Judgment of 6 November 2003

Document Number
090-20031106-JUD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Incidental Proceedings
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,

ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING OIL PLATFORMS

(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA)

JUDGMENT OF 6 NOVEMBER 2003

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

(RÉPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D'IRAN c.ÉTATS-UNIS
D'AMÉRIQUE)

ARRÊT DU 6 NOVEMBRE 2003 Officia1 citati:n
Oil Platforms (Zslamic Republic of Iran
v. United States of America), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 161

Mode officiel de citation:
Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d'Iran
c. Etats- Unis d'Amérique), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 161

Sales number
ISSN 0074-444 1 No de vente: 876
ISBN 92- 1-070984-5 6 NOVEMBER 2003

JUDGMENT

OIL PLATFORMS

(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v.UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA)

6 NOVEMBRE 2003

ARRÊT INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

2003 YEAR 2003
6 November
GenNo. 90ist 6 November 2003

CASE CONCERNING OIL PLATFORMS

(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA)

1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the
United States and Iran - Iranian claims and United States counter-claim for
breach of Article X, paragraph 1 - Jurisdiction based on Article XXI, para-
graph 2 - Factual background.

United States contention that the Court should reject Iran's claims and refuse
it the relief it seeks because of Iran's allegedly unlawful conduct - "Clean
hands" - Argument not presented as objection to admissibility - Not neces-
sary to decide the issue.

Iranian claims based on Article X, paragraph 1, of Treaty - Alleged
infringement of freedom of commerce between the territories of the Parties by
attack on Iranian oil platforms - Judgment of 12 December 1996 onjurisdic-

tion - Relevance of other Articles for interpretation or application of Article X,
paragraph 1 - Task of the Court to ascertair, whether there has been a
breach of Article X, paragraph 1 - United States contention that Article XX,
paragraph 1 (d), concerning measures necessary to protect the essential security
interests of aparty, is determinative of the question - Order in which the Court
should examine Articles X, paragraph 1, and XX, paragraph 1 (d) - Freedom
of Court to choose grounds for its decision - Particular considerations in this
case militating in favour of an examination of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d),
prior to Article X, paragraph 1 - Relationship between Article XX, para-
graph 1 (d), and international law on the use of force - Jurisdiction of the
Court to interpret and apply Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), extending, where
appropriate, to the determination whether action was or not unlawful use of

force, by reference to international law - Provisions of the United Nations Charter and customary international law - Jurisdiction of the Court limited

to that conferred by the consent of the Parties.

Article XX, paragraph 1 (d) - Measures "necessary" to protect theparty's
essential security interests - Criterion of "necessity" to be assessed by the
Court - Overlapping of question whether the measures taken were "necessary"
and of their validity as acts of self-defence - Actions on the platforms amounted
to a use of force.

Attack of 19 October 1987 on Reshadat - United States contention that this

action was necessary to protect its essential security interests and a valid act of
self-defence - Question of the existence of an "armed attack" on the United
States - Missile attack on the Sea Isle City - Burden of proof of the existence
of an attack by Iran on the United States not discharged - Alleged series of
attacks by Iran not an "armed attack" on the United States - Attacks of
18 April1988 on Nasr and Salman and "Operation Praying Mantis" - Mining

of the USS Samuel B. Roberts -Evidence inconclusive that the vesse1 was the
victim of a mine laid by Iran - Mine incident not an "armed attack" by Iran
against the United States.

Examination of criteria of necessity andproportionality in the context of self-

defence - Nature of the target of the force used in self-defence: insufJicient
evidence as to the signzjicance of the military presence and activity on the plat-
forms - Attacks on theplatforms not meeting the criteria of necessity and pro-
portionality under the right of self-defence.

Attacks on the platforms not justzjîed, under Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), as

measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United
States, being acts of armedforce not qualifying under international law as acts
of self-defence.

Article X, paragraph 1 - Scope of the 1996 Judgment - Question whether
the United States actions affected 'ffreedom of commerceJ' under Article X,
paragraph 1 - Meaning of "commerce" in that text - Not limited to maritime
commerce nor to activities of purchase and sale - No justzjication for treating
platforms as military installations, and thus outside protection of Article X,

paragraph 1.

Nature of commercial activities protected - United States attacks entailing
destruction of goods destined to be exported and affecting transport of these
goods with a view to export - Attacks impeded Iran'sfreedom of commerce -
Treaty limitation to freedom of commerce "between the territories of the two

High Contracting Parties" - Exports of Iranian oil to United States territory
until29 October 1987 - Reshadat and Resalat platforms under repair at the time they were attacked - United States Executive Order 12613 of 29 October
1987 imposing an embargo on goods of Iranian origin - No exports of Iranian
crude oil to the United States after 29 October 1987 - Legality of the embargo
not before the Court - Salman and Nasr platforms attacked after enactment of
embargo - Import into United States of petroleum products derived from
Iranian crude oil not constituting "commerce between the territories" of the

Parties for the purposes of the 1955 Treaty - Attacks on the platforms not a
breach of Article X, paragraph 1.

United States counter-claim - Scope of the Order of 10 March 1998 - Ira-
nian objections to jurisdiction and to admissibility of the counter-claim other
than those decided under Article 80, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court.

First objection of Iran - Contention that the counter-claim was presented
without prior negotiation - Dispute "not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy"

for the purposes of Article XXI, paragraph 2 - Second objection of Iran -
Contention that the counter-claim was made on behalfof third States orforeign
entities - Counter-claim limited to alleged breaches of freedoms guaranteed to
the United States - Third objection of Iran - Contention that the counter-
claim is beyond Article X, paragraph 1 - United States limiting the scope of its
counter-claim - Fourth objection of Iran - Contention that jurisdiction of the
Court does not extend tofreedom of navigation - Jurisdiction to deal with free-

dom of commerce and navigation under Article X, paragraph 1 - Fzyth objec-
tion by Iran - Admissibility - Alleged broadening of counter-claim by the
United States - No transformation of the subject of the dispute originally sub-
mitted to the Court.

Examination of speczjîc incidents invoked by the United States - None of the
vessels involved engaged in commerce or navigation between the territories of
the Parties - No breach of Article X, paragraph 1 - United States generic

counter-claim - No proof that actions of Iran infringed thefreedom of com-
merce or of navigation between the territories of the Parties - No speczjîc inci-
dent constituted a breach of Treaty - Generic counter-claim cannot be upheld.

JUDGMENT

Present : President SHI ; Vice-President RANJEVA ; Judges GUILLAUME ,OROMA,
VERESHCHETIN ,IGGINS, PARRA-ARANGUREN, KOOIJMANS, REZEK,

6 AL-KHASAWNE BHU,ERGENTHAL,ELARABYO , WADAS ,IMMA, TOMKA;
Judge ad hoc RIGAUX; Registrar COUVREUR.

In the case concerning oil platforms,

between

the Islamic Republic of Iran,
represented by

Mr. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf, Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Deputy Director for Legal Affairs,
Bureau of International Legal Services of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
The Hague,
as Agent;

Mr. D. Momtaz, Professor of International Law, Tehran University,
member of the International Law Commission, Associate Member of the
Institute of InternationaLaw,
Mr. S. M. Zeinoddin, Head of Legal Affairs, National Iranian Oil Com-
pany7
Mr. Michael Bothe, Professor of Public Law, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Uni-
versity of Frankfurt-am-Main, Head of Research Unit, Peace Research
Institute, Frankfurt,
Mr. James R. Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International
Law, University of Cambridge, member of the English and Australian
Bars, Member of the Institute of International Law,

Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre, member
and former Chairman of the International Law Commission,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, member of the
New York Bar, Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Mr. David S. Sellers, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, Solicitor of the
Supreme Court of England and Wales, Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,

as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. M. Mashkour, Deputy Director for Legal Affairs, Bureau of Interna-
tional Legal Services of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Mr. M. A. Movahed, Senior Legal Adviser, National Iranian Oil Company,

Mr. R. Badri Ahari, Legal Adviser, Bureau of International Legal Services
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran,

Mr. A. Beizaei, Legal Adviser, Bureau of International Legal Services of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Paris,
Ms Nanette Pilkington, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, Frere Cholmeleyl
Eversheds, Paris,
Mr. William Thomas, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales,
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Mr. Leopold von Carlowitz, Research Fellow, Peace Research Institute,
Frankfurt, Mr. Mathias Forteau, docteur en droit, Researcher at the Centre de droit
international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University of Paris X-Nanterre,
as Counsel ;

Mr. Robert C. Rizzutti, Vice-President, Cartographic Operations, Interna-
tional Mapping Associates,
as Technical Adviser,

and

the United States of America,
represented by

The Honourable William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, United States Depart-
ment of State,
as Agent ;
Mr. Ronald J. Bettauer, Deputy Legal Adviser, United StatesDepartment of
State,

as Co-Agent;
Mr. Michael J. Matheson, Professor, George Washington University School
of Law,
Mr. D. Stephen Mathias, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs,

United States Department of State,
Mr. Michael J. Mattler, Attorney-Adviser, United States Department of
State,
Mr. Sean Murphy, Professor, George Washington University School of Law,

Mr. Ronald D. Neubauer, Associate Deputy General Counsel, United States
Department of Defense,
Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor Emeritus, University of Paris II, Member of the
Institute of International Law, member of the Académie des sciences
morales et politiques (Institut de France),

as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Paul Beaver, Defence & Maritime Affairs Consultant, Ashbourne
Beaver Associates, Ltd., London,
Mr. John Moore, Senior Associate, C & O Resources, Washington, D.C.,

as Advocates ;
Mr. Clifton M. Johnson, Legal Counsellor, United States Embassy, The
Hague,
Mr. David A. Kaye, Deputy Legal Counsellor, United States Embassy, The
Hague,
Ms Kathleen Milton, Attorney-Adviser, United States Department of State,

as Counsel;
Ms Marianne Hata, United States Department of State,
Ms Cécile Jouglet, United States Embassy, Paris,
Ms Joanne Nelligan, United States Department of State,
Ms Aileen Robinson, United States Department of State,
Ms Laura Romains, United States Embassy, The Hague,

as Administrative Staff, composed as above,
after deliberation,

delivers the following Judgment:

1. On 2 November 1992, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
(hereinafter called "Iran") filed in the Registry of the Court an Application
instituting proceedings against the Government of the United States of America
(hereinafter called "the United States") in respect of a dispute

"aris[ing] out of the attack [on] and destruction of three offshore oil pro-
duction complexes, owned and operated for commercial purposes by the
National Iranian Oil Company, by several warships of the United States
Navy on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988, respectively".

In its Application, Iran contended that these acts constituted a "fundamental
breach" of various provisions of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and
Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, which was signed in
Tehran on 15 August 1955 and entered into force on 16 June 1957 (hereinafter
called "the 1955 Treaty"), as well as of international law. The Application
invoked, as a basis for the Court's jurisdiction, Article XXI, paragraph 2, of
the 1955 Treaty.

2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was
immediately communicated to the Government of the United States by the
Registrar; and, pursuant to paragraph 3 of that Article, al1 States entitled to
appear before the Court were notified of the Application.
3. By an Order of 4 December 1992 the President of the Court fixed 31 May
1993 as the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial of Iran and 30 November
1993 as the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial of the United
States.
4. By an Order of 3 June 1993 the President of the Court, at the request of
Iran, extended to 8 June 1993 the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial; the
time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial was extended, by the same
Order, to 16 December 1993.

Iran duly filed its Memorial within the time-limit as thus extended.
5. Within the extended time-limit thus fixed for the filing of the Counter-
Memorial, the United States raised a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction
of the Court pursuant to Article 79, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court of
14 April 1978. Consequently, by an Order dated 18 January 1994, the President
of the Court, noting that by virtue of Article 79, paragraph 3, of the Rules of
Court the proceedings on the merits were suspended, fixed 1 July 1994 as the
time-limit within which Iran might present a written statement of its observa-
tions and submissions on the preliminary objection raised by the United States.

Iran filedsuch a statement within the time-limit so fixed and the case became
ready for hearing in respect of the preliminary objection.
6. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of Iranian nationality,
Iran availed itself of its rightunder Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute of

the Court to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case: it chose Mr. François
Rigaux. 7. Between 16 and 24 September 1996, the Court held public hearings on the
preliminary objection raised by the United States.
8. By a Judgment dated 12 December 1996 the Court rejected the prelimi-
nary objection of the United States according to which the 1955 Treaty did not
provide any basis for the jurisdiction of the Court and found that it had juris-
diction, on the basis of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty, to enter-
tain the claims made by Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty.

9. By an Order of 16 December 1996 the President of the Court fixed 23 June
1997 as the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial of the United
States.
Within the time-limit thus fixed, the United States filed its Counter-
Memorial; this included a counter-claim concerning "Iran's actions in the Gulf

during 1987-88 which, among other things, involved mining and other attacks
on US-flag or US-owned vessels".

10. In a letter of 2 October 1997 Iran expressed its opinion that "the counter-
claim as formulated by the United States [did] not meet the requirements of
Article 80 (1) of the Rules" and its wish "to submit a brief statement explaining
its objections to the counter-claim".

At a meeting held on 17 October 1997 with the Agents of the Parties by
the Vice-President of the Court, acting as President in the case by virtue of
Article 13, paragraph 1, and Article 32, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court,
the two Agents agreed that their respective Governments would submit written
observations on the question of the admissibility of the United States counter-

claim.
By a communication from its Agent dated 18 November 1997, Iran trans-
mitted to the Court a document entitled "Request for hearing in relation to the
United States counter-claim pursuant to Article 80 (3) of the Rules of Court" ;
by a letter dated 18 November 1997 the Registrar sent a copy of that document
to the United States Government. By a communication from its Agent dated
18 December 1997, the United States submitted to the Court its observations
on the admissibility of the counter-claim set out in its Counter-Memorial,
taking the observations submitted by Iran into consideration; by a letter dated
18 December 1997, the Registrar communicated a copy of the observations of
the United States Government to the Iranian Government.

Having received detailed written observations from each of the Parties, the

Court considered that it was sufficiently well informed of their respective posi-
tions with regard to the admissibility of the counter-claim.
11. By an Order of 10 March 1998 the Court held that the counter-claim
presented by the United States in its Counter-Memorial was admissible as such
and formed part of the current proceedings. It also directed Iran to file a Reply
and the United States to file a Rejoinder, relatingto the claims of both Parties,
and fixed the time-limits for the filing of the Reply and of the Rejoinder at
10 September 1998 and 23 November 1999 respectively. The Court held that it
was necessary moreover,

"in order to ensure strict equality between the Parties, to reserve the right

of Iran to present its views in writing a second time on the United States counter-claim, in an additional pleading the filing of which [might] be the
subject of a subsequent Order".

12. By Order of 26 May 1998, at the request of Iran, the Vice-President of
the Court, acting as President in the case, extended the time-limits for the filing
of the Reply of Iran and of the Rejoinder of the United States to, respectively,
10 December 1998 and 23 May 2000. By Order of 8 December 1998, at the
request of Iran, the Court subsequently extended the time-limits for the filing
of the Reply and of the Rejoinder to 10 March 1999 and 23 November 2000
respectively.

Iran duly filed its "Reply and Defence to Counter-Claim" within the time-
limit as thus extended.
By Order of 4 September 2000, at the request of the United States, the Presi-
dent of the Court extended the time-limit for the filing of the Rejoinder of the
United States to 23 March 2001.
The United States duly filed its Rejoinder within the time-limit as thus
extended.
13. By a letter dated 30 July 2001, the Agent of Iran, referring to the above-
mentioned Order of 10 March 1998, informed the Court that his Government
wished to present its views in writing a second time on the counter-claim of the
United States.
By an Order of 28 August 2001 the Vice-President of the Court, taking

account of the agreement of the Parties, authorized the submission by Iran of
an additional pleading relating solely to the counter-claim submitted by the
United States and fixed 24 September 2001 as the time-limit for the filing of
that pleading.
Iran duly filed the additional pleading within the time-limit as thus fixed and
the case became ready for hearing.
14. At a meeting with the President of the Court on 6 November 2002, the
Agent of Iran, subject to confirmation, and the Agent of the United States
agreed that the oral proceedings on the merits should begin on 17 or 18 Feb-
ruary 2003; the Agent of Iran subsequently confirmed the agreement of his
Government. At the same meeting the Agents of the Parties also presented their
views on the organization of the oral proceedings on the merits.
Pursuant to Articles 54 and 58 of the Rules, the Court fixed 17 Febru-
ary 2003 as the date for the opening of the hearings and adopted a timetable for

them. The Registrar informed the Parties accordingly by letters of 19 Novem-
ber 2002.
15. At the meeting of 6 November 2002, the Agents of the Parties informed
the President of the Court that they had decided not to present witnesses at the
oral proceedings. The Agent of the United States nevertheless expressed his
Government's intention, under Article 56 of the Rules, to file a new document
containing an analysis and explanations by experts concerning certain evidence
already produced in the case. The Agent of Iran stated that his Government
reserved al1 its rights with regard to the production of that document. On
20 November 2002, the United States filed an expert's report dated 18 Novem-
ber 2002, together with a copy of a diplomatic Note dated 20 November 2002
from the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Washington D.C. to the United States

Department of State. By a letter dated 20 January 2003, the Agent of Iran
informed the Court that his Government did not object to the production of
the above-mentioned documents by the United States and requested that, pur-suant to Article 56, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the comments of an
expert of Iran on the expert report of the United States "be made part of the
record in the case". On 22 January 2003, the Court decided to authorize the
production of the above-mentioned documents by the United States and
the submission of the comments by Iran; by letters dated the same day, the
Registrar communicated this decision to the Parties.

16. Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of its Rules, the Court, having con-
sulted the Parties, decided that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed
would be made accessible to the public on the opening of the oral proceedings
on the merits.
17. Public sittings were held between 17 February and 7 March 2003, at
which the Court heard the oral arguments and replies on the claim of Iran and

on the counter-claim of the United States by:
For Iran : Mr. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf,
Mr. James R. Crawford,
Mr. D. Momtaz,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy,
Mr. Alain Pellet,
Mr. S. M. Zeinoddin,
Mr. David S. Sellers,

Mr. Michael Bothe.
For the United States: TTle Honourable William H. Taft, IV,
1LIr. Paul Beaver,
1LIr. D. Stephen Mathias,
1LIr. Ronald D. Neubauer,
1LIr. John Moore,
1LIr. Ronald J. Bettauer,
1L.r. Michael J. Mattler,
1L:r. Michael J. Matheson,
1LIr. Prosper Weil,
1L:r. Sean Murphy.

In the course of the hearings, questions were put by Members of the Court
and replies given in writing, pursuant to Article 61, paragraph 4, of the Rules
of Court. Each Party presented written observations on the written replies
received from the other, pursuant to Article 72 of the Rules.

18. In the Application, the following requests were made by Iran :

"On the basis of the foregoing, and while reserving the right to supple-
ment and amend these submissions as appropriate in the course of further
proceedings in the case, the Islamic Republic respectfully requests the
Court to adjudge and declare as follows:

(a) that the Court has jurisdiction under the Treaty of Amity to entertain
the dispute and to rule upon the claims submitted by the Islamic
Republic ;
(b) that in attacking and destroying the oil platforms referred to in the
Application on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988, the United
States breached its obligations to the Islamic Republic, inter alia, under Articles 1 and X (1) of the Treaty of Amity and international
law ;
(c) that in adopting a patently hostile and threatening attitude towards
the Islamic Republic that culminated in the attack and destruction of
the Iranian oil platforms, the United States breached the object and
purpose of the Treaty of Amity, including Articles 1 and X (l), and
international law ;
(d) that the United States is under an obligation to make reparations to
the Islamic Republic for the violation of its international legal obli-

gations in an amount to be determined by the Court at a subsequent
stage of the proceedings. The Islamic Republic reserves the right to
introduce and present to the Court in due course a precise evaluation
of the reparations owed by the United States; and
(e) any other remedy the Court may deem appropriate."
19. In the written proceedings, the following submissions were made by the
Parties :

On behalfof the Government of Iran,
in the Memorial:

"In the light of the facts and arguments set out above, the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
1. That the Court has jurisdiction under the Treaty of Amity to entertain
the dispute and to rule upon the claims submitted by Iran;

2. That in attacking and destroying the oil platforms referred to in Iran's
Application on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988, the United States
breached its obligations to Iran, inter alia,under Articles 1, IV (1) and
X (1) of the Treaty of Amity and international law, and that the United
States bears responsibility for the attacks; and

3. That the United States is accordingly under an obligation to make full
reparation to Iran for the violation of its international legal obligations
and the injury thus caused in a form and amount to be determined by
the Court at a subsequent stage of the proceedings. Iran reserves the
right to introduce and present to the Court in due course a precise

evaluation of the reparation owed by the United States; and
4. Any other remedy the Court may deem appropriate" ;
in the "Reply and Defence to Counter-Claim":

"With regard to Iran's claims, and in the light of the facts and argu-
ments set out above, and subject to the reservations set out in Chapter 12
above, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran requests the Court
to adjudge and declare:
1. That in attacking and destroying on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988
the oil platforms referred to in Iran's Application, the United States
breached its obligations to Iran under Article X (1) of the Treaty of
Amity, and that the United States bears responsibility for the attacks;

and
2. That the United States is accordingly under an obligation to make full
reparation to Iran for the violation of its internationallegal obligations
and the injury thus caused in a form and amount to be determined by the Court at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, the right being
reserved to introduce and present to the Court in due course a precise
evaluation of the reparation owed by the United States; and
3. Any other remedy the Court may deem appropriate.
With regard to the United States' counter-claim, and in light of the facts

and arguments set out above, and subject to the reservations set out in
Chapter 12 above, and, in view of the present uncertain nature of the
United States' counter-claim, further subject to the reservation of Iran's
right to amend these submissions, Iran requests the Court to adjudge and
declare:
1. That the United States' counter-claim does not fa11within the scope of
Article X (1) of the Treaty of Amity as interpreted by the Court in these
proceedings, and accordingly that the counter-claim should be dis-
missed.

2. That the United States' counter-claim is, in any event, inadmissible:

(a) generally, in that the United States has not satisfied the require-
ments of Article XXI of the Treaty of Amity with respect to the
satisfactory diplomatic adjustment of the claim;

(b) in any event, to the extent that it relates to vessels which were not
of United States nationality or whose United States flag was not

opposable to Iran at the time.
3. That Iran did not, in any event, breach its obligations to the United
States under Article X (1) of the Treaty of Amity as interpreted by the
Court in these proceedings.
4. That accordingly the United States' counter-claim be dismissed";

in the additional pleading entitled "Further Response to the United States'
Counter-Claim" :
"Based on the facts and legal considerations set forth in Iran's Reply

and Defence to Counter-Claim in the present pleading, and subject to the
reservations set out in Chapter 12 of its Reply and Defence to Counter-
Claim and in Chapter VI11 above and, in view of the present uncertain
nature of the United States' counter-claim, further subject to the reserva-
tion of Iran's right to amend these submissions, Iran requests the Court,
rejecting al1 submissions to the contrary, to adjudge and declare:

That the United States' counter-claim be dismissed."

On behalfof the Government of the United States,
in the "Counter-Memorial and Counter-Claim" :

"On the basis of the facts and arguments set out above, the Government
of the United States of America requests that the Court adjudge and
declare :

1. That the United States did not breach its obligations to the Islamic
Republic of Iran under Article X (1) of the Treaty of Amity between
the United States and Iran, and, 2. That the claims of the Islamic Republic of Iran are accordingly dis-
missed.
With respect to its counter-claim, and in accordance with Article 80 of
the Rules of the Court, the United States requests that the Court adjudge
and declare:

1. That in attacking vessels, laying mines in the Gulf and otherwise
engaging in military actions in 1987-1988 that were dangerous and
detrimental to maritime commerce, the Islamic Republic of Iran
breached its obligations to the United States under Article X of the
1955 Treaty, and
2. That the Islamic Republic of Iran is accordingly under an obligation to
make full reparation to the United States for violating the 1955 Treaty
in a form and amount to be determined by the Court at a subsequent
stage of the proceedings.

The United States reserves the right to introduce and present to the
Court in due course a precise evaluation of the reparation owed by Iran" ;

in the Rejoinder:

"On the basis of the facts and arguments set out above, the Government
of the United States of America requests that the Court adjudge and
declare :

1. That the United States did not breach its obligations to the Islamic
Republic of Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty of
Amity between the United States and Iran, and
2. That the claims of the Islamic Republic of Iran are accordingly dis-
missed.
With respect to its counter-claim, the United States requests that the
Court adjudge and declare :

1. Rejecting al1 submissions to the contrary, that, in attacking vessels in
the Gulf with mines and missiles and otherwise engaging in military
actions that were dangerous and detrimental to maritime commerce,
the Islamic Republic of Iran breached its obligations to the United
States under Article X of the 1955 Treaty, and
2. That the Islamic Republic of Iran is accordingly under an obligation to
make full reparation to the United States for its breach of the 1955
Treaty in a form and amount to be determined by the Court at a sub-
sequent stage of the proceeding.

The United States reserves the right to introduce and present to the
Court in due course a precise evaluation of the reparation owed by Iran."

20. At the oral proceedings, the following final submissions were presented
by the Parties:
On behalf of the Government of Iran,

at the hearing of 3 March 2003, on the claim of Iran
"The Islamic Republic of Iran respectfully requests the Court, rejecting
al1 contrary claims and submissions, to adjudge and declare: 1. That in attacking and destroying on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988
the oil platforms referred to in Iran's Application, the United States
breached its obligations to Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of the
Treaty of Amity, and that the United States bears responsibility for the
attacks; and
2. That the United States is accordingly under an obligation to make full
reparation to Iran for the violation of its international legal obligations
and the injury thus caused in a form and amount to be determined by
the Court at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, the right being
reserved to Iran to introduce and present to the Court in due course a
precise evaluation of the reparation owed by the United States; and
3. Any other remedy the Court may deem appropriate" ;

at the hearing of 7 March 2003, on the counter-claim of the United States:

"The Islamic Republic of Iran respectfully requests the Court, rejecting
al1 contrary claims and submissions, to adjudge and declare:
That the United States counter-claim be dismissed."

On behalfof the Government of the United States,
at the hearing of 5 March 2003, on the claim of Iran and the counter-claim of
the United States:

"The United States respectfully requests that the Court adjudge and
declare :

(1) tRepublic of Iran under Article X, paragraphligations1, of the 1955 Treatyc

between the United States and Iran; and
(2) that the claims of the Islamic Republic of Iran are accordingly dis-
missed.
With respect to its counter-claim, the United States requests that the
Court adjudge and declare :

(1) rejecting al1 submissions to the contrary, that, in attacking vessels in
the Gulf with mines and missiles and otherwise engaging in military
actions that were dangerous and detrimental to commerce and naviga-
tion between the territories of the United States and the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran breached its obligations
to the United States under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty ;
and
(2) that the Islamic Republic of Iran is accordingly under an obligation to
make full reparation to the United States for its breach of the
1955 Treaty in a form and amount to be determined by the Court at a
subsequent stage of the proceedings. "

21. The task of the Court in the present proceedings is to determine
whether or not there have been breaches of the 1955 Treaty, and if it
finds that such is the case, to draw the appropriate consequences accord-
ing to the submissions of the Parties. The Court is seised both of a claim

by Iran alleging breaches by the United States, and of a counter-claim bythe United States alleging breaches by Iran. Its jurisdiction to entertain
both the claim and the counter-claim is asserted to be based upon
Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty.
22. The Court recalls that, as regards the claim of Iran, the question of
jurisdiction has been the subject of a judgment, given on 12 December
1996, whereby the Court found "that it has jurisdiction,on the basis of
Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty, to entertain the claims
made by the Islamic Republic of Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of
that Treaty" (I. C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 821, para. 55 (2));certain ques-
tions have however been raised between the Parties as to the precise sig-
nificance or scope of that Judgment, which will be examined below.
As to the counter-claim, the Court also recalls that it decided by an
Order made on 10 March 1998 to admit the counter-claim, and indicated
in that Order that the facts alleged and relied on by the United States
"are capable of falling within the scope of Article X, paragraph 1, of the
1955 Treaty as interpreted by the Court", and accordingly that "the

Court has jurisdiction to entertain the United States counter-claim in so
far as the facts alleged may have prejudiced the freedoms guaranteed by
Article X, paragraph 1" (1.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 204, para. 36). In this
respect also questions have been raised between the Parties as to the
significance and scope of that ruling on jurisdiction, and these will be
examined below.
It is however established, by the decisions cited, that both Iran's claim
and the counter-claim of the United States can be upheld only so far as a
breach or breaches of Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955,Treaty may be
shown, even though other provisions of the Treaty may be relevant to the
interpretation of that paragraph. Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955
Treaty reads as follows: "Between the territories of the two High Con-
tracting Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation."

23. Before proceeding further, it will be convenient to set out the
factual background to the case, as it emerges from the pleadings of both
Parties; the broad lines of this background are not disputed, being a
matter of historical record. The actions giving rise to both the claim and
the counter-claim occurred in the context of the general events that took
place in the Persian Gulf between 1980 and 1988, in particular the armed
conflict that opposed Iran and Iraq. That conflictbegan on 22 September
1980, when Iraqi forces advanced into the western areas of Iranian terri-
tory, and continued until the belligerent parties accepted a ceasefire in the
summer of 1988, pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolu-
tion 598 (1987) of 20 July 1987. During the war, combat occurred in the
territories of both States, but the conflict also spread to the Persian Gulf
- which is an international commercial route and line of communication
of major importance - and affected commerce and navigation in the
region. From the very beginning of the conflict, on 22 September 1980,
Iran establisheda defence exclusion zone around its coasts; shortly after,
in early October 1980, Iraq declared a "prohibited war zone" and laterestablished a "naval total exclusive zone" in the northern area of the Per-
sian Gulf. In 1984, Iraq commenced attacks against ships in the Persian
Gulf, notably tankers carrying Iranian oil. These were the first incidents
of what later became known as the "Tanker War" :in the period between
1984 and 1988, a number of commercial vessels and warships of various
nationalities, including neutral vessels, were attacked by aircraft, heli-
copters, missiles or warships, or struck mines in the waters of the Persian
Gulf. Naval forces of both belligerent parties were operating in
the region, but Iran has denied responsibility for any actions other
than incidents involving vessels refusing a proper request for stop and
search. The United States attributes responsibility for certain incidents
to Iran, whereas Iran suggests that Iraq was responsible for them.

24. A number of States took measures at the time aimed at ensuring
the security of their vessels navigating in the Persian Gulf. In late 1986
and early 1987, the Government of Kuwait expressed its preoccupation
at Iran's alleged targeting of its merchant vessels navigating in the Per-
sian Gulf. It therefore requested the United States, the United Kingdom
and the Soviet Union to "reflag" some of these vessels to ensure their
protection. Followingthis request, the Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Company was
able to charter a number of Soviet vessels, and to flag four ships under
United Kingdom registry and 11 ships under United States registry. In
addition, the Government of the United States agreed to provide al1
United States-flagged vessels with a naval escort when transiting the Per-
sian Gulf, in order to deter further attacks; these escort missions were
initiated in July 1987, under the designation "Operation Earnest Will".
Other foreign Powers, including Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom, took parallel action, sending warships to the
region to protect international shipping. Despite these efforts, a number
of ships, including reflagged Kuwaiti vessels, merchant tankers carrying
Kuwaiti oil and warships participating in "Operation Earnest Will",
suffered attacks or struck mines in the Persian Gulf between 1987 and
the end of the conflict.

25. Two specific attacks on shipping are of particular relevance in this
case. On 16 October 1987, the Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City ,eflagged to
the United States, was hit by a missile near Kuwait harbour. The United
States attributed this attack to Iran, and three days later, on 19 October
1987, it attacked Iranian offshore oil production installations, claiming
to be acting in self-defence. United Statesnaval forces launched an attack
against the Reshadat ["Rostam"] and Resalat ["Rakhsh"] complexes;the
R-7 and R-4 platforms belonging to the Reshadat complex were destroyed
in the attack. On 14 April 1988, the warship USS Samuel B. Roberts
struck a mine in international waters near Bahrain while returning froman escort mission; four days later the United States, again asserting the
right of self-defence, employed its naval forces to attack and destroy
simultaneouslythe Nasr ["Sirri"] and Salman ["Sassan"] complexes.

26. These attacks by United States forces on the Iranian oil platforms
are claimed by Iran to constitute breaches of the 1955 Treaty; and the
attacks on the Sea Isle City and the USS Samuel B. Roberts were
invoked in support of the United States' claim to act in self-defence. The
counter-claim of the United States is however not limited to those attacks ;
according to the United States, Iran was in breach of its obligations
under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, "in attacking vessels in
the Gulf with mines and missiles and otherwise engaging in military
actions that were dangerous and detrimental to commerce and naviga-
tion between the territories of the United States and the Islamic Republic

of Iran". According to the United States, Iran conducted an aggressive
policy and was responsible for more than 200 attacks against neutral
shipping in international waters and the territorial seas of Persian Gulf
States. Iran denies responsibility for those attacks, suggesting that they
were committed by Iraq and drawing attention to Iraq's interest in inter-
nationalizing the conflict. Furthermore, Iran claims that the attitude of
the Iranian authorities and the measures taken by its naval forces in the
Persian Gulf were solely defensive in nature. It has emphasized that Iraq
was the aggressor State in the conflict, and has claimed that Iraq received
diplomatic, political, economic and military support from a number of
third countries that were not formally parties to the conflict, including

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United States.

27. The Court will first consider a contention to which the United
States appears to have attributed a certain preliminary character. The
United States asks the Court to dismiss Iran's claim and refuse it the
relief it seeks, because of Iran's allegedly unlawful conduct, Le., its viola-
tion of the 1955 Treaty and other rules of international law relating to the
use of force. The United States invokes what it suggests are three related

principles in support of this request. First, a party that acts improperly
with respect to the subject-matter of a dispute is not entitled to relief;
according to the United States, Iran had committed, at the time of the
actions against the platforms, manifestly illegal armed attacks on United
States and other neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf, and it has mis-
represented, in the present proceedings, the facts of the case before the
Court. Second, a party that has itself violated obligations identical to
those that are the basis for its application is not entitled to relief and Iran
had allegedly infringed itself the "mutual and reciprocal" obligations
arising from the 1955 Treaty. Third, an applicant is not entitled to relief

when the actions it complains of were the result of its own wrongful con-duct. Thus the United States claims that the attacks on the platforms
were a consequence of Iran's previous wrongful behaviour in the Persian
Gulf.

28. Iran responds that the concept of "clean hands" underlying these

arguments of the United States, "while reflecting and incorporating fun-
damental principles of law inspired by good faith, is not an autonomous
legal institution". It contends that the concept of "clean hands" requires
the operation of other institutions or legal rules for its implementation.
Iran argues that the "plaintiff s own wrongful conduct" as a ground for
inadmissibility of a claim relates to claims arising in the context of dip-
lomaticprotection and concerns only a foreign individual's "clean hands",
but that such a principle is irrelevant in direct State-to-State claims.
According to Iran, as far as State-to-State claims are concerned, such
principle may have legal significance only at the merits stage, and only at

the stage of quantification of damages, but does not deprive a State of
locus standi in judicio.

29. The Court notes that these issues were first raised by the United
States in its Counter-Memorial, after the Judgment of the Court of
12 December 1996 on the preliminary objection of the United States to
jurisdiction. In that pleading those issues were dealt with at the end, after
the United States had set out its arguments on the merits, and not by way
of a preliminary issue. In subsequent pleadings and in oral argument it
has presented them as having rather a preliminary character, but it has

nevertheless not gone so far as to suggest that they are issues of admis-
sibility, appropriate to be enquired into before any examination of the
merits. Objections to admissibility normally take the form of an assertion
that, even if the Court has jurisdiction and the facts stated by the appli-
cant State are assumed to be correct, nonetheless there are reasons why
the Court should not proceed to an examination of the merits. That is
not the case here. The United States does not ask the Court to find Iran's
claim inadmissible; it asks the Court to dismiss that claim. It does not
argue that the Court should be debarred from examining the merits of
the Iranian claim on the grounds of Iran's conduct; rather it argues that

Iran's conduct is such that it "precludes it from any right to the relief it
seeks from this Court", or that it "should not be perrnitted to recover on
its claim". The United States invites the Court to make a finding "that
the United States measures against the platforms were the consequence
of Iran's own unlawful uses of force" and submits that the "appropriate
legal consequences should be attached to that finding". The Court notes
that in order to make that finding it would have to examine Iranian and
United States actions in the Persian Gulf during the relevant period -
which it has also to do in order to rule on the Iranian claim and the
United States counter-claim. 30. At this stage of itsjudgrnent, therefore, the Court does not need to
deal with the request of the United States to dismiss Iran's claim and
refuse the relief that it seeks on the basis of the conduct attributed to
Iran.TheCourt will now proceed to the consideration of the claims made
by Iran and the defences put forward by the United States.

31. As noted above (paragraph 21), the dispute in the present case has
been brought before the Court on thejurisdictional basis of Article XXI,
paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty, which provides that

"Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the
interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily
adjusted by diplomacy,shall be submitted to the International Court
of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by
some other pacific means."

By its Judgment of 12 December 1996, the Court found that it had juris-
diction, on the basis of this Article, "to entertain the claims made by the
Islamic Republic of Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty"
(1.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 821, para. 55 (2)), which provides, as noted
above (paragraph 22), that "Between the territories of the two High Con-
tracting Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation." In
the reasoning of that Judgment, the Court indicated that another Article
of the Treaty relied on by Iran, Article IV (which relates to reciprocal
treatment of nationals and companies of eachparty), could not "forrn the
basis of the Court's jurisdiction" (ibid., p. 816, para. 36). It found further
that Article 1 of the Treaty, which provides that "There shall be firm and
enduring peace and sincere friendship between the United States of
America and Iran", while being "such as to throw light on the interpreta-
tion of the other Treaty provisions" and "thus not without legal signifi-
cance for such an interpretation, ... cannot, taken in isolation, be a basis
for thejurisdiction of the Court" (ibid., p. 815, para. 31). The task of the
Court is thus to ascertain whether there has been a breach by the United
States of the provisions of Article X, paragraph 1 ;other provisions of the
Treaty are only relevant in so far as they may affect the interpretation or
application of that text.

32. Inthat respect, the Court notes that the United Stateshas relied on
Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the Treaty as determinative of the ques-
tion of the existence of a breach of its obligations under Article X. That
paragraph provides that

"The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of meas-
ures : (d) necessary to fulfil the obligations of a High Contracting Party
for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and
security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests."

It is the contention of the United States that the actions complained of by
Iran were measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of

the United States, and that accordingly, if those actions would otherwise
have been breaches of Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, which the
United States denies, the effect of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), is that
they are justified under the terms of the Treaty itself, and thus do not
constitute breaches of it.
33. In its Judgment on the United States preliminary objection of
12 December 1996, the Court ruled that Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), does
not afford an objection to admissibility, but "is confined to affording
the Parties a possible defence on the merits" (1.C.J. Reports 1996 (II),
p. 811, para. 20). In accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the
Treaty, it is now for the Court to interpret and apply that subparagraph,
inasmuch as such a defence is asserted by the United States.

34. As was noted in that Judgment, the Court has had occasion, in the
case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nica-
ragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), to examine a provision
in another treaty concluded by the United States, of which the text
is substantially identical to that of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d). This
was Article XXI, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1956 Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Nicaragua.
In its decision in that case, the Court observed that since that provision

"contains a power for each of the parties to derogate from the other

provisions of the Treaty, the possibility of invoking the clauses of
that Article must be considered once it is apparent that certain forms
of conduct by the United States would otherwise be in conflict with
the relevant provisions of the Treaty" (1.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 117,
para. 225).

If in the present case the Court is satisfied by the argument of the
United States that the actions against the oil platforms were, in the
circumstances of the case, "measures . . . necessary to protect [the]
essential security interests" of the United States, within the meaning
of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty, it must hold that
no breach of Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty has been established.

35. To uphold the claim of Iran, the Court must be satisfied both that
the actions of the United States, complained of by Iran, infringed thefreedom of commerce between the territories of the Parties guaranteed by
Article X, paragraph 1, and that such actions were not justified to protect
the essential security interests of the United States as contemplated by
Article XX, paragraph 1 (d). The question however arises in what order
the Court should examine these questions of interpretation and appli-
cation of the Treaty. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua, the Court first examined the question
whether the United States conduct constituted a prima facie breach of

other provisions of the Treaty; it concluded that the United States had
"committed acts which are in contradiction with the terms of the Treaty",
but added that this was "subject to the question whether the exceptions in
Article XXI" of the 1956 Treaty, concerning inter alia protection of the
essential security interests of a party, "may be invoked to justify the acts
complained of' (I. C.J. Reports 1986, p. 140, para. 280). The Court thus
dealt first with the substantive provisions of the 1956 Treaty, breaches of
which had been alleged, before turning to Article XXI of the Treaty; in
effect, it analysed that Article as providing for "exceptions" to the sub-
stantive obligations provided for in other Articles of the Treaty (see ibid.,

p. 116, para. 222).

36. In the present case the United States has argued that Article XX,
paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty is not a limitation on Article X,
paragraph 1, nor yet a derogation from it; and that it is a substantive
provision that determines, defines and delimits the obligations of the
parties, simultaneously with and on the same level as Article X, para-
graph 1. The United States therefore contends that there is no compelling
reason to examine the question of breach of Article X, paragraph 1,
before turning to Article XX, paragraph 1 (d); the Court can, it

suggests, dismiss the Iranian claim either on the ground that the actions of
the United States did not involve a breach of Article X, paragraph 1, or
on the ground that those actions were measures necessary to protect the
essential security interests of the United States, and therefore justified
under Article XX, paragraph 1 (d). On this basis, the United States
suggests, the order in which the issues are treated is a matter for the
discretion of the Court.

37. The Court does not consider that the order in which the Articles of
the 1956 Treaty were dealt with in the case concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua was dictated by the

economy of the Treaty; it was rather an instance of the Court's "freedom
to select the ground upon which it will base itsjudgrnent" (Application of
the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants, Judgment,
I. C.J. Reports 1958, p. 62). In the present case, it appears to the Court
that there are particular considerations militating in favour of an exami-
nation of the application of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), before turning
to Article X, paragraph 1. It is clear that the original disputebetween the
Parties related to the legality of the actions of the United States, in thelight of international law on the use of force. At the time of those actions,
neither Party made any mention of the 1955 Treaty. The contention of
the United States at the time was that its attacks on the oil platforms
were justified as acts of self-defence, in response to what it regarded as
armed attacks by Iran,and on that basis it gave notice of its action to the
Security Council under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Before
the Court, it has continued to maintain that it was justified in acting as
it did in exercise of the right of self-defence; it contends that, even if
the Court were to find that its actions do not fa11within the scope of

Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), those actions were not wrongful since they
were necessary and appropriate actions in self-defence.

38. Furthermore, as the United States itself recognizes in its Rejoin-
der, "The self-defense issues presented in this case raise matters of the
highest importance to al1members of the international community", and
both Parties are agreed as to the importance of the implications of the
case in the field of the use of force, even though they draw opposite con-
clusions from this observation. The Court therefore considers that, to the
extent that its jurisdiction under Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955
Treaty authorizes it to examine and rule on such issues, it should do so.

39. The question of the relationship between self-defence and Ar-
ticle XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the Treaty has been disputed between the
Parties, in particular as regards thejurisdiction of the Court. The United
States emphasizes that the Court's jurisdiction in this case is limited, pur-
suant to Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty, to the interpreta-
tion and application of that Treaty, and does not extend directly to the
determination of the legality of any action of either Party under general
international law. It has contended that

"the Court need not address the question of self-defence . . .[Tlhe
scope of the exemption provided by Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), is
not limited to those actions that would also meet the standards for
self-defence under customary international law and the United
Nations Charter."

It however does not contend that the Treaty exempts it, as between the
parties, from the obligations of international law on the use of force, but
simply that where a party justifies certain action on the basis of
Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), that action has to be tested solely against
the criteria of that Article, and the jurisdiction conferred on the Court
by Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty goes no further than that.

40. In the view of the Court, the matter is one of interpretation of the
Treaty, and in particular of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d). The question is
whether the parties to the 1955 Treaty, when providing therein that it

should "not preclude the application of measures .. .necessary to protect[the]essential security interests" of either party, intended that such should
be the effect of the Treaty even where those measures involved a use of
armed force; and if so, whether they contemplated, or assumed, a limi-
tation that such use would have to comply with the conditions laid down
by international law. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua the Court took the view that "action
taken in self-defence, individual or collective,might be consideredas part

of the wider category of measures qualified in Article XXI" - the text in
that case corresponding to Article XX of the 1955 Treaty - "as 'neces-
sary to protect' the 'essential security interests' of a party" (1.C.J. Reports
1986, p. 117, para. 224); and it cited an extract from the proceedings of
the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee tending to show
that such had been the intentions of the Parties (ibid.). This approach is
consistent with the view that, when Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), is
invoked to justify actions involving the use of armed force, allegedly in
self-defence, the interpretation and application of that Article will neces-
sarily entai1 an assessment of the conditions of legitimate self-defence

under international law.

41. It should not be overlooked that Article 1 of the 1955 Treaty,
quoted in paragraph 31 above, declares that "There shall be firrn and
enduring peace and sincere friendship between the United States of
America and Iran." The Court found in 1996 that this Article "is such as
to throw light on the interpretation of the other Treaty provisions"
(1.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 815, para. 31). It is hardly consistent with
Article 1 to interpret Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), to the effect that the
"measures" there contemplated could include even an unlawful use of

force by one party against the other. Moreover, under the general rules of
treaty interpretation, as reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, interpretation must take into account "any relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties"
(Art. 31, para. 3 (c)). The Court cannot accept that Article XX, para-
graph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty was intended to operate wholly inde-
pendently of the relevant rules of international law on the use of force, so
as to be capable of being successfully invoked, even in the limited context
of a claim for breach of the Treaty, in relation to an unlawful use of
force. The application of the relevant rules of international law relating

to this question thus forms an integral part of the task of interpretation
entrusted to the Court by Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty.

42. The Court is therefore satisfied that its jurisdiction under
Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty to decide any question of
interpretation or application of (inter alia) Article XX, paragraph 1 (d),
of that Treaty extends, where appropriate, to the determination whether
action alleged to be justified under that paragraph was or was not anunlawful use of force, by reference to international law applicable to
this question, that is to Say, the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations and customary international law. The Court would however
emphasize that its jurisdiction remains limited to that conferred on it
by Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty. The Court is always
conscious that it has jurisdiction only so far as conferred by the consent
of the parties.

43. The Court will thus examine first the application of Article XX,
paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty, which in the circumstances of this
case, as explained above, involves the principle of the prohibition in
international law of the use of force, and the qualification to itconsti-
tuted by the right of self-defence. On the basis of that provision, a party
to the Treaty may be justified in taking certain measures which it consid-
ers to be "necessary" for the protection of its essential security interests.
As the Court emphasized, in relation to the comparable provision of the

1956 United StatesINicaragua Treaty in the case concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, "the measures taken
must not merely be such as tend to protect the essential security interests
of the party taking them, but must be 'necessary' for that purpose"; and
whether a given measure is "necessary" is 'hot purely a question for the
subjective judgment of the party" (1 C.J. Reports 1986, p. 141, para. 282),
and may thus be assessed by the Court. In the present case, the question
whether the measures taken were "necessary" overlaps with the question
of their validity as acts of self-defence. As the Court observed in its deci-
sion of 1986 the criteria of necessity and proportionality must be observed

if a measure is to be qualified as self-defence (see ibid., p. 103, para. 194,
and paragraph 74 below).

44. In this connection, the Court notes that it is not disputed between
the Parties that neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf was caused consid-
erable inconvenience and loss, and grave damage, during the Iran-Iraq
war. It notes also that this was to a great extent due to the presence of
mines and minefields laid by both sides. The Court has no jurisdiction to
enquire into the question of the extent to which Iran and Iraq complied
with the international legal rules of maritime warfare. It can however

take note of these circumstances, regarded by the United States as
relevant to its decision to take action against Iran which it considered
necessary to protect its essential security interests. Nevertheless, the
legality of the action taken by the United States has to be judged by
reference to Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty, in the light
of international law on the use of force in self-defence. 45. The United States has never denied that its actions against
the Iranian platforms amounted to a use of armed force. Some of the
details of the attacks, so far as established by the material before the Court,
may be pertinent to any assessment of the lawfulness of those actions. As
already indicated, there were attacks on two successive occasions, on
19 October 1987 and on 18 April 1988. The Court will examine whether
each of these met the conditions of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), as inter-
preted by reference to the relevant rules of international law.

46. The first installation attacked, on 19 October 1987,was the Resha-
dat complex, which consisted of three drilling and production platforms
- R-3, R-4 and R-7 - linked to a total of 27 oil wells. The crude oil
produced by the R-3 platform was transported by submarine pipeline to
the R-4 platform and thence, together with the crude oil produced by

R-4, to the R-7 platform that accommodated both production facilities
and living quarters. This latter platform was also connected by sub-
marine pipeline to another complex, named Resalat, which consisted of
three linked drilling and production platforms, referred to as R-1. Al1the
crude oil produced at the Reshadat and Resalat complexes, after gas and
water separation, was transported by undersea pipeline from the R-7
platform to Lavan Island. At the time of the United States attacks, these
complexes were not producing oil due to damage inflicted by prior Iraqi
attacks in October 1986, July 1987 and August 1987. Iran has maintained
that repair work on the platforms was close to completion in October
1987. The United Stateshas however challenged this assertion (see below,
paragraphs 65 and 93).

47. On 19 October 1987, four destroyers of the United States Navy,
together with naval support craft and aircraft, approached the Reshadat
R-7 platform. Iranian personnel was warned by the United States forces
via radio of the imminent attack and abandoned the facility. The United
States forces then opened fire on the platform; a unit later boarded and
searched it, and placed and detonated explosive charges on the remaining
structure. The United States ships then proceeded to the R-4 platform,
which was being evacuated; according to a report of a Pentagon spokes-
man, cited in the press and not denied by the United States, the attack on
the R-4 platform had not been included in the original plan, but it was
seen as a "target of opportunity". After having conducted reconnaissance
fire and then having boarded and searched the platform, the United
States forces placed and detonated explosive charges on this second
installation. As a result of the attack, the R-7 platform was almost com-
pletely destroyed and the R-4 platform was severely damaged. While the
attack was made solely on the Reshadat complex, it affected also theoperation of the Resalat complex. Iran states that production from the
Reshadat and Resalat complexes was interrupted for several years.

48. The nature of this attack, and its alleged justification, was pre-
sented by the United States to the United Nations Security Councilin the
following terms (letter from the United States Permanent Representative
of 19 October 1987, Sl19219) :

"In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, 1 wish, on behalf of my Government, to report that United
States forces have exercised the inherent right of self-defence under
international law by taking defensive action in response to attacks
by the Islamic Republic of Iran against United States vessels in the
Persian Gulf.
At approximately 11 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time on 16 October
1987, a Silkworm missile fired by Iranian forces from Iranian-
occupied Iraqi territory struck the Sea Isle City, a United States flag
vessel, in the territorial waters of Kuwait. This is the latest in a series
of such missile attacks against United States flag and other non-belli-
gerent vessels in Kuwaiti waters in pursuit of peaceful commerce.
These actions are, moreover, only the latest in a series of unlawful
armed attacks by Iranian forces against the United States, including
laying mines in international waters for the purpose of sinking or
damaging United States flag ships, and firing on United States air-
craft without provocation.

At approximately 7 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time on 19 October
1987, United States naval vessels destroyed the Iranian military
ocean platform at Rashadat [sic] (also known as Rostam) in inter-
national waters of the Persian Gulf. The military forces stationed on
this platform have engaged in a variety of actions directed against
United States flag and other non-belligerent vessels and aircraft.
They have monitored the movements of United States convoys by
radar and other means; CO-ordinated minelaying in the path of our
convoys; assisted small-boat attacks against other non-belligerent
shipping; and fired at United Statesmilitary helicopters,as occurred
on 8 October 1987. Prior warning was given to permit the evacua-
tion of the platform."

49. In its Counter-Memorial, the United States linked its previous
invocation of the right of self-defence with the application of Article XX,
paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty. It argued that Iranian actions dur-
ing the relevant period constituted a threat to essential security interests
of the United States, inasmuch as the flow of maritime commerce in thePersian Gulf was threatened by Iran's repeated attacks on neutral ves-
sels; that the lives of United Statesnationals were put at risk; that United
States naval vessels were seriously impeded in their security duties; and
that the United States Government and United States nationals suffered
severe financial losses. According to the United States, it was clear that
diplomatic measures were not a viable means of deterring Iran from its

attacks: "Accordingly, armed action in self-defense was the only option
left to the United States to prevent additional Iranian attacks."

