Reply of the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark | INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Document Number

6621

Document Type

written_pleading

Case

78 - Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway)

Date of the Document

Thu, 01/31/1991 - 12:00

Document File

6621.pdf

INTERNATIONCOURTOF JUSTICE

MARITIME DELIMITATION
IN THEAREA BETWEEN
GREENLANDAND JAN MAYEN

(DENMARKJNORWAY)

SUBMITTEDBY
THEGOVERNMENT OF

THEKINGDOMOF DENMARK

VOLUME 1

JANUARY1991 TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME 1

Page

INTRODUCTION ............................ 3

PART 1. THE FACTS

Refutation of the Norwegian
Presentation and Supplementary Information ....... 9

A . The Relevant Area ....................... II
B. Hisrory of the Dispute .................... 16

I. The Incident ....................... 16
2. lnterim Arrangement ................. 17
3. Arbitration Negotiations ............... 18

C. Jan Mayen ............................ 21

I. General Descriptionof Jan Mayen ........ 21
2. The Relevance of Geology and
Geomorphology ..................... 23

D. Activities in the Region ................... 28

I. General Remarks .................... 28
2. Specific Comments on Map 1
in the Counrer-Memorial .............. 34

E. The Greenland Economy and Fisheries Sector ...... 36

I. Recent Developments in
the Greenland Economy ............... 36
2. Greenland and Foreign Fishing
Activities in Greenland Waters ........... 42 F. The Resources off the EastCoast of Greenland .... 51

1. The Importance of Easr Coast Fishing
to theEconomy of Greenland ............ 51
2. Fishing for Capelin .................. 62
3. Sealing and Whaling in the Easr
Greenland Fishery Zone ............... 70

G. Manne Research in Greenland Waters .......... 78

PART II. THE LAW ............................ 81

CHAPTER 1. The Status of Islands in Maritime Delimitation . . 83

A . General Remarks ........................ 83
B . Analysis of the Effecr of Islands in
Maritime Delimitarion ..................... 86

1. State Practice Reliedon
in the Counter-Mernoriai ............... 86
2. Other Islands Accorded Partial
or No Effect ...................... 96
3. Bear Island ....................... 100

CHAPTER II. The Case of the Island ofJan Mayen ....... 109

A. Prelude ............................ 109
B. Delimitation vis-à-vis theOpen Sea ............ 113
C. Delimitaiion vis-à-vis Iceland................ 114
D. Delimitation vis-à-vis Greenland .............. 118

CHAPTER III . The Rule Applicable to the Present Dispute ... 125

A . Norwegian Contentions .................... 125

I. The 1965 Agreement ................. 126
2. The Conduct of the Parties ............. 130
3. General InternationalLaw .............. 150

B . The Position of Denmark .................. 161 CHAITER IV. The Method of Delimitation . . .. . .. .. . . .. 165

A. General Approach . ... .. . ... . . . .. ... . .. . . 165
B. Relevant Factors . .. . .. . . .. .. . .. . .. . ... . . 167
C. The Single Line Approach . .. . .. .. . . . .. .. . . . 170
D. Computation of the 200-Mile
Delimitaiion Line ... . .. .. . ... . .. . .. .. . . . 173

PART III. SUBMISSIONS .. . .. . . ... . . . .. .. . . ... . . . . 175

MAPS ............................ 179
Map V Disputed and RelevantAreas in their
Geographical Context

Map VI Illustration of theComputation of
East Greenland's 200-Nautical Mile Line

Map VI1 Illustration of the Revised East
Greenland Baseline VOLUME Il

ANNEXES

Annex 56. Excerpt fromMaritime Boundary Agreements (1970 -1984).
Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United
Nations, New York 1987.(page 42).

Annex 57. Map annexed to Proposition No. 61 to thStorting

Annex 58. The Revised Baseline along the East Coast of Greenland

Annex 59. Danish Ministryof Foreign Affairs. "The Incident":
Day-to-Day Description, dated 16September 1981 (excerpt).

Annex 60. Danish Ministryof Foreign Affairs: Elements of an
Arbitration Agreement, dated 9May 1988.

Annex 61. Nonvegian Ministry of Foreign AffairPaper 1 and II

containing draft elements of an "aibitration" procedure. dated
21 June 1988.

Annex 62. Danish Ministry ofForeign Affairs. Conclusion Resumk
Arbitration talks held in Copenhagen on 21 June 1988.

Annex 63. Second Protocol laying down the Conditions relating to
Fishing provided for in the Agreement on Fisheriesbetween
the Government ofDenmark and the Local Government of
Greenland. on the onehand, and the European Economic
Community. on the other.Done al Bmssels 16 July 1990.

Annex 64. Act of the Landsting No. 12 of 22 November 1984on
Commercial Hunting.

Annex 65. Danish and International Marine Research in Greenland
Waters after 1950.

Annex 66. Document A/Conf.62/C.2/L-62 A/geei.,D.ahomey,
Guinea. Ivory Coast, Liberia, Madagascar. Mali, Mauritania,
Morocco. Sierra Leone.Sudan, Tunesia, Upper Volta and
Zambia: draft anicles on the régimeof islands, of 27 August
1974.

Annex 67. Treaty of 6April 1984 on the Delimitation ofMarine and
Submarine Areas and Maritime Cooperation between the
Republic of Colombia and the Republic of Costa Rica,
supplementary to that signed in the City of San Jose on
17 March 1977. Agreement of 24 October 1968 concerningthe Sovereignty
over the Islands ofAlL'Arabiyahand Farsi and the
Delirnitation of the Boundary Line separating the Submarine
Areas between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Annex 69. Agreement of 24 May 1977 between the Republic of ltaly
and the Republic of Greece on the Delineation of the Zones
of the Continental Shelfbelonging to each of the two States.

Annex 70. Agreement of 27 October 1969between theGovernment of
Malaysia and the Government of lndonesia on the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelves between the two
Countries.

Annex 7 1. Agreement of 25 July 1974 concerning Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf between Iran andOman.

Annex 72. Agreement of 7 November 1988between theGovernment of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nonhem lreland
and the Govemment of the Republic of lreland concerning
the Delimitation ofAreas of the Continental Shelf between
the two Countries.

Annex 73. Agreement of 8 January 1968 between ltaly and Yugoslavia
concerning the Continental Shelf Boundary.

Annex 74. Agreement of 20 August 1971 between theGovernment of
the ltalian Republic and the Govemment of the Tunisian
Republic relating to the Delimitationof the Continental Shelf
between the two Countries.

Agreement of 30 March 1969on Settlement of Maritime
Annex 75.
Boundary Lines and Sovereign Rights over Islands between
Qatar and Abu Dhabi.

Annex 76. Agreement of 13 August 1974 between Iran and the United
Arab Emirates on the Continental Shelf Boundary.

Annex 77. Treaty of 18 Decernber 1978 betweenAustralia and the
Independent State of Papua New Guinea concerning
Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area between the
two Countries. including the Area knownas Torres Strait, and
relatedManers.

Annex 78. Sketch Map relating to the Sharjah -Dubai Continental Shelf

Arbitration 1981.

Annex 79. Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen. signed at
Paris, 9 Februaw 1920.Annex 80. Nonvegian Ministry of Justice. Excerptfrom Srorringsmelding
No. 40 (1985 - 1986). Svalbard.

Annex 81. The Hansard, House of Lords, Volume 389, 1977fi8.
Columns 1353 - 1356.

Annex 82. Excerpt from statement by Nonvegian Ministerfor Foreign
Affairs. Mr Knut Frydenlund. during a foreign policy debate
in theSrorringon 6 June 1977 (Records of Debates in the
Srorring No. 40, 3 - 6 June, 1976 - 77).

Annex 83. Excerpt from Records of the Question Time of the Slorting
on 31 May 1989 (Records of Debates in the Storting No. 41,
31 May -2 June, 1988 - 1989).

Annex 84. Nonvegian Ministi of Foreign Affairs.Proposition No. 63 to
the Srorting (1979 - 1980).

Annex 85. Royal Decree No. 259 of 7 June 1963conceming the
Exercise of Danish Sovereignty over the Continental Shelf.

Annex 86. Written Comments by the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs
on a proposal submitted to theFolkering for ratification of
the Convention on the Continental Shelf, adopted on 26 April
1958 in Geneva.

Annex 87. Act No. 259 of 9 lune 1971 on the Continental Shelf.

Annex 88. Act No. 259 of 9 June 1971 on the Continental Shelf
Excerpt from Writlen Comments on the Bill.

Annex 89. Reply by the Minister for Greenland on 9 December 1976 to
the interpellation from theFolkeringCommittee on the Bill
relating to theFishing Temtory of the Danish Realm. INTRODUCTION

1. As stated in Article 49 of the Rules of Court, the
main purpose of the Reply and the Rejoinder should be to
address those issues of the dispute which continue to divide the

Parties. Unfortunately, the Parties seem to have little common
ground with respect to the law which should govem the present
dispute. Also with regard to the facts of the case the two Parties
are not in agreement. The contents of the Mernorial and the

Counter-Memorial make it apparent why this maritime
delimitation case is now pending before the International Court of
Justice.

2. Though the Counter-Memorial operates with several
lines of reasoning which are said to be both independent of and
supplementary to each other, they al1 seem to end up in the

thesis that the median line method amounts to a legal principle
which must govem al1 maritime delimitation situations at least as
a starting point, and in the present case even as a mandatory rule
deciding the dispute.

3. However, the goveming norm for maritime
delimitation according to contemporary international law is to
seek an equitable solution. It is the submission of the Danish

Govemment that the relevant factors substantiating that norm in
the present case, and among them first and foremost the factors
of geography and population, lead to the establishment of a
200-mile boundary line measured from Greenland's baseline.

4. The most astonishing features in the Norwegian
presentation are the assertion that the boundary line conceming
the continental shelf in the waters between Greenland and Jan

Mayen is already in place and has, in fact, been so since 1965,
and the assertion that Denmark has caught Norway by surprise in
suddenly changing its long-standing practice of defending the

median line approach. 5. The former assertion is without legal foundation, see
pages 126 - 130 paragraphs 337 - 350 below. Suffice it at this
stage to recall that this contention has never been made to the

Danish side during the eight years of negotiations preceding the
present proceedings before the International Court of Justice as
acknowledged in the Counter-Memorial, page 73, paragraph 258.

6. The latter assertion, mentioned in paragraph 4 above,
is equally unfounded, see pages 130 - 150, paragraphs 351 - 408.
In this connection it is worth recalling that Nonvay itself
recognised that a median line would not in al1 situations lead to

an equitable result in the North Atlantic region. Already in 1976
Nonvay did not pay any attention to Bear Island -and rightly so
- when drawing the boundary line for the economic zone of
Norway, and four years later when entering into the Agreement

of 28 May 1980 with Iceland on Fishery and Continental Shelf
Questions Norway recognised that the island of Jan Mayen
should not be allowed to encroach upon Iceland's 200-mile
economic zone.

7. Denmark fully shares this attitude adopted by Norway
and has adopted the same position as far as the boundary line in
the waters between Greenland and Jan Mayen is concerned. In

the view of the Danish Government an equitable solution in this
area would not allow Jan Mayen to encroach upon Greenland's
200-mile fishery zone and corresponding shelf area. The island of
Jan Mayen must be well-satisfied with a claim under

contemporary international law to a maritime zone of some
255,000 square kilometres consisting of a 200-mile zone to the
east and a somewhat reduced zone to the south and to the West,
respecting the rights of Iceland and Greenland. That zone alone

would primafacie seem to be exorbitant compared to the land
area of Jan Mayen consisting of some 380 square kilometres. In
terms of maritime zones Nonvay indeed belongs to the group of
countries which may be categorised as geographically privileged

States.

8. The Nonvegian Government has chosen a historical
approach emphasising the importance of earlier bilateralagreements between Denmark and Norway, of Danish conduct
before the present case arose and of the equidistance method
stipulated in Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf. This approach disregards contemporary

international law as evidenced in the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea, in State practice and in international case law,
especially the Judgments of the International Court of Justice.

9. Another characteristic feature of the Counter-Memonal
is its constant reference to the entirlement of Jan Mayen to
maritime zones, including a median line vis-à-vis Greenland, as if
title was the governing nom in maritime delimiration."Title" and

"delimitation" are two different legal concepts. From the fact that
a delimitation situation cannot arise without title, it does not
follow that title governs a maritime .delimitation situation.

Delimitation is governed by the nom of equity as an expression
of justice and the mle of law substantiated by a set of factors
considered to be relevant in each individual case.

10. Norway's strong emphasis on Jan Mayen's entitlement
to broad maritime zones can be explained - as will be done in
Chapter II of Part II of this Reply - by the uncertainty as to
whether Jan Mayen could be considered to have a status under

international law which would allow it to claim the broad
maritime zones that won general acceptance among States in
1976177. Denmark does not, for its part, question Jan Mayen's
status as an island under international law, but it is the Danish

submission that the small size and unpopulated character of Jan
Mayen does not entitle the island to a maritime zone which
impinges upon Greenland's 200-mile zone. This submission still

leaves a 12-mile territorial sea and an additional maritime zone
of no less than 32 nautical miles to Jan Mayen vis-à-vis
Greenland.

II. As to the task of the Court in this case, the
Government of Denmark furthemore wishes to make the
following observations. 12. Under the heading "Procedural Issues" the Nonvegian
Govemment raises questions as to "the nature" of the claim
brought forward in this case. It is stated that "(t)o the extent that
the claim for a single line is a claim for a delimitation of a

different nature as compared with other delimitationsu such claim
would not be admissible without the agreement of the -Parties(the
Counter-Memorial. p. 197, paras. 702 - 704).

13. Norway makes no reference to applicable procedural
rules, and Denmark, for its. part, has not been able to identify
any such niles.

14. The Govemment of Denmark has asked the Court Io
declare that Greenland is entitled to a full 200-mile fishery zone
and continental shelf area vis-à-vis the island of Jan Mayen; and

consequently to draw a single line of delimitation. It is
Denmark's contention that intemational law supports the claim to
a 200-mile fishery zone and a 200-mile continental shelf area. A
special agreement is, therefore, not a precondition for a single

line delimitation.

15. The Govemment of Denmark submits that the Coun
is competent to deal with the case as brought forward by

Denmark and in doing so also competent to draw the final line
of delimitation. This is a task already undertaken by Courts and
Tribunals in delimitation cases and in no sense a claim of a
"different nature" to those normally made.

16. Norway's contention that the Court should not make
the precise identification of the maritime boundary is not
supported by any legal arguments. If the contention were to be

followed by the Court, the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of
of the Statute of the Intemational Court of Justice would be
limited in a way which would not funher intemational justice.

17. Despite the basic difference of approach the
Govemment of Denmark will make a new .effort. to clarify the
Facts (Part 1) and the Law (Part II), taking into account the

presentation contained in the Norwegian Govemment'sCounter-Mernorial. The Reply will end by stating the Submissions
of the Government of Denmark at the present juncture of the

proceedings (Part III).

18. The Government of Denmark reserves its position

with regard to al1points of facts and law advanced by Norway in
its Counter-Mernorial which have not been addressed in this
Reply.'

' In ils Reply. the Governmentof Denmark has not taken Nomay's
CorrectedReprintof Appendix 5 to the Counter-MemorialinIo accouni. The
Governmenlof Denmarkreceivedthe CorrectedReprinton 14 January1991. PART 1

THE FACTS

Refutation of the Norwegian Presentation
and Supplementary Information A. The Relevant Area

19. In the opinion of the Danish Government the Parties
to a delimitation dispute pending before the Court should
establish the area within which the actual delimitation is to be

effected. This is in accordance with the practiceof the Court, see
e.g., the Libya-Malta case (I.CJ. Reports 1985, p. 20, para. 14,
and pp. 49 - 50, paras. 67 '-68). The Nonvegian description of
this basic element of maritime delimitation as "a geometrical

exercise" (the Counter-Memonal, p. 130, para. 437). "wholly
irrelevant to any delimitation in accordance with legal principles"
(ibid., pp. 148 - 49, para. 505), and an "artificiality" (ibid., p.
149, para. 506) appears to be nothing but an attempt to avoid a

confrontation between the two coastal fronts which are the basis
of title to the adjacent maritime areas of Greenland and Jan
Mayen, respectively.

20. Nonvay has argued that by its definition of the
disputed area Denmark has requested the Court to determine its
entitlement to an area which by Agreements between Nonvay and

Iceland of 28 May 1980 and 22 October 1981 has been afforded
to Iceland, see the Counter-Memorial, page 4, paragraph 14.
Norway requests the Court to confine its consideration to the
maritime area which to the south is bounded by the outer limit

of the Icelandic economic zone as defined by Iceland to the point
where this line intersects themedian line between Jan Mayen and
Greenland at 70°12'04"N (the Counter-Memorial, p. 4, para. 15).

21. Denmark does not seek a decision from the Court
which affects the rights of Iceland under international law. It
follows from Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice that a line drawn by the Court will not be binding on

Iceland.

22. At this stage it may be appropriate bnefly to reiterate

the status of the delimitations between Iceland and Greenland and
between Iceland and Jan Mayen. In their relevant legislationDenmark and Iceland have both provided that the waters between

Greenland and Iceland will be delimited by an equidistance line,
see the Mernorial, pages 10 - 11, paragraph 27. The Parties have
not yet agreed on the drawing of the delimitation line, as
Denmark has disputed the legitimacy under international law of

Iceland's use of the rock of Kolbeinsey as a basepoint, see ihid.,
page 11, note 2. At present there are, therefore, two median lines,
an.Icelandic and a Danish, see the sketch map on page 13, where
the northern line between lceland and Greenland employs

Kolbeinsey as a basepoint, whereas the southern line disregards
Kolbeinsey. Similarly, two Icelandic 200-mile lines vis-à-vis Jan
Mayen can be drawn. The sketch map also depicts these two
lines, the northern employing Kolbeinsey as a basepoint

(represented by the B-C,-D, line), the southern disregarding
Kolbeinsey (represented by the B-C-D line).

23. The Norwegian assertion that the B-C-D line

presented by Denmark in Map II of the Memorial prejudices
Iceland's nghts under the above mentioned Agreements between
Norway and Iceland leads the Govemment of Denrnark to make
two observations. First, that under international law two States

cannot by agreement divide a maritime area to which a third
State has a legitimate claim without the consent of that State.
Thus, any agreed Icelandic-Norwegian boundq within maritime
areas that Greenland claims in accordance with international law

is not binding on Denmark.

24. Secondly, the disputed area and the relevant area were
defined by Denmark in its Memonal precisely with a view to
leaving the interests of Iceland unaffected, see the Memorial,

page 10 - 11, paragraphs 25 - 29 and Map II. The definition of
the two areas was based on the assumption that in the
Agreements between lceland and Nonvay of 1980 and 1981,
Nonvay had not consented to Iceland's use of Kolbeinsey as a

basepoint. Sketch Map of the DisputedArea

......... .00-naulical mile line --- ~edtan ltne between -.-.- 200-naulical mile line
off EastGreenland. Greenland and lceland off lceland fBC,D,l
drawn by lceland fwith drawn by Nonvav
------ Msdian line between respectof Kolbeinsey). fwith respect of Kol-
Greenland and JenMayen. beinsey).
- Median line between
- - + - 200-nautical mileline off Greenland and lceland .... ..--.. The broken lin9 BCD
lcaland (Eastofpoint BI. drawn by Denmark ieprerenting the 2W-
fdisregarding Kolbeinsay). nautical mile lineoff
lceland (dioregarding
Kolbeinney). 25. The Agreements between Nonvay and Iceland of 1980
and 1981 do not express such consent. No map depicting the
actual delimitation line was attached to either Agreement as

published in the official Nonvegian ga~ette.~ The Danish
assumption that Kolbeinsey had not been recognised as a valid
Icelandic basepoint by Norway was further supported by the

sketch map attached to the Iceland-Nonvay Agreement of 22
October 1981 in Annex 28 to the Memorial. This map was
copied by Denmark from the United Nations publication Maritime

Boundav Agreements (1970 - 1984), Office for Ocean Affairs
and the Law of the Sea, New York, 1987, pages 38 - 42. The
map from this publication is reproduced in Annex 56. In this
map the delimitation line between lceland and Jan Mayen stops

at a point that is close to or coincides with the point where
Kolbeinsey starts to affect the drawing of the line (point C, on
the sketch map on, page 13 above). Maps showing a similar

delimitation line, Le., tenninating before Kolbeinsey starts to
influence the line, are found in the Report of the Conciliation
Commission appointed by the Governments of Iceland and

Norway to recommend a delimitation of the continental shelf area
between Iceland and Jan Mayen (I.L.M. Vol. XX, 1981, p. 828)
and in the Proposition dated 19 Febmary 1982 submitted by the
Nonvegian Govemment to the Srorring relating to the granting of

consent to conclusion of an Agreement with Iceland on the
continental shelf between Jan Mayen and Iceland (St.Prp. No.
61). The map from the Norwegian Govemment's Proposition to

the Storting is reproduced in Annex 57.

26. The sketch map now attached by Nonvay to the 1981

Agreement between Iceland and Norway on the Continental Shelf
and presented in Annex 72 to the Counter-Mernorial has surprised
the Govemment of Denmark. In contrast to the map presented by

the Norwegian Government to the Storting, this sketch map
depicts a maritime boundary line between Iceland and Jan Mayen
that continues from the point where Kolbeinsey starts to affect

- -

publishedby the Ministryof ForeignAffairs, Oslo.912 and 1982 pa598, the line (point Cl on the sketch map on page 13) up to a point
on the median line between Greenland and Jan Mayen that

corresponds to latitude 70°12'04"N, a latitude given by Nonvay
in the Counter-Memorial. page 4, paragraph 15 (illustrated as
point Dl on the sketch map on page 13). This delimitation line

seems to reflect a Nonvegian consent to Iceland's use of
Kolbeinsey as a basepoint.

27. The Govemment of Denmark would thus appreciate if

the Govemment of Nonvay would disclose any agreement or
understanding between Norway and Iceland which recognises
Kolbeinsey as an Icelandic basepoint and the date of such
agreement or understanding. The Govemment of Denmark would

further appreciate being informed of when the sketch map in
Annex 72 to the Counter-Memorial was produced and when it
was first released.

28. In the Memorial the disputed area was defined on the
basis of information then known to the Government of Denmark.

Upon receipt of the Counter-Memorial the Govemment of
Denmark has noted that the Government of Norway does not
claim any maritime area south of the outer limit of the Icelandic
200-mile economic zone as defined by Iceland (Le., giving full

effect to the rock of Kolbeinsey) as part of the Nonvegian
fishery zone around Jan Mayen, see page 4, paragraphs 14 - 15
of the Counter-Memorial. The relevant segment of the 200-mile

limit as claimed by Iceland is shown in the sketch map on
page 13 as the line B-Cl-Dl.

29. As the Govemment of Norway has renounced al1

claims to the area south of the line B-Cl-Dl on the sketch map,
the area is not part of the dispute between the Parties presently
pending before the Court. The disputed area mus be redefined

accordingly.

30. Consequently, . the Govemment of Denmark
respectfully submits that the Court confines its decision to the

area north of the line B-C,-D, on the sketch map above. The
redefined disputed area is depicted as the triangular-shaped figureA-B-C,-Dl on Map V of this Reply. The relevant coordinates are
listed in the legend to Map V.

31. Map V also incorporates the revised East Greenland
baseline established on the basis of the results of a
hydrographiclgeodetic reconnaissance expedition canied out in
1989, see the Memorial, page 9, note 1.' The northward

transposing of the southem border of the disputed area described
above does not necessitate any substantial modification of the
relevant area as defined in the Memonal, pages 11 - 12,

paragraphs 30 - 35. In accordance with the notation applied
above, the relevant area is now defined as the geodetic polygon:
A - E - the NW baseline of Jan Mayen -F -B - C, - Dl - G -

the relevant baseline of East Greenland- H, see Map V.

32. On the basis of the results of the reconnaissance
expedition the relevant coastal front of Greenland (the geodesic

GH) has now been computed to approximately 518 kilometres
vis-à-vis the relevant coastal front of Jan Mayen (the geodesic
FE) of approximately 54 kilometres. The ratio between the

relevant coastal fronts is thus reduced from 9.8:l to about 9.6:l
in favour of Greenland, see the Memonal, page 96, paragraph
297.

B. History of the Dispute

1. The Incident

33. The Government of Norway finds it difficult to see
how the cntical situation which developed in the disputed area at

the end of August 1981, including the boarding by the
Norwegian Coast Guard of two Danish fishing vessels, can be
termed an "incident", with the connotations attaching to that

concept in current diplomatic usage. Norway prefers to name the

The revised baselisshown in medium scale in Map VI1 insened on
theinside backcover of this VolThe.detailof the baseline are given in
Annex 58.situation a "sequence of events" (the Counter-Memorial, p. 75,
para. 269).

34. This expression is not adequate to describe the critical

situation which, within very few days, necessitated several
contacts, direct and indirect, between the Foreign Ministers of the
two countries as well as meetings in Denmark at governmental
level and consultations with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the

Danish Parliament (Folketing), see the excerpt from a day-to-day
description drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 16
September 1981 (Annex 59). Seen against this background, the

term "incident" is obviously a correct expression for the events.

35. The senous character of the incident proved the
dangers created by the absence of a clear junsdictional line in the

disputed area and has heen one of the factors prompting Denmark
to seek a final solution of the delimitation dispute in accordance
with international law.

2. Interim Arrangement

36. The Memonal descnbes the mutual understanding
reached in 1984 between Denmark and Norway on an interim
arrangement regarding monitoring of fishing for capelin (the
Memonal, pp. 17 - 18, paras. 58 - 60).

37. In the Counter-Memonal the Norwegian Government
disputes the correctness of the account of the issue given in the

Memonal. It is stated that the understanding is "alleged", and the
text of this understanding is claimed to "resemble" an informal
paper produced by the "Danish" side and rejected by Norway. It
is also rnaintained that Norway at the time clearly stated that no

understanding, forma1 or informal, would be acceptable (the
Counter-Memorial, pp. 75 -76, paras. 270 - 272).

38. The description in the Counter-Memorial is not

correct. The facts are as follows. 39. The matter was discussed between Danish and
Nonvegian negotiators at meetings in Oslo on 6 January 1984
and in Copenhagen on 4 June 1984. At the meeting in

Copenhagen the Nonvegian side tabled a draft in the Nonvegian
language, dealing both with catch allocations to each of the
Parties and with the conduct of surveillance operations in the

disputed area. It was agreed at the meeting that the two items
should be dealt with in two separate papers, which were both
typed out dunng the meeting in the Danish language. The text of
the paper dealing with the conduct of surveillance operations was

identical to the Norwegian draft. It is this text translated into
English which is enclosed as Annex 13 to the Memonal and
referred to by Norway as a text resembling an informal paper
produced by the Danish side.

40. At the meeting on 4 June 1984 the Parties agreed on
said textad referendum.

41. On 12 July 1984 the Nonvegian Foreign Ministry
informed the Danish Foreign Ministry that the Nonvegian
authorities would abide by the agreed temporary arrangement,of 4

June 1984 conceming the conduct of surveillance operations. It
was, however, the wish of Nonvay that the two Parties should
consider the arrangement as based on a tacit understanding, and
information to the public would be limited to a statement by the

Norwegian authorities to the effect that the Nonvegian Coast
Guard would receive instructions aiming at avoiding episodes in
the disputed area. This was accepted by Denmark on 19 July
1984 by a letter to the Under-Secretary for Legal Affairs of the

Norwegian Foreign Ministry. The text of the understanding was
attached to thatletter.

3. Arbitration Negotiations

42. The account given in the Counter-Memonal of the

negotiations between Denmark and Norway on having the
delimitation dispute settled by arbitration gives an incorrectdescription of the events (the Counter-Memorial. pp. 73 - 74,
paras. 262 - 263). It is necessary to redress that description.

43. At the meeting in Copenhagen on 7 - 8 April 1988 it

was agreed that the Danish delegation should draft a paper
describing the elements to be included in an arbitration
agreement. Such a paper - covering the composition of an

arbitration court, the questions tobe put to the court, as well as
the basis on which the arbitration court should make its decision
- was sent to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9
May 1988 and discussed at the meeting in Oslo on 20 May 1988

(Annex 60). On al1 essential points Norway disagreed with the
Danish suggestions.

44. At the meeting in Copenhagen on 21 June 1988 the

Nonvegian delegation tabled two papers containing draft elements
of an "arbitration" procedure (Annex 61). adding that the papers
could not be interpreted as reflecting the position of the

Norwegian Govemment, see Danish conclusion résuméof the
meeting on 21 June 1988 (Annex 62).

45. In the view of both delegations, the lengthy and

complicated procedure suggested by Nonvay would extend over
several years and was to be followed by further negotiations.
This procedure did not satisfy the Danish wish for a final
solution of thedispute within a reasonable time.

46. This was made unequivocally clear to the Norwegian
delegation at the meeting on 21 June 1988. At the conclusion.of

the meeting the Dgnish delegation stated that the matter would be
submitted to the Government for evaluation on the basis of the
latest developments and for consideration of the possibilities to
make progress in the matter, either through negotiation or judicial

settlement by arbitration or by the International Court of Justice
(Annex 62). The alleged Norwegian understanding that contact
between the Parties with a view to further exploration of the
possibility of agreement on the procedures for judicial settlement

was still in progress subsequent to this meeting, cannot be based
on the Danish response to the Norwegian proposal. For anyonepresent at the meeting it was clear that the time for further
negotiations between the Parties on these issues had come to an
end. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that contrary to

normal practice, no further meetings were scheduled at the end of
the meeting on 21 June 1988.

47. The Government of Denmark regarded a unilateral

submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice as
the only way to secure a final and binding solution of the dispute
within a foreseeable future, and as a step which Denmark was

fully entitled to take as a matter of law.

48. The Norwegian assertion that the penod 1980 - 1988
can be split up into "Formal Negotiations 1980 - 1983" and

"Further Contacts 1983 - 1988" (the Counter-Memorial, pp. 73 -
74, paras. 256 - 265). is nothing but a semantic exercise. Dunng
the negotiations in Oslo on 20 May 1988 and in Copenhagen on
21 June 1988. concrete documents were submitted and discussed.

49. According to Article 40 of the Statute of the Court, a
case can be brought before the Court either by special agreement
between the parties or by unilateral application by one party. In

this case, the experience gained by Denmark from eight years of
fmitless negotiation -including finally the rejection by Norway of
'the Danish proposa1 concerning the elements of an arbitration

agreement, and the contents of the Nonvegian counter-proposa1 -
could only lead to the conclusion that it would not be possible to
come to lems with Norway on the contents of a special
agreement. Consequently, the Government of Denmark chose to

submit its Application to the International Court of Justice on 16
August 1988.

50. This ought not to have caused any surprise to Norway

considering both the negative result of the negotiations as well as
the fact that Nonvay, when accepting the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice in conformity with Article
36, paragraph 2, of the Statute by its Declaration of 2 April

1976, had added the following reservation to its acceptance: "...the Royal Nonvegian Government, having regard to
Article 95 of the Charter of the United Nations, reserves

the nght at any time to amend the scope of this Decla-
ration in the light of the results of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in respect of
the settlement of disputes." (See Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/8
Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary

General. Status as at 31 December 1989).

51. This reservation would have allowed Norwayto limit
or withdraw, at any moment, its acceptance of the compulsory

jurisdiction of the Court, theieby extinguishing the last possibility
for Denmark to obtain a final judicial solution of the present
delimitation dispute.

C. Jan Mayen

1. General Descriptionof Jan Mayen

52. In the Counter-Memonal, Norway has taken exception
to the way in which Denmark has described Jan Mayen. Norway
finds that Denmark has "rather deprecatingly characterized" Jan
Mayen as "an oceanic volcanic island ...a desolate island ...and
as an isolated island" (the Counter-Mernorial, p. 133, para. 444).

The use of the term "isolated" is felt to be "gratuitously
pejorative", (ihid.,p. 143, para. 482) and Denmark is said to "...
make play with adjectives such as "desolate" and "uninhabited" ..."
(ihid.,p. 189, para. 675). Denmark would respectfully point out
that al1 these terms are commonly used in descriptions of Jan

Mayen, not least by Norwegians themselves. Some examples will
serve to illustrate this point and to refute the Nonvegian attempt
to discredit the scientific integrity which Denmark has sought to
maintain in its pleadings before the Court. "...the Royal Nonvegian Government, having regard to
Article 95 of the Charter of the United Nations, reserves

General. Status as at 31 December 1989).

51. This reservation would have allowed Norwayto limit
or withdraw, at any moment, its acceptance of the compulsory

jurisdiction of the Court, theieby extinguishing the last possibility
for Denmark to obtain a final judicial solution of the present
delimitation dispute.

C. Jan Mayen

1. General Descriptionof Jan Mayen

Mayen, not least by Norwegians themselves. Some examples will
serve to illustrate this point and to refute the Nonvegian attempt
to discredit the scientific integrity which Denmark has sought to
maintain in its pleadings before the Court. 53.
This is a standard geological term, and is used of Jan
Mayen in the most comprehensive published account of Jan
Mayen geology, that by the Icelandic geologist P. Imsland (Rit
Visindafélag islendinga 43, Reykjavik 1984). which begins on

page 11 with the following words: "Oceanic volcanic islandsfa11
into three major groups ..." and continues 14 lines later: "Jan
Mayen falls into this third group". Other oceanic volcanic islands
placed in this third group by P. Imsland are Gough Island,

Réunion, Easter Island and Bouvet Island, the last annexed by
Norway in 1928. Some of these islands are desolate and
uninhabited, others are pleasant places to live on.

54. How the use of the term "oceanic volcanic island" can
be "deprecating" in a paragraph descnbing the geology of Jan

Mayen is beyond comprehension. NATO's Fifeen Nations, April
- May 1978 contains the following description in an article by
Ellrnann Ellingsen (Jan Mayen in Norwegian Security Policy): "It
is of volcanic origin ..Beerenberg, the volcano of 2,277 metres,

covers large parts of North Jan Mayen. It had its last eniption in
1970, when the island was evacuated for a short time."

