INTERNATIONAL COURTOF JUSTICE
REQUEST
FOR ADVISORY OPINION
transmittedto the Courtunderthe United
Nations GeneralAssembly resolution49/75 K
of 15 December 1994
LEGALITYOF THE THREATOR USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
COUR INTERNATIONALEDE JUSTICE
REQUÊTE
POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF
transmàla Couren vertude la réKolution49/75
de l'Assegénéraees NationsUnies
du 15 décembre1994
LICÉITÉDE LA MENACEOU DE L'EMPLOI
D'ARMESNUCLÉAIRES 1994
GeneralList
No. 95
1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE
19 December 1994.
1have the honour to inform you that al ils 90th meeting held on 15Decem-
ber 1994,under its agenda item 62 entitled "General and Complete Disarm-
ament: Report of the First Committee"A/49/699), the General Assembly
adopted resolution 49/7K. "Request for an Advisory Opinion from the
lnternational Court of Justice on the Legality ofthe Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons". The tex1of the resolution is attached.
In this resolution, the General Assembly decided, pursuant to Article 96,
paragraph 1,of the Charter of the United Nations:
"to request the lnternational Court of Justice urgently to render ils advi-
sory opinion on the following question:the threat or use of nuclear
weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?"'
Pursuant to Article 65, paragrap2,of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, the Secretariat is now in the process of preparing a dossier
containing "al1documents likelyto throw lightupon the question", whichwill
be transmitted to the Court as soon as possible.
(Signed)Boutros Bournos-GHALI. 11. RÉSOLUTION 49/75 K ADOPTÉE
PAR L'ASSEMBLÉEGÉNÉRALE À SA 90E SEANCEPLENIERE
LE 15 DÉCEMBRE 1994
Demande d'avismnsultati/de la Cour internationaledeJustice
sur la légalitéla menace ou del'emploi d'armesnucléaires
L Xssembléegénérale,
Considérant que l'existence des armes nucléaires et la poursuite de leur
mise au point font courir de graves dangers l'humanité,
Sachant que les Etats ont en vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies I'obliga-
tion de s'abstenir de recourir à la menace ouà l'emploi de la force contre
l'intégriterritoriale ou l'indépendancepolitique de tout Etat,
Rappelant ses résolutions 1653 (XVI) du 24 novembre 1961, 33171B du
14décembre 1978,34/83 G du 11 décembre 1979,35/152 D du 12décembre
1980,36192 1du 9 décembre 1981,45159 B du 4 décembre 1990 et 46/37 D
du 6 décembre 1991, dans lesquelles elle a déclaréque l'emploi d'armes
nucléairesconstituerait une violation de la Charte et un crime contre I'huma-
nité,
Sefélicitarondeprogrès accomplis en ce qui concerne l'interdiction et l'éli-
mination des armes de destruction massive, notamment la conclusion de la
convention sur l'interdiction de la mise au point, de la fabrication et du stoc-
kage des armes bactériologiques (biologiques) ouà toxines et sur leur des-
truction' et de la convention sur l'interdiction de la mise au point, de la
fabrication, du stockage et de l'utilisation d'armes chimiques et sur leur des-
truction*,
Convaincue que l'éliminationcomplète des armes nucléaires est la seule
garantie contre la menace d'une guerre nucléaire,
h'orantl'inquiétudeexprimée lors de la quatriéme conférence des parties
'31res
chargée de l'examen du trait; sur la non-prolifér31iondr., armes nucli
devait le oeu de oroerès accomolis vers-l'élimination comolète des armes
nucléaires'danslei mgilleurs dél&s,
Rappelant que, convaincue qu'il faut renforcer la primautédu droit dans les
relations internationales, elle a déclaréla periode 1990-1999 Décennie des
Nations Unies pour le droit international3,
Notant qu'elle peut, en vertu du paragraphe 1 de I'article 96 de la Charte,
demander à la Cour internationale de Justice un avis consultatif sur toute
question juridique,
'Résolution2826 (XXVI),annexe.
2Voir D-ments ofineh delilssembléegénéroqle.arante-seplsessions.upplémeni
n"27(A147/27),appendice 1.
Résolution44/23. Recallingthe recommendation of the Secretary-General, made in his report
entitled "An Agenda for Peace" ',that United Nations organs that are author-
ized ta take advantage of the advisory competence of the lnternational Court
of Justice turnta the Court more frequently for such opinions,
Welcomingresolution 46/40 of 14 May 1993 of the Assembly of the World
Health Organization, in which the organization requested the International
Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on whether the use of nuclear
weapons by a State in war or other armed coniiict would be a breach of its
obligations under international law, including the Constitution of the World
Health Organization,
Decider.Dursuant to Article 96.DaramaDh 1, of the Charter of the United
Nations. to request the lnternatio~al&UA of Justtce urgcntly ta render its
advisory opinion on the following quesrion. "Ir the threat or use of nuclear
weapons in any circumstance peÏmLttedunder international law?", Rappelanq rue, dans son rapport intitulé«Un agenda pour la paix*', le
Secrétaire général raecommandé aux organes des Nations Unies qui sont
autorisésà demander des avis consultatifs à la Cour internationale de Justice
de s'adresser plus souventà la Cour pour obtenir d'ellede tels avis,
Sefélicranrde la résolution46/40 de l'Assembléede l'Organisation mon-
diale de la Santé,en date du 14 mai 1993, dans laquelle l'organisation
demande àla Cour internationale de Justice de donner un avis consultatif sur
la question de savoir si l'utilisationd'armes nucléairespar un Etat au cours
d'une guerre ou d'un autre conflit armé constituerait une violation de ses
obligations au regard du droit international,y compris la Constitution de
l'organisation mondiale de la Santé,
Décidec ,onformément au paragraphe I de l'article 96 de la Charte des
Nations Unies. de demander à la Cour internationale de Justice de rendre
dans les meilleurs délaisun avis consultatif sur la question suivante: «Est-il
permis en droit international de recouriràla menace ou à l'emploi d'armes
nucléairesen toute circonstance?)) UNITED NATIONS
LEGALlTY OF THE THREAT
OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(REQUESTFOR AN ADVISORY OPINION)
Documentsrelathgto theQuestionon whian AdvisoryOpinionis requested
by GeneralAssemblyresolution49/75 K of 15 December1994,transtotted
the InternatiClourtof Justiceby theSecretary-Golf theUnitedNations
in accordanwithparagraph2, Article65 of theStatuteof theCourt ,Table of Contents
Document No.
Introductory Note
Part 1 General Assembly resolution 49/75 K and
Documents relating to the proceedings
leading to the adoption thereof
A. Text of General Assembly resolution 49/75K
B. Proceedings in the First Committee
Discussion at the 3rd meeting
Discussion at the 5th meeting
Discussion at the 6th meeting
Discussion at the 7th meeting
Submission of the draft resolution
Introduction of the draft resolution
at the 15th meeting
Discussion at the 22nd meeting
Discussion at the 24th meeting
Discussion at the 25th meeting
Report of the First Committee (A/49/699)
C. Proceedings at the 90th Plenary Meeting of
the General Assembly Verbatim Recordof
the 90th Meeting
Part II General Assembly Resolutions referred to in
Preambular Paragraph 3 of General Assembly
Resolution 49/75K and the documents relating
to the legislative history thereof
A. General Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI) of
24 November 1961
1. Text of General Assembly Resolution1653 (XVI) 13
2. Agenda items 72 and 73
a. Request by United Kingdom and United
States of America for inclusion of
agenda item 72 (A/4799) 14
b. Request by India for inclusion of
agenda item 73 A/4801 and Add.1) 15
3. Draft Resolution (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3) 16
4. Verbatim Records of Proceedings in the First
Committee
a. Introduction of draft resolution at
1189th meeting
b. Discussion at 1189th meeting
c. Discussion at 1190th meeting d. Italian amendments (A/C.l/L.295)to draft
resolution 19
e. Discussion at1191st meeting 20
f. Discussionat 1192nd meeting 21
g. Explanations of vote before the vote at
h. Explanations of vote before the vote at 22
1194th meeting 23
i. Voting on Italian amendmentsat 1194th
meeting 23
j. Voting on draft resolutionat 1194th
meeting 23
5. Report of the First Committee (A/4942/Add.3) 24
6. Verbatim Record of Proceedingsat the 1063rd
Plenary Meeting
a. Introductionof Report of the First
Committee 25
b. , Explanationsof vote beforethe vote 25
c. voting on Draft Resolution II 25
d. Expianationsof vote after the vote 25
B. General Assembly Resolution 33/71 B of
14 December 1978
1. Text of General Assembly Resolution 33/71 B
2. Draft Resolution(A/C.1/33/L.2)
3. Verbatim ~ecords of Proceedingsin the First
Committee
a. Introductionof draft resolutionat 18th
meeting 28
b. Co-sponsor8sstatementon draft resolution
at 19th meeting 29
c. Oral revisionof draft resolution at51st
meeting 30
d. Explanations ofvote beforethe vote
at 51st meeting 3O
e. Voting on draft resolutionat 51st meeting 30
f. Explanationsof vote after the vote at 51st
meeting 30
4. Report of the First Committee (A/33/461) 31
5. 84thaPlenary Meetingroceedingsat the
a. Introductionof Report of the First
Committee 32
b. Voting on Draft ResolutionB 32C. General AssemblyResolution 34/83 G of
11 December 1979
1. Text of General Assembly Resolution 34/83 G 33
2. Report of the Secretary-Generalon "Non-useof
nuclear weaponsand preventionof nuclear waru
of 28 September 1979(A/34/456and Add.1) 34
3. Draft Resolution(A/C.1/34/L.26) 35
4. . Verbatim Records of Proceedingsin the First
Committee
a. Introductionof draft resolution at36th
meeting 36
b. Oral revision of draft resolutionat 42nd
c. Voting on draft resolutionat 42nd meeting 37
d. Explanationof vote afterthe vote at 42nd
meeting 37
5. Report of the First Committee (A/34/752) 38
6. Verbatim Record of Proceedingsat the 97th
Plenary Meeting
a. 'Introductionof Report of the First
Committee 39
b. Voting on Draft ResolutionG 39
D. General AssemblyResolution 35/152 D
of 12 December 1980
1. Text of General Assembly Resolution 35/152 D 40
2. Draft Resolution (A/C.1/35/L.22) 41
3. Verbatim Records of Proceedingsin the First
Committee
a. Introductionof draft resolutionat 35th
meeting 42
b. Explanationsof vote beforethe vote at
39th meeting 43
c. Voting on draft resolutionat 39th
meeting 43
d. Explanationsof vote after the vote at
39th meeting 43
5. Verbatim Record of Proceedingsat the 94thdd.l) 44
Plenary Meeting
a. Introductionof Report of the First
Committee
b. Voting on Draft ResolutionD
E. General Assembly Resolution 36/92 1 of
9 December 1981
1. Text of General Assembly Resolution 36/92 1
2. Draft Resolution (A/C.1/36/L.29) 3. Verbatim Records of Proceedingsin the First
Committee
a. Introductionof draft resolutionat 32nd
meeting
b. Voting on draft resolutionat 40th
meeting
c. Explanationsof vote afterthe vote
at 40th meeting
4. ,Reportof the First Committee (A/36/752)
5. Verbatim Recordof Proceedingsat the
91st Plenary Meeting
a. Introductionof Report of the First
Committee
b. Voting on Draft Resolution 1
c. Expianationof vote afterthe vote
F. General Assembly Resolution 45/59 B of
4 December 1990
1. Text of General Assembly Resolution45/59 B
2. Draft Resolution (A/C.1/45/L.25)
3. Verbatim Records of Proceedingsin the First
Committee
a. Introductionof draft resolutionat 29th
meeting
b. Expianationof vote beforethe vote at
34th meeting
c. Voting on draft resolutionat 34th
d. Explanationsof vote after the vote
at 34th meeting
4. Report of the First Committee (A/45/779)
5. Verbatim Recordof Proceedingsat the 54th
Plenary Meeting
a. Introductionof Report of the First
Committee
b. Voting on Draft ResolutionB
G. General Assembly Resolution 46/37 D of
6 December 1991
1. Text of General Assembly Resolution46/37 D
2. Draft Resolution (A/C.1/46/L.20)
3. CommitteeRecords of Proceedingsin the First
a. Introductionof draft resolutionat 31st
meeting
b. Voting on draft resolutionat 33rd
meeting
c. Explanationsof vote afterthe vote at
33rd meeting
4. Report of the First Committee (A/46/674) 5. Verbatim Recordof Proceedings atthe 65th
Plenary Meeting
a. Introductionof Report of the First
Committee
b. Voting on Draft Resolution E
Part III Texts of Conventions referred to in
preambular paragraph 4 of resolution 49/75K
A. Conventionon the prohibitionof the
development,productionand stockpiling
of bacteriological(biological)and toxin
weapons and on their destruction
B. Conventionon the prohibitionof the
development, production, stockpilingand
use of chemicalweapons and on their
destruction
Part IV Final Document of the Fourth Review Conference
Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons, and Excerpts
£rom Statements madetherein
A. Text of the Final Document of theFourth
Review Conferenceof the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear
Weapons, Oraanizationand Work of the
Conference
B. EXCerDtsof statementsmade at the
~onfekencepertainingto the wconcerns.w
ex~ressedin the Fourth Review Conference
of-the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons/ -
Part 1 p q PART 1
to the ~roceedinssleadins to the ado~tionthereof
Document
No.
A. Text of General Assembly resolution49/75K 1
B. Proceedingsin the First Committee
Discussionat the 3rd meeting
Discussionat the 5th meeting
Discussionat the 6th meeting
Di,scussion at the 7th meeting
Submissionof the draft resolution
Introductionof the draft resolution
at the 15th meeting
Discussionat the 24th meeting
Discussion atthe 25th meeting
Report of the First Committee (A/49/699)
C. Proceedingsat the 90th Plenary Meeting
of the General Assembly
Verbatim Recordof the 90th Meeting 12A. General Assemblv resolution 49/75 K
1. General Assembly resolution 49/75 K entitled l1Request for an
advisory opinionfrom the International Courtof Justice on the
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weaponsl,(No. 1) was
adopted at the forty-ninth sessionof the General Assemblyon 15
December 1994under agenda item 62 entitled "Generaland Complete
Disarmamentr1. The legislative history of the resolution is as
follows .
2. This item, which consists of ten sub-items,was included in
the provisional agenda of the forty-ninth session pursuant to
resolutionsof the previous sessions.
3. On the recommendationof the General Committee,the General
Assembly includedthe item as item 62 in its agenda and allocated
it to the First Conimittee.
B. Proceedincrs in the First Committee
4. The First Committee decidedto hold a general debateon al1
disarmament and international securityitems allocated to it (a
total of 20 items), which includeditem 62. The general debateon
those items took placeat the third to tenth meeting,£rom 17 to 24
October 1994. Discussionsof specificsubjectstook placefrom 25
to 27 October and on 31 October and 1 November. Considerationof
draft resolutions on those items took place at the 12th to 16th
meeting, on 3, 4, 7 and 9 November.Action on draft resolutionson
those items took place at the 19th to 25th meetings from 14 to 18
November. The following paragraphs refer only to those which are
particularlyrelevant to the present request.
5. At the 3rd meeting on 17 October, a statementwas made by
Benin (No. 2).
6. At the 5th meetingon 18 October, a statement was made by the
United Arab Emirates (No. 3).
Zimbabwe and Namibia (No. 4).19 October, statements weremade by
8. At the 7th meeting on 20 October, statements were made by
Tanzania and Malaysia (No. 5).
9. On 3 November 1994, Indonesia submitted draft resolution
A/C.1/49/L.36 entitled "Request for an advisory opinion from the
International Courtof ~usticeon the legalityof the threator use
of.nuclear weaponsw (No. 6) on behalf ofthe States Members of the
United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned
Countries. - 10. At the 15th meeting on 9 November, Indonesiaintroduceddraft
resolutionA/C.1/49/L.36 (No. 7).
11. At the 22nd meeting on 17 November, statements were made by
Malaysia, Senegal, Chile, Morocco, Benin,the Untied States of
America, and Mexico (No. 8).
12. At the 24th meeting on 18 November, statements weremade by
Papua New Guinea and Senegal (No. 9, p. 1).
13. At the same meeting, Morocco proposed notto take action on
the draft resolution (No. 9, p. 1). Germany and Hungary spoke in
favour of the motion; Indonesia and Colombia spoke against the
motion (No. 9, p. 2).
14. At the same meeting, the motion was rejected by a recorded
vote of 67 votes to 45, with 15 abstentions (No. 9, p. 3).
15. At the same meeting, explanations of vote beforethe vote was
made by the Russian Federation, France,Malta, Germany, United
Kingdom, Iran, Mexico, United Arab Emiratesand Benin (No. 9, pp.
3-6).
16. At the same meeting, the Committeeadopted draft resolution
A/C.1/49/L.36 in a recorded vote by 77 votes to 33, with 21
abstentions (No. 9, p. 7).
17. At the same meeting, explanationsof vote after the vote were
made by Canada, Australia and Sweden (No. 9, pp. 7-8).
18. At the 25th meeting on 18 November, explanations of vote after
the vote were madeby Chile, Japan and China (No. 10).
adoptionof draft resolutionommA/C.1/49/L.36,which was submittedas
draft resolution K in paragraph 60 of the Report of the First
Committee on item 62 (A/49/699,No. 11, p. 43).
C.
Assembly
20. At the 90th meeting of the General Assembly,on 15 December
1994, the Rapporteurof the First Committee introducedthe Report
of the First Committee on item 62 (No. 12, pp. 13-14).
21. At the same meeting,Francemoved that no decisionbe taken on
draft resolution K (No. 12, p. 25). Germany and Hungary spoke in
support of the motion; Malaysia and Indonesia spoke against the
motion (No. 12, pp. 26-27). The motion was rejected in a recorded
vcke by 68 votes to 58, with 26 abstentions (No. 12, p. 27).
22. At the same meeting, France then submittedan oral amendment
calling for the deletion of the word "urgentlynfrom the text of
the operative paragraphof draft resolution K (No. 12, pp. 27-28).Indonesiamoved that no action be taken on the French amendment
(No. 12, p. 28). France and the United States spokeagainst the
motion:Malaysiaand Iran spokein favourof the motion (No.12, p.
28). The motion was adopted in a recordedvote by 61 votes to 56,
with 30 abstentions(No. 12, p. 29).
23. At the same meeting, Maldives explained its vote before the
vote on draft resolution K (No. 12, p. 30).
24. At the same meeting,draft resolution K was then adopted ina
recorded voteby 78 votes to 43, with 38 abstentions(No. 12, pp.
35-36). It became General Assembly resolution 49/75 K.
25. At the same meeting,Swedenspoke in explanationof vote after
the vote (No. 12, p. 39). UNlTED A
NATIONS
General Assembly
Distr.
GENERAL
A/RES/49/75
9 January 1995
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 62
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTEDBY TüE GENERALASSEneLY
[on the
report of the First Cornittee (A/49/699)]
49/75. General and cemulete diaarmament
Beauest for an adviaorv 0a-n frm the International Court OC
Justice on the leaalitv of the threat or use of nuclear weawne
me General Aseembly,
Consciou* that the continuing existence and developnt of nuclear
weapons pose serious risks to humanity,
nindful that States have an obligation under the Câarter of the United
Rations to refrain frcm the threat or use 02 force agaFnSt the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State,
peca- its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961. 33/71 B of 14
December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 351152 D Of 12 December 1980,
36/92 1 of 9 December 1981, 45/59 B of 4 Decamber 1990 and 46/37 D of 6
December 1991, in which it declared that the use of nuclear weapons voul'd be a
violation of the Charter and a crima against humanity, Page 169/75
W-w the progreee made on the prohibition and elimination of
weapons of niaes destruction, including the convention on the Prohibition of
the Developent, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction a/ and the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Developent, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chernical
Weapons and on Their Destruction,
Çonvinceq that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the only
guarantee against the threat of nuclear war,
the concerns expreased in the Pourth Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapona that
insufficient progresci had been made towards the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons at the earliest possible tirna,
international relations, convitceha6 declatedneethe periodgthe1990-1999 ruthe Unitedw in
Nations Decade of International Law, W
&!&g that Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter ampowers the General
Aasembly to request the International Court of Justice to give an advieory
opinion on any leqal question,
the recommandation of the Secretary-General, made in hie
report entitled 'An Agenda for mace', W that United Nations organe that are
authorized to take advantage of the advieory competence of the International
Court of Justice turn to the Court more frequently for such opinions,
remlution 46/40 of 14 üay 1993 of the Assembly of the World
Eealth Organization, Ln which the organization requested the International
Court of Justice to qive an advieory opinion on whether the use of nuclear
obligations a under internationalher Law, includingictthe Constitutionreachof the World
Bealth Orqanization,
m, purauurt to Articlb 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the
United Nations, to rrquemt the International Court of Justice urgently to
rendez it8 advisory opinion on the follwing question: '1s the threat or use
of nuclear ueaponm in iny circumetance permitted under international law?".
See Pfficial ~ecorda of t -
Session, Suu~lement No. 27 (A/47/27), appendix 1.
w Resolution 2826 (UVI), annex.
?p/ Reaolution 44/23.
w A/47/277-S/24111. United Nations A;C. II~~:PV.~
GeneralAssembly cia aRecords
Fony-ninihsession
First Cornmittee
3rd Meeting
Monday.17 ûctobe1994.10 am.
New York
~hr delcguionohin u.ouldliu,
ihiwld svoid =y initiativewhichwue- bc
pi,duriivud whic bighirceuiuiaiegrdmg from
11~IntniutiodCOU~ ofJ~ia onquatima a
cruniidly politioiUnUCnichascbwofthe k@y
oftheuseorithrut ockuseof nuclcr eapoŒ. ~r
.ppmpri.ciimtmyde~onarillrcirenrc~~~
mr Govnnmmi cmibiiinitiarM.e intheainrm
~IUi ofongomg~iont. uw litlyIo früi
proara O tkbe of@ ad amplde &
dr iacanniodcomd. UnitedNations A!C.1149-pv.5
GeneralAssembly O&iai Records
Fony-ninihsession
First Cornmittee
5ih Meeting
Tuesday.18Oclober1W. 3 p.D
NewYork
in thii cainenion. I wIOrcfer io thneed IO
pmmote tbemlead iheworkof theInternationalCoun of
Jwia m tba 11may wniributeio the wttlemenof
dispufabavemSuta.
In ourvicw.ruchpnclicc andmure repent the
mi al ofoflaxinihctensionthamisefmmdisputes
iad frictionbsueai Siam uid rrrolvingsuch disputa by
pesccfumcim and~OIby Ibew or thmt of the use of
forceorofanrpon ormsc datruclion. This mcasurewili
effatively contribute toerratiround international
environment. thai ifrrefmm threm and risks. an
environment of disamaumü. developmoi. Mirity and
siabiliiy. United Nations AJC.I/49.'PV.6
- L?giciRecords
Forty-ninh Session
6i Mhecimg
Wcdncday. 19Octokr 1994.3 p.m.
New York
..a
Weshouldlikcto rciuntthunuclcar di~armamcni
isa rnultilucnl issucandnota billural one. In iùis regard;
ihcunanimousdccisionlakenby tMeetingof Minisien
of ForcipnAffainof the Non-AligncdMovemmi in Cairc
in lune ihis yc- and rcaïfirmed unanimouslyby ihc
Meeting. only iwo wccks ago. on 5 Oclober 1%of
Foreign Minisienand HcPds of Dclegation of the
Non-AiigncdMovemmtto rbe foiry-ainiùsessionIhc
CeneraiAucmbly - io mbmit and brhg mtbcvotetba
dmï molution akiniheGencnl Aucrnblyionquat m
advisoy opinionfromiùc IntcmatiCoun of Justiceofi
ihelcgalityof tuseor ofuseof nuclearwcapoar
undcr iotcrnationalIaboiùappropriateand timcly. United Nations A/C.1119/PV.7
GeneralAssembly
Fort)-nindiErsion
First Committee
7t Mhming
Tburday. 20 Ocrober199p.m.
New York
WR. IIWAKAWAGO, üNITBD RRRJBLIC OP TANZAWIA (p.2)
1also wisbto draw!heCornmine's anmiion to th-
dairiooial;at the Elc\cnihMinistcriaiMaitheof
Non-Aiigocd Movemenr.held in Cairo lait lune. to
R-submitandpurtothevotedafircsolutionwcUan
advisoryopinionhm theLnicmatil oun of Justiceon
rhc legaiityofthme oruseof nuclcarweaponr.This
movc is imponanbeuuseit will hclp to wnsirize the
internationaiwmmunityto ihfortoialeliminarionof
nuclcararsmais.
...
S..
AS iwd knoooamb.In-d Cour<of Justice
harbsenrrquarsdbytbc WorlHcairOg.nintion to
givean dvirory opinionihe legiliryrhcuu of
nuclearweapomInthüconncuion.MalayhaSmfly
made a subuision to rbeCo.rguinrhmcheuse Of
nuclearweapomUülegd.CoatistmrMthrhisdsirion. We
look foward to the submiuiotbermolutionof the
Movemcntof Non-Ali@ Counrria on this issueto thi~
Cornminec.UNITED
NATIONS
GeneralAssembly
Distr.
e LIMITED
A/C.1/49/L.36
3November 1994
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Forty-ninthsession
FIRST COMMITTEE
Agenda item62
GENEPAL AND COMPLETEDIS-
Reauest for an advisorv ouinion from the InternatiCourt of
f
Conscious that the continuing existeand developmentof nuclear weapons
pose serious risks to humanity,
Mindful that States have anobligationunder the Chartèr of the United
Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrityor political independencof any State,
Recallinq its resolution1653IXVI)of 24 November1961, 33/71B of
14 December1978, 34/83G of II December1979, 35/15D of 12December 1980,
36/92 1of 9 December1981, 45/59B of 4December 1990and 46/37D of
6 December1991, in which it declared that the use of nuclear weaponswould bea
violationof the Charter of the United Nations a crime against humanity,
Welcominq theprogressmade on the prohibitionand eliminationof weapons
of mass destruction,includingthe Conventionon the Prohibitionof the
Development,Productionand Stockpilingof Bacteriological(Biological)and
Toxin Weaponsand on Their Destructionand the Convention the Prohibitionof
the Development,Production,Stockpilingand Use of Chemical Weapons ond
Their Destmction.
+ On behalf of the States Membersof the United Nations that are members
of the Movementof Non-AlignedCountries.A/C.1/49/~.36
English
Page 2
Convinced that the complete eliminationof nuclear weapons is the only
guarantee against the threat of nuclear war,
Notins the concerns expressed in the Fourth Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, that
insufficient progress had been made towards the complete eliminationof nuclear
weapons at the earliest possible time,
Recallinq that the GeneralAssembly, convinced of the need to strengthen
the rule of law in international relations,has declared the period 1990-1999
the United Nations Decade of InternationalLaw, &/
that Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations
empowers the General Assembly to request the International Court of Justice to
give an advisory opinion on any legal question,
Recallinq the recommendation of the Secretary-General,made in his report
entitled "An Agenda for Peace", 2/ that United Nations organs that are
authorized to take advantage of the advisory competenceof the International
Court of Justice turn to the Court more frequently for such opinions,
Welcominq resolution 46/40 of 14 May 1993 of the Assembly of the World
Health Organization, in which the organization requeststhe International Court
of Justice to give an advisory opinion on whether the useof nuclear weapons by
a State in war or other armed conflict would be a breach of its obligations
under international law, including the Constitutionof the World Health
Organization,
Decides, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter, to request
the International Court of Justice urgently to render its advisory opinion on
the following question: "1s the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any
circumstance permitted under international law?".
&/ Resolution 44/23.
1/ A/47/277-S/24111. UnitedNations A~C.I~W{PY.I~
GeneralAssembly OffrciolRecords
Fom-nint bession
FirstCornmittee
15i Meeting
Wedneday.9Novembe r994.10a.m
Ncu York
hi MdcniiblIhurhrou#nw hinoy mmluabr(
oadew>..cqaiimcaiad.iiulidin(mlclar~.
lbcd ' ofHimdNqn&.icamrof
,b& 'e ad bmor. pwidsd r mpri
poiaoidP-=J* ofvhi iIDyIOday'l
-mcw drmdamrcivc
-. Bhppbrpimdcbc~~pdoxp
ot~cbiarbPind~0ftbpciroeveao
~bm~rirtoibc~mokrincba
wigoi,bW-m&udiophinYaioo.h
CP Mm i+@y bcnidburbtrmaircontinuawk
~byQd~ofulf~01. UnitedNations AIC.I/~YPV.LZ
22~ Meeting
nudy. 17 Novcmkr 1994.10.30a.m
NewYork
1~dlikciomJca (kropmafia~ FdJ: My
siarement on dnfr raolution A!C.IH95.36. eririrld aemion propoicr mm cbc camL.iasc ponpos?
-Rcqunt foran advisoryopinionfromthe Inrcmuio<ill -identii of dnft molutiao A/C.1/49R.36on tht
Coun of lustice on ihc legaiiryof rhe IIuwIofr
nuclev weaponr'. leylily of thrrPor uuof Oirlar wcipom in or10
&le deleguim to annimietbeimnnilwioar.
Malaysiawouldwelwmc ao dvwiy opinionon Ihe
legai stanir ofuuheof nuclar W4mm. a il daim
worldorder ad legaiclarirrhcpuatioooftheuu of
nuclcarwupool.
m. LARBAIU, QI= (P.4)
Althoughrhenile of iorardaIawmdkwwldge
of the Imay lppu unimporunIo ikoucleu hm. ii(VefprudaJCw +ishi: 1
ir is inditpcnw10erbr mdQ' ofSdla hom. "PPon ifeP- b~ thtrrpfacamive of kgai Ihat
~-iaoofdrrllrtso~u<ioaNC. 1/49R.36bedefemd so
which fŒl md niloaibk in smrld inwùicb asroginumtfalhnbcr~utios.
stud lhrras of nuclcaraonihiucrppucmly rllowed
TheGovernmmrof Whysia believa rbn m h-
cawropbe in he be0V of mmtiad cm be wmpued io
checonxqu- ofa ouclcarwuAn undmuadin(r othe
causirophic lwch odestruchoo.uihmd LrrmrdLble
sufferinu a dt ofau qlŒicio of r single mvlar
wuhd rn a popiluad arca mmplr oaiy onc
wnclusion:m nich explosioooners *. arhaber
by rridmt. throughamria n or iw9.
AlthoughIhe endof rhewld wu ha coaridenbly
rsducedthe cklnca oa globainuclairwu. rhe ouclcar-
wqo Srara sril1subscribc~ICstraugy of mvlw
deumnce. in rhptxsm~pad-wu climuc.<helctJ
opinionof ihe IntermriouJCounofJuscicciould aulrc
important contnburioIOibe ruliuionof 1 ouclar-
wupons.fret world. Irwuld m< qlxe nuclcar
disarmaocni uutiarives.but irccuidprovideae legil md
mnl parameters withio whicb such Iiririuiva wuld
succeed. MR. MARIN BOSCH, MEXICO (P.7)
Ur. Amar (Momcco)(inrerprcrrirfnmm French): linicrprcraionfrom
S~ish): At the stan of the meeting bis morning.
Thc delegationof Moroa~ofullysuppoa thproparal y MI. Chaim~~y. ouindicarcdthatue wouldtale actionor.
the reprcsentativeof hcgthat action ondrnfrrrsolution a number of draft resolutions. In the course of our
A/C. 1!19!L.36.'Rcqwst foansdvisoryopinionfromthe discussions this morning some deleparions sucgesied
Inlemtiond Counof Justiceonthelegdiryofrhthrr ur POslpOniBanionon draflrcsolutionAIC.11.l9;L.36.Dws
uu of nuclcar weaponr'. k defemd so that bmader
wnsultation wibe possible. <hi mcan that action is king postponcd until this
aftcmoon'smeeting?Williibeput off uniil iomorroul
Whatis meantby'psrponement'7
The Chairman (inrcrprcrariofrom Sponish): A
numkr ofdelepationspmpowdibepostponernentof action
Mr. WhnaDoc (lBeni(inierprnm'onfmm Fr&): on dnfl molution A/C.1/49/1.36. 11would be my hopc
We join thedelegaion of Morocco in supponing the
pmposal ihil<bc Cornmincedefer iu decision odnn thu this draft wluiiomuld bevoiedupn durinp this
r~lution AIC.11495.36.
afternoon':meeting.WC havean afternwn miinp. or
;itomorrnwrnominp'smeeting.Of ccursc. l hopcthai uie
delcpations concemed wilx kind mough to indicate
. LEDûGAR, UNI* STATES OF -CA (p-6) uhether drah resolurionAIC.11491willk readyio be
,oied on and that it 1s not naces-to continue the
MI. Ledogu (UMd Suraof Amnu): TbcUnid consultationsto whichdelegaiionshave referrcd.
Stateswillvotcignimt ddl wlution AIC.11495.36. by
which theGrnent Asrmbly would quat an dvisory
opinion fmm Intematid Corn of Justice on the 1sthisexplanaiionsatisfaIOtherepresentativeof
Mexico?
legllity of tihrrpor useof nuclcar Wespoar.nour
v-. it wouldk inappropriatetot the Coun for m MI. Marin Barh (Mexico) (inrerpreroi/rom
dnsory opinion on suchan absMt. hypothetiuil md Sponish):Ir is satisfactory. Sir.The only thing I do not
-iiaJly politidil. Funhr. ilegaiopinionwodd
hive no pmiuil effsc. ùnow is whemtheu consultatiouc taLingplace.
Succasa nrhid ove the ycus in limitind TheChsimm finrnpreIm'onfmm Sponish):IIismy
undenundmg Ihu interestcddcleguionrwill ùnowwberc
banning weapons!WC muid fmm the ncgotiationof Iheconsultatiouc llking place.
mia. Thedrafimolution wdd wt wntributetofunha
mm agreementon dur wcdpcm.
The spotsrnuifor thsponsorsrrcognuràthis tact
lm ycarina starcmcntintheFint Comminee.iuhichbc
welcomcd
'the broadeninanddccpeningofthe dimensionsof
disannament^
andexplaincdthat IhcNon-AlignedSlovementwouldnot
pms for a votc
'inorQr to prame the morneununand progress
genentcd by theu initiatives".
Givcn mU viav. i~u cvcn barderIO fahm the
plrpow of r dnA rcrolutionrequestingnich an opinion
hm theluemaiid Coun of Justice thisyur. wbcn
funherstep Iownd md elhinate nuclcarwcaponsarc
beig takcn.ncgotiatadmntemplatui.
The UniteStaterthrcfore urga Statesto abstainor
vote 'No" onthis dnRmolution. It prefexetenergy
md ancntioadevocedmacsdto achicvingwnmte results
inthema of imu comm) md disannament.
'Ibc Chilrmin. Som dclegarioiuhave rcquutedthe
postponewni ofrtion m drafîmolution AIC.11495.36. United Nations
24th Meeting
Friday. 18Novembcr1954. 10a.m.
New York
HR. YARXA,PAPUA NEW WINBA (p.3)
1nih 0 plvr on (iiuerpm'onfmrn Frrnch)Ishdl
record my deleguion's positoiitbcdnn molution k brKf. Dapite rcpuedrppul ry ihe delegaiionof
containcdindoc.t AiC.1149lL.36.wbicbrrlimathe Smgrl. sonr dcfeguiobvc felthuiheyshouldsubmir
'Rqutst for m adviwry opiniofmm ihe IntanMid dniimoluiion AiC.lI491L.on Wf of ihe rnembcrs
Coun of Justice othclegrlity therhrcu orUICof ofOc Mov- of Non-Ali@ Couritna. My wuntr).
nuclearwupons". m ody deploirr rhir but wdd like. ar the sametimc.Io
nac dm weanwt inmy wayaipponchednfircsolution.
My delegaion MU vae in nVw of Q drafi
rcsolution.Howcvn. arirdbtheou- m milrril quiic
clear thuour nippon Wd a01inanywayk *cd a
m anempttopftjudicethevion theInmmiod Coun
of Justice. Norlould our nippon k pmeiwda m (inmpmarionfrom French):
anemprto excn politi~KSSW on tbeCounm amc to rbaildliLmc mke romcconunmu on dd~ remlurion
a paniculardecisionon ciwua.TheCoun Wd and
NC.li49L.M. wbià~daidesIOmpst ihe Lniemiond
must miniain its traditionof impsdirŒuuility. Cam oflunsciorrida rndvicory opinionthethni
ormed m*lar wtlponr.Tbc Kingdom of Mom
PapuaNew (niiauMly wpeEu andnipponsrhc waJd pcopor dm tbcCbmiw MI ukc riionoa ihe
wmplete sovcrci&ntd indepeadcnaof ihe Gnui in- dniï faohüh, pdcuiuly sk Ibcum~sur on this
rcaching a dsisiihu buld MI k viewd u bcuq : nibjaâamag tbMc ovuŒu of Non-Ali@ Counrrieshar
influenccdby my extermi forca or cifcumsw.Our b rnaiily erodcd.and thu the rasons behind
own nationalComtimtiondmguuinim mJ rrrpeu the
abmluteindependeniDdintegrityth udiciaysyaem. poqkdo# tbcrmnn ai thfonylighih sessiona~ slill
Ibar. Wewûuidwve tharhcCornmitte noi takeriion
and we would nsnunlfy be compllcd m uphold ihu oa tbcddl rrrolution in m dlow for funhrr
pnnciple. ~ISUIU~OIUbawcai ihemunuia involvcd.Wehopclhar
chLmo<ionm toukc bon willk supponcdbydl the
Our suppon forthedm? molution ispurelybavd on nrmbm of ibcCornminec.
andinwnfoniity withOurovenll standingpolicyon toul
d~smamenr andourwntinued iute~inanddaire tsec My dcleyrion wooden wh&cr the introductionof
nicb ddl molution cniservesihe wisha of the First
theestablishm01ta giobaienvironml ihat pcrpctuaies
andguaranta wmplete peau and swip.We rhcrciore Co- wiirrrpsato nuclcrrdisumament. Momco
bclicvc thar an opinion from the Iniemation01Coun MLva rhm ir wouid k inippropriarc to rcqueu ihe
Justicewouldsurclyfacilirate.amongother thingr. hinherLnunmbd Cain ofJwk LOmula anadvimy opinion
progrcss rowuds the strengthcningof the.Trcaty on the onnrb m absuma and(bsom gunriona ihe leglliry
Non-holifemion of Nuclcar Wcapons and cornpletc of tbe rhrrm or wc of mlur wcapoas in any
disamarneni. ciraimamcn. In1993.the World Hulth Organization
(WHO) dopcd arrrolutionrqmting cheCouIOrcnder
m dvimy opinionothi sm question.lùat opiison
stiunduconrideruion.radrICIiscumntly examinine
thehenrmoriIl byatlai27 wuntries. Wefeeltcitnewpaltticalinitiativewithinthe Fint CommirtŒaimcdal 1belicvth thesubjm of thisdrafrrcsoluijno!
appropriatefor the Fint ComminaAtihe 1993World
bringingan ideniid questionbeforcthe Coun shouldbe Health Asxmbl. a ruclution war adopre:cek,:.the
\.iewecJSai aitemprIo prejuogedieopinionof the Coun
wiik recxd ic the reqUlu WHO. opinionof the InternatCoun of Jusriceon the Iegalir!.
of the use of nuclearwuponA.funher drah rsrolulion
Adoption of this drah resolutionwould be a clear along rirnilar lines wu submiiicd by the non-aliened
counrrie5at thisConunirtee's1993session.IIwasnot pur
dendriir~iion that poliricalmotivareoinvolvedand io a vote. Rogrcss widi the W0:ld Healih ssembl!
couldbe inrerpretcdasadesiretoexenpressure on theICI
wiiha viewio obtainingapanicularniling.Thedelegarion requesiissuchu theLutemional Counoflusiiceisnom
of \lorocco fals than dvirory opinion ona qucsrion examiningsubmissionsmadeIO bu ailear27States..\n!
tha!isessentiallya politicaionethacburiseIomany hnher initiati!nthe Finr CornmitiIOask a sirnilar
coniroversieswillhaveno practicaieffst. rincewedo noi question of the Coun wuld be wen asan attempr io
believe thar any wupons have evcrban limited or prcjudicc thV~CW of the Coun On the World Healih
Assembly rrquai.
pmhibired by anywna< other rhanthe negoiiatingof a
rreaiy.We fŒlthuthis initiativewillnothelpdiplowic
efforu mw der way to fighrtheprolifemionof nuclur A UnitedNuiommolution woulddo nothing IOhelp
wupom. Stsres with nuclur wqons u well u those Ihe ongoing c.unsidrmion of the questions by the
uithout thcm rhould have rhe politid will Io make lntmuriorui CounofJunicad mightadvcnelyaffectIhe
progres, in cam. standingofboth the fiCornminceand theCoun itself.
11could dro hive widn dvene implicationson non-
pmlifemioo goab aibicWC dlrhuc.
1hope bac my motionnotto uke nion on thedm7
resoluiiowill badoptedpnthouta vote.
ik Cimirman: Thercprrrcntuiveof Mo- hu
moved. wiibio the lem of nile 116 oftheda of Very briefly. rny delegation
procedum.rbrrnoactionbeukmon Q qua! mnuiDcd waiucs iuclfdiywitbthemition jwt prevnted by rhe
reprrreniuive oGcrmmy. Ipuluag on beuf of the
in documentNC. 1149lL.36.Rule 116rrdcalfollm: Eür0pan Union. mtlmnhg rbe=nt of the drah
mol~ti~~uuiukd indocumcatAIC.1f49lL.36.andly .
'Dun- thc dircuuion of my murp. r
rcpmeocuive may move tùedjoummcm of the andmm imponmn. Q dc*gation of Hungsryis fuliy
debntem thcitemunderdircuuianIrsddih IOthe auciou of thermŒu for Q mMi0~put forwud bythe
ptoporerofthme. IWOrepumaiva my spuk mpmanative of M- md. in apprrciaion of those
manma.md in-withnile 116of the nila of
infi~~~l~f.~IW~~.tùemaioa,rfta~ pmcrdurc.Qdckgaimof Huugyrvùhato~e~od the
the mnwa sballk immcdiucly pu IOtheMe.' motionon m *on.
..,
1 now dl upon thcfint rrpiaeniuivc s/irbtnp
spak in favw of the maioii. a ~biirmu: h amirdzm with nile 116. the
Cornminc bP bCPd ni0rpaLcn in hvour thcmotion.
Irbilla>arclllontborcrrprrsenuovawhowishtorpak
agrinrt it.
With rrrpcn todru?
rcrolutionNC.1149lL.36. requatimgdvwy opinion
fromtheIniemuionaiCavt ofluaicconthelegdity of thc 1would like10
h r or uu of auclcar waponr,I auriitmyvlf with pu il on ihu my ddeytico opp03u the motionon
the rcpre~utive of Moma and wirh IO nipponhis no nion mnvedbythc dclelPioof MO~OCCO.
propd IO move thu m vrion betakcnon thcdru?
molution wiihi iheum of nile II6 of the nila of
procedure.
1would likeIOpoimout ihu COIonlyGerminy but (interpre~uion
the mtirc Eumpa UNon u well rcgm ùaving faiIOd fmmSpMirh):Iopporethemaionihumu<ionbeiIkni
ondd molution NC. 11495.36. ad Colombiawillvote
wnvincc the spoaron ofdnf~molution L.36Iowithdnw agiioiuhummion. movd by Momoo.
itandhave dsidcd rhatthectnn~ supponil.
Tbe Cb.lrman: The ComminΠwill now rake a
decisiononthe motion~bmincd by thcrepwntative of
Mom ihum nion bc rnlrm on driftresoluiion h fovour:
Andorra. Argentina. Amia. Ausidia. Bclarus. (rnicrpnrtUion
Belgi-m. Bulearia.Canada. Cmh Rrpublic. RomRusian): Sincethepropsal that no acbcotaken
Denmark. Esroniz. Finland. Franir.. Georgia. Qndafi rescluriAIC.!/49/L.3was Wected îndthe
Geman?. GrrŒe. Hune.. Ifeland. Isracl. Idy.
Japan. Larvia. Luxembourg. Mali.Malu. Marsball drafi rrsolutwiliunfomnalely. bepur ro a vote. wr
wouldIiketo explaindierasons for our voteon Ihedrafi
Islmds. MicroncriaiFedemal Stateson. Morocui. rexilutionbeforr thevotinp.
Nehe~lands.Nonva?. Poland.Portugal. Rcpublicof
Kom. Romnia, RussianFaleruion. Sencgal.Sicm Tbe Russiandelcgaiionwill $,oieagathedafi
Leone. Slovakia. SlovcniSpun. The Former molution. Webelievcthaithequestionof the advisability
Yugosh Rcpublicof MaccQnii. TurLeyUi;nioe. of the use of nuclearwcapons1saboveal1a political.no1
Unitcd Kmgdomof Grur Briuin and Nonhem a legal problem. This bawv of the nature and
Ireland.UnitStateof Amaiu signific ofoucleaweaponslbcmuives.whichhaveno1
Agaimf: ken uwdsinccthc wu. Sk thcChinu of the United
N~iodtheauutaoftbe hmuti4CauiofJusuŒ
Afgbuustsn. AlgeriBahima. B.ngldnh.Bbuua, amcimofo~~,mwlmwupoarbivckcmaincidadin
Bolivù. Botswana , d. Bd Dinuulim. Sma'dwriucsoam~aamcrnrofivirhrrbuta
BUnmdi. CipeVd. W. cOl0mbi Cuhi. adaarrntbown.eipceillyglobrl~.'IbyPc
CYPN. Dewmtic Peopk'i Rcpublic oKom, tùaefore~fiomoQa~.mthutbybivca
EnuQr. Egypt. Gu* Guy- Haiti. Hoodurro. poiiricfunai00inthwdd tcday.
india,bhesia. Ina (Wlmic RcpiMi 00. Irq.
Jordan. Kenya. LesothLibyaoAnb Jamahiiiya, Tbevay-ofmrka- isrccpcdin
MdrgacP. MalaysiaMaldim. Maintiur. MW. IntAnuionrlLRId tbQcis1widenngeofintonai~
MoaSdY .oumbii, MF, Namibii Nqd. awmr rem mcm .here irc mniy mbxive
Nianp. Nigeria. Qum.Plaain P.rmmi.Pqor mtanpionilbillailrndmulrilirail~inf~~,
. .
NewCkiin.Rnsuy.FsrSPhllippina,~ aimKdinpmia.. .thcafd-=2apom, non-
SmdiARb~Si.sOl0~kl~SiiLcb dcplw-. -
Sudm.Surinimc.snrilird.Thhd,'Riniddmd tslbmcd~amIdrovcr<&w~.Funbcr
Tobqeo.UnitedAnb emmoP;:Vnlpp~,sf prolpar~~-,tbmiieb~rbc
Tmsm4 Umgoy.Veocmdi.Vin N~L Y- -itgmic.dipariciilrr.piviqlr$
Zmibir- &ai h d.~
lubcdominmcmdcr~ofdl&-~
Abnailùng: Stma.wad.iooldbeQtamarrliib*\lymrid
-sui and Wuda, A- Azainijaa,Canmma. ... mmLinddmcmdarM.
Cdtc d'lvoirc.El Salvrdm, Irr*o dJlmriu.
Licshtanuin.'Lithuani& New Zcrhd. Nim. Urbmmdy, ddi AIC.II49IL i.M
Re~ublicof MoldovSPn Maino.,@des! ....,: .....,, maberpupac.whirbmitsitmipon1~lariurn
..-.. .. --arppo t.WCthiU voteagaim thdnfl molution.
nuntoaonth,nmocnocnm~~',t"on~mdwion
A/C.I/49L.M was~'eaeà by67wa ro45,viaJS
absfmtiom.
HR. ERRERA, FRANCE (p.7)
ïk Chahmm 'lbe Cornmitteaillnowute a
decision odnfiraolutioA149L.36 1shilmw d&
those reprercnutiva whoMtoexplabtbe irteskforc (Uunpmm'on from French):
rbevoting. Rining dnn molutionNC.1149iL.36to the vote as
rcgrcnablerriodose impliutionsshouldbethomughly
watiderrdFnace wüivotelgunS1the dm7rcsolution.
IIMU dom. fun.kuurc th marieit posisiuelf
unaccepubleTbevay quai foan dvisoy opinioai
theiegdity of a @ailutegory oiniu itaaiamml
toquestionhthelnrlimableri@ of snyStateorpup of
Stptgto rcrminrovcrcigaslongasthey ooutplywith
inteniatiod Iaw. in thechoiŒofmunr of defeoa.
Such ao appmacbisi blataut violation of the United
NationChann. Itgoeragiinstlm; it goerarem.rt France will vote quhct ibis dnh rcsolIls~n
slycountrybasdioun Iobzu itsdefc~on nuclcar kecluscifWC wan: progrns ibrards a Mfcr acMre
denmence - in aberw0rd.S.on1 doclrine0li~ntedna
towarbc vicroinbaiile. but iowardsavoiu.a.This cquiiablcworld.evcFonc mus1mognize tbe nccrsstr?for
docrrlnehs made iipossib10nisure uidstabili- responsibilitiesaudobliguionsrok shared.mdewould
inEurcp. It remainsIhe cornersioneof wr sauriy. nowiiw IOariyonethaithenuclcarPower,aloneshouldhe
theonlyona robaveto=pond rothenewexpcctationrof
ihe intemaiiowmmunity. wbileotherr would icmain
nose who III* chatth? un den! sovereignSnta fretto playtgamcsof the pas[.
ihrir nghtodefendIh~rnSClvabui!'mcansltCOgnued
b! applicdbleinterrmional instmmnrs. or whohi& that
atribunalshoulbcaublirhed10prorecuterknowledged Whmtherpiritof Rspoaribiityexists. i10reals
nuclcar Powm. sbuld cbial mice. One &y, Iky pmgrry.La urm< in chicollectiveeffon by obroleie
rhemcelverdd k ailcdupoatodefendrblegiw of umbds. whicb mighpcrw cbcpuposesof r fw. but
chcmuarthcyuuIOcnnuc<bciruairiIy. wbicb m cwnly cocimry w rhcinum of ï&
c4aww&gmqairy.
Soweetnoaly~whri~~f~~~
pmu,tbeWCiCPParen.ia<imc~tby~
~te~~.ntully~cbcii
rcrpomib'ilid*r<hi tbepc amdinglbUy bCbd ibcir
commitmcnts .Chiddl ~~WliniotryhIOcelibcmIht
iheirefforarcPror<hlar.Iht<by ~CSCIWaabin bgut For tk 1 bave
cmaue?Orirewcmuakrrrmdihm.uthevcrymommi pomicdout.lk Gmpa Unimmd iu applicaStates
ddl rcrohuionNC.ll49n.36.
vlbm dirarmammr à studilybamming 1 rulityu>me
long foribe + whm it wa mlbing moreIbio a
rtiaorid Unw? Ale ibae aluwks - mr rrdy to
cO~midePdac~-afnid~f~u,~ SIR IUCBAKt mmw, rmfPB> KIR- (P.8)
tk&~~~ofmpcmsibiiity?A?cibypahpr~
toamcrrl ihcfm tüa~inmmy qiom of bu wrld, bu TbcUnitcd
hiildup of e~add d c m Kinedom hinityowmad thii driftmlutim
AK.1149L.36 cm make m positivewnlrim
pmgrtmma 10rquirr wupom of Mu dauuç<ionmd ~ ~ ~ ~ e f f ~ r ~ . ( n i ~
kir dclivny synermirea 1-1 in ibpmliferntionof COU"ay. i1Unia imimbaolMau riskawhicùwc
-nia arda sign of kgemonir claimtmiiacd by
Som. bop dei+Bafionrwill amridaefuiiy bcfibeyvae.
Fim. the dnfr rcsolucmmdo mWmg io help the
ongoingworkby tbe InternuiaCoun of Juriiceon the
similu questhmn the WorldHealthhmbly. On the
convuy.itriskskinrec aar delibenieatiemptio cxen
politiul pmsurc oibeCoun UJprcjudicciu rcsponx.
Thiscouidhavescriou impliwiom forthestandingof the
GeoenlAsscmblyand.hdced.of the Counilulf. Seeondly. Ihic dnfl molutioup do noihing io Conferencethisdran resolu15aposiii~~~onirit>u<&?c
funher the vanou positivediplomaiiceffortsuoderwayin thatConferenceas wcll
ihe field of nuclur disumunnanruwntrol and non-
prr.fcraiion. noubly on a'wmprchensive test-bantrcary. My delegaiion will voie in favour of this dran
On the contr..al a tim when rd pmgrcss is king rcsolution. and enwurages other rnembers oi fhe
achievedin a rangeof m. ilun only servIOwnfuw Cornmitteeio cas1a positive vote on il.
andcomplicatethebasison whichwuntria enter intosuch
negoriaiionsa10hardm positions.
M1- lURTN BOSCH, MEXICO (p.9)
Thirdly. thisdnh moluticm do noihingto funher
elobalpeacemd mrity. On tbewntrary. a legalopinion (inlerpmariofrom
on ihis essentiallypoliiid and hypothetical"sksiion Spanish):beStatesMembcrsoi cheUnitedNations.a ue
seriouslv undermiaing confidence in exlting muliilaterd were renundedtoday. are comrrIOtdefendingrherule
ireaiies.Thisoim could serveto undermineihcscsuriry of Iaw.InOurcespoctivecounrrics.ihcrc are cla%s of
of al1those whopui thuiut in these ircatia. rcsponsiblc. inter alia. for condldrypes of legal
maiten. sometimes veq deliuic ones. and for handing
dom opiniooson &cm.
Founhly. rhù draii molution risks vrving the
intemrr of those who wito dit Onnitionhm the
doubiluing rnrmulation of convnrtionai aandfrom Thefounden of the United Nationswishediogivethe
clarniurim pmgmmrs Umsd at acquiriw ngapom of OrglnuVion a sirmlar legai body: hence. the close
mzcsdatmnion anddmloping deliverysystem. rclationshipin the Cbkwecn the UnitedNationrand
the International Coun of luricc.Dnfr molution
A/C.ll49/L.36 pan of rhirrclationshandunnoi bt
Thisdraïtmolution amid imposehuvy cour. II
offm ao bcŒfiü inmutu. lu wider implicationswuld qualifiai or derribin the tem which wereud by
~riauly affenthe-ry of urau. We thercforc urge somc thismmhg and whicbothen uek to impou. The
deleguionm< to qn ir. dnfl molution was origiDnllysubminedlyear:in lhe
mcmùmc. with thfum suppon of the Govemment of
Mexico. the Wodd Hdth Organization ha alrudy
formuiucd arcquat torbe Coun umcrning similu. but
mi idenucal. rtpccu tbir er. WChve no fear of
1Wd likc nvning 10thehcbtempnonCwn of JwtiŒinorder io +<k
it tonur impanillly iü position on this qucsrion of
IO give my dclcgmiou's positiosa dnfr molution hinr(rmrnulirnpomncc.
A/C.1/49/L.M. mtitic'Rapa foran dvby opinion
fromrhein~CGlnofIuaiceonrhc legaiityof the My &legalion will voie in favour of thednfi
Uuut oruseof nulur wuponr". molutkm mdrrkc rl losz muatria whicb.recommitted
Mydelcgatioafullnippon,chi âmfimanlurionThir io imanaionaiItgiiimuy radlhc nile of law Io do the
YIIIC.
iuuc hu bscD Ovm utmsive by fhe
mcmben ofcbcNa-Alignrd MovcmCm. tvhic kbto lk m.
~~Winofthirâmfirrrdutm~ymr. Wemofthc
vicwthotheinteranicd mmmunity ingcŒni dm-
lovingauions ipuiicuiuMd exploreevuyavmuc to (inropmationfron Arabic):My delcguion will mi
cmte i world frec [rom dur wups d otb prnicipauinthevotiagon draflmolution NC.)/495.36.
wapons of rmu dcunr<ioa - .
Lnsuhminingnichdnn rrroluuoarhcirspmson arc
emuing cbeinrghuundaibc UnitcdNnim Chuter. (i)~~eipmrulmm Frmh):
whichmuraga Mcmber Suin tosŒkdvilûry opinions My deltgmim wisha to Ipul rn explmuion of voU on
hm the lolannioniCoun of Juuiccon unin ihicby
dam important. We belim thu rhcânfi raoluticpdo draflmolution NC. 1149lL.M.
noinui conuarytocbcmalution idop<edlut yur bythe Benin'sconmianni to cbpbilmphy andprinciplu
of non-lligamni u wcll-lmoam ta his body. The
Wdd Hdth ûrgmhioo on fhbe hueiabuc.ùdd
complemt arisdpplunaiithem. Monover. on thewe of Movenmt of Non-Ni@ Couutria bu made a
the 1995 Non-RoliferuioTrury Reviw endëxtnuion conuibmioa to rhc multipollnrotion of inremaiionai
rclsiioand totheutablit of m en ofmdud nsk
of globalconfrontuion. With comp<aice aeddediaion.
indo& hrsled the Movemmt's work sIinceiis tenh
historicsummiimeetingiJltuu. in Scptember1992Irhas contribut10 a irnovd of multilatenliartdh coopcntim - have now kgun IO show a spirit of
simi~thenedthcabiliry of the United NuimIOmet opennesr.
eifectiveand npidly the challengercumndy f~ing il.
suchas diunnmient and development.Thedelegaiionof Funbermore.in accordancewith theddnhresoiution
Beninis graiefulro the rcpracntuive of Indoneriafor the contained in docum A(C.1149lL.31. rhe ûeneral
effons he has madIOpreservethe Movemt's uniryof Assemblywould. in the course of ils nimnt foq-ninth
actionandcrcdibiliry. session. reitente iu rquesIO the Conferencc on
Disamiamnit10 undenlke mgoriations. asmatter of
Thedelegationof &in wisheIOcaketheoppomniry priority. in oIOereacbagreementonan international
of the First Commirte's action on dnfi rnoluiion agreementpmhibitingthuseor kat of ux of nuclcar
A!C.1/49/L.36IOmakeknown. acmounced duringthe wesponsin anycirrumtanccs.
genenl debue. the views of iu ûovemmnit on the
substancand fonn of ihe issuesto be subminedfor the Theintemional communityal%aspireIOsirengthen
consideratiof thenternationalCounofJustice.natwly. theTrury on the Non-Roliferuionof Nuclcu Weapons
whethnthm utcircumt- in whch in~emdtionaIlaw (NPT). Disamamml is a politicaip- of negotiating
authorizcsUIbe or use of nuclcarwupons. Wemut tmdiàg towudc the conclusionof bindingagreementsby
ask ourselva abovedl wbahn thi appmscbsema the the pania hvolved. whicarcco& pridly for
well-~WI ORïŒrm of chenon-digocd counuia wih rheir0- Muiy. b' itm imponinc to avoid any
regardto nwlm diwmirmmt in partinilu posibilityioncw iniewioarl rivaiy. which wourt
a Ihrdolvovn al1 positive dcvelopmmu? &in is
Indeed.wearcwcllawm thepolitid positionof wnvhcd thu <be force d the effectiveneu of
the mn-digncd coualriesin the fieldof dit hn
dilvmuDcnt rncirumdand agramcnu lie moreinthe
alwayskai infavw ofgmml andcocompedisamanml rcccpilwc byUICpanier cmcernedof the concluions of
under intemiod contml. ThU explains ou1qua Io their negotiuionslhrmyn legd opinion.which.in the
elimie al1nuclur arscnal. hichposea IIUUIiada W anaiysiun nileononiyoneupx of a subjstthu
connmt dangerto the mtirc in<erpmiooommunify i. ù ofgrru a>m forthe internaciolommunity.
oniybecau ofthe rirk of sccidTbe.qudoa IOk put
io IheCoun doa not toucbuponsucbhdmuuù isua Multiluml dirpnnammtuke pliocwirhà theglobal
as thctcsting. production, stakpiling. pmlifmdtion fnu~~~orkoftbenintia ofthe(jeocrPAsumbly.where
dissemimionof nwlear wcipom.Any rrrpoarcfromrhe Memb~ï %fU eXSICi&?ir $Ovd@ rigbt. A Nling.
Cain couid ~pmait. in au view.m m~~c rhm m evenm &uny opinionbyfbtCaun dd wnstiNte a
iiqdit iü thcp- of rh eli of thU pr&edcni thu ivoulprqudkc thu rigbt. The praait
-*-'"W. situation Ihu rapllm m - whuevn IO the
humutid Cauc of lucice oocof UIC prcveotive
Furrhermorr.ontheppmsrdvnl Iml.an&mIM mrnircr ldvouted by <hc Ssnury-ûa~~nl in bis
thù ueppertkot or rclevrnt, inaüdclcgaioa, m. imponmtrepon. 'An AgcadiforPcrc" d. rndoned in
evn sina rhçQd of rheald wu. exprmd &Mi u puticula bymolution 47IlXl o18D&cmkr 1992and
thevuiolu initiaiva ithc conml md limiutioaof 471120B of20 Sepicmbe1r993.
ummaiu. Momver. UICCod- m ühmuŒm.
enuwccdwirh negotllri.on khlf of fbtimaooionil Invm oflurheforcgoing.lkdekgeguioof Benin.
communiry.multilucrslgrocmmrmr dir of r wbich UmYX adone MY inifili(hltis indquue or
univnvl~mucdsmpcsucbnrhemcmfbt imppommcmd~~rcm<inrbtgmml~~. would
prohibitionochcmic werpoar.ho, infeah. bcpa havepfd na to havethU drift molution submined
oaiu bebif. àu my deleguionemuld dm have widd
thiirhemaioawu>ui;cnionbrd~Idopt~.Lilre
test-bm tmiy.dmcd üxniq itimo 1ûaty on r rhedelegnim of Mm. we fŒlIhm lk motionml Io
wmprchcnsivehn. did na mrlrpmgfuskcavc offbt uke nim wld hve made it possibleIo go bwk Io
relu-. and ffm <hcopposition. of mwlcar-wq informilanuuluiioac fIlnherdiscussion.Butdl theSe
Suia. which. beuw ofrhç positiveduaga hm bm anempu wm uasucarrfui. andthi swhyourdeleguion
takenplvr on <heintemiod veae - mac md will vote thisdrifmlution.
characterizcd by understmding. didogue ind effectiveappmxh io tuilimue climuurionof nuclur
Tbccb.lisu:TbcCommmscwillamrpmcadto wupom anadviwryopinionoftheintematiCou
tate mim m dnfi moluùm ~C.ll49n.M of Justice.
We funher believchu the numbermd pue of
Mr. Kbadi (Sscmuy of the CoUUUitt~):me cumni nc:onaiiononsucbtruies unplydem~nsintechc
commj~meno tn thpanof aiSuta to suchnegoriarions.
voiuig willnow commcna on dnf~ remluiion
A/C.1/49/L.36.mtiiled'Reguatmfodviwry opiaion Canadais aisocnncernedihatprocacof roehg
hm theIniewiod Cou ofJusticeonthelegdiryofihe anadvisoryopinionof the internaiionaiCounhaveld
dura oruu of nuclur wctpopr'. Thisdnfi maluiion
wu inimducd by the rcp~~~utive,of indonesia.on 1 a negaiivempwi on ceruin of thev ongoingoegoiiuions
behdfoftheSrüa Membmof tkUnid Nuionschuuc by divming uteniion hm them.
mcmbm of the Movcmmcof Non-Ali@ Counuia.
theCornminse's1501&in.ca 9 Novembcr1991.mdis Fily. givm ihar the quaMnpovd in thdnfi
~~oluuonu for111niaiu mdpurpna purp beforethe
spomd byirdoaaia onbchilfof Suvs Membmof Coun. mdchu Suterchuwid IOLü& mbmbsioruonthe
the UnitedNuiom thuc mcmbcnof the Movcmmtof issue hadone w drrdy. WCdm quation wberha the
Non-hlignedCouutria. dnfi molutioma a whrl purpovu rhUrime.
vas ado~ted bv 77 votes to 33, Givearhcv wmidauions. Gda absbruinedthe
with 21 abstentions dnfr msulurion.
WR. WlWi"i'AL, CANADA (p.13-14)
..*
Bîih rrspn IO dnf~ msuluioa AiC.1;49/L.M.
cmrd. ha km a ledingpropowt ofnegocuiioandof
~ooil mia UIWJ u eliminuingihenumbermd
rk pmlifanion of nucleu .uerpom. Wearc sirmu
dvauia of ao Wfiniu exiensionofand univd
mion to.theNon-Rolifemion Tm and oftiw
dwioa of nego<*tiot~oa comprrbmriveteu-bm
W.
Wedu, vigomudyuipponimanriooil ngociuioar
IOpem tbc[-fer of mular-veqam Irchoologad
mPai.lr. inrrdindevanuUy dimiaarexististncka
md IObantkepmduaion ofIivilcmmirlr foawlm-
~pupacr.
Tbe C1Di.db Minkm of Fdp Aflain.
Mr.AadrtOuclla. moa rafdy rcitcnredmy
Govemmcnl'swmmiimmt tarbac gds iobu sufrmaii
IOiheûenenlhrvmbly inSepeuber. Weklievihathe
negotiuion omd dbcrrac Ic. biiingmuliilileni
ircltia of thekind jummticaedamsirule a mon 1 rbaild iiLcta explrin
Stwsdm' soteondnlLraahrrionNC. 1149L.36.dtled
'Rqut form miviamy +on hem theImenuliod
Cam of lwi~c on the Igdty of theihrruoruse of
nuclarwapoar".
Itiswellmwn ibai fdecadesSwcden hu workcd
rtivclyandwmisun<lyfor nuclcardiramiammlandfor
ao uliimue totaiban on rmclear weapoar. but my
Gvvcmmcntrbniioed onthednn rcsolurioIistheview
of my Govenumu rhr. ukiag into vcount the ruent
requat madetoibeinumuid Court of lustia by the
World H41b Orgmimion on this topionc funher
qua to the be dd pmboblyuirrela unfortunate
&lly intheongoingworkof rh Court otheissueof Ihe
lepdityothcusc ofwlur weapom. My Govem~lu is
oftheopinionibatheuse of nuclcarweapoaswouldwt
complywithhtmurioanl lawandisamiou ihahelegai
sinuion beclarifiai a manpossibleby theCoun.
inihismntexttheSwedirGovemmcntwouldlikeIo
d ihulut lunc. inconnaion with arcquestfromthe
WoridHdth Orgmuion, Swrdn, officiasiaretothe
intemarionalCoun of Justicethatthe use of nuclearm
would mr k in rcordaau with intemiuiod Lw. This
rcplwya bucd on a reponbycbS w Cornminecon
Foreign Affain othc Sduh Pariiuocnt. which wu
appmvedby ow Puli- laslm. GeneralAssembly
Fony.nintSeunon
FirsrCornmittee
Friday, 18 November1994. 3 p.m.
NewYork
)IR. ESPINOSA, CHILE (p.1)
linceqretationfrom Spanishl: Iehould
liketo erplainChile'evote on draft reeolutio n/C.l/49/L.36.
My delegation believetshat it is diffimlt to .?are the
-est for an advisoryopinionfrm the InternationalCourtof
Ju~tiCeon the legalityof thethreator useof forcewith the
-e#t of the World BealthOrganizatiothrougha draftresolution
prohibitirigcertainreapons.mch ia draftreeolution
~/c.l/49/L.31.Bowever.my delegation votedin favourof thatdrafr
rwolution as it felt chat it shouldk guidedby the wjority
orientationOf the Wovcmcntof Non-aligncdCountriee.
uiuiu, JAPM (p.2)
J shouldlits to explainJapanes
abstentionin the voteson draftresolutions A/C.1/49/L.ZS/ReV.l
md A/C.1/49/L.36.
- -
Japan, withits uniquepast experienc.,honestlydesiresthat
the use of nuclearweapons, vhich vouldause unspeakablehuman
sufferinp,shouldneverba repeatad. It thus attachesqreat
F.portanceto tbm effort.directmitowardsthe ultimateelimination
of nuclearweaponm.
with respectto kaft resolutionAlc.l/4s/L.l6,Japan
considus that, in the present international situatiopursuinq
the qyestionof the leqalityof the use ofnuclear veaponmay
simply resultin confrontatiobetween countriesJ.apan therefore
believesthat itis moreappropriateto steadilypromoterealisric
and specific disarmament measures. 1 should like to srplain the poslrion
of rny deleqation on draft rmsolutionsA/C.l/49/L.36and L.331Rev.l.
First, let ne refer to L.36. He are avare cf the arguments
raised by several States,notablythose of the EuropeanUnion. in
relation to this issue.Ue share some of their concerns,inasmuch
as ue believe it might have been preferableto avait thedecision
of the InternationalCourt of Justice in relation tothe requestof
a similar, thouqn not identical,nature made by the Assemblyof the
worlù Health Oraanization(WHO).
Houever. ve voted in faVOUrof the draft resolutionbecauseve
do not believe ve shoulddeny the rights of an expressgroup of
States to have the International Court of Justice giv its advlsory
opinion about a juridicalquestion of evidentinterestto the
internationalconimunit~. a right which is clearly spelt out in
Article 96 of the Charter.Brazildoes not believe thatthis
measure can harm internationalefforts towards non-proliferation
and disanament. On the contrary,we cal1 upon al1 states to look
upon this request as a furtherappeal to redoublingefforts in
internationalnegotiations,consolidating non-proiiferatioa nnd
leadinq to the gradua1 eliminationof al1 nuclearweapons.
(interptation from chinese) :The
chi- deleqationdid not participitein the vote on draft
-1iitiM AIC.1149lL.36.We would 1Ue to aake eh. follwing
explanetion.
CbiA fully understand. th. ment rish for the prohibitionof
the urs 0f.nuClaarinapoiuon th. part of non-nuclearStates.China
bas consistantlyadvoçatedthe coiprshensiveprohibitionand
complet. elhination.o- mi--ur. .a..oru.
Qdna hopes that rhira fu~.mr promoting nucleardisarmament
LPd th* preventionOC mclear rar. the Wted NationsGeneral
whly the Pimt Cdttee, the Disa-nt Cdasion and the
Qpierence on Dima~t.which have alraady played an Lnportant
1 ri11 continueto do mo. Atthe s.ms tiw, Chine ha8
eauistently supportad al1 tha coilstructivebilateral,regionaland
nulcilateraleffort8mide in thie ragarâ.
Since the day of the poeessionof nuclear weaponshy China. ve
bn sol-ly declaredthat under no circumtances and at no tirne
ri11 ra bc the first to use nuclearweapons. Chinahas also made a
cdrant not to uee or threatento use nuclear weaponson non-
micleax neapon States or nuclear-freezones. we appeal to other
micleax-neaponStates tomake similar cwmitments and to negotiate
and mign a treaty On the non-useof nuclear reaponson each other.
Y belim that if re Can reach these objectives.this ri11 in
pmctice eliminitethe posaibilityof the use or the threat of the
use of nuclearreapons.A/49/699
English
Page 2
was included in the provisional agenda of the forty-ninth session in accordance
with General Assembly resolutions 42/38C of 30 November 1987,46/36 L of
9 December 1991, 47/52 L of 15 December 1992 and 48/75 A to L of
16 December 1993.
2. At its 3rd plenary meeting, on 23 September 1994, the General Assembly, on
the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include the item in its
agenda and to allocate it to the First Committee.
3. At its 2nd meeting, on 13 October 1994, the First Committee decidedto hold
a general debate on al1 disarmament and international security items allocated
to it, namely, items 53 to 66, 68 to 72 and 153. The deliberations on those
items took place at the 3rd to 10th meetings, £rom 17 to 24 October (see
A/C.1/49/PV.3-10). Structured discussionsof specific subjects on the adopted
thematic approach took place £rom 25 to 27 and on 31 October and 1 November.
Consideration of draft resolutions on those items took place at the 12th to
16th meetings, on 3, 4, 7 and 9 November (see A/C.1/49/PV.12-16). Action on
draft resolutions on those items took place at the 19th to 25th meetings, from
14 to 18 November (see ~/~.1/49/PV.19-251.
4. In connection with item 62, the First Committee had before it the following
documents:
(a) Report of the Conference on Disannament; &/
(b) Report of the Disannament Commission; 2/
(c) Report of the Secretary-Generalon non-proliferationof weapons of
mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in al1 its aspects
(A/INF/49/3) ;
(d) ~eport'of the Secretary-Generalon regional disarmament (A/49/202and
Add.1) ;
(e) Report of the Secretary-Generalon a moratorium on the export of
anti-personnel land-mines (A/49/275and Add.1);
(f) Report of the Secretary-General: report on the continuing operation
of the United Nations Register of ConventionalArms and its further development
(A/49/316);
(g) Report of theSecretary-Generalon measures to curb the illicit
transfer and use of conventional ans (A/49/343);
(h) Report of the Secretary-Generalon transparency in armaments - United
Nations Register of Conventional Anns (~/49/352and C0rr.l and Add.1 and 2);
&/ &,
suuuiement No. 27 (A/49/27).
2/ Ibid., Su~ulement No. 42 (A/49/42) 13
UNITED
NAllONS A
GeneralAssembly Distr.
GENBRAL
A/49/699
7December 1994
ORIGINAL: BNGLISH
Agenda item 62ssion
GENERAL AND COMPLBTB DISARMAMENT
Report of the First Conmittee
Ramorteur: Mr. Peter GOOSEN (South Africa)
1. INTRODUCTION
1. The item entitled:
"General and complete disarmament:
"(a) Notification of nuclearts;
"(b)Relationship between disarmamentand development;
"(c)Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for
their delivery in al1ts aspects;
"(d) Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes;
"(e) TranSparenCy in armaments;
"(f) International illicit atraffic;
"(g) Regional disarmament;
"(h) Measures to curb the illicit tranafer and use of conventional arms;
Conventional anns control at the regional and eubregional levels;
i
"(j),Prohibitionof the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices."
94-48521 B) 121294 14/12/94
I1111111I I11III1I11111/11 A/49/699
English
Page 3
(i) Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between
disarmament and development (A/49/476);
(j) Note by the Secretary-General on notification of nuclear tests
(A/49/68 and Add.1);
(k) Note by the Secretary-General on notification of nuclear tests
(A/49/420);
(1) Note by the Secretary-Generalon prohibition of the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
(A/49/97-S/1994/322);
(m) Letter dated 24 January 1994 £rom the representatives of theRussian
Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General (~/49/66-~/1994/91);
(n) Letter dated 3 February 1994 £rom the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission ofUkraine to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General (A/49/69-S/1994/117);
(O) Letter dated 4 February 1994 from the Permanent Representative of
Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/49/73);
(p) Letterdated 21 February 1994 £rom the Permanent Representative of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General (A/49/80-S/1994/204);
(q) Letter dated 31 March 1994 £rom the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission ofGreece to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General (A/49/117-S/1994/395);
Letter dated 21 April 1994'from the Permanent Representative ofthe
(r)
Democratic People's Republic of Korea tothe United Nations addressed to the
secretary-General (A/49/132);
(s) Letter dated 10 May 1994 from the Permanent Representativeof the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea tothe United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General (~/49/155-S/1994/556);
(t) Letter dated 17 May 1994 from the representatives ofUkraine and the
United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General (A/49/162-S/1994/596);
(u) Letter dated 23 May 1994 £rom the Permanent Representative of
Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General fA/49/166);
(v) Letter dated 24 May 1994 fromthe Permanent Representativeof the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General (~/49/165-S/1994/616);A/49/699
English
Page 4
(w) Letter dated 25 June 1994 £rom the Minister for Foreign Affairs Of
Egypt to the Secretary-General (A/49/287-S/1994/894and Corr.1);
(x) Letter dated 8 July 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the
secretary-General (A/49/222);
(y) Letter dated 12 July 1994 £rom the Permanent Representative of Italy
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General fA/49/228-S/1994/827);
(2) Letter dated 8 August 1994 from the Permanent Representative of
Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/49/302);
(aa) Letter dated 8 August 1994 £rom the Permanent Representative of
Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
(A/49/307-S/l994/95e>;
(bb) Letter dated 5 September 1994 £rom the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General (A/49/381);
(cc) Letter dated 17 October 1994 £rom the Permanent Representative of
Indonesia to the United Nations addreseed to the Secretary-General
(A/49/532-S/1994/1179).
II. CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS
A. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.3
5. On 28 October, the Gambia, on behalf of the States Members of the United
Nations that are members of the African Group of States, submitted a draft
resolutionentitled "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes
(A/C.1/49/L.3),which was later also sponsored by u. The draft resolution
was introduced by the representative of the Gambia at the 20th meeting, on
15 November.
6. At its 19th meeting, on 14 November, the Committee adopted draft resolution
A/C.1/49/L.3 without a vote (see para. 60, draft resolution A).
B. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.4
7. On 28 October, Niaeria submitted a draft resolution entitled "Review of the
Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade", which was later also
sponsored by Benin. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative
of Nigeria at the 15th meeting, on 9 November. A/49/699
English
Page 5
8. At its 20th meeting, on 15 November, the Committee adopted draft resolution
A/C.1/49/L.4 by a recorded vote of 111 to 4, with 27 abstentions (see para. 60,
draft resolution B). The voting was as follows: 3/
In favour: Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia,
Australia. Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam.
Bulgaria. Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon,Chile,
China. Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte djIvoire, Cuba,
Cyprus. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala. Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic
Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,
Kuwait. Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malaysia,Maldives,
Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia
(FederatedStates of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,Myanmar,
Namibia. Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia,Solomon Islands,
South Africa, Spain. Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Republicof
Tanzania. Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.
Aqainst: France, Marshall Islands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, United States of America.
Abstaininq: Albania, Argentina. Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan,
Kazakhstan. Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands,New
Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Russian Federation, Samoa, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine.
C. Draft decision A/C.1/49/L.6
9. On 31 October, Colombia submitted a draft decision entitled "International
illicit anns traffic" (A/C.l/49/L.6),which read as follows:
"The General Assembly, recalling its resolutions 48/75 F of
16 December 1993, entitled 'International arms transfers', adopted without
a vote, and 48/77 A of 16 December 1993, entitled 'Report of the
Disarmament Commission', adopted without a vote, as well as the report of
the Disarmament Commission containedin the Officia1 Records of the General
Assembly, fortyrninth session, Supplement No. 42 (A/49/42),decides to
2/ Subsequently, the delegation of Zambia indicated that, had it been
present, it would have voted in favour of the draft resolution.A/49/699
English
Page 6
include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session the item entitled
'International illicitarms traffic'."
10. At the 19th meeting, on 14 November, the representative of Colombia
withdrew draft decision A/C.1/49/L.6.
D. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.18 and Rev.i
il. On 2 November, Arqentina. Australia. Austria. Bahamas. Belarus. Belqium,
Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulqaria, Cambodia, Canada. CaDe Verde. Chile. Costa
Rica. the Czech Re~ublic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiii, Finland, France, Georsia,
Germanv, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana. Honduras. Hunsarv. Iceland. Ireland.
Italv, JaDan, Kazakhstan. Kvrwzstan. Latvia. Liechtenstein. Lithuania,
Luxembourq, Malavsia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands. Namibia. Ne~al, the
Netherlands. New Zealand, Nicarawa, Niqer, Norwav, Panama, PaDua New Guinea,
Peru, Poland. Portusal, Re~ubïic of Korea, Re~ubïic of Moldova, Romania, Russian
Federation. Sierra Leone. Sinqa~ore. Slovakia. Slovenia. Solomon Islands. Spain,
Sweden. the former Yuqoslav Re~ublic of Macedonia, Turkev. Ukraine, the United
Kinsdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America
submitted a draft resolution entitled "Transparency in ammenten
(A/C.1/49/L.18),which was later also sponsored by Albania. Andorra. Cameroon,
Haiti, the Phili~~ines. South Africa and Turkmenistan. The draft resolution was
introduced by the representative of the Netherlands at the 13th meeting, on
4 November.
12. on 3 November, Alseria. Indonesia. Iran (Islamic ReDubiic of). Mexico,
Mvanmar. Niseria and Sri Lanka submitted amendments (A/C.1/49/L.45) to draft
resolution A/C.1/49/L.18, by which:
(a) At the end of operative paragraph 4 (a), the following words would be
added: "including its expansion to cover weapons of mase destruction";
(b) Operative paragraph 4 (b) ,which read:
"(b) Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of
governmental experts to be convened in 1996 on the basis of equitable
geographical representation, to prepare a report on the continuing
operation of the Register and its further development, taking into account
the work of the Conference on Dieannament and the views expressed by Member
States, for submission to the General Assembly with a view to a decision at
its fifty-first session";
would be replaced by:
"(b) Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the
continuing operation of the Register and its further development, taking
into account the views expressed by Member States, for.submission to.the
General Assembly with a view to a decision at its fifty-third session";
(cl Operative paragraph 6 would be deleted and the remaining paragraphs
renumbered accordingly.
/. .. A/49/699
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Page 7
13. The amendments containedin document A/C.1/49/L.45were introducedby the
representativeof Mexico at the 15th meeting, on 9 November.
14. On 15November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution
(~/c.1/49/L.18/Rev.l), which contained the following changes:
(a) ûperative paragraph4 (a), which read:
"(a) Requests Member Statesto provide the Secretary-Generalwith
their views on the continuing operationof the Registerand its further
development" ;
waa revised to read:
"(al Requests Member Statesto provide the Secretary-General with
their views on the continuing operationof the Register andits further
development andon transparencymeaeures related to weapona of mase
destruction' '
(b) ûperative paragraph4 (b),was revisedto read:
"(b) Requests the Secretary-General,with the assistanceof a group of
governmental expertsto be convened in 1997, on the-basis of equitable
geographical representation, to prepare a report on the continuing
operation of the Registerand its further development. taking into account
work of the Conference onDisarmament,the viewsexpreased by Member States
and the 1994 report of the Secretary-Generalon the continuing operationof
the Register and its further developmentw ,ith a view to a decision at its
fifty-secondsession";
(cl ûperative paragraph6, which read:
"Encourasesthe Conferenceon Disarmament to continue its work
undertaken in the field of transparencyin annaments",
was reviaed to read:
"Invites the Conference on Dieannament to consider continuing itswork
undertaken in the field of traneparencyin aimaments".
15. At the 25th meeting, on18 November, the repreaentative of Mexico made a
statement on behalf of the sponsors of draft resolutionA/C.1/49/L.45 that they
intended not to press the draft resolution to vote.
16. At the same meeting, theCommittee voted on draft resolution
A/C.1/49/L.18/Rev.las f~llows:
(a) ûperative paragraph 4 (b) was adopted by a recorded vote of 114 to 1,
with 22 abstentions. The voting was as follows:A/49/699
English
Page 8
In favour: Albania, Andorra, Antigua andBarbuda, Argentina, Armenia,
Australia, ust tri Aa,erbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh.
Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana,Brazil,
Brunei Darussalam, ~ulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde,
Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cypms, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Gennany,
Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,Malta, Marshall Islands,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of),
Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia,Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian
Federation, Samoa, San Marino,Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa,
Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Thailand,the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia.
Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania,
United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
-: Iran (IslamicRepublic of).
Abstaininq: Algeria, Angola, China, Colombia, Cuba,Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, India,
Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,Mexico,
Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka,Sudan,
Swaziland.
(b) Operative paragraph 6 was adopted by a recorded vote of 117 to 4, with
15 abstentions. The voting was as follows:
In favour: Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, CapeVerde,
Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia,Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,Malta,
Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated
States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway,
Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia,Solomon A/49/699
English
Page 9
Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,
Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of
America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Asainst : Ugeria. Cuba, Indonesia, Mexico.
Abstaininq: Angola, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, Ecuador. El Salvador, India, Iran (Islamic Republic
of), Iraq, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Myanmar,Nigeria, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, Sudan.
(CI Draft resolution A/C.l/49/L.lB/Rev.l as a whole was adopted by a
recorded vote of 126 to none, with 17 abstentions (see para. 60, draft
resolution C. The voting was as follows:
In favour: Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina. Armenia,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Bela~S, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei Darussalam. Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,C6te
d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana,Haiti,
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, Russian Federation. Samoa, San Marino, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands,
South Africa, Spain. Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand,
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic
of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Aqainst : None
Abstaininq: Algeria, Angola,Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq,
Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Myanmar, Saudi
Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic.A/49/699
English
Page 10
E. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.19
17. on 1 November. Afahanistan. Arqentina. Austria. Bahamas, Bhutan, Bolivia,
BL
Re~ubiic, Denmark. El Salvador. Eritrea. Germanv, Ghana, Greece. Guatemala,
Guvana. Honduras. riunaarv.Iceland. Ireland. Italv. Kazakhstan. Liberia.
Luxembourq, Madaqascar. Maldives. Malta. the Marshall Islands, Mauritania.
Nepal, Netherlands. New Zealand. Nicarama. Norwav. Panama, Philip~ines, Poland.
portusal. the n h
Africa. Suain. S w e d e n n the
United Kinqdom of Great Britain and Northern Irelan&,the United States of
America, Vanuatu and submitted a draft resolution entitled "Moratoriumon
the export of anti-personnel land-mines" (A/C.1/49/L.19),which was later also
sponsored by Albania. Armenia. Azerbaiian. Belaium, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia,
Georaia, Guinea. JaDan. Jordan. Kenva. Kuwait. India. Malavsia. Monqolia,
Namibia and the Niqer. The draft resolution was introduced by the
representative of the United States of America at the 12th meeting, on
3 November .
18. At its 19th meeting, on 14 November, the.Committee adopted draft resolution
A/C.1/49/~.19 without a vote (see para. 60, draft resolution D).
P. Draft decision A/C.1/49/L.24
19. On 2 November, Mexico submitted a draft decision entitled
"Non-proliferationof weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their
delivery in al1 its aspectsn (A/C.1/49/L.24). The draft decision was introduced
by the representative of Mexico at the 15th meeting, on 9 November.
20. At its 20th meeting, on 15 November, the Committee adopted draft decision
A/C.1/49/L.24 by a recorded vote of 98 to 1, with'42 abstentions (see para. 61,
draft decision). The voting was as follows: 4/ '
In favour: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia,
Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belanis,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, C8te d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus,
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana. Guatemala,
Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (IslamicRepublic of),
Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, LaoPeople's
Democratic Republic. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,Mexico.
Mongolia, MorOCCO. Mozambique, yranmar, Namibia, Nepal,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,Oman, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar,
o/ Subsequently, the delegations of Djibouti and Zambia indicatedthat,
had they been present, they would have voted in favourof the draftresolution.
/. .. A/49/699
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Page 11
Republic of Korea, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Suriname. Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of
Tanzania. Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.
Asainst : United States of America.
Abstaininq: Andorra, Argentina. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Pinland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, .
Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Micronesia (Pederated States of), Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Republ~c of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, the former
YugoSlav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
G.. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.25 and Rev.1
21. On 2 November, Brazil, Colombia, Eqvut. India, Indonesia. Malaysia, Mexico,
Niseria and Zimbabwe submitted a draft resolution entitled "Step-by-step
reduction of the nuclear threatn (A/C.1/49/L.25),which was later also sponsored
by Ecuador and the United Re~ublic of Tanzania. The draft resolution was
introduced by the representative of Mexico at the 14th meeting, on 7 November.
22. On 16 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution
(A/c.1/49/L.25/Rev.l),which was later also sponsored by Alseria. The draft
resolution contained the following changes:
(a) In operative paragraph 3 (a), the words "operative paragraph 1" were
replaced by the words "paragraph 1 of the present resolution";
(b) In operative paragraph 3 (b), the word "operative" was deleted;
(c) ûperative paragraph 4. yhich read:
"4. Reauests that the Conference in Disarmament include in its 1995
report to the General Assembly a section on efforts undertaken in
accordance with the above recommendation."
was revised to read:
"4. Reauests the Conference on Disarmament to include in its 1995
report to the General Assembly a section on efforts undertaken in
accordance with the recommendation set out in paragraph 3";
'(d) An additional paragraph was added reading as follows:
"5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth
session an item entitled 'Step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threattn.A/49/699
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Page 12
23. At its 24th meeting, on 18 November, the Committee adopted draft resolution
A/C.1/49/L.25/Rev.l by a recorded vote of 91 to 24, with 30 abstentions (see
para. 60, draft resolution E) . The voting was as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin,
Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,Brunei Darussalam, Burkina
Paso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
CyprUS, Democratic People Republic of Korea, Djibouti,
Ecuador, Egypt, 51 Salvador, ~thiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guyana, Haiti,Honduras, India, Indonesia. Iran
(Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordari,Kenya, Kuwait,
Lao People's Democratic Republic,Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Pakistan. Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Qatar, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra
Leone. singapore, soiornon~siands, south Africa, Sri Lanka,
Sudan. Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand,~ogo,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. United Arab Emirates, United
Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Aqainst : Andorra, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, ~uxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland,Portugal, Romania, San Marino,
Slovakia, Spain, Turkey,United Kingdom of Great ri t anin
Northern Ireland, United States of America.
Abstaininq: Albania, Antigua andBarbuda, Argentina. Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia,
Georgia, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, Micronesia
(Federated States of), New Zealand, Republic of Korea,
Republic of Moldova, Russian Pederation, Slovenia, Swaziland,
Sweden. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,Ukraine.
H. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.27
24. On 2 November, Australia,Austria. Belqium. Bulaaria. Canada, Denmark,
Pinland. France. Gennanv. Greece.Hunsarv, Iceland, Ireland. Italv, Luxembours,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norwav. Poland. Portuqal, Romania. S~ain, Sweden
and the U n i t e d a submitted a draft
resolution entitled "Code of Conduct for the international transfers of
conventional weapons", which was later also sponsored by w, the
Moldova. Slovakia and Slovenia. The draft resolution, which was introduced by
the representative of Gennany at the 12th meeting, on 3 November, read as
follows: A/49/699
English
Page 13
"The General Assembl~,
"Recallinq its resolutions 46/36 L of 9 December 1991,47/52 L of
15 December 1992 and 48/75 E of 16 December 1993, concerning transparency
in armaments, and 46/36 H of 6 December 1991 and 48/75 P of
16 December 1993 concerning internationalarma transfers,
"Considerinq that an enhanced level of openness and transparencywith
regard to international transfers of armaments contributes greatly to
confidence-building and security among States, eases tensions, strengthens
regional and international peace and security, couldserve as a useful tool
in facilitating non-proliferation efforts in general and could contribute
to restraint in military production and the transfer of arms,
"Welcominq the work of the Conference on Disarmament on its agenda
item entitled 'Transparencyin armaments',
"Reaffirminq the inherent right to individual or collective self-
defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
which implies that States also have the right to acquire arms with which to
defend themselves,
"Recoqnizinq the need for Member States to exercise responsibility and
restraint in transfers of conventional arme,
"Stressinq its strong belief that excessive and destabilizing
accumulations of am pose a threat to national, regional and international
peace and security, particularly aggravating tensions and conflict
situations, and give rise to serious and urgent concerns,
"Affinninq the need for effective national mechanisms for controlling
the transfer of conventional arma and related technology and for transfers
to take place with those mechanisms,
"1. Calls upon al1 Member States to consider the establishment of a
voluntary, global and non-discriminatory Code of Conduct for international
conventional arms transfers with a view to promoting voluntary restraint
and responsibility in conventional arms transfers;
"2. Considers that a Code of Conduct for international armt sransfers
be elaborated in the most appropriate forum;
113. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth
session the item entitled 'Code of Conduct for the international transfers
of conventional weapons'".
25. At the 23rd meeting, on 17 November, the representative of Gennany stated
that the sponsors intended to request the Committee not to take action on draft
resolution ~/C.1/49/L.27.A/49/699
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Page 14
1. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.28
26. On 2 November, Indonesia, Mexico. Namibia.Niqeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe
submitted a draft resolution entitled "1995Review and Extension Conference of
States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons"
(A/C.l/49/L.28),which was later also sponsored by the United Re~ublic of
Tanzania. The draft resolution was introduced bythe representative of Nigeria
at the 14th meeting, on 7 November.
27. At the 22nd meeting, on 17 November, the Secretary of the Committee made a
statement concerning the programme budget implications of draftresolution
A/C.1/49/L.28 (see A/C.1/49/PV.22).
28. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.28
by a recorded vote of 77 to 39, with 32 abstentions (see para. 60, draft
resolution F). The voting was as follows:
In Cavour: Algeria, Angola,Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin,Bhutan, Bolivia,
Botswana. Brunei Darusaalam, Burkina Faso,Burundi, China,
Colombia. Costa Rica,Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of
Korea. Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala,
Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (IslamicRepublic
of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's
Democratic Republic, LibyanArab Jamahiriya,.Madagascar,
Malaysia, Maldives,Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria,.Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay,Peru,
Philippines. Qatar,Saudi Arabia, Senegal, sierra Leone,
Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Swaziland. Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Aqainst: Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,Czech
Republic, Denmark, Eetonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Gennany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland,Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania,
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,Sweden,
Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,Turkey,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and NorthernIreland, United
States of America.
Abstaininq: Argentina,.Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belarus,
Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba,
Djibouti. Dominica, Egypt, Guyana, India, Israel, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Marshall Islands,Micronesia
(FederatedStates of), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Republic
of Korea, Samoa, San Marino, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic,
Ukraine. A/49/699
English
Page 15
J. Draft resolutionA/C.l/49/L.30and Rev.1 and Rev.2
29. On 2 November, Mali submitted a draft resolution entitled "Assistance to
States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them"
(A/C.1/49/L.30 )
30. On 7November, Mali joined by Burkina Faso, C8te d'Ivoire, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau.Mauritania, the Niqer and Senesal, submitted a reviseddraft
resolution A/C.l/49/L.3O/Rev.l. It was introducedby the representativeof Mali
at the 16th meeting, on 9 November. and containedthe following changes:
(a) The original seventh preambular paragraph, whicr head:
"Notinqwith satisfactionthe actionstaken and those recommendedat
the meetings of the States of the subregion held at Banjul, Algiers and
Bamako to establish close regional cooperation with a viewto strengthening
security, and the interest shown by other States of the subregion in
receiving the United NationsConsultativeMission",
was revised to read:
"Takinsnote also of the interest shown by other States of the
subregion in receiving the United Nations ConsultativM eission";
(b) The original operative paragraph1, which read:
"1. Welcomes the actionstaken by the Secretary-General leading to
the initiation of preventive diplomacy in the Saharo-Sahelian subregion",
was revised to read:
"1. Welcomes the initiativetaken by Mali concerning the question of
the illicit circulation of small arms and their collectionin the
Saharo-Sahelian subregion";
(c) The original operative paragraph 2, which read:
"2. Also welcomes the initiativetaken by Mali and the appreciable
help given by the Governmentof Mali to the United Nations Consultative
Mission',
was revisedto read:
"2. Also welcomes theaction taken by the Secretary-Generalin
implementation of this initiative";
(d) A new operative paragraph 3 wasadded, reading:
"3. Thanks the Governmentof Mali for the appreciable help which it
has given to the Consultative Mission and welcomes the declared readiness
of other States of the subregion to receive theMission";A/49/699
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Page 16
(e) The original operative paragraph 3, which read:
"3. Reauests the Secretary-Generalto continue his action,providing
the necessary assistanceto Mali and to al1 other Member Statesrequesting
it, with a view to curbing the illicit circulation of smala lrms and
ensuring their collection",
became operative paragraph4 and was revised to read:
"4. Encourases the Secretary-General to continue his action, with the
support of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peaceand Disarmament in
Africa and in close collaborationwith the Organization of AfricanUnity,
by providing the necessary assistance to Mali and to al1 other States
concerned whichrequest it, with a view to curbing the illicit circulation
of small arms and ensuring their collection";
(f) The original operative paragraphs4, 5 and 6 were renumberedas
paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 respectively.
31. On 17 November, the sponsors submitted a second revised resolution
(A/C.l/49/L.3O/Rev.2), which was later also sponsoredby Benin, Burundi,
Cambodia. Cameroon. Chad. Diibouti and m. The draft resolution contained the
following changes:
(a) Operative paragraph4 was further revisedas followa:
"4. Conqratulatesthe Secretary-Generalon his action withinthe
context of the relevantprovisionsof resolution 40/151 H of
16 December 1985, and encourageshim to continue his efforts to curb the
illicit circulation of small arms and to ensure their collectionin the
affected States which so request, with the support of the United Nations
Centre for Peace and Disarmamentin Africa and in close cooperation with
the Organization of AfricanUnity";
(b) Operative paragraph5 (formeroperative paragraph4). which read:
"InvitesMember States to take al1 necessary measuresto curb the
illicit circulation of small arms, in particularby halting their illegal
export";
was revised to read:
"5. Invites Member Statesto implementnational control measures in
order to check the illicit circulationof small arms, in particular by
curbing the illegal export of such arms".
32. At the 22nd meeting,on 17 November, theSecretaryof the Committeemade a
statement concerning the programme budget implicationsof draft resolution
A/C.1/49/L.30/Rev.2(seeA/C.I/~~/PV.~~).
33. At its 25th meeting,on 18 November, the Committee adopteddraft resolution
A/C.1/49/L.30/Rev.2without a vote (seepara. 60, draft resolutionG).A/49/699
English
Page 18
genéral and complete disarmamentunder strict and effective international
control" ,
was revised to read:
"2. Calls uuon the nuclear-weapon States to pursue their efforts for
nuclear disarmamentwith the ultimate objective of theelimination of
nuclear weapons in the framework of general and complete disarmament, and
also calls upon al1 States to fully implement their commitments in the
field of disarmament and non-proliferationof weapons of mass destructionp.
36. At its 24th meeting, on18 November, the Committee adopted draft resolution
A/C.1/49/L.33/Rev.lby a recorded vote of140 to none, with 8 abstentions (see
para. 60, draft resolutionH). The voting was as follows:
In favour: Afghanietan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina. Annenia, ~ustralia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus. Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brunei Darussalam. Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Canada, Cape verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Djibouti, Ecuador,Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, nonduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia.
Iran (IslamicRepublic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,Kuwait, Lao People's
Democratic Republic, Latvia,Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan-ab
Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,Luxembourg, Madagascar,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia(FederatedStates of), Mongolia,
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Noway, Oman, Pakistati,
Panama. Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,Pen, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal. Qatar,Republic of ~orea, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa,San Marino, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, SierraLeone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia,Solomon
Islands, South Africa, Spain,Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Sweden,Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Bmirates, United
Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela,Viet Nam, Yemen,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Aaainst: None
Abstaininq: Brazil, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France,
India, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, United States of America. A/49/699
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Page 19
L. Draft resolutionA/C.1/49/L.34 and Rev.1
37. On 2 November, Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United
Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, submitted a
draft resolution entitled "Conveningof the fourth special session of the
General Assembly devoted to disarmament" (A/C.1/49/L.34),which was introduced
by its representative at the 15th meeting, on 9 November.
38. On 15 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution
(A/C.1/49/L.34/Rev.l),which contained the following changes:
(a) The third preambular paragraph, which read:
"Reiteratinq its conviction that the implementation of disarmament
measures, particularly nuclear disarmament, is essential forachieving
global peace and security",
was deleted;
(b) ûperative paragraphs 1 and 2, which read:
"1. Decides to convene in May/June 1996 the fourth special session of
the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
"2. Further decides to establish a preparatory committee for the
special session of the General Assembly devotedto disarmament open to al1
States with the mandate of examining al1 relevant questions relating tothe
special session, including its agenda, and submitting to the Assembly at
its fiftieth session appropriate recomendations thereon",
-
were revised to read:
"1. Decides to convene in 1997 the fourth special session of the
General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
"2. Further decides that at its fiftieth regular session it will
establish a preparatory committee for the special session of the General
Assembly devoted to disarmament open to al1 States with the mandate of
examining al1 relevant questions relating tothe special session, including
its agenda, and submitting to the Assembly at its fifty-first session
appropriate recomendations thereon";
(c) ûperative paragraphe 3, 4 and 5 were deleted andoperative paragraph 6
was renumbered as paragraph 3.
39. On 17 November, Belqium. Canada, Denmark, Finland. France, Hunqarv.
Iceland, Ireland, Italv, Japan. Norwav. Poland. Portuqal. Turkev. the United
Kinadom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America
submitted amendmenta (A/C.1/49/L.52)to the revised draft resolution
(A/C.1/49/L.34/Rev.l),by which:A/49/699
English
Page 20
(a) In the fourth preambular paragraph. the word "central"would be
deleted;
(b) Operative paragraph1 would be replaced by the following:
"1. Decides in principle to convene a fourth special sessionof the
General Assemblydevoted to disarmamentat an appropriate dateto be
determined following consultations";
(c) Operative paragraphs 2 and 3 would be deleted.
40. At the 25th meeting, on 18 November, the representative of India proposed
oral amendmentsto the revised draft resolution (A/C.1/49/L.34/Rev.l), by which:
(a) Operative paragraph 1 would be amended to read:
"1. Decides, in principle, to convene, in 1997 if possible, the
fourth special session of the General Assembly devotet do disarmament, the
date to be determined at the fiftieth regularsession";.
(b) Operative paragraph 2 would be deleted and operative paragraph 3 would
be renumberedas paragraph 2.
41. At the same meeting, the representative of the United Sta-tesof America
made a statementon behalf of the sponsorsthat they intended notto press the
amendments containedin document A/C.1/49/L.52to a vote.
42. The Committeeadopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.34/Rev.l,as orally
amended, without a vote (seepara. 60, draft resolution1).
43. On 3 November, Indonesia,on behalf of the States Members ofthe United
Nations thatare members of the Movement ofNon-AlignedCountries, submitted a
draft resolution entitled "Relationship between disarmamen and development"
(A/C.1/49/L.35),which was later also sponsoredby u. The draft resolution
was introducedby the representativeof Indonesiaat the 15th meeting,on
9 November.
44. At its 20th meeting on 15 November. the Committee adopted draft resolution
A/C.l/49/L.35without a vote (seepara. 60, draft resolutionJ).
N. Draft resolutionA/C.1/49/L.36
45. On 3November, Indonesia,on behalf of the States Membersof the United
Nations thatare members of the Movement of Non-AlignedCountries, submitted a
draft resolution entitled"Request for an advisory opinion£rom the
International Court ofJustice on the legality of the threator use of nuclear
weapons' (A/C.1/49/L.36). The draft resolutionwas introducedby the
representativeof Indonesiaat the 15th meeting.on 9 November. A/49/699
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Page 21
46. At its 24th meeting, on 18 November, the Committee acted on a no-action
motion on draft resolutionA/C.1/49/L.36,which was proposed by the
representative of Morocco. The motion was rejectedby a recorded vote of45 to
67, with 15 abstentions. The voting was as follows:
In faveur: Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, BelarusB ,elgium,
Bulgaria. Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Georgia, Germany,Greece, Hungary, Iceland,ïsrael,
Italy, Japan. Latvia, Luxembourg,Mali, Malta, Marshall
Islands,Micronesia (FederatedStates of), Morocco,
Netherlands,Norway, Poland, Portugal,Republic of Korea, .
Romania. Russian Federation,Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Turkey, Ukraine,United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northeni
Ireland,United States ofAmerica.,
Asainst : Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahamas, BangladeshB ,hutan, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil,Brunei Darussalam, Burundi,Cape Verde,
Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, DemocraticPeople's Republic of
Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Iran (IslamicRepublic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya,
Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique,Myanmar,
Namibia, Nepal. Nicaragua. Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,Peru, Philippines,Samoa, Saudi
Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand,Trinidad and Tobago, United
Arab Emirates, United Republic ofTanzania, Uruguay,
Venezuela, VietNam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Abstaininq: Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Azerbaijan, Cameroon,Cate
d'Ivoire, El Salvador, Ireland,Jamaica, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania,New Zealand, Niger, Republic of Moldova, San
Marino, Sweden.
47. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted draft resolutionA/C.1/49/L.36
by a recorded vote of 77 to 33, with 21 abstentions(seepara. 60, draft
resolutionK). The voting was as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan,Algeria, Bahamas, Bangladesh,Bhutan, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil,Brunei Darussalam, Burundi,Cape Verde,
Chile, Colombia, CostaRica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt,El Salvador, Ethiopia,
Fiji. Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of),Iraq, Jordan, Kenya,
Kuwait. Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,Madagascar,
Malaysia, Maldives,Mali, Mauritius,Mexico, Mongolia,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand,Nicaragua,
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Pe, Philippines, Samoa,Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname.
Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic,Thailand, Trinidad andA/49/699
English
Page 22
Tobago, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Auainst : Andorra, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria,Czech Republic, Denmark.
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland. Israel. Italy, Latvia,Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,Republic of Korea, Romania,
Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom
of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland, United States of
America.
Abstaininq: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentins,Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cameroon, Canada, Ireland, Jamaica,
Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, Niger,
Norway, Republic ofMoldova, San Marino, Sweden, Ukraine.
O. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.38
48. On 3 November. Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United
Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, submitted a
draft resolution entitled "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear
disarmament" (A/C.1/49/L.38). The draft resolution was introduced by the
representative of Indonesiaat the 15th meeting, on 9 November.
49. At its 23rd meeting, on 17 November. the Committee adopted draft resolution
A/C.1/49/L.38 without a vote (see para. 60, draft resolution L).
\
P. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.40 and Rev.1
50. On 3 November. Afqhanistan and Colombiasubmitted a draft resolution
entitled "Measuresto curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms"
(A/C.1/49/L.40),which was later also sponsored by Ecuador. Guatemala,
Sri Lanka, the çudan and Zimbabwe. The draft resolution was introduced by the
representative of Afghanistanat the 15th meeting, on 9 November.
51. On 10 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draftresolution
(A/C.l/49/L.40/Rev.l),which was later also sponsored by Botswana. Costa Rica,
El Salvador, South Africa and Swaziland. The revised draft resolution contained
the following changes:
(a) The original third preambular paragraph, which read:
"Realizinq the urgent need to resolve conflicts and to diminish
tensions with a view to maintaining regional and international peace and
security" ,
was revised to read: A/49/699
English
Page 23
"Realizinqthe urgent need to resolve conflictsand to diminish
.tensionsand accelerate effortstowardsgeneral and complete disarmament
with a view to maintaining regional and internationalpeace and security";
(b) The original fifth preambular paragraph, which read:
"Stressinqthe need forinternationalregulationof the transfer of
conventionalweapons",
was revised to read:
"Stressinqthe need foreffective national control measureson the
transfer of conventionalweapons";
(c) The original seventh preambular paragraph, whicr head:
"Convincedthat peace and security are imperatives for economic
developmentand reconstruction",
was revisedto read:
"Convincedthat peace and security are inextricably interlinkedwith
and in some cases imperative foreconomic development andreconstruction";
(d) The original operative paragraph 2, which read:
"2. Invites Member Statesto provide the Secretary-General with
relevant informationon national regulationson arms transferswith a view
to preventing illicit armstransfers, and, in this context,to take
immediate, appropriate and effective measures to ensure that illicit
transfers of arms are discontinued",
was revised to read:
"2. Invites Member States to provide the Secretazy-Generalwith
relevant informationon national control measures on arms transfers with a
view to preventing illicitarms transfers,and, in this context, to take
immediate,appropriate andeffectivemeasures to seek to ensure that
illicit transfers of arms are discontinued";
(e) The original operative paragraph 3. which read:
"3. Reauests the Secretary-General to:
"(a) Seek the views ofMember States on effectiveways and means of
collectingillegal weapons in countries concerned,as well as on concrete
proposals concerning measures at national, regional and international
levels to curb the illicit transferand use of conventionalarms;
"(b) Study, within the existing resources,upon request £rom the
concerned Member States, the possibilities of illicit arms collectioi nn
the light of theexperiencegained by the United Nations and the viewaA/49/699
English
Page 24
expressed by Member States and to submit a reporton the result of his
study to the General Assemblyat its fiftieth session",
was revisedto read:
"3. Resuests the Secretary-Generalto:
"(a) Seek the views ofMember States on effective ways and means of
collecting weapons illicitly transferredin interested countries,as well
as on concrete proposals concerning measuresat national, regional and
international levelsto curb the illicit transferand use of conventional
arms ;
"(b) Study, within the existingresources,upon request £rom the
concernedMember States, the possibilitiesof the collection of weapons
illicitly transferred in,the light of the experience gainedby the United
Nations and theviews expressed by Member States and to submit a reporton
the result of his study to the General Assemblyat its fiftiethsession".
52. At its 19th meeting, on 14 November. the Committee adopted the revised
draft resolution (A/C.l/49/L.40/Rev.l) without a vote (seepara. 60, draft
resolution M).
Q. Draft resolutionA/C.1/49/L.42
53. On 3 November. Albania.Armenia, Benin. Bosniaand Herzeqovina. Cameroon,
Canada. Caue Verde, Chile, Colombia. Costa Rica, the Czech Re~ublic.Eswt,
Ghana. Guinea, Honduras, Italv. Lesotho, Madaqascar, Mali.Malta. Mauritania,
Neual. New Zealand, the Niser. Pakistan. Pauua New Guinea. Poland, Seneqal. Sri
Lanka. the Sudan. Suriname. Swaziland, Toqo,Tunisia. Turkev, Ukraine, the
United Statesof America. Zambia and Zimbabwe submitted a draft resolution
entitled "Regionaldisarmament" (A/C.1/49/L.42), which was also later sponsored
by Belqium, Bolivia, Brazil. Haiti, Kenva, the Reuublic of Moldova and
Turkmenistan. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of
Pakistan at the 19th meeting,on 14 November.
54. At its 19th meeting on 14 November, theConunittee adopted draft resolution
A/C.1/49/L.42by a recorded vote of 140 to none, with 2 abstentions (see
para. 60, draft resolutionN). The voting was as follows: s/
In favour: Afghanistan, Albania,Algeria, Andorra, Argentina.Armenia,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Belams, Belgium. Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei Darussalam. Bu1garia;Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, C6te
d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus,Czech Republic, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt,
-/ Subsequently,the delegationsof Djibouti and Paraguay indicated that,
had they been present, tt~eywuuld have voted infavour of draft resolution.
/. .. A/49/699
English
Page 25
El Salvador. Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,Finland,
France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,Guinea, Guyana,
Haiti, Hungary. Iceland, Indonesia. Iran (IslamicRepublic
of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan,Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,
Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia
(FederatedStates of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Namibia, Nepal. Netherlands,New Zealand, Nicaragua,Niger,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,Papua New Guinea, Peru,
Philippines.Poland, Portugal, Qatar,Republic of Korea,
Republic ofMoldova, Romania, Russian Federation,Samoa,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain,Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic,
Thailand, the former YugoslavRepublic ofMacedonia, Togo,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Rirkey, Ukraine, UnitedArab
Emirates, UnitedKingdom of Great Britainand Northern
Ireland, United Republicof Tanzania, United Statesof
America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
Aqainst : None.
Abstaininq: India, Nigeria.
R. Draft resolutionA/C.1/49/L.43
55. On 3 November, Haiti, Pakistanand Swaziland submitteda draft resolution
entitled "Conventional arms control atthe regional and subregionallevelsn
(A/C.1/49/L.43). The draft resolution wasintroducedby the representativeof
Pakistan at the 19th meeting, on 14 November.
56. At its 19th meeting, on 14 November, the Committee adoptedthe draft
resolutionA/C.1/49/L.43 by a recorded vote of 129 to none, with 11 abstentions
(seepara. 60, draft resolution O). The voting was as follows:5/, Z/
In favour: Afghanistan,Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte
d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, DemocraticPeople's
5/ Subsequently,the delegationsof Djibouti and Paraguay indicated that,
had they been present, they would have voted in favour of draft resolution.
z/ Subsequently,the delegation of Venezuela informed theSecretariat
that it had intended to abstain.A/49/699
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Page 26
Republic of Korea, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,Finland, France, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary,Iceland, Indonesia.
Iran (IslamicRepublic of),Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,Kazakhstan,Kenya, Kuwait,Lao
People's Democratic Republic,Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg,Madagascar,Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,
Malta, Marshall Islands,Micronesia (Federated States of),
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal,
Netherlands,New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway,Oman,
Pakistan, PapuaNew Guinea, Philippines,Poland, Portugal,
Qatar, Republic ofKorea, Republic of Moldova, Romania,
Russian Federation,Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,Sierra
Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa,
Spain. Sri Lanka. Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,Syrian
Arab Republic. Thailand, the former YugoslavRepublic of
Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. Rirkey,
Ukraine, United Arab hnirates,United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United
States of America, Uruguay,Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
Abstaininq: Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala,India, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Mexico,Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Singapore.
S. Draft resolutionA/C.1/49/L.44and Rev.1
57. On 3 November, theRussian Federation,the United Kinqdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the United Statesof America submitted a draft
resolution entitled "Bilateralnuclear-armsnegotiations and nuclear
disarmament" (A/C. 1/49/L.44).
58. On 8 November, thesponsors, joined by Belqium, Greece and Norway submitted
a revised draft resolution (A/C.1/49/L.44/Rev.i). which was later also sponsored
by Arsentina. Armenia, Australia, Bulqaria, the Czech Reuublic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germanv, Hunsarv, Ireland, Italv, Jauan, Luxembours,the
Netherlands,New Zealand, Norway.Poland, Portuqal.Suain. Sweden and Turkey.
The draft resolution was introduced by the representative ofthe United States
of America at the 23rd meeting, on 17 November, and contained the following
changes :
(a) The original ninth preambular paragraph,which read:
"Welcominq thesteps that have already been taken by those States to
begin the process of reducing the number of nuclea weapons from a deployed
status, and bilateral agreementson the issue of de-targetingstrategic
nuclear missiles", A/49/699
English
Page 27
was revised as follows:
"Welcominq the steps that have already been taken by those States to
begin the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons and removing
such weapons £rom a deployed status, and bilateral agreements on the issue
of de-targeting strategic nuclear missiles";
(b) The original eleventh preambular paragraph, which read:
"Notins also that the Russian Federation and the United tat of es
America concurred that, once the START II Treaty is ratified, the Russian
Federation and the United States of America would proceedto deactivate al1
strategic delivery systems to be reduced under START II by removing their
nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from alert status",
was revised as follows:
"Notinq also that the Russian Federation and the United States of
America concurred that, once the Treatybetween them on the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Armswas ratified, they
would proceed to deactivate al1 strategic delivery systems to be reduced
under the Treaty by removing their nuclear warheadsor taking other steps
to remove them from alert status";
(cl The original twelfth preambular paragraph,which read:
"Notinq further the agreement between the Russian Federation and the
United States of America to intensify their dialogueto compare conceptual
approaches and to develop concrete steps to adaptthe nuclear forces and
practices on both sides to the changed internationalsecurity situation,
including the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further
reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces",
was revised as follows:
"Notinq further the agreement between the Russian Federation and the
United States of America to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual
approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and
practices on both sides to the changed international security situation,
including the possibility, after ratification of the Treaty on the hirther
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, offurther reductions
of and limitations on remaining nuclear forces";
(d) In the original operative paragraph 1, the words "the Presidents of"
were added after the words "the trilateral statement by";
(e) In the original operative paragraph 6, the word "Further" was deleted.A/49/699
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59. At itS 23rd meeting, on 17 November, the Committee adopted draft resolution
A/C.1/49/L.44/Rev.l by a recorded vote of 122 to none, with 2 abstentions (see
para. 60, draft resolution P). The voting was as follows: g/
In favour: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina. Armenia, Australia,
Austria. Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium.
Benin. Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam,
Bulgaria. Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cate d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus. Czech
Republic. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark,
Djibouti. Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Finland. France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea,
Guyana. Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia,Iran (Islamic
Republic of), Ireland, 1srael;Italy. Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar,Malaysia,
Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,Mexico, Mongolia,
Morocco. Mozambique, Myanmar, Netherlands,New zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Noway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania. Russian
Federation, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sudan. Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States
of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.
Aqainst : None.
Abstaininq: India, Namibia.
8/ Subsequently, the delegations of Bahrain, Guatemala, Iraq, Kuwait,
Nepal, Saudi Arabia and United ArabEmirates indicated that, had they been
present, they would have voted in favour of the draft resolution. A/49/699
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Page 29
III. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE
60. The First Comnittee recomnenda to the General Assembly the adoption of the
following draft resolutions:
General and com~lete disarmament
The General Assembly,
Bearins in mind resolutions CM/Res.1153 (XLVIII) of 1988 2/ and
CM/Res.l225 L of 1989, U/ adopted by the Council of Ministera of the
Organization of African Unity, concerningthe dumping of nuclear and industrial
wastes in Africa,
Welcominq resolutionGC(XXXIII)/RES/509 on the dumping of nuclear wastes,
adopted on 29 September 1989 by the General Conference of the International
Atomic Energy Agency at its thirty-third regular session, II/
Welcomins also resolution GC(XXXIv)/RES/530 establishing a Code of Practice
on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, adopted on
21 September 1990 by the General Conferenceof the International Atomic mergy
Agency at its thirty-fourth regular session, =/
Considerinq ita resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, inwhich it
requested the Conference of the Conmittee on Disarmament, -/ inter alia, to
consider effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of
warfare,
2/ See A/43/398, annex 1.
-IO/ see A/44/603, annex 1.
-1 See International Atomic EnergyAgency. Resolutions and Other
Decisions of the General Conference. Thirtv-thirdReuular Session,
25-29 September 1989 (GC(XXXII1)/RESOLUTIONS (1989) ) .
12/ Ibid., Thirtv-fourth, 17-21 September 1990
(GC (M[Iv) /RESOLUTIONS (1990)).
-13/ The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated theConference on
Disarmament as from 7 February 1984.A/49/699
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Page 32
4. Calls uvon the Disarmament Commissionto include in its assessment
relevant matters which, in the view of Member States, require such review;
5. Reauests Member States to submit to the Secretary-General their views
and suggestions on such a review no later than 30 April 1995;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to give al1 necessary assistance to the
Disarmament Commission in implementing the present resolution;
7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session
an item entitled "Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third
Disarmament Decade".
Transvarencv in armaments
The General Assembly,
Recallins its resolutions 46/36 L of 9 December 1991, 47/52 L of
15 December 1992 and 48/75 E of 16 December 1993 entitled "Transparency in
armaments" ,
Continuinq to take the view that an enhanced level of transparency in
armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among States
and that the establishment of the Register of Conventional Arma -/ constitutes
an important step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters,
Welcominq the consolidated report of the Secretary-General on the Register
of Conventional Anns, =/ which includes the returns for 1993 of Member States,
Welcominq the response of Member States to the request contained in
paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 46/36 L to provide data on their imports and
exports of arms, as well as available background information regarding their
military holdings, procurementthrough national production and relevant
policies,
Stressinq that the continuing operation of the Register and its further
development should be reviewed in order to secure a Register which is capable of
attracting the widest possible participation,
Takins note of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its agenda
item entitled "Transparency in armaments", -/
171 Resolution 46/36 L.
-
/ A/49/352 of 1 September 1994.
-9/ See Officia1 Records of the General Assemblv. Fortv-ninth Session,
Suvvlement No. 27 iA/49/27), chap. III, sect. H. A/49/699
English
Page 33
1. Reaffirms its determination to ensure the effective operation of the
Register of ConventionalArms as provided for in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of
resolution 46/36 L;
2. Takes note of the report of theSecretary-Generalon the continuing
operation of the Register and its further development =/ and the
recommendations contained therein;
3. Calls upon Member States to provide the requested dataand information
for the Register, on the basis of resolutions 46/36L and 47/52 L and the annex
and appendices to the report of the Secretary-Generalon the continuing
operation of the Register and its further development,to the Secretary-General
by 30 April annually;
4. Decides, with a view to further development of the Register, to keep
the scope of and participation in the Register under review, and, to this end:
(a) Requests Member States to provide the Secretary-Generalwith their
views on the continuing operationof the Registerand its further development
and on transparency measures relatedto weapons of mass destruction;
(b) Requests the Secretary-General,with the assistance of agroup of
governmental experts to be convened in 1997, onthe basis of equitable
geographical representation, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of
the Register and its further development,taking into account work ofthe
Conference on Disarmament, theviews expressed by Member States and the 1994
report of the Secretary-Generalon the continuing operation of the Register and
its further development, witha view to a decision at its fifty-second session;
5. Reauests the Secretary-Generalto ensure that sufficient resources are
made available for the United Nations Secretariatto operate and maintain the
Register;
6. Invites the Conference on Disamment to consider continuing its work
undertaken in the field of transparencyin armaments;
7. Reiterates its cal1 upon al1 Member States to cooperate at the
regional and subregional levels,taking fully into account the specific
conditions prevailing in the region or subregion, with a view to enhancing and
coordinating internationalefforts aimed at increased openness and transparency
in armaments;
8. Reguests the Secretary-Generalto report to the General Assembly at
its fiftieth session on progress made in implementing the present resolution;
9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session
the item entitled "Transparency in armaments".
-0/ A/49/316 of 22 September 1994A/49/699
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Page 34
Moratoriumon the export of anti-personnelland-mines
The General Assemblv,
Recallinswith satisfaction itsresolution 48/75 of 16 December 1993, by
which it, inter alia, called upon States to agree to a moratoriumon the export
of anti-personnelland-minesthat pose grave dangers to civilian populations,
and urged States to implementsuch a moratorium,
N m that there are approximately 85 million or more anti-personnel
land-minesin the ground throughout the world ant dhat many thousandsof such
mines continueto be laid in an indiscriminatemanner,
Exuressinqdeep concernthat anti-personnelland-mineskill or maim
hundreds of peopleevery week, mostly unarmedcivilians, obstructeconomic
development andreconstructionand have other severe consequences,which include
inhibiting therepatriationof refugees and the return of internallydisplaced
persons,
Welcominq the programmes of assistancewhich exist for demining and
humanitarian supportfor the victims ofanti-personnelland-mines,
~ravelv concerned with the suffering and casualtie caused to
non-combatants as aresult of the proliferation, aswell as the indiscriminate
and irresponsibleuse, of anti-personnel land-mines,
Recosnizinqthat States can move most effectively towardsthe ultimategoal
of the eventual elimination of anti-personnelland-minesas viable andhumane
alternativesare developed,
Recallins the report of the Secretary-General =/
concerning progresson the initiativein the aforementionedresolution,
Convincedthat moratoriumsby States exportinganti-personnelland-mines
that pose grave dangers to civilian populationsare importantmeasures in
helping to reduce substantiallythe human and economiccosts resulting from the
use of such devices,
Notinq with satisfactionthat many States alreadyhave declaredmoratoriums
on the export, transfer orsale of anti-personnelland-minesand related
devices,with many of these moratoriums being declared as a result of the
aforementionedresolution,
Believinq that ongoing efforts to strengthen theConventionon Prohibitions
or Restrictionson the Use of Certain ConventionalWeapons Which May Be Deemed A/49/699
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Page 35
to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, a/
particularly Protocol II, a/ are an important part ofthe overall effort to
address problems caused by anti-personnel land-mines,
Recallins with satisfaction its resolution 48/7 of 19 October 1993 calling
for assistance in mine clearance,
1. Welcomes the moratoriums already declared by certain States on the
export of anti-personnel land-mines;
2. Urses States that have not yet done so to declare such moratoriums at
the earliest possible date;
3. Recwests the Secretary-General to prepare a report on steps taken by
Member States to implement such moratoriums, and tosubmit it to the General
Assembly at its fiftieth session under the item entitled "General and complete
disarmament";
4. Em~hasizes the importance of the Conventionon Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional WeaponsWhich May Be Deemed to
Be Excessively Injuriousor to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its Protocols as
the authoritative international instrument governing the responsible use of
anti-personnel land-mines and related devices;
5. Urses States that have not done so to adhere to the Convention and its
Protocols;
6. Encouraqes further international efforts to seek solutions to the
problems caused by anti-personnel land-mines, with a view to the eventual
elimination of anti-personnel land-mines.
Steu-bv-steu reduction of the nuclear threat
The General Assembly.
Bearinq in mind the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons,
Desirinq to reduce, progressively and systematically,the threat posed by
nuclear weapons,
Welcominq the respite from the intense competition in the accumulation of
yeapon-grade fissile materials, in the production of nuclear warheads andin the
deplopent of nuclear-weapon systems which characterized the cold war,
-2/ See The United Nations Disamment Yearbook, vol. 5:1980 (United
Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.4). appendix VII.
-3/ Ibid., Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ,ofMines,
Booby Traps and Other Devices.~/49/699
English
Page 36
Mindful that processingof special fissionable material for weapon purposes
and production of nuclear warheads continues at a steady Pace in some States,
and that many thousands of nuclear-weapon systems remain deployed at the brink
of war,
Welcominq also the standing down of some nuclear-weapon systems from full
alert and the elimination of certain types of weapons,
Mindful also that the military doctrines regarding the threat of use of
nuclear weapons remain unaltered, and that most agreed reductions do not entai1
destruction of the nuclear warheads or delivery vehicles,
Welcominq further the steps taken to increase transparency in armaments and
the emerging pattern of closing or converting nuclear-weapon production
facilities,
Mindful further of the continuing lack of internationally verified
inventories of the nuclear arsenals and thatplans for the redirection of
nuclear-weapon facilitiesto the task of dismantlement of the nuclear arsenals
are only at an early state of development,
Wishinq to,further current efforts regarding multilateral negotiationsand
agreements, and consciousof the urgent need for expeditious actionfor this
purpose.
Confident that the Conference on Disarmament can serve as an effective
multilateral disarmamentnegotiating forum, as envisionedat its 1978 special
session devoted to disarmament -/ and as evidenced recently by the
successful conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, =/
Persuaded that agreement upon a five- to ten-year agenda on nuclear arms
control would provide a needed, overall sense of direction to global disarmament
efforts,
Convinced that the successful pursuit of such an agenda would significantly
advance the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals,
1. Identifies the following general areas for step-by-step reduction of
the nuclear threat:
Area A. Steps to counter, inter:
(a) The acquisition and processingof special fisaionable material
for nuclear-weapon purposes;
24/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 120.
-
25/ See s,
- (~/47/27),appendix 1.
/, A/49/699
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Page 37
(b) The manufacture andtesting of nuclear warheads and their
deliveryvehicles;
(c) The assembly and deployment on fuclear-weapon systems;
by such means as:
(i) Prohibiting thetest explosion of nuclear weapons;
(ii) Cutting off the production of special fissile material for
weapon purposes;
(iii) Ending productionof nuclear warheads;
(iv) Ending the production and testing ofintemediate- and long-range
ballistic missilesfor nuclear-weaponpurposes;
(v) Effectivelegallybinding measuresto deter the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons;
(vi) Other relatedmeasures;
Area B. Steps to actuate, inter:
(a) The withdrawal£rom deployment and disassembly of nuclear-weapon
systems;
(b) The secure storage and dismantlement of nuclear warheadsand
their deliveryvehicles;
(c) The elimination of special fissionable material for nuclear-
weapon purposes;
by such means as:
(i) Standing down nuclear-weaponsystems fromhigh-alertstatus;
(ii) Separating nuclear warheads from their delivev ryhicles;
(iii) Placing nuclear warheads in secure storage;
Liv) Converting deliveryvehicles,where appropriate, topeaceful
uses;
(v) Removing special nuclearmaterials from warheads;
(vi) Converting specialnuclear materialsto non-weaponpurposes;
(vii) Other relatedmeasures;A/49/699
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Page 38
Area C. Steps to prepare, under international auspices:
(a) An inventory of the nuclear arsenals, including:
ii) Al1 special fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their
delivery vehicles;
(ii) Al1 facilities devoted to the processing, manufacture,assembly
and deployment of those items;
(b) A reorientation of those facilities necessary to the task of
implementing measures relatingto area B;
(c) The closure or conversion to peaceful purposes of al1 other such
facilities in furtherance of measures relatingto area A;
2. Member States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to
consider steps which they might take unilaterally, bilaterally, or in
cooperation with other States,to promote progress in the identified areas, and
fully to inform the international community of any steps taken in this regard;
3. Recommendq to the Conference on Disarmament that in 1995 it:
(a) Develop £rom the three general areas identified in paragraph 1 of the
present resolution a comprehensive set of practical, verifiable measures for
possible negotiation in their next five- and ten-yearperiods;
(b) Determine from thatset a year-by-year sequence and combination of
negotiations on specific measures to be commenced during the next five- &d
ten-year periods, with due regard to steps taken pursuant to paragraph 2;
4. Resuests the Conference on Disarmament to include in its 1995 report
to the General Assembly a section on efforts undertaken in accordance with the
recommendation set out inparagraph 3;
5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session
an item entitled "Step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat".
The General Assembly,
Recallinq its resolution 2373 (XXII)of 12 June 1968, the annex to which
contains the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Notins the provisions of article X, paragraph 2, of that Treaty, which
stipulates the holding of a conference twenty-£ive years after the entry into
force of the Treaty, to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force
indefinitely orshall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods, A/49/699
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Page 39
Desirous of ensuring the consolidation ofthe Treaty with a view to
achieving ultimately the elimination of nuclew arapons,
of the needfor the Treaty to attainuniversalityof membership,
Convinced thatthe decision on the extension of theTreaty should lead to
further progressin nuclear disarmament,in accordancewith the preamble and
article VI of the Treaty,
Notinq, therefore,the necessityof giving careful consideration to al1
possible options in order to take a decision that is appropriate and capable of
strengthening thenon-proliferation regimein the pursuit of the ultimate
objective of the elimination on fuclear weapons,
Consciousof the factthat there are various interpretationswhich have
been expressedconcerning the application of article X,paragraph 2,of the
Treaty,
1. Calls upon Statesparties to the Treatyon the Non-Proliferationof
Nuclear Weaponsto give appropriateconsiderationto the import of the Treatyin
its entirety and with special attentionto its article X, paragraph 2;
2. Invites Statesparties to provide their legal interpretations of
article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and their views onthe differentoptions
and actions available, forcompilationby the Secretary-General asa background
document ofthe 1995 Review and Extension Conferenc oef States Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof NuclearWeapons, well beforethe holding of
that Conference.
Assistanceto States for curbinq the illicit
traffic in small arms andcollectinqthem
The General Assembly,
Recallinq its resolutions 46/36H of 6 December 1991, 47/52G and 47/52 J
of 9 December 1992 and 48/75 A and 48/75 J of 16 Decemher 1993,
Çonsiderinqthat the circulationof massive quantitiesof small arms
throughout the worldirnpedes development and is a source of increased
insecurity,
Considerinqalso that the illicit international transfer of smal arma and
their accumulationin many countries constitutes a threat to the populations and
to national andregional security and is a factor contributin tgo the
destabilization ofStates,
Basinq itself on the statement ofthe Secretary-Generalrelatingto the
request of Mali concerning United Nations assistanc for the collectionof small
arms,A/49/699
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Page 40
Gravely concernedat the extent of the insecurityand banditry linked to
the illicit circulationof small anns in Mali and the other affectedStates of
the Saharo-Saheliansubregion,
Takinq note of the first conclusionsof the United NationsAdvisory Mission
sent to Mali by the Secretary-General to study thebest way of curbingthe
illicit circulationof small arms andensuring their collection,
Takinq note alsoof the interest shown by other Statesof the subregion in
receiving the United Nations AdvisoryMission,
Notinq the actions taken and those recormnended at the meetingsof the
States of the subregionheld at Banjul,Algiers and Bamako to establish close
regional cooperationwith a view to strengtheningsecurity,
1. Welcomes the initiativetaken by Mali concerningthe questionof the
illicit circulation ofsmall anns and their collectionin the affected Statesof
the Saharo-Saheliansubregion;
2. Also welcomes the action taken by the Secretary-Generalin
implementation of this initiative;
3. Thanks the Governmentof Mali for the appreciablehelp which it has
given to the United NationsAdvisory Mission and welcomes the declared readiness
of other Statesof the subregionto receive the Mission;
4. Conqratulates the Secretary-Generao ln his action within the context
of the relevant provisionsof resolution40/151 H of 16 December 1985, and
encourageshim to continuehis efforts to curb the illicit circulationof small
anns and to ensure their collectionin the affectedStates which so request,
with the supportof the United Nations Centre for Peace and Disarmamen in
Africa and in close cooperationwith the Organizationof African Unity;
5. Invites Member States to implement nationalcontrol measures in order
to check the illicit circulationof small arms, in particularby curbing the
illegal export of such anns;
6. Also invitesthe internationalcommunityto give appropriatesupport
to the efforts made by the affectedcountriesto suppress the illicit
circulation ofsmall anns, whic'his likely to hampes their development;
7. Reauesta the Secretary-Generalto report to it on the questionat its
fiftieth session. A/49/699
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Page 41
elimination of nuclear weaDons
The General Assembiy,
pecosnizinq that the end of the cold war has increased the possibility of
creating a world free from the fear of nuclear war,
Welcominq the efforts of the Russian Pederation and the United Statesof
America for nuclear disarmament and the conclusion of the two treaties on the
reduction and limitation of strategicoffensive arms (START 1 and START II), and
looking forward to their early entry into force,
Welcominu also the efforts ofother nuclear-weapon Statesin the field of
nuclear disannament,
pttachin m qreat imortance to the contribution which theTreaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has made to the peace and securityof the
world since its entry into force in 1970,
Welcominq the positive developmentsin the negotiations for a comprehensive
nuclear-test-ban treaty based on the consensus achievedat the forty-eighth
session of the General Aesembly.
1. Urqes States not parties to the Treatyon the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons to accede toit at the earliest possible date,recognizing the
importance of the universality of the Treaty;
2. Calls uuon the nuclear-weapon States to pursue their efforts for
nuclear disannament with the ultimate objective of the eliminationof nuclear
weapons in the framework of generaland complete disarmament, and alsocalls
upon al1 States to fully implement their commitmentsin the field of disarmament
and non-proliferationof weapons of mass destruction.
Convenins of the fourth suecial session of the
The ~eneral Assembly,
Recallinq that three special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament were heldin 1978, 1982 and 1988, respectively,
Bearinq in rnindthe Final Document of the Tenth Special session of the
General Aesembly, -/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, andA/49/699
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Page 42
the final objective of general and complete disarmament under effective
international control,
Welcominq the recent positive changes in the international landscape,
characterized by the end of the cold war, the relaxation of tensions at the
global leveland the emergence of a new spirit governing relations among
nations,
Stressinq the central roleof the United Nations for the promotionof
disarmament, peace and security,
1. Decides, in principle, to convene, in 1997 if possible, the fourth
special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the date to be
detennined at the fiftieth session;
2. Decides to include in the provisional agendaof its fiftieth session
an item entitled "Fourth special session of the General Assembly devotedto
disarmament" .
Relationshi~ between disarmament and develovment
The General Assemblv,
Recallinq the provisions of the Final Document of'the Tenth Special Session
of the General Assembly -/ concerning the relationship between disannament
and development,
Recallinq also the adoptionon 11 September 1987 of the Final Document of
the International Conferenceon the Relationship between Disarmament and
Development, -/
Recallinq further its resolution 48/75 A of 16 December 1993,
Bearinq in mind the final documents of the Tenth Conference of Heads of
State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to
6 September 1992, a/
Stressinq the growing importanceof the symbiotic relationship between
disarmament and development in current international relations,
27/ Ibid.
-
28/ United Nations publication, SalesNo. E.87.IX.8.
-
-9/ A/47/675-S/24816, annex. A/49/699
Snglish
Page 43
1. Welcomes th8 report of theSecretary-General 30/ and actions
undertaken in accordance with the Final Document of the International Conference
on the Relationship between Disarmamentand Development;
2. Reauests the Secretary-General to continue to takeaction, through
appropriate organs and withinavailable resources, for the implementation ofthe
action programme adopted atthe International Conference; a/
3. Also reauests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General
hsembly at its fiftieth session;
4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session
the item entitled "Relationship between disarmamena tnd development".
Reauest for an advisorv opinion from the International Courtof
Justice on the lesalitv of the threat or use of nuclear weapons
The General Assembly,
Conscious that the continuing existenceand development of nuclear weapons
pose serious risks to humanity,
Mindful that States have an obligation under the Charter of the United
Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force againstthe territorial
integrity or political independenceof any State,
Recallinq its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of
14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 Deceaber 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980,
36/92 1 of 9 December 1981, 45/59 B of 4 December 1990 and 46/37 D of
6 December 1991, in which it declared that the use of nuclear weapons wouldbe a
violation of the Charter and a crime against humanity,
Welcominq the progress made on the prohibition and elimination of weapons
of mass destruction, including the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological(Biological)and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destniction -/ and the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling andUse of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction, =/
a/ United Nations publication, SalesNo. E.87.IX.8, para. 35.
32/ Resolution 2826 (XXVI)
-3/ See s,
Sup~lement No. 27 (A/47/27),appendix 1.A/49/699
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Page 44
Convinced that the complete eliminationof nuclear weapons is the only
guarantee against the threat of nuclear war,
Notins the concerns expressedin the Fourth Review Conference of the
'
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that
insufficient progress had been made towards thecomplete elimination of nuclear
weapons at the earliest possible time,
Recallinq that the General Assembly, convincedof the need to strengthen
the rule of law in international relations, has declared the period 1990-1999
the United Nations Decade of International Law, %/
Notinq that Article 96,paragraph 1, of the Charter empowers the General
Assembly to request the International Courtof Justice to give an advisory
opinion on any legal question,
Recallinq the recommendation of the Secretary-General, made in his report
entitled "An Agenda for Peace", %/ that United Nations organs that are
authorized to take advantage of the advisory competence of the International
Court of Justice turn to the Court more frequently for such opinions,
Welcominq resolution 46/40 of 14 May 1993 of the Assembly of the World
Health Organization, in which the organization requested the International Court
of Justice to give an advisory opinion on whether the use of nuclear weapons by
a State in war or other armed conflict wouldbe a breach of its obligations
under international law, including the Constitution of the World Health
Organization,
Decides, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United
Nations, to request the International Courtof Justice urgently to render ita
advisory opinion on the following question: "1s the threat or use of nuclear
weapons in any circumstancepermitted under international law?".
Bilateral nuclear-arms neqotiationsand nuclear disarmament
The ~enerai Assembly,
Recallinq its previous relevant resolutions,
Recoqnizinq the fundamental changes that have taken place with respect to
international security, which have permittedagreements on deep reductions in
the nuclear armaments of the States possessing the largest inventories ofsuch
weapons,
-4/ Resolution 44/23.
-5/ A/47/277-S/24111. A/49/699
English
Page 45
Mindful that it is the responsibility and obligation of al1 States to
contribute to the process of the relaxation of international tension and to the
strengthening of international peace and security,
Stressinq the importance of strengthening international peace and security
through disarmament,
hlahasizinq that nuclear disarmament remains one of the principal tasks of
our times,
Stressinq that it is the responsibility of al1 States to adopt and
implement measures towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament
under effective international control,
A~~reciatinq a number of positive developments in the field of nuclear
disarmament, in particular the treaty between the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the united States of America on the elimination of their
intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, o/ and the treaties on the
reduction and limitation of strategic offensive am,
Notinq that there are still significant nuclear arsenals and that the
primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, with the objectiveof the
elimination of nuclear weapons, rests with the nuclear-weapon States, in
particular those which possess the largest stockpiles,
Welcominq the steps that have already been taken by those States to begin
the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons and removing such weapons
£rom a deployed statue, and bilateral agreements on the issue of de-targeting
strategic nuclear missiles,
Notinq the new clirnateof relations between the United States of America
and the States of the former Soviet Union, whic'hpermits them to intensify their
cooperative efforts to ensure the safety, security and environmentally sound
destruction of nuclear weapons,
Notinq also that the Rusaian Federation and the United States of America
concurred that, once the Treaty between them on the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Anns was ratified, they would proceed to
deactivate al1 strategic delivery systeme to be reduced under the Treaty by
removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from alert
statua,
Notins .furtherthe agreement between the Russian Federation and the United
States of America to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches
and to develop concrete ateps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices and both
sides to the changed international security situation, including the
possibility, after ratification of the Treaty on the Further Reduction and
X/ See A/47/965-S/25944; see Officia1 Records of the Securitv Council,
Fortv-eishth Year. SuD~lement for Avril, Mav and June 1993, document S/25944.A/49/699
English
Page 46
Limitation of Strategic OffensiveArms, of further reduction of and limitations
on remaining nuclearforces,
Urqinq the further intensificationof such efforts to accelerate the
implementation of agreements and unilateral decision relating to nuclear-arma
reduction,
Welcominq the reductionsmaae by other nuclear-weapon Statesin some of
their nuclear-weaponprogrammes, and encouragingal1 nuclear-weaponStates to
consider appropriate measures relating to nuclear disarmament,
Affirminq that bilateraland multilateral negotiationson nuclear
disarmament should facilitateand complement eachother,
1. Welcomes the actionstaken towards the ratificationof the Treaty on
the Reduction and Limitation of StrategicOffensive Arms signed in Moscow on
31 July 1991 by the former Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics and the United
States of America and the protocol to that Treaty signedat Lisbon on
23 May 1992 by the four parties-thereto,and urges the parties to take the
necessary stepsto ensure its entry into forceat the earliestpossible date;
2. . Also welcomes the signing of the Treaty between theRussian Federation
and the United Statesof America on thePurther Reduction and Limitationof
Strategic Offensive Arms in Moscow on 3 January 1993, and urges the parties to
take the steps necessary to bring that Treaty into force at the earliest
possible date;
3. ' Bmressea at the continuing implementationof the
treaty on the eliminationof intermediate-rangeand shorter-rangemissiles, =/
in particular at the completionby the parties of the destructionof al1 their
declared missiles subjectto eliminationunaer the Treaty;
4. Encouraues the United Statesof America, the Russian Federation,
Belanis, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to continue their cooperative efforts aimed at
eliminating nuclear weaponsand etrategic offensivearms on the basis of
existing agreements,and welcomes the contributionsthat other Statesare making
to such cooperationas well;
S. Also encouraues andsumorts the Russian Federationand the United
States of America in their efforts to reduce their nuclear armaments and to
continue to give those efforts thehighest priority in order to contribute to
the objectiveof the eliminationof nuclear weapons;
6. Invites the Russian Federation and the United States of America to
keep other StatesMembers of the United Nationsduly informedof progress in
their discussions and in the implementationof their strategic offensive arms
agreements and unilateral decisions. A/49/699
English
Page 47
Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use
of conventional arms
, ,
The General Aesembly,
Recallinq its resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991 and its decision 47/419
of 9 December 1992 on international armstransfers. . .
Recallins also its resoïutions 48/75 P and 48/75 H of 16 Deceder 1993 on
internationalarms transfers and measuresto curb the illicit transfer and use
of conventionalweapons. respectively,
Realizinq the urgentneed to resolve conflicts and to diminishtensions and
accelerate effortstowardsgeneral and completedisannamentwith a view to
maintaining regional and internationalpeace and security,
Recwnizinq that the availabilityof massive quantitiesof conventional
weapons and especially theirillicit transfer.often associatedwith
destabilizingactivities, aremost disturbing and dangerous phenomena,
particularly for theinterna1 situation of affected Statesand theviolation of
human rights,
,.
Stressinq the need for effective national control' meastireson the transfer
of conventionalweapons.
Recwnizinq the curbingof the illicit transfer of arma as,an important
contributionto the relaxationof tension and peaceful reconciliationgrocesses,
Convinced that peace and security are inextricablyinterlinkedwith and in
some cases imperativefor economic development andreconstruction,
1. Invites the Disarmament Commission to:
Expedite its considerationof the agenda item on international arms
(a)
transfers, with specialemphasis on the adverse consequencesof the illicit
transfer of arms and ammunition;
(b) Study measuree to curb the illicit transfer and useof conventional
arms ;
2. Invites Member Statesto provide the Secretary-Generalwith relevant
informationon national control measures on arms transfers with a view to
preventing illicitarms transfers, and,in this context, to take immediate,
appropriateand effective measuresto seek to ensure that illicit transfers of
arma are discontinued;
3. Reauests the Secretary-Generalto:
(a) Seek the views of Member States on effective ways and means of
collecting weaponsillicitly transferred in interested countries, as well as onA/49/699
English
Page 50'
in the post-cold-war era arise mainly among States located in the same region or
subregion,
that the preservation of a balance in the defence capabilitiesof
States at the lowest level of armaments wouldcontribute to peace and stability
and should be-a prime objective of conventional armecontrol,
of promoting agreements to strengthen regional peace and security
at the lowest possible level of armamente and militàry forces,
Believinq thatmilitarily significant States, and States with larger
military capabilities, have a special responsibility in promoting such
agreements for regional security.
