Judgment of 11 November 2013

Document Number
151-20131111-JUD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION
OF THE JUDGMENT OF 15 JUNE 1962 IN THE CASE

CONCERNING THE TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
(CAMBODIA v. THAILAND)

(CAMBODIA v. THAILAND)

JUDGMENT OF 11 NOVEMBER 2013

2013

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

DEMANDE EN INTERPRÉTATION
DE L’ARRÊT DU 15 JUIN 1962 EN L’AFFAIRE

DU TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
(CAMBODGE c. THAÏLANDE)

(CAMBODGE c. THAÏLANDE)

ARRÊT DU 11 NOVEMBRE 2013

8 Ord 1050.indb 1 25/06/14 13:11 Official citation :
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case

concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 281

Mode officiel de citation :
Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en l’affaire
du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande)

(Cambodge c. Thaïlande), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2013, p. 281

Sales number

ISSN 0074-4441 N ode vente: 1050
ISBN 978-92-1-071165-4

8 Ord 1050.indb 2 25/06/14 13:11 11 NOVEMBER 2013

JUDGMENT

REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION
OF THE JUDGMENT OF 15 JUNE 1962 IN THE CASE

CONCERNING THE TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
(CAMBODIA v. THAILAND)

(CAMBODIA v. THAILAND)

DEMANDE EN INTERPRÉTATION
DE L’ARRÊT DU 15 JUIN 1962 EN L’AFFAIRE
DU TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR

(CAMBODGE c. THAÏLANDE)

(CAMBODGE c. THAÏLANDE)

11 NOVEMBRE 2013

ARRÊT

8 Ord 1050.indb 3 25/06/14 13:11 281

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paragraphs

Chronology of the Procfiedure 1-13

I. Historical Backgroundfi 14-29

II. Jurisdiction and Admisfisibility 30-57
1. Jurisdiction of the Court under Article 60 of the Statute 31-52

A. The existence of a dispute 37-45
B. Subject-matter of the dispute before the Court 46-52

2. Admissibility of Cambodia’s Request for interpretation 53-56
3. Conclusion 57

III. The Interpretation offi the 1962 Judgment 58-107
1. Positions of the Parties 59-65

2. The role of the Court under Article 60 of the Statute 66-75
3. The principal features of the 1962 Judgment 76-78
4. The operative part of the 1962 Judgment 79-106

A. The first operative paragraph 80
B. The second operative paragraph 81-99

C. The relationship between the second operative paragraph
and the rest of the operative part 100-106

5. Conclusions 107
Operative Clause 108

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8 Ord 1050.indb 4 25/06/14 13:11 282

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

2013 YEAR 2013
11 November
General List
No. 151 11 November 2013

REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION

OF THE JUDGMENT OF 15 JUNE 1962 IN THE CASE
CONCERNING THE TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR

(CAMBODIA v. THAILAND)

(CAMBODIA v. THAILAND)

Historical background.

*

Jurisdiction and admissibility.
Article 60 of the Statute of the Court — Conditions of jurisdiction — Existence
of a dispute — Dispute as to the meaning or scope of Judgment of 15 June 1962 —
Subject‑matter of the current dispute — Characterization of Annex I map line —

Extent of area of Temple of Preah Vihear — Meaning and scope of phrases “ter
ritory under the sovereignty of Cambodia” and “vicinity on Cambodi▯an territory”
contained in operative par— Nature of Thailand’s obligation to withdraw its
personnel — Question of admissibility — Purpose of request must be limited to
interpretation — Need to interpret second operative paragraph of the 1962 Judg
ment and legal effect of the Court’s statements regarding Annex I map line —
Request for interpretation found admissible.

*

Interpretation of the 1962 Judgment.
Role of the Court under Article 60 of the Statute — Relationship between oper

ative clause and reasoning in original judgment — Role of pleadings, evidence and
submissions of Parties in original case — Principle of non ultra— Nature
and purpose of headnote — Conduct of the Parties occurring after original judg
ment given.

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Principal features of the 1962 Judgment.
Role of Annex I map in reasoning of the Court — Submissions of the Parties —
Subject‑matter of the dispute before the Court — Court concerned with question
of sovereignty over the Temple area and not frontier delimitation.

Operative part of the 1962 Judgment.
First operative paragraph of the 1962 Judgment clear in meaning — Temple
situated in territory under sovereignty of Cambodia — Scope of this operative
paragraph to be assessed in light of the Court’s examination of the s▯econd and
third operative paragraphs.
Second operative paragraph of the 1962 Judgment — No express indication of

territory from which Thailand was required to withdraw — Term “vicinity on
Cambodian territory” to be construed as extending at least to area wh▯ere Thai
personnel stationed — 1962 Thai Council of Ministers’ line — Natural under ‑
standing of concept of “vicinity” of Temple in view of geographica▯l context —
Phnom Trap outside Temple area — 1962 Judgment required Thailand to with ‑

draw from whole territory of promontory of Preah Vihear.

Operative part of the 1962 Judgment to be considered as a whole — Territorial
scope of the three operative paragraphs is the same.
Determination of boundary line between Cambodia and Thailand beyond scop▯e

of 1962 Judgment — Not necessary for the Court to consider whether Thailand’s
obligation to withdraw is a continuing one — Territorial integrity of a State must
be respected.
Temple of Preah Vihear a UNESCO world heritage site — Cambodia and
Thailand must co‑operate to protect the site — Each State under obligation not to

take any deliberate measures which might damage Temple — Access to Temple
from the Cambodian plain to be ensured.

JUDGMENT

Present: President Tomka ;Vice‑President Sepúlveda-Amor ; Judges Owada,

Abraham, Keith, Bennouna,fi Skotnikov, Cançado Trinfidade,
Yusuf, Greenwood, Xue, Donfioghue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhfiandari ;
Judges ad hoc Guillaume, Cot ; Registrar Couvreur.

In the case concerning the Request for interpretation of the Judgment offi
15 June 1962,

between

the Kingdom of Cambodia,
represented by

H.E. Mr. Hor Namhong, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs and International Co-operation,

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8 Ord 1050.indb 8 25/06/14 13:11 284 request for interprefitation (judgment)

as Agent ;
H.E. Mr. Var Kimhong, Minister of State,

as Deputy Agent ;
H.E. Mr. Long Visalo, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

and International Co-operation,
Mr. Raoul Marc Jennar, Expert,
H.E. Mr. Hem Saem, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the
Kingdom of Cambodia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
H.E. Mr. Sarun Rithea, Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and
International Co-operation,

Mr. Hoy Pichravuth, Assistant to the Deputy Prime Minister,
as Advisers ;

Mr. Jean-Marc Sorel, Professor of International Law at the University of
Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Sir Franklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., member of the English Bar, member
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Visiting Professor of Internationfial
Law at Oxford University and the University of Cape Town,

Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, member of the New
York Bar, Eversheds LLP (Paris),
as Counsel and Advocates ;

Mr. Guillaume Le Floch, Professor at the University of Rennes 1,
Ms Amal Alamuddin, member of the English and the New York Bars,
Ms Naomi Briercliffe, solicitor (England and Wales), Eversheds LLP (Parisfi),

as Counsel ;

and

the Kingdom of Thailand,

represented by
H.E. Mr. Virachai Plasai, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
the Kingdom of Thailand to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

as Agent ;
Mr. Voradet Viravakin, Director-General, Department of Treaties and Legal

Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Deputy Agent ;

H.E. Mr. Surapong Tovichakchaikul, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
for Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. Phongthep Thepkanjana, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Education,
H.E. A.C.M. Sukumpol Suwanatat, Minister of Defence,

Mr. Thana Duangratana, Vice-Minister attached to the Office of the Prime
Minister,
Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Nuttavudh Photisaro, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreignfi

Affairs,
General Nipat Thonglek, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence,fi

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Lieutenant General Nopphadon Chotsiri, Director-General, Royal Thai Sur -
vey Department, Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters,