55. The. description of Jan Mayen by W. Werenskiold in
A Geography of Norden (A. Somme (editor), Oslo 1960) begins

with the following words: "Jan Mayen is a desolate island". In an
article published in Annuaire Français de Droit International,
1980, page 711, Judge J. Evensen gives a description of Jan

Mayen containing inter alia the following phrases: "Jan Mayen is
in almost al1 respects an inhospitable island. The flora there is
poor. No tree grows there ...".4

' Originaltext: "JanMayenestàpresquetous égards,une île inhospitalière.
La flore y est pauvre.Aucun arbren'y pou..."

22 56. In the Counter-Memorial, one finds the words "Jan
Mayen stands in isolation" and "an isolated island like Jan

Mayen" (p. 186, para. 665, and p. 191, para. 685). In these days
of helicopters and short take off and landing aircraft, many parts
of the world are geographically isolated yet accessible. The
Counter-Mernorial fails to distinguish between isolation and

inaccessibility, and has assumed that Denmark has done the sarne.

57. Nomay Information, published by the Royal
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 1982, describes

Jan Mayen as follows: "There are no bushes and trees and no
bays sheltered from the open sea ..Access to Jan Mayen is
season-limited and difficult because of the climate and lack of
harbours .The barren, unproductive landscape of Jan Mayen and

its severe climate provides no basis whatsoever for industry of
any kind". The above-mentioned article in AnnuaireFrançais de
Droit International, 1980, page 711, by Judge J. Evensen,
contains the following phrase: "Jan Mayen has no natural

harbours or other harbours".' In NATO's FrfieenNations, April -
May 1978, it is also mentioned that "There is no harbour on the
island.supplies from the sea are therefore today put ashore by
floats and dories." In the same article it is stated that the

Govemor of Svalbard, who holds the chief administrative
responsibility for Jan Mayen, has only visited the island once.

2. The Relevance of Geology and Geomorphology

58. Denmark had not expected that geology and
geomorphology would be an issue in the present case, and had
hoped that the Court would not have to concem itself greatly

with these matters. Unfortunately, Nonvay has chosen othenvise
and has attempted to discredit Denmark's presentation of the facts
conceming geology and geomorphology. However, in its

'Original text: "JanMayen n'a pasde pons naturels ou autres."eagerness to achieve this end, Nonvay has overlooked or
misunderstood several passages in the Memorial. This will be
demonstrated in the following paragraphs.

59. In the Counter-Memorial, the paragraphs on geology
in the Memorial are characterised as "...in form at least,
descriptive, but in the result they produce highly tendentious
evaluation..." (the Counter-Memonal, p. 171, para. 601). As

evidence of tendentiousness the following sentence from page 40,
paragraph 158 in the Memorial is quoted:

"As for the shelf margin to the West of the Ridge and

south of 70°N, this is within 50 nautical miles of the
axis of the Ridge, i.e. more than 200 nautical miles from
the east coast of Greenland."

The words "and south of 70°N" were not emphasised in the
original, as it was not thought that the sentence could be
misunderstood, least ofal1 in its original context.

60. The facts are that in the maritime areaouth of 70°N
and West of the Jan Mayen Ridge, the Ridge is flanked by an
oceanic basin floored by oceanic cmst and more than 2,000

metres deep, see Map on page 39 in the Memonal and Profile 2
on page 30 in the Counter-Memonal. The maximum westerly
position of thegeomorphologic shelf margin of Jan Mayen here
cannot lie farther West than the axis of this basin, i.e., the line

where the ocean floor ceases to slope away from the Ridge and
instead begins to slope towards it. This basin axis is more than
200 nautical miles from the east coast of Greenland. It appears
that Norway has included this oceanic basin in the "Jan Mayen

shelf' (see pp. 27 - 28, para. 69 below). No claim is made by
Denmark that the geologically/geomorpholo gifnelly
continental margin of East Greenland lies farther east than the
axis of the adjacent oceanic basins.

61. As for the area West of Jan Mayen and north of
70°N, this is described on page 40, paragraph 158 in the
Memorial as follows: "However, it should be noted that in the maritime area

Westof Jan Mayen and north of approximately 70°N, the
sea floor topography is rough, and terms like continental
rise, slope and shelf break are not applicable in this
area."

The word "rough" is commonly used in descriptions of sea floor
morphology where volcanic ridges, seamounts and plateaus
(guyots) rise from the ocean floor. The word was chosen here

because the area in question was labelled "zone of rough
topography" in a paper published in a Norwegian journal and
with a Norwegian as first author (Grgnlie, G., Chapman, M. &
Talwani, M. Norsk PolarinsrirutrSkrifter Nr. 170, Oslo 1979, fig.

2, p. 28). Map III in the Counter-Memorial is simplified so much
that the character of this area is not apparent.

62. Frorn the wording of paragraph 602, page 171, and

particularly paragraph 603, pages 171 - 172, in the Counter-
Memorial it would appear that the sentence from paragraph 158
of the Memorial quoted in the paragraph above has been
overlooked. The Memorial makes no attempt to interpret or

conceal the data, or to detect the location of the Jan Mayen shelf
margin north of 70°N. What the Memorial is trying to convey is
that it is doubtful whether a continental shelf, as normally
understood by geologists and geomorphologists, can be said to

exist in the area between 70°N and the Jan Mayen Fracture Zone
to the north.

63. On page 172, paragraph 604 of the Counter-

Mernorial, it is stated that the bathymetry contradicts the
Mernorial. As an example it is implied that the Memorial
suggests that the Jan Mayen continental shelf is cut off to the
south. The Memorial does not discuss how and where the shelf

ends to the south or if there is a continental margin in this
direction. It is merely remarked that the depth of the top of the
ridge increases to about 1,000 metres at a point about 150
nautical miles south of the southwestern tip of the island. Thiscan be supplemented by the following quotations from papers by
Norwegian authors:

"Physiographically, the Jan Mayen Ridge is a flat-
topped north-south trending ridge extending southwards
from the island of Jan Mayen. ...At 69"N the ridge
trend changes towards the south-west. The ridge breaks

up into a regime of individual seamounts at about
68.5"N with no harhymerric relief south of 67.6'N."
(Myhre, A.M., Eldholm, O. & Sundvor, E. Polar
Reseorch Vol. 2 n.s., Oslo 1984, p. 47; emphasis added)

"The Jan Mayen Ridge block, which becomes
fragmented south of 68.S0N, loses its bathymetric

signature south of 67.6ONU(Eldholm, O., Skogseid, J.,
Sundvor, E. & Myhre, A.M. Geology of Norrh Americo
Vol. L, 1990, p. 356).

In other words, Norwegian geoscientists seem to be in no doubt
that the Ridge ends to the south.

64. Perhaps it has been overlooked in the Counter-

Memorial that it is the.Jan Mayen Ridge, and not the continental
shelf and margin, that is described in the relevant sentence on
page 38, paragraph 158 of the Memorial. The Memorial does not
discuss the southern extent of the Jan Mayen shelf, because it is

the maritime boundary between Greenland and Jan Mayen that is
in dispute, not that between lceland and Jan Mayen.

65. In any case page 172, paragraph 604 of the Counter-
Memorial is illogical. The Kolbeinsey Ridge lies to the West of
the Jan Mayen Ridge, not to the south. How the Jan Mayen
Ridge ends to the south has nothing to do with how it might or

might not be connected to Kolbeinsey Ridge to the West. The
western extent of the Jan Mayen Ridge and shelf has already
been discussed above on pages 24 - 25, paragraphs 60 -62.

66. Turning now to the description of geology and
geomorphology in the Counter-Memorial (pp. 18 - 19 and pp. 28 - 31, paras. 60 - 67 and 102 - 109), two comments are called
for.

67. The first is that Norway has not taken care always to

distinguish between facts and opinions. This can be exemplified
by the remark on page 19, paragraph 62, (see also p. 28, para.
104) that "Jan Mayen is a landmass which is situated on a ridge
of continental crust". This is an opinion, not a statement of

scientific fact, and it is an opinion that is not greatly favoured in
the scientific community. The matter is discussed fully in a
monograph on the volcanic rocks of Jan Mayen by the Icelandic
geologist P. Imsland (Rif Visindafélagislendinga 43, Reykjavik

1984, 332 pp.), in which one finds the following statement:

"Gronlie et al. (1979) believe the continental segment in
the Jan Mayen ndge to end somewhere about 50 km

south of Jan Mayen island. All this [the foregoing
paragraphs in Imsland's monograph] points to the
absence of a continental rock segment under Jan Mayen"
(p. 303). (The author Gronlie referred to by P. Imsland

is the Norwegian geoscientist Gisle Grf~nlie.)

68. In a recently published account of the geology of the
Norwegian-Greenland Sea by four Norwegian scientists the island

of Jan Mayen is shown as being situated on oceanic crust, with
continental crust first occurring under the subrnerged Jan Mayen
Ridge to the south- (see Figure 5 on p. 359 in Eldholm, O.,
Skogseid, J., Sundvor, E. & Myhre, A.M. Geology of North

America, Vol. L, 1990). This is how the situation is described in
paragraph 203 of the Memorial.

69. The second comment is more important and concems

the Norwegian use of the term "continental shelf'. While
Denmark, in paragraphs describing geology and geomorphology,
has consistently used this term as it is understood in these
sciences, Norway uses the term in the geological sense when

referring fo the East Greenland shelf, but in some other sense
when referring to the Jan Mayen shelf. This, in a section on
geology, can result in rather confused statements such as thatintroducing paragraph 109, page 31 in the Counter-Memorial: "As

has been noted, the Kolbeinsey Axis projects northeastwards on
the central portion of the continental shelf between Jan Mayen
and Greenland...". Since the Kolbeinsey Ridge (or Axis) is a
typical mid-oceatiic ridge with associated rift (see for example p.

29, para. 104 of the Counter-Memorial), the sentence quoted is,
scientifically speaking, a contradiction in terms.

70. The above should be borne in mind when reading
references in the Counter-Mernorial to "the Jan Mayen shelf ...

towards the west" (p. 29, para. 106). "the western pari of the Jan
Mayen continental.shelf' (p. 29, para. 107). "the shelf to the West
of Jan Mayen" (p. 50, para. 159). Until Norway defines what it
means by the Jan Mayen shelf in each context, these references

to the shelf can lead to ambiguity.

71. In summary, the Memorial presents a correct, albeit
brief, description of the maritime area between Greenland and Jan
Mayen, using terms as they are understood in the sciences of

geology and geomorphology. The final statement in this
description that "...there exists no common shelf between East
Greenland and Jan Mayen" is a statement of a geological fact.

D. Activities in the Region

1. General Remarks

72. The Norwegian activities in the North Atlantic region
are descnbed at great length in the Counter-Memorial, particularly
in Pan 1, Chapter 1 and Appendices 2 - 5. A detailed account is
given of the Norwegian activities in the north, south, east, and

West of this region, but only a small part of the information
submitted by Norway concerns the disputed area or even the area
relevant to the present delimitation as defined by Denmark in the
Memorial, pages 11 - 12, paragraphs 30 - 35. Historical aspects

of Norwegian fishing and particularly sealing as well as the
Norwegian exploitation of a number of resources that are farintroducing paragraph 109, page 31 in the Counter-Memorial: "As

29, para. 104 of the Counter-Memorial), the sentence quoted is,
scientifically speaking, a contradiction in terms.

70. The above should be borne in mind when reading
references in the Counter-Mernorial to "the Jan Mayen shelf ...

to the shelf can lead to ambiguity.

71. In summary, the Memorial presents a correct, albeit
brief, description of the maritime area between Greenland and Jan
Mayen, using terms as they are understood in the sciences of

geology and geomorphology. The final statement in this
description that "...there exists no common shelf between East
Greenland and Jan Mayen" is a statement of a geological fact.

D. Activities in the Region

1. General Remarks

of Norwegian fishing and particularly sealing as well as the
Norwegian exploitation of a number of resources that are far removed from the area in dispute are addressed extensively in the
Counter-Memorial.

73. The present case, however, centres around

- the relevant coasts of East Greenland and Jan Mayen,

-
a certain geographical area between East Greenland and Jan
Mayen (the relevant area as illustrated on Map V of this
Reply),

- a certain period, i.e., from 1979 until the present proceed-
ings, which is the only period when competing claims have
been made to the maritime area in question, and

- the actual and potential exploitation of economic resources in
the relevant area, i.e., primarily capelin fishing, as no
exploitation of possible sea-bed resources has so far taken

place or is likely to take place in the foreseeable future.

74. A striking feature in the Counter-Memorial is the
apparent reluctance to address these essential issues of relevant

coasts, relevant area, relevant period and relevant resources.

75. The Norwegian effort is instead directed towards de-
picting Norway as a major power in the North Atlantic region

dating back from the time of the VikingsPJorsemen, canying out
activities in almost al1 quarters of the region, thereby claiming a
predominant and legitimate interest in, inter alio, the Jan Mayen

region. These activities are then alleged to be opposable to
neighbouring countries, in the present case to Greenland. But how
could an expansive Norwegian maritime policy in the North
Atlantic region in general be opposable to Greenland as far as

the area West of Jan Mayen is concerned, where activities
relevant for the present case, Le., capelin fishing, started as late
as in 1978 and have been the subject of interest of hoth parties?
The answer is of course that it cannot. 76. Norway, in al1 fairness, does not claim any historical
rights in the relevant area. Indeed, such rights would be
impossible for Norway to substantiate, a fact recognised by a
member of the Norwegian Parliament during the debate on the

1980 Icelandic-Norwegian Agreement on 6 June 1980: "In fact
there is no tradition of Norwegian fishing off Jan Mayen", see
Records of the Parliamentary Debate on 6 June 1980 on
Recomrnendation No. 318 (1979 - 1980) to the Storting (Annex

II to the Counter-Memorial, p. 44). It may nevertheless be
appropriate briefly to state the general position of international
law with respect to historical rights.

77. Land territory may be terra nullius and as such
subject to acquisition. It is generally recognised that a State's
activities withinsuch territory can form part of the basis for a
claim of sovereign rights or other rights to the territory whether

in cornpetition or not with clairns from other States whose
activities have been less intensive.

78. As regards the high seas, the situation is different.

The high seas outside territorial waters were until recently
considered to be res communis and could be used by al1 States
and their citizens on an equal basis. A State's activities, however
long they have lasted, could not form the basis for any special

rights in relation to particular parts of the high seas, and certainly
not the basis for an assertion of exclusive, sovereign rights.

79. This is true also as far as such parts of the high seas

are concerned that now form part of the present broad maritime
zones established in accordance with international law as it has
subsequently developed. The basis for the exclusive rights of
coastal States to such zones lies in their mere existence as

coastal States. The previous activities of the coastal State in the
area are of no consequence, and the right of the coastal State to
a broad maritime zone is unaffected by activities previously
carried out within the zone area by other States.

80. It seems equally clear that a delimitarion of maritime
zones outside territorial waters on the basis of international law between opposite Statesare not affected by the previous activities
of the States concerned, however long-lasting, in the zones to be
delimited. Such activities do not constitute a 'relevant

circumstance to be taken into account by an international court in
deciding the course of a boundary line. This does not, however,
hinder the parties concerned from seeking a negotiated
arrangement as a supplement to the delimitation, involving a

"phasing out" of, inter alia. traditional fishery according to the
principles underlying proposais discussed at the Second
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1960, and later implemented
in the Fisheries Convention of 9 March 1964 (the European

Fisheries Convention). An example is provided by the
Danish-Swedish Delimitation Agreement of 9 November 1984
where the median line between Sweden and the Danish island of

Bornholm was supplemented by a Protocol concerning the
phasing out of Danish fishery on the Swedish side of the
boundary, provisionally for a IO-year period (Annex 33 to the
Memorial).

81. Norwegian expansionist activities in the North Atlantic
region have forced Denmark to challenge their legality on a
previous occasion. In the early 1930s. these activities had reached

a point where Norway felt justified in claiming part of East
Greenland for Norway under the name of a Norwegian Viking
(Eirik Raude's Land). This provocative act prom~ted Denmark to
unilaterally institute proceedings against Nonvay before the

Permanent Court of International Justice without consultin-
Norway as to the appropriateness of such a step. Denmark has
felt justified in taking a similar step in the present case to seek

judicial recognition of Greenland's right to a 200-mile fishery
zone and continental shelf zone vis-à-vis the island of Jan
Mayen. In passing, it may be noted that the area in dispute is
situated off that part of the Coast of East Greenland (the area

between latitudes 71°30' and 75'40' N) which Norway attempted
to take possession of in 1931after having annexed Jan Mayen in
1929.

82. It is generally recognised that heavy dependence on
fisheries may be a relevant factor under international law as faras territories like Greenland are concerned. Reference is made to
the Resolution adopted on 26 April 1958 inconnection with the
Convention of 29 April 1958 on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas (Official Records, Vol. II,
Doc. AICONF 13/38, p. 144). By that Resolution Greenland,

together with the Faroe Islands and Iceland, was recognised as
overwhelmingly dependent upon fisheries for its livelihood and
economic development (the Mernorial, p. 98, para. 305).

83. This is far from being the case of Norway. Figures
quoted in the Counter-Memorial, page II, paragraph 39, reveal
that fisheries account for only a very small percentage of

Nonvay's total export value (approximately 4 per cent. in 1985,
see p. 38 - 39, para. 102, note 9, below), although this fact has
been somewhat disguised in the Norwegian presentation of the
figures. In 1989, the corresponding figure for Greenland was 78

per cent. And even more relevant in the case presently pending
before the Court, Jan Mayen -having no population in the usual
sense of the word and no economic life - is not at al1 dependent
on fisheries.

84. Norway has emphasised that the capelin resource of
the disputed area is not fished by Greenland vessels. This is
correct, and the reasons for Greenland's present exploitation of

the capelin resource through issuance of fishing licences to third
State vessels against payment are given below on pages 58 - 60,
paragraphs 142 - 149. It is a method of exploitation of off-shore
resources commonly used by developing States. How Greenland

is exploiting the capelin resource at present is, however,
immaterial to the present delimitation of the maritime zones.
Greenland's right to an extension of the fishery zone to 200
miles is based on a rule of customary international law that has

been expressed in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. A
State's application of this rule does not depend upon the
existence of any particular resource within such a zone, nor is it
conditional on the capacity of the State itself to exploit the
resources of the zone. Article 62 of the 1982 Convention on the

Law of the Sea explicitly recognises that a coastal State may not
have the capacity to harvest the entire resources of its 200-milezone. In this situation the coastal State must give other States
access to reap any surplus living resource. The coastal State
exercises the right to exploit the living resources within the200-

mile zone either by domestic fishing vessels or by licence
arrangements with third States. As a corollary to that right, the
State is obliged, through proper conservation and management
measures, to ensure that the maintenance of the living resources

in the zone is not endangered by over-exploitation.

85. The concept of th? 200-mile zone does not depend
upon ocrual or full exploitation of the resources of the zone by

the coastal State nor does the delimitation of that zone. The
concept recognises the right of the coastal State to its future
economic potential, either through the gradua1 expansion of a
domestic fishing fleet, or through licensing of foreign fishing

vessels. The Norwegian comment that the Greenland population is
largely concentrated on the West Coast is thus irrelevant (the
Counter-Mernorial, p. 175, para. 616). For the population of

Greenland, every single part of ils coast and the adjacent sea is
of importance both to the suwival of the population and to
preserving ils cultural roots. Thus the nonheast coast has been
the site of many settlements throughout the ages and no one

knows which part of Greenland and its surrounding sea may be
the next to prosper. Even if Greenland at present does not itself
catch the capelin in the disputed area but exploits this resource
through the issuance of licences to third State vessels, this merely

reflects the current priorities of Greenland's administration of its
fishing resources, but by no means an absence of Greenland
interest in the resources of the area.

86. Greenland derives an important income from the
issuance of fishing licences to third State vessels under the ten
year Fishery Agreement with the EEC, see below page 50,

paragraphs 126 - 127. Full exploitation of the living resources,
however, must not be pursued at the expense of a proper
maintenance of the ecological balance. In the relevant area the
existence of an ample capelin stock is particularly important, as

the capelin constitutes the main food resource forseals and larger
fish in the area. Greenland's interest in the disputed area isconcerned with the conservation as much as with the exploitation
of the capelin resource.

2. Specific Comments on Map 1in the Counter-Mernorial

87. The Govemment of Denmark wishes to point out that
Map I "Human Settlement and Norwegian Hunting and Fishing
Grounds" in the Counter-Memorial, gives a distorted picture of

habitation, hunting, and fishing patterns, both with respect tothe
time period and the geographic locations coveredby the M~P.~

88. First ofall, the Map does not give any indication of
which date or period it relates to. According to the Counter-
Memorial, page 7, paragraph 21 and the legend to Map 1, the

Map demonstrates "the persistent pattern" of settlement and
Norwegian hunting and fishing grounds.

89. According to the Map legend, the red spots mark

"land use involving 10 people or more within a radius of 2
kilometres". It must be pointed out that a number of inhabited
places in Greenland which satisfy this criterion are not included.

The following examples are striking.

90. In North-West Greenland in the municipality of

Avanersuaq the Savissivik settlement on Meteorite Island, midway
between Cape York and Cape Melville, has 116 inhabitants, and
the settlement Qeqertat at the head of Inglefield Broad has 31

inhabitants. The settlements Moriusaq with 73 inhabitants and
Qeqertarsuaq with 17 inhabitants, both settlements established
around 1950, are not included on the Map. In the East Greenland
municipality of Taasiilaq the settlements lsortoq with 180

inhabitants as of 1 January 1990, and Sermiligaaq with 182 in-
habitants as of 1 January 1990, are not included.

Vn orderto enablethe Court to aegeneralknowledgeon thehistoryand
culture of Greenland the atlas Kalaallit Nunaof Green1990,has been
depositedin 20 copieswith the Registrarof the Court.

34 91. The omission of these inhabited places mentioned here
cannot be due to the scale of the Map, nor to overlap with red
marks already on the Map as the settlements mentioned are
situated in isolation from existing red marks on the Map.

92. Furthermore, the criterion "Land use involving 10
people or more within a radius of 2 kilometres" is not suitable to

Greenland conditions. The Greenland population lives mainly in
towns and settlements, but especially in the hunting regions of
East and Northwest Greenland a significant portion of the
population is semi-nomadic during the summer - a pattern which

has prevailed for centuries. In the hunting and fishing temtory -
fiords, highlands, mountain Stream valleys and bird cliff areas -
numerous summer settlements are used by 10 people or more,
who exploit an area around the settlement larger than four

kilometres in diameter. According to the legend, these settlements
are qualified to a red mark on the Map. In the view of the
Government of Denmark these numerous periodic settlements
should have been included on theMap. This would have shown

a remarkable increase in the number of red spots on Greenland's
land territory.

93. One could of course also sketch a Map with the

criterion 30 people or more within a radius of 25 kilometres in
which case al1 the red spots and many more on Greenland's
territory would appear on the Map whereas the red spots on Jan

Mayen and Bear Island would disappear.

94. The marks on the Map indicating Nonvegian hunting
grounds at sea are similarly incorrect. The four whale signs off

the West Coast of Greenland do not satisfy "the persistent
pattern" criterion that seems to have been adopted by Norway, as
Norwegian whaling in the West Greenland fishery zoneended in
1985. The four whale signs within the East Greenland fishery

zone south of Kangerlussuaq are also incorrect, as the Greenland
Home Rule Authority issued its last permit for Nonvegian
whaling inside the East Greenland fishery zone in 1985. Finally,
when considering the four seal symbols off the East Coast of

Greenland, it should be noted that permission for Nonvegian sealhunting inside the East Greenland fishery zone was last granted
by the Greenland Home Rule Authority in 1988.

95. If the Map presented by Nonvay is intended to reflect

present-day reality, discontinued activities should not be included
as they give the impression that the areas indicated are
"Nonvegian hunting grounds". They are not. The Norwegian
whaling and sealing activities in question belong to history.

96. As regards the marks on the Map for fishing activities
off the West and East Coast of Greenland it must be pointed out
that since January 1977 Norwegian fishing activity has been

dependent on negotiated access to the Greenland zone. The
current Nonvegian access, mainly to the East Coast of Greenland,
is further described below, pages 50 -51, paragraphs 128 - 130.

E. The Greenland Economy and Fisheries Sector

1. Recent Developments in the Greenland Economy

97. In the Counter-Memorial, Norway has set forth a
number of allegations on the economy and fisheries sector of
Greenland and made several comparisons between Greenland and
Nonvegian fisheries. Before responding to these Norwegian

points, developments in the Greenland economy subsequent to the
filing of the Memorial have prompted the Govemment of
Denmark to submit the following supplementary observations on
the status and trends of Greenland's economy and, in particular,

on the prospects of the fisheries sector.

98. The development and strengthening of the Greenland
economy is closely tied to Greenland's ability to generate income
from exports. After having sustained a considerable trade deficithunting inside the East Greenland fishery zone was last granted
by the Greenland Home Rule Authority in 1988.

95. If the Map presented by Nonvay is intended to reflect

96. As regards the marks on the Map for fishing activities
off the West and East Coast of Greenland it must be pointed out
that since January 1977 Norwegian fishing activity has been

dependent on negotiated access to the Greenland zone. The
current Nonvegian access, mainly to the East Coast of Greenland,
is further described below, pages 50 -51, paragraphs 128 - 130.

E. The Greenland Economy and Fisheries Sector

1. Recent Developments in the Greenland Economy

on the prospects of the fisheries sector.

98. The development and strengthening of the Greenland
economy is closely tied to Greenland's ability to generate income
from exports. After having sustained a considerable trade deficit for years, Greenland produced its first trade surplus in 1989
amounting to USD 22 milli~n.~

99. Table 1 illustrates that the 1989 trade surplus was
caused by an increase in export value and a considerable decrease
in the volume of imports.

TABLE 1 Greenland's Trade Balance. Selected Years henveen
1970 and 1989. Millions of USD (Current ric ces)

1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Exports 13 66 135 239 272 307 341 395

lmports 51 96 239 407 382 450' 4538 373
Trade deficit 38 30 104 168 110 143' 112' +22

Source: The Prime Minisrer's Department: Greenland Yearhook1989 and Reporr
on rhe EconomicDevelopmentin Greenland in 1989. suhmirtedhy the Adi'isory
Commirlee on the Econonzy of Greenland, rhe Prime Minisrer's Deparrmenf.
Copenhagen.

100. The reduction in the value of imported goods is a
consequence of austerity measures introduced by the Home Rule
Authority in 1988; measures whose full effect was not felt until

1989. The export increase may be ascribed to two equally
important factors, pnce increases, in particular for zinc ore, and a
quantitativerise in exported goods, particularly cod and cod

products.

'
Throughout the Reply. figures in Danish Kroner havebeen converted into
US dollars at the rate of exchange employed in the Memonal. namely the
kroner 772.25.prevailing on I lune 1989 when 100 US dollars equalled Danish

Vn comparison with Table 11,p. 44 in the Danish Memonal the impon
figures and consequently the deficit figures for1987 and 1988 have
been altered on the hasis of new information made available by the Danish
Bureau of Statistics. 101. 1989 may be the last year within the foreseeable

future in which Greenland will enjoy a trade surplus. As has
been demonstrated in the Memorial, page 43, Table 1,
Greenland's exports consist almost exclusively of unprocessed or
semi-processed natural resources. Thus, the basis of Greenland's

economy is in principle exhaustible and, at any rate, inherently
unstable. The availability and exploitability of Greenland's natural
resources depends to a large extent on extemal factors beyond the

control of man, such as climate, migratory patterns of marine
species and viable accessibility ofmineral deposits. Despite the
trade surplus of 1989, the prospects for the Greenland economy
are bleak, and it is expected that the next few years will expose

the vulnerability of an economy based exclusively on natural
resources.

TABLE II Composition of Greenland Exports Trade in 1987 -
1989. Millions of USD (Current Prices) and Percentage of Total
Export Value

1987 (%) 1988 (%) 1989 (%)
Shrimp 220 72 217 64 236 60

Cod 16 5 30 9 58 15
Other fish products 20 6 20 6 14 3
Zinc and other minerals 37 12 61 18 73 18
Other noods 14 5 12 3 14 4

Total export value 307 100 340 100 395 100

Source: Report on the Economic Dri,elopmenr in Gree1989.si,hmifred
hy rhe Advisory Commirreeon rhe Economyof Greenland. rhe Prime Minister's
Deparrmrnr. Copenhagen.

102. Table II reveals Greenland's extreme dependence on
exports of fish. In 1989 fishery products accounted for 78 per
cent. of total export revenues. In comparison, the Norwegian fish
exports represented approximately 4 per cent. of the total

Norwegian export value in 1985, see the Counter-Memorial, pages 10 - 11, paragraph 39.9In 1989, the Norwegian figurehad
risen to 5.5 per cent. of the total export of goods.I0

103. Greenland's only other important export commodity,
zinc ore and other minerals, represenied 18 per cent. of the total

value of Greenland exports in 1989, see Table II above. The last
active mine in Greenland, the "Black Angel" in Uummannaq

municipality, terminated its operations in the summer of 1990 as
the deposits were exhausted. Consequently, the 1990 export value
of minerals isexpected to fall to approximately one third of the

1989 level, and Greenland will derive no income from mineral
exports in 1991. No other mine projects are expected to open
within the foreseeable future, although exploration surveys are

being carried out in several parts of Greenland.

104. The income generated from sales of cod and cod

products almost doubled between 1987 and 1988 and again
between 1988 and 1989 when cod ,accounted for 15 per cent. of
the total expok value. The catch' statistici for these two years

may be attributed to the exceptionally plentiful cod fry of 1984
and 1985. The cod fry of 1985 may be fished until 1990, but the
subsequent cod years have been so meagre that in the early

1990s the Greenland cod catch is expected to dwindle to
approximately one fifth of the 1989 level. The Greenland fishery

zone lies on the periphery of the cod's geographical area of
distribution, and even very slight variations in climatic conditions
or sea currenis may make the difference between a successful and

a disastrous cod year within the Greenland fishery zone,.

105. With the disappearance of revenues from the

exploitation of mineral resources and the anticipated substantial

'> On the basis of the information submitted hy Nonvay in the
Counter-Memorialp. p. 1- II, para. 39, the toralvalue of Norway'sexpons in
1985 may be calculatedto approximatelyUSD 27,254 million. of which fisheries
is quotedto account forUSD 1,100 million, thus representing4.04 per cent. of
the total expon value.

'OCalculatedon the basis ~f~prelimifigures published the Norwegian
Bureauof StatisticsiStatisriskArho1990.reduction in the cod catches, Greenland will become even more
dependent on the exports of the arctic deep-water shrimp. Shrimp
already constitute Greenland's most important export commodity.

In 1989, shrimp accounted for an approximate 60 per cent. of the
total export revenues. Due to conservation considerations, the
yearly total allowable shrimp catch in the Greenland zone is not
likely to be increased. As the Greenland shrimp are at the same

time encountering fiercer pnce cornpetition on the export markets,
Greenland shrimp fishing is not expected to bring a substantially
higher yield in the next few years. With no other export
commodity immediately capable of offsetting the anticipated loss

of income on mineral resources and cod products, Greenland may
be facing a serious trade deficit problem in the years to corne.
These prospects compel Greenland to augment the exploitation of
al1available resources.

106. As a consequence of the introduction of Home Rule
in Greenland in 1979, most public administrative fields have
through the 1980s been gradually transferred to Home Rule, with
the transfer of the law-making and budgetary powers from the

Central Authonties of the Danish Realm to the Home Rule
Authonty, see the Memonal, pages 31 - 32, paragraphs 124 -
126. Vested with these extensive powers, the Home Rule
Authority decided that increased public expenditure was required

within a number of transferred administrative fields in order for
Greenland to meet the challenge of sustaining an independent
economy.

107. In 1986, the Home Rule Authority launcheda major
industrial development programme to promote employment and
the profitability of the expon trade. The fisheries sector is
expected to remain the corner-stone of the Greenland economy,

and most of the investments were made in fish processing plants,
public and publicly subsidised private purchases of fishing
vessels, port facilities etc. 108. As a result of these extensive capital investments,
Greenland sustained a rapidly increasing budget deficit in the
mid-1980s. Deficits were covered by loans from foreign and

Greenland commercial banks to the Home Rule Authority. In
1988 the Home Rule Authority decided to introduce a public
austerity programme lest the developing Greenland economy be
crippled by a heavy foreign debt burden. Table 111demonstrates

that the austerity measures have improved the Greenland economy
by tuming the budget deficit of the mid-1980s into a surplus.
The surplus was only reached through a severe reduction in

public investments, especially within the fishing industry,
investments that are imperative if Greenland is to obtain a higher
degree of economic independence.

TABLE III lncome and Expenditure of the Home Rule Authority
in 1987 -1989. Millions of USD (Current Prices).

1. Income tax and duties 105 134 160
2. Block grants 174 180 ,198

3. Fishing licences 27 28 29
4. Other income 65 55 77
5. Total income 371 397 464
6. Total operating and

capitalexpenditure 435 391 429
7. Deficit 64 +6 +35

Source: Reporrs on the EconomicDevelopmenr inGreenland in 1988 and 1989,
submirrehy rhe Advisory Commirreeon rhe Economy of Greenland. rhe Prime
Minisrer's Department. Copenhagen.

109. In addition to Greenland's export revenues from its
own fishing activities, Greenland receives a very substantial
income from granting third State fishing vessels access to fishing

operations in the Greenland fishery zone under the Fishery
Agreement with the EEC, see below pages 50, paragraphs 126 -
127. In 1989, Greenland's revenue from the issuance of fishing

licences to third States was USD 28 million, growing Io USD 36
million in 1990. 110. When examining the importance of exploitation of
marine resources in the Greenland fishery zone to the economy
of Greenland, one should focus not only on the current export
revenues of the Greenland fishing industry but also on the

economic potential of a future Greenland exploitation of resources
that are presently allocated to third States against payment.
Greenland vessels already fish more than three fourths of the fish

caught in the Greenland fishery zone, see below page 48, Table
VI, but itis the long-term goal of the Greenland fishery policy to
render the local fishing industry capable of exploiting al1 of
Greenland's manne resources.