Believinq also that one of the principal objectives of conventional arma
control should be to prevent the possibility of militaryattack launched by
surprise,
1. Decides to give urgent considerationto the issues involved in
conventional arms controlat the regional and subregional levels;
2. Reauests the Conference on Disannament, as a firststep, to consider
the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional
agreements on conventional arms control, and looks fomard to a report of the
Conference on this subject;
3. Decidesto include in the provisional agenda of itsfiftieth session
the item entitled "Conventionalarma control at the regional and subregional
levels".
The ~eneral Assembly,
Recallinq its previous relevant resolutions,
Recwnizinq the fundamental changes that have taken place with respect to
international security, whichhave permitted agreements on deep reductions in
the nuclear annaments of the States possessing the largest inventories of such
weapons,
Mindful that it is the responsibility and obligation of al1 States to
contribute to the process of the relaxation of international tension and to the
etrengthening of international peace and security,
Stressinq the importance of strengthening internationap leace and security
through disannament,
Emhasizinq that nuclear disarmament remains one of the principal tasks of
our times, A/49/699
English
Page 51
streèsinq that it is the responsibility ofal1 States to adopt and
implement measures towards the attainment ofgeneral and complete disannament
under effective internationalcontrol,
A~~reciatinq a number of positive developmentsin the field of nuclear
disarmament, in particular the Treaty between the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the United States of America on.the Elimination of
Intermediate-Rangeand Shorter-Range Missiles %/ and the treaties on the
reduction and limitationof strategic offensive arme,
Notinq that there are still significant nucleararsenals and that the
primary responsibility for nucleardisarmament, withthe objective of the
elimination of nuclear weapons, restswith the nuclear-weapon States, in
particular those which possess the largest stockpiles,
Welcominq the steps that have already been taken by those States to begin
the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons and removing such weapons
from a deployed status, and bilateral agreements on the issue of de-targeting
strategic nuclear missiles,
Notinq the new climate of relations between the United States of America
and the States of the former Soviet Union, which permitsthem to intensify their
cooperative efforts to ensure the safety, security and environmentally sound
destruction of nuclear weapons,
Notins also that the Russian Federation and the United States of America
concurred that, once the Treaty between themon the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic OffensiveArms was ratified, they would proceed to
deactivate al1 strategic delivery systems to be reduced under the Treaty by
removing theirnuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them £rom alert
statue,
Notinq further the agreement between the Russian Federation and the United
States of America to intensify theirdialogue to compare conceptual approaches
and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both
sides to the changed international security situation, includingthe
possibility, after ratificationof the Treaty on the Further Reduction and
Limitation of strategic Offensive Anns, of further reductions of and limitations
on remaining nuclear forces,
Vrsins the further intensificationof such efforts to accelerate the
implementation of agreements and unilateral decisions relating to nuclear-arms
reduction,
Welcominq the reduction made by other nuclear-weapon Statesin some of
their nuclear-weaponprogrammes, and encouragingal1 nuclear-weapon Statesto
consider appropriate measures relatingto nuclear disarmament,
=/ The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol.12: 1987 (United
Nations publication, SalesNo. E.88.IX.2), appendix VII.A/49/699
English
Page 52
Affirminq that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear
disarmament should facilitateand complement each other,
1. Welcomes the actions taken towards the ratification of the Treaty
between the former union of Soviet Socialist Republice,and the United States of
America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in
Moscow on 31 July 1991, and the protocol to that Treaty signed at Lisbon on
23 May 1992 by the parties thereto, inter alia, the trilateral statement by the
Presidents of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America
signed on 14 January 1994, a/ and urges the parties to take the necessary
steps to ensure the Treaty's entry into force at the earliest possible date;
2. Also welcomes the signing of the Treaty between the Government of the
Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America on the
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in Moscow on
3 January 1993, and urges the parties to take the steps necessary to bring that
Treaty into force by the earliest possible date;
3. Emresses its satisfaction at the continuing implementationof the
Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Rangeand Shorter-Range Missiles, a/
in particular at the completion by the parties of the destruction of al1 their
declared missiles subject to elimination under the Treaty;
4. ~ncouricresthe United States of America, the Russian Federation,
Beiarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to continue their cooperativeefforts aimed at
eliminating nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms on the basis of
existing agreements, and welcomes the contributions that other States are making
to such cooperation as well;
5. Welcomes the accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons =/ of Belarus and Kazakhstan as non-nuclear-weapon States
and would welcome similar action on the part of Ukraine;
6. Encourases the Russian Federation and the United States
of America in their efforts to reduce their nuclear armamente and to continue to
give those efforts the highest priority in order to contribute to the objective
of the elimination of nuclear weapons;
7. Invites the Russian Federation and the United States of America to
keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in
their discussions and in the implementation of their strategic offensive arma
agreements and unilateral decisions.
61. The First Committee ale0 recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of
the following draft decision:
-0/ ~/49/66-s/1994/91,annex.
-1/ Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex. A/49/699
English
Page 53
5 4
of vehicles for their delivew in al1 its asoects
The General Assembly, recalling its resolution 48/75 C of 16 December 1993,
decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth sessionthe item
entitled "Non-proliferationof weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for
their delivery in al1 its aspectsn. 12
United Nations ~149r~v.90
- mcial Records
1 Forty-ninthSession
Thursday. 15 ~ecember 1994.3 p.m.
New York
President: Mr. Essy .. . .. . . .. .. ... ... . . .. ... (Cate d'Ivoire)
Themeeting wac called to ordeai3.25p.m. articlesand II of the Trcaty.otber relevantarticlesand
witbthe objectand purposesof the Treary.
Agenda item 14 fcontinued)
By includingthe eleventhpmmbular paragrapbin
Report of the international Atomic Energy Agency the tex1of the draft resolutionbefore us. the sponsors
intendedto emphasii the meehanismfor consideration
Draft resolution: AI49L.2IRev.2 of the enlargementof the Board of Governors of the
~g'ency.
Amenàments: ~149n.i~m~.l and ~149n.22
The sponsors arc wnvinced that with these
ThePresident (intnprnofionfrom French):Members ammdmc111iS hewncems of wmcdelegationshavebaen
will recall that the debate on this item was concludedon adequatelyaddressedln thesame way.by insening 'and
Monday. 17October. otherrelevantintemationallylegallybiidiig agreements"
in the fourthand firth lia of the third preambular
1 cal1on the repnsentative ofTurkey to inûuduce paragraph. the sponsoraccommodate he concm of
draft resolutionAi49lL.21Rev.2. some countries thatan parties to regional treaties
c&g nuclear-weapon-fm mues - that is to Say,the
Mr. Guven (nirkey): After lengthydiscussions the Tmty of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga. to which IAEA
sponsors of draft resolution Al491L.2 have ttied to
safeguardsapply.
accommodatetbe concems of somedelegations.We have
introduceda new paragraph in the preambular pan and It is the wish of the sponsors that the draft
extendedthe mpe of someof the existingparagraphs.In resolutionbe adoptedhy wnsaisus.
thiscontext1wouldlikeespeciallyto refer to thethii and
eleventhpreambular paragraphsof the draft resolutionas The Pmldent (interpretaiionfrom French): Ical1
now containedin documentAi49L.2/Rev.2. nexton the repnsentativeof Iraq, to introduceproposed
amendments to draft molution A/49/L.2/Rev.2.
In the preambular paragraph we have added new conrainedin documentAi491L.22.
languageto underlinethenght of thosecounirietha tave
concluded relevant safeguards agreements with the Mr. Hasan (Iraq) (interprcfan'onfrom Arobic):
InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 10 develop Before introducing the pmposed amendmentsto draft
research,productionanduseofnuclearenergyfor peaceful resolution Ai49lL.21Rev.2. contained in document
purposes without discriminationand in wnformity with Ai49L.22. my delegation wishes to express its great
QA5767L IF1 -. 'Thisrecordcontabuorigil rt ofrpccchesdelivcrcdindngintcrprratisfspeeches
delivemintheotherluigiuges. Comtions shouldk wibIOoriginalspcches oniy. Thcy
- ~ - shodd beinwipomicdinawpy of themrdMd k senider sigraninoimcmkr of the
delegationwncemed. wühu onenwNofthedm ofLc m&g. IOtheChiefof theVerbah
RcponingSection.Rwm C-178. Comtions will k issucdaftcr iheend of the auion in
conrolidarcomigcndum.Whentherrailtof a mrded andlormllczll voteis folanwcdby
asicriswt mex IOthemrd. ..GeneralAssembly 90thmeeting
Fortv-ninthsession 15 Decemher1994
appreciationfortheleof thelntektional AtomicEnergy .implementation of the relevanSecurityCouncil
Agency(iAEA) in the quest for a world ftee of nuclear resolutions.(A/49L.2/Rev.Z,para. 7)
weapons and for widespread peaceful use of nuclear
energy. Procdig from this understandimg of the Thiswordiingdoes not reflectthe facts. Thereport
Agency'srole. my wunuy has smngly opposedattempts of the Dior General to the Securit Council.
at politicizingthe IAEA and using it as wver for actionsransmittedon 10October 1994,Statesthat
tha servethe politicalintetestsof ththaoSttate.
"The ensuing series of high-level technical talks
In documentAl49lL.22, mydelegationproposestwo markeda huning-point in the level of cooperation
amendmentsto draf resolutionAl49lL.21Rev.2.The fmt and support extended by the Iraqi authorities to
relatesto theeighthpreambuiarparagraph,whichc~mntly IAEAandthe SpecialCommission. Thischangein
readsas follows: the Iraqiattitudehasenabledinspectors'workto be
wnducted effecîively and has wntributed
Spokein English. significantlytoexpeditkg theprocessofestablishing
ongoingmonitoringandverification,ascalledforin
"Noting hm the Director General'sstatement thé aty ~ouncil resolution."(S/1994/1151.
that theAgencyis now in a positionto implementits anna, para. 4)
ongoing monitoringand verificationplan iIraq".
(A/49L.ZDZev.Z,eighthpreambuhr para.) in the light of this cleax statement about lraqi
cooperation.ou delegationsuggestsreplacingthewords
That paragraph is intentionally vague. To which 'the need for Iraq to wbperate fully" with the words
suement of the DirectorGeneraidoesthe paragraphrefer, 'the need for Iraq to continue its cooperation"
and when was it made?Fuibermore, the word 'now" in (A/49L.22. para. 2).
this paragraph isso intentionailyambipous. The fact is
tha tteDitor Generalstatedin paragraph49ofhis sixth Spokein Arabic.
report to thSefuri touncil. ~ansmittedto the Couricil
on 10October 1994. that Theseamendmentsdo not reflectIraq'sviews;they
reflect those of the IAEA. They make the text less
'with the establishmentat the end ofust of the ambipous andmorerealistic.Wethereforehope thatal1
iAEAwntinuous presencein Iraq.al1elementsof the delegations will view our proposed amendments
IAEA Plan arenow in place". (S/1994/115anna, favoutably.
para. 49)
The Resident (interpretariofrom French): The
Thus. my delegation proposesreplacing the eighth Assembly will now tale action on draft resolution
preamhularparagraphwith thefollowingfactualparagraph: Al49L.2/Rev.2 and on the amendmentsproposad in
document Al49lL.22.
'Noting hm thereportof the Diwtor General
to the Securit Council dated 6 October 1994 The following wuntries have becomesponsorsof
[(S11994/1151, annex)] that al1 elements of the drafiresolution Af491L.21Rev.2:Lithuania and South
Agency'songoing monitoringplansinüaq havebeen Africa.
in placesincethe endof August 1994". (A/49&.22,
para. 1) Beforecallig on the first speakerin explanationof
vote hefore the vote. 1 would reminddelegationsthat
This amendment represenia just and fair reference explanationsof votare limiteIO 10 minutesand that
to the DirectorGeneral's report: delegationsshouldmaketheirstatementsfromtheirseats.
ïhe second amendmentwe arepmposing relates to Mr.Pak (DemocraticPeople's Republicof Korea):
the end ofoperativeparagraph7 of thedraf resolution, The delegationof the DemocraticPeople's Republicof
which nimntly reads as follows: Koreabelievesthat theareno legalgroundswhatsoever
for the inclusionof serious political issuessuch as the
'...siressesthe needfoIraqto cooperateMly with nuclear issue draf resolutionAI49fL.2iRev.2on the
the Agencyin achiwing the wmplete and long-tenu report ofthe InternationalAtomic Energy Agency, anGeneralAssembly 90th meeting
Forty-ninthsession 15 December1994
agency that specialii in science and technology. We If the United Nations, whichha. an obligationto
thereforereiterateour stmng demandfor theunconditional helpto senire negotiatedsettlementsto disputes. ignores
deletionof those paragraphsrelatingto the nuclear issue. thisagreed framework and adopts a draft resolution
whose purpose is to put pressun on a party to the
TheDemocraticPeople's RepublicofKoreahas stated dialogue. it will only impedethe implementationof that
its position time and again: that the nuclear issue onthe agreed framework.Thiswill amountto wanton violation
Korean peninsula should be resolved bilateraily by the of the purposes and principles of the United Nations
Democratic People'sRepublic of Korea and the United Charterand ofinternationallaw and practice.
States. Paitidarly, it ha. long opposedwnsideration of
the nuclear issueby the GeneralAssemblyor the Security If thc sponsors of the draftresolution wanta fair
Council, and has categorically rejected al1unreasonable solutiontothe nuclear issueon the Korean peninsulhey
resolutionsregardingthis issue. will not hlock but. rather, will facilitateimplementation
of the framework agreed between the Democratic
Previous consideration of the nuclear issueon the People's Republicof Koreaand the United States.
Korean peninsulaal the UnitedNationspmved to beof no
help to the resolution ofthe issue. Rather. it was misused For those reasonsthe delegationof the Democratic
hy insidiouselements intheu anemptstoblockanegotiated People's Republicof Korea will vote against the ninth
solution to the nuclear issue, with the sole intention of preambular paragraphandparagraph6of draft resolution
increasingpressureuponus andaggravatingtensionsonthe A/49/L.2iRev.2. which was introducedby Turkey.
Koreanpcninsulato the extreme.
Mr. Kumar (India): India has been a member of
Ail these facts have clearly shown that the nuclear the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since
issueonthe Kom peninsulacanberesolvedonlythrough the inceptionof that body in 1957. Wehavewnsistently
the talks between the Democratic People's Republicof attached thehighest importanceto the objectivesof the
Koreaand the UnitedStatesof America.not atthe United IAEA. and we are active participants in its activities.
Nations. It is well known that the delegations of the Sincethis drafi resolutionconcerns the activitiesof the
Democratic People'sRepublic of Korea and the United IAEA asa whole - somethiig to whichwe attachgreat
States. at the Geneva talks held from 23 September to value- we are inclinedto go dong with it. However,
21 October 1994, Mmed the DPRK-USA joint wehave considerabledifftcultywith thethid preambular
statement of ll lune 1993 and signed the agreed paragraph.
frameworkon the final resolutionof the nuclear issue.
The draft resolution onthe IAEA is a traditional
It is legally stipulated in the framework agned one. Thelanguageof the third preambularparagraphof
between the Democratic People'sRepublicof Koreaand draft resolutionAl491L.2iRev.2 impliesa link between
the United States that the nuclear issue on the Korean adherence to the Treaty'on the Non-holiferation of
Peninsulais one to be resolved between the Democratic Nuclear Weapons (NP') and freedom to develop
People'sRepublicof Koreaand the United Statesand that research, production and use of nuclear energy for
those two couutriesare responsiblefor it. peaeefulpurposes. In this regarditis pertinentto point
out that ArticleII of the IAEA'sstanite. referringto the
The DemocraticPeople's Republicof Korea and the Agency'sobjectives,Statesexplicitlythat it
United States are holdiig expert-level talks on
implementationof the agreed framework, having already "shallseekto accelerateandenlargethecontribution
taken some measures to implement what is envisaged
of atomic energyto peace. health and pmsperiiy
therein. thmughoutthe world".
There is nojustification whatsoeverfor the adoption Article 11wntinues:
of a draft resolution aimed at puning pressure on the
Democratic People'sRepublicofKoreaat a timewhenthe 'It shall ensure, so far as it is able. that assistance
Democratic People'sRepublic of Korea and the United provided by it or at its request or under its
Statesare undenakingpracticalmeasuresto implementthe supervisionor control is notused insuch a way as
a'greedframework. to further any militarypurposes."
8* !, ;.,.:,,.S'.,,,:...:!.7,;General Assembly 90th meeting
Fom-ninth session 15 December1994
Thepurposeof articleII oftheIAEA'sStaNteisobviously 1dl ontherepnsentativeofGermany,whowishes
to encourageaccess to peacefuluses of nuclear energy, to raisea pointof order.
withoutanydiscriminationwhatsoever.
MI. Rudolph (Germany):1should like, on behalf
By implyingthat adherenceto the non-pmliferation of theuropeanUnionanditsacccdingStates - Ausuia.
Treaty - a maner on whichmy Government'sviews are Fiand and Sweden - and the other sponsorsof draft
wcllknown - has a bearingon accessto peaceful usesof resolutionN491L.2iRev.2, to raise a point of order in
nuclearenergy, thedraitresolutiongws beyondthe scope co~ection with the amendment contained in document
of the iAEA statute. Weare thereforeconstrainedto cal1 Ai49lL.lSiRev.1, which wassubmittedby the Islamic
for a vote on the third preambularparagraph. Republicof Iran.
MI. Leahy (United Statesof America): It is the On behalfof the EumpeanUnion and its acceding
positionof my delegationthat the amendmentsthat have Statesandthe othersponsors,1fomiailymove.underthe
beensubmittedindocument Ai49lL.22arenot accurateA. terms of de 74 of the General Assembly'sniles of
rcview of the entire report hm which they are &am procedure.that no actiobe takenon that amenciment.
reveals.instancesinwhichthe International AtomEncrgy
Agency(IAEA)determinedthat Iraqi officiaieither had 1should alsolie to requesta recordedvote.
been less than fonhcoming or had attemptedto conceal
faets. The amendment contained in document
A/49/L.15iRev.1 raisesan issue that is not relevantto
The United States applauds the diligence and the GeneralAssembly'sanaualresolutionon the report
determinationof the IAEA inits pursuit of facts in Iraq. of the International AtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA).The
but we camot supportamendmentsto this dra fesolution newoperativeparagraphpmposed intheamendment goes
that, takenoutofthecontextin which theywereoriginally beyondIAEA issuesto the question ofexpori licensing,
presented, distort the degr& of Iraqi woperation with for which the iAEA has no mandate. Export lieensing
IAEAipspecton. arrangementsderivehom obligationsunderanicles 1.II
andIIIof theTreatyon the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear
In our view, the languageregardiig Iraq is seriouslyWcapons.They are notwithii the pwiew of the IAEA
deficient. 1twould be faxmore appropriatefor this draft and arenot relevanIO thisrirafiresolution.
resolutionIOcal1upontheGovernent of Lraqto 'improve
its cooperation"witb internationalinspectors. 'Ibe language of the proposed amendment
emphuizestherightsof recipientStateswithoutreference
The President (inierpretaiioRom French):The to the supplier States'comspondiig duty to ascenain
Assembly will now take action on drah resolution whetherthe potentialrecipientStateis adheringto non-
Ai49L.2iRev.2 and on the amendments containedin prolifcrationobligations.Theproposedamendment sbeh
documentsAi49L. 15iRev.l and N49lL.22. tounderminethebmad internationalrecognitioanmrded
to the work of the IAEA each year by the Gtneral
Inaccordancewith de 90 of the niles of proecdure. Assembly. This serves neither the IAEA nor the
the amendmentswill be voted on first. Rule 90 also internationacommunity. whose secwity interests are
stipulates: well served hugh the IAEA'ssafeguvds system. We
should also lie to highlight the significant work
"When two or more amendments aremoved to a perfomed by theiAEA in the frameworkof itstechnical
proposal.theCeneral Assemblyshallfirstvoteonthe cooperationprogrammeto pmmote the peacefulusesof
amendment furthest removedin substancefrom the nuclear energy.
originalproposai and then on the amendmentnext
funhest removed therefrom. and so on until al1the Suchhighly divisive languageas that wntained in
amendments havebeenput to the vote." N49lL. 15iRev.1, far frombeiig helpfulin this regard,
would severelyjeopardizetheIAEA'sroleineffectuating
The Assemblywill therefore takea decisionfirston the uansfer of nuclcartechniquesfor peaccfulpurposes.
the amendmentcirculatedin documentAi49lL.l5IRev.1. in this conneaion. we shouldlike to emphasizethat the
sponson have made every effort to accommodate
.-.-i.:.. .. ,ûeneral Assembly 90th meeting
Forty-ninthsession 15Dccember1994
wncems about this point in thetext ofthedralt resolution. introducesa divisivepoliticai element into a resolution
which shodd be seen as a consensus expressionof
At a time when the central element of the nuclear suppon for the IAEA.
non-proliferationregimeisheiig askedbytheinternational
wmmunity to penorm new and expandingtasks,it would The proposed amendment in document
be partimlarly unforninate if the GeneralAssembly were AI49lL.15lRev.1 seeksto assert a right of westricted
not to adopt the annual IAEA dralt resolution with the aeccssto nuclearequipment,materialsandscientificand
customarysupport. We therefore hope that the pmposed technologicai information. While it refers to the
amendmentwntained in doniment A!49lL.l5lRev.l will Non-ProliferationTreaty. theamendmentdoes not take
be njected. into accountthe specificprovisions of theTreaty. This
omissionspeaksvolumes.
The F'resident(inierprelmionfrom French):Wiihin
the terms of de'74 of the mles of procedure, the Let usrememberthat anicle 1of the Tmty obliges
representativeof Germanyhas proposed thatno action be nuclear-weapon States to ensure that any nuclear
taken on the amendment wntaincd in doniment technologythcyprovideis notuseddinctly or indirectly
Al49lL.15lRev.1. Rule 74 Mds as follows: for prolifcration purposes. Sccondly. article II obliges
non-nuclear-weapon States not to manufachue or
'During the discussion of any matter, a otherwiseacquin nuclearweapons.And, thirdly, article
representative may move the adjoununent of the III obligesrecipientStatesto a~ceptIAEA safeguards.
debateon the itemunderdiscussion.Inadditionto the Thisanicle explicitlyrejectsanysuggestionthattradcin
proposer of the motion. two representatives may nuclear technology can be ~uicted. So. 100, does
speakin favourof. and twoagaiast. the motion,alter anicle IV, which the amendmentnow before us quots
which the motion shall be immediatelyput to the hm seltxtively and inmmpletely.
vote."
In the text submined by the sponsors. the issueof
1shallnow cal1on the two representatives whohave technicalwoperation and access to nuclear technology
askedto speakin favourof the motion. without discrimination isalready dealt with. Ththird
preambularparagraphofthedraftmolution indocument
Mr. Keating (New Zealand): The annual draf~ Al49IL.2lRev.2 reflects in an appropriately baland
rewlution on this agenda item has traditionally been fashion any legitimaie concems on this issue. Most
uncontroversial. It has ben an opponunity to recognize importantly. the sponsors' preambular paragrapb does
andexpresssuppon for theimportantandvaluableworkof what the amendmentfails to do: it refers explicitlyto
the International AtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA).Up until articles 1and II and other relevant articlesof the Non-
very recentlythisannual draft resolutionwas wnsistently Roliferation Treaty.
adopted by wusensus. Lat year it was adopted with the
nearunanimoussupportoftheGeneralAssembly .Sponsors The sponsors of this dralt resolution havetwice
last year, like those this year. weredrawn from every offered compromiselanguageto specificallyaddress the
continent. and only one delegation opposed the draft issuesraised in the text ofdocumentAI491L.15lRev1.
molution. Despitethe sponsors'besteffortsat compromise.weare
still faced with essentially the same amendment.
This year anumberof amendmentswereproposedby Therefon we canonly conclude that the amendment
various delegations. The sponsors have worked hard to containcd in document AI49IL.15IRev.1 is not
include in thedrafî resoluiion those amendmentswhich aEceprable.
wdd reasonablybe relatedto the workof theAgency.The
sponsors have soughtto put together a dralt resolution This is a critical period for nuclear
which couldwmmand broadsuppon fromthe international non-proliferation. Forthis mon, we believe it is very
community . important that the work of the IAEA enjoy the full
confidence of the General Assembly. The Agency is
Some amendments, however. wuld no1 be playing a vital monitoringmle around the world. Il is
inwprated into the text. In this regard. my delegation increasingly heiig asked to perform more and more
believes that the amendment proposed in document cnicially Unportanttasks. Al1 of us therefore have a
AI49lL.15/Rev. l should not be included. We believe it commonintenst insupponing the Agency'swork.GeneralAssembly 90thmeeting
Foq-ninth session 15December1994
Consequently, we urge delegations to support this nuclear-pmliferation regime, receive the support and
no-action motion. By voting in favour. the General encouragementofthe Gtneral Assembly .1thereforewish
Assembly will collectively be afifming that peacefui to ask for the suppon of delegations for thisno-action
nuclear cooperation should wnthue in a safe and motion.
responsiblemanner.
The Raident (interpretatiomm French): We
Mr. Tuma(CzechRepublic):Asoneof the sponsors have just heard two speakers in favour of the motion
of the draft resolution(A1491L.ZIRev.on the report of subminedby Germany. Does any other memberwish to
the International AtomicEnergy Agency(IAEA),1wishto speak?
speak in favour of the no-action motion in rest f the
pmposed amendmentto the draft resolution,which was MI. Takht-Ravanehl (Islamic Republicof Iran):
submittedby the IslamicRepublicof Iran and is wntained First, 1 would like to emphasize the fact that the
in documentAI49IL.15IRev.1.
wmments made by the representativesof Gemy and
New Zeaiand am irrelevantto this subjectbecausethey
Wehave agreedto speakin support of thisno-action addressed the contents of our original amendment in
motionbecauseof the seriousnesswith whichwe viewthe Ai49lL.15, whichisnolongerbeforethe Assembly.This
amendmentwntained in documentA/49/L.15/Rev.l. My isperhapsdue to the fact thatmydelegation hasnot been
delegationconsidersthat this amendmentms wunter to given a chance Io intduce the revised version OUI
the purpose and objective of this euentially procedural
amendment.wntained in doniment Al49lL.15IRev.1.
ddt resolution.whichservesas animportantendorsement
of the workof the IAEAby the GencralAssembly. The delegation of the lslamic Republic of Iran
rejets the motion of non-action moved by the
The sponsors have madewnsiderable efforts to take representativeof Gemy on the amendmentcontained
account of the issues which are the subject of the in documentA/49/L.lSIRev.1forthe followingreasons:
amendmentsubmittedby the Islamic Republicof Iran. In
the third preambular paragraphof the draft resolutionthe The IslamicRepublicof Iran. as a wmmined Party
referenceto the importanceof accessto the peacefuluses to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
of nuclear energy by al1 States which havewncluded Weapons (NPT) and the statute of the International
safeguardsagreementswith the Agencyhas ben included AtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA), fidy believesthat the
inrecognitionofthe importancemanydevelopingwuntries rights of developing wuniries Parties to the NPT and
attach toit.We regret thatwe have had to conclude<bat IAEA to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposeam
the languagepmposed by Iran in A1491L1 . 5IRev.1 is an deniedby cenai developcdwuntries thati, violationof
unacseptable deviation from language agd by 168 their obligationsderthe relevantlegalinstrumentsare
wuntries in treaty fom. determinedto perpeNafediscriminationin intemational
relations through the proliferation of exporteontrol
In the same spirit of woperation the sponsors have measutes,closeddoor clubs and ad hoc regimessuchas
added a new preambular paragraph that refers to the the LondonSuppliersand AustraliaGmup.
resolutionon the amendment ofarticleVI of the statuteof
the Agency adopted by its General Conference in The draftresolution in documentAl49lL.2 and its
Septemberof thisyear. My delegationisaware that thisis revised version. L.2.Rev.2, despite some wsmetic
a matter that is of wncern to many countries. and we changes, fails toraopnÙc explicitly and reaffirm the
thereforebelievedit was appropriate to refer to itin the rights of States Parties to the Non-ProliferationTredy
drah resolution. Iso doing, my delegation believes that and IAEAto use nuclcarenergy forpeacef purposes.
the sponsors have responded to the original second
The first paragraph of our original amendment in
amendment ofthe Islamic Republicof Iran in a manner documentL.15.dated8 November1994,wastakenhm
which does not encroach upon the authority and the substantivepaper submitted by the group of non-
responsibilityof the Agency. aligned and other States to the Third Preparatory
Committeeof the 1995ReviewandExtensionConference
In wnclusion, the Czech Republic attaches great of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, document
importanceto the adoptionof the draft resolutionwith the NPTICONF.1995/TC.3/13. of 14 September 1994.It
bmadest possiblesupport. It is vital that the workof the was nothiig but a dimation of the rights of States
Agency, which has played an indispensablerole in the Parties under article IV of the NPT and a cd1for theGeneralAssembly 90thmeeting
Fonv-ninth session 15December1994
removal of discriminatory restrictions tbaaffect the Sice that isnotthecase.1shalnowputto thevote
inalienablenghts of Parties under that article. the motionsubmittedby the repmtative of Gtrmany
tba io actionbe takenon the amendmentcontainedin
The second paragraph of the original amendment ~149n.15iRev.1.
calledfor an earlydecisionon the expansionof tBoard
of Govemon of the IAEA. which was dictatedby such A mrded votehasbŒnrequestedon the motion.
newrealitiesas theincreasingdisparitybetweentheoverall
membership of the Agency compared to the current A rewrdeà wte wos takm.
composition of the Board of Govemors, which was
establisbedmore than 30years ago. Infawur:
Albania,Andorra.AntiguaandBarbuda,Argentina.
The sponsorsof the draiiresolutionrefrained hm Armenia. Ausualia, Austria. Bahamas,Barbados,
negotiationson our amendmentuntil 8 December1994, Belanis. Belgium.Belize.Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,
wben they approachedthe Chaimiaoof the Movementof Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada. Chie. Costa Rica,
Non-AlignedCountriestoworkonacompmmimlanguage. CBted'Ivoire, Cmatia, Czah Republic,Denmark.
Subsequently,a small group of the Movementof Non- Dorninica,El Salvador,Eritrea. Estonia,Ethiopia,
AlignedCountriesanda smallgmupof sponsors met on 8 Fiji,Finland. France, Gabon,Gambia. Germany,
and9 Decemberandnegotiatedandagreed, ad r@erendum, Grcece. Grenada. Guatemala, Guinca, ~b~ana.
on Iwo compromiseoperative paragraphs which would Haiti, Honduras.Hungary,Iceland.Ireland.Is~ael,
qlacc out original amendment, namely, L.15. Italy,Jamaica.Japan, Kazakhstan,Kenya.Kuwait.
Unfottunately,the subsequentresponseof the sponsoto Laivia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Luxembourg.
the compromise formulations was negative. and they Maldives, Malta. Marshall Islands, Micmnesia
renegedon the agreement anddsided not to continuethe (Fedcrated States of). Monaco, Mom.
negotiations.Therefore,oneannotbutdoubtIhesincerity Nuherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Nonvay.
of Ihe move made on 8 December to work on a Papua New Guinea, Paraguay. Poland, Pottugal,
compromiselanguage. RepublicofKom. Republicof Moldova,Romania,
..Russian Federation, SainKim and Nevis. Saint
In light of the foregoing. my dele~ation. after Lucia. Saint Vint and the Grenadii. Samoa,
consultations with some of the members of the Non- SanMarino. SaudiArabia,SierraLeone,Sigapore,
AlignedMovement, decidedto submit arevisedversionof Slovakia.Slovcnia.SolomonIslands.SouthAfrica.
L.15 based on the compromise languagenegotiatod Spain,Suriname,Swaziland.Sweden,Thailand,The
betweena small groupof the Movementof Non-Aligned Fortmx Yugoslav Republicof Macedonia, Togo,
Countriesand a smallgroup of the sponsorson Friday. 9 Trinidad and Tobago. Turkey. Ukraine. United
~ecekber 1994.Moreover.we decided notto insiston the Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain
secondcompromiselanguage ontheexpansionofihe Board and Notthem Ireland, United Saes of America,
of Govemors for thetime being, inorder to enhancethe Uruguay, Uzbekistan.Vanuatu. Zambii
chanceof a smooth adoptionof the draft resolution. The
amendmentwntained in A./49/L.15iRev.l is consistent
Againsr:
with anicle IV of the Non-hliferation Tmiy and the Colombia,Cuba. DemocraticPeople's Republicof
tht of the draft rrsolution. We do ncommmd to Korea, Ecuador. Egypt. Indonesia. Iran (Islamic
MemberStates, in panicular the developingcountries, to Republicof), Lebanon. Libyan ArabJamahiriya,
support this amendmentin its entirety and to reject the Malaysia, Mexico,SyrianArab Republic,Ugaoda,
motionof non-actionby castinga negativevote on it. United Republicof Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yemen.
Zimbabwe
The Presldent (interpretationfromFrench): 1should
simplyliketonotethattheamendmentinAI49IL.15IRev.1 Absraining:
was notintroducedbecausetherewasno requestto do so. Afghanistan,Botswana.Br&. BruneiDarussalam.
unlikethe caseof Al49lL.22, intrcducedby Iraq. Cameroon, Georgia, Ghana. india, Kyrgyzstan.
Lesotho. Mali, Mauritius. Myanmar. Namibia,
Nepal. ~iger. Nigeria. Pakistan. Panama. Pen,
Does any other delegationwish to speak againstthe
motion? Phüippines.Scnegal.SriLanka,Tunisia.VenemelaGeneralAswmbly 90th meeting
Fony-ninthsession 15 Dccember1994
Themotion was &ptd by103votesto 17, with25 Gambia, Gtorgia. Germany . Ghana, Greece,
abstentions. Guatemala.Haiti. Hungary.Iceland.india. Ireland.
Italy, lamaica, Japan. Kazakhstan. Kenya.
The Resident (interpretaîionfFrench):Sincethe Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein,
motionforno actionis adopted.noactionwillbe takenon Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius,
theamendmentcontainedindocumentAI49JL.15Aiev.1. Mongolia,Nwbia, Nepal, NewZealand, Niger.
Nigeria, Nonvay. Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
TheAswrnblywillnextproceedto takea defisionon Guinea.Panguay, Philippines, Poland, Pomgal,
the amencimentswntained in doniment Al49lL.22. Republicof Korea. Romania,Samoa,SanMhno.
Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Suriname,
A separate vote has km requested on each Sweden. The Fomer Yugoslav Republic of
mepiment. As 1 hear no objection, 1 shall put each Macedonia, Togo. Ugai~da, Ukraine. United
amendmentto the vote. Republic ofTanzania
1 first put to the vote the amendmentwntaincd in me amendmentwasrejecfd by32 wtes to31. with
paragraph 1of documentAl49lL.22. 87 abstentions.
A mrded vote haskm requested. Tùe Mdent (intepreîationfmm French):1will
next put to the vote the amendment wntained in
A recordedwte was taken. paragraph2 of documentA149lL.22.
Infavour: A mrdeà votehas beennquested.
Algeria. Brazil. Chi. Cuba. Ecuador. France.
Gabon,Guyana.Indonesia,üaq, Jordan, LibyanArab A recordedwte wastaken.
Jamahiriya, Malaysia. Mali, Mauritania, Mexiw.
Monaco. Myanmar, Oman, Qatar. Russian Infavour:
Federation,Singapore.Spain, SLanka ,ajüristan. Algeria. Botswana. Brazil. China. Colombia.
Thailand, Tunisia. Turkey, Viet Nam. Yemen. Comoms. Cuba. Ecuador. France. Gabon,
Zimbabwe Honduras. IndonesiaIraq,Jordan, Lao People's
Democratic Republic. Lesotho, Libyan Arab
Against: Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mali.Mauritania. Mexiw.
Antigua and Barbuda. Belize, Dominica. Grenada, Monaco,Myanmar.Niger, Oman. Pakisian,Qatar,
Guinea, Honduras. Israel, Kuwait. Maldives, Russian Federation. Spain.SrLanka T,ajikistan,
Marshall Islands, Micmnesia(Federated Statesof). Tunisia. Turkey, United Republic of Tanzania.
Netherlands.NicaraguaPem, Republicof Moldova, Viet Nam. Yemen.Zimbabwe
SaintKittand Nevis. SaintLucia, Saint Vincent and
theGrenaiines, SaudiArabia.Senegal,SierLeone, Againsr:
South Africa. Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago. Antigua andBarbuda.Bahamas,Barbados. Belize,
United Arab Emirates. UnitedKingdom of Great Canada,Dominica,Grenada.Guinea, Israel, Japan.
Britain and Northern Ireland. United Sw of Kuwait, Maldives.Manhall Islands, Micronesia
America,Umguay.Uzbekistan.Vanuatu. Venezuela. (FederatedStatesof),Nethcrlands,Nicaragua,Pem.
Zambia SaintKins and Nevis, SaintLucia. Saint Vincent
and the Grenadiies, Saudi Arabia. Senegal,Sierra
Abstoining: Leone, South Africa. Suriname. Swaziland,
Afghanisian.Albania,Andorra.Argentina,Armenia, TrinidadandTobago.UnitedArabEmirates,United
Australia, Austria. Bahamas. Barbados. Belanis. Kingdomof Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Belgium,&nin. Bhutan.Bolivia. Botswana. Brunei UnitedStatesof America. Zambia
Darussalam,Bulgaria.Cambodia,Camemon.Canada,
CentralAfricanRepublic,Chile.Colombia.Comoms, Abstaining:
CostaRica. Côte d'Ivoire. CmatiaCzechRepublic. Afghanistan. Albania. Andom, Argentina,
DemocraticPeople's Republicof Korea,Denmark. Armenia, Australia. Austria, Belams, Belgium,
El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia. Ethiopia. Fiand. Benin. Bhutan. Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam,General Assembly 90th meeting
Fom-ninth session 15 December1994
Bulgaria, Carnbodia. Cameroon. Central Afncan Honduras, Hungary. Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq,
Republic, Chile, Costa Rica,Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica. Japan,Jordan. Kazakhstan,
Czech Republic. Democratic People's Republic of Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgytstan, Lao People's
Korea, Denmark. El Salvador, Eritrea. Estonia. Democratic Republic, Latvia, LesothoL.ibyanArab
Ethiopia, Fiji. Fiand,Gambia, Georgia.Germany. Jamahiriya,Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Ghana.Greece.Guatemala, Guyana,Haiti, Hungary, Madagascar, Malaysia. Maldives.Mali, Malta.
Iceland. Lndia.Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Marshall Islands.Mauritania. Mauritius, Mexiw.
Kenya,Kyrgyzstan,Latvia, Liechtenstein.Lithuania. Micmnesia (Federated State00, Monaw.
Luxembourg.Malta. Mauritius. Mongolia, Namibia, Mongolia, Morocco. Myanmar, Namibia. Nepal.
Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Notway. Panama, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Niger,
Papua New Guinea. Paraguay. Philippines,Poland,
Nigeria. Norway. Oman, Panama, Papua New
Portugal. Republicof Korea. Republic ofMoldova, Guinea. Paraguay. Pem, Philippines, Poland.
Romania. Samoa. SanMarino.Singapore. Slovakia, Porîugal. Qatar, Republicof Korea, Republic of
Slovenia,Solomon Islands, Sweden,Thailand. The Moldova.Romania.RussianFederation. SaintKits
Former Yugoslav Republic ofMaCedonia.Togo, and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Uganda. Ukraine, Umguay. Uzbekistan. Vanuatu, Grenadines. Samoa, San Marino. Saudi Arabia,
Venezuela Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore. Slovakia.
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, SouthAfrica, Spain,
Theamendmentwasadoptedby 37 votesto 31. with Sri Lanka, Suriname. Swaziland, Sweden.
84 absfenrions. Tajikistan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Madonia, Togo, Tnnidad and
The President (inretpretarion from French): A
Tobago. Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda,
separatevotehasbeen requestedon operativeparagraph7, Ukraine. UnitedArabEmirates.UnitedKingdomof
just amended. ofdraft resolutionA149lL.21Rev.2. GreatBritainandNonhernIreland.United Republic
of Tanzania, United Statesof America, Umguay,
A separatevote bas also been requestedon the third Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam,
and ninth preambular paragraphs and on operative Yemen, Zambia. Zimbabwe
paragraph6 of drafi resolutionAl49lL.21Rev.2.
As thereappearsto be no objection. 1shallput those
paragraphsto the vote first.
Absraining:
1 shall put to the vote firstthe third preambular
Algena, Cuba. Democratic People's Republio cf
paragraph ofdrafi resolutionA/49/L.2/Rev.2. Korea. Pakistan
A recorded votehas ben requested The third preambular paragraph was adopted by
154votesro 2. with 4 abstenrions.
A recorded vote was raken
The President (inrctprerarianfrom French): 1next
Infavour: put to the vote theniIIthpreambular paragraphof draft
Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra. Antigua andrbuda, resolutionAl49lL.21Rev.2.
Argentins, Armenia, Australia.Austria, Bahamas.
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados.Belanis. Belgium, A recorded vote hasbeen requested.
Belize. Benin. Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei Danissalam, Bulgaria, Burundi,Cambodia, A recorded votewas taken.
Cameroon. Canada. Central African RepubliCc,hile,
Colombia. Cornoros, CostaRica, Côte d'Ivoire, Infavour:
Croatia, Cypms.CzechRepublic.Denmark,Djibouti, Afghanistan. Albania. Andorra, Antiguaand
Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Barbuda, Argentina. Armenia. Australia,Austria.
Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,Finland. France, Gabon, Bahamas, Bahrain; Barbados, Belanis, Belgium,
Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana. Greece, Belize. Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana. Brazil.
Grenada. Guatemala. Guinea, Guyana. Haiti, Bmei Dmssalam, Bulgaria, Canada. CentralGeEeralAssembly 901hmeeting
~onv-&th session
15December1994
. AfricanRepublic,Chile. Colombia. Comoros,Costa Infawur:
Rica. Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia. Cypm, Czech Afghanistan. Aibania. Andom, Antigua and
Republic, Dtnmark. Djibouti, Dominica. Eniador, Barbuda, Argentina. Armenia,.Ausualia. Austria,
El Salvador. Eritrea.Estonia.Ethiopia,Fiji, Finland, Bahamas.Bahrain,Bangladesh, BarbadosB, elarus.
France, Gabon. Gambia.Georgia;Germany,Grecce. Belgium,Belize, Benin.Bhutan,Bolivia,Botswana,
Grenada, Guatemala. Guinca, Guyana. Honduras. Braul, Brunei Danissalam, Bulgaria. Camemon,
Hungary. Iceland, Indonesia. ireland. Israel, Italy, Canada, Chile. Colombia. Comoros,Costa Rica.
Jamaica. Japan. Kazakhstan. Kenya, Kuwait. CBted'Ivoire, Croatia,Cypnis. Czech Republic.
Kyrgywtan. Latvia, Lesotho. Liechtenstein, Denmark. Djibouti. Dominica. Ecuador. Egypt,
Lithuania.Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldive. alta, El Salvador. Eritrea. Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Marshall Islands. Mauritius, Mexiw. Micronesia Finland. France. Gabon, Gambia. Georgia.
(Federated States of). Monaco, MongolMoroeui. Germany. Gm, Grenada,Guatemala. Guinca,
Myanmar. Namibia, Nepal. Netherlands, Guyana. Honduras. Hungary,.Iceland. Indonesia.
NewZealand. Nicaragua, Niger; Nigeria, Nonvay. Ireland. Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan. Jordan.
Oman, Panama. PapuaNewGuinea,Paraguay.Peru, Kazakhstan. Kenya, Kuwait.Kyrgywtan, Wia.
Philippines. Poland, Portugal. Qatar. Republicof Lesotho, Liechtenstein.Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Korea. Republic of Moldova, Romania. Russian Malaysia.Maldives. Mali.Malta.Marshall Islands,
Federation.SaintKilts andNevis, Saint.Lucia,Saint Mauritius. Mexiw. Micronesia (FederatedStats
Vincent andthe Grenadii, Samoa, SanMarino. of), Monaco. Mongolia, Moroeui, Myanmar.
Saudi Arabia, Scncgal, Sierra Leone.Sigapore, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands. New Zealand,
Slovakia. Slovenia, SolomonIslands, South Africa. Nicaragua, Niger. Nigeria. Nonvay, Oman,
Spain, Sn Lanka. Suriname S, aziland. Sweden, Panama, Papiia New Guinea. Paraguay. Peru.
Tajikistan,Thailaad.The FormerYugoslavRepublic Philippines,Poland. Portugal, Qatar. Republicof
of Macedonia.Togo. Trinidadand Tobago,Tunisia, Korea, Republicof Moldova. Romania. Russian
Turkey. Turluuenistan, Ukraine. United Arab Federation,SaintKinsandNevis, SaintLucia,Saint
Emirates. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Vincentand the Grenadines. Samoa.San Marino.
Nonhemireland,UnitedStatesofAmerica.Uruguay. Saudi Arabia. Senegal, Sierra Leone. Singapore,
Uzbckistan.Vanuatu.Venezuela.Yemen.ZPmbia Slovakia,Slovenia.SolomonIslands,SouthAfrica,
Spain, SnLanka, Suriname, Swaziland,Sweden,
Against:
Tajikistan.Thailand. The Former Yugoslav
DemocraticPeople'sRepublicof Korea,LibyanArab Republic of Macedonia. Togo. Trinidad and
Jamahiriya Tobago. Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan,Ukraine.
United ArabEmirates, United Kingdomof Great
Abstaining: Britain and Nonhem Ireland. UnitedStates of
Aigeria. Bangladesh, Camemon. Chi, Cuba, Amcrica. Umguay. Uzbekistan. Vanuatu.
Ghana. India.Lao People's Democratic Republic, Veiemela. Yemen.Zambia, Zimbabwe
Mali. Pakistan.Uganda,UnitedRepublicofTanzania,
Viet Nam, Zimbabwe Againrr:
Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Libyan
Theninthpreatnbuiarparagraphwar aàopteà by137 ArabJamahiriya
wtcs IO2. with14 abstentions.
Abstaining:
The F'residen(tinterprctm'onfromFrench):1nowput AlgeriaChi, Cuba, Ghana,India. Lao People's
to the vote operative paragraph 6 of drafi rcsolution Demkratic Republic. Pakistan, Uganda.
Ai49iL.2lRev.2. UnitedRepublic ofTanzania,VietNam
A mrded votehasb&n requested. Operativeparagmph 6 wacadoptad by142wtcs IO
2. with IOabstentions.
A recordcd votewactaken.
The Resident (interpretationfrom French): 1now
put to the vote operative paragraphas amended,of
draîiresolutionA/49/L.2/Rev.2.GeneralAssembly 90th meeting
Foh-ninth session 15 ~esember 1994
A recordedvote hasbeen requested. The President(interprefmionfiom French):1now
..
. . put to the vote drafîresolution A/49/L.42iRev:2 as a
A recordcdw.. w. taken. whole. as amended. . . . , ...
.... _ ... . . . . .
. .. .. A ncorded vote hasbeen requested. , . .
lnfawur: . . . ..
A recorded vote wm taken.
Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Bahrain.
Belarus, Bolivia, Botswana. Brazil, Brunei
Damsalam. Cambodia. Camemn, Colombia. lnfawur:
Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cypms, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria.Andorra, Antigua
Dominica. Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, ' France, and Barbuda. Argentina. Armenia, Australia.
Gabon,Gambia.Guyana, Honduras,Indonesia. Iraq. Austria. Bahamas,Bahrain. Bangladesh, Barbados,
Jordan, Kenya, 'Lesotho. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Belms, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria,
Monaco.Myanmar,Niger, Nigeria,Oman, Pakistan, Burkina Faso, .Burundi, Cambodia. Camerwn.
Panama. Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,
Qatar, Russian Federation. Saudi Arabia. Sierra Chile. Colombia, Comoros, Congo. Costa Rica,
Leone. South Afnca, Spain, Sri Lanka .ajikistan, Côte d'Ivoire. Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic.
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt.
United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu. Yemen. El Salvador. Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji.
Zambia Finland, France. Gabon, Gambia, Georgia.
Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea.
Against: Guyana. Haiti. Honduras.Hungary, Iceland,india,
Antiguaand Barbuda indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel. Italy, Jamaica.
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait,
Abstaining: Kyrgyzstan. Latvia.Lebanon.Lesotho,Libyan Arab
Albania. Andorra. Argentina. Australia. Bahamas. Jamahiriya. Liechtenstein.Lithuania,Luxembourg,
Barbados, Belgium, Belize,Benin,Bhutan.Bulgaria, Madagascar. Malaysia, Maldives, Mali. Malta,
Canada. Chile. Croatia. Cuba, Czech Republic. Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius,Mexico.
Denmark, Eritrea. Estonia. Ethiopia, Fiand. Micronesia (Federated Statesof), Monaco.
Georgia. Germany. Ghana, Greece. Grenada, Mongolia. Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar.
Guatemala,Guinea, Haiti. Hungary, Iceland, india. Namibia, Nepal. Netherlands, NewZealand.
Ireland. Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan. Niwagua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman.
Kuwait,Kyrgyzstan,Latvia. Liechtenstein.Lithuania, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea. Paraguay.
Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands. Mauritius, Peru,Philippines,Poland,Portugal,Qatar,Republic
Micronesia (Federated States of), Namibia, Nepal, of Korea. Republicof Moldova,Romania,Russian
Federation. SaintKittsandNevis, SaintLucia.Saint
Nethedands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nonvay,
Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino,
Republic of Moldova. Romania, Saint Kitts and Saudi Arabia, Senegal.Sierra Leone. Singapore,
Nevis,SaintLucia.SaintVincentandthe Grenadines, Slovakia.Slovenia,SolomonIslands,SouthAfrica.
Samoa, SanMarino, Senegal, Singapore.Slovakia, Spain. Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,
Slovenia. Solomon Islands. Suriname, Swaziland. Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand. The
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo.
Sweden.Thailand.TheFormerYugoslavRepublicof
Macedonia. Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nonhern Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab
Ireland, United States of America. Uruguay, Emirates. UnitedKingdom of Great Bntain and
Uzbekistan.Venezuela.Zimbabwe Northern Ireland. United Republic of Tanzania,
United Statesof America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Vanuatu, Venezuela,Yemen. Zambia. Zimbabwe
Operaiiveparagraph 7.m amended, wm ndopted by
63 votes to 1, with 84 abstentions.
Against:
DemocraticPeople's Republicof Korea.GeneralAssembly , 90th meeting
Fony-ninth session , 15December1994
Abstainin8: My. the Chinese delegation believes thatthe
. Chi. Cuba. Ghana, Iran(lslamicRepublicof). Lao General Assembly resolution on the Agency's annual
. People'sDemocraticRepublic.Viet Nam report should notenter into the specificsof the work of
the Agency,espeçiallyon issues as conmversiai as the
Dr@ resolution A/49L.2LRev.2, as a whok. ar Korcan nuclear question. This is not helpful when the
amendai, was adopteà by 161 wtcr to 1, wiih 6 partiewncerned am wnducting negotiations.
abstentions(molution 49/65).
Founhly. the Chinese delegation would like ro
Tite mident (inferpretaiionfrom French): Several reiterate China's principled position on the Korean
representativeswish to s@ in explanationof vote. May nuclear question. We have always supported the
1reminddelegationsthat explanaiionsof voteare limited denuclearizationof the Koreanpeuinsula. We welwme
to 10minutes and should be made by delegations from the negotiations between the Democratic People's
theu seafs. RepublicofKorea'andthe UnitedStatesandtheprogress
that has been made, awesupportthevariousparties in
Mr. Leahy (UnitedStatesofAmerica):Mydelegation makingfunber efforts to promote ammprehensive,just
was pleased to join others in supportof this molution, and reasonablesolutionof this questionat an early date
which recopks the importaotwork of the international throughpatient negotiationsand multations.
AtomicEnergy Agency(IAEA).The diverseprogrammes
of the IAEA serve the intemts of the international Mr. Jacob(Israel): Israel votcd against the third
mmmunityinmanyways. Countlessindividuailiveson al1 preambularparagaph ofthe draR resolutionjust adopted.
continentsbenefitfrom IAEA-supported programmes such lsraelbelievesthatal1Statesmembersof the International
as nuclear medicine, agricultureanimal husbaudty and Atomic Energy Agency,without discrimination, and
pst wntrol. The safety with whichnuclear materialsand regardlessofwhetheror not theare partiesto theTreaty
technology aremanagedworldwideis cnhance daily by on the Non-bliferation of Nuclear Weaponsor other
ïAEA-sponsored vaining and guidelines. International relevant intemationalagreements. shouldenjoy the full
secwityis reinforced through the ongoing applicationof rightsenvisagedinthe Agency'sstatute.Thelanguageof
lAEA safeguards. thethirdpreambularparagraphisnot clear enoughinthis
regard. Therefore. Israel votedagainstthis paragraph.
The United States is proud of its long and well-
estahlishedrecord of svong support for the IAEA, an1 Mr. Kumar(India):An important areaof thework
should like to reiterate my Govemment'swmmitment to of the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
wntinuing thii support. Welookforwardto workhg with relatesto the applicationsafeguards,and the Agency
others tosuengthenfunher the work and role of this vital hasembarkedupona major exerciseon the strengthening
international institution. of the safeguards system.We attach importanceto lhis
exercise.whichisaimedat makingthe safeguardssystem
Mr. Wu Chengjiang (China) (inierpretationfrom more efficientandcosteffective.
Chinese): The Chinese delegation abstained on &aft
resolution A/49/L.21Rev.2. on the report of the in this context,oneof therecuning themesoverthe
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). in that pastyear inthemeetingsof theAgency'sBoardhas bm
co~ection, 1wishto statethe following. . the implementationof the safeguardsagreementbetween
the Agency and the Democratic People's Republicof
Fit. our abstentionon thedraftmolution does not Korea.This is a mmplex and substantiveissuein which
affec tte Chinese delegation'sview of the work of the there havebeen manydevelopments,both technicaland
IAEA. in out statementin thegeneraldebateon ihis item politicalOur point of view has been consistent. We
on 17Cktoberlasi. we gave awmprehensiveand positive believethat thbestwayin whichthis difficultissuecan
appraisaol f the work of the IAEAover the past y=. be molved isthroughpatient discussionsamong ail the
concerned parties. We have supported a policy of
Secondly. as regards the individuai resolutions cooperationand dialogue, rafher than confrontationand
refemd to inthe resolutionadoptedby the Agency'sBoard deadlines. and in this spirit have welwmed the
of Governors ai the General Conference. theChinese discussionsbetwecntheUnitedStatesandthe Democratic
delegationrserves its views as expresscdin the relevant People's Republicof Korea.
forums. GeneralAssembly 90th meeting
'Forty-ninthsession 15 Decemher1994
Itwas for that reason thatin the Boardwe abstained Respondingto theAssembly's appealthat itwnduct
on those resolutionsthai we felt werenotwntributing to a ils work in aspiritof rationalizationandmakebetteruse
positiveresult. Wehad sirnilarreservationsconcerningthe of the Organization'sresowces, the Committeefunher
ninth preambularparagraphand operativeparagraph 6of reduced the numher of its meetings and wncluded its
draft resolution Al49L.2IRev.2, and therefore we work in the Courseof 26 forma1and eight infod
abstained onthose paragraphs. meetings. in order to enhance its effectiveness, the
Committee this year adopted anew format, which
Nevenheless. since the resolution concerns the included astmctured discussionof specificsubjectson
activitiesof thIAEAasa whole,to whichweattachgmt the thematicappmach. That has lent a higherdegreeof
value. we wmt dong with it. cohesivenessto the discussionsand made them more
focusedand action-oriented.II mayhe pertinentto note
MI. Moradi (Islamic Republicof Iran): The Islamic in thatwnnection that. forthe first tirnein the annalsof
Republicof Iran attachesgmt importance IOthe workof the FirstCommittee. the relevandrafiresolutionentitled
the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency(IAEA) and we 'Rationalizationof the workand refom of the agendaof
havetherefore wnsistently supponed iu activities. the First Committee" was adopted - in fact. without a
vote.
1shouldIie to refer to our statementon 17October
last, beforethe Assembly,underagendaitem 14.whenwe The Committeewnsidered 46 drafî resolutionsand
tooknote with satisfactionof the reportof the Agencyand two draftdecisionsaltogether. while onedrafîresolution
the staiementof Mr. Hans Blix. ils Dimtor,General. andone draft decisionwere withdrawnby the respective
sponsors. Twenty-four, or 60 per cent. were adopted
However. rny delegation abstained on the draft without a vote.
resolutioncontainedin documentAl49lL.21Rev.2,for the
reasonthat weexplainedearlier today - namely.the lack The disannamentcalendar for 1994has been very
of any referenceto the rights of the Statespanies Io the intensive.Duringthislas1year. Member Stateshavebeen
Treatyonthe Non-Proliferationof NuclearWeaponsto use addressingissues that range across the fui1spectnimof
and have access 10 nuclear technology for peaceful disarmament questions. The debates of the Fint
purposes,frŒfmmdiscriminatoryrestrictionspromotedhy Committee were anflection of this. and the statements
certaindevelopedcounlries. that were madeby MemberStates werecharacterizedby
a large measureof wnsensus on the issues thatneed to
The Rgident (interpretafionfrom French):May 1 be focused upon. Some of the issues thai were rnost
iake it that it is the wish of the Assemblyto wnclude its widely referredto included the following.
wnsideraiion of agenda item 14?
One issuewas the recognitionof the disannament-
related advancesthat have been achievedover the las1
yw. A numherof delegations.however, noted thatthe
Introduction of the reports of theFi Cornrninee high e'xpectationthai prevailedfollowingtheend ofthe
cold war have become subdued. They also noted that
The Rgident (interpretation from French): The there is a disturbingescalationin atmed conflictaround
Assembly will now consider the rrpons of the First the world.
Committeeon agenda items53 and 64 (f).54 Io 73 and
153. Another issue was the 1995 Conferenceof the
Partiesto the Tmty on the Non-Roliferationof Nuclear
1 request the Rapporteur of the Fini Committeeto Weapons(NPT), which will be reviewingthe Treaty's
Uitroduce the reports of the First Committee in one operation and which will also be deciding on the
intervention. extension of the life of the NPT. Vinually every
delegationthat spokeduring the debates referred to the
Mr. Goosen(South Africa). Rapporteurof the First NPT and its extension. Also. negotiations for a
Comminee: Il gives me great pleasureto introduceto the wmprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) are king
General Assemblythe reports of the First Committeeon conducted within theConference on Disannament in
agenda items 53 and 64 (0. 54 IO73 and 153. Those Geneva.Manydelegaiionsmadea pointofnoting that the
reports arecontainedindocumentsAl491690to Al491711. drafîCTBT text is still heavilybracketed.GeneralAssembly 90th meeting
Fony:ninth session 15December1994
Other issues included thepmposed Veaty for the Other nuclear-relateddraft resolutions that were
pmhibitionof the productionof fissilemalerialfor nuclewnsidcred andadoptedby the Committeewere IWOdraft
weaponsor other explosivedevices; calls for the early resolutionson bilateral nuclears negotiations.The
conclusionoflegallybiig nuclearsecurityassurancesin draftresolutionsonnuclear-weapon-freewnes in Africa,
favour of non-nuclear-weaponStates; the recognitionby theMiddleEast and LatiAimericawereadopted without
mostdelegationsofthe importanceofnuclear-weapon-free a vote. Two otherson such wnes in South Asiaand the
wues as a means to achieving internationpeace and SouthAtlanticattractedwide support.
security; and the chemid weaponsConventionand the
work whichis beiig donein TheHaguewithregardto the A new dranresolutionin which theComminee has
establishmentof the Organisationfor the Preventionof requested an advisory opinion hm the international
ChemicalWeapons(OPCW). Court of Justice on the legality of the threator use of
nuclearweaponswas introduced.
Another issue was the establishmentof theHoc
GmupofGovemmeatalExpertsof theBiologicalWeapons Draft resolutions wa also intruduced on the
Convention. The pmgms which was made at the "step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat", on
September1994SpecialConferenceof the StatesPartiesto "Weapons of mass destruction and their means of
theConvention in Genevawaswmmendedby mostof the delivery"and on "Nucleardisarmamentwith a view to
sp&ers. theultimateeliminationon nuclear weapons".The first
twodraftresolutionare somewhatsimilarin conceptual
With respect to transparency in armaments with thnistandah at the desîntctionpmper of certtypes
spccificreferenceto the Registerof ConventionalArms, of weapons andtheir deliverymeans withinan agreed
the mle lhat greater transparency plays by inspiring the frame.
confidencewasgenerallyrecognized. heimponantmleof
the United Nations Register itnhisprocesswasalsoraised On regional disarmament measures issues. thm
by mostspeakers.It was, bowever.acknowledgethalthe dran remlutionswere adopted: the'Regionalconfidence-
Registerasit is now sîntcturcanbe impmved. buildingmcasured s"anresolution,which was adopted
by the Comminee without a vote; and the "Regional
A fd issue was the international wmmunity's disarmamat" and 'Conventional arms conml on
concern about the carnage that is being caused by regionalandsubregionallevels"draft resolutions.which
anti-personnelland-mines and the ongoing negotiations canied by a cornfortablemajorityof votes.
currentlyunderway concerning.intearlio, Protowl II of
the Conventionon certainconventional weapons. As was expected, the United Nations Registerof
ConventionalArms receivedconsiderableattention.The
Fifieenout of 45 resolutionsthat were adopteddealtonfidence-buildingpotential of the Register was
with nuclear-relatedissues. The Non-ProliferTreaiy emphasized by some delegations. At the same time.
waathe focusof twodrafïresolutions.1shouldIüreto take wncem wereexpressedat a numberof issuesrelatingto
rhisopportunitytodrawmembers'attentioninparticuiarto the Register and itsplementation.This included the
the accessionto the NPT by a number of new Stam lackof agreementby theGmupofGovernmtal Experts
Parties. and in this context the Ukraine'saccessionas an recommendationsfor theexpansionof the Registerto
non-nuclear-weaponStatedeS.e~e.specialmention. includeothercategoriesof weaponsin it, aswellas data
on promement and militaryholdiigs.
As was the case 1st year, the issues relattheto
comprehensivetest bantreatywmmanded kŒn attention Two draf tes@utions. respectivelycalling for a
hm the Conunittee.The Comminee onceagainadopted moratoriumon the export of anti-personnelmines and
a consensus drar esolution on the CTBT. in which it welwming the pmgress achieved in reviewing the
welcomed the pmgress achieved in the course of Conventionon chernicalweapons.were adopted without
a voie. Then wasgeneraloutrageat thebumansuffering
negotiationswithin the frameworkof the Conferenceon
Disannamentandurged the Conference caused to innocentcivilians by these weaponIn this
co~ection, the report of the Secretary-Generalon the
'10negotiate intensively.aa high pnority task' subjectwashighly appreeiatedby the Comminee.
(Al49/6p 94a. 4).@nerai Assembly 90thmeeting
Forty-ninthsession 15 December1994
Onceagainthisyear the Committeelook up the issue requests"; and operative paragraph 9 should begin
ofscienceand technology.As.inpreviousyears. il wasnot "Funher requesu".
possible to have a unified drafi resolution on this issue.
The substantive workthatwas done during the last year, In documentAi491704.pan III, 'Rmmmendation
especially withii the United Nations Disannament of the Fint Comminee". operative paragraph1 of the
Commission, bowever, ensured chat the differences dran resolution shouldbegin:"Th note of the repon
betweni the twowere less pronound. of the Secretary-General on Anwctica and of the
report".
The debate on thedran resolution on the biological
weapons Convention was mainly focused on the recent I would ask detegaiions to take note of those
SpecialConference.Theestablishmentof a workinggmup technicalcorrections.
to wnsider appropriate measures, includig possible
verification measures,anddrafproposaistostrengthenthe Before concludiig. 1 should like to pay a well-
Convention in alegallybinding instrumenthad a positive deSemcdtributeIo al1the delegationsthatpanicipatedin
influenceon thedebateand enabledtheCommitteetoadopt theworkof the Committeefor their spiritof mperation
the relevant draftresolutionwithout avote. in the commonsearchfor a better, safer and morestable
world.
TheCommineefunhermoreadoptedadraftresolution
on the wnvening of the founh specialsessiondevotcdto 1 should like to make special mention of the
disarmament. Thefact that it was adopted without avote Chairmanof the Committee, HisExcellencyAmbassador
isproof of theneed for a renewedfocuson disannament Luis Valencia-Rodriguez. wbo, with his intimate
and international security issues. knowledge of disarmament and international security
mattersas well as his generaidiplomaticskillsprovided
1tum now to the First Committee's workrelatedto the Committee withvision and able leadership.
agenda item 67 'Question of Antarctica". It sbould be
noted with satisfactionthat for tfmt lime the relevant Let mealsothankthe Comminee'sVice-Chairmen.
dr& resolutionwas adoptedwithout avote. Thestatements Mr. Thomas StelIerand AmbassadorYoshitomo Tanaka,
made during the debate on this issue show the shared who weremost effectivein dischargingtheir duties.
convictionthat for the benefitof mankindAntarcticamust
be presemedas a zoneof peace,wherethe environmentis 1shouldaisn like to expressmy appreciationto the
protectedand freedomof scientificresearchexists. Under Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr.
the draft resolution the Assembly would welwme the MarrackGouldig, for his valuablecontribution,and to
provision by theAntarctic Treaty ConsultativeParties to the Acting Director of the Centre for Disamiament
the Secretary-Generalof the fmalreport of the Eighteenth Affairs, Mr. PrvoslavDavinic.
Consultative Meeting. It would alsn enwurage close
mperation between the Antarctic Treaty Parties and the Inthatcomection, specialthanksgo totheSecretary
UnitedNations EnvironmentProgramme. of theFirst Committee,Mr. SohrabKheradi.wbosevast
experience and high degree of cornpetence made a
Letmenow briefly turnto a fewerrorsof a technical significantcontributionto the successfuloutcomeof the
nature wbich have crept into the texts of the following Committee'swork.
reports:
1 should also like to express my gratitude to MI.
IndocumentN49/692. partIII, 'Resnmmendationof Kheradi's staff. includig Mr. MobammadSartar, Mr.
the First Committee", operativeparagraph4 of the drah Tirnu Alasaniya,Mr. Francesu, Cottafavi, Mrs. Ruby
remlution should begin withthe words "Also invites". Kulanusontit and Mrs. Anna Nania.
.IndocumentAi491700,pan III, "Resnmmendationof The Resident (inretpreration from Frendr): If
the First Comminee". the text of draft resolution C, there is no proposal under de 66 of the rules of
'Regional wnfidence-building measures", should be prdure, 1 sball take it that the General Assembly
corrected as follows: operative paragraph4 should begin decidesnot to disniss the reportsof theFirst Committee
'Takesnote OF;operativeparagraph8shouldbegin'Also that are before today.GeneralAssembly 90th meeting
Fortv-ninthsession 15December1994
Itwas so decided. The Resident (interpretationfrom French):The
Assemblywill now take action on thedraf resolution
The Prrsident: ~tatementswill thereforebe limited recommendedby the First Couunitteein paragraph 10of
to explanationsof vote or position. its report.
The positions of delegations regardmg the The dranmolution, entitled'Objectiveinformation
recommendationsof the Committeehave ben madein the on militarymatters, includmg transparencyof military
Committee and are reflected in the relevant ofiïcial expendihms", was adopted by the First Committee
records. without a vote. May I consider that the General
Assemblywisheato do the same?
May 1remind members that under paragraph 7 of
decision341401the Assemblyagreedthat îhe drofrreolutiowas adopted(resolution49/66).
'When the same draft resolution is The Resident (interpretationfroFrench):May1
consideredin a MainCommineeand in plenary takeit that it is the wishof the Assemblyto concludeits
meeting, a delegationshould, as far aspossible. considerationof agendaitem 53?
expiain its vote only once. Le.. either in the
ComminΠor in plenary meeting unless that IIwas so decided.
delegation'svote in plenarymeetingis different
hm its vote inthe Committee." The President (interpretatiofrom Frenchj:The
Assembly bas thus concluded thii stage of its
May1alsoreminddelegationsthat. alsoiaccordan& considerationof sub-ite(fof item 64.
with Gcneral Assemblydecision 341401,explanationsof
vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by Agenda item 54
delegations fromtheir seau.
Sdentlfic and tcfhnological developments and their
Before we begin to take action on the impd on Intemationalsenirity:report of the First
recommendations contained in the repons of the Commiltee (N491691)
Committee,1shouldlike to adviscrepresentativeathat we
shallpmceed to take decisionsin the samemanner as in The President (interpretatifrom French):The
the Conunittee, except in those cases wheredelegations Assemblywillnowtake adecisiononthedraftresolution
have alreadynotifmi the Secretariatthat they wish to do recommendedby the Fit Committee in paragraph7 of
otherwise. This means that where recorded or separate its report.
votes weretaken, we shall do the same.
A recorded vote hasbeen requested.
1also hope that we can proceed to adopt without a
votethose recommendationsthat were adoptedin the First A record& vote was taken.
Commineewithout avote.
Infavour:
Agenda items 53and 64 Afghanistan. Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda.
Armenia. Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Reduetion of müitary budgets: report of the Fimt
&ngladesh. Barbados, Belarus. Belize. Benin,
Commitîee (N49169û) Bhutan. Bolivia. Botswana. Brazil, Brunei
Darussalam. Burkina Faso. Burundi, Camhodia.
Review of the implementation of the recommendatiom Cameroon.CentralAfrican Republic.Cbile.China.
and deeisioos adopted by the General Assembly at its Colombia, Comoros, Congo, CostaRica, Cuba,
tenth special sesion Spm. Democratic People's Republicof Korea.
Djibouti, Dominica.Ecuador. Egypt, Ei Salvador.
(0 Implementation of the gnidelines and Ethiopia, Fiji. Gabon. Gambia. Ghana. Grenada.
reeommendatiom forobjectiveinformation on Guatemala. Guinea. Guyana. Haiti, Honduras,
military maners: report of the Fimt India, Indonesia. Iran (IslamicRepublic of), Iraq.
Commitîee (A149169û) lamaica. lordai, Kazakhstan. Kenya, Kuwait, General Assembly 9ûîhmeeting
Forty-ninthsession 15 December1994
Kyrgyutan. Lao People's Democratic Republic, recommendedby the First.Committeein paragraph7 of
Lebanon, Lesotho. Libyan Arab lamahiriya, itsreport.
Madagascar, Malawi. Malaysia, Maldives, Mali.
Marshall Islands. Mawitania. Mawitius. Mexiw. Separatevotes havebeen requestedon the seventh
Micmnesia (Federated States of). Mongolia.
and the eighth pnambular paragraphsand on operative
Morocco, Mozambique.Myanmar, Namibia.Nepal, paragraph3.
Nicaragua, Niger. NigeriaOman, Pakistan.Panama,
Papua New Guinea. Paraguay, Pem. Philippines, Thereappearsto be no objection tothat request.
Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines. Samoa; Saudi Arabia, 1sball tint put to the vote the seventbpreambular
Senegal, Seychelles. Sierra Leone. Sigapore, paragraph of the draft resolution recommendedby the
Solomon Islands. SriLanka. Sudan. Suriname. Fint Commineein paragraph7 of its report.
Swaziland. Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand. Togo.
Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia. Turkmenistan. A recordedvote hasbeen requested.
Uganda, United Arab Emirates. United Republicof
Taruania, Umguay. Vanuatu. Venezuela.Viet Nam.
A recorded vote war taken.
Yemen. Zambia, Zimbabwe
Infavour:
Againsr: Afghanistan. Albania. Algeria, Andona. Antigua
France. Israel, UnitedKingdomof Gmt Britainand and Barbuda. Argentina. Armenia, Australia.
Northem Ireland. United Statesof America Austria,Azerbaijan.Bahamas,Babain. Bangladesh,
Barbados,Belanis,BeIgium.Belize,Benin.Bhutan.
Abstoining: Bolivia. Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam,
Albania. Andorra. Argentina. Australia. Austria. Bulgaria. BurkinaFaso. Burundi, Cambodia,
Belgium. Bulgaria. Canada, Côte d'Ivoire. Cmatia. Camemn, Canada. Central African Republic,
CzechRepublic,Denmark.Estonia.Finland.Georgia. Chile. China. Colombia. Comoms. Congo. Costa
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland. Ireland. Italy, Rica. Côte d'Ivoire. Cmatia, Cypms. Czech
Japan,Latvia.Liechtenstein,Lithuania.Luxembourg. Republic.Denmark.Djibouti, Dominica,Ecuador.
Malta, Netherlands,New Zeaiand. Nonvay. Poland. El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia. Ethiopia, Fiji,
Portugal. Republic ofKorea, Republic of Moldova, Finiand. Gabon, Gambia. Georgia, Germany,
Romania.RussianFederation,SanMarino, Slovakia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala. Guinea.
Slovenia, South Africa. Spain. Sweden, Tajikistan. Guyana. Haiti, Honduras, Hungary. Iceland,
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Indonesia. Iraq, Ireland. Israel. Italy. Jamaica,
furkey. Ukraine, Uzbekistan Japan. Jordan. Kazakhstan, Kenya. Kuwait,
Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Thedrofr rcsolution war adoptaby 118 wtes to 4. Latvia,Lebanon.Lesotho. Libyan ArabJamahiriya,
with47 abstentions (resolutionAl49167). Liechtenstein.Lithuania. Luxembourg.Madagascar,
Malawi. Malaysia,Maldives,Mali,Malta.Marshall
The Resident (interpretationfrom French): May 1 Islands, Mauntania, Mauritius. Micmnesia
take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to (Federated States of). Mongolia, Momcco,
wnclude its wnsideration of agendaitem 54? Mozambique, Myanmar. Namibia. Nepal,
Netherlands. New Zealand. Nicaragua, Niger,
It wacso decided Nigeria. Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Pem. Philippines. Poland.
Agenda item 55 Pomigal. Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Moldova,Romania,RussianFederation, SaintKitts
The mle of science aiid teehnology in the context of and Nevis. Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the
internationalseeurity,disarmament and other related Grenadines. Samoa, San Marino.Saudi Arabia,
fieldsreport of theFirs tomminee (A1491692) Senegal. Sierra Leone. Singapore. Slovakia.
Slovenia. Solomon Islands. South Africa. Spain.
The hident (interpretation from French): The SriLanka , udan, Suriname, Swaziland. Sweden,
Assemblywill ww take a decisionon the draft resolution Syrian &ab Republic, Taristan, ?nailand, TheGeneralAssembly 90th meeting
Forty-ninthsession 15 December1994
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Togo. Portugal. Qatar. RepublicofKorea. Republic of
TrinidadandTobago,Tunisia,Turkey,Turkmenistan, Moldova,Romania.RussianFcderation,SaintKins
Uganda, Ukraine, United ArabEmirates, United and Nevis, Saint Lucia, SaintVincent andthe
RepublicofTanzania,Umguay,Uzbekistan,Vanuatu. Grenadii. Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia.
Venezuela. VietNam, Yemen. Zambia, Zimbabwe Senegal, Sierra Leone. Sigapore. Slovakia,
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa. Spain.
Againsr: SriLanka. Sudan. Suriname, Swaziland. Sweden,
Iran (IslamicRepublicof) Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand. The
FormerYugoslav Republic ofMacedonia, Togo,
Abstaining: Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia. Turkey.
Cuba, Democratic People's Republicof Korea, Turkmenistan, Uganda. Ukraine, United Arab
France. hdia. Mexico, Panama. UnitedKingdomof Emirates,United Republicof Tanzania, Uruguay,
Great Britain andNorthern Ireland. United States of Uzbekistan, Vanuam. Venezuela, Viet Nam.
America Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Theseventhpreambuiar paragraph was ndoprcdby Againsr:
159 votesto 1. with8 abstentions. Iran (IslamicRepublicof)
The Presldent (inrerpreratinromFrench):1shall Absraining:
nowput to the vote theeighthpreambular paragraph of the Algeria,Côted'lvoire, Cuba, Democratic People's
draitresolution mmmended by the First Cornmittee in Republicof Korea, France, India, Israel, Mexico,
paragraph7 of iu report. Panama, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Nonhern Ireland, UniteStatesof Amenca
A mded vote hasben requested.
Thc eighth preambuiar paragrapwhasadoptedby
A recordedwre wastaken. 156wres to 1, with11abstentions.
Infawur: The F'resident(inteiprernrionfrnrench):1shall
Afghanistan, Albani, ndorra,AntiguaandBarbuda. ncxt put to the vote operativeparagraph3 of the draft
Argentina. Armenia, Australia, ustria, Azerbaijan. resolution recommended by the First Comminee in
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh. Barbados,Belanis, paragraph7 of iu report.
Belgium, Belize, Benin. Bhutan, BolivB,otswana.
Brazil, Brunei Da~ssalam, Bulgaria. BurkinaFaso, A recorded vote haseen requested.
Bunmdi, Cambodia, Cameroon. Canada, Central
AfricanRepublic,Chile,Colombia, Comoros.Congo, A recorded vote wartaken.
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cypms. Czech Republic.
Denmark. Djibouti. Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, Infawur:
El Salvador.Eritrea.Estonia.Ethiopia,Fiji, Fiand. Afghanistan. Albania, hdorra, Antigua and
Gabon. Gambia,Genrgia. Germany.Ghana.Greecc, Barbuda. Argentins, Armenia, Australia,Austria.
Grenada. Guatemala. Guinea. Guyana. Haiti. Azetbaijan, Bahamas. Bahrain, Bangladesh.
Honduras.Hungary,Iceland. Indonesia, IraqI,reland. Barbados,Belanis,Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,
Italy, Jamaica, Japan. Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Bolivia. Botswana, Brazil. Brunei Darussalam,
Kuwait. Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Bulgaria. Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Republic, Latvia,Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyao Arab Camemon, Canada. Central African Republic,
Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Luxembourg. Chile, China, Colombia. Comoros. Congo. Costa
Madagascar. Malawi. Malaysia, Maldives. Mali. Rica. C6te d'lvoire, Cmatia, Cypm. Czech
Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauntania. Mauritius, Republic,Denmark,Djibouti, Dominica.Ecuador,
Micronesia (Federated States of). Mongolia. El Salvador, Eritrea. Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Morocco. Mozambique.Myanma, Namibia, Nepal, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany,
Netherlands, NewZealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Ghana. Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea,
Nigeria, Nonvay, Oman. Pakistan, Papua New Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary. Ieeland.
Guinea. Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Indonesia, Iraq. Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,GeneraiAssembly 90th meeting
15 December1994
Fortv-ninthsession
Jordan,Kazakhstan.Kenya. Kuwait.Kyrgyzstan.Lao Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia. Cameroon,
People's Democratic Republic, Lwia. Lebanon, Canada. Cape Verdc. Central African Republic.
Lesotho, Libyan Anb Jamahiiya, Liecbtnistein. Chile, Cbina.Colombia, Cornoros, Congo, Costa
Lithuania, Luxembourg. Madagascar, Malawi. Rica. Côte d'ivoire. Cmatia.Cuba.ypm. Czsh
Maldives.Mali, Malta.MarshallIslands.MaUritania. Republic.Denmark.Djibouti, Dominica,Ecuador.
Mauritius. Micronesia (Federated Statesof). Egypt.El Salvador.Eritrea,Estonia,Ethiopia,Fiji.
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar. Finland. Gabon. Gambia, Georgia. Germany.
Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands. New Zealand. Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala. Guinea,
Nicaragua.Niger. Nigeria,Nonvay,Oman. Pakistan, Guyana,Haiti, Honduras.Hungary.Iceland,India,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay. Peru, Philippines. Indonesia.Iraq. ireland, Israel. Italy. Jamaica.
Poland, Portugal, Qatar,RepublicofKorea.Republic Japan, Jordan. Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait.
ofMoldova,Roda. RussianFederation,SaintKitts Kyrgyzstan, Lao Pwple's Democratic Republic,
and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Latvia,Lebanon.Lesatho,LibyanArabJamabiriya.
Grenadines. Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Liechtenstein,Lithuania.Luxembourg,Madagascar,
Senegal.SierraLeone.Singapore.Slovakia.Slovenia, Malawi. Malaysia, Maldives, MalMalta,Marshall
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain. Sri Lanka, Islands, Mauritania.Mauritius,MexicMicronesia
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland.Sweden, Syrian Arab (Federated States of). Mongolia, Moroa'o,
Republic, Tajikistan,Thailand.TheFormerYugoslav Mozambique. Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal.
Republicof Macedonia.Togo. TrinidadandTobago. Netherlands. New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger.
Tunisia, Turkey,Turkmenistan. Uganda, Ukraine, Nigeria. Nonvay,Oman, Pakistan. Panama,Papua
United Arab Emirates. UniteRepublicof Tanzania. NewGuinea. Paraguay,Pem, Philippines.Poland,
Umguay. Uzbekistan,Venezuela,Viet Nam.Yemen, Pomigal. Qatar. Republicof Korea. Republic of
Zambia, Zimbabwe Moldova,Romania.RussianFederation, SaintKitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vinent and the
Againil: Grenadines. Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabi.
Iran (IslamicRepublic of) Senegal. Seychelles. Sierra Leone, Singapore.
Slovakia,Slovenia,SolomonIslands, South Africa.
Abstaining: Spain. SriLanka. Sudan. Suriname. Swaziland.
Algeria, Cuba. Democratic People's Republic of Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic. Tajikistan.
Korea, Egypt, France, India. Israel, Malaysia. Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Mexico, Panama, UnitedKingdomof Great Britain Macedonia,Togo, Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia.
and Northem Ireland. United States of America. Turkey, Turkmenistan. Uganda. Ukraine, United
Vanuatu Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan. Vanuatu, Venezuela.
Operaiiveparagraph3 was adopieàby155wtes to1, Viet Nam. Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
with 13 abstentions.
The Resldent (interpretm'ofrom French): 1shall
now put to the vote the drafi tesolution as a whole
recommendedby the Fit Commineeinparagraph7 of its Abstaining:
Democratic People's Republicof Korea, France.
repo't.
Iran (Islamic Republic of). United Kingdom of
A recordedvote has beenrequested. Great BritainandNorthemIreland,United Statesof
America
A recordedvoie was taken.
ntcdrq?resolutionas a wholewas adoptcd by 166
Infavour: wies toMIIC.wifh5absimn'o~ (resolution49/68).
Afghanistan,Albania.Algeria. Andorra, AntigAd
Barbuda, Argentins, Armenia. Australia, Austria.
Azerbaijan.Bahamas,Bahrain,Bangladesh.Barbados.
Belanis. Belgium, Belize. Benin. Bhutan.Bolivia.
Botswana. Br&, Bnuiei Ddam. Bulgaria.GeneralAssembly 90thmeeting
Fom-ninth session 15December1994
The President (inferprerarifrom French): May 1 Againsr:
take it that it is the wish of the General Assemblyto Israel, Russian Federation, Unitcd Kingdom of
concludeiu consideration of agenda it55? Great BritainandNorthernIreland,United Statesof
AmenCa
II wassodecided.
Absrainin:g
Agenda item 56 Albania. Andorra, Argentina. ArmeNa. Australia.
Austria. Azerbaijan, Belms. Belgium, Bulgaria,
Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Canada, Cmatia. Czech Republic, Denmark.
Tests in the Atmosphere. in Outer Space and under Estonia, Finland, Georgia. Germany. Gm.
Water: report of the First Cornmitîee (A1491693) Hungary, Iceland, Ireland. Itaiy. Japan. Latvia.
Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
The Resident (inteprelationfrom French): The Marshall Islands. Micronesia (Federatcd States of).
Assembly will now takeadecisionon the draft resolution Netherlands. New Zealand. Nonvay. Poland,
recommendedby theFint Committeeinparagraph8 of iîs Portugal.Republicof Korea. Republic ofMoldova.
=l'on. Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain. Sweden,
Tajikistan. 'Ibe Former Yugoslav Republic of
A recordedvote hasbeenrequated. Madonia, Twkey. Turlunenistan, Ukraine,
Vanuatu
A recordedvotewastaken.
Thedrufircsolutiowasadopledby 116wta ro4.
Infavour: wirh49 absrenrionsnsolution 49/69).
Afghanisian.Algeria.AntiguaandBarbuda,Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh. Barbados, Belize,Benin. TheResident (ituerpreraionfromFrench):May1
Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana. Brazil. Brunei take it that it is the wish of the General Assemblyto
Danissalam. Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia. concludeits consideration of agenda i56?
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,
Chile.Colombia,Cornoros,Congo, CostaRica,CBte Itwar sodecided.
d'Ivoire. Cuba, Cypms, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica,Ecuador, Agenda item 57
Egypt. El Salvador. Eritrea. Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon.
Gambia. Ghana. Grenada. Guatemala, Guinea, Comprehensive test-ban treaty: reporî of the Fïrst
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras. India, Indonesia, Iran Cornmittee (A1491694
(Islamic Republicof), Iraq, Jamaica. Jordan.
Kazakhstan, Kenya. Kuwait. Kyrgyzstan, Lao The Resident (ituerprerafifrom French): The
People's Democratic RepublicL. ebanon. Lesotho. Assembly willnow takea decisionon thedraftresolution
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Madagascar, Malawi, recommendedby the First Committeein paragrapb9 of
Malaysia. Maldives. Mali,Mauritania. Mauritius. its report.
Mexico, Mongolia. Morocco, Mozambique.
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua. Niger, The draii resolution entitled 'Comprehensive
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan. Panama. Papua New nuclear-test-ban treaty" was adopted by the First
Guinea, Paraguay. Pem, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Comminee without a vote. May 1 consider that the
Kitu and Nevis, SaintLucia. Saint Vincentand the Assembly wisha Io do thesame?
Grenadines. Samoa, SanMarino, Saudi Arabia.
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sigapore. Thedrafircsoluriowaradoptcd (resolution49/70).
Solomon Islands, South Africa,SriLanka ,udan.
Suriname, Swaziland, Synan Arab Republic, The Resident (interpretaiinromFrench): May1
Thailand. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia. take it th% it is the wish of theGeneral Assembly to
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of concludeits considerationof agendaitem 57?
Tanzania, uniguay, Uzbekistan. Venezuela,
Viet Nam, Yemen. Zambia, Zimbabwe IIw+ssodecidcd.General Assembly 90th meeting
Forty-ninthsession 15December1994
Agenda item 58 Jamaica, Japan. Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya.
Kuwait, Kyrgyutan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho.
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free wne in the LibyanArablamahiiya, Liechtenstein,Lithuania,
region of the Middle East: report of the FCrst Luxembourg, Malawi. Malaysia.Maldives, Mali,
Committee (A/49/695) Malta, Marshall Islands. Mauritania, Mcxiw,
Micmne-sia (Federd States of), Monam.
The President (interpretationfrom French):The
Mongolia,Mo-. Mozambique,NamibiaN , epal,
Assemblywill now take a decisionon thdraftresolution Netherlands, New Zealand. Nicaragua. Niger.
ncommended by the First Committee in paragraph10 of Nigeria,Noway, Oman, Pakistan.Panama,Papua
its report. Nw Guinea, Paraguay,Peru. Philippines.Poland.
Portugal, Qatar. Republic of Korea. Republic of
The draft resolution was adopted by the kt Moldova.Romania,RussianFederation. SaintKitts
Committee without a vote.May1takeit that theAssembly and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the
wishes.to do likewise?
Grenadiies, Samoa. San Marino. Saudi Arabia,
Senegal. Sierra Leone, Siagapore, Slovakia,
nte drap resolutionwm adopted(resolution49/71). Slovenia. Solomon Islands, South Afiica, Spain,
SriLanka ,udan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,
The Mident (interpretatifrom French):May 1 Tajikistau, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav
take it that it is the wish of the Generai Asscmbly to Republic of Macedonia. Togo. Trinidad and
wnclude its considerationof agenda item58? Tobago. Tunisia. Turkey, Turlanenistan, Uganda.
Ukraine, UnitedArabEmirates,UnitedKingdomof
It wasso decided. GreatBritainandNonhem Ireland.UnitedRepublic
of Tanzania. United Statesof America,Uruguay.
Agenda item 59 Uzbekistan,Venezuela.Yemen.Zambia,Zimbabwe
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free wne in South
Asia: report of thFimt Committee (A/49/6%)
The. President (interpretatifbm French): The Abstaining:
Assemblywill now take adecisionon the dmi resolution Algeria, Brazil, Cuba, Cypnis, Indonesia.Lao
recommendedby the First Committeein paragraph 7of its People's Democratic Republic. Madagascar,
report. Myanmar,Vanuatu,Viet Nam
A recorded votehas been requested.
Thedrapresolutionwas adoptedby156wtes to 3,
with10abstentions(resolution49/72).
A recordedvote wastdien
The President(intetpretationfiomFrench)May 1
Infawur: take it that it is the wish of the General Assemblyto
Afghanistan,Albania,Andona. AntiguaandBarbuda. wnclude its wnsideration ofagenda item59?
Argentina. Armenia, Australia,Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados,Belanis, Itwas sodecided.
Belgium. Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei
Danissalam, Bulgana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Agenda item 60
Cambodia.Camemn, Canada, CapeVerde, Central
AfricanRepublic,Chile,Chi. Colombia,Comoms. Conciusion ofeîïeetive internationarrangements to
Congo, Costa Rica. Côte d'Ivoire, Cmatia.Czech assurn eon-nuclear-weapon States against the w or
Republic, Denmark. Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador. threat ofuse of nuciear weapous: report of thFimt
Egypt, El Salvador, Entrea, Estonia, Ethiopia. FijCommittee (A14916971
Finland.France, Gabon,Gambia,Georgia,Germany.
Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala. Guinea, The President (inierpretatifiom French): The
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras. Hungary. Iceland, Iran Assemblywillnowtakea decisiononthedmi resolution
(Islamic Republicof), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,GeneralAssembly 90th meeting
Fom-ninth session 15December1 994
recommendedby the Fint Committeeinparagraph 7 of its Abstaining:
report. France. United Kingdom of Grea~ Britain and
Northem Ireland, United Statesof hneri~
A rewrded vote has been requested.
The draflresolutionwnradoptai by 168 votesto
A recordedvotewastaken. none,wirh 3 abstention(resolutio49/73).
Infawur: The Presldent(intetpretotionfroFrench): May1
Afghanistan, Albania,Algena, Andorra, Antiguaand take it thaî it is the wish of the GeneralAssembIO
Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austna, wnclude its considerationof agendaitem60?
Azerbaijan,Bahamas,Bahrain,Bangladesh.Barbados.
Belanis. Belgium, Belizc, Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia. Irwnrso decidai.
Botswana, Brazil. Brunei Darussalam. Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,Cameroon. Agenda item61
Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,
Chile. China, Colombia. Comoros, Congo, Costa Prevention of an arms race in outer space: reportof
Rica. Càted'Ivoire. Croatia, Cuba, Cypms, Czech the FirstCornmittee (A1491698)
Republic. DemocraticPeople's Republic of Korea,
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica. Ecuador. Egypt, The Resident (interpretatiofrom French): The
El Salvador,Eritrea,Estonia,Ethiopia, FFinland, Assembly willnowtake adecisionon thedraftresolution
Gabon, Gambia.Georgia.Germany.Ghana.Greece, recommendedby the Fint Committee in paragraph7 of
Grenada. Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti. its repon.
Honduras, Hungary. Iceland. India, Indonesia.Iran
(Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland. Israel. Italy, Separaterecorded votes havebeenrequested on the
Jamaica,Japan. Jordan.Kazakhstan,Kenya.Kuwait, eightee& preambular paragraph and on paragraphs 8
Kyrgyutan, Lao People's Democratic Republic. and 10.
Latvia. Lebanon. Lesotho. LibyanArab Jamahinya.
Liechtenstein,Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar. 1sthere any objectionto that request?
Malawi. Malaysia. Maldives.Mali, Malta. Marshall
Islands. Mauritania. Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia As then is no objection,1shallput to the voteFust
(Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, the eighteenthpreambular paragraph.
Mozambique. Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Niger, A recordeàwte wastaken.
Nigeria,Nonvay, Oman. Pakistan, Panama. Papua
New Guinea. Paraguay. Pem. Philippines, Poland. Infawur:
Portugal, Qatar. Republic of Korea, Republic of Afghanistan. Algeria. Antigua and Barbuda,
Moldova, Romania. Russian Federation, SaintKim Argentina. Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan,
and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Bahamas. Bangladesb. Barbados. Belanu, Belize.
Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino. Saudi Arabia. Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana.Brazil, Bmei
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sigapore, Danusalam. Burkina Faso, Burundi. Cambodia.
Slovakia. Slovenia, SolomonIslands. South Africa. Cameroon, Canada, CapeVerde. Central Africao
Spain. Sri Lanka. Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Republic, Chile, China. Colombia. Comoros.
Sweden,Synan ArabRepublic,Tajikistan,Thailand. Congo, Costa Rica, Cbte d'Ivoire. Cuba,Cypm,
TheFormerYugoslavRepublicof Macedonia,Togo. Democratic People'sRepublicof Kom, Djibouti,
TrinidadandTobago,Tunisia,Turkey.Turkmenistan. Dominica,Ecuador. Egypt, El Salvador. Ethiopia.
Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates. United Fiji, Gabon. Gambia.Ghana, Gd, Guatemala.
RepublicofTanzania,Umguay,Uzbekislan.Vanuatu, Guinea.Guyana.Haiti. Honduras.India.Indonesia.
Ven~uela. Viet Nam. Yemen. Zambia.Zimbabwe
Iran (IslamicRepublicof). Iraq. Jamaica, Jordan.
Kazakhstan. Kenya. Kuwait. Kyrgyutan. Lao
Againsr: People's Democratic RepublicL. ebanon, Lesotho,
None Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya. Madagascar. Malaysia,
Maldives, Mali. Marshall Islands.Mauritania,GeneralAssembly 90th meeting
Foriy-ninthsession 15December1994
Mauritius,Mexiw. Micronesia(FederatedStatesof),. Iran(IslamicRepublicof), Iraq. Jamaica, Jordan.
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar. Kazakhstan, Kenya. Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan. Lao
Namibia, Nepal. New Zealand. Nicaragua, Niger, People'sDemocraticRepublic. Lebanon, Lesotho.
Nigeria. Oman. Pakistan, Panama. Papua New Libyan Arab Jamahiiya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Guinea,Paraguay.Pem, PhilippinesQatar,Republic Malaysia, Maldives, Mali. Marshall Islands,
ofKorca.RussianFederation,Saint Kim and Nevis. Mauritania, Mauritius. Mcxiw. Microncsia
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincen tnd the Grenadines, (Federated States of), Mongolia, Mo-.
Samoa. San Marino, SaudiArabia. Scnegal, Sierra Mozambique, Myanmar. Namibia. Nepai, New
Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands. SouthAhica, Zealand. Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria, Oman.
SriLanka ,udan,Suriname,Swaziiand.SyrianArab Pakistan. Panama. Papua New Guinea. Paraguay.
Republic, Tajikistan. Thailand. Togo,Trinidad and Pem. Phiiippincs. Qatar. Republic of Korea.
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan. Uganda. Ukraine, Russian Federation. SainKins and Nevis. Saint
United ArabEmira~es.UnitedRepublicof Tanzania. Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa,
Umguay, Uzbekistan. Vanuatu, Venezuela. San Marino, Saudi Arabia. Senegai,Sierra Leone,
Viet Nam, Yemen.Zambia. Zimbabwe Singaporc, Solomon Islands. South Africa,
Sri LankaS .udan Suriname,Swaziland. Syrian
Againrr: ArabRepublic.Tajikistan.Thailand.Togo,Trinidad
UnitedStatesof America and Tobago. Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda.
Ukraine.UnitedArabEmirates.United Republicof
Absraining: Tanzania. Umguay. Uzbekistan. Venezuela.
Albania. Andorra, Austria. Belgium, Buigaria, Viet Nam. Yemen, Zambia. Zimbabwe
Cmatia,CzeebRepublic.Denmark.Estonia,Finland,
France, Georgia. Gerrnany, Greece. Hungary, Againri:
Iceland, Ireland. Israel, Italy, Japan. Laivia, United Statesof Amcnca
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg. Malta,
Monaco. Netherlands. Norway. Poland. Portugal. Abstaining:
Republicof Moldova, Romania. Slovakia.Slovenia, Albania, Andorra. Austria, Belgium, Buigaria.
Spain, Sweden. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Cmatia. Czech Republic. Denmark. Estonia.
Macedonia.Turkey. UnitedKingdomofGreatBritain Finland. France. Germauy, Greece, Hungary.
and Northem Ireland Iceland. Ireland, Isracl. Italy. Japan, ktvia,
Liechtenstein. Lithuania. Luxembourg. Malta.
Theciglueentpreambubrparagraphwasadoptcdby Monaco, Ncthcrlands. Nonvay. Poland, Portugal.
128wtes to 1. with39 abstentions. RepublicofMoldova,Romania.Slovakia,Slovenia.
Spain. Sweden,The Former YugoslavRepublicof
The Rgident (interpretatJrom French) :shall Macedonia, Turkey. United Kingdom of Grrat
now put to the vote paragraph8. Brilainand Northem ireland
A recordcdwte wastaken. Paragrogh8 wasadoptedby129wtes ro1, wirh38
abstnnnnons.
Infawur:
TheMdent (interprnm'onJromFrench): 1shall
Afghanistan. Aigeria. Antigua and Barbuda.
Argentina.Armenia.Australia,Azerbaijan,Bahamas. next put to the voteoperativeparagraph 10.
Bangladesh. Barbados, Belanis, Belize, Benin.
Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazii. Btunei A recordcdwte wartaken.
Darussalam. Burkina Faso. Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde. Central African Infowur:
Republic.Chile. Chi. Colombia.Comoros,Congo. Afghanistan, Algeria. Antigua and Barbuda.
CostaRica. C6ted'Ivoire.Cuba,Cypm, DemocAic Bangladesh. Barbados, Belanis. Belize. Benin.
People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Bhutan. Bolivia. Botswana. Brazii. Brunei
Eniador, Egypt, El Salvador.Ethiopia; Fiji. Gabon, Darussalam. Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Gambia. Georgia, Ghana. Grenada. Guatemala. Camemon,Cape Verde, CentralAfrie Republic,
Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,India. indonesia. Chile, China. Colombia.Comoms, Congo. CostaGeneral Assembly 90th meeting
Fony-ninthsession 15December 1994
Rica, Cuba,Cyp~s, DemocraticPeople'sRepublicof Infavour:
Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, Afghanistan, Albania,Algeria, Andorra, Anrigua
El Salvador. Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia.
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana,Haiti, Austria,Azerbaijan,Bahamas.Bahrain.Bangladesh,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic Barbados.Belanis,Belgium, Belize, Benin, hutan.
of). Iraq, Jamaica. Jordan. Kenya, Kuwait, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil. Brunei Darussalam.
Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Burkiia Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Lebanon,Lesotho, Libyan Arab JamahiriyaM , alawi, Cameroon, Canada, CapeVerde, Central African
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Republic, Chile, China, Colornbia, Comoros.
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia Congo, Costa Rica, Côted'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba,
(Federated States of). Mongolia, Morocco, Cypms, Czech Republic, Dernocratic People's
Mozambique, Myanmar, NamibiaN , epal,Nicaragua. Republicof Korea. Denmark,Djibouti, Dominica,
Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Ecuador, Egypt. El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia,
Guinea, Paraguay.Perd. Philippines, Qatar, Saint Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia,
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vinceatnd the Georgia, Gerrnany. Ghana, Greece, Grenada,
Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Guatemala, Guinea. Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Senegal,Sierra Leone. Singapore,SolomonIslands, Hungary. Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq,Ireland,
South Africa. Sri Lanka. Sudan, Suriname, Israel, Italy. Jamaica, Japan, Jordan. Kazakhstan.
Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand T,ogo, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's
Trinidadand Tobago,Tunisia. Uganda, United Arab Democratic Republic. Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Emirates. United Republic of Tanzania, Umguay. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Venezuela, VietNam. Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi. Malaysia,
Maldives. Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands,
Againsr: Mauritania. Mauritius. Mexico, Micronesia
United Statesof America (FederatedStatesof), Monaco, Mongolia.Morocco,
Mozambique, Myanmar. Namibia. Nepal,
Absraining: Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Niger,
Albania. Andorra, Argentina, Armenia. Australia, Nigeria, Norway. Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belgium, Bulgaria, NewGuinea, Paraguay,Perd. Philippines, Poland,
Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic. Pomgal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Denmark. Estonia, Finiand, France. Georgia, Moldova.Romania,RussianFederation, SaintKitts
Germany,Greece, Hungary, Iceland,Ireland, Israel. and Nevis. Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the
Italy. Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein. Grenadines, Samoa,San Marino, Saudi Arabia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg,Malta,Monaco,Netherlands, Senegal, Seychelles. Sierra Leone, Singapore,
NewZealand, Norway,Poland,Portugal, Republicof Slovakia, SloveniaSolomonIslands, South Africa,
Korea. Republic of Moldova. Rornania, Russian Spain. Sri Lanka. Sudan. Suriname, Swaziland,
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic. Tajikistan.
Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Turkey.Turkmenistan,Ukraine, United Macedonia.Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia.
Kingdom of Great Britainand Northern Ireland, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine,United
Uzbekistan Arab Emirates, United Kingdomof Great Britain
andNorthemIreland,UnitedRepiiblicofTanzania,
Operativeparagraph 10 wasadoptedby 111votesfo Umguay, Uzbekistan, Vanudtu, Venezuela,
Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
1. with54 abstenrions.
The President(inrerprerationfrom French): 1shall
now put to the vote the draft resolution, as a whole.
A recorded votehas beenrequested. Absraining:
United States of America
A recorded vote was taken. GeneralAssembly 90th meeting
Forty-ninthsession 15December1994
Thedrafl resolufiom. a whole,wmadoprcdby170 'Ibisstateofaffairsiswellhown toal1delegations.
votesfo none, withI absfenfion(resolution 49/74). includiig the sponsorsof the draftresolution.However.
on the eve of the1995extensionConference,there is a
The Resident (iNerprefOnonfornm French): May 1 desireto put in the dockthe nuclear Powersrewgnized
take itthat it is the wish of the General Assemblyto by that insuurnent of internationallaw known as the
concludeits considerationof agendaitem61? Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons,
signedby more tba n60wuntries; andthisisdoneaithe
Ir wm JOdecided. vety limewbenit is clear that thosenuclear Powers are
fully shouldering their responsibiiity and remabhg
Agenda item 62 faithfulto their wmmitments. This desire to accuhe
nuclcir Powers secms to ounveigh respectfor the
General and complete disarmament: repori of the Fint indepeodenceof one ofthe most essentialinstitutionsof
Cornmittee (A/49/699) the UnitedNations system.
The President (inferprerationfromFrench):1cal1on Those who wish to use for partisan purposes an
the representativeof France.on a pointof order. institutioas respected as the international Coun of
Justiceare indeed assuminga senous responsihilit-
Mr. Ladsous (France)(interprefationfrom French): and 1insiston the word 'senous", for, hy attemptingto
This year some delegations in theAssembly chose to bring hitheno unwitnessedpressure tobearin order to
submit in the First Comminee drafl resolution diven chatjuridiction hm ils exclusive mission. the
AIC.1149lL.36,entitled "Requestforanadvisoiyopinion sponsorsof draft resolutiKnwilldo senousand lasting
from the InternationalCoun of Justice on the legalityof damageto thecreditof the InternationalCoun of Justice
the threat or use of nuclear weapons". mis draft and to its imageas an impartialbody.
resolutionwassubminedfor wnsiderationdespitethe fact
that theAssemblyof the World Health Organizationhad For those reasons. therefore, my delegation,
adopted a similar nsolution in 1993. nie International regretfully. is forced. in accordancewith de 74 of the
CounofJusticeisat thisvetytimeconsideringthat request ûcneral Asscmbly's des of procedure. to move the
by the Assemblyof theWorld Health Orgaaizationforan adjoummentof draft resolutioK in paragraph60of the
advisory opinion, as well as the memonals already FirstComminm's repon (Al491699). My delegation
would also movethat a recorded vote be taken on tbis
transmittedby morethan 27 States.
motion. For its part, France hopes tbat the largest
On a numberof occasions my delegationbas drawn possible number of delegations, aware of the
accent-n to what we believe to be the inappmpnate. responsibiiityincumbentupon them.will vote in favour
supemuous and ill-foundedsubmissionin this body of of this motionfor non-action.
anotheirequestfor anadvisory opinion.Atthetimeof the
voting on the draft resolution in the Firstommirtec. The President (imerpretarionfrom French): The
Francewmmented at lengthon the underlyingmotivesof repremtative of Francehas moved, in acwrdancewith
the sponsorsof the text, andill not goover chatagain. de 74 of the Assembly'sdes of procedure, that no
decisionbe takenon drafi remlutioK in paragraph60
However.the draftresolution thatis nowbeforeus- of documentAl491699.Rule74 reads as follows:
althoughthe Coun hasnotyet repliedto thfia request-
is onceagain airnedat obtaininan urgent responseon a 'During the discussion of any matter, a
matter that.as al1 ofus in the Assemblyare awam. is representativemay move theadjoumment of thc
purely politicai and has ken the subject of numemus debate onthe itemunder discussion.in additionto
controversies.This situation isparticularlyregrettable in the proposerof the motion,tworepresentativesmay
thelightofthefactthatthe authontyofthe decisionsofthe speak in favour of, and hvo against. the motion.
tribunal inheHague,whichistheprincipaljudicialorgan after whichthe motionshallbe immediatelyput to
of the United Nations. is based on ils handimgd&vn the vote..."
decisions foundedon law andtaking care not to make
politicaljudgements. 1 shall now cal1upon hvo dclegafionswishing to
speakin favourof the motion.General Assembly 90th meeting
Forty-ninthsession 15 December1994
but note that there is a profond division withii the 'Dunng the discussion of any matter, a
Assemblyon the appropriatenessof this drakïresolution. repmtative may move the adjoumment of the
debateon the itemunder discussion. In additionto
1 have already strongly emphasized the French the pmposerofthemotion,two representativesmay
delegation'swncem that the InternationalCourtof Justice speak in favour of. and two against, the motion,
not beput in thesituation ofbeingpressuredby a specific akïerwhich the motionshall be immediatelyput to
group. This desire therefore prompts my delegation to the vote."
propose to the Assembly an .amendment to drafi
resolutionK. This amendment wouid delete from the 1now dl on the two representativeswho wish to
requestto the IntemationalCourtofJusticein theoperative speakagainst themotion.
paragraph of the draft resolution the word 'urgently".
Funhermore, my delegationwould like this amendment, Mr. Ladsous (France)(intepretation fromFrench):
which would ensure the freedom of a jundical body to My delegation notes with regret thewish expressed by
make its own assessment,to besubmined to a ncorded the delegationwhichsubmineddraft resolutionKthat no
vote. indepth wnsideration be given to the amendment
submittedby France. Thiswnfirnis both tha there are
The Prsident (interpretation from French): The those who fear that the Assembly will opt for a
representativeof France has submittedan oral amendment reasonableattitude and the intentionof the sponson of
to theoperativeparagraphofdraft resolutiK. callingfor the drafiresolurionto exertpressureon the International
the deletion of the word 'urgently" from the text of the Court of Justice.
operative paragraph.
In these circumstances, my delegation can only
1cal1on the representativeof Indonesiaon a pointof oppose the motion forno actionthahasbeen made and
order. we hope that arecordedvotecan be takento that effect.
My delegation takes this oppomuiity to appeal to
Mr. Wiranataatmadja (Indonesia):For the reasons delegations thathavesofar supponed us to oppose the
1describedearlier. mydelegationwishesto makea motion motion when it is put to the vote.
for no actionon the amendment proposed by France. his
is for the simple reason that a decisiobmas madeat Mr. Gelber(UnitedStatesof America):TheUnited
two Ministenal Meetingsof the Non-AlignedMovement. Statesdelegationwill opposethemposedmotionfor no
If, for example. a country intends to wme up with action on the French amendment.We believe that the
compromiselanguage in good faith, this shouldbe done French amendmentwill at least temper an inappropriate
prior to the actionwe are taking now. useofthe InternationalCourtof Justice,aspectedlegal
institution, for whatcan only be seen as political
Mr. Razali (Malaysia): The Malaysian delegation purposes. The removalof the word "urgently"fmm the
fully suppons the motion made by the delegation of draft resolutionwould shield the Court'scalendarfrom
Indonesia. We totally oppose this attempt to amend the unnecessarypoliticalpressure and chaos.
drafiresolutionbeforeus. Wewouldappeatlo al1members
of the GeneralAssemblyto take into accountthe fact that Mr. Moradi (Islamic Republic of Iran): 1 am
the First Cornmitteehas pronounced itself on this dmîl speakingto supportthemotionfornoactionproposedby
resolutionand that an attempt just now to makea motion the repmtative of lndonesia on the amendment
for no action was defeated. We wouid now urgethanto pmposedhy France.
funher devicesbe allowedto preventthe adoptionof this
draft resolution. First. we think that membersof the international
wmmunity should be able to explore every avenueto
The President (intepretation from French): The establisha worldfre rom thethreat.use or deployment
representativeofdonesia, secondedby the representative of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
of Malaysia,has moved.withii the ternisof mle 74of the desuuction. Sewndly, the sponsorsof dmîl resolutions
mles of procedure, that no action be taken on the oral before the Assemblyhave submitted them inexerciseof
amendmentsubmittedbytherepresentativeof France. Rule theirinalienableright under the Charter of the United
74 readsas follows: Nations enwuraging Staîesto seekadvisoryopinionson
issues wheneverthey deem nccessary.ïhe Charterdoes GeneralAssembly 90th meeting
Fony-ninth session 15December1994
-
notexcluderecourseto an advisoryopiniononthe legality Norway. Poland. Pomigal, Romania, Russian
of the use orthrcat of use of nuclear weapons. Thirdly, Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia. Spain,
this issue, namely to seek an advisory opinion on the Tajikisuin. The Former Yugoslav Republic of
legalityof the tbreat or use ofnuciearweaponsbas been Macedonia, Togo. Turkey, Ukraine, United
considered seriously at the highest level among the KinHom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
membersof the Non-AlignedMovement.whichrepresent United Statesof America
the will ofthe overwbelmingmajorityof the international
wmmunity. Abstaining:
Antigua andBarbuda,Austria.Azerbaijan,Baiuain,
ïherefore, we support the mtion for no action Belize, Camemon. Chie, Cmatia. Dominica,
proposedby Indonesia,and weurge other MemberStates Gambia,Ghana,Guatemala,Guinea,Haiti,Ireland,
to supportit by casting a positivevote. Jamaica, Kuwait. Kyrgyzstan. Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Micronesia (FederatcdStatesof). New
The Resident (interpretationnfrFrench):Wehave Zealand, Niger, Pem, San Marino. Saudi Arabia,
just hcard Iwo speakers in favourof the motion and Iwo Swaziland.Tunisia, Uzbekistan,Vmzue1a
against.
Themotionwasaàopfad by61 wtes IO56, wirh30
1shall now put to the vote the motion submittedby abstentions.
therepresentativeof Indonesiathno actionbe takenon
the oral amendmentsubmined by the representativeof The President (interpretntfrom French):Since
France. the motionhas beenadopted,no actionwillbe takenon
the oral amendmentsubmined by the reptesenîativeof
A record4 votehas ban rcquestedon this motion. France.
A recorded votewas taken. Underthis item, theFirst Comminee,in its report
(A/49/699), has rewmmcndcd to the Assembly the
Infavour: adoptionof 16 drafrtsolutions.wntainedin paragraph
Afghanistan, Algeria. Bahamas. Bangladesh, 60. and onedraf deçision,wntained in paragraph61.
Barbados, Bhutan,Bolivia,Botswana,Brazil,Brunei
Darussalam.BurkinaFaso,Burundi.Colombia,Cuba, 1 shall now cal1on tboserepmentatives whowish
Cypms, Democratic People'sRepuMic of Korea, to explaintheir votesbeforethe voting.
Eniador, Egypt,Grenada,Guyana.Honduras.India,
Indonesia, Iran(IslamicRepublicof). Jordan,Kenya, Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine):1 would lie to thank the
Lesotho, LibyanArab lamahiriya. Malaysia. Mali, Rapporteurof the Firstornmirtee,who menlioncdmy
Mexiw. Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal. wuntry in wnnection withits accessionto the Treatyon
Nigeria, Oman. Pakistan. Papua New Guinea,
the Non-Proliferationof NuclearWeapons(NPT).
Paraguay, Philippines, Sainttts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenad'i, Samoa, The recent accession of Ukraine to the NPT
Singapore,SolomonIslands,SouthAnica. Sri Lanka, repments a dccisivecontributionto thestrengtheningof
Sudan, Suriname, Swedcn, Synan Arab Republic. thenon-proliferationregimeon theeveofthe 1995NPT
Thailand, Uganda, United Republicof Tanzania, reviewand extension Conference. Thishistoricstephas
Umguay, Viet Nam. Yemen.Zambia,Zimbabwe openedup a new era and has givengreat impenisIo the
process of nuclear disarmament.It elited the last
Against: obstacle in the way of implcmenting START1 and
Albania, Andom, Argentins, Armenia, Australia, opened up oppottunities for the prompt ratificationof
Belm, Belgium. Benin. Bulgaria. Cambodia, START 11.Itreafîim thefact thatUkrainewntinues to
Canada. Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech bea responsiblememberof the internationalwmmunity
and a reliableinternationalpmer.
Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Eritrea, ~sto&a.
Finland,France. Gabon,Georgia.Gennany. Greece.
Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Thisdecisionwas takenby theUkrainianleadership
Latvia, Luxembourg. Maldives, Malta, Marshall inthemidstofacomplexeconomicandpoliticalsimation
Islands,Mauntania,Monaw, Moroceo,NecherIaods, inUkraine. Its implemmtationwill require additionalGeneralAssembly 90th meeting
Fom-ninth session 15December1994
expenditure and economic sacrificc~on the pan of the Mr. Rudolpb (Germany): 1 have the honour to
Ukrainian people. In taking this historic decision. the speakon behalfof the EwopeanUnionandthe acdig
Parliament of Ukraine was wunting on an appmpriate States,Austria. Finland and Sweden.
response fmm the world mmmunity to our State's
voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons. This is We stronglywelwmed the accessionof Ukraine to
something thathad never becn done before in the hiitory the Treatyon the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons
of mankind. With regard to disarmament issues. the (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weaponState on 5 December
delegationof Ukraineis aware of the greai responsibiiity 1994. We acknowledgethe speedy implementationof
borneby every MemberState,in tem of Ihcpreacrvation Ukraine's conunitmentto becomea Statefreo ef nuclear
oftheTmty ontheNon-Proliferationof NuclearWeapons weapons.We are wnvinced that this importantstepwill
(NPT) and nuclear disarmament. prepare the path for the full implementationof the
StrategicArms ReductionTaiks (START)tmties. and
Mr. Zaki (Maldives):My explanationof vote refers the continuationof the nuclear disarmamentpmcess.
to drafi resolutioK. entitled "Raquest for an advisory
opinion from the International Couri of Justice on the We cal1 upon Ukraine to wnclude as soon as
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons", in possible a full-scope safeguards-agreement with the
document Al491699. InternationalAtomicEnergy Agency(IAEA) acmrd'ig
to artic3eof the NPT.
The question of the legality of the use of nuclear
weaponsis one that maalciid has long soughtto resolve. ThePresident(interprerarionfromFrench): 1shall
Today. in thedemuth of the wld war whenbopes for a nowput the 16draft resolutionsandthedraftdecisionto
new world order arc beiig raised, the answer to the the Assembly one byone. Once ail the decisionshave
questionhasbeenveryclear. Maldivesis very gladto note been taken. representatives will again have the
that positive efforts are beiig made towards overall oppominityto explaintheir votes.
disarmament,inparticularwithregardto nuclear weapons.
In this respect. the 1995 NPT review and extension We shall first turn to draft resolutionA, entitled
Conference and the ongoing negotiations on a "Prohibitionof the dumpingof radioactivewastes".
wmprehensivetest-bantmty withii the frameworkof the
Conferenceon Disarmament can benotedwithsatisfaction. The First Cornminez adopted draft resolution A
Nevenheless,mydelegationbelievesthattheuseofnuclcar without a vote.
weaponsor any weaponsof mass destruction is a crime
againsthumanity and shouid not be permined under any May 1 take it that the Assemblywishes to do the
circumstances.We feel that the world shouidnot only same?
wndemn the use of such weapons but also wnsider the
development.productionanduseofsuchweaponsasillegal DrafrresolurionAwa~odoptcd(resolution49175A).
and immoral.
The Resident (inrerpretationfrom French): Draft
That is why Maldives supported in the First resolution Bisentitled'Reviewof theDeclarationofthe
Cornmitteethe draft resolution nowbefore us entitled 1990sas the ThiudDisarmamentDecade".
'Request for an advisory opinion fmm the International
Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of A recordcdvoie has been requested.
nuclear weapons".
A ncorded vote was taken.
However,owingto the lack of wnsensus wncerning
the produre of asking the InternationalCoun of Justice Infawur:
(ICI) for an opinion at this time, and king awan in Afghanistan, Algeria. Andorra. Antigua and
particular thatthe ICJ is engagedin the considerationof a Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
similarsubject.wnsidered by some Membersas identical, Bahamas,Bahrain, Bangladesh,Barbados, Belize.
my delegationnow feels that the General Assemblymay Benin, Bhutan.Bolivia, Botswana,Brazil, Brunei
pmdently defer taking a decisionon this draft resolution Danissalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
thisyear. Therefore.mydelegationwill abstaininthe vote Cambodia.Camemon,CapeVerde,Central Afncan
on draft resolutionK. Republic. Chile, China, Colombia, Comorw,General Assembly
Fom-ninth session
Congo. Costa Rica, CBte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cypm, Sice that is not thecase,1 fmt put to the vote
Czech Republic, Democmic People's Republicof operativeparagraph4 @).
Korea. Djibouti. Dominica. Ecuador. Egypt. W
Salvador, Eritrea. Estonia, Erhiopia. Fiji. Gabon, A recordai wte was takcn.
Germany. Ghana, Grnec, Grenada. Guatemala,
Guinea. Guyana. Hairi. Honduras. India, Indonesia. In favour:
Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland. Italy, Albania.Andorra.Antigua andBarbuda.Argentina.
Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyut&, Lao Armenia,Australia,Austria, Azcrbaijan,Bahamas,
People's Democratic Republic.Lebanon. Lesotho, Bahrain.Bangladesh. Barbados.Belanis, Belgium,
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Liechtenstei. adagascar, Belize, Benin. Bhutan, Bolivia.Botswana.Brazil.
Malaysia. Maldives, Mali,Malta. Marshall Islands, Brunei Danusalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso.
Mauritania, Mauritius. Mexico, Micronesia Cambodia, Camemn, Canada, Cape Verde,
(Federated States of), Mongolia, Mo-. CentralAfricanRepublic.Chile. Comoms.Congo.
Mozambique,Myanmar.Namibia.Nepal.Nicaragua. Costa Rica.CBted'Ivoire. Croatia,Cypm. Czech
Niger. Nigeria Nonvay, Oman. Pakistan, Panama. Republic.Denmark,Djibouti, Dominifa,Eniador.
Papua New Guinea. Paraguay. Peru. Philippines. El Salvador, Entrea. Estonia, Ethiopia. Fiji.
Portugal, Qatar, Romania. SaintKitts and Nevis, Fiand. France. Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Saint Lucia. Saint Vimt and the Grenadhes. Germany. Greecc. Grenada. Guatemala. Guinea.
Samoa. San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Scnegal, Guyana, Haiti. Honduras. Hungq, Iccland,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone. Sigapore. Slovakia, Ireland, Israel. Italy. Jamaica, Japan. Ka.mkbtan.
Slovenia.SolomonIslands. South Africa. Spain, Sri Kenya. Kuwait. Kyrgyutan. Latvia. Lesotho,
Lanka.Sudan.Suriname.Swaziland. Sweden,Syrian Liechtenstein,Lithuania. Luxembourg. Madagascar.
Arab Republic. Thailand. Togo. Trinidad and Malawi. Malaysia.Maldives. Mali,Malta.Marshail
Tobago.Tunisia,Turkmdstan. Uganda, UnitedArab Islands. Mauritania. Mauritius, Micronesia
Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, (FederatedStatesof),Monaco, Mongolia.Morocu>.
Uzbekistan.Vanuatu,Venezuela. VietNam. Yemen. Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zambia, Zimbabwe Zealand, Nicaragua. Niger. Nigeria, Nonvay.
Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea. Paraguay.
Against: Pem,Philippines.Poland.Portugal,Qatar,Republic
France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and of Korea,Republicof Moldova, Romania.Russian
Nonhem Ireland, UnitedStatesof America Federation,SaintKittsand Nevis. SaintLucia.Saint
Vint and the Grenadines,Samoa. SanMarino.
Senegal. Sierra Leone. Singapore, Slovakia.
Abstaining:
Albania. Argentins, Belanis, Belgium, Canada. Slovenia, Solomon Islands. South Afnca, Spain,
Croatia,Denmark,Finland,Georgia,Hungaty.israel. Suriname. Swaziland. SwedenT,ajikistaThailand,
Japan. Kazakhstan. Lamia. Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Netherlands. New Zealand, Poland. Republic of Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, nirkey,
Korea. Republic of Moldova. Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Uganda. Ukraine. UnitedArab
Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine Notthern Ireland. United Republic of Tanzania,
United Statesof America. Uruguay, UzbeaStan.
DrafrresolutionBwasadopfui by139wtu to th?@?, Vanuatu. Venezuela, ZambiaZ. imbabwe
with 26 nbsrenn'o~(resolution49/75 B).
Against:
The Rgident (interpretationfrom French):Drafi None
mlution C is entitled'Transparencyin armaments".
Abstaining:
Separate, reeorded votes have been requested on Afghanisian. Algeria, China, Colombia, Cuba.
operativeparagraphs4 @) and6. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India.
Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of). Jordan.
1sthere any objectionto this request? Libyan hb Jamahiriya, Mexico. Myanmar,
Pakistan.SaudiArabia, SrLanka SudanGeneralAssembly 90th meeting
Forn-ninth session ISDecember1994
Operativeparagraph4 (b)war adopted by 145 votes Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Myanmar. Pakistan, Sri
to none, with 17 abstenrions. Lanka.Sudan
The President (inrerpretafionfrFrench):1nowput Operariveporagraph6 wardopied by145 votesto
to the vote operativeparagraph6. 4,with 11 absre~m'ons.
A recordai vote was taken. The Resldtnt (inierprefluionfromFrench):1shall
nowput to the vote draftresolutionC. as a whole.
lnfawur:
Albania, Andorra, Antigua andBarbuda,Argentina, A recordedvote hasbeenrequested.
AImenia. Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas.
Bahrain. Bangladesh. Barbados.Belarus, Belgium. A recorded vote war taken.
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,Botswana. Brazil.
BruneiDmssalam, Bulgaria, BurkinaFaso. Burundi, Infavour:
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde. Central Albania.Andorra, Antigua andBarbuda,Argentina,
African Republic, Chile. Comoros. Congo, Costa Armenia, Australia,Austria,Azerbaijan.Bahamas,
Rica, Côte d'Ivoire. Croatia. Spms, Czech Bahrain,Bangladesh. Barbados,Belarus, Belgium.
Republic,Denmark,Djibouti. Dominica, EcuadorE .l Belize, Benin,Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana,Brazil,
Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopi, iji, Finland, Brunei Damsalam. Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
France.Gabon,Gambia,Georgia,Germany,Greece, Burundi. Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape
Grenada. Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana. Haiti, Verde. Central African Republic, Chile, China,
Honduras, Hungary,Iceland. Ireland, Israel, Italy, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte
Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya. Kuwait, d'Ivoire. Croatia, Cypms, Czech Republic.
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia. Lesotho. Liechtenstein, Denmark. Djibouti. Dominica. Ecuador,
Lithuania. Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, El Salvador, Eritrea. Estonia. Ethiopia. Fiji,
Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Finland. France. Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (FederateSues Germany. Ghana. Greece, Grenada. Guatemala,
of). Monaco, Mongolia. Morooco. Mozambique, Guinea. Guyana, Haiti. Honduras, Hungary.
Namibia. Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Ifeland. Ireland. Israel. Italy, Jamaica, lapan,
Nicaragua. Niger,Nigeria,Nonvay, Oman. Panama. Kazakhstan. Kenya. Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, LaNia.
Papua New Guinea. Paraguay, Pem, Philippines, Lesotho. Liechtenstein,Lithuania. Luxembourg.
Poland. Portugal,Qatar,Republic of Korea, Republic Madagascar. Malawi. Malaysia, MaldivesM , ali,
ofMoldova,Roda, RussianFederation. SaintKitis Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania. Mauritius,
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, SaintVincent and the Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco.
Grenadines. Samoa.San Marino. Senegal.Sierra Mongolia.Morocco,Mozambique. NamibiaN . epal.
Leone, Singapore, Slovakia. Slovenia, Solomon Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,
Islands, South Africa, Spain, uriname. Swaziland. Nigeria, Norway. Oman, Pakistan. Panama, Papua
Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, he Fonner Yugoslav NewGuinea.Paraguay,Pem. Philippines. Poland.
Republic ofMacedonia,Togo, TrinidadandTobago, Portugal.Qatar R,epublic of Korea, Republic of
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda. Ukraine. Moldova,Romauia,RussianFederation. SaintKitts
United Arab Emirates, UnitedKingdom of Great and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincena tnd the
Britain and Northem Ireland, United Republic of Grenadines. Samoa,San Marino, Senegal,Sierra
Tanzania, United States of America.Umguay, Leone, Sigapore, Slovakia. Slovenia, Solomon
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia. Zimbabwe Islands. South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland.
Sweden.Tajikistan,Thailand,TheFormer Yugoslav
Againsr: Republic of Macedonia, Togo. Trinidad and
Algena. Cuba, Indonesia,Mexico Tobago, Tunisia. Turkey. Turkmenistan, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, UniteKingdomof
Abstaining: Great BritainandNorthemIreland.United Republic
Afghanistan,Ch&, Colombia, DemocraticPwplc's of Tanzania, United States of America,Umguay.
Republic of Korea,India, Iran(IslamicRepublicof), Uzbekistan, Vanuatu. Venezuela, Zambia,
ZimbabweGeneralAssembly 90th meeting
Forty-ninth session 15December1994
Kitts and Nevis. SaintLucia. SaintVincent andthe
Grenadiies, Samoa. Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Seychelles. Sigapore, Solomon Islands, South
Abstaining: Africa. Sn Lanka, Sudan. Suriname, SyrianArab
Afghanistan, Algeria. Cuba. DemocraticPeople's Republic, Thailand, Togo.Trinidad and Tobago,
Republic of Korea, Egypt. India, Indonesia. Iran Tunisia. Uganda, United Arab Emirates. United
(IslamicRepublicof), Iraq, Jordan,banon,Libyan Republic of Tanzania, Umguay. Uzbekistan.
Arab Jamahiriya,Mexico. Myanmar. Saudi Arabia. Venezuela,Vie1Nam, Yemen, Zambia,Zimbabwe
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian ArabRepublic.Yemen
Against:
Dra9 resolutionC, as a whole, wasadoptai by 150 Belgium. Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland.
votes to none, with 19 abstentions (resolution France. Cemany, Greece. Hungary, Israel, Italy.
49/75C). Luxembourg. Malta. Monaco, Netherlands,
Norway. Poland, Pomigal, Republicof Moldova,
The F'resident (inrerpretationfrom French): Drafi Romania.Slovakia,Spain,Turkey,UnitedKingdom
resolutionD isentitled "Moratoriumon the exportof anti- of GreatBritainandNorthemIreland,UnitedStates
personnelland-mines". of America
The Fint Comminee adopted drafi resolution D Abstaining:
withouta vote. May 1take it that the Assemblywisbesto Albania, Andorra. Argentina. Armenia,Australia,
do the same? Ausiria. Azerbaijan. Bahamas, Bulgana. Canada,
Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia. Estonia, Gwrgia. Iceland,
Draji resolutionD wasadopted(resolution49/75D). Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan.Latvia. Liechtenstein,
Lithuania.Marshall Islands,Micronesia(Federated
The Rgident (inrerprerarionfrom French): Drafi States of). New Zealand, Republic of Kom,
resolutionE is entitled "Step-by-step reducîion of the RussianFederation. SanMarino.Slovenia.Sweden.
nuclearthrea". Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia.Ukraine. Vanuatu
A recordedvote has been requested.
Dra8 resolutionE wasadopted by 111 wtes to 24,
A recorded vote was taken. with33 abstentions (resolution49/75 E).
Infavour: The Resident (interpretafionfrom French): 1shall
Afghanistan,Algeria.AntiguaandBarbuda,Bahrain. now put to îhe vote draftresolution F, entitled '1995
Bangladesh, Barbados. Belanis. Belize. Benin, ReviewandExtensionConferenceof StatesPartiesto the
Bhum, Bolivia. Botswana. Brazil. Brunei Tm on the Non-Proliferationof NuclearWeapons".
Dmssalam, Burkina Faso. Burundi. Cambodia.
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, A rmrded vote has been requested.
Chile, Chia. Colombia. Cornoros. Congo. Costa
Rica, Cuba.Cypm. DemocraticPeople's Republio cf A recordai votewas taken.
Korea, Djibouti. Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji. Gabon. Gambia. Ghana,
Infawur:
Grenada. Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Afghanistan, Algeria. Antigua andBarbuda.
Honduras, India. Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic Bahrain, Bangladesh. Barbados. Belize,Benin.
of), Iraq, Jamaica. Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Bhutan. Bolivia. Botswana, BruneiDmssalam.
Kyrgyum, Lao People's DemocraticRepublic. BurkinaFaso. Burundi,Cambodia.CentralAfrican
Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Republic. China, Colombia, Cornoros. Congo,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Costa Rica. Cypm, DernocraticPeople'sRepublic
Mauritania,Mauritius.Mexico, Mongolia,Morocco, of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica. Ecuador. Egypt.
Mozambique.Myanmar,Namibia.Nepal.Nicaragua, El Salvador,Ethiopia,Fiji, Gabon. Gambia. Ghana.
Niger, NigeriaOman, Pakistan. Panama.Papua New Grenada. Guatemala. Guinea. Guyana. Haiti.
Guinea. Paraguay. Pem, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Honduras. Indonesia. Iran(Islamic Republic of).GeneralAssembly 90th meeting
Fortv-ninthsession 15December1994
A recordedvote has been requested. DrafrrccolurionK was adopred by 78 voresto 43.
wiih38 absienrions(resolution49/75K).
A recordedwre was raken.
The Resident (interpreraiiofrom French)D : raft
h fawur: nsolution L is entitled "Bilateral nuclear-amis
Afghanisian. Algeria, Bahamas, Bangladesh. negotiationsand nucleardisarmament".
Barbados.Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana,azil. Brunei
Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Colombia, The First Committee adopted draft resolution L
Congo. Costa Rica, Cuba, Cypm, Democratic without avote. May1take it thatthe Assemblywishesto
People's Republicof Korea. Eniador, Egypt, El do likcwix?
Salvador, Eihiopia, Fiji,Gambia, Grenada.
Guatemala. Guyana. Haiti. Honduras. India. DrapresolurionL was adopred(resolution49/7L).
Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of). Iraq,Jordan.
Kenya, Lebanon. Lesotho. Libyan ArabJamahtriya, The Resident (inrerpretaionfromFrench):Dr&
Malaysia, Mali. Marshall Islands, Mexiw, resolutionM is entitied 'Measuw to curb the illicit
Mozambique. Myanmar. Namibia, Nepal, New transferand use of wnventionaanns".
Zealand,Nicaragua,NigeriaOman, Pakistan.Papua
NewGuinea.Paraguay.Pen. Philippines.Saint Kim Draft resolutionM was adopted by the First
and Nevis. Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the ComminΠwithout a vote. May 1 take il that the
Grniadines. Samoa.SanMarino. SaudiArabia. Sierra Assemblytoo wishesto adopt thedraftresolution?
Leone,Sigapore, SolomonIslands. SouthAfnca, Sri
La&, Sudau. Suriname. Syrian Arab Republic, Drafr rccolurion M was adopred (resolution
Thailand, Uganda. United Republic of Tanzania, 49/75 M).
Uruguay, Venezuela. Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia,
Zimbabwe The Presldent (inrerpretatifrom French):Draft
resolutionN is entitled 'Regional disannament". A
Againri: recorded votehas been requested.
Albania, Andom. Argentina. Belgium. Benin,
Bulgaria. Cambodia.Comoms, Côte d'Ivoire,Czech A recordedvote was raken.
Republic, Denmark, Djibouti. Estonia, Fiand,
France, Gabon.Georgia,Germany,Gm, Hungary, Infawur:
Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia. Luxembourg.Malta. Afghanistan, Albania. Algeria, Andorra. Antigua
MaUritania,Monaco. Netherlands,Poland, Portugal, and Barbuda. Argentina. Armenia, Australia.
Republic of Korea. Romania, Russian Federation. Austria,Azerbaijan.Bahamas,Bahrain,Bangladesh.
Senegal. Slovakia, Slovenia. Spain. Tajikistan. The Barbados.Belarus,Belgium, BelizBenin B,hutan.
Former Yugoslav Republic of Madonia. Turkey, Bolivia. BosniaandHemgovina, Botswana,Brazil,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nonhem Brunei Darussalam. Bulgaria, Burkina Faso.
Ireland. United Statesof America Burundi. Cambodia. Cameroon. CanadaC , entral
Afncan Republic, Chile, China, Colombia,
Abstaining: Comoms, Congo, Costa Uica. Côte d'Ivoire,
Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia.Austria, Croatia. Cuba. Cypnis. Czech Republic.
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belanis, Belize, Cameroon, DemocraticPeople'sRepublicof Korea,Denmark,
Canada, Central Afncan Republic, Chile. Cmatia, Djibouti. Dominica,Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Dominica.Enwea, Ghana, Guinea. irelandlamaica. Entrea. Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Fdand, France.
Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein. Gabon. Gambia, Georgia, Germany . Ghana.
Lithuania, Maldives. Micmnesia (Federated States Gm. Grenada, Guatemala. Guinea, Guyana.
of), Niger, Nonvay. Republic of Moldova, Haiti. Honduras.Hungary,Iceland,Indonesia. Iran
Swaziland. Sweden. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago, (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Tunisia.Turkmenistan. Ukraine.Uzbekistan,Vanuatu Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic
Republic. Latvia.Lebanon, Lesotho. Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya,Liechtenstein.Lithuania,Luxembourg.GeneralAssembly 90th meeting
Fom-ninth session 15December1994
Madagascar. Malawi. Malaysia. Maldives, Mali. El Salvador. Entrea. Estonia. Ethiopia. Fiji.
Malta, Marshall Islands. Mamitania. Mauritius. Finland, France. Gabon, Gambia. Georgia,
Mexiw, Micmnesia (Federated States of), Monaco. Germany, Ghana, Gr-, Grenada, Guatemala,
Mongolia. Mo-, Mozambique. Myanmar. Guinea, Guyana. Haiti, Honduras. Hungary. ,
Namibia. Nepal. Netherlands. New Zcaland. Iceland.indonesia,Iran(lslamicRepublicof), Iraq,
Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria, Nonvay. man.Palllstan. Ireland. Israel, Italy. Jamaica, Japan. Jordan.
Panama. Papua New Guinea, Paraguay. Pem.
Kazakhstan, Kenya. Kuwait,Kyrgyutan, Latvia,
Philippines, Poland,Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Korea, Republic ofMoldova, Romania. Russian Liechtenstein, Lithuania. LuxembourM. adagacar,
Federation,SaintKins and Nevis, SaintLucia. Saint Malawi. Malaysia. MaldivesM, ali,Malta.Marshall
and the Grenadines. Samoa. San Marino. Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia
Saudi Arabia. Senegai. Seychelles, Sierra Leone. (Federated Stateof), Monaco.Mongolia,Momcco,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia,Solomon Islands,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal,
South Africa, Spain. SriLanka. Sudan, Suriname, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger.
Swaziland, Sweden.SyrianArabRepublic. Tajikistan. Nigeria, Nonvay, Oman.Pakistan, Panama, Papua
Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of New Guinea, Paraguay,Pem, Philippines. Poland,
Macedonia. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. Portugal. Qatar, Republic of Korea. Republic of
Turkey. Tur!mmistan, Uganda. Ukraine. United Moldova,Romania,RussianFederation. SaintKitts
ArabEmiraîes,UnitedKingdomof Great Britain and and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincena tnd the
Nonhem Ireland. United Republic of Tanzania. Grenadines, Samoa. SanMarino, Saudi Arabia,
United States of America, Umguay, Uzbekistan. Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone. Slovakia,
Vanuatu, Venezuela. VieN t am. Yemen, Zambia. Slovenia, Solomon Islands, SouthAfrica. Spain,
Zimbabwe Sri Lanka, Sudan. Suriname, Swaziland. Sweden,
Syrian Arab Republic. Tajikistan. Thailand,The
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo.
Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia. Turkey,
Turkmenisw. Uganda. Ukraine, UnitedArab
Emirates, United Kingdom of Greac Britain and
Northern Ireland, United Republic ofTanzania.
United States of America. Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Drap resolutionN wasadopredby171volesto none, Vanuatu. Yemen, Zambia. Zimbabwe
wirh1 ObsIemion(resolution49/75 N).
The Resident (inierprerafionfrom French): Draft
molution O is entitled 'Conventionalarmswntrol at the
regionalandsubregionallevels". A recorded votehasbeen Abstainin:
requested. Brazil. Cuba. Eeuador, India. Mexiw. Singapore,
Venezuela
A recorded wrc was taken.
Dmp resolution O was adopred by 164 votes to
Infawur: none, w'fh7obsrenriom (resolution49/75 0).
Afghanisw. Albania. Algeria.Andorra,Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina. Armenia. Ausualia. Austria. The President(inrerpretaion from French): Draft
Azerbaijan.Bahamas.Bahrain.Bangladesh.Barbados. resolutionP is entitled "Bilateral nuclear-amis
Belanis. Belgium, Belize, Benin. Bbutan, Bolivia. ncgotiationsandnucleardisannament". A remrded vote
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana. Brunei im been requested.
D~ussalam. Bulgaria, Burkina Faso. Burundi,
Cambodia.Cameroon.Canada. Cape Verde. Central A recorded votewas raken.
AfncanRepublic.Chie. China. Colombia,Comoms.
Congo, CostaRica. Côted'Ivoire. Cmatia, Cypnis. Infawur:
Czeeh Republic. Democratic People's Republic of
Afghanistan. Albania, Algeria. Andorra. Antigua
Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica. Egypt. and Barbuda, Argentina. Armenia. Australia.General.Assembly 90th meiig
Foriy-ninthsession 15December1994
Austria..Azerbaijan.Bahamas,Bahrain, Bangladesh. the First Cornmittee in paragraph61 of its report
.. Barbados,Belam. Belgium,Belize, Benin. Bhutan, (Af491699). The draff decision is entitled "Non-
. .Bolivia, Bosniaand Hemgovina, Botswana.Brzzil, pmiiferation of weapons of $as's destruction and of
BruneiDmsalam, Bulgaria, BurkinaFaso.Burundi. vehiclesfor their delivery in al1its aspects".
Cambodia,Cameroon. Canada, CapeVerde. Central
AfncanRepublic.Chile,China.Colombia. Comoms, ~'recordedvote has been requ&ted.
Congo, Costa Rica. Côte d'Ivoire. Croatia,Cuba.
Cypnis. Czech pepublic. Democratic People's A recorded wte wu taken.
Republic of Kom. Denmark. Djibouti. Dominica,
Mar. Egypt. El Salvador. Eritrea, Estonia. Infavour:
Ethiopia. ,Fiji. Fiand.France. Gabon, Gambia. Afghanistan. Albania, Algeria. Antigua and
Georgia, Gemiany. Ghana. Greece. Grenada. Barbuda. Argentina, Armenia, Australia,
Guatemala, Guinea. Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Azerbaijan. Bahamar, Bahrain. Bangladesh,
Hungary. IŒland, Indonesia, Iran (IslamicRepublic Barbados.Belanis. Belize. Benin. Bhutan, Bolivia.
of).Iraq. Ireland. Israel. Italy, Jamaica, Japan. Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam. Burkina
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait. Kyrgyutan. Faso. Burundi, Cambodia. Camemon, Central
Latvia. Lebanon. Lesotho. LibyanArabJamahiriya. African Republic. Chile. Chia, Colombia,
Liechtenstein,Lithuania. Luxembourg.Madaga~car, Comoros,Congo, CostaRica. Côted'Ivoire,Cuba,
Malawi, Malaysia. Maldives, Mali. Malta, Marshall Cyp~s, Democratic People's Republicof Korea,
Islands, Mauritania, Mawitius, Mexico. Micronesia Djibouti, Dominica. Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador.
(FederatedStates00. Monaco. Mongolia. Morocco. Eritrea. Ethiopia, Fiji. Gabon, Gambia, Ghana.
Mozambique. Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal. Grenada. Guatemala. Guinea, Guyana, Haiti,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Niger, Honduras, India, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic
Nigeria. Norway, Oman. Pakistan. Panama. Papua of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan. Kazakhstan, Kenya,
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru. Philippines. Poland, Kuwait. Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Pomigal, Qatar, Republic of Kom. Republic of Lebanon. Lesotho. Libyan Arab Jamahhiya.
Moldova, Romania. Russi* Fedetation. Saint Kitts
Madagascar. Malawi. Malaysia. Maldives, Mali.
and Nevis. Saint hia, Saint Vicent and the Mawitania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia.
,.- Grenadines. Samoa. San Marino, Saudi Arabia. Mo-, Mozambique,Myanmar.Namibia.Nepal,
Senegal. Seychelles, Sierra Leone. Sigagore, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Niger.Nigeria, Oman.
Slovakia. Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Pakistan, Panama, PapuaNew Guinea. Paraguay.
Spain. SriLanka, Sudan. Suriname, Swaziland. Peru. Philippines,Qatar. Republicof Korea.Saint
Sweden,SyrianArab Republic,Tajikistan.Thailand, Kittsand Nevis.SaintLucia, Saint Vincentand the
ïhe FormerYugoslavRepublicof Macedonia,Togo, Grenadines, Samoa. San Marino. Saudi Arabia,
TrinidadandTobago,Tunisia,Turkey,Turkmenistan, Senegal. Seychelles, Sierra Leone. Singapore,
Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emintes. United SolomonIslands, South Africa. SriLanka S,udan,
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Inland, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic.
United Republic of Tanzania, United States of Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia.
America, Uruguay.Uzbekistan.Vanuatu,Venezuela. Uganda,United ArabEmuates, UnitedRepublicof
Via Nam. Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela.
Viet Nam. Yemen. Zambia. Zimbabwe
Against:
United Statesof America
Abstaining:
lndia Abstaining:
Andom, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,
Drar resolufionPWPT adopted by 171wtes tonone. Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia.
wifh1 abstemion (molution 49/75 P). Fiand, France. Georgia, Gennauy, Greece,
Hungary. Iceland, Ireland. Israel, Italy, Japan,
The President (imerpretation from French): The ïatvia, Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Luxembourg.
Assembly nuns nowto thedraf decisionrecommendedby Malta. Marshall Islands. Micronesia (FederatedGeneralAssembly 9ûîbmeeting
Forty-ninthsession 15December.1994
. .
States of), Monaco, Netherlands. Noway. Poland, p~ciple under which belligerents do not have an
Pomigal. Republic of Moldova. Romania, Russian unre.strictedright to choose weapons or methods of
Fedetaîion. Slovakia. Slovenia. Spain, ~weden, combat. in the Parliament'sopinion, the use of nuclea~
Tajikistan. The Former Yugoslav Republic of weapons would be restncted by the priaciples of
Macedonia, Turkey. Ukraine. UnitedKingdom of distinaion and proponionaiity uoder customary
Great BritainandNorthern Ireland, Vanuatu internationallaw, as they relate in particularto civilian
pobulations and property. and by 0th- general
lXe drap decisionwar adopredby 123 wtes to 1, fundamental legal p~ciples recognized by civilized
with45 ab~tentiom. nations.