Mr. Chukiert Ratanachaichan, Deputy Secretary-General, Office of the
Council of State, Office of the Prime Minister,

Mr. Jumpon Phansumrit, Expert Public Prosecutor, Office of Policy and
Strategy, Office of the Attorney General,
Mr. Darm Boontham, Director, Boundary Division, Department of Treaties
and Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ;

*

Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Lawfi,
University of Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,

Barrister,
Mr. Donald McRae, Hyman Soloway Professor, University of Ottawa, Mem -
ber of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institufit
de droit international, member of the Ontario Bar,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La

Défense, President of the Société française pour le droit infiternational, asso
ciate member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Thomas Grant, member of the New York Bar, Senior Research Associ -
ate, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge,
Ms Alina Miron, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre

(CEDIN), University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
as Counsel ;

Mr. Alastair Macdonald, M.B.E., Honorary Fellow, International Bound-
aries Research Unit, Department of Geography, Durham University,

Mr. Martin Pratt, Director of Research, International Boundaries Researcfih
Unit, Department of Geography, Durham University,

as Expert Advisers ;

Mr. Ludovic Legrand, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterfire
(CEDIN), University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,

as Assistant Counsel,

The Court,

composed as above,

after deliberation,
delivers the following Judgment :

1. On 28 April 2011, the Kingdom of Cambodia (hereinafter “Cambodia”)
filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedingfis in

which, referring to Article 60 of the Statute of the Court and Article 98 of the
Rules of Court, Cambodia requests the Court to interpret the Judgment which
it delivered on 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 6 (hereinafter

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the “1962 Judgment”). Cambodia on the same day, referring to Article 41 of the
Statute and Article 73 of the Rules of Court, also filed a Request for the indica -
tion of provisional measures in order to “cause [the] incursions [by fiThailand]
onto its territory to cease”.

2. In accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Registrar
communicated the Application forthwith to the Government of the Kingdom fiof
Thailand (hereinafter “Thailand”) ; and, pursuant to paragraph 3 of that Arti -
cle, all other States entitled to appear before the Court were notified of the
Application. Pursuant to Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the

Registrar transmitted a certified copy of the Request for the indication of provi -
sional measures to Thailand.
3. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of
either of the Parties, each Party exercised its right, conferred by Artificle 31, para
graph 3, of the Statute, to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case ; Cambodia

chose Mr. Gilbert Guillaume, and Thailand Mr. Jean-Pierre Cot.

4. By an Order of 18 July 2011, the Court, after rejecting Thailand’s request
for the case to be removed from the General List of the Court, indicatedfi the
following provisional measures :

“(1) Both Parties shall immediately withdraw their military personnel cur -
rently present in the provisional demilitarized zone, as defined in par -

agraph 62 of the present Order, and refrain from any military presence
within that zone and from any armed activity directed at that zone ;

(2) Thailand shall not obstruct Cambodia’s free access to the Temple of
Preah Vihear or Cambodia’s provision of fresh supplies to its non-

military personnel in the Temple ;
(3) Both Parties shall continue the co-operation which they have entered into
within ASEAN and, in particular, allow the observers appointed by that
organization to have access to the provisional demilitarized zone;
(4) Both Parties shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or

extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolvfie.”
(Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cam ‑
bodia v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011,
I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), pp. 555-556, para. 69, points B.1 to 4 of the

operative part.)
It further decided that “each Party shall inform the Court as to its ficompliance

with the above provisional measures” and that, “until the Court hafis rendered its
judgment on the request for interpretation, it shall remain seised of the matters
which form the subject of this Order” (ibid., points C and D of the operative
part).
5. Thailand filed written observations on Cambodia’s Request for interprfieta -

tion within the time-limit fixed by the Court for that purpose, in accordance
with Article 98, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court.
6. The Court decided to afford the Parties the opportunity of furnishing furfi -
ther written explanations, pursuant to Article 98, paragraph 4, of the Rules of
Court. Each of the Parties filed such further explanations within the tifime-limits

prescribed by the Court.
7. The Court also decided, in response to a request from Thailand to
which Cambodia did not object, to give the Parties an opportunity to pro -

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8 Ord 1050.indb 14 25/06/14 13:11 287 request for interprefitation (judgment)

vide further oral explanations under Article 98, paragraph 4, of the Rules of
Court.
8. In accordance with Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the
Court decided, after ascertaining the views of the Parties, that copies fiof the
pleadings and documents annexed would be made accessible to the public ofin the

opening of the oral proceedings.
9. Public hearings were held from 15 to 19 April 2013, at which the Court
heard the oral arguments and replies of :

For Cambodia : H.E. Mr. Hor Namhong,
Mr. Jean-Marc Sorel,
Sir Franklin Berman,
Mr. Rodman Bundy.

For Thailand : H.E. Mr. Virachai Plasai,
Mr. Donald McRae,
Ms Alina Miron,
Mr. Alain Pellet,

Mr. James Crawford.
10. At the hearings, a Member of the Court put a question to the Parties, tofi
which replies were given orally and in writing, in accordance with Articfile 61,

paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court. Pursuant to Article 72 of the Rules of
Court, each Party presented written observations on the written replies received
from the other.

*

11. In the Application, Cambodia presented the following claims :

“Given that ‘the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory ufinder the
sovereignty of Cambodia’ (first paragraph of the operative clause [ofif the
1962 Judgment]), which is the legal consequence of the fact that the Temple fi
is situated on the Cambodian side of the frontier, as that frontier was fi
recognized by the Court in its Judgment, and on the basis of the facts
and arguments set forth above, Cambodia respectfully asks the Court to

adjudge and declare that :
The obligation incumbent upon Thailand to ‘withdraw any military or
police forces, or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Templfie,

or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory’ (second paragraph of the operative
clause [of the 1962 Judgment]) is a particular consequence of the general
and continuing obligation to respect the integrity of the territory of Cam -
bodia, that territory having been delimited in the area of the Temple and
its vicinity by the line on the Annex I map, on which the Judgment of the

Court is based.” (P. 36, para. 45.)
12. In the written proceedings, the Parties made the following submissions :

On behalf of the Government of Cambodia,

in the further explanations presented on 8 March 2012 :

“On the basis of the facts and arguments set out in its Application ffior
interpretation and in this Response, Cambodia respectfully asks the Courfit
to adjudge and declare :

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(i) that the submissions made to the Court by each of the two Parties show,
both in the light of the facts and in themselves, that the Parties are ifin
disagreement regarding the meaning and scope of the 1962 Judgment;
(ii) that the disputes between the Parties concern both the first and sec -

ond paragraphs of the dispositif of the 1962 Judgment, as well as the
link between those two paragraphs ;
(iii) that the dispute relating to the first paragraph concerns the meaning
and scope of the Court’s use of the term ‘territory’ (‘is sfiituated in
territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia’), particularly in connefic -

tion with the Court’s decisions regarding the legal status of the
Annex I map as representing the frontier between the two States ;
(iv) that the dispute relating to the second paragraph concerns the mean -
ing and scope of the Court’s use of the terms ‘vicinity’ and ‘territory’
(‘at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory’) ;

(v) that the dispute relating to the link between the two paragraphs relates
to the question of whether the second paragraph must be read in the
light of the first paragraph, or whether the particular terms employed
by the Court in the second paragraph must be read as seeking to limit

the general scope of the first paragraph ;
(vi) that each of those disputes concerns matters decided by the Court with
binding force in the Judgment ;
(vii) that on account of the terms used and given the context (specifically, fi
the Court’s decision concerning the legal status of the Annex I map

as representing the frontier between the two States), the first para -
graph of the dispositif must be understood as determining, with bind -
ing force, that all of the disputed area that lies on the Cambodian sidefi
of the line on the Annex I map — including, therefore, the Temple of
Preah Vihear itself — is to be regarded as falling under Cambodian

sovereignty ;
(viii) that on account of the terms used and given the context (particularly
the expression ‘in consequence’ linking it to the first paragraph), the
second paragraph of the dispositif must be understood as representing

a particular consequence stemming from the decision taken in the
first paragraph, implying that the scope of the second paragraph, both
in space and in time, must be understood in the light of the first
paragraph;
(ix) that on account of the terms used and given the context (particularly

the link with the first paragraph, of which it is a ‘consequence’), the
second paragraph of the dispositif must be understood as imposing on
Thailand both an explicit obligation to withdraw immediately to its
own territory all military or police forces stationed at the Temple or
at nearby sites at that time and an implicit obligation not to send those

forces — or similar forces — back to the Temple or to nearby sites in
the Temple area, which must, on account of the terms used in the
first paragraph of the dispositif, be regarded as Cambodia’s sovereign
territory.