2. Greenland and Foreign Fishing Activities in Greenland

Waters

THE BASIS FOR NORWEGIAN AND GREENLAND/DANIC SHATCH
STATISTICS

111. The Counter-Memonal attempts to demonstrate the
pre-eminence of Nonvegian fishing, sealing and whaling in- the
North Atlantic Ocean inter alia by submitting a large number of

tables. on Noqegian catches in various parts of the North
Atlantic Ocean (pp. 13 - 18, paras. 51 - 59; pp. 33 - 49, paras.
110 - 156; and Appendix 5, pp. 231 -241). . . ,
. .

112. The wealth of Nonvegian catch statistics is interesting
as an overview of the wide-ranging North Atlantic operations of
the Nonvegian fishing fleet, but the information submitted by

Norway i's mostly irrelevant to the present delimitation of the
maritime zones between the East Coast of Greenland and Jan
Mayen. ,Alrnost al1 catch statistics in Appendix. 5 of the

Counter-Mernorial cover fishing' activities outside the disputed
area, or are concemed with species that are 'no 'longer caught in
the disputed area.

113. The tables of Appendix 5 the Counter-Memorial with
respect to fishing in the "Jan Mayen-Greenland Area" are predominantly based on figures published by the Intemational
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). The statistics
compiled by ICES serve as a basis for biological advice on the

management of the fish stocks, but take no account of national
fishery zones. A number of the Norwegian tables thus include
catches taken in parts of the Greenland fishery zone, parts of the
disputed area, pans of the Jan Mayen fishery zone, and in some

cases parts of the high seas. The geographical scope of the
Norwegian tables of Appendix 5 are correspondingly vague ("East
Greenland Area, Table 5.2; "Jan Mayen-Iceland-East Greenland
Area", Table 5.6). Often the tables do not indicate precisely what

geographical areas are covered. The value of this type of
statistics in a delimitation case is at best limited.

114. In order to rebut the inference of Norwegian fishing

pre-eminence in Greenland waters that may be drawn from the
general tenor of the Counter-Memorial, the Govemment of
Denmark will describe the development of the ratio between
Greenland and foreign state fishing in Greenland waters over the

last decades.

115. The Govemment of Denmark has chosen to provide
catch statistics covering catches within the Greenland fishery zone

only. Following the extensions of the Greenland fishery zone in
1977 (on the West Coast and on the East Coast south of 67ON)
and in 1980 (on the East Coast north of 67"N), Danish and
subsequently Home Rule authorities have required al1 vessels

fishing in the Greenland zone to submit catch reports. These
reports have enabled the authonties to monitor al1 activities
within the Greenland zone. Prior to the extensions of the
Greenland fishery zone, Greenland, Faroese and Danish catches in

the waters off Greenland were registered, but the total fishing
activities of al1 States in this period may be recorded only
through the application of figures collected by ICES or ICNAF

(International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries,
covering the waters off the West Coast of Greenland).

116. Due to the above-mentioned rnanner in which

information on catches has been collected by Denmark/Greenland,Nonvay, and international bodies such as ICES and ICNAF,
neither Nonvay nor Denmark is able to provide catch statistics
covering al1 activities within the disputed area.

FISHING IN GREENLAND WATERS BEFORE THE ~~O-MILE FISHERY
ZONE

117. Pnor to the extensions of the Greenland fishery zone
to 200 nautical miles in 1977 and 1980, the resources of the
waters around Greenland were predominantly exploited by

non-Greenland vessels. The vessels came from a number of West
and East European countries. Greenland did not benefit from the
activities ofhese third State vessels in the area; on the contrary,
the absence of regulations on the management of the fish stocks

binding upon al1 parties led to overfishing of several species to
the point of depletion of the stocks. Cod fishing was the main
attraction of Greenland waters to foreign fishing vessels in the

1950s and 1960s with total yearly catches running into several
hundreds of thousands of tonnes. In this penod Greenland vessels
accounted for approximately 5 per cent. of total cod catches. A
sudden drop in sea temperature in the late 1960s resulted in a

drastically reduced occurrence of the available cod stock and in
reduced fishing activities by foreign vessels in the waters off
Greenland. Table IV graphically depicts the proportions of foreign
fishing, Norway separately noted, vis-à-vis Greenland fishing in

the waters around Greenland until the extension of the Greenland
fishery zone. Until 1970 cod catches formed the overwhelming
part of the totalnnual catches. TABLE IV Greenland and Foreign Fishing, Norway Separately
Noted, in the Waters around Greenland in 1954 - 1977.

ThousandTonnes.

O OTHERS
NORWAY
500
O GREENLAND

400

300

280

100

O
1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 11968 1970 1971974 1976

YFAR
Source: /CES and ICNAF.

EXTENSION OF THE GREENLAND FISHERY ZONE - THE EC PERIOD

118. The extensions of the Greenland fishery zone to 200

nautical miles in 1977 and 1980 provided the legal basis for a
closely monitored exploitation and an appropriate conservation of

the fish stocks within the Greenland zone. Total allowable
catches were established for the various species on the basis of

biologicaladvice and fishing by foreign States made contingent
upon negotiated access.

119. At the time of the extensions of the zone in 1977
and 1980, Greenland was a member of the European

Communities, and the Greenland fishery zone was considered
EEC waters for purposes of EEC fishery policy. The EEC fishingauthonties established national quotas phasing out fishing by
non-EC third States in the waters around Greenland in favour of
EC vessels. Although Greenland's crucial dependence on income
from the fishing industry was recognised by the EEC and the

growing Greenland fishing fleet allowed to fish in Greenland
waters, the Greenland vessels still had to compete with vessels
from transatlantic EC countries for the allotment of quotas in
Greenland waters. Norway was not a member of the

Communities and was in pnnciple barred from continuing its
fishing in the waters around Greenland after the extensions of the
Greenland fishery zone. However, the EEC granted Norway
access to fishing in the Greenland fishery zone as part of a

reciprocal fishery agreement concluded in 1980 between the
Communities and Norway. Norway became entitled to exploit
inter aliapart of the valuable shrimp stock at the expense of

reduced access to Greenland shrimp fishing for EC nations,
includingDenmark.

GREENLAND'W SITHDRAWA LROM THE EC

120. Effective as of 1 Febmary 1985 Greenland left the
EC and assumed full control of the exploitationnthe fish stocks
in the Greenland fishery zone. Thisexercise of Greenland's right

to make decisions on the management of its own resources had
been the goal of strong political forces in Greenland since the
institution of Home Rule in Greenland in 1979. The activities of
foreign fishing vessels in Greenland waters did not cease with

Greenland's departure from the EC, but the extent and character
of foreign fishing was now regulated by the Home Rule
Authonty and wasonly allowed in so far as such fishing was
considered ecologically sustainable and beneficial to the

Greenland society.

121. The fishery policy of the Home Rule Authonty has
been committed to the promotion of the domestic Greenland

fishing industry, the main source of income to the Greenland
economy. The Greenland share of the total catches in Greenland
waters has grown rapidly since the extensions of the zone in

1977 and 1980. In 1989 Greenland vessels fished more than 75 per cent. of the total catches in the Greenland fishery zone as

opposed to only 46 per cent. in 1978. The ratio between
Greenland and foreign fishing within the Greenland fishery zone

in the period 1978 - 1989 is graphically depicted below in Table
V. Table V should be compared with Table IV on page 45
depicting the same ratio in the period up to the extension of the

Greenland fishery zone in 1977.

TABLE V Greenland and Foreign Fishing, Noway Separately
Noted, in the GreenlandFishery Zone in 1978 - 1989. Thousand
Tonnes.

250

NORWAY
O GREENLAND
m

150

100

O
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
YEAR

Source: 1978.1984, rhe Minisrry Greenland; 1985-1989. rhe Home Rule
AurhoriIy.

122. In its negotiations for fishery agreements with third

States, the Home Rule Authority has been primarily concemed
with the welfare of Greenland fishemen, and the fishing for the

most valuable species, namely shnmp, has mainly been reservedfor local vessels, see Table VI below. As a result, Greenland's
75 per cent. share of the total catches in the Greenland zone in
1989 is estimated to account for approximately 90 per cent. of

the total first-hand catch value. Table VI below lists the total
quantities of fish and shellfish taken by Greenland and foreign
vessels in the Greenland fishery zone in 1989. Shrimp and cod

are the mostvaluable species per weight unit.

TABLE VI Total Catch of Fish and Shellfish in the Greenland

Fishery Zone in 1989.Tonnes.

Greenland Vessels Foreign Vessels

Shrimp 65,063
Cod 87,116

Greenland halibut 7,440
Redfish 159
Wolf fish 981

Capelin " 239
0ther fish 1.127 184
In total 162,125 (76%) 52,108 (24%)

Source: Greenland Home Rule Authoriry, puhlished inReport on the
Economic Uevelopment in Greenland in 1989. submirred hy the Advisory
Committee on the Economy of Greenland, the Prime Minister's Deparrmenr.
Copenhagen.

THE RATIONAL FOR LICENCF EISHING INGREENLAN WDATERS

123. Tables V and VI above demonstrate that the Home

Rule Authority has not phased out al1 foreign fishing in
Greenland waters subsequent to Greenland's withdrawal from the
EC in 1985. The reasons for the continued existence of licence

fishing in Greenland waters must be sought inter alia in the
limited investment capabilities of an economy as small as

" The capelin figure includes catchestaken outside the Greenlandfishery
zone in accordance with the tripartitAgreement concluded in 1989
betweenDenmark/Greenland.Iceland and Norway. The figure only includes
catchesakenon the quotaallottedto Greenlandunderthe Agreement. Greenland's. The resources of the Greenland fishery zone are to
the widest extent possible utilised by Greenland vessels.
However, the modem Greenland fishing fleet is neither
sufficiently large nor sufficiently specialised tollow Greenland

to exploit itself the full potential of the resources of Greenland
waters. In accordance with the principles embodied in Article 62
of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Greenland has
allowed third States to fish the surplus resource that Greenland is

not currently capable of exploiting itself.

124. A shortage of pnvate capital in Greenland has made
the development of the fishing fleet and the fishing industry in

general dependent on Public support and investments. The largest
operation within the Greenland fisheries sector is Royal
Greenland, a limited Company owned by the Home Rule
Authority. Royal Greenland owns its own trawler fleet, practically

al1 fish processing plants in Greenland and an export unit in
Denmark. Expansion and development of the pnvately owned
Greenland fishing fleet also depends on subsidies and other forms
of public support.

125. The fishery policy of Greenland has focused on local
exploitation of the most profitable species, and the Home Rule
Authority has acquired a number of industrial trawlers as well as

extensively supported the private purchase of fishing vessels in
general. However, rendering the Greenland fishing fleet capable
of fishing al1 available resources in the Greenland zone requires
such substantial investments in the fishing industry that these

must necessarily be undertaken over a period of years. Finally,
Greenland denves a considerable income from the issuance of
fishing licences ta third States, and the revenues constitute an
important contribution to the development of Greenland's

economy, including the fisheries sector. The reasons for allocating
particularly the capelin fishing to third State vessels will be
addressed below on pages 64 - 65, paragraphs 159 - 161. GREENLAND' FISHERY AGREEMEN T lTH THEEEC

126. Greenland's most important fishery agreement is the
ten-year Fishery Agreement concluded with the EEC in 1984 on
the eve of Greenland's withdrawal from the European Community

(Annex 21 to the Memonal). The Agreement is descnbed in the
Memonal, page 47, paragraph 177. Suffice it hereIOpoint out
that the EEC Agreement is more complex than a regular third
State licence arrangement. The EEC is allotted annual quotas for

the different species and pays a fixed yearly fee irrespective of
whether the quotas are exploited. In addition ta the receipt of a
yearly payment from the EEC, Greenland products are exempted

from EEC duty. Under the Agreement, the EEC may reallocate
quotas to the individual EC member States according to EEC
fishery policy and also to non-EC nations. The EEC has

reallocated quotas to Norway and the Faroe Islands. The Faroe
Islands have had Home Rule since 1948 and have never been a
member of the EC.

127. The conditions of the second five-year terni of the
Fishery Agreement with the EECwere negotiated in 1989. In this
Second Protocol (1990-1994) the quotas and payment have been

reviewed and adjusted according to the biological status of the
different fish stocks (Annex 63). As a result, the EEC cod quota
was substantially cut, and the European access ta shnmp fishing

shifted from West Greenland waters to East Greenland.
Greenland's yearly remuneration increased fromECU 26.5 million
(approximately USD 28 milli~n)'~ to ECU 34.25 million

(approximately USD 36 million).

NORWAY'S ACCESS TO GREENLAND WATERS UNDER THE EEC
AGREEMENT

128. Under the reciprocal Fishery Agreement between
Norway and the EEC of 1980, Norway is reallocated part of the

EEC quotas in Greenland waters. The Counter-Memorial omits

"Accordingto the rate of exchange rulingal 1 lune 1989 when 100 ECU
equalled 104.73 USD.

50 direct mention of Norway's negotiated access to the Greenland
fishery zone. The access obtained through the EEC is Norway's
only basis for operating inside the Greenland fishery zone, a fact
that should be kept in mind when examining e.g., the Norwegian

shrimp catches off West Greenland and East Greenland in
Appendix 5, Table 5.11 of the Counter-Memorial.

129. Under the new 5-year Protocol of the Fishery

Agreement between Greenland and the EEC, Norway has been
allotted most of the EEC share of the lucrative shrimp fishing off
the East Coast of Greenland, see Table VI11below on page 57.
In addition, Norway is entitled to fish Greenland halibut off both

the West and the East Coast of Greenland, and (Atlantic) halibut
off the West Coast.

130. The EEC has developed a common denominator for

comparing the value of different species of fish, namely the "cod
equivalent". This denominator has been employed by the EEC
and Greenland in the EEC Fishery Agreement. Based on the EEC
cod equivalent, the value of the Norwegian quotas in the

Greenland fishery zone may be calculated to 7.9 per cent. of the
total value of the quotas allotted to the EEC under the Fishery
Agreement with Greenland. The Norwegian "share" of the total
EEC access fee under the Fishery Agreement thus amounts to
USD 2.8 million. It should be noted that Norway has not

compensated the EEC for the quotas granted to Norway in the
Greenland fishing zone in cash, but by reciprocal fishing rights
for EC vessels in the Norwegian fishery zone.

F. The Resources off the East Coast of Greenland

1. The Importance of East Coast Fishing to the Economy of

Greenland

132. In the Counter-Memorial, Norway has attempted to
belittle the importance to the Greenland economy of the fishing

activities off the East Coast of Greenland. direct mention of Norway's negotiated access to the Greenland
fishery zone. The access obtained through the EEC is Norway's
only basis for operating inside the Greenland fishery zone, a fact
that should be kept in mind when examining e.g., the Norwegian

shrimp catches off West Greenland and East Greenland in
Appendix 5, Table 5.11 of the Counter-Memorial.

129. Under the new 5-year Protocol of the Fishery

the West and the East Coast of Greenland, and (Atlantic) halibut
off the West Coast.

130. The EEC has developed a common denominator for

compensated the EEC for the quotas granted to Norway in the
Greenland fishing zone in cash, but by reciprocal fishing rights
for EC vessels in the Norwegian fishery zone.

F. The Resources off the East Coast of Greenland

1. The Importance of East Coast Fishing to the Economy of

Greenland

132. In the Counter-Memorial, Norway has attempted to
belittle the importance to the Greenland economy of the fishing

activities off the East Coast of Greenland. 132. Norway States that "the activities of the modem
Greenland fishing fleet have been almost exclusively confined to

Greenland West Coast waters" and that "Greenland'sinterest in
east coast fishing is of a very recent date". Norway further
maintains that available resources in the East Coast waters have
mainly been allocated to third States through licences, with

Greenland vessels participating to a limited extent only in the cod
and shrimp fishing off the southeast coast. Finally, emphasis is
put on the fact that out of a total of 310 modem Greenland
fishing vessels, only five had their registered home port in East

Greenland (the Counter-Memonal, p. 12, para. 45).

GREENLAND IS A GEOGRAPHICAP O, LITICAAND ECONOMIC

UNITY

133. The Govemment of Denmark wishes to point out that
by continually emphasising the differences between West

Greenland and East Greenland with respectto e.g., the number of
inhabitants, the level of activity by Greenland vessels, the
occurrence and magnitude of fish stocks, the registered home

ports of the Greenland vessels, etc., Norway fails to recognise the
unity of Greenland.

134. Greenland is an autonomous temtory within the

Danish Realm, a geographical, political and economic whole.
Variations in physical and cultural geography withinGreenland,
e.g., the geographical location of registered home ports of

Greenland vessels fishing in national (Greenland) waters, are an
irrelevant factor in the settlement of the present delimitation
dispute.

135. Greenland is entitled to a 200-mile fishery zone and
vested with the exclusive right of exploiting the resources within
this zone. The freedom of the competent political organs, the

Home Rule Authority, to decide how these resources should be
exploited is unrestricted. The Home Rule Authority has found
that for the time being the interests of Greenland are served
better by exploiting part of the resources of the Greenland waters

through fishing agreements with third States. The fact that thesethird State agreements grant foreign vessels accessmainly to East
Greenland waters should not be viewed as evidence that
Greenland takes less interest in these waters than in the western
fishing grounds. The exploitation of the resources of the East

Greenland fishery zone, including the area in dispute, is of
considerable importance to the economy of Greenland. The
background for the continued existence of licence fishing in
Greenland waters is outlined above on pages 48 - 49, paragraphs

123 - 125.

136. It is correct that large-scale commercial fishing by
Greenland vessels was first developed off the West Coast of

Greenland, and that the activities of the modem Greenland
fishing fleet in East Greenland waters are of afairly recent date
(the Counter-Memorial, p. 12, para. 43, although the fishing in
East Greenland waters by small boats from Tasiilaq/Ammassalik

and Ittoqqortoomiit/Scoresbysund preceded by many decades the
fishing by Norwegian vessels, which did not commence until the
mid-1970s (see the catch figures in the Counter-Memonal,
Appendix 5, Table 5.2). The concentration of the bulk of the

Greenland population on the West Coast and the absence of a
Greenland tradition for distant-water fishing were determinativeof
this development of the Greenland fishing patternas was the fact
that the large shrimp banks were first discovered in West

Greenland. Committed to promoting the interestsof the Greenland
fishing industry, the Home Rule Authonty has to a very large
extent reserved the shrimp fishing on the plentiful banks off
Northwest and West Greenland for Greenland vessels. In general,

most of the quotas allotted to Greenlanders have been granted off
West Greenland, and the majority of the Greenland vessels
operate off the West Coast of Greenland.

137. The Counter-Memonal, page 12, paragraph 45,
highlights the fact that out of a total of310 Greenland fishing
vessels of more than five gross registered tonnes, only five have
registered Tasiilaq/Ammassalik in East Greenland as their homeport. The absence of more registrations in Tasiilaq is merely
indicative of Tasiilaq's status as only the tenth-largest town in

Greenland. The westerly location of the registered home ports is
without relevance to Greenland's possibilities for exploiting the
resources of the East Greenland waters, since modem fishing
vessels are perfectly capable of making the voyage - through

national Greenland waters - from the West Io the east Coast as
they indeed do already.

138. Under the existing third State fishing agreements,

foreign vessels are mainly granted access ta East Greenland
waters. Greenland vessels now take three fourths of al1 fish
caught in the Greenland fishery zone as a whole, but despite an

increasing Greenland participation in the fishing off the East
Coast of Greenland, foreign vessels still outnumber Greenland
vessels. Table VI1 below graphically illustrates the Greenland
share of the total catch of fish and shellfish off the East Coast of

Greenland in the period 1980 - 1989. TABLE VI1 Tora1Carch of Fish and Shellfish by Greenland and
Foreign Vessels,Norway Sepurutely Noted, in the East Greenlund

Fishery Zone in 1980- 1989. Thousand Tonnes.''

Source: IYX-1984: The Mlnisrryi;reenlund. 1985 - IYXY: The Home Rule
Aurhoriry.

IMPORTANC O FEASTCOAST RESOURCE TS THE ECONOM OYF
GREENLAND

139. The distributionof quotas in the Greenlandfishery
zone for 1990 with separatelistings for West GreenlandndEast

"
The yearly catches hy Greenland vessels reflecVI1ohoi,eble
e.rce@ the corresponding figures of the Counter-Mernor5,Tablependix
5.2. The Nowegiarahle does no1 include catches of shrimp.rhe mosr imporranr
species to Greenland fishing on the Easr Coast. Tohle 1/11ahove is limired ro
catches wirhin Greenland zone.Greenland is given below in Table VIII. In addition to the

allocation of quotas to the different foreign States, Table VI11
demonstrates that the quotas established for East Greenland
account for more than half of the total quotas fixed for al1
Greenland waters. Although the quotas may not be fully

exploited, the figure indicates that the resources of East
Greenland waters are of considerable economic importance to
Greenland, contrary to what might be inferred from the statement
in the Counter-Memorial "that the most important and most

exploited fish stocks are concentrated along the West coast" (p.
14, para. 53). The East Coast waters host large resources, and
e.g., the occurrence of redfish is much larger than on the West
Coast, a fact reflected in the allotment of quotas, see Table VI11

below.

140. Table VllI also demonsVates that almost one third of
the aggregate quota established for East Greenland for 1990 has

been retained by Greenland. This retention of the fishing rights
reflects Greenland's determination to enhance the domestic
exploitation of the East Coast resources. TABLEVIIIDistribution of Fish Quotas behveen Greenland, the
Faroe Islands,EEC and Nonvay for 1990. West und East
GreenlandFishery Zones. Tonnes.

Greenland The Faroe EEC EEC quota
Islands allocatedto

Nonvay
West Greenland

Cod 94,000 O 16,000 O
Shrimps 43,500 270, 730 O
Redfish 13,700 O 5,500 O

Greenland halibut 5,000 150 1,650 200
Other fish 11,400 0 2,000 200
Total 167,600 420 25,880 400

East Greenland

Cod O O 15,000 0
Shrimps 9,600 ' 880 1,120 2,500

Redfish 18,880 500 46,820 O
Greenland halibut 4,500 150 3,550 200
Capelin 26,000 10,000 30,000 O
O
Blue whiting 10.000 O 30.000
Total 68,980 11,530 126,490 2,700

Source: The Greenland Home Rule Aurhoriy,

141. Table VI11 above illustrates that under Greenland's
current Fishery Agreement with the EEC, the overwhelming pan
of the total EEC quota has been allocated to the East Greenland

fishery zone; on basis of the above figures the East Coast share
may be calculated to approximat85yper cent. of the total EEC
quota. Thus, most of EEC's payment to Greenland under the
Fishery Agreement, in 1990 USD 36 million, may be considered

remuneration for access to fishing on the East Coast. In weight,
the EEC capelin quota accounts for approximately one fourth ofthe total EEC East Greenland allotment. These figures clearly
demonstrate that Greenland derives a substantial income from
exploitation of the resources of the East Coast waters, including
the capelin-rich disputed area, through receipt of EEC licence

revenues.

EXPLOITATION OF THE CAPELIN RESOURCE

142. Norway has chosen a very broad approach to the
description in the Counter-Mernorial of Nonvegian fishing in the
North Atlantic Ocean, including past and present activities and

catch statistics on a wealth of species that are not caught in the
disputed or even in the relevant area between Greenland and Jan
Mayen. Denmark has thus been encouraged to submit the above
general remarks on the Greenland fisheries sector. The Nonvegian

approach should not, however, obscure the fact that - save a
currently modest seal hunt - the capelin is presently the only
resource of commercial importance in the disputed area.

143. The Govemment of Nonvay has noted that Denmark
has failed to demonstrate that "fishing boats from Greenland fish
now, or have ever fished, in the areas near Jan Mayen" (the
Counter-Memorial, p. 167, para. 581). It is further contended that

"(t)he Danish Memorial offers no evidence of the dependence of
Greenland fisheries on the area in dispute" (ibid., p. 167, para.
584).

144. The Govemment of Denmark refutes the inference
from the Norwegian statements that Greenland has no economic
interest in the resources of the disputed area. It is correct, but

irrelevant, that Greenland's capelin resource in the disputed area
has been caught by foreign vessels under third State fishery
agreements. The extensions of the Greenland fishery zone have
ensured that, today, Greenland benefits economically from al1

fishing within the Greenland zone, either directly through
Greenland vessels catching the resources or through issuance of
fishing licences to third States against payment. 145. In addition to the general comments on the rationale

for Greenland's issuance of fishing licences above on pages 48 -
49, paragraphs 123 - 125 it seems appropriate to explain why the
relevant resource of the disputed area, the capelin, is not
presently caught by Greenland vessels. Further it will be

demonstrated how the Greenland fisheries sector is indeed
dependent upon the area in dispute. Capelin is commercially
utilised for the production of fish meal and fish oil and the
fishing of capelin requires large specialised vessels. The summer
season for capelin fishing in the disputed area is very brief, and

until the Icelandic-Nonvegian-Greenland Capelin Agreement of
1989 Greenland had no access to winter capelin fishing in the
Icelandic zone. In addition, the capelin has in the 1980s proven
an unreliable, albeit potentially lucrative source of income; al1 of

which has led the Home Rule Authority to postpone the requisite
substantial investments in the capelin purse seiners that would
enable Greenland shipowners to participate in the capelin fishing.
The Home Rule Authority has also been negatively influenced by
the fact that Greenland's exclusive right to the prime fishing

ground for summer capelin is disputed by Nonvay.

146. The Home Rule Authority has further decided to
license most of the fishing for redfish in the East Greenland zone

to the EEC. The occurrences of redfish are very large, but the
economically viable fishing season is very short. In weight,
capelin and redfish account for more than half the total quota
allotted to third States in the East Greenland fishery zone in
1990.

147. The fishing of capelin by chartered Faroese vessels,
which is described in greater detail below on pages 64 - 65,
paragraphs 159 - 161 is not merely a vehicle for generation of

income. To the extent possible, the Faroese are required to man
the vessels with Greenland crew for training as well as
employment purposes. Even more important, the licensing offers
the Home Rule Authority an opportunity to monitor the
profitability and reliability of the capelin fishing over a period of

years before making the decision on whether to undenake thesubstantial investments in the requisite purse seiners or subsidise

the private purchase by Greenlanders of such vessels.

148. Unlike Norway, the Greenland economy will within
the foreseeable future remain inseparably tied to the ability of the

fishing industry to generate income. The Greenland community is
not less dependent on its fishing industry today than it was in
1958 when 67 countries adopted the Resolution dated 26 April
1958, acknowledging that Greenland (together with the Faroe

Islands and Iceland) were "ovenvhelmingly dependent upon
coastal fishenes for their livelihood or economic development",
see page 32, paragraph 82 above and the Memonal, page 98,

paragraph 305. Greenland must consequentlyrely on utilisation of
al1 its marine resources, especially one that has proved as
potentially rewarding as the capelin. The fact that the Greenland
capelin quota is presently fished by foreign vessels should not

distract attention from the fact that the resourcemigrates through
Greenland waters -and that the developing economy of Greenland
is in need of al1 income that may be derived from the fishing of
the capelin.

149. Greenland's issuance of licences to third States
should not be viewed as a permanent arrangement. Greenland has
an aspiration ta become capable itself of exploiting more, if not

all, of the resources in the Greenland waters. The opportunity of
creating new jobs both at sea and in the processing plants on
shore weighs heavily in favour of shifting the fishery policy from
the issuance of licences to local fishing and processing of the

catch. However, the vulnerability and relatively small scale of the
Greenland economy makes it necessary to build up the capacity
of the Greenland fishing fleet gradually, and the licensing

arrangements will in the years to come continue to constitute a
necessary and welcome supplement to Greenland's own fishing
income. 150. Norway has cited the "(in)capacity of inshore east
Coast waters for biomass production" as a reason for the absence
of modem fishing operations based in East Greenland (the

Counter-Memorial, pp. 12 - 13, paras. 46). Norway further
assumes there is agreement between Norway and Denmark as to
the paucity of fishing resources in East Greenland inshore waters,
referring to the Memorial, page 14, paragraph 41, as the basis for

this assumption. Denmark refutes both assumptions.

151. In the Memorial (p. 14, para. 41) Denmark cited
potential delimitation difficulties in the areas vis-à-vis Iceland and

Jan Mayen as well as the relative paucity of fish stocks in those
waters as the reasons for not extending the Danish 200-mile
fishery zone north of 67" N. The staternent in the Memonal
explicitly referred to the relative paucity of fish stocks in the

waters nor-thof 67" N (as opposed to the East Greenland waters
south of 67"N).

152. Norway, thus, misrepresents the Danish view in para.

46 of the Counter-Memonal by omitting the qualification
"relative" and the geographical scope "north of 67" N". It follows
from Table VI11that the quotas allocated to Greenland and third

State vessels in East Greenland waters for 1990 account for
around 50 per cent. of the aggregate quotas for Greenland as a
whole in 1990. It is thus erroneous to describe the East
Greenland waters in general as characterised by a paucity of

fishing resources.

153. If the Norwegian assertion of a paucity of fishing
resources is merely concemed with East Greenland inshore

waters, the Norwegian assumption of an agreement between
Denmark and Norway on the basis of paragraph 41 of the
Memonal is incomprehensible. No views are expressed in
paragraph 41 of the Memorial as to the abundance or paucity of

fishing resources in East Greenland inshore waters, but merely as
to the relative paucity of fishstocks in the East Greenland watersnorth of 67ON. Nevertheless, the Nonvegian assumption of an
absence or insignificant occurrence of inshore fishing resources in
East Greenland is incorrect. Inshore small-boat fishing in summer
- coupled with hunting for manne and land mammals - has for

centuries sustained the populations of the settlements of East
Greenland and still represents an important contribution to the
economy and diet of the local population. One example is the
native Greenland inshore capelin stock that is fished intensively

in coastal waters by the inhabitants of Tasiilaq/Ammassalik
municipality in the surnmer months, see Annex 24 to the
Memonal "The Role of Capelin in the Traditional Greenland
Society". Ice conditions render this coastal fishing impracticalfor

the remainder of the year. The dependence of the Inuit population
on the exploitation of the resources of the East Coast of
Greenland is further addressed below on pages 73 - 78,
paragraphs 181 - 199.

2. Fishing for Capelin

THEFIRSTYEAR OF THE PIPARTTTE CAPELIN AGREEMENT

154. On 12 June 1989 Denmark/Greenland, Iceland and
Nonvay entered into an agreement on conservation and

management of the capelin stock migrating between the maritime
zones of the parties. The Agreement is cornmented upon in the
Memorial, page 24, paragraphs 90 - 91 and in the Counter-
Mernorial, pages 47 - 48, paragraphs 151 - 153. In 1989, the first

year of the Capelin Agreement, the marine biologists of the
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) again
advised a relatively low level of fishing activity to ensure an
adequate spawning stock. The capelin constitutes a decisively

important link in the food chains of sealç and larger fish species
of the Northeast Atlantic Ocean. Observance of appropnate and
adequate measures for the conservation of the capelin stock is
imperative, not only to maintain the lucrative capelin fishing in

the years to come, but also - and much more irnportantly - to
secure the preservation of the ecological equilibnum of the area
and thereby an exploitable multi-species resource base. Obviously, a dedicated and rational conservation effort is particularly called
for in the case of a volatile fish stock such as the capelin
migrating between the maritime zones of three jurisdictions, see

Article 63 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.

155. In the course of 1989, the Parties agreed on a total

allowable catch of 900,000 tonnes for the first fishing season
under the Agreement, mnning from 1 July 1989 to 30 April
1990. Under the terms of the Agreement, the total allowable
catch is to be divided between the Parties in the ratio of

78:11:11 for Iceland, Norway and Greenland, respectively. The
Agreement entitles the Parties to fish their allotted quotas
irrespective of zone limits, however with the proviso that
Greenland and Norwegian vessels are not allowed to fish in the

Icelandic zone south of 64O30.N. This geographic restriction
became relevant in 1989 when the migratory pattern of the
capelin proved atypical.

156. The summer capelin stock was very difficult to locate
in the 1989 summer season, and according to available
information none of the Greenland fishing for capelin took place
in Greenland's zone, but rather far south within the Icelandic

zone. In accordance with the Agreement, the Greenland capelin
fishing had to stop when the resource migrated south of 64'30.N.
Iceland declined to suspend the geographical limitation of the
Agreement, and as a consequence only a fourth of the Greenland

quota was utilised.

THEMIGRATORY PA-ITERN OF THE CAPELIN STOCK

157. The first year of the capelin agreement clearly
demonstrated that the migratory pattern of the capelin is
susceptible to infealiaclimatic variations and difficult to predict
with any degree of certainty, a fact recognised in the Memorial,

pages 48 -49, paragraph 182. The sketch figures accompanying
paragraph 182 of the Memorial depicting the migratory pattern of
the capelin stock, have been said by Norway to "give a
misleading view of the recorded migratory pattern of thisapelin

stock" (the Counter-Memorial, p.44, para. 145). 161. The fishing of the Greenland capelin quota by foreign
vessels is effected in two different ways. Under the existing
Fishery Agreement with the EEC, Greenland is required to
allocate annually 40,000 tonnes of capelin ta the EEC, including

10,000 tonnes to be reallocated by thEEC to the Faroe Islands.
This is licence fishing proper, although the complex character of
the EEC Fishery Agreement distinguishes it from standard
licensing arrangements. The remainder of the Greenland capelin

quota is allotted ta Greenland shipowners who then charter
Faroese vessels ta fish the capelin against a fee per kilo fish
taken. Technically speaking, this is not licence. fishing but

exploitation of a Greenland quota even if the fish is caught by
foreign vessels. In the Memorial, the Govemment of Denmark
listed the total catch of capelin taken on Greenland quota within
the Greenland fishery zone instead of breaking the catch down

according ta flag state, see the Mernorial, page 51, Table VI.