The Rgident (intepretationfrom French): 1 cal1 The Parliament,in ils report, notes funher that the
nowon representativeswishiig to speakin explanationof pMciple ofproportionalityisembodiedin thelaw ofthe
voteafter the voting. Charter of the United Nations. Reprisais that are
dispmportionatebywmparison withthe provocationthat
Mr. Ryberg (Swédm):1wish to explainthe voteof preceded them areprohibited. It wouldbe dificult to
my delegationon dr& resolutionK. regard thisp~ciple ascoqsistentwith theuseof nuclea~
weapons in retaliation against an anack using
lt is a well known fact that for decadesSwedenhas wnventid weapons.
worked activelyand wnsistently for nucleardisarmament
and for an ultimate total ban on nuclear weapons. The President (iniepreratiofromFrench): May1
However, Sweden abstained in the vote on draft take it that it is the wish of the Generai Assemblyto
resolutionK. It is the view of theSwedish Government wnclude its wnsiderationof agendaitem62?
that,taking into account the ment request made to the
international Court of Justice by the World Health It warsodecided.
Orgauizationon thistopic. onefurthetrequestto theCourt
wouldprobablycausean unfomtnatedelayin theongoing Agenda item 63
workof the Courton the issue ofthe legalityof theuse of
nuclear weapons. Review and implementation of the Concluding
Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the
On the other hand, if the GeneralAssemblydaides Genersl Assembly: report of the First Committee
to request theCourt to render an advisory opinionon the (A149/7ûû)
questionsetout in the draft resolution.it is importantthat
the Court give its opinion without unnecessary delay. The hident (inrerpretatifrom French): The
Hence Sweden was against the deletion of the word Assembly bas before it five draft resolutions
'urgently" fromthetextoftheoperativeparagraphofdrafî raeommendedby the First Committeeinparagraph17of
resolutionK. its report.
The Swedish Governmentis of the opinion th$ the 1shallputthe fivedraftresolutionsto theAssembly
use of nuclear weaponswould not be in wmpliance with one by one. After al1 the decisions bave been taken.
internationallaw andis anxiousthat the legalsimion be representativeswill have an oppominityto explaintheir
clarifiedby the Court as soon as possible. in this wntext,otes.
the Swedish Governmentwouldlike torecailthatlastJune
Sweden, in wmection with the request from the World We tum fim to drafî resolution Aentitled'United
Health Orgauhtion. officially stated to the internationalNations Disarmamentinfornion Programme".
Court of Justicethat the use ofnuclearms wouldnot be
inaccordancewith internationallaw. Thisreplywasbased The First Committee adopted dr& resolution A
on a reportby the Standing Committeeon ForeignAffairs without a vote.May1takeit that the Assemblywishesto
of the Swedish Parliament, approved by Parliament last do likewise?
June.
Drap resolution A war adopted (remlution
The Parliamentstated,interalia,that ever siocthe 49/76 A).
niniof the cen~ry therehas existed inintemationailaw aGeneralAssembly 90thmeeting
Fom-ninth session 15December1994
The F'resident(inrerprdarifrom Frmch): May 1 Republic. Tbailand, Tunisia. Turkey. Uganda.
take it that il is the wish ofGcneralAsscmblyto Unitcd Arab Emhla, United Republic of
wnclude its wnsiderationof agendaitem64 as a whole? Tanzania.Venezuela. VietNam.Yemea,Zimbabwe
Irwar so decidai. ~~aimt:
Isratl, MarshalIslands,Micmmsia (Federated
Agenda item 65 Statesof), UnitedStateaAmerica
Ismelinucleararmament: reportofthe&~ommittcc AbstaiN'n8:
(M49/702) Albania,Andona. AntiguaandBarbudaA. rgentina.
Armenia, Ausaali, Auha, Babamas, Belanw,
The Resldent (inrerprdan'from French): 'lbe Belgium. Belize, Bolivia. Brazil, Bulgaria,
Assemblywill now<akca decisionon the dd~ resolution Cambodia, Camemon, Canada, Central African
reeommendedby theFirst Committa.inparagraph8 of iw Republic, Chile. Comoms, Congo, Costa Rica.
report. CO<e d'lvoirc. Cd, Cypru?.Czah Republic.
Dnimarlr,Djibouti,Dominica,El SalvadEriuea.
1 cal1 on the reprcsentativeof Boîswana for an ma, Ethiopia.Fiji. Fiaad.France,Gabon.
explanationof vote beforethe voting. Georgia. Germany. Ghana. Graece, Grenada.
Guyana . aiti.Hom, Hungary ,ccland,India,
Mr. Boaq (Botswana):Althoughmydclegationwill kld, ltaly. Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
vote infavourofthdrafrtsolutionwntainedindocumau Kyrgyntsn, LatviaL ,iechteust eituania,
AiC.1149iL.ll1Rev.l and in paragraph8 of doaimmt Luxembourg,Malta.Mauritius,Monaco,Myanmar,
Ai491702.mtitlcd 'ïbe riskof nuelearpmliferationinthc Ncpal. Netherlands, New Zeaiand. Nicaragua,
MiddleEast", we ~ICwmpcllcd to doubt the faimeMof Nigcria. Nonvay,PanamaP ,apui New Guinea,
operative paragrapb1. We would have wisbcdthatthc Paraguay, RN, Poland, Portugal. Republicof
paragraph mention by name.if suchnamczallii was Moldova.Roda. RussianFederation,SaiKim
consideml necessary. al1 the Stata nupected of d Nevis. Saint Lufi. Saint Vit and the
developing, pruducing, tcsting or othcrwiac acquiring
Gmadims, Samoa, San -Marino. Siapore.
nuclearweapons. Slovakia.Slovmia. SolomonIslands, South Africa,
Spain,Surhame. Swedea.Tajikistan.île Former
TheResident (inrerpretationfFrmahj: Imrï put YugoslavRepublic ofMacedonia,Togo. Trinidad
to the vote draf rtsolutiorsommcnded'by theFit d Tobago. Ulrraine.United Kingdomof Great
Committa.in paragraph8 of iwrrpon. It ismti'Thc BritainandNorthemI~eland.U~guay. Uzbekistan,
risk of nucluir pmliferattlkiMiddleEast". Vanualu.Zambia
A reeordedvotehasbeen iquated. ïk dm resolun'onwai adoptaiby 60 wtes to4,
with100 abstention(rtsolution49/78).
A recordaiwte wai taken.
lae Residmt (inrerprRofinromFrench): May1
Infavouc takc iiha itis chcwish of theGeneralAssembly to
Afghanistan, Algcria, Azerbaijan' Bahrain. wnclude iwwusiderationof agendaitem 65?
BangladeshBenin.Bbutan.BosniaandHerzegovina.
Botswana. Brunei Danissaiam, Bu- Faso. Agen& item 66
Burundi. China. Colombia, Cuba. Democratic
People's Republicof Korea. Eniador. Egypt. Coavmtion on Roblbiîlom or Restricîiom on tUse
Guatemala.Guinea.Indonaia.Iran(IslamicRepublic d CertPln ConventionalWeapom Which May Be
of), Iraq. Jordan.Kuwait.Lebanon.Lesotho.Libyan Drcmed to Be Excesdvely hJurious or to Have
ArabJamahiriya,Malawi.Malaysia,Maldiva. Mali. lndlPerlmlnateERsts: reportof thFlmt Cornmittee
Mauritania. Mexico. Mongolia, Morocco. (N49nû3)
Mozambique, ~amibia, Niger. Oman. Pakistan.
Philippines.Qatar. RepublicofKorea.&di Arabia, Tbe Rsldeiit (Uueprwationfrom French): The
Senegal.SierraLeone,SrLanka Sudan.SyrianArab Asscmblywillnowtakea decisiononthedraft~esolution GeneralAssembly 901h meeting
Fonv-ninth session 15 Deamber 1994
rewmmendedby theFit Commitîee inparagraph8 of its
mit.
The Pddent (i~erpraoh'on~m French):May1
TheCommitteeadoptedthe dranmoluti& withouta tak ettha tt is the wish of the General Assemtoy
vote. May 1take it thahe GeneraiAssemblywishesto wncludc its wusideration of agenda item68?
do the same?
Irw so decided.
The dr@ rcsolurionwacadopfed(molution 49/79).
Agendaitan 69
Tùe Rerident (inferpraarifromFm): 'M;~ 1
takcit that it is the wish of the Gmcral Assembiy to Implementation of the De&mtion of the indian
concludeits wusideration agendaitem66? Ocean.as a Zone of Peace: report of the Fû-st
.. commiace(A/49/706) , .
ifwas so decided.
Tbe Resideat (inf~rpreI&iofiom French): The
Agenda item 67 Assembly willww takc adecisiononthedraftmiution
mpmmndedby the Fit Comminec in paragraph7 of
Question ofAntarcüca: rep01I of thFM Committee itsrepart.
(A/49)704)
A recordedvotehasbeen requested.
The Rerident (inferpram'on from French): The
Assemblywill now take aeciiionoi thedrafmolution ..' .A &n*d wre w ruken.
rccotnmendedby the First Commineeinparagraph7 of its . .
~nf&r:
mit.
: ,.~fghauistm.' Algeria, ~nti& and Barbuda,
The First Comminee adopted the draf rtsolution Argentina. Ma, Austraiia, Azerbaijan.
without a vote. May 1take it that the GenaalAasembly .Èahamas.Bahrain . angladesh.BarbadosBelans.
wishesto do the same? . ,el?.Benin Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana.Brazil.
Brunei Darussalam. Burkina'Faso. Burundi.
Cambodia. Camemon. Canada, Cap Verde.
. ,
4.. CentraiAfricanRepublic.Chie. China Colotnbia.
The Resident (inferprefafionfro~rmd;): May 1 Comoms.Congo.Costa'Rica,Cbted'Ivoire.Cuba.
takc it that it is the wish of the General Ammbly to . .Cyprui, Deuxmatic People's Republic of KOM.
wnclùde its wusideration agenda item 67? Djibouti,Dominica,Ecuador Egypt. El Salvador.
Eriaca, Ethiopia, Fiji. Gabon, Gambia,'Ghana.
Grenada. Guatemala. Guinca. Guyana. Haiti,
Honduras, IndiaIndonesia.Iran(IslamicRepublic
Agendaitem 68 of). Iraq,Jamaica. lapan, Jordan. Kazakhstan.
Kenya. Kuwait. Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's
Strengthening of sectuity and coopwatbn' in .tbc Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lcsotho, Libyan
Meditmanean reglon: repor<of the Fkî CommIth . . ArabJamahiriya, Madagascar,Malawi. Malaysia.
(A1491705) Maldives. Mali. Marshall Islands.MaUritania.
Mauritius. Mexico; Micmmia (Federated States
The Resident (inrerprctotifrom French):The of). Mongolia,Mom. Mozambique.Myanmar,
Assemblywill now tak aedecisionon the drift molution Nagibia, Nepal, New Zealand,Niwagua. Niger,
rccommendedby the Fi Commitîeeinparagraph9 of its Nigerja, Oman. Pakistan, Papua New Guinea.
npon. . . , Panama. Paraguay, Pem, Philippines, Qatar,
Rcpublic of KOM, RussianFederation,SainKim
The draf tolution was adopted 'by the Fi and Nevis. Saint Lwia, Saint'ViŒnt and the
Comminee without a vote. May 1 amsider that the Grmadines,Samoa.San Marino, Saudi Arabia,
Asscmblywisba to do the same? ' ScMgal.Seychelles.Sie* Leone.Singapore,South
Africa,SriLanka ,udan, Surioam Sy.ianArabGeneralAssembly 90thmeeting
Forty-nintsession 15DeŒmbet1994
Statemmtby theResident
TheResident (interpretofl'onfmrmah):1Mshto
welwmethesigningbyUlraineof theTnaty ontheNon-
Proliferationof NuclcarWcapons.1believe that this
signaturopensanew andhistoricerain pnrcssofthe
eiiiion of nuclearwcapons.1wish to congratulate
Ukraine'leadersforthiscourageoact.
niemeetingroseai7.20p.m. PART II
A. GENHW ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1653 1XVI1
General Assembly resolution 1653(XVI) entitled "Declaration
on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear
weapons" (No. 13) was adopted at the Sixteenth Session of the
General Assembly on 24 November 1961 under agenda items 73 and
72. The legislative history of the resolution is as follows:
1. On 15 July 1961, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the United States of America requested
the inclusion in the agenda of the sixteenth session of the
General Assembly ofan item entitled "The urgent need for a
treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective
international controln.(A/4799) (N0.14)
2. By letters dated 17 and 28 July 1961, India requested the
inclusion in the agenda of the sixteenth session of the
General Assembly of an item entitled "Continuation of
suspension of nuclear and thermo-nucleartests and
obligations of States to refrain from their renewal."
(A/4801 and Add.1) (No.15)
3. At its 1014th plenary meeting held on 25 September 1961, the
General Assembly includedin its agenda the items mentioned
above as items 72 and 73 respectively,and at its 1018th
plenary meeting on 27 September 1961, the General Assembly
allocated the items to the First Committee for consideration
and report.
4. At its 1169th meeting on 18 October 1961, the First
Committee decided by 83 votes to 10, with 4 abstentions, to
list item 73 as the first item on its agenda. At the same
meeting, it decided by 54 votes to 13, with 31 abstentions,
to list item 72 as the second item,on its agenda and to
discuss it simultaneouslywith item 73.
5. Draft resolution (A/C.l/L.292) entitled "Declaration on the
prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear
weaponst*concerning items 73 and 72 was submitted on 24
October 1961 by Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Libya,
and Togo also joined the sponsors (A/C.l/L.292/Add.l-3).,
(N0.16)
6. At the 1189th meeting of the First Committee, on 8 November
1961, Ethiopia introduceddraft resolution A/C.l/L.292.
(No.17, paragraph 4)
7. Discussion on draft resolution A/C.l/L.292 took place from
the 1189th to the 1194th meeting, held between 8 and 14
November 1961. At the 1189th meeting, on 8 November 1961,
statements were made by Senegal (N0.17, paragraph 5), the and 13), and Poland (No.17, paragraphs 15 and 18).aphs 10
8. At the 1190th meeting, on 9 November 1961, statements were
made by the United Kingdom (No.18, paragraphs 3 and 6-8),
Romania (No.18, paragraph 9), Czechoslovakia (No.18,
paragraphs 12 and 13), the United States of America (No.18,
paragraph 15), Pakistan (No.18, paragraphs 18 and 19), Iraq
(No.18, paragraphs 27 and 28), Cuba (No.18, paragraph 30),
and Ivory Coast (No.18, paragraphs 31 and 32).
9. On 9 November 1961, Italy submitted amendments (A/C.l/L.295)
to draft resolution A/C.l/L.292. (No.19)
.IO. Aits amendmentse(A/C.l/L.295) to draft resolution A/C.l/L.292
(No.20, paragraphs 1-3) and statements were made by the
Dominican Republic (No.20, paragraphs 4 and 7), Ethiopia
(No.20, paragraphs 8, 9 and 32), Italy (No.20, paragraphs
10, 28 and 31), Albania (No.20, paraqraphs 12-14), Mongolia
(No.20, paragraphs 20 and 21), Tunisia (No.20, paragraphs
22, 27, 29 and 30), and Australia (No.20, paragraphs 34, 37
and 38).
11. At the 1192nd meeting of the First Committee, on 10 November
1961, statements were made by the United States (No.21,
paragraphs 1-9), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and India (No.21, paragraphs 15 and 16).aragraphs 13 and 14),
12. At the 1193rd meeting of the First Committee, on 13 November
1961, explanations of vote before the vote on the draft
resolution and amendments thereto were made by the United
Kingdom (No.22, paragraph 4), Hungary (No.22, paragraphs 5
and 6), Japan (No.22, paragraphs 7 and 8), France (No.22,
paragraph 9), Burma (No.22, paragraph 12), Brazil (No.22,
paragraph 13), Philippines (No.22, paragraphs 14 and 15),
Senegal (No.22, paragraph 17), Ireland (No.22, paragraphs
18-20), Afghanistan (No.22, paragraphs 21-23), Sudan (No.
26), Italy (No.22, paragraphs 27 and 58), Saudi Arabia (No.
22, paragraph 28), Tunisia (No.22, paragraph 29), the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (No.22, paragraphs 30 and 32),
Peru (No. 22, paragraphs 33 and 34), Argentina (No.22,
paragraphs 35 and 36), Uruguay (No.22, paragraphs 37 and
38), Canada (No.22, paragraphs 39-41), Spain (No.22,
paragraphs 42-44), Denmark (No.22, paragraphs 45 and 46),
China (No.22, paragraphs 47-50), Pakistan (No.22, paragraphs
51-54) and Venezuela (No.22, paragraphs 55-57).
13. At the 1194th meeting of the First Committee, on 14 November
1961, explanations of vote before the vote on the draft
Soviet Socialist Republics (No.23, paragraphs 1 and 15-16), Nigeria (No.23, paragraph 6), the United Kingdom (No.23,
paragraphs 8-10), Turkey (No.23,paragraphs 11 and 14),
Italy (No.23, paragraph 21), Upper Volta (N0.23, paragraphs
22 and 25), Colombia (No.23, paragraphs 26 and 27).
Dominican Republic (N0.23, paragraphs 28 and 29), Cyprus
(No.23, paragraphs 30and 31), and Ethiopia (No. 23,
paragraph 32).
Committee proceeded to vote on the draft resolution and
related amendments. (N0.23, paragraph 39)
Japan requested a separate vote on the first part of the
sixth Italian amendment (see No.19 above). It was voted
upon separately and rejected by a roll-cal1 vote of 50 to
25, with 25 abstentions. (No.23, for result of voting see
paragraph 39)
and rejected by a roll-cal1 vote of 50 to 28, with 22 whole
abstentions. (No.23,for result of voting see paragraph 40)
Draft resolution A/C.l/L.292 was then put to the vote and
adopted by a roll-cal1 vote of 60 to 16, with 25
abstentions. (No.23, for result of voting see paragraph 41)
The First Committee recommended to the General Assembly the
Draft ResolutiondrIItin Part IV of the Report of the First
Committee (A/4942/Add.3). (No.24)
The Rapporteur of the First Committee introduced Part IV of
the Report of the First Committee at the 1063rd plenary
meeting of the General Assembly held on 24 November 1961.
(No.25, paragraphs 1 and 2)
At the 1063rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly,
were made by Canada (No.25, paragraphsn t4-9), the Unitedion
States of America (No.25, paragraphs 10-22), the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (No.25, paragraphs 34-37and 40-
61), the United Kingdom (No.25, paragraphs 70-83), Pakistan
(No.25, paragraph 84), Poland (No.25, paragraphs 90 and 96-
100), Thailand (No.25, paragraphs 102-105), Spain (No.25,
paragraphs 106-log), and Ethiopia (No.25, paragraphs 110-
119).
At the 1063rd plenary meeting, the General Assembly voted on
Draft Resolution II. A vote in parts was requested as well
as a roll-cal1 voteon the operative paragraphs and on the
draft resolution as a whole. (No.25. .-araa-.DhS 122-126)
The result was as follows: Preambular Paraqra~hs
The first paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 62
votes to none, with 28 abstentions.
The second paragraphof the preamble wasadopted by 63
votes to none, with 29 abstentions.
The third paragraph of the preamble wasadopted by 63
votes to 1, with 31 abstentions.
The fourth paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 62
votes to none, with 28 abstentions.
The fifth paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 61
votes to 6, with 25abstentions.
votes to 19, with 26 abstentions. in a roll-cal1 voteby 56
Sub-paragraph(b) was adopted in a roll-cal1 voteby 59
votes to 17, with 19 abstentions.
Sub-paragraph(c) was adopted in a roll-cal1 voteby 63
votes to 12, with 24 abstentions.
Sub-paragraph(d) was adopted in a roll-cal1 voteby 52
votes to 20, with 23 abstentions.
Operative paragraph 1as a whole was adopted in a roll-
call vote by 56 votes to 19, with 26 abstentions.
Owerative Paraaraoh 2
Operative paragraph 2was adopted in a roll-cal1 vote
by 53 votes to 19, with 29 abstentions.
The Draft Resolution
Draft resolution II as a whole was adopted in a roll-
call vote by 55 votes to 20, with 26 abstentions. It became
General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI).
22. After the vote, the United States of America (No.25,
paragraphs 128-132)and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (No.25,paragraphs 134-137)spoke in exercise of
their rightof reply. Upper Voltaspoke in explanationof
vote after the vote (No.25,paragraphs 139-142). B. GENEXAL ASSEElBLYRESOLUTION 33/71 B
General Assembly resolution 33/71B entitled "Non-use of
nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear warn (No. 26) was
adopted at the Thirty-third Session of the General Assembly on14
December 1978under agenda item 125 entitled "Review of the
implementation ofthe recommendationsand decisions adopted by
the General Assemblyat its tenth specialsession." The
legislative historyof the resolution is as follows:
1. The above-mentioneditem was included in the provisional
agenda of the thirty-third session in accordance with
paragraph 115 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special
Session of the General Assembly (resolutionS-10/2), adopted
on 30 June 1978.
2. At its 4th and 5th plenary meetings, on 22 September 1978,
the General Assembly,on the recommendationof the General
Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda as item
125 and allocate it to the First Committee.
3. The general debate on item 125 took place at the 4th to 19th
meetings, from 16 to 27 October. The views expressed
therein are contained in the verbatim records of those
meetings (~/C.1/33/~~.4-19).
4. Draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.2 entitled "Non-use of nuclear
October 1978 by Algeria, Argentina,Cyprus, Ethiopia, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia,Nigeria and Yugoslavia(No.27). The
draft resolution was subsequently also sponsored by Angola,
Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burundi, Colombia, the Congo,
Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guinea, Jordan, Liberia, Madagascar,
Mali, Mauritius, Morocco,Peru, Romania, Senegal,Sri Lanka,
the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Republic ofCameroon,
Uruguay and Zaire.
5. At the 18th meeting of the First Committee,on 27 October
1978, India introduced draft resolutionA/C.1/33/L.2.
(No.28, pages 73-77)
6. As CO-sponsor, Ethiopia also made a statement on 27 October
1978 concerning draft resolutionA/C.1/33/L.2. (No.29, pages
24-25)
7. At the 51st meeting of the First Committeeon 27 November
1978, India orally announced a draftingchange to operative
paragraph 2 ofdraft resolutionA/C.1/33/L.2. (No.30, pages
51-52)
8. At the 51st meeting, explanations of vote beforethe vote on
the draft resolution,as orally revised, weremade by the
and the United States of Americaic(No.30, pages 56-57).),9. The First Committee adopted the draft resolution, as orally
revised, by a recorded vote of 84 to 16, with 18
abstentions. (No.30, for the result of the voting see pages
57-60)
10. At the 51st meeting, explanations of vote after the vote on
the draft resolution, as orally revised, were made by China
(N0.30, pages 58-60), Japan (No.30, page 61). the United
Kingdom (N0.30, page 61), Finland (No.30, page 62), Sweden
(N0.30, page 62), and Viet Nam (No.30, pages 63-65).
11. The First Committee recommended to the General Assembly, the
adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.2 which was
submitted as raft Resolution B in paragraph 33 of the
Report of the.First Committee on item 125 (A/33/461).
(No.31)
12. The Rapporteur of the First Committee introduced the Report
meeting of the General Assembly on 14 December 1978. (No.32,
paragraphs 54, 70, 73 and 74)
13. Pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Procedure, the Report of
the First Committee was not discussed by the General
Assembly.
14. At the 84th plenary meeting, there were no speakers who
wished to explain their votes on Draft Resolution B. In a
to 18, with 18 abstentions (No.32, for the result of thetes
voting see paragraph 221). It became General Assembly
resolution 33/71 B. C. GENHUU, ASSEXBLY RESOLUTION 34/83 G
General Assembly resolution 34/83G entitled "Non-use of
nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war" (No. 33) was
adopted at the Thirty-fourth Session of the General Assemblyon
11 December 1979 under agenda item 42 entitled "Review of the
implementation of the recommendationsand decisions adoptedby
the General Assembly at its tenth special se~sion.~~The
legislative history of the resolution is as follows:
1. The above-mentioned item was included in the provisional
agenda of the thirty-fourth session in accordance with
General Assembly resolutions33/71 B, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, M
and N of 14 December 1978.
2. General Assembly, on the recommendationof the General
Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda as item
42 and to allocate it to the First Committee.
3. At its 3rd meeting, on 1 October, the First Committee
decided to hold a combined general debate on the items
allocated to it relating to disarmament, namely, items 30 to
45, 120 and 121. The general debate took place at the 4th,
bth, 8th to 13th and 15th to 30th meetings, from 6 October
to 5 November. The views expressed therein are contained in
the verbatim records of those meetings (A/C.1/34/PV.4,6, 8-
13, and 15-30).
4. In connection with item 42(d), the First Committeehad
before it the report of the Secretary-General onnon-use of
nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclearwar (A/34/456 and
Add.1) (No.34). This report contained the views of 13
States on the non-use of nuclearweapons, avoidance of
nuclear war and related matters as requested in operative
paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 B of 14
December 1978. (For the relevance of this report, see text
of General Assemblyresolution 34/83 G in No. 21 above.)
5. Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.26 entitled "Non-use of nuclear
November 1979 by Argentina, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia,on India,
Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia (No.35).
The draft was subsequently also sponsored by Qatar and
Uruguay.
6. At the 36th meeting of the First Committee, on 16 November
1979, India introduced draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.26.
(No.36, pages 31-35)
7. At the 42nd meeting of the First Committee,on 26 November
1979, 1ndia orally revised draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.26.
(No.37, page 36)8. At the 42nd plenary meeting, the First Committee proceeded
States Ofn America requested a recorded vote. ThThe draft
resolution, as orally revised, was adopted by a recorded
vote of 100 to 16, with 14 abstentions. (No.37,for the
result of the voting see page 37)
9. At the 42nd plenary meeting, explanation of vote after the
vote on the draft resolution were made by the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (No.37, pages 38-40), Ireland
(No.37, page 41) and Sweden (No.37, page 41).
10. The First Committee recommended to the General Assembly the
adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.26 which was
submitted as Draft Resolution G in paragraph 38 of the
Report of the First Committee on item 42 (A/34/752). (N0.38)
11. The Rapporteur of the First Committee introduced the Report
of the First Committee on item 42 at the 97th plenary
meeting of the General Assembly on 11 December 1979. (No.39,
paragraphs 2-4, 17-18, and 2'3-24)
12. Pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Procedure, the Report of
the First Committee was not discussed by the General
Assembly.
13. At the 97th plenary meeting, there were no speakers who
wished to explain their votes on Draft Resolution G. In a
to 16, with 14 abstentions (No.39, for the result of thees
voting see paragraph 69). It became General Assembly
resolution 34/83 G. D. GENERAL ASSEWBLY RESOLUTION 35/152 D
General Assembly resolution 35/152 D entitled "Non-use of
nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear waru (No. 40) was
adopted at the Thirty-fifth Sessionof the General Assembly on 12
December 1980 under agenda item 44 entitled "Review of the
implementation of the recommendationsand decisions adopted by
the General Assembly at its tenth special sessi~n.~ The
legislative history of the resolution is as follows:
1. The above-mentioned item was included in the provisional
agenda of the thirty-fifth session in accordance with
General Assembly resolutions 33/71 H (sect. III) and L,
34/83 B, C, D, G, H, 1, J and M and decision 34/422.
2. General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General
Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda as item
44 and to allocate it to the First Committee.
3. At its 3rd meeting, on 9 October, the First Committee
decided to hold a combined general debate on the items
allocated to it relating to disarmament, namely items 31 to
49 and 121. This general debate took placeat the 4th to
12th and 14th to 28th meetings, from 15 October to 4
November 1980. The views expressed therein are contained in
the verbatim records of those meetings (A/C.1/35/PV.4-12and
14-28).
4. Draft resolutionA/C.1/35/L.22 entitled "Non-use of nuclear
weapons and prevention of nuclear war" was submitted on 14
November 1980 by Algeria, Angola, Argentina, the Congo,
Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Madagascar, Nigeria,
Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zaire (No.
41). Bhutan, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Malaysia,
Qatar and Yemen subsequently joined the sponsors.
5. At the 35th meeting of the First Committee, on 19 November
1980, India introduced draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22.
(No.42, pages 14-18)
6. At the 39th meeting of the First Committee, on 21 November
1980, explanations of vote before the vote on draft
resolution A/C.1/35/L.22 were made by Ireland (No. 43, pages
57-65) and Japan (No. 43, pages 63-65).
7. At its 39th meeting, the First Committee voted on draft
resolution A/C.1/35/L.22. The draft resolution was adopted
by 101 votes to 19, with 15 abstentions. (No. 43, pages 63-
65)
8. At the 39th meeting, explanations of vote after the vote on
draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22 were made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (N0.43, page 66), Sweden (N0.43,
page 67), and Finland (No.43, pages 68-70)
9. The First Committee recommended to the General Assembly the
adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22 which was
submitted as Draft Resolution D in paragraph 27 of the
Report of the First Committee on agenda item 44 (A/35/665/
Add.1). (NO.44).
10. The Rapporteur of the First Committee introducedthe Report
of the First Committee on agenda item 44 at the 94th plenary
meeting of the General Assembly heldon 12 December 1980.
(N0.45, paragraphs 1, 4, 17, 23 and 27)
11. Pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Procedure, the Report of
the First Committee was not discussed by the General
~ssembly .
12. At the 94th plenary meeting, there were no speakers who
wished to explain their votes on Draft Resolution D. In a
recorded vote, Draft resolution D was adopted by 112 votes
to 19, with 14 abstentions (No.45, for the result of the
voting see paragraph 108). It became General Assembly
resolution 35/152 D. E. GENERAL ASSEMûLY RESOLUTION 36/92 1
General Assembly resolution 36/92 1 entitled "Non-useof
nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war" (No. 46) was
adopted at the Thirty-sixthSession of the General Assemblyon 9
December 1981 under agenda item 51 entitled "Review of the
implementationof the recommendationsand decisions adopted by
the General Assembly at its tenth special session." The
legislativehistory of the resolution is as follows:
1. The above-mentioneditem was included in the provisional
agenda of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly
in accordancewith its resolutions 34/83 K of 11 December
1980.and 35/152 A, B, C, D, E, F, H, 1 and J of 12 December
2. At its 4th plenary meeting, on 18 September 1981, the
General Assembly,on the recommendationof the General
Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda as item
51 and to allocate it to the First Committee.
3. At its 2nd meeting, on 7 October 1981, the First Committee
decided to hold a combined general debate on the items
allocated to it relating to disarmament, namely, items 39to
56, 128 and 135. The general debate took place at the 3rd
to 26th meetings, from 19 October to 4 November 1981. The
records ofesthose meetings (A/C.1/36/PV.3-26).verbatim
4. Draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.29 entitled "Non-use ofnuclear
weapons and prevention of nuclear warw was submitted on 16
November 1981 by Algeria, Argentina,the Bahamas, Barbados,
Bhutan, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India,
Indonesia,Jamaica, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Nigeria, .
Peru, Romania, Yemen and Yugoslavia (No.47). Bangladesh,
the Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the Niger, Qatar, Rwanda and
Sri Lanka subsequently joined the sponsors.
5. 1981,e India introduceddraft resolutionA/C.1/36/L.29.ovember
(No.48, pages 36-40)
6. At its 40th meeting of the First Committee, on 23 November
1981, the First Committee proceeded to vote on draft
resolution A/C.1/36/L.29.A recorded vote waç requested.
The draft resolution was adoptedby a recorded vote of 99 to
18, with 5 abstentions. (No.49, for the result of the
voting see page 21)
7. At the 40th plenarymeeting, explanationsof vote after the
vote on the draft resolution were madeby the German
22-23), andReIreland (No.49, page 23). Sweden (No.49, pages8. The First Comrnitteerecommended to the General Assembly the
adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.29 which was
Report of the First Committee on agenda item 5132 o(A/36/752).
(No.50)
9. The Rapporteur of the First Committee introduced the reports
of the First Committee at the 91st plenary meeting of the
General Assembly on 9 December 1981. (No.51, paragraphs 1-3,
6 and 7)
10. Pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Procedure, the Report of
the First Committee was not discussed by the General
Assembly .
11. At the 91st plenary meeting, there were no speakers who
Resolution e1.laIn a recorded vote, Draft Resolutionaft 1was
adopted by 121 votes to 19, with 6 abstentions (No.51, for
the result of the voting see paragraph 133). It became
General Assembly resolution 36/92 1.
12. At the 91st plenary meeting, an explanation of vote after
the vote on Draft ~esolution 1 was made by Greece (No.51,
paragraphs 146-149). P. GENHULL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 45/59 B
General Assembly resolution 45/59 B entitled "Convention on
the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" (No. 52) was
adopted at the Forty-fifth session of the General Assembly on 4
December 1990 under agenda item 57 entitled "Review and
implementationof the concluding document of the twelfth special
session of the General Assembly: Conventionon the prohibition of
the use of nuclear weapons." The text of the draft Convention
was annexed to the draft resolution. The legislative history of
the resolution is as follows:
1. agenda of the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly in
accordance with its resolutions 44/117 A, C, D, E and F of
15 December 1989.
2. At its 3rd plenary meeting, on 21 September 1990, the
General Assembly, on the recommendationof the General
Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda as item
57 and to allocate it to the First Committee for
consideration and report.
3. At its 2nd meeting, on 9 October 1990, the First Committee
decided to hold'a combined generaldebate on the disarmament
deliberation on those items took place from the 3rd to the
23rd meetings, from 15 to 30 October. Consideration ofand
action on draft resolutions on those items took place from
the 24th through 39th meetings, from 2 to 16 November. The
views expressed therein are contained in the verbatim
records of those meetings (A/C.1/45/PV.24-39).
4. Draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.25 entitled "Conventionon the
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" was submitted on
31 October 1990 by Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Ecuador, Egypt! Ethiopia, India,
Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia.
(N0.53)
5. At the 29th meeting of the First Committee, on 7 November
1990, India introduced draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.25.
(No.54, pages 11-17)
6. At the 34th meeting of the First Committee, on 12 November
1990, an explanation of vote before the vote on
A/C.1/45/L.25 was made by Hungary. (No.55,page 23)
7. At its 34th meeting, the First Committee adopted draft
resolution A/C.1/45/L.25 by a recorded vote of 106 to 17
votes, with 10 abstentions. (No.55, for the result of the
voting see page 28-30)8. vote after the vote on the draft resolution were made by of
Poland (No.55, page 42), Sweden (No.55, pages 42-43), and
China (No.55, pages 46-47)
9. The First Committee recommendedto the General Assembly the
adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.25 which was
submitted as Draft Resolution B in paragraph 15 of the
Report of the First Committee on agenda item 57 (A/45/779).
(N0.56)
10. of the First Committee at the 54th plenary meeting of thets
General Assembly on 4 December 1990. (No.57, pages 3-10)
11. Pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Procedure, the Report of
the First Committee was not discussed by the General
Assembly .
12. wished totexplain their votes on Draft Resolution B.who In a
recorded vote, Draft Resolution B was adopted by 125 votes
to 17, with 10 abstentions (No.57, for the result of the
voting see page 63). It became General Assembly resolution
45/59 B. G. GENERAL ASS-LY RESOLUTION 46/37 D
General Assembly resolution46/37 D entitled "Conventionon
the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" (No. 58) was
December 1991eunder agenda item 61 entitled "Review andbly on 6
implementation of the concluding'documentof the twelfth special
session of the General Assembly. The text of the draft
Convention was annexed to the draft resolution. The legislative
history of the resolution is as follows:
1. The above-mentioned item was included in the provisional
agenda of the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly in
accordance with its resolutions 44/117 B of 15 December 1989
and 45/59 A, B, C, D and E of 4 December 1990.
2. At its 3rd plenary meeting, on 20 September 1991, the
Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda as item
61 and to allocate it to the First Committee.
3. At its 2nd meeting, on 10 October 1991, the First Committee
decided to hold a combined general debate on the disarmament
items allocated to it, namely, items 47 to 65. The
deliberation on those items took place from the 3rd through
24th meetings, from 14 to 30 October. Consideration of and
action on draft resolutionson those items took place from
the 25th through 37th meetings, from 4 to 15 November. The
views expressed therein are contained in the verbatim
records of those meetings (A/C.1/46/PV.25-37).
4. Draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20 entitled "Convention onthe
prohibition of the use of nuclear weaponsw was submittedon
31 October 1991 by Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Madagascar,
Malaysia, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia. (No.59). Bolivia and the
Lao People's Democratic Republic subsequentlyjoined the
sponsors.
5. At the 31st meeting of the First Committee,on 7 November
1991, India introduced draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20.
(No.60, pages 20-23)
6. At its 33rd meeting, on 11 November 1991, the First
Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20 by a
recorded vote of 96 to 17, with 20 abstentions. (No.61, for
the result of the voting see page 13)
7. At its 33rd meeting, explanations of vote after the vote on
draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20 were made by ~ulgaria (No.61,
pages 31-33), China (No.61, pages 34-36), Czechoslovakia
(No.61, pages 36-37), and Finland (No.61, pages 41-42).8. The First Committee recommendedto the General Assemblythe
adoptionof draft resolutionA/C.1/46/L.20which was
submittedas Draft Resolution E in paragraph20 of the
r(No.62)f the First Committeeon agenda item 61 (A/46/674).
9. The Rapporteurof the First Committeeintroducedthe reports
of the First Committeeat the 65thplenary meeting of the
General Assembly on 6 December 1991. (No.63,pages 3-4 and
6-8)
10. Pthe First Committeewas not discussedby the General Report of
Assembly.
11. At the 65th plenary meeting, there wereno speakerswho
wished to explain their votes on Draft ResolutionE. In a
recordedvote, Draft Resolution E was adopted by122 votes
to 16, with 22 abstentions(No.63,for the resultof the
voting see page 36). It became General Assembly resolution
46/37 D. ,.
on the rohibition of
, ad tg--+ 13
The Ceneml Assembly, Belinringtùat the use of weaponsof da<nrc-
Mindfrrlofitsmponsibility under th(aa. of tion. sucasnudcar and thumo-nudear weapons.ia
the United Nations in the maintenanceof innrnationd a dirm ncgationof the high ideaisand objediva wbich
peace and security, asweil asin the wnsidcrofion tbe United Nation&a beenutabikhcd ta achiem
principles governing disarmament. through the protectionof su&g gmuations from
the scourge war and thmugh the prescrvatioa and
armament have not sfarachievedsatisiadodb,dL-n promotion ofh& cultures.
the armaments race. particularly in the nudear and 1. Dechrcst&t :
thermo-nucleafields.hasrrached a dangvotu dagc (a)The useofnudk and thenno-nudear weapolls
requiring dl possible precautiomurm to is contrdry tothe spirit, letter and aima of the United
tect humanityand civilbahon frnm the Nations andas sucha direcvîoiationotheCharter
nuclear and thermo-nudcar catastrophe, of the UnitedNations;
Recalling ththe useof weapom of masa*c- (b)The use ofnudar and thumo-nudear
tion. causing unnecessaryhu~sufferhgwa~ inthe would acced ep.mthe sfope ofwar and ~tisem-
past prohibitasking ~011- to the lawsof discriminatmffeMg and despuaion tomankindand
ityand to the printiplea of internkw,byainter- àvilization anas such,isow tothe & of
national declantioandbinding agreements,sucas intemationai ky andtothelaws humanitg;
the ~edaration oSt Petersburg 1868 ,heDeclara- (E) nie use of nndear and thumo-nudear weapons
tion othe Brussels Conferenof 1874.theGmnn- iaawar directed Magainstancnemyordu aione
tions of The Hague PeaceGnfm oflm and stitd inguiual, since the pph
1907, and the Geneva Pmtowlof1925,ta whichthe butthe Y-r d not inmlvesncbawar aribneabject-
majority of nations sti&es, edtoaüthe cvi lseratedbytheuseof sucwzapons;
Conrideringthat the w of nudcar andth-. (d) Any State ntide;uand thcmo-mdear
nuclwr weapons wouid bring about indis.- weapor ia tobe oxd u riolahgthe Qnnr
suffering and destruction to mdbad adidon af humani9 .anaiummittingiawcrime agaiprmui-
toan evengreateextent thanthe useof+seanapoPs land and avdkiion;
dedared by the aforcmmtioned internanonal dcdan-
tions ad agreementsto be wntmy to thela* of 2. Requests the SecruaryGencrato amuit tbe
humanity anda crime undu international kw, &-ma of MemberStatutao~certainthevie-
signing a convention on the prohi itheusefof
auclcaand thcrmo-nuk weapons forwar porpo~o
and treportonthe resulb onichwnsultatiom the
keai Assunblyat its seinntcuith session.1 United Kingdom of Great Britaiti and Northern Irelaad and Uaited States of Ameriea: reqaest for
theinciusion of an item in the provisional agenda of the sir<eenth saision
14
; [Agenda item 721 [OrigËial text: Englisli]
115Jul. 19611
3. In keeping with General .4sscmbly resolutioii
1578 (XV) of 20 Dceember 1960. the United States
and the Vnited Kingdom introduced at Geneva. on
On the instmctions of Our respective Governments 21 Jlarch and 29 'ilay 1961. a large number of far-
ire have the honour to request that an item entitled cipal issuesunrsolvedrobetween them and the Sovictn-
'The urgent need for a treaty to ban nudear weapons
tests under effective international controbe included C'niort.These proposals would not only give the Soviet
in the agenda of the sixteenth session of the Generai L:tiion and States associated with it a position of ab-
solute equality with the United States, the Cnited
-4ssembly. Kingdom and States associated with them on the policy-
.%riexplanatory memorandum isattadied in acaord- making control commission and throughout the control
ance with de 20 of the tules of procedure of.the system: they would alsogo asfar as possible. consistent
Gcneral Assembly. ivith the technical and organizational rquircmentsof
effective control. to accommodate Soviet sensitivities
(Signed) P. DEAN on the subject of control. hioreover. the United States
Ptrmanenl Represcntah7:tof the and the Vnited Kingdom introduced on 18 April 1961
United Kingdom of Great Britain and iVorthm Ireland a complete compromise treaty text which they are pre-
io the United .Votions pared to sign immediately or to use as a basis for
(Signed) Francis T. P. PLIYF-TON iurther serious negotiation. A copy of this treaty was
circulated to the Munbers of the United Xations on
Deputy Pertnunent Representaiivr of 3 Jiine 1961 (A/4772).
the Unitd States of A>nmi-a 4. The Soviet Union. on the other hand. did na
Iothe United Nahons heed the counsd of the General Assembly "to make
Annuu (XVI) 73 and 72 evew effort to reach agreement as sam as possible".
It has failed to respond constnictivcly to the initiative
oi its two negotiating parmer? It has not introduced a
single positive proposal within the past year and a
half. Instead, sin21 March 1x1, the Soviet Union
EXPLANATORY YEXORANDUY has retreated from agreements dready rcachcdI. ts
1. At its past six sessions. the General .4ssembly has niost significant badcward step was a new proposal
given serious consideration ro the problem of the ces- that &y-by-day executive authority over the inter-
'ation oi nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons tests. national contrsyst~ k urcrOscd bv a three-rnankr
In a iiiimber oi resolutions-the last of which was administrative council (including rcpraatativesofthe
adopted on 70 December 1960-the .4ssembly has rec- two nuclear sidu and a neutral represmtative) whjdi
ognized the imperative and urgent need for agreement could act only by unanimous consent. ïhis proposa]
l>ytreary on stich a bai. To this end. it has urged the retracted the Soviet Union's earlier agreement on a
three Srares negotiariiig in Gmeva to make every effon single administrator. who would be appointeri witthe
to 2chiej.e stich agreeiiient iinder coriditions oi appro- concurrence of the Soviet Union, who would cary out
priate iiiteriiational control. .\t the sanie tinie. while the directives of the treaty md of the policy-making
iiegoiintioiis ivere in progress. the Gcneral .\ssembly control commission, and who would be responsible to,
urged the negotiating States to refrain volui~r~ily froiii and oprate unda, the supervision of the control com-
the testing of niiclear and thermo-nuclear iveapons. mission. While such a single administrator could take
action rapidly and impartially, under the three-man
7. The Cnited States and the C'nited Kingdom GOV- administrative council proposa1 any action could be
erniiients are conscious of their responsibility hefore blocked, or delayed by any of its members.
the ititernarional community and of the importanceOf
a test han agreement to general world peace and secu- 5. The Soviet Union justifies its proposal for a
rit:. For these reasons the? have negotiatcd patient!? three-member administrative council by assming that
with the Soviet Union in Geneva for nearly three yexs "no person can Iivin a society without being influennd
to achicïe a ban on nudear weapons tests which would by same ideology or othei and by the rcbmonships -.
be open for adherence by al1 States. For these reasons e~isting hetween differmt groups within that society.
the? have reirained {romcoiiducting iiuclear and thermo- That is ahy there are neutral countries but there are,
nuclear test5 sirice negotiations commenced iii October and an be, no neutral persans."'
!'IjS. During al1 this period. however. there has Ixeii 6. 'The United States and United Kingdom Gov-
IIOiiiternational rerification to eyitre that no clandes- ernments categondly repudiate any suggestion that
tine nuclenrLveaponstests are being conducted by any thereare no people capable of exercising independent
iiation. The Soviet Union has ;teadfastly resisted !he judgement on behalf of the international community.
adoption of key mevures of international control which Indeed, the whole history of international organizations
alone could dord a reasonable degree01 assurance, to bears witness to the contrary. The two Governments
al1 States that the parties to a treaty are adhertng believe that the Çoviet rejection of the idea of an inter-
to their obligations. It niust be recognized that the national civil servant acting impartially under guidance
voliintary forbearance of the United States and the from international policy-making organs can only h
Knited Kingdom to conduct nuclear weapons tests. viewed asan attack upon the executive capacityof any
iindersuch conditions. involves a serious risk to their international organization to act effmively.
security. 7. The United States and the United Kingdom
reject the Soviet proposal for the appointment of three-
iiian committees. composed of representatives of States
or of suppsed blocs of States, in whidi al1 action
would have to be taken hy unanimous consent of $1
three-a further opportunity to add to the many in-
dividuai vetoes the Soviet has cast in world dairs
during the post-war period. They are convinced that
al1 iiations which do motwish the domination of great
Powers will likewise rejm it.
8. The Soviet Union's position is further based on
other inadequacies which frustrate the concept of effec-
tive internationd control. Chief among these are: (a)
the determination to limit inspection of suspicious
events in the United States, the United Kingdom and tirsi step toward controlled disarmament: and fd) geii-
the Soviet Union to three annually: (b) the demand erally comiiienciiig a process which could build con-
for a delay of four years after treaty ratificationre fideiiceainong nations and decrease the danger oi rvar.
control operations could begin; and (c) insistence on
provisions permining self-inspection, for example, by 10. The present attitude of the Soviet Union. as
turning over direction of ail controi posts and inspection iiiiderliiied by recent notes oi its Governnient. does
tms in the Soviet Union to nationais of the Soviet norhing to iiarrow differences between the two sides:
Union. Moreover. in introduung the specious cun- iiidce<l.it hs enlarged them. Consequenrlya seriour
tention that the control arrangements proposed by the impasse has been reached. Recognizingthe importance
United States and the United Kingdom could be mis- oi thrse negotiations to the security and peace of the
used for espionage purposes, the Soviet Union has not intertintional com~nunity. the Go~ernments of the
L'iiited States and the Ciiited Kingdom believe that
only overlooked the far-reaching safeguards biOlt into the Geiieral .\ssenibly should coiisider at its sixteenth
these arrangements to obviate any nich danger, but seijion the critical situation that now confronts the
has also, in effect. repudiated a contml system of the coiiierence.The two Governments are prepared topre-
scope recommwded by the Grneva conference of experts jeii3. iiill espositioii.of their petiormance in carrying
in August 1958. oint the General Assenibly maiidair. It is the hope of
9. Confirming its unwillingness to comply with the 110th(;overnments that a treaty for cessation of nuclear
numerous Gencrai Assanbly resolutions urging ewly weqmis tests iinder adeqiiate international control may
reement on a nuclear weapons test ban. the Soviet \.et he xchievedand the' stand reaiy to coiitiniienezo-
LILIOIInow disinisses the significance of a separate tiatio;is at Genera to this end. The importance oi such
[ety. It proposes instead thaia treaty banning nuclear nii agreement as a first step in reversing the dangeroiis
.tapons tests should await agreement on. and perhaps aiid I~iircleiisomeamis race can hardly he over-
indecd implementation of, general and complete dis-
,rmaiiient. This proposal reverses the Soviet Unioii's estiniated. The nations of the a.orld miist take this
opportiiiiity of taking a first significant step townrd
,arlier position; it can onlyk concluded that this is endiiring world peacc.
king done in order to avoid any cominitment now on
,iiuclear iveapons test ban to which al1 States could
,ccede. The IJnited States and the United Kingdom
3reopposed to delaying a test ban treaty until agree-
i,ieiiton total disarmament can be worked niit. The
GenevaConference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear
\\'eaponsTests has shown that a treaty under reasan-
,ble and effective international mntrols is possible:
beiorethe soviet Union started reversing its positions.
theconference had such a treaty well within its reach.
The United States and the United Kingdononb ielieve
!ha1the progress made in nearly three years of nego-
:+aiionshould not be given up, but that efforts shoiild
continueuntil an agreement has been reached. They
belirvethat an adequately coiitrolled nuclear lveapons
:estkii agreement conclitded at an early time would be
oiinestimablevalue for (a) halting dangeroiis prolifera-
lion in nuclear weapn capabilities; (b) eliininating
br ever conceni over fail-out; (c) providing an ngreed
.1 Note bytheGovemmurtof the SovietUnion totk Gamm-
mentof the Unite StatesofAmen- datcd 5 Jdy 1961,mb
mittefi bpthe USSR dei+eatiar atthe 91«i meain d the
Tes& (GES/DNT/I13).n the DisanrtinuancefNudeu keapoa, DOCUMENTS A/4801
India: request for the inclusion of an item in the pi l il
rovisional agenda of the sixteenth sesnion
[.ignida itein 731
Document A/4801 2. Though prorrafted discussions in Gcnorahave re-
sulted in agreement in regard to a numbcr of dauses
Letter dated 17 July 1961 from the representative of the proposeddraft ofa wcaty,the negotiations. which
of lndia to the Seeretary-General were raumcd in Mardi 1961, have reached a stale-
[Original tr.rt: Englisli] mate which thretens to endanger evcn the uneasy
[l8 Jirlv 1961 "moratorium" on thae tats. Statcrnents on behaif of
the differcnt parti- concerned about the possible re-
1have the lionour. iiiider the instructions of my Gov- newd of tests in case agreement is nnt reached. as well
rrniiient. to propose for inciiision in the provisioiial as the contemplateri limitationof the period of mora-
qenda of the sisteenth session of the General .issembly torium. give ause for serious anxiew.
rieitem "Siispension of niiclear and thernio-nuclear
ICSIS". 3. The Government of India, in commoii with large
.in esplanatory ineiiiorniidiiiiiwill follow shortly. nuinbers of Mmber States aswdl asan ovenvhelmiiig
volume of tvorld opinion. is deeply concerned at the
(Siqned) C. S. JHA danger that tests may be conducted either by those ob-
Per~~ionentRzpresentatiue oj India scrviiig the presmt moratorium or by States no: yet
to the United Nations parties to it It may still lx hoped that the Powers
with greater rcsponsibility will find ways and means
of implementing the successive resolutions of the United
Sations. more rticularly Cenerai .4ssenibly raolutioii
Document A/4801 /Add.I 1578 (XV). Xwever, the failure to reach agrnment
and the circumstances tvhich have led to and sustained
hr dated 38 July 1961 from'the nprrsentarive the sialmate are aknning. They do not at present
of India to the SeeretaryCenerd appear to be amenable to the various efforts at com-
promise that have been made at Geneva.
[Original tr.rt: English1
. (28 Julv 1%11 4. In view of the technological advances. the spread
1. 1 have the honour to refer to my letter dated of the relevant knowledge to an increasingly large
:7 July 1961 yroposing that the item "Suspension of number of nations. the continuance of worid tensions
nudear and themo-nuclear tests" be included in the and the indication of desire on the pan of nuclear
provisioiial agenda of the sixteenth session of the Powers to renetv test wshether or not another coitntry
General .4ssembly. indulges in th, it has hecme imperative to ensure
rheir prohibition. It is the view ofthe Covemmrnt of
2. 1 have now to request. under the instructions of India that any State which resumes these tsts would.
my Government, that the title of the item should be bcconie pnmarily responsible for the detefioration af
changedto read asfollows: the entire position. They consider it essenhal not only
that the attempts to reach agreement.on a treaty bc
resiimed withont delay but that. pending such result,
"Contiiiu~tion of siispension of nuclear and thermo- the States principally concerned. as well asal1 other
nuclear tests and obligations of Statetorefrain from States. should undertake not to contempiate the uni.
their renewai". considered appeal tofailStates by the Assembly, par-
3. .An explanatory memomdum in accordance uith ticularly those most directly concerned.to take no initia.
rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the. &neni tive in re-starring nuclear or therm~nudear tests would
.%ssemblyis attached. have the ovemhelming support of world opinion. It
would act as an effective restn.int on those who. for
(Signed) C. S. JHA ivhatever reasons. are wnsidering or may m~isiderthe
Prri~ianr~itReprrsmiatire of lndia resumption of tests unilaterally.
to the United "fations
5. The Government of India, therefore. submit foi
Geiieral Assembly ail item embodying these considen-f the
tioiis entitled "Continuation of suspension of nuclcar
1. .At its 933th pienary meeting. on 20 December ancl therino-nuclear tests and obligations of States to
1960. the Gencral Assembly adopted two resolutiona reimin from their renewal".
(resolutions 1577 (XI') and 1578 (XV)) urging the
States concerned to coiitinuc the present voluntsry
suspension of nuclcar and thermo-nuclear tesü. Reso-
lution 1578 (XV) further rquested other States to .
reirain from undenaking such tats. The resolutions
referred to the progress that had been made towaids
agreement regarding the discontinuance of thae tests
by the parties concerned at the Ceneva negotiations and
urged the successful completion of their endeavours. Slxteetitb. sesalon
FIRsT COMCTPEE
Agsn& itr~ and 72
CC'ZINLUITIO NF SSPEIISION OF WCIEAR AND THTRl!O-NUUZRT RBT3 Mill
OBLTGA2ïO:iO SFS'IATES'RI RERULN iTOM RFNtWAL
Ceylan,.EtUopla, Ghane,Wbya. Rigeria, Somlia, Suclan, Tunisia
and Indonesia: dmft reeolutlon
-he General Aeserribi:~
Mindful of its responsibility under the Cherter of the Lh:ted Nations in
--
the maintenance of infernationa1 peace and secÜrity, as vell as in the
consideration of principies gave* disarmament,
Gravely cencerned that vbilenegotiatione on disarmamen', have not, eo far,
achieved satisfactory resulte, the anasmente race, particularly in the rmcïear
and thermo-nuclcar ficlLe, ha8 reached a âangemue stage requirlng all possible
precautionary meaeurea to pmtect httmenîty and ite civ',lîzation frum the hazard
of nuclear and thernr>-nuclear catastrophe,
Recaiiing t+t the use of veapoas of &se destniction, causiilq unneceasory
humansufieri& nas, in the paet, pmhibited ae belng contkr-y to the laws of
humanity and to the principles of international hw, by internafiou81 declaratio~
and binding agreement, such as the Dechration of St. Petersburg of z68, the
Dechration of the Brussels Conference of l874, the Convention8 of The Bague
Peace Conferences of a99 and 1907, and the Genm Protocol of 1925, to vhich
the majority of nations are atill partiee,
Considering that the uee of wciear and thermo-niiclear weapone Muld bring
about Indiecrinrinate euffering and deetmction to mankind and lts civillzatlon A,&.i;;t.'92
~# E3gUsh '
Page 2
to an even greater extent tbn the uee of those waponî dcclsred by tie
aforeeentioued interuatLonal dechrations asd agreezcnts to be contraq- to tte
h%rs of humcnity iind a crize under international law,
Eelleviq that the use of weapons of mas destmction, such as nuclear and
thema-nuclear voapons, is a direct regation of thehi* ideds and objectives
vhich the UcitedZations has Seen established to achieve ttrough the protection
of succeeding gcneratiocs ?rom the scourge of vsr and through the prescrvetion
and'prormtion of tteir cdtures,
1. Declares:
(a) ltat the use of nuchar & thenno-mxlesr weaCons is contra:y to the
spirit, lectar and aima of the Wted Hat?.om and, as such, a diroc? vLo,et:cn
oi the United Nations Charter;
Tha?the use of nvciesr ,and the--ouclear veocns i-~idd exceod even
(b)
the sc~pe of ,Jar ecd cauze inals;rirdste suffering and destrrrczion to mckicd
and its civilizetion an?, w such, 1s contraAg to the des of intcrnatioael Lw
and to the la;rs O? h-kity;
(c) lüat the aseoimiclcsr and thermo-auclear wea?ons 1s a var dlrected
not'against an en- or enemies alone but 8J.60 again& rpaGkind in gencrsl, since
the peoplee of the vorld mt. involved in such war vlll be subjactéd to aïi the
evilsgenerated Ly the use of euch veapons;
(d) Thatany State using nuchar and thermo-miciear weapons 1s to be
ennsiaered to vlolate the Charter of the ünited &tiona, to act coatrorj to the
laveof humanity and 'to cdt a crime ageinst mmkinl and its ci-rlLizatioz;
2. Reauests the Secretarj-Ceneral to consdt the Covernments O? :&&ber
--
States to ascertain tteir vie~ on tks possibiuty of ccn-?eni= a spîcisl
conference for signing a convention on the pmhibition of the use of nu-lerr and
thermo-mclear weapons for warpurposes and to report on thc results of ou:h
consuLtation to the seventeenth session of the General Asaenbly.uH,r~.~ j,j'À'y(o~s.
Matr.
LPrrPeD
GENERAL ..
~/~.1/~.~2/Add.l
ASSEMBLY'. 9 October1961
ORIGINAL: ENCLEH
sixteefitsession
rniT cor.?,amE
.4;er..la it73sand72
CObmIPilJATIOFSUSPENSION OF NCCLEA RNDTREKJ-NCCLEA TESIS
ANDOBLIGATIOllOSF STATES!iüREFRAIN FROM'IHEIRRENEWAI.
THE URGENTNEEDFOR A mn TO PANN'CW GIEAFOP BIS UNDER
EFFECTIVE IhTERNATlONACLONTROL -
Ccylon,Ethiopia,Chana, Libye,Nigeria, SoiniliaSuàan, ninisiaand
Indonesia: draft resolution
idd Guineato the listof sponsorsof the draft resolution.UNITED NATIONS
Mstr.
LMTED
GENERAL
A/C.I/L.292/:i.2d.
8 November 1961
ASSEMBLY
ORIGINAL: ENCLlSH
5ixreezt.isession
FiRST COI,IAlT!I'E
.kgenEs items73 and 72
COBTI?R'ATICNOF ÇGSFLt:SICN OF NCCLEARAND Ti3ZRM3-,WCLEARTESTS
Ai'DOELI~TIOXS OF STATESTO iE7RAIN FROMTHEIRRENEWAL
TE üRCEI;T NEED FOR A TXATi' Tû WN NtCLE4R lJEAFONSTESE UNLE27
rnPECTIVE IN'WNATIONALCONrnOL
Ceylon. Ethiopla, Ghana, Cuinea. Libya,Nineria, Somalia, Çudan,Tunisiaand
Indonesia: draft resolution
Aùd Liberia to the list of sgcnsorsof the draft resolution.
-----UnitedNations
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
Sl.YTE.?3TSESSION ~, .
ofiid Recordt NEW YORK
CONTENTS
,qgendaitems73 and 72:
CoIdermo-nuclear testsand obligationsnof
Statesto refrain fmm Weir renelval(con-
wed). .. .... ... ............. ..
nie urgentneed for a treatytobannuclear
weamns tests under effective international 10. *. 'I3MUF'laN (Uaton<rlSoviet F+
control(continued.. ........ ....... publics)saidthat hiedeleptionls attitutake hm
draft resolutimui MortheCommitte---f-.---i-ect-
lyïmm the prtndpies rmder~yl=~ovietforeippoiicy,
Cïuzinner: Mr. Marfo AMADEO (Arqentlna). the xnainpraposee of whicbweretodefendpence .o
remove thethreatd war andto pmote the peacefui
AGENDA ITEMS 73AND72 coexistenced Stataswith düferentsocialsystems.
The %ml& Unton had almye supported and muid
Continuationof suspensofnnuclear ond thennonuclear olwayasupportanycansmictivemeasPreshavingthose
tests and o9ligotloSwmf to nfraifm choirm- aima.Itblfed that aeatyonganeral anmplete
newa(Al4801andAdd.1, A/CI/L231/Rn.l, A/C1/ had frequentiymadn spscfiiopmpoaahoutathat ad-
L292 md gd.1) (continued. pmposa1s aihich toolhto accormt au thepcsitive!
slements in the position ofthe WestPomrs. The
The urgentnaed fora tnaty to ban noclwr weaponstesi programme for -rai and complet4 diammuent
under.Hectivintemotional ontio(A/4799,A/Cl/ aibmittedby theChairrmn of the CormcflofWsters
....29andAdd.1)(continuid., ûi theUSSR, &. Khruahchev. atthe theteesession
ûi the ûeneral AaaemblyU muid souad
baslsfor asmemmt: the het UiiimW M ta
aie a tre.5 d ganera and complet4 dhma&nt
m soi ut ibtnaowZappersdindoormutnt~/~.lh.292raft Iaovldingfor thestricteginteanaîioml conmllm-
and~dd.1 hadorfginally been nibmittedtotheAssem- lbedhteiy. Althou@tbatwuuidb theboat mathoricd
bly at ito mteenth KSS~OI~hepurpose &thedech- cmauringpence. agreement cmùd dso b mached on
ration ImnbŒUedwas0 phiMt ths useofdear Cenainpartialmaamms whichwouldhalpmemwhiïe
and the-nuclear weapona for nnpmason ahatao- to reduce Inîernationsl tensndîncmasrmnfldence
ever. Idid notlnsis tponthe conclusion ofheaty &e hw StdraB maoiuslmngnoartWorecotheCommit.-at
atthe presentJrmchuc. butItsndOptiûnWOLI b~an Wd helptaatmngmm paaceontheAiircanamttnent
effective flrstep bwnrds the UlUmatepmMbima M toimpm theinternational sibuon.
by treat y the use aidear wqo~ tarettle 0..
disputes between nations.mged theCamnitî8e to
put thMt msolutlon tothn>teassoonas possible.
S. Mr. CISSE(Senelpl) safd thabieMegation, t~-
gether with a mrmberal other Africao dalegatim.
. had submittean sinendment (A/C.lh.293andAddl
and Add.l/Corr.l)to draftnsolutlun A/C.l/ï.291
andAdd-l Now that timsponsors bsd submfttea
reviscd version (A/C.lh291/Reo.U d tba t, b
mked for the votan itobe postponedpaadfn con-
sultation btween tsponsorsd theamendment. That.
however. shouïdnotstandin thway da voteon draft
.maolutlon AfC.lh232 aadMl. .~ 13. As.fa andmit molrrtion A/C.Ut29.?andAdd.l
cwe c<mwrnsdthe &~UOll it embodbwdd .ct
ui amdtnbiebaoinforsoldngtàe~d pnhîblb
Ing theuse af mriclm an-. Ths sudetulllon
bellevedM italwayaha& -the mem olthe
amrld mustbe mved frOmtbe thmatd llllclau.
Iti1Bof* pmpossdO theWesternPmmmtbnt ümm
.hould bsanq?wment tob.ndear mmpotm, a
butfor theranistancthatpmùiem wdd ha? ban
iettled loago.TheSoviet ,tWa -rpb
dum (A/4892madethe pointthar dedamib bpthe
&aar StatesthutbeyWd not~imdoar~
amad help O aapaiathe pmed for r
genere.idmmpleh~~<rt.Uahoiltdbsr+
ded fntbâtûûmexh thrt chaaenaa ROtOd
pmhmitiollthUEe dpoison~and~glal
mapone ifhd Qmwd dectim in lam&c% in a0
SecondWorid War. In aontrast OtheFht, auab
weaponahd notben ueed,.Itùon@ümy hrd
Thue ulehewasna rensonwtiplt¬ bsplmanle
tomohthittheUEedmiclear.nd&asapana
HLadelemtion muldtàereiam rnmaortddtraa1luCi8n
Is/c.l/L292andAddl Both dr& zceolutinnbd&
the Cornmitkadected the amcern d thepwplea,
ai the arorldattheüueatalanuciearau.andümlr
idoptiowouldbsa d6p townnia enanlsndcomphb
diaarmamsnt.
la. a. WINIEWlcz (Pom
M. -
18. Draft rsaolutloa A/C.lh29andAddl con^-
tuteda d@Jmns app0.I a-t theune aidear
weapons. 'and had thrupportd hiadelègst:onR
should bepofnteout. however. thatonly gaienû and
danwreof nucleaW.nencould flnôIldhhate tàe
Y p d im~aim~itd~~g.~~
oQar Gua. d -WC.I MUUS d W- apnd*
ni.m.uClm. NomQ. 19U~dN~~mnSd~ UnitedNations
FiRS CTOMMiTK 1 1 ,90th 1E
GENERAL MEETING
ASSEMBLY Thursday, 9 November 1961.
at Ila.m.
SIXTEENTH SESSION
OBicialRecordr NEW YORK
CONTENTS whatever degree of force was necess?rJ' in order to
Page repel awsaion.
Agendaitems 73 and 72: 8. Ais delegation wouid vote againat the &aft res*
Continuation of suspension of nuclear and lution. since it felt that the course of action proposed
thenno-nuclear tests and oblleations of in it wouid serve no usefui purpose.
States torefrain from tbeir renëwal (con- 9. MT. MEZINCESCU (Romanis) said thathisdelega-
&!@).' ....................... tion wouid vote Lnfaaiur cd boib draft resoluttons
The urgent need for a treatyto ban nuclear before the Cornmittee. He aped with the United
weap6ns tests under effeciive international Kingdom representatiw Ut the dangerofW couid
contml (continued)..... .... .. ...... be elimlnated onïy withln +e conte* of general and
- complate disarmament. That. however, ma no argii-
Chafman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentinal. ment against adopting measures calcuiatedto impm
the political cllmate and facflitate the resimiption of
negotiations on general and complete diSaZmament:
AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72 indeed. in view of the deterioration oftheinternational
Continuationof suspension of nuclwr and them-nuclwr situationand the increased rlaofnuclear mr. suct
tests and obligations al Stioerefrain lm their rc measures were essential. Altho- the goalofpPohlbiG
newd (A/4801and Add.1, A/C.1/849, A/Ç1/84)A/C. ing nuclear weapona and eliminating them fmm the
l/L.l/Riv.l and Rev.l/Add.l. A/C.l/L.292 md arsenal8 of States-a goal tOwhichailnations should
shive-could be attained onlythrough the implementa-
Add.1-2)(continued) tion of a treaty on genenil and complete diaannament
rile urgent nieFoa tmaty to ban nuclear weaponstests under strict internatid contml. draft reSoluti0n
undn effective iniernatiawntml (A/4799, A/C. l/ ~/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-2. whicb was essentially a
condemnatlon of nuclear aggmssion. Fould help to
849,A/C.1/850, A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-2)(cmtinued) it. The Romantandelegation muid not agree with the
United Kingdomrepresentatiw thatthedraft resolution
couid serve no usefui purpose-th- Sir Michael
---Sii Michael WRIGHT (United Wom) Wrlght was douùüess reilectingtbe general NATOview
i.--~urning to arait resolution A/C.l/L.292 and whsn he aseimied a position whicb BrnWIItedb rejeCt-
Add.1-2. he said that an uncontmlled ban on the use hg allme-s by the enenil Assembly lWly to
of nuclear weapons would be no more effectiw than reduce international tension and to aug~eeting Ut the
the previoua uncontmlled moratorium on nuclear Assembly should take nosteps to impmrs the luter-
testlng. which had been cynically disregarded bythe aational .StInOsphere. but ahould memleeekto en-
Soviet Union.As recently as5 September. the Chair- cerbate the cold war. The Rominlia dele@tiondidnot
man of the Councfl of Minieters of the USSR. MT. regsrd the tw ddt resoluüona as a panama for al1
Khrushchev, had said In an interview in Moscow that the wrld's flls: was conrlnced. bmewr. chat they
a pledge to refrain fmm the use of nuclear weapons could easrta poaitiw Lnfluenceon the hswlopment of
would be meaningiess since a nuclear Power which intemational relations.
felt It was losing a war would unquestionably malte 0 .-
use of such wespons: he had gone on to aay that onïy 12. Mr. KURKA (C~Echo~lovalda)said thaus GO~,
disarmament couid enaure worldpeace. Theobjectives e-nt h-l alwaya supported pmposals forpractical
sought by the sponsors of the draft resolution couid measures aimed at lesseaing international tension,
be achieved onïy within the frameworoi general and hp-g mlatirm between States and cnating
complete disarmament carrfed out in balanced stages famurable conditions for general and complete dis-
and under effective international contml. as provided armament. The sociaiist coimtrles, desiring as they
In the joint statement ofrinciples for diaarmament tktiom aandereduce the danger ofnuclearamnr, nep
Soviet Union (A/4879). He was gratified that the the constantly atresaed thelr willinuness tocanyout such
President of Senegal had supported that approach to measurea lmmediately: the &%et ~ove&ent. for
the pmblem in his statement to the General Assembly elrample. hadmt forward constructive umwsa---~~~-
on 31 October (1045thplenary meeting). memorandum-of 26 September 1961(~14892).
7. With regard to the statement in ohrative para- 13. There could be nodoubt chat adoption ofthe taro
graph 1 of Mt resolution A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-2 iraitresolutions beforetheCommlttee would belp to
that the use of nuclear weapons would constitute a use of nuclear weapona wouldonbe a sttp towardae
direct violation of the United Nations Charter.hs pmhibiting their manufacture and towardatheir final
wished to point out that the Charter recognized the eliminatlon from the arsenala of Stataa. whlch shouid
right ofindividual and collective self-defence, wbich, be carried out witht. the framework of general and
in the vlew ohi6 delegation. lmplied the right to use complete disarmament. The fact that theUnitedKlng- dom representative had spoken agalnst dTUt resolu- representative of the Soviet Union. who had only
tion A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-2 showed that there was recently declared that his country would discuss the
stfll a contradiction between the words and the deeds question of nuclear weapons tests only in the context
of the Westem Powers in matters of disarmament. of general and complete disarmament-wereprepared
The argument that the draft resolution in question to support the proposal to convene a conference for
would be of no practical value because it made no the purpose of signlng a convention pmhibitingtheuse
pmvision for control could not be accepted. Although of nuclear weapons in case of war. The best course
general and complete disarmament under effective would be to defer the draft resolutionforconsideration
international control was undoubtedly the mostreliable under the general headingofdisarmamenr: the position
means of elimlnating the danger of nuclear war. a might then be clarified. If that course was not followed.
~akistan Would ahstain on operative paragraph 2.
convention banning the use of nuclear weapons wouid
certainly help to avert that danger. A comparable . .-
agreement. the Protocol pmhibiting the Use in Warof 27. Mr. SULAIMAN (Iraq)
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Cases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.openedfor signa- i8: 'Hls delegation wouid alsosupport draft resolution
ture at Geneva on 17 June 1925.u hadproved effective A/C. 1/L.292 and Add. 1-2. The mliddraftinecritlcism
in the Second World War. In any case, a convention of operative paragraph 1 (5)made by the riPresenta-
of the ldnd envisaged would not ohlige countries t0 tive of Paldstan might be met by removing the word
undertake any specific measures. so that the question 'letter" or by adding the word "Charter" alter the
of control was irrelevant. His deleption would support words "UnitedNationsW. Thedeterioration in the inter-
that draft resolution. national situation was clearly reflected intheresump-
.-- tion of the arms race, and particularly inthe renewed
15. Mr. DEAN (United States ofAmerica) said that competition in nuclear weapons. Yetboth sides already
the comprehensive plan of generai and complete possessed enougb nuclear weapons to destmy notonly
disarmament placed before the Generai Assembly each other but most of the rest of the world. The target
early in the session (1013th plenary meeting) by the of such weapons was not armies, but peoples them-
selves. who were now hostaps at the mercy of any
President of the United States.W. Kennedy ,rovided
that disarmament should be carried out in stages potential enemy. The prospect that faced the world
containing balanced. phased and safeguarded meas- was self-annihilation: little pmgress had been made
ures, with each measure and stage tobe completed in towards averting that catastrophe since the first
an agreed period of time. That plan provided. in the atomic bombs had been dmpped in 1945. The least
first stage-in other words. at an earlier stage than in that the Assembly could do, therefore. was to adopt
any other plan so far submitted-that States whichhad a declaration stating that any country which used
not acceded to an effective test-ban treaty should do nuclear weapons was committing a crime against
80, that the production offissionablematerialsforuse manldnd and civilization.
in weapons should be stopped and that agreed initial 30. MT. GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI (Cuba) said that
quantities of fissionable materiale fmm pst produc-
tion should be transferred to non-weapons purposes. to de-nuclearize Africa would be to decolonize it.
The plan further pmvided that when armaments Once colonialism disappeared fmm Africa. noAfrican
reached prescribed levels. the arrnaments in depots State would consent to the testingor storingof nuclear
should be destmyed or converted to peaceful uses. weapons on its territory. The colonial Powers had
That was the basic position of the United States taken to using their colonies for teating in preference
Covemment with respect to nuclear and thermo- to their own territory: his dele tion would therefore
nuclear arma and to the eventual elimination. pursuant support dtaft resolution AE.i/~.zgi~v.i and
Rev.l/Add.l. It was not enough toput an end to tests.
to the United States plan of generai and complete however, since the nuclear Powers already bpt vast
disarmament, of al1 nuclear and thermo-miclear gtockpfles of weapms at their various militarybases.
weapons. Moreover. the United States atwd ready to many of which were maintained in foreign countries
sign immediately an effective treaty banning nuclear against the wlshes of their peoples and Oovemments.
weapons tests not only inAfricahutallwer the world. Ris delegation would accorâingly also support draft
. .. resolution A/C. 1/L.292 and Add.1-2.
18. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistanl
..- 3.- -r. USHER (Ivory Coast)
19. With regard to draft resolution A/C.l/L.292 and 32. His delegation had voted in favour of the suspen-
Add.1-2. the aim ofwhich was to ellminate the use of sion'of nuclear tests:but it also belleved that theuse
nuclear weapons in case of war. his delegation con- of nuclear weapons should be pmhibited. since that
sidered that it could more appropriately be discussed would certainly do much more harm than tests alone.
against the background of the question of general and It would therefore vote in favour of draft resolution
complete disarmament. However. if the Committee A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-2. He was @ad tonotethat the
should decide tlmt it was relevant to the two items on
nuclear tests and should vote on it, Pakistan would proposal had the support of many delegations..and in
support operativè pragraph 1. althougb the drafting particular that ofthe socialist countries. since at one
of sub-paragraph (al of that paragraph could be time it had seemed fmm the statements made by the
improved on. Hia delegation found greater difficulty Powers most concerned that the Committee's labours
in supporting operative paragraph 2. The paragrapb would be in vain. Operative paragraph 2 was partic-
related to one aspect of general and complete dis- ularly important: if a convention prohibiting theuseof
armament. which should be discussed in its proper nuclear weapons was signed. tests of such weapons
context. Yet several representativeblncluding the would automatically be rendered unnecessary. Thus
the draft resolution pmvided a solution to theproblem
of tests without linldng it to general and complete
disarmament. It only remained for the Western
Powers to support it.
I/ Leip ofNiumr. Trei<y VOLZN. 1929 .e. 2118. Nstr.
GENERAI LP~TB)
A/C.l/L.295
9 November 1961
ORIGINA L ENGLLSH
.-
5ixt.eer.tsession
rm'i COI.II.IIT?ZE
h;erSa items 73 and 72
C~~?I'IMJATIGONF ÇL'SPINSIONOF WC~R AND m-mcm 'IEÇ'IÇ
AND ORLIGATIOIE OF STAW 'IOREFRAIN FROM mm RENEVAL
'l'H~~~m' Nl'EDFORA mm 'Io PANNCCM ~~PIç mm
EFFECTIV IENPERNATIO N AL L
Italv: amendmentsto draft reçolutionA/C 11~ 292 and ~dd -
<". G'
ia. Sudâa_Toao, . . ia,
"1. In the fiith preambular paragraph. reading as
iollo~s
. "'Bc!ilzing that the use oi meapons oi mass
destruction,uch as nudear and thermo-nuclear
weapons. is a direct negation of the high ideais and
ohjectirestvhich the United Nations has been
established to achieve througthe proteciion oi
succeeding generations from the scourge of war and
through the prescrvation and promotion oi their
cultures.'
"insert the words 'conuary to the Chaner' oi the
u'nited Xationsaiterthe words 'such as nuciear
and thermo-nuclear weapons'.
"2. In operativeparagraph1 (a), insert at the
beginning the words 'Thethreat or use of amed
force. includi;and insm the words'inanymanner
contrary to the Chartof the United Nations' after
the xvords 'thenno-nudear wapns'.
"3. in operativeparagraph 1 (b),'insert at the
begtiining the word '.\ccordinglyand insert the
lvords 'contrary to the Charter of the United Nations'
aiter the words 'thermo-nuclear weapons'.
"4. In operative paragraph 1(ci,insert at the
Ixginning the tvorcl 'Accordingly'; and insen the
irorcià 'contrary to the Chaner of the United Nario~is'
aiter the words 'the-nuclear weapons'.
"5. In opcrativeparagraph 1 (d), insen the
words 'contrary to the Chaner of the United Satians'
aiter the words 'themo-nudear weapon;and delete
the 1,vord'as viokting the Charteoi the Cnited
Sations.'.
"6. In operative paragra2.suhstitute the worrls
'!Oconsider the means of prohibiting' ior the words
'for signing a convention on the prohibitiond
insert the words 'contrary to the Ckarter of the United
Sarions' aiter the words 'ivarpurposes'.":r
United Nations
.-.RRSQ TMMillEE llgl~f 20
i GENERAL < . MEETING
ASSEMBLY Friday, 10 November 1961.
at11am.
SIXTEENTH SESSION
. .
Ofiid Recordc ' NEW YORK
CONTENTS
Page
Agenda items 73 and72: 2. The amendmenta proposed byhis &leganonwould
Continuation of suspension of nuclear and atrengthen thedraftresoiution's condenmation of the
thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of Ue of nuclear weapons byproclaiming tbat theh use
States ID refrain from their renewal -z5-1 vas contrary to the United Nations Charter.Bowever.
ked) ......................... inwoperatbe paragrapht 2 would help to bring abouto
The urgent need for a treaiy totmn nuclear early agreement ongeneral andcompletedisarmament.
weapons tes k under effective international
contml (continued). ... ........... .. 3. U its amendments were adopted. hisdelegatlon
would support the draresolution.
Chainnmi: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentinal.
AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND72
Continuation of suspension of nucandrthenno-nuclear 4. Mr. SANCIIEZY SANCHEZ (Dominican RepubLic)
...
tests and obligations of Stata tarefrain fmm crrir 7. The Dominican Republic would vote in favour of
newal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.l/L291/Rev.l and draft resolution .4/C.l/L.2and Add.1-3.
Rev.l/Add.l-2,A/C.l/L292 andAdd.1-3)(continuedl 8. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) said that the effect
of the amendments proposed by Italy wouldbe to
ihe uqmt need for a tmatta ban nuclear weaponstests autborize tbe use of nuciear weapons on the pretaxr of
under *ffeaive international contml (A/4799, A/C.l/ seif-defence: they wrthus iodirect conflictwithtbe
L292 md Add.1-3) (continuedl draft resolutionnie Italian represenktlvhad con-
tended that the United Nattons Charter permitted
miclear war under certain circumstances. That was
1. MI. b¶ARTïNO(Itaiy). explaining his delegation's not so: the Charter did not permit war,leas af all
amendmenta (A/C.l/L.295) to dr3Aresolution A/C.li uuclear war. % r&ht of self-defence couid nobe
L292 and Add.1-3. said the Soviet representatihad cited aa fustIficatimfor the use of weapons whicb
etated at the1189thmeetingthatsincetheunco~olled could wipe aitwhole areas of the world. Natwith-
and umrerified ban on chernical and bacteriologlcal standing the remah ofthe Italian represenktlve.
warfare embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 had the Geneva Protocol of 1925, na dso the der
been observed, there was no reason tbelievethat a instniments refemed to h the third preambular
simflar ban on miclear weapons waild not ai80 be paragraph ofdraftreeohtlonA/C.1/L*292 andAdd.1-3
effective. Kowever, the anaiogy was apwr one T.he and the Convention othe Prevention andnrnfshment
beliigerentsin the Second Worid War hsdImown that of the Crlme of Cenocide,Y had been lnspiredby
the use ofchemical and b~rfologlcalweapone would humanitarian rather thapurely practlcal considera-
not have prwed decisive and would merely have pro- tionaand had containad specffic prohfblttons oftbeuse
voked immediate retaliation: the banhadbeen observed of weapons d mas8 destruction. in 1946,bath the
out of self-interest rather than humanitarianiam. United States. in Baruch planfor uuclear c~ol,l/
Nuclear weapons. on the other hsnd, appeared to and the Soviet Union. in t&ait conventionwbich it
offer theoppomty of tata victory wer anenemy. had propwed. IIhad calledfor the baiining of nuciear
Furthennore. the use dnucbarweapons byone Power weapons because oftheir indiacrimfnaîenature.
would compel other Powem to use them, and asthe
Chairman of the Council of Ministers ofthe USSR.
on.5 Sentember. amiclear Power whichbelieveditseif US~C~~dyn.oL1m~lli~0. -
to be I;>singabar would unquestlon~ly make use of 2SeeOniclai Recoof~eAmmlcEncmCommlsnm.Flm Year.
Lts miclear weapons. Hence, the baaniag ofnuclear No.. lnmasamgm. 4-14.
weapons could be accomphhed oniywübîntheframe- I/IbldNo.2,ad me. pp Slh
work of a disarmament programme based on the
principlesagreed upon by,the United States and the
Soviet Union in September 1961 (A/4879). 9. -much as the Man amendmenta would com- -...Mr. BOU= Win)
pletely sitar the m~ankig d the &ait resoiuüon 27. The draft resolution aponsored bytwelve African
sponsored by bis andeleven ather delegatlona and Aais. (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3) was
(A/C.l/i.292 and fil+), he wauid vote wt intended as a moral condemnation of nuclear war.
them. audif they were adoptedwnild vote ~gal~t the It reflected the feelings ofpeoples all mer the world.
draft resolutioa Us approach tothequestionwas amora1,not a political
10. Mr. MARTINO WY), rnpl~h~ the Ethiopian one. The imperfections in &a drdraftingcould easily
representative. sdd that fa? eLatln hat the be remedied. and ahouidnot deter delegatlons from
United Nations Charter permitLed the uAeofnuclear joining in what was basically 8a appeal to the General
wespons, hg hadcondemned theose aimch WeapOM Assembly to declare the use ofnuclear weapons to
precisely because Itana ConPsrg to the le-r and be argued that the declaration shouldbeconsidered
s.--it ofthe Charter. under the heading ofdisarmament. Itdeait wlth a
12. Kr. BUDO (Albani@ Said Lhat hb dekgation pressing question andIlktehe resolutions calling for
welcomed both the draft ntsoiutiolrs More theCom- a moratorium on nuclear testa and a test ban trearp,
mittee and considerd that their rdoptlonwouldhelpto warranted separate discussion:in atense international
race lnternatimal tenûion d increase conïidence situation in wàich threats were being uîtebydeach
between States, whlch in 8u-n would faciiitate the side in response to the aiieged war preparationof
conclusion ofan agreerne& on ganerd and complete the other. the adoption ofa declaration ndlawlng the
disannament, thecrucial pmblem afthe present day. use ofmiclear weapons became a mWr ofurgency.
Bls Oavernment had dwaga ~llpPorted simiLu con- Tunisia regretted that theItailadelegation hadseen
structive proposala. Not only was it oppoaedtonuclear fit to submlt amendmenta tothe draft resohtionwhich
tests and the maintenance d atodc bases on foreign hsd the effect of dtstorthg ita essential senne. By
edatingn,ntmkpflesaaand theprohibition aimichar of injecting the question of the right aiseif-defence.
weapm production. iwould berscalled in tha ton- an attempt was belng made tomwe the declaration
nexfon that two years ap Albaoia. together WU the from the mord tothe poiitical leveL The Uaiian
Soviet Union, had propoaed that theBalkaas and the appealed to the Uallan dekgationetowlthdraw them.e
Adriatic should be declared a zone free from atomic 28. Kr. MARTINO(Italy) asked the Tunisian repre-
favour ofnuclear-free zones in Central Europe. the aentative lnwhat wq theItallanamendmentsdisto-d
Pacific and Africa. the 8e-e of&aftresolutionA/C.l/L292 andAdd-1-3.
The IWan delegrdfon felt thatthe amendmenta would
13. if hi8 delegation had not aupported the two draft on thecontrarg atrengthen theresolution.
resolutions alrendy adoptecibythe Committee it was
because the negative attitude ah- by the United
States in the Geneva negotintions lndicated @at the
the framework ofan agreement on general oand com-in 29. Mr. BOUZIRI (Tuuiaia) said that the Ethiopian
plete disarmament. The purpose oftheUnited States representativehad effectively set fortb the Tunisian
and the UnitedKlngdom in submitting draft resolution dekgatiou's abjectiolrs to the amendments, whichwere
A/C.l/L.280 had been to distract attention from the eo muneroue and tended tomake the taxt ofthe draft
problem ofdisarmament. Tbey wiabed to have a free resolutionso imarieldy thatheir purpose could only
hand to continue thermarace andwar preparationa, beto distort itsmeanlng.
ascould be seen from recent statementa by United 30. He wished to state that it4 proper. under
States statesmen that their countryintendedtoachleve certain circumstaaces. to exercise the righofseif-
nuclear mperiority in ail fielde. Aa long as they dafence; in tact,the African continent ahould be
pursued that poIicy, the threat ofa nuclear war would .encwaged to axercisetha tight at the present the.
continue. if the Western Pwersreaiiywantednuclear Hwever, there was no med toder tnthe rigbtoi
testa to be prohlbited. they should respond tothe seIfdefence in draft resolution A/C.l/L.292 and
Soviet Union's propmals for anagreement on general Add.1-3, which waa deaigned to condemn the use of
and complete disannament. mtclear weapons under di circumstancea.
14. Rb delegation wouLdvote for both draftresolu- 31. Mr. MARTINO(Itaiy) obeerved that htsdelega-
tiens nw before the Cornmittee. tion'a. amendmenta (A/C.l/L.295) coatained no ref-
.r. erence to thrlght ofseIf4efence.
20: m. TSEVECMi? (IlboWpJua)
. .* 32. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY(Etbiopia) said that, since the
.Itallan representativnow disclaimed anyintention of
21. Slnce the itm ai fts fore- poiicy was to invoking the issue ofseif-defence andhad thua in
also 8uppo-tdraft reaolirtion A/C.l/L.292 andAdd.1-3. effect accepted the theeisthatnriclear war ras not
amendmente nounIloagerservedanytpurpose.he Itaiian
PlmirvMeennq. 81fmrrunr.prns.12Sl27.Fouriroirnsesri~n. 34. Mr. PUMSOLL (Australla) obeerved thai the two
draft resolutions before the Co-ittee brought into
focus the grest problem ofthe United Nationa: how to
go beyond mers expressions of aspirations and prin-
CiPles and btitute concrete and affective memues
for abolishfng not merely nuclear war, but war in
general.
. ..
37. Draft resolution A/C.l/L292 and Add.1-3sought
to outlaw nuclear weapons; but there were other
weapons ofmasa destruction-for example, bacterio-
logical weapons-which might be equdy horrible in
effect and scale. and the destmctiveness even of
conventional weapona îended to be underestlmated.
Moreover, the draft reaolution was not prsctical.
Nuclear weapons existeci; the defence poiicy ofseveral
great Powers was based on the nuclear &terrent. and
even ifthe draft resolution was adoptedby an over-
destroy its nuclear weapons, hait productioncdwthem
or cease to baae ite defeuce poiicy on the posaibility
of eing them or of their being uaed byother great
Powers. The Sovlet Unionhadthreatened.for example.
that tta nuclear weapona could wipe out whole cities
or whole countries; but it aùio no douht took into
account the capacity of der cnintries to devastate
its ownnational territoryThe prospect waaahorrible :
one; however, its hormr was created not merely by
the existence af nuclear wespons but by the very
possibillty ofwar. Conaequently, thdr& mohition.
by disregarding great Power poiicies as they were
Ukely to exist for some tirne, was unreallstic and
might ,even stand in the way aiendeavcurs tomach
agreement on disarmament.
38. Australla would support the Wan amendments
(A/C.l/L.295) because they took the declfcation
embcdied in draft resohtionA/C.l/L292 andAdd.1-3
as far as s declaration caild go. But the Aesembly
ahould be aiming at other forma of action: hinding
agreements and detailed understandings.tobe worked
consideringvthe prioritieemtotbebogiven to nuclearbe
weapona and detailed messures to prwent their use,
includlng the desirabflity oi demiïitarlzed or *
nuclearized' zones in msny parts ofthe world. The
primary aim d all States, however, should be to do
everything possible in their national and international
poiicies to prevent the outbreak of war anywhere:
for in the event ofwar eacb'side wouid be tempted t0
use whatever weapona ithad atits disposal. including
nuclear weapona. FlRSC TOMMITT 1 E1E9, 2nd 21
MEETIMG
ASSEMBLY Friday, IO November 1961.
at 4.30p.m.
SIXTEENTH SESSlON
NEW YORK
Ofiial Records
CONTENTS world of independent States adhering to common
Page standards of justice and international conduet and
subjecting theuse of force to therule of law. a world
Agenda items 73 and 72: in which complete disarmament would be achieved
Continuation of suspension of nuclear and under effective internationacontrol. In order tofulfil
thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of that objective. the United States was advocating a
States ta refrainfrom their renewal (con- series of specific measures, including the disbanding
Wd) ... .. . ...... ....... .. .. ... of al1 national armed forces. the elimination of al1
The urgent need for a treaty taban nuclear armaments. including weapons of mass destruction
weapons tests under effective international and the means of their delivery. the institutioof
control (continued)....... ... . .. .... effectivemeans for the enforcement of international
agreements and the settlement of disputes. and the
establishment. within the framework of the United
Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Arsentina). Nations. of an internationadisarmament organization
to ensure effective compliance with disarmament
AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72 measures.
Continuati o nsurpensioo nf nuclwrmdtheno-nucleor 4. In the first stage oftheplanproposedby the United
testsandobligationo sf Stoterturefrainfmmtheirrc States,al1 States would adhere to a treaty effectively
prohibitingthe testlng of nuclear weapons. The pro-
newol (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.l/L.29l/Rev.l and duction of fissionablematerials for use in weapons
Rev.l/Add.l-3,A/C.l/L.292 andAdd.1-3()continved) would be stopped and the reconversion of existing
stocks would be undertaken. States owning nuclear
Theurgenn t eedforO treotto bonnuclear weopon tssts weapons would be called upon not torelinquish control
undereffectiveintemotiono clontml(A/4799,A/C.l/ of such weapons to any nation which did not possess
L.292mdAdd.1-3()continued) them and the latter would undertake not to attempt
to obtain such weapons. A commission of experts
1. Mr. DEAN (United States of America) said that he would be established from the outset to report on the
wished first to emphasize that hi8 delegation appre- feasibilityof the verified reduction and eventual
ciated and respected the motives ofthe sponsors of elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.
the twelve-Power draft resolution(A/C.l/L.292 and
Add.1-3). 5. In the second stage. there would be further
2. He noted. however, that the draft resolution substantialreductions in the armed forces and arma-
negiected to mention the elementary right of self- ments ofStates. including strategicnuclear weapons
defence reserved to al1 States under the Charter of and countering weapons. ln thehirdstage.States would
the United Nations. ïn that connexion, iyas relevant retain oniy those forces and non-nuclear armaments
to recall the reply given on 5 Augwit 1961 by the required to maintain internal order; they would also
Chairman of the Council of Miniatera ofthe USSR. support and provide agreed manpower for a United
Mr. Khrushchev. to a correspondent of The New York Nations peace force. The manufacture of armaments
Times. who had asked him whether the Soviet Union would be prohibited. except for those to be used by
prepared to declare that it would never be the the United Nations peace force and those required to
was maintain internal order. Al1otherarmaments wouldbe
first nation-to employ nuclear weapons in a war. destroyed or converted to peacefulpurposes.
Mr. Khrushchev had replied that anyone who made
such a statement, even in al1 ainceritymight find his 6. Nevertheless, pending the achievement of general
words belied by events. for should there be a war and and complete disarmament-and the United States
one side felt that it was losing. it would undoubtedly pledged itself to exert every effort towards that end-
use its nuclear bombs. that 1s. until a peaceful world was established with
3. Mr. Khrushchev had gone on to Say that world appropriate machinery for settling al1 disputes by
peace should be assved not by undertaldngs to refrain peaceful means, within the framework of the United
from the use of nuclear weapons. but by a radical Nations Charter. no State could abrogate its rigtit of
Solution of the cardinal issues. the best guarantee of self-defence. recognized inArticle 51 of the Charter.
Peace being the destruction of armamenta and the There was nothing in that Article which limited the
elimination ofamies-in other words. disamament. right of individual or collectiself-defence orstated
On that fundamental question. the UnitedStates agreed what type of forces or armaments might be used in
With the Soviet Union. as had been demonstrated by repelling an individual or collective armed attack.
the President of the United States. Mr. Kennedy. when ïndeed, it wouldbe suicida1 to impose sucha limitation.
he had submitted to the General Assembly (1013th for an aggressor might am itself with weapons which
Plenary meeting) a .programme for general and com- the intended victim might not have.
plete disarmament. The ultimaîe atm of the United 7. Conversely, any use of armed force in a manner
States was to bnng about a free. secure and peaceful contrary to the United Nations Charter shouid not be sanctioned. directly or indirectiy. by a declaration 13. Mr. ROSSIDES (CyPmS)
referring exclusively to a particular weapon. More-
over. the United States was against the use of al1 ...
force when it was contrary to the United Nations
Charter. In the twelve-Power draft resolution. it was 14. Referring Io the twelve-Power draft resolution
(A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3). he stated that Cyprus was
proposed to outlaw only the use of nuclear and thermo- firmly opposed to war. in particular to nuclear war.
nuclear weapons. which would appear to indicate that and appreciated the motives of the sponsors. The draft
the use of other types of force. even in violation of resolution. however. dealt only with the prohibition
the Charter. might be deemed acceptable. For those of the use of nuclear weapons in war and made no
reasons, the United States would be compelled to vote reference Io the outlawing of nuclear weapons tests
against the draft resolution inits unamended form. in peacetime. The sponsors could have either in-
8. The amendments submittedby the Italiandelegation cluded a reference to tests in their draft resolution
or reserved the latter for discussion in connexion
(A/C.l/L.295) introduced new elements which the with the disarmament item. Nevertheless, despite that
United States Government deemed appropriate.. As procedural aspect. the Cyprio! delegation would sup-
amended. the draft resolution would condemn not only
the use of nuclear weapons. but the use of any armed port the draft resolution.
force contrary Io the Charter. Accordingly. theUnited
States delegation supported the Italian amendments.
If they were adopted-and he sincerely hoped they
would be-it would vote in favour of the draftreso-
lution as amended.
S. The declaration under consideration was not afinal
or complete solution of the problem of the illegal use
of force. The problem could be solved oniy by a
general disarmament agreement which would secure
the replacement of the use of armedforceby adequate
peace-keeping machinery under the ruleoflaw. Thus
it was oniy by adoptingaplanfor generai and Wmplete 15. Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India)
disarmament. such as that proposed by the United
States. that it would be possible to bring about the a00
abolition ofal1 illegal use of force, not only in Africa
but throughout the world. hthefirst stageof that plan. 16. With regard to thetwelve-Power draft resolution.
his delegation did not see how it was contrary to the
Statee would reaffjrm their obligations under the spirit of the United Nations Charter and. specifically.
United Nations Charter to refrain fmm the threat or Io Article 51. The sponsors were not seeldng 10
use of any type of armed force contrary to the prin- impair the natural right of States to self-defence:
ciples of the Charter. they simply considered. for the reasons given in the
preamble to the &aft resolution, that nuclearweapons
should never be used, even in self-defence. The
. .. ltalian amendments would therefore amar to go
1. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- against the very spirit of the draft resolution. The
hdian delegation would not, therefore. be able t0
publics). exercising his right of reply. pointedout that support them. but would vote in favour of the &afl
the question asked by the correspondent of The New
York Times to which the United States representative resolution as it stood.
had referred had called for a unflateral pledge by the
Soviet Union that it would not be the firat nation to
use nuclear weapons. The twelve-Pcnver draft resollc
tion. howewr. called for an international convention
binding al1 States to refrain fmm the uae of nuclear
weapone. Hence. the statement quoted by the United
States representative had no relation to the question
before the Cornmittee;..
United Nations
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY Monday. 13November 1961.
atII a.m.
SIXTEENTH SESSION . .
NEW YORK
OfiiBl Records
CONTENTS
Page
Agenda items 73and 72: 5...Mr. LORINC (Hungary)
Continuation of suspension of nuclear and 6. If the twelve-Power draft resolution was adopted
thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of and implemented. it would he an important advance
Statesto refrain from their renewal (con- towards the final abolition ofnuclear weapons. The
-inued)......................... 157 Hungarian delegation wouid therefore vote for it. On
The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear the other hand. it wouid vote against the Italian
weapons tests under effective international amendments. for the reasons already explained bythe
contml (continued)................. representativeofEthiopla.
~hainn&: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentinal. 7. Mr. OKAZAKf (Japan) satd that he would vote for
the twelve-Power drait resolutionbecause the dis-
aster of nuclear warfare must be prevented by al1
AGENDAITEMS 73 AND 72 means and the adoption ofa resolution dong those
lines m!ght have a stlmulating effect on the efforts
Continuotion of suspension of nucleor ond cherno-nucleor king made to achieve nuclear disarmament. However,
t......nd obliootionr of States to nfroin fmm chair rc Japan was not abandonhg its basic position on dis-
newol (A/&:- and ~dd.1, A/C.l/ L.291/ Rev.1 and armament in general. It continued tomaintain that
Rev.l/Add.l-3,A/C.l/L.292 ond Add.1-3)(c-d) every disarmament measure should heaccompanied
by effective international controi and inspection. The
The urgent need foO treotl to bun nuclmr weoponrtests adoption of the declaration would not in any way
under effective intemotionol contm(A/47W, A/C.l/ duce the necessity of tackllng the prohlem oi
nuclear disarmament. and should he followed by
-L--9 2ndAdd.1-3) (continued) sincere efforts to reach agreementon more complete
2. The CHAIRMAN sald that there were no more measures inthe field ofnÜclear disarmament.
speakers in the debate on the two drait resolutions 8. The Japanese delegationunderstood theconsiders-
before the Comdnee, and tbat he wouid cal1 upon tions which had prompted the Italian delegation to
' reDresentativeswho had asked to explain their votes. &mit ita amendments (A/C.l/L.295). However. it
... belleved that special importance ahouid beattached
4. Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom) wished to to measures designed toavert the threatof a nuclear
explain the United Ktngdom's voteon the twelve-Power war. It would therefore abstain in the vote on the
draft resolutlon (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3). His amendmenta. Intbt corneldon. he requested a separate
delegation welcomed the amendments suhmitted hy vote on the flrst paroithe skîh amendment. reading
Italy (AE.UL.295) because they brought thedeclara- "Suhstihite the worda 'to consider the means of pro-
tion into conformity with the United Nations Charter. hihiUr@ for the worda 'for slgning aconventionon the
If thoae amendments were adopted, his delegation prohibition cd>'. Ifa eeparste vote was rsken, the
wouid support the draft re~0lutiOn as amended. Ifo.n Japanese delepiion wouid vote in favou ofthit part
wouid regretfuïïyhehave to vote againstot athe draftt ofthe amendment.
resolution.By voting against it. the United Kingdom
delegation wouid not bevoting against the elimination
of al1 stockpilesofnuclear weapons or against the
cessation of the production ofsuch weapons. Those
measures were an essential part of the programme
for general and completa disarmament subrnitted by
the United States, which the United Klngdom 'was
eager to see adopted. .. 9. Mr. LEGENDRE (France) said he reoognized that
the principles underlying the declarationin the hvelve- 14. Mr. DELGADO (Philippines) said that he would
Power draft resolution were genemus ones. but Vote for the two draft resolutions despite their defi-
questioned whether such a dec@ration represented ciencles of form and. to some extent, sutstance. His
an appropriate and effective approach tothe basic delegation pariicularly supported operative para-
pmblems facingtheCommlttee: to reduce international graph 1 (2) of the hvelve-Power draft resolution
tension and tomake gradua1 progress towarùs real (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3). for a nuclear war would
disarmament. In the present-iay world, a world in clearly be directed against mankind in general. in view
which undertaklngs made one day were suddenly of the volume offall-out that would result and the
withdrawn the next. to try tobegin with measures genetic effects of radlation.
involving purely moral obligations. without controls 15. The convening ofa special conference to sign
or sanctÏons. Aght well have the effect of intensiiying a convention prohiblting the use ofnuclear andthermo-
mistrust and increaslng tension. The Frenchdeleeation nuclear weapons for war purposes mlght provide 3
therefore hoped that the Committee would retÜrn to
real disarmament measures accompanied byeffective solution to the problem. Such a prohibition would. of
international contml and would not allow itself to be course, have to be subject to effective international
diverted fmm ihat course. Moreover. thereferences ~0ntml and inspection, in accordance with the Wo
that had heen made to The Hague Convention of resolutions on that subject already adopted by the
29 July 1899 and to the Geneva Protocol of 27 June G. p.al Assembly.
1925 prohibithg the use of chemical and hacterio- 17. Mr. CISSE (Senegal) It would also
logical weapons had been misjudged: those weapons vote for the twelve-Power draft resolution sinCe it
were tw dtfferent fmm presentdy nuclear weapons was opposed towar and therefore, a fortiori. to the
to bear comparison with them. In the view ofthe use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war
French Gwernment. as it had been stated by the purposes. For similar reasons. his delegation would
representative of .France at the fourteenth session vote against the Itallan amendments.
(1030th meeting), solemn but unverifiable moral
prohibitions left distrust in existence. and such 18. Mr. RONAN (Ireland)
declarations should be included in an over-ail plan i9:-~lthough the hvelve-Power draft resolution (A/
only when other measures, themselves contmllable C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3) contained some elements
and controlled, had contributed to re-establishhg a which were acceptable, his delegation seriously
minimum of international confidence.'/ For thosfi doubted the value of a declaration of that kind. Since
reasons. the French deleaation would vote against the the leaders of the major Powers hadindicated that
declarailon. which, whllebell intentioned, was actually they would not hesitate tourie their moat powerN
=ointle~- ~nd illu~om.-if. however. thedraft resolution weapoas if their vitai interests were seriously threat-
was amended so as to brkg thepkblemback into Une
with the United Nations Charter and the right of seif- ened. the pmposed declaration would be d linleprac-
defence. or K it was supplemented so as toprovide tical value and might create a false senseof securtty.
for international contml within the framework of a Hia delegation would therefore be obliged to vote
disarmament plan. the F renchdelegation rnight beable against sub-paragraphs (a. @ and (p) ofoperative
paragraph 1 and.ifthey were adopted, agaht the
tosupport it as amended. draft resolution as a whole. Itwould ahstain from the
S.. vote on certain other parts of the draft resolution.
12. U ON SEIN (Burma) said that Burmahad always
opposed tests of nuclear andthermo-nuclearweapons.
wherever they might be carried out. He therefore
appreciated the anxiety which had pmmpted the
African States to urge that theircontinent should be 20. The Italian amendments (A/C .1/L.295) dld no!
regarded as a denuclearized zone. Consequently. his greatly alter the fundamental vlew cd hisdelegationa~
delegation would vote for the fourteen-Power draft to thevalue oi a declaration of the kind pmposed.
resolution. For similar reasons. it would vote for the Although the amendments were unexceptionable in
twehe-Power draft resolution. However. it would be themselves, they would detract fmm the value of the
unable tosupport the Itallan amendments tothelaner. declaration and, in rnany instances, result intautology.
For example. they would cause operative paragraph 1
13. Mt. DE MELO FRANCO (Brazil) said that he (5) to state that action contrary tothe United Nations
would vote for the fourteen-Power draft resolution. Charter was a violation of theCharter. His delegation
since his delegation felt thatthenuclearneutralization wouid therefore abstain in the vote ontheamendments
of a continent iike Airioa could only serve topmmote and iithey were adopted would also be obliged to
the cause of peace and to eliminate at least one source abstain In the vote on the twelve-Power draft resolu-
of internaticrial friction.On the other hand, it would tion asa whole.
be obliged to ahstain fmm the vote on the hvelve-
Power draft resolution, for it believed that the ques- 21. Mr. PAZHWAK (Afghanistan) said that he would
tion dealt with in ihat draft resolution could more Vote against the Italian amendments (A/C.l/L.295)
properly be consideredwithin the framework ofgeneral while bearlng in mincithe tradltionalfriendly relations
and complete disarmament. The ItU amendments e.-dsting between Aighanistan andItaly. He viewed the
did not alter that aspect of the maiter. amendments as an attack on the form and substance
Of the twelve-Power draft resoluiîon and said that
their adoption would make the pmposal meaningless
U sco OfflciRecordsa theCeneri1 Assemblv. FourrconthScaiion. and useless.
as. agendaitem 70. documentA/C.1/8piri.22 22. The insertion ai the phrase "oontrary to the 28. Mr. SUCAlR (SaudiArabia) observed that the right
United NaUons Charter" in the draft resolutlon left of non-alignment was now recognlzed by ail countries
open the possibility ofinterpretlng the Charter as and that it was perfectly pmper. inasmuch as the
aliowing war, even nuclear war, in certain cinXm- nuclear Powers had been unable to reach agreement
stances; since the Charter did not allow war but. on on puttlng an end to nuclear testing. that the African
the contrary. pmhibited it, the amendments atîacked countries should address a solemn appeal toallstates
not oniy the basls ai the draft resolution but the for the denuclearization of their continent. His dele-
Charter itseif. gation would therefore vote for the twodraft resolutions
before the Committee (A/C.l/L.291/Rer.l andRev.l/
23. The vote of ~f~hantstana~ainsttheitdanamend- Add.1-3, and ~/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3) and for the
ments was intended tn pmtect the purpose ofthe dmft Libyan amendment (A/C .i/L.296). It would not be able
resoluuon and defend the purposes of the United to support the Itaiian amendments (A/C.l/L.295).
Nations Charter. which, in its view. were at variance with the imme-
dlate purposes of the twelve-Power draft declaration.
ments as one of the sponsorsussinofhthe twelve-Power-
draft resolution, said that they were intended to in- 29. Mr. BOUZIRI (Tunisia) regretted the Italian
corporate in the declaration the arguments concerning representative's. view thatthe question dealt with in
the principle ofself-defence whtch had been advanced the twelve-Power draft resolution coud be considered
in particuiarby the United Kingdom and United States within the framework of disarmament. for his delega-
delegatlons. Those arguments were unquestionably tion regarded the rnatter as an urgent one. in addition.
valid in their pmper context. but what was involved the Itaiian amendments had the effect of sbiftlng the
in the present instance was a waragalnst al1 manklnd. centre of gravity of the draft resolution andof givlng
the im~resslon that the Charter perrnitted the use of
25. The Italian delegation pmposed, in particular. nuclear weapons. He wished torepeat his reWeStthat
that the words "toviolate the Charter of the United the Itaiian delegation should withdraw Its amendments.
Natlons" in operative paragraph 1 (d) sbould be 30. Mr. TSARAPKIN (union aiSoviet sociaiist Re-
deleted. Thw altered, that vital portion of the decla- pubilcs) said timt the Itaiian amendments seemed to
ration would lose its present pmfound signLficanoe; if him an attempt to justify tuse ofnuclear and thermo-
the amendment was adopted, his delegation wauid be nuclear weapns agstnet man. Those amendments
obiiged to vote against the draft resolutionas a whole. would completely faisiiy the meaning of the twelve-
The fact that the United States representative had Power draft resolution and distort the spirit of the
stated (1192nd meeting) that Ns delegation would vote Charter itseii. Iîaly's afm was tosecure acceptance
in favour ai the draft resolution only If the ItaUan of the principle that the use d nuclear weapons for
amendments were adopted conflrmed thevalidlty of the war purposes was not a violation ai the Charter. as
apprehensions amused by the Italian amendmenta. stated in the draft resolution. but a measure specifi-
cally sanctioned by the Charter. That interpretauon
26. Mr. NINCIC (Yugoslavia) said that he would vote ofthe Charter was endorsed by the members of West-
for the two drdt resolutions. However. if the Italian ern military blocs, wNch were preparing to unleash
amendments were adopted. he would be obllgedtovote a nuclear mket war and oonsequently seelring to
against the twelve-Power draft declaration as a whole, justify the useof nuclear weapons. It wasobvlous that
slnce the declaration was designed to outlaw the use U nuclear weapons had been knownwhen the Charter
of nuclear weapons as contrary to the spirit, letter had been drawn up, a refereace would have been in-
and alma ofthe Charter ofthe United Nations, whereaa oluded tothose lnstnunents of rnass destruction and
the changes pmposed by Italy would have the effect their barbaric nature. Those considerationa sufficed
of sanctioning the use ofthose weapons. to show why hls delegation would vote against the
Itallan amendments.
..-
27. Mr. ZOPPI (Italy) said he was convinced that tt 32. The twelve-Power drsft resolution was also
was essential to act within the framework of the perfectly clear. The conclusion of a convention on
Charter; it was therefore dangemw to isolate the the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-
problem of nuclear weapons from the principles ofthe nuclear weapons for war purposee would certainly
Charter relating to the use of force in any form. make for the prevention of miclear war and would
Although the sponsors of the draft declaration (A/C.l/ be a first step towards the complete prohibition
L.292 and Add.1-3) were acting out ofpraiseworthy of nuclear weapons which. of course, was possible
motives. a ban on the use ai nuclear weapons would orily against a background of general and cornpiete
have more likeiihood of being eüective if it was disarmament. His delegation would accordtngly vote
closely linked with a programme of general and in favour of that draft resolution.
complete disarmament embodying adequate safe-
guarfis. Hls delegation therefore feltthat thedeclara-
tion should he considered within the framework of
disarmament; if, however. that was not possible. it
would prefer to see its amendments adopted so that
it could vote for the dechration as a whole. 40. ~he only way to be sure that nuclear weapons
33. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) wouid not beused in war was to eliminate them fmm
a. the arsenals ofthe nations. Such elidnation was pro-
34. The twelve-Power drait resolution expressed the posed in the United States programme for generai and
universai feeling about nuclear war in unequtvocal complete disarmament and also lnthe plan putforward
terms: Ifthe various principles statedinthat proposai by the Soviet Union. Dechrations of good intent had
were out to the vote senaratelv. his delenation wouid always falled when nations had been faced with the
certaiJy endorse them, &en th&ghthey wiuid be more alternative ofusing what weapons they had or faclng
sultablv Lncludedln the oreamble ofthe drait resolu- defeat. The General Assembly shouid therefore con-
tion on-disarmament whkh the Cornmittee wastoadopt centrate its moral force on helping to bringabout
later. The Generai Assembly had already expressed the speedy resumption of negotiations on generai and
disapprovai of the use ofnuclearweapons. andthe ned complete disarmament.
step was to initiate negotiations on dl aspects of
disarmament. including ita eîfective oontrol. The
proposa1 for the signing ofaconventiononthe prohibi- 41. Hls delegation would vote in favour of the Italian
tion ofthe use of nuclear weapons reflected a pessi- amendments. for they wouid bring the draft resolution
mistfc attitude to such negotiations. For thosevartous more closely into Iine with the Charter. If those
reasons. his delegation wouid abstain on the draft amendments were adopted, hb delegation wouid vote
resolution asa whole. in favour of the draft resolution an amended: other-
35. Mr. FERNANDEZ (Argentina) wise. It would have toabataia.
...
36. His delegation was not sure that the twehe- 42..rr. DEL-'UERICA (Spain)
Power draft resolution, which wouid declare a ban on 43. With regard tothetwelve-Powerdraft resolution,
the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for the Spanish delegation considered that it exceeded
war purposes. was within the scope ofagenda items 73 the ecopa oftheitems under discussion in the Com-
and 72; it had ais0 some faults to find with the drait- mittee and, indeed, dealt with an entirely different
hg. Tbe ltalian amendments impmved the proposal question. Such a resolutionseemedunnecessa~, since
considerably and had the effect of stating the problem recourse to war as a means of seniing international
more correctly in terms ofthe Charter. His delegatton disputes was already pmscribed in more specific
wouid therefore vote in favour of those amendments terma ia the Charter. Moreover. it would be unjust
and. if they were adopted, in favour of the draft
resolution as amended. It wlshed to make it clear. todeprive countries of the right oiseif-defence.
however, that its votes wouid be cast onthe under- 44. The Itallan améndments to the twelve-Power
standing that those provisions couid not be construed draft resolution represented a aubstantial impmve-
as authorizing, either explicitly or implicitiy, the use ment am1 dld not go beyond the Charter. Article 51
of nuclear or thermo-nuclear weapons incases not of which expressiy stated that nothlng inthe Charter
specifically contempiated in the dechration. fmpalred the iDherent right of individual or collective
selfdefence.
37. Mr. VELAZQUEZ (Uniguay)
.* ... Mr. MEKKERUP (Denmark)
38. His delegation wouid lîke tosucport the welve- 46. Where the twelw-Power draft resolution was
Power draft resolution. for it was in keeping with Concemed. aithough theDanlsh delegation broadly
Uruguay's humanltarian and pacfflst tradition.HOw- Wed with the gsaeral oidllne of that proposal and
ever, the proposal should have been examlned at the respected the motives behindIt. it disagreed in certain
same Ume as the other questions relating to general respects with theprssent wordkig. which. inits dm.
and complete disarmament. Although the pmp~sed Rm not entirely coneistent with the letter andspirit
dechration was on a high moral plane and exp=ssed the Charter. The adoption oftheItallanamendments
a universal aspiration.hi8 delegaten couid not vote WOuidaubstantially improPe the text, whichtheDanish
for it in isolation, aad for the aame reasons would delegation would then be able tosupport. On theother.
have to abstain an the IIallan amendments. band,iî the Itallan amendmenta' were not adopted. the
Danish delegation wouid be obïiged toabstain in the
39. Mr. BURNS (Canada) sald that he fully appre- voting. bacause it ConsideRd that the question of
ciated themotives which had prompted the sponsors BUminatiag nuclear weapons was partd the bmader
cb the twelve-Power drait resolution and respected Westion of general and complete disannament uader
thelr concem at the threat to the peoples of the Mectlve inieraational control.
world which the use of nuclear weapons of mass
destruction represented. In the llght pst experience 47. Mr. WEI (Cbina)
and present circumstances. hourmer, the methad
proposed did not appear effective. Al1the declarstions ;a'.'The proposal intic lwelve-~ower drait res01ution
and agreements referred to in the thid preambular (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3) had been aubmitted to the .
pragraph had been violated. and recent events had Atomic Energy Commission bythe Soviet Unionasfar
shm the insecurity alunilaterai declarations on the back as 1946.y andhad been rejected as affordlng no
suspension ofnuclear tests. assurance that such weapons would not be uaed. The
Generai Assembly had since rejected al1 sidar
proposala. 49. The Briand-Kellogg PactS/ had not averted the
outbreak ofwar. The moratorium on nucleartestshad
not prevented the Soviet Union fmrn setting off a
series ofpowerfui eXpi~sionS,andon 5Nwember 1961.
Mr. Khwhchev had told a correspondent of The New
York Tlmes that If either side inawar felt th,
losing. it wouid undoubtedly use its nuclear bombs.
50. The Chinesedelegation hadconsistently advocated
the ellmination of duclear weapons andal1otherweap-
ons of mass destruction, but had always voted against
pmposals pmvlding for pmhibition without control. 57. As to the hvelve-Power drait resolution, his
Itsattltude remained unchanged. Finally. it welcomed delegation considered that theuae d nuclear weapons
the amendments submitted by Italy. which werealrned ahouid be pmhiblted. but didnot agree with theword-
at bringing the draft resolution into llne with the ing d the proposal, because the pmhibition ai such
Charter of the United Nations. weapons could not be dealt wlthin isolation. but mut
,be considered withtn the general iramework af dis-
'...-.. Mu..mmad Zafrulla KHAN (Pakisîanl armament. Moreover, Ltwas necessarg toprohibit
52.-His delegation still hadcertaindoubtsconcerning not oniy the use d auch weapons, but aiso their
the hvelve-Power draft resolution, whlch dealt witb a manufacture and stcc!qiling. and also to oall for the
single aspect ofdisarmament in isolation fmm other destruction d dimdsting stocks. Furthermore, a draft
aspects of the subject. However, it wouid vote for resolutionwhich pmhibltd the usednuclearweapons
operative paragraph 1. since the general princiole
stated Inthat $rigraph was in accordance with'its oniy wouid a contrario sensu authollze the use of
own attitude. conventionai weapons which. although lesa ciangemus.
could neverthelesa algo wipe out entire populations.
Conaequently his delegatlon wouid abstain fmrn voting
on the Itallanamendments and would aiso abstain
53. On the other band, it considered that the Italian from voting on the draft resolution. regdldless of the
amendments were unnecessary. A resolution could result d the pote onthe arnendments.
not have the eüect of amending the Charter. Also, 58. Mr. ZOPPI (IWy). replying to the Soviet repre-
both the draft resolution and the amendments seemed sentative's oriticisms d the Itaiian amendments,
to have been so hastfly drawn up thalt would be dm- pointed out that the Chairman d the Councll of
cuit to assess the effectofthe pmposal. especially if Minlsters d the USSR had repeatedly stated that he
the Italian amendments were Incowrated. Somegreat wouid not hesitate to usnuelearweaponsifnecessary
Powers which opposed any ban on nuclear testlng had and had even mentioued hy many missiles would be
declared themselves in support ofthedraft resolution. sent agatast Italy.
They. therefore, seerned to believe that lt would not
prevent them fmrn continuing to test nuclear weapons
with a view to their possible defensive use.
54. The delegation d Paklstan wouid ahstaln fmrn
voting on the ItaW amendrnents, but would support
operative pragrsph 1 d the Mt reaolution. even US- Officiai Rccoroithe AmmlcEnerg Commtsslm.Ffrst
li the. ItaiIan amendmenta were adopted. Operative Ycir,No.2.2ndmeedng. p2628.
paragraph 2 related to a question which was part of YGrneral Trury fortheR-linon d Wir iranlnrmmirncof
the general pmblem cddiaarmament. Ashis delegation Ni~Ionil PoUcslmed.cPans on27Ainru1928(Leimeof N.aair.
did not know what would emerge hm the debates in TreanScrlssML ~CN. 1929N.o.213h
the Commlttee and in the ~ssembl~ onthat subject.
itwouldte oblined toabatainfromvotin~on that para-
graph. Should th eroposai prove tcbe kessarj' at a
iater stage,it wouid be happyto SUppOrt It.
55 .Mr. SOSARODRIGUE2 Neneruela).
56. With regard to the Itah amendments (A/C.l/
L.295)to the twelve-Power drdî resolution (A/C.l/
L.292and Addl-3). lt was hardly possible, Without
deviattng fmrn the spirit d the Charter. to draw a
distinction between the use d weapons ai mass
destntction inconfodty with the Charter aodthe use
oï such weapons contrary to the Charter. The use of
such weapons couid never be in keeping with the
Charter. J
i
UnitedNations si 1 flRST COMMITE 1E 1,94th
i MEETING
-GENERAL
ASSEMBLY Tuesday, 14 Noat IO:20am..
SIXTEENTH SESSION
. .
Ofid Record> NEW YORK
.-
8. Sir Michnel WRIGHT (United Kingdom). speaking
CONTENTS in exercise ofhis right ofreply. said that the NATO
page countries. by the verytenns ofthe treaty between
Agenda items 73 and 72: them, could take oniy defensive measures. It was
Continuation af suspension of nuclear and absurd to maintain, as the USSR representativhad
tbenno-nuclear tests and obligations oi done at the 11931-dmeeting, that the United Kingdom
Statesio refrainfmm tbefr reneml(2 and the other memhers ofNATO were preparing to
............ .......-..-.. launch a nuclear and rocket war against the Soviet
The urgent need for a &aW bannuclear Union.
weasns tests undereffectiv nternational
contml (concluded... .. ........ . ... 9. The representative ofthe USSRhad also impUed
'the Charter to use nuclear weapons in self-defence.0
Chaimet: Mr. Marlo AMADEO (Argentinal. In that case. one mightask why. in 1946. the Soviet
Cioverament had not accepted the United States pro-
posalu that aii countries ahould glve up maldng and
AGENDA ITEMS73 AND 72 possessing nuclear weapons and whyinthe preceding
two montha it had exploded more thathfrfynuclear
Continuatioof suspension of nua cnldirermo-nuclaot devices with a total yield ofov120megatons. Only
testsandobligationosf Stateiomfminfromiheir recently, the Chairman ofthe Council ofblbiateof
newol(A/4801 and Add.1,A/C.l/L.291/Rev.l and the USSR. Mr. Khrushchev, had achowledged that.
Rev.l/Add.l-3, /Cl/L.292 andAdd.l-3)concludd in a war. U one ofthe sides coneidered tposition
hopeless,it would use nuclearweapons. The repre-
Theurgenn teedforatiwtyioban nuclmiwr eopontssts eentativof the USSRhad himself saidthahiscountry
undereffectiveinternationolnml (A/47W,A/C.l/ the very positiheahad stLacked the day hefore. was
1292ond Add.1-3()conclvded)
1. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union ofSoviet Socialist Repub- 10. The Soviet Union ahould abandonauchpropaganda
Ucs). speaking in exercieeof hle ri& of reply, d join in conatmdivenegotiation on the ending of
recalled that at the 1193rd meettherepresentative nuclear tests and on diaarmament. Meanwbile it was
of Italy hadplled that thesoviet Unionwas prepared important not toundermine the Charteby misinter-
todellver amortalmiclearblowagainstanyaggreasor. pretatiom or to create a false sense ofsafety by
It was obviaus that at the present any war migbt offnteraational verificatcould give security. aystem
develop Mo a nuclear war. and since Italy wu a
member ofNATO andhad allowed theUnited States il. Mr. MENEMENCIOGLU (Turkey)
to eatabllsh bues in ita territoryitwcdd inimF- ii 'The Turkish delegationfurtherconsidered that
diately he &an intosuchawar.w%haii the inevitable legal arrangements.such as those envisaged in the
Consequences. For the Itallan peoplas for all the twelve-Power draft resolutlon (A/C.l/L.292 and
Peoplea ofthe world, aafetylay.notin aliiances and Add.1-3) should form part &d parcel ofa general.
ment. That was the solution which UPiyshouldsupport balanced and progressive programme odiaannament.
in the United Natim. insteadof iryintojustify the Nuclear dissrmament was no doubt essential for the
use of nuclear weapona. aurvival ofmankiad. but was no: enougù in iteelf to
. .. ensure survival in particular ofthe amaller countries
6. Mr. IFEAGWU'(Nigeria). referring to the Itaiian which did notpossess nucleaanns dwhose sraenals
amendments (A/C.l/L395). atressed that the twelve- of conventionalweapons were ineignificant comparedto
Power draft resolution (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3) those of other Powers. The only hop8 ofachieving
would in no way wesken the rightofselfdefeuce as concrete results &us Lay in a balanced, general
defined in Article 51 of the Charter ofthe United arrangement to be carried mtin progressive stages
Nations;it was designed solely to forbid the use ofI that would give no advantage toany one side at any
atomic devices for milit- purposes, because of the the. For those reasom, the Turkish delegationcnild
fearful consequences which such use would have for Itaiian amendmente. which were directly inspibyd for the
.a..ind. the Chsrter ofthe United Nations. although the draft
resolution.even Bs smended, did not really come
within the scopofagenda items 73 and 72. 15. Mr. TSAFLAPKIN(Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 26. M~. TURBAY AYALA (Colombia)
publics). speaking in reply to the United Kingdom r-• .. . .. ..
representative. said that NATO was unquestionably 27. The Colornbian delegation appreciatedthe sincere
aggressive in character. The CENT0 documents to motives of the sponsors of the hvelve-Power draft
which the Soviet delegation had already referred resolution aa alsoof the Itaiiandelegationin submitting
(A/C.1/853 and Corr.2) were adequate proof of the its amendments. The question. however. waa onewhich
true nature of the Western alliances. related to general disarmament rather than to the
suspension of nuclear tests, audit could onlybe settled
by agreement between the parties. if the draft resolu-
16. As to the Baruch ~1an.U the Sovietdelegation had tion were to beadopted without the ltallan amendments,
already pointed out that Itwas notdesignedto prohibit it would put countries which complied with its recom-
nuclear weapons, but to perpetuate the nuclear mono- mendations in an unfavourable position. On the other
poly of the United States and to glve that countrv hnnd, if it were to be adopted with the Itallan amend-
control over the sources of raw materials for the ments, It would appear to authorize the use of nuclear
manufacture of nuclear weapons and over the atomic weapons in certain cases. The Colombian delegation
industries which were beginning to develop in other was morally unable tosupport aresolution whichwould
countries. The United States and the United Kingdom, permit the possible use of aiomic weapons. even for
on the other hand, had taken a completely negative purposes of seiï-defence. For those reasons, it wouid
attitude towards the proposals made bythe Soviet Union vote against the Italian amendments and wouldabstain
in 19462 to bring about a genuine prohibition of from voting on the twelve-Power draft resolution.
nuclear weapons.
... 28. Mr. SANCHEZ Y ....HEZ(Do..nicanR..ublic)
21. Mr. ZOPPI (Italy). replying to the commente . .-
the meeting, said that the Soviet Union had made theg of 29. His delegation had intended tovote for thetwelve-
question &Y issue of the cold war between East and Power draft resolution, in view ofthe eminently moral
West. He wondered why the Soviet Union was so considerations by whicb it had been insplred. But a
interested in the twelve-Power draft resolution when more carehil study of the text. in addition to the lack
it would not besitate touse nuclear weapons ii neces- -.u---v amonn the African countries. had led his dele-
sary. aa Mr. Khrushchev htmseü had stated only draft resolution had no connexion with aendaitemsact, 73e
recently. Did members of the Cornmittee believe that -. -.. .- .-
the Soviet Union. in voting for the draft resolution. did and 72; It related rather to agenda item 19. in other
not intend to use nuclear weapons in caae of war? And words the question of disarmament. Accordingly Us
did they believe that the United States andother West- delegation would have to abstain from the vote on it.
ern countries. in voting againet the proposal. lntended 30. Mr. ROSSDES (C.pr..) . .
to use them? The difierence in attitude towards the . .. -
draft resolution waa easily explained. Thesoviet Union 31. Xis delegation would also vote for the lwelve-
waa ready to vote in favour ofadrafî resolution which Power &ah resolution. It considered that Article 51
it dld notintend to respect if it sbouM prove contrary of the United Nations Charter. which recognized the
to tts own Interests. When the democratic countries. right of self-defence. could not be cited =.a pretext
on the other band, supported a draft resolution it was for limiting the prohibition on the use of nuclear and
with the intention of abidinp: bv it.The uuruose of the thermo-nuclear weapons. If the use of the weaDons in
Itallan amendmenta (~/~;1/-~295) & the twelve- question for purposes ofdefence were to be pennitted.
Power draft resolution waa to avoid placing those the declaration wauld become meaningless. On the
countries which honestly belleved in the importance other hand. the declaration should have prohibited not
of United Nations resolutiom in a diffinilt position. only the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.
but also nuclear test-.
22. Mr. GUIRMA (üp... Vo.ta) 32. Mr. HAMID IBRAHIM (Ethiopia) said that he
.. would vote against the Itallan amendmenta, since their
25. The United Nations would probably bedoingmore purpoee was contrary to that ofthe hvelve-Power draft
effective work if t had before itdraft resolutions resolution. They would have the effect of sanctionlng
resulting from agreements already concluded and the use of weapons of maas destruction where such
'Wiring inîernational guarantee, Lnsteadof &ah uae waa not at variance with the United Nations
resolutions which bad hardiy ben etudied at d. Charter, whereaa the purpose of the &ait declaration
in that connexion, the delegation ofthe Upper Volta was precisely to outlaw the use of such weapons finally
Wel~omed the twelve-Power draft resolution. since it and categorically. The danger they represented would
WU broad in scope and weil constnicted and would be the same whether or not they were employed in
Prepare the ground for diacyssion betweentheAfrican conformity witt the Charter.
Reade of State on the objectives ofthefmeen-Power
resolution. The delegation of the Upper Volta
wWld vote for that draft resolution and against the
hlian amendments to it, which dlstorted its meaning
bearing.
U Se OiiietsRccds oi bic AmmrCEnm~ Commlsilon.Flrsr
Ycar.No.1. 1smuIlW. pp 4-14.
1/IMd.No. 2. 2ndmeedng. &-p.26-28. In favour: France, Greece, Haiti. Honduras, Iceland,
39. The CHALRMANinvited the Committee to voteon Israel. Italy. Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zeaiand,
the Italian amendments (A/C.l/L.295) to the twelve- Nicaragua. Norway. Panama. Paraguay, South Africa,
Power draft resolution (A/C.l/L.292 andAdd.1-3). He
reminded the Committee that the representative of Spain. Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Japan had asked for aseparatevoteonthe fbst part of Northern Ireland, UnitedStates ofAmerica. Argentina,
the sixth amendment. reading "Substitutethewords '!O Austraiia, Belgium. Canada, China, Costa Rica, Den-
consider the means of prohibiting' for the words 'for mark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador.
signing a convention on the prohibition of'". He would Against: Gabon, Chana. ûuinea, Hungary, India.
therefore put that part of the sentence to the vote. Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Laos, Liberia, Libya,
Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger,
A vote was taken by roll-call. Nigeria. Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Yugoslavia, having ken drawn by lot by the Chair- Sierra Leone. Sudan, Syria, Togo. Tunisia, ükrainian
man. was called upon to vote firs t. Soviet Socialist Repuhlic. Union of Soviet Sociallst
Republics. United Arab Repubiic, Upper Volta,Yemen,
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania. Bulgaria. Burma,
In fawur: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Byelorussian Swiet Sociaiist Repubiic, Cambodia,
China, Denmark, Federation of Malaya, France,
Greece, Haiti, Iceland, :taly, Japan. Luxembourg, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Norway, Pana- Colombia. Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville),
ma, Paraguay. South Mrica, Spain, Turkey, United Cuba, Cypms, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia.
Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthernIreland, United Abstaining: Federation of Malaya, Finland. Guate-
States of America. mala, Iran, Ireland, Japan. Jordan, Lehanon, Mexico,
Pakistan. Peru, Phiiippines, Portugal, Somaiia. Swe-
Against: Yugoslavia, Afghanistan. Aibania, Bulgaria. den, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Austria, Boiivia,
Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cam- Brazil, Chile.
bodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon,
Chad. Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopold- nie amendments wererejected by 50 votes to 28,
ville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,Ethiopia, Gabon. with22 aabstentlons.
Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, hory
Coaet. Laos, Liberia, Lihya, Mali, Mauritania, Mon- 41. The CHALRMANput to the vote thehvelve-Power
golia. Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Ro- dran resolution (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3).
mania', Saudi Arabia, Senegai. Sierra leone, Somalia,
Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist A vote was taken by mil-cdl.
Republic, Unlon ofSoviet Sociaiist Repubiica, United Panama, having ken drawn by lot by the Chairman.
Arab Repubiic, Upper Voita, Yemen. was called upon tovote firot.
Abstaining: Austria, Boiivia, Brazil, Cbile, Costa In favour: Philippines, Poland, Romania. Saudi
Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Arahia. Senegal. Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,Syria.
Guatemala, Honduras. Iran. Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru. Philippines. Por- Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
tugal, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Uruguay. Venezuela. Arab Republic. Upper Volta, Yemen. Yugoslavia,
Tbe first pari ai th SM amendment was rejected Afghanistan, Aibania. Bulgaria, Burma. Byelorussian
by 50 potes to 25, witb 25 ab tentions. Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia. Cameroun. Cen-
tral .Urican Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazza-
40. The CHAIRMAN put to the votetheItaiianamend- ville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czech*
ments as a whole (A/C.l/L.295), wtth the exception slovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya,
of the part ofthe sFxlb amendment which hadbeen Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary. India, Indonesia,
voted on separately and rejected. Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan,Jordan, Laos, Lebanon.
A vote was taken by mu-call. Liberia, Lihya, Mali, Mauritania. Mexico. Mongolia,
Morocco. Nepal. Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan.
nie Federation aiMalaya. having &en drawn by lot
by the Chairman, was called upon to wte first. Against: South .Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. United States of
America, Austraiia, Belgium, China. France.Greece,
Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua.
Abstaining: Panama, Paraguay, Pen, Porhigai,
Spain. Sweden, Uruguay.Venezuela, Argentina, Austria,
Bolivia, Brazil. Canada, Chile, Colombia, CostaRica,
Denmark, Dominican Republic. El Salvador. Finland,
Haiti, Honduras, Iceland. Israel, Norway.
The draft resolution was adopted by 60 votes to 16,
with 25 abstentions. Document A/4942/Add.3
Report of the First Committee (pan N)
[Originaltext: English]
(16 Novembpr 1961
1. Pans 1, II and III of the report of the First
Committee (A/4942 and Add.1 and 2) dealing with "(d) Any State using nudear and thenno-nudear
itenis73 and 72 of the agenda of the General Assemhly weapons is to be msiderui'as violating the Charter
recommended to the General Assembly the adoption of the United Nations,as dg mntrary to the laws
oi three draft resolutions. Thc present foiirth part of humanity and as ~ommitting a uime againsr
briii$s to a conclusion the report of the Committee's mankind and civilkation;
,:onsiderationof items 73 and 72. "2. Requests the Seaetary-General to consult the
Governments of Manber States to axertain their
1. The following documents were available to the views on the possibility of convming a speeial con-
Comniittee in connexioti with its consideration of ference for signinga convention on the prohibitioii
;%endaitems 73 and 72: dociiments A/4772 and Add.1. of the use of nuclear and them-nuclear weapons
'\/4778, A/4787. A/4797 and Corr.1, A/4819, A/4853. for war purposes and toreport on the results of such
.\/1869 A/4871. A/4893. A/C.1/849, h/C.1/850. consultation to tGaieral Assemblyat its seventeenth
:\/c. 1/852, A/C. 1/853 and Corr.2, and A/C.1/85j. session."
3. At the 1188th meeting, on 7 Novenilier. El S. On 9 Novernber 1961, Italy submitted amend-
Salvadormoved, under rule 118of the rules of procedure ments (A/C,l/L295) to the twelve-Power draft
the General Assembly, that the Committee should resolution(A/C.l/U92 and Adbl-3). as follows:
closethe general debate on agenda items 73 and 77 and
"1. In the fifth preambuiar paragraph, reading as
heioredit.The Salvadorian motion was adopted by 49ng follows:
" 'Belieuing that the use of weapons of mas
rotes to none, with 35 abstentions. destruction, such as nudrar and thermo-nuclear
4. Discussion on the two remaining draft resoliitions weapons, is a directiaegdtionof the high ideals and
jook place at the 1189th to 1194th meetings. held objectives which the UnitedNations has betn
Detween 8 and 14 November 1x1. established to achieve through the protection of
... succeeding generationsfrom the scourge of war and
7. The second draft resdution. submitted by Ceylon, through the presmtion and promotion of their
cultures,'
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia. Liberia, Libya. "insert the words 'contrary to the Charter of the
Nigeria. Somalia, the Sudan, Togo and Tunisia (A/ United Nations' after the words 'such as nuclear
C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3). was in the fom of a declara- and thermo-nuclear weap'.
tion. The opentive part.read as follows:
"Tlte Genmd Assembly, "2. In operative paragraph 1 (a), insert at the
" ... beginning the words 'The threat or use of amed
" 1. Declares tba: force, includin;and insert the words 'in any mamer
contrary to theCharte of the United Nations' aiter
"(a) The use of nudear and thenno-nudez the words 'thermo-nudear weapons'.
weapons is contrary to the spirit, lettand aims of "3. In operative paragraph 1 (b), insert atthe
the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation beginning the word 'Accordingly'; and insert the
of the Charter of the United Nations: words 'contrary to the Charter of the United Nations'
after the words 'thermo-nuclear weapons'.
"(b) The use of nitdear and thermo-nudear "4. In oprative paragraph 1 (c), insert at the
weapons would exceed even the xope of war and beginning the word 'Accordingly'; and insert the
cause indiscriminate seng and destruction to words 'contrary to the Charter of the United Nations'
mankind and civiiiition and, as such, icon- to after the words 'th-nudear weapons'.
the rules of international law and to the laws of
humanity ; "5. In opuative paragraph 1 (d), insen the
"(c) The use of nuclear and therm~+~udar words 'contrary to the Charter of the United Nations'
weapons is a war directed not against a, many or after the words 'theho-nudear weapons'; and delae
enemies done but ah againstmankind general, the words 'asviolating the Charter of the United
since the people of the world not involved in such Nations.'.
a war will be subjectal to aU the mils g-td
by the use of such weapons; ..lgainst:Afghanistan. Albania. Buleria. Bum.
"6. In operative paragraph2,substiture the words Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. Cambodia.
'to consider the rneans of prohibiting' for the words Cameroun, Centrai African Republic. Ceylon. Chad.
'for signing a convention on the prohibition of'; and Colombia.Congo (Bmzaville), Congo (Leopoldville) .
insert the words 'contrary to the Charter.of the United Cuba. Cvprus. Crshoslovakia, Ethiopia. Gabon, Ghana.
Nations' after the words 'for war purposes'." Giiinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Itaq, Ivory Coast,
9. At its 1194th meeting, on 14 November, the L;r9s, Liberia. Libya. Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia,
Committeeproceededto the vote on the drait resolutions hlorocco, Nepai, Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Romania,
and the related amendments. Saudi Arabia, Senegai, Sierra Leone, Sudan. Syria.
.-.
Togo. Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socidist Republic.
(6) The twdve-Power dnft resolution (A/C.I/ Union of Soviet Sociaiist Republics, United Arab
L.?-?and Add.1-3) and the amendments thereto were Republic, Upper Volta, Yemcn, Yugoslavia.
~ted iipon as follows: Abstaining:Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Federa-
The Italian am&dments (A/C.l/L.BS) were put tion of a Finland, Guatemala, Iran, Ireland,
rothe vote in the following manner. Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Pem.
Philippines, Portugal, Somalia. Sweden, Thailand,
Uruguay, Venezuela.
The Mt resolution was adopted by a ruIl4 vote
of 60 to 16, with 25 abstentions. The voting as
r\t the rquest of the representative of Japan, the follows:
{rst part of the sixth Italian amendment. which woiild In fmour: Afghanista Albania, Buleria, Buma,
iiibstitute the words "to consider the means of pro- Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, cambodia,
~iibiting"for the words "for signing a convention on Cameroun, Cd Africart Republic, Ceylan, Chad,
ihc prohibition of" in operative paragraph2 of the Congo (B-ville), Congo (Leopoldville) , Cuba,
[,celve-Power draft resolution, was voted upon sepa- Cypnis. CtediosloMkia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Federation
ntely. It was rejected by a roll-cal1vote 50 to 25, of Xalaya, Gabon, Ghana Guinea, Hungary, India,
5vit75 abstentions. The voting \vas as follows: Indonesia,Im, hq, Ivory Coast, Japan,JO*, Laos,
111javoilr:Argentina, Austnlia, Belgium, Canada. Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico,
China,Denmark. Federation of Malaya. France, Greece. Mongolia, Mo-, Nepal. Niger. Nigeria, Pakistan,
Haiti. Iceland. Italy, Japan. Luxembourg. Netherlands. Philippines, Poland,Romania, Saudi Arabi, Scnegal,
Sew Zealand, Nicaragua. Xorway, P-, Paraguay. Sierra Leone, Som& Sudan, Syria,Thailand, Togo,
Tunisia.UkrainianSoviet Çoadist Republic, Union of
South.4friu. Spain. Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Soviet Socialist Republics. United Arab Republic.
[?ritainand Northern Ireland, United States of Ameriu.
.4gainst: Afghanistan. Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Upper Volta, Yemm, Yugoskvia
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. Cambodia, Agoinst: Austratia, Belgium.Chi, France, Greece.
Canieroun. Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Guatemala, Ireland, Itaiy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Colombia,Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), New Zealand, Nicaragua, South Africa.Twkey, United
Ciilia.Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Giiinea.Hungary, India. Indonaia. Iraq, Ivory Coast, United States ofMca
os. Liberia, Libya, Mali. MaUritania, Mongolia, Abstoining: Agavina. Austria, Bolivia, Brdl,
\lorocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria. Potand, Romia, Canada. Chile.Coldia, Costa Rica l,nmdc, Danini-
SaiicliArabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone. Somalia. Sudan, on Republic, El WMdor, FI& Haiti. Honduras,
Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Iceland, Isracl,Norway, Panama, Paraguay, PeN,
Cilion of Soviet Sociaiist Republics, United Arab Re- Portugal, Spain, Swedm, Unig~ay, Venuuek
piil~l. pper Volta, Yemen. Yugoslavia.
.-ibstoining:Austria, Bolivia. Brazil. Chile, Costa Recommendotbn of the Flr~r ComMuae
Rica,DominicanRepublic. El Salvador, Finland. Guate-
mala. Honduras. Iran. Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon. 10. The First Gmmittee thereforc rmmmends to
Ilexico. Pakistan. Peru. Philippines, Portugal. Sweden. the General Assanbly the adoption of the following
draft resolutiom:
?;!ria. Thailand. Uruguay, Venezuela.
The remaining Italian amendments were rejaed by DIoft wsolutia I
1 rollallvote of 50 to 28, with 2 abstentions. The CONSIDERATIO ON AFBIcA AS A DWUC~EABPED ZONE
roting was as follows: [Te.rt adopfed by the Cend Assembly Mthout
In favowr: Argentina, Australia, Belginm, Canada
China. Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El change.See "Artion taken by the Ceneral Assemblf
Salvador, France. Grecce, Haiti, Honduras. Iceland, below.]
Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Dmfr rrsoluiionII
'licaragua, Nomy, Panama, Paraguay, suth Africa, DECL.+RATIO ON TEE PBOHIBIITON OF THE USE OF
Spain. Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and NUCLEAP ANù THPBMO-NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Sorthern Ireland. United States of America.
.. ~ [Text adapfrd by th Cnvml Assembly Mthout
change.See "Artion takm by the Genrral Assembly"
'belm.1 United Nations
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY Tuesday. 24 iVovem&r, 1961,
at 10.30a.m.
SIXTEENTHSESSION
O&inl Records NEW YORK
CONTENTS 3. The PRESIDENT (translatedfrom French) Ishall
Page now cal1 on the representatives who wish to explain
Agenda items 73 and 72: their vote.
Continuation of suspension of nuclear and
thermo-nuclear tests and obli@ations of 4. Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation
would Ike to explain its vote on drnft resolution il
States to refrain from their renewal (CA- presented in the report of the First Committee
cmd) [A/4942/Add.3] that is, on the drnft resolution con-
The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear cerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.
weakns tests under effecnve international 5. Since this draft resolution was adopted in the
control (concluded) First Committee, two significant developments have
Report of the First Committee (part IV) ... 797 taken place, both of which affect the attitude of my
delegation to it. In the first place. we have received
President: Mr. Monsi SLlM (Tunisia). the encowaging news that thenegotiations onanuclear
test ban agreement will be resumed in Geneva next
Tuesday. Second. we have reason tobe hopefui that
AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72 an agreement will soon be reached concerning the
resumption of general disarmament negotiations in
Continuation of suspmsion of nucleai and themo-nuclear an appropriate negotiating forum. My delegstion feels
tests and obligations of Statesto refrain fromthair nnawthat it is of great importance that Us Assembly
al (concluded)' should take no action which might in any way hamper
the succesa of these resumed negotiations.