50. The Court will thus first concentrate on the facts tending to show
the validity or otherwise of the claim to exercise the right of self-defence.
In its communication to the Security Council, cited above, the United
States based this claim on the existence of

"a series of unlawful armed attacks by Iranian forces against the
United States, including laying mines in international waters for the
purpose of sinking or damaging United States flag ships, and firing
on United States aircraft without provocation";

it referred in particular to a missile attack on the Sea Isle City as being
the specific incident that led to the attack on the Iranian platforms.
Before the Court, it has based itself more specifically on the attack on the

Sea Isle City, but has continued to assert the relevance of the other
attacks (see paragraph 62 below). To justify its choice of the platforms as
target, the United States asserted that they had "engaged in a variety of
actions directed against United States flag and other non-belligerent
vessels and aircraft". Iran has denied any responsibility for (in particular)
the attack on the Sea Isle City, and has claimed that the platforms had
no military purpose, and were not engaged in any military activity.

51. Despite having thus referred to attacks on vessels and aircraft of
other nationalities, the United States has not claimed to have been exer-
cising collective self-defence on behalf of the neutral States engaged in
shipping in the Persian Gulf; this would have required the existence of a
request made to the United States "by the State which regards itself as
the victim of an armed attack" (1.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 105, para. 199).
Therefore, in order to establish that it was legally justified in attacking
the Iranian platforms in exercise of the right of individual self-defence,
the United States has to show that attacks had been made upon it for
which Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were of such a natureas to be qualified as "armed attacks" within the meaning of that expres-
sion in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and as understood in
customary law on the use of force. As the Court observed in the case con-
cerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, it
is necessary to distinguish "the most grave forms of the use of force
(those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms" (1.C. J.
Reports 1986, p. 101, para. 191), since "In the case of individual self-
defence, the exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned having
been the victim of an armed attack" (ibid., p. 103, para. 195). The United
Statesmust also show that its actions were necessary and proportional to
the armed attack made on it, and that the platforms were a legitimate
military target open to attack in the exercise of self-defence.

52. Since it was the missile attack on the Sea Isle City that figured
most prominently in the United States contentions, the Court will first
examine in detail the evidence relating to that incident. The Sea Isle City
was a Kuwaiti tanker reflagged to the United States;on 16 October 1987
it had just ended a voyage under "Operation Earnest Will" (see para-
graph 24 above), when it was hit by a missile near Kuwait's Al-Ahmadi
Sea Island (or Mina al-Ahmadi) terminal. This incident, which caused
damage to the ship and injury to six crew members, was claimed by the
United States to be the seventh involving Iranian anti-ship cruise missiles
in the area in the course of 1987. The United States asserts that the mis-
sile that struck the Sea Isle City was launched by Iran from a facility
located in the Fao area. It recalls that in February 1986 Iran had taken
control of a large part of the Fao peninsula and had captured three
formerly Iraqi missile sites in the area, which it held at the time of the
attack. It also maintains that there was an additional active cruise missile
staging facility on Iranian territory near the Fao peninsula.

53. The evidence produced by the United States includes images,
taken by satellite or aerial reconnaissance aircraft, of the Fao area and
of the four alleged missile sites under Iranian control at the time of the
attack, as well as a complementary expert report describing and exam-
ining this imagery. Although the United States has indicated that it was
unable to recover and examine fragments of the specific missile that hit
the Sea Isle City, it has produced, in the present proceedings, a state-
ment by an independent expert, dated 27 March 1997, based on a pre-
vious examination by United States military analysts of fragments
retrieved from other similarincidents in early 1987. That evidenceshows,
in the United States submission, that the specific missile was a land-
launched HY-2 cruise missile of Chinese manufacture (alsoknown as the
"Silkworm" missile). The United States has also produced the testi-
mony, dated 21 May 1997, of two Kuwaiti officers, to the effect that
military personnel stationed on Kuwaiti islands had witnessed, in
January, September and October 1987, the launching of six missiles
from Iranian-controlled territory in the Fao area; in addition, one ofthese officers asserts that he personally observed the path of the missile
that struck the SeaIsle City on 16 October 1987.

54. Iran suggests that no credible evidence has been produced that
there were operational Iranian missile sites in the Fao area; it acknow-
ledges that it had captured three Iraqi missile sites in 1986, but these
"were heavily damaged during the fighting with Iraq" and "were inop-
erative throughout the period that Iranian forces held Fao". It therefore

denies that the missile that struck the Sea Isle City was launched from
those sites, or from an additional Iranian Silkworm missile site that the
United States claims to have identified in the area, the existence of which
Iran denies. Iran observes that the satellite images produced by the
United States are not very clear, and appeals to its own experts' opinion
to prove that the installations shown therein "bear no resemblance to a
normal Silkworm missile site". Moreover, according to Iran, other United
States evidence would show that, at the time of the attack, Iran had
operative missile sites only in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran maintains that
the statement of Kuwaiti officers produced by the United States is uncon-
vincing since it is largely based on hearsay and is in part inconsistent.

55. Iran also suggests the alternative theory that the missile that hit the
Sea Isle City was fired by Iraq, which, it contends, had both the appro-
priate missile capabilities,and an interest in internationalizing the con-
flict with Iran. According to Iran, the missile could have been launched
by Iraq either from an aircraft, from a naval vesse1 or from an "opera-
tional missile site located at a position on Fao just to the west of areas
occupied by Iran". Iran alleges that, while the maximum range of the
standard HY-2 (Silkworm) missile is 95 km, Iraq was in possession of
modified versions of that missile that could cover ranges up to 150 or
even 200 km. Moreover, according to an expert report produced by Iran,
a missile of this kind does not necessarily travel in a straight line and

could have been heading in the direction observed by the witnesses
invoked by the United States even if it had not been launched from
Iranian-held territory in the Fao area.
56. The United States claims that its satellite imagery shows that there
was no Iraqi missile launching facility in the Fao area at the time. It also
affirms, on the basis of an independent expert's opinion, that HY-2
missiles are not equipped with a system capable of guiding them along a
circuitous path, as contended by Iran. Finally, the United States rejects
the Iranian theory that the missile was launched from air or sea, both
because the fragments of missiles launched against Kuwaiti territory at
the same period indicated a land-launched missile, and because United
States AWACS radar planes did not detect any Iraqi military aircraft

aloft in the northern Persian Gulf at the time of the attacks. 57. For present purposes, the Court has simply to determine whether
the United States has demonstrated that it was the victim of an "armed
attack" by Iran such as to justify it using armed force in self-defence; and
the burden of proof of the facts showing the existence of such an attack
rests on the United States. The Court does not have to attribute respon-

sibility for firing the missile that struck the Sea Isle City, on the basis of
a balance of evidence, either to Iran or to Iraq; if at the end of the day
the evidence available is insufficient to establish that the missile was fired
by Iran, then the necessary burden of proof has not been discharged by
the United States.

58. As noted above, the United States claims that the missile that
struck the Sea Isle City was a ground-launched HY-2 anti-ship missile of
the type known as the "Silkworm", but it has not been able to produce
physical evidence of this, for example in the form of recovered fragments

of the missile. The Court will however examine the other evidence on the
hypothesis that the missile was of this type. The United States contends
that the missile was fired from Iranian-held territory in the Fao area, and
it has offered satellite pictures and expert evidence to show that there
was, at the time, Iranian missile-firing equipment present there. Even
with the assistance of the expert reports offered by both Parties, the
Court does not however find the satellite images sufficiently clear to
establish this point. The evidence that the particular missile came from
the Fao direction is the testimony, mentioned above, of a Kuwaiti mili-
tary officer, who claims to have observed the flight of the missile over-

head, and thus to be able to identify the approximate bearing on which it
was travelling. However, this testimony was given ten years after the
reported events; and the officer does not state that he observed the
launch of the missile (and the alleged firing point was too remote for this
to have been possible), nor that he saw the missile strike the Sea Isle
City, but merely that he saw a missile passing "overhead", and that that
vesse1 was struck by a missile "minutes later". In sum, the witness evi-
dence cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, the Court notes that there is
a discrepancy between the English and Arabic texts of the statement pro-
duced before the Court, both of which were signed by the witness; the

Arabic version lacks any indication of the bearing on which the observed
missile was travelling.
59. There is a conflict of evidence between the Parties as to the char-
acteristics of the Silkworm missile, in particular its maximum range, and
whether or not when fired it alwaysfollows a straight-linecourse. Accord-
ing to the United States, the maximum range of the missile is of the order
of 105 km, and this type of missile always follows a straight course until
it approaches its objective, when its on-board guidanceequipment causes
it to lock on to a target which may be up to 12 degrees on either side of
its course. Iran however contends that the missile may also be set to fol-

low either a curved or dog-leg path, and that its maximum range is less,
95 km at the most. The Court does not consider that it is necessary for itto decide between the conflicting expert testimony. It appears that at the
time different models of the missile existed, with differing programming
characteristics and maximum ranges. There is however no direct evidence
at al1of the type of missile that struck the Sea Isle City; the evidence as
to the nature of other missiles fired at Kuwaiti territory at this period is
suggestive, but no more. In considering whether the United States has
discharged the burden of proof that Iranian forces fired the missile that
struck the Sea Isle City, the Court must take note of this deficiency in the
evidence available.

60. In connection with its contention that the Sea Isle City was the
victim of an attack by Iran, the United Stateshas referred toan announce-
ment by President Ali Khameini of Iran some three months earlier, indi-
cating that Iran would attack the United States if it did not "leave the
region". This however is evidently not sufficient to justify the conclusion
that any subsequent attack on the United States in the Persian Gulf was
indeed the work of Iran. The United States also observes that, at the
time, Iran was blamed for the attack by "Lloyd's Maritime Information
Service, the General Council of British Shipping, Jane's Intelligence
Review and other authoritative public sources". These "public sources"
are by definition secondary evidence; and the Court has no indication of
what was the original source, or sources, or evidence on which the public
sourcesrelied. In this respect the Court would recall the caveatit included
in its Judgment in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activi-
ties in and against Nicaragua, that "Widespread reports of a fact may
prove on closer examination to derive from a single source, and such
reports, however numerous, will in such case have no greater value as
evidence than the original source." (1.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 41, para. 63.)

61. In short, the Court has examined with great care the evidence and
arguments presented on each side, and finds that the evidence indicative
of Iranian responsibility for the attack on the Sea Isle City is not suffi-
cient to support the contentions of the United States. The conclusion to
which the Court has come on this aspect of the case is thus that the
burden of proof of the existence of an armed attack by Iran on the
United States, in the form of the missile attack on the Sea Isle City, has
not been discharged.
62. In its notification to the Security Council, and before the Court,
the United States has however not relied solely on the Sea Isle City inci-
dent as constituting the "arrned attack" to which the United States
claimed to be responding. It asserted that that incident was "the latest in
a series of such missile attacks against United States flag and other non-
belligerent vessels in Kuwaiti waters in pursuit of peaceful commerce"
and that "These actions are, moreover, only the latest in a series of
unlawful armed attacks by Iranian forces against the United States,
including laying mines in international waters for the purpose of
sinking or damaging United States flag ships, and firing on United
States aircraft without provocation." (See paragraph 48 above.)

Before the Court, it has contended that the missile attack on the Sea Isle

City was itself an armed attack giving rise to the right of self-defence; the
alleged pattern of Iranian use of force, it is said, "added to the gravity of
the specific attacks, reinforced the necessity of action in self-defense, and
helped to shape the appropriate response".

63. The United States relies on the following incidents involving United
States-flagged, or United States-owned, vessels and aircraft, in the period
up to 19 October 1987, and attributes them to Iranian action: the mining
of the United States-flagged Bridgeton on 24 July 1987; the mining of the
United States-owned Texaco Caribbean on 10 August 1987; and firing
on United States Navy helicopters by Iranian gunboats, and from the
Reshadat oil platform, on 8 October 1987. The United States also claims

to have detected and boarded an Iranian vessel, the Iran Ajr, in the act of
laying mines in international waters some 50 nautical miles north-east of
Bahrain, in the vicinity of the entrance to Bahrain's deep-water shipping
channel. Iran has denied any responsibility for the mining of the Bridge-
ton and the Texaco Caribbean; as regards the Iran Ajr, Iran has
admitted that the vessel was carrying mines, but denies that they were
being laid at the time it was boarded, and claims that its only mission
was to transport them by a secure route to a quite different area.

64. On the hypothesis that al1 the incidents complained of are to be

attributed to Iran, and thus setting aside the question, examined above,
of attribution to Iran of the specific attack on the Sea Isle City, the ques-
tion is whether that attack, either in itself or in combination with the rest
of the "series of. . .attacks" cited by the United States can be catego-
rized as an "armed attack" on the United States justifying self-defence.
The Court notes first that the Sea Isle City was in Kuwaiti waters at the
time of the attack on it, and that a Silkworm missile fired from (it is
alleged) more than 100 km away could not have been aimed at the spe-
cific vessel, but simply programmed to hit some target in Kuwaiti waters.
Secondly, the Texaco Caribbean, whatever its ownership, was not flying
a United States flag, so that an attack on the vessel is not in itself to be

equated with an attack on that State. As regards the alleged firing on
United States helicopters from Iranian gunboats and from the Reshadatoil platform, no persuasive evidence has been supplied to support this
allegation. There is no evidence that the minelaying alleged to have been
carried out by the Iran Ajr, at a time when Iran was at war with Iraq, was
aimed specifically at the United States; and similarly it has not been

established that the mine struck by the Bridgeton was laid with
the specific intention of harming that ship, or other United States vessels.
Even taken cumulatively, and reserving, as already noted, the question
of Iranian responsibility, these incidents do not seem to the Court to
constitute an armed attack on the United States, of the kind that the
Court, in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua, qualified as a "most grave" form of the use of
force (see paragraph 51 above).

65. The second occasion on which Iranian oil installations were
attacked was on 18 April 1988, with the action against the Salman and
Nasr complexes. The Salman offshore oil complex consisted of seven
interconnectedplatforms, includingone drilling and two production plat-
forms. Oil extracted from 21 wells was transported by submarine pipeline
to this complex, and then on to Lavan Island after initial water and gas

separation. This complex had been attacked by Iraq in October and
November 1986, and was still undergoing repairs in April 1988; by that
time, according to Iran, the works were "virtually completed", but the
United States questions this. The Nasr complex comprised one central
platform, one flaring point, and six oil-producing platforms grouped
around the central platform, served by 44 wells in the Sirri field and four
wells in the Nosrat field. Crude oil from al1 these wells was transported
by submarine pipeline to the central platform, and from there to Sirri
Island. This complex was functioning normally in April 1988.

66. United States naval forces attacked the Salman and Nasr com-
plexes on 18 April 1988. Two destroyers and a supply ship were involved
in the attack on the Salman complex: shortly before 8 a.m., local time,
the United States forces warned the personnel on the platforms that the
attack was due to begin; some of them began to evacuate the installation,
while others opened fire. A few minutes later, shelling on the complex
commenced from United States ships, warplanes and helicopters. United
States forces then boarded some of the platforms (but not that containing

the control centre), and placed and detonated explosives. Iran states that
the attack caused severe damage to the production facilities of the
platforms, and that the activities of the Salman complex were totallyinterrupted for four years, its regular production being resumed only
in September 1992, and reaching a normal level in 1993.

The central platform of the Nasr complex was attacked at around
8.15 a.m. by three United States warships and a number of helicopters.
After having been warned of the imminent military action, Iranian per-
sonnel evacuated the platform. The United States forces bombarded the
installation and almost completely destroyed it; the platform was not
boarded, since it was considered unsafe due to secondary explosions and
fire. According to Iranian accounts, activities in the whole Nasr complex
(including oil production and water injection) were interrupted as a con-
sequence of the attack and did not resume until nearly four years later.

67. The nature of the attacks on the Salman and Nasr complexes, and
their alleged justification, was presented by the United States to the
United Nations Security Council in the following terms (letter from the
United States Permanent Representative of 18 April 1988, SI19791) :

"In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, 1wish, on behalf of my Government, to report that United
States forces have exercised their inherent right of self-defence under

international law by taking defensive action in response to an attack
by the Islamic Republic of Iran against a United States naval vesse1
in international waters of the Persian Gulf. The actions taken are
necessary and are proportionate to the threat posed by such hostile
Iranian actions.

At approximately 1010 Eastern Daylight Time on 14 April the
USS Samuel B. Roberts was struck by a mine approximately 60 miles
east of Bahrain, in international waters. Ten US sailors were injured,
one seriously, and the ship was damaged. The mine which struck the
Roberts was one of at least four mines laid in this area. The United

States has subsequently identified the mines by type, and we have
conclusive evidence that these mines were manufactured recently in
Iran. The mines were laid in shipping lanes known by Iran to be
used by US vessels, and intended by them to damage or sink such
vessels. This is but the latest in a series of offensive attacks and
provocations Iranian naval forces have taken against neutral
shipping in the international waters of the Persian Gulf.

Through diplomatic channels, the United States has informed the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on four separate occa-
sions, most recently 19 October 1987, that the United States would
not accept Iran's minelaying in international waters or in the waters of neutral States. In October, my Government indicated that the
United States did not seek a military confrontation with Iran, but
that it would take appropriate defensive measures against such hos-
tile actions.

Starting at approximately O100 Eastern Daylight Time 18 April
US forces attacked military targets in the Persian Gulf which have
been used for attacks against non-belligerent shipping in interna-
tional waterways of the Gulf.

The US actions have been against legitimate military targets. Al1
feasible measures have been taken to minimize the risk of civilian
damage or casualties .. ."

68. The Court notes that the attacks on the Salman and Nasr plat-
forms were not an isolated operation, aimed simply at the oil installa-
tions, as had been the case with the attacks of 19 October 1987; they
formed part of a much more extensive military action, designated "Opera-
tion Praying Mantis", conducted by the United States against what it
regarded as "legitimate military targets"; armed force was used, and
damage done to a number of targets, including the destruction of two
Iranian frigates and other Iranian naval vessels and aircraft.

69. The USS Samuel B. Roberts was a warship returning to Bahrain
on 14 April 1988, after escorting a convoy of United States-flagged mer-
chant ships in the context of "Operation Earnest Will", when it hit a
mine near Shah Allum Shoal in the central Persian Gulf. The United
States reports that, in the days following the attack, Belgian and Dutch
mine-clearing forces and its own navy discovered several mines bearing
Iranian serial numbers in the vicinity and it concludes therefore that the
mine struck by the USS Samuel B. Roberts was laid by Iran. It also
adduces other discoveries of Iranian mining activities at the time (includ-
ing the boarding by United States forces of the Iranian vesse1 Iran Ajr,
said to have been caught in the act of laying mines, referred to in para-

and conclusionse), of the internationalntsshipping communityilitar(see para-

graph 60 above), al1 allegedly demonstrating that Iran made a general
practice of using mines to attack neutral shipping.

70. Iran denies that it had systematic recourse to minelaying in the
Persian Gulf and suggests that evidence produced by the United States is
unpersuasive. Furtherrnore, it contends that the United States has sub-
mitted no independent evidence that the laying of the mine that hit theUSS Samuel B. Roberts is attributable to Iran. Iran also suggests that the
mine may have been laid by Iraq, a hypothesis that the United States
rejects.
71. As in the case of the attack on the Sea Isle City, the first question
is whether the United States has discharged the burden of proof that the
USS Samuel B. Roberts was the victim of a mine laid by Iran. The Court
notes that mines were being laid at the time by both belligerents in the
Iran-Iraq war, so that evidence of other minelaying operations by Iran is
not conclusive as to responsibility of Iran for this particular mine. In its
communication to the Security Council in connection with the attack of
18 April 1988, the United States alleged that "The mines were laid in
shippinglanes known by Iran to be used by US vessels, and intended by
them to damage or sink such vessels" (paragraph 67 above). Iran has
claimed that it laid mines only for defensive purposes in the Khor Abdul-
lah Channel, but the United States has submitted evidence suggesting
that Iran's mining operations were more extensive. The main evidence
that the mine struck by the USS Samuel B. Roberts was laid by Iran was
the discovery of moored mines in the same area, bearing serial numbers
matching other Iranian mines, in particular those found aboard the vessel
Iran Ajr (see paragraph 63 above). This evidence is highly suggestive, but
not conclusive.

72. The Court notes further that, as on the occasion of the earlier
attack on oil platforms, the United States in its communication to the
Security Council claimed to have been exercising the right of self-defence
in response to the "attack" on the USS Samuel B. Roberts, linking it also
with "a series of offensive attacks and provocations Iranian naval forces
have taken against neutral shipping in the international waters of the Per-
sian Gulf' (paragraph 67 above). Before the Court, it has contended, as
in the case of the missile attack on the Sea Isle City, that the mining was
itself an armed attack giving rise to the right of self-defence and that the
alleged pattern of Iranian use of force "added to the gravity of the spe-
cific attacks, reinforced the necessity of action in self-defense, and helped
to shape the appropriate response" (see paragraph 62 above). No attacks
on United States-flagged vessels (as distinct from United States-owned
vessels), additional to those cited as justification for the earlier attacks on
the Reshadat platforms, have been brought to the Court's attention,
other than the mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts itself. The question
is therefore whether that incident sufficed in itself to justify action inlf-
defence, as amounting to an "armed attack". The Court does not exclude
the possibility that the mining of a single military vessel might be suffi-
cient to bring into play the "inherent right of self-defence" ;but in view of
al1 the circumstances, including the inconclusiveness of the evidence of
Iran's responsibility for the mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts, theCourt is unable to hold that the attacks on the Salman and Nasr plat-
forms have been shown to have been justifiably made in response to an
"armed attack" on the United States by Iran, in the form of the mining of
the USS Samuel B. Roberts.

73. As noted above (paragraph 43), in the present case a question of
whether certain action is "necessary" arises both as an element of inter-
national law relating to self-defence and on the basis of the actual terms
of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty, already quoted,
whereby the Treaty does "not preclude . . .measures . . .necessary to
protect [the] essential security interests" of either party. In this latter
respect, the United States claims that it considered in good faith that the

attacks on the platforms were necessary to protect its essential security
interests, and suggests that "A measure of discretion should be afforded
to a party's good faith application of measures to protect its essential
security interests." Iran was prepared to recognize some of the interests
referred to by the United States - the safety of United States vessels and
crew, and the uninterrupted flow of maritime commerce in the Persian
Gulf - as being reasonable security interests of the United States, but
denied that the United States actions against the platforms could be
regarded as "necessary" to protect those interests. The Court does not
however have to decide whether the United States interpretation of

Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), on this point is correct, since the require-
ment of international law that measures taken avowedly in self-defence
must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and objective, leaving
no room for any "measure of discretion". The Court will therefore turn
to the criteria of necessity and proportionality in the context of inter-
national law on self-defence.

74. In its decision in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary

Activities in and against Nicaragua, the Court endorsed the shared view
of the parties to that case that in customary law "whether the response to
the [armed] attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of the
necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in self-defence"
(1.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 103, para. 194). One aspect of these criteria is the
nature of the target of the force used avowedly in self-defence. In its com-
munications to the Security Council, in particular in that of 19 October
1987 (paragraph 46 above), the United States indicated the grounds onwhich it regarded the Iranian platforms as legitimatetargets for an armed
action in self-defence. In the present proceedings, the United States has
continued to maintain that they were such, and has presented evidence
directed to showing that the platforms collected and reported intelligence
concerning passing vessels, acted as a military communication link co-
ordinating Iranian naval forces and served as actual staging bases to
launch helicopter and small boat attacks on neutral commercial shipping.
The United States has referred to documents and materials found by its

forces aboard the vesse1 Iran Ajr (see paragraph 63 above), allegedly
establishing that the Reshadat platforms served as military communica-
tion facilities. It has also affirmed that the international shipping com-
munity at the time was aware of the military use of the platforms, as
confirmed by the costly steps commercial vessels took to avoid them, and
by various witness reports describing Iranian attacks. The United States
has also submitted expert analysis of the conditions and circumstances
surrounding these attacks, examining their pattern and location in the
light of the equipment at Iran's disposal. Finally, the United States has
produced a number of documents, found on the Reshadat complex when

it was attacked, allegedly corroborating the platforms' military function.
In particular, it contends that these documents prove that the Reshadat
platforms had monitored the movements of the Sea Isle City on 8 August
1987. On the other hand, the forces that attacked the Salman and Nasr
complexes were not able to board the platforms containing the control
centres, and did not therefore seize any material (if indeed such existed)
tending to show the use of those complexes for military purposes.

75. Iran recognizes the presence of limited military personnel and
equipment on the Reshadat platforms, but insists that their purpose was
exclusively defensive and justified by previous Iraqi attacks on its oil pro-
duction facilities. Iran further challenges the evidence adduced by the
United States in this regard. It alleges that documents found aboard the
Iran Ajr and the Reshadat platforms are read out of their proper context,
incorrectly translated and actually consistent with the platforms' purely

defensive role; and that military expert analysis relied on by the United
States is hypothetical and contradictory. Iran asserts further that reports
and testimony referred to by the United States are mostly non-specific
about the use of the platforms as staging bases to launch attacks, and
that the equipment at its disposa1 could be used from mainland and off-
shore islands, without any need to have recourse to the platforms. 76. The Court is not sufficiently convinced that the evidence available
supports the contentions of the United States as to the significance of the
military presence and activity on the Reshadat oil platforms; and it notes
that no such evidence is offered in respect of the Salman and Nasr com-
plexes. However, even accepting those contentions, for the purposes of
discussion, the Court is unable to hold that the attacks made on the plat-
forms could have been justified as acts of self-defence. The conditions for
the exercise of the right of self-defence are well settled :as the Court
observed in its Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, "The submission of the exercise of the right of self-
defence to the conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of cus-
tomary international law" (ZC..J. Reports 1996 (1), p. 245, para. 41) ;

and in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua, the Court referred to a specific rule "whereby self-
defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the
armed attack and necessary to respond to it" as "a rule well established
in customary international law" (1.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 94, para. 176).
In the case both of the attack on the Sea Isle City and the mining of
the USS Samuel B. Roberts, the Court is not satisfied that the attacks on
the platforms were necessary to respond to these incidents. In this
connection, the Court notes that there is no evidence that the United
States complained to Iran of the military activities of the platforms, in
the same way as it complained repeatedly of minelaying and attacks on
neutral shipping, which does not suggest that the targeting of the plat-

forms was seen as a necessary act. The Court would also observe that
in the case of the attack of 19 October 1987, the United States forces
attacked the R-4 platform as a "target of opportunity", not one previ-
ously identified as an appropriate military target (see paragraph 47
above).

77. As to the requirement of proportionality, the attack of 19 October
1987 might, had the Court found that it was necessary in response to the
Sea Isle City incident as an armed attack committed by Iran, have been
considered proportionate. In the case of the attacks of 18 April 1988,
however, they were conceived and executed as part of a more extensive

operation entitled "Operation Praying Mantis" (see paragraph 68 above).
The question of the lawfulness of other aspects of that operation is not
before the Court, since it is solely the action against the Salman and Nasr
complexes that is presented as a breach of the 1955 Treaty; but the Court
cannot assess in isolation the proportionality of that action to the attack
to which it was said to be a response; it cannot close its eyes to the scale
of the whole operation, which involved, inter alia, the destruction of two
Iranian frigates and a number of other naval vessels and aircraft. As a
response to the mining, by an unidentified agency, of a single United
States warship, which was severely damaged but not sunk, and without
loss of life, neither "Operation Praying Mantis" as a whole, nor even thatpart of it that destroyedthe Salman and Nasr platforms, can be regarded,
in the circumstances of this case, as a proportionate use of force in
self-defence.

78. The Court thus concludes from the foregoing that the actions
carried out by United States forces against Iranian oil installations on
19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988 cannot be justified, under Article XX,
paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty, as being measures necessary to pro-
tect the essential security interests of the United States, since those
actions constituted recourse to armed force not qualifying, under inter-
national law on the question, as acts of self-defence, and thus did not fa11
within the category of measures contemplated, upon its correct interpre-
tation, by that provision of the Treaty.

79. Having satisfied itself that the United States may not rely, in the
circumstances of the case, on the defence to the claim of Iran afforded by
Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty, the Court has now to
turn to that claim, made under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty,
which provides that "Between the territories of the two High Contracting
Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation." In that
respect, Iran's submission is that "in attacking and destroying on 19Octo-
ber 1987 and 18 April 1988 the oil platforms referred to in Iran's Appli-
cation, the United Statesbreached its obligations to Iran under Article X,
paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Amity . . ."It contends that the United
States attacks on the oil platforms were directed against commercial
facilities that were protected by Article X, paragraph 1, that they
"impeded the normal functioning of the oil platforms and that they even
resulted in the complete interruption of the platforms' activities, . . thus
preventing gravely ab ovo the possibility for Iran to enjoy freedom of
commerce as guaranteed by" that Article.

80. As noted above (paragraph 31), in its Judgrnent of 12 December
1996 on the preliminary objection of the United States, the Court
had occasion, for the purposes of ascertaining and defining the scope
of its jurisdiction, to interpret a number of provisions of the 1955
Treaty, including Article X, paragraph 1. It noted that the Applicant
had not alleged that any military action had affected its freedom of
navigation, so that the only question to be decided was "whether the
actions of the United States complained of by Iran had the potential
to affect 'freedom of commerce"' as guaranteed by that provision (1 C..J.Reports 1996 (II), p. 817, para. 38). The Court also rejected the view,
advanced by the United States, that the word "commerce" in Article X,
paragraph 1, is confined to maritime commerce (ibid., para. 43). After
examining the contentions of the Parties as to the meaning of the word,
the Court concluded that

"it would be a natural interpretation of the word 'commerce' in
Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of 1955 that it includes com-
mercial activities in general - not merely the immediate act of pur-
chase and sale, but also the ancillary activities integrally related to
commerce" (ibid., p. 819, para. 49).

81. In 1996 the Court was concerned only to resolve the questions of
its jurisdiction raised by the preliminary objection presented by the
United States. For that purpose, it was not called upon to decide whether
the actions of the United States did in fact interfere with freedom of com-
merce between the territories of the Parties, but only whether, as stated in
the Judgment, the lawfulness of those actions could be evaluated in rela-

tion to Article X, paragraph 1 (ibid., p. 820, para. 51). It has been suggested
by the United States in its written pleadings that that Article does not
in fact create specific legal obligations relevant to Iran's claims, but
is merely an "aspirational" provision, but this view, which the United
States did not press during the oral proceedings, does not seem to the
Court to be consistent either with the structure of the 1955 Treaty or
with the Court's 1996 Judgment.
82. In that decision, the Court observed that it did not then have to
enter into the question whether Article X, paragraph 1, "is restricted to
commerce 'between' the Parties" (ibid., p. 817, para. 44). However it is

now common ground between the Parties that that provision is in terms
limited to the protection of freedom of commerce "between the territories
of the two High Contracting Parties". The Court observes that it is oil
exports from Iran to the United States that are relevant to the case, not
such exports in general. The United States has argued that for the pur-
pose of interpreting Article X, paragraph 1, what must be considered is
whether oil from the specific platforms attacked was, or would have been,
exported to the United States. In this connection it questions whether the
platforms could be said to be on the "territory" of Iran, inasmuch as they
are outside Iran's territorial sea, though upon its continental shelf, and

within its exclusive economiczone. The Court does not however consider
tenable an interpretation of the 1955 Treaty that would have differenti-
ated, for the purposes of "freedom of commerce", between oil produced
on the land territory or the territorial sea of Iran, and oil produced on its
continental shelf, in the exercise of its sovereign rights of exploration and
exploitation of the shelf, and parallel rights over the exclusive economic
zone. 83. In the 1996 Judgment, the Court further emphasized that
"Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of 1955 does not strictly speaking
protect 'commerce' but 'freedom of commerce"', and continued:

"Unless such freedom is to be rendered illusory, the possibility
must be entertained that it could actually be impeded as a result of
acts entailing the destruction of goods destined to be exported, or
capable of affecting their transport and storage with a view to
export." (1.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 819, para. 50.)
The Court also noted that

"Iran's oil production, a vital part of that country's economy, con-
stitutes an important component of its foreign trade.

On the material now before the Court, it is . . not able to deter-
mine if and to what extent the destruction of the Iranian oil plat-

forms had an effect upon the export trade in Iranian oil . . .(Ibid.,
p. 820, para. 51.)
If, at the present stage of the proceedings, the Court were to find that
Iran had established that such was the case, the claim of Iran under
Article X, paragraph 1, could be upheld.
84. The arguments of the Parties in relation to Iran's claim under that

provision have therefore focused on the first and last stages of the pro-
ductionlexport process. In order to establish that freedom of commerce
in oil between the territories of the Parties was affected by the attack, so
that the destruction of the platforms constituted a breach of Article X,
paragraph 1, Iran has sought to show that oil produced or processed by,
stored on, or transported from the platforms attacked could, to some
degree, have been exported to the United States, but this was prevented
by the destruction of the platforms. This has involved explanation of the
construction and operation of the platforms, and assessment of the impli-
cations of the damage caused to them by the attacks. The question has
also been raised as to whether there was an impact on overall oil exports
to the United States, contemporaneous with, and attributable to, the

attacks, or a potential impact of this kind, amounting to an interference
with "freedom" of commerce between the Parties' territories.

85. Before turning to the facts and to the details of Iran's claim, the
Court will mention one consideration advanced by the United States
which, if upheld, would render unnecessary any further examination of
the effects of the attacks on the platforms. The United States alleges, as
has already been noted in connection with its argument founded on self-
defence, that military forces were stationed on the platforms and played
a role in the attacks, attributable to Iran, on United States vessels and
other neutral shipping (see for example the communication from the
United States to the United Nations Security Council of 19 October

1987, quoted in paragraph 48 above). On this basis, the United Statesargues that the guarantee of "freedom of commerce" under Article X,
paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty cannot have been intended to shield one
party's military activities against the other, and that therefore the cover-
age of that Article cannot be extended to the platforms in question. The
United States has not succeeded, to the satisfaction of the Court, in
establishing that the limited military presence on the platforms, and the
evidence as to communications to and from them, could be regarded as

justifying treating the platforms asmilitary installations (see paragraph 76
above). For the same reason, the Court is unable to regard them as out-
side the protection afforded by Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955
Treaty.

86. Iran's initial claim that the attacks violated Article X, paragraph 1,
was based on the contention that "they destroyed important petroleum
installations used by Iran for the commercial exploitation of its natural
resources", and that "fundamental economic and commercial activities
including oil production, storage and transportation were affected". The

Court in its 1996 Judgment contemplated the possibility that freedom of
commerce could be impeded not only by "the destruction of goods des-
tined to be exported", but also by acts "capable of affecting their trans-
port and their storage with a view to export" (1.C.J. Reports 1996 (II),
p. 819, para. 50). In the view of the Court, the activities of the platforms
are to be regarded, in general, as commercial in nature; it does not, how-
ever, necessarily follow that any interference with such activities involves
an impact on the freedom of commerce between the territories of Iran
and the United States.

87. As regards the first of these categories of activity, "acts entailing

the destruction of goods destined to be exported", the United States
observes, first, that the attacks on the platforms did not destroy any oil as
such; and secondly that in any event the platforms were not engaged in
producing goods destined for export. It explains that the oil extracted by
the platforms attacked was not in a form capable of being exported,
either when it came on to or when it left the platforrns, since to transform
it into a product capable of being safely exported it was necessary to sub-
ject it to extensive processing, involving the extraction of gas, hydrogen
sulphide and water. Iran however suggests that the question is not
whether the oil was capable of being safely exported, but whether it was

a good destined for export; in addition, it observes that equipment
required for an initial processing of the oil extracted was situated on the
platforms and destroyed with them by the United States attacks. It does
not however contend that that initial processing rendered the oil capable
of being safely exported.

88. The Court also included in the category of acts interfering withfreedom of commerce "acts . . .capable of affecting [the] transport and
storage with a view to export" of goods destined to be exported. No
storage of oil was effected on the platforms; as regards transport, the
Court noted in 1996 that

"the oil pumped from the platforms attacked in October 1987 passed
from there by subsea line to the oil terminal on Lavan Island and
that the Salman complex, object of the attack of April 1988, was
also connected to the oil terminal on Lavan Island by subsea line"
(1.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 819-820, para. 50).

Similarly, the Nasr central platform served as a crude oil collecting point
for transfer by pipeline to Sirri Island. An act interfering with these sub-
sea lines would therefore prima facie have been an interference with the
transport of goods mainly destined for export; but according to the
United States the attacks on the platforms did not in fact damage the
subsea lines, but only the portions of the platform above the waterline.

An attempt was made by the United States Navy to destroy the power
generation platform of the Salman complex, and if this had been success-
ful it would, according to Iran, have destroyed the equipment necessary
for the transport of oil to Lavan Island, but the explosives placed failed
to detonate.

89. The Court notes that the conclusion which the United States is
inviting the Court to reach is, in effect, that military attacks on installa-
tions used for commercial oil exploitation, which caused - and were
intended to cause - very considerable damage to those installations,

proved to be limited in their effects to the extent necessary to avoid a
breach of a specific commercial treaty. Yet the Court notes also that
there is no evidence that the relevant military orders were devised with
this outcome in mind, or even that the existence and scope of the treaty
was taken into account at al1 at the time of the attacks. However that
may be, the Court considers that where a State destroys another State's
means of production and transport of goods destined for export, or
means ancillary or pertaining to such production or transport, there is in
principle an interferencewith the freedom of international commerce. In
destroyingthe platforms, whose function, taken as a whole, was precisely
to produce and transport oil, the military actions made commerce in oil,

at that time and from that source, impossible, and to that extent preju-
diced freedom of commerce. While the oil, when it left the platform com-
plexes, was not yet in a state to be safely exported, the fact remains that
it could be already at that stage destined for export, and the destruction
of the platform prevented further treatment necessary for export. The
Court therefore finds that the protection of freedom of commerce under
Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty applied to the platforms
attacked by the United States, and the attacks thus impeded Iran's free-
dom of commerce. However, the question remains whether there was inthis case an interferencewith freedom of commerce "between the territo-

ries of the High Contracting Parties".

90. The United States in fact contends further that there was in any
event no breach of Article X, paragraph 1, inasmuch as, even assuming
that the attacks caused some interference with freedom of commerce, it
did not interfere with freedom of commerce "between the territories of
the two High Contracting Parties". First, as regards the attack of 19 Octo-

ber 1987 on the Reshadat platforms, it observes that the platforms were
under repair as a result of an earlier attack on them by Iraq; conse-
quently, they were not engaged in, or contributing to, commerce between
the territories of the Parties. Secondly, as regards the attack of 18 April
1988 on the Salman and Nasr platforms, it draws attention to United
States Executive Order 12613,signed by President Reagan on 29 October
1987,which prohibited, with immediate effect, the import into the United
States of most goods (including oil) and services of Iranian ,origin. As

a consequence of the embargo imposed by this Order, there was, it is
suggested, no commerce between the territories of the Parties that could
be affected, and consequently no breach of the Treaty protecting it.

91. As the Court noted in its 1996 Judgment, it was then not contested
between the Parties (and is not now contested) that "oil exports from
Iran to the United States were - to some degree - ongoing at least until
after the destruction of the first set of oil platforms", Le., 19 October
1987 (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 818, para. 44). It appears also to be

accepted by both Parties that the oil or petroleum products reaching the
United States during this period were to some extent derived from crude
oil produced by the platforms that were later subjected to attack. Iran
has explained that in peace time it had sold crude oil in cargoes where the
producing field was specifically identified, but during the Iran-Iraq war
al1Iranian light crudes and heavy crudes were mixed and sold generically,
as either "Iranian light" or "Iranian heavy". Iran has asserted, and the
United States has not denied, that there was a market for Iranian crude

oil directly imported into the United States up to the issuance of Execu-
tive Order 12613 of 29 October 1987. Thus Iranian oil exports did up to
that time constitute the subject of "commerce between the territories of
the High Contracting Parties" within the meaning of Article X, para-
graph 1, of the 1955 Treaty.

92. At the time of the attack of 19 October 1987 no oil whatsoever was

being produced or processed by the Reshadat and Resalat platforms,

47since these had been put out of commission by earlier Iraqi attacks.
While it is true that the attacks caused a major setback to the process of
bringing the platforms back into production, there was at the moment of
the attacks on these platforms no ongoing commerce in oil produced or
processed by them. Iran however indicates that at the time of the attack

the platforms were nearly repaired and were about to resume production;
it argues that there was therefore an interferencewith "freedom of com-
merce", when commerce is conceived as a pattern of trade over the years
and not a temporary phenomenon. Injury to potential for future com-
merce is however, in the Court's view, not necessarily to be identified
with injury to freedom of commerce, within the meaning of Article X,
paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. In its Judgment of 12 December 1996,
the Court emphasized that the Treaty protected "freedom of commerce"
rather than merely "commerce"; but deduced from this no more than
that

"the possibility must be entertained that [that freedom] could actu-
ally be impeded as a result of acts entailing the destruction of goods
destined to be exported, or capable of affecting their transport and
their storage with a view to export" (1 C.J. Reports 1996 (II),
p. 819, para. 50; emphasis added).

93. There is however a further aspect of the question. According to
Iran, the "Production Commissioning" schedule for the repair of the
platforms contemplated that production would resume at a date around
24 October 1987, but the Court has no information whether, at the time
of the attacks, the works were up to schedule. According to Iran, at the

time of the attacks the turbines that supplied power to the platforms were
being dismantled for repair, which does not suggest that the works were
within a few days of completion. On 29 October 1987 United States
Executive Order 12613 was issued, which put an end to imports of
Iranian crude oil into the United States. Iran has not brought evidence
to show that, if no attack had been made on the Reshadat platforms, pro-
duction from them would have been an element of "commerce" between
the two States before al1 direct commerce was halted by that Executive
Order, and the Court cannot regard that point as established.

94. The embargo imposed by Executive Order 12613 was already in
force when the attacks on the Salman and Nasr platforms were carried
out; and, as just indicated, it hasnot been shown that the Reshadat and
Resalat platforms would, had it not been for the attack of 19 Octo-
ber 1987, have resumed production before the embargo was imposed.
The Court must therefore consider the significance of that Executive
Order for the interpretation and application of Article X, paragraph 1, of
the 1955 Treaty. Iran has not disputed that the effect of the Executive
Order was to halt al1 direct exports of Iranian crude oil to the United

States. The United States therefore argues that "any damage done to
Iran's oil platforms by US actions was irrelevant to Iran's ability toexport oil to customers located in the United States", and that conse-
quently the attacks did not constitute a violation of the freedom of com-
merce "between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties". Iran
however, while not presenting any forma1 submission or claim that the
embargo was unlawful as itself a breach of Article X, paragraph 1, of the
1955 Treaty, has asserted that such was the case, and therefore suggests
that the argument advanced by the United States amounts to a party
taking advantage of its own wrong. The Iranian contention rests on the
hypothesis that the embargo was a breach of the 1955 Treaty, and not
justified under Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), thereof; but these are ques-
tions which Iran has chosen not to put formally in issue, and on which
the Court has thus not heard full argument. The Court is here concerned
with the practical effects of the embargo, about which there is no dispute.

95. In response to the contention of the United States that the damage
to the platforms was irrelevant to Iranian oil exports to the United
States, Iran argues that this conclusion does not follow from the mere
fact that direct import into the United States of Iranian crude oil, as
such, ceased with the issue of the embargo. Iran suggests that "It is in the
nature of the international oil trade thatIranian oil could not be excluded
from the United States": "If Iranian crude oil was received by a refin-
ery", for example in Western Europe, "and if that refinery in turn
exported products to the United States, then it follows that a quantity of
Iranian oil was necessarily imported into the United States in the form of
products." Iran has observed that, as a result of the embargo, it found
itself in 1987 with a surplus crude oil production of approximately
345,000 barrels per day, and had to find other outlets, namely in the
Mediterranean and North-West Europe. At the same time, the United
States had to make good the shortfall resulting from the prohibition of
Iranian crude oil imports, and therefore increased its existing imports of
petroleum products from refineries in the Mediterranean and Western
Europe. Iran has submitted to the Court an expert report showing, inter
alia, a very considerable increase in exports of Iranian crude oil to West-
ern Europe from 1986 to 1987, and again in 1988, and an increase in
United States imports of petroleum products from Western European
refineries.

96. The Court sees no reason to question the view that, over the
period during which the United States embargo was in effect, petroleum
products were reachingthe United States, in considerablequantities, that
were derived in part from Iranian crude oil. Executive Order 12613 con-
tained an exception (Section 2 (b)) whereby the embargo was not to
apply to "petroleum products refined from Iranian crude oil in a third
country". It could reasonably be argued that, had the platforms not been
attacked, some of the oil that they would have produced would have beenincluded in the consignments processed in Western Europe so as to pro-
duce the petroleumproducts reachingthe United States.Whether, accord-
ing to international trade law criteria, such as the "substantial transfor-
mation" principle, or the "value added approach", the final product
could still retain for some purposes an Iranian character, is not the ques-
tion before the Court. What the Court has to determine is not whether
something that could be designated "Iranian" oil entered the United
States, in some form, during the currency of the embargo; it is whether
there was "commerce" in oil between the territories of Iran and the
United States during that time, within the meaning given to that terrn in
the 1955 Treaty.
97. In this respect, what seems to the Court to be determinative is the
nature of the successive commercial transactions relating to the oil,
rather than the successive technical processes that it underwent. What
Iran regards as "indirect" commerce in oil between itself and the United
States involved a series of commercial transactions: a sale by Iran of
crude oil to a customer in Western Europe, or some third country other
than the United States; possibly a series of intermediate transactions;
and ultimatelythe sale of petroleum products to a customer in the United
States. This is not "commerce" between Iran and the United States, but
commerce between Iran and an intermediate purchaser ;and "commerce"
between an intermediate seller and the United States. After the comple-
tion of the first contract Iran had no ongoing financial interest in, or legal
responsibility for, the goods transferred. If, for example, the process of
"indirect commerce" in Iranian oil through Western European refineries,
as described above, were interfered with at some stage subsequent to
Iran's having parted with a consignment, Iran's commitment and entitle-
ment to freedom of commerce vis-à-vis the United States could not be
regarded as having been violated.

98. The Court thus concludes, with regard to the attack of 19 October
1987 on the Reshadat platforms, that there was at the time of those
attacks no commerce between the territories of Iran and the United
States in respect of oil produced by those platforms and the Resalat plat-
forms, inasmuch as the platforms were under repair and inoperative; and
that the attacks cannot therefore be said to have infringed the freedom of
commerce in oil between the territories of the High Contracting Parties
protected by Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, particularly
taking into account the date of entry into force of the embargo effected
by Executive Order 12613. The Court notes further that, at the time of
the attacks of 18 April 1988 on the Salman and Nasr platforms, al1com-
merce in crude oil between the territories of Iran and the United States
had been suspended by that Executive Order, so that those attacks also
cannot be said to have-infringed the rights of Iran under Article X, para-
graph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. 99. The Court is therefore unable to uphold the submissions of Iran,
that in carrying out those attacks the United States breached its obliga-
tions to Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. In view of
this conclusion, the Iranian claim for reparation cannot be upheld.

100. In view of the Court's finding, on the claim of Iran, that the

attacks on the oil platforms did not infringe the rights of Iran under
Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, it becomes unnecessary
for the Court to examine the argument of the United States (referred to
in paragraphs 27-30 above) that Iran might be debarred from relief on
its claim by reason of its own conduct.

101. On 23 June 1997, within the time-limit fixed for the Counter-
Memorial, the United States filed a counter-claim, in its Counter-
Memorial, against Iran. It explains that its "counter-claim is based on
actions by Iran in the Persian Gulf during 1987-88 that created extremely
dangerous conditions for shipping, and thereby violated Article X of

the 1955 Treaty". In the submissions in that pleading (see paragraph 19
above) the United States requests that the Court adjudge and declare:

"1. That in attacking vessels, laying mines in the Gulf and otherwise
engaging in military actions in 1987-88 that were dangerous and

detrimental to maritime commerce, the IslamicRepublic of Iran
breached its obligations to the United States under Article X of
the 1955 Treaty, and

2. That the Islamic Republic of Iran is accordingly under an obli-
gation to make full reparation to the United States for violating
the 1955 Treaty in a form and amount to be determined by the
Court at a subsequent stage of the proceedings."

These submissions were later modified, as explained below.

102. By an Order of 10 March 1998 the Court found that the alleged
attacks on shipping, laying of mines, and other military actions by Iran
were facts capable of falling within the scope of Article X, paragraph 1,
of the 1955 Treaty, that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the
United States counter-claim in so far as the facts alleged may have preju-
diced the freedoms guaranteed by Article X, paragraph 1 (1 . .J. Reports
1998, p. 204, para. 36), and that it emerged from the Parties' submissions

that their claims rest on facts of the same nature and form part of the
same factual complex, and that the Parties pursue the same legal aim(1.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 205, para. 38); consequently, considering that
the counter-claim presented by the United States was directly connected
with the subject-matter of the claim of Iran (ibid., p. 205, para. 39), the
Court found "that the counter-claim presented by the United States in
its Counter-Memorial is admissible as such and forms part of the
current proceedings" (ibid., p. 206, para. 46).

103. Iran maintains that the Court's Order of 10 March 1998 did not
decide al1 of the preliminary issues involved in the counter-claim pre-
sented by the United States. Iran points out that, in that Order, the
Court only ruled on the admissibility of the United States counter-claim
in relation to Article 80 of the Rules of Court, declaringit admissible "as
such", whilst reserving the subsequent procedure for further decision.

Iran contends that the Court should not deal with the merits of the
counter-claim because :

(a) the counter-claim was presented without any prior negotiation, in
disregard of the provisions of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955

Treaty ;
(b) the United States has no title to submit a claim on behalf of third
States or of foreign entities;
(c) the United States counter-claim extends beyond Article X, para-
graph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, the only provision over which the Court
has jurisdiction; and the Court cannot uphold any submissions
falling outside the terms of paragraph 1 of Article X;

(d) the Court has jurisdiction only as far as freedom of commerce as
protected under Article X, paragraph 1, is concerned but not on
counter-claims alleging a violation of freedom of navigation as pro-

tected by the same paragraph;

(e) the United States cannot broaden the actual subject-matter of its
claim beyond the submissions set out in its Counter-Memorial.

104. The United States contends that the Order of 10 March 1998
settled definitively in its favour al1 such issues of jurisdiction and admis-
sibility as might arise.
The Court notes however that the United States is adopting an attitude
different from its position in 1998. At that time, while Iran was asking
the Court to rule generally on itsjurisdiction and on the admissibility of
the counter-claim,the United States was basing itself solely on Article 80.
It argued in particular that :

"Many of Iran's objections to jurisdiction and admissibility involve
contested matters of fact which the Court cannot effectively address
and decide at this stage, particularly not in the context of the abbre- viated procedures of Article 80 (3)." (Cited in 1.C.J. Reports 1998,
p. 200, para. 22.)

105. The Court considers that it is open to Iran at this stage of the
proceedings to raise objections to the jurisdiction of the Court to enter-
tain the counter-claim or to its admissibility, other than those addressed
by the Order of 10 March 1998. When in that Order the Court ruled on
the "admissibility" of the counter-claim, the task of the Court at that
stage was only to verify whether or not the requirements laid down by
Article 80 of the Rules of Court were satisfied, namely, that there was
a direct connection of the counter-claim with the subject-matter of the
Iranian claims, and that, to the extent indicated in paragraph 102 above,
the counter-claim fell within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Order of
10 March 1998 therefore does not address any other question relating to
jurisdiction and admissibility, not directly linked to Article 80 of the
Rules. This is clear from the terms of the Order, by which the Court
found that the counter-claim was admissible "as such"; and in para-
graph 41 of the Order the Court further stated that :"a decision given on
the admissibility of a counter-claim taking account of the requirements
set out in Article 80 of the Rules in no way prejudges any question which
the Court will be called upon to hear during the remainder of the pro-
ceedings" (ibid., p. 205, para. 41). The Court will therefore proceed to
address the objections now presented by Iran to itsjurisdiction to enter-
tain the counter-claim and to the admissibility thereof.

106. Iran maintains first that the Court cannot entertain the counter-
claim of the United States because it was presented without any prior
negotiation, and thus does not relate to a dispute "not satisfactorily
adjusted by diplomacy" as contemplated by Article XXI, paragraph 2, of
the 1955 Treaty, which reads as follows:

"Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the
interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily
adjusted by diplomacy,shall be submitted to the International Court
of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by
some other pacific means."

107. The Court cannot uphold this objection of Iran. It is established
that a dispute has arisen between Iran and the United States over the
issues raised in the counter-claim. The Court has to take note that the
dispute has not been satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy. Whether the
fact that diplomatic negotiations have not been pursued is to be regarded
as attributable to the conduct of the one Party or the other is irrelevant
for present purposes, as is the question whether it is the Applicant or the
Respondent that has asserted a3n de non-recevoir on this ground. As in
previous cases involving virtually identical treaty provisions (see UnitedStates Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980,
pp. 26-28 ; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 427-
429), it is sufficient for the Court to satisfy itself that the dispute was not
satisfactorilyadjusted by diplomacy before being submitted to the Court.

