NUCLEARTESTSCA= fhTW ZEALAND v. FRANCE]
jAp~iicationof9 MPV 1973)
REOUEST FOR ANEXAMINATION OFTHESïiïJATiON
1. 1 have the honour to submitto the International Courof Jdce i
Requesfforan Esaminotionof theSituaiionarisingout of a proposd action annound
by France whichwill,ifcarried out, aEea the basis of the Judgment renderdthe
Coun on 20 December 1974in the ,VuclearTesrsCase@ew Zealandv. rance).' The
irnmediate circumstance _Pi\ingrIOethe present phase of the Case is a decision
announcedby France ina mediastatemenrof 13June 1995 by President Chirac(Annex
1). The statementsaidtharFranceuould conduct afinalsenes of eight nuclearweapons
tests inthe South PacificsraninginSeprember1995.
. The deep concemof the NewZealand Government at this decisiowas
registereuith the French Foreignhlinister as soon as the above natement became
known, and subsequentlyin a varier! of uays. The most recent communicationsent to
theGovernent of Franceby the Govemmentof NewZealand stating the New Zealand
attitudeand inforrningthe Govemrnentof Franceof the New Zealandintentoomakethe presentRequcstto the internarionalCoun of Justiisa note of17 Augun 1995
(Anna 2). New Zdand has no&ho~ev~, rcçeivcd ~y indication that Francewould
wnsida caneelhg thetesu.
3. in consequmce,thisRquest for anExMiSiationof the Smation ismade
under the right grantcd to New Zealand m pampaph63 of the Judgmait of 20
"63. Once the Coun has found that a State has mtered into a
cornmitmentconcemingiu future condua itisnot the Court's funnion to
contemplatethat it wülnot comply withit. Howevcr,the Court observestift
the basisof this Judgmmt were to be aiTead, the ADDlincould rcauest an
examinationofthe situationinaccordancewiththe provisions ofthe Statute;the
dmunciationby France,by lener dated 2 Janua1974, of the GeneralAa for
the PacificSenlementof International Disputwhichis reliedon as a basisof
jurisdiaion in the present case,cannot constituteby it--tobstacleto the
presentationofucha request." (Emphasissupplied.)
5. The Court here had regard to thfan that the French au!horitieshad
during 1974 made certain unilateral declarationswhich the Coun interpreted as
arnountingtolegallybindingcommitmentson the pan of Francethat it wouldncany
out funher atmosphencnucleartests. The Coun thereuponfound thatthe claimof
KewZealandnolongerhad anyobjecrandthatthe Coun wasthdore not calledupon
to givea decisionthereon.Ar the sarnetirne,the Coun considercdit appropriateto
includeparagraph63 as a resenation to its Judgmentin order to cover the possibility
that France might subsequentlycease to cornply with its undenakings regarding
atrnospherictesting or that somethingelse underlyingthe Court's Judgmmtwasno 3
longerapplicable.' ïhe Coun thusgnvitcdNew Zealandthe rightinsud,circumnanc
to request the resumpuon of the Case bcp by Applicationon 9Uay 1973. In :
doing,the Courtalsoimplicitlyindicatetti iatas presavhg itswmpaence inrspa
of the Caseinsuchatcurnstances.
6. Asa kher indicatiothatthe Court did not considu tha!the Caseha
ben broughtto acornpletcend,paragraph63shouldbereadtogetherwithparagraph 11
of theJudgment,where theCoun characteriscdthe phaseof the proceedingswithwhicl
it wasdcalingas one in whichit had to ded oniywithpreliminarymanen. The Cour
continued:
"... isappropriateto recallthat its approachto a phasethiskindmus1 be. a!
it wasexpressedintheFisheBesJurisdicrioncases,as follows:
"Theissuebeingthuslimited.the Coun willavoidnot oniyal1expressions
of opinionon matters of substance,but also any pronouncementwhich
might prejudice or appear to prejudiqe any eventual decision on the
.entsmn3
It seernsunlikelythat the Coun uould have founditnecessaryto rnakethis staternent
unless ithad foreseen the possibilin..subsequentlyexpressed in paragraph 63 of the
Judpent. that itmighrhaveto returnto thesubstanceofthe matter
7. The Keu.Zealand Governent notes that the operative pan of the
Jud-ment of 20 December 197: containsno wcirdsthat couldbe constmed as showing
anyintentionon the pan ofthe Coun fonnallyto terminatethe Case. Norhas the Court
made any Order subsequentto the 1974 Judgment fomdly tenninatingthe Case or
' Sa paragrap20.
'IURcporu 1973.pp 7and54removing itfrom the Court'slin. New Zdand has nmr sought to discontinuethe
Cu.
8. A situatiohas gradudy dcvelopcdand has now muhed the stage at
which,in New Zdand's view, it aects the bais of theJudgmen tnd danan& the
making of the present Request. In thusreaimlligto the Court the NcwZealand
Government has no intentionof abandoningthe spintof fiendrhipand coopaation
whichhasfor so longgovemedits relationwithFrance.
9 The NewZealandGovernmentbclieves, ninhcr,that one of the Ordar
soughtinparagraph113of thisRequest aswellas one of themeasuresof interimrelief
aboutto be soughtin a funherRequest forProbisionalMeasures,providesFrance with
an oppominity to resolve this rnarter in accordance with its obligationsunder
internationallaw. This order and rneasureis that the Coun shouldindicateto France
thatitshould refraifromconductinganyfunher nucleartests untilsuchtimeas it has
conduaed an Environmental Impach tsessrnent in accordance withgenerallyaccepted
internationstandards.It isonlyiitcouldbeenablishedthatthe proposedtestswould
not resultn the introductionof an?radioactive substanceohe marineenvironment,
that France should be then consideringwhether to proceed, having regard to iu
obligationsunderinternationallau. 5
ïL THE CASEBEFORE THE COURTIN 197S74
A. The institutioof vroceedines in 1973
10. On 9May 1973 the New Zcaland Govenunuit idtuteci pding
againstFrancewitha view toobtaining6om the Courta determinatiotha tte conduc
by the FrenchGovmunent of nudeartestsm the South Pdc regiontha giw Ne ti
radioactivefaiioutmnstitutes a violatiNewfZealand'srightsunda intedonal lav
and that these rightswould be violatedany furtha suchtests.' ~imilptoding
werecomrnencedonthe samedayby~unralia.'
11. The basis on which the Court'sjurisdiaion was invokwas two-fold
(a) Article36(1)and 37 of the Staruteof the Coun and Article17 of the GeneralAa
for thePacificSenlemenrof InremarionalDisputes,done at Geneva on 26 Septembei
1928 ("the 1928 General .Act") t..*:h New Zealand and France both acccdedon
21 May 1931;~ and.inthealremarive.(b) .hicle 36(2) and (5) of the Statute'of the
couri.' The Coun is respecrhliy refened to paragraph11 of NewZealand's 1973
Application.
12. The Coun didnor derenninethe questionof junsdictionbcyond holding
in itsOrder of 22 June 1973, indicating interim maures of protection, that the
provisionsinvokedbu h'ewZealand"appear.primojacie, to &ord a basison whichthe
' Thc ApplicationCticrcrnier rIOas'1973 Applicatioappan in 1U Pleadings.Nuelem
Tests.Vol4 D3.
'IbibVol.1p.3.
6So 1973ApplicatioaAnnexeV andVIpp 43 and45.
' Forth<cm ofihc doclarauonsfilcd underMcle by(New ZcalandanFianccrapcc\iveas
inforaon9 May 1973wc IU Yeorbook1972-197pp.72 and60 rrrpcnivcly.jurisdidon of the Court mightbe founded."'Howeva, fourJudges of the Court,
Judges Onycama, Di4 hina de Artchagaand SirHumphrcy ald doc n a joint
diJsmtingopinion,and Judgesde CastrandSu GarfielBanvickin xparate dirzaiting
opinionsWCIU furtha.holdig that Adde 17of the1928 Auuprovidtr iniuelfa vaiid
and sufficientbasisfotheAppiicantto cstablirthejurisdictioofthe Court." In
paragraph63 of the Court's~ud~mutt,the Courtaprrsslyprcsavd, foraichhi&'.:
consideratioasmightarise.theRatus ofFrance 'cseptanaof the1928haal An
as iwas at theUmewhentheprocetdings wac commmccdin 1973.
13. The substantivecontentof the Applicationmadeby NewZdand (asset
out in paragraph27 and 28 of the1973 Application)was that the internationallaw
penainingto, infeolia,the safeguardingof the en\ironment, and related mles and
nrinciplesof internationallau, werebein~kiolatedbythe nuclearrestingundenakenby
the FrenchGovernrnentin the South Paciiicregion." XewZealand contended that,
arnongstotherthings,suchtesring:
"violatesthe rights of al1rnernbersof the internationalcommunity,including
NewZealand. that no nucleartests that give rise to radioactive falbeut
conducted;
violates the rights of al1rnernbersof the internationalcommunity,induding
NewZealand, to the presewation frorn uniustified mificial radioactiy
sontamination of the terrestrial, maritime and aerial cnvironment ain.
panicular.of the environmentofthe repioninwhichthe tests are conductedand
in whichNeufZealand. the Cook IslandsN. iue and the Tokelau Islands
m;
1ICJRcporu 1973.135.aip138.para 18.
9ICJRrpom 1974.p. 510.
10Saabovepragraph4.
IISa AMCX 3foa l~~atimap0th: SouthPa:&: region.
0059234.01 violatesthrightofNew Zealandtha !o radioactimataial enta the tenitc
ofNw Zealandt.. . Cook Islands,Niueor theTokeiau Islandsncludingth1
airspaceand-tonal wat- rsarrsultofnucleartestin%
violaterthenght oNewZealand tha no radiode matcri$havingartat td
temitory ofNew Zealand,the CookLrlandf Niue or the Tokelau Island
inclu tdeiairspaccand monal. asarrsl ofnudear t&g, 'au
induding apprehcnsio~ day Md wncaq to the people ar
Governmcntof New Zealand andof the Cook LrlandsN,iueand ,the Tokeli
Islands;
violatesthe rightNw Zealandto ficedomof the hieh teandudingfrecdoi
ofnavigationandovaflightandthefreedomto exulorrandm1oit:the remurcf
9f the sea and the seabtd. without interferencdetrimen rnu-fh~ I
nucicartesting.(EmphasissuPplied.)"
B. The 1973 Order for interim mensures ofarotection
14. Soonfier the 1973 Applicatiwas filed,the NewZealandGovmcr
alsofileda requesr,in accordanceuith Anicle33 of the 1928GeneralAct. hicles 4
and 48of the Statute of the Coun and hic66of the Rules of the Coun (as then ii
force).for interimmeasuresof protectionro preservethe righisof IYewZealandpendin4
thefinaldecisionofthe ~oun." Therightsuhich'xew Zealandsoughtto haveprotectcc
were those set out in paragr13ha~ove. The measureswhich NewZealand soughl
were:
"that France refrainom conduciingany funher nucleartests that giverise to
radioactivealloutwhiletheCoun is seizedofthe case.""
15. France scnt a communicationdated 16May 1973 to the Court to the
effeci thaitdid nor consider thar the Coun had jurisdiction in the To this
IISe /~fleod,n~s. 'hucÏesrVol.IIp49.
" Ibid,p.59. communicationtherewas attachcdan anna elabordng thewns for this contention
andrequestingtheCourtto orda thathe caseberwnoved hm thee."
16. On 22 June 1973the Court madeanOrduin respectof the Requen for
the indicationofnterimMeanires ofm rot cet ifna'‘oldinginpara~raph18of the
Ordn that it appearedprimofacie toposseosjuridiction,"theCour ptroded to
examinethe Applicant'srequestforthe indicationinth me- of protectio.In
paragraph24 ofthe Order,havingrefmcd to therightwhich New Zealandclaimed had
beenandwould beviolatedbyFrenchnucleartesting,the Court saidthat "it cannobe
assurneda priorithat such claimsfail cornpletelyoutsidethe pumew of the Court's
jurisdiction,or that thenunentofNewZeaiandrnaynot be ableto establisha legal
interestin respectof theseclaimsentitlingthe Coun to admitthe ApplicatAsnthe
Coun said in para.^--^ 30 of the Order. after refemng to NewZealand'sassenions
regarding the prospecsndlikelyharrnhl efÏeztsof radioactivefallouton NewZealand
temtoryandFrance's contentionto thecontrav
"For the purpose of the presentproceedingsitsufices to observe that the
informationsubrnittedto the Coun ..does not exclude the possibilitythat
damage to NewZealand might be show to be caused by the deposit on
NewZeaiandtemtory of radioactivefallout resultifrom suchtests and to be
irreparable.""
17. It shouldbe obsened thatinrelationto eachof the mana covacd in
paragraphs24 and 30of theCoun'sOrder. the Coun did notexpressinposifiw tenns
the standardof proof requiredof t'ne.4pplicant. Instead, theCoun appearsto have
l'hi&pp.318-357.
161W~~p~ 1973, p.135.
17Sa paramph 12abovc.
" ibip.141.paragrap30. 9
adoptcda lessnringent requiremcnamcly , standarwhichwasapressed. inthefi
simation,by the words "thatit cannotbe assuma3 a pnwi tha! archdaims f
completelyoutside the pumew of the Court'sjriridictand, in the wcond,by t
words "doesnot excludctheposbiity tha tamage toNm Zedand might be showr
nie Coun then indicateby way ofpmvisionaîmesures. thatthe Govanmmts of tl
two Panies:
"should cach of thcm mairetha to actionofany knd is taka:,whicmigl
aggravateor extendthe disputesubmittedto the Court or prejudiright(
the otherpartinrespect ofthecanyingout of whatevadecisiotheCourtma
renderinthe case."
