INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME
DISPUTE
(NICARAGUA v. COLOMBIA)
JUDGMENT OF 19 NOVEMBER 2012
2012
COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
DIFFÉREND
TERRITORIAL ET MARITIME
(NICARAGUA c. COLOMBIE)
ARRÊT DU 19 NOVEMBRE 2012
6 CIJ1034.indb 1 7/01/14 12:43 Official citation :
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 624
Mode officiel de citation :
Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2012, p. 624
Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 N ode vente: 1034
ISBN 978-92-1-071148-7
6 CIJ1034.indb 2 7/01/14 12:43 19 NOVEMBER 2012
JUDGMENT
TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME
DISPUTE
(NICARAGUA v. COLOMBIA)
DIFFÉREND
TERRITORIAL ET MARITIME
(NICARAGUA c. COLOMBIE)
19 NOVEMBRE 2012
ARRÊT
6 CIJ1034.indb 3 7/01/14 12:43 624
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraphs
Chronology of the Procxedure 1-17
I. Geography 18-24
II. Sovereignty 25-103
1. Whether the maritime features in dispute are capable of
appropriation 25-38
2. Sovereignty over the maritime features in dispute 39-102
A. The 1928 Treaty 40-56
B. Uti possidetis juris 57-65
C. Effectivités 66-84
(a) Critical date 67-71
(b) Consideration of effectivités 72-84
D. Alleged recognition by Nicaragua 85-90
E. Position taken by third States 91-95
F. Evidentiary value of maps 96-102
3. Conclusion as to sovereignty over the islands 103
III. Admissibility of Nicaraxgua’s Claim for Delimitaxtion
of a Continental Shelfx Extending beyond 200 Nautxical
Miles 104-112
IV. Consideration of Nicarxagua’s Claim for Delimitxation
of a Continental Shelfx Extending beyond 200 Nautxical
Miles 113-131
V. Maritime Boundary 132-247
1. The task now before the Court 132-136
2. Applicable law 137-139
3. Relevant coasts 140-154
A. The Nicaraguan relevant coast 143-145
B. The Colombian relevant coast 146-154
4. Relevant maritime area 155-166
5. Entitlements generated by maritime features 167-183
A. San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina 168-169
B. Alburquerque Cays, East-Southeast Cays, Roncador,
Serrana, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo 170-180
C. Quitasueño 181-183
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6. Method of delimitation 184-199
7. Determination of base points and construction of the provi-
sional median line 200-204
8. Relevant circumstances 205-228
A. Disparity in the lengths of the relevant coasts 208-211
B. Overall geographical context 212-216
C. Conduct of the Parties 217-220
D. Security and law enforcement considerations 221-222
E. Equitable access to natural resources 223
F. Delimitations already effected in the area 224-228
9. Course of the maritime boundary 229-238
10. The disproportionality test 239-247
VI. Nicaragua’s Request foxr a Declaration 248-250
Operative Clause 251
5
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 2012
2012
19 November
General List 19 November 2012
No. 124
TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME
DISPUTE
(NICARAGUA v. COLOMBIA)
Geographical context — Location and characteristics of maritime features in
dispute.
*
Sovereignty.
Whether maritime features in dispute are capable of appropriation — Islands —
Low‑tide elevations — Question of Quitasueño — Smith Report — Tidal mod ‑
els — QS 32 only feature above water at high tide.
1928 Treaty between Nicaragua and Colombia — 1930 Protocol — 2007 Judg ‑
ment on the Preliminary Objections — Full composition of the Archipelago cannot
be conclusively established on the basis of the 1928 Treaty.
Uti possidetis juris — Maritime features not clearly attributed to the colonial
provinces of Nicaragua and Colombia prior to their independence — Title by vir
tue of uti possidetis juris not established.
Effectivités — Critical date — No Nicaraguan effectivités — Different catego
ries of effectivités presented by Colombia — Normal continuation of prior acts à
titre de souverain after critical date — Continuous and consistent acts à titre de
souverain by Colombia — No protest from Nicaragua prior to critical date —
Colombia’s claim of sovereignty strongly supported by facts.
Alleged recognition by Nicaragua of Colombia’s sovereignty — Nicaragua’s
reaction to the Loubet Award — No Nicaraguan claim to sovereignty over Ronca
dor, Quitasueño and Serrana at time of 1928 Treaty — Change in Nicaragua’s
position in 1972 — Some support to Colombia’s claim provided by Nicaragua’s
conduct, practice of third States and maps.
Colombia has sovereignty over maritime features in dispute.
*
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Admissibility of Nicaragua’s claim for delimitation of a continental ▯shelf extend‑
ing beyond 200 nautical miles — New claim — Original claim concerned delimita ‑
tion of the exclusive economic zone and of the continental shelf — New claim still
concerns delimitation of the continental shelf and arises directly out o▯f maritime
delimitation dispute — No transformation of the subject‑matter of the dispute —
Claim is admissible.
*
Consideration of Nicaragua’s claim for delimitation of an extended co▯ntinental
shelf — Colombia not a party to UNCLOS — Customary international law appli ‑
cable — Definition of the continental shelf in Article 76, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS
forms part of customary international law — No need to decide whether other
provisions of Article 76 form part of customary international law — Claim for an
extended continental shelf by a State party to UNCLOS must be in accorda▯nce
with Article 76 — Nicaragua not relieved of its obligations under Article 76 —
“Preliminary Information” submitted by Nicaragua to the Commission▯ on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf — Continental margin extending beyond 200 nau ‑
tical miles not established — The Court not in a position to delimit the boundary
between the extended continental shelf claimed by Nicaragua and the cont▯inental
shelf of Colombia — Nicaragua’s claim cannot be upheld.
*
Maritime boundary.
Task of the Court — Delimitation between Nicaragua’s continental shelf and
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and exclusive economic zon▯e gener ‑
ated by the Colombian islands — Customary international law applicable — Arti ‑
cles 74 and 83 (maritime delimitation) and Article 121 (régime of islands) of
UNCLOS reflect customary international law.
Relevant coasts — Mainland coast of Nicaragua — Entire coastline of Colom ‑
bian islands — Coastlines of Serranilla, Bajo Nuevo and Quitasueño do not form ▯
part of the relevant coast — Relevant maritime area — Relevant area extends to
200 nautical miles from Nicaragua — Limits of relevant area in the north and in
the south.
Entitlements generated by maritime features — San Andrés, Providencia and
Santa Catalina entitled to territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and ▯continental
shelf — Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo are not relevant for delimitation — Roncador,
Serrana, Alburquerque Cays and East‑Southeast Cays generate territorial sea of
12 nautical miles — Colombia entitled to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles
around QS 32 — No need to determine whether maritime entitlements extend
beyond 12 nautical miles.
Method of delimitation — Three‑stage procedure.
First stage — Construction of a provisional median line between Nicaraguan
coast and western coasts of Colombian islands feasible and appropriate — Deter ‑
mination of base points — No base points on Quitasueño and Serrana — Course
of provisional median line.
Second stage — Relevant circumstances requiring adjustment or shifting of the
provisional line — Substantial disparity in lengths of relevant coasts is a relevant
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circumstance — Overall geographical context — Geological and geomorphological
considerations not relevant — Cut‑off effect is a relevant circumstance — Conduct
of the Parties not a relevant circumstance — Legitimate security concerns to be
borne in mind — Issues of access to natural resources not a relevant circum ‑
stance — Delimitations already effected in the area not a relevant circumsta▯nce —
Judgment is without prejudice to any claim of a third State.
Distinction between western and eastern parts of relevant area — Shifting east ‑
wards of the provisional median line — Different weights accorded to Nicaraguan
and Colombian base points — Curved shape of weighted line — Simplified
weighted line — Course of the boundary eastwards from extreme northern and
southern points of the simplified weighted line — Use of parallels — Quitasueño
and Serrana enclaved — Maritime boundary around Quitasueño and Serrana.
Third stage — Disproportionality test — No need to achieve strict proportional‑
ity — No disproportionality such as to create an inequitable result.
*
Nicaragua’s request for a declaration of Colombia’s unlawful condu▯ct — Mari ‑
time delimitation de novo not granting to Nicaragua the entirety of the areas it
claimed — Request unfounded.
JUDGMENT
Present: President Tomka ;Vice‑President Sepúlveda-Amor ; Judges Owada,
Abraham, Keith, Bennounax, Skotnikov, Cançado Trixndade,
Yusuf, Greenwood, Xue, Donoxghue, Sebutinde ; Judges ad hoc
Mensah, Cot ; Registrar Couvreur.
In the case concerning the territorial and maritime dispute,
between
the Republic of Nicaragua,
represented by
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of the Republic of Nic -
aragua to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agent and Counsel ;
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., former Chichele Professor of International Law,
University of Oxford, associate member of the Institut de droit interna -
tional,
Mr. Alex Oude Elferink, Deputy-Director, Netherlands Institute for the Law
of the Sea, Utrecht University,
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Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La
Défense, former Member and former Chairman of the International Law
Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Paul Reichler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C.,
Member of the Bars of the United States Supreme Court and the District
of Columbia,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad
Autónoma, Madrid, member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates ;
Mr. Robin Cleverly, M.A., D.Phil, C.Geol, F.G.S., Law of the Sea Consult -
ant, Admiralty Consultancy Services, The United Kingdom Hydrographic
Office,
Mr. John Brown, R.D., M.A., F.R.I.N., F.R.G.S., Law of the Sea Consult -
ant, Admiralty Consultancy Services, The United Kingdom Hydrographic
Office,
as Scientific and Technical Advisers ;
Mr. César Vega Masís, Director of Juridical Affairs, Sovereignty and Terri -
tory, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of
the Bars of the United States Supreme Court, the District of Columbia anxd
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Ms Carmen Martínez Capdevila, Doctor of Public International Law, Uni -
versidad Autónoma, Madrid,
as Counsel ;
Mr. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, First Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Claudia Loza Obregon, Second Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Romain Piéri, Researcher, Centre for International Law (CEDIN), Unix -
versity Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Yuri Parkhomenko, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C.,
as Assistant Counsel ;
Ms Helena Patton, The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office,
Ms Fiona Bloor, The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office,
as Technical Assistants,
and
the Republic of Colombia,
represented by
H.E. Mr. Julio Londoño Paredes, Professor of International Relations, Uni -
versidad del Rosario, Bogotá,
as Agent and Counsel ;
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Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Lawx,
University of Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,
Barrister,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, member of the
New York Bar, Eversheds LLP, Paris,
Mr. Marcelo Kohen, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Insti -
tute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, associate member
of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates ;
H.E. Mr. Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, Ambassador of the Republic of
Colombia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Permanent Representative
of Colombia to the OPCW,
as Adviser ;
H.E. Mr. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, Presidential High-Commissioner for
Citizenry Security, former Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to thex
Kingdom of the Netherlands, former Minister of State,
Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Member of the International Law Commis -
sion,
H.E. Ms Sonia Pereira Portilla, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairxs,
Mr. Andelfo García González, Professor of International Law, former Dep -
uty Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ms Mirza Gnecco Plá, Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Andrea Jiménez Herrera, Counsellor, Embassy of Colombia in the Kinxg -
dom of the Netherlands,
as Legal Advisers ;
CF William Pedroza, International Affairs Bureau, National Navy of Colxom -
bia,
Mr. Scott Edmonds, Cartographer, International Mapping,
Mr. Thomas Frogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Advisers ;
Mr. Camilo Alberto Gómez Niño,
as Administrative Assistant,
The Court,
composed as above,
after deliberation,
delivers the following Judgment :
1. On 6 December 2001, the Republic of Nicaragua (hereinafter “Nicara -
gua”) filed in the Registry of the Court an Application institutinxg proceedings
against the Republic of Colombia (hereinafter “Colombia”) in resxpect of a dis -
pute consisting of “a group of related legal issues subsisting” bextween the two
States “concerning title to territory and maritime delimitation” ixn the western
Caribbean.
In its Application, Nicaragua seeks to found the jurisdiction of the Couxrt on
the provisions of Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement
signed on 30 April 1948, officially designated, according to Article LX thereof,
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as the “Pact of Bogotá” (hereinafter referred to as such), asx well as on the dec -
larations made by the Parties under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, which are deemed, for the period which txhey still
have to run, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the prexsent
Court under Article 36, paragraph 5, of its Statute.
2. In accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court,
the Registrar immediately communicated the Application to the Governmentx of
Colombia; and, in accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, all other States
entitled to appear before the Court were notified of the Application.
3. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of
either of the Parties, each Party proceeded to exercise its right conferxred by Art-
cle 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case.
Nicaragua first chose Mr. Mohammed Bedjaoui, who resigned on 2 May 2006,
and then Mr. Giorgio Gaja. Following Mr. Gaja’s election as a Member
of the Court, Nicaragua chose Mr. Thomas Mensah. Judge Gaja then decided
that it would not be appropriate for him to sit in the case. Colombia fixrst
chose Mr. Yves Fortier, who resigned on 7 September 2010, and subsequently
Mr. Jean-Pierre Cot.
4. By an Order dated 26 February 2002, the Court fixed 28 April 2003 as the
time-limit for the filing of the Memorial of Nicaragua and 28 June 2004 as the
time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial of Colombia. Nicaragua filed
its Memorial within the time-limit so prescribed.
5. On 21 July 2003, within the time-limit set by Article 79, paragraph 1, of
the Rules of Court, as amended on 5 December 2000, Colombia raised prelimi-
nary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court. Consequently, by an Orxder
dated 24 September 2003, the Court, noting that by virtue of Article 79, para -
graph 5, of the Rules of Court, the proceedings on the merits were suspended, x
fixed 26 January 2004 as the time-limit for the presentation by Nicaragua of a
written statement of its observations and submissions on the preliminaryx objec-
tions made by Colombia. Nicaragua filed such a statement within the tixme-limit
so prescribed, and the case thus became ready for hearing in respect of xthe pre-
liminary objections.
6. The Court held public hearings on the preliminary objections raised by
Colombia from 4 to 8 June 2007. In its Judgment of 13 December 2007, the Court
concluded that it had jurisdiction, under Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá, to
adjudicate upon the dispute concerning sovereignty over the maritime feaxtures
claimed by the Parties, other than the islands of San Andrés, Providexncia and
Santa Catalina, and upon the dispute concerning the maritime delimitatioxn
between the Parties (Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 876, para. 142 (3)).
7. By an Order of 11 February 2008, the President of the Court fixed
11 November 2008 as the new time-limit for the filing of Colombia’s Counter-
Memorial. That pleading was duly filed within the time-limit thus prescribed.
8. By an Order of 18 December 2008, the Court directed Nicaragua to submit
a Reply and Colombia to submit a Rejoinder and fixed 18 September 2009 and
18 June 2010 as the respective time-limits for the filing of those pleadings. The
Reply and the Rejoinder were duly filed within the time-limits thus prescribed.
9. Referring to Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the Govern -
ments of Honduras, Jamaica, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Costa Rixca
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asked to be furnished with copies of the pleadings and documents annexedx in
the case. Having ascertained the views of the Parties in accordance withx that
same provision, the Court decided to grant each of these requests. The Rxegistrar
duly communicated these decisions to the said Governments and to the Parxties.
10. On 25 February 2010 and 10 June 2010, respectively, the Republic of
Costa Rica and the Republic of Honduras each filed in the Registry of xthe Court
an Application for permission to intervene in the case, invoking Articlex 62 of the
Statute of the Court. In separate Judgments rendered on 4 May 2011, the Court
found that those Applications could not be granted.
11. In accordance with Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the
Court decided that, after ascertaining the views of the Parties, copies xof the
pleadings and documents annexed would be made accessible to the public oxn the
opening of the oral proceedings.
12. Public hearings were held between 23 April and 4 May 2012, at which the
Court heard the oral arguments and replies of :
For Nicaragua : H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez,
Mr. Alex Oude Elferink,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns,
Mr. Alain Pellet,
Mr. Robin Cleverly,
Mr. Vaughan Lowe,
Mr. Paul Reichler.
For Colombia : H.E. Mr. Julio Londoño Paredes,
Mr. James Crawford,
Mr. Marcelo Kohen,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy.
13. The Parties provided judges’ folders during the oral proceedings. The
Court noted, with reference to Article 56, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, as
supplemented by Practice Direction IXbis, that two documents included by
Nicaragua in one of its judges’ folders had not been annexed to the wxritten
pleadings and were not “part of a publication readily available”. xThe Court thus
decided not to allow those two documents to be produced or referred to dxuring
the hearings.
14. At the hearings, Members of the Court put questions to the Parties, to
which replies were given orally and in writing, in accordance with Articxle 61,
paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court. Under Article 72 of the Rules of Court,
each Party presented written observations on the written replies receivexd from
the other.
*
15. In its Application, the following requests were made by Nicaragua :
“[T]he Court is asked to adjudge and declare :
First, that the Republic of Nicaragua has sovereignty over the islands of
Providencia, San Andrés and Santa Catalina and all the appurtenant isxlands
and keys, and also over the Roncador, Serrana, Serranilla and Quitasueño
keys (in so far as they are capable of appropriation) ;
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Second, in the light of the determinations concerning title requested
above, the Court is asked further to determine the course of the single mar-
itime boundary between the areas of continental shelf and exclusive eco -
nomic zone appertaining respectively to Nicaragua and Colombia, in
accordance with equitable principles and relevant circumstances recognizxed
by general international law as applicable to such a delimitation of a sxingle
maritime boundary.”
Nicaragua also stated :
“Whilst the principal purpose of this Application is to obtain declarxations
concerning title and the determination of maritime boundaries, the Goverxn -
ment of Nicaragua reserves the right to claim compensation for elements xof
unjust enrichment consequent upon Colombian possession of the Islands ofx
San Andrés and Providencia as well as the keys and maritime spaces upx to
the 82 meridian, in the absence of lawful title. The Government of Nicara -
gua also reserves the right to claim compensation for interference with xfish-
ing vessels of Nicaraguan nationality or vessels licensed by Nicaragua.
The Government of Nicaragua, further, reserves the rights to supplement
or to amend the present Application.”
16. In the written proceedings, the following submissions were presented by x
the Parties :
On behalf of the Government of Nicaragua,
in the Memorial :
“Having regard to the legal considerations and evidence set forth in xthis
Memorial : May it please the Court to adjudge and declare that :
(1) the Republic of Nicaragua has sovereignty over the islands of
San Andrés, Providencia, and SantaCatalina and the appurtenant islets
and cays ;
(2) the Republic of Nicaragua has sovereignty over the following cays: the
Cayos de Alburquerque ; the Cayos del Este Sudeste ; the Cay of Ron-
cador; North Cay, Southwest Cay and any other cays on the bank of
Serrana; East Cay, Beacon Cay and any other cays on the bank of
Serranilla; and Low Cay and any other cays on the bank of Bajo
Nuevo ;
(3) if the Court were to find that there are features on the bank of Qui -
tasueño that qualify as islands under international law, the Court isx
requested to find that sovereignty over such features rests with Nicarxa -
gua ;
(4) the Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty signed in Managua on 24 March 1928
was not legally valid and, in particular, did not provide a legal basis xfor
Colombian claims to San Andrés and Providencia ;
(5) in case the Court were to find that the Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty had
been validly concluded, then the breach of this Treaty by Colombia
entitled Nicaragua to declare its termination ;
(6) in case the Court were to find that the Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty had
been validly concluded and were still in force, then to determine that
this Treaty did not establish a delimitation of the maritime areas alongx
the 82° meridian of longitude west ;
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(7) in case the Court finds that Colombia has sovereignty in respect of thxe
islands of San Andrés and Providencia, these islands be enclaved and x
accorded a territorial sea entitlement of twelve miles, this being the
appropriate equitable solution justified by the geographical and legalx
framework ;
(8) the equitable solution for the cays, in case they were to be found to bex
Colombian, is to delimit a maritime boundary by drawing a 3 nautical
mile enclave around them ;
(9) the appropriate form of delimitation, within the geographical and legal
framework constituted by the mainland coasts of Nicaragua and
Colombia, is a single maritime boundary in the form of a median line
between these mainland coasts.”
in the Reply :
“Having regard to the legal considerations and evidence set forth in xthis
Reply :
I. May it please the Court to adjudge and declare that :
(1) The Republic of Nicaragua has sovereignty over all maritime features
off her Caribbean coast not proven to be part of the ‘San Andrésx Archi -
pelago’ and in particular the following cays : the Cayos de Alburquer -
que; the Cayos del Este Sudeste ; the Cay of Roncador ; North Cay,
Southwest Cay and any other cays on the bank of Serrana ; East Cay,
Beacon Cay and any other cays on the bank of Serranilla ; and Low
Cay and any other cays on the bank of Bajo Nuevo.
(2) If the Court were to find that there are features on the bank of
Quitasueño that qualify as islands under international law, the Courtx
is requested to find that sovereignty over such features rests with Nixca-
ragua.
(3) The appropriate form of delimitation, within the geographical and legal
framework constituted by the mainland coasts of Nicaragua and
Colombia, is a continental shelf boundary with the following co-ordi -
nates :
Latitude north Longitude west
1. 13° 33ʹ18 ˝N 76° 30ʹ 53˝ W ;
2. 13° 31ʹ 12˝ N 76° 33ʹ 47˝ W ;
3. 13° 08ʹ 33˝ N 77° 00ʹ 33˝ W ;
4. 12° 49ʹ 52˝ N 77° 13ʹ 14˝ W ;
5. 12° 30ʹ 36˝ N 77° 19ʹ 49˝ W ;
6. 12° 11ʹ 00˝ N 77° 25ʹ 14˝ W ;
7. 11° 43ʹ 38˝ N 77° 30ʹ 33˝ W ;
8. 11° 38ʹ 40˝ N 77° 32ʹ 19˝ W ;
9. 11° 34ʹ 05˝ N 77° 35ʹ 55˝ W.
(All co-ordinates are referred to WGS84.)
(4) The islands of San Andrés and Providencia (Santa Catalina) be enclaxved
and accorded a maritime entitlement of twelve nautical miles, this beingx
the appropriate equitable solution justified by the geographical and
legal framework.
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(5) The equitable solution for any cay, that might be found to be Colom -
bian, is to delimit a maritime boundary by drawing a 3-nautical-mile
enclave around them.
II. Further, the Court is requested to adjudge and declare that :
— Colombia is not acting in accordance with her obligations under inter-
national law by stopping and otherwise hindering Nicaragua from
accessing and disposing of her natural resources to the east of the 82ndx
meridian ;
— Colombia immediately cease all these activities which constitute viola
tions of Nicaragua’s rights ;
— Colombia is under an obligation to make reparation for the damage
and injuries caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of the obligations
referred to above ; and,
— The amount of this reparation shall be determined in a subsequent
phase of these proceedings.”
On behalf of the Government of Colombia,
in the Counter-Memorial :
“For the reasons set out in this Counter-Memorial, taking into account
the Judgment on Preliminary Objections and rejecting any contrary submisx-
sions of Nicaragua, Colombia requests the Court to adjudge and declare :
(a) That Colombia has sovereignty over all the maritime features in dispute
between the Parties : Alburquerque, East-Southeast, Roncador, Ser -
rana, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo, and all their appurtenanxt
features, which form part of the Archipelago of San Andrés ;
(b) That the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continen -
tal shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia is to be effected by a singlex
maritime boundary, being the median line every point of which is equi-
distant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial seas of the Parties is measured, as depicted on Fig
ure 9.2 of this Counter-Memorial.
Colombia reserves the right to supplement or amend the present submis-
sions.”
in the Rejoinder :
“For the reasons set out in the Counter-Memorial and developed further
in this Rejoinder, taking into account the Judgment on Preliminary Objecx-
tions and rejecting any contrary submissions of Nicaragua, Colombia
requests the Court to adjudge and declare :
(a) That Colombia has sovereignty over all the maritime features in dispute
between the Parties : Alburquerque, East-Southeast, Roncador, Ser -
rana, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo, and all their appurtenanxt
features, which form part of the Archipelago of San Andrés ;
(b) That the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continen -
tal shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia is to be effected by a singlex
maritime boundary, being the median line every point of which is equi-
distant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial seas of the Parties is measured, as depicted on Fig
15
6 CIJ1034.indb 26 7/01/14 12:43 636 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
ure 9.2 of the Counter-Memorial, and reproduced as Figure R-8.3 of
this Rejoinder ;
(c) That Nicaragua’s request for a Declaration . . . is rejected.
Colombia reserves the right to supplement or amend the present submis-
sions.”
17. At the oral proceedings, the following submissions were presented by thex
Parties :
On behalf of the Government of Nicaragua,
at the hearing of 1 May 2012 :
“In accordance with Article 60 of the Rules of Court and having regard
to the pleadings, written and oral, the Republic of Nicaragua,
I. May it please the Court to adjudge and declare that :
(1) The Republic of Nicaragua has sovereignty over all maritime features
off her Caribbean coast not proven to be part of the ‘San Andrésx Archi-
pelago’ and in particular the following cays : the Cayos de Alburquer -
que; the Cayos del Este Sudeste ; the Cay of Roncador ; North Cay,
Southwest Cay and any other cays on the bank of Serrana ; East Cay,
Beacon Cay and any other cays on the bank of Serranilla ; and Low
Cay and any other cays on the bank of Bajo Nuevo.
(2) If the Court were to find that there are features on the bank of Qui -
tasueño that qualify as islands under international law, the Court isx
requested to find that sovereignty over such features rests with Nicarx-
gua.
(3) The appropriate form of delimitation, within the geographical and legal
framework constituted by the mainland coasts of Nicaragua and
Colombia, is a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the
overlapping entitlements to a continental shelf of both Parties.
(4) The islands of San Andrés and Providencia and Santa Catalina be
enclaved and accorded a maritime entitlement of 12 nautical miles, this
being the appropriate equitable solution justified by the geographicalx
and legal framework.
(5) The equitable solution for any cay, that might be found to be Colom -
bian, is to delimit a maritime boundary by drawing a 3-nautical-mile
enclave around them.
II. Further, the Court is requested to adjudge and declare that :
— Colombia is not acting in accordance with her obligations under inter -
national law by stopping and otherwise hindering Nicaragua from
accessing and disposing of her natural resources to the east of the 82ndx
meridian.”
On behalf of the Government of Colombia,
at the hearing of 4 May 2012 :
“In accordance with Article 60 of the Rules of Court, for the reasons set
16
6 CIJ1034.indb 28 7/01/14 12:43 637 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
out in Colombia’s written and oral pleadings, taking into account thex Jud-g
ment on Preliminary Objections and rejecting any contrary submissions ofx
Nicaragua, Colombia requests the Court to adjudge and declare :
(a) That Nicaragua’s new continental shelf claim is inadmissible and thatx,
consequently, Nicaragua’s Submission I (3) is rejected.
(b) That Colombia has sovereignty over all the maritime features in dispute
between the Parties : Alburquerque, East-Southeast, Roncador, Ser -
rana, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo, and all their appurtenanxt
features, which form part of the Archipelago of San Andrés.
(c) That the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continen-
tal shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia is to be effected by a singlex
maritime boundary, being the median line every point of which is equi
distant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial seas of the Parties is measured, as depicted on the mxap
attached to these submissions.
(d) That Nicaragua’s written Submission II is rejected.”
*
* *
I. Geography
18. The area where the maritime features in dispute (listed in the Par -
ties’ submissions in paragraphs 16 and 17 above) are located and within
which the delimitation sought is to be carried out lies in the Caribbeanx
Sea. The Caribbean Sea is an arm of the Atlantic Ocean partially enclosexd
to the north and east by the islands of the West Indies, and bounded to x
the south and west by South and Central America.
19. Nicaragua is situated in the south-western part of the Caribbean
Sea. To the north of Nicaragua lies Honduras and to the south lie Costa x
Rica and Panama. To the north-east, Nicaragua faces Jamaica and to the
east, it faces the mainland coast of Colombia. Colombia is located to thxe
south of the Caribbean Sea. In terms of its Caribbean front, it is bordered
to the west by Panama and to the east by Venezuela. The islands of San
Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina lie in the south-west of the
Caribbean Sea, a little more than 100 nautical miles to the east of the
Nicaraguan coast. (For the general geography of the area, see sketch-map
No. 1, p. 639.)
20. In the western part of the Caribbean Sea there are numerous reefs,
some of which reach above the water surface in the form of cays. Cays arxe
small, low islands composed largely of sand derived from the physical
breakdown of coral reefs by wave action and subsequent reworking by
17
6 CIJ1034.indb 30 7/01/14 12:43 638 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
wind. Larger cays can accumulate enough sediment to allow for coloniza-
tion and fixation by vegetation. Atolls and banks are also common in txhis
area. An atoll is a coral reef enclosing a lagoon. A bank is a rocky or x
sandy submerged elevation of the sea floor with a summit less than
200 metres below the surface. Banks whose tops rise close enough to the
sea surface (conventionally taken to be less than 10 metres below water
level at low tide) are called shoals. Maritime features which qualify axs
islands or low-tide elevations may be located on a bank or shoal.
21. There are a number of Nicaraguan islands located off the mainland
coast of Nicaragua. To the north can be found Edinburgh Reef, Muerto
Cay, the Miskitos Cays and Ned Thomas Cay. The Miskitos Cays are
largely given up to a nature reserve. The largest cay, Miskitos Cay, is
approximately 12 square km in size. To the south are the two Corn
Islands (sometimes known as the Mangle Islands), which are located
approximately 26 nautical miles from the mainland coast and have an
area, respectively, of 9.6 square km (Great Corn) and 3 square km (Little
Corn). The Corn Islands have a population of approximately 7,400.
Roughly midway between these two groups of islands can be found the
small island of Roca Tyra.
22. The islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina are
situated opposite the mainland coast of Nicaragua. San Andrés is apprxox -
imately 105 nautical miles from Nicaragua. Providencia and Santa Cata -
lina are located some 47 nautical miles north-east of San Andrés and
approximately 125 nautical miles from Nicaragua. All three islands are
approximately 380 nautical miles from the mainland of Colombia.
San Andrés has an area of some 26 square km. Its central part is made
up of a mountainous sector with a maximum height of 100 metres across
the island from north to south, from where it splits into two branches. x
San Andrés has a population of over 70,000. Providencia is some
17.5 square km in area. It has varied vegetation. On the north, east and
south coasts, Providencia is fringed by an extensive barrier reef. It haxs a
permanent population of about 5,000. Santa Catalina is located north of x
Providencia. It is separated from Providencia by the Aury Channel, some x
130 metres in width.
23. Nicaragua, in its Application, claimed sovereignty over the islands
of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. In its Judgment of
13 December 2007 (Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v.
Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II),
p. 832), the Court held that it had no jurisdiction with regard to this
claim, because the question of sovereignty over these three islands had
been determined by the Treaty concerning Territorial Questions at Issue x
between Colombia and Nicaragua, signed at Managua on 24 March 1928
(hereinafter the “1928 Treaty”), by which Nicaragua recognized Colom -
bian sovereignty over these islands.
18
6 CIJ1034.indb 32 7/01/14 12:43 639 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
-16-
Judated 8 October(2n0o0t7in force)rleaJaaltetTyrarBoelifaTlta1yrt9eeo9araft3yl1To9fr7e61a9ty77of 1980
REPUBLIC
DOMINICAN
VENEZUELA
HAITI
COLOMBIA
C B
JAMAICA A M CARIBBEAN SEA
M O
A L
Bajo Nuevo J O
C
COLOMBIA
JOINT AREAombia / Jamaica
REGIME
Roncador
Serrana
Serranilla
A
A U East-Southeast Cays
R A
U R Quitasueño San Andrés A
N A Providencia/ AC M PANAMA
OI Santa CatalinCays IR AN
H N COLOMBIAAT AP
COSTA RICO
Alburquerque C
WGS 84
Cays
Miskitos
Island Island
Little Corn
Sketch-map No. 1: Great Corn
Geographical context
Mercator Projection (12° 30' N) RICA
COSTA
This sketch-map has been prepared for illustrative purposes.
The symbols showing maritime features indicate only their location,
and not their physical characteristics or geogrNICARAGUAnd legal status.
HONDURAS
19
6 CIJ1034.indb 34 7/01/14 12:43 640 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
24. Starting from the south-west of the Caribbean and moving to the
north-east, there are various maritime features, sovereignty over which
continues to be in dispute between the Parties.
(a) Alburquerque Cays 1
Alburquerque is an atoll with a diameter of about 8 km. Two cays on
Alburquerque, North Cay and South Cay, are separated by a shallow
water channel, 386 metres wide. The Alburquerque Cays lie about 100 nau -
tical miles to the east of the mainland of Nicaragua, 65 nautical miles to
the east of the Corn Islands, 375 nautical miles from the mainland of
Colombia, 20 nautical miles to the south of the island of San Andrés and
26 nautical miles to the south-west of the East-Southeast Cays.
(b) East‑Southeast Cays
The East-Southeast Cays (East Cay, Bolivar Cay (also known as Mid -
dle Cay), West Cay and Arena Cay) are located on an atoll extending
over some 13 km in a north-south direction. The East-Southeast Cays lie
120 nautical miles from the mainland of Nicaragua, 90 nautical miles
from the Corn Islands, 360 nautical miles from the mainland of Colom -
bia, 16 nautical miles south-east of the island of San Andrés and 26 nauti-
cal miles from Alburquerque Cays.
(c) Roncador
Roncador is an atoll located on a bank 15 km long and 7 km wide. It
is about 190 nautical miles to the east of the mainland of Nicaragua,
320 nautical miles from the mainland of Colombia, 75 nautical miles east
of the island of Providencia and 45 nautical miles from Serrana. Ronca -
dor Cay, located half a mile from the northern border of the bank, is
some 550 metres long and 300 metres wide.
(d) Serrana
The bank of Serrana is located at 170 nautical miles from the mainland
of Nicaragua and about 360 nautical miles from the mainland of Colom -
bia; it lies approximately 45 nautical miles to the north of Roncador,
80 nautical miles from Providencia and 145 nautical miles from the Miski -
tos Cays. There are a number of cays on this bank. The largest one, Ser -
rana Cay (also known as Southwest Cay), is some 1,000 metres in length
and has an average width of 400 metres.
(e) Quitasueño
The Parties differ about the geographical characteristics of Quitasueño
(a large bank approximately 57 km long and 20 km wide) which is located
1 These cays are referred to either as “Alburquerque” or as “Albuxquerque”. For the
purposes of the present case, the Court will use “Alburquerque”.
20
6 CIJ1034.indb 36 7/01/14 12:43 641 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
45 nautical miles west of Serrana, 38 nautical miles from Santa Catalina,
90 nautical miles from the Miskitos Cays and 40 nautical miles from
Providencia, on which are located a number of features the legal status xof
which is disputed.
(f) Serranilla
The bank of Serranilla lies 200 nautical miles from the mainland of
Nicaragua, 190 nautical miles from the Miskitos Cays, 400 nautical miles
from the mainland of Colombia, about 80 nautical miles to the north of
the bank of Serrana, 69 nautical miles west of Bajo Nuevo, and 165 nau -
tical miles from Providencia. The cays on Serranilla include East Cay,
Middle Cay and Beacon Cay (also known as Serranilla Cay). The largest x
of them, Beacon Cay, is 650 metres long and some 300 metres wide.
(g) Bajo Nuevo
The bank of Bajo Nuevo is located 265 nautical miles from the main -
land of Nicaragua, 245 nautical miles from the Miskitos Cays and about
360 nautical miles from the mainland of Colombia. It lies around 69 nau -
tical miles east of Serranilla, 138 nautical miles from Serrana and 205 nau-
tical miles from Providencia. There are three cays on Bajo Nuevo, the
largest of which is Low Cay (300 metres long and 40 metres wide).
II. Sovereignty
1. Whether the Maritime Features in Dispute Are Capable of
Appropriation
25. The Court recalls that the maritime features in dispute comprise
the Alburquerque Cays, East-Southeast Cays, Roncador, Serrana, Quita-
sueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo. Before addressing the question of sov -
ereignty, the Court must determine whether these maritime features in
dispute are capable of appropriation.
26. It is well established in international law that islands, however
small, are capable of appropriation (see, e.g., Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 102, para. 206). By contrast,
low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated, although “a coastal State hasx
sovereignty over low-tide elevations which are situated within its territo -
rial sea, since it has sovereignty over the territorial sea itself” (xibid., p. 101,
para. 204) and low-tide elevations within the territorial sea may be taken
into account for the purpose of measuring the breadth of the territorialx
sea (see paragraph 182 below).
21
6 CIJ1034.indb 38 7/01/14 12:43 642 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
27. The Parties agree that Alburquerque Cays, East-Southeast Cays,
Roncador, Serrana, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo remain above water at
high tide and thus, as islands, they are capable of appropriation. They x
disagree, however, as to whether any of the features on Quitasueño quxal-
ify as islands.
* *
28. According to Nicaragua, Quitasueño is a shoal, all of the features
on which are permanently submerged at high tide. In support of its posi -
tion, Nicaragua invokes a survey prepared in 1937 by an official of thex
Colombian Foreign Ministry which states that “[t]he Quitasueño Cayx
does not exist”. Nicaragua also quotes another passage from the reporxt,
that “[t]here is no guano or eggs in Quitasueño because there is nxo firm
land”. Nicaragua also refers to the 1972 Vázquez-Saccio Treaty between
Colombia and the United States whereby the United States relinquished
“any and all claims of sovereignty over Quita Sueño, Roncador and xSer -
rana”. Nicaragua emphasizes that this treaty was accompanied by an
exchange of diplomatic Notes wherein the United States expressed its
position that Quitasueño “being permanently submerged at high tide, is
not at the present time subject to the exercise of sovereignty”. In axddition,
Nicaragua makes extensive reference to earlier surveys of Quitasueño xand
to various charts of that part of the Caribbean, none of which, accordinxg
to Nicaragua, show the presence of any islands at Quitasueño.
29. For its part, Colombia, relying on two surveys, namely the Study
on Quitasueño and Alburquerque prepared by the Colombian Navy in
September 2008 and the Expert Report by Dr. Robert Smith, “Mapping
the Islands of Quitasueño (Colombia) — Their Baselines, Territorial Sea,
and Contiguous Zone” ofFebruary 2010 (hereinafter the “Smith Report”),
argues that there are 34 individual features within Quitasueño which
“qualify as islands because they are above water at high tide” andx at least
20 low-tide elevations situated well within 12 nautical miles of one or more
of those islands. The Smith report refers to these features as “QS 1” to
“QS 54”.
30. Nicaragua points out that both reports relied on by Colombia were
prepared specially for the purposes of the present proceedings. Nicaraguxa
contests the findings that there are 34 features that are “permanently
above water” and objects to the method used by Dr. Smith in making
these findings. Nicaragua considers that the global Grenoble Tide Modexl
used by Dr. Smith is inappropriate for determining whether some of the
features at Quitasueño are above water at Highest Astronomical Tide
(HAT). According to Nicaragua, the global Grenoble Tide Model is used x
for research purposes for modelling ocean tides but, as stated by the
United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”x)
in its published collection of global tidal models, these global models x“are
22
6 CIJ1034.indb 40 7/01/14 12:43 643 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
accurate to within 2 to 3 cm in waters deeper than 200 m. In shallow
waters they are quite inaccurate, which makes them unsuitable for navi -
gation or other practical applications.”
Colombia disagrees with Nicaragua’s criticism of the Grenoble Tide
Model. It contends that this model should not be rejected for three rea -
sons, namely that international law does not prescribe the use of any paxr-
ticular method of tidal measurement, that the measurements of the many
features made by Dr.Smith were accurate and clear, and that his approach
to whether those features were above water at “high tide” was consxerva-
tive, because it was based upon HAT rather than “mean high tide”.
31. Nicaragua claims that the “‘Admiralty Total Tide’ model”, prxo -
duced by the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, is more appropriate
to determine height in the area of Quitasueño, because it is more accxurate
in shallow waters. Applying that model to the features identified in txhe
Smith Report, all the features, except for the one described in the Smith
report as “QS 32”, are below water at HAT. QS 32’s height above HAT
is about 1.2 metres according to the Smith Report, but only 0.7 metres if
measured by the “‘Admiralty Total Tide’ model”.
32. In any case, Nicaragua contends that QS 32 is “[a]n individual
piece of coral debris, that is, a part of the skeleton of a dead animal,x is
not a naturally formed area of land” and, as such, does not fall withxin the
definition of islands entitled to maritime zones. In response, Colombixa
notes that there is no case in which a feature has been denied the statuxs of
an island merely because it was composed of coral. According to Colom -
bia, coral islands are naturally formed and generate a territorial sea as do
other islands. Colombia moreover asserts that QS 32 is not coral debris,
but rather represents part of a much larger coral reef firmly attachedx to
the substrate.
33. Nicaragua also claims that size is crucial for determining whether a
maritime feature qualifies as an island under international law. It noxtes
that the top of QS 32 “seems to measure some 10 to 20 cm”. Colombia,
on the other hand, contends that customary international law does not
prescribe a minimum size for a maritime feature to qualify as an island.x
* *
34. The Court recalls that, in its Judgment in the Pulp Mills case, it
said that
“the Court does not find it necessary in order to adjudicate the prxes -
ent case to enter into a general discussion on the relative merits, relix-
ability and authority of the documents and studies prepared by the
experts and consultants of the Parties. It needs only to be mindful of
23
6 CIJ1034.indb 42 7/01/14 12:43 644 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
the fact that, despite the volume and complexity of the factual infor -
mation submitted to it, it is the responsibility of the Court, after h-vx
ing given careful consideration to all the evidence placed before it by x
the Parties, to determine which facts must be considered relevant, to
assess their probative value, and to draw conclusions from them as
appropriate. Thus, in keeping with its practice, the Court will make
its own determination of the facts, on the basis of the evidence pre -
sented to it, and then it will apply the relevant rules of internationalx
law to those facts which it has found to have existed.” (Pulp Mills on
the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2010 (I), pp. 72-73, para. 168.)
35. The issue which the Court has to decide is whether or not there
exist at Quitasueño any naturally formed areas of land which are abovxe
water at high tide. It does not consider that surveys conducted many
years (in some cases many decades) before the present proceedings are x
relevant in resolving that issue. Nor does the Court consider that the
charts on which Nicaragua relies have much probative value with regard
to that issue. Those charts were prepared in order to show dangers to
shipping at Quitasueño, not to distinguish between those features whixch
were just above, and those which were just below, water at high tide.
36. The Court considers that what is relevant to the issue before it is
the contemporary evidence. Of that evidence, by far the most important
is the Smith Report, which is based upon actual observations of condi -
tions at Quitasueño and scientific evaluation of those conditions. xNever-
theless, the Court considers that the conclusions of that Report have tox
be treated with a degree of caution. As the Court has already stated, evxen
the smallest island generates a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea (see Mari ‑
time Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain
(Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, pp. 101-102,
para. 205; see also Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua
and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 751, para. 302). The Court therefore has to
make sure that it has before it evidence sufficient to satisfy that a mxari -
time feature meets the test of being above water at high tide. In the prxes-
ent case, the proof offered by Colombia depends upon acceptance of a
tidal model which NASA describes as inaccurate in shallow waters. The
waters around Quitasueño are very shallow. Moreover, all of the features
at Quitasueño are minuscule and, even on the Grenoble Tide Model, arex
only just above water at high tide — according to the Smith Report, with
the exception of QS 32 only one feature (QS 24) is more than 30 cm and
only four others measured on site (QS 17, QS 35, QS 45 and QS 53) are
more than 20 cm above water at high tide ; a fifth, measured from the
boat (QS 30), was 23.2 cm above water at high tide. The other 27 features
which the Smith Report characterizes as islands are all less than 20 cm
above water at high tide, with one such feature (QS 4) being described in
the Smith Report as only 4 mm above water at high tide.
24
6 CIJ1034.indb 44 7/01/14 12:43 645 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
37. No matter which tidal model is used, it is evident that QS 32 is
above water at high tide. Nicaragua’s contention that QS 32 cannot be
regarded as an island within the definition established in customary inter -
national law, because it is composed of coral debris, is without merit.
International law defines an island by reference to whether it is “xnaturally
formed” and whether it is above water at high tide, not by reference xto its
geological composition. The photographic evidence shows that QS 32 is
composed of solid material, attached to the substrate, and not of loose x
debris. The fact that the feature is composed of coral is irrelevant. Even
using Nicaragua’s preferred tidal model, QS 32 is above water at high tide
by some 0.7 metres. The Court recalls that in the case concerning
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bah ‑
rain (Qatar v. Bahrain) (Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 99,
para. 197), it found that Qit’at Jaradah was an island, notwithstanding
that it was only 0.4 metres above water at high tide. The fact that QS 32
is very small does not make any difference, since international law doxes
not prescribe any minimum size which a feature must possess in order to x
be considered an island. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the fea -
ture referred to as QS 32 is capable of appropriation.
38. With regard to the other maritime features at Quitasueño, the
Court considers that the evidence advanced by Colombia cannot be
regarded as sufficient to establish that any of them constitutes an islxand,
as defined in international law. Although the Smith Report, like the exar-
lier report by the Colombian Navy, involved observation of Quitasueñox
on specified dates, an essential element of the Smith Report is its caxlcula-
tions of the extent to which each feature should be above water at HAT. x
Such calculations, based as they are upon a tidal model whose accuracy ixs
disputed when it is applied to waters as shallow as those at and around
Quitasueño, are not sufficient to prove that tiny maritime features are a
few centimetres above water at high tide. The Court therefore concludes x
that Colombia has failed to prove that any maritime feature at Quita -
sueño, other than QS 32, qualifies as an island. The photographic evi -
dence contained in the Smith Report does, however, show those features
to be above water at some part of the tidal cycle and thus to constitutex
low-tide elevations. Moreover, having reviewed the information and ana-
lysis submitted by both Parties regarding tidal variation, the Court con -
cludes that all of those features would be low-tide elevations under thex
tidal model preferred by Nicaragua. The effect which that finding may
have upon the maritime entitlement generated by QS 32 is considered in
paragraphs 182 to 183, below.
2. Sovereignty over the Maritime Features in Dispute
39. In addressing the question of sovereignty over the maritime fea -
tures in dispute, the Parties considered the 1928 Treaty and uti possidetis
25
6 CIJ1034.indb 46 7/01/14 12:43 646 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
juris as a source of their title, as well as effectivités invoked by Colombia.
They also discussed Colombia’s allegation that Nicaragua had recognizxed
Colombia’s title, as well as positions taken by third States, and thex carto-
graphic evidence. The Court will deal with each of these arguments in
turn.
A. The 1928 Treaty
40. Article I of the 1928 Treaty reads as follows :
“The Republic of Colombia recognises the full and entire sover -
eignty of the Republic of Nicaragua over the Mosquito Coast between
Cape Gracias a Dios and the San Juan River, and over Mangle
Grande and Mangle Chico Islands in the Atlantic Ocean (Great Corn
Island and Little Corn Island). The Republic of Nicaragua recognises
the full and entire sovereignty of the Republic of Colombia over the
islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina and over the
other islands, islets and reefs forming part of the San Andrés Archi -
pelago.
The present Treaty does not apply to the reefs of Roncador, Quita-
sueño and Serrana, sovereignty over which is in dispute between
Colombia and the United States of America.” [Translation by the
Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.] (League of
Nations, Treaty Series, No. 2426, Vol. CV, pp. 340-341.)
41. The second paragraph of the 1930 Protocol of Exchange of Ratifi -
cations of the 1928 Treaty (hereinafter the “1930 Protocol”) stipulated
that the “San Andrés and Providencia Archipelago mentioned in the first
clause of the said Treaty does not extend west of the 82nd degree of
longitude west of Greenwich” [translation by the Secretariat of the League
of Nations, for information] (League of Nations, Treaty Series, No. 2426,
Vol. CV, pp. 341-342).
42. The Court notes that under the terms of the 1928 Treaty, Colom -
bia has sovereignty over “San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina
and over the other islands, islets and reefs forming part of the San Andrés
Archipelago” (see paragraph 23). Therefore, in order to address the ques -
tion of sovereignty over the maritime features in dispute, the Court needs
first to ascertain what constitutes the San Andrés Archipelago.
* *
43. Nicaragua observes that, as the first paragraph of Article I of the
1928 Treaty does not provide a precise definition of that Archipelago, it
is necessary to identify the geographical concept of the San Andrés Archi -
pelago. In Nicaragua’s view, the proximity test cannot justify the Coxlom-
bian claim that the maritime features in dispute are covered by the termx
San Andrés Archipelago. Nicaragua argues that the only maritime fea -
26
6 CIJ1034.indb 48 7/01/14 12:43 647 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
tures that are relatively near to the island of San Andrés are the Alburqu -
erque Cays and the East-Southeast Cays, while the closest cay to the east
of Providencia is Roncador at 75 nautical miles ; Serrana lies at 80 nauti -
cal miles from Providencia ; Serranilla at 165 nautical miles ; and
Bajo Nuevo at 205 nautical miles; Quitasueño bank is at 40 nautical miles
from Santa Catalina. According to Nicaragua, taking into account the
distances involved, it is inconceivable to regard these maritime featurexs
claimed by Colombia as forming a geographical unit with the three
islands referred to in Article I of the 1928 Treaty.
44. Nicaragua further contends that there is no historical record show -
ing that the disputed islands and cays formed part of a geographical unixt
with the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. At the
beginning of the nineteenth century, the first Governor of what was
referred to then as the “San Andrés Islands” only mentioned five islands
when explaining the composition of the group : San Andrés, Providencia,
Santa Catalina, Great Corn Island and Little Corn Island. In other docu -
ments from the colonial period, which refer to the islands of San Andrés,
the maritime features in dispute are never described as a group, or as pxart
of a single archipelago. In that regard, Nicaragua cites the Royal Order
of 1803, the survey of “the cays and banks located between Cartagena
and Havana” carried out at the beginning of the nineteenth century onx
the instructions of the Spanish authorities, and the Sailing Directions x
(Derrotero de las islas antillanas) published by the Hydrographic Office
of the Spanish Navy in 1820.
45. Nicaragua stresses that the definition of the San Andrés Archipel -
ago as an administrative unit in Colombian domestic legislation is of nox
relevance at an international level. Nicaragua argues that, from a histoxri -
cal and geographical point of view, the creation of this administrative x
unit does not prove that it constitutes an archipelago within the meaninxg
agreed by the parties in the 1928 Treaty.
46. Nicaragua further explains that, under the second paragraph of
Article I of the 1928 Treaty, the maritime features of Roncador, Quita -
sueño and Serrana were explicitly excluded from the scope of that Trexaty,
and thus clearly not considered part of the San Andrés Archipelago.
47. With regard to the 82° W meridian in the 1930 Protocol, Nicara -
gua argues that this did not set a limit to Nicaraguan territory east ofx that
meridian, but only meant that “no island lying west of the 82° W merid -
ian forms part of the archipelago within the meaning of the Treaty”. x
Nicaragua thus asserts that the 1930 Protocol merely sets a western limit
to the San Andrés Archipelago.
48. Nicaragua concludes that the Archipelago comprises only the
islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina and does not
include the Alburquerque Cays, the East-Southeast Cays, Roncador, Ser -
rana, the shoal of Quitasueño, or any cays on the banks of Serranillax and
Bajo Nuevo.
*
27
6 CIJ1034.indb 50 7/01/14 12:43 648 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
49. According to Colombia the islands and cays of the San Andrés
Archipelago were considered as a group throughout the colonial and
post-colonial era. In support of its position, Colombia contends that they
were referred to as a group in the early nineteenth century survey of thxe
cays and banks “located between Cartagena and Havana” which was caxr -
ried out on the instructions of the Spanish Crown and in the Sailing
Directions (Derrotero de las islas antillanas) published by the Hydro -
graphic Office of the Spanish Navy in 1820. With regard to the report bxy
the first Governor of the San Andrés Islands, Colombia argues that the
five named islands are clearly the main islands of the group but that xthe
smaller islets and cays also formed part of the Archipelago. In Colom -
bia’s opinion, the fact that references to the San Andrés islands in his -
torical documents (in 1803 or subsequently) did not always specify eacxh
and every feature making up the Archipelago does not mean that it only
consisted of the larger maritime features named.
50. Colombia contends that the concept and composition of the Archi-
pelago remained unchanged and that this was the understanding at the
time of the signature of the 1928 Treaty and the 1930 Protocol.
Further, Colombia contends that the 82nd meridian is, at the very
least, a territorial allocation line, separating Colombian territory to xthe
east from Nicaraguan territory to the west, up to the point where it
reaches third States to the north and south. Colombia concludes that thex
1928 Treaty and the 1930 Protocol left no territorial matters pending
between the Parties. Under the terms of these instruments, according to
Colombia, neither State “could claim insular territory on the ‘othxer’ side
of the 82º W meridian”.
51. Colombia adds that by agreeing, under the second paragraph of
Article I of the 1928 Treaty, to exclude Roncador, Quitasueño and Ser -
rana from the scope of the Treaty, since they were in dispute between
Colombia and the United States, Nicaragua accepted that these features
formed part of the Archipelago.
* *
52. The Court observes that Article I of the 1928 Treaty does not spec-
ify the composition of the San Andrés Archipelago. As to the 1930 Pro-
tocol, it only fixes the western limit of the San Andrés Archipelago at the
82nd meridian and sheds no light on the scope of the Archipelago to the
east of that meridian. In its 2007 Judgment on the Preliminary Objec -
tions, the Court stated :
“it is clear on the face of the text of the first paragraph of Artixcle I of
the 1928 Treaty that its terms do not provide the answer to the ques -
tion as to which maritime features apart from the islands of
San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina form part of the
San Andrés Archipelago over which Colombia has sovereignty” (Ter‑
28
6 CIJ1034.indb 52 7/01/14 12:43 649 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
ritorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Prelimi ‑
nary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 863, para. 97).
53. However, Article I of the 1928 Treaty does mention “the other
islands, islets and reefs forming part of the San Andrés Archipelago”. This
provision could be understood as including at least the maritime featurexs
closest to the islands specifically mentioned in Article I. Accordingly, the
Alburquerque Cays and East-Southeast Cays, given their geographical
location (lying 20 and 16 nautical miles, respectively, from San Andrés
island) could be seen as forming part of the Archipelago. By contrast, xin
view of considerations of distance, it is less likely that Serranilla anxd
Bajo Nuevo could form part of the Archipelago. Be that as it may, the
question about the composition of the Archipelago cannot, in the view ofx
the Court, be definitively answered solely on the basis of the geograpxhical
location of the maritime features in dispute or on the historical recordxs
relating to the composition of the San Andrés Archipelago referred to by
the Parties, since this material does not sufficiently clarify the mattxer.
54. According to the second paragraph of Article I of the 1928 Treaty,
this treaty does not apply to Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana which
were in dispute between Colombia and the United States at the time.
However, the Court does not consider that the express exclusion of
Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana from the scope of the 1928 Treaty isx
in itself sufficient to determine whether these features were considerexd by
Nicaragua and Colombia to be part of the San Andrés Archipelago.
55. The Court further observes that the historical material adduced by
the Parties to support their respective arguments is inconclusive as to the
composition of the San Andrés Archipelago. In particular, the historical
records do not specifically indicate which features were considered tox
form part of that Archipelago.
56. In view of the above, in order to resolve the dispute before it, the
Court must examine arguments and evidence submitted by the Parties in
support of their respective claims to sovereignty, which are not based oxn
the composition of the Archipelago under the 1928 Treaty.
B. Uti possidetis juris
57. The Court will now turn to the claims of sovereignty asserted by
both Parties on the basis of uti possidetis juris at the time of independence
from Spain.
* *
58. Nicaragua explains that the Captaincy-General of Guatemala (to
which Nicaragua was a successor State) held jurisdiction over the dis -
puted islands on the basis of the Royal Decree (Cédula Real) of 28 June
1568, confirmed in 1680 by Law VI, Title XV, Book II, of the Compila -
tion of the Indies (Recopilación de las Indias) and, later, the New Compi -
29
6 CIJ1034.indb 54 7/01/14 12:43 650 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
lation (Novísima Recopilación) of 1744, which signalled the limits of the
Audiencia de Guatemala as including “the islands adjacent to the coast”.
59. Nicaragua recalls that, according to the doctrine of uti possidetis
juris, there could have been no terra nullius in the Spanish colonies located
in Latin America. It contends that it thus held “original and derivatxive
rights of sovereignty over the Mosquito Coast and its appurtenant mari -
time features”, including the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and
Santa Catalina based on the uti possidetis juris at the moment of indepen -
dence from Spain. In Nicaragua’s opinion, the application of uti posside ‑
tis juris should be understood in terms of attachment to or dependence on
the closest continental territory, that of Nicaragua. For Nicaragua, “xit is
incontrovertible that all the islands off the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua
at independence appertained to this coast”. Although, as a result of xthe
1928 Treaty, it ceded its sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Prov -
idencia and Santa Catalina, this did not affect sovereignty over the other
maritime features appertaining to the Mosquito Coast. Nicaragua con -
cludes that Roncador and Serrana, as well as the other maritime featuresx
that are not referred to eo nomine in the Treaty, belong to Nicaragua on
the basis of uti possidetis juris, since, in law, the islands and cays have fol
lowed the fate of the adjacent continental coast.
*
60. For its part, Colombia claims that its sovereignty over the
San Andrés Archipelago has its roots in the Royal Order of 1803, when it
was placed under the jurisdiction of the Viceroyalty of Santa Fé
(New Granada), which effectively exercised that jurisdiction until inde -
pendence. Colombia therefore argues that it holds original title over thxe
San Andrés Archipelago based on the principle of uti possidetis juris sup -
ported by the administration of the Archipelago by the Viceroyalty of
Santa Fé (New Granada) during colonial times.
61. Colombia asserts that the exercise of jurisdiction over the San Andrés
Archipelago by the authorities of the Viceroyalty of Santa Fé (New Granada)
was at no time contested by the authorities of the Captaincy-General of
Guatemala. Colombia states that during the period prior to independence,x
Spain’s activities in relation to the maritime features originated eixther in
Cartagena, or on the island of San Andrés itself, but never had any connec -
tion with Nicaragua, which was a province on the Pacific coast under txhe
Captaincy-General of Guatemala. Colombia concludes that such was the
situation of the islands of San Andrés when, in 1810, the provinces of the
Viceroyalty of SantaFé (NewGranada) began their process of independence.
62. Colombia finally states that the 1928 Treaty and the 1930 Protocol
did not alter the situation vis-à-vis its sovereignty over the San Andrés
Archipelago based on uti possidetis juris.
*
30
6 CIJ1034.indb 56 7/01/14 12:43 651 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
63. In response to Colombia’s assertions on the basis of the Royal
Order of 1803, Nicaragua argues that this Order did not alter Nicaraguanx
jurisdiction over the islands, which remained appurtenances of the Mos -
quito Coast. Nicaragua claims that the Royal Order only dealt with mat -
ters of military protection and that, as it was not a Royal Decree, the x
Order lacked the legal requirements to effect a transfer of territoriaxl juris-
diction. Furthermore, the Captaincy-General of Guatemala protested the
Royal Order of 1803, which, according to Nicaragua, was repealed by a
Royal Order of 1806. Nicaragua claims that its interpretation of the
Royal Order of 1803 is confirmed by the Arbitral Award rendered by thex
President of the French Republic, Mr. Emile Loubet, on 11 Septem -
ber 1900 (hereinafter the “Loubet Award”), setting out the land bound -
ary between Colombia (of which Panama formed part at the time) and
Costa Rica (see paragraph 86 below). Nicaragua interprets that Award as
clarifying that Colombia could not claim any rights over the Atlantic
Coast on the basis of the Royal Order of 1803.
* *
64. The Court observes that, as to the claims of sovereignty asserted by
both Parties on the basis of the uti possidetis juris at the time of indepen -
dence from Spain, none of the colonial orders cited by either Party spe -
cifically mentions the maritime features in dispute. The Court has
previously had the opportunity to acknowledge the following, which is
equally applicable to the case at hand :
“when the principle of the uti possidetis juris is involved, the jus
referred to is not international law but the constitutional or adminis -
trative law of the pre-independence sovereign, in this case Spanish
colonial law ; and it is perfectly possible that that law itself gave no
clear and definite answer to the appurtenance of marginal areas, or
sparsely populated areas of minimal economic significance” (Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras : Nica ‑
ragua intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 559, para. 333).
65. In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that in the present
case the principle of uti possidetis juris affords inadequate assistance in
determining sovereignty over the maritime features in dispute between
Nicaragua and Colombia because nothing clearly indicates whether these
features were attributed to the colonial provinces of Nicaragua or of
Colombia prior to or upon independence. The Court accordingly finds
that neither Nicaragua nor Colombia has established that it had title tox
the disputed maritime features by virtue of uti possidetis juris.
31
6 CIJ1034.indb 58 7/01/14 12:43 652 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
C. Effectivités
66. Having concluded that no title over the maritime features in dis -
pute can be found on the basis of the 1928 Treaty or uti possidetis juris,
the Court will now turn to the question whether sovereignty can be estabx -
lished on the basis of effectivités.
(a) Critical date
67. The Court recalls that, in the context of a dispute related to sover -
eignty over land, such as the present one, the date upon which the dispuxte
crystallized is of significance. Its significance lies in distinguisxhing between
those acts à titre de souverain occurring prior to the date when the dispute
crystallized, which should be taken into consideration for the purpose oxf
establishing or ascertaining sovereignty, and those acts occurring afterx
that date,
“which are in general meaningless for that purpose, having been car -
ried out by a State which, already having claims to assert in a legal
dispute, could have taken those actions strictly with the aim of but -
tressing those claims” (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nic‑
aragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), pp. 697-698, para. 117).
68. As the Court explained in the Indonesia/Malaysia case,
“it cannot take into consideration acts having taken place after the x
date on which the dispute between the Parties crystallized unless such
acts are a normal continuation of prior acts and are not undertaken
for the purpose of improving the legal position of the Party which
relies on them” (Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan
(Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 682,
para. 135).
* *
69. Nicaragua maintains that the date on which the dispute over mari -
time delimitation arose was 1969. Nicaragua notes in particular that thex
dispute came about when Nicaragua granted oil exploration concessions
in the area of Quitasueño in 1967-1968, leading to a Note of protest being
sent by Colombia to Nicaragua on 4 June 1969 in which, for the first time
after the ratification of the 1928 Treaty, Colombia claimed that the
82nd meridian was a maritime boundary between the Parties. Nicaragua
underlines that it responded a few days later, on 12 June 1969, denying
this Colombian claim that reduced by more than half Nicaragua’s rightxs
to a full exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.
*
32
6 CIJ1034.indb 60 7/01/14 12:43 653 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
70. According to Colombia, the dispute concerning the sovereignty
over the maritime features crystallized in 1971 when Colombia and the
United States began negotiations to resolve the situation as regards
Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana, which were excluded from the scope x
of the 1928 Treaty, and Nicaragua raised claims over the San Andrés
Archipelago. In the course of the hearings, Colombia limited itself to txak -
ing note of the critical date proposed by Nicaragua, and to setting out the
effectivités carried out by Colombia before that date.
* *
71. The Court observes that there is no indication that there was a
dispute before the 1969 exchange of Notes mentioned by Nicaragua.
Indeed, the Notes can be seen as the manifestation of a difference of xviews
between the Parties regarding sovereignty over certain maritime featuresx
in the south-western Caribbean. Moreover, Colombia does not seem to
contest the critical date put forward by Nicaragua. In light of the abovxe,
the Court concludes that 12 June 1969, the date of Nicaragua’s Note in
response to Colombia’s Note of 4 June 1969 (see paragraph 69), is the
critical date for the purposes of appraising effectivités in the present case.
(b) Consideration of effectivités
72. The Court notes that it is Colombia’s submission that effectivités
confirm its prior title to the maritime features in dispute. By contraxst,
Nicaragua has not provided any evidence that it has acted à titre de sou ‑
verain in relation to these features and its claim for sovereignty relies
largely on the principle of uti possidetis juris.
* *
73. Colombia contends that the activities à titre de souverain carried
out in relation to the islands coincide with Colombia’s pre-existing title
and are entirely consistent with the legal position that resulted from txhe
1928 Treaty and its accompanying 1930 Protocol. Were the Court to find
that effectivités do not co-exist with a prior title, Colombia argues that
effectivités would still be relevant for its claim to sovereignty.
74. With reference to the maritime features in dispute, Colombia notes
that it has exercised public, peaceful and continuous sovereignty over txhe
cays of Roncador, Quitasueño, Serrana, Serranilla, Bajo Nuevo, Albur -
querque and East-Southeast for more than 180 years as integral parts of
the San Andrés Archipelago. In particular, it maintains that it has enacted
laws and regulations concerning fishing, economic activities, immigratxion,
search and rescue operations, public works and environmental issues con-
cerning the Archipelago ; that it has enforced its criminal legislation over
the entire Archipelago; that, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, it
33
6 CIJ1034.indb 62 7/01/14 12:43 654 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
has carried out surveillance and control activities over the entire Archxi -
pelago; that it has authorized third parties to prospect for oil in the mari-
time areas of the San Andrés Archipelago ; and that it has carried out
scientific research with a view to preserving and making responsible use
of the natural wealth of the San Andrés Archipelago. Colombia notes
that public works have been built and maintained by the Colombian
Government on the Archipelago’s cays, including lighthouses, quartersx
and facilities for Navy detachments, facilities for the use of fishermxen and
installations for radio stations.
75. Colombia adds that Nicaragua cannot point to any evidence that it
ever had either the intention to act as sovereign over these islands, lext
alone that it engaged in a single act of a sovereign nature on them. Morxe -
over, Nicaragua never protested against Colombia’s exercise of sover -
eignty over the islands throughout a period of more than 150 years.
*
76. For its part, Nicaragua asserts that the reliance on effectivités is
only relevant for justifying a decision that is not clear in terms of uti pos ‑
sidetis juris. Nicaragua considers that any possession of Colombia over
the area only included the major islands of San Andrés, Providencia and
Santa Catalina but not the cays on the banks of Roncador, Serrana, Ser -
ranilla and Bajo Nuevo, or any of the other banks adjacent to the Mos -
quito Coast. Nicaragua points out that in the nineteenth century, the onxly
activity on the cays was that of groups of fishermen and tortoise huntxers,
who carried out their activities without regulations or under any governx -
mental authority. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, the
United States of America, through the Guano Act of 1856, regulated and
granted licences for the extraction of guano at Roncador, Serrana and
Serranilla.
77. Nicaragua contests the relevance of activities undertaken by
Colombia subsequent to the critical date in this case, i.e., 1969. It noxtes
that the establishment of naval infantry detachments only began in 1975 ;
likewise, it was only in 1977 that Colombia replaced the beacons installxed
by the United States on Roncador and Serrana, and placed a beacon on
Serranilla. These activities, according to Nicaragua, cannot be considerxed
as the normal continuation of earlier practices; they were carried out with
a view to improving Colombia’s legal position vis-à-vis Nicaragua and
are not pertinent to the Court’s decision.
78. Nicaragua asserts that legislation and administrative acts can only
be taken into consideration as constituting a relevant display of authority
“[if they] leave no doubt as to their specific reference” to thex territories in
dispute. It argues that the legal provisions and administrative acts relat -
ing to the San Andrés Archipelago relied upon by Colombia have been
of a general nature and were not specific to the cays. Hence, it maintainxs
34
6 CIJ1034.indb 64 7/01/14 12:43 655 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
that they should not be considered as evidence of sovereignty over the
maritime features.
79. Nicaragua contends that in any event it protested the activities
undertaken by Colombia, but did not have the necessary means at its
disposal to demand that its title over the disputed features be respectexd by
a State with superior means on the ground and conducting a policy of
“faits accomplis”.
* *
80. The Court recalls that acts and activities considered to be performed
à titre de souverain are in particular, but not limited to, legislative acts or
acts of administrative control, acts relating to the application and enfxorce -
ment of criminal or civil law, acts regulating immigration, acts regulatxing
fishing and other economic activities, naval patrols as well as searchx and
rescue operations (see Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua
and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), pp. 713–722, paras. 176-208). It further recalls
that “sovereignty over minor maritime features . . . may be established on
the basis of a relatively modest display of State powers in terms of quaxlity
and quantity” (ibid., p. 712, para. 174). Finally, a significant element to be
taken into account is the extent to which any acts à titre de souverain in
relation to disputed islands have been carried out by another State withx a
competing claim to sovereignty. As the Permanent Court of International
Justice stated in its Judgment in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland
case :
“It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as tox
territorial sovereignty without observing that in many cases the
tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual x
exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other State could not
make out a superior claim. This is particularly true in the case of
claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled
countries.” (Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Judgment, 1933,
P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53, p. 46.)
81. The Court notes that although the majority of the acts à titre de
souverain referred to by Colombia were exercised in the maritime area
which encompasses all the disputed features, a number of them were
undertaken specifically in relation to the maritime features in disputxe.
Colombia has indeed acted à titre de souverain in respect of both the mar -
itime area surrounding the disputed features and the maritime features
themselves, as will be shown in the following paragraph.
82. The Court will now consider the different categories of effectivités
presented by Colombia.
35
6 CIJ1034.indb 66 7/01/14 12:43 656 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Public administration and legislation. In 1920, the Intendente (Governor)
of the Archipelago of San Andrés submitted to the Government a reportx
concerning the functioning of the public administration of the Archipelaxgo
for the period from May 1919 to April 1920. The report specifically referred
to Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana as Colombian and forming an inte-
gral part of the Archipelago. In the exercise of its legal and statutoryx pow -
ers, the Board of Directors of the Colombian Institute for Agrarian Refoxrm
passed resolutions dated 16 December 1968 and 30 June 1969 dealing with
the territorial régime, in particular, of Alburquerque, East-Southeast, Ser -
rana, Roncador, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo.
Regulation of economic activities. In April 1871, the Congress of Colombia
issued a law permitting the Executive Branch to lease the right to extraxct
guano and collect coconuts on Alburquerque, Roncador and Quitasueño. xIn
September 1871, the Prefect of San Andrés and San Luis de Providencia
issued a decree prohibiting the extraction of guano from Alburquerque,
Roncador and Quitasueño. In December 1871, the Prefect of San Andrés
and San Luis de Providencia granted a contract relating to coconut grovexs
on Alburquerque. In 1893, a permit for the exploitation of guano and limxe
phosphate on Serrana was issued by the Governor of the Department of
Bolívar. Contracts for exploitation of guano on Serrana, Serranilla, xRonca -
dor, Quitasueño and Alburquerque were concluded or terminated by the
Colombian authorities in 1893, 1896, 1915, 1916 and 1918. In 1914, and
again in 1924, the Governor of the Cayman Islands issued a Government
Notice informing fishing vessels that fishing in, or removing guano xor phos -
phates from, the Archipelago of San Andrés was forbidden without a lixcence
from the Colombian Government. The notice listed the features of the Arcxhi -
pelago “in which the Colombian Government claims territorial jurisdicxtion”
as including “the islands of San Andres and Providenc[ esic], and the Banks
and Cays known as Serrana, Serranilla, Roncador, Bajo Nueva [sic],
Quitasueno[sic], Alburquerque and Courtown [East-Southeast Cays]”.
Public works. Since 1946, Colombia has been involved in the mainte -
nance of lighthouses on Alburquerque and East-Southeast Cays (Bolívar
Cay). In 1963, the Colombian Navy took measures to maintain the light -
house on East-Southeast Cays, and in 1968 it took further measures for
the inspection and upkeep of the lighthouse on East-Southeast Cays as
well as those on Quitasueño, Serrana and Roncador.
Law enforcement measures. In 1892, the Colombian Ministry of Finance
made arrangements to enable a ship to be sent to the Prefect of Providenx -
cia so that he could visit Roncador and Quitasueño in order to put a xstop
to the exploitation of guano. In 1925, a decree was issued by the Intendente
of San Andrés and Providencia to appropriate funds to cover the expenxses
for the rental of a ship transporting administrative personnel to Quita -
sueño in order to capture two vessels under the British flag engagexd in the
illegal fishing of tortoiseshell. In November 1968, a United States-flagged
vessel fishing in and around Quitasueño was sequestered by the Coloxm -
bian authorities in order to determine whether it had complied with
Colombian fishing regulations.
36
6 CIJ1034.indb 68 7/01/14 12:43 657 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Naval visits and search and rescue operations. In 1937, 1949, 1967-1969,
the Colombian Navy visited Serrana, Quitasueño and Roncador. In 1969,x
two rescue operations were carried out in the immediate vicinity of Albuxr -
querque and Quitasueño.
Consular representation. In 1913 and 1937, the President of Colombia
recognized that the jurisdiction of German consular officials extended x
over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Roncador.
83. Colombia’s activities à titre de souverain with regard to Alburquer -
que, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana
and Serranilla, in particular, legislation relating to territorial organxiza -
tion, regulation of fishing activities and related measures of enforcexment,
maintenance of lighthouses and buoys, and naval visits, continued after x
the critical date. The Court considers that these activities are a normaxl
continuation of prior acts à titre de souverain. The Court may therefore
take these activities into consideration for the purposes of the presentx
case (see Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/
Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 682, para. 135).
84. It has thus been established that for many decades Colombia con -
tinuously and consistently acted à titre de souverain in respect of the mar -
itime features in dispute. This exercise of sovereign authority was publxic
and there is no evidence that it met with any protest from Nicaragua
prior to the critical date. Moreover, the evidence of Colombia’s actsx of
administration with respect to the islands is in contrast to the absencex of
any evidence of acts à titre de souverain on the part of Nicaragua.
The Court concludes that the facts reviewed above provide very strong
support for Colombia’s claim of sovereignty over the maritime featurexs in
dispute.
D. Alleged recognition by Nicaragua
85. Colombia also contends that its sovereignty over the cays was rec -
ognized by Nicaragua itself.
86. As proof of Nicaragua’s recognition of Colombia’s sovereignty
over the disputed maritime features, Colombia refers to Nicaragua’s rxeac -
tion to the Loubet Award of 11 September 1900, by which the President
of France determined what was then the land boundary between Colom -
bia and Costa Rica and is today the boundary between Costa Rica and
Panama. According to this Award :
“As regards the islands situated furthest from the mainland and
located between the Mosquito Coast and the Isthmus of Panama,
namely Mangle Chico, Mangle Grande, Cayos-de-Alburquerque,
San Andrés, Santa Catalina, Providencia and Escudo-de-Veragua, as
well as all other islands, islets and banks belonging to the former
Province of Cartagena, under the denomination of Canton de San
37
6 CIJ1034.indb 70 7/01/14 12:43 658 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Andrés, it is understood that the territory of these islands, withoutx
exception, belongs to the United States of Colombia.” (United
Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA),
Vol. XXVIII, p. 345 [translation of French original by the Registry].)
Colombia recalls that in its Note of protest of 22 September 1900
against the findings in the Loubet Award, Nicaragua stated that the
Award “may in no way prejudice the incontestable rights of the Republxic
of Nicaragua” over certain islands, banks and islets located within ax spec-
ified geographical area. The Note states that those islands and other xfea-
tures “are currently militarily occupied, and politically administerexd by
the authorities of [Nicaragua]”. In that regard, Colombia emphasizes xthat
none of the islands currently in dispute are situated in the geographical
area described by Nicaragua in its Note. Indeed, in its Note, Nicaragua x
only advanced claims to the Great Corn and Little Corn Islands and to
the islands, islets and cays and banks in immediate proximity to the Mosx -
quito Coast, identifying its area of jurisdiction as only extending to
“84º 30´ of the Paris meridian”, which Colombia explains is equivalent to
82º 09´ longitude west of Greenwich. Moreover, none of the islands cur -
rently in dispute were “militarily occupied, and politically administxered”
by Nicaragua in 1900.
Colombia further argues that Nicaragua failed to protest or to claim
rights over Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana, in dispute between
Colombia and the United States ; and that it was only in 1972 that Nica -
ragua first advanced claims over some of the features comprised in thex
Archipelago.
*
87. For its part, Nicaragua states that it has not recognized Colombian
sovereignty over the disputed cays. In particular, it notes that the expxress
exclusion of the features of Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana in the x
1928 Treaty as a result of the dispute over them between the United States
of America and Colombia did not amount to a Nicaraguan renunciation
of its claim of sovereignty over them. Nicaragua contends that neither txhe
text of the 1928 Treaty nor the negotiating history supports such an asser-
tion. Nicaragua points out that, as soon as it became aware of the nego -
tiations concerning Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana between Colombiax
and the United States leading to the 1972 Vázquez-Saccio Treaty, it
reserved Nicaragua’s rights over these maritime features.
* *
88. The Court considers that Nicaragua’s reaction to the Loubet Award
provides a measure of support for Colombia’s case. Although that Awarxd
expressly referred to Colombian sovereignty over Alburquerque Cays and
at least some of the other islands currently in dispute, Nicaragua’s xprotest
38
6 CIJ1034.indb 72 7/01/14 12:43 659 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
was confined to the Corn Islands and certain features close to the Nicxara -
guan coast. Nicaragua, by contrast, failed to make any protest with regaxrd
to the Award’s treatment of the maritime features which are the subjexct of
the present case. That failure suggests that Nicaragua did not claim sovxer -
eignty over those maritime features at the time of the Award.
89. The Court also observes that, in the second paragraph of Article I
of the 1928 Treaty, Nicaragua agreed that Roncador, Quitasueño and
Serrana should be excluded from the scope of the Treaty on the ground
that sovereignty over those features was in dispute between Colombia
and the United States of America. The Court considers that this provi -
sion, which was not accompanied by any reservation of position on the
part of Nicaragua, indicates that, at the time of the conclusion of the x
Treaty, Nicaragua did not advance any claim to sovereignty over those
three features. However, in 1972, there was a change in Nicaragua’s pxosi -
tion on the occasion of the conclusion of the Vázquez-Saccio Treaty when
it laid claim to Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana.
90. The Court considers that although Nicaragua’s conduct falls short
of recognition of Colombia’s sovereignty over the maritime features ixn
dispute, it nevertheless affords some support to Colombia’s claim.
E. Position taken by third States
91. The Court now turns to the evidence said by Colombia to demon -
strate recognition of title by third States.
* *
92. Colombia notes that various reports, memoranda, diplomatic
Notes and other correspondence emanating from the British Government
confirm that “the British authorities clearly understood not only txhat the
San Andrés Archipelago was considered as a group, from Serranilla and
Bajo Nuevo until Alburquerque, but also its appurtenance to Colombia”.
Colombia further contends that “[a]ll neighbouring States have recognxised
Colombia’s sovereignty over the Archipelago, including the cays”. xIn par -
ticular, Colombia refers to its 1976 Treaty with Panama on the Delimitation
of Marine and Submarine Areas and Related Matters, to its 1977 Treaty
with Costa Rica on Delimitation of Marine and Submarine Areas and Mar -
itime Co-operation, to the 1980 Treaty on Delimitation of Marine Areas
and Maritime Co-operation between Panama and Costa Rica, to its 1986
Treaty with Honduras concerning Maritime Delimitation, to its 1981 and
1984 Fishing Agreements with Jamaica, and to its 1993 Maritime Delimita -
tion Treaty with Jamaica. Colombia refers to the 1972 Vázquez-Saccio
Treaty as evidence demonstrating recognition by the United States of itsx
claim to sovereignty over Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana.
*
39
6 CIJ1034.indb 74 7/01/14 12:43 660 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
93. Nicaragua, for its part, contends that in the 1972 Vázquez-Saccio
Treaty, the United States renounced any claim to sovereignty over the
cays but that this renunciation was not in favour of Colombia. Nicaraguax
adds that when the United States ratified that Treaty, it assured Nicara -
gua that it did not understand the Treaty to confer rights or impose obli -
gations or prejudice the claims of third States, particularly Nicaragua.x
94. Nicaragua furthermore asserts that there can be no doubt that any
recognition by third States, including those which have signed maritime x
delimitation treaties with Colombia, is not opposable to Nicaragua.
* *
95. The Court considers that correspondence emanating from the
United Kingdom Government and the colonial administrations in what,
at the relevant time, were territories dependent upon the United King -
dom, indicates that the United Kingdom regarded Alburquerque, Bajo
Nuevo, Roncador, Serrana and Serranilla as appertaining to Colombia
on the basis of Colombian sovereignty over San Andrés.
The Court notes that the 1972 Vásquez-Saccio Treaty mentions some
of the maritime features in dispute. That Treaty contains no explicit pro -
vision to the effect that the United States of America recognized Coloxm-
bian sovereignty over Quitasueño, Roncador or Serrana, although some x
language in the Treaty could suggest such recognition in so far as Roncax-
dor and Serrana were concerned (it was the view of the United States thxat
Quitasueño was not capable of appropriation). However, when Nicara -
gua protested, the United States response was to deny that it was takingx
any position regarding any dispute which might have existed between
Colombia and any other State regarding sovereignty over those features.
Treaties concluded by Colombia with neighbouring States are compat -
ible with Colombia’s claims to islands east of the 82nd meridian but xcan-
not be said to amount to clear recognition of those claims by the other x
parties to the treaties. In any event these treaties are res inter alios acta
with regard to Nicaragua.
Taking the evidence of third State practice as a whole, the Court con -
siders that, although this practice cannot be regarded as recognition by
third States of Colombia’s sovereignty over the maritime features in xdis-
pute, it affords some measure of support to Colombia’s argument.
F. Evidentiary value of maps
96. Colombia asserts that in the Colombian official maps published up
to the present day, the cays in dispute have always appeared as part of xthe
San Andrés Archipelago and therefore as Colombian. In this regard,
40
6 CIJ1034.indb 76 7/01/14 12:43 661 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Colombia ascribes special value to two official maps published by its
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1920 and in 1931, i.e., before and immexdi-
ately after the conclusion of the 1928 Treaty and the signature of the 1x930
Protocol. A comparison of these two maps shows that both of them
include a legend indicating that the maps depict the Archipelago of San x
Andrés and Providencia as “belonging to the Republic of Colombia”x
(Cartela del Archipiélago de San Andrés y Providencia pertenecien▯te a la
República de Colombia). Both maps show all the maritime features now
in dispute. The difference is that the 1931 map reflects the results of the
1928-1930 agreements concluded between Nicaragua and Colombia. It
therefore depicts a line following meridian 82º W, to the left of which is
written “REPÚBLICA DE NICARAGUA”.
97. Colombia further refers to a number of maps published in third
countries, in which the San Andrés Archipelago appears in greater or
lesser detail and in which neither the cays in dispute nor any other marxi -
time features east of the 82º W meridian are indicated as belonging to or
claimed by Nicaragua.
98. Colombia finally asserts that the maps published by Nicaragua
prior to 1980 also show that Nicaragua never considered that the islandsx
and cays of the San Andrés Archipelago — with the exception of the
Corn Islands — belonged to it.