108. According to the second objection of Iran, the United States is in
effect submitting a claim on behalf of third States or of foreign entities,

and has no title to do so. Reference has been made in the United States
argument on the counter-claim to incidents involving vessels flying the
flags of the Bahamas, Panama, the United Kingdom and Liberia; Iran
contends that the United States is thus claiming to defend the interests of
these States, which are not parties to the present proceedings.
109. The Court recalls that the first submission presented by the
United States in regard to its counter-claim simply requests the Court to
adjudge and declare that the alleged actions of Iran breached its obliga-
tions to the United States, without mention of any third States. Accord-
ingly, the Court will strictly limit itself to consideration of whether the
alleged actions by Iran infringed freedoms guaranteed to the United
States under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. The objection of

Iran is thus as such devoid of any object and the Court cannot therefore
uphold it.
110. In its third objection, Iran contends that the United States
counter-claim extends beyond Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty,
the only text in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction, and that the
Court cannot therefore uphold any submissions falling outside the terms
of paragraph 1 of that Article.
111. The Court notes that, while in its Rejoinder the United States
requested the Court to adjudge and declare

"that, in attacking vessels in the Gulf with mines and missiles and
otherwise engaging in military actions that were dangerous and
detrimental to maritime commerce, the Islamic Republic of Iran
breached its obligations to the United States under Article X of the
1955 Treaty " (emphasis added),

in its final submissions (see paragraph 20 above) the United States
substantially narrowed the basis of its counter-claim, when it requested
the Court to adjudge and declare

"Rejecting al1 submissions to the contrary, that, in attacking
vessels in the Gulf with mines and missiles and othenvise engaging
in military actions that were dangerous and detrimental to commerce
and navigation between the territories of the United States and the

Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran breached its
obligations to the United States under Article X, paragraph 1, of the
1955 Treaty. " (Emphasis added.) The United States, in presenting its final submissions on the counter-
claim, thus no longer relies on Article X of the 1955 Treaty as a whole,
but on paragraph 1 of that Article only, and, furthermore, recognizes the
territorial limitation of Article X, paragraph 1, referring specifically to
the military actions that were allegedly "dangerous and detrimental to
commerce and navigation between the territories of the United States and
the Islamic Republic of Iran" (emphasis added) rather than, generally, to
"military actions that were dangerous and detrimental to maritime com-
merce".
By limiting the scope of its counter-claim in its final submissions, the
United States has deprived Iran's third objection of any object, and the
Court cannot therefore uphold it.
112. In its fourth objection Iran maintains that

"the Court has jurisdiction to rule only on counter-claims alleging
a violation by Iran of freedom of commerce as protected under
Article X (l), and not on counter-claims alleging a violation of free-
dom of navigation as protected by the same paragraph".

Iran concludes that
"since an alleged violation of 'freedom of commerce' as protected
under Article X (1) constitutes the only possible basis for the Court's
jurisdiction in the present case, no alleged violation of freedom of
navigation or of any other provision of the Treaty of Amity can be
entertained by the Court in the context of the counter-claim".

113. It seems, nevertheless, that Iran changed its position and recog-
nized that the counter-claim could be founded on a violation of freedom
of navigation. For example, it stated:

"Article X, paragraph 1, refers to 'freedom of commerce and navi-
gation'. It appears that these are distinct freedoms, and in your
Order of 1998 you referred to them in the plural . . .Thus there
could be navigation between the territories of the High Contracting
Parties without any commerce between those territories, even if there
could not be navigation without any boat !"

114. The Court, in its Order of 10 March 1998, stated that
"Whereas the counter-claim presented by the United States alleges
attacks on shipping, the laying of mines, and other military actions
said to be 'dangerous and detrimental to maritime commerce';
whereas such facts are capable of falling within the scope of
Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty as interpreted by the Court; and whereas the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the United
States counter-claim in so far as the facts alleged may have preju-
diced the freedoms guaranteed by Article X, paragraph 1 ." (1.C.J.

Reports 1998, p. 204, para. 36.)

115. Article X, paragraph 1, envisages both freedoms, freedom of
commerce and freedom of navigation, as argued by the United States and
accepted by Iran during the oral hearings. As regards the claim of Iran, it
is true that the Court has found that only freedom of commerce is in
issue (paragraph 80 above). However, the Court also concluded in 1998
that it had jurisdiction to entertain the United States counter-claim in so
far as the facts alleged may have prejudiced thefreedoms (in the plural)
guaranteed by Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, Le., freedom of
commerce and freedom of navigation. This objection of Iran thus cannot
be upheld by the Court.

116. Iran presents one final argument against the admissibility of the
United States counter-claim, which however it concedes relates only to
part of the counter-claim. Iran contends that the United States has
broadened the subject-matter of its claim beyond the submissions set out
in its counter-claim by having, belatedly, added complaints relating to
freedom of navigation to its complaints relating to freedom of commerce,

and by having added new examples of breaches of freedom of maritime
commerce in its Rejoinder in addition to the incidentsalready referred to
in the counter-claim presented with the Counter-Memorial.

117. The issue raised by Iran is whether the United States is presenting
a new claim. The Court is thus faced with identifying what is "a new
claim" and what is merely "additional evidence relating to the original
claim". It is well established in the Court's jurisprudence that the parties
to a case cannot in the course of proceedings "transform the dispute
brought before the Court into a dispute that would be of a different
nature" (Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Pre-
liminary Objections, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1992,p. 265, para. 63). In
other words:

"the liberty accorded to the parties to amend their submissions up
to the end of the oral proceedings must be construed reasonably

and without infringing the terms of Article 40 of the Statute and
Article 32, paragraph 2, of the [1936] Rules which provide that the
Application must indicate the subject of the dispute" (Société com-
merciale de Belgique, Judgment, 1939, P. C.Z.J., Series AIB, No. 78,
p. 173).
A fortiori, the same applies to the case of counter-claims, having regard
to the provisions of Article 80 of the Rules of Court, and in particulartaking into account the fact that it is on the basis of the counter-claim as
originally submitted that the Court determines whether it is "directly
connected with the subject-matter of the claim", and as such admissible
under that text.
If itis the case, as contended by Iran, that the Court has before it
something that "constitutes . .. a new claim, [so that] the subject of the

dispute originally submitted to the Court would be transformed if it
entertained that claim" (Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v.
Australia), Preliminary Objections, 1.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 267, para. 70),
then the Court will be bound to dismiss such new claim.
118. The Court has noted in its Order of 10 March 1998 in the present
case that the counter-claim alleged "attacks on shipping, the laying of
mines, and other military actions said to be 'dangerous and detrimental
to maritime commerce"' (1 C.J. Reports 1998, p. 204, para. 36). The
Court concluded that the counter-claim was admissible in so far as "the
facts alleged may have prejudiced the freedoms guaranteed by Article X,
paragraph 1 " (ibid. .

Subsequently to its Counter-Memorial and counter-claim and to that
Order of the Court, the United States provided detailed particulars of
further incidents substantiating, in its contention, its original claims. In
the view of the Court, the United States has not, by doing so, trans-
formed the subject of the dispute originally submitted to the Court, nor
has it modified the substance of its counter-claim, which remains the
same, i.e., alleged attacks by Iran on shipping, laying of mines and other
military actions said to be "dangerous and detrimental to maritime com-
merce", thus breaching Iran's obligations to the United States under
Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1995 Treaty.

The Court therefore cannot uphold the objection of Iran.
119. Having disposed of al1 objections of Iran to its jurisdiction over

the counter-claim, and to the admissibility thereof, the Court has now to
consider the counter-claim on its merits. To succeed on its counter-claim,
the United States must show that:

(a) its freedom of commerce or freedom of navigation between the
territories of the High Contracting Parties to the 1955 Treaty was
impaired; and that
(b) the acts which allegedly impaired one or both of those freedoms are
attributable to Iran.
The Court would recall that Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty

does not protect, as between the Parties, freedom of commerce or free-
dom of navigation in general. As already noted above (paragraph 90), the
provision of that paragraph contains an important territorial limitation.
In order to enjoy the protection provided by that text, the commerce or
the navigation is to be between the territories of the United States andIran. The United States bears the burden of proof that the vessels which
were attacked were engaged in commerce or navigation between the ter-
ritories of the United States and Iran.
120. The Court will thus examine each of Iran's alleged attacks, in
chronological order, from the standpoint of this requirement of the 1955
Treaty :

(a) tankery Bridgetonine(see paragraph Uni63d above)-rein an internationalm

shipping channel approximately 18 nautical miles south-west
of the Iranian island of Farsi, while en route from Rotterdam,
Netherlands, via Fujairah Anchorage, United Arab Emirates, to
Mina al-Ahmadi, Kuwait. The Court notes that the ship was
not engaged in commerce or navigation between the territories of
the two High Contracting Parties.
(b) 10 August 1987: A mine attack on the United States bareboat-
chartered, Panamanian-flagged, Texaco Caribbean (see paragraph 63
above), at the Khor Fakkan anchorage off Fujairah, which was laden
with a cargo of Iranian light crude being carried from Larak Island
Terminal, Iran, to Rotterdam, Netherlands. The Court notes that
Iran conceded that the Texaco Caribbean was engaged in commerce

between the territories of the two States;but this was in the context
of its contention, in relation to its own claim, that the term "dom-
merce" covers "indirect commerce" as well. It therefore requested
the Court to dismiss the United States claim concerning this ship on
different grounds, namely that the mine incident was not attribu-
table to Iran, and that the United States suffered no loss since the
ship was a Panamanian-owned vessel carrying a Norwegian-owned
cargo. The United States argued, in relation to the claim of Iran,
against such a broad interpretation of the term "commerce" in
Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty and also adduced evidence
that the cargo was owned by a United States corporation. Since the
Court has concluded that the process of "indirect commerce" in

Iranian oil through Western European refineries does not represent
"commerce between the territories of the two High Contracting
Parties" for the purposes of Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955
Treaty (see paragraph 97 above), and taking account of the fact that
the destination was not a United States port, the Court concludes
that the vessel was not engaged in commerce or navigation between
Iran and the United States.

(c) 15 August 1987: A mine attack on the United Arab Emirates flag
supply vessel Anita in the vicinity of Khor Fakkan anchorage off

Fujairah while proceeding to supply the vessels in the anchorage.
The Court notes that the ship was not engaged in commerce or navigation between the territories of the two High Contracting
Parties.
(d) 15 October 1987: A missile attack on the United States-owned,
Liberian-flagged Sungari, while at anchor 10 miles off Mina al-
Ahmadi Sea Island Terminal, Kuwait. The Court notes that the
ship was not engaged in commerce or navigation between the terri-
tories of the two High Contracting Parties.

(e) 16 October 1987: A missile attack on the United States-reflagged
Sea Isle City (see paragraph 52 above), which was proceeding from
its anchorage to the oil loading terminal at Kuwait's Mina al-
Ahmadi Terminal. The Court notes that the ship was not engaged
in commerce or navigation between the territories of the two High
Contracting Parties.
(f) 15 November 1987: A gunboat attack on the United States-owned,
Liberian-flagged, motor tanker Lucy, near the Strait of Horrnuz, off
Al Khassat, northern Oman, en route to Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia,
from Oita, Japan. The Court notes that the ship was not engaged in
commerce or navigation between the territories of the two High
Contracting Parties.

(g) 16 November 1987: A gunboat attack on the United States-owned,
Bahamian-flagged, steam tanker Esso Freeport en route from Ras
Tanura, Saudi Arabia, to the Louisiana Offshore Oil Pipeline Ter-
minal, United States. The Court notes that the ship was not engaged
in commerce or navigation between the territories of the two High
Contracting Parties.
(h) 7 February 1988: A frigate attack on the United States-owned,
Liberian-flagged, motor tanker Diana, while loaded with crude oil
from Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, en route from Bahrain and the
United Arab Emirates to Japan. The Court notes that the ship was
not engaged in commerce or navigation between the territories of
the two High Contracting Parties.

(i) 14 April 1988: A mine attack on the USS Samuel B. Roberts
(United Stateswarship) near the Shah Allum Shoal, while returning
to Bahrain after escorting a convoy of United States-flagged vessels.
As a warship, the USS Samuel B. Roberts does not enjoy the protec-
tion of freedom of navigation guaranteed by Article X, paragraph 1,
of the 1955 Treaty. Paragraph 6 of that Article states that "The term
'vessels', as used herein .. .does not, except with reference to para-
graphs 2 and 5 of the present Article, include . .. vessels of war."
The United States is nevertheless contending that since the USS
Samuel B. Roberts was escorting commercial vessels, it enjoys the
protection by the 1955 Treaty of freedom of commerce. However, at
al1events, these vessels were neither navigating nor engaged in com-
merce between Iran and the United States.Consequently,the United States has not shown a breach of Article X, paragraph 1, of the
1955 Treaty in relation to the incident involving the USS Samuel B.
Roberts.

(j) 11 June 1988: Speedboat attacks on the United States-owned,

British-flagged, steam tanker Esso Demetia, loaded at Umm Said
and Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, en route to Halul Island, Qatar, to
complete loading for a planned discharge in Singapore. The Court
notes that the ship was not engaged in commerce or navigation
between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties.

121. None of the vessels described by the United States as being
damaged by Iran's alleged attacks was engaged in commerce or navigation
"between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties". Therefore,

the Court concludes that there has been no breach of Article X, para-
graph 1, of the 1955 Treaty in any of the specific incidents involving these
ships referred to in the United States pleadings.
122. The United States has also presented its claim in a generic sense.
It has asserted that as a result of the cumulation of attacks on United
States and other vessels, laying mines and otherwise engaging in military
actions in the Persian Gulf, Iran made the Gulf unsafe, and thus breached
its obligation with respect to freedom of commerce and freedom of navi-
gation which the United States should have enjoyed under Article X,
paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty.

123. The Court cannot disregard the factual context of the case, as
described in paragraphs 23 and 44 above. While it is a matter of public
record that as a result of the Iran-Iraq war navigation in the Persian Gulf
involved much higher risks, that alone is not sufficient for the Court to
decide that Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty was breached by
Iran. It is for the United States to show that there was an actual impedi-
ment to commerce or navigation between the territories of the two High
Contracting Parties. However, according to the material before the Court
the commerce and navigation between Iran and the United States con-
tinued during the war until the issuance of the United States embargo on
29 October 1987, and subsequently at least to the extent permitted by the

exceptions to the embargo. The United States has not demonstrated that
the alleged acts of Iran actually infringed the freedom of commerce or of
navigation between the territories of the United States and Iran.

The Court considers that, in the circumstances of this case, a generic
claim of breach of Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty cannot be
made out independently of the specific incidents whereby, it is alleged,
the actions of Iran made the Persian Gulf unsafe for commerce and navi-
gation, and specifically for commerce and navigation between the terri-

tories of the parties. However, the examination in paragraph 120 above
of those incidents shows that none of them individually involved anyinterference with the commerce and navigation protected by the 1955
Treaty; accordingly the generic claim of the United States cannot be

upheld.
124. The Court has thus found that the counter-claim of the United
States concerning breach by Iran of its obligations to the United States
under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, whether based on the
specific incidents listed, or as a generic claim, must be rejected; there is
therefore no need for it to consider, under this head, the contested issues
of attribution of those incidents to Iran. In view of the foregoing, the
United States claim for reparation cannot be upheld.

125. For these reasons,

(1) By fourteen votes to two,

Finds that the actions of the United States of America against Iranian
oil platforms on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988 cannot be justified as
measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United
States of America under Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty
of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United
States of America and Iran, as interpreted in the light of international
law on the use of force; jînds further that the Court cannot however
uphold the submission of the Islamic Republic of Iran that those actions
constitute a breach of the obligations of the United States of America

under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty, regarding freedom of com-
merce between the territories of the parties, and that, accordingly, the
claim of the Islamic Republic of Iran for reparation also cannot be
upheld ;

IN FAVOURP :resident Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek,
Buergenthal, Owada, Simma, Tomka ; Judge ad hoc Rigaux ;

AGAINST :Judges Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby ;
(2) By fifteen votes to one,

Finds that the counter-claim of the United States of America concern-
ing the breach of the obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran under
Article X, paragraph 1, of the above-mentioned 1955 Treaty, regarding
freedom of commerce and navigation between the territories of the
parties, cannot be upheld; and accordingly that the counter-claim of the
United States of America for reparation also cannot be upheld. IN FAVOUR : President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva ; Judges Guillaume,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek,
Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Tomka; Judge ad hoc
Rigaux ;
AGAINST :Judge Simma.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this sixth day of November, two thousand
and three, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of
the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and the Government of the United States of America,
respectively .

(Signed) SHIJiuyong,
President.

(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR,
Regis trar.

Vice-President RANJEVAand Judge KOROMAappend declarations to
the Judgment of the Court; Judges HIGGINS,PARRA-ARANGUR aEdN
KOOIJMANS append separate opinions to the Judgment of the Court;
Judge AL-KHASAWNEHappends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of
the Court; Judge BUERGENTHAL appends a separate opinion to the Judg-

ment of the Court; Judge ELARABY appends a dissenting opinion to the
Judgment of the Court; Judges OWADA and SIMMAand Judge ad hoc
RIGAUXappend separate opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initialled) J.Y .S.
(Initialled) Ph.C.

Bilingual Content

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,

ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING OIL PLATFORMS

(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA)

JUDGMENT OF 6 NOVEMBER 2003

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

(RÉPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D'IRAN c.ÉTATS-UNIS
D'AMÉRIQUE)

ARRÊT DU 6 NOVEMBRE 2003 Officia1 citati:n
Oil Platforms (Zslamic Republic of Iran
v. United States of America), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 161

Mode officiel de citation:
Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d'Iran
c. Etats- Unis d'Amérique), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 161

Sales number
ISSN 0074-444 1 No de vente: 876
ISBN 92- 1-070984-5 6 NOVEMBER 2003

JUDGMENT

OIL PLATFORMS

(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v.UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA)

6 NOVEMBRE 2003

ARRÊT INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

2003 YEAR 2003
6 November
GenNo. 90ist 6 November 2003

CASE CONCERNING OIL PLATFORMS

(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA)

1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the
United States and Iran - Iranian claims and United States counter-claim for
breach of Article X, paragraph 1 - Jurisdiction based on Article XXI, para-
graph 2 - Factual background.

United States contention that the Court should reject Iran's claims and refuse
it the relief it seeks because of Iran's allegedly unlawful conduct - "Clean
hands" - Argument not presented as objection to admissibility - Not neces-
sary to decide the issue.

Iranian claims based on Article X, paragraph 1, of Treaty - Alleged
infringement of freedom of commerce between the territories of the Parties by
attack on Iranian oil platforms - Judgment of 12 December 1996 onjurisdic-

tion - Relevance of other Articles for interpretation or application of Article X,
paragraph 1 - Task of the Court to ascertair, whether there has been a
breach of Article X, paragraph 1 - United States contention that Article XX,
paragraph 1 (d), concerning measures necessary to protect the essential security
interests of aparty, is determinative of the question - Order in which the Court
should examine Articles X, paragraph 1, and XX, paragraph 1 (d) - Freedom
of Court to choose grounds for its decision - Particular considerations in this
case militating in favour of an examination of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d),
prior to Article X, paragraph 1 - Relationship between Article XX, para-
graph 1 (d), and international law on the use of force - Jurisdiction of the
Court to interpret and apply Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), extending, where
appropriate, to the determination whether action was or not unlawful use of

force, by reference to international law - Provisions of the United Nations COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 2003 2003
6 novembre
Rôle général
6 novembre 2003 no 90

(REPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D'IRAN c. ÉTATS-UNIS

D'AMÉRIQUE)

Traité d'amitié, de commerce et de droits consulaires de 1955 - Demandes
de I'Iran et demande reconventionnelle des Etats--Unis relatives à la violation du
paragraphe 1 de I'article X - Compétence fondée sur le paragraphe 2 de I'ar-

ticle XXI - Contexte factuel.

Allégation des Etats-Unis selon laquelle la Cour devrait rejeter les de-
mandes de I'Iran et refuser à celui-ci la réparation qu'il sollicite en raison de
son comportement illicite- K Mains propres)) - Argument non présenté à
titre d'exception d'irrecevabilité - Prononcé sur cette question pas néces-

saire.

Demandes de I'Iran fondées sur le paragraphe 1 de I'article X du traité -
Violations alléguéesde la liberté de commerce entre les territoires des Parties
du fait d'attaques dirigées contre des plates-formes pétrolières iraniennes -
Arrêt du 12 décembre 1996 sur la compétence - Pertinence d'autres articles

pour l'interprétation ou l'application du paragraphe 1 de I'article X - Tâche de
la Cour consistant à établir s'il y a eu violation du paragraphe 1 de I'article X -
L'allégation des Etats- Unis selon laquelle I'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de I'ar-
ticle XX, relatif aux mesures nécessaires à la protection des intérêtsvitaux d'une
partie sur le plan de la sécurité,permet de trancher cette question - Ordre dans
lequel la Cour doit examiner le paragraphe 1 de I'article X et l'alinéa d) du
paragraphe 1 de I'article XX - Liberté de la Cour dans le choix des motifs de

sa décision - Considérations particulières dans le cas d'espèce en faveur de
l'examen de I'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de I'article XX avant celui du para-
graphe 1 de I'article X - Relation entre I'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de I'article XX
et le droit international relatifà l'emploi de la force - Compétence de la Cour
pour interpréter et appliquer I'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de I'article XX auto- Charter and customary international law - Jurisdiction of the Court limited

to that conferred by the consent of the Parties.

Article XX, paragraph 1 (d) - Measures "necessary" to protect theparty's
essential security interests - Criterion of "necessity" to be assessed by the
Court - Overlapping of question whether the measures taken were "necessary"
and of their validity as acts of self-defence - Actions on the platforms amounted
to a use of force.

Attack of 19 October 1987 on Reshadat - United States contention that this

action was necessary to protect its essential security interests and a valid act of
self-defence - Question of the existence of an "armed attack" on the United
States - Missile attack on the Sea Isle City - Burden of proof of the existence
of an attack by Iran on the United States not discharged - Alleged series of
attacks by Iran not an "armed attack" on the United States - Attacks of
18 April1988 on Nasr and Salman and "Operation Praying Mantis" - Mining

of the USS Samuel B. Roberts -Evidence inconclusive that the vesse1 was the
victim of a mine laid by Iran - Mine incident not an "armed attack" by Iran
against the United States.

Examination of criteria of necessity andproportionality in the context of self-

defence - Nature of the target of the force used in self-defence: insufJicient
evidence as to the signzjicance of the military presence and activity on the plat-
forms - Attacks on theplatforms not meeting the criteria of necessity and pro-
portionality under the right of self-defence.

Attacks on the platforms not justzjîed, under Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), as

measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United
States, being acts of armedforce not qualifying under international law as acts
of self-defence.

Article X, paragraph 1 - Scope of the 1996 Judgment - Question whether
the United States actions affected 'ffreedom of commerceJ' under Article X,
paragraph 1 - Meaning of "commerce" in that text - Not limited to maritime
commerce nor to activities of purchase and sale - No justzjication for treating
platforms as military installations, and thus outside protection of Article X,

paragraph 1.

Nature of commercial activities protected - United States attacks entailing
destruction of goods destined to be exported and affecting transport of these
goods with a view to export - Attacks impeded Iran'sfreedom of commerce -
Treaty limitation to freedom of commerce "between the territories of the two

High Contracting Parties" - Exports of Iranian oil to United States territory
until29 October 1987 - Reshadat and Resalat platforms under repair at the PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 162

risant celle-ci à déterminer, en tant que de besoin, si une action a constitué ou
non un recours illicite à laforce au regard du droit international - Dispositions
de la Charte des Nations Unies et du droit international coutumier - Compé-
tence de la Cour limitée à celle que lui confère le consentement des Parties.

Alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX - Mesures «nécessaires)) à lapro-
tection des intérêts vitaux d'une partie sur leplan de la sécurité - Critère de la

«nécessité» devant êtreévaluépar la Cour - Recoupement entre la question de
savoir si les mesures adoptées étaient «nécessaires» et celle de leur validité en
tant qu'actes de légitime défense - Actions dirigées contre les plates-formes
relevant de l'emploi de la force.
Attaque du 19 octobre 1987 sur Reshadat - Allégation des Etats-Unis selon

laquelle cette action était nécessaire à la protection de ses intérêtsvitaux sur le
plan de la sécuritéet justifiée en tant qu'acte de légitime défense - Question de
l'existence d'une «agression armée» à l'encontre des Etats- Unis - Attaque sur
leSea Isle City au moyen d'un missile - Etats-Unis ne s'étantpas acquittés de
la charge de lapreuve relative à l'existence d'une attaque de l'Iran contre eux -
Série d'attaques qui seraient attribuables à l'Iran ne constituant pas une «agres-

sion armée» contre les Etats-Unis - Attaques du 18 avril 1988 sur Nasr et Sal-
man et opération ((Praying Mantis)) - Mouillage de la mine heurtée par
I'USS Samuel B. Roberts - Preuve non concluante que le navire a heurté une
mine mouillée par l'Iran - Incident du mouillage de cette mine ne constituant
pas une «agression armée» de l'Iran à l'encontre des Etats-Unis.
Examen des critères de nécessitéet de proportionnalité dans le cadre de la

légitime défense - Nature de la cible contre laquelle la force est employée au
nom de la légitime défense: preuve insufJisante de l'importance des activités et
de la présence militaires sur les plates-formes - Attaques contre les plates-
formes ne respectant pas les critères de nécessitéet deproportionnalité du droit
de légitime défense.

Attaques contre les plates-formes non justifiées, au titre de l'alinéa d) du
paragraphe 1 de l'article XX, en tant que mesures nécessaires à la protection des
intérêtsvitaux des Etats-Unis sur le plan de la sécurité, dès lors qu'elles cons-
tituaient un recours à la force armée et ne pouvaient pas êtreconsidérées, au
regard du droit international, comme des actes de légitime défense.

Paragraphe 1 de l'article X - Portée de l'arrêtde 1996 - Question de savoir
si les actions des Etats-Unis ont porté atteinte à la ((liberté de commerce)) au
titre du paragraphe 1 de l'article X - Sens du mot «commerce» dans cette dis-
position - Sens non limité au commerce maritime ou aux activités d'achat et de

vente - Plates-formes nepouvant êtreconsidéréescomme des installationsmili-
taires, et donc comme exclues de la protection conféréepar le paragraphe 1 de
l'article X.
Nature des activités commerciales protégées - Attaques des Etats-Unis
ayant emporté la destruction de biens destinés à être exportés ou ayant affecté

le transport de ces biens en vue de l'exportation - Attaques ayant entravé la
liberté de commerce de l'Iran - Traité limité à la liberté de commerce «entre
les territoiresdes deux Hautes Parties contractantes)) - Exportation depétrole
iranien vers le territoire des Etats-Unis jusqu'au 29 octobre 1987 - Plates- time they were attacked - United States Executive Order 12613 of 29 October
1987 imposing an embargo on goods of Iranian origin - No exports of Iranian
crude oil to the United States after 29 October 1987 - Legality of the embargo
not before the Court - Salman and Nasr platforms attacked after enactment of
embargo - Import into United States of petroleum products derived from
Iranian crude oil not constituting "commerce between the territories" of the

Parties for the purposes of the 1955 Treaty - Attacks on the platforms not a
breach of Article X, paragraph 1.

United States counter-claim - Scope of the Order of 10 March 1998 - Ira-
nian objections to jurisdiction and to admissibility of the counter-claim other
than those decided under Article 80, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court.

First objection of Iran - Contention that the counter-claim was presented
without prior negotiation - Dispute "not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy"

for the purposes of Article XXI, paragraph 2 - Second objection of Iran -
Contention that the counter-claim was made on behalfof third States orforeign
entities - Counter-claim limited to alleged breaches of freedoms guaranteed to
the United States - Third objection of Iran - Contention that the counter-
claim is beyond Article X, paragraph 1 - United States limiting the scope of its
counter-claim - Fourth objection of Iran - Contention that jurisdiction of the
Court does not extend tofreedom of navigation - Jurisdiction to deal with free-

dom of commerce and navigation under Article X, paragraph 1 - Fzyth objec-
tion by Iran - Admissibility - Alleged broadening of counter-claim by the
United States - No transformation of the subject of the dispute originally sub-
mitted to the Court.

Examination of speczjîc incidents invoked by the United States - None of the
vessels involved engaged in commerce or navigation between the territories of
the Parties - No breach of Article X, paragraph 1 - United States generic

counter-claim - No proof that actions of Iran infringed thefreedom of com-
merce or of navigation between the territories of the Parties - No speczjîc inci-
dent constituted a breach of Treaty - Generic counter-claim cannot be upheld.

JUDGMENT

Present : President SHI ; Vice-President RANJEVA ; Judges GUILLAUME ,OROMA,
VERESHCHETIN ,IGGINS, PARRA-ARANGUREN, KOOIJMANS, REZEK,

6formes de Reshadat et de Resalat en cours de réparation au moment où elles ont
été attaquées - Executive Order 12613 des Etats-Unis, du 29 octobre 1987,

imposant un embargo sur les biens d'origine iranienne - Absence d'exportation
de pétrole brut iranien aux Etats-Unis après le 29 octobre 1987 - Licéité de
l'embargo non soumise à la Cour - Plates-formes de Salman et de Nasr atta-
quées lorsque l'embargo était déjàen vigueur - Importation aux Etats-Unis de
produits pétroliers dérivés dupétrole brut iranien ne constituant pas du «com-
merce entre les territoires)) des Parties auxjîns du traité de 1955 - Attaques

contre les plates-formes ne constituant pas une violation du paragraphe 1 de
l'article X.

Demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis - Portée de l'ordonnance du
10mars 1998 - Exceptions iraniennes à la compétence et à la recevabilité de la
demande reconventionnelle autres que celles tranchées en vertu du paragraphe 3
de l'article 80 du Règlement de la Cour.
Première exception de l'Iran - Allégation selon laquelle la demande recon-
ventionnelle a été présentée sansavoir été précédée de négociations - Différend

non «réglé d'une manière satisfaisante par la voie diplomatique)) au sens du
paragraphe 2 de l'article XXI - Deuxième exception de l'Iran - Allégation
selon laquelle la demande reconventionnelle a étésoumise au nom d'Etats tiers
ou d'entités étrangères - Demande reconventionnelle limitée aux violations
alléguées des libertés garanties aux Etats- Unis - Troisième exception de l'Iran
- Allégation selon laquelle la demande reconventionnelle sort du cadre du para-

graphe 1 de l'article X - Etats-Unis ayant limité la portée de leur demande
reconventionnelle - Quatrième exception de l'Iran - Allégation selon laquelle
la compétence de la Cour ne couvre pas la liberté de navigation - Compétence
de la Cour pour connaître de la liberté de commerce et de navigation au titre du
paragraphe 1 de l'article X - Cinquième exception de l'Iran - Recevabilité -

Allégation selon laquelle les Etats-Unis auraient élargi leur demande reconven-
tionnelle - Objet du différend originellement soumis à la Cour n'ayant pas été
transformé.

Examen des incidents spéczjîques invoqués par les Etats-Unis - Aucun des
navires concernés ne se livrait au commerce ou à la navigation entre les terri-
toires des Parties - Paragraphe 1 de l'article X n'ayant pas étéviolé -
Demande reconventionnelle de caractère général des Etats-Unis - Absence de
preuve que les actions iraniennes ont porté atteinte à la liberté de commerce ou
de navigation entre les territoires des Parties - Absence d'incident spécz3que

ayant constitué une violation du traité - Rejet de la demande reconventionnelle
de caractère général.

Présents : M. SHI, président ; M. RANJEVA v,ice-président ; MM. GUILLAUME,
KOROMAV , ERESHCHET MINm,e HIGGINSM , M. PARRA-ARANGUREN, AL-KHASAWNE BHU,ERGENTHAL,ELARABYO , WADAS ,IMMA, TOMKA;
Judge ad hoc RIGAUX; Registrar COUVREUR.

In the case concerning oil platforms,

between

the Islamic Republic of Iran,
represented by

Mr. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf, Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Deputy Director for Legal Affairs,
Bureau of International Legal Services of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
The Hague,
as Agent;

Mr. D. Momtaz, Professor of International Law, Tehran University,
member of the International Law Commission, Associate Member of the
Institute of InternationaLaw,
Mr. S. M. Zeinoddin, Head of Legal Affairs, National Iranian Oil Com-
pany7
Mr. Michael Bothe, Professor of Public Law, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Uni-
versity of Frankfurt-am-Main, Head of Research Unit, Peace Research
Institute, Frankfurt,
Mr. James R. Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International
Law, University of Cambridge, member of the English and Australian
Bars, Member of the Institute of International Law,

Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre, member
and former Chairman of the International Law Commission,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, member of the
New York Bar, Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Mr. David S. Sellers, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, Solicitor of the
Supreme Court of England and Wales, Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,

as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. M. Mashkour, Deputy Director for Legal Affairs, Bureau of Interna-
tional Legal Services of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Mr. M. A. Movahed, Senior Legal Adviser, National Iranian Oil Company,

Mr. R. Badri Ahari, Legal Adviser, Bureau of International Legal Services
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran,

Mr. A. Beizaei, Legal Adviser, Bureau of International Legal Services of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Paris,
Ms Nanette Pilkington, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, Frere Cholmeleyl
Eversheds, Paris,
Mr. William Thomas, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales,
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Mr. Leopold von Carlowitz, Research Fellow, Peace Research Institute,
Frankfurt, KOOIJMANS, REZEK, AL-KHASAWNEH B,UERGENTHAL, ELARABY,
OWADA, SIMMA, TOMKA, juges; M. RIGAUX, juge ad hoc;
M. COUVREURg ,reffier.

En l'affaire des plates-formes pétrolières,

entre

la République islamique d'Iran,
représentée par

M. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf, agent de la République islamique d'Iran auprès
du Tribunal des réclamations Etats-UnisIIran, directeur adjoint des
affaires juridiques au bureau des services juridiques internationaux de la
République islamique d'Iran à La Haye,
comme agent;

M. D. Momtaz, professeur de droit international à l'université de Téhéran,
membre de la Commission du droit international, membre associé de 1'Ins-
titut de droit international,
M. S. M. Zeinoddin, directeur des affaires juridiques à la compagnie natio-
nale iranienne des pétroles,
M. Michael Bothe, professeur de droit public à l'université Johann Wolf-
gang Goethe de Francfort-sur-le-Main, directeur de la recherche à 1'Insti-
tut de recherche pour la paix à Francfort,
M. James R. Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international, titu-

laire de la chaire Whewell à l'université de Cambridge, membre des bar-
reaux d'Angleterre et d'Australie, membre de l'Institut de droit internatio-
nal,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l'université de Paris X-Nanterre, membre et
ancien président de la Commission du droit international,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, membre du bar-
reau de New York, cabinet Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
M. David S. Sellers, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, Solicitor auprès de la
Cour suprême d'Angleterre et du pays de Galles, cabinet Frere Cholmeleyl
Eversheds, Paris,

comme conseils et avocats ;
M. M. Mashkour, directeur adjoint des affairesjuridiques au bureau des ser-
vices juridiques internationaux de la République islamique d'Iran,
M. M. A. Movahed, conseiller juridique principal à la compagnie nationale
iranienne des pétroles,

M. R. Badri Ahari, conseiller juridique au bureau des services juridiques
internationaux de la République islamique d'Iran à Téhéran,
M. A. Beizaei, conseiller juridique au bureau des services juridiques interna-
tionaux de la République islamique d'Iran à Paris,
Mme Nanette Pilkington, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, cabinet Frere
CholmeleyIEversheds, Paris,
M. William Thomas, Solicitor auprès de la Cour suprême d'Angleterre et du
pays de Galles, cabinet Frere CholmeleyIEversheds, Paris,
M. Leopold von Carlowitz, chargé de recherche à l'Institutde recherche
pour la paix à Francfort, Mr. Mathias Forteau, docteur en droit, Researcher at the Centre de droit
international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University of Paris X-Nanterre,
as Counsel ;

Mr. Robert C. Rizzutti, Vice-President, Cartographic Operations, Interna-
tional Mapping Associates,
as Technical Adviser,

and

the United States of America,
represented by

The Honourable William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, United States Depart-
ment of State,
as Agent ;
Mr. Ronald J. Bettauer, Deputy Legal Adviser, United StatesDepartment of
State,

as Co-Agent;
Mr. Michael J. Matheson, Professor, George Washington University School
of Law,
Mr. D. Stephen Mathias, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs,

United States Department of State,
Mr. Michael J. Mattler, Attorney-Adviser, United States Department of
State,
Mr. Sean Murphy, Professor, George Washington University School of Law,

Mr. Ronald D. Neubauer, Associate Deputy General Counsel, United States
Department of Defense,
Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor Emeritus, University of Paris II, Member of the
Institute of International Law, member of the Académie des sciences
morales et politiques (Institut de France),

as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Paul Beaver, Defence & Maritime Affairs Consultant, Ashbourne
Beaver Associates, Ltd., London,
Mr. John Moore, Senior Associate, C & O Resources, Washington, D.C.,

as Advocates ;
Mr. Clifton M. Johnson, Legal Counsellor, United States Embassy, The
Hague,
Mr. David A. Kaye, Deputy Legal Counsellor, United States Embassy, The
Hague,
Ms Kathleen Milton, Attorney-Adviser, United States Department of State,

as Counsel;
Ms Marianne Hata, United States Department of State,
Ms Cécile Jouglet, United States Embassy, Paris,
Ms Joanne Nelligan, United States Department of State,
Ms Aileen Robinson, United States Department of State,
Ms Laura Romains, United States Embassy, The Hague,

as Administrative Staff, PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 165

M. Mathias Forteau, docteur en droit, chercheur au Centre de droit interna-
tional de Nanterre (CEDIN) de l'université de Paris X-Nanterre,

comme conseils ;
M. Robert C. Rizzutti, vice-président des opérations cartographiques, Inter-
national Mapping Associates,
comme conseiller technique,

les Etats-Unis d'Amérique,

représentés par
l'honorable William H. Taft, IV, conseiller juridique du département d'Etat
des Etats-Unis,
comme agent;

M. Ronald J. Bettauer, conseiller juridique adjoint du département d'Etat
des Etats-Unis,
comme coagent ;
M. Michael J. Matheson, professeur à la faculté de droit de l'université
George Washington,
M. D. Stephen Mathias, conseiller juridique adjoint chargé des questions
concernant les Nations Unies du département d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
M. Michael J. Mattler, avocat-conseiller au département d'Etat des Etats-

Unis,
M. Sean Murphy, professeur à la faculté de droit de l'université George
Washington,
M. Ronald D. Neubauer, assistant au bureau du conseiller juridique adjoint
du département de la défense des Etats-Unis,
M. Prosper Weil, professeur émérite à l'université de Paris II, membre de
l'Institut de droit internationalmembre de l'Académie des sciences mo-
rales et politiques (Institut de France),
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Paul Beaver, expert consultant en questions de défense et affaires mari-
times, Ashbourne Beaver Associates, Ltd., Londres,
M. John Moore, associé principal, C & O Resources, Washington D.C.,

comme avocats ;
M. Clifton M. Johnson, conseiller juridique à l'ambassade des Etats-Unis à
La Haye,
M. David A. Kaye, conseiller juridique adjoint àl'ambassade des Etats-Unis
à La Haye,
Mme Kathleen Milton, avocat-conseiller au département d'Etat des Etats-
Unis,
comme conseils ;
Mme Marianna Hata, département d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
Mme Cécile Jouglet, ambassade des Etats-Unis à Paris,
Mme Joanne Nelligan, département d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
Mme Aileen Robinson, département d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
MmeLaura Romains, ambassade des Etats-Unis à La Haye,

comme personnel administratif, composed as above,
after deliberation,

delivers the following Judgment:

1. On 2 November 1992, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
(hereinafter called "Iran") filed in the Registry of the Court an Application
instituting proceedings against the Government of the United States of America
(hereinafter called "the United States") in respect of a dispute

"aris[ing] out of the attack [on] and destruction of three offshore oil pro-
duction complexes, owned and operated for commercial purposes by the
National Iranian Oil Company, by several warships of the United States
Navy on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988, respectively".

In its Application, Iran contended that these acts constituted a "fundamental
breach" of various provisions of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and
Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, which was signed in
Tehran on 15 August 1955 and entered into force on 16 June 1957 (hereinafter
called "the 1955 Treaty"), as well as of international law. The Application
invoked, as a basis for the Court's jurisdiction, Article XXI, paragraph 2, of
the 1955 Treaty.

2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was
immediately communicated to the Government of the United States by the
Registrar; and, pursuant to paragraph 3 of that Article, al1 States entitled to
appear before the Court were notified of the Application.
3. By an Order of 4 December 1992 the President of the Court fixed 31 May
1993 as the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial of Iran and 30 November
1993 as the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial of the United
States.
4. By an Order of 3 June 1993 the President of the Court, at the request of
Iran, extended to 8 June 1993 the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial; the
time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial was extended, by the same
Order, to 16 December 1993.

Iran duly filed its Memorial within the time-limit as thus extended.
5. Within the extended time-limit thus fixed for the filing of the Counter-
Memorial, the United States raised a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction
of the Court pursuant to Article 79, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court of
14 April 1978. Consequently, by an Order dated 18 January 1994, the President
of the Court, noting that by virtue of Article 79, paragraph 3, of the Rules of
Court the proceedings on the merits were suspended, fixed 1 July 1994 as the
time-limit within which Iran might present a written statement of its observa-
tions and submissions on the preliminary objection raised by the United States.

Iran filedsuch a statement within the time-limit so fixed and the case became
ready for hearing in respect of the preliminary objection.
6. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of Iranian nationality,
Iran availed itself of its rightunder Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute of

the Court to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case: it chose Mr. François
Rigaux. ainsi composée,
après délibéréen chambre du conseil,

rend l'arrêt suivant:

1. Le 2 novembre 1992, le Gouvernement de la République islamique d'Iran
(dénommée ci-après l'«Iran») a déposéau Greffe de la Cour une requête intro-
ductive d'instance contre le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique (dénom-
més ci-après les «Etats-Unis») au sujet d'un différend

«a[yant] pour origine l'attaque et la destruction de trois installations de
production pétrolière offshore, propriété de la compagnie nationale ira-
nienne des pétroles et exploitées par elleà des fins commerciales, par plu-
sieurs navires de guerre de la marine des Etats-Unis, les 19 octobre 1987 et

18 avril 1988, respectivement ».
Dans sa requête, l'Iran soutenait que ces actes constituaient une «violation
fondamentale)) de diverses dispositions du traité d'amitié, de commerce et de
droits consulaires entre les Etats-Unis et l'Iran, signéà Téhéranle 15 août 1955

et entré en vigueur le 16juin 1957 (dénommé ci-après le «traité de 1955 »), ainsi
que du droit international. La requête invoquait comme base de compétence le
paragraphe 2 de l'article XXI du traité de 1955.

2. Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'article 40 du Statut, la requête a été
immédiatement communiquée au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis par le greffier;
et, conformément au paragraphe 3 de cet article, tous les Etats admis à ester
devant la Cour ont été informésde la requête.
3. Par ordonnance du 4 décembre 1992, le président de la Cour a fixé au
31mai 1993 la date d'expiration du délaipour le dépôt du mémoire de l'Iran et
au 30 novembre 1993 la date d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt du contre-
mémoire des Eta.ts-Unis.
4. Par ordonnance du 3 juin 1993, le président de la Cour, à la demande de

l'Iran, a reporté au 8 juin 1993 la date d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt du
mémoire; la date d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt du contre-mémoire a été
reportée, par la mêmeordonnance, au 16 décembre 1993.
L'Iran a dûment déposé son mémoire dans le délai ainsi prorogé.
5. Dans le délai prorogé ainsi prescrit aux fins du dépôt du contre-mémoire,
les Etats-Unis ont soulevé une exception préliminaire à la compétence de la
Cour conformément au paragraphe 1 de l'article 79 du Règlement de la Cour
du 14 avril 1978. En conséquence, par ordonnance du 18 janvier 1994, le pré-
sident de la Cour, constatant qu'en vertu des dispositions du paragraphe 3 de
l'article 79 du Règlement la procédure sur le fond était suspendue, a fixé au
le' juillet 1994 la date d'expiration du délaidans lequel l'Iran pourrait présenter
un exposé écrit contenant ses observations et conclusions sur l'exception préli-
minaire soulevée par les Etats-Unis.

L'Iran a déposé un tel exposé dans le délai ainsi fixé,et l'affaire s'est trouvée
en état pour ce qui est de l'exception préliminaire.
6. La Cour ne comptant pas sur le siège de juge de nationalité iranienne,
l'Iran s'est prévalu du droit que lui confère le paragraphe 2 de l'article 31 du
Statut de procéder à la désignation d'un juge ad hoc pour siéger en l'affaire: il
a désigné M. François Rigaux. 7. Between 16 and 24 September 1996, the Court held public hearings on the
preliminary objection raised by the United States.
8. By a Judgment dated 12 December 1996 the Court rejected the prelimi-
nary objection of the United States according to which the 1955 Treaty did not
provide any basis for the jurisdiction of the Court and found that it had juris-
diction, on the basis of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty, to enter-
tain the claims made by Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty.

9. By an Order of 16 December 1996 the President of the Court fixed 23 June
1997 as the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial of the United
States.
Within the time-limit thus fixed, the United States filed its Counter-
Memorial; this included a counter-claim concerning "Iran's actions in the Gulf

during 1987-88 which, among other things, involved mining and other attacks
on US-flag or US-owned vessels".

10. In a letter of 2 October 1997 Iran expressed its opinion that "the counter-
claim as formulated by the United States [did] not meet the requirements of
Article 80 (1) of the Rules" and its wish "to submit a brief statement explaining
its objections to the counter-claim".

At a meeting held on 17 October 1997 with the Agents of the Parties by
the Vice-President of the Court, acting as President in the case by virtue of
Article 13, paragraph 1, and Article 32, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court,
the two Agents agreed that their respective Governments would submit written
observations on the question of the admissibility of the United States counter-

claim.
By a communication from its Agent dated 18 November 1997, Iran trans-
mitted to the Court a document entitled "Request for hearing in relation to the
United States counter-claim pursuant to Article 80 (3) of the Rules of Court" ;
by a letter dated 18 November 1997 the Registrar sent a copy of that document
to the United States Government. By a communication from its Agent dated
18 December 1997, the United States submitted to the Court its observations
on the admissibility of the counter-claim set out in its Counter-Memorial,
taking the observations submitted by Iran into consideration; by a letter dated
18 December 1997, the Registrar communicated a copy of the observations of
the United States Government to the Iranian Government.

Having received detailed written observations from each of the Parties, the

Court considered that it was sufficiently well informed of their respective posi-
tions with regard to the admissibility of the counter-claim.
11. By an Order of 10 March 1998 the Court held that the counter-claim
presented by the United States in its Counter-Memorial was admissible as such
and formed part of the current proceedings. It also directed Iran to file a Reply
and the United States to file a Rejoinder, relatingto the claims of both Parties,
and fixed the time-limits for the filing of the Reply and of the Rejoinder at
10 September 1998 and 23 November 1999 respectively. The Court held that it
was necessary moreover,

"in order to ensure strict equality between the Parties, to reserve the right

of Iran to present its views in writing a second time on the United States 7. La Cour a tenu des audiences sur l'exception préliminaire soulevée
par les Etats-Unis du 16 au 24 septembre 1996.
8. Dans son arrêt du 12 décembre 1996, la Cour a rejeté l'exception pré-
liminaire des Etats-Unis selon laquelle le traité de 1955 ne saurait d'aucune
manière fonder la compétence de la Cour et a dit qu'elle avait compétence, sur
la base du paragraphe 2 de l'article XXI du traité de 1955, pour connaître des
demandes formulées par l'Iran au titre du paragraphe 1 de l'article X dudit

traité.
9. Par ordonnance du 16 décembre 1996, le président de la Cour a fixéau
23 juin 1997 la date d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt du contre-mémoire des
Etats-Unis.
Dans le délai ainsi fixé, les Etats-Unis ont déposé leur contre-mémoire;
celui-ci incluait une demande reconventionnelle portant sur «les actions menées
par l'Iran dans le Golfe en 1987 et 1988, qui comportaient des opérations de
mouillage de mines et d'autres attaques contre des navires battant pavillon des
Etats-Unis ou appartenant à ceux-ci».
10. Par lettre du 2 octobre 1997, l'Iran a indiqué qu'il considérait que «la
demande reconventionnelle telle que formulée par les Etats-Unis ne satisfai-
[sait] pas aux exigences du paragraphe 1 de l'article 80 du Règlement » et qu'il
souhaitait ((soumettre un bref exposé de ses objections à l'égard de la demande

reconventionnelle ».
Lors d'une réunion que le vice-président de la Cour, faisant fonction de pré-
sident en l'affaire en vertu des articles13, paragraphe 1, et 32, paragraphe 1, du
Règlement, a tenue avec les agents des Parties le 17 octobre 1997, les deux
agents ont accepté que leurs gouvernements respectifs déposent des observa-
tions écrites sur la question de la recevabilité de la demande reconventionnelle
des Etats-Unis.
Par communication de son agent datée du 18 novembre 1997, l'Iran a fait
tenir à la Cour un document intitulé «Demande tendant à ce que les Parties
soient entendues au sujet de la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis en
application du paragraphe 3 de l'article 80 du Règlement de la Cour»; par
lettre du 18 novembre 1997, le greffier a transmis copie de ce document au
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis. Par communication de leur agent datée du 18 dé-

cembre 1997, les Etats-Unis ont fait tenir à la Cour leurs observations sur la
recevabilité de la demande reconventionnelle formulée dans leur contre-
mémoire, compte tenu des observations présentées par l'Iran; par lettre du
18 décembre 1997,le greffier a communiqué copie de ces observations au Gou-
vernement iranien.
Saisie d'observations écrites détaillées de chacune des Parties, la Cour a
considéré qu'elle était suffisamment informée de leurs positions respectives
quant à la recevabilité de la demande reconventionnelle.
11. Par ordonnance du 10 mars 1998, la Cour a dit que la demande recon-
ventionnelle présentée par les Etats-Unis dans leur contre-mémoire était rece-
vable comme telle et faisait partie de l'instance en cours. Elle a aussi prescrit la
présentation d'une réplique de l'Iran et d'une duplique des Etats-Unis, portant

sur les demandes soumises par les deux Parties, et a fixéau 10 septembre 1998
la date d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt de la réplique et au 23 novembre
1999 la date d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt de la duplique. La Cour a dit
qu'il y avait lieu

«en outre, aux finsd'assurer une stricte égalité entre les Parties, de réserver
le droit, pour l'Iran, de s'exprimer une seconde fois par écrit sur la counter-claim, in an additional pleading the filing of which [might] be the
subject of a subsequent Order".

12. By Order of 26 May 1998, at the request of Iran, the Vice-President of
the Court, acting as President in the case, extended the time-limits for the filing
of the Reply of Iran and of the Rejoinder of the United States to, respectively,
10 December 1998 and 23 May 2000. By Order of 8 December 1998, at the
request of Iran, the Court subsequently extended the time-limits for the filing
of the Reply and of the Rejoinder to 10 March 1999 and 23 November 2000
respectively.

Iran duly filed its "Reply and Defence to Counter-Claim" within the time-
limit as thus extended.
By Order of 4 September 2000, at the request of the United States, the Presi-
dent of the Court extended the time-limit for the filing of the Rejoinder of the
United States to 23 March 2001.
The United States duly filed its Rejoinder within the time-limit as thus
extended.
13. By a letter dated 30 July 2001, the Agent of Iran, referring to the above-
mentioned Order of 10 March 1998, informed the Court that his Government
wished to present its views in writing a second time on the counter-claim of the
United States.
By an Order of 28 August 2001 the Vice-President of the Court, taking

account of the agreement of the Parties, authorized the submission by Iran of
an additional pleading relating solely to the counter-claim submitted by the
United States and fixed 24 September 2001 as the time-limit for the filing of
that pleading.
Iran duly filed the additional pleading within the time-limit as thus fixed and
the case became ready for hearing.
14. At a meeting with the President of the Court on 6 November 2002, the
Agent of Iran, subject to confirmation, and the Agent of the United States
agreed that the oral proceedings on the merits should begin on 17 or 18 Feb-
ruary 2003; the Agent of Iran subsequently confirmed the agreement of his
Government. At the same meeting the Agents of the Parties also presented their
views on the organization of the oral proceedings on the merits.
Pursuant to Articles 54 and 58 of the Rules, the Court fixed 17 Febru-
ary 2003 as the date for the opening of the hearings and adopted a timetable for

them. The Registrar informed the Parties accordingly by letters of 19 Novem-
ber 2002.
15. At the meeting of 6 November 2002, the Agents of the Parties informed
the President of the Court that they had decided not to present witnesses at the
oral proceedings. The Agent of the United States nevertheless expressed his
Government's intention, under Article 56 of the Rules, to file a new document
containing an analysis and explanations by experts concerning certain evidence
already produced in the case. The Agent of Iran stated that his Government
reserved al1 its rights with regard to the production of that document. On
20 November 2002, the United States filed an expert's report dated 18 Novem-
ber 2002, together with a copy of a diplomatic Note dated 20 November 2002
from the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Washington D.C. to the United States

Department of State. By a letter dated 20 January 2003, the Agent of Iran
informed the Court that his Government did not object to the production of
the above-mentioned documents by the United States and requested that, pur- PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 168

demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis, dans une pièce additionnelle
dont la présentation pourrait faire l'objet d'une ordonnance ultérieure».