On that basis, Cambodia respectfully asks the Court, under Article 60 of its

Statute, to respond to the question concerning the interpretation of itsfi
Judgment of 15 June 1962 set out in paragraph 45 of the Application for
interpretation filed on 28 April 2011, namely :

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‘Given that ‘the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory ufinder
the sovereignty of Cambodia’ (first paragraph of the operative clause),
which is the legal consequence of the fact that the Temple is situated ofin the
Cambodian side of the frontier, as that frontier was recognized by the

Court in its Judgment, and on the basis of the facts and arguments set ffiorth
above, Cambodia respectfully asks the Court to adjudge and declare tha:t
The obligation incumbent upon Thailand to ‘withdraw any military or

police forces, or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Templfie,
or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory’ (second paragraph of the opera-
tive clause) is a particular consequence of the general and continuing fio-bli
gation to respect the integrity of the territory of Cambodia, that terrifitory
having been delimited in the area of the Temple and its vicinity by the filine

on the Annex I map, on which the Judgment of the Court is based.’”
On behalf of the Government of Thailand,

in the written observations presented on 21 November 2011 :

“The Kingdom of Thailand requests the Court to adjudge and declare :

— that the Request of the Kingdom of Cambodia asking the Court to inter-
pret the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) under Article 60 of the Statute of
the Court does not satisfy the conditions laid down in that Article and
that, consequently, the Court has no jurisdiction to respond to the

Request and/or that the Request is inadmissible ;
— in the alternative, that there are no grounds to grant Cambodia’s Reqfiuest
to construe the Judgment and that there is no reason to interpret the
Judgment of 1962 ;
— in the further alternative, that the 1962 Judgment does not determine

that the line on the Annex I map is the boundary line between the King-
dom of Thailand and the Kingdom of Cambodia.”

in the further explanations presented on 21 June 2012 :

“In view of the reasons given above and its written observations of
21 November 2011, the Kingdom of Thailand requests the Court to adjudge
and declare :

— that the Request of the Kingdom of Cambodia asking the Court to
interpret the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Tem‑
ple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) under Article 60 of the
Statute of the Court does not satisfy the conditions laid down in that

Article and that, consequently, the Court has no jurisdiction to respondfi
to that Request and/or that the Request is inadmissible ;
— in the alternative, that there are no grounds to grant Cambodia’s
Request to construe the Judgment and that there is no reason to inter -
pret the Judgment of 1962 ; and

— to formally declare that the 1962 Judgment does not determine that the
line on the Annex I map is the boundary line between the Kingdom of
Thailand and the Kingdom of Cambodia.”

13. At the oral proceedings, the following final submissions were presented fi
by the Parties :

On behalf of the Government of Cambodia,

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at the hearing of 18 April 2013 :

“— Rejecting the submissions of the Kingdom of Thailand, and on the basis
of the foregoing, Cambodia respectfully asks the Court, under Arti -

cle 60 of its Statute, to respond to Cambodia’s Request for interpreta -
tion of its Judgment of 15 June 1962.
— In Cambodia’s view: ‘the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory
under the sovereignty of Cambodia’ (first paragraph of the operative
clause), which is the legal consequence of the fact that the Temple is

situated on the Cambodian side of the frontier, as that frontier was
recognized by the Court in its Judgment. Therefore, the obligation
incumbent upon Thailand to ‘withdraw any military or police forces,
or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its
vicinity on Cambodian territory’ (second paragraph of the operative
clause) is a particular consequence of the general and continuing obli -

gation to respect the integrity of the territory of Cambodia, that terrifi -
tory having been delimited in the region of the Temple and its vicinity fi
by the line on the Annex I map, on which the Judgment of the Court is
based.”

On behalf of the Government of Thailand,

at the hearing of 19 April 2013 :
“In accordance with Article 60 of the Rules of Court and having regard

to the Request for interpretation of the Kingdom of Cambodia and its
written and oral pleadings, and in view of the written and oral pleadingfis of
the Kingdom of Thailand, the Kingdom of Thailand requests the Court to
adjudge and declare :

— that the Request of the Kingdom of Cambodia asking the Court to
interpret the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Tem ‑
ple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) under Article 60 of the

Statute of the Court does not satisfy the conditions laid down in that
Article and that, consequently, the Court has no jurisdiction to respondfi
to that Request and/or that the Request is inadmissible ;
— in the alternative, that there are no grounds to grant Cambodia’s
Request to construe the Judgment and that there is no reason to inter -

pret the Judgment of 1962 ; and
— to formally declare that the 1962 Judgment does not determine with
binding force the boundary line between the Kingdom of Thailand and
the Kingdom of Cambodia, nor does it fix the limit of the vicinity of thfie
Temple.”

* * *

I. Historical Backgroundfi

14. The Temple of Preah Vihear is situated on a promontory of the
same name in the eastern part of the Dangrek range of mountains,
“which, in a general way, constitutes the boundary between the two cofiun -

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tries in this region — Cambodia to the south and Thailand to the north”
(Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment,

I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 15).
15. On 13 February 1904, France (of which Cambodia was then a pro -
tectorate) and Siam (as Thailand was then called) concluded a treaty
(hereinafter the “1904 Treaty”) which specified that the frontier in the
Dangrek sector was to follow the watershed line “between the basins ofif

the Nam Sen and the Mekong, on the one hand, and the Nam Moun, on
the other hand”. The 1904 Treaty provided for the establishment of Mixed
Commissions composed of officers appointed by the two parties and
responsible for delimiting the frontier between the two territories. The first
Mixed Commission was thus established in 1904. The final stage of the
operation of delimitation was to be the preparation and publication of

maps, a task assigned to a team of four French officers, three of whom fihad
been members of the Mixed Commission. In 1907, that team prepared a
series of 11 maps covering a large part of the frontiers between Siam and
French Indo-China (of which Cambodia formed part). In particular, it
drew up a map entitled “Dangrek— Commission of Delimitation between

Indo-China and Siam”, on which the frontier passed to the north of
Preah Vihear, thus leaving the Temple in Cambodia. That map was duly
communicated to the Siamese Government in 1908, but was never
approved by the Mixed Commission which had ceased to function some
months before the production of the map (see Temple of Preah Vihear

(Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 21).
16. Following Cambodia’s independence on 9 November 1953, Thai -
land occupied the Temple of Preah Vihear in 1954. Negotiations between
the Parties regarding the Temple were unsuccessful and, on 6 October
1959, Cambodia seised the Court by unilateral application. Thailand filefid
preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court.

17. In its Judgment of 26 May 1961 on Thailand’s preliminary objec -
tions, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) and set
out the subject-matter of that dispute in the following terms :

“In the present case, Cambodia alleges a violation on the part of
Thailand of Cambodia’s territorial sovereignty over the region of thefi
Temple of Preah Vihear and its precincts. Thailand replies by affirm -

ing that the area in question lies on the Thai side of the common
frontier between the two countries, and is under the sovereignty of
Thailand. This is a dispute about territorial sovereignty.” (I.C.J.Rep‑
orts 1961, p. 22.)

