the crucible of meaningful adversarial
testing").

78 Liebmaqsupra, at pp. 2102-06.

79 Anne Gearan, Supreme CourtJustice Supports DeathPenalty Moratorium,
ASSOCIATE PRESS,9 April 2001. 75. Mexican consularofficersare specifically trainedto monitor
and support defensecounsel'sefforts,attendcourt proceedings,and

confer regularly withthe defendantandhis family.80Someattorneys -
particularly ifthey are not Spanish-speaking - will nottakethe time to
visit ther client^. In'these cases, consularoficers - or the attorneys

working withthe Ciovernmentof Mexico - are literally the only people
communicatingwith detainedMexicannationals. Here,too, Mexico's
involvement in a case can makethe differencebetween lifeanddeath.82

76. Sometimes,defenseattorneysarecompetent,but lack

experience representing Mexican nationals. In thesecases,consular
officers will provicleguidanceon culturalfactors,providenamesof
bilingual experts,and assist in investigatingthenational'slifein

~exico. 83

77. Other defensecounselare simplyincompetent,as inthecase of
Mi-. CarlosAvena Guillen. 84 In these cases,Mexican consularofficers

'OSee Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, para. 6,Annex 7.

" Two of the Mexican nationals listed in this Application, Daniel Ange1Plata
(No. 40) and Ramiro Ibarra Rubi (No. 35), never met the lawyers who

represented them during their state post-conviction appeals.early, a lawyer
who never meets his client is unable reliably to determine whether the client
suffers from mental disabilities, regardless of cultural barSeerid., par8.

The case of Ernesto Baylon Mendoza is illustrative. Mr. Baylon Mendoza
was charged with capital murder in rural Texas. Mexican consular officers

enlisted the assistance of a Spanish-speaking attorney to interview Mr. Baylon
Mendoza. After interviewing him, the attorney determined that Mr. Baylon
Mendoza was a juvenile at the time of the crime. Mexican consular officers
subsequently obtained his birth certificate for defense counsel. Defense counsel
had been representiilg Mr. Baylon Mendoza for six months, but was noteven
awarethat his client was only seventeen at the time ofthe crime. Counsel
showed Mr. Baylon Mendoza's Mexican birth certificate to the prosecution,

which promptly agrleedto waive the death penalty. See Declaration of Roberto
Rodriguez Hemandez, para. 33, Annex 7.

83Id.,paras. 6-8.

'*See discussion of'Mr.Avena Guillen's case infra, Chapter III.B.3.do not hesitate to (1) persuade thecourtto dischargecourt-appointed

counsel and provide new counsel;(2)recruitpro bon0 counsel;or (3)
retain counsel to representthe defendantg5Byenhancingthe qualityof
legal representation,consular assistanceis vitalto an adequatedefenses6

78. For example,in the caseof Nicolas SolorioVasquez,a
Mexican national charged with capitalmurder in the state of
~ashin~ton,~~the court initially appointeda patently unqualified lawyer

to representhim. Mexican consularoficers objectedto his
appointment, and requested thatthe court appointa morequalified
attorney. In response toMexico'sobjections,the lawyer withdrewfrom

the case, and another lawyerwas appointed. Thenew lawyerwas

85Id.,para. 9.

86See ,.g., Report to thUN Commission on Human Rights (document
E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.3), Findings of the Special Rapporteur, 117-121 ("[Nlot
informing the [foreign national] defendant of the right to contact hislher

consulate for assistance may curtail the right to an adequate defence[.Iv). The
case of Liliana Pifia, a Mexican national charged with murder in rural Arkansas,
is illustrative. While Ms. Pifiawas initially represented by an experienced
capital litigator, he was subsequently removed from the case and did not get
another lawyer for several weeks. She remained in the jail, isolated and

depressed, and her mental condition began to deteriorate. Whena consular
officer observed Ms. Pifia's mental decline and learned that she was without
legal representation, the consular officer contacted jailciais, the district
attorney's office, and expert legal counsel with the Mexican Capital Legal
Assistance Program. Counsel located an experienced capital litigator in
Arkansas, and then persuaded ajudge to appoint him to represent Ms. Pifia.

Ms. Pifia was immediately removed from thejail and transferred to a psychiatric
facility. Mexico then provided funds for both a bilingual neuropsychologist, and
referred defense counsel to a bilingual psychiatrist, both of whom evaluated
Ms. Pifia. The psychiatrist concluded she was incompetent to stand trial, was
insane atthetime of the crime, and did not understand her legal rights atthe

time of her interrogation. Faced with this new information, as well as a
competent and aggressive defense lawyer, the prosecutor offered to waive the
death penalty, and Ms. Pifiapleaded guilty to a lesser charSee Declaration of
Roberto Rodriguez Hemandez, para. 33, Annex 7.

87Mr. Solorio Vasquez's case is not inciuded in Mexico's Application.

See Declaration of Michael Iaria, par5,Annex 6.ultimately successfulin persuadingthe prosecutionto waive thedeath
penalty,even thoughthe case was highlyaggravated. 89

b. GatheringEvidence

Mexicanconsularofficers also assist in gatheringevidencefortrial.
Most ofienthistakes the formof locating recordsand witnessesin

~exico.~' Wherenecessary,however, theconsulatealsoprovidesfmds
forthe retention of'experts and criminalinvestigators toaid in the
presentationof an effective defenseon behalfof the nati~nal.~'For
instance,in the case of Emesto EstebanRarnirezAnguiano,charged with
murder in Dallas,Texas, the Mexican consulate conductedsuch a

thoroughinvestigationof the crime that prosecutors dismissedthe
charges against hinî. In a letterwritten tothe Texas AttorneyGeneral's
ofice opposingMexico's attemptto gather policereportson the case, the

districtattorneyobserved:

1have also learned that the ConsuladoGeneralde Mexicohas
providedinvestigatorsforthe benefitof the defendantandthe
attorneyrepresentinghim inthe murdercase. They have

intervieweclwitnesses inthe criminalcase and provided
translators. They have madethe defendant'sdefenseattorney
awareof additional witnesses that wereunknownto law
enforcemeritofficers,helped the defense attorneylocate
additionalwitnesses, interviewedthose witnessesand even

determinedwho has possession ofthe murderweapon that
deputieswere mable to locateat the sceneof the crime. They are
clearlyacting on behalf of the defendantin the criminalcaseP2

79. On 8May 2003, the prosecutionannouncedthat it wouldbe
dismissingal1charges in the caseP3 Mr. RarnirezAnguiano'sdefense

89 Id.

"~ee Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernhndez, paras11-13,Annex 7.

91See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernkndez, para11, Annex 7

92See Declaration of Peter Lopez, para7-8,Annex 2.

93See id. at par10.counsel has statedthat withoutMexico'sassistance, Mr.Ramirez
Anguianowould likely stillbe facingmurderchargesP4

c. Preserving InternationalLegalIssues

80. Mexicanconsularofficersalsoassistdefensecounselby

educatingthem directly aboutArticle 36 obligationsand helpingto raise
the claim of aviolationas earlyas possible.95Thisis particularly
important withregardto the municipal law doctrineof procedural
default,discussedinfia in Chapters1II.Cand1V.B. The doctrine

mandates thatwhere trial counseldoes not raisecertainsubstantiverights
at trial,thoserightsare lost to the nationalin al1subsequent
proceedings.96Inthe lastthreeyearsalone,Mexicohas provided
informationon Article 36,as well as sample briefsand otherinformation

on internationallaw, inat least sixty-sevencapitalcases involving
Mexican nationals. In this way, Mexicohas succeededinpreserving
cruciallegalissuesthat can laterbe raisedon agpeal,even if the

defendantis convicted and sentencedto death.

4. MexicanConsularOfficersAssistin AmassingVital
MitigationEvidence.

81. In a capitalcase, it is imperativethat defensecounsel conducta
wide-rangingand intensiveinvestigationof the defendant'sbackground,
mentalcondition,and life experiencestogatherevidencethat militates

94See id. at para11.

95See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, para. 10, Annex 7.

96See discussion, infra Chapter 1V.B.

97 In other cases, Mexico has intewened to preserve a defendant's rights to
appeal his conviction and death sentence, after incompetent defense attorneys
missed crucial filing deadlines. Appellate review in capital casesgoverned by

strict filing deadlines. If those deadlines are not met, the courts will refuse to
review a defendant's appeal. This happened in the case of Daniel Angel Plata,
whose attorney missed a filing deadline byfrve months. Mexico retained
counsel to file anamicus brief in the federal district court, and was able to
persuade the court to permit Mr. Plata to file his appeal. See Declaration of
Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, Appendix A, para. 250,Annex 7.against the impositionof the death penalty.In the parlanceof capital

litigation,this "mitigating evidence"is presented not as a legaldefenseto
the crime itself,but ratheras anexplanation for whythe crimewas
committed. Mitigating evidenceservesto humanizethe defendant,both
in the eyes ofthe prosecution andin the eyesof thejury, andis an

essentialcomponerit inthe defense of every capitalcaseP8

82. As describedabove,mitigatingevidenceis ofienpresented to
the prosecutionpriorto trial in an effortto persuade the prosecution to

waivethe death penalty. In addition,mitigatingevidenceis presented
duringthe sentencingphase of a capital murder Atthe sentencing
phase, mitigatingevidence - oftenavailableonly inthe homestate -

providesthe best and only hopeof convincingthejury to sparethe
national's life.loO

83. Withouttheassistanceof the consulate, mitigation

investigationon behalf ofa Mexican nationalis extraordinarilydifficult.
As one of the United States'leading capital investigators hasexplained:

In myexperience, theprocess of compilingan accurate
socialhistoryis evenmore time-consuming anddelicate

when interviewingclients and farnilymembersfiom
foreigncultures, due toinevitablecultural
misunderstandingsabout the nature of the legalprocess

and thepurposeof the investigation. Everyaspectof the

98 See ABA Guideliries, Guideline 10.7(Commentary), Annex 66.

99 Capital prosecutions in the United States are bifurcated. In the first stage, the
jury decides whether the Government has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant committed the charged offense. In the second stage, the jury

must decide whether to sentence the defendant to be executed. See ABA
Guidelines, Guideline 1.1 (Commentary), Annex 66.

'O0 Often this evidence is presented through a myriad of bilingual and bicultural
experts, including psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists,Pl workers, and

others. Consular officers frequently are more familiar with these experts than
local defense counse:l. In several cases, where the national has not been able to
secure funding for tkieseexperts from the court, Mexico has provided the
necessary funding. ;PeeDeclaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, para. 11,
Annex 7. investigationis moredifficult abroad, fi-omgathering
records togainingthe trust and cooperation of
witnes~es.'~'

84. Investigationin ruralMexico is costly, time-consuming,and
logistically complicated. Withthe assistance of Mexican consular
officers,however,attorneysobtainrecords, interviewwitnesses,identifj
and securelocal guides to help locatewitnesses, and ensure Mexican

witnessesare providedtransportationand visas to enter the United
States.'O2 Mr. Stetlerobserves:

The degreeof cooperationof the foreign governmentcm
have tremendous impacton the successor failureofthe

investigation. The foreigngovernmentcm assist in
securingthe cooperationof local institutionsin locating
and copyinghistoricalrecords, it cm provideaccessto
ethnoculturallycompetentexperts who can facilitate

counsel'sunderstandingof the client'swald and
worldview,and it canpromote trust between clientand
counselby helpingthe client understandthe legal
îiamework in whichcounsel is operating. 'O3

85. In the lastthree yearsalone, Mexico has providedfunds for
experts,mitigationspecialists,or investigatorsin utleast twenty-two
capitalmurder cases. In dozensof other cases, Mexico has gathered
records and documentsfiom Mexico. Mexicois confidentthatthese

efforts have savedthe lives of Mexican nationals.

86. The importanceof consular assistancein gatheringmitigating
evidencewas recently recognizedby the Oklahoma court oflastresort in
the case of Gerardo Valdez, a Mexican national sentenced to death in

'O'See Declaration of Russell Stetler,para. 15,Annex34.

'O2See Declaration ofPeter Lopez, para.4, Annex 2; Declaration Michael Iaria,
para. 6, Annex 6;Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hemandez, para. 13,Annex

7;see also S. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not forthe
Worst Crime But forthe Worst Lawyer, 103 YaleLawJournal(1994),at p.
1877.

'O3Declaration of Russell Stetler, para. 16, Ann34.that statein 1989. The court observed thatMr.Valdez had been
representedat trial bya lawyer whohad neverbefore handled acapital
case. Hehad no moneyto retain expertsor investigators,and neglected
to investigateMr. Valdez'schildhoodin Mexico. The Oklahomacourt

held:

We canriotignore the significanceand importance of the
factual evidencediscoveredwiththe assistance of the
Mexican Consulate.It is evidentfromthe record before
this Courtthat the Governmentof Mexico would have
intervenedin the case, assistedwith Petitioner'sdefense,

and provided resourcesto ensurethathe received a fair
trial and sentencinghearing .We believetrial counsel, as
well as representatives of theStatewho had contact with
Petitioner priorto trial andhew he was a citizenof
Mexico, failedin their dutiesto informPetitioner of his

rightto contact his consu~ate.'~~

87. As inthe case of Mr. Valdez, consularofficers had no
opportunityto assist the defensein gatheringmitigatingevidence in the
casesofthiq Mexican nationals listedin Mexico'sApplication. While
manyof those cases have notyet beenfullyinvestigated,as discussed

aboveit is clearthat in at least some of the cases,attorneys failedto
detectcompellingevidenceof severe cognitiveimpainnents. For
instance, atleast five Mexican nationalsfacingthe death penalty have
been foundto be mentally retardedin the lastthree years alone, after
Mexicoalerteddefensecounsel tothe need forpsychologicaltesting

and/orreferreddefense counsel to competent, bilingualexperts: Virgilio
ald do na do R,ar^iroIbarra~ubi,"~ JoséCalderon alo or ni no,'^^

'O4Valdez v.State,46 P.3d 703, 710 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).

105Case No. 36 in Mexico's Application.

'O6Case No. 34 in Mexico's Application.

'O7See Declaration of Denise 1.Young, Annex5. Mr. Calderon Palomino was
recently foundineligible for the death penalty, due to his mental retardation. He
is not listed in Mexico's Application.FranciscoGonzalez~e~es,"' and DanielAngel~1ata.l~~In three of

thosecases,Mexicoprovided the necessaryfundsfor testing ancilor
investigation,since defense counselhad no resourcesto retain a mental
healthexpert.I Io

In other cases, trial attorneysfailedto locatekey mitigation
88.
witnessesliving in Mexico. Duringpost-convictionproceedings in those
samecases,however,consularofficershave foundwitnesses and
arrangedfordefense counsel to interviewthem. For instance,in the case

of OmarFuentesMartinez, l1 the consulate locatedMr. Martinez's
brotherby arranginga radio broadcast in NuevoLaredo, Mexico,where
the witnesswas living. The consulateknewthatthe majorityof
Mexicans,particularlyin cornrnunitieswith highilliteracy rates, receive

newsthroughradio stations. The witness, who didnot read or write,
heardthe announcementand responded. No decisionhas yet been issued
in Mr.Martinez'spost-convictionchallenge.

1. Fifty-fourCases of Non-Cornpliance With Article36.

89. Fifty-fourIl2Mexicannationalshavebeen convicted and
sentencedtodeath as a resultof criminalproceedingsin whichthe

'O8Mr. Gonzalez Reyes, whose case is discussed in greater detail, supra at paras

67-69, is not listed in Mexico's Application since he pled guilty and received a
life sentence.

109Case No. 40 in Mexico's Application.

110See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, para. 7, Annex 7.

"' Case No. 15in Mexico's Application.

This number encompasses al1of the Mexican nationals listed in Mexico's
Application, except one: Ange1Maturmo Resendiz. In his case, Mexico has
concluded that the authorities didrovide the requisite notification "without

delay;" that is, beforeking any action detrimental to the rights ofthe detainee.
Mexico therefore seeks no remedy for Mr. Maturino Resendiz (No. 37), since
there was no apparent violation of Article 36.UnitedStates failedto comply withtheir obligationstoinformthem,
without delay,of theirrightsto consularnotification and accessunder

Article36(1)(b).'I3 Fi@-one of thesenationals currentlyface death
sentencesin the United tat te 4.'In each case, the competentauthorities
hadreasonto be awareofthe detainedindividual'sMexicannationality.

Nevertheless,in each case, Mexicannationals weredeprivedof their
rightsto seek consular assistance, andMexico was deprivedof its right
to provideconsularservices. Inthe vastmajorityof cases, Mexican
consularofficerslemed oftheir nationals' detentionsonly

coincidentally - throughsourcessuchas the national'sfarnily,media
reports, orthe nationalhimself

90. In thirîycases,Mexicoleamed of the detentionsonlyafier its

nationalswerealready tried,convicted,and sentencedtodeath.'I5 At
that juncture, most ofiena numberof years afierthe dateof arrest,the
Mexican con su la te"^sistance was necessarily limited to humanitarian
assistanceand the provisionof tgal assistancein post-judgrnent

proceedings. As djscussedmore fullybelow,Mexico waspreventedin
thesecases frompsovidingconsular servicesat themostcriticalphase of
the capitalmurderprosecution; namely,prior to and duringtrial
proceedings.

However, since the filing of Mexico's Application, Mexico has discovered an
additional Mexican national under sentence of death in California. The
detainee, Enrique Zambrano Garibi, wasfirst detained in 1989,and was
sentenced to death iri 1993. The authorities never notified Mr. Zambrano of his

rights under Article 36, nor did they notifj Mexican consular officers of his
detention. The case is discussed in detail in the Declaration of Roberto
Rodriguez Hernandez, Appendix A, paras. 146-149,Annex 7.

'13See id.,Appendix A, Annex 7.

Il4Three Mexican nationals, Juan Caballero Hernandez (No. 43, Mario Flores
Urban (No. 46), and Gabriel Solache Romero (No. 47), also were convicted and
sentenced to death as a result of criminal proceedings in whichthe U.S. failedto
abide by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. Their sentences have since been
commuted by formel;Governor Ryan of Illinois as his final act in offic11on
January 2003. Mexico continues to seek a remedy on their behalf to redress the

authorities' failureto comply with Article 36 in their cases.
115
See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, Appendix A, Annex 7. 91. In twenty-four cases, Mexico learnedof the nationals'
detentionsbeforetrial,but oftenafterthe authoritieshad obtained
incriminatingstatementsortaken other actionsharmfulto the rightsof

thosenationals. Inonlythreeof these twenty-fourcases didthe
authoritiesevenattemptto comply withArticle 36in a timelymanner.
Intwo cases,the authorities notified thedefendantofhis rightsunder
Article 36,but failedto providethe requisitenotification"without

delay."'16In anothercase,the authoritiesfailed toprovidecomplete
Article36 notificationto a mentallyil1national specifically, failingto
informhimthat theywould, onhis request,informthe consularpost of
his detention,pursuantto Article36(1)(b).'17

92. In each ofthe fifty-fourcases presenting violationsofArticle
36, hadMexicobeen notifiedby United Statesauthoritiesofthe
detentionsof itsnationals withoutdelay, Mexicowould haverendered
comprehensivelegaland humanitarianassistance,consistentwith its
long-standing policyand practice in capital cases.

93. The casesof CésarRobertoFierroReynaand CarlosAvena
Guillen,two Mexican nationalswhose capitalmurderprosecutionswere
taintedby such failures,typifi the plight of the fifty-four Mexican

nationals facing execution.Mr. Fierro Reyna remainsat imminentrisk
of execution inthe stateof Texas.

''6~arcos Esquivel Barrera (No. 7) and Arturo Juarez Suarez (No. 10).In the
case of Arturo Juarez Suarez, despite the police department's full awareness of
the defendant's nationality,the police interrogatedMr. Juarez Suarez and
obtained an incriminating statement. Only after obtaining the statement- which

wasused as evidence against him at trial- did the authorities notifi him ofhis
rights to consular notification and access. In the case of Mr. Esquivel Barrera,
the authorities formally notified himof his Artic36 rights more than one year
after his arrest.

'l7In the case of Pedro Hernandez Alberto (No. 13), the police officer who
arrested him statedthat he told the defendant that "if he wanted to contact the
Mexican Consulate thathe could." When the defendant failed to respond, the

officer began to interrogate him. The officerneglected to inform Mr. Hernandez
Alberto that the authorities would inform thelosest consularpost of his
detention, and would forward any communicationfrom Mr. HernandezAlberto
without delay. 2. CésarRoberto Fierro ~e~na''~

94. On 1August 1979,TexasauthoritiesarrestedMr. Fierro,age
22, on suspicionofmurderof a taxi cab driver inEl Paso,Texason 27
February 1979.

95. El Pasositsdirectlyacrossthe borderfrom CiudadJuirez,
Mexico. Shortlyalterthe murder,witnessespositivelyidentifiedtwo
suspectsas havingbeen seendriving thevictim's cab acrosstheborder
into CiudadJuarezon the nightof thecrime. The police recommended
that capitalmurderchargesbe brought againstthem. Prosecutorsinstead
chargedboth suspects with unauthorizeduseof the victim's taxi.

96. Five morithsafterthe homicide,a mentallydisturbedjuvenile
offenderapproached theEl Pasopoliceandclaimed thathe had beena
passengerin the victim's cab,and witnessedMr.Fierrocommit the
murder. After discoveringthat Mr.Fierro wasa Mexican nationaland
residentof CiudadJuarez,the El Paso policedetectivesdroveto Juhiez

to meetwith Juarez police CornandanteJorgePalacios. Shortlyafter
this meeting, theJuhrez policeabductedMr.Fierro'sparents andheld
them inthe Juirez jail.

97. The El Pasopolice then arrestedMr. Fierroat the El Paso
Countyjail, and begantheir interrogation.He was never advisedofhis
rightsto consularriotificationand accessunderArticle 36. At the time,

he spokelittle English,andhad hadonlyattended schoolfor fiveyearsin
Mexico.

98. Mr. Fierro initially deniedanyknowledgeof the crime. Once
he learnedthat the Jdrez policehadabductedhis parents,however,he
gave a full "confession"to the crime. AftersecuringMr. Fierro7s

confession,prosecutorsdismissedthe chargesagainst the two initial
suspectsand released themfi-omcustody.

99. Almost i.mmediatelyafterhis parentswere released,Mr. Fierro
recantedhis confession,declaringthathe was innocentandhad

'18Case No. 30 in hlexico's Application. For detailed citations of the facts
discussed in theasr:of Mr. Fierro, see Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez
Hernandez, Appendix A, paras. 163182,Annex 7.confessed onlyout of fearthat hisparentswouldfacebrutaltorture atthe

handsof the notorious Juirez police ifhe didnot cooperate.

100. At a pre-trial hearingto suppressMr.Fierro'sstatementas
having beencoerced, however,the El Paso policedetectiveinsisted that
he hadno prior knowledgeofthe arrestof Mr.Fierro's parentsin Juiirez,
that he had not conspired withthe Juhez police and thatno coercion
was usedto elicit the confession. Mr.Fierro's confessionwasfound
admissibleby the court andthe caseproceededto trial.

101. No physical evidence linked Mr.Fierroto the crime. Indeed,
aside fromthe confession,no otherevidencecorroboratedthe alleged
eyewitnessaccount. At trial, Mr. Fierro'slandlordcorroborated hisalibi
forthe nightof the crime. Theprosecution'skeywitness gave
contradictoryand bizarretestimony,at onepointaccusing oneof the
jurors of meetinghimon the nightof the homicideto purchase astolen

radio. Thedefenseagainarguedthat the confessionwasboth coerced
and fabricated,pointing to thefact thatMr.Fierrohad insistedon adding
to his statement a declarationthat his parents werecompletely innocent
of anyinvolvement. Mr.Fierro's parentstestifiedthat they were
detainedbythe Juhez police, threatenedwithtorture andthen abruptly
releasedafiertheir son confessed. The detectiveadmitted thathe had
providedMr. Fierrowiththe "fine points" forhis confession,such as the

date and locationofthe crime andthe dispositionof the body.

102. Nevertheless,on 12February 1980,Mr. Fierrowas convicted
of murder. He was sentencedto deathon 15February 1980.

103. After his sentencewasimposed,Mr.Fierro's mother sought
the assistanceof the Mexicanconsulate. Sincethat time, Mexico has
providedextensiveandongoing consular assistancetoMr.Fierro.
Consularofficershaveprovided Declarationsin appellate and post-

convictionproceedingstestifj4ngthat Mexicanauthoritieswould have
irnmediatelysecuredthe releaseof hisparentsfromunlawfulcustody,
had theybeen informedof his arrest. Mexicohas submitted aseriesof
amicus curiae briefsin supportof Mr. Fierro,assertingthat his
convictionand sentencingunderthese circumstanceswerein violation of
international law. Mexicoalsohas filednurnerousdiplomaticproteststo
the U.S.Departmentof Stateregardingthe uncontestedviolationof

Article36 and has supportedclemency forMr.Fierrowhenever a new
executiondate has beenset. 104. With the assistanceof Mexican consularofficers,Mr. Fierro

fileda petition forstatepostconviction relief,askingthe Texas state
courts to reconsiderhis convictionanddeath sentence inlightof the
authorities'violationof his Article 36rights. The courtsimply ignored
the issue.

105. Throughouthis state andfederal appeals, Mr. Fierro continued
to insist on his innocence,declaringthat theEl Paso policecommited
perjuryto concealtheir conspiracyto extracta false confession.
However, each appellatecourtreliedon the findingsof thepre-trial

suppressionhearingto concludethatthe policehadtestifiedtruthfully
and that the confession was voluntary.

106. In 1994,somefourteenyearsafterthe trial,Mr.Fierro finally
obtained an evidentiaryhearing onthe claimof coercion. Withthe
assistance of Mexican consular authorities,Mr. Fierro presentednew
evidence that includeda letter rogatoryfromJorgePahcios,the Juarez
police commandantwho had detainedhis parents,alongwithtestimony

fiom seventeen witnessesand voluminousdocumentaryevidence. The
reviewing court found that:

At the time of elicitingthe Defendant's confession, [the
investigatingdetective]did have informationthatthe Defendant's
mother and stepfather had beentakenintocustodybythe Juarez
police wittithe intentof holding themin orderto coercea
confessionfromthe Defendant,contraryto [thedetective's]
testimonyiitthe pretrial suppressionhearing.

107. The evidencepresentedledthe presidingjudge to conclude
that "there is a stronglikelihoodthatthe Defendant'sconfessionwas
coerced bythe actionsofthe Juhrez police andby theknowledgeand
acquiescence of those actions"bythe El Pasodetective. Thejudge ruled
that Mr. Fierro shouldreceivea newtrial.

108. The TexasCourtof CriminalAppeals unanimouslyadoptedthe
trial court's findingsof factfrom theevidentiary hearing,agreeingthat

Mr. Fierro's"due processrightswereviolated"bytheperjured
testimony .

109. However,in a controversial5-4opinion, the Courtnonetheless
held that the violation constituted"harmlesserror" andrefùsedto ordera
newtrial, on the gounds that Mr. Fierrowouldhavebeenconvictedevenwithouthis confession. Thisconclusionwas squarely rejectedby the

trial prosecutor,who declaredunder oaththat:

Had 1knownat thetime of Fierro's suppressionhearing what1
have sincelearnedabout thefamily'sarrest,1would havejoined
in a motion to suppressthe confession. Hadthe confession been
suppressed, 1wouldhave movedto dismissthe caseunless1
couldhave corroborated[theeyewitness]testimony. My
experienceas a prosecutor indicatesthatthejudge wouldhave

grantedthe motionas a matter of course.

110. The federalcourtsconsistentlyhaveadopted thesamefindings
of factthat ledto the cal1fora new trial,but haveheldthat Mr.Fierrois
procedurallybarred fromobtainingreliefinthe federalcourts.

111. The Stateof Texashasopposedvigorouslyal1effortsto obtain
a remedy forthe admitted violationofMr.Fierro's constitutionalights.

112. Just days beforehis scheduledexecution in1997,the U.S.
Courtof Appealsforthe FifihCircuitallowed Mr. Fierroto filean
additionalhabeas corpuspetitionto challengehis capitalmurder
convictiononthe groundthathe was innocentofthe crime. Ultimately,
however, the Fifih Circuit concluded thatMr.Fierro'sclaim was
procedurally barred,becausehe had filedhis subsequenthabeaspetition
shortlyafier the one-yeardeadlinefor suchpetitionshadexpired.

Despitethe factthatMr. Fierrohad compliedfullywiththebriefing
schedule setby the district court,hispetitionon grounds ofactual
innocencewas thus deniedas "procedwallydefaulted," withoutany
considerationof itsmerits. A subsequentpetitionto the UnitedStates
Supreme Courtfor awritof certiorari wasdenied without comment on
31March2003.

113. As Mr. Fierro hasnow exhaustedbothhis primaryandhis
successiveappeals,the Stateof Texashas declared itsintentto schedule
his execution in thenear future. 3. Carlos Avena ~uilled'~

114. On 15 September 1980,law enforcementauthoritiesof Los
Angeles County, California arrestedCarlosAvena Guillen, anineteen

year-oldMexican national. Mr. Avenawas a suspectin aseriesof
shootingsin Los Angelesthree daysearlier,in which twopeople had
died.

115. At the time of his arrest,Mr.Avena wasregistered with the

Immigrationand NaturalizationService, afact that wouldhavebecome
apparentduring routine verificationof his identityby the police.
Nonetheless,at no time was Mr.Avenainformed ofhis rightsunder
Article 36. Indeed, Mexicanconsularofficers onlybecameawareof his

case morethan 11years after his convictionand sentence.

116. Despite his limited commandof English,Mr.Avenawas
interrogatedsolelyin that languageand eventuallyconfessedto the
crime. His confessionwas surreptitiouslyrecorded by police. Nowhere

on the recording did the policeadvisehim of his legalrightsunderU.S.
constitutionallaw to keep silentand to have a lawyer appointedto defend
him,120 nor didthey obtain his writtenconsent to waivethoserights.
Furthermore, itis clear from the transcriptof the recording that Mr.

Avena attemptedto terminatethe interview(as hewas legally entitledto
do),to no avail.

117. At his trial, Mr.Avena pled notguilty. Unableto affordan

attorney,he was providedwithcourt-appointedlegalcounsel on 7
January 1981. For the next elevenmonths, the appointedattorneyspent
a totalofjust 53 hours preparingfor hisclient's capitalmurdertrial. The
attorney metwith his clientfour times,conductedno pre-trial

'19Case No. 1in Mexico's Application. For detailed citations of the facts
discussed in the case of Mr. Avena, seeDeclaration of Roberto Rodriguez
Hernandez, Appendi:~A, paras. 1-9, Annex 7.

120InMiranda v.Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme

Court held that, prior to interrogating a detained suspect, the police must inform
him that (1) he has a right to remain si(2)anything he says can and will be
used against him inacourt of law; (3) he has the right to have a lawyer present
during questioning; and (4) if he cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed
forhim.investigation,presented no motions,retainedno expertwitnessesand
failed even tointerview Mr.Avena'sclosestrelatives. Despiteknowing
that Mr. Avena hadgiven a recorded confession,the attorney madeno

effort tohavethe statementsuppressedbeforetrial andreportedly failed
to discuss itscontents or circumstanceswithhis client.

118. At trial, Mr.Avena's attorney madeno opening statementand
presentedno witnesses. He did not objectto the violationof hisclient's
Article 36rights. During his brief closingargument,Mr.Avena's
attorneyconcededthe weight of the prosecution's evidenceofthe

murders,declaringthat "The tape is right infiont of you,literally
confessing toshootingdown a couple ofpeople.. . ."Mr. Avenawas
promptly convictedof both murders.

119. At the sentencingphase, Mr.Avena's attorney calledno
mitigationwitnessesto make the case fora sentenceother thandeath.
His closingstatementto thejury urged themto feel "no sympathy"for
his clientandhe declared:

He doesn't haveanyexcuses.He's abad
person. There's noquestionabout that. 1
submitthat. 1am not goingto arguehis
good points.. .I neversaidanythinglike
that. 1understand thedefendantthat 1

have here. He doesn'tcome up here
with a good reputationor a lot of
kindness or whateverthat might be. He
doesn't havethose things. He'sa person
that you can'tlike.

120. Thejury recommendedthat Mr.Avena be sentencedto death.
As a CaliforniaSupreme Courtjudge laterobserveddissentingfroma
decisionto denyMr.Avena habeasrelief,

Having stripped his client ofal1vestiges
of his humanityin the eyesof thejurors,

having deprivedhim of anychance of
stining their compassionor deserving
their mercy, [defensecounsel]was then
reducedto arguingthatthejury should
spare petitioner simplybecause some murderersare even worse. .. onthis
record [Mr.Avena] wouldprobably
havehad a better chance of receiving a
sentenceof life imprisonmentwithout
possibilityof parole ifhis counselhad
made noargumentat all.

121. On 14February 1992,eleven years after Mr.Avena'sdeath
sentencewas imposed,the Mexicanconsulatein San Franciscoreceived
a letter fiomthe wardenof the CaliforniaState Prisonin San Quentin

statingthat Mr.Avenawas incarceratedand that prisonrecords indicated
he was a Mexican national. Mexican consularofficersirnmediately
visited him in prison,and began rendering humanitarian and other
assistance.

122. Mr.Avena'scounsel failedto raise anyArticle 36 violationsin
direct appealand state post-judgrnent proceedings.His attorneyshave

recently filedan additionalpetition in state court,in whichthey have
raised the violation of Article36. The petitionis still pending.

123. Withregard tothe obligationsof the United States under

Article 36(2),if andwhen Mexican consulatesleam of the detertion,
prosecution, and convictionof Mexicannationals,severaldoctrinesof
United Statesmunicipallaw prevent Mexican nationalsfiom obtaining
meaningfulreview of violationsof the Vienna Convention. Indeed,not a
single Mexicannational hasobtained ajudicial remedyfor a violationof
Article 36 - due, irilargepart, to these procedural obstacles.

124. Indeferenceto these proceduralrules,three Mexican nationals
have been executetlsince2000, despitethe uncontestedviolationof
Article 36 in their cases. The majority ofthe Mexicannationalshave
soughtjudicial rerriediesfor violations of their Article36 rights.12'The
courts havedenied reliefin every petition upon which theyhave ruled. '22

12'See Declarationof Roberto Rodriguez Hernhndez,AppendixA (detailing
cases), Annex7.In seven cases, the Article 36violation has beenpresented,but is notyet
resolved. 12' However, inal1but one of thosecases, it isvirtually certain
the courts will findthe claim to be procedurally defaulted,since it was

never raisedat trial. At present,these procedural doctrineseffectively
preclude Mexicannationals fromobtainingajudicial remedyfor
violationsof Article36.

1. DefaultDoctrines

125. In the cases beforethis Court broughtby Paraguayand
Gennany with regardto the Vienna Convention, therewasno dispute
that the competentauthoritiesof the United Statesfailedto advise

Mr. Breardor the LaGrandbrothers, respectively, oftheirrights to
consular notificationand ac~ess.'~~Similarly,in the majorityof the fi@-
four casesbeforethis Court,there is no credible disputethatthe local
authoritiesfailedto advisethe national "without delay"of his rights

under Article 36 of theConvention. Yet in each case inwhich nationals
have petitionedU.S.courts for redress,the courtshaverefusedto provide
a remedy. Quiteoften,the courtshavejustified this outcomeby claiming

that the nationalfailedto complywith the applicable procedural
requirementsforproperlyraising a claimof an Article36violation. This
is so eventhough the nationalwas not previously aware ofhis rights
precisely becausethe competentauthorities failedto providetimely
notificationunderArticle 36. Althoughthe Courtconfrontedand

rejectedthis purportedjustificationin LaGrandas an independent
violation of Article 36(2),'25U.S. courtshave continuedto invoke this
municipal doctrine to barreview of Article 36 vi01ations.I~~

12' Ibid.

124See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of
America), Provisional Measures, Order of 9April1998, para. 18;LaGrand

(Germany v. UnitedStates ofAmerica), Merits, Judgment of27 June 2001, para.
15.

'25See LaGrand at para. 15.