ESTABLISHMENT OF TAC'S AND QUOTAS PRIOR TO THE CAPELIN
AGREEMENT

162. In its account of the inter-state cooperation onelin
management, the Norwegian Government contends that the
issuance of third State capelin licences by the Greenland

authorities in 1980 "automatically authorise(d) an element of
overîïshing in relation ta the recommended TAC" (the
Counter-Memarial. p. 47, para. 149). The Govemment of
Denmark refutes the Norwegian statement.

163. First, it should be emphasised that Norwegiancapelin
fishing in the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen did not

commence until 1978. Secondly, in 1980 the Nonvegian
Govemment was fully aware that DenmarkIGreenland took a
serious interest in the exploitation of the capelin resource. The
Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs had in August 1979 advised

his Norwegian colleague that Denrnark contemplated an extension
of Greenland's fishery zone north of 67'N precisely because of
the newly discovered capelin stock, part of the fishing of which
had been canied out within 200 nautical miles of the Greenland

Coast, see the Memorial, pages 14 - 15, paragraphs 46 -47. Itmust be reiterated that in 1980 Greenland was still a member of
the EC, and the EEC the competent body in matters of fishery
policy in Greenland. In 1980 Nonvay and Iceland unilaterally

agreed on a capelin TAC and how that TAC should be divided
between the two countries. EECIGreenland was not invited to
these negotiations, nor was EECIGreenland allotted a capelin
share, according to the Counter-Memorial, page 47, paragraph

149, because "no Greenland catch had occurred previously". The
failure to include EECIGreenland in the Icelandic and Nonvegian
negotiations on the management of the capelin stock left
EECIGreenland with no alternative but to establish its own, very

modest capelin quota for 1980. The quota was fished by Faroese
and EC vessels.

164. The developments of 1981 expose the fallacy of the
Norwegian justification for why Norway and Iceland did not allot
a capelin share to Greenland. Despite knowledge that Faroese and
EC vessels had fished capelin on an EECIGreenland quota in the

Greenland fishery zone in 1980, Iceland and Norway again in
1981 shared the bilaterally established capelin TAC between them
without providing for an EECIGreenland quota. Again,
EECIGreenland was forced to establish its own capelin quota.

165. Thus, EECIGreenland establishments of capelin quotas
were clearly prompted by the exclusive nature of the strictly
bilateral Icelandic/Norwegian management of the migratory

capelin stock. The Nonvegian application of the term
"overfishing" is not warranted. The fact was that Iceland and
Nonvay had attempted to exclude Greenland from any capelin
quota. Greenland, as a coastal State, insisted on a quota, as it

had every right to do. To describe EECIGreenland's use of this
quota as "overfishing" is a travesty of the tem. It was rather
Nonvay and Iceland that introduced the risk of overfishing by

sharing a migratory resource between them. As the capelin
indisputably migrates through the uncontested Greenland fishery
zone, the Norwegianllcelandic exploitation of the capelin and the
attempted exclusion of EECIGreenland from the management

negotiations are contrary theprinciple of multi-state management of migrating fish stocks embodied in Article 63 of the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea.

PERMANEND TELIMITATIO ONF THE DISPUTED AREANECESSARY

166. The Government of Norway has called it a

"misconception" when it is assumed in the Memorial, page 24,
paragraphs 90 - 91, that the settlement of the delimitation issue
would have an influence on the management of the capelin stock
ta be agreed upon between Greenland, Norway and Iceland (the

Counter-Memorial, pp. 48 - 49, para. 154). Nonvay goes on ta
stress that "the exact location of the boundary line is therefore
not a decisive factor in determining national allotments".

Nowhere in the Memorial is it stated that the size of the national
maritime zones is the decisive factor for the sharing of the
capelin resource. It would seem difficult, however, for Norway to
deny al1 correlation between the geographical distribution of the

resource between the national zones and the national quotas.
Thus, the fact that the Icelandic percentage of the total allowable
catch (78 per cent.) under the tripartite capelin Agreement reflects
inter alia that the occurrences of capelin are much larger inside

the Icelandic zone than outside.

167. The coming into existence of the intenm tripartite

capelin Agreement between Greenland/Denmark, lceland and
Nonvay does not render a permanent delimitation of the fishery
zones superîluous. Delimitation of fishery zones and joint
management of fish stocks are distinct legal concepts and should

not be viewed as alternatives or mutually exclusive. The tripartite
capelin Agreement is temporary in nature and covers only one
type of resource, whereas the establishment of definite

jurisdictional lines will provide a lasting framework for
conservation and exploitation of al1 resources of the area.

168. A joint management agreement will in many cases be

a most useful and natural supplement to a maritime delimitation,
but without an established delimitation of the maritime areas
under consideration, no solid basis exists for coming to terms on

a joint management of the relevant resources. In the Icelandic-Nonvegian Agreement of 28 May 1980 concerning Fishery and
Continental Shelf Questions, the need for a fixed boundary

between the fishery zones was duly acknowledged by the Parties
as a prerequisite for joint management arrangement in the waters
between Jan Mayen and Iceland (Annex 16 to the Mernorial,
Annex 70 to the Counter-Memorial). In the preamble to the

Agreement, Nonvay recognisedIceland's right to a full 200-mile
economic zone opposite Jan Mayen. That recognition fomed the
basis of the operative provisions of the Agreement concerning

intearlia joint management by Iceland and Nonvay of the fish
stocks.

169. Greenland remains committed to a responsible

exploitation and conservation of the migratory capelin resource to
be agreed upon between the parties concemed in accordance with
Article 63 of the 1982 Convention on the ~aw of the Sea. Only
clear jurisdictional lines will ensure, however, that the highest

possible level of efficiency is reached with respect to
conservation and exploitation of the resource as well as policing
of. the activities in the area. The Government of Denmark

considers it essential that the renegotiation of the tripartite capelin
Agreement in 1992 is conducted on the basis of a permanent
delimitation of the maritime area between Greenland and Jan
Mayen. As pointed out by Norway in the Counter-Memorial,

pages 47 -48, paragraph 151,the tripartite capelin negotiations
leading up to the 1989 Agreement proved uncommonly lengthy
and complex. In the opinion of the Govemment of Denmark this

was to a large extent attributable to the existence of overlapping
maritime claims.

VALUE TO GREENLAN DF THE CAPELIN RESOURCE

170. Nonvay has emphasised that Greenland's "income
derived from the licensing of capelin fishing off the East

Greenland Coast north of 68" N constitutes less than one per
cent. of the value of fisheries in the whole Greenland zone" (the
Counter-Memorial, p. 167, para. 584). The Norwegian assertion is
not correct. In 1988, Greenland's income derived from

exploitation of the capelin resource accounted for 1.6 per cent. ofthe total first-hand value of fishery products landed in Greenland.
Greenland's capelin income includes payment for EEC access to
capelin fishing under the EEC Fishery Agreement as well as

charter fees from Faroese vessels accordingto quantities caught.

171. According to information available to the Danish
Government, the value of the Norwegian capelin catches taken in

the Jan Mayen area has accounted forless than 1 per cent. of the
total first-hand value of Norwegian catches in the period 1987 -
1989.14It woul'dthus seem that the relative dependence of the

Greenland economy on the capelin resource in the waters
between Greenland and Jan Mayen, including the disputed area,
at least equals that of Norway, even assuming Norway's

dependence to be a relevant factor.

172. It must be reiterated that whereas the fishenes sector

is the decisive component of Greenland's economy (78 per cent.
of totalexports in 1989) it accounts only for a minor part of the
Nonvegian economy (5.5 per cent. of total export value in 1989).
In this perspective, Greenland's reliance on its capelin income.

clearly exceeds that of Nonvay, let alone that of Jan Mayen.

173. Part of the Greenland quota is allocated to EC and

Faroese vessels against paymentof a substantial lump sum under
the Fishery Agreement between Greenland and the EEC, and
another part of the Greenland quota is allocated to Greenland

shipowners but fished by chartered Faroese vessels in return for a
licence fee calculated on the basis of the quantity taken. Despite
the above comparison of the relative importance of the capelin

resource to the Greenland and Norwegian economies, it should
not be overlooked that the value of the capelin resource to the
Greenland community cannot be measured exclusively by income
figures. Most importantly the capelin resource represents an

economic potential to the Greenland society. This potential will
hopefully be harvested within the foreseeable future by Greenland
vessels to the benefit of the Greenland society.

l4Calculated onthe basis of figures made pubNonvegian Fisheries
1987 - 1989 and Fiskrs Gang No. 2, 1990. published by the Nonvegian
Directorateof Fisheries.3. Sealing and Whaling in the East Greenland Fishery Zone

174. Nonvegian sealing and whaling activities in "the Jan
Mayen Region" have been described in great detail in the

Counter-Memorial, pages 35 - 40, paragraphs 119 - 131, as well
as in the lengthy Appendix 3. The portrait painted by Norway
calls for comment and a more detailed review of select topics.

HISTORICAO LVERVIEW OF SEALING AND WHALINC I~
GREENLANW D ATERS

175. The general tenor of the Counter-Memorial leaves the

impression that from historical times until the present the
Nonvegians have exercised a virtual monopoly over the
exploitation of marine resources in the North Atlantic. This is
especially the case when it comes to Nonvegian hunting for

marine rnarnmals. One cannot help assuming that Map 1 attached
to the Counter-Memorial reflects a Nonvegian conception of the
North Atlantic Ocean - including the adjacent Barents Sea and
the Davis Strait- as historically a Norwegian mare nostrum. The

Nonvegian Map 1 is addressed in more detail on pages 34 - 36,
paragraphs 87 - 96 above.

176. This impression is reinforced by the unequivocal and

erroneous statement in the Counter-Memorial, page 15, paragraph
56, that the resources of the East Greenland waters north of 68"N
have been exploited exclusively by Nonvegians (save some
Soviet sealing activity). This staternent omits al1 reference to the

hunt for seals and whales canied out by the Inuit inhabitants of
the settlements ofEast Greenland.

177. Unlike the Norwegian activities, the Inuit subsistence

hunt for marine mammals has for many centuries and to this day
supported indigenous human settlements on the East Coast of
Greenland. In historical retrospect, the numbers taken by the
subsistence hunters of East Greenland are not comparable to the
toll inflicted upon the marine mammal stocks by the industrial European sealers and whalers, but the fact remains that seals and
whales continue to constitute the mainstay of the livelihood of
the East Greenland communities. Indeed, in the most recent years

the number of seals and whales caught by Inuit hunters in East
Greenland even exceeded the Nonvegian catches in the maritime
area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, see below page 73,
paragraph 183 and Table IX on page 78. Without attempting to

belittle the Norwegian activities within the field of industrial
whaling and sealing, the historical approach of the
Counter-Memorial, in particular Appendix 3 on Norwegian sealing

activities, induces the Govemment of Denmark to comment upon
certain historical aspects of North Atlantic sealing and whaling.

178. Commercial whaling in the North Atlantic was the

invention of the Basques in the Middle Ages. In the early 17th
century Basque supremacy was challenged by British, Dutch and
Danish whaling vessels. The newcomers relied heavily on the
experiise of the Basque on board the vessels and engaged in

multispecies exploitation (whale/seai/waims). The seemingly
inexhaustible hunting grounds in the waters around Spitsbergen
was the prime field of contest between the whaling nations. The
primary hunting prey was the Greenland right whale (bowhead),

used for the production of train oil. A number of Nonvegian
vessels also took part in the Arctic whaling. It should be kept in
mind that Denmark and Norway were united in one kingdom
until 1814. DenmarkDiorway exerted considerable effort but did

not attain supremacy in the North Atlantic, as Holland and
particularly the United Kingdom became the dominant whaling
nations in the 17th and 18th centuries. The presence of the

British whalers and their modem technology also affected the
daily life of the inhabitants of Greenland, and in the 1790s the
harpoon canon and field glasses were introduced into Inuit
whaling through the British.

179. In the 19th century the stock of the Greenland right
whale had become senously depleted, and large-scale commercial
whaling in Greenland waters by and large ceased as economically

unviable. Only by the end of the 19th century did Nonvay
establish itself as a major whaling nation in the North Atlantic. 180. The Govemment of Denmark does not dispute that

Nonvay has dominated the industrialseal hunt in the West Ice l5
and the Denmark Strait for more than a century. When
contemplating the Nonvegian catch figures listedin Table 3.3 of

Appendix 3 to the Counter-Memonal, it should be noted that the
massive Norwegian sealing efforts have not been without
detrimental effects on the Inuit population of East Greenland. In

particular, the Nonvegian hunt for hooded seals in the moulting
grounds of the Denmark Strait that commenced in 1876 caused a
severe depletion of the stock or possibly a shift in breeding

grounds. Whether it was an altered migratory pattern of the
hooded seal or a mere depletion of stock that came into play, the
fact remains that the subsistence seal hunt carried out by the

Inuit of East and South West Greenland was detrimentally
affected. Contemporary eye witness accounts speak of serious
famine afflicting the hunting tribes in the Tasiilaq/Ammassalik
area in the 1880s owing to the shonage of hooded seal in the

traditional hunting grounds. The Inuit sealing of East Greenland
continued to be adversely affected well into the 20th century.
Nonvay's industnal sealing activities in the West Ice and in

particular in the Deninark Strait caused the surplus-reaping seal
hunt of the Inuit to detenorate to the point where it became
necessary in several instances in the 1920s and 1930s to resettle

groups of families from the Tasiilaq/Ammassalik tribes to new,
far-off locations in order to secure the livelihood of the Inuit
hunters.

181. The Counter-Memorial fails to recognise the existence
of Greenland sealing in the maritime areas between East
Greenland and Jan Mayen, implying that Norway and the Soviet

" Throughout the Counter-MernorialNorway has referredto the polar drift
ice off the East Coast of Greenland as the "Westce", a narne probably
originating in the fact that the ice lies to theway. Allhough the term
"polarice" has been ernployedin the Mernorial,seeap on p. 41, and the
drift ice in question lies to the east of Greenland, Denrnark has adopted the
Norwegian terminology in this Reply to avoid any risk of confusion. Union exercise a sealing monopoly in the area. The tmth is very
different.

182. The 1984 Home Rule Act on Commercial Hunting
(Annex 64) regulates sealing within the Greenland fishery zone
and reserves the hunt for any of Greenland's five species of seal

for the inhabitants of Greenland. None of the Greenland seal
species are endangered, and, at present, TAC'S and quotas have
not been established in Greenland. In the absence of quota
regulations, Greenland's sealing activities are not subject to

mandatory reporting of catch figures to the competent Greenland
authorities, and seal catch figures in the Greenland fishery zone
are given by the Greenland Fisheries Research Institute mainly as
estimates based on reports submitted by the hunters.

183. In the 1980s;the hunters of East Greenland north of
68"N, mainly from lttoqqortoormiitlScoresbysund a,re estimated to

have taken an annual average catch of 5,000 - 10,000 specimen
whereas the hunters south of 68"N, mainly from Tasiilaql
Ammassalik, have taken an estimated annual average of 10,000 -
15,000 specimen. The estimated catch figures demonstrate that in

the period 1980 - 1989 the East Greenland Inuit seal catch has
exceeded Norway's average annual catch in the West Ice between
Greenland and Jan Mayen, see the Counter-Memonal, Table 5,
page 40.

184. The Greenland sealing activities are in many ways
different from the Seal hunt carried out by Norwegian vessels.
The Nonvegian sealing takes place at the edge of the West Ice.

The location of the edge of the drifting West Ice shifts from year
to year between the Jan Mayen fishery zone, the disputed area,
and the undisputed Greenland fishery zone. The Norwegian
sealing operations are industrial in character employing large

specialised sealing vessels and utilising by and large only the
valuable skin of the seal.

185. All the settlements of East Greenland are essentially

hunting communities depending primarily on sealing, and to a
lesser degree on whaling and fishing for nourishment andgeneration of income. Inuit sealing is very much a subsistence
activity, hunting only the surplus of the stock. The hunt for seals
is camied out close to the East Greenland Coast. In the traditional

fashion, al1 parts of the seal are used. Most of the meat from
seals taken by the Inuit is used locally for human and animal
consumption whereas the majority of the seal skins are sold as a
by-product. The adverse public opinion and the ensuing recession

of the world seal skin market in the 1970s have caused the
hunting communities of East Greenland to suffer great economic
hardships. The Greenland export of seal skin has been
detrimentally affected to the extent that the Home Rule Authority

has found it necessary to introduce a sealing subsidy scheme in
order to secure the livelihood of the hunting communities, inter
alia in East Greenland.

186. The Home Rule Authority of Greenland remains
convinced that continued exploitation of the five seal species of
Greenland, none of which is threatened with extinction but rather
counted in millions, is possible and appropriate within a

framework of responsible management and conservation of the
stocks.

After the extension of the Greenland fishery zoneto
187.
200 nautical miles off the East Coast of Greenland in 1980,
Nonvegian sealing in the West Ice became dependent upon
permission from the Danish and subsequently Greenland
authorities in those years when the edge of the West Ice would

drift inside the Greenland fishery zone. As a token of solidarity
with a fellow sealing nation, Greenland granted Nonvay seal
hunting privileges in the West Ice in the period 1981 through

1988. Greenland has never claimed any compensation for these
privileges.

188. The figures on pages 222 - 223 in the

Counter-Memorial depict the occurrences, and consequently the
probable catch locations, of seals in the maritime area betwéen
Jan Mayen and Greenland in the period of 1975 - 1986. From
these figures itseems that the undisputed Greenland fishing zone as well as the disputed area have been important hunting grounds
for the Norwegian sealing vessels.

189. The permissions for Norwegian sealing inside the

Greenland fishery zones were issued annually in the form of
letters from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Upon request
from the Home Rule Authonty Norway's permission to hunt seals

inside the Greenland fishery zone was not renewed in 1989 and
1990. Enforcement considerations, as well as a wish to safeguard
the public image of Greenland's subsistence sealing, prompted
this decision by the Greenland Home Rule Authonty. Greenland

is committed to a continuation of international cooperation with
Norway and other countries on the management and conservation
of the seal stocks. Rational management and conservation
measures, and in particular the enforcement of such, are,

however, intrinsically dependent on a delimitation of the relevant
national fishery zones and the ensuing division of inspection
authority.

190. In the opinion of the Government of Denmark the

Norwegian description in the Counter-Memorial, pages 35 - 37,
paragraphs 120 - 123, of the international regulation of whaling
as well as the extent of and legal basis for Norwegian whaling in
the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen is incomplete. In

addition, a few comments on Inuit whaling in East Greenland are
warranted.

191. The hunt for larger whales, e.g., blue whale,

Greenland right whale (bowhead), humpback, sperm, fin, sei and
minke whales, is regulated by the International Whaling
Commission. The International Whaling Commission has banned

the hunting of endangered whale species and established catch
quotas for others. Due to the Greenland hunting communities'
traditional dependence on whaling, the International Whaling
Commission has recognised Greenland whaling as "aboriginal

subsistence whaling", eligible for preferential treatment withrespect to the allotment of quotas. Norwegian. whaling is

considered commercial by the International Whaling Commission.

192. The Counter-Memonal fails to recognise the existence
of Greenland whaling as well as the fact that sealing and whaling

are the dominant sources of income to the inhabitants of the
municipalities of TasiilaqIAmmassalik and Ittoqqortoormiit/
Scoresbysund, the two largest towns on the Greenland East Coast.

193. Since 1976 the International Whaling Commission has
allowed only the minke whale of the Central North Atlantic
Stock.to be caught in .the waters off East Greenland, Iceland and

Jan Mayen. In the. period 1976 - 1985 Norway was allotted
approximately a third of the annual total allowable catch of the
Central North Atlantic Stock established by the International
Whaling Commission, whereas Iceland was allotted the remaining

two thirds of the annual catch quota. Subsequent to the extension
of the fishery zone off the East Coast of Greenland north of
67ON in 1980, the Home Rule Authority granted Norway the

right to catch its minke whale quota inside the Greenland fishery
zone subject to submission of catch figures to Greenland
authorities. Greenland has never claimed any compensation for
this concession to Norway.

194. Effective as of 1 January 1986 the International
Whaling Commission agreed upon a moratorium on commercial
whaling, including the minke whale in the waters off the East

Coast of Greenland. The moratorium was not binding upon those
countries that protested against it, inter.alia Nonvay. Norway
continued to catch minke whales in the waters between Greenland
and Jan Mayen in 1986 and 1987, see the Counter-Memorial,

page 241, Table 5.12, despite the statement in the
Counter-Memonal, page 37, paragraph 122, that "Norwegian
commercial small-type whaling was temporarily suspended in
1987".

195. Greenland's consent to Norwegian whaling within the
East Greenland fishery zone, which had been notified in the form

of yearly letters between the relevant ministers,was not renewed in 1986 (or subsequent years) as Greenland felt bound by the

International Whaling Commission's moratorium on commercial
whaling. The locations of the Norwegian minke whale catches in
1984 - 1987 are illustrated in the Counter-Memonal, page 36.
When contemplating the westerly location of a large number of

the Norwegian whale catches, it should be borne in mind that
Norwegian vessels have not been allowed to take minke whales
within the East Greenland fishery zone since 1985.

196. These facts underscore the inaccuracy and misleading
character of Map 1 attached to the Counter-Memorial. At the time
of the submission of the Counter-Memorial, Norway did not have
access ta whaling in the fishery zones of West and East

Greenland. Neither was Norway allowed to hunt seals within the
Greenland fishery zone. Despite this fact, Map 1 prominently
depicts these areas as Norwegiai sealing and whaling grounds.

197. When the International Whaling Commission -
apprehensive of a possible depletion of the stocks - decided to
issue a total moratorium on commercial whaling effective as of

1986, the dependence of the East Greenland hunting communities
on whaling was recognised through the Commission's adoptionof
an aboriginal subsistence quota of 12 annual minke whales to be
taken in the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen.I6

198. The East Greenland Inuits' landing of minke whales
has always been modest, but the whale take is of vital nutritional

and economic importance to the inhabitants of the municipalities
of Tasiilaq/Ammassalik and Ittoqqortoormiit/ScoresbysundT . able
IX shows the minke whale catches by Greenland, Norway and
Iceland in the waters off East Greenland, Iceland and Jan Mayen

in the period 1980 through 1989.

l6 A sirnilar,albeit larger,G-enland aboriginalsubsistencequota exists in
West Greenland for minend fin whales.

77TABLEIX Greenland,Nonvay and Iceland'sMinke WhaleCatch
in the Waters off East Greenland. lceland and Jan Mayen
(Central North Atlantic Stock) in the Period 19809.

Greenland 2 O 1 9 11 14 2 4 10 10

Nonvay 120 45 100 113 104 85 50 50 O O
Iceland 201 201 212 204 178 145 O O O O

Source:The GreenlandFishery ResearchInsriture.

199. As the small-boat whalers of East Greenland take
their catch close to thest of East Greenland and Nonvay has
suspended its commercial whaling activities, minke whales are
not, at present, a resource exploited in the disputed area. Whaling

should thereforbe of no consequence to the delimitation issue at
stake. in the present case, although Greenland's incapacity to
enforce the International Whaling Commissions moratorium on
commercial whaling within the disputed part of the Greenland

fishery zone once again exposes the difficulties created by the
absence of a clear line of delimitation.

G. Marine Research in Greenland Waters

200. The Counter-Memonal's account of marine research
carried out in the waters around Greenland and Newfoundlandl

Labrador is concerned exclusively with Norwegian activities,
see page 50, paragraph 160; page 169, paragraph 594; and
Appendix 4 of the Counter-Memorial.

201. In order to provide a more comprehensive review of
the scientific research undertaken in the waters around Greenland,
the Govemment of Denmark has found it appropriate to briefly
outline these activities,with particularemphasis on East

Greenland waters. see Annex 65.TABLEIX Greenland,Nonvay and Iceland'sMinke WhaleCatch
in the Waters off East Greenland. lceland and Jan Mayen
(Central North Atlantic Stock) in the Period 19809.

Greenland 2 O 1 9 11 14 2 4 10 10

Nonvay 120 45 100 113 104 85 50 50 O O
Iceland 201 201 212 204 178 145 O O O O

Source:The GreenlandFishery ResearchInsriture.

fishery zone once again exposes the difficulties created by the
absence of a clear line of delimitation.

G. Marine Research in Greenland Waters

200. The Counter-Memonal's account of marine research
carried out in the waters around Greenland and Newfoundlandl

Labrador is concerned exclusively with Norwegian activities,
see page 50, paragraph 160; page 169, paragraph 594; and
Appendix 4 of the Counter-Memorial.

Greenland waters. see Annex 65. 202. Annex 65 offers in Table II a presentation of the
Danish/Greenland oceanographical and fisheries-related biological
research conducted in East Greenland waters since 1957.

203. Table III in the Annex lists research programmes

undertaken jointly with third States in Greenland waters in
general since 1963. Finally, a list of permission for foreign
oceanographical and marine biological expeditions in Greenland
waters in 1989 and 1990 is provided in Table IV. PART II

THE LAW CHAPTER 1

The Status of Islands in Maritime Delimitation

A. General Remarks

204. Norway asserts that Denmark has misunderstood the
role of islands in maritime delimitation by treating them as a

separate legal category (the Counter-Memonal. p. 134, paras. 446
- 448). In the view of the Govemment of Denmark this assertion
is not warranted. Ever since the question of maritime delimitation

between States first emerged in the preparations leading to the
First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958,
islands have been given special attention.

205. In the commentaq of the Intemational ~aw
Commission to Article 72 on the delimitation of the continental
shelf in the final version of the Commission's Articles on the
Law of the Sea, it was stated that "provision must be made for

departures [from the median line] necessitated by any exceptional
configuration of theCoast, as well as the presence ofislands or
of navigable channels. This case may arise fairly often, so that
the mle adopted is fairly elastic" (emphasis added), see 1956

I.L.C. Yearhook, Vol. II, page 300.

206. At the 1958 Conference islands were included among

the features which might constitute "special circumstances".

207. Dunng the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, a group of African States tabled a proposa1

conceming the entitlement of islands to maritime zones."
According to the proposa1 factors such as an island's size,
population and distance to its mainland or to the mainland of
another State should be taken into account when deciding the

" DOCUMENTA/CONF.62/C.2/L-62Rev.l of 27August1974(Annex66).maritime spaces to be allocated to the island. The role of islands

proved one of the central issues that complicated the negotiations
on the question of delimitation of maritime zones at UNCLOS
III.18

208. Many bilateral delimitation agreements disclose a
recognition by both parties that the presence of islands creates

special problems, and a variety of solutions to such problems has
been adopted. It is of course difficult to extract from State
practice the exact reasoning leading to a delimitation agreement
because the negotiating history is seldom made public. State

practice provides numerous examples of islands belonging to one
or both of the parties which have been either totally disregarded
or given either full or partial effect in the delimitation even

though no possibility exists of disceming any particular reason
for the solution chosen.

209. In a recent publication on the law of maritime
delimitation the role of islands in delimitation cases is said to
present a kaleidoscopic picture, scarcely explained in case law,
and is characterized as one of the most difficult aspects of the

subject of delimitati~n.'~

210. In the most recent survey exclusively on the regime

of islands in international law the following is stated:

"In State practice, islands have constantly emerged as

natural features warranting special solutions ..In the
maritime limits sphere, islands have recently ernerged as
one of the most troublesome features. A wide body of

" Fordocumentationof the issue of islandsat the vanous Lofthe Sea
Conferences,see HiranW. JayewardeneThe Regime of Islands in Infernational
Low, p. 306- 310 (Dordrecht1990).

'' ProsperWeil.The Law of Marifime Delimifafion - Refecfiop..233
(Cambridge1989) State practice has developed, but considerable refinement
of legal technique is required." 20

211. In order to ascertain any trend conceming the effect

of islands in maritime delimitations, focus must be on those
situations where the effect of one or more islands has been in
dispute in connection with the drawing of the line of delimitation.

Of particular importance to the present case are, of course, those
situations where islands are situated far from the mainland of the
State exercising sovereignty over those islands and close to an
opposite mainland of another State (detached islands). If such

situations are to be found in the same region as in the present
delimitation case, their importance is further enhanced, see pages
100 - 108, paragraphs 277 - 298 and Chapter II below.

212. In the Report of the Conciliation Commission
appointed by the Govemments of Iceland and Norway to consider
the delimitation of the continental shelf area between Jan Mayen

and Iceland, the following was said about the effect of islands in
general:

"...Islands belonging to a state and lying in the vicinity

of its coasts are ordinarily given full weight for
delimitation purposes. Where both coastal States have
islands along their coasts, examples are found where a

"trade-off' takes place by ignoring the islands on both
sides when drawing the boundary line. Where islands are
situated within the 200-mile economic zone of another
state, the "enclave principle" has sometimes been utilized

to give them territorial seas. There are other examples in
which islands have been given limited weight,
particularly in straits and other narrow areas. ..."(I.L.M.

Vol. XX, 1981, pp. 824 - 825).2'

HiranW. layewardene, The RegirneofIslands in /nrernarinnal Lpw,
192.

" The differentcategoriesof islands listed by the Conciliation Commission
correspond to the structurechosen by Hiran W. Jayewardene in his
cornprehensive stuyn the regimeof islandsin internationallaw. 213. In response to the Counter-Memorial, an analysis will
be made in the following sections of State practice and
international case law involving islands. First the delimitation
agreements mentioned in the Counter-Memorial, pages 176 - 181,
paragraphs 619 - 648, will be addressed (B 1). Then delimitation

practice and case law in which islands have been given partial or
no effect will be reviewed (B 2). Finally the importance of the
delimitation of the exclusive economic zone off mainland Norway
and the fishery protection zone around Svalbard, including Bear

Island, will be explained (B 3). The case of Jan Mayen will be
dealt with separately in Chapter IIbelow.

B. Analysis of the Effect of Islands in Maritime Delimitation

1. State Practice Relied on in the Counter-Memorial

214. In the Counter-Memorial (pp. 176 - 181, paras. 618 -

648), Nonvay refers to a number of examples of State practice in
order to identify

"a substantial sample of geographical situations which, in
its view, are comparable to the relationship between

Greenland and Jan Mayen and which have been the
subject of international agreement" (p. 176, para. 618).

215. However, closer analysis shows that the examples

chosen by Nonvay are not comparable to the relationship between
Greenland and Jan Mayen. The examples do not support the
Nonvegian claim that Jan Mayen should be allowed to impinge
upon Greenland's full 200-mile fishery zone and continental shelf
area.

216. Norway has emphasised that this Agreement gave full

effect to the Shetland Islands (the Counter-Memorial, p. 176, para. 621). Nonvay, however, fails to acknowledge the fact that
the Shetland Islands notoriously have a sizeable indigenous
population and an economic life of their own.

217. The Nonvegian contention with respect to this

Agreement is that it "gives full effect to the Japanese islands of
Tsushima" (the Counter-Memorial, p. 177, paras. 623 - 624).

218. The Counter-Memorial ignores the fact that the
Tsushima islands are large islands of about 708 square
kilometres, and that they have a population of approximately
47,000 who derive their livelihood essentially from fishing,

forestry and tourism. Thus there is no similarity between the
Tsushima islands and Jan Mayen.

219. The Counter-Memorial mentions this Agreement
attempting to demonstrate "that the Indian island of Great

Nicobar is given full effect" (see p. 177, para. 625).

220. However, a look at the map shows that in this case
the modified equidistance line was selected for two reasons; first,

because both the opposite coasts consisted of narrow ends of
linear island chains, and secondly, because there was not a great
disparity between the lengths of the relevant coasts, the coastal
front on the Indian side being about 16 miles, and on the

lndonesian side about 20 miles in length. These factors are not
comparable to but clearly distinguishable from those existing in
the present case.

221. It is also relevant that the Great Nicobar is a large,
densely populated island that has its own economy consisting of
agriculture,forestry, fishing and tourism. It is in fact larger than

many island States. 222. The Counter-Memorial asserts that the above
Agreement "delimiting maritime boundaries in the Caribbean Sea
and the Pacific Ocean", in its Article 1 "expressly adopts the
principle of equidistance" (p. 177, para. 627).

223. However, while Article 1 refers to the mcdian line,
the median line (as expressed in the text) is only applied, with
minor modifications, along those segments of both frontages

which involve a relationship of adjacency.

224. Norway asserts (p. 177, para. 628) that "the result is

that the very small islands and cays on which Colombia's
entitlement is tiased have been given full effect". Butthis is not
so; as explained in an analysis of maritime boundary agreements
presented to the Court by the Government of Canada inthe Gulf

of Maine case: "The boundary provided foran equal exchange of
areas in relation to a modified equidistance line drawn to give
half-effect to the Colombian Albuquerque and Southeast Cays,
and full effect to the islands of San Andrés and Providencia,

while disregarding Roncador ..."(Guy of Maine case, Annexes to
the Reply submitted by Canada, Vol.1, State Practice, p.12, para.
Il).

225. It is also important to note that the Colombian
islands of San Andrés and Providencia have a population of
about 22,000.

226. In the Pacific, the same method was followed with
an equidistant boundary where the relationship is one of
adjacency, but where the coasts tend to become opposite, the

delimitation line is constituted by a parallel, that of 5ON, a
boundary which operates to the detriment of Colombia.

(5) INDlA -THE MALDIVES (1976)

227. The Counter-Memorial invokes this Agreement to
show that "the modest and isolated lndian island of Minicoy wasallowed full effect" despite being 210 nautical miles from the
lndian mainland (p. 178, para. 630).

228. This cornparison ignores the fact that Minicoy Island
has a population of about 7,000 who are supported by coconut

cultivation and fishery, and Minicoy thus cannot be compared to
Jan Mayen. Apparently, Minicoy was seen by India, not as an
isolated island but as the most southerly island in the Laccadive
Islands, a group of islands in many ways comparable to the

Maldives. It is 'also worth noting that the Maldives obtained a
favourable delimitation line from points 1 to10 of the boundary.

229. The Counter-Memorial invokes the 1977 Agreement
between India and Indonesia extending the boundary established
in 1974 in the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean between

Great Nicobar and Sumatra (p. 178, para. 631).

230. The Counter-Memorial is silent as to the inferences it
wishes to draw from this Agreement. It must be emphasised that

the extension of the original boundary was drawn in such a way
that India and Indonesia received comparable compensations in
different segments of the boundary line.