18. During the merits phase, Cambodia relied upon the map referred
to in paragraph 15 above, which was annexed to its pleadings and was
referred to as the “Annex I map”. Cambodia argued that this map had
been accepted by Thailand and had entered into the treaty settlement,

thereby becoming binding on the two States. According to Cambodia, the
line shown on the map (hereinafter “the Annex I map line”) had thus

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become the frontier between the two States. Thailand denied that it had fi
accepted the Annex I map, or that the map had otherwise become bind -

ing upon it, and maintained that the boundary between the two States
followed the watershed line, as provided in the text of the 1904 Treaty,
with the result, according to Thailand, that the Temple lay in Thai terrfii -
tory (cf. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judg ‑
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 21).

19. In the 1959 Application and its Memorial, Cambodia asked the
Court to rule : (1) that Thailand was under an obligation to withdraw the
detachments of its armed forces stationed in the ruins of the Temple of fi
Preah Vihear and (2) that the territorial sovereignty over the Temple of
Preah Vihear belonged to Cambodia (ibid., p. 9). In its final submissions

presented at the conclusion of the oral proceedings in 1962, however,
Cambodia went further, asking the Court to rule : (1) that the Annex I
map had been drawn up and published in the name and on behalf of the
Mixed Commission set up by the 1904 Treaty, that it set forth the deci -
sions taken by the said Commission and that, by reason of that fact and fi
also of the subsequent agreements and conduct of the Parties, it presentfied

a treaty character ; (2) that the frontier line between Cambodia and Thai -
land, in the disputed region in the neighbourhood of the Temple, was thefi
Annex I map line ; (3) that the Temple of Preah Vihear was situated in
territory under Cambodian sovereignty ; (4) that Thailand was under an
obligation to withdraw the detachments of armed forces it had stationed fi

since 1954 in Cambodian territory in the ruins of the Temple; and (5) that
Thailand must return property removed from the Temple since 1954
(ibid., p. 11).
20. In its Judgment on the merits, delivered on 15 June 1962, the Court
stated that “the subject of the dispute submitted to the Court [was] ficon -

fined to a difference of view about sovereignty over the region of the
Temple of Preah Vihear” (ibid., p. 14). For that reason, the Court con -
cluded that Cambodia’s first and second final submissions could be enfiter -
tained “only to the extent that they give expression to grounds, and finot
as claims to be dealt with in the operative provisions of the Judgment”fi

(ibid., p. 36). In its reasoning, the Court stated that, in 1908-1909, Thai -
land had accepted the Annex I map “as representing the outcome of the
work of delimitation, and hence recognized the line on that map as beingfi
the frontier line, the effect of which is to situate Preah Vihear in Cambo -
dian territory” (ibid., p. 32).
21. The operative part of the Judgment reads as follows :

“The Court,

[1] by nine votes to three, finds that the Temple of Preah Vihear is
situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia ;

finds in consequence

[2] by nine votes to three, that Thailand is under an obligation to
withdraw any military or police forces, or other guards or keepers,

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8 Ord 1050.indb 26 25/06/14 13:11 293 request for interprefitation (judgment)

stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian
territory ;

[3] by seven votes to five, that Thailand is under an obligation to
restore to Cambodia any objects of the kind specified in Cambo -
dia’s fifth Submission which may, since the date of the occupation
of the Temple by Thailand in 1954, have been removed from the
Temple or the Temple area by the Thai authorities.” (I.C.J.

Reports 1962, pp. 36-37.)
22. Following the delivery of the 1962 Judgment, Thailand withdrew

from the Temple buildings. It erected a barbed wire fence which divided fi
the Temple ruins from the rest of the promontory of Preah Vihear. This
fence followed the course of a line (hereinafter sometimes referred to fias
the “Thai Council of Ministers’ line”) depicted on the map attached to a
resolution, adopted by the Council of Ministers of Thailand on 10 July

1962 but not made public until the present proceedings. By that resolu -
tion, the Thai Council of Ministers fixed what it considered to be the
limits of the area from which Thailand was required to withdraw.

23. On 5 January 1963, the Head of State of Cambodia, Prince Siha -

nouk, and a large party of Cambodian officials and monks, as well as
diplomatic representatives of other States, visited the Temple. During tfihe
course of this visit, they remained within the area enclosed by the barbfied
wire fence. The events of this period are considered in paragraphs 38 to
42 below.

24. On 21 June 1997, the Parties established the “Thai-Cambodian
Joint Commission on Demarcation for Land Boundary”, entrusting it
with the task “of placing markers in order to indicate the land boundfiary
between the two countries”. On 14 June 2000, they concluded a “Memo -
randum of Understanding on the Survey and Demarcation of the Land

Boundary” (hereinafter the “Memorandum of Understanding”), whfiich
provided for the demarcation of the frontier line between the two Statesfi
and included, in particular, the terms of reference for the work of the
Thai-Cambodian Joint Commission on Demarcation for Land Boundary.
25. In 2007, Cambodia requested that the UNESCO World Heritage

Committee inscribe the site of the Temple of Preah Vihear on the World
Heritage List established under the provisions of the 1972 Convention
concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
(hereinafter the “World Heritage Convention”). To that end, it cfiommuni -
cated to the Committee, in accordance with the Guidelines for the Imple -

mentation of the World Heritage Convention adopted by the Committee,
a map depicting the site of the property. Cambodia included on the map
what it considered to be the course of the frontier separating it from
Thailand, the actual site of the monument and a buffer zone (described ifin
the Committee’s Guidelines as “an area surrounding the nominated prop-

erty which has complementary legal and/or customary restrictions placed fi
on its use and development to give an added layer of protection to the

16

8 Ord 1050.indb 28 25/06/14 13:11 294 request for interprefitation (judgment)

property”). According to that map, the entire promontory of Preah
Vihear, as well as the hill of Phnom Trap 1 immediately to the west of the
promontory, were within Cambodian territory.
26. On 17 May 2007, Thailand contested that map by means of an

aide-memoire, which it sent to Cambodia and to the World Heritage
Committee, to which it attached its own map showing the international
boundary between the two States as following the line drawn on the map
attached to the 1962 resolution of the Thai Council of Ministers (see

paragraph 22 above).
27. On 7 July 2008, the World Heritage Committee decided to inscribe
the site of the Temple of Preah Vihear on the World Heritage List, albeifit
with what the Committee described as “a revised graphic plan of the pfirop -
erty”, which excluded the area disputed between Cambodia and Thailandfi.

28. Following the Temple’s inscription on that List, a number of armed
incidents took place in the border area close to the Temple. On 14 Febru -
ary 2011, the United Nations Security Council called for a permanent
ceasefire to be established and expressed its support for the efforts of fithe

Association of South-East Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) to find a solution
to the conflict. The Chair of ASEAN, Indonesia, was subsequently invitfied
by Cambodia and by Thailand to send observers to the affected border
areas so as to avoid further armed clashes. This invitation was welcomed

by the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN and their representatives but was
not acted upon.

29. It is recalled that, on 28 April 2011, Cambodia filed a Request for
interpretation of the 1962 Judgment, together with a Request for the indi -

cation of provisional measures (see paragraph 1 above). In its Order of
18 July 2011 on provisional measures, the Court found that there existed,
prima facie, a dispute within the meaning of Article 60 of the Statute and
indicated provisional measures which, in particular, required both Partifies

to withdraw their military personnel from a “provisional demilitarizefid
zone” around the Temple, as defined by the Court (Request for Interpre ‑
tation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple
of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Provi ‑

sional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 537)
(see paragraph 4 above).

II. Jurisdiction and Admisfisibility

30. The Court will first determine whether it has jurisdiction over the
Request for interpretation submitted by Cambodia and, if so, whether
this Request is admissible.

1 In the original proceedings, and in the 1962 Judgment, the spelling usedfi was “Pnom”.
However, the spelling “Phnom” is the one generally used today. It fihas therefore been
employed in the present Judgment.

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8 Ord 1050.indb 30 25/06/14 13:11 295 request for interprefitation (judgment)

1. Jurisdiction of the Court under Article 60 of the Statute

31. Cambodia submitted its Request for interpretation pursuant to

Article 60 of the Statute of the Court (see paragraph 29 above). That
Article provides that
“The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute

as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe
it upon the request of any party.”