126Indeed, since the issuance of the LeGrand judgment, only one federal trial
court hasheld that procedural default rules should not be invokedto avoid an

Article 36claim. See Madej v. Schomig, 223 F.Supp. 2d 968, 978-79 (2002). a. StateProcedural DefaultRules

126. The fie-four Mexican nationalsdescribed herein were

prosecutedin ten different States,each ofwhich has its own rules
governingthe procedures acriminal defendant must followin orderto
properlyraise and preserve a claimforrelief. Under these state lawsof
proceduraldefault,i3nothenvisemeritoriousclaim is considered

defaulted wherethe defendant (orhis lawyer)did not follow theproper
proceduresin raising that claim. In mostcases, once a statecourt has
madesuch a determination,the legal argumentcannot be resurrectedin
laterproceedingsin stateor federal court. Courts have repeatedlyheld

that foreignnationals, including severalof the fie-four nationalswhose
casesgave riseto these proceedings,haveprocedurally defaulted - that
is,theyhave foreverwaived - meritoriousclaims under the Vienna
Convention. '27

b. Federal ProceduralDefaultRules

127. As the Court is aware fromtheLaGrandcase,theprocedural

defaultdoctrinein federal court operatesin a similar way to thwart
Mexicannationals from vindicating theirrights under the Convention.

c. Non-Retroactivity: Teaguev.Lane

128. Evenif a Mexicannationalis able successfùllyto navigatethe
proceduraldefault doctrines he must alsoovercomethe non-retroactivity
doctrine,knownas rhe Teagued0~trine.l~~Underthis doctrine, afederal
court maynot grant a prisonerhabeasrelief basedon new rules of

criminalprocedure announcedafier the prisoner's directappeal

127See,e.g., State v. Reyes-Camarena, 7P. 3d 522, 524-26 (Or. 2000) (en banc)
(state courtecision denying Vienna Convention claimmade by Mexican

national in a capital case because, inter alia, he had failed to raise the claim in
the trial court); see also Valdezv. St46 P. 3d 703, 707-710 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2002) (state court decision denying Vienna Convention claim based on
procedural default, despite determining that the trial and appellate counsel had
been constitutionally deficient in failing to present certain mitigating evidence,
which the efforts of Mexican consular officers had uncovered).

'28See Teague v.Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).proceedingsarecompleted. lZ9 Thus,the non-retroactivitydoctrinecomes
intoplaywhenthe prisoner attemptsto rely ona new rule of criminal
procedure infederal habeas proceedings.

129. A case announcesa new ruleof procedure"if the result was
not dictatedby precedentexistingatthe timethe defendant'sconviction
becamefinal."130Federalcourtshave consistentlyheld that claimsunder
the ViennaConventionraise a new ruleof lawthat is not availablein

federalhabeasproceedings.131As a result, the Teague doctrine assures
that a foreignnational is unableto vindicate his claimunder the Vienna
Convention. '32

2. Denialof Rights-BasedRemedies

130. Further,even ifthe claims of Mexicannationals are not barred
byproceduraldefault ,federaland statecourtshearing such challenges
have failedto provide any effectivejudicial remedies. Specifically,in at

least tencases,the courts have uniforrnlyrefused to provide remedies
suchas vacaturofthe conviction,vacatur of the death sentence,
dismissalof the indictment,or eventhe suppressionof self-incriminating

statementsgarneredby authoritiesin proceedingstainted by
acknowledgedviolationsof Article 36 of the Vienna C~nvention.'~~

129The completion of al1direct appeal proceedings is further defined under
United States law based on whether the petitioner seeks Supreme Court review
of the case.

''O Teague,489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original).

131See, e.g.,Annex 56 (case of Plata) (judicial decision refusing to recognize
ViennaConvention as creating a "personally-enforceable right" because sucha
finding "would create a newof law, violatingthe principles of Teague.").

132Likethe procedural default doctrine, the Teaguedoctrineis subject to limited
exceptions. However, no court has ever held, and no prosecutor has ever
conceded,that claims under the Vienna Convention would fa11within these
exceptions.

133
Arturo Juarez Suarez (No. 9), Juan Dedios Ramirez Villa (No. 20), Juan
Ramon SanchezRamirez (No. 23), Eduardo DavidVargas (No. 26), Ramiro
HernandezLlanas (No. 33), Juan Carlos Alvarez (No.29), FélixRocha DiazMoreover,the practïcein U.S.courts in thiiregard has not changed since
this Court'sdecisionin LaGrand.

131. The courts' failureto provide ajudicial remedyrests upon
threebasic holdings.

a. No IndividualRights

132. First, despitethe UnitedStatesSupremeCourt's statementin
Breard thatArticle136 "arguably"creates individualrights'34and this
Court'sfindingin ~a~rand:~~federalandstate courts considering the

issue havefoundthat theViennaConventiondoesnot confer individual
rightson foreignnationals, andaccordingly,a detained foreign national
hasno abilityto vindicatehis rights in a United Statescourt.'36

b. NoFundamentalRights

133. Second,state and federalcourtshave foundthat even assuming
arguendo that theViennaConventioncreatesindividualrights, those
rights arenot "fundamental"rights on par with constitutionalrights(e.g.,

the rightto counsel:)and do notjusti@judicial relief suchas the
dismissalof the indictmentor the suppressionof evidence. Thejudicial
relief embodiedinthe suppressionof evidence,in particular, is based

uponthe applicationof the constitutionalrule of U.S. law that excludes
evidence obtained in violationof a defendant's rightsunder federal or
--

(No. 42), Jose Trinidad Loza (No. 52), Gabriel Solache (No. 47), and Ignacio
Gomez(No. 32).

'34Breardv. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).

'35LaGrand, Judgment, at para. 77.

'36See, e.g., U.S.v. L>eLa Pava,268 F.3d 157,164-65 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding
that international law,the text of the Vienna Convention itself, andtheate
ratification hearings !supportthe view that the Convention creates nojudicially
enforceable individual rights);.S.v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 392 (61hCir.
2001), cert. denied, 122S. Ct. 1450(2002) (same);Bell v. Commonwealth, 563

S.E.2d695, 706(Va.2002) (denyingthe creation of enforceable individual
rightsunder Vienna Convention); State v. Martinez-Rodriguez,33 P.3d 267,273
(N.M.2001) (same).state law (the swalled "exclusionaryrule"). The generalrule in federal
and statecourtsisthat neitherthe dismissalofthe indictmentnor the
suppressionof incriminatingstatements obtainedfroma foreign national
137
are availableremediesunderthe Convention.

'37 For federal cases, by Circuit,see UnitedStates v. Nui Fook Li, 206 F.3d 56,
6 1(1st Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that even if Vienna Convention confers
individual rights on foreign nationals, appropriate remedies do not include

suppression of evidence or dismissal of an indictment because the treaty does
not create "fundamental rights on par with the right to be free from unreasonable
searches,the privilege against self-incrimination, or the right toounsel"), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 956(2000); UnitedStates v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 165

(2d Cir. 2001) (government's failure to comply with the Vienna Convention
does notjustify the extraordinary remedy of dismissal of an indictment because
Article 36 rights do not quali@as "fundamental"); Murphy v. Netherland, 116
F.3d 97, 9%100(4th Cir.) (habeas corpus petitioner does not make "a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," the precondition for
obtaining appellate review, by asserting violation of his Vienna Convention
rights), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.26 (1997); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243
F.3d 192(5th Cir.) (Vienna Convention creates nojudicially enforceable rights,

but even assumingthe contrary, suppression of evidence would be an
inappropriate remedy),cert. denied, 533 U.S. 962 (2001); UnitedStates v. Page,
232 F.3d 536, 540-41 (6th Cir.) (even if Vienna Convention confers rights on

foreign nationals, the nature of those rights does notjustifi the judicially created
remedies of dismissal of an indictment or suppression of evidence), cert. denied
532 U.S. 935 (2001); UnitedStates v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616,620-
24 (7th Cir.) (even if Vienna Convention confers rights on foreign nationals,

suppression of evidence is not the appropriate remedy for a violation of those
rights), cert. denied, 51U.S. 1026(2000); UnitedStates v. Lawal, 231F.3d
1045, 1048(7th Cir. 2000) (reafirming Chaparro-Alcantara and asserting that
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention does not provide such an "extraordinary

remedy"), cert. denied, 531U.S. 1182(2001); UnitedStates v. Lombera-
Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (even if Vienna Convention
creates individuallyenforceable rights, the exclusion of evidence in a criminal
proceeding is not among them), cert. denied, 531U.S. 991 (2000); UnitedStates

v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194, 1196 (1 lth Cir.) (even if Vienna
Convention creates rights enforceable by individuals,court would followthe
lead of other circuits in holding that available remedies do not include
suppression of evidence or dismissal of an indictment), cert. denied, 531U.S.

1131(2001). See also UnitedStates v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1281-82
(1lthCir. 2002)(deferring to the U.S. State Department view that "the only
remedies for a violation of the Vienna Convention are diplomatic, political, or
derived from international law."). 3. Prejudice Requirement

134. Third,some courtshavecircumventedthe previousissuesby
hding that even assuming Article36providesforan individual right

and creates a fundamentalrightpermittingajudicial remedysuchas
exclusion,the defendantwouldstillnot be entitledto suchremedies
absent a showingofprejudice;that is, thattheviolation harmedhis

interestsin sucha wayas to affectthe outcome ofthe proceedings.'38

For state casessee, e.g.,Statev. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 45 (Iowa
2003)(Iowa state court case adopting a rule that the exclusionary rule never
applies to evidence ohtained in violation of Article 36People v.Lopez, 2002
WL 31898309, slip op. at *3 (No. G027444) (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2002)
(California state court holding that exclusionary rule does not apply to violations

of the Vienna Convention); Lopez v. State,558 S.E.2d 698, 700 (Ga. 2002)
(Georgia state court finding that even if the Vienna Convention creates a
privately enforceable right, nothing in its textrequires the application of the
exclusionary rule, and such ajudicially-created remedy cannot be imposed
absent a violation of a constitutional right);Stav. Chavez, 19P.3d 923, 925

(Or. 200 1)(Oregon state court holding the exclusionary rule doesnot apply to
Vienna Convention \~iolations)Zavalav. State, 739 N.E.2d 135, 13843 (Ind.
2000) (Indiana state court holding same);People v. Corona, 108Cal. Rptr.2d
210,211-12(2001)(California state court holding same); Rocha v.State,16

S.W.3d 1, 13, 19(Tex. Crim. App 2000) (Vienna Convention, and indeed al1
international treaties, do not create "laws" within the meaning of Texas state
statute that excludes evidence obtained inviolation of the constitution or laws of
Texasor the United States).

'38See, e.g., UnitedStates v. Santos,235 F.3d 1105, 1107-08(8th Cir. 2000)
(even if Vienna Convention confersjudicially enforceable rights on foreign
nationals, and even if the remedy for violations ofhose rights includes
suppression of evidence, defendant foreign national's delay in exercising his
Vienna Convention rights and the overwhelming evidence against him made any

possible violation "harmless error");UnitedStates v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 887-
88 (8th Cir. 2002); UnitedStates v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 987-88
(10th Cir. 2001) (post-LaGrand, finding defendant failed to show prejudice from
the violation);UnitedStates v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212F.3d 1194, 1195-96
(1lth Cir. 2000) (same), cert. denied,531 U.S. 1131(2001). See also Breard v.

Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998) ("[Ilt is extremely doubtful that the [Vienna
Convention] violation should result inthe overturning of a final judgment of
conviction without some showing that the violation had an effect on the trial."). 135. Invariably,the courtshave applieda highthreshold ofproofof

actualprejudiceand havefoundthe defendantfailed to make that
showing. Inmanycases, the federalcourtshave assumed that foreign
nationals' right tobe notified ofthe availability of consular assistanceis

superfluouswhenthey havebeennotifiedof al1UnitedStates
constitutionaland statutoryrights, includingthe right to c0unse1.l~~

Accordingly, a defendantis put intothe diffkult position of establishing
that anyadvicerenderedbythe consulatewould have beenof assistance
to him beyondhis existingknowledgeof rights garneredfrom Miranda
warnings and/ordefensecounsel,andthat furthermore,he wouldhave

followed whateveradvicethe consulateprovided.

139See, cg., UnitedStates v. Rodriguez, 68 F.Supp.2d 178, 183-84 (E.D.N.Y.

1999) ("Prejudice has never been-nor could reasonably be-found in a case
where a foreign national was given, understood, and waived his or her Miranda
rights."). But see United States State Department, Pub. No. 10518, Consular
Notification and Access: lnstructions for Federal, State and OtherLocal Law
Enforcement and Other Oflicials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United

States and the Rights of Consular officers toAssist Them(released Jan. 1998)at
19-20. In response to the question of whether a foreign national must be given
consular notification, even if the Miranda warning was given, the handbook
directs that:

Consular notification should not be confused with the Miranda
warning, whichis given regardless of nationality to protect the
individual's constitutional rights against selfiincrimination and to

the assistance of legal counsel. Consularnotification is given as a
result of international legal requirements, so that a foreign
government can provide its nationalswith whatever consular
assistance it deems appropriate. You should follow consular
notification procedures with respect to detained foreign nationals in

addition to providing Miranda or other warnings required. Id.

140See, e.g., UnitedStates v. Moreno, 122 F.Supp. 2d 679, 683-84 (E.D.Va.
2000) (finding no prejudice where defendant wasprovided proper notice of his

Miranda rights, validly waived them, and failedto demonstrate how consular
assistance would have affected his decision to waive those rights); UnitedStates
v.Rodriguez, 68 F.Supp.2d 178, 184(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that prejudice
can never be found where a foreign national was given, understood and waived
his Miranda rights, because the advice a consular officia1would give would

simply augment the content of Miranda); United States v.Alvarado-Torres, 45
F. Supp. 2d 986,990-91 (S.D. Cal. 1999)(same). Indeed, despite the dozens of 136. In short,municipaldefault doctrinesoperateto preclude
Mexican nationalsfrom obtainingeffective remediesbasedon violations

of the ViennaConvention. Further, evenwhere UnitedStatescourtsdo
not findthe ViennaConventionclaimsto beprocedurallybarred,they
have foundthat nojudicial remedyis availableto addressthose accepted

violations. Finally,since the LaGranddecisionwas issued,no changes
have takenplacein the practicesof stateand federal courtsto provide
meaningfulreviewfor acknowledgedviolationsof the Vienna
Convention. 14'

D. MEXICO' JIJDICIAL AND DIPLOMATE ICFFORTS

137. Prior to filingits Application,Mexicorepeatedlysoughtrelief

forviolations of Article 36in the UnitedStates courtsandwith the
United StatesExecutive Branch. Mexico also sought relief inthe Inter-
American Court ofHumanRights. None oftheseeffortshas been

availing.

cases in which U.S. courts have considered the issue, only two courtshave
found prejudice based explicitly on the Vienna Convention violations.State
v.Reyes, 1999 WL 743598, *3 (Del. Super., 1999)(prejudice found where the
State conceded that defendant was not informed of his consular notification
rights and defendant made incriminating statements which the State sought to
introduce in its case-in-chief; motion to suppress uphValdezv.State,46

P.3d 703 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (case remanded for resentencing upon finding
a reasonable probability that thejury wouldnot have imposed the death penalty
had defendant had thebenefit of consular assistance, a thorough background
investigation and adequate legal representation).

14'See J.Fitzpatrick, The Unreality of International Law in the United States

and the LaGrand Case, 27YaleJournal ofInternational Law (2002)at p. 428
(concluding that of the eight decisions involving uncontested Convention
violations rendered by the federal courts of appeal after thed decision
and before March 2002, not one provided any remedy to the defendant foreign
national); A. Bishop, The Unenforceable Rights to Consular Notification and
Access in the United States: What's Changed Since thLaGrand Case?, 25

Houston Journal ofInternational Law (2002) at p.1("Since the LaGrand
decision was issued, no visible changes have taken place in the practices ofstate
and federal govemmi-nts to ensure that foreign nationals' consular rights are
protected."). 1. Effortsby MexicoBeforeJudicial Authoritiesofthe

United States

138. In orderto prevent the executionsof itsnationalswhose Article
36 rights were violated,Mexico has repeatedly intervenedin the state

and federal courtsof the United States. Forexarnple,in 1997,Mexico
filed suit in its own right in United Statesfecleralcourt. Thefederal
court dismissedthe lawsuit,and the courtof appealsaffirmedthis

decision, findingthat Mexico'ssuitwas barredbythe Eleventh
Amendment to the UnitedStates con~titution.'~~ Pursuantto this
holding, neitherMexiconor its consularofficerscan gainaccessto the
federaljudicial forumin which to seek vindicationof theirrights under

the ViennaConvention.

139. In addition,Mexicohas filedat leastsixteen amicuscuriae
briefs on behalf of its nationalsover thelast threeyears. Thusfar,

Mexico's legalargumentshave failed topersuadeany UnitedStates
court that whenthe authoritiesviolateArticle36 in a capitalmurder

142 United Mexican States v. Woods, 126F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1997),cert. denied
523 U.S. 1075 (1998). Mexico had sought an injunction to prevent the
execution of Ramon Martine~Villareal, who the United States conceded had
been convicted and sentenced in Arizona proceedings that did not comport with
the Vienna Convention. In dismissingthe suit, the court of appeals held that a

suit to prevent an execution that had not yet occurred was actually a suitfor
retrospective relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States
constitution and did not fa11into any exceptions to the bar. Id., 126 F.3d at
1223; accord Paraguay v. Allen, 134F.3d 622 (4th Cir.) (affirming the district
court's dismissal of actiony Paraguay alleging violations of its Vienna
Convention rights on Eleventh Amendment grounds), cert. deniedsub nom

Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 37 1(1998);see also Consulate General of Mexico v.
Phillips, 17F.Supp. 2d 1318 (S.D.FI. 1998).The United States Supreme Court
did not consider the merits of the dismissal of Mexico's suit. However, in
response to similarsuits brought by Paraguay and Germany, the Supreme Court
did state in dicta that a foreign state's suit to enjoin an imminent execution of

one of its nationals based upon a Vienna Convention violation did not constitute
circumstances sufficient to defeat Eleventh Amendment immunity. Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1998);Federal Republic of Germany v. United
States,526 U.S. 111, 112(1999) (declining to exercise originaljurisdiction over
Gerrnany's suitagainstArizona based on Vienna Conventionviolations because,
inter alia, it would be "in probable contravention of EleventhAmendment

principles").prosecution,theymust providea meaningful remedyforthe violation.
Moreover,Mexicohas failedto persuadeany U.S. courtthat, underthe

LuGrand decision, the UnitedStatescourtsmay notapplymunicipalbars
suchas the proceduraldefaultdoctrineto prevent"review and
reconsideration" of the national's conviction and sentence.

2. Diplomatic Démarches

140. Over the pastdecades, Mexico hasalso pursuednurnerous
diplomaticandpoliticalchannelsto enlistthe assistanceofthe Executive
Branchof the U.S. Governmentin remedying violationsof the Vienna

Convention andensuringtheir nonrepetition. Specifically,Mexicohas
fileddiplomatic notesin at least twentycapitalcasesinvolving Mexican
nationalsover the last six years.'43In each note, Mexico reiterated the
vitalnature of the rightsto consularnotificationand access, expressed its

viewthat violations ofArticle36are incompatiblewithinternational
law,and requested thatthoseviews be conveyedto localauthorities.

141. One of the earliestcapitalcasesthat resulted inan execution
despiteMexico's protestswas thatof IrineoTristanMontoya,whowas

executedby the Stateof Texason 18June 1997. In thefifieenmonths
priorto Mr. Montoya'sexecution,Mexico filedfourdiplomaticprotests
withthe United StatesDepartmentof Statein which Mexicoraised the
ViennaConvention vi01ations.l~~Neverthekss, the UnitedStates failed

to respondto the notes beforeMr. Montoya's execution.

142. The day followingMr. Montoya'sexecution, Mexico fileda
fifihdiplomatic note,protestingthe executionand thefailureofthe

UnitedStatesto respondto itspreviousnotes.14'In that note,Mexico
-
143See Annexes 8-26.

144Specifically, in einphasizing that competent authorities of Texas had failed to

comply with Article 36(l)(b), Mexico formally requested that the Texas Board
of Pardons and Paroles commute Mr. Montoya's sentence and sought, at a
minimum, a thirty-day reprieve from the Governor of Texas in order to allow
time for a full investigation of the circumstances of the consular rights violation.
See Diplomatic Notes from Notice to United States Department of State: Note
000409 of 14March 1996;Note 00067 of 6 May 1997; Note DAN-01657 of 11
June 1997; Note 00087 of 17June 1997,Annex 16.

14See Diplomatic Note 000896 of 19June 1997,Annex 16.specificallyobserved that the UnitedStateshad failedto provide
informationto the United Statescourtsregardingthe violations ofArticle
36 andrequested that the United Statesadoptnecessarymeasuresto

prevent "new irreparableeventssuchas the onewhichoccurred
yesterday."146

143. On 9 Jul 1997,the UnitedStatesapologizedforthe execution
of Mr. Montoya. 147 Mexico fileda sixthdiplomaticnote in re~~onse.'~~

In this finalnote, Mexico thankedthe United Statesfor its apology,but
reiteratedits view that the UnitedStatesneededto do more, particularly
in capitalcases, to vindicatethe rights containedinArticle36. Mexico
observedthat, as of 5 August 1997,there were thirty-sixcases of

Mexicannationals sentencedto deathin the UnitedStates,and thatin al1
of thosecases the competentauthoritieshad failedto comply with
Article 36. Mexico noted that its concernover the violationswas
mounting,given the increased number ofMexicannationalswho had

been sentencedto death without being promptly advised of theirrightsto
consularnotification and access. Mexico also advisedthe UnitedStates
of its viewthat the violationsof Article 36 undermined itsnationals'due
processrights. Mexico requested thattheUnited Statesmakeitsposition
clear beforestate authoritiesandthe United States courtswithregardto

the violations of Article 36. Finally,Mexico requested aguaranteethat
in futurecases, Mexico be dulynotifiedby stateauthoritieswhenever
oneof its nationals was detained and chargedwitha capitalcrime.'49

144. Notwithstanding Mexico'sefforts,neitherthe Executive

Branch ofthe federal govemmentnor the competent authorities of the
Stateof Texas took any stepsto ensuremeaningfulreviewand
reconsiderationof Mr. Montoya'scase. Instead,United States
authoritiesrefused to allowevena temporarystayof theexecution, and

the Texasstate authoritiesexpressedthe view that it was not their

146Id (unofficia1English translation).

147See Diplomatic Note 0011 18 from Mexico to United States Deparimentof 5
August 1997, Annex 16.

148Id.

149Id.responsibilityto determinewhether therehad beena violationof the
Vienna Convention,since Texas had not signedthe treaty.lS0

145. Less thanthree months later, on 18September 1997,the State
of VirginiaexecutedMexican nationalMario Benjamin Murphy.
Mexicohad filed a diplomaticprotest with the Departmnt of State

regardingMr. Murpliy'scase in June 1997."' Inthatprotest,Mexico
informed theState Departmentthat notonly didVirginiastate authorities
failto informMr. Murphyof his right of consularaccess uponhis arrest,

but state prison officiaksubsequentlyrefusedhis request to contactthe
c0nsu1ate.l~~Again,,Mexico formally requested commutationof the
sentence.' 53

I5OSee Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, para. 28, Annex 7

15'See Diplomatic Note 000948 from Mexico to United States Department of
State of 25 June 1997,Annex 17.

lS2Diplomatic Note 001394 from Mexico to United States Department of State
of 25 September 1997,Annex 17.

153See Diplomatic Note 001275 from Mexico Embassy to U.S. State

Department of 8 September 1997, Annex 17; Diplomatic Note 001308 from
Silva Herzog, Mexican Ambassador to Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs, U.S. State Department of 10 September 1997. In conversations with the
Ambassador of Mexic:oto the United States,the United States opined that the

outcome of Mr. Murphy's case was not affected by the violation. In response to
this opinion, the Ambassador sent a letter to the United States urging the United
States to join Mexico in requesting a commutation because:

In any given case whether a foreign national's case would be
affected by denial of his Article 36 rights will always be a matter of
conjecture.... From Ourperspective, as a foreign Govemment, the
question whether the United States has complied with its
international legal obligations under the Vienna Convention is even

more importaiît. That treaty gives foreign nationals Article 36
rights in every instance and the very denial of these rights should
be protected irrespective of whether in any casetheir exercise
would 'have affected the outcome' of any given matter. 146. Stateand federalauthoritiesof the UnitedStatestookno action

in responseto this protest. AfierVirginia executedMr.Murphy,the
Departmentof State apologized to Mexico. 154

147. Threeyearslater,on 9 November2000, the State of Texas

executedMexicannational Miguel Angel Flores. Inthat case, Texas
officiaisconceded that theyhad violated Mr. Flores's rights under
Article 36(l)(b). Again,Mexico protestedformallytothe Departmentof

Stateandmade diplomaticoverturesto Texasstateauthorities.15'Again,
Mexico soughta commutationofMr. Flores'ssentenceor a reprieve of
his execution. 156 This time, Mexico took thefurthersteps ofsending

diplomaticrepresentativesto meetwith the Chairmanofthe TexasBoard
of Pardonsand Paroles,as well as supportingMr.Flores'spetitionto the
Inter-American Commissionon HumanRights,which issued
precautionarymea~ures.''~Finally,Mexico soughtaid from other

foreign states, and thegovernmentsof Argentina,Chile,Honduras,

Diplomatic Note 001308from Silva Herzog, Mexican Ambassador to

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, U.S. State Department of
10 September 1997, Annex 17.

154See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez, para. 29, Annex 7. One week aîter

the execution, Mexico filed another diplomatic note, observing that an apology
was an insufficient remedy for a violation of Article 36 in a capital case.
Mexico conveyed to the United Statesits strong opinion that the United States
must take "specific actions" to guarantee compliance with Articl36.
Furthermore, Mexico noted that the United States should take a more active role
in enforcing the Vienna Convention in the United States courts, since it was

responsible for ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Convention.
Mexico reiterated that there were still 35 Mexican nationals remaining on death
row, al1of whom had been deprived of their rights to consular notification. See
Diplomatic Note 001308 from Silva Herzog, MexicanAmbassador to Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, U.S. State Department of 10September

1997 (referencing the apology of the United States,Annex 7.

'55See Diplomatic Note 001205 from Mexican Embassy to U.S. State
Department of 14November 2000, Annex 1 1.

156Id.

157See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Press Communiqué,No.
171100, dated 13November 2000, para. 3.Panama,Poland,Spain, Switzerlandand Uruguay,as well as the
EuropeanUnion,intervened diplomaticallyon its behalf.I5'

148. Again,U.S. federaland stateauthorities tookno meaningful
action toensurereview ofthe proceedingsby which Mr.Floreswas
convicted andsentencedor to stay theexecution. After Texas executed

Mr. Flores, theDepartmentof State,bya note dated 9 November2000,
apologizedto Mexicloforthe failureof Texas authoritiesto complywith
Article 36 of the ViennaConventionin the case of Mr. ~1ores.I~~

149. In the recent casesofMexicannationals Gerardo Valdezand

JavierSuiirezMedina,whose executionswere scheduled to occur after
this Court'srulingin LaGrand, the onlyactiontakenbythe United
Statesin response to Mexico's extensivediplomatic efforts was tosend

terse lettersto the stateclemencyauthoritiesin each case,requestingthat
they"consider" the Article 36 violations.

150. Specif~ally,inthe case of GerardoValdez, it is undisputed
that Mr. Valdezwas arrested, detained,tried, convicted,and sentencedto

deathby the Stateof Oklahoma withoutreceiving notification of his
Article36 rights.l6' Mexicofileda diplomatic noteprotestingthe
violation and Consularofficersirnmediatelyassisted Mr. Valdezin the

onlyway possible atthat stage:intervention before the Oklahoma Board

15'See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hemandez, para. 30, Annex 7.

'59See Diplomatic Note from U.S. State Departmnt to Embassy of Mexico of 9
November 2000, Annex 11.

160See Oral Argurnerzt,Avenu and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v.United
States),para. 3.12 (argument of Catherine Brown,U.S. State Dep't). Mexico
first learned of Valdez's arrest in April2001, only two months before his
scheduled execution date, when one of Mr. Valdez's relatives contacted the
Mexican consulate. By conducting a brief but thorough investigation of Mr.
Valdez's history, Mexico discovered that he had suffered brain damage and

other trauma that should have been presented to the Oklahomajury as mitigating
evidence relevant to its decision whether to sentence Mr. Valdez to death.
Specifically, upon learning of Mr. Valdez' impending execution, Mexico hired
experienced counsel, an investigator and a bilingual neuropsychologist to assist
Mr. Valdez. See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, para. 31,Annex
7.ofPardonsand~aro1es.I~'Based on newevidenceuncoveredby
Mexico,Oklahoma'sBoardof Pardons andParoles, afierholdinga
publichearing withthe presenceof Mexicandiplomaticrepresentatives,
recommendedthat Valdez's sentencebe cornrnutedto life

imprisonment.'62At the request of PresidentVincenteFox,Oklahoma's
Govemor,FrankKeating, granted a 30-dayreprieve to studythe case,
duringwhichthis Courtissuedits decisionin theLaCrandcase. Mexico
thensent a Delegation headedby the ForeignMinistry'sLegalAdvisor

to meetwithGovemorKeating andexplainMexico'sviewson the case.

151. Followingthe issuanceof thejudgmentin theLaCrandcase,
the State Department,in a perfunctorygesture similarto thatmadeto the
Govemor of Virginiain theBreardcase,"requested" that Govemor

Keating considerwhetherthe ViennaConventionviolation"had any
prejudicial effecton eitherMr. Valdez'sconviction or his sentence."63

152. After receiving theletter kom the StateDepartment,Govemor
Keatingrejectedthe Board's recommendationand denied clemency.In
his letterto the President ofMexicoexplaininghis reasonsfordenying

clemency,GovemorKeatingstated:

Takingthe decisionin LaGrandinto account,1have
conductedthis reviewand reconsiderationofMr.
Valdez'sconvictionand sentenceby taking accountof

theadrnitted violation of Article36 of the Vienna
Convention regarding consularnotification.. .Whileit is
tme that Mr.Valdez wasnotnotifiedof his rightto
contactthe Mexican Consulatein clearviolation of

Article36 of the Vienna Conventionon Consular
Relations,that violation,whileregrethl and inexcusable,
doesnot, in andof itself, establish clearly discemible
prejudice orthata differentconclusionwouldhave been

161
See DiplomaticNote 000445 from Mexican Embassyto U.S. State
Department of10May2001,Annex26.
162
See Declarationof Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, par. 8,Annex7.

163Letterfrom WilliamH. Tu3IV, Legal Advisorfor the U.S.Department of
State to FrankKeating, Governor of Oklahoma,uly 11,2001, Annex26. reachedat trial oron appealof Mr. Valdez'sconviction

153. Oklahoma'scourt of last resort, moreover,refused to respect
therulingin LaGrarzdthat themunicipallaw doctrineof procedural

defaultmust notbeappliedin amannerthat bars considerationof the
Vienna Conventionviolations. I6j

154. On 14August2002,the Stateof Texas executed Mexican

nationalJavierSuarezMedina. Again,Mexicohad sent diplomatic
notes,bothin 1997and in 2002, protestingthe violationsof Mr.Suarez's
Vienna Conventionrights. 166 Mexico's Foreign Ministercornmunicated

Mexico's concemsdirectlyto theUnitedStates Secretaryof State, and
the Presidentof Mexico personally communicatedwith the Governor of
Texasto request areprieve. Mexico also sent diplomatic representatives

to meetwiththe Secretaryof Stateof Texasand withthe Chairmanof
the Texas Boardof Pardonsand Paroles. Additionally,Mexico
supportedMr. Suarez'spetitionto the Inter-AmericanCommissionon

HumanRights,whichresulted in the issuanceof precautionary measures

164Letterfrom GovernorKeating to the Hon. VicenteFox Quesada, President of

Mexico, July 20,2001, Annex 26.

165See Valdez,46 P.3d at 707-09. The court ultimately determined, in an
unprecedented decision, that Valdez's trial and appellate counsel had been
constitutionally ineffective for failing to discover and present the mitigating

evidence uncovered tly Mexico's efforts. It was on this basis, not onthe basis of
the violation of Article 36, that the court ordered the Oklahoma trial court to
sentence Valdez. Id.at 710.

'66See Diplomatic Note from Mexican Embassy to U.S. State Department of 3 1
October 1997;Diplomatic Note from Mexican Embassy to U.S. State

Department of 17July 2003, Annex 25. Prior to the diplomatic efforts, Mexico
had vigorously supported Mr. Suarez's efforts to obtainjudicial review of his
Article 36 violation,iling amicus curiae briefs in the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. When the Texas court invoked
the municipal doctrine of procedural default to avoid reaching the merits of the

claim, Mexico and 13other nations filed anamicus brief in support of Mr.
Suarez's petition for review with the United States Supreme Court. See
Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, para. 32, Annex 7. The Supreme
Court denied review of the case.by the Commission. At Mexico'sbehest,Argentina,Brazil,Chile,

Colombia,Costa Rica,Ecuador,El Salvador,Guatemala,Honduras,
Panama, Paraguay,Poland, Slovenia,Spain,Switzerland, Uruguay,
Venezuela,the Holy See, andthe EuropeanUnion supportedMr.

Suarez's effortsbeforejudicial and administrativeauthoritiesto obtain
meaningfulreview andreconsideration ofthe admittedviolationof his

rights underArticle36(1)(b).'~~

155. TheUnitedStatesdid notprovidesuchreview, nor didit stay
the proceedings. Instead,the State Department,in anotherperhnctory

gesture, senta letterto the Texas Board, conveyingthe Department's
"request"thatthe Boardgive "specific attention" to the acknowledged

violation ofMr. Suirez's Article 36(b)rights.I6'Withoutdiscussion
amongstthe membersof the Board, or conveninga hearing,or even
respondingtoMr. Suarez's requestfora hearing,the seventeenmembers

of the Boardvotedby faxto denythe commutation. Thereis no record
of anydeliberationsand contraryto the State Department'sadvice, the
Board provided nowritten explanationsfortheir action. 16'

3. Actioninthe Inter-AmericanCouro tf HumanRights

156. Facedwiththe continuingpatternand practiceof Vienna

Conventionviolationsby United Statesauthorities, Mexicosought a
declarationof its rightsin the Inter-American Courtof HumanRightsin

December 1997.Inthat case,the UnitedStatesargued, inter alia, that
the failureof a receivingstateto notifi a detainedforeignnational of his

- - - -- -
167 Declarationof Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, para. 32, Annex 7.

168
Letterfrom William H. TaftIV, Legal Advisorfor the U.S.Department of
State to Gerald Garrett, Chairman, TexasBoard ofPardons and Paroles,
August 5,2002, Annex 25.

16'As a result of the execution of Mr. Suarez,the President of Mexico cancelled
his announced official visit to Texas formally to protest the violation of
international law. See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, para. 39,
Annex 7. In a press release issued on the day of the execution by the Office of

the President, the position of Mexico on Article 36 was reiterated. The
Department of State did not apologize to the Governrnent of Mexico for the
violations cornmitted in this case. Seeibid.consular rightsmayonly properlyresult "in diplomaticmeasuresthat
seek to addresssucha failureandimprovefuturec~rn~liance."~~~

157. The Inter-AmericanCourtrejectedthe United States'position.

In AdvisoryOpinioriOC-16/99, thatCourtheld that failureto respectthe
right to consularassistance establishedbyArticle 36(l)(b) of the Vienna
Conventionwouldprejudicethe dueprocess rightsof foreignnationals

such that the impositionof capitalpunishmentunder such circumstances
would violatethehumanrightnotto be deprivedof lifearbitrarily.I7'
That violation, theCourtSound,givesriseto internationalresponsibility

and the obligationto providereparations.'72

158. The Inter-AmericanCourt'sdecisionhas had no apparent

effect on thepolicyandpracticeofthe UnitedStates. Afterthe Inter-
American CourtissueditsAdvisoryOpinion,severalforeignnational~
attempting to vindicate their consularrights soughtto rely uponthis

ruling in U.S.court:;,to no avail. The federalcourts consideringthe
issues dismissedthe:relevanceof the AdvisoryOpinionandheld that
Conventionviolationscould notbe remediedby the U.S.judiciary. 173

159. Al1of the nationalsnamedin Mexico'sApplication were
arrestedprior to thisCourt's ruling in~a~rand.'~~Mexicois entitledto

- --

170~h e ight to Information on ConsularAssistance in theFramework of the
Guarantees of theDue Process ofLaw, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of 1
October 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser A) No. 16,para. 26 (1999).

17'Id, para. 141(7)

'72Ibid.

'73See, e.g., UnitedStates v.Li, 206 F.3d 56, n4 (1st Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(dismissing relevance of the Advisory Opinion by noting "the United States is
not a party to the treaty that formed the [Inter-American Court of Human
Rights], and is not bound by that court's conclusions.").

174 TWOnationals were convicted andsentenced to death after LaGrand;
Specifically, Mr. Marcos Esquivel Barrera was convicted on 17 July 2001 andrelief forthe Article36violationsintheir cases,even if, asthe United
Statesmaintains, the authorities' compliance withArticle 36 has

improvedin the interveningyears.