*
99. Nicaragua contests the evidentiary value of the maps and charts
produced by Colombia. Nicaragua asserts that these maps do not contain
any legend making it possible to assess their precise meaning. At most, x
these maps depict the 82nd meridian as the dividing line between the
islands of San Andrés and Providencia and their surrounding islets on the
one hand and the Corn Islands on the other.
* *
100. The Court recalls that,
“of themselves, and by virtue solely of their existence, [maps] cannoxt
constitute a territorial title, that is, a document endowed by interna-
tional law with intrinsic legal force for the purpose of establishing
territorial rights” (Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 582, para. 54).
Moreover, according to the Court’s constant jurisprudence, maps gen -
erally have a limited scope as evidence of sovereign title.
101. None of the maps published by Nicaragua prior to 1980 (when
Nicaragua proclaimed that it was denouncing the 1928 Treaty) show the
maritime features in dispute as Nicaraguan. By contrast, Colombian
41
6 CIJ1034.indb 78 7/01/14 12:43 662 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
maps and indeed some maps published by Nicaragua show at least some
of the more significant features as belonging to Colombia and none as x
belonging to Nicaragua.
102. The Court considers that, although the map evidence in the pres -
ent case is of limited value, it nevertheless affords some measure of xsup -
port to Colombia’s claim.
3. Conclusion as to Sovereignty over the Islands
103. Having considered the entirety of the arguments and evidence put
forward by the Parties, the Court concludes that Colombia, and not
Nicaragua, has sovereignty over the islands at Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo,
East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana and Serranilla.
III. Admissibility of Nicaraxgua’s Claim for Delimitaxtion
of a Continental Shelfx Extending
beyond 200 Nautical Milexs
104. The Court recalls that in its Application and Memorial, Nicara -
gua requested the Court to determine the “single maritime boundary”x
between the continental shelf areas and exclusive economic zones apper -
taining respectively to Nicaragua and Colombia in the form of a median
line between the mainland coasts of the two States. In its Counter-Memo -
rial, Colombia contended that the boundary line claimed by Nicaragua
was situated in an area in which the latter had no entitlements in view xof
the fact that the two mainland coasts are more than 400 nautical miles
apart.
105. In its Reply, Nicaragua contended that, under the provisions of
Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), it has an entitlement extending to the outer edge of the
continental margin. Nicaragua thus requested the Court to delimit
the continental shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia in view of the
fact that the natural prolongations of the mainland territories of the
Parties meet and overlap. Nicaragua explains this change of its claim onx
the ground that “[o]nce the Court had upheld ‘[Colombia’s] fixrst
preliminary objection . . .’ in its Judgment [on Preliminary Objections]
of 13 December 2007, Nicaragua could only accept that decision and
adjust its submissions (and its line of argument) accordingly”. In xthe
course of the hearings, Nicaragua acknowledged that, while the outer
edge of the continental margin of the mainland of Colombia did not
extend up to 200 nautical miles, Article 76 entitled it to a continental
shelf extending to a limit of 200 nautical miles from the baseline from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured (see sketch-map
No. 2, p. 663).
42
6 CIJ1034.indb 80 7/01/14 12:43 663 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
WGS 84 COLOMBIA
Delimitation
Sketch-map No. 2: for illustrative purposes only.
claimed by Nicaragua
This sketch-map has been prepared30' N)
12-nautical-mile enclaves around Colombian islandsto be Colombianaguaragua
A IA
I B
A M
A L
J O
Bajo Nuevo C
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
JOINTREA
REGIME
Colombia / Jamaica
CARIBBEAN SEA
PANAMA
Roncador
Serrana
Serranilla
East-Southeast Cays
A Quitasueño
A U
R A A A
U R ProSanta Catalina I MA
N A RA NA
O I San Andrés Cays TS P
H N COLOMBIA OC
Alburquerque COSTA RICA
Cays
Miskitos
Island Island
Little Corn
Great Corn
RICA
COSTA
HONDURAS NICARAGUA
43
6 CIJ1034.indb 82 7/01/14 12:43 664 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
106. In its final submission I (3), Nicaragua requested the Court to
define “a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the overlap -
ping entitlements to a continental shelf of both Parties”. According xto
Nicaragua, the subject-matter of the dispute set out in its final submis -
sions is not fundamentally different from that set out in the Applicatxion
since the purpose of the Application was to request the Court to settle x
issues of sovereignty and, in the light of that settlement, to delimit txhe
maritime areas between the two States “in accordance with equitable
principles and relevant circumstances recognized by general internationaxl
law as applicable to such a delimitation”.
*
107. For its part, Colombia asserts that in its Reply Nicaragua changed
its original request and that the new continental shelf claim was not
implicit in the Application nor in the Nicaraguan Memorial. Colombia
states that the question of Nicaragua’s entitlement to a continental xshelf
extending beyond 200 nautical miles (hereinafter referred to as “extended
continental shelf”), and the delimitation of that shelf based on geoxlogical
and geomorphological factors cannot be said to arise directly out of thex
question that was the subject-matter of the Application, namely the
delimitation of a single maritime boundary based solely on geographical x
factors. Colombia recalls that the Court has held on a number of occa -
sions that a new claim which changes the subject-matter of the dispute
originally submitted is inadmissible. In this regard, Colombia points tox a
series of additional questions of fact and law that Nicaragua’s new cxlaim
would, in its view, require the Court to address. In these circumstancesx,
according to Colombia, Nicaragua’s claim to an extended continental
shelf, as well as its request for the Court to delimit on this basis thex con -
tinental shelf boundary between the Parties, is inadmissible.
* *
108. The Court observes that, from a formal point of view, the claim
made in Nicaragua’s final submission I (3) (requesting the Court to effect
a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the overlapping entxi -
tlements to a continental shelf of both Parties) is a new claim in relaxtion
to the claims presented in the Application and the Memorial.
109. The Court is not however convinced by Colombia’s contentions
that this revised claim transforms the subject-matter of the dispute
brought before the Court. The fact that Nicaragua’s claim to an extenxded
continental shelf is a new claim, introduced in the Reply, does not, in x
itself, render the claim inadmissible. The Court has held that “the mxere
fact that a claim is new is not in itself decisive for the issue of admixssibil-
44
6 CIJ1034.indb 84 7/01/14 12:43 665 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
ity” (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2007 (II), p. 695, para. 110). Rather, “the decisive consideration is
the nature of the connection between that claim and the one formulated
in the Application instituting proceedings” (Ahmadou Sadio Diallo
(Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 657, para. 41).
110. For this purpose it is not sufficient that there should be a link of
a general nature between the two claims. In order to be admissible, a nexw
claim must satisfy one of two alternative tests : it must either be implicit
in the Application or must arise directly out of the question which is txhe
subject-matter of the Application (ibid.).
111. The Court notes that the original claim concerned the delimita -
tion of the exclusive economic zone and of the continental shelf betweenx
the Parties. In particular, the Application defined the dispute as “xa group
of related legal issues subsisting between the Republic of Nicaragua andx
the Republic of Colombia concerning title to territory and maritime
delimitation”. In the Court’s view, the claim to an extended continental
shelf falls within the dispute between the Parties relating to maritime
delimitation and cannot be said to transform the subject-matter of that
dispute. Moreover, it arises directly out of that dispute. What has chanxged
is the legal basis being advanced for the claim (natural prolongation
rather than distance as the basis for a continental shelf claim) and thxe
solution being sought (a continental shelf delimitation as opposed to ax
single maritime boundary), rather than the subject-matter of the dispute.
The new submission thus still concerns the delimitation of the continentxal
shelf, although on different legal grounds.
112. The Court concludes that the claim contained in final submis-
sion I (3) by Nicaragua is admissible. The Court further notes that in decid-
ing on the admissibility of the new claim, the Court is not addressing
the issue of the validity of the legal grounds on which it is based.
IV. Consideration of Nicaxragua’s Claim for Delimixtation
of a Continental Shelfx Extending
beyond 200 Nautical Milexs
113. The Court now turns to the question whether it is in a position to
determine “a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the oxver -
lapping entitlements to a continental shelf of both Parties” as requexsted
by Nicaragua in its final submission I (3).
* *
45
6 CIJ1034.indb 86 7/01/14 12:43 666 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
114. The Parties agree that, since Colombia is not a party to UNCLOS,
only customary international law may apply in respect to the maritime
delimitation requested by Nicaragua. The Parties further agree that the x
applicable law in the present case is customary international law reflxected
in the case law of this Court, the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea (ITLOS) and international arbitral courts and tribunals. The Par -
ties further agree that the relevant provisions of UNCLOS concerning thex
baselines of a coastal State and its entitlement to maritime zones, the x
definition of the continental shelf and the provisions relating to thex delim -
itation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf reflexct
customary international law.
115. The Parties agree that coastal States have ipso facto and ab initio
rights to the continental shelf. However, Nicaragua and Colombia dis -
agree about the nature and content of the rules governing the entitlements
of coastal States to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
116. Nicaragua states that the provisions of Article 76, paragraphs 1
to 7, relating to the definition of the continental shelf and to the detexrmi -
nation of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles, have the status of customary international law.
117. While Colombia accepts that paragraph 1 of Article 76 reflects
customary international law, it asserts that “there is no evidence ofx State
practice indicating that the provisions of paragraphs 4 to 9 of Article 76
[of UNCLOS] are considered to be rules of customary international law”x.
118. The Court notes that Colombia is not a State party to UNCLOS
and that, therefore, the law applicable in the case is customary internax -
tional law. The Court considers that the definition of the continentalx shelf
set out in Article 76, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS forms part of customary
international law. At this stage, in view of the fact that the Court’s task is
limited to the examination of whether it is in a position to carry out ax
continental shelf delimitation as requested by Nicaragua, it does not nexed
to decide whether other provisions of Article 76 of UNCLOS form part
of customary international law.
* *
119. Nicaragua asserts that the existence of a continental shelf is essen -
tially a question of fact. Nicaragua argues that the natural prolongatioxn of
its landmass seawards is constituted by the “Nicaraguan Rise”, whixch is “a
shallow area of continental crust extending from Nicaragua to Jamaica”x
that represents the natural prolongation of Nicaragua’s territory andx over -
laps with Colombia’s entitlement to a continental shelf of 200 nautical
miles generated by its mainland coast.
120. Nicaragua notes that, in accordance with Article 76, paragraph 8,
of UNCLOS, any State party which intends to delineate the outer limits
of its continental shelf where it extends beyond 200 nautical miles must
46
6 CIJ1034.indb 88 7/01/14 12:43 667 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
submit relevant information to the Commission on the Limits of the Con-
tinental Shelf (hereinafter the “Commission”). The Commission wixll
review the data and make recommendations. The limits established by a
coastal State on the basis of these recommendations are final and bindxing.
Nicaragua recalls that in May 2000 it ratified UNCLOS, and that in
April 2010, within the ten-year deadline, it submitted “Preliminary Infor -
mation” to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (in accordance
with the requirements established by the Meeting of the States parties txo
UNCLOS) indicative of the limits of the continental shelf. Such Prelimix -
nary Information does not prejudice a full submission, and will not be
considered by the Commission. According to Nicaragua, the basic techni -
cal and other preparatory work that is required in order for it to make xa
full submission is well advanced. Nicaragua asserts that it has establisxhed
the outer limit of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles on the
basis of available public domain datasets and intends to acquire addi -
tional survey data in order to complete the information to be submitted x
to the Commission in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS and the
Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission.
121. Nicaragua also maintains that its entitlement to continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles extends into areas within 200 nautical miles of
Colombia’s coasts and that, under Article 76, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS,
an entitlement to continental shelf based on the distance criterion doesx
not take precedence over an entitlement based on the criterion of natural
prolongation.
*
122. According to Colombia, Nicaragua’s request for continental shelf
delimitation is unfounded because there are no areas of extended conti -
nental shelf within this part of the Caribbean Sea given that there are xno
maritime areas that lie more than 200 nautical miles from the nearest land
territory of the coastal States. Colombia contends that Nicaragua’s pxur -
ported rights to the extended continental shelf out to the outer edge of the
continental margin beyond 200 nautical miles have never been recognized
or even submitted to the Commission. According to Colombia, the infor -
mation provided to the Court, which is based on the “Preliminary Infoxr-
mation” submitted by Nicaragua to the Commission, is “woefully
deficient”. Colombia emphasizes that the “Preliminary Informatioxn” does
not fulfil the requirements for the Commission to make recommenda -
tions, and therefore Nicaragua has not established any entitlement to anx
extended continental shelf. That being the case, Colombia asserts that
Nicaragua cannot merely assume that it possesses such rights in this case
or ask the Court to proceed to a delimitation “based on rudimentary axnd
incomplete technical information”.
47
6 CIJ1034.indb 90 7/01/14 12:43 668 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
123. Colombia maintains that a State’s entitlement based on the dis -
tance criterion always takes precedence over another State’s entitlemxent
based on natural prolongation beyond 200 nautical miles. Colombia fur -
ther contends that Article 76 of UNCLOS does not enable States by
means of outer continental shelf submissions, and particularly ones thatx
have not followed the procedures of the Convention, to encroach on
other States’ 200-mile limits.
124. Colombia adds that the Commission will not consider any extended
continental shelf submissions unless neighbouring States with potential
claims in the area consent. Thus, if a neighbouring State does not give xits
consent, the Commission will take no action with the result that a State
will not have established extended continental shelf limits that are fixnal
and binding. Colombia recalls that such limits, in any event, are withouxt
prejudice to questions of delimitation and would not be opposable to
Colombia.
* *
125. The Court begins by noting that the jurisprudence which has been
referred to by Nicaragua in support of its claim for continental shelf dxelim -
itation involves no case in which a court or a tribunal was requested tox
determine the outer limits of a continental shelf beyond 200nautical miles.
Nicaragua relies on the judgment of 14 March 2012 rendered by ITLOS
in the Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar),
Judgment of 14 March 2012, ITLOS, pp. 1-151 [hereinafter Bay of Bengal
case]. ITLOS in this judgment did not, however, determine the outer limits
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The Tribunal extended
the line of the single maritime boundary beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit
until it reached the area where the rights of third States may be affected
(Judgment of 14 March 2012, para. 462). In doing so, the Tribunal under -
lined that, in view of the fact that a thick layer of sedimentary rocks xcovers
practically the entire floor of the Bay of Bengal, the Bay presents a xunique
situation and that this fact had been acknowledged in the course of negox -
tiations at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(ibid., paras. 444-446).
The Court emphasizes that both parties in the Bay of Bengal case were
States parties to UNCLOS and had made full submissions to the Com -
mission (see ibid., para. 449) and that the Tribunal’s ruling on the delimi -
tation of the continental shelf in accordance with Article 83 of UNCLOS
does not preclude any recommendation by the Commission as to the
outer limits of the continental shelf in accordance with Article 76, para -
graph 8, of the Convention. ITLOS further noted that a “clear distinc -
tion” exists under UNCLOS between the delimitation of continental shexlf
and the delineation of its outer limits (ibid., paras. 376-394).
126. In the case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between
48
6 CIJ1034.indb 92 7/01/14 12:43 669 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras),
the Court stated that “any claim of continental shelf rights beyond
200 miles [by a State party to UNCLOS] must be in accordance with
Article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf established thereunder” (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II),
p. 759, para. 319). The Court recalls that UNCLOS, according to its Pre -
amble, is intended to establish “a legal order for the seas and oceanxs
which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the x
peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilixzation
of their resources”. The Preamble also stresses that “the problemsx of
ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a wholxe”.
Given the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stipulated in its Preamble,
the fact that Colombia is not a party thereto does not relieve Nicaraguax
of its obligations under Article 76 of that Convention.
127. The Court observes that Nicaragua submitted to the Commission
only “Preliminary Information” which, by its own admission, falls xshort
of meeting the requirements for information on the limits of the continexn -
tal shelf beyond 200 nautical miles which “shall be submitted by the
coastal State to the Commission” in accordance with paragraph 8 of Arti -
cle 76 of UNCLOS (see paragraph 120 above). Nicaragua provided the
Court with the annexes to this “Preliminary Information” and in thxe
course of the hearings it stated that the “Preliminary Information”x in its
entirety was available on the Commission’s website and provided the nxec -
essary reference.
128. The Court recalls that in the second round of oral argument,
Nicaragua stated that it was “not asking [the Court] for a definitixve ruling
on the precise location of the outer limit of Nicaragua’s continental
shelf”. Rather, it was “asking [the Court] to say that Nicaragua’xs conti -
nental shelf entitlement is divided from Colombia’s continental shelf enti -
tlement by a delimitation line which has a defined course”. Nicaragua
suggested that “the Court could make that delimitation by defining xthe
boundary in words such as ‘the boundary is the median line between thxe
outer edge of Nicaragua’s continental shelf fixed in accordance witxh
UNCLOS Article 76 and the outer limit of Colombia’s 200-mile zone”’.
This formula, Nicaragua suggested, “does not require the Court to detxer -
mine precisely where the outer edge of Nicaragua’s shelf lies”. Thxe outer
limits could be then established by Nicaragua at a later stage, on the bxasis
of the recommendations of the Commission.
129. However, since Nicaragua, in the present proceedings, has not
established that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to x
overlap with Colombia’s 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental
shelf, measured from Colombia’s mainland coast, the Court is not in ax
position to delimit the continental shelf boundary between Nicaragua andx
Colombia, as requested by Nicaragua, even using the general formulation x
proposed by it.
130. In view of the above, the Court need not address any other argu -
49
6 CIJ1034.indb 94 7/01/14 12:43 670 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
ments developed by the Parties, including the argument as to whether a
delimitation of overlapping entitlements which involves an extended con -
tinental shelf of one party can affect a 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the
continental shelf of another party.
131. The Court concludes that Nicaragua’s claim contained in its final
submission I (3) cannot be upheld.
V. Maritime Boundary
1. The Task Now before the Court
132. In light of the decision it has taken regarding Nicaragua’s final
submission I (3) (see paragraph 131 above), the Court must consider what
maritime delimitation it is to effect. Leaving out of account any Nicaxra -
guan claims to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles means that
there can be no question of determining a maritime boundary between
the mainland coasts of the Parties, as these are significantly more thxan
400 nautical miles apart. There is, however, an overlap between Nicara -
gua’s entitlement to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone x
extending to 200 nautical miles from its mainland coast and adjacent
islands and Colombia’s entitlement to a continental shelf and exclusixve
economic zone derived from the islands over which the Court has held
that Colombia has sovereignty (see paragraph 103 above).
133. The present case was brought before the Court by the Application
of Nicaragua, not by special agreement between the Parties, and there haxs
been no counter-claim by Colombia. It is, therefore, to the Nicaraguan
Application and Nicaragua’s submissions that it is necessary to turn xin
order to determine what the Court is called upon to decide. In its Applix -
cation, Nicaragua asked the Court
“to determine the course of the single maritime boundary between the x
areas of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone appertaining
respectively to Nicaragua and Colombia, in accordance with equita -
ble principles and relevant circumstances recognized by general inter-
national law as applicable to such a delimitation of a single maritime
boundary”.
This request was clearly broad enough to encompass the determination of x
a boundary between the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone
generated by the Nicaraguan mainland and adjacent islands and the vari -
ous maritime entitlements appertaining to the Colombian islands.
134. In its Reply, however, Nicaragua amended its submissions. In its
final submissions, as has been seen, it sought not a single maritime bxound -
50
6 CIJ1034.indb 96 7/01/14 12:43 671 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
ary but the delimitation of a continental shelf boundary between the twox
mainland coasts. Nevertheless, Nicaragua’s final submissions at thex end
of the oral phase also asked the Court to adjudge and declare that
“(4) The islands of San Andrés and Providencia and Santa Catalina
be enclaved and accorded a maritime entitlement of 12 nautical
miles, this being the appropriate equitable solution justified by the
geographical and legal framework.
(5) The equitable solution for any cay, that might be found to be
Colombian, is to delimit a maritime boundary by drawing a
3-nautical-mile enclave around them.”
These submissions call upon the Court to effect a delimitation betweenx
the maritime entitlements of the Colombian islands and the continental
shelf and exclusive economic zone of Nicaragua. That this is what the
Court is asked to do is confirmed by the statement made by the Agent oxf
Nicaragua in opening the oral proceedings :
“On a substantive level, Nicaragua originally requested of the
Court, and continues to so request, that all maritime areas of Nica -
ragua and Colombia be delimited on the basis of international law ;
that is, in a way that guarantees to the Parties an equitable result.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
But whatever method or procedure is adopted by the Court to effect
the delimitation, the aim of Nicaragua is that the decision leaves no
more maritime areas pending delimitation between Nicaragua and
Colombia. This was and is the main objective of Nicaragua since it
filed its Application in this case.” (See sketch-map No. 2, p. 663.)
135. Colombia, for its part, has requested that the delimitation of the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf between Nicaragua and
Colombia be effected by a single maritime boundary, constructed as a mxedian
line between Nicaraguan fringing islands and the islands of the San Andrxés
Archipelago (see sketch-map No. 3 : Delimitation claimed by Colombia,
p. 672).
136. As the Court held in the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jama ‑
hiriya/Malta) case, “[t]he Court must not exceed the jurisdiction con -
ferred upon it by the Parties, but it must also exercise that jurisdiction to
its full extent” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 23, para. 19). Notwith -
standing its decision regarding Nicaragua’s final submission I (3) (para-
graph 131 above), it is still called upon to effect a delimitation between x
the maritime entitlements of Colombia and the continental shelf and
exclusive economic zone of Nicaragua within 200 nautical miles of the
Nicaraguan coast.
51
6 CIJ1034.indb 98 7/01/14 12:43 672 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
-68-
Outline of a bank
JOINT
SerraniREGIME
AREA
S
NDURUA Colombia / Jamaica
HOIARA
N
HONDURAS
Edinburgh
Reef
Muerto
Cay
Miskitos Quitasueño
Cays Serrana
Ned Thomas
Cay
Roncador
Roca Providencia/
NICARAGUA Tyra Santa Catalina
San Andrés
Little Corn
Island East-Southeast Cays
Great Corn Alburquerque
Island Cays
CARIBBEAN
SEA
COLOMBIA
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
A Sketch-map No. 3:
RC
TA AA
COSAN Delimitation
P
claimed by Colombia
This sketch-map has been prepared
COSTA RICA
for illustrative purposes only.
Mercator Projection (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
PANAMA
52
6 CIJ1034.indb 100 7/01/14 12:43 673 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
2. Applicable Law
137. The Court must, therefore, determine the law applicable to this
delimitation. The Court has already noted (paragraph 114 above) that,
since Colombia is not party to UNCLOS, the Parties agree that the appli-
cable law is customary international law.
138. The Parties are also agreed that several of the most important
provisions of UNCLOS reflect customary international law. In particu -
lar, they agree that the provisions of Articles 74 and 83, on the delimita-
tion of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, and
Article 121, on the legal régime of islands, are to be considered declara -
tory of customary international law.
Article 74, entitled “Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts”, provides that :
“1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States
with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement
on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to
achieve an equitable solution.
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of
time, the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided
for in Part XV.
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States
concerned, in a spirit of understanding and co-operation, shall
make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a
practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeop -
ardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such
arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation.
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States con -
cerned, questions relating to the delimitation of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone shall be determined in accordance with the provisions
of that agreement.”
Article 83, entitled “Delimitation of the continental shelf between
States with opposite or adjacent coasts”, is in the same terms as Arti -
cle 74, save that where Article 74, paragraphs (1) and (4), refer to the
exclusive economic zone, the corresponding paragraphs in Article 83 refer
to the continental shelf.
Article 121, entitled “Regime of islands”, provides that :
“1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provi -
sions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
53
6 CIJ1034.indb 102 7/01/14 12:43 674 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life
of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf.”
139. The Court has recognized that the principles of maritime delimi -
tation enshrined in Articles 74 and 83 reflect customary international law
(Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bah ‑
rain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 91,
paras. 167 et seq.). In the same case it treated the legal definition of an
island embodied in Article 121, paragraph 1, as part of customary inter -
national law (ibid., p. 91, para. 167 and p. 99, para. 195). It reached the
same conclusion as regards Article 121, paragraph 2 (ibid., p. 97,
para. 185). The Judgment in the Qatar v. Bahrain case did not specifically
address paragraph 3 of Article 121. The Court observes, however, that
the entitlement to maritime rights accorded to an island by the provisioxns
of paragraph 2 is expressly limited by reference to the provisions of para -
graph 3. By denying an exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf
to rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of theirx
own, paragraph 3 provides an essential link between the long-established
principle that “islands, regardless of their size,... enjoy the same xstatus,
and therefore generate the same maritime rights, as other land territoryx”
(ibid.) and the more extensive maritime entitlements recognized in
UNCLOS and which the Court has found to have become part of cus -
tomary international law. The Court therefore considers that the legal
régime of islands set out in UNCLOS Article 121 forms an indivisible
régime, all of which (as Colombia and Nicaragua recognize) has the xsta -
tus of customary international law.
3. Relevant Coasts
140. It is well established that “[t]he title of a State to the continentaxl
shelf and to the exclusive economic zone is based on the principle that xthe
land dominates the sea through the projection of the coasts or the coastxal
fronts” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 89, para. 77). As the Court stated in the
North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark ;
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) cases, “the land is the legal
source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial extensioxns
to seaward” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 51, para. 96). Similarly, in
the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) case, the Court
observed that “the coast of the territory of the State is the decisivxe factor
for title to submarine areas adjacent to it” (Application for Permission to
Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 61, para. 73).
141. The Court will, therefore, begin by determining what are the rel -
evant coasts of the Parties, namely, those coasts the projections of whixch
overlap, because the task of delimitation consists in resolving the overxlap -
ping claims by drawing a line of separation between the maritime areas
54
6 CIJ1034.indb 104 7/01/14 12:43 675 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
concerned. As the Court explained in the Maritime Delimitation in the
Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) case :
“The role of relevant coasts can have two different though closely
related legal aspects in relation to the delimitation of the continentalx
shelf and the exclusive economic zone. First, it is necessary to identifxy
the relevant coasts in order to determine what constitutes in the spe -
cific context of a case the overlapping claims to these zones. Second,x
the relevant coasts need to be ascertained in order to check, in the
third and final stage of the delimitation process, whether any dispro -
portionality exists in the ratios of the coastal length of each State and
the maritime areas falling either side of the delimitation line.” (Judg ‑
ment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 89, para. 78.)
142. The Court will first briefly set out the positions of the Parties rexga-rd
ing their respective coasts (see sketch-maps No. 4 and 5, pp. 676 and 677).
A. The Nicaraguan relevant coast
143. Nicaragua maintains that its relevant coast comprises its entire main -
land coast in the Caribbean together with the islands which it considersx to
be “an integral part of the mainland coast of Nicaragua”. In this xcontext, it
principally refers to the Corn Islands in the south and the Miskitos Cayxs in
the north (see paragraph 21). The latter are located within 10 nautical miles
of the coast. The former are located approximately 26 nautical miles from
the coast but Nicaragua maintains that the presence of a number of smallxer
islets and cays between the Corn Islands and the mainland means that thexre
is a continuous belt of territorial sea between the islands and the mainxland.
Employing, for these purposes, a straight line from the northern bound -
ary with Honduras to the southern boundary with Costa Rica, Nicaragua
estimates the length of its relevant coast as 453 km. Alternatively, Nicara -
gua estimates the length of the relevant coast, if one follows its naturxal
configuration, as 701 km.
*
144. Although Colombia appeared at one point to suggest that the rele -
vant Nicaraguan coast was confined to the east-facing coasts of the islands,
since it is from these islands that the Nicaraguan entitlement to a 200-nauti -
cal-mile continental shelf and exclusive economic zone would be measured,
in its pleadings as a whole, Colombia accepts that the relevant Nicaraguxan
coast comprises the mainland coast of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan
islands. Colombia accepts that this coast has a length of 453 km, if the
straight line system is used. If, however, the Nicaraguan coast is measuxred
in a way which takes full account of its natural configuration, Colombxia
maintains that the maximum length of that coast is 551 km and not the
701 km suggested by Nicaragua.
* *
55
6 CIJ1034.indb 106 7/01/14 12:43 676 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Nicaragua's relevant coastst
WGS 84
COLOMBIA
the relevant area
Sketch-map No. 4: shown in the boxed areas,le.
for illustrative purposes only.
according to Nicaraguaments of the islands,
The relevant coaThis sketch-map has been prepared (12° 30' N)
A IA
I B
A M
M LO
J O
Bajo Nuevo C
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
JOINTAREA
REGIMEColombia / Jamaica
CARIBBEAN SEA
PANAMA
Roncador
Serrana
Serranilla
East-Southeast Cays
A
S U Quitasueño
R G A
U R PrSanta Catalina ACI MA
D A R NA
N I Cays ATS P
H N San Andrés COLOMBIA O
Alburquerque COSTA RICAC
Cays
Miskitos
Island
Little Corn Island
Great Corn
RICA
COSTA
HONDURAS NICARAGUA
56
6 CIJ1034.indb 108 7/01/14 12:43 677 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
-74-
Nicaragua's relevant coastst
WGS 84 COLOMBIA
Sketch-map No. 5:vant area shown in the boxed areas,ale.
for illustrative purposes only.
The enlargements of the islands,
The relevant coasts andetch-map has been preparedn (12° 30' N)
A IA
I B
A M
M LO
JA O
Bajo Nuevo C
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
JOINTAREA
REGIMEColombia / Jamaica
CARIBBEAN SEA PANAMA
Roncador
Serrana
Serranilla
East-Southeast Cays
A Quitasueño
SA U
R A Providencia/ A AM
U R Santa Catalina CIR AN
N AC A AP
O N San Andrés Cays COLOMBIA S
H COSTA RICA
Alburquerque
Cays
Miskitos
Island Island
Little CoGreat Corn
RICA
COSTA
HONDURAS NICARAGUA
57
6 CIJ1034.indb 110 7/01/14 12:43 678 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
145. The Court considers that the relevant Nicaraguan coast is the
whole coast which projects into the area of overlapping potential entitlxe-
ments and not simply those parts of the coast from which the 200-nauti -
cal-mile entitlement will be measured. With the exception of the short
stretch of coast near Punta de Perlas, which faces due south and thus
does not project into the area of overlapping potential entitlements, thxe
relevant coast is, therefore, the entire mainland coast of Nicaragua (sxee
sketch-map No. 6, p. 681). Taking the general direction of this coast, its
length is approximately 531 km. The Court also considers that Nicara -
gua’s entitlement to a 200-nautical-mile continental shelf and exclusive
economic zone has to be measured from the islands fringing the Nicara -
guan coast. The east-facing coasts of the Nicaraguan islands are parallel
to the mainland and do not, therefore, add to the length of the relevantx
coast, although they contribute to the baselines from which Nicaragua’xs
entitlement is measured (see below, paragraph 201).
B. The Colombian relevant coast
146. There is a more marked difference between the Parties regarding
what constitutes the relevant Colombian coast. Nicaragua’s position is
that it is the part of the mainland coast of Colombia which faces west and
north-west. Nicaragua advanced that position in connection with its ini -
tial claim for a single maritime boundary following the median line
between the two mainland coasts. It maintains this position in connectioxn
with its current claim for a continental shelf boundary between the outexr
limit of the extended continental shelf which it claims and the continenxtal
shelf entitlement generated by the Colombian mainland. Nicaragua
argues, in the alternative, that, if the Court were to hold that it was xnot
possible to address the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond
200 nautical miles, then the relevant Colombian coast would be that of
the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. It maintaixns,
however, that only the west-facing coasts of those islands should be con -
sidered as the relevant coast, since only they project towards Nicaragua,
and to treat the other coasts of the islands as part of the relevant coaxst
would constitute a form of double counting. Nevertheless, Nicaragua
contends that the area of overlapping entitlements extends all the way
from the Nicaraguan coast to a line 200 nautical miles from the baselines
of that coast.
147. Nicaragua estimates the total length of the west-facing coasts of
the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina as 21 km. So
far as the other maritime features are concerned, Nicaragua maintains
that they should not be counted as part of the relevant coast and that, xin
any event, they are so small that the combined length of their west-facing
coasts would be no more than 1 km.
*
58
6 CIJ1034.indb 112 7/01/14 12:43 679 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
148. Colombia’s position is that its mainland coast is irrelevant because x
it is more than 400 nautical miles from Nicaragua’s coast and thus cannot
generate maritime entitlements which overlap with those of Nicaragua.
Colombia maintains that the relevant Colombian coast is that of the
Colombian islands. Its position about what part of those coasts is to bex
taken into account, however, is closely bound up with its view of what
constitutes the relevant area (a subject which the Court considers beloxw
in paragraphs 155-166). Colombia’s initial position is that the relevant
area in which the Court is called upon to effect a delimitation betweexn
overlapping entitlements is located between the west-facing coasts of the
islands and the Nicaraguan mainland and islands, so that only the
west-facing coasts of the Colombian islands would be relevant. However,
Colombia argues, in the alternative, that if the area of overlapping entxitle -
ments includes the area to the east of the islands, extending as far as the
line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan baselines, then the entire
coasts of the Colombian islands should be counted, since islands radiatex
maritime entitlement in all directions.
149. Colombia estimates the overall coastline of San Andrés, Provi -
dencia and Santa Catalina at 61.2 km. It also maintains that the coasts of
the cays immediately adjacent to those three islands (Hayne’s Cay, Rock
Cay and Johnny Cay, adjacent to San Andrés, and Basalt Cay, Palma
Cay, Cangrejo Cay and Low Cay, adjacent to Providencia and Santa
Catalina) are also relevant, thus adding a further 2.9 km. In addition,
Colombia contends that the coastlines of Alburquerque (1.35 km),
East-Southeast Cays (1.89 km), Roncador (1.35 km), Serrana (2.4 km),
Serranilla (2.9 km) and Bajo Nuevo (0.4 km) are relevant, giving a total
of 74.39 km. At certain stages during the hearings, Colombia also sug -
gested that the coast of Quitasueño, calculated by a series of straigxht lines
joining the features that Colombia claims are above water at high tide, x
constitutes part of Colombia’s relevant coast.
* *
150. The Court recalls that, in order for a coast to be regarded as relevant
for the purpose of a delimitation, it “must generate projections whicxh over -
lap with projections from the coast of the other Party” (Maritime Delimita ‑
tion in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009,
p. 97, para. 99) and that, in consequence, “the submarine extension of any
part of the coast of one Party which, because of its geographic situatioxn,
cannot overlap with the extension of the coast of the other, is to be exxcluded
from further consideration” (Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jama ‑
hiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 61, para. 75).
151. In view of the Court’s decision regarding Nicaragua’s claim to a
continental shelf on the basis of natural prolongation (see paragraph 131
59
6 CIJ1034.indb 114 7/01/14 12:43 680 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
above), the Court is concerned in the present proceedings only with thoxse
Colombian entitlements which overlap with the continental shelf and
exclusive economic zone entitlements within 200 nautical miles of the
Nicaraguan coast. Since the mainland coast of Colombia does not gener -
ate any entitlement in that area, it follows that it cannot be regarded xas
part of the relevant coast for present purposes. The relevant Colombian x
coast is thus confined to the coasts of the islands under Colombian sover -
eignty. Since the area of overlapping potential entitlements extends welxl
to the east of the Colombian islands, the Court considers that it is thex
entire coastline of these islands, not merely the west-facing coasts, which
has to be taken into account. The most important islands are obviously
San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. For the purposes of calcux -
lating the relevant coasts of Providencia and Santa Catalina, those two x
features were joined with two short straight lines, so that the parts ofx the
coast of each island (in the north-west of Providencia, in the area of San
Juan Point, and in the south-east of Santa Catalina) which are immedi -
ately facing one another are not included in the relevant coast. The Couxrt
does not consider that the smaller cays (listed in paragraph 149 above),
which are immediately adjacent to those islands, add to the length of thxe
relevant coast. Following, as with the Nicaraguan coastline, the generalx
direction of the coast, the Court therefore estimates the total length oxf the
relevant coast of the three islands as 58 km.
152. The Court also considers that the coasts of Alburquerque Cays,
East-Southeast Cays, Roncador and Serrana must be considered part of
the relevant coast. Taken together, these add a further 7 km to the rele -
vant Colombian coast, giving a total length of approximately 65 km. The
Court has not, however, taken account of Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo for
these purposes. These two features lie within an area that Colombia and x
Jamaica left undelimited in their 1993 Maritime Delimitation Treaty
(United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS), Vol. 1776, p. 27) in which there
are potential third State entitlements. The Court has also disregarded, xfor
these purposes, Quitasueño, whose features, as explained below (see xpara -
graphs 181-183) are so small that they cannot make any difference to the
length of Colombia’s coast.
153. The lengths of the relevant coasts are therefore 531 km (Nicara-
gua) and 65 km (Colombia), a ratio of approximately 1:8.2 in favour of
Nicaragua. The relevant coasts as determined by the Court are depicted
on sketch-map No. 6 (p. 681).
154. The second aspect mentioned by the Court in terms of the role of
relevant coasts in the context of the third stage of the delimitation prxocess
(see paragraph 141 above and paragraphs 190 et seq. below) will be dealt
with below in paragraphs 239 to 247 in the section dealing with the dis -
proportionality test.
60
6 CIJ1034.indb 116 7/01/14 12:43 681 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
-81-
Nicaragua's relevant coast
Colombia's relevant coast
Outline of a bank JOINT
SerranilREGIME
AREA
URA Colombia / Jamaica
HONRAGUA
NICA
HONDURAS Edinburgh
Reef
Muerto
Cay
Miskitos
Quitasueño Serrana
Cays
Ned Thomas
Cay
Roncador
Roca Providencia/
NICARAGUA Tyra Santa Catalina
San Andrés
Little Corn
Island East-Southeast Cays
Punta
de Perlas
Great Corn Alburquerque
Island Cays
COLOMBIA
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA Sketch-map No. 6:
The relevant coasts
A
RCA as identified by the Court
SA A
CO AN This sketch-map has been prepared
P
for illustrative purposes only.
The enlargements of the islands, shown in the
COSTA RICA boxed areas, are not to the same scale.
Mercator Projection (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
PANAMA
61
6 CIJ1034.indb 118 7/01/14 12:43 682 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
4. Relevant Maritime Area
155. The Court will next consider the extent of the relevant maritime
area, again in the light of its decision regarding Nicaragua’s claim to a
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. In these circumstances, Nica-
ragua maintains that the relevant area is the entire area from the Nicarxa-
guan coast, in the west, to a line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan
coast and islands, in the east. For Nicaragua, the southern boundary of x
the relevant area is formed by the demarcation lines agreed between
Colombia and Panama and Colombia and Costa Rica (see paragraph 160
below) on the basis that, since Colombia has agreed with those States txhat
it has no title to any maritime areas to the south of those lines, they xdo
not fall within an area of overlapping entitlements. In the north, Nicarxa -
gua contends that the relevant area extends to the boundary between
Nicaragua and Honduras, which was determined by the Court in its
Judgment of 8 October 2007 (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 659). The sketch-maps of the rele -
vant area submitted by Nicaragua also excluded the Colombia-Jamaica
“Joint Regime Area” (see paragraph 160 below), although at one point,
during the oral proceedings, counsel for Nicaragua suggested that “thxe
Joint Regime Area is part of the area that [the Court is] asked to delimxit”.
(See sketch-map No. 4 : The relevant coasts and the relevant area accord -
ing to Nicaragua, p. 676.)
*
156. Colombia maintains that the relevant area is confined to the area
between the west coasts of the Colombian islands and the Nicaraguan
coast (see sketch-map No. 5 : The relevant coasts and the relevant area
according to Colombia, p. 677) bordered in the north by the boundary
between Nicaragua and Honduras and in the south by the boundary
between Colombia and Costa Rica (see paragraph 160 below). Colombia
considers that its sovereignty over the islands bars any claim on the paxrt
of Nicaragua to maritime spaces to the east of Colombia’s islands.
* *
157. The Court recalls that, as it observed in the Maritime Delimitation
in the Black Sea case, “the legal concept of the ‘relevant area’ has to be
taken into account as part of the methodology of maritime delimitation”
(Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 99, para. 110). Depending on the configuration of
the relevant coasts in the general geographical context, the relevant area
may include certain maritime spaces and exclude others which are not
germane to the case in hand.
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6 CIJ1034.indb 120 7/01/14 12:43 683 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
158. In addition, the relevant area is pertinent when the Court comes
to verify whether the line which it has drawn produces a result which isx
disproportionate. In this context, however, the Court has repeatedly
emphasized that :
“The purpose of delimitation is not to apportion equal shares of
the area, nor indeed proportional shares. The test of disproportion -
ality is not in itself a method of delimitation. It is rather a means ofx
checking whether the delimitation line arrived at by other means
needs adjustment because of a significant disproportionality in the
ratios between the maritime areas which would fall to one party or
other by virtue of the delimitation line arrived at by other means, and
the lengths of their respective coasts.” (Maritime Delimitation in the
Black Sea, I.C.J. Reports 2009, pp. 99-100, para. 110.)
The calculation of the relevant area does not purport to be precise but is
only approximate and “[t]he object of delimitation is to achieve a dexlimi -
tation that is equitable, not an equal apportionment of maritime areas”x
(ibid., p. 100, para. 111 ; see also North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal
Republic of Germany/Denmark ; Federal Republic of Germany/Nether ‑
lands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 22, para. 18 ; Continental Shelf
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 45,
para. 58 ; Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan
Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 67,
para. 64).
159. The relevant area comprises that part of the maritime space in
which the potential entitlements of the parties overlap. It follows thatx, in
the present case, the relevant area cannot stop, as Colombia maintains ixt
should, at the western coasts of the Colombian islands. Nicaragua’s cxoast,
and the Nicaraguan islands adjacent thereto, project a potential maritimxe
entitlement across the sea bed and water column for 200 nautical miles.
That potential entitlement thus extends to the sea bed and water column x
to the east of the Colombian islands where, of course, it overlaps with xthe
competing potential entitlement of Colombia derived from those islands. x
Accordingly, the relevant area extends from the Nicaraguan coast to a
line in the east 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of Nicaragua’s territorial sea is measured. Since Nicaragua hxas
not yet notified the Secretary-General of the location of those baselixnes
under Article 16, paragraph 2, of UNCLOS, the eastern limit of the rel -
evant area can be determined only on an approximate basis.
160. In both the north and the south, the interests of third States
become involved.
In the north, there is a boundary between Nicaragua and Honduras,
established by the Court in its 2007 Judgment (Territorial and Maritime
Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicara ‑
gua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), pp. 760-763). The
endpoint of that boundary was not determined but “[t]he Court made a x
clear determination [in paragraphs 306-319 of the 2007 Judgment] that
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6 CIJ1034.indb 122 7/01/14 12:43 684 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
the bisector line would extend beyond the 82nd meridian until it reached
the area where the rights of a third State may be affected” (Territorial and
Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Application by Honduras for
Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 443,
para. 70). In the north, the Court must also take into account that the
1993 Agreement between Colombia and Jamaica (paragraph 152 above)
established a maritime boundary between those two States but left unde -
limited the “Joint Regime Area” (depicted in sketch-map No. 1, p. 639).
In the south, the Colombia-Panama Agreement (UNTS, Vol. 1074,
p. 221) was signed in 1976 and entered into force on 30 November 1977.
It adopted a step-line boundary as a simplified form of equidistance in the
area between the Colombian islands and the Panamanian mainland.
Colombia and Costa Rica signed an Agreement in 1977, which adopts a
boundary line that extends from the boundaries agreed between Colom -
bia and Panama (described above) and between Costa Rica and Panama.
The Agreement has not been ratified, although Colombia contends that
Costa Rica has indicated that it considers itself to be bound by the sub -
stance of this Agreement. The boundary lines set out in all of these agrxee-
ments are depicted on sketch-map No. 1 (p. 639).
161. The Court recalls the statement in its 2011 Judgment on Costa
Rica’s Application to intervene in the present proceedings that, in ax mar -
itime dispute, “a third State’s interest will, as a matter of principle, be
protected by the Court” (Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v.
Colombia), Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene, Judg ‑
ment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 372, para. 86). In that Judgment the
Court also referred to its earlier Judgment in the case concerning Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), in which it
stated that
“the taking into account of all the coasts and coastal relationships . . .
as a geographical fact for the purpose of effecting an eventual delim -
itation as between two riparian States . . . in no way signifies that by
such an operation itself the legal interest of a third . . . State . . . may
be affected” (Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1990, p. 124, para. 77).
In the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case, the Court noted that,
in parts of the area in which the potential entitlements of Romania and
Ukraine overlapped, entitlements of third States might also come into
play. It considered, however, that this fact did not preclude the inclusxion
of those parts in the relevant area “without prejudice to the positioxn of
any third State regarding its entitlements in this area” (Maritime Delimi ‑
tation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2009, p. 100, para. 114). The Court stated that
“where areas are included solely for the purpose of approximate iden -
tification of overlapping entitlements of the Parties to the case, whixch
64
6 CIJ1034.indb 124 7/01/14 12:43 685 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
may be deemed to constitute the relevant area (and which in due
course will play a part in the final stage testing for disproportionality),
third party entitlements cannot be affected. Third party entitlements x
would only be relevant if the delimitation between Romania and
Ukraine were to affect them.” (I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 100, para. 114.)
162. The same considerations are applicable to the determination of
the relevant area in the present case. The Court notes that, while the
agreements between Colombia, on the one hand, and Costa Rica, Jamaica
and Panama, on the other, concern the legal relations between the partiexs
to each of those agreements, they are res inter alios acta so far as Nicara -
gua is concerned. Accordingly, none of those agreements can affect the
rights and obligations of Nicaragua vis-à-vis Costa Rica, Jamaica or Pan-
ama; nor can they impose obligations, or confer rights, upon Costa Rica,
Jamaica or Panama vis-à-vis Nicaragua. It follows that, when it effects
the delimitation between Colombia and Nicaragua, the Court is not pur -
porting to define or to affect the rights and obligations which might exist
as between Nicaragua and any of these three States. The position of Hon-
duras is somewhat different. The boundary between Honduras and Nica -
ragua was established by the Court’s 2007 Judgment, although the
endpoint of that boundary was not determined. Nicaragua can have no
rights to the north of that line and Honduras can have no rights to the x
south. It is in the final phase of delimitation, however, not in the pxrelimi-
nary phase of identifying the relevant area, that the Court is required xto
take account of the rights of third parties. Nevertheless, if the exercixse of
identifying, however approximately, the relevant area is to be a useful
one, then some awareness of the actual and potential claims of third parx-
ties is necessary. In the present case, there is a large measure of agrexement
between the Parties as to what this task must entail. Both Nicaragua andx
Colombia have accepted that the area of their overlapping entitlements
does not extend beyond the boundaries already established between eitherx
of them and any third State.
163. The Court recalls that the relevant area cannot extend beyond the
area in which the entitlements of both Parties overlap. Accordingly, if
either Party has no entitlement in a particular area, whether because ofx an
agreement it has concluded with a third State or because that area lies
beyond a judicially determined boundary between that Party and a third
State, that area cannot be treated as part of the relevant area for present
purposes. Since Colombia has no potential entitlements to the south and x
east of the boundaries which it has agreed with Costa Rica and Panama,
the relevant area cannot extend beyond those boundaries. In addition,
although the Colombia-Jamaica “Joint Regime Area” is an area in which
Colombia and Jamaica have agreed upon shared development, rather
than delimitation, the Court considers that it has to be treated as fallxing
outside the relevant area. The Court notes that more than half of the
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6 CIJ1034.indb 126 7/01/14 12:43 686 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
“Joint Regime Area” (as well as the island of Bajo Nuevo and the xwaters
within a 12-nautical-mile radius thereof) is located more than 200 nauti -
cal miles from Nicaragua and thus could not constitute part of the rele -
vant area in any event. It also recalls that neither Colombia, nor (at xleast
in most of its pleadings) Nicaragua, contended that it should be includxed
in the relevant area. Although the island of Serranilla and the waters
within a 12-nautical-mile radius of the island are excluded from the “Joint
Regime Area”, the Court considers that they also fall outside the relxevant
area for the purposes of the present case, in view of potential Jamaicanx
entitlements and the fact that neither Party contended otherwise.
164. The Court therefore concludes that the boundary of the relevant
area in the north follows the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and
Honduras, laid down in the Court’s Judgment of 8 October 2007 (Territo ‑
rial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Carib ‑
bean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II),
p. 659), until it reaches latitude 16 degrees north. It then continues due
east until it reaches the boundary of the “Joint Regime Area”. Froxm that
point, it follows the boundary of that area, skirting a line 12 nautical
miles from Serranilla, until it intersects with the line 200 nautical miles
from Nicaragua.
165. In the south, the boundary of the relevant area begins in the east
at the point where the line 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua intersects
with the boundary line agreed between Colombia and Panama. It then
follows the Colombia-Panama line to the west until it reaches the line
agreed between Colombia and Costa Rica. It follows that line westwards
and then northwards, until it intersects with a hypothetical equidistancxe
line between the Costa Rican and Nicaraguan coasts.
166. The relevant area thus drawn has a size of approximately
209,280 square km. It is depicted on sketch-map No. 7 (p. 687).
5. Entitlements Generated by Maritime Features
167. The Court finds it convenient at this point in its analysis to con -
sider the entitlements generated by the various maritime features in the
present case.
A. San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina
168. The Parties agree that San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Cata -
lina are entitled to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and contxi -
nental shelf. In principle, that entitlement is capable of extending up xto
200 nautical miles in each direction. As explained in the previous section, x
that entitlement overlaps with the entitlement to a 200-nautical-mile con -
tinental shelf and exclusive economic zone of the Nicaraguan mainland
and adjacent islands. That overlap exists to the east, as well as the wexst,
of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. However, to the east txhe
maritime entitlement of the three islands extends to an area which lies x
66
6 CIJ1034.indb 128 7/01/14 12:43 687 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
WGS 84
COLOMBIA
Sketch-map No. 7:
for illustrative purposes only.
This sketch-map has been prepared30' N)
The relevant maritime areaourt
A
A I
I M
M O
A L
J O
Bajo Nuevo C
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
JOINTAREA
REGIMEColombia / Jamaica
CARIBBEAN SEA
PANAMA
Roncador
Serrana
Serranilla
East-Southeast Cays
S AU Quitasueño
A G
R A Providencia/ A AM
UD A Santa Catalina CIR AN
N I San Andrés Cays AT AP
O N COLOMBIA SO
H COSTA RICAC
Alburquerque
Miskitos
Island Island
Little Corn
Great Corn
RICA
COSTA
HONDURAS NICARAGUA
67
6 CIJ1034.indb 130 7/01/14 12:43 688 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
beyond a line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan baselines and thus
falls outside the relevant area as defined by the Court.
169. Nicaragua submits that, in order to achieve an equitable solution,
the boundary which the Court will draw should confine each of the threxe
islands to an enclave of 12 nautical miles. The Court will consider that sub -
mission when it comes to determine the course of the maritime boundary
(see paragraphs 184-247). At this stage, it is necessary only to note that the
Parties are agreed regarding the potential entitlements of the three islxands.
B. Alburquerque Cays, East‑Southeast Cays, Roncador, Serrana, Serranilla
and Bajo Nuevo
170. The Parties differ regarding the entitlements which may be gener -
ated by the other maritime features. Their differences regarding Quitax -
sueño are such that the entitlements generated by Quitasueño will xbe
dealt with in a separate section (paragraphs 181-183 below). Nicaragua
contends that Alburquerque Cays, East-Southeast Cays, Roncador, Ser -
rana, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo all fall within the exception stated in x
Article 121, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS, that is to say, they are rocks with
no entitlement to a continental shelf or exclusive economic zone. Nicarax-
gua argues that these features must each be regarded separately and suchx
entitlements as they generate cannot be enlarged by treating them as a
group, particularly in view of the considerable distances between them. It
also rejects what it characterizes as Colombia’s attempt to suggest txhat
these islands are larger than they are by giving the dimensions of the
banks and shoals on which the different cays sit. Nicaragua maintains
that it is only those individual features which are above water at high xtide
that generate any maritime entitlement at all and that in each case the x
extent of that entitlement is determined by the size of the individual
island, not by its relationship to other maritime features.
171. Nicaragua points to the small size of these islands and the absence of
any settled population and maintains, in addition, that none of them has any
form of economic life. It argues that they cannot sustain human habitatixon or
economic life of their own and therefore constitute rocks which fall witxhin the
exceptional rule stated in Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Convention. Accord-
ingly, it contends that they have no entitlement to either an exclusive economic
zone or a continental shelf and are confined to a territorial sea.
172. In addition, Nicaragua maintains that the achievement of an
equitable solution regarding the overlapping entitlements around these
islands requires that each be restricted to an enclave extending 3 nautixcal
miles from its baselines. In support of this submission, it points to a xnum -
ber of instances in which it maintains that the Court and arbitration tri -
bunals have accorded only a restricted territorial sea to small islands xand
maritime features.
*
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6 CIJ1034.indb 132 7/01/14 12:43 689 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
173. Colombia maintains that Alburquerque Cays, East-Southeast
Cays, Roncador, Serrana, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo are islands which
have the same maritime entitlements as any other land territory, includixng
an entitlement to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, an exclusive eco -
nomic zone and a continental shelf. Colombia points to the presence on
Alburquerque (North Cay), East-Southeast Cays, Roncador, Serrana and
Serranilla of housing for detachments of Colombian armed forces and
other facilities, on several of the islands of communication facilities xand
heliports, and on some of them of activities by local fishermen. It maxin -
tains that all of the islands are capable of sustaining human habitationx or
economic life of their own and would thus fall outside the exception in
Article 121, paragraph 3.
174. So far as the entitlement of each island to a territorial sea is con -
cerned, Colombia denies that there is any basis in law for Nicaragua’xs
proposal that the territorial sea surrounding each island can be restricted
to 3 nautical miles. Colombia maintains that the entitlement of an island,
even one which falls within the exception stated in Article 121, para -
graph 3, to a territorial sea is the same as that of any other land territory x
and that, in accordance with the customary international law principle
now codified in Article 3 of UNCLOS, a State may establish a territorial
sea of up to 12 nautical miles from its territory, something which Colom -
bia has done. According to Colombia, where the entitlement to a territo -
rial sea of one State overlaps with the entitlement of another State to xa
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, the former must always
prevail, because the sovereignty of a State over its territorial sea takxes
priority over the rights which a State enjoys over its continental shelfx and
exclusive economic zone.
* *
175. The Court begins by recalling that Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo fall
outside the relevant area as defined in the preceding section of the Judg -
ment and that it is accordingly not called upon in the present proceedinxgs
to determine the scope of their maritime entitlements. The Court also
notes that, in the area within 200 nautical miles of Nicaragua’s coasts, the
200-nautical-mile entitlements projecting from San Andrés, Providencia
and Santa Catalina would in any event entirely overlap any similar enti -
tlement found to appertain to Serranilla or Bajo Nuevo.
176. With regard to Alburquerque Cays, East-Southeast Cays, Ronca -
dor, Serrana, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo, the starting-point is that
“[i]n accordance with Article 121, paragraph 2, of the 1982 Conven -
tion on the Law of the Sea, which reflects customary international
law, islands, regardless of their size, in this respect enjoy the same
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6 CIJ1034.indb 134 7/01/14 12:43 690 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
status, and therefore generate the same maritime rights, as other land
territory” (Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between
Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2001, p. 97, para. 185).
It inevitably follows that a comparatively small island may give an entixtl-e
ment to a considerable maritime area. Moreover, even an island which
falls within the exception stated in Article 121, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS
is entitled to a territorial sea.
177. That entitlement to a territorial sea is the same as that of any
other land territory. Whatever the position might have been in the past,x
international law today sets the breadth of the territorial sea which thxe
coastal State has the right to establish at 12 nautical miles. Article 3 of
UNCLOS reflects the current state of customary international law on thxis
point. The Court notes that Colombia has established a 12-nautical-mile
territorial sea in respect of all its territories (as has Nicaragua). xWhile the
territorial sea of a State may be restricted, as envisaged in Article 15 of
UNCLOS, in circumstances where it overlaps with the territorial sea of
another State, there is no such overlap in the present case. Instead, thxe
overlap is between the territorial sea entitlement of Colombia derived
from each island and the entitlement of Nicaragua to a continental shelfx
and exclusive economic zone. The nature of those two entitlements is difx -
ferent. In accordance with long-established principles of customary inter -
national law, a coastal State possesses sovereignty over the sea bed andx
water column in its territorial sea (ibid., p. 93, para. 174). By contrast,
coastal States enjoy specific rights, rather than sovereignty, with respect
to the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone.
178. The Court has never restricted the right of a State to establish a
territorial sea of 12 nautical miles around an island on the basis of an
overlap with the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone entitle -
ments of another State. In the case concerning Territorial and Maritime
Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicara ‑
gua v. Honduras), Nicaragua argued that the four small islands which the
Court had held belonged to Honduras (Bobel Cay, South Cay, Savanna
Cay and Port Royal Cay) should be accorded a territorial sea of only
3 nautical miles in order to prevent them having an inequitable effect oxn
the entitlement of Nicaragua to a continental shelf and exclusive eco -
nomic zone, whereas Honduras maintained that it was entitled to a
12-nautical-mile territorial sea around each island, save where that terri -
torial sea overlapped with the territorial sea of one of Nicaragua’s xterrito -
ries. The Court found for Honduras on this point :
“The Court notes that by virtue of Article 3 of UNCLOS Hondu -
ras has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to xa
limit of 12 nautical miles be that for its mainland or for islands under
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6 CIJ1034.indb 136 7/01/14 12:43 691 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
its sovereignty. In the current proceedings Honduras claims for the
four islands in question a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles. The
Court thus finds that, subject to any overlap between the territorial sea
around Honduran islands and the territorial sea around Nicaraguan
islands in the vicinity, Bobel Cay, Savanna Cay, Port Royal Cay and
South Cay shall be accorded a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles.”
(Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaraguav. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J.Reports
2007 (II), p. 751, para. 302 ; emphasis added.)
Other tribunals have adopted the same approach. For example, the Court
of Arbitration in the Dubai‑Sharjah Border Arbitration (1981) (Interna ‑
tional Law Reports (ILR), Vol. 91, p. 543) rejected Dubai’s submission
that the territorial sea around the island of Abu Musa should be limitedx
to 3 nautical miles. The Court of Arbitration held that “every island, no x
matter how small, has its belt of territorial sea” and that the extent of that
belt was 12 nautical miles except where it overlapped with the territorial
sea entitlement of another State (p. 674). Most recently, ITLOS held, in
the Bay of Bengal case, that
“Bangladesh has the right to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea arounxd
St. Martin’s Island in the area where such territorial sea no longer
overlaps with Myanmar’s territorial sea. A conclusion to the contraryx
would result in giving more weight to the sovereign rights and juris -
diction of Myanmar in its exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf than to the sovereignty of Bangladesh over its territorial sea.”
(Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myan ‑
mar), Judgment of 14 March 2012, ITLOS, pp. 55-56, para. 169.)
179. Since the entitlement to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea became
established in international law, those judgments and awards in which
small islands have been accorded a territorial sea of less than 12 nautical
miles have invariably involved either an overlap between the territorialx sea
entitlements of States (e.g., the treatment accorded by the Court to thxe
island of Qit’at Jaradah in Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 109, para. 219) or the presence of a historic or
agreed boundary (e.g., the treatment of the island of Alcatraz by the Cxourt
of Arbitration in the Guinea‑Guinea Bissau Maritime Delimitation Case
(1985), RIAA, Vol. XIX, p. 190 (French) ; ILR, Vol. 77, p. 635 (English)).
180. The Court cannot, therefore, accept Nicaragua’s submission that
an equitable solution can be achieved by drawing a 3-nautical-mile
enclave around each of these islands. It concludes that Roncador, Ser -
rana, the Alburquerque Cays and East-Southeast Cays are each entitled
to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, irrespective of whether they fall
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6 CIJ1034.indb 138 7/01/14 12:43 692 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
within the exception stated in Article 121, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS.
Whether or not any of these islands falls within the scope of that excepx -
tion is therefore relevant only to the extent that it is necessary to dexter -
mine if they are entitled to a continental shelf and exclusive economic x
zone. In that context, the Court notes that the whole of the relevant arxea
lies within 200 nautical miles of one or more of the islands of San Andrés,
Providencia or Santa Catalina, each of which — the Parties agree — is
entitled to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. The Court
recalls that, faced with a similar situation in respect of Serpents’ xIsland in
the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case, it considered it unneces -
sary to determine whether that island fell within paragraph 2 or para -
graph 3 of Article 121 of UNCLOS (Maritime Delimitation in the Black
Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, pp. 122-123,
para. 187). In the present case, the Court similarly concludes that it is notx
necessary to determine the precise status of the smaller islands, since xany
entitlement to maritime spaces which they might generate within the rel -
evant area (outside the territorial sea) would entirely overlap with txhe
entitlement to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone generatedx
by the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina.
C. Quitasueño
181. The Court has already set out (paragraphs 27-38 above) the rea -
sons which lead it to find that one of the features at Quitasueño, xnamely
QS 32, is above water at high tide and thus constitutes an island within
the definition embodied in Article 121, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS and
that the other 53 features identified at Quitasueño are low-tide elevations.
The Court must now consider what entitlement to a maritime space
Colombia derives from its title to QS 32.
182. For the reasons already given (paragraphs 176-180 above),
Colombia is entitled to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles around QS 32.
Moreover, in measuring that territorial sea, Colombia is entitled to relxy
upon the rule stated in Article 13 of UNCLOS :
“Low-tide elevations
1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is
surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at
high tide. Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly
at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from
the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation
may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the
territorial sea.
2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceed-
ing the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an
island, it has no territorial sea of its own.”
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6 CIJ1034.indb 140 7/01/14 12:43 693 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
The Court has held that this provision reflects customary internationaxl
law (Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 100,
para. 201). Colombia is therefore entitled to use those low-tide elevations
within 12 nautical miles of QS 32 for the purpose of measuring the
breadth of its territorial sea. Colombia’s pleadings in the present case
make clear that it has exercised this right and has used all the features
identified in the Smith Report in measuring the breadth of the territoxrial
sea around Quitasueño.
183. The Court observes that all but two of the low-tide elevations on
Quitasueño (QS 53 and QS 54) are within 12 nautical miles of QS 32.
Thus the territorial sea around Quitasueño extends from those low-tide
elevations located within 12 nautical miles of QS 32, the position of which
means that they contribute to the baseline from which the breadth of thex
territorial sea is measured. It has not been suggested by either Party txhat
QS 32 is anything other than a rock which is incapable of sustaining
human habitation or economic life of its own under Article 121, para -
graph 3, of UNCLOS, so this feature generates no entitlement to a conti -
nental shelf or exclusive economic zone.
6. Method of Delimitation
184. The Court will now turn to the methodology to be employed in
effecting the delimitation. On this subject, the Parties express markexdly
different views.
* *
185. Nicaragua maintains that the geographical context is such that it
would not be appropriate for the Court to follow the approach which it
normally employs, namely to establish a provisional equidistance/median
line, then analyse whether there exist relevant circumstances requiring xan
adjustment or shifting of that line and, finally, test the adjusted lixne to see
whether the result which it would produce is disproportionate. For Nicara -
gua, the act of constructing a provisional equidistance line between the
Nicaraguan coast and the west-facing coasts of the Colombian islands
would be wholly artificial. It would treat the islands as though they xwere an
opposing mainland coast, despite the fact that the west-facing coasts of San
Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina are less than one twentieth thxe
length of the mainland coast of Nicaragua and the islands which would be
used in the construction of the provisional equidistance/median line arex
situated at a considerable distance from one another. Moreover, Nicaraguxa
maintains that a provisional equidistance/median line would completely
disregard the substantial part of the relevant area which lies to the eaxst of
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6 CIJ1034.indb 142 7/01/14 12:43 694 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
the Colombian islands, thus leaving some three quarters of the relevant
area on the Colombian side of the line. While Nicaragua recognizes that
the establishment of a provisional equidistance/median line is only the first
step in the methodology normally employed by the Court, it contends thatx,
in the present case, adjustment or shifting of that line would be insuffixcient
to achieve an equitable solution and that a different methodology is
required. Nicaragua notes that in the case concerning Territorial and Mari ‑
time Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nica‑
ragua v. Honduras), the Court stated that there may be factors which make
it inappropriate to use the methodology of constructing a provisional eqxui -
distance/median line and then determining whether there are circumstancexs
requiring its adjustment or shifting (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II),
p. 741, para. 272). Nicaragua maintains that this is such a case.
186. For Nicaragua, the appropriate methodology requires recognition
at the outset that the Colombian islands are very small features and arex
located on what it describes as the Nicaraguan continental shelf. It maixn -
tains that small island features of this kind are frequently given a reduced
effect, or even no effect at all, in maritime delimitation. In thesex circum -
stances, Nicaragua maintains that the appropriate methodology to adopt
is to enclave each of the Colombian islands, while recognizing that, outx -
side these enclaves, the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone
from the Nicaraguan coast to the line 200 nautical miles from the Nicara -
guan baselines would be Nicaraguan. Nicaragua contends that the enclave
approach was employed in respect of the Channel Islands by the Court of x
Arbitration in the case of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French▯
Republic (1977) [hereinafter the Anglo‑French Continental Shelf case]
(RIAA, Vol. XVIII, p. 3 ; ILR, Vol. 54, p. 6), and that it is appropriate in
the present case for the same reasons. Nicaragua also refers to a numberx
of other judgments and arbitration awards in which it maintains that
comparatively small islands were given a reduced maritime space.
*
187. Colombia maintains that the Court should adopt the same meth -
odology it has used for many years in cases regarding maritime delimita -
tion, starting with the construction of a provisional equidistance/mediaxn
line and then adjusting or shifting that line if relevant circumstances xso
require. Colombia acknowledges that the Court has not invariably
employed this method but observes that in the only recent case in which x
the Court departed from it, the case concerning Territorial and Maritime
Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicara ‑
gua v. Honduras), the reason for doing so was that the configuration of
the coastline made the construction of an equidistance line impossible
(Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 743, para. 280). According to
Colombia, nothing in the present case renders the construction of a pro -
visional equidistance/median line impossible or even difficult.
74
6 CIJ1034.indb 144 7/01/14 12:43 695 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
188. Colombia rejects the enclave approach suggested by Nicaragua as
an unwarranted departure from the approach which, it maintains, has
become standard practice both for the Court and for other international
tribunals, of establishing a provisional equidistance/median line and thxen
examining whether there exist circumstances requiring adjustment or
shifting of that line. It argues that the Anglo‑French Continental Shelf case
is not a relevant precedent, as the Channel Islands were located very clxose
to the French coast, surrounded on three sides by French territory and
the overall context was that of a delimitation between the opposite coasxts
of the United Kingdom and France. According to Colombia, the present
context is entirely different, as its islands are more than 65 nautical miles
from the nearest Nicaraguan territory, face the Nicaraguan coast in onlyx
one direction and the delimitation does not involve the mainland coast oxf
Colombia.
189. In addition, Colombia contends that the enclave methodology
proposed by Nicaragua would fail to take account of Colombia’s entitlxe -
ments, derived from the islands, to the east of the line drawn 200 nautical
miles from the Nicaraguan baselines.
* *
190. The Court has made clear on a number of occasions that the
methodology which it will normally employ when called upon to effect ax
delimitation between overlapping continental shelf and exclusive eco -
nomic zone entitlements involves proceeding in three stages (Continental
Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985,
p. 46, para. 60 ; Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v.
Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 101, paras. 115-116).
191. In the first stage, the Court establishes a provisional delimitation
line between territories (including the island territories) of the Parxties.
In doing so it will use methods that are geometrically objective and
appropriate for the geography of the area. This task will consist of
the construction of an equidistance line, where the relevant coasts are
adjacent, or a median line between the two coasts, where the relevant
coasts are opposite, unless in either case there are compelling reasons xas a
result of which the establishment of such a line is not feasible (see Territo‑
rial and Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2007 (II), p. 745, para. 281). No legal consequences flow from the use of
the terms “median line” and “equidistance line” since the mexthod of delimi-
tation in each case involves constructing a line each point on which is an
equal distance from the nearest points on the two relevant coasts (Mari ‑
time Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 101, para. 116). The line is constructed using the
most appropriate base points on the coasts of the Parties (ibid., p. 101,
paras. 116-117).
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6 CIJ1034.indb 146 7/01/14 12:43 696 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
192. In the second stage, the Court considers whether there are any
relevant circumstances which may call for an adjustment or shifting of txhe
provisional equidistance/median line so as to achieve an equitable resulxt.
If it concludes that such circumstances are present, it establishes a dixffer-
ent boundary which usually entails such adjustment or shifting of the
equidistance/median line as is necessary to take account of those circum -
stances (Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 47, para. 63 ; Maritime Delimitation in the Black
Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, pp. 102-103,
paras. 119-121). Where the relevant circumstances so require, the Court
may also employ other techniques, such as the construction of an enclavex
around isolated islands, in order to achieve an equitable result.
193. In the third and final stage, the Court conducts a disproportional -
ity test in which it assesses whether the effect of the line, as adjusxted or
shifted, is that the Parties’ respective shares of the relevant area are mark -
edly disproportionate to their respective relevant coasts. As the Court x
explained in the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case
“Finally, and at a third stage, the Court will verify that the line (a
provisional equidistance line which may or may not have been
adjusted by taking into account the relevant circumstances) does not,
as it stands, lead to an inequitable result by reason of any marked
disproportion between the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and
the ratio between the relevant maritime area of each State by reference
to the delimitation line . . . A final check for an equitable outcome
entails a confirmation that no great disproportionality of maritime
areas is evident by comparison to the ratio of coastal lengths.
This is not to suggest that these respective areas should be propor -
tionate to coastal lengths — as the Court has said ‘the sharing out of
the area is therefore the consequence of the delimitation, not vice
versa’ (Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan
Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 67,
para. 64).” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania
v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 103, para. 122.)
194. The three-stage process is not, of course, to be applied in a
mechanical fashion and the Court has recognized that it will not be
appropriate in every case to begin with a provisional equidistance/mediaxn
line (see, e.g., Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 741, para. 272). The Court has therefore given
careful consideration to Nicaragua’s argument that the geographical
context of the present case is one in which the Court should not begin bxy
constructing a provisional median line.
195. Unlike the case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute
between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), this is not a case in which the construction of such a line is
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6 CIJ1034.indb 148 7/01/14 12:43 697 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
not feasible. The Nicaraguan coast (including the Nicaraguan islands) x
and the west-facing coasts of the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and
Santa Catalina, as well as the Alburquerque Cays, stand in a relationshixp
of opposite coasts at a distance which is nowhere less than 65 nautical
miles (the distance from Little Corn Island to the Alburquerque Cays).x
There is no difficulty in constructing a provisional line equidistant fxrom
base points on these two coasts. The question is not whether the construxc -
tion of such a line is feasible but whether it is appropriate as a startx -
ing-point for the delimitation. That question arises because of the unusual x
circumstance that a large part of the relevant area lies to the east of the
principal Colombian islands and, hence, behind the Colombian baseline
from which a provisional median line would have to be measured.
196. The Court recognizes that the existence of overlapping potential
entitlements to the east of the principal Colombian islands, and thus bexhind
the base points on the Colombian side from which the provisional equidisx -
tance/median line is to be constructed, may be a relevant circumstance
requiring adjustment or shifting of the provisional median line. The samxe is
true of the considerable disparity of coastal lengths. These are factors which
have to be considered in the second stage of the delimitation process; they
do not justify discarding the entire methodology and substituting an
approach in which the starting-point is the construction of enclaves for
each island, rather than the construction of a provisional median line. xThe
construction of a provisional median line in the method normally employexd
by the Court is nothing more than a first step and in no way prejudgesx the
ultimate solution which must be designed to achieve an equitable result.x As
the Court said in the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case :
“At this initial stage of the construction of the provisional equidisx -
tance line the Court is not yet concerned with any relevant circumstancexs
that may obtain and the line is plotted on strictly geometrical criteriax on
the basis of objective data.” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romaniav.Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p.101, para.118.)
197. The various considerations advanced by Nicaragua in support of
a different methodology are factors which the Court will have to take xinto
account in the second stage of the process, when it will consider whethexr
those factors call for adjustment or shifting of the provisional median xline
and, if so, in what way. Following this approach does not preclude very x
substantial adjustment to, or shifting of, the provisional line in an apxpro -
priate case, nor does it preclude the use of enclaving in those areas whxere
the use of such a technique is needed to achieve an equitable result. Byx
contrast, the approach suggested by Nicaragua entails starting with a
solution in which what Nicaragua perceives as the most relevant consid -
erations have already been taken into account and in which the outcome
is to a large extent pre-ordained.
198. The Court does not consider that the award of the Court of Arbi -
tration in the Anglo‑French Continental Shelf case calls for the Court to
abandon its usual methodology. That award, which was rendered in 1977
77
6 CIJ1034.indb 150 7/01/14 12:43 698 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
and thus some time before the Court established the methodology which
it now employs in cases of maritime delimitation, was concerned with a
quite different geographical context from that in the present case, a xpoint
to which the Court will return. It began with the construction of a provxi-
sional equidistance/median line between the two mainland coasts and
then enclaved the Channel Islands because they were located on the
“wrong” side of that line (Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French▯
Republic (1977), RIAA, Vol. XVIII, p. 88, para. 183 ; ILR, Vol. 54, p. 96).
For present purposes, however, what is important is that the Court of
Arbitration did not employ enclaving as an alternative methodology to
the construction of a provisional equidistance/median line, but rather
used it in conjunction with such a line.
199. Accordingly, the Court will proceed in the present case, in accor -
dance with its standard method, in three stages, beginning with the con -
struction of a provisional median line.
7. Determination of Base Points and Construction
of the Provisional Median Line
200. The Court will thus begin with the construction of a provisional
median line between the Nicaraguan coast and the western coasts of the
relevant Colombian islands, which are opposite to the Nicaraguan coast. x
This task requires the Court to determine which coasts are to be taken
into account and, in consequence, what base points are to be used in thex
construction of the line. In this connection, the Court notes that Nicarxa -
gua has not notified the Court of any base points on its coast. By conx -
trast, Colombia has indicated on maps the location of the base points
which it has used in the construction of its proposed median line (withx -
out, however, providing their co-ordinates) (see sketch-map No. 3 : Deli-
mitation claimed by Colombia, p. 673). Those base points include two
base points on Alburquerque Cays, several base points on the west coast x
of San Andrés and Providencia, one base point on Low Cay, a small cayx
to the north of Santa Catalina, and several base points on Quitasueñox. As
the Court noted in the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case
“In . . . the delimitation of the maritime areas involving two or
more States, the Court should not base itself solely on the choice of
base points made by one of those Parties. The Court must, when
delimiting the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones, select
base points by reference to the physical geography of the relevant
coasts.” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v.
Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 108, para. 137.)
The Court will accordingly proceed to construct its provisional median
line by reference to the base points which it considers appropriate.
201. The Court has already decided that the islands adjacent to the
Nicaraguan coast are part of the relevant coast and contribute to the
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6 CIJ1034.indb 152 7/01/14 12:43 699 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
baselines from which Nicaragua’s entitlements to a continental shelf xand
exclusive economic zone are to be measured (see paragraph 145). Since
the islands are located further east than the Nicaraguan mainland, they x
will contribute all of the base points for the construction of the provix -
sional median line. For that purpose, the Court will use base points
located on Edinburgh Reef, Muerto Cay, Miskitos Cays, Ned Thomas
Cay, Roca Tyra, Little Corn Island and Great Corn Island.
202. So far as the Colombian coast is concerned, the Court considers
that Quitasueño should not contribute to the construction of the provxi -
sional median line. The part of Quitasueño which is undoubtedly abovex
water at high tide is a minuscule feature, barely 1 square m in dimension.
When placing base points on very small maritime features would distort
the relevant geography, it is appropriate to disregard them in the con -
struction of a provisional median line. In the Maritime Delimitation in the
Black Sea case, for example, the Court held that it was inappropriate to
select any base point on Serpents’ Island (which, at 0.17 square km was
very much larger than the part of Quitasueño which is above water at x
high tide), because it lay alone and at a distance of some 20 nautical miles
from the mainland coast of Ukraine, and its use as a part of the relevanxt
coast “would amount to grafting an extraneous element onto Ukraine’xs
coastline; the consequence would be a judicial refashioning of geography,
which neither the law nor practice of maritime delimitation authorizes”x
(Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 110, para. 149). These considerations apply with
even greater force to Quitasueño. In addition to being a tiny featurex, it is
38 nautical miles from Santa Catalina and its use in the construction of
the provisional median line would push that line significantly closer xto
Nicaragua.
Colombia did not place a base point upon Serrana. The Court’s deci -
sion not to place a base point upon Quitasueño means, however, that ixt
must consider whether one should be placed upon Serrana. Although
larger than Quitasueño, Serrana is also a comparatively small featurex,
whose considerable distance from any of the other Colombian islands
means that placing a base point upon it would have a marked effect upoxn
the course of the provisional median line which would be out of all pro -
portion to its size and importance. In the Court’s view, no base poinxt
should be placed on Serrana.
The Court also considers that there should be no base point on Low
Cay, a small uninhabited feature near Santa Catalina.
203. The base points on the Colombian side will, therefore, be located
on Santa Catalina, Providencia and San Andrés islands and on Alburqu -
erque Cays.
204. The provisional median line constructed from these two sets of
base points is, therefore, controlled in the north by the Nicaraguan basxe
points on Edinburgh Reef, Muerto Cay and Miskitos Cays and Colom -
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6 CIJ1034.indb 154 7/01/14 12:43 700 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
bian base points on Santa Catalina and Providencia, in the centre by basxe
points on the Nicaraguan islands of Ned Thomas Cay and Roca Tyra
and the Colombian islands of Providencia and San Andrés, and in the
south by Nicaraguan base points on Little Corn Island and Great Corn
Island and Colombian base points on San Andrés and Alburquerque
Cays. The line thus constructed is depicted on sketch-map No. 8 (p. 701).
8. Relevant Circumstances
205. As indicated above (see paragraph 192), once the Court has estab-
lished the provisional median line, it must then consider “whether thxere
are factors calling for the adjustment or shifting of that line in orderx to
achieve an ‘equitable result’” (Land and Maritime Boundary between
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria : Equatorial Guinea interven‑
ing), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 441, para. 288). Those factors are
usually referred to in the jurisprudence of the Court as “relevant cixrcum-
stances” and, as the Court has explained,
“[t]heir function is to verify that the provisional median line, drawxn
by the geometrical method from the determined base points on the
coasts of the Parties is not, in light of the particular circumstances oxf
the case, perceived as inequitable” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black
Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 112,
para. 155).
206. The Parties invoked several different considerations which they
found relevant to the achievement of an equitable solution. They drew
markedly different consequences from their analysis of those consider -
ations. For Nicaragua these factors necessitate a complete break with thxe
provisional median line and the substitution of enclaves around each of x
the Colombian islands. The result would be separate Colombian enclaves
around San Andrés and Alburquerque, East-Southeast Cays, Providencia
and Santa Catalina, Serrana and Roncador, as well as Quitasueño, if any
maritime features on it were to be above water at high tide. Colombia
argues that the provisional median line affords an equitable solution xand
therefore requires no adjustment or shifting.
207. The Court will examine in turn each of the considerations invoked
by the Parties. In doing so, it will determine whether those consideratixons
require an adjustment or shifting of the provisional median line con -
structed by the Court in the previous section of the Judgment in order txo
achieve an equitable result.
A. Disparity in the lengths of the relevant coasts
208. Nicaragua emphasizes the fact that its coast is significantly longer
than that of the Colombian islands and argues that this factor must be
taken into account in order to arrive at an equitable solution. Colombiax
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6 CIJ1034.indb 156 7/01/14 12:43 701 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Outline of a bank
JOINT
SerraniREGIME
AREA
S
NDUAUA Colombia / Jamaica
HCARAG
NI
HONDURAS
Edinburgh
Reef
Muerto
Cay
Miskitos Quitasueño
Cays Serrana
Ned Thomas
Cay
Roncador
Roca Providencia/
NICARAGUA Tyra Santa Catalina
San Andrés
Little Corn
Island East-Southeast Cays
Great Corn Alburquerque
Island Cays
CARIBBEAN
SEA
COLOMBIA
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
A Sketch-map No. 8:
RI
T AM
CO A Construction of the
P
provisional median line
This sketch-map has been prepared
COSTA RICA
for illustrative purposes only.
Mercator Projection (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
PANAMA
81
6 CIJ1034.indb 158 7/01/14 12:43 702 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
responds that the achievement of an equitable solution does not entail axn
exact relationship between the lengths of the respective coasts and the xpro -
portion of the relevant area which the delimitation would leave to each
Party. It adds that Nicaragua’s approach of enclaving each island wouxld
itself fail to give due effect to the length of the Colombian relevantx coast.
* *
209. The Court begins by observing that “the respective length of coasts
can play no role in identifying the equidistance line which has been proxvi -
sionally established” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v.
Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 116, para. 163). However, “a
substantial difference in the lengths of the parties’ respective coastlines may
be a factor to be taken into consideration in order to adjust or shift txhe
provisional delimitation line” (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cam‑
eroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria : Equatorial Guinea intervening),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 446, para. 301 ; emphasis added).
210. In this respect, two conclusions can be drawn from the jurispru -
dence of the Court. First, it is normally only where the disparities in xthe
lengths of the relevant coasts are substantial that an adjustment or shixft-
ing of the provisional line is called for (Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), ▯
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 323, para. 185; Maritime Delimitation
in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009,
p. 116, para. 164). Secondly, as the Court emphasized in the case concern-
ing Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen
(Denmark v. Norway), “taking account of the disparity of coastal lengths
does not mean a direct and mathematical application of the relationship
between the length of the coastal front [of the Parties]” (Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 69, para. 69).
211. In the present case, the disparity between the relevant Colombian
coast and that of Nicaragua is approximately 1:8.2 (see paragraph 153).
This is similar to the disparity which the Court considered required
adjustment or shifting of the provisional line in the case concerning Mar ‑
itime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den ‑
mark v. Norway) (ibid., p. 65, para. 61) (approximately 1:9) and the case
concerning Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) (Judg ‑
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 53, paras. 74-75) (approximately 1:8). This is
undoubtedly a substantial disparity and the Court considers that it
requires an adjustment or shifting of the provisional line, especially gxiven
the overlapping maritime areas to the east of the Colombian islands.