This provision is supplemented by Article 98, paragraph 1, of the Rules
of Court, which stipulates that “[i]n the event of dispute as to the fimean -
ing or scope of a judgment any party may make a request for its interprefi-
tation . . .”. Further, Article 98, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court,
requires a party to indicate in its request for interpretation “the pfirecise

point or points in dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment”fi.
32. The Court begins by recalling that “[its] jurisdiction on the basis ofif
Article 60 of the Statute is not preconditioned by the existence of any
other basis of jurisdiction as between the parties to the original case”fi and
that “by virtue of Article 60 of the Statute, [the Court] may entertain a

request for interpretation provided that there is a ‘dispute as to thfie mean -
ing or scope’ of any judgment rendered by it” (Request for Interpretation
of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Provi ‑
sional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 542,

para. 21 ; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in
the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v.
United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Provi ‑
sional Measures, Order of 16 July 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 323,
paras. 44 and 46 ; and Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 9, paras. 15-16).

33. The Court also recalls that, while the English text of Article 60 uses
the term “dispute”, which also appears in the English text of Artificle 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute, the French text of Article 60 uses the term
“contestation”, which has a broader meaning than “différend”fi, the term
used in the French text of Article 36, paragraph2. The Court further recalls

that “a dispute within the meaning of Article 60 of the Statute must be
understood as a difference of opinion or views between the parties as to the
meaning or scope of a judgment rendered by the Court” (Request for Inter ‑
pretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerningthe Temple
of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Provi ‑
sional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 542,

para. 22). As the Court has previously confirmed, the existence of a dispute
under Article 60 of the Statute “does not require the same criteria to be
fulfilled as those determining the existence of a dispute under Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute” (ibid. ; see also Interpretation of Judgments
Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J.,

Series A, No. 13, pp. 10-12 ; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of
31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals

18

8 Ord 1050.indb 32 25/06/14 13:11 296 request for interprefitation (judgment)

(Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of Amer ‑
ica), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 July 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008,

p. 325, para. 53). Furthermore, it is not required that a dispute as to the
meaning and scope of a judgment “should have manifested itself in a ffior -
mal way; . . . it should be sufficient if the two Governments have in fact
shown themselves as holding opposite views in regard to the meaning or
scope of a judgment of the Court” (Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and

8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judgment No.11, 1927, P.C.I.J., SeriesA, No. 13,
p. 11; see also Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of
24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1985, pp. 217-218, para. 46; Request for Interpretation of the
Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexi -

can Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United
States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 July 2008,
I.C.J. Reports 2008, pp. 325-326, para. 54).
34. In accordance with the jurisprudence of the Court, “a dispute within
the meaning of Article 60 of the Statute must relate to the operative clause

of the judgment in question and cannot concern the reasons for the judg -
ment except in so far as these are inseparable from the operative clausefi”
(Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case con ‑
cerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v.
Thailand), Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports

2011 (II), p. 542, para. 23; see also Request for Interpretation of the Judg ‑
ment of 11June 1998 in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Bound -
ary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary
Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I),
p. 35, para. 10; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004
in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v.

United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Provi ‑
sional Measures, Order of 16July2008, I.C.J.Reports 2008, p.323, para.47)
or, in the words of the Permanent Court, constitute “a condition essefintial
to the Court’s decision” (Interpretation of Judgments Nos.7 and 8 (Factory
at Chorzów), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 13, p. 20).

That said, “a difference of opinion as to whether a particular point has or
has not been decided with binding force also constitutes a case which cofimes
within the terms of Article 60 of the Statute” (Request for Interpretation of
the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah
Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Provisional Mea ‑

sures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 544, para. 31; see
also Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judg ‑
ment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 13, pp. 11-12).
35. In its Order on provisional measures in the present case, the Court
observed that “a difference of opinion or views appears to exist betwefien
[the Parties] as to the meaning or scope of the 1962 Judgment” and that

“this difference appears to relate” to three specific aspects of thfiat Judg -
ment :

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8 Ord 1050.indb 34 25/06/14 13:11 297 request for interprefitation (judgment)

“in the first place, to the meaning and scope of the phrase ‘vicinfiity on
Cambodian territory’ used in the second paragraph of the operative

clause of the Judgment . . . next, to the nature of the obligation imposed
on Thailand, in the second paragraph of the operative clause of the
Judgment, to ‘withdraw any military or police forces, or other guardsfi
or keepers’, and, in particular, to the question of whether this oblifigation
is of a continuing or an instantaneous character; and . . . finally, to the

question of whether the Judgment did or did not recognize with binding
force the line shown on the Annex I map as representing the frontier
between the two Parties . . .” (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment
of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Provisional Meas ‑

ures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 544, para. 31.)
36. The Court stated, however, that the decision rendered on the

Request for the indication of provisional measures “in no way prejudgfie[d]
any question that the Court may have to deal with relating to the Requesfit
for interpretation” (ibid., p. 554, para. 68). Accordingly, the Court must
at this stage determine whether a dispute indeed exists between the Partfiies

as to the meaning or scope of the operative clause of the 1962 Judgment,
and, if so, identify the precise point or points that require interpretafition.
The Court will address these two questions in turn.

A. The existence of a dispute

37. Cambodia maintains that the Parties are in dispute as to the mean -
ing and scope of the 1962 Judgment, specifically in the following respects :
(a) whether the Court in the 1962 Judgment did or did not recognize
with binding force the Annex I map line as constituting the frontier
between the two Parties in the area of the Temple ; (b) whether or not the

meaning and scope of the phrase “situated in territory under the sovefir -
eignty of Cambodia” and the phrase “its vicinity on Cambodian terri -
tory” included, respectively, in the first and second paragraphs of tfihe
operative clause of the 1962 Judgment, must be understood by reference
to the line depicted on the Annex I map which the Court “recognized” as

constituting the frontier between the Parties in the area of the Temple ;
and (c) whether or not Thailand’s obligation to withdraw from the area
of “the Temple [and] its vicinity on Cambodian territory”, derivinfig from
the second paragraph of the operative clause, is of a continuing charactfier.
38. Cambodia asserts that this dispute emerged immediately after the

1962 Judgment. In particular, Cambodia maintains that, immediately after
the 1962 Judgment and throughout the 1960s, it continually protested
against Thailand’s unilateral determination, in July 1962, of the “vicinity
of the Temple” (as manifested by the barbed wire fence and notices efirected
by Thailand), and against Thailand’s view that the geographical scopfie of

its obligation to withdraw under the 1962 Judgment was limited to the
ruins of the Temple and the ground on which the Temple stood. Cambo -

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8 Ord 1050.indb 36 25/06/14 13:11 298 request for interprefitation (judgment)

dia emphasizes that in those protests it expressed its view that this unfiilat-
eral determination by Thailand was incompatible with the 1962 Judgment.

39. Cambodia acknowledges that it made no protests either during the
period of armed conflicts in Cambodia or during the succeeding years
when, according to Cambodia, Thailand refrained from imposing its uni -
lateral determination of the vicinity of the Temple. Nonetheless, Cambo -
dia contends that the dispute between the Parties concerning this issue fi

re-emerged in 2007-2008, following Cambodia’s request for the inscrip -
tion of the site of the Temple on the UNESCO World Heritage List, and
continued until the time of its Request for interpretation. Cambodia
argues that this dispute is evidenced by a series of incidents which occfiurred
in the vicinity of the Temple after 2008 and into early 2011, as well asfi by

certain events and statements of the Parties following Cambodia’s reqfiuest
for the inscription of the site of the Temple on the UNESCO World
Heritage List in 2007. In particular, Cambodia refers to the statements fi
made by each Party in their respective correspondence with the United
Nations in the context of Cambodia’s complaint concerning the allegedfi

incursions of Thai forces into Cambodian territory in the area of the
Temple.
40. For its part, Thailand denies the existence of a dispute within the
meaning of Article 60 of the Statute, since the language of the 1962 Judg -
ment is clear and in need of no interpretation. Thailand asserts that Cafim -

bodia accepted (or, at least, did not contest) that Thailand had
implemented the 1962 Judgment by withdrawing to the Thai Council of
Ministers’ line. According to Thailand, the events and statements relfiied
upon by Cambodia in respect of the period following Cambodia’s requesfit
for the inscription of the site of the Temple on the UNESCO World Heri-

tage List reflect only an ongoing delimitation dispute between the Parfities.
Noting that this delimitation dispute was not part of the dispute beforefi
the Court in 1962 and that the Court had expressly declined to pronouncefi
upon it in the operative part of the 1962 Judgment, Thailand argues that
this issue cannot be brought before the Court today in the context of

proceedings under Article 60 of the Statute.