160. Any claimby the UnitedStatesthat itscurrentcompliancewith
Article 36 is near-universalor has even substantiallyimprovedsincethe

de~ision,'~~ however,is beliedbythe ongoing failureof competent
authoritiesto adviseMexicannationalsof theirArticle 36rights without
delayupon arrest. A comprehensivesurvey conductedbythe Mexican

ForeignMinistryof the forty-fiveMexican consulatescovering
jurisdictions throughoutthe UnitedStatesrevealsthat violationsof
Article 36 remaincornmonplace,despiteLaCrand, and despitethe

United States'sefforts to increase~ornp1iance.l~~

161. Together,the consulatesidentifiedno fewerthan 102cases of
Mexicannationalsdetained onseriouscriminalcharges afier27 June

2001, none of which were notifiedof theirArticle 36rights. In eighty-

sentenced on 13 December 2001and Mr. Pedro Hernandez Alberto was
convicted on 4 November 2001 and sentenced on 28 May 2002.

17'Oral Argument 21 Jan. 2003, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mexico v.UnitedStates),Rebuttal, at 10-11(argument of Catherine
Brown):

[Al11of the arrests [of Mexican nationals named inthe Application]
predate the LaGrand decision, and many predate Ourefforts to intensifi
Ourcompliance efforts which began in the early 1990s. 1would also
note that Mexico failed to acknowledge that there are literally thousands
of Mexicans arrested in the United States each week, and there are
hundreds of thousands of Mexicans living in the United States. Viewed

in that context, 1submit that Mexico has failed to show that there is
even a likelihood that a Mexican arrested today in the United States will
not be advised of his rights under Article 36.

176 Al1forty-five Mexican consulatesprovided information regarding Mexican

nationals detained and charged with serious felonies after the issuance of the
LaGrandjudgment, who were not advised of their rights to consular notification
and access. The consulates also provided information with respect to
implementation of Article 36 by the competent authorities within each of their
jurisdictions. See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hernandez, paras.42-47
and Appendix B, Annex 7.nine of the cases,nationals have beenchargedwithhomicides;of these,
thirty-sixcouldreceive the deathpenalty. The remainingcasesinvolve
charges suchas attemptedmurder,assault,andkidnapping. In each of
these cases, thereis no record of anynotificationto the nationalor the

consulate. Rather,the relevant consulatesbecameaware of thecases
throughmediareports, contactwiththe detainednational'sfamily or
fiiends,and/orbytaking the initiativeto reviewweekiyarrest lists
suppliedby lawenforcementauthorities.' 77

162. The cases reportedby the consulatesanddescribedin the
Declaration of Ambassador Rodriguezbyno meansrepresent theentire
universeof cases in whichthe authoritieshave violatedArticle36.
Indeed, theconsulatesreported additionalcasesinwhich the treaty
provisionwas violated, but unlessthey involved crimes forwhich the

nationalcouldface a lengthytermof imprisonment,theywere excluded
fiom the attachedreport. Moreover,Mexicois certainthat the consulates
are not aware ofevery case in whichthe authorities'failedto notifi a
detainednationalof his rights to consularnotificationand access,
preciselybecauseof the ongoing violationsof Article36.

163. With regard to overall compliancewithArticle 36,nineteen
con su la te r^por^ed widespreadnon-compliancewiththe treaty
provision,and nineteen cons~lates'~r ~eportedmixedcompliance. Only

17'These consulates are located in LosAngeles (California), SanJose
(California), Presidio (Texas), Las Vegas (Nevada), Oxnard (California), Omaha
(Nebraska), Detroit (Michigan), Chicago (Illinois), Raleigh (North Carolina),
Orlando (Florida), Santa Ana (California), Del Rio (Texas), Miami (Florida),

New York (New York), Atlanta (Georgia), Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), Boston
(Massachusetts), Portland (Oregon), and Fresno (California).

'79The consulates are located in San Bernardino (California), Austin (Texas),
Houston (Texas), San Antonio (Texas),cAllen (Texas), Brownsville (Texas),
El Paso (Texas), Sacramento (California), San Francisco (California), San Diego
(California),Calexico (California), Albuquerque (New Mexico), Phoenix
(Arizona), Dallas (Texas), Kansas (Kansas), Seattle (Washington), Denver
(Colorado), Washington D.C., and Salt Lake City (Utah).six con su la te r^po^tedno violationsof Article36,al1of them located
on ornear the Mexicanborder."'

1 Ofthoseconsulatesdetailingmixedcompliance,many
reported that while notificationis receivedfiom authoritiesin a certain
limited numberof countieswithin a state, mostcountieseitherdo not

compl Ys2all,or only complywith regardto minormisdemeanor
cases.

165. For example,the Sacramentoconsulate reported that ih t as
neverreceivednotificationofthe detentionof a Mexicannationalin any

of the ten countiescomprisingCalifornia'sCentralValley,in which the
majorityof Mexicannationalsreside.ls3 TheAtlantaconsulate,which is
responsiblefor403 countiesin four States(Georgia,Alabama,Michigan,
and Tennessee),calculatedthat from theperiodbetweenJanuary2002

and 15April2003, the consulatebecameawareof andregistered 1,555
detained Mexicannationalsin its the consular protectionsystem. ls4 In
thatsarneperiod,there werebeen only272notifications fromauthorities,

translatingto a levelof complianceofroughly 17.49%.Is5

IsoThese consulates are located in Yuma (Arizona), Tucson (Arizona), Nogales
(Arizona), Eagle Pass (Texas), Laredo (Texas), and Douglas(Arizona).

18'One consulate, in Indianapolis (Indiana), opened in November 2002, and
could not provide sufficient data regarding compliance.

Is2See Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hemcindez,AppendixB, paras.4647,
Annex 7.Moreover, of those consulates reporting mixed compliance, it appears
that federal immigration and criminal authorities comply with 36twith

somewhat greater frequency than their state or local counterparts. The Presidio
consulate, for instance, reports that only federal immigrationauthorities provide
written notificationto detainees of their consular rights.

'83See id.paras. 21-29.

Is4See id.paras. 122-130.

See id.para. 125. The number is necessarily an underestimate, as it cannot
capture the presumed number of detained Mexican nationals of which the
consulate has no knowledge. 166. Similarly,the Philadelphiaconsulateestimated that it receives
notification from competent authoritiesin only 5 or 6 outof 100cases.Ig6
The Miami consulatelikewisereportedthat whiletwo counties regularly

provided notifications, elevendidnot.Ia7TheMiamiconsulatefurther
reportedthat at times,local authoritieshave actively prevented detained
nationals fromcommunicatingwith the consulate,despitethe nationals'
explicit requests to doSO.'~'

167. The recentcase ofJoelHuber Mendoza illustratesthenow-

farniliarlitanyofthe authorities' ongoingfailureto notifj detained
Mexicannationalsof their rightspursuantto article36. On 1December
2001,Mr. Mendozawas arrestedby law enforcementauthoritiesin
StanislausCounty,Californiafortriple homicide. Mr.Mendozahas a

historyof mentalinstability. Theauthoritiesdid not informMr.
Mendozaof his rightto consularassistancepursuantto Article36.
Mexican consularofficersdidnotbecome awareofthecaseuntil8
November 2002,when Mr. Mendoza'sdefense attorneynotified the
consulate inorderto obtain assistancein hiscase.It was onlyaflerthe

consulate wrote a letterto the authoritiesprotestingthe lackof
notificationthatthe authoritiesissued aletterinformingthe consulateof
Mr. Mendoza's detention,almostone year afterhis initialarrest. If
convicted, MI-. Mendozamaybe sentencedto death.

168. Detailsofeach ofthe 102casesandthe documentedarticle36
violationsare includedinthe ~nnexes.'~~

Ia6See id.,para. 146.

lg7See id.,para.90.

lg8See ibid..

lg9See Declaration ofRobertoRodriguezHernhndez,AppendixB, Annex7. VIOLATIONSOF THEVIENNA CONVENTIONBYTHE
UNITED STATES

169. In eachof the fifty-fourseparatecases thatformthe basisof
thisaction, the United Stateshasviolated Mexico's rightsunderthe
ViennaConvention,aswell asthe individual rights ofits nationals,
whichMexico raises in its exerciseof diplornaticprotection 'O First,the
UnitedStatesbreached theunequivocallanguageofArticle36(l)(b)by

failingto noti@the fifty-fourMexicannationalsof their consularrights
withoutdelay, therebyalso deprivingMexico ofits rightto provide
consularprotectionand assistance toits nationals. Second,theUnited
States breachedArticle 36(2)by employing certainmunicipallaw

doctrinesto prevent theMexican nationalsfi-omchallengingtheir
convictionsand death sentencesonthe basisof the UnitedStates's
violationsof Article36(1).

1.
Article36(1) Obligatedthe UnitedStatesto Notify
Mexican Nationalsof theirRights UnderTheVienna
Convention"WithoutDelay,"MeaningBeforeTaking
AnyAction PotentiaiiyPrejudicialTothe Rights of the
ForeignNational.

170. The United Statesdoesnot contestthatArticle36(l)(b)

requiredthe competent authoritiesto notiS,each ofthe fi@-four
Mexicannationals"without delay"oftheir rightsunderthe Vienna
Convention.

190Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case, P.I.C.J. Series AINo.2;
Barcelona Traction Case,1970I.C.J. Reports; Interhand1959 I.C.J. Reports;
Elettronica Siccula1989,I.C.J. Reports. 171. Article 36(1) "establishesan interrelated régime designedto
facilitate theimplementationof the systemof consular protection."'91
Specifically,Article 36(l)(a) provides:

(a) consular officers shall be freeto communicatewithnationals

of the sending Stateand to have access tothem. Nationals of the
sendingState shall have thesame freedomwith respectto
communication withand accessto consular officersof the
sending State.

172. This provïsion sets forth"the basicprinciple governmg
consularprotection:the right of communicationand ac~ess."'~~ It
constitutesthe foundationof consular protection. The consular rightsset
forthin Article 36(1), and the consular functionsenurneratedin Article

5,'93dependon the abilityof a consular officerto comrnunicatefreely
and promptlywiththe sending State'snationals. As the UnitedStates
has emphasized,"communicationis so essentialto the exerciseof
consular hnctions that its preclusion would render meaninglessthe
entire establishment.of consular relation^."'^^

173. Article 36(l)(c) elaborateson "the measures consularofficers
may take in rendering consular assistanceto their nationalsin the
custody ofthe receiving tat te."' ^tprovides:

(c) consular officers shall havethe right to visita nationalof the
sendingState who is in prison,custody ordetention,to converse

and correspondwithhim andto arrange for hislegal
representation. Theyshall alsohave theright to visitanynational

19'LaGrand (Germany v. United States ofilmerka), Merits, Judgment of 27
June 2001, para. 74.

19'id.,para. 74.

'93See Vienna Convention, Chapter 1,arts. 5(a), (e), (g(h),(i).

194 UnitedStates Diplornatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v.
Iran), 1980 1.C.J. Pleadings,p. 174.

'95LaGrand, para. 74. of the sendingState who is inprison, custodyor detentionin their
district in pursuance of ajudgment. ...

174. The notificationright embodiedin Article 36(l)(b) is the
predicate forthe exerciseof al1the other consularrightsprovidedin
Article 36. Thissubparagraph"spellsout the modalitiesof consular

notification"and "the obligations of the receivingState towardboththe
detainedpersonand the sending tat te."'^^

175. First, "competent authoritiesof the receivingStateshall,
without delay,inform"any foreign nationalof the sending State"in
prison, custodyor detention" of his rightto communicatewithhis

c~nsulate.'~'

176. Second,ifthe detainednationalof the sendingState"so
requests, competentauthoritiesof the receivingState shall,without
delay,informthe consularpost of the sending State,if withinits consular
district,a nationalof that State [hasbeen] mested or committedto
prison or to custodypending trial or [has been] detainedin anyother

manner."

177. Finaliy, communicationsfiomthe detainednationalof the
sendingStateto his consulate shall be fonvardedby competent
authoritiesof the receiving State "without delay."

a. The Travaux Préparatoirea sndU.S.Practice
ConfirmThat "WithoutDelay"1sa Functional
Expressionof Immediacy.

178. It is clearthat the purpose of Article 36(1)is to ensure
immediate consularnotificationand assistanceto any detainedforeign
national. The timing ofthe notice is criticalto the exercise of therights

providedby Article36; for this reason,Article 36(l)(b) repeatedly
reinforces the necessityof consularnotification andaccess"without
delay." Indeed,this phrase appears in every sentenceof subparagraph
(b).

196Id.,paras.74, 77.

197Vienna Convention, art.36(l)(b). 179. The travawcpréparatoiresforthe Vienna Conventionconfinn
thatthe intentof the phrase "without delay"was to requireunqualified
immediacy .

180. The originaltext proposedby the InternationalLaw

CommissionforArticle 36(b)employedthe phrase "withoutundue
delay." The UnitedKingdomproposed an amendment,which was
accepted,deletingthe word "undue" to avoid the implication"thatsome
delay [wouldbel permissible."'98

181. The Soviet delegateobjectedto the deletionof theword undue

because"[tlhe new wording seemedto imply an obligationtosupplythe
information immediately .. No delegatevoiced disagreementwith
the Soviet Union's jnterpretationthat Article 36(l)(b), afterthe deletion
of "undue," required immediatenotification. The travauxmake clear
that other states were quite anxiousto get the SovietUnionto agreeon a
text. If any fi-omthe Western bloc hadthoughtthat Article36 did not

require immediate notification,they would havesaid so. They didnot.

182. The lackof anytemporaldefinitionof "withoutdelay"in
Article 36(l)(b), lendsîurther supportto the conclusionthat notification
must beirnrnediate. At the conference,Germany's delegate proposed an
arnendrnentby which the"without undue delay" languagewouldhave

beenretained,but qualifiedby the words "but at the latestwithinone
rn~nth."~OO Whendiscussionin the committeemade it clearthat other
stateswere not willing to allowso long a periodto passwithout
notification,Gennanyrevisedits own amendmentto change "thirty

19'See OfJicialRecords,Proposals and Amendments Submitted to the Second
Cornmittee, at 85, United Kingdom:Amendments to Article 36, 13March 1963,
AlCONF.25lC.21L.107(proposa1to delete "undue" submitted to the Second
Comrnittee);see also OfficialRecords, Vol.1,p. 337 (statement of the United
ArabRepublic )(supportingthe United Kingdom's proposal).

199Official Records, Vol. 1:U.N. Conference on Consular Relations 37, U.N.
Doc.AlCONF.25116(1963) (Statement of the U.S.S.R.) (emphasis added).

200U.N. DOC.AICONF.25lC.2lL.74,in Official Records, Vol. II: U.N.
Conference on ConsillarRelations 81, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/16/Add.1(1963).days" to"forty-eight h~urs."~~'In this revised forrn,the amendmentwas
put to a vote. Eventhe forty-eighthour qualification was rejected.'02

183. The delegatesobviouslychose to require notification"without

delay" rather than specifj a particulartime period, so as to accommodate
the object and purpose of Article36 of prompt,effectiveconsular
protection withinthe context of thediversity of legal systemsthat exist
arnongthe States A specifictime period couldbe ineffective in

preventing injuryto a foreignnationalwhere differentmunicipalsystems
permittedor required interrogation,court proceedingsor other similar
actionsto be taken in the timepriorto the expirationof sucha setperiod.
Whilenotification within the forty-eight hours proposedby Germany

may ordinarilybe understood toconstitute notification"without delay,"
if interrogationtakes place immedkitelyafter apprehensionor detention,
even a delayof severalhoursmayviolate the purposeand intentof
Article36.

184. By rejecting a 48-hourgrace period and deleting"undue"the
statesparticipatingin the conferencemade clearthat "without delay"
meantwith no delay. Notificationpursuant to Article 36(l)(b) musttake
place at thetimethe nationalis firstdetained.

185. Althoughthe UnitedStateshas stated that noticewithin24 to
72hours would generally beconsideredwithout delay?O4the U.S.

20'Official Records, Vol. II: U.N. Conference on Consular Relation131,U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.25/16/Add.1(1963).

'O2Official Records, Vol.II: U.N. Conference on Consular Relation131,U.N.
Doc.A/CONF.25/16/Add.1(1963).

203Article 36 was designedto ensureprompt consularnotification andassistance
inthe context of "an international convention on consular relations, privileges
and immunities [that] would ...contribute to the development of friendly
relations amongnations, irrespective oftheir differingconstitutional andsocial
systems." Id., pmbl.

204U.S. Department of State telegram to al1U.S. diplomatic and consularposts

abroad concerningconsular assistancefor American nationals abroad, para.4,
January 1,200 1,available at <http://www.travel.state.gov/notification3.html~
(last visite14 June, 2003).Departmentof Statehas always understood"withoutdelay" to require
immediacy,in a qualitative sense,ratherthan within a certain number of
hoursor days.

186. The Foreign AffairsManualof the U.S.Department of State
explainsquiteclearlywhy "[plractical considerationsmake it imperative

that theconsularofficerbe notified imrnediatelyby local authorities
whenevera U.S.citizen is arre~ted."'~~Suchimmediate notificationis
essentialto thewhole regime of effective andmeaningfulconsular
protection:

In orderfor the consularofficerto performthe protective

function inluiefficientand timely manner,it is essentialthat the
consulobtain prompt notification whenevera United States
citizenis arrested. Promptnotificationis necessaryto assure
early accessto the arrestee. Earlyaccessin turn is essential,
amongother things, to receiveanyallegationsof abuse [and]to
providea list of lawyersand a legal systemfact sheetto

prisoners. . ..Withoutsuch promptnotificationof arrest, it is
irnpossible 1.0achievethe essentialtimelyaccess to a detained
U.S.citizen. 206

187. Moreover,the actualpracticeof the United States in serious
caseshasbeento insiston notification and accesswithoutany delay for

its detainednationals,in order to facilitateconsularassistance fiom the
earliest stagesofthe detention. For instance,in 1977,two American
missionarieswere detainedby Salvadoranauthoritiesfor taking a
photographofa police station,which wasdeemedto be a "national
securityinstallation'"duringa "state of siege." TheUnited Statesdid not
wait foran arbitrarydeadlineto expirebeforeresponding. Althoughthe

authoritiesreleasedthe individualsafter 32hoursof detention, the State
Departmentnevertheless lodgeda protestnoterequestingthe Salvadoran
Ministerof Foreign Relations to "elaborate expeditiously"as to

205U.S.Dep7tof Stati:,7 ForeignAffairsManual400 (emphasisadded) ,Annex
28. [wlhythe . ..two UnitedStates citizenswere notinformed of
theirrightto contactthe Consulateas providedunderArticle36
of theVienna Conventionon Consular Relationsof 1963;and
whythe Consulatewas notofficiallyinformedof the detention

oftwo UnitedStatescitizensuntilapproximately28 hours
after~ards.~'~

188. U.S.federalpoliciesand regulations alsoconfirmthat "without

delay"requires imrnediatenotification with respect to foreign nationals
within the UnitedStates. For instance,a 1986notice issuedby the U.S.
Departmentof Stateto law enforcementagenciesnationwideregarding
the Vienna Convention andthe arrest of foreignnationabreads in
pertinent part:

Thearresting officialshouldin al1cases immediatelyinform the
foreignnational of hisrightto havehis governmentnotified
concerningthe arreddetention.

Ifthe foreign nationalasksthat suchnotificationbe made,you

shoulddo so withoutdelay by informing thenearest consulateor
emba~s~.~~~

207L. Lee, ConsularLaw andPractice (2d ed. 1991),at p. 149(quoting U.S.
Dep'tof State, FileNo. P77 0095-2225; Dept. of State Digest, 1977, at 290).
208
United StatesDepartment of State Notice, October, 1986(emphasis added).
Similarly,since 1967,Department of Justice regulations have provided that: "In
every case in which a foreign national is arrestthe arresting officer shall
informtheforeign national that his consul will be advised of his arrest unlesshe
does not wish such notification to be given." Notificationof Consular Officers
upon the arrest offoreign national,28 C.F.R.5 50.5 (1) (emphasis added).

Likewise, since 1968,U.S. military regulations have stressed the need for
immediate consular notification whenever a foreign national is arrested:

When a circumstance requiring notification occurs, theotcJLingofJicer
will immediately communicate by telegram directly with the consul of
the foreign countryconcemed nearest the locale inwhich the
circumstancesrequiring notification occur.

ConsularProtection of Foreign Nationals Subject to the UniformCode of

Militaly JusticeAR 27-52, 5 November 1968 (ernphasisadded). 189. Certain state laws andregulationsof the United Statesare even
more specific. For instance,since 1999,al1police officersin California

have been requiredto provideimrnediatenotification of consular rights:

Inaccordancewithfederallawand the provisionsof this section,
everypeace officer,upon arrestand bookingor detentionfor

morethan bvo hoursof a knownor suspectedforeignnatjonal,
shalladvisethe foreignnationalthat he or she has a rightto
communicatewithanofficia1fromthe consulate ofhis or her
209
country ....

190. Finally, theUnitedStateshas recently affirmedin federal court
that imrnediatenotificationof consularrights is requiredunderArticle

36. Duringa recent oral argument beforethe U.S.Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit,the following colloquytook place:

The Court: Doesit [theVienna Convention]requirethat the

individualbe notifiedimmediately?

209Cal. Penal Code 5 834c (a) (1) (1999). See also Georgia Department of
Community Affairs, '4Mode1Law Enforcement Operations Manual, chapter 8-
1,Sixth Edition, Revïsed Febtuary 1996,available ut:
<http://www.dca.state.ga.uslresearchilaw/ChapfG1.html> (last visited 10June
2003). ("A foreign national whois arrested (taken into custody) will be
informed that he or she has the rightder a treaty to which the United States is

a party, to have his or her country's embassy ornearest consulate notified of his
or her arrest and detention.isshould be done ut the time of the arrest but no
later than during booking at thejail.") (emphasis added).

Similarly, the New York Police Department requires the arresting officer to
"[I]nform prisoner ofright to have embassy or consulate notified" and requires

the desk officer to "ensure that arresting officer" has carried out departmental
procedures whenever "notification to the prisoner's embassy or consulate is
required or in other cases when an arrested alien has so requesteNYPD
Patrol Manual, Procedure No. 208-56 (Date Effective: 02-28-01). Government Counsel:Well,yes itdoes. There is no questionthat
this treaty was violatedinthis instance andthe UnitedStatesis
not sayingthatit wasn't~iolated.~'~

b. Specifically,WithoutDelayMeansBefore
Interrogationof the Foreign National.

191. The Statespartyto the Convention obviously appreciatedthat
under custodialcircumstances,evena minor delay couldcause
irreparable prejudiceto therightsof a foreign national. Without

immediate notificationand access,consularofficerswill beprohibited
fiom performingtheir most basicfunctionsto protect theirmost
vulnerable nationals - those inthe custodyof a foreign state.
Accordingly, Article36requiresnotification andaccesswithoutdelayto
enable meaningful consular assistance.

192. As the U.S.Departmentof Stateadvises its foreignservice
staff: "[plromptpersona1access ...providesan opportunityforthe
consularofficerto explainthe legalandjudicial proceduresof the host
governmentandthe detainee's rightsunderthat governrnentut a time
when such informationis mostusef~l."~"

193. As discussedin ChapterTwo, themost importantaid a
consular officia1can rendercornesatthe outset of a criminalproceeding.

UnitedStatesv.Li, 206 F.3d 56,69 (lStCir. 2000) (Tomella, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).

211U.S. Dep't of State,7ForeignAffairs Manual § 412 (emphasis added),
Annex 28. In a letter to the Chairmanof the Texas Board of Pardons and
Paroles, on27 November 1998,FormerSecretaryof State Madeline Albright
summarizedthe thrust ofthe UnitedStates's consular assistance program for its
nationals detained abroad thus:

Weassist byattemptingto ensurethat [detainees] understand the foreign
country's legal systemandtheir legaloptions, by helping them obtain

qualified legalrepresentation,bycommunicatingwith their familiesif they
wish, and bytaking other stepsto improvethe prisoner's situationand in
somecases, to influence the outcomeofthe proceedings.

Correspondence with M.Albright,, Annex 29.The assistanceof qualifiedlegal counselis cruciallyimportantfromthe
first momentof detenti~n,~"asis a workingunderstanding ofthe local

legalsystem. 213 Consuls areentitled toprovideassistance with both.
Therefore,just as countriesrecognizethat adetaineemusthave
imrnediateaccess "withoutdelay"to legaladvicepriorto makingany

statementto authoritie~?'~it is equallymanifestthat consularnotification

212 The Human Right!;Cornmittee has stated that "al1persons who are arrested

must have immediate access to counsel." Concluding Observations of the HRC:
Georgia, U.N. Doc. C:CPRIC/79/Add.74,9April 1997,para. 28. The Inter-
American Commission has stated that the right to defend oneself requires that an
accused person be permitted to obtain legal assistance when first detained.

Annual Report of the .Inter-AmericanCommission, 1985-1986,
OEAISer.LNIII.68, doc. 8 rev. 1, 1986,p. 154, El Salvador. See alsoMurrayv.
UnitedKingdom, (41/'1994/488/570),8 February 1996. paras.4070 (failure to
grant access to counscrlduring the first 48 hours after his arrest was a violation

of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights).

2'3 For this reason, "[alny person shall, at the moment of arrest andatthe
commencement of detention or imprisonment, or promptly thereafter, be

provided by the authority responsible for his arrest, detention or imprisonment,
respectively, with inJ7rmation onand an explanation of his rights and how to
avail himself of such rights." Principle 13,Body ofPrinciples for the Protection
of Al1Persons under Any Form ofDetention or Imprisonment, G.A. res. 431173,

annex, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.49) at 298, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988)
(emphasis added).

2'4 Many national constitutions require al1detained persons to have access to

counsel and advice about their legal rights "without delay." For example,
Section 23(l)(b) of the New Zealand Bill of RightsAct (1990) statesthat every
detained or arrested person "shall have the right to consult and instruct a lawyer
without delay and to be informed of that right." Similarly, Section 10 (b) of the

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) declares that everyone has the
right on arrest or detention "to retain and instruct counsel without deZayand to
be informed of that right" (emphasis added).

In construing the precise meaning of "without delay" inthis context, the
Supreme Court of Canada has explained that:

A detainee is advised of the right to retain and instruct counsel without

delay because it isupon arrest or detention that a detainee is faced with
an imrnediate need for legal advice, especially in respect of how to
exercise theright to remain silent.and accessmust occur immediatelyupondetentionand priorto any
interrogationof the foreigndetainee,so that theconsulmay offeruseful
adviceaboutthe foreignlegalsystem andprovideassistancein htaining

counsel beforethe foreign nationalmakesanyill-infonneddecisionsor
the Statetakes any actionpotentiallyprejudicialto his

194. Accordingly, in TheRighttoInformationon Consular

Assistancein theFrameworkof the GuaranteesofDue Pmcess of
~aw:'~the Inter-ArnericanCourtof HurnanRightsconcludedthat

R. v. Brydges, [1990] 1S.C.R. 190,at p. 191(emphasis added).

The Court of Appeal for Western Samoa reached preciselythe same
construction of the term "without delay" in thatcountry's Constitution:

Although there was no express requirement to informthe arrestedperson
promptly of the right to consult counsel, this obligation was to be implied
into Art 6(3) of the Constitution which provided inter alia that every person
who is arrested shall be allowed to consult a legal practitioner of his own

choice without delay.. If the right to counsel was to be effective, the
information had to be conveyed before any statement was taken and it should
be made clearthat if the person arrested wished to consult a lawyer, any
questioning would be deferredfor a reasonable time toenable the person to
obtain legal advice.

Attorney-General v U, Western Samoa, Court of Appeal, 5 May 1994 1 HRNZ
286; [1996] 1CHRLD 96 (emphasis added).

215ASone English judge noted in the case of two Lebanese nationals, the
notification obligationrovides "a protection of fundamental importance." The
court noted that had consular notification taken place,

a French or Arabic speaking officia1would have visited the defendants in the
police station at short notice. Such a person would have helped themto reach
an informed decision about their position, and might well have advised them
to obtain the services of a solicitor and an interpreter before being
interviewed.

R. v. Bassil and Mouffareg (1990) 28 July, Acton Crown Court, HHJ Sich.
Reported inLegal Action 23, December 1990(emphasis added).

216Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of 1October 1999,Series A, No. 16.because the Vienna Convention'sdrafiersintendedArticle36(1),among
other goals,to ensurethe efficacyof a foreignnational'slegaldefense,

"notification mustbe made at the time theaccusedis deprivedof his
freedom,or at leasl beforehe makeshisfirst statementbeforethe
authorities.'" l7

195. The Inter-American Commissionalso concludedthat consular
notification"afier crucialpreliminary stagesof [a foreign]national's
criminalproceedings [have]transpired,includingthe retaining of his
attorney,the presentation ofthe chargesagainsthim andthe

developmentof hisdefense"would failto satisQthe mandateof
"without delay."218

196. Irrespective ofself-servingargumentsformulatedexclusively
forthe purpose of litigatingthe ViennaConvention beforethis Courtin

~a~rand,~'~with respectto U.S.nationalsdetainedabroad, theUnited
Stateshas always understoodthe purposeofthe consularnotification
right and the necessityofnotification prior to interrogationand other

prejudicial acts by thereceiving state.

197. Certainly,the viewadopted forpurposesof theLaGrand
litigationcannot be reconciledwith the viewspreviouslyexpressedby
the United States. TheU.S.Departmentof Statehas acknowledgedthe

functionaldefinitionof "withoutdelay" meaningprior to interrogation,
stating:

217 Id,, para. 106 (emphasis added).

218 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report No. 52/02,Merits,

Case 11.753,(Ramon Martinez Villareal v. UnitedStates) (10 October 2002).

219LaGrand, Memorial of the United States of America, para. 84:

...nothing in Article 36 relates [a State's] notification obligations to the
criminal justice process. Article 36 provides that both notification

obligations must be carried out 'without delay,' butoes not define thisterm
or relate it to any particular event in the criminaljustice process. Nor does
Article 36 specify the manner in which consular officers must be notified,
leaving it opento States party [to the Convention] to use a variety of
methods, including ones that result in notification occurring after critical
events in a criminal investigation have occurred. Whilethere is no precise definitionof "withoutdelay,"it is the
Department's viewthat such notificationshouldtakeplaceas
quicklyas possible and,in anyevent,no laterthanthe passageof
a few days. Seriousproblemsin thisregardhavebeen

experiencedby American consularofficersincountriesin Eastern
Europe, where ...detention of anindividualforprolonged
"interrogation"priorto the filingof formalchargesis officially
sanctioned. ... Clearlythis typeofprocedureisnot inkeeping
with eithertheletterorthe spirit oftheVienna t on vent ion.^^^

198. Similarly,in Congressionalhearingsin 1975regarding
ArnericancitizensinprisoninMexico, theadministrationof securityand
consular affairsforthe Departmentof State testified:

We believethat immediateconsularaccessisthe linchpinon

which hangsin largemeasurethe solutionofmanyof our
problems. With earlyaccessto eachprisonerweareconvinced
we can go a longwaytowardguaranteeingthe prisoneragainst
mistreatmentand forcedstatementsatthe timeof arrest,along
with makingavailableto him information about responsible legal

counselandjudicial procedures.22'

199. Moreover,the UnitedStatesrespondsvigorouslywhenits
nationals have faced interrogation without thebenefitof consular
assistance. On29 August 2001,the UnitedStatesEmbassyin Belarus

issued a forma1statementonthe case ofRobert Fielding.Notingthat
Mr. Fieldinghad beenarrestedand subjectedto a 10-hourinterrogation
and then subsequentlydeported,the Embassystated:

220U.S. Dep't of State File LIMISCA,1973Dep't of StateDigest 161, quotedin
Lee, supra,at pp. 143-144.

221U.S. Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico: Hearingsbeforethe Subcommitteeon
International Political and MilitaryAffairs oftheHouse Committeeon
International Relations,94th Cong., 1stSess. Part I6,(1975). (Statement of
Hon. Leonard F.Walentrynoucz, Bureau of Securiîy and ConsularAffairs,
Department ofState). U.S. Citizens ImprisonedinMexico: Hearingsbefore the
Subcommittee on International Political and MilitaryAffairs ofthese
Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.Part II,at 37 (1975)
(Letterfrom Hon. Robert J.McCloskey, Assistant Secretary of Statefor

Congressional Relations to Hon. Dante B.Fascell, Dated November 26,1975). Duringthis entire interrogationprocess,he was deniedthe right
to legalcounsel, forcedto sign a statement,and subjectedto

being filmed by the state-controlled BelarusianNational ...The
U.S.Embassy wouldliketo emphasize thefollowing: The
Govemment.of Belarusis a signatoryto the ViennaConvention
on Consular Relationswhichassures notification,without delay,

ofhome-countryconsularoficers in caseswherea foreign
nationalis detained. The Government ofBelarusactedwith
extraordinaryhaste to seethat Mr.Fieldingwas deportedbefore
he could see a U.S. consularoficer.. .Bytakingthe

extraordinary action of detainingand harassingan American
citizenapparently forthe solepurpose of creating apropaganda
piece for the statecontrolled BelarusianNationalTelevision,the
Government has raisedseriousquestionsabout itsintentions.222

c. The Vulnerabilityof ForeignNationals inCustody
Requires the Definitionthat MexicoUrges.

200. The necessity of construing"without delay" tomeanpriorto
interrogationof a detained foreignnationalis reinforcedby the
vulnerabilityof foreignnationalsin custody.

201. Reports and documentationrepeatedly show thatthe greatest

potential forabuse by authorities existst the timeof initial custody and
detenti~n.~~~ Indeed, in the landmarkdecision Miranda v. ri zona)^ the

222ErnbassyStatement on Detention and Deportation of U.S.Citizen Robert
Fielding, Embassy of the United States of America, Minsk, Belarus, available at
< http://www.usis.minsk.by/html/f (iaslviineg.h0Jrnel2003).

223See, e.g., Amnesty International, Torture Worldwide: An Affront to Human

Dignity 12-13(2000:)(Criminal suspects are one of the most common victims of
torture used to obtain information orract confessions); Civil and Political
Rights, IncIuding the Questions of Tortureand Detention: Report of the Special
Rapporteur, SirNigel Rodley, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 56th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda ItemIl (a)1 11, U.N. Doc E/CN.412000/9/Add.3(2000)
(Criminal suspects aremost at risk of being subjected to torture or other ill-
treatment in early phases of detentionS. Rodley, The Treatment of

Prisoners Under International LawO-11(2nd ed. 1999) (torture frequently used
on ordinary criminal suspects immediately after being seized in order to secure
confessions and other information); D. Lohman, Human Rights Watch,
Confessions atany Cost: Police Torture in Russia (1999) (torture of detainedUnited States Supreme Courtciteda police manual that illusiratesthe
dangers inherent in custodial interrogation. The manualexplainedhow

bestto elicitconfessions,emphasizing howthe conditionsofcustodial
interrogationare conduciveto the solicitationof confessions:

persons is reportedly rampant in Russia); AmnestyInternational, United States
of America: Police Brutalityand Excessive Forcein the New York City Police
Department 9-10(1996) (persons reportedly tortured by New YorkCity police

officers during course of arrest, duringdisputes, or in transport to station).
Reports of SirNigel Rodley, Special Rapporteurto the [TortureConvention
Committee]detail specific instances of police brutality duringpre-trial custody
inorder to obtain confessions. See, e.g., Civiland Political Rights, Including
the Questions of Tortureand Detention: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Sir
Nigel Rodley, U.N. Commission on HumanRights, 57th Sess.,Provisional

Agenda Item 1 l(a)7 6-9,22, 114U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2001/66/Add.l (2001)
(describingpre-trial custodial torture in orderto extract confessionsby law
enforcementofficiais inAzerbaijan,); CivilandPolitical Rights, Including the
Questions of Torture and Detention: Report of the Special Rapporteur, SirNigel
Rodley, U.N. Commission on HurnanRights, 57thSess., ProvisionalAgenda
Item 1l(a),77 7-9, 17, 56, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2001/66/Add.2(2001) (custodial

torture by police reportedly endemicin Brazil)Civiland Political Rights,
Including the Questions of Tortureand Detention: Report of the Special
Rapporteur, Sir Nigel Rodley, U.N. Commissionon HumanRights,56th Sess.,
ProvisionalAgenda Item 1l(a), 7 5, U.N.Doc E/CN.4/2000/9/Add.2(2000)
(describing custodial torture in Cameroonto extract confessions orto punish or
intimidate individuals suspected of having committed crimes);Civil and

Political Rights,Including the Questions of Torture and Detention: Report of the
Special Rapporteur, Sir Nigel Rodley, U.N. Commission on HumanRights, 56th
Sess.,ProvisionalAgenda Item 1 l(a),Tj6, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2000/9/Add.3
(2000) (describing custodial torture by police in Romania to extractconfessions
or to punish criminal suspects)Civil and Political Rights, Including the
Questions of Tortureand Detention: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Sir Nigel
Rodley, U.N. Commission on HumanRights, 56thSess., ProvisionalAgenda

Item 11,lTj6, 11,U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2000/9/Add.4(2000) (describing torture
used almost systematically to obtain confessionsin Kenya);Civil and Political
Rights, Including the Questions of Torture andDetention: Report of the Special
Rapporteur, Sir Nigel Rodley, U.N. Commissionon HurnanRights,55th Sess.,
Provisional AgendaItem 11(a), 7 14,U.N.Doc E/CN.4/1999/61/Add.1(1999)
(securityforces carrying out interrogationsin Turkey avoid visiblesignsof

torture byusing less brutal forms oftorture).