231. The Counter-Memonal invokes this Agreement,

asserting that although it does not adhere to aiiy particular
principle of delimitation, it "gives more or less full effect to the
small islands and cays in the Canbbean which form the basis of
Colombian entitlement". Norway adds that "the alignment is

related predominantly to the Cayos de Albuquerque" (p. 178,
para. 632).

232. However, the Counter-Mernorial fails to mention that

this Agreement, while ratified by Colornbia within seven months
of its signature, has caused strong opposition in Costa Rica for
the very reason that it gives too much weight to Colombia'sarchipelagic and insular territory. Opposition to ratification in
Costa Rica caused the ratification process to be withdrawn in
1983.

233. In an attempt to solve the impasse, Colombia
negotiated with Costa Rica, on 6 April 1984, another delimitation
treaty, this time in the Pacific, and the Parties linked the

ratification of both instmments by providing that the exchange of
instruments of ratification should take place on the same date.
Article 1 of this second Treaty recognises the baselines

established around the Costa Rican Isla del Coco and specifically
provides that the delimitation line "will continue for the margin
of the 200 miles of maritime areas of the island del Coco". No
such margin of 200 nautical miles is attributed to the opposite

smaller Colombian island of Malpelo. The distance between the
islands is about 335 nautical miles, so Malpelo gets less than 200
nautical miles, thus adopting a solution similar to the one
requested in the present case by Denmark. The maritime area

thus recognised to Costa Rica is considered to be rich in
migratory species, especially tuna (Annex 67).

234. There has been no Costa Rican ratification of the two

Treaties. Colombia ratified the second Treaty in ,1985.

235. Nonvay invokes in support the treatment given in this
Treaty to the Venezuelan Aves Island (Isla Aves) as the basis for
an equidistance boundary opposite the United States island of

Saint Croix (the Counter-Memorial. pp. 178 - 179, para. 633).

236. There are, however, special historical and economic
reasons for the treatment accorded to Aves Island.

237. A dispute between the United States and Venezuela
conceming Aves Island arose in the 1850s. By a Treaty dated
1859 the United States, after receiving compensation for the

damages suffered by its nationals who had been exploiting nch
guano deposits inthe island, waived al1claims over Aves Island, abandoning in favour of Venezuela al1the rights they might have
over the island".22The Treaty from 1859 shows the economic
importance of Aves.

238. In early 1977 the United States informed Venezuela
of its intention to enforce a limit based on the equidistant line
giving full effect to al1 islands. This was a policy choice by the

United States to be applied to al1 boundary areas. In the
Venezuela - United States context this had the practical effect
that the United States would recognise full effect to Aves Island,

but this is a reflection of a general policy aim of the United,
States, divorced from the intrinsic ments of Aves Island, and as
such, is not a reflection of the Court's approach which is to
consider the individual characteristics of each case.

239. The Counter-Memonal cites this Agreement as giving
full effect to offshore islands (p. 179, para. 635).

240. A proper analysis of this Agreement leads to

conclusions fully in support of the Danish claim in the present
case. The delimitation concerned relates to two separate areas in
the Caribbean Sea which are represented in the two sketch maps

on pages 246 and 247 in Volume II of the Counter-Mernorial.

241. This Agreement is very complex covering both the
temtorial waters, the continental shelves as well as the economic

zones between, on the one hand, the Dutch islands of Aruba,
Curaçao and Bonaire and the northeasterly situated Leeward
Islands, Saba and St. Eustatius, and on the other hand the
Venezuelan mainland and the Venezuelan islands Los Monjes,

Islas de Aves and Aves Island. It should be pointed out that this
Agreement is not an equidistance agreement, the Preamble stating
that the Parties' "desire to delimit the maritime and underwater-

areas ...in a fair, precise and equitable manner".

"
Lapradelleet PolitRecueildesArbitrates InternationaVol. II., p.
407. 242. The islands of Amba, Curaçao and Bonaire are

situated at an average distance of only 30 nautical.miles from the
Venezuelan mainland coast. The delimitation line between them
and the Venezuelan mainland is near an equidistance line but is
in fact in favour of Venezuela, and in the major delimitation area

on the seaward side of these islands, their effect on the boundary
line to the Venezuelan economic zone is further reduced by
tilting the lateral boundary lines towards each other. In fact the

reduction in sea area for these three islands arnounts to 56 per
cent. compared to a hypothetical equidistance delimitation.

243. In the minor sea area to the north between the

relatively small Dutch islands of Saba and St. Eustatius and the
Venezuelan Aves Island it was logical to apply an equidistance
delimitation.

244. The Counter-Mernorial invokes this Treaty on the
ground that "full effect is given to three very small insular

features some distance off the coast of Yucatan: Arenas Cay, Isla
Desterrada and Arrecife Alacran" (p. 179, para. 636).

245. The description in the Counter-Mernorial, is, however,

incomplete. As shown on pages 250 and 251 in Volume II of the
Counter-Mernorial, this Treaty applies to two delimitations, onein
the Gulf of Mexico, the other, in the Pacific Ocean. And in the
Pacific the boundary penetrates deeply to the south, towards the

Mexican side, giving full effect to the US islands of San
Clemente and San Nicolas. In this way there is a "[rade-off' with
the Mexican islands off the coast of Yucatan.

246. Nonvay refers to this Agreement, stressing the fact

that it accords full effect to the Nicobar Islands (the Counter-
Memonal, p. 179, para. 637). 247. This Agreement does not provide an analogy that
deserves to be taken into account by the Court when deciding the
present case. Full effect to the Nicobar Islands between point 2

and 7 of the delimitation line should be seen as the equitable
result of according full effect to al1 the relevant Thai islands,
some of which lie up to a distance of 32 nautical miles from the
mainland Coast of Thailand.

248. The delimitation line between point 1 and 2, clearly
in favour of Thailand, has to be seen, not in isolation but in the
context of the boundaries established by the 1975 Agreement

between Thailand and Indonesia and the 1977 Agreement between
lndia and Indonesia (phase 2).

249. The above comments to the Agreement between the
United Kingdom and Nonvay (Phase 1) are equally applicable to
this Supplementary Protocol, see pages 86 - 87, paragraph 216

above.

250. Nonvay describes the alignment contained in the
Agreement between the Dominican Republic and Venezuelaof 3
March 1979 as "an equidistant line between the Dominican
Republic and the Netherlands Antilles islands.."Norway goes on

to describe the size of these islands, concluding that they are
given full effect (the Counter-Memorial. p. 180, para. 639-640).

251. This presentation of the Agreement is based on a

misunderstanding. The Agreement, concluded between Venezuela
and the Dominican Republic, does not apply to the Netherlands
Antilles Islands. What the Agreement applies to is, of course, the
delimitation between the two Parties, Venezuela and the island
State of the Dominican Republic. And the outcome of the

Agreement was that the delimitation line was drawn somewhat
closer to the Dominican Republic than to the Venezuelan
mainland, one of the reasons being that the Dominican Republicaccepted that Venezuela utilised the Netherlands Antilles Islands
as basepoints. It remains to be seen what effect the Netherlands
Antilles Islands will be given vis-&-visthe Dominican Republic

in a future delimitation between those parties.

252. In this Agreement concerning the delimitation of the
continental shelf and the fishery zones between the Faroe Islands
and Norway, full effect was given to the Faroe Islands and an

equidistance boundary was established between them and Norway
(the Counter-Memonal, p. 180, para. 641). This Agreement
represents an equitable solution considering the fact that these
islands enjoy an independent political status within the Kingdom

of Denmark, that the islands have a population of 47,000, and
that they have their own economy which is overwhelmingly
dependent on fishenes. Moreover, given that a median line
boundary had been agreed between the Norwegian coast and the

United Kingdom coast (including the ûrkneys and the Shetlands
which were given full effect) the same equitable solution was
called for with respect to the Faroe Islands, lying slightly farther
to the north.

253. The Counter-Memonal invokes this Treaty in order to
show that it "treats the small Venezuelan island (Aves) and the
very large French islands (Guadeloupe and Martinique) on a basis
of parity" (pp. 180 - 181, paras. 642 - 643).

254. This is not actually the case. The mendian
delimitation line mentioned by Norway is far from being an
equidistance line. In fact, the two segments of the indicated

meridian give only some 80 per cent. effect to Aves Island.

255. Norway relies on this Agreement which establishes
two boundaries between Australia and the French territories in the Indian Ocean and the southwest Pacific Ocean (the Counter-
Memonal, p. 181, paras. 644 - 645).

256. Article 1 of the Agreement, refemng to the southwest
Pacific Ocean, establishes the boundary between ".Australian
islands in the Coral Sea, Norfok Island, and other Australian
islands on the one hand and New Caledonia, the Chesterfield

Islands and other French islands on the other hand ..."Thus, the
boundary is essentially a median line between two sets of broadly
comparable islands, with each set of islands being backed by
long coastlines - the Australian mainland on the one side and

New Caledonia on the other.

257. The above argument of broadly comparable islands

also applies to the delimitation in the Indian Ocean between the
French Kerguelen Islands and the Australian McDonald and
Heard Islands.

258. Nonvay states that the Agreement accorded full

weight to the Indian Andaman and Nicobar Islands in relation to
Myanmar (the Counter-Memorial, p. 181, para. 648). The Indian
Narcodam Island and Barren Island were given half effect in this
delimitation.

259. As a general comment, it should be noted that in its
description of India's Agreements with Indonesia, Thailand, and
Myanmar regarding the delimitation of the Andaman and Nicobar

Islands vis-à-vis the coasts of the three States (Agreements 3, 6,
and 11 above) the Counter-Memonal omits to mention the fact
that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands consist of about 300
islands with a total area of approximately 8,250 square

kilometres. The total population of the islands is about 1.88
million, and the islands have a very flourishing economy deriving
from agriculture, fishing, forestiy and tounsm. 2. Other Islands Accorded Partial or No Effect

260. It is convenient, at this stage, to include a more
extended commentary with respect to the methods that have been

employed in the practice of States and in case law in order to
correct the 'inequitable and distorting effects that certain islands
may produce on a boundary based on equidistance.Two different
methods have been used for achieving the necessary corrections,

and both of them would in the present case lead to solutions
which are much more radical with respect to Jan Mayen than the
one requested in Denmark's Submissions.

PARTIAL EFFECT

261. The first method is to give partial effect to the island
in question when drawing an equidistant boundary. In several
cases the approach has been the "half effect" solution, first used

in the Iran - Saudi Arabia Agreement of 13 December 1965, for
the large Iranian island of Kharg, lying 17 nautical miles off
Iran's mainland. This Agreement was later superseded by the
Agreement of 24 October 1968 (Annex 68).

262. In the Greece - Italy Agreement of 24 May 1977, the
solution adopted was to give varying effect to certain Greek
islands: full effect for the large islands oforfu, Kefallinia and

Zakynthos; three quarters effect for the islands in the Channel of
Otranto (Othonoi and Mathraki); and half effect for the
Strofadhes group (Annex 69).

263. A similar flexibility is displayed in the Indonesia -
Malaysian Agreement of 27 October 1969 (Annex 70).The
boundary between the adjacent Coast of Bomeo (Indonesia) and
Sarawak (Malaysia) is a modified equidistant line, with less and

less effect being given to the Indonesian islands the futther they
lie offshore (there are no Malaysian islands to balance them). The
effect declines from full effect through 0.86, 0.74, 0.68 to 0.56,
avoiding any rigid adherence to "three quarters" or "half effect". 264. In the Iran - Oman Agreement of 25 July 1974, the

island of Umm al Faiyarin was given half effect for turning point
18 (Annex 71).

265. In the recent United Kingdom -Ireland Agreement of

7 November 1988, the Scilly Isles were given half effect for
purposes of the southem boundary projecting into the South West
Approaches (Annex 72).

266. Denmark has already mentioned the Agreements of
Sweden with the USSR and Poland, in which three quarters
effect was given to the Swedish island of Gotland (the Memorial,
p. 93).

267. Denmark has also referred to the Treaty of 14
September 1988 between Denmark and the German Democratic
Republic, where the Danish island of Bornholm was not given

full effect (theMemonal, pp. 92 - 93). .

268. The International Court of Justice has attributed less
than full effect to several islands in its Judgments: half effect to

the Kerkennah islands and no effect to the island of Jerba in the
Tunisiu-Libya case (I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 89, para. 129; pp.
63 -64, para. 79); half effect to the Canadian Seal Island in the
Guy of Maine case (I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 336 - 337, para.

222) and reduced effect to Malta in the Libya-Malta case (I.C.J.
Reports 198.5, p. 56, para. 78). Finally, the Anglo-French
Arbitration Tribunal in the Channel Island case awarded half
effect to the Scilly Isles (Reports of International Arbitral

Awards, Volume XVIII, p. 117, para. 251).

269. A second method to avoid the distorting effect of
certain islands, is to attribute to these islands a limited territorial
sea or a 12-mile zone. Endowing a mid-way island with a
12-mile arc of territorial sea, displacing by that arc the

equidistance line, is another method for reducing the effect of
certain islands causing inequity.This method invariably accords areduced maritime area to the State whose island is enclaved
compared to what would have been the result if the island had
been given full effect.

270. In the delimitation of the Adriatic Sea between Italy
and Yugoslavia of 8 January 1968 two Yugoslav islands
(Pelagosa Islands) were only given a 12-mile zone (Annex 73).

271. In the Mediterranean Sea between Italy and Tunisia
four quite small Italian islands, Lampedusa, Pantelleria, Lampione
and Linosa, lie closer to Tunisia than to Sicily. In the Agreement

of 20 August 1971 the Parties accorded to these islands a
maritime area similar to that attributed to Pelagosa Islands, Le.,
an arc of 13 nautical miles around Pantelleria, Lampedusa and
Linosa. and 12 nautical miles around Lampione which is

uninhabited (Annex 74).

272. In the Iran - Saudi Arabia Agreement of 24 October
1968, the Iranian island of Farsi was faced by the Saudi island of

Arabi (Annex 68). The solution adopted was to have a median
line between the two islands and then to allow to each a 12-
mile territorial sea limit, causing a "bulge" in the otherwise
continuous median line between the two mainland coasts.

273. In the Qatar - Abu Dhabi Agreement of 30 March
1969, the modified equidistance boundary between the two

adjacent States is displaced to allow Dayyinah, an island
belonging to Abu Dhabi, a 12-mile limit (Annex 75).

274. Also the Iran and United Arab Emirates Agreement

of 13 August 1974 allows a 12-mile arc around the Island of
Sirri (Annex 76).

275. In the Australia -Papua New Guinea Agreement of

18 December 1978, the problem was that the Australian inhabited
islands Boigu and Sabai, in the Torres Strait, lie within very few
miles of the coast of Papua New Guinea (Annex 77). On the
landward side, facing the mainland coast, they were given a

territorial sea of 3 miles only and, on the seaward side theywere, in effect, ignored for purposes of the maritime boundary
which runs well to the south of these islands. According to a
recent study the result is in some respects similar to that arrived

at in the Anglo - French arbitrati~n.~The author adds that "from
the point of view of proportionality, the line achieves a
reasonable balance between the rights of Papua New Guinea,

based on its mainland Coast,and the nghts of Australia, based on
its ownership of numerous islands scattered throughout the
Strait".

276. Another example of an island receiving only
12-miles of temtonal sea but was not enclaved is the island of
Abu Musa, according to the 1981 Award in the Sharjnh-Dirbai
Continental Shelf Arbirration. The Tnbunal rejected Sharjah's

submission that Abu Musa should be given half effect with
respect to an equidistant boundary. The Tribunal pointed out that
half effect would have attributed 460 square kilometres to the

island in addition to the area of 1,870 square kilometres
represented by its 12-mile temtonal sea. This result, in the
Tribunal's opinion, would have been disproportionate. Abu Musa
was therefore granted a 12-mile temtonal sea but disregarded as

a basepoint in the drawing of the equidistance line, see the
sketch map in Annex 78.24Since the island was on the "right
side" of the equidistance line, the decision did not result in a
total enclave, but rather a displacement of the equidistance line

by the 12-mile arc of temtonal sea. In other respects the
approach was similar to that accorded to the Channel Islands in
the 1977 Award, see the Memorial, pages 84 - 86, paragraphs
278 -282.

Publications de l'institut universitairede hautes étudesinternationales, Genève,
Paris Presses Universitaires de France, 1984, pp. 195 3. Bear Island

277. Denmark has referred to the delimitation between the

fishery protection zone around Svalbard, including Bear Island,
and the economic zone off the mainland of Nonvay as an
example of State practice in the area supporting the Danish
request for a 200-mile continental shelf zone and a 200-mile

fishery zone off the East Coast of Greenland opposite Jan Mayen
(the Memorial, p. 94).

278. Norway has argued that the case of Bear Island "is

not in point at all". The separation between the fishery protection
zone around Svalbard and the Norwegian mainland economic
zone is not a 'Jurisdictional boundary", but an "administrative
distinction" and "no delimitation in international law has been

effected" because both areas are under the jurisdiction of the
same State (the Counter-Mernorial. p. 137, para 459).

279. The Nonvegian argument that the separation between

the economic zone off the mainland of Nonvay and the fishery
protection zone around Svalbard does not constitute an
international delimitation but a domestic measure cannot be
accepted.

280. Norway claims that its Decree of 3 June 1977
(Annex 35 to the Memorial) has legal effects vis-à-vis third
States, in particular with respect to the Parties to the Svalbard
Treaty. This makes'the delimitation an international delimitation

and its validity subject to the control of international law. As the
Court said in the Fisheri ease between Norway and the United
Kingdom "The delimitation of sea areas has always an
international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will

of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it
is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act,
because only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the
validity of the delimitation with regard to other States depends

upon international law"(I.C.J.Reports 1951, p. 132). 281. The Nonvegian attempt to discount the Bear Island

delimitation as an important precedent of a maritime delimitation
in the area obliges the Govemment of Denmark to give a full
account of the facts.

282. The main islands of the Svalbard Archipelago are
situated some 250 nautical miles from the northeast coast of
Greenland and some 350 nautical miles north of the North Cape

of mainland Norway. Spitsbergen is the largest island of the
Archipelago. The southemmost island of the Archipelago, Bear
Island, is situated 130 nautical miles from the southemmost point
of the island of Spitsbergen in isolation from the rest of the

Svalbard Archipelago. The distance from Bear Island to the
Nonvegian mainland is 215 nautical miles, see the sketch map on
page 103. Bear Island is 178 square kilometres and is, like Jan

Mayen, a small rocky island with no population and unable to
sustain economic life. There is a radio station and a
meteorological station on the island.

283. In the Treaty of Spitsbergen of 9 Febmary 1920
(Annex 79) the Contracting Parties recognised, subject to certain
stipulations in the Treaty, the full and absolute sovereignty of
Norway over the Archipelago of Svalbard, including Bear Island,

see Article 1 of the Treaty. Under Article 2 of the Treaty ships
and nationals of al1 the Contracting Parties shall enjoy equally
the nghts of fishing and hunting in the. territones specified in

Article 1 and in their territonal waters. At the time of the Treaty
Norway's territorial waters extendedto 4 nautical miles from the
coast.

284. The Spitsbergen Treaty contained a quid pro quo.
Nonvay acknowledged that al1 the Contracting Parties had an
equal right to exploit the resources of the Archipelago of
Svalbard and its territorial waters. The other Contracting Parties

acknowledged that Norway had sovereignty over the islands.
Under the Treaty, Nonvay is obliged to exercise its sovereign
rights in the interests of al1the Contracting Parties. 285. At the time of the conclusion of the Treaty,
territories bordering the sea were only entitled to territorial
waters. Contiguous zones, continental shelf rights and exclusive

economic zones were unknown concepts at the time. Later
development in international law has entitled coastal States to
such zones.

286. With the development in international law, the
question arose whether the Treaty of Spitsbergen only applies to
the islands and the temtorial waters extending 4 nautical miles
from the Coast as recognised at the time of the conclusion of the

Treaty or whether the Treaty, applies to the continental shelf and
the 200-mile exclusive economic zone appertaining to the
Archipelago under current international law.

287. The Government of Norway has taken the position
that the Spitsbergen Treaty does not confer any rights concerning
the continental shelfoutside the temtorial waters of Svalbard on

the other Parties to the Treaty. The Government of Norway has
taken the same position in relation to the economic zone.

288. Pnor to Norway's establishment of the exclusive

economic zone off mainland Norway and a non-exclusive fishery
protection zone around Svalbard, a number of the States that are
Parties to the Spitsbergen Treaty had advised Norway that the
Treaty applied to the continental shelf off Svalbard and to a00-

mile economic zone around the Archipelago. Other Contracting
States including Denmark have made their reservation to the
Norwegian interpretation of the Spitsbergen Treaty known to the
Norwegian Government.

289. An official Nonvegian account of the Norwegian
position and other States' reaction to the Norwegian position is
given in a Report on Svalbard submitted by the Norwegian

Ministry of Justice to the Storting in 1986. In Section 3 of the
Report, Legal Issues, itis said that the Norwegian legislation on
the continental shelf applies "until theter limit of the territorial

seau of Svalbard. It is further stated:SketchMap of the Delimitationbetween MainlandNorwayand
Bear Island. "Some of the Parties to the Svalbard Treaty have
contended, however, that the provisions of the Treaty are

also applicable to the shelf outside the territorial sea.
The Soviet Union voiced this point of view in 1970.
Other States have subsequently resewed their position to
this issue. The Norwegian Govemment has maintained
that the sphere of application of the Treaty must be

detemined by the wording of the Treaty ....he Soviet
Union has raised objections to the basis for establishing
a fishery protection zone, and other States have resewed
their position or claimed that their fishermen are fully

entitled to fish in the zone pursuant to the provisions of
the Svalbard Treaty." (Sr. Meld. nr. 40, Section 3.3;
Annex 80).

290. Among the considerable number of States who had
eitherinformed Norway that the Spitsbergen Treaty applied to the
continental shelf off Svalbard and a 200-mile economic zone
around the Archipelago or resewed their position to the

Nonvegian interpretation, no State has publicly disclosed its
disagreement with Norway. Apart from the information given by
the Norwegian Govemment the existence of disagreement was
made public by the Govemment of the United Kingdom in 1978

through the Govemment's written reply to questions posed by a
member of the House of Lords. The Govemment was asked
whether in their view the Spitsbergen Archipelago generated a
continental shelf and whether the regime established under the

Spitsbergen Treaty operated on such a continental shelf. The
Mernber of the House of Lords further asked whether the islands
of the Spitsbergen Archipelago generated an exclusive fishery
zone, and to whom such a zone would be exclusive. The

questions were answered by the Minister of State, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, who replied:

"(a)It is the view of Her Majesty's Govemment that the

Spitsbergen Archipelago has its own continental shelf.
Whether or not the economic regime established for the
islands by the 1920 Treaty of Paris should also apply to
the continental shelf areas appertaining to the Spitsbergen Archipelago is an unresolved question
between Nonvay and the other Treaty Powers.

(b) It is the view of Her Majesty's Govemment that the
islands of the Spitsbergen Archipelago are entitled to
fishery rights in the surrounding waters on the same

basis as any other island archipelago. Any suggestion
that the fishenesnghts in a Spitsbergen zone should be
exclusive to Norway would raise issues very similar to
those relating to the continental shelf mentioned above."

(The Hansard, the House of Lords, 14 March 1978;
Annex 81).

291. The wish of the Norwegian Govemment to benefit

from the new development within the field of the law of the sea
created a dilemma for Norway. The establishment of an economic
zone around Svalbard with exclusive rights for Nonvegian
nationals would cause a confrontation with some of the

Contracting States, a fact acknowledged by the Norwegian
Foreign Minister in the Storting in 1977, see pages 106 - 107,
paragraph 295 below. The Nonvegian Govemment decided to

avoid such confrontation and abstained from establishing an
exclusive economic zone around Svalbard. The Nonvegian
Govemment limited itself to the establishment of a non-exclusive
fishery protection zone around Svalbard.

292. It was the declared policy of the Nonvegian
Govemment to avoid confrontations with other States over the
interpretation of the Spitsbergen Treaty in connection with the

establishment of broad maritime zones in the area. Other
Contracting States would regard the delimitation of the economic
zone off mainland Norway and any broad maritime zones around
Svalbard as an intemational delimitation precisely because they

regarded the two zones as different jurisdictional regimes. In
order to avoid confrontation with these States, Nonvay had to
effect the establishment of such zones in accordance with

intemational law. The actual delimitation effected unilaterally by
the Govemment of Norway demonstrates how Norway perceivedthe effect of an uninhabited island in a maritime delimitation
opposite a populated mainland.

293. Norway established a 200-mile economic zone in the
waters off the Norwegian mainland by Royal Decree dated
17 December 1976 (Annex 25 to the Counter-Memonal). The
200-mile limit of the economic zone also applied in the maritime

area between the mainland of Nonvay and Bear Island bringing
the outer lirnit of the Norwegian economic zone to a distance of
less than 20 nautical miles from Bear Island, see the sketch map

on page 103 above. The sketch map depicts the boundary of the
Norwegian economic zone opposite Bear Island and an
hypothetical median line between the Norwegian mainland and
Bear Island. It is interesting to note that in its establishment of

the 200-mile economic zone off the Norwegian mainland, Nonvay
also paid no heed to the presence of the main islands of the
Svalbard Archipelago lying some 350 nautical miles to the north
of mainland Norway (North Cape).

294. Shortly after establishing an economic zone off the
mainland of Norway, the Govemment of Norway decided to
establish a fishery protection zone around Svalbard. By Royal

Decree of 3 June 1977, issued pursuant to the 1976 Act relating
to the Economic Zone of Norway, the Norwegian Govemment
established a 200-mile fishery protection zone in the maritime

areas around Svalbard (Annex .35 to the Memorial). The fishery
protection zone was delimited by the outer limit of the economic
zone off the Nonvegian mainland (Section 2 (3) of the Royal
Decree). Under Section 3 of the 1976 Act relating to the

Economic Zone of Norway persons who are not nationals or
placed on an equal footing with Nonvegian nationals pursuant to
Nonvegian legislation may not engage in fishing within the
Norwegian economic zone. This restriction was not made

applicable to the fishery protection zone around Svalbard, see
Section 2 of the Royal Decree.

295. Norway's reasons for not establishing an economic

zone around Svalbard was explained to the Srorring by the
Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Knut Frydenlund, dunng a parliamentary foreign policy debate held on 6 June
1977, shortiy after the establishment of the fishery protection

zone. Dunng the debate Mr. Knut Frydenlund stated that in the
view of the Nonvegian Govemment, Norway was undoubtedly
entitled to establish an economic zone around Svalbard with

exclusive nghts for Nonvegian fishermen. The Nonvegian
Minister for Foreign Affairs cited two reasons why the
Nonvegian Govemment had decided for the time king to refrain

from establishing an exclusive zone around Svalbard. First, the
object of the implemented legislation was pnmarily to supervise

and reduce the fishing activities in the area. For that purpose it
was not necessary to discriminate between Norwegian and foreign
fishermen. Secondly, Mr. Frydenlund stated:

"...we must assume that Norway's fundamental view
according to which the provision of equal fishing nghts

under the Svalbard Treaty will not apply to the zone
will be disputed, and that the immediate establishment of
a zone with exclusive rights for Nonvegian fishermen

could have led to a confrontation with other Contracting
Parties. This would hardly be in the interest of Nonvay."
(Annex 82)25

296. Nonvay knew that other Parties to the Spitsbergen
Treaty were of the opinion that the exploitation nghts in any

broad maritime zones around Svalbard would be vested jointly in
the Contracting States. As Nonvay wanted to avoid an open '
dispute with these Contracting States on the applicability of the

Spitsbergen Treaty to the broad maritime zones around Svalbard,
Nonvay had to make sure that the establishment of an economic

As stated above. cenain States have disputed Nonvay's right to estahlish
the fishery protection zone. At the question lime of the Nonvegian Parliament on:
protection zone around Svalbard prompted a Member of Parliament to ask whathery
measures the Minister for Foreign Affairs intended to take toompliance
with the existing regulations. The question was answered by the Minister of
Defence who pointed out that when evaluating what measures could be it
shouldbe kept in mind "that not al1 States share the Nonvegian view of the
fishery protection zone around Svalbard and that some of them do not recognise
the zone" (Annex 83).zone off the mainland of Norway opposite the maritime areas
around Svalbard was done in accordance with international law,
and that the regulation of maritime areas around Svalbard was
carried out in a non-discriminatory way.

297. If Bear Island had been entitled under international
law to any effect in such a maritime delimitation opposite
mainland Norway, those rights would have had to be respected

by Norway when the exclusive economic zone was established
off the Norwegian mainland. This would have implied that in the
area between Bear Island and the Norwegian mainland, the
economic zone off the Norwegian mainland would have been less
than 200 miles. This was not so. Bear Island-was notoriously

depnved of effect in the delimitation of the exclusive economic
zone.

298. It is thus evident that the Government of Norway

took the view that under international law Bear Island could not
impinge on the maritime zone of mainland Norway. The Case of the Island of Jan Mayen

A. Prelude

299. Jan Mayen falls into the category of islands which

may be depicted as detached islands in the sense of islands lying
so fat from their parent mainland that they are situated on the
"wrong side" of an equidistance line measured between the

respective mainlands in casu Greenland and N~nvay.~~The
median line between mainland Nonvay and Greenland is of
course only illustrative as there is no common continental shelf
or other maritime zone to be delimited. But that does not change

the fact that Jan Mayen is totally detached from Nonvay
(approximately 550 nautical miles) and so close to Greenland
(approximately 250 nautical miles) that a boundary line between

Greenland and Jan Mayen has to be established in isolation from
Nonvay. It is therefore misleading when Nonvay claims that Jan
Mayen is geographically independent of Greenland (the Counter-

Memonal, p. 147, para. 497).

300. The development and acceptance during UNCLOS III
of the establishment of 200-mile fishery or exclusive economic

zones as well as the contemplated regime for islands suddenly
placed Nonvay in a situation where doubt was raised as to Jan
Mayen's entitlement to generate such broad maritime zones.

Would Jan Mayen fa11within the concept of a rock, because it
has never sustained human habitation or any economic life of its
own, in which case it would only be able to generate a 12-mile
zone of temtonal sea and maybe an additional 12-mile

contiguous zone? Or could Jan Mayen obtain recognition as an
island entitled to the new broad maritime zones. at least to the

See the illustrativeexamples in HiranJayewThe Regime of Islands
in Inrernarional Lapp. 368 -69. In thesame treatise the Iceland-Norway
Agreementswith regardto Jan Mayen are reviewed underthe heading: Detached
islands on"theWrongSide"(p. 391, cf. pp. -461).extent where these zones would not encroach upon the maritime
zones belonging to other States, in casu Iceland and
DenmarWGreenland?

301. When Norway in December 1976 passed Act No. 91
enabling the Govemment to establish economic zones around the
Kingdom, the Nonvegian Govemment was well aware of the
problem which Jan Mayen might create vis-&-vis Iceland and

Greenland, if a broad maritime zone was established unilaterally.
It was considered most pmdent to try to secure in advance the
acceptance by Iceland of such a zone. In his presentation to the
Storting of the first Agreement with Iceland dated28 May 1980

conceming Fisheries and Continental Shelf Questions between
lceland and Jan Mayen, the Nonvegian Foreign Minister at the
time, Mr. Knut Frydenlund, said the following about the origin of
that Agreement:

"This whole issue also originated in unanimity. There
was agreement, for one thing that Norway should
establish an economic zone around Jan Mayen, so that

stocks couldbe protected from uncontrolled exploitation.
But secondly, there was also agreement in this charnber
that such a zone [an economic zone around Jan Mayen]
should be established by agreement with Iceland, and

that Norway was prepared to have due regard for
Iceland's interests in the area.

Thus far it was al1plain sailing.

But as the subsequent negotiations between Norway and
Iceland showed, it was not so easy to reach an
understanding with Iceland. On the one hand, Iceland

argued on the basis that Jan Mayen had no right to such
a zone, a view which, incidentally, other countries
shared. On the other hand, Iceland maintained that it
ought to be possible to base measures to conserve the

stocks in the area on an agreement between the two
countries and not on Nonvegian jurisdiction.... The Icelandic point of departure for the fist round of
negotiations was thus that Jan Mayen is not an island of
such a nature that it can form the basis of an economic
zone or a continental shelf. The subsidiary line of
argument was that Norway had no right to establish a

zone around the island on its own. ..."(The Counter-
Memonal, Amex 11, p. 52)

302. Dunng the same debate in the Parliament, one of the

members, Mr. Jakob Aano, expressed the same theme in the
following way:

"And as for Jan Mayen, 1 don't suppose anyone
imagined, when Norway obtained sovereignty over that

uninhabited volcano in the middle of the Atlantic, that it
would result only a couple of generations later in our
sovereignty over a sea area as big as the whole
Norwegian mainland. 1 repeat: Norway acquired this

without either working or paying for it. Where the
extension around Jan Mayen is concemed, that has now
also been acknowledged by virtue of the agreement with
Iceland.Ithink it is important to emphasize that we had

no such acknowledged right before we reached this
agreement. ...(Ibid., p73)

303. To secure agreement with Iceland before establishing
an economic or fishery zone around Jan Mayen would also

strengthen the hand of Norway vis-à-vis Denmark/Greenland. This
was stated during the parliamentary debate by Kire Willoch (who
later becarne Prime Minister of Nonvay):

"Nor could one expect, should this agreement be
rejected, any support from Iceland for the Norwegian
demand that the line of delimitation between the zones
between Jan Mayen and Greenland must follow the
median line. If, on the other hand, the agreement

between Nonvay and Iceland is approved by the
Storting, with the nghts that Iceland thus obtains, that
will make it in Iceland's interest for Norway to maintain its zone in its entirety up to the median line opposite

Greenland, because for Iceland that would also mean the
exclusion of EC vessels from the zone, which is to
Iceland's advantage, too.Icelandic support for Nonuay's
diplomatic defence of the median line towards Greenland

could be of genuine and positive significance."(Ibid p..,
42)

304. The delimitation vis-A-vis Greenland was seen as a

diplomatic - not a legal - fight primarily against Denmark and
the European Community. The Chaiman of the Enlarged
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, MI.
Awid Johanson, explained it in the following way:

"Permit me to recall that the agreement with Iceland is
not the last of the set of agreements that lie ahead of us
in thisregion.1 am thinking of the Danish establishment

of a zone off East Greenland which extends into both
Jan Mayen's and Iceland's zone. This will confront us
with new problems, but they are different in many
respects. Iceland is a small country and overwhelmingly

dependent on its fisheries. Special circumstances have
led to Our acceptance of an agreement which recognizes
its zone in full. There is no question of such
circumstances in connection with negotiations concerning

the East Greenland zone. The latter is a matter, not of a
small separate island community on its own, but of a
State on the continent of Europe, and indeed of the
European Communities, the EC. It is a fundamentally

different situatio...