*

41. The Court observes that the events and statements dating from the

period immediately following the 1962 Judgment clearly demonstrate that
Thailand was of the view that the Court had left the term “vicinity ofif the
Temple” in the second operative paragraph undefined and that Thailandfi
could thus determine unilaterally the limits of that “vicinity”. Ifin particu-
lar, this position is reflected in the 1962 resolution of the Thai Council of

Ministers which determined the

“location of the limit of the vicinity of the [Temple], from which Thfi-ai
land has the obligation to withdraw police forces, guards or keepers,

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8 Ord 1050.indb 38 25/06/14 13:11 299 request for interprefitation (judgment)

on the principle that Cambodia will only obtain the ruins of the [Tem -
ple] and the ground on which the Temple stood”.

In implementation of this decision, Thailand erected a barbed wire
fence on the ground along the line determined by the resolution, and

posted signs stating that “the vicinity of the Temple of Preah Vihearfi does
not extend beyond this limit”.
42. Contrary to Thailand’s assertions, the record before the Court
shows that Cambodia did not accept Thailand’s withdrawal as fully
implementing the 1962 Judgment. Rather, Cambodia protested the Thai

presence on territory which, according to Cambodia, the 1962 Judgment
had recognized as Cambodian. Cambodia also complained that the
barbed wire fence erected by Thailand “encroach[ed] fairly significanfitly”
upon that territory in contravention of the Court’s Judgment. In partfiicu-
lar, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cambodia in an aide-memoire

issued in November 1962 stated, inter alia, that “this limit [of the Temple
zone]”, marked with barbed wire, “was in complete disagreement witfih the
Court’s decision which confirmed the frontier as it appeared on the 1907
[Annex I] map”.

43. This divergence of views reappeared in the Parties’ correspondence
following Cambodia’s request for the inscription of the site of the Tfiemple
on the UNESCO World Heritage List in 2007-2008. For instance, on
17 May 2007, the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent an aide-memoire
to the Cambodian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the World Heritage

Committee, objecting to “Cambodia’s nomination file . . . in particular,
the delineation of the indicative boundary line, the monumental zone,
and the development zone” depicted on the map attached to the file
which, in Thailand’s view, implied “the exercise of Cambodian sovefir -
eignty in the area where [the two] countries assert different claims on

boundary line”. Thailand further contended that this depiction “cafinnot
in any way prejudice the existing international boundary between Thai -
land and Cambodia” as it appeared in Thailand’s own map series L7017.

44. On 18 and 19 July 2008, Cambodia sent letters to the President of
the Security Council and the President of the General Assembly of the
United Nations, stating inter alia that “[o]n 15 July 2008, about 50 Thai
soldiers crossed into . . . Cambodia’s territory about 300 metres from the
Temple of Preah Vihear”. Cambodia asserted that “[t]aking into accfiount

[the 1962 Judgment of the Court], the only map which legally delimits the
border in the area of the Temple of Preah Vihear is the ‘Annex I map’
based on which the Court made its judgment”.

In response, Thailand, in a letter sent on 21 July 2008 to the President

of the Security Council, stated inter alia that “the area adjacent to the
Temple of Preah Vihear . . . is part of Thailand’s territory” and that

22

8 Ord 1050.indb 40 25/06/14 13:11 300 request for interprefitation (judgment)

“Thailand’s position in this regard is fully consistent with the [fi1962 Judg-
ment], which Thailand has fully and duly implemented”. Thailand furthfier

stated that
“Cambodia’s territorial claim in this area is based on Cambodia’fis

unilateral understanding of the said ICJ Judgment that a boundary
line was determined by the Court in this Judgment. Thailand contests
this unilateral understanding since the ICJ ruled in this case that it
did not have jurisdiction over the question of land boundary and did
not in any case determine the location of the boundary between Thai -

land and Cambodia. . . . Taking into account Article 59 of the Statute
of the ICJ and the fact that the issue before the ICJ in this case was
limited solely to the question of sovereignty over the region of the
Temple of Preah Vihear, the boundary line claimed by Cambodia has
no legal status from the Judgment.” (Emphasis added.)

45. In the opinion of the Court, these events and statements clearly
demonstrate that at the time Cambodia filed its Request for interpret-

ation the Parties had a dispute as to the meaning and scope of the
1962 Judgment. The Court now turns to the precise subject-matter of
this dispute in order to ascertain whether it falls within the scope of the
Court’s jurisdiction under Article 60 of the Statute.

B. Subject‑matter of the dispute before the Court

46. In its final submissions Cambodia expressed the view that

“‘[t]he Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory under the fisov-
ereignty of Cambodia’ (first paragraph of the operative clause), whfiich
is the legal consequence of the fact that the Temple is situated on the
Cambodian side of the frontier, as that frontier was recognized by the
Court in its Judgment. Therefore, the obligation incumbent upon
Thailand to ‘withdraw any military or police forces, or other guards

or keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cam -
bodian territory’ (second paragraph of the operative clause) is a pfiar-
ticular consequence of the general and continuing obligation to respect
the integrity of the territory of Cambodia, that territory having been
delimited in the area of the Temple and its vicinity by the line of the

Annex I map, on which the Judgment of the Court is based.”
47. In its final submissions, Thailand requested the Court to adjudge
and declare that :

“— the Request of the Kingdom of Cambodia asking the Court to
interpret the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning
the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) under

Article 60 of the Statute of the Court does not satisfy the
conditions laid down in that Article and that, consequently, the

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8 Ord 1050.indb 42 25/06/14 13:11 301 request for interprefitation (judgment)

Court has no jurisdiction to respond to that Request and/or
that the Request is inadmissible ;

— in the alternative, that there are no grounds to grant Cambo -
dia’s Request to construe the Judgment and that there is no
reason to interpret the Judgment of 1962 ; and
— to formally declare that the 1962 Judgment does not determine
with binding force the boundary line between the Kingdom of

Thailand and the Kingdom of Cambodia, nor does it fix the
limit of the vicinity of the Temple”.

*

48. The Court observes that both Parties accept that there is a dis -

agreement between them as to whether or not the Court, in the 1962 Judg-
ment, decided with binding force that the Annex I map line represents the
frontier between them in the area of the Temple. The Parties’ divergefince
of views on this issue is further reflected in their positions expressed in the
events and statements analysed above (see paragraphs 41-44) and clarified

in the course of the present proceedings. Contrary to Thailand’s assefir -
tions concerning the Court’s lack of jurisdiction in this regard, the Court
reiterates that “a difference of opinion as to whether a particular point
has or has not been decided with binding force also constitutes a case
which comes within the terms of Article 60 of the Statute” (see para -

graph 34 above).
49. Further, the Court considers that the Parties’ positions, expressed
during the period following the 1962 Judgment as well as that following
Cambodia’s request to have the site of the Temple inscribed on the Wofirld
Heritage List (see paragraphs 41-44 above) and in the course of the pres -
ent proceedings, also reveal their divergent views as to the meaning andfi

scope of the phrase “vicinity on Cambodian territory” in the second
operative paragraph of the 1962 Judgment and the relationship between
that paragraph and the Court’s finding, in the first operative paragrfiaph,
that the Temple is situated in “territory under the sovereignty of Cafimbo -
dia”. Cambodia maintains that the Annex I map line necessarily determines

the meaning and scope of the operative clause since the Court’s recogfinition
of that line as representing the frontier between the Parties in the Temfiple
area constituted the “essential” reason underlying its conclusionsfi therein.
By contrast, Thailand asserts that the Court’s reasoning concerning tfihe
Annex I map line cannot be seen as “essential” and that it is therefore fi

neither necessary nor possible to resort to that reasoning in order to efilu -
cidate the meaning and scope of the operative clause of the 1962 Judg -
ment. Rather, Thailand asserts that the terms “territory” and “fivicinity”
were not explicitly defined by the Court and should be interpreted as
strictly confined to the grounds on which the Temple stands and its imme -
diate surroundings — the “Temple area”, as defined by the 1962 resolu -

tion of the Thai Council of Ministers.