224384 U.S.436 (1966). Ifat al1practicable,the interrogationshould take placein the
investigator's officeor at least in a room ofhis own choice. The

subject should bedeprivedof every psychologicaladvantage. In
his own homehe may be confident,indignant, orrecalcitrant. He
is morekeenlyaware of his rightsand more reluctantto tell of his
indiscretions ofcriminalbehavior withinthe walls of his home.

Moreover his familyand other fiiends are nearby,their presence
lending moral

202. Thesefactsapply afortiori to foreign nationalswho, fàrmore

than citizensdetainedby their own government,will findthemselves,
"thrust into an unfamilia atmosphereandrun throughmenacingpolice
interrogationprocedures.'s26

203. Inthe wordsofthe United States:"Immediateconsular access,
in [the Departmentof State's]opinion, still remainsthe restraining factor
preventing abusingtreatrnent[inprison], andwe continueto pursuethat
goal[.]"227

204. In surn,there can be no disputethat noneof the objectivesof
Article 36( 1)(b) can be achieved with appropriateeffect(effetutile)
unless compliancetakes place literally"without delay,"in other words,

immediatelyand priorto any interrogation. It isalsoevidentthat the

225Id. at 449-50 (quoling Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions
(1962), p. 1(interna1quotation marks omitted);see also id.at pp. 448-56
(canvassing the range of interrogation techniques used by policefficers to elicit
confessions).

226Id. at 457. The U.S. Supreme Court further observedthat foreign law had
likewise recognized the dangers of custodial interrogation. See id. at 487-89
(discussing the law and practice of Scotland, England, and Ceylon).

227U.S. Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico: Hearings before the Subcornmittee on
International Political and Military Affairs of the House Cornmittee on

International Relations, 94th Cong., 1stSess., Part II, at 58 (1975) (Statement of
Hon. Leonard F. Walentynowicz,Administrator, Bureau of Security and
Consular Affairs, Department of State); see also id 37 (Letterfrom Robert J.
McClosky,Asst. Sec. Of Statefor Congressional Relations to Hon. Dante B.
Rascell, dated Nov. 26, 1975) ("prompt consular access offers the best hope of
effective deterrenceofabuse during interrogation.").UnitedStatesroutinely appliesthese sameprinciplesonbehalf of its
nationalsdetainedabroad.

2. TheUnited StatesDid Not Providethe RequisiteNotice
Without DelayTo Any ofthe FiftyFour Mexican
Nationals.

205. Therecord inthis caseclearlyestablishesthatthe United States
providedno notice whatsoeverto fi@-one Mexicannationals whowere

convictedand sentenced todeath in the United States. TheUnited States
- throughtherelevant municipalprosecutingauthoritiesor through
judicial findings - has conceded manyof these violations;the others
cannotbe disputed. 228

206. The recordin this case also clearly establishesthat even inthe
three caseswherethe UnitedStates didnotiQ the detainedMexican
nationalsoftheir rightsunderArticle 36,such notice either wasnot
conveyed"without delay,"or failed tonotiQ the detained national ofall
his rights,asrequiredby the plain languageof Article 36(1)(b).~~~

207. Failureto providethe notice requiredby Article36(l)(b)
constitutesa violationof the "individual rights"of eachdetained foreign
national,asestablishedbythis Court in~a~rand.~~~In fact,the failure
to notiQ a nationalof his rights- and thereaftertonoti@that national's

consulateuponrequest- without delay,evisceratesthe entirepwpose
of Article36(1). If a receivingState failsto complywithits obligations
underArticle 36(l)(b), a foreignnationalseldomwill be awareof or in a
positionto exercise his right tocontacthis consularofficer.

208. Equally,by failingto notiQ the detainedMexicannationalsof
their Article 36 rights,the UnitedStatesnecessarilyalsoviolated
Mexico'srightto provideconsular assistancepursuantto subparagraphs
(a)and (c). Asthis Courtheld in LaGrand, "whenthe sendingStateis
unawareof the detentionof its nationalsdue tothe failureof the

228See supra Chapter III.3.B.

229See supra Chapter III.3.B.

230LaCrand, para. 77.receiving Statetoprovide the requisite consularnotificationwithout
delay. .the sendingStatehas beenprevented for al1practicalpurposes
fromexercising its rightsunderArticle 36, pa.'23'ph1

B. BYAPPLYIN CTSMUNICIPA LLAW INA MANNER THAT FAILS

TO CIVE FULL EFFECT TOTHEPURPOSE OF ARTICL3 E6,THE
UNITED STATE SASVIOLATED AN,DCONTINUE TO VIOLAT~
ARTICL3 E6(2)OFTHE VIENNA CONVENTION.

209. The UnitedStatesviolated Article36(2) by invokingmunicipal
lawsto precludejudicial remedies for violationsof Article 36(1). In
particular,the United Stateshas used its municipal defaultdoctrinesand

itsjudicial findingsthat Article 36doesnot create fundamental
individualrightsto bar Mexican nationalsfromchallengingtheir
convictionsanddeath sentenceson the basisthat they werenot notified
pursuantto Article:36(2)of their right to contacttheir consulates.

210. Moreover,the UnitedStateshas informed Mexico and this

CourtthatbecauseU.S. courtsarebarredby these municipaldoctrines
fromconsideringVienna Convention violations,it "has electedto relyon
the clemencyprocess in the specificcasesthat have arisensince
LaGrand. ..[as]the surest andmost effective wayto take account of the
violationof the Vienna Conventionrights."32 But, the discretionary
clemencyprocess-which rarely,if ever,includesa reviewand

reconsiderationof the effect of a violationofthe Vienna-Convention
cannotremedythe United States's failure to givehl1 effectto the
purposesof Article36.

211. The United States'selevation ofits municipal law and
federalist structure overits treaty obligation togive "full effect" to the

purposesof Article36 is a violationof internationallaw and constitutes a
separatebreachof its obligationsunderthe Vienna Convention.

231LaGrand,para. 74.

232CR200314(Collins), at p.16. 1. The United States Was Obligatedto GiveFull Effectto

the Purposesof Article36 in itsMunicipalLaw To
Enablethe EffectiveEnforcementand Meaningful
Vindicationat Lawof ThoseConsular Rights.

212. The draftersof the ViennaConventionenvisioned"an

internationalconventionon consular relations,privileges and irnmunities
[that]would . .. contributeto the development of friendlyrelations
amongnations, irrespective of their diSferingconstitutional and social
systems."

213. It was an essentialtask forthe drafiersto accommodatethe
myriadlegalsystemsamongthe Statespartyto the Convention,whileat
the sametime protectingagainst Statesusingtheir municipallaws to

underminethe rights establishedin Article 36. To permit a State'slaws
andregulationsto impairor diminishrightsconferredby the Convention
woulddefeatthe objectand purposeof Article36(2) and violatethe
fundamentalprincipleof internationallaw that nostate may invoke its

municipallaw or internalstructureto excuseorjustiQ failureto obey
international

233Id., pmbl. (emphasis added).

234See, e.g., Reparationfor Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949,at p. 180(emphasizing that
where a "claim is based on the breach of an international obligation on the part
of [a]Member [State],the Member [State] cannot contend that this obligation is

governedby municipal law"); Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons
of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932
P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 44, p. 4 ("[A] State cannot adduce as against another
State its own Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it
under international law or treaties in force.");Free Zones of UpperSavoy and
the District oGex, Order of 6 December 1930,P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 24, p. 12
(obse~ing that a State "cannot rely on [its] own legislation to limit the scope of

[its] international obligations"). See also International Law Commission, Dra8
Articles on the Responsibility of Statesfor lnternationally WrongifulActs, 3,t.
("The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is
governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the
characterization of theame act as lawful by internal law"); Oppenheim 's
International Law, pp. 500-01. International Law Commission, Drap Articles
on theResponsibility of Statesfor InternationallyrongjiulActs, Art. 4 ("The 214. Inorderto strikethat balance, Article36(2)of the Vienna
Convention provides:

Therightsreferredto in paragraph 1of this Article shallbe
exercisedin conformity withthe laws and regulations ofthe
receiving State,subject tothe proviso, however,that the said laws

andregulationsmustenablefull effectto be given tothe pyoses
for whichthe rightsaccordedunderthis Articleare intended. 35

215. The travauxpréparatoiresforthe ViennaConvention,in

particulartherevisionofthe text of Article 36(2),clearlyreveal the
understandingof theStates partyof the meaning of"full effect." The
ILC'sDraftArticleson ConsularRelations,which served as the basis for

negotiationsof thefinaltext ofthe Convention,had providedin full:

The rights referredto inparagraph 1of thisArticle shallbe
exercisedinconformitywith the lawsand regulationsof the

receiving State,subjecttothe proviso, however,that the said
lawsandregulationsrnustnotnullljj theseriight~.~'~

216. The UnitedKingdomproposedan amendmenttothis

provision,whichwas ultimatelyacceptedas the finaltext of Article

conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or
any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization ofthe State,
and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a
territorial unit of the State");see also Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 23 May 1963,art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 33 1. ("A party may not invoke
the provisions of its interna1lawas justification for its failure to perform a

treaty").

235 Vienna Convention, art. 36(2).

236Dra3 Articles onResponsibility ofStatesfor intentionally wrongful acts,

adopted by the International Law Commission at its Fifty-third session (2001),
Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No.
IO(A/56/10), Chp. 1V.E.1,art. 36(2), (emphasis supplied) [hereafter "ILC Draft
Articles"].36(2),preciselybecausethe ILCversiondid not, in its view,gofur
enough.2 '

217. The UnitedKingdom'sdelegateemphasizedthat '"to nullifi'
mean[s]to 'rendercompletelyinoperative.' But [the]rights [established

byArticle 36(1)]couldbe seriouslyimpairedwithout becoming
completelyin~~erative."'~~ For example,while a sendingState's
"consulates mustcomplywithlawsand regulationson suchmatters as
prisonvisitingand what might begivento the prisoner,""it was of the
greatest importance ...that thesubstanceof the rightsandobligationsin

paragraph 1 .. .be preserved."239Other Statedelegatesagreed. Not only
shouldmunicipal lawsandregulations not"nullifj" the rightsin Article
36(1),they shouldnot in any wayimpairthe eff~cacyofthose rights.

21 8. The Sovietdelegation,supportedbythe Byelorussianand

Romaniandelegates,soughtto resurrectthe ILCversionbecause it
"recognized thatnationaljurisdictionshould not be interferedwith, and
...established a satisfactorybalance betweenthe consul's right toprotect
hisnationalsand the requirementsof municipallaw in the receiving
tat te.'' ^'Sthe Sovietdelegatefurtherpointedout,the approved

version of Article36(2)"couldhave serious consequences for the
receiving State where an alien committed acrime." 24 The Soviet bloc
fearedthe U.K.amendment couldrequirechangesin domesticcriminal

237OfJicialRecords, Proposalsand Amendments Submitted to the Second
Committee, at 85, UnitedKingdom:Amendments to Article 36, 13March 1963,
AlCONF.25lC.21L.107.

238OfJicialRecords, Vol.1,p. 40 (statement of the United Kingdom).

239OfJicialRecords, Vol.1,p. 347 (statement of the United Kingdom).

240United Nations, Official Records of the Conferenceon Consular Relations,
Vol. 1,Twelfih Plenary Meeting, agenda item 10,para. 3, document
A/CONF.25/16; seealso id. para. 8 and Eleventh Plenary Meeting, agenda item
10,para. 26.

241Id,para. 4.laws and procedures. Afterthe considerationofthese concerns,the U.K.
amendmentto Article36(2)prevailed.242

219. Thus,the languageofArticle36(2)maximizes the flexibility
that each State enjoysto integratethoserightsand obligationsinto its
particular systemof municipal law. Butin no eventcan that flexibility

become a pretext for diminishing or impairingthe rights conferredby
Article 36(1); in no eventcanthe meanschosen(howa State electsto
give fulleffect) evisceratetheend required(that its lawsad regulations
do infact give full effect).

220. In LaGrand, the Courthadoccasionto interpretthe
requirementsofthe obligation establishedby Article 36(2)to give "full
effectto the purposes"forwhich Article36was intended. With respect

to Germannationals whowere "convictedand sentencedto severe
penalties" without havingbeenaffordedtheir rightsto consular
notificationandcommunication,the Courtheld,first, that a Stateviolates
Article36(2) when it gives effectto a lawor regulationthat

does not allow [adetained foreign nationalof the sending State]
to challenge a convictionand sentenceby claiming,in reliance
on Article 36,paragraph1,of theConvention,that thecompetent
national authoritiesfailedto comply withtheir obligationto

providethe requisite consular information "withoutdelay,"thus
preventingthe personfromseekingand obtainingconsular
assistance fromthe sending tat te.^^^

221. Second,the Courtheldthat a receivingStateviolatesArticle36
when itgives effectto a iawor regulationthat preventsthe authoritiesof

-- -
242 Official Records, Vol. 1,p348.

243LaGrand, Judgment of 27 June 2001, para. 90; cJ:Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Paraguay v. UnitedStates of America), I.C.J.Reports 1998,
Order of 9 April, Declaration of President Schwebel ("Itisof obvious
importance to the maintenance and development of a rule of law among States
that the obligations imposed by treaties be complied with and that, where they
are not, reparation be required.").that State"from attachinganysignificancetothe fact [of3the
violation."244

222. Third, inthe caseof sucha convictionandsentence,the Court
imposed an obligationon the United States"to allowthe reviewand
reconsideration"of boththe convictionandthe sentence where rights to
consularaccesswere~iolated.~~~ The Courtspecificallyinstmctedthe

UnitedStatesthatthe reviewandreconsiderationhadto "tak[e] account
of the violationof the rights setforthinthe

223. Fimlly, by holdingthatthe UnitedStateshadthe "choiceof

means,"the Courtlefithe implementationoftheseconcrete obligations
to the United States.

224. InLaGrand, the Court consideredArticle36(2)inthe context

of the UnitedStatesmunicipaLlawdoctrineof proceduraldefault. As
discussedin Chapter Two,pursuanttothat doctrine, a defendantwho
could haveraised,but failsto raise,a legalissueat trial willgenerallynot
bepermittedto raiseit in future proceedings, on appeal oir n a petition

fora writof habeas corpus. Becauseapplicationofthe procedural
defaultdoctrine (i)prevented theLaGrandbrothers (nationalsof the
sendingState)fiom challengingtheir convictionsandsentencesin
relianceon Article36(1),and (ii)preventedthe courts(authoritiesof the

receiving State)fi-omattaching significanceto thefactof the violations,
the Court heldthatthe UnitedStateshad "breacheditsobligation" to
Germanyand the LaGrandbrothers(Germannationals)"under Article
36,paragraph2, of the TheCourttherebyaffirmedits

authorityto hold,"[ilf necessary,that adomesticlaw hasbeenthe cause
ofth[e]violation."24s

- -

244Id., para. 1.

245Id., para. 125.

246Id., paras. 125, 128(7).

247Id., para. 128(4).

248Id., para. 125. 225. Although theLaGrandjudgment is bindingonlybetween the
United Statesand Germany,the Court'sholding with respectto the
"obligations ofthe UnitedStatesin casesof severepenalties imposedon
Gennan nationals" whowere not accorded their rightsunderArticle 36

has clearrelevanceforMexico, as well. In a separatedeclaration
President Guillaumestated:

subparagraph(7) [ofthe dispositifjdoesnot addressthe position
of nationalsof other countriesorthat of individualssentencedto
penalties thatare not ofa severe nature. However,inorderto

avoidanyarnbiguity,it shouldbe made clear thatthere can be no
questionof applyingan a contrario interpretation tothis
paragraph.''49

2. The UnitedStates HasViolated Article36(2)by
ForeclosingLegalChallengesto Convictionsand Death
Sentencesof Mexican Nationals Resulting from
ProceedingsThatFailedto Respect Article36(1) of the
Convention.

226. By applyingprovisionsof its municipallawto defeator
forecloseremedies forthe violationofrights conferredbyArticle 36 -
thus failingto providemeaningfulreview and reconsiderationof severe
sentencesimposedin proceedingsthat violated Article36 - the United
Stateshas violated,and continuesto violate,the ViennaConvention.

227. The UnitedStates uses severalmunicipal legaldoctrinesto
prevent findingany legal effectfiomtheviolationsofArticle36. First,
despitethis Court's clearanalysisin LaGrand, U.S. courts,at boththe
state and federallevel,continue toinvoke default doctrinesto bar any
review ofArticle36violations - even when thenational had been

unaware of hisrightsto consularnotificationandcommunication and
thus his abilityto raisetheir violationas an issue attrial, dueto the
competentauthorities'failureto complywithArticle36.

228. In thecase ofRamiroIbarra~ubi?" althoughstateofficiais

conceded both "thathe is a citizenof Mexicoandthathe was never

249Id.,Decl. Guillaume.

250Case no. 34 in Mexico's Application.informedof or accordedhis ri hB to freeaccessto andconsultationwith
the consularpost of Mexico," j1 the TexasCourtof CriminalAppeals
applied the stateproceduraldefaultdoctrineandrefusedto considerMr.
Ibarra'sclaim that thedetainingauthoritieshad failedto notify himof his

rights under Article 36 of the ViennaConvention:

We need not decidethe meritsof appellant'scontention,however,
as he failed topreserve thisissue forreview. [Texas]Ruleof
Appellate Procedure33.1,Preservationof AppellateComplaints,

requiresthat the record showthe complaintwas timelymadeto
the trial court,the groundswere specificallystated orwere
readily apparent,thecomplaint complied withtherulesof
evidenceor appellate procedure,andthe requirementof a ruling

on the complaintbe satisfied. Exceptforcomplaintsinvolving
fundamentalconstitutionalsystemicrequirements,whicharenot
applicablehere, al1other complaintsbased ona violationof both
constitutional and statutory rights arewaivedby failureto comply

with Rule33.1.~~~

229. The courtmadeno exceptionfor thefactthatArticle36
violations consistof a failureof the authoritiesto notifydefendantsof

their rights.

230. As this Courtis aware,the federalprocedwaldefaultrule
works in a similar fashion. Oncea statecourt determinesaMexican
national's Article 36claimto have been defaultedbecauseitwas not

raised atthe trial level,the federalcourtsreviewing casesfromthese
stateswill deferto that default findingand willthereforerefuseto
considerthe merits of the underlyingclaim. 253

231. The federalprocedural defaultruleis subjectto severallimited

exceptions;however, the application of these exceptions revealsthe

251Ibarra v. State11S. W .3d 189, 197(Tex. Crim.App. 1999).

252Id. (interna1citations ornitted).

253
See, cg.,Murphy v. Netherland, 116F.3d97, 100(4thCir.1997);Annexes
39-65 (containingcourtdecisions inthecases of Mexicannationalswhich apply
the proceduraldefaultrule).extentto which the UnitedStatesmisconceives ofthe importanceof the
rightscreated by Article 36 andfailsto givethem fulleffect. An inmate

seekinga federalwrit of habeas corpuscanovercomea stateprocedural
defaultif he can demonstrate"cause forthe defaultand prejudice
attributablethereto,or demonstrate that failure toconsiderthe federal
claimwill result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.''54"Cause"

sufficientto excuse a stateproceduraldefaultrequiresthe inmateto
prove"that some objective factor external to the defensiempeded
counsel'sefforts to complywiththe State'sproceduralr~le.''~~
'Prejudice'meansproof "not merelythat the errors athistrial createda

possibilityof prejudice,but thattheyworked tohis actualand substantial
disadvantage,infectinghis entiretrialwith errorof constitutional
dimensions."256And 'miscarriageofjustice' means"the convictionof
onewho is actuallyinnocent."257

232. Federal courtshave held thatViennaConventionclaimsdonot
satisQ any of these exceptions.258Justasthe TexasCourtof Criminal
Appeals refusedto make an exception forstateprocedural defaultniles
for Mr.Ibarra's claimbecauseit did notconsiderArticle36 a

"findamental constitutional systemic requirement,"so too nocourt has
ever found, and no prosecutor has everagreed,that failureto considera
defaultedViema Convention claim would cause"prejudice" or would
worka "miscarriage ofjustice."

233. Likewise, federalcourtshave specifcally "rejected [the]
contentionthat thenovelty ofa ViennaConvention claim and thestate's
failureto advisethe [foreignnational]of his rightsunderthe Vienna

254 Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,262 (1989)(internal citations omitted),
emphasis added.

255Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,488 (1986).

256UnitedStates v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170(1982).

257Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496.

258See, e.g., LaGrandv. Stewart, 133F.3d 1253, 1261(9thCir. 1998)("It is

undisputed that the State of Arizona did not notifi the LaGrands of their rights
under the [Vienna Convention]. It is also undisputed that this claim was not
raised in any state proceeding. The claim is thus procedurally defaulted.").Conventioncould constitute causeforthe failureto raisetheclaimin
state Courts findthat [tlhelegalbasis forthe Vienna
Conventionclaim could ...have beendiscoveredupona reasonably

diligent investigationby [thedefendant's]attorney.'"h0

234. By contrast, despitethe factthat "the Vienna Convention has
beenin effect since 1969,"~~' federalcourtsalsoconsiderVienna
Conventionclaims to raisesuchnewrulesof criminalproceduresoasto

barViennaConventionclaimspursuantto the non-retroactivity doctrine
of Teaguev.~ane.~~~ Under Teague,the federalcourtsrefuseto grant
habeas relief based on a rulethat"breaks newgroundor imposesa new

obligationon the Statesor the Federal~overnment."~~~

235. So, in short,U.S.courtsconsidera claimunderArticle 36 to be
sufficientlynew both to excuse an incompetent attorneyandto trigger
the non-retroactivitydoctrineof Teague so as to barreliefforMexican

nationalswhose rightstobenotzjiedofthe basisfor such a daim were
violated, butnot sufficiently novel toconstitutejustifiable causefor
failingto timely raise them intrial proceedings.

236. Second, even wherethe ViennaConventionclaimsofMexican

nationalshave not been defaulted,U.S.courtsrefuseto providejudicial
remedies, because they havedeterminedthat the ViennaConvention
doesnot create individualrights,a that it does notcreate fundamental

dueprocessrights on a par withconstitutional rights(e.g.,therightto

259Breardv. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619-620 (41hCir. 1998);see also Murphyv.

Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100(41hCir. 1997) (same).

260Id. Ironically, while finding Vienna Convention claims insufficiently
"novel" to excuse raising the claims below, courts refuse to grantas claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel where inept trial counsel failed tosuch
claimson the groundthat Vienna Convention claims arose relatively recently
and even competent counsel cannot be expected to have foreseen such a

development in the law.

26'Breard v.Pruetf, 134F.3d 615, 620 (4th Cir. 1998).

262See supra Chapter 1II.C.1

263Teaguev. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).counsel),or that, in anyevent, Mexican nationalsare not entitled toa
remedywithout meetinga high threshold of proofthat they havebeen

prejudicedby the United States's failureto abideby its obligationsunder
Article36.264

237. As a result ofthese various holdingsdecliningto equateArticle
36 rights with"fundamentalrights," Mexicannationalsgenerallycannot

obtain anyeffectiverelief by asserting violations ofthe Vienna
convention. 265 For example,state courtshaverefusedto extendto
violationsof Article 36 the constitutionalrule of United Statesmunicipal
law thatexcludesevidenceobtained in violation ofa defendant'srights

underMiranda v.Arizona.

238. Just as the proceduraldefault doctrine has"the effectof
preventing 'full effect [frombeing] givento the purposes for whichthe
rights accorded under [Article361are intended"'because it prevents

foreignnationals fromeffectivelychallengingtheir convictionsand
sentenceson the basisofArticle 36 violations,sotoo therefusa1to
recognizeArticle 36 rightsas fundamentalto due processfor a foreign

nationalviolates the mandate ofArticle 36(2)because it also preventsthe
courts"from attachingany legal significance"to the effect ofsuch
violations.266

264See supra Chapter 1II.C.

265
See, e.g.,Statev. Chavez, 19P.2d 923, 925 (Or. 2001) (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to Vienna Convention violations); Zavala v.
State, 739 N.E.2d 135, 138-43(Ind. 2001) (same). Since LaCrand, federal
courts addressing the issue have also continued to find that exclusion of
evidence is entirely unavailable as a remedy for Article 36violations.ee, e.g.,
UnitedStates v.Emuegbaum, 268 F.3d 377, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,

122 S.Ct. 1450 (200%);UnitedStates v.Felix-Felix, 275 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir.
2001); UnitedStates v.Carrillo, 269 F.3d 761, 771 (7thCir. 20011,cert. denied,
122 S.Ct. 1576(2002); UnitedStates v. Gamez, 301 F.3d 1138, 1143-44 (9th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied 2003 WL 21048997 (May27,2003); UnitedStates v.
Robinet, No. 00-50495, 2001 WL 1631475, at *1(9th Cir. 2001); UnitedStates
v. Contreras-Cortez, No. 01-8030,2002 WL 734772,at *2 (10th Cir. 2002);
UnitedStates v.MinjaresAlvarez, 264 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2001).

266LaCrand, para 91. 3. Clemency ReviewDoes Not GiveFullEffectTo The
PurposeOfArticle36 And DoesNotProvideUniform,
FairOr Meaningful "ReviewAnd Reconsideration."

239. At the hearing onprwisional measuresinthiscase, theUnited
States for thefirsttimeexplainedtothis Courtits understandingofthe

obligationof "review andreconsideration." The UnitedStatesargued
that the Court's holdingin LaGrand did not impose anobligationof
resulton the UnitedStates. Rather,"[tlhe obligation imposeduponthe
UnitedStatesunderthe ViennaConventionfor a violationof the rightof
consularnotificationis an obligationof reviewandreconsideration,not
an obligationof re~ult."~~~

240. Moreover, the UnitedStatesmaintained thatit alone hadthe
choiceof meansin providingreview and reconsideration.From this
positiontheUnitedStatesdeducesthat the Court"hasalready delineated
what remedy isavailableunder internationallaw" andleftit to the
UnitedStates to implementthe remedy.268Itwasthus "not appropriate
for thisCourt"to review themeanstaken by the United tat tes.^^^

241. The United Statesexplainedthat,sinceit hadthe "choiceof
means," it had decidedthat "the clemencyprocess" was"an appropriate
meansforenswing review andreconsiderationofconvictionsand
sentence^." C^'urse1forthe United Statesexplained that:

clemencyhasbeenone of the principalmeansby whichthe

UnitedStateshas soughtto accomplishthereviewand
reconsiderationcontemplatedby this CourtinLaGrand. Ithas
electedto relyon the clemencyprocessin the specificcasesthat
havearisen sinceLaGrand. .. [Theclemencyprocess is]the

267CR 200312(Thessin), at32,para.3.46.

Id.at 33,para.3.49.

269Id.

270CR200312(Brown), at20,para. 3.10. surestand mosteffectivewayto take account of the violationof
the Vienna Convention~i~hts.'~'

242. The United States openly admittedthat it chosethe remedyof
clemencyproceedings precisely becausejudicial proceedingsmay not
alwaysprovidean adequatereviewandreconsiderationof a conviction
or sentencefora viohtion of the Vienna Convention. As the Agent for

the UnitedStatesput it plainly,"[a] court may determine . ..that
domesticlawprinciples still preclude anexpressjudicial remedy fora
failureof consularn~tification."~~'In short, the United Stateseffectively
concededthatits municipal lawsdo not presently permit"review and
reconsideration"of convictionsand death sentencesby taking into

accountthe violation of Article36rights of Mexican nationals. Hence,
the UnitedStatesmaintainsthat 'keviewand reconsiderationthrough the
clemency processoccurs if it does not firstoccur in thejudicial
pr~~e~~."273

243. However, executiveclemencydoes not fulfillthe United
States'sobligationto give full effect tothe purposes of Article36,and
the UnitedStateswas and is not entitled tochoose an ineffectiveremedy
to satis@its internationallegal obligations.

244. As an initialmatter,the UnitedStates'sreliance on clemency
proceedingsis wholly inconsistentwithits obligation to providea
remedy,as that obligationwas foundbythis Court in LaGrand.

245. First, it is clearthat the Court'sdirection to the United States
inLaGrand clearly contemplatedthat "review and reconsideration"

271CR 200314(Collins), at 16. See also id.at 25 (Taft) "We also have made a
conscious choiceto focus Ourefforts on clemencyproceedings for providing the
review and reconsideration this Court called for inrand. .. clemency
proceedings provide a more flexible process that is best suited for achieving,
without procedural obstacles the review and reconsideration this Court called
for".

272CR 200314(Taft), at 25. And indeed this is an indisputable point. U.S.

courts routinely and consistently refuse to provide judicial remedies for
violations ofArticle 36.See supra Chapter 1II.C.

273CR 200312(Brown),at 28, para. 3.34.wouldbe carriedout byjudicial procedures. The referenceto "review
and reconsideration"in the decisioncamein directresponse to
Germany's secondsubmission:thatthe UnitedStates'application of the
doctrineof proceduraldefaultbarredKarland WalterLaGrandfrom

raisingtheirViennaConvention claimsduring appellatereview.
Proceduraldefaultis a purely judicialconcept, withno bearingon
clemency. TheCourtfoundthatthis denialofjudicial reviewand
reconsiderationconstituteda violation ofthe United States'obligationto

give"full effect"to the rightsenshrinedunderArticle36.274

246. Second,the Courtwas fullyawarethat the LaGrandbrothers
hadreceived a clemency hearing, duringwhich the ArizonaPardons
Boardtook intoaccountthe violation of theirconsularrights.275
Accordingly,the CourtdeterminedinLaGrand that clemency review

alonedid not constitute the required"reviewand reconsideration;"
othenvise, the Courtpresumably wouldnothave found that theUnited
States violateditsobligationsto give "fulleffect" tothe rightsofthe
LaGrandbrotherscontainedinArticle 36.

247. Finally, the Court specifiedthatthe UnitedStates must"allow
the review and reconsiderationof the convictionand sentencebytaking
accountof the violationof the rights setforthin the onv vent ion. A"^^
the United Statesis wellaware,it is a basicmatter of U.S. criminal
procedurallawthat courtsreviewconvictions;clemencypanelsdo not.

Withthe rare exceptionof pardonsbasedon actualinnocence, thefocus
of capital clemencyreviewis on the proprietyof the sentenceandnoton
the underlyingconviction.277

248. Nevertheless, Mexicoiscompelledto addresstheUnited

States'contentionsthat theclemencyprocessis "an appropriatemeans"
to review violationsof Article36.278ASexplainedin detailbelow,

274See LaGrand,Judgment of 27 June 2001, para. 128(4); paras. 90 and 91.

275Id., paras. 271.3
276Id., para. 7 (emphasisadded).

277See OhioAdult Parole Authority et av.Woodard, 523 U.S. 284 (1998).

278CR 2003102(Brown), at 20, para. 3.10.clemencyreviewis standardless, secretive,andimmunefromjudicial
~versight.~~~ Moreover,clemency proceduresin most executing states
withinthe UnitedStatesare so grossly deficientthat they could not

possiblyprovidemeaningfulreview or reliable reconsideration. 280

249. Finally,the failure ofstateclemencyauthoritiesto pay heed to
the interventionsof the U.S. Departmentof State in cases of death-
sentencedMexicannationalsrefutesthe contentionthat clemencyreview

willprovidemeaningfülconsideration of theviolationsof rights
conferredunderArticle36.

a. TheNature of ClemencyReview

250. Bydefinition,clemencyis an executiveact of grace and not a
matterof right.281The UnitedStatesSupremeCourt has repeatedly held
thata prisonerhasno constitutional entitlementto commutation ofhis
sentence,andthat clemencydecisionsare largelyimmunefromjudicial

re~iew.~~~ "Apetitionforcommutation,like an appeal for clemency, 'is
simplya unilateralhope. "i283

Anexaminationof the functionand significanceof the

discretionaryclemencydecision ... readily shows itis far
differentfromthe firstappeal of right. .. Clemencyproceedings
are notpari ofthe trial- or even ofthe adjudicatory process.
Theydo not determinethe guiltor innocence ofthe defendant,
and arenot intendedprimarilyto enhancethe reliabilityof the

trial process.284

279See generally Declaration of Michael Radelet, Annex 1.

280Id.

Id. See also OhioAdult Parole Authori~ v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998);
Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458,464 (1981).

283OhioAdult Parole Authority et al. v. Woodard,supra, at 280 (citing
Dumschat, 452 U.S. at465).

284Id. at284. 251. As a Congressionalsubcornmitteereport concludedin 1993,
"the prospectof clemency providesonlythe thinnestthreadof hope and

is certainly no guaranteeagainstthe executionof an innocent
indi~idual."~~'

252. It is widelyrecognized that clemencyreview inthe United

Statesis stron2!Yinfluencedby political considerations,particularlyin
capitalcases. As one recent cornrnentarystates:

Invariably,the clemencyprocess involvesan electedofficia1and

her or his appointees who regularly takeinto accountthe potential
reactionofthe newsmedia, politicalalliesand adversaries,
specialinterestgroups,as well as the implicationsfor a future
political career,wheneverhe or she makesa decision.The reality

is perhapsbestcaptured inthe recent wordsof one governmental
official:"if 1toldyou thatpolitics were irrelevant[tothe
clemency decision],that wouldbe likethe fishtellingyou the

water doesn'tmatter.'"87

The risk thatpoliticsratherthan the merits ofthe individualcase will
determine clemencyoutcomesis not limitedto electedofflcials;

appointed membersof pardons boardsare alsoimplicated.288

285Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional

Rights, Innocence and the Death Penalp: Assessing the Danger of Mistaken
Executions, page 18(November 1994).

286See, e.g., Declaration of Michael Radelet, Ann1; J. Berry, Governors Shy
Awayfrom Death Row Pardons, Dallas Morning News, 15August 1993, at 1J;
C. Sullivan, Associated Press, BCCycle, Another Death Penalty Debate: Are

Clemency Decisions Arbitrary?, 27 June 1993; see alsD. Kobil, Chance and
the Constitution in Capital Clemency Cases, 2Cap.U. L. Rev. 567, 567 (2000).

287B. Breslin & J.P Howley,Defending the Politics of Clemency, 81Or.L. Rev.
231,232 (2002).

288For example, H. Marsellus, former chairman of the Louisiana Board of
Pardons and Paroles, has admitted that pressure from the Governor's office
compelled him to vote against clemency in cases such as that of Timothy
Baldwin, who Marsellus believed to be innocent. See H. Prejean, C.S.J.,d
Man Walking, (1993) pp. 169-74. 253. Due largelyto the increasedpoliticizationof the deaîhpenalty
itself,the use of clemencyhas declinedprecipitouslyin the lasttwenty-

fiveyears to thepointwhereonlya small fraction ofthose facing
executionare nowreleasedfromdeathrow through executiveaction.289
As the AmericanBarAssociation(ABA)has pointed out:

grantedin
In recentyears, however, clemencyhas been
substantiallyfewercases than it was priorto the U. S. Supreme
Court's1972decisiondeclaringthe death penalty
unconstitutional. .. In fact,the need fora meaningfulclemency

power is moreimportantthan e~er.~~'

254. Each ofthe statesin whichMexicannationalshave been
sentencedto death has institutedits own uniqueapproach to executive

clemencyre~iew.~~'In 14states,the govemorhas sole authorityfor
clemencyreview and decision-making.In 9 states,the govemormay
only cornmutea death sentencebasedon the favorable recommendation
of a pardons boardor other advisory body.In 9 other states,the

governor makes afinaldecisionafterreceiving a non-bindingdecision
fiom an advisorybody. In 3 states,the govemoris a memberof the
clemency board,whichmakesa bindingdecisionon a majorityvote.

289See M. A. G. Korengold et al., And Justice For Few: The Collapse of the
Capital Clemency System in the UnitedStates, 20 Hamline L. Rev. 349 (1996).