B. Overall geographical context
212. Both Parties have addressed the Court on the subject of the effect
which the overall geographical context should have on the delimitation. x
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6 CIJ1034.indb 160 7/01/14 12:43 703 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Nicaragua maintains that the Colombian islands are located “on Nicarax-
gua’s continental shelf”, so that the waters and sea bed around thxem nat-
urally form part of Nicaragua. It contends that one of the most importanxt
principles of the international law of maritime delimitation is that, sox far
as possible, a State should not be cut off, or blocked, from the maritxime
areas into which its coastline projects, particularly by the effect ofx small
island territories. Nicaragua argues that Colombia’s approach in the xpres -
ent case treats the western coasts of Alburquerque Cays, San Andrés,
Providencia, Santa Catalina and Serrana as a wall blocking all access foxr
Nicaragua to the substantial area between the east coasts of those islands
and the line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan baselines, an area to
which, according to Nicaragua, it is entitled by virtue of the natural pxro -
jection of its coast.
*
213. Colombia rejects Nicaragua’s reliance on natural projection and
contends that the significance which it attaches to its islands does nxot
infringe any principle precluding a “cut-off”. Moreover, it maintains that
Nicaragua’s proposed solution of enclaving the Colombian islands itsexlf
infringes that principle, since it denies those islands their natural prxojec -
tion to the east up to and, indeed, beyond, the line 200 nautical miles
from the Nicaraguan coast. According to Colombia, Nicaragua’s pro -
posed solution, by confining the Colombian islands to their territoriaxl
seas would, in effect, require Colombia to sacrifice the entire contxinental
shelf and exclusive economic zone to which the islands would entitle it.x
* *
214. The Court does not believe that any weight should be given to
Nicaragua’s contention that the Colombian islands are located on “Nica -
ragua’s continental shelf”. It has repeatedly made clear that geolxogical
and geomorphological considerations are not relevant to the delimitationx
of overlapping entitlements within 200 nautical miles of the coasts of
States (see, e.g., Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahirya/Malta), Judg ‑
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 35, paras. 39-40). The reality is that the
Nicaraguan mainland and fringing islands, and the Colombian islands,
are located on the same continental shelf. That fact cannot, in and of
itself, give one State’s entitlements priority over those of the othexr in
respect of the area where their claims overlap.
215. The Court agrees, however, that the achievement of an equitable
solution requires that, so far as possible, the line of delimitation shoxuld
allow the coasts of the Parties to produce their effects in terms of mxari -
time entitlements in a reasonable and mutually balanced way (Maritime
Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 127, para. 201). The effect of the provisional
83
6 CIJ1034.indb 162 7/01/14 12:43 704 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
median line is to cut Nicaragua off from some three quarters of the arxea
into which its coast projects. Moreover, that cut-off effect is produced by
a few small islands which are many nautical miles apart. The Court con -
siders that those islands should not be treated as though they were a con -
tinuous mainland coast stretching for over 100 nautical miles and cutting
off Nicaraguan access to the sea bed and waters to their east. The Couxrt
therefore concludes that the cut-off effect is a relevant consideration
which requires adjustment or shifting of the provisional median line in
order to produce an equitable result.
216. At the same time, the Court agrees with Colombia that any
adjustment or shifting of the provisional median line must not have the x
effect of cutting off Colombia from the entitlements generated by its
islands in the area to the east of those islands. Otherwise, the effecxt would
be to remedy one instance of cut-off by creating another. An equitable
solution requires that each State enjoy reasonable entitlements in the
areas into which its coasts project. In the present case, that means thaxt the
action which the Court takes in adjusting or shifting the provisional
median line should avoid completely cutting off either Party from the x
areas into which its coasts project.
C. Conduct of the Parties
217. Both Parties addressed the Court regarding the significance of
conduct in the relevant area but it was Colombia that principally reliedx
upon this factor, so that it is appropriate to begin by reviewing Colom -
bia’s arguments. Colombia submits that it has for many decades regu -
lated fishing activities, conducted scientific exploration and conduxcted
naval patrols throughout the area to the east of the 82nd meridian,
whereas there is no evidence of any significant Nicaraguan activity thxere
until recent times.
*
218. Nicaragua argues that Colombia’s case on this point amounts in
practice to an attempt to resurrect its argument that the 1928 Treaty
established a maritime boundary along the 82nd meridian, a theory which
the Court rejected in its Judgment on Preliminary Objections (Territorial
and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 869, para. 120). According to
Nicaragua, the conduct of Colombia with regard to fisheries and patrol -
ling neither establishes a tacit agreement between the Parties to treat xthe
82nd meridian as a maritime boundary, nor constitutes a relevant circum -
stance to be taken into account in achieving an equitable solution.
* *
84
6 CIJ1034.indb 164 7/01/14 12:43 705 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
219. The Court has already held that the 1928 Treaty did not fix the
82nd meridian as a maritime boundary between the Parties (Territorial
and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 869, para. 120). The Court does not
understand Colombia as attempting either to reopen that question by
arguing that the Parties have expressly agreed upon the 82nd meridian as
a maritime boundary, or as contending that the conduct of the Parties isx
sufficient to establish the existence of a tacit agreement between themx to
treat the 82nd meridian as such a boundary. In that context, the Court
would, in any event, recall that
“[e]vidence of a tacit legal agreement must be compelling. The estab -
lishment of a permanent maritime boundary is a matter of grave
importance and agreement is not easily to be presumed.” (Territorial
and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Carib ‑
bean Sea (Nicaraguav.Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J.Reports2007(II),
p. 735, para. 253.)
220. The Court understands Colombia to be advancing a different argu-
ment, namely that the conduct of the Parties east of the 82nd meridian
constitutes a relevant circumstance in the present case, which suggests that
the use of the provisional median line as a line of delimitation would bxe
equitable. While it cannot be ruled out that conduct might need to be taxken
into account as a relevant circumstance in an appropriate case, the jurixspr-
dence of the Court and of arbitral tribunals shows that conduct will notx
normally have such an effect (Maritime Delimitation in the Area between
Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1993, p. 77, para. 86; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria : Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 447, para. 304 ; Maritime Delimitation in the Black
Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 125, para. 19 ;8
award of the Arbitration Tribunal in the Arbitration between Barbados and
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago [hereinafter the Barbados/Trinidad and
Tobago case] Tribunal Award of 11 April 2006 (2006), RIAA, Vol. XXVII,
p. 222, para. 269; ILR, Vol. 139, p. 533; award of the Arbitration Tribunal
in the Guyana/Suriname case (2007), Permanent Court of Arbitration Award
Series (2012), pp. 147-153; ILR, Vol. 139, pp. 673-678, paras. 378-391).
The Court does not consider that the conduct of the Parties in the present
case is so exceptional as to amount to a relevant circumstance which itsxelf
requires it to adjust or shift the provisional median line.
D. Security and law enforcement considerations
221. Both Parties also invoke security and law enforcement consider -
ations in relation to the appropriate course of the maritime boundary.
Colombia contends that it has taken responsibility for the exercise of
jurisdiction in relation to drug trafficking and related crimes in the xarea
east of the 82nd meridian. Nicaragua counters that most of the crime in
question originates in Colombia.
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6 CIJ1034.indb 166 7/01/14 12:43 706 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
222. The Court considers that much of Colombia’s arguments on this
issue are, in effect, arguments regarding conduct which have been dealxt
with in the preceding section of the Judgment. It also notes that control
over the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf is not nor -
mally associated with security considerations and does not affect righxts of
navigation. However, the Court has recognized that legitimate security
concerns might be a relevant consideration if a maritime delimitation waxs
effected particularly near to the coast of a State and the Court will xbear
this consideration in mind in determining what adjustment to make to thex
provisional median line or in what way that line should be shifted.
E. Equitable access to natural resources
223. Both Parties raise the question of equitable access to natural
resources but neither offers evidence of particular circumstances thatx it
considers must be treated as relevant. The Court notes, however, that, as
the Arbitral Tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago case observed,
“[r]esource-related criteria have been treated more cautiously by the
decisions of international courts and tribunals, which have not gen -
erally applied this factor as a relevant circumstance” (Tribunal Award
of 11 April 2006, RIAA, Vol.XXVII, p. 214, para. 241; ILR, Vol.139,
p. 523).
The Court, which quoted this observation with approval in its Judgment
in the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case (I.C.J. Reports 2009,
p. 125, para. 198), considers that the present case does not present issues
of access to natural resources so exceptional as to warrant it treating
them as a relevant consideration.
F. Delimitations already effected in the area
224. Colombia refers in some detail to delimitation agreements which
it has concluded with other States in the region. Those agreements are
described in paragraph 160, above.
The lines prescribed by all of these agreements, together with the
boundary agreed between Costa Rica and Panama in an Agreement of
1980, and the boundary between Nicaragua and Honduras established by
the Court’s 2007 Judgment, are depicted on sketch-map No. 1 (p. 639).
225. The Court has already explained the relevance of these agree -
ments and the judicial determination of the Nicaragua-Honduras bound -
ary for the identification of the relevant area (see paragraphs 160-163,
above). The Court will now consider whether, and if so how, they affexct
the boundary now to be determined by the Court.
* *
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6 CIJ1034.indb 168 7/01/14 12:43 707 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
226. There are two questions for the Court to consider. The first is
whether the agreements between Colombia and Costa Rica, Jamaica and
Panama amount, as Colombia argues, to a recognition by those States of
Colombian entitlements in parts of the relevant area which the Court
should take into account in the present case. The second is whether thosxe
agreements impose limits upon the action which the Court can take in thex
present case, because of the requirement that the Court respect the righxts
of third States.
227. With regard to the first question, the Court accepts that Panama’s x
agreement with Colombia amounts to recognition by Panama of Colom -
bian claims to the area to the north and west of the boundary line laid x
down in that agreement. Similarly the unratified treaty between Colombxia
and Costa Rica entails at least potential recognition by Costa Rica of
Colombian claims to the area to the north and east of the boundary line x
which it lays down, while the Colombia-Jamaica agreement entails recog -
nition by Jamaica of Colombian claims to the area to the south-west of
the boundary of the Colombia-Jamaica “Joint Regime Area”. The Court
cannot, however, agree with Colombia that this recognition amounts to a x
relevant circumstance which the Court must take into account in effecting
a maritime delimitation between Colombia and Nicaragua. It is a funda -
mental principle of international law that a treaty between two States
cannot, by itself, affect the rights of a third State. As the Arbitralx Tribu -
nal in the Island of Palmas case put it, “it is evident that whatever may be
the right construction of a treaty, it cannot be interpreted as disposinxg of
the rights of independent third Powers” (Reports of International Arbitral
Awards (RIAA), Vol. II, p. 842). In accordance with that principle, the
treaties which Colombia has concluded with Jamaica and Panama and
the treaty which it has signed with Costa Rica cannot confer upon Colom-
bia rights against Nicaragua and, in particular, cannot entitle it, vis-à-vis
Nicaragua, to a greater share of the area in which its maritime entitle -
ments overlap with those of Nicaragua than it would otherwise receive.
228. With regard to the second question, the Court observes that, as
Article 59 of the Statute of the Court makes clear, it is axiomatic that a
judgment of the Court is not binding on any State other than the partiesx
to the case. Moreover, the Court has always taken care not to draw a
boundary line which extends into areas where the rights of third States x
may be affected. The Judgment by which the Court delimits the boundaryx
addresses only Nicaragua’s rights as against Colombia and vice versa xand
is, therefore, without prejudice to any claim of a third State or any clxaim
which either Party may have against a third State.
9. Course of the Maritime Boundary
229. Having thus identified relevant circumstances which mean that a
maritime boundary following the course of the provisional median line
87
6 CIJ1034.indb 170 7/01/14 12:43 708 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
would not produce an equitable result, the Court must now consider what x
changes are required to that line. The extent and nature of those changexs
is determined by the particular relevant circumstances which the Court
has identified. The first such circumstance is the considerable dispxarity in
the lengths of the relevant coasts, the ratio of Colombia’s relevant xcoast
to that of Nicaragua being approximately 1:8.2 (see paragraphs 208-211,
above). The second relevant circumstance is the overall geographical coxn -
text, in which the relevant Colombian coast consists of a series of islaxnds,
most of them very small, and located at a considerable distance from onex
another, rather than a continuous coastline (see paragraphs 212-216,
above). Since these islands are situated within 200 nautical miles of txhe
Nicaraguan mainland, the potential entitlements of the Parties are not
confined to the area between that mainland and the western coast of thxe
Colombian islands, but extend to the area between the east coasts of the
Colombian islands and the line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan
baselines (see paragraphs 155-166, above, and sketch-map No. 7, p. 687).
The first circumstance means that the boundary should be such that thex
portion of the relevant area accorded to each State takes account of thex
disparity between the lengths of their relevant coasts. A boundary whichx
followed the course of the provisional median line would leave Colombia
in possession of a markedly larger portion of the relevant area than thaxt
accorded to Nicaragua, notwithstanding the fact that Nicaragua has a farx
longer relevant coast. The second circumstance necessitates a solution ixn
which neither Party is cut off from the entirety of any of the areas ixnto
which its coasts project.
230. In the Court’s view, confining Colombia to a succession of
enclaves drawn around each of its islands, as Nicaragua proposes, would x
disregard that second requirement. Even if each island were to be given x
an enclave of 12 nautical miles, and not 3 nautical miles as suggested by
Nicaragua, the effect would be to cut off Colombia from the substantxial
areas to the east of the principal islands, where those islands generatex an
entitlement to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. In addi -
tion, the Nicaraguan proposal would produce a disorderly pattern of sev -
eral distinct Colombian enclaves within a maritime space which otherwise
pertained to Nicaragua with unfortunate consequences for the orderly
management of maritime resources, policing and the public order of the
oceans in general, all of which would be better served by a simpler and x
more coherent division of the relevant area.
231. Moreover, the jurisprudence on which Nicaragua relies does not
support its argument that each Colombian island should be confined to x
an enclave. As the Court has already remarked (paragraph 198 above),
the decision of the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo‑French Continental
Shelf case to enclave the Channel Islands took place in the context of a
delimitation between mainland coasts. As the Court of Arbitration
remarked
88
6 CIJ1034.indb 172 7/01/14 12:43 709 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
“The Channel Islands . . . are situated not only on the French side of
a median line drawn between the two mainlands but practically within
the arms of a gulf on the French coast. Inevitably, the presence of
these islands in the English Channel in that particular situation dis -
turbs the balance of the geographical circumstances which would
otherwise exist between the Parties in this region as a result of the
broad equality of the coastlines of their mainlands.” (Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the French Republic (1977), RIAA, Vol. XVIII,
p. 88, para. 183 ; ILR, Vol. 54, p. 96.)
By contrast, in the present case the Colombian islands face Nicaragua inx
only one direction and from a far greater distance than the Channel
Islands face France. Whereas the distance between the nearest point in
the Channel Islands and the French coast was less than 7 nautical miles,
the most westerly point on the Colombian islands, Alburquerque Cays, is
more than 65 nautical miles from the nearest point on the Nicaraguan
islands and, most of the San Andrés Archipelago is much farther away
from Nicaragua than that. Nor did the approach taken by the Court of
Arbitration in the Anglo‑French Continental Shelf case divide the Channel
Islands into a series of separate enclaves. None of the other instances in
which enclaving was employed involved a situation comparable with that
in the present case.
232. The Court considers that it should proceed by way of shifting the
provisional median line. In this context, it is necessary to draw a distinc -
tion between that part of the relevant area which lies between the Nicarxa-
guan mainland and the western coasts of Alburquerque Cays, San Andrésx,
Providencia and Santa Catalina, where the relationship is one of oppositxe
coasts, and the part which lies to the east of those islands, where the xrela-
tionship is more complex.
233. In the first, western, part of the relevant area, the relevant circum-
stances set out above call for the provisional median line to be shiftedx
eastwards. The disparity in coastal lengths is so marked as to justify ax
significant shift. The line cannot, however, be shifted so far that itx cuts
across the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea around any of the Colombian
islands, since to do so would be contrary to the principle set out in paxra -
graphs 176 to 180, above. The Court notes that there are various tech -
niques which allow for relevant circumstances to be taken into
consideration in order to reach an equitable solution. In the present caxse,
the Court considers that in order to arrive at such a solution, taking dxue
account of the relevant circumstances, the base points located on the
Nicaraguan and Colombian islands, respectively, should be accorded dif -
ferent weights.
234. In the Court’s opinion, an equitable result is achieved in this part x
of the relevant area by giving a weighting of one to each of the Colom -
89
6 CIJ1034.indb 174 7/01/14 12:43 710 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
bian base points and a weighting of three to each of the Nicaraguan basex
points. That is done by constructing a line each point on which is threex
times as far from the controlling base point on the Nicaraguan islands axs
it is from the controlling base point on the Colombian islands. The Courxt
notes that, while all of the Colombian base points contribute to the conx-
struction of this line, only the Nicaraguan base points on Miskitos Caysx,
Ned Thomas Cay and Little Corn Island control the weighted line. As a
result of the fact that the line is constructed using a 3:1 ratio between
Nicaraguan and Colombian base points, the effect of the other Nicara -
guan base points is superseded by those base points. The line ends at thxe
last point that can be constructed using three base points (see sketch-map
No. 9: Construction of the weighted line p. 711).
235. The method used in the construction of the weighted line (as
described in the previous paragraph) results in a line which has a curvxed
shape with a large number of turning points. Such a configuration of txhe
line may create difficulties in its practical application. The Court thxerefore
proceeds to a further adjustment by reducing the number of turning
points and connecting them by geodetic lines. This produces a simplifixed
weighted line which is depicted on sketch-map No. 10. The line thus
constructed (“the simplified weighted line”) forms the boundarxy between
the maritime entitlements of the two States between points 1 and 5, as
depicted on sketch-map No. 10 (p. 712).
236. The Court considers, however, that to extend that line into the
parts of the relevant area north of point 1 or south of point 5 would not
lead to an equitable result. While the simplified weighted line represents a
shifting of the provisional median line which goes some way towards
reflecting the disparity in coastal lengths, it would, if extended beyxond
points 1 and 5, still leave Colombia with a significantly larger share of the
relevant area than that accorded to Nicaragua, notwithstanding the fact x
that Nicaragua’s relevant coast is more than eight times the length oxf
Colombia’s relevant coast. It would thus give insufficient weight tox the
first relevant circumstance which the Court has identified. Moreoverx, by
cutting off Nicaragua from the areas east of the principal Colombian
islands into which the Nicaraguan coast projects, such a boundary would
fail to take into account the second relevant circumstance, namely the
overall geographical context.
The Court considers that it must take proper account both of the dis -
parity in coastal length and the need to avoid cutting either State off from
the maritime spaces into which its coasts project. In the view of the Coxurt,
an equitable result which gives proper weight to those relevant considerx -
ations is achieved by continuing the boundary line out to the line 200 nau-
tical miles from the Nicaraguan baselines along lines of latitude.
237. As illustrated on sketch-map No. 11 (Course of the maritime
boundary, p. 714), that is done as follows.
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6 CIJ1034.indb 176 7/01/14 12:43 711 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Outline of a bank
SerranillaINT
REGIME
AREA
RA
HONDUGUA Colombia / Jamaica
NICAA
HONDURAS
Edinburgh
Reef
Muerto
Cay
Miskitos Quitasueño Serrana
Cays
Ned Thomas
Cay
Roncador
Roca Providencia/
NICARAGUA Tyra Santa Catalina
San Andrés
Little Corn
Island East-Southeast Cays
Great Corn Alburquerque
Island Cays
CARIBBEAN
SEA
COLOMBIA
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
A
RI Sketch-map No. 9:
TA MA
OSAN Construction of
C P
the weighted line
COSTA RICA This sketch-map has been prepared
for illustrative purposes only.
Mercator Projection (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
PANAMA
91
6 CIJ1034.indb 178 7/01/14 12:43 712 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Sketch-map No. 10:
The simplified 0
1
weighted line
This sketch-map has been prepared
for illustrative purposes only.
Mercator Projection (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
Providencia/
Santa Catalina
3
4
San Andrés
East-Southeast
Cays
Alburquerque
Cays
5
Outline of a bank
92
6 CIJ1034.indb 180 7/01/14 12:43 713 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
First, from the extreme northern point of the simplified weighted linex
(point 1), which is located on the parallel passing through the northern -
most point on the 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs around Roncador,
the line of delimitation will follow the parallel of latitude until it rxeaches
the 200-nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which the territoriaxl
sea of Nicaragua is measured (endpoint A). As the Court has explained
(paragraph 159 above), since Nicaragua has yet to notify the baselines
from which its territorial sea is measured, the precise location of end -
point A cannot be determined and the location depicted on sketch-map
No. 11 is therefore approximate.
Secondly, from the extreme southern point of the adjusted line (point 5),
the line of delimitation will run in a south-east direction until it intersects
with the 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs around South Cay of Alburqu -
erque Cays (point 6). It then continues along that 12-nautical-mile enve -
lope of arcs around South Cay of Alburquerque Cays until it reaches the x
point (point 7) where that envelope of arcs intersects with the parallel
passing through the southernmost point on the 12-nautical-mile envelope
of arcs around East-Southeast Cays. The boundary line then follows that
parallel until it reaches the southernmost point of the 12-nautical-mile
envelope of arcs around East-Southeast Cays (point 8) and continues
along that envelope of arcs until its most eastward point (point 9). From
that point the boundary line follows the parallel of latitude until it rxeaches
the 200-nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which the territoriaxl
sea of Nicaragua is measured (endpoint B, the approximate location of
which is shown on sketch-map No. 11, p. 714).
238. That leaves Quitasueño and Serrana, both of which the Court has
held fall on the Nicaraguan side of the boundary line described above. Ixn
the Court’s view, to take the adjusted line described in the preceding
paragraphs further north, so as to encompass these islands and the sur -
rounding waters, would allow small, isolated features, which are locatedx
at a considerable distance from the larger Colombian islands, to have a x
disproportionate effect upon the boundary. The Court therefore consid -
ers that the use of enclaves achieves the most equitable solution in thixs
part of the relevant area.
Quitasueño and Serrana are each entitled to a territorial sea which, xfor
the reasons already given by the Court (paragraphs 176-180 above), can -
not be less than 12 nautical miles in breadth. Since Quitasueño is a rock
incapable of sustaining human habitation or an economic life of its own x
and thus falls within the rule stated in Article 121, paragraph 3, of
UNCLOS, it is not entitled to a continental shelf or exclusive economic x
zone. Accordingly, the boundary between the continental shelf and exclu -
sive economic zone of Nicaragua and the Colombian territorial sea
around Quitasueño will follow a 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs mea -
sured from QS 32 and from the low-tide elevations located within 12 nau-
tical miles from QS 32 (see paragraphs 181-183 above).
93
6 CIJ1034.indb 182 7/01/14 12:43 714 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
A I
I B
Outliof the relevantdaarte(not in force)2007BtyteirlaalBtetirrleaaaltettyrreaBoalifttlyra1et9oea9frtya31lo9t7fre61a9ty77of 1980
A L
J O
C
COLOMBIA
Bajo Nuevo CARIBBEAN SEA WGS 84
Course of the
JOINTAREA A
REGIME Sketch-map No. 11: for illustrative purposes only.
Colombia / Jamaica
B This sketch-map has been prepared30' N)
Roncador
Serrana
Serranilla
9
Quitasueño East-Sout8east Cays
A PrSanta Catalina
A U 1 7
R A AC AM
U R IR AN
DN AC 2 San Andrés Cays T P
O N 3 SO
H Alburquerque COLOMBIA C
4 6 COSTA RICA
5
Miskitos
Island
Island
Little Corn
Great Corn
COSTA RICA
NICARAGUA
HONDURAS
94
6 CIJ1034.indb 184 7/01/14 12:43 715 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
In the case of Serrana, the Court recalls that it has already concluded x
that it is unnecessary to decide whether or not it falls within the rule
stated in Article 121, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS (paragraph 180 above).
Its small size, remoteness and other characteristics mean that, in any
event, the achievement of an equitable result requires that the boundaryx
line follow the outer limit of the territorial sea around the island. Thxe
boundary will therefore follow a 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs mea -
sured from Serrana Cay and other cays in its vicinity.
The boundary lines thus established around Quitasueño and Serrana
are depicted on sketch-map No. 11.
10. The Disproportionality Test
239. The Court now turns to the third stage in its methodology, namely
testing the result achieved by the boundary line described in the precedxing
section to ascertain whether, taking account of all the circumstances, txhere
is a significant disproportionality which would require further adjustxment.
240. In carrying out this third stage, the Court notes that it is not
applying a principle of strict proportionality. Maritime delimitation isx not
designed to produce a correlation between the lengths of the Parties’x rel -
evant coasts and their respective shares of the relevant area. As the Coxurt
observed in the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) case,
“If such a use of proportionality were right, it is difficult to seex what
room would be left for any other consideration ; for it would be at
once the principle of entitlement to continental shelf rights and also
the method of putting that principle into operation.” (Continental
Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1985, p. 45, para. 58.)
The Court’s task is to check for a significant disproportionality. What
constitutes such a disproportionality will vary according to the precisex
situation in each case, for the third stage of the process cannot requirxe the
Court to disregard all of the considerations which were important in thex
earlier stages. Moreover, the Court must recall what it said more recentxly
in the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case,
“that various tribunals, and the Court itself, have drawn differentx
conclusions over the years as to what disparity in coastal lengths
would constitute a significant disproportionality which suggested the x
delimitation line was inequitable and still required adjustment” (Mar ‑
itime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 129, para. 213).
241. ITLOS, in the Bay of Bengal case, spoke of checking for “signifi -
cant disproportion” (Judgment of 14 March 2012, ITLOS, pp. 142-143,
95
6 CIJ1034.indb 186 7/01/14 12:43 716 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
para. 499). The Arbitration Tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago
case referred to proportionality being used as “a final check upon xthe
equity of a tentative delimitation to ensure that the result is not tainted by
some form of gross disproportion” (Tribunal Award of 11 April 2006,
RIAA, Vol. XXVII, p. 214, para. 238; ILR, Vol. 139, pp. 522-523;
emphasis added). The Tribunal in that case went on to state that this
process
“does not require the drawing of a delimitation line in a manner that
is mathematically determined by the exact ratio of the lengths of the
relevant coastlines. Although mathematically certain, this would in
many cases lead to an inequitable result. Delimitation rather requires
the consideration of the relative lengths of coastal frontages as one
element in the process of delimitation taken as a whole. The degree
of adjustment called for by any given disparity in coastal lengths is a
matter for the Tribunal’s judgment in the light of all the circumstanxces
of the case.” (RIAA, Vol. XXVII, p. 235, para. 328 ; ILR, Vol. 139,
p. 547.)
242. The Court thus considers that its task, at this third stage, is not to
attempt to achieve even an approximate correlation between the ratio of xthe
lengths of the Parties’ relevant coasts and the ratio of their respective shares
of the relevant area. It is, rather, to ensure that there is not a disprxoportion so
gross as to “taint” the result and render it inequitable. Whether xany dispropor
tion is so great as to have that effect is not a question capable of bxeing answered
by reference to any mathematical formula but is a matter which can be
answered only in the light of all the circumstances of the particular caxse.
243. Application of the adjusted line described in the previous section
of the Judgment has the effect of dividing the relevant area between txhe
Parties in a ratio of approximately 1:3.44 in Nicaragua’s favour. The
ratio of relevant coasts is approximately 1:8.2. The question, thereforex, is
whether, in the circumstances of the present case, this disproportion isx so
great as to render the result inequitable.
244. The Court recalls that its selection of that line was designed to
ensure that neither State suffered from a “cut-off” effect and that this
consideration required that San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalinxa
should not be cut off from their entitlement to an exclusive economic x
zone and continental shelf to their east, including in that area which ixs
within 200 nautical miles of their coasts but beyond 200 nautical miles
from the Nicaraguan baselines. The Court also observes that a relevant
consideration, in the selection of that line, was that the principal Colxom -
bian islands should not be divided into separate areas, each surrounded x
by a Nicaraguan exclusive economic zone and that the delimitation was
one which must take into account the need of contributing to the public x
order of the oceans. To do so, the delimitation should be, in the words xof
the Tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago case, “both equitable
and as practically satisfactory as possible, while at the same time in keep -
ing with the requirement of achieving a stable legal outcome” (Award of
96
6 CIJ1034.indb 188 7/01/14 12:43 717 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
11 April 2006, RIAA, Vol. XXVII, p. 215, para. 244 ; ILR, Vol. 139,
p. 524).
245. Analysis of the jurisprudence of maritime delimitation cases
shows that the Court and other tribunals have displayed considerable
caution in the application of the disproportionality test. Thus, the Couxrt
observes that in the case concerning Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Malta), the ratio of relevant coasts was approximately 1:8, a
figure almost identical to that in the present case. The Court considexred,
at the second stage of its analysis, that this disparity required an adjxust -
ment or shifting of the provisional median line. At the third stage, it xcon-
fined itself to stating that there was no significant disproportionaxlity
without examining the precise division of shares of the relevant area. Txhat
may have been because of the difficulty of determining the limits of thxe
relevant area due to the overlapping interests of third States. Neverthex -
less, it is clear that the respective shares of Libya and Malta did not come
anywhere near a ratio of 1:8, although Malta’s share was substantiallxy
reduced from what it would have been had the boundary followed the
provisional median line.
246. Similarly in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area
between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), the ratio of
relevant coasts was approximately 1:9 in Denmark’s favour (Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 65, para. 61). That disparity led the Court to shift
the provisional median line. Again, the Court did not discuss, in its Juxdg -
ment, the precise shares of the relevant area (referred to in that Judgxment
as the “area of overlapping potential entitlements”) which the lixne thus
established attributed to each State, but the description in the Judgmenxt
and the depiction of the boundary on the maps attached thereto show
that it was approximately 1:2.7. The Court did not consider the result to
be significantly disproportionate.
247. The Court concludes that, taking account of all the circumstances
of the present case, the result achieved by the application of the line xpro -
visionally adopted in the previous section of the Judgment does not entaxil
such a disproportionality as to create an inequitable result.
VI. Nicaragua’s Request foxr a Declaration
248. In addition to its claims regarding a maritime boundary, Nicara -
gua’s Application reserved “the right to claim compensation for elxements
of unjust enrichment consequent upon Colombian possession of the
Islands of San Andrés and Providencia as well as the keys and maritime
spaces up to the 82 meridian” and “for interference with fishing vessels of
Nicaraguan nationality or vessels licensed by Nicaragua”. In its fixnal sub -
missions, Nicaragua made no claim for compensation but it requested
that the Court adjudge and declare that “Colombia is not acting in acxcor -
dance with her obligations under international law by stopping and
97
6 CIJ1034.indb 190 7/01/14 12:43 718 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
otherwise hindering Nicaragua from accessing and disposing of her
natural resources to the east of the 82nd meridian”. In this regard, Nica -
ragua referred to a number of incidents in which Nicaraguan fishing vexs-
sels had been arrested by Colombian warships east of the 82nd meridian.
249. Colombia states that Nicaragua’s request for a declaration is
unfounded. According to Colombia, Nicaragua has not demonstrated
that it has suffered any damage as a result of Colombia’s alleged cxonduct.
It adds, first, that in a maritime delimitation dispute, parties do noxt claim
reparation if the judgment finds that areas over which one party has bxeen
exercising its jurisdiction actually fall under the jurisdiction of the xother.
Secondly, Colombia argues that it cannot be criticized for blocking Nicax-
ragua’s access to natural resources to the east of the 82nd meridian. In
particular, Colombia states that, in the normal exercise of its jurisdiction,
it has intercepted to the east of the 82nd meridian fishing vessels flying the
Nicaraguan flag which were not in possession of the appropriate permitxs.
Additionally, Colombia contends that there is no evidence that any Nica -
raguan vessel involved in the exploitation of natural resources in the axreas
east of the 82nd meridian has been threatened or intercepted by Colom -
bia. In light of the above, Colombia submits that the Court should rejecxt
Nicaragua’s request for a declaration.
* *
250. The Court observes that Nicaragua’s request for this declaration
is made in the context of proceedings regarding a maritime boundary
which had not been settled prior to the decision of the Court. The consex-
quence of the Court’s Judgment is that the maritime boundary between x
Nicaragua and Colombia throughout the relevant area has now been
delimited as between the Parties. In this regard, the Court observes thaxt
the Judgment does not attribute to Nicaragua the whole of the area whichx
it claims and, on the contrary, attributes to Colombia part of the mari -
time spaces in respect of which Nicaragua seeks a declaration regarding x
access to natural resources. In this context, the Court considers that Nxic-
ragua’s claim is unfounded.
* * *
251. For these reasons,
The Court,
(1) Unanimously,
Finds that the Republic of Colombia has sovereignty over the islands at
Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Ronca -
dor, Serrana and Serranilla ;
98
6 CIJ1034.indb 192 7/01/14 12:43 719 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
(2) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds admissible the Republic of Nicaragua’s claim contained in its
final submission I (3) requesting the Court to adjudge and declare that
“[t]he appropriate form of delimitation, within the geographical and xlegal
framework constituted by the mainland coasts of Nicaragua and Colom -
bia, is a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the overlapx -
ping entitlements to a continental shelf of both Parties” ;
in favour : President Tomka ;Vice‑President Sepúlveda-Amor ;Judges Abra-
ham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Greenwood,
Xue, Donoghue, Sebutinde ; Judges ad hoc Mensah, Cot ;
against : Judge Owada ;
(3) Unanimously,
Finds that it cannot uphold the Republic of Nicaragua’s claim con -
tained in its final submission I (3) ;
(4) Unanimously,
Decides that the line of the single maritime boundary delimiting the
continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of the Republic of
Nicaragua and the Republic of Colombia shall follow geodetic lines con -
necting the points with co-ordinates :
Latitude north Longitude west
1. 13° 46ʹ 35.7˝ 81° 29ʹ 34.7˝
2. 13° 31ʹ 08.0˝ 81° 45ʹ 59.4˝
3. 13° 03ʹ 15.8˝ 81° 46ʹ 22.7˝
4. 12° 50ʹ 12.8˝ 81° 59ʹ 22.6˝
5. 12° 07ʹ 28.8˝ 82° 07ʹ 27.7˝
6. 12° 00ʹ 04.5˝ 81° 57ʹ 57.8˝
From point 1, the maritime boundary line shall continue due east along
the parallel of latitude (co-ordinates 13° 46ʹ 35.7˝ N) until it reaches the
200-nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured. From point 6 (with co-ordinates
12° 00ʹ 04.5˝ N and 81° 57ʹ 57.8˝ W), located on a 12-nautical-mile enve -
lope of arcs around Alburquerque, the maritime boundary line shall con -
tinue along that envelope of arcs until it reaches point 7 (with co-ordinates
12° 11ʹ 53.5˝ N and 81° 38ʹ 16.6˝ W) which is located on the parallel pass -
ing through the southernmost point on the 12-nautical-mile envelope of
arcs around East-Southeast Cays. The boundary line then follows that
parallel until it reaches the southernmost point of the 12-nautical-mile
envelope of arcs around East-Southeast Cays at point 8 (with co-ordi -
nates 12° 11ʹ 53.5˝ N and 81° 28ʹ 29.5˝ W) and continues along that enve -
lope of arcs until its most eastward point (point 9 with co-ordinates
12° 24ʹ 09.3˝ N and 81° 14ʹ 43.9˝ W). From that point the boundary line
99
6 CIJ1034.indb 194 7/01/14 12:43 720 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
follows the parallel of latitude (co-ordinates 12° 24ʹ 09.3˝ N) until it
reaches the 200-nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which the texr -
ritorial sea of Nicaragua is measured ;
(5) Unanimously,
Decides that the single maritime boundary around Quitasueño and Ser-
rana shall follow, respectively, a 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs mea -
sured from QS 32 and from low-tide elevations located within
12 nautical miles from QS 32, and a 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs
measured from Serrana Cay and the other cays in its vicinity ;
(6) Unanimously,
Rejects the Republic of Nicaragua’s claim contained in its final submis-
sions requesting the Court to declare that the Republic of Colombia is
not acting in accordance with its obligations under international law by
preventing the Republic of Nicaragua from having access to natural
resources to the east of the 82nd meridian.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at x
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this nineteenth day of November, two
thousand and twelve, in three copies, one of which will be placed in thex
archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of
the Republic of Nicaragua and the Government of the Republic of
Colombia, respectively.
(Signed) Peter Tomka,
President.
(Signed) Philippe Couvreur,
Registrar.
Judge Owada appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the
Court ; JudgeAbraham appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of
the Court ; Judges Keith and Xue append declarations to the Judgment
of the Court ; Judge Donoghue appends a separate opinion to the Judg -
ment of the Court ; Judges ad hoc Mensah and Cot append declarations
to the Judgment of the Court.
(Initialled) P.T.
(Initialled) Ph.C.
100
6 CIJ1034.indb 196 7/01/14 12:43
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME
DISPUTE
(NICARAGUA v. COLOMBIA)
JUDGMENT OF 19 NOVEMBER 2012
2012
COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
DIFFÉREND
TERRITORIAL ET MARITIME
(NICARAGUA c. COLOMBIE)
ARRÊT DU 19 NOVEMBRE 2012
6 CIJ1034.indb 1 7/01/14 12:43 Official citation :
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 624
Mode officiel de citation :
Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2012, p. 624
Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 N ode vente: 1034
ISBN 978-92-1-071148-7
6 CIJ1034.indb 2 7/01/14 12:43 19 NOVEMBER 2012
JUDGMENT
TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME
DISPUTE
(NICARAGUA v. COLOMBIA)
DIFFÉREND
TERRITORIAL ET MARITIME
(NICARAGUA c. COLOMBIE)
19 NOVEMBRE 2012
ARRÊT
6 CIJ1034.indb 3 7/01/14 12:43 624
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraphs
Chronology of the Procxedure 1-17
I. Geography 18-24
II. Sovereignty 25-103
1. Whether the maritime features in dispute are capable of
appropriation 25-38
2. Sovereignty over the maritime features in dispute 39-102
A. The 1928 Treaty 40-56
B. Uti possidetis juris 57-65
C. Effectivités 66-84
(a) Critical date 67-71
(b) Consideration of effectivités 72-84
D. Alleged recognition by Nicaragua 85-90
E. Position taken by third States 91-95
F. Evidentiary value of maps 96-102
3. Conclusion as to sovereignty over the islands 103
III. Admissibility of Nicaraxgua’s Claim for Delimitaxtion
of a Continental Shelfx Extending beyond 200 Nautxical
Miles 104-112
IV. Consideration of Nicarxagua’s Claim for Delimitxation
of a Continental Shelfx Extending beyond 200 Nautxical
Miles 113-131
V. Maritime Boundary 132-247
1. The task now before the Court 132-136
2. Applicable law 137-139
3. Relevant coasts 140-154
A. The Nicaraguan relevant coast 143-145
B. The Colombian relevant coast 146-154
4. Relevant maritime area 155-166
5. Entitlements generated by maritime features 167-183
A. San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina 168-169
B. Alburquerque Cays, East-Southeast Cays, Roncador,
Serrana, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo 170-180
C. Quitasueño 181-183
4
6 CIJ1034.indb 4 7/01/14 12:43 624
TABLE DES MATIÈRES
Paragraphes
Qualités 1-17
I. Géographie 18-24
II. Souveraineté 25-103
1. Question de savoir si les formations maritimes en litige sont
susceptibles d’appropriation 25-38
2. Souveraineté sur les formations maritimes en litige 39-102
A. Le traité de 1928 40-56
B. L’uti possidetis juris 57-65
C. Les effectivités 66-84
a) La date critique 67-71
b) L’examen des effectivités 72-84
D. La prétendue reconnaissance par le Nicaragua du titre
colombien 85-90
E. La position adoptée par des Etats tiers 91-95
F. La valeur probante des cartes 96-102
3. Conclusion concernant la souveraineté sur les îles 103
III. Recevabilité de la demxande du Nicaragua tenxdant à la
délimitation d’un plaxteau continental s’étxendant au-delà
de 200 milles marins 104-112
IV. Examen de la demande du xNicaragua tendant à lax déli-
mitation d’un plateaxu continental s’étendxant au-delà de
200 milles marins 113-131
V. La frontière maritime 132-247
1. La tâche incombant à la Cour 132-136
2. Le droit applicable 137-139
3. Les côtes pertinentes 140-154
A. La côte pertinente du Nicaragua 143-145
B. La côte pertinente de la Colombie 146-154
4. La zone maritime pertinente 155-166
5. Les droits générés par les formations maritimes 167-183
A. San Andrés, Providencia et Santa Catalina 168-169
B. Cayes d’Alburquerque, cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est, Ronca -
dor, Serrana, Serranilla et Bajo Nuevo 170-180
C. Quitasueño 181-183
4
6 CIJ1034.indb 5 7/01/14 12:43 625 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
6. Method of delimitation 184-199
7. Determination of base points and construction of the provi-
sional median line 200-204
8. Relevant circumstances 205-228
A. Disparity in the lengths of the relevant coasts 208-211
B. Overall geographical context 212-216
C. Conduct of the Parties 217-220
D. Security and law enforcement considerations 221-222
E. Equitable access to natural resources 223
F. Delimitations already effected in the area 224-228
9. Course of the maritime boundary 229-238
10. The disproportionality test 239-247
VI. Nicaragua’s Request foxr a Declaration 248-250
Operative Clause 251
5
6 CIJ1034.indb 6 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 625
6. La méthode de délimitation 184-199
7. La détermination des points de base et la construction de la
ligne médiane provisoire 200-204
8. Les circonstances pertinentes 205-228
A. La disparité entre les longueurs respectives des côtes per
tinentes 208-211
B. Le contexte géographique général 212-216
C. Le comportement des Parties 217-220
D. Les considérations de sécurité et de maintien de l’ordre 221-222
E. L’accès équitable aux ressources naturelles 223
F. Les délimitations déjà opérées dans la région 224-228
9. Le tracé de la frontière maritime 229-238
10. La vérification de l’absence de disproportion 239-247
VI. La déclaration demandéxe par le Nicaragua 248-250
Dispositif 251
5
6 CIJ1034.indb 7 7/01/14 12:43 626
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 2012
2012
19 November
General List 19 November 2012
No. 124
TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME
DISPUTE
(NICARAGUA v. COLOMBIA)
Geographical context — Location and characteristics of maritime features in
dispute.
*
Sovereignty.
Whether maritime features in dispute are capable of appropriation — Islands —
Low‑tide elevations — Question of Quitasueño — Smith Report — Tidal mod ‑
els — QS 32 only feature above water at high tide.
1928 Treaty between Nicaragua and Colombia — 1930 Protocol — 2007 Judg ‑
ment on the Preliminary Objections — Full composition of the Archipelago cannot
be conclusively established on the basis of the 1928 Treaty.
Uti possidetis juris — Maritime features not clearly attributed to the colonial
provinces of Nicaragua and Colombia prior to their independence — Title by vir
tue of uti possidetis juris not established.
Effectivités — Critical date — No Nicaraguan effectivités — Different catego
ries of effectivités presented by Colombia — Normal continuation of prior acts à
titre de souverain after critical date — Continuous and consistent acts à titre de
souverain by Colombia — No protest from Nicaragua prior to critical date —
Colombia’s claim of sovereignty strongly supported by facts.
Alleged recognition by Nicaragua of Colombia’s sovereignty — Nicaragua’s
reaction to the Loubet Award — No Nicaraguan claim to sovereignty over Ronca
dor, Quitasueño and Serrana at time of 1928 Treaty — Change in Nicaragua’s
position in 1972 — Some support to Colombia’s claim provided by Nicaragua’s
conduct, practice of third States and maps.
Colombia has sovereignty over maritime features in dispute.
*
6
6 CIJ1034.indb 8 7/01/14 12:43 626
COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
ANNÉE 2012 2012
19 novembre
Rôle général
19 novembre 2012 n 124
DIFFÉREND
TERRITORIAL ET MARITIME
(NICARAGUA c. COLOMBIE)
Contexte géographique — Localisation et caractéristiques des formations mari ‑
times en litige.
*
Souveraineté.
Question de savoir si les formations maritimes en litige sont susceptibl▯es d’ap
propriation — Iles — Hauts‑fonds découvrants — Question de Quitasueño —
Rapport Smith — Modèles de marée — QS 32, seule formation restant découverte
à marée haute.
Traité de 1928 entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie — Protocole de 1930 — Arrêt
de 2007 sur les exceptions préliminaires — Composition exacte de l’archipel ne
pouvant être établie de manière concluante sur la base du trait▯é de 1928.
Uti possidetis juris — Formations maritimes n’ayant pas été clairement attri
buées aux provinces coloniales du Nicaragua et de la Colombie avant l▯eur indépen ‑
dance — Titre en vertu de l’uti possidetis juris non établi.
Effectivités — Date critique — Absence d’effectivités nicaraguayennes — Diffé
rentes catégories d’effectivités invoquées par la Colombie — Continuation normale
d’activités antérieures accomplies à titre de souverain après la date critiq—e
Colombie ayant agi de manière constante et cohérente à titre de▯ souverain —
Absence d’opposition de la part du Nicaragua avant la date critique — Faits confor
tant très nettement la revendication de souveraineté de la Col▯ .ie
Prétendue reconnaissance par le Nicaragua de la souveraineté de la▯ Colom ‑
bie — Réaction du Nicaragua à la sentence Loubet — Nicaragua n’ayant pas
revendiqué Roncador, Quitasueño et Serrana à l’époque du ▯traité de 1928 — Nica
ragua étant revenu sur sa position en 1972 — Comportement du Nicaragua, pra ‑
tique des Etats tiers et cartes tendant à conforter l’argumentation de la Colombie▯.
Colombie ayant la souveraineté sur les formations maritimes en litige▯.
*
6
6 CIJ1034.indb 9 7/01/14 12:43 627 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Admissibility of Nicaragua’s claim for delimitation of a continental ▯shelf extend‑
ing beyond 200 nautical miles — New claim — Original claim concerned delimita ‑
tion of the exclusive economic zone and of the continental shelf — New claim still
concerns delimitation of the continental shelf and arises directly out o▯f maritime
delimitation dispute — No transformation of the subject‑matter of the dispute —
Claim is admissible.
*
Consideration of Nicaragua’s claim for delimitation of an extended co▯ntinental
shelf — Colombia not a party to UNCLOS — Customary international law appli ‑
cable — Definition of the continental shelf in Article 76, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS
forms part of customary international law — No need to decide whether other
provisions of Article 76 form part of customary international law — Claim for an
extended continental shelf by a State party to UNCLOS must be in accorda▯nce
with Article 76 — Nicaragua not relieved of its obligations under Article 76 —
“Preliminary Information” submitted by Nicaragua to the Commission▯ on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf — Continental margin extending beyond 200 nau ‑
tical miles not established — The Court not in a position to delimit the boundary
between the extended continental shelf claimed by Nicaragua and the cont▯inental
shelf of Colombia — Nicaragua’s claim cannot be upheld.
*
Maritime boundary.
Task of the Court — Delimitation between Nicaragua’s continental shelf and
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and exclusive economic zon▯e gener ‑
ated by the Colombian islands — Customary international law applicable — Arti ‑
cles 74 and 83 (maritime delimitation) and Article 121 (régime of islands) of
UNCLOS reflect customary international law.
Relevant coasts — Mainland coast of Nicaragua — Entire coastline of Colom ‑
bian islands — Coastlines of Serranilla, Bajo Nuevo and Quitasueño do not form ▯
part of the relevant coast — Relevant maritime area — Relevant area extends to
200 nautical miles from Nicaragua — Limits of relevant area in the north and in
the south.
Entitlements generated by maritime features — San Andrés, Providencia and
Santa Catalina entitled to territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and ▯continental
shelf — Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo are not relevant for delimitation — Roncador,
Serrana, Alburquerque Cays and East‑Southeast Cays generate territorial sea of
12 nautical miles — Colombia entitled to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles
around QS 32 — No need to determine whether maritime entitlements extend
beyond 12 nautical miles.
Method of delimitation — Three‑stage procedure.
First stage — Construction of a provisional median line between Nicaraguan
coast and western coasts of Colombian islands feasible and appropriate — Deter ‑
mination of base points — No base points on Quitasueño and Serrana — Course
of provisional median line.
Second stage — Relevant circumstances requiring adjustment or shifting of the
provisional line — Substantial disparity in lengths of relevant coasts is a relevant
7
6 CIJ1034.indb 10 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 627
Recevabilité de la demande du Nicaragua tendant à la délimitatio ▯ n d’un plateau
continental au‑delà de 200 milles marins — Demande nouvelle — Demande origi ‑
nelle se rapportant à la délimitation de la zone économique excl▯ usive et du plateau
continental — Nouvelle demande se rapportant toujours à la délimitation du p ▯ lateau
continental et découlant directement du différend en matière de délimitation mari ‑
time — Absence de modification de l’objet du différend — Demande étant recevable.
*
Examen de la demande du Nicaragua se rapportant à la délimitation d ▯ ’un pla ‑
teau continental étendu — Colombie non partie à la CNUDM — Droit internatio ‑
nal coutumier étant applicable — Définition du plateau continental figurant au
paragraphe 1 de l’article 76 de la CNUDM faisant partie du droit international
coutumier — Nul besoin de déterminer si d’autres dispositions de l’arti▯ cle 76 font
partie du droit international coutumier — Prétention d’un Etat partie à la CNUDM
relative à des droits sur le plateau continental étendu devant êt▯ re conforme à l’ar ‑
ticle 76 — Nicaragua non exonéré des obligations qu’il tient de l’a▯ rticle 76 —
«Informations préliminaires » soumises par le Nicaragua à la Commission des
limites du plateau continental — Marge continentale au‑delà de 200 milles marins
n’étant pas établie — Cour n’étant pas en mesure de délimiter la frontière ent▯ re le
plateau continental étendu revendiqué par le Nicaragua et le platea▯ u continental de
la Colombie — Demande du Nicaragua ne pouvant être accueillie.
*
Frontière maritime.
Tâche incombant à la Cour — Délimitation entre le plateau continental et la
zone économique exclusive du Nicaragua et le plateau continental et l▯a zone éco ‑
nomique exclusive générés par les îles colombiennes — Droit international coutu ‑
mier étant applicable — Articles 74 et 83 (délimitation maritime) et article 121
(régime des îles) de la CNUDM reflétant le droit internationa▯l coutumier.
Côtes pertinentes — Côte continentale du Nicaragua — Ensemble des côtes des
îles colombiennes — Côtes de Serranilla, Bajo Nuevo et Quitasueño ne faisant pas
partie de la côte pertinente — Zone maritime pertinente — Zone pertinente s’éten‑
dant à 200 milles marins du Nicaragua — Limites septentrionale et méridionale de
la zone pertinente.
Droits générés par les formations maritimes — San Andrés, Providencia et
Santa Catalina engendrant des droits à une mer territoriale, à une zone écono ‑
mique exclusive et à un plateau continental — Serranilla et Bajo Nuevo étant sans
pertinence aux fins de la délimitation — Roncador, Serrana, cayes d’Alburquerque
et cayes de l’Est‑Sud‑Est générant une mer territoriale de 12 milles marins —
Colombie pouvant prétendre à une mer territoriale de 12 milles marins autour de
QS 32 — Nul besoin de déterminer si les droits à des espaces maritime▯s s’étendent
au‑delà de 12 milles marins.
Méthode de délimitation — Méthode en trois étapes.
Première étape — Construction d’une ligne médiane provisoire entre la côte
nicaraguayenne et les côtes occidentales des îles colombiennes pos▯sible et appro ‑
priée — Détermination des points de base — Absence de points de base sur Quita ‑
sueño et Serrana — Tracé de la ligne médiane provisoire.
Deuxième étape — Circonstances pertinentes justifiant l’ajustement ou le dépla▯‑
cement de la ligne provisoire — Disparité importante entre les longueurs des côtes
7
6 CIJ1034.indb 11 7/01/14 12:43 628 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
circumstance — Overall geographical context — Geological and geomorphological
considerations not relevant — Cut‑off effect is a relevant circumstance — Conduct
of the Parties not a relevant circumstance — Legitimate security concerns to be
borne in mind — Issues of access to natural resources not a relevant circum ‑
stance — Delimitations already effected in the area not a relevant circumsta▯nce —
Judgment is without prejudice to any claim of a third State.
Distinction between western and eastern parts of relevant area — Shifting east ‑
wards of the provisional median line — Different weights accorded to Nicaraguan
and Colombian base points — Curved shape of weighted line — Simplified
weighted line — Course of the boundary eastwards from extreme northern and
southern points of the simplified weighted line — Use of parallels — Quitasueño
and Serrana enclaved — Maritime boundary around Quitasueño and Serrana.
Third stage — Disproportionality test — No need to achieve strict proportional‑
ity — No disproportionality such as to create an inequitable result.
*
Nicaragua’s request for a declaration of Colombia’s unlawful condu▯ct — Mari ‑
time delimitation de novo not granting to Nicaragua the entirety of the areas it
claimed — Request unfounded.
JUDGMENT
Present: President Tomka ;Vice‑President Sepúlveda-Amor ; Judges Owada,
Abraham, Keith, Bennounax, Skotnikov, Cançado Trixndade,
Yusuf, Greenwood, Xue, Donoxghue, Sebutinde ; Judges ad hoc
Mensah, Cot ; Registrar Couvreur.
In the case concerning the territorial and maritime dispute,
between
the Republic of Nicaragua,
represented by
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of the Republic of Nic -
aragua to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agent and Counsel ;
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., former Chichele Professor of International Law,
University of Oxford, associate member of the Institut de droit interna -
tional,
Mr. Alex Oude Elferink, Deputy-Director, Netherlands Institute for the Law
of the Sea, Utrecht University,
8
6 CIJ1034.indb 12 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 628
pertinentes étant une circonstance pertinente — Contexte géographique général —
Considérations géologiques et géomorphologiques dépourvues d▯e pertinence —
Effet d’amputation étant une circonstance pertinente — Comportement des Parties
n’étant pas une circonstance pertinente — Considérations légitimes en matière de
sécurité devant être gardées à l’esprit — Questions de l’accès aux ressources natu
relles n’étant pas une circonstance pertinente — Délimitations déjà effectuées dans
la région n’étant pas une circonstance pertinente — Arrêt étant sans préjudice de
toute revendication d’un Etat tiers.
Distinction à opérer entre les parties occidentale et orientale de▯ la zone perti
nente — Déplacement de la ligne médiane provisoire vers l’est — Valeurs diffé ‑
rentes conférées aux points de base nicaraguayens et colombiens — Forme incur ‑
vée de la ligne pondérée — Ligne pondérée simplifiée — Tracé de la frontière à
l’est du point le plus septentrional et du point le plus méridiona▯l de la ligne pondé
rée simplifiée — Utilisation de parallèles — Enclavement de Quitasueño et de Ser ‑
rana — Frontière maritime autour de Quitasueño et de Serrana.
Troisième étape — Vérification de l’absence de disproportion — Nul besoin de
parvenir à une stricte proportionnalité — Absence de disproportion susceptible
d’aboutir à un résultat inéquitable.
*
Demande du Nicaragua tendant à obtenir une déclaration de la Cour ▯selon
laquelle le comportement de la Colombie est illicite — Délimitation maritime de
novo n’attribuant pas au Nicaragua la totalité de la zone qu’il rev▯endiquait —
Demande étant dépourvue de fondement.
ARRÊT
Présents : M. Tomka, président ; M. Sepúlveda-Amor, vice‑président ;
MM. Owada, Abraham, Keith, Bennxouna, Skotnikov, Cançadxo
Trindade, Yusuf, Greenwooxd, M mesXue, Donoghue, Sebutinde,
juges ; MM. Mensah, Cot, juges ad hoc; M. Couvreur, greffier.
En l’affaire du différend territorial et maritime,
entre
la République du Nicaragua,
représentée par
S. Exc. M. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, ambassadeur de la République du
Nicaragua auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent et conseil ;
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., ancien professeur de droit international à l’Univer -
sité d’Oxford, titulaire de la chaire Chichele, membre associé xde l’Institut
de droit international,
M. Alex Oude Elferink, directeur adjoint de l’Institut néerlandais du droit de x
la mer de l’Université d’Utrecht,
8
6 CIJ1034.indb 13 7/01/14 12:43 629 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La
Défense, former Member and former Chairman of the International Law
Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Paul Reichler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C.,
Member of the Bars of the United States Supreme Court and the District
of Columbia,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad
Autónoma, Madrid, member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates ;
Mr. Robin Cleverly, M.A., D.Phil, C.Geol, F.G.S., Law of the Sea Consult -
ant, Admiralty Consultancy Services, The United Kingdom Hydrographic
Office,
Mr. John Brown, R.D., M.A., F.R.I.N., F.R.G.S., Law of the Sea Consult -
ant, Admiralty Consultancy Services, The United Kingdom Hydrographic
Office,
as Scientific and Technical Advisers ;
Mr. César Vega Masís, Director of Juridical Affairs, Sovereignty and Terri -
tory, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of
the Bars of the United States Supreme Court, the District of Columbia anxd
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Ms Carmen Martínez Capdevila, Doctor of Public International Law, Uni -
versidad Autónoma, Madrid,
as Counsel ;
Mr. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, First Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Claudia Loza Obregon, Second Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Romain Piéri, Researcher, Centre for International Law (CEDIN), Unix -
versity Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Yuri Parkhomenko, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C.,
as Assistant Counsel ;
Ms Helena Patton, The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office,
Ms Fiona Bloor, The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office,
as Technical Assistants,
and
the Republic of Colombia,
represented by
H.E. Mr. Julio Londoño Paredes, Professor of International Relations, Uni -
versidad del Rosario, Bogotá,
as Agent and Counsel ;
9
6 CIJ1034.indb 14 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 629
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La
Défense, ancien membre et ancien président de la Commission du droxit
international, membre associé de l’Institut de droit internationalx,
M. Paul Reichler, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C.,
membre des barreaux de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du
district de Columbia,
M. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, professeur de droit international à l’Universi
dad Autónoma de Madrid, membre de l’Institut de droit internationaxl,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Robin Cleverly, M.A., D.Phil, C.Geol, F.G.S., consultant en droit de la
mer, Admiralty Consultancy Services du bureau hydrographique du
Royaume-Uni,
M. John Brown, R.D., M.A., F.R.I.N., F.R.G.S., consultant en droit de la
mer, Admiralty Consultancy Services du bureau hydrographique du
Royaume-Uni,
comme conseillers scientifiques et techniques ;
M. César Vega Masís, directeur des affaires juridiques, de la souveraineté et x
du territoire au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangèxres,
M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires
étrangères,
me
M Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, conseiller juridique au ministère des
affaires étrangères,
M. Lawrence H. Martin, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., mem -
bre des barreaux de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, du dis-
trict de Columbia et du Commonwealth du Massachusetts,
me
M Carmen Martínez Capdevila, docteur en droit international public de
l’Universidad Autónoma de Madrid,
comme conseils ;
M. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, premier secrétaire de l’ambassade du Nicara-
gua au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
me
M Claudia Loza Obregon, deuxième secrétaire de l’ambassade du Nicara -
gua au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Romain Piéri, chercheur au centre de droit international (CEDIN) de
l’Université de Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M. Yuri Parkhomenko, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C.,
comme conseils adjoints ;
M me Helena Patton, bureau hydrographique du Royaume-Uni,
M me Fiona Bloor, bureau hydrographique du Royaume-Uni,
comme assistantes techniques,
et
la République de Colombie,
représentée par
S. Exc. M. Julio Londoño Paredes, professeur de relations internationales à
l’Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá,
comme agent et conseil ;
9
6 CIJ1034.indb 15 7/01/14 12:43 630 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Lawx,
University of Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,
Barrister,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, member of the
New York Bar, Eversheds LLP, Paris,
Mr. Marcelo Kohen, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Insti -
tute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, associate member
of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates ;
H.E. Mr. Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, Ambassador of the Republic of
Colombia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Permanent Representative
of Colombia to the OPCW,
as Adviser ;
H.E. Mr. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, Presidential High-Commissioner for
Citizenry Security, former Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to thex
Kingdom of the Netherlands, former Minister of State,
Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Member of the International Law Commis -
sion,
H.E. Ms Sonia Pereira Portilla, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairxs,
Mr. Andelfo García González, Professor of International Law, former Dep -
uty Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ms Mirza Gnecco Plá, Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Andrea Jiménez Herrera, Counsellor, Embassy of Colombia in the Kinxg -
dom of the Netherlands,
as Legal Advisers ;
CF William Pedroza, International Affairs Bureau, National Navy of Colxom -
bia,
Mr. Scott Edmonds, Cartographer, International Mapping,
Mr. Thomas Frogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Advisers ;
Mr. Camilo Alberto Gómez Niño,
as Administrative Assistant,
The Court,
composed as above,
after deliberation,
delivers the following Judgment :
1. On 6 December 2001, the Republic of Nicaragua (hereinafter “Nicara -
gua”) filed in the Registry of the Court an Application institutinxg proceedings
against the Republic of Colombia (hereinafter “Colombia”) in resxpect of a dis -
pute consisting of “a group of related legal issues subsisting” bextween the two
States “concerning title to territory and maritime delimitation” ixn the western
Caribbean.
In its Application, Nicaragua seeks to found the jurisdiction of the Couxrt on
the provisions of Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement
signed on 30 April 1948, officially designated, according to Article LX thereof,
10
6 CIJ1034.indb 16 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 630
M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Uni -
versité de Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’xInstitut
de droit international, avocat,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau
de New York, cabinet Eversheds LLP, Paris,
M. Marcelo Kohen, professeur de droit international à l’Institut de hautes
études internationales et du développement de Genève, membre asxsocié de
l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, ambassadeur de la République de
Colombie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas, représentant permanent de la
Colombie auprès de l’OIAC,
comme conseiller ;
S. Exc. M. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, haut conseiller présidentiel pour la
cohabitation et la sécurité des citoyens, ancien ambassadeur de lax Répu-
blique de Colombie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas, ancien ministre d’Etat,
M. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, membre de la Commission du droit interna -
tional,
S. Exc. M me Sonia Pereira Portilla, ambassadeur, ministère des affaires
étrangères,
M. Andelfo García González, professeur de droit international, ancien mi-
nistre adjoint des affaires étrangères,
M me Mirza Gnecco Plá, ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères,
me
M Andrea Jiménez Herrera, conseiller à l’ambassade de Colombie au
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
le capitaine de frégate William Pedroza, bureau des affaires internationales,
Marine colombienne,
M. Scott Edmonds, cartographe, International Mapping,
M. Thomas Frogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseillers techniques ;
M. Camilo Alberto Gómez Niño,
comme assistant administratif,
La Cour,
ainsi composée,
après délibéré en chambre du conseil,
rend l’arrêt suivant :
1. Le 6 décembre 2001, la République du Nicaragua (dénommée ci-après le
«Nicaragua») a déposé au Greffe de la Cour une requête introductivex d’instance
contre la République de Colombie (dénommée ci-après la « Colombie») au sujet
d’un différend portant sur un «ensemble de questions juridiques connexes … qui
demeurent en suspens » entre les deux Etats « en matière de titre territorial et de
délimitation maritime» dans les Caraïbes occidentales.
Dans sa requête, le Nicaragua entend fonder la compétence de la Cour sur les
dispositions de l’article XXXI du traité américain de règlement pacifique signé
le 30 avril 1948, dénommé officiellement, aux termes de son article LX, «pacte
10
6 CIJ1034.indb 17 7/01/14 12:43 631 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
as the “Pact of Bogotá” (hereinafter referred to as such), asx well as on the dec -
larations made by the Parties under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, which are deemed, for the period which txhey still
have to run, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the prexsent
Court under Article 36, paragraph 5, of its Statute.
2. In accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court,
the Registrar immediately communicated the Application to the Governmentx of
Colombia; and, in accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, all other States
entitled to appear before the Court were notified of the Application.
3. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of
either of the Parties, each Party proceeded to exercise its right conferxred by Art-
cle 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case.
Nicaragua first chose Mr. Mohammed Bedjaoui, who resigned on 2 May 2006,
and then Mr. Giorgio Gaja. Following Mr. Gaja’s election as a Member
of the Court, Nicaragua chose Mr. Thomas Mensah. Judge Gaja then decided
that it would not be appropriate for him to sit in the case. Colombia fixrst
chose Mr. Yves Fortier, who resigned on 7 September 2010, and subsequently
Mr. Jean-Pierre Cot.
4. By an Order dated 26 February 2002, the Court fixed 28 April 2003 as the
time-limit for the filing of the Memorial of Nicaragua and 28 June 2004 as the
time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial of Colombia. Nicaragua filed
its Memorial within the time-limit so prescribed.
5. On 21 July 2003, within the time-limit set by Article 79, paragraph 1, of
the Rules of Court, as amended on 5 December 2000, Colombia raised prelimi-
nary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court. Consequently, by an Orxder
dated 24 September 2003, the Court, noting that by virtue of Article 79, para -
graph 5, of the Rules of Court, the proceedings on the merits were suspended, x
fixed 26 January 2004 as the time-limit for the presentation by Nicaragua of a
written statement of its observations and submissions on the preliminaryx objec-
tions made by Colombia. Nicaragua filed such a statement within the tixme-limit
so prescribed, and the case thus became ready for hearing in respect of xthe pre-
liminary objections.
6. The Court held public hearings on the preliminary objections raised by
Colombia from 4 to 8 June 2007. In its Judgment of 13 December 2007, the Court
concluded that it had jurisdiction, under Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá, to
adjudicate upon the dispute concerning sovereignty over the maritime feaxtures
claimed by the Parties, other than the islands of San Andrés, Providexncia and
Santa Catalina, and upon the dispute concerning the maritime delimitatioxn
between the Parties (Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 876, para. 142 (3)).
7. By an Order of 11 February 2008, the President of the Court fixed
11 November 2008 as the new time-limit for the filing of Colombia’s Counter-
Memorial. That pleading was duly filed within the time-limit thus prescribed.
8. By an Order of 18 December 2008, the Court directed Nicaragua to submit
a Reply and Colombia to submit a Rejoinder and fixed 18 September 2009 and
18 June 2010 as the respective time-limits for the filing of those pleadings. The
Reply and the Rejoinder were duly filed within the time-limits thus prescribed.
9. Referring to Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the Govern -
ments of Honduras, Jamaica, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Costa Rixca
11
6 CIJ1034.indb 18 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 631
de Bogotá » (et ci-après ainsi désigné), ainsi que sur les déclarations faitesx par
les Parties en vertu de l’article 36 du Statut de la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale, considérées, pour la durée restant à courir,x comme comportant
acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire de la présente Cour conformément
au paragraphe 5 de l’article 36 de son Statut.
2. Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 40 du Statut de la Cour, la
requête a été immédiatement communiquée au Gouvernement dxe la Colombie
par le greffier ; conformément au paragraphe 3 de cet article, tous les autres
Etats admis à ester devant la Cour ont été informés de la rexquête.
3. La Cour ne comptant sur le siège aucun juge de la nationalité des xParties,
chacune d’elles s’est prévalue du droit que lui confère le pxaragraphe 3 de l’ar -
ticle 31 du Statut de procéder à la désignation d’un juge ad hoc pour siéger en
l’affaire. Le Nicaragua a d’abord désigné M. Mohammed Bedjaoui, qui a démis-
sionné le 2 mai 2006, puis M. Giorgio Gaja. Après l’élection de ce dernier en
qualité de membre de la Cour, le Nicaragua a désigné M. Thomas Mensah.
Le juge Gaja a alors estimé qu’il ne serait pas approprié pour lui de siéger en
l’affaire. La Colombie a d’abord désigné M. Yves Fortier, qui a démissionné le
7 septembre 2010, puis M. Jean-Pierre Cot.
4. Par ordonnance du 26 février 2002, la Cour a fixé au 28 avril 2003 la date
d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt du mémoire du Nicaragxua et au 28 juin 2004
la date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt du contre-mémoire de la Colombie.
Le Nicaragua a déposé son mémoire dans le délai ainsi prescrxit.
5. Le 21 juillet 2003, dans le délai prévu au paragraphe 1 de l’article 79 du
Règlement, tel que modifié le 5 décembre 2000, la Colombie a soulevé des excep-
tions préliminaires à la compétence de la Cour. En conséquenxce, par ordon -
nance du 24 septembre 2003, la Cour, constatant que, en vertu des dispositions
du paragraphe 5 de l’article 79 du Règlement, la procédure sur le fond était sus -
pendue, a fixé au 26 janvier 2004 la date d’expiration du délai dans lequel le
Nicaragua pourrait présenter un exposé écrit contenant ses obsexrvations et
conclusions sur les exceptions préliminaires soulevées par la Coloxmbie. Le Nica -
ragua a déposé un tel exposé dans le délai fixé, et l’xaffaire s’est ainsi trouvée en
état pour ce qui est des exceptions préliminaires.
6. La Cour a tenu des audiences publiques sur les exceptions préliminairxes sou -
levées par la Colombie du 4 au 8 juin 2007. Dans son arrêt du 13 décembre 2007,
la Cour a conclu qu’elle avait compétence, sur la base de l’artxicle XXXI du pacte
de Bogotá, pour statuer sur le différend relatif à la souveraxineté sur les formations
maritimes revendiquées par les Parties autres que les îles de San Andrés, Provi-
dencia et Santa Catalina, ainsi que sur le différend relatif à la délimitatioxn mari-
time entre les Parties (Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie),
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 876, par. 142, point 3).
7. Par ordonnance du 11 février 2008, le président de la Cour a fixé au
11 novembre 2008 la date d’expiration du nouveau délai pour le dépôt du x
contre-mémoire de la Colombie. Cette pièce a été dûment déposxée dans le délai
imparti.
8. Par ordonnance du 18 décembre 2008, la Cour a prescrit la présentation
d’une réplique du Nicaragua et d’une duplique de la Colombie etx a fixé au
18 septembre 2009 et au 18 juin 2010, respectivement, les dates d’expiration des
délais pour le dépôt de ces pièces. La réplique et la dupxlique ont été dûment
déposées dans les délais impartis.
9. Les Gouvernements du Honduras, de la Jamaïque, du Chili, du Pérou,x de
l’Equateur, du Venezuela et du Costa Rica, s’appuyant sur le paragraphe 1 de
11
6 CIJ1034.indb 19 7/01/14 12:43 632 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
asked to be furnished with copies of the pleadings and documents annexedx in
the case. Having ascertained the views of the Parties in accordance withx that
same provision, the Court decided to grant each of these requests. The Rxegistrar
duly communicated these decisions to the said Governments and to the Parxties.
10. On 25 February 2010 and 10 June 2010, respectively, the Republic of
Costa Rica and the Republic of Honduras each filed in the Registry of xthe Court
an Application for permission to intervene in the case, invoking Articlex 62 of the
Statute of the Court. In separate Judgments rendered on 4 May 2011, the Court
found that those Applications could not be granted.
11. In accordance with Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the
Court decided that, after ascertaining the views of the Parties, copies xof the
pleadings and documents annexed would be made accessible to the public oxn the
opening of the oral proceedings.
12. Public hearings were held between 23 April and 4 May 2012, at which the
Court heard the oral arguments and replies of :
For Nicaragua : H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez,
Mr. Alex Oude Elferink,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns,
Mr. Alain Pellet,
Mr. Robin Cleverly,
Mr. Vaughan Lowe,
Mr. Paul Reichler.
For Colombia : H.E. Mr. Julio Londoño Paredes,
Mr. James Crawford,
Mr. Marcelo Kohen,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy.
13. The Parties provided judges’ folders during the oral proceedings. The
Court noted, with reference to Article 56, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, as
supplemented by Practice Direction IXbis, that two documents included by
Nicaragua in one of its judges’ folders had not been annexed to the wxritten
pleadings and were not “part of a publication readily available”. xThe Court thus
decided not to allow those two documents to be produced or referred to dxuring
the hearings.
14. At the hearings, Members of the Court put questions to the Parties, to
which replies were given orally and in writing, in accordance with Articxle 61,
paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court. Under Article 72 of the Rules of Court,
each Party presented written observations on the written replies receivexd from
the other.
*
15. In its Application, the following requests were made by Nicaragua :
“[T]he Court is asked to adjudge and declare :
First, that the Republic of Nicaragua has sovereignty over the islands of
Providencia, San Andrés and Santa Catalina and all the appurtenant isxlands
and keys, and also over the Roncador, Serrana, Serranilla and Quitasueño
keys (in so far as they are capable of appropriation) ;
12
6 CIJ1034.indb 20 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 632
l’article 53 du Règlement, ont demandé à avoir communication des pièces de
procédure et documents annexés produits en l’espèce. La Courx, s’étant rensei -
gnée auprès des Parties conformément à cette même disposixtion, a fait droit à
chacune de ces demandes. Le greffier a dûment communiqué ces déxcisions aux -
dits gouvernements et aux Parties.
10. Le 25 février 2010 et le 10 juin 2010, respectivement, la République du
Costa Rica et la République du Honduras ont déposé au Greffe une rexquête à
fin d’intervention dans l’affaire en vertu de l’article 62 du Statut. Par deux arrêts
en date du 4 mai 2011, la Cour a déclaré que ces requêtes ne pouvaient être
admises.
11. Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 53 de son Règlement, la
Cour, après s’être renseignée auprès des Parties, a déxcidé que des exemplaires
des pièces de procédure et documents annexés seraient rendus accessibles au
public à l’ouverture de la procédure orale.
12. Des audiences publiques ont été tenues entre le 23 avril et le 4 mai 2012,
au cours desquelles ont été entendus en leurs plaidoiries et réxponses:
Pour le Nicaragua : S. Exc. M. Carlos José Argüello Gómez,
M. Alex Oude Elferink,
M. Antonio Remiro Brotóns,
M. Alain Pellet,
M. Robin Cleverly,
M. Vaughan Lowe,
M. Paul Reichler.
Pour la Colombie : S. Exc. M. Julio Londoño Paredes,
M. James Crawford,
M. Marcelo Kohen,
M. Rodman R. Bundy.
13. Les Parties ont fourni des dossiers de plaidoiries au cours de la procéxdure
orale. Se référant au paragraphe 4 de l’article 56 du Règlement, tel que complété
par l’instruction de procédure IXbis, la Cour a noté que deux documents figu -
rant dans l’un des dossiers de plaidoiries du Nicaragua n’avaient xpas été annexés
aux pièces de procédure écrite et ne faisaient pas « partie d’une publication faci -
lement accessible ». Elle a donc décidé de ne pas permettre que ces deux docu -
ments soient produits ou cités dans le cadre de la procédure oralex.
14. A l’audience, des questions ont été posées aux Parties par des membres de
la Cour, auxquelles il a été répondu oralement et par écrit xconformément au
paragraphe 4 de l’article 61 du Règlement. Conformément à l’article 72 du
Règlement, chacune des Parties a présenté par écrit des obsexrvations sur les
réponses écrites fournies par l’autre.
*
15. Dans sa requête, le Nicaragua a formulé les demandes suivantes :
«[L]a Cour est priée :
Premièrement, de dire et juger que la République du Nicaragua a la sou -
veraineté sur les îles de Providencia, San Andrés et Santa Cataxlina et toutes
les îles et cayes qui en dépendent, ainsi que sur les cayes de Ronxcador,
Serrana, Serranilla et Quitasueño (pour autant qu’elles soient suxsceptibles
d’appropriation) ;
12
6 CIJ1034.indb 21 7/01/14 12:43 633 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Second, in the light of the determinations concerning title requested
above, the Court is asked further to determine the course of the single mar-
itime boundary between the areas of continental shelf and exclusive eco -
nomic zone appertaining respectively to Nicaragua and Colombia, in
accordance with equitable principles and relevant circumstances recognizxed
by general international law as applicable to such a delimitation of a sxingle
maritime boundary.”
Nicaragua also stated :
“Whilst the principal purpose of this Application is to obtain declarxations
concerning title and the determination of maritime boundaries, the Goverxn -
ment of Nicaragua reserves the right to claim compensation for elements xof
unjust enrichment consequent upon Colombian possession of the Islands ofx
San Andrés and Providencia as well as the keys and maritime spaces upx to
the 82 meridian, in the absence of lawful title. The Government of Nicara -
gua also reserves the right to claim compensation for interference with xfish-
ing vessels of Nicaraguan nationality or vessels licensed by Nicaragua.
The Government of Nicaragua, further, reserves the rights to supplement
or to amend the present Application.”
16. In the written proceedings, the following submissions were presented by x
the Parties :
On behalf of the Government of Nicaragua,
in the Memorial :
“Having regard to the legal considerations and evidence set forth in xthis
Memorial : May it please the Court to adjudge and declare that :
(1) the Republic of Nicaragua has sovereignty over the islands of
San Andrés, Providencia, and SantaCatalina and the appurtenant islets
and cays ;
(2) the Republic of Nicaragua has sovereignty over the following cays: the
Cayos de Alburquerque ; the Cayos del Este Sudeste ; the Cay of Ron-
cador; North Cay, Southwest Cay and any other cays on the bank of
Serrana; East Cay, Beacon Cay and any other cays on the bank of
Serranilla; and Low Cay and any other cays on the bank of Bajo
Nuevo ;
(3) if the Court were to find that there are features on the bank of Qui -
tasueño that qualify as islands under international law, the Court isx
requested to find that sovereignty over such features rests with Nicarxa -
gua ;
(4) the Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty signed in Managua on 24 March 1928
was not legally valid and, in particular, did not provide a legal basis xfor
Colombian claims to San Andrés and Providencia ;
(5) in case the Court were to find that the Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty had
been validly concluded, then the breach of this Treaty by Colombia
entitled Nicaragua to declare its termination ;
(6) in case the Court were to find that the Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty had
been validly concluded and were still in force, then to determine that
this Treaty did not establish a delimitation of the maritime areas alongx
the 82° meridian of longitude west ;
13
6 CIJ1034.indb 22 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 633
Deuxièmement, à la lumière des conclusions auxquelles elle sera parvenue
concernant le titre revendiqué ci-dessus, de déterminer le tracé d’une fron -
tière maritime unique entre les portions de plateau continental et lexs zones
économiques exclusives relevant respectivement du Nicaragua et de la
Colombie, conformément aux principes équitables et aux circonstancxes per -
tinentes que le droit international général reconnaît comme s’xappliquant à
une délimitation de cet ordre.»
Le Nicaragua a indiqué de surcroît :
«Bien que la présente requête ait pour objet principal d’obtenirx une déci -
sion en matière de titre et de détermination de frontières marixtimes, le
Gouvernement du Nicaragua se réserve le droit de demander réparatixon
pour tout élément d’enrichissement indu résultant de la possxession par la
Colombie, en l’absence de titre légitime, des îles de San Andrés et de Pro -
videncia, ainsi que des cayes et des espaces maritimes qui s’étendxent
e
jusqu’au 82 méridien. Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua se réserve égale -
ment le droit de demander réparation pour toute entrave à l’actxivité des
bateaux de pêche battant pavillon nicaraguayen ou des bateaux détexnteurs
d’un permis délivré par le Nicaragua.
Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua se réserve en outre le droit de compléx-
ter ou de modifier la présente requête. »
16. Au cours de la procédure écrite, les conclusions ci-après ont été présen -
tées par les Parties :
Au nom du Gouvernement du Nicaragua,
dans le mémoire :
«Vu les éléments juridiques exposés et les éléments de prexuve produits
dans le présent mémoire, il est respectueusement demandé à la Cour :
1) de dire et juger que la République du Nicaragua a la souveraineté xsur
les îles de San Andrés, Providencia et Santa Catalina, ainsi que sur les
îlots et cayes qui en dépendent ;
2) de dire et juger que la République du Nicaragua a la souveraineté xsur
les cayes suivantes : Cayos de Alburquerque ; Cayos del Este Sudeste ;
Roncador Cay; North Cay; Southwest Cay et toutes autres cayes situées
sur le banc de Serrana ; East Cay, Beacon Cay et toutes autres cayes
situées sur le banc de Serranilla ; Low Cay et toutes autres cayes situées
sur le banc de Bajo Nuevo ;
3) de déclarer, si elle devait constater que certaines formations situéxes sur
le banc de Quitasueño peuvent prétendre au statut d’île au rxegard du
droit international, que la souveraineté sur ces formations revient axu
Nicaragua ;
4) de dire et juger que le traité Bárcenas-Esguerra signé à Managua le
24 mars 1928 était nul, et en particulier ne pouvait fonder en droit les
prétentions de la Colombie sur San Andrés et Providencia ;
5) de dire et juger, dans le cas où elle conclurait que le traité Báxrcenas-
Esguerra a été validement conclu, que la violation de ce traité par la
Colombie autorisait le Nicaragua à le dénoncer ;
6) de déclarer, dans le cas où elle conclurait que le traité Báxrcenas-Esguerra
a été validement conclu et qu’il est toujours en vigueur, qu’xil n’a pas
opéré de délimitation des zones maritimes le long du 82 eméridien de
longitude ouest ;
13
6 CIJ1034.indb 23 7/01/14 12:43 634 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
(7) in case the Court finds that Colombia has sovereignty in respect of thxe
islands of San Andrés and Providencia, these islands be enclaved and x
accorded a territorial sea entitlement of twelve miles, this being the
appropriate equitable solution justified by the geographical and legalx
framework ;
(8) the equitable solution for the cays, in case they were to be found to bex
Colombian, is to delimit a maritime boundary by drawing a 3 nautical
mile enclave around them ;
(9) the appropriate form of delimitation, within the geographical and legal
framework constituted by the mainland coasts of Nicaragua and
Colombia, is a single maritime boundary in the form of a median line
between these mainland coasts.”
in the Reply :
“Having regard to the legal considerations and evidence set forth in xthis
Reply :
I. May it please the Court to adjudge and declare that :
(1) The Republic of Nicaragua has sovereignty over all maritime features
off her Caribbean coast not proven to be part of the ‘San Andrésx Archi -
pelago’ and in particular the following cays : the Cayos de Alburquer -
que; the Cayos del Este Sudeste ; the Cay of Roncador ; North Cay,
Southwest Cay and any other cays on the bank of Serrana ; East Cay,
Beacon Cay and any other cays on the bank of Serranilla ; and Low
Cay and any other cays on the bank of Bajo Nuevo.
(2) If the Court were to find that there are features on the bank of
Quitasueño that qualify as islands under international law, the Courtx
is requested to find that sovereignty over such features rests with Nixca-
ragua.
(3) The appropriate form of delimitation, within the geographical and legal
framework constituted by the mainland coasts of Nicaragua and
Colombia, is a continental shelf boundary with the following co-ordi -
nates :
Latitude north Longitude west
1. 13° 33ʹ18 ˝N 76° 30ʹ 53˝ W ;
2. 13° 31ʹ 12˝ N 76° 33ʹ 47˝ W ;
3. 13° 08ʹ 33˝ N 77° 00ʹ 33˝ W ;
4. 12° 49ʹ 52˝ N 77° 13ʹ 14˝ W ;
5. 12° 30ʹ 36˝ N 77° 19ʹ 49˝ W ;
6. 12° 11ʹ 00˝ N 77° 25ʹ 14˝ W ;
7. 11° 43ʹ 38˝ N 77° 30ʹ 33˝ W ;
8. 11° 38ʹ 40˝ N 77° 32ʹ 19˝ W ;
9. 11° 34ʹ 05˝ N 77° 35ʹ 55˝ W.