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8 Ord 1050.indb 44 25/06/14 13:11 302 request for interprefitation (judgment)

50. Finally, the Court turns to the contention that the Parties disagree
about the nature of Thailand’s obligation to withdraw from “the Tefimple

[and] its vicinity on Cambodian territory”, deriving from the second para-
graph of the operative clause of the 1962 Judgment. The correspondence
of the Parties surrounding the inscription of the site of the Temple on fithe
World Heritage List, and the armed clashes that took place in the borderfi
area close to the Temple (see paragraph 28 above), reveal that the Parties

disagreed, prior to the filing of Cambodia’s Request for interpretatifion,
about where Thai personnel could lawfully be located in the light of thefi
1962 Judgment. That difference of views has been confirmed by the writ -
ten and oral arguments of the Parties in the present proceedings.

51. According to Cambodia, Thailand’s obligation to withdraw relates
to an area which the Judgment had placed under Cambodia’s sovereigntyfi
and must consequently be understood as having a continuing character,
in line with the general principle of respect for territorial sovereignty and
integrity of States. Thus, in its final submissions, Cambodia claims thafit
Thailand’s obligation to withdraw “is a particular consequence of fithe

general and continuing obligation to respect the integrity of the territfiory
of Cambodia” (see paragraph 13 above). Thailand accepts that it has a
“general and continuing obligation” under international law to resfipect
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cambodia. However, it rejecfits
Cambodia’s assertion that “the obligation to withdraw as specifiedfi in the

[1962] Judgment has the same character”. Rather, Thailand maintains
that this latter obligation applied to its relations with Cambodia only fi“in
respect of one place at one time” and that it fully discharged that ofibliga-
tion once it withdrew from the vicinity of the Temple in accordance withfi
the 1962 resolution of the Thai Council of Ministers.

52. In the light of the above considerations, the Court concludes that
the dispute between the Parties as to the meaning and scope of the
1962 Judgment relates to three specific aspects thereof. First, there is a
dispute over whether the 1962 Judgment did or did not decide with bind -
ing force that the line depicted on the Annex I map constitutes the fron -

tier between the Parties in the area of the Temple. Secondly, there is a
closely related dispute concerning the meaning and scope of the phrase
“vicinity on Cambodian territory”, referred to in the second operafitive
paragraph of the 1962 Judgment, a paragraph which the Court stated was
a consequence of the finding, in the first operative paragraph, that thefi
Temple is situated in “territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia”fi.

Lastly, there is a dispute regarding the nature of Thailand’s obligatfiion to
withdraw imposed by the second paragraph of the operative part.

2. Admissibility of Cambodia’s Request for Interpretation

53. Thailand maintains that Cambodia’s Request for interpretation is
inadmissible since its real purpose is not to obtain the Court’s intefirpret-

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8 Ord 1050.indb 46 25/06/14 13:11 303 request for interprefitation (judgment)

ation of the 1962 Judgment but, rather, to obtain the Court’s ruling on
the Parties’ delimitation dispute in the area of the Temple by havingfi the

Court recognize with binding force that the Annex I map line constitutes
their common frontier in that area. Thailand recalls that the Court explfiic -
itly refused to pronounce on the Parties’ common frontier in the Tempfile
area in 1962 and asserts that it is therefore barred from determining thfiis
question now, through the interpretation of the 1962 Judgment.

54. Cambodia insists that it is not requesting the Court to delimit any
boundary between the Parties on the basis of the Annex I map. Rather, it
is “merely asking the Court to explain the findings that it reached ifin its
1962 Judgment . . . in particular as regards the relationship between those
findings and the meaning and scope of the dispositif of the Judgment”.

*

55. The Court recalls that the process of interpretation is premised

upon the “primacy of the principle of res judicata” which “must be main -
tained” (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the
Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v.
Cameroon), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), pp. 36-37, para. 12).

Accordingly, as the Court has previously held :
“[t]he real purpose of the request must be to obtain an interpretatiofin
of the judgment. This signifies that its object must be solely to obtainfi

clarification of the meaning and the scope of what the Court has
decided with binding force, and not to obtain an answer to questions
not so decided. Any other construction of Article 60 of the Statute
would nullify the provision of the article that the judgment is final
and without appeal.” (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of

20 November 1950 in the Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 402; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment
of 11 June 1998 in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Bound -
ary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Prelim-
inary Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports

1999 (I), pp. 36-37, para. 12.)
56. Having regard to the Parties’ divergent views over the meaning and

scope of the 1962 Judgment, identified above (see paragraph 52), the
Court considers that there is a need for the interpretation of the seconfid
operative paragraph of the 1962 Judgment and of the legal effect of what
the Court said regarding the Annex I map line. Within these limits, Cam -
bodia’s Request is admissible. Nevertheless, in line with the Court’fis prev-i
ous observation on this matter, in as far as Cambodia’s Request for

interpretation “may go further, and seek ‘to obtain an answer to ques -
tions not [decided with binding force]’, or to achieve a revision of fithe

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8 Ord 1050.indb 48 25/06/14 13:11 304 request for interprefitation (judgment)

Judgment, no effect can be given to it” (Application for Revision and Inter‑
pretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the

Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 223, para. 56).

3. Conclusion

57. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that a dispute

exists between the Parties as to the meaning and scope of the 1962 Judg -
ment pursuant to Article 60 of the Statute. Accordingly, the Court has
jurisdiction to entertain Cambodia’s Request for interpretation of thfie
1962 Judgment, and the Request is admissible.

III. The Interpretation offi the 1962 Judgment

58. The Court now turns to the interpretation of the 1962 Judgment.

1. Positions of the Parties

59. Cambodia maintains that the first and second operative paragraphs
of the Judgment are “symbiotically linked” : in the first paragraph, the
Court held that the Temple was “situated in territory under the sover -
eignty of Cambodia”, while in the second paragraph it found, in

consequence, that Thailand was required to withdraw the personnel
which it had stationed “at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodiafin
territory”. According to Cambodia, the requirement to withdraw, in thfie
second operative paragraph, can only be understood as a requirement
that Thailand should withdraw the personnel from the Temple, and the

Cambodian territory in its vicinity, to Thai territory and that the Cambo -
dian territory referred to in the second operative paragraph coincides
with the territory identified as being under Cambodian sovereignty in thfie
first operative paragraph. In Cambodia’s view, the obligation to withfi -
draw has a continuing character, in the sense that the requirement that fi

Thailand withdraw its forces implied an obligation not to return them atfi
any future time to the Cambodian territory identified in the Judgment.