Inpanicular,the Coun indicated:
"The French Governrnentshould avoid nuclear tests causing the depoOit
radioactivefalloutonthetemtory ofNew Zealand,the CookIslands,Niue or thi
TokelauI~lands."'~
It maybe noted thatinthe operativepan ofthe Orders theterm "nucleartests" was no
limitedbytheuseoftheword "atmosphcric"
18. In thissameOrae:. theCoun alsodirectedthat thewrittenproceedingsin
the Case shouldbe addressedfirst to the questionsof thedictionof the Coun to
entenain the dispute and of the admissibilityof the AppliWnnen proceedings
and. on 10and 11July 1971. oral argumentsto the Coun followed. NmZealand
panicipatedinboth unrten and oral proceedings. No plcadingswere filedby France,
norwas itrepresentedat the oralheanngs. C The 1974Judoment
19.. & 20 December 1974 the Corn renducd a ~udgmcnt~in whic4 as
surnmdy indicatedabove, the Court took note of a numba of unilateralstatcmmts
madebythe French authoritieswhichthe Courtfoundamountedto a cornmitmentthat
Francewouldnot carryout anyfurthaatmosphnc tests." ïhe Court concludedthat it
"facesa situationinwhichtheobjectiveoftheApplicanthas in&ecîbem accomplished,
inasmuch asthe Coun hds that Francehasundertakmthe obligationto holdno funha,.
nucleartestsinthe atmosphereinthe South~acific."~. Aftu fonnulatingthe condition
set out inparagraph63 of the Judgmentand quoted in paragaph 4 above, the Court
found "thatthe claim of NewZealand no longerhas any object and that the Court
thereforeis not called uponto give a decisionthereonn.= In that contexi, the Court
appearsto havediscemed KewZealand'sobjectasbeingtheterminationof atmospheric
testing,lthoughno suchlimitationwasexpr~ccedinthe prayerof theApplicationas to
the nature of the nuclear tests whichwere the subjecrof cornplaint. Rather, the
ApplicationreflectedNewZealand's concem at the risk of any contamination of the
environmentoutside of French temton by radioactivernaterialansing from nuclear
testing ofanykind.
20. The Coun's inclination tonarrow the dispute was understandablein
1974. The only mode of testingused by Francein the Pacifwas atmospheric. The
NewZealandstaternents evidenced a prirnan concem with fallout fromatmospheric
" ~~~rportr 1974.p457.
21SecJudgmcnrparagraphs3and54
" Inparagrap55.
" SŒlURcports 1974.p.478.
WI9234.01tesring,and the Frenchundenakingwas in terms of a cessationof atmosphenct&g.
The Court therefore"matched" the French undertakjngwith NewZcaland's primary
conan and felt able to look on the disputeasrcsolved. Nevertheless,the Courtwas
fullyawarethat,initsApplicationNew Zealand had expreswdwida conccrns. Had the
Court realised,in 1974, that a shiA to underground testingwould raisethe same
concems,then,doubtless,the"matching"wouldnot have bem made. But the Courthad
no evidence,at thatime,of thepotentiallyadverseor detrimentaleffectsof underground
in 1995,
testing, and therefore no reason to doubt the adequacy of the "match".
however, there issuch evidenceand therefore the whole basis of the Court's 1974
Judgrnent- thebasis uponwhichthe "match"urasassumed -hasbeenaffeaed.
III. FRENCH TESmG 1974-92
A. Tcstino nt hlururoa and Fanontnuln
It is a facr,derivedFrornFrcn:h Go~ernmtni souries, that between the first
21.
Judgrnenthandeddoun by the Coun on 20 Drcernbe: 1971 and the commencementin
1992 of the moratoriumwhichFrance is nou. proposing IO abandon, France exploded
some 134 nuclearderices undergroundar hluniroa and Fangataufa(126 at Mururoa,8
at Fangataufa)(Annex 4). Sevenry-eighrof these devices (76 at Mururoa, 2 at
Fangataufa) wereexploded inholesdrilledthroughthe coralcrownsof the atolls.Fe-
six(50 at Mururoa,6 at Fangaraufa)ureredetonatedinshafisdrilledthrough thecentral
pans ofthe atollsundertheirlagoons2'
24
LesAtollsde Muniroaci d: Fangaiauf(Pol!nesiFrancaiu).VolIl:'La Expcrimencations
NuclcairnEffetmcchaniquc umino-th:nniqu:clcctromagnetiqucBsouchu 1.AndLccomtcR.
May1995. page73.tesring,and the Frenchundenakingwas in terms of a cessationof atmosphenctesting.
The Court therefore"matched" the French undertakjngwith NewZcaland's primary
conan and felt able to look on the disputeasrcsolved. Nevertheless,the Courtwas
fullyawarethat,initsApplicationNew Zealand had expreswdwida conccrns. Had the
Court realised,in 1974, that a shiA to underground testingwould raisethe same
concems,then,doubtless,the"matching"wouldnot have bem made. But the Courthad
no evidence,at thatime,of thepotentiallyadverseor detrimentaleffectsof underground
in 1995,
testing, and therefore no reason to doubt the adequacy of the "match".
however, there issuch evidenceand therefore the whole basis of the Court's 1974
Judgrnent- thebasis uponwhichthe "match"urasassumed -hasbeenaffeaed.
III. FRENCH TESmG 1974-92
A. Tcstino nt hlururoa and Fanontnuln
It is a facr,derivedFrornFrcn:h Go~ernmtni souries, that between the first
21.
Judgrnenthandeddoun by the Coun on 20 Drcernbe: 1971 and the commencementin
1992 of the moratoriumwhichFrance is nou. proposing IO abandon, France exploded
some 134 nuclearderices undergroundar hluniroa and Fangataufa(126 at Mururoa,8
at Fangataufa)(Annex 4). Sevenry-eighrof these devices (76 at Mururoa, 2 at
Fangataufa) wereexploded inholesdrilledthroughthe coralcrownsof the atolls.Fe-
six(50 at Mururoa,6 at Fangaraufa)ureredetonatedinshafisdrilledthrough thecentral
pans ofthe atollsundertheirlagoons2'
24
LesAtollsde Muniroaci d: Fangaiauf(Pol!nesiFrancaiu).VolIl:'La Expcrimencations
NuclcairnEffetmcchaniquc umino-th:nniqu:clcctromagnetiqucBsouchu 1.AndLccomtcR.
May1995. page73. 22. nie advent of tcsting on Fangatar>faduring this paiod has aggravated
NewZealand'sconcern. Thisislandhas neva beui visite.by independentwientistsand
scarcely any information is adable about the &cm of testing on tha! ktoll's
environment. This concem is campoundedby the factthat sincc1988Fangataufa has
beenthe siteused foral1major explosions(ova 70kilotons).=
B. Efiects of exolosionson the atolls and surroundine environment
23. Each of the explosionson Mururoa and Fanw has generated very
large quantitiesof radioactive material.Whilesomeof this materialhas a shon half-life,
substantialquantitiesof biologicallysi-enificantmaterialsremainwithin the structure of
the atoll.It is esrimaredrhat there arein this marerialapproximately8.000 and 11.000
tera~ec~uerels'~respectivelyof the longerli\.edisotopesof strontiumand caesiurn. and
800teraBecquerelsof isotopesof plutonium." In consequence,there are noursome 126
nuclear waste "stockpiles" located wirhinthestructure of hlururoa atoll at depths of
berween500and 1000metres.and S largestockpilesat Fangataufa.
24. If al1or substantialpans of this matenal were to be released into the
marine environmentt ,he effectupon manne naturallivingresources, especiallyfish and
26Ibid.
RadioaEuviitsrhsponiancou smission ofradiation byrhenofunstabl~ucliduas thyby.
The Becquere s rhc uni1ofmcasuremcni ofradioamki'..Onc Bccqunel quals thc radioanive
disin~cgntionf onc nu:lcuspcr second. OnctcraBqucrcl cqualsone millionmillion (10"'
Baqucrcis.
''Estimationszrivcfrom datain"En\ironmcntaElBm ofUnderground ExplosionsR.otblai1in
7owards a Comprchcnsiv TccnBan Trea~". Puguarh ConfcrcnΠosnScienceandWorld Afkirr.
Oslo.1992.pp46-62,plankton,couldbe significant.Radionuclidetrcleasedintothe waterare concentastcd
theypas through thefood chai nohigha organisms.The &atr would bedistniuted
throughthe marineecosystan,aEectinghighlymigratoryrpecies- includintuna -on
which people of the region rely foraistenano and de. A major release of
radioactivifrom Mururoa orFangatauf wbould bclikelyto affe c tters which are
increasingly being fisheby New Zealandm and dinant water fishing nations,:
particularlyfor Nna andbillfish. Thex speciesare eithercxponed diiectlyto nonhem
hemispherefrcsh fish(sashimi)markets or are procedby canningor othcnvise and
distributedon world markets.uchconcem are refleded in paragraph 17 of the 1973
Application:
"Migratoryspeciesof such livingnaturalresourcesrnaycarryboth sornatic and
genetic effectsbeyond the ranee of fallout occumng in the vicinity of an
explosionand can affect the protein diet of other species, includingman, in
widelydistributedareas."
25. Untilthe present, thereseenevidenceonlyofver).lirnitedandgradual
leakage,whichis whythe NewZealandGovemrnenthas not hitheno madean issueof
the impactof undergroundesrsupon themarineenrironrnent.althougithasprotested
replarly againstFrench testsinthePacificandhasexpressedconcern aboutthe possible
environmentaleffectsof the underground testing programearried out by France at
Mururoa and Fangataufa. However. recently- and sornewhat belatedl- incrwing
eridencehasernergedof scienrificconcern aboutthe possibleenvironrnentalimpactsof
underground nuclearesring.'' This includesthat setout byProfessorVincent, anoted
a ExpcnSnidyonQucssionrelartoa ComprchcnsivccnBanTrcaiyCD11167.notein Gcncd
hrnbly Rcsoluuo47/4of9Dc;crnkr1992. 14
FrenchvuIcanologin,in a recent articl(Anna 5). as wellas the admissionsthat have
ïhm
rccultlybeenmadebyFrancethatproblvnshave beai expaicnced in the
is,thereforç now reason to fear that therisksof asignificandurw of radioactive
materialfiom either or both of the atolas a dt of or consequentupon renewcd
tening activityare nibstantialhigherthanwas previody belicvcd to have bm the
case. ïhese risksincludethe possiii of a seriouscollapseor fihg of the atoUs
such as to releasesignificaquantiticsof the radioactivmataial storcd therein*th
potentiallyseriousconsequencesfor themarineenvironmmt.lD
C. lnvestioations ofthe effectsof nuclear tcstino on the atolls
26. Mururoa and Fangataufk like other Polynesian atolls. are inactive
volcanoeswhich,havingbeeneroded,havesunkbelowsealevelandhavethengradually
been built up again by the formationof a coral reef. Since:he eariiest days of the
undergroundtesting programme,rhere has been concern aboutthe suitability ofsuch
atolls for the condutfnucleartestsanda desireforfunherinformation.
27. Such concernsled to numerous requestsfrom New Zealandand other
SouthPacificcountriesforinformationonthe Frenchnucleartesting programmeandfor
accessto the test sites. Follomingpressrepons in 1981 of an accidentat the Mururoa
test site, theZealandhiinisterof ForeignAnairswroteto hisFrenchcounterpart in
thefollouingterms: "You may be aware of my Govcnuncnt'slongstandingqua for access to
informationwhichwould ddy establishthe safetyof the testing procedurat
Mururoa These latestmporis, andthe public concm thcy have arouscd,
underlinethe importanceof adcquate informationbang madeavsilable. 1trust.
therefore,that your Governmd di nowfcel ableto rqond positivelyto the
requests we have madefor infodon, and for acws to the atoll for New
ZcalandscientistandjournalW. I wouldiippreciateyour spdc wmments on
the allegationswhichhavebeenmade.
"You willappreciatetha in puttingthesenquests to yoq1speak not only on'
behalfof my Cabine t iieagues with whom 1have dicaicul(thismatter.but on
behalfof a concernedNew Zealandpubiic. Thcy in tum share the widespread
apprehensionof the effectsof nucleartcstingwhicisfeh throughout the South
Pacificand whichwas reflmed inthe lastSouthPacifieFON~ rcsoiutionon th%
question. Thereisno doubt that theentireSouthPacifieregioisof one mindin
:'
iü bdief that nothingshould be allowedto hann the marine environmenton
whichwe areal1so dependent.""
28. Despitesubstantialpressure.the FrenchGovernmenthas neverpermined
a full scieniific investigatiffururoa atollThree limitedinvestigationsare al1that
has beenallowed. Thefirstof thesewascamed out betuteen 26 and 28 June 1982 bya
oroup under the leadership ofhi Haroun Tazirii. noted French v~~lcanologist.The
secondwas a team of scientistsfrom Few Zealand.Australiaand Papua New Guinea,
led bu Air Hugh Athnson. then Director of Kew Zealand's National Radiation
Laboratoty,whowereinviredto \isii the atollfor fourdaysbetween25 and 29 October
1963. The third was a scientificand film tearnfrom the CousteauFoundation,led by
CommanderJacques-YvesCousteau,which \"sitedthe atoll for days between20 and
25 June 1987,butwasallowedonlytwo daysfor thecolleciionof samples."
31Lcncrof 9 Dmmkr 1981 fromhir TaIbo!s.hiinincr of ForeignAfof NewZealandto M
Chqwn MinincrofForeignMiairs ofFrance.
3:'Ihcreportsof thcu invcnigatiotwaI:ngih>iobe rcprodud in IheAnnues. butmpiaarc
king madeavailablIOtheCoun. 29. No independent scientificmission has ever been permined to visit
Fangataufawhae thelargerexplosionshaveoccurred.
Asnoted, eachof themissionsto Mururoa was shortahd incornpletcand
30.
was strictlyconiïnedby the French authoritiesas to its scope, access and duration.
Access was wnsistentlydenied tothoseareas ofthe atollbelicveto bethe mostheavily
contaminated. Evm so, each of the missionswncluded thatradioactivematerialî!ad
been introducedinto the aerial and marineenvironmenu as a consequence of the
underground tening programme.
31. M Tazieffnotedthat hishad onlybeenan exploratoryinvestigationand
he calledfor a longermmissionto followup hiswork. He observedthat the lackof a
ccientificteam chargeduith obsening the programme,and interpretingand publishing
the results, was senously felt. ProfessorSalvat, a member of the Tazieff team,
recommended thus:
"If appears to us indispensable thata general study of the environmentof
Mururoaand Fangataufa should be camed out in the imrnediatefuture. These
locationshave notbeenvisitedbyspecialistssince1979."33
No suchindependentstudieshave everbeenundenaken."
D. Short-term releasesof radioactivin into the Mururoa aerial and
marine cnvironments
-
33
Y TaziuTMirsiornpon p 6.
NeithetheAtlÿnsonortheCouneau missioMas a longiermissioasmmmendcd byTarie
norcouldeithkr dcscribasa gencraldy asrccommend cdSalvat.
OOJ9234.01 32. As statcd, it is now well establishethatradioactive material has been
rel-ed into the aenal and marine environmenu of Mururoa during even routine
activitiesassociatedwiththe testingprogramme.
33. Commenting on the effectiveness of the containment of radioactivity
withinthe detonationchambers, M ~azieffsid that the possibilitythat nomally gaseous:
or highlyvolatileradioactiveproducts maypanially escape into theatmosphere(through
the phenomenon known as "venting") could not be excluded, although he lacked
eviden~e.'~The AtkinsonMission,however,found evidenceof venting,and cornrnented
that the amount was greater than would have been especred if the sole causehad been
theimperfectsealingof the emplacementwell.'"
34. In his \isit in 19s:. Commander Cousteau found clear e~idence that
radioactivity had been released shonly beiore his amval. The French authorities
eventuallyacknowledgedthat a releasehad occurredduringa post-test drillingoperation
to obtainsamplesfrorndetonation chambers,but maintained thatthe accidentwas "quite
exceptiona~".~'However, at least one other sirnilarrelease is known to have occurred
dunnga post-testsamplingoperationinJune 1990.'~
" TazieBMissionrepon,p.6.
" AlkinsonMissionRepon.p132.
3:CouncauMissionrcpon p.33.
Y PrcciscDetcrmi~uonof the îonccnmrion of Radimiurn inthe Waterof Mururoa Lagoon".
BourlaiY.andManin G. 1..Environ.Radioacuvi11 (1992) 13-2p.27. Bourlatand Manin arc
rnernkrsofLheSenice Mxic deStcuriitRadiologioftheCommissariaAt I'EnergieAtomique. 35. Plutoniumis present in alltypes of samplesfiom Mururoa. In 1991.
plutoniumlevelsin access of thoseamiutable to fallouthm atmospherictcstingwerc
measuredbya teamfromthe InternationalAtomic En= Agcncywhichtook samples
outsidethe 12mileterritorialiimitaround Whileintcrpretationsdia, part
ofthisplutoniumisbelieved to haveresiiltedhm weaponsafq triaiwhich caused the
..
dispersalof plutoniumover anarca of the atolrima nida, an attcmpt was made ''
to sealofftheaffectcdgroundwith bitumen buta cyclonein 1981 scaneredsomeof the..
plutonium-laden bitumenaroundtheatoll. ThisaccidentcausedtheFrenchauthoritiesto
undertakea protractedclean upof the atolland has led to plutoniumwashingout of
sedimentsintothe Mururoalagoon,and to dispersalinto theocean. Tazieff, therefore,
calledfor eeneralstudiesto be doneof the dispersalof plutoniumwithinthe atoil and
intothe marineenvironment." bu1 nosuchindependentstudyhastakenplace.
--
l9Sumrnar)o.f Radionuclid1nrcr;omparisnesulü in Scawaterand PlankionCollcctdOutside
MururoaAtoll.BallcnrS.andNoshhn V.. IAEAIAUO44.IAEA-ILMR Repon No.48.Iuly1991.
" Aikinsonp 141;Cousicau.p 36.
41Taziefp.7. Lan-term leaknee of radiorctivitv into the manne environnent
E.
36. Wata circulatesthrough and sahiratesthe mtire geologicalstructure of
atollssuchas MururoaandFangataufa. In gencial, wata risesonlyslowly through the
volcanicrock, followingthe minutefis- which permcate it But water Nes much
more rapidlythrough theiiiestone layen of theupperpart ofthe atoll takingonlya few
This movment of water can cany "
years to percolate through to the surface.
radioaaivityfromthe detonationchamben towardsthe sunace whereit can be reluisod,
into the environment. In order to prevent such release, it is crucialthat a substantial:
thicknessof volcanicrock abovethe detonationchamberand the surroundingfractured
rock rernainsondamagedbytesting activities
37. All the independentscientificmissions that havevisited hlumroa agree
that longterrnleakagewilloccur
38 Noneofthe missionshss had accessto suficient data to estimatereliably
the tirnescale involved Tazieffcornrnentedrhai a systematicstudy over a nurnberof
yearsof thernostmobileradionuclides in:round warer and in the seawouldbe required
foranassessrnent of theffectivenessof containinthe radioactivitybut. again,no such
independent scientifctudyhas Deen permitted
39. TheAtkinsonRepon consideredthedangersof the leakageof radioactive
rnatenalfromthe atollinto thesunoundingenvironment.It statedthat: "A; the undergroundtest sites wa!a isavailablefor leachingthe radioactive
material(which can be quated to high-lwelwaste). Mechanismswst for the
transfa of this contaminatawata intothe biosphae,atlest in the longterni
(pater than500 y). The radiologicalwnscqucnce of this leakage depends
markedlyon the depthof placementoftheweapons tcnedandon thar relative
placement.onetestto another.Preci~ detailsofplacanentarc not known.""
40. CommanderCousteaureported thattheFrench authonties had appriscd
him dunng his visitinJune 1987 of the manna by which they calculatethe rquired'
depth forplacementof eachtest devic~.~ This was theih timesuchinformation had
been made public. On the basisof that information, ousteauwncluded that leakage
could occur on a time scaie of 100 to 300 yean. This is significantlyshoner than
previousestimates.
F. Eficts onthe atoll structure
41. Kuclearexplosionsha\.e h?.2 suos;antizlimpactonthe atoll's structure.
42. Shockuaves from an esplosioncause localisedsurface subsidenceand
fissuring. On occasions,uhoie sections ofthe outer limestoneflanks of the atoll
collapse.Suchsubmarine landsiideosfthelinestonesandlorsedirnentsare knownhave
occurred in1977, 1979 and 1980as a result of largeexplosionsconductedunder the
atollim." Duringitsaenalinspectionoftheatollthe Atkinson Mission noted thatthere
wasfissuring oftheatoll surface attributao thetestingprogrammeand reponed that
therehadbeen regionalsubsidenceandsubrnarineslidesas a consequenceof the tests.'It concludedthat theintegrityofthe carbonatepan of the atollhad bten impaired." The
Frmch authontics ~bsequentiy acknowiedged that substantialparts of the atoll had
subsidd by one meteror moredue to the te- causingsame areas of the outer rimto
be pennanently~ubmer~ed.~It is believedthatit was to avoid theNk of Wer such
incidentsthat the tests weremovedfromthe outer rim ofthe atollintothe centralregion
underthe lagoon. Similarly,the riskthat repeatedunderground explosionsmightcause '
seriousfracturesinthe rock structureof Mururoais reported to havewntributed to the:
decisionto movethelargestteststo Fangataufain 1988."
43. Undenvaterfilmingdown to 730 metersby the Cousteauteam revealed
spectacular fissureandcollapsesofrockintheatollthat could only have been causedby
the underground explosions.Sorneof the fissuresobservedwere of recent origin and.
:ore.couldhave onlybeencaused by tesrinundcr the lagoon. Thereremainsa real
riskof furtherslurnpingon theouter flanks ifmoretests arecamed out anywhereon the
atoll
44. There are no publiclyavailablerepons on the condition of the lower
lirnestoneflanks of the atollbelow 230 rneters or on the lower basalt flanks of the
volcan0itself Iffissuringuere IO afiectthebasaltfoundationandwereto reachthe old
test chambersclosestto the volcano'sedge. that wouldprovidea rneansof escape of
radioactiviiyinto the environment In hisanicle, ProfessorVincentnoted the evidence
U-Ibib p105.
49BouchezandLe~mtc.pp 138-143.
Ibid.p 73se alsacommenrc of ViceAdmiral Thireau6 rcponcdin InternatilneraldTribuneof
28March 1988and LaDepcsheof 29 March1988.oftheQBnenceofa nenvorkof fracturesof the upperpan of theatollanributableto the
eariietests.WeighingthisinformationintheiightofFrance'sdecisiontoresumetesting
onMururoa,hecomments:
"AU thefanors nowknownto be conducive tothe ddion of volcanots-
majorweatheringand fracturingof materiaisandstccpsides - are presaitat
Mururoa. in viewof that iâct,the shockwaveproduccdby one of the pla~ed
new explosions,even if it were wnducted beneahthe lagoon, wuld be big
cnoughto cause oneor moreofthe large'pn-perforatedblocks'to shcaraway.
This situatio~ which has no parallelelsewhcncanody be described as high
risk."%
G. Unsuitabiliîv of Mururoa and Faneataufa as testine nnd nuclcar wnste
&s
45. hlururoa and Fangataufaare not suited tothe purposesfor whichthey
havebeenused.
46. As describedin the precedingparagraphs.thereare senous doubtsabout
the structuralntegrityof hlururoa atoll as a consequenceof the many tests that have
beencamed outthere. ltlile rnanyfeulertestshavebeencamedout atFangataufa,it is
houn that those thai have beencamed out on that atollhave beensignificantlylarger
thanthosecamedout inrecenryearson hlururoa
47. The realityithat thtre havealu-aysbeendoubtsabout the suitability of
any ofthe atolls for undergroutesting.given theextrernehazardsthcan accompany
nuclearexplosionsand accornpanyingaciiviiies. The siteswere chosennot becauseof
their inherentsuitabilityfor undergroundtestingbut becausethey were removedFromsigniiïcantpopulation centres, and the infrastructurefor the testing programme was
alreadyin placeas a reuiltofthe previousatmosphcrictestingprogramme.
48. As noted, the nuclearexplosionsconduaed inMururoa'andFangataufa
releaseenonous amountsof energyand radioaaivity. The detonationchamben under
the atolls havebecome,ineffect,unprotected,high-levelnuclear waste storagesites. in.:
addition,a significanrquantityof nuclearwasteproduas fromFrenchPolynesiais nored
inuseddetonationshaftsandinotherwellsdrilledforthe purpose.
49. MururoaandFangataufaatollsfailto meetthe principalcriteriaaccepted
internationallyfor the safelong-term disposa]of nuclear waste in an underground
depositoV." %le muchof the radioacrivir!.sF~sedinroglass-likelava thislavadoes
noritselfmeerthe intern-rionalstan2rrdj is:i~.:siil!s=ii~;i of radioactiviry. There are
no additionalbamers ro contain th:raiiar.u:iit:c an??:event their migrationinto the
environment. The volcanicbasalrf~ilsro mcc: :hcyeolsyi:al and hydrologicalcriteria
nonnallyrequiredof a reposiron medium II is severel!.fracturedand its capabilityfor
retardingthernovementof raaionuciidesissuspecr
50. One of ihe majorfe-turcs whichdistinguishesMururoa and Fangataufa
fromnuclearwane sroragesitesis rne saturarednature of the atoll environment. The
absenceof ground uater is arp-bl!.themostimponantrequirernentfor a nuclearwaste
repositov. Yet. on hlururor an3 Fang2iaufa.ground water circulatesthroughout the
51Roibla~pp.54-56 volcaniccorc and lirnestonesof the atoll. Witheachnucleartest. water rapidlyfillsthe
cavitycrcatcdbythe explosionandpcrcolatestowardsthedace.
51. Inthisregard,the SouthPaufic sites uscd byFrance.arequite udkc any
oftheothersitesthat haveben usedforthe condua ofundergroundnuclearexplosions.
Unlikca continentalland mass or other oc&c islandswhich havebeen usedfor
underground testin&" coralatollssuch asMururoaandFangataufa are an integralpart,
of theirsurroundingmarine environment.Water passesfrornthe occan into the atoll,
includingitscentralcore,andfromthe atollintotheocean.
52. Thustheboundan.berweenlandandseaisindistinct.The entireatollis a
"mannefeature"uhich cannot be considcred2s land inan\.normalsenseand must be
consideredas pan of the manne en\ironrnen: .Accordinglyt.he ham IO the manne
environment inthis caseis directand is alreajy occurrincThe disposalof radioactive
waste in an atoll hassirnilarirto oceani: srorage as uellas to storageon dry and.^'
Thesefactorsalonedernonsrrare the inncren:unsuitabilityof Mumroa and Fangataufa
for thepurposesfor uhich the! ha\.ebeenused in the developmeno t f France'snuclear
weaponsprogramme.
H. Inadeouacv of French assurancesofsafeh.
" Such arAmchitkain thc BcringSca.a former icning siusxiby the UnitedSute. or Nwaya
Zcnùyain (hArcOcOcean. whch wasuscdbyihe formcrSo\icUnion.
53Secdiscussioi paragraphs100and101. 53. Since the inception of the underground testing programme. French
officiaishave repcatedlyasaired New Zealand,othercountriesof the South Pacificand
the UnitedNationsthatthe testsposeno hannto humanhealthor to the envir~nrnent.~
These assurances have beenrepeated &ce the announcement that testing war to
res~rne.'~ Experiencesuggests, however. that suchassurances must be treated with
caution. For example,the assuranceprovidedbytheFrenchMinisterof Foreign Anain
in January 1982 that cracks that had appearedon the sides of the atoll were due to
naturai causes and not to the testss6was subsequently disprovedby the Atkinson and
:
CousteauMissions.
54. In recentyears other evidencehas emergedabout accidentswhich have
caused or have had the potential to cause hzrm to the irnmediareenvironment of
hiumroa and beyond. In panicula:. the iollotl:-- incidents,the existence ofwhich had
previouslybeenconcealedor deniedto th-oursidcworld,havenou beenconfirmed:
5.
For exarnplc:Notedatd 10lune1971fromFrenchErnbasn Io NewZcaland Io Minisuy of External
Mairs reproducd ai p.298. Vol II.Pleaa~nhYcleor TesfsCase(New Zealond vFrancc); Siatcmcnt
by Frcnch Rcprewntativcto Special Political Commiria: on 6 Octokr 1979. OB~cialRccf~rthef
GcncralAswrnbl!.aliu Thiq-Founh Scsston.A/SPCB4ISR5. p 5; Lcttcr Qtcd 12January 1982fmm
M Cheysron.Ministcrof Forcign Mairs of France. Mr Cooper.Minincr of Foreign Anairsof New
Lcaland (Anncx 6); Staicmeniby Frcnch Reprcsentativcto SpecialPolitical Gmmittcc Onokr
1986.OfficiaiRecordsofLhcGencralAsvrnblyaiiuFoq-Fim Session AISPU4llSR4. p 7.
35
SiarcrncntbyM Ctura:.Prcsidentof France.ai press wnicrencc at Palais de 1'Elysce.13June 1995,
16nncx 1).
Lener daid 12Januaq 1982frornM Chqsson. Minincr ofForeign mais of Fmnu.co Ur Cooper.
Mnincr of ForeignAiïairs of NewZealand (Anncx 6). wittcn in rcspoIOlener refemd 10innote
31.(a) InJune 1987 officidsonMururoaadmittedto Cousteau theaccidentalreleaseof
approximately 1.5 teraBecquerels of radioactive iodineplus other volatile
material."
(b) In 1992 scientistsof the CombinedRadiologicalSafety Service on Mururoa
acknowledged that 0.2teraBecquerelsof radioactive iodinhad beenaccidentally
In June 1995 an officialpublicationof the FrenchAtomicEnergyCommission
(c)
.
acknowledged for the first timethat aevicewhichhad become stuck in the
detonationshafthadbeendeliberatelydetonatedat lessthanits intendeddepth in
1979.' T~hisacknowledgment contrastsmarkedlywiththe assurancesgivenby
the French representativeto the Special Political Committee of the United
Nations GeneralAssemblyin 1979inthe consideration ofthe itemon theEffects
of Atomic Radiation.On that occasion theCornrnitteewas told that there had
been no mishap with respect to the conduct of a test and that"al1 the
undergroundtestshadbeen kept perîectlyunderc~ntrol".~~
In fact the incidentaused asubmanne landslideof about one millionaibic
meters(ie 100 rneterx 100meters x 100 rneters)of materialoff themassofthe
atoll whichset of; a tsunami which washed over pan of the atoll, seriously
5:Sa noie37.
Y Secnoie38.
" Bouchezandkomic. p 93.
65ûtTiciRacccrdoftheÇencral AsscmbaiiisThiwFounh Session,AISPCB4ISRS.p 5. injunngtwo persons.6' Sincethat incident,ailpenons on the atollare rquired
tobe on raisedplaffom whenevera nucleartest isbùng conducted.
These incidents belie assuranceass to the safetyof the nuciear testand their lack of
impactonthe environment.
55. Theaboveaccountdemonstrates threekey points:
îhere have been leaks of radioactive matenai into the aend and marine
(i)
environmentsas a consequenceof past nucleartests and there willcertainlybe
leakagesof furtherradioactivity ovetime.
(ii) There is a risk thar the weakened structure of Mururoa has become so
undermined by previous explosionsthat a resurnptionof nuclear explosioncould
cause a seriouscollapseor iissuring which uould open up existingdetonation
chambers, therebp releasingsipihcant arnounrs- whichcannotbe quantifiedfor
lack of informationbut whichcannotbe disregarded -of the storedradioactive
materiaiwithpotentiallysenousconsequences for the environment.
(iii) Notwithstandingthe proven darnagecaused to the atolls by the underground
explosions, Francehasconsistentlyclairned thatits nucleartesting programmeis
safe,but haslirnitedor deniedaccess tothe testsites.
IV THE Th'TERVATIOSVLCOSTEST injunngtwo persons.6' Sincethat incident,ailpenons on the atollare rquired
tobe on raisedplaffom whenevera nucleartest isbùng conducted.
These incidents belie assuranceass to the safetyof the nuciear testand their lack of
impactonthe environment.
55. Theaboveaccountdemonstrates threekey points:
îhere have been leaks of radioactive matenai into the aend and marine
(i)
environmentsas a consequenceof past nucleartests and there willcertainlybe
leakagesof furtherradioactivity ovetime.
(ii) There is a risk thar the weakened structure of Mururoa has become so
undermined by previous explosionsthat a resurnptionof nuclear explosioncould
cause a seriouscollapseor iissuring which uould open up existingdetonation
chambers, therebp releasingsipihcant arnounrs- whichcannotbe quantifiedfor
lack of informationbut whichcannotbe disregarded -of the storedradioactive
materiaiwithpotentiallysenousconsequences for the environment.
(iii) Notwithstandingthe proven darnagecaused to the atolls by the underground
explosions, Francehasconsistentlyclairned thatits nucleartesting programmeis
safe,but haslirnitedor deniedaccess tothe testsites.
IV THE Th'TERVATIOSVLCOSTEST 56. At no Umesince nucleartesting in the SouthPacificregion began can
Fm= have been inany doubt aboutthe attitudeofNew Zealandtowards suchtesting.
As beseenfkomthe annexed lis(Anna 7). thereisa longhistoryofNewZdand's
expressionof iu firm oppositionto French nucleartesting,aswcll as nucieartesting
generally.NewZealand,andother countrie sf the regioninpartiailaby meansofthe
communiquesof the annual meetingsof Hcadsof Govcmmmt ofSouth PacificForum
membercountnes, and in the very recmt Dedaration by South PacificEnvironment.
MnistersonNuclearTestingadoptedat theirmeetingof 16-17August 1995 (Anna 8).
haveneveracceptedFrenchnucieartestingintheregion.
57. France, foritspan. as alreadyindicatedinparagraph2 of this Requesis
adamantthat the tests whichithas announced uilltake placeover the period between
September1995and i .ofhiay 1996 .4s canbeseenfromthe staternentmadeby
President Chirac on 13 June 1995,~'uhich ovenumed a moratorium on further
undergroundnucleartests uhich the Govemmentof Francehad declaredin April 1992
and subsequentlyobser~ed.~'France considers thetests necessary for its "higher
interests".Thedecisionto conductthemisstatedto beirrevocable.
SecAnnex1
61It is nothi the President of Franc:. President Mifierrand. during the moratorium provided
assuranc asO the linkagcbetutcn the moratoriumdcclard by Frana and theobscrveby
threcofthefourothernuclcar-ucaponS(RussiaU~tedKingdom UnitedStates)Forexample.in
April 1991,consincntlywiih statcmcnu Io similar cEm in 1993. he 'siated thatthee quaiion of
rcnimptionof Frana's nucleartens dcpcndcdon theactions ofothcpowm:eaif thq did no1
rcme tening neither would France" (secdoc. prepared for Non-ProTmty RMown and
Enension Conference.NPTICo199512.of 15March 1995,page10.paramph 33). 58. Zn the 13June 1995 statcment Francehar taken the position that "the
tesu take place ...in conditions which ...have absolutely no wnsqucnce on the
environment". it assensthat theabsenceof anydanger to the environment "has been
codrmed by manyforeignspecialistsand scientihuon location". However, asisevident
from the scientificmaterialprescnteinPart iïoïf thisRquest, this proposition cannot
be sustained.No scientificstudyhasbeen ableto giveany assuranceon the point which
now most disnirbs NewZealand, namely. the potential for the distribution of
accumulatedradioactivematerialsinto themarineenvironment
59. National and international oppositionto nuclear testing has intensified
sincethe Case was initiatedin 1973. Even yearsincethen.the UnitedNations General
Assernblyhas adopteda resolution,withtheCO-sponsorship of NewZealand.pointingto
the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treatyIn 1993 and 1991, the
resolution was adopted unanirnously. Since
1992. four of the five nuclear-weapon
States.includingFrance, have been obsening a moratorium onnuclearresting. In May
1995, the Parties to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear ~ea~ons,"
includingFrance, adoptedunanimouslyat their Revieu and ExtensionConferencea set
of principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferationand disarmament. This
provided for a programme of action towards the full realisation and effective
irnplernentationof Articl\'iofinal'TreatY6includingthe negotiationof a universaland
Tcn in 729 Uh7S 161.
''~nicleVi rcadasfollows:
'&ch of îhcPanicsIotheTrean.undçnake o pursucncgotiation goodfaithon
measurcrselaungtocessatiofthenuclararms rac etancarlydateandtonucleadisarmamcnafnd
on amn on gencralandcomplct eisannamentundesuin andeRMivt intcmalionmlnml." internationallyand tnectively veriiïableComprehensiveNuclear-Test-Ban T reaty tobe
completedno laterthan 1996. The programmeof action .Itoprovided th* pendingthe
entryinto forceof sucha Treaty,the nuclear-weapon States should exercisethe utmost
rearaint. Negotiationson the CornprehensiveNuclearTest Ban Treatyare undenvay in
the Conference onDisarmamentin Geneva. Non-nuclear-wcaponStates Parties to the
Non-Protifdon Treaty, now comprising ova 170 states.have wmpliedwhlally
completelywiththeirsideof thebargainnot to manufactureor othenvise aquire nuclear
explosivedevices.
60. Funher evidence of the intensification of national and international
attitudesisto beseeninthe SouthPacificXuclearFreeZone Treaty, which wasadopted
at Rarotongaon 6 Auyst 1985and entered into force on 11 December 19~6.~~Each
Parr).to the Treaty undenakes, inter aiiatc ent in its territor). the testing of any
nuclear explosivedeviceand notto take an! actionto assist or encourage the testing of
anysuchdevice. Nuclear-ufeaponStates are inviredto becomepany to Protocols to the
Treatyinwhichtheywouldundenake, inter alia.not to contributeto any act of a Party
to theTreatyor to a Protocol whichconstitutes aviolationthereof and notto test any
nuclear explosivedeviceanywherewithinthe SouthPacificNuclear Free Zone. France
is not pany to anyof the Protocols. Itis also not pany to the Treaty Banning Nuclear
WeaponTests in the Atmosphere. inOuter Spaceand under water of 5 August 1963;'
which prohibits. interalia. an! nuclear explosionin any other environment ifsuch
" Tcn of theTrca' anddraft iex~ofthcihrteassiaicd Proioc24sILM 1442(1985);finatexlof
lheProtouilsin28ILh1599 (1989).
''480UhT 43.qlosion causes radioactivedebristo bepresent outsidethe territoriallimitsof the State
unda whosejurisdiction or convol such explosion irwnducted. Thefia that France
has not becornea partyto this treatinno way diminishcsitssignificanceas midence of
the standard ofehaviourfavouredbyvirtualiyailthe rest oftheworid.
V. THE SlGNJFJCANCE OFPARAGRAPH 63 OFTHE 1974 JUDGMENT
61. It is at this point necessaryto retinnpater detaito paragraph 63 of
the 1974 Judgment and its consequences.
As already indicated, the Court in that ..
paragraphpreservedthe right of the Applicantto seek to resumethe proceedings. The
essentialwords of the paragraphprovidedthat:
..ifthe basis of thisludgrnent wereto be affected,the Applicantcould request an
examinationof the situatioin accordancewiththe provisionsofthe tat tu te;^'
62. Although this passage does not expressly identify the "basis" of the
Coun's Judgrnent, itseerns rnost likelthatthe Coun is refemng to its finding in the
earlier pan of its Judgrnent that the staternents made by the high French oficials
arnounted to a bindinglegal undenaking not to cary out further atrnospheric nuclear
tests inthe SouthPacificregion69 Asthe Coun saidinparagraph58:
"If the declarationsof France concerning theeffectivecessationof nuclear tests
havethe significancedescnbed bu the Coun. that is to sayif they havecausedthe
dispute to disappear. al1the necessa- consequencesmust be drawn fiom this
finding"
taIUReporis 1974,p457.aipJ7i
69Sa para.53 otheIudgmentqlosion causes radioactivedebristo bepresent outsidethe territoriallimitsof the State
unda whosejurisdiction or convol such explosion irwnducted. Thefia that France
has not becornea partyto this treatinno way diminishcsitssignificanceas midence of
the standard ofehaviourfavouredbyvirtualiyailthe rest oftheworid.
V. THE SlGNJFJCANCE OFPARAGRAPH 63 OFTHE 1974 JUDGMENT
61. It is at this point necessaryto retinnpater detaito paragraph 63 of
the 1974 Judgment and its consequences.
As already indicated, the Court in that ..
paragraphpreservedthe right of the Applicantto seek to resumethe proceedings. The
essentialwords of the paragraphprovidedthat:
..ifthe basis of thisludgrnent wereto be affected,the Applicantcould request an
examinationof the situatioin accordancewiththe provisionsofthe tat tu te;^'
62. Although this passage does not expressly identify the "basis" of the
Coun's Judgrnent, itseerns rnost likelthatthe Coun is refemng to its finding in the
earlier pan of its Judgrnent that the staternents made by the high French oficials
arnounted to a bindinglegal undenaking not to cary out further atrnospheric nuclear
tests inthe SouthPacificregion69 Asthe Coun saidinparagraph58:
"If the declarationsof France concerning theeffectivecessationof nuclear tests
havethe significancedescnbed bu the Coun. that is to sayif they havecausedthe
dispute to disappear. al1the necessa- consequencesmust be drawn fiom this
finding"
taIUReporis 1974,p457.aipJ7i
69Sa para.53 otheIudgment 32
63. It isin passing,peninent to observe that no time limiwas associated
with the French undenakings. Indeed, the Court arpressly found 'that the unilaterai
undertaking5resultingfromthese statementscannot be intuprctedas havingbecn made
in implicitrelianceoan arbitrarypowerof reconsidaation.'"
"
64. One may now retum to the question raid by paragraph 58 of the
Judgment: whatwas the dispute thoughtby the Courtto haveben thus brought to m.
end? The 1973Application makes it clearthat the disputewinits ongin about nuclear
contaminationof the environmentarisingfrom nucleartesting of whatever nature. The
"atmospheric"featurewas merelyincidentalto the "contamination"feature, whichwas
ofthe essence.
65. Indeed,itshould be emphasised that the adject"etm nc" does not
appearinthe prayeror submissionnith whichtheKewZealand Application concludes:
"Accordingly,Xew Zealand asks the Coun to adjudge and deciare: that the
conduct by the FrenchGovernent of nucle teatrin the South Pacific ...
constitutes a violation of Kew Zealand'snghts under international law...".
(Emphasissupplied.)
The absenceof any qualibingadjective before the wo"nuclear"rnaybe noted. In fact.
New Zealand commencedits proceeaings in 1973 to prevent nuclear contamination
whatever the source - at that time understood to be limited to atrnospheric tests.
Moreover, althoughthe Coun ma) have thought that the French declarations madein
10
IUReporrs1973.p.475. para.531974 rnatchedthe finalobjectivesought by NewZealand in the Case, the Coun itself
does not appearto haveanached anycontroüingimportanceto the use of the adjective
"atrnosphericn.The word does not appearin the operativepart of the Court'sOrder of
22 June 1973 where the Court indicatedthat "inpartiah, the French Govcmment
shouldavoidUr tests causingthe depositof radioactivefailouton the tenitory of
"71
NewZealand ....
66. The scope of the 1973 Application was not limited to land tenitory :
exclusiveiy.In paragraph17, NewZealandreferredto the effectof fallouton the living
naturalresourcesof the seo. Even moreto the point,paragraph22 of the Application
includedin ifsidentificationofthe consequencesoffunhertesting:
"the entryintotemtov of h'ewZealand,the CookIslands, Niue and the Tokelau
Islands, includine theirtemtonal sea ...of additionalradioactive matenal ...;
renewed restrici ;freedom ofthehi~hseas ...andthefreedomto exploreand
exuloitthe resourcesof the sea and seabed;and the continued pollutionof the
territorial, maritimeand aenal emironment of NewZealand [etc], of other
countriesand temtones and of areasbe\.ondthe limitsof nationaliurisdiction."
(Emphasissupplied )
Andinparagraph28 ofthe Application,NeupZealand assenedthat internationallawwas
~~olated by nucleartestingundenakenby the FrenchGovernmentin that. inter alia, if
violatesthenght ofNew Zealand.
"to the preservationfromunjustifiedanificialradioactivecontaminationof the ...
marine ..environment"as wellas thenght ofNewZealand "tofreedomof the
hieh seas. includinsfreedomof navisafion ...and the freedomto explore and
exuloitthe resourcesof the seaandtheseabed, withoutinterferenceor detriment
resultinefromnucleartesring". (Emphasissupplied.) 67. It is tme that the French dedarations had said that, in giving up
aunosphcrictesting, Francewouldbe in a positiontopass to the nage of underground
testing. .Thusmen though the prospectof undergroundtcsting was in the Mnd of the
Court, it did not specificallyrule that underground t&g would end the dispute
absolutely. The crucialpoint tortcallisthatno one had anyidea at that time that the
undergroundtening subsequentlyto be carricdout atMuma or at Fangataufacould,
or would indue course,leadto someof the resultsthat itwas thought the tennination'of
atmospheric testingwould avoid. namely, pollution of the marine environmentby
radioactive material.Ifithad beenso contemplated. theCourt could hardlyhave taken
theviewthat the Frenchrenunciationof atmospheric testing couldby itself have brought
the"dispute"to an end -for evidentlitwouldnot have.
68. Another way of puttins [ne point is that the scope of the Coun's 1994
Judgmentmust be measurednot by referenceIO atrnospherictesting as such. but rather
by referenceto the true and stated o~jectiveof the Application whichwas to prohibit
testinglikelyto producecontarninationof thePacificmarineenvironmentbyanyanificial
radioactive material.
69. In 1974. the assurnptionwas madethat the temination of atmospheric
tesringand its replacementbyunàergroundtestingwouldput an end to the prospect of
contarnination. That assurnprion,iiever valid, certainlyis nox, now in relation to
nuclear testing either at hlururoa or Fangataufa. If it had been appreciated that
contaminationcould stilloccuras a result ofunderground testing,the substitutionof the 35
latter for the former could scarcely have been seas a means of resolving the dispute
then before the Court.
70. It should be added, bythe same tokw tha!the fac hatthe term 'fiiUout'
was used to descnbe the manner inwhichthe radioactivematcrialreached thedestination
in which it wuld do injury does not mean that the case cannot be reopened because
"fallout" as such is not alleged. The equivalent of fallout is achieved if contamination.
spreads to andthrough the ocean as a result of the escape of radioactive materials fiom
the structure of the atoll.
71. The case that Seu. Zealand now presents is that. on the basis of the
scieniific evidence set out above. underground nuclc~r testin- at hluniroa and
Fanparaufa has already led to some contamin: ~f th: marine en\.ironment and that
there appears to be a real risk of it le ad:^^to hnher. potentially significant.
contaminaiion. The basis oi the1974 Judgmenr (whether the abandonment by France of
testing likelyto leadto pollution of the marineen~ironrnby!radioactive rnaterialor the
assumption asto the "match" reierred to inparagraph 20) has therefore been aitered.
NeufZealandmayin consequence "requesl an examinationof the situation in accordance
with the provisions of the Statute"This means that New Zealand is entitled to seeka
resumption of the 1973 proceedings. The Coun remains seizedof the original case. As
a result, thejurisdiction of the Coun is the sameitwas in 1973,based upon the 1928
GeneralAct, aswell asFrance's axepiance of the OptionalClauseas it stood at the tirne
of the originalApplication. 72. Havingregardto the faas set out abovNew Zealand ~0nted.stha he
resumptionby Franc ofundergroundnucleartestingatMururoa andFangataufawillbe
abreachofinternationallawand,inparticular,ofthriglusoNew Zealandas well as of
thenghts of othercountrieasset out inparagraph2ofthe 1973Application.
A. ~
Assessment
73. There is. firsa.clear iegal obligation upon France to conduct an
EnbironmentalImpact Assessment before c?-.ing out an! funher nuclear tests at
MumroaandFangalaufa. Thisobiigarion fio~r:iirsr.froma specifictreaty undenaking
and, second. from customan intrrnationl?u orrive3 irom uidespread international
practice.
1. Specifictream undenakino: theNournea Convention
74. One instrumentin panicular is directly binding on Fraasewell as
XewZealandand other Statesin theSouth PacificRegion. This is the Convention for
the Protectionof theaturai Resourcesand Environmentof the South PacificRegion
concludedon 25 Kovember 19.86('.thSournea k on vent ion").t entcred into force
for bothNewZealandandFranceon 22Au-st 1990.
" Tcnin26ILM38 (1987) 75. Anicle 16, 2nvimnmental Impact Asscssment" of this Conventiok
provides asfollows:
"1. The Parties agrec to develop and maintain , ith the assistance of.
competentglobal,regionaland suù-regionalorganisations as rquested, technical ::
guideiinesand legislationgivingadquate cmphasis to environmentaland social
factorsto facilitatebalanceddevelopmentof th& natura lesourcesand planning
of theirmajor projectswhichrnightaffectthe mMneenvironmentin such a way':.
asto preventor minimisehannfulimpactsonthe Convention Area.
2. EachPastyshall,withinits capabilities.assessthepotentialeffectsofsuch
projects on marineenvironrnent,so that appropriatemeasures can be taken to
prevent any substantialpollutionof, or significantand harmfulchangeswithik
the ConventionArea.
3. With respect to the assessmentreferred to in paragraph 7, each Party
shall.whereappropnate,invite:
(a) publiccomment accord in t^itsnationalprocedures.
(b) other Parties that ma! be aKe:red to consult nith ,. id submir
cornments.
The resultsof these assessmenrsshallbe communicatedto the Organisation[the
South Pacific Commission].which shallmake them available to interested
Panies."
The definitionof "pollution" in the Conventionis quite broad enough to cover the
seepage or escapeof radioactibfewaste from the atolls into the surrounding marine
" "Pollution"is defincdin Ariicle2(l) as follows:
""pollution" rncans thc introduction by man. dircclly or indiraly. of subnancss oihcncrgy into
marineenvironment(inciudingenuarics) which resulu or is likelyIord1 in such &aucicasous
harm io living resourccs and marine 1st. ha10human hcalthhindrana to marineaaivitics.
including fishing and olhcr legitimaicuses ofirnpairmcniof qualiy fuseofsea uaicr and
rcductionof amcnities: in applyingihis definilion to the ConventionoblPania shalluse
Lhcirkn cndcavoursIo mrnply uith ihe appropriait standards and tuommcndatiohc enablished by
cornpcientinlcrnationalorganisations.includingLhcInternationalAiomicEncrgyAgcncy." 76. ïhm is no provision whichexanpu nuclear testing from the
requirementsherelaiddown. Onthewntrarynucleartesting iscxpresslycoveredbythe
Convention,dong withotheractionswhich mightdamagethe avironment. hicle 12
providesthat "the Paniesshalltake al1appropriatemcasures to pmuiî., reduu and
control pollutionnthe ConventionArea which mightresultfromthe testingof nudear
devices". But ths referenceto nucleartestingdoes not excludesuch activihm the,
cleardutyexpressedin Anicle 16to carryout an environmentalimpactassessment. It
maybe noted that theUnitedStates -whichhas camed out many more underground
nuclearteststhanFrance -hasnot shared Frenchinhibitionsabout publicknowledgeof
thesafetyaspectsofitsnucleartesting
77. T~L .. ..edureof anEn\.ironmentaIlmpactAssessrnentinvolvesan open
considerationof the issues, theprovisionof an opponunityfor1interested partiesto
presenttheirviews,a staternentby the pany proposingthe action of al1the scientific
elementsinvolved,togetheruithanindicationofwhythe measuresare proposedand of
their possible effect utheenvironment Thernerecarryingout of an assessrnentdoes
notmeanthatthat panycanproceed inanyevent. It canonlydo so ifthe project isthen
approvedas being environrnentaliacceptablefollowingthe fullconsiderationof any
objections. In the case of the underground nucle arts in a location so intimately
relatedto the sea,"environrnentaacceptable"necessarilymeansthat beforethe tests
maybe conductedthe assessrnent must concludethat noradioactivematerid will be
introducedintothemarine environmentas aresultofthetests. 78. France hasapparentlyno1 cbed out suchan assessment. Ifit has,it has
failedtoshare the resultswith therest of the internaticomrnunity and, in paniailar,
withthe Statesof the SouthPacifieRegion with&ch, byrcason of its participatiin
the NoumeaConvention," it hasa specialrelationshipand towhich it owu a spccific
obligationunderthe lastsentenceofArticle16 to makethe reuilts availableto the South
PacificCommission andt ,hroughit,to interested~arties."
79. Not onlyhasFranceitself notcarriedout the requiredpriorassessment;it
hasnot allowedscientistsfrornoutsideto carryout the necessarytests and ascenainal1
the information thatis essential for theformation of an impartial, balanced and
cornprehensiveviewofthe matterbeforea test or specificseriesof tests is held. Various
proposalswhichhave been made for assessingthe situation showthe kind of detailed
investigationthat rnustbecarriedout and made public aspan of any assessrnent ofthe
safetyof the proposedtests. Suchtests shouldbe consideredonlyifan assessmentwere
to repon that theisksofcontaminationby radioactivernaterialwereni].
80. The FrenchGovernmenrhassoughtto allaypublicanxietyby statingthat
the tests are perfectlysafeanthattheir effectsupon the atollsand the adjacentmarine
environment arecarefullyrnonitoredafiereachblast.
1.
75Sa abovc.paragrap74.
Amclc 16.Sa abovcparagraph75. 81. As to the first of these contentions,that the tests areperfesafe. it
mu be recalledthat a risk of accidentaiescape of radioactivematerialaccompanies
everytest. Byreferenceto thestandardofbehaMour which the internationalcommunity
has adopted in relationto the deposit of radioactivematerialor waste in the marine
environment,suchrisksare not acceptable. As noted &a, th- have alrcadybeen
accidentaiescapesof radioactivematerialwhich,having initialbeendeniedby France,
were subsequently admittedto haveoccurred. Eventhough thequantiticsinvolved may
havebeen small,the very occurrenceof suchescapesshowsthat accidentsmay occur.
There is also evidencethat the explosionswhich havetaken place so farhave caused
damageto the structureof theatoll. Largeslabsof rock havebrokenoffthe sideof the
atollbelowwaterlevel. \%at hasalreadyhappenedcanhappenagain.
82. Nor is the Frenchcontenri. .tthe effects of the tests are carefully
monitoredsuficient to dischargeFrance'slesal obligations. It is no1 suficient that
monitoringtakes place ajrer the event. The requirementof EnvironmentalImpact
Assessmentisoneof conduc: priorto eachtest or senesoftests. Thewholepurposeof
such assessmentsis to determine inadvanceof experimentsthat they do not entailan
unacceptabledegree of risk to the environment. This is inherentin the concept of
EnklronmentaiImpactAssessment and is reflecteinthe wording of the statementsof
obligationbindingFrance in .bide 16of the Soumea Convention. This obligationis
expressedin the words of paragraph 2 of that Aniclethat "eachParty shall,withinits
capabilities,assess the potentialefiec...on themanne environment ..." (of major
projectswhich might affect the manneenvironment). The word "potentiai"used inconjunctionwith"efïeas" indicatesan obligationto pcrfonn the assessrnentbefore the
testsS .ubjectto variationsof language,the same LItnie of the other trcatio which
adopttheconceptofEnvironmentalImpactAsscssment.
83. In anyevent,to the extentthat suchpst hoc monitoringis carriedout. it
would appearfiom the Frenchrepon entitled SituationRaa7010giqu e de PoIpesie
~rancuise of'~hichthelatestissueisthat of 1994, thatthe monitoringdoes not extend,
to an examinationof the cumulativeeffect of testingupon the structure of the atolls .,
themselves. Ratheri,t relatesonlyto a considerationof radioactivityin the environment
andofthe exposureto radioactibityof thepopulationofFrench Polynesia.
81. Thisisa longwayfromthe s!stern3tic.cornprehensive and publicscrutiny
Jependentscientistsand others beiare the event thac is required if international
standardsareto bemet.
85. Theexaminationthat should bt conductedarMururoaand Fangataufa as
pan of the EnvironmentalImpact Assessmenl should include investigationof the
followingmatters: the topography of theatolls; ashallowseismictesting programme;a
comprehensive sampling carnpaign ro investigatethe concentrationof radionuclidesin
fish,planktonicorganisms,sedirnentsandcorallinestructures;an extensive determination
of the hydrolog of the atoll and reef structure; and an epiderniologicalstudy. In
76The repon carrieon irs front co\.er the of ihMininire de laDcfense he Didon da
Centreds'ExprimcntatioNnsucltairt.eCommissari aI'EncrgiAtomiqua end the SeniaMinc
de Sumcillana Radiologiqueci Biologdcl'Hommeel deI'Environncmcnt.addition,ajudgmentofthepotentialforradionucliderelcasefiromthetcstingsitesshould
be made not only by refemce to the standardsroutinelycnforced for civil nudear
idlations, butalso by referenceto estirnateswhichshould be providedby France of
the strengthand radioactivyieldofthepropoxd detonations.
86. Moreover, theredts of uich invesiigationshouldbe madepublic sothat
the debate abouttheir significancecan takeplace in a systernatic.open and orddr
marner as part of a transparentprocess of prior assessment;and the wnsidcrations
whichthoseperformingthe assessmenttakeinto account can beclearlyidentifiedandthe
validityof their conclusiocanbe the subjen of properandobjective scientifiscrutiny
by other interestedbutfullyindependent scientissndothers
87. An additional reason iora full & assessrne, the important
requirernent thathe processrnust entailsomeconsiderationof the benefilswhichthose
responsible forthe project ma) hope to aînieve, coupledwith a balancingof those
clairnedbenefitsagainstthe"sks involvedinsuchacti~ity.~
..
''The application of this pnnciplc wiihin the EuropcanCommunknfound in Anicle qa) of
Diredine801836Euraiom(O.J.L236.p.1)asamrndcd byDiratitr 8J14671Eunto(O.J.L.65p.4).
This lays doun thu, called "justification- rquircAaording tothis. the variocypa of
acthities which entail cxponireio radiaiionrquire pnor junificati10 the advanugato
begainedthrough theseaccivities. An English ludge hasheldthat an absuan balancingof advanmges
and disadvantagerwouldnbe d~cicnt to complyuith this rquircment. The provisionctkls for
balancingof 'panicuiar practifcswdmch panicular individds in panicuiar cirmnmm(Se
Poiÿ 1.IR v Saxtam of Staicand othersD.Grcen~eactandLancashireCountvCouncijudgment
of4 March1994.(1994)loumal ofEnvironmentLaw.312ar 323) 88. The considerationwhich triggen the rquirementofan Environmental
impact Asstsrrnent is the prospectthatthe proposed conduct could occasion a
significantadverseimpactuponthe environmentl'hcrcan be no realdoubt that, inthe
light of the factual and legal developmuits herein, the rrsumpofounderground
nuclear testingbyFranceallsintothiscategory. Evenifthe pointwere not self-&dent,
the burdenwould,by reasonof theapplicationof the preauitionarypnnciple, to which
referenceis made below," lie on Franceto prove that thtre is no necessity ai:
EnvironmentaiImpaqtAssessment,ratherthanuponNewZeaiandto prove that there is
one. In any case, it is instructiveto examinethe lists contained in the European
Commu~ryCouncil Directive 85/337iEE of 27 June 1985 - a directive which is
applicableto the tes-as shouing the kind of marrerwhich the European Union. of
uthichFranceis a member, regardsas caliingfor an Environmental Impact Assessment.
and.inpanicular,asdel ~atingthe concerthalesists regardingan).kindof nuclear
acti\~ty. Thesematters incluthe constructionof nuclearpourerstations, installations
for theermanentstorage orfinaldisposalof raaioactiveuaste and installationsfor the
productionorenrichmentof nuclearfuels.forthe reprocessingof irradiatednuclearfuels
and for thecollectingand processin: of radioactivewasAeforrior nuclear testing
mustrequirepriorassessment. 89. Even ifFrancewere not boundbythe NoumeaConvention,it would nill
& requùcd by customary international law to cany out an Environmental Impact
Assessrnentbefore conducting nuclear testsatMururoa The obligationto cany out
such assessmentsexists in relation to anyachity which is likelytocause significant
darnage to the environment, particularly where such &ectsarc likcly to bc
transboundary innature. It is diicult to conceivany a*. thatmore clcatly demands
suchanassessmentthan a nucleartest:
(i) whichis conducted beneatha srnallatoll
(ii) that hasalreadybeenthe sceneof numeroussubnantialexplosions
(iii) thatmus1 contain significant deposits of radioactive material within the test
chambers
(IV) whichcouldbereleasedintothe irnmediarelysurroundin_mp arineenvironment
(v) throughexistingfissuresliableto beopenedup funherby more explosions
Theaccumulationof thesefivefactorsdistinpishes the tests at MururoaandFangataufa
fromundergroundnucleartests conducted uithincontinentallandmasses.
90. The basis of the subrnissionthatthere is an obligation tocany out
Environmental Impact Assessrnents in such circumstances is the existence of a
considerablearnountof concordant State practice evidencingthe opinionsof States in
thisregard.
91. The 1978 UhXP DrafiPrinciplesof Conduct proposedthat:
"states should makean environmentalimpactassessmentbefore engagingin any
activitywith respect ta shared natural resource which may create a risk of significantlyaffectingthe environrnentof another aate or nates sharing that
resour~e".~
92. ïhe wncept was subscquentlydeveloped, first, in a number of non-
binding instruments and then, and in pan cancuirdy, in a number of trcaty
arrangements,suchas:
(i) Articles205 and206 ofthe 1982UnitedNations Law ofthe Sea onv vent ion;"
(ii) the 1985ASEAN~greement;"
(iii) the 1985 EuropeanCornmunityEnvironmentAssessment~irective;"
''Sa San&. Principles oflnrernoiionol Em,tronmenrLou..Vol1(1995).p.580.
IOGnired.VarionsConvenïionon theLm. oJrhe Seo.doneor.ilonregoBoy.Jomoico. 10Deccntber 196.'
Arricle205. "PublicorionoJreporrs
States shall publish rcpons of the renilts obiaincd pursuant to aniclc 204 or proridc such
rcporu ai appropriate intervals to the campetent intenuiional organ~sations.which should make thcm
availablcto ail States.
Arricl206. Assemenr-oJpotentio1 eflerrO,u~,!viries.
Whcn States have rcasonable grounds for bclining Lhat planncd activitics under thcir
jurisdimion or mnuol ma) cause subnantial pollution of or signiiicant and harnüul changes to the
marinecn\ironmcnL th? shall. as faras praflicabl:. asvss LhcpoteniialcKecü of such aniritits on chc
marine environmeni and shall tommunicate repons of Lhcrcsulü of mch asressrncnü in the manncr
providcdin antclc 205." Tek1in 21 ILhf1261(1982).
Su alsonoie93.
ai Ihe ASClh'Agrermenron the Consen-arionoJ:i'orureond herurol Resources. Julv1985. (Not yet
in forcc).
Aniclc 14(1)providcs:'Impact asessrnent The ContractingParùcs undcnakc that proposais
for an?amivin which mas significantlaKea the naluial cniironrnent shaas faras possiblebe
mbjmed IO an assessrnent of thcir consqucnces beforc thn arc adopid. and thcy shall ukc into
considcrationthedu ofthis sessrnent in thcir decision-makingprarrc."
Aniclc 20(3)(a) pm\idcs that Contraaing Panics shall endcavow 'to rnake environmentai
impact assessrnentkforc cngaging in an'.actiriv thmay crcatc a risk of significantly afïccling Ihe
enrironmcnt or the namral resources of anther Contraning Parryor the environrnent or nalurai
rcsouras bond nationaljuridiction:".
CTcrlin San& eral.. Docvmenrsinlnternor~onolEnrtronmeniolLov (hercinojlcr "Sands. Inrcmationol
a:cumcnrs"l.Vol 11.4p.958.
CouncilDirective85/337iEEC 01-7 June 1985on rhemssmenr oJlhe eJects ofcertain publie and
prlvoleprojecrs on thecnvironmenr.
"Article2.
1 Mcrnbcr Statu shall adopt al1 mcasures nuxssar) to cmc ht. kforc mnsentis givcn,
projeas lkelyIOhavesignificanreBccü on the cnrironmcnby vinuc. inteotiaofthcir nature& or
loetion arc made abject 10an assessmentuith regard to their cK-. Thae pmjcns arcdefincd in
ANclc 4. Çiv) the 1989 World Bank Operational~irective;~
(v) the 1991 Espoo onv vent ion;^
(vi) the 1991 ProtocolonEnvironmental Protection tothe Antarctic~reaty:' and
2 The environmenial impact ase~ment =y k inlem in10CheuJaing ptumiW for
m-1 IOprojeas ithcMcmbc~ States,or. faithisiato n<hPpmdm or into proced~ 10bc
mablishcdm mmplywiihthe aimcofthisDi
3 Membcr Stat mesyin rraptional- o<cmpt aspecifkpmjeeîin&le orinpuc hm r&
provisionsladom inrhiDirectiveInthi rvcnfthcMunba S~taW:
a Consider whether anothcr fom ofaPmment wnild bc sppmpriatc and whnha L!IC
informationthusmllmcd shoulk madeavailablctthcpublic.
b makcamilable to the public mnumed theinformarionrrhting io Cheexemptioand Che
rcasansforgrantingiS
inforthe Commissioh prior to gnnting ansentthemsonrjwiijing Cheexemptiongran14 and
providcit Mihtheinfonnatio&madeavailablc.whm appropriaim hir own iutiods.
TheCommissionshallimmcdiatelyfornard the docwienu rcçcimcthcothcrMembcrStates.
~heCommissionshall rcponannuallyto the Councilon theapplicuion ofthis patagraph.
Arricl4
1 Subjm Io Anicle 2(3). projeru of the classa lincd in Ameï k smade mbjm Io an
-ment in aaordana uith Anicl5sto 10.
2 Rojccü of the clasvs lincd in Anncs II shall k madembjccî io an arwssmenl. in acwrdanct
uirh Aniclc5 to 10.whcrcMcmkr Sratesconsidcr thathcir chaactensu,require.
To chis end Memkr Statu may inter olispxify anain ~pa of projccts as bcing mbjm to an
assessrnenior mayenablish the criteriaandlor thrcsholdsnto detemine which of the projcm
,f thecl- lincd in AnnexII IOk ~bja IOan assessrnentin accordana uith Aniclcs 5 to 10."
men in San& and Tarasofsky.Documenrin Europeon CommunipEnvironmeniolh. vol.111(1995).
13266).
I4Sa Sands.Principles.p.593.uhich alsowü ourthe histop ofthe devclopmcntai pp.. 579-594.
Convenrionon Envtronmenrol/mpncrAssesmenl tn O Tronsboundo~ Conrrrr. doneof fip.
Finlond.25Fcbruow 1991.Wot !etinforce.)
'2rricle2.
1 The Panics shall cither individuallyor joinrly. takc al1appropriate andcflcctivcmeanires to
prmcnt. rcduce and wntrol significani adverse uansboundar) cn\ironmental impan from proposcd
activities.
2 hch Pan shall takc rhe neccssan Icgal. adminisuaiive or othcr meanires to implcmcntthe
provisionsoflhis Convention. inclu. ith respIOproposcdactivitio lined in Appcnhix1arc
likelyio aux signifiant adversetrawboundary impaa the csiablishmentof an environmentalimpact
assessrnentproocdurethapermispublic participation and prcpantion of rhe environmenial impact
assesSmen1documentationdcscritui in AppcndixII.
3 The Pan). of origin shall ensure that in accordana with the provisionsof ihis Conventionan
cn\ironmenlal impactasussrnent is undenakenIOna decisionio authonse or undeaaproposed
acti\i'. lincd in Appcndix1that isltaulya simcant adverseu;ursboundaryimpact."
CTcnin 30IL41802 (1991)and San&.lnrernoiionnlDocuments.vol.IB. p.1332.)
" Proiocolon EnvironmcniolProrcciionroiheAnlorclic Trroiy01Madrid. 4Octobrr 1991.(Not
yctin fora). Fnna uas a lcadingproponentofthis Protocol.8nofwhichprovido:
"ENlIIRONhIEh7AL IMPACTASSESS~fEhT
1. Propowdactivitia refend to in paragraph 2 belou. shali k mbjeci to Chepdse<out in
Annex 1 for prior -ment of the impacts of thow activities on the Antarc<icenvironmentor on
depcndentor associaicd~~stemr avording to uhcther thoseanivities are iashaving:
(a) lachana minorortransi[on impan;(vii) the 1992ConventiononBiologid ~iversity."
Ashas beenstatedinthelatesttreatiseonthe subject:
"the ideathat environrnentai lmpact asswmcnts may nowbe required as amanu
of customarylaw, particularlyat the regionallevel.is capabledf beingarguai,
particulad$when the projectwncmied is ükcly to have v W signitïcant&ecu
on theenvironmentandthoseeffm willbetransboundary".
93. Arecentreflectionofthesameprinciple isalso to befoundinPrinciple17
of theRioDeclaratio~whichFrancesupponed. ïhis Statesthat:
"environmentalimpactassessrnent, as a nationalinstrument,&iJ be undertaken ;
for proposed activitiesthat are likelyto havea significantadverseimpacton the
environmentand are subjectto a decisionof a cornpetentnational authority".
(Emphasissupplied)
- ~ ~ -
(b)a minoror iransiioryimpacr.or
(c) morelhan a Mnor or uansiion irnpazi.
2.Each Partyshall ensurefhai the assessrneniprdurcut out in .AnncsI are applicd in the planning
processa leading Io decisiom aboui an! azu\iues undcruken ln th- hnur7-ic'.-rca pursuant to
uienufic rcsearchprogrammes.tourisrnand ail oihcrgoi.crnrnenu1and non-governmenul acuvitics in
the Antarnjc Trwn ara for which advanccnoiicc is ryuired under AmclcVI1 (5) of the Antarctic
Trcaty. includingassociaicdloginic supponacti~?un
3. The assessrnentprocedurewt oui inAnnes 1sbll appi! Io an! chîngc in an acii\iV whcther the
change frornan incrcav or dcerm in Lhciniensin ofan cxisungacuviry.fromthe additioanf
acti\iry, thc dtcommissioningof a facilin. or oiheru~r
4.Whercactivitiesare planncdjoinily bx moreLhaone Pam. th: Panics involvcdshall nominate one
ofthcir numkr IOcwrdinaie the irnplcrncnidiionoftheenvironmentalimpactaswsment prMdurcs wt
out in Anncx1."
Subnantial elabration ofthe cn\ironrn:nul impactasscssrncntproceduresarOUIin Anncx 1IO the
Proiml.
CTeHin30IUf 1461(1991))
16
Convenrronon BiologicalD~vrrsir)5June 1992.
';lri~cle14Impact Prrernncnr and minrrninnpoherse impocrs.
1 Each Conuaning Party.asfaras possible andasappropnatc.shall:
a lnuodua appropnatc proceduresrquinng cn\~ronmentalimpact assessrneniof ils proposcd
projectsthai are likelyIohavesignficanr advcrszeBcN on biologicaldivenity with a vicwto avoiding
or minimisingsucheBau and whcreappropnatc.ailou.forpublicpanicipationin nichprdurrr:
b Inirodua appropnarc amngerncnts io ensure that the environmental c~nsmuencesa-..-s
programmesand policieshi arc \&il!IOhavesignificaniadvcrszimpactson biologicdldivcnita
dulytaken inioaccouni."
CTcnin 31ILM822 (1992)and Sands./nremofionolDocirnenrs.vol .IIA.p.845.)
1:San&. PrIncIples. p. 594. îhc work ofthe lntcmarionalLaw Commissionin iu drift Aniclp an
In\ernaUonalLiability for lnjunous Consqucnm of Acts Nol ProhibibydIntemational Law u du,
relevant Io France's obligationrarq out a prior and adquate Environmental Impacc Assessrnent
kforc conductingfunhtr nucleartestsin the SouthPacific. 94. Another relevanttext alsobmdmg on France is the Euratom Trcaty,
Article34 ofwhichprovides:
'Any MernberState inwhosetemtones paniculadydangerousexperimenuare
to take place shalltakeadditionalhealth and safety meanires on which itMl
ûrst obtainthe opinionof the Commission fhe assent of the Cornmission shall
be required where the effects of such cxperimmts arc Sable to &ccf the
territoriesofotherMernberStates."
95. As NewZealandis not a pariy to the EuratomTreaty it camot invoke
..
this provisionas one chat islegallybiding between it and France. The provision k,
however, yetanother illustrationof the internationalstandards acceptedby France as
applicablein this sphere ofactivity. Indeed,the EuropeanCommissionhas taken the
position that Frenchnucleartestinsfallswithinthescopeofthisrequirernent."
96. It is France'sconsisien:re5~s~l caT ou: a procedure which is now
accepted vinually world-wideas absolutel! essential in this class of activity that
constitutesthefirstelementofilie~aliryinrheposition tnatFranceisnowtaking.
On21lune 1957.whcntheFrenchNacionalAsrrnb1.vuaswnsidcnng the ratificationof the htom
Trcary. M. Maurice Faure. the French Foreign Minisrer.nin the relevant ComminΠof the
Assembl?t.hai the provisionsof Aniclc 32 appl!.io bothcidian and Mliiary "panicularly dangernus
expcrimenü". ln conwquena. the Commiiiec.in its rcpon on bis Bill authorising the Praidcnt of
FranceIora. the Trcanmtcd: 'ks dispositionsde l'art34s'appliquena touieIo experienm
parücuiiertment dangereuses.ci\ilcr ou milil(SeS." Neri and H. Spcrl. Traite innituLat
EURATOM Travaux prcparatoircs.Dtclarations inicrpremtivcdes six Gowerncments. Documents
parlementaires. Courde Iwiades CommunautesEuropienncs. Luxembourg 1962.p. 122).In the
early 1960Fma notifid ib airnosphericmililan nuclcartes&in the andaamplicd withthe
prduir laid doun in Amcle 34 of ihc Euratom Trcary. Ii is wdcmood (ha1the Eu-
Commission hasaskcdFrana io funish dam in relatIOthe ta now proposed.It ino! h-r
know whethcrFrance hacdoncso. Sa alsoDeimannandBetlern.'Nuclcar Tcstiand Eurtipc".
LawJournal,11Augun 1995.p. 1236. The ille~alitv of conduct which causa. or islikelv to cause. the introduction
B.
into the mnrine environment of rndionctive mnterinl
97. Having presented itscase 6rstinternisof the failurof France tomm iu
specificobligations to conduct an EnvironmentalImpact AsMment, New Zeaiand now
tums to another respect in whichthe conductof France isillegal.
98. The well enablished proposition of custornary international law. state'
and reflectedin principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment
1972 and pnnciple 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992,
now takes bindingtreaty fonn for the South Pacificregion in Artic4(6) of the Noumea
Convention:
"Nothin_ein this Convention shall affect tne sovereign right of States to exploit,
develop and manage their OHT~natural resources pursuantto their own policies.
taking into account their duty to protect and presewe the environment. Each
pany shall ensure that actibiries within ils jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of its
nationaljurisdiction."
Another convention bindingboth Ne\\.Zealand andFrance. the Convention on Biological
Diversityof 5June 1992. Anicle 3. is to the sameeffect
99. In addition ro this general obligation. special les have developed in
relation to conduct which involves. or ma? involve, the introduction of radioactive
materialinto the oceans This is regardrd as a matter of specialconcem calling for the
most extensive, if not absolute. prohibition. Theduty of States in this respects notmerelyto take care. Nor istheir obligationto be measuredby derence to the quantity
of material so introduced. Suggestions that States may introduce. or pennit the
introduction of,such material into the oceans ifthe quantiticsart negligible, orare
unlikelyto cause hann or maynot have significan tects, are quiteout of place. The
interdictionis absolute. Anyrelaxatioof the absolutecbaractaof the prohibitionmus
be justified by referenceto the benefits whichareciaimed to &se ffom the aetivity
causingthe contamination.The emphaticjudgmentof the world commuNtythat testing
of nuclearweaponsgivesrise to no benefit,is becomingmore clearly evidenccdby the
day.
1. Periinent treaties
100. The need to ensure thaino :adioacri\.emarerialis introduced into the
marine environment hasi,ndeed,been recogniscdb!.France. which has joined in action
to developa rangeof noms withthat objective inmind. The extent of this obligationis
dernonstrated in instruments adopted afier France announced its moratorium on
underground nucleartests in 1991 shonly before the UnitedNations Conferenceon
Environmentand Developrnent inJune 1991. At that Conference France supponed
Agenda 21,paragraph22.5(c). Statesshould not:
"promote or allow the srorage or disposalof high-level.intermediate-levelor
low-levelradioactivewasre near the marine environmenu tnless they determine
that the scientific evidence. consiswtith the applicableinternationallyagreed
principles and guidelines,shows that such storage or disposal poses no
unacceptablerisk to people and the marine environmeno t r does not interfere
with other legitimateuses of thesea, making,in the process of consideration.
appropriateuse ofthe conceptof the precautionaryapproach." 101. This general pnnciple irefl~ed in and supponed by arange of treaties
to which Franceis a Party. Unda Anicle 10 of theNoumea Convention:"The Parties
agrce to prohibit the dumping of radioactive wastes or otha radioactivmatterin the
Convention Arean In Septcrnba 1992 France signedinParisthe Convention on the
Protection of the MarineEnvironmentof the Nonh-East ~tlantic-,whichprohiiits the
dumpingof alradioactive substances, includinwasty inorda to prwent, interalia,
harmto livingresourcesor marineecosystems(biodiversi~~).~'
102. Additionally,and with wider geographicaleffect. in January 1994France
became boundby the amendmentto Annex 1 of the 1972 London convention" which
prohibited thedisposal of a radioactive wastes at sea. Initially the Parties to this
Convention had agreed to the prohibition only of the dumpingat sea of hich level
-1ctivewastes. In 1985. houever. thcy adopted a Resolution. 21(9), appljing an
indefinitemoratorium onthe dumpineof &i radioactive wastesat sea to "permit rimefor
...a broader basisfor an informedjudgrnent on proposalsand to allow additionalstudies
IO be madeof the wider political.legal.economicand socialaspects of radioactivewastc
dumpine at sea". Subsequently. .&-enda 21 called on al1States to encourage "the
London Dumping Conventionto expedite work to complete studieson replacingthe
cunent voluntarymoratoriumon disposalof low-levelradioactivewastes at sea by a ban.
tabng into account the precautionay approach ..."(paragraph 22.5@)). Finally, in
Kovember 1993, the Sixteenth ConsultativeMeeting completed the prohibition of the
32LM 1069(1993).
91Annex IIOtheConvcntionAn 3(3)(a)and@).
91Adoptd byRcsaluiionLCSI (16) ConcemingDisposalal ScaofRadio-active ancrand olhcr
Radio-actiMacccr ,ovcmber1993 dumpingof wastes by adopting theabove amendmentprohibitingthe disposaiof a
radioactivewastes at sea"
103. It is broadlyconsistaitwith thisbodyofmtdnal hw and principle
that Frenchnationallaw andpracticerelatingto civilian nudcar powa plants and the
handlingandstorageof"civiiianradioactivewaste" incorporata ehigha standard ofcare ''
thanthat applicableto otheractivitiesinvolvingless risk" It is notclcarwhaha this,
bodyof lawappliesto FrenchPolynesiaor to MururoaandFangatauh But whaha it .,
doesor notcmot affect thequalityof therule as evidenceof thestandardwhichFrance
itselfregards asappropnateinsuchmatters.
kfcrencc rhodd also k mademorcgenerall!.to th: LinilcdNationsConvct.,.~..dn th: Lawof the
Sea 1982. Aniclc 192.providcsthat'Siatcs havc ~c obligatiIO protect and prcwme the manne
ensironment". Arriclc194proddcsasfollows:
hfemres io prrvenr. reduce wd conrrolpollulron ofrhe morinc rnvironnrenl
1. States shdl fake. indisiduai- or joiar)appropriait. al1 meanires mnrincnt uith lhis
Conventionihararc noxssan io procnl redutx and wntrol pollutionof the marine cnvimnmentfrom
any source.using for lhis purposethe kn pranicable meansai ihcir disposaland in accordana with
thcir capabiliticr.and thq shallcndcIOharmonizclhcirpolicia in thiswnnection.
2. Suta shalltakc ail meanircr to emrc hi aniviùa undcr thcir juridiction or
conuol arcso wnducredarnoi IOcaus eamagcbypollutionIOother Siaiesand kir environmeni,and
ihat pollutionarising from incidentsor anivitics undcr thcir juridinion or wnuol dspmad!
bond the am whcrcIhq ucrciw sovcreignrightsin avardancc withibis Convention
3. The takenpurniantIOthiPan shalldeal uilh al1sourcofpollutionof the marine
cnvironrncntThev rncasurc shallincludinter 011thow daigned to minimizIO dicfilles possible
cneni:
(a) the rclcareof rosic.hamrfulor noxioussubnances,espcciailyhose warchpcrsiw~ fmm
land-bascdsourcrc.romor ihroughihcatrnosphcrcorbydumping....."
II isIO k noied hi ihe ANcIcs of the Conventionform pan of Pan XII on protectionand
prcwrvation of the marine environmentand ihat. upon signaturcof the ConvenFrancc made a
deciaraon chat:'The prmisionsoftheConvcniionrclatingtotnaiu ofthe d'incni maritimespŒs
and Io the legal rcgimcof usa and proimion of the marineenvironmentanfimi and wnsolidaic
the gcncral mles of the law of tsa and thus entidc the French Rcpublic nIO mgnise as
cnforccableagainn it any forcign1au.sor rcgulations!ha( are no1in wnfonnity with Lhorcgcneral
94lcs."
Sa dences 77-974of 19AugiLn1977.63-1228of 1I Decemkr 1963 (asamendcd)andLaw 91-1381
of30 Dcccmbcr1981. 104. These international and national inmumenu refi~ the view that the
introduction of radioactive material into the marine environment U considered
undesirable and is genefally prohibited.Moreover, even the songe of radioactive
wastes (mcludingthe produce of nuclear tesu) isprohiited unlesshue iscompclling
evidenceto the effect that such storagwillnot lcadto the introduction of radioactive
.'
materialinto the marineenvironment. Franc heasaccepted these stringtnt rcquircmcnu,
whichmua be considerednow asgeneralprinciplesof internationallaw, applicabledl:.,
aaivities of this type. includingin particular the consquences of underground nuclear .;
testingandthe dispersalof its produns.
2. Thc orecautionan. principie
105. It is, also, peninen! to rde: ta sicniiicanr development which has a
directbearing dn the application of these niles in the environmental field.In the
traditionalapproach to the establishmentof responsibiliryfor violationsof international
law, theburdenof proof would normallytest upon the complainant.unlessaccess to the
evidencewas al1within thecontrol of the respondent, as in large pan is the case with
French nucleartesting. But in the field of environmentalprotectiit has corne to be
realised thatinsistence that a complainantust cany the burden of proving that the
conduct conternplated by the respondent will lead to damage, could give rise to
situationsin whichinemediable damase would occur. As a result therhas ernergeda
very widely accepted and ope:aii\pe principle of international law referredas the
"precautionaryprinciple". This has the effect that in situations that rnay possbtly significantlyenvironmentathreatening the burdcnis placedupon the pany seelüngto
cany out the conducttha could give risto environmentaldamageto prove that that
conduct will not lead to wca resuit.Thi srinciplhas been describeclin the mon
recentmajortextbookon the subject,asfollows:
"The precautionary phciple provides guidancein the development and
application of international environmental law wherc there is scicntific..
uncenainty.. The precautionaryapproach bas beai died upon in relation to
measuresto protect ..environmentalmedia, especiallythe marine environment.
ThePreambleto the 1984Mi~sterid Declarationofthe InternationalConfaence.
on the Protection of the Nonh Sean5d a conscioumessthat Statu 'must '
not wait for proof of hdl effectsbeforetakingaction', since damage to the
marine environment can be irreversiblCor runediable only at considerable
expenseandoverlongperiods".9)
Agai~ in 1990, the BergenMinisterialDec!arationon SustainableDevelopmentin the
ECERegionpronded that:
"...environmentalmeasures must anticipate,prevent and anack the causes of
en\~ronmernaldegradation Uhere there arethreats of senous or irreversible
damage, lack offull scientific cenainiy should notbe used as a reason for
postponingmeasures IOpreventenvironmentdegradation."%
106. ln 1989. the LKEP Go\ferningCouncil had already recognised that
"waiting for scientiproofregarding theimpactofpollutantsdischarged into the marine
environmentcouldresult inirreversibledamageto the manneenvironmentand in human
sufiering"and recommended thatal1Governmentsadopt "thepnncipleof precautionary
actionas the basisof theirpoli~ithregardto thepreventionandelimination of marine
pollution". As the sametreariseindicarcs."sincethat timeat least seven environmental
treaties. two of which are of global applicationon environmentalrnatters of broad
9'Sands.PrIncIppp.208-210
% Ibid p.210.concernand applicableto almon al1human activitieshave adopted the precautionary
principleoriu underlyingrationale". Thesameauthor concludes:
"The legal status of the precautionaryprincipleis evolving. At a minimum.
however,there is sufficientevidenceof state practiceto justify the conclusion
that the principle, elaboratcdin theRio Dcclaration and the Clmate Change
and BiodiversityConventions, has now re~ivcd sifficiently broad nippon IO
ailowa goodargument to be madethatit refiectsaprincipleof customarylaw.""
107. The mon cogent proof of al1that the precautionaryprincipleis one by
whichFrance mua guideits conductis the factthat it hasinterms been adopted asone '
of the directingprinciplesof the FrenchLaw No. 95-101 of 2 February 1995 on the
Strengtheningofthe Protection oftheEnvironment:
"the precautionaryprinciple,accordingto whichthe absenceof certainty.having
regardto scientific andtechnicalknowledgeat the time, should not holdup the
adoptionof effectiveand proponionacemeasureswitha view to avoidinea risk
of serious and irreversibledamage to the enbironment at an economically
acceptable cos^."^^
108. II followsthat before Francecan cay Ourunderground nuclear iests
which will lead to the deposicand stor2ge of rzdioactive wastes near the marine
environment, itmuscprovideevidtncetnat thetests willno1resultinthe introductionof
an! radioactivematerialto that environmentAs hasalreadybeenstated, that obligation
can only be satisfied by caming ou: a fullEnvironmentalImpact Arsessrnent in
accordance uith internationalsrandards
9?iùid pp212-213.
98J.O. of 3 Fcbmry 1995. Franx 1sal? pam to th: Trcaryof ihe EuropcanUnion (Maanricht
Trcaty).1992.whithpro\idcs. inT117.Anicle 130r.bat theprccautionpnnciplci10fom the
basisof EwopeanUnionen\ironrnentalprote:tion. 56
109. Thisconclusionis further strengthencdby cutain generalconsiderations
which have wcn greater force now thanthey did in 1973. NewZcolandrcmains
convincedthat conternporaryinternationallaw do& not countuwce the continuanceof
nucleartestingwhichcausesradioactiveantamination of the environmat outsidethe
temtoryofthe testingstate. This isthe consequace oftheKing qualiiyof the Treaty
BanningNuclearWeaponTestsin the Atrnosphcre, in Outa Spaceand underWaterof
5 August 1963 and of the factthat the principlesunde@ingth panicular rejectionof
nuclear testing have in the ensuing third of a century become generalisedby the
conscienceof theworldintoanoutright legaicondemnationT . his condemnationisbascd
onthe proclamation intheprearnbleofthe 1963Treatyoftheobjectiveof theParties'Io
achievethe discontinuation ofl1test explosions onuclearweapons foral1tirne"andof
theirdesire"to put anend to the contaminarionof man's environmenb ty radioactive
bstances"
The positionraitenby XewZtaland 20 yearsago at the beginningof this
110.
Case hasnowbeen coniirmed incusrornaryinternarionalaw. Atthat timeNewZealand
contendedthat ailrnembersof the internationalommunityhadthe rightto be freefrom
nucleartestswhichgiveriseto radioactivefalloutand,aswell,the rightto be preserved
frorn"unjustifiedanificialradioactive contaminatnftheterrestrial,maritimeandaeriai
en\ironment".* Sirnilarly,Ausrraliaconrendedin 3973that the 1963Treaty"embodied
>
and crystaliisedan emergenrmie of customaryinternationallaw". The ovenvhelrning
attitudeof the world comrnunitymentionedeariiershould,rernoveany suggestionthatphciples of such magnitude.reflected ina Treaty <O which more than 130 States are
now parties,has not inthe course of theyean asnimed biding customary force in the
internationaliegalsystem.
CONCLUSIONS
111. For al1the reasons set out above, New Ztaland subrnits that the Couri,
should.inthe wordsof paragraph 63 of the1974 Judgment,"examinethe situation"as it ..
now exists. NewZealandcontendsthat that examination shouldlead the Court to make
appropnate proceduraiorders in respect of the New Zealand Applicationof May 1973
with a view to according NewZealand therelief that is requested in paragraph 113
below. As a matter of priorit! and urgenc).Neu.Zealandwill, however, first be asking
the Coun for pro\isional measuresto pïûtec; i!irirhts pendingfunhc . ..siderationof
the Case.
112. The rights for which Keu.Zealand seeks protection al1 fall within the
scope of the rightsinvoked b! Keu.Zealand inparaeraph 28 of the 1973 Application
(see above. paragraph 13). At the present tirne, however, New Zealand seeks
recognitiononlyofthose rightsthar wouldbe adverselyaffectedby entry into the marine
environrnentof radioactivematerialin consequenceof the funher teststo be camed out
at Mururoaor FangataufaAtolls.and of its entitlernentto the protection and benefitof a
properly conductedEnvironrnenralImpact.4ssessment.phciples of such magnitude.reflected ina Treaty <O which more than 130 States are
now parties,has not inthe course of theyean asnimed biding customary force in the
internationaliegalsystem.
CONCLUSIONS
111. For al1the reasons set out above, New Ztaland subrnits that the Couri,
should.inthe wordsof paragraph 63 of the1974 Judgment,"examinethe situation"as it ..
now exists. NewZealandcontendsthat that examination shouldlead the Court to make
appropnate proceduraiorders in respect of the New Zealand Applicationof May 1973
with a view to according NewZealand therelief that is requested in paragraph 113
below. As a matter of priorit! and urgenc).Neu.Zealandwill, however, first be asking
the Coun for pro\isional measuresto pïûtec; i!irirhts pendingfunhc . ..siderationof
the Case.
112. The rights for which Keu.Zealand seeks protection al1 fall within the
scope of the rightsinvoked b! Keu.Zealand inparaeraph 28 of the 1973 Application
(see above. paragraph 13). At the present tirne, however, New Zealand seeks
recognitiononlyofthose rightsthar wouldbe adverselyaffectedby entry into the marine
environrnentof radioactivematerialin consequenceof the funher teststo be camed out
at Mururoaor FangataufaAtolls.and of its entitlernentto the protection and benefitof a
properly conductedEnvironrnenralImpact.4ssessment. 113. Withintheselirnits,therefort, New Zealand ask she Coun to adjudgeand
declare:
(1) that the conductof the proposednuclcartests willconnitute a violationof
the rightsunderinternationallawofNew Zealanda ,swcii as of other States;
furtheror inthe aiternative;
(ii) that it isunlawfulfor France to conduct such nuclcar tests before it hac
undenaken an EnvironmentalImpact Assessrnentaccording to accepted intematio~ial.~
standards. Unlesssuchan assessmenteaablishesthat the tests willnot giverise,directly
or indirectly,to radioactive contaminationof the marineenvironmentthe rights under
internationallawofNew Zealand,as wellas the rightsof other States,willbeviolated.
........................
Co-agent of theGo\ :ni oîScu Zcz!ani
Dated21 Auest 1995
Application instituting proceedings