(All co-ordinates are referred to WGS84.)
(4) The islands of San Andrés and Providencia (Santa Catalina) be enclaxved
and accorded a maritime entitlement of twelve nautical miles, this beingx
the appropriate equitable solution justified by the geographical and
legal framework.
14
6 CIJ1034.indb 24 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 634
7) de dire et juger, dans le cas où elle conclurait que la Colombie a lax
souveraineté sur les îles de San Andrés et de Providencia, que celles-ci
doivent être enclavées et que le droit à une mer territoriale dxe 12 milles
doit leur être reconnu, cette décision constituant la solution éxquitable
appropriée au cadre géographique et juridique ;
8) de dire et juger que la solution équitable pour les cayes, dans le caxs où
il serait conclu qu’elles sont colombiennes, consiste à délimitxer une fron
tière maritime en traçant une enclave de 3 milles marins autour d’elles ;
9) de dire et juger que, dans le cadre géographique et juridique constitxué
par les côtes continentales du Nicaragua et de la Colombie, la forme x
appropriée de délimitation consiste à tracer une frontière mxaritime
unique suivant une ligne médiane entre lesdites côtes. »
dans la réplique :
«Vu les éléments juridiques exposés et les éléments de prexuve produits
dans la présente réplique :
I. La Cour est priée de dire et juger :
1) que la République du Nicaragua a la souveraineté sur toutes les foxrma -
tions maritimes situées au large de sa côte caraïbe dont l’axppartenance à
l’«archipel de San Andrés» n’a pas été prouvée et, en particulier, sur les
cayes suivantes: Cayos de Alburquerque; Cayos del Este Sudeste; Ron -
cador Cay; North Cay; Southwest Cay et toutes autres cayes situées sur
le banc de Serrana; East Cay, Beacon Cay et toutes autres cayes situées
sur le banc de Serranilla ; Low Cay et toutes autres cayes situées sur le
banc de Bajo Nuevo;
2) que, si elle devait constater que certaines formations situées sur lex banc
de Quitasueño peuvent être considérées comme des îles au xregard du
droit international, la souveraineté sur ces formations revient au Nixca -
ragua ;
3) que, dans le cadre géographique et juridique constitué par les côxtes
continentales du Nicaragua et de la Colombie, la méthode de délimita -
tion à retenir consiste à tracer une limite de la zone du plateau xconti -
nental ayant les coordonnées suivantes :
Latitude nord Longitude ouest
1. 13° 33 ʹ18 ˝N 76° 30ʹ 53˝ W ;
2. 13° 31ʹ 12˝ N 76° 33ʹ 47˝ W ;
3. 13° 08ʹ 33˝ N 77° 00ʹ 33˝ W ;
4. 12° 49ʹ 52˝ N 77° 13ʹ 14˝ W ;
5. 12° 30ʹ 36˝ N 77° 19ʹ 49˝ W ;
6. 12° 11ʹ 00˝ N 77° 25ʹ 14˝ W ;
7. 11° 43ʹ 38˝ N 77° 30ʹ 33˝ W ;
8. 11° 38ʹ 40˝ N 77° 32ʹ 19˝ W ;
9. 11° 34ʹ 05˝ N 77° 35ʹ 55˝ W.
(Toutes les coordonnées ont été établies sur la base
du Système géodésique mondial (WGS), 1984.)
4) que les îles de SanAndrés et de Providencia (ainsi que celle de Santa Cata-
lina) doivent être enclavées et se voir attribuer un espace maritxime propre
de 12 milles marins, ce qui constitue la solution équitable à retenir au
regard du cadre géographique et juridique;
14
6 CIJ1034.indb 25 7/01/14 12:43 635 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
(5) The equitable solution for any cay, that might be found to be Colom -
bian, is to delimit a maritime boundary by drawing a 3-nautical-mile
enclave around them.
II. Further, the Court is requested to adjudge and declare that :
— Colombia is not acting in accordance with her obligations under inter-
national law by stopping and otherwise hindering Nicaragua from
accessing and disposing of her natural resources to the east of the 82ndx
meridian ;
— Colombia immediately cease all these activities which constitute viola
tions of Nicaragua’s rights ;
— Colombia is under an obligation to make reparation for the damage
and injuries caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of the obligations
referred to above ; and,
— The amount of this reparation shall be determined in a subsequent
phase of these proceedings.”
On behalf of the Government of Colombia,
in the Counter-Memorial :
“For the reasons set out in this Counter-Memorial, taking into account
the Judgment on Preliminary Objections and rejecting any contrary submisx-
sions of Nicaragua, Colombia requests the Court to adjudge and declare :
(a) That Colombia has sovereignty over all the maritime features in dispute
between the Parties : Alburquerque, East-Southeast, Roncador, Ser -
rana, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo, and all their appurtenanxt
features, which form part of the Archipelago of San Andrés ;
(b) That the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continen -
tal shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia is to be effected by a singlex
maritime boundary, being the median line every point of which is equi-
distant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial seas of the Parties is measured, as depicted on Fig
ure 9.2 of this Counter-Memorial.
Colombia reserves the right to supplement or amend the present submis-
sions.”
in the Rejoinder :
“For the reasons set out in the Counter-Memorial and developed further
in this Rejoinder, taking into account the Judgment on Preliminary Objecx-
tions and rejecting any contrary submissions of Nicaragua, Colombia
requests the Court to adjudge and declare :
(a) That Colombia has sovereignty over all the maritime features in dispute
between the Parties : Alburquerque, East-Southeast, Roncador, Ser -
rana, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo, and all their appurtenanxt
features, which form part of the Archipelago of San Andrés ;
(b) That the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continen -
tal shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia is to be effected by a singlex
maritime boundary, being the median line every point of which is equi-
distant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial seas of the Parties is measured, as depicted on Fig
15
6 CIJ1034.indb 26 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 635
5) que, pour toute caye susceptible d’être reconnue comme appartenantx à
la Colombie, la solution équitable consiste à l’enclaver en traxçant autour
d’elle une frontière maritime située à 3 milles marins de son pourtour.
II. La Cour est également priée de dire et juger :
— que la Colombie manque à ses obligations au regard du droit interna -
tional en empêchant de quelque façon que ce soit le Nicaragua d’xavoir
accès à ses ressources naturelles à l’est du 82ridien et d’en dispo -
ser ;
— que la Colombie doit immédiatement mettre fin à toutes ces activxités
qui constituent une violation des droits du Nicaragua ;
— que la Colombie est tenue à réparation à raison des préjudicxes causés
au Nicaragua par les manquements aux obligations mentionnées
ci-dessus ; et
— que le montant de cette réparation sera déterminé dans une phasxe
ultérieure de la procédure. »
Au nom du Gouvernement de la Colombie,
dans le contre-mémoire :
«Pour les raisons exposées dans le présent contre-mémoire, au vu de
l’arrêt sur les exceptions préliminaires et toute conclusion coxntraire du
Nicaragua étant rejetée, la Colombie prie la Cour de dire et jugerx:
a) que la Colombie a la souveraineté sur toutes les formations maritimes en
litige entre les Parties — à savoir Alburquerque, Est-Sud-Est, Roncador,
Serrana, Quitasueño, Serranilla, Bajo Nuevo et toutes les formations xqui
en dépendent —, formations qui appartiennent à l’archipel de San Andr;és
b) que la délimitation de la zone économique exclusive et du plateau xconti
nental entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie doit être opérée en trxaçant une
frontière maritime unique, constituée par une ligne médiane donxt tous
les points sont équidistants des points les plus proches des lignes dxe base
à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de la mer territoriale de cha
cune des Parties, comme indiqué sur la figure 9.2 du présent contre-
mémoire.
La Colombie se réserve le droit de compléter ou de modifier les xprésentes
conclusions. »
dans la duplique :
«Pour les raisons exposées dans le contre-mémoire et précisées plus
avant dans la présente duplique, au vu de l’arrêt sur les excepxtions prélimi
naires et toute conclusion contraire du Nicaragua étant rejetée, lxa Colom-
bie prie la Cour de dire et juger :
a) que la Colombie a la souveraineté sur toutes les formations maritimes en
litige entre les Parties — à savoir Alburquerque, Est-Sud-Est, Roncador,
Serrana, Quitasueño, Serranilla, Bajo Nuevo et toutes les formations xqui
en dépendent —, formations qui appartiennent à l’archipel de San Andr;és
b) que la délimitation de la zone économique exclusive et du plateau xconti
nental entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie doit être opérée en trxaçant une
frontière maritime unique, constituée par une ligne médiane donxt tous
les points sont équidistants des points les plus proches des lignes dxe base
à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de la mer territoriale de cha
15
6 CIJ1034.indb 27 7/01/14 12:43 636 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
ure 9.2 of the Counter-Memorial, and reproduced as Figure R-8.3 of
this Rejoinder ;
(c) That Nicaragua’s request for a Declaration . . . is rejected.
Colombia reserves the right to supplement or amend the present submis-
sions.”
17. At the oral proceedings, the following submissions were presented by thex
Parties :
On behalf of the Government of Nicaragua,
at the hearing of 1 May 2012 :
“In accordance with Article 60 of the Rules of Court and having regard
to the pleadings, written and oral, the Republic of Nicaragua,
I. May it please the Court to adjudge and declare that :
(1) The Republic of Nicaragua has sovereignty over all maritime features
off her Caribbean coast not proven to be part of the ‘San Andrésx Archi-
pelago’ and in particular the following cays : the Cayos de Alburquer -
que; the Cayos del Este Sudeste ; the Cay of Roncador ; North Cay,
Southwest Cay and any other cays on the bank of Serrana ; East Cay,
Beacon Cay and any other cays on the bank of Serranilla ; and Low
Cay and any other cays on the bank of Bajo Nuevo.
(2) If the Court were to find that there are features on the bank of Qui -
tasueño that qualify as islands under international law, the Court isx
requested to find that sovereignty over such features rests with Nicarx-
gua.
(3) The appropriate form of delimitation, within the geographical and legal
framework constituted by the mainland coasts of Nicaragua and
Colombia, is a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the
overlapping entitlements to a continental shelf of both Parties.
(4) The islands of San Andrés and Providencia and Santa Catalina be
enclaved and accorded a maritime entitlement of 12 nautical miles, this
being the appropriate equitable solution justified by the geographicalx
and legal framework.
(5) The equitable solution for any cay, that might be found to be Colom -
bian, is to delimit a maritime boundary by drawing a 3-nautical-mile
enclave around them.
II. Further, the Court is requested to adjudge and declare that :
— Colombia is not acting in accordance with her obligations under inter -
national law by stopping and otherwise hindering Nicaragua from
accessing and disposing of her natural resources to the east of the 82ndx
meridian.”
On behalf of the Government of Colombia,
at the hearing of 4 May 2012 :
“In accordance with Article 60 of the Rules of Court, for the reasons set
16
6 CIJ1034.indb 28 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 636
cune des Parties, comme indiqué sur la figure 9.2 du contre-mémoire,
reproduite sur la figure R-8.3 de la présente duplique ;
c) que la demande du Nicaragua tendant à obtenir une déclaration … est
rejetée.
La Colombie se réserve le droit de compléter ou de modifier les xprésentes
conclusions. »
17. A l’audience, les conclusions ci-après ont été présentées par les Parties :
Au nom du Gouvernement du Nicaragua,
à l’audience du 1 ermai 2012 :
«Conformément à l’article 60 du Règlement de la Cour et sur la base des
moyens exposés dans ses écritures et à l’audience, la Répxublique du Nica -
ragua :
I. Prie la Cour de dire et juger :
1) que la République du Nicaragua a la souveraineté sur toutes les foxrma -
tions maritimes situées au large de sa côte caraïbe dont l’axppartenance
à l’«archipel de San Andrés » n’a pas été prouvée et, en particulier, sur
les cayes suivantes : Cayos de Alburquerque ; Cayos del Este Sudeste;
Roncador Cay; North Cay; Southwest Cay et toutes autres cayes situées
sur le banc de Serrana ; East Cay, Beacon Cay et toutes autres cayes
situées sur le banc de Serranilla ; Low Cay et toutes autres cayes situées
sur le banc de Bajo Nuevo ;
2) que, si elle devait constater que certaines formations situées sur lex banc
de Quitasueño peuvent être considérées comme des îles au xregard du
droit international, la souveraineté sur ces formations revient au Nixca -
ragua ;
3) que, dans le cadre géographique et juridique constitué par les côxtes
continentales du Nicaragua et de la Colombie, la méthode de délimita -
tion à retenir consiste à tracer une limite opérant une divisioxn par parts
égales de la zone du plateau continental où les droits des deux Parties
sur celui-ci se chevauchent ;
4) que les îles de San Andrés et de Providencia (ainsi que celle de Santa Cata -
lina) doivent être enclavées et se voir attribuer un espace maritxime
propre de 12 milles marins, ce qui constitue la solution équitable à rete -
nir au regard du cadre géographique et juridique ;
5) que, pour toute caye susceptible d’être reconnue comme appartenantx à
la Colombie, la solution équitable consiste à l’enclaver en traxçant autour
d’elle une frontière maritime située à 3 milles marins de son pourtour.
II. Prie également la Cour de dire et juger :
— que la Colombie manque à ses obligations au regard du droit interna -
tional en empêchant de quelque façon que ce soit le Nicaragua d’xavoir
e
accès à ses ressources naturelles à l’est du 82 méridien et d’en dispo -
ser. »
Au nom du Gouvernement de la Colombie,
à l’audience du 4 mai 2012 :
«Conformément à l’article 60 du Règlement de la Cour, la République
16
6 CIJ1034.indb 29 7/01/14 12:43 637 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
out in Colombia’s written and oral pleadings, taking into account thex Jud-g
ment on Preliminary Objections and rejecting any contrary submissions ofx
Nicaragua, Colombia requests the Court to adjudge and declare :
(a) That Nicaragua’s new continental shelf claim is inadmissible and thatx,
consequently, Nicaragua’s Submission I (3) is rejected.
(b) That Colombia has sovereignty over all the maritime features in dispute
between the Parties : Alburquerque, East-Southeast, Roncador, Ser -
rana, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo, and all their appurtenanxt
features, which form part of the Archipelago of San Andrés.
(c) That the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continen-
tal shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia is to be effected by a singlex
maritime boundary, being the median line every point of which is equi
distant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial seas of the Parties is measured, as depicted on the mxap
attached to these submissions.
(d) That Nicaragua’s written Submission II is rejected.”
*
* *
I. Geography
18. The area where the maritime features in dispute (listed in the Par -
ties’ submissions in paragraphs 16 and 17 above) are located and within
which the delimitation sought is to be carried out lies in the Caribbeanx
Sea. The Caribbean Sea is an arm of the Atlantic Ocean partially enclosexd
to the north and east by the islands of the West Indies, and bounded to x
the south and west by South and Central America.
19. Nicaragua is situated in the south-western part of the Caribbean
Sea. To the north of Nicaragua lies Honduras and to the south lie Costa x
Rica and Panama. To the north-east, Nicaragua faces Jamaica and to the
east, it faces the mainland coast of Colombia. Colombia is located to thxe
south of the Caribbean Sea. In terms of its Caribbean front, it is bordered
to the west by Panama and to the east by Venezuela. The islands of San
Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina lie in the south-west of the
Caribbean Sea, a little more than 100 nautical miles to the east of the
Nicaraguan coast. (For the general geography of the area, see sketch-map
No. 1, p. 639.)
20. In the western part of the Caribbean Sea there are numerous reefs,
some of which reach above the water surface in the form of cays. Cays arxe
small, low islands composed largely of sand derived from the physical
breakdown of coral reefs by wave action and subsequent reworking by
17
6 CIJ1034.indb 30 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 637
de Colombie, sur la base des moyens exposés dans ses écritures et xà l’au -
dience, au vu de l’arrêt rendu sur les exceptions préliminairesx et toute
conclusion contraire du Nicaragua étant rejetée, prie la Cour de dxire et
juger :
a) que la nouvelle revendication du Nicaragua concernant le plateau conti-
nental est irrecevable et que le point 3) I) des conclusions du Nicaragua
est en conséquence rejeté ;
b) que la Colombie a la souveraineté sur toutes les formations maritimes
en litige entre les Parties — à savoir Alburquerque, Est-Sud-Est, Ron -
cador, Serrana, Quitasueño, Serranilla, Bajo Nuevo et toutes les autrxes
formations qui en dépendent — formations qui appartiennent à l’archi-
pel de San Andrés ;
c) que la délimitation de la zone économique exclusive et du plateau xcont-
nental entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie doit être opérée en trxaçant une
frontière maritime unique, constituée par une ligne médiane donxt tous
les points sont équidistants des points les plus proches des lignes dxe base
à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de la mer territoriale de cha -
cune des Parties, comme indiqué sur la figure jointe aux présentxes
conclusions ;
d) que le point II des conclusions écrites du Nicaragua est rejeté. »
*
* *
I. Géographie
18. La zone dans laquelle sont situées les formations maritimes en
litige (énumérées dans les conclusions des Parties reproduitesx aux para -
graphes 16 et 17 ci-dessus) et dans laquelle doit être opérée la délimitation
demandée se trouve dans la mer des Caraïbes, laquelle constitue unx bras
de l’océan Atlantique partiellement entouré, au nord et à l’xest, par les îles
des Antilles et limité, au sud et à l’ouest, par l’Amériqxue du Sud et l’Amé -
rique centrale.
19. Le Nicaragua est situé au sud-ouest de la mer des Caraïbes. Au
nord, il est bordé par le Honduras. Au sud, se trouvent le Costa Rica et
le Panama. Au nord-est, il fait face à la Jamaïque et, à l’est, à la côtex
continentale de la Colombie, située au sud de la mer des Caraïbes.x Sur sa
façade caraïbe, la Colombie est bordée, à l’ouest, par lex Panama et, à
l’est, par le Venezuela. Les îles de San Andrés, Providencia et Santa Cata-
lina sont situées dans la partie sud-ouest de la mer des Caraïbes, à une
centaine de milles marins au large de la côte nicaoaguayenne. (Pour la
géographie générale de la zone, voir croquis n 1, p. 639.)
20. La partie occidentale de la mer des Caraïbes compte de nombreux
récifs, dont certains émergent pour former des cayes. Celles-ci sont de
petites îles de faible altitude composées principalement de sable xprove -
nant de la décomposition des récifs coralliens sous l’action dexs vagues, et
177
6 CIJ1034.indb 31 7/01/14 12:43 638 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
wind. Larger cays can accumulate enough sediment to allow for coloniza-
tion and fixation by vegetation. Atolls and banks are also common in txhis
area. An atoll is a coral reef enclosing a lagoon. A bank is a rocky or x
sandy submerged elevation of the sea floor with a summit less than
200 metres below the surface. Banks whose tops rise close enough to the
sea surface (conventionally taken to be less than 10 metres below water
level at low tide) are called shoals. Maritime features which qualify axs
islands or low-tide elevations may be located on a bank or shoal.
21. There are a number of Nicaraguan islands located off the mainland
coast of Nicaragua. To the north can be found Edinburgh Reef, Muerto
Cay, the Miskitos Cays and Ned Thomas Cay. The Miskitos Cays are
largely given up to a nature reserve. The largest cay, Miskitos Cay, is
approximately 12 square km in size. To the south are the two Corn
Islands (sometimes known as the Mangle Islands), which are located
approximately 26 nautical miles from the mainland coast and have an
area, respectively, of 9.6 square km (Great Corn) and 3 square km (Little
Corn). The Corn Islands have a population of approximately 7,400.
Roughly midway between these two groups of islands can be found the
small island of Roca Tyra.
22. The islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina are
situated opposite the mainland coast of Nicaragua. San Andrés is apprxox -
imately 105 nautical miles from Nicaragua. Providencia and Santa Cata -
lina are located some 47 nautical miles north-east of San Andrés and
approximately 125 nautical miles from Nicaragua. All three islands are
approximately 380 nautical miles from the mainland of Colombia.
San Andrés has an area of some 26 square km. Its central part is made
up of a mountainous sector with a maximum height of 100 metres across
the island from north to south, from where it splits into two branches. x
San Andrés has a population of over 70,000. Providencia is some
17.5 square km in area. It has varied vegetation. On the north, east and
south coasts, Providencia is fringed by an extensive barrier reef. It haxs a
permanent population of about 5,000. Santa Catalina is located north of x
Providencia. It is separated from Providencia by the Aury Channel, some x
130 metres in width.
23. Nicaragua, in its Application, claimed sovereignty over the islands
of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. In its Judgment of
13 December 2007 (Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v.
Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II),
p. 832), the Court held that it had no jurisdiction with regard to this
claim, because the question of sovereignty over these three islands had
been determined by the Treaty concerning Territorial Questions at Issue x
between Colombia and Nicaragua, signed at Managua on 24 March 1928
(hereinafter the “1928 Treaty”), by which Nicaragua recognized Colom -
bian sovereignty over these islands.
18
6 CIJ1034.indb 32 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 638
remodelé ensuite par le vent ; les plus grandes d’entre elles peuvent accu -
muler suffisamment de sédiments pour qu’une végétation s’xy développe et
s’y fixe. La présence d’atolls et de bancs est également cxourante dans cette
zone. Un atoll est une ceinture corallienne entourant un lagon. Un banc x
est une élévation immergée du fond marin constituée de rochex ou de sable
qui culmine à moins de 200 mètres au-dessous de la surface de l’eau. Ceux
dont le sommet s’élève suffisamment près de la surface de la mer
(c’est-à-dire, par convention, à moins de 10 mètres au-dessous du niveau
de l’eau à marée basse) sont appelés des basses. Les formatxions maritimes
susceptibles d’être considérées comme des îles ou des hauxts-fonds décou -
vrants peuvent être situées sur un banc ou une basse.
21. Il existe un certain nombre d’îles nicaraguayennes situées au lxarge
de la côte continentale du Nicaragua. Au nord, se trouvent le récixf d’Edim-
bourg, la caye de Muerto, les cayes des Miskitos et la caye de Ned Tho -
mas. Les cayes des Miskitos sont en grande partie occupées par une
réserve naturelle. La plus grande, Miskito, s’étend sur 12 kilomètres car -
rés environ. Au sud, se trouvent les deux îles Mangle, situées xà environ
26 milles marins de la côte continentale et ayant respectivement une
superficie de 9,6 kilomètres carrés (Mangle Grande) et de 3 kilomètres car -
rés (Mangle Chico). Les îles Mangle comptent environ 7400 habitants. A
peu près à mi-chemin entre ces deux groupes d’îles se trouve la petite île
de Roca Tyra.
22. Les îles de San Andrés, Providencia et Santa Catalina font face à la
côte continentale du Nicaragua. San Andrés se trouve à environ 105milles
marins du Nicaragua. Providencia et Santa Catalina sont situées à
quelque 47 milles marins au nord-est de San Andrés et 125 milles marins
du Nicaragua. Les trois îles sont distantes de 380 milles marins environ de
la côte continentale de la Colombie.
San Andrés a une superficie approximative de 26 kilomètres carrés. Sa
partie centrale comprend une zone montagneuse qui culmine à 100 mètres
d’altitude et qui s’étend du nord au sud de l’île, où xelle se divise en deux.
San Andrés compte plus de 70 000 habitants. L’île de Providencia a une
superficie de 17,5 kilomètres carrés et abrite une végétation variée. Sur lexs
côtes septentrionale, orientale et méridionale, un long récif-barrière
entoure l’île. Elle compte en permanence quelque 5000 habitants. Au
nord de Providencia se trouve Santa Catalina ; les deux îles sont séparées
par le chenal d’Aury, large de quelque 130 mètres.
23. Dans sa requête, le Nicaragua revendique la souveraineté sur les
îles de San Andrés, Providencia et Santa Catalina. La Cour, dans son
arrêt du 13 décembre 2007 (Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua
c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II),
p. 832), a déclaré qu’elle n’avait pas compétence pour connxaître de cette
demande au motif que la question de la souveraineté sur ces trois îles
avait été réglée par le traité de règlement territoriaxl entre la Colombie
et le Nicaragua, signé à Managua le 24 mars 1928 (ci-après le « traité
de 1928 »), en vertu duquel le Nicaragua avait reconnu la souveraineté
colombienne sur ces îles.
18
6 CIJ1034.indb 33 7/01/14 12:43 639 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
-16-
Judated 8 October(2n0o0t7in force)rleaJaaltetTyrarBoelifaTlta1yrt9eeo9araft3yl1To9fr7e61a9ty77of 1980
REPUBLIC
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This sketch-map has been prepared for illustrative purposes.
The symbols showing maritime features indicate only their location,
and not their physical characteristics or geogrNICARAGUAnd legal status.
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19
6 CIJ1034.indb 34 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 639
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19
6 CIJ1034.indb 35 7/01/14 12:43 640 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
24. Starting from the south-west of the Caribbean and moving to the
north-east, there are various maritime features, sovereignty over which
continues to be in dispute between the Parties.
(a) Alburquerque Cays 1
Alburquerque is an atoll with a diameter of about 8 km. Two cays on
Alburquerque, North Cay and South Cay, are separated by a shallow
water channel, 386 metres wide. The Alburquerque Cays lie about 100 nau -
tical miles to the east of the mainland of Nicaragua, 65 nautical miles to
the east of the Corn Islands, 375 nautical miles from the mainland of
Colombia, 20 nautical miles to the south of the island of San Andrés and
26 nautical miles to the south-west of the East-Southeast Cays.
(b) East‑Southeast Cays
The East-Southeast Cays (East Cay, Bolivar Cay (also known as Mid -
dle Cay), West Cay and Arena Cay) are located on an atoll extending
over some 13 km in a north-south direction. The East-Southeast Cays lie
120 nautical miles from the mainland of Nicaragua, 90 nautical miles
from the Corn Islands, 360 nautical miles from the mainland of Colom -
bia, 16 nautical miles south-east of the island of San Andrés and 26 nauti-
cal miles from Alburquerque Cays.
(c) Roncador
Roncador is an atoll located on a bank 15 km long and 7 km wide. It
is about 190 nautical miles to the east of the mainland of Nicaragua,
320 nautical miles from the mainland of Colombia, 75 nautical miles east
of the island of Providencia and 45 nautical miles from Serrana. Ronca -
dor Cay, located half a mile from the northern border of the bank, is
some 550 metres long and 300 metres wide.
(d) Serrana
The bank of Serrana is located at 170 nautical miles from the mainland
of Nicaragua and about 360 nautical miles from the mainland of Colom -
bia; it lies approximately 45 nautical miles to the north of Roncador,
80 nautical miles from Providencia and 145 nautical miles from the Miski -
tos Cays. There are a number of cays on this bank. The largest one, Ser -
rana Cay (also known as Southwest Cay), is some 1,000 metres in length
and has an average width of 400 metres.
(e) Quitasueño
The Parties differ about the geographical characteristics of Quitasueño
(a large bank approximately 57 km long and 20 km wide) which is located
1 These cays are referred to either as “Alburquerque” or as “Albuxquerque”. For the
purposes of the present case, the Court will use “Alburquerque”.
20
6 CIJ1034.indb 36 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 640
24. Du sud-ouest au nord-est de la mer des Caraïbes s’égrènent un cer -
tain nombre de formations maritimes dont la souveraineté continue de x
faire l’objet de prétentions concurrentes entre les Parties.
a) Cayes d’Alburquerque 1
Alburquerque est un atoll d’environ 8 kilomètres de diamètre. Deux
des cayes qui le composent, North Cay et South Cay, sont séparées par
un chenal peu profond de 386 mètres de large. Les cayes d’Alburquerque
sont situées à quelque 100 milles marins à l’est de la masse continentale
du Nicaragua, 65 milles marins à l’est des îles Mangle, 375 milles marins
de la masse continentale de la Colombie, 20 milles marins au sud de l’île
de San Andrés et 26 milles marins au sud-ouest des cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est.
b) Cayes de l’Est‑Sud‑Est
Les cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est (East Cay, Bolivar Cay (également appelée
Middle Cay), West Cay et Arena Cay) font partie d’un atoll qui s’étend
sur quelque 13 kilomètres du nord au sud. Elles sont situées à 120 milles
marins de la masse continentale du Nicaragua, 90 milles marins des îles
Mangle, 360 milles marins de la masse continentale de la Colombie,
16 milles marins au sud-est de l’île de San Andrés et 26 milles marins des
cayes d’Alburquerque.
c) Roncador
Roncador est un atoll situé sur un banc de 15 kilomètres de long et
7 kilomètres de large, à environ 190 milles marins à l’est de la masse conti -
nentale du Nicaragua, 320 milles marins de celle de la Colombie, 75 milles
marins à l’est de l’île de Providencia et 45 milles marins de Serrana.
La caye de Roncador, située à un demi-mille marin de la limite septentrio -
nale du banc, mesure environ 550 mètres de long et 300 mètres de large.
d) Serrana
Le banc de Serrana se trouve à 170 milles marins de la masse continen-
tale du Nicaragua et à environ 360 milles marins de celle de la Colombie ;
il est situé à quelque 45 milles marins au nord de Roncador, 80 milles
marins de Providencia et 145 milles marins des cayes des Miskitos. Sur ce
banc se trouvent plusieurs cayes, dont la plus grande, celle de Serrana
(également appelée Southwest Cay), mesure environ 1 kilomètre de long,
pour une largeur moyenne de 400 mètres.
e) Quitasueño
Les Parties sont en désaccord quant aux caractéristiques géographiques
de Quitasueño (vaste banc d’environ 57 kilomètres de long et 20 kilo -
1 Ces formations sont appelées cayes d’Alburquerque ou d’Albuquer. ux fins de la
présente affaire, la Cour a retenu l’appellation « Alburquerque ».
20
6 CIJ1034.indb 37 7/01/14 12:43 641 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
45 nautical miles west of Serrana, 38 nautical miles from Santa Catalina,
90 nautical miles from the Miskitos Cays and 40 nautical miles from
Providencia, on which are located a number of features the legal status xof
which is disputed.
(f) Serranilla
The bank of Serranilla lies 200 nautical miles from the mainland of
Nicaragua, 190 nautical miles from the Miskitos Cays, 400 nautical miles
from the mainland of Colombia, about 80 nautical miles to the north of
the bank of Serrana, 69 nautical miles west of Bajo Nuevo, and 165 nau -
tical miles from Providencia. The cays on Serranilla include East Cay,
Middle Cay and Beacon Cay (also known as Serranilla Cay). The largest x
of them, Beacon Cay, is 650 metres long and some 300 metres wide.
(g) Bajo Nuevo
The bank of Bajo Nuevo is located 265 nautical miles from the main -
land of Nicaragua, 245 nautical miles from the Miskitos Cays and about
360 nautical miles from the mainland of Colombia. It lies around 69 nau -
tical miles east of Serranilla, 138 nautical miles from Serrana and 205 nau-
tical miles from Providencia. There are three cays on Bajo Nuevo, the
largest of which is Low Cay (300 metres long and 40 metres wide).
II. Sovereignty
1. Whether the Maritime Features in Dispute Are Capable of
Appropriation
25. The Court recalls that the maritime features in dispute comprise
the Alburquerque Cays, East-Southeast Cays, Roncador, Serrana, Quita-
sueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo. Before addressing the question of sov -
ereignty, the Court must determine whether these maritime features in
dispute are capable of appropriation.
26. It is well established in international law that islands, however
small, are capable of appropriation (see, e.g., Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 102, para. 206). By contrast,
low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated, although “a coastal State hasx
sovereignty over low-tide elevations which are situated within its territo -
rial sea, since it has sovereignty over the territorial sea itself” (xibid., p. 101,
para. 204) and low-tide elevations within the territorial sea may be taken
into account for the purpose of measuring the breadth of the territorialx
sea (see paragraph 182 below).
21
6 CIJ1034.indb 38 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 641
mètres de large), qui se trouve à 45 milles marins à l’ouest de Serrana,
38 milles marins de Santa Catalina, 90 milles marins des cayes des Miski-
tos et 40 milles marins de Providencia, et sur lequel sont situées un certain
nombre de formations dont la nature juridique est en litige.
f) Serranilla
Le banc de Serranilla est situé à 200 milles marins de la masse conti -
nentale du Nicaragua, 190 milles marins des cayes des Miskitos, 400milles
marins de la masse continentale de la Colombie, environ 80 milles marins
au nord du banc de Serrana, 69 milles marins à l’ouest de Bajo Nuevo et
165 milles marins de Providencia. Parmi les cayes situées sur ce banc
figurent East Cay, Middle Cay et Beacon Cay (également appelée caye de
Serranilla). La plus grande d’entre elles, Beacon Cay, mesure 650 mètres
de long et quelque 300 mètres de large.
g) Bajo Nuevo
Le banc de Bajo Nuevo se trouve à 265 milles marins de la masse conti -
nentale du Nicaragua, 245 milles marins des cayes des Miskitos et envi -
ron 360 milles marins de la masse continentale de la Colombie. Il est situé
à environ 69 milles marins à l’est de Serranilla, 138 milles marins de Ser -
rana et 205 milles marins de Providencia. Trois cayes reposent sur ce
banc, la plus grande étant Low Cay (qui mesure 300 mètres de long et
40 mètres de large).
II. Souveraineté
1. Question de savoir si les formations maritimes en litige
sont susceptibles d’appropriation
25. La Cour rappelle que les formations maritimes en litige com -
prennent les cayes d’Alburquerque, les cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est, Roncador,
Serrana, Quitasueño, Serranilla et Bajo Nuevo. Avant d’examiner la
question de la souveraineté, il appartient à la Cour de détermixner si elles
sont susceptibles d’appropriation.
26. Il est bien établi en droit international que les îles, si petitesx
soient-elles, sont susceptibles d’appropriation (voir, par exemple, Délimi ‑
tation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Q▯atar
c. Bahreïn), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 102, par. 206). En revanche,
les hauts-fonds découvrants ne peuvent faire l’objet d’appropriation, et x
ce, bien que l’« Etat côtier exerce sa souveraineté sur les hauts-fonds
découvrants situés dans sa mer territoriale, puisqu’il exerce sxa souverai -
neté sur la mer territoriale elle-même » (ibid., p. 101, par. 204), et que les
hauts-fonds découvrants situés à l’intérieur de la mer territorxiale puissent
être pris en considération aux fins de mesurer la largeur de celle-ci (voir
paragraphe 182 ci-dessous).
21
6 CIJ1034.indb 39 7/01/14 12:43 642 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
27. The Parties agree that Alburquerque Cays, East-Southeast Cays,
Roncador, Serrana, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo remain above water at
high tide and thus, as islands, they are capable of appropriation. They x
disagree, however, as to whether any of the features on Quitasueño quxal-
ify as islands.
* *
28. According to Nicaragua, Quitasueño is a shoal, all of the features
on which are permanently submerged at high tide. In support of its posi -
tion, Nicaragua invokes a survey prepared in 1937 by an official of thex
Colombian Foreign Ministry which states that “[t]he Quitasueño Cayx
does not exist”. Nicaragua also quotes another passage from the reporxt,
that “[t]here is no guano or eggs in Quitasueño because there is nxo firm
land”. Nicaragua also refers to the 1972 Vázquez-Saccio Treaty between
Colombia and the United States whereby the United States relinquished
“any and all claims of sovereignty over Quita Sueño, Roncador and xSer -
rana”. Nicaragua emphasizes that this treaty was accompanied by an
exchange of diplomatic Notes wherein the United States expressed its
position that Quitasueño “being permanently submerged at high tide, is
not at the present time subject to the exercise of sovereignty”. In axddition,
Nicaragua makes extensive reference to earlier surveys of Quitasueño xand
to various charts of that part of the Caribbean, none of which, accordinxg
to Nicaragua, show the presence of any islands at Quitasueño.
29. For its part, Colombia, relying on two surveys, namely the Study
on Quitasueño and Alburquerque prepared by the Colombian Navy in
September 2008 and the Expert Report by Dr. Robert Smith, “Mapping
the Islands of Quitasueño (Colombia) — Their Baselines, Territorial Sea,
and Contiguous Zone” ofFebruary 2010 (hereinafter the “Smith Report”),
argues that there are 34 individual features within Quitasueño which
“qualify as islands because they are above water at high tide” andx at least
20 low-tide elevations situated well within 12 nautical miles of one or more
of those islands. The Smith report refers to these features as “QS 1” to
“QS 54”.
30. Nicaragua points out that both reports relied on by Colombia were
prepared specially for the purposes of the present proceedings. Nicaraguxa
contests the findings that there are 34 features that are “permanently
above water” and objects to the method used by Dr. Smith in making
these findings. Nicaragua considers that the global Grenoble Tide Modexl
used by Dr. Smith is inappropriate for determining whether some of the
features at Quitasueño are above water at Highest Astronomical Tide
(HAT). According to Nicaragua, the global Grenoble Tide Model is used x
for research purposes for modelling ocean tides but, as stated by the
United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”x)
in its published collection of global tidal models, these global models x“are
22
6 CIJ1034.indb 40 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 642
27. Les Parties conviennent que les formations suivantes — cayes d’Al-
burquerque, cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est, Roncador, Serrana, Serranilla et
Bajo Nuevo — sont découvertes à marée haute et sont donc des îles, sxus -
ceptibles d’appropriation. Elles sont toutefois divisées sur le poxint de
savoir si l’une quelconque des formations de Quitasueño constitue xune île.
* *
28. Selon le Nicaragua, Quitasueño est une basse dont toutes les for -
mations sont constamment immergées à marée haute. A l’appui xde sa
position, le Nicaragua invoque un levé réalisé en 1937 par un représentant
du ministère colombien des affaires étrangères et cite deux passages du
rapport établi par ce dernier, dans lequel il est dit que « [l]a caye de Qui -
tasueño n’existe pas » et qu’« [o]n ne trouve ni guano ni œufs sur Quita -
sueño, car il n’y existe pas de terre ferme ». Il se réfère également au traité
Vázquez-Saccio conclu entre la Colombie et les Etats-Unis en 1972, dans
lequel les Etats-Unis renoncèrent « à faire valoir toute prétention de sou -
veraineté sur Quita Sueño, Roncador et Serrana ». Ce traité, souligne-t-il,
était accompagné d’un échange de notes diplomatiques dans lexquel les
Etats-Unis déclarèrent que, « étant une formation constamment recou -
verte à marée haute, Quitasueño ne se prêt[ait] pas à l’xexercice de la sou-
veraineté». En outre, le Nicaragua se réfère abondamment à des levéxs
antérieurs réalisés à Quitasueño, ainsi qu’à diversxes cartes marines repré -
sentant cette partie des Caraïbes, et soutient qu’aucun de ces docxuments
n’atteste la présence d’îles dans cette zone.
29. Se fondant quant à elle sur deux autres levés — l’étude sur Quita -
sueño et Alburquerque réalisée par la marine colombienne en sepxtembre
2008 et le rapport d’expert établi en février 2010 par M. Robert Smith, inti -
tulé «Cartographie des îles de Quitasueño (Colombie): leurs lignes de base,
mer territoriale et zone contiguë » (ci-après le « rapport Smith ») —, la
Colombie affirme que Quitasueño comporte 34 formations individuelles
qui « peuvent être considérées comme des îles parce qu’elles soxnt décou -
vertes à marée haute» et au moins 20 hauts-fonds découvrants qui se situent
à nettement moins de 12 milles marins de l’une de ces îles ou de plusieurs
d’entre elles. Dans le rapport Smith, ces formations sont désignées par le
sigle «QS» et numérotées de 1 à 54.
30. Le Nicaragua fait observer que les deux rapports invoqués par la
Colombie ont été spécialement établis aux fins de la préxsente procédure.
Il conteste la conclusion selon laquelle 34 formations seraient « constam -
ment découvertes » ainsi que la méthode utilisée par M. Smith pour par -
venir à ce résultat. A ses yeux, le modèle mondial de marée xde Grenoble
dont M. Smith s’est servi ne permet pas de déterminer si certaines des
formations de Quitasueño émergent au moment de la plus haute mer
astronomique. Selon lui, le modèle de Grenoble est utilisé pour lax
recherche, aux fins de modéliser les marées océaniques, mais,x comme la
National Aeronautics and Space Administration des Etats-Unis d’Amé -
rique (ci-après la « NASA») l’a fait observer dans son recueil de modèles
22
6 CIJ1034.indb 41 7/01/14 12:43 643 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
accurate to within 2 to 3 cm in waters deeper than 200 m. In shallow
waters they are quite inaccurate, which makes them unsuitable for navi -
gation or other practical applications.”
Colombia disagrees with Nicaragua’s criticism of the Grenoble Tide
Model. It contends that this model should not be rejected for three rea -
sons, namely that international law does not prescribe the use of any paxr-
ticular method of tidal measurement, that the measurements of the many
features made by Dr.Smith were accurate and clear, and that his approach
to whether those features were above water at “high tide” was consxerva-
tive, because it was based upon HAT rather than “mean high tide”.
31. Nicaragua claims that the “‘Admiralty Total Tide’ model”, prxo -
duced by the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, is more appropriate
to determine height in the area of Quitasueño, because it is more accxurate
in shallow waters. Applying that model to the features identified in txhe
Smith Report, all the features, except for the one described in the Smith
report as “QS 32”, are below water at HAT. QS 32’s height above HAT
is about 1.2 metres according to the Smith Report, but only 0.7 metres if
measured by the “‘Admiralty Total Tide’ model”.
32. In any case, Nicaragua contends that QS 32 is “[a]n individual
piece of coral debris, that is, a part of the skeleton of a dead animal,x is
not a naturally formed area of land” and, as such, does not fall withxin the
definition of islands entitled to maritime zones. In response, Colombixa
notes that there is no case in which a feature has been denied the statuxs of
an island merely because it was composed of coral. According to Colom -
bia, coral islands are naturally formed and generate a territorial sea as do
other islands. Colombia moreover asserts that QS 32 is not coral debris,
but rather represents part of a much larger coral reef firmly attachedx to
the substrate.
33. Nicaragua also claims that size is crucial for determining whether a
maritime feature qualifies as an island under international law. It noxtes
that the top of QS 32 “seems to measure some 10 to 20 cm”. Colombia,
on the other hand, contends that customary international law does not
prescribe a minimum size for a maritime feature to qualify as an island.x
* *
34. The Court recalls that, in its Judgment in the Pulp Mills case, it
said that
“the Court does not find it necessary in order to adjudicate the prxes -
ent case to enter into a general discussion on the relative merits, relix-
ability and authority of the documents and studies prepared by the
experts and consultants of the Parties. It needs only to be mindful of
23
6 CIJ1034.indb 42 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 643
mondiaux de marées, ces modèles « sont exacts à 2 ou 3 centimètres près
dans des eaux de plus de 200 mètres de profondeur. En eaux peu pro -
fondes, ils ne sont guère fiables, et ne sont donc pas adaptés axux besoins
de la navigation ou à d’autres applications pratiques. »
La Colombie rejette les critiques formulées par le Nicaragua contre lxe
modèle de marée de Grenoble. Elle soutient que ce modèle ne devxrait pas être
écarté, et ce, pour trois raisons: tout d’abord, le droit international n’impose
aucune méthode particulière pour mesurer les marées; ensuite, M. Smith a
obtenu des mesures précises et claires en ce qui concerne ces nombreuxses for -
mations; et, enfin, il a fait preuve de prudence aux fins de déterminer si ces
formations restaient découvertes à « marée haute», ses calculs étant fondés sur
la plus haute mer astronomique et non sur la p «leine mer moyenne».
31. Le Nicaragua soutient, pour sa part, que le « modèle de marée
«Admiralty Total Tide»», mis au point par le bureau hydrographique du
Royaume-Uni, est mieux adapté aux calculs de hauteur dans la zone de
Quitasueño en ce qu’il est plus précis en eaux peu profondes. Sxi l’on
applique ce modèle aux formations recensées dans le rapport Smith,
toutes sont immergées lors de la plus haute mer astronomique, à l’excep -
tion de la formation dite QS 32. Celle-ci reste en effet découverte d’envi -
ron 1,2 mètre selon ce rapport, et de 0,7 mètre seulement d’après le
«modèle de marée « Admiralty Total Tide »».
32. En tout état de cause, le Nicaragua prétend que QS 32 est un
«débris corallien — autrement dit une partie du squelette d’un animal
mort — et non une étendue naturelle de terre », et que cette formation ne
répond donc pas à la définition d’une île ouvrant droitx à des espaces mari -
times. La Colombie réplique qu’une formation ne s’est jamais vux refuser
la qualification d’île pour la seule raison qu’elle était xcomposée de corail.
Selon elle, les îles coralliennes sont des formations naturelles qui xgénèrent
une mer territoriale au même titre que les autres îles. Elle estimxe en outre
que QS 32 n’est pas qu’un débris de coraux mais fait au contraire partxie
d’un récif corallien beaucoup plus vaste, solidement fixé au xsubstrat.
33. Le Nicaragua soutient également que les dimensions d’une forma -
tion maritime sont déterminantes pour établir si celle-ci est une île au
regard du droit international. Il note que la partie haute de QS 32 «semble
mesurer de 10 à 20 cm». La Colombie soutient, pour sa part, que le droit
international coutumier ne fixe pas de dimension minimale pour qu’uxne
formation maritime puisse être considérée comme une île.
* *
34. La Cour rappelle la position qu’elle a adoptée dans l’affairex relative
à des Usines de pâte à papier :
«la Cour n’estime pas nécessaire, pour statuer en l’espèce, de s’en-
gager dans un débat général sur la valeur, la fiabilité et l’autorité
relatives des documents et études élaborés par les experts et lxes
consultants des Parties. Elle doit seulement garder à l’esprit quex, si
23
6 CIJ1034.indb 43 7/01/14 12:43 644 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
the fact that, despite the volume and complexity of the factual infor -
mation submitted to it, it is the responsibility of the Court, after h-vx
ing given careful consideration to all the evidence placed before it by x
the Parties, to determine which facts must be considered relevant, to
assess their probative value, and to draw conclusions from them as
appropriate. Thus, in keeping with its practice, the Court will make
its own determination of the facts, on the basis of the evidence pre -
sented to it, and then it will apply the relevant rules of internationalx
law to those facts which it has found to have existed.” (Pulp Mills on
the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2010 (I), pp. 72-73, para. 168.)
35. The issue which the Court has to decide is whether or not there
exist at Quitasueño any naturally formed areas of land which are abovxe
water at high tide. It does not consider that surveys conducted many
years (in some cases many decades) before the present proceedings are x
relevant in resolving that issue. Nor does the Court consider that the
charts on which Nicaragua relies have much probative value with regard
to that issue. Those charts were prepared in order to show dangers to
shipping at Quitasueño, not to distinguish between those features whixch
were just above, and those which were just below, water at high tide.
36. The Court considers that what is relevant to the issue before it is
the contemporary evidence. Of that evidence, by far the most important
is the Smith Report, which is based upon actual observations of condi -
tions at Quitasueño and scientific evaluation of those conditions. xNever-
theless, the Court considers that the conclusions of that Report have tox
be treated with a degree of caution. As the Court has already stated, evxen
the smallest island generates a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea (see Mari ‑
time Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain
(Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, pp. 101-102,
para. 205; see also Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua
and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 751, para. 302). The Court therefore has to
make sure that it has before it evidence sufficient to satisfy that a mxari -
time feature meets the test of being above water at high tide. In the prxes-
ent case, the proof offered by Colombia depends upon acceptance of a
tidal model which NASA describes as inaccurate in shallow waters. The
waters around Quitasueño are very shallow. Moreover, all of the features
at Quitasueño are minuscule and, even on the Grenoble Tide Model, arex
only just above water at high tide — according to the Smith Report, with
the exception of QS 32 only one feature (QS 24) is more than 30 cm and
only four others measured on site (QS 17, QS 35, QS 45 and QS 53) are
more than 20 cm above water at high tide ; a fifth, measured from the
boat (QS 30), was 23.2 cm above water at high tide. The other 27 features
which the Smith Report characterizes as islands are all less than 20 cm
above water at high tide, with one such feature (QS 4) being described in
the Smith Report as only 4 mm above water at high tide.
24
6 CIJ1034.indb 44 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 644
volumineuses et complexes que soient les informations factuelles qui
lui ont été soumises, il lui incombe, au terme d’un examen attexntif de
l’ensemble des éléments soumis par les Parties, de déterminexr quels
faits sont à prendre en considération, d’en apprécier la forxce pro -
bante et d’en tirer les conclusions appropriées. Ainsi, fidèlxe à sa pra-
tique, la Cour se prononcera sur les faits, en se fondant sur les
éléments de preuve qui lui ont été présentés, puis appxliquera les règles
pertinentes du droit international à ceux qu’elle aura jugés avxérés. »
(Usines de pâte à papier sur le fleuve Uruguay (Argentine c. Uru ‑
guay), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (I), p. 72-73, par. 168.)
35. La question qu’il appartient à la Cour de trancher est celle de
savoir s’il existe à Quitasueño des étendues naturelles de txerre restant
découvertes à marée haute. La Cour estime que les levés réxalisés il y a de
cela des années (voire parfois des décennies) avant la présente instance
sont de peu d’utilité pour l’aider dans sa tâche. Elle consixdère par ailleurs
que les cartes marines sur lesquelles s’appuie le Nicaragua ont peu dxe
valeur probante à cet égard. Ces cartes étaient destinées àx montrer les
dangers présentés par Quitasueño pour la navigation et non àx distinguer
celles des formations en cause qui étaient découvertes à maréxe haute.
36. La Cour estime que sont pertinents, pour trancher la question dont
elle est saisie, les éléments de preuve contemporains. Et, parmi cxeux-ci, ceux
que contient le rapport Smith, qui repose sur l’observation des condixtions
réelles à Quitasueño et leur évaluation scientifique, sontx de loin les plus
importants. Cela étant, la Cour est d’avis que les conclusions éxnoncées dans
ce rapport doivent être considérées avec une certaine prudence.x Comme elle
l’a déjà dit, toute île, si petite soit-elle, génère une mer territoriale de
12 milles marins (voir Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre
Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001,
p. 101-102, par. 205 ; voir également Différend territorial et maritime entre
le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Hondu‑
ras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 751, par. 302). La Cour doit dès lors
s’assurer qu’elle dispose d’éléments de preuve suffisantxs pour établir qu’une
formation reste découverte à marée haute. En l’espèce, cexux qu’a fournis la
Colombie reposent sur un modèle de marée qualifié par la NASAx de peu
fiable en eaux peu profondes. Or les eaux entourant Quitasueño sont très
peu profondes. Par ailleurs, toutes les formations en question sont minuxs -
cules et, même selon le modèle de marée de Grenoble, dépassent de peu la
surface de l’eau à marée haute : d’après le rapport Smith, à l’exception de
QS 32, une seule formation (QS 24) la dépasse de plus de 30 centimètres et
seulement quatre autres (QS 17, QS 35, QS 45 et QS 53), mesurées in situ,
de plus de 20 centimètres ; une cinquième formation (QS 30), mesurée
depuis le navire, la dépasse de 23,2 centimètres à marée haute. Parmi les
27 autres formations qualifiées d’îles dans ce rapport, toutes dxépassent la
surface de l’eau de moins de 20 centimètres à marée haute, dont une (QS 4)
ne la dépasse que de 4 millimètres.
24
6 CIJ1034.indb 45 7/01/14 12:43 645 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
37. No matter which tidal model is used, it is evident that QS 32 is
above water at high tide. Nicaragua’s contention that QS 32 cannot be
regarded as an island within the definition established in customary inter -
national law, because it is composed of coral debris, is without merit.
International law defines an island by reference to whether it is “xnaturally
formed” and whether it is above water at high tide, not by reference xto its
geological composition. The photographic evidence shows that QS 32 is
composed of solid material, attached to the substrate, and not of loose x
debris. The fact that the feature is composed of coral is irrelevant. Even
using Nicaragua’s preferred tidal model, QS 32 is above water at high tide
by some 0.7 metres. The Court recalls that in the case concerning
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bah ‑
rain (Qatar v. Bahrain) (Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 99,
para. 197), it found that Qit’at Jaradah was an island, notwithstanding
that it was only 0.4 metres above water at high tide. The fact that QS 32
is very small does not make any difference, since international law doxes
not prescribe any minimum size which a feature must possess in order to x
be considered an island. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the fea -
ture referred to as QS 32 is capable of appropriation.
38. With regard to the other maritime features at Quitasueño, the
Court considers that the evidence advanced by Colombia cannot be
regarded as sufficient to establish that any of them constitutes an islxand,
as defined in international law. Although the Smith Report, like the exar-
lier report by the Colombian Navy, involved observation of Quitasueñox
on specified dates, an essential element of the Smith Report is its caxlcula-
tions of the extent to which each feature should be above water at HAT. x
Such calculations, based as they are upon a tidal model whose accuracy ixs
disputed when it is applied to waters as shallow as those at and around
Quitasueño, are not sufficient to prove that tiny maritime features are a
few centimetres above water at high tide. The Court therefore concludes x
that Colombia has failed to prove that any maritime feature at Quita -
sueño, other than QS 32, qualifies as an island. The photographic evi -
dence contained in the Smith Report does, however, show those features
to be above water at some part of the tidal cycle and thus to constitutex
low-tide elevations. Moreover, having reviewed the information and ana-
lysis submitted by both Parties regarding tidal variation, the Court con -
cludes that all of those features would be low-tide elevations under thex
tidal model preferred by Nicaragua. The effect which that finding may
have upon the maritime entitlement generated by QS 32 is considered in
paragraphs 182 to 183, below.
2. Sovereignty over the Maritime Features in Dispute
39. In addressing the question of sovereignty over the maritime fea -
tures in dispute, the Parties considered the 1928 Treaty and uti possidetis
25
6 CIJ1034.indb 46 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 645
37. Quel que soit le modèle de marée utilisé, il est clair que la fxormation
QS 32 reste découverte à marée haute. L’argument du Nicaragua sxelon lequel
elle ne peut être considérée comme une île au sens du droit xinternational
coutumier, parce qu’elle est composée de débris coralliens, est dépourvu de
fondement. Le droit international définit une île comme une « étendue natu-
relle» qui reste «découverte à marée haute», et ce, indépendamment de tout
critère géologique. Les éléments de preuve photographiques mxontrent que
QS 32 est composée de matières solides, fixées au substrat, et nxon de débris
épars. Le fait que la formation soit composée de coraux n’a pasx d’importance.
Même lorsque l’on utilise le modèle de marée privilégiéx par le Nicaragua,
QS 32 dépasse la surface de l’eau de 0,7 mètre à marée haute. La Cour rap -
pelle que, en l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime et des questions territoriales
entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn) (fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001,
p. 99, par. 197), elle a conclu que Qit’at Jaradah était une île, même si celle-ci
ne dépassait la surface de l’eau que de 0,4 mètre à marée haute. Le fait que
QS 32 soit minuscule n’a aucune importance du point de vue juridique, lex
droit international ne fixant pas de dimension minimale pour qu’unex forma -
tion maritime puisse être considérée comme une île. Par consxéquent, la Cour
conclut que la formation dite QS 32 est susceptible d’appropriation.
38. Quant aux autres formations maritimes de Quitasueño, la Cour
estime que les éléments présentés par la Colombie n’ont pxas suffisamment de
valeur probante pour établir que l’une quelconque d’entre elles constitue une
île, au sens du droit international. En effet, bien que le rapport xSmith
— comme le rapport antérieur de la marine colombienne — s’appuie sur
l’observation de Quitasueño à des dates bien précises, il rexpose pour l’essen-
tiel sur des calculs visant à déterminer dans quelle mesure chaquex formation
serait découverte au moment de la plus haute mer astronomique. Or cesx
calculs, fondés sur un modèle de marée à la fiabilité cxontestée lorsqu’il est
appliqué à des eaux aussi peu profondes que celles qui entourent Qxuita -
sueño, ne suffisent pas à établir que telle ou telle formation maritime minu-s
cule dépasse de quelques centimètres la surface de l’eau à marée haute. La
Cour conclut donc que la Colombie n’a pas apporté la preuve que, àx l’excep -
tion de QS 32, l’une quelconque des formations maritimes de Quitasueño
puisse être considérée comme une île. Il ressort cependant dxes éléments de
preuve photographiques contenus dans le rapport Smith que ces formationsx
émergent durant une partie du cycle de la marée et qu’elles conxstituent donc
des hauts-fonds découvrants. En outre, après avoir examiné les donnéesx et
analyses présentées par les deux Parties concernant l’amplitudex des marées,
la Cour conclut que toutes ces formations seraient des hauts-fonds décou-
vrants d’après le modèle de marée privilégié par le Nixcaragua. Les effets que
cette conclusion est susceptible d’avoir sur les espaces maritimes auxxquels
ouvre droit QS 32 seront examinés aux paragraphes 182 et 183 ci-dessous.
2. Souveraineté sur les formations maritimes en litige
39. Lorsqu’elles ont traité de la question de la souveraineté sur lxes for-
mations maritimes en litige, les Parties se sont intéressées au trxaité de 1928
25
6 CIJ1034.indb 47 7/01/14 12:43 646 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
juris as a source of their title, as well as effectivités invoked by Colombia.
They also discussed Colombia’s allegation that Nicaragua had recognizxed
Colombia’s title, as well as positions taken by third States, and thex carto-
graphic evidence. The Court will deal with each of these arguments in
turn.
A. The 1928 Treaty
40. Article I of the 1928 Treaty reads as follows :
“The Republic of Colombia recognises the full and entire sover -
eignty of the Republic of Nicaragua over the Mosquito Coast between
Cape Gracias a Dios and the San Juan River, and over Mangle
Grande and Mangle Chico Islands in the Atlantic Ocean (Great Corn
Island and Little Corn Island). The Republic of Nicaragua recognises
the full and entire sovereignty of the Republic of Colombia over the
islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina and over the
other islands, islets and reefs forming part of the San Andrés Archi -
pelago.
The present Treaty does not apply to the reefs of Roncador, Quita-
sueño and Serrana, sovereignty over which is in dispute between
Colombia and the United States of America.” [Translation by the
Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.] (League of
Nations, Treaty Series, No. 2426, Vol. CV, pp. 340-341.)
41. The second paragraph of the 1930 Protocol of Exchange of Ratifi -
cations of the 1928 Treaty (hereinafter the “1930 Protocol”) stipulated
that the “San Andrés and Providencia Archipelago mentioned in the first
clause of the said Treaty does not extend west of the 82nd degree of
longitude west of Greenwich” [translation by the Secretariat of the League
of Nations, for information] (League of Nations, Treaty Series, No. 2426,
Vol. CV, pp. 341-342).
42. The Court notes that under the terms of the 1928 Treaty, Colom -
bia has sovereignty over “San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina
and over the other islands, islets and reefs forming part of the San Andrés
Archipelago” (see paragraph 23). Therefore, in order to address the ques -
tion of sovereignty over the maritime features in dispute, the Court needs
first to ascertain what constitutes the San Andrés Archipelago.
* *
43. Nicaragua observes that, as the first paragraph of Article I of the
1928 Treaty does not provide a precise definition of that Archipelago, it
is necessary to identify the geographical concept of the San Andrés Archi -
pelago. In Nicaragua’s view, the proximity test cannot justify the Coxlom-
bian claim that the maritime features in dispute are covered by the termx
San Andrés Archipelago. Nicaragua argues that the only maritime fea -
26
6 CIJ1034.indb 48 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 646
et à l’uti possidetis juris comme sources de leur titre, ainsi qu’aux effectivi -
tés invoquées par la Colombie. Elles ont également examiné l’allégation
de la Colombie selon laquelle le Nicaragua avait reconnu son titre, ainsxi
que la position adoptée par des Etats tiers et les éléments de xpreuve car -
tographiques. La Cour examinera tour à tour chacun de ces arguments.
A. Le traité de 1928
40. L’article premier du traité de 1928 est ainsi libellé :
«La République de Colombie reconnaît la souveraineté pleine et
entière de la République du Nicaragua sur la côte de Mosquitos,x
comprise entre le cap de Gracias a Dios et la rivière San Juan, et sur
les îles Mangle Grande et Mangle Chico dans l’océan Atlantique x
(Great Corn Island et Little Corn Island). La République du Nicara-
gua reconnaît la souveraineté pleine et entière de la Républxique de
Colombie sur les îles de San Andrés, de Providencia, de Santa Cata -
lina, et sur les autres îles, îlots et récifs qui font partie de l’archipel de
San Andrés.
Le présent traité ne s’applique pas aux récifs de Roncador, xQuita-
sueño et Serrana, dont la possession fait actuellement l’objet d’xun
litige entre la Colombie et les Etats-Unis d’Amérique. » [Traduit par
le Secrétariat de la Société des Nations, à titre d’infor▯mation.] (Recueil
des traités de la Société des Nations, no 2426, vol. CV, p. 340-341.)
41. Au deuxième paragraphe du protocole d’échange des ratificatioxns
du traité de 1928, qui date de 1930 (ci-après le « protocole de 1930 »), il
est précisé que « l’archipel de San Andrés et Providencia, mentionné
à l’article premier du traité, ne s’étend pas à l’ouest du quatre-vingt-
deuxième degré de longitude Greenwich » [traduit par le Secrétariat de la
Société des Nations, à titre d’information] (Recueil des traités de la Société
des Nations, n 2426, vol. CV, p. 341-342).
42. La Cour note que, aux termes du traité de 1928, la Colombie a la
souveraineté sur « les îles de San Andrés, de Providencia, de Santa Cata -
lina, et sur les autres îles, îlots et récifs qui font partie dxe l’archipel de
San Andrés» (voir paragraphe 23). Aussi, pour se prononcer sur la ques -
tion de la souveraineté sur les formations maritimes en litige, la Coxur
doit-elle d’abord établir quelles sont les formations qui constituent lx’ar -
chipel de San Andrés.
* *
43. Le Nicaragua fait observer que, le premier alinéa de l’article premier
du traité de 1928 ne donnant pas de définition précise de l’archipel de
San Andrés, ce concept géographique demande à être éclairci. xIl estime qu’il
ne saurait être fait droit à l’argument de la Colombie selon lexquel les forma-
tions maritimes en litige font partie de l’archipel de San Andrés sur le fond -e
ment du critère de proximité. Il soutient que les seules formationxs maritimes
26
6 CIJ1034.indb 49 7/01/14 12:43 647 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
tures that are relatively near to the island of San Andrés are the Alburqu -
erque Cays and the East-Southeast Cays, while the closest cay to the east
of Providencia is Roncador at 75 nautical miles ; Serrana lies at 80 nauti -
cal miles from Providencia ; Serranilla at 165 nautical miles ; and
Bajo Nuevo at 205 nautical miles; Quitasueño bank is at 40 nautical miles
from Santa Catalina. According to Nicaragua, taking into account the
distances involved, it is inconceivable to regard these maritime featurexs
claimed by Colombia as forming a geographical unit with the three
islands referred to in Article I of the 1928 Treaty.
44. Nicaragua further contends that there is no historical record show -
ing that the disputed islands and cays formed part of a geographical unixt
with the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. At the
beginning of the nineteenth century, the first Governor of what was
referred to then as the “San Andrés Islands” only mentioned five islands
when explaining the composition of the group : San Andrés, Providencia,
Santa Catalina, Great Corn Island and Little Corn Island. In other docu -
ments from the colonial period, which refer to the islands of San Andrés,
the maritime features in dispute are never described as a group, or as pxart
of a single archipelago. In that regard, Nicaragua cites the Royal Order
of 1803, the survey of “the cays and banks located between Cartagena
and Havana” carried out at the beginning of the nineteenth century onx
the instructions of the Spanish authorities, and the Sailing Directions x
(Derrotero de las islas antillanas) published by the Hydrographic Office
of the Spanish Navy in 1820.
45. Nicaragua stresses that the definition of the San Andrés Archipel -
ago as an administrative unit in Colombian domestic legislation is of nox
relevance at an international level. Nicaragua argues that, from a histoxri -
cal and geographical point of view, the creation of this administrative x
unit does not prove that it constitutes an archipelago within the meaninxg
agreed by the parties in the 1928 Treaty.
46. Nicaragua further explains that, under the second paragraph of
Article I of the 1928 Treaty, the maritime features of Roncador, Quita -
sueño and Serrana were explicitly excluded from the scope of that Trexaty,
and thus clearly not considered part of the San Andrés Archipelago.
47. With regard to the 82° W meridian in the 1930 Protocol, Nicara -
gua argues that this did not set a limit to Nicaraguan territory east ofx that
meridian, but only meant that “no island lying west of the 82° W merid -
ian forms part of the archipelago within the meaning of the Treaty”. x
Nicaragua thus asserts that the 1930 Protocol merely sets a western limit
to the San Andrés Archipelago.
48. Nicaragua concludes that the Archipelago comprises only the
islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina and does not
include the Alburquerque Cays, the East-Southeast Cays, Roncador, Ser -
rana, the shoal of Quitasueño, or any cays on the banks of Serranillax and
Bajo Nuevo.
*
27
6 CIJ1034.indb 50 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 647
relativement proches de l’île de San Andrés sont les cayes d’Alburquerque et
de l’Est-Sud-Est. A l’est de Providencia, la caye la plus proche est, selon lui,
Roncador, à 75milles marins, Serrana étant à 80milles marins, Serranilla, à
165 milles marins, et Bajo Nuevo, à 205 milles marins; le banc de Quita -
sueño se trouve, d’après lui, à 40milles marins de SantaCatalina. De l’avis
du Nicaragua, les distances sont telles que l’on ne peut considérexr les forma-
tions maritimes revendiquées par la Colombie comme formant une unitéx
géographique avec les trois îles visées à l’article premier du traité de 1928.
44. Le Nicaragua soutient également qu’il n’existe aucune source hixs -
torique permettant de conclure que les îles et cayes en litige forment une
unité géographique avec les îles de San Andrés, Providencia et Santa
Catalina. Au début du XIX esiècle, le premier gouverneur de ce qui s’ap -
pelait alors les «îles de San Andrés» ne mentionnait que cinq îles lorsqu’il
détaillait la composition du groupe insulaire, à savoir : San Andrés, Pro -
videncia, Santa Catalina, Mangle Grande et Mangle Chico. Dans d’autres
documents de la période coloniale mentionnant les îles de San Andrés, les
formations maritimes aujourd’hui en litige ne sont jamais décritesx comme
formant un groupe ou comme faisant partie d’un seul et même archipxel.
A cet égard, le Nicaragua cite l’ordonnance royale de 1803, le levé des
«cayes et bancs situés entre Cartagena et La Havane » réalisé au début du
XIX e siècle à la demande des autorités espagnoles et les instructionxs nau-
tiques (Derrotero de las islas antillanas) publiées par les services hydro -
graphiques de la marine espagnole en 1820.
45. Selon le Nicaragua, le fait que l’archipel de San Andrés soit défini
comme une unité administrative dans le droit interne colombien est saxns
incidence sur le plan international. Le Nicaragua soutient que, d’un xpoint
de vue historique et géographique, la création de cette unité axdministra -
tive ne prouve pas que ces formations constituent un archipel au sens oùx
l’entendaient les parties au traité de 1928.
46. Le Nicaragua relève d’ailleurs que, au second alinéa de l’article pre -
mier du traité de 1928, les formations maritimes de Roncador, Quita -
sueño et Serrana étaient expressément exclues du champ d’appxlication de
cet instrument, et n’étaient donc manifestement pas considéréxes comme
faisant partie de l’archipel de San Andrés.
47. En ce qui concerne la mention du 82 e méridien de longitude ouest
dans le protocole de 1930, le Nicaragua affirme que celle-ci visait non pas à
limiter son territoire à l’est dudit meridien, mais uniquement xà préciser
qu’«aucune île située à l’ouest du 82 méridien ne fai[sait] partie de l’archi-
pel au sens du traité ». Aussi le Nicaragua soutient-il que le protocole de
1930 ne faisait qu’établir la limite occidentale de l’archipel xde San Andrés.
48. Le Nicaragua conclut que l’archipel comprend uniquement les îles
de San Andrés, Providencia et Santa Catalina, et ne comprend pas les
cayes d’Alburquerque, les cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est, Roncador, Serrana, la
basse de Quitasueño, ni aucune des cayes situées sur les bancs de xSerra -
nilla et de Bajo Nuevo.
*
27
6 CIJ1034.indb 51 7/01/14 12:43 648 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
49. According to Colombia the islands and cays of the San Andrés
Archipelago were considered as a group throughout the colonial and
post-colonial era. In support of its position, Colombia contends that they
were referred to as a group in the early nineteenth century survey of thxe
cays and banks “located between Cartagena and Havana” which was caxr -
ried out on the instructions of the Spanish Crown and in the Sailing
Directions (Derrotero de las islas antillanas) published by the Hydro -
graphic Office of the Spanish Navy in 1820. With regard to the report bxy
the first Governor of the San Andrés Islands, Colombia argues that the
five named islands are clearly the main islands of the group but that xthe
smaller islets and cays also formed part of the Archipelago. In Colom -
bia’s opinion, the fact that references to the San Andrés islands in his -
torical documents (in 1803 or subsequently) did not always specify eacxh
and every feature making up the Archipelago does not mean that it only
consisted of the larger maritime features named.
50. Colombia contends that the concept and composition of the Archi-
pelago remained unchanged and that this was the understanding at the
time of the signature of the 1928 Treaty and the 1930 Protocol.
Further, Colombia contends that the 82nd meridian is, at the very
least, a territorial allocation line, separating Colombian territory to xthe
east from Nicaraguan territory to the west, up to the point where it
reaches third States to the north and south. Colombia concludes that thex
1928 Treaty and the 1930 Protocol left no territorial matters pending
between the Parties. Under the terms of these instruments, according to
Colombia, neither State “could claim insular territory on the ‘othxer’ side
of the 82º W meridian”.
51. Colombia adds that by agreeing, under the second paragraph of
Article I of the 1928 Treaty, to exclude Roncador, Quitasueño and Ser -
rana from the scope of the Treaty, since they were in dispute between
Colombia and the United States, Nicaragua accepted that these features
formed part of the Archipelago.
* *
52. The Court observes that Article I of the 1928 Treaty does not spec-
ify the composition of the San Andrés Archipelago. As to the 1930 Pro-
tocol, it only fixes the western limit of the San Andrés Archipelago at the
82nd meridian and sheds no light on the scope of the Archipelago to the
east of that meridian. In its 2007 Judgment on the Preliminary Objec -
tions, the Court stated :
“it is clear on the face of the text of the first paragraph of Artixcle I of
the 1928 Treaty that its terms do not provide the answer to the ques -
tion as to which maritime features apart from the islands of
San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina form part of the
San Andrés Archipelago over which Colombia has sovereignty” (Ter‑
28
6 CIJ1034.indb 52 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 648
49. Selon la Colombie, tout au long de la période coloniale et post-
coloniale, les îles et cayes de l’archipel de San Andrés ont été considérées
comme formant un groupe. A l’appui de sa position, la Colombie fait
valoir qu’elles étaient présentées comme telles dans le levéx des cayes et
bancs « situés entre Cartagena et La Havane » réalisé au début du
e
XIX siècle à la demande de la couronne espagnole ainsi que dans les
instructions nautiques (Derrotero de las islas antillanas) publiées par les
services hydrographiques de la marine espagnole en 1820. S’agissant du
rapport établi par le premier gouverneur des îles de San Andrés, elle sou -
tient que les cinq îles nommément désignées sont à l’évidence les prinxci -
pales îles du groupe, mais que les îlots et cayes de moindres dimexnsions en
faisaient également partie. Selon elle, de ce que les formations compxosant
l’archipel n’étaient pas toujours toutes énumérées lorxsqu’il était question
des îles de San Andrés dans les documents historiques (à partir de 1803),
l’on ne saurait déduire que celui-ci n’était composé que des seules forma -
tions les plus importantes nommément désignées.
50. La Colombie affirme que l’idée que l’on se faisait de l’arcxhipel et de
sa composition est demeurée inchangée et que c’est sur cette baxse qu’ont
été signés le traité de 1928 et le protocole de 1930.
Elle soutient également que le 82 e méridien constitue, à tout le moins,
une ligne d’attribution territoriale entre le territoire colombien (xà l’est) et
le territoire nicaraguayen (à l’ouest), jusqu’à ce que cetxte ligne rejoigne le
territoire d’Etats tiers au nord et au sud. Le traité de 1928 et le protocole
de 1930, conclut-elle, n’ont laissé aucune question territoriale pendante
entre les Parties. Selon la Colombie, aux termes de ces instruments, aucun
des deux Etats « ne pou[vait] revendiquer de territoire insulaire de
e
l’«autre» côté du 82 méridien de longitude ouest ».
51. La Colombie ajoute qu’en acceptant, au second alinéa de l’ar -
ticle premier du traité de 1928, d’exclure Roncador, Quitasueño et Ser -
rana du champ d’application du traité, en raison du différendx qui existait
entre elle et les Etats-Unis à leur sujet, le Nicaragua a reconnu que ces
formations faisaient partie de l’archipel.
* *
52. La Cour relève que l’article premier du traité de 1928 n’indique pas
précisément la composition de l’archipel de San Andrés. Quant au proto -
cole de 1930, il fixe uniquement la limite occidentale de l’archipel au
82 méridien, sans en préciser d’aucune façon l’étendue àx l’est. Dans son
arrêt de 2007 sur les exceptions préliminaires, la Cour en était déjàx venue
au constat suivant :
«il ressort très clairement du libellé du premier [alinéa] de l’xarticle pr-
mier du traité de 1928 que celui-ci ne répond pas à la question de
savoir quelles sont, en dehors des îles de San Andrés, Providencia et
Santa Catalina, les formations maritimes qui font partie de l’archipel
de San Andrés sur lequel la Colombie a souveraineté » (Différend ter‑
28
6 CIJ1034.indb 53 7/01/14 12:43 649 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
ritorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Prelimi ‑
nary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 863, para. 97).
53. However, Article I of the 1928 Treaty does mention “the other
islands, islets and reefs forming part of the San Andrés Archipelago”. This
provision could be understood as including at least the maritime featurexs
closest to the islands specifically mentioned in Article I. Accordingly, the
Alburquerque Cays and East-Southeast Cays, given their geographical
location (lying 20 and 16 nautical miles, respectively, from San Andrés
island) could be seen as forming part of the Archipelago. By contrast, xin
view of considerations of distance, it is less likely that Serranilla anxd
Bajo Nuevo could form part of the Archipelago. Be that as it may, the
question about the composition of the Archipelago cannot, in the view ofx
the Court, be definitively answered solely on the basis of the geograpxhical
location of the maritime features in dispute or on the historical recordxs
relating to the composition of the San Andrés Archipelago referred to by
the Parties, since this material does not sufficiently clarify the mattxer.
54. According to the second paragraph of Article I of the 1928 Treaty,
this treaty does not apply to Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana which
were in dispute between Colombia and the United States at the time.
However, the Court does not consider that the express exclusion of
Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana from the scope of the 1928 Treaty isx
in itself sufficient to determine whether these features were considerexd by
Nicaragua and Colombia to be part of the San Andrés Archipelago.
55. The Court further observes that the historical material adduced by
the Parties to support their respective arguments is inconclusive as to the
composition of the San Andrés Archipelago. In particular, the historical
records do not specifically indicate which features were considered tox
form part of that Archipelago.
56. In view of the above, in order to resolve the dispute before it, the
Court must examine arguments and evidence submitted by the Parties in
support of their respective claims to sovereignty, which are not based oxn
the composition of the Archipelago under the 1928 Treaty.
B. Uti possidetis juris
57. The Court will now turn to the claims of sovereignty asserted by
both Parties on the basis of uti possidetis juris at the time of independence
from Spain.
* *
58. Nicaragua explains that the Captaincy-General of Guatemala (to
which Nicaragua was a successor State) held jurisdiction over the dis -
puted islands on the basis of the Royal Decree (Cédula Real) of 28 June
1568, confirmed in 1680 by Law VI, Title XV, Book II, of the Compila -
tion of the Indies (Recopilación de las Indias) and, later, the New Compi -
29
6 CIJ1034.indb 54 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 649
ritorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 863, par. 97).
53. Cela étant, l’article premier du traité de 1928 mentionne effective -
ment « les autres îles, îlots et récifs qui font partie de l’archipxel de
San Andrés ». Cette disposition pourrait être interprétée comme englo -
bant au moins les formations maritimes les plus proches des îles nommxé-
ment désignées dans cet article. Ainsi, les cayes d’Alburquerquxe et de
l’Est-Sud-Est pourraient, vu leur situation géographique (les premières
étant à 20 et les secondes à 16 milles marins de l’île de San Andrés), être
considérées comme faisant partie de l’archipel. A l’inverse,x toujours pour
des raisons de distance, il est moins probable que Serranilla et Bajo Nuevo
en fassent partie. Quoi qu’il en soit, de l’avis de la Cour, la quxestion de la
composition de l’archipel ne peut être tranchée en se fondant uxniquement
sur la situation géographique des formations maritimes en litige ou sxur les
documents historiques invoqués à cet égard par les Parties, faute d’indica -
tions suffisamment claires.
54. Aux termes du second alinéa de son article premier, le traité de
1928 ne s’applique pas à Roncador, Quitasueño et Serrana, qui faisaient
à l’époque l’objet d’un litige entre la Colombie et les Extats-Unis. De l’avis
de la Cour, cependant, le fait que ces trois formations aient été xexpressé -
ment exclues du champ d’application du traité de 1928 n’est pas en soi
suffisant pour conclure que le Nicaragua et la Colombie les considérxaient
comme faisant partie intégrante de l’archipel de San Andrés.
55. La Cour relève en outre que les sources historiques invoquées par x
les Parties à l’appui de leurs positions respectives n’établxissent pas de
manière concluante la composition de l’archipel de San Andrés. En parti -
culier, les documents historiques ne désignent pas nommément les forma -
tions qui étaient considérées comme en faisant partie.
56. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, la Cour devra, pour régler le prxésent
différend, examiner les éléments de preuve et arguments préxsentés par les
Parties à l’appui de leurs revendications de souveraineté respexctives autres
que ceux fondés sur la composition de l’archipel aux termes du traxité de 1928.
B. L’uti possidetis juris
57. La Cour en vient donc à présent aux revendications de souverai -
neté que les deux Parties ont formulées sur la base de l’uti possidetis juris
à la date de leur indépendance vis-à-vis de l’Espagne.
* *
58. Le Nicaragua soutient que la capitainerie générale de Guatemala
(dont il est un Etat successeur) exerçait son autorité sur les îxles en
litige en vertu du décret royal (Cédula Real) du 28 juin 1568, confirmé
en 1680 par la loi VI, titre XV, livre II, de la Recopilación de las Indias,
puis par la Novísima Recopilación de 1744, qui indiquaient les limites
29
6 CIJ1034.indb 55 7/01/14 12:43 650 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
lation (Novísima Recopilación) of 1744, which signalled the limits of the
Audiencia de Guatemala as including “the islands adjacent to the coast”.
59. Nicaragua recalls that, according to the doctrine of uti possidetis
juris, there could have been no terra nullius in the Spanish colonies located
in Latin America. It contends that it thus held “original and derivatxive
rights of sovereignty over the Mosquito Coast and its appurtenant mari -
time features”, including the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and
Santa Catalina based on the uti possidetis juris at the moment of indepen -
dence from Spain. In Nicaragua’s opinion, the application of uti posside ‑
tis juris should be understood in terms of attachment to or dependence on
the closest continental territory, that of Nicaragua. For Nicaragua, “xit is
incontrovertible that all the islands off the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua
at independence appertained to this coast”. Although, as a result of xthe
1928 Treaty, it ceded its sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Prov -
idencia and Santa Catalina, this did not affect sovereignty over the other
maritime features appertaining to the Mosquito Coast. Nicaragua con -
cludes that Roncador and Serrana, as well as the other maritime featuresx
that are not referred to eo nomine in the Treaty, belong to Nicaragua on
the basis of uti possidetis juris, since, in law, the islands and cays have fol
lowed the fate of the adjacent continental coast.
*
60. For its part, Colombia claims that its sovereignty over the
San Andrés Archipelago has its roots in the Royal Order of 1803, when it
was placed under the jurisdiction of the Viceroyalty of Santa Fé
(New Granada), which effectively exercised that jurisdiction until inde -
pendence. Colombia therefore argues that it holds original title over thxe
San Andrés Archipelago based on the principle of uti possidetis juris sup -
ported by the administration of the Archipelago by the Viceroyalty of
Santa Fé (New Granada) during colonial times.
61. Colombia asserts that the exercise of jurisdiction over the San Andrés
Archipelago by the authorities of the Viceroyalty of Santa Fé (New Granada)
was at no time contested by the authorities of the Captaincy-General of
Guatemala. Colombia states that during the period prior to independence,x
Spain’s activities in relation to the maritime features originated eixther in
Cartagena, or on the island of San Andrés itself, but never had any connec -
tion with Nicaragua, which was a province on the Pacific coast under txhe
Captaincy-General of Guatemala. Colombia concludes that such was the
situation of the islands of San Andrés when, in 1810, the provinces of the
Viceroyalty of SantaFé (NewGranada) began their process of independence.
62. Colombia finally states that the 1928 Treaty and the 1930 Protocol
did not alter the situation vis-à-vis its sovereignty over the San Andrés
Archipelago based on uti possidetis juris.
*
30
6 CIJ1034.indb 56 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 650
de l’Audiencia de Guatemala en y incluant « les îles adjacentes à la
côte ».
59. Le Nicaragua rappelle que, selon le principe de l’uti possidetis juris, il
ne pouvait exister de terra nullius dans les colonies espagnoles d’Amérique
latine. Il soutient qu’il était donc titulaire «de droits de souveraineté origi
naires et dérivés sur la côte des Mosquitos et les formations mxaritimes qui y
étaient rattachées» — au nombre desquelles figuraient les îles de San Andrés,
Providencia et Santa Catalina — sur la base de l’uti possidetis juris à la date
de son indépendance vis-à-vis de l’Espagne. Le principe de l’uti possidetis
juris, estime-t-il, doit être appliqué en tenant compte du lien de rattachement
ou de dépendance par rapport au territoire continental le plus prochex, à
savoir le sien. Selon lui, « il est incontestable que, lors de son accession à
l’indépendance, toutes les îles situées au large de la côxte caraïbe du Nicara-
gua relevaient de [sa] côte» continentale. Bien que, dans le traité de 1928, il
ait accepté de renoncer à sa souveraineté sur les îles de Saxn Andrés, Provi -
dencia et Santa Catalina, il n’aurait pas perdu pour autant sa souveraineté
sur les autres formations maritimes rattachées à la côte des Moxsquitos. Le
Nicaragua conclut que Roncador et Serrana, ainsi que les autres formations
maritimes qui ne sont pas nommément désignées dans le traité, lui appar -
tiennent en vertu de l’uti possidetis juris puisque les îles et les cayes adjacentes
relèvent du même régime juridique quela côte continentale.