12. Par ordonnance du 26 mai 1998, à la demande de l'Iran, le vice-président
de la Cour, faisant fonction de président en l'affaire, a reporté au 10 décembre
1998 la date d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt de la réplique de l'Iran et au

23 mai 2000 la date d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt de la duplique des
Etats-Unis. Par ordonnance du 8 décembre 1998, à la demande de l'Iran, la
Cour a ultérieurement reporté au 10 mars 1999 la date d'expiration du délai
pour le dépôt de la réplique et au 23 novembre 2000 la date d'expiration du
délai pour le dépôt de la duplique.
Dans le délai ainsi prorogé, l'Iran a dûment déposésa ((Réplique et réponse
à la demande reconventionnelle ».
Par ordonnance du 4 septembre 2000, à la demande des Etats-Unis, le pré-
sident de la Cour a reporté au 23 mars 2001 la date d'expiration du délai pour
le dépôt de la duplique.
Les Etats-Unis ont dûment déposé leur duplique dans le délai ainsi prorogé.

13. Par lettre du 30 juillet 2001, l'agent de l'Iran, se référant à l'ordonnance
susmentionnée du 10 mars 1998, a fait connaître à la Cour que son gouverne-
ment souhaitait s'exprimer une seconde fois par écrit sur la demande reconven-
tionnelle des Etats-Unis.
Par ordonnance du 28 août 2001, le vice-président de la Cour, compte tenu
de l'accord des Parties, a autorisé la présentation par l'Iran d'une pièce addi-
tionnelle portant exclusivement sur la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-
Unis et a fixéau 24 septembre 2001 la date d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt
de cette pièce.
L'Iran a dûment déposé la pièce additionnelle dans le délai ainsi prescrit, et
l'affaire s'est trouvée en état.
14. Lors d'une réunion tenue avec le président de la Cour le 6 novembre
2002, l'agent de l'Iran, sous réserve de confirmation, et l'agent des Etats-Unis

ont exprimé leur accord pour que la procédure orale sur le fond s'ouvre le 17
ou le 18 février 2003 ;l'agent de l'Iran a par la suite confirmé l'accord de son
gouvernement. Lors de cette réunion, les agents des Parties ont en outre pré-
senté leurs vues sur l'organisation de la procédure orale sur le fond.
Conformément aux articles 54 et 58 du Règlement,la Cour a fixéau 17 février
2003 la date d'ouverture de la procédure orale et a adopté le calendrier de celle-
ci. Par lettres du 19 novembre 2002, le greffier a porté cette décision à la
connaissance des Parties.
15. Au cours de la réunion du 6 novembre 2002, les agents des Parties ont
fait part au président de la Cour de leur décision de ne pas présenter de témoins
lors de la procédure orale. L'agent des Etats-Unis a néanmoins exprimé le vŒu
de son gouvernement de produire, conformément aux dispositions de l'ar-
ticle 56 du Règlement, un document nouveau contenant une analyse et des expli-

cations d'experts au sujet d'éléments de preuve déjà versés au dossier de l'af-
faire. L'agent de l'Iran a fait savoir que son gouvernement réservait l'ensemble
de ses droits quant à une telle production. Le 20 novembre 2002, les Etats-
Unis ont déposé un rapport d'expert daté du 18 novembre 2002, ainsi qu'une
copie d'une note diplomatique, datée du 20 novembre 2002, adressée au dépar-
tement d'Etat des Etats-Unis par l'ambassade royale de Norvège à Washing-
ton. Dans une lettre datée du 20 janvier 2003, l'agent de l'Iran a fait savoir à la
Cour que son gouvernement n'avait pas d'objection à la production des docu-suant to Article 56, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the comments of an
expert of Iran on the expert report of the United States "be made part of the
record in the case". On 22 January 2003, the Court decided to authorize the
production of the above-mentioned documents by the United States and
the submission of the comments by Iran; by letters dated the same day, the
Registrar communicated this decision to the Parties.

16. Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of its Rules, the Court, having con-
sulted the Parties, decided that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed
would be made accessible to the public on the opening of the oral proceedings
on the merits.
17. Public sittings were held between 17 February and 7 March 2003, at
which the Court heard the oral arguments and replies on the claim of Iran and

on the counter-claim of the United States by:
For Iran : Mr. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf,
Mr. James R. Crawford,
Mr. D. Momtaz,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy,
Mr. Alain Pellet,
Mr. S. M. Zeinoddin,
Mr. David S. Sellers,

Mr. Michael Bothe.
For the United States: TTle Honourable William H. Taft, IV,
1LIr. Paul Beaver,
1LIr. D. Stephen Mathias,
1LIr. Ronald D. Neubauer,
1LIr. John Moore,
1LIr. Ronald J. Bettauer,
1L.r. Michael J. Mattler,
1L:r. Michael J. Matheson,
1LIr. Prosper Weil,
1L:r. Sean Murphy.

In the course of the hearings, questions were put by Members of the Court
and replies given in writing, pursuant to Article 61, paragraph 4, of the Rules
of Court. Each Party presented written observations on the written replies
received from the other, pursuant to Article 72 of the Rules.

18. In the Application, the following requests were made by Iran :

"On the basis of the foregoing, and while reserving the right to supple-
ment and amend these submissions as appropriate in the course of further
proceedings in the case, the Islamic Republic respectfully requests the
Court to adjudge and declare as follows:

(a) that the Court has jurisdiction under the Treaty of Amity to entertain
the dispute and to rule upon the claims submitted by the Islamic
Republic ;
(b) that in attacking and destroying the oil platforms referred to in the
Application on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988, the United
States breached its obligations to the Islamic Republic, inter alia,ments susviséspar les Etats-Unis et a prié la Cour que, conformément au para-
graphe 3 de l'article 56 du Règlement, les observations de l'expert de l'Iran sur
le rapport d'expert des Etats-Unis «soient versées au dossier de l'affaire)). Le
22 janvier 2003, la Cour a décidéd'autoriser la production desdits documents
par les Etats-Unis et la présentation des observations de l'Iran; le greffier a
porté cette décision à la connaissance des Parties par lettres datées du même
jour.
16. Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'article 53 du Règlement, la Cour,
après s'êtrerenseignée auprès des Parties, a décidéque des exemplaires des
pièces de procédure et des documents annexés seraient rendus accessibles au pu-
blic à l'ouverture de la procédure orale sur le fond.
17. Des audiences publiques ont été tenuesdu 17 février au 7 mars 2003, au
cours desquelles ont étéentendus en leursplaidoiries et réponses sur la demande
de l'Iran et la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis:

Pour l'Iran: M. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf,
M. James R. Crawford,
M. D. Momtaz,
M. Rodman R. Bundy,
M. Alain Pellet,
M. S. M. Zeinoddin,
M. David S. Sellers,
M. Michael Bothe.
Pour les Etats-Unis: l'honorable William H. Taft, IV,
M. Paul Beaver,
M. D. Stephen Mathias,
M. Ronald D. Neubauer,
M. John Moore,
M. Ronald J. Bettauer,
M. Michael J. Mattler,
M. Michael J. Matheson,
M. Prosper Weil,
M. Sean Murphy.
A l'audience, des questions ont étéposées par des membres de la Cour, aux-
quelles il a étérépondu par écrit, conformément au paragraphe 4 de l'article 61
du Règlement. Chacune des Parties a présenté des observations écrites sur les
réponses de l'autre Partie, conformément à l'article 72 du Règlement.

18. Dans la requête, les demandes ci-après ont été formuléespar l'Iran:

Sur la base de ce qui précède, et en se réservant le droit de compléter et
modifier les présentes conclusions en tant que de besoin au cours de la
suite de la procédure en l'affaire, la République islamique prie respectueu-
sement la Cour de dire et juger:
a) que la Cour a compétence en vertu du traité d'amitié pour connaître
du différend et statuer sur les demandes présentées par la République
islamique ;
b) qu'en attaquant et détruisant, les 19 octobre 1987 et 18 avril 1988, les
plates-formes pétrolières mentionnées dans la requête, les Etats-Unis
ont manqué à leurs obligations vis-à-vis de la République islamique, under Articles 1 and X (1) of the Treaty of Amity and international
law ;
(c) that in adopting a patently hostile and threatening attitude towards
the Islamic Republic that culminated in the attack and destruction of
the Iranian oil platforms, the United States breached the object and
purpose of the Treaty of Amity, including Articles 1 and X (l), and
international law ;
(d) that the United States is under an obligation to make reparations to
the Islamic Republic for the violation of its international legal obli-

gations in an amount to be determined by the Court at a subsequent
stage of the proceedings. The Islamic Republic reserves the right to
introduce and present to the Court in due course a precise evaluation
of the reparations owed by the United States; and
(e) any other remedy the Court may deem appropriate."
19. In the written proceedings, the following submissions were made by the
Parties :

On behalfof the Government of Iran,
in the Memorial:

"In the light of the facts and arguments set out above, the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
1. That the Court has jurisdiction under the Treaty of Amity to entertain
the dispute and to rule upon the claims submitted by Iran;

2. That in attacking and destroying the oil platforms referred to in Iran's
Application on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988, the United States
breached its obligations to Iran, inter alia,under Articles 1, IV (1) and
X (1) of the Treaty of Amity and international law, and that the United
States bears responsibility for the attacks; and

3. That the United States is accordingly under an obligation to make full
reparation to Iran for the violation of its international legal obligations
and the injury thus caused in a form and amount to be determined by
the Court at a subsequent stage of the proceedings. Iran reserves the
right to introduce and present to the Court in due course a precise

evaluation of the reparation owed by the United States; and
4. Any other remedy the Court may deem appropriate" ;
in the "Reply and Defence to Counter-Claim":

"With regard to Iran's claims, and in the light of the facts and argu-
ments set out above, and subject to the reservations set out in Chapter 12
above, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran requests the Court
to adjudge and declare:
1. That in attacking and destroying on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988
the oil platforms referred to in Iran's Application, the United States
breached its obligations to Iran under Article X (1) of the Treaty of
Amity, and that the United States bears responsibility for the attacks;

and
2. That the United States is accordingly under an obligation to make full
reparation to Iran for the violation of its internationallegal obligations
and the injury thus caused in a form and amount to be determined by PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 170

notamment celles qui découlent de l'article premier et du paragraphe 1
de l'articleX du traité d'amitié, ainsi que du droit international;
c) qu'en adoptant envers la République islamique une attitude manifes-
tement hostile et menaçante qui a abouti à l'attaque et à la destruction
des plates-formes pétrolières iraniennes, les Etats-Unis ont enfreint

l'objet et le but du traité d'amitié, notamment son article premier et le
paragraphe 1 de son article X, ainsi que le droit international;
d) que les Etats-Unis sont tenus de réparer le préjudice ainsi causé à la
République islamique pour avoir enfreint leurs obligations juridiques
internationales, selon un montant à déterminer par la Cour à un stade
ultérieur de l'instance, le droit de la République islamique d'introduire
et de présenter, le moment venu, à la Cour une évaluation précise des
réparations dues par les Etats-Unis étant réservé; et d'ordonner
e) tout autre remède que la Cour jugerait approprié. ))

19. Dans la procédure écrite, les conclusions ci-après ont été présentéespar
les Parties:
Au nom du Gouvernement de l'Iran,

dans le mémoire :
«A la lumière des faits et des arguments exposés ci-dessus, le Gouver-
nement de la République islamique d'Iran prie la Cour de dire et juger:

1. que la Cour a compétenceen vertu du traité d'amitié pour connaître du
différend et statuer sur les demandes présentées par l'Iran;
2. qu'en attaquant et détruisant, les 19 octobre 1987 et 18 avril 1988, les
plates-formes pétrolières mentionnées dans la requête de l'Iran, les
Etats-Unis ont manqué à leurs obligations vis-à-vis de l'Iran, notam-
ment celles qui découlent de l'article premier, du paragraphe 1de l'ar-
ticle IV et du paragraphe 1de l'article X du traité d'amitié, ainsi que du
droit international, et quela responsabilité de ces attaques incombe aux
Etats-Unis ;

3. que les Etats-Unis sont donc tenus de réparer intégralement le préjudice
ainsi causé à l'Iran pour avoir enfreint leurs obligations juridiques
internationales, selon des formes et un montant à déterminer par la
Cour à un stade ultérieur de l'instance, le droit de l'Iran d'introduire et
de présenter, le moment venu, devant la Cour une évaluation précise
des réparations dues par les Etats-Unis étant réservé; et d'ordonner
4. tout autre remède que la Cour jugerait approprié));

dans la «Réplique et réponse à la demande reconventionnelle » :
«En ce qui concerne les demandes de l'Iran, compte tenu des faits et
arguments exposés ci-dessus, et sans préjudice des réserves formulées au
chapitre 12 ci-dessus, le Gouvernement de la République islamique d'Iran
prie la Cour de dire et juger:

1. qu'en attaquant et détruisant, les 19 octobre 1987 et 18 avril 1988, les
plates-formes pétrolières mentionnées dans la requête de l'Iran, les
Etats-Unis ont manqué à leurs obligations vis-à-vis de l'Iran au regard
du paragraphe 1de l'articlX du traité d'amitié, et que la responsabi-
lité de ces attaques incombe aux Etats-Unis; et
2. que les Etats-Unis sont donc tenus de réparer intégralement le préjudice
ainsi causé à l'Iran pour avoir enfreint leurs obligations juridiques
internationales, selon des formes et un montant à déterminer par la the Court at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, the right being
reserved to introduce and present to the Court in due course a precise
evaluation of the reparation owed by the United States; and
3. Any other remedy the Court may deem appropriate.
With regard to the United States' counter-claim, and in light of the facts

and arguments set out above, and subject to the reservations set out in
Chapter 12 above, and, in view of the present uncertain nature of the
United States' counter-claim, further subject to the reservation of Iran's
right to amend these submissions, Iran requests the Court to adjudge and
declare:
1. That the United States' counter-claim does not fa11within the scope of
Article X (1) of the Treaty of Amity as interpreted by the Court in these
proceedings, and accordingly that the counter-claim should be dis-
missed.

2. That the United States' counter-claim is, in any event, inadmissible:

(a) generally, in that the United States has not satisfied the require-
ments of Article XXI of the Treaty of Amity with respect to the
satisfactory diplomatic adjustment of the claim;

(b) in any event, to the extent that it relates to vessels which were not
of United States nationality or whose United States flag was not

opposable to Iran at the time.
3. That Iran did not, in any event, breach its obligations to the United
States under Article X (1) of the Treaty of Amity as interpreted by the
Court in these proceedings.
4. That accordingly the United States' counter-claim be dismissed";

in the additional pleading entitled "Further Response to the United States'
Counter-Claim" :
"Based on the facts and legal considerations set forth in Iran's Reply

and Defence to Counter-Claim in the present pleading, and subject to the
reservations set out in Chapter 12 of its Reply and Defence to Counter-
Claim and in Chapter VI11 above and, in view of the present uncertain
nature of the United States' counter-claim, further subject to the reserva-
tion of Iran's right to amend these submissions, Iran requests the Court,
rejecting al1 submissions to the contrary, to adjudge and declare:

That the United States' counter-claim be dismissed."

On behalfof the Government of the United States,
in the "Counter-Memorial and Counter-Claim" :

"On the basis of the facts and arguments set out above, the Government
of the United States of America requests that the Court adjudge and
declare :

1. That the United States did not breach its obligations to the Islamic
Republic of Iran under Article X (1) of the Treaty of Amity between
the United States and Iran, and, PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 171

Cour à un stade ultérieur de l'instance, le droit de l'Iran d'introduire et
de présenter, le moment venu, devant la Cour une évaluation précise
des réparations dues par les Etats-Unis étant réservé;et d'ordonner
3. tout autre remède que la Cour jugerait approprié.

En ce qui concerne la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis,compte
tenu des faits et arguments exposés ci-dessus, et sans préjudice des réserves
formulées au chapitre 12 ci-dessus et, étant donné l'incertitude existant
actuellement quant à la nature de la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-
Unis, sous réserve en outre du droit de l'Iran de modifier les présentes
conclusions, l'Iran prie la Cour de dire et juger:
1. que la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis n'entre pas dans le

champ d'application du paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité d'amitié
tel qu'interprété par la Cour en la présente instance, et qu'en consé-
quence cette demande reconventionnelle doit être rejetée ;
2. que la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis est, de toute manière,
irrecevable :
a) d'une manière générale,parce que les Etats-Unis n'ont pas satisfait
aux prescriptions de l'article XXI du traité d'amitié en ce qui
concerne le règlement satisfaisant de la demande par la voie diplo-

matique ;
b) en tout état de cause, dans la mesure où elle a trait à des navires qui
n'avaient pas la nationalité des Etats-Unis ou dont le pavillon des
Etats-Unis n'était pas opposable à l'Iran à l'époque;
3. que l'Iran n'a pas, de toute façon, manqué à ses obligations vis-à-vis
des Etats-Unis au regard du paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité d'ami-
tié tel qu'interprété par la Cour en la présente instance;
4. qu'en conséquence la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis est

rejetée» ;
dans la pièce additionnelle intitulée «Réponse additionnelle à la demande
reconventionnelle »:

«Sur la base des faits et des considérations juridiques exposés dans la
réplique et la réponse à la demande reconventionnelle présentées par l'Iran
et dans la présente pièce de procédure, et sans préjudice des réserves for-
mulées au chapitre 12 desdites réplique et réponse à la demande reconven-
tionnelle et au chapitre VI11 ci-dessus et compte tenu de l'incertitude exis-
tant actuellement quant à la nature de la demande reconventionnelle des
Etats-Unis, et sous réserve en outre du droit de l'Iran de modifier les pré-
sentes conclusions, l'Iran prie la Cour, rejetant toutes les conclusions
d'objet contraire, de dire et juger:

que la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis est rejetée. >>
Au nom du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis,

dans le «Contre-mémoireet demande reconventionnelle »:
«Sur la base des faits et arguments exposés ci-dessus, le Gouvernement
des Etats-Unis d'Amérique prie la Cour de dire et juger:

1. que les Etats-Unis n'ont pas enfreint leurs obligations envers la Répu-
blique islamique d'Iran au titre du paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité
d'amitié entre les Etats-Unis et l'Iran; et 2. That the claims of the Islamic Republic of Iran are accordingly dis-
missed.
With respect to its counter-claim, and in accordance with Article 80 of
the Rules of the Court, the United States requests that the Court adjudge
and declare:

1. That in attacking vessels, laying mines in the Gulf and otherwise
engaging in military actions in 1987-1988 that were dangerous and
detrimental to maritime commerce, the Islamic Republic of Iran
breached its obligations to the United States under Article X of the
1955 Treaty, and
2. That the Islamic Republic of Iran is accordingly under an obligation to
make full reparation to the United States for violating the 1955 Treaty
in a form and amount to be determined by the Court at a subsequent
stage of the proceedings.

The United States reserves the right to introduce and present to the
Court in due course a precise evaluation of the reparation owed by Iran" ;

in the Rejoinder:

"On the basis of the facts and arguments set out above, the Government
of the United States of America requests that the Court adjudge and
declare :

1. That the United States did not breach its obligations to the Islamic
Republic of Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty of
Amity between the United States and Iran, and
2. That the claims of the Islamic Republic of Iran are accordingly dis-
missed.
With respect to its counter-claim, the United States requests that the
Court adjudge and declare :

1. Rejecting al1 submissions to the contrary, that, in attacking vessels in
the Gulf with mines and missiles and otherwise engaging in military
actions that were dangerous and detrimental to maritime commerce,
the Islamic Republic of Iran breached its obligations to the United
States under Article X of the 1955 Treaty, and
2. That the Islamic Republic of Iran is accordingly under an obligation to
make full reparation to the United States for its breach of the 1955
Treaty in a form and amount to be determined by the Court at a sub-
sequent stage of the proceeding.

The United States reserves the right to introduce and present to the
Court in due course a precise evaluation of the reparation owed by Iran."

20. At the oral proceedings, the following final submissions were presented
by the Parties:
On behalf of the Government of Iran,

at the hearing of 3 March 2003, on the claim of Iran
"The Islamic Republic of Iran respectfully requests the Court, rejecting
al1 contrary claims and submissions, to adjudge and declare: PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 172

2. que les demandes de la République islamique d'Iran doivent en consé-
quence êtrerejetées.

S'agissant de leur demande reconventionnelle, et conformément à l'ar-
ticle 80 du Règlement de la Cour, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique prient la Cour
de dire et juger:
1. qu'en attaquant les navires, en mouillant des mines dans le Golfe et en
menant d'autres actions militaires en 1987 et 1988 qui étaient dange-
reuses et dommageables pour le commerce maritime, la République

islamique d'Iran a enfreint ses obligations envers les Etats-Unis au titre
de l'articleX du traité de 1955 ; et
2. quela République islamique d'Iran est en conséquencetenue de réparer
intégralement le préjudice qu'elle a causé aux Etats-Unis en violant le
traité de1955, selon des formes et un montant à déterminer par la Cour
à un stade ultérieur de l'instance.
Les Etats-Unis se réservent le droit d'introduire et de présenter, le

moment venu, devant la Cour une évaluation précise des réparations dues
par l'Iran ;
dans la duplique :

«Sur la base des faits et arguments exposés ci-dessus, le Gouvernement
des Etats-Unis d'Amérique prie la Cour de dire et juger:

1. que les Etats-Unis n'ont pas enfreint leurs obligations envers la Répu-

blique islamique d'Iran au titre du paragraphe 1 de l'articlX du traité
de 1955 entre les Etats-Unis et l'Iran; et
2. que les demandes de la République islamique d'Iran doivent en consé-
quence êtrerejetées.
S'agissant de leur demande reconventionnelle, les Etats-Unis d'Amé-
rique prient la Cour de dire et juger:

1. rejetant toute conclusion contraire, qu'en attaquant les navires dans le
Golfe avec des mines et des missiles et en menant d'autres actions mili-
taires qui étaient dangereuses et nuisibles pour le commerce maritime,
la République islamique d'Iran a enfreint les obligations qui étaient les
siennes envers les Etats-Unis au titre de l'article X du traité de 1955; et
2. quela République islamique d'Iran est en conséquencetenue de réparer
intégralement le préjudice qu'elle a causé aux Etats-Unis en violant le
traité de 1955, selon des formes et un montant à déterminer par la Cour
à un stade ultérieur de l'instance.

Les Etats-Unis se réservent le droit d'introduire et présenter, le moment
venu, devant la Cour une évaluation précise des réparations dues par
l'Iran.))

20. Dans la procédure orale, les conclusions finales ci-après ont été présen-
tées par les Parties :

Au nom du Gouvernement de ['Iran,
à l'audience du 3 mars 2003, concernant la demande de l'Iran:

«La République islamique d'Iran prie respectueusement la Cour, une
fois rejetées toutes demandes et conclusions en sens contraire, de dire et
juger : 1. That in attacking and destroying on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988
the oil platforms referred to in Iran's Application, the United States
breached its obligations to Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of the
Treaty of Amity, and that the United States bears responsibility for the
attacks; and
2. That the United States is accordingly under an obligation to make full
reparation to Iran for the violation of its international legal obligations
and the injury thus caused in a form and amount to be determined by
the Court at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, the right being
reserved to Iran to introduce and present to the Court in due course a
precise evaluation of the reparation owed by the United States; and
3. Any other remedy the Court may deem appropriate" ;

at the hearing of 7 March 2003, on the counter-claim of the United States:

"The Islamic Republic of Iran respectfully requests the Court, rejecting
al1 contrary claims and submissions, to adjudge and declare:
That the United States counter-claim be dismissed."

On behalfof the Government of the United States,
at the hearing of 5 March 2003, on the claim of Iran and the counter-claim of
the United States:

"The United States respectfully requests that the Court adjudge and
declare :

(1) tRepublic of Iran under Article X, paragraphligations1, of the 1955 Treatyc

between the United States and Iran; and
(2) that the claims of the Islamic Republic of Iran are accordingly dis-
missed.
With respect to its counter-claim, the United States requests that the
Court adjudge and declare :

(1) rejecting al1 submissions to the contrary, that, in attacking vessels in
the Gulf with mines and missiles and otherwise engaging in military
actions that were dangerous and detrimental to commerce and naviga-
tion between the territories of the United States and the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran breached its obligations
to the United States under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty ;
and
(2) that the Islamic Republic of Iran is accordingly under an obligation to
make full reparation to the United States for its breach of the
1955 Treaty in a form and amount to be determined by the Court at a
subsequent stage of the proceedings. "

21. The task of the Court in the present proceedings is to determine
whether or not there have been breaches of the 1955 Treaty, and if it
finds that such is the case, to draw the appropriate consequences accord-
ing to the submissions of the Parties. The Court is seised both of a claim

by Iran alleging breaches by the United States, and of a counter-claim by 1. qu'en attaquant et en détruisant, les 19 octobre 1987 et 18 avril 1988,
les plates-formes pétrolières mentionnées dans la requête de l'Iran, les
Etats-Unis ont manqué à leurs obligations vis-à-vis de l'Iran au regard
du paragraphe 1de l'articleX du traité d'amitié, et que la responsabi-
litéde ces attaques incombe aux Etats-Unis ; et
2. que les Etats-Unis sont donc tenus deréparer intégralement le préjudice
ainsi causé à l'Iran pour avoir manqué à leurs obligations juridiques
internationales, selon des formes et un montant à déterminer par la
Cour à un stade ultérieur de l'instance, le droit de l'Iran d'introduire et
de présenter, le moment venu, à la Cour une évaluation précise des
réparations dues par les Etats-Unis étant réservé; etd'ordonner
3. tout autre remède que la Cour jugerait approprié »;

à l'audience du 7 mars 2003, concernant la demande reconventionnelle des
Etats-Unis :
«La République islamique d'Iran prie respectueusement la Cour, une fois
rejetées toutes demandes et conclusions en sens contraire, de dire et juger:

que la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis est rejetée. »
Au nom du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis,

reconventionnelle dess Etats-Uniser:ant la demande de l'Iran et la demande

«Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique prie respectueusement la
Cour de dire et juger :
1) que les Etats-Unis n'ont pas enfreint les obligations qui étaient les leurs
envers la République islamique d'Iran au titre du paragraphe 1 de
l'articleX du traité de 1955 entre les Etats-Unis et l'Iran; et
2) que les demandes de la République islamique d'Iran doivent en consé-
quence êtrerejetées.

S'agissant de leur demande reconventionnelle, les Etats-Unis d'Amé-
rique prient la Cour de dire et juger:
1) une fois rejetée toute conclusion en sens contraire, qu'en attaquant les
navires dans le Golfe avec des mines et des missiles et en menant
d'autres actions militaires dangereuseset nuisibles pour le commerce et
la navigation entre les territoires des Etats-Unis et de la République
islamique d'Iran, celle-ci a enfreint les obligations qui étaient les
siennes envers les Etats-Unis au titre du paragraphe 1 de l'articleX
du traité de 1955; et
2) quela République islamique d'Iran est en conséquencetenue deréparer
intégralement le préjudice qu'elle a causé aux Etats-Unis par sa viola-
tion du traité de 1955, selon des formes et un montant à déterminer par
la Cour à un stade ultérieur de l'instance.»

21. La Cour a pour tâche en la présente instance de déterminer s'il y a
eu ou non violation du traité de 1955 et, si elle juge que tel est le cas, d'en
tirer les conséquences appropriées au vu des conclusions des Parties. La
Cour est saisie à la fois d'une demande de l'Iran alléguant que les Etats-
Unis ont violé le traité, et d'une demande reconventionnelle des Etats-the United States alleging breaches by Iran. Its jurisdiction to entertain
both the claim and the counter-claim is asserted to be based upon
Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty.
22. The Court recalls that, as regards the claim of Iran, the question of
jurisdiction has been the subject of a judgment, given on 12 December
1996, whereby the Court found "that it has jurisdiction,on the basis of
Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty, to entertain the claims
made by the Islamic Republic of Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of
that Treaty" (I. C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 821, para. 55 (2));certain ques-
tions have however been raised between the Parties as to the precise sig-
nificance or scope of that Judgment, which will be examined below.
As to the counter-claim, the Court also recalls that it decided by an
Order made on 10 March 1998 to admit the counter-claim, and indicated
in that Order that the facts alleged and relied on by the United States
"are capable of falling within the scope of Article X, paragraph 1, of the
1955 Treaty as interpreted by the Court", and accordingly that "the

Court has jurisdiction to entertain the United States counter-claim in so
far as the facts alleged may have prejudiced the freedoms guaranteed by
Article X, paragraph 1" (1.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 204, para. 36). In this
respect also questions have been raised between the Parties as to the
significance and scope of that ruling on jurisdiction, and these will be
examined below.
It is however established, by the decisions cited, that both Iran's claim
and the counter-claim of the United States can be upheld only so far as a
breach or breaches of Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955,Treaty may be
shown, even though other provisions of the Treaty may be relevant to the
interpretation of that paragraph. Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955
Treaty reads as follows: "Between the territories of the two High Con-
tracting Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation."

23. Before proceeding further, it will be convenient to set out the
factual background to the case, as it emerges from the pleadings of both
Parties; the broad lines of this background are not disputed, being a
matter of historical record. The actions giving rise to both the claim and
the counter-claim occurred in the context of the general events that took
place in the Persian Gulf between 1980 and 1988, in particular the armed
conflict that opposed Iran and Iraq. That conflictbegan on 22 September
1980, when Iraqi forces advanced into the western areas of Iranian terri-
tory, and continued until the belligerent parties accepted a ceasefire in the
summer of 1988, pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolu-
tion 598 (1987) of 20 July 1987. During the war, combat occurred in the
territories of both States, but the conflict also spread to the Persian Gulf
- which is an international commercial route and line of communication
of major importance - and affected commerce and navigation in the
region. From the very beginning of the conflict, on 22 September 1980,
Iran establisheda defence exclusion zone around its coasts; shortly after,
in early October 1980, Iraq declared a "prohibited war zone" and later PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 174

Unis alléguant que l'Iran a violé celui-ci. La compétence de la Cour pour
connaître de la demande et de la demande reconventionnelle découlerait

du paragraphe 2 de l'article XXI du traité de 1955.
22. La Cour rappelle que, s'agissant de la demande de l'Iran, la ques-
tion de la compétence a fait l'objet d'un arrêt,rendu le 12 décembre 1996,
dans lequel la Cour a dit avoir ((compétence, sur la base du paragraphe 2
de l'article XXI du traité de 1955, pour connaître des demandes formu-
léespar la République islamique d'Iran au titre du paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticle X dudit traité» (C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 821, par. 55, alinéa 2) ;
les Parties ont cependant soulevé, quant au sens ou à la portée exacts de
cet arrêt, certaines questions qui seront examinées plus loin.

Quant à la demande reconventionnelle,la Cour rappelle en outre que,
par ordonnance rendue le 10 mars 1998, elle a déclarécette demande
recevable et a indiqué que les faits alléguéspar les Etats-Unis et sur les-
quels ceux-ci s'appuient «sont susceptibles d'entrer dans les prévisions du
paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955 tel qu'interprété par la
Cour» et que, dès lors, ((celle-ci est compétente pour connaître de la
demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis dans la mesure ou les faits
alléguésont pu porter atteinte aux libertés garanties par le paragraphe 1

de l'article X» (C.I. J. Recueil 1998, p. 204, par. 36). Là encore, les
Parties ont soulevé, quant au sens et à la portée de cette décision relative
à la compétence, des questions qui seront examinées plus loin.
Il ressort toutefoisdes décisions précitées qu'il ne saurait être fait droit
à la demande de l'Iran età la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis
que pour autant qu'une ou plusieurs violations du paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticleX du traité de 1955 peuvent être établies,mêmesi d'autres disposi-
tions du traité peuvent être pertinentes pour interpréter ce paragraphe.
Le paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955 est libellécomme suit: ((11

y aura liberté de commerce et de navigation entre les territoires des deux
Hautes Parties contractantes. fi
23. Avant de poursuivre, il convient de décrire les circonstances de
l'espèce telles qu'elles ressortent des écritures des deux Parties, étant
constaté que celles-ci, dans leurs grandes lignes, ne sont pas contestées.
Les actions à l'origine de la demande et de la demande reconventionnelle
s'inscrivent dans le contexte des événements survenus dans le golfe Per-
sique entre 1980 et 1988, en particulier du conflit armé entre l'Iran et
l'Iraq. Ce conflit débuta le 22 septembre 1980, lorsque des forces ira-

quiennespénétrèrent dans la partie occidentale du territoire iranien, et se
poursuivit jusqu'à l'acceptation par les parties belligérantes, durant
l'été1988, d'un cessez-le-feu conformément à la résolution 598 (1987) du
Conseil de sécuritéde l'organisation des Nations Unies du 20 juillet 1987.
Au cours de la guerre, des combats se déroulèrent sur les territoires des
deux Etats, mais le conflit s'étendit également au golfe Persique - voie
internationale d'échanges et de transport d'importance majeure - et per-
turba le commerce et la navigation dans la région. Dès le début du
conflit, le 22 septembre 1980, l'Iran établit une zone défensive d'exclusion

le long de ses côtes; peu après, au début du mois d'octobre 1980, l'Iraqestablished a "naval total exclusive zone" in the northern area of the Per-
sian Gulf. In 1984, Iraq commenced attacks against ships in the Persian
Gulf, notably tankers carrying Iranian oil. These were the first incidents
of what later became known as the "Tanker War" :in the period between
1984 and 1988, a number of commercial vessels and warships of various
nationalities, including neutral vessels, were attacked by aircraft, heli-
copters, missiles or warships, or struck mines in the waters of the Persian
Gulf. Naval forces of both belligerent parties were operating in
the region, but Iran has denied responsibility for any actions other
than incidents involving vessels refusing a proper request for stop and
search. The United States attributes responsibility for certain incidents
to Iran, whereas Iran suggests that Iraq was responsible for them.

24. A number of States took measures at the time aimed at ensuring
the security of their vessels navigating in the Persian Gulf. In late 1986
and early 1987, the Government of Kuwait expressed its preoccupation
at Iran's alleged targeting of its merchant vessels navigating in the Per-
sian Gulf. It therefore requested the United States, the United Kingdom
and the Soviet Union to "reflag" some of these vessels to ensure their
protection. Followingthis request, the Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Company was
able to charter a number of Soviet vessels, and to flag four ships under
United Kingdom registry and 11 ships under United States registry. In
addition, the Government of the United States agreed to provide al1
United States-flagged vessels with a naval escort when transiting the Per-
sian Gulf, in order to deter further attacks; these escort missions were
initiated in July 1987, under the designation "Operation Earnest Will".
Other foreign Powers, including Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom, took parallel action, sending warships to the
region to protect international shipping. Despite these efforts, a number
of ships, including reflagged Kuwaiti vessels, merchant tankers carrying
Kuwaiti oil and warships participating in "Operation Earnest Will",
suffered attacks or struck mines in the Persian Gulf between 1987 and
the end of the conflict.

25. Two specific attacks on shipping are of particular relevance in this
case. On 16 October 1987, the Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City ,eflagged to
the United States, was hit by a missile near Kuwait harbour. The United
States attributed this attack to Iran, and three days later, on 19 October
1987, it attacked Iranian offshore oil production installations, claiming
to be acting in self-defence. United Statesnaval forces launched an attack
against the Reshadat ["Rostam"] and Resalat ["Rakhsh"] complexes;the
R-7 and R-4 platforms belonging to the Reshadat complex were destroyed
in the attack. On 14 April 1988, the warship USS Samuel B. Roberts
struck a mine in international waters near Bahrain while returning frominstaura une «zone de guerre interdite», puis une «zone navale d'exclu-
sion totale» dans la partie septentrionale du golfe Persique. En 1984,

l'Iraq commença à attaquer des navires dans le golfe Persique, notam-
ment des pétroliers qui transportaient du pétrole iranien. Ce furent les
premiers incidents de ce qui devait plus tard êtreappelé la «guerre des
pétroliers)):entre 1984 et 1988, des navires de commerce et des bâtiments
de guerre de diverses nationalités, y compris des navires neutres, furent
attaqués par des avions, des hélicoptères, des missiles ou des navires de
guerre, ou heurtèrent des mines dans les eaux du golfe Persique. Les
forces navales des deux parties belligérantes menaient des opérations dans
la région, mais l'Iran nie être responsable de quelque action que ce soit,à
l'exception d'incidents concernant des navires ayant refusé l'arraisonne-
ment et la fouille demandés en bonne et due forme. Les Etats-Unis attri-
buent à l'Iran la responsabilité de certains incidents, alors que l'Iran
laisse entendre que l'Iraq en était responsable.
24. A l'époque, un certain nombre d'Etats prirent des mesures en vue
d'assurer la sécurité de leurs navires faisant route dans le golfe Persique. A
la fin de 1986 et au début de 1987, le Gouvernement du Koweït se déclara
préoccupépar les attaques que, selon lui, l'Iran menait contre ses navires
marchands présents dans le golfe Persique. Aussi demanda-t-il aux Etats-
Unis, au Royaume-Uni et à l'Union soviétique de «faire passer ..sous
leur pavillon))certains de ces navires afin d'assurer leur protection. A la
suite de cette demande, la Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Company put affréter un
certain nombre de navires soviétiques et faire passer quatre navires sous
pavillon britannique et onze sous pavillon américain. En outre, le Gou-
vernement des Etats-Unis accepta de fournir une escorte navale à tous les
navires battant pavillon américainfaisant route dans le golfe Persique afin
de prévenir de nouvelles attaques; ces missions d'escorte débutèrent en
juillet 1987, sous couvert de l'«Operation Earnest Will » («volonté réso-
lue))). Parallèlement, d'autres puissances étrangères, notamment la Bel-
gique,la France, l'Italie, les Pays-Bas et le Royaume-Uni, dépêchèrent des
bâtiments de guerre dans la région pour protéger le trafic maritime inter-
national. Malgré ces efforts, un certain nombre de navires, parmi lesquels
des navires koweïtiens réimmatriculés, des navires marchands transpor-
tant du pétrole koweïtien et des bâtiments de guerre participant à l'opé-
ration Earnest Will)), subirent des attaques ou heurtèrent des mines dans
le golfe Persique entre 1987 et la fin du conflit.
25. Deux attaques dirigées contre des navires présentent un intérêt
particulier en l'espèce. Le 16 octobre 1987, le pétrolier koweïtien
Sea Isle City, réimmatriculé aux Etats-Unis, fut touché par un missile
près du port de Koweït. Les Etats-Unis attribuèrent cette attaque à l'Iran
et, trois jours plus tard, le 19 octobre 1987, affirmant agir en légitime
défense, ils attaquèrent des installations iraniennes de production de
pétrole offshore. Des forces navales américaines lancèrent une attaque
contre les complexes de Reshadat [«Rostam »]et de Resalat [«Rakhsh »],
au cours de laquelle les plates-formes R-7 et R-4 du complexe de Resha-
dat furent détruites. Le 14 avril 1988, le navire de guerre américain USSan escort mission; four days later the United States, again asserting the
right of self-defence, employed its naval forces to attack and destroy
simultaneouslythe Nasr ["Sirri"] and Salman ["Sassan"] complexes.

26. These attacks by United States forces on the Iranian oil platforms
are claimed by Iran to constitute breaches of the 1955 Treaty; and the
attacks on the Sea Isle City and the USS Samuel B. Roberts were
invoked in support of the United States' claim to act in self-defence. The
counter-claim of the United States is however not limited to those attacks ;
according to the United States, Iran was in breach of its obligations
under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, "in attacking vessels in
the Gulf with mines and missiles and otherwise engaging in military
actions that were dangerous and detrimental to commerce and naviga-
tion between the territories of the United States and the Islamic Republic

of Iran". According to the United States, Iran conducted an aggressive
policy and was responsible for more than 200 attacks against neutral
shipping in international waters and the territorial seas of Persian Gulf
States. Iran denies responsibility for those attacks, suggesting that they
were committed by Iraq and drawing attention to Iraq's interest in inter-
nationalizing the conflict. Furthermore, Iran claims that the attitude of
the Iranian authorities and the measures taken by its naval forces in the
Persian Gulf were solely defensive in nature. It has emphasized that Iraq
was the aggressor State in the conflict, and has claimed that Iraq received
diplomatic, political, economic and military support from a number of
third countries that were not formally parties to the conflict, including

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United States.

27. The Court will first consider a contention to which the United
States appears to have attributed a certain preliminary character. The
United States asks the Court to dismiss Iran's claim and refuse it the
relief it seeks, because of Iran's allegedly unlawful conduct, Le., its viola-
tion of the 1955 Treaty and other rules of international law relating to the
use of force. The United States invokes what it suggests are three related

principles in support of this request. First, a party that acts improperly
with respect to the subject-matter of a dispute is not entitled to relief;
according to the United States, Iran had committed, at the time of the
actions against the platforms, manifestly illegal armed attacks on United
States and other neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf, and it has mis-
represented, in the present proceedings, the facts of the case before the
Court. Second, a party that has itself violated obligations identical to
those that are the basis for its application is not entitled to relief and Iran
had allegedly infringed itself the "mutual and reciprocal" obligations
arising from the 1955 Treaty. Third, an applicant is not entitled to relief

when the actions it complains of were the result of its own wrongful con- PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 176

Samuel B. Roberts, de retour d'une mission d'escorte, heurta une mine
dans les eaux internationales à proximité de Bahrein; quatre jours plus
tard, les Etats-Unis, se prévalant à nouveau du droit de légitime défense,

attaquèrent simultanément et détruisirent avec leurs forces navales les
complexes de Nasr [(Sirri »] et de Salman [«Sassan »].
26. Ces attaques menées par des forces américaines contre les plates-
formesiraniennesconstituent selon l'Iran une violation du traité de 1955 ;
et les attaques contre le Sea Isle City et 1'USS Samuel B. Roberts sont
invoquées par les Etats-Unis pour affirmer qu'ils ont agi en état de légi-
time défense. La demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis ne se limite
cependant pas à ces attaques; selon les Etats-Unis, l'Iran a manqué aux
obligations qui lui incombaient en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l'article X du
traité de 1955 «en attaquant des navires dans le Golfe à l'aide de mines et
de missiles et en menant d'autres actions militaires dangereuses et nui-
sibles pour le commerceet la navigation entre le territoire des Etats-Uniset
celui de la République islamique d'Iran». Selon les Etats-Unis, l'Iran a
mené une politique agressive et est responsable de plus de deux cents
attaques de navires neutres dans les eaux internationales et les eaux ter-
ritoriales d'Etats du golfe Persique. L'Iran nie êtreresponsable de ces
attaques, menées selon lui par l'Iraq, qui aurait eu intérêt à internationa-
liser le conflit. L'Iran affirme en outre que l'attitude de ses autorités et les
mesures prises par ses forces navales dans le golfe Persique étaient de
nature uniquement défensive. Il souligne que l'Iraq était 1'Etat agresseur
dans ce conflit, et affirme que ce pays recevait un soutien diplomatique,
politique, économique et militaire d'un certain nombre d'Etats tiers qui
n'étaient pas officiellement parties au conflit, notamment le Koweït,
l'Arabie saoudite et les Etats-Unis.

27. La Cour examinera tout d'abord une argumentation à laquelle les
Etats-Unis semblent attribuer un certain caractèrepréliminaire. Les Etats-
Unis, attribuant àl'Iran un comportement illiciteà savoirla violation du
traité de 1955 ainsi que d'autres règles du droit international régissant
l'emploi de la force, prient la Cour de rejeter la demande de l'Iran et de
lui refuser la réparation qu'il sollicite. Ils invoquent ce qu'ils présentent
comme trois principes connexes. Premièrement, une partie qui a adopté
un comportement inapproprié en rapport avec l'objet d'un différend n'a
pas droit à réparation; selon les Etats-Unis, au moment de leurs actions
contre les plates-formes, l'Iran avait lancé des attaques armées manifes-
tement illicites contre des navires américains et d'autres navires neutres
dans le golfe Persique, et il a en la présente instancefourni à la Cour une
version déformée des faits de la cause. Deuxièmement, une partie ayant
elle-mêmeméconnu des obligations identiques à celles sur lesquelles se
fonde sa requête n'a pas droit à réparation; or l'Iran avait, d'après les
Etats-Unis, lui-même violé les obligations ((mutuelles et réciproques))
découlant du traité de 1955. Troisièmement, le demandeur n'a pas droit àduct. Thus the United States claims that the attacks on the platforms
were a consequence of Iran's previous wrongful behaviour in the Persian
Gulf.

28. Iran responds that the concept of "clean hands" underlying these

arguments of the United States, "while reflecting and incorporating fun-
damental principles of law inspired by good faith, is not an autonomous
legal institution". It contends that the concept of "clean hands" requires
the operation of other institutions or legal rules for its implementation.
Iran argues that the "plaintiff s own wrongful conduct" as a ground for
inadmissibility of a claim relates to claims arising in the context of dip-
lomaticprotection and concerns only a foreign individual's "clean hands",
but that such a principle is irrelevant in direct State-to-State claims.
According to Iran, as far as State-to-State claims are concerned, such
principle may have legal significance only at the merits stage, and only at

the stage of quantification of damages, but does not deprive a State of
locus standi in judicio.

29. The Court notes that these issues were first raised by the United
States in its Counter-Memorial, after the Judgment of the Court of
12 December 1996 on the preliminary objection of the United States to
jurisdiction. In that pleading those issues were dealt with at the end, after
the United States had set out its arguments on the merits, and not by way
of a preliminary issue. In subsequent pleadings and in oral argument it
has presented them as having rather a preliminary character, but it has

nevertheless not gone so far as to suggest that they are issues of admis-
sibility, appropriate to be enquired into before any examination of the
merits. Objections to admissibility normally take the form of an assertion
that, even if the Court has jurisdiction and the facts stated by the appli-
cant State are assumed to be correct, nonetheless there are reasons why
the Court should not proceed to an examination of the merits. That is
not the case here. The United States does not ask the Court to find Iran's
claim inadmissible; it asks the Court to dismiss that claim. It does not
argue that the Court should be debarred from examining the merits of
the Iranian claim on the grounds of Iran's conduct; rather it argues that

Iran's conduct is such that it "precludes it from any right to the relief it
seeks from this Court", or that it "should not be perrnitted to recover on
its claim". The United States invites the Court to make a finding "that
the United States measures against the platforms were the consequence
of Iran's own unlawful uses of force" and submits that the "appropriate
legal consequences should be attached to that finding". The Court notes
that in order to make that finding it would have to examine Iranian and
United States actions in the Persian Gulf during the relevant period -
which it has also to do in order to rule on the Iranian claim and the
United States counter-claim. PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 177

réparation lorsque les actes dont il se plaint sont la conséquence de son
propre comportement illicite. Ainsi, selon les Etats-Unis, les attaques
contre les plates-formes étaient la conséquence du comportement illicite

qui avait étécelui de l'Iran dans le golfe Persique.
28. L'Iran répond que la notion de ((mains propres» sur laquelle re-
posent ces arguments des Etats-Unis, ((tout en exprimant et en incorporant
des principes de droit fondamentaux inspirés de la bonne foi, n'est pas une
institutionjuridique autonome ». Il soutient que cettenotion requiert, pour
êtremise en Œuvre, l'intervention d'autres institutions ou règlesjuridiques.
L'Iran affirme que c'est dans le cadre de demandes relatives à la protection
diplomatique que peut être invoqué l'argument selon lequel le ((propre
comportement illicite du plaignant » constituerait un motif d'irrecevabilité

d'une demande ; ce principe concernerait uniquement les ((mainspropres »
d'un ressortissant étranger, mais serait dépourvu de pertinence s'agissant
de réclamations directes d'Etat à Etat. Selon l'Iran, dans les réclamations
de cette nature, ce principe ne peut avoir de signification juridique qu'au
stade du fond, et uniquement à celui de la fixation du montant de la répa-
ration, mais ne prive pas un Etat de son droit à se présenter en justice.
29. La Cour note que ces questions ont étésoulevées pour la première
fois par les Etats-Unis dans leur contre-mémoire, après l'arrêt de la Cour
du 12 décembre 1996 sur l'exception préliminaire à sa compétence for-
mulée par les Etats-Unis. Dans cette pièce, les Etats-Unis abordaient ces

questions in$ne, après avoir exposé leurs arguments sur le fond, et non à
titre de question préliminaire. Dans leurs écritures ultérieures et leurs
plaidoiries, ils ont présenté ces arguments comme si ceux-ci revêtaient
plutôt un caractère préliminaire, sans toutefois aller jusqu'à donner à
penser qu'il s'agissait de questions de recevabilité, devant êtreexaminées
avant tout examen au fond. Normalement, une exception à la recevabilité
consiste à affirmer que, quand bien mêmela Cour serait compétente et les
faits exposés par 1'Etat demandeur seraient tenus pour exacts, il n'en
existe pas moins des raisons pour lesquelles il n'y a pas lieu pour la Cour
de statuer au fond. Tel n'est pas le cas en l'espèce. Les Etats-Unis ne
demandent pas à la Cour de juger les prétentions de l'Iran irrecevables;

ils lui demandent de les écarter. Ils ne prétendent pas que la Cour devrait
êtreempêchéed'examiner la demande iranienne quant au fond en raison
du comportement de l'Iran; ils font plutôt valoir que, par ce comporte-
ment, l'Iran ((s'est lui-même ôté tout droit à la réparation qu'il cherche à
obtenir devant la Cour», ou qu'«il ne saurait se voir reconnaître aucun
droit à réparation en l'espèce». Les Etats-Unis invitent la Cour à conclure
«que les mesures qu'ils ont prises contre les plates-formes étaient la
conséquence de l'emploi illicite de la force par l'Iran lui-même» et es-
timent que la Cour devrait assortir cette conclusion ((des conséquences
juridiques pertinentes)). La Cour note que, pour parvenir à cette conclu-

sion, il lui faudrait examiner les actions de l'Iran et des Etats-Unis dans le
golfe Persique durant la période pertinente - ce qu'elle doit également
faire pour statuer sur la demande iranienne et la demande reconvention-
nelle des Etats-Unis. 30. At this stage of itsjudgrnent, therefore, the Court does not need to
deal with the request of the United States to dismiss Iran's claim and
refuse the relief that it seeks on the basis of the conduct attributed to
Iran.TheCourt will now proceed to the consideration of the claims made
by Iran and the defences put forward by the United States.

31. As noted above (paragraph 21), the dispute in the present case has
been brought before the Court on thejurisdictional basis of Article XXI,
paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty, which provides that

"Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the
interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily
adjusted by diplomacy,shall be submitted to the International Court
of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by
some other pacific means."

By its Judgment of 12 December 1996, the Court found that it had juris-
diction, on the basis of this Article, "to entertain the claims made by the
Islamic Republic of Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty"
(1.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 821, para. 55 (2)), which provides, as noted
above (paragraph 22), that "Between the territories of the two High Con-
tracting Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation." In
the reasoning of that Judgment, the Court indicated that another Article
of the Treaty relied on by Iran, Article IV (which relates to reciprocal
treatment of nationals and companies of eachparty), could not "forrn the
basis of the Court's jurisdiction" (ibid., p. 816, para. 36). It found further
that Article 1 of the Treaty, which provides that "There shall be firm and
enduring peace and sincere friendship between the United States of
America and Iran", while being "such as to throw light on the interpreta-
tion of the other Treaty provisions" and "thus not without legal signifi-
cance for such an interpretation, ... cannot, taken in isolation, be a basis
for thejurisdiction of the Court" (ibid., p. 815, para. 31). The task of the
Court is thus to ascertain whether there has been a breach by the United
States of the provisions of Article X, paragraph 1 ;other provisions of the
Treaty are only relevant in so far as they may affect the interpretation or
application of that text.

32. Inthat respect, the Court notes that the United Stateshas relied on
Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the Treaty as determinative of the ques-
tion of the existence of a breach of its obligations under Article X. That
paragraph provides that

"The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of meas-
ures : 30. C'est pourquoi la Cour n'est pas tenue, à ce stade de son arrêt, de
se pencher sur la conclusion des Etats-Unis tendant à ce que la demande

de l'Iran soit rejetée et à ce que la réparation qu'il sollicite lui soit refusée
en raison du comportement attribué à l'Iran. La Cour va maintenant exa-
miner les demandes formulées par l'Iran et les moyens de défense invo-
qués par les Etats-Unis.