The urgent need foi a treoty to bon nucleai weapons tests
undei effective international control (concluded). 6. 1 should like toremind Memhers that inthe First
Committee my delegation expreaaed the sympthy
REPORT OF THE FlRST COMWTTEE (PART iVl which we felt, andwhich we continue tofeel, for the
(A/4942/ADD.3) motives of the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft
resolution.
Pursuant tomle 68 of the Rules of Procedure. it 7. However, we made it very clear that we had
was decided not todiscuss tbe report of the ~irst serious reserwtions about the effectiveness of this
Committee. sort of dechration. We recalled in the First Com-
mittee that aii dechrationa prohtbiting the use of
Mr. Encke11 (Flnland), Rapporteur ofthe Flrs t Com- specific typesd weapona had. without exception. been
mlttee, presented the report of the Committee and vioiated in the pst in wartime: and it was on this
then spoke as follows: ground that Canadaabstained on the draft resolution
1. Mr. ENCKELL (Flnland). Rapporteur of the Firat in theFirat Committee.
Conmittee: The consideration of the two Itema under
discussion in the First Committeewas concluded on 8. Now, in the light of ment devalopmenta to which
14 November by the adoption of the two draft reeolu- 1 referred, our doubte about the wisdom of adopting
vons repduced in the prreent report. [A/4942/ this draft resolution have been relnforced. For ex-
Add.31. During the debate on these draft resolutiona ample, it appears tnmy delegation that the convening
the view was expressed bysome speakers that their of a special conference, as envisaged inoperative
ecope. and especiaily the scope ofdraft resolution II. pragraph 2 af the draft resolution. would be ill-
was wider than the item under discussion as included advised in preaent cimumstances. Action toassemble
in the agenda. The opinion was ai80 voiced that it a world conference to sign a convention of doubthrl
would have been desirable that draft resolution 1 be utillty might very well detract fmm the efiort tn
regionally discussed before comlng tothecommittee. negotiate binding disarmament agreements which are
It was. however. very widely felt that theCommittee the only flnally efiective means of dealing with the
could consider and decide upon these proposa18 at that îhreat ofnuclear weapons.
atage of its pmceedings. Both draft resolutions weie 9. Accordingly, my delegation bas come tothe con-
adopted. the first one. without opposition; the second clusion that wemuet oppose draft resolution II.onthe
one. in lts original wording by 60 votes to16. with 25 prohibitionof the use of nuclear weapona, on which
abstentions. the Assembly bas been Called upon tovote.
2. 1 have -the honour to recommend for adoption by 10. Mr. DEAN (United StatesofAmerica):IwouldlIke
the General Assembly the draft resolutions contained to speak firat mdraftresoiutionIIcmtainedin the re-
in the report. port ofthe Flrat Committee [A/4942/Add.l]. 1have a
number of the tbings toSayabout thisdraft resolution.
11 The United States fuily rec50gnizes that most of
the delegations which voted for Us draft resolutionin the First Committee did so in the sincere belief receive invitations to visit Mr. Khnishchev onhis own
wt they were acting from noble motlves and effec- territorv. Nuclear war will be effectively outlawed
tively. in an attempt to prohibit the use of nuclear when nuclear weapons are reduced and abollshed
weapons in war. With this view everyone can be in thmwh a disarmament Droeramme carefully formu-
sympathy. It is necessary to say frankly and bluntly lated; with effective inie&tional contmli, as the
that in the opinion of the United States delegatlon- United States has pmposed in this Assembly. [See
these votes were wasted. 1 regret to say it but this A/4891.) With such effective safeguards. the United
draft resolutlon cannot fulfil the wishes of its pro-
States and other countries could destroy their own
ponents who. we luiow. supported it out 06 their ab- nuclear weapons without impairing their own security.
horrence of nuclear war.~ll peoples.genuinely in- There is no other effective way to go about this task
terested in peace share that abhorrence. with assurance and with success.
12. But, as in al1 these matters. there is a correct
way and an incorrect way to make a wish or a desire 18. The third basic defect in the draft resolution
arises fromits own terms. It 1s sirnply Untnie to Say
come true and be carried out. So 1 am sorry to say that the use of nuclear weapons 1s ~0ntrar)' to the
that this draft resolution. in the opinion of the United Charter and to international iaw or toassert that the
States delegation. will not achieve its objective. Charter itself can be emended-for thiS there are
ample provisions-by declaratlons in the Assembly.
13. I say this carefully because the Soviet Union. as That being the case. this draft resolution, 1submit,
It has indicated in this Assembly. hasnot the slightest sets a very dangemus precedent. If it is an attempt
Intention of paying any attention to this draft resolu- to try to amend the Charter by resolution. 1would
tion.despite the enthusiastic support which the Soviet like to point out that surely it 1s ineffective. since
Union gave to it in theCommittee.Howdo I know thls? this Ceneral Assembly has no such power.
We know it from. the Soviet representative's own
statements in the Committee that the Soviets openly 19. This Assembiy cannot rewrite the Charter in
intend to use nuclearweapons at the sole discretion a manner totally forelgn to the precise provisions for
of the Soviet Union, ii that country considers their
use necessary. The delegatlon of the United States its amendaient. Ifpeople wish to amend the Charter,
and other delegations quoted Mr. KhniShCheV's state- 1 submit that they should follow the orderly pmcedure
iaid down in that regard But this Assemhly is a body
ment to this ëffect. so there can be no doubt of the of re~resentatlvea of States. Itis essentiai that they
Soviet intentions in this matter. So. just as in the case shoulh respect legal processes and procedures. and
of the uninspected. uncontmlled moratorium resolu- not nout them. It 1s essential that the United Nations
tions on the subject of nuclear testing. the Soviet be preserved as an effective Instrument for the
Union votes for this draft resolution with every inten- ~reservation of -ce. But this Assembly's reputation
tion of violating it,if for its sole purposes it suits is bound to s&er if du- waves of emotion it
itto do so. caats the Charter pr&isiona to one side and acts
capriciously.
14. No. 1 regret to Say that the Soviet Union wlll not
observe this draft resolution. It will continue to rat- 20. Indeed. the verv pmvisiona of the Charter ap-
tle its rockets and to threaten other countries with pmve, and demand. -the exercise of self-defence
thermo-nuclear destnictlon. aeainst armed attack. It isverv clearthat the Charter
aiys nothing whatwer about -any prticular weapon
15. At the same time. the Soviet Union will attack or method which nay be used for self-defence. Those
the United States when it votes, as a natter of sln-
cere principie. against this ddt resolution. It was who wrote the charter expected victims ofaggression
the Soviet Union and no one eise which bmke off the to react as neceaaary to pmtect their territorial
nuclear test ban negotiations at Geneva so the Soviet integrity and political independence. and they were
Union could conduct its own series oftestsweek after verv careful not to say ùow seif-defencecouldbe car-
week. The Soviet Union will Say that our vote here ri4 out. The unforgivable crime under the Charter
Cast as a natter of aincere princl-le.~.mves that the ts not self-defence but aggression. direct or indirect;
United States desires to w& nuclear war. Now the in other words, the iUegal uae of force. The General
United States desires no such thina. and the Members Assembly has recognized that fact many limes. 1cal1
the attention of representatives in particular to the
of this Assembly imow that this charge ofthe Soviet resolution 1380 (V) ]n "Peace through deedsn adopted
Union is pure hokum. and nothing but holnun. But the as far back as the fifîh session of the Assembly, and
point 1s. that the Soviet Union has already begun to 1 can cite many other -ples.
use this draïi resolution as an Inetrument ofpropa-
guida in the cold war. wblle the Soviet Union continues 21. The amendmenta which the Itatallan delegation
to prepare to disregard it. Surelythis isnot the reauit introduced and so ably and courazeously defended In
the aincere supporters of this ddt resolution hsd the Firat Committee -&resentedWan atiempt to re-
in mind when they cast their favourable votes. conclle the Assembly's desire to prevent theuse of
16. The second reason for the ineffectlveness of this nuclear weapona with the clear anddedinite pmvisiona
.&aft resolution is. with aU respect. that itgoes ab& of the Charter. Rad these amendrnents pmpoaed by
the task of ridding the world of atomic war in the Italy been adopted. the United States wodd &en havé
wmng way. Wlth the end lt seeka we can all agree. been giad to vute for the draft resolution, as so
However. this draft resolutlon deciares that theuseof amended, for then it WOuld have heen a renection of
atomlc weapons is a crime. But it sets up no sate- a humanitarian desire shad hy al1 men of goodwill.
Wrds whatsoever to pmtect anv nation awlnst the Instead, in lts present form, the draft resolutlon can
assaults of the Soviet union. - ~ ~ only mislead dang8mualy those who put thelr iaith
in the acts of this Assexnbly.
17. States which seek security fmm wa~ which do
not wlsh to wage war-that is the positionof the United 22. Mv delenation bs that al1 those who wish this
States-annot, I submit. trust their safety to such ~ssembly to he a &al contribution to theoutiawing
81nsuDporteddeclarations: or othenvise we, too. might of nuclear weapons. to the attamment of general andcomplete disarmament under effective international Peninsula. in the Near and Middle East, LnAsia and
controls, and to the support and strengthening of the the Pacifie Ocean. This last pmposal was putfonvard
United Nations Charter, will vote against this draft hy the Government of the People's Republic of China.
resolution.
40. It iS dlfficuit to over-estimatethe great positive
significance of the second resolution also-a declara-
tion proclaiming that the uae of nuclear and thermo-
nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit. letter and
34. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist aims of the United Nations and as such 1s a violation
Republics) (translated fmm Russian): After careful of the United Nations Charter-a declaraîlon which
discussion the First Committee has byanovenvhelm- proposes that a multilateral international convention
ing majority of votes approved hvo important draft should be concluded on this question.
resolutions contained in its report [A/4942/Add.3], 41. The Soviet Union has always favoured and,
which are an important contribution to the cause of naturally, continues to favour a ban on nuclear and
peace and to the preparation of conditions whichwould hydrogen weapons. Of course, the best decision would
free humanity from the threat of nuclear warand help be a cornplete ban on nuclear weapons, together with
p solve the problem ofgenerai andcomplete disarma- the liquidation of al1 the stock piles of these deadly
ment. These resolutions have now been submitted for weapons. We trust tbat it wiL1 4 fact be possible in
the approval of the General Assembly. this way to solve this problem within the framework
ai a treaty on generai and complete disarmament and
35. The Soviet delegation was very happy to support thus to eradicate the threat of nuclear war.
both the draft resolution of the African States de-
claring Africa a denuclearized zone and the draft 42. At the snme time. the Soviet Union ha8 for many
resolution of the African and Asian States concerning years past been emphasizing ü@, even before ihe
adoption of a declaration pmclaiming that the use of conclusion of an agreement on generai andcomplete
nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is contrary to disarmament, which would put an end to the very
the spirit, the letter and the aims ofthe United Nations existence of nuclear and hydrogen bombs and the
and ia. accordingly. a direct violation of the United means of delivering them to the target. the States
Nations Charter. manufachiring nuclear weapons might. as mord
36. In advocating an immediate solution of the prob- preparation for such an agreement, declare their
lem of general and complete disarmament. the most resolve not to use nuclear wepons.
burning and urgent problem of our time. the Soviet
Union at the same time warmiy supports any con- 43. The Soviet Union ha8 more thanonce invited the
structive pmposals aimed atdimiriishinginternational take a solemn andunconditional obligation to renounce
tension. strengîhening trust between States andthere-
by facilitaîing the realization of general and complete the uae of nuclear weapons and otherweapons of masa
disarmament. One such measure whichwould impmve destruction. And were it not for the obetlnate objec-
ihe international atmosphere and lessen the danger of tions of our Western partners, this question would
war would be the creation of denuclearized zones and, have been settled long ago.
more especiaiiy, a denuclearized zone on the African 44. We are. therefore, happy that. on the proposai
ofEthiopla and a number of other Afrioan and Asian
Continent. States. the Flrst Committee hae adopted adeclaration
37. The idea of creating in varioua partsof the world on banning the use ofnuclear weapons and we voice
zones free of atomic nuclear weapons is a sound and the hope that the General Assembly will coniirm this
constructive ides and one which meets the wishes of
the peoples. It is.therefore. making headway. As we
ail how. in recent years Governments ofvarioua
countries have put fornard plana for thecreation of
denuclearized zones for düierent aress. There ie a
proposal for the creation of a denuclearized zone in
Central Europe-the most sensitive area of theworld.
where the armed forces ofthe Lw0mllitary gmups ai
States are in direct contact with one another.This
proposal is usually called the RapacM ~lan?l after
the name of the distinguished Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Poland. the State which put fonvard the
plan for creating a denuclearized zone in Centrai
Eumpe. There are also proposais for creating de-
nuclearized zones in Northern Eumpe. in the Balkan
!/Sce-0
Plcnar\leerinqr. 69meeting.important decision, which is the first steptowardsthe way help & create a favourable atmosphere for the
complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. negotiations on disarmament which the Soviet Umonis
45. The Soviet delegation will, of course. vote for approaching with an open rnind. with a definite posi-
bath draft resolutions-for declaring Africa a de- tion and with a crystal-lear programme. We would
nuclearized zone and for pmhibiting the use of nu- llke the United States to help in every way, and not
clear weapons. Only those who do not want peace or obstmct. the creation of a favourable atmosphere for
who want the United Nations to legalize the incon- achieving agreement on the resumption of disarma-
ment negotiations. and for these negotiations them-
ceivable horrors of thermonuclear warfare can fail selves.
to support these resolutions or can vote against them.
46. In this connexion, 1cannot refrain from sayingat 53. Mr. Dean attempted £rom this rostrum to cast
doubfs on the good will of the Soviet Union as regards
least a few words about the statements made from complying with the General Assembly resolutions on
this platform at the beginning of our discussiontoday. the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. May
47. 1 would like to Say, Literally, a couple of words 1. not through the mouth of Mr. Dean but through that
about the speech made by the representative of of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Canada, who today propounded a rather strange and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. reply to that
unintelligibleargument in support of his alteredposi- question.
tion on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. 54. Nikita Sergeevich Khmshchev, the Head of the
In the First Committee the Canadian delegation did Government of the Soviet Union, in reply to a letter
not display a very great degree of baldness and did
not vote for this resolution. As a member of NATO. from Cannon Collins, Chairman of the Committee for
Canada did not go nll the way on this question, but Nuclear Disarmament. said:
still it abstained and did not vote against. "The question of not being the first to use nuclear
weapons which you touch upon in your proposa1 is
48. Today General Burns indicated that the Canadian certainiy of paramount importance. A good solu-
delegation would now vote against this resolution.Ap- tion to that problem would play an important role
parently. NATO discipline has prevailed. At the same in the elimination of the threat of war and the solu-
time. we cannot but point to the completely unfounded
assertion that the better the atmosphere gets as tion of the whole pmblem of disarmament. A
simultaneous undertaking by al1 States possessing
favourable symptoms of progress towards disarma- nuclear weapons not to be the first to use them
ment appear. the more strongly one should oppose would be an Important step towards the elimination
the very measure which favour the achievement of of the danger of a nuclear war. The position of the
agreement on general and completedisarmament. This Soviet Union is quite olear. We are in favour of an
however. was the very argument put fonvard by the undertaking by ail States renouncing the use of nu-
representative of Canada today. 1am sorry, but it is clear weapons and we are prepared to sign an
one I cannot nccept, and I feel sure that theAssembly
will not agree with it. agreement not to be the first State touse nuclear
weapons."
49. Mr. Dean. the representative of the UnitedStates. 55. Yes, we. the Soviet Union, are prepared to sign
made a speech here in which. possibly for the first such an unde-g. We are prepared to sign and
Ume in United Nations history. he tried to speak, as implement an international convention on the pro-
it were, on behaiF of the Soviet Union. This is a
hibition of the use of nuclear weapons. That is the
rather unusual situation-to find the United States positionof the Soviet Union.
representative speaking for the Soviet Union, speaking 56. Unfortunately, to our great regret, the position
from this mstnun-and with complete assurance- of the United States 1s. apparantly, the opposite. The
about what the Soviet Union will do and what it will
not do. United States representative tried to juste this op-
posite position by referring here to the discussion in
50. With al1 due respect to Mr. Dean. the Soviet the First Committee. where the Iîalian amendmenta
Government has instmcted the Soviet delegation to [~/C.l/L.295] tothe Afm-Asian resolution of banning
speak fmm this rostnun and explain the position of the use of nuclear weapons. were rejected by an
the Soviet Union-it gave no instmctions to the United ovenvhelming rnajoriîy. The United States delegation,
States delegation. you see, cannot, he said, vote for thisdraft resolution
because the Itaiian amendments were defeated. Yes,
51. 1 leave aside the question of diplomatic tact there was actually such an incident in the First
which. as we think. has not been entirely ohserved by
the United States delegation in trying to speak here Committee. one of which it might be better not to
for the Soviet Union. But why worry about the remind the Western Powers-the Incident of the sub-
diplomatic tact of United States representatives when mission of the Italian amendments, the whole point of
their country. the country of Abraham Lincoln. isnow which boiled down tn the terrible thought that the
supporting a proposal that African Negroes should united Nations Charter sanctions the use of nuclear
remain for another ten years the slaves of white weapons.
masters; when their country, the country of Franklin 57. No. the United Nations Charter is not adocument
Roosevelt, is now the mainstay of facist regimes in which can be constmed tosuit those who want war.
different parts of the world. including the Dominican The United Nations Charter. of course. does not
Repubiic: when their country, the country ofJefferson ~ermit, and cannot per-mit. theuseof nuclearweapons.
and Paine, irr now preparing a terrible nuclear catas- and the resolution of the African States, which we
trophe for the peoples in reply tothe Soviet proposai are now coneiderlng. is in full confarmity with the
toconclude a German peace treaty. United Nations Charter.
52. Still. we shall leave the question of diplomatic 58. It 1s no mere accident that, when the Italian
tact on the side. We oniy want to Say that speeches. amendments were put to the vote, fewer thana quarter
such as that made today by Mr. Dean. do not in any of the United Nations memhers supported those amendments. SO it was a rather unhappy incident in
the Flrst Committee for the Western Powers and it
would be better not to remind them of It. 73. We very much regret that it was not possible in
59. Finally, one remark about the position of the the First Committee to achieve a meeting ofminds on
United States. and apparently, of the other Western the best way tosecure whatwebothwant. what indeed.
Powers. members of the North Atlantic military 1 hope that we ail want. This regret does not temper
bloc. a remark about their position on the ffrst our SYmpathY With the sponsors and with their ob-
resolution proclaiming the African continent a de- jective.
nuclearized zone.
74. SinCe the discussion of this draft resolution in the
60. The United States representative expended much First Committee. we have. of course. resumed con-
energy and many words on tryinn to Iustifv from this sideration there of the subject of disarmament: and
mstnim the unwiiiingness of thetnitid States tosup- my own delegatlon and that of the United States have
prt this noble resolution. reafffrmed the urgent need for general and complete
61. He tried to explain this position from various disarmament. carried out in balance stages andunder
angles but he failed and was unahle, to explain one effective international control. The joint statement
thing: Why after all. is the United States against pm- ofagreed principles [A/4879], submitted bythe United
claiming Africa a denuclearized zone?Or does it want. States and the Soviet Union, provides for the ellmlna-
again thmugh France's intermedlary, tohegin testing tion of stockplles ofnuclear weapons and the cessa-
nuclear weapons there? Or does it want to transform tion of theproduction of such weapons. carried out in
Africa into a nuclear, not a denuclearized zone. to such a wny that at no stage of the pmcess could any
saturate African States with lta nuclear weapons? 1s State or gmup of States gain military advantage.
than how the United States understands helping Africa? 75. Under the United Statesdisarmament programme
1s that how the'united States understands giving sup- [A/48911. which we supporS, ail nuclear weapons
port to the young AfricanStates?lsthathow the United would cease ta adat. There would ba no nuclear or
States understands aupportlng the lnitlative of the thermonuclear weapona to use. Wben al1 existing nu-
African States, for it was the initiative of the States clear weapons are destmyed, when no more are being
of Africa. Mt. Dean said here that the African States made. and when this can be verifled internatlonally,
must themselves take the initiative in ensuring their the pmblem oi preventing their use wiil have solved
aecurity. They did so. They are aaking everyone. IteeU. The aim of this draït resolutlon and ofmany
includlng the Soviet Union. the United States. the other partial proposala will have been achieved. That
United Klngdom and France, not to tranaform Africa lewhat we ourselves favour. For tbat weare working,
into a nuclear zone. The Soviet Union sigufles Its and WU work. with al1 our power.
agreement. The United States dws not give itsagm-
ment to this pmposal. It does not support it. 76. But the hard fact remalas that so long as States
possess nuclear weapons. they will use them in self-
defence. Mr. Wnishchev has shoam himseU a reallst
on this pointin a recent statement toMr. Sulzberger.
which ha8 alresdy been the a+bject of discussion in
70. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): 1should iike to Us Aasembly. Mr. Wnishchev dealt speciffcaiiy with
make quite a brief intervention here thia mornlng on the question of undertnkings to refrain fmm the use
the vote of my delegation on the second oi the taro ainuclear weapons. The Soviet representative in the
resolutions which we are considering hem. aamely First Committee sought to show that the point which
draft resolution II contalnein the repart ofthe First Mt. Wrushchev wae maklng le, in some way, tnap-
Cornmittee (A/4942/Add.3]. pilcahle to the reaolution which Isnav before
us. 1 Would Uke the Assembly tojudge on this. What
71. Now this la a caee in which the sponsoro sfthe Mr. Khrushchev said when aaked whether the Soviet
draft resolution and those who. as in our mm cane. Union would be the finit to employ nuclear weapons
have serious healtations abait the windom ofit inlta ina war was. and 1 quotnhlsacbial words aa reported
present form, none thelesa. 1 thin k.th have the in The New York Times of 8 September 1961:
eame aima. We both want to M the world of the po- "Evm if aither side abould in such a war feel lt
tential disasterof nuclearand thermonucleararar. We waa loaing. would It not use nuclear weapons to
both want the whole oftheworld tobe adenuclearized apold defeat? ILwould doubtediy use Ita nuclear
area. fmm which the fearofaoy fonn af war. Loclud- tmmbs ... .
ing nuclear and thermomlear war. inbanished. That. "AU thia goes to shoslw-and I am still quoting
1 think, la common gmund. We düfer only aa tothe Mr. Wnishche~-~that if atomic weapons are pre-
best methods of achieving ou common end. se&. and if war Isunleaaheld t.ilïbe a thenno-
nuclear war. Therefore. world peaca muet beas-
' 72. The sponsors oi this ddt resolution bellme- - sured wt by dertaldng to &nain hm the use
and 1 am quite sure they are absolutely sinceTe in of nuclear weapons but by radical solution ofthe
this-that the aim can he artained bya noble declara- cardinal issues. And the best parantee to peace is
tion which. in its present form, we beileve-1 am
bnind to say-is dwmed to be ineffectuai. Now. we.
for our part, are Convinced lbat the same goal mUSt
be sought. but it must be sought through genenil and
complete disamlament with effective international
verification: and 1emphasize those laat words. the destruction of armaments and the elimination 81. For Our own pafi, sinCe we do agree with Mr.
of armies, in other words, disarmament." KhNshCheVs logic in this matter, we see no alter-
77. Nm those are the words of Mr. Kh~shchev. native. if international honesty and good faith areto
You will notice that in this there is no reference be preserved, but tovote againat this draftresolution.
whatever to unilateral declarations, no suggestion At the same the. we again pl-e ourselves tobend
that this view. so forthrightly and-if 1may Say so- . our every effort in the cause of ConcludIng an au-ee-
ment on general and complete disarmakent, with
so effectively. stated. depended upun the number of proper pmvision for effective internationalcontml
States which might declare that they would not use under which there can no longer be any question of
nuclear weapuns. using nuclear weapons..This is the way toremove the
78. The arguments which have been advanced by
Soviet representatives in the FirstCommittee seeking threal; and it is for this reason that we feel bound to
to justify their vote in favour of such vague declara- vote against this particular drait resolution.
tions as that envisaged In the draft resolution before 82. 1 think it was significant this morning when the
us, are specious. The point quite clearly made by representative of Canada here announced that hi3
Mr. Khrushchev hirnself-and on this, at least. we delegation wouid nm vote against this draft resolu-
are bound to agree with him-isthat mereunverifiable tion. and 1 hope that may encourage others, too, to
undertakine- n~ ~ ~ ~se nuclear weawns-in the ab- feel that this is really the correct action to Lake in
sence of general and complete disirmament under regard to this particuiar draft resolution because of
effective internationalcontrol-are. in those circum- the implications which 1 have tried to spell out. We
stances, entiGly valieless. He ha; clearly said that al1 want to achieve real and lasting disarmament,
the Soviet Union wouid use nuclear weapons in seif- in which nuclear weapons will disappear altogether.
defence if it found itseif at a disadvantagein any war, But in the light of the arguments 1 have presented.
includim what is ususllv called a conventional war. 1 believe that it is no help to thls Organizationfor us
1find it ïmpossible to understand howany representa- to blind ourselves to the issues invofied here merely
tive of Mr. Khrushchev or his Government oan then bv mssh resolutions which appear to have the right
justify casting a vote in favour of a drait resolution hkention and to thtnk that by so doing we are solving
which says among other things that " ... any State these vital pmblems.
using nuclear and thermonuclear weapons 1s to be
considered to violate the Charter of the United Na- 83. 1hope very much that other delegations willthink
tions ...." This must surely he taken as a declara- carefully about this. For the reasons stated. my dele-
tion by the Soviet Government of their readiness to gation wiii vote against thisdraft resolution.
violate the Charter. It can mean nothing else. 84. Mr. IQBAL (paldstan): When draft resolution II.
79. 1 listened with great care to what the represen- contained in the report of the First Committee
tative of the Soviet Union said to us thia morning. [A/4942/Add.3) and couched in the form of a declara-
He is well aware that 1raised thismatter on a pre- tion, was voted upon in the Committee, we pointed
vious occasion with himin the First Committee [1197th out that it in fact related to the item on disarmament.
meeting); indeed. on that occasion, 1think he thought rather than to that on the banning of nuclear weapons
the worda 1 used were unnecessarily harsh, but as 1 tests. There has been a development since the draft
resolution was adopted in the First Committee, be-
reminded him on that occasion. 1cannot cal1 other cause the USSR has deciared its intention to resume
than hypocrisy actions which are, in fact,hypocritical negotiations on the banning of nuclear weapons tests.
in this way. When we are told that the Soviet Union As we al1 hope that this may lead speedily to a treaty
1s supporting this drnft resolution, in the light of on the banning of nuclear weapons tests, we feel that
these remarks of Mr. Wrushchev. then 1cannot see draft resolution IIhas becomeunnecessary. Wethere-
any other expianation for that action. fore W that. in orderto give the fullest chance for
80. 1 listened careiuilythis mornlngto see ifwe were these negotiationa to result in a treaty banning nu-
to receive a hirther explanation of these words of
olear weapons tests, we should not pmceed with this
Mr. Khruehchev; 1 should have been very interested draft resolution. In any case, if this draft resolution
indeed to hear it. But 1 do understand that it wdd is put to the vote, we shall abstain.
be ciifficuit, if not embarrassing. for the repreaenta- . ..
tive of the Soviet Union here pubUcly to disagree 90. Mr. BLUSZTATN IPoland): 1 would Ue brieflv
with what Mr. Khrushchev said in ~osciw. ~cerlainlv to explain the vote of my delbtion on the hvo d&
do not wish the representative aqy harm and so 1do
not want to oress the point and to embarraas him mittee [A/4942/Add.3] nm before us. of the First Com-
further on it, kt itis a matter in Which 1think we oan
al1 draw our own conclusions: and for myself. men 0.-
with the greatest respect for the words of-the repre- 96. The PoIish delegation wiii also support draft
sentative here, 1prefer the WOrdS of Mr. Khrushchev resolution R, a dechration banning the use of nuclear
on this occasion as showing What the real intentions weapons. We beiieve tùat the adoption of this draft
of the Soviet Union are. resolution wdd be a VeIy iUWrtant contribution of
this Assembly tothe solution ofthe genenl pmblem
ofdisarmament.
97. The representative of the United iUngdom, who
spoke a while ago, tried to enlarge the scope of our
debate. It seems tohim that the pmblem, which the
authors of thia draft resolution are trying to solve,can best be solved by a treaty on general and com- Its work wiU not only duplicate. but also complicate.
plete disarmament. 1 am in full agreement with him the work of the Geneva conference.
3n this point, with only one reservation. I cannot see
.low this declaration can be opposed to Our efforts to 105. In the light of these reasons-changeof situation
conclude an agreement on general and complete dis- and the conviction that al1 peace-loving people every-
armament. It is certainly not Our intention to sub- where should welcome the resumed negotiations and
stitute this declaration for a determined effort to should give their wholehearted support to achieving
reach an agreement on general and complete dis- their success-my delegation will abstain in the vote
armament. We are looking fomard to the resumption on draft resolution II.
of negotiations on general and complete disarmament
106. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) (translated from
and we hope that these negotiations will lead to an Spanish): The Spanish delegation has no comment to
early conclusion of a comprehensive treaty. make on the first of the draft resolutions on which we
98. We are also in favour ofpartial measures leading are to vote-that concerning atomic explosions on the
towards generai and completedisarmament and we see African continent. We shall cast Our vote and pursue
many merits in the adoption by this Assembly of a our policy on this pmposal as we did in the First
declaration which would state in clear terms that the Committee. On the other hand. ourdelegationisamong
international community is against the use of nuclear those which are changlng their votes on the other
weapons. draft resolution-that concerning the use of nuclear
weapons. The hvo draft resolutions appear in part N
99. The representative of the United Kingdom has of the report of the First Committee (A/4942/Add.3].
quoted here a statement by Mr. Khwhchev. This 107. Strictly speaking. however. we are not changing
has been the subject of debate in the First Committee our vote; above all. we are not changing our ideas,
and has been, 1U, clearly and definitely refuted by which we expressed with the utmost firmness in the
the representative of the Soviet Union. 1wonder why First Conmittee. 1venture to read what 1said there:
we have here reverted to the custom of some repre-
sentatives taking the flwr to explain their wn vote "Furthermore, the proposal unlntentionally serves
and trying also to explain the votes of other repre- to bind band and foot. in the face of acts ofaggres-
sentatives. The representative of the United Kingdom sion by the country of constant atomic explosions.
has used rather harsh language. those countries which obey international law. Tode-
100. It seems to me that it is not hypocritical to prive those countries of the right to take adequate
favour disarmament and to vote for adeclaration such military counter-measures in the face oftheSoviet's
as this. But one can easily cal1 it hypocrisy when one untrammelled preprations would be an injustice.
sees somehody vote against the declaration and pre- These bonds would aotbe mer-stmng, for they would
tend. at the same time, to be in favour of general and lack tme moral force, which is what we are in a
complete disarmament. position to give; K 1remember my Swift correctly.
they would be rather Uke GuiIlver's bonds. which
O. The PRESIDENT (translated fmm French): Be- were of soft aiik, andwhichhe threw ofi with a single
fore calling on the succeedtng speakers and in order movement when he awoke.
to facilitate ourwork somewhat, Iintend, before the
vote, to cal1 on three speakers who have asked to "At dl events. we must be mindfulof the moral
explain their vote. 1 shall grant any other requests consideration we owe to the opinions ofthe United
for an explanation of vote, under Rule 90, after the Nations, and muat not be wer-hasty in givingex-
voting. 1 call on the first of these three persons. the pression to them .....Y
representatlve of Thailand. 108. Our view. then, was wholly unfavourab1e to the
102. Mr. ANUMAN RAJADHON (Thalland): In the draft resolution. When the vote was taken. we ex-
First Committee, the delegation ofThailandvoted in pressed that unfavourable view in the courteousform,
favour ofdraft resolution II contained in the Com- increasingly adopted hem, of abstention: first, out of
respect, friendship andconsideration for the aponsor-
mittee's report [A/4942/Add.3]. The reas0.n for its ing countries, of whose good intentions andalms we
action aras that it has full aympathy with the noble had no doubt. andsecondiy out of a kindof instinctive
desire and motives of the sponsors of this draft respect for the wording; for it is dlfficult to aay "no"
resolution. to noble and genemua words. even if inpractice they
103. The genuine desire of my country andmy people
to see the baniehment ofall nuclear weapons. as well draftsrwhich are couched Thisins aubllme language but
as to see al1 areas ofthe world denuclearized, is whose nitcorne may beless sublime andeven, perhaps,
well known. That is why my delegation ha8 mpported
al1 previoua resolutions on nuclear matters adopted prejudiciaï to the amooth progress of international
by this Assembly. order and extemai dedence. Moreover. we were then
unaware of the forhinate agreement to continue
104. However. now that thehvo great nuclear Powers, negotiations.reached between the countries represent-
the United States of American and the Swiet Union. ing the taro main contending schwls ofthought on this
have agreed to return to the conference table at matter of armamenta-an agreement which clarifies
Genew in order to nesume negotiations on a nuclear -y pmblema andcalls for clear and well-defined
test ban. my delegation is ofthevfewthat no duplicat- positions on ourpart also.
ing action shouid be taken by this Assembly which 109. The Spaniehdelegation. then renising to be
mlght prejudice the resumption of these negotiationa. tempted by genemua words and good intentions. was
A apecial conference for signing a convention on the
prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear but when the time came to vote. it took the courteousd;
weapons for war purposes, as envisaged bythis draft
resolution will, in the view of my delegation. not ?/ This sratcmenivns mint th1193rd medq ofthe Firsi Cam-
serve any useful purpose at the present'time, for it mine. rhe offlcial recdrvhich arc pbllrheonlin aummiry
will certainly clash with the conference at Geneva. form.course of abstaining. as the correct and civillzed 115. I submit that nothing inourdraft resolutionpre-
thing to do. At the present grave juncture, faced with vents anybody fmm doing anything-in fact, it wel-
new circumstances. and wishing to assume its full comes negotiations to prepare and define a treaty
responsibilities and avoid the snare of mere words, banning nuclear weapons. Nowhere does the draft
it announces that itwill vote against the draft resolu- resolution say that it ia against the conclusion of a
Uon in question. treaty baming nuclear weapons: it does not Say that.
In al1 humility. 1amboundto Saythat those who invoke
110. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Thedraftresolu- this fact are not giving a pmper interpretaticn tothe
tions contained in the report of the First Committee situation. The draft resolution in fact. in operative
[A/4942/Add.3] and upon which we are about to vote, paragrapb 2. envisages such a convention. but that is
are historic. We have given birth toboth of them- to come in due course.
that is to Say, we. the Ethiopiandelegation. Of course.
being the father of two historic children, if 1 may pu: 116. Supposlng, however, that there is agreement
it so. we have no preference whatsoever. Yet, since on nuclear weapons. Tbere is no conflict, because
one of them comes before the other-that ia. the draft operative paragraph 2 does not Say that this cannot
resolution containlng Ihe declararion. draft ;esolution be done; it simply requests the SecretaryGeneral
II-Uie first child should have alinle bit of meference. to consult the Governments of Member States on the
although not very much. possibility of convening a conference for drawing
111. The ldea of this drafî resolution was brought up a convention. There is no conflict whatsoever. If
Up by my delegation-indeed, by my Minister of State the countries now engaged in negotiations onanuclear
for Foreign Affairs-three years ago. We bmught it test ban succeed before the replies come fmm the
here during the fourteenth session, but we did not various Governments, well and good; we shall be the
the first toapplaud them. If they do not succeed, 1
submit a draft resolution. We consulted a number of submit that theyshould notprevent otherGovernments,
delegations and. as history now shows. the great including themaelves as a matter offact. fmm makuig
majority of the Members were completely in favour another attempt.
ofit. 117. Second, the draft resolution in substance is not
112. Duringthe fifteenth session we presented the againat the nuclear Powers concluding an agreement
draft resolutiong and, for reasons which are nowweiI on nuclûir weapons. Nowhere does it say that it is in
known, it was not voted upon. So it was that this year
again twelve African-Asian countries brought the fact against it. If they agree, by contml and other
draft resolution to the First Committee. Now the means, to conclude auch an agreement. again, our
Ethiopean Government and delegation have already declaration would beimplemented, just as is envisaged
explained in detail the reasons for submittiq the in its operative pragraph 2.
draft resolution. We have replied to al1 criticisma 118. 1 also heard an argument to the effect that
and1am most happy to note that the Committee adopted negotintions on dlssrmament are being advanced and
our resolution not simply by a majority vote. not that therefore thia drafî resolution 1s unnecessary.
slmply by a ho-thirds vote, but by avote appmaching This is reaiiy a repetition ofthe previous argument
unanimity. A glance at the voUng record shows that and 1need not deal with itat le@. If there is an ad-
the amendments which were submitted against our vance. weiI and good. K an agreement on disarma-
&ait resolution-amendments which would have ment is concluded. this would constitute a prt oithat
authorized something which the Charter itself never historic document. 1see no contradiction whatsoever
hew and would not dare, even K it did knw, to in that.
authorize-were rejected by 50 votes to 28, with
22 abstentions. Once that was done, the draft resolu- 119. 1 heard one more argument, which aeema to
tion was adopted by a mU-call vote of60 to 16 with deserve my attention. and that wae. tbat D~Clear
25 abstentions. weapons camot be done away witb byban- them.
Well. that is a dmlaration of the human rsce and it
113. 1 Wnk the conclusion is clear that the entire mut be respectad. 1 do not know why it must be
human race le for the draft resolution. As a matter concluded: "Do not do thia because 1 am not going
oi fact, even those who voted againat it accepted it- to fouow it or othera are not going to follow it". If
they could not Say they wanted to useatomic weapons. we take that üne ofaction then we shall aot do any-
They simply said that they wanted toachieve the same W. 1fI am told: "Do not do thb because 1 am going
end by other menus. ao that. to my delegation. the to do something against it". thm îhat iîne of action,
occasion is very historic. Theworld hasnow accepted 1 submit. can pievent action everywhere, not only
that which we bmught to ita attention. thatwhich grew hem. but everywhere.
out of our experience. The world now respects our 120. 1am therefore compeiled tabegthose delegations
experience in this maner and 1s ready to vote on this that have spoken a- the draft resolution to we*
draft resolution, and thereby take a position on it. the consequences oftheir position and at least.iithey
cnnnot vate for 11.to abat*.
114. 1 have heard a nurnber of delegations say that
there are some developments which must be bmught 121. 7he PRESIDENT Vanslated from French): We
to the attention ofthe ~ssembi~. What are these de- shall naw vote on the draft resolutions.
velopments? One 1s. that the hvo great Powera have
agreed to further negotiations regarding a nuclear
test ban treaty. and so it is argued thnt this &afî
resolution now ties ourhands. It is said that for this
reason it should be defeated.
Y Orriciai Recorofrhe Cemril As9embly. FllientSession.
-. agcnd* iims67.Sb.69and73. documcirirAjC.lIL.2SI and 122. The President (translated fmm French): We
shall now vote on drait resolution IIcontained in the Sub-paragraph (aJ vas adopted by 56 votes to 19,
report (A/4942/Add.3] of the First Committee. A with 26 abstentions
vote in parts has been requested. as well as a roll-
Cali vote on the operative paragraphs and on the drait Subparagraph (bJwas adopted by 59 votes to 17,
witb 19 abstentions.
resolution as a whole. Inaccordancewith this request, Su¶grap.h.(c) was adopted by 63 votes to 12.
we shall first vote on the preamble, paragraph by with 24 abstentions.
parngraph.
The first paragraph of the preamble was adopted by Sut-paragraph (üJ was adopted by 52 votes to 20.
62 votes to none. with28 abstentions. with 23 abstentions.
124. The PRESLDENT (translate0 iiv,iiFrench): 1
The second paragraph of thepreamble was adopted
by 63 votes to none. with29 abstentions. shall now put the whale of operative paragraph 1 to
The third paragraph of the preamble was adopted ' the vote.
by 63 votes to1. with 31abstentions. A vote was taken by mll-call.
The fourth paragraph of the preamble was adopted Cuinea, Iiaving &en drawn by lot by the President.
by 62 votes to none. with28 abstentions. was called upon to vote first.
The fiftb paragraph of the preamble was adopted Znfavour: Guinea, Hungary, India. Indonesia, Iraq,
hy 61 votes to 6. with25 abstentions. Ivory Coast, Japan. Jordan. Lebanon, Liberia, Llbya,
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia,
123. The PRESIDENT (translated fmm French): We Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Poland. Romania,
shall now vote on the operative part of draft resolu- Saudi Arabia. Senegal, Sierra Leone. Somalia, Sudan.
tionII. A vote inparts has been requested for each Syria, Togo. Tunisia, Wainian Soviet Socialist Re-
of the sub-paragraphs of operative paragraph 1; a public. Union of Sodet Socialist Republfcs. United
roll-cal1 vote has been requested on sub-paragraph Arab Repuhlic, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavla.
(a) of paragraph 1, on paragraph 1 as a whole. on Afghanistan, AM, Bulgaria. Burma, Byelorussian
paragraph 2 and on the draft resolution as a whole. Soviet Socialist Republic. Cambodia, Cameroun. Cen-
The vote was taken by mil-c@I on subparagraph tral African Republic, Ceylon, Chad. Congo (Brazza-
(a) of operative paragraph 1. ville). Congo (Leopoldviiie). Cuba, Cypm, Czecho-
Turkey, baving been drawn by lotby the President. slovakia. Dahomey, Ethiopia. Federation of Malaya.
was called upon tovote firs t. Gabon, Ghana.
Against: Ireland. Italy, Luxembourg. Netherlands.
in favour: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republlc, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Portugal, South Africa,
Union of Soviet Sociaiist Republics, United Arab Re- Spain. Turkey, Unlted Klngdom of Great Britain and
public, Upper Volta, Yemen. Yunoslavia. Afnhanistan. Northern Ireland. United States ofAmerica, Australla,
Àlbania, ~ul~aria, ~urma. oruss us si &oviet soc- Beigium. Canada, China. France, Greece, Guatemak.
ialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun.CentralAfrican
Republic; Ceylon. Chad. congo (~razzaville), Congo Abstaining: Halti, Honduras. Iceland. Iran, Israel.
(Leopoldvillei. Cuba. Cyprus. Cz6shoslovakia, Da- Norway. Paldstan, Panama. Paraguay, Penq Philip-
homey, Ethiopia. Federation of Malaya, Gabon.chana. pines, Sweden, Thailand. Uruguay, Venezuela, Argen-
Guinea. Hungary, India. Indonesia, ~raq, Ivory Coast, tins,Austria, Bolivla, Brazfl, Cbile, Colombia. Costa
Japan. Jordan. Lebanon. Liberia. Libya, ~ad'agascar, Rica. Denmark. Eouador. El Salwdor. Finland.
Mali, Mauritania. Mexico, Mangolia, ~orocco, Nepal, Operative psragraph 1 as a wbole was adopted by
Niger. Nigeria, Poland. Romania. Saudi Arabia. 56 votes to19,witb 26 ehstentions.
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Soouilia, Sudan. Syria, Togo,
Tunisia. 125. The PRESIDENT (tmslated fmm French): We
Against: Turkey, United Klngdom of Great Britain shall nowvote onoperative paragraph 2ofdraft resolu-
and Northern Ireland. United States of America. tion U set fourth in the report [A/4942/Add.3] of the
First Committee.
Australia. Belgium, Canada, China, France, Greece.
Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg. Netherlands, A vote was taken by mll-cdl.
New Zealand. Nicaragua. Porhigsl. South Africa, The United Kingdom. baving &en drawn bylot by
Spain. ihe President, was called upon to vote first.
Abstaining: Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentins, Aus-
tria. Bolhia, Brazil, Chile, Colombla, Costa Rica, In favour: Upper Volta, Yemen. Yugoslavis. Af-
Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Halti, Hon- ghanistan. Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian
duras, Iceland, Iran, Israel. Nomay, Pakistan, Pana-
pia. Paraguay, Pem. Philippines. Sweden, Thailand. Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia. Cameroun. Cen- rive of the Soviet Union qs complaining about this
tral African Republlc, Ceylon. Chad. Congo (Brazza- morning.
ville). Congo (Leopoldvilie), Cuba. Cyprus. Czecho- 129. 1 used Soviet sources and nothing else to de-
slovakia. Dahomey, Ethiopia. Gabon, Ghana, Guinea. scribe the Soviet position. The representative d the
Hungary, India, Indonesia. Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan. United Kingdom bas already quoted Mr. Khrushchev's
Lebanon, Liberia, Libya. Madagascar, Mali, Mauri- statement in which he said that
tania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nlger, Nigeria,
Pobd. Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone. " ...it would be untimely at present to say that
Somalia, Sudan, Syria. Togo, TunIsia, UkraMan Ln the event of wu atomic weapons would not be
Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist empioyed. Anyone who made such a statement could
Republics. United Arab Republic. turn out to be untruthful even though. when making
Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and such a pledge. he would he sincere and not be
Northern Ireland. United States ofAmerica, Australla, lying ... if either side should In such a war feel it
Belgium, Canada, China. Costa Rica, France.Greece, was losing, would it notuse nuclear weapons to avoid
Guatemala, Italy. Luxembourg. Netherlands, New defeat?Y Itwouldundouhtedly use its nuclearbombs."
Zealand, Nicaragua. Portugal. South Africa. Spain. 130. Nevertheless. the Soviet Union bas suppoaed a
Turkey. statement that theuse of nuclear wapons, evenin self-
defence, was a violation of the Charter. In the First
Abstaining: Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina. us- Committee. in the meeting of 13Novemher 1961. the
tria, Bolivia, Brazil. Chile, Colombia. Denmark, representative d the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin.
Ecuador. El Salvador, Federation of Malaya. Finland. said:
Haiti. Honduras. Iceland, Iran. Ireland, Israel. Japan, .It is quite clear to us-and 1think lt 1sjust as
Mexico, Norway, Pakistan. Panama, Paraguay. Pem. clear to the representative of Italy-because the
Philippines, Sweden. Thailand. draft resolution of the eleven African couutries
Operative paragaph 2 was adopted by 53 mites to atates that the use ofnuclear and thermonuclear
19, with 29 abstentions. weapons is a dlrect violation ofthe Charter of the
United Nations."u
126. The PRESIDENT (translated fmm French): We
shall now vote on draft resolution U as a whoie. 131. 1 stated that the Soviet Union enthusiastically
A mite was taüen by roll-call. aupported this draft resolution. The next day, in the
meeting of 14Nwember. Mr. Tsarapkin of the Soviet
Yemen. hahaPingken dram by lotby the President, Union sald:
was called upon tovote first. .Yesterday, in reply toOUI criticism oftheItalian
In famiur: Yemen. Yugoslavia. Afgùanistan. Al- amendments [A/C.l/U95]. the representative of
bania, Bulgaria. Burma, Byelorussian SovietSociaiist Italy.being unable to refute that criticism. statedthat
Republic. Camboila. Camemun, Centrai Airican Re- the Soviet Union waeureuared todeal acrushing nu-
public, Ceylon. Chad. Congo (Brazzaville). Congo clear hlw*-1 repeat~cr;ehlrignuclear blow-"6 any
(Leopold~le). Cuba. Cyprus, Czechoslovakfa. Da- aggressor. Every'body wili understand thatthat wiU
homey, Ethiopia, Gabon. Ghana, Guinea, Eungaiy, happen. It Laexactly what will happen iiwar beglns.
India. Indonesis, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan. War ie war. and it has ite ownlogical sequence of
Lebanon. Liberia. Libya, Madagascar. Mali. Mauri- events. inour day any war can immediately become
tanla. Mexico. Mongoiia. Momcco. Nepai. Niger, a nuclear war. and since Itabie a memher of NATO,
Nigeria. Poland, RomanIa, Saudi Arabia, Senegai. and has allwedthe United States to establish miUtary
Sierra Leone. Somalia, Sudan, Syria. Togo. %sia. bases on its territory. It isclear that. In,view of
UkMan Soviet Socialist Republic. Union afSoviet its undertakings under the NATO agreements, it
Socialist Republic. United Arab Repubiic, Upper Volta. will, whether it wiehes or not. he drawn into any
such war in the most active manner- and. cd course.
Against: AustIalia, Belgium. Canada, Chlna. Costa with aii due consequences.
Rica. France, Greece. Guatemala. hiand. Italy.
Luxembourg. Netherlands. New Zeaiand, Nicaragua. *The ltalian representative has no doubta con-
Portugal, South Africa. Spain. Turkey, United Kingdom cerning the objective af these NATO hases in hia
of Great Britain and Northem ireland. United States country. We have no doubîs on that score either.
ofAmerica. That is why it is withinthe logic ofevents that. la
AbMing: Argentina. Austria. Bolivia, Brazil, the event ofwar, those hases will he immediately
Chile, Colomhia. Denmark. Ecuador, El Salvador, dealt a cnsbing and devastating blwm-and here is
Federation ofMalaya. FW, Haiti. Honduras, Ice- Soviet irony-"but the reaponsihillty for these con-
land, Iran, Iarael, Nomay, Palristao, Panama, Para- sequences wlU. af course. rest with those who
guay, Pen, Phlllppines, Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay. created NATO, who have dravm Italy into NATO and
Venezuela. who have estabushed military bases on ItaUan soi1
and bave thus made that country ninerable to such
Draft resolution IIas a wbole was adopted by 55 hlws."Y
mtes to20, with 26 abstentions. 132. 1 suhmit that what 1 said in entirely justifled by
127. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): what MI. Wnishchev bas said and what the repre-
There are SUU two speakers on my Ust who wish to
exercise their right oi teply. one who wishes to ex-
plain hievote after the-te.I caü uponthe represen-
tative ofthe United States of America, who desires
toexercise Ms right of reply.
128. Mr. DEAN (United States of America): lt was
not quite clear to our delegation what the representa- sentative of the Soviet Union has said in this hall. tO draw attention tnthe vitnlly important necessity of
namely. that aithough they have voted for a resolution ensuring a healthy and favourable atmosphere for the
which would outlaw nuclear weapons even in theexer- forthcoming disarmament negotiations. We consider
cise of self-defence. nevertheless, the Soviet Union this to he a most important task and we appeal to al1
does not intend to iive up to that resolution. delegations, including the United States delegation,
tohelp in creating such an atmosphere.
133. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I
cal1 upon the representative of the Union of Soviet 138. The PRESIDENT (translated fmm French): 1
Sociaiist Repubiics. who wishes to exercise bis right caii upon the representative of the Upper Volta. for
of reply. an explanation of vote.
134. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Sociaiist 139. Mr. GUIRMA (Upper Volta) (translated fmm
Republics) (translated from Russian): At this hour 1 French): It may seem strange and contradictory that
have no intention of detaining the General Assembly certain African countries shouid have abstained in the
for long. and want to make only two short remarks. vote on the resolution [1652 (XVI)] which asks for the
The fondness which the United Kingdom and United denuclearization of Africa, and yet have voted in
States delegations have iately shown for quoting favour of the resolution [1653 (XVI)] which declares
from Soviet sources should, in our view. be hacked up that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is
ais0 by correctness of quotation. since what is the contrary to the spirit. letter and aima of the United
point of quoting, if the quotationis incorrect7 Nations and, as such, a direct violationofthe Charter
of the United Nations.
135. As regards the declarations by the Head of the
Soviet Govemment which were quoted by the repre- 140. Nevertheless. our position ia clear. 1 shouid
sentatives of Western delegations speaking from this iiketo repeat briefiy here the explanations we have
rostrum, 1 cannot do other than Say that they were already given in the First Cornmittee. During the
quoted incorrectiy. 1 rend out today a clear and ab- Cornmittee's disoussion on denuclearization and vari-
solutely definite statement by the Head of the Soviet ous nuclear pmblems. we found ourselves witnessing
Government about that Government's readiness to sign what was virtually a duel between the United States of
an undertaking by States to renounce the use of nu- American and the Soviet Union. This brought it home
clear weapons the very same day that other States to us that disarmament was an extremely pressing
also do so. pmi>lem: that the problems bad tobe placed in order
136. As regards the declarations made by Mr. N. S. of importance andurgency; that thedisarmament pmb-
Khrushchev in reply to questions put by the United lem was. into the bargain Indivisible;and that it was
necessaxy to think in terms ofgeneral disarmament
States fournalist, Mr. Suizberger, the Soviet dele- rather tbandisarmament by continents. Even Uacon-
gation is obliged. for the third Ume, to draw the at- tinent was declared a denuclearized zone. it wouid
tention of the delegations of Western Powers m the not, in the event of nuclearwar. necessarlly be spared
fact that the United Statesobserver, Mr. Suizberger. by the atomic bomba, much les8 by the radio-actlve
asked: "Wouid the Soviet Union agree to declare that faii-t that the nuclear explosions might pmduce.
it wouid never be the first toemploy nuclear weapons This pmmpted us to feel that we shouid strive for
in the event of war?" Mr. Suizberger went on to say: a more general and more comprehensive form of dis-
"It seems to me that, U just onecountry were to make armament thmughout the world. because it would be
such a statement. then perhaps the other nuclear
Powers also wouid make similar statementan.g And idle to think that Africa's destiny couidbe kept apart
N. S. Khrushchev, the Head of the Soviet Government. fmm that of the rest aithe world.
replied: "We shall never he the tiret to start a war 141. We also felt that thismove sbouidcomefmm the
various African Heads of State. Faced with the con-
against any country. That is our position: we shall troversy amused by the wrious pmblema of disarma-
never be the first to start a waragainst any countryg. ment and denuclearizaUon, tbe African Heads of State
huther. in reply to Mr. Suizberger's question about
the unilateral assumption by the Soviet Union ofa com- muat reach a thomugh and unanimous agreement on
mitment not to employ nuclear weapons, Mr. Khrush- the steps to be taken to keep Airica safe. It ia not
chev explained why such a cornmitment couid not be our iunction. here in the United Nationa, take up
accepted unilateraiiy.And we. today. continue tohope positions and ask our Heads of State tosanction them;
that, after the General Assembly has. by an over- we are bere rather in order tosecure international
wbelmlng majority of votes. adopted the resolution in sanction for the decisiona taken by the supreme
favour of concluding a muitilateral convention pm- authorities of OUI States. That is wby we abatainsi
hibiting the use of nuclear weapons, it will pmve on the resolution concerning the denuclearization of
possible to conclude such a convention and that the Airica, yet votad in iavour ofthe resolution submined
Governments of the United States and theUnitedKlng- by Ethiopia and ita friends.
dom wiii not oppose this. On ita part.the Soviet Union 142. 1 say this in order ta dispel any conhision re-
is prepared toconclude such a convention. garding our intentions andta make it clear that there
137. Secondly, with reference to Mr. Dean's last has never been any quesuon Of Ourwishing toproteet
speech. the Soviet delegation wouid llke once again anyone, or any intention in connexion with the initiai
testing or stnrago of atomic weapons in Africa.
lEe meeting me at1.45 p.a 33/71. Renew of the implementation of the
recommendations and decisions adopted
by the General Assembly at itn tenth
speeial session
B
NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENTION
OF NUCLEAR WAR
The General Assembly,
Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind
and to the life-sustaining Eystem posed by nuclear
weapons and by their use inherent in concepts of
deterrence,
the preventionof nuclear war and forthetrengthening
of international peaceand security,
Recallingthe statementcontainedin the Fmai Docu-
ment.of the Tenth SpecialSessionof the GeneraI As-
sembly that al1 States should activcly participate in
efforts to bring about conditions in international rela-
tions among Statesin whicha codeof peacefulwnduct
of nationsin international &airs could be agreedand
which would preclude the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapon~,'~
1. Declares that:
(a) The use of nuclcar weapons will be a nola-
tion of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime
against humanity;
(b) The use of nuclear weapons should therefore
be prohibited, pendingnudear disarmament;
2. Requests ail States, particularly nuclear-weapon
States, to submit to the SeentaryGeneral, beforc the
thirty-founh session of the General Assembly, pro-
posais concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons,
avoidance of nuclear war and rclated maners, in
order that the question ofan international convention
or some other agreement on the subject may be dis-
cussed at that session.
84th plenary meeting
14 December 1978
'8Rcsolution SIO/Z para58. ( ' .
~flITED NATIONS - '. ,,... Distr.
LIMITE3
A/C.1/33/L.2
20 October 1978
ORIGIPIAL: ENGLISH
/
ajrty-thirc? session
.z-- CO!.CIITTEE
,:genia item 125
REVIEi OF THE IPJ~PLEIENTATION OF THE RECOMI.BNDATIONS
AND DECISIONS ADOFTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT
ITS TEHTHSPECIAL SESSION
Aigeria. Ar~entina, Cyprus, Ethiovia, India, Indonesia.
blalaysia, Nigeria and Yugoslavia: draft resolution
Non-use of nuclear weauons and prevention of nuclear var
The Ceneral Assenbly,
Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and te the life-sustaining
sfsten posed by nuclear weapons and by their use inherent in concepts of
ieterrence,
Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear
var and for the strengthening of international peace and security,
Recallinq the Declaration of the Ceneral Assembly contained in the Final
hcment adopted at its tenth special session that "al1 States should actively
;orticipate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among
Ztates in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs
%uld be agreed and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear
.~eapons", i/
1. Declares that:
(a) The use of nuclear weapons will be a violation of the Charter of the
Ynited Nations and a crime against humanity;
(b) The use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending
:.ï:iear disarzeaent ;
2. Requests al1States. particularly nuclear-weapon States, to submit to
the Ceneral Assezbly at its thirty-fourth session propcsals concerning the
non-use of nucleu veapons. avoidance of nuclear var and related matters in Order
that the question of an international convention or some other agreement on the
subJect may be discussed at the thirty-fourth session. United Natiotu
GENERAL FIRSTCOMMITTEE
18thmeeting
ASSEMBLY heldon
Friday,27 October1978
THIRTY-THIRDSESSION at 10.30a.m.
O&k1 Records' New York
VERBATIMRECORD OF THE 18THMEETING
Chaiman: Mr. PASTINEN (Finland)
CONTENTS
AGENDA ITE1 M25: RFVIEWOF THE IMPLEMENTATIO ONF THE RECOMMMDATIONS ANDDECISIONS
ADOPTEDBY THE GENERALASSEMBLYAT ITSTENTHSPECIALSESSION: REPORTOF THE
SECRETARY-GENERA (continued)
Thiecorisubkc10conection. C~mctionrbcincurporinacopal DistrGENERAL
the rccuddhouidbcunt wrnmonwek ofth&te ofpvbllcownthe Chicl. A/C.1/33/W.18
0ffi;iri RecordsEditingSe*-su..rwm 30 October1978
Camctionr vill besharialterthe endof the axpuiic faSCoil
erchCornmittee. The CIIP.PE141T: In the few minutes that are left to us, 1 cal1 on
... reprec~ntative of India fomally to introduce to the Comittee the draft
.-.olution~ in document A/C.1/33/L.Z and P./C. 1/33/L. 3.
:Ir. GIL4REm4Ji (India): Permit me to introduce the tvo draft
resoliitions which have been before this Committee for the past week and, in
aaaûner of s~eaking, before the dele~ations assembled here for the past
four to five months. The draft resolutions pertain to important questions
rhich were not adequately reflected in the Final Document adoited at the
special session devoted to disarmament.
Representatives vil1 recall that India did not press its draft resolutions
to a vote during the speciai session in the interests of achieving a consensus,
but we reserved the right to introduce those draft resolutions, suitably
mended, during this session.
On behalf of the delegations of Aigeria, Angola, .Argentka, Shutan,
Cyprus, Emt , Ethiopia, Cuinea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Figeria,
hania, the S-nian Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire and my ovn, 1 have the
privilege to introduce the draf't resolution contained in document A/C.1/33/L.2
on the non-use of nuclear veapons and the prevention of nuclear var.
The General Assembly at its special session unambipusly and unanimously
. .
reiterated the fact that nuclear weapons ysed the greatest danger to mankind
and to the survival of civilization. T!ie 'ips.l )cc-xent of the special session also reccmized that the
zcz+ effectix-e guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use
of ?.uclear 'Iequns is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of
nuclezr veapons. In fact the General Assembly had, at its ver:.? first s?ss&,
helà 32 j-ears ago, callecl for the adoption of measures preventing the use
of atomic energy for military purFoses and for the elimination of nuclear
i.?eapor.s. Since there is no indication whatsoever of an early halt to the
nuclear aris race, let alone the commencement of a process of nuclear
disarm~ent leading to the final elimination of nuclear weapons, there is no
reason rrhy mankind should not be given credible and binding assurance againct
the use of nuclear weapons.
Both auring the special session and in the ceneral debat? here in the
First Cormittee arguments have been put forward by some nuclear weapons States,
3.S :.~€ll as ?r scre of their allies, to the effect that they were obliged to
retain nuclear arsenais in the interests of their security. Eut surely these
Powers have an equal obligation not to endanger the rest of mankind by
the use or theet of nuclear weapons.
This draft resolution reiterates the provisions of the declaration
contained in General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) of November 1961. It
also reiterates the position of the non-aligned countries adopted since the
first non-aligned Siiamit meeting held in Belgrade in 1961. Most recently
the Belgrade Declaration of the Foreign Hinisters of non-dignod
countries expressed regret that the negative attitude of some nuclear-weapon
States had prevented the special session from adopting measures necessarr
to prohibit the use ofnuclear weapons and to have a ~oratorim cn their
testing.
1 should like to point out that in this draft resolution the sponsors
. are net asking for an ianediate ~oncluslûn of a convention on non-use of
nuclecr veapons. We are merely calling upon al1 States, particularly the
nuclear veapon Stateq to submit proposais on the arrangements for the conclusion
of 2.Ccn-rention or any other agreement on the non-use cf nuclear weapons
so that the subject could be studied at the thirty-fourth session of the
Generd Assembly. surelY, no delegation should find any difficulty in supporting such a
and non-controversial resolution.
ji:pi* I
1 have just been asked to announce that the United Republic of Cameroon
has also beccme a CO-srorsor of àraft resolution ~/~.1/33/L.2. The respective
Co-sponsors of both these àrafi resolutions which 1 have just formaily
introduced sincerely hope that both will receive the general appr0v.d of cl1
tembers and vil1 be adopted by consensus.united Nationr 29
FIRSTCO-
cENERAL
19th meeting
ASSEMBLY held on
THIRTY-THIRD SESSION Pridsy, 27 October 1978
at 3 p.m.
0p.d Razor& * New York
VERBATIM RECORDOF THE 19TH MEZTIHC
Chairman: Mr.PASTINm (Finland)
AGENDAITR4 125: REVIEW OF THEIMPLPIEHTATIO OHF THERECOMMEBDATIOB A ND DECISIOHS
ADOPTED BY THE GENERALASSEMBLY AT ITSTZHTH SPECIALSESSIOB:
SECRETARY-GEWER Acontinued) REWRT OP THE
Ethiopia is firmly committed to strenqthenin,? international peace and security,
building confidence among States, ccnsolidating détente and prcmoting respect
for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. AS the
victin of successive vars of aggression, the people and Govenunent of
Ethiopia are alr~ays ready to join in al1 efforts aMed at avoiding the horrors
of war. The nuclear Pcvers and non-nuclear-wea~on States must realize that time
is of the essence, because war in the present-day world is a war of total
destruction. For these reasons Ethiopia has been participating actively in
efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the principle of the non-use of force,
and particularly the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. This als0
explains vhy we have joined in sponsoring the draft resolution, initiated by
India, on non-use of nuclerr wea-ons and the oreventicn of nuclear war
(A/C.1/33/L.2).
Ethiopia's ultimate objective is general and complete disannament under
effective international control on the basis of equal security for fi. This
process can begin only after the cessation of the arms race in the nuclear
field. Since there is no indication that this will be attained in the near
future, Ethiopia supports al1 efforts that contribute towards thc achievement of
that objective... United Nations
FIRSTCOMMITPEE
GENERAL 51stmeeting
ASSEMBLY held on
Monday,27November1978
THIRTY-THIRD SESSION at 10.30a.m.
O8;iaiRecords NewYork
VEREATIiRECORDOF THE51ST MEETING
Chaiman: Mr.PASTINEN F in land)
AGENDAITEM125: REYIEWOF THE IMPLPlENTATIO OF THERECOMM&I7ûATI AONDDECISIONS
ADOPPEDBYTüE CENERACASSEMBLY AT il'TENTHSPECIALSESSIOif:REPORTOF THE
SECRETARY-GENER Acontinue)d P..e CCBAI- As no oti!er deleg~tion has asked to sp&,
the Cornmitter: hzs thus conclwJod its considt.rntion of tli? *rift rc.solution
in document A/C.1/33/L.l. It will now consider the draft resolution in
document A/C.1/33/1.2, entitled "~eview of the implementation of the eeconmendations
ar.3 àecisions adopted ùy the General Asseibly at its tenth special session". The
draft concerns the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war.
It has 36 sponsors, end 17~s introduced by the representative of India at
the eiehteenth meeting of the First Comnittee, on 27 October 1978. The sponsors
have expressefi the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by cons.msus. ---. GHARW (India): !Then the First Cornittee adjourned on Friday
evening, Kr. Chairman, you were good enough to annouilce that the sponsors of
&aft resolutions ~/C.1/33/L.2 and L.3 would be me et in^ this morning at 9.30.
~~f~~tunately today's Journal i.0ntfl.ini.d ;in miforturiate i:rror It liinounccd that
the sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/33/L.l anC L.2 were to r,iêet this morninz
for informal consultations. As a result of this mistalie in the Jo-urnal n+ny of
the sponsors did not etterid the morning consultations. 1 would tlierefore
ffiii, M. Ch~irnnn at least as far as draft resolution A/C.1/33/1.3 is
concerned, if you could possibly give us snrle tsme for infom?.l consultations.
As far as drnft resolution A/C.1/33/L.2 is concerned, perhaps we codd
dispense with the need for consultations among the sponsors.
1 should like to reac out a smaU drnfting chaii~e' to operative paragraph
? of the draft. That paragraph should be reworded to read as follows:
"Requests al1 States, particularly niiele;i~.weapon Stztes, to submit
to the Secretary-Generai, before the thirty-fourth session of the General
..
P.sai.mSl.y, proposais concerning the non-use of nuclear wecpons ..."
the rest of that parapaph remeining unchanged.
That is a very small change, and it does not at al1 affcct the substance
of the draft resolution.
The CHAIRÿA?: 1 thank the representative of Indie for his
clarification. If 1 understood him correctly, the snonsors of draft reaolution
A/C.1/33/~.2 have nothing qainst the Committee proce3Ckg ta consider thrt
&ft resolution 8s nmended by thr- renresatative of SnQia. Fnr tte
of claîity 1 shall now read out his anendment. Tbo parzgraph r;hould.read:
"Requests ail States, perticulnrly nuclear-ïe5~0n States, to submit
to the Secretary-General, before the thirty-fotrrth session of the General
assekibly, proposals .. .''
and so on.
That is the only change.
1 Vould ask the representative of India whether =kt is correct.
W. GHARE~411(India): Yes, Mr. Chai-, it is csrrect.
i Would take this oyportunity to ctate that if the tiraft resoliitic? is not t0
be ado~tcd by cons,.risus my dele~ation would a~preciete 8 recsrded vote. The CIiAIPiW?: 1 shall now cal1 upon those representatives wishing ta
srea:: in exclanation of vote before the vote.
. ISSRA-LYKT (Union of Soviet Socidist ~epublics) (interpretatio~ frai
Russian) : Tne Soviet Union cogci<?rc that the question of the prohibition of th,
use of ni!c\ear veaoons sust be considerea and decicied upon in c0nnc::ion vith the
n~n-üse of force in interna-tional relations and the stren,-th en in^ of inteniatiocal
leeal guarantee of the sec-kity of States. Such aa ap~roach is in total accord
with the decisions of the Wited Nations, and in picrticular trith GsnCal Jsserkl7
resoiution 2936 iX)NII) on t~oon-üseof force in international relations and
pennsnen+. prohibition of the usa of nuclear wcapo~s whick 57:~s.sBo~tcd.
as rrill De recdled, at zhe erenty ~~er.f!l session of thc &naal Asseably. mat principie was reflectea as vell in a nurber of .ravisions of the Final
iocment of the special session devoted to disarmsrient. On the basis af those
Drovision~ and decisions, the Soviet Lhion, as is known, intrcduced for consideration
in the United llations R draft universd treaty on the ncn-use of force
international relations, article 1 of vtiich provides that sarties to the
treaty sh&L refrain from the use of armeci force invo1vi.q the use of any
types of weapons, including nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
me conclusion of such a treaty in accordance with United nations decisions
muid, in our opinion, be a major step towards the solution of the question of
:he prohibition of the use of nucleer weapons.
ünfortunatelp, in the draft resolution bef ore us, dociment A/C.l/33/L. 2,
the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is artificially
divorced fiam the question of the adoption of internationaï political and
legal measures to strengthen security for all States and fram the question of
the non-use of force by States in international relations.
In view of this, the Soviet delegation wiïi astain in the vote on this
. .
draft resolution.
Mr. FISHER (~nited States of America) : The llnited States would
like to explain the vote that it vil1 cast epainst the draftresolution
indccmeat A/C.1/33/L.2. This vote is based, in 1-e part,on
oprative paragraph 1 of this draft resolution .=hich ~urnorts to outlair the use
ofnüclear weapons, under any circumstances, as a violation Of the Charter.
lhe United States cannot find the basis for this draft resolution in the
amer. 5e Clarter provides that ail States nust not use 02' threaten to
ue force in their reïations vith other States except ia self defence or in
Other situations pennitted under the Charter. The ünited Rations Charter &es
ad outlaw nucleer means for deterrence or defence against an attack ae;&st
United States or its allies.
The bited States has peviouçly referred tothe facts of nucleer deterrence.
are not pleasant fads but we cannot overlooii the Zact that in many areas
Of the world nuclear weapons are pprt of tte securit:. arranqements tkat have
ke~t the peace. mis fact exists, as does its frightening corollarY the
'mer of nuclesr 7,eanons and aeapon systems deplove6 on hth sices. The:?
'sot be ra:, to disaupear by the passage of r resolution by the United mations. ILqainst : Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany ,
Federal Republic of, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Noway, Portugal, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America
.4bstainin&: Austria, Bulgaria, Byelomssian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Czechoslovakia, Finland, Germen Democratic Republic,
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan,
Mongolia, Poland, Spain, Sweden , Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.2 was adouted by 8k votes to 16, with
18 abstentions.
The CRAIRMAN: 1 shall now call on those representatives who wish
to explain their vote after the vote.
Mr. HSü (China) (interpretation from Chinese) : The Chinese delegation
is of the view that the desire of many countries for the non-use of nuclear
weapons is just. China has consistently stood for the complete prohibition
and thorough destniction of nuclear weapons and has repeatedly declared that
China wiU at no the and under no circumstances use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear States. It is kno~ to all that the most effective way to eliminate
the danger of a nuclear var is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction
of nuclear weapons. Before this objective is realized, the two super-Powers
possessing the largest nuclear arsenal3 should be the first to undertake
unccnditionaily that nt no time and under no circumstances vil1 they use nuclear
veapons against non-nuclear States or nuclear-free zones, and should proceed
forthwith to reduce substantially their nuclear weapons.
As no reference is made in &ait resolution A/C.1/33/L.2 to this
fundamental question, the Chinese delegation did not participate in the vote
on this &aft resolution and requests that this statement of the Chinese
delegation be reflected in the records. ilr. OC120 (Yapn): LThequestion of non-use of nuclear weapons
- ----
ha~ been ùiscusseci a nmber of %i>:~esin Unite6 nlations fo- : and TIY
coultrj hm consistently talcen tlie positioii that a comitmexit to the non-use
of i~uclear ireapons rrill never ùe ~enuinekr effective imless it is backed up
by the ~~l~acnt2+ion of coficrete aeasures af nuclear disamament and
effective iiiternationd control.
Furtlisnore, it is rie11 uncierstood by al1 "ie~bers present :lere
that the C1.arter of the Chiteci !rations :las a le~ally binclinq provision in
Article 2, uaragr-h 11, that
1 ebers shall refrain in tiieir international relations fmn
:;!le -tlires.tor use of force ~2inst the territorial integrity or ooliticel
indepeildence of any State, orin nny otùer muiner inconsistent with the
II
gurposes of the hited Zations.
me Governnent of Jepan therefore believes that the question of non-use
of nuclear 7reapOiïS s:iould be considered b'j the United :?utions only after
procress lias beeil xa2.e on concrete uieasiires of disarmament and an!!! control,
such as SALTII and III-, a comnre:lensive test-ban, prohibition of chernical
veapons, a cut-off of fissiona5le naterials, and so forth.
For this reason, ny delecation abstnined fron votinl on draft
resolution A/C.1/33/L.2.
--r Dere!: ASEX (United ItinzGm) : The viem of Covement ori the
issues raised in this drzft resoluticn are too rrell hown for me to need to make
Fore thzn the Sriefest explanation of vr:~y qy d~legation hes voted a~ainst it.
- ..
VJeof course Wree on the supreme iqortance of ensurinr: tnat nucleer - 1
?:eapoz!s cever need to be used, but a ban on use is not a prectical measuire
for !Jestem countries in an aree. rrhere nuclear veapons e-est in larg= nuabers
and vrhere tlicre is a 'neevy conventional imbalance, so thet security for the
present rests & nuclear deterrcnce. Deterrence of aggression is essentid
to internationel security until nuclect disamment has been achieved.
hy non-use pleùge vould weaken the credibility of ùeterrence and increise
the chances of a~~ression. -~. RAJE::OZCI (Finland): The Finnish dele,-;ation abstained in the vote
th: draft resolution in document ~/~.1/33/~.2. Ye Cid because of
qerative paragra'h 1 (a), and more speciîically becîuse of the mention that
The se of nuclear weapons will be a violatiori of the Charter". !!e thinL
:bat this iuention does not rccur2t.ely reflect reality.
Havins said that, ï shouid like to add that my delegation arodd have Seen
ja??y to vote in favour of it could the aforementioned inconsistency rrith the
in our viev,
charter have been avoided. The main puqose of the draft resolution is,
certainly quite positive enù thus meets the concerns of the Finnish C-ovement
as far as the dancer of nuclear war is concerned.
P.*. LIDGARD(Swecien): It is in the interest of the sukval of -li:;ir>d
--
that nuc1e.u r.reapons not be used. Tliere is also a certain loeical link betrreen
non-use and non-proliferation rrhich must be Ise- in mind. Thus the issue of
:On-use ~erits the hinhest attention. The latest occasion ~rhen it was discussed
in depth ?raç during the deliberstions of the s~ecial session of the Generd
bsserlbly on disamment.
1 tnsh to recall trhat is said in paragrzph 58 of the Final Docuen.: on
that issue. Those deliberations have harever aïs0 reninded us of al1 the
It is al1 too evident that the probleus inherent
?Tactical difficdties involved.
in the nuclear arsenal= and their relateù militsry doctrines cannot be solved.
'hply by a declzration of non-use. It is in fact necessary to p~.pple with the
COncrete reality of deployed nuclear forces md of the doctrines fûr their
"ssible use x.rhich GO deeply into the gcneral z~ilitary diSp0~itionS of the
ieading silitary Powers and concern conventional forces :.Swcll.
JUS^as in the case of security guarantees, a declaration of co:?-use
L.tich could gain ~enerd acceotance cm under no cir~umstances Serve 3s a
':bstitute for measas on nuclear disamament. Unfortunately, in th= absence
"substaritial results in the efforts underteken so far to restrein the nuclear
'% r2Cee, and il vie11 of the differences in force postures and doctrines aireacbr
"''entioned, the issue of a non-use declaration tends too ecsily to become less
' way to mep.ter security for al1 than a divisive issue between the
"'lear-weapon Ytat es.
That nust be avoided, ad for those various reesons my delecation zbstGned
in tlie vote. 1 visii to concl!ide by recallins once tain the Final Document of the
s?ecial sessior?. nie auertlon of non-use is too inportant to be left aside,
am1 th? non-nucleir-iiea~on States have a legit iazte right to eeeCt COnstruct ivg
actions iii orkr to halt the nucleé~r anus rece.
Fr. NGUYEN V.@N Lx (Yiet Fan) (interpretation fron French) : The deleneii
of the Socialist Republic of Viet ?Tm voted in favour of dreft resolution
A/C.1/33/L.2, it 'Jeinq ~x.derstoo that uncier its tem recourse to nuclear weapans
in cme of eggression is a violation of the Chuter and a crime aaainst humanity,
--he CHAIRKW: !le have noIr !lep.rd dl d.ele~ations -rishing to e.qlain
their votes after the vote.. $1..
united Nations Agenda item 125
GENERAL
ANNEXES
ASSEMBLY THIRTY-THIRS ESSION
fic ciRecordr NEW YORK. I9781le7P
Gndi item 125:' Rcvicwof rhe implementation ofhe r-commeadationi uid deciaioru adopted by ihe Gnerd
Aucmbly ililsken& vcid uuion:
(a)Repori of ihe Di.um.meni Cornminion:
(b) Rep.,* ofhe Secretuy-Gnerd
C
COYTEYTS
WIU o I<#U rd.,
A133116 Repoof rlFinCommi~ .....................................................I
*mkmby<brIAmcdArmbh ...................................................................13...
.....
'-bdLbiddaumQo ........................................................................
....I>...............
DOCUMENTA1331461
[Original:Enqlishl
Il2Drcrmber 19781
1. INTRODUC~ON
1.ïhc ium entitlcd"Revicwoftheimplementaofthe 6. On20Onobcr.Algma. Argentina.Cypnrr.Miopia.
~mmendations anddecisions aQpad by theGmral As- India. Inâonesia. Maiaysia. NiandiYugmhvu sub-
mbly aïicsunth specialsession:(a) Rem oftDiwnn- mineda drpnnsolution (AIC.11331L.. ukqumflyah
ment Commission: (b)Repaa of chSeact~yCimwl" s nrorrd byAngola.Bahdos. Bhuun. Bolivu.Burundi.
m includcd in theprovisid agead.of thduny-thid &ombia. the Congo.Cuba. Ecudor. Egypt. Gui-.
mion in accordancwithpampph I15oftheFiniDlOEU- Jordan.Liberia.Mdqucsr. M. Mauritiw.Maoceo.
mcntof theTmth Spfiai Susion oftheGed ibanbly RIU. Romania. Senegai.SriW. IbeSyfianAnb Rc-
~uolutioS-1012).doprcdon 30 Junc1978. blic. the Unitai Repiblic of Camemon. Uruguayand
2. Atiu4thand 5thplenarydnp. oa22 Seplmibcr L, wh.icwirinuuiucoibyüaerrpracntaùveoudi.u
'1978.theGmralkumibly.ontherrcommmditionofche the 18thdng. on 27Ocmba.ïk uxtrrsdu foUows:
Gcd Commirrcc.dccidedtoincludctheimnininagcda [Sam feuru dm# resoiwio~B ipara8rapA33 kkw.
mdai1ouu~it to tFm1 CommiücC. withrheuccurion -.orrative.ra-.wh 2 whichrd ru
follows:
3.At iu3rd meeting.on6 Onobs. theFurt CommitUe "2.Rque~ dl Stata.phnilady nuclur-wqmn
boMa combincdgmnlvpdcbuc oncheotheimnr diocadIO S<ntcr.u>~ubmit<ocheûmnlkunnbly~i~thirty-
oit rrlatuig w bssmiPmmt. nuncly. i35 to 49. 'Ihc fourrsasion nomulr ancanin= thenon-usofnuclar
pnaslâebauonium IU&pLrauthe4thmI%h we~ponr.avo& of nutep wYand rr~g(cd
mceringshm 16to 27 Octoba. ordarboithe qunWn ofM iaPmnDohllconvamai a 33.The Fm1Cornminet ncommends IOtheGncd As-
rcrnblyrhe adopuonof LIKfollowingdrafmoluiions:
III. VOTINC
Rcv~ewof the implementarionof the recomme~ionr and
.*. decirions ridopteby the Generaî ~ssemb(voius renrh
20 Ai the rame meeting. bcfm Ihe Fmt Comrnina special session
procccdcd io voie on drafiasnlutioA/C 1133I L.lndm . ., B
announccd a drafunn change IOoarauve p.ra-.h 2. the NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEA~NS AND pREVENTlON
paragraph rd in as fGllows:' OF NUCLEAR WAR
"Requests ail Siarcs. panicularty nuclcar-weapon TheGenerai Assembly.
States. to rubmiiIO theSecrruryGed. beforr the Alarmedby thethrcaIOthe~urvivalofmankindandtothe
thiny-fouith session of theGcned Asrernbly.propa;rls life-rustainingsystposcd bynuclearwcaponsand bytheu
conceming the non-use of nuclearweaponr. . .". ux inhercnt in concepts of detcrrcnce.
themc of the pangraph rcmainingunchangcd.Thercupon. Convincedthu nucleardisamwunt is csvnual for the
the draftmoluoon. asrcviud. vasdoprsd by a recordrd prcveniionof nuclearwarand forthsmnglhening-f Inter-
v- ~ - ~ ~to 16.with 18absunuonr (ibiddraftmoluuon nationalpeace and rccurity. -
8). The voting&as as follows: Recdling Ihe rmcmenr conuined in thWd Document
In ~<IYOUI:Afghanisran. Algeria. Angola. Argentina. of the Tenth Specid %ion ofche Gcncnl Arremblythu
Bahamas. Bnhnin. Bangladnh. Bah~h. Benin. Bhuw. "al1 States rhould actively participate in eIObring
Botswana. Bruil. Buma. Bumndi.Chad,Chile.Colombia. about conditions in intcmatiorelationamonn SIDUSin
Congo. Cortl Rica. Cuba, Demacmic Yemcn. Dominicm which icodeof pa~cful conduciof nauoiu inihmaood
Rcpublic, Ecusdor.Egypt, Uhiopia. Fiji. Ghana. Guinep. affamcould be andwhichwouldpr.cludethe iuca
Guyana. Haiti. india, indonesiIran Irq. IV- Cout. thrcat of useof nÜcluirwapons".'
Jamaica. Jordan. Kenya,Kuwait. LzoPcople'sDemocrdIic 1.Declares rhot:
Republic. Lebanm. Liha. LibyanArdbJamahiiya. Md- (a) ïhe use of nuclcar weaponswibc a vialaion of the
agarcar. Malaysia, Maldiva. Mali. Malia, Mauriuinia. Charterofthe UnitaiNationsda crimeagainrihumanity;
Mauritius. Mexico. Morocco.Mozambique.Nepal.Niger. (b)The ureof nuclcar wuponr sharld rhacfm be
Nigeria. Oman. Pakistan, Panma. Papa New Guinep. hibired. pnding nuclcar disannament:
Paraguay. Pmi. PhilippinesQatar. Romania. Smcd.
Sierra Leone. Sri Lanka. Sudan. SHan Arab Repiblic.
Thailand. Togo. Trinidad uidToùago, Tunisia. UgMdo.
UniicdRcpublicofCamemon.United ~~~~~~~~~~~~ia.
UppcrVolta. Uruguay. Venezuela.Vie:Nam. Yugalavia. ml& -. in
Zairc.Zambia. conventionor somc ocheargrmncnt onnIhcsubjst my be
Againrr: Ausnalia. Belgiurn.Cm&. DenmarkF .nnce. dirusscd a1.h session.
Gennany. Fded Republicof. GM. belud. Italy. Lux-
embourg. Nethcrlands. New Wand. Nonway. PnaigJ.
United Kingdom of Greu Britain ud Nonhcrn beland.
United Sram of Arnerica.
Absraining: Ausma. Bulguia. Byelonwian Soviei
Socialist Republic.Czshoslovakia. Finland.GerwDem-
ocratic Rcpublic.Guatemala.Hondurac,Hungary.Icelud.
Israel. Japan. Mongolia.Poland.Spain.Swcdcn.Ilkrainh
Soviet Socialist Rcpublic. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. united Nations
NEW YORK
Agenda itm125:
Rcriew of the lmplementatiO(the rceommcn~timr SI. The PRESIDENT (inrerprrario/mm Sprnish):I
and deciions ndoplby the Genenl Aüeiiibly al itr nowputto the votedraftremlutionB.A ~cordedvotehas
tenth spccial semion: brenrcqucrted.
(4) Repart of the Disarmament Commission:
/blReports otheSceretaryCcned
RcpQrof the Fùrt Committe............ .. . . . Anmrdcdvotenustaken
In fovourt Afghanutan. Algeria, Angola. Argentina.
BPbms. Bahnui. Bangladesh.Barbador. BeninB. hutan.
51.Mr.M~HAJLOVIC (Yligodavia),Rapporteur of the BolMa.Botswana, Brarjl, Burma.Burundi.Cap Verde,
ES conmittee: 1 have the konour to prexnt COthe Ctmnl African Empin. Chd. Chile. Colombia, Congo,
anal A~~mblythe reportsof the Fint Committee onits Co- Ria. Cuba,DemocraticYemen. DjiboutiD, omnian
wtkmiatingto %enda item 35 Io 50, 125and 128.Tb
pi Cornmitte considercd thev 18 item during the &public,Ecuador, E~pt, EquatorialGuinea. Ethiopia.
piiodfmm16Odober to 8Deamber 1978.Asaresultof Fiji.Gambh,Ghana. Guatemala,Guinea. Guinea-Bissau,
aidelibentions,the Cornmitteeadopted 45 draft nrolu- Cu~m, Haiti,Honduras.Indu, Indoneria,Iran.Iraq. Ivory
Ca. himica, Jordan. Kenya, Kuwait. Lao People's
inuandoneremmmcndation,whichare containcdin the hocfatic Republic, Lebanon.Lesotho,Liïria, Liayan
fdbwinEpO~ts. Anb hrnahiriya. Madagascar,Malawi.Malaysia,Maldives.
Mau , alta.Miutirania, Mexico,Morocco.Mozambique.
NeW N.iger,Nigeria, Oman.akisian.Panama.PapuaNew
70. DocumentAl331461mntairu the npat of the Fint Cuhl, Paraguay. P~N. Philippines.Qatar. Romania.
Commiitecon item 125.Under th item.th Co&tre
adopted 14 dnfî molutions wfiichare to be found in Rmdr. Samoa, 90 Tome and Princip. Saudi Arabia.
pngnph 33. Sicm Leone.Somalh. Sri Lanka,Sudan. Swi-
mm, Srnuland. Syrian Arab Republic,Thailuid, Togo.
T%d andTobago. Tunisia .gand..UnitedAnb Ernir-
-0 hited RepubEcof Cmroon, United Repiblic of
'13. This yair-ua reailt of the decison of the tenth TWa. Uppr Volta, Uruguay.Venezuela.Vict NG,
rpcial session.devoted to dimiment-the Fi Com- Yenun, YuprLni. Zambù
mittee dealt exclusivelywith the problemof dhnllmmt
Aminsr:Aurtnb, Bel6um. Cm&. Dcnmuk, Fnna,
and nhted international seeurity questions. Tun-
peccdcnted nwnber of proponlr adoptcd by thsCorn- Gemany, Fedenl RepubIicof, Gmcc, lacland. Ireluid.
mittee-41 drafîrcnilutiom mnarning dirvnnmcnt and Itrly, Luxembourg.Nethcrhds, New Zcrland, Nomy.
four mnarning intemational scurity, and one tecorn- Portugal Turf<ey,United Kingdomof Great Britainand
mendation on diumwnent-and the record number of Northnn Ireland,UnitedShta ofAmcria
statements made duringthe gcnerol debatc d inthe
mune of mmideration of the dorementioncd wn& Abs~hing.. Autria. Buleria, Byelonutian Soviet
items, arc. in my opinion. an exDresdonoth ind Social& Republic,Crcchodw, El Snlvador,Fmhnd.
interest, puticukrly o4 coumriu, in themlvi~ of Gabon. Gem hocniic Republic.Hungary, Incl,
questionsof dinmamem and internationalrecurityanthin
the fnmework of the UnitedNstionr and in the rtrrng<h- han. Mongol*, Niclngu~ Poland, Sprk Swcden,
lkminian Sonet Social& Republic, Union of Soviet
eningof the roleof the woridOtganizatiothi &cId. Soaaüsf Republia
74. On behalfof the FiniCommittce it imy planirc to Dmfi molution8 ws odopted by IO3 votesto 18.wirh
mmmend to the Gened A~cmbly for ilr adoption the 18abstention(moùuion 33/71 8)11
dratt nsolutions and the decison to which 1 hi= jurt
refened.
22The delsgdonof Mauritirubrquentlmformcd the Sc-
urbi thai iwuhcd Iohne iu vo~erecadul al hanbccn in
hvour of the dnft inolution.34/83. Review of the implementationof thmm-
mendations and decisiom adopted by the
General Assembly al its tenth spedal sesion
NON-US EF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENnON
OF NUCLEAR WAR
TheGeneralAssernbly,
Recalling its resoluti33/71 B of 14 Davmber
1978,in whicb,interdia. it caUedfor prohibitionof the
useofnuclear weapons, pending nuclearmament,
Taking into occount proposais submittby States
concemingthe non-use of nuclear weapons;prevention
ofnuclearwarand related matîer~,'~
1. Decides to transmit to the Cornminceon Dis-
armamentthe viewsof Statesconcenùngthenon-useof
nuclear weapons,avoidance of nuclear warand relatcd
matters:
2. Requests theComminee on Diarmament tatake
thoseviewsiato appropriate considerationandreport
thereonto theGeneraiAssemblyatitsthirty-ûfsession.
97thplenarymeeting
IIDecernber1979
'SecA/34/456and Add.1. General AsmUB RA Ry ~i~t~.
OCT -Q IQJ~ GFNERAL
~/34/456
UN/& COLLECTION 28 septeder 1979
ORIGINAL: WGLISH/FRENM/
SPANISH
qndartitemu42 Id)ion
RNIEW OP THE IMPLMENTATION OP THE RECOMMENDATIONA SND DECISIONS
ADOPTEDBY THE GFNERALASS-LY AT ITSmH SPECIAL SESSION
Non-useof nuclear ueawns and preventionof nuclear war
Reportof the Secretarv-General
CONTMTS
&=
1. INTRODUCTION... . ... .. .. . .... . .. . ... .. .. . . 2
1. REPLIES RECEIVEDFROElGOVERMTS . . .. . . .. . .. .. .. . .. 3
Barbados.. . . .... . .. . . . . . . ...... . ... .. .. 3
Chile ................................ 3
Cuba................................. 5
Pinland ... . .. . . .. . . .. ..... . . . .. .. .. . . . 6
German Demcra tic Republic.. . . . ... . .. . . . . . . ... . . 8
India .. . . . ,... .. . . . . . . . .. . . . .. ... . . . .. 10
Kenya ................................ 11
Peru................ ................. 11
mgo................................. 12
United Kingdom of GreatBritain and Northern Ireland. . .. . . . . . 12 A/34/456
Engli'sh
Pasge 2
1. INTRODUCTION
1. On 14 December 1978, the General ~ssembly adopted, under the item entitled-
.Review of the implementation of the recomendations and decisions adopted by *e
General Assembly at its tenth special sessiong, reS0i~tion 33/71 8, the operative
part of which reads as follous:
"The General Assembly,
"1. Declares that:
The use of nuclear ueapons will be a violation of the Charter of
(a)
United Nations and a crime against humanity)
(d) The use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited. Pending
nuclear disarmament;
"2. reuuests al1 States, particularly nuclear-weapon States, to submit to
the Secretary-General, before the
thirty-fourth session of the General
Assembly, proposals concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of
nuclear war and related matters, in order that the question of an
international mnvention or some other agreement on the subject may be
, discussed at that session..
2. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the resolution, the Secretary-General submits
herewith the report on the proposals received frm Hember States concerning the
non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters., A/34/456
mglish
Page 3
II. REPLIES RECEIVPD PROn COVERWMTS
BARBAWS
112 July 19791
1, Barbados has set as its goal general and canplete disarmament and has
@roached the question of disarmament with this goal.
BarbadΠis deeply opposed to the threat which the proliferation of nuclear
1
,d other weapons poses to international pesa and security and to the very
Grvival of mankind.
Barbados supports al1 efforts which seek to reduce or eliminate the threat of
3~ arms race.
$ Barbados cunsiders that nuclear veapons pose the greatest danger to the
,,tvival of mankind and hence there is a real need to prohibit the use of these
*apons not only by renuving them £rom the drawing board and the lines of
*oduction but also by ba~ing them fran combat.
5 Barbados gives its fullest support to measures vhich seek to achieve nuclear
!,sarmamemt uhether by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones or by
,*erence to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
q Barbados will lend its support to the drafting of an international convention
n agreement if by its very existence such a wnvention or agreement will enhance
the effectiveness OP the international thrust for the elimination of the threat of
ruclear warfare and its destructive wnsequenŒs and for the achievement of
jeneral md ccmplete disarmament.
[Original: Spanishl
127 June 19791
1. Traditionally the Government of Chtle has aff irmed its positirm against the
frmtic arw race into which mnkind has been dragged despite the valiant efforts
of al1 States Hembers of the United Nations to avoidit. It accordingly supports
la the ultimate goal general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control and supports al1 proposais for achieving individual
dlsarmament goals.
2. It recognizes that the way in which this vil1 be achieved is through gradua1
$karmament action, isolated or simultaneous, and to this end it has suppotted the
Xder of priorities laid &ni in paragraph 45 of the pinal Document of the Tenth
SPecial Session of the General Assembly.
/. .. A/34/456
English
Pasge 4
3. It is dismuraged to note that enormous investments in armamnts are
retarding the development of peoples, especially those of the developing
countries, which are wmpelled to invest disproportionate sums in armaments, sinO
war tensions are reaching regions which until ncu seemed to be free frm the
swurge of war.
4. We have repeatedly stated that al1 attempts at disarmament would iail as long
as rivalry and mistruat existed between the major Powers, which are threatening b
unleash a general wnflict in which it would be very difficult for any country
remain neutral and uncommitted. Accordingly there is an urgent need:
(a) Tb devise effective verification procedures in order to mnitor
disarmament measures;
(b) lb make the deterrenΠprocedures worked out in Europe universal and t,,
ensure that political .deterrene is camplemented by military deterrence;
(c) 'Ib prevent the formation of military blocs;
(d) To secure reai achievements in halting the arms race!
(e) lb ensure respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, especially the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force,
non-interferenΠin the interna1 affaira of other States, etc.
5. At present the greatest threat is that the nuclear weapai may be used. A
general nuclear strike would have uitastrophic wnsequences for mankind and the
use of that weapcm in local wars could lead us irrevocably into a global
wnflict. Prom this it can be deduced that nuclear disarmament takes priority
over any other type of disarmament.
6. Nevertheless, we realize that existing treaties do not fulfil and have not
fulfilled their purpose of limiting, reducing and eliminating those weapons.
(a) mday vertical proliferation is increasing and. more seriously, is
increasing in quality rather than in quantity. That means that with less weaponry
and smaller but more sophisticated weapons greater destructive force can be
attained.
(b) Horizontal proliferation is increasing alarmingly, inasmuch as in a few
years frm na, over 30 countries will be able to join the nuclear terror club.
Year after Year aie nure Member State acquires nuclear capacity. And this cannot
be s topped .
(c) The SALT talks are slow and are merely helping to limit and control
nuclear weapons at levels capable of destroying mankind.
7. Unaubtedly the greatest responsibility lies at the rroment with the nuclear
Pwers, but as States Members of the United Nations we have a duty to help in
seeking a solution to this problem and to know clearly where we stand. A/34/456
hgush
Page 5
8. uuclear proliferation is a consequence of a number of factors which ue must
stresswith a view to ensuring speedy adoption of legs1 documents regulating that
C-SS and sa preventing its exacerbating the problem.
pn
(a) Military scientific research leads to the &velopnt Of increasingly
sophisticated weapons, thereby raisin9 the cost of national security and improving
its cfficacy.
(b) The treaty on the general and total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests
must be cunpleted withait delay, for without it nothing cm be done to prevent
nuc!ear proliferation.
Vis wst make it clear that this step does not imply banning the use of nuclear
energy. for peaceful purposes, which is an inalienable right of al1 peoples. Such
use is guaranteed by the safeguards accepted by UEA, which ahaild become
iricreasingly effective and rigorous.
9, mreover, we believe that we have the necessary material available to
Consider an .in terna t ional conven t im covering al1 sub jectsg which would provide
gïeater assurance of the non-use of the nuclear weapon.
(a) Latin America has set m example in the matter of a treaty prohibitinq
nuclear wapons. What is required nar is to enmurage the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, the niddle Bast, Me South Pacific and
clsewhere.
lb) Al1 nuclear Pawers or those that are in a position to manufacture
wclear military devices should conclude a treaty cm the non-use of weapons of
rsis type against non-nuclear-weapon States. The treety On the non-use of forCa
in inter national relations should cover these matter S.
10. Pinally, we welwme any proposa1 aimcd at banning var, at settling by
paccful means any disputes that may arise betwean peoples, at avoiding the use of
force in international relations and at devoting al1 air efforts to wnquering the
1crious problems of developmnt .
CUBA
[Original: Spaniah]
1. The Government of the &public of Cuba considers that preSent level.9 of
Yuclear weapons arsenals represent a serious danger to al1 mankind.
2. It therefore considers it vitally important to reach agreements which
This
cffectively guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be uscd again.
puarantee vil1 only k fully in affect when the nuclear arma race in hdted and
rcversed and when, at the final stage, this type of veapon ia' mmpletely
el iminated .
/... A/34/456
English
Pasge 6
3. The attainment of these objectives will cal1 for the negotiation of
agreements at appropriate stages, with the participation of al1 nuclear-weapon
States and other States with a large military potential, in a favairable
international atmosphere, after al1 a ttempts to obtain Unilaterai advantages have
ceased.
4. The renunciation of the use or threat of force in international relations
ehould mast specifically cover nuclear force. In the present-day world, the use
or threat of nuclear force by a State or grcup of States against another State or
other States would cause a crisis that would extend beyond the confines of the
States involved in the mnflict and become a serious threat to the very survival
.of civilization.
5. The' Qngers inherent in such a situation wuld increase in proportion to th.
increase in the levels of nuclear arsenaLs thraighait the world. Aence the urgent
need to start negotiations with a view to bringing about the cessation of
production of al1 types of nuclear weapons and the gradua1 reduction of nuclear
arsenals mtil they have been wmpletely ùestroyed.
6. These negotiations could be conducted in different phases, by degrees, and in
a mnner mitually acceptable to and agreed upon by these States in the
negotiations. The Cormaittee on Disarmament might be the most suitable forum for
the talks, which should also ensure the steady lovering of levels of nuclear
strength, while keeping the existing balance in that area unchanged and
guaranteeing the security of al1 States.
7. Lastly, the Goverrurent of the Republic of Cuba mnsiders that the initiation
of these negotiations should in no way affect the conduct of other negotiations
that are in progress and designed to achieve the sam objective of nuclear-arma
limitation.
PINIAND
[Original: Engliah]
1. Effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the preventiai of nuclear wat
have been identified as a priority task tovards the ultimate goal of general ~d
canple te disarmament under effecive international control. Withcut pre judice to
other urgent tasks, this priority was reaffirmed by the General Assembly at its
special session devoted to disarmament.
2. Efforts to eliminate the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and to halt and
reverse the nuclear arms race should include a variety of approaches. The ongoing
efforts to this effect should be intensified and further aspects of nuclear arms
build-up should be brcught within the scope of negotiations.
3. While not being disarmment measures per se, arrangements for limitations m
the development, production, deployment and use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons can constitute important masures to reduce the dangers inherent in the
very existence of these weapons. A/34/456
English
Page 7
Amonq such measures, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones has
,lready proved its viability. Based on arrangements freely arrived at amng the
*dtes of the reqion concerned and involving commitments by nuclear-weapon States,
h;iclear-weapon-free zones are a contribution to nuclear arms control and the
'
Ign-proliferation of nuclear weapons and thereby to the security of the region and
@ international security in general. The consideration of the establishment of
*ch zones should continue to benefit fran the cmprehensive study of the question
,,fnuclear-weapon-free zones in al1 its aspects undertaken by the United Nations
,q 1975. y
g. The prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear
,,plosive devices is a central element in the efforts to contain the dangers of an
wtbreak Of nuclear var. In this regard, the non-proliferation treaty remains the
bst instrument. As the acquisition of nuclear weapons by more States is against
the security interests of al1 States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, further
,!forts should be made to strenqthen the non-proliferation régime in the interest
of the international wmmunity as a whole.
6. Fran the point of viev of the countries that have renounced nuclear weapons -
Ze it in the context of the non-proliferation treaty or regional arrangements such
a~ nuclear-weapon-free zones - it is reasonable that nuclear-weapon States give
~mitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against such States.
7. The Government of Pinland has noted with satisfaction the security assurances
tlready unilaterally given by the five nuclear-weapon States. While these are
cteps forward, such unilateral declarations of individual nuclear-weapon States
:m neither by their content nor by their form ampletely satisfy the objective
rcight by the non-nuclear-weapon States. In paragraph 59 of the Pinal mcument of
:he Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the nuclear-weapon States uere
xqed .to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to
assure non-nuclear-weapon States against. the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons" .
. It is b be hoped that the consideration of security guarantees undertaken by
the General Assembly at its thirty-third session and, subsequently, by the
:mittee on Disarmament, vil1 lead to arrangemencs for the provision of such
quarantees as called for by the Assembly.
9. In this perspective, the bilateral agreements concluded for the prevention of
wclear war between a number of nuclear-weapon States are also a contribution to
:he security of al1 States and the international community as a whole.
!O. While the responsibility for the prevention of nuclear var lies primarily
iith the nuclear-weapon States, the issue is of crucial wncern for al1 States.
'ie Pinal Document of the Tenth Special Session called upon al1 States, in
'articular nuclear-weapon States, to consider, as soon as possible, various
?roposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons. lb this
I/ Officia1 Records of the General Assemblv, Thirtieth Session, Suvplement
(A/10027/Add.l), annex 1.
/... A/34/456
English
Pasge 8
effect, the Final Document envisages the possibility of international agreement, ,
goal vhich has the support of the Pinnish Government.
[original: EnglliL:
Il0 AUgUSt 19791
1. TO halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament have become key issues hcrr
the safeguarding of peace is wncerned. Cnly thrcugh effective measures of
disarmament in both the nuclear and conventional fields will it be possible &
create the conditions to mke security lasting and stable. Steps towards nuclear
disarmament have priority since the nuclear arms race is bound to heighten the
risk of a nuclear war. Such a var wuld threaten the survival of al1 mankind. xt
is thecefore necessary to counter this danger with the utmost determination.
2. It vas fully in line with the Final Document adopted at the United Nations
special session devoted to disarmament when the German Demcratic Repulbic,
jointly with the other states parties to the Warsaw Treaty, proposed wncrete and
effective measures designed to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament in the
nuclear field in the Moscow Declaration of 23 November 1978 and at the Meeting of
the Conmittee of Foreign ninisters on 14 and 15 May 1979.
3. The Germn Demcratic Republic welcomes the signing of SALT II as a
significant step touard lastingly ensuring peace and security for the peoples and
lessening the danger of a nuclear war. The Treaty wnstitutes the basis for the
preparation of further accords. Its ratification is a matter of great urgency.
4. Ta wunteract the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war and of the use of
nuclear weapons, the German Demcratic Republic believes that States should
concentrate their efforts ai the follouing steps:
5. The most effective way of elirninating the risk of nuclear var is the canpletr
liquidation of nuclear weapons. This objective wuld be reached by way of partial
steps of the widest possible scope. In this connexion the inmediate initatia of
negotiations wng al1 nuclear-weapon Powers with the participation of a number of
non-nuclear-weapon States cm the cessation of the production of al1 types of
nuclear weapons and on the gradua1 reduction of their stockpiles and eventually
their complete liquidation is of primary importance.
6. This objective wuld be reached if the qualitative improvement and further
development of nuclear weapons were halted, if the production of al1 types of
nuclear arms, their means of delivery as well as the production of fissionable
material for armament purposes were discontinued, and if nuclear weapons stocks
and the means of their delivery were reduced step by step and finally eliminated
cmple tely .
/..a A canplete and general ban on nuclear-weapon tests would be a significant
?8.p toward diseontinuing the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and
&ld, at the same tirne, counteract the development of new such weapons. The
M,ticipation of al1 nuclear-weapon States in such a mve is a sine sua non.
The non-proliferation régime concerning nuclear weapons should be further
8..,engthened. The emergence of new nuclear-weapon States muld wnsiderably
I-
.ighten the danger of nuclear war. Therefore, the universaility of the Treaty on
L,e on-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be regarded as an urgent
,Nuirement. This would at the same time facilitate negotia tions among the '
.,clear-weapon Povers.
q. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones mst effectively benefit the
,,n-proliferaticm of nuclear weapons and enhance the security of the States
,,volved.
10. MeasUres of nuclear disarmament should be accanpanied by activities to
,trengthen political and international legal security guarantees for States.
il. The German Demcratic Republic holds the view that it is essential, parallel
.J the efforts for nuclear disarmament, to create political instruments of
international law that will give States stronger safeguards against the outbreak
of a nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons. It mnsiders it necessary for
me nuclear-weapon States to shape their relations on the basis of peaceful
a>existence in a way that avoids dangerous aggravation and wnflicts. This is
,160 an effective iwthod of guarding against nuclear conflict being unleashed
arough the failure of technical systems. International security would also
aenefit frm a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. This problem should be tackled,
parallel to negotiations on nuclear disarmament, in the framwork of a world
treaty cm the non-use of 'force in international relations. Such a treaty should
wmit al1 States to renounce the use or threat of force in al1 forms and
~mifestations, including the use of nuclear weapons.
12. The Germn Demcratic Republic further believes that the security guarantees
for non-nuclear-weapon States ought to be improved without delay. This should be
bsne through the wnclusion of an international convention on the renunciation of
the use of nuclear weapons against States that forgo the production and
acquisition of such weapons and & not have nuclear weapons deployed in their
territor ies.
13. Another important step in this direction muld be taken if the nuclear-weapon
Parers were to renounce the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of
States where there are no such weapons at present.
14. The lessening of military confrontatim in Europe is a task of increasing
Argency. In view of the importance which stability in Europe has for the
Political climate al1 over the world, the conclusion of an accord among the States
of the Conference on Security and co-operation in Europe on the renunciation of
/... A/34/456
English
Pasqe 10
the first use of both nucïear and wnventionai weapons carries particuiarly gr&
weiqht. Such a treaty would be a form of practical application of the principh.
agreed in Helsinki as well as a logical and effective step in the mntinued
pursuit of political détente and in cmplementinq it by concrete measures in
military field.
III
15. The German Democratic Republic is convinced that joint action by the
nuclear-weapon States is of decisive importance for progress in the field of
nuclear disarmament. Theirs is a special responsibility, and the participation
al1 nuclear-weapon States in the negotiations is absolutely necessary.
16. International relations can be meaningfully stabilized only through the
reduction of armaments a, the basis of the principle of equal, undiminished
security. The policy of deterrence, on which the stepped-up arms race thrives,
must be abandoned once and for all. What is required is resolute action of
Governments to halt the arms race, limit armaments and achieve disarmament and, in
particular, to ban the weapns of mass destruction.
17. A world disarmament conference in which al1 States. possessinq nuclear
weapns or not, participate, would be apt to bring about genuine progress in the
field of nuclear disarmament as it would elaborate and conclude corresponding
agreements.
18. The German Demcratic Republic welwmes the joint statement made on a world
disarmament conference by Leonid 1. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central
Cmittee of the Comnist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR, and James E. Carter, President of the United States of
America, at their meeting in Vienna (see A/34/414).
19. The German Democratic Republic wishes to express the expectation that that
conference vil1 take place at the earliest suitable date.
INDIA
[original: hglish]
130 July 19791
1. Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. The internat ional community
has unequivocally and repeatedly expressed its sense of concern and alarm at the
grave threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons to the very survival of
mank ind. A/34/456
hglish
Page 11
ço long as any nuclear weapons remain in the possession of any r-tion,
Eyvhere in the world, the danger of a nuclear war with al1 its awesom
jplications, including a world holocaust, will continue to exist. It is,
aereforet imperative that no effort should be spared to achieve nuclear
disarmament, whereby nuclear weapons would have been canpletely eliminated from
face of this earth.
3. Pending nuclear disariaament, there should be a total prohibition of al1 use
.[ nucleaï weapons, particularly since any use of nuclear weapons has already been
by the international oommunity as a violation of the United Nations
-9.rter and a crime against humanity.
4 Security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, like peace in
tiis nuclear age, is indivisible. Efforts Co seek security against the use of
,,,clcar ueapons can only be fruitful if al1 States, withait any exception, are
svered, including those States which posseas such weapons, sa they too are
insecure against such weapons and need to be protected against them, pending
,gclear disarmament. Iio be effective, a convention ai the prohibition of the use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons muid require the active support of al1
jtates, par ticularly of States possessing such weapons.
KENYA
[Original: Englishl
123 April 19791
The Government of Kenya does not have any nuclear weapons and welcomes and
supports the nations that are pressing for easing of international tension through
promotion of détente. Concerted efforts in the search for more lasting and
effective mans of avoiding nuclear war have the full support of the Government of
Kenya.
PERU
[Original: Spanishl
121 June 19791
1. Awace of the threat posed by the continuing and increasing manufacture and
refinement of nuclear weapons and of the negative wnsequences which their use
would have for the forms of life on this planet, Peru reiterates its support for
General Assembly resolution 33/71 B by reaffirming that the use of such weapons
would be a violation of the United Nations Charter, in that it would detract from
the Organization's aim and objective of pintaining international peace and
security. A/34/456
English
Pasge 12
2. ~o that end, Peru endorses the idea of supporting any initiative &signed b,
strengthen the principle of the non-use of nuclear weapons and advocating the
drafting of a wnvention or agreement, the main wntractual element of which
be that the nuclear-weapon States expressly renounced the use of nuclear weapm Wb
in any form or in any circumstance, thereby ruling wt the possibility of a
nuclear war, with unforeseeable consequences For the whole of mankind.
3. &ce again, we mst emphasize that the nuclear-wapon States have a very
special responsibility that they alone can fulf il, namely, a responsibility ta
reach the agreements needed ta avoid the possibility of nuclear uar.
TOGO
[Original: PrenQ)
..
(12 July 19791
1. Pirst of all, the Togolese Army has no nuclear weapons at the present time.
2. Secondly, the mgoiese Army has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons.
3. Consequently, the Togolese Government endorses the principle of the non-use
of nuclear weapons as set out in General Assembly resolution 33/71 B.
CINITID KINGDaM OF GREATBRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
[Original: hglia
[5 September 19791
1. The Government of the United Kingdom voted against General Assembly
resolution 33/71 B because the vording did not, in air view, reflect the realities
of the modern world, and the relationship between deterrence Of aggression and the
maintenance of peace. ûrr vote did not signify any disagreement with the
fundamental 'importance of ensuring that a conflict never arises in which the use
of nuclear weapons needs ta be wntemplated. But,, in the British view, such
avoidahce of conflict can only be achieved thrcugh the creation of conditionsiin
which there is sufficient amfidence between States to remve al1 fears of
aggression. The Government of the United Kingdom will CO-Operate in al1 measures
which will lead ta an increase in such confidence, but it has to be recognized
that the achievement of our ultimate goal will necessarily be a long-term
process. In the aieantime our inunediate aims are twofold: on the one hand, to
pursue efforts to check and to reverse the arms race, both nuclear and
conventional; and on the other, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to areas
uhere such weapons are not an integral part of current security arrangements. ~/34?456
English
Page 13
2. In this process, recognition must be given to the differing basis which
the: security of regioiia is founded. In the ~u'ropean theatre, the existing
compsition Of forces and the strategies of the military alliances mean that steps
towads nuclear disarmment cannot be mnsidered in isolation. It is neCeSSarY to
Otherwise
mintain a stable equilibcium both in nuclear and conventiond terms.
the instability created would seriously increase the risk of mi~~alculati~n and
conflict, which could have grave consequences for mankind. We therefoce seek
be:.snced and verifiable measures of arms mntrol and disarmment which. through a
stec-bY-Step approach, reduΠthe numbers of both nuclear and conventional arms
whce mintaininq the security of ail States at each stage, thcogh with
pr&ressively lower levels of armaments. The willingness of al1 States to
co.-.uperate in full masures of verification is essential for progress in this
Equally, it is important to devise measures which are susceptible to such
.Je,jfication.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, to which British nuclear deterrent
forces are comitted, is a defensive alliance and ri11 nOt contemplate the use of
nu~lear ireapons except where necessary in selfdefena. If one of its nembers
wer- attacked, NATO would respcmd at the most apprdpriate level both to halt the
attdck and to wnvinΠthe aggressor that continucd aggression uwld involve risks
out of a11 proportion to the gains he might have hoped to achieve. To sustain the
c,-+iibility of this &terrent ability, NAM needs to possess a full range of
nu:lear and conventional weapons, both to &ter the use of similar weapons by
those ho deploy them in Europe and to demnatrate Mat the Alliance wuld be
w:'.lling, if attacked, to defend itself to whatever level might be necessary.
Plcdqes of 'non-use. or 'no first une. of nuclear wsapons, or attempts to aitlaw
the use of such weapons, would remove NATO's ability to &ter al1 form of
aggession, and thereby lead to instability with al1 the grave risks which this
enta ils.
4. Undertakings by nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear
rcdpons aqainst non-nuclear-weapon Srates are a different caatter. The Covernment
af the United Kingdom nude such an undertaking at the tenth apcial session of the
;cneral Assembly on DiSarinawrnt, in June 1978, when it gave an assurance to
m-nuclear-weapon States uhich are parties to the non-proliferation treaty, or
>cher internationally binding coamPitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear
explosive devices, not br,use nuclear wsapons against them 'except in the case of
m attack on the United Kingde, itn &pendent territories, its armed forces or
its allies by such a state in association or alliana with a nuclear-weapon Stateg.
me United Kingdan beiieves that su& assurances should increa6e the donfidence of
nm-nuclear-veapon States in their am security frm nuclear attack.
S. The Covernment of the United Kingdan placed emphaais at the spcial session
m disarmament on the objective of halting and reversing the nuclear arma race in
its quantitative md qualitative dimensions. The tw SALT agreements ~d the ABn
:reaty have already been successfully achieved in thia field. The Final Cecumcnt
of the Tenth Special Session recommended khat SALT II should k follwed promptly
by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the hm parties, leading
agreed signif icmt reductiona of and qualitative limita tions on strategic
aras. The United Kingdom is itself engaged in intensive negotiations with the A/34/456
English
Pasge 14
United States and the Soviet Union ar a wmprehensive test ban treaty. These
agreements should constitute an important step in the directim of nuclear
disarmament and ultimately of establihsing a world free of nuclear veapons.
6. So long as nuclear weapons exist, and bearing in mind the potentially
devastating results which nuclear war vould have on belligerents and
non-belligerents alike, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities b
do everything possible to avoid the risk of the outbreak of such a war. It is
incumbent upm them in particular to maintain and, where necessary, to improve
their existing organizational and technical arrangements for guarding against the
accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their control. The
Government of the United Kingdom note that appropriate bilateral arrangements ai
the prevention of accidental nuclear war exist between France, the United Kingdoip
and the United States ai the one. hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. They
believe that these agreements have been helpful in building international
confidence. UN LIBRARY
OCT 2 4 1979
UFIITED fiAriOPIS UNISA COLLECTDN, Distr.
~/3b/b56/~dd.l
16 October 1979
LIiGLISH
ORIGIiJAL: EUSSIbiI
%:Y/-fourth session
ogda item 42 (d)
REVIEWOF THE IbPm.IENTATION OF THE RFCOE,iTicNDATION ASND DECISIOMS
AWFTED BY THE CEliERAL ASSEIBLY AT 1'15Tï3ITH SPECIAL SESSION
Non-use of nuclear weaoons and wrevention of nuclear var
Rerort of the Secretary-Ceneral
CONTENTS
-ace
PLIES RECEIVEDFROMGOVERNbIENTS
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic ................. 2
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic .................. 3
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics .................. 5 BYELORU33IAi4SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
-cricinal : Russian
/ï6 October 19797
- -
The countries of the socialist comiiiiity, including the Byelorussian SSR,
consistently advocate the limitation and elimination of nuciear Veapons, the
per:.ienont pronibition of the use of such weapons and, at the sane time, the
.renuncietion of the use of force in international relations. The Treaty Bannin-I
iiuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Mater, the Trearies
~rohibiting the placern ne nt of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
in outer space and on the sea-bed. and the Treaty on the Ilon-Proliferation of iIir-lear
Weapons, concluded during the 1:.LOs and 1970s, played an important role in CUrbing
the nuclear arns race.
h outstanding event in international life Iras the signing in Vienna in
June 1979 of the Soviet-United States Treaty on the Limitation of Strateâic
Offensive Arms (SALT-II). which represented areal contribution to the limitatirn
of the arms race b~th quantitatively end qualitatively and with regard to the mcst
destructive rneans of wa~ing war, namely strategic nuclear missiles. The conclusi~n
cf cte SCLT-II Treaty makes possible Ljrogress in other directions, too, in the
liwitation of thenuclear ams race and in disarmament.
The latest initiative of the USSR and other countries of the socialist
comunity in introducing in the Committee on Disarmament a proposai for negotiatirn
on ending the production of dl types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing
their stockpiles until they havebeen completely destroyed and the participation in
such negotiations of al1 nuclear-weapon States and some non-nuclear States deserve
full support.
There is no doubt that th? implementation of practical measures in this fielc
should be considered in close conjnnction with the renunciation of the use of force
in international relations and the strengthening of international legal guarantees
of the security of States. In this connexion, the conclusion of a world treaty on
the non-use of force in international relations wouïd be of enormous çignificance.'
A number of bilateral agreements on measures to reduce the danger of an outbrwk
of nuclear var and to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear ireapons
concluded during the 1970s by the.Soviet Union with the United States, France and
the United Kingdom are aimed at preventin~ the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear
war. iieasures of this kind, designed to reduce the danger of nuclear var, nust be
expanded and improved.
The solenn declaration by the Soviet Union that it would never use nuclear
weapons against those countries which renounce the production and acquisition of
nuclear weapons and have no nuclear iieapons on their territories was of fundaientil
sig~ificance for the zecurity of the non-nuclear States. The USSR has also declared
its readiness to conclude 2ppropriate agreements vith such countries. Gn the initiative of rhe Soviet Union, the Cecei-21 Assenbly at it; thirty-thire
ses~;onaac~ted a resclution on the pre~arstion of an international convention on
the :.in-iise of nucleir ïea-ons azainst those States vhich renomce the grciductign
and 2sss1siti3n ?f nuclear vearo-2 snd nnvc no nuclear 2eacons on their territorles.
A :;?"d:r 3re7ara:ion 2nd conclusion of the conventicn ?ro;osed Sy the USS? :iod3
considerab:y reeuco :te tos;icility Of :lie outbrea of ~uclear var. p.e
strengthening ic every ~osziole iray of the ré:ir.:e for the non-croliferation of
nu=learYelFonS. the creetion of nuclear-free zones in various re~ions of the
world, anà tne non-stationica of nuclear ::eapons on the territories of States ..rhere
thereare no Suc.1 weepons at PreSent uould contribute tovards the sace enàs.
:!le nuclear arzs race rrpresents the major danger to international pecce and
secufitytsday. The 3yelorussian SSR is convinced that the efforts of al1 peace-
LovingStates stiould be directed towards lieitin~ and ending the nuclear ams race
.Adaverting the threat of an outbreak of nuclear war.
U:<?AI:!IfiI SOVIET SOCIALIST FIEPLISLIC
-Original : ~ussie~7
/il October 19727
-
ihe nuclear ans rece represents the sain danger to peace and international
security.The efforts of States should therefore focus on measures directeà towards
elirninacinqhe threat of nuclear var and excluding nuclear weapons in al1 their
-differentforms from the arsenals of States. Since the first appearance of this
mgtde~astating veapon of mass destruction, the socialist countries, in particxlar
thesoviet Union. have repeatedly put forward in the United Nations concrete
proposals~alling for an end to the nuclear arms race, the prohibition of the use
:.fnuclear veapons and their complete elimination, and, at the same time, the
renunc'iatlonof the use of force as a means of settljng disputes between States.
TheUkrainian SSR has consistently supported al1 these initiatives.
In recent yezrs, a nimiber of international agreements have been concluded
whichha~e to some extent limited the nuclear arms race. Of particuiar significance
inthe curbing of the nuclear arms race vas the signing in Vienna in June 1979 by
theleaders of the USSR and the United States of the Treaty on the Limitation of
strategicOffensive Aras and other Soviet-United States documents. The pre.ctica1
implementatlorbf those documents would give a considerable impetus to further
pr~resstowards the liaitation and reduction of arsenals of nuclear missiles and
towardsiuclear disamment in general.
At the special session of the General Asselibly. the Soviet Union put fonrard
nn inportant proposal in the field of nuclear disamament - a proposal for ending
the-roduction of al1 types of nuclear weapons and gradudl~ reducing their
~tockpilmuntil they have been completely destroyed. A detailed description of
that-roposal vas given in spring 1973 by the socialist States which are merbers of
theCoimittee on Disamairent at the meetin~s of that organ, which is a for- for
nult-:laterolnegotiations on mstters relating to disarnarent. The Ukrainian SSF! considers that an early start to preparatory cOnsultat
iot
regardinn necetiations on endi2~ the production of al1 types of nuclear veamaoa$
~radually roducinp their stockpiles until they have been corpletely destroyèd,
to the negotiati~ns the-selves, in vhich ail the nuclear-weapon Povers and go-,
non-nuclear States vould partici'ete, wculd in 3 practical riay irpierent the
decisions adopte* by the General Asserbly at its special session devoted to
dis~rracent and vould represent a significant step forvard towards the preventi- --
üf nuclear var.
The Llkrainian SSR believes that the vorking out and iaplerentation of
aized at ending the production of nuclear veapons and' at destroyin: such veapoo,
should be closely linked to the strenehenin~ of ~oliticai and international lecal
guarantees of the security of States. The Generaï A-sserbly has already adopted,
nurber of irportant resolutions the icplerentation of vhich could contribute in a
significant vay to the elinination of the threat of nuclear var and the
strenshening of peace and the security of peoples.
In 1972, the General Assembly. in resolution 2936 (XX'fII). solemniy declarcd,
on behalf of the States Merbers of the United Nations, their renunciation of the
use or threat of force in al1 its fons and canifestations 'in international
relations, in accordance vith the Charter of the United !ations, and the per-ane~:
Unfortunately, because of the positicr.
prahibition of the use of nuclear veaFons.
taken by a nwber of States, that irportant dechration could not be given bindic;
force. Pronpted by a desire to strengthen the existing systea for safeguarding
peace and security and to establish a rore reliable legal basis for irportant
advances in the field of disarnair.ent, in particular nuclear disment, the
Soviet Union, at the thirty-iirst session of the General Assembly in 1976, propo&
the conclusion of a vorld treaty on the non-use of force in international relatiow,
vhich muld inpose an obli~tion on al1 States to renounce the use or threat of
force in al1 its forns and manifestations and to prohibit the use of nuclear
veapons. iiovever, this propsaï, too, has so far not been implenented. for reas-
which are vell knovn.
The strengthening of the régine for the non-proliferation of nuclear veaponl,
the establishment on al1 continents of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the preparatim
of international agreements on questions relatin~ to the strengthening of guarantee:
of the security of non-nuclear-veapon States and the non-stationing of nuclear
veaFons on the territories of States vhere there are no such weapons at present
vouid be a sienificant contribution tovards elininating the threat of a nuclear
catastrophe.
In viev of the above, the Ukrainian SSR considers that the efforts of the
United Nations to solve the question of the non-use of nuclear veapcns and to
prevent nuclear var should focus on the adoption of effective rneasures in the field
of nuclear disament and the sioultaneous strengthenin~ of political and
international legal guarantees of the security of States, as vell as ceasures to
reduce the danger of the use of nuclear weapons. . A/3b/k56/Add.l
Enql i sh
Page 5 .
As a resal: of the active efforts of the countries of the socialist cozzunicy
and of al1 sesce-loving States in recent years it has 'been possible to avert the
threat of a furtner world var; detente has become the dominant trend in
j-rernational relations. The main task now consists in supplementing political
b-tente with military détente.
Since the main danger to international peace and security arises froc the
c.;clear arms race, the efforts of States. Should focus on neasures directed tovares
trie halting and reversa1 of the nuclear arms race, the permanent prohibition of the
<se of nuclear veapons, and, at the same time, the renunciation of the cse of force
in international relations.
With this aim in view, the Soviet Union, since the first appearance of nuclear
jelpons, has consistently advocated and continues to advocate the implementaticn oi
?ractical steps in the field of the limitation and elhination of nuclear weacons
ànd the adootion of parallel measures to strengthen international peace and
aecl~~fty.
As a result of these efforts, a nuinber of bilateral and multilateral
~reements were concluded during the 1960s and 1970s which have had a certain
restraining influence on the nuclear am race. These include the important
international Treaties banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer
$Face and under water, and prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other
+eapons of mass destruction in outer space and on the sea-bed, the Treaty on the
bn-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. and others.
An event of historic importance in the curbing of the nuclear arms race vas
:he signing on 18 June 1979 in Vienna by the leaders of the USSR and the United
States of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and related
iocuments. The essence of this Treaty consists in the quantitative limitation of
ieapons and controls on their qualitative improvement. The full implementation of
rhe documents signed in Vienna vould open up nev possibilities for halting the
increase in the arsenals of nuclear ~issiles and ensuring the further quantitative
and qualitative limitation and the significant reduction of such weapons.
At the present time, on the initiative of the USSR, the question of ending the
~roduction of al1 types of nuclear weapons and gradudly reducing their stockpiles
-1ti1 they have been completely destroyed is on the agenda of international
r.egotiations. At the beginning of February 1979. the USSR. together with other
zocialist countries. introduced in the Conmittee on ~isarmanent a concrete proposa1
rhat negotiations should be held on that question with the participation of ail
r.zclear-wea-on States and soce non-nuclear States. The aim now is to begin
lonsultations without delay vith a viev to preparing for practical negotiations on
this question. In its er.<?avcrrr: -.;.~chicve cenuine results in the bltin~ of the nuclou sm
rzcr, the Zo-:i-r Uzi-ri jtli+vej tbat the wcrkicg cut and izclementation of cewures
in that field si.;uii ee closely linked to the srre2~r.i.enin.g of political and
inter:.ltiinâ!. 1=.::i g.;z=-r..-ces of t"e sec~~rity of 3crtei. The cocclusior. cf a
.,.r-:itreery CE the :.r,--,q;eof force in internztional relasions would be a cajor
s:o; in this lirecricn. The Parties to such a treaty, including, of course, thc
r.xclerx ?c.iorz, .~oLi 2a;~ze an obligation to refrain frcn the use or threat or
force er.;icjir..: en- zy~e cf weapons, includine nuclear wes-ons and other tmes
veapons of sa:; desir-c-ion. The advantace of solving the question of the nonLse
cf nuciear wez-ons ir. ti.e context of the ;rohitition cf the use of any type of
veepons lies in the fsc: chat al1 States - both nuclear and non-nuchar - vould be
placed in tke 5arr.e zosi?ion.
Such an a'-rgac.*. is also fully in keepinc with the decisions of the Unitcd
iiations. In ;&rticular, in resolution 2936 (XXVII) on the non-use of force in
international reiations and pemanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weaFom,
the General Acsectly, on oenalf of the States Members of the Organization
asciarea tneir renunciation of the use of force in international relations
;errenent prchibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The Final Cucument of tto
sp-cial sessicn of the General Assemoly devoted to aiâar::ment, notes the ce&
the adoption of meaâ-ses aized at preventing the outbreel. of nuclear var an6 the
use cf force in interrarional relations, in acccrdacce vith the oi-avisions 31 tte
Charter of the United listions, including the use of nuclear weapons.
In conditions vhere ncclear veapons are retained in the arsenals of States
the nuclear arns race continues, the Soviet Union is doing everything in its p&&
to exclude the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear var and to avert the threat
of the use of nuclear veapons. With this aim in mind, the USSR has concluded a
number of agreements vith other nuclear States vith a viev to preventing the
possibility of the outbreak of conflicts involving the use of nuclear veapons.
These include such important documents as the agreement between the USSR and tbe
United States on the prevention of a ruclear var (1973). the agreement vith the
United States on measures to reduce the daager of the outbreak of nuclear va. M?
on measures to improve direct communications lines (1971). the exchange of letters
between the ilinisters for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and Rance on the prevention
of the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons (19761, the agreement
between the Goverments of the UÇSR and the United Kingdom on the prevention of
From the standpoint of the USSR. dl
accidental outbreak of nuclear var (1977).
nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so should conclude vith other
nuclear States agreements concerning measures to reduce and avert the danger of
nuclear var and to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
ana those nuclear States between vhich such agreerents already exist should immve
and expa.nd such measures.
ike USS? has decle-ed that it is opposed to the .Ise sf nuclecr weapoes: 0?i??
extraordinar,- circmtacces - aggression against the US3À or its allies by another
nuclear Pover - couid coqel it to resort to that extreme means of self-defene-
The USSR has solemljr declared tkst it wiii never use nuclear veacons against those
couutries which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear veapons ad have nuclear ;rezpor.j t,eir territcrii.s. 7" soviet Union has also exyrested its
reaoiness to ccnclsfo jFeciel aGrierents oc :tij ratter vith an7 SUCÇ c~untries.
the USSR~ZS sppezled -2 the sther nuclear ?o.iers to f0llc.d the sue course
of cction ar.3 to ZS;(LT~ the sac ~tli~ations.
.-
. t . , ---. cCnorol .$~~~-~ly, on a :roiosal of tk~e Zcvie:
Union.z<c?tei a resol.Jtic2 cn the conclysicn gf an international con'lention Zn :Le
non-use f nïclear tre=por.; a,sin-t :nose states vhich renounce the producticn ana
acqu.i~;t'oncf nuclear veaFons and have no naclear i,ea;ons on their territcries.
The speedypreraration and conclusion of such a c-invention irould ~0nSiàerab1.i
inducethe ~Ossibility of the outbreak of nuclear cmflict and would strenethen the
secufityOf non-nuclear.ccuntries a~ainst the threat of the >se of nuclou ;;ezpor.;
againstthe=.
The intensification of United Nations efforts vith regard to the
non-rroliferation of nuclear weapons, the expansion of the number of parties to the
peaty on the Flon-Proliferation of Nuclear \.Ieapons and the establishment of
nuc?ei.:--fTee zones in various regions of the vorld. and the inplementation of the
resolution adopted by the Ceneral Asseably at its thirty-third session, on the
jn;-tistive of the USSR, on the question of the non-stationinq of nuclear wez:ons
or. :ke territories of Statesvhere there are no such veapons at present would
undoobt@~ contribute to:rar?s the goal of ~reventing nuclear var.
-.
.nus, the Soviet Union considers that a solution to the question of the non-use
of r.,;clear veapons and the prevention of nuclear var can te achieved, first and
foremost, through halting the nuclear anus race and ending the production of nuclear
weaponsand reducing a7d destmying stockpiles of such weapons; secondly. parallel
withsuch measures. through the strengthening of political and international legai
quaranteesof the security of States providing for the prohibition of the use of
ùothnuclear and other types of weapons and of force in general in intemationai
.-clations; and, third, throyh the adoption of measures directed towards
:-rengthening the régime for the non-proliferationof nuclear veapons and avertine
:.:e danger of the outbreak of conflicts involving the use of nuclear veapons. ..
~JNITED NATIONS
NOV 1 !71979 Distr.
LIMITED
GENERAI
A/C.l/ib/L.26
ASSE.MBLY 15 ?!ovenber 1979
ORICICrAL: DICLISH
T!?irty.-fourth session
FIRIT CO~"~~ITTEE
hgrnda iter. 42
P.FirIFr OF THE IE~PL~.E~PTATIO~ OlF TII ? .FCOI.D.T.F!DATIO!ISD DCCISIONS
ADOPTED BY Tm CEIrFRALASSITqBLYAT ITS TEPTH SPECIAL SFSSIOI!
-r~entina, Cy~rus, Wt, ïthiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran,
I!ieeria, Sri Lanka and Yqoslavia: draft resolution
The General Assembly,
Recallinz its resolution 33/71 B, inter dia, calling for prohibition of
5ie Ge of nuclear weapons, pendinp nuclear disarmament,
Takinrz into account proposais submitted by States concernine the non-use of
nucleer weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and relat.ed matters (A/34/&5 and Aci.d.11,
1. -ecides to transmit the views of States concerning the non-use of
ncclear wea-on~, avoidance of nuclear var and related matters, to the Cornittee
cn Disarmament i
2. Eeauests the Cornittee on Disrrmament to take those views into
consideration along with other related items on its agenda and to report thereon
tc the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.UnitedNaions 36
GENERAL FIIW COWiïïTEZ
36tmeeting
ASSEMBLY hela on
THIRTY-FOURTHSESSION Riàay. 16 tfovemù1979
et 10.ja.m.
DISrnrnrENITEMS
AGENDAITEMS30 TO45,120 AND121 (continuedl Thci CHAIRtrn:
* **
1 now cal1 on the representative of ïndia, who wishes to introduce draft
resolution A/C.1/34/L.26.
Mr. GHAREKHAn (India): On behalf of the delegations of Argentina,
Cyprus, Egypt,Ethiopia, ïndonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia, as
well as my OM. 1 introduce the draît resolution contained in document
A/C.1/34/L.26. This &ait resolution is related to agenda item b2, vhich deals
with the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted
by the General Assembly at its tenth special session. The Codttee will recall
that at the session last year, the Assembly adopted, by an overvhelming mnjority,
resolution33/71 B, which called for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons
pending nuclear disarmament and which further called upan Member States to
transmit their views regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons and the avoidance of
a nuclear var.
My delegation was happy that sewral Members responded to the Secretary-
General's letter inviting their views and those views are available in document
A/34/456 and Add.1. The drait resolution in A/C.1/3b/L.26 is of a procedural
nature. It is a very simple text, in accordance with the custom of Indian A/C.~/~~/PV. 36
32-35
(Mr. Gharekhan, India)
delegations of drafting resolutions in very simple language, and we trust thot the
draft will be acce?table to al1 delegations. The first preambiilar paragraph merely
recalls resolution 33/71 B. wnich, as 1 stated earlier, was adopted by a very large
majority last year. The second preambular paragraph would take into account the
proposals submitted by tat tes concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, the
avoidance of nuclear war and other related matters. In operative paragrapn 1 the
Assembly would decide to transmit those views to the Comrnictee on Disarmament for
consideration and in operative paragraph 2 it would request the Committee to take
chose views into consideration when it considers other items on its agenda and to
report on its considerations to the Assembly at its next session.
1 would not like to take any more of the Committee's time since the draft
resolution is really very simple and self-explanatory, and on behalf of the
sponsors 1 muid request and express the hope that the resolution be adopted
without a vote when it is taken up. United Nations
FIRST CONMITTEE
.' GENERAL 42nd meeting
held on
ASSEMBLY
!.ionday, 26 November 1979
THIRTY-FOURTH SESSION at 10.30 a.m.
NewYork
0di;ciaiRecords
DISAWW~ENT IT~~S
AGETDAITEMS Y, 32, 35, 39 ND 42 TO 45 (continued)
A statement vas made by:
!&. Garcia Robles (Mexico)
Thunmrd u rub- Icomcuoo. ComcwnisJiouldb. vicomntrdcow of Distr. GENERAL
thmord uid shoubcml wlhm m mk of lhe &le pbiamn IOthcml. ~/~.1/34/~.42
OIT4 RMds Ebun~ku>o. roomA.=
27 Elovember 1979
ComctimsviUk i-d shadydur theendothmpn. inrapuitdIiPclfor
euh Com~im. ENGLISH
73-74249 The CHAIRHAN: The Ccmittee kas concluded its consideration of
~lc.i/3h/~.23.
It is my intention to turn now to draft resolutio ~/~.1/34/~.26, under
agenda item 42, entitled "Review of the Implenentation of the Recommendations
and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly at its Tenth Special Session".
This draft resolution bs 12 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of
India at the 36th meeting of the First. Committee on 16 November.
Mr. GHARI-ICFA(N India) : 1 should like to inforn the Coimittee of a
slight amendment to this draft resolution. The phrase in the second line of
operative paramaph 2, "along with other .related items on its agenda" should be
deleted, and the word "appropriate" should be inserted between the words "into"
and "consideration" so that the paragraph now reads:
"Requests the Cdttee on Disarmment to take those views
into appropriate consideration and to report thereon to the General
Assenbly at its thirty-fifth session1'..
This saal1 amendment is in response to sug~estions made to us by some
delegations, and 1 hope that it vil1 facilitae the tssk of those delegations.
The CHAIRMAN: The sponsors of riraft resolution A/~.1/34/L. 26 are :
Argentina , Cyorus , Pgyot , Ethiopia , India, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Qatar,
Sri Lanlui, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. The &raft resolution as just amended
by the representative of India, vil1 nom be put to the vote.
-. - ... ,'
Mr. FISHER (~nited States of America): 1 wish to request a recorded
vote.
The CiU.IRMAï?: A recorded vote has been requested.
A recorded vote was taken. In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria. Angola, Argentina, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil,
Burma, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cliile, China, Colombia,
Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egfpt ,Ethiopia, Fiji,
Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Qlana, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,
Kuwait , Lao People's Democratic Republic , Lebanon,
Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, lkdagascar,
Malaysia, Mali , Mslt a, Plauritani a, Mauritius , kxi CO,
florocco, bbzambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Sa0 Tome and Principe,
Saudi Arabia, Sene@, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,
Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United
Republic of Cammon, United Republic of Tanzania,
Upper Volta, Uruguq, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yenien, Yugoslavia,
Zaire, Zambia
Agains t : Belgium, Canada, Denmaris, fiance, Gennany , Federai
Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg,
~etherlands , Nel? Zesland, Noiway, Portugal, Turkey ,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Irelaad,
United States of America
Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet
Abstaining:
Sociaiist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Ge- Democratic
Republic, Hungary , Israel, Japan, Mngolia, Poland,
Spain, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of
soviet Sociaiist Repuhlics
Draft resolution 4/C.1/34/~.26, as amended, was adopted by 100 votes to 16,
with 14 abstentions. The CHAIRMAN: 1 shall nar cal1 on those representatives who wish
to explain their votes.
Mr, PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation
from Russian) : With respect to the vote just taiser. on draft, resolution
A/C.1/34/L.26 on the review of 'the implementation of the recomiendations and
decisions of the tenth soecial.sessicn, we should like to state the following.
2r0~ the the vrhen nuclear weauons bad just emerged, the Soviet-Union has
consistently advocated and still advocates the imulementation of
practical steps to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons together with
parallei mesures to strengthen international peace and security. We
recogiize that the main danger for international peace and security stems
from the nuclear arms race and the Soviet Union considers that the' central
place in the efforts of States should be taken by mesures dmed at the halting
and then the reversal of the arms race, to ban forever the use of nuclear
weapons and at the same time to refrain from using force in international
relations.
TO attain real results, the Soviet Union beliwes that the elaboration and
kplenentstion of measures in this field should be part of the oreanic
process of strengthening legal and political guarantees of the security of
States. An important step in this direction would be the conclusion of a
world treaty on the nm-use of force in international relations. The parties
to such a treaty, naturally including the nuclear Parers, would undertake to
refrain from the use of force and the threat of the use of force from the
use of any types of weapons , including nuclear weapms and other types of
weapons of mass destruction.
The advantage of resolving the question of nuclear weapons in the context
of banning al1 types of weapons is that all States - both nuclear and
non-nuclear States - wouïd be put on an equal footing. That approach is
îU3.y in line with the decisions taken by the United Nations, in particular
resolution 2936 (XXVII) adopted at the twenty-seventh session of the General
Assembly on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and the Permament
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear tleapons. That resolution contains
an apoee-1 by the General P.ssembly to States to renounce the use of A/c.1/34/pv.42
39-40
(~r. Petmvsigr, =SR)
such weapons snd to pmhibit permanently the use of such weapons. In the
Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament, the need is noted to take measures
Il
.. .to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, to
ensure that war is no longer an instrument for settling international
disputes and that the use and the threat of force are eliminated from
international life, as provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations". (resolution S-10/2, para. 19)
AS nuclear weapons are stiU maintained in the arsenals of States and
the nudear armç race continues unabated, the Soviet Union is doina its utmost
to exclude the possibiLity of the outbreak of a nuclear var and to prevent
the threat of such a var. On these lines, we have concluded a number of
agreements with other nuclear States to prevent the possibility of the use
of nuclear weapons in cinflicts widch might arise.
In order to prevent a nuclear war, further efforts should be made by
States Merabers of the United Nations so as to halt the pmliferation of nuclear
weapons and to expand the nuaber of parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
to cre8te nuclear-wespon-fiee zones thm@out the world and also to implement,
at the initiative of the Soviet Mon, the resolution on the non-stationing
of nuclear vespons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons
at present.
The Soviet ünion thus sees the solution to the non-use of nuclear weaponç
in var fint and foremst in the halting of the nuclear-arms race. the cessation of
the production of euch weapone and the cutting dm of araenals of them.
Secondly, and parailel with this, we would strengthen international legal
guaraatees for the security of States, envisaging the prohibition of the use of
nuclear and other types of weapons and in fact of force in general in international
relations. Thirdly, we would aâvocate adopting measures to strengthen the
régimeof non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to prevent the danger of
conflicts arising which would use nuclear weapons.
hfortunately, the draltresalution that we have just amed refeX3 to
resolutian 33/71 B which cslls for the of the use of nuclear
WespOnsbut artificiau separates it JIU the other measures which should be taken,
namely, the provision of international legal guarantees and the renunciation b~ all
States of the uae of force in intemationai relations. For that reason
the Soviet Won abstained in the vute on this draft resolution. Mr. MULLOY (Ireland): Ireland regards draft resolution ~/~.1/34/~.26
introduced by India, entitled "Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations
and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session", as
a procedural resolution; first, deciding to transmit proposàls concerning the
non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters to the
Committee on Disarmament; secondly, requesting the Cdttee on Disannament t0
take those views into appropriate consideration and to report thereon to the
General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.
Ireland, in voting for the procedural draft resolution, believes it necessary
to say that we regard it as important that al1 views formally notified on th5
issue should be Ailly taken into account in the discussions in the Committee on
Disamament.
Our views on the substantive issue arising were expressed in the position
we took on last year's resolution 33/71 B, which Ireltind voted against.
Mr. LIDGARD(Sweden): Sweden has voted in favour of draft resolution
~/C.1/34/~.26. This positive vote does not imply that we are not avare of the
role of nuclear weapons in the current military doctrines of certain States and
military alliances, or the interrelationship between nuclear weapons and
conventional forces and the relative sizes of such forces. Unfortunately, ve do
not think that there is sufficient ground to implythat the use of such weapons
is prohibited by present international law. Deficiencies in last year's resolution
in these respects led us to abstain in the vote which then took place.
But our positive vote today should be seen as an expression of our deep
conviction that the use of nuclear veapons, in al1 circunstances, should be
prohibited, taking into accouat their utterly inhumane effects and their threat
to the very survival of civilized Society. This objective must remain our central
concern.
It ia ou. finn belief that a more resolute effort to achieve that objective
is urgent. This should take place through gradua1 and balanced reductions of
nuclear-weapon stockpiles with the aim of their total abolition. Such an effort
holds greater prospects for'increasing werybody's security than the present
seemingly never-ending build-up and the modernization beyond any reasonable Mt
of nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, within nations and both major alliances. DOCUMENT A1341
Repori oftheFïnt Committwon agenda item42
[Origind: Engüshl
[8 Decembcr19791
1. The item cntitled: "Reviewof the implementa- ' In javow: Afghaakran, Algeria, Angola Argentin&
tion of the rceommendationsand decisionsadopted by Bahamas. Bahmin, Bangiadah, Barbados, Bhutan.
the Gcneral As~unbly at its tenth specid session: B~livia, Buma. Burundi. Cape Verde, Chile.