With a disagreement with the Danes looming on the
horizon, knowing that we have an unsolved problem in

relation to the Soviet Union concerning delimitation in
the Barents Sea, knowing that many have refused to
recognize our fishery protection zone around Svalbard -
who needs an u~esoived dispute with Iceland to add to

the list? There are limits to how many sea area
delimitation disputes Nonvay can handle. That is another reason for satisfaction at the resolution of at least one of
these issues." (Ibid., pp. 3- 40).

305. Thus a clear picture of Nonvegian thinking in the

years 1977 - 1980 with regard to the status of Jan Mayen in
relation to the newly accepted broad maritime zones reveals
itself. When Norway on 17 December 1976 established an
economic zone off its mainland, the Govemment felt a genuine

wony - and nghtly so - as to what would be the status of Jan
Mayen with regard to a 200-mile economic zone and
corresponding continental shelf area. If Nonvay could secure

Iceland's recognition of Jan Mayen's entitlement to a continental
shelf area and a fishery zone, the door would be open to the
establishment of a full 200-nautical mile zone off Jan Mayen
towards the open sea and a line up to Iceland's 200-mile

economic zone which would give to Jan Mayen an additional
zone of almost 100 nautical miles to the south. Then the stage
would be set to launch a diplomatic offensive in favour of a
median line towards Greenland/ûenmark/EEC. A tirst step was

taken by the Icelandic - Nonvegian negotiations on the
management of the capelin stock in the area, by leaving
EEC/Greenland out of these negotiations and basing the division
of quota on inter alia a median line between Greenland and Jan

Mayen (see paras. pp. 65 - 67, paras. 163 - 165 above).

306. Since then, more than ten years have elapsed.
Greenland has celebrated its 10 year anniversary of Home Rule

and is no longer a member of the European Communities.

307. In the following sections the delimitation situations

facing Jan Mayen will be dealt with one by one.

B. Delimitation vis-à-vis the Open Sea

308. The Govemment of Denmark does not wish to
comment upon Jan Mayen's entitlement to a full 200-mile fishery
zone in the open sea to the east, in so far as it is not directly

relevant to the Danish submission in the case before the Court.But, it is not irrelevant to point to out that, even with full
respect for Iceland's and Greenland's claims, Jan Mayen will
command an extremely large maritime zone when the size and

character of the island are taken into consideration. The Jan
Mayen fishery zone, depicted on Map IV of the Memonal and
Map IV of the Counter-Memonal, has an expanse of some
255,000 square kilometres, even if full respect is accorded to

Greenland's 200-mile zone. This should be related to the size of
Jan Mayen, which is only about 380 square kilometres. Such a
maritime area may be considered exorbitant compared to the land
area on which it is based.

C. Delimitation vis-à-visIceland

309. It was from the outset made clear to Norway by both
Iceland and Denmark that they could not accept that a 200-mile
fishery zone around Jan Mayen would cut into their respective

zones of 200 nautical miles.

310. At the very beginning of the negotiations with
Norway, which led to the conclusion of the Agreements of 1980

and 1981, Iceland did not recognise that Jan Mayen was entitled
to broad maritime zones in accordance with the new
developments in the law of the sea, see pages 110 - 111,
paragraph 301 above. In many of the interventions dunng the

debate in the Storting on the consent to the 1980 Agreement
between Nonvay and Iceland, it was stressed that a unilaterally
declared Nonvegian economic or fishery zone around Jan Mayen
would not have been respected by other countries, Le., Iceland,

DenmaruGreenland and the Soviet Union. Thus the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Knut Frydenlund, stated:

"But we must also face the fact that it would have been

a zone which other countries would not have respected
and which Iceland would probably actively have
opposed. ..."(The Counter-Memonal, Annex 11, p. 54) As described in paragraph 301 above Iceland based its rejection
of Norway's right to establish a broad maritime zone around Jan

Mayen on the fact that an island of such a nature as Jan Mayen
cannot generate an economic zone and a corresponding
continental ~helf.~'

311. In the Agreement of 28 May 1980 between Iceland
and Norway conceming Fishery and Continental Shelf questions,
Iceland has given in to the Norwegian claim to accord island

status to Jan Mayen, but only to the extent that it be recognised
that Jan Mayen should not be allowed to infringe upon Iceland's
full 200-mile economic zone. The reasons for that recognition are

found in the Preamble to the Agreement, where separate
paragraphs mention respectively Iceland's overwhelming
dependence on fisheries (paragraph 4) and the special

circumstances of importance for the drawing of the dividing line
(paragraph 6).The same emphasis on Iceland's economic interests
and special circumstances is to be found in Article 9 of the
Agreement conceming the dividing line for the shelf. It thus

seems clear that the special circumstances involved were those
created by the nature, size and position of Jan Mayen, as seen in
relation to Iceland. The same delimitation result would appear to

follow from a direct application of the equidistancelspecial
circumstances mle contained in Article 6 of the 1958 Convention
on the Continental Shelf.

312. In the Counter-Memorial it is stressed repeatedly,
e.g., the Counter-Memorial, page 195, paragraph 700, that the

Agreements with Iceland are political in nature and therefore
provide no basis as a legal precedent. The Agreements are said
to represent "generous political concessions" on the part of the
Norwegian Govemment (the Counter-Memorial, p. 161, para.

559). However, as can clearly be seen from the debate in the

" AccordingIo an articlehy Willy 0streng puhlishedhy the Press Service
of theNonvegian Institutefor ForeignPolicy (NUPI). No. 37 of 15 September
1981. Iceland foundthe groundsfor ils rejectionof Nonvay's nght ta establisha
hroadmaritimezone aroundJan Mayen "in Article 121 of the Negotiating Text
of the UN Con-rence on the Lawof the Sea which makesa distinction between
islandswhich are entitledto zone as well as shelrockswhich lack such
entitlement.JanMayen wasa rock,accordingta Iceland"(Unofficialtranslation).Norwegian Parliament on the two Agreements of 1980 and 1981
with Iceland (see Annex 11 and Annex 15 of the Counter-
Memorial) the "generous political concessions" offered by
Norway had nothing to do with the acceptance of Iceland's 200-

mile economic zone - which for Iceland was simply not
negotiable- but concerned the significant additional nghts Iceland
obtained in relation to fisheries and the continental shelf area in
the Norwegian zone.

313. As to fisheries, Iceland was given the nght to fix
capelin quotas off Iceland and Jan Mayen as well as the right to
catch as much capelin as Nonvay in the fishery zone around Jan

Mayen, whereas Norway was not allowed to catch any of its
quota in Iceland's zone.

314. With regard to the continental shelf questions, the
Norwegian "generous political concessions" did not relate to the

200-mile line measured from Iceland's baselines, because by
virtue of the Agreement of 28 May 1980 Norway had already
accepted an Icelandic continental shelf of at least 200 miles
towards Jan Mayen (see Annex 14 to the Counter-Memonal, p.

82). In the Report of the Conciliation Commission appointed by
the Governments of Iceland and Norway, the Conciliators
presented the problem in the following way:

"In the preamble of the Agreement it was recognized
that Iceland should have an economic zone of 200 miles
pursuant to the Icelandic Law on Territorial Sea,
Continental Shelf and Economic Zone of June 1, 1979.
The shortest distance between Iceland and Jan Mayen is

about 290 nautical miles.During the negotiations of the
aforementioned agreement the Icelandic Government
advanced the view that Iceland was entitled to a
continental shelf area extending beyond the 200-mile

economic zone. ..."(I.L.M.Vol XX, 1981, p. 798)

315. Again the concessions on the part of Norway related
to Iceland's special rights in the Norwegian zone. Thus the
cooperation area on the Norwegian side of the dividing line is considerably larger than the cooperation area on the Icelandic
side of the dividing line (see Articles 5 and 6 of the 1981
Agreement).

316. As expressed by one of the Members of Parliament
during the debate in the Storting, the recognition by Iceland of
Norway's right to establish an economic zone around Jan Mayen

was Nonvay's main pnze for these concessions (Annex 11 to the
Counter-Memonal, p. 51, last paragraph but one). The importance
of that recognition was described by the Chaiman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee:

"At the risk of being too bold, let me out that on
the day before our seventy-fifthanniversary celebrations
of the 7th of June, the Storting has leamed of the

international recognition of the expansion of our
temtories by some 330,000 square kilometres: equal to
the total area of Mainland Norway." (The Counter-
Memorial, Annex I1, p. 40)

317. The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that
Norway, from the very outset when the question of according

broad maritime zones to Jan Mayen arose in 1977, was ready to
accept a situation where Jan Mayen, because of its special
character, could not generate maritime zones which would cut
into another State's economic or fishery zone. The bilateral

Agreements between Norway and Iceland of 28 May 1980 and
22 October 1981 represent a recognition of this fact and are at
the same time seen by the Parties to represent an equitable and
just solution in the area. The Agreements take into account the

developments in the law of the sea. This is stated explicitly in
the 8th preambular paragraph of the 1980 Agreement. With
respect to the 1981 Agreement, which is based on the Report of
the Conciliation Commission it should be noted that the

Conciliation Commission consisted of three outstanding lawyers
and scholars within the field of the law of the sea, each of them
occupying the post as head of delegation of their respective
Govemments to UNCLOS III. In their Report the Conciliators

state that "(a)lthough not a court of law, the Commission hasthoroughly examined state practice and court decisions in order to
ascertain possible guidelines for the practicable and equitable

solution of the questions concerned." (I.L.M.Vol. XX, p. 823).

318. Thus, the single line boundary between Iceland and
Jan Mayen is clearly based upon legal considerations, in the light

of developments in the law of the sea at the time, and cannot be
dismissed as political compromise. It may also be worth noting
in this connection that the literature on maritime delimitation

tends to treat the senlement of the Iceland-Jan Mayen boundary
among the precedents created by case law, Le., legal settlement
through third party inv~lvement.~~

319. Against this background it is only natural that the
Norwegian Parliament, in its deliberations on the proposed
Agreements, paid particular attention to the question of the

precedent which these Agreements might create in respect of
future delimitations concerning Jan Mayen, i.e., the delimitation
vis-A-vis Greenland (Annex 11 and Annex 15 to the Counter-

Memorial). The Norwegian Parliament and Government had no
wish for the Agreements to form a precedent. But the precedent
was nevertheless created by the ratification of the two

Agreements.

D. Delimitation vis-à-visGreenland

320. The Govemment of Denmark feels bound, as a matter
of propriety, to make the following initial remark.

321. Norway has stated that "the present case concerns the
delimitation of maritime areas in relation to two island temtories,

each located at some distance from the administrative centres of
the two Parties, not between one continental territory and an
island." (the Counter-Mernorial, p. 133, para. 443). This staternent

is contradicted by the facts of the case.

See e.g., Hiran W. JaywardenThe Regime of Islands in lnrernarional
Law. p. 314 and p. 332 cf. pp. 457 - 460, and Encyclopedia of Public
lnrernarional Law VoII p. 214. 322. In geological terms Greenland can best be descnbed
as a continent dating back more than 2,500 million years. The
normal notion of Greenland as the world's largest island stems
from the fact that it was discovered around 1900 that Greenland

does not in fact form part of the American continent but
constitutes a separate entity. This discovery gave rise to the
designation of Greenland as the world's largest island.

323. In constitutional terms, as described in detail in the
Mernorial, pages 28 - 35, paragraphs 112 - 145, Greenland has
steadily rnoved towards a society govemed by its own population
through a popularly elected local government which has its seat

in the capital of Nuuk.

324. Nor is the statement in harmony with the content of

paragraph 265 of the Counter-Mernorial, where it is said that the
Nonvegian side throughout the period of negotiations with
Denmark has been conscious of the long-range interest in
maintaining a fnendly and constructive basis for the relationship
between the Norwegian authorities and the Greenland Home Rule

Authority. The interest in upholding good relations is shared by
the authorities of Greenland. However, in relation to Jan Mayen
Greenland has not been presented with an explanation, which can
make the striking difference between the Nonvegian attitude to

Greenland and to Iceland acceptable or understandable to
Greenland.

325. It is difficult to see how the position of Jan Mayen

vis-à-vis Iceland could be different from that towards Greenland.
The Icelandic and the Greenland cases are for al1 practical
purposes very similar, see the Resolution adopted at the 1958
Conference on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources

of the High Seas which in particular singles out Iceland, the
Faroe Islands and Greenland as overwhelmingly dependent on
fisheries (the Memorial, p. 98, para. 305). The special
dependency upon the living resources of the sea is furthermore

recognised in Article 71 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of
the Sea which States that "(t)he provisions of Articles 69 [Rightof land-locked States] and 70 [Right of geographically
disadvantaged States] do not apply in the case of a coastal State

whose economy is overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation
of the living resources of its exclusive economic zone". In the
Agreement of 28 May 1980 between Norway and Iceland on

Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions a direct reference to
"Article 71 in the text of the Conference on the Law of the Sea"
is contained in the 4th preambular paragraph to the Agreement
thereby indicating Nonvay's recognition of "strong economic

dependence on the fisheries" as a specific relevant factor
operating in favour of Iceland as no fishery emanates from Jan
Mayen.

326. It is also wonh noting that Iceland, when issuing its
regulations concerning the fishery limits off Iceland, has drawn
the 200-mile line in a way which assumes that Jan Mayen would

not be allowed to encroach upon a 200-mile zone off Greenland
(see the Icelandic Chart in Annex 14 to the Memorial).

327. These facts must weigh heavily in favour of not
allowing the island of Jan Mayen to infringe upon Greenland's
200-mile fishery zone and corresponding continental shelf area.
This would be in line with the dictum in the North Seo

ContinentalShelf cases to the effect that among the factors to be
taken into account when negotiating a maritime delimitation line
are "the effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental

shelf delimitations between adjacent States in the same region"
(1.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 53 - 54, para. 101 (D)(3)). The same
dictum is to be found in the TunisiulLibya case (I.C.J. Reports
1982, pp. 92 - 93, para. 133 B (5)). In theGuinealGuineu-Bissau

case, 1985, paragraph 93, the point is expressed in the following
way: "A delimitation designed to obtain an equitable result
cannot ignore the other delimitations already made or still to be

made in the region." (I.L.M., Volume XXV, No. 2, March
1986).29This point of view lay behind the immediate reaction of

Originaltext: "Unedélimitatvisant à obtenirun résultatéquitablene
peut ignorer les autres dklimitationsdkjà effectuéàseffectuer dans la
région." See alsoMalcolmD. Evans,Relevant Circumstances and Maritime
Delimitatio(Oxford1989)pp. 234- 237.the oddities of the "examples" recounted ..."(ibid., p. 137, para.
458) while at the same time uying to minimise the importance of
Norway's own conduct in relation to the Agreements with Iceland
concerning Jan Mayen and to the boundary between the economic

zone off the Norwegian mainland and the fishery protection zone
around Svalbard, including Bear Island (the Counter-Memonal, p.
161, para. 559).

330. It is submitted, however, that the closer one moves
towards the actual area of delimitation, the more relevant State
practice in that region becomes (see the Court's dicta in the
cases referred to in paragraph 327 on pages 120 - 121 above),

and State practice relating to the very same temtory, which is the
subject of the dispute in casu the island of Jan Mayen, becomes
of particular relevance. Analogies from one ocean to another are
difficult given the distinct characteristics of each region.

331. Norway seems to admit this point of view in
dismissing totally the relevance of State practice in the Baltic
Sea, even though that area and the States involved are closer

both in geographical and political terms to the North Atlantic
region than the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, the Sea of Japan
and other far-away waters (the Counter-Memonal, p. 182, para.
654). In actual fact the Parties may concur in the view that the

relevant State practice is that of the North Atlantic region with
particular emphasis on State practice related to the island of Jan
Mayen. That practice is clearly illustrated by both Parties, see
Map IV in the respective Mernorials (except that the Nonvegian

Map is cut off to the east in a way which leaves out Bear Island
and the Nonvegian mainland). As will be seen from these Maps,
most delimitation lines, actual or potential, are median lines
corresponding to what the respective parties have found to

represent an equitable solution. The human societies which
sustain themselves in this harsh part of the world are placed on
an equal footing - and rightly so - when it comes to delimiting
the surrounding waters which do represent the life-line to sumival

and prosperity of these communities. Thus a median line has
been applied from West through east covering the delimitation
situations between Canada and Greenland, Greenland and Iceland,Iceland and the Faroe Islands, the Faroe Islands as well as the
Shetland Islands and Nonvay.

332. The delimitation line between Greenland and Svalbard
is laid down by Denmark in Section 1 (4) of Executive Order

No. 176 of 14 May 1980 on the Fishing Temtory in the Waters
surrounding Greenland (Annex 6 to the Memorial). The Executive
Order applies the method of equidistance, in the absence of
special agreement to the contrary, because of the size and

character of Svalbard.

333. The only delimitation situations which have deviated
from the median line do so because a median line would not

render an equitable result, see e.g., the boundary line between
Iceland and Jan Mayen and that between the Nonvegian mainland
and Bear Island. In neither of these situations are human societies
in jeopardy - as far as these two desolated islands are concerned
- and therefore these islands have not been allowed to encroach

upon the 200-mile economic zone established by Iceland and
mainland Nonvay, respectively. Denmark fully agrees with the
attitude adopted by Iceland and Nonvay. International law has
been created and developed to serve the needs of human

societies, not to accommodate landscapes. CHAPTER III

The Rule Applicable to the Present Dispute

A. Norwegian Contentions

334. In contrast to the line of reasoning developed in the
Memorial with regard to the mles and principles applicable to

maritime delimitation (pp. 59 - 111, paras. 208 - 356) Norway
argues as if the Court should deliver a judgment on histoncal
grounds, based on the legal situation which prevailed before the
present dispute materialised in 197911980(the Counter-Memonal,

p. 73, para. 258, and pp. 86 - 89, paras. 302 - 316).

335. Such an argument completely overlooks the fact that
treaties must be interpreted in the light of developments in

international law up to the time of the close of any negotiations
or proceedings. The International Court of Justice has declared in
the Nantihia Advisory Opinion that "an international instrument
has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the

entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation",
(I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 31, para. 53) and in the Gu@of Maine
case, the Chamber stated that codification conventions such as the
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf must "be seen against

the background of customary international law and interpreted in
its light" (I.C.J.Reports 1984, pp. 290 - 291, para. 83). This
position corresponds well with the general mle of interpretation
contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

which calls for any subsequent practice to be taken into account,
see Article 31, paragraph 3(2).

336. The line of reasoning in the Counter-Memorial will

be dealt with in the following three sections dealing with (1) the
1965 Agreement between Denmark and Nonvay, (2) Conduct of
the Parties, and (3) General International Law. 1. The 1965 Agreement

337. The primary argument in the reasoning of the

Norwegian Govemment (the Counter-Memorial. pp. 81 - 89,
paras. 279 - 316), can be summ;uised as follows: The 1965
bilateral Agreement between Denmark and Norway relating to
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf adopts a median line; this

being so, the 1965 Agreement, as a specific treaty, takes
precedence over the general 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf; accordingly the concept of "special
circumstances" in the 1958 Convention is no longer operative as

between Denmark and Norway; the 1965 Agreement being still in
force, the delimitation provision contained in the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention has no legal force as between Denmark and

Norway (see Article 83, para. 4) - and mirahile dictu - the
median line adopted in the 1965 Agreement emerges as the
boundary required by law in the waters between Greenland and
Jan Mayen and has in fact been in place since 1965.

338. As an exercise in legal reasoning, the Norwegian
argument is indeed astonishing. First of al1 it must be recalled
that Article 31, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties requires that "a treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the tems of the treaty in their conrexr and in the light of its
object and purpose" (emphasis added). Norway's interpretation of

the 1965 Agreement does not fulfil that requirement. The 1965
bilateral Agreement, in line with normal practice, addresses a
specific area of delimitation in the North Sea and the Skagerrak

shown on the chart annexed to the Agreement and indicated by
relevant geographical CO-ordinates set out in Article 2 of the
Agreement. Norway attempts to isolate Article 1 and separate it
from the rest of the Agreement alleging that Article 2 deals with

a different subject, namely, that it "is concerned with
demarcation" (the Counter-Memonal. p. 82, para. 283). 339. But this is wrong. According to established
definitions," the delimitation of a frontier is a juridical operation
which fixes a boundary, in this case by means of imaginary

straight lines (compass lines) drawn on a chart through points
determined hy geographical coordinates. In contrast, demarcation
is a material and technical operation which consists in canying

out the terms of the delimitation which has been established, by
means of boundary markers in the case of a land frontier and by
lights and buoys in a maritime boundary.

340. Articles 2 and 3 of the 1965 Agreement are those
which specifically set out the maritime boundary between the
Parties and consequently, they are the provisions estahlishing the

delimitation of the Continental Shelf announced in the title of the
1965 Agreement. The dividing line established by the Agreement
was drawn on a hydrographie chart annexed to the Agreement

"which constitutes an integral part of the Agreement" (Art. 2).
Furthemore, it should he noted that Article 1 of the Agreement
uses the definite article "the" in describing the boundary, which
corresponds to the fact that the Agreement addresses the specific

area indicated in Article 2.

341. Al1 this shows that the object and purpose of the
1965 Agreement, considered in its context, is clearly the

delimitation in the North Sea and the Skagerrak between the
Parties, according to the method of equidistance, on the basis that
the median line produced an equitable division of the seabed

between and off the coasts. Looking at the travaux préparatoires.
there is nothing to support the Norwegian contention that the
1965 Agreement covers more than the area in the North Sea and
the Skagerrak specifically addressed by the coordinates of Article

2 of the Agreement and depicted in thechart.

342. In the Nonvegian travaux préparatoires to the

subsequent delimitation Agreement of 15 June 1979 between the

" See BasdevantDictionnaire de la Terminologie du Droit International,
Paris, 1960.Faroe Islands and Nonvay, it is expressly stated that the 1965
bilateral Agreement does not cover this maritime area. This is
said in the summary of the Norwegian Proposition to the
Nonvegian Parliament conceming the 1979 Agreement and further

explained in Part 1 of the Proposition in the following way:

"On 8 December 1965 Nonvay and Denmark signed an

agreement conceming the delimitation of the continental
shelf between the two states.

The agreement did not cover the delimitation of the

continental shelf in the area between Norway and the
Faroe Islands. One of the reasons for this was that the
Nonvegian Govemment did not at that time wish to give
access to exploitation of the continental shelf areas north

of 6Z0N" (Sr.prp. No. 63 (1979 - 80), Annex 84,
emphasis added).

343. Consequently, the 1979 Agreement does not contain

any reference to the 1965 Agreement. The Preamble states that
the Parties conclude the Agreement of 1979 "(h)aving decided to
delimit the continental shelf in the area". If the Nonvegian

contention in the Counter-Memorial were correct, the Parties
should have recalled in that phrase of the preamble that they had
already decided in 1965 to delimit also this particular shelf area
on the basis of the median line principle. Moreover, the presence

of Article 3 in the 1979 Agreement is also difficult to reconcile
with the Nonvegian thesis. This Article foresees the possibility
that "natural resources on the sea-bed or in the subsoil thereof
extend on both sides of the boundary". This provision formed

part already of the 1965 Agreement, specified there as Article 4.
If the 1965 Agreement already established the delimitation in
respect of the Faroe Islands, as Nonvay contends, to repeat the
same provision in the 1979 Agreement would be redundant and

serve no useful purpose.

344. Likewise, according to the next paragraph in the

Preamble of the 1979 Agreement, the Parties decided that "for
the time being, they will not establish the boundary farther north than" a certain point. If in 1965 they had already decided to
apply the median line to the whole boundary, and without
limitations, it cannot be explained why they abstained from
delimiting beyond a certain point. The tmth is that in accordance

with normal practice of settling delimitation issues on a case by
case basis, solving each dispute on its own ments, the 1979
Agreement addresses exclusively the maritime area between the
Faroe Islands and Nonvay.

345. A further point to be mentioned relates to the fact
that Norway was not a party to the 1958 Geneva Convention at
the time of the conclusion of the 1965 Agreement, and no

reference was made to that Agreement when Nonvay acceded to
the Geneva Convention in 1971. No generally accepted mle of
treaty interpretation could therefore be invoked to demonstrate
that the 1965 Agreement modifies the basic concept of

equidistance contained in the Convention so as to eliminate
"special circumstances" from Article 6. On the contrary, the 1958
Convention is the later treaty between the two Parties and,
consequently, the reference to special circumstances in Article 6

of the Convention prevails between the Parties and continues to
be relevant.

346. During the debate in the Srorring on the Agreements

with Iceland of 28 May 1980 on Fishery and Continental Shelf
Questions and 22 October 1981 relating to the delimitation of the
Continental Shelf, the Norwegian Foreign Minister never
suggested that the boundary with Greenland was already settled

by the 1965 Agreement. On the contrary, Mr. Knut Frydenlund
said inter alia:"...Clearly there is a potential source of conflict
here with Denmark ..."(Annex 11 to the Counter-Memorial, p.
55). That statement could only mean that the boundary with

Greenland remained to be settled.

347. Even ifthe 1965 Agreement had been formulated as
a general agreement applying to ail parts of the continental shelf

as between the Kingdoms of Denmark and Nonvay, no common
shelf existed between Greenland and Jan Mayen within the
meaning of the 1958 Geneva Convention seen at the time of theconclusion of the 1965 Agreement (see p. 40, para. 158 of the
Memorial and pp. 23 - 28, paras. 58 -71 above).

348. The Norwegian reasoning based on the 1965 bilateral

Agreement is thus both incompatible with Norway's own position
and legally unfounded.

349. In passing it should be noted that in paragraph 7 of

the Counter-Memorial the words "al1 parts" in the third line do
not represent a correct quotation from the 1965 Agreement as
these words do not appear in the Agreement. The word "general"
in paragraph 182, first line of the Counter-Memorial, and the

word "supplemented" in the first line of paragraph 183 are
likewise incorrect.

350. The line of reasoning adopted by the Respondent

State leads to the conclusion in paragraph 290 of the Counter-
Mernorial that "Norway was fully prepared to enter into
negotiations with Denmark with a view to reaching agreement as
to the details of the demarcation", because the shelf boundary

was already in place. This conclusion not only rnakes a mockery
out of eight years of serious and difficult negotiations, which
were never concemed with the "details of the demarcation". It is
also contradicted by the Counter-Memonal in paragraph 258,

which correctly makes no reference to the 1965 bilateral
Agreement. Dunng the eight years of negotiations no mention
was ever made by Nonvay - let alone Denmark - of the 1965
bilateral Agreement (the Counter-Mernorial, p. 73, para. 258).

Neither has Denmark for its part referred to that Agreement in its
Memorial since the Agreement has no bearing on the present
case.

2. The Conduct of the Parties

351. Norway argues that Denmark has expressly

recognised and accepted a median line boundary applicable to
continental shelf delimitations and fishery zone delimitations
between Denmark and Nonvay (the Counter-Mernorial. pp. 114 - 116, paras. 390 - 398); that the consistent pattern of Danish
conduct constitutes a tacit recognition of or acquiescence in the
median line boundary between Greenland and Jan Mayen in

respect of continental shelf rights and in respect of fisheries
(ibid., p. 116, paras. 399-402); that the Danish conduct togeiher
with the knowledge of Nonvay's position in maritime
delimitations prevents Denmark from challenging the existence

and validity of the median line boundary between Greenland and
Jan Mayen (ihid., pp. 117 - 118, paras. 403 - 409); that the
Danish claim of a 200-mile zone cannot be opposable to Norway
in view of Denmark's previous conduct and the relationships

established between the Parties (ihid., p. 119, para. 410) and,
finally, that the principle of estoppel precludes Denmark's claim
(ibid., p. 119, para. 411).

352. In support of these far-reaching conclusions, Norway
refers to Danish legislative acts, delimitation agreements between
Denmark and Nonvay, Denmark's position during the negotiations

at UNCLOS III, the exchanges and negotiations between the
Parties, and the delimitation practice conceming fishery zones.

353. The so-called "evidence" brought forwardby Norway

does not support the Nonvegian conclusions. Each of the
elements of the Norwegian "evidence" will now be dealt with in
tum.

DANISHROYALDECREE OF 7 JUNE1963 CONCERNING THE
CONTINENTA SHELF

354. It is Norway's understanding that accordingto the
Danish Royal Decree of 7 June 1963 (Annex 85) the boundary of
the Danish continental shelf is the median line (the Counter-
Memorial, pp. 95 - 97, paras. 328 - 333, and p. 155, para. 532).

This is not correct. The Norwegian reading of the last part of
Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Decree leads Norway to this
erroneous conclusion.

355. The Royal Decree of 7 June 1963 conceming the
Exercise of Danish Sovereignty over the Continental Shelf doesnot establish a median line delimitation in the absence of special
agreements. This clearly follows from the text of the Royal

Decree. The travawr préparatoires of the Royal Decree also show
that Denmark had no intention of derogating from the
delimitation mles of international law applicable at the time of
the Royal Decree.

356. The Preamble to the Royal Decree States that the
Decree has been prornulgated in accordance with the Convention
on the Continental Shelf opened for signature at the Conference

on the Law of the Sea in Geneva in 1958.'2

357. Article 1 of the Royal Decree stipulates that Danish

sovereignty shall be exercised over that portion of the continental
shelf which under the Convention on the Continental Shelf
"belongs to the Kingdom of Denmark.

358. Under the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, a
coastal State is entitled to a continental shelf. The entitlement is
not conditioned upon a declaration. The declaration made by the

Kingdom of Denmark in Article 1 of the Royal Decree does not
claim any portion of the continental shelf other than the one
which Denmark is entitled to under international law, but

expressly extends the Danish claim as far as the Convention
allows.

359. Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Royal Decree

incorporates the equidistancelspecial circumstances provision of
Article 6 of the Convention by stating that "(t)he boundary of the
continental shelf..shall be determined in accordance with Article

6 of the Convention...". The Counter-Mernorial recognises that the
Royal Decree "expressly incorporates the provisions of Article 6
of the Convention" (the Counter-Memorial, p. 114, para. 390).

360. The reference in the Royal Decree to Article 6 of the
Convention incorporates al1of Article 6, including the concept of

" The F'reambleIo the Royal Decree has been ornittedfmm Nonvay's
translationof the Royal Decree in A29eto the Counter-Memorial. "special circumstances" and therefore makes aspecific reference
to special .cucumstances superfluous.

361. The absence of an explicit reference to "special

circumstances" in Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Decree cannot be
constiued to exclude Denmark's application of the
well-established delimitation cnterion in Article 6 of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf. If Article 2, paragraph 2, -

as suggested by Norway - were viewed as derogation from the
Convention by disallowing the application of the special
circumstances cnterion, one would assume that such derogation
would have been mentioned in the travaux préparatoires to the

Royal Decree and made the subject of an express reservation by
Denmark when it ratified the Convention. This is not the case.

362. If Article 2, paragraph 2 were constmed as suggested

by Norway, the reference to Article 2 in Article 1 (stating that
Denmark shall exercise sovereignty over that part of the
continental shelf which belongs to Denmark under the Continental
Shelf Convention) should have read "but see Article 2" instead of

"see Article 2".

363. The inference drawn in the Counter-Memonal that in
the legislative process pnor to the promulgation of the Royal

Decree the geographical situation of the Kingdom of Denmark
had been examined, and no special .circumstances had been found
calling for delimitation on any other basis than the median line
(the Counter-Memonal, p. 96, para: 330) is not warranted by the

wording of, the 'Royal Decree .and. is also contradicted by the
trayux préparatoires.to the Royal Decree.

364: In the 'travaux préparatoires to the Royal Decree

(Written Comments on a-proposal submitted to the Folkering for
ratification of the Convention on the Continental Shelf) the
Minister for Foreign Affairs stated: "Article 6 [of the Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelfl lays down provisions on. the

del.imitatihn of the continental shelf between adjacent States and
States whose coasts are opposite each other. The boundary shall
be determined by agreement. In the absence of agreement, unlessjustified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median
line between the baselines appertaining to the States concemed."
(Annex 86)

365. Nothing in the travaux préparatoires,the records of
the parliamentary debate or the Report submitted by the
Parliamentary Standing Committee, suggests that derogation from

the convention rule on delimitation of the continental shelf vis-à-
vis third States was intended with the promulgation of the Royal
Decree.

ACTNO. 259 OF 9 JUNE1971 ON THE CONTINENTAS LHELF

366. Act No. 259 of 9 June 1971 on the Continental Shelf

(Annex 87) vests the resources of the Danish continental shelf in
the Danish State. The Act further contains conditions for the
granting of concessions on the continental shelf, extends Danish
jurisdiction to shelf installations and safety zones, and enables

competent ministers to issue detailed regulations.

367. In the travaux préparatoires to Article 1 (providing
that the natural resources on the Danish Continental Shelf belongs

to the Danish State) it is stated as follows:

"In those cases where the Danish continental shelf
borders portions of the shelf appertaining to other States,

the delimitation must - in accordance with the
[Continental Shelfl Convention - pnmarily be sought
effected through agreement between the neighbounng

States. In the absence of --agreement, the delimitation
must be effected in accordance with the principle of
equidistance unless special circumstances dictate an
alternate line of delimitation'! (Annex 88).

368. Nothing in the legislative history of the 1971
Continental Shelf Act suggests that the Act should represent a
deviation from the legal position under the 1963 Royal Decree

conceming the Continental Shelf. The Act applies to al1 ofDenmark with the exception of the Faroe Islands, see Article 8
of the Act."