31. Ainsi qu'il a éténoté ci-dessus (paragraphe 21)' le différend, en la
présente espèce, a étéporté devant la Cour sur la base de compétence
constituée par le paragraphe 2 de l'article XXI du traité de 1955, selon
lequel

«Tout différend qui pourrait s'élever entre les Hautes Parties
contractantes quant à l'interprétation ou à l'application du présent
traité et qui ne pourrait pas être régléd'une manière satisfaisante par
la voie diplomatique sera porté devant la Cour internationale de Jus-
tice, à moins que les Hautes Parties contractantes ne conviennent de
le régler par d'autres moyens pacifiques. ))
Par son arrêt du 12 décembre 1996, la Cour s'est déclaréecompétente, sur

la base de cet article, «pour connaître des demandes formulées par la
République islamique d'Iran au titre du paragraphe 1 de l'articleX dudit
traité)) (C.1.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 821, par. 55, alinéa 2)' lequel dispose,
ainsi qu'il a été indiquéplus haut (paragraphe 22)' qu'«[il1 y aura liberté
de commerceet de navigation entre les territoires des deux Hautes Parties
contractantes)). Dans les motifs de cet arrêt, la Cour a indiqué qu'un
autre article du traité sur lequel s'appuyait l'Iran, l'article IV (qui a pour
objet le traitement que chacune des parties accorde aux ressortissants et
aux sociétésde l'autre partie), ne saurait ((fonder la compétence de la
Cour)) (ibid.,p. 816, par. 36). Elle a estimé en outre que l'article premier

du traité, aux termes duquel «[il1 y aura paix stable et durable et amitié
sincère entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et l'Iran», tout en étant «de
nature à éclairer l'interprétation des autres dispositions du traité» et
n'étant pas ainsi «sans portée juridique pour une telle interprétation, ...
ne saurait, pris isolément, fonder la compétence de la Cour» (ibid.,
p. 815, par. 31). Il incombe donc à la Cour de rechercher s'il y a eu viola-
tion par les Etats-Unis des dispositions du paragraphe 1 de l'article X; les
autres dispositions du traité ne sont pertinentes que dans la mesure où
elles peuvent avoir une incidence sur l'interprétation ou l'application de
ce texte.

32. A cet égard, la Cour relève que, selon les Etats-Unis, l'alinéa d) du
paragraphe 1 de l'article XX du traité permet de trancher la question de
l'existence d'une violation de leurs obligations en vertu de l'article X. Ce
paragraphe dispose que :
«Le présent traité ne fera pas obstacle à l'application de mesures : (d) necessary to fulfil the obligations of a High Contracting Party
for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and
security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests."

It is the contention of the United States that the actions complained of by
Iran were measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of

the United States, and that accordingly, if those actions would otherwise
have been breaches of Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, which the
United States denies, the effect of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), is that
they are justified under the terms of the Treaty itself, and thus do not
constitute breaches of it.
33. In its Judgment on the United States preliminary objection of
12 December 1996, the Court ruled that Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), does
not afford an objection to admissibility, but "is confined to affording
the Parties a possible defence on the merits" (1.C.J. Reports 1996 (II),
p. 811, para. 20). In accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the
Treaty, it is now for the Court to interpret and apply that subparagraph,
inasmuch as such a defence is asserted by the United States.

34. As was noted in that Judgment, the Court has had occasion, in the
case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nica-
ragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), to examine a provision
in another treaty concluded by the United States, of which the text
is substantially identical to that of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d). This
was Article XXI, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1956 Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Nicaragua.
In its decision in that case, the Court observed that since that provision

"contains a power for each of the parties to derogate from the other

provisions of the Treaty, the possibility of invoking the clauses of
that Article must be considered once it is apparent that certain forms
of conduct by the United States would otherwise be in conflict with
the relevant provisions of the Treaty" (1.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 117,
para. 225).

If in the present case the Court is satisfied by the argument of the
United States that the actions against the oil platforms were, in the
circumstances of the case, "measures . . . necessary to protect [the]
essential security interests" of the United States, within the meaning
of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty, it must hold that
no breach of Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty has been established.

35. To uphold the claim of Iran, the Court must be satisfied both that
the actions of the United States, complained of by Iran, infringed the PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 179

d) ...nécessaires à l'exécution des obligations de l'une ou l'autre des
Hautes Parties contractantes relatives au maintien ou au réta-
blissement de la paix et de la sécuritéinternationales ou à la pro-
tection des intérêts vitaux de cette Haute Partie contractante sur

le plan de la sécurité.

Les Etats-Unis soutiennent que les actions dont l'Iran se plaint étaient
des mesures nécessaires à la protection de leurs intérêts vitaux sur le plan
de la sécurité et que, par conséquent, quand bien même ces actions
auraient constitué une violation du paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité
- ce que contestent les Etats-Unis -, elles étaient justifiées aux termes
de l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX du traité lui-même, et
qu'elles ne constituent donc pas une violation de ce dernier.
33. Dans l'arrêt qu'elle a rendu le 12 décembre 1996 sur l'exception
préliminaire des Etats-Unis, la Cour a jugé que l'alinéa d) du para-
graphe 1 de l'article XX n'ouvre pas une exception d'incompétence,
mais ((offre seulement aux Parties [, le cas échéant,] une défense au
fond » (C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 811, par. 20). Conformément au
paragraphe 2 de l'article XXI du traité, il appartient aujourd'hui à la
Cour, dèslorsqu'une telle défenseestprésentéepar les Etats-Unis, d'inter-
préter et d'appliquer cet alinéa.
34. Ainsi qu'il a étérappelé dans l'arrêt en question, la Cour a eu
l'occasion, en l'affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nica-
ragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c.Etats- Unis d'Amérique), de se pen-
cher sur une disposition contenue dans un autre traité conclu par les
Etats-Unis et dont le texte est en substanceidentique à celui de l'alinéad)
du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX. Il s'agissait de l'alinéa d) du para-
graphe 1del'article XXI du traité d'amitié, de commerce et denavigation
de 1956 entre les Etats-Unis et le Nicaragua. Dans l'arrêt rendu en
cette affaire, laCour a fait observer que:

«Les Parties s'étant réservéchacune par [cette disposition] ...du
traité ...la faculté de déroger aux autres dispositions de cet instru-
ment,la possibilité d'invoquer les clauses de cet article doitêtreexami-
néedès lors qu'une contradiction apparaît entre certaines conduites
des Etats-Unis et les dispositions pertinentes du traité.)) (C.Z. J.
Recueil 1986, p. 117, par. 225.)

Si en la présente espèce la Cour est convaincue par l'argument des Etats-
Unis selon lequel les actions menées contre les plates-formes pétrolières
étaient, dans les circonstances de l'espèce, des ((mesures ..nécessaires ...
à la protection des intérêts vitaux [des Etats-Unis] ...sur le plan de la
sécurité))au sens de l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX du traité
de 1955, elle doit en conclure qu'aucune violation du paragraphe 1 de
l'article X du traité n'a étéétablie.
35. Pour faire droit à la demande de l'Iran, la Cour doit être convain-
cue à la fois que les actions des Etats-Unis dont se plaint l'Iran ont portéfreedom of commerce between the territories of the Parties guaranteed by
Article X, paragraph 1, and that such actions were not justified to protect
the essential security interests of the United States as contemplated by
Article XX, paragraph 1 (d). The question however arises in what order
the Court should examine these questions of interpretation and appli-
cation of the Treaty. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua, the Court first examined the question
whether the United States conduct constituted a prima facie breach of

other provisions of the Treaty; it concluded that the United States had
"committed acts which are in contradiction with the terms of the Treaty",
but added that this was "subject to the question whether the exceptions in
Article XXI" of the 1956 Treaty, concerning inter alia protection of the
essential security interests of a party, "may be invoked to justify the acts
complained of' (I. C.J. Reports 1986, p. 140, para. 280). The Court thus
dealt first with the substantive provisions of the 1956 Treaty, breaches of
which had been alleged, before turning to Article XXI of the Treaty; in
effect, it analysed that Article as providing for "exceptions" to the sub-
stantive obligations provided for in other Articles of the Treaty (see ibid.,

p. 116, para. 222).

36. In the present case the United States has argued that Article XX,
paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty is not a limitation on Article X,
paragraph 1, nor yet a derogation from it; and that it is a substantive
provision that determines, defines and delimits the obligations of the
parties, simultaneously with and on the same level as Article X, para-
graph 1. The United States therefore contends that there is no compelling
reason to examine the question of breach of Article X, paragraph 1,
before turning to Article XX, paragraph 1 (d); the Court can, it

suggests, dismiss the Iranian claim either on the ground that the actions of
the United States did not involve a breach of Article X, paragraph 1, or
on the ground that those actions were measures necessary to protect the
essential security interests of the United States, and therefore justified
under Article XX, paragraph 1 (d). On this basis, the United States
suggests, the order in which the issues are treated is a matter for the
discretion of the Court.

37. The Court does not consider that the order in which the Articles of
the 1956 Treaty were dealt with in the case concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua was dictated by the

economy of the Treaty; it was rather an instance of the Court's "freedom
to select the ground upon which it will base itsjudgrnent" (Application of
the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants, Judgment,
I. C.J. Reports 1958, p. 62). In the present case, it appears to the Court
that there are particular considerations militating in favour of an exami-
nation of the application of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), before turning
to Article X, paragraph 1. It is clear that the original disputebetween the
Parties related to the legality of the actions of the United States, in theatteinte à la liberté de commerce entre les territoires des Parties garantie
par le paragraphe 1 de l'article X, et que ces actions n'étaient pas justi-
fiéespar la nécessitéd'assurer la protection des intérêts vitaux des Etats-

Unis sur le plan de la sécurité,au sens de l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de
l'article XX. La question se pose toutefois de savoir dans quel ordre la
Cour doit examiner ces questions d'interprétation et d'application du
traité. Dans l'affaire des Activités militaires etparamilitaires au Nicara-
gua et contre celui-ci, la Cour a commencé par rechercher si la conduite
des Etats-Unis constituait prima facie une violation d'autres dispositions
du traité. Elle en a conclu que les Etats-Unis avaient ((commis des actes
qui sont en contradiction avec les termes de ce traité)), ajoutant toutefois
qu'il en était ainsi «pour autant que les exceptions de l'article XXI» du
traité de 1956, qui concernaient notamment la protection des intérêts
vitaux d'une partie sur le plan de la sécurité, «ne puissent êtreinvoquées
pour justifier les actes incriminés » (C.1.J. Recueil 1986, p. 140-141,
par. 280). La Cour a donc examiné en premier lieu les dispositions de
fond du traité de 1956 dont la violation avait été alléguée,avant de se
pencher sur l'article XXI du traité, considérant ainsi que cet article pré-
voyait des «exceptions» aux obligations de fond énoncéesdans d'autres
articles du traité (voir ibid., p. 116, par. 222).
36. En la présente espèce, les Etats-Unis ont soutenu que l'alinéa d) du
paragraphe 1 de l'article XX du traité de 1955 ne constituait pas une limi-
tation au paragraphe 1 de l'article X, pas plus qu'il n'y dérogeait; il s'agit
selon eux d'une disposition de fond qui, en mêmetemps et sur le même
plan que le paragraphe 1de l'article X, détermine, définit et délimite les
obligations des parties. Les Etats-Unis affirment donc qu'il n'existe
aucune raison impérieuse d'examiner la question de la violation du para-
graphe 1 de l'article X avant de se pencher sur l'alinéa d) du para-
graphe 1de l'article XX. Ils suggèrentque la Cour peut rejeter la demande
de l'Iran soit au motif que les actions menées par les Etats-Unisn'ont pas
entraîné une violation du paragraphe 1 de l'article X, soit au motif que
ces actions étaient des mesures nécessaires à la protection des intérêts
vitaux des Etats-Unis sur le plan de la sécurité, et donc qu'elles étaient
autorisées par l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX. Sur cette base,
les Etats-Unis estiment que l'ordre dans lequel les questions seront abor-
dées relèvede la discrétion de la Cour.
37. L'ordre dans lequel les articles du traité de 1956 ont étéexaminés
en l'affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et
contre celui-ci n'a pas, selon la Cour, étédictépar l'économie du traité; il
illustre plutôt le principe selon lequel la Cour «reste libre dans le choix
des motifs sur lesquels elle fondera son arrêt))(Application de la conven-
tion de 1902 pour régler la tutelle des mineurs, arrêt, C.Z. J. Recueil 1958,
p. 62). En la présente espèce, la Cour est d'avis que des considérations
particulières incitent à examiner l'application de l'alinéa d) du para-
graphe 1 de l'article XX avant d'aborder le paragraphe 1 de l'article X.
Il est indéniable que le différend initial entre les Parties portait sur la licéité
des actions menées par les Etats-Unis, à la lumière du droit internationallight of international law on the use of force. At the time of those actions,
neither Party made any mention of the 1955 Treaty. The contention of
the United States at the time was that its attacks on the oil platforms
were justified as acts of self-defence, in response to what it regarded as
armed attacks by Iran,and on that basis it gave notice of its action to the
Security Council under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Before
the Court, it has continued to maintain that it was justified in acting as
it did in exercise of the right of self-defence; it contends that, even if
the Court were to find that its actions do not fa11within the scope of

Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), those actions were not wrongful since they
were necessary and appropriate actions in self-defence.

38. Furthermore, as the United States itself recognizes in its Rejoin-
der, "The self-defense issues presented in this case raise matters of the
highest importance to al1members of the international community", and
both Parties are agreed as to the importance of the implications of the
case in the field of the use of force, even though they draw opposite con-
clusions from this observation. The Court therefore considers that, to the
extent that its jurisdiction under Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955
Treaty authorizes it to examine and rule on such issues, it should do so.

39. The question of the relationship between self-defence and Ar-
ticle XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the Treaty has been disputed between the
Parties, in particular as regards thejurisdiction of the Court. The United
States emphasizes that the Court's jurisdiction in this case is limited, pur-
suant to Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty, to the interpreta-
tion and application of that Treaty, and does not extend directly to the
determination of the legality of any action of either Party under general
international law. It has contended that

"the Court need not address the question of self-defence . . .[Tlhe
scope of the exemption provided by Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), is
not limited to those actions that would also meet the standards for
self-defence under customary international law and the United
Nations Charter."

It however does not contend that the Treaty exempts it, as between the
parties, from the obligations of international law on the use of force, but
simply that where a party justifies certain action on the basis of
Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), that action has to be tested solely against
the criteria of that Article, and the jurisdiction conferred on the Court
by Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty goes no further than that.

40. In the view of the Court, the matter is one of interpretation of the
Treaty, and in particular of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d). The question is
whether the parties to the 1955 Treaty, when providing therein that it

should "not preclude the application of measures .. .necessary to protect PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 181

relatifà l'emploi de la force. A l'époque, aucune des deux Parties n'a
mentionné le traité de 1955. Les Etats-Unis soutenaient alors que leurs
attaques contre les plates-formes pétrolières étaient justifiées au titre de la
légitime défense, en réponse à ce qu'ils considéraient comme des agres-
sions armées de l'Iran, raison pour laquelle ils ont porté leurs actions à la
connaissance du Conseil de sécuritéconformément à l'article 51 de la
Charte des Nations Unies. Devant la Cour, les Etats-Unis ont continué

d'affirmer que l'exercice du droit de légitime défense justifiait leurs
actions; ils soutiennent que, mêmesi la Cour devait conclure que leurs
actions n'entraient pas dans le champ d'application de l'alinéa d) du
paragraphe 1 de l'article XX, elles n'étaient pas illicites, en tant qu'elles
constituaient des actes de légitime défense nécessaires et appropriés.
38. En outre, ainsi que les Etats-Unis eux-mêmesle reconnaisseilt dans
leur duplique, «[l]es aspects de la présente espèce touchant à la légitime
défense soulèvent des questions de la plus haute importance pour l'en-
semble des membres de la communauté internationale)), et les deux Parties
conviennentque la présente affaire est loin d'être sansincidences en matière
d'emploi de la force, mêmesi elles tirent de ce constat des conclusions
opposées. La Cour considère donc que, dans la mesure où la compétence
que lui confère le paragraphe 2 de l'article XXI du traité de 1955 l'autorise
à examiner ces questions et à se prononcer sur celles-ci, elle doit le faire.
39. Les Parties sont en désaccord sur la question du lien entre la légi-
time défense et l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX du traité,
s'agissant notamment de la compétence de la Cour. Les Etats-Unis sou-
lignent qu'en l'espèce, en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l'article XXI du traité
de 1955, la Cour a compétence uniquement en ce qui concerne l'interpré-
tation et l'application de ce traité, et non directement pour apprécier la
licéité,au regard du droit international général,de toute action menée
par l'une ou l'autre Partie. Ils ont soutenu ce qui suit:
«La Cour n'a ...pas besoin de traiter la question de la légitime

défense ..Le champ d'application de l'exception prévue à l'alinéad)
du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX ne se limite pas aux actions qui
répondraient aussi aux conditions de la légitime défense imposées
par le droit international coutumier et par la Charte des
Nations Unies. »
Ils n'en affirment pas pour autant que le traité les libère, dans les rela-
tions entre les parties, des obligations prescrites par le droit international
en matière d'emploi de la force, mais simplement que, si une partie justifie
une action donnée en invoquant l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticle XX, cette action doit être appréciéeuniquement en fonction des cri-
tères énoncésdans cette disposition, et que la compétence conférée à la
Cour par le paragraphe 2 de l'article XXI du traité ne va pas plus loin.
40. De l'avis de la Cour, il s'agit ici d'une question d'interprétation du
traité, et en particulier de l'alind) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX. Il y
a lieu de déterminer si les parties au traité de 1955, en précisant dans
celui-ci qu'il «ne fera pas obstacleàl'application de mesures ..nécessaires[the]essential security interests" of either party, intended that such should
be the effect of the Treaty even where those measures involved a use of
armed force; and if so, whether they contemplated, or assumed, a limi-
tation that such use would have to comply with the conditions laid down
by international law. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua the Court took the view that "action
taken in self-defence, individual or collective,might be consideredas part

of the wider category of measures qualified in Article XXI" - the text in
that case corresponding to Article XX of the 1955 Treaty - "as 'neces-
sary to protect' the 'essential security interests' of a party" (1.C.J. Reports
1986, p. 117, para. 224); and it cited an extract from the proceedings of
the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee tending to show
that such had been the intentions of the Parties (ibid.). This approach is
consistent with the view that, when Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), is
invoked to justify actions involving the use of armed force, allegedly in
self-defence, the interpretation and application of that Article will neces-
sarily entai1 an assessment of the conditions of legitimate self-defence

under international law.

41. It should not be overlooked that Article 1 of the 1955 Treaty,
quoted in paragraph 31 above, declares that "There shall be firrn and
enduring peace and sincere friendship between the United States of
America and Iran." The Court found in 1996 that this Article "is such as
to throw light on the interpretation of the other Treaty provisions"
(1.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 815, para. 31). It is hardly consistent with
Article 1 to interpret Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), to the effect that the
"measures" there contemplated could include even an unlawful use of

force by one party against the other. Moreover, under the general rules of
treaty interpretation, as reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, interpretation must take into account "any relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties"
(Art. 31, para. 3 (c)). The Court cannot accept that Article XX, para-
graph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty was intended to operate wholly inde-
pendently of the relevant rules of international law on the use of force, so
as to be capable of being successfully invoked, even in the limited context
of a claim for breach of the Treaty, in relation to an unlawful use of
force. The application of the relevant rules of international law relating

to this question thus forms an integral part of the task of interpretation
entrusted to the Court by Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty.

42. The Court is therefore satisfied that its jurisdiction under
Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty to decide any question of
interpretation or application of (inter alia) Article XX, paragraph 1 (d),
of that Treaty extends, where appropriate, to the determination whether
action alleged to be justified under that paragraph was or was not an PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 182

...à la protection des intérêts vitaux ...sur le plan de la sécurité» de l'une
ou de l'autre des parties, avaient l'intention de lui donner un tel effet,
mêmelorsque ces mesures impliquaient un recours à la force armée; et,
dans l'affirmative, si les parties envisageaient ou admettaient une limita-

tion selon laquelle un tel recours devrait être compatible avec les condi-
tions énoncéespar le droit international. Dans l'affaire des Activités mili-
taires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci, la Cour a estimé
que «des mesures de légitime défense, individuelle ou collective, peuvent
êtreconsidéréescomme entrant dans la catégorie plus vaste des mesures
qualifiées à l'article XXI» - dont le texte correspond en l'occurrence à
l'article XX du traité de 1955 - «de ((nécessaires à la protection des inté-
rêts vitaux» d'une partie » (C.I.J. Recueil 1986,p. 117, par. 224)' et elle a
cité un extrait des travaux de la commission des affaires étrangères du
Sénat des Etats-Unis tendant à prouver que telle avait étél'intention des
Parties (ibid.). Cette approche concorde avec le point de vue selon lequel,
lorsque l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX est invoqué pour jus-
tifier que soient prises, au nom de la légitime défense, des mesures impli-
quant un recours à la force armée, l'interprétation et l'application de cet
article supposent nécessairement une appréciation des conditions d'exer-
cice de la légitime défense au regard du droit international.
41. Il convient de ne pas perdre de vue qu'aux termes de l'article pre-
mier du traité de 1955, citéau paragraphe 31 ci-dessus, «[il1 y aura paix
stable et durable et amitié sincère entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et
l'Iran». En 1996, la Cour a dit que cet article était «de nature à éclairer
l'interprétation des autres dispositions du traité » (C.I.J. Recueil 1996
(II), p. 815, par. 31). Une interprétation de l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1
de l'article XX selon laquelle les ((mesures » qui y sont prévues pourraient
même comprendre un recours illiciteà la force par une partie contre
l'autre ne serait guère compatible avec l'article premier. En outre, confor-

mément aux règles généralesd'interprétation des traités telles qu'elles ont
trouvé leur expression dans la convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit
des traités, l'interprétation doit tenir compte de toute règle pertinente de
droit international applicable dans les relations entre les parties)) (ali-
néa c) du paragraphe 3 de l'article 31). La Cour ne saurait admettre que
l'alinéad) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX du traité de 1955 ait été conçu
comme devant s'appliquer demanière totalement indépendante des règles
pertinentes du droit international relatif à l'emploi de la force, de sorte
qu'il puisse être utilement invoqué, y compris dans le cadre limité d'une
réclamation fondée sur une violation du traité, en cas d'emploi illicite de
la force. L'application des règles pertinentes du droit international relatif
à cette question fait donc partie intégrante de la tâche d'interprétation
confiée à la Cour par le paragraphe 2 de l'article XXI du traité de 1955.
42. La Cour estime par conséquent que la compétence que lui confère
le paragraphe 2 de l'article XXI du traité de 1955 pour régler toute ques-
tion concernant l'interprétation ou l'application de - notamment -
l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX de ce traité l'autorise aussi, en
tant que de besoin, à déterminer si une action présentée comme justifiéeunlawful use of force, by reference to international law applicable to
this question, that is to Say, the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations and customary international law. The Court would however
emphasize that its jurisdiction remains limited to that conferred on it
by Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty. The Court is always
conscious that it has jurisdiction only so far as conferred by the consent
of the parties.

43. The Court will thus examine first the application of Article XX,
paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty, which in the circumstances of this
case, as explained above, involves the principle of the prohibition in
international law of the use of force, and the qualification to itconsti-
tuted by the right of self-defence. On the basis of that provision, a party
to the Treaty may be justified in taking certain measures which it consid-
ers to be "necessary" for the protection of its essential security interests.
As the Court emphasized, in relation to the comparable provision of the

1956 United StatesINicaragua Treaty in the case concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, "the measures taken
must not merely be such as tend to protect the essential security interests
of the party taking them, but must be 'necessary' for that purpose"; and
whether a given measure is "necessary" is 'hot purely a question for the
subjective judgment of the party" (1 C.J. Reports 1986, p. 141, para. 282),
and may thus be assessed by the Court. In the present case, the question
whether the measures taken were "necessary" overlaps with the question
of their validity as acts of self-defence. As the Court observed in its deci-
sion of 1986 the criteria of necessity and proportionality must be observed

if a measure is to be qualified as self-defence (see ibid., p. 103, para. 194,
and paragraph 74 below).

44. In this connection, the Court notes that it is not disputed between
the Parties that neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf was caused consid-
erable inconvenience and loss, and grave damage, during the Iran-Iraq
war. It notes also that this was to a great extent due to the presence of
mines and minefields laid by both sides. The Court has no jurisdiction to
enquire into the question of the extent to which Iran and Iraq complied
with the international legal rules of maritime warfare. It can however

take note of these circumstances, regarded by the United States as
relevant to its decision to take action against Iran which it considered
necessary to protect its essential security interests. Nevertheless, the
legality of the action taken by the United States has to be judged by
reference to Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty, in the light
of international law on the use of force in self-defence. PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 183

par ce paragraphe constituait ou non un recours illicite à la force au
regard du droit international applicable en la matière, à savoir les dispo-
sitions de la Charte des Nations Unies et du droit international coutu-
mier. Elle souligne toutefois que sa compétence demeure limitée à celle

que lui confère le paragraphe 2 de l'article XXI du traité de 1955. La
Cour demeure consciente qu'elle n'a que la compétence que lui confère le
consentement des parties.

43. La Cour commencera donc par examiner l'application de l'ali-
néa d) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX du traité de 1955, ce qui, dans les
circonstances de l'espèce, et ainsi qu'il a été expliqué plus haut, fait inter-

venir le principe de l'interdiction en droit international de l'emploi de la
force et sa limitation constituée par le droit de légitime défense. Compte
tenu de cette disposition, une partie au traité peut êtrefondée à prendre
certaines mesures qu'elle considère «nécessaires» à la protection de ses
intérêts vitaux sur le plan de la sécurité. Ainsi que la Cour l'a souligné en
l'affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre
celui-ci à l'égard de la disposition équivalente du traité de 1956 entre les
Etats-Unis d'Amérique et le Nicaragua, ((les mesures ne doivent pas sim-
plement tendre à protéger les intérêts vitaux de sécuritéde la partie qui
les adopte; elles doivent être((nécessaires » à cette fin »; en outre, la ques-

tion de savoir si une mesure donnée est «nécessaire» ne ((relève pas de
l'appréciation subjective de la partie intéressée » (C. 1.J. Recueil 1986,
p. 141, par. 282)' et peut donc êtreévaluéepar la Cour. En l'espèce, la
question de savoir si les mesures adoptées étaient ((nécessaires))recoupe
en partie celle de leur validité en tant qu'actes de légitime défense. Ainsi
que la Cour l'a relevé dans sa décision de 1986, les critères de nécessitéet
de proportionnalité doivent êtrerespectés pour qu'une mesure puisse être
qualifiée d'acte de légitime défense (voir ibid., p. 103, par. 194, et para-
graphe 74 ci-dessous).
44. La Cour observe à cet égard qu'il n'est pas contesté par les Parties

que, durant la guerreentre l'Iran et l'Iraq, la navigation neutre dans le golfe
Persique avait étéconsidérablement entravée et avait subi des pertes et de
graves dommages. Elle relève également que cette situation était dans une
large mesure le résultat de la présence de mines et de champs de mines posés
par les deux parties au conflit. La Cour n'a pas compétence pour s'interro-
ger sur la question de savoir si et dans quelle mesure l'Iran et l'Iraq se sont
conformés aux règles de droit international applicables aux conflits armés
sur mer. Elle peut toutefois prendre note de ces circonstances,qui selon les
Etats-Unis étaient pertinentes aux fins de leur décision de mener contre
l'Iran les actions considéréespar eux comme nécessaires pour protéger leurs
intérêts vitaux sur le plan de la sécurité.La licéité des mesures prises par les

Etats-Unis n'en doit pas moins être évaluéeau regard de l'alinéa d) du
paragraphe 1 de l'article XX du traité de 1955, à la lumière du droit inter-
national relatif à l'emploi de la force en cas de légitime défense. 45. The United States has never denied that its actions against
the Iranian platforms amounted to a use of armed force. Some of the
details of the attacks, so far as established by the material before the Court,
may be pertinent to any assessment of the lawfulness of those actions. As
already indicated, there were attacks on two successive occasions, on
19 October 1987 and on 18 April 1988. The Court will examine whether
each of these met the conditions of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), as inter-
preted by reference to the relevant rules of international law.

46. The first installation attacked, on 19 October 1987,was the Resha-
dat complex, which consisted of three drilling and production platforms
- R-3, R-4 and R-7 - linked to a total of 27 oil wells. The crude oil
produced by the R-3 platform was transported by submarine pipeline to
the R-4 platform and thence, together with the crude oil produced by

R-4, to the R-7 platform that accommodated both production facilities
and living quarters. This latter platform was also connected by sub-
marine pipeline to another complex, named Resalat, which consisted of
three linked drilling and production platforms, referred to as R-1. Al1the
crude oil produced at the Reshadat and Resalat complexes, after gas and
water separation, was transported by undersea pipeline from the R-7
platform to Lavan Island. At the time of the United States attacks, these
complexes were not producing oil due to damage inflicted by prior Iraqi
attacks in October 1986, July 1987 and August 1987. Iran has maintained
that repair work on the platforms was close to completion in October
1987. The United Stateshas however challenged this assertion (see below,
paragraphs 65 and 93).

47. On 19 October 1987, four destroyers of the United States Navy,
together with naval support craft and aircraft, approached the Reshadat
R-7 platform. Iranian personnel was warned by the United States forces
via radio of the imminent attack and abandoned the facility. The United
States forces then opened fire on the platform; a unit later boarded and
searched it, and placed and detonated explosive charges on the remaining
structure. The United States ships then proceeded to the R-4 platform,
which was being evacuated; according to a report of a Pentagon spokes-
man, cited in the press and not denied by the United States, the attack on
the R-4 platform had not been included in the original plan, but it was
seen as a "target of opportunity". After having conducted reconnaissance
fire and then having boarded and searched the platform, the United
States forces placed and detonated explosive charges on this second
installation. As a result of the attack, the R-7 platform was almost com-
pletely destroyed and the R-4 platform was severely damaged. While the
attack was made solely on the Reshadat complex, it affected also the 45. Les Etats-Unis n'ont jamais contesté que leurs actions dirigées
contre les plates-formes iraniennes relevaient de l'emploi de la force
armée. Certains détails des attaques, pour autant qu'ils aient été établis

par les pièces soumises à la Cour, peuvent être pertinents pour l'évalua-
tion de la licéitéde ces actions. Ainsi qu'il a étéindiqué plus haut, des
attaques ont étémenées à deux reprises, le 19 octobre 1987 et le 18 avril
1988. La Cour examinera si chacune d'entre elles satisfait aux conditions
de l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX, tel qu'interprété à la
lumière des règles pertinentes du droit international.

46. Les premières installations attaquées, le 19 octobre 1987, furent

celles du complexe de Reshadat, qui comprenait trois plates-formes de
forage et de production - R-3, R-4 et R-7 - reliéesà vingt-sept puits de
pétrole. Le pétrole brut provenant de la plate-forme R-3 était acheminé
par oléoduc sous-marinjusqu'à la plate-forme R-4, puis, avec le pétrole
brut produit par cette dernière,jusqu'à la plate-forme R-7, qui abritait à
la fois des installations de production et des quartiers d'habitation. Cette
dernière plate-forme était par ailleursjointe par oléoduc sous-marin à un
autre complexe, celui de Resalat, qui comprenait trois plates-formes de
forage et de production reliéesentre elles, appelées R-1. Après séparation

de l'eau et du gaz, la totalité du pétrole brut produit par les complexes de
Reshadat et de Resalat était transportée par oléoduc sous-marin de la
plate-forme R-7 à l'île de Lavan. Au moment des attaques menées par les
Etats-Unis, ces complexes ne produisaient pas de pétrole, du fait des
dommages causés par les attaques iraquiennes en octobre 1986 et en
juillet et août 1987. Au cours de la procédure, l'Iran a affirmé que, en
octobre 1987, la réparation des plates-formes était quasiment achevée.
Les Etats-Unis ont toutefois contesté cette assertion (voir ci-après, para-
graphes 65 et 93).
47. Le 19 octobre 1987, quatre destroyers de la marine américaine,
accompagnésd'unités d'appui naval et aérien, s'approchèrent de la plate-

forme R-7 de Reshadat. Les forces américaines l'ayant prévenu par radio
de l'imminence de l'attaque, le personnel iranien évacua les lieux. Les
forces des Etats-Unis ouvrirent alors le feu sur la plate-forme. Un détache-
ment monta ensuite sur celle-ci et procéda à sa fouille, puis y plaça des
charges explosives qu'il mit à feu. Les navires américains se dirigèrent
alors vers la plate-forme R-4, dont le personnel avait entamé l'évacua-
tion. D'après les propos d'un porte-parole du Pentagone, cités dans la
presse et non démentis par les Etats-Unis, le plan initial ne prévoyait pas
l'attaque de la plate-forme R-4, qui s'est présentée comme une ((cible
d'occasion». Après un tir de reconnaissance, les forces des Etats-Unis

montèrent sur la plate-forme pour procéder à une fouille, puis la détrui-
sirent elle aussi à l'explosif. Cette attaque se solda par la destruction
quasi totale de la plate-forme R-7 et de graves dommages à la plate-
forme R-4. Bien que ladite attaque ait visé seulement le complexe deoperation of the Resalat complex. Iran states that production from the
Reshadat and Resalat complexes was interrupted for several years.

48. The nature of this attack, and its alleged justification, was pre-
sented by the United States to the United Nations Security Councilin the
following terms (letter from the United States Permanent Representative
of 19 October 1987, Sl19219) :

"In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, 1 wish, on behalf of my Government, to report that United
States forces have exercised the inherent right of self-defence under
international law by taking defensive action in response to attacks
by the Islamic Republic of Iran against United States vessels in the
Persian Gulf.
At approximately 11 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time on 16 October
1987, a Silkworm missile fired by Iranian forces from Iranian-
occupied Iraqi territory struck the Sea Isle City, a United States flag
vessel, in the territorial waters of Kuwait. This is the latest in a series
of such missile attacks against United States flag and other non-belli-
gerent vessels in Kuwaiti waters in pursuit of peaceful commerce.
These actions are, moreover, only the latest in a series of unlawful
armed attacks by Iranian forces against the United States, including
laying mines in international waters for the purpose of sinking or
damaging United States flag ships, and firing on United States air-
craft without provocation.

At approximately 7 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time on 19 October
1987, United States naval vessels destroyed the Iranian military
ocean platform at Rashadat [sic] (also known as Rostam) in inter-
national waters of the Persian Gulf. The military forces stationed on
this platform have engaged in a variety of actions directed against
United States flag and other non-belligerent vessels and aircraft.
They have monitored the movements of United States convoys by
radar and other means; CO-ordinated minelaying in the path of our
convoys; assisted small-boat attacks against other non-belligerent
shipping; and fired at United Statesmilitary helicopters,as occurred
on 8 October 1987. Prior warning was given to permit the evacua-
tion of the platform."

49. In its Counter-Memorial, the United States linked its previous
invocation of the right of self-defence with the application of Article XX,
paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty. It argued that Iranian actions dur-
ing the relevant period constituted a threat to essential security interests
of the United States, inasmuch as the flow of maritime commerce in theReshadat, elle affecta également les opérations du complexe de Resalat.
L'Iran affirme que la production des complexes de Reshadat et Resalat

fut interrompue pendant plusieurs années.
48. Dans une lettre adressée au Conseil de sécuritédes Nations Unies,
les Etats-Unis décrivirent cette attaque et expliquèrent ce qui, selon eux,
lajustifiait, dans les termes qui suivent (lettre du représentant permanent
des Etats-Unis auprès des Nations Unies en date du 19 octobre 1987,
doc. Sl19219):
«En application de l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies, je
tiens à faire savoir, au nom de mon gouvernement, que les forces
américaines ont exercéle droit de légitime défenseque leur reconnaît
le droit international en ripostant aux attaques lancées contre des
bâtiments américains dans le golfe Persique par la République isla-
mique d'Iran.
Le 16 octobre 1987,vers 23 heures (heure d'étéde New York), un
missile Silkworm tiré par les forces iraniennes à partir du territoire
iraquien qu'occupent les troupes iraniennes a touché le Sea Isle City,
pétrolier battant pavillon américain, dans les eaux territoriales du
Koweït. Cette attaque n'est que la dernièred'une série de tirs de mis-
siles contre des bâtiments battant pavillon américain et contre
d'autres navires de commerce non belligérants dans les eaux du
Koweït. Elle s'ajoute au demeurant, comme celles qui l'ont précédée,

à une séried'attaques armées illégales que les forces iraniennes ont
lancéescontre les Etats-Unis, ycompris le mouillage de mines auquel
il a étéprocédé dans les eaux internationales en vue de couler ou
d'endommager des navires battant pavillon américain, ainsi que des
tirs non provoqués contre des aéronefs américains.
Le 19 octobre, vers 7 heures (heure d'été de New York), des na-
vires de guerre américains ont détruit la plate-forme militaire ira-
nienne au large de Reshadat (Rostam) dans les eaux internationales
du golfe Persique. Les forces militaires se trouvant sur cette plate-
forme ont mené diverses actions dirigées contre des bâtiments bat-
tant pavillon américain et contre des bâtiments et aéronefs non
belligérants. Ils ont suivi par radar et par d'autres moyens les mouve-
ments de convois américainset coordonné le mouillage de mines sur
le passage de nos convois; ils ont participé à des attaques menées
contre des navires non belligérants par des petites embarcations et
ont tiré sur des hélicoptères militaires américains, le 8 octobre 1987,
notamment. Des sommations ont étéfaites afin que la plate-forme
puisse être évacuée.)) [Traduction du Secrétariat de l'organisation
des Nations Unies.]
49. Dans leur contre-mémoire, les Etats-Unis établissent un lien entre
l'argument invoqué à l'époque des faits, selon lequel ils auraient exercé
leur droit de légitime défense, et l'application de l'alinéa d) du para-
graphe 1 de l'article XX du traité de 1955. Ils font valoir que les actions
menées par l'Iran pendant la période considérée représentaient unePersian Gulf was threatened by Iran's repeated attacks on neutral ves-
sels; that the lives of United Statesnationals were put at risk; that United
States naval vessels were seriously impeded in their security duties; and
that the United States Government and United States nationals suffered
severe financial losses. According to the United States, it was clear that
diplomatic measures were not a viable means of deterring Iran from its

attacks: "Accordingly, armed action in self-defense was the only option
left to the United States to prevent additional Iranian attacks."

50. The Court will thus first concentrate on the facts tending to show
the validity or otherwise of the claim to exercise the right of self-defence.
In its communication to the Security Council, cited above, the United
States based this claim on the existence of

"a series of unlawful armed attacks by Iranian forces against the
United States, including laying mines in international waters for the
purpose of sinking or damaging United States flag ships, and firing
on United States aircraft without provocation";

it referred in particular to a missile attack on the Sea Isle City as being
the specific incident that led to the attack on the Iranian platforms.
Before the Court, it has based itself more specifically on the attack on the

Sea Isle City, but has continued to assert the relevance of the other
attacks (see paragraph 62 below). To justify its choice of the platforms as
target, the United States asserted that they had "engaged in a variety of
actions directed against United States flag and other non-belligerent
vessels and aircraft". Iran has denied any responsibility for (in particular)
the attack on the Sea Isle City, and has claimed that the platforms had
no military purpose, and were not engaged in any military activity.

51. Despite having thus referred to attacks on vessels and aircraft of
other nationalities, the United States has not claimed to have been exer-
cising collective self-defence on behalf of the neutral States engaged in
shipping in the Persian Gulf; this would have required the existence of a
request made to the United States "by the State which regards itself as
the victim of an armed attack" (1.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 105, para. 199).
Therefore, in order to establish that it was legally justified in attacking
the Iranian platforms in exercise of the right of individual self-defence,
the United States has to show that attacks had been made upon it for
which Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were of such a nature PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 186

menace pour leurs intérêts vitaux sur le plan de la sécurité,les attaques
répétéesde cet Etat contre des navires neutres compromettant le com-
merce maritime dans le golfe Persique. Les Etats-Unis affirment égale-
ment que la vie de leurs ressortissants était menacée, que les navires de la
marine américaine chargés d'assurer la sécurité voyaient leur mission
sérieusement entravée, et que tant le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis que
des ressortissants américains avaient subi de graves préjudices financiers.
Selon les Etats-Unis, il était manifeste que des actions diplomatiques ne
constituaient pas un moyen approprié de dissuader l'Iran de mener des
attaques : «[alussi une intervention armée en légitime défense était-ellela
seule solution qui s'offrait [à eux] pour empêcher de nouvelles attaques
iraniennes ».
50. La Cour portera donc en premier lieu son attention sur les faits de
nature à confirmer ou à infirmer le bien-fondé de l'affirmation des Etats-
Unis selon laquelle ceux-ci auraient exercéleur droit de légitime défense.
Dans leur communication susmentionnée au Conseil de sécurité, les
Etats-Unis fondaient cette affirmation sur l'existence de

«une série d'attaques armées illégales que les forces iraniennes
[avaient] lancées contre les Etats-Unis, y compris le mouillage de
mines auquel il [avait] été procédédans les eaux internationales en
vue de couler ou d'endommager des navires battant pavillon améri-
cain, ainsi que des tirs non provoqués contre des aéronefs améri-
cains »;

les Etats-Unis invoquaient notamment une attaque au missile contre le
Sea Isle City comme étant l'incident particulier déclencheur de leur at-
taque contre les plates-formesiraniennes. Devant la Cour, les Etats-Unis
ont plus particulièrement fondé leur argumentation sur cette attaque
contre le Sea Isle City, mais n'en ont pas moins continué àinsister sur le
rôle des autres attaques (voir paragraphe 62 ci-après). Afin de justifier le
choix des plates-formes pour cible, les Etats-Unis ont affirmé qu'elles
avaient servi à mener ((diversesactions dirigées contre des bâtiments bat-
tant pavillon américain et contre des bâtiments et aéronefs non belligé-
rants». L'Iran a niétoute responsabilité dans - notamment - l'attaque
contre le Sea Isle City, et a soutenu que les plates-formes n'avaient pas
de finalité militaire et n'étaient engagées dans aucune activité de cette
nature.
51. Bien que s'étant ainsi référésà des attaques menéescontre des bâti-
ments et aéronefs d'autres nationalités, les Etats-Unis ne prétendent pas
avoir agi dans l'exercice de la légitime défense collective au nom des Etats
neutres se livrant à la navigation dans le golfe Persique, ce qui aurait
exigéqu'une demande en ce sens leur fût adressée par ((1'Etat se jugeant
victime d'une agression armée» (C.I. J. Recueil 1986, p. 105, par. 199).
Par conséquent, pour établir qu'ils étaient en droit d'attaquer les plates-
formes iraniennes dans l'exercice du droit de légitime défense indivi-
duelle, les Etats-Unis doivent démontrer qu'ils ont étéattaqués et que
l'Iran était responsable des attaques, et que celles-ci étaient de nature àas to be qualified as "armed attacks" within the meaning of that expres-
sion in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and as understood in
customary law on the use of force. As the Court observed in the case con-
cerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, it
is necessary to distinguish "the most grave forms of the use of force
(those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms" (1.C. J.
Reports 1986, p. 101, para. 191), since "In the case of individual self-
defence, the exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned having
been the victim of an armed attack" (ibid., p. 103, para. 195). The United
Statesmust also show that its actions were necessary and proportional to
the armed attack made on it, and that the platforms were a legitimate
military target open to attack in the exercise of self-defence.

52. Since it was the missile attack on the Sea Isle City that figured
most prominently in the United States contentions, the Court will first
examine in detail the evidence relating to that incident. The Sea Isle City
was a Kuwaiti tanker reflagged to the United States;on 16 October 1987
it had just ended a voyage under "Operation Earnest Will" (see para-
graph 24 above), when it was hit by a missile near Kuwait's Al-Ahmadi
Sea Island (or Mina al-Ahmadi) terminal. This incident, which caused
damage to the ship and injury to six crew members, was claimed by the
United States to be the seventh involving Iranian anti-ship cruise missiles
in the area in the course of 1987. The United States asserts that the mis-
sile that struck the Sea Isle City was launched by Iran from a facility
located in the Fao area. It recalls that in February 1986 Iran had taken
control of a large part of the Fao peninsula and had captured three
formerly Iraqi missile sites in the area, which it held at the time of the
attack. It also maintains that there was an additional active cruise missile
staging facility on Iranian territory near the Fao peninsula.

53. The evidence produced by the United States includes images,
taken by satellite or aerial reconnaissance aircraft, of the Fao area and
of the four alleged missile sites under Iranian control at the time of the
attack, as well as a complementary expert report describing and exam-
ining this imagery. Although the United States has indicated that it was
unable to recover and examine fragments of the specific missile that hit
the Sea Isle City, it has produced, in the present proceedings, a state-
ment by an independent expert, dated 27 March 1997, based on a pre-
vious examination by United States military analysts of fragments
retrieved from other similarincidents in early 1987. That evidenceshows,
in the United States submission, that the specific missile was a land-
launched HY-2 cruise missile of Chinese manufacture (alsoknown as the
"Silkworm" missile). The United States has also produced the testi-
mony, dated 21 May 1997, of two Kuwaiti officers, to the effect that
military personnel stationed on Kuwaiti islands had witnessed, in
January, September and October 1987, the launching of six missiles
from Iranian-controlled territory in the Fao area; in addition, one of PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 187

être qualifiées d'«agression armée)) tant au sens de l'article 51 de la

Charte des Nations Unies que selon le droit coutumier en matière d'emploi
de la force. Ainsi que la Cour l'a fait observer dans l'affaire des Activités
militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci, il y a lieu de
distinguer ((entre les formes les plus graves de l'emploi de la force (celles
qui constituent une agression armée) et d'autres modalités moins bru-
tales>)(C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 101, par. 191)' car «[dlans le cas de la légi-
time défense individuelle, ce droit ne peut êtreexercé que si 1'Etat inté-
ressé a étévictime d'une agression armée)) (ibid., p. 103, par. 195). Les

Etats-Unis doivent également démontrer que leurs actions étaient néces-
saires et proportionnées à l'agression armée subie par eux, et que les
plates-formes constituaient une cible militaire légitime susceptible d'être
attaquée dans l'exercice de la légitime défense.
52. Puisque l'attaque au missile contre le Sea Isle City occupe une place
prééminentedans l'argumentation des Etats-Unis, la Cour examinera tout
d'abord en détail les éléments de preuve concernant cet incident. Le
Sea Isle City était un pétrolier koweïtien réimmatriculé aux Etats-Unis; le
16 octobre 1987, à l'issue d'une traversée qu'il venait d'effectuer sous cou-

vert de l'opération «Earnest Will)) (voir paragraphe 24 ci-dessus), il fut tou-
chépar un missile près du terminal koweïtien d'Al-Ahmadi Sea Island (ou
Mina al-Ahmadi).Cette attaque, qui endommagea le navire et fit six blessés
parmi les membres d'équipage, était selon les Etats-Unisla septième menée
par l'Iran dans la régiondepuis le début de l'année 1987 avec des missiles de
croisière antinavires. Les Etats-Unis affirment que le missile ayant touché le
Sea Isle City fut tirépar l'Iran à partir d'un site installé dans la région de
Fao. Ils rappellent qu'en février 1986 l'Iran s'était emparé d'une vaste por-
tion de la péninsule de Fao, dont trois sites iraquiens de tir de missiles qu'il

occupait à l'époque de l'attaque. Les Etats-Unis soutiennent également
qu'il existait en territoire iranien,à proximité de la péninsule de Fao, un
autre site de tir de missiles de croisière en activité.
53. Parmi les élémentsde preuve produits par les Etats-Unis figurent
desimages,prises par satellite ou par des avionsde reconnaissanceaérienne,
de la région de Fao et des quatre sites de tir de missiles qui se seraient trou-
véssous contrôle iranien au moment de l'attaque; ces images sont complé-
téespar un rapport d'expert qui en donne une description et une analyse.
Bien qu'ils n'aient pas, de leur propre aveu, été en mesure de retrouver et

d'analyser des fragments du missile ayant touché le Sea Isle City, les Etats-
Unis ont produit en la présente instance la déclaration d'un expert indé-
pendant, en date du 27 mars 1997, qui s'appuie sur une étude antérieure
réaliséepar des analystes de l'armée américaine portant sur des fragments
de missiles retrouvés à la suite d'attaques similaires menées au début
de 1987. Pour les Etats-Unis, ces données prouvent que le missile qui a
touché le Sea Isle City était un missile de croisièreHY-2 à lanceur terrestre
de fabrication chinoise (dit aussi missile «ver à soie» («Silkworm)))). Les
Etats-Unis ont également produit le témoignage, en date du 21 mai 1997,

de deux officiers koweïtiens selon lesquels des militaires basés sur des îles
koweïtiennes auraient vu, en janvier, septembre et octobre 1987, six mis-these officers asserts that he personally observed the path of the missile
that struck the SeaIsle City on 16 October 1987.

54. Iran suggests that no credible evidence has been produced that
there were operational Iranian missile sites in the Fao area; it acknow-
ledges that it had captured three Iraqi missile sites in 1986, but these
"were heavily damaged during the fighting with Iraq" and "were inop-
erative throughout the period that Iranian forces held Fao". It therefore

denies that the missile that struck the Sea Isle City was launched from
those sites, or from an additional Iranian Silkworm missile site that the
United States claims to have identified in the area, the existence of which
Iran denies. Iran observes that the satellite images produced by the
United States are not very clear, and appeals to its own experts' opinion
to prove that the installations shown therein "bear no resemblance to a
normal Silkworm missile site". Moreover, according to Iran, other United
States evidence would show that, at the time of the attack, Iran had
operative missile sites only in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran maintains that
the statement of Kuwaiti officers produced by the United States is uncon-
vincing since it is largely based on hearsay and is in part inconsistent.

55. Iran also suggests the alternative theory that the missile that hit the
Sea Isle City was fired by Iraq, which, it contends, had both the appro-
priate missile capabilities,and an interest in internationalizing the con-
flict with Iran. According to Iran, the missile could have been launched
by Iraq either from an aircraft, from a naval vesse1 or from an "opera-
tional missile site located at a position on Fao just to the west of areas
occupied by Iran". Iran alleges that, while the maximum range of the
standard HY-2 (Silkworm) missile is 95 km, Iraq was in possession of
modified versions of that missile that could cover ranges up to 150 or
even 200 km. Moreover, according to an expert report produced by Iran,
a missile of this kind does not necessarily travel in a straight line and

could have been heading in the direction observed by the witnesses
invoked by the United States even if it had not been launched from
Iranian-held territory in the Fao area.
56. The United States claims that its satellite imagery shows that there
was no Iraqi missile launching facility in the Fao area at the time. It also
affirms, on the basis of an independent expert's opinion, that HY-2
missiles are not equipped with a system capable of guiding them along a
circuitous path, as contended by Iran. Finally, the United States rejects
the Iranian theory that the missile was launched from air or sea, both
because the fragments of missiles launched against Kuwaiti territory at
the same period indicated a land-launched missile, and because United
States AWACS radar planes did not detect any Iraqi military aircraft

aloft in the northern Persian Gulf at the time of the attacks.siles tirés du territoire sous contrôle iranien dans la région de Fao; l'un de
ces officiers a en outre affirméavoir personnellement observé la trajectoire
du missile ayant touché le Sea Isle City le 16 octobre 1987.
54. Selon l'Iran, les Etats-Unis n'ont produit aucun élémentcrédible
prouvant qu'il existait des sites iraniens de tir de missiles opérationnels
dans la région de Fao; l'Iran reconnaît avoir pris le contrôle de troissites
iraquiens en 1986, mais affirme que ces derniers «[avaient] été gravement
endommagés lors des combats avec l'Iraq» et qu'ils ((n'étaient pas opéra-
tionnels durant la période pendant laquelle les forces iraniennes ont tenu
Fao». Il nie donc que le missile qui a frappé le Sea Isle City ait été tiréà
partir d'un de ces sites, ou d'un autre site iranien de missiles «verà soie»
que les Etats-Unis affirment avoir identifié dans la région, et dont l'Iran
conteste l'existence. L'Iran observe que les images satellites produites par
les Etats-Unis ne sont pas très claires et signale que, selon ses propres
experts, les installations que l'ony voit «ne ressemblent aucunement à un
site de tir de missiles «ver à soie» ordinaire)). En outre, d'après l'Iran,
d'autres élémentsde preuve produits par les Etats-Unis montreraient que,
au moment de l'attaque, l'Iran n'avait de sites de tir de missiles opération-
nels que dans le détroit d'Ormuz. L'Iran affirme que le témoignage des
officiers koweïtiens invoqué par les Etats-Unis n'est pas convaincant car il
repose largement sur des ouï-dire et présente des incohérences.
55. L'Iran avance une autre thèse, à savoir que le missile qui a touché
le Sea Isle City aurait été tirpar l'Iraq, lequel auraità la fois disposé des
équipements de missile nécessaires et aurait eu intérêt à internationaliser
le conflit l'opposant à l'Iran. D'après l'Iran, le missile aurait pu être tiré
par l'Iraq d'un avion, d'un navire ou d'un «site de tir de missiles opéra-
tionnel situé sur Fao juste à l'ouest des zones occupées par l'Iran».
L'Iran affirme que, bien que la version courante du missile HY-2 (((ver à
soie») ait une portée maximale de 95 kilomètres, l'Iraq possédait des ver-
sions améliorées de ce missile dont la portée pouvait atteindre 150,
voire 200 kilomètres. En outre, selon un rapport d'expert présenté par
l'Iran, les missiles de ce type ne se déplacent pas nécessairement en ligne
droite; il serait donc possible qu'un missile se soit dirigédans la direction
décrite par les témoins produits par les Etats-Unis mêmesans avoir été
lancé du territoire sous contrôle iranien dans la région de Fao.
56. Les Etats-Unis affirment que leurs images satellites démontrent
qu'il n'y avait à l'époque aucun site iraquien de tir de missiles dans la
région de Fao. Ils soutiennent également, en se réclamant de l'avis d'un
expert indépendant, que les missiles HY-2 ne sont pas équipés d'un sys-
tème de téléguidage qui leur permette de suivre une trajectoire courbe
comme le prétend l'Iran. Enfin, les Etats-Unis rejettent la thèse de l'Iran
selon laquelle le missile aurait été tiréd'un avion ou d'un navire, d'une
part, parce que les fragments retrouvés en territoire koweïtien à la même
époque provenaient de missiles à lanceur terrestre et,d'autre part, parce
que les avions-radars AWACS américains n'ont détectéaucun aéronef
militaire iraquien volant dans la partie septentrionale du golfe Persique

au moment des attaques. 57. For present purposes, the Court has simply to determine whether
the United States has demonstrated that it was the victim of an "armed
attack" by Iran such as to justify it using armed force in self-defence; and
the burden of proof of the facts showing the existence of such an attack
rests on the United States. The Court does not have to attribute respon-

sibility for firing the missile that struck the Sea Isle City, on the basis of
a balance of evidence, either to Iran or to Iraq; if at the end of the day
the evidence available is insufficient to establish that the missile was fired
by Iran, then the necessary burden of proof has not been discharged by
the United States.