(a) Re on of the Committee on Diamiment; (6)Re- China, Colombia,~ongo3osta Rica,Cuba, Cypnir,
portO! the Disarmament Commission;(c) United Na- Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
tiens studion disannament: report of the Secrctary- Guatemaia,Guinea.Guinea-Bissau,Guyana, Honduras,,
General;(4 Non-useofnucicarweaponsand prwention hdia Indonesia, In ka Ireland, Ivory Coat,
of nuclear war report of the Secretary-General; (e) Jamaica. Jordan, Kenya Kuwait, Lao People'sDemo-
Disarmament Week: reports of the Secretary-General; cratic Republic, Lebanon. Lesotho. Liberia, Lib~an
(B United Nationsprogrammeof feuowshipson disarm- Arab lamahiriya, Madagascar,Malaysia,Mali, Malta,
ment: report of the SecretaryGenera(g)Implemen- Mauritania,Mauritius,Mexico.Momeco,Mozambique,
tation of the rewmmendations and deasions of the Nepal,Nigr, Nigeria.Oman, Pakistan. Panama,Pa ua
tenth spsial session: report of the Sccrct~Gcncral; New Guinea. Paraguay, Pem. Philippines.Qata[O-
(h) Disseminationof informationon tamis race and Sierra Lmne, Singaporc. Somalia, Sri Lanka. Sudan,
disamment: (i) Reports of the SaretaryGeneral; Suriname,Swaziland.Sweden, Synan Anb Republic,
tions Educational, Scientificand Cultural Organization;Thailand Top, finidad and Tobago.Tunisia,Uganda.
(OMonitoringof disarmamentagreementsand suength- United ArabEmintn, United Republicof Carnemon,
ening of international smirity: repoofthe Sece United Republicof Tanuinia. Upper Volta Umeuay,
taryeeneral;03Programmeof rsearch and studiu on Venezuela, Viet Nam. Yemen, Yugoslavia, &m.
disarmament: report of the SecretaryGeneral; (k) Zambia.
Study on the relationship bctween disamament and Againrt: Belgium.Canada, Denmark, France, Ger-
development: report of the SecretaryGenenl(0New many.FederalRepublicof. Grecce. Iceland,ItaLm-
philosophy on disarmament: report of the Secretary- embourg,Netherlands.NewLaland. Nonvay,Portugal.
Gthirty-fourthsessionin accordancewithGeneralAsxm-he Ireland.UnitedStatu of Amcriea.itainandNonhem
bly molutions 33/71 B. DE,F, G. H. J,K.M and N Abnaining:Australia.Austna. Bulgaria,Byelomssian
of 14 December 1978. Soviet Socialit Republic. aedioslovakia,German
2. At iu 4th plenary meeting, on 21Sc tember Democratic Republic, Hungary, hrael, Japm, Mon-
1979, theGeneral Assembly.on the mmmen tton of golia. Poland,Spain. Ukrainian SovietSocialistRepub-
theGenenl Committee,dccidedto includetheitemin iis lic.UnionofSovietSocidkt Republia.
agenda and to allocate it to the Fint Committee. ..O
3. At its 3rd meeting,on 1October,the Fint Com- Re- of theFini Commitîes
mittcedended to hold acombinedpneral debateon the 38. Tbe Wm Committee rccommcndsto the Gen-
items allocated to it relatingto disarmament. namely, eralAuembly the adoption of the hllowing drm-t
items 30 to 45, 120 and 121. The gcneraldebate twk olutions:
placeat the 4th. 6th. 8th to 13thand 15thto 30th meet-
...fmm 6 October to 5 Novemkr. Reand&Nionse iadopid by the Gened Auembly ainr
irrrentspeciaisession
.m. a
...
H. Draft ruolution A/C.1/34/L.26 NON-US EP NUCLEARWEAWNS AND PREVEHTION
22. On 15 ~ov~mbm.Argmtina, WN. E~pt. OF NUCLEARWAR
Ethiopia India, Indonnin Inn, Nigena, Sn hkaand The Grnerd Assembly,
Yugoslaviasubmitted a draft molution (A/C.I/3?/ Recaflin'giis molution 33/71 B of 14 Daxmber
L.26)concemingthe non-meofnudear we?pons.which 1978,in which,interah, it callcdfor pmhibitionof
wasintrodh by the rcpracntative of Indiaat the 36th thew of nuclear weapons, pending nucleardisarma-
meetinplon 16 November.The draft was Subquentiy ment.
sponsoÏedah by Qatar and ~niguay. Taking inro amountproposaissubmittedby Statu
23. At the 42nd meeting on 26 November.kfore concemingthe non-use of nudear weapons,avoidance
che Fmt Conunitteeproccak o vote on the draft of nuclcar war and related manen (A/34/456 and
operativeparapph 2rbydeletingthe ph-d"dong ~11th Add.I),
otherrclated item on in agenda"aftcr the w0rd "con- 1. Decidu to Iransmit to the CommitteeonDis-
sideration" and inserting the word "appmpnaten k- armament the viewsof Set~ concming tbe non-
tween the words "into" and "consideration" (for the of nuclear weapons,avordana of nuciex and
tCXt.wepan. 38 below,draft rcsolutionG). The drafi dated matten;
rs~lutionasorally rcvisewatadoptedbya ~~rded 2 ReqvurstheCornmitteeon Disarmamentto &e
voteof 100 10 16. with 14abstentions.The votingwas those viewsinto appmpnate cormderationandvn
thermn to the General Ambly at its th@-nfth ses-
sion.!? United Norions
PLENAR M Y EEiiNG
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY Tursday. IIDrcernbrr 1979.
ïWàïï-FOURTHSESSION U or IIu.m.
OfGd Record NEW IOIK
Agenda ilem42:
Rerlev uithe implementat;on ,,l the rccommenduian, and 4. Before introducing the individual repons on the
deci?iuns adopted byticiicrAswmbly aiillenih variousagendaitems.Lwishto,apologizetodelcgations
ta) Repon othe Committcitiliwfrnuncnl: forthe factthatitwasnotpossiblefortheSecretariat 10
publish al1the repons in lime for distribution 10the
(CIUnilcdNations studie, on tlirumimpon of the permanent missions. 1 have been assured. howcver.
Sccrrwçenenl: thai al1the reports are nowavailableal the documents
(4Nonusc ofnuclcareapon* iind pmven'of nuclear booth.
le)Disamumentwcck:emponqroftheSccFtaryClencd: ...
V)UnitedNationspm-me 181fell~ihW on dim- 17. The Cornmittee'srcpon on item 42.entitled"Re-
ment:mpon ofthihc mtimmcndalionr Md decirions view of the implementationof the rccommendations
(Oofmhceienih5-id s~isiunrepon oftheSecreiary- and decisions adopted by the General Assemblyat its
Gcnerdi: . tenth specialsession". appears indocumentA13417St.
th)Disscmtmionof infomatiiiun lhcarms raceand Under this itemtheCommitteeadopted 13drafiresolu-
( i~Repon sfthe~ecmmrvlicncd. nationai security": "Repon of the Committeeon Dis-r-
tiiRepon ofth~imtor-<;cnc+p(theUnitedNations annament"; "lmplementationofthe recommendations
~ducatiom~Scienitfnnd culiurOrnuauon. and decisions of the tenth spetial session"; "United
(11inaoftinsrns~i-n~~~u~tiye.ponsofiheSecceW.. Nations programme offellowshipson disarmament";
Gëncnl: "Monitoring of disarmament agreements and
(I)Rognmme of ms-h *tudiesondiwmiuneni: strengthening of international xcurity": "Freezing
IL)Studyonfthc mlnuonship b~iwdirnnwnen t nde- and reduction of military budgets": "Nonuse of
velopmeni:mpon the~ecre~ûe~erdi: nuclear weaponsand preventionofnuclear war": "Re-
tl) New phiiosophy on diurmmenl: Won of ihc on ofthe DisarmamentCommission";"Disarmament
ReponoftheFintCommiiirs: .................... beek": '.Nuclearweaponsinail aspects"; "Study on
the rclationship benveen disarmament and develop-
ment": "Committee on Disarmament"; and ..Pro-
1. The PRESIDENT: 1regret that throughnofaultof gramme of research and studies on disarmament".
oum. and panicularly no l'nul1of the delegations,we These draft rcsolutionsappear in paragraph 38of the
have had to sw our meetingrather late. Thatwasnot report.
because representatives were not herc punctuaîiy-aJl
of them were-but because the documents were not 18. Funhermore. under the same item. the Commit-
though the documents. I thoughto dl11more prudentto10o tee adopred also adralt decistonconcern~nga&udyon
wat untilailmemben had thedocuments beforestart- a comprehensive nucleartestban. The relevantrccom-
lng the meeting. mendations of the Commitree am cinÏGned in
panyraph 39of ilsreport[A/341752l.1wish topointout
2. Mr. SUCHARIPA (Austria). Rapporteur of the a minor ermr in this repon. The las1paragraphshould
First Committee:1have the honourof presentingtothe be numbered 39. insteadof ?1.
General Assemblythe repens pf the First Committee . .-
on its work concemingagenda items301045anditems 23. The large number of pmpods adopted by the
120 -and 121. which üII relate to questions of Committeeandthe factchatno lessthan 105 smements
disarmament. were made in thegeneraldebateondisannamentituns
are againaclearexpressionofthe intensificdinterestof
3. The Fint ~ommittec ,ibis year,held a combined al1 delegations in these pressing issues as wellasa
general debate on these items having regard to the i-cflectionof the serious effons made by the General
and decisionsadopted by th? Genet-alAssemblyat itss Assemblytosolvequestionsofdisament withii the
tenth specialsession[resolutlonS-lOa] as wellasothcr frameworkofthe UnitedNationswhich.inrhewordsof
disarmament items.fhe yencd debate on theseitems the FinalDocumentofthe tenth spccialsession,which
look place at the 4th to 30th meetings of the First was devoted to disamament. ha. inaccordancewith
Cornmittee from 16Octoher 10 5 November. Subse- the Charter, acenirairoleandprimaryrcsponsibilityin
quently. the Fint Committee devoted t5 meetings. the sphere ofdisarmament [ser rrsuluriunS-1012.srci.
from 6to 27November. and again Pan of onemeeting II.pora. 271. Most. if not all. of these proposaisarc
on 30 November. to an in-depth consideration ofand designed to ensure the carliest implementation ofthe
action on thedraftresolutions that hadbeen pmsented. i-ccommendationsand decisionsadopted by the Gen-
As aresultof ildelibentions. the Cornmitteeadopted eral Assemblyat itstendi spccial session.
38 Jraft resolutionsand one drafi decision. 24. On behaifof theFint Committee.irismypleasure
IOrecommend to the General Assembly foradoption
hav.-just referred.s and the drafl decision toIwhtch
60.
now consider the repon of the Fint Committee on
agenda item42 [A/34/75 Th]eAssemblywillnowtake
a decision on the 13draft resolutionsrccommendedb
theFint Committeeinpamgmph 38ofiurcpon. whicl
appear together under the tiUe"Review of the imple-
adopredoby the General Assemblysatils tenth special
session".
69. The PRESiDENT: Dr& resolution G isentitled
"Non-use of nuclcar weapons and prcvention of
nuclear war". A rccorded vote basbeen rcquested.
A recordedVorewas takon.
Infavour:Afghanistan. Algeria. Angola.ArgenCna.
"--~mas. Bahn. Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin.
Bhutan. Bolivia, ~o<swaia. Brazil, Burma. Burundi.
Cape Verde, Cenual AfricanRe ublic, Chad, Chüe,
China. Cqmoms. Congo, Costa Lca, cuba, cypm
Democdic ,Kampuchea Dcmocratic Y-n. ~$1
bouti. Dom+ca? Republic, Ecuador, Egypt. El
Ghana.oGE*.hopiGuatemala Guinea. Guinea-Bissau.
GU ana. Hain. Honduras. .hdia,Indonesih. Iraq,
Irrand. Ivow.Coast, Jarnac?,Jordan, Kenya,Kuwait.
Lao Peoples Democmc Republic, &banon,
Lesotho. Liberia. Libyan &ab Jmahhiya.
Maita. Mauntania Mauritius, Mexico. Mo-, Md.
Mozambique. Nepal. Niger. NigeriaOman. Palristan.
panama.Paraguay. Pcni.Philippines.Qw. Romania.
--anda. Samoa. Sao Tome and Ruici~c, Saudi
..hia. -enesai. Sier-~L~~~.-~-innaoor.&da. Sri
-- -Lanka S.*. SU*~. Swaziiand, Swcdcn, Syrian
Tunisia. Uganda Unile Adp. Emiratcs. United Re-
oublicof camemon. UmtcdRepublicofTanzania Up
'er Volta. Uruguay, Venezuela. Viet Nam. Ycmcn,
$ugoslavia, Zak. Zambii
Apainst: Beleium. Canada. DenmarL. France.
~erkany, Federal Republicof. Grcece, Iceland. Italy.
Luxembourg. Netherlands, New Zealand, Noway.
Nonhern Ireland, Umtcd States of America.nand
Abstoining:Australia, Austria, Bul 'aB elorus-
sian Soviet Socialist Republic. P z"c.rsovakta.
German Democratic Republic,Hungary.Isracl.Japan.
Mon olia. Poland. Spain, Uk++ Sovi. Socialisr
~epu!lic, Unionof Soviet SocraiistRepublics.
Drafi resolutioG wasadoptedby 112 votesto16.
with 14 ubstenriom(resolutio34\83 G). 35/152. Reviewof the implementationoftherecommen-
dations and decisions adopted by the General
Assemblyat its tenth specialsession
NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAWNS AND PREVENTION OF
NUCLEARWAR
The-GeneralAssembly.
Alarmed by the threat to the survivalof rnankindand
to thelife-sustainingsystem posed by nuclear weapons
and by their use,inhercnt in concepts of deterrena.
Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for
the prevention of nuclear warand for the strengthening
of international peace and security,
Recallingits declaration, contained in the Final Docu-
ment of the Tentb Special Seision of the General
Assembly. that al1States should actively participate in
efforts tobring about conditions in international rela-
tions among States in which a code of pcacefulconduct
of nations in intemationalaffairs could be agrctd upon
and which would precfudethe use or threat of useof nu-
clear weapons,"
Recalling its rcsolution1653 (XVI) of 24 November
1961.33/71 B of 14Dcccmber 1978and 34/83 G of II
December 1979.
Wcapons, prepared
Experts,
1. Declaresonce again that:
of theCharter ofihe United Nations and a crimeagainstn
humanity;
(b) The use or thrcat ,of iuc of nuclear weapons
should thereforc be prohibitcd, pending nuclcar dis-
armament;
2. Requestsail States that have sofar not submitted
their proposals conŒming the non-useofnuclcarwca
ons, avoidanΠof nuclcar war and rclated matten, t8 O
so, in order that the question of an international con-
vention orsome other agreement on the subjcctmay be
funher considercd at the thiny-sixth mion of the
General Ascmbly;
3. Decides to include in the provisionalagendaofits
thirty-sixth session the item cntitled "Non-ux of nu-
clear weapons and prevention of nuclcar war".
94thplenarymeeting
12 December1980
"ThercportwaslaicbrucdwiththetitlCompnhmir SiudyMI
NuclcaWeapnr(Uni1edNationspublicatioSalaNo. E.81II1).ljNIlED DARIONS
UNISA c~XLECT]DN Distr.
LI!.IIT.ZD
6ENERAL
A/C.1/35/L.22
"Ek/iB!'f 14 Hovember 1960
A3 J
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Thirty-fifth session
EEST CONTiITTEE
&enda icen 44 (.g)
REVILI! OF THE Ii.!PLEI~IENTATIOïO 'lF THERECOP~!MEilDATIOM I~ISD
DECISIONS AEOPTEDBY THE GENERALASSE'BLY AT ITS TENTH
SPECIAL SESSION
NOiI-USE OF NUCLCAR WEAPONSANDPREVEPITIOW OF NüCLEAR \!AR
Algeria, Angola, Argentins, Congo, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia,
, ;
Yugoslavia and Zaire: draft resolution
The Generd Assembly,
Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining
system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use inherent in concepts of
deterrence,
Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essentiaï for the prevention of nuclear
var and for the strengthening of international peace and security,
Recalling its declaration, contained in the Final Document of the Tenth
Çpecial Session, that "Al1 States should actively participate in efforts to bring
about conditions in international relations amone States in which a code of
~eacefui conduct of Nations in international affairs could be agreed and which
.muid preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons::,
Recalling its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 Novenber 1961, 33/71 B of
14 Decenber 1978 and 34/63 C of 11 December 1979,
Notin~ the comprehensive study of nuclear weapons prepared by the Secretary-
&neraï with the assistance of a group of experts (~/35/392),
1. Oeclares once again that:
(a) The use of nuclear weapons vil1 be a violation of the Charter of the
United Nations and a crime against humanity: (b) Tke use or tkreat of use of nuclear ueapons Shoulil th~refore be
proilibite*, pending nuclear disarmerient;
2. !?e?iie;tç al1 Steteswhich have so fa* not subnitted tlieir proposals
concerniiig the no:;-use of cuciezr rreacons, avoidance of nuclear var and. related
rattex, to do so, hl ordzr .tlir.t the 2urstio;i of a? i~terna~ional conventiori or
some othsr agreemriit on the subject ;na.{ be funher considered at the thirty-sixrh
sessicn of t'ne Ceneral Asst.mbl7;
3. Decides to include in the -,rovisional Menda of its thirty-sixth session
m item entitleù "llon-use of nuclear i.reapons s72 preiention of nuclear var".c.7 United Notions
CENERAL FlRST COMMITTEE
35thmeeting
ASSEMBLY heldon
Wednesday, 19 Hovember 1980
THIRTY-FIFTHSESSION at 10.30 a.m.
O&id Records* NewYork
VERBATIM RECORDOF THE 35TH MEETING
Chaiman: Mr. NAIK(Pakistan)
DISARMAMEN TTEMS
AGENDA1'i'R. 3E1M b9 AlJD121 (continued)
Dr& resolutionw sere introduce dy:
Mr.Bdasubramsniam (sriLanka) - A/C.1/35/~.24
Mr. Komives (~ungary) - A/C.1/35/L.27
Mr.Mittd (India) - A/C.1/35/L.22
Mr.Adeniji(Higeria) - A/C.1/35/L.3a 0ndL.3
PROGRAMME OF WORK
rignaturcof a membnof thedelegvirhin monrof r&rec DlstrCENERAL
ofpublicarmnto theChOmdofRecordaEiiitiq SecA-3SS0.om A/C.1/35/W.35
866UnitedNatiPla(Alma Building).ad inco1mPYaofthc 20 Eovember 1980
record.
ComctiowilbUsucaftcrtheend oftheisrcpurtefaacidefor
=ch Committec.
80-63707 The CHAIRMAN: 1 cal1 on the representative of India to introduce
the &ait resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.22.
On behalf of its sponsors, includirq my am
Mr. Mï'ïTAL(India) :
delegation, 1 have the honour of introducing the &aft resolution contained
in document A/C.l'/35/L.22 on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention
of nuclear war.
It will be recded that the Final Document of the speciaï session
of the General Assembly dwoted to disarmament unequivocally States:
"iiuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the
survivaï of civilization. It is essentiaï to halt and reverse the
nuclear anns race in ail its aspects in order to avert the danger
of rar involving nuclear weapons. The ulthte goal in this context
is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons." (resolution s-1012,
para. 47) (Mr. Mittal. 1ndia)
The Final Document also stated that the most effective guarantee against
the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear
disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weaFons.
The several statements that we have heard during our debate in the past
fe~r weeks in this Committee have underscored the fact that the nuclear arms
race has continued unchecked and that the danger of a nuclear var breaking
out has significantly escalated. This is due not onïy to the continued increase
in the nuclear arsenals of nuclear-weapon States, but also to the espousal
of such dangerous strategic doctrines as nuclear deterrence, limited nuclear
strilses and so on. Given this situation, the question of providing mankind
with a credible and binding assurance against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons has become more urgent than ever before.
The draft resolution before us is basically a reiteration of the pkovisions
of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) of
November 1961. That Declaration had clearly stated that the use of nuclear
weapons would be a violation of the United Nations Charter and a crime against
humanity. The effects of any nuclear war, as should be apparent to dl, would
not be limited merely to the territories of those who may wage it. All States,
including non-nuclear-weapon countries, would suffer from the radioactive
fall-out and the contamination that muid inevitably ensue. This is amply
clear from the study on nuclear veapons prepared by the Secretary-Ceneral with
the assistance of a gmup of experts, contained in document A/35/392. It is
for this pressing reason that we continue to hold that the sovereignty and
irell-being of el1 States, includiw those not involved in the conflict, would
be endangered in the event of a nuclear var. Such a develoment, then, would
clearly be a violation of the United Nations Charter and a crime against the
whole of mankind. In addition, given the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear
war, it may well mean the end of Our species and human civilization as we
know it . (fi . ittal. 1ndlk)
The present draft resolut:r,n refers in adàitio~i to tir0 other resolutions
The first, General Assembly resolution 33/71 B. was aponsored
on the subject.
by as ncny as 34 delegations and was adopted by an overirhelming majority of
the international ccnliunity. Tne present draft resolution is on similar lines.
The reason rihy it is felt necessary to focus attention once again on this
extremely important issue rests on the increasingly elusive prospect of rnzking
meaningful progress in regard to nuclear disarmament. The draft resolution
further tal,es note of the study on nuclear weapons prepared by the Secretary-
Ceneral to which 1 have aiready made reference.
The other resolution referred to is General Assembly resolution 34/83 G,
which was meinly procedural in nature and had asked for the views of States
concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons and avoidance of nuclear rrar to be
transmitted to the Cornmittee on Disarmament for its consideration.
The sponsors of the draft resolution which is now before us are not asking
for the immediate conclusion of a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons,
since this would obviously take considerable time. But they do consider it
necessary that at least a beginning must be made without delay in that
direction to prevent the possibility of a nuclear conflict. In response to
the earlier resolution 33/71 B, some States had communicated their proposais
in this regard to the United NatLons. These are available ;n documents
~/34/456 of 28 Septaber 1979 and A/34/456/Add.l of 16 October 1979. The
current draft resolution calls upon those States that have not already done
so similarly to submit their suggestions in this regard so that the possibility
of concluding an international convention or other suitable agreement on the
subject may be seriously considered at the thirty-sixth session of the General
Assembly. It is the opinion of the sFonsors that once a cross-section of
views, rrhich shouïd be as broad as possible, has been obtained, the objective
of negotiating a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons, or some other
internationally binding agreement to that effect, could be taken up in a more
practical and concrete manner. The sFonsors of the draft resolution which 1 have just introduccd
earnestly hope that it will receive the widest support of ail membcri .>fthe
First Committee and that this will in turn move the rrorld comunity closer
towards the goal of eliiiinating once and for all the danger of a nuclear
var, thereby rnsuringthat Our generation as well as future generations
are free frcm the ever.-present and groinng threat to their swival
from such a war.
lir.PETmE (United States of ~merica): For the first tire in its
history, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean has been able to fornulate
a draft resolution which, we believe, should be able to command unanimous
support in this body. Al1 countries who participated in the lengthy Ad Xoc
Cornittee discussions of the past year share the credit for this achievenent,
but praise is most especially due to Chai- Balasubramaniam and his grou-
of friends, whose tireless efforts plnyed u key role in negotiating the presmt
consensus draft resolution.
It is well recognised that this draft resolution may not be entirely
satisfactory to al1 members of the Ad Hoc Committee. Indeed, the lengthy
substantive discussions undertaken in the Committee and st the meetings of
the "Friends of the Chairman" have clearly demonstrated that a vide diversence
of views on a number of fundamental issues remains.
As this Committee is avare, the United States itself over the years has
voiced its concerns on fundamental issues relating to the vork of the Ad Hoc
Committee. Indeed, Our difficulties with aspects of the mandate of the Ad Hoc
Committee precluded our participation in its vork until this year when,
after lengthy consultations, the United States accepted the invitation extended
to it to Join the Ad Hoc Committee. United Nations
FIRST cornumm 43
GENERAL 39th meeting
ASSEMBLY held on
Fridw, 21 November 1980
THIRTY-FIFTH SESSION at 3 p.m.
Ofid Records ~ewl'ork
VERBATLY RECORDOF THE 39THMEETING
Chairman: Mr. NAIK (~akistan)
CONTENTS
DISARMAMEN ITTEMS
AGENDA ITDG 31, 32, 34 TO 37, 39 M 42AND44 M 49 (continued)
A draft resolution was introduced by:
Mr. Rose (German Democratic ~epublic) - A/C.l/35/3 L.
.mirrecoudrvbjcct to correction. Corrcctianr shauld bc unt under thDlstGENERAL
anaturof a rncrnber of the delcgatioonmonrh of the Ire A/C.1/35/W.39
866 United Nation(AlcoBuilding). and incorporated in a copy of the 22 bvember 1980
record.
Corrections will be issucd alter the end of the session, in a separate fascicie for
each Cornmittoel The CIiAIF'iml: \Je noir turn to draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22.
It is sponsored by 24 delegations and iras introduced by the representative of
India at the Comi.Sitteets 35th meeting on 19 Pioveriber 1980.
1 shall nov cal1 on those representatives ~ishing to explain their votes
before the voting.
iir. i,ULLOY (Ireland): 1 should like to explain Ireland's vote on
the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear rrar as set out in
draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22, which was introduced by India, calling once again
on the General Assembly to declare the use of nuclear ireapons to be a violation
of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity.
We are opposed to the use of nuclear weapons: we consider that their use
would indeed be disastrous. 1 wish to quote the statement made by the Irish
delegation earlier, in the generai debate:
"#e do not ever uant to see such weapons used. We believe that it wouid be
madness, the ultimate madness.. . Be want to see an end to the further
development of these weapons; a reduction in the stoclrpiles: and the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons as soon as possible."
(A/C.1/35/PV.28, p. 5)
Vre deeply regret, therefore, that ve should be obliged to vote acainst
a draft resolution under the title "Bon-use of nuclear weapons and prevention
of nuclear rai-" and, to avoid any misunderstandine of Our position on this very
issue, we rrant to put it quite clearly on record.
Already in 1961 Ireland voted against resolution 1653 (XVI) on
24 November 1961, rthich declared
"the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons Lto be/ contrary to the
spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct
violation of the Charter of the United Mations."
The 1961 resolution further declared that the use of such weapons vas
"contrary to the rules of international lavr and to the lairs of humanity."
In explaining Our position on that issue the Irish liinister for Foreign
Affairs, tir. Frank AiIren, in a letter to the Secretary-General dated 29 June 1962
indicated that Ireland was not convinced that a simple declaration ~rouid be aneffective method of preventing the use of nuclear weapons or that such a
àeclaration arould add anything to the clear terms of the Charter, by which
al1 I!embers are obliged to "refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against.. .any State:'. (Ik. Mulloy, Ireland)
In Ireland's vie~r, said Llr. Aiken, the declaration might even be
positively dangerous, in so far as it wculd tend to encourage a false sense
of security and lead States to reduce their endeavours to prevent the further
spread of these terrible neapons and to establish a world security system
~rhicii would be effective in preventing war and would ensure the gradua1
elimination of nuclear weapons in the handc of individual Powers.
That was the position in 1962, three years after Ireland's first
introduction to this Assembly of a draft resolution to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons and six years before the culmination of the efforts
initiated by Ireland in 1958 which resulted in the conclusion of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) .
While 1 wouid not wish at this point to enter into the merits of the
system of controls and safeyuards established as the result of the NPT,
is it realistic to imply that a single declaration is an adequate .
siibstitute for patient negotiations involving the nuclear Powers to restrict
the production, transfer and stockpilirg of nuclear weapons and fissionable
materiais for weapcns purposes. However, the draft resolution on which we
are to vote is not simply a general statement with which all can agree.
It declares specificaily that the use of nuclear weapons muld be a violation of
the Charter and a crime against humanity and that the use or threat of use
of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited pending nuclear disament.
1 regret to have to Say that we do not agree that this particular approach
is a good one. The nuclear Parers which claim to hold nuclear weapons as a
deterrent have developed those weapons over many years as a natter of military
policy and they always emphasize that they are ready to retaliate if attacked.
Granted that position, we see little prospect that the nuclear Powers will
now put into practice a declaration here that the use of nuclear weapons wodd
be a violation of the Charter, especially since the Charter itself makes no
mention of any weapons and does provide for the right of self-defence. (Mr . Nulloy , Ireland )
Nor will the nuclear Powers accept a declaration by the Assembly that
the use of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity. They may agree, as we
do, that it would be the supreme folly. But they attach a ~articular legal
significance to the term "crime against humanity", which was given a specific
definition by the international community follo~iing the Second Vorld Var,
and they will not concede in response to a simple declaration by the Assembly
that the military policies of deterrence to which they are at present cormitted
are in effect crimes in international law which merit international punishment.
Furthermore, we consider it unrealistic and indeed dangerously mislesdin~
to the world at large to suggest that pending nuclear disarmament the nuclear
Powers couid be willing to accept a prohibition on the threat of use of
nuclear weapons iihen that is central to the logic of their strategic doctrines,
however much we regret those doctrines.
Given the huge arsenals that exist , it is , rather , only throush nuclear
disarmament that the immense risk to mankind can be reduced and eventually
rernoved. We question seriously the value of sweeping declarations of this
kind because we fear that they may distract attention from the very Serious
need to negotiate the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons,
to which we are strongly committed, and devalue the currency of United
Nations resolutionn and their authority.
\Je know that a simple declaration by the Assembly vil1 change nothing
in practice, however emotionally satisfying it may sem. ben if the nuclear
Powers were to accept such a declaration now, they wuld, we believe, still
retain their weapons, and we see no prospect that they would really abide by
the declaration in the of war.
As evidence of the ineffectiveness of such declarations in achieving
real nuclear disarmament, I wouid point to the fact that the 1961 resolution
declared the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons a violation of the Charter
and a crime against humanity. That was 19 years ago, and the only change
since then has been a great increase in the arsenals of nuclear weapons held
by the nuclear Powers. ~/C.1/35/W.39
63-65
(1Ir. Ilulloy , Ireland )
In voting against the draft resolution already in 1961, Ireland's
delegation explained its position as follows:
"Each nuclear Power may declare ncw that to use its nuclear weapons would be
contrary to international law, but if its very survival were at stalce, it
would not hesitate to use the most potent weapons available to it, regardless
of what declarations it subscribed to ... ?ly delegation yields to none in our
horror at the prospect of the use of nuclear weapons ... but we strongly feel
that this declaration'' - the 1961 draft declaration - "although well intended,
would be of very little real value. Indeed, in so far as a convention of the
kind proposed would give a false sense of security, it may even be positively
dangerous - as it would lead States to reduce their search for the
construction of a world security system which would be effective in preventing
war and wouïd permit the gradua1 elimination of nuclear weapons in the hands
of individual Powers." (A/C.l/W.1193. P. 38)
Those were the views of my delegation in 1961, as expressed in this Cornmittee
on a somewhat simi'lar resolution. 1 believe that those views have been fully borne
out in the 19 years which have passed since then and it is essentially for similar
reasons that to Our regret we must vote against the present draft resolution.
Mr. NONOYAMA (Japan): Against the baclqround of increased international
tension in various regions, notably in Afghanistan, my Goverment considers a
stabilized system of nuclear deterrence to be of ever-increasing importance as a
factor to contain the further spreading of such tension. That is the reason why
this year my delegation has been instructed to vote against the draft resolution
contained in document A/C.1/35/L.22.
The CHAIRMAN: 1 shall now put to the vote draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22.
Draft resolution A/C.J./35/L.?2 was adoptedby 101votes to 19, with
15 abstentions.
The CHAlXbRnI: 1 shall now cal1 on those representatives who wish to
explain their votes. - n/c.1/35/pv.39
66
kir. ZILUKOV ( Union of Soviet Socielist Republics) (interpretation
. .
from Russian): Flitk respect to the vote that has just been taken on the draft
resolution contained in document ~/C.1/35/~.22, on the non-use of nuclear
weapons and the ixevention of nuclear war, the delegation of the USSR brould
lilie to state the follorring.
The Soviet Union considers that a solution to the question of the non--use
of nuclear rreapons and the prevention of nuclear war can be achieved by
a cessation of the nuclear-arns race end the cessation of the production of
those WeaPons, the reduction and elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons
and, parallel with that, by al1 States refraining from the use of force in
international relations. The position of the USSR on this matter has been
repeatedly stated in the United i~lations, including in a letter sent by the
Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretau-General of the United Nations on the question of the non-use of
nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war, dated 2 October 1979, which
was circulated as document A/34/456 Add.1. The Soviet Union sees the solution
of this matter first and foremost through a cessation of the nuclear-arms race;
secondiy,and in parallel with that, through stren~thening the political and
international legal guarantees for the security of States, including a ban on the
use of nuclear and other types of ireapons and banning the use of force in generd in
international relations; and thirdly, through the adoption of measures aimed at
strengthening the non-.proliferation regime and preventine the danger of conflicts
arising where nuclear ireapons might be used.
We believe that it is inadmissible artificially to divorce the prohibition
of the use of nuclear weapons from the prohibition of the use of force in
international relations. TTe are convinced that the advantage of resolving
the question of the non-use of nuclear weapons in the context of the prohibition
of the use of al1 types of rreapons lies in the fact that al1 States, nuclear
and non-nuclear, wodd be placed on an equal footing. Unfortunately, in the
àraft resolution contained in document ~/~.1/35/L.22,the question of the
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is once more artificially divorced
from the question of the adoption of international political and legal measures
to strengthen the security of al1 States and from the question of the
renunciation by States of the use of force in international relations. Because
Of that the Soviet Mion was compelled to abstain in the vote on that draft
resolution. bk. LIDGARD(Sweden): The Svedish Goverment attaches the greatest
importance to measures aimed at preventing the use of nuclear rieapons. It is
in fact a matter of the very survival of mankind that such weapons
shouid not be used. There is also a logical linl; betlreen non-use and
non-proliferation which must be kept in nind.
1 wish to recall what was said in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of
the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the
question of the non-use of nuclear weapons. Negotiations on the natter during
that session reminded us of ai1 the practical difficulties involved. It is al1
too evident that effective measures in the field of non-use cannot be.
achieved without fully taking into account the problems inherent in the
nuclear arsenals and their related military doctrines. It is in fact necessary
to grapple with the concrete reality of nuclear forces and of the doctrines
for their possible use which go deeply into the ~eneral military dispositions of
the leading military Powers and concern their conventional forces as well.
It is our firm belief that more resolute efforts to achieve nuclear
disarmament are urgently needed. That should take place through gradua1 and
balanced reductions of nuclear-weapons stockpiles with the aim of their total
abolition. Measures of non-use have their natural place in such a process,
although unfortunately it does not seem realistic to expect that a prohibition
of nuclear weapons can start such a process.
Sweden entirely shares, however, the objectives of this draft resolution.
We also share the opinion of the representative of India in his introductory
statement that a nuclear var most probably muld have such effects that it
would constitute a crime against hmanity.
As operative paragraph 1 is worded, naking a precise interpretation
of the Charter of the United ifations, we think it has to be carefdly scrutinized
from a legal standpoint as well. In that light we have, much to our regret, not
found it possible to vote in favour of this draft resolution, since we do not
think that a declaration of this kind will fulfil its purpose. . .
th. 8AJA:COSIlI (Finiancl): ?ke Finnisii deleiration .rotcd In C'a-ruci of ::le
draft resollrtion conzained in docunent ~/~.1/35/L.22 that has just been
ado'ted. !le believe that efforts to oliii~inate the dmgers pose.; by nuclex
rieapons and to halt and reverse the ans race siioulfi include a varietÿ of
..
approaches, including neasures ained at the >re7rention of nuclelr var. i!e
consider th~t to be the overriding goal of that draft resolution.
However, in tiie vie:.^ of my delezation, operative paragrapn 1 is not in
conformity trith the Charter of the United Sstions. That is a serious
snortcoming in the draft resolution just adooted. Taking into account. iior;e.r?r,
clle uitisiate objective exoresseci in the draft resolution , nazely the prevent-in
of nuclear var, my deieqation cast a positive vote.. [Oriximl: English]
[9 December19801
D
Non-useof nuclearweaponrandprevenrion
1. The fist pan of the report dealt only withdrafi ofnuclearwar
resolution A/C.1/35/L.7on the preparationr for the The Grnerd Assembly,
secondspecialsessionof the GeneralAssemblydevoted
to disannament; the present parteals with ail other Alarmrd by the threat to the survivalof mankind
proposaissubmittedunder agenda item44. and to the Me-sustaining system posed by nuclcar
. , ./ weapons and by their use, inbcrent in wncepts of
deterrence,
Convinced that nucleat disarmamenis esxntial for
the prevention ofnuclear warnd for the strengrhcning
of internationalpcace and security,
Recdlingiü deelaracion,containin theFinaDocu-
ment of the Teoth Spetial Sessionof the GenerAs-
E. Drafr resolurionA/C.1/3S/L.22 sembly, that all States should actively particinate
10. On 14 November, Ngeria, Angola,Argentina. effortstobringaboutconditionsinintemationalrelations
the Congo,Ethiopia. India, Indonesia, lamaica,Mada- among Statesin which a code of peacehil wnductd
gascar. Nigeria.Pem. Romania. Sri Lanka. U~guay. nations in international affain could k agreed upon
Yugoslaviaand Zaire submitteda draft resolution(A/ and whichwould preelude the use or tiueat ouseof
C.1/35iL.22) entitled "Nan-use of nuclear WaponS nuclearweapon,.*
and preventionof nuclear war" (for the tcxt, set pan.
27 below, draft resolution D); This draft rcrolution, Recallinib rnoluuons 1653 (XVI) of 24 Novem-
which wassubsequently also sponsorcd by Bhutan, ber 1961,33/71 Bof 14 Deceinber 1978and 34/83 Cl
Costa Rica.Cypnis, Ecuador. Egypt. Malaysia.Qatar of 11Dccernkr 1979.
and Yemen. was introduced by the representltiveof Takingmre of the repon of the SecrctaryGeneral.
Indiaat the35th meeting,on 19November. Io which i.~annexcd the Comprehensive Sfudy on
Il. At its 39th meeting,on 21 November, theCom- Nuclear Weaper, preparcd with the assistanceof a
mitteeadopted the draft resolution by 101vot0 19, Groupof Expert sA/35/392).
with 15 abstentions. 1. Declareonceagain that:
# .- (a) The useof nuclearweapon, woulbe a nolation
Recommendatinnrof fheFirat Commiiîee of iheCharteof the United Nationsand a crimeagainrt
humanity;
27. nie Fit Committcerecommendsto the Gen-
eral Assembly the adoption of the following draft (b) The useor threat of use of nuclear weapns
resolution: should therefork prohibited, pending nucleadis-
armament;
REVIEW OF nie IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOM- 2. R~~U~S dIi Statesthat hawe far not submitted
MENDAT~ONSAND DECISIONS ADOPTW BY THE GEN- their proposah wncerning the non-w of nuclcar
ERAL ASSEMBL AYT ITS TENTBSPEClALSESSION weapons,avoidanccof nuclear war and rclatedmanen.
..O to do so,inorder that the question of an international
conventionor wme other agreementon thesubjut may
be hirther considercdat the thirty-sixthsessionof the
Gencral Assembly;
3. DecidesIo include in the provisionalagenda
itcthiny-sixth sasion the item cntitled "Non-uof
nuclcarweaponaandpreventionof nuclear&'.
*ResoludoSIOR. pur 58. ,ynaed Nm'ons 94th 45
GENERAL PLENAM RYEEllNG
ASSEMBLY Friday12 Dccember 1w.
ai3p.m.
THIRTY-FIFTSESSION
offiitReco& NEW VORK
17. Pan II of the report of the First Committee
on agenda item44 appears in document ,413516651
Add.1.Undercharitem, the FirstCornmitteeadopted
AgendailcU: 10draflrcsolutionsdeaiing with the United Nations
hriew of theimpiemenof ihcmomnnndniionr programmeof fellowships on disarmament.nuclcar
anddecirionsdopiby tbûcncrdiArwmbly weaponsin ail aspects, non-useof nuclearweapons
iutrniipceixsrion froncludrd): andthepreventionofnuclearwax.theimplementation
(6) RepooftkhDisamument~ommission: of the rccommendationsand decirions of the tenth
(c)&dona fotihserandapciai wuion of speciai session.the report of the DisannamentCorn-
Gcncrnl~~wmblydcvoicdto duamwicnt: missionparagraph 125of theFinalDocumentof the
(d) RnprPphIL(othFid Documentdihc Tcnih Tenth Special Session. the programmeof rcsearch
S(iRcponotbcCornmittmeDiumilmcnt: and studieson disannaent.the wodd disarmamen,-
(ü)Repn oftbDi~iwmvmcClornminion; campaignandtheiepod oftheCornmitteeonDis-.
L<)ImpkmcalaIioaof Ihc rtsommendoiionr.M1 ment.ïhe relevantrccommendationunderthisitemiS
decùionrotbtcnlbrpecd ie~i0n: 0*be foundin pamgta~hT] of the rcaon.
V) ummnt:NimponoftbcSccrewOencnl. on dir
(r) on-us f nuclw weaponand prevenliond 3. As ar prcvaus sessions. the workof the Fmt
nuclepruu:wpon oitbcCornmitte on Dis- Committee reflected the General Assembly'sdrep
umamcnl: concem a< thepace of disamament and expresscd
(h)Gencd:isasWai: rcpond tbc Samw a definitedesirefor action,inpanicukrtheimpfe-
(0 NuclcawuponrionlIipcU:mpoKoflbCorn on disannament.ofvthe decuionsandsrccommenda-on
mit- onDuumimcnc tions of thetint spccialsessiThisyear the F-t
y) ~0~ d m.rarcbandanidicrad'mma- Committeeadopted 20draft rcsoiuiiobyconsensus
ik)UnitedNitionamidondumnmcm:L:mpon of and a large numbcr by a substantialmajority-indi-
thcscmun- cating, let us hope,a trend. howeverslow. towards
ReponoftbFit Cornminc............... the enlargementoamas of agreementin thefieldof
disarmament. Highlighu of thic session werc the
establishmentof the Reparatory Committeefor the
President: Mr. Rüdiger von WECHMAR Second Speciai Session of rhe General ~ssembly
(FederalRepublicof Germany). Devoted to Disannament and Ihc adoption of the
Declmtion ofthe 1980sas the SecondDisannament
Decade.Manyotherddtrcsolutions laidstresos the
1. Mr. KENSMIL (Suriname), Rapporteurof the needforactionin the fieldofdisamament.
Fint Cornmittee:1have the honour of prcsentingto *a -
the GeneralAssembly thereports of theFit Corn-
mitteeon its work conceming agenda items310 35. 27. On behdf of the First Cornmitte1,comme,.,d
37 to46. 48and 49 on the questionof nt (0the General Assembly the adoption of ibedmt
and item50on the impiementationof theDeclaration resolutionsthaIhavejust outlined.
on the Strcngtheningof IntemationalSecurity..
- - . *.
4. AS at prcvioussessions. this year theCorn-t
mitte hcld a combined encra1 debate on the items 103- me PRESIDENT Now the Grnerd Asscmbly
mlating10disarmament.Arotaiof 47draftrcsolutions willconsiderpan n of the report of the ficorn-
wercsubmitted,out of which fourwerc withdnwn. mitteeonagendaitem 44[A/35/66S/~dd.]].naddition
o. - Committee.theAssemblyhasiCbeforritadraftdecirion
~A/35IL.47/Rev.l].
104. TheAssemblywillnüw tak edecisionon the
10drafr rcsolutionsmommended by the Fimt corn-
m-*teeinparagraph27of its report. 108. The PRESIDENT: Now we turn to dm?
resolution D, entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapomj
and prevention ofnuclear war". A recordedvbue
been requested.
A recorded vote wastaken.
In favourAfghanistan, Algena. Angola,Argentina.
Bahamas, Bahrain. Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin.
Bhutan, Bolivia.azil. Burma, BurundCapeVerde.
bia. Comoms. Congo. Costa Rica. Cuba, Cyph,olom-
Democratic Kampuchea, Dernocratic YemB.
Djibouti. Dominiean Republic, Ecuador, EgypEl
Salvador, Ethiopin. Fiji. FiandGabon, Gambia,
Ghana. Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea. GuyanHaiti.
Hondum. India. Indonesia.Iran, IraIvoryCoaat,
Jamaica. Jordan.Kenya, Kuwait, LaoPeoplDem+
cratic Republic. Lebanon, Lesotho, LibeLibyv
Arab Jamahinya. Madagascar. Malaysia. Maldives,
Maii.MaltaMsuritaniaM.auritius.Mexico,Mon>sco.
Mozambique, Ncpai, Nicaragua. Niger, Ni&
Oman. PaListanP,anama.Papua New Gui- Parai
guay, Pem. Phiiippines. QataRomania,Rwanda
Saint Lucia; Samoa. SaoTome and Principe.Saudi.
Arabia, Senegal. Sierra Leone. Singapore..Somalia
SriLanka ,udaa. Suriname. Swariland. SyriaiiAraù
Republic,Thailand.TogoMnidad andTobago, Tuni-
sia, Uganda. UniteArab Emirates. UniteRepubk
of Camemon. United Republic of Tan2ani.Uppr
Volta, Uruguay, Venemeia, Vit Nm. Ycmen.
Yugoslavia Zairc.Zambia.Zimbabwe.
Againsr: Ausüaüa. Belgium. Denmark. F&.
Germany, Fedcral Republic of. Grecce, Icelmd.
Ireland. Isracl. ItaJapan, Luxembourg. New
lands. New Zealand. Nonvay. Pomgai. TurLeY*
land, UnitedStates of America. and Nonhem Ife
AbstainingAuda. Bulgaria, ByelonissianSovic!
SociaiistRepublic.Caa8da.'Ctechoslovakh, Ge-
~cmocratic Republic, Hungary. Malawi, hfongoli&
poland, Spain. Sweden. Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
~epublic, Union of Soviet Sociaiist Republics.
Draft r~solutiDnwas odopredby Il2 voresto 19,
wiih14 abstentions(resolurion3311D).
'The delegsiniCMad. wrbsequedyidod ib a
againsithedrcwlution. it vote recordbniy bccd 36/92. Review of the implementation of the mm-
mendations and detisions.adopted by <heGen-
eral Assemhlyat itstenth special session
1
NON-USE OFNUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENTlON OF
NUCLEAR WAR
TheGrneral Assembly.
Alarmed by the hat to the survivalof mankindand to
the life-sustainingsystemposedby nuclearweaponsandby
their use,inherentinconceptsof dctemnce.
Convinced that nucleardismament is essentialfor the
preventionof nuclearwar and for thesucngtheningof in-
ternationalpeaceand secuity,
Rccallinilsdeclaration.containcdinthe Final Document
of theTenthSpecialSessionof theGeneralAssembly,that
al1Statesshould activelyparticipateineffonstob~g about
conditionsin internationalrelations amongatesin which
a codeof peacefulconductof Rationininternational&airs
could bc agreeduponand which wouldprccludcthe useor
threatof use of nuclearweapons,"
Rccalling irs resolutions 165(XVI) of 24 Novemk
1961. 33/71B of 14 December1978. 34/83 G of 11 Dc-
cembcr 1979and 351152D of 12December1980.
Takng note of the Comprehcnsive SI& on Nyclear
WeaponP prcparcdby the Secretary-Gcneralwittbca?-
sistanceof a groupof experts.
1. Dcclaresonceagain hat:
(a) The use of nuclcarweaponswould be a violation
of theChaner of the United Nations anda crime against
humanity;
thereforcbe ~rohibited.Œndin~nucleardisamiamwithouid
- ..
2 Urger theconsideranon.attbcsecondspccialsession
of theGeneral Assemblydcvotedto diJarniamnit. of the
questionof an intedonal conventionon rhemni-usc of
nuclear weapons and prevention ofnuclearwiu or somc
other agreement on the subjecr. taking ineuni the
proposaisand viewsof Sutes in this ngard;
3. Decides to includeintheprovisional agendaof iu
thiny-sevcnthsession the itementitlcd"Non-useofnuclear
weaponsand prevention ofnuclear war".
91s ~/CM? meeting
9 Dccembcr 1981
' UniteNations publicaSalaNo.E.78.1X.Z.
" RcroluwnS-1012.par58.
Y UniicdNations publicSaleNsoE.81.1.11. General Assembly
Distr.
LIMITED
. .
16 November 1981
, . i. ,i... .
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
ll-tirty-sixth session
FIRST COMMITTEE
kgenda item 51 (9)
REVIDY OF THE IMPLFXENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATION S ND DECISIONS
ADOPTED BY THE GENERALASSEXBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION
NON-USE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS AND PREVENTION OF NUCLEARWAR
Alqeria, Argentina. Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Colombia, Cyprus,
Ecuador, Eqypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan,
Madagascar, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Yemen and
. Yugoslavia: draf t resolution
The General Assembly,
Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining
System posed by nuclear.weapons and by their use, inherent in concepts of
,deterrence,
Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear
Var and for the strengthening of international peace and security.
Recallinq its declaration, contained in the Final mcument of.the Tenth
special Session of the General Assembly, that al1 States should actively
Participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among
States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs
coula be agreed upon and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear
meapons,
Recallinq its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of
14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979 and 35/152 D of 12 December 1980,
Mtinq the comprehensive stuay of nuclear weapons prepared by the
Se~retar~-~neral with the assistance of a group of experts, A/C.1/36/L.29
English
Page 2
1. Declaresonce again that:
(a) The use of nuclearweapons wouldbe a violationof the Charter of the
United Nationsand acrime against humanityr
ib) The use or threatof use of nuclear weapons should therefore be
prohibited, pendingnuclear disarmamenti
2. Urges the secona specialsession of the UnitedNationsGeneral Assembly
devoted to disarmamentto consider the question of an international convention on
the non-useof nuclearweapons and prevention of nuclearwar or some other
agreementon the subject,takinginto consiaerationthe proposalsand views of
States in this regardr
3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh
session the itementitled "Non-useof nuclear weapons and preventionof nuclear
war".united Nations
FIRST COMMITTEE
GENERAL 32nd meeting
held on
-4s S.E M BLY
Tuesday, 17 November 1981
mIRTY-SIXTH SESSION at 10.30 a.m.
ofiial Record(* NP* York
-
VERBATIMRECORD OF THE 32NDMEETING
Chairman: Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia)
hît resolutions vere introduced by:
Mr. Ahmad (Pekistan) - A/C.1/36/L.17
Mr. EUiott (Belgim) - A/C.l/36/L. 37
Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico) - ~/~.1/36/L.22
Mr. Krishna (India) - A/C.1/36/L.29
ür. Djokic (Yugoslavia) - ~/~.1/36/~.26
ür. Rostov (Bulgaria) - A/c.1/36/L.24
Dlstr. CENERAL
UIn*turro,,,=,,,ber 01 th.coneeined >*iNn oneof ik diir of
P"bilcoIto the Chofthe Ofnciil ReEdltln8 Seulon, room A4SSO. A/C.1/36/W .32
'66Unitcd ~atinirini coBuildln8). and incmvinIcornaithe 19 November 1981
'tC0,d. Islr. S. M. ICRISIINA(India): On behalf of the delegations of Algeria,
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, .
Ethiopia, Indonesia, Janaica, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru,
Qatar, Romania, Yemen, Yugoslavia and India, 1 have the honour to introduce
today draft resolution ~/~.1/36/~.29 entitled "l'on-Use of Nuclear Tleapons
and Prevention of Nuclear War".
It will be recailed that a similar resolution, 35/152 D, vas adopted
last year by the Ceneral Assenibly by an overwhelming majority of lï2 votes
in îavour, 19 against and 14 abstentions. An important feature of the voting
last year was the positive vote cast by one nuclear-weapon State. That and
the growing supportthat our initiative has been able to ~O!mmldhave encouraged
the CO-sponsors to lceep this item on the disarmament agenda.
During the general debate in the First Conmittee this year, there has
been an unprrcedented and universal expression of concern over the growing
danger of a nuclear war. The nuclear arms race in both its quantitative and its
qualitative aspects has acquired a new momentum and the international A/c.~/~~/Pv. 32
37
(tir. S. M. ICrishna, India)
situation has worsened to the point that the international c0mmunj.t~ has
greater apprehensions than ever before that a nuclear war, with al1 its
catastrophic consequences, may break out. In such circumstances, it iS
Our collective responsibility to undertake al1 possible measures to reduce
the threat of a nuclear war. VJhat is at stake is not the security of a
handful of countries or military alliances, but the very survival of the
human species itself. It is .the conviction of the CO-sponsors of the
draft resolution on the non--use of nuclear weapons and' prevention of
nuclear war that, pending the conplete elimination of nuclear weapons,
sn 2-reenent on the prohi'dition of the ilse or threat of cse of nuclc?r :re:?OnS
would reùucethe threat of a nuclear war.
The draft resolution makes it clear that our ultimate objective,
and indeed an objective which has been universally accepted, is the
achievement of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament alone can
provide the only'effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons. IIuclear disamûnent is , liurever , a co~?lex issue ?nd 3:iy
not be achieved immediately. However, the threat of the use of such
weapons creates insecurity for al1 States, including the nuclear-weapon
States themselves. Nuclear weapons cannot be ogarded as ordinary weapons,
as instruments of war. They are weapons of mass destruction, whose use vil1
have disastrous consequences for belligerents and non-belligerents alilte.
The effects of the use of nuclear weapons cannot, because of the very
nature of such weapons, be confined to national or regional boundaries.
Their use will mean the mass slaughter of millions of innocent civilians,
including those belonging to States which are non-belligerents. It is for that
reason that the draft resolution declares that the use of nuclear weapons
would be a violation of the United Iiations Charter and a crime against
humanity. It is true that the United Nations Charter pennits individual
and collective self-defence, but it would be making a nockery of the Charter
to suCCest that in the pursuit of its individual security concerns, a State
way jeopardize the collective survival of al1 the States and peoples in the
world. A State's choice of weapons and the means of warfare, even in the
exercise of individual end collective self-defence, is not unlimited. The use of nuclear weapons will not merely mean the mutual annihilation
of States usine them, but would result in the death and permanent incapacitation
of millions of human beines al1 over the world through the spread of radioactive
fallcut and the snapping of the economic and social linliages which would
inevitably follow a nuclear var. We live today in a world that has, under
the pressure of technological progress, become increasingly interdependent
and interlinked. The massive destruction which would result from the use
of nuclear weapons would destroy the delicate interlinkages which have been
built up over the years and which sustain the economic and social life over
our entire planet. Those dis~ptive effects of a nuclear war are well
ùocumented in the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons, which the draft
resolution has referred to in its preamble.
The tragic experience of Hiroshima and iiagasaki indicates that not
only would nillions upon millions die in a nuclear var, but that succeeding
generations would suffer permanent impairment as a result of radiation-inrluced
genetic disorders. Taking al1 those factors into account, is it not true
to Say that the use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity?
The draft resolution 1 have introduced today is shilar to the text
of resolution 35/152 D adopted by the General Assembly last year. However,
operative paragraph 2 is different from last year's. It urges the second
special session devoted to disanaament scheduled to be held next year to
consider the question of an international convention, or some other aame€~.ent,
on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear var, tal:in:-
into consideration the proposals and views of States in this regard. We
are convinced that one of the urgent questions that the second special
session irould have to address is the prevention of a nuclear war. It is
Our earnest hope that the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear
.&apons would be eiven the attention it deserves in that context.
Finally, the sponsors of this dreft rcsolution venture to hope that
*hose States, which for one reason or another have earlier opposed our initiative
Or abstained on it, will rise above their separate and individual security
C""cernS and join the mninstreani of international opinion in ensuring the
CO1lective survival and well-beinp of mankind as a whole.,i
- united Nations
' ~ENERAL FïRSTCDMMITTEE
40th meeting
heldon
.4SSEMBLY
THIRT- YSIXTH SESSION Monday,23 Bovember 1981
at 3 p.m.
O@i.,l Records NewYork
VERBATI MECORD OF TEE ~OTH MEETING
Chaiman: Mr. GOMB (Yugoslavia)
DISARMAMEIN TEMÇ
AGENDA ITEMS39 TO 56,128AND135 (continued)
ORGANIZATIO ONFWORK
-~~
- - ~ p -
'Th"record ir rutoconcctloConwllom houid bml un- th# Dlstr.CENERAL
"ln~tuieof a mimber of the dclcptlon conwC.LOftk dit01M. Uc .1/36/w .bo
PubIC~ntoth. chiof the OmddRecords Edltins 5roomA.JSSO.
'6Unilcd NitiPlie(AlcorBuilding). and incoLniMWd d th* 29 December 1981
'-0rd.
Coriection~vil1 b. iuucd ifter the eniupiiliflukllot. in
''Comrni~tce. Tlle CHAIRtîAII: Tàa-2 concludes Our consideration of rirait resolutior!
A/C.1/36/L.24.
$e shall norr take up draft resolutioil A/C.1/36/~.29, relating to aqenc'a item
51 (g), "Revie?.~ of Che ifi~plementation of the recomflendations and decisions
adogted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session; non--use of
nuclear rrealoilo and ~revention of nuclear var". This rirait resolution has 30
sponsors and vas introducea by tlie representative of India on 17 Novenber
at the 32nd ~eetinr: of the "irst Ca-~zittee. The ;O snonsors are: Alfieria,
Ar~entina, sahanas, Sanpladesh, 3arbados, Bhutan, Colonbia, Congo, Q,'prus, Eciiador,
Sypt ..phiopin, Ghana,Guinea, India, Inaonesia, Janaica, Jordan, Hda.gascar,
Bala~sia, 'Mali, Higer, Nigeria, Oeru, Qatar, nouania, mrancia, Sri Lanka, Yemen
and Yu$oslavia. The ciiAIRI.!iU~I: Cie shall now take a vote on the draft resolution
contsined in document A/C.1/36/L.29. A recorded vote has been requested.
A recorded vote vas taken.
In falrour: Afghanistan, Alseria, Ancola, Argentins, ?ahanas,
Dahrain, Ban~ladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia,
rai Buigaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Regublic,
Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Denocrat ic Yemen, Djibouti , Ecuador . Egypt , Ethiopia,
Fiji , Gabon, German Deniocrat ic Republic , Ghana,
Guatemala: Guinea, Guyana, IIaiti, Honduras, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica,
Jordan, ICenya, ICuirait, Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Lebulcn, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, lbdagascar, Malaysia.,
Maldives, I.iali, I:Ialta, Mauritania, EIexico, tJongolia,
biorocco, Mozambique, Nepal, ?Ticar.wua, Niger, Nigeria,
Oman, Paliistan, Peru, .~hilippines, Poland, Qatar,
Romania, Ehmnda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic ,
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda,
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, United Arab aiirates, United
Republic of Cameroon, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen,
Yu~oslavia, Zaire and Zambia
A~ainst : Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmaris, France, Germany,
Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
IJetherlands , Xew Zealand, IJoniay , Portugal., Spain,
Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Eiorthern
Ireland, United States of America
Abstainin~: Austria, Finland, Greece, Israel, Sweden
Draft resolution A/~.1/36/L.29 was ado~ed by 99 votes to 18, with
abstentions. -ne [email protected]?.: 1 notr cal1 upon those representatives ~rho wish
to exglain their
vote after the vote.
?!k. !2UTZSCH (Gernan Democrat ic Recublic ): IlIy delegat ion
supported draft resol~tion A/C.l/:G/L.29, irhich was just adosted. We believe
that in the face of the current acute danyers of a nuclear ver this proposa1
is a very timely one. We regard it as especially importent th3.t ?.t the second
speciel session devoted to disamment every effort be rizc1.e to e::clude
the iise of nuclear veapons. Eut we have seen that certain States have
opposed this proSect. It is even more incredible that among those
which have czst a negative vote are nucle'ar-weapon States and their closest
allies wiiose CO-operation is essential in the endeavour to exclude the danger.
of a nuclear war.
1.k. LIDG.4RIi (Sueden) : & Government attaches the greatest
importance to nieirsures aimed at preventing the use of nuclear weapons.
In fact, it is vital for the very swival of manl,inù that such weapons
are not used. There is also a logical link between non-use and non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons that nust be kept in mind.
1 wish to recall irhat vas said in paragraph 53 of the Final Document
of the tenth special session of the Ceneral Assembly (A/s-10/2) on the question
of the non-use of nuclear rreapons. Deliberations on the inztter during that
session well illustrated the practical difficulties involved. I-t is ail
too evident tliat effective measures in this field must fully trl;e into
account the problems iniierent in the existing military doctrines. It is,
in fact, necessary to ,:rapple witli the concrete reality of niclear forces
and of the doctrines for their possible use, .rhich ?O Cee?lv into the :encrd
iiilitary preparations of the leadinz military Po~rers, and which concern
their conv.entiona1 forces as well.
It is iiy Governr~ent's firm belief that I?ore resolute efforts to
achieve nucle2.r disarmament are ur~ently needea. This should be achieved
thi-ough a process of grac?ual and balanced reductions of nuclear l?eaPons
with the aim of their total elininatior.. Mezsures on ncn.-use hrve their natuml
place in this context although, unfortunatoly, it does not seem realistic -,O exoect that prohibition of the use of nuclear iieapons can start such a
?rocesS.
Sweden entirely shares the objectives of this draft resolution. It also
~hares the opinion that nuclear war most probably vodd have such effects as
to constitute a crime against hmanity. As operative paracraph 1 is worded it
!!!&es a precise inter-retation of the Charter of the United Nations end thus does
not seem to be entirely correct from a legal standpoint. In that light,
nuch to Our regret we have not found it possible to vote in favour of this
arzft resolution, since rre do not thinlc that a declaration of this kind will
fulfil itS purpose. Although tlie Swedish delegation isin strong SYmpathy with
the oeneral aims of this draft resolution, it has reservations of a lecal nature
û:.?Fnst it and it also has some doubt as to uhether a declaration of this
kind !.riil fulfil its purpose. Thereîore, to its regret, ny dele&ation
has not been in a position to vote in favour of th? draft resolution,
but abstained in the votin~.
Mr. O'CONPIOR i~reland) : 1 do not think i t is necessary for me
tc emahasize the opoosition of my delegation to any use of nuclear ireapons.
Our record on the question is clear. Fle would consider that any use of such
treapons woulc? be disastrous for the world. It is, therefore, with deep
regret that my delegation, in line with the position it has taken in the
psst, felt obliged to vote against the present text. We have done so
because of doubts regarding the approach adopted in the resolution, doubts
irllich Le have expreçsed inthis forum at previous sessions going baclc as
far as 1961. DOCUMENT A136R52
[7Decembcr19811ishl
Report of the First Cornmiltee on agenda i51m
1. îhe item enuded: Dr@ resolwionAIC.1136lL.29
22. On 16 November.Algeria. Argentina.die Baha-
"Review of the implementationof the rccommenda- mas. Barbados. Bhua. Colombia. Cypm, Ecuador,
rionsanddaisions adoptcdby the GcncraiAssemblyat Egypt. Eihiopia.India. Indonesia.lamaica,Jonian, Mad-
is unth special session: agascar. Malaysia.Nigeria, Pem. Romania.Yemcn
"(a) Repon of the Disarmament Commission: Yugoslaviasubmitlcda draftrcsolution(AIC.ICi6/L.29)
.'(b)~ebn of the Cornmime on Disarmamcnt; . mtitlcd "Non-use ofnuclear weaponsand prcvcntionof
nuclcarwu". whichwas subsequentlyalso sponsorcdby
ament:npon of the SccreraryCeneial;ieson disam- Bangladesh.the Congo. Ghana.Guinea.Mali.the Niger,
Qatar, Rwanda andSri Lanka. Thedraft ~olution war
"(d) Studyon the rclationshipbetweendisarmameni inIoduccdby thercprcsentativeof Indiaai the32ndmec<
ad dcvelopmenr:repon of the Scmtary-Generai; in-, on 17November.
"(e) United Nationsprogrammeof fellowshipson 23. At it40rh meeting, on23November.the Com-
disarmament:reportof the SecrctaryGenerai; mime adoptcddraftrcsolutionA/C.1136lbyarecord
-'V) Nuclcar weapons in al1aspects: rcpon of the voteof 99 to 18.with5abstentions(forthe sectpan.
Conunina on Disamament; 32 below.draftrcsolutiD. The votingwasas follows:
"(6) Non-useof nuclcarweaponsand prcvcntionof Infoyow: Afghanisa. Algeria.Angola.Argentina.Ba-
nuclcarwar. hamas. Bahrain.Bangladesh.Barbados.Bhutan.Bolivia.
"(h) implementation ofthe recommendationsand Bwl. Bulgaria.Bum. Bumndi.ByelomssianSovietSo.
dccisionsof the unth specialsession:repon of theCom- cialist Republic.Cape Verde. Central AfricanRepublic,
minecon Disarmamcnt; Lia.DemocraticYemcn.Djibouti.Eeuador.Egypt.Ethio.-
"(1')World DisarmamentCampaign: report of the pia. Fiji. Gabon. Gemian Dernoentic Rcpublic,Ghana.
S~Guicrai: Guatemala.Guinea. Guyana. Haiti. Honduras.Hungary,
"(j~ Diient Wek: rcpon of the .Scerary-
kncnl" india. IndonesIran,Iraq. lvoryCoast.lanuica. Jordan,
was includcin the pmvisionalagendaof the cbiny-sixth Kenya. Kuwait.LaoPeople'sDemocraUcRepublic.Lcb
=ion of thehed ieralmblyin accordancewith irs anon. Libyan.Arab Jamahiriya. Madagascar.Malaysia.
molutioiu 34/83K of Il December 1979and 351152A. Maldives. Mali.alta, Maurimia. Mexico. Mongolia.
B.C, D.E. F, H, 1and Jof 12December1980. Morocco.Mozambique.Nepal.Nicaragua.Niger.Nigma,
2. At irs41hpluiary meetingon 18Sqxunkr 1981. mania. Rwanda. Sao Tomc and Principe.SaudiArabia,
theGaural Asscmbly.on Ihemmmcndation of theGen- Senegal.SierraLmne. Singaporc.Somalia.SriLanka.Su-
en1Cornmittee.decided Io inclutheitem initagenda dan,Suriname,Swaziland.SyrianArabRepublic.lhailand.
md ta ailoute it theFust Conunina for consideration Togo. Trinidadand Tobago, Tunisia. UgandUkrainian
md rcanr. SovietSocialistRepublic. Union of SovietSocialiciRe-
3. '~t ir'& meeting,on 7 0ctok. bic mi Com- publics. UniteAI& Emirates. United Repubiof Ca-
minodecided to hold aeombincd grner arbaîeon the meroon.Venezuela.VietNam. Yemen.Yugodavia. Zairc.
Zambia.
39 ta56, 128aad 135.Thisngeddisdcbatcmokniplace atem Againsr:Australia.Belgium.Canada.Denmark.ronce.
3rdto26thmarings, hm 19Oftokr to 4 Novmber. Germany, Fcden lepubiicof. Iceland,Ireland,I!a-y,,
..- pan. Netherfands.NewZealand.Norway,hmgal. Spm.
Turkey. United Kingdomof Great Britainand Nontien
Ireland.UnitedSws of Amcrica.
Abstaining:Austria,Fmland.Grcece. Israel.Swedcn.
. .. RecommendnhB of theFLsr Commütee
32. The Fint Commim momrnends to the Gcneral
Assernblythe adoptionof the followingdraft rcsoluiions:
REVIEW OF THE iMPLEMENTATlON OF THE RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND OECIS~ONS ADOPTEO BY THE GENERAL
ASSEMBL AT il5 nNTH SPECIALSESSION
S.. 1
Non-meof~rucleaw r eopomundprevenrionof nucleurwar
TheGencrulRrsrmbly.
Alarmcdby theducat Io the survivalof mankindand to
thelife-sustainingsyslemposcdby nuclearwc;iponsandby
their use. inhemntin concepts of deterrcmc.
Convinredthat nuclcardisarmamentis essentialfor the
prcveniionof nucicarwar and for the smngthening of in-
lemationalpacc and xcdy.
Recullinitsdcclaration.containedinihcFinalDocumcni
of the TenthSpecialSessionof theûeneral Asscmbly.chat
alStatesshouldaciivelyparticipateffom tobringabout
amditions in indonal relationsamongSîam in which
acodeof pcaccfulconductof nationininremationaaffairs
wuld k ag& uponand which wouldprccludcthe useor
thrca --use ~ ~a-~learweawns."
r -~~~.
Recalfingio molutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 Novcmkr
1%1. 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83G of IIDc-
ccmber 1979and 351152D of 12 Decemkr 1980.
Takingnoteof the Comprehcmive Studyon NUCICOI
Weapom preparcdby theSaxcaryGed witbtheassisi-
aacc of a pup of upau,"
1. Declarcsonceagainihac:
(a) The useof nuclcar weaponswould k a violation
of theChana of the Unitcd Nationand a crime against
ùumanity;
(b) 'Ihcuseorthrcafofuseof nuclearweaponsshould
thercfork prohibitcd.pcndingnuclcardisarmament;
2. Urgesthewnsidaation. u thexcond spccialsession
of theGtneral Asrcmbly devolcdm disamiament.of the
questionof an indonal conventionon the non-use of
auclcar wcaponrand prcvenùon of nuclcar war or some
aher agreement on the subjcct, taking into account the
proposaisand vicw ofStatesinmis regard;
3. Dccides m include in the provisionalagendaof its
th*-scventh sessiontheitementitied"Non-useof nuclear
weaponsand prcventionof nuclcarwar".
''RcroluiS-IOIL.pur. 58.
* UniudNiuonrpublicutSJa No.E.81.1.11T united Nations
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
Wednesduy. 9 Deccmbcr 1981.
THIRTY.SIXTH SESSION or 3.30p.m.
atïcial Records NEW YORK
AgcndaitemJI:
Revicvof ihcimplcmcniainfthemommcndaiionasr.d
dsciiionradoptcdiheGcnrrrlAswmblyu ils tenth
spialwrrion:
Io) Rcpond ihcDiwmiunea Commission:
(b) ReponoftheCornminaon Disartnamcnt: 2. The First Comminee, as in prcviousyearr. hcldai
(cl RDmm d m h and ~rudirndimament: rc- thissessicicombinedgened debateon al1dismament
pi of thcQcrcwyCencd: items. which took place at its 3rd to 26th meetings.k-
(4 velopmen:cpmioflhc krctary-Gcncnl;nddc- ween 19 October and 4 November.The discussionon
UnitedNaionpmgrammc d feilwshipondima- items57 and 58 tmk place arits 45th to 51st meetings.
(r)ment:rcpond theSecrcwy-ûcncral: fmm 27 Novemberto 3 Decemkr. The Commineehad
y) Nuclw wpon. in 111irpccu: mpond ihcCommit- bcfon it a totalof 22 items andtwk actionon 52 draft
teon Diumumni: rcsolutions.The= was wide ~anicipationinthe general
(r) Non-iÿeof nuch wuponi andpmcntioofnuclcu debatc, whichrcflmed the gcineralfeelingsof sup$n by
W. the internationalmmunityfor disannament.pcace and
(hl lmplc~nutiond the mmmcnduions anddsc!sionr sccurity.
d ihlcnlspechlsessiorcponcdihCommieceon
Diwmumcni: 3. The fact that the discussion in the Fit omminee
(O WorldDiurmimcniCmpugn: mpnlcdiheQccrrcury- lookplace on thecve of the xcond spcial session ofthe
ûenenl: General Assemblydevd to disarmament,scheduledto
(1Rcponofihe Fini Cornmi....................l conveneon 7June 1982. gavean opponunity to a large
numberof participantsCoaniculatcrhcirexpectauonsand
to expresstheiropcs about future actiointhe fieldof
dismament.
.
President: Mr. lsmat T. KITTANI (Iraq).
6. Despite the complexitiesand diflicultofsdisanna-
mentproblems, the discussioin the Fmt Conminec has
In rhe absericof lhe Prrsidenr. Mr.Nuik (PokisluiiJ. shownboth that thuc cocuinuetabe a spiritofbopeand
Vice-Prcsidenrrook rhc Chuir. optimismand the convictionthat morc effonan needcd
and that there is no alternativebut toprcss on with the
hard work, whcther in the delikrative or ncgotiating
bodies. in order to make hvthcr pmgrcss. Rrhapsa sign
of this hopir tote rcen in the continued adoption by
consensusof a substaatial numkr of ciraft mlutions.
This year the Conuninceadopted48 ciraftrcsolutionson
disannamentitems. of which 18wac adoptcd without a
vote. Thisis an indicationthat the internationalcommu-
nity still enccnainrthe hoof wideningthe undustand-
1. Mr. MAKONNEN (Ethiopia),Rapponeurofthe First ing of the problems andenlargintheanas of agrrrmciit
Comminee: 1 have thehonour to pmcnt to the Gcned in the field of disamiament.
Assembly thercpons ofthe First Comminceon iu work.
They contain its recommendationson the disannament 7. With these fnv remarks1 have the honourto submit
and sccurity questions under agenda items39 to 58, 128 thedraft rcsolutionsof the Fmt Cornminecto the Genual
and 135.Thox recommendations an IObe found in doc- Assemblyfor adoption.
uments Al361740to 761. Withthe exceptionof items 128
and 135. which arc nw, al1the disannamentiums hevc
been included in the agendaof the thiny-sixth session in
accordancewith prcvious Gened Asxmbly molution%
Thur. this year. discussion on these items in tFm1
Comminee couldbe considcd asa continucd expression
of concern over the complexiticsofdisarmament prob
lems andof determinaiion IOcontinueexemng effow to
make pmgnss towsrds the ultimateobjective of gencd
and complete disamament. 45/59. RRfcrand Implcmcn(st1onof the Concludlqj
Documentorthe ïkLl<h SperialSesslonofthe
CONVENnON ON ME PROHIBITIO OF ME USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAWNS ANNEX
ihe GeneralAssernbly,
Dnn Cammu~ ona Roblbluomor& Uu
Convinced that the existence and use of nuclear dNiudru Wupou
weaponspose thegreatest threat to thesuMvalofman- ncSInluPMYIro~~
Lind, AhmvdbyIhcthrutU>thcvcysunmlofmra~dposcdbyibe
Conrcious that the nuclcar-armsrace incrcasesthe aistena ofnuclurwpom
dangerof the use of nuclear weapons, ConW Ihum),us?ofnuclw aeaponmnaitutaviolation
of ihmer of tUnid Nitionradacrimaegaimhuminiry.
Convincedaivo that nuclcar dimament isthe only C~rinccdht IhiComtion WOUd beistept h themm-
ultimateguarantee againstthuse ofnuclearwcapons, pktcctimiolliooofouc*lrrup*Mïngm p~nl &ldmmplele
Convincedfruiherthat a multilateralagreementpro- diurmrmcntundcmia andeilectiv. inlemmotmi,
hibitingthe use or threat of use of nuclearweapons Rrrmrludto mntinuŒgotiatiolvfor thc.mimmcotihy
should strcngthen international rccurily and help to
create the climatcfor ncgotiationsleadig to the wm- eosL
pletceliminationof nuclcarWapons, Hm a@ u fOh
AdkI
Conrciousah that the -nt ste takenbilaterally
bythe U~on of Soviet hdit keptiblicsand the
UnitedStatu of America towardsa reductionof thcir
nuclearweaponsandthe improvement inEast-WestPZ-
lationsand the international climatecaumntribute to-
wardsthisgoal,
Recaüing thai, in paragra h 58 of the final Docu-
ment of the Tenth Spccial .ion of cheGeneralAs-
sembly,"it isstated that aüStat~ shouldactivelypar-
ticipate in efforts to bring about mnditions in
internationalrelations amongStatu inwhicha codeof
peaccful wndua of nations in international affairs
wuld bc agrecd u n and that wouldprcdude thuse
or threat of uOenuclcar Wapong 3. ThuCommtionih.uentcrin<oIoioconthcdcpaitofh-
menuofnriuuriobynmy-&s GDnmmrno indtwüothGa-
Rcapning that theuseofnuclearweaponswouldbe rmmmn Of tbc&s mdur+-3p SW4 & rrmdrare nia
a violationof the Cbancr of the UnitcdNationsand a plngraph2dIhi.iriYlr
aime against bumanity, asdeclared iitsmlutions
1653 (XVI) of24 Novcmber 1961.33I11 B of14 De-
ambcr 1978,34/83 G of11 Dnxmbcr 1979,35/152D
of 12Dcccmbcr 1980and 36/921of 9Dccember 1981.
Nofing witnngm that the Conferracc on Disar-
take negotiationswith viewotoa9 no1ablagreement-
on aninternational conventionpmhiiüng the use or
threat of useof nucicar ahapons underany circum-
stances,lakingasa basW the texi annexcdto Gcneral AmicL4
Asscmblyresolution441117C of 15Dcxmbcr 1989,
1. Rcùenuu iu nque.9to the Conferenccon Disar- RurniDdo~~SpniliQiRuc cqii.li,uhct,rbiU bdepaiw
marnent10commencencgotiationgasamatter of pri- mIhth~~olihUnilcdN8rianirborbiUrnddvly
ority,in ordcr to rcaehagreementonaainternational ccnificdmpie~tbaea~thc~tdia~IOi>.~n-
conventionpmbibiting the useorthrcatof useof nu- dng suvs
clcar weapons undcr any cimumtanaq taking as a IN- WEWX, ibcwicdqd, king dvlyiolhoNcd
basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the ianto by1h9rcrpemnGovcmmmt~ bm rigocdIhi. Comcntion.
Use of NucicarWeaponsanncxctd o the pmnt rao- opcd forugunucu auibc diof one
lution: Wuarndninshunddd-.
2. Ako rrqwu the Conferenccon Disarmament 10
rtpon to theGencralAsmbly at iUforry-llnhsession
on tbc mulis of those ncgotiatiom.
54thplnoiy meeting
4 December 1990 53
UNITED A
NATIONS *,1.
--
Distr.
LIMITE0
AIC.1/45/L.25
31 October 1990
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
~orty-fifth session
FIRST COMMITTEE
Agenda item 57(b)
REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATIONOF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE
TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSIOR OF THE GENERAL ASSEHBLY: COWENTION
ON THE PROHIBITION OFTHE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AEahanistan, Alaeria. Arwntina.Banaladesh. Bhutan. Ecuadoq,
Esv~t. Ethiaoik India, Indoresia. Madawscar. Malavsia,
Viet Nam and Yussslavia:draft resolutioa
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of
Puclear WeaD0n.q
The General Assembh,
l
threat to the survival of mankind,nd useof nuclear weapons pose the greatest
l
Ces that the nuclear-arms race increases the danger of the use of
nuclear weapons,
Convinced that nuclear disarmamentis the only ultimate guarantee against the
use of nuclear veapons, I
Convinced also that a multilateral agreement prohibiting theuse or threatof
use of nuclear weapons should strengthen international securand help to create
the climate for negotiations leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,
Consciouq that therecent stepstaken bilaterally by the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics towards a reduction of their
nuclear weapons and the improvementin the East-West relations andinternational
climatecan contribute towards this goal, A/C.1/45/L.25
English
Page 2
Recallinq that, in paraqraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special
Session of the General Assembly, I/ it is stated that al1 States should actively
participate in efforts to bring about conditions in internationalrelations among
States in vhich a code of peaceful conduct of nations in internafionalaffairs
could be agreed upon and that vould preclude the use or threat Of use of nuclear
veapons.
Reaffirminq that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the
Charter of the United Nations anda crime against humanity, as declared inits
resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961. 33/71 B of 14 December 1978,34/83 G of
11 December 1979, 35/1:2 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 1 of 9 December 1981, .
Notino with remet that the Conference on Disarmament,durinq its 1990 session
vas not able to undertake negotiationswith a view to achieving agreement on an
international conventionprohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
under any circumstances. taking as a basis the text annexed to General Assembly
resolution 44/177 C of 8 December 1989,
1. Reiterates its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence
negotiations, as a matter of priority. in order to reach agreement on an
international conventionprohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
under any circumstances, taking as a basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution;
2. Also requests theConference on Disarmament to report to the General
Assembly at its forty-sixthsession on the results of those negotiations.
Draft Conventionon the Prohibition of the Use of
Nuclear Weapons
Alarmed by the threat to the very'survival of mankind posed by the existence
of nuclear weapons,
Convince_dthat any use of nuclear weapons constitutes aviolation of the
Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,
Convinced that this Convention vould be a step towards the complete
elimination of nuclear weaponsleading to general and complete disarmamentunder
strict and effective international control,
Determined to continue negotiations for the achievementof this goal,
Have aareeè as follovs: A/C.1/45/L.25
English
Page 3 .;
Article 1
The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or
threaten to use nuclearweapons under any circumstances.
Article 2
This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
Article 1
1. This Convention shall be open to al1 States for signature..Any State
that does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with
paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratificationby signatory States.
Instrumentsof ratificationor accessionshall be deposited withthe
Secretary-Generalof the United Nations.
3. This Convention shall enterinto force on thedeposit of instrumentsof
ratificationby twenty-fiveGovernments,including theGovernmentsof the five
nuclear-weaponStates. in accordance witp haragraph 2 of this article.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited
after the entry into force of the Convention, it shall enter intoforce on the date
of the depositof their instrumentsof ratification oraccession.
5. The depository shall promptlyinform al1 signatory andacceding States of
the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrumentof ratification
or accession and the date of theentry into force ofthis Convention,as uell as of
the receiptof other notices.
6. This Convention shall be registered bythe depositoryin accordance with
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 4
This Convention. ofwhich the Arabic, Chinese. English. French. Russian and
Spanish textsare equally authentic, shallbe deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations,who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the
Goverment of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorizedthereto by their
respective Governments.have signed this Convention. openedfor signature at
on the day of
one thousand nine hundred and ... .. :
UNITED NATIONS FIRST COhWITl'EE
29th meeting
held on
~eneral %~@ .A. -& ssembl~ Viedneshay, November 1990
at 10 a.m.
FORTY-FIFTH SESSION New York
Officùù Records
VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 29th MEETING
Chairman: Mr. RANA (Nepal)
CONTENTS
- Consideration of and action on al1 disannament agenda items (m)
- Staternent by the Chaiman
Ru-<d iwib~aiiacotmlm
Comciionrbrmlunderri-m of* mmhrdtsdckpmnrrnrd Distr. GENERAL
wthMI -rolr2unidNzriPlu. ainraantncwxddrmdinlSoRmmW3.M A/C.1/45/PV.29
8 November 1990
Corrrciion.W,ihow.4udihseutina wgnle rom~ndum forcrh Commana ENGLISB The CHAIRMAN: 1 now cal1 on the representativeof India to introduce
draft resolutions A/C.1/45/L.25and A/C.1/45/L.24.
Mr. CHADHA (India): 1 have askedto speak to introduce two draft
resolutions. The first,entitled "Conventionon the prohibition Ofthe use of
nuclear weapons", is containedin documentA/C.1/45/L.25and has been sponsoredby
Afghanistan,Algeria, ~rgentina.Bangladesh. Bhutan, BoliviE a.uador, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Indonesia. Madagascar. MalaysiV ai,et Nam. the UkrainianSoviet Socialist
Republic,Yugoslaviaand India.
The rationalebehind thedraft resolutionis simple and clearlystated in the
preamble. It is accepted that the existenceand useof nuclear weaponspose a
threat tolife on this planet. It is also acceptedthat the nuclear-anusrace only
serves to increase the risk of theuse of nuclearweapons. The "nuclear winter"
studies by R. Turco, O. Toon. T. Ackerman,J. Pollack andC. Sagan (the TTAPS
group), by the ScientificConunittee on Problemsof the Environmentof the
International Councilof ScientificUnions, and in 1988 by the Secretary-General's
Group of Expertshave al1 concludedthat theuse of nuclearweapons. even on a
limited scale of 1 per cent of the existing meqatonnage,rould produce
"irreversible consequencesf "or life on this planet. 1 quote further from the
study by the Secretary-General's Group of Expertson the Climaticand OtherGlobal
Effects of Nuclear War:
"Scientific evidence is now conclusivethat a major nuclearwar rould
entai1 the high risk of a global environmentaldisruption. ...
Three-dimensional atmospheric circulatim ondela with detailed representations
of physical processes indicateregionalepisodea ofsub-freeaingtemperatures.
even in summer. ... A/C.1/45/PV.29
12
(Mr. Chadha. India)
"Beyond one month. agriculturalproduction and thesurvival of natural
ecosystemswould be threatenedby a considerable reductioin sunlight,
temperaturedepressions of several degrees below normal and suppressionof
precipitation andsmer monsoons. In addition.these effectswould be
aggravatedby chernicalpollutants. anincrease in ultravioletradiation
associatedwith depletion of ozone and the likely per,sisteof radioactive
'hotspots'.
"...The widespread impact of nuclear exchange on climate would
constitute a severe threatto world foodproduction. The prospect of
widespread starvation as a consequenceof a nuclearar would confront both
targeted and non-targetednations.... The direct effectsof a major nuclear
exchange could kill hundreds of millions: the indirect effectcould Li11
billions.
"The socio-economicconsequences in aworld intimatelyntercomected
economically,socially and environmentallywould be grave. The functionsof
production, distribution and consumption inisting socio-economicsystems
wuld be completely disrupted."(-/4 -25)
Those are only some of the irreversibleconsequencesof a nuclear war.
The Conference on Disannament at Geneva, the single multilateralnegotiating
forum inwhich al1 nuclear-weaponStates are represented. habeen repeatedly
requested bythe GeneralAssembly to undertakeneqotiationswith the objectiveof
concludinga convention thatwould prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.
Accordingly,we have submitted our draft conventionto the Conferenceon
Disarmamentfor its consideration. It is therefore amatter of great regret that
the Conferenceon Disannament has not been able to registery progress on that
priority item. WC. 1/45/PV.2'9
13
At the same time, no logicalreasons have beenput forvardas to vhy such a
conventionshould not be negotiated. To relate the urgencyof preventing nuclear
var with preventing al1 vars is to deny thespecialmenace thatnuclear veapons
pose to mankind. We must, of course,entirely rule out any kind of var as a
possible option. 1 reiterate.however, that while conventionalvars may escalate
into nuclear var, and vhile thatfatefultransitioncan be prevented.a nuclearvar
cannot de-escalate intoa conventionalvar. We are resubmittingOur draft
resolution tounderline the importance of that iss and in the hope that the Pirst
Connnitteewill be able to bringthe might ofits moral authorityto bear on the
Conferenceon Disarmamentto commencenegotiationson that item.
The draft convention is containedin the annex to the draft resolution. It is
based onthe recognitionby this forum thatthe use or threatof use of nuclear
veapons vouldbe a violationof the Charterof the United Nations and contrary to
the lavs of humanity. That vas accepted almost three decadesaqo in General
Assembly resolution1653 (XVI) in 1961.
The vorld conmunity has sincexelcomed the statementby the United States and
the Soviet Unionthat "a Buclearwar cannot be wn and must not be fought". Our
draft resolutionseeks to transfonu that understandin into a legally binding
conmitment. Such a prohibitionin the form of a legal agreementwuld help bring
about a qualitativechange in securitydoctrinesand policiesand create the right
climate fornegotiations leadingto the completeelhination of nuclearweapons.
On behalf of thedelegationsof Afghanistan, Bolivia,the Bplorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic,Hungary,Indonesia. Peru, Sri Lanka.Venezuela and my om
delegation, 1 should now like to introduce a draftresolutionentitled "Scientific
and technologicaldevelopmentsand their impact on internationalsecurity".
contained in document A/C.1/45/L.24. (Mr. Chadha. radié)
At the first special sessionof the ~eneralAssemblydevoted to disarmament,
the threat posed to international peaceand ~ecurityby the growing anns race was
acknovledgedby the world community. It vas agreed that. along with quantitative
measures, qualitative measures in the field ofdisarmament also needed to be
negotiated if the arrnsrace was to be halted. More than a decade has passed since
the adoption of the Final Document,a decade in which qualitative aspecto sf the
arms race have not received the attention theydeserved. That concernras
reflected inOur initiativeat the third special session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmamentand in the 1988General Assembly resolution 43/17A, in
.
which the Secretary-Generalwas requested:
"to follow future scientificand technologicaldevelopments, especiallythose
which have potentialmilitary applications, and to evaluate their impact on
internationalsecurity". A/C.1/45/PV.29
16
(Ur. Chadha. India)
In the report of the Secretary-Generalon this subject. it is made clear that
"in some respects modern technologicaladvancesmay be hindering rather than
helping thepursuit of internationalsecurity." (A/45/568. u. 3)
The reportidentifies fivebroad fields in which scientificand technological
developments shouldbe followed: nuclear technology,space technology.materials
technology,informationtechnologyand biotechnology. The cumulative impact of
individualdevelopments inthese five fields could substantivelt yransfonn the
security environment. Taking into account the illustrativeset of criteria
elaboratedin it. the report suggeststhat the internationalcommunityneeds to be
better equipped to follov the nature and direction of technologicalchange and
that, inthis regard. the United Nations can serve as a catalyst and a
clearing-houseof ideas.
The Conferenceon the peace and security implications ofnew trends in science
and technology,which was held in April 1990 in Sendai, Japan, saw a convergenceof
vievs favouring the goal of mare active andeffectivemultilateral collaborationin
the area of technology assessment - in which the UnitedNations shouldplay a
leading role -the purpose of which would be to improve predictabilityand foster
greater publicawareness. It ras also recognizedthat it is necessary for the
scientificand policy communitiesta work together indealing from a truly global
perspectiverith the compleximplicationsof technologicalchange. Tbe
Secretary-Ganeralhas thereforebeen requestedto continue to follow these
developments andto suggest tothe General Assembly atits forty-seventh sessiona
frameworkfor their assessment.
It is interestingto speculate whetherthe securityenvironmentwould not be
better and safer today if attemptsby some scientistsof thehighest stature had
resultedin the creationof a shared awarenessagainst thedevelopmentof many of
the technologies, 4th their attendantmilitary applications.with which we areburdened today. Tomorrow'sweaponswill be more subtle.more threatening and less
verifiable,and will giveus shorter responsetimes. The impactof some of these
can already beseen in the areas dealt with in the report. and many others can be
perceiveddimly at present. However. it is soberingto realizethat al1 weapon
technologiesand systemsbegin with the postulatingof an idea: unrestrained hwnan
ingenuitydoes the rest.
Only watchfulnessand collective actioncan restraintrends that undermine
global security. We have a common futureand must demonstratea common
determinationto give scienceand tecbnologya human face. The challengesof
eradicatinghunger. poverty and disease and of solving the problemsof global
wanning. oaone depletionand environmentmanagement - al1 of which have acquireda
global dimension - require inventiveness on Our part and international CO-operation
on an unprecendentedscale. Scientificand technologicaldevelopmentmust
continue.but should be orientedentirely in favour of peacefuluses, forthe
benefit of mankind.
My delegationand theothers on whose behalf re are introducingthis draft
resolutionhope that these proposalswill receive the seriousconaiderationand
universal supportof the Conunitteethat thay deserve. UNITED NATIONS 55
FIRST COMMITTEE
34th heldinon
~enerd~ %- L-LAssernb1~
Monday, 12 November 1990
FORTY-FIFTH SESSION at 10.30 a.m.
officiai Reconis New York
VERBATIM RECORDOF THE 34th MEETING
Chairman: Mr. RANA
CONTENTS
- Considerationof and action on draft resolutions(çontinued)
~~~~~-~~
Co-ionshoub uundcihc signinireothedelepconccmcd Distr. GENERAL
rthM. I,ofl2Unid NiiFI-.anincorpoinacofth-rd.ction.Rmm DCI.754 A/C.1/45/PV.34
3 December 1990
ENGLISH Mr. GAJDA (Hungary): At this juncturethe Hungariap deleqationwishes to
explainits position on three draft resolutionsin cluster 5.
The Hungarian delegation has been carefully studying the draft resolution
containedin documentL.25, concerning a conventionon the prohibitionof the use
of nuclear weapons.
It is common knowledge in this body, as it is beyond these walls. that Hungary
is totallyopposed to nuclear weaponsand, consequently. is a willingpartner to
any effort that can lead to their complete and final elimination. We are not
convinced.however, thatthe conventionpromotedby this draft resolutionis
realisticenough to be accorded priorityby the Conferenceon Disannament. As long
as the parties involved continue the practic of engaging inm0n010g~e~.time and
energywill be taken away from other, morerealisticsubjects. For that reason the
Hungariandelegationwill, with some reluctance,abstain in the Vote on this draft
resolution. The CHAIRMAN: The Cornittee will now take a decision on draft resolution
A/C.1/45/L.25, entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of
the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly: convertion on the prohibition (TheChaima)
of the use of nuclearweapons". The draft resolution vas introducedby the
representativeof India at the 29th meeting of the Conunitteon 7 November1990.
1 cal1 on the Secretary toread out thelist of sponsors.
Mr. (secretaryof the Conunittee):The sponsors of draft
,,solutionA/C.1/45/L.25are Afghanistan. Algeria, ArgentinaB .angladesh,Bhutan,
Ecuador.EgYPt, Ethiopia,India. Indonesia. Madagascar, MalaysiV a.et Nam and
The CHAIRMAN: A recordedvote has been requested.
A recordedvote was taken.
u-: Afghanistan.Albania.Algeria, Angola, Argentina Austria,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, BhB utan,ia,
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam.Burkina Faso. Burundi.
Byelorussian Soviet SocialistRepublic, Cameroon. CentralAfricân
Republic.Chile, China. Colombia.Congo, Costa Rica.
Côte d'Ivoire.Cuba, Cyprus,Djibouti, Dominican Republic.
Ecuador, Egypt,Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland.Ghana, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea-BissauG.uyana.Baiti. India, Indonesia. Iran
(Islamic Rep-lic of), Iraq,Jamaica.Jordan. Kenya. Kuwait,Lao
People'sDemocraticRepublic, Lebanon,Lesotho. Liberia.Libyh
Arab Jamahiriya.Madagascar, MalaysiaM ,aldives,Mali. Malta,
Mauritania,Mauritius,Mexico,Mongolia,Morocco, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua,Niger. Nigeria,Oman. Pakistan.
Panama,Peru. Philippines,Qatar, Branda, Samoa. Saudi Arabia,
Senegal,Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia.Sri Lanka. Sudan.
Suriname,Swaziland,Sweden,SyrianArab Republic,ïhailand.
Togo, Tunisia.Uganda, ULrainianSoviet Socialist Bepublic.Union
of Soviet SocialistBepublics.United ArabEmirates,United
Republicof Tanzania,Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen,
Yugoslavia,taire, Zambia,Zimbabwe
m: Australia,Belgium, Canada,Denmark.France, Germany. Iceland.
Italy, Luxembourg,Netherlands.New Zealand. Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Turkey,United Kingdornof Great Britain and Northern
Ireland,United States of America
Wstaining: Bulgaria.Czechoslovakia,Greece, Hungary, Ireland. Israel.
Japan. Liechtenstein,Polana.Romania
Draft resolutionA/C.1/45/L.25was adoutedbv 106 votesto 17. rith LQ
-a. Mr. PAWLAY (Poland): 1 should like to explain the vote of the Polish
delegation on draft resolutionA/C.1/45/L.25,"Conventionon the prohibitionof the
use of nuclear weapons".
Poland is in general in favour of the objectivesset Forth in that draft
resolution. namely, reductionof the threat of nuclear warand prohibition of the
use of nuclear weapons. However,we have certain doubts asto whether the draft
convention annexed to draft resolutionL.25, in its present form, can realisticallg
be acceptable to and consideredby the Conferenceon Disarmamentas a practical
disarmamentmeasure. Forthat reason. Poland reluctantlyabstained in the voting
on the draft resolution.
Mr. ELM (Sweden): The Swedish delegationwould like to explain its vote
on draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.25."Conventionon the prohibitionof the use of
nuclear weapons".
Sweden voted in favour of draft resolutionL.25, which ras introduced bythe
representativeof India. We have done so. as with similar draft resolutionsin A/C.1/45/PV.34
43
(-1
previous years. because Sweden supports the concept of the prohibition in an
internationallegal instrumentof the use and threat of useof nuclear weapons. It
seems that such a prohibitioncorrespondsto an emerging internationalnorm
according to which the use of nuclear weapons contravenet she laws of humanity and
the dictates of public conscience. Already manryules of international lawlimit
or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons incertain circumstances. Sweden considers
that the time is ripe for an investigationinto thepossibilitiesof
cornprehensivelybanning, in an appropriate,legally binding form, the use of
nuclear weapons.
Since the prohibition of the use of nuclear weaponscannot be inferredfrorn
the Charter Of the United Nations, Sweden has reservations concerning the seventh
preambularparagraph of the draft resolutionand its interpretationof the Charter. Mr. HU Xiaodi (China) (interpretation fromChinese): The Chinese
deleqationvoted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.25. entitled "Convention
on the prohibitionof the use of nuclear weapons"because we are in faveur of the
main purpose of the draft resolution. This is known to all. Since the first day
when nuclear weapons came into its possession, the chinese Government has solemnly
declared that China will at no time and in no circumstances be the first to use
nuclearweapons. China has also undertaken torefrain fr0m the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weaponStates or nuclear-weapon-free
ZOr~es. (~r. Bu Xiaodi.China)
China has always maintained that, pending the achievement of the goal of a
complete ban on and totaldestructionof nuclear weapons. al1 the nuclear States
should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any
circumstances, and unconditionall yromise to refrain £rom the use or threat of use
of nuclear veapons against non-nuclear-weapon State or nuclear-weapon-freezones.
On this basis, correspondinginternationalagreements could be concluded. The
Chinese delegation believesthat some of the wording indraft resolution
A/C.1/45/L.25 and the draft conventionannexed thereto couldbe further discussed
and improved. DOCUMENT N4m9
Reporl of the Flrst Comminee on -nenda it~~57 [Origiml: English]
[21November 19901
1. The itementitled
.*ReviewandimplementationoftheConcludingDocu- Consideratlon of proposab
ment of the Twelfth Special Session of the General
~ssembiy: **
..(O)WorldDisarmamentCampaign: DrofiresolurioAlC.Il45lL.25
7. On 31 October, Afghanistan,Algeria. Argentina.
..(b)Conventionon the Prohibitionof theUse of Bangladesh. BhutaEcuador.Egypt. EthiopiaI.ndia.indo-
NuclearWeapons; ncsia, Madagascar.Malaysia. Viet Nam and Yugoslavia
"(c) Nuclear-amisfreeze;
submincda drafi rcsolutionentirled "Convention on the
'*(d) UnitedNationsdisamament fellowship,train- Prohibitionof the Use of Nuclear Weapons(A/C.1/451
ingand advisoryservicesprogramme; L.25). Thedraftnsolution wasintroducedbytherepnsen-
(e) UnitedNations~e~ional'cenmfor Peaceand tativeofindiatthe 29thmeeting.on 7 November.
Disarmament in Africa. Unitcd Naions 8. Atiu 34thmeting. on 12Novemkr. theComminec
RegionalCenm for PeaceandDisarmamentin adopvd drafmolution AIC.1145L.25by a mcordedvoit
Asia and the Pacific and Unitcd Nations of 106to17.with10abstention(sa para. 15klow. draft
RegionalCenm for Peace Disannamentand resolutionB). nie votingwas follows:
Dcvelopment in Latin America and the
Caribkan" In fovow: Afghanistan, Albania. Algeria, Angola,
Argentina.Ausuia. Bahamas.Bahtain, Bangladesh.Bar-
was includedin the pvisional agendaof the forty-fifth bados. Benin.Bhutan, Bolivia. Botswana,razil.Bmnei
sessionof the General Assemblyin accordanecwith its Ddam. BurkinaFaso . urundi. ByelonisrianSoviet
resolutios 117 A. C. D. EandF of 15December1989. SocialistRepublic,Cawroon. Cenual Afnw Republic.
2. At its3rdplenaty meeting.on 21 Septembe1990. Chile,China, Colombia. Congo.ostaRica.C8ted'Ivoire.
iheGeneralAssembly.on thewommendationof thcGen- Cuba. Cypnu. Djibwti. DominicanRepublic.Efuador.
eralCornminec, ecidedtoincludetheiteminitsagennda Egypt.Ubiopia.Fiji.Finiand.Ghana,Guatemala.Guinea.
Guinea-Bissau.Guyana Haiti. India. indonesia.üan 0s-
toallocateit to ihe Fmt Commineeforcomi~o11 and hic Republi of),Laq,Jamaica.Jordan.Kenya.Kuwait.
report. Lao People'sDcmrratic Republic. Lebanon. Lesotho.
3. Atits2ndmeeting.on 9 Octokr. theFit Commit- Liberia. LibyanrabJamahiriya.Madagascar,Malaysia,
teedecidedto hold acombinedgenel ebatcon thedisam- Maldives. Mali. Malta. Mauntania. Mauritius,Mexico.
amcntitem aliocaudtoit.namel,items45to66.Atits4th
meeting. n 16Octokr, theCommiüe decida3tomider Mongolia. Moroav. Mozambique. Myanmar. Nepal,
jointlywiihotherdisamiamcntitemsitem 155.whichwas Nicaragua.Niger.Nigaia. Oman,PaLisiaa.PanamaP, em.
allocavdtoitupona decisionoftGcd Assembly atits PhilippineQatar.Rwanda,Samoa,SaudiArabia.Senegal.
Mth plenarymeeting.on 15October.ïùsdelibaationson SierraLeone.Singaporr.Somalia.SriLa&, Sudan Su-
hoseitemstookplacehm the 3rdthroughî3rdmeetings. riname. Swaziland.weden,Syrian Amb Republic.Thai-
land. Togo.Tunisia. Uganda. UkrainianSoviet Socialist
from15to30ûctokr. Considerationofand actioondraft Republic.Unionof SovietSocialistublics.UnitcdArab
resolutiosnthoseiwms tookplacehm the24thhugh Emùatcs. UnircdRcpublicof Tanuuiia. Umguay. Vcn-
3% meetings.frum 2 to16 November. mela. Viet Nam. Yemcn. Yugoslavia. Zak. Zambia.
Zimbabwe.
Againif:Auswlia. BelgiumCanada. DcomarlrF.rance.
Gcminny,Iccland,Italy,Luxembourg.Nerhcrlands.New
Zealand.Nomay. Ponugal. Spain.Turlrey.UnitcdKing-
domofGrra BritainandNonhernireland,UnitedStatesof
America.
Abstaining:Bulgaria.Czechoslovakia.Grrecc.Hungary.
ireland. Israel.Japan,Liahtenstein. Poland,Romania.r 1. Reireraresifsreqwsr to theConferenceon Disanna-
15. The Fint Cornmitteerecommendsto the General ment10 commence negotiations . sa matterof pnority, in
Assemblythe adoptionof draftresolutions A 10E klow:
Orderto mach agreementon an international convention
prohibitintheuseorbat ofuseofnuciearweaponsunder
R~vnw AND ~MPLEMEKTA~ONOF THE CONCLUDIN DGON- anY circumstances.takingasa basisthedm Conventionon
MEKT OF THE TWELFIS WPECIAS LESSION OF THE GEN-
ERAi ASSEMBLY , the Rohibitionof the Useof NuclearWeapansannexedto
thepresentrcsolution: .
2. Also rrquesrsthe Conferenceon Dismarnent to
reportto theGeneralAssemblyat iu fony-sixthsessionon
theresultsof thosencgotiations.
ANNEX
DrinCoavuitioa on theRohlbition oltbcUx
B d NudPr Wcipon.
ïk Srarn PartirorhiCanvenrion.
Conventionon theProhibitionof the Use Aiwrud bythchri 10Q vvoysurvivdof dimi povd by the
ofNuclearWeapons rlislenccof nuclurweuerpom.
TheGeneral Assembly: '. Convim~dIhu anyusofnueles wapms cwstiMna violationof Ue
Convinced thatthe existenceanduseof nuclear weapons Chvvr ofUieUniieNuiom snd acrimea-nu hwnini, .
pose the grcatestthrcat to the survivalof mankind. ConvisrdUurthirConveniionwoulbea sep towh thccornpletc
climiiillof nuela wupnr ldng to gcncnradcornplcei-.
Conreiovr that thenuclear-amisraceincreawsthe danger mnr undcrsùictmd effectinvmarioollconmil.
of theuse of nuclear weapons. Lkrcrmiiutocontinuencgaiuioforthachievmr of thirgd.
Haveogrcrdasfollowr:
Convinced aisa thatnucleardisamament isthe onlyulti-
mateguaranteeagainstthe use ofnuclearweapons. MicleI
TheSW Mu w thiCsanvmtionsolcmnltmkmkt na IOwe or
Convinced/unkr thata multilated agmment prohibit- diruonw urenwlcu vupons undcranyeimmuanm.
ing the use or bat of use of nuclear weapons should Miik 2
sorngtheninumational securityand helpto mate the cii- TbiConventionduIbe of unlirnddurarion.
matefornegotiationsleadingtothecomplereeliminationof
Mirk 3
nuclearweapons. 1. 'IhirConvcnwnshdbeopenio JSuus forsipanirr.AnSute
Cornciouiaiso that the ment stepstakcnbilatedly by dm doa nn rigtheCoaventioiibcfiurnw inwfncc inscordanec
thUnionof SovietSaialist Republicsandthe UniiedStates wiih.an~ ~h3 ofthilhclcnuy ocçcdto iQJanvrim.
2. TbirCanrcniionrbbcsub* Iodficuioo byridSurn.
ofAmericamwardsareductionoftheirnuclear weapons and Insmimnu of ntifiutioa rrruion &ail be depmiwdwiih thc
theimprovementinEast-Westrelations andthe international Smmryû+d of drUniW Nbom.
climatccanconmbutetowardsthis goal. 3. ~~CainMonrhilImaintofora:mthcdtporitofimmunnm
oidficition byrrreniyc owrmmo. iacludingQ Govmmmo of
Rccallingthai.inparagraph58ofthe Final Documentof Q 6ve aucleu-vcapa SUcr.iac+md.n wih png.ph 2of this
theTenthSpecialSessionof theencra1 As~mbly.~~it is miclc.
statedthaai lratesshouldactivelyparticipateineffons to
bnng about conditions in internationalrelations among
Slatesin whicha code ofpcacefulconductof dons in
internationalais could k agd upm and that would 5. Thcdepmilrarshdl prompilinfmmJI sipnuq d &ing
prccludetheuse or baf of usc of nuclcarweapons. SutaofWducofucbii~.thedueofdeporitofocbinrrmmniof
~~arocuniddrdrnofthe~imofm~cof~r~vea-
Reafinning ihat theuseof nuclearweapm wouldbca ~.u(~~U~ofrbtb~ip~dO<hQ~.
violationoftheCharter of the UnitedNationsand a crime 6. ThisConvcntim.h.U bc~gincrrdbQ dcporiwyinaEcadiiicc
againsthumanity.asdelad in iu resolutions1653(Xm mth ~rriclIM of drQna al thUnitcNh.
of24Novcmber1%1.33171Bof 14December1978,34183
AnVIl4
G of 11Deccmbcr1979,351252Dof 12December 1980and Tb"Convention. vhishQ Anbic. aiirese. Endil. FW.R--
36/921of 9 Decembcr1981. am mi p.n n-XIIm ogua~y unhcnoc.SNI k-&iw *,tme
SmmqOarnl ofthcUmw NUION. who Ml und duly-ficd
Noringwirhrcgrerthat the Conferenceon Disannament. mpa fkmf w ~ICOovemnrniof thrigmay d .cocdusws
duringits 1990session,wasnotable to undendte negoria- INwmmr weaem. theuadarigmi. beinaduiyurthorùcdtkby
rionswithaviewto achievingagreementonaninternational Qir rrrpctivcOovcmmsno.han si@ thirCaavcntion.oprncfda
conventionprohibitingthe ux or thrcatof use of nucicar ii((ninuc- on fhe &y of
o<rtbauuidnkhvadrrdud-.
wcaPonsunder any circumstances,taLing as a basis the
'=XIannexedto Gencd As~mbly resolution441117C of
15 December1989.UNITED 57 A.
NATIONS . . . -.-.. -
GeneralAasembly
PROVISIONAL.
A/45/PV.54
18 December 1990
ENGLISH
Porty-fifth session
GENERALASSPIBLY
PROVISIONALVERBATIM RECORD OF THE FIFTY-FOURTHMEETING
Held at Eeadquarters,New York,
on Tuesday,4 December1990, at 10 a-m.
president: Mr. de WC0
This recordcontainsthe originaltext ofspeechesUeliveredin Englishand
interpreta.i.ns of speechesin the otherlanguages. The final text ri11 be printed
in the QgfacaalRecords of the eneral Assen@&.
Correctionsshouldbe submittedto originalspeechesonly. They shouldbe
sent under the signature of a memberof the delegationconcerned,rithin one veek,
to theChief,Officia1RecordsEditingSection.Departmentof ConferenceServices,
room DC2-750,2 United NationsPlaza,and incorporatedin a copy of the record. The PRESIDENT: 1 request theRapporteur of the Pirst Committee,
Mr. ~atéviModem Lawson-Betumof Togo, to introduce the reports of the First
Committee in one intervention.
P. LAWSON-BETUM (Togo),Rapporteurof the First Comittee
(interpretation£rom French): Ur. President, since this is the first time 1 have
spoken in the General Assembly in my capacity as Rapporteurof the First Conunittee.
I am especially pleased to congratulateyou on the competence,ski11 and
selflessnesswith which you have been guiding the proceedingsof the forty-fifth
session. While these fine qualities confirm the wisdom of the choice made in
entrustingyou with the presidencyof the General Assembly, coupled vith your
constant readiness to serve, theyhave ensured the full success of oursession. (Mr. Lawson-Betum.Ra~Dorteur,
Pirst Conmittee)
Reflectingthe increasingimprovement in theinternational political climate,
the Pirst Cornittee'swork was carried out in an atmosphere markedby serenity,
constructive dialogueand CO-operation. Even if deep differencesof opinion still
existed on some importantissues, it must be acknowledgedthat considerable efforts
were made to make the legitimate concerns of Member States or groups of States
better known and toenlarge upon some pointsor areas of agreement.
In its considerationof the 27 agenda items, referredto it by the General
Assembly, the Pirst Committee followed its customaryprocedure. that is to Say, to
organize its work into three broadphases correspondingto the threegroupi of
items - namely, questions relatingto disarmament, items 45 to 66 and 155; the
question of Antarctica, item67; and questions relatingto internationalsecurity.
items 68 to 70. The Pirst Comittee also had on its agenda the relevant part of
agenda item 12, section D of chapter III of the reportof the Economic and Social
Council, entitled "International CO-operatio in eliminating the consequencesof
the accidentet the Chernobyl nuclear-powerplant". (Mr. Lawson-Betum.Ravoorteur,
First Cornittee)
At this plenary meeting of the GeneralAssembly, 1 have the honour to
introduce the First Cornmittee'sreports on agenda items 45 to 60, 62 to 66, and 155
on disarmament. These reports are contained indocumentsW45/767 to 782, A/45/784
to 788, and A/45/794.
The first phase of the First Committee's work - considerationof the 23 agenda
items on disarmament - vas carried out at 38 meetings, from 15 October to
16 November, and consisted in 106 statements and the adoption of 52 draft
resolutions anddecisions, 25 of which were adopted without avote. In all, 22
meetings were devoted to the general debateand an exchange of views on al1 items
relating ta disarmament, from15 to 30 October. Moreover,the Cornittee held 16
meetings. from 2 to 16 November.to consider draft resolutions anddecisions on
agenda items on disarmament.as well as to take decisions relating thereto.
At the same time, intensive informa1 consultationswere held among delegations
as part of efforts to deepen dialogue andnarrow differing views and positions on
various issues of cornon interest.
Both the positive assessment of the international politicalsituation and the
ongoing challenges, as well as new ones, served as backdrop to the statementsmade
in the general debate and in the exchange of views on disarmamentquestions. (-,
Cornittee)
The number of statementsmade vas undoubtedlydue to an increasedinterestin
disannamentissues in the light of the opportunities offereb dy the improvementin
the internationalpoliticalclimate. In this connection particular emphasisvas
placed on the endof the coldwar andthe resultingmovement frommistrust and
confrontationto dialogue, partnership and CO-operation asuell as on
American-Soviet efforts tolimit arms and disarmamentin the nuclear and chemical
fields, the initiativestaken in variousparts of the world, particularlyEurope,
to promote trust.security andCO-operation.and the importanceof the forthcoming
international exchangeson the subjectof disarmament.
Nevertheless, theConunittee'sattention was called to the fact thatpeace
remains fragile inthe light of the persistence of militarythreats. in particular
tbe crisis in the Persian Gulf, and of non-militarythreatsto international peace
and security.
The feeling emergedfrom the various statementsthat the disarmamentproaess
should drav nev encouragemenf trom the improvementof the internationalpolitical
climate and should respont do the follovingrequirementsto ensure the reign of a
nev vorld order: reinforcement ofthe dynamicinteractionof bilateral and
multilateral negotiations; continuanceand intensification of bilateral
negotiationson nuclear disannamentand multilateral negotiationo sn chemical
veapons; equitabledistribution ofthe dividendsof peace: rationaluse of the
collective security machinery provide for in the Charter,particularly toensure
the rule of lav and to promotethe preventionand peaceful settlement of conflicts:
strengthening ofthe role of the United Nitions in disarmamentmatters: improvement
of the verification machinery under disarmamentagreements.transperencyon
military questions and preventio of the proliferationof weapons of mess
destruction:and. finally,harmonizationof regionaldisarmamentefforts. (m. Lawson-Betum. ~aooorteui;,'
Pirst Cornmittee)
As illustrated by the information received £rom the Pourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, increased
interest in the question of nuclear testinq in the Conference on Disarmament Ad
prospects for the amendment Conference on the partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty. as
well as the requirements of national. reqional and international security, nuclear
disarmament occupied a particularly important place again this year in the concerns
expressed by deleqations.
Thus, of the 48 draft resolutions adopted by the Committee, 19 deal witb
various aspects of nuclear disarmament. (Mr. Lawson-Betum. Rannorteu~,
Pirst Conunittee)
The positivechanges in international political relations have been reflected
in the considerationof disarmament questions. Also. within the framework of
efforts to rationalizeOur work and to narrow the differences betweenviews and
positions it has been possible to reduce the number of draft resolutions and
decisions submitted and adopted and to increase the number of draft resolutionsand
decisions adoptedwithout a vote. Indeed, 54 draft resolutions anddecisionswere
submitted during this session compared to 64 at the forty-fourth session, 14 at the !-,
First Conunittee)
forty-thirdsession and 79 at the forty-secondsession. Furthemore, 52 draft
resolutions and decisionw sere adopted in the courseof this session. as compared
to 59 at the forty-fourthsession:while 26 draft resolutions anddecisions. as
compared to 22 last year and 23 at the forty-thirdsession,were adoptedwithout a
vote. This constitutesconsiderable progress and it is an encouragingtrend
tovards consensus.
The amalgamationof two draft resolutions on thc eonclusionof effective
international arrangementt so assure non-nuclear-weapoS ntates againstthe useor
threat of use of nuclear weapons should also be mentioned. while a singledraft
resolutionwas submittedon the preventionof an anns race in outer space.
1 must also report that the Chairman of the Pirst Conunitteeorganized several
informalmeetings of the Friends of the Chainnan,an open-endedgroup, to ascertain
the vievs of delegationson ways andmeans of rationalizing both the substantive
and the procedural aspects of the FirstConunittee's work. Asa result of those
consultationsthe Chairman submitteda working paper containing pcoposals for
rationalizingthe proceduraland substantivevork of the PirstCommitteee.
1 cannot concludemy submissionof the reportsof the PirstCommittee oa
disarmamentagenda items 45 to 60, 62 to 66 and 155 withoutpaying a vell-deserved
tribute to those who are responsiblefor the successof the vork of Our Conunittee.
It is only right and properfor me to make special mention ofthe Chairman of the
First Committee,Mr. Jai Pratap Rana. With his great intellectual and moral
probity. keen political sense and profound knowledgeof what is at atake in
connectionwith questionsof disarmamentand international peace and security,he
wss able to givevise, responsible and effective leadership. (W. Lawson-Betum.Ra~porteur,
First Committee)
It is a pleasure for me to pay a tribute also to the two Vice-Chairmen,
Mr. Ronald Morris and Mr. Sergei Martynovwho. with ski11 and perspicacity,
confirmedthe excellent reputationsthat preceded their election to their posts.
1 wish alsoto express appreciationof the enlighteningand valuable
contribution of theUnder-Secretary-General for DisarmamentAffairs,
Mr. Yasushi Akashi, andof the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security
Council Affairs,Mr. Vasiliy Safronchuk,to the smooth accomplishmentof our work.
It gives me great pleasure to thank mostwarmly the Secretaryof the Committee,
Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, who, as usual, put al1 his abilityand long experience at the
service of the Committee.with the wise and effective assistanceof his colleagues,
includingMr. Mohmad Sattar..Mr. Timur Alasaniya,Mr. Jack Gerardi-Siebert,
Mr. Kuo-ChungLin andMrs. Agnes Marcaillou.and al1 the other members of the
secretariatof the Committee. The PRESIDENT: The Assemblyhas concludedit.9considerationOf agenda
item 56.
We turn next to the report of theFirst Committee(A/45/779)on agenda
item 57, "Review and implementationof the Concluding Document of the Twelfth
SpecialSession of the GeneralAssembly".
The Assemblywill now take decisionson the five draft resolutions, t Ao E,
recommendedby the First Committeein paragraph15 of its report.
Draft resolutionA is entitled "United Nations disannament fellowship,
trainingand advisoryservicesprogramme". It was adopted withouta vote in the
First Committee. May 1 take it that the General Assemblyadopts draft resolution A?
Praft resolutionA was adooted (resolution45/59 A).
-PR_ESIDENT: Draft resolutionB is entitled"Conventionon the
prohibitionof the Use of Nuclear Weapons".
A recordedvote has been requested.
recordedvote was taken. In favour: Afghanistan, Albania. Algeria. Angola.Antigua andBarbuda,
Argentina. Austria, Bahamas,Bahrain. Bangladesh,Barbados,
Belize, Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana,Brazil. Brunei
Darussalam. BurkinaFaso, Burundi.Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central AfricanRepublic, Chad,
Chile, China. Colombia,Cornoros, Congo. Costa Rica,
Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus,Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador,Egypt, El Salvador. Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland,
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia,Iran (IslamicRepublic of),
Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan,Kenya, Kuwait. Lao People's Democratic
Republic. Lebanon, Lesotho,Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,Madagascar.
Malawi. Malaysia, Maldives.Mali. Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico. Mongolia, Morocco,Mozambique. Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal,
Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria, Oman. PakiStan. Papua New Guinea.
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,Qatar. Rwanda, Saint Kittsand
Nevis. Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the GrenadinesS ,amoa,
Saudi Arabia. senegal, Seychelles.Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Solomon Islands. Somalia, Sri Lanka. Sudan. Suriname,Swaziland,
Sweden. Syrian Arab Republic,Thailand. Togo. Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet SocialistRepublic,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Ernirates,United
Republic of Tanzania, UruguayV ,anuatu. Venezuela, VietNam,
Yemen, Yugoslavia,Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Aaainst: Australia, Belgium. Canada. Denmark. France. Germany.Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal.
Spain, Turkey,United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland. United States ofAmerica
Abstaininq: Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia,Greece, Hungary. Ireland. Israel.
Japan. Liechtenstein,Poland, Romania
Draft resolutiOn B was adouted bv 125 votes to 17. with 10 abstentiana
(resolution 45/59 8). ..
46/37. Rcviewand implementntioa of the Concluding
Documcntofthe TwelfthSpeeialSessionofthe
Gencral .ltscmb~y 58
2. AIso requeru theConferenceonDisamamentto n-
portto theGeneralAssemblyontheresuluofthesenege
tiations.
ïhe GenerolAssembly. 63thplenarymeeting
Convincedthat the existence anduseof nuclearwcap 6December1991
onsposethe greacesthreatto thdd ofIMUkd.
Convincrd also that nucleardisarmament is the only
ultimategmee againn the useof nuclearweapom, DnnCoi-Uoi .a dmRohiùlUomoflh Uuol
Convinced funher tbata multilateralagrement prohib Ndur Wupool
iting the useor thm of use of nuclearWWm shodd ?'kSmuPmiaioLMiGmufion.
mengthen internationalsecurityand anmbute to the cli- Abd bylb )ic iaia(.ihm'val of mniiopacd byibcex-
matefornegotiationsleadingtotheultimateeiimiMti0nof isacnsrof ouaiciponr.
nuclev weapom, CorvimcdIhliqr w d dcu wciponrconaiitur noluionof
Welcomingthe Treaty between the United States of thebmr ofth. Ud Nb ud i uim qiwi hwiiy,
Americaand the Union of SovietSocialistRepublia on Convincdth. iabLCocirooldad be ncptowardibccompiric
theReductionand Limitationof SmtegicOffensiveAmis, dimiomiooonwkarwiponr tudioiogcocal id soniplucdim.
siçnedon 31 July1991. mcmu&r ruiuiadcIicd invonitid wmml.
Ikruinwdiaont*r wgddaoa foribcachicvemctfthigmi,
R'elcoming &O the announcemenrsby theGovenunent
ofthe Unionof SovietSociaiiitRepubliaand theCioveru- Hmr ogrecu fdbvr
mentof the United States ofAmericaof significantmeas-
ures.includingunilateralseps. whicbcouldsignaltheR-
versalof the nuclear-anm race. and expnssing thhop
chatthesewillbe followedby agrectnenîsatan cariydaîc
on funher cutsin saegic nuclcarasenals.
Consciousthat the ~ccnt neps taken by the Unionof
Soviet SocialistRevublia and theUaitcdSiaiesofAmer- MirkJ
iw towardsa rcdu&onoftbeirnuclcarwapom andtheim- 1. nir Coovao~ ahal1beoponia.II Shlca aip8urr.Aoy
proveinentinthe inemtiod die cancontribue io- Sutoihiida. na sigib.bovco~ioo bcforrirny,im forsio
wvds thegoalof cnmplne dimirdon ofaudearwap~~& ucordaocc riib paaypb 3 of ibis aniclc my utiiu any
ümc.
Recallingchy inpaqraph58of the Fi Documentof L ThisConrrnriddi b.mibjeIomi1ÏCui0bysgnnory
theTath SpecialSessionof the Genusl APwmbly: it brvum~uof* a8Œ&oo &O bodcpostrwith<Scanuy-
mted that III S~es shouldadvely panicipatein effom QIŒdollbUdNviolr
to bringaboutconditionsin intctnatiod rrfarionsamong 1 ïùia bowdoa rhi lie# in(oroM th @il ofirmnmxrn
Sutes in which a codeof peacenilmndua of nationsin dniificmibymu Oonmmmu inludiogih.Oovcmmm of
internationalaffain couldbeaval upon and chatwould iarfivooulur-nuponSLi*r Y vsordrow riih pingrph 2 oii.L
precludetheuse or thre aftuse of nuch Wns. &la
Reaflrming chattheuseof nudear wcaponswould bea 4. ForSialorh iuîmnŒnIrof ntiliulioruceaaioo an
hpoiicdiflnibi.n*ipp~dibiCoarocim~dJI.itcrh
violationof theChanuof theUnited Nationasndacrime ~0nibdlUdlLdrp0.adthnriDILMnc<illdair&~am
agjinn humanity,asdecW in iîsrrrolutions 1653 @VI) -a.
of 24 Novmber 1961.33/71 B of 14 Deccmba 1978.
34/83G of II Decemba 1979.351152Dof 12Demba
1980and 36/921of 9 Demnbcr 1981.
Noring withregm thattheConfemce onDisamat.
durineiis1991session wa¶ Mi abletoundUUke=oh-
-- ~ ~ ~ ~
tions with aviewto &ming agreement cm âüintema-
tional conventionpmhibitiagthe useor thrcatof useof -4
nuclur wwpons undu any circumnanca. taking aïa
bvis the tut mxed to Ocneral AcKmbly molution Liraia.iidspui&nuUiran rqmally.uibco~i;&tib.dcporiud
45/59Bof4 Dccembcr1990, rabib.S~d<brU~N.UoŒ.wbodJldduly~
(iTicd~icrrbnrolialb~dlbiicsiwriadrodini
1. Reiierw itsrequet sotheConferna onDisanna-
mentto commencenegotiations. as amatterofpnority,in
order toRacb agreement on an inmional convention
prohibiting the +e or<hrrîtofuse of nuclear weapoar
underany circumstances.takingas a basi thedraA Con- '
ventionon theProhibitionoftheUseofNuclur Weaoom
annexedto the p~~~nt~solutioa;UNIT€0
NATIONS A' C.
.O
\ .
3- @'
General Assec@ly Foy*,., Distr.
y!
4dr LIMITED
A/C.1/46/L.20
31 October 1991
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Forty-sixth session
FIRST COKYITTEE
Agenda item 61 (c)
REVIEW )rNDIMPLEMENTATIONOF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OP THE
TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: CONVENTION
ON THE PROHIBITIONOF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Afahanistan.Alqeria. Banaladesh. Bhutan. Ecuador.Ewiit,
Ethiopia, Indiè. Indonesia. Madauascar. Malavsia. Viet Nam
and Yuaoslavia: draft resolution
Convention oneof the Use of Nuclear Wea~ong
The General Assembb.
ConvinceQ that the existence and useof nuclear weaponspose the greatest
threat to the survival of mankind,
Convinced als~ that nuclear disarmament is the only ultimate guarantee
against the use of nuclear weapons,
Convinced furth= that a multilateral agreement prohibitingthe use or
threat of useof nuclear weapons should strengtheninternationalsecurity and
contribute to the climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate elimination
of nuclear weapons,
Welcoming theTreaty betweenthe United Statesof America and the Union
of Soviet SocialistRepublicson the Reductionand Limitation OfStrategic
Offensive Arms signed on 31 July 1991,
Welcominu alsQ their announcements ofsignificantmeasures including
unilateral steps rhich could signalthe reversa1 of the nuclear arms race, and
expressing the hopethat these vil1 be followed by agreements at an early date
on further cuts in strategic nucleararsenals, . A/C.1/46/L.20
English
Page 2
Conscioua that the recent steps taken by the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics towards a reductionof their nuclear
weapons and the improvement inthe internationalclimate can contribute
tovards thegoal of complete elimination ofnuclear weapons.
Recalling that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth
Special Session of theGeneral Assembly. it is stated that al1 States should
actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international
relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in
international affairs could be agreed upon and that vould precludethe use or
threat of use of nuclear veapons,
Reaffirminq that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the
Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its
resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978,
34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 1 of
9 December 1981,
Notins vith reafet that the Conferenceon Disarmament,during its 1991
session, vas not able to undertake negotiations with a viev to achieving
agreement on an internationalconvention prohibiting the use or threat of use
of nuclear weapons under any circumstances,taking as a basis the text annexed
to General Assembly resolution45/59 B of 4 December 1990,
1. to the Conference onDisarmament to commence
negotiations. as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an
international convention prohibitiogthe use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons under any circumstances,taking as a basis the draft Conventionon the
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution:
2. Also the Conferenceon Disarmament to report to the General
Assembly on the results of these negotiations.
Draft Conventionon the Prohibition of the Use of
Nuclear WeaDong
The States Partiesta this Convention,
by the threat to the very survival ofmankind posed by the
existence of nuclear veapons.
Çonvinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes aviolation of the
Charter of the United Nationsand a crime against humanity,
C- that thisConvention would be a step towards the complete
elimination of nuclear veapons leading to general and completedisarmament
under strict and effective internationalcontrol. A/C.1/46/L.20
English
Page 3
Determined to continue neqotiations for the achievement of this goal.
Have aoreed as follovs:
Article 1
The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertakenot to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.
Article 2
This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
Article 3
1. This Convention shall be open to al1 States for signature. Any
Scate that does not sign the Convention before its entry into forcein
accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratificationby signatory
States. Instruments of ratification or accession shallbe deposited vith the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments
of ratification by twenty-five Governments. including the Governments of the
five nuclear-weaponStates. in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are
deposited after the entry into force of the Convention, it shall enter into
force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or
accession.
5. The depository shall promptly informal1 signatory and acceding
States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument
of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this
Convention, as vell as of the receipt of other notices.
6. This Convention shall be registeredby the depository in accordance
vith Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 4
This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,Russian
and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shallbe deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, vho shall send duly certified copies
thereof to the Government of the signatory and acceding States.AIC.lI46IL.20
English
Page 4
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned. beingduly authorized theretoby
their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for
signature at on the daY
of one thousand nine hundred and UNITEI) YA'I'IOSS
.- FIRSTCOMMITTEE 60
~eneral@!&4ssernbl~ 31th hmeeetiong
Thursday, 7 November 1991
FORTY.SISTH SESSION
at 3~..m.
Ofjici aecords New York
VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 3lst MEETING
Chai rrnan : Mr. MROZIEWICZ (Poland)
CONTENTS
- Considerationof and action on draft resolutionsunder al1
disarmament agenda items (continued)
- Organizatio~of work
-
~htrmci>rdirtucnrin'iii>n. Distr. GENERAL
cilirrr.iiunr shunderthe\opormcmbcrofiiIclcpconccrncd A/C.1/46/PV.31
.irh,,,,.,i/,dur, o/publi<urioniu 0flicRccordrEditinpSeali>n.Rixm DC?75ii. 15 November 1991
2Unirnt Naii<inr Plua. inacowiihc reuwd
Cilirrction, ~ill heir,uïd<..iiirwpmteri>rri:cndun>Ior c3ch Commtiim.
ENGLISH
91-61712 7258V (E) me CAAIRMàN: 1 now cal1 upon the representativeof India.who vil1
introducedraft resolutionsA/C.1/46/L.19and WC.1/46/L.20. Mr. SHAH (India): Over the last coupleof weeks we have heard many
statementswelcoming the manypositivechanges that have occurred in the
politico-militaryand security situationin the world. The dramatically
changed scenario inthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republicsand Eastern
Europe, the end of cold war and East-Westconfrontationand its impacton
prospects for peace and disarmament,the unilateralannouncementsof decisions
to dismantleand destroy someportions ofthe awesomenuclear arsenalsof some
nuclear-weaponcountries.and the improvedpoliticalclimate for furthercuts,
are al1 indeed very positive changes. (Fr. Shah. Indiq)
We believe it is a welcome,thoughbelated,change.inthe approachto nuclear
disarmament. Welistencarefully when the non-nuclearweapon coustriesare
asked torespondto thesechanges intheir approach to disarmamenb t.t we
also believe that welcomeas these changesare, they mustnot blind us tothe
other reality. And that relatesto changesthathave not takenplace.
There is no changein the thinkingthat nuclearweaponsare necessaryfor
security. The existingnuclear arasenals can stilldestroythe wrld several
times over. Despitethe end of East-Westconfrontation. there is no changein
approach as regards the doctrio ne deterrence. There is no changein the
policy of reserving theright to conductnuclearexplosions for armements
purposes. The productionof nuclearweapons,the qualitativeenhancementof
nuclear weaponry through scientificand technological improvements.the
production of fissionable materials,the manufacture of deliverysystemsfor
nuclearveapons. and nuclearweapon testingstillcontinue. Anthere is no
change inthe policiesthat do no want to renouncethe right touse nuclear
weapons or to threatento use them, despitethe welcome assertion that a
nuclearwar must not be foughtand cannotbe won. and despitethe innumerable
expert opinionsabout the "nuclearwinter"and end of al1 kinds of living
organism if nuclearweaponsare used eitherby designor by accident.
The overwheimingmajorityof humanitywants a nuclear-weapon-frew eorld.
They wantcompletenuclear disarmament.They wantthe eliminationof al1
nuclear weaponsfrom this Earth and from outer space. These are Our goals and
objectives. And themust remainhumanity'simmutableobjectives,which
._
should notbe changedor diluted regardleso sf improvementsin the
internationalclimate,which ve welcome. (& Shah. Indig)
r
My delegationbelievesthat these are achievableobjectivesdespitethe
differenceof perceptionson their realization. My delegationis optimistic
that just as the internationalcomunity is now negotiatinga total ban onthe
use of chemicaland toxicweapons in additionto a ban on their production and
stockpiling, we wilo lne day negotiatea conventionon banning the use of
nuclearweapons.on the cessationof al1 nuclear-weapons tests. on production
of nuclearweaponsand on their complete elimination. Buwe believe that it
is necessaryto reiteratethese goals and to pursueproposalsto achieve
them. These proposalsdo not become irrelevant or uaaecessary,as somemight
think.just becausethe political climate has changed. In fact, the changed
politicalclimate is conduciveto implementation of the ideas contained inthe
draft resolutionswe are presenting.
The secondis draft resolution WC.1/46/L.20, on aconventionon the
This draft resolution is
Prohibition of the uae of nuclearweapons. (Mr. Shah. India)
sponsoredby Afghanistan,Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Ecuador.Egypt,
Ethiopia. Indonesia. Madagascar, MalaysV ia,t Nam and Yugoslaviaas well as
by India. The draft resolution reiterates thc eonvictionthat the complete
eliminationof nuclear weapons remains thegoal and it calls upon the
Conferenceon Disannamentto commence negotiations in order to reacb agreement
on an internationalconventionprohibitingthe use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons under any circumstances.
My delegation isprivilegedto introducethe tw draft resolutions on
behalf of al1 the sponsors.to whom we extend Our thanks. We urge al1 Member
States to contributepositivelyto the changed international climate by
supporting these resolutions, and subsequentlyto taie action to implement
them. held on
Monday, 11 Novemher 1991
;TH SESSIOS ...
at 10 a.m. ~'
New York
Officiol Records
-
VERBATIM RECORDOF THE 33rd MEETING
Chairman: Mr. MROZIEWICZ
CONTENTS
- Considerationof an action on draft resolutionsunder al1
disarmament agenda items
ni, ,<~,3,."h,C,,><,,,,CL,,<*".
ci>r~,.iiiin< hresuunduihc \ienait.rinrinhdihc dclepr#c<iwern~if
,-,,~i,~..,.,.i ,I,i,,.uhb<l,,<I~CC~,L.I O~I;C~RLC,,~~d~~~~~ ~~~ a,n~ ~)r..7«1
:~lnntçd~aiiPln~.rtid iwiirpirrrO>Fi.*'hc rrcisrrl. Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/46/PV.33
C,~rri,~.+,IIhI,WCrticr inc <,~hcw..ii,t>.r.prari,i.irri$iiCL~~CIIII~IIIIIIII..
19 November 1991
ENGLISH
91-61730 7295V (E) The CHAIRMAN: The Conunittee will now proceed to take a decision on
draft resolutionA/C.1/46/L.20, entitled "Reviewand irnplementation of the
concluding documentof the twelfth sepcial session of the General Assembly:
Convention on the Prohibitionof the Use of Nuclear Weapons".
1 cal1 on the Secretary of the Conunittee.
(Secretaryof the Conmittee): Draft resolution
A/C.1/46/L.20has 15 sponsors andwas introducedby the representativeof
India at the 31st meeting of the Pirst Conmittee. on 7 November 1991. The
list of sponsors reads as follows: Afghanistan,Algeria. Bangladesh. Bhutan,
Bolivia, Ecuador, EgyptE ,thiopia, India, Indonesia.Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Madagascar, MalaysiaV ,iet Nam andYugoslavia.
The CHAIRMAN: A recorded vote has beenrequested.
A recorded vote vas taka.
Subsequently,the deleqationsof Benin, Gabon.Rwanda and Uganda
advised the Secretariat that theyhad intendedto vote in favour. RC/~ A/C.1136/PV.33
In favour: Afghanistan,Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh.
Barbados. Belarus. Bhutan. Bolivia. Botswana. Brazil.
Brunei Darussalam. Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Central AfricanRepublic, Chad, Chile. China,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, CubaCyprus,
Democratic People's Republio cf Korea, Djibouti.Ecuador,
Eqypt, Ethiopia. Ghana,Grenada. Guatemala.Guinea. Guyana,
India, Indonesia. Iran (IslamicRepublic of). Iraq, Jamaica.
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait,Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.
Madagascar,Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta. Mauritius,
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,Myanmar, Namibia,
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger,Nigeria, Oman. Pakistan. Panama,
Peru, Philippines. QatarS ,audi Arabia. Senegal. Singapore.
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan. Suriname. Swaziland,
Syrian Arab Republic.Thailand, Togo. Tunisia. Ukraine,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates,
United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay.Vanuatu. Venezuela,
Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire. Zimbabwe
Asainst: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark. France. Iceland. Italy.
Luxembourg. Marshall Islands, Netherlands,New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, TurkeyU,nited iiingdomof Great
Britain and Northern Ireland. United Statesof America
Wstaininq: Albania, Argentina. Austria, Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia,
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Bungary, Ireland. Israel.
Japan. Latvia, Liechtenstein. LithuaniaP ,oland, Republic of
Korea, Romania. Sweden
Subsequently,the delegationsof Benin, Gabon, Rwanda and Uganda
advisedthe Secretariat that they had intended to vote in faveur: the
deleqationof Germany advised that it had intended to vote against. Mr. (Bulgaria): 1 wish to explainmy deleqation'svote on
two draft resolutionsjust adoptedby the First Conmittee: draft resolution
A/C.1/46/L.19,on a nuclear-armsfreeze,and draft resolutionA/C.1/46/L.20,
On the Conventionon the Prohibitionof the Use of NuclearWeapons.
In principleBulgaria takesa positiveview of the basic objective behind
the conceptof a nuclear-armsfreeze. intended tofix the existing situation
with a view to providingtime to negotiate appropriate reductions o nuclear
arsenalsin such a way that the negotiated agreements wouln dot run too greatPKB/ASW A/C.1/46/PV.33
32
(Mr. Devanov.Bulaaria)
a risk of being overtakenby the Pace of the arms race. We believe that such
a freeze could have been a viable and valuable option indeed inthe past. when
the nuclear-armsrace vas going on unabated.
At present. however.the situationseems to have changed completely.
Nuclear disarmament has becomp eart of our life. Significantprogress in
reducing the nuclear arsenalsof the two leading nuclear Powers has been made
during the past severalyears. It may suffice to mention only the Treaty on
the Eliminationof Intermediate-and Shorter-Range Missiles(INF Treaty), the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty(START)and the most recentunilateralsteps
by the United States of Americaand the USSR to withdraw non-strategicnuclear
weapons on a global scale. These are elements ofa completelynew situation
in the nuclear field, when mankind has begun a long process aimedat the
elimination of al1 nuclear weaponseverywhere.
In such circumstances.calling for a nuclear-arms freezemight, in
practice, be somewhat misleadingor even implya reversa1of the existing
momentum in nuclear disarmament, which would be highly undesirable. It is
difficult for us to reconcile the conviction expressed in the draft resolution
on a nuclear-arms freeze that the current international situation is most
conducive to nuclear disarmament witb a cal1 to freezethe nuclear statusquo.
For those reasons my delegation decidedto change the vote it cast last
year on a similar draftresolution. We are glad to observe that a number of
other delegations acted in the same manner in the new situation.
On the draft resolution dealing with the Conventio on the Prohibitionof
the Use of NuclearWeapons, the delegation of Bulgaria again abstained,as it
did on a similar draft resolution at last year's session. We believe that the
new situation offers new opportunitesfor change in long-heldperceptionsonpKB/ASW A/C.l/46/PV.33
33
(Mr. Deyanov. Bulaaria)
the use of nuclear weapons, but we are not quite sure that the draft
reeolution in document A/C.1/46/L.20 adequately reflects the most promising
avenues for progress in this area. That is why rny delegation abstained on
that draft resolution.PKBlASW
Mr. LIU Jievi (China) (interpretation£rom Chinese): The Chinese
deleqation wishes to make a few remarks concerningits position of principle
on the issue ofa nuclear-testban.
China understands the urgentdesire of a vast number of
non-nuclear-weapon States for the early attainmentof a comprehensive
nuclear-testban. Adopting a restrainedand prudentattitude towardsnuclear
testing, China has conducted a very limited numberof nuclear tests, and
stopped nuclear testingin the atmosphere in 1981. China has also
constructively participated in the work of theAd Eoc Conunitteeon a Nuclear
Test Dan of the Conference on Disarmamentin Geneva. From May to June this
year China participated in part of the second technical test relating to the
global exchange and analysis of seismic data organized by the Ad Hoc Group of
Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament.
We believe thatthe cessation of nuclear testing by al1 States shouldbe
effected in the framework of an effective nuclear-disarmamen process. On
such issues as the cessationof nuclear testingand nuclear disarmament,
countries with the largest nuclear arsenals have special responsibiliti esd
should take the lead in halting thetesting, production anddeployment of
nuclear weapons and drastically reducetheir nuclear arsenals soas to create
conditions for the realization of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. We have
taken note of the actionsthey have taken in the field of nuclear
disannament. However, they still have a long way to go in discharging their
special responsibilitiesand obligations. China is prepared towork with
other countries in exploring the ways to promote complete nuclear disarmament,
including a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.
1 shall now makea few connnents on draft resolutionA/C.1/46/L.20.~KB/ASW A/C.1/46/PV.33
35
(Mr. Liu Jievi. China)
The Chinese deleqationhas just voted in favour of draft resolution
~/~.1/46/L.20,entitled "Conventionon the Prohibitionof the Use of Nuclear
Weapons". 1 am speaking nowin order to reiterate the position of principle
the Chinese Goverment on the prohibition of the use ofnuclear weapons.
The Chinese Goverment has al1 along stood for the complete prohibition and
thoroughdestruction of nuclear veapons and has, since the first day of its
possessionof nuclear weapons, undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear
weapons atany time or under any circwnstances. (Mr.Liu Jievi. China)
China has also undertakennot to use or threaten touse nuclearweapons
against non-nuclear-weapon Stata esd nuclear-weapon-freeones at any time or
under any circumstances. We hope thatal1 the other nuclear-weaponStatescan
make thesame cornitmentunconditionally.
China has also called for the signinogf a corresponding international
agreementon this basiswhich will provide a forcefulimpetusto theprocess
of nuclear disarmament. We hope thatChina'sconstructive initiativ eill
receivea positiveresponse.
Based on the above-mentionedpositionof principle,the Chinese
deleqationis in favour ofthe main thrust of draft resolutionA/C.1/46/L.20
on the prohibition of thuese ofnuclearweaponsand at the same time wishes
to point out that certain element sf the draft resolution an 'theannexed
text of the draft convention neetdo be improved.
Pr. PULE (Czechoslovakia):On behalfof Bungary,Poland and
Czechoslovakia. lemte explainOur voting on two draft resolutions whic vere
adopted just a moment ago: A/C.1/46/L.19,"Nuclear-arms freeze",and
A/C.1/46/L.20,"Conventionon the prohibition of the use of nuclearweapons".
The three countries - Bunqary,Poland and Czechoslovakia - strongly
support arealisticand most effective approach in variousfieldsof
disarmament. During recentmonths, they have witnessedan impressive
breakthroughin nuclear disannament aa s resultof the outstanding initiatives
taken by President Bush and Presiden Gorbachev. Consequently.it is time for
real and verified nuclea disannament. Taking into accountthe fact that the
United Statesand theUSSR are considerablyreducingtheir nucleararsenals,
the idea of a nuclear-arinfsreeze is simplyoutdated. That is vhy Bungary,
Poland and Czechoslovakia decided to vote again draft resolution
A/C.1/46/L.19,entitled "Nuclear-armf sreeze". (Mr. Fule. Czechoslovak&)
As for draft resolutionA/C.1/46/L.20,"Conventionon the prohibitionof
the use of nuclear weapons", the three would like to reiterate their
consistentsupport for and cornitmentto the principle of the non-useof
nuclearweapons. They consider it an essential,importantelement, together
vith a strong non-proliferationregime, for global and regional security. At
the same time. they advocate pragmatic and realisticapproachesand measures
in this field.
At this juncture, the necessarypolitical and legal requirementsare not
present fora possible codification of the principle of the non-use of nuclear
veapons. For this reason the delegationsof Hungary, Poland and
Czechoslovakiaabstained in the vote on draft resolutionA/C.1/46/L.20. Mr. (Finland): 1 wish to explain Finland'sabstentionin
the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20,entitled "Convention on the
Prohibitionof the Use of NuclearWeapons". Finlandcontinues to believe that
the use of nuclearweaponswould pose agrave threat to internationap leace
and security. and thatnuclearweapons thereforeshould notbe used. At the
sanietirnewe realize that the dramaticchangesin international relationo sver
the past few years havecreatednew opportunities to ensure that they will
indeed notbe used. (Mr. Patokallio. Finland)
The disappearanceof East-West confrontationhas for al1 practical
purposes removed the one scenario that in a crisis could haveinvolved theuse
of nuclear weapons on a global scale. Intensifiedefforts tostrengthen
internationalnon-proliferationarrangementswill also help create conditions
in which the emergence, and therefore thepotential use, of nuclear weaponsis
precluded. We also realize that the repeatedcalls in draft resolution
~/C.1/46/L.20 and itspredecessorsfor the commencementof negotiationson a
legallybinding instrumentto prohibit the use of nuclear weapons havenot
been answered, andthere seemsto be little prospect that they will be
answered in the future.
It is for al1 those reasons thatFinland decided it could no longer
support this draftresolution. DOCUMENTA/46/674
Report ofthe Fint Cornmitteeonagendaitem61
DmJî molutionlC.U46/L20
1. The itementitled:
"ReviewandimplemmtationoftheConcludingDocu- 16. On31October.Afghanistan.Algeria, Bangladesh.
ment of the TwelRh Special Session of theGeneral Bhutan, Ecuador, Egypt. Ethiopia, Ladia, Indonesia.
Assembly: minedasdraArsolution entitled"Conventionon thePro-
"(a) Regionaidisamramenreporof theSan<ary- hibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapoas" (AIC.U46/
Gmeral; L.20).whichwaslateraisosponsoredby Bolivia andthe
"(b) United NatidisannamentfeIiowshipl,raining Laa People'sDemocraticRepublic.TdraA molution
andadvisorservicprogamme: was inuoducedby the repnsentative of atthe 31st
meeting.on 7November.
'Tc) ConventionotheRuhibitionofthe UseofNw
dearWeapaos: mittee adoptedrafnsolution A/C.V46/L-.by,are- Com-
"(4 WorIdDisamamentCampaign: wrded voteof96 to 17.with20 abstent40(secpara.
"(e)Nudear-ams neeP; 20belav,drafnsolution E). ThevotingwasfoUows:
"y) UnitedNationsRegid Cenmfor Peaa aod In/ovourAfghaniFtan,lgeria,Angok Bahamas,Bah-
Disamiamentin Aüia Unitai NatiomRegiaai Cern raio.Banglade Bar,ados,Belanis.Bhutan,Bolivia.Bo-
faPeaa and DisarmameniinAsiaandthePacifiaod h-.oaB,r&CapeVude. Cenoal AfricanRepublic.Chad
UnitedNationRegionalma for Peaa ,isarmament Ch&,China Colombia.Congo.CostRica Côted'Ivoire.
andDcvelopmen tnLati Amcricand the arilhan" Cuba Cyprus. vnocntic bple's Republicoff<Dai-
wasincludedin the provisiagendaofthefariy-sixth bouti,aiador.Egypt,EthiopkaGhana,Grrnada.Guate-
sesion othe GUIMi Asmnbly in acmrdance with its ma4 Guinea. uyanaIndiaIndonsiaIra (rlamicRe-
moiutions 44/3Bof 15Decunber 1989and 45/59A,B. public ofhq, Jamaica Jordan. Kenya. Kuwait,Lao
C,DandE of4 kmba 1990. People'sDandc Republic.iebanoLsotho Libaia
2. At its3nipl- meeting,on20 Seplabu 1991t.he LibyaArabJamahiya, MadagascaMr,alaysi, aldives,
CiencraiAaetnbly, on the recommendoftheGermai Mali.Malta,Matuitiu. Muim, Mongolia.Momcco,Mo-
Committee,decidedtoincluth eteminitagend ndto rambi,que.Mya~mar,Namibia.Nepai,Nicaraguq Niger,
ailocaîeit the Fust Committeefor mnsideraîaod Nigeria. hkkW& Paoama, Pew Philippines,Qatar,
npon. Saudi MW Suicga Sliapon, SolomonIsbnds, Sri
3. At it2ndmeeting,on10Octoba.the usCmnmit- hh. Suda% SvmzihudS,yriaArabRcpublic.
teedecidedtoholdawmbinedgeneraidebatonthedisar- ThailandTogo .\misiU.loain, nionoSovieSocialkt
mamentitemsaüocatcdto it,namely.itansto65.'Ihe Republiu. Uniîui Arab Emintes. United Republic of
delibcntions on thŒe itemtookplace hm the 3rd Taaran Uirguay,Vaiiualu.Vmezuek VietNam.Yunea.
through24th meeting6um 14to 30 Octoba. Considem YugosIavia,aiie,Zimbabwe.
tion ofandactionodraAmolufioni onthoseitemtook Agodr: Au- Belgium.CanadaD,enmarkFrance.
pkce hom the25th hugh 37th meetingshm 4 tal5 Iceland,Italy,LUOnbourg,MarshallIsiands,Nerherlands,
Novanber. NewZealand Nw, hmgal, Spain,'Iwley,United
Kingdomof GrratBritainand Northan Inland, United
StatesoAmerica.
Absiaùùng:Al- Agentiua, Autria, Bulgaria
Czcchmlovalria. stonkaFi Gwhany,@ Gmecz.
Hungar~I.rela4 h'ael. Japan, Lhia, Liechtemein.
LithuaniPolandRepublicof KOM.RomauiaS, weden Recommrnd&n of ihe Firsi Cornmittee
20. Tne Fust Commineerecomrnendsto the Cienetal
1. Reitemter iurequerttotheConferenceon Disanna-
Asembly theadoptionof &ail resolutions A to Fbelow: ment 10commence negotiations , a matterof priority,in
REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCLUDINO
orderto reach agreementon an internationalconvention
DOCUMEN OF THE TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE Prohibithgthe use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
GENERAA LSSEMBLY underany circumstances,taking as a basisthe draftCon-
"enlionon the Prohibitionof theUseof Nuclw Weapons
aexed to thepresent resolution;
2. AIso requests the Conference on Disarmament 10
to the General Assemblyon the results of these
ne80tiations.
Conventionon theProhibitionofthe Useof
NuclenrWenpons
ANNEX
TheGewai Assembly,
Convincedtbattheexistenceand useofnuclw weapons Dr-ftConvrndon on tbcPrnhihitioortheUse of
pose the greatestthreatto thesurvivalof mankind NucicirWcapons
Convincedaho tbat nucleardisarmament isthe onlyul- Alomed bythe ihrcato thveryswivalofmankinp doxd by thc
tunateguaranteeagainn theuseof nuclearweapons. existencefnuclcawr edponr.
ConvincedjLrtherthata multilateralagreementprohibit- Convinced that anyou fsneuclcaruhapoconrtihitrviolation
of thCharteroftheUnitedNationsanda crime"~ainstumani,.
ing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should ConvincetdhatthisConventiownould basteptowardtshecom-
Smngtheninternationalsecurityand contributeto the cli- pletecliminatiofnuclcarveaponlseadinto gcncmlandcomplete
matefornegotiationsIeadingto theultimateeliminationof disannamen understricandeffective internatioclml.
nuclearweapons. Detenninetomntinue nqotiationortheachicvcmeonftthisgoal.
Welcomingthe Treaty beween the United Statesof Hnvc agreedasfollows:
AmericaandtheUnionof SovietSocialistRepublicsonthe ArticlI
Reductionand Limitationof Strategic Offensive Arms. TheStatesPartietothisConventionilcmnlundertalenot to urc
signedon31July 1991. orthrcatetouwnuclcaw r caponsnderanycircumstançcr.
Welcoming &O the announcementsby the Govenunent
Articl2
oftbeUnionof Soviet SocialistRepublicsandtheGovern- ThirConventiosnhalk ofunlimitedduration
mentof the United Statesof Arnericaof significantmeas-
ures.includingunilateralsteps. which could signalthe re- ArticlJ
versalof the nuclear armsrace, andexpressing thehope 1. ThisConventiosnhnllbeopento al1Stavsfosignm. Any
thatthesewill be followedby agreementsat an earlydate Swteha1 dou Mt slgnIhcGnvrntionbcforciucaty inio famein
onfunherculs instrategicnuclev arsenals, accordancwithparagkp h ofthkaniclmny affcd c iataw the.
2. This~on~enl~n~sh allsubjecioratificatiby signatory
Consciouschatthe recent stepscakenby the Union of Staro.Instrumentoafratificatioraccsuionshall k deporitcd
SwietSocialistRepublicsandtheUnited StatesofAmerica with thSecrcrnryûenmo l fthUnitedNations.
towards a reductionof tbeir nuclw weaponsand the im- 3. ThirConventiosnhallenterintofoion thedcpositoinstm-
provementin the internationalclimate can contributeto- menuofratificationylwenry-fiveovemmenu i.cludingheGov-
wardsthegoalof complete elimination of nuclearweapons, ernmenu ofthefivenuclcar-wcapoStatesnaccordanecwithpara-
gnph 2afthiranicle.
RecaiIingtbat iaparagraph58of the Fi Documentof 4. ForStateswhowinrbumenu ofratificatinraccessionan
theTenthSpecialSessionof the General Assembly.1it is depositeakr theenuyintofoiceof theConvention i,shall enter
mtedthatal1Statesshouldactivelypanicipate ineffortsto intoforceontheateofthedepositftheirinstnimenufratification
bringabout conditions in international relations among -I-ccession.
Statesin which a code of peacefulconductof nations in 5. Thedcposilnrsyhallpmmptlyinformal1signatoyndassed-
internationalaffain wuld be agreed uponand chatwould ingSratesofthedateofcachsignaturet.h&te ofdcpositofeach
precludetheuseor threatofuseof nuclear weapons. insrnuncnofmtificationraccessioand thedateofthccnrrvinto
forcof thiConventionaswcllY ofthercceipot fothcrnotiks.
Reoflnning tbat the use of nuclearweapons wouldbea 6. ïhis Conventionhallbercgistercby thedcpositq inac-
violationof the Charterof the UnitedNationsand a crime cordancwithAnicle102 otfheChancrof theUnitedNations.
againsthumanity, asdeclaredinilsresolutions 1653 (XVI) Articl4
of 24 November 1961. 33/71 B of 14 December 1978. ThirConventiono.fwhichtheArnbicC. hinew.Ennlish. rench.
34/83 Gof II December1979,351152D of 12December Rwian andS~anish texuuc eauallvauthentic;.halÏ&asited
1980and36/92 Iof 9 December1981. withthe~ecre&-Genmlof the'UniGNitlonsuho shnllse;ldduly
sertificopaetshemftotheGovemmeo ntthesagnaiolyndassed-
Nohngwiihregrettht the Conferenceon Disamament. hg Srates.
dwmg ils 1991session.waï notabletoundertakenegolia- IN wmsswwreoP.theundenigned king dulyauthorirrdtherc-
tfonswith a view toachievingagreementon an interna- to bytheirrcrpcctiGommenu. haverigncdthis Convention.
tionalconvention prohibitingthe use or threat of use of opencdforsigna- ai' onthe &Y
nuclearweapons under any circumstances, taking as a of one thournndninehundred and
basis the text annexed to General Assembly resolution
45/59B of 4 December1990. GeneraI Assembiy
PROVISIONAL
20 December 1991
ENGLISE
Porty-sixthsession
GENEBAL'ASSEMBLY
PROVISIONALVERBATIMRECORD OP THE 65th MEETING
Eeld at Eeadquarters.New York,
on Priday,6 December 1991. at 10 a.m.
(SaudiArabia)
President: Mr. SBIHABI
later: Mr. EL-KEUSSAIBY îOman)
(Vice-President)
This record containsthe originaltext of speechesblivered in English
and interpretations of speechesin the other languages. The final textxi11
be printed in the Recordsof the General Aum&J,g.
Correctionsshould be submittedto originalSpeechéSonly. They should
be sent under the signature ofa member of the delegationconcerned.
Qne veek, to the Chief, OfficialRecords Editing Section,Departmentof
Conference Services, room DC2-750,2 United Nations Plaza. and incorporatedin
a copy of the record.
91-61971 7852V (E) The PRESIDENT(interpretationfrom Arabic): 1 cal1 on the
Rapporteurof the FirstConunitteeM .r. Pablo EmilioSaderof Uruguayto
introducethe reportsof the FirstConunittee in one intervention.
Mr. SADER (Uruguay),Rapporteurof the FirstCommittee
(interpretation from Spanish): It is a particularpleasureand honour for me
to address theplenarymeeting ofthe General Assemhlyand to informthe
Assemblythat theFirstCommitteesuccessfullyconcludedits vork inan
atmospherefree of confrontation, reflectingthe changesthat have takenplace
on the internationalscenesincethe endof the coldvar. The approachtaken
by delegationsvas constructive and cooperative,makingit possiblefor a
spiritof compromiseto prevailthroughoutthe meetingsof the First Conunittee
at the forty-sixthsession. The membersof the Committeefocusedmainlyon
issuesvhich vereripe for consideration a the multilaterallevel and vhich
yieldedfruitful results. (Hr. Sader.Raouorteur,
First Committee)
A few statisticsmay illustrate the spirio tf cooperationand
concession. This year. 48 draft resolutionsand decisionswere submitted,
3 of which werelater withdrawn,in comparisonwith the 54 that were submitted
during the forty-fifthsession. This constitutes a notabl decreasefrom the
forty-secondsession, when 79 draftswere submitted.
There ras also amajor change in the voting patternsthe voting patterns
and a grovingwillingnessto acceptdifferingpositions. not pressin cgertain
issues to a vote, andmaking every effortto achieve a consensus.
Thus the 22 drafts adopted without v aote represent apercentaqe
increase.from 50 per cent lastyear to 60per cent at this session.
In connectionwith disannament-related issues,this ras a year in which
new and important issues werc eonsidered thatseem to be destinedfor future
development. This and other elementscontributedto making this session
qualitatively different from past sessions.
The first fact we can note in the generaldebate of the FirstConnnittee
is that a spiritof widespread satisfactiov nas observedat the unprecedented
progress achieved by the hromajor nuclear Powers in reducingtheir nuclear
arsenals. (-,
First Committee)
As in previous years. nuclear disarmamentissues had a prominent place on
the First Committee's agenda. One third of al1 the resolutions on disarmament
deal vith such nuclear-relatedissues as non-proliferation,a nuclear-test
ban. nuclear-veapon-freezones. security assurances for non-nuclear-veapon
States. on nuclear-acms freeze and a ban on the production of Eissionable
material for nuclearveapons.
Takinq into account the circumstancessurroundinq the Gulf War and its
aftermath, many deleqations expressedconcern about nuclearproliferation aiid
emphasized the need for universal accession to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, an instrument thah tas become even more
relevant since the accessionto the Treaty, or the declarationof intent to
accede to it. by China. France, South Africa, Lithuania,the United Republic
of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Many deleqations also called for
strenqtheninq the safequardssystem of the International Atomic Enerqy Aqency.
It is appropriate to mention that this year, forthe first the. the
draft resolution on implementationof the Declaration on the Denuclearization
of Africa vas adopted without a vote. Another agenda item that vas the focus
of special attention dealt with nuclear tests. After 20 years of submitting
tvo separate draft resolutions on this item, this year, for the first time, it
vas possible to achieve a singletest on the cessationof al1 nuclear tests.
Likevise, particularlynoticeable this year ras the increased emphasis on
conventional and regional disarmament, vhich vas reflected in the adoption of
a number of draft resolutionson these items. The favourablepolitical
atmosphere for the speedy conclt~sion of a convention on the complete
proliibitionof ch~mical veapons vas reflectedin a draft resolutionadopted (MT. Sader. Rauportefif.
First Committee)
without a vote, in which the Conferenceon Disarmament is urged to resolve
outstanding issues so as to achieve a final agreement at its 1992 session.
Judging €rom a process begun a few years ago, it can be said that the
First Committee made even further progress towards a more practical
decision-making procedure, geared towards achieving practical results in
specific matters. With the progressive consolidation o the new international
situation and the prevailing atmosphere of cooperation, it may be said that
there has been an automatic rationalizationof the Cornittee's work. As was
pointed out by the Chairman of the Committee in his concluding statement.
pertinent suggestions have been submittedas to the procedure tobe followcd
for the consideration of disarmament and international security issues in
order to rationalize the Committee's work even further(A/C.1/46/PV.45.
-16). In this regard. the Chairman announced thatconsultations would be
held in New York and in Geneva with a view to making progress in this area at
the forty-seventh sessionof the General Assembly.
The last - and certainly not the least important - item that 1 should
like to highlight with regard to the disarmament agenda is the widespread
recognition of the broadened concept ofsecurity, which emerged during the
general debate and in the treatment of the item on the relationship between
disarmament and development. This concept is reflectedin the words of the
Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi. in the
statement he made before the First Conmittee:
"Arms control and disarmament nowconstitute essential parts of the
complex process of consolidating peace. together with peace-keeping.
diplornaticmediation, judicial settlements and other efforts for (k Sader. Rawaorteur,
&st Comittee)
enhancinq internationalcooperation. What is needed is a sustained
well-coordinatedand non-compartmentalized approact ho new global issues.
"The international comunity bas to espouse a multidimensional
approach to peace and security inwhich the military aspect vil1 not
dominate but will be considered in relation to other priorities such as
development,welfare, environmentand the protection ofhuman rights."
(+/C.1/46/PV.4, PD..3 and 4) The PRESIDENI: The Assemblyhas thus concluded thisstage of its
considerationof agenda item 60.
We turn next to the report (A/46/674)of the PirstCommitteeon agenda
item 61. entitled "Review and implementation ofthe ConcludingDocument of the
Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly".
The Assembly has before it six draft resolutions,A to P, recomended by
the First Committee in paragraph 20 of its report. As 1 informed the Assembly
earlier, action on draft resolution C ispostponeduntil Monday mornieg. The
Assembly, therefore,vil1 take action onthe five draft resolutionA s and B
and D to F. After al1 the votes have been taken, representativesri11 again
be given an opportunityto explain their vote. The PRESIDENT: Draft resolution Eis entitled "Convention ot nhe
Prohibitionof the Use of NuclearWeapons".
A recordedvote hasbeen requested.
A recorded vote wastaken.
In favour: Afghanistan.Algeria,Angola,Antigua andBarbuda.Bahamas,
Bahrain.Bangladesh, BarbadosB ,elarus. BelizeB.enin,
Bhutan.Bolivia. Botswana, Brazil,~runeiDarussalam.
BurkinaPaso, Burundi.Cameroon,Cape Verde. CentralAfrican
Republic.Chad. Chile,China, Colombia. ComorosC .ongo,
Costa Rica. Côte d'Ivoire, CubaCyprus.DemocraticPeople's
Republic ofKorea,Djibouti, Dominica, DominicanRepublic.
Ecuador,Egypt. El Salvador, EthiopiaP,ederated Statesof
Micronesia.Fiji. Gabon,Gambia.Ghana. Guinea.
Guinea-Bissau.Guyana,Haiti, Honduras.India.Indonesia.
, Iran (IslamicRepublicof), Iraq, Jamaica.Jordan. Kenya,
Kuwait,Lao People'sDemocraticRepublic.Lebanon,Lesotho.
Liberia.LibyanArab Jamahiriya, Madagascar. Malawi,
Malaysia, MaldivesM,ali, Malta, Mauritania,Mauritius,
Mexico,Mongolia,Morocco,Mozambique,blyanmar, Namibia.
Nepal.Nicaragua.Niger,Nigeria.Chnan,Pakistan,Panama.
Papua New Guinea.Paraguay, Peru,Philippines,Qatar, Saint
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, SaintVincent and the
Grenadines,Sao Tome and Principe, SaudiArabia.Senegal,
Seychelles, SierraLeone. Singapore,SolomonIslands,
Somalie,Sri Lanka,Sudan,Suriname,Swaziland,SyrianArab
Republic.Thailand,Togo, Trinidadand Tobago.Tunisia.
Uganda,Ukraine, Union of Soviet SocialiR stpublics, United
Arab Emirates,United Republic of Tanzania.Uruguay,
Vanuatu. VenezuelaV .iet Nam. Yemen,Yugoslavia,Zaire,
Zambia.Zimbabwe
Aaainst: Australia,Belgium.Canada.Denmark.France,Germany,Italy,
Luxembourg,Netherlands,New Zealand.Norway,Portugal.
Spain,Turkey.United Kingdomof GreatBritainand Northern
Ireland.United States of America
mstaininq: Albania,Argentina.Austria,Bulgaria,Czechoslovakia,
Estonia.Finland.Greece,Hungary.Iceland.Ireland,Israel,
Japan. Latvia. Liechtenstein,Lithuania.MarshallIslands.
Poland.Republicof Korea. Bomania.Samoa.Sweden
Draft resolutionE was'adoutedbv 122 to 16, with 22 abstentions
(resolution46/37 D).Part III PART III
Document No.
A. Convention on the prohibition of the 64
development, production and stockpiling
of bacteriological (biological) and toxin
weapons and on their destruction
B. Convention on the prohibition of the
development, production, stockpiling and
use of chemical weapons and on their
destruction No. 14860
MULTILATERAL
Convention on the prohibition of the developrnent, produc-
tion and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and
toxin weapons and on their destruction. Opened for
signature at London, Moscow and Washington on
10 April 1972
Aurhenricrerts: English. Russian, French. Spanishutid Cliitiese.
Regisreredbv the Union of SovietSocialist Republics.rhe ti/iited Kingdom of
GreatBrirain and ~Vonhernlreland and rhe ti/trted SruresofAmerica on 15
July 1976.
Convention sur l'interdiction de la mise au point, de la
fabrication et du stockage des armes bactériologiques
(biologiques) ou à toxines et sur leur destruction.
Ouverte à la signature à Londres, Moscou et Washing-
ton le 10 avril 1972
Extes authentiqu:anglais. russe.français. espagttolet chinois
Enregistrpar les États-unis d'Amérique.lee-Uni deGratide-Bretagne
et d'Irlande du Nord et l'Union des Républiquessociulisressoi,iériquesle
15juillet 1976. CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT. PRO-
DüCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGIC-
AL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THElR DESTRUCTION
The Siares Panies to thisConvention.
Dcierminedto act with a view to achieving effectiveprogresstowards general and
cornpletcdisarmament.includinr!the ~rohibitionandeliminationof al1tvws of weaDons
01&,<, Je\imîiion. ana 'on\in&d ihat thepmhib:tionof ihe de\elopm;nt. produ~tion
and .iockpilin~ui chemical and bactenologicaltbiologicaliueapons anc iheirelimina-
[ion.througheffectivemeasures.willfacilitate theachie\.emeniof feneral andcomplete
disarmamentunder strict and effectiveinternationalcontrol.
Recognisingthe imponant significanceofthe Protocolforthe Pri,hibitionof the Use
inWar of Asphyxiating.Poisonousor Other Gases. and of Bacicriologicalh4eihod.iof
Warfare.signedatGenevaon 17June 1925.'andconsciousalso ofthecontribution which
the said Protocolhas already made.and continuesto make. to mitigatingthe horrorsof
war,
Rsafirming their adhemnceto the pnnciples and objectivesof that Protocoiand
calling upon al1States to comply strictly wiih them.
Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly
condemnedal1actionscontraryto theprinciplesandobjectivesof theGenevaProtocolof
17 June 1925,
Desiringto contributeto thestrengtheningof confidencebetweenpeoplesand ihe
general improvemeniof rhe inrernationalatmosphere.
Desiringalso to contributeto the realisationof the purposesand principlesof ihe
Charter of the Uniied Nations,
Convincedof the importanceandurgencyof eliminatingfromthe arsenalsof States.
ihroush effectivemeasures.suchdangerousweaponsof massdestmctionas thoseusing
chemical or bacteriological(biological)agents.
Recognising ihat an agreementon theprohibition ofbacteriologicalibiological)and
toxin weaponsrepresentsa first possiblestep towards the achievement of agreemnt
effeciivcmeasures also forthe prohibition of the development. prodnndstockpiling
of chemical weapons.and determined to continuenegotiationsto that end.
Determined. for the sake of al1mankind.to excludecompletelythe possibilityof
bacteriologicalbiological)agents and toxinsking used as weapons.
Convincedthar such use would be repugnantto fheconscienceof mankindandthat
no effon shouldk spared to minimise this nsk.
Have agreed as follows:
Aire 1 Each Siate Pany to this Convention undenakesnever in any circum-
stances to develop. produce. stwkpile or othewise acquire or rctain:
(1) microbialor other biologicalagents. or toxins wharevertheir origin or methodof
production. of types and in quantifiesthat haveno justification for prophylactic.
protectiveor other peacefulpurposes:
(2) weapons. equipment ormeansof deliverydesigncd !O use suchagents ortoxinsfor
hostile purposes or in umed conflict.
EachState Panyto thisConvention undenakestodestroy.or todivento
peaceiulpurposes.as soon aspossiblebut norlaterthannine monthraftertheentryinro
forceof the Convention. a11agents. toxins. weapons.equipmentand meansof delivery
Came into force on 26 March 1975. Text of the Convention is reproduced
£rom 1015 WTS 164. 1976 UnilcdNalion< - T-ty Srria . YatioruUnies - RecueildesTraiti. 161
specified in hnicle 1 of rhe Convention. which are in ifspossessionor under ils
jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisionsof thi3 Anicle al1necessa. safety
precautionsshall be obsemed to protect populaitons and the environment.
Anicle 111. Each StatePany to this Convention undenales no1to transier to any
recipient whatsover. direcrly or indirectly. and no1in an!. way fo assisi. encourqe. or
induce an). State. group of States or international organisations tornanufsciure or
othewise acquire any of the agents.roxins. weapons.equipmentor rneansoi deliven
specified in Aniclc I of the Convention.
Anicle IV Each Statc Pany to rhis Convention shall. in accordancewirh ifs
constitutional processes. take any necessa. mexures to prohibir and prevent the
development. production. stockpiling. acquisition or retentionof the agents. iorins.
weapons.equipment and means of delivery spccified in r\nicle I of the Convention.
within the temrory of such State. under ifs jurisdiction or under ifs conrrol anywhere.
Anicle i! The Siares Panies to rhis Conventionundenake toconsult one another
and to CO-opcrate in solving an!. problemswhich rnayansein relation to theobjectiveof.
or in theapplication of the provisions of. theConvention. Consulrationand CO-operation
pursuanr to this Anicle ma). also be undenaken through appropriate international
procedureswithin the framework of the United Nationsandin nccordnncewith itsChaner.
AnicleVI. (1) An! State Pany ro thisConventionwhich finds thatan?otherStatç
Pany is acting in breachof obligations deriving from the provisionsof the Convention
rnaylodgeacomplaint with the Security Council of theUnited Nations.Suchacomplaint
should includeal1possible evidence confirming ifs validity. as well as a requestfor its
considerationby the Securiv Council.
(2) EachSiate Pany to this Convention undeflakesto CO-operate in c-ing out an!
invesiigation which the Security Council rnay initiale. in accordancewith theprovisions
of the Chaner of the United Nations. on the basisof the cornplaint received by ihe
Council. The Security Council shall inform the StatesPaniesto the Convention oi the
resulo of the investigation.
Anicle VI/. Each Statc Pany ro this Conventionundenakes toprovide or suppon
assistance.in accordanceu-ith the United NationsChaner.to any Panyto theConvention
which so requests.if the Securiry Council decidesihai such Pmy has beenexposedto
danger as a result of violarion of the Convention.
ArricleVIII. Nothing in this Conventionshallbeinterpretedasin an?way lirniting
or delracting fmm the obligations assumedby any State under rhc Protocol for thc
Rohibiiion of the Use in War of Asphyxiating. Poisonousor Other Gases. and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. signed at Geneva on 17 June 1915.
Articlelx. EachStaie Partyto ihis Convcntiona[firms rherecognisedobjective of
effec~iveprohibition of chcmical weapons and. to this end. undenakcs to continue
negotiationsin goodfaith with a view to reachingearly agreementon effective measures
for the prohibition of their development. productionand stockpiling and for their
destruction. and on appmpriatc measuresconcerningequipment andmeansof delivey
specifically designedfor the production or useof chernicalagentsfor wcaponspurposcs.
Anicle X. (1) The States Panies~-~ ~-i~~~~-~~ntionundenaketo facilitate. and
have theright to p&icipate in. the fullest possibleexcha"geof equipment.materialsand
scientific andtechnolonical information for the useof bacterioloeical(bioloeicall aeenis
andtoxinsfor peaceful~urposes.Paniesto theconvention in apositionto doko shalialso
CO-opcraiein convibuting individually or togerhcr with orher States or internalional
organisations to thefunher developrnent and application of scientific discoveriesin the
PI 1015. 1-14- 168 UnitedNation<- mity Seria Nation<~nla - Recueilda irait6 19l6
field of bactcriology (biology) for the prevenrion of disease. or for other peaceful
.UI.OSCS.
12, ThisCon\ention ,hall k implcrnentedin a mannerdesiencdto avoidhampenng
the ecunomic or technoloeicaI develo~rnenroi States Pmies IO the Con\,eniion Jr
inrernationalco.operation the field o'fpeacefulbacteriological(biological)acriviries.
includingthe internationalexchangeof bacteriological(biological)agents andtoxins and
equiprnentfor theprocessing.useor productionof bactenologicalIbiological)agentsand
toxins forpeaceful purposes in accordance with the provisionsof the Convention.
Aniclr XI. Any State Pany may propose amendments to this Convention.
Amendmrntsshall enter into forcefor each State Panyaccepting the arnendmenrsupon
rheiracceptanceby a majoriryof theStates Parties tothe Convention and thereaftefror
each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by il.
AnicleXII. Fiveyearsaftertheenrry intoforce ofthisConvention.orearlierif itis
requestedby 3 majorityof Paniesto theConventionbysubmirting aproposalrothiseffect
to the DepositaryGovernments.a conferenceof States Paniesto theConvenrionshallbe
held ar Geneva. Switzerland. toreviewthe operationof theConvention.wirha view to
assuringthntthe purposesof the preamble and the provisionosftheConvenrion.including
the provisionsconcerning negoriarionson chemical weapons. are being realised. Such
review,hall take intoaccounrany newscientificandtechnologicaldevelopmentsrelevant
to the Convention.
Anicle XIII. (1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
(2) Each State Panyto this Convention shallinexercising its nationalsovereignry
have the right to wiihdrawfrornthe Convenrionif itdecidesthat extraordinary events.
relatedro the subjectatterof theConvention.havejeopardised thesupremeinterestsof
its country. Ir shall give notice of such withdrawalto ail other States Paniesto the
Conventionand to the United Nations SecurityCouncilthree monrhsin advance. Such
notice shall include asratement of the exunordinary events it regards as having
jeopardised its supreme intercsts.
AnicleXIV (1) ThisConvention shall beopen toal1Statesforsignature.AnyStale
which does nor sign the Convenrionkfore its entry into force in accordnnce with
paragraph 3 of this Anicle may accede ro it at any tirne.
(2) This Conventionshall be subjectto ratificationby signaroy States. Instmments
of ratificationand instmrnentsof accessionshalbe deposited withtheGovernmentsofthe
United Kingdornof Gren Britain and Nonhem Ireland. the Union ofSoviet Socialist
Republicsand theUnitedStatesof America. which are herebydcsignatedthe Depositary
Governments.
13) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instmrnenrs of
ratification by rwenty-twoGovernmenis. inciuding rhc Governments designated as
Depositaies of the Convention.
(4) For States whose instmrnents of ratification or accession are deposited
subsequentto the entryinroforceof rhisConvention. itshallenterinroforce on the dateof
the deposit of theirinsrmmentsof ratification or accession.
(5) The DeposirnryGovernments shallpromptlyinformal1signatoryand acceding
Statesofthedateofeach signature,thedate of depositof each instmmentof ratificationor
of accessionand the dateof the entryinto forceof this Convention.and of the receiprof
orher notices.
(6) This Conventionshallbe registeredby the Deposiq Governmentspunuant to
Anicle 102 of rheChaner oi the United Nations.lW6 UnitedYslions- Tmnty &ria . SstiancUnie s Recueiles Trait& 169
nirle XI! This Convention. the English. Russian. French. Spanishand Chinese
texrsof which are equally authentic. shall be depositedin the archivesof the Deposiray
Governrnents. Duly cenified copies of the Convenrion shall bc transmiited bu the
Deposiray Governrnents IO the Governments of the signatop and accedine States. CentreforamentAffairs
DISARMMENT
TheChernicalWeapons
SelectiveIndex
UnitedNations,NewYork1994 EditorialNote
The present publicationcomprisesthetextof thehemicalweapons Conventionand
aselectiveindex.Thelatterisintendedtoprovidethereaderwiththemainelementsandkey
wordsand phrasesof theConvention;itisbasedonafullerindexpreparedby A. WalterDom
and published bythe United NationsInstitutefor DisarmamentAffairs(UNIDIR)asInder
to the ChemicalWeaponsConvention(Sales No. GV.E.93.0.13),ResearchPaper No. 18.
The text of the Conventioninthe present volumcan also be used inconjunctionwiththe
UNIDIRIndex, asboth publicationsutilize the paginationof the certifiedtrue copy ofthe
Convention.
UNiTED NAïlONS PUBLICATION
SalesNo. E.95.iX.2
ISBN92-1-142213-2
CopyrighO UnitedNations 1994
Al1rightsreserved
ManufacturedintheUnited Statesof AmericaContents
CO~VENTIO ONN THEPROHIBITIO OF THEDEVELOPMEP NTODUCTIO .N
STOCKPILIN AGD USE OF CHEMICA WLEAPON SND
ON THEIR DESTRU~ON
Preamble ............................................................
1. General obligatio..................................:...........
II. Definitionsand cnten.............................................
II I Declarations......................................................
V. Chemicalweapons .................................................
V. Chemicalweapons productionfacilit................................
VI. ActMtiesnot prohibited under thisconven.........................
VI1. National implementationmeasure...................................
VI1.1 The Organizatio..................................................
IX. Consultations.cooperation and fact-f............................
X. Assistanceand protection againstchernicalwe....................
XI. Economicandtechnologicaldevelopment............................
XII. Measuresto redressa situation andto ensure compliance.
includingsanctio...............................................
XII.1 Relation toother international agre.............................
XIV. Settlement ofdisput..............................................
XV. Amendments ....................................................
XVI. Duration and withdraw............................................
XVII. Statusof the annex...............................................
XVII .I Signatur.........................................................
XIX. Ratificati.......................................................
XX . Accessio......................................................
XXI. Entryinto for....................................................
XXII. Reservation......................................................
XXII .I Depositar........................................................
XXI V. Authentic text...............................................:..
Annexon chemicals(table ofcontent...................................
Annexon implementationandverification(table ofconte................ 54
Annexon theprotection of wnfidential information (table of........s167Conventiononthe Prohibition
ofthe Development,Production,
StockpilingandUseof Chernical
Weaponsand onTheirDestruction The States Parties to this Convention,
Detemined to act with a viewto achievingeffective progress towardsgeneral
and complete disarmament under strictand effectiveinternational control,including
the prohibition and elimination of al1types of weapons of mass destruction,
Desiringto contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations,
Recallingthat the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly
condemned al1actions contrary to the principles and objectivesof the Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on
17 June 1925(the Geneva Protocol of 1925),
Recognizingthat this Convention reaffirms principles and objectives of and
obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925,and the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpilingof Bacteriological
(Biological)and ToxinWeaponsandon their DestructionsignedatLondon, Moscow
and Washingtonon 10 April 1972,
Bearingin mind the objective contained in Article IX of the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpilingof Bacteriological
(Biological)and ToxinWeapons and on their Destruction,
Detemined for the sake of al1mankind, to excludewmpletely the possibility
of the use of chemical weapons,through the implementation of the provisionsof
thisConvention,thereby complementingthe obligationsassumed under the Geneva
Protocol of 1925,
Recognuingthe prohibition,embodiedin the pertinent agreementsand relevant
principles of international law, of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare,
Considering that achievements in the field of chemistry should be used
exclusivelyfor the benefit of mankind,
Desiringto promote fkeetrade in chemicalsaswellas international cooperation
and exchange of scientific and technical information in the field of chemical
activities forurposes not prohibited under this Convention in order to enhance
the economic and technological development of al1States Parties,Convention
Convincedthat the cornuleteand effective ~rohibitionof the develoornent.
production, acquisitionstockpiling,etention,traisferanduseofchernicaw l éapons;
andtheirdestruction,representa necessarysteptowardsthe achievementof these
commonobjectives,
Have agreedas follows: Arücle 1
Article I
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any
circurnstances:
To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chernical
weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemicalweapons to anyone;
(b) To use chernical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;
(d) Toassist,encourageorinduce,inanyway,anyoneto engageinanyactivity
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chernical weapons it owns or
possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
3. Each State Partyundeaakes to destroyal1chemicalweaponsit abandoned
on the territory of another State Party, in accordance with the provisionsof this
Convention.
4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemicalweaponsproduction
facilitiesit ownsor possesses,or that are located in anyplace under itsjurisdiction
or control, in accordance with the provisionsof this Convention.
5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a rnethod
of warfare.Convention
ArticleII
DEFINITIO ANND CRITERIA
For the purposes of this Convention:
1. "Chemical Weapons" means the following, together or separately:
(a) Toxicchemicals and their precursors, exceptwhere intended for purposes
not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are
consistent withsuch purposes;
(b) Munitions and devices,specificallydesigned to cause death orother harm
through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagr(a),
which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and
devices;
Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with
the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph(b).
2. "ToxicChemical" means:
Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This
includes al1 such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of
production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions
or elsewhere.
(For the purpose of implementing this Convention, toxicchemicals which have
been identified for the application of verification measures are listed in Schedules
contained in the Annex on Chemicals.)
3. "Precursor" means:
Any chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by
whatever method of a toxic chemical. This includes any key component of a binary
or multicomponent chemical system.
(For the purpose of implementingthis Convention, precursors which have been
identified for the application of verification measures are listed in Schedules
contained in the Annex on Chemicals.)
4. "Key Component of Binary or Multicomponent Chemical Systems"
(hereinafter referred to as "key component") means:
The precursor which plays the most important role in determining the toxic
pro~erties of the final product and reacts rapidly with other chemicals in the binary
or multicomponent system. Article II
5. "Old Chernical Weapons" rneans:
(a) Chemical weapons which were produced before 1925; or
(b) Chemical weapons produced in the period between 1925 and 1946 that
have deteriorated to such extent that they can no longer be used as chemical
weapons.
6. "Abandoned Chernical Weapons" means:
Chemicalweapons, including old chemicalweapons,abandoned bya Stateafter
1 January 1925on the territory of another State without the consent of the latter.
7. "Riot Control Agent" rneans:
Any chernical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans
sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time
following tennination of exposure.
8. "Chemical Weapons Production Facility":
(a) Means any equipment, as well as any building housing such equipment,
that was designed,constructedor used at any lime since 1 Januq 1946:
(i) As part of the stage in the production of chernicals ("final
technological stage") where the rnaterial flowswould contain, when
the equipment is in operation:
(1) Any chernical listed in Schedule 1 in the Annex on Chemicals;
or
(2) Any other chemical that has no use, above 1 tonne pet year on
the territory of a State Party or in any other place under the
jurisdiction or control ofa State Party,for purposes not prohibited
under this Convention, but can be used for chernical weapons
purposes;
(ii) For filling chemical weapons, including, inter alia, the filling of
chemicals listed in Schedule 1into munitions, devicesor bulk storage
containers; the filling of chernicals into containers thatorm part of
assembled binary munitions and devices or into chemical
submunitions that forrn part of assernbled unitary munitions and
devices, and the loading of the containers and chernicalsubmunitions
into the respective munitions and devices;Convention-
(b) Dws not mean:
(i) Any facility having a production capacity for synthesis of chemicals
specified in subparagraph (a)(i) that is less than1 tonne;
(ii) Any facility in which a chemical specified in subparagraph (a) (i) is
or was produced as an unavoidable by-product of activities for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention, provided that the
chernical does not exceed 3 per cent of the total product and that
the facilityssubject to declaration and inspection under the Annex
on Implementation and Verification (hereinafter referred to as
"Venfication Annex"); or
The single small-scale facility for production of chemicals listed in
(iii)
Schedule 1 for purposes not prohibited under this Convention as
referred to in PartVI of the Verification Annex.
9. "Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention" means:
(a) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other
peaceful purposes;
(b) Protective purposes, narnelythose purposes directlyrelated to protection
against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons;
(c) Military purposes not co~ected with the use of chemical weapons and
not dependent on the useof the toxicproperties ofchernicalsasamethod ofwarfare;
(d) Law enforcement including domestic riot wntrol purposes.
10. "Production Capacity" means:
The annual quantitativepotential for manufacturing a specificchemical based
on the technological process actually used or, if the process is not yet operational,
planned to be used at the relevant facility.It shall be deemed to be equal to the
nameplate capacity or, if the nameplate capacity is not available, to the design
capacity.The nameplate capacityis the product output under conditions optimized
for maximum quantity for the production facility,as demonstrated by one or more
test-runs. The design capacityisthe corresponding theoreticallycalculated product
output.
11. "Organization" means the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons established pursuant to Article VI11of this Convention. Artideil
12. For the purposes of Article VI:
"Production" of a chernical means its formation through chemical
reaction;
(b) "Rocessing"of a chemicalmeansa physicalprocess,suchas formulation,
extraction and purification, in which a chernical is not converted into another
chemical;
(c) "Consumption"ofa chemicalmeansitsconversionintoanother chemical
via a chemicalreaction. 1. Each State Party shall subrnitto the Organization, not later than 30 days
after this Convention enters into force for it, the followingdeclarations, in which
itshall:
(a) With respect to chemical weapons:
(i) Declare whether it owns or possesses any chernical weapons, or
whether there are any chemical weaponslocated in any place under
its jurisdiction or control;
(ii) Specifythe precise location,aggregatequantityand detailed inventory
of chernical weaponsit owns or possesses,or that are located in any
place under itsjurisdictionor control,in accordancewithPart IV (A),
paragraphs 1to 3,ofthe VerificationAnnex, exceptfor those chemical
weapons referred to in sub-subparagraph (iii);
(iii) Report any chernical weapons on its territory that are owned and
possessed by another State and located in any place under the
jurisdiction or control of another State, in accordance with Part IV
(A), paragraph 4, of the Verification Annex;
(iv) Declare whether it bas transferred or received, directly or indirectly,
any chemical weapons since 1January 1946and specifythe transfer
or receipt ofsuchweapons, inaccordancewithPart IV (A), paragraph
5,of the Verification Annex;
(v) Provide its general plan for destruction of chemical weapons that it
owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its
jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 6,
of the Verification Annex;
(b) With respect to old chernicalweapons and abandoned chernical weapons:
(i) Declare whether it has on its territory old chemical weapons and
provide al1available information in accordance with Part IV (B),
paragraph 3, of the Verification Annex; ArticleIII
(ii) Declare whether there are abandoned chemical weapons on its
territory and provide al1availableinformation in accordance with Part
IV (B), paragraph 8, of the Verification Annex;
Declare whether it has abandoned chemical weapons on the territory
(iii) of other States and provide al1available information in accordance
with Part IV (B), paragraph 10, of the Verification Annex;
(c) With rcspect to chemical weapons production facilities:
Declare whether it has or has had any chemical weapons production
(i)
facilityunder itsownership or possession,or that isor has been located
in anyplace under itsjurisdiction or control at anytime since 1January
1946;
(ii) Specify any chemical weapons production facility it has or has had
under its ownership or possession or that is or has been located in
any place under itsjurisdiction or control at any time since 1January
1946, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 1, of the Verification
Annex,,except for those facilitiesreferred to in sub-subparagraph (iii);
(iii) Report any chemical weapons production facility on its territory that
another State has or has had under its ownership and possession and
that is or has been located in any place under the jurisdiction or
control of another State at any time since 1 January 1946, in
accordance with Part V, paragraph 2, of the Verification Annex;
(iv) Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly,
any equipment for the production of chemical weapons since 1
January 1946 and speciîj the transfer or receipt of such equipment,
in accordance with Part V, paragraphs 3 to 5, of the Verification
Annex;
(v) Provide its general plan for destruction of any chemical weapons
production facilityit owns or possesses, or that is located in any place
under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part V,
paragraph 6, of the Verification Annex;
Specify actions to be taken for closure of any chemical weapons
(vi)
production facilityit ownsor possesses,or that is located in any place
under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part V,
paragraph 1 (i), of the Verification Annex;Convention
- - -
(vü) Provideits general plan for anytemporav conversionof anychemical
weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is located
in any place under itsjurisdiction or control,into a chemicalweapons
destruction facility, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 7, of the
Verification Annex;
(d) With respect to other facilities:
Specifythe preciselocation,natureand general scope of activitiesof anyfacility
or establishment under its ownership or possession, or located in any place under
its jurisdiction or control, and that has been designed, constructed or used since
1 January 1946 primarilyfor development of chemical weapons.Such declaration
shail include, interalia, laboratories and test and evaluation sites;
(e) With respect to riot control agents: Specifythe chemicainame, structural
formula and ChemicalAbstracts Service (CAS) registrynumber, if assigned,of each
chemical it holds for riot control purposes. This declaration shail be updated not
later than 30 days after any change becomes effective.
2. The provisions of this Article and the relevant provisions of Part IV of
the VerificationAnnex shallnot, at the discretion of a State Party, applyto chemical
weapons buried on its territory before 1 January 1977and which remain buried,
or which had been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985. ArticleIV
Article IV
1. The provisions of this Article and the detailed procedures for its
implementation shall apply to al1chemicalweaponsownedor possessedby a State
Party, or that are located in any placender itsjurisdiction or control, except old
chemical weapons and abandoned chemicalweapons to which Part IV (B) of the
VerificationAnnex applies.
2. Detailed procedures for the implementation of this Article are set forth
in the Verification Annex.
3. Al1locationsatwhichchemicalweaponsspecifiedinparagraph 1are stored
or destroyed shall be subject to systematic verificationthrough on-site inspection
and monitoring with on-site instruments, in accordance with Part IV (A) of the
Verification Annex.
4. Each State Partyshall, immediatelyafterthe declaration under Article III,
paragraph 1 (a), has been submitted,provideaccessto chemicalweapons specified
in paragraph 1for the purpose of systematic verificationof the declaration through
on-site inspection. Thereafter, each State Party shall not remove any of these
chemicalweapons, exceptto a chemicalweapons destructionfacility.It shallprovide
accessto such chemical weapons,for the purpose of systematicon-siteverification.
5. Each State Partyshallprovideaccessto any chemicalweaponsdestmction
facilities and their storagereas, that it owns or possesses,or that are located in
anyplace under itsjurisdictionor control,for the purpose of systematic verification
through on-site inspectionand monitoring with on-site instruments.
6. Each State Party shalldestroyail chemicalweaponsspecifiedin paragraph
1 pursuant to the Verification Annexand in accordance with the agreed rate and
sequence of destruction (hereinafter referred to as "order of destmction"). Such
destruction shall begin not later than two years after this Convention enters into
force for it and shall finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of this
Convention.A State Party is not precludedfrom destroyingsuchchemicaiweapons
at a faster rate.
7. Each State Party shall:
(a) Submit detailed plans for the destruction of chemicalweapons specified
in paragraph 1 not later than 60 daysbefore each annual destruction periodbegins,
inaccordancewithPartIV (A), paragraph29,oftheVerificationAnnex;the detailed
plans shall encompass al1stocksto be destroyedduringthe nextannual destmction
period;Convention
(b) Submit declarations annually regarding the implementation of its plans
for destruction of chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1,not later than 60days
after the end of each annual destruction period; and
(c) Certifj, not later thah 30 days after the destruction process has been
completed, that al1chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 have been destroyed.
8. If a State ratifies or accedes to this Convention after the 10-year.period
for destruction set forth in paragraph 6, it shall destroy chemical weapons specified
in paragraph 1 as soon as possible. The order of destruction and procedures for
stringent verification for such a State Party shall be determined by the Executive
Council.
9. Any chemical weapons discovered by a State Party after the initial
declaration of chemical weapons shall be reported, secured and destroyed in
accordance with Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex.
10. Each State Party, during transportation, sampling, storage and destruction
of chemicalweapons, shall assignthe highest priority toensuring the safety of people
and to protecting the environment. Each State Party shall transport, sample, store
and destroy chemical weapons in accordance with its national standards for safety
and emissions.
11. Any State Party which has on its territory chemicalweapons that are owned
or possessed by another State, or that are located in any place under the jurisdiction
or control of another State, shall make the fullest efforts to ensure that these
chemical weapons are removed from its territory not later than one year after this
Convention enters into force for it. If they are not removed within one year, the
State Party may request the Organization and other States Parties to provide
assistance in the destruction of these chemical weapons.
12. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with other States Parties that
request information or assistance on a bilateral basis or through the Technical
Secretariat regardingmethods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction
of chemical weapons.
13. In carrying out verification activities pursuant to this Article and Part IV
(A) of the Verification Annex, the Organization shall consider measures to avoid
unnecessary duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on verification of
chemical weapons storage and their destruction among States Parties.
To this end, the Executive Council shall decide to limitverification to measures
complementary to those undertaken pursuant to such a bilateral or multilateral
agreement, if it considers that: Article N
Verification provisions of such an agreement are consistent with the
verification provisions of this Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex;
Implementation of such an agreement provides for sufficient assurance
(b)
of compliance with the relevant provisions of this Convention; and
(c) Parties to the bilateral or multilateral agreement keep the Organization
fully informed about their verification activities.
14. If the Executive Council takes a decision pursuant to paragraph 13, the
Organization shall have the right to monitor the implementation of the bilateral
or multilateral agreement.
15. Nothing in paragraphs 13and 14shall affect the obligation of a State Party
to provide declarations pursuant to Article III, this Article and Part IV (A) of the
Verification Annex.
16. Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapons
it is obliged to destroy. It shall alsomeet the costs of verification of storage and
destruction of these chemical weapons unless the Executive Council decides
otherwise. If the Executive Council decides to limit verification measures of the
Organization pursuant to paragraph 13,the costs of complementary verification and
monitoring bythe Organization shall be paid in accordance with the United Nations
scale of assessment, as specified in Article VIII, paragraph 7.
17. The provisions of this Article and the relevant provisions of Part IV of
the VerificationAnnex shall not, at the discretion of a State Party, applyto chemical
weapons buried on its territory before 1 January 1977 and which remain buried,
or which had been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985.
.Convention
Article V
1. The provisions oi this Article and the detailed procedures for its
implementation shall apply to any and al1chernicalweapons production facilities
owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are located in any place under its
jurisdiction or control.
2. Detailed procedures for the implementation of this Article are set forth
in the Verification Annex.
3. Al1chemical weapons production facilities specified inparagraph 1 shall
be subject to systematicverification through on-site inspection and monitoring with
on-site instruments in accordance with Part V of the Verification Annex.
4. Each State Party shall cease immediately al1activityat chemical weapons
production facilities specified inparagraph 1, except activityrequired for closure.
5. No State Party shall construct any new chemical weapons production
facilities or modify any existing facilities for thepurpose of chemical weapons
production or for any other activityprohibited under this Convention.
6. Each State Party shall, immediatelyafter the declaration under Article III,
paragraph 1 (c),has been subrnitted,provide accessto chemicalweaponsproduction
facilities specifiedin paragraph 1,for the purpose of systematic verificationof the
declaration through on-site inspection.
>7. Each State Party shall:
(a) Close, not later than 90 daysafter this Convention enters into force for
it,al1chernicalweapons production facilitiesspecifiedin paragraph 1, in accordance
with Part V of the Verification Annex,and give notice thereof; and
,br Provide access to chernical weaoons oroduction facilities s~ecified in
paragraph 1, subsequent to closure, for the purpose of systematic verification
through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in order to
ensure that the faciiityrernains closed andis subsequently destroyed.
8. Each State Party shall destroy al1chemical weaponsproduction facilities
specified in paragraph 1 and related facilities and equipment, pursuant to the
Verification Annex and in accordance with an agreed rate and sequence of
destruction (hereinafter referred to as "order of destruction"). Such destruction
shall begin not later than one year after this Convention enters into force for it,
and shall finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention.
A State Party is not precluded from destroying such facilities at a faster rate. ArticleV
9. Each State Party shall:
(a) Submit detailed plans for destruction of chemical weapons production
facilities specifiedinparagraph 1, not later than 180days before the destmction
of each facilitybegins;
(b) Submit declarations annually regarding the implementation of its plans
for the destruction of al1chemical weapons production facilities specified in
paragraph 1,not later than 90 days afterthe end of each annual destmction period;
and
(c) Certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been
completed, that al1chemical weapons production facilities specifiedin paragraph
1 have been destroyed.
10. If a State ratifies or accedes to this Convention after the 10-yearperiod
fordestructionsetforthinparagraph 8,itshaildestroychemicalweaponsproduction
facilities specifiedin paragraphas soon as possible.The order of destruction and
procedures for stringent verificationfor such a State Party shallbe determined by
the Executive Council.
11. Each State Party, during the destmction of chemicalweapons production
faciiities, shall assignthe highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to
protecting the environment. Each State Party shall destroy chemical weapons
production facilities in accordance with its national standards for safety and
emissions.
12. Chemical weapons productionfacilities specifiedin paragraph 1may be
temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons in accordance with
Part V,paragraphs 18 to 25, of the VerificationAnnex. Such a converted facility
must be destroyed as soon as it is no longer in use for destruction of chemical
weapons but, in any case, not later than 10years after entry into force of this
Convention.
13. A State Party may request, in exceptional cases of compelling need,
permission to use a chemical weaponsproduction facility specifiedin paragraph
1 for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.Upon the recommendation
of the Executive Councii,the Conference of the StatesParties shalldecidewhether
or not to approvethe request and shallestablishthe conditionsupon whichapproval
iscontingent in accordance with Part V,Section D, of the VerificationAnnex.Convention
14. The chemical weapons production facility shall be converted in such a
manner that the converted facility is not more capable of being reconverted into
a chemical weapons production facility than any other facility used for industrial,
agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes not
involving chemicals listed in Schedule 1.
15. Al1converted facilities shall be subject to systematic verification through
on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with
Part V, Section D, of the Verification Annex.
16. In carrying out verification activitiesursuant to this Article and Part V
of the Verification Annex, the Organization shall consider measures to avoid
unnecessary duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on verification of
chemical weapons production facilities and their destruction among States Parties.
To this end, the Executive Council shall decide to limit the verification to
measures complementary to those undertaken pursuant to such a bilateral or
multilateral agreement, if it considers that:
(a) Verification provisions of such an agreement are consistent with the
verification provisions of this Article and Part V of the Verification Annex;
(b) Implementation of the agreement provides for sufficient assurance of
compliance with the relevant provisions of this Convention; and
Parties to the bilateral or multilateral agreement keep the Organization
fully informed about their verification activities.
17. If the Executive Council takes a decision pursuant to paragraph 16, the
Organization shall have the right to monitor the implementation of the bilateral
or multilateral agreement.
18. Nothing in paragraphs. 16and 17shall affect the obligation of a State Party
to make declarations pursuant to Article III, this Article and Part V of the
Verification Annex.
19. Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapons
production facilitiesits obliged to destroy. It shall also meet the costs ofverification
under this Article unless the Executive Council decides otherwise. If the Executive
Council decides to limit verification measures of the Organization pursuant to
paragraph 16, the costs of complementary verification and monitoring by the
Organization shall be paid in accordance with the United Nations scale of
assessment, as specified in Article VIII, paragraph 7. ArticleVI
Article CiI
ArnV~n~s NOT PROHIBITEDUNDER THIS CONVENTION
1. Each State Party has the right, subject to the provisionsof this Convention,
to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and
their precursors for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic
chernicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired,
retained, transferred, or used within its territory or in any other place under its
jurisdiction or control forpurposes not prohibited under this Convention. To this
end, and in order to ver@ that activities are in accordance with obligations under
this Convention, each State Party shall subject toxic chernicalsand their precursors
listed in Schedules 1, 2 and3 of the Annex on Chemicals, facilitiesrelated to such
chemicals, and other facilitiesasspecified in the VerificationAnnex,that are located
on its territoly or in any other place under itsjurisdiction or control, to verification
measures as provided in the Verification Annex.
3. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 1 (hereinafter
referred to as "Schedule1chemicals") to the prohibitions on production, acquisition,
retention, transfer and use as specified in PaVI of the Verification Annex. It shall
subject Schedule 1 chemicals and facilities specified in Part VI of the Verification
Annex to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with
on-site instruments in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex.
4. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 2 (hereinafter
referred to as "Schedule 2 chemicals") and facilities specified in Part VI1 of the
Verification Annex to data monitoring and on-site verification in accordance with
that Part of the Verification Annex.
5. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 3 (hereinafter
referred to as "Schedule 3 chemicals") and facilities specifiein Part VI11of the
Verification Annex to data monitoring and on-site verification in accordance with
that Part of the Verification Annex.
6. Each State Party shall subject facilities specified in Part IX of the
Verification Annex to data monitoring and eventual on-site verification in
accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex unless decided otherwise by
the Conference of the States Parties pursuant to Part IX, paragraph 22, of the
Verification Annex.Convention
7. Not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, each
State Party shall make an initial declaration on relevant chemicals and facilities
in accordance with the Verification Annex.
8. Each State Party shall make annual declarations regarding the relevant
chemicals and facilities in accordance with the Verification Annex.
9. For the purpose of on-site verification, eachState Party shallgrant to the
inspectors access to facilitieas required in the Verification Annex.
10. In conducting verification activities,the TechnicalSecretariat shall avoid
undue intrusion intotheState Party'schemicalactivitiesfor purposes not prohibited
under this Convention and, in particular, abide by the provisions set forth in the
Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information (hereinafter referred to as
"Confidentiality Annex").
11. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in a manner which
avoidshampering the economicor technologicaldevelopmentof States Parties, and
international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention includingthe international exchangeof scientific
and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production,
processing or use of chemicalsfor purposes not prohibited under this Convention. ArticleW
Article YI1
NATIONA IMPLEMENTATiON MEASURES
General undertakings
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes,
adopt the necessarymeasures to implement its obligationsunder this Convention.
In particular, it shail:
(a) Prohibit naturai and legalpersonsanywhere onitsterritoryor inanyother
place under itsjurisdictionas recognizedby international lawfrom undertaking any
activityprohibited to a State Partyunder this Convention,includingenacting penal
legislation withrespect to such activity;
(b) Not permit in anyplaceunder itswntrol any activityprohibited to a State
Party under this Convention; and
(c) Extend itspend legislationenacted under subparagraph (a)to anyactivity
prohibited to a State Partyunder this Convention undertaken anywherebynatural
persons, possessingits nationality, in conformitywith international law.
2. Each State Party shail cooperate with other States Parties and afford the
appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the
obligations under paragraph 1.
3. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligationsunder this
Convention, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and
to protecting the environment,and shallcooperate as appropriate withother States
Parties in this regard.
Relations between the StateParty and the Organization
4. In order to fulfil its obligations under this Convention,each State Party
shall designate orestablisha National Authorityto serveas the national focalpoint
for effective liaison withthe Organizatioand other StatesParties.Each State Party
shall notify the Organization of its National Authority at the time that this
Convention enters into force for it.
5. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the legislative and
administrative measures taken to implement this Convention.
6. Each State Party shall treat as wnfidential and affordspecial handling to
information and data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in
connection with the implementation of this Convention. It shall treat suchConvention
information and data exclusivelyin connection with its rights and obligations under
this Convention and in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Confi-
dentiality Annex.
7. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization in the
exercise ofal1its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical
Secretariat. Article WI
ArticleWII
THEORGANIZATION
A. GENERA LROViSlONS
1. The States Parties to.this Convention hereby establish the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to achieve the object and purpose of this
Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for
international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for
consultation and cooperation among States Parties.
2. Al1States Parties to this Convention shall be members of the Organization.
A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization.
3. The seat of the Headquarters of the Organization shall be The Hague,
Kingdom of the Netherlands.
4. There are hereby established as the organs of the Organization: the
Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council, and the Technical
Secretariat.
5. The Organization shall conduct itsverification activitiesprovided for under
this Convention in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely
and efficient accomplishment of their objectives.It shallrequest onlythe information
and data necessary to fulfil its responsibilities under this Convention. It shall take
every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and militas,
activities and facilities coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this
Convention and, in particular, shallabide by the provisions set forth in the
Confidentiality Annex.
6. In undertaking its verification activities the Organization shall consider
measures to make use of advances in science and technology.
7. The wsts of the Organization's activities shall be paid by States Parties
in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into
account differences in membership between the United Nations and this
Organization, and subject to the provisions of Articles IV and V. Financial
contributions of States Parties to the Preparatos, Commission shail be deducted
in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular budget. The budget
of the Organization shall comprise two separate chapters, one relating to
administrative and other wsts, and one relating to verification costs.
8. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payrnent of its
financial contribution to the Organization shall have no vote in the Organization
if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution dueConvention
from it for the preceding two fullyears. The Conference of the States Parties may,
nevertheless, permituch a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay
is due toconditions beyond the wntrol of the member.
B. THE CONFEREN CE THE STATE PSARTIES
Composition,proceduresand deckion-making
9. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referrto as "the
Conference") shallbe composed ofl1members ofthis Organization. Each member
shall have one representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by
alternates and advisers.
10. The first session of the Conference shall be wnvened by the depositary
not later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Convention.
11. The Conference shall meet in regular sessionswhichshallbe held annually
unless it decides othenvise.
12. Special sessionsof the Conference shall be convened:
(a) When decided by the Conference;
(b) When requested by the Executive Council;
(c) When requested by any member and supported by one third of the
members; or
(d) In accordance with paragraph 22 to undertake reviews of the operation
of this Convention.
Except in the case of subparagraph (d), the special sessiobeswnvened
not later than 30 days after receipt of the request by the Director-General of the
TechnicalSecretariat, unless specifiedotherwise in the request.
13. ~he Conference shall also be wnvened in the form of an Amendment
Conference in accordance with ArticXV, paragraph 2.
14. Sessionsof the Conference shalltake place at the seat of the Organization
unless the Conference decides otherwise.
15. The Conference shall adopt its niles of procedure. At the beginning of
each regular session, it shallelect its Chairman and such other asmay be
required. They shall hold office until anewman and other officersare elected
at thenext regular session. ArticleWI
16. A majority of the members of the Organization shall constitute a quorum
for the Conference.
17. Each member of the Organization shall have one vote in the Conference.
18. The Conference shalitake decisionson questions ofprocedure bya simple
majority of the members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance
should be taken as far as possibleby consensus.If consensusis not attainable when
an issue cornesup for decision,the Chairman shall defer anyvote for 24hours and
during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement
of consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If
consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take the
decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless specified
otherwise in this Convention. When the issue arises as to whether the question is
one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance
unless othenvise decided by the Conference by the majority required for decisions
on matten of substance.
19. The Conference shali be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall
consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Convention,
including those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and
the TechnicalSecretariat. It may make recommendationsand take decisions on any
questions, matters or issues related to this Convention raised by a State Party or
brought to its attention by the Executive Council.
20. The Conference shalloversee the implementation of this Convention, and
act in order to promote its object and purpose. The Conference shall review
compliancewith this Convention.It shall alsooversee the activitiesof the Executive
Council and the TechnicalSecretariat and may issue guidelinesin accordance with
this Convention to either of them in the exercise of their functions.
21. The Conference shall:
(a) Consider and adopt at its regular sessions the report, programme and
budget of the Organization,submitted by the Executive Council,as wellas consider
other reports;
Decide on the sale of financialcontributions to be paid byStatesParties
(b)
in accordance with paragraph 7;
(c) Elect the members of the Executive Council;Convention
(d) Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter
referred to as "the. Director-General");
~~~rove'the rules of procedure of the Executive Council submitted by
the latter;
Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of
its functionsin accordance with this Convention;
Foster international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of
(g)
chemical activities;
(h) Review scientific and technological developments that could affect the
operation of this Convention and, in this context, direct the Director-General to
establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him, in the performance of his
functions, to render specializedadvice in areas of science and technology relevant
to this Convention, to the Conference, the Executive Council or States Parties.The
Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts appointed in
accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference;
Consider and approve at its first session any draft agreements, provisions
and guidelines developed by the Preparatory Commission;
Establish at its first session the voluntary fund for assistance in accordance
0)
with Article X;
Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Convention
(k)
and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this
Convention, in accordance with Article XII.
22. The Conference shall not later than one year after the expiry of the fifth
and the tenth year after the entry into force of this Convention, and atsuch other
times within that the period as may be decided upon, convene in special sessions
to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention. Such reviews shall take
into account any relevant scientific and technological developments. At intervals
of five years thereafter, unless otherwise decided upon, further sessions of the
Conference shall be convened with the same objective.
Composition,procedure anddecision-making
23. The Executive Council shall consist of 41 members. Each
State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the principle of rotation, to serve
on the Executive Council. The members of the Executive Council shall be elected Article MI1
by the Conference for a term of two years. In order to ensure the effective
functioning of this Convention, due regard being specially paid to equitable
geographical distribution, to the importance of chemical industry, as well as to
political and security interests, the Executive Council shall be composed as follows:
(a) Nine States Parties from Africa to be designated by States Parties located
in this region. As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these nine
States Parties, three'members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with the most
significant national chemical industry in the region as determined by internationally
reported and published data; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take
into account other regional factors in designating these three members;
(b) Nine States Parties from Asia to be designated by States Parties located
in this region. As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these nine
States Parties, four members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with the most
significant national chemical industry in the region as determined by internationally
reported and published data; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take
into account other regional factors in designating these four members;
FiveStates Parties from Eastern Europeto be designated byStatesParties
located in this region. As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of
these five States Parties, one member shall, as a rule, be the State Party with the
most significant national chemical industry in the region as determined by
internationally reported and published data; in addition, the regional group shall
agree alsoto take into account other regional factors in designatingthis one member;
(d) Seven States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean to be
designated by States Parties located in this region. As a basis for this designation
it is understood that, out of these seven States Parties, three members shall, as a
rule, be the States Parties with the most significant national chemical industry in
the region asdetermined byinternationally reported and published data; in addition,
the regional group shall agree also to take into account other regional factors in
designating these three members;
(e) Ten States Parties from among Western European and other States to
be designated byStates Parties located in this region. As a basis for this designation
it is understood that, out of these 10 States Parties, 5 members shall, as a rule,
be the States Parties with the most significant national chemical industry in the
region as determined by internationally reported and published data; in addition,
the regional group shall agree also to take into account other regional factors in
designating these five members;Convention
(f) One further State Party to be designated consecutivelyby States Parties
located in the regions of Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. As a basis
for this designationit is understood that this State Party shallbe a rotating member
from these regions.
24. For the first election of the Executiveuncil20 members shallbe elected
for a term of one year, due regard being paid to the established numerical
proportions as described in paragraph 23.
25. After the full implementation of ArticlesIV and V the Conference may,
upon the request of a majority of the members of the Executive Council,review
the compositionof the Executive Council takinginto account developments related
to the principles specified in paragraph 23 that are governing itscomposition.
26. The Executive Council shallelaborate its rules of procedure and submit
them to the Conference for approval.
27. The ExecutiveCouncii shall elect its Chairman from among its members.
28. The Executive Councii shall meet for regular sessions. Between regular
sessions it shall meet as often as may be required for the fulfilment of its powers
and functions.
29. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote. Unless
otherwise specified in this Convention, the Executive Council shalltake decisions
on matters of substanceby a two-thirdsmajorityof al1its members. The Executive
Councii shalltake decisions on questions of procedure by a simple majority of al1
its members. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance
or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise
decided by the Executive Councilby the majorityrequired for decisionson matters
of substance.
Powersandfunctions
30. The Executive Council shall be the executiveorgan of the Organization.
It shall be responsible to the Conference. The Executive Council shall carry out
the powers and functions entrusted to it under this Convention, as well as those
functions delegated to it by the Conference. In so doing, it shallact in conformity
with the recommendations,decisions and guidelinesof the Conference and assure
their proper and continuous implementation.
31. The Executive Council shallpromote the effectiveimplementation of, and
compliance with, this Convention. It shall supervise the activitiesof the Technical
Secretariat, cooperate with the National Authorityof each State Party and facilitate
consultations and cooperation among States Parties at their request. Article WI
32. The Executive Council shall:
Consider and submit to the Conferencethe draft programme and budget
of the Organization;
Consider and submit to the Conference the draft report of the
(b)
Organization on the implementation of this Convention, the report on the
performance of its own activities and such special reports as it deems necessary
or which the Conference may request;
(c) Make arrangements for the sessirns of the Conference including the
preparation of the draft agenda.
33. The Executive Councilmay request the convening ofa special sessionof
the Conference.
34. The Executive Council shall:
(a) Conclude agreements or arrangements with States and international
organizations on behalf of the Organization, subject to prior approval by the
Conference;
(b) Conclude agreements with States Parties on behalf of the Organization
in connection with Article X and supervise the voluntary fund referred to in
Article X;
(c) Approve agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of
verification activities,negotiated by the TechnicalSecretariat with States Parties.
35. The Executive Council shall consider any issue or.matter within its
cornpetence affecting this Convention and its irnplementation, includingwncems
regarding cornpliance, and cases of non-compliance, and, as appropriate, inform
States Parties and bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference.
36. In itsconsiderationof doubts or concernsregardingcornplianceand cases
of non-compliance, including, interalia,abuse of the rights providedfor under this
Convention, the Executive Council shall consult with the States Parties involved
and,as appropriate, request theState Partyto take measuresto redressthe situation
withii a specified time.To the extent that the Executive Councilconsidersfurther
actionto be necessary,it shall takeinteraliaone or moreofthe followingmeasures:
(a) Inform al1States Parties of the issue or matter;
(b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference;Convention
Make recommendations to the Conference regarding mesures to redress
the situation and to ensure compliance.
The Executive Council shall, incases of particular gravity and urgency, bring
the issue ormatter, includingrelevant information and conclusions,directlyto the
attention of the United Nations General Assemblyand the United Nations Security
Council. It shall at the same time inform al1States Parties of this step.
37. The TechnicalSecretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive
Council in the performance of their functions. The TechnicalSecretariat shallcany
out the verification mesures provided for in this Convention.It shall carry out the
other functions entrusted to it under this Convention as well as those functions
delegated to it by the Conference and the Executive Council.
38. The Technical Secretariat shall:
(a) Prepare and submit to the Executive Councilthe draft programme and
budget of the Organization;
(b) Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft report of the
Organization on the implementation of this Conventionand such other reports as
the Conference or the Executive Council may request;
(c) Provide administrative and technical support to the Conference, the
Executive Counciland subsidiary organs;
(d) Address and receive communications on behalf of the Organization to
and from States Parties on matters pertaining to the implementation of this
Convention;
(e) Provide technical assistanceand technical evaluation to States Parties in
the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, includingevaluation of
scheduled and unscheduled chemicals.
39. The TechnicalSecretariat shall:
(a) Negotiate agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation
of verification activities withStates Parties, subject to approval by the Executive
Council;
Not later than 180 days after entry into force of this Convention,
(b)
coordinate the establishment and maintenance of permanent stockpiles of
emergency and humanitarian assistance by States Parties in accordance with Article WI
Article X,paragraphs 7 (b) and (c).The TechnicalSecretariat mayinspect the items
maintained for se~ceabiiiîy. Listsof itemsto be stockpiledshallbe considered and
approved by the conferen& pursuant to paragraph 21 (ij above; '
...
(c) Administer the voluntary fund referred to in ~rticle X, compile
declarations made by the States Parties and register, when requested, bilateral
agreements concluded between States Parties or between a State.Party and the
Organization for the purposes of Article X.
40.The Technical Secretariat shall inform the Executive Council of any
problem that has arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions, including
doubts, ambiguities or uncertainties about compliance with this Convention that
have come to its notice in the performance of its verificationactivitiesand that it
has been unable to resolve or clariij through its consultationswith the State Party
concemed.
41. The TechnicalSecretariat shallcomprise a Director-General,who shallbe
its head and chief administrative officer, inspectorsand such scientific,technical
and other personnel as may be required.
42. The Inspectorate shall be a unit of the Technical~ecretariat and shall act
under the supervision of the Director-General.
43. The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon the
recommendation of the Executive Councilfor a term of four years, renewable for
one further term, but not thereafter.
44. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and the
Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and the organization and
functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the
employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of seMce shall
be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency,competence and
integrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Director-General, as
inspectors or as other members of the professional and clerical staff. Due regard
shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical
basis as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff shall
be kept to a minimum necessaryfor the proper discharge of the responsibilities
of the Technical Secretariat.
45. The Director-General shall be responsible for the organization and
functioning of the ScientificAdvisoryBoard referred to in paragraph 21 (h). The
Director-General shall, inconsultationwith States Parties, appoint membersof the
ScientificAdvisoryBoard,who shall serve intheir individualcapacity.The members
of the Board shall be appointed on the basis of their expertise in the particularConvention
scientific fields relevant to 'the implementation of this Convention. The
Director-General may also, as appropriate, in consultation with members of the
Board, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide
recommendations on specific issues. In regard to the above, States Parties may
submit lists of experts to the Director-General.
46. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, the inspectors
and the other members of the staff shali not seek or receive instructions from any
Government or from any other source external to the Organization. They shall
refrain from any action that might reflect on their positions as internationalicers
responsible only to the Conference and the Executive Council.
47. Each State Party shall respect the exclusivelyinternational character of
the responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectorsand the other members
of the staffand not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.
E. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
48. The Organization shallenjoy on the territory and in any other place under
the jurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges
and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions.
49. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers,
representatives appointed to the Executive Council together with their alternates
and advisers, the Director-General and the staff of the Organization shall enjoy
such privilegesand immunities as are necessary in the independent exerciseof their
functions in connection with the Organization.
50. The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred to in this Article
shall be defined in agreements between the Organization and the StatesParties as
well as in an agreement between the Organization and the State in which the
headquarters of the Organization is seated. These agreements shall be considered
and approved by the Conference pursuant to paragraph 21 (i).
51. Notwithstanding paragraphs 48 and 49, the privileges and immunities
enjoyed by the Director-General and the staff of the Technical Secretariat during
the conduct of verification activities shall be those set forth in Part II, Section B,
of the Verification Annex. ArticleIX
Article IX
1. States Parties shall consult and cooperate, directly among themselves,or
through the Organization or other appropriate international procedures, including
procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with
its Charter, on any matter which rnaybe raised relatingto the object and purpose,
or the implementation of the provisions, of thisConvention.
2. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request a challenge
inspection,StatesParties should,whenever possible,firstmakeeveryeffort to clarify
and resolve,through exchangeof information and consultationsamongthemselves,
anymatter whichrnaycausedoubt about wmpliance withthisConvention,or which
givesrise to concerns about a related matter which rnaybe consideredambiguous.
A State Party which receives a request from another State Party for clarification
of any matter which the requesting State Party believes causes such a doubt or
concern shallprovidethe requesting State Party as soon as possible,but in any case
not later than 10days after the request, with information sufficientto answer the
doubt or concern raised alongwithan explanation ofhowthe informationprovided
resolves the matter. Nothing in this Convention shall affectthe right of any two
or more States Parties to arrange by mutual consent for inspectionsor any other
procedures among themselvesto clarify and resolve any matter which rnay cause
doubt about compliance or givesrise to a concern about a related matter which
may be considered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not affect the rights and
obligations of any State Partyunder other provisionsof this Convention.
Procedurefor requestingclarification
3. A State Party shall havethe rightto request the Executive Councilto assist
in clarifying anysituation which rnaybe considered ambiguousor which gives rise
to a concern about the possible non-cornplianceof another State Party with this
Convention. The Executive Council shall provide appropriate information in its
possession relevant to such a concern.
4. A StatePartyshallhavethe rightto requesttheExecutive Councilto obtain
clarification from another State Party on any situation which rnay be considered
ambiguousor which givesrise to a concern about its possiblenon-wmpliance with
this Convention. In such a case, the following shall apply:
(a) The ExecutiveCouncil shall forward the request for clarificationto the
State Party concerned through the Director-General not later than 24 hours after
its receipt;Convention
(b) The requested State Party shallprovidethe clarificationto the Executive
Council as soon aspossible,but in any case not later than 10days after the receipt
of the request;
(c) The ~xecytive Council shall take note of the clarification and forward
it tothe requesting State Party not later than 24 hours after its receipt;
(d) If the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it
shall have the right to request the Executive Councilto obtain from the requested
State Party further clarification;
(e) For the purpose of obtaining further clarification requested under
subparagraph (d), the Executive Council may cal1on the Director-General to
establish a group of experts from the TechnicalSecretariat, or if appropriate staff
are not available in the Technical Secretariat, from elsewhere, to examine al1
available information and data ,relevant to the situation causing the concern. The
group ofexpertsshallsubmitafactualreport tothe ExecutiveCouncilon itsfindings;
(f) If the requesting State Party considers the clarification obt~ined under
subparagraphs (cf)and (e) to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to request
a specialsession of the ExecutiveCouncilin whichStates Parties involvedthat are
not membersofthe ExecutiveCouncilshallbe entitled to take part. In sucha special
session, the ExecutiveCouncil shall consider the matter and may rewmmend any
measure it deems appropriate to resolve the situation.
5. A State Party shall also have the right to request the Executive Council
to clarifyany situation which has been wnsidered ambiguous or has given rise to
a concem about its possible non-compliancewith this Convention. The Executive
Council shall respond by providing such assistance as appropriate.
6. The Executive Councilshall inform the States Parties about any request
for clarification providedin this Article.
7. If the doubt or concern of a State Party about a possiblenon-compliance
has not been resolved within 60 days after the submission of the request for
clarification to the Executive Council, or it believes its doubts warrant urgent
consideration, notwithstanding its rightto request a challenge inspection, it may
request a special session of the Conference in accordance with Article VIII,
paragraph 12 (c).At sucha special session,the Conferenceshallconsiderthe matter
and may rewmmend any measure it deems appropriate to resolve the situation. ArticleIX
Proceduresfor challengeinspections
8. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site challengeinspection
of anyfacilityor location in theterritory or in anyother placeunder the jurisdiction
or wntrol of any other State Party for the sole purpose of clarifyingand resolving
any questions concerning possible non-compliance with the provisions of this
Convention, and to have this inspection conducted anywherewithout delay by an
inspection team designated by the Director-General and in accordance with the
Verification Annex.
9. Each State Party is under the obligation to keep the inspection request
within the scope of this Convention and to provide in the inspection request al1
appropriate information on the basis of which a concern has arisen regarding
possiblenon-wmpliance withthisConventionasspecifiedin the VerificationAnnex.
EachState Partyshall refrainfrom unfounded inspectionrequests, carebeingtaken
to avoid abuse. The challengeinspection shallbe carried out for the sole purpose
of determining facts relating to the possible non-wmpliance.
10. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the provisions of this
Convention,each State Party shallpermit the TechnicalSecretariat to wnduct the
on-site challenge inspection pursuant to paragraph 8.
11. Pursuant to a request for a challengeinspection of a facilityor location,
and in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Verification Annex,the
inspected State Party shallhave:
(a) The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to
demonstrate its compliance with this Convention and, to this end, to enable the
inspection team to fulfil its mandate;
(b) The obligation to provide access withinthe requested site for the sole
purpose of establishing facts relevant to the concern regarding possible
non-compliance; and
(c) The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations, and to
prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, not related to this
Convention.
12. With regard to an observer, the followingshall apply:
(a) The requestingStatePartymay,subjectto the agreementofthe inspected
State Party, send a representative who may be a national either of the requesting
State par& or of a third State Party, toobserve the conduct of the challenge
inspection.
(b) The inspected State Party shall then grant access to the observer in
accordance with the Verification Annex.Convention - -
(c) The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed observer,
but if the inspected State Party exercises arefusal, that fact shall be recorded in
the final report.
13. The requesting State Party shallpresent an inspectionrequestfor an on-site
challenge inspection to the Executive Council and at the same time to the
Director-General for immediate processing.
14. The Director-General shall immediately ascertain that the inspection
request meets the requirements specified inPart X, paragraph 4, of the Verification
Annex, and, if necessary, assistthe requesting State Party in filing the inspection
request accordingly. When the inspection request fulfils the requirements,
preparations for the challenge inspection shall begin.
15. The Director-General shalltransmit the inspectionrequest tothe inspected
State Party not less than 12hours before the planned arriva1of the inspection team
at the point of entry.
16. After having received the inspection request, the Executive Council shall
take cognizance of the Director-General's actionson the request and shall keep
the case under its consideration throughout the inspection procedure. However,its
deliberations shall not delay the inspection process.
17. The Executive Councilmay, not later than 12 hours after having received
the inspection request, decide bya three-quarter majority of al1its members against
carrying out the challenge inspection, if it considers the inspection request to be
frivolous, abusiveor clearly beyond the scope of this Convention as described in
paragraph 8. Neither the requesting nor the inspected State Party shall participate
in sucha decision.If the Executive Councildecidesagainstthe challenge inspection,
preparations shall be stopped, no further action on the inspection request shall be
taken, and the States Parties concerned shall be informed accordingly.
18. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct
of the challenge inspection.The inspection mandate shall be the inspection request
referred to in paragraphs 8 and 9 put into operational terms, and shall conform
with the inspection request.
19. The challenge inspection shall be conducted in accordance with Part X
or, in the case of alleged use, in accordance with Part XI of the Verification Annex.
The inspection team shall be guided by the principle of conducting the challenge
inspection in the least intrusive manner possible, consistentwith the effective and
timely accomplishmentof its mission.
20. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the
challenge inspection and facilitate its task. If the inspected State Party proposes, ArticleïX
pursuant to Part X, Section C, of the Verification Annex, arrangements to
demonstrate compliancewiththis Convention,alternativeto fulland comprehensive
access, it shallmake every reasonable effort, through consultation; with the
inspection team, to reach agreement on the modalities for establishing the facts
with the aim of demonstrating its compliance.
21. The final report shall contain the factual findingsas wellas an assessment
by the inspection team of the degree and nature of accewand cooperation granted
for the satisfactory implementation of the challenge inspection. The
Director-General shall promptly transmit the final report of the inspection team
to the requesting State Party,to the inspectedState Party,to the Executive Council
and to al1other StatesParties. TheDirector-General shallfurther transmit promptly
to the Executive Council the assessments of the requesting and of the inspected
States Parties, as well as theviewsof other States Parties which may be conveyed
to the Director-General for thatpurpose,andthen providethemto al1States Parties.
22. The Executive Council shall,in accordancewith its powers andfunctions,
reviewthe finalreport of the inspectionteam as soon as it ispresented, and address
any concerns as to:
(a) Whether any non-compliance has occurred;
Whether the request had been within the scope of this Convention;and
(b)
(c) Whether the right to request a challenge inspectionhad been abused.
23. If the ExecutiveCouncilreaches the conclusion,in keepingwith its powers
and functions, that further action may be necessarywith regard to paragraph 22,
it shall take the appropriate measures to redress the situation and to ensure
compliance with this Convention, including specific recommendations to the
Conference. In the case of abuse, the Executive Council shall examinewhether the
requesting State Party shouldbear anyof the financial implicationsof the challenge
inspection.
24. The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party shall have the
right to participatein the review process. The Executive Council shall informthe
States Parties and the nextsessionof the Conferenceof the outcome of the process.
25. If the Executive Council has made specific recommcndations to the
Conference, the Conference shall consider action in accordance with Article XII.Convention
Article X
ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL WEAPONS
1. For the purposes of this Article, 'Assistance"means the coordination and
delivery to States Parties of protection against chemical weapons, including,
inter Ùlia,the following: detection equipment and alarm systems; protective
equipment;dewntamination equipment and dewntarninants; medicalantidotesand
treatments; and adviceon any of these protective measures.
2. Nothing in this Conventionshall be interpreted as impeding the right of
any State Party to wnduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use
means of protection against chemical weapons,for purposes not prohibited under
this Convention.
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to
participate in, thefullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific
and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical
weapons.
4. For the purposes of increasingthe transparency of national programmes
related to protective purposes, each State Party shall provide annually to the
TechnicalSecretariat informationon its programme,in accordancewithprocedures
to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII,
paragraph 21 (i).
5. TheTechnicalSecretariatshall establish,not later than 180 daysafter entry
intoforce of thisConventionand maintain,forthe useofanyrequesting State Party,
a data bank wntaining freely available information concerningvarious means of
protection against chemicalweaponsaswellassuchinformationasmaybe provided
by States Parties.
The TechnicalSecretariat shall also, withinthe resources available to it, and
at the request of a State Party,provide expert advice and assist the State Party in
identifying how its programmes for the development and improvement of a
protective capacity against chernicalweapons wuld be implemented.
6. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of
StatesPartiesto request andprovideassistancebilaterallyand toconcludeindividual
agreements with other States Parties concerning the emergency procurement of
assistance.
7. Each State Party undertakes to provide assistance through the
Organizationand to thisend to electto take oneor more of the followingmeasures:
(a) To wntribute to the voluntary fund for assistance to be established by
the Conference at its first session; (b) To wnclude, if possible not later than 180 days after this Convention
enters into force for it, agreements with the Organization concerning the
procureme'nt,upon demand, of assistance;
(c) Todeclare, not later than 180daysafter this Conventionenters into force
for it, the kind of assistance it might provide in response to an appeal by the
Organization. If, however, a State Party subsequently is unable to provide the
assistance envisaged in its declaration, it istill under the obligation to provide
assistance in accordance with this paragraph.
8. Each State Party has the right to request and, subject to the procedures
set forth in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, to receive assistance and protection against
the use or threat of use of chemical weaponsif it considers that:
(a) Chemical weapons havc been used againstit;
(b) Riot wntrol agents have been used against it as a method of warfare;
or
(c) Itis threatened by actions or activitiesof any State that are prohibited
for States Parties by Article 1.
9. The request, substantiated by relevant information, shall besubmitted to
the Director-General, who shall transmit it immediatelyto the EjrecutiveCouncil
and to al1States Parties. The Director-General shall immediately forward the
request to States Parties which have volunteered, in acwrdance with paragraphs
7 (b) and (c), to dispatch emergency assistancein case of use of chemicalweapons
or use of riot wntrol agents as a method of warfare, or humanitarian assistance
in case of serious threat of use of chemical weaponsor serious threat of use of riot
control agents as a method of warfare to the State Party concerned not later than
12 hours after receipt of the request. The Director-Generai shall initiate, not later
than 24 hours after receipt of the request, an investigation in order to provide
foundation for furiher action. He shall wmplete the investigationwithin 72 hours
and forward a report to the Executive Council. Ifadditional time is required for
wmpletion ofthe investigation,an interimreport shallbesubmittedwithinthe same
time-frame.The additionaltirnerequired forinvestigationshallnot exceed72hours.
It may,however,be further extendedby similarperiods.Reports at the end of each
additional period shall be submitted to the Executive Council.The investigation
shall, as appropriate and in conformity with the request and the information
acwmpanying the request, establish relevant facts related to the request as well
as the type and scope of supplementary assistance and protection needed.
10. The EwecutiveCouncil shallmeet not later than 24 hours after receiving
an investigationreport to considerthe situation and shall takea decisionby simpleConvention
majority within the following 24 hours on whether to instruct the Technical
Secretariat to provide supplementary assistance. The Technical Secretariat shall
immediately transmit to al1States Parties and relevant international organizations
the investigationreport and the decision taken by the Executive Council.When so
decided by the Executive Council, the Director-General shall provide assistance
immediately. For this purpose, the Director-General may cooperate with the
requesting State Party,other StatesParties and relevant international organizations.
The States Parties shall make the fullest possible efforts to provide assistance.
11. Ifthe information availablefromthe ongoing investigationor other reliable
sourceswouldgivesuftïcientproof that there are victimsof useof chemicalweapons
and immediate action is indispensable, the Director-General shall notify al1States
Parties and shall take emergency measures of assistance, usingthe resources the
Conference has placed at his disposa1for suchcontingencies.The Director-General
shall keep the Executive Councilinformed of actions undertaken pursuant to this
paragraph. ArticleXI
Article XI
ECONOM AICD TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
1. The provisionsof this Convention shall beimplemented in a manner which
avoidshampering the economicor technological developmentof StatesParties, and
international coooeration in the field of chemical .activities f.r .uruoses not
prohibited under this Convention includingthe international exchangeof scientific
and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production,
processing or useof chemicalsforpurposes not prohibited under this convention.
2. Subject to the provisionsof this Convention and without prejudiceto the
principles and applicable rules of international law, the States Parties shall:
(a) Have the right, individuallyor collectively,to conduct research with, to
develop, produce, acquire, retain, transfer, and use chemicals;
Undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest
possibleexchangeof chemicals,equipment and scientific and technicalinformation
relatingto the developmentand applicationofchemistryforurposesnot prohibited
under this Convention;
(c) Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, includingthose in any
international agreements, incompatiblewith the obligationsundertakennder this
Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the development and
promotion of scientificand technological knowledgein the field of chemistry for
industrial,agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful
purposes;
(d) Not use thisConvention asgroundsfor applyinganymeasures other than
those provided for, or permitted, under this Convention nor use any other
internationalagreementfor pursuingan objectiveinconsistentwiththis Convention;
(e) Undertake to review their existing national regulations in the field of
trade in chemicals inorder to render them consistentwith the object and purpose
of this Convention.Convention
Article XII
MEASURE TS REDRESS A SITUATIONAND TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE.
INCLUDINGSANCTIONS
. .
1. The Conference shall take the necessary measures, as set forth in
paragraphs 2,3 and 4, to ensure compliance with thisConvention and to redress
and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisionsof this Convention. In
considering action pursuant to this paragraph, the Conference shall take into
account al1information and recommendations on the issues submitted by the
Executive Council.
2. .In caseswhere a State Party has been requested bythe Executive Council
to take measures to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its
compliance,and where the State Partyfailsto fulfilthe request within the specified
time, the Conference may, intealia,upon the recommendation of the Executive
Council, restrict or suspend the State Party's rights and privilegesder this
Convention until it undertakes the necessaryaction to conformwith its obligations
under this Convention.
3. In caseswhere seriousdamageto theobjectandpurposeof thisConvention
mayresult fromactivitiesprohibitedunder this Convention,in particular byArticle
1,the Conference may iecommend collective measures to States parties in^
Gnformity with international law.
4. The Conference shall, in cases of particular gravity, bring the issue,
including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United
Nations General Assemblyand the United Nations SecurityCouncil.
Article XiII
RELATIO TO OTHER INTERNAnONAL AGREEMENTS
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way
limitingor detractingfrom the obligations assumedby anyState under the Protowl
for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of BacteriologicalMethods of Warfare, signed atGeneva on7June 192.5,and
under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, signed at London, Moscowand Washingtonon 10 April 1972. Article XIV
Article XN
1. Disputes that may arise concerningthe application or the interpretation
of this Convention shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of
this Conventionand in conformitywith the provisionsof the Charter of the United
Nations.
2. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, or between
one or more States Parties and the Organization, relating to the interpretation or
application of this Convention, the parties concerned shall consult together with
a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other
peaceful means of the parties' choice, includingrecourse to appropriate organs of
thisConventionand,by mutualconsent,referralto the International Court of Justice
in conformitywith the Statute of the Court. The States Parties involvedshall keep
the Executive Councilinformed of actions being taken.
3. The Executive Councilmay contribute to the settlement of a dispute by
whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling
upon the States Parties to a dispute to start the settlementrocess of their choice
and rewmmending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
4. The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by
States Parties or brought to itsattention bythe Executive Council.The Conference
shall, as it finds necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to the
settlement of these disputes in conformitywith Article VIII, paragraph 21 (f).
5. The Conference and the Executive Council are separately empowered,
subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to
request the International Court of Justice to given advisoryopinion on any legal
question arisingwithinthe scopeof the activitiesofthe Organization.An agreement
between the Organization and the United Nations shall be concluded for this
purpose in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 34 (a).
6. This Article is without prejudice to Article IX or to the provisions on
measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions.Convention
ArticleXV
1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any State
Party may also propose changes, as specifiedin paragraph 4, to the Annexes of this
Convention. Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures in
paragraphs 2 and 3. Proposals for changes, as specified in paragraph 4, shall be
subject to the procedures in paragraph 5.
2. The text of a proposed amendment shall be submitted to the
Director-General for circulation toal1States Parties and.to the Depositaty. The
proposed amendment shallbe considered onlybyan Amendment Conference. Such
an Amendment Conference shall be convened if one third or more of the States
Partiesnotify the Director-General not later than 30 days after its circulation that
they support further wnsideration of the proposal. The Amendment Conference
shail be held immediatelyfollowinga regular session of the Conference unless the
requesting States Parties ask for an earlier meeting. In no case shallan Amendment
Conference be held less than 60 days after the circulation of the proposed
amendment.
3. Amendments shall enter into force for al1States Parties 30 days after
deposit of the instruments of ratification or acceptance byl1the States Parties
referred tounder subparagraph (b) below:
(a) When adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a
majority of al1States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote; and
(b) Ratified or accepted by ail those States Parties casting a positive vote
at the Amendment Conference.
4. In order to ensure the viabiliiyand the effectivenessof this Convention,
provisionsin the Annexes shallbe subject to changes in accordance with paragraph
5, if proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or technical
nature. Al1changes to the Annex on Chemicals shall be made in accordance with
paragraph 5. Sections A and C of the Confidentiality Annex, Part X of the
VerificationAnnex, and those definitions in Part 1of the Verification Annexwhich
relate exclusively to challenge inspections, shall not be subject to changes in
accordance with paragraph 5.
5. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 4 shallbe made in accordance
with the followingprocedures:
The text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted together with the
(a)
necessary information to the Director-General. Additional information for the Article XV
evaluation of the proposal may be provided by any State Party and the
Director-General. The Director-General shall promptly communicate any such
proposals and information to al1States Parties, the Executive Council and the
Depositaxy;
Not later than 60 days after its receipt, the.Director-General shall
evaluate the proposal to determine al1its possibleconsequences forthe provisions
of this Convention and its implementation and shall communicate any such
information to al1States Parties and the Executive Council;
The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of ail
information availableto it, includingwhether the proposa1fulfilsthe requirements
of paragraph 4.Not later than 90 daysafter its receipt, the ExecutiveCouncilshall
notify its recommendation, with appropriate explanations,to al1States Parties for
consideration. States Parties shallacknowledgereceipt within 10 days;
(d) If the Executive Council recommends to al1States Parties that the
proposa1be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party objects to
it within 90days after receipt of the recommendation. If the Executive Council
recommendsthatthe proposalbe rejected,itshallbe consideredrejected ifno State
Party objects to the rejection within90 days after receipt of the recommendation;
(e) If a recommendation of the Executive Councildoes not meet with the
acceptance required under subparagraph (d), a decisionon the proposal, including
whether it fulfils the requirements of paragraph 4, shall be taken as a matter of
substance by the Conference at its next session;
(f) The Director-General shall notify al1States Parties and the Depositary
of any decision under this paragraph;
(g) Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for al1
StatesParties 180daysafter the date of notificationbythe Director-General of their
approval unless another time period is recommended by the Executive Councilor
decided by thè Conference.Convention
ArticleXCiI
DURATIO AND WITHDRAWAL
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercisingitsnational sovereignty,have the right
to withdraw from this Convention if itides that extraordinary events, related
to the subject-matter of this Convention, havejeopardized the supreme interests
of its country.It shall givenotice ofthdrawal90 daysin advance to al1other
States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations
Security Council.ch notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events
it regards as havingjeopardized its supreme interests.
3. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in anyway
affect the duty of States to continueillingthe obligations assumed under any
relevantrules of international law, particularly the Geneva Pro1925. of
ArticleXi41
STATU O FTHEANNEXES
The Annexes form an integral part of this Convention. Any reference to this
Convention includes the Annexes.
ArticleXMII
SIGNATURE
This Convention shabe open for signature for al1States before its entry into
force.
ArticleXZX
RATTFICATION
This Convention shallbe subject to ratification byStates Signatories according
to their respective constitutional processes. ArticleXXII
Article XY
ACCESSION
Any State which does not sign this Convention before its entry into force may
accede to it at any time thereafter.
ArticleXXI
ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. This Convention shall enterinto force 180daysafterthedate of the deposit
of the 65th instrument of ratification, but in no caseier than two years after
itsopening for signature.
2. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited
subsequent to the entry into force 'ofthis Convention, it shall enter into force on
the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or
accession.
ArticleXII
RESERVATIONS
The Articles of this Convention shallnot be subject to reservations. The
Annexes of this Convention shall not be subject toe~ations incompatible with
itsobject and purpose.Convention
ArticleXXZZZ
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the
Depositary of this Convention and shainte alia:
(a) Promptly inform al1signatory and acceding States of the date of each
signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and
thedate ofthe entryintoforce ofthisConvention,and oftheceipt ofother notices;
(b) Transmit dulycertified copies of this Convention to the Govemments of
al1signatory and acceding States; and
(c) Register this Convention pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
ArticleXXN
This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
INWITNESSWHEREOF the undersigned,being dulyauthorized to that effect, have
signed this Convention.
DONE at Paris on the thirteenth day of January, one thousand nine hundred
and ninety-three. AnnexonCbemicals
ANNEX ON CHEMICALS
CONTENTS
Page
A. GUIDEIJNE~ FOR SCHEDULESOF CHEMICALS ................................ . .48 .
B. SCHEDUL EFSCHEMICALS ............................. .........................50...AnnexonChernicals
k GUIDELINE FOR SCHEDULES OF CHEMICALS
Guidelinesfor Schedule1
1. The followingcriteria shall be taken into account in wnsidering whether
a toxic chemical or precursor should be included in Schedule 1:
(a) It has been developed, produkd, stockpiledor used as a chemicalweapon
as defined in Article II;
(b) It poses otherwisea high riskto the object and purpose of this Convention
by virtue of its high potential for use in activitiesprohibited under this Convention
because one or more of the followingconditions are met:
(i) It possesses a chemical structure closely related to that of other toxic
chemicals listed in Schedule 1, and has, or can be expected to have,
wmparable properties;
(ii) It possesses such lethal or incapacitating toxicity as well as other
properties that would enable it tobe used as a chemical weapon;
(iii) It may be used as a precursor in the final single technologicalstage of
production of a toxicchemical listedin Schedule 1, regardless ofwhether
this stage takes place in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere;
(c) It has little or no use for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.
Guidelinesfor Schedule2
2. The followingcriteria shall be taken into account in considering whether
a toxic chemical not listedin Schedule 1 or a precursor to a Schedule 1 chemical
or to a chemical listed in Schedule 2, part A, should be included in Schedule 2:
(a) It poses a significant riskto the object and purpose of this Convention
because it possessessuch lethal or incapacitatingtoxicityaswell as other properties
that wuld enable it to be used as a chemicalweapon;
(b) It maybe used as a precursor in one of the chemical reactions at the final
stage of formation of a chemical listed in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2, part A;
(c) It poses a significant risk to the object and purpose of this Convention
byvirtue of its importance in the production of a chemical listed inSchedule 1 or
Schedule 2, part A; (d) It is not produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention.
Guidelinesfor Schedule3
3. The followingcriteria shall be taken into account in considering whether
a toxicchemical or precursor, not listed in other Schedules, shouldbe included in
Schedule 3:
(a) It has been produced, stockpiled or used as a chernical weapon;
(b) It poses otherwise a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention
because it possessessuchlethal or incapacitatingtoxicityaswell as other properties
that might enable it to be used as a chemicalweapon;
(c) It poses a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention by virtue of
its importance in the production of one or more chemicalslisted in Schedule 1or
Schedule 2, part B;
(d) It rnay be produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention.Annex on Chernicals
The following Schedules list toxic chemicals and their precursors. For the
purpose of implementing this Convention, these Schedules identify chemicalsfor
the application of verification measures according to the provisions of the
Verification Annex. Pursuant to ArticleII,subparagraph 1 (a), these Schedules do
not constitute a definition of chemical weapons.
(Whenever reference is made to groups of dialkylated chemicals, followedby
a list of alkyl groups in parentheses, al1 chemicals possible by al1 possible
combinations of alkyl groups listed in the parentheses are consideredas listed in
the respective Schedule as long as they are not explicitly exempted. A chemical
marked "*" on Schedule 2, part A, is subject to special thresholds for declaration
and verification, as specified in Part1 of the Verification Annex.)
Schedule 1
(CAS regisrrnumber)
A. Toxicchemicals:
(1) O-Alkyl (sCio, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates
e.g. Sarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (107-44-8)
Soman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate (96-64-0)
(2) O-Alkyl (s CIO,incl. cycloalkyl)N,N-dialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidocyanidates
e.g. Tabun: O-Ethyl N,N-dimethyl
phosphoramidocyanidate
(3) O-Alkyl (H or =CIO, incl. cycloalbl) S-Zdialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonothiolates and
corresponding alkylated or protonated salts
e.g. VX: O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl
methyl phosphonothiolate (4) Sulfur mustards:
2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulfide
Mustard gas: Bis(2-chloroethy1)sulfide
Bis(2-chloroethy1thio)methane
Sesquimustard: 1,2-Bis(2-ch1oroethylthio)ethane
1,3-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane
1,4-Bis(2-chloroethy1thio)-n-butane
1,5-Bis(2-chloroethy1thio)-n-pentane
Bis(2-chloroethylthiomethyl)ether
O-Mustard: Bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether
(5) Lewisites:
Lewisite1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine
Lewisite2: Bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine
Lewisite 3: Tris(2-chloroviny1)arsine
(6) Nitrogen mustards:
HN1: Bis(2-ch1oroethyl)ethylamine
HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine
HN3: Tris(2-chloroethy1)amine
(7) Saxitoxin
(8) Ricin
B. Precursors:
(9) Aikyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonyldifluorides
e.g. DF: Methylphosphonyldifluoride
(10) O-Aikyl(H or SCio, incl. cycloalkyl)O-Zdialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethylalkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites and
corresponding alkylated or protonated salts
e.g. QL: O-Ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl
methylphosphonite
(11) Chlorosarin: O-Isopropymethylphosphonochloridate
(12) Chlorosoman:O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonochlondateAnnexonChemicals
Schedule2
A. Toxicchemicals:
(1) Amit0.n: 0,O-Diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl]
phosphorothiolate
and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts
(2) PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethy1)-
1-propene
(3) BZ: 3-Quinuclidinylbenzilate (*)
B. Precursors:
(4) Chemicals, exceptfor those listed in Schedule 1,
containing a phosphoms atom to which is bonded
one methyl, ethyl or propyl (normal or iso) group
but not further carbon atoms,
e.g. Methylphosphonyl dichloride
Dimethyl methylphosphonate
Exemption: Fonofos: O-Ethyl S-phenyl
ethylphosphonothiolothionate
(5) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidic
dihalides
(6) Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates
(7) Arsenic trichloride
(8) 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydro aciyacetic
(9) Quinuclidin-3-01
(10) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethyl-2-
chlorides and corresponding protonated salts
(11) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-01s
and corresponding protonated salts
Exemptions: N,N-Dimethylaminoethanol
and corresponding protonated salts
N,N-Diethylaminoethanol
and corresponding protonated salts N,N-Dialkyl(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-
thiols and corresponding protonated salts
Thiodiglycol: Bis(2-hydroxyethy1)sulfide
(14) Pinawlyl alcohol: 3,3-Dimethylbutan-2-01
Schedule 3
A. Toxicchemicals:
(1) Phosgene: Carbonyl dichloride
(2) Cyanogen chloride
(3) Hydrogen cyanide
(4) Chloropicrin: Trichloronitromethane
B. Precursors:
Phosphorus oxychloride
Phosphorus trichloride
Phosphorus pentachloride
Trimethylphosphite
Triethylphosphite
Dimethyl phosphite
Diethyl phosphite
Sulfur monochloride
Sulfur dichloride
Thionyl chloride
Ethyldiethanolamine
Methyldiethanolamine
TriethanolamineVerificationAnnex
ANNEX ON IMPLEMENTATION AND VERIFICATION
("VEIUFI~ON ANNEX")
CONTENTS
Page
PART II: GENERA LULES OF VERIFICATION
k DESIGNA~O NF INSPECïûRS AND
INSPECTION ASSISTANTS ..............
B. PRIVILEGE ASND IMMUNITIES..............;..........................67..................
C. STANDIN GRRANGEMENTS ..........................................69..............................
Points of en 69
Arrangements for use of non-scheduled aircraft...................70............
Administrative arrangements 71
Approved equipment 71
D. PRE-INSPECTI O NTIVI~ES..... ....................................72.............
Notification 72
Entry into the territory of the inspected State Party
or Host State and transfer to the inspection site 73
Pre-inspection briefin...........................................73....
73
74
. .
Communications ................................................74.....................................
Inspection team and inspected State Party rights 74
Collection, handling and analysis of sample.......................5..
Extension of inspection duration 77
Debriefing 77 Page
Pm III:GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR VERINCATION MEASURES
PURSUAh'T M ARTICL IVE,S AND VI. PARAGRAPH 3
k ~NITIALINSPECiïONS AND FACiLITY AGREEMENTS.......................79..............
B. STANDIN GRRANGEMENTS ........................................80..............................
...
PART IV (A):DESTRUC~O NF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ITS
VEIUFICAnON PURSUANT TO AI(T1CI.EIV
A . DECLARATIO N..................................................82................
......................
Chemical weapons .............................................82.........................
............
Declarations of chemicalweapons pursuant to
Article III. paragraph1 (a) (iii................................84........................
Declarations of past transfers and receip.......................84................
Submission of the general plan for destruction of
chemical weapons ..............................................85........................
...........
B . MEASURE TO SECURE THE STORAGE FACILITY AND
STORAGE FACILITYPREPARATiON...............................
Principles and methods for destruction of
chemical weapons ..............................................86........................
.............
Order of destruction ...........................................86...........................
........
Modification of intermediate destruction deadline...............88..........
Extension of the deadline for completion
of destruction..................................................89....................
...................
Detailed annual plans for destructio............................90..................
Annual reports on destruction ..................................92...........................
D. VERIFICATIO .....................................................92................
.........................
Verificat'ionof declarations of chemicalweapons
through on-site inspectio.......................................92...........................
Systematicverification of storage facili........................92.................
. .
Inspections and visit...........................................93...........................
.......
Systematicverification of the destruction of
chemical weapons .............................................
Chemical weapons storagefacilitiesat chemical
weapons destruction facilities..................................97...........................
Systematic on-site verificationasures at chemical
weapons destruction facilities..................................97...........................Veriîication Annex
Page
PARTIV (B): OLD CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ABANDONED CHEMICAL WEAPONS
A. GENERAL .............. ... .............................................99.......................
REGIME FOR OLD CHEMICAL WEAPONS ........................... .. ...99.. ..
B.
C. REGIME FOR ABANDONW CHEMICAL WEAPONS .............. ...00
PART V: DESTR~&ON OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACI-ES
AND ITS VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE V
Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities ............103...
Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities
pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (iii) .105
Declarations of past transfers and receipts .........................105............
Submission of general plans for destruction ........................106...........
Subrnissionof annual plans for destmction and
annual reports on destmction 106
B. DESTRUC~O ...........................................................107...............
General principles for destruction of chernicalweapons
production facilities ............... ... .............107.
Principles and methods for closure of a chemical weapons
production facility ....................................................107................
Technical maintenance of chernicalweapons production
faciiities prior totheir destmction ..................................108..................
Principles and methods for temporary conversion of chemical
weapons producti...facilities into chemical weapons
destmction facilities ...................... ...........................108.............
Principles and methods related to destmction of a
chemical weapons production facility 110
Order of destruction 110
Detailed plans for destmction 111
Review of detailed plans 113
Verification of declarations of chemical weapons production
facilities through on-site inspection ........ 114 Contents
Page
C. VERlFICATIO (continued)
Systematic verificationof chernicalweapons production
facilities and cessation of their activities...........................115.............
Verification of destruction of chemical weapons
production facilities .................................................116........
Verification of temporary conversion of a chernicalweapons
production facility into a chernicalweapons destruction facility ...116
D. CONVERSIO OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCnON FACILITIES
TO PURPOSES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER ms CONVENTIO ........... ..117
Procedures for requesting conversion ... .. ...... . ...............117
Actions pending a decision 119
Conditions for conversion 120
Decisions by the Executive Council and the Conference ..........120
Detailed plans for conversion 121
Review of detailed plans 122
Pm VI: Acnm~s NOT PROHIBITEDUNDER THIS CONVENTION
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE VI:
REGIME FOR SCHEDUL 1ECHEMICALSAND FACILITIES
RELATED TO SUCH CHEMICALS
General principles for production
Single srnall-scale facility
Other facilities
D. DECLARATIO .N.S... .................................................126.... ..
Single small-scalefacility ...........................................126....
Other facilities referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11 ..............127......
Single small-scalefacility ... .. .. ........................ .. .... 129
Other facilities referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11 ...............129.....VerificationAnnex
Page
PART VII:A~TIEs NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THISCONVENTION
INACCORDANCE wm ARTICLV EI:
REGIME FOR SCHEDUL E CHEMICALS AND FAClLITIES
RELATED TO SUCH CHEMICALS
A. DECLARATION 131
Declarations of aggregate national data 131
Declarations of plant sites producing, processing or
consuming Schedule 2 chernicals 131
Declarations on past production of Sched2le
chernicals for chernical weapons purp............. .133
Information to States Parties 134
B. VERIFKATION 134
134
135
Initial inspecti..........................................135...........................
............
Inspections 136
Inspection procedures 136
Notification of inspectio 137
C. TRANSFER TO STATE SOT Pm TO THISCONVENTIO N..........138.......
PART vin: Acnm~s NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION
IN ACCORDANCE wm ARTICLE VI:
REGIME FOR SCHEDUL E CHEMICALS AND FACILiTIES
RELATED TO SUCH CHEMICALS
A. DECLARATIONS 139
Declarations of aggregate national ................. ..139
Declarations of plant sites producing Schedule 3 che......139..
Declarations on past production of Schedule 3 chernicals
141
Information to States Parties 141
141
141
142
142
Notification of inspectio 143
C. TRANsFERs TO STATE SOT PARTY TO THISCONVENTIO N..........144.... Contents
Page
Pm E: AC~NITIES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE VI:
REGIME FOR OTHER CHEMICAL PRODUCïiON FACILiTIES
A. DECLARATIO ...S.. ......................................................,..145
List of other chemical production facilities ...........................145
Assistance by the TechnicalSecretariat
146
Information to States Parties 146
B. VERIFICATIO 146
Gener 146
Inspection aims ............................................................147..............
Inspection procedures 147
Notification of inspection 148
C. IMPLEMENTA~ ONND REVIEW OF SECTION B ..... ..... ... ..... ......148... ....
Implementation .................. .........................................148.
Review .......... .............................. .... . .................,...149....
PART X: CHALLENG IESPECïïONS PURSUANT ï0 ARTICLE IX
A. DESIGNAIIO ANND SELECTION OF INSPE~ORS AND
INSPECTION ASSISTANTS ....... .........................
Notification ...............................................................,.150.
Entry into the territory of the inspected State Party
or the Host State ..........................................................152
Alternative determination of final perimeter .... ...................153
Verification of location ............... ...................................154..............
Securing the site, exit monitoring .............................. ........154...............
Pre-inspection briefing and inspection plan ............................155...
. ..
Perimeter activities .......................................................156..........
General rules ..............................................................156.....
158
159
Duration of inspection 160VerficationAnnex
Page
......................160..............
Departure ....................................................160.................
.........................
Reports.......................................................160..............
.............................
PART XI. ~NVESTIGATIONSIN CASESOF ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICALWEAPONS
Requestfor an investigatio...................................162.....................
162
Assignmentof inspection team 163
Dispatchof inspectionteam 163
163
Extensionof mspectionsite
Extensionof inspection duration...............................165.......................
Interviews....................................................165.................
......................
Procedures ...................................................165.................
Contents .....................................................165................
......................
E. STATE SOT PARTY TO THISCONVENTI ..........................166.............. ... Part 1
.. ..
1. "ApprovedEquipment" means the devicesand instruments necessaryfor
the performance of the inspection team's duties that have been'krtified by the
Technical Secretariat in acwrdance with regulations prepared by the Technical
Secretariat pursuant to Part II, paragraph 27 of this Annex. Such equipment may
also refer to the administrative suppliesor recording materialsthat would be used
by the inspection team.
2. "Building"as referred to in the definitionof chemicalweaponsproduction
facility in Article II wmprises specialized buildingsand standard buildings.
(a) "Specialized Building"means:
(i) Any building, including underground structures, containing
specialized equipment in a production or fillingconfiguration;
(ii) Any building, includingunderground structures,whichhas distinctive
features which distinguish it from buildings normally used for
chemical production or filling activities not prohibited under this
Convention.
(b) "Standard Building" means any building, including underground
structures, wnstructed to prevailingindustry standards for facilitiesnot producing-
any chemical specified in -&ticle G, parag&ph 8 (a) (i), or wrrosive chemicais.
3. "Challenge Inspection"means the inspectionof any facilityor location in
the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or wntrol of a State Party
requested by another State Party pursuant to Article IX, paragraphs 8 to 25.
4. "Discrete Organic Chemical" means any chemical belongingto the class
of chemicalwmpounds consistingof al1wmpounds of carbon exceptfor its oxides,
sulfidesand rnetalcarbonates, identifiablebychemicalname, bystructural formula,
if known, and by Chemical Abstracts Service registxynumber, if assigned.
5. "Equipment" as referred to in the definition of chemical weapons
production facility in Article II comprises specialized equipment and standard
equipment.
(a) "Specialized Equipment" means: (i) The main production train, including any reactor or equipment for
product synthesis, separation or purification, any equipment used
duectly for heat transfer in the final technologid stage, such as in
reactors or in product separation, as well as any other equipment
which has been in contact with any chemical specifiedin Article II,
paragraph 8 (a) (i), or would be in contact with such a chemical if
the facilitywere operated;
(ii) Any chemical weapon filling machines;
(iii) Any other equipment specially designed, built or installed for the
operation of the facility as a chemical weapons production facility,
as distinct from a facility constructed according to pr.evailing
commercial industry standards for facilities not producing any
chemical specified in Article II, paragraph 8 (a) (i), or corrosive
chemicals, such as: equipment made of high-nickel alloysor other
special corrosion-resistant material; special equipment for waste
control, waste treatment, air filtering, or solvent recovery; special
containment enclosures and safety shields; non-standard laborato~y
equipment used to analyse toxic chemicals for chemical weapons
purposes; custom-designed process control panels; or dedicated
spares for specialized equipment.
(b) "Standard Equipment" means:
(i) Production equipment whichisgenerally usedinthe chemical industry
and is not included in the types of specialized equipment;
(ii) Other equipment commonly used in the chemid industry, such as:
fire-fighting equipment; guard and security/safety surveillance
equipment; medicalfacilities,laboratory facilities;or communications
equipment.
6. "Facility" in the context of Article VI means any of the industrial sites
as defined below ("plant site","plantn and "unit").
(a) "Plant Site" (Works, Factory)means the local integration of one or more
plants, with anyintermediate administrativelevels,whichare under one operational
control, and includes common infrastructure, such as: Part 1
(i) Administration and other offices;
(ii) Repair and maintenance shops;
(iii) Medical centre;
(N) Utilities;
(v) Central analytical laboratoq;
(vi) Research and development laboratories;
(vii) Central effluent and waste treatment area; and
(viii) Warehouse storage.
(b) "Plant" (Production facility,Workshop) means a relativelyself-contained
area, structure or buildingcontainingone or more unitswith auxiliaryand associated
infrastructure, such as:
(i) Small administrative section;
(ii) Storagehandling areas for feedstock and products;
(iii) Effluenttwaste handlingltreatment area;
(iv) Control/analytical laboratoq;
(v) First aid servicelrelated medical section; and
Records associatedwith the movementinto, around and from the site,
(vi)
of declared chemicals and their feedstock or product chemicals
formed from them, as appropriate.
(c) "Unit" (Production unit, Process unit) means the combination of those
items ofequipment, includingvesselsandvesse1set up, necessaryfor the production,
processing or consumption of a chernical.
7. "FacilityAgreement" means an agreement or arrangement betweena State
Partyand the Organization relating to a specificfacilitysubjectto on-siteverification
pursuant to Articles IV,V and VI.
8. "Host State" means the State on whose territory lie facilities or areas of
another State, Party to this Convention, which are subject to inspection under this
Convention.
9. "In-Countq Escort" means individuals specified by the inspected State
Party and, ifappropriate, bythe Host State, if they sowish,to accompanyand assist
the inspection team during the in-country period.VerificationAnnex
10. "In-Country Period" means the period from the arriva1of the inspection
team at a point of entry until its departure from the State at a point of entry.
11. "Initial Inspection" means the first on-site inspection of facilitiesto verify
declarations submitted pursuant to Articles III, IV, V and VI and this Annex.
12. "Inspected State Party" means the State Party on whose territory or in any
other place under its jurisdiction or control an inspection pursuant to this
Convention takes place, or the State Party whose facilityor area on the territory
of a Host State issubject to such an inspection; itdoes not, however, include the
State Party specified in Part II, paragraph 21 of this Annex.
13. "Inspection Assistant" means an individual designated by the Technical
Secretariat as setforth in Part II, Section A, of this Annex to assist inspectors in
an inspection or visit,such as medical, security and administrative personnel and
interpreters.
14. "Inspection Mandate" means the instructions issued by the
Director-General to the inspection team for the conduct of a particular inspection.
15. "Inspection Manuai" means the compilation of additional procedures for
the conduct of inspections developed by the Technical Secretariat.
16. "Inspection Site"meansanyfacilityorarea atwhichan inspectioniscarried
out andwhich isspecificallydefined inthe respective facilityagreement or inspection
request or mandate or inspection request as expanded by the alternative or final
perimeter.
17. "Inspection Team"means the group of inspectorsand inspection assistants
assigned by the Director-General to conduct a particular inspection.
18. "Inspector" means an individual designated by the Technical Secretariat
according to the procedures as set forth in Part II, Section A, of this Annex, to
cany out an inspection or visit inaccordance with this Convention.
19. "Mode1Agreement" means a document specifyingthe general fonn and
content for an agreement concluded between a State Party and the Organization
for fulfilling the verification provisions specifiedin this Annex.
20. "Observer" means a representative of a requesting State Party or a third
State Party to observe a challenge inspection. Part 1
21. "Perimeter" in case of challenge inspectionmeans the extemai boundary
of the inspection site, defined by either geographic coordinates or description on
a map.
(a) "Requested Perimeter" means the inspectionsite perimeter asspecified
in conformity withPart X, paragraph 8, of this Annex;
(b) "AlternativePerimeter" means the inspectionsite perimeter as specified,
alternatively to the requested perimeter, by the inspected State Party; it shall
conform to the requirements specified in Part X, paragraph 17, of this Annex;
(c) "Final Perimeter" means the final inspectionsite perimeter as agreed in
negotiations between the inspection team and the inspected State Party, in
accordance with Part X, paragraphs 16 to 21, of this Annex;
(d) "Declared Perimeter" means the external houndary of the facility
declared pursuant to Articles III, IVV and VI.
22. "Period of Inspection", forthe purposes of Article IX, means the period
of time from provision ofaccessto the inspection team to the inspection site until
its departure from the inspection site,exclusiveof time spent on briefings before
and after the verification activities.
23. "Period of Inspection",for the purposes of Articles IV, and VI, means
the period of time from arriva1of the inspection team at the inspection site until
its departure from the inspection site,exclusiveof time spent on briefingsbefore
and after the verification activities.
24. "Point of Entry"/"Point of Exit" means a location designated for the
in-country arrivai of inspection teams for inspectionspursuant to this Convention
or for their departure after completion of their mission.
25. "Requesting State Party" means a State Party which has requested a
challenge inspection pursuant to Article IX.
26. "Tome" means metric ton, i.e. 1,00 0g.VenficationAnnex
A. DESIGNATI O N INSPECïORS AND INSPECI'iONASSISTANTS
1. Not later than 30 days after entry into force of this Convention the
TechnicalSecretariat shall communicate, in writing,tol1States Parties the names,
nationalities and ranks of the inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for
designation, as well as a description of their qualificationsand professional
experiences.
2. Each State Party shall immediately acknowledge receipt of the list of
inspectors and inspection assistants, proposed for designation communicated to it.
The State Party shall inform the TechnicalSecretariat in writing of its acceptance
of each inspector and inspection assistant, not later than 30 days after
acknowledgement of receipt of the list. Any inspector and inspection assistant
included in this list shall be regarded as designated unless a State Party, not later
than 30daysafter acknowledgementofreceipt ofthe list,declaresitsnon-acceptance
in writing. The State Party may include the reason for the objection.
In the case of non-acceptance, the proposed inspector or inspection assistant
shdl not undertake or participate in verificationactivitieson the territory or in any
other place under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party which has declared
its non-acceptance. The Technical Secretariat shall, as necessary, submit further
proposais in addition to the original list.
3. Verification activitiesder this Convention shall only be performed by
designated inspectors and inspection assistants.
4. Subject to the provisionsof paragrap5,a State Party has the right at any
time to object to an inspector or inspection assistant who has already been
designated. It shall notifythe TechnicalSecretariat ofs objection in writing and
may include the reason for the objection. Such objection shall come into effect
30 days after receipt by the TechnicalSecretariat. The TechnicalSecretariat shall
immediately inform the State Party concerned of the withdrawalof the designation
of the inspector or inspection assistant.
5. A State Party that has been notifiedan inspection shailnot seek to have
removed from the inspection team for that inspection any of the designated
inspectors or inspection assistants named in the inspectionarn list.
6. The number of inspectors or inspection assistants accepted by and
designated to a State Party must be suEcient to allowfor availabilityand rotation
of appropriate numbers of inspectors and inspection assistants. 7. If,in the opinionof the Director-General, the non-acceptanceof proposed
inspectors or inspection assistantsimpedes the designation of a sufficientnumber
of inspectors or inspection assistantsor otherwisehampers the effectivefulfilment
of thetasks of the TechnicalSecretariat, the Director-General shall refer the issue
to theExecutive Council.
8. Whenever amendments to the above-mentioned lists of inspectors and
inspection assistants are necessary or requested, replacement inspectors and
inspectionassistants shallbe de-ignatedin theamemanner assetforthwithrespect
to ihe initial list.
9. The members of the inspectionteam carryingout an inspectionof a facility
of a State Party located on the territory of another State Party shallbe designated
in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Annex as applied both to the
inspected State Party and the Host State Party.
B. PRMLEGES AND IMMUNITIES
10. Each State Party shall,not later than 30 days after acknowledgementof
receipt of the list of inspectors and inspection assistants or of changes thereto,
provide multipleentrylexitandior transit visasand other suchdocumentsto enable
each inspector or inspection assistant to enter and to remain on the territory of
that State Party for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities. These
documentsshallbe validfor at least twoyears after their provisionto the Technical
Secretariat.
11. Toexercisetheir functions effectively,inspectorsand inspection assistants
shall be accorded privileges and immunities as set forth in subparagraphs (a)to
(i) Privilegesand immunities shallbe granted to members of the inspection team
for the sake of this Convention and not for the persona1benefit of the individuals
themselves.Suchprivilegesand immunities shallbe accordedto them forthe entire
period between arrivai onand departure from the territory of the inspected State
Party or Host State, and thereafter with respect to acts previouslyperformed in
the exercise of theirofficialfunctions.
(a) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the inviolability
enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Conventionon
Diplomatic Relations of 18April 1961.
(b) The livingquarters and office premises occupiedbythe inspection team
carryingout inspection activitiespursuant to this Conventionshall be accordedthe
inviolabilityand protection accordedto the premisesof diplomaticagents pursuant
to Article30, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventionon Diplomatic Relations.VerüïcationAnnex
(c) The papers and correspondence,includingrecords, ofthe inspectionteam
shallenjoythe inviolabilityaccorded to al1papers and correspondence of diplomatic
agents pursuant to Article30,paragraph 2,ofthe Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations. The inspection team shall have the right to use codes for their
communications with the TechnicalSecretariat.
(d) Samples and approved equipment carried by members of the inspection
team shall be inviolable subject to provisions contained in this Convention and
exempt from al1 customs duties. Hazardous samples shall be transported in
accordance with relevant regulations.
(e) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the immunities
accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
(B The members of the inspection team carrying out prescribed activities
pursuant to this Convention shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes
accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations.
The members of the inspection team shall be permitted to bring into the
(g)
territory of the inspected State Party or Host StateParty,without payrnent of any
customs duties or related charges, articlesfor personal use, with the exception of
articlesthe import orexportofwhichisprohibited bylawor controlled byquarantine
regulations.
The membersof the inspectionteam shallbe accorded the same currency
(h)
and exchange facilities as are accorded to representatives of foreign Govemments
on temporary official missions.
(i) The members of the inspectionteam shallnot engage in any professional
or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected State
Party or the Host State.
12. When transiting the territory of non-inspectedStates Parties, the members
of the inspection team shall be accorded the privilegesand immunities enjoyed by
diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations. Papers and correspondence, including records, and
samples and approved equipment, carried bythem, shallbe accorded the privileges
and immunities set forth in paragraph 11 (c) and (d).
13. Without prejudice to their privilegesand immunities the members of the
inspection team shall be obligedto respect the lawsand regulationsof the inspected
State Party or Host State and, to the extent that is consistent with the inspection
mandate, shall be obliged not to interfere in the interna1 affairs of that State.
If the inspected State Party or Host State Party considers that there has been an
abuse of privileges and immunities specified in this Annex, consultations shall be held between the State Party and the Director-General to determine whether
such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such
an abuse.
14. The immunityfrom jurisdiction of members of the inspection team may
be waivedby the Director-General in those cases whenthe Director-General is of
the opinion that immunity wouldimpede the course of justice and that it can be
waivedwithout prejudicetothe implementationoftheprovisionsofthisConvention.
Waivermust alwaysbe express.
15. Observersshall be accorded the same privilegesand immunitiesaccorded
to inspectors pursuant to this section, except for those accorded pursuant to
pqagraph Il (d).
C. STANDIN ARRANGEMENTS
Points ofenhy
16. Each State Party shalldesignate the points of entry and shall supply the
required information to the TechnicalSecretariat not later than 30 days after this
Convention enters into force for it. These points of entry shall be such that the
inspection team can reach any inspectionsitefromat least onepoint of entrywithin
12hours. Locations of points of entry shallbe provided to al1States Parties by the
TechnicalSecretariat.
17. Each State Party maychange the points of entry by givingnotice of such
change to the TechnicalSecretariat. Changes shall become effective30 days after
the TechnicalSecretariat receivesuchnotificationto allowappropriate notification
to al1States Parties.
18. If the TechnicalSecretariat wnsiders that there are insufficientpoints of
entry for the timelyconduct of inspections or that changes to the points of entry
proposed by a State Party wouldhamper suchtimelyconductof inspections,it shall
enter into consultations with the State Party concerned to resoive the problem.
19. In cases where facilitiesor areas of an inspected State Party are located
on the territory of a Host State Party or where the accessfrom the point of entry
to the facilitiesor areas subject to inspectionrequires transit through the territory
of another State Party, the inspected State Party shall exercisethe rights andil
the obligationsconcerningsuchinspectionsinaccordancewith thisAnnex.The Host
State Partyshallfacilitatethe inspectionofhose facilitiesor areas and shallprovide
for the necessary support to enable the inspection team to carry out its tasks in
a timely and effective manner. States Parties through whose territory transit is
required to inspect facilitiesoreas of an inspectedState Party shallfacilitatesuch
transit. VerificaüonAnnex
20. 'In caseswhere facilities or areas of an inspected State Party are located
.on the territory of a State not Party to this Convention, the inspected State Party
shall take al1necessary measures to ensure that inspections of those facilities or
areas can be carried out in accordancewith the provisionsof this Annex. A State
Party that has one or more faciiitiesor areas on the territory of a State not Party
to this Convention shall take al1necessary measures to ensure acceptance by the
Host State of inspectors and inspection assistants designated to that State Party.
If an inspected State Party is unable to ensure access,it shall demonstrate that it
took all necessary measures to ensure access.
21. In cases where the facilities or areas sought to be inspected are located
on the territory of a State Party, but in a place under the jurisdiction or control
of a State not Party to this Convention, the State Party shall take al1necessary
measures as would be required of an inspected State Party and a Host State Party
to ensure that inspectionsof suchfaciiitiesor areas can be carried out in accordance
with the provisions ofthis Annex. If the State Party is unable to ensure access to
those facilitiesor areas, it shalldemonstrate that it took al1necessarymeasures to
ensure access.This paragraph shall not apply where the facilitiesor areas sought
to be inspected are those of the State Party.
Arrangements for use of non-scheduledaircrafl
22. For inspections pursuant to Article IX and for other inspections where
timely travel is not feasible using scheduled commercial transport, an inspection
team may need to utilize aircraft ownedor chartered by the TechnicalSecretariat.
Not later than30 daysafter this Conventionentersinto force for it, each State Party
shall inform the TechnicalSecretariat of the standingdiplomaticclearance number
for non-scheduled aircrafttransporting inspectionteams and equipment necessary
for inspection into and out of the territory in which an inspection site is located.
Aircraftroutingsto and fromthe designated pointof entryshallbe alongestablished
international airways that are agreed upon between the States Parties and the
TechnicalSecretariat as the basis for such diplomatic clearance.
23. When a non-scheduled aircraft is used, the Technical Secretariat shall
providethe inspectedState Party with a flight plan,through the National Authority,
for the aircraft's flightfrom the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the
State in whichthe inspection site is located to the point of entry, not less than six
hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be
filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation
Organization applicable to civil aircraft. For its owned or chartered flights, the
Technical Secretariat shall include in the remarks section of each flight plan the
standing diplomatic clearancenumber and the appropriate notation identifyingthe
aircraft as an inspection aircraft. 24. Not lessthan three hours before the scheduleddeparture of the inspection
team from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the State in which the
inspectionisto take place,the inspectedStatePartyor Host State Partyshallensure
that the flight plan filed in accordancewith paragraph 23 is approved so that the
inspection team may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arriva1time.
25. The inspected State Party shall provide parking, security protection,
se~cing and fuel as requued by the TechnicalSecretanat for the aircraft of the
inspection team at the point of entry when such aircrafi is owned or chartered by
the TechnicalSecretariat. Suchaircraftshallnot be liablefor landingfees,departure
tax, and similarcharges.The TechnicalSecretariat shall bear the cost of such fuel,
security protection and se~cing.
Administrativearrangements
26. The inspected State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities
necessary for the inspection team.such as communication means, interpretation
seMces to the extent necessaryfor the performance ofinte~iewing and other tasks,
transportation, workingspace, lodging,meals and medicalcare. In this regard, the
inspectedState Partyshallbe reimbursedbythe Organizationfor suchcostsincurred
by the inspection team.
Approved equipment
27. Subjectto paragraph 29,there shallbe no restrictionbythe inspectedState
Party on the inspection team bringing ont0 the inspection site such equipment,
approved in accordance with paragraph 28,which the Technical Secretariat has
determined to be necessary to fulfil the inspection requirements. The Technical
Secretariat shallprepare and, asappropriate, update a listof approved equipment,
whichmay be needed for the purposes described above,and regulationsgoverning
such equipment which shall be in accordance with this Annex. In establishingthe
list of approved equipment and these regulations, the TechnicalSecretariat shail
ensure that safety considerations for al1the types of facilities at which such
equipment is likely to be used, are taken fully into account. A list of approved
equipment shallbe consideredand approved bythe Conferencepursuant to Article
VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
28. The equipment shall be in the custody of the TechnicalSecretariat and
be designated, calibratedand approved bythe TechnicalSecretariat. The Technical
Secretariat shall,to the extent possible, selectthat equipment which is specifically
designed for the specific kind of inspection required. Designated and approved
equipment shall be specificallyprotected against unauthorized alteration.VerifcationAnnex
29. The inspected State Party shall have the right, without prejudice to the
prescribed time-frames,to inspectthe equipment in the presence of inspectionteam
members at the point of entry, Le.,to checkthe identityof the equipment brought
in or removed from the territory of the inspected State Party or the Host State.
To facilitatesuch identification, the TechnicalSecretariat shall attach documents
and devices to authenticate its designation and approval of the equipment. The
inspection of the equipment shall also ascertain to the satisfactionof the inspected
State Party that the equipment meets the description of the approved equipment
for the particular type of inspection. The inspected State Party may exclude
equipment not meetingthat description or equipmentwithoutthe above-mentioned
authentication documents and devices.Procedures for the inspectionof equipment
shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII,
paragraph 21 (i).
30. In cases where the inspection team finds it necessary to use equipment
available on site not belonging to the Technical Secretariat and requests.the
inspectedState Partyto enable the team to use suchequipment, the inspectedState
Party shall complywith the request to the extent it can.
Notification
31. The Director-General shall notifi the State Party before the planned
arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and within the prescribed
tirne-bames, where specified, of its intention to carry out an inspection.
32. Notifications made by the Director-General shall include the following
information:
(a) The type of inspection;
(b) The point of entry;
(c) The date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;
(d) The means of arrival at the point of entry;
(e) The site to be inspected;
(f) The names of inspectors and inspection assistants;
(g) If appropriate, aircraft clearance for special flights. 33. The inspected State Party shail acknowledgethe receipt of a notification
bythe TechnicalSecretariat of an intention to conductan inspection,notlater than
one hour after receipt of such notification.
34. In the case of an inspection of a facilityof a State Party located on the
territory of another State Party,both States Parties shallbe simultaneously notified
in accordance with paragraphs 31 and 32.
Enhy into the temtoryof the ins ected StatePartyor HostStateand transfer
to ti' .nspection site
35. The inspected State Party or Host State Partywhich has been notified of
the arrivai of an inspectioneam, shallensure its immediateentry into the territory
and shallthrough an in-country escortor byother means do everythingin itspower
to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team and its equipment and supplies,
from its point of entry to the inspection site(s) and to a point of exit.
36. The inspected State Party or Host State Party shall, as necessary, assist
the inspection team in reaching the inspection site not later than12 hours after
the arrival at the point of entry.
37. Upon arrival at the inspection site and before the commencementof the
inspection,the inspection team shall be briefed by facilityrepresentatives,with the
aid of maps and other documentation as appropriate, on the facility,theact~ties
carried out there, safety measures and administrative and logistic arrangements
necessaryfor the inspection.The time spent for the briefingshallbe limited to the
minimum necessaryand in any event not exceed three hours.
E. CONDUCI OF INSPECTIONS
Generalrules
38. The members of the inspection team shall discharge their functions in
accordance with the provisionsof this Convention, as well as rules established by
the Director-General and faciiityagreements concluded betweenStates Parties and
the Organization.
39. The inspection team shall strictly observe the inspection mandate issued
bythe Director-General. It shallrefrain from activities going beyond thismandate.
40. The activities of the inspection team shall be so arranged as to ensure
the timely and effective discharge of its functions and the least possible
inwnvenience to the inspected State Party or Host State and disturbance to the
facility or area inspected. The inspection team shall avoid unnecessarily
hampering or delaying the operation of a facility and avoid affecting its safety.Venficaüon Annex
In particular, the inspectionteam shallnot operate anyfacility.If inspectorsconsider
that, to fulfiltheir mandate, particular operations should be carried out in a facility,
they shall request the designated representative of the inspected facility to have
them performed. The representative shall carry out the request to the extent
possible.
41. In the performance of their duties on the territory of an inspected State
Party or Host State, the members of the inspectionteam shall,ifthe inspected State
Party so requests, be accompanied by representatives of the inspected State Party,
but the inspection team must not thereby be delayed or othenvise hindered in the
exercise of its functions.
42. Detailed procedures for the conduct of inspections shallbe developed for
inclusion inthe inspection manual by the TechnicalSecretariat, taking into account
guidelines to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article
VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
43. In carrying out their activities, inspectors and inspection assistants shall
observe safety regulations establishedat the inspection site, includingthose for the
protection of wntrolled environments within a facilityand for personal safety. In
order to implement these requirements, appropriate detailed procedures shall be
considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph
21 (i).
Communications
44. Inspectors shall have the right throughout the in-country period to
communicate with the Headquarters of the TechnicalSecretariat. For this purpose
they may use their own, duly certified, approved equipment and may request that
the inspected State Party or Host State Party provide them with access to other
telecommunications.The inspection team shallhavethe right to use itsowntwo-way
system of radio communications between personnel patrolling the perimeter and
other members of the inspection team.
Zmpectionteam and inspectedState Party rights
45. The inspection team shall, in accordance with the relevant Articles and
Annexes of this Convention as well as with facilityagreements and procedures set
forth in the inspectionmanual, havethe right to unimpeded accessto the inspection
site. The items to be inspected will bechosen by the inspectors.
46. Inspectors shall have the right to interview any facility personnel
in the presence of representatives of the inspected State Party with the PartII
purpose of establishingrelevant facts.Inspectors shallonlyrequest information and
data whichare necessaryfor the conduct of the inspection,and the inspected State
Party shall furnish such information upon request. Thc inspected State Party shall
havethe right toobjectto questionsposed to the facilitypersonnel ifthose questions
are deemed not relevantto the inspection.Ifthe head ofthe inspection team objects
and Statestheir relevance,the questionsshall be provided in writingto the inspected
State Partyfor reply.The inspectionteam maynote anyrefusalto permit interviews
or to allow questions to be answered and any explanationsgiven, in that part of
the inspection report that deals with the cooperation of the inspected State Party.
47. Inspectors shall havethe right to inspect documentation and records they
deem relevant to the conduct of their mission.
48. Inspectors shall havethe right to have'photographs taken at their request
by representatives of the inspected State Party or of the inspected facility. The
capabilityto take instant development photographie prints shall be available.The
inspection team shall determine whether photographs conformto those requested
and,ifnot, repeat photographsshallbe taken. The inspectionteam and the inspected
State Party shall each retain one copy of every photograph.
49. The representatives of the inspected State Party shall havethe right to
observe al1verification activities carried out by the inspection team.
50. The inspected State Party shall receive copies, at its request, of the
information and data gathered about its facility(ies)by the TechnicalSecretariat.
51. Inspectors shall have the right to request clarifications inwnnection with
ambiguities that arise during an inspection. Such requests shallbe made promptly
through the representative of the inspected State Party. The representative of the
inspected State Party shall provide the inspection team, during the inspection, with
suchclarificationasmaybe necessaryto removethe ambiguity.Ifquestions relating
to an object or a building located within the inspection site are not resolved, the
object or building shall,if requested, be photographed for the purpose of clarifying
its nature and function. Ifthe ambiguitycannot be removed during the inspection,
the inspectorsshall notie theTechnicalSecretariatimmediately.The inspectors shall
includeinthe inspectionreport anysuchunresolved question, relevant clarifications,
and a copy of any photographs taken.
Collection,handlingand anabsis of samples
52. Representatives of the inspected State Party or of the inspected facility
shalltake samplesat the request ofthe inspectionteam inthe presenceofinspectors.
If so agreed in advancewith the representatives of the inspected State Party or of
the inspected facility,the inspection team may take samples itself.VerificationAnnex
53. Where possible, the analysis of samples shall be performed on-site. The
inspection team shall have the right to perform on-site analysis of samples using
approved equipment brought by it. At the request of the inspection team, the
inspected State Partyshail,inaccordancewithagreed procedures, provideassistance
for the anaiysisof samples on-site. Altematively, the inspectioneam may request
that appropriate analysison-site be performed in its presence.
54. The inspected State Party has the right to retain portions of al1samples
taken or take duplicate samples and be present when samples are analysed on-site.
55. The inspection team shall, if it deems it necessary, transfer samples for
analysis off-site at laboratories designated by the Organization.
56. The Director-General shallhavethe primaryresponsibilityfor the security,
integrity and preservation of samples and for ensuring that the wnfidentiality of
samples transferred for analysis off-site is protected. The Director-General shall
do so in accordance with procedures, to be considered and approved by the
Conference pursuant to ArticleVIII, paragraph 21(i),for inclusioninthe inspection
manual. He shall:
(a) Establish a stringent regime govemingthe collection,handling, transport
and analysis of samples;
(b) Certify the laboratories designated to perform different types of analysis;
(c) Oversee the standardization of equipment and procedures at these
designated laboratories, mobile anaiyticalequipment and procedures, and monitor
quality control and overall standards in relation to the certification of these
laboratories, mobile equipment and procedures; and
(d) Select from amongthe designated laboratories those whichshallperform
analytical or other functions in relation to specific investigations.
57. When off-site analysis is to be performed, samples shall be analysed in
at least two designated laboratories. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure the
expeditious processing of the analysis.The samples shall be acwunted for by the
TechnicalSecretariat and any unused samplesor portions thereof shall be retumed
to the TechnicalSecretariat.
58. The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the laboratory
analysisof samples relevant to wmpliance with this Convention and include them
in thefinai inspection report. The TechnicaiSecretariat shall include in the reportVerificatioAnnex
64. Should the report contain uncertainties, or should cooperation between
the National Authorityand the inspectorsnot measure up to the standardsrequired,
the Director-General shall approach the State Party for clarification.
65. If the uncertainties cannot be removed or the facts established are of a
nature to suggestthat obligationsundertakenunder this Conventionhave not been
met, the Director-General shall inform the ExecutiveCouncil without delay.
H. APPLICATION OF GENERAL PROVISIONS
66. The provisions of thisPart shallapplyto al1inspectionsconductedpursuant
to thisConvention,exceptwherethe provisionsofthisPart differfromthe provisions
setforth for specific typesof inspections in PaIIIto XI of this Annex, in which
case the latter provisions shalltake precedence. Part III
PARTIII
GENERA PLROVISIONSFOR VERIFICATION MEASURESPURSUANTTO
ARTICLES IV,V AND VI, PARAGRAPH 3
A. INITIA NSPECTIONSAND FACILITYAGREEMENTS
Each declared facilitysubjectto on-siteinspectionpursuant to ArticlesIV,
1.
V, and VI, paragraph 3, shall receivean initial inspection promptlyafter the facility
is declared. The purpose of this inspection of the facility shall be to verify
informationprovided and to obtain anyadditional informationneeded for planning
future verification activities at the facility, including on-site inspections and
continuous monitoring with on-site instruments, and to work on the facility
agreements.
2. States Parties shall ensure that the verification of declarations and the
initiation of the systematic verification measures can be accomplished by the
TechnicalSecretariat atal1facilities withinthe established time-frames after this
Convention enters into force for them.
3. Each State Party shallconcludea facilityagreementwiththe Organization
for each facilitydeclared and subject to on-site inspectionpursuant to ArtIV,es
V,and VI, paragraph 3.
4. Facilityagreements shall be completed not later tha180 days after this
Conventionentersinto forceforthe StatePartyorafterthe facilityhasbeen declared
for the first time, except for a chemical weapons destruction facility to which
paragraphs 5 to 7 shall apply.
5. In the case of a chemical weapons destruction facility that begins
operations more than one year after this Conventionenters into force for the State
Party, the facilityagreement shall be completednot less than 180days before the
facility beginsoperation.
6. In the case of a chemicalweapons destructionfacilitythat is in operation
when thisConventionenters into force for the State Party,or begins operation not
later than one year thereafter, the facilityagreement shallbe completed not later
than 210 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party, except
that the ExecutiveCouncil may decide that transitionalverificationarrangements,
approved in accordancewithPart IV (A), paragraph 51,of this Annexandincluding
a transitional facility agreement, provisions for verification through on-site
inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, and the time-frame for
application of the arrangements, are sufficient.
7. In the case of a facility, referred to in paragraph 6, that will cease
operations not later than twoyears after this Conventionenters into force for theVerificationAnnex
State Party, the Executive Council may decide that transitional verification
arrangements, approvedin accordancewithPart IV (A), paragraph 51,of thisAnnex
and including a transitional facilityagreement, provisionsfor verification through
on-site inspectionand monitoringwith on-site instruments,and the time-frame for
application of the arrangements, are sufîïcient.
8. Facility agreements shall be based on models for such agreements and
provide for detailed arrangements which shall govem inspections at each facility.