*
60. La Colombie affirme pour sa part que sa souveraineté sur l’archipxel
de San Andrés tire son origine de l’ordonnance royale de 1803 ayant
placé l’archipel sous l’autorité de la vice-royauté de Santa Fé (Nouvelle-
Grenade), laquelle exerça effectivement cette autorité jusqu’xà l’indépen -
dance. Aussi fait-elle valoir que, en vertu de l’uti possidetis juris, elle
détient un titre originaire sur l’archipel de San Andrés qui serait attesté
par le fait que ce dernier était administré à l’époque coxloniale par la
vice-royauté de Santa Fé (Nouvelle-Grenade).
61. La Colombie soutient que les autorités de la capitainerie générxale
de Guatemala n’ont jamais contesté l’exercice par les autoritéxs de la
vice-royauté de Santa Fé (Nouvelle-Grenade) de leurs attributions sur
l’archipel de San Andrés. Avant l’indépendance, déclare-t-elle, l’Espagne
y exerçait des activités soit depuis Cartagena, soit depuis l’îxle de
San Andrés elle-même, mais sans jamais y associer le Nicaragua, qui était
alors une province de la côte pacifique relevant de la capitaineriex générale
de Guatemala. La Colombie conclut que telle était la situation des îxles de
San Andrés lorsque, en 1810, les provinces de la vice-royauté de Santa Fé
(Nouvelle-Grenade) s’engagèrent sur la voie de l’indépendance.
62. La Colombie déclare enfin que le traité de 1928 et le protocole
de 1930 n’ont aucunement entamé la souveraineté qu’elle détexnait sur
l’archipel de San Andrés en vertu de l’uti possidetis juris.
*
30
6 CIJ1034.indb 57 7/01/14 12:43 651 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
63. In response to Colombia’s assertions on the basis of the Royal
Order of 1803, Nicaragua argues that this Order did not alter Nicaraguanx
jurisdiction over the islands, which remained appurtenances of the Mos -
quito Coast. Nicaragua claims that the Royal Order only dealt with mat -
ters of military protection and that, as it was not a Royal Decree, the x
Order lacked the legal requirements to effect a transfer of territoriaxl juris-
diction. Furthermore, the Captaincy-General of Guatemala protested the
Royal Order of 1803, which, according to Nicaragua, was repealed by a
Royal Order of 1806. Nicaragua claims that its interpretation of the
Royal Order of 1803 is confirmed by the Arbitral Award rendered by thex
President of the French Republic, Mr. Emile Loubet, on 11 Septem -
ber 1900 (hereinafter the “Loubet Award”), setting out the land bound -
ary between Colombia (of which Panama formed part at the time) and
Costa Rica (see paragraph 86 below). Nicaragua interprets that Award as
clarifying that Colombia could not claim any rights over the Atlantic
Coast on the basis of the Royal Order of 1803.
* *
64. The Court observes that, as to the claims of sovereignty asserted by
both Parties on the basis of the uti possidetis juris at the time of indepen -
dence from Spain, none of the colonial orders cited by either Party spe -
cifically mentions the maritime features in dispute. The Court has
previously had the opportunity to acknowledge the following, which is
equally applicable to the case at hand :
“when the principle of the uti possidetis juris is involved, the jus
referred to is not international law but the constitutional or adminis -
trative law of the pre-independence sovereign, in this case Spanish
colonial law ; and it is perfectly possible that that law itself gave no
clear and definite answer to the appurtenance of marginal areas, or
sparsely populated areas of minimal economic significance” (Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras : Nica ‑
ragua intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 559, para. 333).
65. In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that in the present
case the principle of uti possidetis juris affords inadequate assistance in
determining sovereignty over the maritime features in dispute between
Nicaragua and Colombia because nothing clearly indicates whether these
features were attributed to the colonial provinces of Nicaragua or of
Colombia prior to or upon independence. The Court accordingly finds
that neither Nicaragua nor Colombia has established that it had title tox
the disputed maritime features by virtue of uti possidetis juris.
31
6 CIJ1034.indb 58 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 651
63. Aux arguments que la Colombie tire de l’ordonnance royale de1803,
le Nicaragua répond que cette dernière n’a rien changé à xson autorité
sur les îles, qui sont demeurées rattachées à la côte des Mosxquitos.
Selon lui, cette ordonnance royale ne portait que sur des questions de
protection militaire et, à la différence d’un décret royalx, ne remplissait pas
les conditions juridiques requises pour opérer un transfert de compéxtence
territoriale. La capitainerie générale de Guatemala aurait du restxe pro -
testé contre cette ordonnance, qui, selon le Nicaragua, fut abrogée par
une autre ordonnance royale en 1806. Le Nicaragua soutient que son
interprétation de l’ordonnance royale de 1803 est confirmée par la sen -
tence arbitrale rendue le 11 septembre 1900 par Emile Loubet, président
de la République française (ci-après la « sentence Loubet»), qui établit la
frontière terrestre entre le Costa Rica et la Colombie (dont faisait alors
partie le Panama) (voir paragraphe 86 ci-dessous). Selon l’interprétation
du Nicaragua, il était clairement énoncé dans cette sentence quxe la Colom -
bie ne pouvait revendiquer le moindre droit sur la côte atlantique enx se
fondant sur l’ordonnance de 1803.
* *
64. La Cour fait observer, à propos des revendications de souverainetéx
formulées par les deux Parties sur la base de l’uti possidetis juris à la date
de leur indépendance vis-à-vis de l’Espagne, qu’aucune des ordonnances
datant de l’époque coloniale citées par l’une ou par l’auxtre ne fait spécifi -
quement référence aux formations maritimes en litige. La Cour a déxjà eu
l’occasion de faire la constatation suivante, qui vaut également pxour la
présente espèce :
«lorsque le principe de l’uti possidetis juris est en jeu, le jus en question
n’est pas le droit international mais le droit constitutionnel ou admxi -
nistratif du souverain avant l’indépendance, en l’occurrence le droit
colonial espagnol, et il se peut parfaitement que ce droit lui-même
n’apportait aucune réponse claire et catégorique à la questixon de savoir
de quelle entité relevaient des zones marginales ou des zones peu peux -
plées n’ayant qu’une importance économique minime » (Différend
frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras; Nica ‑
ragua (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 559, par. 333).
65. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, la Cour conclut que, dans la préx -
sente affaire, le principe de l’uti possidetis juris ne permet pas de détermi -
ner qui détient la souveraineté sur les formations maritimes en lixtige entre
le Nicaragua et la Colombie, car aucun élément ne vient clairementx attes -
ter que les formations en question ont été attribuées aux provixnces colo -
niales du Nicaragua ou à celles de la Colombie avant leur indépendxance
ou à cette date. La Cour estime en conséquence que ni le Nicaraguax ni la
Colombie n’ont établi qu’ils détenaient un titre sur les forxmations mari -
times en litige en vertu de l’uti possidetis juris.
31
6 CIJ1034.indb 59 7/01/14 12:43 652 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
C. Effectivités
66. Having concluded that no title over the maritime features in dis -
pute can be found on the basis of the 1928 Treaty or uti possidetis juris,
the Court will now turn to the question whether sovereignty can be estabx -
lished on the basis of effectivités.
(a) Critical date
67. The Court recalls that, in the context of a dispute related to sover -
eignty over land, such as the present one, the date upon which the dispuxte
crystallized is of significance. Its significance lies in distinguisxhing between
those acts à titre de souverain occurring prior to the date when the dispute
crystallized, which should be taken into consideration for the purpose oxf
establishing or ascertaining sovereignty, and those acts occurring afterx
that date,
“which are in general meaningless for that purpose, having been car -
ried out by a State which, already having claims to assert in a legal
dispute, could have taken those actions strictly with the aim of but -
tressing those claims” (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nic‑
aragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), pp. 697-698, para. 117).
68. As the Court explained in the Indonesia/Malaysia case,
“it cannot take into consideration acts having taken place after the x
date on which the dispute between the Parties crystallized unless such
acts are a normal continuation of prior acts and are not undertaken
for the purpose of improving the legal position of the Party which
relies on them” (Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan
(Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 682,
para. 135).
* *
69. Nicaragua maintains that the date on which the dispute over mari -
time delimitation arose was 1969. Nicaragua notes in particular that thex
dispute came about when Nicaragua granted oil exploration concessions
in the area of Quitasueño in 1967-1968, leading to a Note of protest being
sent by Colombia to Nicaragua on 4 June 1969 in which, for the first time
after the ratification of the 1928 Treaty, Colombia claimed that the
82nd meridian was a maritime boundary between the Parties. Nicaragua
underlines that it responded a few days later, on 12 June 1969, denying
this Colombian claim that reduced by more than half Nicaragua’s rightxs
to a full exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.
*
32
6 CIJ1034.indb 60 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 652
C. Les effectivités
66. Ayant conclu qu’aucun titre sur les formations maritimes en litige
ne pouvait être établi sur la base du traité de 1928 ou de l’uti possidetis
juris, la Cour se penchera à présent sur la question de savoir si la soxuve -
raineté peut être établie sur la base des effectivités.
a) La date critique
67. La Cour rappellera que, lorsqu’il est question d’un différendx relatif
à la souveraineté sur un territoire, comme ici, la date à laquelle le diffé -
rend s’est cristallisé est importante. En effet, cette date permxet de faire
la part entre les actes accomplis à titre de souverain avant la naissancxe
du différend, lesquels doivent être pris en considération pour dxéterminer
ou vérifier la souveraineté, et les actes postérieurs à lax naissance du diff -
érend,
«lesquels ne sont généralement pas pertinents en tant qu’ils sonxt le
fait d’un Etat qui, ayant déjà à faire valoir certaines revendications
dans le cadre d’un différend juridique, pourrait avoir accompli xles
actes en question dans le seul but d’étayer celles-ci » (Différend ter‑
ritorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer
des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II),
p. 697-698, par. 117).
68. Comme la Cour l’a déclaré dans l’affaire Indonésie/Malaisie,
«elle ne saurait prendre en considération des actes qui se sont pro -
duits après la date à laquelle le différend entre les Partiesx s’est crista-l
lisé, à moins que ces activités ne constituent la continuation xnormale
d’activités antérieures et pour autant qu’elles n’aient pxas été entre -
prises en vue d’améliorer la position juridique des Parties qui lexs
invoquent » (Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indo ‑
nésie/Malaisie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 682, par. 135).
* *
69. Le Nicaragua soutient que le différend relatif à la délimitatxion mari -
time a vu le jour en 1969. Il note en particulier que celui-ci est apparu suite
à l’octroi de concessions d’exploration pétrolière dans lxa zone de Quita -
sueño en 1967-1968, qui conduisit la Colombie à lui adresser, le 4 juin 1969,
une note de protestation dans laquelle, pour la première fois depuis la rxati -
fication du traité de 1928, elle prétendait que le 82 méridien constituait une
frontière maritime entre les Parties. Le Nicaragua précise avoir rxépondu
quelques jours plus tard, le 12 juin 1969, en rejetant cette prétention colom -
bienne, qui réduisait de moitié, sinon plus, l’étendue totalxe de la zone éco -
nomique exclusive et du plateau continental qui devaient lui revenir.
*
32
6 CIJ1034.indb 61 7/01/14 12:43 653 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
70. According to Colombia, the dispute concerning the sovereignty
over the maritime features crystallized in 1971 when Colombia and the
United States began negotiations to resolve the situation as regards
Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana, which were excluded from the scope x
of the 1928 Treaty, and Nicaragua raised claims over the San Andrés
Archipelago. In the course of the hearings, Colombia limited itself to txak -
ing note of the critical date proposed by Nicaragua, and to setting out the
effectivités carried out by Colombia before that date.
* *
71. The Court observes that there is no indication that there was a
dispute before the 1969 exchange of Notes mentioned by Nicaragua.
Indeed, the Notes can be seen as the manifestation of a difference of xviews
between the Parties regarding sovereignty over certain maritime featuresx
in the south-western Caribbean. Moreover, Colombia does not seem to
contest the critical date put forward by Nicaragua. In light of the abovxe,
the Court concludes that 12 June 1969, the date of Nicaragua’s Note in
response to Colombia’s Note of 4 June 1969 (see paragraph 69), is the
critical date for the purposes of appraising effectivités in the present case.
(b) Consideration of effectivités
72. The Court notes that it is Colombia’s submission that effectivités
confirm its prior title to the maritime features in dispute. By contraxst,
Nicaragua has not provided any evidence that it has acted à titre de sou ‑
verain in relation to these features and its claim for sovereignty relies
largely on the principle of uti possidetis juris.
* *
73. Colombia contends that the activities à titre de souverain carried
out in relation to the islands coincide with Colombia’s pre-existing title
and are entirely consistent with the legal position that resulted from txhe
1928 Treaty and its accompanying 1930 Protocol. Were the Court to find
that effectivités do not co-exist with a prior title, Colombia argues that
effectivités would still be relevant for its claim to sovereignty.
74. With reference to the maritime features in dispute, Colombia notes
that it has exercised public, peaceful and continuous sovereignty over txhe
cays of Roncador, Quitasueño, Serrana, Serranilla, Bajo Nuevo, Albur -
querque and East-Southeast for more than 180 years as integral parts of
the San Andrés Archipelago. In particular, it maintains that it has enacted
laws and regulations concerning fishing, economic activities, immigratxion,
search and rescue operations, public works and environmental issues con-
cerning the Archipelago ; that it has enforced its criminal legislation over
the entire Archipelago; that, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, it
33
6 CIJ1034.indb 62 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 653
70. La Colombie, quant à elle, estime que le différend relatif à xla souve -
raineté sur les formations maritimes s’est cristallisé en 1971, lorsqu’elle
entama un processus de négociation avec les Etats-Unis afin de régler la
situation concernant Roncador, Quitasueño et Serrana, les trois formations
exclues du champ d’application du traité de 1928, et que le Nicaragua émit
des prétentions sur l’archipel de San Andrés. A l’audience, la Colombie
s’est contentée de prendre acte de la date critique proposée paxr le Nicara-
gua et d’exposer les effectivités qu’elle avait exercées axvant cette date.
* *
71. La Cour constate que rien n’indique qu’un différend existait xavant
l’échange de notes de 1969 mentionné par le Nicaragua. Ces notes peuvent
en effet être considérées comme la manifestation d’une divergence de vues
entre les Parties au sujet de la souveraineté sur certaines formationxs mari -
times situées dans le sud-ouest de la mer des Caraïbes. La Colombie ne
semble d’ailleurs pas contester la date critique proposée par le Nxicaragua.
Compte tenu de ce qui précède, la Cour conclut que le 12 juin 1969, date
à laquelle le Nicaragua adressa une note en réponse à la note dxe la Colom -
bie en date du 4 juin 1969 (voir paragraphe 69), constitue la date critique
aux fins d’apprécier les effectivités dans la présente axffaire.
b) L’examen des effectivités
72. La Cour note que c’est la Colombie qui invoque des effectivités x
pour confirmer son titre antérieur sur les formations maritimes en xcause.
Le Nicaragua, lui, n’a produit aucun élément démontrant qu’xil avait agi à
titre de souverain à l’égard de ces formations ; sa revendication de souve-
raineté repose pour l’essentiel sur le principe de l’uti possidetis juris.
* *
73. La Colombie fait valoir que les activités exercées par elle à titre de
souverain concordent avec son titre préexistant sur les îles et soxnt parfai-
tement conformes à la situation juridique découlant du traité dxe 1928 et
du protocole de 1930. Elle affirme que, même si la Cour devait conclure à
l’absence de titre antérieur, les effectivités suffiraient àx justifier sa revendi-
cation de souveraineté.
74. S’agissant des formations maritimes en litige, la Colombie note
que, pendant plus de 180 ans, elle a exercé de manière publique, pacifique
et continue sa souveraineté sur les cayes de Roncador, de Quitasueñxo, de
Serrana, de Serranilla, de Bajo Nuevo, d’Alburquerque et de l’Est-Sud-Est,
qui étaient considérées comme faisant partie intégrante de lx’archipel de
San Andrés. Elle affirme en particulier avoir, pour l’ensemble de l’xarchi -
pel, adopté des lois et règlements concernant les activités de xpêche, les
activités économiques, l’immigration, les opérations de recherche et de
sauvetage, les ouvrages publics et les questions environnementales ; veillé
33
6 CIJ1034.indb 63 7/01/14 12:43 654 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
has carried out surveillance and control activities over the entire Archxi -
pelago; that it has authorized third parties to prospect for oil in the mari-
time areas of the San Andrés Archipelago ; and that it has carried out
scientific research with a view to preserving and making responsible use
of the natural wealth of the San Andrés Archipelago. Colombia notes
that public works have been built and maintained by the Colombian
Government on the Archipelago’s cays, including lighthouses, quartersx
and facilities for Navy detachments, facilities for the use of fishermxen and
installations for radio stations.
75. Colombia adds that Nicaragua cannot point to any evidence that it
ever had either the intention to act as sovereign over these islands, lext
alone that it engaged in a single act of a sovereign nature on them. Morxe -
over, Nicaragua never protested against Colombia’s exercise of sover -
eignty over the islands throughout a period of more than 150 years.
*
76. For its part, Nicaragua asserts that the reliance on effectivités is
only relevant for justifying a decision that is not clear in terms of uti pos ‑
sidetis juris. Nicaragua considers that any possession of Colombia over
the area only included the major islands of San Andrés, Providencia and
Santa Catalina but not the cays on the banks of Roncador, Serrana, Ser -
ranilla and Bajo Nuevo, or any of the other banks adjacent to the Mos -
quito Coast. Nicaragua points out that in the nineteenth century, the onxly
activity on the cays was that of groups of fishermen and tortoise huntxers,
who carried out their activities without regulations or under any governx -
mental authority. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, the
United States of America, through the Guano Act of 1856, regulated and
granted licences for the extraction of guano at Roncador, Serrana and
Serranilla.
77. Nicaragua contests the relevance of activities undertaken by
Colombia subsequent to the critical date in this case, i.e., 1969. It noxtes
that the establishment of naval infantry detachments only began in 1975 ;
likewise, it was only in 1977 that Colombia replaced the beacons installxed
by the United States on Roncador and Serrana, and placed a beacon on
Serranilla. These activities, according to Nicaragua, cannot be considerxed
as the normal continuation of earlier practices; they were carried out with
a view to improving Colombia’s legal position vis-à-vis Nicaragua and
are not pertinent to the Court’s decision.
78. Nicaragua asserts that legislation and administrative acts can only
be taken into consideration as constituting a relevant display of authority
“[if they] leave no doubt as to their specific reference” to thex territories in
dispute. It argues that the legal provisions and administrative acts relat -
ing to the San Andrés Archipelago relied upon by Colombia have been
of a general nature and were not specific to the cays. Hence, it maintainxs
34
6 CIJ1034.indb 64 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 654
à l’application de son droit pénal; exercé, à partir du milieu du XIX siècle,
des activités de surveillance et de contrôle ; autorisé la prospection pétro -
lière par des tiers dans les espaces maritimes relevant de l’archixpel ; et
mené des activités de recherche scientifique en vue d’assurer la préserva -
tion et l’utilisation responsable des richesses naturelles de l’arxchipel. Elle
relève que le Gouvernement colombien a construit sur les cayes de l’xarchi -
pel des ouvrages publics, dont il a ensuite assuré l’entretien (pxhares, stru-c
tures d’hébergement et autres installations à l’usage des déxtachements de
la marine, installations destinées aux pêcheurs, stations de radiox, etc.).
75. La Colombie ajoute que le Nicaragua ne peut faire valoir le
moindre élément prouvant qu’il ait jamais eu l’intention d’xagir en qualité
de souverain sur ces îles, et encore moins qu’il y ait accompli unx seul acte
à caractère souverain. Le Nicaragua n’a d’ailleurs jamais prxotesté, fait-elle
observer, contre la souveraineté exercée par la Colombie sur les îxles pen -
dant plus de 150 ans.
*
76. Le Nicaragua affirme pour sa part que les effectivités ne peuvent x
être invoquées que pour justifier une décision qui ne serait xpas claire au
regard de l’uti possidetis juris. Selon lui, les possessions de la Colombie
dans cette zone se limitaient aux îles principales de San Andrés, Providen -
cia et Santa Catalina, sans inclure les cayes situées sur les bancs de Ron -
cador, Serrana, Serranilla et BajoNuevo, ni sur aucun autre banc adjacent
à la côte des Mosquitos. Il rappelle que, au XIX e siècle, les cayes n’étaient
utilisées que par des groupes de pêcheurs et de chasseurs de tortuxes, qui se
livraient à leurs activités sans être soumis à aucune réexlementation ni
autorité gouvernementale. Vers le milieu du XIX siècle, les Etats-Unis,
en adoptant la loi sur le guano (Guano Act) de 1856, se mirent à régle -
menter la collecte du guano à Roncador, Serrana et Serranilla et àx déli -
vrer des permis à cet effet.
77. Le Nicaragua conteste la pertinence des activités menées par la
Colombie après la date critique, à savoir 1969. Il note que des détache -
ments de l’infanterie de marine n’ont été établis qu’à partir de 1975 et que
ce n’est qu’en 1977 que la Colombie aurait remplacé les phares érigés par
les Etats-Unis sur Roncador et Serrana et en aurait construit un autre à
Serranilla. De l’avis du Nicaragua, de telles activités ne sauraiexnt être
considérées comme la continuation normale d’activités antérieures ; elles
avaient pour but de renforcer la position juridique de la Colombie
vis-à-vis de lui, et la Cour ne devrait pas en tenir compte pour rendre sa
décision.
78. Le Nicaragua fait valoir que la législation et les actes administratifs
peuvent seulement être pris en considération en tant que manifestaxtion
pertinente d’autorité « [s’il] ne fait aucun doute qu’ils portent spécifique -
ment» sur les territoires en litige. Partant, les dispositions juridiques et
actes administratifs concernant l’archipel de San Andrés invoqués par la
Colombie revêtent selon lui un caractère général et ne sauraxient, dès lors
34
6 CIJ1034.indb 65 7/01/14 12:43 655 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
that they should not be considered as evidence of sovereignty over the
maritime features.
79. Nicaragua contends that in any event it protested the activities
undertaken by Colombia, but did not have the necessary means at its
disposal to demand that its title over the disputed features be respectexd by
a State with superior means on the ground and conducting a policy of
“faits accomplis”.
* *
80. The Court recalls that acts and activities considered to be performed
à titre de souverain are in particular, but not limited to, legislative acts or
acts of administrative control, acts relating to the application and enfxorce -
ment of criminal or civil law, acts regulating immigration, acts regulatxing
fishing and other economic activities, naval patrols as well as searchx and
rescue operations (see Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua
and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), pp. 713–722, paras. 176-208). It further recalls
that “sovereignty over minor maritime features . . . may be established on
the basis of a relatively modest display of State powers in terms of quaxlity
and quantity” (ibid., p. 712, para. 174). Finally, a significant element to be
taken into account is the extent to which any acts à titre de souverain in
relation to disputed islands have been carried out by another State withx a
competing claim to sovereignty. As the Permanent Court of International
Justice stated in its Judgment in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland
case :
“It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as tox
territorial sovereignty without observing that in many cases the
tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual x
exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other State could not
make out a superior claim. This is particularly true in the case of
claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled
countries.” (Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Judgment, 1933,
P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53, p. 46.)
81. The Court notes that although the majority of the acts à titre de
souverain referred to by Colombia were exercised in the maritime area
which encompasses all the disputed features, a number of them were
undertaken specifically in relation to the maritime features in disputxe.
Colombia has indeed acted à titre de souverain in respect of both the mar -
itime area surrounding the disputed features and the maritime features
themselves, as will be shown in the following paragraph.
82. The Court will now consider the different categories of effectivités
presented by Colombia.
35
6 CIJ1034.indb 66 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 655
qu’ils n’intéressent pas spécifiquement les cayes, avoir vxaleur de preuve
établissant la souveraineté sur ces formations maritimes.
79. Le Nicaragua soutient qu’il a, en tout état de cause, protesté xcontre
les activités menées par la Colombie, mais qu’il n’était xpas en mesure
d’exiger que son titre sur les formations contestées soit respectéx par un
Etat qui, sur le terrain, le surpassait en moyens et menait une politiquxe du
fait accompli.
* *
80. La Cour rappelle que les actes et activités considérés comme ayxant
été accomplis à titre de souverain entrent notamment, mais non xexclusive -
ment, dans les catégories suivantes : actes législatifs ou administratifs,
application du droit pénal et du droit civil, réglementation de l’ximmigra -
tion, réglementation des activités de pêche ou d’autres formxes d’activités
économiques, patrouilles navales et opérations de recherche et de xsauve -
tage (voir Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Hondu ‑
ras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil
2007 (II), p. 713-722, par. 176-208). Elle rappelle en outre que « [l]a sou -
veraineté sur des formations maritimes mineures … peut … être établie
sur la base d’une manifestation relativement modeste, d’un point dxe vue
tant qualitatif que quantitatif, des pouvoirs étatiques » (ibid., p. 712,
par. 174). Enfin, un élément important à prendre en considératxion est la
mesure dans laquelle des actes ont été accomplis à titre de souxverain par
un autre Etat formulant une revendication concurrente de souverainetéx
sur les îles en litige. En effet, comme l’a déclaré la Couxr permanente de
Justice internationale dans son arrêt en l’affaire du Statut juridique du
Groënland oriental :
«Il est impossible d’examiner les décisions rendues dans les affaires
visant la souveraineté territoriale sans observer que, dans beaucoup
de cas, le tribunal n’a pas exigé de nombreuses manifestations d’xun
exercice de droits souverains pourvu que l’autre Etat en cause ne pûxt
faire valoir une prétention supérieure. Ceci est particulièremexnt vrai
des revendications de souveraineté sur des territoires situés dansx des
pays faiblement peuplés ou non occupés par des habitants à demexur »e.
(Statut juridique du Groënland oriental, arrêt, 1933, C.P.J.I. sér ▯ ie A/B
no 53, p. 46.)
81. La Cour note que, si les actes à titre de souverain invoqués par la
Colombie ont le plus souvent été accomplis dans la zone maritime exnglo -
bant l’ensemble des formations contestées, plusieurs de ces actes xavaient
spécifiquement trait aux formations elles-mêmes. En fait, la Colombie a
agi à titre de souverain aussi bien à l’égard de ces formatixons qu’à l’égard
des eaux environnantes, ainsi qu’exposé au paragraphe suivant.
82. La Cour examinera à présent les différentes catégories d’xeffectivités
invoquées par la Colombie.
35
6 CIJ1034.indb 67 7/01/14 12:43 656 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Public administration and legislation. In 1920, the Intendente (Governor)
of the Archipelago of San Andrés submitted to the Government a reportx
concerning the functioning of the public administration of the Archipelaxgo
for the period from May 1919 to April 1920. The report specifically referred
to Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana as Colombian and forming an inte-
gral part of the Archipelago. In the exercise of its legal and statutoryx pow -
ers, the Board of Directors of the Colombian Institute for Agrarian Refoxrm
passed resolutions dated 16 December 1968 and 30 June 1969 dealing with
the territorial régime, in particular, of Alburquerque, East-Southeast, Ser -
rana, Roncador, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo.
Regulation of economic activities. In April 1871, the Congress of Colombia
issued a law permitting the Executive Branch to lease the right to extraxct
guano and collect coconuts on Alburquerque, Roncador and Quitasueño. xIn
September 1871, the Prefect of San Andrés and San Luis de Providencia
issued a decree prohibiting the extraction of guano from Alburquerque,
Roncador and Quitasueño. In December 1871, the Prefect of San Andrés
and San Luis de Providencia granted a contract relating to coconut grovexs
on Alburquerque. In 1893, a permit for the exploitation of guano and limxe
phosphate on Serrana was issued by the Governor of the Department of
Bolívar. Contracts for exploitation of guano on Serrana, Serranilla, xRonca -
dor, Quitasueño and Alburquerque were concluded or terminated by the
Colombian authorities in 1893, 1896, 1915, 1916 and 1918. In 1914, and
again in 1924, the Governor of the Cayman Islands issued a Government
Notice informing fishing vessels that fishing in, or removing guano xor phos -
phates from, the Archipelago of San Andrés was forbidden without a lixcence
from the Colombian Government. The notice listed the features of the Arcxhi -
pelago “in which the Colombian Government claims territorial jurisdicxtion”
as including “the islands of San Andres and Providenc[ esic], and the Banks
and Cays known as Serrana, Serranilla, Roncador, Bajo Nueva [sic],
Quitasueno[sic], Alburquerque and Courtown [East-Southeast Cays]”.
Public works. Since 1946, Colombia has been involved in the mainte -
nance of lighthouses on Alburquerque and East-Southeast Cays (Bolívar
Cay). In 1963, the Colombian Navy took measures to maintain the light -
house on East-Southeast Cays, and in 1968 it took further measures for
the inspection and upkeep of the lighthouse on East-Southeast Cays as
well as those on Quitasueño, Serrana and Roncador.
Law enforcement measures. In 1892, the Colombian Ministry of Finance
made arrangements to enable a ship to be sent to the Prefect of Providenx -
cia so that he could visit Roncador and Quitasueño in order to put a xstop
to the exploitation of guano. In 1925, a decree was issued by the Intendente
of San Andrés and Providencia to appropriate funds to cover the expenxses
for the rental of a ship transporting administrative personnel to Quita -
sueño in order to capture two vessels under the British flag engagexd in the
illegal fishing of tortoiseshell. In November 1968, a United States-flagged
vessel fishing in and around Quitasueño was sequestered by the Coloxm -
bian authorities in order to determine whether it had complied with
Colombian fishing regulations.
36
6 CIJ1034.indb 68 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 656
Législation et administration. En 1920, l’Intendente (gouverneur) de l’ar-
chipel de San Andrés présenta au gouvernement un rapport sur le fonction -
nement de l’administration de l’archipel pour la période allantx de mai 1919
à avril 1920. Il y était spécifié que Roncador, Quitasueño et Serrxana appar -
tenaient à la Colombie et faisaient partie intégrante de l’archipel. Dans
l’exercice de ses attributions légales et statutaires, le conseil xd’administra-
tion de l’Institut colombien pour la réforme agraire adopta des réxsolutions
datées du 16 décembre 1968 et du 30 juin 1969 au sujet du régime territorial
de l’archipel et, en particulier, d’Alburquerque, des cayes de l’xEst-Sud-Est,
de Serrana, de Roncador, de Quitasueño, de Serranilla et de Bajo Nuevxo.
Réglementation des activités économiques. En avril 1871, le Congrès
colombien adopta une loi autorisant le pouvoir exécutif à délivrer des pexr -
mis pour la collecte du guano et des noix de coco sur Alburquerque, Ron-
cador et Quitasueño. En septembre 1871, le préfet de San Andrés et
San Luis de Providencia prit un arrêté interdisant la collecte du guanxo sur
Alburquerque, Roncador et Quitasueño et, en décembre 1871, il conclut un
contrat relatif à une plantation de cocotiers sur Alburquerque. En 1893, le
gouverneur du département de Bolívar délivra un permis d’expxloitation du
guano et des phosphates de chaux sur Serrana. Des contrats d’exploitation
du guano sur Serrana, Serranilla, Roncador, Quitasueño et Alburquerquxe
furent conclus ou résiliés par les autorités colombiennes en 1893, 1896,
1915, 1916 et 1918. En 1914, puis à nouveau en 1924, le gouverneur des îles
Caïmanes publia un avis informant les navires de pêche que, à dxéfaut d’un
permis délivré par les autorités colombiennes, la pêche, la xcollecte du guano
et l’extraction de phosphates étaient interdites dans l’archipexl de San Andrés.
Cet avis dressait la liste des formations de l’archipel «sur lequel le Gouver -
nement de la Colombie affirm[ait] sa compétence territoriale», à savoir «les
îles de San Andrés et Providence [sic] et les bancs et cayes connus sous les
noms de Serrana, Serranilla, Roncador, Bajo Nueva [sic], Quitasueno [sic],
Alburquerque et Courtown [cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est]».
Travaux publics. A compter de 1946, la Colombie s’occupa de l’entretien
de phares situés sur Alburquerque et les cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est (Bolívar
Cay). En 1963, la marine colombienne prit des mesures afin d’assurer l’en -
tretien du phare érigé sur les cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est et, en1968, elle prit des
mesures additionnelles d’inspection et d’entretien du phare des caxyes de
l’Est-Sud-Est ainsi que de ceux érigés sur Quitasueño, Serrana et Roncadoxr.
Mesures d’application des lois. En 1892, le ministère colombien des finances
prit des dispositions pour qu’un navire soit mis à la disposition du préfet de
Providencia afin que ce dernier puisse se rendre sur Roncador et Quitaxsueño
et mettre un terme à l’exploitation du guano. En 1925, l’Intendente de San
Andrés et Providencia ordonna l’affectation des fonds nécessaxires pour affré -
ter un navire à destination de Quitasueño emportant à son bord xdes agents
de l’administration chargés d’intercepter deux navires battant pavillon bri -
tannique qui pêchaient illicitement l’écaille de tortue. En novembre 1968, les
autorités colombiennes immobilisèrent un navire battant pavillon dxes
Etats-Unis qui pêchait à Quitasueño et aux alentours afin de vérxifier s’il avait
respecté la réglementation colombienne en matière de pêche.
36
6 CIJ1034.indb 69 7/01/14 12:43 657 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Naval visits and search and rescue operations. In 1937, 1949, 1967-1969,
the Colombian Navy visited Serrana, Quitasueño and Roncador. In 1969,x
two rescue operations were carried out in the immediate vicinity of Albuxr -
querque and Quitasueño.
Consular representation. In 1913 and 1937, the President of Colombia
recognized that the jurisdiction of German consular officials extended x
over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Roncador.
83. Colombia’s activities à titre de souverain with regard to Alburquer -
que, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana
and Serranilla, in particular, legislation relating to territorial organxiza -
tion, regulation of fishing activities and related measures of enforcexment,
maintenance of lighthouses and buoys, and naval visits, continued after x
the critical date. The Court considers that these activities are a normaxl
continuation of prior acts à titre de souverain. The Court may therefore
take these activities into consideration for the purposes of the presentx
case (see Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/
Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 682, para. 135).
84. It has thus been established that for many decades Colombia con -
tinuously and consistently acted à titre de souverain in respect of the mar -
itime features in dispute. This exercise of sovereign authority was publxic
and there is no evidence that it met with any protest from Nicaragua
prior to the critical date. Moreover, the evidence of Colombia’s actsx of
administration with respect to the islands is in contrast to the absencex of
any evidence of acts à titre de souverain on the part of Nicaragua.
The Court concludes that the facts reviewed above provide very strong
support for Colombia’s claim of sovereignty over the maritime featurexs in
dispute.
D. Alleged recognition by Nicaragua
85. Colombia also contends that its sovereignty over the cays was rec -
ognized by Nicaragua itself.
86. As proof of Nicaragua’s recognition of Colombia’s sovereignty
over the disputed maritime features, Colombia refers to Nicaragua’s rxeac -
tion to the Loubet Award of 11 September 1900, by which the President
of France determined what was then the land boundary between Colom -
bia and Costa Rica and is today the boundary between Costa Rica and
Panama. According to this Award :
“As regards the islands situated furthest from the mainland and
located between the Mosquito Coast and the Isthmus of Panama,
namely Mangle Chico, Mangle Grande, Cayos-de-Alburquerque,
San Andrés, Santa Catalina, Providencia and Escudo-de-Veragua, as
well as all other islands, islets and banks belonging to the former
Province of Cartagena, under the denomination of Canton de San
37
6 CIJ1034.indb 70 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 657
Visites navales et opérations de recherche et de sauvetage. En 1937, 1949
et 1967-1969, la marine colombienne se rendit sur Serrana, Quitasueño et
Roncador. En 1969, deux opérations de sauvetage furent menées dansx le
voisinage immédiat d’Alburquerque et de Quitasueño.
Représentation consulaire. En 1913 et 1937, le président de la Colombie
reconnut que la compétence des agents consulaires allemands s’éxtendait
aux îles de San Andrés, Providencia et Roncador.
83. Les activités accomplies par la Colombie à titre de souverain
concernant Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo, les cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est, Quita -
sueño, Roncador, Serrana et Serranilla — législation relative à l’organisa-
tion territoriale, réglementation des activités de pêche et mesxures
d’application connexes, entretien de phares et de bouées, et visitxes navales,
notamment — ont été poursuivies après la date critique. La Cour voit
dans ces activités la continuation normale d’activités antérxieures accom -
plies à titre de souverain. Aussi peut-elle les prendre en considération aux
fins de la présente affaire (voir Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau
Sipadan (Indonésie/Malaisie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 682, par. 135).
84. Ainsi, il est établi que, pendant de nombreuses décennies, la Coloxm -
bie a agi de manière constante et cohérente à titre de souveraixn à l’égard
des formations maritimes en cause. Elle a exercé publiquement son autxo-
rité souveraine, et aucun élément ne vient démontrer qu’exlle aurait ren -
contré la moindre opposition de la part du Nicaragua avant la date
critique. En outre, les éléments de preuve que la Colombie a produxits
pour établir les actes d’administration qu’elle a accomplis àx l’égard des
îles sont à mettre en regard de l’absence d’éléments dxe preuve de la part
du Nicaragua attestant qu’il aurait agi à titre de souverain.
La Cour conclut que les faits examinés ci-dessus confortent très nette -
ment la revendication de souveraineté de la Colombie sur les formatioxns
maritimes en litige.
D. La prétendue reconnaissance par le Nicaragua du titre colombien
85. La Colombie affirme également que le Nicaragua lui-même a
reconnu sa souveraineté sur les formations en litige.
86. La Colombie en veut pour preuve la réaction du Nicaragua à la
sentence Loubet du 11 septembre 1900, dans laquelle le président français
fixa le tracé de la frontière terrestre entre la Colombie et le xCosta Rica,
qui constitue aujourd’hui la frontière entre le Costa Rica et le Pxanama.
Selon cette sentence :
«Quant aux îles les plus éloignées du continent et comprises entxre
la côte de Mosquitos et l’Isthme de Panama, nommément : Mangle-
Chico, Mangle-Grande, Cayos-de-Alburquerque, San Andrès, Santa-
Catalina, Providencia, Escudo-de-Veragua, ainsi que toutes autres
îles, îlots et bancs relevant de l’ancienne Province de Cartagexna, sous
la dénomination de canton de San-Andrès, il est entendu que le terx -
37
6 CIJ1034.indb 71 7/01/14 12:43 658 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Andrés, it is understood that the territory of these islands, withoutx
exception, belongs to the United States of Colombia.” (United
Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA),
Vol. XXVIII, p. 345 [translation of French original by the Registry].)
Colombia recalls that in its Note of protest of 22 September 1900
against the findings in the Loubet Award, Nicaragua stated that the
Award “may in no way prejudice the incontestable rights of the Republxic
of Nicaragua” over certain islands, banks and islets located within ax spec-
ified geographical area. The Note states that those islands and other xfea-
tures “are currently militarily occupied, and politically administerexd by
the authorities of [Nicaragua]”. In that regard, Colombia emphasizes xthat
none of the islands currently in dispute are situated in the geographical
area described by Nicaragua in its Note. Indeed, in its Note, Nicaragua x
only advanced claims to the Great Corn and Little Corn Islands and to
the islands, islets and cays and banks in immediate proximity to the Mosx -
quito Coast, identifying its area of jurisdiction as only extending to
“84º 30´ of the Paris meridian”, which Colombia explains is equivalent to
82º 09´ longitude west of Greenwich. Moreover, none of the islands cur -
rently in dispute were “militarily occupied, and politically administxered”
by Nicaragua in 1900.
Colombia further argues that Nicaragua failed to protest or to claim
rights over Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana, in dispute between
Colombia and the United States ; and that it was only in 1972 that Nica -
ragua first advanced claims over some of the features comprised in thex
Archipelago.
*
87. For its part, Nicaragua states that it has not recognized Colombian
sovereignty over the disputed cays. In particular, it notes that the expxress
exclusion of the features of Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana in the x
1928 Treaty as a result of the dispute over them between the United States
of America and Colombia did not amount to a Nicaraguan renunciation
of its claim of sovereignty over them. Nicaragua contends that neither txhe
text of the 1928 Treaty nor the negotiating history supports such an asser-
tion. Nicaragua points out that, as soon as it became aware of the nego -
tiations concerning Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana between Colombiax
and the United States leading to the 1972 Vázquez-Saccio Treaty, it
reserved Nicaragua’s rights over these maritime features.
* *
88. The Court considers that Nicaragua’s reaction to the Loubet Award
provides a measure of support for Colombia’s case. Although that Awarxd
expressly referred to Colombian sovereignty over Alburquerque Cays and
at least some of the other islands currently in dispute, Nicaragua’s xprotest
38
6 CIJ1034.indb 72 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 658
ritoire de ces îles, sans en excepter aucune, appartient aux Etats-Unis
de Colombie. » (Nations Unies, Recueil des sentences arbitrales
(RSA), vol. XXVIII, p. 345.)
La Colombie rappelle que, dans la note de protestation qu’il émit le 22 s -ep
tembre 1900 pour en contester les conclusions, le Nicaragua déclarait que
cette sentence «ne saurait en aucune manière porter préjudice [à ses] droits
incontestables» sur certaines îles et certains bancs et îlots situés dans xune
zone géographique définie, précisant que ces îles et autres formations « se
trouv[ai]ent [alors] sous l’occupation militaire et l’administratixon politique
[de ses] autorités ». A cet égard, la Colombie souligne qu’aucune des
îles actuellement en litige n’est située dans la zone géographique dxécrite par
le Nicaragua dans sa note. De fait, dans cette note, celui-ci ne formulait de
revendications que sur Mangle Grande et Mangle Chico ainsi que sur les îxles,
îlots, cayes et bancs situés à proximité immédiate de la côte des Mosquitos,
et définissait la limite de la zone soumise à son autorité coxmme étant le mé -
ridien situé à «84° 30´du méridien de Paris», ce qui — précise la Colombie —
correspond à 82° 09´ de longitude ouest par référence au méridien de Green-
wich. En outre, aucune des îles actuellement en litige ne se trouvait « sous
l’occupation militaire et l’administration politique» du Nicaragua en 1900.
La Colombie affirme en outre que le Nicaragua n’a émis aucune protes-
tation ni prétendu détenir de droits sur Roncador, Quitasueño ext Serrana,
qui faisaient l’objet d’un différend entre la Colombie et les Etats-Unis. Ce
n’est qu’en 1972 qu’il a, pour la première fois, revendiqué certaines des
formations relevant de l’archipel.
*
87. Pour sa part, le Nicaragua se défend d’avoir reconnu la souveraineté
colombienne sur les cayes en litige. Il argue en particulier que, de ce que le
traité de 1928 exclut expressément Roncador, Quitasueño et Serrana de son
champ d’application en raison du différend qui opposait les Etatxs-Unis et la
Colombie à leur sujet, il ne s’ensuit pas que lui-même aurait renoncé à faire
valoir sa souveraineté sur ces formations ; ni le texte du traité de 1928 ni
l’historique des négociations ne viendraient d’ailleurs corroboxrer une telle
conclusion. Il précise que, dès qu’il a eu connaissance des néxgociations qui
se tenaient entre la Colombie et les Etats-Unis au sujet de Roncador, Qui-
tasueño et Serrana — qui débouchèrent sur la conclusion, en 1972, du traité
Vázquez-Saccio —, il a réservé ses droits sur ces formations maritimes.
* *
88. La Cour estime que la réaction du Nicaragua à la sentence Loubet tend
à conforter l’argumentation de la Colombie. Bien que cette sentencxe fasse
expressément référence à la souveraineté colombienne sur xles cayes d’Albur -
querque et au moins certaines des autres îles actuellement en litige,x la pro -testa
38
6 CIJ1034.indb 73 7/01/14 12:43 659 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
was confined to the Corn Islands and certain features close to the Nicxara -
guan coast. Nicaragua, by contrast, failed to make any protest with regaxrd
to the Award’s treatment of the maritime features which are the subjexct of
the present case. That failure suggests that Nicaragua did not claim sovxer -
eignty over those maritime features at the time of the Award.
89. The Court also observes that, in the second paragraph of Article I
of the 1928 Treaty, Nicaragua agreed that Roncador, Quitasueño and
Serrana should be excluded from the scope of the Treaty on the ground
that sovereignty over those features was in dispute between Colombia
and the United States of America. The Court considers that this provi -
sion, which was not accompanied by any reservation of position on the
part of Nicaragua, indicates that, at the time of the conclusion of the x
Treaty, Nicaragua did not advance any claim to sovereignty over those
three features. However, in 1972, there was a change in Nicaragua’s pxosi -
tion on the occasion of the conclusion of the Vázquez-Saccio Treaty when
it laid claim to Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana.
90. The Court considers that although Nicaragua’s conduct falls short
of recognition of Colombia’s sovereignty over the maritime features ixn
dispute, it nevertheless affords some support to Colombia’s claim.
E. Position taken by third States
91. The Court now turns to the evidence said by Colombia to demon -
strate recognition of title by third States.
* *
92. Colombia notes that various reports, memoranda, diplomatic
Notes and other correspondence emanating from the British Government
confirm that “the British authorities clearly understood not only txhat the
San Andrés Archipelago was considered as a group, from Serranilla and
Bajo Nuevo until Alburquerque, but also its appurtenance to Colombia”.
Colombia further contends that “[a]ll neighbouring States have recognxised
Colombia’s sovereignty over the Archipelago, including the cays”. xIn par -
ticular, Colombia refers to its 1976 Treaty with Panama on the Delimitation
of Marine and Submarine Areas and Related Matters, to its 1977 Treaty
with Costa Rica on Delimitation of Marine and Submarine Areas and Mar -
itime Co-operation, to the 1980 Treaty on Delimitation of Marine Areas
and Maritime Co-operation between Panama and Costa Rica, to its 1986
Treaty with Honduras concerning Maritime Delimitation, to its 1981 and
1984 Fishing Agreements with Jamaica, and to its 1993 Maritime Delimita -
tion Treaty with Jamaica. Colombia refers to the 1972 Vázquez-Saccio
Treaty as evidence demonstrating recognition by the United States of itsx
claim to sovereignty over Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana.
*
39
6 CIJ1034.indb 74 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 659
tion du Nicaragua visait uniquement les îles Mangle et certaines formations
proches de la côte nicaraguayenne. Le Nicaragua n’a pas élevé la moindre pro -
testation au sujet des formations maritimes mentionnées dans cette sexntence qui
font aujourd’hui l’objet de la présente instance, ce qui semblex indiquer que, à
l’époque, il ne revendiquait pas la souveraineté sur ces formatxions maritimes.
89. La Cour relève également que, au second alinéa de l’article premier
du traité de 1928, le Nicaragua a accepté que les formations de Roncador,
Quitasueño et Serrana soient exclues du champ d’application du traxité car
la question de leur souveraineté faisait l’objet d’un difféxrend entre la
Colombie et les Etats-Unis. La Cour considère qu’il ressort de cette dis -
position, à l’égard de laquelle le Nicaragua n’a aucunement réservé sa
position, que celui-ci ne faisait valoir aucune revendication de souverai -
neté sur ces trois formations à l’époque de la conclusion dux traité. Il est
toutefois revenu sur sa position en 1972, à l’occasion de la conclusion
du traité Vázquez-Saccio, revendiquant alors Roncador, Quitasueño et
Serrana.
90. La Cour estime que, s’il ne vaut pas reconnaissance de la souverai -
neté de la Colombie sur les formations maritimes en litige, le comporxte -
ment du Nicaragua tend toutefois à conforter l’argumentation de lax
Colombie.
E. La position adoptée par des Etats tiers
91. La Cour en vient à présent aux éléments de preuve censés, selon la
Colombie, démontrer la reconnaissance du titre par des Etats tiers.
* *
92. La Colombie note que divers rapports, mémorandums, notes diplo -
matiques et autre correspondance émanant du Gouvernement britannique
confirment qu’il était clair pourl«es autorités britanniques que non seulement
l’archipel de San Andrés constituait un groupe, de Serranilla et Bajo Nuevo
jusqu’à Alburquerque, mais également qu’il appartenait à xla Colomb»i.e
La Colombie soutient en outre que «[t]ous les Etats voisins ont reconnu
[s]a souveraineté… sur l’archipel, y compris les cayes». Elle se réfère en par-
ticulier au traité relatif à la délimitation des zones marines xet sous-marines et
à des sujets connexes qu’elle a conclu en 1976 avec le Panama, au traité sur la
délimitation des zones marines et sous-marines et sur la coopération maritime
conclu en 1977 avec le Costa Rica, au traité concernant la délimitation des
zones marines et la coopération maritime entre le Panama et le Costa Rica
de 1980, au traité de délimitation maritime qu’elle a conclu en 1986 avec le
Honduras, ainsi qu’aux accords de pêche de 1981 et 1984 et au traité de déli -
mitation des zones maritimes de 1993 qu’elle a conclus avec la Jamaïque. La
Colombie voit dans le traité Vázquez-Saccio de 1972 une preuve que les
Etats-Unis ont reconnu sa souveraineté sur Roncador, Quitasueño et Serraxna.
*
39
6 CIJ1034.indb 75 7/01/14 12:43 660 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
93. Nicaragua, for its part, contends that in the 1972 Vázquez-Saccio
Treaty, the United States renounced any claim to sovereignty over the
cays but that this renunciation was not in favour of Colombia. Nicaraguax
adds that when the United States ratified that Treaty, it assured Nicara -
gua that it did not understand the Treaty to confer rights or impose obli -
gations or prejudice the claims of third States, particularly Nicaragua.x
94. Nicaragua furthermore asserts that there can be no doubt that any
recognition by third States, including those which have signed maritime x
delimitation treaties with Colombia, is not opposable to Nicaragua.
* *
95. The Court considers that correspondence emanating from the
United Kingdom Government and the colonial administrations in what,
at the relevant time, were territories dependent upon the United King -
dom, indicates that the United Kingdom regarded Alburquerque, Bajo
Nuevo, Roncador, Serrana and Serranilla as appertaining to Colombia
on the basis of Colombian sovereignty over San Andrés.
The Court notes that the 1972 Vásquez-Saccio Treaty mentions some
of the maritime features in dispute. That Treaty contains no explicit pro -
vision to the effect that the United States of America recognized Coloxm-
bian sovereignty over Quitasueño, Roncador or Serrana, although some x
language in the Treaty could suggest such recognition in so far as Roncax-
dor and Serrana were concerned (it was the view of the United States thxat
Quitasueño was not capable of appropriation). However, when Nicara -
gua protested, the United States response was to deny that it was takingx
any position regarding any dispute which might have existed between
Colombia and any other State regarding sovereignty over those features.
Treaties concluded by Colombia with neighbouring States are compat -
ible with Colombia’s claims to islands east of the 82nd meridian but xcan-
not be said to amount to clear recognition of those claims by the other x
parties to the treaties. In any event these treaties are res inter alios acta
with regard to Nicaragua.
Taking the evidence of third State practice as a whole, the Court con -
siders that, although this practice cannot be regarded as recognition by
third States of Colombia’s sovereignty over the maritime features in xdis-
pute, it affords some measure of support to Colombia’s argument.
F. Evidentiary value of maps
96. Colombia asserts that in the Colombian official maps published up
to the present day, the cays in dispute have always appeared as part of xthe
San Andrés Archipelago and therefore as Colombian. In this regard,
40
6 CIJ1034.indb 76 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 660
93. Le Nicaragua fait quant à lui valoir que, par le traité Vázquez-
Saccio de 1972, les Etats-Unis ont renoncé à toute revendication de sou -
veraineté sur les cayes, sans pour autant l’avoir fait en faveur dxe la
Colombie. Le Nicaragua ajoute que, lorsque les Etats-Unis ont ratifié le
traité, ils l’ont assuré qu’ils ne comprenaient pas ce dernixer comme confé-
rant des droits ou imposant des obligations à des Etats tiers, ou comme
portant préjudice aux revendications de ces derniers, en particulier xdu
Nicaragua.
94. Enfin, il ne fait aucun doute pour le Nicaragua que la reconnais -
sance par des Etats tiers, notamment ceux qui ont signé des traitéxs de
délimitation maritime avec la Colombie, ne lui est pas opposable.
* *
95. La Cour considère qu’il ressort de la correspondance émanant dux
Gouvernement britannique et des administrations coloniales des terri -
toires qui, à l’époque, dépendaient du Royaume-Uni que, pour ce dernier,
Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo, Roncador, Serrana et Serranilla apparte -
naient à la Colombie puisque celle-ci avait souveraineté sur San Andrés.
La Cour note par ailleurs que le traité Vázquez-Saccio de 1972 men -
tionne certaines des formations maritimes en litige. Ce traité ne conxtient
aucune disposition expresse emportant reconnaissance, par les Etats-Unis,
de la souveraineté colombienne sur Quitasueño, Roncador ou Serrana,
encore que son libellé puisse suggérer une telle reconnaissance enx ce qui
concerne Roncador et Serrana (les Etats-Unis estimaient que Quitasueño
n’était pas susceptible d’appropriation). Cela étant, lorsqxue le Nicaragua
protesta, les Etats-Unis nièrent avoir pris position sur tout différend qui
opposerait la Colombie à un Etat tiers relativement à ces formatioxns.
Les traités conclus par la Colombie avec des Etats voisins concordentx,
pour leur part, avec la revendication de souveraineté formulée parx celle-ci
sur les îles situées à l’est du 82e méridien, mais il ne peut en être déduit
aucune reconnaissance claire de cette revendication par les autres partixes
à ces traités. En tout état de cause, les traités en questioxn sont res inter
alios acta à l’égard du Nicaragua.
La Cour estime que, bien que la pratique des Etats tiers telle qu’ellxe
ressort de l’ensemble des éléments de preuve ne puisse être xconsidérée
comme valant reconnaissance de la souveraineté de la Colombie sur lesx
formations maritimes en litige, elle tend à conforter l’argumentatxion de la
Colombie.
F. La valeur probante des cartes
96. La Colombie affirme que, sur les cartes officielles qu’elle a publiées
jusqu’à ce jour, les cayes en litige sont toujours apparues comme xfaisant
partie de l’archipel de San Andrés et, partant, comme colombiennes. A
40
6 CIJ1034.indb 77 7/01/14 12:43 661 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Colombia ascribes special value to two official maps published by its
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1920 and in 1931, i.e., before and immexdi-
ately after the conclusion of the 1928 Treaty and the signature of the 1x930
Protocol. A comparison of these two maps shows that both of them
include a legend indicating that the maps depict the Archipelago of San x
Andrés and Providencia as “belonging to the Republic of Colombia”x
(Cartela del Archipiélago de San Andrés y Providencia pertenecien▯te a la
República de Colombia). Both maps show all the maritime features now
in dispute. The difference is that the 1931 map reflects the results of the
1928-1930 agreements concluded between Nicaragua and Colombia. It
therefore depicts a line following meridian 82º W, to the left of which is
written “REPÚBLICA DE NICARAGUA”.
97. Colombia further refers to a number of maps published in third
countries, in which the San Andrés Archipelago appears in greater or
lesser detail and in which neither the cays in dispute nor any other marxi -
time features east of the 82º W meridian are indicated as belonging to or
claimed by Nicaragua.
98. Colombia finally asserts that the maps published by Nicaragua
prior to 1980 also show that Nicaragua never considered that the islandsx
and cays of the San Andrés Archipelago — with the exception of the
Corn Islands — belonged to it.
*
99. Nicaragua contests the evidentiary value of the maps and charts
produced by Colombia. Nicaragua asserts that these maps do not contain
any legend making it possible to assess their precise meaning. At most, x
these maps depict the 82nd meridian as the dividing line between the
islands of San Andrés and Providencia and their surrounding islets on the
one hand and the Corn Islands on the other.
* *
100. The Court recalls that,
“of themselves, and by virtue solely of their existence, [maps] cannoxt
constitute a territorial title, that is, a document endowed by interna-
tional law with intrinsic legal force for the purpose of establishing
territorial rights” (Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 582, para. 54).
Moreover, according to the Court’s constant jurisprudence, maps gen -
erally have a limited scope as evidence of sovereign title.
101. None of the maps published by Nicaragua prior to 1980 (when
Nicaragua proclaimed that it was denouncing the 1928 Treaty) show the
maritime features in dispute as Nicaraguan. By contrast, Colombian
41
6 CIJ1034.indb 78 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 661
cet égard, deux cartes officielles publiées par le ministère cxolombien des
affaires étrangères en 1920 et 1931 — soit avant et immédiatement après
la conclusion du traité de 1928 et la signature du protocole de 1930 —
revêtent selon elle une importance particulière. En comparant ces deux
cartes, l’on constate que sur l’une et sur l’autre figure unex légende dans
laquelle l’archipel de San Andrés et Providencia est présenté comme
«appartenant à la République de Colombie » (Cartela del Archipiélago de
San Andrés y Providencia perteneciente a la República de Colombia). L’en -
semble des formations actuellement en litige y sont représentées, xla diffé-
rence entre les deux cartes étant que celle de 1931 est le reflet des accords
de 1928-1930 conclus entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie. Ainsi, cette
deuxième carte comporte une ligne suivant le 82 eméridien de longitude
ouest, à gauche de laquelle apparaît la mention « REPÚBLICA DE
NICARAGUA ».
97. La Colombie se réfère également à un certain nombre de cartes
publiées dans des pays tiers, sur lesquelles l’archipel de San Andrés est
représenté de manière plus ou moins détaillée et dont aucxune ne fait appa -
raître les cayes en litige ni aucune autre formation maritime situéxe à l’est
du 82 eméridien comme étant des possessions du Nicaragua ou comme
faisant l’objet d’une revendication de la part de celui-ci.
98. Enfin, affirme la Colombie, il ressortirait également des cartes
publiées par le Nicaragua avant 1980 que celui-ci n’a jamais estimé déte -
nir la souveraineté sur les îles et cayes de l’archipel de San Andrés, à l’ex -
ception des îles Mangle.
*
99. Le Nicaragua conteste la valeur probante des cartes géographiques
et marines produites par la Colombie. Ces cartes, qui ne comporteraient
aucune légende permettant d’apprécier leur signification exacte, représen -
teraient tout au plus le 82 méridien comme constituant la ligne de sépa -
ration entre les îles de San Andrés et Providencia et les îlots environnants,
d’une part, et les îles Mangle, de l’autre.
* *
100. La Cour rappellera que les cartes
«ne constituent jamais — à elles seules et du seul fait de leur exis -
tence — un titre territorial, c’est-à-dire un document auquel le droit
international confère une valeur juridique intrinsèque aux fins xde
l’établissement des droits territoriaux » (Différend frontalier (Burkina
Faso/République du Mali), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 582, par. 54).
En outre, selon la jurisprudence constante de la Cour, les cartes n’oxnt géné
ralement qu’une portée limitée en tant que preuve d’un titrex de souveraineté.
101. Aucune des cartes publiées par le Nicaragua avant 1980 (date à
laquelle celui-ci a officiellement dénoncé le traité de 1928) ne représente
les formations maritimes en cause comme nicaraguayennes. En revanche,
41
6 CIJ1034.indb 79 7/01/14 12:43 662 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
maps and indeed some maps published by Nicaragua show at least some
of the more significant features as belonging to Colombia and none as x
belonging to Nicaragua.
102. The Court considers that, although the map evidence in the pres -
ent case is of limited value, it nevertheless affords some measure of xsup -
port to Colombia’s claim.
3. Conclusion as to Sovereignty over the Islands
103. Having considered the entirety of the arguments and evidence put
forward by the Parties, the Court concludes that Colombia, and not
Nicaragua, has sovereignty over the islands at Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo,
East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana and Serranilla.
III. Admissibility of Nicaraxgua’s Claim for Delimitaxtion
of a Continental Shelfx Extending
beyond 200 Nautical Milexs
104. The Court recalls that in its Application and Memorial, Nicara -
gua requested the Court to determine the “single maritime boundary”x
between the continental shelf areas and exclusive economic zones apper -
taining respectively to Nicaragua and Colombia in the form of a median
line between the mainland coasts of the two States. In its Counter-Memo -
rial, Colombia contended that the boundary line claimed by Nicaragua
was situated in an area in which the latter had no entitlements in view xof
the fact that the two mainland coasts are more than 400 nautical miles
apart.
105. In its Reply, Nicaragua contended that, under the provisions of
Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), it has an entitlement extending to the outer edge of the
continental margin. Nicaragua thus requested the Court to delimit
the continental shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia in view of the
fact that the natural prolongations of the mainland territories of the
Parties meet and overlap. Nicaragua explains this change of its claim onx
the ground that “[o]nce the Court had upheld ‘[Colombia’s] fixrst
preliminary objection . . .’ in its Judgment [on Preliminary Objections]
of 13 December 2007, Nicaragua could only accept that decision and
adjust its submissions (and its line of argument) accordingly”. In xthe
course of the hearings, Nicaragua acknowledged that, while the outer
edge of the continental margin of the mainland of Colombia did not
extend up to 200 nautical miles, Article 76 entitled it to a continental
shelf extending to a limit of 200 nautical miles from the baseline from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured (see sketch-map
No. 2, p. 663).
42
6 CIJ1034.indb 80 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 662
les cartes colombiennes, et plusieurs cartes publiées par le Nicaraguxa,
représentent au moins certaines des formations les plus importantes
comme appartenant à la Colombie, et aucune comme appartenant au
Nicaragua.
102. La Cour considère que, même s’ils n’ont qu’une valeur limxitée
dans la présente affaire, les éléments de preuve cartographiqxues tendent à
conforter l’argumentation de la Colombie.
3. Conclusion concernant la souveraineté sur les îles
103. Ayant examiné l’ensemble des arguments et des éléments de
preuve présentés par les Parties, la Cour conclut que c’est la Colombie, et
non le Nicaragua, qui a la souveraineté sur les îles faisant partixe d’Albur -
querque, de Bajo Nuevo, des cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est, de Quitasueño, de
Roncador, de Serrana et de Serranilla.
III. Recevabilité de la demxande du Nicaragua
tendant à la délimitatxion d’un plateau contxinental
s’étendant au-delà de 200 milles marins
104. La Cour rappellera que, dans sa requête et son mémoire, le Nicara -
gua la prie de tracer une «frontière maritime unique» entre les portions du
plateau continental et les zones économiques exclusives relevant respxective -
ment des deux Parties, suivant une ligne médiane entre leurs côtesx contin-en
tales respectives. Dans son contre-mémoire, la Colombie fait valoir que la
ligne frontière revendiquée par le Nicaragua se trouve dans une zoxne où
celui-ci ne peut prétendre à aucun droit, les côtes continentales desx deux
Etats étant situées à plus de 400 milles marins l’une de l’autre.
105. Dans sa réplique, le Nicaragua soutient que le droit que lui
confère l’article 76 de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la
mer (ci-après la «CNUDM») s’étend jusqu’au rebord externe de sa marge
continentale. Il prie donc la Cour de délimiter le plateau continentaxl reve -
nant, respectivement, à la Colombie et à lui-même, en tenant compte du
fait que les prolongements naturels des masses continentales des deux
pays se rencontrent et se chevauchent. Il indique avoir modifié sa xdemande
au motif que, « dans son arrêt [sur les exceptions préliminaires] du
13 décembre 2007, la Cour [ayant] retenu « la première exception prélimi -
naire [de la Colombie]… », il ne pouvait que s’incliner et ajuster ses
conclusions (et son argumentation) en conséquence ». A l’audience, le
Nicaragua a reconnu que, bien que le rebord externe de la marge conti -
nentale de la Colombie se trouve à moins de 200 milles marins de la côte,
l’article 76 confère à cette dernière un droit à un plateau continentaxl
jusqu’à 200 milles marins de la ligne de base à partir de laquelle est mesu -
rée la largeur de la mer territoriale (voir croquis n o 2, p. 663).
42
6 CIJ1034.indb 81 7/01/14 12:43 663 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
WGS 84 COLOMBIA
Delimitation
Sketch-map No. 2: for illustrative purposes only.
claimed by Nicaragua
This sketch-map has been prepared30' N)
12-nautical-mile enclaves around Colombian islandsto be Colombianaguaragua
A IA
I B
A M
A L
J O
Bajo Nuevo C
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
JOINTREA
REGIME
Colombia / Jamaica
CARIBBEAN SEA
PANAMA
Roncador
Serrana
Serranilla
East-Southeast Cays
A Quitasueño
A U
R A A A
U R ProSanta Catalina I MA
N A RA NA
O I San Andrés Cays TS P
H N COLOMBIA OC
Alburquerque COSTA RICA
Cays
Miskitos
Island Island
Little Corn
Great Corn
RICA
COSTA
HONDURAS NICARAGUA
43
6 CIJ1034.indb 82 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 663
bi ua )
m r gua N
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s l l N iuée l E
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43
6 CIJ1034.indb 83 7/01/14 12:43 664 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
106. In its final submission I (3), Nicaragua requested the Court to
define “a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the overlap -
ping entitlements to a continental shelf of both Parties”. According xto
Nicaragua, the subject-matter of the dispute set out in its final submis -
sions is not fundamentally different from that set out in the Applicatxion
since the purpose of the Application was to request the Court to settle x
issues of sovereignty and, in the light of that settlement, to delimit txhe
maritime areas between the two States “in accordance with equitable
principles and relevant circumstances recognized by general internationaxl
law as applicable to such a delimitation”.
*
107. For its part, Colombia asserts that in its Reply Nicaragua changed
its original request and that the new continental shelf claim was not
implicit in the Application nor in the Nicaraguan Memorial. Colombia
states that the question of Nicaragua’s entitlement to a continental xshelf
extending beyond 200 nautical miles (hereinafter referred to as “extended
continental shelf”), and the delimitation of that shelf based on geoxlogical
and geomorphological factors cannot be said to arise directly out of thex
question that was the subject-matter of the Application, namely the
delimitation of a single maritime boundary based solely on geographical x
factors. Colombia recalls that the Court has held on a number of occa -
sions that a new claim which changes the subject-matter of the dispute
originally submitted is inadmissible. In this regard, Colombia points tox a
series of additional questions of fact and law that Nicaragua’s new cxlaim
would, in its view, require the Court to address. In these circumstancesx,
according to Colombia, Nicaragua’s claim to an extended continental
shelf, as well as its request for the Court to delimit on this basis thex con -
tinental shelf boundary between the Parties, is inadmissible.
* *
108. The Court observes that, from a formal point of view, the claim
made in Nicaragua’s final submission I (3) (requesting the Court to effect
a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the overlapping entxi -
tlements to a continental shelf of both Parties) is a new claim in relaxtion
to the claims presented in the Application and the Memorial.
109. The Court is not however convinced by Colombia’s contentions
that this revised claim transforms the subject-matter of the dispute
brought before the Court. The fact that Nicaragua’s claim to an extenxded
continental shelf is a new claim, introduced in the Reply, does not, in x
itself, render the claim inadmissible. The Court has held that “the mxere
fact that a claim is new is not in itself decisive for the issue of admixssibil-
44
6 CIJ1034.indb 84 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 664
106. Au point I. 3) de ses conclusions finales, le Nicaragua prie la Cour
de tracer « une limite opérant une division par parts égales de la zone du
plateau continental où les droits des deux Parties sur celui-ci se che -
vauchent». Selon le Nicaragua, l’objet du litige tel qu’exposé dans xses
conclusions finales n’est pas fondamentalement différent de cexlui présenté
dans la requête, puisque cette dernière avait pour objet de demandxer à la
Cour de régler des questions de souveraineté et, à la lumièrxe de ce règle -
ment, de délimiter les espaces maritimes entre les deux Etats « conformé-
ment aux principes équitables et aux circonstances pertinentes que lex droit
international général reconnaît comme s’appliquant à une xdélimitation de
cet ordre ».
*
107. Pour sa part, la Colombie soutient que, dans sa réplique, le
demandeur a modifié sa demande originelle et que la nouvelle préxtention
du Nicaragua concernant le plateau continental n’est implicitement coxnte -
nue ni dans la requête ni dans le mémoire. Elle affirme que la quxestion du
droit du Nicaragua à un plateau continental s’étendant au-delà de
200 milles marins (ci-après le « plateau continental étendu ») et la délimi -
tation de ce plateau en fonction de facteurs géologiques et géomorxpholo-
giques ne sauraient être considérées comme découlant directexment de
l’objet de la requête, à savoir la détermination d’une frxontière maritime
unique exclusivement basée sur des facteurs géographiques. La Coloxmbie
rappelle que la Cour a conclu à plusieurs reprises à l’irrecevaxbilité d’une
demande nouvelle modifiant l’objet du différend initialement sxoumis. A
cet égard, elle évoque un certain nombre de questions de droit et xde fait
additionnelles que, selon elle, la nouvelle demande du Nicaragua contrain-
drait la Cour à examiner. Aussi estime-t-elle que la prétention du Nicara -
gua relative à un plateau continental étendu ainsi que la demande xde
celui-ci tendant à ce que la Cour délimite, sur cette base, le plateau conti -
nental relevant de chacune des Parties sont irrecevables.
* *
108. La Cour constate que, d’un point de vue formel, la demande pré -
sentée par le Nicaragua au point I. 3) de ses conclusions finales (tendant
à ce que la Cour trace une limite opérant une division par parts égales de
la zone du plateau continental où les droits des deux Parties sur celxui-ci se
chevauchent) constitue une demande nouvelle par rapport à celles de xla
requête et du mémoire.
109. La Cour n’est toutefois pas convaincue par les arguments de la
Colombie selon lesquels cette demande revisée modifie l’objet du diffé -
rend porté devant elle. Le fait que la demande de plateau continentalx
étendu soit une demande nouvelle, formulée pour la première foixs par le
Nicaragua dans sa réplique, ne la rend pas per se irrecevable. La Cour a
en effet jugé que « la nouveauté d’une demande n’est pas décisive en soi
44
6 CIJ1034.indb 85 7/01/14 12:43 665 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
ity” (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2007 (II), p. 695, para. 110). Rather, “the decisive consideration is
the nature of the connection between that claim and the one formulated
in the Application instituting proceedings” (Ahmadou Sadio Diallo
(Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 657, para. 41).
110. For this purpose it is not sufficient that there should be a link of
a general nature between the two claims. In order to be admissible, a nexw
claim must satisfy one of two alternative tests : it must either be implicit
in the Application or must arise directly out of the question which is txhe
subject-matter of the Application (ibid.).
111. The Court notes that the original claim concerned the delimita -
tion of the exclusive economic zone and of the continental shelf betweenx
the Parties. In particular, the Application defined the dispute as “xa group
of related legal issues subsisting between the Republic of Nicaragua andx
the Republic of Colombia concerning title to territory and maritime
delimitation”. In the Court’s view, the claim to an extended continental
shelf falls within the dispute between the Parties relating to maritime
delimitation and cannot be said to transform the subject-matter of that
dispute. Moreover, it arises directly out of that dispute. What has chanxged
is the legal basis being advanced for the claim (natural prolongation
rather than distance as the basis for a continental shelf claim) and thxe
solution being sought (a continental shelf delimitation as opposed to ax
single maritime boundary), rather than the subject-matter of the dispute.
The new submission thus still concerns the delimitation of the continentxal
shelf, although on different legal grounds.
112. The Court concludes that the claim contained in final submis-
sion I (3) by Nicaragua is admissible. The Court further notes that in decid-
ing on the admissibility of the new claim, the Court is not addressing
the issue of the validity of the legal grounds on which it is based.
IV. Consideration of Nicaxragua’s Claim for Delimixtation
of a Continental Shelfx Extending
beyond 200 Nautical Milexs
113. The Court now turns to the question whether it is in a position to
determine “a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the oxver -
lapping entitlements to a continental shelf of both Parties” as requexsted
by Nicaragua in its final submission I (3).
* *
45
6 CIJ1034.indb 86 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 665
pour la question de la recevabilité » (Différend territorial et maritime entre
le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Hon ‑
duras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 695, par. 110). En revanche, « ce
qui est décisif, c’est la nature du lien entre cette demande et cexlle qui est
formulée dans la requête introductive » (Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Répu ‑
blique de Guinée c. République démocratique du Congo), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil
2010 (II), p. 657, par. 41).
110. A cet effet, il ne suffit pas qu’existe entre ces deux demandes unx
lien de nature générale. Afin d’être recevable, la nouvellxe demande doit
satisfaire à l’un des deux critères suivants : elle doit être implicitement
contenue dans la requête ou découler directement de la question quxi fait
l’objet de la requête (ibid.).
111. La Cour note que la demande originelle se rapporte à la délimita -
tion de la zone économique exclusive et du plateau continental des dexux
Parties. Selon les termes de la requête, le différend porte en pxarticulier sur
«un ensemble de questions juridiques connexes en matière de titre terrxito -
rial et de délimitation maritime qui demeurent en suspens entre la Réxpu-
blique du Nicaragua et la République de Colombie ». La Cour estime
donc que la demande de plateau continental étendu relève du différend
qui oppose les Parties en matière de délimitation maritime et ne pxeut être
considérée comme modifiant l’objet de celui-ci, et ce, d’autant plus qu’elle
en découle directement. Ce qui a changé, ce n’est pas l’objext du différend;
ce sont, d’une part, le fondement juridique invoqué au soutien de xla
demande (à savoir le prolongement naturel et non plus la distance poxur
fonder la prétention relative au plateau continental) et, d’autrex part, la
solution recherchée (la délimitation du plateau continental et noxn plus
une frontière maritime unique). Par conséquent, bien qu’elle repose sur
des fondements juridiques différents, la nouvelle demande se rapporxte
toujours à la délimitation du plateau continental.
112. La Cour conclut que la demande formulée au point I. 3) des
conclusions finales du Nicaragua est recevable. Elle fait toutefois obxserver
que, en tranchant la question de la recevabilité de cette nouvelle dexmande,
elle ne se prononce pas sur la validité des fondements juridiques invoqués
à l’appui de celle-ci.
IV. Examen de la demande du xNicaragua
tendant à la délimitatxion d’un plateau contxinental
s’étendant au-delà de 200 milles marins
113. La Cour en vient maintenant à la question de savoir si elle est en
mesure de tracer « une limite opérant une division par parts égales de la
zone du plateau continental où les droits des deux Parties sur celui-ci se
chevauchent», ainsi que le Nicaragua le lui demande au point I. 3) de ses
conclusions finales.
* *
45
6 CIJ1034.indb 87 7/01/14 12:43 666 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
114. The Parties agree that, since Colombia is not a party to UNCLOS,
only customary international law may apply in respect to the maritime
delimitation requested by Nicaragua. The Parties further agree that the x
applicable law in the present case is customary international law reflxected
in the case law of this Court, the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea (ITLOS) and international arbitral courts and tribunals. The Par -
ties further agree that the relevant provisions of UNCLOS concerning thex
baselines of a coastal State and its entitlement to maritime zones, the x
definition of the continental shelf and the provisions relating to thex delim -
itation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf reflexct
customary international law.
115. The Parties agree that coastal States have ipso facto and ab initio
rights to the continental shelf. However, Nicaragua and Colombia dis -
agree about the nature and content of the rules governing the entitlements
of coastal States to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
116. Nicaragua states that the provisions of Article 76, paragraphs 1
to 7, relating to the definition of the continental shelf and to the detexrmi -
nation of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles, have the status of customary international law.
117. While Colombia accepts that paragraph 1 of Article 76 reflects
customary international law, it asserts that “there is no evidence ofx State
practice indicating that the provisions of paragraphs 4 to 9 of Article 76
[of UNCLOS] are considered to be rules of customary international law”x.
118. The Court notes that Colombia is not a State party to UNCLOS
and that, therefore, the law applicable in the case is customary internax -
tional law. The Court considers that the definition of the continentalx shelf
set out in Article 76, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS forms part of customary
international law. At this stage, in view of the fact that the Court’s task is
limited to the examination of whether it is in a position to carry out ax
continental shelf delimitation as requested by Nicaragua, it does not nexed
to decide whether other provisions of Article 76 of UNCLOS form part
of customary international law.
* *
119. Nicaragua asserts that the existence of a continental shelf is essen -
tially a question of fact. Nicaragua argues that the natural prolongatioxn of
its landmass seawards is constituted by the “Nicaraguan Rise”, whixch is “a
shallow area of continental crust extending from Nicaragua to Jamaica”x
that represents the natural prolongation of Nicaragua’s territory andx over -
laps with Colombia’s entitlement to a continental shelf of 200 nautical
miles generated by its mainland coast.
120. Nicaragua notes that, in accordance with Article 76, paragraph 8,
of UNCLOS, any State party which intends to delineate the outer limits
of its continental shelf where it extends beyond 200 nautical miles must
46
6 CIJ1034.indb 88 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 666
114. Les Parties conviennent que, la Colombie n’étant pas partie à lxa
CNUDM, seul le droit international coutumier peut s’appliquer à l’xégard
de la délimitation maritime sollicitée par le Nicaragua. Elles conxviennent
également que le droit applicable en la présente affaire est le xdroit inter -
national coutumier tel qu’il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour, xdu
Tribunal international du droit de la mer (ci-après le « TIDM») et de
juridictions arbitrales internationales. Elles conviennent en outre que les
dispositions pertinentes de la CNUDM relatives aux lignes de base d’uxn
Etat côtier et à son droit à des espaces maritimes, à la déxfinition du pla -
teau continental ainsi qu’à la délimitation de la zone éconoxmique exclu -
sive et du plateau continental reflètent le droit international couxtumier.
115. Les Parties s’accordent sur le fait que les Etats côtiers ont, ipso facto
et ab initio, droit au plateau continental. Elles sont toutefois en désaccord
sur la nature et le contenu des règles régissant les droits des Etats côtiers
sur le plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base à
partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de la mer territoriale.
116. Le Nicaragua soutient que les dispositions des paragraphes 1 à 7
de l’article 76 relatives à la définition du plateau continental et à la dxéter
mination des limites extérieures de celui-ci au-delà de 200 milles marins
ont le caractère de règles de droit international coutumier.
117. Bien qu’elle reconnaisse que le paragraphe 1 de l’article 76 reflète
le droit international coutumier, la Colombie affirme pour sa part que x
«rien n’atteste l’existence d’une pratique étatique suivant lxaquelle les dis -
positions des paragraphes 4 à 9 de l’article 76 [de la CNUDM] seraient
considérées comme des règles de droit international coutumier ».
118. La Cour constate que la Colombie n’est pas partie à la CNUDM
et que, par conséquent, le droit applicable en la présente affaixre est le
droit international coutumier. Elle considère que la définition xdu plateau
continental énoncée au paragraphe 1 de l’article 76 de la CNUDM fait
partie du droit international coutumier. A ce stade, la Cour ayant simplxe -
ment à examiner la question de savoir si elle est en mesure de délximiter le
plateau continental, comme le lui demande le Nicaragua, point n’est
besoin pour elle de déterminer si d’autres dispositions de l’arxticle 76 de la
CNUDM font partie du droit international coutumier.
* *
119. Le Nicaragua soutient que l’existence d’un plateau continental estx
essentiellement une question de fait. Selon lui, le prolongement naturelx en
mer de sa masse terrestre est constitué par le seuil nicaraguayen, «x une
zone peu profonde de croûte terrestre s’étendant du Nicaragua àx la
Jamaïque», qui représente le prolongement naturel de son territoire et quix
empiète sur le droit concurrent de la Colombie à un plateau continental
de 200 milles marins généré par sa côte continentale.
120. Le Nicaragua note que, selon le paragraphe 8 de l’article 76 de la
CNUDM, tout Etat partie qui entend fixer les limites extérieures dex son
plateau continental au-delà de 200milles marins est tenu de communiquer à
46
6 CIJ1034.indb 89 7/01/14 12:43 667 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
submit relevant information to the Commission on the Limits of the Con-
tinental Shelf (hereinafter the “Commission”). The Commission wixll
review the data and make recommendations. The limits established by a
coastal State on the basis of these recommendations are final and bindxing.
Nicaragua recalls that in May 2000 it ratified UNCLOS, and that in
April 2010, within the ten-year deadline, it submitted “Preliminary Infor -
mation” to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (in accordance
with the requirements established by the Meeting of the States parties txo
UNCLOS) indicative of the limits of the continental shelf. Such Prelimix -
nary Information does not prejudice a full submission, and will not be
considered by the Commission. According to Nicaragua, the basic techni -
cal and other preparatory work that is required in order for it to make xa
full submission is well advanced. Nicaragua asserts that it has establisxhed
the outer limit of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles on the
basis of available public domain datasets and intends to acquire addi -
tional survey data in order to complete the information to be submitted x
to the Commission in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS and the
Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission.
121. Nicaragua also maintains that its entitlement to continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles extends into areas within 200 nautical miles of
Colombia’s coasts and that, under Article 76, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS,
an entitlement to continental shelf based on the distance criterion doesx
not take precedence over an entitlement based on the criterion of natural
prolongation.
*
122. According to Colombia, Nicaragua’s request for continental shelf
delimitation is unfounded because there are no areas of extended conti -
nental shelf within this part of the Caribbean Sea given that there are xno
maritime areas that lie more than 200 nautical miles from the nearest land
territory of the coastal States. Colombia contends that Nicaragua’s pxur -
ported rights to the extended continental shelf out to the outer edge of the
continental margin beyond 200 nautical miles have never been recognized
or even submitted to the Commission. According to Colombia, the infor -
mation provided to the Court, which is based on the “Preliminary Infoxr-
mation” submitted by Nicaragua to the Commission, is “woefully
deficient”. Colombia emphasizes that the “Preliminary Informatioxn” does
not fulfil the requirements for the Commission to make recommenda -
tions, and therefore Nicaragua has not established any entitlement to anx
extended continental shelf. That being the case, Colombia asserts that
Nicaragua cannot merely assume that it possesses such rights in this case
or ask the Court to proceed to a delimitation “based on rudimentary axnd
incomplete technical information”.