58. As noted above, the United States claims that the missile that
struck the Sea Isle City was a ground-launched HY-2 anti-ship missile of
the type known as the "Silkworm", but it has not been able to produce
physical evidence of this, for example in the form of recovered fragments

of the missile. The Court will however examine the other evidence on the
hypothesis that the missile was of this type. The United States contends
that the missile was fired from Iranian-held territory in the Fao area, and
it has offered satellite pictures and expert evidence to show that there
was, at the time, Iranian missile-firing equipment present there. Even
with the assistance of the expert reports offered by both Parties, the
Court does not however find the satellite images sufficiently clear to
establish this point. The evidence that the particular missile came from
the Fao direction is the testimony, mentioned above, of a Kuwaiti mili-
tary officer, who claims to have observed the flight of the missile over-

head, and thus to be able to identify the approximate bearing on which it
was travelling. However, this testimony was given ten years after the
reported events; and the officer does not state that he observed the
launch of the missile (and the alleged firing point was too remote for this
to have been possible), nor that he saw the missile strike the Sea Isle
City, but merely that he saw a missile passing "overhead", and that that
vesse1 was struck by a missile "minutes later". In sum, the witness evi-
dence cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, the Court notes that there is
a discrepancy between the English and Arabic texts of the statement pro-
duced before the Court, both of which were signed by the witness; the

Arabic version lacks any indication of the bearing on which the observed
missile was travelling.
59. There is a conflict of evidence between the Parties as to the char-
acteristics of the Silkworm missile, in particular its maximum range, and
whether or not when fired it alwaysfollows a straight-linecourse. Accord-
ing to the United States, the maximum range of the missile is of the order
of 105 km, and this type of missile always follows a straight course until
it approaches its objective, when its on-board guidanceequipment causes
it to lock on to a target which may be up to 12 degrees on either side of
its course. Iran however contends that the missile may also be set to fol-

low either a curved or dog-leg path, and that its maximum range is less,
95 km at the most. The Court does not consider that it is necessary for it 57. La Cour doit en l'espèce simplement déterminer si les Etats-Unis
ont démontré qu'ils avaient étévictimes de la part de l'Iran d'une «agres-
sion armée)) de nature àjustifier l'emploi qu'ils ont fait de la force armée
au titre de la légitime défense; or, c'est à eux qu'il revient de prouver
l'existence d'une telle agression. Il n'appartient pas à la Cour d'établir,

par une appréciation des différents élémentsde preuve, si la responsabi-
litédu tir de missile contre le Sea Isle City doit êtreattribuée à l'Iran ou
à l'Iraq. Si, en définitive, les preuves disponibles sont insuffisantes pour
permettre de déterminer si l'Iran est à l'origine de ce tir de missile, les
Etats-Unis ne se seront pas acquittés de la charge de la preuve qui pèse
sur eux.
58. Ainsi qu'il a étédit plus haut, les Etats-Unis affirment que le mis-
sile qui a touché le Sea Isle City était un missile de croisière anti-
navire HY-2 à lanceur terrestre, de type «ver à soie», mais ils n'ont pas
été enmesure de corroborer cette affirmation par des preuves matérielles,
telles que des fragments du missile. La Cour examinera néanmoins les
autres éléments de preuve disponibles en partant de l'hypothèse qu'il

s'agissait bien d'un missile de ce type. Les Etats-Unis affirment que le
missile a été tiré dela zone de la région de Fao sous contrôle iranien, et
ont fourni des images satellites et un rapport d'expert visant à démontrer
la présence à l'époque et dans cette zone de matériel iranien de tir de mis-
siles. Néanmoins, même en s'aidant des rapports d'experts de l'une et
l'autre des Parties, la Cour estime que les images satellites ne sont pas
suffisamment claires pour établir ce point. La thèse selon laquelle le mis-
sile en cause serait venu de la direction de Fao repose sur le témoignage,
mentionné plus haut, d'un officier koweïtien affirmant avoir observé ce
missile en vol et donc êtreen mesure d'en déterminer approximativement
le cap. Ce témoignage a toutefois étédonné dix ans après les faits, et
l'intéresséne dit pas qu'il a observé le tir du missile (l'endroit d'où celui-ci

aurait ététiré étant d'ailleurs trop éloignépour que cela soit possible), ni
qu'il a vu le missile toucher le Sea Isle City, mais seulement qu'il a vu
un missile passer «en vol» et que le navire a été touchépar un missile
((quelques instants plus tard)). En bref, on ne peut se fonder sur le témoi-
gnage en question. La Cour relève en outre qu'il existe une divergence
entre les textes anglais et arabe, tous deux signés par le témoin, de la
déclaration produite devant la Cour; le texte arabe ne mentionne en
effet aucunement la direction suivie par le missile observé.
59. Les éléments de preuve fournis par l'une et l'autre des Parties di-
vergent quant aux caractéristiques des missiles «ver à soie », en particulier
quant à leur portée maximale et à la question de savoir si, une fois tirés, ils
suivent toujours une ligne droite. Selon les Etats-Unis, la portée maximale

de ces missiles serait de l'ordrede 105 kilomètres, et les missiles de ce type
se déplaceraient toujours en ligne droite jusqu'à l'approche de l'objectif
visé,moment à partir duquel le radar de bord bloquerait la trajectoire en
direction d'une cible pouvant se trouver jusqu'à 12 degrés à droite ou à
gauche de cette trajectoire. Cependant, l'Iran soutient pour sa part que le
missile pouvait aussi avoir étéprogrammé pour suivre une trajectoireto decide between the conflicting expert testimony. It appears that at the
time different models of the missile existed, with differing programming
characteristics and maximum ranges. There is however no direct evidence
at al1of the type of missile that struck the Sea Isle City; the evidence as
to the nature of other missiles fired at Kuwaiti territory at this period is
suggestive, but no more. In considering whether the United States has
discharged the burden of proof that Iranian forces fired the missile that
struck the Sea Isle City, the Court must take note of this deficiency in the
evidence available.

60. In connection with its contention that the Sea Isle City was the
victim of an attack by Iran, the United Stateshas referred toan announce-
ment by President Ali Khameini of Iran some three months earlier, indi-
cating that Iran would attack the United States if it did not "leave the
region". This however is evidently not sufficient to justify the conclusion
that any subsequent attack on the United States in the Persian Gulf was
indeed the work of Iran. The United States also observes that, at the
time, Iran was blamed for the attack by "Lloyd's Maritime Information
Service, the General Council of British Shipping, Jane's Intelligence
Review and other authoritative public sources". These "public sources"
are by definition secondary evidence; and the Court has no indication of
what was the original source, or sources, or evidence on which the public
sourcesrelied. In this respect the Court would recall the caveatit included
in its Judgment in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activi-
ties in and against Nicaragua, that "Widespread reports of a fact may
prove on closer examination to derive from a single source, and such
reports, however numerous, will in such case have no greater value as
evidence than the original source." (1.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 41, para. 63.)

61. In short, the Court has examined with great care the evidence and
arguments presented on each side, and finds that the evidence indicative
of Iranian responsibility for the attack on the Sea Isle City is not suffi-
cient to support the contentions of the United States. The conclusion to
which the Court has come on this aspect of the case is thus that the
burden of proof of the existence of an armed attack by Iran on the
United States, in the form of the missile attack on the Sea Isle City, has
not been discharged.
62. In its notification to the Security Council, and before the Court,
the United States has however not relied solely on the Sea Isle City inci-
dent as constituting the "arrned attack" to which the United States
claimed to be responding. It asserted that that incident was "the latest in
a series of such missile attacks against United States flag and other non-
belligerent vessels in Kuwaiti waters in pursuit of peaceful commerce"
and that PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 190

courbe ou effectuer un virage brusque en vol et que sa portée maximale
était inférieure, et ne pouvait dépasser 95 kilomètres. La Cour estime qu'il
ne lui est pas nécessaire de trancher entre les témoignages contradictoires

des experts. Il existait à l'époque, semble-t-il, des modèles différents de ce
missile en ce qui concerne tant sa programmation que sa portée. Or,
aucune preuve directe ne permet de déterminer le type de missile ayant
touché le Sea Isle City; les éléments de preuve relatifs à la nature des
autres missiles tirés vers le territoire koweïtien à la mêmeépoque consti-
tuent tout au plus une indication. Lorsqu'elle examine si les Etats-Unis
ont rapporté la preuve, dont la charge leur incombait, que le missile qui a
touché le Sea Isle City avait été tirépar les forces iraniennes, la Cour doit
tenir compte de cette insuffisance des éléments de preuve disponibles.

60. Dans le cadre de leur thèse selon laquelle le Sea Isle City aurait été
victime d'une attaque iranienne, les Etats-Unis se sont référés à une décla-
ration du président iranien Ali Khameini faite environ trois mois plus tôt,
dans laquelle celui-ci indiquait que l'Iran attaquerait les Etats-Unis s'ils ne
quittaient pas la région. Mais cela ne suffit évidemment pas à étayer la
conclusion selon laquelle toute attaque menée par la suite contre les Etats-
Unis dans le golfe Persique était effectivement l'Œuvre de l'Iran. Les Etats-
Unis font également remarquer que, à l'époque, le ((serviced'information
maritime du Lloyd's, le General Council of British Shipping, la Jane's Intel-
ligence Review et d'autres sources publiques dignes de foi» tenaient l'Iran

pour responsable de l'attaque. Ces ((sources publiques)) constituent par
définition des preuves de seconde main, et la Cour n'a pas eu connaissance
de la source ou des sources originelles, ni des preuves sur lesquelles ces
sources publiques se sont appuyées. La Cour rappellera à cet égard la
réserve qu'elle a introduitedans son arrêten l'affaire des Activités militaires
et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci: ((11peut apparaître après
examen que des nouvelles fort répandues proviennent d'une source unique,
de sorte qu'en dépit de leur nombre elles n'ont pas de force probante plus
grande que celle-ci. » (C.I. J. Recueil 1986, p. 41, par. 63.)
61. En bref, après avoir examiné très attentivement les éléments et

arguments présentés par chaque Partie, la Cour estime que les preuves
apportées à l'appui de la responsabilité iranienne dans l'attaque contre le
Sea Isle City ne suffisent pas à fonder les affirmations des Etats-Unis. La
Cour conclut donc sur ce point de l'affaire que les Etats-Unis ne se sont
pas acquittés de la charge de la preuve qui pesait sur eux, à savoir démon-
trer l'existence d'une agression armée contre eux par l'Iran, sous la forme
d'une attaque au missile contre le Sea Isle City.
62. Toutefois, que ce soit dans la lettre qu'ils ont adressée au Conseil
de sécurité ou devant la Cour, les Etats-Unis ne se sont pas bornés à
invoquer le seul incident du Sea Isle City comme constituant 1'agression

armée» à laquelle ils auraient riposté. Ils ont affirmé que cette attaque
n'était «que la dernière d'une série de tirs de missiles [dans les eaux du
Koweït] contre des bâtiments battant pavillon américain et ...d'autres
navires ...non belligérants [se livrant pacifiquement au commerce] », et
que ces actions "These actions are, moreover, only the latest in a series of
unlawful armed attacks by Iranian forces against the United States,
including laying mines in international waters for the purpose of
sinking or damaging United States flag ships, and firing on United
States aircraft without provocation." (See paragraph 48 above.)

Before the Court, it has contended that the missile attack on the Sea Isle

City was itself an armed attack giving rise to the right of self-defence; the
alleged pattern of Iranian use of force, it is said, "added to the gravity of
the specific attacks, reinforced the necessity of action in self-defense, and
helped to shape the appropriate response".

63. The United States relies on the following incidents involving United
States-flagged, or United States-owned, vessels and aircraft, in the period
up to 19 October 1987, and attributes them to Iranian action: the mining
of the United States-flagged Bridgeton on 24 July 1987; the mining of the
United States-owned Texaco Caribbean on 10 August 1987; and firing
on United States Navy helicopters by Iranian gunboats, and from the
Reshadat oil platform, on 8 October 1987. The United States also claims

to have detected and boarded an Iranian vessel, the Iran Ajr, in the act of
laying mines in international waters some 50 nautical miles north-east of
Bahrain, in the vicinity of the entrance to Bahrain's deep-water shipping
channel. Iran has denied any responsibility for the mining of the Bridge-
ton and the Texaco Caribbean; as regards the Iran Ajr, Iran has
admitted that the vessel was carrying mines, but denies that they were
being laid at the time it was boarded, and claims that its only mission
was to transport them by a secure route to a quite different area.

64. On the hypothesis that al1 the incidents complained of are to be

attributed to Iran, and thus setting aside the question, examined above,
of attribution to Iran of the specific attack on the Sea Isle City, the ques-
tion is whether that attack, either in itself or in combination with the rest
of the "series of. . .attacks" cited by the United States can be catego-
rized as an "armed attack" on the United States justifying self-defence.
The Court notes first that the Sea Isle City was in Kuwaiti waters at the
time of the attack on it, and that a Silkworm missile fired from (it is
alleged) more than 100 km away could not have been aimed at the spe-
cific vessel, but simply programmed to hit some target in Kuwaiti waters.
Secondly, the Texaco Caribbean, whatever its ownership, was not flying
a United States flag, so that an attack on the vessel is not in itself to be

equated with an attack on that State. As regards the alleged firing on
United States helicopters from Iranian gunboats and from the Reshadat PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 191

«s'ajout[aient] au demeurant, comme celles qui [les avaient] précé-

dée[~], à une série d'attaques armées illégales que les forces ira-
niennes [avaient]lancées contre les Etats-Unis, y compris le mouillage
de mines auquel il [avait]été procédédans les eaux internationales en
vue de couler ou d'endommager des navires battant pavillon améri-
cain, ainsi que des tirs non provoqués contre des aéronefs améri-
cains » (voir paragraphe 48 ci-dessus).

Les Etats-Unis ont soutenu devant la Cour que l'attaque au missile
contre le Sea Isle City constituait en elle-même une agression armée

autorisant l'exercice du droit de légitime défense. L'emploi répétéde la
force par l'Iran qu'invoquent les Etats-Unis n'aurait «fait que confirmer
la gravitéde ces attaques, [aurait] renforcé la nécessitéd'agir au titre de la
légitime défense et [aurait] contribué à définir la riposte appropriée ».
63. Les Etats-Unis invoquent les incidents suivants, survenusjusqu'au
19 octobre 1987, dans lesquels des bâtiments et aéronefs immatriculés
aux Etats-Unis, ou appartenant à des intérêts américains, ont été impli-
qués, et qu'ils attribuent à l'Iran : mouillage de la mine heurtée le 24 juillet
1987 par le Bridgeton, navire battant pavillon américain, et mouillage de
la mine heurtée le 10 août 1987 par le Texaco Caribbean,pétrolier appar-

tenant à des intérêts américains; tirs dirigés contre des hélicoptères de la
marine des Etats-Unis par des vedettes rapides iraniennes, ainsi que
depuis la plate-forme pétrolière de Reshadat, le 8 octobre 1987. Les
Etats-Unis prétendent en outre avoir repéréet arraisonné un navire ira-
nien, l'Iran Ajr, en train de mouiller des mines dans les eaux internatio-
nales à quelque 50 milles marins au nord-est de Bahreïn, à proximité de
l'entrée du chenal de navigation en eau profonde de cet Etat. L'Iran nie
toute responsabilité dans le mouillage des mines heurtées par le Bridgeton
et le Texaco Caribbean. S'agissant de l'Iran Ajr, l'Iran reconnaît que le
navire transportait des mines, mais nie que celui-ci ait été en train de les

mouiller au moment où il fut arraisonné, et allègue que la seule mission
du navire était d'acheminer sans danger ces mines vers une tout autre
région.
64. A supposer que tous les incidents dénoncés par les Etats-Unis
doivent être attribués à l'Iran, et laissant par conséquent de côté la ques-
tion examinée plus haut de l'attribution à celui-ci de l'attaque menée contre
le Sea Isle City, la question est de savoir si cette attaque, prise isolément
ou dans le cadre de la «série d'attaques» invoquée par les Etats-Unis,
peut êtrequalifiée d'« agression armée » contre les Etats-Unis, agression
qui justifierait le recours à la légitime défense. La Cour constate tout
d'abord que le Sea Isle City se trouvait dans les eaux koweïtiennes

lorsqu'il fut attaqué, et qu'un missile «ver à soie» tiré, comme il est allé-
gué, à plus de 100 kilomètres de là ne pouvait pas viser précisément ce
navire, mais pouvait seulement avoir été programmé pour toucher une
cible dans les eaux koweïtiennes. D'autre part, quel qu'en soit le proprié-
taire, le Texaco Caribbean ne battait pas pavillon américain, de sorte
qu'une attaque contre ce navire ne peut êtreassimilée, en elle-même, àoil platform, no persuasive evidence has been supplied to support this
allegation. There is no evidence that the minelaying alleged to have been
carried out by the Iran Ajr, at a time when Iran was at war with Iraq, was
aimed specifically at the United States; and similarly it has not been

established that the mine struck by the Bridgeton was laid with
the specific intention of harming that ship, or other United States vessels.
Even taken cumulatively, and reserving, as already noted, the question
of Iranian responsibility, these incidents do not seem to the Court to
constitute an armed attack on the United States, of the kind that the
Court, in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua, qualified as a "most grave" form of the use of
force (see paragraph 51 above).

65. The second occasion on which Iranian oil installations were
attacked was on 18 April 1988, with the action against the Salman and
Nasr complexes. The Salman offshore oil complex consisted of seven
interconnectedplatforms, includingone drilling and two production plat-
forms. Oil extracted from 21 wells was transported by submarine pipeline
to this complex, and then on to Lavan Island after initial water and gas

separation. This complex had been attacked by Iraq in October and
November 1986, and was still undergoing repairs in April 1988; by that
time, according to Iran, the works were "virtually completed", but the
United States questions this. The Nasr complex comprised one central
platform, one flaring point, and six oil-producing platforms grouped
around the central platform, served by 44 wells in the Sirri field and four
wells in the Nosrat field. Crude oil from al1 these wells was transported
by submarine pipeline to the central platform, and from there to Sirri
Island. This complex was functioning normally in April 1988.

66. United States naval forces attacked the Salman and Nasr com-
plexes on 18 April 1988. Two destroyers and a supply ship were involved
in the attack on the Salman complex: shortly before 8 a.m., local time,
the United States forces warned the personnel on the platforms that the
attack was due to begin; some of them began to evacuate the installation,
while others opened fire. A few minutes later, shelling on the complex
commenced from United States ships, warplanes and helicopters. United
States forces then boarded some of the platforms (but not that containing

the control centre), and placed and detonated explosives. Iran states that
the attack caused severe damage to the production facilities of the
platforms, and that the activities of the Salman complex were totally PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 192

une attaque contre les Etats-Unis. S'agissant des tirs qui auraient été
dirigés contre des hélicoptères américains par des vedettes rapides ira-
niennes, ainsi que depuis la plate-forme de Reshadat, les Etats-Unis
n'ont fourni aucun moyen de preuve convaincant à l'appui de leur allé-
gation. Il n'est pas démontré que le mouillage de mines auquel se serait
livré l'Iran Ajr visait précisément,à une époque où l'Iran était en guerre
avec l'Iraq, les Etats-Unis; de la mêmemanière, il n'a pas été établi que
la mine heurtée par le Bridgeton avait étémouillée dans le but précis
d'endommager ce navire ou d'autres navires américains. Même pris
conjointement, et réserve faite, comme il a déjà étédit, de la question de
la responsabilité de l'Iran, ces incidents ne semblent pas à la Cour cons-
tituer une agression armée contre les Etats-Unis comparable àce qu'elle
a qualifié, en l'affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires auNica-
ragua et contre celui-ci, de forme d'emploi de la force parmi «les plus
graves » (voir paragraphe 51 ci-dessus).

65. Des installations pétrolières iraniennes furent attaquées une
seconde fois le 18 avril 1988, lors de l'action menée contre les plates-
formes de Salman et de Nasr. Le complexe pétrolier offshore de Salman
était composé de sept plates-formes reliées entre elles, dont une plate-
forme de forage et deux plates-formes de production. Le pétrole extrait
de vingt et un puits était transporté par oléoduc sous-marin jusqu'à ce
complexe, puis, après une première séparation de l'eau et du gaz, jusqu'à
l'île de Lavan. Ce complexe avait étéattaqué par l'Iraq en octobre et
novembre 1986, et se trouvait encore en cours de réparation en avril
1988 ; selon l'Iran, les réparations étaient alors ((quasiment achevées»,
une assertion que les Etats-Unis ont toutefois mise en doute. Le complexe
de Nasr comprenait une plate-forme centrale, une torchère, et six plates-
formes de production groupées autour de la plate-forme centrale et ali-
mentées par quarante-quatre puits du champ de Sirri et quatre puits
du champ de Nosrat. Le pétrole brut provenant de tous ces puits était
transporté par oléoduc sous-marin jusqu'à la plate-forme centrale et,
de là, jusqu'à l'île de Sirri. Ce complexe fonctionnait normalement en
avril 1988.
66. Les forces navales des Etats-Unis attaquèrent les complexes de Sal-
man et de Nasr le 18 avril 1988. Deux destroyers et un navire ravitailleur

participèrent à l'attaque du complexe de Salman: peu avant 8 heures,
heure locale, les forces américainesavertirent le personnel se trouvant sur
les plates-formes de l'imminence de l'attaque; alors que plusieurs
membres de ce personnel commençaient à évacuer l'installation, d'autres
ouvrirent le feu. Quelques minutes plus tard, des navires, des avions et
des hélicoptères américainscommencèrent à bombarder le complexe. Les
forces américaines montèrent alors sur certaines des plates-formes, mais
pas sur celle abritant le centre de contrôle, et elles placèrent et mirent à
feu des explosifs. L'Iran expose que l'attaque endommagea gravement lesinterrupted for four years, its regular production being resumed only
in September 1992, and reaching a normal level in 1993.

The central platform of the Nasr complex was attacked at around
8.15 a.m. by three United States warships and a number of helicopters.
After having been warned of the imminent military action, Iranian per-
sonnel evacuated the platform. The United States forces bombarded the
installation and almost completely destroyed it; the platform was not
boarded, since it was considered unsafe due to secondary explosions and
fire. According to Iranian accounts, activities in the whole Nasr complex
(including oil production and water injection) were interrupted as a con-
sequence of the attack and did not resume until nearly four years later.

67. The nature of the attacks on the Salman and Nasr complexes, and
their alleged justification, was presented by the United States to the
United Nations Security Council in the following terms (letter from the
United States Permanent Representative of 18 April 1988, SI19791) :

"In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, 1wish, on behalf of my Government, to report that United
States forces have exercised their inherent right of self-defence under

international law by taking defensive action in response to an attack
by the Islamic Republic of Iran against a United States naval vesse1
in international waters of the Persian Gulf. The actions taken are
necessary and are proportionate to the threat posed by such hostile
Iranian actions.

At approximately 1010 Eastern Daylight Time on 14 April the
USS Samuel B. Roberts was struck by a mine approximately 60 miles
east of Bahrain, in international waters. Ten US sailors were injured,
one seriously, and the ship was damaged. The mine which struck the
Roberts was one of at least four mines laid in this area. The United

States has subsequently identified the mines by type, and we have
conclusive evidence that these mines were manufactured recently in
Iran. The mines were laid in shipping lanes known by Iran to be
used by US vessels, and intended by them to damage or sink such
vessels. This is but the latest in a series of offensive attacks and
provocations Iranian naval forces have taken against neutral
shipping in the international waters of the Persian Gulf.

Through diplomatic channels, the United States has informed the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on four separate occa-
sions, most recently 19 October 1987, that the United States would
not accept Iran's minelaying in international waters or in the watersinfrastructures de production des plates-formes et que les activités du
complexe de Salman furent totalement interrompues pendant quatre ans,
la production n'ayant repris régulièrement qu'en septembre 1992, pour
n'atteindre son niveau habituel qu'en 1993.
La plate-forme centrale du complexe de Nasr fut attaquée vers 8 h 15
par trois navires de guerre et des hélicoptères américains.Après avoir été
averti de l'imminence d'une action militaire, le personnel iranien évacua
la plate-forme. Les forces des Etats-Unis bombardèrent l'installation et la
détruisirent presque complètement; elles ne montèrent pas sur la plate-
forme, considérée comme dangereuse du fait des risques d'explosion et
d'incendie. L'Iran soutient que, du fait de cette attaque, les activités de
l'ensemble du complexe de Nasr (dont la production pétrolière et l'injec-
tion d'eau) furent interrompues et ne reprirent que près de quatre années
plus tard.
67. La nature des attaques menées contre les complexes de Salman et
de Nasr, ainsi que la justification invoquée furent exposées au Conseil de
sécurité des Nations Unies par les Etats-Unis dans les termes suivants
(lettre en date du 18 avril 1988 du représentant permanent des Etats-
Unis, Nations Unies, doc. Sl19791) :

«Conformément à l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies, j'ai
l'honneur, au nom de mon gouvernement, de vous faire savoir que
les forces des Etats-Unis d'Amérique ont exercéleur droit naturel de
légitime défense reconnu par le droit international en prenant des
mesures défensives en réponse à une attaque de la République isla-
mique d'Iran contre un navire des Etats-Unis d'Amérique se trou-
vant dans les eaux [internationales] du golfe Persique. Les mesures
prises étaient nécessaires et proportionnées à la menace que repré-
sentait l'action hostile de l'Iran.
A 10 h 10 environ (heured'été de New York), le 14 avril, le navire
américain Samuel B. Roberts a été touchépar une mine à 60 milles
marins environ à l'est de Bahreïn, dans les eaux internationales. Dix
marins américains ont étéblessés,dont l'un gravement,et le navire a
été endommagé. La mine qui a touché le Roberts était l'une de plu-

sieurs mines (quatre au moins) posées dans cette zone. Nous avons
par la suite identifié ces mines d'après leur type et nous avons la
preuve qu'elles ont étéfabriquées récemment en Iran. Elles ont été
posées dans des voies de navigation dont l'Iran sait qu'elles sont uti-
lisées par les navires américains, dans le but d'endommager ou de
couler ces navires. Ce n'est là que la dernière d'une séried'attaques
et de provocations auxquelles les forces navales iraniennes se sont
livrées contre des navires marchands de pays neutres dans les eaux
internationales du golfe Persique.
Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique a informé, par la
voie diplomatique, le Gouvernement de la République islamique
d'Iran, en quatre occasions distinctes dont la plus récente remonte
au 19 octobre 1987, que les Etats-Unis ne toléreraient pas que l'Iran of neutral States. In October, my Government indicated that the
United States did not seek a military confrontation with Iran, but
that it would take appropriate defensive measures against such hos-
tile actions.

Starting at approximately O100 Eastern Daylight Time 18 April
US forces attacked military targets in the Persian Gulf which have
been used for attacks against non-belligerent shipping in interna-
tional waterways of the Gulf.

The US actions have been against legitimate military targets. Al1
feasible measures have been taken to minimize the risk of civilian
damage or casualties .. ."

68. The Court notes that the attacks on the Salman and Nasr plat-
forms were not an isolated operation, aimed simply at the oil installa-
tions, as had been the case with the attacks of 19 October 1987; they
formed part of a much more extensive military action, designated "Opera-
tion Praying Mantis", conducted by the United States against what it
regarded as "legitimate military targets"; armed force was used, and
damage done to a number of targets, including the destruction of two
Iranian frigates and other Iranian naval vessels and aircraft.

69. The USS Samuel B. Roberts was a warship returning to Bahrain
on 14 April 1988, after escorting a convoy of United States-flagged mer-
chant ships in the context of "Operation Earnest Will", when it hit a
mine near Shah Allum Shoal in the central Persian Gulf. The United
States reports that, in the days following the attack, Belgian and Dutch
mine-clearing forces and its own navy discovered several mines bearing
Iranian serial numbers in the vicinity and it concludes therefore that the
mine struck by the USS Samuel B. Roberts was laid by Iran. It also
adduces other discoveries of Iranian mining activities at the time (includ-
ing the boarding by United States forces of the Iranian vesse1 Iran Ajr,
said to have been caught in the act of laying mines, referred to in para-

and conclusionse), of the internationalntsshipping communityilitar(see para-

graph 60 above), al1 allegedly demonstrating that Iran made a general
practice of using mines to attack neutral shipping.

70. Iran denies that it had systematic recourse to minelaying in the
Persian Gulf and suggests that evidence produced by the United States is
unpersuasive. Furtherrnore, it contends that the United States has sub-
mitted no independent evidence that the laying of the mine that hit the PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 194

pose des mines dans les eaux internationales ou dans les eaux terri-
toriales des Etats neutres. En octobre dernier, mon gouvernement a
indiqué que les Etats-Unis d'Amérique ne recherchaient pas une
confrontation militaire avec l'Iran mais qu'ils prendraient les me-
sures défensives voulues contre tout acte hostile.
A partir d'une heure du matin environ (heure d'été de New York),
le 18 avril, les forces des Etats-Unis d'Amérique ont attaqué, dans le
golfe Persique, des objectifs militaires qui avaient été utilisés pour
lancer des attaques contre des navires marchands de pays non belli-

gérants se trouvant dans les eaux internationales du Golfe.
Les mesures prises par les Etats-Unis étaient dirigées contre des
objectifs qui pouvaient être considérés légitimement comme des
objectifs militaires et tout a été fait pour réduire au maximum le
risque de dommages causés à des personnes ou à des biens civils ..»
[Traduction du Secrétariat de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.]

68. La Cour relève que l'attaque menée contre les plates-formes de
Salman et de Nasr ne constituait pas une action isolée visant simplement

les installations pétrolières,ce qui avait étéle cas des attaques du 19 oc-
tobre 1987. Elle s'inscrivait dans le cadre d'une opération militaire bien
plus vaste, appelée «Operation Praying Mantis » (((mante religieuse »),
menée par les Etats-Unis contre ce qu'ils estimaient êtredes ((cibles mili-
taires légitimes)); la force armée fut employée, et des dommages furent
infligésà plusieurs cibles, avec notamment la destruction de deux frégates
iraniennes ainsi que de plusieurs navires et aéronefs militaires iraniens.
69. Le 14 avril 1988, 1'USS Samuel B. Roberts, un navire de guerre,
regagnait Bahreïn après avoir escorté un convoi de navires marchands
battant pavillon des Etats-Unis sous le couvert de l'opération ((Earnest

Will» lorsqu'il heurta une mine à proximité des hauts-fonds de Shah
Allum, au milieu du golfe Persique. Les Etats-Unis expliquent que, dans
les jours qui suivirent l'attaque, des unités belges et néerlandaises spécia-
liséesen déminageet des unités navales américainesdécouvrirent dans les
environs plusieurs mines portant des numéros de série iraniens. Ils en
concluent que la mine heurtée par I'USS Samuel B. Roberts avait été
mouillée par l'Iran. Les Etats-Unis invoquent également d'autres élé-
ments relatifs aux opérations de minage menées par l'Iran à l'époque
(dont l'arraisonnement par les forces américaines, mentionné au para-
graphe 63 ci-dessus, du navire iranien Iran Ajr, qui aurait été surpris

mouillant des mines), des déclarations contemporaines de chefs militaires
iraniens et les constats des milieux maritimes internationaux (voir para-
graphe 60 ci-dessus), autant d'éléments qui tendraient à prouver que
l'Iran aurait alors eu pour pratique d'attaquer des navires neutres au
moyen de mines.
70. L'Iran nie avoir systématiquement recouru au mouillage de mines
dans le golfe Persique et estime que les preuves produites par les Etats-
Unis ne sont pas convaincantes. En outre, l'Iran estime que les Etats-
Unis n'ont pas présenté d'élémentsde preuve indépendants démontrantUSS Samuel B. Roberts is attributable to Iran. Iran also suggests that the
mine may have been laid by Iraq, a hypothesis that the United States
rejects.
71. As in the case of the attack on the Sea Isle City, the first question
is whether the United States has discharged the burden of proof that the
USS Samuel B. Roberts was the victim of a mine laid by Iran. The Court
notes that mines were being laid at the time by both belligerents in the
Iran-Iraq war, so that evidence of other minelaying operations by Iran is
not conclusive as to responsibility of Iran for this particular mine. In its
communication to the Security Council in connection with the attack of
18 April 1988, the United States alleged that "The mines were laid in
shippinglanes known by Iran to be used by US vessels, and intended by
them to damage or sink such vessels" (paragraph 67 above). Iran has
claimed that it laid mines only for defensive purposes in the Khor Abdul-
lah Channel, but the United States has submitted evidence suggesting
that Iran's mining operations were more extensive. The main evidence
that the mine struck by the USS Samuel B. Roberts was laid by Iran was
the discovery of moored mines in the same area, bearing serial numbers
matching other Iranian mines, in particular those found aboard the vessel
Iran Ajr (see paragraph 63 above). This evidence is highly suggestive, but
not conclusive.

72. The Court notes further that, as on the occasion of the earlier
attack on oil platforms, the United States in its communication to the
Security Council claimed to have been exercising the right of self-defence
in response to the "attack" on the USS Samuel B. Roberts, linking it also
with "a series of offensive attacks and provocations Iranian naval forces
have taken against neutral shipping in the international waters of the Per-
sian Gulf' (paragraph 67 above). Before the Court, it has contended, as
in the case of the missile attack on the Sea Isle City, that the mining was
itself an armed attack giving rise to the right of self-defence and that the
alleged pattern of Iranian use of force "added to the gravity of the spe-
cific attacks, reinforced the necessity of action in self-defense, and helped
to shape the appropriate response" (see paragraph 62 above). No attacks
on United States-flagged vessels (as distinct from United States-owned
vessels), additional to those cited as justification for the earlier attacks on
the Reshadat platforms, have been brought to the Court's attention,
other than the mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts itself. The question
is therefore whether that incident sufficed in itself to justify action inlf-
defence, as amounting to an "armed attack". The Court does not exclude
the possibility that the mining of a single military vessel might be suffi-
cient to bring into play the "inherent right of self-defence" ;but in view of
al1 the circumstances, including the inconclusiveness of the evidence of
Iran's responsibility for the mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts, theque le mouillage de la mine heurtée par 1'USS Samuel B. Roberts lui
serait attribuable. L'Iran affirme également que la mine aurait pu être
mouillée par l'Iraq, hypothèse que les Etats-Unis rejettent.
71. Comme dans le cas de l'attaque contre le Sea Isle City,la première
question qui se pose est celle de savoir si les Etats-Unis ont rapporté la
preuve, dont la charge leur incombe, que 1'USS Samuel B. Roberts a été
touché par une mine mouillée par l'Iran. La Cour relève que, à l'époque,

l'Iraq et l'Iran, qui étaient en guerre, mouillaientous deux des mines, de
sorte que les éléments démontrant l'existence d'autres opérations ira-
niennes de mouillage de mines ne permettent pas de conclure que l'Iran
est responsable du mouillage de cette mine particulière. Dans une lettre
adressée au Conseil de sécuritéau sujet de l'attaque du 18 avril 1988, les
Etats-Unis ont soutenu que «[les mines avaient] étéposées dans des voies
de navigation dont l'Iran [savait] qu'elles [étaient]utilisées par les navires
américains, dans le but d'endommager ou de couler ces navires» (voir
paragraphe 67 ci-dessus). L'Iran affirme n'avoir mouillé des mines qu'à
des fins défensives, dans le chenal de Khor Abdullah, mais les Etats-Unis
ont présentédes élémentsde preuve laissant entendre que les opérations
de minage de l'Iran étaient plus étendues. Le principal élémentde preuve
apporté à l'appui de l'affirmation selon laquelle la mine heurtée par
I'USS Samuel B. Roberts aurait étémouillée par l'Iran est la découverte
dans la mêmezone de mines lestées portant des numéros de série simi-
laires à ceux d'autres mines iraniennes, en particulier celles trouvées à
bord de l'Iran Ajr (voir paragraphe 63 ci-dessus). Cet élémentde preuve
n'est certes pas dépourvu d'importance, mais il n'est pas déterminant.
72. La Cour relèvera de surcroît que, comme lors de leur précédente
attaque contre des plates-formes pétrolières, les Etats-Unis, dans leur
lettre au Conseil de sécurité,prétendirent en l'espèce avoir exercéleur droit
de légitime défense, en réponse à l'«attaque» subie par 1'USS Samuel B.
Roberts, et rattachèrent de même celle-ci à «une série d'attaques et de
provocations auxquelles les forces navales iraniennes [s'étaient] livrées
contre des navires marchands de pays neutres dans les eaux internatio-
nales du golfe Persique» (voir paragraphe 67 ci-dessus). Les Etats-Unis
ont, comme pour l'attaque au missile contre le Sea Isle City, affirmé
devant la Cour que le minage constituait en lui-même une agression
armée donnant lieu à l'exercice du droit de légitime défense et que ce
qu'ils considèrent comme un emploi systématique de la force par l'Iran
n'aurait «fait que confirmer la gravité de ces attaques, [aurait] renforcé la
nécessitéd'agir au titre de la légitime défense et [aurait] contribuéà défi-
nir la riposte appropriée» (voir paragraphe 62 ci-dessus). Aucune autre
attaque contre des navires battant pavillon des Etats-Unis (par opposi-
tion aux navires appartenant à des intérêtsaméricains) que celles citées
pour justifier les précédentes attaques contre les plates-formes de Resha-
dat et que le minage de I'USS Samuel B. Roberts n'a été invoquéedevant
la Cour. La question est par conséquent de savoir si cet incident suffisait
à lui seul à justifier des actes de légitime défense au motif qu'il aurait
constitué une ((agression armée». La Cour n'exclut pas que le minageCourt is unable to hold that the attacks on the Salman and Nasr plat-
forms have been shown to have been justifiably made in response to an
"armed attack" on the United States by Iran, in the form of the mining of
the USS Samuel B. Roberts.

73. As noted above (paragraph 43), in the present case a question of
whether certain action is "necessary" arises both as an element of inter-
national law relating to self-defence and on the basis of the actual terms
of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty, already quoted,
whereby the Treaty does "not preclude . . .measures . . .necessary to
protect [the] essential security interests" of either party. In this latter
respect, the United States claims that it considered in good faith that the

attacks on the platforms were necessary to protect its essential security
interests, and suggests that "A measure of discretion should be afforded
to a party's good faith application of measures to protect its essential
security interests." Iran was prepared to recognize some of the interests
referred to by the United States - the safety of United States vessels and
crew, and the uninterrupted flow of maritime commerce in the Persian
Gulf - as being reasonable security interests of the United States, but
denied that the United States actions against the platforms could be
regarded as "necessary" to protect those interests. The Court does not
however have to decide whether the United States interpretation of

Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), on this point is correct, since the require-
ment of international law that measures taken avowedly in self-defence
must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and objective, leaving
no room for any "measure of discretion". The Court will therefore turn
to the criteria of necessity and proportionality in the context of inter-
national law on self-defence.

74. In its decision in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary

Activities in and against Nicaragua, the Court endorsed the shared view
of the parties to that case that in customary law "whether the response to
the [armed] attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of the
necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in self-defence"
(1.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 103, para. 194). One aspect of these criteria is the
nature of the target of the force used avowedly in self-defence. In its com-
munications to the Security Council, in particular in that of 19 October
1987 (paragraph 46 above), the United States indicated the grounds on PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 196

d'un seul navire de guerre puisse suffireà justifier qu'il soit fait usage du
«droit naturel de légitime défense)) ; toutefois, au vu de l'ensemble des
circonstances, et notamment du caractère non concluant des éléments

concernant la responsabilité de l'Iran dans le mouillage de la mine heur-
tée par 1'USS Samuel B. Roberts, la Cour n'est pas en mesure de dire
qu'il a été démontré queles attaques contre les plates-formes de Salman
et de Nasr constituaient une riposte justifiée à une «agression armée ))de
l'Iran contre les Etats-Unis résultant du heurt de cette mine.

73. Comme il a éténoté ci-dessus (voir paragraphe 43)' en la présente
affaire, la question de savoir si telle ou telle action est «nécessaire» se
pose à la fois en tant qu'élément du droit international de la légitime
défense et au regard du texte mêmede l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de
l'article XX du traité de 1955, déjà cité,aux termes duquel le traité «ne
fera pas obstacle à l'application de mesures ..nécessaires ...à la protec-
tion des intérêts vitaux [de l'une ou l'autre partie] sur le plan de la sécu-
rité)). Sur ce dernier point, les Etats-Unis affirment qu'ils ont estimé de
bonne foi que les attaques contre les plates-formes étaient nécessaires
pour protéger leurs intérêts vitaux sur le plan de la sécurité,et qu'«une
partie devrait se voir accorder une certaine liberté d'appréciation en ce
qui concerne l'application de bonne foi de mesures destinées à protéger
ces intérêts vitaux en matière de sécurité». L'Iran est prêt à reconnaître
que certains des intérêtsévoquéspar les Etats-Unis - la sécurité des
navires de ces derniers et de leur équipage, et la continuité du commerce
maritime dans le golfe Persique - étaient des intérêts raisonnables sur le
plan de la sécuritédes Etats-Unis, mais il conteste que les actions menées

par les Etats-Unis contre les plates-formes puissent être considérées
comme «nécessaires» à la protection de ces intérêts. LaCour n'a toute-
fois pas à décider si l'interprétation que donnent les Etats-Unis de l'alinéa
d) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX est sur ce point correcte, dès lors que
l'exigence que pose le droit international, selon laquelle des mesures
prises au nom de la légitime défense doivent avoir éténécessaires à cette
fin, est rigoureuse et objective, et ne laisse aucune place à «une certaine
liberté d'appréciation)). La Cour se penchera donc maintenant sur les cri-
tères de nécessitéet de proportionnalité dans le cadre du droit interna-
tional relatifà la légitime défense.
74. Dans sa décision en l'affaire des Activités militaires et paramili-
taires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci, la Cour a fait sienne l'opinion par-
tagée par les Parties selon laquelle, en droit coutumier, «la licéité dela
riposte à l'agression [armée]dépend du respect des critères de nécessitéet
de proportionnalité des mesures prises au nom de la légitime défense))
(C.IJ. Recueil 1986, p. 103, par. 194). Figure notamment au nombre de
ces critères la nature de la cible contre laquelle la force a étéemployée au
nom de la légitime défense. Dans leurs communications adressées au
Conseil de sécurité,et en particulier dans celle du 19 octobre 1987 (voirwhich it regarded the Iranian platforms as legitimatetargets for an armed
action in self-defence. In the present proceedings, the United States has
continued to maintain that they were such, and has presented evidence
directed to showing that the platforms collected and reported intelligence
concerning passing vessels, acted as a military communication link co-
ordinating Iranian naval forces and served as actual staging bases to
launch helicopter and small boat attacks on neutral commercial shipping.
The United States has referred to documents and materials found by its

forces aboard the vesse1 Iran Ajr (see paragraph 63 above), allegedly
establishing that the Reshadat platforms served as military communica-
tion facilities. It has also affirmed that the international shipping com-
munity at the time was aware of the military use of the platforms, as
confirmed by the costly steps commercial vessels took to avoid them, and
by various witness reports describing Iranian attacks. The United States
has also submitted expert analysis of the conditions and circumstances
surrounding these attacks, examining their pattern and location in the
light of the equipment at Iran's disposal. Finally, the United States has
produced a number of documents, found on the Reshadat complex when

it was attacked, allegedly corroborating the platforms' military function.
In particular, it contends that these documents prove that the Reshadat
platforms had monitored the movements of the Sea Isle City on 8 August
1987. On the other hand, the forces that attacked the Salman and Nasr
complexes were not able to board the platforms containing the control
centres, and did not therefore seize any material (if indeed such existed)
tending to show the use of those complexes for military purposes.

75. Iran recognizes the presence of limited military personnel and
equipment on the Reshadat platforms, but insists that their purpose was
exclusively defensive and justified by previous Iraqi attacks on its oil pro-
duction facilities. Iran further challenges the evidence adduced by the
United States in this regard. It alleges that documents found aboard the
Iran Ajr and the Reshadat platforms are read out of their proper context,
incorrectly translated and actually consistent with the platforms' purely

defensive role; and that military expert analysis relied on by the United
States is hypothetical and contradictory. Iran asserts further that reports
and testimony referred to by the United States are mostly non-specific
about the use of the platforms as staging bases to launch attacks, and
that the equipment at its disposa1 could be used from mainland and off-
shore islands, without any need to have recourse to the platforms.paragraphe 46 ci-dessus), les Etats-Unis ont exposé les raisons pour les-
quelles ils s'étaient estimés fondés à prendre les plates-formes iraniennes
pour cibles d'une action armée au titre de la légitime défense. Dans le
cadre de la présente espèce, ils ont maintenu qu'il s'agissait d'objectifs
légitimes à ce titre, et produit des éléments de preuve visant à indiquer
que les plates-formes recueillaient et transmettaient des renseignements

sur les mouvements de navires, servaient de relais de communication
militaire aux fins de coordonner les forces navales iraniennes et faisaient
fonction de bases logistiques à partir desquelles étaient menées, au moyen
d'hélicoptères et de petites embarcations, des attaques contre des navires
de commerce neutres. Les Etats-Unis ont fait état de documents et
d'autres élémentsdécouverts par leurs forces à bord du navire Iran Ajr
(voir paragraphe 63 ci-dessus), qui établiraient que les plates-formes de
Reshadat servaient de stations de communication militaire. Ils ont égale-
ment soutenuqu'à l'époque les milieux maritimes internationaux savaient
que les plates-formesétaient utilisées à des fins militaires, comme l'attes-

teraient les mesures coûteuses prises par les navires commerciaux pour les
éviter, ainsi que divers témoignages décrivant des attaques iraniennes.
Les Etats-Unis ont également présenté des analyses d'experts sur les
conditions et circonstances de ces attaques, examinant leurs modalités et
l'endroit où elles avaient eu lieu à la lumière du matériel dont disposait
l'Iran. Enfin, les Etats-Unis ont soumis un certain nombre de documents,
trouvés sur le complexe de Reshadat lors de l'attaque de celui-ci, qui
confirmeraient la fonction militaire des plates-formes. Selon eux, ces
documents établissent notamment que les plates-formes de Reshadat
auraient servi à surveiller les mouvements du Sea Isle City le 8 août 1987.

En revanche, les forces déployées dans l'attaque des complexes de Sal-
man et de Nasr n'ayant pas pu monter sur les plates-formes abritant les
centres de contrôle, aucun élément (à supposer qu'il y en ait eu) n'a pu
êtresaisi qui tendrait à démontrer que ces complexes étaient utilisés à des
fins militaires.
75. L'Iran reconnaît la présence, en proportions restreintes, de person-
nel et de matériel militaires sur les plates-formes de Reshadat, mais sou-
ligne qu'elle n'avait d'autres fins que défensives et se trouvait justifiée par
les précédentes attaques menées par l'Iraq contre ses installations de pro-
duction pétrolière. L'Iran récuse en outre les élémentsde preuve mis en

avant par les Etats-Unis à cet égard. Il soutient que les documents trou-
vés à bord de l'Iran Ajr et sur les plates-formes de Reshadat sont pris
hors du contexte dans lequel ils devraient être lus, qu'ils sont mal traduits
et qu'ils confirment en réalitéle rôle purement défensif des plates-formes,
et que les analyses d'experts militaires sur lesquelles se fondent les Etats-
Unis comportent des éléments hypothétiques et contradictoires. L'Iran
affirme en outre que, pour la plupart, les informations et témoignages
invoqués ne font pas spécifiquement état de l'utilisation des plates-formes
en tant que bases servant à lancer des attaques, et que le matériel dont il
disposait pouvait être employé depuis le continent et les îles proches des

côtes, sans qu'il fût aucunement nécessaire de recourir aux plates-formes. 76. The Court is not sufficiently convinced that the evidence available
supports the contentions of the United States as to the significance of the
military presence and activity on the Reshadat oil platforms; and it notes
that no such evidence is offered in respect of the Salman and Nasr com-
plexes. However, even accepting those contentions, for the purposes of
discussion, the Court is unable to hold that the attacks made on the plat-
forms could have been justified as acts of self-defence. The conditions for
the exercise of the right of self-defence are well settled :as the Court
observed in its Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, "The submission of the exercise of the right of self-
defence to the conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of cus-
tomary international law" (ZC..J. Reports 1996 (1), p. 245, para. 41) ;

and in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua, the Court referred to a specific rule "whereby self-
defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the
armed attack and necessary to respond to it" as "a rule well established
in customary international law" (1.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 94, para. 176).
In the case both of the attack on the Sea Isle City and the mining of
the USS Samuel B. Roberts, the Court is not satisfied that the attacks on
the platforms were necessary to respond to these incidents. In this
connection, the Court notes that there is no evidence that the United
States complained to Iran of the military activities of the platforms, in
the same way as it complained repeatedly of minelaying and attacks on
neutral shipping, which does not suggest that the targeting of the plat-

forms was seen as a necessary act. The Court would also observe that
in the case of the attack of 19 October 1987, the United States forces
attacked the R-4 platform as a "target of opportunity", not one previ-
ously identified as an appropriate military target (see paragraph 47
above).

77. As to the requirement of proportionality, the attack of 19 October
1987 might, had the Court found that it was necessary in response to the
Sea Isle City incident as an armed attack committed by Iran, have been
considered proportionate. In the case of the attacks of 18 April 1988,
however, they were conceived and executed as part of a more extensive

operation entitled "Operation Praying Mantis" (see paragraph 68 above).
The question of the lawfulness of other aspects of that operation is not
before the Court, since it is solely the action against the Salman and Nasr
complexes that is presented as a breach of the 1955 Treaty; but the Court
cannot assess in isolation the proportionality of that action to the attack
to which it was said to be a response; it cannot close its eyes to the scale
of the whole operation, which involved, inter alia, the destruction of two
Iranian frigates and a number of other naval vessels and aircraft. As a
response to the mining, by an unidentified agency, of a single United
States warship, which was severely damaged but not sunk, and without
loss of life, neither "Operation Praying Mantis" as a whole, nor even that 76. La Cour n'est pas pleinement convaincue que les éléments de
preuve dont elle dispose étayent les allégations des Etats-Unis quant à
l'importance des activités et de la présence militaires sur les plates-formes
pétrolièresde Reshadat, et elle relève qu'aucun élémentn'a étéproduit en
ce sens s'agissant des complexes de Salman et de Nasr. Toutefois, quand
bien même, pour les besoins de la discussion, elle admettrait l'exactitude
des allégations américaines, la Cour ne saurait conclure que les attaques

lancées contre les plates-formes pouvaient se justifier au titre de la légi-
time défense. Les conditions régissant l'exercice du droit de légitime
défense sont bien établies : comme l'a relevéla Cour dans son avis consul-
tatif relatif à la Licéitéde la menace ou de l'emploi d'armes nucléaires,
«[l]a soumission de l'exercice du droit de légitime défense aux conditions
de nécessité et de proportionnalité est une règle du droit international
coutumier» (C. 1.J. Recueil 1996 (1)' p. 245, par. 41) ; en outre, la Cour a
évoqué, en l'affaire des Activités militaires etparamilitaires au Nicaragua
et contre celui-ci, la règle spécifique «selon laquelle la légitime défense ne

justifieraitque des mesures proportionnées à l'agression armée subie, et
nécessaires pour y riposter)) comme étant «bien établie en droit interna-
tional coutumier» (C.I. J. Recueil 1986,p. 94, par. 176). Qu'il s'agisse de
l'attaque contre le Sea Isle City ou du mouillage de la mine heurtée par
1'USS Samuel B. Roberts, la Cour n'est pas convaincue que les attaques
contre les plates-formes étaient nécessaires en réponse à ces incidents. A
cet égard, elle relève que rien n'indique que les Etats-Unis se soient
plaints auprès de l'Iran des activités militaires des plates-formes, comme
ils l'avaient fait à maintes reprises s'agissant du mouillage de mines et
d'attaques contre des navires neutres - ce qui ne donne pas à penser

qu'ils jugeaient nécessaire de prendre les plates-formes pour cibles. La
Cour note également que, lors de l'attaque du 19 octobre 1987, la plate-
forme R-4 fut attaquée par les forces américaines non pas en tant que
cible militaire appropriée identifiée au préalable, mais en tant que ((cible
d'occasion » (voir paragraphe 47 ci-dessus).
77. S'agissant de l'exigence de proportionnalité, la Cour, si elle avait
conclu à la nécessité des attaques du 19 octobre 1987 en réponse à l'inci-
dent du Sea Isle City vu comme une agression armée commise par l'Iran,
aurait pu considérer qu'elles y satisfaisaient. En revanche, l'attaque du
18 avril 1988 fut planifiée et menée dans le cadre d'une opération plus

vaste baptisée opération «Praying Mantis » (voir paragraphe 68 ci-
dessus). La question de la licéitéd'autres aspects de cette opération n'a pas
étéposée à la Cour, seule l'action menée contre les complexes de Salman
et de Nasr ayant étéprésentée comme une violation du traité de 1955;
mais la Cour ne saurait apprécier isolément la proportionnalité entre
cette action et l'attaque censée l'avoir motivée; elle ne peut faire abstrac-
tion de l'ampleur de l'ensemble de l'opération, qui s'est notamment sol-
déepar la destruction de deux frégatesiraniennes et d'un certain nombre
d'autres navires et d'aéronefs. En réponse au mouillage, par un auteur
non identifié, de la mine que devait heurter un seul navire de guerre amé-
ricain, lequel, s'il fut gravement endommagé, ne sombra toutefois pas etpart of it that destroyedthe Salman and Nasr platforms, can be regarded,
in the circumstances of this case, as a proportionate use of force in
self-defence.