The mode1 agreements shallinclude provisions to take into account future
technological developments and shall be considered and approved by the
Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
9. The TechnicalSecretariat may retain at each site a sealed container for
photographs, plansand other informationthat it maywishto refer to in the course
of subsequent inspections.
10. Where applicable, the TechnicalSecretariat shall have the right to have
continuous monitoringinstrumentsand systemsand sealsinstalledand to use them,
in conformity with the relevant provisions in this Convention and the facility
agreements between States Parties and the Organization.
11. The inspectedStateParty shall,inaccordancewithagreedprocedures,have
the right to inspect any instrument used or installed by the inspection team and
to have it tested in the presence of representatives of the inspected State Party.
The inspection team shall have the right to use the instmments that were installed
by the inspected State Party for its own monitoring of the technological process
of the destruction of chemicalweapons.Tothis end, the inspectionteam shall have
the right to inspect those instruments that it intends to use for purposes of
verification of the destruction of chemicalweapons and to have them tested in its
presence.
12.The inspected State Party shall provide the necessary preparation and
support for the establishment of continuous monitoring instmments and systems.
13. In order to irnplement paragraphs 11and 12, appropriate detailed
procedures shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to
Article VIII,paragraph 21 (i).
14. The inspectedState Party shallimmediately notifythe TechnicalSecretariat
if an event occurs or may occur at a facility where monitoring instruments are
installed, which may have an impact on the monitoring system. The inspected
State Party shallcoordinate subsequent actionswith the TechnicalSecretariat with PartIII
a viewto restoring the operation of the monitoringsystemand establishinginterim
measures, if necessary, as soon as possible.
15. The inspection team shallveriij duringeachinspectionthat the monitoring
system functions correctly and that emplaced seals havenot been tampered with.
In addition, visitsto senricethe monitoringsystemmaybe required to perform any
necessary maintenance or replacement of equipment, or to adjust the coverage of
the monitoring systemas required.
16. If the monitoringsystemindicates any anomaly,the TechnicalSecretariat
shall immediatelytake action to determine whether this resulted from equipment
malfunction or activities at the facility. If, after this examination, the broblem
remains unresolved,the TechnicalSecretariat shall immediatelyascertainthe actual
situation, includingthrough immediate on-siteinspection of,or visitto, the facility
if necessary.The TechnicalSecretariat shall report any such problem immediately
after its detection to the inspected State Party which shall assistin its resolution.
17. The inspected State Party shall, exceptas specified in paragraph 18, be
notified of inspections not lessthan 24 hours in advance of the planned arrival of
the inspection team at the point of entry.
18. The inspected State Party shall be notified of initial inspections not less
than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team
at the point of entry.VerificationAnnex
PART IV (A)
DESTRUCTIO NF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ITSVERIFICATION
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE IV
Chemical weapons
1. The declaration of chemical weapons by a State Party pursuant to
ArticleIII,paragraph 1 (a)(ii), shall include the following:
(a) The aggregate quantity of each chemical declared;
(b) The precise location of each chemical weapons storage facility,
expressed by:
(i) Name;
(ii) Geographical coordinates; and
(iii) A detailed site diagram, including aboundary map and the location
of bunkerslstorage areas within the facility.
(c) The detailed inventory for each chemical weapons storage facility
including:
(i) Chemicals defined as chemical weapons in accordance with
Article II;
(ii) Unfilled munitions, sub-munitions,devicesand equipment defined as
chemical weapons;
(iü) Equipment specially designedfor use directlyin connection with the
employment of munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment
specified in sub-subparagraph (ii);
(iv) Chemicaisspecificallydesignedfor use directlyinconnectionwiththe
emp- -ment of munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equip-.nt
specified in sub-subparagraph (ii).
2. For the declaration of chemicals referred to in paragraph 1(c) (i) the
followingshall apply:
(a) Chemicals shallbe declared in accordancewith the Schedulesspecified
in the Annex on Chemicals; Part N (Al
(b) For a chemicalnot listed in the Schedules in the Annex on Chemicals
the information required for possible assignmentof the chemicalto the appropriate
Schedule shall be provided, including the toxicity of the pure compound. For a
precursor, the toxicityand identity of the principal finalreaction product(s) shall
be provided;
(c) Chemicals shall be identified by chemical name in accordance with
current International UnionofPure andAppliedChemistry (IUPAC)nomenclature,
structural formula and ChemicalAbstracts Service registrynumber, ifassigned.For
a precursor, the toxicityand identityof the principal finalreactionproduct(s) shall
be provided;
(d) In casesinvolvingmixturesof two or more chemicals,each chemicalshall
be identified and the percentage of each shall be provided, andthe mixture shall
be declared under the category of the most toxic chemical. If a component of a
binary chemical weapon consists of a mixture of two or more chemicals, each
chemical shall be identified and the percentage of each provided;
(e) Binaq chemicalweaponsshallbe declared under the relevantend product
withinthe frameworkofthe categoriesof chemicalweaponsreferredto in paragraph
16. The followingsupplementary information shall be provided for each type of
binary chemical munitionidevice:
(i) The chemical name of the toxic end-product;
(ii) The chemical compositionand quantity of each component;
(iii) The actual weight ratio between the components;
(iv) Which component is considered the key component;
The projected quantity of the toxic end-product calculated on a
(v)
stoichiometricbasis from the key component, assuming 100per cent
yield.A declared quantity(in tonnes) of the keycomponent intended
for a specific toxicend-product shallbe considered equivalentto the
quantity (in tonnes) of this toxic end-product calculated on a
stoichiometric basis assuming 100per cent yield.
(f) For multicomponentchemicalweapons,the declarationshallbe analogous
to that envisagedfor binary chemicalweapons;
(g) For each chemical the form of storage, i.e. munitions, submunitions,
devices,equipment or bulk containers and other containers shall be declared. For
each form of storage the followingshall be listed:VerificationAnnex
(il Type;
(ii) Size or calibre;
(iii) Number of items; and
(iv) Nominal weightof chemical fil1per item.
(h) For each chemical the total weight present at the storage facilityshall be
declared;
(i) In addition, for chemicals stored in bulk, the percentage purity shall be
declared, ifknown.
3. For each type of unfilled munitions, sub-munitions,devicesor equipment,
referred to in paragraph 1 (c) (ii), the information shall include:
(a) The number of items;
(b) The nominal fill volume per item;
(c) The intended chemical fill.
Declarations of chernical weapons pursuant to Article III,
paragraph I (a) (iii)
4. The declaration of chemical weapons pursuant to Article III, paragraph
1 (a) (iii), shall wntain al1information specified in paragraphs 1 to 3 above. It is
the responsibility of the State Party on whose territory the chemical weapons are
located to make appropriate arrangements with the other State to ensure that the
declarations are made. If the State Party on whose territory the chemicalweapons
are located is not able to fulfil its obligations under this paragraph, it shall state
the reasons therefor.
Declarations of past transfers and receipts
5. A State Party that has transferred or received chemical weapons since
1 January 1946 shall declare these transfers or receipts pursuant to Article III,
paragraph 1 (a) (iv),provided the amount transferred or receivedex-eded 1tonne
per chemicalper year in bulk and/or munition form. This declaration shall be made
according to the inventoryformat specified inparagraphs 1 and 2. This declaration
shall also indicate the supplier and recipient countries, the dates of the transfers
or receipts and,aspreciselyas possible,the current locationof the transferred items.
When not al1the specified information is available for transfers or receipts of
chemical weapons for the penod between 1 January 1946 and 1January 1970, the
State Party shall declare whatever information is still available to it and provide
an explanation as to why it cannot submit a full declaration. Part N (A)
Submission of the general pian for destruction of chemical weapons
6. The general plan for destmction of chemicalweaponssubmitted pursuant
to Article III, paragraph 1(a) (v), shall provide an overviewof the entire national
chemical weapons destruction programmeof the State Party and information on
the efforts of the State Party tofilthe destruction requirements contained in this
Convention. The plan shall specify:
(a) A generalschedulefordestruction,givingtypesand approximatequantities
of chemical weapons planned to be destroyed in each annual destruction period
for each existing chemical weapons destruction facility and, if possible, for each
planned chemical weapons destruction facility;
(b) The number of chemicalweapons destructionfacilities existingorplanned
to be operated over the destruction period;
(c) For each existingor planned chemicalweapons destruction facility:
(i) Name and location; and
The types and approximate quantitiesof chemical weapons, andthe
(ii)
type (for example, nerve agent or blister agent) and approximate
quantity of chemical fill, to he destroyed;
(d) The plans and programmes for training personnel for the operation of
destmction facilities;
(e) The national standards for safety and emissions that the destruction
facilities must satisfy;
@ Information on the development of new methods for destruction of
chemical weapons and on the improvement of existingmethods;
(g) The cost estimates for destroying the chemical weapons;and
(h) Any issues which could adversely impact on the national destruction
programme.
B. MEA~URE TOS SECURE THE STORAGEFACIUïï
AND STORAGE FACILITYPREPARATION
7. Not later thanwhen submittingitsdeclarationofchemicalweapons, aState
Party shall take such measures as it considers appropriate to secure its storage
facilities and shall prevent any movement of its chemical weapons out of the
facilities, excepttheir removal for destmction.VerificationAnnex
8. A State Party shall ensure that chemicalweapons at its storage facilities
are configuredto allow ready access for verification in accordance with para-
graphs 37 to 49.
9. While a storage facility remains closed for any movement of chemical
weapons out of the facilityother than their removal for destruction, a State Party
may continue at the facility standard maintenance activities, including standard
maintenance of chemical weapons;safetymonitoringand physicalsecurityactivities;
and preparation of chemical weapons for destruction.
10. Maintenance activities of chemical weapons shallnot include:
Replacement of agent or of munition bodies;
(a)
(b) Modification of the original characteristics of munitions, or parts or
components thereof.
11. Al1maintenance activities shallbe subject to monitoringby the Technical
Secretariat.
Principlesand methodîfor destructionof chemical weapons
12. "Destruction of chemical weapons"means a process by which chemicals
are converted in an essentiallyirreversiblewayto a form unsuitablefor production
of chemical weapons,and which in an irreversiblemanner renders munitions and
other devicesunusable as such.
13. Each State Party shall determine how it shall destroy chemical weapons,
exceptthat the followingprocessesmaynot be used: dumpinginanybodyofwater,
land burial or open-pitburning.It shalldestroychemicalweaponsonlyat specifically
designated and appropriately designed and equipped facilities.
14. Each State Party shall ensure that its chemical weapons destruction
facilities are constructed and operated in a manner to ensure the destruction of
the chemical weapons;and that the destruction process can be verified under the
provisions of this Convention.
Orderof destruction
15. The order of destruction of chemicalweapons is based on the obligations
specified in Article 1 and the other Articles, including obligations regarding
systematicon-site verification. It takes into account interests of States Parties for
undiminishedsecurityduringthe destruction period;confidence-buildinginthe early
part of the destmction stage; gradua1 acquisition of experience in the course of
destroyingchemicalweapons;and applicabilityirrespectiveof the actual composition Part IV(A)
of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the destruction of the chemical
weapons. The order of destruction is based on the principle of levellingout.
16. For the purpose of destruction, chernicalweapons declared by each State
Party shall be divided into three categories:
Category 1: Chemicaiweaponson the basisof Schedule 1 chemicalsand
their parts and components;
Category 2: Chernicalweapons on the basis of al1other chemicals and
their parts and components;
Category 3: Unîilled munitions and devices,and equiprnent specifically
designed for use directlyin connectionwith ernploymentof
chemicalweapons.
17. A State Party shall start:
(a) The destruction of Category 1 chemicalweaponsnot later than twoyears
after this Convention enters into force for it, and shail complete the destruction
not later than 10years after entry into force of this ConventiAnState Party shall
destroy chemical weapons in accordancewith the followingdestruction deadlines:
(i) Phase 1: Not later than two years after entry into force of this
Convention, testingof itsirst destruction facilityshallbe completed.
Not less than 1 per cent of the Category 1 chemicalweapons shail
be destroyed not later than three years after the entry into force of
this Convention;
(ü) Phase 2: Not lessthan20percent ofthe Category 1 chernicalweapons
shail be destroyed not later than fiveyears after the entry into force
of this Convention;
(iü) Phase3: Not lessthan45percent ofthe Category 1 chemicalweapons
shallbe destroyednot later than sevenyearsafter the entryinto force
of this Convention;
(iv) Phase 4: Al1Category 1 chemical weapons shall be destroyed not
later than 10years after the entry into force of this Convention.
(b) The destruction of Category 2 chemicalweapons not later than one year
after this Conventionenters into force for it and shallcompletethe destructionnot
later than five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Category 2
chemical weapons shall be destroyed in equal annual increments throughout the
destruction period. The cornparisonfactor for such weapons is the weight of the
chemicals withinCategory 2; andVerificationAnnex
(c) The destruction of Category 3 chemical weapons not later than one year
after this Convention enters into force for it, and shall complete the destruction
not later thm fiveyears after the entry into force of this Convention. Category3
chemical weapons shall be destroyed in equal annual increments throughout the
destruction period. The comparison factor for unfilled munitions and devices is
expressed in nominal fil1volume (m3) and for equipment in number of items.
18. For the destruction of binary chemicalweapons the following shall apply:
(a) For the purposes ofthe order ofdestruction, adeclared quantity(intonnes)
of the keycomponent intended for a specifictoxicend-product shallbe considered
equivalent to the quantity (in tonnes) of this toxic end-product calculated on a
stoichiometric basis assuming 100 per cent yield.
(b) A requirement to destroyagivenquantityofthe keycomponent shallentai1
a requirement to destroy a corresponding quantity of the other component,
calculated from the actual weight ratio of the components in the relevant type of
binary chemical munitionldevice.
(c) If more of the other component is declared than is needed, based on the
actual weightratio between components, the excessshallbe destroyed over the first
two years after destruction operations begin.
(d) At the end of each subsequent operational year a State Party may retain
an amount of the other declared component that is determined on the basis of the
actual weight ratio of the components in the relevant type of binary chemical
munition/device.
19. For multicomponent chemical weaponsthe order of destruction shall be
analogous to that envisaged for binary chemical weapons.
Modification of intermediate destruction deadlines
20. The Executive Council shallreview the general plans for destruction of
chemical weapons, submitted pursuant to Article III,paragraph 1 (a) (v), and in
accordance with paragraph 6,inter dia, to assess their conformity with the order
of destruction set forth in paragraphs 15to 19.The ExecutiveCouncil shall consult
with any State Party whose plan does not conform, with the objective of bringing
the plan into conformity.
21. If a State Party, due to exceptional circumstances beyond its control,
believes that it cannot achieve the level of destruction specified for Phase 1,
Phase 2 or Phase 3 of the order of destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons,
it may propose changes in those levels. Such a proposal must be made not later
than 120 days after the entry into force of this Convention and shall contain a
detailed explmation of the reasons for the proposal. 22. Each State Party shall take al1necessarymeasures to ensure destruction
of Category 1 chemical weapons in accordance with the destruction deadlinesset
forth in paragraph 17 (a)as changedpursuant to paragraph 21.However,if a State
Party believesthat it willbe unable to ensure the destruction of the percentage of
Category 1chemicalweapons required by an intermediate destruction deadline,it
may request the Executive Council to recommend to the Conference to grant an
extension of its obligationtomeet that deadline. Sucha request must be made not
less than 180daysbefore the intermediate destruction deadline and shall contain
a detailed explanationof the reasonsfor the request and the plansof the State Party
for ensuring that it willbe able to fulfilits obligationto meet the next intermediate
destruction deadline.
23. If an extensionisgranted, the State Party shall stillbe under the obligation
to meet the cumulative destructionrequirements set forth for the next destruction
deadline. Extensionsgranted pursuant to this Sectionshall not, in anyway,modify
the obligation ofthe State Party to destroy al1Category 1 chemicalweapons not
later than 10years after the entry into force of this Convention.
Extensionof the deadlinefor completion of desmtction
24. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to ensure the destruction
of dl Category 1 chemicalweapons notlater than 10yearsafter the entryinto force
ofthis Convention,itmaysubmita request to the ExecutiveCouncilfor anextension
of the deadline for completingthe destruction of such chemical weapons..Sucha
request must be made not later than nine years after the entry into force of this
Convention.
25. The request shall contain:
(a) The duration of the proposed extension;
(b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension; and
(c) A detailed plan for destruction during the proposed extension and the
remaining portion of the original 10-yearperiod for destruction.
26. A decision on the request shall be taken by the Conference at its next
session, on the recommendation of the Executive Council. Any extension shallbe
the minimum necessary, but in no case shall the deadline for a State Party to
complete its destruction ofal1chemicalweaponsbe extendedbeyond 15years after
the entry into force of this Convention.The Executive Council shallset conditions
forthe grantingofthe extension,includingthe specificverificationmeasures deemed
necessary as well as specific actions to betaken by the State Party to overcome
problems in its destruction programme. Costs of verification during the extension
period shallbe allocated in accordance with Article IV,paragraph 16.VerifcationAnnex
27. If an extension isgranted, the State Party shalltake appropriate measures
to meet al1subsequent deadlines.
28. The State Party shall continue to submit detailed annual plans for
destruction in accordance with paragraph 29 and annual reports on the destruction
of Category 1 chemical weapons in accordance with paragraph 36, until al1
Category 1 chemicalweapons are destroyed. In addition, not later than at the end
of each 90 daysof the extensionperiod, the State Party shallreport to the Evecutive
Council on its destruction activity. The Executive Council shall review progress
towards completion of destruction and take the necessary measures to document
this progress. Al1 information concerning the destruction activities during the
extension period shall be provided by the Executive Council to States Parties,
upon request.
Detailed,annualplans for destruction
29. The detailed annual plans for destruction shall be submitted to the
Technical Secretariat not less than 60 days before each annual destruction period
begins pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 7 (a),and shall specify:
(a) The quantity of each specific type of chemical weapon to be destroyed
at each destruction facility and the inclusive dates when the destruction of each
specific type of chemical weapon will be accomplished;
The detailed site diagram for each chemical weaponsdestruction facility
(b)
and any changes to previouslysubmitted diagrams; and
(c) The detailed schedule of activitiesfor each chemicalweapons destmction
facility for the upcoming year, identifying time required for design, construction
or modification of the facility,installation of equipment, equipment check-out and
operator training, destruction operationsfor each specifictypeof chemicalweapon,
and scheduled periods of inactivity.
30. A State Party shall provide, for each of its chemicalweapons destruction
facilities, detailed facility information to assist the Technical Secretariat in
developing preliminary inspectionprocedures for use at the facility.
31. The detailed facilityinformation for each destruction facilityshall include
the followinginformation:
(a) Name, address and location;
(b) Detailed, annotated facility drawings; Part IV(A)
(c) Facility design drawings, process drawings, and piping and instrumen-
tation design drawings;
(d) Detailed technical descriptions, including design drawingasnd instmment
specifications,for the equipment required for: removingthe chemicalfil1from the
munitions, devices, and containers; temporarily storing the drained chemical fill;
destroying the chemical agent; and destroying the munitions, devices, and
containers;
Detailed technical descriptions of the destruction process, including
material flowrates, temperatures andpressures,and designeddestructionefficiency;
Design capacity for each specific typeof chemical weapon;
Cf)
(g) A detailed description of the products of destruction and the method of
their ultimate disposal;
(h) A detailed technical description of measures to facilitate inspections in
accordance with this Convention;
(i) A detailed description of any temporary holding area at the destruction
facility thatill be used to provide chemical weapons directly to the destruction
facility, includingsite and facility drawingsand information on the storage capacity
for each specifictype of chemicalweapon to be destroyed at the facility;
A detailed description of the safetyand medicalmeasures in force at the
facility;
(k) A detailed description of the livingquarters and working premises for
the inspectors; and
(1) Suggested measures for internationalverification.
32. A State Party shall provide, for each of its chemicalweapons destruction
facilities,the plant operations manuals,the safety andcalplans,the laboratory
operations and quality assurance and control manuals, and the environmental
permits that have been obtained, except that this shall not includeaterial
previouslyprovided.
33. A State Party shall promptly notify the Technical Secretariat of any
developments that wuld affect inspection activitiesat its destruction facilities.
34. Deadlines for submission of the information specified in paragraphs 30
to 32shallbe consideredand approvedbythe Conferencepursuant to ArticleVIII,
paragraph 21 (i). 35. After a review of the detailed facility information for each destruction
facility, theechnical Secretariat, if the need arises, shall enter into consultation
with the State Party concerned in order to ensure that its chernical weapons
destruction facilities are designed to assure the destruction of chemical weapons,
to dow advanced planning on how verification measures may be applied and to
ensure that the application ofverificationmeasures isconsistentwith proper facility
operation, and that the facilityoperation allows appropriate verification.
Annualreportson destruction
36. Information regarding the implementation of plans for destruction of
chemical weapons shall be submitted to the Technical Secretariat pursuant to
Article IV, paragraph 7 (b), not later than60 days after the end of each annual
destruction period and shall specifythe actual amounts of chernicalweapons which
were destroyed during the previousyear at each destruction facility.If appropriate,
reasons for not meeting destruction goals should be stated.
VerificationO declarationsof chemicalweapons
ttroughon-siteinspection
37. The purpose of the verification of declarations of chemicalweapons shall
be to wnfirm through on-site inspection the accuracy of the relevant declarations
made pursuant to Article III.
38. The inspectors shall wnduct this verificationpromptly after a declaration
issubmitted.Theyshall, interaliaverifythe quantityand identityofchemicals, types
and number of munitions, devices and other equipment.
39. The inspectors shall employ,as appropriate; agreed seals,rnarkersor other
inventory control procedures to facilitate an accurate inventory of the chemical
weapons at each storage facility.
40. As the inventory progresses,inspectors shall install such agreed seals as
may be necessary to clearly indicate if any stocksare removed, and to ensure the
'securing of the storage facility during the inventory. After completion of the
inventory, such seals will be removed unlessotherwise agreed.
Systematic verificarionof storage facilities
41. The purpose of the systematic verification of storage facilities shall be
to ensure that no undetected removal of chernical weapons frorn such facilities
takes place. . . Part N (A)
. .
42. The systematic verification shallbe initiated as soon as possibleafter the
declaration of chemicalweapons is submitted and shail continueuntil .al1chemical
weapons have been removed from the storage facility.It sha1l.Gaccordance with
the facility agreement, combine on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site
instruments. . . ..
43. When al1chemicalweaponshave been removed from the storage facility,
the Technical Secretariat shall confirm the declaration of the ~ta'teParty to that
effect. After this confirmation, the Technical Secretariat shall terminate the
systematic verification of the storage facility and shall promptly remove any
monitoring instruments instailed by the inspectors.
Inspections and visits
44. The particular storage facility to be inspected shall be chosen by the
TechnicalSecretariat in such a wayasto preclude the prediction of precisely when
the facility is to be inspected. The guidelines for determining the frequency of
systematicon-siteinspectionsshallbe elaboratedbytheTechnicalSecretariat,taking
into account the recommendations to be considered and approved by the
Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
45. The Technical Secretariat shall notifj the inspected State Party of its
decision to inspect or visit the storage facility48 hours before the planned arrival
of the inspection team at the facilityfor systematic inspectionsor visits.In cases
of inspections or visits to resolve urgent problems, this period may be shortened.
The TechnicalSecretariat shall specdy the purpose of the inspection or visit.
46.The inspected State Party shall make any necessarypreparations for the
amval of the inspectorsand shallensure their expeditioustransportation from their
point of entry to the storage facility. The facility agreement will specify
administrative arrangements for inspectors.
47. The inspectedStatePartyshallprovidethe inspectionteamupon itsarrival
at the chemicalweaponsstoragefacilitytocarryout aninspection, withthe following
data on the facility:
(a) The number of storage buildings and storage locations;
(b) For each storage building and storage location, the type and the
identification number or designation, shownon the site diagram; and
(c) For each storagebuildingand storagelocation at the facility,the number
of items of each specific typeof chemical weapon,and, for containers that are not
part of binary munitions, the actual quantity of chemical fil1in each container. 48. In canying out an inventory,withinthe time available,inspectorsshall have
the right:
(a) To use any of the followinginspection techniques:
(i) inventory al1the chemical weapons stored at the facility;
(ii) inventory al1the chemical weapons stored in specific buildings or
locations at the facility, ashosen by the inspectors; or
(iii) inventory al1the chemical weapons of one or more specific types
stored at the facility,as chosen by the inspectors; and
(b) To check al1items inventoried against agreed records.
49. Inspectors shall, in accordance with facilityagreements:
(a) Have unimpeded access to al1parts of the storage facilities including any
munitions, devices,bulk containers, or other containers therein. While conducting
their activity,inspectors shall complywith the safety regulationsat the facility.The
items to be inspected will be chosen by the inspectors; and
(b) Have the right, during the first and any subsequent inspection of each
chemical weapons storage facility,to designate munitions, devices, and containers
from which samples are to be taken, and to affi to such munitions, devices, and
containers a unique tag that will indicate an attempt to remove or alter the tag.
A sample shall be taken from a tagged item at a chemicalweapons storage facility
or a chemical weapons destruction facility as soon as it is practically possible in
accordance with the corresponding destruction programmes, and, in any case, not
later than by the end of the destruction operations.
Systematic ver$cation of the destruction of chemical weapons
50. The purpose of verification of destruction of chemicalweapons shall be:
(a) To confirm the identity and quantity of the chemical weapons stocks to
be destroyed; and
To confirm that these stocks have been destroyed.
(b)
51. Chemical weapons destruction operations during the first 390 days after
the entry into force of this Convention shall be govemed by transitional verification
arrangements. Such arrangements, including a transitional facility agreement,
provisions for verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site
instruments, and the time-frame for applicationofthe arrangements, shallbe agreed Part IV (A)
between the Organization and the inspected State Party.These arrangements shall
be approved by the Executive Councilnot later than 60 daysafter this Convention
enters into force for the State Party,taking into account the recommendations of
the Technical Secretariat, which shall be based on an evaluation of the detailed
facility information provided in accordancewith paragraph 31 and a visit to the
facility.The Executive Council shall,at its first session, establishthe guidelinesfor
such transitional verification arrangements, based on recommendations to be
considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, para-
graph 21 (i)The transitional verificationarrangements shallbe designed to verify,
throughout the entire transitional period, the destruction of chemical weapons in
accordance with the purposes set forth in paragraph 50, and to avoid hampering
ongoing destruction operations.
52. The provisions of paragraphs 53 to 61 shall apply to chemical weapons
destruction operations that are to begin not earlier than 390 daysafter the entry
into force of this Convention.
53. On the basis of this Convention and the detailed destruction facility
information, and as the case maybe, on experience from previous inspections,the
Technical Secretariat shall prepare a draft plan for inspecting the destruction of
chemical weapons at each destruction facility. The plan shall be completed and
provided to the inspected State Party for comment not less than 270 days before
the facility begins destruction operations pursuant to this Convention. Any
differencesbetween the TechnicalSecretariat and the inspected State Party should
be resolved through consultations. Any unresolved matter shall be foiwarded to
the Executive Council for appropriate action with a view to facilitating the full
implementation of this Convention.
54. The TechnicalSecretariat shall conduct an initial visitto each chemical
weaponsdestructionfacilityoftheinspectedStatePartynotless than 240daysbefore
each facilitybegins destruction operations pursuant to this Convention, to allow
it to familiarize itself with the facility and assess the adequacy of the inspection
plan.
55. In the case of an existing facility where chemical weapons destruction
operations have already been initiated, the inspected State Party shall not be
required to decontaminate the facilitybefore the TechnicalSecretariat conductsan
initial visit.The duration of the visit shallnot exceedfivedays and the number of
visiting personnel shall not exceed 15.
56. The agreed detailed plans for verification, with an appropriate
recommendation by the TechnicalSecretariat, shall be forwarded to the Executive
Council for review. The Executive Council shall reviewthe plans with a view to
approving them, consistent with verification objectives and obligations under thisVerificationAnnex
Convention. It should also confirm that verification schemes for destruction are
consistent with verification aims and are efficient and practical. This reviewshould
be completed not less than 180 days before the destmction period begins.
57. Each member of the Evecutive Council may wnsult with the Technical
Secretariaton any issuesregarding the adequacyof the plan forverification.If there
are no objections by any member of the Executive Council,the plan shall be put
into action.
58. If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council shall enter into
consultations with the State Party to reconcile them. If any difficulties remain
unresolved they shall be referred to the Conference.
59. The detailed facilityagreementsfor chemicalweapons destructionfacilities
shallspecify,takinginto accountthe specificcharacteristicsofthe destruction facility
and its mode of operation:
(a) Detailed on-site inspection procedures; and
(b) Provisions for verification through continuous monitoring with on-site
instmments and physical presence of inspectors.
60. Inspectors shall be granted access to each chemicalweapons destruction
facilitynot lessthan 60daysbefore the commencement of the destruction, pursuant
to this Convention, at the facility.Suchaccessshall befor the purpose of supervising
the installation of the inspection equipment, inspecting thisequipment and testing
its operation, as well as for the purpose of canying out a final engineering review
of the facility.In the case of an existingfacilitywhere chemicalweapons destruction
operations have already been initiated, destruction operations shall be stopped for
the minimum amount of time required, not to exceed 60 days,for installation and
testing of the inspection equipment. Depending on the results of the testing and
review, the State Party and the Technical Secretariat may agree on additions or
changes to the detailed facility agreement for the facility.
61. The inspected State Party shallnotify,in writing,the inspectionteam leader
at a chemical weapons destruction facility not less than four hours before the
departure of each shipment of chemicalweapons from a chemicalweapons storage
facility to that destruction facility.This notification shallspecifythename of the
storage facility,the estimated times of departure and arriva],the specific typesand
quantities of chemical weapons being transported, whether any tagged items are
being moved, and the method of transportation. This notification may include
notification of more than one shipment. The inspection team leader shall be
promptly notified, in writing, of any changes in this information. Part N (A)
Chemicalweaponsstoragefacilitiesat chemical weapons
destructionfacilities
62. The inspectors shall verify the arriva1of the chemical weapons at the
destruction facility andthe storing ofthese chemical weapons.The inspectors shall
verify the inventory of each shipment, using agreed procedures consistent with
facility safetyegulations, prior to the destmction of the chemical weapons. They
shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, markers or other inventory control
procedures to facilitate an accurate inventory of the chemical weapons prior to
destruction.
63. As soon and as longas chemicalweapons are stored at chemicalweapons
storage facilities located at chemicalweapons destruction facilities, these storage
facilities shall be subject to systematic verificationconformity withthe relevant
facility agreements.
64. At the end of an active destruction phase, inspectors shall make an
inventoryofthe chemical weapons,that havebeen removedfromthe storagefacility,
to be destroyed. They shall verify the accuracy of the inventory of the chemical
weapons remaining, employing inventory control procedures as referred to in
paragraph 62.
Systematicon-siteverificationmeasuresat chemical weapons
destructionfacilities
65. The inspectors shall be granted access to conduct their activities at the
chemicalweapons destruction facilitiesand the chemicalweapons storage facilities
located at such facilities during the entire active phase of destruction.
66. At each chemicalweapons destruction facility,to provide assurance that
no chemical weapons are diverted and that the destruction process has been
completed, inspectors shall havethe right to verifythrough their physicalpresence
and monitoring with on-site instruments:
(a) The receipt of chemical weapons at the facility;
(b) The temporary holding area for chemicalweapons and the specific type
and quantity of chemicalweapons stored in that area;
The specifictype and quantity of chemicalweapons being destroyed;
(c)
(d) The process of destruction;
(e) The end-product of destruction;
(f) The mutilation of metal parts; andVerificationAnnex
(g) The integrity of the destruction process and of the facility as a whole.
67. Inspectors shall have the right to tag, for sampling, munitions,devices,or
containers located in the temporary holding areas at the chemical weapons
destmction facilities.
68. To the extent that it meets inspection requirements, information from
routine faciiity operations, with appropriate data authentication, shall be used for
inspection purposes.
69. After the com~letion of each ~eriod of destruction. the Technical
Secretariat shallconfinn the declaration of the State Party,reporting the completion
of destruction of the designated quantity of chemical weapons.
70. Inspectors shall, in accordance with facility agreements:
(a) Have unimpeded accessto al1parts of the chemicalweapons destruction
facilities and the chemical weapons storage facilities located at such facilities,
including any munitions, devices,bulk containers, or other containers, therein. The
items to be inspected shall be chosen by the inspectors in accordance with the
verification plan that has been agreed to bythe inspectd State Party and approved
by the Executive Council;
(b) Monitor the systematicon-site analysisof samplesduring the destruction
process; and
(c) Receive, if necessary, samples taken at their request from any devices,
bulk containers and other containers at the destruction facilityor the storage facility
thereat. Part IV (B)
PART IV (B)
1. Old chemicaiweapons shall be destroyedas provided for in Section B.
2. Abandoned chemical weapons, including those which also meet the
definition of Article II, paragraph 5 (b), shall be destroyed as provided for in
Section C.
B. REGIME FOR OLD CHEMICAL WEAPONS
3. A State Party which has on its territory old chemicalweapons as defined
in Article II,paragaph 5 (a), shail, not later than30 days after this Convention
enters into force for it, submit to the TechnicalSecretariatal1available relevant
information, including,to the extent possible, the location, type,quantity and the
present condition of these old chemical weapons.
In the case of old chemicalweapons as defined in Article II, paragraph 5(b),
the State Party shall submit to the TechnicaiSecretariat a declaration pursuant to
Article III, paragraph 1 (b) (i), including,to the extent possible, the information
specified in Part IV (A), paragraphs 1 to 3, of this Annex.
4. A State Pam which discoversold chemical weaponsafter this Convention
enters into force for it shall submit to the TechnicalSecretariat the information
specified in paragraph 3 not later than 180days after the discovery of the old
chemical weapons.
5. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial inspection, and any
hirther inspectionsasmaybe necessary,in order toverifythe informationsubmitted
pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 and in particular to determinewhether the chemical
weapons meet the definition of old chemical weapons as specified in Article II,
paragraph 5. Guidelines to determine the usabilityof chemicalweapons produced
between 1925 and 1946 shall be considered and approved by the Conference
pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
6. A State Party shall treat old chemical weaponsthat have heen confirmed
by the TechnicalSecretariat as meeting the definition in Article II, paragraph 5 (a),
as toxic waste.It shall inform the TechnicalSecretariat of the steps being taken
to destroy or othenvise dispose of such old chemical weapons as toxic waste in
accordance with its national legislation.VerüïcationAnnex
7. Subject to paragraphs 3 to 5, a State Party shall destroy old chemical
weapons that have been confirmed by the Technical Secretariat as meeting the
definition in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), in accordance with Article IV and
Part IV (A) of this Annex.Upon request of a State Party, the Executive Council
may,however,modifythe provisionson tirne-limitand order of destruction of these
old chemical weapons,if it determines that doing so would not pose a risk to the
object and purpose of this Convention.The request shallcontain specificproposals
for modificationof the provisionsand a detailed explanationof the reasons for the
proposed modification.
C. REGIM FEOR ABANDONED CHEMICALWEAPONS
8. A State Party on whose territory there are abandoned chemicalweapons
(hereinafter referred to as the "Territorial State Party") shalater than 30 days
after this Convention enters into force fort, submit to the TechnicalSecretariat
al1availablerelevant informationconcemingthe abandoned chemicalweapons. This
information shall include, to the extent possible, the location, type,quantity and
the present condition of the abandoned chemicalweapons as well as information
on the abandonment.
9. A State Party which discovers abandoned chemical weapons after this
Convention enters intoforce for it shall,notter than 180days afterthe discovery,
submit to the TechnicalSecretariat al1available relevant information concerning
the discoveredabandoned chemicalweapons.This information shallinclude,to the
extent possible, the location, type, quantity and the present condition of the
abandoned chemical weapons as well as information on the abandonment.
10. A State Party which has abandoned chemicalweapons on the territory of
another State Party (hereinafter referred to as the "AbandoningState Party") shall,
not later than 30 daysafter this Convention enters into force for it, submit to the
TechnicalSecretariat ail available relevant informationconceming the abandoned
chemical weapons. This information shall include, to the extent possible, the
location, type, quantity as well as information on the abandonment, and the
condition of the abandoned chemical weapons.
11. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial inspection, and any
further inspections as may be necessary, inorder to verify al1available relevant
information submitted pursuant to paragraphs 8 to 10and determine whether
systematic verificationin accordancewith Part IV (A), paragraphs 41 t43,of this
Annex isrequired. It shall,ifnecessary,verifythe origin of the abandoned chemical
weapons and establish evidence conceming the abandonment and the identity of
the Abandoning State. Part IV(B)
12. The report of the TechnicalSecretariat shall be submitted tothe Executive
Council,the TerritorialState Party,and to the AbandoningState Party or the State
Party declaredbythe TerritorialState Partyor identifiedbythe TechnicalSecretariat
as having abandoned the chemical weapons. If one of the States Parties directly
wncemed isnot satisfiedwith the report it shall havethe right to settle thematter
in accordancewithprovisions of this Conventionor bringthe issueto the Executive
Council with a view to settling thematter expeditiously.
13. Pursuant to Article 1,paragraph 3, the Territorial State Party shallhave
the right to request the State Party whichhas been established as the Abandoning
State Partypursuant toparagraphs 8to 12 to enter intoconsultationsforthe purpose
of destroying the abandoned chemicalweapons in cooperation with the Territorial
State Party. It shall immediately informthe TechnicalSecretariat of this request.
14. Consultations between the Territorial State Party and the Abandoning
State Party with a viewto establishing a mutuallyagreed plan for destruction shall
begin not later than 30 days after the TechnicalSecretariat has been informed of
the request referred to in paragraph 13.The mutually agreed plan for destruction
shall be transmitted to the TechnicalSecretariat not later than180 days after the
Technical Secretariat has been informed of the request referred to in paragraph
13.Upon the request of the Abandoning State Partyand the TerritorialState Party,
the Executive Councilmay extend the time-limitfor transmission of the mutually
agreed plan for destmction.
15. For the purpose of destroying abandoned chemical weapons, the
Abandoning State Party shall provide al1necessary financial, technical, expert,
facility as well as other resources. The Territorial State Party shall provide
appropriate cooperation.
16. If the Abandoning State cannot be identified or is not a State Party, the
Territorial State Party, in order to ensure the destruction of these abandoned
chemical weapons,mayrequest the Organization andother States Parties to provide
assistance in the destruction of these abandoned chemical weapons.
17. Subject to paragraphs 8 to 16,Article IV and Part IV (A) of this Annex
shall also applyto the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons.In the case of
abandoned chemical weapons which also meet the definition of old chemical
weapons in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), the Executive Council,upon the request
of the Territorial State Party, individuallyor together with the Abandoning State
Party, may modifyor in exceptional casessuspend the application of provisionson
destruction, ifit determines that doing so would not pose a risk to the object and
purpose of this Convention. In the case of abandoned chemical weaponswhichdo
not meet the definition of old chemicalweapons in Article II,paragraph 5 (b), the
Executive Council,upon the request of the Territorial State Party, individuallyorVerifcationAnnex
together with the Abandoning State Party,mayin exceptionalcircumstancesmodify
the provisions on the time-limit and the order of destruction, if it determines that
doing so would not pose a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention. Any
request as referred to in this paragraph shall contain specific proposals for
modification of the provisions and a detailed explanation of the reasons for the
proposed modification.
18. States Parties may conclude between thernselves agreements or
arrangements concerning the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons. The
Executive Councilmay, upon request of the Territorial State Party, individuallyor
together with the Abandoning State Party, decide that selected provisionsof such
agreements or arrangements take precedence over provisions of this Section, ifit
determines that the agreement or arrangement ensures the destruction of the
abandoned chemical weapons in accordance with paragraph 17. PART V
DESTRUCTI OFNCHEMICALWEAPONSPRODUCTIONFACILITIES AND ITS
VERiFïCATiONPURSUANTTO ARTICLE V
Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities
1. The declaration of chemicalweapons production facilitiesbya State Party
pusuant to Article III, paragrap1 (c) (iishall contain for each facility:
(a) The name of the facility,the names of the owners,and the names of the
companies or enterprises operating the facilitysi1cJanuary 1946;
(b) The precise locationof the facility,includingthe address, location of the
complex, location of the facility withinthe complex includingthe specific building
and structure number, ifany;
(c) A statement whether it is a facilityfor the manufacture of chemicalsthat
are defined aschemicalweaponsor whether it is facilityfor the fillingof chemical
weapons, or both;
(d) The date when the construction of the facility was completed and the
periods during which any modifications to the facilitywere made, including the
installationofnewormodifiedequipment,that significantlychangedthe production
process characteristics of the facility;
(e) Information on the chemicals defined as chemical weapons that were
manufactured at the facility;the munitions,ices,and containers that were filled
at the facility;and the dates of the beginning and cessation of manufacture
or filling:
For chemicalsdefined as chemicalweapons that were manufactured
(i)
at the facility,h information shall be expressed in terms of the
specific types of chemicals manufactured, indicating the chemical
name inaccordancewiththe current InternationalUnion of Pure and
Applied Chemistry (IUPAC)nomenclature, structural formula, and
the Chemical AbstractsSeMce registry number, if assigned, and in
termsofthe amount ofeach chemical expresseby weightof chemical
in tonnes;
(ii) For munitions, devicesand containers that were filled at the facility,
such information shall be expressedin terms of the specific type of
chemical weapons filledand the weight of the chemicall1per unit;VenficationAnnex
<n The production capacity of the chemical weapons production facility:
(i) For a facilitywhere chemicalweaponswere manufactured, production
capacity shall be expressed in terms of the annual quantitative
potential for manufacturing a specificsubstance on the bais of the
technological process actually usedor, in the case of processesnot
actually used, planned to be used at the facility;
(ü) For a facilitywhere chemicalweaponswere filled,production capacity
shallbe expressedin terms of the quantityof chemicalthat the facility
can fil1into each specific type of chemical weapon a year;
(g) For each chemicalweapons production facilitythat has not been desîroyed,
a description of the faciiity including:
(i) A site diagram;
(ii) A process flow diagram of the facility;and
(iii) An inventory of buildings at the facility,and specialized equipment
at the facility and of any spare parts forsuch equipment;
(h) The present status of the facility,stating:
(i) The date when chemicalweapons were last produced at the facility;
(ii) Whether the facility has been destroyed, including the date and
manner of its destruction; and
(iii) Whether the facilityhasbeen used or modifiedbefore entry into force
of this Convention for an activity not related to the production of
chemical weapons,and ifso, infoimation on what moifications have
been made, the date such non-chemical weapons related activity
began and the nature of such activity, indicating, ifapplicable, the
kind of product;
(i) A specification of the measures that have been taken by the State Party
for closure of, and a description of the measures that have been or will be taken
by the State Party to inactivate the facility;
0) A description of the normal pattern of activityfor safety and secunty at
the inactivated facility; and Part V
(k) A statement as to whether the facilitywillbe convertedfor the destruction
of chemicalweapons and, if so, the dates forsuch conversions.
Declarationsof chemicalweaponsproductionfacilitiespursuantto
ArticleIII,paragraph1 (c) (iii)
2. The declaration of chemical weapons production facilities pursuant to
Article III, paragraph1(c)(iii), shallcontain al1information specifiedinparagraph
1above. It is the responsibility of the State Party on whose territory the facility
is or has been located to make appropriate arrangements with the other State to
ensure that the declarations are made. If the State Party on whose territory the
facilityis orhas been located is not able to fulfilthis obligation, it shall state the
reasons therefor.
Declarationsof pad transfersand receipts
3. A State Partythat has transferred orreceived chemicalweaponsproduction
equipment since 1January 1946shalldeclare these transfers and receipts pursuant
to Article III, paragrap1(c) (iv),and inaccordancewithparagraph 5 below.When
not al1the specified information is available for transfer and receipt of such
equipment for the period between 1January 1946and 1 Janualy 1970,the State
Party shall declare whatever information is still available to it and provide an
explanation as to why it cannot submit a full declaration.
4. Chemical weapons production equipment referred to in paragraph 3
means:
(a) Specializedequipment;
Equipment for the production of equipmentspecificallydesignedfor use
directly in wnnection with chemical weapons employment;and
Equipment designed or usedexclusivelyforproducingnon-chemicalparts
for chemical munitions.
5. The declaration concerning transfer and receipt of chemical weapons
production equipment shall specify:
(a) Who reŒivedltransferred the chemical weapons productionequipment;
(b) The identity of such equipment;
(c) The date of transfer or receipt;
(d) Whether the equipment was destroyed,if known; andVerificationAnnex
(d) Installation of blind flanges and other devices to prevent the addition
of chemicals to,or the removalofchemicalsfrom,anyspeciaiizedprocessequipment
for synthesis,separation or purification of chemicalsdefined as a chemicalweapon,
any storage tank, or any machine for fillingchemicalweapons, the heating, cooling,
or supply of electrical or other forms of power touch equipment, storage tanks,
or machines; and
(e) Interruption of rail, road and other accessroutes for heavy transport to
the chemicalweapons production facilityexcept those required for agreed activities.
14. While the chemical weapons production facility remains closed, a State
Party may continue safety and physicaisecurity activitiesat the facility.
Technicalmaintenanceof chemical weaponsproductionfacilities
prior to their destruction
15. A State Party may cany out standard maintenance activities at chemical
weapons production facilities only for safety reasons, including visual inspection,
preventive maintenance, and routine repairs.
16. Al1planned maintenance activities shallbe specified in the general and
detailed plans for destruction. Maintenance activities shall not include:
(a) Replacement of any process equipment;
Modification of the characteristics of the chemical process equipment;
(b)
Production of chemicals of any type.
(c)
17. Al1maintenance activities shallbe subject to monitoring bythe Technical
Secretariat.
Princi les and methodrfor temporay conversionof
c emrcalweapons productionfacilities into
chemical weapons destruction facilities
18. Measures pertaining to the temporary conversion of chemical weapons
production facilities into chemical weapons destruction facilities shallre that
the regime for the temporarily converted facilities is at least as stringent as the
regirne for chemical weapons production facilitiesthat have not been converted.
19. Chemical weapons production facilities converted into chemical weapons
destruction facilities before entry into force of this Convention shall be declared
under the category of chemical weapons production facilities. They shall be subject to an initial visit by inspectors, who shall wnfirm the
correctnessof the informationabout these facilities.Verificationthatthe conversion
of these facilities wasperformed in such a manner as to render them inoperable
aschemicalweapons productionfacilitiesshall alsobe required, and shall fallwithin
the framework of measures provided for the facilities that are to be rendered
inoperable not later than 90 days after ents, into force of this Convention.
20. A State Party that intends to carry out a conversionof chemicalweapons
production facilities shallsubmitto the TechnicalSecretariat, not later than 30days
after thisConventionenters intoforce forit,or not later than 30daysafter a decision
has been taken for temporary conversion, a general facilityconversion'plan, and
subsequently shall submit annual plans.
21. Should a State Party have the need to convert to a chemical weapons
destructionfacilityan additionalchemicalweaponsproduction facilitythat had been
closed after this Convention entered into force for it, it shall inform the Technical
Secretariat thereof not less than 150 days before conversion. The Technical
Secretariat, in wnjunction with the State Party, shallmake sure that the necessary
measures are taken to render that facility, after its conversion, inoperable as a
chemical weapons production facility.
22. A facilityconverted for the destruction of chemicalweapons shallnot be
more fit for resuming chemical weapons production than a chemical weapons
production facilitywhich hasbeen closedand is under maintenance.Its reactivation
shall require no less time than that required for a chemical weapons production
facility that has been closed and is under maintenance.
23. Converted chemicalweapons production facilitiesshall be destroyed not
later than 10years after entry into force of this Convention.
24. Any measures for the conversion of any given chemical weapons
production facility shall be facility-specificand shall depend upon its individual
characteristics.
25. The set of measures carried out for the purpose of wnverting a chemical
weapons production facilityinto a chemicalweapons destruction facilityshall not
be less than that which is provided for the disabling of other chemical weapons
production facilitiesto becarried out not later than 90 days after this Convention
enters into force for the State Party.VerificationAnnex
Principlesand methodî relatedto destructionof a
chemical.weaponsproduction facility
26. A State Party shall destroy equipment and buildings covered by the
defimitionof a chemical weapons production facility as follows:
Al1specialized equipment and standard equipment shall be physically
destroyed;
(b) Al1 specialized buildings and standard buildings shall be physically
destroyed.
27. A State Party shall destroy facilities for producing unfilled chemical
munitions and equipment for chernicalweapons employment as follows:
(a) Facilities used exclusively for production of non-chemical parts for
chernicalmunitions or equipment specificallydesignedfor use directly inconnection
with chemical weapons employment, shall be declared and destroyed. The
destruction process and its verification shall be conducted according to the
provisions of Article V and this Part of this Annex that govern destruction of
chemical weapons production facilities;
Al1equipment designed or used exclusivelyfor producing non-chemical
parts for chemical munitions shall be physicallydestroyed.Such equipment, which
includes specially designed moulds and metal-forming dies, may be brought to a
special location for destruction;
Al1buildingsand standard equipment used for such production activities
(c)
shallbe destroyed or converted for purposes not prohibited under this Convention,
with confirmation, as necessary,through consultations and inspections as provided
for under Article IX;
(d) Activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention may
continue while destruction or conversion proceeds.
Orderof destruction
28. The order ofdestmction ofchemicalweapons production facilitiesisbased
on the obligations specified inArticle1and the other Articles of this Convention,
including obligationsregarding systematicon-site verification.It takes into account
interests of States Parties for undiminished securiq during the destruction period;
confidence-building in the early part of the destruction stage;radua1acquisition
of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons production facilities;
and applicabilityirrespective of the actual characteristics of the facilities and the
methods chosen for their destruction. The order of destruction is based on the
principle of levelling out. 29. A State Partyshall,for each destruction period, determine whichchemical
weapons production facilitiesare to be destroyed and carry out the destruction in
such a way that not more than what is specified in paragraphs 30 and 31 remains
atthe end ofeachdestruction period.A StatePartyisnot precludedfrom destroying
its facilities at a faster pace.
30. The following provisions shall apply to chemical weapons production
facilities that produce Schedule1 chernicals:
A State Party shall start the destruction of such facilitiesnot later than
(a)
one year after this Convention enters into force for it, and shallcomplete it not
later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention.For a State which is
a Partyat the entry into force ofthisConvention,this overallperiod shallbeivided
into three separate destruction periods,namely,years2-5,years6-8,and years 9-10.
For States which become a Party after entry into force of this Convention, the
destruction periods shall be adapted,taking into account paragraphs 28 and 29;
(b) Production capacity shall be used as the cornparison factor for such
facilities.It shallbe expressedin agenttonnes,takingintoaccountthe mles specified
for binary chemical weapons;
(c) Appropriate agreed levelsof production capacityshall be established for
the end of the eighth year after entry into force of this Convention. Production
capacitythat exceedsthe relevantlevelshallbe destroyedinequalincrementsduring
the first two destruction periods;
(d) A requirement to destroy a given amount of capacity shall entai1 a
requirement to destroyanyother chemicalweaponsproductionfacilitythat supplied
the Schedule 1facility or filled the Schedule 1chemical produced there into
munitions or devices;
(e) Chemical weapons production facilities that have been converted
temporarily for destruction of chernicalweaponsshallcontinue to be subjectto the
obligation to destroy capacity accordingto the provisionsof this paragraph.
31. A State Party shallstart the dest~ction of chemicalweapons production
facilitiesnot coveredin paragraph 30 notlater than one year after this Convention
enters into force for it, and complete it not later than fiveyears after entry into
force of this Convention.
Detailedplansfor destruction
32. Not less than 180days before the destruction of a chemical weapons
production facilitystarts, a State Party shaprovide to the TechnicalSecretariatVerificationAnnex
the detaiied plans for destruction of the facility, includingproposed measures for
verification of destruction referred toin paragraph 33 ÿ), with respect to, inreralia:
(a) Timing of the presence of the inspectors at the facilityto be destroyed;
and
(b) Procedures for verification of measures to be applied to each item on
the declared inventory.
33. The detailed plans for destruction of each chemical weapons production
facility shall wntain:
(a) Detailed time schedule of the destruction process;
(b) Layout of the facility;
(c) Process flow diagram;
(d) ~etailed inventory of equipment, buildings and other items to be
destroyed;
(e) Measures to be applied to each item on the inventory;
ÿ) Proposed measures for verification;
(g) Security/safety measures to be observed during the destruction of the
facility; and
(h) Working and livingconditions to be provided for inspectors.
34. If a State Party intends to convert temporarily a chemical weapons
production facility into a chemicalweapons destruction facility, it shall notifythe
Technical Secretariat not less than 150 days before undertaking any conversion
activities. The notification shall:
(a) Specify the name, address, and location of the facility;
(b) Provide a site diagram indicating al1structures and areas that will be
involved in the destruction of chemical weapons and also identify al1structures of
the chemical weapons production facility that are to be temporarily wnverted;
(c) Specify the types of chernical weapons, and the type and quantity of
chemical fil1to be destroyed;
(d) Specify the destruction method;
(e) Provide a process flow diagram, indicating which portions of the
production process and specializedequipment willbe wnverted for the destruction
of chernical weapons; (f) Specifi the seals and inspection equipment potentially affected by the
conversion, ifapplicable; and
(g) Provide a schedule identifiing: The time allocated to design,temporary
conversion of the facility, installation of equipment, equipment check-out,
destruction operations, and closure.
35. In relation to the destruction of a facilitythat was temporarily wnverted
for destruction of chemical weapons,information shall be provided in accordance
with paragraphs 32 and 33.
Review ofdetailedplans
36. On the basis of the detailed plan for destructionand proposed measures
for verification submitted by the State Party, and on experience from previous
inspections, the Technical Secretariat shall prepare a plan for verifying the
destruction of the facility,consulting closelywith the State Party. Any differences
between the Technical Secretariat and the State Party concerning appropriate
measures shouldbe resolved through consultations. Any unresolved matters shall
be forwarded to the Executive Council for appropriate action with a view to
facilitating the full implementation of this Convention.
37. 'Ioensure that the provisions of Article V andthis Part are fulfilled,the
combined plans for destructionand verification shallbe agreed upon between the
Executive Counciland the State Party. This agreement should be completed, not
less than 60 days before the planned initiation of destruction.
38. Each member of the Executive Councilmay consult with the Technical
Secretariat on any issues regarding the adequacy of the combined plan for
destruction and verification. If there are no objections by any member of the
hecutive Council, the plan shall be put into action.
39. If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council shall enterinto
consultations with the State Party to reconcile. them. If any difficulties remain
unresolved they shall be referred to the Conference. The resolution of any
differencesovermethods of destruction shallnot delaythe executionof other parts
of the destruction plan that are acceptable.
40. If agreement is not reached with the Executive Council on aspects of
verification, or if the approved verification plan cannot be put into action,
verificationof destruction shallproceed through continuous monitoringwithon-site
instruments and physical presence of inspectors.
41. Destruction and verification shallproceed according to the agreed plan.
The verification shallnot unduly interfere with the destruction process and shall
be conducted through the presence of inspectors on-siteto witnessthe destruction.VerificationAnnex
42. If required verification or destruction actions are not taken as planned,
al1States Parties shall be so informed.
Vérificationof declarationsof chemical weapons productionfacilities through
on-siteinspection
43. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial inspection of each
chemical weapons production facilityin the period between 90 and 120days after
this Convention enters into force for the State Party.
44. The purposes of the initial inspection shall be:
(a) Toconfirm that the production of chemicalweapons has ceased and that
the facility has been inactivated in accordance with this Convention;
(b) Topermit the TechnicalSecretariat to familiarizeitself withthe measures
that have been taken to cease production of chemical weapons at the facility;
(c) To permit the inspectors to install temporary seals;
(d) To permit the inspectors to confirm the inventory of buildings and
specialized equipment;
(e) To obtain information necessary for planning inspection activities at the
facility,includinguse of tamper-indicating sealsand other agreed equipment, which
shall be installedpursuant to the detailed facility agreement for the facility; and
u> To conduct preliminary discussionsregarding a detailed agreement on
inspection procedures at the facility.
45. Inspectors shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, markers or other
inventorycontrolprocedures to facilitatean accurate inventory ofthe declared items
at each chemical weapons production facility.
46. Inspectors shall installsuch agreed devicesas maybe necessaryto indicate
if anyresumption of production of chemicalweapons occursor ifany declared item
is removed. Theyshalltake the necessaryprecaution not to hinder closure activities
by the inspected State Party. Inspectors may return to maintain and verify the
integrity of thedevices.
47. If, on the basis of the initial inspection, the Director-General believes
that additional measures are necessaryto inactivate the facility inccordance with
this Convention, the Director-General may request, not later than 135days after
this Convention enters into force for a State Party, that such measures be Part V
implemented by the inspected State Party not later than 180 days after this
Convention enters into force for it. At its discretion, the inspected State Party may
satisfythe request. If itoes not satisfythe request, the inspected State Party and
the Director-General shall consult to resolve the matter.
Systematic verificationof chemical weaponsproduction facilities
and cessationof their activities
48. The purpose of the systematic verification of a chemical weapons
production facilityshall beto ensure that anyresumption ofproduction of chernical
weapons or removal of declared items will be detected at this facility.
49. The detailed facility agreement for each chemical weapons production
facility shall specify:
(a) Detailed on-site inspection procedures, which may include:
(i) Visual examinations;
(ü) Checking and sewicing of seals and other agreed devices; and
(iü) Obtaining and analysing samples;
(b) Procedures for usingtamper-indicatingsealsand other agreed equipment
to prevent the undetected reactivation of the facility, whichshall specify:
(i) The type, placement, and arrangements for installation; and
The maintenance of such seals and equipment; and
(ii)
(c) Other agreed rneasures.
50. The seals or other approved equipment provided for in a detailed
agreement on inspection measures for that facilityshall be placed not later than
240 days after this Convention enters into force for a State Party. Inspectors shall
be permitted to visiteach chemical weaponsproduction facilityfor the installation
of such seals or equipment.
51. During each calendar year, the TechnicalSecretariat shall be permitted
to conduct up to four inspections of each chemical weaponsproduction facility.
52. The Director-General shallnote the inspected State Partyof his decision
to inspector visita chemicalweaponsproductionfacility48hours before the planned
arriva1of the inspection team at the facility for systematic inspections or visits.
115In the case of inspections or visits to resolve urgent problems, this period may be
shortened. The Director-General shall specifythe purpose of the inspection or visit.
53. Inspectors shall, in accordance with the facility agreements, have
unimpeded access to al1parts of the chemical weapons production facilities. The
items on the declared inventory to be inspected shall beosen by the inspectors.
54. The guidelines for determining the frequency of systematic on-site
inspections shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to
Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). The particular production facility to be inspected
shall be chosen by the Technical Secretariat in such a way as to preclude the
prediction of precisely when the facility is to be inspected.
Vén$cation of destructionof chernicalweapons
productionfacilities
55. The purpose of systematic verification of the destruction of chemical
weapons production facilities shall be to confirm that the facility is destroyed in
accordance with the obligations under this Convention and that each item on the
declared inventory is destroyed.in accordance with the agreed detailed plan for
destruction.
56. When al1items on the declared inventory have been destroyed, the
TechnicalSecretariat shall confirm the declaration of the State Party to that effect.
After this confirmation, the Technical Secretariat shall terminate the systematic
verification of the chemicalweapons production facilityand shall promptly remove
al1devices and monitoring instruments installed by the inspectors.
57. After this confirmation, the State Party shall make the declaration that
the facility has been destroyed.
Vmficationof ternporaryconversionof a chernical weaons production
faciliy intoa chernicalweapons destruction facility
58. Not later than90 days after receivingthe initial notification of the intent
to convert temporarily a production facility, the inspectors shall have the right to
visit the facilityto familiarize themselveswith the proposed temporary conversion
and to study possible inspection measures that will be required during the
conversion.
59. Not later than60 days after such a visit, the TechnicalSecretariat and the
inspected State Partyshaii conclude a transition agreement containing additional
inspection measures for the temporary conversionperiod. The transition agreement
shall specify inspection procedures, including the use of seals, monitoring
equipment, and inspections, thatillprovide confidence that no chemicalweaponsproduction takes place during the conversion process.This agreement shail remain
in force from the beginning of the temporaty conversion activityuntil the facility
begins operation as a chemical weapons destruction facility.
60. The inspected State Party shall not remove or convert any portion of the
facility,or remove or modify any seal or other agreed inspection equipment that
mayhave been installed pursuant to this Conventionuntil the transition agreement
has been concluded.
61. Once the facility begins operation as a chemical weapons destruction
facility, it shallbe subject to the provisionsof Part IV (A) of this Annexapplicable
to chemical weapons destruction facilities. Arrangements for the pre-operation
period shall be govemed by the transition agreement.
62. During destruction operations the inspectors shall have access to al1
portions of the temporarily converted chemical weapons production facilities,
including those that are not directly involved with the destruction of chemical
weapons.
63. Before the commencementofworkat the facilityto convertit temporarily
for chemical weapons destruction purposes and after the facility has ceased to
function as a facilityfor chemicalweapons destruction,the facilityshallbe subject
to the provisionsof this Part applicableto chemicalweapons production facilities.
Proceduresfor requestingconversion
64. A request to use a chemicalweapons productionfacilityfor purposes not
prohibited under this Convention may be made for any facilitythat a State Party
is already using for such purposes before this Convention enters into force for it,
or that it plans to use for such purposes.
65. For a chemicalweapons productionfacilitythat isbeingused for purposes
not prohibited under this Convention when this Conventionenters into force for
the State Party, the request shall be submitted to the Director-General not later
than 30daysafter thisConventionenters into force for the State Party. Therequest
shailcontain, in addition to data submitted in accordancewithparagraph 1 (h) (iii),
the followinginformation:
(a) A detailed justification for the request;
A general facility conversionplan that specifies:
(6)VerifkationAnnex
(i) The nature of the activity to be conducted at the facility;
(ii) If the planned activity involves production, processing, or
consumption of chemicals: the name of each of the chemicals, the
flow diagram of the facility, and the quantities planned to be
produced, processed, or consumed annually;
(iii) Which buildings or structures are proposed to be used and what
modifications are proposed, if any;
(iv) Which buildings or structures have been destroyed or are proposed
to be destroyed and the plans for destruction;
What equipment is to be used in the facility;
(v)
What equipment has been removed and destroyed and what
(vi) equipment is proposed to be removed and destroyed and the plans
for its destruction;
The proposed schedule for conversion, if applicable; and
(vu)
The nature of the activityof each other facilityoperating at the site;
(viü)
and
(c) A detailed explanation of how measures set forth in subparagraph (b),
as wellas anyother measures proposed bythe State Party,willensure the prevention
of standby chemical weapons production capability at the facility.
66. For a chemical weapons production facility that is not being used for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention when this Convention enters into
force for the State Party, the request shall be submitted to the Director-General
not later than 30 days after the decision to convert, but in no case later than
four years after this Convention enters into force for the State Party. The request
shall contain the followinginformation:
(a) A detailed justification for the request, including its economic needs;
(b) A general facility conversion plan that specifies:
(i) The nature of the activityplanned to be conducted at the facility; (ii) If the planned activity involves production, processing, or
consumption of chemicals: the name of each of the chemicals,the
flow diagram of the facility, and the quantities planned to be
produced, processed, or consumed annually;
(iü) Which buildingsor structures are proposed to be retained and what
modifications are proposed, if any;
(iv) Which buildingsor structures have been destroyed or are proposed
to be destroyed and the plans for destruction;
(v) What equipment is proposed for use in the facility;
What equipment is proposed to be removed and destroyed and the
(vi)
plans for its destruction;
The proposed schedule for conversion;and
(vii)
(viii) The nature of the activityof each other facilityoperating at the site;
and
(c) A detailed explanation of how the measures set forth in subpara-
graph (b),as well as any other measures proposed by the State Party, will ensure
the prevention of standby chemical weapons production capabilityat the facility.
67. The State Party may propose in its request any other measures it deems
appropriate to build confidence.
Actions pending a decision
68. Pending a decision of the Conference, a State Party maycontinue to use
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention a faciliiythat was being used
for such purposes before this Convention enters into force for it, but only if the
State Party certifies in its request that no specializedequipment and no specialized
buildings are being used and that the specialized equipment and specialized
buildingshave been rendered inactive usingthe methods specifiedin paragraph 13.
69. If the facility, for which the request was made, was not being used for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention before this Convention enters into
force for the State Party,or if the certificationrequired in paragraph 68isnot made,
the State Party shallcease immediatelyal1activitypursuant to Article V,paragraph
4.The State Party shall closethe facilityin accordancewith paragraph 13not later
than 90 days afier this Convention enters into force for it.VerificationAnnex
Conditionsfor conversion
70. As a wndition for conversion of a chemical weapons production facility
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, al1specializedequipment at the
facility must be destroyed andl1special features of buildings and structures that
distinguish them from buildings and structures normally used for purposes not
prohibitedunder this Convention and not involvingSchedule 1 chemicalsmust be
eliminated.
71. A wnverted facilityshail not be used:
(a) For any activityinvolvingproduction, processing, or wnsumption of a
Schedule 1 chemical or a Schedule 2 chemical; or
(b) For the production of anyhighly toxicchemical, including anyhighlytoxic
organophosphorus chemical, or for any other activity that would require special
equipment for handling highly toxic or highly corrosive chemicals, unless the
Executive Council decides that such production or activitywould pose no risk to
the object and purpose of this Convention,taking into account criteria for toxicity,
corrosiveness and, if applicable, other technical factors, to be considered and
approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
72. Conversion of a chemicalweapons production facilityshall be wmpleted
not later than six years after entry into force of this Convention.
Decisionsby the ExecutiveCounciland the Conference
73. Not later than90 daysafter receipt of the request bythe Director-General,
an initial inspectionof the facilityshall be wnducted by the TechnicalSecretariat.
The purpose of thisinspection shallbe to determine the accuracyof the information
provided in the request, to obtain information on the technical characteristics of
the proposed wnverted facility,and to assess theonditions under which use for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention may be permitted. The
Director-General shall promptly submit a report to the Executive Council, the
Conference, and ail States Parties wntaining his rewmmendations on the measures
necessaxyto wnvert the facilityto purposes not prohibited under this Convention
and to provide assurance that the converted facilitywill be used only for purposes
not prohibited under this Convention.
74. If the facility has been used for purposes not prohibited under this
Convention before this Convention enters into force for the State Party, and is
wntinuing to be in operation, but the measures required to be certified under
paragraph 68 have not been taken, the Director-General shall immediately inform
the Executive Council, which mayrequire implementation of measures it deems appropriate, inter alia, shut-down of the facility and removal of specialized
equipment and modificationof buildingsor structures. The Executive Council shall
stipulate the deadline for implementation of these measures and shall suspend
consideration of the request pending their satisfactoiycompletion.The facilityshall
be inspected promptly after the expiration of the deadline to determine whether
the measures have been implemented. If not, the State Party shallbe required to
shut down completely al1facility operations.
75. As soon aspossible after receivingthe report of the Director-General, the
Conference, upon recommendation of the Executive Council, shalldecide, taking
into account the report and any views expressed by States Parties, whether to
approve the request, and shall establish the conditions upon which approval is
contingent. If any State Party objects to approval of the request and the associated
conditions, consultations shall be undertaken among intefested States Parties for
up to 90 days to seek a mutually acceptable solution. A decision on the request
and associated conditions, dong with any proposed modificationsthereto, shall be
taken, as a matter of substance,as soon as possibleafter the end of the consultation
period.
76. If the request is approved, a facilityagreement shallbe completed not later
than 90 days after such a decision is taken. The facility agreement shall contain
the conditions under which the conversion and use of the facility is permitted,
including measures for verification. Conversion shallnot begin before the facility
agreement is concluded.
Detailed plans for conversion
77. Not lessthan 180daysbefore conversionof a chemicalweapons production
facility is planned to begin, the State Party shall provide the TechnicalSecretariat
with the detailed plans for conversion of the facility,includingproposed measures
for verification of conversion, with respect to,interalia:
(a) Timing of the presence of the inspectors at the facilityto be wnverted;
and
(b) Procedures for verification of measures to be applied to each item on
the declared inventory.
78. The detailed plan for conversion of each chemical weapons production
facilityshdl contain:
(a) Detailed time schedule of the conversion process;
(b) Layout of the facility before and after conversion; (c) Process flowdiagram of the facilitybefore, and as appropriate, after the
conversion;
(d) Detailed inventoryofequipment, buildingsand structures andother items
to be destroyed and of the buildings and structures to be modified;
(e) Measures to be applied to each item on the inventory, if any;
(B Proposed measures for verification;
Securitylsafety measures to be obsewed during the conversion of the
(g)
facility; and
Working and livingconditions to be provided for inspectors.
(h)
Reviewof iietailedplans
79. On the basis of the detailed plan for conversion and proposed measures
for verification submitted by the State Party, and on experience from previous
inspections, the Technical Secretariat shall prepare a plan for verifying the
conversion of the facility, consultingclosely withthe State Party. Any differences
between the Technical Secretariat and the State Party concerning appropriate
measures shall be resolved through consultations. Any unresolved matters shall be
forwarded to the Executive Councilfor appropriate action with a viewto facilitate
the full implementation of this Convention.
80. To ensure that the provisions of Article V and this Part are fulfilled, the
combined plans for conversion and verification shallbe agreed upon between the
Executive Counciland the State Party. This agreement shall be completed not less
than 60 days before conversion is planned to begin.
81. Each member of the Executive Council may consult with the Technical
Secretariaton any issueregardingthe adequacyof the combined planfor conversion
and verification.If there are no objectionsbyanymember of the Executive Council,
the plan shall be put into action.
82. If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council should enter into
consultations with the State Party to reconcile them. If any difficulties remain
unresolved, they should be referred to the Conference. The resolution of any
differencesovermethods of conversionshould not delaythe executionofother parts
of the conversion plan that are acceptable.
83. If agreement is not reached with the Executive Council on aspects of
verification, or if the approved verification plan cannot be put into action,
verification of conversion shallproceed through continuous monitoringwith on-site
instruments and physical presence of inspectors. Part V
84. Conversion and verification shall proceed according to the agreed plan.
The verification shall not unduly interfere with the conversion process and shall
be conducted through the presence of inspectors to confirm the conversion.
85. For the 10 years after the Director-General certifies that conversion is
complete, theState Partyshailprovideto inspectors unimpededaccessto the facility
at any time. The inspectors shall have the right to observel1areas, al1activities,
and al1items of equipment at the facility. The inspectors shall have the right to
verifythat theact~ities at the facilityare consistentwith anyconditions established
under this Section, by the Executive Council andthe Conference. The inspectors
shall also havethe right,in accordancewithprovisionsof Part II, SectionE, of this
Annexto receivesamplesfrom anyarea ofthe facilityandto analysethem to verify
the absence of Schedule 1 chemicals,their stable by-products anddecomposition
products and of Schedule 2 chemicalsand to verifythat the activitiesat the facility
are consistent withany other conditions on chemical activities established under
this Section,bythe Executive Counciland the Conference.The inspectorsshallalso
have the right to managed access, in accordance with Part X, Section C, of this
Annex, to the plant site at whichthe facilityis located. During the 10-yearperiod,
the State Partyshallreport annuallyon the activitiesat the wnverted facility.Upon
completion of the 10-year period, the Executive Council, taking into account
recommendations of the Technical Secretariat, shall decide on the nature of
continued verification measures.
86. Costs of verification of the converted facility shall be allocated in
accordance with Article V, paragraph 19. Acnvm~s NOT PROHïBITED UNDER THIS CONVEN~ON
-.IN ACCORDANCE WITHAKTXCLE VI
REGIM EOR 'SCHEDUL 1ECHEMICALSAND FA CI^
REUTED TO SUCH CHEMICALS
1. A State Partyshallnot produce, aquite, retain or useSchedule 1chemicals
outside the territories of StatesParties and shallnot transfer such chemicalsoutside
its territory except to another State Party.
2. A State Party shall not produce, acquire, retain, transfer or use
Schedule 1 chemicals unless:
(a) The chemicals are applied to research, medical, pharmaceutical or
protective purposes;and
(b) The types and quantities of chemicalsare strictly limited to those which
can be justified for such purposes; and
(c) The aggregate amount of such chemicals at any given time for such
purposes is equal to or less than 1 tonne; and
The aggregate amount for such purposes aquired by a State Party in
anyyear through production, withdrawalfromchemicalweapons stocksand transfer
isequal to or less tha1 tonne.
3. A State Party may transfer Schedule 1 chemicalsoutside its territory only
to another State Party and only for research,cal,pharmaceutid or protective
purposes in accordance with paragraph2.
4. Chemicals transferred shall not be retransferred to a third State.
5. Not lessthan 30daysbefore anytransfer to anotherState Partyboth States
Parties shallotify the Technical Secretariat of the transfer.
6. Each State Party shall make a detailed annual declaration regarding
transfers during the previous year. The declaration shall be submitted not later than
90 days after the end of that year and shall for each Schedule 1 chemical that has
been transferred include the followinginformation: The chemicai name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service
(a)
registry number, if assigned;
The quantity acquired from other States or transferred to other States
Parties. For each transfer the quantity, recipient and purpose .hall.be included.
Generalprinciplesfor production . ,
7. Each State Party,during production under paragraphs 8 to 12,shallassign
the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the
environment. Each State Party shall wnduct such production in accordance with
its national standards for safety and emissions.
Singlesmall-scalefacility
8. EachState Partythat producesSchedule 1 chemicalsfor research,medicai,
pharmaceutical or protective purposes shall carry out the production at a single
small-scale facility approved by the State Party, except as set forth in para-
graphs 10, 11 and 12.
9. The production at a single small-scale facility shall be carried out in
reaction vesselsin productionlines not wnfigurated for chntinuousoperation. The
volume of such a reaction vesse1shall not exceed 100litres,and the total volume
of al1reaction vessels with a volume exceeding 5 litres shall not be more than
500 litres.
Otherfacilities
10. Production of Schedule 1chemicalsin aggregate quantities notexceeding
10 kg per year may be carried out for protective purposes at one facilityoutside
a single small-scalefacility.Thisfacility shallbe approved by the State Party.
11. Production of Schedule 1 chemicals in quantities of more than 100 g
per year may be carried out for research, medical or pharmaceutical purposes
outside a single small-scale facility in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10 kg
per year per facility.These facilities shallbe approved by the State Party.
12. Synthesisof Schedule1chemicalsfor research,medicalor pharmaceutical
purposes, but not for protective purposes, may be carried out at laboratories in
aggregate quantities less than 100 g per year per facility.These facilitiesshall not
be subject to any obligation relating to declaration and verificationas specified in
Sections D and E. -VeriîicationAnnex
D. DECLARATIONS
Single small-scale facility
13. Each State Party that plans to operate a single small-scale facility shall
provide the TechnicalSecretariat with the precise location and a detailed technical
description of the facility, including .an inventory of equipment and detailed
diagrams. For existing facilities, this initial declaration shall be provided not later
than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party. Initial
declarations on new facilities shall be provided not less than 180 days before
operations are to begin.
14. Each State Partyshallgiveadvancenotification to the TechnicalSecretariat
of planned changes related to the initial declaration. The notification shall be
submitted not less than 180 days before the changes are to take place.
15. AState Partyproducing Schedule 1chemicalsat a singlesmall-sale facility
shall make a detailed annual declaration regarding the activities of the facility for
the previous year. The declaration shall be submitted not later than 90 days after
the end of that year and shall include:
(a) Identification of the facility;
(b) For each Schedule 1 chemical produced, acquired, consumed or stored
at the facility, the following information:
The chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts
(i) SeMce registry number, if assigned;
The methods employed and quantity produced;
(ii)
(iii) The name and quantity of precursors listed in Schedules 1, 2, or 3
used for production of Schedule 1chemicals;
(N) The quantity consumed at the facility and the purpose(s) of the
consumption;
(v) The quantity received from or shipped to other facilitiesin the State
Party. For each shipment the quantity, recipient and purpose should
be included;
The maximum quantity stored at any time during the year; and
(vi)
The quantity stored at the end of the year; and
(vii) Part VI
(c) Information on any changes at the facilityduring the year cornpared to
previously submitted detailed technical descriptions of the facility including
inventories of equipment and detailed diagrams.
16.Each State Party producing Schedule 1 chemicals at a single small-scale
facilityshall make a detailedannual deciaration regarding the projected activities
and the anticipated production at the facilityfor the coming year.The declaration
shall be submitted not lessthan 90 daysbefore the beginningof that year and shall
include:
(a) Identification of thefacility;
(b) For each Schedule 1 chemical anticipated to be produced, consumed or
stored at the facility,thefollowinginformation:
(i) The chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts
SeMce registry number, if assigned;
(ii) The quantity anticipated to be produced and the purpose of the
production; and
(c) Information on any anticipated changes at the facilityduring the year
compared to previously submitted detailed technical descriptions of the facility
including inventories of equipment and detailed diagrams.
Other facilit reiersredto inparagraphs 10 and Il
17. For each facility, a State Party shall provide the Technical Secretariat
with the name, location and a detailed technical description of the facility or its
relevant part(s)as requested by the TechnicalSecretariat. Thefacility producing
Schedule 1 chernicalsfor protective purposes shall be specificallyidentified. For
existing facilities, this initial declaration shall be provided not later than 30 days
after this Conventionenters into force for the State Party. Initial declarations on
newfacilitiesshallbe providednot lessthan 180daysbefore operations are to begin.
18. Each State Partyshallgiveadvancenotificationto the TechnicalSecretariat
of planned changes related to the initial declaration. The notification shall be
submitted not less than 180days before the changes are to take place.
19. Each State Party shall,for eachfacility,make a detailed annual declaration
regarding the activitiesof the facilityfor the previous year. The declaration shall
be submitted not later than 90 days after the end of that year and shall include:
(a) Identification of the facility; For each Schedule 1chemicalthe followinginformation:
(b)
(i) The chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts
Serviceregistrynumber, if assigned;
(ii) The quantity produced and, in case of production for protective
purposes, methods employed;
(iii) The name and quantityof precursors listed in Schedules 1, 2, or 3,
used for production of Schedule 1 chemicals;
(iv) The quantity consumed at the facility and the purpose of the
consumption;
(v) The quantitytransferredto other facilitieswithinthe State Party Fo.r
each transfer the quantity,recipient andpurpose shouldbe included;
(vi) The maximumquantity stored at any time during the year; and
The quantity stored at the end of the year; and
(vii)
(c) Information onanychangesat the facilityor itsrelevantparts duringthe
year compared to previouslysubmitteddetailedtechnicaldescriptionof the facility.
îû. Each StatePartyshall,for eachfacility,makea detailed annualdeclaration
regarding the projected activitiesand the anticipated production at the facilityfor
the comingyear. The declaration shall be submitted not less than 90 daysbefore
the beginningof that year and shall include:
(a) Identification of the facility;
(b) For each Schedule 1 chemicalthe followinginformation:
(i) The chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts
Serviceregistry number, ifassigned;and
(ii) The quantityanticipated to be produced, the time periodswhen the
production is anticipated to take place and the purposes of the
production; and
(c) Informationonanyanticipatedchangesat thefacilityor itsrelevantparts,
during the year compared to previouslysubmitted detailed technical descriptions
of the facility. PartVI
E. VERIFICATION
Singlesmall-scalefaciliq
21. The aim of verification activitiesat the single small-scale facilityshall be
to verifythat the quantities of Schedu1echemicalsproduced are correctlydeclared
and, in particular, that their aggregate amount does not ex. .d1 tonne.
22. The facility shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site
inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments.
23. The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections for a
particular facility shall be based on the risk to theobject and purpose of this
Convention posed by the relevant chemicals,the characteristicsof the facilityand
the nature of the activities carried out there. Appropriate guidelines shall be
wnsidered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph
21 (i).
. The purpose ofthe initial inspectionshailbtoverifyinformationprovided
concerning the facility,includingverification of the limits on reaction vessels set
forth in paragraph 9.
25. Not later than 180daysafter this Conventionenters into force for a State
Party,it shail conclude a facilityagreement, based ona model agreement, with the
Organization, wvering detailed inspection procedures for the facility.
26. Each State Partyplanningto establisha singlesmail-scalefacilityafter this
Convention enters into force for it shail wnclude a faciiityagreement, based on
a model agreement, withthe Organization,coveringdetailed inspectionprocedures
for the facilitybefore it begins operation or is used.
27. A model for agreements shall be considered and approvedby the
Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
Otherfacilitiesrefeiredto inparagraphs10 and 11
28. The aim of verification activitiesat any facilityreferred to in paragraphs
10 and 11 shall be to verify that:
(a) The facility isnot used to produce any Schedule 1 chemical,except for
the declared chemicals;
(b) The quantities of Schedule1chemicalsproduced,processedor consumed
are wrrectly declared and consistent with needs for the declared purpose; and
(c) The Schedule 1 chemical is not diverted or used for other purposes. 29. The facility shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site
inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments.
30. The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections for a
particular facility shall be based on the risk to the object and purpose of this
Convention posed by the quantities of chemicals produced, the characteristics of
the faciliiyand the nature of theact~ities carried out there. Appropriate guidelines
shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII,
paragraph 21 (i).
31. Not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into forcefor a State
Party, it shallconclude facilityagreements with the Organization, based on a model
agreement covering detailed inspection procedures for each facility.
32. Each State Party planning to establish such a faciliiyafter entry into force
of this Convention shallconclude a facilityagreement with the Organization before
the facility begins operation or is used. WrlVII
Acrrvm~s NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION
IN ACCORDANCEWITH ARTICLE VI
REGIME FOR SCHEDUL 2ECHEMICALS AND FACILITIES
RELATED TO SUCH CHEMICALS
Dechrationsof aggregate national data
1. The initial and annual declarations to be provided by each State Party
pursuant to ArticleM, paragraphs 7 and 8,shall include aggregate national data
for the previous calendar year on the quantities produced, processed, consumed,
imported and exported of each Schedule 2 chemical, as well as a quantitative
specification of import and export for each country involved.
2. Each State Party shall submit:
(a) Initial declarations pursuant to parag1anot later tha30 days after
this Conventionentersinto force for it; and, starting in the followingcalendar year,
(b) Annual declarations not later th90daysafter the end of the previous
calendar year.
Dechrationsofplant sites roducing, processingor consuming
Sche fule 2 chemicak
3. Initial and annual declarationsare required for al1plant sitesthat comprise
one or more plant(s) which produced, processed or consumed during any of the
previous three calendar years or is anticipated to produce, process or consume in
the next calendar year more than:
1 kg of a chemicaidesignated"*" in Schedule2, partA;
(a)
(b) 100kg of any other chemical listed in Schedu2, partA; or
1tonne of a chemical listedin Schedule2,part B.
(c)
4. Each State Party shall submit:
(a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 not later than
30daysafter thisConventionenters into force for it; and, starting in the following
calendar year;
Annual declarations on past activitiesnot later than 90days after the
end of the previous calendar year;VeriTicationAnnex
(c) Annual declarations on anticipated activities not later than
60 days before the beginning of the following calendar year. Any such activity
additionally planned after the annual declaration has been submitted shall be
declared not later than five daysbefore this activity begins.
5. Declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 are generally not required for
mixtures containing a lowconcentration of a Schedule 2 chemical. They are only
required, in accordance with guidelines,in cases where the ease of recoveryfrom
the mixture of the Schedule 2 chemical and its total weight are deemed to pose
a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention. These guidelines shall be
considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII,paragraph
21 (i).
6. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 shall include:
(a) The name of the plant site and the name of the owner, company, or
enterprise operating it;
(b) Its precise location including the address; and
The number of plants within the plant site which are declared pursuant
to Part VI11of this Annex.
7. Declarations of a plant sitepursuant to paragraph 3shall also include,for
each plant which is located within the plant site and which falls under the
specificationsset forthin paragraph 3, the followinginformation:
(a) .The name ofthe plantand the nameof the owner,company,or enterprise
operating it;
(b) Its precise location within the plant site including the specific building
or structure number, if any;
(c) Its main activities;
(d) Whether the plant:
(i) Produces, processes, or consumes the declared Schedule 2
chemical(s);
(ii) 1sdedicated to such activitiesor multi-purpose; and
(iii) Performs other activities with regard to the declared
Schedule 2 chemical(s),includinga specificationof that other act~ity
(e.g. storage); and
The productioncapacityof the plantfor eachdeclared Schedule 2 chemical.
(e) 8. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph3 shall also include the
followinginformationon each Schedule 2chemicalabovethe declarationthreshold:
(a) Thechemicalnarne,wmmon or trade name usedbythefacility,structural
formula, and Chemical Abstracts Service registrynumber, if assigned;
In the case of the initial declaration: the total amount produced,
(b)
processed, consumed,imported and exported by the plant site in each of the three
previous calendar years;
In the case of the annual declaration on past activities:the total amount
produced, processed, consumed, imported and exported by the plant site in the
previous calendar year;
In the case of the annual declaration on anticipated activities:the total
amount anticipated to be producmi,processed or consumed bythe plant site in the
following calendar year, including the anticipated time periods for production,,
processing or consumption; and
The purposes for whichthe chemicalwasor willbe produced, processed
or consumed:
Processingand consumptionon sitewitha specificationofthe product
(i)
types;
(ii) Sale or transfer within the territory or to any other place under the
jurisdiction or control of the State Party,witha specificationwhether
to other industry,trader or other destination and,ifpossible,of linal
product types;
(iii) Direct export, with a specificationof the States involved;or
(i) Other, includinga specificationof these other purposes.
Dechrationsonpastprodu~tionof Schedule2 chernicals
for chernicalweaponspurposes
9. Each State Party shall, notlater than 30daysafter this Conventionenters
into force for it, declare aplant sitescomprisingplants that produced at any time
since 1 January 1946 a Schedule 2 chemicalfor chemical weaponspurposes.
10. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 9 shall include:
(a) The name of the plant site and the name of the owner, Company,or
enterprise operating it;VerificationAnnex
(b) Its precise location including the address;
For eachplant whichislocated withinthe plant site,and whichfallsunder
(c)
the specificationsset forth in paragraph 9, the same information as required under
paragraph 7, subparagraphs (a) to (e); and
(d) For each Schedule 2 chemical produced for chemicalweapons purposes:
(i) The chemical name, common or trade name used hy the plant site,
for chemical weapons production purposes, structural formula, and
Chemical Abstracts Service registxynumber, if assigned;
(ii) The dates when the chemical was produced and the quantity
produced; and
(iii) The locationto whichthe chemicalwasdeliveredand the finalproduct
produced there, if known.
Information to States Parties
11. A list of plant sites declared under this Section together with the
information provided under paragraphs 6, 7 (a), 7 (c),7 (d) (i),7 (d) (iü),8 (a)
and 10 shall be transmitted by the Technical Secretariat to States Parties upon
request.
General
12. Verification provided for in Article VI, paragraph 4, shall be carried out
through on-site inspection at those of the declared plant sites that comprise one
or more plants which produced, processed or consumed during any of the previous
three calendar years or are anticipated to produce, process or consume in the next
calendar year more than:
(a) 10 kg of a chemical designated "*" in Schedule 2, part A,
1 tonne of any other chemical listed in Schedule 2,part A; or
(b)
10 tonnes of a chemical listed in Schedule 2, part B.
(c)
13. The programme and budget of the Organization to be adopted by the
Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (a) shall contain, as a separate
item, a programme and budget for verification under this Section. In the allocation
of resources made availahle for verification under Article VI, the Technical
Secretariat shall, during the first three years after the entry into force of this Part VI1
Convention, give priority to the initial inspections of plant sites declared under
SectionA. The allocationshallthereafter bereviewedon the basisofthe experience
gained.
14. The TechnicalSecretariat shallconduct initial inspectionsand subsequent
inspections in accordance with paragraphs 15to 22.
Inspectionaims
15. The general aim of inspections shall be to verify that activities are in
accordance with obligations under this Convention and consistent with the
information to be provided in declarations. Particularaims of inspections at plant
sites declared under Section A shall includeverification oE
The absenceofanySchedule 1chemical, especiallyitsproduction, except
if in accordance with Part VI of this Annex;
(b) Consistency with declarations of levels of production, processing or
consumption of Schedule 2 chemicals; and
(c) Non-diversionof Schedule 2 chemicalsfor activitiesprohibitedunder this
Convention.
Initial inspections
16. Each plant site to be inspected pursuant to paragraph12 shall receive an
initial inspections soon as possiblebut preferablynot later than three years after
entry intoforceofthis Convention.Plant sitesdeclaredafter thisperiod shall receive
an initial inspection not later than one year after production, processing or
consumption is first declared. Selection of plant sites for initial inspections shall
be made by the TechnicalSecretariat in such a wayas to preclude the prediction
of precisely whenthe plant site is to be inspected.
17. During the initial inspection, adraft facilityagreement for the plant site
shall be prepared unless the inspected State Party and the TechnicalSecretariat
agree that it is not needed.
18. With regard to frequency and intensity of subsequent inspections,
inspectorsshallduringthe initial inspection assessthe riskto the objectand purpose
of this Convention posedby the relevant chemicals,the characteristicsof the plant
site and the nature of the activitiescarried out there,nginto account, inte rlia,
the followingcriteria:
The toxicityof the scheduled chemicalsand of the end-products produced
with it, ifny;
(b) The quantityof the scheduled chemicalstypicallystored at the inspected
site;VerificationAnnex
The quantity of feedstock chemicalsforthe scheduled chemicalstypically
(c)
stored at the inspected site;
The production capacity of the Schedule 2 plants; and
(d)
(e) . The capability and convertibility for initiating production, storage and
filling of toxic chemicals at the inspected site.
Inspections
19. Having received the initial inspection, each plant site to be inspected
pursuant to paragraph 12 shall be subject to subsequent inspections.
20. In selecting particular plant sites for inspection and in deciding on the
frequency and intensity of inspections, the Technical Secretariat shall give due
consideration t'othe risk to the object and purpose of this Convention posed by
the relevant chemical, the characteristics of the plant site and the nature of the
activitiescarried out there, taking into account the respective facilityagreement as
weUas the results of the initial inspections and subsequent inspections.
21. The Technical Secretariat shall choose a particular plant site to be
inspected in such a way as to preclude the prediction of exactly when it will be
inspected.
22. No plant site shall receive more than'two inspections per calendar year
under the provisions of this Section. This, however, shall not limit inspections
pursuant to Article IX.
Inspection procedures
23. In addition to agreed guidelines, other relevant provisionsof this Annex
and the Confidentiality Annex, paragraphs 24 to 30 below shall apply.
24. A facilityagreementfor the declared plant site shallbe conciudednot later
than 90 days after completion of the initial inspection between the inspected State
Party and the Organization unless the inspected State Party and the Technical
Secretariat agree that it is not needed. It shall be based on aode1agreement and
govern the conduct of inspections at the declared plant site. The agreement shall
specify the frequency and intensity of inspections as well as detailed inspection
procedures, consistent with paragraphs 25 to 29.
25. The focusof the inspection shallbe the declaredSchedule 2 plant(s) within
the declared plant site. If the inspection team requests accessto other parts of the
plant site,access to these areas shall be granted in accordance with the obligation
to provide clarification pursuant to Part II, paragraph 51, of this Annex and in accordance with the facilityagreement, or, in the absence of a facilityagreement,
in accordance with the rules of managed access as specified in Part X, Section C,
of this Annex.
26. Accessto records shall be provided, as appropriate, to provide assurance
that there has been no diversionof the declared chemicaland that production has
been consistent with declarations.
27. Sampling and analysis shall be undertaken to check for the absence of
undeclared scheduled chemicals.
28. Areas to be inspected may include:
(a) Areas where feed chemicals (reactants) are delivered or stored;
(b) Areas where manipulative processes are performed upon the reactants
pnor to addition to the reaction vessels;
(c) Feed lines as appropriate from the areas referred to in subparagraph (a)
or subparagraph (b) to the reaction vesselstogetherwith anyassociatedvalves, flow
meters, etc.;
(d) ' The extemal aspect of the reaction vesselsand ancillaryequipment;
(e) Lines from the reaction vesselsleading to long-or short-term storage or
to equipment further processing the declared Schedule 2 chemicals;
u> Control equipment associatedwith anyof the itemsunder subparagraphs
(a) to (el;
Equipment and areas for waste and effluent handling;
(g)
Equipment and areas for dispositionof chemicalsnot up to specification.
(h)
29. The period of inspection shall not last more than 96 hours; however,
extensionsmaybe agreedbetweenthe inspection team and the inspectedStateParty.
Notification of inspection
30. A State Partyshallbenotifiedbythe TechnicalSecretariatof the inspection
not less than 48 hours before the arriva1of the inspection team at the plant site
to be inspected.Verificaüon Annex
31. Schedule 2 chemicals shallonlybe transferred to or receivedfrom States
Parties. This obligation shall take effect threeyears after entry into force of this
Convention.
32. During this interim three-year period, each State Party shall require an
end-usecertificate,asspecifiedbelow,fortransfersof Schedule 2 chemicalsto States
not Party to this Convention. For such transfers, each State Party shall adopt the
necessasr measures to ensure that the transferred chemicals shall onlybe used for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention. Inter dia, the State Party shall
require from the recipient State a certificatestating, in relation to the transferred
chemicals:
(a) That they will only be used for purposes not prohibited under this
Convention;
(b) That they will not be re-transferred;
(c) Their types and quantities;
(d) Their end-use(s); and
(e) The name(s) and address(es) of the end-user@). PartWI
PART VI11
ACI~VITIE NS T PROHIBITEDUNDER THIS CONVENTION
INACCORDANCEWITH ARTICLV EI
REGIM EOR SCHEDUL 3ECHEMICALSAND FACILITIES
RELATEDTO SUCH CHEMICALS
k DECLARA~ONS
Declarationsof aggregatenationaldata
1. The initial and annual declarations to be provided bya State Partypursuant
to Article VI, paragraphs 7 and 8, shall include aggregate national data for the
previous calendar year on the quantities produced, imported and exported of each
Schedule 3 chemical, as well as a quantitative specification of import and export
for each country involved.
2. Each State Party shall submit:
(a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 1 not later than 30 days after
this Convention enters into force for it; and, starting in the followingcalendar year,
(b) Annual declarations not later than 90 days after the end of the previous
calendar year.
Declarationsofplant sitesproducing Schedul3e chernicals
3. Initial and annual declarations are required for al1 plant sites that
comprise one or more plants which produced during the previous calendar year
or are anticipated tooduce in the next calendar year more than 30 tonnes of a
Schedule 3 chemical.
4. Each State Party shall submit:
(a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 not later than 30 days after
this Convention enters into force for it; and, starting in the followingcalendar year;
(b) Annual declarations on past activities not later than 90 days after the
end of the previous calendar year;
(c) Annual declarations on anticipated activitiesnot later than 60daysbefore
the beginning of the followingcalendar year. Anyactivityadditionally planned
after theannual declaration has been submitted shall be declared not later than
five days before this activity begins.VerificationAnnex
5. Declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 are generally not required for
mixtures containing a low concentration of a Schedule 3 chemid. They are only
required, in accordance with guidelines, in such cases where the ease of recovery
from the mixture of the Schedule 3 chemical and its total weight are deemed to
pose a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention. These guidelines shall
be wnsidered and approved bythe Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph
21 (i).
6. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 shall include:
The name of the plant site and the name of the owner, company, or
enterprise operating it;
Its precise location including the address; and
(b)
The number of plants within the plant site which are declared pursuant
to Part)VI1 of this Annex.
7. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 shall also include, for
each plant which is located within the plant site and which falls under the
specifications set forth in paragraph 3, the followinginformation:
(a) The name of the plant and the name of the owner,company,or enterprise
operating it;
(b) Its precise location within the plant site, including the specific building
or structure number, if any;
(c) Its main activities.
8. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 shall also include the
followinginformation on each Schedule3 chemical above the declaration threshold:
(a) The chemicalname, comrnonor trade name used bythe facility,structural
formula, and Chemical Abstracts SeMce registry number, ifassigned;
(b) The approximate amount of production of the chemid in the previous
calendar year, or, in case of declarations on anticipated activities, anticipated for
the nextcalendar year,expressedin the ranges:30to 200tonnes, 200to 1,000tonnes,
1,000 to 10,000tonnes, 10,000to 100,000tonnes, and above 100,000tonnes; and
(c) The purposes for which the chemical was or wiil be produced. Part WI
Declarations on part production of Schedule 3 chemicah for
chemical weapons puposes
9. Each State Party shall,not later tha30 daysafter this Conventionenters
into force for it, declare al1plant sites comprisingplants that produced at any tirne
since 1January 1946 a Schedule 3 chemical for chemicalweapons purposes.
10.Declarations of a plant site punuant to paragraph 9 shall include:
(a) The name of the plant site and the name of the owner, Company,or
enterprise operating it;
(b) Its precise location including the address;
For eachplant whichis locatedwithinthe plant site, andwhichfallsunder
(c)
the specificationsset forthinparagraph 9, the same information as required under
paragraph 7, subparagraphs (a) to (c); and
For each Schedule3 chemicalproduced for chemicalweapons purposes:
(d)
The chemical name, common or trade name used by the plant site
(i) for chemical weapons production purposes, stmctural formula, and
Chernical Abstracts Service registry nurnber, if qssigned;
The dates when the chemical was produced and the quantity
(ii) produced; and
(iii) The locationtowhichthe chernicalwasdeliveredandthe finalproduct
produced there, if known.
Information to States Parties
11.A list of la nt sites declared under this Section toeether with the
information proviged under paragraphs 6, 7 (a), 7 (c), 8 (a)and 10shall be
transrnitted bythe TechnicalSecretariat to States Parties upon request.
General
12. Verification providedfor in paragraph 5 of Article VI shall be carried out
through on-site inspectionsat those declared plant siteswhichproduced during the
previous calendar year or are anticipated to produce in the next calendar year in
excess of 200 tonnes aggregate of any Schedule 3 chernicalabove the declaration
threshold of 30 tonnes.VerificationAnnex
13. The programme and budget of the Organization to be adopted by the
Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (a),shall contain,asa separate
item, aprogramme and budget forverificationunder thisSectiontaking into account
Part VII, paragraph 13, of this Annex.
14. Under this Section, the Technical Secretariat shall randomly select plant
sites for inspection through appropriate mechanisms, such as the use of specially
designed computer software, on the basis of the following weighting factors:
(a) Equitable geographical distribution of inspections; and
(b) The information on the declared plant sites available to the Technical
Secretariat, related to the relevant chemical,the characteristicsof the plant site and
the nature of the activitiescarried out there.
15. No plant site shall receivemore than two inspections per year under the
provisions of this Section. This, however, shall not limit inspections pursuant to
Article IX.
16. In selecting plant sites for inspection under this Section, the Technical
Secretariat shall observe the following limitation for the combined number of
inspections to be received by a State Party per calendar year under this Part and
Part IX of this Annex: the combined number of inspections shall not exceed three
plus 5 per cent of the total number of plant sites declared by a State Party under
both this Part and Part IX of this Annex, or 20 inspections, whicheverof these two
figures is lower.
Inspectionaims
17. At plant sites declared under Section A, the general aim of inspections
shall be to verify that activitiesare consistent with the information to be provided
in declarations. The particular airn of inspections shall be the verification of the
absence ofanySchedule 1chemical,especiallyitsproduction, exceptifinaccordance
with Part VI of this Annex.
Inspection procedures
18. In addition to agreed guidelines, other relevant provisionsof this Annex
and the Confidentiality Annex, paragraphs 19 to 25 below shall apply.
19. There shall be no facility agreement, unless requested by the inspected
State Party.
20. The focus of the inspections shall be the declared Schedule 3 plant(s)
within the declared plant site. If the inspection team, in accordance with Part II,
paragraph 51, of this Annex, requests access to other parts of the plant site for Part WI
clarification of ambiguities,the extent of such access shallbe agreed between the
inspection team and the inspected State Party.
21. The inspectionteam mayhaveaccessto records in situations inwhichthe
inspection team and the inspected State Party agree that such accesswill assistin
achievingthe objectives of the inspection.
22. Samplingand on-siteanalysismaybe undertaken to checkfor the absence
of undeclared scheduledchemicals.In caseof unresoived ambiguities,samplesmay
be analysedin a designated off-sitelaboratory,subjectto the inipectetaie~a+
agreement.
23. Areas to be inspected may include:
(a) Areas where feed chemicals (reactants) are delivered or stored;
(b) Areas where manipulative processes are performed upon the reactants
prior to addition to the reaction vessel;
(c) Feed lines as appropriate from the areas referred to in subparagra(a)
or subparagraph (b) to the reaction vesseltogether with any associatedvalves, flow
meters, etc.;
The extemal aspect of the reaction vesselsand ancillaryequipment;
(d)
(e) Lines from the reaction vesseisleading to long-or short-term storage or
to equipment further processing the declared Schedule3 chemicals;
(f) ControIequipment associatedwith anyof the itemsunder subparagraphs
(a) to (4;
k) Equiprnent and areas for waste and effluent handling;
(h) Equipment and areas for dispositionof chemicalsnot up to specification.
24. The period of inspection shall not last more than 24 hours; however,
extensionsmaybe agreed betweenthe inspectionteamandthe inspectedStateParty.
Notification of inspection
25. A StatePartyshallbe notifiedbythe TechnicalSecretariatofthe inspection
not less than120 hours before the arrival of the inspection team at the plant site
to be inspected. C. TIUNSFERS TO STATES NOT PARTY TO THIS CONVENTION
26. When transferring Schedule 3 chernicals to States not Party to this
Convention,eachState Party shalladopt the necessarymeasuresto ensure that the
transferred chernicals shallonly be used forrposes not prohibited under this
Convention. Inter alia, the State Party shall require frorn the recipient State a
certificate stating, in relation to the transferred chemicals:
That they will only be used for purposes not prohibited under this
(a)
Convention;
That they will not be re-transferred;
(b)
(c) Their types and quantities;
(d) Their end-use(s); and
(e) The narne(s) and address(es) of the end-user(s).
27. Fiveyears after entry into force of this Convention,the ConferenΠshall
consider the need to establish other rneasiires regarding transfers of Schedule 3
chernicalsto States not Party to this Convention. Wrtm
PART IX
ACTMTES NOT PROHIBITEDUNDER THIS CONVENTION
IN.ACCORDANCE WlTH hXICLE VI
REGIM EOR OTHERCHEMICALPRODUCTIONFAC1LiTE.î
List of other chemical productionfacilities
1. The initial declaration to be providby each State Party pursuant to
ArticleVI, paragraph 7, shall include a list of al1plant sites that:
Produced by synthesisduring the previouscalendar year more than 200
(a)
tonnes of unscheduled discrete organicchemicals;or
Comprise one or more plants which produced by synthesisduring the
(b)
previous calendar year more than 30 tonnes of an unscheduled discrete organic
chemical containing the elements phosphorus, sulfur or fluorine (hereinafter
referred to as "PSF-plants" and "PSF-chernical").
2. The list of other chemicalproduction facilitiesto be submitted pursuant
to paragraph 1shall not include plant sites that exclusivelyproduced explosivesor
hydrocarbons.
3. Each StatePartyshallsubmititslistof other chemicalproduction facilities
pursuant to paragraph 1as part of its initial declaration notlater than 30daysafter
this Convention enters into force for it. Each State Party shall, not than
90 days after the beginningof each followingcalendar year, provide annuallythe
information necessaryto update the list.
4. The list of other chemicalproduction facilitiesto be submitted pursuant
to paragraph 1 shall include the followinginformation on each plant site:
(a) The name of the plant site and the name of the owner, Company,or
enterprise operating it;
(b) The precise location of the plant site includingits address;
(c) Its main activities; and
(d) The approximate number of plants producing the chemicalsspecifiedin
paragraph 1 in the plant site.
5. With regard to plant siteslisted pursuant to paragraph 1(a), the listshall
also include information on the approximate aggregate amount of production ofVerificationAnnex
the unscheduled discrete organic chemicals in the previous calendar year expressed
in the ranges: under 1,000tonnes, 1,000to 10,000tonnes and above 10,000tonnes.
6. With regard to plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph (b),the list shall
also specifythe number of PSF-plantswithin the plant site and include information
on the approximate aggregate amount of production of PSF-chemicals produced
by each PSF-plant in the previous calendar year expressed in the ranges: under 200
tonnes, 200 to 1,000tonnes, 1,000to 10,000tonnes and above 10,000tonnes.
Assistance by theTechnicalSecretanat
7. If a State Party, for administrative reasons, deems it necessary to ask for
assistanceincompiling itslistofchemicalproduction facilitiespursuant to paragraph
1, it may request the Technical Secretariat to provide such assistance. Questions
as to the completeness of the list shall then be resolved through consultations
between the State Party and the Technical Secretariat.
Informationto States Parties
8. The lists of other chemical production facilities submitted pursuant to
paragraph 1, including the information provided under paragraph 4, shall be
transmitted by the Technical Secretariat to States Parties upon request.
General
9. Subject to the provisions of Section C, verification as provided for in
Article VI, paragraph 6, shall be carried out through on-site inspection at:
(a) Plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 1(a);and
(b) Plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph (b) that comprise one or more
PSF-plantswhichproduced during the previous calendar year more than 200tonnes
of a PSF-chemical.
10. The programme and budget of the Organization to be adopted by the
Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21(a),shall contain, as a separate
item, a programme and budget for verification under this Section after its
implementation has started.
11. Under this Section, the Technical Secretariat shall randomly select plant
sites for inspection through appropriate mechanisms, such as the use of specially
designed computer software, on the basis of the followingweighting factors: (a) Equitable geographical distribution of inspections;
(6)The information on the listed plant sites available to the Technical
Secretariat, related to the characteristicsof the plant site and the activitiescarried
out there; and
(c) Proposals by States Parties on a basis to be agreed upon in accordance
with paragraph 25.
12. No plant site shall receivemore than two inspections per year under the
provisions of this Section. This, however, shallnot limit inspections pursuant to
Article IX.
13. In selecting plant sites for inspection under this Section, the Technical
Secretariat shall observe the following limitation for the combined number of
inspections to be received by a State Party per calendar year under this Part and
Part VI11ofthis Annex:the combinednumber of inspections shallnot exceedthree
plus 5 per cent of the total number of plant sites declared by a State Party under
both this Part and Part VI11of this Annex, or 20 inspections, whicheverof these
two figures is lower.
Inspectionaims
14.At plant sites listed under Section A, the general aimof inspectionsshail
be to ve;ify that activities are consistent with the information to be provided in
declarations. The particular aim of inspections shall be the verification of the
absenceofanySchedule 1chemical,especiailyitsproduction,exceptifinaccordance
with Part VI of this Annex.
Inspection procedures
15. In addition to agreed guidelines,other relevant provisionsof this Annex
and the ConfidentialityAnnex, paragraphs 16 to 20 below shall apply.
16. There shall be no facility agreement, unless requested by the inspected
State Party.
17. The focus of inspection at a plant site selected for inspectionshall be the
plant(s) producihg the chemicals specified in paragraph 1, in particular the
PSF-plants listedpursuant to paragraph 1 (6).The inspectedState Partyshail have
the right to manage accessto these plants in accordancewiththe les of managed
access as specified in Part X, Section C, of this Annex. If the inspection team, in
accordancewithPart II, paragraph 51,of this Annex,requests accessto other parts
of the plant site for clarification of ambiguities,thextent of such access shallbe
agreed between the inspection team and the inspected State Party.Vedcation Annex
18. The inspectionteam mayhave accessto recordsin situationsin whichthe
inspectionteam and the inspected State Party agree that such accesswillassist in
achievingthe objectivesof the inspection.
19. Samplingand on-siteanalysismaybe undertaken to checkfor the absence
of undedared scheduledchemicals.In casesofunresolvedambiguities,samplesmay
be analysedin a designatedoff-sitelaboratory,subjectto the inipecttaie ~a&
agreement.
2û. The period of inspection shall not last more than 24 hours; however,
extensionsmay beagreedbetweenthe inspectionteamandthe inspectedStateParty.
Notificationof inspection
21. A StatePartyshallbe notifiedbytheTechnicalSecretariatofthe inspection
not les than 120 hours before the arrivai of the inspectionteam at the plant site
to be inspected.
Implernentation
22. The implementationof SectionB shallstart at the beginningofthe fourth
year after entry into force of this Conventionunlessthe Conference, at its regular
session-inthe third yearafter entryintoforce ofthisConvention,decidesothenvise.
23. The Director-General shall,for the regular sessionof the Conference in
the third year after entry into force of this Convention, prepare a report which
outlines the experienceof the TechnicalSecretariat inimplementingthe provisions
of Parts VI1and VI11of this Annex aswell asof Section A of this Part.
24. At its regular session in the third year after entry into force of this
Convention,the Conference,on the basisof a report of the Director-General,may
alsodecideon the distributionof resources availableforverificationunder Section
B behveen "PSF-plants" and other chemical productionfacilities.Othe~wise,this
distributionshall be leftto the expertiseof the TechnicalSecretariat and be added
to the weightingfactors in paragraph11.
25. At its regular session in the third year after entry into force of this
Convention, the Conference, upon advice of the Executive Council,shall decide
on whichbasis (e.g.regional) proposais byStates Parties for inspections shouldbe
presented to be taken into account as a weightingfactor in the selection process
specifiedin paragraph 11. 26. At the first special session of the Conference convened pursuant to
ArticleVIII,paragraph 22, the provisionsof this Part of the VerificationAnnex
shallbereexamined inthelightofacomprehensivereviewoftheoverallverification
regime for the chemicalindustry (Article VI, Parts VI1to IX of this Annex) on
the basis of the experience gained. The Conference shall then make
recommendations so asto improvethe effectivenessof the verification regime.VeriîicaüonAnnex
CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS PURSUANT TO hllCLE IX
A. DESIGNA~O NND SELECïION OF INSPECTORS
AND INSPECTION ASSISTANTS
Challenge inspections pursuant to Article IX shall only be performed by
1.
inspectors and inspection assistants especiaiiydesignated for this function. In order
to designate inspectors and inspection assistants for challengeinspections pursuant
to Article IX, the Director-General shall, by selecting inspectors and inspection
assistantsfrom among the inspectorsand inspectionassistantsfor routine inspection
activities, establish a list of proposed inspectors and inspection assistants. It shall
comprise a suftïcientlylarge number of inspectors and inspection assistants having
the necessary qualification, experience, ski11and training, to allow for flexibilityin
the selection of the inspectors, taking into account their availability,and the need
for rotation. Due regard shall be paid also to the importance of selectinginspectors
and inspectionassistantson aswidea geographicalbLis aspossible.~hedesignation
of insaectors and insaection assistantsshallfollowthe arocedures arovided for under
Part i1,Section A, of this Annex.
2. The Director-General shall determine the sizeof the inspection team and
select itsembers taking into account the circumstances of a particular request.
The sizeof the inspectionteam shall be kept to a minimumnecessaryfor the proper
fuifilment of the inspection mandate. No national of the requesting State Party or
the inspected State Party shall be a member of the inspectionteam.
3. Before submitting the inspection request for a challenge inspection, the
State Party may seek confirmation from the Director-General that the Technical
Secretariat is in a position to take immediate action on the request. If the
Director-General cannot provide such confirmation immediately, he shall do so at
the earliest opportunity, in keeping with the order of requests for confirmation. He
shall also keep the State Party informed of when it is likelythat immediate action
canbe taken. Should the Director-General reach the conclusionthat timelyaction
on requests can no longer be taken, he may ask the Executive Council to take
appropriate action to improve the situation in the future.
Notification
4. The inspection request for a challenge inspection to be submitted to the
Executive Council and the Director-General shall contain at least the following
information: Part X
(a) The State Party to be inspected and, if applicable, the Host State;
(b) The point of entry to be used;
(c) The size and type of the inspection site;
(d) The concern regarding possible non-compliance with this Convention
includinga specificationof the relevant provisionsof this Convention about which
the concern has arisen, and of the nature and circumstances of the possible
non-compliance as well as al1appropriate information on the basis of which the
wncem has arisen; and
(e) The name of the observer of the requesting State Party.
The requesting State Party may submit any additional information it deems
necessary.
5. The Director-General shallwithinone hour acknowledgeto the requesting
State Party receipt of its request.
6. The requestingState Party shallnotifytheDirector-General of the location
of the inspection site in due time for the Director-General to be able to provide
this information to the inspected State Party not less than 12 hours before the
planned arriva1of the inspection team at the point of entry.
7. The inspection site shallbe designated by the requesting State Party as
specificallyaspossible byprovidinga site diagram related to a reference point with
geographic coordinates,specified to the nearest second if possible.If possible,the
requesting State Party shall also provide a map with a general indication of the
inspection site and a diagram specifying as precisely as possible the requested
perimeter of the site to be inspected.
8. The requested perimeter shall:
(a) Run at least a 10metre distance outside any buildingsor other structures;
(b) Not cut through existing security enclosures;and
(c) Run at least a 10metre distance outside any existing securiiyenclosures
that the requesting State Party intends to include within the requested perimeter.
9. If the requested perimeter does not conform with the specifications of
paragraph 8, it shallbe redrawnby the inspectionteam so as to conformwith that
provision.Ve.ri6catioAnnex
10. The Director-General shall, not less tha12 hours before the planned
arrivai of the inspection team at the point of entry, inform the Executive Council
about the location of the'inspection site as specified in paragraph
11. Contemporaneously with informing the Executive Council according to
paragraph 10, the Director-General shall transmit the inspection request to the
inspected State Party including the location of the inspection site as specified in
paragraph 7. This notification shall aiso include the information specified in Part
II, paragraph32,of this Annex.
12. Upon airival of the inspection team at the point of entry, the inspected
State Party shall be informed by the inspectionm of the inspection mandate.
Enhy into the terriiory of the inspected State Party
or the Host State
13. The Director-General shall, in accordance with Article IX, paragr13hs
to 18,dispatch an inspection team as soon as possible aaneinspection request
has been received. The inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry specified
in the request in the minimum time possible, consistent with the provisions of
paragraphs 10 and 11.
14. If the requested perimeter is acceptable to the inspected State Party, it
shail be designated as the final perimeter as early as possible, but in no case later
than 24 hours after the arrivai of the inspection team at the point of entry. The
inspected StatePartyshdl transport the inspection team to the final perimeter of
the inspection site. If the inspected State Party deems it necessary, such
transportation may begin up to 12 hours before the expiry of the time period
specifiedin this paragraphfor the designationof the final perimeter. Transportation
shall, in any case, be completed not later th36hours after the arrival of the
inspectionteam at the point of entry.
15. For aildeclared facilities,the procedures insubparagraphs (a) and (b) shail
apply. (For theurposes of thisPart, "declared facility"means al1facilitiesdeclared
pursuant to Articles III, IV, aV.With regard to Article VI, "declared facility"
means only facilitiesdeclared pursuant to Part VI of this Annex,as well as declared
plants specified by declarations pursuant to Part VII, para7rands10 (c), and
Part VIII, paragraphs7 and 10 (c)of this Annex.)
(a) If the requested perimeter is contained within or conforms with the
declared perimeter, the declared perimeter shail be considered the finalperimeter.
The final perirneter may, however,if agreed by the inspected State Party, be made
smaller in order to conform with the perimeter requested by the requesting
State Party. (b) The inspected State Party shall transport the inspection team to the final
perimeter as soon as practicable, but in any case shail ensure their arrival at the
perimeter not later than 24 hours after the arrivai of the inspection team at the
point of entry.
Alternativedeterminationof@al pmimeter
16. At the point of entry, if the inspected State Party cannot accept the
requested perimeter, it shall propose an alternativepenmeter as soon as possible,
but in any case not later than 24 hours after the mival of the inspection team at
the point of entry. In case of differences of opinion, the inspected State Party and
the inspectionteam shall engagein negotiationswith the aim of reachingagreement
on a final perimeter.
17. The alternativeperimeter should be designated as specificaliyas possible
in accordancewithparagraph 8.It shall includethe wholeoftherequested perimeter
and should, as a rule, bear a close relationship to the latter, taking into aCcount
natural terrain features and man-made boundaries. It should normally run close
to the surroundhg securitybarrier if such a barrier exists.The inspected State Party
should seektoestablishsucha relationshipbetween the per&eters byacombination
of at least two of the followingmeans:
(a) An alternative perimeter that does not extend to an area significantly
greater than that of the requested perimeter;
(b) An alternative perimeter that is a short, uniform distance from the
requested perimeter;
(c) At least part of the requested perimeter is visible from the alternative
perimeter.
18. If the alternative perimeter is acceptable to the inspection team, it shall
become the final perimeter and the inspection tearn shail be transported from the
point of entry to that perimeter. If the inspected State Party deems it necessary,
such transportation may begin up to 12hours before the expiryof the time period
specified in paragraph 16 for proposing an alternative perimeter. Transportation
shall, in any case, be completed not later than 36 hours after the arrival of the
inspection team at the point of entry.
19. If a final perimeter is not agreed, the perimeter negotiations shall be
concluded aseariyas possible,but inno caseshalltheycontinuemore than 24houn
after the arrivai of the inspection team at the point of entry. If no agreement is
reached, the inspected State Party shalltransport the inspection team to a location
at the alternative perimeter. If the inspected State Party deems it necessary, such
transportation may begin up to 12 hours before the expiry of the time periodVerificationAnnex
14. Before the commencement of the inspection the inspection team shall
prepare an inspection plan to serve, interaliaa ,s a basis for logistic and safety
arrangements. The inspection plan shall be updated as need arises.
Access
15. The inspection team shall have the right of access to any and al1areas
which could be affected by the alleged use of chemicalweapons. It shall also have
the right of accessto hospitals,ehigee camps and other locations it deems relevant
to the effective investigationof the alleged useofchemical weapons.For suchaccess,
the inspection team shall consult with the inspected State Party.
Sampling
16. The inspection team shall have the right to collect samples of types, and
in quantities it considers necessary.If the inspection team deems it necessary, and
ifsorequested byit, the inspected State Party shallassist inthe collectionof samples
under the supervision of inspectors or inspection assistants. The inspected State
Party shall also permit and cooperate in the collection of appropriate control
samples from areas neighbouring the site of the alleged use and from other areas
as requested by the inspection team.
17. Samples of importance in the investigation of alleged use include toxic
chemicals,munitions and devices,remnants ofmunitionsand devices,environmental
samples (air, soil,vegetation,water, snow,etc.) and biomedicalsamplesfrom human
or animal sources (blood, urine, excreta, tissue etc.).
18..If duplicate samples cannot be taken and the analysis is performed at
off-site laboratories, any remaining sample shall, if so requested, be returned to
the inspected State Party after the completion of the analysis.
Extensionof inspectionsite
19. If the inspection team during an inspection deems it necessary to extend
the investigationinto a neighbouring State Party, the Director-General shall notiQ
that State Party about the need for access to its territory and request and confirm
arrangements for the safe reception of the team. Part XI
Extension ofinspectionduration
20. If the inspection team deems that safe accessto a specificarea relevant
to the investigation is not possible, the requesting State Party shall be informed
immediately.If necessary,the period ofinspectionshall beextended untilsafeaccess
canbe provided and the inspection team will have concluded its mission.
Interviews
21. The inspectionteam shall havethe right to intemiewand examinepersons
who may have been affected by the alleged use of chemical weapons.It shall also
have the right to interview eyewitnessesof the alleged use of chemical weapons
and medical personnel, and other persons who have treated or have come into
contact with persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of chemical
weapons. The inspection tearn shail have access to medicai histories, if available,
and be permitted to participate in autopsies, as appropriate, of persons who may
have been affected by the aileged use of chemical weapons.
Procedures
22. The inspection team shall, not later than 24 hours after its arriva1on the
territory of the inspected State Party, send a situation report to the
Diector-General. It shallfurther throughout the investigationsend progressreports
as necessary.
23. The inspection team shall, not later than 72 hours after its return to its
primary work location, submit a preliminary report to the Director-General. The
final report shallbe submitted to the Director-Generalnot later than30 daysafter
itsreturn to itsprimaryworklocation.The Director-General shallpromptlytransmit
the preliminary and final reports to the ExecutiveCounciland to ail States Parties.
Contents
24. The situation report shallindicate any urgent need for assistance andany
other relevant information. The progress reports shall indicate any further need
for assistance that might be identified during the course of the investigation.
25. The final report shall summarize the factual findings of the inspection,
particularlywith regard to the allegeduse cited inthe request. In addition, a report
of an investigationof anailegeduse shallincludea description of the investigation
process, tracing its various stages,with special reference to:ConfidentialiîyAnnex
Access to confidential information shall be regulainaccordance with
its classificationThe dissemination of confidential information within the
Organization shall bestrictly on a need-to-know basis.
3. The Director-General shall report annually to the Conference on the
implementation of the regime governing the handling of confidential information
by the Technical Secretariat.
Each State Party shall treat information which it receives from the
4.
Organization in accordance with the level of confidentiality established for that
information. Upon request, a State Party shallrovide details on the handling of
information provided to it by the Organization.
B. EMPLOYME ANND CONDUCT OF PERSONNELIN THE
TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT
5. Conditions of staff employment shall be such as to ensure that access to
and handling of confidential information shall be in conformity with the procedures
established by the Director-General in accordance with Section A.
6. Each position in the Technical Secretariat shall be governed by a forma1
position description that specifies the scope of access to confidential information,
if any, needed in that position.
7. The Director-General, the inspectors and the other members of the staff
shall not disclose even after termination of their functions to any unauthorized
persons any confidential information coming to their knowledge in the performance
of theirofficial duties. They shall not comrnunicate to any State, organization or
person outside the TechnicalSecretariat any information to which they have access
in wnnection with their activities in relation to any State Party.
8. In the discharge of their functions inspectors shallonly request the
information and data which are necessary to fulfii their mandate. They shall not
make anyrecords of information collected incidentallyand not related to verification
of cornpliance with this Convention.
9. The staff shall enter into individual secrecyagreements with the Technical
Secretariat covering their period of employment and a period of five years after
it is terminated.
10. In order to avoid irnproper disclosures,inspectors and staff members shall
be appropriately advised and reminded about security considerations and of the
possible penalties that they would incur in the event of irnproper disclosure.
11. Not less than 30 days before an employee is given clearance for access
to confidential information that refers to activities on the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, the State Party concerned
shall be notified of the proposed clearance. For inspectors the notification of a
proposed designation shall fulfil this requirement.
12. In evaluating the performance of inspectors and any other employees of
the TechnicalSecretariat, specificattention shall be given to the employee's record
regarding protection of confidential information.
C. MEASURE TO PROTECTSENSITIVEINSTWATIONS AND
PREVENT DISCLOSUREOF CONFIDENTIALDATA IN THE COURSE OF
ON-SITEVERIFICATIONACïNITIES
13. States Parties may take such measures as they deem necessary to protect
ccnfidentiality, provided that they fulfiltheir obligations to demonstrate compliance
in accordance with the relevant Articles and theificationAnnex. When receiving
an inspection, the State Party may indicate to the inspection team the equipment,
documentation or areas that it considers sensitive and not related to the purpose
of the inspection.
14. Inspection teams shall be guided by the principle of conducting on-site
inspections in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the effective and
timely accomplishment of their mission.They shalltake into consideration proposals
which may be made by the State Party receiving the inspection, at whatever stage
of the inspection, toensure that sensitive equipment or information, not related
to chemical weapons, is protected.
15. Inspection teams shall strictly abide by the provisions set forth in the
relevant Articles and Annexes governing the conduct of inspections. They shallfully
respect the procedures designed to protect sensitive installations and to prevent the
disclosure of confidential data.
16. In the elaboration of arrangements and facility agreements, due regard
shall bepaid to the requirement of protecting confidential information. Agreements
on inspection procedures for individual facilities shall also include specific and
detailed arrangements with regard to the determination ofhose areas of the facility
to which inspectors are granted access, the storage of confidential information
on-site, the scope of the inspection effort in agreedreas, the takingof samples
and their analysis,the access to records and the use of instruments and continuous
monitoring equipment.
17. The report to be prepared after each inspection shall only contain facts
relevant to compliance with this Convention. The report shall be handled in
accordance with the regulations established by the Organization governing the
handling of confidential information. If necessary,the information contained in the
report shall be processed into less sensitive forms before it is transmittedside
the Technical Secretariat and the inspected State Party.ConfidentialityAnnex
D. PROCEDUR ENSCASE OF BREACHESOR ALLEGED
BREACHESOF CONFiDENïïAiITY
18. The Director-General shall establish necessaryprocedures to be followed
in case of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality, taking into account
rewmmendations to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to
Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
19. The Director-General shall oversee the implementation of individual
secrecy agreements. The Director-General shall promptly initiate an investigation
if, in his judgement, there is sufficient indication that obligations concerning the
protection of wnfidential information have been violated. The Director-General
shallalso promptly initiate an investigation if an allegation concerning a breach of
wnfidentiality is made by a State Party.
20. The Director-General shall impose appropriate punitive and disciplinary
measures on staff members who have violated their obligations to protect
confidential information. In cases of serious breaches, the immunity from
jurisdiction may be waived by the Director-General.
21. States Parties shall, to the extent possible, cooperate and support the
Director-General in investigating any breach or alleged breach of confidentiality
and in taking appropriate action in case a breach has been established.
22. The Organization shall not be held liable for anybreach of confidentiality
wmmitted by members of the Technical Secretariat.
23. For breaches involving both a State Party and the Organization, a
"Commission for the settlement of disputes related to confidentiality", set up as
a subsidiaryorgan of the Conference, shallnsider the case.This Commissionshall
be appointed by the Conference. Rules governing its composition and operating
procedures shall be adopted by the Conference at its first session.SelectiveIndex SELECïiVEINDEX
The following sample enhies illustrate thway in which the various sections of the
Convention are referredtoin the Seteciive Index:
Preamble ............................ Preamble
11.2 ................................ ArticleII,paragraph 2
AC.A.2 ............................. Annex on Chemicals, part A,
paragraph 2
VA.X.27,48 ......................... Verification Annex, p8rtX,
paragraphs 27 and 48
CA.2(h) ............................. Gonfidentiality Annex,
subparagraph 2(h).
An underlined entry signifies the primary source of informationon a subject:
................................ The article deaiingwith chemical
weapons
The following acronyms appear in the Selective Index:
CSP ............................... Conferenceof thc States Parties
ICJ ................................ International Court of Justice
ISP ................................ inspected State Party
IUPAC ............................. International Unionof Pure and
Applied Chemistry
OPCW ............................. Organizationfor the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons
PSF ............................... phosphorus, sulfur or fluorine
ber VA.iX)
UN ................................ United Nations
The Selective Index does not contain anyreferences to the "Text on the Establishment of a
Preparatory Commission".
Abaadoned cbemicalweapons
Declarations ............................ III.1(b), VA.IV(B).8-1O
Defmition ............................. 11.6
Destruction ............................ 1.3,VA.IV(B).Z,13-18
Regime for ............................. VA.IV(B).2,8-18
(see also Chemical weqons, buried; Old chemicai weqons)Access
Aerial ................................ VA.X.40(see also TmspoHm'on,
wrrnft)
Challenge inspections..................... IX.20-21,VA.X.38,41-42,59 (see
also Challengeinspection,ancged
ciccess)
Confidentid infornation ................... CA.2(h),5-7, 11, 16
Docurnentation/records.................... VA.Ii.47,VA.VII.26,VA.VIII.21,
VA.IX.18,VA.X.33, VA.XI.21,
CA.16
Fullllessthan ful........................ iX.20, VA.X.29,42, 49, 52
Managed ............................... (see Challenge inspection)
Negotiationof .......................... VA.X.51
Observer's ............................. IX.12, VA.X.55
Other (e.g. neighbouring)States Parti........ VA.II.19-20, VA.XI.6,19
Perimeter,within ........................ VA.X.20,37-39,43,47,51,55
Randornlrandornselective .................. VA.X.27,48 (sec also Plantslplmt
sites, selectionoj)
Rightof ............................... VA.II.45,VA.N(A).49, VA.V.53,
85, VA.X.29,41.55, VA.XI.15
State Paitytopmvide ..................... N.4-5, V.6-7, VI.9, IX.11-12,20-
21, VA.II.20,VA.N(A).E, 60, 65,
70, VA.V.62, VA.VI1.25,
VA.VIII.20-21,VA.X.20,34,37-52,
55, VA.XI.15,CA.1
(sec alsoAnnex on Chemicais;Annex on Implementationand Yenfication;Annex on the
Pmtection of ConfidentialInfornation; Inspectorslinspectiontemn;
Obliga?ionslunde~R coqtuesfsg;StaiePw; Storrqge)
Activitiealpuiporeaaot pmhibited............... VI ,.2, XI.1-2,AC.A.1,3, VA.I.2,
VA.V.27
Defmition ............................. 11.9
Internationalcooperationandlorexchange ...... Preamble,VI.11, XI.1
Regimefor other chernicalpmductionfacilities... VA.D(
~eiime for Schedule 1chemicalsand facilities...
Regimefor Schedule2 chernicals andfacilities... VA.VII
~eiime for Schcdule3 chernicalsand facilitie... EI
Singlesmall-scalefacility.................. IL8
(see alsoMedicalpuposes; Pecicefulpuposes; Proteciivepurposes;Resemh)
Alternaiiveperimeter ........................ (secPenmeter)
(sec alsoDirector-Genemlof the TechnicalSecretmiai;ExecutiveCouncil)
Aaaex on C&emicair ........................ 11.2-3,8,VL2, XV.4, a,
VA.IV(A).2(a),(b)Annex on Implementationand Venfication
('VerificationAnnex') ..................
(see also Inspection; Verification)
Annex on the Pmteciion of Confidentid
Lfomation ("ConfidentiaiityAnnex") VLIO,VII.6,VII1.5,XV.4,
VA.VII.23, VA.VIII.18, VA.IX.15,
VA.X.48,60, a
(see also Confidentid informafionlconj?dentidiiy)
Amais in payment ... :.....................
Assistance
Clarification ofambiguities(by Executive Council) IX.3,5
Definition (assistance against chemical weapons) , X.l
Destruction ............................ IV.11-12,VA.IV(B).I6
Emergencyandlor humanitarian .............. VIIL39,X.6-7,9, 11.
Equipmentproblems,resolving .............. VA.III.16
lmplementation ......................... V11.2,VI11.38
Protectionagainst chemicalweapons .......... X (see also Pmtectionogainst
chemicai weqons)
Voluntq fund X.7
B
..
Binaty chemicai weapons
Components ............................ 11.3-4,VA.IV(A).2(d)-(B,18
Declarations ............................ VA.IV(A).2(d)-(e)
Destruction ............................ VA,IV(A).l8-19,VA.V.30
Productionfacility ....................... 11.8 , ,
(seeMulticomponentchernicd weq~onslsyslems) . .;
Biologicd weapons Convention ................ Preamble,XII1
Capacily
Design ................................ 11.10,VA.IV(A).3l(B
Destruction ............................ VA.V.8-9,30
Nameplate ............................. II.10
Production ............................. IL8, 10,VA.V.lV), 30, VA.V11.18
Storage ............................... VA.IV(B).3l(i)
Ceitificaie,end-use(for cbemicalhansfers) ........ VA.V11.32V , A.VIII.26Ce~tification/ceitify
Conversion, completion of ................. VA.V.85
Destruction of chernical weapons ............. IV.7
Destnictionluse of chemical weapons
production facilities .................... V.9, VA.V.68-69, 74
Equipment ............................. VA.I.1, VA.II.44,56
Laboratories ............................ VA.II.56
Challenge inspection ........................ iX.8-25, VA.X
Abuse of .............................. IX.9,22-23
Access during .......................... (seeAccess, challenge inspections;
managed)
Decide against (314majority in Executive Council) IX.17
Declar. .facilities ........................ VA.X.15, 37, 43, 51-52
Definitions ............................. VA.I.3, 20-21
Exit monitoring during .................... VA.X.23-32
Financial implications of abuse of ............ IX.23
Managed access ......................... VA.V.85, VA.VII.25, VA.IX.17,
VA.X.29,38-52
Point of entrylexit ....................... IX.15, VA.I.10, 24, VA.II.16-32,35-
36, VA.I11.17-18,VA.IV(A).46,
VA.X.4-23, 39, 47, 53, 58,VA.XI.3
Procedure.for ........................... iX.8-25, VA.X.I,35
Report ................................ iX.21, VA.X.59-61
Request ............................... IX.2, 7-11, 13-14,16-18,22, VA.I.3,
25, VA.X.2-4, 44,59 (see also
Inspection, requesl)
Right to request ......................... IX.2, 7-8, 22
Time limits (during a challenge inspection) ..... iX.15, 17,VA.X
(see also Exenrtive Council; Facility agreements;Inspection; Observer, Verification,
ruleslpmvisions, geneml)
Chaiter (of the United Nations) ................ Preamble, IX.1, XIV.1, XXIII .
Chernicai.pmduction facilities (see Chemical weqons production facilities; Other.chemica1. .
production facilities)
Chernicalweapons ......................... E
Buried ................................ 111.2,IV.17, VA.IV(A).13
Categories, three (for purpose of deshuction) .... VA.IV(A).16
Dumped ............................... 111.2,IV.17,VA.IV(A).13
Nerve agent or blister agent ................. VA.IV(A).6(c)
Removal/transport ....................... IV.4, 10-11, VA.IV(A).7, 9,40-43,
61, 64, VA.V.13, 48
Stockpiles ..................... .. ..... Preamble, 1.1,AC.A.1, 3,
VA.IV(A).15
Transfers .............................. Preamble, 1.1,III.l(a),(c), X.2,
VA.N(A).5, VA.V.3, VA.VI.2 (see
also Transfers) ..
Usability .............................. VA.IV(B).5
(see alsoAbmdoned chernicalweqons; Binq chemical weqons; Declarations;
Definitions and criteriq Destruction of chemical weqons; Equipment;Herbicides;
Mixtures of chemicais; Multicomponent chemicai weqonslsystems; Old chemicai
weqons; Schedule 1, 2 or 3 chemicaisifacilities;Storage; Toxic chemicais;
Trcasporfm'on)
Cbemicd weapons destnietioa facilities
Annual reports .......................... VA.IV(A).6,36
Coastructionltesting ...................... VA.N(A).14, 17,29
Conversion ofchemical weapons production
facilities ............................ (see Convenion)
Declarations ............................ III.l(c), VA.111., A.V.1(k)
Inspection of ........................... IV.4-5, VA.III.6,VA.N(A).30, 49,
51, 53-55, 59-63, 65-70,VA.V.58-
63
Plan for destruction ...................... VA.N(A).6, 29-35, VA.V.7-9
Removal of chemical weapons tolûom ......... N.4, VA.N(A).43,61
(see also Destruction of chemicai weqons; Stomge)
Cbemicd weapoas pmductioa facilities ........... V, VA.V
Closedlclosure .......................... IIl.l(c),V.4,7,VA.V.l(i),12-14,
21-22,46, 69
Conversion ............................ (see Conversion)
Declarations ............................. III.I(c), V.9, VA.V.l-IO, 45,
VA.IX.3
Defimition ............................. IL8
Destruction ............................ I.4,Ill.l(c),V.7-12,16,19,VA.V.6-
9, 11-42,55-57, 70
Order of destruction ...................... VA.V.28-31
Renderedinoperable ...................... VA.V.19,21
Use of (in exceptionalcases of
compellingneed) ...................... V.12-14,VA.V.64-66
(see alsoActivitieslpurposesnotprohibited)
Cbemicds ............................... K
Corrosive .............................. VA.1.2,5, VA.V.71
Discrete organic ......................... VA.1.4,VA.iX.1,5
Explosives ............................. VA.iX.2
Hydmcarbons ........................... VA.IX.2
Identificationof ......................... VA.N(A).(c)
Mixtures .............................. VA.N(A).2(d), VA.V11.5,VA.VIII.5
Not listed in Scheduleslunscheduled ........... 11.7,V111.38(e)V, A.N(A).Z(b),
VA.iX.1, 51 (see also Other
chemicaiproductionfacilities)
Organophosphoms ....................... VA.V.71
Production, processingor use ............... 11.12,VI.11, XI.1-2
PSF .................................. (seePSF chemicalslplmts) Riot control agents ....................... (seeRio! contml agents)
Schedules ............................. (seeSchedules 1, 2, 3)
Synthesis .............................. 11.8,VA.I.5, VA.V.13,VA.VI.12,
VA.IX.1
Toxic ................................. 11.1-4,9,VI.I-2,x,VA.I.5,
VA.IV(A).2(d),(e),VA.IV(B).6,
VA.V.71,VA.VII.18,VA.XI.3, 17
(see also Chemicalweqons; Otherchemicals;Schedules 1, 2, 3; Storage; Tmnsfers)
Compliaacdnon-complisnee
Challenge inspection ...................... (see Challenge inspection)
Clarificationof .......................... VIII.40,M.2-8, VA.II.51,64,
VA.VII.25, VA.VIII.20,VA.IX.17,
VA.X.39,42,44
CSP, mle of ............................ VIII.20,21(k),XII.1-4(see also
CSP)
Doubts/ambiguities/uncertaintie ............. VIII.36,40, E.2-5, 7, VA.II.51,60,
VA.VIII.20,22, VA.IX.17
Executive Council,role of .................. VIII.31,35-36, M.3-7, 22-23,XII.2
InspectedState Party obliged to demonstrate .... VA.X.42,49, 52
Inspectionreport tocontainfacts relevant to ..... VA.II.62, VA.X.59,CA.17 (see also
Inspection,reports)
Inspection requestto contain
informationregarding ................... iX.9, VA.X.4
Inspection tem to use only methods
necessaryto clariS ..................... VA.X.44
Measures to ensure ....................... VIII.2l(k), M.23, XJ
Measuresto redress ...................... (seeMemures to redress)
OPCW ................................ VIII.1,CA.17
Sanctions .............................. XII,XIV.6 (seealso Memures to
redress;Sanctions)
State Party,mle of ....................... IX.2-5, 11,20, VA.X.29,42,49, 52,
CA.13
Technical Secretariat,role of................ VIII.37,40
Confidence-building ........................ VA.IV(A).IS,VA.V.28,67
Confidentidinfomaîiodconfiden6diiy
Accessto .............................. CA.Z(h),5-7, 11,16
Breachesor allegedbreaches of .............. CA.18-23
Civil and military activitiesand faciliti....... VIII.5,CA.1
Classified/classificatio.................... CA.Z(c),(d),(h)
Dataldocument .......................... V11.6,VIII.5,E.11, VA.X.48,61,
CA.1-2, 15
Disclosures, righttoprevent ................ E.ll, VA.X.48 Level of sensitivity ....................... c~.2(4
Liability of the Organization ................ CA.22
Need-to-knowbasis ...................... CA.2(h), 6, 8
Penalities, punitive measures ................ CA.10, 20 ...
Protection ............................. VI.10, VIII.5, IX.11. VA:il.S6,
VA.X.48, CA
Release ............................... CA.2(c)
Rules/regulations ........................ CA.I(c),(h), 17
State Party'smatment of. .................. V11.6,CA.4
Storage ............................... CA.Z(e)-0, 16
Technical Secretariaito abide by provisions for .. VI.10, CA.20
Treatmentniandling ....................... V11.6
(se- also ConjidentialityAnnex)
Consultations. cooperatioa and fact-findiag ........ -IX (see alsoDimctor-Geneml,
Executive Council;Settlement of
disputes; TechnicalSecretariai;
OPCW)
Director-General(with States Parties) .......... VI11.45,VA.II.13, VA.V.47
Executive Council ....................... V111.313 , 6, XIV.2,VA.N(A).ZO,
57-58, VA.V.38-39, 81-82
Inspection team ....................... 1X.20, VA.XI.15
OPCW .............................. VIILI, XN.2
Staîes Parties ......................... VIII.1, 31, 36, IX.1-2, XIV.2,
VA.IV(B).13-14,VA.V.27,75
Technical Secretariat ...................... VIIi.40, VA.11.18,VA.N(A).35, 53,
57, VA.IV(B).13-14,VA.V.36,38,
75, 79, 81, VA.lX.7
Convention and Amexed ..................... XV-XXN
Accession ............................. XX
-
Amendments ...........................
Authentic tcxts ..........................
Depositary .............................
Duraiion and withdrawal ...................
Enûy into force .........................
Ratification ............................
Reservations ............................
Signahire ..............................
Siatus of annexes ........................
Convenion (of chernicalweapons pmdudion
facilitien)
Actions pending a decision ................. Chemical weaponsdestruction.for purposeof
Conditionsfor ..........................
Costs of verification ......................
Decisionby Executive Councilandlor CSP .....
Notification ............................
Plans for ..............................
Transition agreement .....................
Verificationof ..........................
(see also Chemical weqons
productionfacilities)
Cosb
Destruction .............................
Executive Councildecideson ...............
inspection .............................
OPCW ................................
PreparatoryCommission ...................
Scale of (financial)assessrnent ..............
TechnicalSecretariatto bear ................
Verification ............................
CSP.mlemd funetions ....................
Agreements. procedures consideredand
approvedby (pursuantto VIII.21) ........
Chaiman ..............................
Chemical weaponsproductionfscilities (permission
touse) ............................. V.13, VA.V.68
CornplianceInon-cornpliance ................ VII1.20,21(k). 35-36. 1x.7, 23.25.
XII.1-4,CA.23
Confidentialinformation ................... VA.11.56,CA.Z(c)-(d), 3. 18.23
VA.V.73.75, 82. 85
Conversion ............................ VA.VII.5, VA.VIII.5
Declarations.guidelinesfor .................
Director-Generalof the Technical Secretariat .... v111.21(4,44,46
Emergencyandhumanitarian assistance ........ VIII.39,X.7, II
Executive Council ....................... (seeExecutiveCounciI)
Extensionof destructiondeadline ............. VA.N(A).22.26 VIII.10,21(i),X.7, VA.N(A).51,
VA.IX.26,CA.23
Guidelines ............................. (seeInspection)
Old chemicalweapons, usability of ........... VA.N(B).S
Programmeand budget (of the OPCW) ........ VIII.2l(a), 32, VA.VI1.13, .
VA.VIII.13,VA.IX.10
Quorum ............................... VIII.I6
Reviewof operationof Convention/verification
regune VIII.22,VA.IX.26
Setîlementof disputes ..................... XN.4-5, CA.23
Specialsession .......................... VIII.12, 22, 33, IX.4,,.VA.iX.26
TechnicalSecretariat ...................... (see Technicd Secretmiai)
Voting ................................ V111.8,17-18
III, VA.VI.13-20, VA.VII.1-11,
VA.VIII.I-II, VA.IX.1-8
Aggregatenational data III.l(a), VA.N(A).l, VA.VII.1-2,
VA.VIII.l-2
Annuel N.7(b), V.9(b),V1.8,VA.VI.6,15-
16, 19-20,VA.VII.1-8,VA.VIIi.1-8,
VA.IX.3,CA.2(b)
Assistanceand protection .................. X.7(c)
Changes ............................... III.l(e), VA.VI.14,18
Chemical weapons ....................... III.l(a), N.4, 915, VA.IV(A).I-7,
16,4243, 69, VA.N(B).3,
VA.V.45,VA.VII.9,VA.VIII.9
Chemicalweaponsdestructionfacilities .... III.l(c), VA,V.l(k)
Chemicalweaponsproductionfacilities .... III.l(c), V.6, 9, 18,VA.V.1-IO,19,
27,4347
Confidentialityof ........................ CA.2(b)
Destruction ............................ III.l(a),(c), N.7, V.9, VA.IV(A).I-6,
16, 18,29-37,69, VA.V.6-IO,27,
32-35, 55-57
Initial III, N.9, VI.7, VA.VI.13-14, 17-18,
-
VA.VII.1-II, VA.VIII.1-Il,
VA.IX.1-6,CA.2(b)
Inventoryformatfor ...................... VA.N(A).S
Old and abandoned chemical weapons ......... III.l(b), VA.IV(B).3
Otherfacilities .......................... III.I(d), VI.7-8, VA.IX.1-8
Scheduledchemicals ...................... (seeSchedule 1,2 or 3
chemicdslfiiIities)
Shipments ............................. VA.IV(A).61-62,VA.VI.15 Single small-scalefaciliîy .................. VA.VI.13-16
Supplier and recipient countries .............. VA.IV(A).S,VA.VI.6, 15. 19.