290American Bar Association Section Of Individual Rights And
Responsibilities,Death without Justice: A Guidefor Examining the

Administration of theDeath Penalty in the United States, p. 23 (June, 2001).
Available at<http:/lwww.abanet.org/irrlpubs.html> (last visited 14June 2003).

29' Ariz. Const., Art. V, $5, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8g31-443, 31-445 (1996);
Ark. Const., Art. VI, $18,Ark. Code Ann. 495-4-607, 1693-204 (1997, Supp.
1997); Cal. Const., ArtV, $8, Cal. Penal Code Am. $$4800-4807 (West 1992);
Fla. Const., An. IV,$8, Fla. Stat. $940.01 (1997); Ill. Const., V,$12, Ill.

Comp. Stat., ch. 730, $5133-13(1997); Nev. Const., Art. V, $13, Nev. Rev.
Stat. 5213.100 (1995); Ohio Const., Art. III, 1,Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
$$2967.01 to 2967.12 (1996); Okla. Const., Art. VI, $10, Okla. StatTit.21,
$701.1 la (Supp. 1998); Ore. Const., ArtV, $14, Ore. Rev. Stat. $8144.649 to
144.670 (2001); Tex. Const., Art.IV,$11,Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Am., Art.
48.01 (Supp. 1997).Finally,in 3 states,authority over clemencyreview and decisions rests
solelywith a pardonsboardwhich doesnot includethe governor.292

255. Justasthe mechanisms forexecutiveclemencyVarywidely, so
too dothe actual proceduresforreviewing petitions. Evenstatesthat

relyon similar mechanismshaveinstituted widely differing review
procedures. In some states,parole boardshavethe discretiontoconvene
hearingson clemencypetitions. Suchclemencyhearings are routinely
heldin Oklahomaand Arizona,whereasthe TexasBoardof Pardonsand

Paroles routinelyfailsto holdhearingsanddoesnot evenmeetas a body
to discuss the petitionssubmittedto it.

256. Injurisdictionsthatrelyentirelyon clemency reviewby the
state governor,suchas Califomia,no forma1procedures existfor

clemencyhearings.As a consequence,governorsmustrelyontheirown
privateand subjectivereviewofmaterials submittedby theprosecution
andthe defense,augmentedbywhateverinterviewstheymaysee fitto
conduct. Identical claimsforclemencymaythus receive afullandopen
hearingin onejurisdictionandonlycursoryreviewwhenraisedinan

adjacent tat te.^^^

257. Govemorsand paroleboardsacrossthe UnitedStateshave
virtuallyunfettereddiscretionto grantor denycommutationrequests.294
Althoughthe generalprocedures forthe considerationofclemency

petitionsare specifiedunderstate lawsorregulations,fewprovisions
existto guidedecisiorrmakerson the criteriaforexercising mercy.
Clemency outcomes are thusentirelydiscretionary, subject only to the
requirementin a handfulof statesthatthe executive authoritymust

providean explanationforits decision. The most commonreasonsfor
the48 humanitariancommutationsof deathsentencesbetween 1977and
2002were: doubtover the defendant'sguilt (15 cases), disproportionate
sentencing(10cases),oppositionto the death penaltyinprinciple(9

292Death Penalty Information Center,Clernency,available at
<http://www.deathpenal~info.org/Article.php? (list=sitd&scid=13>
14 June2003).

293See Declaration of Michael Radelet, Ann1.

294Id.cases) andmentalincapacity(6 cases).295Due processconcernssuch as
trial irregularitiesalmostneverresult in humanitariancommutations;the

assumptionby manyclemencyauthoritiesappearsto be that such
questionshavealready beenaddressedand disposedof by the appellate

258. The crisisin clemency reviewpromptedthe ABAto develop
extensive criteriaand recommendationsto ensurethe faimessof
clemencyproceedingsnati~nwide.~~~ To date, no statehas adoptedthose

recommendations.

259. Given theentirelydiscretionary natureof clemencyreview and
the widedisparitiesin the proceduresused, it is notsurprisingthat the
ratio of commutationsto executionsfluctuateswildlybyjurisdiction.

The followingtable displays the ratiobetween commutationsof death
sentenceson humanitariangroundsand executions carried out, ineach of
the ninejurisdictions inwhich Mexicannationalsare currentlyunder

sentenceof death.

295See M. L. Radelet & B. A. Zsembik; Executive Clemency in Post-Furman

Capital Cases, 27 Universis of Richmond Law Review (1993), at p. 289 and the
annual updates provided by the Death Penalty InformationCenter, Washington,
D.C.

296For example, during his term as governor of Texas, George W. Bush

reiterated that "the only two issues he considered appropriate for purposes of
clemency were actual innocence and whether access to the courts had been
provided." Amnesty International, Killing without Mercy:Clemency
Procedures in Texas, p.8, AI Index: AMRI51185199.Available at
<http:llwww.web.amnesty .orgllibraryiindeENGAMRS 1085199?
open&of=ENG-USA> (last visited 14June 2003). See generally A.L.
Williamson, Clemency in Texas--A Question of Mercy?, 6 Texas Wesleyan Law

Review (1999), at p. 140.

297Id. at pp. 25-27. Percentageratioof commuteddenthsentencesto executions,1977-
2003 (as of 26 February2003f9*

b. ClemencyProceedingsFailtoProvideNecessary
Procedural Safeguards.

260. As the U.N.SpecialRapporteur onsummary,arbitraryor
extrajudicialexecutionshas noted,"[plardonor commutationgenerally
has limitedfair procedure ~afe~uards.'~~T 'heUnitedStateshas
vigorouslyopposedthe provision offederalfundsto lawyersfor death

row inmatesthat wouldallow themto file clemencyrequests withstate
a~thorities.~'~As a result, indigent death rowinmatesin 12Statesare no

298Death Penalty Information Center,informationavailableat:
<http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/> (lastvisited 10Jun 2003).

299NOcommutations have been granted in Floridasince 1983.

300Al18commutationswere granted by an outgoinggovernorin 1991.

301
UN Economic and Social Council,Report of the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary orarbitrary executionUN Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.3,para. 102,22 January 1998.

302Brief forthe United Statesas Amicus CuriaeIn re GaryA. Taylor,No. 01-

1605,November 2002.longer entitled to receivefederallyfundedlegal representationto assist
them in preparingclemencyapplications.303Consequently, many

condemned prisonerswill be executedwithout seekingclemency,simply
because they cannot affordto retain a la~yer.~'~

261. The clemencyprocess inTexas,wheresixteenMexican

nationals are currentlyundersentenceof death,hasbeenharshly
criticized for itslack of proceduralfairness. In Texas,prisonershaveno
right to a hearing, no rightto present witnesses,andno rightto confiont
the witnesses againstthem. The UNSpecialRapporteur"was appalled

to find out that in Texas,the [pardonsboard]membersnevermeet,do
not discuss the casesbroughtto their attentiontogether andprovidetheir
individual votesby phone.'J05

262. Indeed,the TexasBoardof Pardonsand Paroleshasno

substantive criteriato guide itsmembers in deciding whetherto sparean

303 See Clark v.Johnson, 278 F.3d459,462-63 (5th Cir.),cert. denied(2002),
123S.Ct. 687 (2002); King v. Moore, 312F.3d 1365, 1368(11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 123S.Ct. 662 (2002); Hain v. Mullin,324 F.3d 1146(10th Cir. 2003).
Collectively,these decisions are binding on 12U.S.stateswhich account for

some 61% of al1executions since 1977.The states (with numbersof executions
as of April 3,2003) are: Texas (301), Oklahoma (59) , Florida (54), Georgia
(32), Louisiana (27), Alabama (26) Mississippi (6), Utah(6), Colorado(l),
New Mexico(l), Wyoming (1), Kansas.

304 For example, in the case of Emerson Rudd, the federal courts denied

counsel's request for funding to present a clemency application on behalf ofMr.
Rudd. The United States SupremeCourtdenied a stayof execution, and Mr.
Rudd was executed without filing a clemency application. Rudd v. Cockrell,
122S.Ct. 585 (2001:).Ofthe twelve states cited above,only Floridaprovides by
statute for state-funded representation of indigent prisoners incapital clemency
proceedings. SeeFia. Stat. Ann.$5 27.702, 922.07,925.035(4) (West 2001 &

Supp. 2002).

305United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,suprapara. 102,
22 January 1998. Not surprisingly, the board hasnever recommended pardon in
a capital case.inmate's~ife.~'~ Board membersare not requiredevento readclemency
applications.307The Board has consistentlyrefùsedto provideanynotice

ofthe factorsit considersin weighing aprisoner'srequest for
commutationofa death sentence308Although the Board'sregulations
provide for clemencyhearings, the Board hasnotconveneda hearingfor
severalyears. At least 213inmateshave been executedwithout

clemencyhearings in thelastelevenyears.

263. Afier reviewing numerous Texasclemencypetitionsraising
well-foundedclaims of actual innocence,mentalretardationandother

compellingissues, Amnesty International determined:

Far fi-omservingasthe fail-safemechanism envisagedbytheUS
SupremeCourt,the Texas BoardOf PardonsAndParoleshad
become somethingakinto a hostile and secretiveagency

interestedonly inpreservingthe illusion ofmeaningful clemency
review. 309

264. The case of Canadiannational JosephStanley Faulder

illustratesthe insurrnountableobstaclesfacingforeignnationals seeking
clemencyreviewin Texas. Faulder's caseinvolvedanundisputed
violation of Article36,which prompted formerSecretaryof State

MadeleineAlbrightto writea letteron his behalfto thenGovernor
GeorgeBush andthe TexasBoardof Pardons andParoles,suggesting
that clemency mightbe an appropriateremedyforthetreatyviolation. 310

306Faulder v.TexasBoard ofPardons andParoles, et. al.,No. A-98-CA-801,at
11 1(Testimony of Board Chairman Victor Rodriguez at Evidentiary Hearing on
December 21-22, 1998),Annex 31.

307
Id. at 66 (Testimony of Brett Hornsby, Supervisor of Texas Clemency
Process forthe Board of Pardons and Paroles),Annex 31.

308 Id.at 146-48 (Testimony of Victor Rodriguez),Annex 31

309 Amnesty International Killingwithout Mercy:ClernencyProceduresin

Texas, supra, page 5.

310 Id., at p. 5 (referring to Letter to Victor Rodriguez, Chairman,Texas Board
ofPardons and Paroles, 27 November 1998). Excerpts of letter also available at
<http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Article.php?did=536&scid=45>(last visited
14June 2003). Ms. Albright's letter,which contained elevenpages ofIn her letter,sheexplainedthat Texashad violatedMr. Faulder's rights
under the ViennaConventionon Consular Relations, described the
impactof the violationon Mr. Faulder's trial, and offered tosend State

Departmentrepresentativesto discussthe matterwith the Board. Bythe
time her letterreachedthe Board, however,al1but four membersofthe
Boardhad voted to deny Mr. Faulder'srequest for~lemenc~.~"The
Boardneverrespondedto the Secretary'sofferto meet with its members,
nor did the Board pollits members whohad already voted, todetermine

whetherthey wishedto change their votes in light of the Secretary7s
obser~ations.~" The Board denied Faulder'srequest for commutation,
and refused to grant hima hearingon his request.

265. Fauldersued, arguing that the Board'ssecretiveclemency

procedureshad violated his right to due process. In December1998,a
federaldistrictcourt in Austin, Texas conveneda hearing in the case.
Testimony elicitedat the hearing establishedthatnone of the 17board
membershad discussed SecretaryAlbright'sletter. None of the several

board memberswhotestified couldrememberthe contentsof the letter,
whichthey had received one month earlier. BoardmemberPaul
Prejean's testimonytypifies the quality of theBoard'sreview ofthe
Article 36 violation:

Q: . ..What did you think of Secretaryof StateAlbright's

letter?

A: Well,the letter prettymuchexplained what theGeneva
Conventionwas about and howthe United Statesshouldliveup

to that agreement. 1 - 1didn'thave - you know,thoughtone
way or anotheron it.

observations on Faulder's case, pre-dated this Court's decision inLaCrand.
Nevertheless, the letter presents a more convincing case for clemency than any
of the United States' interventionsost-LaCrand. Ms. Albright also offered to

send Department officiais to Texasto discussthe Vienna Convention with the
Board, an offer that has not been repeated in any of the Department's letters to
clemency authorities. post-LaCrand.

311Faulder v.TexasBoard of Pardons and Paroles, et. al., No. A-98-CA-801,
supra, at p.7.

l2Id., at p.5. Q: Whatdid you think about whather - youknow,the eleven
pages ofobservationsaboutthe Faulder case;what didyouthink
about that?

A: Well,mythought was - did she reviewthe case? And 1
mean, how could she recornrnendthings,that perhaps shehadn't
read the case or -

Q: Did youknow whether she had read the case or reviewedthe
case?

A: No. I'massuming she didr~~t.~'~

266. SeveralBoardmembers admittedthat theydid not read
clemencypetitions linefor lir~e.~'~ After two daysof testimony,thecourt

observed:

It is abundantlyclear the Texas clemencyprocedureis extremely
poor and certainlyminimal. Legislatively,there is a dearthof

meaningfulprocedure. Administratively,the goal is moreto
protect thesecrecy and autonomyof the system ratherthan
carryingoutan efficient, legallysound system. ... Giving
reasons forits decisions andor holdinghearingsto allow

petitionersand other interestedpartiesto preseri evidencewould
not threatenthe employmentof the Huntsvilleexe~utioner.~'~

267. The courtwent on to notethat a flipof the coinwouldprovide

a moremercifulmeansof deciding clemencyapplicationsthanthe
Board'sunwaveringdenial of such requests3I6

313 Faulder v. TexasBoard of Pardons and Paroles, et. al., No. A-98-CA-80 1,
at 269-70 (Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing December 21-22, 1998) ,Annex
31.

3'4Faulder v. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, et al., No. A-98-CA-801,

slip op. at 1(W.D. Tx December 28, 1998).

315Id. at 16.

316Ibid.; see also Alan Berlow, The Texas ClernencyMemos, The Atlantic
(JulyIAug. 2003) (observing that in the case of Mexican national Irineo Tristan 268. Finally,contraryto whatthe United Statessuggestedin oral
proceedingson Mexico'sRequestforProvisional Measures, clemency

review is notexemptfiomproceduralbarriers that may prohibit
considerationof an othenvisemeritoriouspetition. On 10 March2003
the Texas Boardof Pardons andParolesannouncedthat it wouldnot

considera request forclemencyin the case of Delma Banksbecausethe
requestwas filedafter a deadlinerequiring submissionat least21days
beforeexecution dates. Lawyers missedthe deadlineby 7 daYs.

269. Somestates'proceduresalso limit the scopeof the issuesthat
maybe consideredin a clemencypetition. In Utah, for example,judicial
issuesthat have been or should havebeen raised through the courtsmust

notbe consideredby the Boardof Pardon and ~arole.~"

c. Violationsof the Vienna ConventionAreGivenNo
WeightInClemencyReview.

270. Between 1988and2002, twenty confirmedforeignnationals
were executed in the United states319 In that sametime period,no

executivecommutationswere grantedto foreign nationalsunder sentence
of death. Clemency applicationsciting consular rights violationswere
filed in morethan half ofthe cases resultingin executions, tono avail. 320

Montoya, the Govemor's legal counsel did not even mention the Article 36
violation in his memorandum briefing the case for former Governor George
Bush, eventhough the State Department had intervened in the case).

317W. Gardner Selby,Ex-FBI boss helping inmate,San Antonio Express-News,

March 11,2003, at 2B. Attorneys for Banks (including a former Director ofthe
Federal Bureau of Investigations) had raised a number of compelling claims
including actual innocence, the use by the prosecution of unreliable informants
and the withholding of a crucial witness interview for 19 years.

318Utah Code Ann. $77-27-5.5 (6) (1994).

l9Death Penalty Information Center, Foreign Nationals and theDeath Penalty
in the UnitedStates, available <http:/lwww.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/Article.php?scid-3 1&did=582#executed> (last visited 14June 2003).

320See, e.g., Declaration of Deni1.Young, paras. 7- 10,Annex 5. Cases in
which violations of Article 36 were cited in clemency applications include 271. Thai nationalJaturun Siripongswas executedin Californain
1998. Mr. Sirpongswasneverinformedof his consular rights,andhis
trial attorneyhad failedto conductany investigationintohis client's

backgroundand upbringingin Thailand. Withthe belated assistanceof
Thaiauthorities,fiftywitnesseswerelocatedyears after the trialwho
"would haveprovided compellingtestimonyabout Siripongs'life and
[good]~haracter."~' Boththe ThaiforeignministryandThailand's

ambassadorto the UnitedStates wroteto the GovemorofCalifornia,
seekingthe commutationof the deathsentence. GovernorWilsonstated
that "theplea fiom Thailand's ambassador was eloquentand dignified,"
butadded,"[tlhe factthat in this case aforeignnational committedthe

crime should not make a difference under our systemof law, whichtreats
everyoneas an indi~idual."~~~ Duringhis two termsas govemor,Wilson
rejectedal1fiverequestshe receivedfor clemencyin capitalcases.323

272. In1999,Nevada authoritiesrejectedpleas bythe Philippine
governrnentand executed Filipino national Alvaro Calambro,whohad
refused to fileanappeal. Calambro'sattorneynotedthathis clienthad an
IQof 71and did notappearto understandthe appellateprocess.

Philippineofllicialsarguedthattheexecutionwouldviolatethe Vienna
Conventionbecausetheywerenotnotifiedof Calambro'sanest in 1994,
leavinghimwith inadequatelegalrepresentation. Attorney General
FrankieSueDel Papa respondedthatthe U.S. Supreme Courthadmade

clearthat a foreign nationalimprisonedin the UnitedStatesmustraise
alleged treaty violationsin a timelymanner, which Calambrohad failed
to do. Effortsby the Philippinegovernrnentto persuadeGovemor

Carlos Santana, Ramon Montoya, Irineo Tristan Montoya, Mario Murphy,
Ange1Breard, Jose Villafuerte, Jaturun Siripongs, Karl LaGrand, Walter
LaGrand, Alvaro Calambro, Stanley Faulder, Miguel Flores, Javier Suarez
Medina and Mir Aima1Kasi.

321Additional case information is available from Death Penalty Focus, at
<http://www.deathpenalty.org/old~site/cuent/Sir (lst ngs/jsinfo.html
visited14June 2003).

322Id.,at6B.

323Associated Press, Wilsondenies clemency to Siripongs, November 14, 1998.

<http://www.ccadp.org/siripongs.html(last visited o14June 2003).Kenny Guinn tocommutethe sentencewere rejected. After meeting
withdiplomaticrepresentatives,Guinn declared: "Since neither 1nor the
PardonsBoardhave seen any compellingevidencethat would warranta

delay,1haveno choicebut to upholdthe laws andconstitutionof the
state of~evada".~~~

273. Post-LaGrandcaseshave faredno better. In 2001, in the case
of Mexicannational Gerardo Valdez,the OklahomaPardon and Parole

Boardrecommendedcommutationaîler reviewingextensive evidence
gathered withthe assistanceof Mexico consularofficers. Governor
Keatingsubsequentlyreîused to followthe Board's recornmendation,

even thoughit cameas the result of thedirectpresentationof evidence at
a fullandopenhearing. 325

274. Similarly, inresponseto the imminentexecutionof Javier
SuiirezMedina,the State Departmentrequested theTexas Boardto give

"specificconsideration"to the admitted Article36 violation in hiscase
andto give writtenreasonsfor its de~ision.~~~ TheBoard unanimously
denied the requestfor a reprieve andforcommutationon August 13,

2002, giving nospecific reasons, writtenor othenvise,for its de~isi0n.j~~

d ClemencyAuthoritiesPayLittleOr No HeedTo
The DepartmentOf State.

275. TheU.S.Department of Statefiequentlyresponds to the
imminentexecutionsof foreign nationals deprived oftheir consular

324S. Whaley,Efforts to Postpone, Prevent ExecutionFail, Las Vegas Review
Journal,3April 1999.

325Amnesty International A Timefor Action: Protecting the Consular Rights of
Foreign NationalsFacing the Death Penalty, pag9, AI Index: AMR

51/106/2001.

326Letter from WilliamH. Taft IV tMr. Gerald Garrett, 5 August 2002, Annex
25.

327According to Board Chairman Gerald Garrett, "We took into account al1that

was presented to us in support of the argument for commutation and voted to
recommend against it.K. Murray, Planned TexasExecutionof Mexican Upsets
Ties, ReutersNews Agency, 13August 2002.rightsby callingon stateauthorities to investigate theArticle 36
violation,or byrequesting "seriousconsideration" ofthe treaty breachas
groundsforclemency. Neither approach has influenced the outcomeof
evena single caseand stateauthorities routinelybrushaside these
interventions.

276. As notedabove,in Novemberof 1998,thensecretas. of State
Madeleine K.Albrightwrotepersonallyto the Chairmanof the Texas
Boardof Pardons andParoles, expressingdeep concernover the Article
36violationinthecase of CanadiannationalStanley~aulder.~~~

AlthoughAlbright'sletterand an accompanying 12-pagememorandum
on the effectsofthe violationon the qualityof Faulder'strial defense
werecirculatedto the Boardmembers, the Boardvotedunanimouslynot
to recommendclemency. Less than a monthlater,duringa courthearing
intothe Texas clemencyprocess,no member of the Boardcouldrecall

anydetailsof the Secretaryof State'ssubmis~ions.~~~

277. In responseto State Department interventionsin the case of
Mexican national MarioBenjamin Murphy,the Governorof Virginia
publicly "disputedwhether it was Virginia's responsibilittyonoti@

Murphy,a foreigneron deathrow,of his Vienna Conventionright".330
Ignoringthe factthat the courtshaddismissedMurphy'sappeal of the
consularrights violationas procedurally defaulted,GovemorAllen
denied commutationon the grounds that"the issues raisedon clemency
... ereissuesthatwere availableto be consideredinthe courts andwere

so~onsidered."~'

278. In the caseof Mexican national Irineo TristanMontoya,the
General Counselto TexasGovernor GeorgeW. Bushdeclined a State

328Letter fromthe Hon. MadeleineK.Albright to Mr.Victor Rodriguez,
November 27, 1998,Annex 29.

329AmnestyInternational,Killing without Mercy: ClemencyProcedures in
Texas,supra,p.7.

330F. Green,Mission Chief Urges Allen to CommuteSentence,Richmond
Times-Dispatch, 17September 1997,at A1.

33 1
Commonwealthof Virginia Off~ceof the Govemor, Statement of Governor
George Allen Re:Mario Benjamin Murphy, press releaseof 17September 1997.Departmentrequestto investigateand assessthe Article 36 violationon
the groundsthat "the Stateof Texasis not a signatoryto the Vienna
Convention." 332 Montoyawasexecuted twodays later,after the Texas

Board voted unanimouslynotto recornrnendclemency. Despitethe lack
of any meaningfuljudicialconsiderationof the treaty violationdueto
procedural default, GovernorBushrefused togrant a reprieve, declaring

that the courts"have had ampleopportunityto addressal1of the issues
inv01ved."~~~

279. In anyevent,theDepartmentof State has deliberatelyand
publiclyminimizedits role in affording"reviewand reconsideration"

through the clemency process.In response to media enquiries regarding
the Suirez case, one spokespersonforthe Department stated"We have
taken no position,if that'sclearenough,no positionon this petition.

That's amatter forthe Texas authoritiestodo. We,though,playthe role
of passing along thïstypeof messagefromthe Government of
~exico."~~~Anotherspokespersondeclaredthat the case "involvesthe
State Departmentin some smallregard."335

e. The Shortcomingsof Clemency ReviewPreclude
Meaningful Review andReconsideration.

280. Any one of thepointsaddressedabovewouldbe sufficientin
itself to refutethe notion that clemencyreview can providemeaningful
"review andreconsideration." In short,clemency reviewis no surrogate
forjudicialproceduresthat guaranteedueprocess, representationby

332
Al Kamen, VirtuallyBlushing, Washington Post, 23 June 1997, at A17.

333J. Pierpoint, CourtRejects Mexican 'sFinal Appeal, Reuters News Agency,
18 June 1997.

334U.S. Department of State, Daily Press BrieJing,WashingtonDC, August 13,

2002, p.10,available at: <http:llwww.state.gov/ripalprs/ dpb/2002/12644.htm>
(last visited 14June 2003).

335U.S. Department of State, National Security Council BrieJingfor Foreign
Media, Washington, DC, August 14,2002, available ut:
<http://fpc.state.gov/l2693.htm>(last visited 14June 2003).counsel,anddecisionsmadein accordancewithlegal standardsreviewed
by highercourts.

281. The UnitedStatesmadeclearat the provisional measures
hearing that,in its view,it suflicesthat executiveauthorities ofits
constituentstateshavethe authority - not thelegal obligatio- to
reviewand reconsider a sentenceandgrant clemencybasedon a
violation of the Mexicodisagrees.

282. Article36(2)creates alegalobligation. It mandatesa
meaningfulremedyunderthemunicipallaws of each Stateparty,nota
theoreticalpolitical remedy that exists,ft al],as a matterof executive
grace. The specificremedyneednot bethe samefor eachState-and
given the diverselegal and politicalsystems ofStatesparties, almost

certainlywillnotbethe same. Toconstrue"full effect"not to require
some legalremedy,however,wouldbe to eviscerateArticle36(2)
altogether.

4. The United StatesDidNot Enjoy Unlimited Choice of

MeansBut WasObligedto ChooseMeansthat Give
"FuiiEffect"to thePurposesforArticle36.

283. The UnitedStates seriouslymisappliesthe Court's holdingin
LaGrandwhen it insists thatit enjoyedunlimited"choiceof means."
The meanschosenmustbe designedto achievethe result,that isto
providean effectiveremedy that gives fulleffectto the obligations ofthe

Vienna Convention.If the U.S. legalsystemdoesnot providethe
necessarymeansto afford aneffectiveremedy,as the UnitedStates
seemsto have conceded,thenthe UnitedStatesis underan obligation to
amendits domesticlaws. The provisionof awhollydiscretionary
processthat mayor maynot reviewor reconsiderthe violation of Article

36and its effects is patentlynsufficientto satisQ the requirements of
Article36(2).

336CR200310( 2Brown) para.3.10.

116 a. TheMeansChosenmustbeDesignedto Achieve the

Resultandmust AchieveanEffectiveRemedy.

284. The United States is incorrectto arguethat there is no
obligationof result. Underinternational law,the United Statesis

requiredto take whatever actionis necessaryto give effect toits treaty
obligations. Hence,the obligationofthe resultsought inthis case isthe
fulfillmentof the UnitedStates'streaty commitmentin Article36ofthe
ViennaConvention.

285. The precisemannerby whichthe UnitedStatesseeksto fulfill
its obligationsis a matterof domesticlaw. Whatdomesticlaw
mechanismsare utilizedis not relevant, providedthat those mechanisms

upholdthe internationallegalobligations ofthe United States. Underthe
well-establishedjurisprudenceof this Court,the United Statesmay not
assert its domestic lawas an excuseforevadingany of the obligations

incumbenton it under internationalia~.~~'ASprovided in Article31of
the ILC Articleson State Responsibility,a Stateresponsibleforan
internationallywronghl act"maynot relyonthe provisionsof its
internallawasjustificationforfailureto comply"with its obligations to

make fullreparation for theinjury~aused.~~H ~ence,the UnitedStates

337 Treatment ofPolish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech
inthe Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932, P.C.I.J., Series AB, No. 44, p.
4; Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Free Zones of Upper

Savoy and the District of Gex,Judgment, 1932, P.C.I.J., Series AB, No. 46, p.
167. See also Greco-Bulgarian "Communities ",Advisory Opinion, 1930,
P.C.I.J.,eries B,No. 17,p.32; Reparationfor Injuries Suffered in theService
of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, at p. 180;
Difference Relating to Immunityfrom Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of
the Commission on Human Rights,Advisory Opinion of 29 April1999,l. C.J.

Reports 1999, para. 62.

338See also Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which
provides that "a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty." Theprinciple has also been
applied by numerous arbitral tribunals. See, e.g., the "Alabama" case, in Moore,

IV International Arbitrations 4 144,4 15457 (1872); Norwegian Shipowners '
Claims (NonvayIUnited Statesof America), 1 RIAA 309, 331(1922); Tinoco
case (United KingdomICosta Rica), 1RIAA 371 (1923); Shufeldt Claim, 2
RIAA, 1081, 1098(1930); Wollemborg case, 14RIAA 283,289 (1956).cannot choosedomesticmeansthat donotallowitto complyîullywith

the internationalobligation. 339

286. It doesnot matterwhetherthe UnitedStatesintendedthose
meansto provideeffectivereview andreconsideration, ifthey in fact do

not achievethatresult. Asthe ILCremarkedinits 1977Report,

whereit is found that the situationcreatedinconcret0bythe
State,bytakingone orotherofthe courses betweenwhichit had

the initialchoice,is incompatiblewith theresult requiredbythe
obligation,the Statewillobviouslynot beable to claim thatit
has discharged its obligationsthrough,forexample,the adoption

ofmeasuresby whichithopedto achieve theresult requiredby
the international obligation. 340

287. Insistingon aneffectiveremedyis anobviousrecourse against
the denialof rights, andinrequiringthatthe UnitedStatesprovidean
effectiveremedy,the Court isacting consistentlywithother international

339 Dionisio Anzilotti, former President of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, stated:

[L]a libertéque le droit international laisse àl'État dansle choix des
moyens pour I'accomplissement des devoirs qui lui sont imposésne
doit pas rendre l'accomplissement même de ces devoirs moins sûr ou
incertain...[Ill faut que l'accomplissement de ses obligations

internationales soit en tout cas assuré;et lorsque cet accomplissement
dépend,de quelque façon que ce soit, des lois ou de l'organisation
intérieurede l'État, c'est àcelui-ci de promulguer les règles et de se
donner l'organisation nécessairesàassurerla conduite voulue par le
droit international. Sans quoi, il n'y aurait plusaucune garantie de la

réalisationdu droit international, tout État pouvant toujours, en prenant
prétexteou moyen de son organisation et de ses lois, retarder ou rendre
impossible l'exécution des devoirs qui lui sont imposés.

D. Anzilotti, La responsabilité internationale des Étatsà raison des dommages

souffertspar des étrangers, in Opere di Dionisio Anzilotti, 149, 177 (1956)
(citations omitted).

340 ILC Yearbook 1977, Vol.Ii, Part 2,comments to draft Article 2 1, at para. 26.courts and tribun al^.^ H u manrights courts,forexample,require

remediesthat addressthe relevantviolationandthat provideappropriate
reliefto the victim of theviolation.

288. In the LasPalmerascase, forinstance,the Inter-Arnerican

Court explainedthat "[ilt is thejurisprudence constanteofthis Courtthat
it is notenough that such recoursesexistformally;theymust be
effe~tive."~~ The Courthasalso explainedthat, in orderto be
"effective," a remedy"must give resultsor responsestothe violationsof

rights established n the Convention."343Remediesthat "proveillusory

34 Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR, for example, requires States Parties "[tlo ensure
that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall

have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed
by persons acting in an official capacity." Article 13of the European
Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
provides that "[elveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons

acting in an official capacity." Article 25 of the American Convention on
Human Rights also supports the availability of an effective remedy forthe
violation of its terms, as it provides: "Everyone has the right to simple and
prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal
for protection against acts that violation his fundamentalrights.. .".

342See The Mayagna (Sumo)Awas Tingni Case, Judgment of August 31,2001,
Series C, No. 79, paras 111-113; Constitutional Court Case, Judgment of
January 3 1,200 1.Series C No. 71, para. 90;Bamaca Velasquez Case,
Judgment of November 25, 2000, Series C No. 70, para. 191; Cesti Hurtado

Case, Judgment of September 29, 1999. Series C No. 56, para. 125;Paniagua
Morales et al. Case, supra, para. 164;Suarez Rosero Case, Judgment of
November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 63; Godinez Cruz Case, Judgment
of January 20, 1989, Series C No. 5, para. 66; VelasquezRodriguez Case,
Judgment of July 29, 1988,Series C No. 4,para. 63, andJudicia1 Guarantees in
States of Emergency (Arts.27(2), 25 and 8 of theAmerican Convention on

Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987. Series A No. 9,
para. 24.

343See, inter alia, C'onstitutionalCourt Case,supra, para. 89, andBamaca
Velasquez Case, supra, para. 191.due to thegeneral situationofthe countryor eventhe particular
circumstancesofany givencase,cannotbe consideredeffe~tive.'"~~

289. Likewise,the European Court ofHurnanRightshasheldthat a
remedyis effectiveifthe injured party is entitledto invokeit)45andthe

remedyentailsan examinationof the substanceofthe rightviolatedby
the Stateand grantsappropriaterelief.346

290. Hence, themeanschosenby the UnitedStatescanprovidean

effectiveremedy onlyifthe accusedhas accessto the remedyas amatter
of law,and if that remedyprovidesa reviewandreconsiderationofthe
convictionand sentenceto addressthe "violationof the rightssetforthin

the Convention,"and if it providesadequaterelief.

344See Bamaca Velhsquez Case,supra, para. 191; Ivcher Bronstein Case, ,

Judgment of 6 February 2001, Series C No. 74,para. 136; Judicial Guarantees
in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 of the American Convention on
Human Rights, supra, at para. 24.

345See, e.g., A. Drzemczewski & C. Giakoumopoulos,Article 13,in: L.E.

PettitiE. Décaux& P.H. Imbert, La Convention Européenne desDroits de
l'Homme, Commentaire Article par Article,455,467 ("En principe, le recours
doit être accessible l'intéressé lui-même e, ce sens que celui-ci doit avoir la
qualitéde partie devant l'instance nationale et surtout êtreàmêmed'intenter le
recours et déclencher la procédure nationale"); Plattform "Arztefür dus Leben"

v. Austria, App. No. 10126/82, Eur. Comm'n H.R. (SeriesA, No.139), 29-32,
17 107-111, 115, 119.

346See, e.g.,A. Drzemczewski & C. Giakoumopoulos, supra, 467("Le recours
doit être adéquate,à savoir, organiséde manièreàpermettre de dénoncer la

violation alléguée dela Convention."); see also TheSoering, Judgment of July
7, 1989, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Series A, No.161), para. 120;Silver and Others,
Judgment of March 25, 1983, Eur. Ct. H.R., (Series A, No. 61), para. 113(a)
(victim "should have a remedy before a national authority in order both to have
his claim decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress"). b. If Necessary, TheUnitedStateswasRequiredto
Changeits DomesticLawto Conform Fullywith its
InternationalLegalObligations.

291. If the domesticlaws ofthe UnitedStatesmakeit impossible

forofficiaisof the UnitedStatesto give"full effect" tothe purposesof
Article36 as interpretedby this Court,the United Statesis underan
obligationto modifythose domesticlaws.

292. It iswell-established that a Statethat is party to a treatymust,
if necessary,modie its domesticlawin orderto ensure proper

compliancewith the obligationsit has assurned. As the Permanent Court
held inits opinionconcerning theExchangeof GreekandTurkish
Populations,"a Statewhich has contractedvalid internationalobligations
is boundto makein its legislationsuchmodificationsas may be
necessary toensurethe fulfillmentofthe obligations~ndertaken."~~~

293. The Inter-ArnericanCourt likewise observedthat a State that
has ratifieda treaty "must introduce thenecessarymodificationstoits
domesticlawto ensure the proper compliancewith the obligationsit has
a~sumed."~~

294. Notably,as the U.S. Secretaryof State notedlong-ago:

Nor is a change of municipal lawto meetthe exigenciesof
internationalintercoursewithoutprecedentin the UnitedStates.
In the case ofMcLeod,in 1842,when,in replyto thedemandof
the British Governrnentforthe releaseof the prisoner. .. .
Congressarnendedthe lawregulatingthe issuanceof writsof

habeascorpus so as to facilitatethe performanceby the

347Exchange of Greek and TurkishPopulations, 1925,P.C.I.J.,Series B, No.1O,
p.20.

348"TheLast Temptation of Christ Case" (Olemdo Bustos et al.Judgment of5
February2001, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R., SeriesC No. 73 (2001), paras. 85and 87. Governmentof the United Statesof its international
obligations.349

295. Finally,the travauo xf the ViennaConventionconfirm that
there can be no question that the State delegateswho adoptedthe

Convention werefully awarethatArticle36(2),in particular,could
requirechangesto a State'smunicipallaws orregulationsin orderfor
those laws andregulationsto enablefulleffectto be givento Article 36.

296. Statedelegates dismissedtheconcernraised by Romania's

delegateafierthe United Kingdom'samendmentto replacethe concept
of "shall notnullifj?'with the language ultimately adopted,Article36(2)
wouldpurportto "codiQ criminallawor criminalprocedure."350The
Romaniandelegatecontinuedthat Article36(2)"could notpossibly
attempt to modiQ the criminallaws andregulationsor thecriminal

procedure ofthe receiving ta te."^ T"he Soviet Unionobjected thatas
revised, Article36(2) would "bringbackan unsatisfactory situationfrom
the past,whenthe consuls of colonial powers interferedwiththeinterna1
affairs of Statesby hamperingthe administrationofjustice in regardto
alien~.'~~~

297. Addressingthese objectionsthatmunicipal lawshould prevail
over internationallaw, the UnitedKingdom'sdelegatesimply responded:
"that objectioncould not applyto the rights recognizedinparagraph1of
Article 36."353

298. The UnitedStatesmaythereforechoosethe meansto
implement its internationalobligationsunderthe ViennaConventionbut
this choicestillrequires a resultconsistingof an effectiveremedythat

349Correspondence with Mr. Connery, Chargé toMexico, Nov. 1, 1887, idat p.

239.

350Official Records, Vol. 1,p. 38 (statement of Romania).

351Id.

352Official Records, Vol. 1,p. 40 (statement of the Union of SovietSocialist
Republics).

353Offlcial Records, Vol1,p. 348 (statement ofthe United Kingdom).producedadherence withinternationalobligations. Moreover,the choice
of means cannotbe constrainedby the United States'domesticlaw. If

needbe, that law mustbe changed in orderto provide a remedythat
givesfull effect to theViennaConvention. THE BREACHESOFARTICLE 36 RESULTEDIN
FUNDAMENTALLYUNFAIR CRIMINALPROCEEDINGS

299. By its terms, Article 36 ofthe Vienna Conventionconfers
rights upon a sending State toprovide consularassistanceto detained
national^. ^qu^allyby its terms,as this Courtheldin LaGrand,Article
36 confersrightsuponforeignnationalsof the sendingstate,whomay
seekthe assistanceof consularofficerswhen detair~ed.~'~

300. Here, Mexico sufferedinjuryboth directlyandinthe form of
injuryto its nationals. Asto the direct injury,the past andcontinuing
violationsof Article36 bythe United Statesimpair Mexico'srights
underthe Vienna Conventiontothe timely exerciseof its consular
functionswithrespect toits nationals.

301. Article 3l(2) of the ILCArticles on StateResponsibility
broadly definesthe injuryforwhich a Statemayclaim reparationas
comprising"any damage,whethermaterialor moral." lt iswell-settled
that a State is mjuredwhenan intemationallywrongfulact deprivesthe
Stateof the opportunityto exerciseits right~.~~Sthe InternationalLaw

Commission has observed:

[wlheretwo Stateshaveagreed to engageinparticularconduct,
the failureby one State toperform theobligation necessarily

354Vienna Convention, art. 36(1).

355LaGrand, para. 77.
356
See R.Ago, Second Report on State ResponsibilILC,Yearbook 1970,
vol.11,195, doAlCN.41233, para. 54 ("every breach of an engagement vis-à-
vis another State and every impaiment of a subjective right of that State in itself
constitutes a damage, material or moral, to that State"). concernstheother. A promise hasbeenbroken and the ript of
the other State to performance correspondingly infringed. 57

302. It is equallywell-established that aninjury sufferedby
nationalsof a particular Stateis also an injuryto the State of their
nati~nality.~~~ Hence,Mexico has been injurednot only becausethe

breacheshavepreventedit fiom providingconsular assistanceto
Mexicannationalsin capital proceedings,but because those nationals
havebeen preventedfromreceiving that assistance.

303. Whenareceiving State'sbreachprevents a detainednational
fiom seeking,anda sending State fiomprovidingthe consularassistance
contemplatedby Article 36,the ultimateinjurytakes the form of an
unfaircriminalproceeding. The consularnotification and assistance

provisionsof Article36 do not guaranteemere courtesies or
conveniences;theyhave as their objectto guaranteeto a sending State
the opportunityto ensure fair proceedingsfor its nationals subjectto trial
beforethe criminalauthoritiesof a foreignState.

304. At bottom,therefore,the rights protectedby Article 36 are in
the natureof due process rights: thatbodyof rights whose objectiveis to
guaranteeproceduralfairnesswhen a governmentalauthoritychargesan

individual with a crime andseeksto imposecriminal penalties. This
case perfectlyillustratesthat point in the most compellingpossible
context: thatof criminalproceedingsin whichthe receiving State seeks
the deathpenalty.

-
357Draft Articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts,
Report of the International Law Commissiononthe work of its FifS-third
session, Official Records of the General Assembly, 56th session, Supplement

No. 10,U.N. Doc. Al56110(2001).

35gMavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Jurisdiction, Judgment, 1924, P.C.1.1,
Series A, No. 2, at 12; see aIso Paneve~ys-Saldutirki Railway, Judgment, 1939,
P.C.I.J.,Series A/B, No.76,at 16; Reparationfor Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, IC.J. Reports 1949,at 185.k THEDEPRIVATIO ONFCONSULA ROTIFICATIO AND
ASSISTANC REENDERC SFUMINA PROCEEDINGS

FUNDAMENTAL ULNYFAIR

305. The right to a fair andjust criminalprocessis a fundamental
principlein internationallaw and implicitin the concept of ordered

libert359Proceduresnecessaryto maintainingthe fair andjust character
of acriminalproceeding constitutethe dueprocessof the lawto which
everypersonis entitled. The InternationalCovenanton Civiland
Political Rights("ICCPR), bindingboth onMexico and theUnited

States,recognizesdue processof the lawas a nght derived directlyfiom
"the inherentdignity of thehuman person.''60

306. Thebasic components ofdue processare widely recognized.

Article14of the ICCPRdefinesthe minimumstandardsof due process
in acrirninalproceedingto include,amongotherthings,the right to "a
fairandpublichearing;"the rightto "full equality;"the right "to be
informedpromptlyand in detail and ina languagewhich [the defendant]

understandsof the nature andcauseof the chargeagainst him;" the right
to haveadequatetime and facilitiesto prepare adefense and to
cornmunicatewithcounselof his own choosing;the right to have the free
assistanceof an interpreterin court, if necessary; andthe right "not to be

compelledto testi@againsthimself or to confessg~ilt."36'

-
359See e.g., C. Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure (2001)

pp. 20-21"[Flor the criminal trial[,] [flairness is absolutely essential in order to
arrive at ajust verdict. discourse is not limited to the determination of
the facts andthe assurance of but is concerned also with the personality of
the perpetrator, how far he can be held responsible, and how rnuch punishment
should be imposed. Procedural fairness is crucial forthe realization ofjustice in
a democratic society").

360International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,
Preamble, para. 3. 9.9.9. U.N.T.S. 171(entered intoforce Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR]. Cf:Universal Declarat10;Prosecutor v. Delalic et
al.,Decision on the Adrnissibility of Handwriting Evidence, 19January 1998,
ICTY, Case No. IT-96-21, at para.59 (affirming that "[ilt isthe sacred and
solemn duty of everyjudicial institution to respect and give benevolent

construction to the provisions guaranteeing [fairtrial] rights").

361ICCPR,art. 14. 307. A departurefromtherequirementsofprocedural fairness
renders illegitimateanyconvictionor sentenceresulting fromthe flawed
proceedings. As the Inter-AmericanCourt hasstated,"[tlhe legitimacy

of [a]judgment rests upon thelegitimacy ofthe process."362This
principleapplieswithspecialforce indeath penaltycases, wherethe
"penaltyis irreversible"and "the strictest andmost rigorousenforcement
ofjudicial guaranteesis requiredof the Statesothat thoseguaranteesare

not violated and ahumanlifenot arbitrarilytaken as a res~lt.'~~~

308. Consularnotificationconstitutes abasiccomponent ofdue
processbyensuringboththe proceduralequalityof a foreignnationalin
the criminalprocessandthe enforcementof the other fundamentaldue

process guaranteestowhichthat nationalis entitled. It is therefore an
essential requirementforfaircriminalproceedings against foreign
nationals.

1. ConsularNotification1sNecessaryto Ensurethe
Procedural Equalityof ForeignNationalsin the Criminal
Process.

309. Due processguaranteesrecognize - and attemptto redress -

the disparityof power betweena prosecutinggovernmentalauthorityand
a criminaldefendant. Theyprovidethe procedural equalityessentialto
enablethe defendanttodefendhis interestseffectively. 364 As the Inter-
American Courthas stated:

Toaccomplishits objectives,thejudicial processmust
correctany real disadvantagesthat those brought before
the bar might have,thus observing the principle of
equalitybeforethe lawand thecourtsandthe corollary

362Castillo Petruzzi et aCase, Judgment ofMay 30, 1999, T219, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 52 (1999).

363Adv. Opinion OC-16, para. 136.

364Adv. OpinionOC-1 6,para. 117("For 'the due process of law' a defendant
must be ableto exercise his rights and defend his interests effectively and in ful
procedural equality withother defendants");see also Delcourtv.Belgium,
Judgment (Merits) of 17January 1970, Eur. Ct. H.R.26891651A-11,at para. 28. principleprohibiting discrimination.The presence ofreal
disadvantagesnecessitatescountervailingmeasures that
help to reduce oreliminate theobstaclesand deficiencies
that impair ordiminish aneffective defenseof one's

interests. Absentthosecountervailing measures,. .. one
could hardlySaythatthosewho have the disadvantages
enjoy atrue opportunityforjustice and the benefitof the
dueprocessof lawequalto thosewho do not havethose

di~advanta~es.~~~

310. Christoph Safferlingmakesthe same point whenhe writesthat

it is of utmostimportancethat a'fair trial'guarantees therespect
for the dignityof the suspectin a situationwherehe is

jeopardizedmost. Criminalproceedingsmustnever treat the
defendantlikean object. The subjectivityof the personmustbe
guaranteed,that meanshe must be put into a situationwhere he
can effectivelyparticipate inthe proceedings.366

311. Theconsularnotification andassistance guaranteesofArticle
36, in turn, reflect a recognitionthat a foreignnationalfacingcriminal
charges in a receiving State standson a fùndamentallydifferent footing
than does a nationalof that State.

312. Detained foreign nationals faceobstacles oflanguageand
culture,unfarniliaritywiththe legal system,fearsof deportation,and
isolationfi-omfamily,fi-iends,andtheir cornrnunity. Consularofficers
are uniquely well-positioned to educatetheir nationalsconcerningtheir
legalrightsand to dispel the national'sculturally-rootedmisconceptions

of thecriminaljustice stem.^ In additionto actingas a "cultural
bridge,"consularofficersprovidea physicallink to the informationand

- - --
365Adv. Opinion OC-1 6,para. 119.

366Safferlingsupra, atp. 29.See Nihal Jayawickrama, TheJudichl
ApplicationofHumanRights Law: NationalRegional and International
Jurisprudence,at 505(referringtothe equality of armsas the principle of
procedural equality ofthe parties attrial).

367See supra Section1II.A.individualsfrom thesendingStatethatare necessaryforthe defenseof

the foreign national. 368

313. Further,foreignnationals - and Mexican nationalsin particular
- are frequentlysubjectto discriminatorytreatmentas a consequenceof

theirrace and immigrant status. Whethersubtleor overt,shouted or
murmured,bias often infectsthe treatmentgivento foreign nationalsin
the courtrooms,jails, and lawyers'officesofreceiving states. Consular

officerscan detectthe presenceof unfairbiasand raisesuchconcerns
withthe appropriate authoritiesand,if needbe, withthe court itse~~~~

314. It is forthese reasons thatthe drafiersofArticle 36 of the

ViennaConventionrecognized the rightto consularnotificationand
assistanceas a basichurnanright. Mr.Douglas Edmonds, the United
Statesmember oftheInternationalLawCommission,for instance,urged
that "[tlhe protectionofhumanrightsby consulsin respectof their

nationals shouldbe the primaryconsiderationforthe ~ommission."~~~
Atthe Vienna Confèrence,variousdelegatescharacterizedthe receiving
States' obligationunderArticle36 as "extremelyimportantbecauseit

relatesto one ofthe fundamentaland indispensablerights of the
individ~al."~~'

315. It is the fact that theUnitedStateshas likewiserecognized

"consularprotection as aninherent rightof everycitizen.'372As the
Departmentof StateadvisedtheUnitedStatesCongress:

368See supra Chapter 1II.A.(e~laining the activities of consular officers in
obtainingevidence and facilitating the transport of witnesses).

369See supra Section 1II.A.(discussing the role of consular officers in ensuring
the fairness of proceedings involving foreign nationals).

370 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1960 vol.I,p.47 (para. 41);

see also comment by Milan Bartos, id., p. 46 (para.28)

371See Official Records, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, U.N. Doc.
No. AIConf.25116. See also infra Chapter V,B,2.

372
Statement of Hon. Leonard F. Walentynowicz, Administrator, Bureau of
Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State,U.S. Citizens Imprisoned in
Mexico: Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Political and Thatright is not affectedby evidence orfindings of guilt. Nor
has itanythingto do withthe natureofthe allegedcrime,be it
murder,narcotics smuggling,or a minortrafic violation.

Providing consularprotectionto American citizensarrested,
detained,or imprisoned abroadis a basichistoricresponsibility
of this Departmentand its consular~fficers?~~

316. In that, detained foreignnationals suffer from discreteand
particularvulnerabilitiesthat Article36 guarantees seekto redress.
Thoseguaranteesaddressthe detaineein hiscapacityas foreignnational,
not simplyas criminaldefendant. Forthat reason, otherdue process

guarantees,such as a right to counsel,cannotsubstituteforArtCle36
rights.374

2. ConsularNotificationEnsurestheEnforcementof Other
Essential Due Process Guarantees.

317. Ina veryreal sense,the rightto be informedofpotential
consularassistanceisthe essentialfirststepfordetained foreign
nationalsto the exerciseor waiveroftheir rightagainstself-

incrimination,to the effective assistanceof counsel, and to the
opportunityto prepare a defense. Whenthe mandates of Article36(1)
are violated,the due process rights of detained foreign nationalsare
necessarily undermined and theproceduralprotectionsthat characterize a

fairandjust criminalproceeding losetheir

Military Affairs of the House Committee onInternational Relations, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. Part 1,at 16(1975).

373Id.

374ASthe Court held inLaGrand, the fact that "United States courts could and
did examine the professional competence of counsel assigner did not eliminate
a "violation of the rights set forth in Article 36, paragraph 1"that prevents a
sending state "in a timely fashion, from retaining private counsel for them and
othenvise assisting in their defence as provided forthe Convention."See
LaGrand, para. 91.

375 M. Kadish, Article 36of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A
Search for the Rightto Consul, 18Michigan Journal International Law (1997)
at p. 609 (The deprivation of the nationals' rightser Article 36 of the Vienna a. RightTo Be Protected AgainstSelEIncrimination

318. Of al1of thedue process rights setforthin Article 14of the
ICCPR,none is moreimportantin protecting againstthe danger of
wrongfulconvictionsthan the rightnot tobe compelledto confess guilt.

As the UnitedStatesSupremeCourt hasobserved,

al1the carefulsafeguardserectedaround thegivingof
testimony,whetherby an accused oranyother witness,

would becomeempty formalitiesina procedure where
the mostcompellingpossible evidenceof guilt, a
confession,wouldhave alreadybeenobtainedat the
unsupervisedpleasure ofthe

319. It is duringinterrogation thatthe singular vulnerabilityof
foreignnationals,stemrningfromtheirdisadvantagesof languageand
unfarniliaritywith the receiving state'slegalsystem,is mostapparent

and easily abused.

320. Whilethe United Statesprovidescertain proceduralprotections
for detainees,they are often inadequateto apprise foreignnationalsof

their rights. Foreignnationalsare isolated,confùsed,and frightenedand
are more inclinedto waive legalrightswithoutunderstandingtheir
import.377The rapidrecital oftheMiranda rightsprior tointerrogation

Convention "raises a presump tion of prejudice"). Assuch, consular notification
is similar to other rights, such as the right to counsel, that, when violated, cause
the criminal process to lose its character as a meaningful, adversarial
confrontation. In the United States,when a defendant has actually or
constructively received no assistance of counsel, "the adversary process [is]
itself presumptively unreliable." UnitedStates v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659

(1984).

376Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466 (citing Mapp v.Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961)
(Harlan, J.,dissenting)).

377For instance, the approximately thirty-eight Mexican nationals in the

Application gave statements to United States law enforcement officers prior to
being notified of their consular rights. In many cases, the statements were used
as the principa- if not the only-evidence of the defendant's guilt. See
Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez, Exhibit A (detailed case summaries), Annex
7. As one commentator has noted, a suspect's statements to the policecanmay pass unnoticedby a foreignnationalfor whomEnglishis not his

primary language.378Detained Mexicannationals,asresultofthe
differencesbetweenthe United States andMexicancriminaljustice
systems,are particularlyaptto misunderstandthe significanceof early

questioning. The consequenceofthesedisadvantagesis thatforeign
nationals may falselyconfessto crimesthey didnot

321. The presenceof consularoficials throughout interrogation

provides an essentialsafeguardagainstsuchabuses,andundoubtedly
"enhances the integrity ofthe fact-findingprocessesin court."380Thus,
the foreignnational'sright to seek the guidanceofconsularofficersis

essentialto an intelligent,voluntary,and informeddecisionwhetherto
exercisehis right to remainsilent in the faceof interrogation.

fatally undermine his credibility before the jury, even when they are, on their

face, non-incriminating. N. Jayawickrama, TheJudicial Application of Human
Rights Law: National Regional and International Jurisprudence (2002) at p.
576.

378
See Declaration of Roseann Duefias Gonzale~ Annex 4;supra Chapter 1II.A.
When Mexican national Virgilio Maldonado was arrested, for example, he spoke
only Spanish, had less than a first grade education, and was mentally retarded.
Although the police informed him of his Miranda rights, including his right to
have an attorney present while he was interrogated, the interrogating officers

spent only 39 seconds reading those rights to Mr. Maldonado, and didnot in any
way attempt to explain them. He subsequently confessed in response to
interrogation. At trial, prosecutors relied heavily on his confession to obtain a
conviction, since there was virtually no other evidence tying himto the crime.
Mr. Maldonado's case, listed #32 in Mexico's Application, is fully described in

Declaration ofRobert0 Rodriguez, Exhibit A, para. 220-228, Annex7.

379 See Declaration of Roseann DuefiasGonzalez, para. 36 (describing the case
of Mexican national Omar Aguirre) ,Annex 4. Researchers have documented
several cases in which innocent defendants falselyconfessed to murders they did

not commit, and were then sentencedto death on the basis of that confession.
See, e.g., Center on Wrongful Convictions, Causes and Remedies: False
Confessions (February 2002)(available at
http://www.law.northwestem.edddepts/clinic/wrongful/documents/FalseConfR
pt 1.htm) (last visite17June 2003).

380 See supra Center on Wrongful Convictions. b. EffectiveAssistance of Counsel

322. Just as the rightto be protectedagainstself-incriminationis
essentialto prevent coercedor falseconfessions,the rightto counsel is
fimdamentalto ensuring equalityof armsbetweenthe governmentand an

individualaccused of a crime.38'Whileal1criminaldefendantshavethe
rightto effective legal representation,382 no one requiresthe assistanceof
competentcounsel morethan a defendant facingthe death

323. The right to consular notificationand access isnecessaryto

ensurethe effective assistance of counsel. TheVienna Convention
expresslystates that "[c]onsularfunctions consistin: ...representingor
arranging appropriaterepresentation fornationals ofthe sending State
before thetribunals and other authoritiesof the receiving tat te.'"^

324. Indeed, the importanceof consularassistancein securing

counselwas recognizedby RobertJ. McCloskey,the then Assistant
Secretaryof State for Congressional Relations:

[Elarlynotificationof arrest .. .will .. ..furtherenable
usto make availableto [thedetainedAmerican citizen]

381The right of the accused to be assisted by legal counsel is set forth in virtually
every international instrument dealing with the rights of accused persons. See,
e.g., ICCPR, Art. 14(3)(d); European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov. 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221, entered intoforce 3
Sept. 1953,Art. 6(3)(c); American Convention on Human Rights, 22 Nov. 1969,

1 144 U.N.T.S. 123,entered intoforce 18July 1978,Art. 8(2)(d) and 8(2)(e).

382See supra Chapter 1II.A.

383See supra Chapter 1II.A.(discussing the procedures in a capital proceedings).
The Court has already observed in LaGrand that violations of Article 36 incases
involving severe penalties or prolonged incarceration merit special
consideration. See LaGrand, paras. 63, 123. Nowhere is this more appropriate
than in a case in which a national's very life is at stake.

384 Vienna Convention, art. 5(i). informationregardingthejudicial systemand the
obtaining of responsiblelegal coun~el.~~~

325. Like the United States, Mexico, when notified of adetained
national,attemptsto secure and assist legalcounsel for that national.In

particular,Mexican consular officersreceivespecialtrainingso thatthey
may effectivelymonitor and support defensecounsel incapital
pro~eedin~s.~~~ Should counselfailin his duty toprovidecompetent
representation,consular officersdo not hesitateto inter~ene.~~T ~hrough

these efforts,consular officershaveenhancedthe quality oflegal
representationfor their nationak in innumerablecases.

c. The Rights To Presenta Defenseand ToCoiiectand
Present Evidence.

326. Article 14(3)(e)of the ICCPRguaranteesthe rightof the
accusedto "have adequatetime and facilitiesfor the preparation ofhis

defence" andto "obtain the attendance of witnesseson his behalfunder
the sarneconditions as witnesses againsthim."388

327. Foreign nationals facingthe death penalty sufferthetwin

disadvanta3ki of indigence and geographicseparationfromtheirhome
countries. Together,these disabilitiesmake it nearly impossiblefor

385Letterfiom Hon. Robert J. McCloskey, supra, at 37.

386See supra Chapter 1II.A.Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Hemindez at

para. 7.
387See, e.g., Declaration of Michael Iaria, para. 5, Annex 6.

388These rights are reiterated in the European Convention, Articles 6(3)(b) and
6(3)(d); the American Convention, Articles 8(2)(c) and 8(2)(f); and the African
Charteron Human and People's Rights, 27 June 1981,OAU, document

CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5; 21 I.L.M. 58, entered intoforce 21 Oct. 1986,Article
7(l )(cl.

389Even if a foreign national has lived in the United States for years, crucial
mitigation is invariably located in his home country. A thorough mitigation
investigation is multi-generational, and "encompasses al1the forces which
molded the client's life, both nature and nurture, the confluence and convergence

of genetic predispositions and environmental influences..Investigation of theforeign nationalsto marshalthe evidence criticalto their defense, bothat
the guilt andpenalty phasesof a capital proceeding.

328. There is an enormousdisparityin the resources available to the
governrnentalentity that prosecutescrimes andthe foreignnational,who
is isolatedfrom family andfriends and withoutthe meansof gathering
evidence topresent a defense. Manystates, includingthe United States,
simplydo not provide the financialresources necessary to undertakean

investigationin a foreigncountry,or for the bilingualexperts essentialin
the defenseof a criminalcase.390

329. The collectionof mitigating and other relevant evidencefrom

the sending Stateis a fundamentalconsular activity. Whena sending
State'snationalsare tried andsentenced in a foreigncountry,consular
officersare oftenthe singularconduit for the receiptandtransmission of
informationfromthe sendingState. Vital information abouta

defendant's education,mental capacity,health or social situationmay
onlybe accessiblethroughstate agencies. Consulatesmay organize
psychologicaland neuropsychologicaltesting, if necessary. Consular
officersare also uniquelywell-situatedto locate,transport, and arrange

visas forothenvise unavailablewitnesses so thattheymay testifj on the
national'sbeha~f.~~'

330. Whendeprived ofthe right to seek consularassistance,a

detained foreignnational,particularly in a capitalmurderproceeding,
stands in deadlyperil. Givenhis undeniablevulnerability,the inherent
disparityin resourcesbetweenthe receiving state andthe individual
defendant,andthe indispensablerole of consularofficersin ensuringthe

fundamentalfairnessof theproceedings, his right to seek consular

client's childhood includes the climate of caregiving in the home, the quality of

relationships, hygiene, nutrition, education, exposure to toxins (in the air, in the
dwelling, in utero, etc.).R.Stetlet Mitigation Evidence in Death Penalty
Cases, TheChampion (JanuaryIFebruary 1999) available at
<http://www.criminalju s lictvisieg2 May 2003).

390See supra Chapter 1II.A.

391See supra Chapter1II.A.assistancecanonly be characterizedas a basic componentof due
process.

B. CONSULA NROTIFICATIO HNASBEEN WIDELY RECOGNIZE AS
A FUNDAMENTD AULEPROCESS RIGHT AND, INDEED ,
HUMAN RIGHT

1. ConsularNotification Has Been Internationally
Recognizedasan Essential Element of DueProcess

331. "Dueprocess is nota staticconcept, it undergoesevolutionary
change to takeinto accountaccepted current notionsof fairne~s.'"~
Developmentsin internationallaw confinn the status ofconsular

notificationas "among the minimum guarantees essentialto providing
foreign nationalsthe opportunityto adequatelyprepare their defenseand
receive a fair The fundamentaldue processcharacterof the
rightto consularaccess, and indeed its characteras a humanright, has

been recognizedby the Inter-AmericanCourt of HumanRights,treaty-
law, Statepractice, andacademicliterature.

332. First,the Inter-American Courtof HumanRights, inits recent
AdvisoryOpinionon the Rightto Informationon ConsularAssistancein

theFrarneworkof the Guaranteesof the Due Processad^^

392Rodriguez-Fernandez v.Wilkinson,654 F.2d 1382, 1388(ldh Cir. 1981)
(considering international law principles for notions of fairness inaffirming writ
of habeas corpus for excludable Cuban refugee who was being detained in
federal prison); see also V. Uribe, Consuls as Work: Universal Instruments of

Human Rights and Consular Protection in the Context of Criminal Justice, 19
Houston Journal InternationalLaw (1997) at p. 390 (noting the evolution of the
concept of due process in Americanjurisprudence, citing the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law ofthe UQ:711,cmt. a (1986)).
Notions of due process have evolved considerably in the United States, for
example, since the inception of the Vienna Consular Convention. See e.g.,
Washingtonv. Texas,388 U14(1967) (ensuring the right to compulsory
process for thepose of obtaining favorable witnesses); Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966) (excludingconfessions without informing the defendant of
his right to an attorney).

39Adviso~ Opinion OC-16, at para. 122.

394See supra Chapter III.D.3 (discussing the opinion more fully).unequivocallyheldthat the rightto promptconsular accessunderArticle
36 (1)"mustbe recognized and counted among theminimumguarantees

essentialto providingforeignnationalsthe opportunityto adequately
preparetheir defenseandreceivea fair TheCourtunanimously
resolved:

That theindividual'sright to informationestablishedin Article

36(1)(b)of the ViennaConventionon Consular Relationsallows
the rightto the due processof lawrecognized in Article14ofthe
InternationalCovenant on Civiland PoliticalRightsto have
practicaleffectsin concrete cases; Article 14establishes

minimumguaranteesthatcan be amplified in thelightof other
international instrumentssuch asthe Vienna Conventionon
ConsularRelations,whichexpandthe scopeofthe protection
affordedto the ac~used.)~~

333. Second,a numberof internationalinstrumentson the
individualrights of foreignersexpresslyinclude the rightprovided forby
Article36 of the Vienna Conventionandconfirmthatthe rightto

consular notificationunderArticle 36(1)is an essential elementof due
process. The 1984UnitedNations ConventionagainstTorture andOther
Cruel,Inhurnanor DegradingTreatrnentor Punishment,is an examplein
point. It providesin Article 6.3 that

[alnypersonin custodypursuantto paragraph 1of thisArticle
shallbe assistedin communicatingirnrnediatelywith the nearest

395Adv. Opinion OC-16, para. 122.

396Id.para. 141.6.Srzealso id ,ara. 23 for the position taken by the Inter-
American Commission in its written submissions in theC-16 proceedings,
stating that "the very objective of the notification provision of Articleis

to ensure that alien detainees-whomay not enjoy 'equality of arms' with the
detaining authority-benefitfromconsultation with their consul. That
consultation, and notification thereof, provide a means to ensure that the
conditions are met which will protect the right of the alien detainee to a trial
conducted with due guarantees. The notification provision of Article 36s
plays a role in, and is integrally linked to ensuring due pr..The failure of
a party to the Vienna Convention to carry out its treaty based commitment may,

in either case, implicate the due process guarantees of the inter-Americanhuman
rights system." appropriate representativeof the Stateof which heis a national,
or, ifhe is a statelessperson,withthe representative ofthe State
wherehe usuallyreside~.~~'

334. Anotherexamplecanbe foundinthe International Convention
on theProtection ofthe RightsofAl1Migrant Workersand Members of

TheirFamilies, adoptedby the UnitedNations General Assemblyin
December1990. Itprovidesin Article 16.7that:

[wlhena migrantworkeror a memberof his or her family
isarrestedor comrnittedtoprisonor custody pending trial

or isdetainedin anyother manner:

(a) The consularor diplomaticauthoritiesof his a her State
of originor of a Staterepresentingthe interestsof that State

shall,if he or she so requests,be informed without delayof
his or her arrest or detention andof the reasons therefore;

(b)The personconcerned shallhavethe rightto

cornmunicatewith the saidauthorities.Any communication
bythe personconcernedto the saidauthoritiesshallbe

397Likewise, most of the international conventions dealing with terrorism
contain a provision reflecting the obligations under Article 36(2) of the Vienna
Convention. Some contain practically identical language. See, e.g., 1999 OAU
Convention onthe Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism, art. 7(3); the 1999
International Convention forthe Suppression ofthe Financing of Terrorism, art.
9(3); the 1997International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, art.7(3); the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and

Associated Personnel, adopted on 9 December 1994, art. 17(2) (entitling any
alleged offender to communicate without delay to the nearest appropriate
representative of the State or States of whichh person is a national); the 1979
International Convention against the taking of hostages, art. 6(3); the 1973
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally
protected persons, including diplomatic agents, art.); the 1971 Convention

for the suppression of unlawful actsagainstthe safety of civil aviation, art. 6(3);
the 1963Convention on offences and certain other acts committed on board
aircraft, art.(2). The draft International Convention for the suppression of acts
of nuclear terrorism, art lO(3); and the draft ComprehensiveConvention on
International Terrorism, art.(3), currently under consideration of tUN
General Assembly, contain similar provisions. fonvardedwithoutdelay, and heor sheshall also havethe

rightto receivecommunications sentby the said authorities
without delay;

of this rightandof rights derivingfromrelevanttreaties, if
any, applicablebetween theStatesconcerned, to
correspondandto meetwith representatives of thesaid

authoritiesandto make arrangementswith them for hisor
her legalrepresentation.398

335. The rightto immediateconsular accesshas furtherbeen
embodiedin a numberof UN resolutions providingfor basichuman and
due process rights.399For instance,the UnitedNations Declarationon
the humanrightsof individualswho are not nationals ofthe country in

398 Article 16.5of Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and
Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, provides that "each State Party shall comply with its
obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, where

applicable, includingthat informingthe person concerned without delay about
the provisions concerning notification to and communication with consular
officers." G.A. res. 55/25. 55U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 65, U.N. Doc.
Ai45149(Vol. 1)(2001), Article 16.5.

399 In addition, as this Court had previously noted, General Assembly
resolutions, though not legally bindingstricto sensu, may have normative value
to the extent that they reflect the existence of a rule of lawor the emergence of
an opiniojuris. Legality of the Threatof the Use of NucIear Weapons,Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J.Reports, 1996, para. 70. Although it would only be natural for

international tribunals to confirm the existence of a rule of law, asJorge
Castafiedawrites: "il n'existe aucune raison essentielle qui interdise'autres
organes internationaux, largement représentatifs,d'exprimer valablement, au
nom de la communauté internationale,ce qui, dans l'opinion de celle-ci, est le
droit international a un moment donné." See J. Castafieda,Recueil des cours,

(Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law), 1970 1,Vol.
129,p.315(les resolutions "ne créentpas le droit, mais elles peuvent prouver,
avec autorité, sonexistence"); M. Pinto, De la protection diplomatique a la
protection des droits de l'homme,Revue Générale deDroit Intem?:ional Public,
2002-3, p.545 ("Cet ensemble de règlesde soft law prévoient l'assistance
consulaire parmi les garantiesjudiciaires applicables a des étrangers.").whichtheylive,adoptedby UnitedNations General Assemblyon 13
December1985,providesthat:

[alnyalienshallbe freeat any timeto communicatewiththe
consulateor diplomaticmission ofthe Stateof whichhe or she is
a nationalor, intheir absence, withthe consulateor diplomatic
mission ofanyother Stateentrustedwiththe protectionof the

interestsofthe Stateof whichhe or she isa nationalin the State
wherehe or she resides. 400

336. Third,a largenumberof Stateshaverepeatedlyaffirmedthe

fundamentaldueprocesscharacterof the rightto consular notification
and access. In theproceedingsbefore the Inter-AmericanCourt
regardingthe AdvisoryOpinionNo.16 (OC-16),for instance,seven
States supportedtheargumentthatthe rightto consularaccess under

Article36(2)ofthe ViennaConvention constitutedan important due
process Followingthe issuanceof AdvisoryOpinionOC-16,
eighteen States,the EuropeanUnionon behalfof its fifieenmember

400
U.N. GeneralAssemblyResolution401144 of 13December 1985,adopted
without avote. The drafting history ofthe declaration showsthat various
Governmentsreferredto the closerelationship betweenArt. 10ofthe
Declaration andArt. 36 ofthe ViennaConvention on Consular Relations (see
U.N.Doc.ElCN.411354p. 19). See alsoU.N. General AssemblyResolution
AIRES14311 73 of December9, 1988("Body of Principles forthe Protection of
Al1Personsunder Any Formof Detention or Imprisonment"), pr.16(2);G.A.

Res.451113U.N. GAOR,45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. AlRESl45/113
(1990) ("Rules forthe Protection ofJuveniles Deprived oftheir Liberty"), Rule
1.56;and resolution of 23 April2003 ofthe UN Commission onHuman Rights
regarding Migrant Rights,U.N. DocumentElCN.412003146p , ara 7.

40 Adv. Opinion OC-16, para. 26. Those States wereMexico, CostaRica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguayand the Dominican Republic. The

argumentwas further supportedbynon-govemmental organizations,academics,
and individuals appearing beforethe CourSee BriefsofComisibn Mexicana de
Defensa y Promocibn de los Derechos Humanos, Human Rights Watch 1
Americas and Center forJustice and Intemational Law; Death PenaltyFocus of
Califomia; InternationalHumanRights Law Institute of Depaul University
College ofLaw and McArthurJustice Center, MinnesotaAdvocates for Human
Rights and Sandra Babcock;Bonnie Lee Goldstein and William H. Wright Jr.;

andAdele Shankand John Quigley, al1of them appearing asamici curiaebefore
the Inter-American Courtof HumanRights, OC-16/99.States,and the EuropeanCommissionexpressedtheir support of the
Inter-AmericanCourt'sconclusion that the rightto consular access under
Article 36(2) constitutesa fundamentaldue process right when they

appeared asamicicuriae in at leastfivedeathpenaltycases40'involving
foreignnationalsin the UnitedStates.In addition,nineteen Statessent
officia1communicationsto Govemorsand Boardsof Pardonsand
Parolesin supportof clemencypetitions in death penaltycases involving

foreign national^. ^ ^' increasing supportof OC-16by foreign
governrnentsin deathpenaltycases involving foreignnationalsstrongly
suggeststhe existenceofan emerging consensusin the practiceof
nations.

337. Finally, leadingscholarshave likewiseadvocatedthe due

process characterof therightto consularaccesscontained inArticle
36(2). For MartinMennecke,forexarnple,

it appearsevidentthata foreignnationalfacingcriminal
proceedingsabroadhas due process relatedintereststo consult

with hk consulate [and that][tlhisfunctionallink entwiningthe
consularcommunicationset forthunderArticle 36 withdue

402In five cases, demarches were filed: Miguel Ange1Flores; Gregory Madej;
Gerardo Valde~Maltos; Arboleda A. Ortiz, Plutarco Tello and German
Sinisten-a; and Javier Suarez-Medina. Furthermore, two judges of the Supreme
Courtof Illinois wrote dissenting opinions when the writ of certiorari requested
by Mr. Gregory Madej was denied. Illinois v. GregoryMadej, 193Ill. 2d 395
(Ill. 2000). Judge McMorrow obsewed that the Inter-American Court's
holdings on OC-16"mirror[ed]this court's ownrecognition that death penalty

cases require a high standard of procedural accuracy." Id. (quotation and citation
omitted). Justice Heiple obsewed that the consularnotification requirement "is
meant to ensure that foreign nationals imprisoned abroad have adequate legal
representation and that they should be tried in accordance with principles of
justice generally recognized in the international community." Id.

403Those States are Argentina, Bolivia,Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador,El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland,
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Switzerland, Uruguay, and Venezuela. process guaranteesof internationah lumanrightslaw iseven
more obviousincases involvingthe death

338. Similarly,Eric Roberthasaffirmedthat

L'existenceet l'applicationeffectivedes droitsdeprotection
consulaireconstituentpourtantun élémenitmportantdes droits
de lapersonne à l'heureou lesindividus sedéplacentde plus en
plus souvent à l'étrangerpourdifférentesraisons .. le butde
l'Article36 estdepermettreleprocèséquitabledesétrangers,et

que lesdroitsreconnusparcetArticle,commele reconnaissaitle
juriste Yasseen,sont étroitemenlties auxdroitsde l'homme,en
l'occurrence,ledroit ala défense.405

2. ConsularNotificationUnderArticle36 is an Essential
DueProcessRightand,Hence, aHumanRight.

339. Becauseof its fundamentaldue processcharacter,the right to
consular notification and accesswithoutdelaywasalready recognizedby
manyStates asa humanright as early as the negotiating processof the

Vienna Conventionon ConsularRelations. Membersof the United
NationsinternationalLawCommission,and States participatingin the
Diplomatic Conferencethatadopted theVienna Conventionon Consular
Relations, identifiedthehumanrights natureof consular notificationand
access.

340. Mr.MilanBartos, a memberof the ILC,observedduringthe
deliberationsthat thenArticle30A "was intended tosafeguardhuman
rights ...."O6He furthernotedthat:

404M. Mennecke, Towardsthe Humanization of the Vienna Convention of
Consular Rights-The LaGrand Case Before the International Court of Justice,
German Yearbook of InternationalLaw, Vo1.44,2001, p.453.

405E. Robert, Laprotection consulaire des nationaux enpéril?Les ordonnances
en indication de mesures conservatoires renduespar la Cour internationale de
justice dans les affaires Breard (Paraguayc. Etats-Unis) et LaGrand (Allemagne
c. Etats-Unis), RévueBelge de Droit International, 1998/2, Vol.XXX1,p.444
and p.447.

406Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1960vol. 1,p. 46 (para. 28). [a] code suchas the Commission waspreparingwas an integrated
whole andin its definition of the consularfùnctionsthe hurnan
rights of a foreignercouldnot beignored, forit was preciselyone
of the consul'sfunctionsto protectthoserightsof his national~.~~'

341. Duringthe 13thsessionof theInternational LawCommission
in 1961,Mr. Edmonds,the U.S.memberof the ILC,againcalledthe
right of a foreignerto communicatewiththe consulateof his or her home

state"a very fundamentalhumanright."408

342. Sirnilarly,atthe DiplomaticConferencethat adoptedthe
Vienna Conventionon Consular Relations,theKoreanRepresentative
referredto "[tlhe receiving State'sobligationunderparagraph(l)(b) [a]s

extremely importantbecause it relatesto one of the fundamental and
indispensablerights of the individ~al.'~~~ The GreekRepresentative
notedthat codification ofthe international law andcustomson consular
relationswas consistentwiththe "present-day trendof promoting and
protectinghumanrights, for which futuregenerations wouldbe

grateful."410Finally,in the samecontext,the SpanishDelegatestated
that: "the right of the nationalsof a sendingStateto communicatewith
and haveaccessto the consulateandconsularofficersof their own
country.. . is one ofthe most sacredrights offoreignresidentsin a

~ountry."~ '

343. The travauxpréparatoiresconfirrnthat Statesparticipatingat
the Diplomatic Conference that adoptedthe ViennaConventionwere
clear on the natureof the rightsembodied inArticle 36. The factthat

the Vienna Conventionis not in itselfa humanrights instrument is not

407Id.,p. 50 (para. 23).

408 Yearbook ofthe international Law Commission 196 1,vol. 1,p. 33 (para16).

409See Officiai Records, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, U.N. Doc.
No. A/Conf.25/16.

410Id.

411 Id.relevant and doesnot prevent thatinstrumentfiomrecognizinghuman
rights.412

344. As previously shown,without the benefits flowing fromthe
due process rights embodiedin Article 36ofthe ViennaConvention,the
fie-four Mexicannationalswere subjectto inherentlyflawed andunfair
proceedings. Theinjurycaused bothto Mexicoandto the fie-four

Mexican nationalsadmits of no doubt. As conclusivelystatedby the
Inter-AmericanCourtof HumanRights,in criminalproceedingsin
which foreignnationals'

mostprecious juridical rights,perhapseventheirlives,hangin
the balance[. ..] it is obviousthat notificationofone's right to
contacttheconsularagentof one'scountry willconsiderably
enhanceone's chancesof defendingoneselfandthe proceedings

conductedin the respective cases,including thepolice
investigations,are morelikely tobecarriedoutin accordwith
the lawandwith respectforthe dignityofthe humanperson. 413

345. Despitethe international recognition ofconsularnotificationas
an elementof fundamentaldue processanda humanright,the rightsof
Mexican nationalshave beenregularlyviolated - andcontinuetobe
violated - bythe authoritiesofthe United States. Strippedofthis right,

these foreignnationals havebeen subjectedtocriminalproceedings

412Article 5.2 ofthe International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights
recognizes that notal1civil and political rights are spelled out in its provisions.
Other scholars have affirmed that "individual rights need not necessarily derive

from classical human rights treaties." See C. Tams, Consular Assistance and
Rights and Remedies:Comments on the ICJ's Judgement in the LaGrand Case,
13European Journal of lnternational Law (2002) at p. 1257.Monica Feria
Tinta, has also acknowledged that, "The relevance of human rights norms is
evident today in areas as varied as immunities or the law of the sea."M.ee
Tinta, Due Process and the Right to Life in the Context of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations: Arguing the LaGrand Case, 12European

Journal of International Law(2001)at p.10. Thistrend has been characterized
by Judge Antonio Cançado Trindade as the humanizationof international law.
See Advisory OpinionOC-1 6,concurring opinion, para 35.

413Advisory Opinion OC-16, para. 12 1.without the fairnessand dignityto which eachpersonis entitled.414
Consequently,theintegrityof theseproceedingshas been hopelessly
undermined,their outcornes rendered irrevocablyunjust.

414Id. MEXICOIS ENTITLEDTO FULL REPARATIONSFOR

THE UNITED STATES'S VIOLATIONSOF THEVIENNA
CONVENTION

346. In LaGrand, this Courthadthe opportunityto providea

definitiveinterpretationof the rightsof the sending Stateand its
nationalsand the correspondingobligationsof the receivingStateunder
Article36 of the ViennaConvention.

347. The Court, however,did nothave the sameopportunitywith
respectto remedies, forthe simplereasonthat the German nationalswho
werethe subject of that case had beenexecutedat the timethe Court
rendereditsjudgment. For that reason, Germanydid not seekthe

primaryinternational law remedyof resitutio in integrum.4'5

348. In this case, by contrat, the Mexican nationalswhoprompted
Mexico's filing,though under sentenceof death in variousconstituent
jurisdictions of the UnitedStates,remainalive. This case,therefore,will

requirethe Court to consider,in a fundamentallydifferent posturethan
LaGrand, the remedies to whichMexico isentitled. Specifically,this
case willgive the Court the opportunityto elaborateon itsrulingsin
LaGrand by bringing fullyto bear its authority to issue authoritative

declarationsof legal right,to orderrestitutio in integrum,and todirect

415 Even in that posture, however, the Court granted Germany substantial relief,
first, in declaring that, in failing to notify Karl and Walter LaGrand without
delay oftheir consular notification rights, the United States had breached its

obligations under Article 36(1) of the ConventioSecond,in declaringthat, by
failing to permit review and reconsideration of theands' convictions and
sentences that took account of the Article 36(1) violations, the United States had
breached its obligation under Article 36(2) to give full effect to the purposes of
Article 36; Andfinally, by holding, in response to Germany's request for
assurances of non-repetition, thatould any German national be sentenced to a
severepenalty in a proceeding that violated Article 36, the United States would
have the obligation to permit review and reconsideration that took account of

that violation.aGrand, paras. 128(3),(4),(7).not been c~mmitted."~'~Article 34 of the Articleson State
Responsibility providesfor reparation in "the formofrestitution,

compensationand satisfaction,either singlyor in cornbinati~n.'~'~

351. In this proceeding,Mexico seeksonlythat reliefthatis
essentialto ensurethat its nationals receive fair processin criminal
proceedingsin whichtheir life is at stake. Mexicodoes not seek

monetarycompensationor any other formof remedyto redress any
moral, psychological, and physical injuriessufferedby its nationalsby
virtueof the denialof Article 36 rights in their capitalcriminal

proceedings. Nor does Mexico seek a blanketpardonor any otherform
of reliefthat wouldpreventthe United Statesfromretryingthe nationals
in proceedingsthatconfonn with the requirementsof Article36.

352. To ensurethat its nationalsreceive fairprocessin criminal

proceedingsin whichtheir lives are at stake, Mexicoseeksthree formsof
relief.

353. First, Mexicoseeks declarationsthat the United Stateshas

violatedits internationallegal obligations toMexico,in its ownrightand
in the exerciseof its rightof consularprotection of its nationals.

354. Second,becausedeclarationsstandingalonewouldnotremedy

the injurysustainedby Mexico and itsnati~nals;~'Mexico seeks
restitutio in integrum Inthe circumstanceshere, restitutio in integrum
requiresthat this Courtorder the United Statesto take al1steps necessary
to ensurethat (1)the convictionsand sentences of thefi@-four Mexican

418Factoly at Chorzbw, Merits, 1928, P.C.I.J.Ser. A,No. 17, p. 47.

419ASthe ILC has observed, "[wliping out al1the consequences of the wrongful
act may .. . require some or al1forms of reparation to be provided, depending on
the type and extent of the injury that has been caused." ILC Articles on State
Responsibility, Commentary to Art. 34,para. 2.

420See, cg., D. Shelton, Remedies inInternational HumanRights Law (1999) p.
128 ("[dleclaratory judgments may be useful where the act or omission imputed
to the state is unlawful but where there is no material or objective injury suffered
or it is not possible to prove the injury. In general, however, a declaration of
wrongdoing is rarely sufficient to remedy the harm done to an individual,
national or alien.").nationalssubjectto thisproceedingare vacated; (2)al1evidenceobtained
in violationof Article 36is excludedfiom any futurecriminal
proceedingagainstthosenationals;and (3) no municipal lawbar is

appliedto prevent anyof the Mexicannationals subjectto thk
proceedingfiom obtaining relieffromthe Vienna Convention
violations.421Suchan order is necessaryto restore the situationthat
existedprior to the commission of theintemationally wrongfulacts.

355. Finally, Mexicorequests anorder of cessation andguarantees
ofnon-repetitionin orderto terminatethe United States'ongoing
violationsof article 36of the ViennaConventionand to prevent
comparableviolationsin the future.

356. Mexico seeksdeclarationsin its own ri&, aswell as in the
right of its nationals,as part of the reparations owed by United States for

its unlawfulconduct. The purpose of a declaratoryjudgment isto
"ensurerecognition ofa situationat law,once and foral1and with
binding forceas between the Parties,so that the legal positionthus
establishedcannotagainbe calledin question in so far asthe legal

effectsensuingtherefromare ~oncerned.'*~~ The declarationsrequested
by Mexico, whichare set forth in Mexico's Submissionsbelow,are
designedto state clearlyand preciselythe internationallegal obligations
ofthe United Statesunderthe Vienna Convention,as wellasthe

consequencesthat aise fromthose obligations. These declarationsare
an essential complementtothe otherremedies sought.

421By "municipal law bars," Mexico is referring to the federal and state

procedural defaultrules, the retroactivity doctrine from Teague v. Lane, and the
lackof remedies at law. See supra Chapter IIISection C.1.

422Interpretation of Judgments, Nos.7and 8 (Factory at Chorzbw), P.C.I.J.,
Series A,No. 13, p. 20. 1. Restitutioin IntegrumRequiresReestablishment of the
StatusQuoAnte.

357. Itiswell-establishedthat theprimary formof reparation
availabletoa Stateinjued byan internationallywrongful actisrestitutio

in integrun?.4'3 Article35 ofthe ILCArticles on State Responsibility
providesthat

a Stateresponsibleforan internationallywrongful actis under an
obligationto makerestitution,that is, to re-establish the situation

whichexistedbefore the wrongfulact was cornrnitted.

TheILC deliberately adopteda definitionof restitutio in integrumthat
requiredthe responsibleState to"re-establish[]the statusquo ante, i.e.

the situationthat existedpriorto the occurrence of thewrongfula~t.'*'~
Thisdefinitionis consistentwiththe holdingsof this Court and other
internationalcourts.

358. Inthe caseconcerningtheFree Zones of UpperSavoyand the
District ofGex,the PermanentCourtrequired thatFrance"withdrawits
customsline in accordancewiththe provisionsofthe saidtreatiesand
instruments;and that this regime mustcontinuein forceso longas it has

notbeenmodifiedby agreement betweenthe ~arties.'"'~Inhis
PreliminaryReportto the InternationalLaw Commission, Professor

423Commentary to Art. 35 of the Articles on State Responsibility, para 1.

424Id. at par2. The importance of returning to the situation pre-existing the
commission of the internationally wrongful act has been recognized by other
distinguished international jurists. See, e.g., P. Guggenh2iTraitéde Droit
International Public 954),68-69 ("Un des premiers principes appliqués est

celui de la restitutio in integrum, de la remise en état.");Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United State5901, cmt. d (1987)
("Ordinarily, emphasis is on forms of redress that will undo the effect of the
violation, such as restoration of the status quo ante, restitution, or specific
performance of an undertaking.")

425Free Zones ofUpper Savoyand the District ofGex, PCIJ, Series AiB, No. 46,

Judgment of 7 June 1932, p.96, at p. 172.Arangio-Ruizobsewed that, "[a]lthoughthe Court did notexpressly
qualiQ itsdecisionas purportinga French obligation ofrestitutio, the

withdrawal envisagedobviouslyimplies,in addition tothe cessation of a
situationnot inconformitywith internationallaw, that re-establishment
ofthe statusquoante whichis at leastthe main portionof the essential
content ofre~titutio."~~

359. TheCentralAmerican Court also endorsedthis view in holding
that restitution required re-establishingthe situationthat existed prior to
the conclusionofthe Bryan-ChamorroTreaty.El Salvadorcomplained

that a concessionfora naval basein the Gulfof Fonsecagranted by
Nicaraguain the Treaty violatedEl Salvador's rights ofcoownership.
The CentralArnericanCourtorderedthe ie-establishmentof the status
quoante byimposinga dutyon Nicaragua"to re-establishandmaintain

the legal statusthat existedprier to the BryanChamorro Treaty between
the litigantrep~bli~s.7'27

360. The Inter-ArnericanCourtfor HumanRights,too, has

invariablydefinedrestitutio in integrumas "reestablishing the previous
andas "restoring, insofaras possible, thesituation as it was
beforethe violationswere ~ommitted.'~~~

361. The ILCexpressly rejectedan alternativedefinitionof

restitutioin integrumthat wouldhaverequired theresponsible Stateto
establishthe situationthatwouldhave existedhadthe wronghl act not
occurred. As theILCexplained,that broader definitionconfuses the

426Preliminary Report on State Responsibility by Mr. Caetano Arangio-Ruiz,
Special Rapporteur,UNDoc.AlCN.41416andAdd. 1 inILCYearbook, 1988,

Vol. II,PartOne,p.26, para.76.

427Bryan-Chamorro Treaty Case (Nicaragua v. El Salvador), 11 Am J.Int'lL.
674 (1917)at 696.

428See, e.g., Ivcher BronsteinCase, Judgment o6 February 2001, Inter-Am. Ct.

H.R. (Ser.C)No. 74(2001), para. 178;Constitutional Court Case (Aguirre
Roca, Rey Terry andRevoredo Marsano vs. Peru), Judgment ofJanuary 31,
2001, Inter-Am.Ct. RR. (Ser.C) No. 71 (2001),para.119.

429Ivcher BronsteinCase, Interpretation of the Judgmenton the Merits of 4
September 2001, Inter-Am.Ct. H.R. (Ser.C)No. 84, para.21.general conceptof reparationwith the specificremedyofrestitution. 430

Whereas"reparationmust,so faras possible, wipeout al1the
consequencesof the illegalact and re-establishthe situationthat would,
in al1probability, haveexistedif that act had not been~omrnitted,"~"
restitutio in integvumis onlyone of variousremediesof reparation that

may beutilizedto achieve that result.

362. In addition, the ILC recognized thatthe obligationto re-

establishthestatus quoante - as opposedto anobligationto establish
the situationthatwouldhave existed ifthe acthad notoccurred - has
"the advantageof focusingon the assessmentof a factualsituation andof

not requiringa hypothetical inquiry intowhatthe situationwould have
been ifthe wrongfulact had not been ~omtnitted."~~

363. The UnitedStatesis thereforeobligedto take the necessary

action to restorethestatus quoante in respectof Mexico'snationals
detained, tried, convictedand sentenced in violationoftheir
intemationallyrecognizedrights.

430Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary to Art. 35, para. 2 ("latter

definition absorbs into the concept of restitution other elements of full reparation
and tends to conflate restitution as a form of reparation and the underlying
obligation of reparation itself").

431Factory at Chbrzow, Merits, 1928,P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17,p.47

432Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary to Art. 35, para. 2. Indeed, the
United States argued inLaGrand that the determination whether timely
notification would have prevented the deaths of the LaGrand brothers "rest[s] on
speculation" and isbased on "suppositions." LaGrand, para. 72. Earlier, it had

argued that it "would beunworkable for a court to attempt to determine reliably
what a consular officer would have done and whether it would have made a
difference. ... Surely, governmentsdid not intend that such questions become
a matter of inquiry inthe courts." Vienna Conventionon Consular Relations
(Paraguay v. UnitedStates of America), CR 1998/7 (Brown), para. 2.18. See

also Brief to the SupremeCourt inBreard v. Greene, 1997U.S. Briefs 1390,
Annex 34, at 23 (argument of the U.S. Solicitor General before the Supreme
Court) ( "there is no workable way to determine whether consular notification
would have made a difference at a defendant's trial, given theinviolability of
consular archives and the privileges and immunities of consular officers"). 2. ToRe-EstablishtheStatusQuoAnte, the UnitedStates

MustEnsurethe Vacnturofthe Convictions and
Sentences, EnsuretheExclusionof EvidenceIUegally
Obtained, andPreventtheApplicationofMunicipalLaw

Bars.

a. Mexico 1sEntitledTo Vacaturof the Convictions
and Sentences ofItsNationals.

364. To restore thestatus quoante,the convictionsand sentencesof
the fi@-four Mexican nationals subject to this proceedingmust be

vacated. Here, theinjuryconsistsof a criminalproceeding(1) in which
fundamentaldueprocess protectionsin the formof guaranteesof
consularnotificationand assistance weredenied,and (2)which resulted
in a criminalconvictionand deathsentence. Inthese circumstances,

restorationof thestatus quoanterequiresrelievingthe personsubjected
to the unfairproceedingof the legaleffects ofthe tainted convictionand
sentence.433Onlyby vacatingtheconvictionsand sentencesrendered

illegitimateby virtueof thedenialof fundamentalprocedural rightsmay
the responsible State makeit possibleforthe sendingState andits
national to exercisetheirrightsin a new proceedingin whichthoserights
arerespected. 434

- -
433 The removal ofthe effects of the illegal act in the restoration of the status
quo ante is inherent in returning to the situation that existed prior to the unlawful

act. See O. Schachter, International Law inTheory and Practice, 178Hague
Rec. (V, 1982)p. 190("When a State is internationally responsible for a
wrongfùl act, it is under an obligation to discontinue the actand toprevent the
continuing of the effects ofthe act. isalso norrnally under a duty to restore the
situation as it existetl before the breach. This may requireto cany out actions

which it failed to do in accordance with its international obligation.") (emphasis
added).

434 Constitutional Court Case, Judgment ofJanuary 31, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R.
(Ser.C) No. 71 (2001), paras. 119-120(finding thatthe due process violation
required restitutio in integrum sothat "the victims are ensured the enjoyment of

their violated rights and freedoms."). 365. It is well-establishedthat the restorationof thestatusquoante

rnayconsist of the vacaturofajudicial decision .35 In itsCommentaryto
the Articles on StateResponsibility,theILCobservedthat restitutio in
integrumrnaytakethe formof "the reversa1of somejudicial act" suchas

"the rescindingorreconsiderationof anadministrativeorjudicial
measure unlawfullyadoptedin respectof the person or propertyof a
f~rei~ner."~~~

366. Restitution,therefore, requires annulment ofthejudgment ofa
national tribunalwhenthatjudgrnentresults from proceedings conducted

in violation of internationaliawP3' Forexample,in the Martinicase:38

435See Preliminary Report on State Responsibility by Mr. Gaetano Arangio-
Ruiz, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. AlCN.41416and Add. 1in ILC Yearbook,

1988,Vol. II,Part One, at para.73,citing K. Nagy, The problem of reparation in
international law, in Questions of International Law: Hungarian Perspectives,
(H. Bokor-Szego, ed., vol. 3, p. 173,at 177-78)(maintaining that restitutio in
integrum rnaymean "annulment of certain decisions, e.g. laws, the omission of

which cannot be compensated by payment of money"); J.Personnaz, La
reparation du prejudice endroit international public 77 (1939) (stating that
juridical restitutio rnay"lead to the revocation, annulment or amendment of the
act" and rnay imply "theannulment or amendment of the judgment"); Guiliano,
Diritto internazionale 594 (2nded, 1983)(including in his description of

restitutio in integrum, "[tlhe repeal ofa law enacted in violation of a rule of
international law ...[and] the rescinding of an administrative orjudicial
measure unlawfully adopted in respect of the person or property of a
foreigner.. ."). See also Restatement ofthe Law (Third), TheForeign Relations

Law of the UnitedStates (1987), 901, cmt. c (1987) ("The obligation of a state
to terminate a violation of international law rnay include discontinuance,
revocation, or cancellation of the act (whether legislative, administrative or
judicial) that caused the violation").

436 ILC, Repori on the work of its fifiy-third session (2001), DraftArticles on the
Responsibility of States for InternationallyWrongfùl Acts, Commentary to Art.
35, para. 5.

437
L.Reitzer, La Réparation comme Conséquencede l'Acte Illicite en Droit
International 173(1938) ("Restitution rnayconsist in the annulment of the
judgment of a national tribunal delivered in contradiction of international law.").
See also P. Daillier, A. Pellet: Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Droit International Public, 5e
ed. (1994), 768,T 506 ("Si l'acte illicite est un actejuridique, la remise des

choses en l'état consistedans son annulation, indépendammentde sa nature,
mêmes'il s'agit d'une décisiondejustice.").the ItalimVenezuelan Commission examinedthejudicialproceedings
beforeVenezuelancourtsagainst theMartiniCompanyand annulled
certainpaymentobligationsimposedby the Venezuelancourt, where the
proceedingsconstituted"a patent injustice"andwere thus in violationof

internationallaw. Thetribunal held:

En prononçantleur annulation, le Tribunal Arbitralsouligne
qu'un acteillicitea été commiset applique le principeque les
conséquencesde l'acteillicite doiventêtreeffacées.439

367. For another example,in the case concemingAppealfrom a
Judgment of theHungaro/CzechoslovakMixedArbitral Tribunal (The
PeterPhmarry University),the Permanent Court ordered the Respondent
to restorethe irnmovablepropertyclaimedbythe University"in the
conditionin which it was beforethe applicationof the measuresin

question." The Court alsoordered that the restored propertyhad to be
"freed fiom any measureof transfer, compulsoryadministrationor
~e~uestration."~~'TheCourt thereforeeffectivelyannulledany decisions
regardingthe propertyat issue.

368. Internationalhumanrightsbodies have regularlyfoundthat a
convictiontaintedby a due process violation oranotherviolationof an
internationallyrecognizedrightcannotstand. In the CastilloPetruzzi
case, forexample,the claimants challenged actionsof the Peruvian
government involvedin theirtrialfor treasonbeforemilitarycourtswith

"faceless"judges presiding. Inholdingthat Peruhad violatedthe
defendants' due processrights,the Inter-ArnericanCourtof Human
Rightsobserved:

Failureto fulfillthe requirementsofdue processrendersthe
proceedingsinvalid. Withthat,thejudgment is automatically

invalid,as it doesnotmeetthe requirementsforit to standand

438Affaire Martini,RIAA, vol.II,p. 973 (1930).

439Id.,atp.1002.

440Appeal frorn a Judgment of the Hungary/Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal (ThePeter Pazmany University), 1933,P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 61,
208,249. have the effects that norrnallyfollowfroman act ofthis nature.
It is up to the State,hen,withina reasonable timeperiod, to
ordera new trialthat ab initio satisfiesthe requirementsof due
44 1
process of law ...

The Court furtherstated that:

If the proceedingsuponwhich thejudgmentrests have serious

defectsthat stripthem ofthe efficacytheymust haveunder
normalcircumstances,thenthejudgmentwillnot stand. It will
not havethe necessary underpinning,whichis litigation
conductedby law. Theconcept ofnullificationof a proceeding

is a familiarone. With it,certainactsare invalidatedandany
proceedingsthat followedthe proceedingin whichthe violation
that causedthe invalidationoccurred,are repeated. This,in turn,
meansthat a newjudgmentis handeddown. The legitimacyof

thejudgment rests uponthe legitimacyofthe process.442

369. The obligationto annula taintedjudgmententailsthe
obligationto eradicate al1the effectsof thejudgment. In the Cantoral

Benavides case,the Court orderedPeruto

nullifi al1judicial or administrative,criminalor police
proceedings against LuisAlbertoCantoralBenavidesin

connectionwith the eventsof the presentcaseand...expungethe
corresponding records.443

370. Similarly,in the Cesti Hurtado aPeruviannational
had beenarrested,deprivedof his liberty and sentencedunderthe

441Castillo Petruzzi et al. case,Judgment of 30 May 1999, Inter-Am.Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 52 (1999), para.221.

442
Id., para219.

443Cantoral Benavides case,Reparations, JudgmentofDecember 3, 2001,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.8 (2001), para.78.

444Cesti Hurtado Case, Judgment of29 September, 1999,Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser.C) No. 56 (1999).militaryjustice system,despitea habeas corpusactionorderingthat the
alleged victim should be separated fromthe proceedingsunderthe
militaryjustice systemandthat his Geedomshould bere~~ected.~~P ~eru

rejectedthe Commission'sdemandsthat the Court "shouldannulthe
whole proceeding againstthe victim bythe Peruvian militarytribunalsas
well as al1the effectsofthejudgment that was pronouncedin irregular
proceedings."446Peru arguedthat the grantof sucha requestwould

"result in procedural chaos,destabilizingthe systemof lawsof the
Peruvian State" and thatthe annulmentdemandwas "extravagantand
constitutes an attack on the sovereigntyof the Peruvian tat te.'*^'
RejectingPeru'sposition, the Courtheld that theproceedingunderthe

militaryjustice systemhaddeprivedMr. Cestiofdue processrights,and
ittherefore ordered "thatthe State mustannulthisproceedingand al1the
effects derived fromit."448

371. Unswprisingly,authors examiningthe consequencesof

violations of the ViennaConventionin U.S.deathpenalty proceedings
have advocatedthat restitutioin integrumconsistof the vacaturofthe
convictions and sentences. ProfessorKadish,forexample,explainsthat

full effectcannotbe givento the Article [36]oncea foreign
national has beenconvictedin violationof its provisionunless a
new trial is granted. A correctremedynecessarilydemandsa
new trial in whichthe foreignnational hasfull accessto the

cultural bridge envisionedby the worlddelegatesofthe Vienna
Convention. 449

372. Professor Quigleyobserves that

445Id., para. 3.

446 Id., para. 190(interna1quotations omitted).

447Id., para. 191 (internal quotations omitted).

448Id., para.194.

449M. Kadish, Article 36of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A
Search for the Right to Consul 18Michigan Journal of InternationaLaw

(1997) at 61CL611. in the face of a failure tonoti@,a convictionmustbereversed.
This is a straightfonvardapplicationof therequirement,inthe

law of state responsibility,of restoringthestatusquobefore a
violation.450

373. Vacaturof the convictionand sentencesofthe fifty-four

Mexican nationalsis essentialtorestitutio in integrumherebecauseit is
literallythe only way to restorethe status quoantethe internationally
wrongful act .451 Onlyby relievingthese nationalsof thelegaleffectof

their tainted convictionsand sentenceswill thisCourtensurethe
restoration of asituationin whicha fair proceedingmaygo forward.

Mexico1sEntitledinAny FutureCriminal
b.
ProceedingsAgainstIts Nationalsto theExclusion
of EvidenceObtainedin Breach of Article 36.

374. As an aspect ofrestitutio in integrum,Mexicoisalsoentitled
to an order that in any subsequentcriminalproceedings against the

450J. Quigley, LaGrand: A Challenge to the U.S. Judiciary, 27YaleJournal of

International Law (2002) at 437.

451Professor Mann, for example, writes:

Obviously the problem arises only where it is ajuristic act such as

legislation, an executive order or ajudicial decision that is alleged to
be tortious. Insuch cases it rnay happen that nullity, and possiblya
judicial declaration of nullity is the only effective method or at least
the necessary concomitant of an effective method for the protection of
avictim State.

F.A. Mann, The Consequences of an International Wrong in International and
National Law, 48 Brit. YBInt 'L. (1976-1977) at p. 6. Mann then cites with
approval the view of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht that "the absence of more direct
means of enforcement tends to endow the principle of nullity of illegal acts with
particular importance in the international sphere.Id. (citingH. Lauterpacht,

Recognition in International Law 42 1(1947)). See also 1.Brownlie,State
Responsibility (1983), p. 210("to achieve the object of reparation tribunals may
give 'legal restitution' in the form of a declarationt... the relevant act of the
executive, legislature or judicial organs of the respondent state, is a nullity in
international law").nationals,statements and confessionsobtainedprior to notificationto the

nationalof his rightto consularassistancebe excluded. The exclusionof
this evidencein these circurnstanceswouldcomportwith the
exclusionaryrule, a general principleof lawunder Article 38(l)(c) of the

Court's Statute.

375. The exclusionaryrule appliesinboth cornmonlaw andcivil
lawjurisdictionsand requiresthe exclusion ofevidencethat is obtained

in a mannerthat violates due process obligations. For example,under
UnitedStateslaw, evidenceobtained in violationof basicdue process
rightsmust be excluded from useat trial againstthe defenda~~t.~~ In' the

UnitedKingdomand Canada, confessions obtainedin violationof
domesticlaw, including applicablehumanrights obligations,are
excluded as a matterof law so as not tojeopardizethe faimessand

justice of the proceedings.453Indeed, courtsin the UnitedKingdomhave
specificallyexcluded confessionsobtainedby the police in procedures
taintedby a violationof the foreignnational's consularrights.454

452See supra Chapter III.

453 For the United Kingdom, section 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act
of 1984mandates the exclusion of confessions that are obtained in violation of
United Kingdom law, consistently with the European Convention on Human
Rights. See Re Arrows (No. 4),Hamilton v. Naviede [1994] 3 All ER 814, 821.
See also D. Feldman, Regulating Treatment of Suspects in Police Stations:
Judicial Interpretation of Detention Provisions in the Police andriminal

Evidence Act 1984,Criminal Law Review (1990) p. 463.

For Canada, the 1982 Constitution's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section
24(2) declares that "where ..a court finds that evidence was obtained in a

manner that infringed or denied any of the rights or freedoms guaranteed by this
Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to
al1the circumstances, the admissbn ofit in the proceedings would bring the
administration ofjustice into disrepute." The Canadian Supreme Court has
found that §24(2) "does not confer a discretion on the [trial] judge but a duty to

admit or exclude as result of his finding [of a disrepute.]" The Queen v. Collins,
33 C.C.C.(3d) 1,13 (1987).

454 R.V. Bassi1and hfouffareg (1990) 28 July, Acton Crown Court, HHJ Sich.
Reported inLegal Action 23, December 1990. 376. Civil lawjurisdictions have alsorecognizedthe im ortantrol4P6
of the exclusionaryrule. For exarnple,~erman~,~~F ~rance, and
~tal~~a ~l1requirecourts to excludeevidence, particularly confessions,

when obtainedin violation of basic principlesofdue process. Likewise,
the JapaneseConstitutionand Code of CriminalProcedureprovide

explicit legalprovisionsregardingthe applicationof the exclusionary
rule to confessions.458Article 206of the Mexican Federal Code of

CriminalProcedure likewisecontainsa general exclusionaryrule by
providing thatevidence obtained in violation of theapplicablelawis
inadmissible.459

377. The preponderantuse of the exclusionarymle in domesticlaw
proceedingshas ledto its recognitionin the procedural rules of

- --

455 See, e.g., section 136German Strafprozessordnung. In addition, German
courts have found that confessions obtained in violation of the accused's rights
under the Strafprozessordnung, such asthe rights to counsel or silence, also
must be excluded. See, e.g., BGH Judgment 27 February 1992in 22 NJW 1463

(1992)(citing United States, British, Danish, Dutch and Italian precedent to
mandate exclusion of confessions garnered in absence of police warnings as to
accused's rightsto counsel or silence).

456
See articles 170(1), 170(2) and 59(3) of the FrenchCode de Procédure
Pénale.

457 Italian law categorically bars confessions from trial unless the confession is
given in the attorney's presence. See, e.g., Decision of the Constitutional Court
of May 23, 1991,259 Gazz. Uff. Article 19l(1) of the Italian Criminal
Procedure Code of 1989, Codice di Procedura Penale, expressly provides that

"[elvidence acquired in violation of prohibitions established by law cannot be
used [in court]."

458
See Kenpo [The Constitution of Japan], Article 38(2); Keisoho [The Code of
Criminal Procedure], Law No. 131of 1948,Article 319(1).

459 Under Article 20 ofthe Mexican Constitution, Article 287, section II, of the

Federal Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 249, section IV, of the Federal
District Code of Criminal Procedure, a confession obtained from a criminal
defendant is not admissible against that defendant unless the confession was

taken in front of the Ministerio Publico or judge and in the presence of counsel
to the defendant. Article 287 expressly excludes confessions obtained by the
judicial police.internationalcriminalbodies. Thus, Rule 95 of the International
CriminalTribunalforthe FormerYugoslaviais entitled"exclusionof

certain evidence"andprovidesthat "[nlo evidence shall be admissibleif
obtainedby methodswhich cast substantialdoubt on its reliabilityor if
its admissionis antithetical to, and would seriouslydarnage,the integrity

of theproceedings.'*60Like theother provisionsof the ICTY'sRules of
Evidence,this rule reflects a "concept[. . .] generallyrecognizedas being
fair andjust in theinternational~ena."~'

378. The affirmationof this general principle of law is further
evidentin Article 69(VII)of the Rome Statuteof the International
CriminalCourt, whichrules out evidence obtained by meansof a

violationof the proceduraldue process guarantees of the Statuteor of
internationallyrecognizedhumanrights where the violation (a)casts
substantial doubton the reliabilityof the evidence,or (b) if theadmission
would seriouslydamagethe integrityof the proceedings.462The

protection is a broadone intendedto excludeany evidencethat is
obtainedby meansof a seriousviolation of due process or otherhurnan
rightsthat wouldendangerthe integrityof the proceedings.463

460International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc. ITl321rev. 12(1996), entered into force 14

March 1994,amendments adopted 8 January 1996. Rule 95 works in tandem
with rule 89(D), which empowers trialjudges with the ability to exclude
evidence if its probative value is substantiallyoutweighed by the need to ensure
a fair trial. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion on
Hearsay, ICTY Case No. IT-94- 1-T,5 Aug. 1996, para. 18. See also R. May &

M. Wierda, International Criminal Evidence (2002), 295, para. 8.84 ("The most
obvious remedy for the infringement of the fairtrial rights of the accusis the
exclusion of any evidence obtained as a result ofthe infringement.").

461 1994Annual Report, U.N. Docs Al491342, SI199411007, paras. 52-54.

462RomeStatute of the International CrirninalCourt, 37 International Legal
Materials 999 (1998). Art. 69(VII).

463See C. Safferling, Towards anInternational Criminal Procedure, (2001) p.

296; H.J. Behrens, Investigation, Trial and Appeal in the International Criminal
Court Statute,6 Eur.J.Crime Cr.L.Cr. J. (998) p. 120 ("[A]lmost al1imaginable
cases of violations ofuman rights" will make evidence inadmissible."); D. 379. In light ofthe due processaspect inherentin theapplicationof
the exclusionary rule,internationalhuman rightstreatieshaveprovided

forthe applicationofthe exclusionaryrule. Article 15of the Convention
againstTortureand OtherCruel,Inhumanor DegradingTreatmentor
Punishment,forexample,providesthat "any statementwhichis

established tohave beenmade as a result of torture shallnot be invoked
as evidencein anyproceedings,except against a person accusedof
torture as evidencethatthe statementwas made." Similarly,Article8(3)

of the American Conventionof Human ~i~hts~~e~ stablishesthe
exclusionary rule ofevidence as part of the rightto a fairtrialby
expresslydeclaringthat "[a] confessionof guilt by the accused shallbe

valid onlyif it is made withoutcoercionof anykind." The Inter-
American Commission forHumanRights has acted consistentlywiththis
principlein its f~ndin~s.~~~

380. The status ofthe exclusionaryrule as a general principleof law
permits the Courtto orderthat the United Statesis obligatedto applythis
principlein respect ofstatementsand confessions givento United States

law enforcementofficiaisprior to theaccused Mexican nationals being
advised oftheir consularrightsin any subsequentcriminalproceedings
against them.

c. Mexico1sEntitledTo an OrderProhibiting
ApplicationofMunicipalLawBars.

381. To restorethe statusquoante, andto ensurethat fulleffectis
giventhe purposes forwhich theArticle 36 rights were intended,the
Court shouldalsoprohibitthe United States fromapplyingany

procedural penaltyfora Mexicannational's failuretimelyto raise a
claimor defensebasedonthe ViennaConvention - in theforrnof any
stateor federal doctrine of proceduraldefault, bar of retroactivity,or

- - - - -- -

Piragoff,Commentary on the Rome Statute, in Trifterer (ed.), Art. 69, No76
80 (1999).

464Adopted at the Inter-AmericanSpecialized Conference on HumanRights,

San José, CostaRica,22 November 1969.
465
See, e.g., Garciav.Peru, Report No. 1/95, Case 11.006, Inter-Am.Cm. H.R.
71, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88,Doc. 9 rev. (1995), at 103.similarrulepreventinga United Statescourt fiomreachingthe merits of
the claim ordefense - where competentauthoritiesof the United States
have breachedtheir obligationto advisethe nationalof his or herrights

underthe Viennaconvention. 466

382. Withoutsucha prohibition,these procedural penaltés would
havethe effectof hstrating any attemptby the national to assertthe

ViennaConventionrightsthat Mexico seeksto vindicate here. Indeed,
inLaCrand, even in a remedial posture thatdid not implicaterestitutio,
the Courthasalreadyheldthat the UnitedStateshas an obligationto
allowreviewand reconsiderationof convictionsand sentences that takes

accountof ViennaConvention

383. Equally, the Courtshouldprohibitthe United Statesfiom
applyinganymunicipallaw doctrineorjudicialholding that prevents a
courtinthe United Statesfiom providingaremedy,including the relief

to whichthis Courtholdsthat Mexico isentitledhere, to a Mexican
nationalwhoseArticle 36rights have been~iolated.~~~ Onlyinthat
mannerwouldMexicoand its nationalbe restored,in any subsequent

criminalproceedings againstthe national,to a situationin whichtheir
Article36 rightsmight be respected.

384. Finally,the Court shouldprohibitthe United Statesfrom
applyinganymunicipallaw doctrine orjudicial holding that requires an

individualizedshowingof prejudice as a prerequisiteto relief forthe
ViennaConventionviolationsshownhere.469As Mexico has
demon~trated,~~ consularnotificationand assistanceare fundamentaldue
process rights whosedeprivation rendersa criminalproceeding - and,in

particular,a criminalproceedingin which the death penaltyis sought -
fundamentallyunfair. Inthese circumstances, too,placing the burden of

466See ChapterIV.B.2.

467
LaGrand, para.128(4)andpara.128(7).

468See ChapterIV.B.2.

469See supraChapterIII.C.3.

470See supraChapter V.showingprejudiceon the victim ofthe violationswoukldeny to Mexico
and itsnationalsthe full effectof theArticle 36provisions. Hence, to
restorethe statusquo ante in whichtheserightsmaybe fully exercised,
the Courtshouldprecludeany suchrequirement.

3. TheReestablishment of the StatusQuo Ante 1sNot
MateriailyImpossible and1sProportionateto the Injury
Caused.

385. Article35 of the Articles on State Responsibilityprovides for
restitution"providedand to the extentthat" restitutionneither is

"materiallyimpossible"nor involvesa "burden outof al1proportionto
the benefitderivingfiom restitution instead of compensation."Neither
of theseprovisosapplies here.

a. Reestablishment of the StatusQuo Ante 1sPossible.

386. Restitution wouldbe materially impossiblehere onlyifthe
Mexicannationalssubjectto this proceedinghadbeen e~ecuted.~~'It is
evidentthat it is not materially impossibleforthe United Statesto
provideforvacatur of the convictions and sentences,the exclusionfrom

any futurecriminalproceedingsof evidence illegally obtained, andthe
prohibitionofmunicipal law bars tohearingViennaConventionclaims
on theirmeritsand providing effectiverelief for those claims.

387. The UnitedStatesmay notadduceinconvenienceor

impracticabilityto avoid restitutio in integrum As the ILC notedin its
Commentaryto Article 35:

471By their Applications, both Paraguay and Germany sought restitution in
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and LaGrand, respectively. Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. UnitedStates ofAmerica),
Application of the Republic of Paraguay, pa25;LaGrand (Germany v.
UnitedStates ofAmerica), Application of Germany, para15.However, in each
instance, the nationals of these States were executed shortly afier the filing of
the Applications. Paraguay did not continue its case to the merits; Germany no

longer soughtrestitutionuring the meritsphase of LaGrand. restitutionis notimpossiblemerelyon groundsof legalor

practicaldifficulties,eventhough the responsible Statemay have
to makespecial effortsto overcomethe~e.~~~

388. As a matterof fundamentalprinciplesof internationallaw, the
UnitedStatesalsomaynot relyon its federal system or itsinterna1law to
avoidits obligationto makefullreparationson the groundsofmaterial
impossibility.473In anyevent,in this proceeding,it is uncontestedthat as

a matter of its own intemallaw,the UnitedStatesis fullycapableof
implementingany judgmentthis Courtmayrender.474

b. NoBurdenOutof Proportiontothe Benefit
DerivingfromRestitution Insteadof Compensation.

389. Restitutionwouldnot impose a disproportionate burdenon the
UnitedStates. The only"burden"that restitutionwould impose onthe
UnitedStatesherewouldbetheneed to conductnewtrials and

sentencingproceedings inthe casessubjectto this proceeding,so that in

472Commentary to Art. 35 of the Articles on StateResponsibility, para. 8.

473Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons ofPolish Origin or Speech
in theDanzig Territory,Advisory Opinion, 1932, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 44, p.
4. ("a State cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution with a
view to evading obligations incumbent upon itunder international law or treaties
in force"). See also Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex,Free

Zones of Upper Savo<v and theDistrict of Gex,Judgment, 1932, P.C. I.J., Series
A/B, No. 46, p.167; Greco-Bulgarian "Communities", Advisory Opinion, 1930,
P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 17,p.32; Reparutionfor Injuries Suflered in the Service
of the UnitedNations, Advisory Opinion of II April 1949, 1.C.J.Reports 1949,
p. 180; DijjferenceRelating to Immunityfrom Legal Process of a Special

Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion of29 April
1999,I. C.J. Reports 1999, para. 62.

474Avenu and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. UnitedStates of America),
Requestfor the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection Submitted by

the Government of the United Mexican States, paras. 22-29 (settingoutthe
means available to the United States to ensure cornpliance withthe Court
orders); Oral Proceedings, CR 200312(Thessin), para. 3.43 ("we will not
debate with Mexico the legal principles involved in implementing United States
international law obligations").thoseproceedingsthe United Statescould conform to its obligations
underthe Vienna Convention,a treaty towhich it hasbeen a party for
over thirtyyears. Al1criminaljustice systems,and certainlythat ofthe
United States,provide forretrialand resentencingin cases in whichthe
original proceedingshave beenflawed,and the Court wouldtherefore

imposeno novelrequirementbyorderingrestitutionin the formof
vacatur. Likewise,United Statescourtsare well accustomedto
excluding evidenceillegally obtained,anordernotto apply
municipallaw bars would equate simplyto an orderto determinecases
on theirerits. In otherwords,restitution wouldimpose no burdenhere

at al475

390. By contrat to the simplerequirementsto be imposedon the
UnitedStatesin restoringthestatusquo ante, the injuryto be sufferedby
Mexico'snationals withouttherequirementto makerestitutionis the

greatest of all: the loss oflife. TheinjurysufferedbyMexicois equally
graveas it involvesthe ongoingdenial of Mexico'sinternationallaw
rights: the abrogationofpacta suntsewanda. Thereis no cornparison
betweenthe burdenthat wouldbe imposedon Mexicoby a denialof
restitutionandthat which theUnitedStateswould bearon a grant,let

alonea disproportionateburdeninthe United States'sfavor.

C. THE UNITED STATEM S USTCEASE ITSUNLAWFU CLONDUCT
AND OFFER MEXICO GUARANTE E SNON-REPETITION

391. In addition to the reparationssought in relation to Mexico's
own rights andthose of its nationalson death row, Mexicoseeks orders
fiom this Courtthat the UnitedStates(1) cease its violations of Article
36 in respectof Mexicoand itsnationals,and (2)provideMexico with
guarantees ofnon-repetitionofthe illegalacts describedin this

475
Any balancing permitted between compensation and restitution must be
based on considerations of equity and reasonableness, "with a preference for the
position of the injured State in any case where the balancing process does not
indicate a clear preference for compensation as compared with restitution."
Article 35(b) of the Articleson State Responsibility. Mexico does not seek
compensation here, and no such balancing would be possible, because
compensation could not vindicate in any way the rights of the fifty-four Mexican

nationals to consular notificationand assistance in a proceeding at which their
life and liberty are at stake.Memorial. Cessationandguaranteesare wel-establishedremediesunder
internationallaw, asthey "are aspectsofthe restoration and repair ofthe

legalrelationshipaffectedbythe brea~h.''~~

1. The UnitedStatesHasRegularlyViolatedandContinues
Regularlyto ViolateMexico'sArticle36 Rightsand

Thoseof ItsNationals.

392. InLaGrand,by its fourthsubmission, Germanysought
assurances ofnon-repetition.477 AddressingGermany'srequestfor
general assurances,theCourt tooknoteofthe information providedby

the UnitedStatesof its efforts toraiseawareness of consularprotection
rightsthroughthe distributionofpamphletsand pocketcardsandby the
conductoftrainingprograms.478TheCourtheld:

If a State,inproceedingsbeforethisCourt, repeatedly refers to

substantial activitieswhichit is carryingoutin orderto achieve
compliancewithcertain obligationsundera treaty,thenthis
expressesacornrnitmentto followthrough withthe effortsinthis
regard. * *** The Court considersthat thecornmitment

expressedbythe UnitedStatestoensureimplementationof the
specificmeasuresadoptedinperformance ofits obligations
underArticle 36,paragraph1 (b),mustbe regardedasmeeting
Germany7srequestfora generalassurance ofn~n-re~etition.~~~

The UnitedStatesagainreferredtothisprogramduringthe provisional
measuresphaseof this proceeding. 480

393. Regrettably, however,the UnitedStatesprogram,whatever its
components,has proven ineffectiveto preventthe regularandcontinuing

476Comrnentary to Art. 30 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, para. 1.

477LaCrand, paras.117-127.

478LaCrand, paras. 121, 123and 124.

479Id.

480
CR 200312(Lauterpacht), para. 4.17; CR 200314(Brown), at 10-11.violationby its competent authoritiesofconsularnotificationand
assistancerights guaranteedbyArticle36.

394. First,competent authoritiesof the UnitedStates regularlyfail
to providethe timely notification required by Article36(l)(b) and

therebyto fmstratethe communicationandaccess contemplatedby
Article36(l)(a) and the assistance contemplatedby Article36(1)(~).~"
Theseviolationscontinue notwithstandingtheCourt'sjudgment in
LaGrandand the prograrndescribedtherePx2

395. The factsofthe fi@-fourcases detailedby Mexico in this
proceedingmakes clearthe historicnoncompliancebythe United States
with its Article36 obligations.4s3The first arrestofthe Mexican

nationalssubject tothis Application occurred on3 March 1979,and the
most recentwas4 January1999.

396. Mexico hasdemonstrated,moreover,that thepatternof regular

noncompliancecontinues. Duringthe firsthalfof 2003, Mexicohas
identifiedat least one hundred casesinwhichMexicannationalshave
been arrestedby competentauthoritiesofthe UnitedStates forserious

feloniesbutnot timely notifiedoftheir consularnotificationrights.484
The actualnurnberis almostcertainlyfarlarger,becausethese cases

48'See supra Chapter 1V.A. The United States' "self-described practice of

'investigating reports of violations and apologizing to foreign governments, and
working with domestic law enforcement to prevent further violations,"' remains,
in the words of one United States federaljudge, "equivalent to securing
enforcement by a toothless, clawless lion." UnitedStates v. Lombera-
Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999)(Boochever, J.dissenting).

482
See supra Chapter 1II.E.(referring to the comprehensive survey undertaken
by the Mexican Foreign Ministry in respect of its consulates in the United
States); Declaration of Ambassador Roberto Rodriguez Hemandez, Exhibit B
(detailing cases).

483See Avenu and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v.UnitedStates of
America), Application of Mexico, paras67-267, and Declaration of Roberto
Rodriguez Hernandez, Exhibit A (detailing cases),Annex 7.

484See Declaration of Ambassador Roberto Rodriguez Hemandez, Exhibit B
(detailing cases,Annex 7.suggest,by the very natureof the violation, that theremustbe many
others of which Mexicanconsulatesremain unaware.

397. Second,courts inthe UnitedStates continueto applydoctrines

of proceduraldefault and non-retroactivity that preventthosecourts fiom
reaching the meritsof Vienna Convention claims,andthosecourts that
have addressedthe meritsof those claims(becauseno proceduralbar
applies) have repeatedly heldthat no remedyis availablefora breach of

the obligationsofArticle36.485Ofcourse, theUnitedStates'education
and trainingprograrndescribed in~a~rand,~~~even iffully effective on
its own terms, couldhaveno effectwhatsoeveron theselegalrules and
doctrines. Likewise, the UnitedStates7reliance onclemencyproceedings

to meet LaGrand7srequirement ofreview and reconsiderationrepresents
a deliberate decisionto allowthese legalrulesanddoctines to continue
to have their inevitableeffectpp7Hence, theUnitedStatescontinuesto
breach Article 36(2)by failingto give fulleffectto thepurposesfor
which the rights accordedunderArticle36 are intended.

2. Mexico1sEntitledtoCessation andGuaranteesof Nom
Repetition.

398. Article30 of the ILCArticles on State Responsibility provides

that Statesare to cease wrongfulconduct andofferguaranteesof non-
repetition where thecircumstancessorequire. Suchordersare
appropriatehere.

399. First, the restorationof Mexico'slegalrelationshipwith the
United Statesunderthe ViennaConvention necessarilyrequiresthe
United Statesto cease its ongoingviolationsof that treaty. The
requirement of cessationrepresents afundamentalconcem for
compliancewith internationalobligationsand for upholdingthemle of

~aw.~~' In seekingan orderîrom this Courtthatthe UnitedStatestimely

485See supra Chapter 1II.C

486LaGrand, paras.121, 123and 124.

487See supra Chapter IV.B.4.

488The International Law Commission thus explains: "The responsible State's
obligationof cessationhus protects both the interests of the injured State ornotiS/ Mexicannationalsof their consular rightsand givefulleffect to
this obligationin its domesticlaw, Mexicodoesnothingmorethan ask
the Courtto upholdthe fundamentaltenet ofpacta suntsewanda.

400. The Tribunalin the Rainbow WarriorArbitration identified
"two essential conditionsintimatelylinked forthe requirementof
cessationto arise,"narnelythat the wrongful act hasa continuing
characterand that the violated rule is still in force atthe timein which

the order is is~ued."'~~There is no questionhere that the obligationsof
the Vienna Conventionhave been andremainin forcebetweenthe
parties, andthe wrongfulconduct in this caseindisputablyhasa

continuing character.

401. As to Article36(1),the patternof noncomplianceis
pronounced and has extended fora lengthyperiod. In anyevent,

cessation "encompassessituationswherea Statehasviolatedan
obligation on a seriesof occasions,implyingthe possibilityof further
repetitions.7"'90

402. As to Article36(2),there is nodisputethatthe municipallaw

rules and doctrinesthat have repeatedly preventedthe UnitedStatesfrom
giving full effect to thepurposesof Article36remain infullforceand
effect. Maintainingthese domestic impedimentscontinuesthe

internationallywrongfulactP9'

403. Second,the United Statesmustnot onlyceaseitscurrent
wrongful conduct,but it must also take stepsto preventfutureviolations

Statesand the interests of the international community as a whole inthe
preservation of, and reliance on, the rule of law." Commentary to Art.30 of the
Articles on State Responsibility, para.

489Rainbow Warrior, UNRIAA, vol.XX, p. 217(1990), at p.270, para114.

490Commentary to Art. 30 ofthe Articles on State Responsibility, para3

49 1
Ago, in his fiAhreport as Special Rapporteur to thILC, provided examples
of wrongful continuing acts, including "the act of maintaining in force a law
which the State is internationally required to repeal, or conversely, the act of not
passing a law that is internationally requireILC Yearbook (1976),vol. II
(Part One), p. 22, document A/CN.4/291 and Add. 1 and2, para. 62.of the samekind. Guaranteesof non-repetition are soughtas a

preventivemeasure so that future violationsof the sarnetype will not
occuragain,492 especially in the faceof a pattern of internationallaw
violations.493This Courtdid not questionwhether assurancescouldbe

grantedin LaGrand, but moved directly intoa considerationofwhat
assurancesshould be afforded in orderto prevent recurrentviolationsof
Articles36(1) and (2) by the United States.

404. As Mexico has demonstrated,theCourt canno longeraccept
as adequatethe assurancesprovidedinLaGrand. Whenconsideringa
guaranteeof non-repetition,"[tlhe measuresenvisagedmay involve

forma1assurancesfromthe wrongdoing state, instructionsto government
agents,or adoptionof certain conduct considered preventivein
nature.'d94Here, an apology or simpleverbal assuranceof non-repetition

would not s~ffice.~~'Mexico recognizesthat the UnitedStates;hot
guaranteethat no futureviolationsof Article36 will ever occur. But
internationallaw requires that the UnitedStates take concretesteps
designed toensurethat it will achieve regular compliancewithits Article

492Commentary to Art. 30 of the Articles on State Responsibility, para1.

493
For example, the U.S. Secretary of State notified Spain of its demand to
prevent unlawful visitation and search of United States'erchant vessels by
Spanish armed cruisers. Letter of Secretary of State Evarts to the Minister to
Spain, Mr. Fairchild, of11Aug. 1880,in: J. Moore (ed.),A Digest of
International Law (1906), vol. 2, pp. 907 (seeking "a distinct assurance against

their repetition"). The Human Rights Committee has frequently called on States
party to theICCPR to take stepsto ensure that similar violations will not occur
in the future and thathose States are under an obligation to take immediate
steps toensure strict observanceof the obligations set out in the Covenant. See
D. Shelton,Remedies in International Human Rights Law (1999) p. 143.

494 D.Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (1999) p.102
(discussingreparations for injuries to aliens under the rules of State
Responsibility).

495ASthe ILC notes, "Assurances are normlly given verbally, while guarantees
of non-repetition involve something more." Commentary to Art. 30 of the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, para12.

496LaGrand, para. 124.36 obligations. Requests for specificste s or for specific instructionsare
commonly grantedin internationallaw, 46: andare clearlyrequiredin this

case.

405. Accordingly,Mexico is entitled to anorderrequiringthat the
United Statestake al1legislative,executive, andjudicial stepsnecessary

to (1) ensurethat the regular and continuingviolationsof the Article36
consular notification,access, and assistancerights of Mexicoand its
nationalscease,and (2)guaranteethat itscompetent authorities, of

federal, state,and localjwisdiction, maintainregular and routine
compliancewith their Article 36 obligations.

406. In addition,Mexico is entitled to anorder that the United

Statestake al1legislative, executive,andjudicial stepsnecessaryto
ensurethat itsjudicial authoritiescease applying, and guaranteethat in
the futuretheywill not apply,(1) any proceduralpenalty fora Mexican

national's failure timely toraise a claimor defense basedon the Vienna

497See, e.g., TraiI Smelter (United States / Canada), III U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905,

1934(1938, 1941); Martens, Nouveau Recueil, 2"*series, vol. XXIX, pp. 456,
486 (describing the need for the United Kingdom to issue "instruction to the
British Naval Commandersto molest no German merchantmen in places not in
the vicinity of the seat of war" followingthe seizure of two German ships by the
British Navy during the Boer war). Garcia-Amador cited the following
examples of the United States providing specific assurances of non-repetition:

After the lynching of Italian citizens in Tallulah, President McKinley
repeatedly asked Congress to 'confer upon the federal courtsjurisdiction
in this class of international cases where the ultimate responsibility of
the Federal Government may be involved.' Similarly, in connection

with the Japanese schools incident (1906), President Roosevelt
requested Congress to amend the criminal and civil law of the United
States to enable the Executive to protect the rights of aliens in
conformity with the provisions of international agreements. Previously,
in connection with the case of McLeod, who had been arrested in New
York state for murder during the destruction of the Carolina (1840), it

has been held that the federal authorities were not competent todeal
with the British Government's claim. In order to prevent any recurrence
of that difficulty, Congress amended the Habeas Corpus Act in 1842.

F.V. Garcia-Amador, The Changing Law of International Claims, Vol. II,
(1984), at pp. 587-88 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).Convention - in the formof anystate or federal doctrineofprocedural
default,bar of retroactivity,or similar rule preventinga United States
court Gomreachingthe meritsof the claim or defense - where competent
authoritiesof the United Stateshave breached their obligationto advise
the national ofhis or her rightsunder the Convention;(2)anymunicipal

law doctrineor judicial holdingthat prevents a court in the United States
fromprovidinga remedy, including therelief to which thisCourt holds
that Mexicois entitledhere,to a Mexican nationalwhoseArticle 36
nghts have been violated;and (3) any municipallaw doctrineorjudicial
holding thatrequires an individualizedshowing of prejudice as a

prerequisiteto relief forthe Vienna Conventionviolationsshown here. SUBMISSIONS

407. FORTHESEREASONS,the submissionsofthe Government
of Mexico respectfullyrequeststhe Courtto adjudgeanddeclare

(1) thatthe UnitedStates,in arresting,detaining,trying,
convicting,andsentencingthe fi@-fourMexican
nationalson deathrow describedin Mexico's

Applicationandthis Memorial,violateditsinternational
legalobligationsto Mexico,in its own rightand inthe
exercise of its rightof diplomaticprotectionof its
nationals,as providedby Article 36of theVienna
Convention;

that the obligationin Article 36(1)ofthe Vienna
(2) Conventionrequires notificationbeforethe competent
authoritiesofthe receiving Stateinterrogatethe foreign

nationalortake any otheractionpotentiallydetrimental
to his or herrights;

(3) that the UnitedStates,in applyingthedoctrine of
procedural default,or any other doctrine of its municipal
law,to precludethe exercise andreview of therights
affordedby Article36 ofthe Vienna Convention,

violateditsinternational legal obligationsto Mexicoi,n
itsown rightand in the exerciseof itsrightof diplomatic
protection ofitsnationals,s providedby Article 36of
the Vienna Convention;and

(4) thatthe UnitedStatesis under an internationallegal
obligationto carryout in conformitywiththe foregoing
international legalobligationsany futuredetentionofor

criminalproceedingsagainstthe fifty-fourMexican
nationalson deathrow and anyotherMexicannational
in its territory, whetherby a constituent, legislative,
executive,judicial or otherpower,whetherthat power
holds a superioror a subordinatepositioninthe
organizationof the United States,and whetherthat power's functionsare internationalor intemal in
character;

and that,pursuantto the foregoinginternationallegal obligations,

(1) Mexicois entitledto restitutio in integrum,and the
United Statesthereforeis under an obligationto restore
the status quoante, that is,reestablish the situationthat
existed at the time of the detention andprior to the
interrogationof, proceedingsagainst, and convictions

and sentencesof, Mexico's nationals inviolationof the
United States'internationallegal obligations,
specificallyby, amongother things,

(a) vacatingthe convictionsof the fifty-fourMexican
nationals;

(b) vacatingthe sentencesofthe fi@-four Mexican

nationals;

(c) excludingany subsequentproceedings againstthe
fifty-four Mexicannationals any statementsand
confessionsobtainedfromthem prior to notification
of their rightsto consular notification and access;

(d) preventingthe applicationof any proceduralpenalty

for a Mexicannational's failure timelyto raise a
claim or defense based onthe ViennaConvention
where competentauthoritiesof the United States
have breachedtheir obligationto advisethe national
of his rightsunderthe Convention;

(e) preventingthe applicationof any municipallaw
doctrineorjudicial holding that prevents acourtin

the UnitedStates fromproviding aremedy,
includingthe reliefto which this Court holdsthat
Mexico is entitledhere, to a Mexicannational whose
Article 36rights havebeen violated; and

(f) preventingthe applicationof any municipal law
doctrineorjudicial holding that requiresan individualizedshowingof prejudiceas a prerequisite
to relief for theviolationsof Article36;

(2) the United States,in light ofthe regular and continuous
violationssetforthin Mexico's Application and
Memorial,is underan obligationto take al1legislative,
executive, andjudicial steps necessaryto:

(a) ensure that theregularandcontinuing violations of
theArticle 36 consularnotification, access,and
assistance rights of Mexicoand its nationals cease;

(b) guarantee that its competentauthorities,of federal,
state, and localjurisdiction,maintainregular and routine
cornpliancewiththeirArticle 36 obligations;

(i) any procedural penaltyfor a Mexican
national'sfailuretimelyto raise a claim or
defensebasedon the Vienna Convention
wherecompetentauthoritiesof the United
Stateshavebreachedtheir obligationto
advisethenationalof his or her rightsunder
the Convention;

(ii) any municipallawdoctrine orjudicial
holdingthat preventsa courtin the United
Statesfromproviding a remedy,including
the reliefto whichthis Court holds that
Mexico is entitledhere, to a Mexican
nationalwhose Article 36 rights have been
violated; and

(iii) anymunicipal lawdoctrineorjudicial
holdingthatrequiresan individualized
showingof prejudiceas a prerequisiteto
relief forthe ViennaConventionviolations
shownhere. 408. Mexico reserves therightto modiQ or extendthe tenns of its
requestedjudgment, aswellas the groundsinvoked inthis Memorial.

NewYork, 18June2003

Juan ManuelGomez-Robledo
Agent of Mexico

Sandra L.Babcock Donald FrancisDonovan
Advocate-Counselor Katherine BirminghamWilmore
Dietmar Prager
VictorM. Uribe Natalie Klein
SocorroFlores-Liera CatherineM. Amirfar
Maria Cortina-Borja ThomasJ. Bollyky

Advocate-Counselorsand Counsel Debevoise& Plimpton
New York,New York
Advocate-Counselorand Counsel Annexesto theMemorialofMexico

Tableof Contents

DeclarationofProf. MichaelRadelet,Professor
Annex 1
of Sociologyat the Universityof Colorad...........l.

Annex2 DeclarationofPeterM. Lopez,III,Attorney for
ErnestoEstebanRamirezAnguiano ..................9.....

AppendixA Letterdated25April2003 from Kay
Hastingsto DanaW. Cooley.. ..................

Annex 3 DeclarationofProf.AdrianFranco,Professorof
ConstitutionalLawatthe Schoolof Law of the
National Autonomous Universityof Mexico ..........17

Annex4 DeclarationofRoseannDuefiasGonzalez,PH.D.,

DirectoroftheNationalCenterforInterpretation
Testing,Research and Policyatthe University
ofArizona ......................................A21.....................

Annex 5 DeclarationofDenise1.Young,Attorneyand
FormerDirectoroftheArizona Capital
RepresentationProject...........................A..2......

Annex 6 Declarationof Michael Iaria,Attorneyfor
Nicolas SolorioVasquez..................................

Annex 7 DeclarationofAmbassador RobertoRodriguez
Hemandez, DirectorGeneral forProtection and

ConsularAffairsin the MexicanMinistryof Foreign
Relations ......................................A39.....................

AppendixA Case Summaries .......................A.5....

AppendixB Mexican ConsulateReports.. ...........A..35Annex 8 DiplornaticNotesinthe case of
Horacio Arciga Orozco ..............................l.2.....

Annex 9 DiplornaticNotesinthe case of
Ramon ChavezGutiérrez. .........................A...6...

Annex 10 Diplornatic Noteinthe case of
CésarRobertoFierro Reyna .......................A...1..

Annex 11 Diplornatic Notes and correspondence in the
case of MiguelAngelFloresRange1 ...................84

Annex 12 Diplornatic Notesinthe case of
SergioFlores Soto.................................A..23....

Annex 13 Diplornatic Notesinthe case of
ElviaGarcia Bailon ..................................26....

Annex 14 Diplornatic Notesinthe case of

Jorge Garcia Lira.................................A..28......

Annex 15 Diplornatic Notesinthe case of
Ramon MartinezVillarreal ........................A..34..

Annex 16 Diplornatic Notesinthe case of
IrineoTristanMontoya ...............................36....

Annex 17 Diplornatic Notes in thecase of
Mario B. Murphy ....................................56....

Annex 18 Diplornatic Notesin the caseof
Carlos Pérez Gutiérre.............................A...2...

Annex 19 Diplornatic Notesinthe case of
Jesus RamirezEsquivelandAlbertoSifuentes ........275

Annex20 DiplornaticNote inthe caseof
BautistaRarnirezToledo .............................7...

Annex21 DiplornaticNote in the caseof
FranciscoRangelOviedo .............................8....Annex22 DiplomaticNote in thecaseof
FélixRochaDiaz ....................................5.......

Annex 23 Diplomatic Notesinthe caseof
Juan Ramon Sanchez Ramirez ....................A287.........

Annex24 Diplomatic Noteinthe caseof
AlbertoSihentes ....................................7......

Annex25 DiplomaticNotes and correspondenceinthe

case of JavierSuarezMedina ...................................

Annex26 DiplomaticNotes and correspondenceinthe
caseof Gerardo ValdezMaltos ........................7.

Annex 27 BriefAmicus Curiaeofthe Governmentsof
TheUnitedMexicanStates,Argentina, Brazil,
Chile,Colombia,El Salvador,Guatemala, Honduras,
Panama, Paraguay, Poland, SpainU, ruguay,and
Venezuela in Supportof PetitionerSuhrezMedina,
Medina v.Texas,13Aug.2002 (U.S.SupremeCt.). .A374

Annex28 ForeignAffairs Manual,Arrestof U.S.Citizens
Abroad,7 FAM400, et. seq. ......................A...7...

Annex29 Correspondencewithformer Secretaryof State
M.Albright inthe case Joseph StanleyFaulde........420

Annex30 BriefAmicus Curiaeofthe GovernmentofCanada
in Supportof an Application for theWritof
Habeas Corpus,Exparte Faulder,23May1997
(Tex.Crim.App.) ...............................A...0.....

Volume 2

Annex31 Hearingtranscriptexcerpts,Faulderv. TexasBa!
ofPardons and Paroles, et. al, 1-22 Dec.1998
(NO.A-98-CA-801). .............................A504...............

Annex 32 PetitionforWritof HabeasCorpus,Fierro v.
Johnson,(W.D.Tex.) (No.EP-97-CA-480) ........A.538Annex 33 Affidavitsin Fierro v.Johnson, (U.S.D.C.,
W.D.Tex.)(No. EP-97-CA-480) ..................A..77.

Annex 34 Affidavitof Russell Stetler,8 Aug.2001 ............A.689

Annex 35 Hearing transcriptexcerpt,People v.Vargas,
3 Oct.2001(Cal. Super.Ct.)(No.99CF0831) .......A.699

Annex 36 Hearingtranscript excerpt,People v.Juarez
Suarez, 17Jan.2001(Cal. Super.Ct.)
(NO.62-3495) .............................................

Annex 37 Hearingtranscript excerpt,People v.Fuentes
Martinez,9Nov. 1992(Cal.Ct. App.)
(Nos.S032832and SI12103) ..........................2.

Annex 38 Respondent7s Briefin Opposition,Hernandez v.
Texas,(U.S. Supreme Ct.)(No.02-10346) ............17

Annex 39 Soriano v.State,No. 71,914(Tex.Crim.App.
18 Sept.1996) ........................................0.......

Annex 40 Statev.Reyes-Camarena,7P.3d522
(Or.Sup.Ct.2000) ....................................7....

Annex 41 Rocha v.State, No. 73,280 (Tex.Crim.App.
12Apr.2000) ..............................................

Annex42 Statev.Soto-Fong, No. CR-39599(Ariz.

Super.Ct.27 June 2002) ..............................2...

Annex 43 Statev.Loza,No. CA96-10-214,1997Ohio App.
LEXIS4574, (OhioCt.App. 13Oct. 1997) .........A858.

Annex 44 State v.Loza, No. CR91-02-0104(OhioCt.
Comm.Pleas24 Sept. 1996) .......................A...8..

Annex 45 State v.Loza, No. C-1-98-287(S.D.Ohio
24 Jan.2003) .....................................A...........

Annex46 Torres v.Gibson, No.CIV-99-155-R(W.D.Okla.
23 Aug.2000) ...............................................Annex47 People v.Ayala, 24 Cal.4th243
(Sup.Ct. 2000)...................................A...7........

Volume3

Annex48 Alvarezv. State, No. 73,648 (Tex.Crim.App.
30 Oct.2002) ....................................A..9..........

Annex49 Exparte Hernandez,No.A97-364(216thDist.Tex.
5Nov. 1998) .....................................A..031.........

Annex50 Hernandez v.State, No. 73,776 (Tex.Crim.App.
18Dec.2002) ....................................A..0.7.....

Annex51 Exparte Leal, No.94-CR-4696-W1
(1~6'~Dist. Tex.)................................A..072......

Annex52 Exparte Leal, No.41,742-01(Tex.Crim.App.
20 Oct. 1999)....................................A...56.......

Annex 53 Maldonado v.State,No. 72,986(Tex.Crim.App.
30 June 1999)...............................................

Annex54 Respondent'sProposedFindingsofFact,
ConclusionsofLaw,and Order,Exparte
Maldonado,No. 721568-A(338th Dist. Tex.
3 Jan.2001) .....................................A...8.......

Annex55 Respondent'sProposedFindings of Fact,

ConclusionsofLaw and Order,Exparte
Medellin,No.675430-A(339thDist. Tex.
22 Jan. 2001)....................................A...........

Annex56 Respondent'sProposedFindingsofFact,
ConclusionsofLawand Order,Exparte
Plata, No. 693143-A(351th Dist.Tex.
22 June2000) ....................................A..213.......

Annex57 Exparte Plata, No. 46,749-01(Tex.Crim.App.
4Oct.2000) ........................................2.......Annex 58 Plata v. Cockrell,N0.H-01-2587(S.D.Tex.
7 May2002) .....................................A..2..8........

Annex59 Cardenasv. State, 30 S.W.3d.384 (Tex.Crim.
App. 26Apr. 2000) ...............................A.12..1....

Annex60 ProposedOrderContainingFindingsof Fact,
ConclusionsofLaw, anda Recornmendation,
Exparte RamirezCardenas, No. CR-0722-97-G
(370thDist. Tex. 8Feb. 2001) .....................A1280.......

Annex61 Gomezv.State, No. 73,199(Tex. Crim.App.
20 Sept.2000) ....................................A.1...7.....

Annex 62 Ibarra v.State,11S.W.3d 189(Tex.Crim.
App. 1999) .......................................A.13........

Annex 63 People v. Solache,No. 98CR-12440 (CookCty.
Cir. Ct. Crim.Div.)(Findings regardingArticle36
violation) .......................................A.131........

Annex64 People v. SanchezRamirez,Reporter's transcript,
11Mar. 1999(Findingsregarding
Article 36 violation..............................A.1.2....

Annex65 People v. VillaRamirez,No. 76259A(22Dec.2000)
(Findingsregarding Article 36 violation.............l329

Annex66 Excerpts fromArnerican BarAssociation Guidelines

forthe Appointmentand PerformanceofDefense
Counsel in DeathPenaltyCases, Revised
Edition, February2003 ............................A...6....

Document Long Title

Memorial of Mexico