THEAGREEMENT BETWEEN NORWAY AND DENMARK OF 1965ON
THE DELIMITATIO NF THE CONTINENTA SHELF

369. Norway has invoked the 1965 Continental Shelf
Agreement between Denmark and Norway as evidence of
Denmark's commitment to an unconditional and universal
application of a strict median line pnnciple (the

Counter-Memonal, pp. 97 - 98, paras. 337 -339 and p. 114,
para. 391). It has been demonstrated on pages 126 - 130,
paragraphs 337 - 350 that this interpretation of the 1965

Agreement propounded by Norway is without foundation.

ACT OF 17 DECEMBER 1976 ON THE FISHINGTERRITORY OF THE

KINGDOM OF DENMARK

370. Norway contends that the Act No. 597 of 17
December 1976 on the Fishing Temtory of the Kingdom of

Denmark (Annex 1 to the Memonal) does not authonse Denmark
to establish a 200-mile fishery limit between Greenland and Jan
Mayen (the Counter-Memorial,.pp. 104 - 105, paras. 358-360).
The basis of the Norwegian contention is the wording of Section

1, paragraph2 of the Act. This provision states:

"Failing any agreement to the contrary, the delimitation

of the fishing temtory relative to foreign States whose
coasts are situated at a distance of less than 400 nautical
miles opposite the coasts of thegdom of Denmark or

adjacent to Denmark shalbe a line which at every point
is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines at
the coasts of the twotates (the median ,line)."

371. The legislative history of the 1976 Act on Fishing
Temtory of the Kingdom of Denmark shows that, at the reading

"Articl8 has been deleted from the Nonvegian translation of the Act in
Annex 30 to the Counter-Mernorial.of the Bill, the extension of the fishing temtory in the. area
between Greenland and Jan Mayen was discussed.

372. After the tabling of the Bill on 9 November 1976 by
the Prime Minister, the Parliamentary Committee established to
hear the Bill had a consultation with the Minister for Greenland

on 9 December 1976. The Minister was asked by the Committee
why the Govemment did not intend to enact an immediate
extension of the fishing temtory around the whole of Greenland.
In Lis written reply the Minister for Greenland stated inte rlia

that in East Greenland the full200-mile fishery 'zone was enacted
up to the point where a delimitation problem- vis-à-vis Iceland
arose. The Minister for Greenland informed the Parliamentary
Committee that Denmark and Iceland were in agreement on the

applicability of themedian line pnnciple. However, Denmark had
reserved its position with respect to the unilaterally drawn
Icelandic fishery limit owing to the fact that the small rock of

Kolbeinsey had ben accorded full weight in the delimitation.
The Minister for Greenland further stated:

"Extending the limit vis-à-vis Iceland northward, a

delimitation problem vis-à-vis the Nonvegian island of
Jan Mayen will arise. According to information available
Nonvay has no intention, at this point in time, to extend
the fishery limit around Jan Mayen, and since it is not

quite clear to what extent an island with the
characteristics of Jan Mayen (the island is uninhabited,
except for a few scientists and meteorologists) may
under intemational law generate maritime zones, it would

be inexpedient to raise the question of delimitation now."

373. The Minister for Greenland finally informed the

Parliamentary Committee that the Govemment of Denmark had
agreed with the Greenland authorities that for the time being the
fishery limit should not be extended beyond 67ON off the EastCoast of Greenland." The full text of the reply is reproduced in
Annex 89.

374. The legislative history evidences that, at the time of
the enactment of the Fishing Territory Act, it was envisaged by
the Government of Denmark that a delimitation issue would anse

in relation to Jan Mayen and that the Parliamentary Committee
established to hear the Bill was advised on this issue. The issue
was to what extent an island with the characteristics of Jan

Mayen was entitled to maritime zones under international law.
From the above-mentioned written reply submitted by the
Minister for Greenland to the Parliamentary Committee it appears

that in so faras Denmark was justified under international law, a
full 200-mile fishery zone around Greenland would be claimed.

375. It is Denmark's position that the 1976 Act on the

Fishing Territory of the Kingdom of Denmark cannot be
construed as acceptance of a departure from international law to
the detriment of Denmark. There is a presumption against a

State's unilateral limitation of its rights under international law
through domestic legislation. Norway has not invalidated this
presumption. On the contrary, the legislative historyof the Act
makes it clear that the Act entitled the Govemment of Denmark

to unilaterally establish a 200-mile fishery zone east of Greenland
vis-à-vis Jan Mayen.

THEPOSITION OF DENMARK DURING THE NEGOTIATION ST
UNCLOS III

376. Norway claims that the position taken by Denmark in

the course of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea shows a firm and consistent adherence to the median line
(the Counter-Memorial, pp. 99 - 103, paras. 345 - 353). The

Nonvegian argument seems to be that by virtue of its position
dunng this conference, Denmark is barred from claiming a

" The Executive Order o22 December 1976 extended thGreenland
fishery zofrom 12 nautical miles to 200 nautical miles. Off the East Coast of
Greenland the extension only applied up to 67'N latitude (the Memorial p. 14.
para40).200-mile continental shelf area and a 200-mile fishery zone in the
area between Greenland and Jan Mayen.

377. There is no incompatibility between the stance
adopted by Denmark during the Third United NationsConference
on the Law of the Sea and the position taken by Denmark
towards Norway on the delimitation of Jan Mayen's maritime

zones and those of Greenland. Denmark agrees with the
Norwegian contention that, at UNCLOS III, Denmark expressed
its preference for the "median line" in lieu of "equitable

principles" as theprimary critenon for delimiting the continental
shelf and the economic zone. However, the rule of law advocated
by Denmark and a number of other states (Norway among them)
at UNCLOS III was not a strict application of the equidistance

method in any delimitation situation, but the well-known
equidistancelspecial circumstances formula adopted in the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf.

378. It follows clearly from Doc. NG712 of 20 April 1978,
entitled "Informal Suggestions Relating to Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3
of Articles 74 and 83, ICNT" (Annex 2 Io the Counter-

Memorial), that the CO-sponsorsdid not simply propose a median
line delimitation as an absolute or invariable mle. Paragraph 1 of
the said document proposes that the delimitation of the Exclusive
Economic ZoneIContinental Shelf between opposite states "...shall

be effected by agreement employing as a general principle the
median or equidistance line, taking into account any special
circumstances where this is justifie#(emphasis added).

379. The statements made by the Danish delegation to the
Conference on 29 April 1978 and 8 September 1978 expressly
refer to the importance of special circumstances. In the statement
made on 29 April 1978 it is said "...in the view of my

delegation, the principle of median line taking into account
special circumstances would lead to equitable solutions"
(emphasis added). Similarly, in the statement delivered on 8

September 1978 (the Counter-Memorial, p. 100 - 102, paras. 349
- 351) it is said"...Ithink it is important to reiterate that in ourview the median line principle raking due accouni of special
circumstances would lead to equitable results" (emphasis added).35

380. The consistency of the Danish position during
UNCLOS III and Denmark's position towards Norway in the Jan

Mayen dispute is further dernonstrated by the fact that Denrnark
maintained its sponsorship of the proposal in document NG7/2 as
this document was reissued with additional sponsors on 25 and

28 March 1980 (see the Counter-Memorial. p. 103, para. 353)
and at the same time advised Norway that a median line

delimitation in the waters between Greenland and Jan Mayen
would not be acceptable to Denmark. It would be recalled that a
statement to this effect was made by the Danish Minister for

Foreign Affairs, Mr Henning Christophersen, to the Norwegian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Knut Frydenlund, at the Session
of the Nordic Ministers for Foreign Affairs heldin Copenhagen

'"he Nonvegian quotations in the Counter-Memorial from the Danish
is said in the Counter-Memorial. p. 102. para. 352, that the Danish statements are

repons in question have been made for intemal use in the Danish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and circulated to other relevant authonties. They have never been
made public or handed overficially to other States.on 29 - 30 March 1979; see the Memorial, page 14, paragraph

44.16

DANISH-NORWEGIA DENLIMITATION AGREEMEN T ONCERNING

THE FAROE ISLANDS

381. Norway has also invoked the Agreement between
Denrnark and Norway, signed on 15 June 1979, concerning the
Faroe Islands as evidence of Denmark's cornmitment to an

unconditional and unmodified application of a strict median line
principle (the Counter-Memorial, p. 103, para. 354).

382. As explained on page 94, paragraph 252 above, this
Agreement is not relevant to the present dispute.

383. Nonvay attaches special importance to the Danish
Executive Order No. 176 of 14 May 1980 (Annex 6 to the

Memorial) on the Fishing Territory in the Waters surrounding
Greenland in its attempt to demonstrate the alleged Danish

'6Nonvay has maintained that Denmark has adopted the view that "the 1958

Convention continues in force. undisturbed the 1982 Convention" (the
Counter-Memorial, p. 88. para. 313). This is wrong. In suppon of this contention
Nonvay has referred Io an anicle written in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook
1983 hy a Danish civil servant in his personal capacity. That is of academic
interest only. The following excerpt from Denmark's statement in the Plenary on
31 March 1982 at the las1session of UNCLOS III is more pertinent:

"The compromise proposed by you. Mr. President. on the delimitation
criterion, as now contained in paragraph I of Anicle 74 and of Anicle
83. is acceptable to my delegation. According to paragraph I of
Anicle 311 the new convention shall prevail over the Geneva
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1958. In identifying the
maritimearea to be delimited between countries, which are parties to
hoth Conventions. the provisions contained in the new Convention on
natural prolongation and on rocks. which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own, must, in Our understanding.
prevail over the obsoleteloitability-criterionand the provision on
islands, contained in the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
My delegation's acceptance of the proposed delimitation criterion with
ils reference Io Anicle 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice is based upon this understanding of theationship with
paragraphIin Anicle 311 in the Draft Convention." commitment to a strict application of the so-called median line
pnnciple (the Counter-Memonal. pp. 103 - 105, paras. 355 -
360.) In this Executive Order Denmark extended the fishery zone
off East Greenland north of 67"N from 12 nautical miles to 200

nautical miles.

384. Norway claims that the Executive Order "not only
disregards the clear provisions of the enabling Act but also seeks

to establish the zone beyond the scope of the authority granted
under the Act" (ibid., p. 104, para. 359). As explained on pages
135 - 137, paragraphs 370 - 375 above, the Nonvegian claim is
not correct. The wording of the enabling Act does not exclude

special circumstances from being taken into account in the
delimitation of the fishery zones of Denmark. The legislative
history of Act No. 597 of 17 December 1976 on the Fishing
Territory of the Kingdom of Denmark shows that at the time of

the enactment it was envisaged that the delimitation in the waters
between Greenland and Jan Mayen would extend beyond the
median line (see p. 136, para. 372 above).

385. It will be recalled that prior to the issuance of the
Executive Order on 14 May 1980, the Danish Minister for
Foreign Affairs had advised his Nonvegian colleague that
Denmark would extend its fishery zone off East Greenland north

of 67' N to 200 nautical miles (the Memonal, p. 15, para. 48).
This information was given at the Session of the Nordic
Ministers for Foreign Affairs in Helsinki, held on 27 -28 March
1980. At this session the DanishMinister for Foreign Affairs also

told the Norwegian Foreign Minister that in order to avoid
difficulties Denmark would not, for the time being, exercise
jurisdiction beyond the median line. The Executive Order issued
on 14 May 1980 stipulated in Article 1, paragraph 4, that until

further notice the fisheries jurisdiction would not be exercised
beyond the median line between Greenland and Jan Mayen.

386. The Norwegian Government has chosen to descnbe

this restraint shown by Denmark as Danish recognition of the
fact "that it would be inappropriate to cany this attempt to the
point of implementation" and to see the restraint as anotherexpression of Denmark's alleged adherence Io a strict application
of a median line principle (the Counter-Memonal, pp. 10- 105,
para. 360).

387. As explained by the Danish Minister to his
Nonvegian colleague prior to thessuance of the Executive Order,
Denmark's reason for showing restraint in the enforcement of

Danish fishing regulations was to avoid difficulties with Nonvay.
In exercising this restraint, Denmark relied on Nonvay's readiness
to exercise a similar pmdence until the delimitation issue was
resolved. When Norway decided the following year to escalate

the dispute with Denmark by sending an armed vesse1 to the
disputed area, with instmctions to board Danish fishing vessels,
the Govemment of Denmark issued on 31 August 1981 an

Executive Order rescinding the temporary restraint on the exercise
of jurisdiction in the disputed area (the Memorial, p. 17, para.
54). This decision did not reflect a changed perception of
Denmark's rights under intemational law or a change in

Denmark's general maritimepolicy. The decision was a necessary
response to Nonvay's actions at the time.

DIPLOMA~C EXCHANG NSTHE PERIOD 1979 -1980

388. In the Nonvegian attempt to support the contention
that Denmark has departed from a conduct of consistent

adherence to the median line in maritime delimitations, the
Counter-Memorial surprisingly refers, on page 105, paragraph
362, to the content of a letter of 3 July 1979 from the Danish
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Henning Christophersen, to his

Nonvegian colleague (Annex 3 to the Memorial) as "the
somewhat tentative expression of misgivings on the part of the
Govemment of Denmark". It should be recalled that prior to the

3 July 1979 letter, the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs
advised his Norwegian colleague at the Session of the Nordic
Ministers for Foreign Affairs held in Copenhagen on 29 - 30
March 1979 that an equidistance line delimiting the waters

between Greenland and Jan Mayen would not beacceptable to
Denmark (the Memorial, p. 14 para. 44). The Foreign Minister's
letter was sent to his Norwegian colleague after the Govemment of Denmark in June 1979 had leamed through the news media of
the commencement of negotiations between Nonvay and Iceland
on fishing in the waters between Jan Mayen and Iceland andon

the delimitation of those waters (ibid., p. 14, para. 45). In the
second paragraph of the 3 July 1979 letter itisplainly stated that
"Denmark would make reservations if Norway established for Jan
Mayen an economic zone delimited by a median line in relation

to Greenland".

-389. The letter of 4 July 1979 from the Norwegian
Minister for Foreign Affairs (Annex 4 to the Memorial) did not

respond to the repeated Danish reservation to a median line
delimitation between Greenland and Jan Mayen.

390. In the opinion of the Govemment of Denmark, the
Nonvegian account of, and conclusions drawn from, the

negotiations between Denmark and Norway on the delimitation of
the maritime area between Greenland and Jan Mayen that opened
in December 1980 are not fully in accordance with the facts (the
Counter-Memorial, p. 108, paras. 371 - 372). The Norwegian

Govemment States that it "maintained its position on the issues of
legal principle involved"contrary to the Govemment of Denmark
who "for the first time began to assert that Denmark should
receive, as a matter of legal entitlement, what Norway had

granted to Iceland as a political concession unrelated to legal
pnnciple" (ibid., p. 108, para. 372).

391. When it is contended in the Counter-Memorial, page
108, paragraph 372 that Denmark did not claim a full 200-mile
fishery zone off East Greenland opposite Jan Mayen until
December 1980, the Norwegian Govemment ignores the

well-established fact that as early as March 1979 Denmark had
made it clear to Nonvay that a median line delimitation in the
maritime areas between Greenland and Jan Mayen would not be
acceptable to Denmark, see the Memorial, page 14, paragraph 44. 392. Nonvay's apparent wish to stress its adherence to an
absolute application of the median line principle is contradicted
by Norway's actual conduct in 1976when a 200-mile exclusive

economic zone off the mainland of Nonvay was established
opposite the maritime areas of the Svalbard Archipelago. Here
Bear Island was not allowed to impinge upon the Nonvegian
200-mile limit. Nonvay's argument of an unwavering endorsement

of the principle of equidistance is also inconsistent with Nonvay's
Agreement with Iceland dated 28 May 1980 conceming Fishery
and Continental Shelf Questions, where Jan Mayen was equally
not allowed to impinge upon Iceland's 200-mile zone.

PRACTICE CONCERNING DELIMITATIO NF FISHER ZYONES

393. Nonvay has addressed the relationship between the
delimitation of the continental shelfea and the delimitation of
the exclusive economic zone and the practice of other coastal
States in the Counter-Memorial, pages 108- 111, paragraphs 373

- 381. The Govemment of Denmark has found it difficult to
understand the meaning of the Norwegian argument and fails to
see the relationship between the argument and the conduct of
Denmark. It would appear that the Nonvegian argument may be

summarised as follows: the median line delimitation between
Greenland and Jan Mayen is in place so far as the continental
shelf is concemed; State practice shows that existing continental
shelf limits are normally adopted for subsequent delimitations of

exclusive economic zones or fishery zones; this is also Danish
and Norwegian practice; since the 1965 Agreement between
Denmark and Nonvay delimits not only the continental shelf in

the North Sea but also al1 other continental shelf areas between
Denmark and Nonvay including the Faroe Islands and Greenland,
by the median line, the fishery zones between Greenland and Jan
Mayen must also be delimited by the median line.

394. It is Denmark's submission that the interpretation of
the 1965 Agreement advocated by Nonvay is manifestly wrong
(see pp. 126 - 130, paras 337- 350 above). 395. It appears difficult to reconcile Nonvay's reasoning
on pages 108 - 111 in the Counter-Memorial with Norway's
claim that in absence of any agreement between the Parties,

Denmark's request for a single-line delimitation is not admissible
(the Counter-Memorial, p. 197, para. 703).

THELEGALEFFECTS OF THE CONDUCT OF DENMARK

396. The Norwegian arguments with regard to the actual

Danish conduct in maritime delimitation described in the
preceding sections leads Nonvay through the use of concepts
such as "recognition", "tacit recognition", "opposability" and
"estoppel" to assert that Denmark is precluded from claiming

anything but a median line as boundary between Greenland and
Jan Mayen (the Counter-Memorial, pp. 114 - 119, paras. 390 -
411). This assertion is not warranted.

397. Under intemational law the question of estoppel
arises in the event a State has made representations and another
State has relied on these representations to such an extent that

the acceptance of a change in the position of the former State
would cause prejudice to the latter State. In the North Seo
Continental Shey cases, the Court observed that only a situation

of estoppel could suffice to lend substance to the contention that
the Federal Republic was bound by the Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf "...that is to say if the Federal Republic
were now precluded from denying the applicability of the

conventional régime,by reason of past conduct, declarations, etc.,
which not only clearly and consistently evinced acceptance of
that régime,but also had caused Denmark or the Netherlands, in

reliance on such conduct, detrimentally to change position or
suffer some prejudice" (I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 26, para. 30).

In the present case the principle of estoppel does not
398.
preclude Denmark from bringing forward its claim. The conduct
of Denmark, pnor to the finalisation of UNCLOS III, has
evidenced a clear adherence to the equidistance/special

circumstances mle in maritime delimitation. The Govemment of
Denmark has not in its implementation of legislation, generalconduct or by any other means expressed an acceptance of a
median line delimitation of the maritime areas hetween Greenland
and Jan Mayen.

399. Nothing in the conduct of the Govemment of
Denmark evidences an acceptance of a median line delimitation
of the maritimé areas between Greenland and Jan Mayen. The

review carried out on pages 131 - 134, paragraphs 354 - 365;
page 135, paragraph 369 cf. pages 126 - 130, paragraphs 337 -
350; and pages 135 - 137, paragraphs 370 - 375 above of the
three episodes, which according ta the Norwegian Govemment,

involves an acceptance of the median line boundary, makes it
clear that such acceptance has not taken place.

400. The Govemment of Denmark must point out that,
whatever Norway may have understood about the Danish conduct,
the fact remains that Norway has not changed its position vis-à-
vis Greenland or suffered any prejudice as a consequence of that

conduct. The second condition which must be satisfied in
applying the concept of estoppel is thus not present.

401. In support of its contention that recognition may

constitute a root of title, Norway refers in the Counter-Memorial,
page 115, paragraph 394, ta the late scholar, Sir Gerald
Fitzmaunce, British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 32

(1955 -56), pages 58 - 62. Commenting on the Court's judgment
in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case, Fitzmaunce writes that "a
failure by one party claiming title to territory to protest against
acts that would be encroachments on its sovereignty if title

existed, may be evidence of the non-existence of such title". It is
evident that "the three separate episodes" referred to by Norway
cannot be regarded as a failure ta claim title or a failure to
protest against a title claimed by Norway. The examples referred

to in Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 2 (Department
of State Publication 7553, released December 1963). pages 1082 -
1084 illustrate that recognition estops the State which has

recognised the title from contesting ils validity. The undertakings
by Norway recognising Danish sovereignty over Greenland in the
Eastern Greenland case (1933 P.C.I.J., Sec. AIB no. 53) providea tme illustration of the effect of recognition for the series of
undertakings by Norway constituted a recognition of Danish
sovereignty over the specific temtory in dispute. But in the

present dispute Norway is unable to point to any express or tacit
recognition by the Government of Denmark of a median line
delimitation of the maritime areas between Greenland and Jan

Mayen. The Norwegian Government also refers to Suy, Les Actes
Juridiques Unilatéraw en Droit International Public, Paris, 1962,
pages 189 - 214. Suy rightly points out that recognition

presupposes "une manifestationde volonté".But in this case such
manifestation is clearly lacking in relation to the specific
delimitation in question. Rousseau, Droir International Public, I
Paris, 1970, page 426, paragraph 344, referred to in the

Counter-Memorial does not appear to support the Norwegian
claim.

402. The Norwegian claim that Danish legislation contains
a recognition of the median line delimitation in the maritime
areas between Greenland and Jan Mayen cannot be sustained. The
Danish legislation cannot support the interpretation claimed by

Norway. Even if this were not so, Denmark could not be barred
from benefiting from developments in international law
subsequent to the enactment of the legislation. For when a State

legislates in conformity with a given rule of customary
international law at a particular stage of the law's development
and the nile of international law then evolves, it cannot be said
that the State is barred from benefiting from evolution of the

customary rule. Moreover, this cannot be the result in a situation
where Denmark, prior to Norway's establishment of a fishery
zone around Jan Mayen, had informedNorway that a median line

delimitation would not be acceptable to Denmark (the Memorial,
pp. 14 - 15, paras. 44 - 47). An express statement of position
cannot be overturned by a mere inference.

403. Norway claims that the consistent pattern of Danish
conduct constitutes a racit recognition of, or acquiescence in, a
median line boundary between Greenland and Jan Mayen, first in

respect of continental shelf rights and subsequently in respect of
fisheries (the Counter-Memonal. p. 116, paras. 399 - 402).Norway refers inter aliato the description of acquiescence given

by the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case as "equivalent to tacit
recognition manifested by unilateral conduct which the otherparty
may interpret as consent ..."(I.CJ. Reports 1984, p. 305, para.
130).

404. The Government of Denmark respectfully submits
that no evidence has been brought forward by Norway indicating
any Danish conduct which could give the Norwegian Government

any reason to believe that the Government of Denmark had
consented to or would accept a median line delimitation of the
continental shelf area and the fishery zones between Greenland
and Jan Mayen. Act No. 597 of 17 December 1976 on the

Fishing Territory of the Kingdom of Denmark could not
reasonably be understood by the Norwegian Government as a
consent by the Government of Denmark to a median line
delimitation between Greenland and Jan Mayen (see pp. 135 -
137, paras. 370 - 375 above).

405. It was the understanding of the Government of
Denmark that Norway did not contemplate establishing a fishery
zone around Jan Mayen, at least until September 1978 when the

Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that newly
discovered prospects of capelin fishing in the waters around Jan
Mayen had led the Government of Norway to consider the
establishment of an economic zone around Jan Mayen (the

Memorial, p. 14, para. 42). Six months later- in March 1979 -
the Government of Denmark learned that the Norwegian and the
Icelandic Governments had initiated talks concerning maritime
delimitation of the area between Iceland and Jan Mayen. The
Danish reaction came immediately. At the end of March 1979 the

Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs advised his Norwegian
colleague that an equidistance line delimiting the waters between
Greenland and Nonvay would not be acceptable to Denmark (the
Memorial, p. 14, paras. 43 - 44). The Danish point of view was

reiterated on several occasions in the period from Mach 1979
until May 1980 (the Memorial, pp. 14 - 15, paras. 45 -48). On
14 May 1980 the Government of Denmark issued Executive
Order No. 176 on the Fishing Territory in the Waters aroundGreenland, extending Greenland's fishing territory north of 67"N
from 12 nautical miles to 200 nautical miles (the Memorial, p.
15, para. 49 and Annex 6). At the time of the issuance of the
Danish Executive Order, the Norwegian Govemment had not

established maritime zones around Jan Mayen. This did not
happen until 23 May 1980 when Norway issued a Royal Decree
establishing a fishery zone around Jan Mayen. An exchange of

Verbal Notes between the Parties followed (the Memorial,pp. 15
-16, paras. 50 - 52).

406. This sequence of events cannot possibly be

understood as expressing a tacit recognition of, or acquiescence
in, a median line delimitation of the maritime areas between
Greenland and Jan Mayen. It is difficult to believe that the
Nonvegian Government was at the time acting under the

influence of such a gross misconception. One should recall the
lucid statement delivered by the Chairman of the Enlarged
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Constitution on 6

June 1980 during the Norwegian parliamentary debate on whether
to approve the Agreement between Norway and Iceland
concerning Fisheries and Continental Shelf Questions. In his
recommendation to the Storring to give its consent to the

Agreement, the Chairman stated:

"The main reason why the Committee is in favour of the
agreement is clear: without an agreement, there would

have been open conflict between Iceland and Nonvay.
Nonvay would have been obliged to establish its own
zone around Jan Mayen unilaterally. Iceland would not
have respected it, nor would any other country." (See p.

39,Annex 11 to the Counter-Memorial; emphasis added.)

407. It is difficult to reconcile this statement with the
notion that the Nonvegian Government should have interpreted
the conduct of the Government of Denmark as expressing tacit
recognition of, or acquiescence in, a median line delimitation

between Greenland and Jan Mayen. For the reference to "any
other country" must have included Denmark. 408. To conclude this section on conduct and to place the
facts in their proper perspective the Government of Denmark
wishes to point out that from the outset when a delimitation

situation arose between Greenland and Jan Mayen Denmark made
it expressly clear to Norway that a median line delimitation
would not be acceptable to DenmarkIGreenland. In its conduct
conceming the delimitation situations between Jan Mayen and

lceland and between the Norwegian mainland and Bear Island
Nonvay has adopted a similar point of view. Thereby Norway's
conduct becomes an essential element in support of a delimitation

line respecting Greenland's full 200-mile fishery zone and a
corresponding continental shelf area.

3. General International Law

409. The Norwegian submissions are primarily based on a

histoncal approach to the dispute. The Counter-Memorial does,
however, almost as a fall-back position, offer some views as to
what would constitute an equitable solution under current general
intemational law (Section C of the Counter-Memorial). This

presentation mainly takes the form of a repetition of facts and
arguments presented earlier in the Counter-Memorial, ignonng
completely what cannot be ignored in a maritime delimitation

case, namely the establishment of a relevant area within which
the delimitation is to be effected and the identification of the
relevant factors apt to produce an equitable result. The applicable
pnnciples as presented by Norway in that Section of the Counter-

Memonal, cal1 for the following comments.

410. First, reference is made to the pnnciple of title (pp.

121 - 124, paras. 414 - 420). Not only in this section but in
numerous other places in the Counter-Memorial does Norway
stress the importance of Jan Mayen's entitlement to maritime

zones. At one point it is even stated that "(i)t should be no part
of a procedure of "equitable delimitation" to assist in the Danish attempt substantially to reduce the status and entitlements of Jan
Mayen." (the Counter-Memorial, p. 188, para. 672). Norway tries
to depict the facts as if this case was concemed with the
entitlement of Jan Mayen to maritime zones. It is and remains a

maritime clelimitarion case. This is registered in the Court's
official records of the present dispute and is also explained in the
Memorial at the very Qutset where the status of islands in

maritime delimitations is discussed (the Memorial, p. 81, paras.
271 - 273). Entiflement and delinrirution are distinct legal
concepts, as indicated by the Court in the very same passage
quoted by Nonvay from the TunisiulLihya case where it is stated:

"...Adjacency of the sea-bed to the tenitory of the
coastal State has been the paramount cntenon for
determining the legal status of the submerged areas, as
distinct from their delimitation,..."(I.C.J. Reports 1982,

p. 61, para. 73 and the Counter-Memorial, p. 122, para.
414).

411. It is, of course, true that although entitlement and
delimitation are different concepts, dealt with by different articles
both the 1958 and 1982 Conventions, they are complementary.
As the Court noted in the LihyalMalfa case:

"That the questions of entitlement and of definition of
continental shelf, on the one hand, and of delimitation of
continental shelf on the other, are not only distinct but
are also complementary is self-evident. The legal basis of

that which is to be delimited, and of entitlement to it,
cannot be other than pertinent to that delimitation."
(I.C.J.Reports, 1985, pp. 29 - 30, para. 27.)

The fact that a delimitation situation cannot aise without title
does not, however, mean that title govems a maritime
delimitation situation. Delimitation is govemed by the nom of
equity as an expression of justice and the rule of law

substantiated by a set of factors considered to be relevant in each
individual case. Within that nom title is pertinent in rendenng
the Coast - the basis of title- a relevant factor. The adoption ofthe 200-mile distance criterion as basis of title has made the
factors of geology and geomorphology of the seabed irrelevant
within that distance.

412. What is striking about the Nonvegian thesis is that it
fails to explain how the entitlement of Jan Mayen leads to the
selection of one relevant factor. or the reiection of another.

Apparently al1 it leads to is an insistence upon equidistance -
irrespective of relevant factors, and despite the clear jurispmdence
to the contrary.

413. The Norwegian preoccupation with Jan Mayen's
entitlement to broad maritime zones seems to be a reminiscence
of the negotiations with Iceland in the late 1970s during which
Iceland initially refused to accept Jan Mayen as an island entitled

to generate more than a 12-mile temtorial sea (see p. 114 - 115,
para. 310 above).

414. The Government of Denmark does not, however,

question Jan Mayen's status as an island under international law,
as is evidenced by the fact that Denmark did not object to the
establishment of Jan Mayen's 200-mile fishery zone to the east
towards the open sea. This position, however, has nothing to do

with the delimitation issue between Greenland and Jan Mayen
which involves the weighing of relevant factors in order to
achieve an equitable result. The Norwegian attempt to evade the
central legal issue in the present dispute leads Norway to state

that the delimitation claimed by Denmark is based on an "outer
limit of 200-mile zone principle", see page 111, paragraph 384
and page 150, paragraph 512 of the Counter-Memorial. These
Norwegian assertions stem from the confusion of entitlement with

delimitation. Denmark has nowhere in the Memorial used the
expression quoted by Norway: "outer limit of 200 miles zone
pnnciple". The Danish contention is that an equitable boundary
line in the waters between Greenland and Jan Mayen "shouldbe

drawn along the outer limit" of Greenland's fishery zone - to
borrow the term used by Nonvay in describing the delimitation
line between Iceland and Jan Mayen, see the Counter-Memorial.
page 159, paragraph 551. 415. Denmark bases its legal position in the present
maritime delimitation dispute on the premise that an island with
the characteristics of Jan Mayen may have title to a zone, but as

regards the extent of that zone cannot generate a maritime zone
which impinges on that of Greenland. A claim of that kind by
Norway could not produce an equitable solution as required by
the goveming international nom for deciding maritime

delimitation issues. Consequently, the delimitation in this case
must respect Greenland's 200-mile zone, notwithstanding that
DenmarklGreenland, for its part, does not question Jan Mayen's
entitlement to a territorial sea of 12 miles and an additional

maritime zone of no less than 32 miles up to the 200-mile limit
measured from Greenland's baseline.

416. Secondly, Nonuay claims that a principle of equal

division is involved (the Counter-Memorial, pp. 124 - 126, paras.
421 -424). Reference is made to the North Sea ContinentalShelf
cases, but nowhere does that Judgment pronounce a principle of
equal division. The Court states that "(i)n a sea with the

particular configuration of the North Sea, and in view of the
particular geographical situation of the Panies' coastlines upon
that sea, the methods chosen by them for the purpose of fixing
the delimitation of their respective areas may happen in certain

localities to lead to an overlapping of the areas appertaining to
them." (1.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 52, para. 99). In such marginal
situation the solution may inter aliabe "an equal division of the
overlapping areas" (ibid.,para. 99). Thus, the asserted principle

of equal division supposed to be denved from that case was to
apply only in those marginal areas of overlap, not in the
delimitation as a whole.

417. The reference in the Counter-Memonal, page 126,
paragraph 423 to a passage from the Gulf of Maine case is
likewise besides the point. The Chamber states: "Within this
framework [the geography of the coast], it is inevitable that the

Chamber's basic choice should favour a criterion long held to be
as equitable as it is simple, namely that in pnnciple, while
having regard to the special circumstances of the case, oneshould aim at an equal division of areas where the maritime
projections of thecoasts of the States between which delimitation
is to be effected converge and overlap." (I.C.J.Reports 1984, p.

327, para. 195.) No pnnciple of equal division is pronounced by
the Chamber. What may be inferred from this passage is that in
delimitation situations where no special circumstances exist an
equal division of maritime areas which meet and overlap could

form a simple and equitablc solution. In the present case,
however, where a special circumstance exists, in casu Jan Mayen,
an equal division would run contrary to international law.

418. In the concluding Chapter of Section C of the
Counter-Memonal, page 193, paragraph 695 Norway States that
its submission in the present case reflects legal pnnciples,

whereas Denmark's claims are labelled "eccentric",
"opportunistic", "monopolistic" etc., However, one looks in vain
in international legal sources to find a "principle of equal
division". The Norwegian thesis in reality amounts to regarding

equidistance as a mandatory principle. Such a thesis has
consistently been rejected both in case law and in treaty law.

419. The third principle invoked by Nonvay is concealed

in the notion of "abating the effects of incidental special features
within the appropriate legal and geographical framework - a
notion partly borrowed from the North Sea Continental Shelf
cases (the Counter-Memonal, p. 126, the title preceding para.