VA.VI1.32,VA.VIII.26
Threshold ........................... (seeThresholdF)
Transfers ............................ III.l(a),(c), VA.IV(A).S,VA.V.3-5,
VA.VI.6,VA.V11.7(see also
CeHificure.end-use)
Unlisted chernicals ....................... VA.N(A).2(b)
Verification ............................ (sec Venficdion)
(see also Abmdoned chernicalweqons; Obligations;Old chernicalweqons)
Definitions and cntena ......................
Abandonedchemicalweapons ...............
Chemical weapons .......................
Chernicalweapons productionfacility .........
Key componentof binary or multicomponent
chemical systems ......................
Old chemicalweapons ....................
Organization ...........................
Precursor ..............................
Production capacity ......................
Purposes not prohibitedunder this Convention ...
Riot control agent ........................
Toxic chernical ..........................
(see also Definitions inAnnexes)
Definitions in Annexes ...................... AC.B, VA.I
Delivey systems ........................... (seeMuniiionsldevices)
Desbuaion of chemicaiweapons ............... 1.2-3,N.3, VA.N
Abandonedchemicalweapons ............... 1.3,VA.N(B).13-18
Assistance ............................. N.11-12, VA.N@).16
Conversionand verification.adequacyof plans for VA.V.81
Costs ................................. N.16, V.19, VA.N(A).6(g), 26:
VA.IV(B).lS
Defmition ............................. VA.N(A).lZ
Exceptional circumstances .................. VA.N(A).21, VA.IV(B).17
Levelling out principle (order of destruction) .... VA.IV(A).15
Methods pmhibited ....................... VA.N(A).13
Modification andextensionof deadlines ........ VA.IV(A).17.20-28
Old chernical weapons .................... VA.N(B).6-7, 17
Orderof ............................... N.6, 8. VA.N(A).15-21,
VA.IV(B).7, 17
Period. annual .......................... 1v.7, V.9, VA.N(A).6(a), 17. 29.36
Period. IO-year ............. .. .......... 1v.6, 8. V.lO, VA.IV(A).25,
VA.V.30
Phases .......................... VA.IV(A).I7, 21. 64 Plan for ............................... III.l(a)(v). N.7. VA.N(A).6. 20. 22.
25. 28.36. VA.N@).14
Plan for inspecting ....................... VA.N(A).50-60
Preparationfor .......................... VA.N(A).9
Process ............................... IV.7. VA.IV(A).lZ. 31(e). 66. 70
Ratefpaceand sequence of .................. IV.6
Removal for ............................ N.4. VA.N(A).7.9. 15.4243, 64
Reports (annual) ......................... VA.N(A).28.36. VA.V.9-IO
Safeîy ................................ IV.IO.12.V.11.VA.N(A).6(e).
31(i). 32. 49. 62. VA.V.33
Samples.monitoring of analysis of ........... VA.N(A).70 (see also
Smples fsmpling)
Temination of venfication ................. VA.N(A).43. VA.V.56
Transitional verification arrangements ......... VA.111.6.7. VA.N(A).51
Undetected removal ...................... VA.IV(A).4I
(see also Assisimce; Chemicai weqons desituctionfacilities; Chemicai weqons
pmduciion facilifies; Conversion;Declumtions;Equipmenl;Schedule 1
chemicaislfailiiies; Yenfication)
Dest~ciion of chemicalweaponspmdriction
facil~bes ............................... 1.4.III.l(c). V.7-12. 16. 19.
VA.V.l(g), 6-9. 11-42.55-57. 70
(see also Conversion)
Director-Genedof theTechnicalSeeretaiiaî,
mle andfunctions ........................ VIII.ZI(d). 41.4 3.46
Amendments(to the Convention) ............. XV.2. 5
Assistance and protection .................. X.9-11
Challenge inspection ...................... IX.8. 13-16, 18.21. VA.X.l.6.
10-11. 13.60-61
Chemical weapons productionfacilities ........ VA.V.47. 52.65.66. 73-748 .5
Clarification (ofcompliance) ................ IX.4. VA.II.64
Confidential information ................... CA.2.3. 5. 7. 18-21
Executive Council informed by .............. VA.11.65.VA.V.74. VA.X.10.
VA.XI.5, 12 (see alsoExecutive
Council)
Inactivationof chemical weapons
production facilities.................... VA.V.47
Inspectionmandate ...................... IX.18. VA.I.14. VA.II.39
Inspection. notificationof .................. VA.Il.31-32, VA.V.52.VA.X.II.
VA.XI.6, 19
Inspection report ........................ IX.21.VA.II.62.65. VA.V.73.
VA.X.60-61, VA.XI.22-23
Inspection request ....................... IX.13.16. 18. VA.V.73.VA.X.24.
11. 13.VA.XI.12
inspectoratesupervisedby ................. VIII.42
Inspectors/inspectionteam designatedby ....... K.8. VA.1.17.VA.II.7. VA.XI.8 Investigationof allegedchemicai weapons use ... X.9. VA.XI.1.3. 6.12. 19.22.23
Pnvileges and immunities .................. VIII.49. 51.VA.11.13.14.CA.20
Report onexperienceof TechnicalSecretariat .... VA.IX.23
Requestfor protection andassistance .......... X.9
Samples.responsibilityfor ................. VA.II.56
(seealso CSP; ExecutiveCouncil;ScientificAdvisotyBo&; TechnicalSecretaria)
Disputes.seüiementof ...................... m. CA.23
Eeonomicand technologid development ......... Preamble.VI.11, a
End-use cettificates.......................... VA.VII.32, VA.VIII.26
Environmentalproteciion
During destruction .......................
Dunng implementationof obligations .........
During inspection ........................
Duringproductionof Schedule 1chemicals .....
Dunngtransport .........................
Equipment
Approved .............................. VA.I.1,VA.II.1l(d). 12.27.30. 44.
53. VA.V.50,VA.X.22
Assistancelprotection(againstchernicalweapons) . X.l, 3. VA.V.13
Authenticationdocuments .................. VA.11.29
Availableon site ........................ VA.II.27,30
Chemical weapons destruction ............... VA,N(A).13,29,31(d), VA.V.34
Chemical weaponsproduction ............... 11.8,IIl.l(c), V.8, VA.I.2,5.6.
VA.V.l(d),(g), 3-5. 7-9. 13.26.27.
33.44. 65-66. 70. 78.VA.VI.13,
15.16.VA.V11.28,VA.VIII.23
Chemical weapons storage ................. VA.N(A).I(c),2(g),3;317VA.V.13
Conver..on ............................ VA.V.27, 34.65.66. 70. 78.85
Definition ............................. VA.I.5
Destructionof .......................... V.8, VA.V.5,7-9. 26.27. 65. 66(b).
70. 78
Detectionldecontamination .................. X.1
Installed............................... VA.I.5, VA.N(A).29, 60.
VA.V.I(d), 13.44. 50. 60. VA.X.22
(see also Monitoring.instnrments)
Location-fmding ......................... VA.X.22
Monitoruig ............................. (seeMonitoring. instruments)
Non-prohibited .......................... VI.11,X.3, XI.1-2,VA.V.27
Non-standardlaboratory ................... VA.I.5
Process ............................... VA.I.6,VA.V.l, 13. 16.34
Product synthesis ......................... VA.1.5 Samp..analysis ......................... VA.II.53,56,58
Sensitive .............................. VA.X.33,46,48, CA.13-14,16
Specialized............................. VA.I.2,5, VA.V.l(g), 4, 13,26,34,
44, 68,70, 74
Standard .............................. VA.I.5,VA.II.56
Transfer ................................ III.I(c), VA.V.3-5
(see alsoInspection;Monitoring; Seals;Vessels. reaction)
ExecutiveCouacil, mle end funetions ............ VIII.23-36
Amendments (toihe Convention) ............. XV.5
Assistanceand protection .................. X.9-Il
Chaiman .............................. VIII.27
Challengeinspection ...................... IX.13, 16-17,21-25, VA.X.34, IO-
11,60
Composition ........................... VIIL23-25
Confidentid information ................... CA.2(c),(e)
Destructionof chemical weapons ............. IV.8, 13-14, 16V, A.I11.6-7,
VA.IV(A).20,22, 24, 26,28, 51, 53,
56-58,70
Destructionof chemicd weapons
production facilities.................... V.lO, 13, 16-17,19,VA.V.36-40,
71, 73-75,79-83,85
Destructionof old and abandoned
chemicalweapons ..................... VA.IV(B).7,12, 14, 17-18
Investigation ofdleged use ................. VA.XI.5,12.23
Pnvileges and immunitiesof representativesto ... VI11.49
Reviewcompositionof .................... V111.232,5
Specialsession .......................... IX.4
Voting ................................. VIII.29
(see alsoAssistmce; Complimcelnon-complimce; Conversion;CSP;Dimctor-Geneml;
Industry;Memures to redress;NationalAuthority; RepoHs;Rights of States Pdies;
Scientifc Ah>isov Bo& Settlement of disputes; TechnicalSecretmiat;Voluntmy
fun41
Exit monitoring ............................ (see Challengeinspection)
Export
Scheduledchemicals ...................... VA.VII.I,8, VA.VIII.1
(see alsoImpori;Schedule 1, 2 or 3 chemicdslfacilifies;Tmsfers)
Extension
Inspection duration ....................... VA.II.59,VA.V.20
Destruction period ....................... (seeDestructionof chemical
weqons, modiQ?carion andextension
of deadlines)Faciliiies
Definition ............................. VA.1.6
(see also Binq chemicaiweqons; Chemicaiweqons destructionfacilities; Chemicai
weqons productionfacilities; Conversion;Ofherchemicaipmductionfacilities;
Plmtsiplmt sites, Schedule 1.2 or 3 chemicais~acilities;Single smail-scaiefaciliry)
Faciliîy agieements ......................... VA.I.7, VA.II.38, 45, VA.III.1-9
Challenge inspection ...................... VA.X.51
Chernical weapons destruction facilities ........ VA.III.4-7, VA.N(A).S 1,59-60, 63,
70
Chemical weapons production facilities ........ VA.V.44(e), 49-50, 53, 76
Confidentialiîy .......................... CA.16
Model ................................ VA.III.8, VA.Vl.25-27,31,
VA.VI1.24
Other chemical production facilities ........... VA.IX.16
Schedule 1 ............................. VA.VI.25-26,31-32
Schedule 2 ............................. VA.VII.I7,20, 24-25
Schedule3 ............................. VA.VIII.19
Storage facilities......................... VA.IV(A).42, 46, 49, 63
Transitional ............................ VA.III.6-7, VA.IV(A).51
(see also Access)
Genwa Pmtocol ............................ Preamble, XIII, XVI.3
Guidelines
Confidentialiîy .......................... CA.2(a)-(h) (see also Confidentid
information/confidentiaiity)
Old chernical weapons, usabiliîy of ........... VA.IV(B).S
Preparatory Commission develops ............ VIII.21(i)
Schedules of chernicals .................... AC.A, VA.VII.5 (see also Schedule
1, 2 or 3 chemicais/focilities)
(see also CSP;ExecutiveCouncil;Inspection;TechnicaiSecretm'at)
Headq..tîers agnxment ...................... VIII.50
Heibicides ............................... Preamble
Host State (inspecîions) ...................... VA.I.8-9, 12, VA.II.9-44,61,
VA.X.4, 13, 54, 56Jmmunity fmmjunsdiction ................... (see Inspectorslinspectionteam)
hpod
Scheduledchemicals ...................... VA.VII.1, 8, VA.VIII.1
hcapacitdion/incapacitding ..... ;............. 11.2,AC.A.
hdusby
Purposesnot pmhibited .................... 11.9(see alsoActivitieslpurposesno!
pmhibited)
Verification ............................ u, VA.IX.26(see also Other
chemicalproduction facilities;
Schedule 2 or 3 chemicds~ïilities)
(se also Other chemicalproductionfacilities; Plmtsiplant sires;Schedule 1, 2 or3
chemicals/facilities)
Initial visi............................... VA.IV(A).54-55,VA.V.19(see also
Inspection)
hspecîed StatePsi*......................... VA.I.12(see also Obligations; -
Rights of InspectedState Pmfy)
hspeetioo
Aims ................................. VA.VII.15,VA.VIII.17,VA.IX.14
Challenge ............................. (see Challenge inspection)
. .
Communications ......................... VA.II.1l(c), 26.44, VA.X.54
Conduct of. ............................ IX.8,10, 12, 18-19, VA.I.14-15, 17,
VA.II.18,33, 35, 38-60, 62, 66,
VA.IV(B).S,11,VA.V.44,51,
VA.VII.14,24, VA.X.24,33, 38-61,
VA.XI.8, 15-21,CA.14-15
Debnefing ............................. VA.iI.60
Definitions (inspection: initial, assistant, mandate,
manual, site, team)..................... VA.I.ll-17
Documentation/~ecords .................... (seAccess)
Durationlperiod ......................... VA.I.1O, 22-23,VA.11.44,
VA.IV(A).45,VA.V.52,VA.X.54
Extensionof. ........................... VA.II.59,VA.VII.29, VA.VIII.24,
VA.IX.20,VA.X.57,VA.XI.20
Equipment ............................. VA.I.1,VA.II.1l(d), 12,22, 27-30,
35, 44, 51, 58, VA.III.15-16,
VA.IV(A).oO,VA.V.34,50, 60,
VA.X.22,24
Guidelines ............................. VIII.ZI(i), VA.II.42-43, 56,
VA.III.13,VA.N(A).44, 51,
VA.V.54,VA.VI.23,27, 30,
VA.VII.23, VA.VIII.18,VA.IX.15,
VA.X.51
Intounby escort ........................ VA.I.9,VA.Il.35 Initial................................ VA.I.II,VA.III.I-9,18,
VA.IV(A).49,54, VA.IV(B).S,11,
VA.V.4347, 58, 73, VA.VI.24,
VA.VII.13-20, 24, VA.X.34
Interviews ............................. VA.11.26.46,VA.X1.21,25
Mandate .............................. D(.ll,I8,VA.1.14,16,VA.I1.13,
3840, 62, VA.X.2, 12,59
Manual ............................... VA.I.15,VA.II.42,45,56
Notification ............................ (seeNotificafion)
Number, intensiîy, duration,timing and
mode of ............................ VA.VI.23,30
On-site ............................... (see On-siteinspectionlvenficalion)
Photographslphotographing ................. VA.Il.48,51, VA.III.9,VA.X.24, 26,
CA.2(e)
Plan ................................. VA.N(A).53-54, VA.X.32-34,43,
46, VA.XI.14
Post-inspectionprocedures ................. VA.II.60-61, VA.X.58-61
Pm-inspection activities ................... VA.II.31-37, VA.III.17-18V , A.X.3-
37, VA.XI.3-14
Pm-inspectionbnefmg .................... VA.II.37,VA.X.32-34,43,46
Purpose ............................... N.4-5, V.6-7, IX.8-IO,VA.11.46,
VA.III.1,VA.N(A).37, 45, 68,
VA.V.44,52,55,73, VA.Vi.24,
VA.X.33,CA.13
Reports ............................... IX.12, 21-22, VA.II.46, 515 ,8,62-
65, VA.IV(B).12,VA.V.73,
VA.X.59-61, VA.XI.22-26C , A.17
(see alsoComplimcelnon-
complimce; Reports)
Request ............................... IX.9, 13-18, VA.I.16, VA.X.3-4, 11,
13,29, 39, 44, 49, 52 (see also
Chailengeinspection,request)
Routine ............................... VA.X.1
Rules,general .......................... VA.11.38-42(see also venficalion)
Selectionof sites for...................... VA.IV(A).44,VA.V.54,VA.VII.16,
20, VA.VIII.14, 16V , A.iX.11, 13
Storageareaslfacilitie..................... iV.5, VA.N(A).41-49,61
Techniques ............................. VA.IV(A).48
Visual ................................ VA.V.I5,49, VA.X.50
(see alsoAccess; Confidentid infomalionlconfidentiality;Costs;Director-Geneml;
Equipment;Guidelines;Initiai visit;Mqs; Monitoringsystems;Noti3cation; On-site
inspectionlvenficarion;Post-inspectionpmcedures; Pre-inspectionactivities; Reports;
Safety; Yenficarion;Weightingfactom)
Iaspecîorate .............................. VIII.42(see also TechnicalSecretariui)
laspeetoislinspeetionteam .................... (see partiallisting of referencesin AnnexonImplementationmd
Vetiflcation)
Access ................................ V1.9,IX.20-21,VA.1.22,VA.II.19-
20,4445, VA.N(A).49,60, 65, 70,
VA.V.53,62, 85, VA.VIi.25,
VA.VIII.20-21,VA.M.18, VA.X.20,
29, 32,3740, 4749, 52, 55, 59,
VA.XI.15,19-21, CA.16
Arriva1 ................................ IX.15,VA.I.10,23, VA.IL24.31,
35-37, VA.III.17,VA.N(A).45-47,
VA.V.52,VA.VII.30, VA.VIII.25,
VA.M.21,VA.X.6, 10, 12-14,16-
19,21,23,25,53,55, VA.XI.13
Assistant ....................... :...... VA.L13,17,VA.II.I-8,10-11,20,
32, 43, VA.X.1-2,VA.XI.8,16
Confidentialinfornation ................... CA.7-8,10-13,16
Consu..ations ........................... iX.20,VA.XI.15
Defïuiihon ............................. VA.1.17-18
Depamire .............................. VA.I.10,22-23, VA.II.61,VA:X.58
(see alsoPointof entty/exit)
Designationlselectionlassignment............. IX.8,VA.I.13, 17,VA.II.l-9, 20,
VA.X.1-2, VA.XI.7-9, CA.11
Eswrt ................................ VA.1.9,VA.11.35V , A.X.26
Independence of ......................... VI11.46-47
Listof ................................ VA.II.2,5,8,10,VA.X.I,VA.Xi.8
Mandate/principles ....................... D< .1, 19,VA.1.14
Objection to ............................ VA.II.2,4,46
Physicalpresenceof ...................... VA.N(A).59,66, VA.V.4041,83-
84
Privilegesandforimmunities ................ VA.1I.B
Rccniitment ............................ VIII.44
Reports ............................... (seeReports)
Rights ................................ (seeRightsof inspection
teŒnlinspeclors)
Safety ................................ VA.II.27,35,40,43, VA.N(A).49,
62, VA.X.32,VA.XI.14,19-20
Training ............................... VA.X.1
Transportationltranspor .t................. VA.II.22.26, VA.IV(A).46,
VA.X.14-15, 18-192 ,2
Visas, transit........................... VA.II.10
(see alsoAssistmce; Diector-Geneml,Inspection;Reports; Rightsof inspection
teŒnlinspeciors;TechnicaiSectetariut;Transporiaiion)
httuments ............................... (seeEquipment;Monitoring)InternationalCouit of Justice(ICI)
Advisoryopinion ........................ XN.5
Referralto ............................. XN.2
internationalUnion of hite and Applied
Cbemisûy (IUPAC) ...................... VA.N(A).2(c), VA.V.1(e)
investigation
Allegedbreachof confidentiality............. CA.19
Allegeduse/useof chemicalweapons .......... IX.19,X.9-Il, VA.XI
(see alsoChemicaiweqons, usabilily)
Junsdiction or contml ....................... 1.2,4,11.8, 111,1(a)-(),.1, 5, Il,
V.l, VI.2,VII.1, V111.48,X.8,
VA.1.3,12,VA.II.2, 14, 21,
VA.V11.8,VA.XI.27, CA.11,20
K
Key componenb 11.3-4.,VA.N(A).Z(e),18(see also
Pmnrrsors)
Lebonitories .............................. VA.1.5-6,VA.IL55-58,
VA.N(A).32, VA.XI.26
Designated &y the OPCW) ................. VA.II.55-58, VA.VIII.22, VA.IX.19
Off-site ............................... VA.II.55,57, VA.VIII.22,VA.IX.19,
VA.XI.18
Researchandlor development ............... IlI.l(d), VA.1.6,VA.VI.12
(see alsoResemh)
Law enforcernent .......................... 11.9(seeA ctivitieslputposesnot
pmhibited, Riot contml cppents)
Liabilityniable ............................ VA.11.25,CA.22
Maoagedafcess ........................... (see Challenge inspection)
Maps .................................. VA.I.21,VA.11.37,VA.N(A).l,
VA.X.7,22, 33Maikeis ................................. VA.N(A).39,62, VA.V.45, (see
also Seais; Tags)
Meatuies to iediess (non-compliance) ............ m, XN.6
CSP ................................. VIII.2I(k),36,IX.23,XIl.l-4
Executive Council ....................... VIII.36,iX.23, X11.1-3
Suspension of rights and privileges ........... XII.2
(see also Complimcelnon-complimce)
Medical arsistancdcare ...................... X.1,VA.II.26,VA.X.56
Medical cenWf~eiliiy1pemonaeVseetio .......... VA.1.5-6,13,VA.N(A).3 l(j),
VA.XI.21
Medical eraminatiouslmearuies ................ VA.N(A).3 l(j), VA.XI.25
Medical purposes .......................... 11.9,V.14, X1.2,VA.VI.2-3, 8,11-12
(see also Peacefulpurposes)
Mixture oschemicals ....................... VA.N(A).2(d), VA.VII.5, VA.VIII.5
Monitoring
Bilaterallmultilateralagreements ............. IV.14, V.17
Data ................................. VI.4-6, VA.X.24
Exit .................................. VA.X.23-31
instruments ............................ N.3, 5, V.3, 7, 15,V1.3-4,VA.II.56,
VA.III.l, 6-7, 10-12, 14,
VA.N(A).42-43, 51, 59,66,
VA.V.40, 56, 83,VA.Vl.22, 29,
VA.X.36,CA.16
Maintenance activities ..................... VA.N(A).I 1,VA.V.17
Sensors ............................... VA.X.27
Systems ............................... VA.II.10-16
(see also Equipmeni; Schedule 1, 2 or 3 chemicaislfaciliiies; Verijication)
Multicompowut cbemicalweapons/systems ....... 11.34, VA.IV(A).ZO),19 (see also
Binary chemicai weqons)
Munitionsldevices .......................... 11.1-2,8, AC.A.1, VA.IV(A).I,
2(e),(g), 9-10, 12,18, 31(d), 38, 47,
49, 67, 70,VA.V.l(e), 4, 27,30,
VA.XI.17
Filled ................................ 11.8,VA.N(A).S, 31(d), 47,
VA.V.I(e), 30
Unfilled ............................... VA.N(A).I, 3, 16-17,VA.V.27
National Autboriiy
Cooperation withinspectors ................ VA.II.64
Designateor establish ..................... VI1.4
Executive Council to cooperatewith .......... VIIL31
Flight plan provided through ................ VA.II.23 Storingdata with ........................ CA.2(e)
National implernentaiion ..................... a (see also National legislation)
National legislation
Disposai of old chemical weapons ............ VA.N(B).6
Nationalsafety standards ..................... (see SMety)
Nationalsecunty ........................... (see Security,nationallStaies
Pmîiesl)
Neive agent .............................. AC.B.Schedule 1.1-3,VA.IV(A).6(c)
Non-cornpliance ........................... (see Complimcelnon~omplimce)
Notification
Amendments ........................... XV.2,5
Clearance(for accessto confidentialinformation) . CA.1I
Conversion ............................ VA.V.34, 58
Declarations,changesto ................... VA.VI.14, 18
Inspections ............................. VA.II.5,31-34, VA.III.17-18,
VA.IV(A).45,61, VA.V.52,58,
VA.Vi.2, VA.VII.30,VA.VIII.25,
VA.IX.21, VA.X.4-12, VA.XI.5-6
Points ofentry .......................... VA.II.17
Shipmentof chemicalweapons .............. VA.IV(A).61
(see Dimctor-General,Observer,Otherchemicalpmductionfacilities; Schedules 2 or 3
chemicaisl/acilities;Verijîcation)
Object and purpose(of this Convention) .......... VIII.1,20, m.1, x1.2, XII.3, XXII
Convertedfacilities ....................... VA.V.71
Risktothe ............................. AC.A, VA.N(B).7, 17,VA.V.71,
VA.VI.23.30, VA.VII.5, 18,20,
VA.VIII.5
Schedules ............................. AC.A, VA.V.23, 30, VA.VII.5, 18,
20, VA.VIII.5
Preamhle,VI11.5,22, XI.2,
VA.N(A).20, 56, VA.VIII.21,
VA.IX.18(see also Inspection,mms)
Obligationslunde~ .t.a.....g..........
Access,pmvide ......................... IX.11, VA.II.19, VA.VII.25,
VA.X.41-42
Assistanceagainst chemicalweapons .......... X.7
Assistancein destruction ................... N.12
Clarification,pmvide ..................... VA.VII.25
Compliance,demonsirate .................. 1X.I1,VA.X.42,CA.13
Confidentialinformation, protect ............. VII.6,CA.1, 19-20
Deadlinefor destruction,meet ............... VA.N(A).22-23 Destructionof chemical weapons/chemical
weapons productionfacilities ............. (seeDesinrction of chemicd
weqonslchemical weqons
pmductionfacilities)
Generai ............................... Preamble. 1. CA.1
GenevaProtocol ......................... Preamble. XIII. xvi.3
IX.ll, VA.II.19
Inspection.allow/enable/permit ..............
Inspection requestkept within scope
ofconvention ........................
Order of destruction based on ...............
Probibited activities.not engaged in ...........
Resûictions (on trade) incompatiblewith. not
mamtam ............................ x12
StatT(of Technicai Secretariat) .............. CA.20
State Party to conformwith its .............. x112
State Part yo implemenVfulfilits ............ VIl.1,4. VA.II.19,VA.IV(A)A,22.
VA.V.2, 10.CA.13
UnmeVunfufilled ........................ VA.n.65, VA.Iv(A).4, VA.V.2, 10
Verificationplans ........................ VA.N(A).56
(see aiso Access. State Party topmvide; Decladions ; Prohibitions;Rights)
Observer
Access ................................
Defmition .............................
Depamire ..............................
Nameof ..............................
Privileges and immunities ..................
Refusal ...............................
Rightsof ..............................
Transporiation ..........................
Oldcbemicalweapons
Declarations ............................ IIIl(b). VA.IV(B).
..
Definition ............................. 11.5-6
Destructionor disposai .................... VA.IV(B).6-7,17
Regime for ..................... ;....... 1v.1, VA.IV(B).I, 3-7. 17
(see also Abmdoned chemicd weqons; Guidelines)
On-siteiaspedonlverification ................. IV.3-5, V.3,6.7. 15.VI.3-6,9. R.8,
10. 13.VA.I.7, II. VA.II.53-54,
VA.III.l,3, 6-7. 16.VA.IV(A).I5,
37.70. VA.V.28,40.41.49. 54. 83.
VA.VI.22, 29. VA.VII.12,
VA.VIII.12,22. VA.IX.9, 19.
CA .13-17 (see alsoInspection;
Schedule 1 chemicalsl/aFilifies;
Schedule 3 chemicdslfacilities;
Monitoring; Venpcation)OPCW ................................. VlII
Agreements with ........................ XN.5. VA.1.7.19.VA.II.38.
VA.111.3,10.VA.IV(A).Sl,
VA.VI.25-26,31-32.VA.VII.24,
CA.1 (sec alsoFixility qgreements)
Alleged use of chemicalweapons ............ VA.XI.27
Assistancein desüuction ................... N.11. VA.N(B).I6 (see also
Assisfmtce;TechnicdSecmtmiat)
Bilaterallmultilateralagreements ............. N.13-17. V.16-17
Confidentialiiy .......................... VIII.5. CA.l.3(c).(e).(h). 4. 17.22-
23 (see also Confidentid
infomation/confidentidi@)
CSP ................................. VIII.9-22
Declarations ............................ 111.1
ExecutiveCouncil ....................... VI11.23.36
Generalprovisions ....................... VIII.1-8
Privilegesand immunities .................. V111.48-51
Programmeand budget .................... N.16. V.19. VA.VI1.13.VA.IX.10
Relations betweenState Party and ............ V11.4-7
Scienceand technology.making use of ........ VII1.6
Settlementof disputes ..................... XN.2
Technicalsecretariat ...................... VI11.37.47
(see alsoConfidenfialinfom&onlconj)dentidi@; CSP;Director-Geneml;Executive
Council;Labomfones;Pnvilegesmd/or immunities;TechnicdSecmfm.d)
ûther chernicalpmdudon faeilitiea ............. VI.6.VA.M
Data monitoringand evenhial
on-site verificatio..................... V1.6
Declarations ............................ VA.IX.1-8.VA.XI.13-14
Notification time of iaspection .............. VA.IX.21
Reviewof verificationregime ............... VA.IX.26
Selectionof sites ........................ VA.IX.13
Thresholdfor declarations .................. VA.IX.1
Time limit for inspection .................. VA.IX.20
Verscation ............................ VI.6. VA.IX.9-26
(see also Chemicds; Weightingfactors)
ûther chernicals ........................... 11.4.8. VA.IV(A).I6
ûther faeilities (Schedule1 chemids pmduction) ... (see Schedule1 chemicdslfixilities)
Peaeeful purposes
Indushial. agnculhiral. research.medical.
phmaceutical or other ................. 11.9.V.14. X1.2
International cooperation................... VIII.21Cg) Not pmhibited .......................... 11.9
Trade ................................. XI.2
(see ais0A ctivitieslputposesnotpmhibited; Medicd putposes; Protectiveputposes;
Resewch)
Penmeter
...
Activities.............................. VA.11.44,VA.X.35-37
Alternative ............................. VA.I.l6,21,VA.X.15-21,23,35,55
Declared .............................. VA.1.21,VA.X.15
Final ................................. VA.I.16, 21, VA.X.14-16,18-25,35,
38,43,47,51, 55
Requested ............................. VA.I.21, VA.X.7-9,14-17,23, 38-
39.47
(sec aiso Access; Challenge inspection)
Pleats/plant sites ........................... VA.I.6, VA.IV(A).32,VA.V.85,
VA.VII.3, 6-25,30, VA.VIII.3,6-20,
25, VA.IX.l-24, VA.X.15
Selectionof (for inspection) ................ (seeInspections; Weightingfactors)
Point of enbylexit .......................... (see Chdlenge inspection)
Piecutsors ................................ II.1,VI.l-2, VA.N(A).2(b)-(c)
..
Definition ............................. 1L3-4
Scheduled ............................. VI.2, AC.A, B, VA.VI.15, 19
(see also Key components)
Pmparatoiy Commission
Draft agreements,provisions and
guidelines developed ................... VIII.2l(i)
Financing .............................. VIII.7
Pnvilegw andlor immunitiea .................. VIII.48-51, VA.II.10-15
Abuse hy inspectors ...................... VA.II.13
Abuse by State Party ..................... VIII.36
Inspectors/ispection team .................. VA.II.10-15
Inviolabilityof samples andor papers
and correspondence .................... VA.II.1l(c)-(d), 12
OPCW's ............................... VI11.48-5 1
Suspension of State Party's .......... :...... XII.2
Viema Convention ....................... VA.II.11-12
Waiver of stafïlinspection team member's ....... VA.11.14,CA.20
Produdion capacity ......................... 11.10,VA.V.IV),30, VA.VII.7,18
Productionfacilities ......................... (see Chemicd weqons production
facilities; Other chemicd production
facilities)
Prohibitions/prohibited
...
Activit~es .............................. 1.1,V.5, VII.1,X.8, X11.3,AC.A.1,
VA.VII.15,VA.X.41(See aiso
Activitieslputposesnotpmhibited) Chemical weaponsproductionfacilities ........ V.5
Schedule 1 chemicals ..................... VI.3
Weaponsof mass destruction ................ Preamble
(seekso A ctivitieslpurposesnot pmhibited; GenevaPmtocol; ObligcltionslundeHdings;
OPCW) .
Protectionagainst ebemid weapons ............ X
Assistance and .......................... X.l, 8-11
Data bank of informationon ................ X.5
Equipment ............................. X.1.3, VA.V.13
Request for ............................ X.5, 8-9, VA.XI.3
Voluntaryfund .......................... X.7, VIII.2l(i), 34, 39
(see also Chemicalweqons, usability)
Pmtective purposes
National pmgrammes ..................... X.4
Purposenot pmhibited .................... IL9
Schedule 1chemicalsused for ............... VA.VI.2-3,8. 10, 12, 17, 19
Voluntaryfund .......................... (see Voluntatyfund)
(see alsoActivitieslpurposesnot pmhibited, Medicalputposes; Peacefulputposes)
Pmtocol for the Pmhibiiion of îbe Use in Warof
Aspbyxiating,Poisooousor mer *es, and
of BacteriologicalMeîhodcof Wmfm ...... (see GenevaPmtocol)
PSF-chemicalslplants ........................ VA.IX.I,6,9, 17,24
Recoids .............................. (seeAccess, documentationlrecorris)
Reports
Annual ............................
Another State's chemicaw l eaponsor chemicai
weapons productionfacilities ...........
Appendix (to final inspectionreport)........
Challenge inspection ....................
Confidentiality ........................
Conversion ............................
Destruction ............................
Director-General .........................
Executive Council .................. Groupof experts ........................ IX.4(e)
Inspection.includingpreliminary ............. (seespecificitems)
Investigation (ofallegeduse) ................ X.9.10. VA.Xl.22.26
National programmes ..................... X.4
OPCW ................................ VIII.2l(a), 32. 38
Safeguards(to protectsensitive information)..... VA.X.59
Situationlprogressreport ................... VA.X1.22,24
TechnicalSecretariat ...................... VlIi.38. X.10.VA.II.58, VA.III.16.
VA.IV(A).69,VA.N(B). 12.
VA.iX.23, CA.3
(see also Complimcelnon-complimce; Inspection)
Requested Sîate P* ....................... IX.4
Requwting State P* ....................... IX.2.4. 12.14. 17.21,23-24. X.5.
IO.VA.I.20,25. VA.X.2,4.8. 15.
22. 53-54.56. 58.60.
VA.XI.5,9. 20
Reaearch
Laboratones ............................. VA.I.6.VA.VI.12
Peacefulpurposes ........................ 11.9.V.14.XI.2
Protectivepurpoges ....................... X.2
Rightto mnduct ......................... X.2. XI.2
Schedule1cbemicals ..................... VA.VI.2-3.8. 11-12
(see alsoActivitieslpurposesno1pmhibited; Peacefulpurposes)
Rights
Of OPCWto monitorbilateralor
multilateralagreements .................. N.14. V.17
Of requestingState Partyto participate
in reviewprocess ...................... IX.24
Of TechnicalSecretariat tohave monitoring
systemsinstalled ....................... VA.II.10
Of TerritorialState Partyto request
consultationsltosettlemaner .............. VA.N(B).12-13
(see alsoAccess;Privilegesmd/or immunities)
Rightsof iaspected SîatePmîy (LSP)
Concerninginspections .................... VA.11.19
To demonstrate compliance ................. iX.11
To identifydata unrelated to chemicawl eapons .. VA.X.61
To inspectany instrument ................... VA.III.11
To inspectequipmentof inspection team ....... VA.II.29
To manage access ........................ VA.IX.17
To objectto questionsnot relatedto inspection... VA.II.46
To observe al1verificationactivitie........... VA.II.49
To participatein reviewpmcess .............. M.24
To protectnationalsecurity ................. VA.X.41
To pmtect sensitive installations............ IX.11.VA.X.48 To retain portions of al1samples .............
Rights of inspection team/inspecîors
To access any and al1areas affectedby
alleged use ................... : ......
To be briefedby representativesof the ISP......
To cany out an inventory ..................
To collect samples .......................
To commence perimeter activities ............
To communicate with Headquarters ...........
To demonstrate compliance .................
To go. under escort. to any part of the
perimeter ............................
To have monitoring instnimentsinstalled .......
To have photographstaken .................
To have takenlreceive samples and affixtags ....
To identify any informationldatanot relevant ....
To inspect documentationand records .........
To inspect vehiculartraffic .................
To interview any facility personnel ...........
To interview any persons affected or
eyewihess of alleged use ................
To managed access .......................
To observe al1areas. facilities and equipment ....
To perform on-site analysis of samples ........
To request clarifications ...................
Totag ................................
To unimpeded access toinspection site ........
To use approved location-findingequipment .....
To use certain inspectiontechniques ..........
To use codes for communications ............
To uselinspect instniments installed by ISP .....
To use monitoring equipment ...............
To verify that activities are consistent
with conditions .......................
To veri S. that no chemical weapons arediverted
and that destruction has heen completed .....
To visit facility to be converted ..............
Rights of States Paiîies
Abuseof ..............................
Confidential information îreated in
accordance with .......................
Restriction or suspension of ................
To demonstrate compliance .................
To object to an inspecter ................... To participate in exchange for protection
against chemical weapons ................
To patticipate in fullest possible exchange
of chemicals (etc.) .....................
To protect sensitive installations and
confidential information .................
To protection of confidential information .......
To request a challenge inspection .............
To request assistance .....................
To request Executive Council to assist
in clarifying situation ...................
To serve on the Executive Council ............
To settle matter concerning report on
abandoned chemical weapons .............
(see also A crivitfeslpuposes nor pmhibited)
Riot contml agent9
Declar.t.ons ............................ II.1(e)
Definition ............................. 11.7
Law enforcement ........................ 11.9
Method of warfare ........................ 1.5,X.8-9, VA.XI.1
Risk tothe object andputpose of this Convention ... (see Object and purpose)
~outine inspec'tion ......................... (see Inspection. mutine)
Safety
Briefing ............................... VA.II.37, VA.X.32-34
Chemical weapons production facilities ........ VA.V.I(j), 13
(see Destruction of chemicai
Destruction .............................
wecymns)
Equipment ............................. VA.I.5, VA.11.27,VA.V.13
Measures .............................. VA.IL37, VA.IV(A).3l(i), VA.V.33,
78
Monitonng ............................. VA.N(A).9
National standards ....................... IV.10, V.11, V1.7,VA.IV(A).6(e)
People ................................ IV.lO, V.11, VII.3, VA.II.43,
VA.VI.7
Physical security activities .................. VA.V.14
Plans ................................. VA.IV(A).32
Regulations ............................ VA.Il.43, VA.IV(A).49, 62
Shields ............................... VA.I.5.
Standard maintenance activities .............. VA.V.15
(see also Desrrucrion of chemicai weqons)Sampleslsmpling .......................... N.lO. VA.N(A).49. VA.X.27.47.
VA.XI.16-18
Allegeduse of chemical weapons ............ VA.Xi.16-18.26
Analysis .............................. VA.II.53,55.58. VA.IV(A).70.
VA.V.49, VA.VII.27, VA.VIII.22,
VA.IX.19, VA.X.27, 48. VA.XI.18,
25.26. CA.16
Challenge inspections ..................... VA.X.27.36
Collection.handlingand analysis .............. VA.IL52.58
Confidentiality .......................... VA.II.56.CA.16
Duplicate .............................. VA.II.54
Facility agreements ....................... VA.V.49
InspcctedStateParty ..................... VA.II.52-54.60, VA.X.48.
VA.Xi.18
Investigationof ailegeduse ................. VA.Xi.16-18.26
lnviolabilityof .......................... VA.II.1l(d). 12
Off-Ion-site ............................ VA.II.53.57.VA.VIII.22. VA.IX.19.
VA.XI.18,25 (see also Laboraiones;
Smples/sŒnpling .malysis)
Right to designateand receive ............... VA.IV(A).49.70. VA.V.85.
VA.X.36, VA.XI.16
Right to retain portion .................... VA.II.54
Safety ................................ N.10
Security.integrityand pmservationof .......... VA.II.56.CA.16
Transferltransport ........................ VA.II.1l(d). 52. 55-56
Undeclaredscheduled chemicals ............. VA.V11.27.VA.VIII.22.VA.IX.19
(see alsoEquipment;Laboraiones)
Sanetions ................................
CSP may bringissueto attentionof UN General
Assemblyand SecuriîyCouncil ........... X11.4
CSP may recommendcollectivemeasures ...... XII.3
Settlementof disputesand .................. XIV.6
(see alsoMecsures to redmss;Rights ofStcde Patiies .abuseof)
Schedule 1cbemicals/facilities................. VA.VI
Absence.verificationof ................... VA.V.85.VA.VII.15.VA.VI11.17.
VA.IX.14
Chemicalweapons production facilities........ 11.8.V.14, VA.V.30.70.71. 85
Declarations ............................ VA.N(A).2(a), VA.Vi.6. 13-20
Destruction ............................ VA.N(A).16.VA.V.30
General provisionsfor ......... ; ........... VA.VI.I.2
Guidelinesfor selectionof ................. AC.A.1
List of ................................. AC.B
On-siteinspection/monitoringwith
on-site instruments ..................... VI.3. VA.VII11 . 7.VA.IX.14 Other facilities..........................
Production .............................
...
Prohibitions ............................
Transfers ..............................
Verfication .............................
(see also Protectivepurposes)
Schedule 2 chemicalsIfacilities .................
Chemical weapons production facilitieslsites .....
Data monitoringand on-site verification ........ v1.4, VA.V.85
Declarations ............................ VA,IV(A).2(a),VA.VII.1-II, 13.16.
26
Guidelinesfor selection of ................. AC.A.2
List of ................................ AC.B, VA.VII.11
Notification time before inspection ........... VA.VII.30
Threshold for declarations of ................ VA.VII.3
Time limit for inspections .................. VA.VII.29
Transfers .............................. VA.V11.8,31-32
Verification ............................ v1.2, 4. VA.V.85,VA.VII.12-30
(see also Venficafion)
Schedule 3 chernicais/facilities................. VA.VIII
Data monitoring and onsite verification ........ v1.5
Declarations ............................ VA.N(A).2(a), VA.VIII.1-II, 16
Guidelines for selection of ................. AC.A.3
Inspection period ........................ VA.VI11.24
List of ................................ AC.B, VA.VIII.11
Notification time before inspection ........... VA.V111.25
Threshold for declarationsof ............... VA.VIII.3, 12
Transfers .............................. VA.VI11.26-27
Verification ............................ V1.2,5. VA.VIII.12-25 (see also
VetiJîcaiion)
(see Precumo IS, scheduled;Schedule
1. 2 or 3 chernicals//acilities)
Science andtechnology
Avoid hampering ........................ VI.11, XI.1-2
Cooperationlexchange ofinformation .......... Preamble.N.12, VI.11, X.3, XI.1-2
OPCW to maùe use of advances ............. VIIi.6
Review of developments ................... VIII.2l(h), 22
Use in verification activities ................ V111.6
(see also Economic and technologicaldevelopment)
Scientific Advianiy Board .................... V111.21(h)4 ,5
Seais (andlor otber contml pmceduies) ........... VA.III.10, 15.VA.IV(A).39-40,62.
64. VA.V.34, 44-45 .49-50. 59-60
(see also Tops)
CA.2, 19Secmîary-Gened (of the UN)
Alleged use of chemical weapons investigated by
Depositary ...........................
First session of CSP. convening of .........
Secunîy. nationailStates Phes' ..............
Seculity Council
Notice of withdrawal given to ............... xv1.2
Recourse to ............................ VIII.36, x11.4
Selection of plant sites ...................... (see Inspection. selection of sites
for, Plmtslplmt sites. selection)
Sensitive information VA.X.46, 59. CA.2(e), 13.14. 17
(see alsoConfidenrial
infonnaiionlconfidentiali@)
Setîlement of disputes ........................ m. VA.iV(B).12, CA.23
Shmudlshmuding .......................... VA.X.48, 50
Single small-scde faciliîy .................... 11.8,VA.VI.8-16
Declarations ............................ VA.VI.13-16
Verification ............................ VA.VI.21-27
Special session ............................ (see CSP)
States not pmiy (to this Convention)
Alleged use of chemical weapons hy .......... VA.IX.27
Facilities under jurisdiction or temtory of ...... VA.II.20-21
Inspection on temiory of ................... VA.Ii.20
Transfers to ............................ VA.VII.31-32, VA.VIII.26-27
Stoclcpiles(of chemicai weapons) ............... (see Chernical weqons)
Stomge (of chemicaislchemicai weapons)
Access ................................
Bulk .................................
Declarations ............................
Facilities ..............................
Inventory control procedures ................
Safety ................................
(see also Equiprnent; Inspection)
Tags .................................. VA.IV(A).49.61.67 (see also
Mmkers; Seals)
Technical Secmtanaî, mle and funeiion ........... VIII.4. 37-47
Agreements negotiated .................... VIII.34. VA.IV(A).SI. 60. VA.V.59.
VA.VII.17. 24 Appointment/employment .................. VI11.44,CA.5
Conditions of service ..................... VIII.44, CA.5
Assistance bylthrough ..................... IV.12,X.5, 10,VA.IX.7
Assistance to ........................... V11.7,VA.III.16, VA.IV(A).30
Avoidanceof intrusion .................... VI.]O
Challenge inspection ...................... E.10 (referencesin Verification
Annex are omiîted) (see also
Inspection; Inspectorslinspection
. . rem)
Composttion ........................... VIII.41-42
Confidentiality .......................... VI.10, VA.X.61, CA.I,2(b),
0, 3, 5-12, 17, 22 (see also
Confidentid informaiion1
conjidentialiiy)
Destruction ofchemical weapons/chemicalweapons
production facilities ..................... IV.12, VA.N(A).29, 35-36, 51,69,
VA.IV(B).14,VA.V.32,34, 38
Equipment certified by .................... VA.I.1,VA.II.44
Group of experts ........................ IX.4
Inspection/ispectors ...................... VIII.39,41,44, IX.10 (references in
Verification Annex are omitted) (see
also Inspection;Inspectorslinspeclion
team)
lnspectorate ............................ VIII.42
Penalties .............................. CA.lO, 20
Privileges andimmunities .................. VIII.48-51
Respect for internationalcharacter ............ VIII.46-47
(see also Compliancelnon-complimce;CSP; Direclor-Geneml;Exenilive Council;
Guidelines; Inspection; Inspectorslinspectionlem)
Tesbltesîing
Destructionfacilities ...................... VA,IV(A).17,60
Lnspectionequipment ..................... VA.III.11,VA.IV(A).6O
Production capacity ...................... II.1O
Sites ................................. III.I(d)
Thresbolds (for declaratioalvenfication)
Other chemicai production facilities ........... VA.lX.1
Schedule 2 chemicals ..................... AC.B, VA.VII.3, 8, 12
Schedule3 chemicals ..................... VA.VI11.3,8, 12
(see also Schedule 1,2 or 3 chernicalsfiilifies)
Toxic chernicals ........................... (see Chemicals,toxic)
Toxic waste .............................. VA.IV(B).6(see also Warte)
Toricity ................................. AC.A., VA.N(A).2(b)-(e), VA.V.71,
VA.VII.18
Tde
Free hade in chemicals .................... Preamble,XI.2 National regulations(to be reviewed) ..........
(se also Tmsfem)
Tiaining
Destruction ............................
Inspecton .............................
Tmsfeis (of chemicais/chemicaw i eapons)
Declarations ............................ IILl(a),(c), VA.IV(A).S,VA.V.3-5,
VA.VI.6, VA.VII.7
Purposesnot prohibited .................... V1.l-2, X.2, VA.VII.32,VA.VI11.26
Prohibitions ............................ Preamble,1.1,VI.3, VA.VI.1-2(see
Schedule 1, 2 or 3
chemicaisifiiilities)
Restrictions VA.VI.1-6,VA.V11.3 1-32,
VA.VIII.26-27
Right to ............................... vl.l, X.2, XI.2
Scheduledchernicals ...................... VA.VI.3-6,VA.VII.31-32,
VA.VI11.26-27 (see also Schedule 1.
2 or 3 chemicaisifiiilities)
(sec also Cempctûe, end-use)
Tiinsit thmugbthe îemtoly of anotherStaîe ......
Tnmspottation
Aircraft .............................. N.10, VA.11.22-253 , 2
Chernicalweapons ...................... VA.N(A).oI, VA.V.13 (seealso
Chemicaiweqons,
removd/tr(p1spotî;Destructionof
chemicaiweqons, removal)
Inspectionteam ......................... VA.Ii.26, VA.N(A).46, VA.X.14-
15, 18-19, 22,56 (see also
Inspectors/inspectiontem)
N.10
Unitaiymunitionsanddeviees ................. 11.8
UnitedNations ............................ (see Chmie<SectelayGeneml,
Senrtily Councii)Verifidon
Activitiesnot prohibited ................... V1.2,10,VA.VI. VA.VII,VA.VII1,
VA.IX (see also Schedule 1, 2 or 3
chemicais//ocilities)
Bilateral/multilateralagreements ............. N.13, V.16
Challengeinspection ...................... (see Challenge inspection)
Confidentiality .......................... (see Conjidential
infomationlconfidentiaiity; On-site
inspectionlveri~cdion)
Costs ................................ N.16, V.19, VI11.7,VA.II.25-26,
VA.IV(A).26,VA.V.86,VA.VII.13,
VA.VIII.13,VA.iX.10, VA.X.56
N.4, V.6, VA.II1.2,VA.IV(A).37-
40, VA.V.43-47,VA.VI.21, 28,
VA.VII.15,VA.VIII.17,VA.M.14
Defîitions ............................ VA.I
Destructionof chemical weapons ............ N.8, VA.N(A).37-70 (see also
Destmction of chemicaiweapons)
Destructionof chemical weapons production
facilities....................... VA.V.43-63(see also Chemicai
wecponsproductionfacilities)
Instruments ............................ (seeEquipment)
Locat. . .............................. VA.X.22
Monltomg ............................. (seeMonitoring)
Oldlabandonedchemical weapons ............ 111.1,N.l, VA.N(B)
On-site ............................... (see On-site inspectionlverijicdion)
Otherchernicalproductionfacilities ........... (see Otherchemicd production
facilities)
Pre-inspectionactivities VA.II.31-37,VA.III.17-18,VA.X.3-
37, VA.XI.3-14
Removal ........... :..... (see Destructionof chemicai
weqons)
Ruleslprovisions,general ................... VA.11,VA.111
Schcdule 1 chemicalslfacilities............... VA.Vi.21-32 (see alsoSchedule 1
chernicals1fdities)
Schedule2 chemicalslfacilities VA.VII.12-30(see also Schedule2
chemicalsl facilities)
Schedule3 chemicalslfacilities VA.VIII.12-25(see also Schedule3
chemicalslfacilities)
Standingarrangements VA.II.16-30,VA.III.10-16 Systematic ............................. IV.3-5,V.3, 6-7, 15,VI.3,VA.IIi.2,
VA.N(A).IS, 41-45, 50-70,
VA.IV(B).I1,VA.V.28,48-56,
VA.VI.22,29
(see alsoAccess;Conversion;InspectionI ;nspeclorslinspectionteam;Reports;Thresholds)
Vessels, teaction........................... VA.1.6,VA.VI.9,24, VA.VII.28,
VA.VIII.23
Violaiions ................................ (see Complimcelnon-complimce;
Smclions)
Voluntaryfund(forassistanceagainstchemical
weapons use) ......................... VII1.2l(j),34, 39, X.7
Warfm ...................... .. ........ Preamble,I.5,11.9,X.8-9, XI.] (see
also GenevaPmtocoi)
Wmte
Controlltreatment........................ VA.1.5,VA.VII.28,VA.VI11.23
Old chemical weapons .................... VA.IV(B).6
Toxic ................................. VA.N@).6
Weaponsof mms dest~ction .................. Preamble
Weightingfactors(forplantsite seleetion) ........ VA.VIII.14,VA.IX.11,24-25 HOW 10 OB'TAM UNITEDNAnONS PUBLICATIONS
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Litho in United Nations, New York United Nationspublication
38988-October 1994-2.800 Sala No. E.95.IX2 PART IV
c
of NuclearWeawns. and Excemts from Statementsmade therein
1. The sixth preambular paragrapohf General Assembly resolution
49/75 K'referredto "the concernsexpressedin the Fourth Review
Conferenceof the Parties to the Treatyon the Non-Proliferatioof
Nuclear Weapons, that insufficientprogresshas been made towards
the complete elimination of nuclear weapons at the earliest
possibletime".
FourthReview Conferenceof the Partiesto the Treaty on theNon-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Oraanizationand Work of the
Conference(No. 66), which was convenedon 20August 1990 at the
Palais des Nations in Geneva.
3. Also included are Excerpts from statementsmade at the
Conference pertainingto the "concerns" mentioned above (No.67).
Al1 excerptsare copied fromthe FinalDocumentof the Conference,
Part III.SummarvRecords, Geneva, 1992 (NPT/CONF.IV/45/IIIi)n the
order of the statementsmade. Before each excerpt, reference is
givento the name of the speaker,nationality, meetingnumber,page
number (in the Final Document),and paragraphnumber (inthe Final
Document). For easeof reference,an indexis also attached. FINAL DOCUMENT OF THFEOURTHREVIEWCONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE TREATXON THE NON-PROLIFERATIONOF NUCLEARWEAPONS
ORGANIZATION ANDWORK OF THE CONFERENCE
1. In the Final Declaratioonf the Third Review Conferencoef the Partiesto
the Treatyon the Non-Proliferatioonf Nuclear Weapons,under the section
"Reviewof the Operationof the Treatyand Reconmendations". it is stated,
with regardto articleVI11 of the Treaty:
"The States Partyto the Treaty participatinign the Conference
proposeto the Depositary Government shat a fourthConferenceto review
the operationof the Treatybe convenedin 1990.
"The Conference accordingly invites States Pa totyhe Treatywhich
are Membersof theUnitedNationsto requestthe Secretary-Generao lf the
UnitedNationsto includethe followingitem in the provisional agendaof
the forty-thirdsessionof the GeneralAssembly:
'Implementatioonf the conclusionsof the ThirdReview Conference of
the Parties to the Treatyon the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weaponsand
establishment of a PreparatoryConimittefor the FourthConference."'
2. At its forty-thirdsessionthe General Assembly of the UnitedNationsin
resolution43/82noted that,following appropriate consultatioa ns.
open-endedpreparatoryconimitteh ead been formedof Partiesto theTreatyon
the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons servingon the Boardof Govemors of
the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency or representedin the Conference on
Disarmament as well as anyParty to theTreatywhichwould expressits
interestin participatingin the work of the PreparatoryComnittee.
3. Accordingly,the following106 Parties participatei dn the work of one or
more sessionsof the Preparatory Conmittee: Afghanietan.Awtralia. Autria.
Bahamas,Bahrain,Bangladesh.Belgium,Benin,Bhutan,Bolivia.Bulgaria.
BurkinaFaso, Cameroon,Canada,Cape Verde, CentralAfricanRepublic,
Colombia, CostaRica. Côte d'Ivoire,Cyprus,Czech and SlovakFederal
Republic.DemocraticPeople'sRepublicof Korea,DemocraticYemen,Denmark,
Ecuador,Egypt.Ethiopia,Fiji.Finland.Gabon,Ge- Democratic Republic,
Germany,Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece,Grenada.Guinea-Bissau, Holy See,
Honduras,Eungary,Iceland,Indonesia,Iran (IslamicRepublicof), Iraq,
Ireland.Italy.Japan, Jordan, Kenya,Kwait. Lao People'sDemocratic
Republic.Lebanon.Liberia,Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, LiechtensteiM n,dagascar.
Malaysia.Maldives, Malta,Mauritius, MexicoM ,ongolia, MoroccoN,auru,
Nepal.Netherlands, New Zealand, NicaraguaN.igeria,Norway.Panama.
Papua New Guinea.Paraguay,Peru,Philippines, Poland,Portugal,Qatar,
Republicof Korea, Romania, San Marino.Saudi Arabia, Senegal.SierraLeone.
Singapore, Spain, SrL ianka,Sudan,Swaziland. Sweden, Switzerland,
Syrian ArabRepublic,Thailand,Togo,Trinidadand Tobago, Tunisia,Turkey,
Uganda. Union of SovietSocialistRepublics,UnitedKingdomof GreatBritain
and Northem Ireland,United States of America,Uruguay. Venezuela Viet Nam.
YemenArab Republic, Yugoslaviaand Zaire.page 2
4. The Committeeheld three sessions: the first took placi en New York
from 1 to 5 May 1989.the secondin Geneva from11 to 15September 1989 and
the thirdin Genevafrom 23 April to 2 May 1990. Progress reports on the
first two sessionsof the Committeewere issuedas documents NPT/CONF.IV/PC.I/*
and NPT1C0NF.1V1PC.111181Rev.1.
5. At its first session,the Preparatory Cornitteuenanimously elected
AmbafisadoBrariyuAdeyemi(Nigeria).AmbassadorTadeuszStrulak(Poland)and
AmbassadorChuseiYamada (Sapan)to serve together asmembereof the Bureau
for the three sessionsthat the Conmitteeintendedto hold and decided
thatAmbassador Yamada would bethe Chairmanof the firet session.
Ambassador Strulakthe Chairmanof the second session and Ambassador Adeyemi
the Chairmanof the thirdsession. When one member of the Bureau wasserving
as Chairmanof a given session, thetwo othermemberswould serve as
Vice-Chairmenof theCommittee. The Committee authorizei dta Bureau to handle
technical andothermattersin the periodbefore the ReviewConference.
Furthermore.the Cornittee decidedthat the Chairmanof the thirdsession
shouldopen the ReviewConference.
6. Pursuantto the request of the PreparatoryCornittee, theSecretariatof
the United Nations, the Internationaltomic EnergyAgency (DEA), the Agency
for the Prohibitionof NuclearWeapons inLatinAmericaand the Caribbean
(OPANAL)and theSouthPacificForum prepareda numberof background papers
whichwere submittedto theConference as backgrounddocument*as follows:
(a) by the Secretariat of the UnitedNations:
- Working Paper on the basic factswithin the frameworkof the
UnitedNationsin connectionwith the realization of the purposes
of the tenthparagraphof the Preambleof the Treaty onthe
Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons (NPTlCONF.IVl2)
-
Working Paper on the basic facts withinthe frameworkof the
UnitedNationsin connection withthe implementation of
articles1 and II of the Treatyon the Non-Proliferatio nf
Nuclear Weapons (NPTICONF.V131
- Working Paper on basic factawithin the frameworkof the
United Nationsin connectionwith the realizationof the purposes
of articlesIVand V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferato ion
NuclearWeapons (NPTlCONF.IVl4)
- WorkingPaperon basic facts within the frameworkof the
UnitedNationsin connection with the realizationof the purposes
of articleVI of the Treatyon the Non-Proliferatio of Nuclear
Weapons (NPTICONF.V/5)
- Working Paperon the dynamicsand consequencesof the
nuclear-anusrace.includingits quantitative. qualitativeand
verticalaspects(NPTlCONF.IVl6)
- Working Paper onthe dynamicsand consequencesof the wider
disseminationof nuclearweapons (NPTICONF.IVf7) - Studiesrelevantto the Treatyon the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.V/8)
- Report onthe presentstatusof negotiations of the Conferenceon
Disamament on "NuclearTest Ban" (NPT/CONF.IV/g)
- Reporton the presentstatusof negotiations of the Conferenceon
Disarmamenton effectivemeasuresrelatingto cessationof the
nuclear-arms racaet an early dateand to nucleardisarmament,
and on a treaty on generaland completedisament under strict
and effective internationc alntrol(NPT/CONF.IV/lO)
- Report onthe presentstatusof negotiations of the Conferenceon
Disamament on "Effectiveinternational arrangements toassure
non-nuclear-weapon Stata esainstthe use or threatof use of
nuclearweapons"(NPT/CONF.IV/ll)
(b) by the International Atomic Energy Agen (AEA):
- Activitiesof IAEA under articleIII ofthe Treatyon the
Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons(NPT/CONF.IV/lZ)
- Activitiesof IAEAunderarticleIV ofthe Treaty onthe
Non-Proliferation o NuclearWeapons (NPT/CONF.IV/13)
- Activitiesof IAEA underarticleV of the Treaty onthe
Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons(NPT/CONF.IV/14)
(c) by theAgency for the Prohibitionof NuclearWeaponsin LatinAmerica
and the Caribbean(OPANAL):
- Memorandumfrom the GeneralSecretariatof OPANALprepared for
the FourthReviewConferenceof the Parties to the Treatyon the
Non-Proliferationof NuclearWeapons (NPT/CONF.IV/15)
(d) by theSouth PacificForum:
- Memorandumfrom the Secretariatof the SouthPacificForum onthe
subjectof the SouthPacificNuclear-Free ZonT ereatyprepared
for the FourthReviewConferenceof the Partiesto the Treatyon
the Non-Proliferatioof Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.IV/lb)
7. In addition,to assist the Review Conferencet,he PreparatoryCornittee
invitedthe nuclear-weapon Statesand other partiesto the Treaty on the .
Non-Proliferationof NuclearWeaponsto provide.sufficiently in advanceof
the ReviewConference,information relevant to the implementationof various
articlesof the Treaty.includingespecially articlV eI. Pursuantto the
Conmittee'sinvitation.the followingdocuments were submittedto the
Conference:
-
Informationon the implementationby the Unionof Soviet Socialist
Republicsof the Treaty onthe Non-Proliferationof NuclearWeapons
(NPT/CONF.IV/19) - United Statesinformation pertainingto theTreatyon the
Non-Proliferationof Nuclear.Weapons (NPT/CONF.IV/ZO)
- The UnitedKingdom'simplementation of the Treatyon the
Non-Proliferatioonf NuclearWeapons1985-90(NPT/coNF.IV/~~)
8. The Final Reportof the PreparatoryCommitteefor the FourthReview
Conferenceof the Partiesto theTreatyon theNon-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT/CONF.IV/lw)as alsoissuedas a documentof theConferenceprior
to its opening. The reportincluded, interalia, the Provisional Agendafor
the Conference,a proposedAllocationof Itemsto theMain Committeesof the
Conference,the Draft Rules of Procedureand a Schedulefor theDiviaionof
Costs of the Conference.
of the
9. In accordance withthe decisionof thePreparatory Conmitteet ,he
Conference was convened on 20 Augus1t990at the Palaisdes Nationsin Geneva.
After the openingof the Conference by Ambasaado BariyuAdeyemiof Nigeria,
Chairmanof the Third Sessionof the Preparatory Committee.the Conference
electedby acclamation as its President Ambassador Oswald de Riveroof Peru.
The Conferencealso unanimouslyconfirmedthe nominationof Mr. Arpad Prandler
as Secretary-Generao lf the Conference.The nominationhad been madeby the
Secretary-Generalof the United Nations, followia ng invitation bythe
PreparatoryCommittee.
10. Atthe samemeeting. Mr. YasushiAkashi,Under-Secretary-Genera lor
DisarmamentAffaira,UnitedNations. conveyet do the Conferencea message
of the Secretary-Generaolf the United Nations, an Dr. Hans Blix, ,
Director-Generalof the International AtomicEnergyAgency. addressedthe
Conference.
11. At the opening meeting, tC henference adoptedits agendaand the
Allocationof Itemsto the Main Cornmitteeo sf the Conferenceas proposedby
the PreparatoryCoumittee(seeAimexes1 and'II.respectively).
12. Aleo at the first meeting, the Conference adoptetdhe rulesof procedure
reconmended bythe PreparatoryCornmittee. The rulesof procedureof the
Conferenceare-contained in document NPT/CONP.IV/l.
13. The rulesof procedure providef dor the establishmentof (a) threeMain
Committees; (b)a GeneralConmittee,to be presidedover by the President of
the Conferenceand composedof the Chairmenof the Conference's threeMain
Conmittees,its DraftingCommitteeand its CredentialsCornittee,as well
as 26 Vice-Presidentsof the Conference; (c) a DraftingCommittee. compose of
representatives of the 32 States Partiesrepresentedon the General Committee,
but open to representativeosf other delegations whemnatters ofparticular
concernto themwere under discussion;and (d) a CredentialsConmittee,
. composedof a Chairmanand two Vice-Chairmen electedby the Conference, and
six othermembersappointedby the Conference on the proposa1of the President.
14. The Conference unanimousl electedthe Chairmenand Vice-Chairmen of the
threeMain Committees,the' Drafting Committeea ,nd the CredentialsConmittee,
as follows: Main Conmittee1 Chairman AmbassadorBariyuA. Adeyemi
(Nigeria)
Vice-Chairman Ambaseador TodorDitchev
(Bulgaria)
Vice-Chairman AmbassadorOscarVaerno (Norway)
Main ConunitteII Chaitman AmbassadorTadeuszStrulak
(Poland)
Vice-Chairman Mr. Arend J.Meerburg
(Netherlands)
Vice-Chairman Ambassador HectorK. Villarroel
(Philippines)
Main ConmitteeIII Chairman AmbassadorChuseiYamada (Japan)
Vice-Chairman Dr. Jh Chandoga
(Czechand SlovakFederal
Republic)
Vice-Chairman Mrs. Fatma Hussein (~gy~t)
DraftingColnmittee Chairman AmbassadorCarl-MagnusHyltenius
(Sweden)
Vice-Chairman AmbassadorPeggy Hason (Canada)
Vice-Chairman AmbassadorTibor T6th (Hungary)
CredentialsComnittee Chairman AmbassadorJan Groop(Finland)
Vice-ChBi- Mr. PlamenGrozdanov(Bulgaria)
Vice-Chairman AmbassadorSawanitKongsiri
(Thailand)
The Conference alsuonanimouelyelected25 Vice-Presidentefrom the following
StatesParties:
Bangladesh Indonesia Spain
Bulgaria Iran (IslamicRepublicof) Union ofSoviet
Cameroon Ireland SocialistRepublics
Canada Italy UnitedKingdomof Great
Czech and Slovak Mexico Britainand Northern
Federal Republic Morocco Ireland
New Zealand United Statesof America
. EgYPt
Ethiopia Republicof Korea Venezuela
Ghana Romania Yemen
Eungary YugoslaviaNPT/CONF.IV/45/I
page 6
15. The Conference al80 appointed, onthe proposa1of the President,
representativesfrom thefollowingsix States Parties as membeo rs the
CredentialsCornnittee:Italy.Kenya,Nigeria.Poland, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics an the United Statesof America.
16. At the firstmeetingof the GeneralDebate,a message was addresse do
the participantsin the Conferenceby President GeorgeBueh of the
UnitedStatesof America (NPTICONF.iVI25).
17. At the samemeeting, a message was address edthe Conference by
PresidentMikhailGorbachevof the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
(NPTICONF.IVI26).
18. At the same meeting a message was also address todtheConferenceby
President AlbertoFujimoriof Peru (NPTICONF.IVI27).
the CDnference
19. Eighty-four(84) States Partyto the Treaty onthe Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weaponsparticipated.in the Conference.as follows:
Australia Honduras Qatar.
Auetria Bungary Republicof Korea
Bahrain Iceland Romania
Bangladesh Indoneaia San Marino
Belgium Iran (Islamic Sao Tome and Principe
Bhutan Republic of) SaudiArabia
Bolivia Iraq Senegal
BruneiDarusaalam Ireland Singapore
Bulgaria Italy Somalia
Cameroon Jamaica Spain
Canada Japan SriLanka
Colombia Jordan sudan
Costa Rica Kenya Sweden
Côte d'Ivoire Kuwait Switzerland
CYPW LibycuArab Jamahiriya SyrianArab Republic
Czechand Slovak Liechtenstein Thailand
FederalRepublic Luxembourg Tunisia
DemocraticPeople's Malaysia Turkey
Republicof Korea Malta Uganda +
Denmark Mexico Union of Soviet
Ecuador Mongolia Socialist Republics
E~YP~ Morocco UnitedKingdomof
Ethiopia Netherlands Great Britain and
Finland New Zealand Northern Ireland ,
Ge- Democratic Nicaragua United Statesof America
Republic Nigeria Uruguay
Ge-y. Federal Norway Venezuela
Republicof Peru Viet Nam
Ghana Philippines Yemen
Greece Poland Yugoslavia
Holy See Portugal _.A,.,".....<,
page 7
20. In accordancewith subparagraph 2 (a) of Rule 44. 15 States.not Parties
to the Treaty.namely.Algeria.Argentina,Brazil,Byeloruesiao Soviet
SocialistRepublic, Chile.China, Cuba, France.Israel.Myanmar. Oman,
Pakistan,UkrainianSovietSocialistRepublic.UnitedRepublicof Tanzaniaand
Zimbabwe,were granted observes rtatua.
21. In accordance with subparagraph 2(b) of Rule 44, Palestine wagranted
observerstatua.
22. The UnitedNationsand the InternationaA ltomicEnergyAgency
participatedin the Conferenceunderparagraph3 of Rule 44.
23. The Agency for the Prohibitionof Nuclear Weaponsin LatinAmericaand
the Caribbean,the Commissionof the EuropeanConmnunitie snd the Leaguoef
Arab Stateswere granted Observer Agency statusunderparagraph 4 of Rule 44.
24. Forty-four (44) non-governmen talanizations attende the Conference
underparagraph5 of Rule 44.
25. A listof al1 delegations to the Conference,incliidinSgtatesParties,
Obaervers,the United Nations and International Atomic En Agrgycy,Observer
Agencies and ReserachInstitutes ann don-governmentaolrganizations,is
containedin Annex IV to this report.
26. The CredentialsCommitteemet on12 September and adopted its reportto
the Conferenceon the credentials of States Parties(NPT/CONF.IV/CC/ lnd
Corr. At its 14th plenary meeting o1n4 September,the Conferencetook
note of thereport.
27. At its 12th plenarymeeting,the Conference decidedto adoptthe
cost-sharing formulaproposedby the Preparatory Committeein theAppendixto
Rule 12 of the rulesof procedure(NPT/CONF.IV/l). The final schedulreas
basedon the actualparticipation of States Partiesin the Conference.
28. The Conference held 14 plenarymeetingsbetween20 Auguat
and 14 September 1990,when it concluded itwsork.
29. The generaldebatein plenary, in which62 States Partiestookpart.
was held from 20to 28 August.
30. The General Committee ,t its1stmeetingon 22 August, considered
item 10 of the Agendaentitled"Progranmioef Work"and decided, inter, to
make the followingrecommendations:
(1) the Conferenceshould completi ets work by 14 September;
(2) the threeMain Conmitteesshouldaccordingly complet theirwork on
5 Septemberand the DraftingCommittee should convenehediately
thereafter.NPT/CONF.IV/45/1
page 8
31. At ite 8th meeting, on 24 ~~~at, the Conference adopted the above
recommendations of the General C-ittee.
32. Main Committee 1 held seven meetings from 24 Augrnt t0 10 September.
Its report (NPTICONF.IV/MC.I/~) vas submitted to the Conference at
its 13th meeting on 11 Septaber. Main Cornnittee II held eight meetings
from 24 August to 5 September. Its report (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/l) waa
submitted to the Conference at its 13th meeting on 11 September. Itsinreport
Conmittee III held five meetings from 27 A-ust t0 5 September.
(NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I11/2) was submitted to the Conference at its 13th meeting
on 11 September.
33. At its 13th meeting on 11 September 1990, the Conference decided to take
note of the three reports.
34. The Draf ting Cornittee met from 10 to 14 Septaber. Its report.
(NPT/CONF.IV/DC/l) waa submitted to the Conference at ite 14th meeting on
14 September 1990. At that meeting, the Conference took note of the report.
35. A liat of the documents of the Conference is attached as Annex III.
36. At its last plenary meeting, on 14 September. the Conference.
notwithstanding extensive consultations and considerable effort, xas dle to
adopt a final declaration. Excerpts from Statements
made at the
Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the
on-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Index of the mcer~ts (No. 67)
paae Number in the Excer~t
Acting President
Mr. Collins, Ireland
Mr. Sujka, Poland
Mr. Lehman, United States of America
Mr. Petrovsky, USSR
Mr. Benhima, Uorocco
Mr. Vaerno, Norway
Mr. Vitalone, Italy
Mr. Mackay, New Zealand
Mr. Ogada, Kenya
Mrs. von Grunigen, Switzerland
Mr. Loeis, Indonesia
Mr. Genscher, Germany
Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia
Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands
Mr. Pirek, Czech and Slovak Republic
Mr. Ene, Romania
Mr. Stephanou, Greece
Mr. Tcheul, DPR of Korea
Mr. Staikov, Bulgaria
Mr. Houllez, Belgium
Mr. Calderon, Peru
Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka
Mr. Somogyi, Hungary
Mr. Kongsiri, Thailand
Mr. Lee, Republic of Korea
Mr. Evans, Australia
Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela
Mr. Duna, Turkey
Mrs. Mason, Canada
Mr. Barnett, Jamaica
Mr. Mgbokwere, Nigeria
Mr. Nasseri, Iranstria
Mr. Amoo-Gottfried, Ghana
Mr. Rozental, Uexico
Mr. Luong, Viet Nam
Mr. Ngoubeyou, Cameroon
Mr. Rivas, Colombia
Mr. Rivadeneira, Ecuador
Mr. Andersson, Sweden
Mr. Villarroel, Philippines
Mgr. Tauran, Holy See
Mr. Sene, Senegal
Mr: Katsigazi, Uganda
Mr. Markides, Cyprus
Mr. Guttierez, Peru
Mr. Kralik, Czech and Slovak
Mr. Reese, Australia
Mr. Gordon, USA StaternentftheActin gesident(Fira Meeting p)age6, para I
1. ne Actina PRESIDC~, in his capacity as Chairman of the third session of
the Preparatory Cornittee, declared open the Fourth Reviev Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on eh0 Non-Prolitoration of Nuclear Weapons. The
Conference had been convened in accordanco vith article VIII, paraqraph 3. of
the Treaty. a proposal made durinq tTho riqnificant increase in the number of
General Assembly resolution 43/82.
States Parties Co the Treaty aince the Third Roviev Conference, in 1985, vas
convincinq evidence of the qreat importance atcached to the need to ensure'
non-proliferation of nuclear veapons. Since 1985. actual reductions in nuclear
reapons had been achievedfor the first rime al the result of a neqotiated
aqreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. The international
community vas nov avaitinq the finalizatlon of an aqreement betveen the cwo
major nuclear-weapon Povers concerninq the reductionof Strateqic nuclear
veapons. Yec there continued to bo very serious concorn Chat not enouqh had
been dooe, or seemed likely Co be dons. Co proceed tovards the complece
elirnination£rom national arsenalsof nuclear weapons and the means of their
delivery pursuant to a troaty on genoral and complete disarmamenc under strict
and effective internacional control. With thoso issues in mind. and takinq
into account the rovibv of Cho Iroaty's future Chat ras to cake place in 1995.
it ras of the umost importance forth0 Conference to reaffirm its stronq
commiment CO the purposes of the Treaty's preahble and provisions.
MR. COLLINS, IRELAND(2nd meeting) page 21, para 10
IO. The Treaty drev a fundamencal distinction becveen nuclcar-veapon and
:on-nuclear-veaponStates. Like al1 other non-nuclear-veaponStates parties
ch*Yraaty, Ireland had forqone the right Co develop a nuclear weapons
-vability and considered Chat the only acceptabla leveï of nuclear veapons
'&' z*r0. His Govermont did believe that nuclear veapons couid
Tho nuciear-veapon States musc neqotiace
>Crcnqthethe security of a stdte.
rr4ucci0nOf nuclear veapons and evencually their complete eiimination. The.
'"" 'tep towards th. zero option vas to the development of 0uclear
w*'poas,rhich required an end CO nuclear tescing.
MR. SUJKA, POLAND(2nd meeting) page 34, para73
73. The first steps taken in the are. of nuclear disarmament vith the
implementation of the Treaty eoncludad b.tvaen th. United States and the USSR
on intermediate-rang. nucloar forces. togother vith Cho progress made in the
START talks. demonstrated the desire of ch0 tvo super-Povars CO meet their
obligations under articlo VI of the NPT and.gave rearon Co hope for
substantial reductions in Choir strateqic nuclear-weapons arsenals. But the
rorld expected more from the implementation of Chat crucial article for the
viability of th. Troaty. Thoso siqns of progross should be only a beqinninq.
and considerable efforts vere still neoded in order Co attain the desired
tangible results. Cortain urgent problems still needed Co be resolved. id
particular in the ares Of a ban on nuclear testinq. testinq rhich could only
be conducive to the qualitative and quantitacive dovelopment of nuclear
arsenals in violation Of the spirit of the NPT. Althouqh the limited measurca
adopted by the United States and the USSP Co reduce Choir testinq vere
velcome. they still fell short of the long-standing expectation of the
international cornunity that nuclear testinq should be brouqht CO a complete
halt, rhich vas a fundamental measure aimedat endinq the nuclear arms race.
It vas therefore Co be hoped that vith the improvement in thair relacionshipa.
the tvo major nuclear Povers. folloved by other councries. vould soon take
meaninqful steps towards Chat qoal. The Conterence on Disarmanent should b*
called upon to play a role in chatundertakinq. vith additional constructive
support from the conference currentlybeinq preparedon the reviev of Che lgbJ
Partial Test Ban Treaty. MR. LEHMAN,UNITEDSTATES OF AMERICA(2ndmeeting) page 25,para33;
page 26,para3s6and37
33. pourthly, the United Stateshad, over the previous five years, conducced
intensive neqotiationson a broad range of arms-controlissues. The list of
aqreements and neqotiationssince the Third Review Conferencemade it clear
that the United States vas successfully discharqinqits responsibilitiesunder
article VI of th. Treaty. Thus, in 1986. the United Stateshad subscribed to
the Final Document of the Stockholm Conferenceon Disarmament in Europe.
In 1981.it had concluded an aqreement with the Soviet Union on establishinq
nuclear-riskreductioncentres andhad signed the INF Treaty and an agreemeac
on enhancinq the norms establishedby the BioloqicalWeapons Convention.
In 1988. it had entered into an agreementwith the Soviet Union on advance
notification ofballistic-missilelaunches. In 1989. it had joined in the
reaffirmatiooby the 140 participantsin the Paris Conferenceon Chemical
Weapons of the need to uphold the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the usa of chemical
weapons and to achieve auniversal ban on such weapons. In the same year. it
had concluded an agreementvith the SovietUnion onprevention of danqerous
military activities, an agreement on implementinqtrial SIART verificationand
stabilitymeasures and an agreementon advance notificationof major strategic
exsrcises and an agreementwith other NATO and Warsaw Pact countriesin CSCE
ta open neqotiationson conventionalforces in Europe. In1990. it had
concluded an agreementwith the SovietUnion on the destructionof.
chamical-weaponstockpiles.as well as new varificationprotocols-relatedto
the 1974Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Huclear Explosions
Treaty.
36. hong notable achievementsrince the Review Conferenceof 1985 vas the
fact Chat the 23 States members of HAT0 and the Warsav Pact were now makinq
proqress in their neqotiations- coverinq the aria from the Atlantic to the
Urals -on conventionalforces in Europe. At the Washinqton Sumnit. the
United States andthe Soviet Union had concludeda bilateral agreement to
destroy the bulk of United Statesand Soviet chemical weapons by the
year 2002. In December 1987, President Reagan and President Gorbachevhad
signed ahistoric aqreement - the IN? Treaty on the elimi,natinnof
qround-launchedintermediate-range nuclear delivery systems. The aqreement.
vhich had entered into forcein 1988. had already resulted in the elimination
of 2.257 Soviet and UnitedStates missilesand almast 800 Soviet and
United Stateslaunchers,and in the introductionof an elaborate system of
verification. including innovativeforms of on-site inspection.
37. At their meeting inJune 1990, President Bushand President Gorbachev had
indicatedthat an agrmementon strategic arms reduction miqhtbe sigoed by r?.e
end of the year. For the first rime ever. both sides rould carry out
siqnificantreductions -up to 50 per cent in certain categoiies - in the
nwnbers of strateqic offensive arms. Ihose reductionswould be designed Ca
maitea first strikelesr plausible, providinq qreater stabilityand a louer
risk of var. Uoreover. thefar-reachinq reductionsof the START Treaty uou!A
be accompaniedby innovativeprovisions for effectiveverificationand
informationexchange. thus increasingth. confidenceessential for a round
strategic relationship. When that goal vas attained.the United States and
the-SovietUnion would continue their talks on nuclear and space weapons. MR. PETROVSKY,UNIONOF SOVIETSOCIALISTREPUBLICS (2nd Meeting)
page 28, para46; page29, paras47 and49; page30, para 51
46. The profound changes which had taken place in the interotional situation
had had a direct effect on arms controland disarmament; it would be no
exaggeration to say that a reliable peaCe process. accompaniedby a gradua1
reductionof military potential. had already taken shape. Ihat had been the
object of the progrme of stage-by-stageeliminationof nuclear and other
types of weapons of mars destruction presentedby the Soviet Unionon
15 January 1986. The most importantstep towards the implementationof that
had been achievedvith the OntKy into force of the INF Treaty
betveen the Soviet Union and the United States. whose main political
siqnificanceconsisted in reversing the absurd logic of nuclear confrontation
and destroying thedangarous stereotype according to which the nuclear arms
build-up ras unavoidable. Forthe firit time. the USSP and the United States
had agreed on the elimination oftwo classes of nuclcar missiles and,
accordinq to a joint assessmentmade at the highest level. the implementation
of the agreementras proceeding normally. The eliminarion of short-range
missiles had been completed on both sides. As of 1 June 1990, the
Soviet Union had. for its part, eliminated a total of more than 1.500
medium-range and rhorter-rangm eissiles. or90 par cent of the original
number. The experience of theINP Treaty in other areas of disarmament,and
above al1 nuclear disarmament. especially with regard to verification
mechanism. would be extremely valuable to the START agreement at pr.esentbeing
negotiated. which ras to mark the beqinninq of major reductionsiqstrategic
arsenals measured in hundreds of delivery vehicles and thousands of charges.
As soon as possible afterthe conclusionof the Treaty, the two countries
would hold ~0ns~ltati0nson future negotiationson nuclear and spaceweapons
and on the strenqtheningof strategic stability.
47. There vas non a real opportunity for radical reduction of tactical
nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet Union had already withdram 500 nuclear
charges stationed in the territory of its allies in 1989 and hadrefrained
from modernizing its tactical nuclear missiles in 1989 or 1990.
49. The Soviet Union favoured a ban on the production of weapons-grade
fissionablematerials. which shouldconrtitute a reliable barrier to both
vertical and :.orizontalproliferation. It had ceascd,on a unilateral basis,
the production of highly-enricheduranium and hadbegun to implement a
programme of gradua1 diacontinuanceof al1 its industrial reactorsproducinq
weapons-grade plutonium by the year 2000. It had aïs0 proposed the
elaborationof a USSP-United States agreement. as well as a multilateral
agreement. on verifiable cessation of production of al1 weapons-grade
fissionablematerials. conpliancewith which could beverified withthe help
of IAEA's experience. Lastly. the Soviet Union had proposed. at the
United Nations. that agreement should be reachedon the non-use for military
purposes of nuclear material made available as a result of reductions in
nuclear arsenals.together with a correspondingverificationmechanism.
51. The signing at the Washington Suimit of protocols to the Threshold
Treaties of 1974 and 1976 non made it possible ta ratify those treaties and
pave the ray for setting further limitson nuclear tests with a viev
eventually to stoppinq them altogether. The Soviet Union favoured the
cont.inuance, without delay, of full-scale negotationsin that field. in
accordance wich the agreement reachedin 1987. However. the nuclear-testinq
issue called for multilateral efforts in parallel with bilateral efforts. and
the Soviet Union thereforeconsistently advocated that practical work on a
test ban shouldbe started, vithin the frameworkof the Conference On
Disarmament in Geneva. In 1987. toqether vithother States,it had submitted
draft basic provisions of a treaty on the comprehensiveand universal
prohibition of nuclear weaponstests. One of the options in that respect
would be to extend the 1963 Moscov Treaty banningnuclear weapons tests in t?.e
atmosphere, in outer space and under water to cover underground testinq. :te
forthcomingconference on that question should make a positive contributionCo
Che search for a solution to the nroblern of a r:~c!onrtoa? .=?.MR. BENHIMA, MOROCCO (2nd meeting) page38, pirr90
90. Uith regard to articleVI. hir dolegationwelcolird the proqrersmade in
that aroa by th. cwo rupor-Poveraand ch. continuocionof th0 negociations
begun with O viow to roducingtheir rtratogicarsenalsby 30-50 par cent.
Nevertholorr,th0 now order of internationalsocurityand poace would not be
ushered in as long asthe other throo nuclearPowers remainedoutside the
d~sarmment process. Co-operation in ehat are. ras al1 the more necessary
because the two military alliances conridorodthemrolvesno longer to be .
antagonistrbut partnerr in the aetting-upof a now securitysystem based on
CO-oporacionand dialogue.as proven by the progressmade at the latest
internationalconferences. In chat connection.hi9 deleqation0arnest:yhoped
chat the Cornitteeon a NuclearTest Ban. re-est€~blishe vdith the
Conferenceon Diaarmmont. would benefit(rom th. United States-USSR bi?areral
neqotiations.
MR. VAERNO, NORWAY(3rd meeting) page45, p.ri 13andpage 46,para 19
ln no other field had the new era in Cart-Weatrelations made more impact
13. in arma control. Major progress -the IN1Treaty Md the Stockholm
poc-nt - had alreadybeen made~d more signific~t achievementswere within
reach. The prospectsof an early STAR1 Treaty,providinpfor aizeable
reductionsin strateqicnucleerweapoaswere promiringand it ras to'be hoped
bilateral neqotiationrbetween theUnited States andthe SovietUnion
,ouldbe succearfullyconcludodin the noar futur.. In Vionna, the end-game
in the noqotiationson conventionalforCOsras about to begin and bis country
,as confidentthat. given the necessarypoliticalwill. the major issues that
,,,ainedoutstanding couldbe sortrd out in tiw for the first CFE treaty to
ba siqnedat the CSCE summit in November1990.
Together with a meaningful
on confidence-and security-building meaaurea.such a CFE agreement
coulddramaticallyimprove security Md atabilityin Europe by eliminatinqthe
cspability for surpriseattack and large-scalaoffonsiva operations and would
halpconsolidate the recent politicc alanges andserve as a barrier against
ay attemptto re-establishthe previous -. Such an agreement would
.]sopave the way for significantreductionrin the nuclear arsenalain
Europeand n0w.negotiation~could be startedon the reductionof Soviet and
unitedStates short-range nuclear forces.. In addition.at the July summit in
London.the menbers of NATO's integratedmilitary structure hadmade it clear
chatthey intended. in responseto reciprocal action on the partof the
sovietUnion, toeliminste al1 the Alliance'snuclearartilleryshells in
Europe.
19. The objoetivesof esdinq the nuclear arma race andimplementinqeffective
measures for nuclear disarmament wer emajor and integralpart of the
Treaty. It ras gratifyingCo note that considerable progresh sad taken place
during the period under review and that the prospects forfurtheradvances
were good. In that connection.ho referredin particularto the agreementon
basic provisions of the STAR1 Tresty achievedat the United States-Soviet
rununitin June 1990. He alsonoted wichsatisfactionthat the twoparties
were to begin further talks on strategic nuclear forces specificallyto
achieve a mors stable strateqib calanceafter the Treatyvas completed. The
riqningof verificationprotocolsfor the ThresholdTest Ban Treatyaad the
PeacefulNuclearErplosions Treaty opened the way for the ratificationof
those instrumentsand thus representeda step towardsa comprehensir.b ean on
ail nuclear testing. UR. VJTALONE,ITALY (3rdmeetingpage48, para27
27. Against such a backgrountheoverwhelmingimportanceof the Treatyon
the on-proliferatioof NuclearWeapons ras self-evidenThe Treaty's
r , status as the principalmultilateralinstrumentin the field of ams control
ras reflectedby the fact thatov140 States had acceded to it in the desire
not only to prevent a recurrenceof the tragediesof Hiroshima andNagasaki.
developmentsin the Soviet Union and in the countriesof Eastern Europehad
radically transformdhe internationalscene. so that theSecond World War
and the ensuinq cold war could beraid to have coma definto an end.
In that connectionha referred inparticularto the Londondeclarationof the
NATO countries.as roll as to the conclusionof the IN? agreement and the
agreementsconcerningthe reductionby one-halfof the strategicnuclear
arsenalsof the two Great PowerHe also stressedthe importanceof the
adoptionof verificationprotocolsto the Ihresholdt Ban Treatyand the
Peaceful Nuclear ExplosionsTreaty.as well as the onqoingVienna negotiations
on the reductionof convencionalforces inEurope and of the forthcomingParis
srnit of the Conferenceon Securityand Co-Operationin EuroThe Italian
Goverment. in its capacityas current Prasidentof the EuropeanComunity,
ras activelyengaqed in al1 those endeavours.
MR. MACKAY.NEWZEALAND (3rdmeeting)pag54,para50
50. In thefive yearsince the previourPeview Conference.there had been
unprecedentedrogress in nucleardisarmment as between the major Porers.
The conclusionof the INF treaty hadeliminateda whole categoryof weapons.
aqreementon rignificantreductionsin strategic nuclweapons ras close and
there were grounds for optimismwith regard to short-range nuclear forces.
nuclear arms race.The chemical weaponsagreementbetween the UnStatesponthe
and the Soviet Union, and the progresstowardsan agreementon conventional
forces in Europehowed a new willingnessto achieveconcreteand major
disarmment measures.MR. OGADA, KENYA (3rdmeeting) page56, pua 61
61. the Ireaty souqht Co prohibit not only horizoota1proliferacionbut alio
vertical proliferacion. Article VI O< Che Treacy Ici11 rernainedCo be coca::?
fulfilled. Two of the nuciear-weaponStaces Parties Co the NP1 concinued t~
be enqaqed in bilateralnuclear arms control and disarmamentneqotiacioni trar
had alreadyculminated in the destruccionof a whole caceqoryof nuclcar
wcapona. Heverchelesa.choie reaponr cancinuedto exist in the arienalasf a
fer Scacea. th* neqociaciona,coeliminatenuclearweapona ihould encompass
al1 thoie Statesvhich porieiaedauch weapons. The world could not :e safe
uncil al1 nuclear veapona, wherever they exiated.were effectivelyand
verifiablydestroyed. Th* banninq of a11 nucleartests in al1 enviroumenti
and for a11 cime vas long overdue. Under the prerenc favourableioternaci=ca!
circwnstancas,Cher* was 00 justification f3r the cootinuationof choie tescs.
MRS. VON GRUNIGEN, SWITZERLAND (4th meeting p)age60, pan 5
5. Reqardinqthe implementationof article V: of the Xresty. her deleqacloc
welcomed the aubrtantialproqresrmade in recencyears by the tmo Super-Powerr
in the ares of arma reduction,especiallyin Europe. The siqnfngof the
INF Treaty betreen the United scates aad the Soviet Uni00 in December 1987
rcpresentedunprecedestedproqresi in the area of armr control.iince the
Treaty provided for qeouine reduccionof both States' potentidlnuclear
iapa~il~ciei,coqetherwith an encirelynev varificationayscem.which miqnt
serve as a precedentfor tbe elimioatiosof other military inbalanees.
Houever.the IW? Treaty Should ba follorod by ocher aqreemancson conventional
and chernicalwapooi. lt reeiud chat an aqreemaocon con~eotionalforces
in Europemiqht be concludedbefore the next Cooferenceon Securityand
Co-operscionin Europe. Wer deloqacioohoped ehat tbe oeqotiationsoo a
reductiooof strateqicnuclaar veaponsrould produce a oer aqreenencio 1990,
and. like mit States. it consideredchat cha conclusionol an aqreement on a
compranensiv*nuclear test ban ras essencialfor guaranteeinqconpliancewith
the c~~i~nta made UDAer articleVI of the Treaty. MR. LOEIS, INDONESIA(4th meeting) page 66.para29
29. Turning Co an evaluatiom Of the implementatioaof the Treaty, he raid
chat the three nuclear-weapon States parties hadobserbd the provisionsof
~rt~cle 1 but had noc been able fully to implement the provisionsof the
eighth to eleventh preambular paragrapbs and article VI. Since the Treaty's
entry into force, progresr towardr halting the nuclear arma race and vertical
The non-nuclear-weaponStates parties to
proliferation had been meagre.
the Treacy, for their part. had fully discharged chair obligations undar .
article II. Indonesia believed Chat the factors Chat had led to the inabilicy
of States parties fully to implement the Treaty's provilions should be
reviewed regularly to enhance ics credibility. The United Statesand the
buc thac
Soviet Union had concludedagreements aimed at haltinq the arms race.
vas insufficient. His delegation ras of the view that the most deciaive
measure Co halt the nucleararms race war a total ban on nuclear teacinq.
Moreover. under the provisions of article VI. al1 parties had undertaken
to pursue negotiations in good faithon effective measurcs relacinq
the cessationof the nuclear arms race at an early dace and on nuclear
disarmament. as well as on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective internationalcontrol. Thur the Treaty should noc bc
considerad merely as an instrument Co encourage negotiations on nuclear and
non-nuclear arms control. Indonesia war also worried by the fact thac the
reduction of the number of nuclear weapons ras beinq accompanied by
improvementr in the quality, dccuracy and reliabilityof nuclear weapon
systems. With regard to nuclear dirarmanent. an assessment of the position
also revealed a certain degree of dissatisfaction. Itwar true chat the
INF Treaty had initiated a reduction in nuclear arseaals. However. even a
30 per cent reduction of the strategic nuclear weaponry of the United States
and the Soviet Union would still leave them with arsenals far exceedinq thoar
they had had in1970, which ras con-rary Co the spiritof article VI of the
Treatv.
MRGENSCHER,FEDERALREPUBLICOF GERMANY(4th meeting) page 70.
para 43
43. Further nuclear disarmanent waa neceasary and indeed possible. The
changed security situation in Europe would permit less and less reliance on
nuclear weaponr for the purpore of preventing war. In that connection,he
mentioned the negotiationr betweeo the United Stater and the SovietUnion on
the reduction of short-raoge nuclear weapons. which would be started soon
after the signing of ao agreement on conventional forces inEurope. The
siqninq of the verification protocolr Co the thresholdTreaties at the
United States-Soviet srrnmitin Washington would constitute a further stage
alonq the road Co a ban on nuclear tests.
MR. KOSIN,YUGOSLAVIA(4th meeting) page78,para 85
85. Although thay recognized the positiveelemonts and affects brought about
by recent agreements and onqoinq negotistions in the nuclear disarmament
field. thecountries he repreaented regretted that the modernizationand
qualitative improvemancof nuclear weapons continued. Vertical proliferation
of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weaponStates continued contraryto the
provisions of the preamble and the articles of the Treaty. Ar for horizontal
proliferacion.the spread of nuclearweapons capability amonq certain Stater
not parties to the NP1 posed a serious threat to the non-proliferationrégime
and underlincd the qravity of the problem. MR. WAGENMAKERS,NETHERLANDS(5th meeting)page 84, para13
. The NP1 had also been of Crucial importance asthe major post-war
multilateralarms controlagreement. It had strengthenedthe belief chat the
spreadof ouclear reepons could not be allored to go unchecked. The presmble
notsd the intentionof the Parties "CO achieve at the earliest possible date
the cessation ofUie nuclear arms race" and article VI reflectedthat same
undertaking. Io the part five years considerableprogress had been mide in
the field oC aras control and more tanqible resultr could be expected in the
=car future. ~mportantagreementshad been reached by the Uoited Statesand ,
the Soviet Union on major outstandingissues in that connection. There had
a;so been considerableadvances in regional and rorld-ride disarmamentover
the past five years and the negotiationsin Vienna on conventiooalscability
in Europe could be expected Co lead to an agreementrithin a fer mooths. The
discussionson a treaty on chemicalreapons had reached an advanced Stage.
Geoeral and completedisarmamentunder strict and effective internetional
cîctrol, one of the aims of the NPT. still seemad rather remote, but there ras
some indicationof movement in the right direction. After yearr of
staqoacioo.some progrers had been achieved on the subject of nuclear-reapon
restiog and discussion onchat item'hadbeen resuinedin the Conference 00
Disarmament. IC ras important thatthe nunber and yield of nucleartests
should be reduced to a minimum level. thereby offering the prospect of a
comprehensivetest ban at the appropriatemoment.
UR. PIREK,CZECHAND SLOVAKFEDERALREPUBLIC(5th meeting)page93,
paras.50 and5 1
50. As to the revier Of articlesV, VI and VII. he rished to emphasire chat
the gradua1 and consistentconscructionof a rorld free of nuclear reaponsras
a priority in hi1 country's foreign policy. Like most other participantsin
the C00fere0~e.Czechoslovakiavar oot fully satisfiedrith the implementation
of the provirionrof article VI. although it ras crue chat more had been donc
in that field siece the 1985 Reviev Conference than in al1 previous years
rakeotogecher. His country expecced chat process to continueand hoped to
sec it advance to the stage of multilataralnegotiationsin the near future.
Ir chat context. it greatly apprecistedthe Soviet-UnitedStates
:NF Agreement.in whose implementationit ras partly involved. The Agreement.
"cichhad launcheda process of real disarmament in the nuclearfield. should
:e rupplementedin the foresecablefuture by a radicalreductionin the tro
p3uerV offensivertratagicreaponr. someching his Goverment stroogly
favoured. In vier of the LondonDeclaracionof the NATO countries in
:.L!Y1990. the start of negotiationson the eliminationof al1 tactical
~uc:earreapons in Europe reemed pramising. The cino ras approachingrhen the
iroceSSof nuclear disarmamentshould be jcined by the other nuclear Porers.
:: "as to be hoped that their participationin the relevant nsgotiationsrould
=Grbe linked to any preconditians. The firststep towards that end miqhtbe
:r.adoptionof so-cslled negative assurances.
il.
teneraland cornpletc prohibitionof ouciear-reapootests vas the most
e:fectiveway of haltinq the escalationof armamentsand achievingnuclear
:'"rmment. Unfortunately,the results expected had not been achieved:
a:'houghthe additionalprotocols to the Soviet-UnitedStates agreements
=cnuclcar-weapootests of 1974 and 1976 had been siqned at the
jo'~iet-UniteStates smit in Washingtonearlier in 1990. they had Dot yer
'eenKasifiad.
~t ras CO be hoped thst resumed negotiations wouldresult ic a
slpnificantlimitation by both Powers of the'oumber and enerqy yield Oftheir
LUcleartests. At the Conference on Disarmament,the matter had remained in a
"_te Of protracted stagnation. The Czechoslovakdelegationras am009 those
trying Co find ways of overcoming the impasse.
recencly established Ic ras to be hoped that the
Cornittee rould at long last produce tangible
resulti. One possible solution miqht be found in the non-sliqnedcountries'
proposal Chat the validity of the Partial Trrt-Ban Treaty rhould be extended
to cover underground testing. t~echoslovakia,for its part. var makiog
responribleand serious Preparatioorfor th8 United Nations conferenceto be
held in New York at the beginning of 1991. MR. ENE, ROMANIA (5thmeeting)page95, pua 59
59. ha poaitiva raaults achieved ?inca tka e'try into forca of th.
Won-prolifaracionTraacy demonstratedthe important Kola tâac cha NPT played
in maintaining internationalpeace and security and promoting davalopment,
somethinqchat mure be borna in'mind in 1995 whan the Stataa Parties met to
decide on the Traaty's further duration. In viaw of the recent positive
~developmentsin incarnationalrelationsand the democrrtizationand improved
human riqhts situation in Europe. the coming five years offered a uniqua
opportunityto prepare the qroundvark for Che abolition ofnuclear weapods.
The Conference souqht to give fresh impetus Co that goal by improvinqupon the
ioadequaciesof the non-proiiferationrégime so as to make thespread of
nuclearweapoos more difficult. The ConferencemuSc also attach priority to
the early completionof the Soviet-UnitedStates neqotiationson a 50 par cent
reductionin strateqic nuclearweapons. Che beqinning of a new series of
ncqotiationson short-range nuclear missile sn Europe and a rs-evaluationof
nuclearweapons strategy in the light of ner policical realitias. ~t ras ai30
important CO qive leqal force to the obligationof States not to resort tocbc
Us* or threat of UseOC nuclear WeapOnS. The issue of sacurity assurancesfor
non-nuclaarScatas should no longer creace difficultiar. Tha stops taken to
rrducenuclaar weapons were mort qratifyinq.but such afforts musc also help
achieveanother objectiveof the Treaty - a ban on al1 nuclear tests. Romania
*elcomedtha recent initiativeby six non-aliqned States in that matter.
MR. STEPHANOU, GREECE(5th meeting)page96.Para65
65. Despite the continuinq risk chat yet more countriesmiqbt acquire nuclear
weapons and the tact that a number of States continued Co romain outside the
non-proliferationrégime, important progress had been achieved in recent
years: the INP Treaty, the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe
agreement. the verificationprotocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and
the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.and the aqreement batween the
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republicsto destroy chemical
weapons rare al1 encouraging signs chat the tvo ruper-Porerswere on the riqhc
path cowards genuine nuclear disarmment and a reduction in vertical
proliferation. Ais delegation looked forward to further proqresa towards the
~ompletio~by the end of 1990 of a number of bilateral agreements hetveen
the United States and the Soviet Union on strateqicnuclear weapons and
chemicalweapons.
MR. TCHEUL,DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, (6th meeting)
page 100,para 4
4. The NPT hed already played a significant role in that no new
nuclear-weaponStace had ernergedin recenc yaars. Since the Third Review
Conference affortshad been made by the nuclear-weapon States to achievs
nuclear diaarmment and progress had been made towards that goal. The
1987 Treaty between the United Statesand theUSSR on the Elimination of the11
Intermediate-Rangeand Shorter-RanqeMissiles. thprospects for stracegic
&rms reductions and the unilateral reductionof certain tactical nuclear
weapons aroused hopes chat neqotiationson nuclear disarmamentwould extricate
themselves from their three-decade-longstagnation. It ras for the Conference
to see that those hopes vere fulfilled. MR. STAIKOV,BULGARiA(6th meeting page 105,pua 27
27. Bis Goverment vas convincedthat continued nuclear disarmament efforts
rould contribute siqnificantly to the strenqtheninqof the non-proliferation
The eliminationof thousands ofintermediate-range ans dhort-range
riqime.
nuclearmissilesby the SovietUnion and the United States represented
considerable proqress towardsthat end, and it ras to be hoped that the
agreementconcluded in June on a framework forreducinqstrateqic nuclear .
arsenalswould lead to the rapid conclusionof a treatyon the subject and
that neqotiationson future reductions would beqin immediately aft the
conclusionof the START-1 Treaty, which would be fully in keepingrith the
States parties' commitmentsunder articleVI of the Treaty. The unilateral
rithdrawalof hundredsof tacticalnuclear charges by the USSR and the
United States ras another encouraginq siqn of full cornpliancwith the
proviaionsof articleVI. Ris Goverment also welcomed the proqress in the
negotiationson conventionalarms reductions. confidence-building measures in
Europe and the prohibitionof chemicalweapons. And it welcomed the recenc
siqninq of the protocolson the control mchanism of the agreementsconcluded
between the USSB and the United Statesin 1974 and1976, and hoped that those
agreements vould be ratifiedshortly.
UR. HOULLEZ, BELGIUM(6th meeting)page 106, para30
30. In the area of disarmament. theIN? Aqreement.the firstsince the
Second World Mar to be accompaniedby effectivevarificationmeasures.
ras
beinq implemented satisfactorilb yy al1 the parties. The signinqof the STAR1
Aqreementon the reductionof strateqicweapons.which would have a strooq
impact on the capabilitiesof the two major nuclear Powers, appeared CO be
imminent.and the North AtlanticTreaty Alliance. for ita part. had repeated
its ri11 to beqin neqotiations on short-rangeweapons as soonas an agreement
on Conventionalforces in Europe ras siqned. Similarly,at theirLondon
sunmit. the aeada of State and Goverwnt of the Alliance countrieshad taken
full account of the new relationsbetween the countries of Europe.
which
aroused hopes that the new NATO strategywould be less dependenton nuclear
weapons. The United States bad in turn announcedits intention to refrain
from modernirinqits LANCE miasiles and to withdrawits nuclear artillery from
Europe. In the area ofthe cessationof nuclear testinq,too, a welcome
siqn ras the inirainentatificationof the protocolsto the 1914 and 1976
treatieson thresholda andpeacefulnuclear explosionsby the two nuclear
super-Powers. In that CoMection. the re-establishmentof the
Committeeon a Nuclear Test Ban proved that the final objective.to which
Belqium ras stronqlycomitted. nmely, a permanentand varifiablehalt to
nuclear testing,could finally beachieved. MR. CALDERON. PERU (6thmeeting) page 108,pur 40
O. nr. CALDLROIPeru)hat it had probablybeen out of fear of the
conrequenceiof a nuclear cooflict that Che ¶up*r-PO~~rrhad bequn
neqotiationron a creatyCo check theproliferotionof ruch reaponr of mars
destruction. The NPT had been an important initial rtaqa on the roadCO
reason. tt ras rimply one vay of creatinqcondicionr that vould make it
possible to eliminacenuclear weaponrfrom the face of the earth once and.
for 111. Non-proliferacion did noc mean elininationor reduction.but
non-reproduction. Thac var rhy the Ireaty ras dircriminatory,in cvo
respects. lirrt. it var the firrt international inscrwnencleqally CO
recoqnize€ive States ar beinq the sole nucleerPorerr under article IX,
paraqraph 3. tt var perhapr chac diacriminatorynature chat explainedthe
existenceof articleVI. Indaed.rince ic war noC a nucleirdisarmunent
creaty. icr moral authorityand universalirationdependedon the cesration of
the nuclear armr race and on nueleardisarmament.Cvo procerrer leadinqta
qeneral and completedirarmunenc. Secondly.the Treatyqave prelerential
traaunant CO the non-nuclear-veaponStates parties. Article IV provided :ha:
non-nuclear-reapon States rhould benefit lion the devolopnuncof the many uses
of nuclear enerqy for peacefulpurporer.
MR. CALDERON, PERU (6th meeting)page 109, pan 43
43. The successful implementation of the 1987 WashinqtonTreaty, on the
eliminationof intermediate-range ans dhort-rangemirailes, and the
announcementthat the super-Porerswould beconcludinqa treaty on the
eliminationof certain categoriesof rtraceqicoffenrivereaponr by the end of
the year vere exmples of the mearures that musc be taken in order to
lersenthe disappoinementof the non-nuclear-reaponStatea parties at Che
'implementationof arcicle VI.
UR. RASAPUTRAM,SRI LANKA (6thmeeting)page 113. pans 60 and 61
60. Regsrdioparticle VI. ho note6 vith sacirfactionthe proqrers in bilacerai
neqotiationrrince 1985. The tvo nuclear super-Poverrhad concludedthe
INl Treaty andconmitcedthemrelverCo concludinqthe STAR1 Aqreement.
However.his Governmentvar dirappoincedchat there had been no aqreemeocon
effectivelimitat~ons.and it Chus feared that the quert for a ner qeneration
of nuclear veaponrvould continue.
51. Ihere had been reportsof ner nucl*ar-weaPOnsystemr. includingsubmarize-
baredmissiles and cruise mirriles. noreover.even if 3 Co 4 par cent of :ze
missilesver. dertroyedunder the IN? Treaty. thair rarheadrwould be
recainad. The STAR1 Aqreemencenviraqedmuch leri than a 50 per cent
reduction.but even after a 50 per cent reductionof the tvo super-Povers.
scrategicarsenals.Chose tvo councriesvould have 20 per cent more nuclcar
rarheadrchan chey had had in the early 19701. Currenc neqotiationr had noc
producedany proqresr Concerninpa possible agreementon prevencinqan arms
race in outer rpace. Rerearchand davelopmencvere continuinq inchat field.
Sri Lanka var Chus leriourlyconcernedat Che porribilityof an expensiveand
destabilirinqarmr racein oucer rpace coupled rith the developmentof new
nuclearreaponr. --..UU-IW I 1~YuBLIC OF HUNGARY (6tbmeeting) page.ll4. nara6R
-- -
MR. DUNA, TURKEY (7tbmeetiog) page131. para51
51. The progress achieved in nuclear disarmanentoves the past five years
representeda major stop in the implen»ntationof article VI of the Treaty.
In that connection,he referred to the IN? AqreeMnt of 1988, the impendinq \
conclusionof a STAR1 agreement. to be followedby turther talks o. ;trategic
balance issues, andthe neqotiationsOn the reduction Of short-range nuclear
forces expected to take place sfter the conclusionof the agreement on
conventionalforces in Europe. Bis deleqationalso weleomed the decision'of
the Conference on DisarmainenttO discuss at informalmeetings the topics of
cessationof-the nuclear armsrace and nuclear disarmameatand prevention of
nuclear war. includinqal1 relatedmatterS. and hoped thatthe debate on those
items rould be continued at the 1991 sessions of the Conference.
MRS. MASON, CANADA (8th meeting) page 137. para7
1. Maoy States Partiesalso participstedin bilateral nuclearCO-operation.
and as a major exporter of nucleer items. Canada had played and would continue
to play a significantsols in internationalnuclear CO-operationwith aride
variety of countries,both developed and developing. Itwould be submittioq
to the Conference a paper on its bilateral activities.which included uranium
exports. provision of powar and research reactors.nuclear technoloqytransfer
and training activities. Canada had bilateralagreementswith 28 countries
which, with the exceptionof France. a nuclear-weaponState, were parties to
the NPT. It believed that adherence to the NP? or to NFT-type safeguardsras
an essential condition of nuclear supply. bother important pointwar to
clarify the list of nuclear materials and equipment. Some parties to the HP1
objected to the additional non-proliferation assurance often required by
suppliers. Such requirementswera often a matter of national policy.
responded to nuclear non-proliferation concerna and provided fallback
safequards in the event that IUA ras unable to apply safeguards. Theymade
it possible to take particularpreeautionswith hiqh enrichment and
reprocessingand to have som control ovmr the retransferof items to third
parties. It ras within that more comprehensive non-proliferatior négime that
assurancesof nuclear supplycould continueto contributeto world
prosperity. That did not eitend to the peacaful applicationsof nuclear
explosions.as provided for in article V. for the benefits remained doubtful.
As to the provisionsof article VI, under which parties undertook to pursue
neqotiations ingood faith on effectiveNasures relatinq to cessationof the
nuclear arms raceand to nuclear disarmament.and on a treatyon qeneral and
complotedisarrnsnent. al1 the efforts undertaken in that directio had
provoked the huild-up rather than the reductionof arms.in a climats of
internationaltension. Howevsr, the international climate had chanqed
considerablysince the previous Review Conterence, particularly in the
East-West context, andStates were demonstratinga revitaliaedcornitmentto
resolve problems by peaceful means. Unprecedentedproqrsrs had been made
towards haltinq and reversingthe nuclear arms race.The INP Treaty.
concluded in 1987, ras a noteworthy achrevement. The United States.qndthe
Soviet Union had reached agreement in principle on a STmT treaty, which
shouldbe signed before the end of the year. They had also conmitted
themselvesto neqotiatinq a STUZ II treaty and to pursuing adialogueOn
enhancinq rtrategic stability after the inplenentationof STMT 1. There rere
also other indicationstùat the super-Powrr had indemd embarked on thm path
of nuclear dieamaumnt. MR. BARNET, JAMAICA(8th meeting)page 139, 17-22
17. The last half of the 1980s bad beralded the nev direction in
internationalrelations, marked by improved relations betveenthe super-Povers
and the siqninq of the INP Treaty. Bowever. the elimioation of an entire
class of missiles still loft the international comuoity militarily only
marqioally better off. as there ver. still more Chan enouqb weapons to deatroy
thevorld several times over. The siqnificance of the recent turn in
internationalrelations portended more chan it actually meant. However.the -
prospects for an early signature of a strateqic arms reduction treacy and of
rubstantialproqress in the Vieona neqotiacions ver0 al1 the more encouraqinq.
20.
Only a comprehensive nuclear-test ban vould prevent the developmenc of
*ore aophisticatad nuclear weapons syatems. Continued testing, at whatever
ievel,implied acceptaoceof the idea chat nuclear veapons vere usable and
uouldbe used. thus indicacinq persistent adherence to a doctrine of certain
autualdestruction. If no proqresa ras made beyond ttiatstage, th00 tbe NPï
had not yet provided a suitable framework for the maintenance of international
peaceand security in a chanqinq world.
22. The principal concerns initially raisedby the noo-aliqoed Countriervere
=tillunmet. more particularlya comprehenrive test ban, a cut-off Of the
productionof fissile material for veaponr. a freeie and reduction 0: 'stocka
Of nuclcar veapons and their delivery systems. prohibition of the use of
nuclear weapons, and iecurity assurances Co non-nuclear-weaponStates. The
Treaty, vhich ras essentially about States and not about veaponr, had led Co
scant proqress in chose spheres.
MR. MGBOKWERE, NIGERIA (8th meeting)page 144,para47
47. -1t had Co be remembered that. pursuanc to article VI of the Treaty. aii
States Parties. nuclear and non-nuclear alike. had accepted a leqally-bindinq
cornmiunentto purrue neqotiatioor in good faith on effective measuresrelatinc
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and CO nuclear
disarmament. ad on a treaty an general and complete disarmamentunder strict
and effective internationalcoptrol. However. the adverse affect of Che
military posture and defence doctrines of the nuclear-veaponStates and other
militarily siqoificant States Parties vere likely Co jeopardire actaiment of
the qoals of the NPT. Accordinqly. Niqeria urqently calledon the
super-Povers and other nuclear-veapooStates. rhich vere primarily responsiblr
for the implementationof article VI. CO cake advancaqe of the conliderably
improved relations betveenCham Co redouble choir efforts tovardr fulfilliuq
the'aims of that article. The statements they had alreadymade durinq the
Conference were encouraqinq and it vas Co be hoped that theyvould actively
parcicipare in tha 1991 Amendment Conference aimed at coovertinq the Partial
Test Ban Treaty inta a comprehensive test ban creacy to enrure ici success.
MR. GLESSINER, AUSTRlA (8th meeting)page 147, para59
59. Further to the conclusion of the INP Treaty by the United States and the
ÜSSR. and Co other recent developmentr in the field of diaarmament. for the
first time it seemed that the provisions of article VI of the
Non-ProliferationTreaty vere actuallybeinq applied. However, in view of the
nlvnberof nuclear veapons to be destroyed, the INP Treaty could onlybe
considercd as a first step tovards comprehensivenuclear disarmament. In the
rame concext. it ras co be hoped chat the STUT 1 agreement on the reduction
of Che strateqic arsensals of the tvo nuclear super-Poverrvould be concluded
skortly and that a secondagreement vould also be reached lacer. MR. NASSERI, ISLAMICREPUBLICOF IRAN(8th meeting)page149, para70
70. The objectiveof article VI ras undoubtedly themort importantof the
Treaty. althouqh it had to aarge ertent long beeo iqnored by the
super-Pouers. Durinq the cold war. the arms race hadreached its peak, but a .3
nunber of positive developmentshad since taken place. However, the policy of
maintalning nuclear supremacyand refusinq to disavar the nuclearoption
remained intact. Various States had adopted the doctrine of acquirinq
security throughthe achievemeatof nuclear auperiority.Such trends had .
unfortunatelypaved the way for a qualitative and quantitative reqional
conventionalarms race, thus boostinq Cho transfer of arms to such reqions.
~ecent developments in the Middle East and the Periiin Gulf were the
consequenceof that danqerousprocesS.
MR. AMOO-GOTTFRIED,GHANA(8th meeting)page151, pm 78
required an end to bothhorizontal and vertical proliferationof nucleart.*hicE
weapons. The fact that nuclear-weaponStates conrinued to improthe quality
of such weapons could only encouraqe non-nuclear-ueaonates with advanced
nuclear technoloqy Co cross th0 nuclear threshold and develop nuclaar
weapons. The first stop to halt that process ras an end to nuclear testinq
would be the mortconcrete proof of the determinationof the nuclearlweapon
States to stop vertical proliferationand to work tovards complete nuclear
disarmament. The prospects ofiuch a treaty werenot as bleak as seemed at
first sight. The riqninq of the IN? Treaty. in 1987. had been followedby the
conclusion of a number of bilateral aqreemeotsbetween the United States and
the SovietUnion. Aqain. the Comittee on a Nuclear Test Ban had bem
a developmentrhich Ghana welcomed as a positive siqn of the
e-eslished,
cornitment of the nuclear-weaponStates to nuclear disarmament.
MR. ROZENTAL, MEXICO (9thmeeting)page159,pm 18
18. He welcomed the reductionof10to 30 per cent in the rtratmqic arrenals.
but noted with wiety thet the woapona thenselvoswere not diaappearinq.but
were beinq redeployodoutside Curopo. to other reqionr. Thur. the nuclear
threat had duindled in Europe. but it had mot dirappeareNuclear disarmament
would not be achieved a8 long am nuclear weapon tertinq and the production of
fissionablematerial for military purposer continueThe necessary stops
musr therefore be takeo to "suffocate"th. nuclear arms race.
UR. LUONG, VIETNAM (9tbmeetkg) page'160para23
23. Since the Third Review Conference. internationalrelations hadundergone
profound modifications.The wrld had moved out of the cold war period inco
ooe of dialogue and CO-operation. There werew real porsibilitierof
prerervinq internationalpoace and security and findinq equitable soluttons
reqional conflicts. In that context. the procers ot bath qeneral and nuclear
disarmanunthad made qreat proqress. With theentry into force of the
INF Aqreement in 1988, qenuine nuclear disarmamentmeasurer had been taken for
the first time in history. Alro to be welcomed ras the signatureof the
verificationprotocolr to the "threshold" treaties of 1974 and 1976. as roll
as the proqresr beinq made towards conclusionof the STIPT treaty. rhich
provided forimportant reductions in the strateqic nuclear arrenals of the
Soviet Unionand the United States. There war rearon bo ratisfied.but no:
excessively so, rince ovin if the STAR?.treacy rare roll implemented.thouranc
of nuclear warheadr wouldromain, enouqh co cause a nuclear holocwhore
consequenceswould brinq aboutthe total destructionof civiliration. MR. NGOUBEYOU,CAMEROON(10th meeting) pige 165, para8
8. ~t vas a natter of concern mat. despite some siqnificant developmagts
iuch as the signing of the INI Treaty, the jointdeclaration on
non-proliferationby the United States and the Soviet Union and the adoption
of verification protocols at the recent Washington Sumnit. an roll as
significantproqress achieved at the Vienna and Stockholm talks. the
undertakingsset out in article VI had not been fully discharqed during the
period under review. The problem of the cessation of al1 test explosionsof
nuclear weapons, likeChat of the CO~C~U¶~O~ of a treaty an general and
camplete disarmament, remained unresolved. He continued tobelieve that the
conc1usionof an agreement onthe complete halting of nuclear testa vas an
essentialcondition for complianca with article VI. and also supportedthe
Nigerian proposa1 an neqative security assurancesto non-nuclear-veaponStates
Parties tothe Treaty (NPT/CONF.IV/17). It ras ais0 to be hoped thatthe
Cornittee on a Nuclear Test Ban re-establishedby the Conference on
Disarmamentwould accelerate ita work with a viaw to arrivinq at an early
agreement which.together vith measures prohibiting the threat or use of
nuclear weaponsaqainst non-nuclear Stataa Parties. vould unquestionmiy
contribute towards strengtheoing the NPT ia particular and th0
non-proïiferationrCqime in generai. encouraqinq States vhich had not yet donr
a0 to acceds to the Treaty and rertorinq the confidenceof non-nuclear-weapcn
States Parties.
MR. RIVAS, COLOMBIA(10th meeting) page 168, para20
The Conference afforded an exceptional opportunityfor nuclear phwers to
20.
strengthen their cornitment under article VI. Important. albeit partial,
steps had beau taken on the road to nuclesr disarmament.or rather Co a lower
rate of nuclesr armament. There ras no douht. however.chat international
,,pinionand the aspirationsof al1 peoplaa contiaued to be in favour of bolder
and more ~itioua measurer in that field. It ras not snouqh for the two
,~per-Paverato aqree on certain limitations to their nuclear arsenals vhile
leaving their destructiveCapacity intact. if nuclear-ueaponStates continued
the race towards technical improvementof their wapons of masa destruction
and a vertical praliferationwhich continued tothreaten mankind. aomethinq
that vas against the very spirit of the Treaty.
MR. RIVADENEIRA, ECUAWR (10thmeeting page 172,para 33
,-,. mile he welcomed the efforts mado by the nuclear-weaporStates to ComPlY
,,itharticle VI of the Treaty. it val important to make furtlierpro9re- in
neqotiationa on effective measUres relating to cessation of Che nuclear
race. The exceptionally ravouraol* internation altuationlnusfbe used to
the partial lest BU rreaty into an instrumentbanoing al1 nuclear
teseing. the 10.g-term goal beinq complot* disarmament.
MR. ANDERSSON, SWEDEN (1ltb meeting)page 174,para2
2. Significant proqress had been made in the field of nuclear disarmameot.
In January 1985, the Soviet Union and the United States hadagreed to beqln
negotiations on the reductionof strategic and intermediate-rangenuclear
weapons. Subiequent declarations by the tvo major nuclear Povers had
demonstrated CO the world cornunity thst policy makers were non arking
fundamental questions about the future role of nuclear weapons as a meana of
detorrence. The firat real stop tovards nuclear disarmament hadbeen the
conclusi.onin 1987 of the bilateral IN? Treaty, vhich provided forthe
elimination of a whole categoryof nuclear veapons. The comprehensive study
on nuclear veapona. in which both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-veapon States
had participated, had also made a valuable contribution to the analysis of the
matter. In the European context in particulsr, negotistions were under way on
both disarmament and confidence-and security-buildinqmeasures. The States
participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe(CSCE)
were expected to adopt regional measures in the near future; andalthough
military negotiationr had so far been Concerned vitb conventionalweapons,
they rere also expected to addrass th* issue of nuclear voapons in the future. MR. ANDERSSON.SWEDEN(Ilth meeting) page 175, para 5
5. The best way of achievinquniversalityadharoncelay in brinqinq about a
situationin wbich al1 States Parties strictly obrervet dhe provisionsof the
Treaty,not only in pence-Cimebut also in times Of crisis or war. It ras
also hiqhly desirableto pursue comprehensiveneqotiationson nuclear
disarmament,includinqnaval dirarmamenc. witb the objective ofbanninq
nuclearweapons from al1ships and sibnarinesother than Chose placed in
classes speciallydesiqnatedby aqreement. Such a prohibition shouldcovec
al1 sen-lauchedcruisemissiles withnuclear warheads. Moreover. in
fulfilmentof their obligationsin mat respect.States Parties should
obviouslyconcludea comprehensivenuclear test-ban treats yo as Co halt the
qualitativeimprovementand horizontalproliferationof increasinqly
sophisticated nucleawreapons. The Threrbold Test-BanTraaty and the Peaceful
Nuclear ExplosionsTreaty concludedbetween tbe United States and the Soviet
Union containadno bindinq provisionsin that connection. The Swedish
Goverment hoped thatthe Cornitteeon a HuclearTest Ban wouldbe
reactivatedat the begiminq of the 1991 sessionof the Conferenceon
Disarmament.rince it had alreadybeen clearlydamonrtratedthat the
internationalcomunity had at its disposal the scientific and technicam leans
of verifyinqobservanceof a colnprehensivn euclear test ban. and draft
treatieson the subjectwere alreadyon the table. In the iaeantime, the
principalnuclear-weaponStates should non declare nuclear test moratorium.
In that connection.Sweden shared Finland'sseriousconcern about nuclear
tests in the Arctic. It also consideredthat al1 productionof new nuclear
,materialwhich miqht ba used to build weapons shoulbde halted. and that any
aqreemencreached in that connectionshould be verifiable.the prerequisite
for any verificationof that naturebeinq saparation. in nuclear-reapon
States. ofnuclear activitiesfor peaceful andfor military purposas. In
addition. nuclearwarheads should be dismantledand destroyed.al1 resultanc
transfersof fissionablematerialbeinq mnicored under IAEA safequards.
MR. VILLARROEL,PHlLLIPlNNES (1ltb meeting)page 182. para37
37. SO far a3 articleVI was concerned,a comprehensive test ban would be c3.e
most effectiveway to end the nuclear arms race. It would more0Ver ba
desirablefor the Conferenceon DisarmCuMntCo ceceive the nacessarysupport
to achieve a comprehensiveproqr-e 01 disarmment.
MGR. TAURAN, HOLY SEE (Iltb meeting) page183,para 43
43. It could be said that qenuine proqress had beenmade since the
Third Review Conference. In 1987, the two super-Powershad signed the
INP Agreement,which provided for the dismantlinqof al1 intermediate-range
missiles and respective installations in the United Statesand the
Soviet Union, and the START negotiationsbetween the same two countriesto
achieve a 50 per cent reductionin strategic weapons raised the possibilityof
an even stricter limitation of nuclear weapons. Those factors. togetherwith
the currant neqotiationson conventionaland chemical disarmament. represented
a genuina peace dynamic. It ras increasinqly apparent thawtar was incapable
of solvinq conflictsand that deterrencaras merely anamergency solution.
It
ras but one staqe on the path towardsdiaarmament.and other means of
quaranteeingpeace shouldbe actively souqht. MR. SENE,SENEGAL(1lth meeting)page 185,para56
56. There weremany lessons to be learned froman examination of the
functioningof the NPI as far asarticle VI1 ras concerned,in the light
of the new internationalenvironment. The first meeting between
PresidentCorbachev and PresidentReagan. at which theyhad agreed that a
nuclearwar couldnot be won and mustnever be fought,had marked the
beginninqof that process. The conclusion,in 1987. of the Treaty between
the United States of Americaand the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublicson
the Eliminationof Their Intermediate-Range anS dhorter-RangeMissiles.which
should befollowedby new agreementsand by consideration ofa reductionin
strategic weapons.had been the continuation of that meeting. In addition.
thereras the iminent ratificationby the two super-Powersof the protocols
to the 1974 Threshold Test-Ban Treatyand the 1976 Peaceful NuclearExplosions
Treaty. The InternationalParis Conferenceon chemical weaponshad, moreover.
given a powerful impetus to negotiationsaimed at the complete and universal
eliminationof chemical weaponsin conjuctionwith a verificationsystem.
Lastly,mention should be made of thS etockholm Document on securityand
CO-operationin Europe and the forthcomingconclusionin Vienna oc an
agreementon conventional forces in Europe and North America togetherwith an
agreementon confidence-and security-building measures, concludedin the
spiritof the Final Act adoptedin Helsinki in 1975. The Final Act, one of.
the legal milestones of the present ara,had organizedEast-WestCO-operation
in spheres ranging from economicsto disarmament,including scienceand
technoloqy,environmental protection and respect for human rights, in order to
usher in an era of détentein Europe capable ofdiminishingthe risk of
MR. KATSIGAZI. UGANDA (1 lthmeeting)page 189,para74
74. Article VI of the Treaty, in which al1 partior undertookto pursue
negotiationsin good faithon offectivomoaruros rolating tocorrationof the
nuclear arrnrrace and general and complotodisarmamont. had nob toen respected
and the nuclear-weaponPowors had done nothing in the part 20 yoars topromoce
that objective. The quantitativereductiooin nuclear arrenalr war largely
offset by the productionof tochnologicallyadvanced weaponr that would allow
each super-Powerevon if bilateralnegotiationron arma roductionsuccoedod.
to.retainmore than 9.000 nuclearweapoqr - throe timor more than thoy hadhad
uhen the NP1 had been siqned in 1968.MR. MARKIDES,CYPRUS(12th meeting) page 193.para9. and page 194, paraII
1
9. Despitethe conclusionof a nunber of armo Control treaties.includinq 7
'Ornimportantbilateraltreatiesbetween the United States and the
SovietUnion, thora had. unfortunately,bean no significantand substantial
Progrestowardstha.aimsset out in articleVI of theNPT.
CO'J'Jectiho,joinedwith othar speakerwho had welcomedthe agreement
"cmen the United Statesand the Soviet Unionfor theeliminationof
intermediatend shorter-rangemissiles in Europ-the IN? Treary. mat
'qreem9nvas a tirs: small.but positive,stop towards achievingsoma of the
objectivesof the NPT. It ras to he kpad that the recent favourable
developmentsin internationalrelations woulmake it possible foran
agreemantto be reachedpreventinqan am. race in spaceand andinq it on
Earth. Such an agraamentras essantialnot only as a necsssarybalancinq
element for the self-restraintshom by the n~i-n~~lear-wespntates Parties.
~nder erticlaIIof the NPTbut alao sa an ancouragenentto otharStates,
whethernuclear-weaponStatss or non-nuclear-wespStates, to join the
non-proliferatiorégi- establishedby the Treaty.
11. A% recoqnizmdin tha preanibto theRPf, tha conclusionof a
comprabensivmtaut ban traaty raiasantialin order to achievenuclear
disamament. Negotiationsin that diractionshouldbe resunieas roon as
porsiblaand such a treaty could parhapbacofipletewithin a fer years.The
procesr could ba hastinadby a linkagebatween the comprehensivetest ban and
the NFT. Tha daclarationadopte4 in Septmhar 1989 bythe Non-AliqnedSmit
Conferenceatated;-, that a comprehaasivenuclear test-bantreaty
ras absolutelyessantialfor tha preservatioaof the non-prolifsratireqim
embodiedin tha üF'T.Bis delegationras in full agreementwith tha proposals
put forrardby othar non-aliqnedcoutrias witb a viaw to preserviq and
strenqtheningthe W. Thoia proposalaincluded: (1) tha daclarationof a
moratoriumon al1 nuclaar tasts axploaionstill 1995O) a moratoriumon the
productionof fiasionablematarialr (3) cb. promotionof full-scop.
neqotiationson a coaprehensivatest ban in tha Comiitteaestablished
by tha Conferencmon Disamamant;.(4)a raadinasato accaptmultilatarally
binding legalinstrwnts to guaranteaal1 non-nuclear-weapoStatea aqainst
the use or throat ofuse of nucloarwapons; (5)supportand racognitionfor,
existingnuclear-weapon-Creezonas and for thora toba establishedin the
furure: (6)improvadIAEA assistanceto developinqcouutriesthrouqhfinancinq
institutionsto promota the peacefulusas of nuclearenergy.
MR. GUïTIEREZ, PERU(Committee 1,meeting2) page226,para 13
Despite ade moratoriumon tha productionof fissionablematerial
13.
on accountof tha huge stockpilesin thehands of the nuclear-weaponStates,
none of those States had voiced a decisionto suspenaproauction. Therefore,
neqotiationsmust be initiatedon an agreementfor internationalverificaion
of a completeend to such production;such a masure would accord fullywith
bilateralunderstandingson the reductionof interaiediata-raand strategic
nuclearwaapons and theraforebe consonantwith srticlVI of theNPT.MR. KRALIK, CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERALREPUBLIC(Committec 1,
meeting2) page 229, para26 and page230, para28
26. The review of article VI focused particularly onnuclear-reaponStates.
Although implementationof its provisionsras stillnot fully satisfactory,
therehad been more proqress Since the previousReview Conferencethan in al1
the prscedinqyears; that dynamic atmosphoreras propitiousfor the
stop-by-stepsolutionezemplifiedby the signinqof the INF Treaty in 1978',
lomcthingrhich had rhom that even highly COmplex problemscould be iolved
glven the politicalwill, and by the tact that neqotiationsfor STAR1 II had
already led to the elaborationof 12 verificationmethods. Such round
proqressauguredroll for further strengtheningof the TrObty.
28. Nuclear disarmamentras inseparable fromthe disarmamentprocess as a
uhole. andthe comprehensivebanninq of auclear-weapontests vas inseparable
from the issue of non-proliferation. The connitteefor Chat purpose in the
Conferenceen Disarmment had been re-esfablished,and a Partial TestBan
Treaty AmendmentConferencewould be convenedin Jsnuary 1991. A complete
qlobal ban on nuclear tests ras a key factor for strengtheningthe NP? and
achieving nueleararma reduction anddisarmament.
MR. REESE. AUSTRALlA (Cornmittee1,meeting2) page232. paras38 and 39
38. Article VI and preambularparaqraphs 8 to 12 relatedessentiallyto tne
other half of the bargain struck in acceding tothe NPT: the comnitrnentto
nuclear disarmament. In Chat context,Australia welcomedthe improved
political climate and the resultantenhanced prospectsfor uuclaar and
conventionaldisarmament. It supportedthe range of arma control
neqotiations, especially START. betreen the United Statesand the Soviet Union
and lookedforward tothe conclusion of an agreemenr thich would drastically
reduce their arsenals. Horever, as the AustraliinForeignMinister had
pointed out during the general debate tha number of nuclearreapons in the
rorld would stillbe unacceptsblyhigh. Bir deleqationthereforereiterated
its conviction that nuclear disarmonuntmurt ho pursued. aetivelyand in good
Eaith. pursuant to articleVI. rhile recognixingthat theprocesi would be
slow and complex and that, aa noted at the previous RevierConference.
atabilitywaa important.
39. A comprehensive nuclear teat-bantreaty remainedan urgentpriority,
since the limita it would imposa on proliferation.verticaland horizontal,
made it an integralpart OC tBa nuclear disamment process andthus of full
implementation ofthe NPT. Althouph the agreementssigned. since the previous
Revier Couference,by the United Statesand the Soviet Unionon the
VerificationProtocol of the 1974 ZhresholdTest-BanTrbaty and the 1976
PeacefulHuclear Explosions Treatr yare welcom and should be acknowledgedin
the Final Document,a comprehensive test ban ras some ray off. It ras
gratifying CO ree Che recent re-establishment,in the Conferenceon
Disarmment, of the hPljPC Conmitteeon a NuclearTest Ban. for it ras time
for theinternationalcomunity to begin rork torards the eirly conclusionof
a cornp~rehensivtest-ban treaty. AlthoughAustralia haddoubts about the
Partial Test-Ban Treaty AmendinantConference,it rould participatein it
constructively. Whatever the Conference'rfindingarith regard to tertinq.
the NPT remainedessential. MR. GORDON, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Cornmith 1. meeting2)
page233.para45
45. ArticleVI appliadnot just to nuclear-wesponStates but to 811
countrier,and involvadnon-nuclearas roll al nuclearatm8 control
neqotiations. The United Stateshad an impr~l~iverecordof atm8 coatrol 1
negotiationrand activitier.nuclearand non-nucl*ar.which rpoke for itrelf
and tercifiadto articlevl'r viability.yet it var tim for the international
comunity to demand that al1 Parties rhouldmakm cornensurateeffotos
achievearma controlmearurerchat could eare reqionaltensionsand abat.
regionalarmr competition.The Conference1hOuldrend a atronqmerraqr Co al1
StatesPartieraccordioqly. Tulfilmentof articleVI's objectiverrhouldoot
be judged aolely in termr of the aqreementrconcluded.for the articledralt
with a procerawhich var, in and of itself.of the utmort importance. It ras
alto ersencialCo recoqnirethat chanqinqpoliticalrelationrhipsaffectrd
arms controland disarmamentmearurerand vice verra. and that particulararms
controlmearurerthemrelves.auch as deep cutr in arsenalr.requiredvery
carefulattentionin reqard to the type and reliabilitythe veaponr
remaininq. To avoid instability.reductionrmust be dariqnedto maintain
balanceddefanrivecaprbilityat every phare. *pain. at every staqe of
reduction,the ability totest ras essential. It must be recoqnisedthat
nucleararsenal reductionr othe type rouqht in the STMT neqotiations
dependedon avarenerschat the remaininqweaponscould be rtored.deployedor
tranrportedsafelyand wouldperfornal desiqned- which mesnt the abilityCo
test. Th* United Statesras coaoittedto an eventu.1 conplet.ban.on
on a rtep-by-rtapbasis. The conditionsit inpasedrare base6 th.
convictionthat diaregardfor the relationrhipb~tv~enthe typeof reapons
romainin9at any tim. or their reliability,wuld b.l s.riourly
dertabiliainqfactor.
MR. HARUN-üR RASHID, BANGLADESH(Cornmittee 1. meeting 2)page235,
para51
51. The wrdinq O< articleVI ai.& its purposevery elearrcessationof the
nucleararma race. as -11as OuCli*rand comprehensivedisam.ii.nt.In thac
regard.bis deleqationn1coii.dthe iuy recentpositivestaps such as the
progrersin the variou8.rus controlnoqotiationsand masures undertakenby
the SovietUnion andthe Unitd States.and eh. re-estrbllsbiwntin the
Conferenceon Disamat. ol th. Corittee on a lucliarTest Ban. A
compreheosivmtest banrascrucialto lullilwnt ol the Treaty ohlipationr;it
ris not in itrella substantiw disa-nc rasure but only a prelud..In
that connaetiona11 aspoctsO< disa-nt. partieularlynueleardisimwnt
purruaocto the tema ol articleVI. wre containedin draLt
rerolutionNPT/COlT.IVIL.l.
UR. PALIHARKARA. SRI LANKA (Cornmi* 1.meeting 2)page236.pua 58
58. nr. (SriLanka). relmrrinqCo articleVI, said chat he
relcomedthe recentproqrearin bilateralneqotietions.whicb contrastedwith
theoveralllack of proqresaprior tothe previouslevierConference.
Neverthelers,it ras disappointinqthat no etlectivelimitationshed been
aqreed upoa in conneetionwith the qualitativedevelopŒnt ol nuclearweaponi
rybteaa,deapita swcific ealls voiced at the previousaevier. ras a
matter for concernchat, despitethe deep cuts in stratoqicarsenalsforrreen
in the STMT neqotiations,20 por cent mre nuclearnapans rould be deployed
chan badbeen the case in 1~10.. sboun inCh. recenccoipreh.nsivertudyby
the United MationsGroup ol Cxports,continuedwderniratioo wuld lead to the
deploymnt of new typos of weapons rystna, cootraryto the purp.ofes
articleVI1 of theMPT. MR. FLYNN, IRELAND(Maincornmittee 1,5th meeting)page 258,
Para5
5. The past five years had witnessedrom0 positive andencouraginq
developments: the improvementin East-westrelationshad provideda frmework
for significantproqress in soma areas of arma control;the INP Treaty had
been signad and vas being implemented;and a strateqicarms reduction
treaty (START) should soonbe sine an event that would strenqthenthe
implementationof Article VI and result in reducingthe verticalproliferation
of nuclear weapons.
MR. BOLIATKO,UNIONOF SOVIETSOClALlSTREPUBLICS(MaioCornmittee 1,
5th meeting)page 260, paras 14and 19
14.
The Soviet-UnitedStates treatyon the eliminationof intermediateand
short-ranqe missileshad marked the beqinningof nucleardisarmment in Europe
and throughoutthe world.
19. The unilateral reductioo nf anned forces.defence budgets and military
proqramnesby the Soviet Union and other countriesand the reduction inthe
manufacture fornuclear armamentpurposesof certain products such as fissile
materialsras also contributinqto the implementation of thm eighth to
trelfthpreambular paragrapha snd of Article VI of theNPT.
MR. GORDON. UNITEDSTATESOF AMERlCA(MainCornmittee 1,5th meeting)
page 262. para28 -
28. In the first place, he hoped thatthe Cornitteewould not engage in
academicor leqalisticdebates about whatmeasures should be consideredin
reviewinq Article VI and preambularparaqraphs 8 to 12 of the NPT. If the
conclusionof a single treaty providing for general ac nodmpletedisamament
vas reqardedas the literalobjectivetest. it ras clear that that objective
had not been accomplished. However,that would not amount to a fair
assessmentof theprogressmade in the last rive years. Article VI should
rather be considered interms of al1 the accomplishments which had contributed
to achievement ofthe long-termobjective - INP. strategicanns reductionsand
other disarmament measures in both nucle and non-nuclear areas.
i
MR. WEMBOU.CAMEROON (Cornmittee1.meetin g)page 266.pur 47
47. He noted that in the pariod sinca the yaar 1985 varticalprolifaration
had continued, ouclearwapona had continuedto bo improvadin qualitative
terms andproqreaain the bilataralCiald had not alraya hoan accompaniedby
similarprogrersin multilateralnoqotiationa. Daspita th* considerabla
proqressmade. much still ramainaIn ochar wrds, strict and comprehensive
disarmment could ha achiaved.
implementation of th* proviaionsof Article VI hava not yet beau accomplished.
MRS. MASON, CANADA (MainCommittce1,5tb meeting)prge267. prri52
52. ws, MASpL!(Canada)said that the Tinal Docuwnt ahould refar to the
unp~cedented progressmsde since 1985, particularlyduring th* past 18 aonths,
involvingdevelopnts al1 of which wr* consistentrith th. aima of Article VI
of the NPT. Developnts of particularipportancawra the Ill?Traaty and the
proqresswhich had been made in negotiatinqa STNï traaty. Iba nogotiations
on a comprebensivetest ban wera wra difficult,but proqrasrhad naverthelers
been made with the re-establishment of an Comittea on nuclaar taiting
in the Conferenceon Disamamant and th* conclusion,in Juna 1990, of the
Protocolson verificationof th* 1914 and 1916 bilataralTreaties. MR. PALIHAItKARA, SRI LANKA (Cornmitte 1, meeting5) page267. para56
56. mile the conclurionof the 1NF Treaty and the proqressbeinq made in the
cothinqhad been don. to limitthe modernizationof nucleararmamentr. It vasat
necessaryalso to bear in mind thet. aven if the nucleararsenalrwere halved.
:?.cvould atill exceed by 20 pur cent their lave1 at the rtart of the 1970s.
Re altodrew attentionto the factthat rpace weapon progrmes had not been .
abandonadand he joinedthe representative of New Lealand in rtreasinqthe
.lrgsnteed for a comprehenrivenucleartest ban. The cessationof tests ras
inessentialmeasure to combatthe proliferation of nuclearWeaponl. In that
~Onnection,he reqrettedthat the Conferenceon Disarmamenthsd not been able
taqive a neqotiatinqmandate to the qroup on nucleartests. The
~oaferencarhouldrtronqlyencourage continuatioo nf the comprehenrivenuclear
test-banprocerr,particularlyin vie- of the forchcominqconferenceto amend
thePartialTest-EanTreaty.
MRS. SOLESBY, UNITED KINGDOM(M8in Cornmittee.5th meeting) page 268,
para58
58. Since the 1985 Review Conferenceaubstaotialunexpectedresults hadbeen
achieved in the field of nucleardisamament. Examplesrare the bilateral
aqreementrconcludedbetween the United Statesand the USSR. the progressmadEven
towards conclusionof a START treaty andChe signinpof the IWO Trmty.
before the latter treaty had been concluded,NATO had unilaterallydecided Co
deatroy 2.400 of its nuclearwarhsadsdaployed in Europe,so that, currently.
NATO had fewer nuclearwarheads in Europe than at the time of the conclurion
of the NPT. Furthemore, NATO had proposedthe initiationof negotiationron
eliminacionof short-rangenuclaar forceaand of nuclearshells, once the
treaty on conventional forcea in Europe had been concluded.
MR. HILALE, MOROCCO (Commiotee 1, meetin5) page269, para65
65. & RILU (Morocco)
raid chat whmn r+e NPT bad been riqaed in 1968. the
prlmaryobjective hadbeen thatthe nuclearPowera should undercaketo
neqotiatewith a view Co 8ecurinqqeneral disarmuirntunder internationel
control. Thst had beena counterpart.aa it rare. for the non-nuclear-weapon
States,which hadiovereiqmlyrenouncedthe nucle8roption by accedinqCo the
Treaty. Unlike the 1985 PeviewConference. the FourthConferenceras takinq
Placein a mort favouraùlecliaate,as aubatancialdiaarnwnt aqreemnta had
beenconcludedand other aqreemontrver* beinq neqotiated. Aa IN? Treatyhad
been concluded,neqotiationrwre in proqrerrwith the aia of reducinq
stracaqicarnwnnts by 30 to 50 per cent. and other neqotiation8had been
inatatedbetreen the tm allianceson the questionof reductionof
conventionalwoapons.
rhouldpermit fulfilruntof the derlre Of the internationalencomunity for
general and complet*dila-nt. The Conference.in ira ?inal Docuunt,
rhoulddevote eonriderebleattentionto the proqr.88 iude towarde
disam-nt. It ras necesaaryto be realiatic,bowver, rithout beiq
neqative,and to point out that the reeultaachieveddid mt fully moet the
hoper arouaedby the undartakinqqiven in 1968 Dy the three nuclear-wapon
Powerswhich were the Depoaitariesof th0 rreaty.
rhould Cherelorefurtherbe urqed Co redoubletheir etfort8 in the interestof
the entireworld comuity.
Request for Advisory Opinion (including the dossier of documents transmitted to the Court pursuant to article 65, paragraph 2 of the Statute)