47
6 CIJ1034.indb 90 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 667
la Commission des limites du plateau continental des Nations Unies (ci-après
la «Commission») les informations pertinentes. Après examen de ces don-
nées, la Commission formule des recommandations. Les limites fixéxes par
un Etat côtier sur la base de ces recommandations sont définitivxes et de
caractère obligatoire. Le Nicaragua rappelle qu’il a ratifié xla CNUDM en
mai 2000 et que, en avril 2010, dans le délai décennal prévu par cet instru -
ment, il a présenté au Secrétaire général de l’Organisxation des Nations Unies
(conformément aux prescriptions établies par la Réunion des Etxats parties à
la CNUDM) des «informations préliminaires» indiquant les limites de son
plateau continental. Il précise que la communication de ces informations
préliminaires ne libère pas de l’obligation de procéder àx la communication
ultérieure de l’ensemble des informations requises, la Commission xn’exami -
nant pas les informations préliminaires. Selon lui, les études tecxhniques de
base et autres travaux préparatoires nécessaires à la communicaxtion de l’en -
semble des données requises sont déjà bien avancés. Le Nicarxagua ajoute
qu’il a établi les limites extérieures de son plateau continentxal au-delà de
200 milles marins sur la base de données relevant du domaine public et qu’il
envisage d’acquérir d’autres données topographiques afin dxe compléter les
informations qu’il est tenu de soumettre conformément à l’arxticle 76 de la
CNUDM et aux directives scientifiques et techniques de la Commission.
121. Le Nicaragua soutient également que son droit à un plateau
continental au-delà de 200 milles marins s’étend à des zones situées à
moins de 200 milles marins des côtes colombiennes et que, selon le para -
graphe 1 de l’article 76 de la CNUDM, le droit à un plateau continental
fondé sur le critère de distance ne saurait primer le droit fondéx sur le cri -
tère du prolongement naturel.
*
122. Pour la Colombie, la demande de délimitation du plateau conti -
nental formulée par le Nicaragua est infondée car il n’existe aucune zone
de plateau continental étendu dans cette partie de la mer des Caraïxbes, où
aucun espace maritime ne se trouve à plus de 200 milles marins du terri -
toire terrestre le plus proche des Etats côtiers. La Colombie soutienxt que
le droit à un plateau continental étendu que le Nicaragua prétexnd détenir
jusqu’au rebord externe de la marge continentale, au-delà de 200 milles
marins, n’a jamais été reconnu ni même soumis pour examen àx la Com -
mission. Selon elle, les données communiquées à la Cour par le xNicara -
gua, sur la base des « informations préliminaires » qu’il a soumises à la
Commission, sont « totalement insuffisantes ». La Colombie souligne que
ces « informations préliminaires » ne satisfont pas aux exigences requises
pour que la Commission puisse formuler des recommandations ; le Nica -
ragua n’aurait donc pas établi qu’il possédait le moindre drxoit à un pla -
teau continental étendu. Partant, affirme-t-elle, le Nicaragua ne saurait se
contenter de postuler qu’il détient de tels droits en l’espèxce, ni demander
à la Cour de procéder à une délimitation « sur la base de renseignements
techniques rudimentaires et incomplets ».
47
6 CIJ1034.indb 91 7/01/14 12:43 668 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
123. Colombia maintains that a State’s entitlement based on the dis -
tance criterion always takes precedence over another State’s entitlemxent
based on natural prolongation beyond 200 nautical miles. Colombia fur -
ther contends that Article 76 of UNCLOS does not enable States by
means of outer continental shelf submissions, and particularly ones thatx
have not followed the procedures of the Convention, to encroach on
other States’ 200-mile limits.
124. Colombia adds that the Commission will not consider any extended
continental shelf submissions unless neighbouring States with potential
claims in the area consent. Thus, if a neighbouring State does not give xits
consent, the Commission will take no action with the result that a State
will not have established extended continental shelf limits that are fixnal
and binding. Colombia recalls that such limits, in any event, are withouxt
prejudice to questions of delimitation and would not be opposable to
Colombia.
* *
125. The Court begins by noting that the jurisprudence which has been
referred to by Nicaragua in support of its claim for continental shelf dxelim -
itation involves no case in which a court or a tribunal was requested tox
determine the outer limits of a continental shelf beyond 200nautical miles.
Nicaragua relies on the judgment of 14 March 2012 rendered by ITLOS
in the Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar),
Judgment of 14 March 2012, ITLOS, pp. 1-151 [hereinafter Bay of Bengal
case]. ITLOS in this judgment did not, however, determine the outer limits
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The Tribunal extended
the line of the single maritime boundary beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit
until it reached the area where the rights of third States may be affected
(Judgment of 14 March 2012, para. 462). In doing so, the Tribunal under -
lined that, in view of the fact that a thick layer of sedimentary rocks xcovers
practically the entire floor of the Bay of Bengal, the Bay presents a xunique
situation and that this fact had been acknowledged in the course of negox -
tiations at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(ibid., paras. 444-446).
The Court emphasizes that both parties in the Bay of Bengal case were
States parties to UNCLOS and had made full submissions to the Com -
mission (see ibid., para. 449) and that the Tribunal’s ruling on the delimi -
tation of the continental shelf in accordance with Article 83 of UNCLOS
does not preclude any recommendation by the Commission as to the
outer limits of the continental shelf in accordance with Article 76, para -
graph 8, of the Convention. ITLOS further noted that a “clear distinc -
tion” exists under UNCLOS between the delimitation of continental shexlf
and the delineation of its outer limits (ibid., paras. 376-394).
126. In the case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between
48
6 CIJ1034.indb 92 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 668
123. La Colombie soutient que le droit d’un Etat fondé sur le critèrxe de
distance prévaut toujours sur celui qu’un autre Etat tient du prolxonge -
ment naturel de sa masse continentale au-delà de 200 milles marins. Elle
fait en outre valoir que l’article 76 de la CNUDM ne permet pas à un
Etat d’empiéter sur la zone des 200 milles marins d’autres Etats en dépo -
sant une demande d’extension de son plateau continental, a fortiori lors -
qu’il ne respecte pas les procédures prévues par la convention.x
124. La Colombie ajoute que la Commission n’examinera aucune
demande de plateau continental étendu sans le consentement de tous lexs
Etats voisins pouvant avoir des prétentions dans la zone. A défautx de ce
consentement, la Commission ne donnera pas suite à la demande et l’xEtat
concerné ne pourra donc pas fixer de manière définitive et xcontraignante
les limites de son plateau continental étendu. La Colombie rappelle qxue,
en tout état de cause, de telles limites ne préjugent en rien des xquestions
de délimitation et ne sauraient lui être opposables.
* *
125. La Cour note tout d’abord que, dans la jurisprudence invoquée
par le Nicaragua à l’appui de sa demande de délimitation du plaxteau
continental, il n’est jamais question de déterminer les limites exxtérieures
d’un plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles marins.
Le Nicaragua se fonde sur l’arrêt rendu le 14 mars 2012 par le TIDM
en l’affaire du Différend relatif à la délimitation de la frontière maritime▯
entre le Bangladesh et le Myanmar dans le golfe du Bengale (Bangladesh/▯
Myanmar). Or, dans cet arrêt, le TIDM n’a pas fixé les limites extéxrieures
du plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles marins. Il a décidé que le
tracé de la frontière maritime unique se poursuivrait au-delà de la limite
des 200 milles marins jusqu’à atteindre la zone où les droits d’Etatxs tiers
étaient susceptibles d’entrer en jeu (arrêt du 14 mars 2012, par. 462). Ce
faisant, le Tribunal a souligné que, les fonds marins du golfe du Benxgale
étant presque entièrement recouverts d’une épaisse couche dex roches sédi -
mentaires, le golfe présentait une situation tout à fait particulixère qui
avait été reconnue au cours des négociations de la troisièmex conférence
des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (ibid., par. 444-446).
La Cour souligne que, dans l’affaire du Golfe du Bengale, le demandeur
et le défendeur étaient des Etats parties à la CNUDM et avaientx commu -
niqué toutes les informations nécessaires à la Commission (voixr ibid.,
par. 449). La délimitation du plateau continental effectuée par le Txribunal
en application de l’article 83 de la CNUDM n’empêchait aucunement la
Commission de formuler d’éventuelles recommandations sur les limitxes
extérieures du plateau continental conformément au paragraphe 8 de l’ar -
ticle 76 de la convention. Le TIDM a en outre relevé que la CNUDM
établissait une « nette distinction » entre la délimitation du plateau conti -
nental et le tracé de sa limite extérieure (ibid., par. 376-394).
126. Dans l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicara ‑
48
6 CIJ1034.indb 93 7/01/14 12:43 669 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras),
the Court stated that “any claim of continental shelf rights beyond
200 miles [by a State party to UNCLOS] must be in accordance with
Article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf established thereunder” (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II),
p. 759, para. 319). The Court recalls that UNCLOS, according to its Pre -
amble, is intended to establish “a legal order for the seas and oceanxs
which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the x
peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilixzation
of their resources”. The Preamble also stresses that “the problemsx of
ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a wholxe”.
Given the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stipulated in its Preamble,
the fact that Colombia is not a party thereto does not relieve Nicaraguax
of its obligations under Article 76 of that Convention.
127. The Court observes that Nicaragua submitted to the Commission
only “Preliminary Information” which, by its own admission, falls xshort
of meeting the requirements for information on the limits of the continexn -
tal shelf beyond 200 nautical miles which “shall be submitted by the
coastal State to the Commission” in accordance with paragraph 8 of Arti -
cle 76 of UNCLOS (see paragraph 120 above). Nicaragua provided the
Court with the annexes to this “Preliminary Information” and in thxe
course of the hearings it stated that the “Preliminary Information”x in its
entirety was available on the Commission’s website and provided the nxec -
essary reference.
128. The Court recalls that in the second round of oral argument,
Nicaragua stated that it was “not asking [the Court] for a definitixve ruling
on the precise location of the outer limit of Nicaragua’s continental
shelf”. Rather, it was “asking [the Court] to say that Nicaragua’xs conti -
nental shelf entitlement is divided from Colombia’s continental shelf enti -
tlement by a delimitation line which has a defined course”. Nicaragua
suggested that “the Court could make that delimitation by defining xthe
boundary in words such as ‘the boundary is the median line between thxe
outer edge of Nicaragua’s continental shelf fixed in accordance witxh
UNCLOS Article 76 and the outer limit of Colombia’s 200-mile zone”’.
This formula, Nicaragua suggested, “does not require the Court to detxer -
mine precisely where the outer edge of Nicaragua’s shelf lies”. Thxe outer
limits could be then established by Nicaragua at a later stage, on the bxasis
of the recommendations of the Commission.
129. However, since Nicaragua, in the present proceedings, has not
established that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to x
overlap with Colombia’s 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental
shelf, measured from Colombia’s mainland coast, the Court is not in ax
position to delimit the continental shelf boundary between Nicaragua andx
Colombia, as requested by Nicaragua, even using the general formulation x
proposed by it.
130. In view of the above, the Court need not address any other argu -
49
6 CIJ1034.indb 94 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 669
gua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), la
Cour a déclaré que « toute prétention [d’un Etat partie à la CNUDM]
relative à des droits sur le plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles d[e-
vait] être conforme à l’article 76 de la CNUDM et examinée par la Com -
mission des limites du plateau continental constituée en vertu de ce traité»
(C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 759, par. 319). La Cour rappelle que, aux
termes de son préambule, la CNUDM a pour objet d’établir « un ordre
juridique pour les mers et les océans qui facilite les communicationsx inter -
nationales et favorise les utilisations pacifiques des mers et des océxans
[ainsi que] l’utilisation équitable et efficace de leurs ressourcxes »; il y est
également souligné que « les problèmes des espaces marins sont étroite -
ment liés et doivent être envisagés dans leur ensemble ». Eu égard à l’objet
et au but de la CNUDM, tels qu’exposés dans son préambule, le fxait que
la Colombie n’y soit pas partie n’exonère pas le Nicaragua des xobligations
qu’il tient de l’article 76 de cet instrument.
127. La Cour fait observer que le Nicaragua n’a communiqué à la
Commission que des «informations préliminaires» qui, comme l’admet ce
dernier, sont loin de satisfaire aux exigences requises pour pouvoir êxtre
considérées comme des informations que «[l]’Etat côtier communique … à
la Commission» sur les limites de son plateau continental, lorsque celui-ci
s’étend au-delà de 200 milles marins, conformément au paragraphe 8 de
l’article 76 de la CNUDM (voir paragraphe 120 ci-dessus). Le Nicaragua
a communiqué à la Cour les annexes des « informations préliminaires». Il
a précisé, à l’audience, que l’intégralité de ces ixnformations figurait sur le
site de la Commission et indiqué le lien permettant d’y avoir accèxs.
128. La Cour rappelle que, au second tour de plaidoiries, le Nicaragua
a déclaré qu’il « ne [lui] demand[ait] pas de décision définitive sur l’empla -
cement précis de la limite extérieure d[e son] plateau continentalx», mais la
«pri[ait] de dire que les portions du plateau continental auxquelles pou -
vaient prétendre le Nicaragua et la Colombie étaient délimitéxes par une
ligne au tracé défini ». Le Nicaragua a indiqué que « la Cour pou[v]ait
opérer cette délimitation en définissant la frontière commxe étant «la ligne
médiane entre la limite extérieure du plateau continental du Nicarxagua
établie conformément à l’article 76 de la CNUDM et la limite extérieure
de la zone des 200 milles marins relevant de la Colombie»». Grâce à cette
formulation, a-t-il ajouté, «la Cour n’aurait pas à déterminer précisément
l’emplacement de la limite extérieure du plateau du Nicaragua ». Le Nica -
ragua pourrait ensuite fixer cette limite sur la base des recommandatixons
de la Commission.
129. Toutefois, le Nicaragua n’ayant pas, dans la présente instance,
apporté la preuve que sa marge continentale s’étend suffisammexnt loin
pour chevaucher le plateau continental dont la Colombie peut se prévax -
loir sur 200 milles marins à partir de sa côte continentale, la Cour n’est
pas en mesure de délimiter les portions du plateau continental relevaxnt de
chacune des Parties, comme le lui demande le Nicaragua, même en utilix -
sant la formulation générale proposée par ce dernier.
130. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, il n’y a pas lieu pour la Cour
49
6 CIJ1034.indb 95 7/01/14 12:43 670 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
ments developed by the Parties, including the argument as to whether a
delimitation of overlapping entitlements which involves an extended con -
tinental shelf of one party can affect a 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the
continental shelf of another party.
131. The Court concludes that Nicaragua’s claim contained in its final
submission I (3) cannot be upheld.
V. Maritime Boundary
1. The Task Now before the Court
132. In light of the decision it has taken regarding Nicaragua’s final
submission I (3) (see paragraph 131 above), the Court must consider what
maritime delimitation it is to effect. Leaving out of account any Nicaxra -
guan claims to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles means that
there can be no question of determining a maritime boundary between
the mainland coasts of the Parties, as these are significantly more thxan
400 nautical miles apart. There is, however, an overlap between Nicara -
gua’s entitlement to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone x
extending to 200 nautical miles from its mainland coast and adjacent
islands and Colombia’s entitlement to a continental shelf and exclusixve
economic zone derived from the islands over which the Court has held
that Colombia has sovereignty (see paragraph 103 above).
133. The present case was brought before the Court by the Application
of Nicaragua, not by special agreement between the Parties, and there haxs
been no counter-claim by Colombia. It is, therefore, to the Nicaraguan
Application and Nicaragua’s submissions that it is necessary to turn xin
order to determine what the Court is called upon to decide. In its Applix -
cation, Nicaragua asked the Court
“to determine the course of the single maritime boundary between the x
areas of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone appertaining
respectively to Nicaragua and Colombia, in accordance with equita -
ble principles and relevant circumstances recognized by general inter-
national law as applicable to such a delimitation of a single maritime
boundary”.
This request was clearly broad enough to encompass the determination of x
a boundary between the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone
generated by the Nicaraguan mainland and adjacent islands and the vari -
ous maritime entitlements appertaining to the Colombian islands.
134. In its Reply, however, Nicaragua amended its submissions. In its
final submissions, as has been seen, it sought not a single maritime bxound -
50
6 CIJ1034.indb 96 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 670
d’examiner l’un quelconque des autres arguments avancés par lesx Parties,
comme celui de savoir si la délimitation d’une zone de chevauchemexnt de
droits dans laquelle l’une des parties revendique un plateau continenxtal
étendu est susceptible de porter atteinte au droit à un plateau coxntinental
dont l’autre partie peut se prévaloir sur une distance de 200 milles marins.
131. La Cour conclut qu’elle ne peut accueillir la demande formulée
par le Nicaragua au point I. 3) de ses conclusions finales.
V. La frontière maritime
1. La tâche incombant à la Cour
132. Eu égard à sa décision concernant la demande formulée par lex
Nicaragua au point I. 3) de ses conclusions finales (voir paragraphe 131
ci-dessus), la Cour doit maintenant s’interroger sur la nature de la déxlimi -
tation maritime à effectuer. La Cour n’ayant pas fait droit àx la demande
du Nicaragua relative à un plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles
marins, il ne saurait être question de déterminer une frontière maritime
entre les côtes continentales des Parties, ces côtes se trouvant àx bien plus
de 400 milles marins l’une de l’autre. Il y a cependant chevauchement
entre les droits du Nicaragua à un plateau continental et à une zone
économique exclusive, à l’intérieur de la limite de 200 milles marins depuis
sa côte continentale et les îles adjacentes à celle-ci, d’une part, et les droits
de même nature que la Colombie tient des îles sur lesquelles la Coxur a
jugé qu’elle avait souveraineté, d’autre part (voir paragraxphe 103 ci-
dessus).
133. La Cour a été saisie de la présente affaire par voie de requêxte et
non par voie de compromis ; la Colombie n’a par ailleurs présenté aucune
demande reconventionnelle. C’est donc à la requête du Nicaragua et aux
conclusions présentées par celui-ci qu’il convient de s’intéresser afin de
déterminer ce sur quoi la Cour est appelée à se prononcer. Dansx sa
requête, le Nicaragua prie la Cour :
«de déterminer le tracé d’une frontière maritime unique entre les
portions de plateau continental et les zones économiques exclusives
relevant respectivement du Nicaragua et de la Colombie, conformé -
ment aux principes équitables et aux circonstances pertinentes que lex
droit international général reconnaît comme s’appliquant àx une déli -
mitation de cet ordre ».
La formulation de cette demande est à l’évidence suffisamment xlarge pour
englober la détermination d’une frontière entre le plateau contxinental et la
zone économique exclusive générés par la masse continentale du Nicara -
gua et les îles adjacentes, d’une part, et les divers espaces marixtimes aux -
quels ouvrent droit les îles colombiennes, d’autre part.
134. Dans sa réplique, le Nicaragua a toutefois modifié ses conclu -
sions. Comme indiqué précédemment, il recherche non plus, dans xses
50
6 CIJ1034.indb 97 7/01/14 12:43 671 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
ary but the delimitation of a continental shelf boundary between the twox
mainland coasts. Nevertheless, Nicaragua’s final submissions at thex end
of the oral phase also asked the Court to adjudge and declare that
“(4) The islands of San Andrés and Providencia and Santa Catalina
be enclaved and accorded a maritime entitlement of 12 nautical
miles, this being the appropriate equitable solution justified by the
geographical and legal framework.
(5) The equitable solution for any cay, that might be found to be
Colombian, is to delimit a maritime boundary by drawing a
3-nautical-mile enclave around them.”
These submissions call upon the Court to effect a delimitation betweenx
the maritime entitlements of the Colombian islands and the continental
shelf and exclusive economic zone of Nicaragua. That this is what the
Court is asked to do is confirmed by the statement made by the Agent oxf
Nicaragua in opening the oral proceedings :
“On a substantive level, Nicaragua originally requested of the
Court, and continues to so request, that all maritime areas of Nica -
ragua and Colombia be delimited on the basis of international law ;
that is, in a way that guarantees to the Parties an equitable result.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
But whatever method or procedure is adopted by the Court to effect
the delimitation, the aim of Nicaragua is that the decision leaves no
more maritime areas pending delimitation between Nicaragua and
Colombia. This was and is the main objective of Nicaragua since it
filed its Application in this case.” (See sketch-map No. 2, p. 663.)
135. Colombia, for its part, has requested that the delimitation of the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf between Nicaragua and
Colombia be effected by a single maritime boundary, constructed as a mxedian
line between Nicaraguan fringing islands and the islands of the San Andrxés
Archipelago (see sketch-map No. 3 : Delimitation claimed by Colombia,
p. 672).
136. As the Court held in the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jama ‑
hiriya/Malta) case, “[t]he Court must not exceed the jurisdiction con -
ferred upon it by the Parties, but it must also exercise that jurisdiction to
its full extent” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 23, para. 19). Notwith -
standing its decision regarding Nicaragua’s final submission I (3) (para-
graph 131 above), it is still called upon to effect a delimitation between x
the maritime entitlements of Colombia and the continental shelf and
exclusive economic zone of Nicaragua within 200 nautical miles of the
Nicaraguan coast.
51
6 CIJ1034.indb 98 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 671
conclusions finales, le tracé d’une frontière maritime uniquex, mais la déli-
mitation du plateau continental entre les côtes continentales des deux
Parties. Néanmoins, dans les conclusions finales qu’il a présxentées à la fin
de la procédure orale, il a aussi prié la Cour de dire et juger :
«4) que les îles de San Andrés et de Providencia (ainsi que celle
de Santa Catalina) doivent être enclavées et se voir attribuer un
espace maritime propre de 12 milles marins, ce qui constitue la
solution équitable à retenir au regard du cadre géographique etx
juridique ;
5) que, pour toute caye susceptible d’être reconnue comme apparte -
nant à la Colombie, la solution équitable consiste à l’enclaxver en
traçant autour d’elle une frontière maritime située à 3 milles
marins de son pourtour. »
La Cour est donc invitée à effectuer une délimitation entre lxes espaces
maritimes générés par les îles colombiennes, d’une part, xet le plateau conti -
nental et la zone économique exclusive revenant au Nicaragua, d’auxtre
part. La déclaration faite par l’agent du Nicaragua à l’ouverture de la pro-
cédure orale confirme qu’il s’agit bien là de la tâche xincombant à la Cour:
«[s]ur le fond, ce que le Nicaragua demandait initialement à la Cour, x
et qu’il lui demande toujours, c’est que l’ensemble des zones mxari -
times du Nicaragua et de la Colombie soient délimitées conforméx -
ment au droit international; c’est-à-dire d’une manière qui garantisse
aux Parties un résultat équitable.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mais, quelle que soit la méthode ou la procédure que suivra la
Cour pour effectuer la délimitation, le Nicaragua souhaite qu’auxcune
zone maritime ne reste à délimiter entre lui-même et la Colombie.
C’est là le principal objectif du Nicarogua depuis qu’il a intrxoduit sa
requête en l’espèce. » (Voir croquis n 2, p. 663.)
135. La Colombie a, quant à elle, demandé que la délimitation de la x
zone économique exclusive et du plateau continental entre le Nicaraguxa et
elle-même soit opérée en traçant une frontière maritime uniquex, suivant
une ligne médiane entre les îles côtières nicaraguayennes etx l’archipel de
San Andrés (voir croquis n o 3 : Délimitation revendiquée par la Colom -
bie, p. 672).
136. Ainsi qu’elle l’a dit dans l’affaire du Plateau continental (Jamahi ‑
riya arabe libyenne/Malte), « [l]a Cour ne doit pas excéder la compétence
que lui ont reconnue les Parties, mais elle doit exercer toute cette comxpé-
tence » (arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 23, par. 19). La Cour estime que,
nonobstant sa décision concernant la demande formulée par le Nicarxagua
au point I. 3) de ses conclusions finales (paragraphe 131 ci-dessus), il lui
est toujours demandé de procéder à la délimitation, à l’xintérieur de la
limite des 200 milles marins depuis la côte nicaraguayenne, entre, d’une
part, les espaces maritimes dévolus à la Colombie et, d’autre part, le pla -
teau continental et la zone économique exclusive du Nicaragua.
51
6 CIJ1034.indb 99 7/01/14 12:43 672 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
-68-
Outline of a bank
JOINT
SerraniREGIME
AREA
S
NDURUA Colombia / Jamaica
HOIARA
N
HONDURAS
Edinburgh
Reef
Muerto
Cay
Miskitos Quitasueño
Cays Serrana
Ned Thomas
Cay
Roncador
Roca Providencia/
NICARAGUA Tyra Santa Catalina
San Andrés
Little Corn
Island East-Southeast Cays
Great Corn Alburquerque
Island Cays
CARIBBEAN
SEA
COLOMBIA
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
A Sketch-map No. 3:
RC
TA AA
COSAN Delimitation
P
claimed by Colombia
This sketch-map has been prepared
COSTA RICA
for illustrative purposes only.
Mercator Projection (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
PANAMA
52
6 CIJ1034.indb 100 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 672
Contour d'un banc
SerranillaE DE
RÉGIME
COMMUN
AS Colombie / Jamaïque
ONDUGUA
HIARA
N
HONDURAS Récif
d'Edimbourg
Caye de
Muerto
Cayes des Quitasueño Serrana
Miskitos
Caye de
Ned Thomas
Roncador
Roca Providencia/
NICARAGUA
Tyra Santa Catalina
San Andrés
Mangle Cayes de l'Est-Sud-Est
Chico
Mangle
Cayes
Grande d'Alburquerque
MER DES
CARAÏBES
COLOMBIE
PANAMA
COLOMBIE
COSTA RICA
IA Croquis nº3:
AR A
STNAM Délimitation revendiquée
COPA
par la Colombie
COSTA RICA Ce croquis a été établi
à seule fin d'illustration.
Projection de Mercator (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
PANAMA
52
6 CIJ1034.indb 101 7/01/14 12:43 673 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
2. Applicable Law
137. The Court must, therefore, determine the law applicable to this
delimitation. The Court has already noted (paragraph 114 above) that,
since Colombia is not party to UNCLOS, the Parties agree that the appli-
cable law is customary international law.
138. The Parties are also agreed that several of the most important
provisions of UNCLOS reflect customary international law. In particu -
lar, they agree that the provisions of Articles 74 and 83, on the delimita-
tion of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, and
Article 121, on the legal régime of islands, are to be considered declara -
tory of customary international law.
Article 74, entitled “Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts”, provides that :
“1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States
with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement
on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to
achieve an equitable solution.
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of
time, the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided
for in Part XV.
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States
concerned, in a spirit of understanding and co-operation, shall
make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a
practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeop -
ardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such
arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation.
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States con -
cerned, questions relating to the delimitation of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone shall be determined in accordance with the provisions
of that agreement.”
Article 83, entitled “Delimitation of the continental shelf between
States with opposite or adjacent coasts”, is in the same terms as Arti -
cle 74, save that where Article 74, paragraphs (1) and (4), refer to the
exclusive economic zone, the corresponding paragraphs in Article 83 refer
to the continental shelf.
Article 121, entitled “Regime of islands”, provides that :
“1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provi -
sions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
53
6 CIJ1034.indb 102 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 673
2. Le droit applicable
137. La Cour doit, dès lors, déterminer le droit applicable à cette xdéli-
mitation. Comme indiqué précédemment (paragraphe 114 ci-dessus), la
Colombie n’étant pas partie à la CNUDM, les Parties conviennentx que le
droit applicable est le droit international coutumier.
138. Les Parties s’accordent également sur le fait que plusieurs des dis -
positions les plus importantes de la CNUDM reflètent le droit internatio -
nal coutumier. Elles reconnaissent en particulier que les dispositions dxes
articles 74 et 83, relatifs à la délimitation de la zone économique exclusive x
et du plateau continental, ainsi que l’article 121, relatif au régime juri -
dique des îles, sont à considérer comme déclaratoires du droxit internatio-
nal coutumier.
L’article 74, intitulé « Délimitation de la zone économique exclusive
entre Etats dont les côtes sont adjacentes ou se font face», est ainsi libellé:
«1. La délimitation de la zone économique exclusive entre Etats dont
les côtes sont adjacentes ou se font face est effectuée par voiex
d’accord conformément au droit international tel qu’il est viséx à
l’article 38 du Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice, afin
d’aboutir à une solution équitable.
2. S’ils ne parviennent pas à un accord dans un délai raisonnable,x
les Etats concernés ont recours aux procédures prévues à la par -
tie XV.
3. En attendant la conclusion de l’accord visé au paragraphe 1, les
Etats concernés, dans un esprit de compréhension et de coopéra -
tion, font tout leur possible pour conclure des arrangements pro -
visoires de caractère pratique et pour ne pas compromettre ou
entraver pendant cette période de transition la conclusion de l’acx -
cord définitif. Les arrangements provisoires sont sans préjudicex de
la délimitation finale.
4. Lorsqu’un accord est en vigueur entre les Etats concernés, les
questions relatives à la délimitation de la zone économique excxlu -
sive sont réglées conformément à cet accord. »
L’article 83, intitulé « Délimitation du plateau continental entre Etats
dont les côtes sont adjacentes ou se font face », reprend les termes de l’ar -
ticle 74, à ceci près que les paragraphes 1 et 4 de l’article 74 font référence
à la zone économique exclusive et les paragraphes correspondants dxe l’ar -
ticle 83, au plateau continental.
L’article 121, intitulé « Régime des îles », se lit comme suit :
«1. Une île est une étendue naturelle de terre entourée d’eau quxi reste
découverte à marée haute.
2. Sous réserve du paragraphe 3, la mer territoriale, la zone contiguë,
la zone économique exclusive et le plateau continental d’une îlxe
sont délimités conformément aux dispositions de la Convention
applicables aux autres territoires terrestres.
53
6 CIJ1034.indb 103 7/01/14 12:43 674 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life
of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf.”
139. The Court has recognized that the principles of maritime delimi -
tation enshrined in Articles 74 and 83 reflect customary international law
(Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bah ‑
rain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 91,
paras. 167 et seq.). In the same case it treated the legal definition of an
island embodied in Article 121, paragraph 1, as part of customary inter -
national law (ibid., p. 91, para. 167 and p. 99, para. 195). It reached the
same conclusion as regards Article 121, paragraph 2 (ibid., p. 97,
para. 185). The Judgment in the Qatar v. Bahrain case did not specifically
address paragraph 3 of Article 121. The Court observes, however, that
the entitlement to maritime rights accorded to an island by the provisioxns
of paragraph 2 is expressly limited by reference to the provisions of para -
graph 3. By denying an exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf
to rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of theirx
own, paragraph 3 provides an essential link between the long-established
principle that “islands, regardless of their size,... enjoy the same xstatus,
and therefore generate the same maritime rights, as other land territoryx”
(ibid.) and the more extensive maritime entitlements recognized in
UNCLOS and which the Court has found to have become part of cus -
tomary international law. The Court therefore considers that the legal
régime of islands set out in UNCLOS Article 121 forms an indivisible
régime, all of which (as Colombia and Nicaragua recognize) has the xsta -
tus of customary international law.
3. Relevant Coasts
140. It is well established that “[t]he title of a State to the continentaxl
shelf and to the exclusive economic zone is based on the principle that xthe
land dominates the sea through the projection of the coasts or the coastxal
fronts” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 89, para. 77). As the Court stated in the
North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark ;
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) cases, “the land is the legal
source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial extensioxns
to seaward” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 51, para. 96). Similarly, in
the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) case, the Court
observed that “the coast of the territory of the State is the decisivxe factor
for title to submarine areas adjacent to it” (Application for Permission to
Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 61, para. 73).
141. The Court will, therefore, begin by determining what are the rel -
evant coasts of the Parties, namely, those coasts the projections of whixch
overlap, because the task of delimitation consists in resolving the overxlap -
ping claims by drawing a line of separation between the maritime areas
54
6 CIJ1034.indb 104 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 674
3. Les rochers qui ne se prêtent pas à l’habitation humaine ou àx une
vie économique propre n’ont pas de zone économique exclusive nix
de plateau continental. »
139. La Cour a reconnu que les principes relatifs à la délimitation marxi -
time consacrés par les articles 74 et 83 reflétaient le droit international cou-
tumier (Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreï▯ n
(Qatar c. Bahreïn), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 91, par. 167 et suiv.).
Elle a également laissé entendre, à la même occasion, que la définition juri-
dique d’une île, énoncée au paragraphe 1 de l’article 121, faisait partie du
droit international coutumier (ibid., p. 91, par. 167, et p. 99, par. 195). Elle
est parvenue à la même conclusion s’agissant du paragraphe 2 de cet
article (ibid., p. 97, par. 185). Bien que, dans son arrêt Qatar c. Bahreïn, elle
n’ait pas spécifiquement examiné le paragraphe 3 de l’article 121, la Cour
relève que les droits générés par une île au titre du parxagraphe 2 sont expres-
sément limités par le renvoi aux dispositions du paragraphe 3. En énonçant
que les rochers qui ne se prêtent pas à l’habitation humaine ou à une vie
économique propre n’ont ni zone économique exclusive ni plateaux continen -
tal, le paragraphe3 crée un lien essentiel entre, d’une part, le principe établi
de longue date selon lequel « les îles, quelles que soient leurs dimensions,
jouissent … du même statut, et par conséquent engendrent les mêmes droits
en mer que les autres territoires possédant la qualité de terre fexrm »e(ibid.)
et, d’autre part, les droits à des espaces maritimes plus étendxus consacrés par
la CNUDM, droits déclarés par la Cour comme ayant acquis un caractxère
coutumier. Dès lors, la Cour considère que le régime juridique xdes îles défini
à l’article 121 de la CNUDM forme un tout indivisible et que chacune de ses
dispositions fait partie (comme l’admettent la Colombie et le Nicaraxgua) du
droit international coutumier.
3. Les côtes pertinentes
140. Il est bien établi que « [l]e titre d’un Etat sur le plateau continental
et la zone économique exclusive est fondé sur le principe selon lexquel la
terre domine la mer du fait de la projection des côtes ou des façaxdes
côtières » (Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 89, par. 77). Ainsi que la Cour l’a dit dans les
affaires du Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (République fédérale d’A ▯ ‑
lemagne/Danemark; République fédérale d’Allemagne/Pays‑Bas), « la terre
est la source juridique du pouvoir qu’un Etat peut exercer dans les prolon-
gements maritimes» (arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 51, par. 96). De même,
dans l’affaire du Plateau continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), la
Cour a fait observer que « c’est la côte du territoire de l’Etat qui est déter-
minante pour créer le titre sur les étendues sous-marines bordant cette
côte » (requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 61, par. 73).
141. La Cour commencera donc par définir les côtes pertinentes des
Parties, à savoir celles dont les projections se chevauchent, la déxlimitation
consistant à résoudre la question du chevauchement des revendications en
traçant une ligne de séparation entre les espaces maritimes concerxnés.
54
6 CIJ1034.indb 105 7/01/14 12:43 675 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
concerned. As the Court explained in the Maritime Delimitation in the
Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) case :
“The role of relevant coasts can have two different though closely
related legal aspects in relation to the delimitation of the continentalx
shelf and the exclusive economic zone. First, it is necessary to identifxy
the relevant coasts in order to determine what constitutes in the spe -
cific context of a case the overlapping claims to these zones. Second,x
the relevant coasts need to be ascertained in order to check, in the
third and final stage of the delimitation process, whether any dispro -
portionality exists in the ratios of the coastal length of each State and
the maritime areas falling either side of the delimitation line.” (Judg ‑
ment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 89, para. 78.)
142. The Court will first briefly set out the positions of the Parties rexga-rd
ing their respective coasts (see sketch-maps No. 4 and 5, pp. 676 and 677).
A. The Nicaraguan relevant coast
143. Nicaragua maintains that its relevant coast comprises its entire main -
land coast in the Caribbean together with the islands which it considersx to
be “an integral part of the mainland coast of Nicaragua”. In this xcontext, it
principally refers to the Corn Islands in the south and the Miskitos Cayxs in
the north (see paragraph 21). The latter are located within 10 nautical miles
of the coast. The former are located approximately 26 nautical miles from
the coast but Nicaragua maintains that the presence of a number of smallxer
islets and cays between the Corn Islands and the mainland means that thexre
is a continuous belt of territorial sea between the islands and the mainxland.
Employing, for these purposes, a straight line from the northern bound -
ary with Honduras to the southern boundary with Costa Rica, Nicaragua
estimates the length of its relevant coast as 453 km. Alternatively, Nicara -
gua estimates the length of the relevant coast, if one follows its naturxal
configuration, as 701 km.
*
144. Although Colombia appeared at one point to suggest that the rele -
vant Nicaraguan coast was confined to the east-facing coasts of the islands,
since it is from these islands that the Nicaraguan entitlement to a 200-nauti -
cal-mile continental shelf and exclusive economic zone would be measured,
in its pleadings as a whole, Colombia accepts that the relevant Nicaraguxan
coast comprises the mainland coast of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan
islands. Colombia accepts that this coast has a length of 453 km, if the
straight line system is used. If, however, the Nicaraguan coast is measuxred
in a way which takes full account of its natural configuration, Colombxia
maintains that the maximum length of that coast is 551 km and not the
701 km suggested by Nicaragua.
* *
55
6 CIJ1034.indb 106 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 675
Ainsi que la Cour l’a explicité en l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime en
mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine) :
«Le rôle des côtes pertinentes peut revêtir deux aspects juridiques
distincts, quoique étroitement liés, dans le cadre de la délimixtation du
plateau continental et de la zone économique exclusive. En premier
lieu, il est nécessaire d’identifier les côtes pertinentes aux fins de déter-
miner quelles sont, dans le contexte spécifique de l’affaire, xles revend -i
cations qui se chevauchent dans ces zones. En second lieu, il convient
d’identifier les côtes pertinentes aux fins de vérifier, xdans le cadre de la
troisième et dernière étape du processus de délimitation, s’xil existe une
quelconque disproportion entre le rapport des longueurs des côtes de
chaque Etat et celui des espaces maritimes situés de part et d’autxre de
la ligne de délimitation.» (Arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 89, par. 78.)
142. La Cour rappellera d’abord brièvement les positions des Parties enx
ce qui concerne leurs côtes respectives (voir croquis n 4 et 5, p. 676 et 677).
A. La côte pertinente du Nicaragua
143. Le Nicaragua soutient que sa côte pertinente comprend l’ensemble
de sa côte continentale dans les Caraïbes ainsi que les îles qux’il considère
comme faisant « partie intégrante de [celle-ci]». A cet égard, il mentionne
principalement les îles Mangle, au sud, et les cayes des Miskitos, aux nord
(voir paragraphe 21). Ces dernières sont situées à moins de 10milles marins
de sa côte continentale, tandis que les îles Mangle se trouvent àx quelque
26 milles marins. Le Nicaragua affirme néanmoins qu’il existe entre xlesdites
îles et sa masse continentale une ceinture continue de mer territoriaxle en
raison de la présence d’un certain nombre d’îlots et cayes dxe plus petite taille.
Retenant, à cet effet, une ligne droite partant de sa frontière xseptentrio -
nale avec le Honduras et allant jusqu’à sa frontière méridionale avec le
Costa Rica, le Nicaragua évalue la longueur de sa côte pertinente à
453 kilomètres. A titre subsidiaire, il estime à 701 kilomètres la longueur
de cette côte si l’on suit sa configuration naturelle.
*
144. Bien que la Colombie ait, à un moment donné, semblé avancer que
la côte pertinente du Nicaragua se limitait aux côtes orientales dxes îles nica-
raguayennes — puisque c’est à partir de ces formations que serait mesurée
la limite de 200 milles marins en deçà de laquelle le Nicaragua a droit à un
plateau continental et à une zone économique exclusive —, il ressort de l’en -
semble de ses écritures et plaidoiries qu’elle reconnaît que lax côte pertinente
du Nicaragua est constituée de la côte continentale de celui-ci et de ses îles.
Elle admet que cette côte mesure 453 kilomètres si l’on utilise le système des
lignes droites. Elle affirme toutefois que, si la côte nicaraguayennxe est mesu-
rée suivant sa configuration naturelle, sa longueur maximale est dex 551 k-ilo
mètres, et non de 701 kilomètres comme le prétend le Nicaragua.
* *
55
6 CIJ1034.indb 107 7/01/14 12:43 676 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Nicaragua's relevant coastst
WGS 84
COLOMBIA
the relevant area
Sketch-map No. 4: shown in the boxed areas,le.
for illustrative purposes only.
according to Nicaraguaments of the islands,
The relevant coaThis sketch-map has been prepared (12° 30' N)
A IA
I B
A M
M LO
J O
Bajo Nuevo C
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
JOINTAREA
REGIMEColombia / Jamaica
CARIBBEAN SEA
PANAMA
Roncador
Serrana
Serranilla
East-Southeast Cays
A
S U Quitasueño
R G A
U R PrSanta Catalina ACI MA
D A R NA
N I Cays ATS P
H N San Andrés COLOMBIA O
Alburquerque COSTA RICAC
Cays
Miskitos
Island
Little Corn Island
Great Corn
RICA
COSTA
HONDURAS NICARAGUA
56
6 CIJ1034.indb 108 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 676
WGS 84 COLOMBIE
Côte pertinente du Nicaraguaombie
Croquis n°4:
Ce à seule fin d'illustration.
Leagrà des échelles différentes.
et la zone pertinenteua
Les côtes pertinentes
Projection de Mercator (12° 30' N)
E IE
Q B
A M
M L
J O
C
Bajo Nuevo
COLOMBIEA
ZONE COMMUN
Colombie / Jamaïque
PANAMA
Roncador MER DES CARAÏBES
Serrana
Serranilla
Cayes de l'Est-Sud-Est
A Quitasueño
S U
R G A
U AR PrSanta Catalina AI MA
D A RA NA
NO I San Andrés Cayes TS P
H N COLOMBIE OC
COSTA RICA
d'Alburquerque
Cayes dess
Mangleco
MaGrande
RICA
COSTA
HONDURAS NICARAGUA
56
6 CIJ1034.indb 109 7/01/14 12:43 677 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
-74-
Nicaragua's relevant coastst
WGS 84 COLOMBIA
Sketch-map No. 5:vant area shown in the boxed areas,ale.
for illustrative purposes only.
The enlargements of the islands,
The relevant coasts andetch-map has been preparedn (12° 30' N)
A IA
I B
A M
M LO
JA O
Bajo Nuevo C
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
JOINTAREA
REGIMEColombia / Jamaica
CARIBBEAN SEA PANAMA
Roncador
Serrana
Serranilla
East-Southeast Cays
A Quitasueño
SA U
R A Providencia/ A AM
U R Santa Catalina CIR AN
N AC A AP
O N San Andrés Cays COLOMBIA S
H COSTA RICA
Alburquerque
Cays
Miskitos
Island Island
Little CoGreat Corn
RICA
COSTA
HONDURAS NICARAGUA
57
6 CIJ1034.indb 110 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 677
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57
6 CIJ1034.indb 111 7/01/14 12:43 678 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
145. The Court considers that the relevant Nicaraguan coast is the
whole coast which projects into the area of overlapping potential entitlxe-
ments and not simply those parts of the coast from which the 200-nauti -
cal-mile entitlement will be measured. With the exception of the short
stretch of coast near Punta de Perlas, which faces due south and thus
does not project into the area of overlapping potential entitlements, thxe
relevant coast is, therefore, the entire mainland coast of Nicaragua (sxee
sketch-map No. 6, p. 681). Taking the general direction of this coast, its
length is approximately 531 km. The Court also considers that Nicara -
gua’s entitlement to a 200-nautical-mile continental shelf and exclusive
economic zone has to be measured from the islands fringing the Nicara -
guan coast. The east-facing coasts of the Nicaraguan islands are parallel
to the mainland and do not, therefore, add to the length of the relevantx
coast, although they contribute to the baselines from which Nicaragua’xs
entitlement is measured (see below, paragraph 201).
B. The Colombian relevant coast
146. There is a more marked difference between the Parties regarding
what constitutes the relevant Colombian coast. Nicaragua’s position is
that it is the part of the mainland coast of Colombia which faces west and
north-west. Nicaragua advanced that position in connection with its ini -
tial claim for a single maritime boundary following the median line
between the two mainland coasts. It maintains this position in connectioxn
with its current claim for a continental shelf boundary between the outexr
limit of the extended continental shelf which it claims and the continenxtal
shelf entitlement generated by the Colombian mainland. Nicaragua
argues, in the alternative, that, if the Court were to hold that it was xnot
possible to address the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond
200 nautical miles, then the relevant Colombian coast would be that of
the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. It maintaixns,
however, that only the west-facing coasts of those islands should be con -
sidered as the relevant coast, since only they project towards Nicaragua,
and to treat the other coasts of the islands as part of the relevant coaxst
would constitute a form of double counting. Nevertheless, Nicaragua
contends that the area of overlapping entitlements extends all the way
from the Nicaraguan coast to a line 200 nautical miles from the baselines
of that coast.
147. Nicaragua estimates the total length of the west-facing coasts of
the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina as 21 km. So
far as the other maritime features are concerned, Nicaragua maintains
that they should not be counted as part of the relevant coast and that, xin
any event, they are so small that the combined length of their west-facing
coasts would be no more than 1 km.
*
58
6 CIJ1034.indb 112 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 678
145. La Cour considère que la côte pertinente du Nicaragua couvre l’xin -
tégralité de la côte qui se projette dans la zone de chevauchemxent potentielle
et non les seules portions de cette côte à partir desquelles est cxalculée la
limite de 200 milles marins. A l’exception du court segment côtier situé àx
proximité de Punta de Perlas, qui est orienté plein sud et ne se pxrojette donc
pas dans la zone de chevauchement potentielle, la côte pertinente estx dès lors
constituée de l’intégralité de la côte continentale du Nicaragua (voir croquis
n 6, p. 681). Si l’on tient compte de la direction générale de cette cxôte, la
côte pertinente mesure environ 531 kilomètres. La Cour considère égale -
ment que la limite de 200 milles marins en deçà de laquelle le Nicaragua a
droit à un plateau continental et à une zone économique exclusixve doit être
calculée à partir des îles côtières nicaraguayennes. Les côtes orientales des
îles nicaraguayennes étant parallèles à la masse continentalxe, elles n’augmen -
tent pas la longueur de la côte pertinente, et ce, bien que les lignexs de base à
partir desquelles sont mesurés les espaces maritimes auxquels peut prxétendre
le Nicaragua se trouvent sur ces formations (voir ci-dessous, paragrap2 h0e1).
B. La côte pertinente de la Colombie
146. La divergence de vues entre les Parties est plus marquée en ce qui
concerne la côte pertinente de la Colombie. Le Nicaragua estime qu’xil s’agit
de la portion du littoral continental colombien qui est orientée versx l’ouest
et le nord-ouest. Il a avancé cet argument dans le cadre de sa demande
initiale tendant à la détermination d’une frontière maritimex unique suivant
la ligne médiane entre les côtes continentales des deux Etats, et xle maintient
dans le cadre de sa demande actuelle tendant au tracé d’une frontière entre
la limite extérieure du plateau continental étendu qu’il revendxique et celle
de la portion du plateau continental revenant à la Colombie au titre xde sa
masse continentale. Il soutient, à titre subsidiaire, que, si la Courx devait
juger qu’il n’était pas possible de trancher la question de la xdélimitation du
plateau continental au-delà de la limite de 200milles marins, la côte colom -
bienne pertinente serait alors celle des îles de San Andrés, Providencia et
Santa Catalina. Il fait cependant valoir que les côtes de ces îlesx ne devraient
être considérées comme pertinentes que dans leur portion occidexntale, elle
seule faisant face au Nicaragua, et que considérer les autres côtexs de ces
formations comme faisant partie de la côte pertinente reviendrait àx prendre
les îles deux fois en compte. Il soutient néanmoins que la zone dex chevau -
chement s’étend depuis sa côte continentale sur une distance de 200 milles
marins à partir des lignes de base de ladite côte.
147. Selon le Nicaragua, la longueur totale des côtes occidentales des
îles de San Andrés, Providencia et Santa Catalina est de 21 kilomètres.
Pour ce qui est des autres formations maritimes, le Nicaragua estime
qu’elles ne devraient pas être considérées comme faisant parxtie de la côte
pertinente et que, en tout état de cause, elles sont si petites que lxa lon -
gueur totale de leurs côtes occidentales n’excéderait pas 1 kilomètre.
*
58
6 CIJ1034.indb 113 7/01/14 12:43 679 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
148. Colombia’s position is that its mainland coast is irrelevant because x
it is more than 400 nautical miles from Nicaragua’s coast and thus cannot
generate maritime entitlements which overlap with those of Nicaragua.
Colombia maintains that the relevant Colombian coast is that of the
Colombian islands. Its position about what part of those coasts is to bex
taken into account, however, is closely bound up with its view of what
constitutes the relevant area (a subject which the Court considers beloxw
in paragraphs 155-166). Colombia’s initial position is that the relevant
area in which the Court is called upon to effect a delimitation betweexn
overlapping entitlements is located between the west-facing coasts of the
islands and the Nicaraguan mainland and islands, so that only the
west-facing coasts of the Colombian islands would be relevant. However,
Colombia argues, in the alternative, that if the area of overlapping entxitle -
ments includes the area to the east of the islands, extending as far as the
line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan baselines, then the entire
coasts of the Colombian islands should be counted, since islands radiatex
maritime entitlement in all directions.
149. Colombia estimates the overall coastline of San Andrés, Provi -
dencia and Santa Catalina at 61.2 km. It also maintains that the coasts of
the cays immediately adjacent to those three islands (Hayne’s Cay, Rock
Cay and Johnny Cay, adjacent to San Andrés, and Basalt Cay, Palma
Cay, Cangrejo Cay and Low Cay, adjacent to Providencia and Santa
Catalina) are also relevant, thus adding a further 2.9 km. In addition,
Colombia contends that the coastlines of Alburquerque (1.35 km),
East-Southeast Cays (1.89 km), Roncador (1.35 km), Serrana (2.4 km),
Serranilla (2.9 km) and Bajo Nuevo (0.4 km) are relevant, giving a total
of 74.39 km. At certain stages during the hearings, Colombia also sug -
gested that the coast of Quitasueño, calculated by a series of straigxht lines
joining the features that Colombia claims are above water at high tide, x
constitutes part of Colombia’s relevant coast.
* *
150. The Court recalls that, in order for a coast to be regarded as relevant
for the purpose of a delimitation, it “must generate projections whicxh over -
lap with projections from the coast of the other Party” (Maritime Delimita ‑
tion in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009,
p. 97, para. 99) and that, in consequence, “the submarine extension of any
part of the coast of one Party which, because of its geographic situatioxn,
cannot overlap with the extension of the coast of the other, is to be exxcluded
from further consideration” (Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jama ‑
hiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 61, para. 75).
151. In view of the Court’s decision regarding Nicaragua’s claim to a
continental shelf on the basis of natural prolongation (see paragraph 131
59
6 CIJ1034.indb 114 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 679
148. La Colombie soutient que sa côte continentale ne peut être consi -
dérée comme pertinente, puisqu’elle est située à plus de 400 milles marins
de la côte nicaraguayenne et que les droits à des espaces maritimexs qu’elle
génère ne peuvent, dès lors, se chevaucher avec ceux du Nicaragxua. Elle
affirme que sa côte pertinente, en l’espèce, est celle de ses xîles. Sa position
quant à la question de savoir quelles parties de ces côtes doivent être
prises en compte est toutefois très étroitement liée à sa déxfinition de la
zone pertinente (question que la Cour examinera ci-après, aux para -
graphes 155 à 166). Elle avance, à titre principal, que la zone que la Cour
est appelée à délimiter est celle située entre les côtes xoccidentales des îles
colombiennes, d’une part, et la masse continentale et les îles du xNicara -
gua, d’autre part, de sorte que seules les côtes occidentales des xîles colom -
biennes seraient pertinentes. Elle fait toutefois valoir, à titre subxsidiaire,
que, si la zone de chevauchement comprend l’espace situé à l’xest des îles
et s’étend jusqu’à la limite située à 200 milles marins des lignes de base du
Nicaragua, l’intégralité des côtes des îles colombiennes xdoit alors être
prise en compte, ces formations ouvrant droit à des espaces maritimes
dans toutes les directions.
149. D’après la Colombie, le littoral de San Andrés, Providencia et
Santa Catalina mesurerait au total 61,2 kilomètres. La Colombie soutient
en outre que les côtes des cayes situées à proximité imméxdiate de ces trois
îles — Hayne’s Cay, Rock Cay et Johnny Cay, pour San Andrés, et
Basalt Cay, Palma Cay, Cangrejo Cay et Low Cay, pour Providencia et
Santa Catalina — doivent être également prises en compte, ce qui aug -
menterait la longueur de la côte pertinente de 2,9 kilomètres. Elle fait de
surcroît valoir que les côtes d’Alburquerque (1,35 km), des cayes de
l’Est-Sud-Est (1,89 km), de Roncador (1,35 km), de Serrana (2,4 km), de
Serranilla (2,9 km) et de Bajo Nuevo (0,4 km) doivent être prises en
considération, de sorte que la côte pertinente mesurerait au totalx 74,39 kilo -
mètres. A l’audience, elle a aussi parfois laissé entendre que xla côte de
Quitasueño, mesurée grâce à un ensemble de lignes droites rexliant les for -
mations qui, selon elle, sont découvertes à marée haute, faisaixt partie de
sa côte pertinente.
* *
150. La Cour rappellera qu’une côte, pour être considérée commxe per -
tinente aux fins de la délimitation, doit « générer des projections qui che -
vauchent celles de la côte de la partie adverse » (Délimitation maritime en
mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 97,
par. 99) et que, dès lors, « tout segment du littoral d’une [p]artie dont, en
raison de sa situation géographique, le prolongement ne pourrait rencxon -
trer celui du littoral de l’autre [p]artie est à écarter de la suite [de l’]exa -
men » (Plateau continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 61, par. 75).
151. Compte tenu de sa décision concernant la demande du Nicaragua
relative au plateau continental fondée sur le prolongement naturel (xvoir
59
6 CIJ1034.indb 115 7/01/14 12:43 680 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
above), the Court is concerned in the present proceedings only with thoxse
Colombian entitlements which overlap with the continental shelf and
exclusive economic zone entitlements within 200 nautical miles of the
Nicaraguan coast. Since the mainland coast of Colombia does not gener -
ate any entitlement in that area, it follows that it cannot be regarded xas
part of the relevant coast for present purposes. The relevant Colombian x
coast is thus confined to the coasts of the islands under Colombian sover -
eignty. Since the area of overlapping potential entitlements extends welxl
to the east of the Colombian islands, the Court considers that it is thex
entire coastline of these islands, not merely the west-facing coasts, which
has to be taken into account. The most important islands are obviously
San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. For the purposes of calcux -
lating the relevant coasts of Providencia and Santa Catalina, those two x
features were joined with two short straight lines, so that the parts ofx the
coast of each island (in the north-west of Providencia, in the area of San
Juan Point, and in the south-east of Santa Catalina) which are immedi -
ately facing one another are not included in the relevant coast. The Couxrt
does not consider that the smaller cays (listed in paragraph 149 above),
which are immediately adjacent to those islands, add to the length of thxe
relevant coast. Following, as with the Nicaraguan coastline, the generalx
direction of the coast, the Court therefore estimates the total length oxf the
relevant coast of the three islands as 58 km.
152. The Court also considers that the coasts of Alburquerque Cays,
East-Southeast Cays, Roncador and Serrana must be considered part of
the relevant coast. Taken together, these add a further 7 km to the rele -
vant Colombian coast, giving a total length of approximately 65 km. The
Court has not, however, taken account of Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo for
these purposes. These two features lie within an area that Colombia and x
Jamaica left undelimited in their 1993 Maritime Delimitation Treaty
(United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS), Vol. 1776, p. 27) in which there
are potential third State entitlements. The Court has also disregarded, xfor
these purposes, Quitasueño, whose features, as explained below (see xpara -
graphs 181-183) are so small that they cannot make any difference to the
length of Colombia’s coast.
153. The lengths of the relevant coasts are therefore 531 km (Nicara-
gua) and 65 km (Colombia), a ratio of approximately 1:8.2 in favour of
Nicaragua. The relevant coasts as determined by the Court are depicted
on sketch-map No. 6 (p. 681).
154. The second aspect mentioned by the Court in terms of the role of
relevant coasts in the context of the third stage of the delimitation prxocess
(see paragraph 141 above and paragraphs 190 et seq. below) will be dealt
with below in paragraphs 239 to 247 in the section dealing with the dis -
proportionality test.
60
6 CIJ1034.indb 116 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 680
paragraphe 131 ci-dessus), la Cour ne s’intéressera, en la présente ins -
tance, qu’aux zones sur lesquelles la Colombie peut prétendre àx un titre et
qui chevauchent le plateau continental et la zone économique exclusivxe
dont le Nicaragua peut se prévaloir en deçà de 200 milles marins depuis
sa côte. Le littoral continental de la Colombie ne générant aucun
droit dans cette zone, il ne peut être considéré comme faisant partiex de la
côte pertinente pour les besoins de l’espèce. La côte colombxienne perti -
nente se limite donc à celle des îles relevant de la souverainetéx de la
Colombie. La zone de chevauchement potentielle s’étendant bien au-delà
de la façade orientale des îles colombiennes, la Cour estime que cx’est
l’intégralité de la côte de ces formations, et non leurs seuxles côtes
occidentales, qui doit être prise en compte. Les îles les plus impxortantes
sont de toute évidence San Andrés, Providencia et Santa Catalina.
Afin de calculer la longueur des côtes pertinentes de Providencia et
Santa Catalina, ces deux formations ont été reliées par deux courtes xlignes
droites, de sorte que les segments côtiers (au nord-ouest de Providencia,
dans la zone de San Juan Point, et au sud-est de Santa Catalina) qui se
font directement face sont exclus de la côte pertinente. Les cayes dex plus
petite taille (dont la liste figure au paragraphe 149 ci-dessus), situées à
proximité immédiate de ces îles, n’augmentent pas, selon la xCour, la lon -
gueur de la côte pertinente. En conséquence, la Cour estime que, sxi l’on
tient compte de la direction générale du littoral, comme dans le cxas du
Nicaragua, la longueur totale de la côte pertinente des trois îlesx est de
58 kilomètres.
152. La Cour estime par ailleurs que les côtes des cayes d’Albur -
querque, de l’Est-Sud-Est, de Roncador et de Serrana doivent être consi -
dérées comme faisant partie de la côte pertinente. Prises dans leur
ensemble, elles augmentent de 7 kilomètres la côte colombienne perti -
nente, ce qui donne à celle-ci une longueur totale d’environ 65 kilomètres.
La Cour n’a cependant pas tenu compte de Serranilla et de Bajo Nuevo.
Ces deux formations se trouvent dans une zone maritime que la Colombie
et la Jamaïque n’ont pas délimitée dans leur traité de 1993 (Nations Unies,
Recueil des traités (RTNU), vol. 1776, p. 27) et dans laquelle des Etats
tiers pourraient exprimer des prétentions. La Cour n’a pas non pluxs tenu
compte de Quitasueño, dont les formations, ainsi qu’il est expliquxé
ci-après (voir paragraphes 181-183), sont si petites qu’elles ne sauraient
avoir d’incidence sur la longueur de la côte colombienne.
153. En conséquence, les côtes pertinentes mesurent respectivement
531 kilomètres (pour le Nicaragua) et 65 kilomètres (pour la Colombie),
ce qui correspond à un rapport d’environ 1 à 8,2 en faveur du Nicaragua.
Les côtes pertinentes, telles que définies par la Cour, sont repxrésentées sur
o
le croquis n 6 (p. 681).
154. Le second aspect du rôle que peuvent avoir, comme l’a mentionné
la Cour, les côtes pertinentes dans le cadre de la troisième étxape du pro -
cessus de délimitation (voir paragraphe 141 ci-dessus et paragraphes 190
et suivants ci-dessous) sera examiné plus loin, aux paragraphes 239 à 247,
consacrés à la vérification de l’absence de disproportion.x
60
6 CIJ1034.indb 117 7/01/14 12:43 681 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
-81-
Nicaragua's relevant coast
Colombia's relevant coast
Outline of a bank JOINT
SerranilREGIME
AREA
URA Colombia / Jamaica
HONRAGUA
NICA
HONDURAS Edinburgh
Reef
Muerto
Cay
Miskitos
Quitasueño Serrana
Cays
Ned Thomas
Cay
Roncador
Roca Providencia/
NICARAGUA Tyra Santa Catalina
San Andrés
Little Corn
Island East-Southeast Cays
Punta
de Perlas
Great Corn Alburquerque
Island Cays
COLOMBIA
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA Sketch-map No. 6:
The relevant coasts
A
RCA as identified by the Court
SA A
CO AN This sketch-map has been prepared
P
for illustrative purposes only.
The enlargements of the islands, shown in the
COSTA RICA boxed areas, are not to the same scale.
Mercator Projection (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
PANAMA
61
6 CIJ1034.indb 118 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 681
Côte pertinente du Nicaragua
Côte pertinente de la Colombie
Contour d'un banc
ZONE DE
SerraniRÉGIME
COMMUN
URA Colombie / Jamaïque
HONRAGUA
NIC
HONDURAS Récif
d'Edimbourg
Caye de
Muerto
Cayes des
Quitasueño Serrana
Miskitos
Caye de
Ned Thomas
Roncador
Roca Providencia/
NICARAGUA Tyra Santa Catalina
San Andrés
Mangle
Chico Cayes de l'Est-Sud-Est
Punta
de Perlas
Mangle Cayes
Grande
d'Alburquerque
COLOMBIE
PANAMA
COLOMBIE
COSTA RICA Croquis nº6:
Les côtes pertinentes
A
RC telles qu'identifiées par la Cour
TA AA
COSAN
P Ce croquis a été établi
à seule fin d'illustration.
Les cartouches sont des agrandissements
COSTA RICA
des îles, à des échelles différentes.
Projection de Mercator (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
PANAMA
61
6 CIJ1034.indb 119 7/01/14 12:43 682 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
4. Relevant Maritime Area
155. The Court will next consider the extent of the relevant maritime
area, again in the light of its decision regarding Nicaragua’s claim to a
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. In these circumstances, Nica-
ragua maintains that the relevant area is the entire area from the Nicarxa-
guan coast, in the west, to a line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan
coast and islands, in the east. For Nicaragua, the southern boundary of x
the relevant area is formed by the demarcation lines agreed between
Colombia and Panama and Colombia and Costa Rica (see paragraph 160
below) on the basis that, since Colombia has agreed with those States txhat
it has no title to any maritime areas to the south of those lines, they xdo
not fall within an area of overlapping entitlements. In the north, Nicarxa -
gua contends that the relevant area extends to the boundary between
Nicaragua and Honduras, which was determined by the Court in its
Judgment of 8 October 2007 (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 659). The sketch-maps of the rele -
vant area submitted by Nicaragua also excluded the Colombia-Jamaica
“Joint Regime Area” (see paragraph 160 below), although at one point,
during the oral proceedings, counsel for Nicaragua suggested that “thxe
Joint Regime Area is part of the area that [the Court is] asked to delimxit”.
(See sketch-map No. 4 : The relevant coasts and the relevant area accord -
ing to Nicaragua, p. 676.)
*
156. Colombia maintains that the relevant area is confined to the area
between the west coasts of the Colombian islands and the Nicaraguan
coast (see sketch-map No. 5 : The relevant coasts and the relevant area
according to Colombia, p. 677) bordered in the north by the boundary
between Nicaragua and Honduras and in the south by the boundary
between Colombia and Costa Rica (see paragraph 160 below). Colombia
considers that its sovereignty over the islands bars any claim on the paxrt
of Nicaragua to maritime spaces to the east of Colombia’s islands.
* *
157. The Court recalls that, as it observed in the Maritime Delimitation
in the Black Sea case, “the legal concept of the ‘relevant area’ has to be
taken into account as part of the methodology of maritime delimitation”
(Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 99, para. 110). Depending on the configuration of
the relevant coasts in the general geographical context, the relevant area
may include certain maritime spaces and exclude others which are not
germane to the case in hand.
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6 CIJ1034.indb 120 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 682
4. La zone maritime pertinente
155. La Cour examinera à présent la question de l’étendue de la zxone
maritime pertinente, là encore à la lumière de la décision qxu’elle a prise à
l’égard de la demande du Nicaragua relativement au plateau continexntal
au-delà de la limite de 200 milles marins. Dans ce contexte, le Nicaragua
soutient que la zone pertinente couvre l’intégralité de l’esxpace allant de sa
côte continentale, à l’ouest, jusqu’à une ligne se trouvant à 200 milles
marins de cette côte et des îles côtières, à l’est. Sexlon lui, la limite méridio
nale de la zone pertinente correspond aux lignes de démarcation dont xla
Colombie est convenue avec le Panama, d’une part, et avec le Costa Rica,
d’autre part (voir paragraphe 160 ci-dessous), au motif que, la Colombie
ayant reconnu qu’elle ne pouvait prétendre à aucun des espaces xmaritimes
situés au sud de ces lignes, ceux-ci n’entrent pas dans la zone de chevau -
chement. Le Nicaragua allègue que, au nord, la zone pertinente s’éxtend
jusqu’à la frontière le séparant du Honduras, laquelle a éxté établie par la
Cour dans l’arrêt qu’elle a rendu le 8 octobre 2007 (Différend territorial et
maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes
(Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 659). Sur les
croquis de la zone pertinente présentés par le Nicaragua est égxalement
exclue la « zone de régime commun » de la Colombie et de la Jamaïque
(voir paragraphe 160 ci-dessous), et ce, bien que le conseil du Nicaragua
ait déclaré à l’audience que « [l]a zone de régime commun s’inscrit dans
celle que [la Cour est appelée à] délimiter » (voir croquis n o 4 : Les côtes
pertinentes et la zone pertinente selon le Nicaragua, p. 676).
*
156. La Colombie soutient pour sa part que la zone pertinente se limite
à l’espace situé entre les côtes occidentales de ses îlesx et la côte nicara -
guayenne (voir croquis n o 5 : Les côtes pertinentes et la zone pertinente
selon la Colombie, p. 677) et qu’elle est bordée au nord par la frontière
entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras et, au sud, par celle la séparant du
Costa Rica (voir paragraphe 160 ci-dessous). Elle estime que sa souverai -
neté sur ces îles fait obstacle à toute revendication du Nicaraxgua sur les
espaces maritimes situés à l’est de celles-ci.
* *
157. La Cour rappellera, ainsi qu’elle l’a fait observer dans l’affxaire de
la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire, que « le concept juridique de [la]
«zone pertinente» doit être pris en considération dans la méthodologie de
la délimitation maritime» (Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie
c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 99, par. 110). En fonction de la
configuration des côtes devant être retenues dans le contexte géxographique
général, la zone pertinente peut comprendre certains espaces maritximes et
en exclure d’autres qui ne présentent pas d’intérêt pour xle cas d’espèce.
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6 CIJ1034.indb 121 7/01/14 12:43 683 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
158. In addition, the relevant area is pertinent when the Court comes
to verify whether the line which it has drawn produces a result which isx
disproportionate. In this context, however, the Court has repeatedly
emphasized that :
“The purpose of delimitation is not to apportion equal shares of
the area, nor indeed proportional shares. The test of disproportion -
ality is not in itself a method of delimitation. It is rather a means ofx
checking whether the delimitation line arrived at by other means
needs adjustment because of a significant disproportionality in the
ratios between the maritime areas which would fall to one party or
other by virtue of the delimitation line arrived at by other means, and
the lengths of their respective coasts.” (Maritime Delimitation in the
Black Sea, I.C.J. Reports 2009, pp. 99-100, para. 110.)
The calculation of the relevant area does not purport to be precise but is
only approximate and “[t]he object of delimitation is to achieve a dexlimi -
tation that is equitable, not an equal apportionment of maritime areas”x
(ibid., p. 100, para. 111 ; see also North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal
Republic of Germany/Denmark ; Federal Republic of Germany/Nether ‑
lands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 22, para. 18 ; Continental Shelf
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 45,
para. 58 ; Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan
Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 67,
para. 64).
159. The relevant area comprises that part of the maritime space in
which the potential entitlements of the parties overlap. It follows thatx, in
the present case, the relevant area cannot stop, as Colombia maintains ixt
should, at the western coasts of the Colombian islands. Nicaragua’s cxoast,
and the Nicaraguan islands adjacent thereto, project a potential maritimxe
entitlement across the sea bed and water column for 200 nautical miles.
That potential entitlement thus extends to the sea bed and water column x
to the east of the Colombian islands where, of course, it overlaps with xthe
competing potential entitlement of Colombia derived from those islands. x
Accordingly, the relevant area extends from the Nicaraguan coast to a
line in the east 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of Nicaragua’s territorial sea is measured. Since Nicaragua hxas
not yet notified the Secretary-General of the location of those baselixnes
under Article 16, paragraph 2, of UNCLOS, the eastern limit of the rel -
evant area can be determined only on an approximate basis.
160. In both the north and the south, the interests of third States
become involved.
In the north, there is a boundary between Nicaragua and Honduras,
established by the Court in its 2007 Judgment (Territorial and Maritime
Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicara ‑
gua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), pp. 760-763). The
endpoint of that boundary was not determined but “[t]he Court made a x
clear determination [in paragraphs 306-319 of the 2007 Judgment] that
63
6 CIJ1034.indb 122 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 683
158. La zone pertinente permet en outre à la Cour de s’assurer que le
résultat auquel donne lieu la ligne qu’elle a tracée n’est pxas dispropor -
tionné. A cet égard, la Cour a cependant maintes fois souligné xce qui suit :
«La délimitation ne vise pas à découper un secteur en parts éxgales,
ni même en parts proportionnelles, et cette vérification de l’xabsence
de disproportion n’est pas une méthode de délimitation en elle-même.
Il s’agit plutôt d’un moyen de déterminer si la ligne de délimitation
obtenue par d’autres moyens doit être ajustée afin d’évxiter qu’elle ne
donne lieu à une disproportion significative entre les espaces marix -
times attribués à chacune des parties et la longueur de leurs côxtes
respectives. » (Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie
c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 99-100, par. 110.)
Le calcul de la superficie de la zone pertinente ne vise pas à la pxrécision et
n’est qu’approximatif. L’« objet de la délimitation est en effet de parvenir
à un résultat équitable et non à une répartition égale des espaces mari -
times » (ibid., p. 100, par. 111; voir aussi Plateau continental de la mer du
Nord (République fédérale d’Allemagne/Danemark ; République fédérale
d’Allemagne/Pays‑Bas), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 22, par. 18 ; Plateau
continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985,
p. 45, par. 58 ; Délimitation maritime dans la région située entre le Groen ‑
land et Jan Mayen (Danemark c. Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1993,
p. 67, par. 64).
159. La zone pertinente correspond à la partie de l’espace maritime
dans laquelle les droits potentiels des parties se chevauchent. Elle ne xsau -
rait dès lors, en la présente affaire, s’arrêter, comme lex prétend la Colom-
bie, aux côtes occidentales des îles colombiennes. La côte du Nxicaragua
ainsi que les îles nicaraguayennes adjacentes à celle-ci génèrent des droits
potentiels sur les fonds marins et la colonne d’eau surjacente, sur uxne
distance de 200 milles marins, y compris à l’est des îles colombiennes où,
évidemment, ils empiètent sur les droits potentiels concurrents géxnérés
par ces dernières. En conséquence, la zone pertinente s’étenxd vers l’est de
la côte nicaraguayenne jusqu’à une ligne située à 200 milles marins des
lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de la mexr territo -
riale du Nicaragua. Ce dernier n’ayant pas encore notifié au Secxrétaire
général l’emplacement de ces lignes de base, en application du para -
graphe 2 de l’article 16 de la CNUDM, la limite orientale de la zone per -
tinente ne peut être tracée que de manière approximative.
160. Les intérêts d’Etats tiers entrent en jeu aussi bien au nord qu’au
sud.
Au nord, il existe une frontière entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras fixxée
par la Cour dans son arrêt de 2007 (Différend territorial et maritime entre
le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Hon ‑
duras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 760-763). Le point terminal de
cette frontière est resté indéterminé, mais « [l]a Cour a clairement indiqué
[aux paragraphes 306 à 319 de l’arrêt de 2007] que la bissectrice s’éten -
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6 CIJ1034.indb 123 7/01/14 12:43 684 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
the bisector line would extend beyond the 82nd meridian until it reached
the area where the rights of a third State may be affected” (Territorial and
Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Application by Honduras for
Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 443,
para. 70). In the north, the Court must also take into account that the
1993 Agreement between Colombia and Jamaica (paragraph 152 above)
established a maritime boundary between those two States but left unde -
limited the “Joint Regime Area” (depicted in sketch-map No. 1, p. 639).
In the south, the Colombia-Panama Agreement (UNTS, Vol. 1074,
p. 221) was signed in 1976 and entered into force on 30 November 1977.
It adopted a step-line boundary as a simplified form of equidistance in the
area between the Colombian islands and the Panamanian mainland.
Colombia and Costa Rica signed an Agreement in 1977, which adopts a
boundary line that extends from the boundaries agreed between Colom -
bia and Panama (described above) and between Costa Rica and Panama.
The Agreement has not been ratified, although Colombia contends that
Costa Rica has indicated that it considers itself to be bound by the sub -
stance of this Agreement. The boundary lines set out in all of these agrxee-
ments are depicted on sketch-map No. 1 (p. 639).
161. The Court recalls the statement in its 2011 Judgment on Costa
Rica’s Application to intervene in the present proceedings that, in ax mar -
itime dispute, “a third State’s interest will, as a matter of principle, be
protected by the Court” (Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v.
Colombia), Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene, Judg ‑
ment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 372, para. 86). In that Judgment the
Court also referred to its earlier Judgment in the case concerning Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), in which it
stated that
“the taking into account of all the coasts and coastal relationships . . .
as a geographical fact for the purpose of effecting an eventual delim -
itation as between two riparian States . . . in no way signifies that by
such an operation itself the legal interest of a third . . . State . . . may
be affected” (Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1990, p. 124, para. 77).
In the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case, the Court noted that,
in parts of the area in which the potential entitlements of Romania and
Ukraine overlapped, entitlements of third States might also come into
play. It considered, however, that this fact did not preclude the inclusxion
of those parts in the relevant area “without prejudice to the positioxn of
any third State regarding its entitlements in this area” (Maritime Delimi ‑
tation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2009, p. 100, para. 114). The Court stated that
“where areas are included solely for the purpose of approximate iden -
tification of overlapping entitlements of the Parties to the case, whixch
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6 CIJ1034.indb 124 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 684
drait au-delà du 82 eméridien jusqu’à atteindre la zone dans laquelle
pourraient être affectés les droits d’un Etat tiers » (Différend territorial et
maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), requête du Honduras à fin d’interven ‑
tion, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (II), p. 443, par. 70). Au nord, la Cour
doit également tenir compte du fait que l’accord conclu en 1993 entre la
Colombie et la Jamaïque (paragraphe 152 ci-dessus) a établi une frontière
maritime entre ces deux Etats, sans toutefois délimiter la « zone de régime
commun» (représentée sur le croquis n o 1, p. 639).
Au sud, la Colombie et le Panama ont signé en 1976 un accord (RTNU,
vol. 1074, p. 221) qui est entré en vigueur le 30 novembre 1977 et aux
termes duquel a été retenue, pour la zone située entre la massex continen -
tale panaméenne et les îles colombiennes, une frontière en escaxlier en tant
que version simplifiée de la ligne d’équidistance. La Colombixe a par ail -
leurs signé en 1977 un accord avec le Costa Rica aux termes duquel a été
établie la ligne de délimitation entre les deux pays à partir des frontières
convenues par la Colombie et le Panama (voir ci-dessus) et par le
Costa Rica et le Panama. Quoique cet accord n’ait pas été ratifié, la
Colombie soutient que le Costa Rica a indiqué qu’il s’estimait xlié par la
substance de ce traité. Les lignes frontières établies par l’xensemble de ces
accords sont représentées sur le croquis n o 1 (p. 639).
161. La Cour rappelle qu’elle a dit, dans son arrêt de 2011 sur la
requête du Costa Rica à fin d’intervention en la présente instance que,
dans le cadre d’un différend maritime, « l’intérêt des Etats tiers [était], par
principe, protégé par la Cour » (Différend territorial et maritime (Nicara ‑
gua c. Colombie), requête du Costa Rica à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 2011 (II), p. 372, par. 86). Dans cet arrêt, elle a également fait
référence à l’affaire du Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime
(El Salvador/Honduras), dans laquelle elle avait précisé que
«le fait de tenir compte, en tant que facteur géographique, de toutes x
les côtes et relations côtières … pour effectuer une éventuelle délimi -
tation entre deux Etats riverains … ne signifie aucunement que l’in -
térêt juridique d’un troisième Etat riverain … soit susceptible d’être
affecté » (requête à fin d’intervention,arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 124,
par. 77).
Dans l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire, la Cour a relevé
que, dans les parties de la zone où les droits potentiels de la Roumaxnie et
de l’Ukraine se chevauchaient, les droits d’Etats tiers pouvaient xégale -
ment entrer en jeu. Elle a jugé qu’elle n’en était pas pour xautant empêchée
d’inclure ces parties dans la zone pertinente, « sans préjudice de la posi -
tion de tout Etat tiers relativement à ses droits dans cette zone » (Délimi‑
tation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil
2009, p. 100, par. 114), précisant que
«le fait d’inclure certains espaces — qui peuvent être considérés
comme constituant la zone pertinente (et dont il conviendra, lors de la
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6 CIJ1034.indb 125 7/01/14 12:43 685 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
may be deemed to constitute the relevant area (and which in due
course will play a part in the final stage testing for disproportionality),
third party entitlements cannot be affected. Third party entitlements x
would only be relevant if the delimitation between Romania and
Ukraine were to affect them.” (I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 100, para. 114.)
162. The same considerations are applicable to the determination of
the relevant area in the present case. The Court notes that, while the
agreements between Colombia, on the one hand, and Costa Rica, Jamaica
and Panama, on the other, concern the legal relations between the partiexs
to each of those agreements, they are res inter alios acta so far as Nicara -
gua is concerned. Accordingly, none of those agreements can affect the
rights and obligations of Nicaragua vis-à-vis Costa Rica, Jamaica or Pan-
ama; nor can they impose obligations, or confer rights, upon Costa Rica,
Jamaica or Panama vis-à-vis Nicaragua. It follows that, when it effects
the delimitation between Colombia and Nicaragua, the Court is not pur -
porting to define or to affect the rights and obligations which might exist
as between Nicaragua and any of these three States. The position of Hon-
duras is somewhat different. The boundary between Honduras and Nica -
ragua was established by the Court’s 2007 Judgment, although the
endpoint of that boundary was not determined. Nicaragua can have no
rights to the north of that line and Honduras can have no rights to the x
south. It is in the final phase of delimitation, however, not in the pxrelimi-
nary phase of identifying the relevant area, that the Court is required xto
take account of the rights of third parties. Nevertheless, if the exercixse of
identifying, however approximately, the relevant area is to be a useful
one, then some awareness of the actual and potential claims of third parx-
ties is necessary. In the present case, there is a large measure of agrexement
between the Parties as to what this task must entail. Both Nicaragua andx
Colombia have accepted that the area of their overlapping entitlements
does not extend beyond the boundaries already established between eitherx
of them and any third State.
163. The Court recalls that the relevant area cannot extend beyond the
area in which the entitlements of both Parties overlap. Accordingly, if
either Party has no entitlement in a particular area, whether because ofx an
agreement it has concluded with a third State or because that area lies
beyond a judicially determined boundary between that Party and a third
State, that area cannot be treated as part of the relevant area for present
purposes. Since Colombia has no potential entitlements to the south and x
east of the boundaries which it has agreed with Costa Rica and Panama,
the relevant area cannot extend beyond those boundaries. In addition,
although the Colombia-Jamaica “Joint Regime Area” is an area in which
Colombia and Jamaica have agreed upon shared development, rather
than delimitation, the Court considers that it has to be treated as fallxing
outside the relevant area. The Court notes that more than half of the
65
6 CIJ1034.indb 126 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 685
dernière étape du processus de délimitation, de tenir compte poxur
vérifier qu’il n’y a pas de disproportion) — à seule fin de déterminer
approximativement l’étendue des droits concurrents des Parties [éxtait]
sans incidence sur les droits d’Etats tiers. De tels droits ne seraiexnt en
effet pertinents que si la délimitation entre la Roumanie et l’Uxkraine
devait les affecter.» (C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 100, par. 114.)
162. Ces considérations valent également pour la détermination de lax
zone pertinente en la présente affaire. La Cour note que, si l’axccord que la
Colombie a signé avec le Costa Rica et ceux qu’elle a conclus avec la
Jamaïque et le Panama concernent les relations juridiques entre les Extats
parties à chacun de ces instruments, ils sont en revanche res inter alios
acta à l’égard du Nicaragua. En conséquence, les droits et obligxations du
Nicaragua vis-à-vis du Costa Rica, de la Jamaïque ou du Panama ne sau -
raient être affectés par aucun de ces accords, qui ne peuvent paxs davan -
tage imposer d’obligations ni conférer de droits au Costa Rica, à la
Jamaïque ou au Panama vis-à-vis du Nicaragua. Il s’ensuit que, en opé -
rant une délimitation entre la Colombie et le Nicaragua, la Cour n’xentend
nullement définir ni mettre en cause les droits et obligations qui pour -
raient exister entre le Nicaragua et l’un quelconque de ces trois Etaxts. La
situation est quelque peu différente en ce qui concerne le Hondurasx. La
frontière entre celui-ci et le Nicaragua a été fixée par la Cour dans son
arrêt de 2007, même si le point terminal en est resté indéterminé. Lex Nica -
ragua ne peut donc se prévaloir de droits au nord de cette ligne, et xle
Honduras, au sud. C’est, toutefois, à la dernière étape du pxrocessus de
délimitation, et non lors de l’étape préliminaire consistantx à définir la
zone pertinente, que la Cour doit tenir compte des droits d’Etats tiexrs. Ce
nonobstant, pour que l’étape consistant à définir, mêmex de manière
approximative, la zone pertinente soit vraiment utile, il est nécessaxire
d’avoir conscience des revendications existantes ou potentielles d’Etats
tiers. En la présente affaire, les Parties s’accordent dans une xlarge mesure
sur ce que cela implique. Le Nicaragua et la Colombie reconnaissent en
effet que la zone de chevauchement ne va pas au-delà des frontières dont
l’un et l’autre sont déjà convenus avec des Etats tiers.
163. La Cour rappelle que la zone pertinente ne peut s’étendre au-delà de
celle dans laquelle les droits des Parties se chevauchent. Il s’ensuixt que les
espaces sur lesquels l’une d’elles n’a aucun droit, soit parce xqu’elle a conclu
un accord avec un Etat tiers, soit parce que l’espace en question estx situé
au-delà d’une frontière fixée par voie judiciaire entre elle xet un Etat tiers,
sont exclus de la zone pertinente pour les besoins du présent examen.x La
Colombie n’ayant aucun droit potentiel au sud et à l’est de sesx frontières
convenues avec le Costa Rica et le Panama, la zone pertinente ne peut
s’étendre au-delà de ces frontières. En outre, bien que la « zone de régime
commun» de la Colombie et de la Jamaïque soit un espace dans lequel les
deux Etats concernés se sont mis d’accord sur un régime d’exxploitation com -
mune, et non sur une délimitation, la Cour estime qu’elle doit être considé-
rée comme exclue de la zone pertinente. La Cour observe que plus de la
65
6 CIJ1034.indb 127 7/01/14 12:43 686 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
“Joint Regime Area” (as well as the island of Bajo Nuevo and the xwaters
within a 12-nautical-mile radius thereof) is located more than 200 nauti -
cal miles from Nicaragua and thus could not constitute part of the rele -
vant area in any event. It also recalls that neither Colombia, nor (at xleast
in most of its pleadings) Nicaragua, contended that it should be includxed
in the relevant area. Although the island of Serranilla and the waters
within a 12-nautical-mile radius of the island are excluded from the “Joint
Regime Area”, the Court considers that they also fall outside the relxevant
area for the purposes of the present case, in view of potential Jamaicanx
entitlements and the fact that neither Party contended otherwise.
164. The Court therefore concludes that the boundary of the relevant
area in the north follows the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and
Honduras, laid down in the Court’s Judgment of 8 October 2007 (Territo ‑
rial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Carib ‑
bean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II),
p. 659), until it reaches latitude 16 degrees north. It then continues due
east until it reaches the boundary of the “Joint Regime Area”. Froxm that
point, it follows the boundary of that area, skirting a line 12 nautical
miles from Serranilla, until it intersects with the line 200 nautical miles
from Nicaragua.
165. In the south, the boundary of the relevant area begins in the east
at the point where the line 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua intersects
with the boundary line agreed between Colombia and Panama. It then
follows the Colombia-Panama line to the west until it reaches the line
agreed between Colombia and Costa Rica. It follows that line westwards
and then northwards, until it intersects with a hypothetical equidistancxe
line between the Costa Rican and Nicaraguan coasts.
166. The relevant area thus drawn has a size of approximately
209,280 square km. It is depicted on sketch-map No. 7 (p. 687).
5. Entitlements Generated by Maritime Features
167. The Court finds it convenient at this point in its analysis to con -
sider the entitlements generated by the various maritime features in the
present case.
A. San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina
168. The Parties agree that San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Cata -
lina are entitled to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and contxi -
nental shelf. In principle, that entitlement is capable of extending up xto
200 nautical miles in each direction. As explained in the previous section, x
that entitlement overlaps with the entitlement to a 200-nautical-mile con -
tinental shelf and exclusive economic zone of the Nicaraguan mainland
and adjacent islands. That overlap exists to the east, as well as the wexst,
of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. However, to the east txhe
maritime entitlement of the three islands extends to an area which lies x
66
6 CIJ1034.indb 128 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 686
moitié de la «zone de régime commun» (de même que l’île de Bajo Nuevo
et les eaux adjacentes sur un rayon de 12 milles marins) se trouve à plus de
200 milles marins du Nicaragua et ne peut donc, en tout état de cause, faire
partie de la zone pertinente. Elle rappelle par ailleurs que ni le Nicarxagua
(du moins dans la majeure partie de ses exposés) ni la Colombie n’ont
demandé son inclusion. Bien que l’île de Serranilla et les eauxx adjacentes sur
un rayon de 12 milles marins soient exclues de la « zone de régime com -
mun», en l’espèce, la Cour considère qu’elles sont égalemxent exclues de la
zone pertinente, eu égard aux droits potentiels de la Jamaïque et xau fait que
ni l’une ni l’autre des Parties n’ont avancé d’argument cxontraire.
164. La Cour conclut, en conséquence, que la limite de la zone perti -
nente suit, au nord, la frontière maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Hxondu-
ras, telle que définie dans son arrêt du 8 octobre 2007 (Différend territorial
et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbe▯s
(Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 659), jusqu’à
son intersection avec le parallèle situé par 16 degrés de latitude nord. Elle
se poursuit ensuite plein est jusqu’à la limite de la « zone de régime com -
mun». A partir de ce point, elle longe cette limite, en décrivant un xarc de
cercle d’un rayon de 12 milles marins autour de Serranilla, jusqu’à son
intersection avec la ligne située à 200 milles marins du Nicaragua.
165. Au sud, la limite de la zone pertinente part, à l’est, du point oùx la
ligne située à 200 milles marins du Nicaragua croise la ligne frontière
convenue entre la Colombie et le Panama. Elle suit ensuite cette ligne vxers
l’ouest, jusqu’à la limite convenue entre la Colombie et le Cosxta Rica. Elle
longe ensuite cette limite vers l’ouest, puis vers le nord, jusqu’à son inter -
section avec une ligne d’équidistance hypothétique entre les côxtes du
Costa Rica et du Nicaragua.
166. La zone pertinente ainsi définie a une superficie d’environ
209 280 kilomètres carrés, et est représentée sur le croquis n o7 (p. 687).
5. Les droits générés par les formations maritimes
167. La Cour estime opportun, à ce stade de son analyse, d’aborder la
question des droits que peuvent générer les différentes formaxtions mari -
times en cause.
A. San Andrés, Providencia et Santa Catalina
168. Les Parties conviennent que San Andrés, Providencia et Santa
Catalina engendrent des droits à une mer territoriale, à une zone xécono -
mique exclusive et à un plateau continental. Ces espaces maritimes
peuvent, en théorie, s’étendre dans toutes les directions sur uxne distance
de 200 milles marins. Comme il a été expliqué dans la section précéxdente,
les droits en question empiètent sur ceux que génèrent, sur la xmême dis -
tance, la côte continentale du Nicaragua et les îles adjacentes. Ext ce che -
vauchement s’étend aussi bien à l’est qu’à l’ouest xdes îles de San Andrés,
Providencia et Santa Catalina. Du côté est, toutefois, la portée des droits
66
6 CIJ1034.indb 129 7/01/14 12:43 687 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
WGS 84
COLOMBIA
Sketch-map No. 7:
for illustrative purposes only.
This sketch-map has been prepared30' N)
The relevant maritime areaourt
A
A I
I M
M O
A L
J O
Bajo Nuevo C
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
JOINTAREA
REGIMEColombia / Jamaica
CARIBBEAN SEA
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Roncador
Serrana
Serranilla
East-Southeast Cays
S AU Quitasueño
A G
R A Providencia/ A AM
UD A Santa Catalina CIR AN
N I San Andrés Cays AT AP
O N COLOMBIA SO
H COSTA RICAC
Alburquerque
Miskitos
Island Island
Little Corn
Great Corn
RICA
COSTA
HONDURAS NICARAGUA
67
6 CIJ1034.indb 130 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 687
e, )
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67
6 CIJ1034.indb 131 7/01/14 12:43 688 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
beyond a line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan baselines and thus
falls outside the relevant area as defined by the Court.
169. Nicaragua submits that, in order to achieve an equitable solution,
the boundary which the Court will draw should confine each of the threxe
islands to an enclave of 12 nautical miles. The Court will consider that sub -
mission when it comes to determine the course of the maritime boundary
(see paragraphs 184-247). At this stage, it is necessary only to note that the
Parties are agreed regarding the potential entitlements of the three islxands.
B. Alburquerque Cays, East‑Southeast Cays, Roncador, Serrana, Serranilla
and Bajo Nuevo
170. The Parties differ regarding the entitlements which may be gener -
ated by the other maritime features. Their differences regarding Quitax -
sueño are such that the entitlements generated by Quitasueño will xbe
dealt with in a separate section (paragraphs 181-183 below). Nicaragua
contends that Alburquerque Cays, East-Southeast Cays, Roncador, Ser -
rana, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo all fall within the exception stated in x
Article 121, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS, that is to say, they are rocks with
no entitlement to a continental shelf or exclusive economic zone. Nicarax-
gua argues that these features must each be regarded separately and suchx
entitlements as they generate cannot be enlarged by treating them as a
group, particularly in view of the considerable distances between them. It
also rejects what it characterizes as Colombia’s attempt to suggest txhat
these islands are larger than they are by giving the dimensions of the
banks and shoals on which the different cays sit. Nicaragua maintains
that it is only those individual features which are above water at high xtide
that generate any maritime entitlement at all and that in each case the x
extent of that entitlement is determined by the size of the individual
island, not by its relationship to other maritime features.
171. Nicaragua points to the small size of these islands and the absence of
any settled population and maintains, in addition, that none of them has any
form of economic life. It argues that they cannot sustain human habitatixon or
economic life of their own and therefore constitute rocks which fall witxhin the
exceptional rule stated in Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Convention. Accord-
ingly, it contends that they have no entitlement to either an exclusive economic
zone or a continental shelf and are confined to a territorial sea.
172. In addition, Nicaragua maintains that the achievement of an
equitable solution regarding the overlapping entitlements around these
islands requires that each be restricted to an enclave extending 3 nautixcal
miles from its baselines. In support of this submission, it points to a xnum -
ber of instances in which it maintains that the Court and arbitration tri -
bunals have accorded only a restricted territorial sea to small islands xand
maritime features.
*
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6 CIJ1034.indb 132 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 688
engendrés par les trois îles s’étend au-delà de la limite de 200milles marins
depuis les lignes de base nicaraguayennes et se situe, par conséquent, en
dehors de la zone pertinente définie par la Cour.
169. Le Nicaragua fait valoir que, pour être équitable, la délimitatxion op-
rée par la Cour doit prévoir l’enclavement de chacune des troisx îles dans un
rayon de 12millesmarins. La Cour reviendra sur cette prétention au moment
de déterminer le tracé de la frontière maritime (voir paragrapxhes 184-247). Il
suffit, à ce stade, de prendre acte de ce que les Parties sont d’accord quant aux
droits que les trois îles sont susceptibles d’engendrer.
B. Cayes d’Alburquerque, cayes de l’Est‑Sud‑Est, Roncador, Serrana,
Serranilla et Bajo Nuevo
170. Les Parties sont en désaccord en ce qui concerne les droits que
peuvent générer les autres formations maritimes. Concernant Quitasxueño,
leurs divergences sont telles que les droits générés par cette xformation
feront l’objet d’une section distincte (paragraphes 181-183 ci-dessous). Le
Nicaragua soutient que les cayes d’Alburquerque, les cayes de l’Esxt-Sud-Est,
Roncador, Serrana, Serranilla et Bajo Nuevo tombent toutes sous le coup
de l’exception prévue au paragraphe 3 de l’article 121 de la CNUDM ;
autrement dit, il s’agirait de rochers ne générant aucun droit à un plateau
continental ou à une zone économique exclusive. Il fait valoir quex les for-
mations en question doivent être considérées séparément ext que l’on ne
saurait étendre la portée géographique des droits qu’elles génèrent en mer
en les considérant comme un groupe, compte tenu surtout de la distancxe
considérable qui les sépare. Il conteste par ailleurs ce qu’il tient pour une
tentative, de la part de la Colombie, de donner à ces îles une taixlle dispro-
portionnée, en se servant des dimensions des bancs et des basses sur xles -
quels elles reposent. Selon lui, seules les formations individuelles quix
restent découvertes à marée haute peuvent générer des droxits à des espaces
maritimes et, dans chaque cas, la portée de ces droits est fonction dxes
dimensions de l’île et non de ses liens avec d’autres formationxs maritimes.
171. Le Nicaragua souligne la petite taille de ces îles, sur lesquelles ilx n’y
aurait aucune population établie et, ajoute-t-il, aucune vie économique. Il
soutient qu’elles ne se prêtent pas à l’habitation humaine oxu à une vie éco -
nomique propre et que, par conséquent, elles constituent des rochers xvisés
par l’exception énoncée au paragraphe 3 de l’article 121 de la convention. Il
en conclut qu’elles engendrent des droits non pas à une zone écxonomique
exclusive ou à un plateau continental, mais seulement à une mer texrritoriale.
172. En outre, le Nicaragua soutient que, pour parvenir à une solution
équitable, la question du chevauchement des espaces revendiqués auxtour de
ces îles doit être résolue par l’enclavement de chacune d’xelles dans un rayon
de 3 milles marins à partir de ses lignes de base. A l’appui de cextte préten-
tion, il fait référence à un certain nombre d’affaires danxs lesquelles la Cour
elle-même et des tribunaux arbitraux n’auraient attribué aux îlesx et forma -
tions maritimes de petite taille qu’une mer territoriale réduite.
*
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6 CIJ1034.indb 133 7/01/14 12:43 689 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
173. Colombia maintains that Alburquerque Cays, East-Southeast
Cays, Roncador, Serrana, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo are islands which
have the same maritime entitlements as any other land territory, includixng
an entitlement to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, an exclusive eco -
nomic zone and a continental shelf. Colombia points to the presence on
Alburquerque (North Cay), East-Southeast Cays, Roncador, Serrana and
Serranilla of housing for detachments of Colombian armed forces and
other facilities, on several of the islands of communication facilities xand
heliports, and on some of them of activities by local fishermen. It maxin -
tains that all of the islands are capable of sustaining human habitationx or
economic life of their own and would thus fall outside the exception in
Article 121, paragraph 3.
174. So far as the entitlement of each island to a territorial sea is con -
cerned, Colombia denies that there is any basis in law for Nicaragua’xs
proposal that the territorial sea surrounding each island can be restricted
to 3 nautical miles. Colombia maintains that the entitlement of an island,
even one which falls within the exception stated in Article 121, para -
graph 3, to a territorial sea is the same as that of any other land territory x
and that, in accordance with the customary international law principle
now codified in Article 3 of UNCLOS, a State may establish a territorial
sea of up to 12 nautical miles from its territory, something which Colom -
bia has done. According to Colombia, where the entitlement to a territo -
rial sea of one State overlaps with the entitlement of another State to xa
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, the former must always
prevail, because the sovereignty of a State over its territorial sea takxes
priority over the rights which a State enjoys over its continental shelfx and
exclusive economic zone.
* *
175. The Court begins by recalling that Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo fall
outside the relevant area as defined in the preceding section of the Judg -
ment and that it is accordingly not called upon in the present proceedinxgs
to determine the scope of their maritime entitlements. The Court also
notes that, in the area within 200 nautical miles of Nicaragua’s coasts, the
200-nautical-mile entitlements projecting from San Andrés, Providencia
and Santa Catalina would in any event entirely overlap any similar enti -
tlement found to appertain to Serranilla or Bajo Nuevo.
176. With regard to Alburquerque Cays, East-Southeast Cays, Ronca -
dor, Serrana, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo, the starting-point is that
“[i]n accordance with Article 121, paragraph 2, of the 1982 Conven -
tion on the Law of the Sea, which reflects customary international
law, islands, regardless of their size, in this respect enjoy the same
69
6 CIJ1034.indb 134 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 689
173. La Colombie soutient pour sa part que les cayes d’Alburquerque,
les cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est, Roncador, Serrana, Serranilla et Bajo Nuevo
sont des îles qui engendrent des droits à des espaces maritimes aux même
titre que tout autre territoire terrestre, c’est-à-dire des droits à une mer
territoriale d’une largeur de 12 milles marins, à une zone économique
exclusive et à un plateau continental. Elle signale l’existence de structures
d’hébergement à l’intention des détachements militaires cxolombiens, ainsi
que d’autres installations sur Alburquerque (North Cay), les cayes de
l’Est-Sud-Est, Roncador, Serrana et Serranilla, d’installations de commu-
nication et d’héliports sur plusieurs des îles, et d’activitxés liées à la pêche
locale sur certaines d’entre elles. Elle soutient que toutes les îles se prêtent
à l’habitation humaine ou à une vie économique propre et ne sont donc
pas visées par l’exception prévue au paragraphe 3 de l’article 121.
174. S’agissant du droit à une mer territoriale que pourrait engendrer x
chacune des îles, la Colombie tient pour dénuée de tout fondemexnt juri -
dique la proposition du Nicaragua tendant à en limiter la largeur à
3 milles marins. Elle fait valoir que toute île, même lorsqu’ellex tombe sous
le coup de l’exception énoncée au paragraphe 3 de l’article 121, ouvre
droit à une mer territoriale au même titre que tout autre territoixre ter -
restre et que, en conformité avec le principe de droit international xcoutu-
mier désormais codifié à l’article 3 de la CNUDM, tout Etat peut fixer à
12 milles marins la largeur de sa mer territoriale à partir de sa côtxe, ce
qu’a fait la Colombie. Selon cette dernière, en cas de chevauchemexnt, les
droits d’un Etat sur sa mer territoriale doivent toujours prévaloixr sur les
droits de tout autre Etat à une zone économique exclusive ou à xun pla -
teau continental, puisque la souveraineté de l’Etat sur sa mer terxritoriale
l’emporte sur les droits de l’autre Etat sur son plateau continental et sa
zone économique exclusive.
* *
175. A titre liminaire, la Cour rappelle que Serranilla et Bajo Nuevo se
trouvent à l’extérieur de la zone pertinente, telle que défixnie dans la sec -
tion précédente du présent arrêt, et que, en conséquence,x elle n’a pas à se
prononcer, en l’espèce, sur la portée des droits à des espacxes maritimes
que ces formations pourraient engendrer. Elle note également que, danxs
la zone s’étendant sur 200 milles marins à partir des côtes nicara -
guayennes, les droits générés par San Andrés, Providencia et Santa Cata -
lina sur 200 milles marins recouvriraient de toute façon entièrement ceux
que pourraient engendrer Serranilla ou Bajo Nuevo.
176. S’agissant des cayes d’Alburquerque, des cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est,
de Roncador, de Serrana, de Serranilla et de Bajo Nuevo, il convient de
partir du principe que,
«[c]onformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 121 de la convention
de 1982 sur le droit de la mer, qui reflète le droit international couxtu-
mier, les îles, quelles que soient leurs dimensions, jouissent à cxet
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6 CIJ1034.indb 135 7/01/14 12:43 690 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
status, and therefore generate the same maritime rights, as other land
territory” (Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between
Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2001, p. 97, para. 185).
It inevitably follows that a comparatively small island may give an entixtl-e
ment to a considerable maritime area. Moreover, even an island which
falls within the exception stated in Article 121, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS
is entitled to a territorial sea.
177. That entitlement to a territorial sea is the same as that of any
other land territory. Whatever the position might have been in the past,x
international law today sets the breadth of the territorial sea which thxe
coastal State has the right to establish at 12 nautical miles. Article 3 of
UNCLOS reflects the current state of customary international law on thxis
point. The Court notes that Colombia has established a 12-nautical-mile
territorial sea in respect of all its territories (as has Nicaragua). xWhile the
territorial sea of a State may be restricted, as envisaged in Article 15 of
UNCLOS, in circumstances where it overlaps with the territorial sea of
another State, there is no such overlap in the present case. Instead, thxe
overlap is between the territorial sea entitlement of Colombia derived
from each island and the entitlement of Nicaragua to a continental shelfx
and exclusive economic zone. The nature of those two entitlements is difx -
ferent. In accordance with long-established principles of customary inter -
national law, a coastal State possesses sovereignty over the sea bed andx
water column in its territorial sea (ibid., p. 93, para. 174). By contrast,
coastal States enjoy specific rights, rather than sovereignty, with respect
to the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone.
178. The Court has never restricted the right of a State to establish a
territorial sea of 12 nautical miles around an island on the basis of an
overlap with the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone entitle -
ments of another State. In the case concerning Territorial and Maritime
Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicara ‑
gua v. Honduras), Nicaragua argued that the four small islands which the
Court had held belonged to Honduras (Bobel Cay, South Cay, Savanna
Cay and Port Royal Cay) should be accorded a territorial sea of only
3 nautical miles in order to prevent them having an inequitable effect oxn
the entitlement of Nicaragua to a continental shelf and exclusive eco -
nomic zone, whereas Honduras maintained that it was entitled to a
12-nautical-mile territorial sea around each island, save where that terri -
torial sea overlapped with the territorial sea of one of Nicaragua’s xterrito -
ries. The Court found for Honduras on this point :
“The Court notes that by virtue of Article 3 of UNCLOS Hondu -
ras has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to xa
limit of 12 nautical miles be that for its mainland or for islands under
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6 CIJ1034.indb 136 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 690
égard du même statut, et par conséquent engendrent les mêmesx
droits en mer que les autres territoires possédant la qualité de terre
ferme » (Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et
Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 97,
par. 185).
Il s’ensuit qu’une île de taille relativement réduite peut ouvrir droit à un
espace maritime considérable. Par ailleurs, même une île tombanxt sous le
coup de l’exception prévue au paragraphe 3 de l’article 121 de la CNUDM
ouvre droit à une mer territoriale.
177. Ce droit à une mer territoriale est le même que pour tout autre
territoire terrestre. Quelle qu’ait pu être la règle dans le passé, le droit
international fixe de nos jours à 12 milles marins la largeur de la mer ter -
ritoriale dont peut se prévaloir l’Etat côtier, et l’articlex 3 de la CNUDM
reflète l’état actuel du droit international coutumier sur cex point. La Cour
constate que la Colombie s’est approprié une mer territoriale d’xune lar -
geur de 12 milles marins autour de tous ses territoires (tout comme le
Nicaragua). Or, si la mer territoriale d’un Etat peut être restrexinte dans le
cas où elle chevauche la mer territoriale d’un autre Etat, comme lxe prévoit
l’article 15 de la CNUDM, tel n’est pas le cas en l’espèce. Il y a toutefxois
chevauchement de la mer territoriale revendiquée par la Colombie autoxur
de chacune de ses îles avec le plateau continental et la zone éconxomique
exclusive auxquels peut prétendre le Nicaragua. Les droits en cause ici
sont de nature différente : conformément à des principes bien établis en
droit international coutumier, l’Etat côtier a la souveraineté xsur le fond
de la mer et la colonne d’eau surjacente dans les limites de sa mer txerrito -
riale (ibid., p. 93, par. 174), tandis qu’il se voit reconnaître des droits spé -
cifiques, et non la souveraineté, sur le plateau continental et la zone
économique exclusive.
178. La Cour n’a jamais restreint le droit d’un Etat de fixer à 12xmilles
marins la largeur de la mer territoriale entourant une île en raison xd’un
chevauchement avec la zone économique exclusive et le plateau continexn -
tal d’un autre Etat. Dans l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime entre
le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Hon ‑
duras), le Nicaragua avait fait valoir que les quatre îles de petites dimenx-
sions dont la Cour avait jugé qu’elles appartenaient au Honduras
(Bobel Cay, South Cay, Savanna Cay et Port Royal Cay) devaient se voir
reconnaître une mer territoriale d’une largeur limitée à troxis milles marins,
afin de ne pas avoir d’effet inéquitable sur ses droits à uxn plateau conti -
nental et à une zone économique exclusive. De son côté, le Hxonduras
soutenait avoir droit à une mer territoriale de 12 milles marins autour de
chacune des îles en question, sauf là où cette mer territoriale empiéterait
sur celle engendrée par l’un des territoires nicaraguayens. La Couxr a
donné raison au Honduras sur ce point :
«La Cour relève que, en vertu de l’article 3 de la CNUDM, le
Honduras a le droit de fixer à 12 milles marins la largeur de sa mer
territoriale, tant pour son territoire continental que pour les îles rele -
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6 CIJ1034.indb 137 7/01/14 12:43 691 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
its sovereignty. In the current proceedings Honduras claims for the
four islands in question a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles. The
Court thus finds that, subject to any overlap between the territorial sea
around Honduran islands and the territorial sea around Nicaraguan
islands in the vicinity, Bobel Cay, Savanna Cay, Port Royal Cay and
South Cay shall be accorded a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles.”
(Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaraguav. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J.Reports
2007 (II), p. 751, para. 302 ; emphasis added.)
Other tribunals have adopted the same approach. For example, the Court
of Arbitration in the Dubai‑Sharjah Border Arbitration (1981) (Interna ‑
tional Law Reports (ILR), Vol. 91, p. 543) rejected Dubai’s submission
that the territorial sea around the island of Abu Musa should be limitedx
to 3 nautical miles. The Court of Arbitration held that “every island, no x
matter how small, has its belt of territorial sea” and that the extent of that
belt was 12 nautical miles except where it overlapped with the territorial
sea entitlement of another State (p. 674). Most recently, ITLOS held, in
the Bay of Bengal case, that
“Bangladesh has the right to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea arounxd
St. Martin’s Island in the area where such territorial sea no longer
overlaps with Myanmar’s territorial sea. A conclusion to the contraryx
would result in giving more weight to the sovereign rights and juris -
diction of Myanmar in its exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf than to the sovereignty of Bangladesh over its territorial sea.”
(Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myan ‑
mar), Judgment of 14 March 2012, ITLOS, pp. 55-56, para. 169.)
179. Since the entitlement to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea became
established in international law, those judgments and awards in which
small islands have been accorded a territorial sea of less than 12 nautical
miles have invariably involved either an overlap between the territorialx sea
entitlements of States (e.g., the treatment accorded by the Court to thxe
island of Qit’at Jaradah in Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 109, para. 219) or the presence of a historic or
agreed boundary (e.g., the treatment of the island of Alcatraz by the Cxourt
of Arbitration in the Guinea‑Guinea Bissau Maritime Delimitation Case
(1985), RIAA, Vol. XIX, p. 190 (French) ; ILR, Vol. 77, p. 635 (English)).
180. The Court cannot, therefore, accept Nicaragua’s submission that
an equitable solution can be achieved by drawing a 3-nautical-mile
enclave around each of these islands. It concludes that Roncador, Ser -
rana, the Alburquerque Cays and East-Southeast Cays are each entitled
to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, irrespective of whether they fall
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6 CIJ1034.indb 138 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 691
vant de sa souveraineté. Le Honduras demande en l’espèce, pour xles
quatre îles en cause, une mer territoriale de 12 milles marins. La
Cour estime donc que, sous réserve d’éventuels chevauchements entre
les mers territoriales situées respectivement autour d’îles hon▯duriennes
et d’îles nicaraguayennes se trouvant alentour, Bobel Cay,
Savanna Cay, Port Royal Cay et South Cay doivent se voir accorder
une mer territoriale de 12 milles marins. » (Différend territorial et
maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes
(Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 751,
par. 302; les italiques sont de la Cour.)
Cette position est également celle d’autres juridictions. Ainsi, lxe tribunal
arbitral saisi de l’affaire du Différend frontalier entre Doubaï et Chard‑
jah (1981) (International Law Reports (ILR), vol. 91, p. 543) a rejeté la
prétention de Doubaï selon laquelle la mer territoriale entourant
Abou Moussa devait être limitée à 3 milles marins. Il a déclaré que « toute
île, si petite soit-elle, posséd[ait] une ceinture de mer territoriale » dont la
largeur était de 12 milles marins, sauf là où elle chevauchait la mer terri -
toriale à laquelle pouvait prétendre un autre Etat (p. 674) [traduction du
Greffe]. Très récemment, dans l’affaire du Golfe du Bengale, le TIDM a
constaté que
«le Bangladesh a[vait] droit à une mer territoriale de 12 milles autour
de l’île de Saint-Martin dans la zone où sa mer territoriale ne che -
vauch[ait] plus la mer territoriale du Myanmar. Le contraire revien -
drait à accorder davantage de poids aux droits souverains et à la x
juridiction du Myanmar dans sa zone économique exclusive et sur
son plateau continental qu’à la souveraineté du Bangladesh sur xsa
mer territoriale. » (Différend relatif à la délimitation de la frontière
maritime entre le Bangladesh et le Myanmar dans le golfe du Bengale,
arrêt du 14 mars 2012, TIDM, par. 169.)
179. Depuis que le droit à une mer territoriale d’une largeur de
12 milles marins est établi en droit international, chaque fois qu’unx arrêt
ou une sentence a attribué à une île de petite taille une mer txerritoriale
d’une largeur inférieure, c’était soit parce qu’elle empixétait sur la mer ter-
ritoriale d’un autre Etat (c’était le cas, par exemple, de l’xîle de Qit’at Ja-a
dah dans l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime et des questions territoriales
entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001,
p. 109, par. 219), soit parce qu’il existait une frontière historique ou
convenue (comme c’était le cas pour l’île d’Alcatraz danxs l’Affaire de la
délimitation de la frontière maritime entre la Guinée et la Guinée‑Bissau
(1985), RSA, vol. XIX, p. 190 (français) ; ILR, vol. 77, p. 635 (anglais)).
180. La Cour ne peut donc souscrire à la prétention du Nicaragua selon
laquelle la solution équitable consisterait à tracer autour de chaxcune des
îles en cause une enclave d’un rayon de 3 milles marins. Elle conclut que
toutes les formations en question — Roncador, Serrana, les cayes
d’Alburquerque et les cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est — ouvrent droit à une mer
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6 CIJ1034.indb 139 7/01/14 12:43 692 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
within the exception stated in Article 121, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS.
Whether or not any of these islands falls within the scope of that excepx -
tion is therefore relevant only to the extent that it is necessary to dexter -
mine if they are entitled to a continental shelf and exclusive economic x
zone. In that context, the Court notes that the whole of the relevant arxea
lies within 200 nautical miles of one or more of the islands of San Andrés,
Providencia or Santa Catalina, each of which — the Parties agree — is
entitled to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. The Court
recalls that, faced with a similar situation in respect of Serpents’ xIsland in
the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case, it considered it unneces -
sary to determine whether that island fell within paragraph 2 or para -
graph 3 of Article 121 of UNCLOS (Maritime Delimitation in the Black
Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, pp. 122-123,
para. 187). In the present case, the Court similarly concludes that it is notx
necessary to determine the precise status of the smaller islands, since xany
entitlement to maritime spaces which they might generate within the rel -
evant area (outside the territorial sea) would entirely overlap with txhe
entitlement to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone generatedx
by the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina.
C. Quitasueño
181. The Court has already set out (paragraphs 27-38 above) the rea -
sons which lead it to find that one of the features at Quitasueño, xnamely
QS 32, is above water at high tide and thus constitutes an island within
the definition embodied in Article 121, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS and
that the other 53 features identified at Quitasueño are low-tide elevations.
The Court must now consider what entitlement to a maritime space
Colombia derives from its title to QS 32.
182. For the reasons already given (paragraphs 176-180 above),
Colombia is entitled to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles around QS 32.
Moreover, in measuring that territorial sea, Colombia is entitled to relxy
upon the rule stated in Article 13 of UNCLOS :
“Low-tide elevations
1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is
surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at
high tide. Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly
at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from
the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation
may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the
territorial sea.
2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceed-
ing the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an
island, it has no territorial sea of its own.”
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6 CIJ1034.indb 140 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 692
territoriale d’une largeur de 12 milles marins, indépendamment de la ques-
tion de savoir si elles tombent sous le coup de l’exception prévuex au para-
graphe 3 de l’article 121 de la CNUDM, question qui n’entre en jeu que
pour déterminer si elles peuvent engendrer des droits à un plateaux conti-
nental et à une zone économique exclusive. A cet égard, la Courx remarque
que l’ensemble de la zone pertinente se trouve à moins de 200milles marins
d’une ou plusieurs des îles de San Andrés, Providencia ou Santa Catalina,
les Parties étant d’accord pour dire que chacune d’elles génxère un droit à
un plateau continental et à une zone économique exclusive. La Courx rap-
pellera que, confrontée à une situation similaire en ce qui concerxne l’île des
Serpents dans l’affaire relative à laDélimitation maritime en mer Noire, elle
n’a pas jugé nécessaire de déterminer si cette île relevaxit des paragraphes 2
ou 3 de l’article 121 de la CNUDM (Délimitation maritime en mer Noire
(Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 122-123, par. 187).
En la présente affaire, la Cour conclut également qu’il n’xest pas nécessaire
de déterminer la nature exacte des îles de plus faibles dimensions, puisque
tout droit que celles-ci pourraient engendrer dans la zone pertinente sur
des espaces situés au-delà de la mer territoriale serait entièrement couvert
par le droit à un plateau continental et à une zone économique xexclusive
généré par les îles de San Andrés, Providencia et Santa Catalina.
C. Quitasueño
181. La Cour a déjà exposé (paragraphes 27-38 ci-dessus) les raisons
qui l’ont amenée à conclure que l’une des formations de Quitxasueño, en
l’occurrence QS 32, restait découverte à marée haute et était par consé -
quent une île au sens de la définition énoncée au paragrapxhe 1 de l’ar -
ticle 121 de la CNUDM, et que les 53 autres formations recensées à
Quitasueño étaient des hauts-fonds découvrants. Il lui incombe à présent
d’examiner la question du droit à des espaces maritimes auquel peuxt pré-
tendre la Colombie au titre de sa souveraineté sur QS 32.
182. Pour les motifs déjà exposés (paragraphes 176-180 ci-dessus), la
Colombie peut prétendre à une mer territoriale de 12 milles marins autour
de QS 32. Elle est par ailleurs en droit, afin de mesurer cette mer territo -
riale, de s’appuyer sur la règle énoncée à l’article 13 de la CNUDM :
« Hauts-fonds découvrants
1. Par «hauts-fonds découvrants», on entend les élévations naturelles
de terrain qui sont entourées par la mer, découvertes à maréxe basse
et recouvertes à marée haute. Lorsque des hauts-fonds découvrants
se trouvent, entièrement ou en partie, à une distance du continentx
ou d’une île ne dépassant pas la largeur de la mer territorialex, la
laisse de basse mer sur ces hauts-fonds peut être prise comme ligne
de base pour mesurer la largeur de la mer territoriale.
2. Lorsque des hauts-fonds découvrants se trouvent entièrement à une
distance du continent ou d’une île qui dépasse la largeur de lax mer
territoriale, ils n’ont pas de mer territoriale qui leur soit propxe.»
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6 CIJ1034.indb 141 7/01/14 12:43 693 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
The Court has held that this provision reflects customary internationaxl
law (Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 100,
para. 201). Colombia is therefore entitled to use those low-tide elevations
within 12 nautical miles of QS 32 for the purpose of measuring the
breadth of its territorial sea. Colombia’s pleadings in the present case
make clear that it has exercised this right and has used all the features
identified in the Smith Report in measuring the breadth of the territoxrial
sea around Quitasueño.
183. The Court observes that all but two of the low-tide elevations on
Quitasueño (QS 53 and QS 54) are within 12 nautical miles of QS 32.
Thus the territorial sea around Quitasueño extends from those low-tide
elevations located within 12 nautical miles of QS 32, the position of which
means that they contribute to the baseline from which the breadth of thex
territorial sea is measured. It has not been suggested by either Party txhat
QS 32 is anything other than a rock which is incapable of sustaining
human habitation or economic life of its own under Article 121, para -
graph 3, of UNCLOS, so this feature generates no entitlement to a conti -
nental shelf or exclusive economic zone.
6. Method of Delimitation
184. The Court will now turn to the methodology to be employed in
effecting the delimitation. On this subject, the Parties express markexdly
different views.
* *
185. Nicaragua maintains that the geographical context is such that it
would not be appropriate for the Court to follow the approach which it
normally employs, namely to establish a provisional equidistance/median
line, then analyse whether there exist relevant circumstances requiring xan
adjustment or shifting of that line and, finally, test the adjusted lixne to see
whether the result which it would produce is disproportionate. For Nicara -
gua, the act of constructing a provisional equidistance line between the
Nicaraguan coast and the west-facing coasts of the Colombian islands
would be wholly artificial. It would treat the islands as though they xwere an
opposing mainland coast, despite the fact that the west-facing coasts of San
Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina are less than one twentieth thxe
length of the mainland coast of Nicaragua and the islands which would be
used in the construction of the provisional equidistance/median line arex
situated at a considerable distance from one another. Moreover, Nicaraguxa
maintains that a provisional equidistance/median line would completely
disregard the substantial part of the relevant area which lies to the eaxst of
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La Cour a considéré que cette disposition reflétait le droit xinternational
coutumier (Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et
Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 100, par. 201).
La Colombie est dès lors en droit de tenir compte de ces hauts-fonds
découvrants, qui se trouvent à moins de 12 milles marins de QS 32, pour
mesurer la largeur de sa mer territoriale. Il ressort clairement des expxosés
présentés par la Colombie dans la présente affaire que celle-ci a exercé ce
droit et qu’elle s’est servie de toutes les formations recenséexs dans le rap-
port Smith pour mesurer la largeur de la mer territoriale entourant Qui -
tasueño.
183. La Cour constate que, à l’exception de deux hauts-fonds décou -
vrants (QS 53 et QS 54), toutes les formations maritimes situées sur Qui -
tasueño se trouvent dans un rayon de 12 milles marins de QS 32. Ainsi, la
largeur de la mer territoriale autour de Quitasueño s’étend àx partir des
hauts-fonds découvrants se trouvant dans un rayon de 12 milles marins
de QS 32 qui, de par leur position, peuvent servir au tracé de la ligne de
base à partir de laquelle est mesurée la largeur de la mer territoxriale.
Puisque aucune des Parties n’a soutenu que QS 32 est autre chose qu’un
rocher ne se prêtant pas à l’habitation humaine ou à une vie économique
propre, au sens du paragraphe 3 de l’article 121 de la CNUDM, cette
formation ne génère aucun droit à un plateau continental ou àx une zone
économique exclusive.
6. La méthode de délimitation
184. La Cour abordera maintenant la question de la méthode à utiliser
pour effectuer la délimitation. Sur ce point, les Parties ont exprixmé des
vues diamétralement opposées.
* *
185. Le Nicaragua soutient que la situation géographique est telle que la
Cour aurait tort de recourir à la méthode qu’elle utilise habitxuellement et
qui consiste à établir une ligne d’équidistance (ou médixane) provisoire, puis
à examiner s’il existe des circonstances pertinentes justifiant xl’ajustement ou
le déplacement de cette ligne, avant de vérifier si la ligne ainxsi ajustée ab-u
tit à un résultat disproportionné. Pour le Nicaragua, il seraitx tout à fait
artificiel de tracer une ligne d’équidistance provisoire entre lxa côte nicara-
guayenne et les côtes occidentales des îles colombiennes, puisque xcela
reviendrait à considérer les îles comme une côte continentalxe lui faisant
face, alors même que les côtes occidentales de San Andrés, Providencia et
Santa Catalina représentent à peine un vingtième de la longueur de sa côte
continentale à lui, et que les îles susceptibles de servir à lax construction
d’une telle ligne sont situées à une distance considérable lxes unes des autres.
En outre, le Nicaragua fait valoir que le tracé d’une ligne d’éxquidistance
(ou médiane) provisoire aurait pour effet de méconnaître toxtalement la por -
tion importante de la zone pertinente qui se trouve à l’est des îles colom -
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6 CIJ1034.indb 143 7/01/14 12:43 694 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
the Colombian islands, thus leaving some three quarters of the relevant
area on the Colombian side of the line. While Nicaragua recognizes that
the establishment of a provisional equidistance/median line is only the first
step in the methodology normally employed by the Court, it contends thatx,
in the present case, adjustment or shifting of that line would be insuffixcient
to achieve an equitable solution and that a different methodology is
required. Nicaragua notes that in the case concerning Territorial and Mari ‑
time Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nica‑
ragua v. Honduras), the Court stated that there may be factors which make
it inappropriate to use the methodology of constructing a provisional eqxui -
distance/median line and then determining whether there are circumstancexs
requiring its adjustment or shifting (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II),
p. 741, para. 272). Nicaragua maintains that this is such a case.
186. For Nicaragua, the appropriate methodology requires recognition
at the outset that the Colombian islands are very small features and arex
located on what it describes as the Nicaraguan continental shelf. It maixn -
tains that small island features of this kind are frequently given a reduced
effect, or even no effect at all, in maritime delimitation. In thesex circum -
stances, Nicaragua maintains that the appropriate methodology to adopt
is to enclave each of the Colombian islands, while recognizing that, outx -
side these enclaves, the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone
from the Nicaraguan coast to the line 200 nautical miles from the Nicara -
guan baselines would be Nicaraguan. Nicaragua contends that the enclave
approach was employed in respect of the Channel Islands by the Court of x
Arbitration in the case of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French▯
Republic (1977) [hereinafter the Anglo‑French Continental Shelf case]
(RIAA, Vol. XVIII, p. 3 ; ILR, Vol. 54, p. 6), and that it is appropriate in
the present case for the same reasons. Nicaragua also refers to a numberx
of other judgments and arbitration awards in which it maintains that
comparatively small islands were given a reduced maritime space.
*
187. Colombia maintains that the Court should adopt the same meth -
odology it has used for many years in cases regarding maritime delimita -
tion, starting with the construction of a provisional equidistance/mediaxn
line and then adjusting or shifting that line if relevant circumstances xso
require. Colombia acknowledges that the Court has not invariably
employed this method but observes that in the only recent case in which x
the Court departed from it, the case concerning Territorial and Maritime
Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicara ‑
gua v. Honduras), the reason for doing so was that the configuration of
the coastline made the construction of an equidistance line impossible
(Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 743, para. 280). According to
Colombia, nothing in the present case renders the construction of a pro -
visional equidistance/median line impossible or even difficult.
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6 CIJ1034.indb 144 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 694
biennes, ce qui reviendrait à attribuer à la Colombie environ les xtrois quarts
de cette zone. Même s’il reconnaît que l’établissement d’xune ligne d’équidis -
tance (ou médiane) provisoire n’est que la première étape xde la méthode
normalement employée par la Cour, le Nicaragua soutient que, en l’xespèce,
l’ajustement ou le déplacement d’une telle ligne serait insuffixsant pour par -
venir à un résultat équitable, et qu’une méthode difféxrente s’impose. Il fait
remarquer que, dans l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime entre le
Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Hon‑
duras), la Cour a dit que certains facteurs pouvaient rendre inappropriée
l’application de la méthode consistant à établir une ligne d’équidistance
(ou médiane) provisoire pour ensuite examiner s’il existe des circonsxtances
exigeant son ajustement ou son déplacement (arrêt, C.I.JR . ecueil2007 (II),
p. 741, par. 272). Il soutient que tel est le cas en l’espèce.
186. Selon le Nicaragua, la méthode à retenir suppose qu’il soit recxonnu
d’emblée que les îles colombiennes sont des formations minusculxes situées
dans la partie du plateau continental qui lui revient. Le Nicaragua estixme
que ce genre de formations insulaires de petites dimensions ne se voientx
souvent accorder qu’un effet limité, voire aucun effet, dans lxa délimitation
maritime. Dans ces conditions, il soutient que la méthode qu’il convient
d’appliquer consiste à enclaver chacune des îles colombiennes, xtout en
reconnaissant que, hors ces enclaves, les espaces situés entre la côxte nicara-
guayenne et la limite de 200 milles marins calculée à partir de ses lignes de
base et correspondant à son plateau continental et à sa zone écxonomique
exclusive doivent lui être attribués. Il fait valoir que la technixque de l’en-
clavement a été utilisée par le tribunal arbitral à l’éxgard des îles Anglo-
Normandes dans l’affaire de la Délimitation du plateau continental entre
Royaume‑Uni de Grande‑Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord et République f ▯ ran
çaise (1977) (RSA, vol. XVIII, p. 3 ; ILR, vol. 54, p. 6), et que son utilisa -
tion est indiquée en l’espèce pour les mêmes raisons. Il faixt également
référence à nombre d’autres arrêts et sentences où desx îles de dimensions
comparables se seraient vu attribuer un espace maritime réduit.
*
187. La Colombie soutient pour sa part que la Cour devrait s’en tenir
à la méthode qu’elle utilise depuis de nombreuses années en xmatière de
délimitation maritime, qui consiste à établir en premier lieu uxne ligne
d’équidistance (ou médiane) provisoire, puis à l’ajuster ou à la déplacer si
des circonstances pertinentes l’exigent. La Colombie reconnaît qu’xil est
arrivé à la Cour de recourir à d’autres méthodes, mais prxécise que, dans
la seule affaire récente où elle s’est écartée de sa pratique habituelle, celle
du Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans
la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), elle l’a fait parce que la
configuration de la côte rendait impossible l’établissement dx’une ligne
d’équidistance (arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 743, par. 280). Or, selon
la Colombie, rien en l’espèce ne rend la construction d’une ligxne d’équi -
distance (ou médiane) impossible ou même difficile.
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6 CIJ1034.indb 145 7/01/14 12:43 695 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
188. Colombia rejects the enclave approach suggested by Nicaragua as
an unwarranted departure from the approach which, it maintains, has
become standard practice both for the Court and for other international
tribunals, of establishing a provisional equidistance/median line and thxen
examining whether there exist circumstances requiring adjustment or
shifting of that line. It argues that the Anglo‑French Continental Shelf case
is not a relevant precedent, as the Channel Islands were located very clxose
to the French coast, surrounded on three sides by French territory and
the overall context was that of a delimitation between the opposite coasxts
of the United Kingdom and France. According to Colombia, the present
context is entirely different, as its islands are more than 65 nautical miles
from the nearest Nicaraguan territory, face the Nicaraguan coast in onlyx
one direction and the delimitation does not involve the mainland coast oxf
Colombia.
189. In addition, Colombia contends that the enclave methodology
proposed by Nicaragua would fail to take account of Colombia’s entitlxe -
ments, derived from the islands, to the east of the line drawn 200 nautical
miles from the Nicaraguan baselines.
* *
190. The Court has made clear on a number of occasions that the
methodology which it will normally employ when called upon to effect ax
delimitation between overlapping continental shelf and exclusive eco -
nomic zone entitlements involves proceeding in three stages (Continental
Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985,
p. 46, para. 60 ; Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v.
Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 101, paras. 115-116).
191. In the first stage, the Court establishes a provisional delimitation
line between territories (including the island territories) of the Parxties.
In doing so it will use methods that are geometrically objective and
appropriate for the geography of the area. This task will consist of
the construction of an equidistance line, where the relevant coasts are
adjacent, or a median line between the two coasts, where the relevant
coasts are opposite, unless in either case there are compelling reasons xas a
result of which the establishment of such a line is not feasible (see Territo‑
rial and Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2007 (II), p. 745, para. 281). No legal consequences flow from the use of
the terms “median line” and “equidistance line” since the mexthod of delimi-
tation in each case involves constructing a line each point on which is an
equal distance from the nearest points on the two relevant coasts (Mari ‑
time Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 101, para. 116). The line is constructed using the
most appropriate base points on the coasts of the Parties (ibid., p. 101,
paras. 116-117).
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6 CIJ1034.indb 146 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 695
188. La Colombie rejette la solution de l’enclavement proposée par le
Nicaragua, qui romprait de manière injustifiée avec la méthodxe devenue,
selon elle, pratique courante aussi bien pour la Cour que pour d’autres
juridictions internationales et qui consiste à établir une ligne dx’équidistance
(ou médiane) provisoire puis à examiner s’il existe des circonstances appe-
lant un ajustement ou un déplacement de cette ligne. Elle fait valoir que
l’affaire du Plateau continental entre le Royaume‑Uni et la France est sans
rapport avec l’espèce, puisque les îles en question se trouvaiexnt tout près de
la côte française, qu’elles étaient entourées sur trois cxôtés par le territoire
français et que cette affaire s’inscrivait dans le cadre plus vaxste d’une procé
dure de délimitation entre les côtes française et britannique. xSelon la
Colombie, le présent contexte est entièrement différent, en ce que ses îles se
trouvent à plus de 65 milles marins du point le plus rapproché du territoire
nicaraguayen, auquel elles ne font face que dans une seule direction, etx que
sa côte continentale n’est pas en jeu pour les besoins de la déxlimitation.
189. En outre, la Colombie fait valoir que la méthode de l’enclavement
proposée par le Nicaragua ne permet pas la prise en compte des droits
que les îles pourraient générer en sa faveur à l’est de lxa limite de 200milles
marins établie depuis les lignes de base nicaraguayennes.
* *
190. La Cour a dit clairement et à plusieurs reprises que, en cas de
chevauchement de droits à un plateau continental et à une zone éxcono -
mique exclusive, la méthode de délimitation qu’elle entendait exmployer
normalement comportait trois étapes (Plateau continental (Jamahiriya
arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 46, par. 60 ; Délimita ‑
tion maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil
2009, p. 101, par. 115-116).
191. Dans un premier temps, il s’agit pour la Cour d’établir une ligxne
de délimitation provisoire entre les territoires respectifs des Parties
(y compris leurs territoires insulaires). Elle a recours pour ce faire àx des
méthodes à la fois objectives sur le plan géométrique et adaxptées à la
géographie de la zone. Cette tâche consiste à construire une lixgne d’équi -
distance, lorsque les côtes pertinentes sont adjacentes, ou une ligne
médiane entre les deux côtes, lorsque celles-ci se font face, à moins
que, dans un cas comme dans l’autre, des raisons impérieuses ne le per -
mettent pas (voir Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le
Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 745, par. 281). L’emploi des termes « ligne
médiane» et « ligne d’équidistance» est sans incidence en droit puisque la
méthode de délimitation consiste dans chaque cas à tracer une lxigne dont
chaque point se trouve à égale distance des points les plus prochexs des
deux côtes pertinentes (Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie
c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 101, par. 116). La ligne est tra -
cée à partir des points les plus pertinents des côtes des deux Etats concer -
nés (ibid., p. 101, par. 116-117).
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6 CIJ1034.indb 147 7/01/14 12:43 696 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
192. In the second stage, the Court considers whether there are any
relevant circumstances which may call for an adjustment or shifting of txhe
provisional equidistance/median line so as to achieve an equitable resulxt.
If it concludes that such circumstances are present, it establishes a dixffer-
ent boundary which usually entails such adjustment or shifting of the
equidistance/median line as is necessary to take account of those circum -
stances (Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 47, para. 63 ; Maritime Delimitation in the Black
Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, pp. 102-103,
paras. 119-121). Where the relevant circumstances so require, the Court
may also employ other techniques, such as the construction of an enclavex
around isolated islands, in order to achieve an equitable result.
193. In the third and final stage, the Court conducts a disproportional -
ity test in which it assesses whether the effect of the line, as adjusxted or
shifted, is that the Parties’ respective shares of the relevant area are mark -
edly disproportionate to their respective relevant coasts. As the Court x
explained in the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case
“Finally, and at a third stage, the Court will verify that the line (a
provisional equidistance line which may or may not have been
adjusted by taking into account the relevant circumstances) does not,
as it stands, lead to an inequitable result by reason of any marked
disproportion between the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and
the ratio between the relevant maritime area of each State by reference
to the delimitation line . . . A final check for an equitable outcome
entails a confirmation that no great disproportionality of maritime
areas is evident by comparison to the ratio of coastal lengths.
This is not to suggest that these respective areas should be propor -
tionate to coastal lengths — as the Court has said ‘the sharing out of
the area is therefore the consequence of the delimitation, not vice
versa’ (Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan
Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 67,
para. 64).” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania
v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 103, para. 122.)
194. The three-stage process is not, of course, to be applied in a
mechanical fashion and the Court has recognized that it will not be
appropriate in every case to begin with a provisional equidistance/mediaxn
line (see, e.g., Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 741, para. 272). The Court has therefore given
careful consideration to Nicaragua’s argument that the geographical
context of the present case is one in which the Court should not begin bxy
constructing a provisional median line.
195. Unlike the case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute
between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), this is not a case in which the construction of such a line is
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6 CIJ1034.indb 148 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 696
192. A la deuxième étape, il s’agit pour la Cour de déterminer s’xil existe
des circonstances pertinentes qui pourraient appeler un ajustement ou
un déplacement de la ligne d’équidistance (ou médiane) provisxoire afin
d’aboutir à un résultat équitable. Si elle conclut à l’xexistence de telles cir-
constances, elle établit une frontière différente, généxralement en ajustant
ou en déplaçant la ligne d’équidistance (ou médiane), dxe manière à tenir
compte de ces circonstances (Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 47, par. 63 ; Délimitation
maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009,
p. 102-103, par. 119-121). Lorsque les circonstances pertinentes l’exigent,
la Cour peut également recourir à d’autres techniques, comme l’enclave -
ment d’îles isolées, de manière à aboutir à un résuxltat équitable.
193. La troisième et dernière étape consiste pour la Cour à véxrifier si la
ligne, telle qu’ajustée ou déplacée, a pour effet de créer une disproportion
marquée entre les espaces maritimes attribués à chacune des Parxties dans
la zone pertinente, par rapport à la longueur de leurs côtes pertixnentes
respectives. Comme elle l’a expliqué dans l’affaire de la Délimitation mari ‑
time en mer Noire :
«Enfin, la Cour s’assurera, dans une troisième étape, que la lxigne (une
ligne d’équidistance provisoire ayant ou non été ajustée en fonction des
circonstances pertinentes) ne donne pas lieu, en l’état, à un xrésultat
inéquitable du fait d’une disproportion marquée entre le rapporxt des
longueurs respectives des côtes et le rapport des zones maritimes perxti -
nentes attribuées à chaque Etat par ladite ligne … La vérification finale
du caractère équitable du résultat obtenu doit permettre de s’assurer
qu’aucune disproportion marquée entre les zones maritimes ne ressoxrt
de la comparaison avec le rapport des longueurs des côtes.
Cela ne signifie toutefois pas que les zones ainsi attribuées à xchaque
Etat doivent être proportionnelles aux longueurs des côte:sainsi que la
Cour l’a indiqué, «c’est … le partage de la région qui résulte de la déli -
mitation et non l’inverse» (Délimitation maritime dans la région située
entre le Groenland et Jan Mayen (Danemark c. Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1993, p. 67, par. 64). » (Délimitation maritime en mer Noire
(Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 103, par. 122.)
194. Bien entendu, cette démarche en trois temps ne doit pas être appli -
quée de façon mécanique, et la Cour a reconnu qu’il ne seraixt peut-être pas
toujours opportun de commencer par l’établissement d’une ligne xd’équi -
distance (ou médiane) provisoire (voir, par exemple, Différend territorial et
maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (N ▯ ica‑
ragua c. Honduras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 741, par. 272). Aussi
la Cour a-t-elle examiné avec beaucoup de soin l’argument du Nicaragua
selon lequel la situation géographique de l’espèce rendait inopportun le
tracé d’une ligne médiane provisoire à titre de point de déxpart.
195. Contrairement à ce qui avait été le cas en l’affaire du Différend
territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer de▯s
Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), en l’espèce, l’établissement d’une ligne
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6 CIJ1034.indb 149 7/01/14 12:43 697 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
not feasible. The Nicaraguan coast (including the Nicaraguan islands) x
and the west-facing coasts of the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and
Santa Catalina, as well as the Alburquerque Cays, stand in a relationshixp
of opposite coasts at a distance which is nowhere less than 65 nautical
miles (the distance from Little Corn Island to the Alburquerque Cays).x
There is no difficulty in constructing a provisional line equidistant fxrom
base points on these two coasts. The question is not whether the construxc -
tion of such a line is feasible but whether it is appropriate as a startx -
ing-point for the delimitation. That question arises because of the unusual x
circumstance that a large part of the relevant area lies to the east of the
principal Colombian islands and, hence, behind the Colombian baseline
from which a provisional median line would have to be measured.
196. The Court recognizes that the existence of overlapping potential
entitlements to the east of the principal Colombian islands, and thus bexhind
the base points on the Colombian side from which the provisional equidisx -
tance/median line is to be constructed, may be a relevant circumstance
requiring adjustment or shifting of the provisional median line. The samxe is
true of the considerable disparity of coastal lengths. These are factors which
have to be considered in the second stage of the delimitation process; they
do not justify discarding the entire methodology and substituting an
approach in which the starting-point is the construction of enclaves for
each island, rather than the construction of a provisional median line. xThe
construction of a provisional median line in the method normally employexd
by the Court is nothing more than a first step and in no way prejudgesx the
ultimate solution which must be designed to achieve an equitable result.x As
the Court said in the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case :
“At this initial stage of the construction of the provisional equidisx -
tance line the Court is not yet concerned with any relevant circumstancexs
that may obtain and the line is plotted on strictly geometrical criteriax on
the basis of objective data.” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romaniav.Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p.101, para.118.)
197. The various considerations advanced by Nicaragua in support of
a different methodology are factors which the Court will have to take xinto
account in the second stage of the process, when it will consider whethexr
those factors call for adjustment or shifting of the provisional median xline
and, if so, in what way. Following this approach does not preclude very x
substantial adjustment to, or shifting of, the provisional line in an apxpro -
priate case, nor does it preclude the use of enclaving in those areas whxere
the use of such a technique is needed to achieve an equitable result. Byx
contrast, the approach suggested by Nicaragua entails starting with a
solution in which what Nicaragua perceives as the most relevant consid -
erations have already been taken into account and in which the outcome
is to a large extent pre-ordained.
198. The Court does not consider that the award of the Court of Arbi -
tration in the Anglo‑French Continental Shelf case calls for the Court to
abandon its usual methodology. That award, which was rendered in 1977
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6 CIJ1034.indb 150 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 697
médiane n’est pas impossible. La côte du Nicaragua (y compris les îles
nicaraguayennes) et les côtes occidentales des îles de San Andrés, Provi -
dencia et Santa Catalina, ainsi que des cayes d’Alburquerque, se font face
à une distance qui n’est nulle part inférieure à 65 milles marins (soit la
distance séparant Mangle Chico des cayes d’Alburquerque). Il n’xy a donc
aucun obstacle à la construction d’une ligne provisoire située xà équidis -
tance des points de base situés sur ces deux côtes. La question n’xest donc
pas de savoir si le tracé d’une telle ligne est possible, mais s’xil constitue un
point de départ approprié pour la délimitation, étant donnéx qu’une partie
importante de la zone pertinente se trouve à l’est des îles colxombiennes
principales, c’est-à-dire — fait inhabituel — derrière la ligne de base à
partir de laquelle serait établie la ligne médiane provisoire.
196. La Cour reconnaît que l’existence d’un chevauchement potentiel
de droits à l’est des îles colombiennes principales, c’est-à-dire derrière les
points de base à partir desquels, du côté colombien, serait traxcée la ligne
d’équidistance (ou médiane), pourrait constituer une circonstxance perti -
nente exigeant d’ajuster la ligne médiane provisoire ou de la déxplacer. Il en
va de même de l’importante disparité entre la longueur des côtes en cause.
Ces facteurs doivent effectivement être pris en considération àx la deuxième
étape du processus de délimitation, mais ils ne sauraient justifixer que la
méthode soit rejetée au profit d’une autre dont le point de dxépart consis-
terait à enclaver chacune des îles plutôt qu’à établirx une ligne médiane
provisoire. Selon la méthode normalement employée par la Cour, la
construction d’une telle ligne n’est qu’une première étapxe et ne compromet
en rien la recherche d’un résultat équitable. La Cour s’est xexprimée comme
suit dans l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire :
«A ce stade, la Cour ne s’intéresse pas encore aux éventuelles cxir -
constances pertinentes, et la ligne est tracée selon des critères xstricte-
ment géométriques, sur la base de données objectives. » (Délimitation
maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil
2009, p. 101, par. 118.)
197. Les diverses considérations avancées par le Nicaragua pour justi -
fier le recours à une méthode différente sont des facteurs xque la Cour devra
prendre en considération à la deuxième étape du processus, axfin de décider
s’ils appellent un ajustement ou un déplacement de la ligne médxiane provi -
soire et de quelle manière. La méthode retenue par la Cour n’emxpêche pas
que la ligne provisoire soit très sensiblement ajustée ou déplaxcée lorsque
cela est justifié, ni qu’il soit procédé à l’enclavexment de certaines forma -
tions dans les portions de la zone pertinente où il est nécessairex de recourir
à cette technique pour aboutir à un résultat équitable. La mxéthode pro-
posée par le Nicaragua part au contraire d’une solution dans laquexlle les
considérations que celui-ci juge les plus pertinentes ont déjà été prises en
compte et dont le résultat est dans une large mesure prédétermixné.
198. La Cour ne croit pas devoir renoncer à sa méthode habituelle en
raison de la sentence rendue dans l’affaire du Plateau continental entre le
Royaume‑Uni et la France, sentence qui remonte à 1977, c’est-à-dire long -
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6 CIJ1034.indb 151 7/01/14 12:43 698 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
and thus some time before the Court established the methodology which
it now employs in cases of maritime delimitation, was concerned with a
quite different geographical context from that in the present case, a xpoint
to which the Court will return. It began with the construction of a provxi-
sional equidistance/median line between the two mainland coasts and
then enclaved the Channel Islands because they were located on the
“wrong” side of that line (Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French▯
Republic (1977), RIAA, Vol. XVIII, p. 88, para. 183 ; ILR, Vol. 54, p. 96).
For present purposes, however, what is important is that the Court of
Arbitration did not employ enclaving as an alternative methodology to
the construction of a provisional equidistance/median line, but rather
used it in conjunction with such a line.
199. Accordingly, the Court will proceed in the present case, in accor -
dance with its standard method, in three stages, beginning with the con -
struction of a provisional median line.
7. Determination of Base Points and Construction
of the Provisional Median Line
200. The Court will thus begin with the construction of a provisional
median line between the Nicaraguan coast and the western coasts of the
relevant Colombian islands, which are opposite to the Nicaraguan coast. x
This task requires the Court to determine which coasts are to be taken
into account and, in consequence, what base points are to be used in thex
construction of the line. In this connection, the Court notes that Nicarxa -
gua has not notified the Court of any base points on its coast. By conx -
trast, Colombia has indicated on maps the location of the base points
which it has used in the construction of its proposed median line (withx -
out, however, providing their co-ordinates) (see sketch-map No. 3 : Deli-
mitation claimed by Colombia, p. 673). Those base points include two
base points on Alburquerque Cays, several base points on the west coast x
of San Andrés and Providencia, one base point on Low Cay, a small cayx
to the north of Santa Catalina, and several base points on Quitasueñox. As
the Court noted in the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case
“In . . . the delimitation of the maritime areas involving two or
more States, the Court should not base itself solely on the choice of
base points made by one of those Parties. The Court must, when
delimiting the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones, select
base points by reference to the physical geography of the relevant
coasts.” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v.
Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 108, para. 137.)
The Court will accordingly proceed to construct its provisional median
line by reference to the base points which it considers appropriate.
201. The Court has already decided that the islands adjacent to the
Nicaraguan coast are part of the relevant coast and contribute to the
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temps avant que ne soit mise au point la méthode qu’elle applique xde nos
jours dans les affaires de délimitation maritime. Dans cette affaxire, la
situation géographique était sensiblement différente, et la Cxour reviendra
sur ce point. Le tribunal arbitral a commencé par construire une lignxe
d’équidistance (ou médiane) provisoire entre les deux côtexs continentales,
avant de procéder à l’enclavement des îles Anglo-Normandes, parce que
celles-ci se trouvaient du « mauvais» côté de la ligne en question (Délimi ‑
tation du plateau continental entre Royaume‑Uni de Grande‑Bretagne et
d’Irlande du Nord et République française (1977), RSA, vol. XVIII,
p. 223-224, par. 183 ; ILR, vol. 54, p. 96). Ce qui importe pour les besoins
de l’espèce, c’est que le tribunal a eu recours à l’enclaxvement non pas
comme méthode de substitution à la construction d’une ligne d’xéquidis -
tance (ou médiane) provisoire mais en association avec celle-ci.
199. Par conséquent, conformément à sa méthode de référence, la
Cour procédera en l’espèce en trois étapes, en commençantx par tracer une
ligne médiane provisoire.
7. La détermination des points de base et la construction
de la ligne médiane provisoire
200. La Cour commencera donc par tracer une ligne médiane provi -
soire entre la côte nicaraguayenne et les côtes occidentales des îxles colom-
biennes pertinentes qui lui font face. A cet effet, la Cour doit déterminer
les côtes qu’il convient de prendre en compte et, de ce fait, les xpoints de
base qu’il y a lieu de retenir aux fins de la construction de la lixgne. Elle
remarque à cet égard que le Nicaragua ne lui a soumis aucun point xde
base sur son littoral. La Colombie, en revanche, a indiqué sur des caxrtes
(sans toutefois en préciser les coordonnées) l’emplacement de ceux qu’elle
avait utilisés pour tracer la ligne médiane qu’elle propose (vxoir le croquis
n 3: Délimitation revendiquée par la Colombie, p. 673): elle a ainsi
retenu deux points de base sur les cayes d’Alburquerque, plusieurs suxr la
côte occidentale de San Andrés et de Providencia, un sur Low Cay, petite
caye située au nord de Santa Catalina, et plusieurs sur Quitasueño. Tou -
tefois, comme la Cour l’a dit en l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime en
mer Noire,
«Dans le … cas … de la délimitation des zones maritimes concer -
nant deux Etats ou plus, la Cour ne saurait se fonder sur le seul choix x
par l’une des parties de [tels ou tels] points de base. La Cour doit,x
lorsqu’elle délimite le plateau continental et les zones économxiques
exclusives, retenir des points de base par référence à la géxographie
physique des côtes pertinentes. » (Délimitation maritime en mer Noire
(Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 108, par. 137.)
La Cour tracera donc sa ligne médiane provisoire à partir des poinxts de
base qu’elle aura choisi de retenir.
201. Elle a déjà conclu que les îles adjacentes au littoral nicaraguxayen
étaient à prendre en compte aux fins de calculer la longueur de xla côte
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6 CIJ1034.indb 153 7/01/14 12:43 699 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
baselines from which Nicaragua’s entitlements to a continental shelf xand
exclusive economic zone are to be measured (see paragraph 145). Since
the islands are located further east than the Nicaraguan mainland, they x
will contribute all of the base points for the construction of the provix -
sional median line. For that purpose, the Court will use base points
located on Edinburgh Reef, Muerto Cay, Miskitos Cays, Ned Thomas
Cay, Roca Tyra, Little Corn Island and Great Corn Island.
202. So far as the Colombian coast is concerned, the Court considers
that Quitasueño should not contribute to the construction of the provxi -
sional median line. The part of Quitasueño which is undoubtedly abovex
water at high tide is a minuscule feature, barely 1 square m in dimension.
When placing base points on very small maritime features would distort
the relevant geography, it is appropriate to disregard them in the con -
struction of a provisional median line. In the Maritime Delimitation in the
Black Sea case, for example, the Court held that it was inappropriate to
select any base point on Serpents’ Island (which, at 0.17 square km was
very much larger than the part of Quitasueño which is above water at x
high tide), because it lay alone and at a distance of some 20 nautical miles
from the mainland coast of Ukraine, and its use as a part of the relevanxt
coast “would amount to grafting an extraneous element onto Ukraine’xs
coastline; the consequence would be a judicial refashioning of geography,
which neither the law nor practice of maritime delimitation authorizes”x
(Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 110, para. 149). These considerations apply with
even greater force to Quitasueño. In addition to being a tiny featurex, it is
38 nautical miles from Santa Catalina and its use in the construction of
the provisional median line would push that line significantly closer xto
Nicaragua.
Colombia did not place a base point upon Serrana. The Court’s deci -
sion not to place a base point upon Quitasueño means, however, that ixt
must consider whether one should be placed upon Serrana. Although
larger than Quitasueño, Serrana is also a comparatively small featurex,
whose considerable distance from any of the other Colombian islands
means that placing a base point upon it would have a marked effect upoxn
the course of the provisional median line which would be out of all pro -
portion to its size and importance. In the Court’s view, no base poinxt
should be placed on Serrana.
The Court also considers that there should be no base point on Low
Cay, a small uninhabited feature near Santa Catalina.
203. The base points on the Colombian side will, therefore, be located
on Santa Catalina, Providencia and San Andrés islands and on Alburqu -
erque Cays.
204. The provisional median line constructed from these two sets of
base points is, therefore, controlled in the north by the Nicaraguan basxe
points on Edinburgh Reef, Muerto Cay and Miskitos Cays and Colom -
79
6 CIJ1034.indb 154 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 699
pertinente et de tracer la ligne de base à partir de laquelle seraient mesu -
rés le plateau continental et la zone économique exclusive dévoxlus au
Nicaragua (voir paragraphe 145). Ces îles s’avançant plus à l’est que la
masse continentale nicaraguayenne, elles fourniront l’ensemble des poxints
de base aux fins de construire la ligne médiane provisoire. A cet exffet, la
Cour utilisera des points situés sur le récif d’Edimbourg, la cxaye de
Muerto, les cayes des Miskitos, la caye de Ned Thomas, Roca Tyra,
Mangle Chico et Mangle Grande.
202. En ce qui concerne la côte colombienne, la Cour estime que Quita -
sueño ne devrait pas entrer en considération pour le tracé de la ligne
médiane provisoire. La partie de Quitasueño à propos de laquellxe il est
certain qu’elle est découverte à marée haute est une formatixon minuscule,
d’à peine un mètre carré. Or, lorsque des points de base situés sur de très
petites formations pourraient avoir un effet de distorsion eu égardx au
contexte géographique, il convient de ne pas en tenir compte pour l’xétablis -
sement de la ligne médiane provisoire. Dans l’affaire de la Délimita ‑
tion maritime 2n mer Noire, la Cour a ainsi jugé que l’île des Serpents (qui,
avec 0,17 km , possédait une superficie autrement plus importante que la
partie de Quitasueño découverte à marée haute) ne devait paxs être utilisée
pour le tracé d’une telle ligne, parce qu’il s’agissait d’une formation isolée
et située à quelque 20 milles marins de la côte continentale de l’Ukraine,
dont la prise en compte dans la mesure de la côte pertinente « reviendrait
à greffer un élément étranger sur la côte ukrainienne ; c’est-à-dire à refa-
çonner, par voie judiciaire, la géographie physique, ce que ni le xdroit ni la
pratique en matière de délimitation maritime n’autorisent » (Délimitation
maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009,
p. 110, par. 149). Ces considérations s’appliquent a fortiori à Quitasueño,
formation qui non seulement est minuscule, mais est située à 3m 8illes marins
de Santa Catalina, et dont l’utilisation aurait pour effet de rapprocher senx -
siblement la ligne médiane provisoire du territoire nicaraguayen.
La Colombie n’a pas placé de point de base sur Serrana. Ayant déxcidé
de ne pas établir de point de base sur Quitasueño, la Cour doit toxutefois
examiner la question de savoir s’il convient de le faire sur Serrana.x Bien
que plus grande que Quitasueño, Serrana n’en est pas moins une forxma -
tion de petite taille, si éloignée de toute autre île colombienxne qu’y placer
un point de base aurait un effet marqué — et absolument disproportionné
par rapport à la taille et à l’importance de cette formation — sur le tracé
de la ligne médiane provisoire. De l’avis de la Cour, aucun point xde base
ne devrait être placé sur Serrana.
La Cour considère de même qu’aucun point de base ne devrait êxtre retenu
sur Low Cay, petite formation inhabitée à proximité de Santa Catalina.
203. Les points de base seront donc, en ce qui concerne la Colombie,
situés sur les îles de Santa Catalina, de Providencia et de San Andrés, et
sur les cayes d’Alburquerque.
204. Le tracé de la ligne médiane provisoire au moyen de ces deux
ensembles de points de base sera ainsi déterminé : au nord, par les points
de base retenus, du côté nicaraguayen, sur le récif d’Edimbourg, la caye
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6 CIJ1034.indb 155 7/01/14 12:43 700 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
bian base points on Santa Catalina and Providencia, in the centre by basxe
points on the Nicaraguan islands of Ned Thomas Cay and Roca Tyra
and the Colombian islands of Providencia and San Andrés, and in the
south by Nicaraguan base points on Little Corn Island and Great Corn
Island and Colombian base points on San Andrés and Alburquerque
Cays. The line thus constructed is depicted on sketch-map No. 8 (p. 701).
8. Relevant Circumstances
205. As indicated above (see paragraph 192), once the Court has estab-
lished the provisional median line, it must then consider “whether thxere
are factors calling for the adjustment or shifting of that line in orderx to
achieve an ‘equitable result’” (Land and Maritime Boundary between
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria : Equatorial Guinea interven‑
ing), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 441, para. 288). Those factors are
usually referred to in the jurisprudence of the Court as “relevant cixrcum-
stances” and, as the Court has explained,
“[t]heir function is to verify that the provisional median line, drawxn
by the geometrical method from the determined base points on the
coasts of the Parties is not, in light of the particular circumstances oxf
the case, perceived as inequitable” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black
Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 112,
para. 155).
206. The Parties invoked several different considerations which they
found relevant to the achievement of an equitable solution. They drew
markedly different consequences from their analysis of those consider -
ations. For Nicaragua these factors necessitate a complete break with thxe
provisional median line and the substitution of enclaves around each of x
the Colombian islands. The result would be separate Colombian enclaves
around San Andrés and Alburquerque, East-Southeast Cays, Providencia
and Santa Catalina, Serrana and Roncador, as well as Quitasueño, if any
maritime features on it were to be above water at high tide. Colombia
argues that the provisional median line affords an equitable solution xand
therefore requires no adjustment or shifting.
207. The Court will examine in turn each of the considerations invoked
by the Parties. In doing so, it will determine whether those consideratixons
require an adjustment or shifting of the provisional median line con -
structed by the Court in the previous section of the Judgment in order txo
achieve an equitable result.
A. Disparity in the lengths of the relevant coasts
208. Nicaragua emphasizes the fact that its coast is significantly longer
than that of the Colombian islands and argues that this factor must be
taken into account in order to arrive at an equitable solution. Colombiax
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6 CIJ1034.indb 156 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 700
de Muerto et les cayes des Miskitos et, du côté colombien, sur Sanxta Cata -
lina et Providencia ; au centre, par les points de base situés, du côté nica -
raguayen, sur la caye de Ned Thomas et Roca Tyra et, du côté colombien,
sur les îles de Providencia et de San Andrés ; enfin, au sud, par les points
de base choisis, du côté nicaraguayen, sur Mangle Chico et Mangle
Grande et, du côté colombien, sur San Andrés et les cayes d’Albur -
o
querque. La ligne ainsi tracée est reproduite sur le croquis n 8 (p. 701).
8. Les circonstances pertinentes
205. Comme elle l’a expliqué plus haut (voir paragraphe 192), la Cour,
après avoir établi la ligne médiane provisoire, doit examiner «x s’il existe
des facteurs appelant un ajustement ou un déplacement de cette ligne afin
de parvenir à un « résultat équitable »» (Frontière terrestre et maritime
entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria ; Guinée équatoriale
(intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 441, par. 288). Ces facteurs,
dans sa jurisprudence, sont habituellement appelés « circonstances perti-
nentes» et ont, comme la Cour l’a précisé,
«pour fonction de [lui] permettre … de s’assurer que la ligne médiane
provisoire, tracée, selon la méthode géométrique, à partixr de points
de base déterminés sur les côtes des parties, n’est pas, àx la lumière des
circonstances particulières de l’espèce, perçue comme inéxquitable »
(Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 112, par. 155).
206. Les Parties ont invoqué différents éléments qu’elles jugeaient perti-
nents en vue de parvenir à une solution équitable, pour aboutir à des
conclusions bien distinctes. Selon le Nicaragua, ces facteurs imposent dxe
faire abstraction de la ligne médiane provisoire et de procéder, exn lieu et
place, à l’enclavement de chaque île colombienne. Des enclaves xcolom -
biennes distinctes seraient ainsi formées autour de San Andrés et Albur-
querque, des cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est, de Providencia et Santa Catalina, de
Serrana, de Roncador, ainsi que de Quitasueño dans l’hypothèse xoù il s’y
trouverait une formation découverte à marée haute. La Colombie soutient
quant à elle que la ligne médiane provisoire permet d’aboutir àx une solu-
tion équitable et, partant, n’appelle aucun ajustement ou déplaxcement.
207. La Cour examinera successivement chacun des éléments invoqués
par les Parties. Ce faisant, elle déterminera s’ils exigent un ajuxstement
ou un déplacement de la ligne médiane provisoire qu’elle a étabxlie dans
la section précédente du présent arrêt afin d’aboutir àx un résultat équi -
table.
A. La disparité entre les longueurs respectives des côtes pertinentes▯
208. Le Nicaragua souligne que sa côte est nettement plus longue que
celle des îles colombiennes, et argue que ce facteur doit être pris en compte
afin de parvenir à une solution équitable. La Colombie, quant àx elle, sou-
80
6 CIJ1034.indb 157 7/01/14 12:43 701 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Outline of a bank
JOINT
SerraniREGIME
AREA
S
NDUAUA Colombia / Jamaica
HCARAG
NI
HONDURAS
Edinburgh
Reef
Muerto
Cay
Miskitos Quitasueño
Cays Serrana
Ned Thomas
Cay
Roncador
Roca Providencia/
NICARAGUA Tyra Santa Catalina
San Andrés
Little Corn
Island East-Southeast Cays
Great Corn Alburquerque
Island Cays
CARIBBEAN
SEA
COLOMBIA
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
A Sketch-map No. 8:
RI
T AM
CO A Construction of the
P
provisional median line
This sketch-map has been prepared
COSTA RICA
for illustrative purposes only.
Mercator Projection (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
PANAMA
81
6 CIJ1034.indb 158 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 701
Contour d'un banc
ZONE DE
SerraniRÉGIME
COMMUN
DURAS Colombie / Jamaïque
HON RAUA
NIA
HONDURAS
Récif
d'Edimbourg
Caye de
Muerto
Cayes des Quitasueño
Miskitos Serrana
Caye de
Ned Thomas
Roncador
Providencia/
NICARAGUA Roca
Tyra Santa Catalina
San Andrés
Mangle Cayes de l'Est-Sud-Est
Chico
Mangle
Cayes
Grande d'Alburquerque
MER DES
CARAÏBES
COLOMBIE
PANAMA
COLOMBIE
COSTA RICA
IC Croquis nº8:
TARMA
OS NA Construction de la
C P
ligne médiane provisoire
COSTA RICA Ce croquis a été établi
à seule fin d'illustration.
Projection de Mercator (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
PANAMA
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6 CIJ1034.indb 159 7/01/14 12:43 702 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
responds that the achievement of an equitable solution does not entail axn
exact relationship between the lengths of the respective coasts and the xpro -
portion of the relevant area which the delimitation would leave to each
Party. It adds that Nicaragua’s approach of enclaving each island wouxld
itself fail to give due effect to the length of the Colombian relevantx coast.
* *
209. The Court begins by observing that “the respective length of coasts
can play no role in identifying the equidistance line which has been proxvi -
sionally established” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v.
Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 116, para. 163). However, “a
substantial difference in the lengths of the parties’ respective coastlines may
be a factor to be taken into consideration in order to adjust or shift txhe
provisional delimitation line” (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cam‑
eroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria : Equatorial Guinea intervening),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 446, para. 301 ; emphasis added).
210. In this respect, two conclusions can be drawn from the jurispru -
dence of the Court. First, it is normally only where the disparities in xthe
lengths of the relevant coasts are substantial that an adjustment or shixft-
ing of the provisional line is called for (Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), ▯
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 323, para. 185; Maritime Delimitation
in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009,
p. 116, para. 164). Secondly, as the Court emphasized in the case concern-
ing Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen
(Denmark v. Norway), “taking account of the disparity of coastal lengths
does not mean a direct and mathematical application of the relationship
between the length of the coastal front [of the Parties]” (Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 69, para. 69).
211. In the present case, the disparity between the relevant Colombian
coast and that of Nicaragua is approximately 1:8.2 (see paragraph 153).
This is similar to the disparity which the Court considered required
adjustment or shifting of the provisional line in the case concerning Mar ‑
itime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den ‑
mark v. Norway) (ibid., p. 65, para. 61) (approximately 1:9) and the case
concerning Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) (Judg ‑
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 53, paras. 74-75) (approximately 1:8). This is
undoubtedly a substantial disparity and the Court considers that it
requires an adjustment or shifting of the provisional line, especially gxiven
the overlapping maritime areas to the east of the Colombian islands.
B. Overall geographical context
212. Both Parties have addressed the Court on the subject of the effect
which the overall geographical context should have on the delimitation. x
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6 CIJ1034.indb 160 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 702
tient qu’une telle solution ne consiste pas à établir une corréxlation exacte
entre les longueurs des côtes respectives des Parties et les parts dex la zone
pertinente qui reviendront, au terme de la délimitation, à chacunex d’entre
elles. Elle ajoute que la solution du Nicaragua consistant à enclaverx cha-
cune des îles ne permet pas de donner dûment effet à la longuxeur de sa
propre côte pertinente.
* *
209. La Cour commence par faire observer que, si «les longueurs respec-
tives des côtes ne peuvent jouer aucun rôle dans l’établissement de la ligne
d’équidistance provisoire» (Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie
c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 116, par. 163), « une différence
importante de longueurs des côtes respectives des parties peut être un élé -
ment à prendre en considération pour ajuster ou déplacer la ligxne provi -
soire de délimitation» (Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et
le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria ; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 446, par. 301; les italiques sont de la Cour).
210. A cet égard, deux constats se dégagent à l’examen de la jurixspru-
dence de la Cour. Premièrement, ce n’est en règle généralxe que si les dis -
parités entre les longueurs des côtes pertinentes sont importantesx que
l’ajustement ou le déplacement de la ligne provisoire s’impose x(Délimita‑
tion de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine (C▯anada/
Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 323, par. 185 ; Déli‑
mitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 116, par. 164). Deuxièmement, comme elle l’a sou -
ligné en l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime dans la région située entre le
Groenland et Jan Mayen (Danemark c. Norvège), « la prise en compte
d’[une telle] disparité … ne signifie pas une application directe et mathé -
matique du rapport entre les longueurs des façades côtières [dexs Parties]»
(arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 69, par. 69).
211. En la présente espèce, le rapport entre les côtes pertinentes dxe la
Colombie et du Nicaragua est de l’ordre de 1 à 8,2 (voir paragraphe 153).
Il est donc comparable à celui qui, d’après la Cour, exigeait lx’ajustement
ou le déplacement de la ligne provisoire dans l’affaire de la Délimitation
maritime dans la région située entre le Groenland et Jan Mayen (Danemark
c. Norvège) (ibid., p. 65, par. 61) (où le rapport était d’environ 1 à 9) et
dans celle du Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte)
(arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 53, par. 74-75) (où il était d’environ 1 à 8). Il
s’agit indubitablement d’une disparité importante, qui nécessite, selon la
Cour, d’ajuster ou de déplacer la ligne provisoire, compte tenu noxtamment
du chevauchement des espaces maritimes à l’est des îles colombixennes.
B. Le contexte géographique général
212. Les deux Parties ont exposé à la Cour leurs vues sur la question
de l’incidence que devrait avoir le contexte géographique généxral dans la
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6 CIJ1034.indb 161 7/01/14 12:43 703 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Nicaragua maintains that the Colombian islands are located “on Nicarax-
gua’s continental shelf”, so that the waters and sea bed around thxem nat-
urally form part of Nicaragua. It contends that one of the most importanxt
principles of the international law of maritime delimitation is that, sox far
as possible, a State should not be cut off, or blocked, from the maritxime
areas into which its coastline projects, particularly by the effect ofx small
island territories. Nicaragua argues that Colombia’s approach in the xpres -
ent case treats the western coasts of Alburquerque Cays, San Andrés,
Providencia, Santa Catalina and Serrana as a wall blocking all access foxr
Nicaragua to the substantial area between the east coasts of those islands
and the line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan baselines, an area to
which, according to Nicaragua, it is entitled by virtue of the natural pxro -
jection of its coast.
*
213. Colombia rejects Nicaragua’s reliance on natural projection and
contends that the significance which it attaches to its islands does nxot
infringe any principle precluding a “cut-off”. Moreover, it maintains that
Nicaragua’s proposed solution of enclaving the Colombian islands itsexlf
infringes that principle, since it denies those islands their natural prxojec -
tion to the east up to and, indeed, beyond, the line 200 nautical miles
from the Nicaraguan coast. According to Colombia, Nicaragua’s pro -
posed solution, by confining the Colombian islands to their territoriaxl
seas would, in effect, require Colombia to sacrifice the entire contxinental
shelf and exclusive economic zone to which the islands would entitle it.x
* *
214. The Court does not believe that any weight should be given to
Nicaragua’s contention that the Colombian islands are located on “Nica -
ragua’s continental shelf”. It has repeatedly made clear that geolxogical
and geomorphological considerations are not relevant to the delimitationx
of overlapping entitlements within 200 nautical miles of the coasts of
States (see, e.g., Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahirya/Malta), Judg ‑
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 35, paras. 39-40). The reality is that the
Nicaraguan mainland and fringing islands, and the Colombian islands,
are located on the same continental shelf. That fact cannot, in and of
itself, give one State’s entitlements priority over those of the othexr in
respect of the area where their claims overlap.
215. The Court agrees, however, that the achievement of an equitable
solution requires that, so far as possible, the line of delimitation shoxuld
allow the coasts of the Parties to produce their effects in terms of mxari -
time entitlements in a reasonable and mutually balanced way (Maritime
Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 127, para. 201). The effect of the provisional
83
6 CIJ1034.indb 162 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 703
présente délimitation. Le Nicaragua soutient que les îles colomxbiennes se
situent sur « son» plateau continental, de sorte que les eaux et les fonds
marins qui les entourent lui ressortissent naturellement. Selon lui, l’xun des
principes essentiels du droit international en matière de délimitaxtion mari -
time est d’empêcher, dans la mesure du possible, que la projectionx en mer
des côtes d’un Etat ne soit amputée ou bloquée, notamment paxr la pré -
sence de petits territoires insulaires. Le Nicaragua soutient que la position
adoptée par la Colombie en la présente espèce prête aux côxtes occiden -
tales des cayes d’Alburquerque, de San Andrés, Providencia, Santa Cata -
lina et Serrana l’effet d’un mur qui lui barrerait tout accèsx à la vaste zone
s’étendant entre les côtes orientales de ces îles et la lignxe située à 20milles
marins de ses lignes de base, zone à laquelle il estime que la projecxtion
naturelle de sa côte lui donne droit.
*
213. La Colombie rejette l’argument du Nicaragua fondé sur la projec -
tion naturelle et soutient que l’importance qu’elle attache à sxes îles ne
porte aucune atteinte au principe de « non-amputation»; pour elle, c’est
au contraire la solution de l’enclavement préconisée par le Nicxaragua qui
fait entorse à ce principe, puisqu’elle prive ses îles de leur xprojection natu -
relle vers l’est jusqu’à la limite située à 200 milles marins du littoral nica -
raguayen, et même au-delà. La solution du Nicaragua, en n’attribuant à
ces îles qu’une mer territoriale, la priverait, de fait, de la totxalité du pla -
teau continental et de la zone économique exclusive auxquels ces formxa -
tions lui donnent droit.
* *
214. La Cour ne pense pas qu’il faille accorder le moindre poids à l’xar -
gument du Nicaragua selon lequel les îles colombiennes se situent surx
«son» plateau continental. Elle a précisé maintes fois que les consxidéra -
tions géologiques et géomorphologiques n’avaient aucun rôle xà jouer
dans le cadre de la délimitation d’une zone de chevauchement en dexçà de
la limite des 200 milles marins à partir des côtes des Etats en cause (voir,
par exemple, Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 35, par. 39-40). Il se trouve que le territoire
continental du Nicaragua et les îles qui le bordent, d’une part, ext les îles
colombiennes, d’autre part, sont situés sur une même partie du xplateau
continental, mais ce fait ne peut, en soi, faire primer les droits d’un Etat
sur ceux de l’autre dans la zone où leurs revendications se chevauxchent.
215. La Cour reconnaît toutefois que, afin d’aboutir à une solution
équitable, la ligne de délimitation doit, autant que faire se peutx, permettre
aux côtes des Parties de produire leurs effets, en matière de drxoits à des
espaces maritimes, d’une manière raisonnable et équilibrée pxour chacune
d’entre elles (Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 127, par. 201). La ligne médiane provisoire a
83
6 CIJ1034.indb 163 7/01/14 12:43 704 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
median line is to cut Nicaragua off from some three quarters of the arxea
into which its coast projects. Moreover, that cut-off effect is produced by
a few small islands which are many nautical miles apart. The Court con -
siders that those islands should not be treated as though they were a con -
tinuous mainland coast stretching for over 100 nautical miles and cutting
off Nicaraguan access to the sea bed and waters to their east. The Couxrt
therefore concludes that the cut-off effect is a relevant consideration
which requires adjustment or shifting of the provisional median line in
order to produce an equitable result.
216. At the same time, the Court agrees with Colombia that any
adjustment or shifting of the provisional median line must not have the x
effect of cutting off Colombia from the entitlements generated by its
islands in the area to the east of those islands. Otherwise, the effecxt would
be to remedy one instance of cut-off by creating another. An equitable
solution requires that each State enjoy reasonable entitlements in the
areas into which its coasts project. In the present case, that means thaxt the
action which the Court takes in adjusting or shifting the provisional
median line should avoid completely cutting off either Party from the x
areas into which its coasts project.
C. Conduct of the Parties
217. Both Parties addressed the Court regarding the significance of
conduct in the relevant area but it was Colombia that principally reliedx
upon this factor, so that it is appropriate to begin by reviewing Colom -
bia’s arguments. Colombia submits that it has for many decades regu -
lated fishing activities, conducted scientific exploration and conduxcted
naval patrols throughout the area to the east of the 82nd meridian,
whereas there is no evidence of any significant Nicaraguan activity thxere
until recent times.
*
218. Nicaragua argues that Colombia’s case on this point amounts in
practice to an attempt to resurrect its argument that the 1928 Treaty
established a maritime boundary along the 82nd meridian, a theory which
the Court rejected in its Judgment on Preliminary Objections (Territorial
and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 869, para. 120). According to
Nicaragua, the conduct of Colombia with regard to fisheries and patrol -
ling neither establishes a tacit agreement between the Parties to treat xthe
82nd meridian as a maritime boundary, nor constitutes a relevant circum -
stance to be taken into account in achieving an equitable solution.
* *
84
6 CIJ1034.indb 164 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 704
pour effet d’amputer la projection côtière du Nicaragua d’xenviron les
trois quarts de sa superficie. Qui plus est, cet effet d’amputatixon est pro -
duit par quelques petites îles très éloignées les unes des axutres. La Cour
estime que ces îles ne doivent pas être traitées comme le seraixt une côte
continentale qui se déploierait de manière continue sur plus de 10x0milles
marins, avec pour effet d’empêcher le Nicaragua d’accéder xaux fonds
marins et aux eaux s’étendant au-delà de leurs côtes orientales. Elle
conclut donc que l’effet d’amputation constitue un facteur pertixnent qui
exige l’ajustement ou le déplacement de la ligne médiane provisxoire afin
d’aboutir à un résultat équitable.
216. Pourtant, la Cour convient avec la Colombie qu’un ajustement ou
un déplacement de la ligne médiane provisoire, quel qu’il soit,x ne devrait
pas avoir pour effet de priver celle-ci des espaces maritimes auxquels ses
îles ouvrent droit vers l’est, auquel cas la Cour ne ferait que créer un pro -
blème d’amputation en tentant d’en régler un autre. Une soluxtion équi -
table suppose que chaque Etat puisse bénéficier de droits raisonxnables
dans les espaces correspondant aux projections de ses côtes. En l’espèce,
cela signifie que la Cour, lorsqu’elle ajustera ou déplacera la xligne médiane
provisoire, devra veiller à ce que ni l’une ni l’autre des Partxies ne soit
entièrement privée des espaces correspondant aux projections de sexs côtes.
C. Le comportement des Parties
217. Les deux Parties ont exposé à la Cour leurs vues sur l’incidencxe de
leurs comportements respectifs dans la zone pertinente, mais, cet aspectx
ayant principalement été invoqué par la Colombie, c’est par xles argu -
ments de celle-ci qu’il paraît opportun de commencer. La Colombie sou -
tient que, depuis des dizaines d’années, elle réglemente les acxtivités de
pêche et effectue des opérations d’exploration scientifiquex et des patrouilles
e
navales dans la zone située à l’est du 82 méridien, où, jusqu’à une date
récente, aucune activité notable du Nicaragua n’a été conxstatée.
*
218. Le Nicaragua argue que la Colombie tente à nouveau de faire
valoir sa prétention selon laquelle le traité de 1928 aurait établi une fron -
tière maritime suivant le 82 méridien, argument qu’elle avait déjà avancé
et que la Cour, dans son arrêt sur les exceptions préliminaires, a écarté
(Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions pré ‑
liminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 869, par. 120). D’après lui, le
comportement de la Colombie en matière de pêche et de patrouilles xne
permet pas davantage de conclure à l’existence entre les Parties dx’un
accord tacite faisant du 82 eméridien la frontière maritime entre elles, pas
plus qu’il ne constitue une circonstance pertinente à prendre en cxompte en
vue d’une solution équitable.
* *
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6 CIJ1034.indb 165 7/01/14 12:43 705 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
219. The Court has already held that the 1928 Treaty did not fix the
82nd meridian as a maritime boundary between the Parties (Territorial
and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 869, para. 120). The Court does not
understand Colombia as attempting either to reopen that question by
arguing that the Parties have expressly agreed upon the 82nd meridian as
a maritime boundary, or as contending that the conduct of the Parties isx
sufficient to establish the existence of a tacit agreement between themx to
treat the 82nd meridian as such a boundary. In that context, the Court
would, in any event, recall that
“[e]vidence of a tacit legal agreement must be compelling. The estab -
lishment of a permanent maritime boundary is a matter of grave
importance and agreement is not easily to be presumed.” (Territorial
and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Carib ‑
bean Sea (Nicaraguav.Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J.Reports2007(II),
p. 735, para. 253.)
220. The Court understands Colombia to be advancing a different argu-
ment, namely that the conduct of the Parties east of the 82nd meridian
constitutes a relevant circumstance in the present case, which suggests that
the use of the provisional median line as a line of delimitation would bxe
equitable. While it cannot be ruled out that conduct might need to be taxken
into account as a relevant circumstance in an appropriate case, the jurixspr-
dence of the Court and of arbitral tribunals shows that conduct will notx
normally have such an effect (Maritime Delimitation in the Area between
Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1993, p. 77, para. 86; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria : Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 447, para. 304 ; Maritime Delimitation in the Black
Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 125, para. 19 ;8
award of the Arbitration Tribunal in the Arbitration between Barbados and
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago [hereinafter the Barbados/Trinidad and
Tobago case] Tribunal Award of 11 April 2006 (2006), RIAA, Vol. XXVII,
p. 222, para. 269; ILR, Vol. 139, p. 533; award of the Arbitration Tribunal
in the Guyana/Suriname case (2007), Permanent Court of Arbitration Award
Series (2012), pp. 147-153; ILR, Vol. 139, pp. 673-678, paras. 378-391).
The Court does not consider that the conduct of the Parties in the present
case is so exceptional as to amount to a relevant circumstance which itsxelf
requires it to adjust or shift the provisional median line.
D. Security and law enforcement considerations
221. Both Parties also invoke security and law enforcement consider -
ations in relation to the appropriate course of the maritime boundary.
Colombia contends that it has taken responsibility for the exercise of
jurisdiction in relation to drug trafficking and related crimes in the xarea
east of the 82nd meridian. Nicaragua counters that most of the crime in
question originates in Colombia.
85
6 CIJ1034.indb 166 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 705
219. La Cour a déje conclu que le traité de 1928 n’avait pas eu pour
effet de faire du 82 méridien la frontière maritime entre les Parties (Diffé‑
rend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions prélimi ‑
naires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 869, par. 120). Elle ne pense pas
que la Colombie cherche à rouvrir cette question en faisant valoir quxe les
Parties sont expressément convenues de faire de ce méridien une frxontière
maritime ou que leur comportement suffit à établir l’existence entre elles
d’un accord tacite à cet effet. La Cour, par le passé, a dit xà ce sujet que
«[l]es éléments de preuve attestant l’existence d’un accord tacite d[e -
vaient] être convaincants. L’établissement d’une frontièrxe maritime
permanente est une question de grande importance, et un accord ne
doit pas être présumé facilement. » (Différend territorial et maritime
entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicara ‑
gua c. Honduras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 735, par. 253.)
220. Selon la Cour, la Colombie avance un argument différent, à savoixr
que le comportement des Parties à l’est du 82 méridien constitue une cir-
constance pertinente en l’espèce, ce qui donne à penser que le xrecours à
une ligne médiane provisoire pour la délimitation est équitablex. Certes,
l’on ne saurait exclure qu’un comportement puisse, dans certains cxas,
mériter d’être pris en considération comme circonstance pertinente, mais
la jurisprudence de la Cour et des tribunaux arbitraux enseigne que, en x
règle générale, tel n’est pas le cas (Délimitation maritime dans la région
située entre le Groenland et Jan Mayen (Danemark c. Norvège), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 77, par. 86 ; Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le
Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria ; Guinée équatoriale (inter ‑
venant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 447, par. 304 ; Délimitation mari ‑
time en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009,
p. 125, par. 198 ; sentence rendue en l’affaire Barbade/Trinité‑et‑Tobago
(2006), RSA, vol. XXVII, p. 222, par. 269; ILR, vol. 139, p. 533; sentence
rendue en l’affaire Guyana/Suriname (2007), Recueil des sentences de la
CPA (2012), p. 147-153; ILR, vol. 139, p. 673-678, par. 378-391). En l’es-
pèce, la Cour estime que le comportement des Parties n’est pas de xnature
si exceptionnelle qu’il puisse être considéré comme une circxonstance per-
tinente qui imposerait d’ajuster la ligne médiane provisoire ou de la
déplacer.
D. Les considérations de sécurité et de maintien de l’ordre
221. Les Parties invoquent toutes deux des considérations de sécuritéx et
de maintien de l’ordre à propos du tracé que devrait, selon chaxcune d’elles,
suivre la frontière maritime. La Colombie affirme avoir pris en charxge la
lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants et les activités criminexlles connexes dans
la zone située à l’est du 82 méridien, ce à quoi le Nicaragua rétorque que
la plupart de ces activités criminelles trouvent leur origine en Coloxmbie.
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6 CIJ1034.indb 167 7/01/14 12:43 706 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
222. The Court considers that much of Colombia’s arguments on this
issue are, in effect, arguments regarding conduct which have been dealxt
with in the preceding section of the Judgment. It also notes that control
over the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf is not nor -
mally associated with security considerations and does not affect righxts of
navigation. However, the Court has recognized that legitimate security
concerns might be a relevant consideration if a maritime delimitation waxs
effected particularly near to the coast of a State and the Court will xbear
this consideration in mind in determining what adjustment to make to thex
provisional median line or in what way that line should be shifted.
E. Equitable access to natural resources
223. Both Parties raise the question of equitable access to natural
resources but neither offers evidence of particular circumstances thatx it
considers must be treated as relevant. The Court notes, however, that, as
the Arbitral Tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago case observed,
“[r]esource-related criteria have been treated more cautiously by the
decisions of international courts and tribunals, which have not gen -
erally applied this factor as a relevant circumstance” (Tribunal Award
of 11 April 2006, RIAA, Vol.XXVII, p. 214, para. 241; ILR, Vol.139,
p. 523).
The Court, which quoted this observation with approval in its Judgment
in the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case (I.C.J. Reports 2009,
p. 125, para. 198), considers that the present case does not present issues
of access to natural resources so exceptional as to warrant it treating
them as a relevant consideration.
F. Delimitations already effected in the area
224. Colombia refers in some detail to delimitation agreements which
it has concluded with other States in the region. Those agreements are
described in paragraph 160, above.
The lines prescribed by all of these agreements, together with the
boundary agreed between Costa Rica and Panama in an Agreement of
1980, and the boundary between Nicaragua and Honduras established by
the Court’s 2007 Judgment, are depicted on sketch-map No. 1 (p. 639).
225. The Court has already explained the relevance of these agree -
ments and the judicial determination of the Nicaragua-Honduras bound -
ary for the identification of the relevant area (see paragraphs 160-163,
above). The Court will now consider whether, and if so how, they affexct
the boundary now to be determined by the Court.
* *
86
6 CIJ1034.indb 168 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 706
222. La Cour estime que, dans une large mesure, les arguments déve -
loppés par la Colombie à cet égard rejoignent, en réalitéx, ceux qui se rap-
portent au comportement des Parties, dont elle a déjà traité daxns la
section précédente du présent arrêt. Elle signale également que l’autorité
qu’exerce un Etat sur la zone économique exclusive et le plateau cxonti -
nental n’est généralement pas associée à des considérations de sécurité ni
n’a d’incidence sur les droits de navigation. Toutefois, elle a rexconnu que
des considérations légitimes en matière de sécurité pouvaientx constituer
des circonstances pertinentes dans le cas d’une délimitation maritxime opé -
rée particulièrement près du littoral d’un Etat, et elle garxdera cet élément
présent à l’esprit lorsqu’il s’agira de déterminer de xquelle manière ajuster
ou déplacer la ligne médiane provisoire en l’espèce.
E. L’accès équitable aux ressources naturelles
223. Bien que les Parties aient toutes deux soulevé la question de l’acx -
cès équitable aux ressources naturelles, aucune n’a présentéx d’éléments
attestant l’existence de circonstances particulières devant êtrxe considérées
comme pertinentes. La Cour remarque toutefois que, ainsi que le tribunalx
arbitral l’a fait observer en l’affaire Barbade/Trinité‑et‑Tobago,
«les juridictions internationales ont tendance à faire preuve d’unex
plus grande prudence à l’égard des critères liés aux ressxources natu -
relles; ce facteur n’est pas, en règle générale, considéré cxomme une
circonstance pertinente» (sentence du 11 avril 2006, RSA, vol. XXVII,
p. 214, par. 241 ; ILR, vol. 139, p. 523) [traduction du Greffe].
La Cour, qui a reproduit, en la faisant sienne, cette observation dans sxon
arrêt en l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (C.I.J. Recueil
2009, p. 125, par. 198), estime que, en l’espèce, les questions d’accès aux
ressources naturelles ne présentent pas de caractère si exceptionnxel qu’il
serait justifié de les traiter comme des circonstances pertinentes.x
F. Les délimitations déjà opérées dans la région
224. La Colombie se réfère de manière assez détaillée aux accoxrds de
délimitation existant entre elle et d’autres Etats de la régionx. Ces accords
sont présentés au paragraphe 160 ci-dessus.
Les limites établies par l’ensemble de ces accords, ainsi que la fxrontière
convenue entre le Costa Rica et le Panama en 1980 et la frontière entre le
Nicaragua et le Honduras établie par la Cour dans son arrêt de 200x7, sont
o
représentées sur le croquis n 1 (p. 639).
225. La Cour a d’ores et déjà indiqué l’importance que revêxtaient ces
accords, et l’établissement par voie judiciaire de la frontièrex entre le Nica-
ragua et le Honduras, aux fins de la détermination de la zone pertixnente
(voir paragraphes 160-163 ci-dessus). Elle s’intéressera à présent à la
question de savoir s’ils affectent la frontière qu’elle doit xtracer, et, le cas
échéant, de quelle manière.
* *
86
6 CIJ1034.indb 169 7/01/14 12:43 707 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
226. There are two questions for the Court to consider. The first is
whether the agreements between Colombia and Costa Rica, Jamaica and
Panama amount, as Colombia argues, to a recognition by those States of
Colombian entitlements in parts of the relevant area which the Court
should take into account in the present case. The second is whether thosxe
agreements impose limits upon the action which the Court can take in thex
present case, because of the requirement that the Court respect the righxts
of third States.
227. With regard to the first question, the Court accepts that Panama’s x
agreement with Colombia amounts to recognition by Panama of Colom -
bian claims to the area to the north and west of the boundary line laid x
down in that agreement. Similarly the unratified treaty between Colombxia
and Costa Rica entails at least potential recognition by Costa Rica of
Colombian claims to the area to the north and east of the boundary line x
which it lays down, while the Colombia-Jamaica agreement entails recog -
nition by Jamaica of Colombian claims to the area to the south-west of
the boundary of the Colombia-Jamaica “Joint Regime Area”. The Court
cannot, however, agree with Colombia that this recognition amounts to a x
relevant circumstance which the Court must take into account in effecting
a maritime delimitation between Colombia and Nicaragua. It is a funda -
mental principle of international law that a treaty between two States
cannot, by itself, affect the rights of a third State. As the Arbitralx Tribu -
nal in the Island of Palmas case put it, “it is evident that whatever may be
the right construction of a treaty, it cannot be interpreted as disposinxg of
the rights of independent third Powers” (Reports of International Arbitral
Awards (RIAA), Vol. II, p. 842). In accordance with that principle, the
treaties which Colombia has concluded with Jamaica and Panama and
the treaty which it has signed with Costa Rica cannot confer upon Colom-
bia rights against Nicaragua and, in particular, cannot entitle it, vis-à-vis
Nicaragua, to a greater share of the area in which its maritime entitle -
ments overlap with those of Nicaragua than it would otherwise receive.
228. With regard to the second question, the Court observes that, as
Article 59 of the Statute of the Court makes clear, it is axiomatic that a
judgment of the Court is not binding on any State other than the partiesx
to the case. Moreover, the Court has always taken care not to draw a
boundary line which extends into areas where the rights of third States x
may be affected. The Judgment by which the Court delimits the boundaryx
addresses only Nicaragua’s rights as against Colombia and vice versa xand
is, therefore, without prejudice to any claim of a third State or any clxaim
which either Party may have against a third State.
9. Course of the Maritime Boundary
229. Having thus identified relevant circumstances which mean that a
maritime boundary following the course of the provisional median line
87
6 CIJ1034.indb 170 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 707
226. Il reste à la Cour à se pencher sur deux questions. La premièrex est
celle de savoir si l’accord que la Colombie a signé avec le Costa Rica et
ceux qu’elle a conclus avec la Jamaïque et le Panama valent, commex celle-ci
le soutient, reconnaissance par ces Etats de droits colombiens sur certaines
portions de la zone pertinente, reconnaissance dont la Cour devrait tenixr
compte en l’espèce. La seconde est de savoir si ces accords restrexignent la
marge de manœuvre dont jouit la Cour en la présente affaire, comxpte tenu
de l’obligation qui lui est faite de respecter les droits d’Etats xtiers.
227. S’agissant de la première question, la Cour admet que l’accord
entre la Colombie et le Panama emporte reconnaissance, par ce dernier, dxes
prétentions colombiennes sur la zone située au nord et à l’oxuest de la ligne
frontière qu’il établit. De même, le traité entre la Coloxmbie et le Costa Rica,
qui à ce jour n’a pas été ratifié, vaut à tout le moxins reconnaissance poten -
tielle des prétentions colombiennes sur la zone située au nord et xà l’est de la
ligne frontière qu’il définit, et l’accord entre la Colombie et la Jamaïque
emporte reconnaissance, par cette dernière, de prétentions de mêxme nature
sur la zone située au sud-ouest de la ligne marquant la limite de la « zone de
régime commun». La Cour ne peut toutefois faire sienne la position de la
Colombie selon laquelle cette reconnaissance constituerait une circonstaxnce
pertinente qu’il lui faudrait prendre en considération dans la déxlimitation
des espaces maritimes des deux Parties. Il est un principe fondamental dxu
droit international qu’un traité conclu entre deux Etats ne peut axffecter par
lui-même les droits d’un Etat tiers. Comme l’a dit le tribunal arbixtral saisi
de l’affaire de l’Ile de Palmas, «[i]l est évident que, quelle que puisse être la
juste interprétation d’un traité, celui-ci ne peut être interprété comme
disposant des droits d’Etats tiers indépendants » (traduction française :
Revue générale de droit international public (RGDIP), t. XLII, 1935, p. 168).
Conformément à ce principe, les traités que la Colombie a conclus avec la
Jamaïque et le Panama, et celui qu’elle a signé avec le Costa Rica, ne
peuvent conférer à celle-ci des droits vis-à-vis du Nicaragua; en particulier,
ces accords ne sauraient lui permettre de revendiquer, dans la zone oùx se
chevauchent les droits respectifs des deux Parties, une portion plus impor-
tante que celle qui lui reviendrait en l’absence de tels traités.
228. S’agissant de la seconde question, il va de soi que, comme le pré -
cise l’article 59 du Statut de la Cour, la décision de celle-ci n’est obliga -
toire que pour les parties en litige. En outre, la Cour a toujours pris xsoin
de ne pas tracer de frontière pénétrant dans une zone où lesx droits d’Etats
tiers sont susceptibles d’être affectés. Le présent arrêxt, par lequel la Cour
délimite la frontière, détermine uniquement les droits du Nicarxagua par
rapport à la Colombie et inversement, et est donc sans préjudice dxe toute
revendication d’un Etat tiers ou de toute revendication d’une des xParties
à l’égard d’un Etat tiers.
9. Le tracé de la frontière maritime
229. Ayant ainsi établi l’existence de circonstances pertinentes qui nex
permettraient pas de parvenir à un résultat équitable en traçxant une fron-
87
6 CIJ1034.indb 171 7/01/14 12:43 708 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
would not produce an equitable result, the Court must now consider what x
changes are required to that line. The extent and nature of those changexs
is determined by the particular relevant circumstances which the Court
has identified. The first such circumstance is the considerable dispxarity in
the lengths of the relevant coasts, the ratio of Colombia’s relevant xcoast
to that of Nicaragua being approximately 1:8.2 (see paragraphs 208-211,
above). The second relevant circumstance is the overall geographical coxn -
text, in which the relevant Colombian coast consists of a series of islaxnds,
most of them very small, and located at a considerable distance from onex
another, rather than a continuous coastline (see paragraphs 212-216,
above). Since these islands are situated within 200 nautical miles of txhe
Nicaraguan mainland, the potential entitlements of the Parties are not
confined to the area between that mainland and the western coast of thxe
Colombian islands, but extend to the area between the east coasts of the
Colombian islands and the line 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan
baselines (see paragraphs 155-166, above, and sketch-map No. 7, p. 687).
The first circumstance means that the boundary should be such that thex
portion of the relevant area accorded to each State takes account of thex
disparity between the lengths of their relevant coasts. A boundary whichx
followed the course of the provisional median line would leave Colombia
in possession of a markedly larger portion of the relevant area than thaxt
accorded to Nicaragua, notwithstanding the fact that Nicaragua has a farx
longer relevant coast. The second circumstance necessitates a solution ixn
which neither Party is cut off from the entirety of any of the areas ixnto
which its coasts project.
230. In the Court’s view, confining Colombia to a succession of
enclaves drawn around each of its islands, as Nicaragua proposes, would x
disregard that second requirement. Even if each island were to be given x
an enclave of 12 nautical miles, and not 3 nautical miles as suggested by
Nicaragua, the effect would be to cut off Colombia from the substantxial
areas to the east of the principal islands, where those islands generatex an
entitlement to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. In addi -
tion, the Nicaraguan proposal would produce a disorderly pattern of sev -
eral distinct Colombian enclaves within a maritime space which otherwise
pertained to Nicaragua with unfortunate consequences for the orderly
management of maritime resources, policing and the public order of the
oceans in general, all of which would be better served by a simpler and x
more coherent division of the relevant area.
231. Moreover, the jurisprudence on which Nicaragua relies does not
support its argument that each Colombian island should be confined to x
an enclave. As the Court has already remarked (paragraph 198 above),
the decision of the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo‑French Continental
Shelf case to enclave the Channel Islands took place in the context of a
delimitation between mainland coasts. As the Court of Arbitration
remarked
88
6 CIJ1034.indb 172 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 708
tière maritime le long de la ligne médiane provisoire, la Cour doixt à présent
examiner les changements à apporter à cette ligne. Leur ampleur etx leur
nature dépendent des circonstances pertinentes particulières que lxa Cour a
identifiées: la première est la très forte disparité entre les longueurs dxes
côtes pertinentes, le rapport entre les côtes pertinentes de la Coxlombie et du
Nicaragua étant d’environ 1 à 8,2 (voir paragraphes 208-211 ci-dessus) ;
la seconde est le contexte géographique général, caractériséx par le fait que
la côte colombienne pertinente est constituée d’une série d’xîles, pour la
plupart très petites et fort éloignées les unes des autres, et xne forme pas une
ligne côtière continue (voir paragraphes 212-216 ci-dessus). Ces îles se trou -
vant à moins de 200milles marins de la masse continentale nicaraguayenne,
les espaces maritimes auxquels peuvent prétendre les Parties ne se limitent
pas à la zone située entre cette masse continentale et les côtexs occidentales
des îles colombiennes, mais s’étendent à celle située entxre les côtes orientales
des îles colombiennes et la limite des 200milles marins mesurée à partir des
lignes de base nicaraguayennes (voir paragraphes 155-166 ci-dessus et cxro -
o
quis n 7, p. 687). La première circonstance signifie que la frontière devrait
être tracée de manière à accorder à chaque Etat une portixon de la zone
pertinente qui prenne en compte la disparité entre les longueurs de leurs
côtes pertinentes. Or une frontière qui suivrait la ligne médiaxne provisoire
attribuerait à la Colombie une portion nettement plus importante de la
zone pertinente qu’au Nicaragua, dont la côte pertinente est pourtxant bien
plus longue. La seconde circonstance pertinente appelle une solution qui
n’ait pas pour effet d’amputer l’un ou l’autre Etat de la xtotalité de l’une
quelconque des zones correspondant à ses projections côtières.
230. La Cour estime qu’il ne serait pas tenu compte de cette seconde
exigence si le territoire de la Colombie était confiné dans une série d’en -
claves tracées autour de chacune de ses îles, comme le propose le xNica-
ragua. Même si chaque île devait se voir attribuer une enclave de
12 milles marins, au lieu de 3 comme le propose le Nicaragua, cette solu -
tion aurait pour effet d’amputer la Colombie de vastes zones situéxes à l’est
de ses îles principales, où celles-ci lui donnent droit à un plateau continen -
tal et à une zone économique exclusive. En outre, la proposition nxicara -
guayenne donnerait naissance à un système désorganisé d’enclaves
colombiennes, coupées les unes des autres, à l’intérieur d’xun espace mari -
time qui ressortirait par ailleurs au Nicaragua. Ce système aurait dexs
conséquences fâcheuses sur les activités de surveillance ainsi que sur la
gestion ordonnée des ressources maritimes et des océans en généxral,
autant de fins qu’un partage plus simple et plus cohérent de la xzone perti -
nente permettrait d’atteindre plus aisément.
231. La jurisprudence sur laquelle se fonde le Nicaragua ne vient pas
davantage étayer son argumentation selon laquelle chacune des îles colom -
biennes devrait être enclavée. Comme la Cour l’a déjà faixt observer (para -
graphe 198 ci-dessus), dans l’affaire du Plateau continental entre le Roya unmie‑
et la France, le tribunal arbitral avait décidé d’enclaver les îles Anglxo-
Normandes dans le contexte d’une délimitation entre les côtes cxontinentales de
la France et du Royaume-Uni. Comme le tribunal arbitral l’a fait remarquer,
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6 CIJ1034.indb 173 7/01/14 12:43 709 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
“The Channel Islands . . . are situated not only on the French side of
a median line drawn between the two mainlands but practically within
the arms of a gulf on the French coast. Inevitably, the presence of
these islands in the English Channel in that particular situation dis -
turbs the balance of the geographical circumstances which would
otherwise exist between the Parties in this region as a result of the
broad equality of the coastlines of their mainlands.” (Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the French Republic (1977), RIAA, Vol. XVIII,
p. 88, para. 183 ; ILR, Vol. 54, p. 96.)
By contrast, in the present case the Colombian islands face Nicaragua inx
only one direction and from a far greater distance than the Channel
Islands face France. Whereas the distance between the nearest point in
the Channel Islands and the French coast was less than 7 nautical miles,
the most westerly point on the Colombian islands, Alburquerque Cays, is
more than 65 nautical miles from the nearest point on the Nicaraguan
islands and, most of the San Andrés Archipelago is much farther away
from Nicaragua than that. Nor did the approach taken by the Court of
Arbitration in the Anglo‑French Continental Shelf case divide the Channel
Islands into a series of separate enclaves. None of the other instances in
which enclaving was employed involved a situation comparable with that
in the present case.
232. The Court considers that it should proceed by way of shifting the
provisional median line. In this context, it is necessary to draw a distinc -
tion between that part of the relevant area which lies between the Nicarxa-
guan mainland and the western coasts of Alburquerque Cays, San Andrésx,
Providencia and Santa Catalina, where the relationship is one of oppositxe
coasts, and the part which lies to the east of those islands, where the xrela-
tionship is more complex.
233. In the first, western, part of the relevant area, the relevant circum-
stances set out above call for the provisional median line to be shiftedx
eastwards. The disparity in coastal lengths is so marked as to justify ax
significant shift. The line cannot, however, be shifted so far that itx cuts
across the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea around any of the Colombian
islands, since to do so would be contrary to the principle set out in paxra -
graphs 176 to 180, above. The Court notes that there are various tech -
niques which allow for relevant circumstances to be taken into
consideration in order to reach an equitable solution. In the present caxse,
the Court considers that in order to arrive at such a solution, taking dxue
account of the relevant circumstances, the base points located on the
Nicaraguan and Colombian islands, respectively, should be accorded dif -
ferent weights.
234. In the Court’s opinion, an equitable result is achieved in this part x
of the relevant area by giving a weighting of one to each of the Colom -
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6 CIJ1034.indb 174 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 709
«les îles [A]nglo-[N]ormandes … sont situées non seulement du
côté français de la ligne médiane tracée entre les territoires terrexstres
des deux Etats, mais pratiquement au fond d’un golfe de la côte fran-
çaise. Il est inévitable que la présence de ces îles dans lax Manche dans
une situation si particulière rompe l’équilibre des conditions xgéogra-
phiques que l’on constaterait sans cela entre les Parties dans cette x
région en raison de l’égalité approximative des lignes côxtières de leurs
territoires. » (Délimitation du plateau continental entre Royaume‑Uni
de Grande Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord et République française▯
(1977), RSA, vol. XVIII, p. 223-224, par. 183 ; ILR, vol. 54, p. 96.)
Dans la présente affaire, au contraire, les îles colombiennes nex font face
au Nicaragua que dans une seule direction et encore en sont-elles bien
plus éloignées que les îles Anglo-Normandes ne le sont de la France. En
effet, le point des îles Anglo-Normandes le plus proche de la côte fran -
çaise est situé à moins de 7 milles marins, tandis que l’extrémité occiden -
tale des îles colombiennes — les cayes d’Alburquerque — se trouve à plus
de 65 milles marins du point le plus proche des îles nicaraguayennes, l’ar -
chipel de San Andrés étant pour l’essentiel encore bien plus distant du
Nicaragua. La démarche adoptée par le tribunal arbitral dans l’xaffaire du
Plateau continental entre le Royaume‑Uni et la France n’avait pas non plus
eu pour effet d’isoler ces îles les unes des autres en les enferxmant dans une
série d’enclaves différentes. Dans les autres affaires oùx la technique de
l’enclavement a été utilisée, la situation n’était jamxais comparable à celle
de la présente instance.
232. La Cour estime qu’en l’espèce il lui faut procéder au déplacement
de la ligne médiane provisoire. A cet égard, il convient d’opéxrer une dis -
tinction entre, d’une part, la partie de la zone pertinente qui est cxomprise
entre la masse continentale nicaraguayenne et les côtes occidentales xdes
cayes d’Alburquerque, de San Andrés, de Providencia et de Santa Cata -
lina là où elles se font face et, d’autre part, la partie situéxe à l’est de ces
îles, qui met en jeu des rapports plus complexes.
233. Dans la première partie de la zone pertinente, située à l’ouxest, les
circonstances pertinentes exposées ci-dessus appellent un déplacement de
la ligne médiane provisoire vers l’est. La disparité entre les xlongueurs des
côtes est telle qu’elle justifie un déplacement important —x sans toutefois
aller jusqu’à couper la mer territoriale de 12 milles marins de l’une quel -
conque des îles colombiennes, ce qui serait contraire au principe exposé
aux paragraphes 176 à 180 ci-dessus. La Cour relève qu’il existe diffé -
rentes techniques qui permettent de tenir compte des circonstances pertix-
nentes en vue de parvenir à une solution équitable. En la présexnte espèce,
elle considère que, pour parvenir à une telle solution en fonctionx des cir -
constances pertinentes qui sont propres à l’affaire, il convientx de conférer
une valeur différente aux points de base situés sur les îles xrespectives du
Nicaragua et de la Colombie.
234. De l’avis de la Cour, un résultat équitable est obtenu, dans cette
partie de la zone pertinente, en accordant une valeur unitaire à chacun des
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6 CIJ1034.indb 175 7/01/14 12:43 710 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
bian base points and a weighting of three to each of the Nicaraguan basex
points. That is done by constructing a line each point on which is threex
times as far from the controlling base point on the Nicaraguan islands axs
it is from the controlling base point on the Colombian islands. The Courxt
notes that, while all of the Colombian base points contribute to the conx-
struction of this line, only the Nicaraguan base points on Miskitos Caysx,
Ned Thomas Cay and Little Corn Island control the weighted line. As a
result of the fact that the line is constructed using a 3:1 ratio between
Nicaraguan and Colombian base points, the effect of the other Nicara -
guan base points is superseded by those base points. The line ends at thxe
last point that can be constructed using three base points (see sketch-map
No. 9: Construction of the weighted line p. 711).
235. The method used in the construction of the weighted line (as
described in the previous paragraph) results in a line which has a curvxed
shape with a large number of turning points. Such a configuration of txhe
line may create difficulties in its practical application. The Court thxerefore
proceeds to a further adjustment by reducing the number of turning
points and connecting them by geodetic lines. This produces a simplifixed
weighted line which is depicted on sketch-map No. 10. The line thus
constructed (“the simplified weighted line”) forms the boundarxy between
the maritime entitlements of the two States between points 1 and 5, as
depicted on sketch-map No. 10 (p. 712).
236. The Court considers, however, that to extend that line into the
parts of the relevant area north of point 1 or south of point 5 would not
lead to an equitable result. While the simplified weighted line represents a
shifting of the provisional median line which goes some way towards
reflecting the disparity in coastal lengths, it would, if extended beyxond
points 1 and 5, still leave Colombia with a significantly larger share of the
relevant area than that accorded to Nicaragua, notwithstanding the fact x
that Nicaragua’s relevant coast is more than eight times the length oxf
Colombia’s relevant coast. It would thus give insufficient weight tox the
first relevant circumstance which the Court has identified. Moreoverx, by
cutting off Nicaragua from the areas east of the principal Colombian
islands into which the Nicaraguan coast projects, such a boundary would
fail to take into account the second relevant circumstance, namely the
overall geographical context.
The Court considers that it must take proper account both of the dis -
parity in coastal length and the need to avoid cutting either State off from
the maritime spaces into which its coasts project. In the view of the Coxurt,
an equitable result which gives proper weight to those relevant considerx -
ations is achieved by continuing the boundary line out to the line 200 nau-
tical miles from the Nicaraguan baselines along lines of latitude.
237. As illustrated on sketch-map No. 11 (Course of the maritime
boundary, p. 714), that is done as follows.
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6 CIJ1034.indb 176 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 710
points de base colombiens et une valeur triple à chacun des points de base
nicaraguayens. Il convient pour ce faire de construire une ligne dont
chaque point se trouve à une distance trois fois plus importante du pxoint
de base établi sur les îles nicaraguayennes que du point de base cxorrespon -
dant sur les îles colombiennes. La Cour fait remarquer que, bien que xtous
les points de base colombiens contribuent au tracé de cette ligne, sexuls les
points de base nicaraguayens situés sur les cayes des Miskitos, la caxye de
Ned Thomas et Mangle Chico ont une incidence sur cette ligne pondérée.x
La ligne étant construite sur la base d’un rapport de 3 à 1 entre les points
de base du Nicaragua et ceux de la Colombie, l’effet de ces points xde base
l’emporte sur celui des autres points de base nicaraguayens. La lignex s’ar -
rête au dernier point pouvant être établi à partir de trois xpoints de base
(voir croquis n o 9: Construction de la ligne pondérée, p. 711).
235. La méthode utilisée pour construire la ligne pondérée telle xqu’ex -
posée au paragraphe précédent produit une ligne incurvée présentant de
nombreux points d’inflexion. Cette configuration risquant de donner lieu
à certaines difficultés pratiques, la Cour procédera à un ajustement sup -
plémentaire en réduisant le nombre de points d’inflexion et en les reliant
par des lignes géodésiques ; il en résulte une ligne pondérée simplifiée, qui
o
est illustrée sur le croquis n 10 (p. 712). La ligne ainsi construite (la
«ligne pondérée simplifiée ») constitue la frontière entre les espaces mari -
times des deux Etats entre le point 1 et le point 5, ainsi qu’il ressort du
croquis n o 10.
236. La Cour estime cependant que cette ligne n’aboutirait pas à un
résultat équitable si elle pénétrait dans des secteurs de lax zone pertinente
situés, vers le nord, au-delà du point 1 et, vers le sud, au-delà du point 5.
La ligne pondérée simplifiée représente un déplacement xde la ligne
médiane provisoire tendant à prendre en compte la disparité entxre les lon -
gueurs des côtes pertinentes ; là encore, si elle était prolongée au-delà des
points 1 et 5, cette ligne attribuerait à la Colombie une part bien plus
importante de la zone pertinente que celle attribuée au Nicaragua aloxrs
que la longueur de la côte nicaraguayenne est plus de huit fois supérieure
à celle de la côte colombienne. Cette ligne n’accorderait donc xpas suffi -
samment d’importance à la première circonstance pertinente idenxtifiée
par la Cour. En outre, en privant le Nicaragua des espaces situés àx l’est
des principales îles colombiennes dans lesquels se projette sa côtxe conti -
nentale, cette délimitation ne prendrait pas en compte la seconde cirxcons-
tance pertinente, celle du contexte géographique général.
La Cour estime qu’il convient de tenir dûment compte de la disparixté
entre les longueurs des côtes et de veiller à ne pas amputer l’xun ou l’autre
Etat des espaces maritimes correspondant à ses projections côtièxres. De
l’avis de la Cour, un résultat équitable prenant dûment en cxonsidération
ces circonstances pertinentes est obtenu en prolongeant la ligne frontièxre
le long de parallèles jusqu’à la limite des 200 milles marins mesurés à par -
tir des lignes de base du Nicaragua.
237. Ainsi qu’il ressort du croquis n o11 (Tracé de la frontière mari -
time, p. 714), la ligne sera tracée comme il est exposé ci-après.
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6 CIJ1034.indb 177 7/01/14 12:43 711 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Outline of a bank
SerranillaINT
REGIME
AREA
RA
HONDUGUA Colombia / Jamaica
NICAA
HONDURAS
Edinburgh
Reef
Muerto
Cay
Miskitos Quitasueño Serrana
Cays
Ned Thomas
Cay
Roncador
Roca Providencia/
NICARAGUA Tyra Santa Catalina
San Andrés
Little Corn
Island East-Southeast Cays
Great Corn Alburquerque
Island Cays
CARIBBEAN
SEA
COLOMBIA
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
A
RI Sketch-map No. 9:
TA MA
OSAN Construction of
C P
the weighted line
COSTA RICA This sketch-map has been prepared
for illustrative purposes only.
Mercator Projection (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
PANAMA
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6 CIJ1034.indb 178 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 711
Contour d'un banc
ZONE DE
SerraniRÉGIME
COMMUN
URAS Colombie / Jamaïque
HOND AUA
NIAR
HONDURAS Récif
d'Edimbourg
Caye de
Muerto
Cayes des Quitasueño Serrana
Miskitos
Caye de
Ned Thomas
Roncador
Roca Providencia/
NICARAGUA Tyra Santa Catalina
Mangle San Andrés
Cayes de l'Est-Sud-Est
Chico
Mangle
Cayes
Grande d'Alburquerque
MER DES
CARAÏBES
COLOMBIE
PANAMA
COLOMBIE
COSA RCAC
A
IC Croquis nº9:
TARMA
OS NA Construction de la
C P
ligne pondérée
COSTA RICA Ce croquis a été établi
à seule fin d'illustration.
Projection de Mercator (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
PANAMA
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6 CIJ1034.indb 179 7/01/14 12:43 712 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
Sketch-map No. 10:
The simplified 0
1
weighted line
This sketch-map has been prepared
for illustrative purposes only.
Mercator Projection (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
Providencia/
Santa Catalina
3
4
San Andrés
East-Southeast
Cays
Alburquerque
Cays
5
Outline of a bank
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6 CIJ1034.indb 180 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 712
Croquis n°10:
0
Ligne pondérée
1
simplifiée
Ce croquis a été établi
à seule fin d'illustration.
2
Projection de Mercator (12° 30' N)
WGS 84
Providencia/
Santa Catalina
3
4
San Andrés
Cayes de
l'Est-Sud-Est
Cayes
d'Alburquerque
5
Contour d'un banc
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6 CIJ1034.indb 181 7/01/14 12:43 713 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
First, from the extreme northern point of the simplified weighted linex
(point 1), which is located on the parallel passing through the northern -
most point on the 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs around Roncador,
the line of delimitation will follow the parallel of latitude until it rxeaches
the 200-nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which the territoriaxl
sea of Nicaragua is measured (endpoint A). As the Court has explained
(paragraph 159 above), since Nicaragua has yet to notify the baselines
from which its territorial sea is measured, the precise location of end -
point A cannot be determined and the location depicted on sketch-map
No. 11 is therefore approximate.
Secondly, from the extreme southern point of the adjusted line (point 5),
the line of delimitation will run in a south-east direction until it intersects
with the 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs around South Cay of Alburqu -
erque Cays (point 6). It then continues along that 12-nautical-mile enve -
lope of arcs around South Cay of Alburquerque Cays until it reaches the x
point (point 7) where that envelope of arcs intersects with the parallel
passing through the southernmost point on the 12-nautical-mile envelope
of arcs around East-Southeast Cays. The boundary line then follows that
parallel until it reaches the southernmost point of the 12-nautical-mile
envelope of arcs around East-Southeast Cays (point 8) and continues
along that envelope of arcs until its most eastward point (point 9). From
that point the boundary line follows the parallel of latitude until it rxeaches
the 200-nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which the territoriaxl
sea of Nicaragua is measured (endpoint B, the approximate location of
which is shown on sketch-map No. 11, p. 714).
238. That leaves Quitasueño and Serrana, both of which the Court has
held fall on the Nicaraguan side of the boundary line described above. Ixn
the Court’s view, to take the adjusted line described in the preceding
paragraphs further north, so as to encompass these islands and the sur -
rounding waters, would allow small, isolated features, which are locatedx
at a considerable distance from the larger Colombian islands, to have a x
disproportionate effect upon the boundary. The Court therefore consid -
ers that the use of enclaves achieves the most equitable solution in thixs
part of the relevant area.
Quitasueño and Serrana are each entitled to a territorial sea which, xfor
the reasons already given by the Court (paragraphs 176-180 above), can -
not be less than 12 nautical miles in breadth. Since Quitasueño is a rock
incapable of sustaining human habitation or an economic life of its own x
and thus falls within the rule stated in Article 121, paragraph 3, of
UNCLOS, it is not entitled to a continental shelf or exclusive economic x
zone. Accordingly, the boundary between the continental shelf and exclu -
sive economic zone of Nicaragua and the Colombian territorial sea
around Quitasueño will follow a 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs mea -
sured from QS 32 and from the low-tide elevations located within 12 nau-
tical miles from QS 32 (see paragraphs 181-183 above).
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6 CIJ1034.indb 182 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 713
Premièrement, à partir du point le plus septentrional de la ligne xpondé-
rée simplifiée (point 1), situé sur le parallèle passant par le point le plus au
nord de la ligne composée d’arcs de cercle (ci-après « l’enveloppe d’arcs»)
tracée à 12 milles marins de Roncador, la ligne de délimitation suit le
parallèle jusqu’à ce qu’elle atteigne la limite située àx 200milles marins des
lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de la mer territo -
riale du Nicaragua (point terminal A). Comme la Cour l’a déjà précisé
(paragraphe 159 ci-dessus), le Nicaragua n’ayant pas encore notifié les
lignes de base à partir desquelles sera mesurée sa mer territorialxe, la posi -
tion du point terminal A ne peut être déterminée avec précision et l’empla-
cement du point représenté sur le croquis n 11 n’est donc qu’approximatif.
Deuxièmement, à partir du point le plus méridional de la ligne xajustée
(point 5), la ligne de délimitation se poursuit vers le sud-est jusqu’à son
intersection avec l’enveloppe d’arcs tracée à 12 milles marins de
South Cay, l’une des cayes d’Alburquerque (point 6). Elle se poursuit le
long de cette enveloppe tracée autour de South Cay jusqu’à son intersec -
tion (point 7) avec le parallèle passant par le point le plus méridional de
l’enveloppe d’arcs tracée à 12 milles marins des cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est.
Elle longe ensuite ce parallèle jusqu’au point le plus méridionxal de l’enve -
loppe d’arcs tracée à 12 milles marins des cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est (point 8),
puis longe cette enveloppe jusqu’à son point le plus oriental (poxint 9). A
partir de ce point, elle suit le parallèle jusqu’à la limite sixtuée à
200 milles marins des lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée la
largeur de la mer territoriale du Nicaragua (point terminal B, dont l’em -
placement approximatif est représenté sur le croquis n o 11, p. 714).
238. Aussi ne reste-t-il à régler que la question de Quitasueño et de Ser-
rana, deux formations situées du côté nicaraguayen de la ligne frontière
définie ci-dessus par la Cour. La Cour estime que déplacer vers le nord la
ligne ajustée, telle que définie dans les paragraphes précéxdents, de manière
à englober ces îles et les eaux environnantes, conférerait un exffet dispro -
portionné sur la frontière à des formations de petite taille, ixsolées et très
éloignées des principales îles colombiennes. Elle considère, en consé -
quence, que l’enclavement constitue la solution la plus équitable xdans
cette portion de la zone pertinente.
Chacune de ces formations ouvre droit à une mer territoriale dont la xlar -
geur ne peut, pour les raisons déjà exposées (voir paragraphesx 176-180
ci-dessus), être inférieure à 12milles marins. Quitasueño, en tant que rocher
ne se prêtant pas à l’habitation humaine ou à une vie écoxnomique propre,
et entrant donc dans les prévisions de la règle énoncée au paraxgraphe 3 de
l’article 121 de la CNUDM, n’engendre pas de droit à un plateau continen -
tal ou à une zone économique exclusive. Dès lors, entre le platxeau contin-en
tal et la zone économique exclusive du Nicaragua et la mer territoriaxle
colombienne entourant Quitasueño, la frontière suit l’enveloppex d’arcs
tracée à 12 milles marins de QS 32 et des hauts-fonds découvrants situés
à moins de 12 milles marins de ce point (voir paragraphes 181-183
ci- dessus).
93
6 CIJ1034.indb 183 7/01/14 12:43 714 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
A I
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94
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94
6 CIJ1034.indb 185 7/01/14 12:43 715 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
In the case of Serrana, the Court recalls that it has already concluded x
that it is unnecessary to decide whether or not it falls within the rule
stated in Article 121, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS (paragraph 180 above).
Its small size, remoteness and other characteristics mean that, in any
event, the achievement of an equitable result requires that the boundaryx
line follow the outer limit of the territorial sea around the island. Thxe
boundary will therefore follow a 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs mea -
sured from Serrana Cay and other cays in its vicinity.
The boundary lines thus established around Quitasueño and Serrana
are depicted on sketch-map No. 11.
10. The Disproportionality Test
239. The Court now turns to the third stage in its methodology, namely
testing the result achieved by the boundary line described in the precedxing
section to ascertain whether, taking account of all the circumstances, txhere
is a significant disproportionality which would require further adjustxment.
240. In carrying out this third stage, the Court notes that it is not
applying a principle of strict proportionality. Maritime delimitation isx not
designed to produce a correlation between the lengths of the Parties’x rel -
evant coasts and their respective shares of the relevant area. As the Coxurt
observed in the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) case,
“If such a use of proportionality were right, it is difficult to seex what
room would be left for any other consideration ; for it would be at
once the principle of entitlement to continental shelf rights and also
the method of putting that principle into operation.” (Continental
Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1985, p. 45, para. 58.)
The Court’s task is to check for a significant disproportionality. What
constitutes such a disproportionality will vary according to the precisex
situation in each case, for the third stage of the process cannot requirxe the
Court to disregard all of the considerations which were important in thex
earlier stages. Moreover, the Court must recall what it said more recentxly
in the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case,
“that various tribunals, and the Court itself, have drawn differentx
conclusions over the years as to what disparity in coastal lengths
would constitute a significant disproportionality which suggested the x
delimitation line was inequitable and still required adjustment” (Mar ‑
itime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 129, para. 213).
241. ITLOS, in the Bay of Bengal case, spoke of checking for “signifi -
cant disproportion” (Judgment of 14 March 2012, ITLOS, pp. 142-143,
95
6 CIJ1034.indb 186 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 715
Dans le cas de Serrana, la Cour rappelle ce qu’elle a dit plus haut, à
savoir qu’il n’y a pas lieu de déterminer si cette formation toxmbe ou non
sous le coup de la règle énoncée au paragraphe 3 de l’article 121 de la
CNUDM (voir paragraphe 180 ci-dessus). Compte tenu de sa petite taille,
de son éloignement et d’autres caractéristiques, il convient enx tout état de
cause, pour parvenir à un résultat équitable, que la ligne fronxtière suive la
limite extérieure de la mer territoriale entourant cette île. La fxrontière sui-
vra donc l’enveloppe d’arcs tracée à 12 milles marins de la caye de Ser -
rana et des autres cayes avoisinantes.
Les lignes frontières ainsi tracées autour de Quitasueño et de xSerrana
sont représentées sur le croquis n o 11.
10. La vérification de l’absence de disproportion
239. La Cour en vient à présent à la troisième étape de sa déxmarche,
qui consiste à vérifier le résultat obtenu par la délimitaxtion décrite à la
section précédente, afin d’examiner si, compte tenu de l’exnsemble des cir -
constances, une disproportion marquée exige de nouveaux ajustements.
240. La Cour fait observer qu’il ne s’agit pas à ce stade d’appliquer un
principe de stricte proportionnalité. La délimitation maritime ne vise pas
à établir une corrélation entre la longueur des côtes pertinxentes respec -
tives des Parties et la part de la zone pertinente qui est attribuée xà cha -
cune d’elles. Comme la Cour l’a fait observer dans l’affaire xdu Plateau
continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte) :
«Si la proportionnalité pouvait être appliquée ainsi, on voit maxl
quel rôle toute autre considération pourrait encore jouer ; en effet la
proportionnalité serait alors à la fois le principe du titre sur lxe pla -
teau continental et la méthode permettant de mettre ce principe en
œuvre. » (Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 45, par. 58.)
Il incombe donc à la Cour de vérifier l’absence de toute dispxroportion
marquée. Ce qui constitue une telle disproportion varie selon la situxation
propre à chaque affaire, car on ne saurait s’attendre à ce quxe la Cour, à
cette troisième étape du processus, fasse fi des considératioxns jugées
importantes aux étapes précédentes. Elle doit par ailleurs gardxer à l’esprit
ce qu’elle a dit plus récemment dans l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime
en mer Noire, à savoir
«que diverses juridictions — dont elle-même — sont, au fil des ans,
parvenues à des conclusions différentes quant à savoir quellex dispa -
rité entre les longueurs des côtes constituerait une disproportionx
significative indiquant qu’une ligne de délimitation est inéqxuitable et
devrait être ajustée » (Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie
c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 129, par. 213).
241. Dans l’affaire du Golfe du Bengale, il s’agissait pour le TIDM de
vérifier l’absence de toute « disproportion marquée » (arrêt du 14 mars
95
6 CIJ1034.indb 187 7/01/14 12:43 716 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
para. 499). The Arbitration Tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago
case referred to proportionality being used as “a final check upon xthe
equity of a tentative delimitation to ensure that the result is not tainted by
some form of gross disproportion” (Tribunal Award of 11 April 2006,
RIAA, Vol. XXVII, p. 214, para. 238; ILR, Vol. 139, pp. 522-523;
emphasis added). The Tribunal in that case went on to state that this
process
“does not require the drawing of a delimitation line in a manner that
is mathematically determined by the exact ratio of the lengths of the
relevant coastlines. Although mathematically certain, this would in
many cases lead to an inequitable result. Delimitation rather requires
the consideration of the relative lengths of coastal frontages as one
element in the process of delimitation taken as a whole. The degree
of adjustment called for by any given disparity in coastal lengths is a
matter for the Tribunal’s judgment in the light of all the circumstanxces
of the case.” (RIAA, Vol. XXVII, p. 235, para. 328 ; ILR, Vol. 139,
p. 547.)
242. The Court thus considers that its task, at this third stage, is not to
attempt to achieve even an approximate correlation between the ratio of xthe
lengths of the Parties’ relevant coasts and the ratio of their respective shares
of the relevant area. It is, rather, to ensure that there is not a disprxoportion so
gross as to “taint” the result and render it inequitable. Whether xany dispropor
tion is so great as to have that effect is not a question capable of bxeing answered
by reference to any mathematical formula but is a matter which can be
answered only in the light of all the circumstances of the particular caxse.
243. Application of the adjusted line described in the previous section
of the Judgment has the effect of dividing the relevant area between txhe
Parties in a ratio of approximately 1:3.44 in Nicaragua’s favour. The
ratio of relevant coasts is approximately 1:8.2. The question, thereforex, is
whether, in the circumstances of the present case, this disproportion isx so
great as to render the result inequitable.
244. The Court recalls that its selection of that line was designed to
ensure that neither State suffered from a “cut-off” effect and that this
consideration required that San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalinxa
should not be cut off from their entitlement to an exclusive economic x
zone and continental shelf to their east, including in that area which ixs
within 200 nautical miles of their coasts but beyond 200 nautical miles
from the Nicaraguan baselines. The Court also observes that a relevant
consideration, in the selection of that line, was that the principal Colxom -
bian islands should not be divided into separate areas, each surrounded x
by a Nicaraguan exclusive economic zone and that the delimitation was
one which must take into account the need of contributing to the public x
order of the oceans. To do so, the delimitation should be, in the words xof
the Tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago case, “both equitable
and as practically satisfactory as possible, while at the same time in keep -
ing with the requirement of achieving a stable legal outcome” (Award of
96
6 CIJ1034.indb 188 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 716
2012, TIDM, par. 499). Quant au tribunal arbitral saisi de l’affaire
Barbade/ Trinité‑et‑Tobago, il voyait dans le critère de proportionnalité
«un dernier contrôle du caractère équitable de la délimitatioxn provisoire,
afin de veiller à ce que le résultat ne soit pas entaché de qxuelque dispropor ‑
tion flagrante » [traduction du Greffe] (sentence du 11 avril 2006, RSA,
vol. XXVII, p. 214, par. 238 ; ILR, vol. 139, p. 522-523 ; les italiques sont
de la Cour). Il a ajouté que ce processus
«n’exige[ait] pas le tracé d’une limite correspondant mathémaxtiquement
au rapport exact entre les différentes longueurs des côtes pertixnentes.
Malgré la certitude mathématique qui la caractérise, cette façxon de pro -
céder conduirait dans bien des cas à un résultat inéquitablex. La délim - ita
tion suppose plutôt la prise en considération de la longueur relatxive des
façades maritimes, en tant qu’élément d’un processus globxal. L’impor -
tance de l’ajustement exigé par telle ou telle disparité dans lxa longueur
des côtes relève du pouvoir d’appréciation de la juridiction, qui tiendra
compte de l’ensemble des circonstances de l’affaire ».(RSA, vol. XXVII,
p. 235, par. 328; ILR, vol. 139, p. 547.) [Traduction du Greffe.]
242. Aussi la Cour estime-t-elle que, à cette troisième étape, sa tâche
consiste non pas à diviser la zone pertinente entre les Parties selonx le rap -
port existant entre les longueurs respectives de leurs côtes pertinentes, xne
serait-ce qu’approximativement, mais bien à éviter toute disproportionx de
nature à « entacher» le résultat et à le rendre inéquitable. La question de
savoir si une disproportion est suffisamment marquée pour avoir un tel effet
saurait être résolue non par l’application d’une formule matxhématique, mais
plutôt par la prise en considération de toutes les circonstances dxe l’affaire.
243. L’application de la ligne ajustée conformément à la section xprécé -
dente du présent arrêt a pour effet de partager la zone pertinenxte dans un
rapport d’environ 1 à 3,44 en faveur du Nicaragua. Or le rapport entre les
côtes pertinentes est d’environ 1 à 8,2. La question est donc de savoir si,
dans les circonstances propres à la présente affaire, cette dispxroportion est
telle qu’elle aboutirait à un résultat inéquitable.
244. La Cour rappelle que, en arrêtant cette ligne, elle a veillé à xce
qu’aucun des Etats intéressés ne subisse d’effet d’« amputation», ce qui
supposait de ne pas priver San Andrés, Providencia et Santa Catalina des
droits à une zone économique exclusive et à un plateau continenxtal que ces
îles pouvaient générer vers l’est, en particulier dans la zoxne qui se trouve à
moins de 200 milles marins de leurs côtes mais à plus de 200 milles marins
des lignes de base nicaraguayennes. La Cour fait aussi observer que le
choix de cette ligne a tenu compte d’un autre facteur pertinent, à savoir la
nécessité de veiller à ne pas isoler les îles colombiennes principales à l’inté -
rieur de la zone économique exclusive du Nicaragua. Elle s’est ainxsi donné
pour objectif de parvenir à une délimitation qui prenne en compte xl’intérêt
d’une gestion ordonnée des océans. A cette fin, la délimitxation devrait être,
pour paraphraser le tribunal arbitral saisi de l’affaire Barbade/Trinité‑
et‑Tobago, « à la fois équitable et aussi satisfaisante que possible sur le
plan pratique, compte tenu de la nécessité de parvenir à un réxsultat stable
96
6 CIJ1034.indb 189 7/01/14 12:43 717 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
11 April 2006, RIAA, Vol. XXVII, p. 215, para. 244 ; ILR, Vol. 139,
p. 524).
245. Analysis of the jurisprudence of maritime delimitation cases
shows that the Court and other tribunals have displayed considerable
caution in the application of the disproportionality test. Thus, the Couxrt
observes that in the case concerning Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Malta), the ratio of relevant coasts was approximately 1:8, a
figure almost identical to that in the present case. The Court considexred,
at the second stage of its analysis, that this disparity required an adjxust -
ment or shifting of the provisional median line. At the third stage, it xcon-
fined itself to stating that there was no significant disproportionaxlity
without examining the precise division of shares of the relevant area. Txhat
may have been because of the difficulty of determining the limits of thxe
relevant area due to the overlapping interests of third States. Neverthex -
less, it is clear that the respective shares of Libya and Malta did not come
anywhere near a ratio of 1:8, although Malta’s share was substantiallxy
reduced from what it would have been had the boundary followed the
provisional median line.
246. Similarly in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area
between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), the ratio of
relevant coasts was approximately 1:9 in Denmark’s favour (Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 65, para. 61). That disparity led the Court to shift
the provisional median line. Again, the Court did not discuss, in its Juxdg -
ment, the precise shares of the relevant area (referred to in that Judgxment
as the “area of overlapping potential entitlements”) which the lixne thus
established attributed to each State, but the description in the Judgmenxt
and the depiction of the boundary on the maps attached thereto show
that it was approximately 1:2.7. The Court did not consider the result to
be significantly disproportionate.
247. The Court concludes that, taking account of all the circumstances
of the present case, the result achieved by the application of the line xpro -
visionally adopted in the previous section of the Judgment does not entaxil
such a disproportionality as to create an inequitable result.
VI. Nicaragua’s Request foxr a Declaration
248. In addition to its claims regarding a maritime boundary, Nicara -
gua’s Application reserved “the right to claim compensation for elxements
of unjust enrichment consequent upon Colombian possession of the
Islands of San Andrés and Providencia as well as the keys and maritime
spaces up to the 82 meridian” and “for interference with fishing vessels of
Nicaraguan nationality or vessels licensed by Nicaragua”. In its fixnal sub -
missions, Nicaragua made no claim for compensation but it requested
that the Court adjudge and declare that “Colombia is not acting in acxcor -
dance with her obligations under international law by stopping and
97
6 CIJ1034.indb 190 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 717
sur le plan juridique » [traduction du Greffe] ( sentence du 11 avril 2006,
RSA, vol. XXVII, p. 215, par. 244 ; ILR, vol. 139, p. 524).
245. L’analyse de la jurisprudence en matière de délimitation maritixme
montre que la Cour et les autres juridictions ont fait preuve d’une gxrande
prudence dans l’application de cet outil de vérification. Ainsi, la Cour
remarque que, dans l’affaire du Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne/Malte), le rapport entre les côtes pertinentes était d’environ 1
à 8, soit presque identique à celui de la présente affaire. Elle axvait alors
considéré, à la deuxième étape de son analyse, que cette xdisparité exigeait
l’ajustement ou le déplacement de la ligne médiane provisoire. xA la troi -
sième étape, elle s’était bornée à constater qu’il n’y avait pas de dispro -
portion marquée, sans revenir sur la répartition précise de la xzone
pertinente entre les Parties. Cela peut s’expliquer par la difficultxé qu’il y
avait, en l’espèce, à définir les limites de celle-ci en raison des intérêts
concurrents d’Etats tiers. Quoi qu’il en soit, il est clair que lex rapport
entre les parts respectivement attribuées à la Libye et à Maltex n’était pas
du tout de l’ordre de 1 à 8, même si la part attribuée à Malte était consi -
dérablement moindre qu’elle ne l’aurait été si la frontièxre avait suivi le
tracé de la ligne médiane provisoire.
246. De même, dans l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime dans la région
située entre le Groenland et Jan Mayen (Danemark c. Norvège), le rapport
entre les côtes pertinentes était d’environ 1 à 9 en faveur du Danemark
(arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 65, par. 61), et cette disparité a amené la
Cour à déplacer la ligne médiane provisoire. Là encore, la Cxour n’a pas
analysé le rapport précis entre les parts de la zone pertinente (xdénommée,
dans cette décision, « zone de chevauchement des titres potentiels ») res -
pectivement attribuées aux Parties selon la ligne ainsi établie, mxais il res-
sort de la description de la frontière donnée dans l’arrêt ext de son tracé
sur les cartes y annexées que le rapport était de l’ordre de 1 à 2,7. Or, la
Cour a estimé qu’il ne s’agissait pas là d’une disproportxion marquée.
247. La Cour conclut que, compte tenu de l’ensemble des circonstances
entourant la présente affaire, le résultat obtenu par applicatioxn de la ligne
adoptée à titre provisoire à la section précédente du présent arrêt n’en -
traîne pas de disproportion donnant lieu à un résultat inéquxitable.
VI. La déclaration demandéxe par le Nicaragua
248. Dans sa requête, le Nicaragua, outre sa demande concernant la
fixation d’une frontière maritime, s’est «réserv[é] le droit de demander répa -
ration pour tout élément d’enrichissement indu résultant de xla possession
par la Colombie … des îles de San Andrés et de Providencia, ainsi que des
cayes et des espaces maritimes qui s’étendent jusqu’au 82 e méridien » et
«pour toute entrave à l’activité des bateaux de pêche battantx pavillon nica -
raguayen ou des bateaux détenteurs d’un permis délivré par lxe Nicaragu »a.
Dans ses conclusions finales, il n’a présenté aucune demande xde réparation,
mais a prié la Cour de dire et juger «que la Colombie manqu[ait] à ses obli -
97
6 CIJ1034.indb 191 7/01/14 12:43 718 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
otherwise hindering Nicaragua from accessing and disposing of her
natural resources to the east of the 82nd meridian”. In this regard, Nica -
ragua referred to a number of incidents in which Nicaraguan fishing vexs-
sels had been arrested by Colombian warships east of the 82nd meridian.
249. Colombia states that Nicaragua’s request for a declaration is
unfounded. According to Colombia, Nicaragua has not demonstrated
that it has suffered any damage as a result of Colombia’s alleged cxonduct.
It adds, first, that in a maritime delimitation dispute, parties do noxt claim
reparation if the judgment finds that areas over which one party has bxeen
exercising its jurisdiction actually fall under the jurisdiction of the xother.
Secondly, Colombia argues that it cannot be criticized for blocking Nicax-
ragua’s access to natural resources to the east of the 82nd meridian. In
particular, Colombia states that, in the normal exercise of its jurisdiction,
it has intercepted to the east of the 82nd meridian fishing vessels flying the
Nicaraguan flag which were not in possession of the appropriate permitxs.
Additionally, Colombia contends that there is no evidence that any Nica -
raguan vessel involved in the exploitation of natural resources in the axreas
east of the 82nd meridian has been threatened or intercepted by Colom -
bia. In light of the above, Colombia submits that the Court should rejecxt
Nicaragua’s request for a declaration.
* *
250. The Court observes that Nicaragua’s request for this declaration
is made in the context of proceedings regarding a maritime boundary
which had not been settled prior to the decision of the Court. The consex-
quence of the Court’s Judgment is that the maritime boundary between x
Nicaragua and Colombia throughout the relevant area has now been
delimited as between the Parties. In this regard, the Court observes thaxt
the Judgment does not attribute to Nicaragua the whole of the area whichx
it claims and, on the contrary, attributes to Colombia part of the mari -
time spaces in respect of which Nicaragua seeks a declaration regarding x
access to natural resources. In this context, the Court considers that Nxic-
ragua’s claim is unfounded.
* * *
251. For these reasons,
The Court,
(1) Unanimously,
Finds that the Republic of Colombia has sovereignty over the islands at
Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Ronca -
dor, Serrana and Serranilla ;
98
6 CIJ1034.indb 192 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 718
gations au regard du droit international en [l’]empêchant de quelque façon
que ce soit … d’avoir accès à ses ressources naturelles à l’est du 82 méri-
dien et d’en disposer». A cet égard, il a fait état d’un certain nombre d’éxp -i
sodes où des bateaux de pêche nicaraguayens avaient été saisis par des
e
navires de guerre colombiens à l’est du 82 méridien.
249. La Colombie tient pour dénuée de tout fondement cette demande
du Nicaragua, qui, selon elle, n’a pas démontré qu’il avait xsubi un préju-
dice à raison des faits reprochés. Elle ajoute, d’une part, qu’xen matière de
délimitation maritime l’attribution d’un espace à l’une dxes parties n’ouvre
pas droit à réparation contre l’autre qui y aurait exercé lax souveraineté
qu’elle croyait avoir et, d’autre part, que l’on ne saurait luix reprocher
d’avoir tenté d’empêcher le Nicaragua d’avoir accès auxx ressources natu-
e
relles se trouvant à l’est du 82 méridien. En particulier, elle déclare que,
dans l’exercice normal de sa souveraineté, elle a intercepté, àx l’est du
82 méridien, des bateaux de pêche battant pavillon nicaraguayen parcex
qu’ils n’étaient pas en possession des autorisations voulues. Lxa Colombie
soutient en outre qu’il n’existe aucun élément montrant qu’xelle ait pu ten -
ter d’intimider ou d’intercepter des navires nicaraguayens affecxtés à l’ex-
ploitation des ressources naturelles à l’est du 82 méridien. A la lumière de
ce qui précède, elle soutient que la Cour devrait rejeter la demanxde de
déclaration formulée par le Nicaragua.
* *
250. La Cour fait observer que la demande du Nicaragua est présentée
dans le cadre d’une instance concernant une frontière maritime quix n’a
jamais été tracée auparavant. Le présent arrêt a pour effxet de fixer la fron -
tière maritime entre les deux Parties, le Nicaragua et la Colombie, dans
l’ensemble de la zone pertinente. A cet égard, la Cour relève qxue son arrêt
n’attribue pas au Nicaragua la totalité de la zone qu’il revendxique et
alloue au contraire à la Colombie une partie des espaces maritimes àx
l’égard desquels le Nicaragua demande une déclaration concernanxt l’accès
aux ressources naturelles. Dans ces conditions, elle estime que la demanxde
du Nicaragua sur ce point n’est pas fondée.
*
* *
251. Par ces motifs,
La Cour,
1) A l’unanimité,
Dit que la République de Colombie a la souveraineté sur les îles faisant
partie des formations suivantes : Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo, cayes de
l’Est-Sud-Est, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana et Serranilla ;
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6 CIJ1034.indb 193 7/01/14 12:43 719 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
(2) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds admissible the Republic of Nicaragua’s claim contained in its
final submission I (3) requesting the Court to adjudge and declare that
“[t]he appropriate form of delimitation, within the geographical and xlegal
framework constituted by the mainland coasts of Nicaragua and Colom -
bia, is a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the overlapx -
ping entitlements to a continental shelf of both Parties” ;
in favour : President Tomka ;Vice‑President Sepúlveda-Amor ;Judges Abra-
ham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Greenwood,
Xue, Donoghue, Sebutinde ; Judges ad hoc Mensah, Cot ;
against : Judge Owada ;
(3) Unanimously,
Finds that it cannot uphold the Republic of Nicaragua’s claim con -
tained in its final submission I (3) ;
(4) Unanimously,
Decides that the line of the single maritime boundary delimiting the
continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of the Republic of
Nicaragua and the Republic of Colombia shall follow geodetic lines con -
necting the points with co-ordinates :
Latitude north Longitude west
1. 13° 46ʹ 35.7˝ 81° 29ʹ 34.7˝
2. 13° 31ʹ 08.0˝ 81° 45ʹ 59.4˝
3. 13° 03ʹ 15.8˝ 81° 46ʹ 22.7˝
4. 12° 50ʹ 12.8˝ 81° 59ʹ 22.6˝
5. 12° 07ʹ 28.8˝ 82° 07ʹ 27.7˝
6. 12° 00ʹ 04.5˝ 81° 57ʹ 57.8˝
From point 1, the maritime boundary line shall continue due east along
the parallel of latitude (co-ordinates 13° 46ʹ 35.7˝ N) until it reaches the
200-nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured. From point 6 (with co-ordinates
12° 00ʹ 04.5˝ N and 81° 57ʹ 57.8˝ W), located on a 12-nautical-mile enve -
lope of arcs around Alburquerque, the maritime boundary line shall con -
tinue along that envelope of arcs until it reaches point 7 (with co-ordinates
12° 11ʹ 53.5˝ N and 81° 38ʹ 16.6˝ W) which is located on the parallel pass -
ing through the southernmost point on the 12-nautical-mile envelope of
arcs around East-Southeast Cays. The boundary line then follows that
parallel until it reaches the southernmost point of the 12-nautical-mile
envelope of arcs around East-Southeast Cays at point 8 (with co-ordi -
nates 12° 11ʹ 53.5˝ N and 81° 28ʹ 29.5˝ W) and continues along that enve -
lope of arcs until its most eastward point (point 9 with co-ordinates
12° 24ʹ 09.3˝ N and 81° 14ʹ 43.9˝ W). From that point the boundary line
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6 CIJ1034.indb 194 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 719
2) Par quatorze voix contre une,
Déclare recevable la demande formulée par la République du Nicara -
gua au point I. 3) de ses conclusions finales, par laquelle celle-ci la prie de
dire et juger que, « dans le cadre géographique et juridique constitué par
les côtes continentales du Nicaragua et de la Colombie, la méthodex de
délimitation à retenir consiste à tracer une limite opérant xune division par
parts égales de la zone du plateau continental où les droits des deux Par -
ties sur celui-ci se chevauchent »;
pour :M. Tomka, président ; M.Sepúlveda-Amor, vice‑président ; MM.Abra-
hamesKeith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Greenwood,
M Xue, Donoghue, Sebutinde, juges; MM. Mensah, Cot, juges ad hoc ;
contre : M.Owada, juge ;
3) A l’unanimité,
Dit qu’elle ne peut accueillir la demande formulée par la Républiqxue du
Nicaragua au point I. 3) de ses conclusions finales ;
4) A l’unanimité,
Décide que le tracé de la frontière maritime unique délimitant le plax -
teau continental et les zones économiques exclusives de la Républixque du
Nicaragua et de la République de Colombie suit les lignes géodéxsiques
reliant les points dont les coordonnées sont les suivantes :
Latitude nord Longitude ouest
1. 13° 46ʹ 35,7˝ 81° 29ʹ 34,7˝
2. 13° 31ʹ 08,0˝ 81° 45ʹ 59,4˝
3. 13° 03ʹ 15,8˝ 81° 46ʹ 22,7˝
4. 12° 50ʹ 12,8˝ 81° 59ʹ 22,6˝
5. 12° 07ʹ 28,8˝ 82° 07ʹ 27,7˝
6. 12° 00ʹ 04,5˝ 81° 57ʹ 57,8˝
A partir du point 1, la frontière maritime se poursuit plein est le long du
parallèle situé par 13° 46ʹ 35,7˝ de latitude nord, jusqu’à la limite située à
200 milles marins des lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée lxa lar-
geur de la mer territoriale du Nicaragua. A partir du point 6, situé par
12° 00ʹ 04,5˝ de latitude nord et 81° 57ʹ 57,8˝ de longitude ouest sur l’enve-
loppe d’arcs tracée à 12 milles marins d’Alburquerque, elle suit cette enve-
loppe d’arcs jusqu’au point 7, de coordonnées 12° 11ʹ 53,5˝ de latitude
nord et 81° 38ʹ 16,6˝ de longitude ouest, situé sur le parallèle passant par
le point le plus méridional de l’enveloppe d’arcs tracée àx 12milles marins
des cayes de l’Est-Sud-Est. Elle longe ensuite ce parallèle jusqu’au point le
plus méridional de l’enveloppe d’arcs tracée à 12 milles marins des cayes
de l’Est-Sud-Est, soit le point 8, situé par 12° 11ʹ 53,5˝ de latitude nord et
81° 28ʹ 29,5˝ de longitude ouest, puis se poursuit le long de cette enveloppe
d’arcs jusqu’à son point le plus oriental, soit le point 9, situé par
12° 24ʹ 09,3˝ de latitude nord et 81° 14ʹ 43,9˝ de longitude ouest. A partir
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6 CIJ1034.indb 195 7/01/14 12:43 720 territorial and marixtime dispute (judgmentx)
follows the parallel of latitude (co-ordinates 12° 24ʹ 09.3˝ N) until it
reaches the 200-nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which the texr -
ritorial sea of Nicaragua is measured ;
(5) Unanimously,
Decides that the single maritime boundary around Quitasueño and Ser-
rana shall follow, respectively, a 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs mea -
sured from QS 32 and from low-tide elevations located within
12 nautical miles from QS 32, and a 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs
measured from Serrana Cay and the other cays in its vicinity ;
(6) Unanimously,
Rejects the Republic of Nicaragua’s claim contained in its final submis-
sions requesting the Court to declare that the Republic of Colombia is
not acting in accordance with its obligations under international law by
preventing the Republic of Nicaragua from having access to natural
resources to the east of the 82nd meridian.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at x
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this nineteenth day of November, two
thousand and twelve, in three copies, one of which will be placed in thex
archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of
the Republic of Nicaragua and the Government of the Republic of
Colombia, respectively.
(Signed) Peter Tomka,
President.
(Signed) Philippe Couvreur,
Registrar.
Judge Owada appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the
Court ; JudgeAbraham appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of
the Court ; Judges Keith and Xue append declarations to the Judgment
of the Court ; Judge Donoghue appends a separate opinion to the Judg -
ment of the Court ; Judges ad hoc Mensah and Cot append declarations
to the Judgment of the Court.
(Initialled) P.T.
(Initialled) Ph.C.
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6 CIJ1034.indb 196 7/01/14 12:43 différend territoriaxl et maritime (arrêt) 720
de ce point, elle longe le parallèle situé par 12° 24ʹ 09,3˝ de latitude nord,
jusqu’à la limite située à 200 milles marins des lignes de base à partir des -
quelles est mesurée la largeur de la mer territoriale du Nicaragua ;
5) A l’unanimité,
Décide que, autour de Quitasueño et de Serrana, la frontière maritime
unique suit une enveloppe d’arcs à une distance de 12 milles marins mesu-
rée, dans le premier cas, à partir de QS 32 et des hauts-fonds découvrants
situés dans un rayon de 12 milles marins de QS 32 et, dans le second, à
partir de la caye de Serrana et des cayes avoisinantes ;
6) A l’unanimité,
Rejette la demande formulée par la République du Nicaragua dans ses
conclusions finales, par laquelle celle-ci prie la Cour de déclarer que la
République de Colombie manque à ses obligations au regard du droitx
international en l’empêchant d’avoir accès aux ressources naxturelles à
l’est du 82e méridien.
Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palaxis de la
Paix, à La Haye, le dix-neuf novembre deux mille douze, en trois exem -
plaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et lexs autres
seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la République du
Nicaragua et au Gouvernement de la République de Colombie.
Le président,
(Signé) Peter Tomka.
Le greffier,
(Signé) Philippe Couvreur.
M. le juge Owada joint à l’arrêt l’exposé de son opinion dissidente ;
M. le juge Abraham joint à l’arrêt l’exposé de son opinion individuelle ;
M. le juge Keith joint une déclaration à l’arrêt ; M me la juge Xue joint
me
une déclaration à l’arrêt ; M la juge Donoghue joint à l’arrêt l’exposé
de son opinion individuelle; MM. les juges ad hocMensah et Cot joignent
une déclaration à l’arrêt.
(Paraphé) P.T.
(Paraphé) Ph.C.
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6 CIJ1034.indb 197 7/01/14 12:43
Judgment of 19 November 2012