425) . But Norway's use of the Court's dicta is, even in that
respect, not correct. The relevant passage from the Judgment
quoted on page 127, paragraph 428 of the Counter-Memonal,

addresses a situation where the coastlines of the respective Parties
"are in fact comparable in length". Consequently it would be
unacceptable if "a State should enjoy continental shelf nghts
considerably different from those of .its neighbours merely

because in the one case the coastline is roughly convex in form
and in the other it is markedly concave, although those coastlines
are comparable in length.". Given this "geographical situation of
quasi-equality" justice requires "abating the effects of an

incidental special feature [the concavity of the coastline] fromwhich an unjustifiable difference of treatment could result."
(I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 49 - 50, para.91).

420. This statement of the Court supports the reasoning

advanced by Denmark to the effect that where no quasi-equality
exists in geographical tems, as is the fact in the present case, it
does not make sense to talk about abating the effect of Jan
Mayen. That would amount to a refashioning of geography, "and
equity does not require that a State without access to the sea

should be allotted an area of continental shelf, any more than
there could be a question of rendenng the situation of a state
with an extensive coastline similar to that of a State with a
restricted coastline." (I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp49 - 50, para.91).

421. The Norwegian presentation of general international
law continues with a chapter on the significance of islands in
maritime delimitation (the Counter-Memorial, pp. 133 - 137,

paras. 442 - 460). Here Nonvay continues to argue as if the
present dispute was concemed with entitlement and not with
delimitation (paras.444 - 445). However, this is a false premise
as pointed out in pages 150 - 153, paragraphs 410 - 415 above.

422. In the next Section (paras. 446 - 448) Nonvay
contends that Denmark has misunderstood the role of islands in
maritime delimitation. This erroneous assertion has been refuted
on pages 83 - 86, paragraphs 204 - 213 above.

423. In the following paragraphs of the Counter-Memonal
(paras.449 - 453) an attempt is being made to place islands in a
geographical and legal framework which focuses only on the

general geographical context of the delimitation situation, leaving
aside any reference to the exact area within which the actual
delimitation is to be effected. As to the general geographical
context of the present dispute Denmark wishes to refer to Map
IV of the Memorial and Map IV of the Counter-Mernorial which

illustrate the use of the median line approach to maritime
delimitation in the North Atlantic region except in relation to the
islands of Jan Mayen and Bear Island. 424. Nonvay argues that the general geographical context
within which the relation of Greenland and Jan Mayen is to be
assessed has the consequence that Jan Mayen be accorded full

effect as a geographically independent feature (the Counter -
Memorial, pp. 186 - 187, paras. 664 - 666). Norway believes that
the "key factor" for purposes of maritime delimitation is that the
region is "extrovert" (ibid., pp. 143 - 144, para. 483). Since

Greenland and Jan Mayen are "two entities at a considerable
distance frorn each other and not forming part of any introverted
geographical framework" Norway purports that the lengths of the

respective coasts have no relevance (ibid., pp. 186 - 187, para.
666). The conclusion reached by Nonvay is that full effect has to
be accorded to Jan Mayen in the delimitation vis-à-vis Greenland.

425. The Norwegian arguments are not supportedby State
practice or case law and Norway fails to bring forward the
rationale for its conclusions.

426. Norway. has referred to decisions where the
geographical framework has been. described as enclosed and

semi-enclosed (the Counter-Memonal, pp. 134 - 136, paras. 449 -
452)

427. In the North Sea Continental Shev cases the Court

made the observation that the North Sea to some extent had the
general look of an enclosed sea (I.C.J. Reports 1969, p.13, para.
3). In the LibyalMalta case the Court referred to "the general

geographical context in which the islands of Malta appear as a
relatively small feature in a semi-enclosed sea" (I.C.J. Reports
1985, pp. 52 -53, para. 73).

428. It appears difficult to deduct frorn these cases the
far-reaching conclusion drawn by Nonvay.

429. Jan Mayen is not a "geographically independent
feature" as rnaintained by Norway. The very existence of the
present dispute contradicts the notion of Jan Mayen as an
independent feature. The fact that the distance from Greenland toJan Mayen is about 250 nautical miles does not entitle a barren,
uninhahited island far away from the mainland of Nonvay to full

effect in a maritime delimitation opposite the mainland of
Greenland. State practice and case law, in particular the Channel
Islands Award suggest that the enclave solution is the one
appropnate in the case of distorting islands which are mid-way

islands or "wholly detached" from their mainland. If Jan Mayen
were closer to Greenland enclaving would be the logical solution;
in other tems, full recognition of 200 miles for Greenland and

an enclave of 12-mile territorial sea for the island. Fortunatelyfor
Nonvay, the relative long distance between Greenland and Jan
Mayen obviates the need for enclaving and allows to Jan Mayen

a much larger area.

430. The failure of Nonvay to make clear why the
geographical position of Jan Mayen leads to full effect to Jan

Mayen in the present dispute is understandable. It is not easy to
explain why the large maritime zones generated. by Jan Mayen
east of the island towards.the open sea should operate in favour

of Jan Mayen extending its broad maritime zone West of 'the
island at the expense of the maritime zone off the mainland of
Greenland. ., :

431. Some remarks are made in the Counter-Memonal
about Denmark's interpretation of the existing case law and State
practice (the Counter-Memorial. pp. 136 - 137, para. 454 -460).

The fact is, as stated in the Memorial, page 117, paragraph 365,
that the present maritime delimitation dispute has no parallel in
existing case law, and State practice is almost as meagre in

providing relevant precedents comparable to the Greenland - Jan
Mayen situation.

432. The one example of State practice which is extremely

pertinent, as it relates to the very same island, is the boundary
line established between Jan Mayen and Iceland, wherehy
Iceland's 200-mile economic zone hasbeen fully respected. That

solution was found to be equitable both by the Conciliation
Commission appointed by the Govemments of lceland and
Nonvay and by the two Govemments concerned. To theknowledge of the Government of Denmark, that bilateral
arrangement has never been described as "eccentric",
"extravagant", "opportunistic", "monopolistic" with regard to the
result achieved by Iceland. And for very good reasons, because it

was considered equitable by the two Parties.

433. The other example showing Nonvay's attitude to the
role of an isolated arctic island in a delimitation situation is the

boundary line established by the Nonvegian Government between
the economic zone of mainland Norway and the fishery
protection zone of the Svalbard Archipelago. In this delimitation
the southemmost island of the Archipelago -Bear Island, which

is located at a distance of 215 miles from the Nonvegian
mainland - was not allowed to impinge on the Norwegian
economic zone which was extended fully to 200 miles vis-à-vis
Bear Island, see pages 100 - 108, paragraphs 277 -298 above.

434. Finally, Norway describes the elements which in the
view of the Norwegian Govemment form part of an equitable
solution in the present case, (the Counter-Mernorial, pp. 139 -

175, paras. 461 - 617). Not surprisingly, this presentation by and
large repeats the facts presented in Part 1 of the Counter-
Memorial. This is quite natural in so far as the final stage of the
reasoning -for the Parties as well as for .the Court itself- is to

apply the law to the facts. The Memorial proceeds in the same
manner. The divergence of views relates to the fundamental
question of which elements or factors must be regarded as
relevant with a view to achieving an equitable result.

435. Norway dismisses as irrelevant such basic factors as
the establishment of a relevant area, the relevant coasts as well
as population, economy and the constitutional status of the

respective temtories, although these elements form part of the
whole legal rationale both for allocating maritime zones to coastal
States and for the delimitation of such zones between opposite or
adjacent States.

436. Instead of these factors, Norway treats as relevant an
element of a political nature, namely "the substantial interest of Norway in the Jan Mayen maritime region" '(the Counter-
Memonal, pp. 164 - 170, paras. 567 - 596). Denmark and
Greenland do not deny that Nonvay has indeed shown an interest

in exploiting different hunting and fishing grounds far away from
its own shores, see Part 1, D and F, 2 - 3 above. But an
expansionist fishery policy cannot be a relevant circumstance in a
maritime delimitation dispute which must be decided on legal

grounds and not on power politics. Indeed, a major factor in the
international efforts to establish 200-mile exclusive economic
zones in favour of coastal States was precisely the need generally
felt by the international community to have these States, and

among them especially the developing countries, protected against
exploitation of the resources in their adjacent waters by long-
range fishing fleets from highly developed and industrialised

countries - a situation which corresponds well to Norway's
activities close to the shores of Greenland. In this respect it must
be recalled that no part of "the substantial interests of Norway in
the Jan Mayen maritime region" emanates from Jan Mayen,

which has no population. The delimitation dispute, however,
concems the maritime zone between Greenland and Jan Mayen
and not the sea between Greenland and the Nonvegian mainland.
Norway, therefore, is not a coastal State in relation to the present

delimitation dispute.

437. The factors of geology and geomorphology do not
have any independent role in the present dispute, and secunty

considerations and other protective interests of the Parties are
sufficiently covered by a 12-mile temtonal sea, and a contiguous
zone of another 12 miles. The only factor which both Parties

appear to agree upon as relevant is their conduct. In this respect
Denmark is of the opinion that only conduct which in one way
or another relates to the present dispute, or to situations which
are comparable to the present dispute, is a relevant factor. This

means that attention must primarily be directed towards the
Parties' conduct in the North Atlantic region, especially the
maritime area around Jan Mayen. While Nonvay suggests that
any conduct over the years in relation to maritime delimitation

should be regarded as relevant, it is Denmark's position that the
most relevant conduct relates to the region and the area wherethe actual delimitation is to be effected. It is furthermore the

Danish subrnission that it is Norway's conduct in respect of Jan
Mayen and Bear Island, that demonstrates what would be an
equitable and just delimitation in the waters between Greenland
and Jan Mayen. The relevant Norwegian behaviour is fully

supported by Denmark, which endorses the position taken by
Nonvay to the effect that islands like Jan Mayen andBear Island
are not entitled to maritime zones which would impinge upon the
200-mile zone of Iceland and mainland Norway.

438. The various Norwegian contentions become a medley

of incommensurable elements presented on page 196, paragraph
701, cf. paragraph 16 of the Counter-Memonal, in the form of a
"shopping list" from which the Court, in its task to establish a
boundary, rnay pick and choose one or the other mle, concept,

principle, elernent offered by the Norwegian Govemrnent as the
basis for affirming the pre-existence of a median line boundary in
the waters between Greenland and Jan Mayen. But how, for
instance, can the continental shelf boundary both be in place and

not be in place?

439. If Norway indeed believes that a continental shelf
boundary is already in place, it violates logic to state at the same

tirne that. such a boundary rnay in actual fact not be in place.
According to Norway's reasoning, such contradictions are of no
importance because the Court is free to pick one or the other of
the concepts rnentioned, for instance, that of "opposability" which

is said to lead to the same result. However, "opposability" is not
a governing nom but simply one way of expressing a result
arrived at on the basis of legalnoms, to the effect that a certain
legal position upheld by one State must be respected by, or is

"opposable ton, other specific States.

440. In the sarne paragraph (701) under (2) it is stated that
the rnedian line in respect of the fishery zones is based upon

"...the express recognition and adoption of the boundary by
Denrnark; andlor ...". In logical terms it means that thissubmission alone is decisive. Now, it is evident from the history

of the present dispute (see pp. 12 - 16, paras. 36 - 53 of the
Memonal) that from the very first moment the island of Jan
Mayen, presented a problem, namely in relation to the

contemplated extension of the Danish and the Nonvegian fishery
zones to 200 miles, the Government of Denmark made it clear to
Nonvay that a median line would no1 be an acceptable
delimitation in the waters between Greenland and Jan Mayen.

Thus, there was no "express recognition and adoption" of a
median line boundary by Denmark. On the contrary, there were
express communications to Nonvay that a median line was not
acceptable in this area, which left the matter to be settled through

agreement or adjudication.

441. The Government of Denmark, therefore, invites
Nonvay to state in ils Rejoinder which mle of international law it

considers to be applicable to the present dispute.

B. The Position of Denmark

442. It is the Danish submission as developed in the
Memonal (pp. 59 -1 1l),that the rule applicable to solve the
maritime delimitation dispute-in question is that which leads to

an equitable result through the application of al1 those factors
which are considered to be relevant to the dispute.

443. The mle of equity in relation to disputes concerning

maritime delimitations was first developed by the Court in the
North Sea Continental Sheif cases. This mle should be seen in
the context of the "Truman Proclamation" of 28 September 1945,
which enunciated the doctrine of "equitable principles" as the

basis for solving delimitation issues conceming the continental
shelf. It was the International Law Commission which translated
this concept of equitable principles into what was apparently seen
as a more practical equidistance/special circumstances mle which

was eventually endorsed by UNCLOS 1, 1958. A decade later,
the jurispmdence of the Court influenced the thinking of the
Member States of the United Nations in the drafting of the delimitation provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
as far as the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone

are concerned. In these provisions (Articles 74 and 83,
respectively), equity based on the mle of law has been adopted
without venturing into any assessment of the factors which, in a
given delimitation case, would lead to an equitable result. This

assessment is left to be decided by the parties concerned or, in
the absence of an agreed settlement, by an independent third
party such as the International Court of Justice. Equity, as

expressed in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, is
imperfect in the sense that it fails to give guidance on the exact
contents of that nile. But, on the other hand, this imperfection
'
could have the advantage that future developments in the field of
maritime delimitation are best served by a general nile leaving it
to State practice and case law to endow it with specific contents.

The drafting of Articles 74 and 83 thus may often leave it to the
International Court of Justice to promote international law by
adapting equitable principles to the specific circumstances of each

delimitation case, yet within a general framework of legal
predictability.

444. Against this background, the legal situation may

probably best be described as one where customary international
law is reflected in Articles 74 and 83 of the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention, and based upon State practice as interpreted and

developed in the case law of the Court. It is often difficult to
discern which source is the pnmary one: State practice as
evidence of an opinio juris t,eaty law as codified international

customary law or the case law of the Court. In the view of the
Government of Denmark, the legal sources of maritime
delimitation consist of a combination of al1 these sources of

international law in a constructive interplay for furthering the
international l-gal order in a most important field of inter-State
activity."

" See Rudolf Bernhard,Custom and Treaty in Law of the Sea, Recueil
des Cours Volume V, 1987. especially page 276.

,162 445. The precise contents of the rule of equity consists of
a weighing of those factors which are considered to be relevant
in order to reach an equitable result. As to the concrete factors

which, in the view of the Govemment of Denmark, must be
considered relevant in deciding the present dispute, these have
been described in detail in the Memorial, pages 95 - 111,
paragraphs 294 - 356. Suffice it therefore in this Reply rnerely to

refer to these factors as those relating to: geography - population
- constitutional status of the respective territories - the socio-
economic structure - cultural hentage - proportionality - the
conduct of the parties in regard to the actual dispute - other

delimitations in the region. Applying these factors with a view to
an equitable solution constitutes the governing nile of the present
dispute and leads Denmark to submit that the island of Jan

Mayen cannot be accorded an effect in the delimitation which
would reduce Greenland's 200-mile fishery zone and
corresponding continental shelf.

446. Denmark submits that the legal reasoning set forth in
the Memorial and this Reply is in accordance with contemporary

international law as developed and expressed in treaty law and
case law.

447. It could also have been considered to develop the
legal arguments in respect of the continental shelf and the fishery
zone respectively.

448. As the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf is in force between the two Parties (the Memonal, p. 59,
para. 210). the equidistancelspecial circumstances mle contained

in Article 6 of the Convention would be the governing nom
deciding the boundary line for the shelf. On the basis of the
1958 Convention the Government of Denmark could plead along
the same lines as in the Memonal and this Reply in support of a

contention that the island of Jan Mayen, par excellence, falls
within the concept of "special circumstances" and should begiven no effect on Greenland's 200-mile continental shelf area.
As the equidistance/special circumstances mle can be seen as an
expression of equity, see the Memorial, page 63, paragraph 218,

the same pleading could be advanced to the effect that the
relevant factors supporting a mle of equity in the present case
lead to a solution whereby Jan Mayen would,not be allowed to
impinge upon Greenland's 200-mile continental shelf.

449. As to the fishery zones the governing nom of
delimitation is that which leads to an equitable solution, cf.
Article 83 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. The

pleading developed in the Memonal and this Reply with
particular emphasis on the factor relating to the importance to
Greenland of the fishery resource could also be developed in
support of the contention that the boundary line must respect

Greenland's 200-mile fishery zone. The result would be the same
if the equidistance/special circumstances mle were to be applied,
by way of analogy, to the fishery zones. That was in actual fact
the starting point of the negotiations between the Parties in 1980,

see the Counter-Memorial page 73, paragraph 258. The word
"boih" before Parties in paragraph 258 is, however, not correct.
Only Nonvay adopted the limited histonc point of view described
in' that paragraph, whereas Denmark based its reasoning on the

1958 Convention seen in the light of subsequent developments in
case Lawand treaty law.

450. The two boundary lines would thus coincide given

the existence of the same basic facts, including the fact that there
is less than 400 nautical miles between the two temtories.

451. Against this background the Govemment of Denmark

has felt justified in this case to start the legal reasoning in media
res as described in the Memorial and on pages 161 - 163,
paragraphs 442 - 445 above and to ask the Court to draw a
single line of delimitation. CHAPTERIV

The Method of Delimitation

A. General Approach

452. In the Memorial, pages 117 - 121, paragraphs 365 -
377, it has been submitted that the method of delimitation in the

present case should take as its starting point, the relevant coasts
of Greenland and Jan Mayen, respectively. Given the striking
disparity in coastal lengths and considering the fact that Jan
Mayen has no population and no economic life of its own, this

leads directly to applying another method than the median line
approach even as the starting point. That should corne as no
surprise as the method of equidistance is but one method among
others, which could lead to an equitable solution in some cases,

but produce inequitable results in others.

453. It would seem to follow that a median line can only
be the starting point in a delimitation dispute if it would primo

facie tend to lead to justice. In the present case a median line is
prima facie creative of inequity, precisely because the lengths of
the relevant coasts as well as the size, constitutional status,
dependence on fisheries, and the population of the respective

temtories are not comparable. Therefore, one must fall back on
the principle of equity even as a starting point to judge where
the line of delimitation should be drawn in order that equity and
justice may prevail. This implies the use of a method whereby al1

relevant factors are weighed against each other - like the scale of
Justitia.

454. In case of an agreed settlement, it will be up to the

States concemed to weigh the relevant factors against each other.
The point being that when there is agreement there is, for al1
practical purposes, also equity, see the LibyalMalra case, 1985,
page 39, paragraph 46. 455. If no agreement can be reached it will normally be
up to an independent third party, such as the Court, to evaluate
the relevance of the factors submitted by the two Parties.

456. In both situations the final result must be equitable.
However, a marked difference in the two approaches is seen in
the fact that, while thedecision by a court reveals which factors
have been considered relevant, the same will under normal

circumstances not apply to a negotiated settlement where only the
result ispublicly known and the detailed considerations leading to
that result remain in the archives of the respective Parties.

457. To the Govemment of Denmark it is important to
clarify how the delimitation process itself is to be carried out.
That represents the essential part of any maritime delimitation.
Common sense would appear to suggest that when embarking

upon that process one must begin with the idea that the starting
line must itself appear to lead towards an equitable result which
is the fundamental nom goveming maritime delimitation. But
how can one know in advance what may lead towards an

equitable result? In the words of the Court of Arbitration in the
Channel Islands case, 1977, a prima facie view of the
geographical situation may suggest that a particular island or
groups of islands represent "a circumstance creative of inequity

and calling for a method of delimitation that in some measure
redresses the inequity" (para. 196 of the Award). The arbitrators
in the GuinealGuinea-Bissau case, 1985 proceeded from an
overall view of the geographical context in which the delimitation

line was to be drawn (para. 108 of the Award). The International
Court of Justice followed similar reasoning whe'nit stated inthe
LibyalMalta case, 1985 that "...(t)he fact that the Court has
found that, in the circumstances of the present case, the drawing

of a median line constitutes an appropnate first step in the
delimitation process, should not be understood as implying that
an equidistance line will be an appropriate beginning in al1cases,
or even in al1 cases of delimitation between opposite States. ..."

(I.C.J. Reports 1985,pp. 55 - 56, para. 77). 458. Recognising that the delimitation process in the last
analysis is one single complex operation it seems fair to conclude

that a maritime delimitation-process should proceed from a prima
facie view of the particular case with its most prominent factors.

B. Relevant Factors

459. Approaching now the question of drawing the line of

delimitation in the waters between Greenland and Jan Mayen, and
weighing the different factors involved, the first consideration to
be taken into account is the fact that the dispute relates to a

delimitation situation caused by the introduction of broad
maritime zones of up to 200 nautical miles by both Denmark and
Norway off the coasts of Greenland and Jan Mayen.

460. As mentioned in on pages 83 - 84, paragraph 207,
the introduction and adoption by UNCLOS IIIof the new broad

maritime zones had an influence on the entitlement of islands to
maritime zones under international law. The provision contained
in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Temtorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, Article 10, had to be reconsidered in the light

of the new concept of 200-mile fishery or economic zones and
corresponding continental shelf areas. It was not considered to be
reasonable to allow such broad zones around small isles, islets or

mere rocks unable to sustain human habitation?' The result at the
Conference was that rocks were singled out as not being entitled
to the broad maritime zones, see Article 121 (3) of the 1982

Convention on the Law of the Sea.

461. Article 121 does not, however, address the question

of the effect of an island in a delimitation situation. It would be
in line with the reasoning underlying Article 121(3), as indeed
with the basic philosophy behind the new order governing the
regime of the sea-bed outside national jurisdiction as contained in

the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, to adopt an

''See e.g.HiranW. Jayewardene.The Regimeof Islands in lnrernational
Law. pp. 5-6, 15- 16 and18.approach towards delimitation consistent with the one adopted for
the singling out of rocks for special treatment as regards
entitlement. Otherwise small islands without population would be

given a role in intemational maritime law which is completely
out of proportion to the other basic concept contained in the
1982 Convention, namely that of allowing coastal States broad
maritime zones. That concept has as its rationale the support of

the living conditions of the coastal State population and as far as
Greenland is concerned its overwhelming'dependency on fishery
has been described in Part 1 under E. and F. It has never been
intended that the concept of the new broad maritime zones

should turn into a devi6e which could supply a mainland in
possession of a far-away island without a natural population with
disproportionate maritime zones. Only where a detached island
can claim a status more or less similar to that of the mainland it

confronts, i.e., a living community which depends for its sumival
on its surrounding sea, would it be reasonable to regard that
island as equal in principle to an opposite-lying mainland. But
that is not the case as far as the present dispute is concemed:

Though Jan Mayen is not a mere rock, it is certainly not the
type of island one would expect to be'entitled to broad maritime
zones at the expense of an.opposite-lying mainland.

462. To conclude this first consideration, it would seem to
follow from the very nature of the island of Jan Mayen - seen in
relation to the delimitation dispute in question, which is
concemed with .broad maritime zones of an economic character 1

that the method of drawing a line of delimitation would have to
be based on the premise that the island of Jan Mayen could not
be accorded a maritime zone which would impinge upon
Greenland's right to a 200-mile fishery zone and a corresponding

continental shelf area.

463. The second consideration which Denmark believes it
is important to take into account when establishing the method

for drawing the line of delimitation in the present case, is that of
comparing the relevant coastal fronts of the two opposite-lying
territories, see the Memorial pages 11 - 12, paragraphs 30 - 35,
and pages 11 - 16, paragraphs 19 - 32 above. Such ageographical cornparison based on nature itself is relatively easy
tomake, given the straight-line character of the respective coasts,
and would suggest a method of delimitation reflecting the ratio of

the length of the two coasts, i.e., almost 10 to 1. If coastal ratios
were the only cntenon, the line should be drawn even further
from Greenland's coast than 200 nautical miles. An illustration of
this line is shown on page 120 in the Memonal. However,

geography is not the only factor operating in a delimitation case,
especially where the delimitation covers the fishery zone as well
as the continental shelf area. In such situations other relevant

factors must be given due weight. In the present case factors
such as population, constitutional status, economic structure,
cultural heritage al1operate in favour of Greenland alone, adding
to the strength of the case for drawing an equitable line beyond

the 200-mile mark measured from Greenland's baseline. Under
contemporary international law such a line cannot, however, be
drawn because the international community for political-legal
reasons has decided to restnct the claims of coastal States to a

distance of 200 nautical miles as far as fishing zones are
concerned, and to apply the same distance critenon with regard
to the continental shelf in cases where the maritime area between

the opposite-lying temtories is less than 400 nautical miles in
breadth. Thus a proportionality line, however reasonable in itself,
has to be adjusted back to the 200-mile distance mark.

464. Norway's conduct with regard to the islands of Jan
Mayen and Bear Island points decisively towards a full 200-mile
fishery zone and continental shelf for Greenland as an equitable
and just settlement in the region.

465. There is yet another factor operating in favour of the
200-mile line measured from the actual baselines of Greenland:
the ice condition along Greenland's east coast.The heavy flow of

pack ice during the year and the permanent portion of ice close
to the coast mean that throughout the year only part of
Greenland's 200-mile fishery zone is accessible by boat or ship

(see the figure on page 41 in the Memorial and Map IIin the
Counter-Memorial). The disputed area in the present case is non-
navigable for part of the year and this fact constitutes anotheressential reason for Denmark's insistence upon the 200-mile
fishery zone measured from Greenland's straight baselines. In
making this point, Denmark does not try to establish a legal
position whereby the limit of the ice off this part of Greenland's

Coast " should in the future serve as a baseline for measuring the
breadth of the territorial sea and other maritime zones. With the
exception of one article (Art. 234). concerning the right of the

coastal State to institute measures to control pollution caused by
vessels inside her exclusive economic zone in cases where this
zone is ice-covered, the Convention on the Law of the Sea
contains no particular regulations governing ice formations.

Denmark raises this point only as a fact which the Court should
bear in mind in the process of determining the boundary line.
Greenland's 200-mile zone will not, in fact, provide Greenland
with 200 miles of exploitable sea area.

466. The Counter-Memorial offers no method. of
delimitation, allegedly because the median line .in respect of the
continental shelf has been in place since 1965, and the boundary
delimiting the fishery zones should then, according to State

practice, also follow the line established for the continental shelf.
It is, of course, an easy way to solve the problem to state that
there is no problem because the line of delimitation is already in
place. On pages 126 - 130, paragraphs 337 - 350 above it has

been explained why this subrnission by Norway does not stand
up to legal scmtiny. There is no way to avoid addressing the
central issue concerning the method of delimitation required under

contemporary international law.

C. The Single Line Approach

467. A point on which the Parties appear to be in
agreement is that a single line of delimitation is called for.

''The situation rnabedifferent in the north-east pan of Greenland, see
10rgen Molde, The status of ice in international laNnrdic Journal of
lnrernarional Ln1982 Vol. 51, pp. 1-5166 468. Denmark does not disagree with the Nonvegian point
of view as expressed in the Counter-Memorial, page 91 - 92,

paragraphs 317 - 322 and page 108 - 111, paragraphs 373 - 381
that existing continental shelf boundaries havenormally served as
a basis for the delimitation of the new exclusive economic zones
or extended fishery zones, wherethe distance between the States
concemed is less than 400 nautical miles. #en one boundary
already exists, States are inclined touse it also for other purposes
whenever feasible, especially taking into account the background

and contents of the concept of the exclusive economic zones
comprising both a fishery zone and a continentalshelf area.

469. That is in line with the reasoning underlying the
request for a single lineof maritime delimitation, put fonvard by
Denmark in its Memorial on page 113,paragraphs 357 - 360. A

single line of delimitation presents the obvious advantage of
providing a division of al1 the natural resources of the zones,
living and non-living, on the sea-bed, under its subsoil or in the
superjacent waters. It is a sensible and practical choice when as
in the present case no specific factors exist which dictate the use
of differentlines for the shelf and the fishery zone.

470. As indicated in the Memorial (pp. 115 - 117, para.
364), there is a clear tendency for State practice to adopt the
single line approach. The latest example is provided by the
arbitration to settle the maritime delimitation between Canada and
France in the waters surrounding the French islands of St. Pierre
and Miquelon where a single line delimitation hasalso been

requested.

471. Denmark and Nonvay seem to be in agreement about
the current legal trend as well as the practical and political
advantages in support of the concept of a single line of
delimitation. But Denmark cannot agree on the way the tendency
towards a single line delimitation is used by Nonvay in its

Counter-Memorial. 472. First, and most important, the Norwegian point of
dep&ure is the false argument that the continental shelf boundary
between Greenland and Jan Mayen is already in place. That this
argument is without legal foundation has been demonstrated on

pages 126 - 130,paragraphs 337 - 350 above.

473. Equally untenable is the suggestion that the pattern of

median line continental shelf boundaries in the region should
almost automatically generate not only continental shelf
boundaries of the same kind elsewhere in the area but also
identical fishery zone boundaries.

474. It would, indeed, be easy if a whole number of
delimitation issues in a region could be solved by following a
"pattern" in spite of al1 kinds of differences involved in the

various situations. But, of course, it is not as simple as that.
Ironically, Nonvay itself has provided convincing proof of the
importance of judging each delimitation issue on its own ments.

. .
475. Norway has established a full 200-mile econornic
zone for mainland Nopvay vis-à-vis Bear Island and has
recognised Iceland's 200-mile economic zone vis-à-vis Jan

Mayen. Also noteworthy is the fact that no. continental shelf
boundary was in place before the boundary for the economic and
fishery zones was established. On the contrary, in relation to
Iceland the latter boundary was established first, and. then 17

months later, an identical continental shelf boundary was drawn.
In other words, when cornpared with the pattern of conduct
claimed by Nonvay to be prevailing in the region, the events

occurred in exactly the reverse order between Nonvay and
Iceland.

476. Thus, Norway has very convincingly dernonstrated

that practical life may very well run ounter to theoretical
"patterns".. for both the. procedure and the substance of
delimitations supposed to reign in the area. This conclusion
should not come as a surprise, considenng that equitable

pnnciples are not intended to lead to equal solutions for unequal
situations. D. Computation of the 200-Mile Delimitation Line

477. Based on the revised baseline mentioned on page 16,
paragraph 31 above and described in detail in Annex 58, the
Govemment of Denrnark has made a computation of the

200-mile line off the relevant part of East Greenland.

478. Said line is presented as a geodetic traverse between
points A and B (Map V) consisting of a certain number of

intermediate points at discrete intervals on the some 600
kilometres long line.

479. The actual computer-lists provided with explanatory

notes and sketches showing the different modes in which the
computation takes place, are available to the Court and the
Respondent State.

480. Map VI is an illustration of the computation of
Greenland's pertinent 200-mile line based on 96 points,
corresponding to an average discrete interval between the points

of some 6,300 metres. The red "herring bone" pattern represents
the lines (for convenience loxodromes instead of geodesics) along
which the geodetic distance of 200 nautical miles is computed to
produce the consecutive points on the line. PART III

SUBMISSIONS 481. In view of the facts and the arguments presented in
the Memorial and this Reply,

May it please the Court:

(1) To adjudge and declare that Greenland is entitled to
a full 200-mile fishery zone and continental shelf area

vis-à-vis the island of Jan Mayen; and consequently

(2) To draw a single line of delimitation of the fishery
zone and continental shelf area of Greenland in the

waters between Greenland andJan Mayen at a distance
of 200 nauticai miles measured from Greenland's
baseline, the appropnate part of which is given by
straightlines (geodesics) joining the following points in

the indicatedorder:*

Point No. Designation LatitudeN Longitude W

At Cape Russel 69"59'38"3
At Cape Brewster ' 70°07'24"0
At Cape Lister 70°29'33"5
At Cape Hodgson 70°32'16"7

Rathbone Island SE 70°39'53"4
Rathbone Island NE 70°40'14"7
At Cape Topham 71°19'560
Murray Island 71°32'45"3

Rock 72O16'09"4
Franklin Island 72"38'57"2
Bontekoe Island 73O07'15"9
Cape Broer Ruys SW 73'28'57"9

At Cape Broer Ruys 73"30'30"9
Anindei Island 73"45'49"4

" Between points NO. I a2, 3 and 4,12 and 13,and 19and 20 the
baselineollows the low water mark along the coastline. The protrusive pointson
to Annex58. Coordinatesof al1 basepoints aregWGSn84.esented in the suh-annex LatitudeN LongitudW

AtCapeBorlase
Warren
At ClarkBjerg
Lille Pendulum

At Cape Philip
Broke
CapePanschS
AtCape Pansch
Cape BflrgenSE

Copenhagen,31 January1991

Agents of-the Government of the Kingdom of DenmarkMAP VI

ILLUSTRATION OFTHE
COMPUTATION OF EAST

GREENLAND'S200-NAUTICAL
MILELlNE

MercatorProjection

Scale 1:7 000000

Listof ApproximateCoordinates:

A: 74'21'9N 5000'4W
8: 69'34'7N12'09'4W

G: 70°32'3N 21'28'9W
H: 75'01'6N17'20'7W

- 200naulical mile line
offEastGreenland.

- StraighbaselinesofEsSI

Greenland.MAP V

DISPUTEDANDRELEVANT
AREASINTHElR
GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT

Mercator Proiection

Scale 1:7 000 000

List of Approximate Coordinates:

A : 74'21'9N 5'00'4W
0 : 69'34'7N 12'09'4W
C, : 6998'4N 12'43'4W

0,: 70'12'4N 1610'2W
E : 71D09'7N 7'57'5W

F : 70'49'8N 9'03'5~
G : 70'32'3N 21'28'9W

H : 75W1'6N 17'20'7W

----
200-nautical mileline
off EastGresnland.

---- Medisn line between
Greenland end Jan
Mayen.Thelirnitingline

BC,D,towaids the south.

........ Li.iting lines AE. FB
D,Gand AH. Coartal
frontsGHand FE.

- Straight baselinesof East
Gresnland.

- 200-nautical mile lines
off Greenland (North of
point Al. lcelsnd (East
of point 0) and JanMayen
Ito the east)iespectively.MAP VI1

ILLUSTRATIONOFTHE

REVISEDEAST
GREENLAND BASELINE

COORDINATES OFTHBASE-
LlNEPOINTSAREGlVEN
IN ANNE58

Document Long Title

Reply of the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark