Order of 28 May 2009

Document Number
144-20090528-ORD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Incidental Proceedings
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES AR|TS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L’OBLIGATION

DE POURSUIVRE OU D’EXTRADER

(BELGIQUE cuNEuGAL)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION
DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE DU 28 MAI 2009

2009

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE OBLIGATION
TO PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE

(BELGIUM v. SENEGAL)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION
OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES

ORDER OF 28 MAY 2009 Mode officiel de citation:
Questions concernant l’obligation de poursuivre ou d’extrader
(Belgique c. Sénégal), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 28 mai 2009,
C.I.J. Recueil 2009,p.139

Official citation:
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite
(Belgium v. Senegal), Provisional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009,
I.C.J. Reports 2009,p.139

N de vente:
ISSN 0074-4441
Sales number 954
ISBN 978-92-1-071063-3 28 MAI 2009

ORDONNANCE

QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L’OBLIGATION

DE POURSUIVRE OU D’EXTRADER

(BELGIQUE c. SuNuGAL)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION

DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES

QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE OBLIGATION
TO PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE

(BELGIUM v. SENEGAL)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION
OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES

28 MAY 2009

ORDER INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 2009 2009
28 May
General List
28 May 2009 No. 144

QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE OBLIGATION

TO PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE

(BELGIUM v. SENEGAL)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF
PROVISIONAL MEASURES

ORDER

Present: President OWADA ; Judges SHI,K OROMA ,A L-K HASAWNEH,
SIMMA,A BRAHAM ,S EPÚLVEDA-AMOR ,B ENNOUNA ,SKOTNIKOV,
CANÇADO T RINDADE,Y USUF,G REENWOOD ; Judges ad hocUR,

KIRSCH; Registrar OUVREUR.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,

After deliberation,
Having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court and

Articles 73 and 74 of the Rules of Court,

Makes the following Order:

1. Whereas, by an Application filed in the Registry of the Court on
19 February 2009, the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium (herein-
after “Belgium”) instituted proceedings against the Republic of Senegal

(hereinafter “Senegal”) in respect of a dispute concerning “Senegal’s
compliance with its obligation to prosecute Mr. H. Habré [former Presi-
dent of Chad] or to extradite him to Belgium for the purposes of criminal
proceedings”; whereas Belgium bases its claims on the United Nations

4Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 (hereinafter “the Con-

vention against Torture”), as well as on customary international law;

2. Whereas in its Application, as a basis for the jurisdiction of the
Court, Belgium refers to the declarations made under Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute, by Belgium on 17 June 1958 and by Senegal on

2 December 1985, and to Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Convention
against Torture;
3. Whereas, in this Application, Belgium maintains that Senegal, where
Mr. Habré has resided since 1990, has taken no action on its repeated
requests to see the former President of Chad prosecuted in Senegal, fail-

ing his extradition to Belgium, for acts characterized as including crimes
of torture and crimes against humanity, allegedly perpetrated during his
presidency between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990; and whereas it
explains that, following the complaints filed in Senegal in 2000 against
Mr. Habré by seven natural persons and one legal person, he was
indicted for complicity in “crimes against humanity, acts of torture and

barbarity” by the senior investigating judge of the Dakar Tribunal
régional hors classe and placed under house arrest, but that those com-
plaints were dismissed by the Chambre d’accusation of the Dakar Court
of Appeal on 4 July 2000 on the grounds that “crimes against humanity”
did not form part of Senegalese criminal law and, with regard to the

crime of torture, that Senegalese law did not allow a Senegalese court to
exercise jurisdiction in respect of acts committed abroad by an alien;

4. Whereas in the said Application Belgium also states that, between
30 November 2000 and 11 December 2001, a Belgian national of Chadian

origin and certain Chadian nationals filed criminal complaints with civil-
party applications with the Belgian judicial authorities against Mr. Habré
for crimes under international humanitarian law; and whereas it adds
that, following the filing of those complaints, acting on the basis of
passive personal jurisdiction as recognized by the Belgian courts, the

investigating judge responsible for the case issued an international arrest
warrant against Mr. Habré on 19 September 2005;

5. Whereas Belgium states that the said arrest warrant, in which spe-
cific reference is made to the lifting by Chad on 7 October 2002 of any
immunities which Mr. Habré might have claimed, was transmitted to

Senegal on 19 September 2005 with a view to obtaining his extradition;
and whereas it further states that the Chambre d’accusation of the Dakar
Court of Appeal found, on 25 November 2005, that it could not act on
this warrant because it concerned acts committed by a Head of State “in
the exercise of his functions”;

6. Whereas Belgium states moreover that the case was passed on to the
African Union by Senegal on 7 December 2005; and whereas it adds that,
following a decision taken at Banjul (Gambia) on 2 July 2006 by the

5SummitofAfricanUnionHeadsofStateandGovernment,Senegalamend-
ed its Penal Code to include the offences of genocide, war crimes and crimes

against humanity and also its Code of Criminal Procedure to enable Sene-
galese courts to exercise universal jurisdiction;

7. Whereas Belgium complains that Senegal, referring to financial dif-
ficulties which prevent it from organizing the trial, has not brought any

criminal proceedings against Mr. Habré;
8. Whereas Belgium, in its Application, contends that Senegal’s failure
to prosecute Mr. Habré, if he is not extradited to Belgium to answer for
the acts of torture that are alleged against him, violates the Convention
against Torture, in particular Article 5, paragraph 2, Article 7, para-

graph 1, Article 8, paragraph 2, and Article 9, paragraph 1, of that
instrument; and whereas it adds that this failure also violates the obligation
under customary international law to punish crimes under international
humanitarian law which is to be found in numerous acts emanating
from international organizations and is established in treaty law;

9. Whereas Belgium maintains that a dispute thus exists between itself
and Senegal over the interpretation and application of the Convention
against Torture and of the customary law relating to the punishment of
crimes against humanity;
10. Whereas, at the end of its Application, Belgium presents the fol-

lowing submissions:
“Belgium respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare
that:

— the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between the
Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Senegal regarding
Senegal’s compliance with its obligation to prosecute Mr. H.
Habré or to extradite him to Belgium for the purposes of criminal

proceedings;
— Belgium’s claim is admissible;
— the Republic of Senegal is obliged to bring criminal proceedings
against Mr. H. Habré for acts including crimes of torture and
crimes against humanity which are alleged against him as

perpetrator, co-perpetrator or accomplice;
— failing the prosecution of Mr. H. Habré, the Republic of Senegal
is obliged to extradite him to the Kingdom of Belgium so that he
can answer for these crimes before the Belgian courts”;

and whereas it reserves the right to revise or supplement the terms of the
Application;
11. Whereas on 19 February 2009, having filed its Application, Bel-
gium submitted a Request for the indication of provisional measures,

invoking Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and Articles 73 to 75 of
the Rules of Court;
12. Whereas, in its Request for the indication of provisional measures,

6Belgium refers to the same bases of jurisdiction of the Court relied on in
its Application (see paragraph 2 above);

13. Whereas, in this Request for the indication of provisional meas-
ures, Belgium states that

“[a]t present, Mr. H. Habré is under house arrest in Dakar, but it
transpires from an interview which the President of Senegal,
A. Wade, gave to Radio France Internationale that Senegal could
lift his house arrest if it fails to find the budget which it regards as
necessary in order to hold the trial of Mr. H. Habré”;

and whereas, according to Belgium, in such an event, it would be easy for

Mr. Habré to leave Senegal and avoid any prosecution;
14. Whereas, in the said Request for the indication of provisional
measures, Belgium argues that if Mr. Habré were to leave the territory of
Senegal, that would cause irreparable prejudice to the right conferred on
Belgium by international law to bring criminal proceedings against him;
whereas it further maintains that this would violate Senegal’s obligation

to prosecute Mr. Habré for the crimes under international law which are
alleged against him, failing his extradition;

15. Whereas, at the end of its Request for provisional measures, Bel-
gium asks the Court

“to indicate, pending a final judgment on the merits, provisional
measures requiring Senegal to take all the steps within its power

to keep Mr. H. Habré under the control and surveillance of the
judicial authorities of Senegal so that the rules of international
law with which Belgium requests compliance may be correctly
applied”;

16. Whereas on 19 February 2009, the date on which the Application
and the Request for the indication of provisional measures were filed in
the Registry, the Registrar informed the Senegalese Government of the

filing of these documents and transmitted certified copies of them to it
forthwith, in accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute and
Article 38, paragraph 4, and Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of
Court; and whereas the Registrar also notified the Secretary-General of
the United Nations of this filing;

17. Whereas on 23 February 2009, the Registrar informed the Parties
that the President of the Court, in accordance with Article 74, para-
graph 3, of the Rules of Court, had fixed 6, 7 and 8 April 2009 as the
dates for the oral proceedings on the Request for the indication of pro-
visional measures;

18. Whereas, pending the notification provided for by Article 40, para-
graph 3, of the Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of Court by transmis-
sion of the printed bilingual text of the Application to the Members of

7the United Nations, the Registrar informed those States on 24 Febru-
ary 2009 of the filing of the Application and its subject, and of the filing

of the Request for the indication of provisional measures;
19. Whereas, on 2 April 2009, Senegal transmitted to the Court the
documents on which it wished to rely during the hearings; and whereas
copies of those documents were immediately communicated to Belgium;
whereas, on 3 April 2009, Belgium in turn transmitted to the Court the

documents on which it wished to rely during the hearings; and whereas
copies of those documents were immediately communicated to Senegal;

20. Whereas, since the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the
nationality of the Parties, each of them proceeded, in exercise of the right

conferred by Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute, to choose a judge
ad hoc in the case; for this purpose Belgium chose Mr. Philippe Kirsch,
and Senegal chose Mr. Serge Sur;
21. Whereas, at the public hearings held on 6, 7 and 8 April 2009, in
accordance with Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, oral
observations on the Request for the indication of provisional measures

were presented by the following representatives of the Parties:
On behalf of Belgium: Mr. Paul Rietjens, Agent,

Mr. Gérard Dive, Co-Agent,
Mr. Eric David,
Sir Michael Wood;
On behalf of Senegal: H.E. Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Thiam, Agent,

Mr. Demba Kandji, Co-Agent,
Mr. Ndiaw Diouf,
Mr. Alioune Sall,
Mr. Oumar Gaye,
Mr. Abdoulaye Dianko;

and whereas, during the hearings, questions were put by certain Members
of the Court, to which replies were given orally and in writing;

* * *

22. Whereas, in its first round of oral observations, Belgium reiterated
the arguments developed in its Application and its Request for the indi-
cation of provisional measures, and argued that the conditions necessary

for the Court to indicate the requested measures had been fulfilled;

23. Whereas Belgium reaffirmed that, in respect of Mr. Habré, a dis-
pute existed between itself and Senegal over the interpretation and appli-
cation of the obligation to extradite or prosecute the perpetrators of

crimes of torture and crimes against humanity, as set forth in conven-
tional international law, in particular Article 7 of the Convention against
Torture, and customary international law; whereas it contended that

8Senegal could not divest itself of the said obligation by handing Mr. Habré
over to an international organization or to a State which had not sought

his extradition for the purposes of prosecution;
24. Whereas Belgium also referred to certain recent statements made
by Mr. Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal, which,
according to Belgium, indicated that if Senegal did not have available to
it the funds required to organize the trial of Mr. Habré, it could at any

time abandon its prosecution of the person in question, cease monitoring
him or transfer him to another State; and whereas Belgium concluded
that there was consequently a real and imminent risk of irreparable preju-
dice to the rights which formed the subject of its Application;

*

25. Whereas, in its first round of oral observations, Senegal asserted
that, since 2005, it had been willing, as declared by President Wade to try
Mr. Habré in the Senegalese courts and thus to comply with its obliga-
tions under international law; whereas it maintained that, as the condi-

tions required for the indication of provisional measures were not
fulfilled in the present case, Belgium’s request for such measures to be
indicated was unfounded; and whereas it added that the indication of the
measures sought by Belgium would prejudge the merits and deprive Sen-
egal of the rights it held under international rules, in particular the Con-

vention against Torture;
26. Whereas Senegal stated that, following Belgium’s request for the
extradition of Mr. Habré, the latter had been arrested and placed in cus-
tody on 15 November 2005 pending extradition; whereas it confirmed
that, by a judgment dated 25 November 2005, the Chambre d’accusation

of the Dakar Court of Appeal had held that it was without jurisdiction
over the request for Mr. Habré’s extradition, on the grounds that he
enjoyed immunity from jurisdiction by virtue of having been Head of
State at the time the acts occurred (see paragraph 5 above); and whereas
Senegal stated that on 23 December 2005 it had informed Belgium of this

decision, which put an end to the extradition proceedings;

27. Whereas Senegal explained that, in these circumstances, it had
sought the support of the African Union, and seised it of the matter;
whereas it confirmed that, on 2 July 2006, the Heads of State and
Government of the African Union had given Senegal a mandate to pro-

secute and try Mr. Habré; and whereas it also confirmed that sub-
sequently it had taken a number of measures with a view to the holding
of Mr. Habré’s trial in Senegal, in particular the introduction of offences
linked to international crimes into its criminal legislation, the broad-
ening of the jurisdiction of the Senegalese courts and the search for the

financial resources needed for the organization of such a trial (see para-
graph 6 above);
28. Whereas Senegal, in the light of the facts as thus restated, maintained

9that no legal dispute existed between the Parties on the interpretation or
application of an international legal rule and, in particular, of the rules

set forth in the Convention against Torture; whereas it contended that
the Court’s prima facie jurisdiction had consequently not been estab-
lished; and whereas Senegal argued, moreover, that Belgium’s Request
was inadmissible since the procedural conditions laid down by Article 30
of the Convention against Torture had not been fulfilled;

29. Whereas Senegal also pointed out that the interview given to
Radio France Internationale by President Wade on 2 February 2009, to
which Belgium had referred, confirmed that Senegal was willing to pur-
sue the process under way, that Mr. Habré was being kept under surveil-

lance, a situation which Senegal did not envisage ending, and that the
international negotiations aimed at obtaining the necessary support to
organize his trial were following their course; whereas this led Senegal to
conclude that no urgency existed which might justify the indication by
the Court of the provisional measures requested by Belgium; and whereas
Senegal further argued that Belgium had not identified the rights it

wished to see protected, nor the irreparable prejudice which might be
caused to those rights without the indication of provisional measures;

30. Whereas Senegal concluded from the foregoing that the Request
for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Belgium should

be rejected;

*

31. Whereas, in its second round of oral observations, Belgium

reaffirmed that Mr. Habré should be prosecuted and tried in Senegal, and
that only if it failed to prosecute him should Senegal extradite Mr. Habré
to Belgium to answer for the acts alleged against him;

32. Whereas Belgium stated that the dispute between itself and

Senegal concerned, first, the question of whether the obligation
to try Mr. Habré derived from the mandate given to Senegal by the
African Union and, secondly, whether Senegal had already fulfilled its
obligations under the provisions of the Convention against Torture by
passing on the case to the African Union; whereas Belgium also comp-
lained that Senegal was systematically bringing up financial reasons

to justify its incapacity and failure to fulfil its conventional or custom-
ary obligations; and whereas Belgium added that the proceedings
instituted in respect of Mr. Habré before the Court of Justice of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Afri-
can Court of Human Rights raised concerns that one of these regional

courts might render an order liable to prejudice Belgium’s rights in the
current proceedings;

10 33. Whereas, in response to a question put by a Member of the Court
at the hearings, Belgium indicated that a solemn declaration made before

the Court by the Agent of Senegal, in the name of his Government, could
be sufficient for Belgium to consider that its Request for the indication of
provisional measures had no further raison d’être, provided that such a
declaration would be clear and unconditional, and that it would guaran-
tee that all the necessary measures would be taken by Senegal to ensure

that Mr. Habré did not leave Senegalese territory before the Court deliv-
ered its final Judgment; and whereas Belgium expressed the wish that, if
such a declaration were made, the Court should include it in the opera-
tive part of its Order;
34. Whereas, at the end of its second round of oral arguments,

Belgium presented the following submissions:
“Belgium respectfully asks the Court to indicate the following

provisional measures: the Republic of Senegal is requested to take
all the steps within its power to keep Mr. Hissène Habré under the
control and surveillance of the Senegalese authorities so that the
rules of international law with which Belgium requests compliance
may be correctly applied”;

*

35. Whereas, in its second round of oral observations, Senegal re-
affirmed that the judgment of the Chambre d’accusation of the Dakar
Court of Appeal had put a definitive end to the extradition proceedings
initiated by Belgium;
36. Whereas Senegal maintained that its obligation to prosecute

Mr. Habré derived from the provisions of the Convention against Tor-
ture and that it had always referred to that Convention to justify the
measures taken with a view to the trial; whereas Senegal stated that it
had seised the African Union in order to obtain the financial support and
mutual judicial assistance required for the organization of the trial, but

that at no point had it based its obligation to prosecute Mr. Habré on a
resolution of that organization; and whereas Senegal concluded that the
lack of a dispute between the Parties was therefore manifest;
37. Whereas Senegal further pointed out that the statements made to
the media by President Wade did not demonstrate the existence of any
real or serious risk that Mr. Habré might evade Senegalese justice; and

whereas it added that, in any event, any possible prejudice to Belgium’s
rights, despite the surveillance measures put in place by Senegal in respect
of Mr. Habré, could not be described as irreparable since the obligation
to extradite or prosecute was, according to Belgium, a customary norm
and therefore enforceable by Belgium against any State where Mr. Habré

might happen to be;
38. Whereas, in response to the question put by a Member of the
Court at the hearings, referred to in paragraph 33 above, Senegal solemnly

11declared that it would not allow Mr. Habré to leave its territory while the
present case was pending before the Court;

39. Whereas at the end of its second round of oral observations Sen-
egal presented the following submissions: “Senegal respectfully asks the
Court to reject the provisional measures requested by Belgium on 7 April
2009”;

* * *

PRIMA FACIE JURISDICTION

40. Whereas, when dealing with a request for the indication of provi-
sional measures, there is no need for the Court, before deciding whether
or not to indicate such measures, to satisfy itself in a definitive manner

that it has jurisdiction as regards the merits of the case; but whereas it
may only indicate those measures if the provisions relied on by the Appli-
cant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which its jurisdiction could
be founded;
41. Whereas Belgium is seeking to found the jurisdiction of the Court

on Article 30 of the Convention against Torture and on the basis of the
declarations made by the two States pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute; and whereas the Court must now endeavour to establish
whether the compromissory clause under the convention, or the declara-

tions relied upon do indeed confer upon it prima facie jurisdiction to rule
on the merits, enabling it to indicate provisional measures if it considers
that the circumstances so require;

**

42. Whereas Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Convention against Tor-
ture reads as follows:

“Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be
settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be

submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the
request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organi-
zation of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dis-
pute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity

with the Statute of the Court.”;
43. Whereas both Belgium and Senegal are parties to the Convention

against Torture; whereas Senegal ratified that Convention on 21 August
1986 without entering any reservation as to Article 30, paragraph 1; and
whereas Belgium did likewise on 25 June 1999;
44. Whereas Belgium contends that a dispute exists between the Parties
on the interpretation and application of the said Convention, and that by

12failing to prosecute Mr. Habré, in default of extraditing him to Belgium
to answer for the acts of torture that are alleged against him, Senegal has

violated the Convention against Torture, in particular Article 5, para-
graph 2, Article 7, paragraph 1, Article 8, paragraph 2, and Article 9,
paragraph 1; whereas Belgium maintains that negotiations on this sub-
ject began between the Parties in 2005 and that those negotiations, in
which Belgium expressly referred to the provisions of the Convention

against Torture, did not allow the dispute to be settled, as it observed
formally in its Note Verbale to Senegal of 20 June 2006; whereas Belgium
further maintains that it suggested recourse to arbitration to Senegal the
same day, a proposal to which the Senegalese authorities did not respond,
either within six months or thereafter, while Belgium reiterated its pro-

posal of recourse to arbitration in a Note Verbale dated 8 May 2007, and
confirmed the continuation of the dispute by a Note Verbale of 2 Decem-
ber 2008; whereas Belgium concludes from the foregoing that the condi-
tions to which Article 30 of the Convention against Torture subjects the
jurisdiction of the Court have been fulfilled;

45. Whereas Senegal takes the view that there is manifestly no dispute
over the interpretation or application of the Convention, since it follows
from the terms of the Application that Belgium is requesting the Court to
adjudge and declare that Senegal is under an obligation to prosecute
Mr. Habré; whereas Senegal emphasizes that it has already taken appro-

priate steps to comply with that obligation; whereas Senegal further
maintains that Belgium’s Application is inadmissible because the pro-
cedural conditions specified in Article 30 of the Convention against Torture
have not been fulfilled; whereas Senegal contends that Belgium merely
requested information from the Senegalese authorities on the status of

the proceedings, which cannot be regarded as real negotiations; and
whereas it claims that the Note Verbale dated 20 June 2006 to which Bel-
gium refers, and which is said to contain its offer of recourse to arbitra-
tion, cannot be found in Senegal’s archives; whereas Senegal concludes
from the foregoing that Article 30 of the Convention against Torture

cannot found the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case;

**
46. Whereas Article 30 of the Convention against Torture makes the

Court’s jurisdiction conditional on the existence of a “dispute between
two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of
this Convention”; whereas, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court
must begin by establishing whether, prima facie, such a dispute existed on
the date the Application was filed, since, as a general rule, it is on that

date, according to the Court’s jurisprudence, that its jurisdiction must be
considered (see South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v.
South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962 ,

13p. 344; Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Hondu-
ras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988 ,p.95,

para. 66; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Mon-
treal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998 , p. 130, para. 43);
47. Whereas, following the judgment of the Dakar Court of Appeal

bringing to an end the proceedings on Mr. Habré’s extradition to Bel-
gium, Senegal seised the African Union and informed Belgium of this in
a Note Verbale dated 23 December 2005; whereas, in a Note Verbale of
11 January 2006, Belgium disputed whether Senegal could comply with
the obligation set forth in Article 7 of the Convention against Torture by

referring a matter covered by that Convention to an international organi-
zation; whereas Belgium argued that Senegal was not fulfilling its obli-
gations under the Convention against Torture, in particular Article 7
thereof; whereas Senegal considered that it has taken measures in order
to fulfill the said obligations and that it reaffirmed its will to continue the
ongoing process, in which it intends to assume in full its obligations as a

State party to the Convention against Torture; whereas, in view of the
foregoing, it appears prima facie that a dispute as to the interpretation
and application of the Convention existed between the Parties on the
date the Application was filed;
48. Whereas the Court will next consider whether such a dispute con-

tinues, prima facie, to exist in the light of the way in which the Parties
explained their positions at the hearings; whereas Senegal has affirmed
that its obligations do not derive from the mandate given by the African
Union in 2006 and that a State party to the Convention against Torture
cannot fulfil the obligations under Article 7 thereof by the mere act of

referring the matter to an international organization; whereas the Parties
nonetheless seem to continue to differ on other questions relating to the
interpretation or application of the Convention against Torture, such as
that of the time frame within which the obligations provided for in Arti-
cle 7 must be fulfilled or that of the circumstances (financial, legal or

other difficulties) which might be relevant in considering whether or not
a failure to fulfil those obligations has occurred; whereas, moreover, the
Parties seem to continue to hold differing views as to how Senegal should
fulfil its treaty obligations; and whereas in consequence it appears that
prima facie a dispute of the kind contemplated by Article 30 of the Con-
vention against Torture continues to exist between the Parties, even if the

scope of that dispute may have changed since the Application was filed;

*

49. Whereas the Court will now consider whether the procedural con-

ditions laid down by Article 30 of the said Convention have been ful-
filled; whereas that provision requires, first, that any dispute submitted to
the Court should be such as “cannot be settled through negotiation”;

14whereas Belgium maintains that, it had attempted unsuccessfully to
resolve the dispute by negotiations with Senegal (see paragraph 44 above);

whereas Senegal takes the view, on the contrary, that the diplomatic cor-
respondence relied on by Belgium cannot be regarded as amounting to
negotiations (see paragraph 45 above); and, further, that that correspon-
dence does not justify the conclusion that the supposed negotiations had
failed;

50. Whereas, at the stage of considering prima facie jurisdiction, it is
sufficient for the Court to note that an attempt has been made by Bel-
gium to negotiate; whereas, it considers that the diplomatic correspon-
dence, in particular the Note Verbale of 11 January 2006, whereby
Belgium wished to submit certain clarifications to the Government of Senegal

“within the framework of the negotiation procedure covered by Arti-
cle 30 of the Convention against Torture . . .”, shows that Belgium
attempted to resolve the said dispute by negotiation and that it cannot be
concluded that the negotiations thus proposed had the effect of resolving
the dispute; and whereas the Court thus concludes that the requirement
that the dispute is one which “cannot be settled through negotiation”

must be regarded as having been satisfied prima facie;
51. Whereas Article 30 of the Convention against Torture provides,
secondly, that a dispute between States parties which has not been
settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be
submitted to arbitration, and that it may be referred to the Court

only if the parties are unable to agree on the organization of such
arbitration within six months from the date when it was requested;
whereas Belgium has indicated that Senegal did not respond to the
formal proposal for recourse to arbitration made in its Note Verbale
of 20 June 2006, and pointed out that this proposal was reiterated

in its Note Verbale of 8 May 2007; and whereas Senegal states
that the Belgian Note Verbale of 20 June 2006 cannot be found and
that the proposal allegedly reiterated was at the very least
ambiguous;

52. Whereas, in the view of the Court, the Note Verbale of 20 June 2006
contains an explicit offer from Belgium to Senegal to have recourse to
arbitration, pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Convention
against Torture, in order to settle the dispute concerning the application
of the Convention in the case of Mr. Habré; whereas, at this stage of the
proceedings, it is sufficient for the Court to note that, even supposing

that the said Note Verbale never reached its addressee, the Note Verbale
of 8 May 2007 explicitly refers to it; and whereas it has been confirmed
that this second Note was communicated to Senegal and received by it
more than six months before the date of referral to the Court, i.e.,
19 February 2009;

**

15 53. Whereas, in the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that it

has prima facie jurisdiction under Article 30 of the Convention against
Torture to entertain the case;
54. Whereas, moreover, the prima facie jurisdiction which the Court
derives from the Convention against Torture is sufficient to enable it, if
the circumstances so require, to indicate the provisional measures

requested by Belgium; and whereas consequently there is no need to
ascertain, at this stage of the proceedings, whether the declarations made
by the Parties pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute might
also, prima facie, afford a basis on which the Court’s jurisdiction could

be founded;

**

55. Whereas, in the light of the findings it has reached in paragraphs 53
and 54 above, the Court may examine the Request for the indication of
provisional measures;

*
* *

L INK BETWEEN THE RIGHT PROTECTED AND THE M EASURES REQUESTED

56. Whereas the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures
under Article 41 of the Statute has as its object the preservation of the
respective rights of the parties pending its decision; whereas it follows
that the Court must be concerned to preserve by such measures the rights

which may subsequently be adjudged by the Court to belong either to the
Applicant or to the Respondent (Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herze-
govina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures,

Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993 , p. 19, para. 34; Land and
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nigeria), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 March 1996, I.C.J. Reports
1996 (I), p. 22, para. 35; Application of the International Convention on

the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Rus-
sian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 October 2008, I.C.J.
Reports 2008, pp. 388-389, para. 118); whereas a link must therefore be
established between the provisional measures requested and the rights

which are the subject of the proceedings before the Court as to the merits
of the case;
57. Whereas the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures
should be exercised only if the Court is satisfied that the rights asserted

by a party are at least plausible;

**

16 58. Whereas Belgium points out that its request is intended to protect
its right to see Senegal prosecute Mr. Habré directly or, failing that, the

right to obtain his extradition; whereas Belgium maintains that the Con-
vention against Torture confers upon all the States parties the right to
obtain compliance by Senegal with the provisions of the Convention; and
whereas Belgium states that its request for the extradition of Mr. Habré,

resulting from the proceedings brought in Belgium by victims of Belgian
nationality, confers a specific right upon it to see Senegal prosecute
Mr. Habré or, failing that, to obtain his extradition in accordance with
Article 7 of the said Convention;
59. Whereas Senegal argues that the only right which might be attrib-

uted to States parties to the Convention against Torture is the right to
require another State party to try the perpetrator of an act of torture who
is present in its territory or, failing that, to request his extradition; and
that, consequently, if it is considered that Article 5, paragraph 2, and

Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention create a right for a State party,
it can only be the right to demand extradition, which cannot however
prevail over the right of a State which takes on its obligation to hold a
trial;

**

60. Whereas at this stage of the proceedings the Court does not need
to establish definitively the existence of the rights claimed by Belgium or
to consider Belgium’s capacity to assert such rights before the Court; and
whereas the rights asserted by Belgium, being grounded in a possible

interpretation of the Convention against Torture, therefore appear to be
plausible;
61. Whereas the provisional measures requested in the current pro-
ceedings are aimed at ensuring that Senegal takes all necessary measures

in its power to keep Mr. Habré under the surveillance and control of the
Senegalese authorities until the Court has given its final decision; whereas
the possible departure of Mr. Habré from Senegalese territory would be
likely to affect the rights which might be adjudged to belong to Belgium
on the merits, even as qualified by Senegal; whereas, therefore, in view of

the subject-matter of the proceedings, the provisional measures requested
may be indicated if the circumstances so require;

*
* *

R ISK OF IRREPARABLE PREJUDICE AND U RGENCY

62. Whereas however the power of the Court to indicate provisional
measures will be exercised only if there is urgency, in the sense that there
is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused to
the rights in dispute before the Court has given its final decision (see, for
example, Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Provi-

17sional Measures, Order of 29 July 1991, I.C.J. Reports 1991 ,p .,
para. 23; Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo

v. France), Provisional Measure, Order of 17 June 2003, I.C.J. Reports
2003, p. 107, para. 22; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v.
Uruguay), Provisional Measures , Order of 23 January 2007, I.C.J.
Reports 2007 (I), p. 11, para. 32; Application of the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia

v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 Octo-
ber 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, pp. 392-393, para. 129); and whereas the
Court must therefore consider whether such urgency exists in these pro-
ceedings;

**

63. Whereas Belgium, in its Request for the indication of provisional
measures, makes reference to an interview given on 2 February 2009 to
Radio France Internationale by President Wade (see paragraph 13
above); whereas Belgium also referred at the hearings to interviews given

by President Wade to the Spanish newspaper Público, the French news-
paper La Croix and Agence France Presse on 14 October 2008, 18 Decem-
ber 2008 and 3 February 2009 respectively, in which the organization of
the trial of Mr. Habré and its funding were discussed; whereas Belgium
points out that at different junctures on these various occasions, the

President of Senegal said that he was not going to keep Mr. Habré in
Senegal indefinitely, that he would make the latter leave Senegal, even
though he did not know where Mr. Habré would go, that he was willing
to try him but that he had to be given the resources, and that, if the trial
was not held, he would either send Mr. Habré back home or transfer him

to the Chairperson of the African Union; whereas, according to Belgium,
it follows from this that Senegal could lift the house arrest imposed on
Mr. Habré if the funding needed for the organization of his trial were not
provided;
64. Whereas Belgium infers from this, in the first instance, that there is

a real risk of Senegal causing irreparable prejudice to the rights of Bel-
gium; whereas Belgium asserts that, should Mr. Habré receive permis-
sion to leave Senegalese territory, he might evade any prosecution and it
would become impossible for Senegal to comply, in particular, with the
obligations laid down by the Convention against Torture; and whereas it
adds that the violation of the obligation to prosecute or extradite thus

caused could not be redressed by other means, in particular by monetary
compensation;
65. Whereas Belgium points out, moreover, that the statements con-
cerning Mr. Habré leaving Senegalese territory were made recently by the
highest State authority; whereas it infers from this that the risk of preju-

dice must be regarded as imminent;
66. Whereas Senegal argues that it does not follow from the comments
by President Wade that irreparable prejudice might be caused to the

18rights which Belgium claims to hold under the Convention against Tor-
ture; whereas it affirms that it has no intention of lifting the effective con-

trol and surveillance measures imposed on Mr. Habré; whereas it states
in particular that Mr. Habré does not possess a valid travel document
and that his surveillance is carried out by an elite unit of the Senegalese
military forces; whereas it further points out that the measures which it
has already implemented are consistent with the provisions of the Con-

vention and identical to the provisional measures requested by Belgium;
67. Whereas Senegal maintains, moreover, that the statement made by
President Wade to Radio France Internationale, on the basis of which
Belgium requests provisional measures, has been taken out of context
and “has been attributed a meaning . . . which it manifestly did not

have”; whereas it contends that, on the contrary, the said statement dem-
onstrates Senegal’s willingness to hold a trial, with regard to the funding
of which President Wade specified the following:

“[After all the promises of support that were made], as it was
taking a little too much time, I said ‘[the promised financial support]
will actually have to be available . . . It was in order to push a bit to
speed things up . . . As soon as we have the funding, the trial will

begin. There is absolutely no doubt about it.’” [Translation by the
Registry] ;

whereas it states that the negotiations with the European Union and the
African Union aimed at obtaining the funds needed for the prosecution
of Mr. Habré are proceeding well; whereas Senegal considers that the
measures taken by the Senegalese authorities show that they are perform-

ing in good faith their obligations under the Convention against Torture;
and whereas, according to Senegal, it follows from this that there is no
imminent risk to justify the indication of provisional measures;
68. Whereas, as has been indicated above (see paragraphs 29 and 66),
Senegal asserted on several occasions at the hearings that it is not con-

templating lifting the surveillance and control imposed on the person of
Mr. Habré either before or after the funds pledged by the international
community are made available to it for the organization of the judicial
proceedings; whereas the Co-Agent of Senegal, at the end of the hear-
ings, solemnly declared, in response to a question put by a Member of the
Court, the following:

“Senegal will not allow Mr. Habré to leave Senegal while the

present case is pending before the Court. Senegal has not the inten-
tion to allow Mr. Habré to leave the territory while the present case
is pending before the Court.”

19 69. Whereas the Co-Agent of Belgium, making clear that he spoke in
the name of his Government, asserted at the hearings, in response to a

question put by a Member of the Court, that such a solemn declaration
given by the Agent of Senegal, in the name of his Government, to the
effect that the latter would not allow Mr. Habré to leave Senegalese
territory while the present case was pending before the Court,
could be sufficient for Belgium to consider that its Request for

the indication of provisional measures no longer had any object,
provided that certain conditions were fulfilled (see paragraph 33 above);

**

70. Whereas the statements concerning the possibility of Mr. Habré
leaving Senegal were made by the Senegalese Head of State and could
therefore have given rise to some concern on the part of Belgium as to
Mr. Habré’s possible departure; whereas the Court nonetheless observes

that those statements, made in interviews given to the press, were clarified
subsequently by other statements emanating from the Head of State (see
paragraph 67 above);
71. Whereas the Court further notes that Senegal, both proprio motu
and in response to a question put by a Member of the Court, gave a for-

mal assurance on several occasions during the hearings that it will not
allow Mr. Habré to leave its territory before the Court has given its final
decision;
72. Whereas, as the Court has recalled above, the indication of provi-
sional measures is only justified if there is urgency; whereas the Court,

taking note of the assurances given by Senegal, finds that, the risk of
irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by Belgium is not apparent on
the date of this Order;

73. Whereas the Court concludes from the foregoing that there does

not exist, in the circumstances of the present case, any urgency to justify
the indication of provisional measures by the Court;

* * *

74. Whereas the decision given in the present proceedings in no way
prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the
merits of the case or any questions relating to the admissibility of the
Application, or relating to the merits themselves; and whereas it leaves
unaffected the right of the Governments of Belgium and Senegal to sub-

mit arguments in respect of those questions;
75. Whereas the present decision also leaves unaffected Belgium’s
right to submit in future a fresh request for the indication of provisional

20measures, under Article 75, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, based on

new facts;

*
* *

76. For these reasons,

T HE COURT ,

By thirteen votes to one,

Finds that the circumstances, as they now present themselves to the
Court, are not such as to require the exercise of its power under Arti-
cle 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures.

IN FAVOUR: President Owada; Judges Shi, Koroma, Al-Khasawneh, Simma,
Abraham, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Yusuf, Greenwood;
Judges ad hoc Sur, Kirsch;

AGAINST: Judge Cançado Trindade.

Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at

the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-eighth day of May, two thou-
sand and nine, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives
of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the King-

dom of Belgium and the Government of the Republic of Senegal, respec-
tively.

(Signed) President. (Signed) Hisashi O WADA ,

President.

(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR ,

Registrar.

Judges K OROMA and Y USUF append a joint declaration to the Order of
the Court; Judges A L-KHASAWNEH and SKOTNIKOV append a joint sepa-
rate opinion to the Order of the Court; Judge C ANÇADO T RINDADE

appends a dissenting opinion to the Order of the Court; Judge ad hUR S
appends a separate opinion to the Order of the Court.

(Initialled) H.O.

(Initialled) Ph.C.

21

Bilingual Content

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES AR|TS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L’OBLIGATION

DE POURSUIVRE OU D’EXTRADER

(BELGIQUE cuNEuGAL)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION
DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE DU 28 MAI 2009

2009

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE OBLIGATION
TO PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE

(BELGIUM v. SENEGAL)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION
OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES

ORDER OF 28 MAY 2009 Mode officiel de citation:
Questions concernant l’obligation de poursuivre ou d’extrader
(Belgique c. Sénégal), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 28 mai 2009,
C.I.J. Recueil 2009,p.139

Official citation:
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite
(Belgium v. Senegal), Provisional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009,
I.C.J. Reports 2009,p.139

N de vente:
ISSN 0074-4441
Sales number 954
ISBN 978-92-1-071063-3 28 MAI 2009

ORDONNANCE

QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L’OBLIGATION

DE POURSUIVRE OU D’EXTRADER

(BELGIQUE c. SuNuGAL)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION

DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES

QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE OBLIGATION
TO PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE

(BELGIUM v. SENEGAL)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION
OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES

28 MAY 2009

ORDER COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

2009 ANNÉE 2009
28 mai
Rôlo général
n 144 28 mai 2009

QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L’OBLIGATION

DE POURSUIVRE OU D’EXTRADER

(BELGIQUE c. SEuNEuGAL)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION
DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE

Présents: M. OWADA , président ; MM.HI,K OROMA ,A L-KHASAWNEH ,
SIMMA ,A BRAHAM,S EPÚLVEDA-AMOR ,BENNOUNA ,S KOTNIKOV,
C ANÇADO T RINDADE,Y USUF,G REENWOOD , juges; MM. UR ,

K IRSCH, juges ad hoc; M.OUVREUR, greffier.

La Cour internationale de Justice,

Ainsi composée,

Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,
Vu les articles 41 et 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 73 et 74 de

son Règlement,

Rend l’ordonnance suivante:

1. Considérant que, par une requête déposée au Greffe de la Cour le
19 février 2009, le Gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique (dénommé
ci-après la «Belgique») a introduit une instance contre la République du

Sénégal (dénommée ci-après le «Sénégal») au sujet d’un différend relatif
au «respect par le Sénégal de son obligation de poursuivre M. H. Habré
[, ancien président de la République du Tchad,] ou de l’extrader vers la
Belgique aux fins de poursuites pénales»; que la Belgique fonde ses

4 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 2009 2009
28 May
General List
28 May 2009 No. 144

QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE OBLIGATION

TO PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE

(BELGIUM v. SENEGAL)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF
PROVISIONAL MEASURES

ORDER

Present: President OWADA ; Judges SHI,K OROMA ,A L-K HASAWNEH,
SIMMA,A BRAHAM ,S EPÚLVEDA-AMOR ,B ENNOUNA ,SKOTNIKOV,
CANÇADO T RINDADE,Y USUF,G REENWOOD ; Judges ad hocUR,

KIRSCH; Registrar OUVREUR.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,

After deliberation,
Having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court and

Articles 73 and 74 of the Rules of Court,

Makes the following Order:

1. Whereas, by an Application filed in the Registry of the Court on
19 February 2009, the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium (herein-
after “Belgium”) instituted proceedings against the Republic of Senegal

(hereinafter “Senegal”) in respect of a dispute concerning “Senegal’s
compliance with its obligation to prosecute Mr. H. Habré [former Presi-
dent of Chad] or to extradite him to Belgium for the purposes of criminal
proceedings”; whereas Belgium bases its claims on the United Nations

4demandes sur la convention des Nations Unies contre la torture et autres
peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants du 10 décembre

1984 (ci-après dénommée la «convention contre la torture»), ainsi que
sur le droit international coutumier;
2. Considérant que, dans sa requête, la Belgique se réfère, pour fonder
la compétence de la Cour, aux déclarations faites, en application du para-
graphe 2 de l’article 36 du Statut, par la Belgique le 17 juin 1958 et par le

Sénégal le 2 décembre 1985, ainsi qu’au paragraphe 1 de l’article 30 de la
convention contre la torture;
3. Considérant que, dans cette requête, la Belgique soutient que le
Sénégal, où M. Habré réside depuis 1990, n’a pas donné suite à ses

demandes répétées de voir l’ancien président tchadien poursuivi en justice
au Sénégal, à défaut d’être extradé vers la Belgique, pour des faits qua-
lifiés, notamment, de crimes de torture et de crimes contre l’humanité qui
auraient été commis au cours de sa présidence entre le 7 juin 1982 et le
1er décembre 1990; et qu’elle expose que, suite aux plaintes déposées

en 2000 au Sénégal contre M. Habré par sept personnes physiques et une
personne morale, celui-ci a été inculpé de complicité de «crimes contre
l’humanité, d’actes de torture et de barbarie» par le doyen des juges
d’instruction près le tribunal régional hors classe de Dakar et assigné à
résidence, mais que lesdites plaintes ont été rejetées le 4 juillet 2000 par la

chambre d’accusation de la cour d’appel de Dakar au motif que le «crime
contre l’humanité» ne faisait pas partie du droit pénal sénégalais et que,
s’agissant du crime de torture, la loi sénégalaise ne permettait pas au juge
sénégalais d’exercer sa compétence pour des faits commis à l’étranger par
un étranger;

4. Considérant que, dans ladite requête, la Belgique indique également
qu’entre le 30 novembre 200 et le 11 décembre 2001 un ressortissant
belge d’origine tchadienne et des ressortissants tchadiens ont déposé
des plaintes avec constitution de partie civile auprès des autorités judi-
ciaires belges, contre M. Habré, pour des crimes de droit international

humanitaire; et qu’elle ajoute qu’à la suite de ces plaintes, agissant au
titre de la compétence personnelle passive que se reconnaissent les juri-
dictions belges, le juge d’instruction en charge du dossier a décerné
un mandat d’arrêt international à l’encontre de M. Habré le 19 sep-
tembre 2005;

5. Considérant que la Belgique précise que ledit mandat d’arrêt, qui
fait notamment référence à la levée par le Tchad, le 7 octobre 2002, des
immunités dont M. Habré aurait pu le cas échéant se prévaloir, a été
transmis au Sénégal le 19 septembre 2005 en vue d’obtenir l’extradition
de l’intéressé; et qu’elle précise en outre que la chambre d’accusation de

la cour d’appel de Dakar a estimé, le 25 novembre 2005, ne pas pouvoir
donner suite à ce mandat dans la mesure où il concernait des faits com-
mis par un chef d’Etat «dans l’exercice de ses fonctions»;
6. Considérant que la Belgique indique encore que le dossier a été

transmis par le Sénégal à l’Union africaine le 7 décembre 2005; et qu’elle
ajoute que, suite à une décision prise au sommet de Banjul (Gambie), le

5Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 (hereinafter “the Con-

vention against Torture”), as well as on customary international law;

2. Whereas in its Application, as a basis for the jurisdiction of the
Court, Belgium refers to the declarations made under Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute, by Belgium on 17 June 1958 and by Senegal on

2 December 1985, and to Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Convention
against Torture;
3. Whereas, in this Application, Belgium maintains that Senegal, where
Mr. Habré has resided since 1990, has taken no action on its repeated
requests to see the former President of Chad prosecuted in Senegal, fail-

ing his extradition to Belgium, for acts characterized as including crimes
of torture and crimes against humanity, allegedly perpetrated during his
presidency between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990; and whereas it
explains that, following the complaints filed in Senegal in 2000 against
Mr. Habré by seven natural persons and one legal person, he was
indicted for complicity in “crimes against humanity, acts of torture and

barbarity” by the senior investigating judge of the Dakar Tribunal
régional hors classe and placed under house arrest, but that those com-
plaints were dismissed by the Chambre d’accusation of the Dakar Court
of Appeal on 4 July 2000 on the grounds that “crimes against humanity”
did not form part of Senegalese criminal law and, with regard to the

crime of torture, that Senegalese law did not allow a Senegalese court to
exercise jurisdiction in respect of acts committed abroad by an alien;

4. Whereas in the said Application Belgium also states that, between
30 November 2000 and 11 December 2001, a Belgian national of Chadian

origin and certain Chadian nationals filed criminal complaints with civil-
party applications with the Belgian judicial authorities against Mr. Habré
for crimes under international humanitarian law; and whereas it adds
that, following the filing of those complaints, acting on the basis of
passive personal jurisdiction as recognized by the Belgian courts, the

investigating judge responsible for the case issued an international arrest
warrant against Mr. Habré on 19 September 2005;

5. Whereas Belgium states that the said arrest warrant, in which spe-
cific reference is made to the lifting by Chad on 7 October 2002 of any
immunities which Mr. Habré might have claimed, was transmitted to

Senegal on 19 September 2005 with a view to obtaining his extradition;
and whereas it further states that the Chambre d’accusation of the Dakar
Court of Appeal found, on 25 November 2005, that it could not act on
this warrant because it concerned acts committed by a Head of State “in
the exercise of his functions”;

6. Whereas Belgium states moreover that the case was passed on to the
African Union by Senegal on 7 December 2005; and whereas it adds that,
following a decision taken at Banjul (Gambia) on 2 July 2006 by the

52 juillet 2006, par la conférence des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement de
l’Union africaine, le Sénégal a modifié, d’une part, son Code pénal, en y

intégrant l’incrimination de génocide, de crime de guerre et de crime
contre l’humanité, et, d’autre part, son Code de procédure pénale, en per-
mettant au juge sénégalais d’exercer la compétence universelle;
7. Considérant que la Belgique se plaint de ce que le Sénégal, faisant
état des difficultés financières qui l’empêcheraient d’organiser le procès,

n’a conduit aucune procédure pénale à l’encontre de M. Habré;
8. Considérant que la Belgique, dans sa requête, affirme que le fait
pour le Sénégal d’avoir omis de poursuivre M. Habré, à défaut de l’extra-
der vers la Belgique, pour répondre des faits de torture qui lui sont impu-

tés viole la convention contre la torture, notamment l’article 5, para-
graphe 2, l’article 7, paragraphe 1, l’article 8, paragraphe 2, et l’article 9,
paragraphe 1, de cet instrument; et qu’elle ajoute que cette même omis-
sion viole également l’obligation, en vertu du droit international coutu-
mier, de réprimer les crimes de droit international humanitaire figurant

dans de nombreux actes émanant d’organisations internationales et énon-
cée dans le droit conventionnel;
9. Considérant que la Belgique soutient qu’un différend l’oppose ainsi
au Sénégal sur l’interprétation et l’application de la convention contre la
torture et du droit coutumier relatif à la répression des crimes contre

l’humanité;
10. Considérant qu’au terme de sa requête la Belgique formule les
demandes suivantes:

«La Belgique prie respectueusement la Cour de dire et juger
que:
— la Cour est compétente pour connaître du différend qui oppose

le Royaume de Belgique à la République du Sénégal en ce qui
concerne le respect par le Sénégal de son obligation de pour-
suivre M. H. Habré ou de l’extrader vers la Belgique aux fins de
poursuites pénales;
— la demande belge est recevable;

— la République du Sénégal est obligée de poursuivre pénalement
M. H. Habré pour des faits qualifiés notamment de crimes de
torture et de crimes contre l’humanité qui lui sont imputés en
tant qu’auteur, coauteur ou complice;
— à défaut de poursuivre M. H. Habré, la République du Sénégal

est obligée de l’extrader vers le Royaume de Belgique pour qu’il
réponde de ces crimes devant la justice belge»;
et qu’elle se réserve le droit de modifier et de compléter ladite requête;

11. Considérant que, le 19 février 2009, après avoir déposé sa requête,
la Belgique a présenté une demande en indication de mesures conserva-
toires en se référant à l’article 41 du Statut de la Cour et aux articles 73

à 75 de son Règlement;
12. Considérant que, dans sa demande en indication de mesures conser-

6SummitofAfricanUnionHeadsofStateandGovernment,Senegalamend-
ed its Penal Code to include the offences of genocide, war crimes and crimes

against humanity and also its Code of Criminal Procedure to enable Sene-
galese courts to exercise universal jurisdiction;

7. Whereas Belgium complains that Senegal, referring to financial dif-
ficulties which prevent it from organizing the trial, has not brought any

criminal proceedings against Mr. Habré;
8. Whereas Belgium, in its Application, contends that Senegal’s failure
to prosecute Mr. Habré, if he is not extradited to Belgium to answer for
the acts of torture that are alleged against him, violates the Convention
against Torture, in particular Article 5, paragraph 2, Article 7, para-

graph 1, Article 8, paragraph 2, and Article 9, paragraph 1, of that
instrument; and whereas it adds that this failure also violates the obligation
under customary international law to punish crimes under international
humanitarian law which is to be found in numerous acts emanating
from international organizations and is established in treaty law;

9. Whereas Belgium maintains that a dispute thus exists between itself
and Senegal over the interpretation and application of the Convention
against Torture and of the customary law relating to the punishment of
crimes against humanity;
10. Whereas, at the end of its Application, Belgium presents the fol-

lowing submissions:
“Belgium respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare
that:

— the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between the
Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Senegal regarding
Senegal’s compliance with its obligation to prosecute Mr. H.
Habré or to extradite him to Belgium for the purposes of criminal

proceedings;
— Belgium’s claim is admissible;
— the Republic of Senegal is obliged to bring criminal proceedings
against Mr. H. Habré for acts including crimes of torture and
crimes against humanity which are alleged against him as

perpetrator, co-perpetrator or accomplice;
— failing the prosecution of Mr. H. Habré, the Republic of Senegal
is obliged to extradite him to the Kingdom of Belgium so that he
can answer for these crimes before the Belgian courts”;

and whereas it reserves the right to revise or supplement the terms of the
Application;
11. Whereas on 19 February 2009, having filed its Application, Bel-
gium submitted a Request for the indication of provisional measures,

invoking Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and Articles 73 to 75 of
the Rules of Court;
12. Whereas, in its Request for the indication of provisional measures,

6vatoires, la Belgique renvoie aux bases de compétence de la Cour invo-
quées dans sa requête (voir paragraphe 2 ci-dessus);

13. Considérant que, dans cette demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires, la Belgique expose que

«[a]ctuellement, M. H. Habré est en résidence surveillée à Dakar,
mais [qu’]il ressort d’un entretien donné par le président sénégalais,
A. Wade, à Radio-France-Internationale que le Sénégal pourrait
mettre fin à cette mise en résidence surveillée s’il ne trouve pas le
budget qu’il estime nécessaire à l’organisation du procès de

M. H. Habré»;

et que, selon la Belgique, dans cette hypothèse, il serait facile pour
M. Habré de quitter le Sénégal et de se soustraire à toute poursuite;
14. Considérant que, dans ladite demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires, la Belgique fait valoir que, si M. Habré devait quit-
ter le territoire sénégalais, cela porterait un préjudice irréparable

au droit que le droit international confère à la Belgique d’exercer des
poursuites pénales contre l’intéressé; qu’elle soutient en outre que
cela violerait l’obligation du Sénégal de poursuivre M. Habré pour
les crimes de droit international qui lui sont imputés, à défaut de
l’extrader;

15. Considérant que, au terme de sa demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires, la Belgique prie la Cour

«d’indiquer, en attendant qu’elle rende un arrêt définitif sur le fond,
que le Sénégal doit prendre toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour
que M. H. Habré reste sous le contrôle et la surveillance des autori-
tés judiciaires du Sénégal afin que les règles de droit international
dont la Belgique demande le respect puissent être correctement

appliquées»;
16. Considérant que, le 19 février 2009, date à laquelle la requête

et la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires ont été dépo-
sées au Greffe, le greffier a informé le Gouvernement sénégalais du
dépôt de ces documents et lui en a adressé immédiatement des copies
certifiées conformes en application du paragraphe 2 de l’article 40
du Statut ainsi que du paragraphe 4 de l’article 38 et du paragraphe 2

de l’article 73 du Règlement; et que le greffier a également infor-
mé le Secrétaire général de l’Organisation des Nations Unies de ce
dépôt;
17. Considérant que, le 23 février 2009, le greffier a informé les Parties
que le président de la Cour, en application du paragraphe 3 de l’article 74

du Règlement, avait fixé aux 6, 7 et 8 avril 2009 les dates de la procédure
orale sur la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires;

18. Considérant que, en attendant que la communication prévue au

paragraphe 3 de l’article 40 du Statut et à l’article 42 du Règlement ait été
effectuée par transmission du texte bilingue imprimé de la requête aux

7Belgium refers to the same bases of jurisdiction of the Court relied on in
its Application (see paragraph 2 above);

13. Whereas, in this Request for the indication of provisional meas-
ures, Belgium states that

“[a]t present, Mr. H. Habré is under house arrest in Dakar, but it
transpires from an interview which the President of Senegal,
A. Wade, gave to Radio France Internationale that Senegal could
lift his house arrest if it fails to find the budget which it regards as
necessary in order to hold the trial of Mr. H. Habré”;

and whereas, according to Belgium, in such an event, it would be easy for

Mr. Habré to leave Senegal and avoid any prosecution;
14. Whereas, in the said Request for the indication of provisional
measures, Belgium argues that if Mr. Habré were to leave the territory of
Senegal, that would cause irreparable prejudice to the right conferred on
Belgium by international law to bring criminal proceedings against him;
whereas it further maintains that this would violate Senegal’s obligation

to prosecute Mr. Habré for the crimes under international law which are
alleged against him, failing his extradition;

15. Whereas, at the end of its Request for provisional measures, Bel-
gium asks the Court

“to indicate, pending a final judgment on the merits, provisional
measures requiring Senegal to take all the steps within its power

to keep Mr. H. Habré under the control and surveillance of the
judicial authorities of Senegal so that the rules of international
law with which Belgium requests compliance may be correctly
applied”;

16. Whereas on 19 February 2009, the date on which the Application
and the Request for the indication of provisional measures were filed in
the Registry, the Registrar informed the Senegalese Government of the

filing of these documents and transmitted certified copies of them to it
forthwith, in accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute and
Article 38, paragraph 4, and Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of
Court; and whereas the Registrar also notified the Secretary-General of
the United Nations of this filing;

17. Whereas on 23 February 2009, the Registrar informed the Parties
that the President of the Court, in accordance with Article 74, para-
graph 3, of the Rules of Court, had fixed 6, 7 and 8 April 2009 as the
dates for the oral proceedings on the Request for the indication of pro-
visional measures;

18. Whereas, pending the notification provided for by Article 40, para-
graph 3, of the Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of Court by transmis-
sion of the printed bilingual text of the Application to the Members of

7Membres des Nations Unies, le greffier a, le 24 février 2009, informé ces
Etats du dépôt de la requête et de son objet, ainsi que du dépôt de la

demande en indication de mesures conservatoires;
19. Considérant que, le 2 avril 2009, le Sénégal a fait parvenir à la
Cour les documents sur lesquels il souhaitait s’appuyer à l’audience; et
que copie de ces documents a été immédiatement communiquée à la Bel-
gique; et considérant que, le 3 avril 2009, la Belgique a à son tour fait

parvenir à la Cour les documents sur lesquels elle souhaitait s’appuyer à
l’audience; et que copie desdits documents a été immédiatement commu-
niquée au Sénégal;
20. Considérant que, la Cour ne comptant sur le siège aucun juge de la
nationalité des Parties, chacune d’elles a procédé, dans l’exercice du droit

que lui confère le paragraphe 3 de l’article 31 du Statut, à la désignation
d’un juge ad hoc en l’affaire; que la Belgique a désigné à cet effet M. Phi-
lippe Kirsch, et le Sénégal M. Serge Sur;
21. Considérant que, lors des audiences publiques tenues les 6, 7 et
8 avril 2009, conformément au paragraphe 3 de l’article 74 du Règlement,
des observations orales sur la demande en indication de mesures conser-

vatoires ont été présentées par:
Au nom de la Belgique: M. Paul Rietjens, agent,

M. Gérard Dive, coagent,
M. Eric David,
sir Michael Wood;
Au nom du Sénégal: S. Exc. M. Cheikh Tidiane Thiam, agent,

M. Demba Kandji, coagent,
M. Ndiaw Diouf,
M. Alioune Sall,
M. Oumar Gaye,
M. Abdoulaye Dianko;

et qu’au cours des audiences des questions ont été posées par certains
membres de la Cour, questions auxquelles des réponses ont été apportées

oralement et par écrit;

* * *

22. Considérant que, lors de son premier tour d’observations orales, la
Belgique a réitéré l’argumentation développée dans sa requête et sa
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires, et a avancé que les

conditions requises pour que la Cour indique les mesures demandées
étaient remplies;
23. Considérant que la Belgique a réaffirmé que, s’agissant de
M. Habré, un différend l’opposait au Sénégal quant à l’interprétation et
à l’application de l’obligation d’extrader ou de poursuivre les auteurs de

crimes de torture et de crimes contre l’humanité telle qu’énoncée par le
droit international conventionnel, et notamment par l’article 7 de la
convention contre la torture, ainsi que par le droit international coutu-

8the United Nations, the Registrar informed those States on 24 Febru-
ary 2009 of the filing of the Application and its subject, and of the filing

of the Request for the indication of provisional measures;
19. Whereas, on 2 April 2009, Senegal transmitted to the Court the
documents on which it wished to rely during the hearings; and whereas
copies of those documents were immediately communicated to Belgium;
whereas, on 3 April 2009, Belgium in turn transmitted to the Court the

documents on which it wished to rely during the hearings; and whereas
copies of those documents were immediately communicated to Senegal;

20. Whereas, since the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the
nationality of the Parties, each of them proceeded, in exercise of the right

conferred by Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute, to choose a judge
ad hoc in the case; for this purpose Belgium chose Mr. Philippe Kirsch,
and Senegal chose Mr. Serge Sur;
21. Whereas, at the public hearings held on 6, 7 and 8 April 2009, in
accordance with Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, oral
observations on the Request for the indication of provisional measures

were presented by the following representatives of the Parties:
On behalf of Belgium: Mr. Paul Rietjens, Agent,

Mr. Gérard Dive, Co-Agent,
Mr. Eric David,
Sir Michael Wood;
On behalf of Senegal: H.E. Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Thiam, Agent,

Mr. Demba Kandji, Co-Agent,
Mr. Ndiaw Diouf,
Mr. Alioune Sall,
Mr. Oumar Gaye,
Mr. Abdoulaye Dianko;

and whereas, during the hearings, questions were put by certain Members
of the Court, to which replies were given orally and in writing;

* * *

22. Whereas, in its first round of oral observations, Belgium reiterated
the arguments developed in its Application and its Request for the indi-
cation of provisional measures, and argued that the conditions necessary

for the Court to indicate the requested measures had been fulfilled;

23. Whereas Belgium reaffirmed that, in respect of Mr. Habré, a dis-
pute existed between itself and Senegal over the interpretation and appli-
cation of the obligation to extradite or prosecute the perpetrators of

crimes of torture and crimes against humanity, as set forth in conven-
tional international law, in particular Article 7 of the Convention against
Torture, and customary international law; whereas it contended that

8mier; qu’elle a fait valoir que le Sénégal ne pouvait s’acquitter de ladite
obligation en remettant M. Habré à une organisation internationale ou à

un Etat n’en ayant pas demandé l’extradition aux fins de poursuites;
24. Considérant que la Belgique a également fait état de certaines
déclarations récentes de M. Abdoulaye Wade, le président de la Répu-
blique du Sénégal, qui, selon elle, laissaient entendre que le Sénégal, s’il
ne disposait pas des fonds nécessaires pour l’organisation du procès de

M. Habré, pourrait, à tout moment, renoncer à poursuivre l’intéressé,
mettre fin à sa surveillance ou le transférer vers un autre Etat; et que la
Belgique en a conclu qu’il existait un risque réel et imminent que les
droits faisant l’objet de sa requête subissent un préjudice irréparable;

*

25. Considérant que, lors de son premier tour d’observations orales, le
Sénégal a affirmé que, depuis 2005, il avait accepté, par la voix du prési-

dent Wade, de faire juger M. Habré par les juridictions sénégalaises et de
respecter ainsi ses obligations au regard du droit international; qu’il a
soutenu que, les conditions requises pour l’indication de mesures conser-
vatoires n’étant pas remplies en l’espèce, la demande de la Belgique ten-
dant à ce que de telles mesures soient indiquées n’était pas fondée; et

qu’il a ajouté que l’indication des mesures sollicitées par la Belgique pré-
jugerait du fond et priverait le Sénégal des droits qu’il tient des règles
internationales, et notamment de la convention contre la torture;
26. Considérant que le Sénégal a exposé que, suite à la demande
d’extradition de M. Habré formulée par la Belgique, l’intéressé avait été

arrêté et placé sous écrou extraditionnel le 15 novembre 2005; qu’il a
confirmé que, par un arrêt en date du 25 novembre 2005, la chambre
d’accusation de la cour d’appel de Dakar s’était déclarée incompétente
pour connaître de la demande d’extradition dirigée contre M. Habré, au
motif que l’intéressé jouissait d’une immunité de juridiction en raison

de sa qualité de chef d’Etat au moment des faits (voir paragraphe 5 ci-
dessus); et que le Sénégal a précisé avoir informé la Belgique, le 23 dé-
cembre 2005, de cette décision ayant mis définitivement fin à la procédure
d’extradition;
27. Considérant que le Sénégal a expliqué que, dans ces circonstances,

il avait recherché l’appui de l’Union africaine et saisi celle-ci du dossier;
qu’il a confirmé que, le 2 juillet 2006, les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement
de l’Union africaine lui avaient donné mandat de poursuivre et juger
M. Habré; et qu’il a également confirmé que, par suite, il avait pris un
certain nombre de mesures dans la perspective de la tenue du procès de

M. Habré au Sénégal, à savoir, notamment, l’introduction des infractions
liées aux crimes internationaux dans sa législation pénale, l’élargisse-
ment de la compétence des juridictions sénégalaises et la recherche des
ressources financières nécessaires à l’organisation d’un tel procès (voir

paragraphe 6 ci-dessus);
28. Considérant que le Sénégal, à la lumière des faits ainsi rappelés, a

9Senegal could not divest itself of the said obligation by handing Mr. Habré
over to an international organization or to a State which had not sought

his extradition for the purposes of prosecution;
24. Whereas Belgium also referred to certain recent statements made
by Mr. Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal, which,
according to Belgium, indicated that if Senegal did not have available to
it the funds required to organize the trial of Mr. Habré, it could at any

time abandon its prosecution of the person in question, cease monitoring
him or transfer him to another State; and whereas Belgium concluded
that there was consequently a real and imminent risk of irreparable preju-
dice to the rights which formed the subject of its Application;

*

25. Whereas, in its first round of oral observations, Senegal asserted
that, since 2005, it had been willing, as declared by President Wade to try
Mr. Habré in the Senegalese courts and thus to comply with its obliga-
tions under international law; whereas it maintained that, as the condi-

tions required for the indication of provisional measures were not
fulfilled in the present case, Belgium’s request for such measures to be
indicated was unfounded; and whereas it added that the indication of the
measures sought by Belgium would prejudge the merits and deprive Sen-
egal of the rights it held under international rules, in particular the Con-

vention against Torture;
26. Whereas Senegal stated that, following Belgium’s request for the
extradition of Mr. Habré, the latter had been arrested and placed in cus-
tody on 15 November 2005 pending extradition; whereas it confirmed
that, by a judgment dated 25 November 2005, the Chambre d’accusation

of the Dakar Court of Appeal had held that it was without jurisdiction
over the request for Mr. Habré’s extradition, on the grounds that he
enjoyed immunity from jurisdiction by virtue of having been Head of
State at the time the acts occurred (see paragraph 5 above); and whereas
Senegal stated that on 23 December 2005 it had informed Belgium of this

decision, which put an end to the extradition proceedings;

27. Whereas Senegal explained that, in these circumstances, it had
sought the support of the African Union, and seised it of the matter;
whereas it confirmed that, on 2 July 2006, the Heads of State and
Government of the African Union had given Senegal a mandate to pro-

secute and try Mr. Habré; and whereas it also confirmed that sub-
sequently it had taken a number of measures with a view to the holding
of Mr. Habré’s trial in Senegal, in particular the introduction of offences
linked to international crimes into its criminal legislation, the broad-
ening of the jurisdiction of the Senegalese courts and the search for the

financial resources needed for the organization of such a trial (see para-
graph 6 above);
28. Whereas Senegal, in the light of the facts as thus restated, maintained

9soutenu qu’il n’existait aucun différend juridique entre les Parties portant
sur l’interprétation ou l’application d’une règle de droit international, et

notamment des règles énoncées par la convention contre la torture; qu’il
a fait valoir que la compétence prima facie de la Cour n’était en consé-
quence pas établie; et que le Sénégal a avancé, en outre, que la requête de
la Belgique était irrecevable dans la mesure où il n’avait pas été satisfait
aux conditions procédurales posées par l’article 30 de la convention

contre la torture;
29. Considérant que le Sénégal a par ailleurs souligné que l’entretien
accordé à Radio-France-Internationale par le président Wade le 2 février
2009, auquel la Belgique s’était référée, confirmait que le Sénégal avait la

volonté de poursuivre le processus entamé, que M. Habré faisait l’objet
de mesures de surveillance auxquelles le Sénégal n’envisageait pas de
mettre fin et que les négociations internationales tendant à obtenir les
appuis nécessaires à l’organisation de son procès suivaient leur cours;
que le Sénégal en a déduit qu’il n’existait aucune urgence qui justifierait

l’indication par la Cour des mesures conservatoires sollicitées par la
Belgique; et que le Sénégal a avancé, en outre, que la Belgique n’avait
pas identifié les droits qu’elle souhaitait voir protéger, ni le préjudice
irréparable que ces droits pourraient subir en l’absence d’indication de
mesures conservatoires;

30. Considérant que le Sénégal a conclu de ce qui précède que la
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires introduite par la Bel-
gique devait être rejetée;

*

31. Considérant que, lors de son second tour d’observations orales, la
Belgique a réaffirmé que M. Habré devait être poursuivi et jugé au Séné-
gal et que ce n’était qu’à défaut de le poursuivre que le Sénégal devait
extrader l’intéressé vers la Belgique pour qu’il réponde des faits qui lui

sont imputés;
32. Considérant que la Belgique a précisé que le différend qui l’oppose
au Sénégal porte, d’une part, sur la question de savoir si l’obligation de
juger M. Habré découle du mandat donné par l’Union africaine au Séné-
gal, ainsi que, d’autre part, sur la question de savoir si le Sénégal s’est

d’ores et déjà acquitté de ses obligations en vertu des dispositions de la
convention contre la torture en transmettant le dossier à l’Union afri-
caine; que la Belgique s’est également plainte de ce que le Sénégal
évoquait systématiquement des raisons financières pour justifier son
inaptitude à l’exécution de ses obligations conventionnelles et coutu-

mières; et que la Belgique a ajouté que les procédures engagées par
M. Habré devant la Cour de justice de la Communauté économique
des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) et la Cour africaine des
droits de l’homme lui faisaient craindre que l’une de ces juridictions

régionales ne rende une ordonnance susceptible de porter atteinte aux
droits de la Belgique en la présente espèce;

10that no legal dispute existed between the Parties on the interpretation or
application of an international legal rule and, in particular, of the rules

set forth in the Convention against Torture; whereas it contended that
the Court’s prima facie jurisdiction had consequently not been estab-
lished; and whereas Senegal argued, moreover, that Belgium’s Request
was inadmissible since the procedural conditions laid down by Article 30
of the Convention against Torture had not been fulfilled;

29. Whereas Senegal also pointed out that the interview given to
Radio France Internationale by President Wade on 2 February 2009, to
which Belgium had referred, confirmed that Senegal was willing to pur-
sue the process under way, that Mr. Habré was being kept under surveil-

lance, a situation which Senegal did not envisage ending, and that the
international negotiations aimed at obtaining the necessary support to
organize his trial were following their course; whereas this led Senegal to
conclude that no urgency existed which might justify the indication by
the Court of the provisional measures requested by Belgium; and whereas
Senegal further argued that Belgium had not identified the rights it

wished to see protected, nor the irreparable prejudice which might be
caused to those rights without the indication of provisional measures;

30. Whereas Senegal concluded from the foregoing that the Request
for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Belgium should

be rejected;

*

31. Whereas, in its second round of oral observations, Belgium

reaffirmed that Mr. Habré should be prosecuted and tried in Senegal, and
that only if it failed to prosecute him should Senegal extradite Mr. Habré
to Belgium to answer for the acts alleged against him;

32. Whereas Belgium stated that the dispute between itself and

Senegal concerned, first, the question of whether the obligation
to try Mr. Habré derived from the mandate given to Senegal by the
African Union and, secondly, whether Senegal had already fulfilled its
obligations under the provisions of the Convention against Torture by
passing on the case to the African Union; whereas Belgium also comp-
lained that Senegal was systematically bringing up financial reasons

to justify its incapacity and failure to fulfil its conventional or custom-
ary obligations; and whereas Belgium added that the proceedings
instituted in respect of Mr. Habré before the Court of Justice of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Afri-
can Court of Human Rights raised concerns that one of these regional

courts might render an order liable to prejudice Belgium’s rights in the
current proceedings;

10 33. Considérant que, en réponse à une question posée par un membre
de la Cour à l’audience, la Belgique a indiqué qu’une déclaration solen-

nelle prononcée devant la Cour par l’agent du Sénégal au nom de son
gouvernement pourrait suffire à la Belgique pour considérer que sa
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires n’aurait plus d’objet, si
ladite déclaration était claire et sans condition, et qu’elle garantissait que
toutes les mesures nécessaires seraient prises par le Sénégal pour que

M. Habré ne quitte pas le territoire sénégalais tant que la Cour n’aurait
pas rendu sa décision définitive; et que la Belgique a précisé souhaiter
que, si une telle déclaration était faite, la Cour la reprenne dans le dispo-
sitif de l’ordonnance qu’elle serait amenée à rendre;

34. Considérant qu’au terme de son second tour de plaidoiries la Bel-
gique a présenté les conclusions suivantes:

«La Belgique prie respectueusement la Cour d’indiquer les me-
sures conservatoires suivantes: il est demandé à la République du
Sénégal de prendre toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour que
M. Hissène Habré reste sous le contrôle et la surveillance des auto-
rités sénégalaises afin que les règles de droit international dont la

Belgique demande le respect puissent être correctement appliquées»;

*

35. Considérant que, lors de son second tour d’observations orales, le
Sénégal a réaffirmé que l’arrêt de la chambre d’accusation de la cour
d’appel de Dakar avait mis fin de manière définitive à la procédure

d’extradition initiée par la Belgique;
36. Considérant que le Sénégal a soutenu que son obligation de pour-
suivre M. Habré découlait des dispositions de la convention contre la tor-
ture et qu’il s’était toujours référé à cette convention pour justifier les
mesures prises en vue du procès; que le Sénégal a exposé qu’il avait saisi

l’Union africaine dans le but d’obtenir les soutiens financiers et l’entraide
judiciaire nécessaires à l’organisation du procès, mais qu’à aucun moment
il n’avait fondé son obligation de poursuivre M. Habré sur une résolution
de l’organisation; et que le Sénégal a conclu qu’il était dès lors manifeste
qu’il n’existait aucun différend entre les Parties;

37. Considérant que le Sénégal a encore fait observer que les déclara-
tions faites aux médias par le président Wade ne démontraient l’existence
d’aucun risque réel et sérieux que M. Habré puisse se soustraire à la jus-
tice sénégalaise; et qu’il a ajouté que, en tout état de cause, un préjudice
éventuel causé aux droits de la Belgique, malgré les mesures de sur-

veillance mises en Œuvre par le Sénégal à l’égard de M. Habré, ne saurait
être qualifié d’irréparable dans la mesure où l’obligation d’extrader ou de
poursuivre est, selon la Belgique, une norme coutumière et, de ce fait,
opposable par la Belgique à tout Etat où M. Habré pourrait se trouver;

38. Considérant que, en réponse à la question posée par un membre de
la Cour à l’audience visée au paragraphe 33 ci-dessus, le Sénégal a déclaré

11 33. Whereas, in response to a question put by a Member of the Court
at the hearings, Belgium indicated that a solemn declaration made before

the Court by the Agent of Senegal, in the name of his Government, could
be sufficient for Belgium to consider that its Request for the indication of
provisional measures had no further raison d’être, provided that such a
declaration would be clear and unconditional, and that it would guaran-
tee that all the necessary measures would be taken by Senegal to ensure

that Mr. Habré did not leave Senegalese territory before the Court deliv-
ered its final Judgment; and whereas Belgium expressed the wish that, if
such a declaration were made, the Court should include it in the opera-
tive part of its Order;
34. Whereas, at the end of its second round of oral arguments,

Belgium presented the following submissions:
“Belgium respectfully asks the Court to indicate the following

provisional measures: the Republic of Senegal is requested to take
all the steps within its power to keep Mr. Hissène Habré under the
control and surveillance of the Senegalese authorities so that the
rules of international law with which Belgium requests compliance
may be correctly applied”;

*

35. Whereas, in its second round of oral observations, Senegal re-
affirmed that the judgment of the Chambre d’accusation of the Dakar
Court of Appeal had put a definitive end to the extradition proceedings
initiated by Belgium;
36. Whereas Senegal maintained that its obligation to prosecute

Mr. Habré derived from the provisions of the Convention against Tor-
ture and that it had always referred to that Convention to justify the
measures taken with a view to the trial; whereas Senegal stated that it
had seised the African Union in order to obtain the financial support and
mutual judicial assistance required for the organization of the trial, but

that at no point had it based its obligation to prosecute Mr. Habré on a
resolution of that organization; and whereas Senegal concluded that the
lack of a dispute between the Parties was therefore manifest;
37. Whereas Senegal further pointed out that the statements made to
the media by President Wade did not demonstrate the existence of any
real or serious risk that Mr. Habré might evade Senegalese justice; and

whereas it added that, in any event, any possible prejudice to Belgium’s
rights, despite the surveillance measures put in place by Senegal in respect
of Mr. Habré, could not be described as irreparable since the obligation
to extradite or prosecute was, according to Belgium, a customary norm
and therefore enforceable by Belgium against any State where Mr. Habré

might happen to be;
38. Whereas, in response to the question put by a Member of the
Court at the hearings, referred to in paragraph 33 above, Senegal solemnly

11solennellement qu’il ne permettrait pas à M. Habré de quitter son terri-
toire pendant toute la durée de la présente instance;

39. Considérant qu’au terme de son second tour d’observations orales
le Sénégal a présenté les conclusions suivantes: «Le Sénégal prie respec-
tueusement la Cour de rejeter les mesures conservatoires demandées par
la Belgique»;

* * *

COMPÉTENCE PRIMA FACIE

40. Considérant que, en présence d’une demande en indication de
mesures conservatoires, point n’est besoin pour la Cour, avant de décider
d’indiquer ou non de telles mesures, de s’assurer de manière définitive
qu’elle a compétence quant au fond de l’affaire, mais qu’elle ne peut indi-

quer ces mesures que si les dispositions invoquées par le demandeur sem-
blent prima facie constituer une base sur laquelle sa compétence pourrait
être fondée;
41. Considérant que la Belgique entend fonder la compétence de la
Cour sur l’article 30 de la convention contre la torture et sur les décla-

rations faites par les deux Etats en application du paragraphe 2 de
l’article 36 du Statut; et que la Cour doit maintenant chercher à établir
si la clause attributive de juridiction contenue dans la convention ou si
les déclarations invoquées lui confèrent effectivement une compétence
prima facie pour se prononcer sur le fond, lui permettant, si elle estime

que les circonstances l’exigent, d’indiquer des mesures conservatoires;

**

42. Considérant que le paragraphe 1 de l’article 30 de la convention

contre la torture se lit comme suit:
«Tout différend entre deux ou plus des Etats parties concernant

l’interprétation ou l’application de la présente convention qui ne
peut être réglé par voie de négociation est soumis à l’arbitrage à la
demande de l’un d’entre eux. Si, dans les six mois qui suivent la date
de la demande d’arbitrage, les parties ne parviennent pas à se mettre
d’accord sur l’organisation de l’arbitrage, l’une quelconque d’entre

elles peut soumettre le différend à la Cour internationale de Justice
en déposant une requête conformément au Statut de la Cour.»;

43. Considérant que tant la Belgique que le Sénégal sont parties à la
convention contre la torture; que le Sénégal a ratifié cette convention le
21 août 1986 sans émettre de réserve à l’article 30, paragraphe 1, de celle-
ci; et que la Belgique a fait de même le 25 juin 1999;

44. Considérant que la Belgique fait valoir qu’il existe un différend
entre les Parties sur l’interprétation et l’application de ladite convention

12declared that it would not allow Mr. Habré to leave its territory while the
present case was pending before the Court;

39. Whereas at the end of its second round of oral observations Sen-
egal presented the following submissions: “Senegal respectfully asks the
Court to reject the provisional measures requested by Belgium on 7 April
2009”;

* * *

PRIMA FACIE JURISDICTION

40. Whereas, when dealing with a request for the indication of provi-
sional measures, there is no need for the Court, before deciding whether
or not to indicate such measures, to satisfy itself in a definitive manner

that it has jurisdiction as regards the merits of the case; but whereas it
may only indicate those measures if the provisions relied on by the Appli-
cant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which its jurisdiction could
be founded;
41. Whereas Belgium is seeking to found the jurisdiction of the Court

on Article 30 of the Convention against Torture and on the basis of the
declarations made by the two States pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute; and whereas the Court must now endeavour to establish
whether the compromissory clause under the convention, or the declara-

tions relied upon do indeed confer upon it prima facie jurisdiction to rule
on the merits, enabling it to indicate provisional measures if it considers
that the circumstances so require;

**

42. Whereas Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Convention against Tor-
ture reads as follows:

“Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be
settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be

submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the
request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organi-
zation of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dis-
pute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity

with the Statute of the Court.”;
43. Whereas both Belgium and Senegal are parties to the Convention

against Torture; whereas Senegal ratified that Convention on 21 August
1986 without entering any reservation as to Article 30, paragraph 1; and
whereas Belgium did likewise on 25 June 1999;
44. Whereas Belgium contends that a dispute exists between the Parties
on the interpretation and application of the said Convention, and that by

12et que, en omettant de poursuivre M. Habré, à défaut de l’extrader vers la
Belgique, pour répondre des faits de torture qui lui sont imputés, le Séné-

gal a violé la convention contre la torture, notamment son article 5, para-
graphe 2, son article 7, paragraphe 1, son article 8, paragraphe 2, et son
article 9, paragraphe 1; considérant que la Belgique soutient que des
négociations à ce sujet ont été entamées en 2005 entre les Parties et que
ces négociations, au cours desquelles elle s’est expressément référée aux

dispositions de la convention contre la torture, n’ont pas permis de régler
le différend, ce qu’elle a formellement constaté dans la note verbale
qu’elle a adressée au Sénégal le 20 juin 2006; que la Belgique soutient en
outre qu’elle a proposé le même jour au Sénégal de recourir à une pro-

cédure d’arbitrage, proposition à laquelle les autorités sénégalaises n’ont
pas donné suite, ni dans les six mois ni plus tard, alors que la Belgique a
rappelé son offre de recourir à l’arbitrage par note verbale en date du
8 mai 2007 et a confirmé la persistance du différend par note verbale en
date du 2 décembre 2008; considérant que la Belgique conclut de ce qui

précède que les conditions auxquelles l’article 30 de la convention contre
la torture assujettit la compétence de la Cour sont remplies;
45. Considérant que le Sénégal estime qu’il n’existe manifestement pas
de différend sur l’interprétation ou l’application de la convention dans la
mesure où il ressort des termes de la requête que la Belgique demande à

la Cour de dire et juger qu’il est obligé de poursuivre pénalement
M. Habré; que le Sénégal souligne qu’il a déjà pris les dispositions appro-
priées pour se conformer à cette obligation; considérant que le Sénégal
soutient en outre que la requête belge est irrecevable dans la mesure où
les conditions procédurales posées à l’article 30 de la convention contre la

torture ne sont pas remplies; que le Sénégal fait valoir que la Belgique
s’est bornée à demander des renseignements aux autorités sénégalaises
sur l’état des procédures, ce qui ne saurait équivaloir à de véritables négo-
ciations; et qu’il prétend que la note verbale en date du 20 juin 2006 à
laquelle se réfère la Belgique, et qui contiendrait son offre de recourir à

l’arbitrage, demeure introuvable dans les archives du Sénégal; considé-
rant que le Sénégal conclut de ce qui précède que l’article 30 de la conven-
tion contre la torture ne saurait fonder la compétence de la Cour en
l’espèce;

**

46. Considérant que l’article 30 de la convention contre la torture
subordonne la compétence de la Cour à l’existence d’un «différend entre
deux ou plus des Etats parties concernant l’interprétation ou l’application

de la présente convention»; qu’au stade actuel de la procédure il appar-
tient d’abord à la Cour d’établir si, prima facie, un tel différend existait à
la date du dépôt de la requête, puisque, en règle générale, c’est à cette
date que, selon la jurisprudence de la Cour, sa compétence doit s’appré-

cier (voir Sud-Ouest africain (Ethiopie c. Afrique du Sud; Libéria c. Afri-
que du Sud), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962 , p. 344;

13failing to prosecute Mr. Habré, in default of extraditing him to Belgium
to answer for the acts of torture that are alleged against him, Senegal has

violated the Convention against Torture, in particular Article 5, para-
graph 2, Article 7, paragraph 1, Article 8, paragraph 2, and Article 9,
paragraph 1; whereas Belgium maintains that negotiations on this sub-
ject began between the Parties in 2005 and that those negotiations, in
which Belgium expressly referred to the provisions of the Convention

against Torture, did not allow the dispute to be settled, as it observed
formally in its Note Verbale to Senegal of 20 June 2006; whereas Belgium
further maintains that it suggested recourse to arbitration to Senegal the
same day, a proposal to which the Senegalese authorities did not respond,
either within six months or thereafter, while Belgium reiterated its pro-

posal of recourse to arbitration in a Note Verbale dated 8 May 2007, and
confirmed the continuation of the dispute by a Note Verbale of 2 Decem-
ber 2008; whereas Belgium concludes from the foregoing that the condi-
tions to which Article 30 of the Convention against Torture subjects the
jurisdiction of the Court have been fulfilled;

45. Whereas Senegal takes the view that there is manifestly no dispute
over the interpretation or application of the Convention, since it follows
from the terms of the Application that Belgium is requesting the Court to
adjudge and declare that Senegal is under an obligation to prosecute
Mr. Habré; whereas Senegal emphasizes that it has already taken appro-

priate steps to comply with that obligation; whereas Senegal further
maintains that Belgium’s Application is inadmissible because the pro-
cedural conditions specified in Article 30 of the Convention against Torture
have not been fulfilled; whereas Senegal contends that Belgium merely
requested information from the Senegalese authorities on the status of

the proceedings, which cannot be regarded as real negotiations; and
whereas it claims that the Note Verbale dated 20 June 2006 to which Bel-
gium refers, and which is said to contain its offer of recourse to arbitra-
tion, cannot be found in Senegal’s archives; whereas Senegal concludes
from the foregoing that Article 30 of the Convention against Torture

cannot found the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case;

**
46. Whereas Article 30 of the Convention against Torture makes the

Court’s jurisdiction conditional on the existence of a “dispute between
two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of
this Convention”; whereas, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court
must begin by establishing whether, prima facie, such a dispute existed on
the date the Application was filed, since, as a general rule, it is on that

date, according to the Court’s jurisprudence, that its jurisdiction must be
considered (see South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v.
South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962 ,

13Actions armées frontalières et transfrontalières (Nicaragua c. Hondu-
ras), compétence et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1988 , p. 95, par. 66;

Questions d’interprétation et d’application de la convention de Montréal
de 1971 résultant de l’incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1998, p. 130, par. 43);
47. Considérant que, suite à l’arrêt de la cour d’appel de Dakar met-

tant fin à la procédure d’extradition de M. Habré vers la Belgique, le
Sénégal a saisi l’Union africaine et en a informé la Belgique par note ver-
bale en date du 23 décembre 2005; que, par note verbale en date du
11 janvier 2006, la Belgique a contesté que le Sénégal puisse se conformer

à l’obligation énoncée à l’article 7 de la convention contre la torture en
déférant une question relevant de ladite convention à une organisation
internationale; que la Belgique a soutenu que le Sénégal ne remplissait
pas ses obligations en vertu de la convention contre la torture, notam-
ment son article 7; et que le Sénégal a estimé avoir pris des mesures pour

s’acquitter desdites obligations et qu’il a réaffirmé sa volonté de conti-
nuer le processus en cours par lequel il entend assumer intégralement ses
obligations d’Etat partie à la convention contre la torture; considérant
que, au vu de ce qui précède, il apparaît prima facie qu’un différend sur
l’interprétation et l’application de la convention opposait les Parties à la

date du dépôt de la requête;
48. Considérant que, compte tenu de la façon dont les Parties ont pré-
senté leurs positions à l’audience, la Cour examinera à présent si un tel
différend continue, prima facie, d’exister; que le Sénégal a affirmé que les
obligations qui sont les siennes ne découlent pas du mandat reçu de

l’Union africaine en 2006 et qu’un Etat partie à la convention contre la
torture ne peut pas s’acquitter des obligations énoncées à son article 7 par
le simple fait de saisir une organisation internationale; que les Parties
semblent néanmoins continuer de s’opposer sur d’autres questions d’inter-
prétation ou d’application de la convention contre la torture, telles que

celle du délai dans lequel les obligations prévues à l’article 7 doivent être
remplies ou celle des circonstances (difficultés financières, juridiques ou
autres) qui seraient pertinentes pour apprécier s’il y a eu ou non manque-
ment auxdites obligations; que les vues des Parties, par ailleurs, conti-
nuent apparemment de diverger sur la façon dont le Sénégal devrait

s’acquitter de ses obligations conventionnelles; et qu’en conséquence
il appert que, prima facie, un différend de la nature de celui visé à l’ar-
ticle 30 de la convention contre la torture demeure entre les Parties,
même si sa portée a pu évoluer depuis le dépôt de la requête;

*

49. Considérant que la Cour examinera à présent si les conditions pro-
cédurales posées à l’article 30 de ladite convention sont réunies; que cette

disposition exige en premier lieu que le différend soumis à la Cour soit de
ceux «qui ne peu[vent] pas être réglé[s] par voie de négociation»; considé-

14p. 344; Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Hondu-
ras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988 ,p.95,

para. 66; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Mon-
treal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998 , p. 130, para. 43);
47. Whereas, following the judgment of the Dakar Court of Appeal

bringing to an end the proceedings on Mr. Habré’s extradition to Bel-
gium, Senegal seised the African Union and informed Belgium of this in
a Note Verbale dated 23 December 2005; whereas, in a Note Verbale of
11 January 2006, Belgium disputed whether Senegal could comply with
the obligation set forth in Article 7 of the Convention against Torture by

referring a matter covered by that Convention to an international organi-
zation; whereas Belgium argued that Senegal was not fulfilling its obli-
gations under the Convention against Torture, in particular Article 7
thereof; whereas Senegal considered that it has taken measures in order
to fulfill the said obligations and that it reaffirmed its will to continue the
ongoing process, in which it intends to assume in full its obligations as a

State party to the Convention against Torture; whereas, in view of the
foregoing, it appears prima facie that a dispute as to the interpretation
and application of the Convention existed between the Parties on the
date the Application was filed;
48. Whereas the Court will next consider whether such a dispute con-

tinues, prima facie, to exist in the light of the way in which the Parties
explained their positions at the hearings; whereas Senegal has affirmed
that its obligations do not derive from the mandate given by the African
Union in 2006 and that a State party to the Convention against Torture
cannot fulfil the obligations under Article 7 thereof by the mere act of

referring the matter to an international organization; whereas the Parties
nonetheless seem to continue to differ on other questions relating to the
interpretation or application of the Convention against Torture, such as
that of the time frame within which the obligations provided for in Arti-
cle 7 must be fulfilled or that of the circumstances (financial, legal or

other difficulties) which might be relevant in considering whether or not
a failure to fulfil those obligations has occurred; whereas, moreover, the
Parties seem to continue to hold differing views as to how Senegal should
fulfil its treaty obligations; and whereas in consequence it appears that
prima facie a dispute of the kind contemplated by Article 30 of the Con-
vention against Torture continues to exist between the Parties, even if the

scope of that dispute may have changed since the Application was filed;

*

49. Whereas the Court will now consider whether the procedural con-

ditions laid down by Article 30 of the said Convention have been ful-
filled; whereas that provision requires, first, that any dispute submitted to
the Court should be such as “cannot be settled through negotiation”;

14rant que la Belgique soutient qu’elle a tenté, sans y parvenir, de régler
le différend par des négociations avec le Sénégal (voir paragraphe 44

ci-dessus); considérant que le Sénégal estime au contraire que la corres-
pondance diplomatique invoquée par la Belgique ne peut être considérée
comme valant négociations (voir paragraphe 45 ci-dessus); et que cette
correspondance ne permet pas davantage de conclure à l’échec des négo-
ciations supposées;

50. Considérant qu’au stade de l’examen de sa compétence prima facie
il suffit à la Cour de constater que la Belgique a tenté de négocier; que, de
l’avis de la Cour, la correspondance diplomatique, notamment la note
verbale en date du 11 janvier 2006 par laquelle la Belgique entendait

apporter certaines précisions «dans le cadre de la procédure de négocia-
tion visée à l’article 30 de la convention contre la torture ...», montre que
la Belgique a tenté de résoudre le différend concerné par voie de négocia-
tion et que les négociations ainsi proposées ne sauraient être réputées
avoir résolu ce différend; et que la Cour en conclut que la condition selon

laquelle le différend qui lui est soumis doit être de ceux qui «ne peu[vent]
pas être réglé[s] par voie de négociation» doit être regardée comme rem-
plie prima facie ;
51. Considérant que l’article 30 de la convention contre la torture
prévoit en deuxième lieu qu’un différend entre Etats parties qui n’aurait

pas été réglé par voie de négociation devra être soumis à l’arbitrage
à la demande de l’un d’entre eux, et que la Cour ne pourra en être
saisie que si les Parties ne parviennent pas à se mettre d’accord sur
l’organisation de cet arbitrage dans les six mois à compter de la date à
laquelle il aura été demandé; considérant que la Belgique a indiqué

que le Sénégal n’avait pas répondu à la proposition formelle de recourir
à une procédure d’arbitrage, formulée dans sa note verbale en date du
20 juin 2006, et a souligné que cette proposition avait été réitérée par
note verbale en date du 8 mai 2007; et considérant que le Sénégal
affirme que la note verbale belge du 20 juin 2006 demeure introuvable

et que la proposition prétendument réitérée était pour le moins
ambiguë;
52. Considérant que, de l’avis de la Cour, la note verbale en date du
20 juin 2006 contient une offre explicite de la Belgique au Sénégal de
recourir à une procédure d’arbitrage, conformément au paragraphe 1 de

l’article 30 de la convention contre la torture, pour régler le différend
concernant l’application de la convention au cas de M. Habré; qu’à ce
stade de la procédure il suffit à la Cour de constater que, même à suppo-
ser que ladite note verbale ne soit jamais parvenue à son destinataire,
la note verbale en date du 8 mai 2007 s’y réfère explicitement; et qu’il

est confirmé que cette seconde note a été communiquée au Sénégal et
reçue par celui-ci plus de six mois avant la date de la saisine de la Cour le
19 février 2009;

**

15whereas Belgium maintains that, it had attempted unsuccessfully to
resolve the dispute by negotiations with Senegal (see paragraph 44 above);

whereas Senegal takes the view, on the contrary, that the diplomatic cor-
respondence relied on by Belgium cannot be regarded as amounting to
negotiations (see paragraph 45 above); and, further, that that correspon-
dence does not justify the conclusion that the supposed negotiations had
failed;

50. Whereas, at the stage of considering prima facie jurisdiction, it is
sufficient for the Court to note that an attempt has been made by Bel-
gium to negotiate; whereas, it considers that the diplomatic correspon-
dence, in particular the Note Verbale of 11 January 2006, whereby
Belgium wished to submit certain clarifications to the Government of Senegal

“within the framework of the negotiation procedure covered by Arti-
cle 30 of the Convention against Torture . . .”, shows that Belgium
attempted to resolve the said dispute by negotiation and that it cannot be
concluded that the negotiations thus proposed had the effect of resolving
the dispute; and whereas the Court thus concludes that the requirement
that the dispute is one which “cannot be settled through negotiation”

must be regarded as having been satisfied prima facie;
51. Whereas Article 30 of the Convention against Torture provides,
secondly, that a dispute between States parties which has not been
settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be
submitted to arbitration, and that it may be referred to the Court

only if the parties are unable to agree on the organization of such
arbitration within six months from the date when it was requested;
whereas Belgium has indicated that Senegal did not respond to the
formal proposal for recourse to arbitration made in its Note Verbale
of 20 June 2006, and pointed out that this proposal was reiterated

in its Note Verbale of 8 May 2007; and whereas Senegal states
that the Belgian Note Verbale of 20 June 2006 cannot be found and
that the proposal allegedly reiterated was at the very least
ambiguous;

52. Whereas, in the view of the Court, the Note Verbale of 20 June 2006
contains an explicit offer from Belgium to Senegal to have recourse to
arbitration, pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Convention
against Torture, in order to settle the dispute concerning the application
of the Convention in the case of Mr. Habré; whereas, at this stage of the
proceedings, it is sufficient for the Court to note that, even supposing

that the said Note Verbale never reached its addressee, the Note Verbale
of 8 May 2007 explicitly refers to it; and whereas it has been confirmed
that this second Note was communicated to Senegal and received by it
more than six months before the date of referral to the Court, i.e.,
19 February 2009;

**

15 53. Considérant que, à la lumière de ce qui précède, la Cour estime
avoir compétence prima facie en vertu de l’article 30 de la convention

contre la torture pour connaître de l’affaire;
54. Considérant par ailleurs que la compétence prima facie que la
Cour tire de la convention contre la torture est suffisante pour lui per-
mettre, si les circonstances l’exigent, d’indiquer les mesures conserva-
toires demandées par la Belgique; et qu’il n’y a dès lors pas lieu de

rechercher, à ce stade de la procédure, si les déclarations faites par les
Parties en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’article 36 du Statut pourraient éga-
lement fonder, prima facie, la compétence de la Cour pour connaître
de l’affaire;

**

55. Considérant que, au vu des conclusions auxquelles elle est parve-
nue aux paragraphes 53 et 54 ci-dessus, la Cour peut examiner la demande
en indication de mesures conservatoires;

* * *

L IEN ENTRE LE DROIT PROTÉGÉ ET LES MESURES DEMANDÉES

56. Considérant que le pouvoir d’indiquer des mesures conservatoires
que la Cour tient de l’article 41 de son Statut a pour objet de sauvegarder
le droit de chacune des parties en attendant qu’elle rende sa décision;

qu’il s’ensuit que la Cour doit se préoccuper de sauvegarder par de telles
mesures les droits que l’arrêt qu’elle aura ultérieurement à rendre pour-
rait éventuellement reconnaître, soit au demandeur, soit au défendeur
(Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime
de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténé-

gro)), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 8 avril 1993, C.I.J. Recueil
1993, p. 19, par. 34; Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et
le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance
du 15 mars 1996, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (I) , p. 22, par. 35; Application
de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de

discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie), mesures
conservatoires, ordonnance du 15 octobre 2008, C.I.J. Recueil 2008 ,
p. 388-389, par. 118); qu’un lien doit donc être établi entre les mesures
conservatoires sollicitées et les droits qui font l’objet de l’instance
pendante devant la Cour sur le fond de l’affaire;

57. Considérant que le pouvoir de la Cour d’indiquer des mesures
conservatoires ne devrait être exercé que si les droits allégués par une par-
tie apparaissent au moins plausibles;

**

16 53. Whereas, in the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that it

has prima facie jurisdiction under Article 30 of the Convention against
Torture to entertain the case;
54. Whereas, moreover, the prima facie jurisdiction which the Court
derives from the Convention against Torture is sufficient to enable it, if
the circumstances so require, to indicate the provisional measures

requested by Belgium; and whereas consequently there is no need to
ascertain, at this stage of the proceedings, whether the declarations made
by the Parties pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute might
also, prima facie, afford a basis on which the Court’s jurisdiction could

be founded;

**

55. Whereas, in the light of the findings it has reached in paragraphs 53
and 54 above, the Court may examine the Request for the indication of
provisional measures;

*
* *

L INK BETWEEN THE RIGHT PROTECTED AND THE M EASURES REQUESTED

56. Whereas the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures
under Article 41 of the Statute has as its object the preservation of the
respective rights of the parties pending its decision; whereas it follows
that the Court must be concerned to preserve by such measures the rights

which may subsequently be adjudged by the Court to belong either to the
Applicant or to the Respondent (Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herze-
govina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures,

Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993 , p. 19, para. 34; Land and
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nigeria), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 March 1996, I.C.J. Reports
1996 (I), p. 22, para. 35; Application of the International Convention on

the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Rus-
sian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 October 2008, I.C.J.
Reports 2008, pp. 388-389, para. 118); whereas a link must therefore be
established between the provisional measures requested and the rights

which are the subject of the proceedings before the Court as to the merits
of the case;
57. Whereas the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures
should be exercised only if the Court is satisfied that the rights asserted

by a party are at least plausible;

**

16 58. Considérant que la Belgique indique que sa demande vise à proté-
ger son droit de voir le Sénégal poursuivre directement M. Habré ou, à

défaut, le droit d’obtenir son extradition; que la Belgique soutient que la
convention contre la torture confère à tous les Etats parties le droit
d’obtenir le respect par le Sénégal des dispositions de la convention; et
que la Belgique précise que sa demande d’extradition concernant
M. Habré, consécutive aux procédures engagées en Belgique par des vic-

times de nationalité belge, lui confère un droit spécifique de voir le Séné-
gal poursuivre M. Habré ou, à défaut, d’obtenir son extradition confor-
mément à l’article 7 de ladite convention;
59. Considérant que le Sénégal soutient que le seul droit qui pourrait

être reconnu aux Etats parties à la convention contre la torture serait le
droit d’exiger d’un autre Etat partie qu’il juge l’auteur d’un acte de tor-
ture qui se trouverait sur son territoire ou, à défaut, de demander son
extradition; et que, en conséquence, s’il est estimé que les articles 5, para-
graphe 2, et 7, paragraphe 1, de la convention créent un droit pour un

Etat partie, ce ne peut être que celui de revendiquer l’extradition, un tel
droit ne pouvant cependant prévaloir sur celui d’un Etat assumant son
obligation de juger;

**
60. Considérant qu’à ce stade de la procédure la Cour n’a pas à établir

de façon définitive l’existence des droits revendiqués par la Belgique ni à
examiner la qualité de la Belgique à les faire valoir devant la Cour; et que
ces droits, en tant que fondés sur une interprétation possible de la
convention contre la torture, apparaissent en conséquence plausibles;

61. Considérant que les mesures conservatoires demandées en l’espèce
tendent à garantir que le Sénégal prendra toutes les mesures en son pou-
voir pour que M. Habré reste sous le contrôle et la surveillance des auto-
rités sénégalaises jusqu’à ce que la Cour ait rendu sa décision définitive;
que le départ éventuel de M. Habré du territoire sénégalais serait suscep-

tible d’affecter les droits que la Belgique pourrait se voir reconnaître au
fond, même tels que qualifiés par le Sénégal; que, dès lors, au regard de
l’objet de l’instance, les mesures conservatoires sollicitées peuvent être
indiquées si les circonstances l’exigent;

*
* *

R ISQUE DE PRÉJUDICE IRRÉPARABLE ET URGENCE

62. Considérant cependant que le pouvoir de la Cour d’indiquer des
mesures conservatoires ne sera exercé que s’il y a urgence, c’est-à-dire s’il
existe un risque réel et imminent qu’un préjudice irréparable soit causé

aux droits en litige avant que la Cour n’ait rendu sa décision définitive
(voir par exemple Passage par le Grand-Belt (Finlande c. Danemark),

17 58. Whereas Belgium points out that its request is intended to protect
its right to see Senegal prosecute Mr. Habré directly or, failing that, the

right to obtain his extradition; whereas Belgium maintains that the Con-
vention against Torture confers upon all the States parties the right to
obtain compliance by Senegal with the provisions of the Convention; and
whereas Belgium states that its request for the extradition of Mr. Habré,

resulting from the proceedings brought in Belgium by victims of Belgian
nationality, confers a specific right upon it to see Senegal prosecute
Mr. Habré or, failing that, to obtain his extradition in accordance with
Article 7 of the said Convention;
59. Whereas Senegal argues that the only right which might be attrib-

uted to States parties to the Convention against Torture is the right to
require another State party to try the perpetrator of an act of torture who
is present in its territory or, failing that, to request his extradition; and
that, consequently, if it is considered that Article 5, paragraph 2, and

Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention create a right for a State party,
it can only be the right to demand extradition, which cannot however
prevail over the right of a State which takes on its obligation to hold a
trial;

**

60. Whereas at this stage of the proceedings the Court does not need
to establish definitively the existence of the rights claimed by Belgium or
to consider Belgium’s capacity to assert such rights before the Court; and
whereas the rights asserted by Belgium, being grounded in a possible

interpretation of the Convention against Torture, therefore appear to be
plausible;
61. Whereas the provisional measures requested in the current pro-
ceedings are aimed at ensuring that Senegal takes all necessary measures

in its power to keep Mr. Habré under the surveillance and control of the
Senegalese authorities until the Court has given its final decision; whereas
the possible departure of Mr. Habré from Senegalese territory would be
likely to affect the rights which might be adjudged to belong to Belgium
on the merits, even as qualified by Senegal; whereas, therefore, in view of

the subject-matter of the proceedings, the provisional measures requested
may be indicated if the circumstances so require;

*
* *

R ISK OF IRREPARABLE PREJUDICE AND U RGENCY

62. Whereas however the power of the Court to indicate provisional
measures will be exercised only if there is urgency, in the sense that there
is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused to
the rights in dispute before the Court has given its final decision (see, for
example, Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Provi-

17mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 29 juillet 1991, C.I.J. Recueil
1991, p. 17, par. 23; Certaines procédures pénales engagées en France

(République du Congo c. France), mesure conservatoire, ordonnance du
17 juin 2003, C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 107, par. 22; Usines de pâte à papier
sur le fleuve Uruguay (Argentine c. Uruguay), mesures conservatoires,
ordonnance du 23 janvier 2007, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (I) , p. 11, par. 32;
Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes

les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie), me-
sures conservatoires, ordonnance du 15 octobre 2008, C.I.J. Recueil 2008 ,
p. 392-393, par. 129); et que la Cour doit donc examiner si, dans la pré-
sente instance, une telle urgence existe;

**

63. Considérant que la Belgique, dans sa demande en indication de
mesures conservatoires, fait référence à un entretien donné à Radio-

France-Internationale le 2 février 2009 par le président Wade (voir
paragraphe 13 ci-dessus); que la Belgique s’est également référée, à
l’audience, à des entretiens accordés par le président Wade au journal
espagnol Público, au journal français La Croix ainsi qu’à l’agence
France-Presse, en date du 14 octobre 2008, du 18 décembre 2008 et

du 3 février 2009 respectivement, au cours desquels la question de
l’organisation du procès de M. Habré et de son financement a été
évoquée; que la Belgique relève qu’à ces diverses occasions le président
du Sénégal a indiqué, selon le cas, qu’il n’allait pas garder indéfiniment
M. Habré au Sénégal, qu’il ferait que M. Habré abandonne le Sénégal,

même s’il ne savait pas où l’intéressé irait, qu’il accepterait de le juger
si on lui en donnait les moyens, ou encore que, si le procès ne se tenait
pas, il renverrait M. Habré chez lui ou au président de l’Union africaine;
qu’il en ressort, selon la Belgique, que le Sénégal pourrait mettre fin à
la mise en résidence surveillée à laquelle est soumis M. Habré si le finan-

cement nécessaire à l’organisation de son procès n’était pas assuré;
64. Considérant que la Belgique en déduit, d’une part, qu’il existe un
risque réel que le Sénégal cause un préjudice irréparable aux droits de la
Belgique; que la Belgique expose que, si M. Habré devait être autorisé à
quitter le territoire sénégalais, il pourrait se soustraire à toute poursuite et

il deviendrait impossible pour le Sénégal de se conformer, notamment,
aux obligations énoncées par la convention contre la torture; et qu’elle
ajoute que la violation de l’obligation de poursuivre ou d’extrader ainsi
causée ne saurait être réparée par d’autres moyens, notamment par des
compensations pécuniaires;

65. Considérant que la Belgique fait observer, d’autre part, que les dé-
clarations évoquant le départ de M. Habré du territoire sénégalais ont été
faites à des dates récentes par la plus haute autorité de l’Etat; et qu’elle
en infère que le risque de préjudice doit être considéré comme imminent;

66. Considérant que le Sénégal souligne qu’il ne ressort pas des propos
du président Wade que les droits que la Belgique prétend tenir de la

18sional Measures, Order of 29 July 1991, I.C.J. Reports 1991 ,p .,
para. 23; Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo

v. France), Provisional Measure, Order of 17 June 2003, I.C.J. Reports
2003, p. 107, para. 22; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v.
Uruguay), Provisional Measures , Order of 23 January 2007, I.C.J.
Reports 2007 (I), p. 11, para. 32; Application of the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia

v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 Octo-
ber 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, pp. 392-393, para. 129); and whereas the
Court must therefore consider whether such urgency exists in these pro-
ceedings;

**

63. Whereas Belgium, in its Request for the indication of provisional
measures, makes reference to an interview given on 2 February 2009 to
Radio France Internationale by President Wade (see paragraph 13
above); whereas Belgium also referred at the hearings to interviews given

by President Wade to the Spanish newspaper Público, the French news-
paper La Croix and Agence France Presse on 14 October 2008, 18 Decem-
ber 2008 and 3 February 2009 respectively, in which the organization of
the trial of Mr. Habré and its funding were discussed; whereas Belgium
points out that at different junctures on these various occasions, the

President of Senegal said that he was not going to keep Mr. Habré in
Senegal indefinitely, that he would make the latter leave Senegal, even
though he did not know where Mr. Habré would go, that he was willing
to try him but that he had to be given the resources, and that, if the trial
was not held, he would either send Mr. Habré back home or transfer him

to the Chairperson of the African Union; whereas, according to Belgium,
it follows from this that Senegal could lift the house arrest imposed on
Mr. Habré if the funding needed for the organization of his trial were not
provided;
64. Whereas Belgium infers from this, in the first instance, that there is

a real risk of Senegal causing irreparable prejudice to the rights of Bel-
gium; whereas Belgium asserts that, should Mr. Habré receive permis-
sion to leave Senegalese territory, he might evade any prosecution and it
would become impossible for Senegal to comply, in particular, with the
obligations laid down by the Convention against Torture; and whereas it
adds that the violation of the obligation to prosecute or extradite thus

caused could not be redressed by other means, in particular by monetary
compensation;
65. Whereas Belgium points out, moreover, that the statements con-
cerning Mr. Habré leaving Senegalese territory were made recently by the
highest State authority; whereas it infers from this that the risk of preju-

dice must be regarded as imminent;
66. Whereas Senegal argues that it does not follow from the comments
by President Wade that irreparable prejudice might be caused to the

18convention contre la torture pourraient subir un préjudice irréparable;
qu’il assure ne pas avoir l’intention de mettre fin aux mesures efficaces

de contrôle et de surveillance dont fait l’objet M. Habré; qu’il précise
notamment que M. Habré ne dispose pas d’un titre de voyage valide et
que sa surveillance est assurée par une unité d’élite des forces militaires
sénégalaises; et qu’il souligne en outre que les mesures déjà mises en
Œuvre par lui sont conformes aux dispositions de la convention et iden-

tiques aux mesures conservatoires demandées par la Belgique;
67. Considérant que le Sénégal soutient par ailleurs que la déclaration
du président Wade à Radio-France-Internationale, dont se prévaut la
Belgique pour demander des mesures conservatoires, a été extraite de son

contexte et «s’est vu attribuer ... un sens qu’elle n’avait évidemment
pas»; qu’il allègue que, au contraire, ladite déclaration démontre la
volonté du Sénégal de tenir un procès, le président Wade précisant ce qui
suit au sujet du financement dudit procès:

«[Après toutes les promesses d’appui qui ont été faites], comme ça
traînait un peu, j’ai dit «il faut que le [soutien financier promis] soit

réellement disponible... C’était pour pousser un peu pour qu’on
accélère... Dès que nous aurons les moyens, le procès va commencer.
Il n’y a absolument aucun doute.»»;

qu’il souligne que les négociations avec l’Union européenne et avec
l’Union africaine, visant à l’obtention des fonds nécessaires aux pour-

suites de M. Habré, se déroulent bien; que le Sénégal considère que les
mesures prises par les autorités sénégalaises attestent que celles-ci exécu-
tent de bonne foi leurs obligations en vertu de la convention contre la
torture; et que, de l’avis du Sénégal, il en résulte qu’il n’existe aucun
risque imminent justifiant l’indication de mesures conservatoires;

68. Considérant que, comme il a été indiqué plus haut (voir para-
graphes 29 et 66), le Sénégal a affirmé à plusieurs reprises à l’audience
qu’il n’envisageait pas de mettre fin à la surveillance et au contrôle exercés
sur la personne de M. Habré tant avant qu’après que les fonds promis par
la communauté internationale soient mis à sa disposition pour assurer

l’organisation de la procédure judiciaire; que le coagent du Sénégal, au
terme de l’audience, a solennellement déclaré, en réponse à une question
posée par un membre de la Cour, ce qui suit:

«Senegal will not allow Mr. Habré to leave Senegal while the pre-
sent case is pending before the Court. Senegal has not the intention
to allow Mr. Habré to leave the territory while the present case is

pending before the Court.» (En anglais dans l’original.);
«Le Sénégal ne permettra pas à M. Habré de quitter le Sénégal
aussi longtemps que la présente affaire sera pendante devant la
Cour. Le Sénégal n’a pas l’intention de permettre à M. Habré de

quitter le territoire alors que cette affaire est pendante devant la
Cour.» [Traduction du Greffe.] ;

19rights which Belgium claims to hold under the Convention against Tor-
ture; whereas it affirms that it has no intention of lifting the effective con-

trol and surveillance measures imposed on Mr. Habré; whereas it states
in particular that Mr. Habré does not possess a valid travel document
and that his surveillance is carried out by an elite unit of the Senegalese
military forces; whereas it further points out that the measures which it
has already implemented are consistent with the provisions of the Con-

vention and identical to the provisional measures requested by Belgium;
67. Whereas Senegal maintains, moreover, that the statement made by
President Wade to Radio France Internationale, on the basis of which
Belgium requests provisional measures, has been taken out of context
and “has been attributed a meaning . . . which it manifestly did not

have”; whereas it contends that, on the contrary, the said statement dem-
onstrates Senegal’s willingness to hold a trial, with regard to the funding
of which President Wade specified the following:

“[After all the promises of support that were made], as it was
taking a little too much time, I said ‘[the promised financial support]
will actually have to be available . . . It was in order to push a bit to
speed things up . . . As soon as we have the funding, the trial will

begin. There is absolutely no doubt about it.’” [Translation by the
Registry] ;

whereas it states that the negotiations with the European Union and the
African Union aimed at obtaining the funds needed for the prosecution
of Mr. Habré are proceeding well; whereas Senegal considers that the
measures taken by the Senegalese authorities show that they are perform-

ing in good faith their obligations under the Convention against Torture;
and whereas, according to Senegal, it follows from this that there is no
imminent risk to justify the indication of provisional measures;
68. Whereas, as has been indicated above (see paragraphs 29 and 66),
Senegal asserted on several occasions at the hearings that it is not con-

templating lifting the surveillance and control imposed on the person of
Mr. Habré either before or after the funds pledged by the international
community are made available to it for the organization of the judicial
proceedings; whereas the Co-Agent of Senegal, at the end of the hear-
ings, solemnly declared, in response to a question put by a Member of the
Court, the following:

“Senegal will not allow Mr. Habré to leave Senegal while the

present case is pending before the Court. Senegal has not the inten-
tion to allow Mr. Habré to leave the territory while the present case
is pending before the Court.”

19 69. Considérant que le coagent de la Belgique, en précisant qu’il agis-
sait au nom de son gouvernement, a affirmé à l’audience, en réponse à

une question posée par un membre de la Cour, qu’une telle déclaration
solennelle faite par l’agent du Sénégal au nom de son gouvernement,
et selon laquelle celui-ci ne permettrait pas à M. Habré de quitter le
territoire sénégalais aussi longtemps que la Cour serait saisie de la
présente affaire, pourrait suffire à la Belgique pour considérer que sa

demande en indication de mesures conservatoires n’aurait plus d’objet,
pour autant que certaines conditions soient remplies (voir para-
graphe 33 ci-dessus);

**

70. Considérant que les déclarations évoquant la possibilité que
M. Habré quitte le Sénégal émanaient du chef de l’Etat sénégalais et

qu’elles ont pu, de ce fait, fonder certaines inquiétudes de la Belgique
quant à un éventuel départ de M. Habré; que la Cour relève cependant
que lesdites déclarations, faites à l’occasion d’entretiens accordés à la
presse, ont été précisées par la suite par d’autres déclarations émanant du
chef de l’Etat (voir paragraphe 67 ci-dessus);

71. Considérant par ailleurs que la Cour note que le Sénégal, tant pro-
prio motu qu’en réponse à une question posée par un membre de la Cour,
a formellement et à plusieurs reprises, au cours des audiences, donné
l’assurance qu’il ne permettra pas à M. Habré de quitter son territoire
avant que la Cour ait rendu sa décision définitive;

72. Considérant que, comme la Cour l’a déjà rappelé ci-dessus, l’indi-
cation de mesures conservatoires ne se justifie que s’il y a urgence; consi-
dérant que la Cour, prenant acte des assurances données par le Sénégal,
constate que le risque de préjudice irréparable aux droits revendiqués par
la Belgique n’est pas apparent à la date à laquelle la présente ordonnance

est rendue;
73. Considérant que la Cour conclut de ce qui précède qu’il n’existe,
dans les circonstances de l’espèce, aucune urgence justifiant l’indication
de mesures conservatoires par la Cour;

*
* *

74. Considérant que la décision rendue en la présente procédure ne
préjuge en rien la question de la compétence de la Cour pour connaître

du fond de l’affaire, ni aucune question relative à la recevabilité de la
requête ou au fond lui-même, et qu’elle laisse intact le droit des Gouver-
nements de la Belgique et du Sénégal de faire valoir leurs moyens en ces
matières;

75. Considérant que la présente décision laisse également intact le
droit de la Belgique de présenter à l’avenir une nouvelle demande en indi-

20 69. Whereas the Co-Agent of Belgium, making clear that he spoke in
the name of his Government, asserted at the hearings, in response to a

question put by a Member of the Court, that such a solemn declaration
given by the Agent of Senegal, in the name of his Government, to the
effect that the latter would not allow Mr. Habré to leave Senegalese
territory while the present case was pending before the Court,
could be sufficient for Belgium to consider that its Request for

the indication of provisional measures no longer had any object,
provided that certain conditions were fulfilled (see paragraph 33 above);

**

70. Whereas the statements concerning the possibility of Mr. Habré
leaving Senegal were made by the Senegalese Head of State and could
therefore have given rise to some concern on the part of Belgium as to
Mr. Habré’s possible departure; whereas the Court nonetheless observes

that those statements, made in interviews given to the press, were clarified
subsequently by other statements emanating from the Head of State (see
paragraph 67 above);
71. Whereas the Court further notes that Senegal, both proprio motu
and in response to a question put by a Member of the Court, gave a for-

mal assurance on several occasions during the hearings that it will not
allow Mr. Habré to leave its territory before the Court has given its final
decision;
72. Whereas, as the Court has recalled above, the indication of provi-
sional measures is only justified if there is urgency; whereas the Court,

taking note of the assurances given by Senegal, finds that, the risk of
irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by Belgium is not apparent on
the date of this Order;

73. Whereas the Court concludes from the foregoing that there does

not exist, in the circumstances of the present case, any urgency to justify
the indication of provisional measures by the Court;

* * *

74. Whereas the decision given in the present proceedings in no way
prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the
merits of the case or any questions relating to the admissibility of the
Application, or relating to the merits themselves; and whereas it leaves
unaffected the right of the Governments of Belgium and Senegal to sub-

mit arguments in respect of those questions;
75. Whereas the present decision also leaves unaffected Belgium’s
right to submit in future a fresh request for the indication of provisional

20cation de mesures conservatoires fondée sur des faits nouveaux, en vertu

du paragraphe 3 de l’article 75 du Règlement;

*
* *

76. Par ces motifs,

L A COUR ,

par treize voix contre une,

Dit que les circonstances, telles qu’elles se présentent actuellement à la
Cour, ne sont pas de nature à exiger l’exercice de son pouvoir d’indiquer
des mesures conservatoires en vertu de l’article 41 du Statut.

POUR: M. Owada, président ; MM. Shi, Koroma, Al-Khasawneh, Simma,
Abraham, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Yusuf, Greenwood,
juges; MM. Sur, Kirsch, juges ad hoc;

CONTRE: M. Cançado Trindade, juge.

Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au Palais de

la Paix, à La Haye, le vingt-huit mai deux mille neuf, en trois exem-
plaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les autres
seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement du Royaume de

Belgique et au Gouvernement de la République du Sénégal.

Le président,

(Signé) Hisashi O WADA .

Le greffier,

(Signé) Philippe COUVREUR .

MM. les juges K OROMA et YUSUF joignent une déclaration commune à
l’ordonnance; MM. les juges A L-KHASAWNEH et SKOTNIKOV joignent à
l’ordonnance l’exposé de leur opinion individuelle commune; M. le juge

C ANÇADO TRINDADE joint à l’ordonnance l’exposé de son opinion dissi-
dente; M. le juge ad hocUR joint à l’ordonnance l’exposé de son opinion
individuelle.

(Paraphé) H.O.

(Paraphé) Ph.C.

21measures, under Article 75, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, based on

new facts;

*
* *

76. For these reasons,

T HE COURT ,

By thirteen votes to one,

Finds that the circumstances, as they now present themselves to the
Court, are not such as to require the exercise of its power under Arti-
cle 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures.

IN FAVOUR: President Owada; Judges Shi, Koroma, Al-Khasawneh, Simma,
Abraham, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Yusuf, Greenwood;
Judges ad hoc Sur, Kirsch;

AGAINST: Judge Cançado Trindade.

Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at

the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-eighth day of May, two thou-
sand and nine, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives
of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the King-

dom of Belgium and the Government of the Republic of Senegal, respec-
tively.

(Signed) President. (Signed) Hisashi O WADA ,

President.

(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR ,

Registrar.

Judges K OROMA and Y USUF append a joint declaration to the Order of
the Court; Judges A L-KHASAWNEH and SKOTNIKOV append a joint sepa-
rate opinion to the Order of the Court; Judge C ANÇADO T RINDADE

appends a dissenting opinion to the Order of the Court; Judge ad hUR S
appends a separate opinion to the Order of the Court.

(Initialled) H.O.

(Initialled) Ph.C.

21

ICJ document subtitle

Request for the indication of provisional measures

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Order of 28 May 2009

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