78. The Court thus concludes from the foregoing that the actions
carried out by United States forces against Iranian oil installations on
19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988 cannot be justified, under Article XX,
paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty, as being measures necessary to pro-
tect the essential security interests of the United States, since those
actions constituted recourse to armed force not qualifying, under inter-
national law on the question, as acts of self-defence, and thus did not fa11
within the category of measures contemplated, upon its correct interpre-
tation, by that provision of the Treaty.

79. Having satisfied itself that the United States may not rely, in the
circumstances of the case, on the defence to the claim of Iran afforded by
Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty, the Court has now to
turn to that claim, made under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty,
which provides that "Between the territories of the two High Contracting
Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation." In that
respect, Iran's submission is that "in attacking and destroying on 19Octo-
ber 1987 and 18 April 1988 the oil platforms referred to in Iran's Appli-
cation, the United Statesbreached its obligations to Iran under Article X,
paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Amity . . ."It contends that the United
States attacks on the oil platforms were directed against commercial
facilities that were protected by Article X, paragraph 1, that they
"impeded the normal functioning of the oil platforms and that they even
resulted in the complete interruption of the platforms' activities, . . thus
preventing gravely ab ovo the possibility for Iran to enjoy freedom of
commerce as guaranteed by" that Article.

80. As noted above (paragraph 31), in its Judgrnent of 12 December
1996 on the preliminary objection of the United States, the Court
had occasion, for the purposes of ascertaining and defining the scope
of its jurisdiction, to interpret a number of provisions of the 1955
Treaty, including Article X, paragraph 1. It noted that the Applicant
had not alleged that any military action had affected its freedom of
navigation, so that the only question to be decided was "whether the
actions of the United States complained of by Iran had the potential
to affect 'freedom of commerce"' as guaranteed by that provision (1 C..J. PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 199

dont l'équipage n'eut à déplorer aucune perte en vie humaine, ni l'opé-
ration ((Praying Mantis» dans son ensemble ni même le volet de celle-ci
qu'a constitué la destruction des plates-formes de Salman et de Nasr ne
sauraient être considérés, dans les circonstances de l'espèce, comme un
emploi proportionné de la force au titre de la légitime défense.

78. La Cour conclut de ce qui précède que les actions menées par les
forces américaines contre les installations pétrolières iraniennes les
19 octobre 1987 et 18 avril 1988 ne sauraient être justifiées, en vertu de
l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX du traité de 1955,en tant que
mesures nécessaires à la protection des intérêts vitaux des Etats-Unis sur
le plan de la sécurité, dès lors qu'elles constituaient un recours à la force
armée et ne pouvaient être considérées, au regard du droit international

relatif à cette question, comme des actes de légitime défense, et ne rele-
vaient donc pas de la catégorie des mesures prévues par cette disposition
du traité telle qu'elle doit être interprétée.

79. Etant parvenue à la conclusion que, dans les circonstances de
l'espèce, les Etats-Unis ne peuvent se prévaloir, vis-à-vis de la demande
de l'Iran, du moyen de défense qu'ouvre l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de
l'articleXX du traité de 1955, la Cour doit à présent se pencher sur cette
demande, fondée sur le paragraphe 1 de E'article X dudit traité, aux

termes duquel «[il1 y aura liberté de commerce et de navigation entre les
territoires des deux Hautes Parties contractantes». L'Iran affirme à cet
égard que, «en attaquant et détruisant, le 19 octobre 1987 et le 18 avril
1988, les plates-formes pétrolières visées dans la requête de l'Iran, les
Etats-Unis ont manqué à leurs obligations vis-à-vis de l'Iran au regard du
paragraphe 1 de l'articleX du traité d'amitié ..». L'Iran soutient que les
attaques menées par les Etats-Unis contre les plates-formes visaient des
installations commerciales protégées par le paragraphe 1 de l'article X,
qu'elles ont ((entravé le fonctionnement normal des plates-formes et

qu'elles ont mêmeabouti à l'interruption complète de leurs activités...,
sapant ainsi gravement toute possibilité pour l'Iran dejouir de la liberté
de commerce telle que garantie» par cet article.
80. Comme il a été rappeléplus haut (voir paragraphe 31)' dans son
arrêt du 12 décembre 1996 sur l'exception préliminaire soulevée par les
Etats-Unis, la Cour a eu l'occasion, pour déterminer si et dans quelle
mesure elle était compétente, d'interpréter certaines dispositions du traité
de 1955, notamment le paragraphe 1 de l'articleX. Elle a constaté que le
demandeur n'avait pas alléguéqu'une action militaire avait porté atteinte
à sa liberté de navigation, si bien que la seule question à trancher était de
((savoir si les actions que l'Iran reproche aux Etats-Unis étaient suscep-

tibles de porter atteinte à la ((liberté de commerce » telle que garantie parReports 1996 (II), p. 817, para. 38). The Court also rejected the view,
advanced by the United States, that the word "commerce" in Article X,
paragraph 1, is confined to maritime commerce (ibid., para. 43). After
examining the contentions of the Parties as to the meaning of the word,
the Court concluded that

"it would be a natural interpretation of the word 'commerce' in
Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of 1955 that it includes com-
mercial activities in general - not merely the immediate act of pur-
chase and sale, but also the ancillary activities integrally related to
commerce" (ibid., p. 819, para. 49).

81. In 1996 the Court was concerned only to resolve the questions of
its jurisdiction raised by the preliminary objection presented by the
United States. For that purpose, it was not called upon to decide whether
the actions of the United States did in fact interfere with freedom of com-
merce between the territories of the Parties, but only whether, as stated in
the Judgment, the lawfulness of those actions could be evaluated in rela-

tion to Article X, paragraph 1 (ibid., p. 820, para. 51). It has been suggested
by the United States in its written pleadings that that Article does not
in fact create specific legal obligations relevant to Iran's claims, but
is merely an "aspirational" provision, but this view, which the United
States did not press during the oral proceedings, does not seem to the
Court to be consistent either with the structure of the 1955 Treaty or
with the Court's 1996 Judgment.
82. In that decision, the Court observed that it did not then have to
enter into the question whether Article X, paragraph 1, "is restricted to
commerce 'between' the Parties" (ibid., p. 817, para. 44). However it is

now common ground between the Parties that that provision is in terms
limited to the protection of freedom of commerce "between the territories
of the two High Contracting Parties". The Court observes that it is oil
exports from Iran to the United States that are relevant to the case, not
such exports in general. The United States has argued that for the pur-
pose of interpreting Article X, paragraph 1, what must be considered is
whether oil from the specific platforms attacked was, or would have been,
exported to the United States. In this connection it questions whether the
platforms could be said to be on the "territory" of Iran, inasmuch as they
are outside Iran's territorial sea, though upon its continental shelf, and

within its exclusive economiczone. The Court does not however consider
tenable an interpretation of the 1955 Treaty that would have differenti-
ated, for the purposes of "freedom of commerce", between oil produced
on the land territory or the territorial sea of Iran, and oil produced on its
continental shelf, in the exercise of its sovereign rights of exploration and
exploitation of the shelf, and parallel rights over the exclusive economic
zone.la disposition précitée» (C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 817, par. 38). La
Cour a en outre rejeté la thèse, avancée par les Etats-Unis, voulant que le
mot «commerce» au paragraphe 1 de l'articleX se limitât au commerce
maritime (ibid., par. 43). Après avoir examiné les arguments des Parties
quant au sens du mot «commerce» dans ce texte, la Cour a conclu ce qui

suit :
«il serait naturel d'interpréter le mot ((commerce » au paragraphe 1
de l'article X du traité de 1955 comme incluant des activités com-
merciales en général - non seulement les activités mêmesd'achat et

de vente, mais également les activités accessoires qui sont intrinsè-
quement liéesau commerce» (ibid., p. 819, par. 49).
81. En 1996, la seule préoccupation de la Cour était de trancher les
questions de compétence soulevées par l'exception préliminaire présentée

par les Etats-Unis. A cette fin, elle n'avait pas à déterminer si les actions
des Etats-Unis avaient effectivement porté atteinte à la liberté de com-
merce entre les territoires des Parties, mais seulement si, comme il est dit
dans l'arrêt, la licéitéde ces actions pouvait s'apprécier au regard du
paragraphe 1 de l'article X (ibid., p. 820, par. 51). Les Etats-Unis ont fait
valoir dans leurs écritures que cet article ne créait pas véritablement
d'obligations juridiques particulières qui seraient pertinentes aux fins de
la demande iranienne, et ne faisait qu'«exprimer un vŒu»; toutefois, cette
thèse, sur laquelle les Etats-Unis n'ont pas insisté lors de la procédure
orale, ne semble pas compatible aux yeux de la Cour avec la structure du

traité de 1955 ni avec l'arrêtde 1996.
82. Dans cette décision, la Cour a fait observer qu'elle n'avait pas
alors à examiner la question de savoir si le paragraphe 1 de l'articleX
«ne s'appliqu[ait] qu'au commerce «entre » les Parties » (ibid., p. 817,
par. 44). Les Parties admettent néanmoins toutes deux aujourd'hui que
cette disposition se limite expressément à la protection de la liberté de
commerce ((entre les territoires des deux Hautes Parties contractantes ».
La Cour observe que ce sont les exportations de pétrole de l'Iran vers
les Etats-Unis qui sont pertinentes en l'espèce, et non les exportations
de pétrole iranien en général. Les Etats-Unis soutiennent que, pour

interpréter le paragraphe 1 de l'article X, la question à éclaircir est de
savoir si le pétrole provenant des plates-formes qui ont étéattaquées
était, ou aurait été, exportéaux Etats-Unis. A cet égard, ils jugent contes-
table que les plates-formes puissent êtreconsidérées comme étant sur le
«territoire» de l'Iran, puisqu'elles se trouvent hors de sa mer territo-
riale, bien qu'elles soient situées sur son plateau continental et dans sa
zone économique exclusive. La Cour ne saurait toutefois considérer
comme défendable une interprétation du traité de 1955 qui opérerait une
distinction, aux fins de la ((libertéde commerce)),entre le pétrole produit
sur le territoire terrestre oudans la mer territoriale de l'Iran et le pétrole
produit sur son plateau continental dans l'exercice des droits souverains

d'exploration et d'exploitation de ce plateau et des droits comparables
sur la zone économique exclusive. 83. In the 1996 Judgment, the Court further emphasized that
"Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of 1955 does not strictly speaking
protect 'commerce' but 'freedom of commerce"', and continued:

"Unless such freedom is to be rendered illusory, the possibility
must be entertained that it could actually be impeded as a result of
acts entailing the destruction of goods destined to be exported, or
capable of affecting their transport and storage with a view to
export." (1.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 819, para. 50.)
The Court also noted that

"Iran's oil production, a vital part of that country's economy, con-
stitutes an important component of its foreign trade.

On the material now before the Court, it is . . not able to deter-
mine if and to what extent the destruction of the Iranian oil plat-

forms had an effect upon the export trade in Iranian oil . . .(Ibid.,
p. 820, para. 51.)
If, at the present stage of the proceedings, the Court were to find that
Iran had established that such was the case, the claim of Iran under
Article X, paragraph 1, could be upheld.
84. The arguments of the Parties in relation to Iran's claim under that

provision have therefore focused on the first and last stages of the pro-
ductionlexport process. In order to establish that freedom of commerce
in oil between the territories of the Parties was affected by the attack, so
that the destruction of the platforms constituted a breach of Article X,
paragraph 1, Iran has sought to show that oil produced or processed by,
stored on, or transported from the platforms attacked could, to some
degree, have been exported to the United States, but this was prevented
by the destruction of the platforms. This has involved explanation of the
construction and operation of the platforms, and assessment of the impli-
cations of the damage caused to them by the attacks. The question has
also been raised as to whether there was an impact on overall oil exports
to the United States, contemporaneous with, and attributable to, the

attacks, or a potential impact of this kind, amounting to an interference
with "freedom" of commerce between the Parties' territories.

85. Before turning to the facts and to the details of Iran's claim, the
Court will mention one consideration advanced by the United States
which, if upheld, would render unnecessary any further examination of
the effects of the attacks on the platforms. The United States alleges, as
has already been noted in connection with its argument founded on self-
defence, that military forces were stationed on the platforms and played
a role in the attacks, attributable to Iran, on United States vessels and
other neutral shipping (see for example the communication from the
United States to the United Nations Security Council of 19 October

1987, quoted in paragraph 48 above). On this basis, the United States 83. Dans l'arrêt de 1996, la Cour a souligné en outre que «le para-
graphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955 ne protège pas à proprement
parler le «commerce» mais la ((liberté de commerce)) », et elle a ajouté:

«sauf à rendre une telle liberté illusoire, il faut considérer qu'elle
pourrait êtreeffectivement entravée du fait d'actes qui emporteraient
destruction de biens destinés à être exportés,ou qui seraient suscep-
tibles d'en affecter le transport et le stockage en vue de l'exporta-
tion» (C. I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 819, par. 50).

La Cour a également fait observer que
«la production pétrolière de l'Iran, pièce maîtresse de l'économie de
ce pays, constitue une composante majeure de son commerce exté-
rieur.
En l'état actuel du dossier, la Cour n'est ..pas en mesure de déter-
miner si et dans quellemesure la destruction des plates-formespétro-
lières iraniennes a eu des conséquences sur l'exportation du pétrole
iranien...)) (Ibid., p820, par. 51.)

Si, au stade actuel de l'instance,la Cour devait constater que l'Iran avait
établi que tel était le cas, elle pourrait faire droià la demande de l'Iran
fondée sur le paragraphe 1 de l'article X.
84. Les arguments des Parties concernant la demande de l'Iran fondée
sur ce texte sont donc centrés sur la première et la dernière étape du pro-
cessus de production et d'exportation. Afin d'établir que les attaques
avaient porté atteinte à la liberté de commerce du pétrole entre les terri-
toires des Parties et que la destruction des plates-formes constituait par
conséquent une violation du paragraphe 1 de l'article X, l'Iran a cherché
à démontrer que le pétrole produit, transformé, stocké ou transporté sur
les plates-formes attaquées ou à partir d'elles aurait pu, dans une certaine
mesure, être exporté aux Etats-Unis, ce que la destruction des plates-
formes aurait empêché.Cela a conduit l'Iran à préciser de quelle manière
les plates-formesétaient construites et exploitées, età analyser les consé-
quences des dommages que les attaques leur ont causés. La question a
également étéposée de savoir si l'ensemble des exportations de pétrole
vers les Etats-Unis avaient subi, ou auraient pu subir, au moment des
attaques et en raison de celles-ci, un préjudice équivalant à une atteinte à
la «liberté» de commerce entre les territoires des Parties.
85. Avant d'examiner les faits et les points de détail relatifsà la
demande de l'Iran, la Cour évoquera une considération avancée par les
Etats-Unis qui, si elle était retenue, rendrait inutile un examen plus
poussé des conséquencesdes attaques contre les plates-formes. Les Etats-
Unis allèguent, comme il a déjà étédit concernant leur argumentation
fondée sur la légitime défense, que des forces militaires étaient basées sur
les plates-formes et avaient joué un rôle dans les attaques, attribuables à
l'Iran, dirigées contre des navires américains et autres navires neutres
(voir par exemple la lettre du 19 octobre 1987 adressée par les Etats-Unis
au Conseil de sécuritéde l'organisation des Nations Unies, citéeau para-argues that the guarantee of "freedom of commerce" under Article X,
paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty cannot have been intended to shield one
party's military activities against the other, and that therefore the cover-
age of that Article cannot be extended to the platforms in question. The
United States has not succeeded, to the satisfaction of the Court, in
establishing that the limited military presence on the platforms, and the
evidence as to communications to and from them, could be regarded as

justifying treating the platforms asmilitary installations (see paragraph 76
above). For the same reason, the Court is unable to regard them as out-
side the protection afforded by Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955
Treaty.

86. Iran's initial claim that the attacks violated Article X, paragraph 1,
was based on the contention that "they destroyed important petroleum
installations used by Iran for the commercial exploitation of its natural
resources", and that "fundamental economic and commercial activities
including oil production, storage and transportation were affected". The

Court in its 1996 Judgment contemplated the possibility that freedom of
commerce could be impeded not only by "the destruction of goods des-
tined to be exported", but also by acts "capable of affecting their trans-
port and their storage with a view to export" (1.C.J. Reports 1996 (II),
p. 819, para. 50). In the view of the Court, the activities of the platforms
are to be regarded, in general, as commercial in nature; it does not, how-
ever, necessarily follow that any interference with such activities involves
an impact on the freedom of commerce between the territories of Iran
and the United States.

87. As regards the first of these categories of activity, "acts entailing

the destruction of goods destined to be exported", the United States
observes, first, that the attacks on the platforms did not destroy any oil as
such; and secondly that in any event the platforms were not engaged in
producing goods destined for export. It explains that the oil extracted by
the platforms attacked was not in a form capable of being exported,
either when it came on to or when it left the platforrns, since to transform
it into a product capable of being safely exported it was necessary to sub-
ject it to extensive processing, involving the extraction of gas, hydrogen
sulphide and water. Iran however suggests that the question is not
whether the oil was capable of being safely exported, but whether it was

a good destined for export; in addition, it observes that equipment
required for an initial processing of the oil extracted was situated on the
platforms and destroyed with them by the United States attacks. It does
not however contend that that initial processing rendered the oil capable
of being safely exported.

88. The Court also included in the category of acts interfering with PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 202

graphe 48 ci-dessus). Sur cette base, les Etats-Unis soutiennent que la
garantie de la ((liberté de commerce)) en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticleX du traité de 1955 ne peut avoir eu pour objet de protéger les acti-
vités militaires de l'une des parties dirigées contre l'autre, et que dès lors

le champ d'application de cette disposition ne peut s'étendre aux plates-
formes en question. Les Etats-Unis ne sont pas parvenus à établir, à la
satisfaction de la Cour, que la présence militaire limitée sur les plates-
formes et les indications selon lesquelles des communications en prove-
naient ou leur étaient destinées pouvaient être considérées comme justi-
fiant que les plates-formes fussent traitées comme des installations
militaires (voir paragraphe 76 ci-dessus). Pour le mêmemotif, la Cour ne
saurait les considérer comme exclues de la protection conférée par le
paragraphe 1 de l'articleX du traité de 1955.

86. L'Iran a fait initialement valoir que les attaques avaient violé le
paragraphe 1 de l'article X en affirmant qu'elles avaient détruit «d'impor-
tantes installations pétrolières utilisées par l'Iran aux fins de l'exploita-
tion commerciale de ses ressources naturelles))et qu'«il a[vait] étéporté
atteinte à des activités économiques et commerciales fondamentales, y
compris la production, le stockage et le transport de pétrole)). La Cour,
dans son arrêt de 1996, a envisagé la possibilité que la liberté de com-
merce puisse être entravée non seulement par la ((destruction de biens
destinés à être exportés)),mais aussi par des actes «qui seraient suscep-
tibles d'en affecter le transport et le stockage en vue de l'exportation))
(C.I. J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 819, par. 50). Pour la Cour, les activités des

plates-formes doivent être considérées dans l'ensemble comme commer-
ciales par nature; toutefois, une entrave à ces activités n'entraîne pas
nécessairement des conséquences pour la liberté de commerce entre les
territoires de l'Iran et des Etats-Unis.
87. S'agissant de la première de ces catégories d'activités - les actes
«qui emporteraient destruction de biens destinés à être exportés)) -, les
Etats-Unis font observer en premier lieu que les attaques contre les
plates-formes n'ont pas détruit de pétrole en tant que tel, et en second
lieu que, de toute manière, les plates-formes ne produisaient aucune
marchandise destinée à l'exportation. Ils indiquent que le pétrole extrait

à partir des plates-formes attaquées n'était pas exportable en l'état, que ce
soit à l'arrivée ou à la sortie de ces plates-formes, puisque, afin de le
transformer en produit pouvant être exporté en toute sécurité, il était
nécessaire de lui faire subir un traitement considérable, notamment d'en
extraire le gaz, l'hydrogène sulfuré et l'eau. L'Iran fait cependant valoir
que la question n'est pas de savoir si le pétrole était susceptible d'être
exporté en toute sécurité, mais s'il s'agissait d'un bien destiné à l'expor-
tation; il fait observer par ailleurs que l'équipement requis pour le trai-
tement initial du pétrole extrait se trouvait sur les plates-formes et fut
détruit avec elles lors des attaques menées par les Etats-Unis. En re-

vanche, il n'affirme pas que ce traitement initial permettait d'exporter
ce pétrole en toute sécurité.
88. La Cour a également inclus dans la catégorie des actes portantfreedom of commerce "acts . . .capable of affecting [the] transport and
storage with a view to export" of goods destined to be exported. No
storage of oil was effected on the platforms; as regards transport, the
Court noted in 1996 that

"the oil pumped from the platforms attacked in October 1987 passed
from there by subsea line to the oil terminal on Lavan Island and
that the Salman complex, object of the attack of April 1988, was
also connected to the oil terminal on Lavan Island by subsea line"
(1.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 819-820, para. 50).

Similarly, the Nasr central platform served as a crude oil collecting point
for transfer by pipeline to Sirri Island. An act interfering with these sub-
sea lines would therefore prima facie have been an interference with the
transport of goods mainly destined for export; but according to the
United States the attacks on the platforms did not in fact damage the
subsea lines, but only the portions of the platform above the waterline.

An attempt was made by the United States Navy to destroy the power
generation platform of the Salman complex, and if this had been success-
ful it would, according to Iran, have destroyed the equipment necessary
for the transport of oil to Lavan Island, but the explosives placed failed
to detonate.

89. The Court notes that the conclusion which the United States is
inviting the Court to reach is, in effect, that military attacks on installa-
tions used for commercial oil exploitation, which caused - and were
intended to cause - very considerable damage to those installations,

proved to be limited in their effects to the extent necessary to avoid a
breach of a specific commercial treaty. Yet the Court notes also that
there is no evidence that the relevant military orders were devised with
this outcome in mind, or even that the existence and scope of the treaty
was taken into account at al1 at the time of the attacks. However that
may be, the Court considers that where a State destroys another State's
means of production and transport of goods destined for export, or
means ancillary or pertaining to such production or transport, there is in
principle an interferencewith the freedom of international commerce. In
destroyingthe platforms, whose function, taken as a whole, was precisely
to produce and transport oil, the military actions made commerce in oil,

at that time and from that source, impossible, and to that extent preju-
diced freedom of commerce. While the oil, when it left the platform com-
plexes, was not yet in a state to be safely exported, the fact remains that
it could be already at that stage destined for export, and the destruction
of the platform prevented further treatment necessary for export. The
Court therefore finds that the protection of freedom of commerce under
Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty applied to the platforms
attacked by the United States, and the attacks thus impeded Iran's free-
dom of commerce. However, the question remains whether there was in PLATES-FORME PSTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 203

atteinte à la liberté de commerce les «actes ...qui seraient susceptibles
d'...affecter le transport et le stockage en vue de l'exportation)) de biens
destinés à l'exportation. Aucun pétrole n'était stocké sur les plates-
formes; quant au transport, la Cour a relevéen 1996 que

«le pétrole pompé à partir des plates-formes attaquées en octobre
1987 passait de ces plates-formes au terminal pétrolier de l'île de
Lavan par le moyen d'un oléoduc sous-marin et que l'installation de
Salman, qui a fait l'objet de l'attaque d'avril 1988, était aussi reliée
au terminal pétrolier de Lavan par un oléoduc sous-marin)) (C.1.J.
Recueil 1996 (II), p. 819-820, par. 50).
De même,la plate-forme centrale de Nasr servait de collecteur pour le
pétrole brut avant son transport par oléoduc vers l'île de Sirri. Un acte
portant atteinte à ces oléoducs sous-marins aurait prima facie porté
atteinte au transport de biens principalement destinés à l'exportation;
mais, selon les Etats-Unis, les attaques contre les plates-formes, en réa-
lité, n'ont pas endommagé les oléoducs, mais seulement les parties des

plates-formes situéesau-dessus du niveau de la mer. La marine des Etats-
Unis a tenté de détruire à l'explosif la plate-forme de production d'élec-
tricité du complexe de Salman, et si cette tentative avait réussi, cette
action aurait, selon l'Iran, détruit l'équipement nécessaire au transport
du pétrole vers l'île de Lavan; mais la charge placée sur la plate-forme n'a
pas explosé.
89. La Cour relève que la conclusion à laquelle les Etats-Unis la prient
de parvenir est, en fait, que les attaques militaires contre des installations
utilisées pour l'exploitation commerciale de pétrole, qui causèrent - et
visaient à causer - des dégâts considérables à ces installations, se révé-
lèrent limitées, quant à leurs effets,à ce qui était nécessaire pour éviter
une violation d'un traité de commerce particulier. Or la Cour constate
également que rien ne prouve que les ordres militaires aient étéconçus
dans une telle intention, ni même que l'existence et la portée du traité
aient été prises en compte de quelque façon au moment des attaques.
Quoi qu'il en soit, la Cour estime que, lorsqu'un Etat détruit des moyens
de production et de transport de biens d'un autre Etat destinés à l'expor-
tation, ou des moyens accessoires ou ayant trait à cette production ou à
ce transport, il y a en principe atteinteà la liberté du commerce interna-
tional. En détruisant ces plates-formes, dont la fonction globaleétait pré-
cisément de produire et de transporter du pétrole, les actions militaires
ont rendu impossible à l'époque le commerce du pétrole provenant de ces
plates-formes et ont, dans cette mesure, porté atteinte à la liberté de com-
merce. Si le pétrole, lorsqu'il quittait les complexes de plates-formes,
n'était pas encoreen état d'être exportéen toute sécurité,il n'en reste pas
moins qu'il pouvait déjà à ce stade être destiné àl'exportation, et que la
destruction des plates-formes a empêchéla poursuite du traitement néces-
saire à cette exportation. La Cour conclut donc que la protection de la
liberté de commerce prévue au paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de
1955 s'étendait aux plates-formesattaquées par les Etats-Unis, et qu'ainsithis case an interferencewith freedom of commerce "between the territo-

ries of the High Contracting Parties".

90. The United States in fact contends further that there was in any
event no breach of Article X, paragraph 1, inasmuch as, even assuming
that the attacks caused some interference with freedom of commerce, it
did not interfere with freedom of commerce "between the territories of
the two High Contracting Parties". First, as regards the attack of 19 Octo-

ber 1987 on the Reshadat platforms, it observes that the platforms were
under repair as a result of an earlier attack on them by Iraq; conse-
quently, they were not engaged in, or contributing to, commerce between
the territories of the Parties. Secondly, as regards the attack of 18 April
1988 on the Salman and Nasr platforms, it draws attention to United
States Executive Order 12613,signed by President Reagan on 29 October
1987,which prohibited, with immediate effect, the import into the United
States of most goods (including oil) and services of Iranian ,origin. As

a consequence of the embargo imposed by this Order, there was, it is
suggested, no commerce between the territories of the Parties that could
be affected, and consequently no breach of the Treaty protecting it.

91. As the Court noted in its 1996 Judgment, it was then not contested
between the Parties (and is not now contested) that "oil exports from
Iran to the United States were - to some degree - ongoing at least until
after the destruction of the first set of oil platforms", Le., 19 October
1987 (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 818, para. 44). It appears also to be

accepted by both Parties that the oil or petroleum products reaching the
United States during this period were to some extent derived from crude
oil produced by the platforms that were later subjected to attack. Iran
has explained that in peace time it had sold crude oil in cargoes where the
producing field was specifically identified, but during the Iran-Iraq war
al1Iranian light crudes and heavy crudes were mixed and sold generically,
as either "Iranian light" or "Iranian heavy". Iran has asserted, and the
United States has not denied, that there was a market for Iranian crude

oil directly imported into the United States up to the issuance of Execu-
tive Order 12613 of 29 October 1987. Thus Iranian oil exports did up to
that time constitute the subject of "commerce between the territories of
the High Contracting Parties" within the meaning of Article X, para-
graph 1, of the 1955 Treaty.

92. At the time of the attack of 19 October 1987 no oil whatsoever was

being produced or processed by the Reshadat and Resalat platforms,

47 PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 204

ces attaques ont entravé la liberté de commerce de l'Iran. La question
demeure toutefois de savoir s'il y a eu en l'espèce entrave à la liberté de
commerce ((entre les territoires des deux Hautes Parties contractantes ».

90. De fait, les Etats-Unis soutiennent également qu'il n'y a pas eu, en
tout état de cause, violation du paragraphe 1 de l'article X étant donné
que, même à supposer que les attaques aient entravé d'une manière quel-
conque la liberté de commerce, il n'a pas étéporté atteinte à la liberté de
commerce ((entre les territoires des deux Hautes Parties contractantes».
En premier lieu, pour ce qui est de l'attaque du 19 octobre 1987 contre les
plates-formes de Reshadat, les Etats-Unis font observer que les plates-
formes étaient en cours de réparation à la suite d'une attaque menée par
l'Iraq; en conséquence, elles n'étaient pas engagées dans le commerce
entre les territoires des deux Parties, ni ne contribuaient à celui-ci. En
second lieu, s'agissant de l'attaque du 18 avril 1988 contre les plates-
formes de Salman et de Nasr, les Etats-Unis appellent l'attention sur

I'Executive Order 12613, signépar le président Reagan le 29 octobre 1987,
qui interdisait, avec effet immédiat, l'importation aux Etats-Unis de la plu-
part des biens (y compris le pétrole) et services d'origine iranienne. En
raison de l'embargo imposé par ce texte, il n'y avait, est-il soutenu, aucun
commerce entre les territoires des Parties qui pût être entravé, et donc
aucune violation du traité qui protège ce commerce.
91. Comme la Cour l'a relevé dans son arrêt de 1996, il n'était pas
contesté par les Parties (et il n'est pas davantage contesté aujourd'hui par
celles-ci) que «les exportations de pétrole de l'Iran vers les Etats-Unis se
[fussent] - dans une certaine mesure - poursuivies au moins jusqu'à
une date postérieure à la destruction du premier ensemble de plates-
formes pétrolières »,c'est-à-direjusqu'au 19 octobre 1987 (C.1J. Recueil
1996 (II), p. 818, par. 44). Les Parties semblent également admettre
toutes deux que le pétrole ou les produits pétroliers acheminés aux Etats-
Unis durant cette période étaient dans une certaine mesure des dérivés du
pétrole brut produit par les plates-formes qui furent attaquées par la
suite. L'Iran a précisé qu'en temps de paix il avait vendu du brut par car-
gaisons sur lesquelles était clairement indiqué le champ de production,
mais que, durant la guerre entre l'Iran et l'Iraq, tous les bruts légers et
lourds iraniensétaient mélangéset vendus sousl'appellation génériquede
((brut légeriranien» ou de ((brut lourd iranien». L'Iran affirme - et les
Etats-Unis ne le contestent pas - qu'il existait un marché pour le brut
iranien importé directement aux Etats-Unis jusqu'à l'adoption de 1'Exe-
cutive Order 12613 du 29 octobre 1987. Les exportations de pétrole ira-
nien jusqu'à cette époque constituaient donc un ((commerce ...entre les
territoires des deux Hautes Parties contractantes» au sens du para-
graphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955.
92. Au moment des attaques du 19 octobre 1987, les plates-formes de

Reshadat et de Resalat ne produisaient ou ne transformaient aucunsince these had been put out of commission by earlier Iraqi attacks.
While it is true that the attacks caused a major setback to the process of
bringing the platforms back into production, there was at the moment of
the attacks on these platforms no ongoing commerce in oil produced or
processed by them. Iran however indicates that at the time of the attack

the platforms were nearly repaired and were about to resume production;
it argues that there was therefore an interferencewith "freedom of com-
merce", when commerce is conceived as a pattern of trade over the years
and not a temporary phenomenon. Injury to potential for future com-
merce is however, in the Court's view, not necessarily to be identified
with injury to freedom of commerce, within the meaning of Article X,
paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. In its Judgment of 12 December 1996,
the Court emphasized that the Treaty protected "freedom of commerce"
rather than merely "commerce"; but deduced from this no more than
that

"the possibility must be entertained that [that freedom] could actu-
ally be impeded as a result of acts entailing the destruction of goods
destined to be exported, or capable of affecting their transport and
their storage with a view to export" (1 C.J. Reports 1996 (II),
p. 819, para. 50; emphasis added).

93. There is however a further aspect of the question. According to
Iran, the "Production Commissioning" schedule for the repair of the
platforms contemplated that production would resume at a date around
24 October 1987, but the Court has no information whether, at the time
of the attacks, the works were up to schedule. According to Iran, at the

time of the attacks the turbines that supplied power to the platforms were
being dismantled for repair, which does not suggest that the works were
within a few days of completion. On 29 October 1987 United States
Executive Order 12613 was issued, which put an end to imports of
Iranian crude oil into the United States. Iran has not brought evidence
to show that, if no attack had been made on the Reshadat platforms, pro-
duction from them would have been an element of "commerce" between
the two States before al1 direct commerce was halted by that Executive
Order, and the Court cannot regard that point as established.

94. The embargo imposed by Executive Order 12613 was already in
force when the attacks on the Salman and Nasr platforms were carried
out; and, as just indicated, it hasnot been shown that the Reshadat and
Resalat platforms would, had it not been for the attack of 19 Octo-
ber 1987, have resumed production before the embargo was imposed.
The Court must therefore consider the significance of that Executive
Order for the interpretation and application of Article X, paragraph 1, of
the 1955 Treaty. Iran has not disputed that the effect of the Executive
Order was to halt al1 direct exports of Iranian crude oil to the United

States. The United States therefore argues that "any damage done to
Iran's oil platforms by US actions was irrelevant to Iran's ability to PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 205

pétrole puisqu'elles avaient été mises hors d'usage par des attaques ira-
quiennes antérieures. S'il est vrai que les attaques ont considérablement

retardé la reprise de la production des plates-formes, aucun commerce de
pétrole produit ou transformé par elles ne se poursuivait au moment des
attaques. L'Iran indique toutefois qu'à ce moment la réparation des
plates-formes était presque achevée et que celles-ci étaient sur le point de
reprendre la production; il soutient qu'il y a donc eu atteinte à la «liberté
de commerce», si par commerce l'on entend des échanges réguliers qui
s'étendent sur plusieurs années et non un phénomène temporaire. Pour la
Cour, cependant, une atteinte à la possibilité d'un commerce futur n'est
pas nécessairement assimilable à une atteinte à la liberté de commerce au
sens du paragraphe 1 de l'articleX du traité de 1955. Dans son arrêtdu

12 décembre 1996, la Cour a souligné que le traité protégeait «la liberté
de commerce » et pas seulement «le commerce », mais la seule conclusion
qu'elle en a tirée est que
«il faut considérer [que cette liberté] pourrait être effectivement
entravée du fait d'actes qui emporteraient destruction de biens des-

tinés à être exportés, ou qui seraient susceptibles d'en affecter le
transport et le stockage en vue de l'exportation» (C.I. J. Recueil
1996 (II), p. 819, par. 50; les italiques sont de la Cour).
93. La question présente cependant un autre aspect. Selon l'Iran, le

calendrier de «mise en service de la production» pour la réparation des
plates-formes prévoyait que la production reprendrait vers le 24 octobre
1987, mais la Cour ne dispose d'aucun élémentd'information quant à la
question de savoir si, au moment des attaques, le calendrier des travaux
était respecté. D'après l'Iran, au moment des attaques, les turbines qui
alimentaient les plates-formesen énergie avaient été démontées pour être
réparées,ce qui ne donne pas à penser que les travaux allaient se terminer
en quelquesjours. Le 29 octobre 1987,l'Executive Order 12613 des Etats-
Unis fut adopté, mettant ainsi fin aux importations de brut iranien aux
Etats-Unis. L'Iran n'a produit aucune preuve démontrant que, si aucune

attaque n'avait étémenée contre les plates-formes de Reshadat, leur pro-
duction aurait étéun élémentdu «commerce» entre les deux Etats avant
que l'Executive Order ne mette fin au commerce direct dans son en-
semble, et la Cour ne saurait considérer ce point comme établi.
94. L'embargo imposé par l'Executive Order 12613 était déjà en
vigueur lorsque furent lancées les attaques contre les plates-formes de
Salman et de Nasr; par ailleurs, comme il vient d'être indiqué,il n'a pas
été établi que les plates-formes de Reshadat et de Resalat auraient, s'il
n'y avait eu l'attaque du 19 octobre 1987, repris leur production avant
l'imposition de l'embargo. La Cour doit donc examiner la portée de

I'Executive Order pour l'interprétation et l'application du paragraphe 1
de l'articleX du traité de 1955. L'Iran n'a pas contesté que I'Executive
Order ait eu pour effet de mettre fin à toute exportation directe de brut
iranien aux Etats-Unis. Les Etats-Unis soutiennent donc qu'a aucun dom-
mage subi par les plates-formespétrolières iraniennes du fait des actionsexport oil to customers located in the United States", and that conse-
quently the attacks did not constitute a violation of the freedom of com-
merce "between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties". Iran
however, while not presenting any forma1 submission or claim that the
embargo was unlawful as itself a breach of Article X, paragraph 1, of the
1955 Treaty, has asserted that such was the case, and therefore suggests
that the argument advanced by the United States amounts to a party
taking advantage of its own wrong. The Iranian contention rests on the
hypothesis that the embargo was a breach of the 1955 Treaty, and not
justified under Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), thereof; but these are ques-
tions which Iran has chosen not to put formally in issue, and on which
the Court has thus not heard full argument. The Court is here concerned
with the practical effects of the embargo, about which there is no dispute.

95. In response to the contention of the United States that the damage
to the platforms was irrelevant to Iranian oil exports to the United
States, Iran argues that this conclusion does not follow from the mere
fact that direct import into the United States of Iranian crude oil, as
such, ceased with the issue of the embargo. Iran suggests that "It is in the
nature of the international oil trade thatIranian oil could not be excluded
from the United States": "If Iranian crude oil was received by a refin-
ery", for example in Western Europe, "and if that refinery in turn
exported products to the United States, then it follows that a quantity of
Iranian oil was necessarily imported into the United States in the form of
products." Iran has observed that, as a result of the embargo, it found
itself in 1987 with a surplus crude oil production of approximately
345,000 barrels per day, and had to find other outlets, namely in the
Mediterranean and North-West Europe. At the same time, the United
States had to make good the shortfall resulting from the prohibition of
Iranian crude oil imports, and therefore increased its existing imports of
petroleum products from refineries in the Mediterranean and Western
Europe. Iran has submitted to the Court an expert report showing, inter
alia, a very considerable increase in exports of Iranian crude oil to West-
ern Europe from 1986 to 1987, and again in 1988, and an increase in
United States imports of petroleum products from Western European
refineries.

96. The Court sees no reason to question the view that, over the
period during which the United States embargo was in effect, petroleum
products were reachingthe United States, in considerablequantities, that
were derived in part from Iranian crude oil. Executive Order 12613 con-
tained an exception (Section 2 (b)) whereby the embargo was not to
apply to "petroleum products refined from Iranian crude oil in a third
country". It could reasonably be argued that, had the platforms not been
attacked, some of the oil that they would have produced would have been PLATES-FORME PSTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 206

américaines n'a eu d'incidence sur la capacité de l'Iran d'exporter du
pétrole à destination de clients installés aux Etats-Unis)),et que les at-
taques ne constituaient donc pas une violation de la liberté de commerce
((entre les territoires des deux Hautes Parties contractantes ». Néanmoins,
l'Iran, bien que n'ayant pas présenté une conclusion ou demande formelle
selon laquelle l'embargo aurait étéillicite parce que constituant lui-même
une violation du paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955, a soutenu
que tel était le cas et estime donc qu'en avançant un tel argument les
Etats-Unis voudraient tirer profit de leur propre faute. La thèse iranienne
postule que l'embargo constituait une violation du traité de 1955, et qu'il
n'était pas justifié par l'alinéad) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX dudit
traité; mais il s'agit là de questions quel'Iran a choisi de ne pas soulever
formellement, et sur lesquelles la Cour n'a donc pas entendu pleinement
les Parties. Or, la Cour s'occupe ici des effets pratiques de l'embargo, qui
ne sont pas contestés.
95. En réponse à l'affirmation des Etats-Unis selon laquelle les dégâts
causés aux plates-formes sont dépourvus de pertinence aux fins des
exportations de pétrole iranien aux Etats-Unis, l'Iran soutient qu'une
telle conclusion ne saurait êtretiréedu seul fait que l'importation directe
aux Etats-Unis de pétrole brut iranien, en tant que telle, avait pris fin
après l'imposition de l'embargo. L'Iran fait valoir que «[l]a nature du
commerce international du pétrole fait qu'il n'était pas possible d'empê-
cher le pétrole iranien d'entrer aux Etats-Unis »: [s]idu pétrole brut ira-
nien était reçu par une raffinerie)), par exemple en Europe occidentale,
«et si cette raffinerie exportait des produits aux Etats-Unis, il en découle
qu'une certaine quantité de pétrole brut iranien était nécessairement
importée aux Etats-Unis sous la forme de produits)).L'Iran fait observer
qu'en 1987, du fait de l'embargo, sa production de pétrole brut a connu
un excédent d'environ 345000 barils par jour et qu'il a dû trouver
d'autres débouchés pour cette production, à savoir en Méditerranée et
dans le nord-ouest de l'Europe. Dans le même temps, les Etats-Unis
devaient compenser le déficit résultant de l'interdiction des importations
de pétrole brut iranien, et ont par suite accru leurs importations de pro-
duits pétroliers provenant de raffineries situées en Europe méditerra-
néenne et en Europe occidentale. L'Iran a versé au dossier un rapport
d'expert indiquant notamment que le volume des exportations de brut
iranien vers l'Europe occidentale a très fortement augmenté de 1986 à
1987, puis en 1988, et que les importations aux Etats-Unis de produits
pétroliers provenant de raffineries d'Europe occidentale se sont accrues.
96. La Cour ne voit aucune raison de douter que, au cours de la

période durant laquelle l'embargo des Etats-Unis était en vigueur, des
produits pétroliers dérivésen partie de pétrole brut iranien soient parve-
nus aux Etats-Unis en très grandes quantités. L'Executive Order 12613
comportait une exception (section 2b)) selon laquelle l'embargo ne devait
pas s'appliquer aux ((produits pétroliers raffinésà partir de brut iranien
dans un pays tiers». Il pourrait être raisonnablement soutenu que, si les
plates-formes n'avaient pas été attaquées, une partie du pétrole qu'ellesincluded in the consignments processed in Western Europe so as to pro-
duce the petroleumproducts reachingthe United States.Whether, accord-
ing to international trade law criteria, such as the "substantial transfor-
mation" principle, or the "value added approach", the final product
could still retain for some purposes an Iranian character, is not the ques-
tion before the Court. What the Court has to determine is not whether
something that could be designated "Iranian" oil entered the United
States, in some form, during the currency of the embargo; it is whether
there was "commerce" in oil between the territories of Iran and the
United States during that time, within the meaning given to that terrn in
the 1955 Treaty.
97. In this respect, what seems to the Court to be determinative is the
nature of the successive commercial transactions relating to the oil,
rather than the successive technical processes that it underwent. What
Iran regards as "indirect" commerce in oil between itself and the United
States involved a series of commercial transactions: a sale by Iran of
crude oil to a customer in Western Europe, or some third country other
than the United States; possibly a series of intermediate transactions;
and ultimatelythe sale of petroleum products to a customer in the United
States. This is not "commerce" between Iran and the United States, but
commerce between Iran and an intermediate purchaser ;and "commerce"
between an intermediate seller and the United States. After the comple-
tion of the first contract Iran had no ongoing financial interest in, or legal
responsibility for, the goods transferred. If, for example, the process of
"indirect commerce" in Iranian oil through Western European refineries,
as described above, were interfered with at some stage subsequent to
Iran's having parted with a consignment, Iran's commitment and entitle-
ment to freedom of commerce vis-à-vis the United States could not be
regarded as having been violated.

98. The Court thus concludes, with regard to the attack of 19 October
1987 on the Reshadat platforms, that there was at the time of those
attacks no commerce between the territories of Iran and the United
States in respect of oil produced by those platforms and the Resalat plat-
forms, inasmuch as the platforms were under repair and inoperative; and
that the attacks cannot therefore be said to have infringed the freedom of
commerce in oil between the territories of the High Contracting Parties
protected by Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, particularly
taking into account the date of entry into force of the embargo effected
by Executive Order 12613. The Court notes further that, at the time of
the attacks of 18 April 1988 on the Salman and Nasr platforms, al1com-
merce in crude oil between the territories of Iran and the United States
had been suspended by that Executive Order, so that those attacks also
cannot be said to have-infringed the rights of Iran under Article X, para-
graph 1, of the 1955 Treaty.auraient produit aurait étéincluse dans les quantités de brut transformées
en Europe occidentale en produits pétroliers exportés aux Etats-Unis. La
question de savoir si, d'après les critères du droit commercial internatio-
nal, tels celui de la ((transformation substantielle)) ou celui de la ((valeur
ajoutée)), le produit final pouvait conserver à certaines fins un caractère
iranien n'est pas la question que la Cour a à trancher. Ce que la Cour
doit déterminer, ce n'est pas de savoir si un produit donné qui pouvait
êtredésignécomme du pétrole «iranien» a pénétré auxEtats-Unis d'une

manière ou d'une autre pendant la durée de l'embargo, mais s'il existait
un «commerce» de pétrole entre les territoires de l'Iran et des Etats-Unis
pendant cette période - au sens donné àce terme dans le traité de 1955.
97. A cet égard, c'est la nature des transactions commerciales succes-
sives liéesau pétrole qui paraît déterminante aux yeux de la Cour, et non les
traitements techniques successifs qu'a subis ledit produit. Ce que l'Iran
considère comme un commerce ((indirect » de pétrole entre lui et les Etats-
Unis impliquait une sériede transactions commerciales :la vente par l'Iran
de pétrole brut à un client en Europe occidentale, ou à un pays tiers autre
que les Etats-Unis; peut-être une série de transactions intermédiaires; et
pour finir la vente de produits pétroliers à un client aux Etats-Unis. Il ne
s'agit pas là de «commerce» entre l'Iran et les Etats-Unis, mais de com-
merce entre l'Iran et un acheteur intermédiaire, et de «commerce» entre
un vendeur intermédiaire et les Etats-Unis. Une fois le premier contrat
exécuté,l'Iran n'avait plus aucun intérêtfinancier dans les biens cédés,ou
n'était plus juridiquement responsable de ceux-ci. Si, par exemple, le cir-
cuit du ((commerceindirect » de pétrole iranien par l'intermédiaire de raf-
fineries d'Europe occidentale, tel que décrit ci-dessus, était entravé après
que l'Iran se fut dessaisi d'une cargaison, les droits et obligationsde l'Iran
vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis en ce qui concerne la liberté de commerce ne
pourraient être considéréscomme ayant étéviolés.

98. La Cour conclut donc, en ce qui concerne l'attaque, le 19 octobre
1987, des plates-formes de Reshadat qu'il n'existait à ce moment-là aucun
commerce entre les territoires de l'Iran et des Etats-Unis s'agissant du
pétrole produit par ces plates-formes et celles de Resalat, dans la mesure
où elles étaient en réparation et hors d'usage; et que ces attaques ne sau-
raient dès lors être considéréescomme ayant porté atteinte à la liberté de
commerce du pétrole entre les territoires des hautes parties contractantes
protégéepar le paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955, compte tenu
notamment de la date d'entrée en vigueur de l'embargo imposé par 1'Exe-
cutive Order 12613. La Cour constate en outre que, au moment des at-
taques contre les plates-formes de Salman et de Nasr, le 18 avril 1988, tout
commerce de pétrole brut entre les territoires de l'Iran et des Etats-Unis
était suspendu par cet Executive Order, si bien que lesdites attaques ne
sauraient non plus êtreconsidéréescomme ayant porté atteinte aux droits
garantis à l'Iran par le paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955. 99. The Court is therefore unable to uphold the submissions of Iran,
that in carrying out those attacks the United States breached its obliga-
tions to Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. In view of
this conclusion, the Iranian claim for reparation cannot be upheld.

100. In view of the Court's finding, on the claim of Iran, that the

attacks on the oil platforms did not infringe the rights of Iran under
Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, it becomes unnecessary
for the Court to examine the argument of the United States (referred to
in paragraphs 27-30 above) that Iran might be debarred from relief on
its claim by reason of its own conduct.

101. On 23 June 1997, within the time-limit fixed for the Counter-
Memorial, the United States filed a counter-claim, in its Counter-
Memorial, against Iran. It explains that its "counter-claim is based on
actions by Iran in the Persian Gulf during 1987-88 that created extremely
dangerous conditions for shipping, and thereby violated Article X of

the 1955 Treaty". In the submissions in that pleading (see paragraph 19
above) the United States requests that the Court adjudge and declare:

"1. That in attacking vessels, laying mines in the Gulf and otherwise
engaging in military actions in 1987-88 that were dangerous and

detrimental to maritime commerce, the IslamicRepublic of Iran
breached its obligations to the United States under Article X of
the 1955 Treaty, and

2. That the Islamic Republic of Iran is accordingly under an obli-
gation to make full reparation to the United States for violating
the 1955 Treaty in a form and amount to be determined by the
Court at a subsequent stage of the proceedings."

These submissions were later modified, as explained below.

102. By an Order of 10 March 1998 the Court found that the alleged
attacks on shipping, laying of mines, and other military actions by Iran
were facts capable of falling within the scope of Article X, paragraph 1,
of the 1955 Treaty, that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the
United States counter-claim in so far as the facts alleged may have preju-
diced the freedoms guaranteed by Article X, paragraph 1 (1 . .J. Reports
1998, p. 204, para. 36), and that it emerged from the Parties' submissions

that their claims rest on facts of the same nature and form part of the
same factual complex, and that the Parties pursue the same legal aim 99. La Cour ne saurait donc faire droit aux conclusionsde l'Iran selon
lesquelles les Etats-Unis, en menant ces attaques, auraient violé les obli-
gations qui étaient les leursà l'égard de l'Iran au titre du paragraphe 1 de
l'article X du traité de 1955. De ce fait, la demande en réparation pré-
sentée par l'Iran ne saurait êtreaccueillie.

100. La Cour ayant conclu, sur la demande de l'Iran, que les attaques
menées contre les plates-formes pétrolières ne portaient pas atteinte aux
droits que celui-ci tient du paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955,
il n'y a plus lieu pour elle d'examiner l'argument des Etats-Unis (men-
tionné aux paragraphes 27 à 30 ci-dessus) selon lequel le propre compor-
tement de l'Iran empêche qu'il soit fait droit à sa demande.

101. Le 23 juin 1997, dans le délai fixé pour le dépôt du contre-
mémoire, les Etats-Unis ont, dans ce contre-mémoire, présentéune demande
reconventionnelle contre l'Iran. Ils expliquent que cette « demande recon-
ventionnelle se fonde sur les actions que l'Iran a menéesdans le golfe Per-
sique en 1987-1988, créant des conditions extrêmement dangereuses pour la
navigation et violant par là mêmel'article X du traité de 1955)). Dans les
conclusions figurant dans cette pièce (voir paragraphe 19 ci-dessus), les
Etats-Unis prient la Cour de dire et juger:
« 1. qu'en attaquant les navires, en mouillant des mines dans le
Golfe et en menant d'autres actions militaires en 1987 et 1988
qui étaient dangereuses et dommageables pour le commerce
maritime, la République islamique d'Iran a enfreint ses obliga-
tions envers les Etats-Unis au titre de l'article X du traité de
1955; et
2. que la République islamique d'Iran est en conséquencetenue de

réparer intégralement le préjudice qu'elle a causé aux Etats-
Unis en violant le traité de 1955, selon des formes et un montant
à déterminer par la Cour à un stade ultérieur de l'instance)).
Ces conclusions ont étéultérieurement modifiées, comme expliqué ci-
dessous.
102. Par une ordonnance datée du 10 mars 1998, la Cour a conclu que
les attaques contre le transport maritime, le mouillage de mines et les
autres activités militaires attribuables selon les Etats-Unisà l'Iran étaient
des faits de nature à entrer dans les prévisions du paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticleX du traité de 1955, qu'elle était compétente pour connaître de la
demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis dans la mesure ou les faits
alléguésavaient pu porter atteinte aux libertés garanties par le para-
graphe 1 de l'article X(C.I.J. Recuei1 l998, p. 204, par. 36)' qu'il ressortait
des conclusions des Parties que leurs demandesreposaient sur des faits de(1.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 205, para. 38); consequently, considering that
the counter-claim presented by the United States was directly connected
with the subject-matter of the claim of Iran (ibid., p. 205, para. 39), the
Court found "that the counter-claim presented by the United States in
its Counter-Memorial is admissible as such and forms part of the
current proceedings" (ibid., p. 206, para. 46).

103. Iran maintains that the Court's Order of 10 March 1998 did not
decide al1 of the preliminary issues involved in the counter-claim pre-
sented by the United States. Iran points out that, in that Order, the
Court only ruled on the admissibility of the United States counter-claim
in relation to Article 80 of the Rules of Court, declaringit admissible "as
such", whilst reserving the subsequent procedure for further decision.

Iran contends that the Court should not deal with the merits of the
counter-claim because :

(a) the counter-claim was presented without any prior negotiation, in
disregard of the provisions of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955

Treaty ;
(b) the United States has no title to submit a claim on behalf of third
States or of foreign entities;
(c) the United States counter-claim extends beyond Article X, para-
graph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, the only provision over which the Court
has jurisdiction; and the Court cannot uphold any submissions
falling outside the terms of paragraph 1 of Article X;

(d) the Court has jurisdiction only as far as freedom of commerce as
protected under Article X, paragraph 1, is concerned but not on
counter-claims alleging a violation of freedom of navigation as pro-

tected by the same paragraph;

(e) the United States cannot broaden the actual subject-matter of its
claim beyond the submissions set out in its Counter-Memorial.

104. The United States contends that the Order of 10 March 1998
settled definitively in its favour al1 such issues of jurisdiction and admis-
sibility as might arise.
The Court notes however that the United States is adopting an attitude
different from its position in 1998. At that time, while Iran was asking
the Court to rule generally on itsjurisdiction and on the admissibility of
the counter-claim,the United States was basing itself solely on Article 80.
It argued in particular that :

"Many of Iran's objections to jurisdiction and admissibility involve
contested matters of fact which the Court cannot effectively address
and decide at this stage, particularly not in the context of the abbre- PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 209

mêmenature et s'inscrivaient dans le cadre d'un mêmeensemble factuel
complexe, et que les Parties poursuivaient le mêmebut juridique (C.I. J.
Recueil 1998, p. 205, par. 38). En conséquence, la Cour, estimant que
la demande reconventionnelle présentée par les Etats-Unisétait en conne-

xitédirecte avec l'objet de la demande de l'Iran (ibid., p. 205, par. 39)' a
jugé «que la demande reconventionnelleprésentée par les Etats-Unis dans
leur contre-mémoire [était] recevable comme telle et [faisait] partie de
l'instance en cours» (ibid., p. 206, par. 46).
103. L'Iran fait valoir que, par son ordonnance du 10 mars 1998, la
Cour n'a pas tranché toutes les questions préliminaires soulevées par la
demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis. Il fait observer que la Cour
ne s'y est prononcée que sur la recevabilité de la demande reconvention-
nelle des Etats-Unis en relation avec l'article 80 du Règlement de la Cour,
déclarant cette demande recevable ((comme telle » tout en réservant la

suite de la procédure.
L'Iran soutient que la Cour ne devrait pas examiner la demande recon-
ventionnelle au fond aux motifs que:

a) cette demande reconventionnelle a étéprésentéesans avoir étéprécé-
dée de négociations, au mépris des dispositions du paragraphe 2 de
l'article XXI du traité de 1955 ;
b) les Etats-Unis ne sont en rien fondés à soumettre une demande au
nom d7Etats tiers ou d'entités étrangères ;
c) la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis sort du cadre du para-
graphe 1 de l'articleX du traité de 1955, seule disposition à l'égard de
laquelle la Cour soit compétente; or, cette dernière ne saurait faire
droit à des conclusions n'entrant pas dans les prévisions du para-

graphe 1 de l'article X;
d) la Cour n'est compétente que dans la mesure où la liberté de corn-
merce protégée par le paragraphe 1 de l'article X est concernée, et
non pour connaître de demandes reconventionnelles alléguant une
violation de la liberté de navigation protégée par le même para-
graphe ;
e) les Etats-Unis ne peuvent élargir l'objet de leur demande au-delà des
conclusions figurant dans leur contre-mémoire.

104. Les Etats-Unis affirment que l'ordonnance du 10 mars 1998 a
définitivement régléen leur faveur toutes les questions de compétence et
de recevabilité qui pourraient se poser.
La Cour note toutefois que les Etats-Unis adoptent une attitude diffé-
rente de celle qui était la leur en 1998. A l'époque, alors que l'Iran

demandait à la Cour de statuer de manière généralesur sa compétence et
sur la recevabilité de la demande reconventionnelle, les Etats-Unis se fon-
daient uniquement sur l'article 80. Ils soutenaient en particulier que

«[d]e nombreuses objections de l'Iran relatives à la compétence et à
la recevabilité portent sur des points de faitlitigieux, que la Cour ne
peut pas traiter et trancher utilement à ce stade, particulièrement viated procedures of Article 80 (3)." (Cited in 1.C.J. Reports 1998,
p. 200, para. 22.)

105. The Court considers that it is open to Iran at this stage of the
proceedings to raise objections to the jurisdiction of the Court to enter-
tain the counter-claim or to its admissibility, other than those addressed
by the Order of 10 March 1998. When in that Order the Court ruled on
the "admissibility" of the counter-claim, the task of the Court at that
stage was only to verify whether or not the requirements laid down by
Article 80 of the Rules of Court were satisfied, namely, that there was
a direct connection of the counter-claim with the subject-matter of the
Iranian claims, and that, to the extent indicated in paragraph 102 above,
the counter-claim fell within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Order of
10 March 1998 therefore does not address any other question relating to
jurisdiction and admissibility, not directly linked to Article 80 of the
Rules. This is clear from the terms of the Order, by which the Court
found that the counter-claim was admissible "as such"; and in para-
graph 41 of the Order the Court further stated that :"a decision given on
the admissibility of a counter-claim taking account of the requirements
set out in Article 80 of the Rules in no way prejudges any question which
the Court will be called upon to hear during the remainder of the pro-
ceedings" (ibid., p. 205, para. 41). The Court will therefore proceed to
address the objections now presented by Iran to itsjurisdiction to enter-
tain the counter-claim and to the admissibility thereof.

106. Iran maintains first that the Court cannot entertain the counter-
claim of the United States because it was presented without any prior
negotiation, and thus does not relate to a dispute "not satisfactorily
adjusted by diplomacy" as contemplated by Article XXI, paragraph 2, of
the 1955 Treaty, which reads as follows:

"Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the
interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily
adjusted by diplomacy,shall be submitted to the International Court
of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by
some other pacific means."

107. The Court cannot uphold this objection of Iran. It is established
that a dispute has arisen between Iran and the United States over the
issues raised in the counter-claim. The Court has to take note that the
dispute has not been satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy. Whether the
fact that diplomatic negotiations have not been pursued is to be regarded
as attributable to the conduct of the one Party or the other is irrelevant
for present purposes, as is the question whether it is the Applicant or the
Respondent that has asserted a3n de non-recevoir on this ground. As in
previous cases involving virtually identical treaty provisions (see United PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 210

dans le cadre de la procédure limitée du paragraphe 3 de l'article 8))

(cité dans C.Z.J. Recueil 1998, p. 200, par. 22).
105. La Cour estime qu'il est loisible à l'Iran, à ce stade de l'instance,

de soulever des exceptions à la compétence de la Cour pour connaître de
la demande reconventionnelle ou à la recevabilité de cette demande,
autres que celles ayant fait l'objet de l'ordonnance du 10 mars 1998.
Lorsque, par cette ordonnance, la Cour a statué sur la «recevabilité» de
la demande reconventionnelle, il ne s'agissait pour elle, à ce stade, que de
vérifier s'ilavait étésatisfait aux exigences de l'article 80 du Règlement de
la Cour, à savoir s'il existait une connexité directe entre cette demande
reconventionnelle et l'objet des demandes iraniennes et si, dans la mesure

indiquée au paragraphe 102 ci-dessus, cette demande relevait de la com-
pétence de la Cour. L'ordonnance du 10 mars 1998 ne traite donc, en ce
qui concerne la compétence et la recevabilité, d'aucune question qui ne
soit directement liéeà l'article 80 du Règlement. Cela ressort clairement
des termes de l'ordonnance, dans laquelle la Cour a jugé que la demande
reconventionnelle était recevable ((comme telle », et en particulier de son
paragraphe 41, dans lequel elle a dit qu'a une décision rendue sur la rece-
vabilité d'une demande reconventionnelle compte tenu des exigences for-
mulées à l'article 80 du Règlement ne saurait préjuger aucune question

dont la Cour aurait à connaître dans la suite de la procédure» (ibid.,
p. 205, par. 41). La Cour examinera donc maintenant les exceptions
à sa compétence pour connaître de la demande reconventionnelle et à
la recevabilité de cette demande présentées aujourd'hui par l'Iran.
106. L'Iran soutient d'abord que la Cour ne peut connaître de la
demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis parce que celle-ci a étéprésen-
tée sans avoir étéprécédéede négociations, et qu'elle ne concerne donc
pas un différend n'ayant pu être ((régléd'une manière satisfaisante par la
voie diplomatique)) au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article XXI du traité de

1955, qui se lit comme suit :
((Tout différend qui pourrait s'élever entre les Hautes Parties

contractantes quant à l'interprétation ou à l'application du présent
traité et qui ne pourrait pas êtrerégléd'une manière satisfaisante par
la voie diplomatique sera porté devant la Cour internationale de Jus-
tice, à moins que les Hautes Parties contractantes ne conviennent de
le régler par d'autres moyens pacifiques. ))

107. La Cour ne saurait accueillir cette exception de l'Iran. Il est établi
qu'un différend est néentre l'Iran et les Etats-Unis sur les questions sou-
levéesdans la demande reconventionnelle.La Cour doit prendre acte que
le différend n'a pas étérégléd'une manière satisfaisante par la voie diplo-
matique. Peu importe aux fins de la présente question que l'absence de
négociations diplomatiques soit attribuable au comportement de l'une ou

de l'autre Partie, ou que ce soit le demandeur ou le défendeur qui a pour
ce motif opposé une fin de non-recevoir. Comme dans de précédentes
affaires qui mettaient en cause des dispositions conventionnelles prati-States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980,
pp. 26-28 ; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 427-
429), it is sufficient for the Court to satisfy itself that the dispute was not
satisfactorilyadjusted by diplomacy before being submitted to the Court.

108. According to the second objection of Iran, the United States is in
effect submitting a claim on behalf of third States or of foreign entities,

and has no title to do so. Reference has been made in the United States
argument on the counter-claim to incidents involving vessels flying the
flags of the Bahamas, Panama, the United Kingdom and Liberia; Iran
contends that the United States is thus claiming to defend the interests of
these States, which are not parties to the present proceedings.
109. The Court recalls that the first submission presented by the
United States in regard to its counter-claim simply requests the Court to
adjudge and declare that the alleged actions of Iran breached its obliga-
tions to the United States, without mention of any third States. Accord-
ingly, the Court will strictly limit itself to consideration of whether the
alleged actions by Iran infringed freedoms guaranteed to the United
States under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. The objection of

Iran is thus as such devoid of any object and the Court cannot therefore
uphold it.
110. In its third objection, Iran contends that the United States
counter-claim extends beyond Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty,
the only text in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction, and that the
Court cannot therefore uphold any submissions falling outside the terms
of paragraph 1 of that Article.
111. The Court notes that, while in its Rejoinder the United States
requested the Court to adjudge and declare

"that, in attacking vessels in the Gulf with mines and missiles and
otherwise engaging in military actions that were dangerous and
detrimental to maritime commerce, the Islamic Republic of Iran
breached its obligations to the United States under Article X of the
1955 Treaty " (emphasis added),

in its final submissions (see paragraph 20 above) the United States
substantially narrowed the basis of its counter-claim, when it requested
the Court to adjudge and declare

"Rejecting al1 submissions to the contrary, that, in attacking
vessels in the Gulf with mines and missiles and othenvise engaging
in military actions that were dangerous and detrimental to commerce
and navigation between the territories of the United States and the

Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran breached its
obligations to the United States under Article X, paragraph 1, of the
1955 Treaty. " (Emphasis added.)quement identiques (voir Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-
Unis à Téhéran, C.Z.J. Recueil 1980, p. 26-28; Activités militaires et

paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis
d'Amérique), C.Z.J. Recueil 1984, p. 427-429), il suffit à la Cour de cons-
tater que le différend n'a pas étérégléd'une manière satisfaisante par la
voie diplomatique avant de lui être soumis.
108. Selon la deuxième exception de l'Iran, les Etats-Unis présentent
en fait une demande au nom d'Etats tiers ou d'entités étrangères, et ils
n'ont aucun titre pour ce faire. Des incidentsconcernant des navires bat-
tant pavillon des Bahamas, du Panama, du Royaume-Uni et du Libéria
ont été évoquéspar les Etats-Unis à l'appui de leur demande reconven-
tionnelle,et l'Iran soutient que les Etats-Unis prétendent ce faisant défen-

dre les intérêts deces Etats, qui ne sont pas parties à la présente instance.
109. La Cour rappelle que, dans leur première conclusion concernant
leur demande reconventionnelle, les Etats-Unis prient simplement la
Cour de dire et juger que, par les actions qui lui sont attribuées, l'Iran a
violé ses obligations à leur égard, sans mentionner aucun Etat tiers. En
conséquence, la Cour se limitera strictement à examiner si les actions
attribuées à l'Iran ont porté atteinte à des libertés que le paragraphe 1 de
l'articleX du traité de 1955 garantissait aux Etats-Unis. Cette exception
de l'Iran est donc comme telle sans objet et la Cour ne saurait partant

l'accueillir.
110. Dans sa troisième exception, l'Iran fait valoir que la demande
reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis sort du cadre du paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticle X du traité de 1955, seul texte à l'égard duquel la Cour soit compé-
tente, et que celle-ci ne peut donc faire droit à des conclusions n'entrant
pas dans les prévisions de ce paragraphe 1.
111. La Cour note que si, dans leur duplique, les Etats-Unis ont prié la
Cour de dire et juger

((qu'en attaquant les navires dans le Golfe avec des mines et des mis-
siles et en menant d'autres actions militaires qui étaient dangereuses
et nuisibles pour le commerce maritime, la République islamique
d'Iran a enfreint les obligations qui étaient les siennes envers les
Etats-Unis au titre de l'article X du traité de 1955 » (les italiques sont
de la Cour),

ils ont, dans leurs conclusions finales (voir paragraphe 20 ci-dessus),
substantiellement réduit le fondement de leur demande reconvention-

nelle, priant la Cour de dire et juger,
«une fois rejetée toute conclusion en sens contraire, qu'en attaquant
les navires dans le Golfe avec des mines et des missiles et en menant

d'autres actions militaires dangereuses et nuisibles pour le commerce
et la navigation entre les territoires des Etats-Unis et de la Répu-
blique islamique d'Iran, celle-ci a enfreint les obligations qui étaient
les siennes envers les Etats-Unis au titre du paragraphe I de l'article X
du traité de 195.5)) (les italiques sont de la Cour). The United States, in presenting its final submissions on the counter-
claim, thus no longer relies on Article X of the 1955 Treaty as a whole,
but on paragraph 1 of that Article only, and, furthermore, recognizes the
territorial limitation of Article X, paragraph 1, referring specifically to
the military actions that were allegedly "dangerous and detrimental to
commerce and navigation between the territories of the United States and
the Islamic Republic of Iran" (emphasis added) rather than, generally, to
"military actions that were dangerous and detrimental to maritime com-
merce".
By limiting the scope of its counter-claim in its final submissions, the
United States has deprived Iran's third objection of any object, and the
Court cannot therefore uphold it.
112. In its fourth objection Iran maintains that

"the Court has jurisdiction to rule only on counter-claims alleging
a violation by Iran of freedom of commerce as protected under
Article X (l), and not on counter-claims alleging a violation of free-
dom of navigation as protected by the same paragraph".

Iran concludes that
"since an alleged violation of 'freedom of commerce' as protected
under Article X (1) constitutes the only possible basis for the Court's
jurisdiction in the present case, no alleged violation of freedom of
navigation or of any other provision of the Treaty of Amity can be
entertained by the Court in the context of the counter-claim".

113. It seems, nevertheless, that Iran changed its position and recog-
nized that the counter-claim could be founded on a violation of freedom
of navigation. For example, it stated:

"Article X, paragraph 1, refers to 'freedom of commerce and navi-
gation'. It appears that these are distinct freedoms, and in your
Order of 1998 you referred to them in the plural . . .Thus there
could be navigation between the territories of the High Contracting
Parties without any commerce between those territories, even if there
could not be navigation without any boat !"

114. The Court, in its Order of 10 March 1998, stated that
"Whereas the counter-claim presented by the United States alleges
attacks on shipping, the laying of mines, and other military actions
said to be 'dangerous and detrimental to maritime commerce';
whereas such facts are capable of falling within the scope of
Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty as interpreted by the PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 212

Ainsi, dans les conclusions finales qu'ils présentent sur leur demande
reconventionnelle, les Etats-Unis n'invoquent plus l'article X du traité de
1955 dans son ensemble mais seulement le paragraphe 1 de cet article et,
de plus, prennent acte de la limitation territoriale du paragraphe 1 de
l'article X, en visant expressément les actions militaires qui auraient été
({dangereuses et nuisibles pour le commerce et la navigation entre les ter-
ritoires des Etats- Unis et de la République islamique d'Iran » (les italiques
sont de la Cour) et non plus les (tactions militaires dangereuses et nui-
sibles pour le commerce maritime».
En limitant la portée de leur demande reconventionnelle dans leurs
conclusions finales, les Etats-Unis ont privé la troisième exception de
l'Iran de tout objet et la Cour ne saurait partant l'accueillir.
112. Dans sa quatrième exception, l'Iran soutient que

«la Cour est compétente pour statuer uniquement sur les demandes
reconventionnelles alléguant une violation par l'Iran de la liberté de
commerce telle que celle-ci est protégée par le paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticle X, etnon sur les demandes reconventionnelles alléguant une vio-
lation de la liberté de navigation telle que protégée par le même
paragraphe ».

L'Iran conclut que
(tpuisqu'une violation de la «liberté de commerce)) telle que proté-
géepar le paragraphe 1 de l'article X constitue la seule base de com-
pétence possible pour la Cour dans la présente affaire, aucune allé-
gation faisant état d'une violation de la liberté de navigation ou de
toute autre disposition du traité d'amitié ne peut être accueillie par la
Cour dans le cadre de la demande reconventionnelle)).

113. Il semble pourtant que l'Iran ait modifié sa position et reconnu
que la demande reconventionnellepouvait êtrefondée sur la violation de
la liberté de navigation. C'est ainsi qu'il a déclaré:

«Le paragraphe 1 de l'article X parle de «liberté de commerce et
de navigation)). Apparemment il s'agit de libertés distinctes, que
vous avez désignéesdans votre ordonnance de 1998 par le pluriel ...
Par conséquent, il pourrait y avoir liberté de navigation entre les ter-
ritoires de Hautes Parties contractantes sans qu'il y ait de commerce
entre lesdits territoires, mêmes'il ne pourrait pas y avoir de naviga-
tion sans embarcation !»

114. Dans son ordonnance du 10 mars 1998, la Cour a déclaré:

«Considérant que la demande reconventionnelle présentée par les
Etats-Unis invoque des attaques contre le transport maritime, des
mouillages de mines et d'autres activités militairesqui seraient «dan-
gereuses et nuisibles pour le commerce maritime)); que de tels faits
sont susceptibles d'entrer dans les prévisions du paragraphe 1 de l'ar- Court; and whereas the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the United
States counter-claim in so far as the facts alleged may have preju-
diced the freedoms guaranteed by Article X, paragraph 1 ." (1.C.J.

Reports 1998, p. 204, para. 36.)

115. Article X, paragraph 1, envisages both freedoms, freedom of
commerce and freedom of navigation, as argued by the United States and
accepted by Iran during the oral hearings. As regards the claim of Iran, it
is true that the Court has found that only freedom of commerce is in
issue (paragraph 80 above). However, the Court also concluded in 1998
that it had jurisdiction to entertain the United States counter-claim in so
far as the facts alleged may have prejudiced thefreedoms (in the plural)
guaranteed by Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, Le., freedom of
commerce and freedom of navigation. This objection of Iran thus cannot
be upheld by the Court.

116. Iran presents one final argument against the admissibility of the
United States counter-claim, which however it concedes relates only to
part of the counter-claim. Iran contends that the United States has
broadened the subject-matter of its claim beyond the submissions set out
in its counter-claim by having, belatedly, added complaints relating to
freedom of navigation to its complaints relating to freedom of commerce,

and by having added new examples of breaches of freedom of maritime
commerce in its Rejoinder in addition to the incidentsalready referred to
in the counter-claim presented with the Counter-Memorial.

117. The issue raised by Iran is whether the United States is presenting
a new claim. The Court is thus faced with identifying what is "a new
claim" and what is merely "additional evidence relating to the original
claim". It is well established in the Court's jurisprudence that the parties
to a case cannot in the course of proceedings "transform the dispute
brought before the Court into a dispute that would be of a different
nature" (Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Pre-
liminary Objections, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1992,p. 265, para. 63). In
other words:

"the liberty accorded to the parties to amend their submissions up
to the end of the oral proceedings must be construed reasonably

and without infringing the terms of Article 40 of the Statute and
Article 32, paragraph 2, of the [1936] Rules which provide that the
Application must indicate the subject of the dispute" (Société com-
merciale de Belgique, Judgment, 1939, P. C.Z.J., Series AIB, No. 78,
p. 173).
A fortiori, the same applies to the case of counter-claims, having regard
to the provisions of Article 80 of the Rules of Court, and in particular PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 213

ticleX du traité de 1955 tel qu'interprété par la Cour; et que celle-
ci est compétente pour connaître de la demande reconventionnelle
des Etats-Unis dans la mesure où les faits alléguésont pu porter

atteinte aux libertés garanties par le paragraphe 1 de l'article X.))
(C.I. J. Recueil 1998, p. 204, par. 36.)

115. Le paragraphe 1 de l'article X envisage les deux libertés,la liberté
de commerce et la liberté de navigation, comme les Etats-Unis l'ont fait
valoir et comme l'Iran l'a reconnu lors de la procédure orale. S'agissant
de la demande de l'Iran, la Cour a certes conclu que seule la liberté de
commerce était en cause (voir paragraphe 80 ci-dessus). Elle n'en a pas
moins conclu par ailleurs en 1998 qu'elle était compétente pour connaître
de la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis dans la mesure où les
faits alléguésavaient pu porter atteinte aux libertés (au pluriel) garanties
par le paragraphe 1 de l'articleX du traité de 1955, c'est-à-dire la liberté
de commerce et la liberté de navigation. La Cour ne peut donc faire droit

à cette exception de l'Iran.
116. L'Iran présente un dernier argument contre la recevabilité de la
demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis, dont il admet néanmoins
qu'il ne concerne qu'une partie de cette demande. Il soutient que les
Etats-Unis ont élargi l'objet de leur demande au-delà des conclusions qui
figuraient dans la demande reconventionnelle en ajoutant tardivement à
leurs griefs concernant la liberté de commerce des griefs concernant la
liberté de navigation, et en donnant, dans leur duplique, de nouveaux
exemples de violation de la liberté de commerce maritime qui viennent
s'ajouter aux incidents déjà invoqués dans la demande reconventionnelle

présentée avec le contre-mémoire.
117. La question que soulève l'Iran est celle de savoir si les Etats-Unis
présentent une demande nouvelle. Il appartient donc à la Cour de déter-
miner ce qui constitue «une demande nouvelle» et ce qui constitue seu-
lement des «éléments de preuve additionnels relatifs à la demande origi-
nelle)). Il est bien établi dans la jurisprudence dela Cour que les parties à
une affaire ne peuvent en cours d'instance «transformer le différend
porté devant la Cour en un différend dont le caractère ne serait pas le
même» (Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru (Nauru c. Australie),
exceptionspréliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 265, par. 63). En

d'autres termes :
«la faculté laissée aux parties de modifier leurs conclusionsjusqu'à
la fin de la procédure orale doit être comprise d'une manière raison-

nable et sans porter atteinte à l'article 40 du Statut et à l'article 32,
alinéa 2, du Règlement [de 19361, qui disposent que la requête doit
indiquer l'objet du différend)) (Société commerciale de Belgique,
arrêt, 1939, C. P. J.1. sériAIB no 78, p. 173).

Il en va à fortiori de même des demandes reconventionnelles, eu égard
aux dispositionsde l'article 80 du Règlement de la Cour, et en particuliertaking into account the fact that it is on the basis of the counter-claim as
originally submitted that the Court determines whether it is "directly
connected with the subject-matter of the claim", and as such admissible
under that text.
If itis the case, as contended by Iran, that the Court has before it
something that "constitutes . .. a new claim, [so that] the subject of the

dispute originally submitted to the Court would be transformed if it
entertained that claim" (Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v.
Australia), Preliminary Objections, 1.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 267, para. 70),
then the Court will be bound to dismiss such new claim.
118. The Court has noted in its Order of 10 March 1998 in the present
case that the counter-claim alleged "attacks on shipping, the laying of
mines, and other military actions said to be 'dangerous and detrimental
to maritime commerce"' (1 C.J. Reports 1998, p. 204, para. 36). The
Court concluded that the counter-claim was admissible in so far as "the
facts alleged may have prejudiced the freedoms guaranteed by Article X,
paragraph 1 " (ibid. .

Subsequently to its Counter-Memorial and counter-claim and to that
Order of the Court, the United States provided detailed particulars of
further incidents substantiating, in its contention, its original claims. In
the view of the Court, the United States has not, by doing so, trans-
formed the subject of the dispute originally submitted to the Court, nor
has it modified the substance of its counter-claim, which remains the
same, i.e., alleged attacks by Iran on shipping, laying of mines and other
military actions said to be "dangerous and detrimental to maritime com-
merce", thus breaching Iran's obligations to the United States under
Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1995 Treaty.

The Court therefore cannot uphold the objection of Iran.
119. Having disposed of al1 objections of Iran to its jurisdiction over

the counter-claim, and to the admissibility thereof, the Court has now to
consider the counter-claim on its merits. To succeed on its counter-claim,
the United States must show that:

(a) its freedom of commerce or freedom of navigation between the
territories of the High Contracting Parties to the 1955 Treaty was
impaired; and that
(b) the acts which allegedly impaired one or both of those freedoms are
attributable to Iran.
The Court would recall that Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty

does not protect, as between the Parties, freedom of commerce or free-
dom of navigation in general. As already noted above (paragraph 90), the
provision of that paragraph contains an important territorial limitation.
In order to enjoy the protection provided by that text, the commerce or
the navigation is to be between the territories of the United States and PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 214

au fait que c'est sur la base de la demande reconventionnelle telle qu'elle
a étéinitialement présentée que la Cour détermine si celle-ci est «en
connexité directe avec l'objet de la demande», et recevable comme telle
au regard de cet article.

Si, comme l'affirme l'Iran, ce dont la Cour est saisie ((constitue une
demande ..nouvelle ...[de sorte que] l'objet du différend qui lui a origi-
nellement étésoumis se trouverait transformé si [la Cour] accueillait cette
demande» (Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru (Nauru c. Australie),
exceptions préliminaires, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 267, par. 70)' alors elle
est tenue de rejeter cette demande nouvelle.
118. La Cour a en l'espèce relevé dans son ordonnance du 10 mars
1998 que la demande reconventionnelleinvoquait «des attaques contre le
transport maritime, des mouillages de mines et d'autres activités mili-
taires qui [auraient été]((dangereuseset nuisibles pour le commerce ma-

ritime »» (C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 204, par. 36). Elle a conclu que la
demande reconventionnelle était recevable dans «la mesure où les faits
allégués [avaient] pu porter atteinte aux libertés garanties par le para-
graphe 1 de l'articleX >>(ibid. ).
Postérieurement à leur contre-mémoire et à leur demande reconven-
tionnelle, ainsi qu'à cette ordonnance de la Cour, les Etats-Unis ont
fourni des descriptions détaillées d'autres incidents étayant, selon eux,
leurs demandes originelles. De l'avis de la Cour, les Etats-Unis n'ont pas,
ce faisant, transformé l'objet du différend initialement porté devant la
Cour, ni modifié la substance de leur demande reconventionnelle, qui

demeure la même, à savoir que l'Iran se serait livré à des attaques contre
le transport maritime, au mouillage de mines et à d'autres activités mili-
taires qui seraient((dangereuses et nuisibles pour le commerce maritime »,
violant ainsi ses obligations vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis au regard du para-
graphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955.
La Cour ne saurait donc accueillir cette exception de l'Iran.
119. S'étant prononcée sur toutes les exceptions à sa compétence pour
connaître de la demande reconventionnelle et à la recevabilité de cette
demande formulées par l'Iran, la Cour doit maintenant examiner la
demande reconventionnelle au fond. Pour qu'il puisse être fait droit à

leur demande reconventionnelle, les Etats-Unis doivent montrer:
a) qu'il a étéporté atteinte à leur liberté de commerce ou à leur liberté
de navigation entre les territoires des hautes partiescontractantes au
traité de 1955; et que

b) les actes qui auraient porté atteinte à l'une de ces libertés ou aux deux
sont attribuables à l'Iran.
La Cour rappellera que le paragraphe 1 de l'articleX du traité de 1955 ne
protège pas, dans les relations entre les parties, la liberté de commerce ou
la liberté de navigation en général. Comme il a déjà éténoté (voir para-

graphe 90), ce paragraphe contient une limitation territoriale importante.
Pour bénéficierde la protection prévue par ce texte, le commerce ou la
navigation doivent s'effectuer entre les territoires des Etats-Unis et deIran. The United States bears the burden of proof that the vessels which
were attacked were engaged in commerce or navigation between the ter-
ritories of the United States and Iran.
120. The Court will thus examine each of Iran's alleged attacks, in
chronological order, from the standpoint of this requirement of the 1955
Treaty :

(a) tankery Bridgetonine(see paragraph Uni63d above)-rein an internationalm

shipping channel approximately 18 nautical miles south-west
of the Iranian island of Farsi, while en route from Rotterdam,
Netherlands, via Fujairah Anchorage, United Arab Emirates, to
Mina al-Ahmadi, Kuwait. The Court notes that the ship was
not engaged in commerce or navigation between the territories of
the two High Contracting Parties.
(b) 10 August 1987: A mine attack on the United States bareboat-
chartered, Panamanian-flagged, Texaco Caribbean (see paragraph 63
above), at the Khor Fakkan anchorage off Fujairah, which was laden
with a cargo of Iranian light crude being carried from Larak Island
Terminal, Iran, to Rotterdam, Netherlands. The Court notes that
Iran conceded that the Texaco Caribbean was engaged in commerce

between the territories of the two States;but this was in the context
of its contention, in relation to its own claim, that the term "dom-
merce" covers "indirect commerce" as well. It therefore requested
the Court to dismiss the United States claim concerning this ship on
different grounds, namely that the mine incident was not attribu-
table to Iran, and that the United States suffered no loss since the
ship was a Panamanian-owned vessel carrying a Norwegian-owned
cargo. The United States argued, in relation to the claim of Iran,
against such a broad interpretation of the term "commerce" in
Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty and also adduced evidence
that the cargo was owned by a United States corporation. Since the
Court has concluded that the process of "indirect commerce" in

Iranian oil through Western European refineries does not represent
"commerce between the territories of the two High Contracting
Parties" for the purposes of Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955
Treaty (see paragraph 97 above), and taking account of the fact that
the destination was not a United States port, the Court concludes
that the vessel was not engaged in commerce or navigation between
Iran and the United States.

(c) 15 August 1987: A mine attack on the United Arab Emirates flag
supply vessel Anita in the vicinity of Khor Fakkan anchorage off

Fujairah while proceeding to supply the vessels in the anchorage.
The Court notes that the ship was not engaged in commerce orl'Iran. La charge de prouver que les navires qui ont étéattaqués se
livraient au commerce ou à la navigation entre les territoires des Etats-

Unis et de l'Iran incombe aux Etats-Unis.
120. La Cour examinera donc maintenant, dans l'ordre chronolo-
gique, chacune des attaques que les Etats-Unis attribuent à l'Iran, au
regard de cette exigence du traité de 1955 :

a) Le 24 juillet 1987, le Bridgeton, pétrolieà vapeur réimmatriculé aux
Etats-Unis (voir paragraphe 63 ci-dessus), heurte une mine dans une
voie de navigation internationale à quelque 18 milles marins au sud-
ouest de l'île iranienne de Farsi, alors qu'il se rend de Rotterdam
(Pays-Bas) à Mina al-Ahmadi (Koweït) via le mouillage de Fujairah
(Emirats arabes unis). La Cour note que ce navire ne se livrait pas au
commerce ou à la navigation entre les territoires des deux hautes
parties contractantes.
b) Le 10 août 1987, le Texaco Caribbean, navire battant pavillon
panaméen et affrété en coque nue par les Etats-Unis (voir para-
graphe 63 ci-dessus), heurte une mine au mouillage de Khor Fakkan,
au large de Fujairah, alors qu'il transporte une cargaison de brut
léger iranien entre le terminal de l'île de Larak (Iran) et Rotterdam
(Pays-Bas). La Cour note que l'Iran a concédéque le Texaco Carib-
bean se livrait au commerce entre les territoires de deux Etats; mais
il l'a fait dans le cadre de son assertionavancée en rapport avec sa
propre demande, selon laquelle le terme ((commerce » devait égale-
ment s'entendre du ((commerce indirect)). Il demandait donc à la
Cour de rejeter la demande des Etats-Unis concernant ce navire
pour des motifs différents, à savoir que le mouillage de la mine
que celui-ci avait heurtée ne pouvait être attribué à l'Iran, et que les
Etats-Unis n'avaient subi aucune perte puisque le navire appartenait
à des intérêts panaméens et transportait une cargaison propriété
d'une société norvégienne. Les Etats-Unis ont contesté, en ce qui
concerne la demandede l'Iran, une interprétation aussi large du terme
«commerce» utilisé au paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de
1955 et ont en outre avancé des éléments tendant à prouver que
la cargaison appartenait à une sociétéaméricaine. La Cour ayant
conclu que le ((commerce indirect» de pétrole iranien par l'inter-
médiaire des raffineries d'Europe occidentale ne relevait pas
du ((commerceentre les territoires des deux Hautes Parties contrac-
tantes~ aux fins du paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955 (voir
paragraphe 97 ci-dessus), et compte tenu du fait que la destination
du navire n'était pas un port américain, la Cour conclut que le
navire en question ne se livrait pas au commerce ou à la navigation
entre l'Iran et les Etats-Unis.
c) Le 15 août 1987, I'Anita, navire de service battant pavillon des Emi-
rats arabes unis, heurte une mine à proximité du mouillage de Khor
Fakkan, au large de Fujairah, alors qu'il assure le ravitaillement des
navires au mouillage. La Cour note que ce navire ne se livrait pas au navigation between the territories of the two High Contracting
Parties.
(d) 15 October 1987: A missile attack on the United States-owned,
Liberian-flagged Sungari, while at anchor 10 miles off Mina al-
Ahmadi Sea Island Terminal, Kuwait. The Court notes that the
ship was not engaged in commerce or navigation between the terri-
tories of the two High Contracting Parties.

(e) 16 October 1987: A missile attack on the United States-reflagged
Sea Isle City (see paragraph 52 above), which was proceeding from
its anchorage to the oil loading terminal at Kuwait's Mina al-
Ahmadi Terminal. The Court notes that the ship was not engaged
in commerce or navigation between the territories of the two High
Contracting Parties.
(f) 15 November 1987: A gunboat attack on the United States-owned,
Liberian-flagged, motor tanker Lucy, near the Strait of Horrnuz, off
Al Khassat, northern Oman, en route to Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia,
from Oita, Japan. The Court notes that the ship was not engaged in
commerce or navigation between the territories of the two High
Contracting Parties.

(g) 16 November 1987: A gunboat attack on the United States-owned,
Bahamian-flagged, steam tanker Esso Freeport en route from Ras
Tanura, Saudi Arabia, to the Louisiana Offshore Oil Pipeline Ter-
minal, United States. The Court notes that the ship was not engaged
in commerce or navigation between the territories of the two High
Contracting Parties.
(h) 7 February 1988: A frigate attack on the United States-owned,
Liberian-flagged, motor tanker Diana, while loaded with crude oil
from Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, en route from Bahrain and the
United Arab Emirates to Japan. The Court notes that the ship was
not engaged in commerce or navigation between the territories of
the two High Contracting Parties.

(i) 14 April 1988: A mine attack on the USS Samuel B. Roberts
(United Stateswarship) near the Shah Allum Shoal, while returning
to Bahrain after escorting a convoy of United States-flagged vessels.
As a warship, the USS Samuel B. Roberts does not enjoy the protec-
tion of freedom of navigation guaranteed by Article X, paragraph 1,
of the 1955 Treaty. Paragraph 6 of that Article states that "The term
'vessels', as used herein .. .does not, except with reference to para-
graphs 2 and 5 of the present Article, include . .. vessels of war."
The United States is nevertheless contending that since the USS
Samuel B. Roberts was escorting commercial vessels, it enjoys the
protection by the 1955 Treaty of freedom of commerce. However, at
al1events, these vessels were neither navigating nor engaged in com-
merce between Iran and the United States.Consequently,the United commerce ou à la navigation entre les territoires des deux hautes
parties contractantes.
d) Le 15 octobre 1987, le Sungari, navire appartenant à une sociétéamé-
ricaine et battant pavillon libérien, est touché par un missile alors
qu'il est à l'ancre à 10 milles marins au large du terminal de Mina
al-Ahmadi sur Sea Island (Koweït). La Cour note que ce navire ne se
livrait pas au commerce ou à la navigation entre les territoires des
deux hautes parties contractantes.
e) Le 16 octobre 1987, le Sea Isle City, navire réimmatriculé aux Etats-
Unis (voir paragraphe 52 ci-dessus), est touché par un missile alors
qu'il se rend de son mouillage au terminal de Mina al-Ahmadi
(Koweït) pour charger du pétrole. La Cour note que ce navire ne se
livrait pas au commerce ou à la navigation entre les territoires des
deux hautes parties contractantes.
f) Le 15 novembre 1987, le Lucy, pétrolier à moteur appartenant à une
sociétéaméricaine et battant pavillon libérien, est attaqué par des
vedettes rapides près du détroit d'Ormuz, au large d'Al Khassat, situé
dans le nord d'Oman, alors qu'il se dirige vers Ras Tanura (Arabie
saoudite) en provenance d70ita (Japon). La Cour note que ce navire
ne se livrait pas au commerce ou à la navigation entre les territoires
des deux hautes parties contractantes.
g) Le 16 novembre 1987, 1'EssoFreeport, pétrolier à vapeur appartenant
à une sociétéaméricaine et battant pavillon des Bahamas, est attaqué
par des vedettes rapides alors qu'il se rend de Ras Tanura (Arabie
saoudite) au terminal du Louisiana Offshore Oil Pipeline (Etats-Unis).
La Cour note que ce navire ne se livrait pas au commerce ou à la navi-
gation entre les territoires des deux hautes parties contractantes.
h) Le 7 février 1988, le Diane, pétrolier à moteur appartenant à une
sociétéaméricaine et battant pavillon libérien, est attaquépar une fré-
gate alors que, transportant une cargaison de brut de Ras Tanura
(Arabie saoudite), il se rend de Bahreïn et des Emirats arabes unis au
Japon. La Cour note que ce navire ne se livrait pas au commerce ou
à la navigation entre les territoires des deux hautes parties contrac-
tantes.
i) Le 14 avril 1988, I'USS Samuel B. Roberts (navire de guerre des
Etats-Unis) heurte une mine près des hauts-fonds de Shah Allum,
alors qu'il revient de Bahreïn après avoir escortéun convoi de navires
battant pavillon des Etats-Unis. En tant que navire de guerre, I'USS
Samuel B. Roberts ne bénéficiepas de la protection de la liberté de
navigation garantie au paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955.
Le paragraphe 6 de cet article dispose en effet que, «[a]u sens du pré-
sent %traité, le terme «navires» ... ne vise ...pas, sauf en ce qui
concerne l'application des paragraphes 2 et 5 du présent article...les
bâtiments de guerre)). Les Etats-Unis soutiennent néanmoins que,
ktant donné que 1'USS Samuel B. Roberts escortait des navires com-
merciaux, il bénéficiaitde la protection prévue par le traité de 1955
*pour la liberté de commerce. Mais, en tout état de cause, ces navires States has not shown a breach of Article X, paragraph 1, of the
1955 Treaty in relation to the incident involving the USS Samuel B.
Roberts.

(j) 11 June 1988: Speedboat attacks on the United States-owned,

British-flagged, steam tanker Esso Demetia, loaded at Umm Said
and Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, en route to Halul Island, Qatar, to
complete loading for a planned discharge in Singapore. The Court
notes that the ship was not engaged in commerce or navigation
between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties.

121. None of the vessels described by the United States as being
damaged by Iran's alleged attacks was engaged in commerce or navigation
"between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties". Therefore,

the Court concludes that there has been no breach of Article X, para-
graph 1, of the 1955 Treaty in any of the specific incidents involving these
ships referred to in the United States pleadings.
122. The United States has also presented its claim in a generic sense.
It has asserted that as a result of the cumulation of attacks on United
States and other vessels, laying mines and otherwise engaging in military
actions in the Persian Gulf, Iran made the Gulf unsafe, and thus breached
its obligation with respect to freedom of commerce and freedom of navi-
gation which the United States should have enjoyed under Article X,
paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty.

123. The Court cannot disregard the factual context of the case, as
described in paragraphs 23 and 44 above. While it is a matter of public
record that as a result of the Iran-Iraq war navigation in the Persian Gulf
involved much higher risks, that alone is not sufficient for the Court to
decide that Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty was breached by
Iran. It is for the United States to show that there was an actual impedi-
ment to commerce or navigation between the territories of the two High
Contracting Parties. However, according to the material before the Court
the commerce and navigation between Iran and the United States con-
tinued during the war until the issuance of the United States embargo on
29 October 1987, and subsequently at least to the extent permitted by the

exceptions to the embargo. The United States has not demonstrated that
the alleged acts of Iran actually infringed the freedom of commerce or of
navigation between the territories of the United States and Iran.

The Court considers that, in the circumstances of this case, a generic
claim of breach of Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty cannot be
made out independently of the specific incidents whereby, it is alleged,
the actions of Iran made the Persian Gulf unsafe for commerce and navi-
gation, and specifically for commerce and navigation between the terri-

tories of the parties. However, the examination in paragraph 120 above
of those incidents shows that none of them individually involved any PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 217

ne se livraient pas au commerce ou à la navigation entre l'Iran et les
Etats-Unis, et ces derniers n'ont donc pas démontré une violation du
paragraphe 1 de l'articleX du traité de 1955 en relation avec l'inci-

dent ayant mis en cause I'USS Samuel B. Roberts.
Le Il juin 1988,l'Esso Demetia, pétrolier à vapeur appartenant à une
société américaine et battant pavillon britannique, qui avait chargé à
Umm Said et Ras Tanura (Arabie saoudite) et faisait route vers Halul
Island (Qatar) pour y chercher le reste de sa cargaison, destinée à Sin-
gapour, est attaqué par des vedettes. La Cour note que ce navire ne se
livrait pas au commerce ou à la navigation entre les territoiresdes
deux hautes parties contractantes.

121. Aucun des navires dont les Etats-Unis indiquent qu'ils auraient
été endommagés par des attaques iraniennes ne se livrait au commerce ou
à la navigation ((entre les territoiresdes deux Hautes Parties contrac-
tantes ». La Cour conclut donc qu'il n'y a eu violation du paragraphe 1 de
l'articleX du traité de 1955 lors d'aucun des incidents précis mettant en
cause ces navires et invoqués dans les écritures des Etats-Unis.
122. Les Etats-Unis ont également présenté leur demande dansun sens
général. Ils ont en effet soutenu qu'en dirigeant des attaques répétées
contre des navires des Etats-Unis et autres, en mouillant des mines et en
menant d'autres actions militaires dans le golfe Persique, l'Iran aurait

rendu le Golfe périlleux et aurait ainsi méconnu son obligation relative à
la liberté de commerce et la liberté de navigation dont les Etats-Unis
auraient dû jouir en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l'articlX du traité de 1955.
123. La Cour ne peut pas ne pas tenir compte du contexte factuel de
l'affaire tel qu'il estdécrit aux paragraphes 23 et 44 ci-dessus. S'il est
notoire que, du fait de la guerre entre l'Iran et l'Iraq, la navigation dans
le golfe Persique comportait beaucoup plus de risques, ce fait ne saurait à
lui seul suffire à la Cour pour décider que l'Iran a violéle paragraphe 1 de
l'articleX du traité de 1955. Il incombe aux Etats-Unis de démontrer
qu'il y a eu une entrave effective au commerce ou à la navigation entre les

territoiresdes deux hautes parties contractantes. Or, il ressort des élé-
ments soumis à la Cour que le commerce et la navigation entre l'Iran et
les Etats-Unis se sont poursuivis durant la guerrejusqu'à ce que les Etats-
Unis décrètent un embargo le 29 octobre 1987 et, par la suite, au moins
dans les limites permises au titre des exceptions à cet embargo. Les Etats-
Unis n'ont pas démontré que les faits qu'ils attribuent à l'Iran ont porté
atteinte à la liberté de commerce ou de navigation entre les territoires des
Etats-Unis et de l'Iran.
La Cour considère que, dans les circonstances de la présente espèce,
une réclamation de caractère général alléguant la violation du para-
graphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955 ne peut êtreexaminée sans tenir

compte des incidents précis par lesquels les actions de l'Iran auraient
rendu le golfe Persique périlleux pour le commerce ou la navigation, et
spécialement pour le commerce et la navigation entre les territoiresdes
parties. Or, l'examen de ces incidents, au paragraphe 120, montreinterference with the commerce and navigation protected by the 1955
Treaty; accordingly the generic claim of the United States cannot be

upheld.
124. The Court has thus found that the counter-claim of the United
States concerning breach by Iran of its obligations to the United States
under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, whether based on the
specific incidents listed, or as a generic claim, must be rejected; there is
therefore no need for it to consider, under this head, the contested issues
of attribution of those incidents to Iran. In view of the foregoing, the
United States claim for reparation cannot be upheld.

125. For these reasons,

(1) By fourteen votes to two,

Finds that the actions of the United States of America against Iranian
oil platforms on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988 cannot be justified as
measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United
States of America under Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty
of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United
States of America and Iran, as interpreted in the light of international
law on the use of force; jînds further that the Court cannot however
uphold the submission of the Islamic Republic of Iran that those actions
constitute a breach of the obligations of the United States of America

under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty, regarding freedom of com-
merce between the territories of the parties, and that, accordingly, the
claim of the Islamic Republic of Iran for reparation also cannot be
upheld ;

IN FAVOURP :resident Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek,
Buergenthal, Owada, Simma, Tomka ; Judge ad hoc Rigaux ;

AGAINST :Judges Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby ;
(2) By fifteen votes to one,

Finds that the counter-claim of the United States of America concern-
ing the breach of the obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran under
Article X, paragraph 1, of the above-mentioned 1955 Treaty, regarding
freedom of commerce and navigation between the territories of the
parties, cannot be upheld; and accordingly that the counter-claim of the
United States of America for reparation also cannot be upheld. PLATES-FORME PSTROLIÈRES (ARRÊT) 218

qu'aucun d'entre eux, pris individuellement, n'a porté atteinte au com-
merce et à la navigation protégés par le traité de 1955 ;en conséquence, la
demande de caractère général des Etats-Unis ne peut être accueillie.
124. La Cour est ainsi parvenue à la conclusionque la demande recon-
ventionnelle des Etats-Unis relative à la violation par l'Iran de ses obli-
gations à l'égard des Etats-Unis au titre du paragraphe 1 de l'article X du
traité de 1955, qu'elle soit fondée sur les incidents précis invoqués ou
qu'elle soità entendre dans un sens général,doit être rejetée. Il n'est en
conséquence point besoin pour elle d'examiner, au titre de cettedemande,
les questions contestées d'attribution à l'Iran de ces incidents. Compte
tenu de ce qui précède, la demande en réparation présentéepar les Etats-
Unis ne saurait êtreaccueillie.

125. Par ces motifs,

1) Par quatorze voix contre deux,

Dit que les actions menées par les Etats-Unis d'Amérique contre les
plates-formespétrolières iraniennes le 19 octobre 1987 et le 18 avril 1988
ne sauraient être justifiées en tant que mesures nécessaires à la protection
des intérêts vitauxdes Etats-Unis d'Amérique sur le plan de la sécuritéen
vertu de l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX du traité d'amitié, de
commerce et de droits consulaires de 1955 entre les Etats-Unis d'Amé-
rique et l'Iran, tel qu'interprétà la lumière du droit international relatifà
l'emploi de la force; diten outre qu'elle ne saurait cependant accueillir la
conclusion de la République islamique d'Iran selon laquelle ces actions
constituent une violation par les Etats-Unis d'Amérique des obligations
que leur impose le paragraphe 1 de l'article X dudit traité, relativesà la

liberté de commerce entre les territoires des parties, et qu'en conséquence
elle ne saurait davantage accueillir la demande en réparation présentée
par la République islamique d'Iran;
POUR : M. Shi, président; M. Ranjeva, vice-président; MM. Guillaume,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, Mme Higgins, MM. Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,
Rezek, Buergenthal, Owada, Simma, Tomka, juges; M. Rigaux, juge ad
hoc;
CONTRE :MM. Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby, juges ;
2) Par quinze voix contre une,

Dit que la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis d'Amérique
concernant la violation par la République islamique d'Iran des obliga-
tions que lui impose le paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955 sus-
visé, relativesà la liberté de commerce et de navigation entre les terri-
toires des parties, ne saurait être accueillie; et qu'en conséquence elle ne
saurait davantage accueillir la demande reconventionnelle en réparation
présentéepar les Etats-Unis d'Amérique. IN FAVOUR : President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva ; Judges Guillaume,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek,
Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Tomka; Judge ad hoc
Rigaux ;
AGAINST :Judge Simma.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this sixth day of November, two thousand
and three, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of
the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and the Government of the United States of America,
respectively .

(Signed) SHIJiuyong,
President.

(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR,
Regis trar.

Vice-President RANJEVAand Judge KOROMAappend declarations to
the Judgment of the Court; Judges HIGGINS,PARRA-ARANGUR aEdN
KOOIJMANS append separate opinions to the Judgment of the Court;
Judge AL-KHASAWNEHappends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of
the Court; Judge BUERGENTHAL appends a separate opinion to the Judg-

ment of the Court; Judge ELARABY appends a dissenting opinion to the
Judgment of the Court; Judges OWADA and SIMMAand Judge ad hoc
RIGAUXappend separate opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initialled) J.Y .S.
(Initialled) Ph.C. POUR : M. Shi, président; M. Ranjeva, vice-présiden; MM. Guillaume,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, Mme Higgins, MM. Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,
Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Tomka, juges;
M. Rigaux, juge ad hoc;
CONTRE: M. Simma, juge.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglaisfaisant foau Palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le six novembre deux mille trois, en trois exemplaires,
dont l'un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les autres seront
transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la République islamique
d'Iran et au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

Le président,

(Signé) SHIJiuyong.

Le greffier,
(Signé) Philippe COUVREUR.

M. lejuge RANJEVAv , ice-président, et M. le juge KOROMA joignent des
déclarations à l'arrêt; Mme le juge HIGGINSet MM. les juges PARRA-
ARANGURE et KOOIJMANS joignent à l'arrêt les exposés de leur opinion
individuelle; M. le juge AL-KHASAWNEH joint à l'arrêt l'exposé de son
opinion dissidente; M. le juge BUERGENTHAjL oint à l'arrêt l'exposé de
son opinion individuelle; M. le juge ELARABY joint à l'arrêt l'exposé de
son opinion dissidente; MM. les juges OWADAet SIMMAet M. le juge ad
hoc RIGAUXjoignent à l'arrêt les exposés de leur opinion individuelle.

(Paraphé) J.Y.S.

(Paraphé) Ph.C.

ICJ document subtitle

Merits

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Judgment of 6 November 2003

Links