60. For Cambodia, these findings in the operative part are the conse -
quence of the Court’s determination, in the reasoning of the 1962 Judfig -
ment, that the Annex I map line constituted the frontier between the

Parties in the region of the Temple (see paragraph 20 above). Cambodia
maintains that this part of the reasoning stated a condition essential ffior
the findings contained in the operative part of the 1962 Judgment and
thus has binding force. Accordingly, the area of territory to which the fi
Court referred, in the first operative paragraph, and from which, in thefi

second operative paragraph, it required Thailand to withdraw, extended
beyond the confines of the Temple itself and included all of the land infi

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8 Ord 1050.indb 50 25/06/14 13:11 305 request for interprefitation (judgment)

the disputed area up to the Annex I map line. Cambodia considers that
this area encompasses the whole promontory of Preah Vihear and the hill fi

of Phnom Trap as far north as the Annex I map line. Cambodia rejects
the Thai Council of Ministers’ line (see paragraph 22 above) as a unilat -
eral action which ran counter to the reasoning of the 1962 Judgment.
According to Cambodia, the practice of the Parties since 1962 has no
relevance for the interpretation of the 1962 Judgment, although it denies

that its conduct amounted to acceptance of Thailand’s interpretation fiof
the 1962 Judgment. Cambodia maintains that the Memorandum of
Understanding deals only with the demarcation of the frontier, thereby
implying that delimitation of the frontier has already occurred.
61. Thailand maintains that the dispute which was before the Court in
1962 concerned territorial sovereignty, not delimitation of a frontier, fiand

that the 1962 Judgment decided only that the Temple fell under the sov -
ereignty of Cambodia. The Annex I map was significant only as evidence
of whether the Temple lay in Cambodian territory and did not serve the
purpose of defining the boundary, a task which had to be carried out by fi
agreement between the Parties. In Thailand’s view, it would have beenfi

contrary to the principle non ultra petita for the Court to have ruled upon
the boundary line, since Cambodia had not included any request for a
ruling on the map in its original submissions and the Court had declinedfi
to entertain the new submissions which Cambodia had advanced at the
end of the oral proceedings.

62. Thailand also argues that more than one version of the Annex I
map is in existence and that the different versions contain important disfi -
crepancies. In addition, Thailand claims that there are important deficifien -
cies in the Annex I map, including topographical and positioning errors,
that it is imprecise and that it departs in significant respects from thfie
watershed line stipulated in the 1904 Treaty. According to Thailand, it

would be impossible to transpose the Annex I map line onto a modern
map without more information.
63. In any case, Thailand contends, the Annex I map was only one of
the reasons on which the Judgment was based, since the Court also reliedfi
upon entirely distinct grounds, in particular, the visit to the Temple ifin

1930 by Prince Damrong of Thailand, which the Court described as
“significant” and considered to be recognition by Thailand of the sovefir -
eignty of Cambodia (then a protectorate of France) over the Temple
(I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 30-31). Thailand concludes that the 1962 Judg -
ment decided only that Cambodia had sovereignty over the small parcel

of land on which the ruins of the Temple are located, the area which wasfi
later depicted on the map attached to the 1962 resolution of the Thai
Council of Ministers. According to Thailand, the Judgment did not deal
with sovereignty over the remainder of the Preah Vihear promontory or
the hill of Phnom Trap.

64. Thailand denies that the obligation to withdraw in the second
operative paragraph of the 1962 Judgment has a continuing character, in

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8 Ord 1050.indb 52 25/06/14 13:11 306 request for interprefitation (judgment)

the sense suggested by Cambodia. Thailand argues that it discharged its fi
obligation when it withdrew its personnel behind the Council of Minis -

ters’ line and that Cambodia accepted that line when Prince Sihanouk fi
visited the Temple in 1963 (see paragraph 23 above). Thereafter, the obli -
gation not to enter Cambodian territory was derived not from the 1962
Judgment but from the duty, arising under general international law, of
one State to respect the territorial integrity of another.

65. Thailand concludes that the delimitation of the frontier in the rele -
vant area remains to be accomplished and that the Memorandum of Unde -r
standing provides the mechanism for the Parties to undertake that task.

2. The Role of the Court under Article 60 of the Statute

66. The Court begins by recalling that its role under Article 60 of the
Statute is to clarify the meaning and scope of what the Court decided infi the
judgment which it is requested to interpret (Request for Interpretation of the
Judgment of 20 November 1950 in the Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 402). Accordingly, the Court must keep

strictly within the limits of the original judgment and cannot question mat -
ters that were settled therein with binding force, nor can it provide anfiswers
to questions the Court did not decide in the original judgment.
67. While the existence of a dispute between the parties regarding the
original judgment is a prerequisite for interpretation under Article 60 of

the Statute, the way in which that dispute is formulated by one or both fiof
the parties is not binding on the Court. As the Permanent Court of Interfi -
national Justice explained :

“the Court does not consider itself as bound simply to reply ‘yes’fi or
‘no’ to the propositions formulated in the submissions of [the Appfili -
cant]. It adopts this attitude because, for the purpose of the interpretfi-
ation of a judgment, it cannot be bound by formulae chosen by the
Parties concerned, but must be able to take an unhampered decision.” fi

(Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judg ‑
ment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 13, pp. 15-16.)

68. In determining the meaning and scope of the operative clause of
the original Judgment, the Court, in accordance with its practice, will fi
have regard to the reasoning of that Judgment to the extent that it sheds
light on the proper interpretation of the operative clause.
69. The pleadings and the record of the oral proceedings in 1962 are

also relevant to the interpretation of the Judgment, as they show what
evidence was, or was not, before the Court and how the issues before it fi
were formulated by each Party.

70. Thailand argues that the principle of non ultra petita precluded the

Court from going beyond the submissions of the Parties and that the
1962 Judgment must be interpreted accordingly.

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8 Ord 1050.indb 54 25/06/14 13:11 307 request for interprefitation (judgment)

71. The principle of non ultra petita is well established in the jurispru -
dence of the Court (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of

20 November 1950 in the Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 402 ; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002,
pp. 18-19, para. 43) and is one reason why the claims contained in the
final submissions of the Parties in the original case are of relevance ifin

interpreting the 1962 Judgment. Nevertheless, that principle cannot jus -
tify an interpretation which runs counter to the terms of the 1962 Judg -
ment. The Court in 1962 necessarily made an assessment of the scope of
the petitum before it; Article 60 of the Statute does not give the Court the
power today to substitute a different assessment for that made at the timfie
of the Judgment.

72. Cambodia suggests that the headnote to the 1962 Judgment dem -
onstrated that the Judgment determined the course of the frontier in thefi
relevant area.
73. Under Article 95, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court (Article 74,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court of 1946 applicable in 1962), the head -

note is not one of the elements of the Judgment and it does not form parfit
thereof. Moreover, the purpose of the headnote is only to give the reader
a general indication of the points examined in a judgment ; it does not
constitute an authoritative summary of what the Court has actually
decided. The Court does not consider that the headnote to the 1962 Judg -

ment assists in resolving the questions of interpretation raised in the fipres-
ent proceedings.
74. Thailand makes extensive reference to the conduct of the Parties
between 15 June 1962, when the Judgment was delivered, and 2007-2008,
when the present dispute may be said to have crystallized. The principalfi
purpose for which Thailand refers to that conduct is in connection with fi

its argument that there is no dispute, within the meaning of Article 60,
between the Parties, an issue to which that conduct is of course relevanfit
(see paragraphs 38-45 above). However, Thailand suggests that this con -
duct is also relevant to the interpretation of the Judgment.

75. A judgment of the Court cannot be equated to a treaty, an instru -
ment which derives its binding force and content from the consent of thefi
contracting States and the interpretation of which may be affected by thefi
subsequent conduct of those States, as provided by the principle stated fiin
Article 31, paragraph 3 (b), of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law

of Treaties. A judgment of the Court derives its binding force from the fi
Statute of the Court and the interpretation of a judgment is a matter offi
ascertaining what the Court decided, not what the parties subsequently
believed it had decided. The meaning and scope of a judgment of the
Court cannot, therefore, be affected by conduct of the parties occurring
after that judgment has been given.

More generally, as the Permanent Court of International Justice made
clear,

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8 Ord 1050.indb 56 25/06/14 13:11 308 request for interprefitation (judgment)

“the Court, when giving an interpretation, refrains from any exami -
nation of facts other than those which it has considered in the judg -

ment under interpretation, and consequently all facts subsequent to
that judgment” (Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at
Chorzów), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 13, p. 21).

3. The Principal Features of the 1962 Judgment

76. Three features of the 1962 Judgment stand out when that Judg -
ment is read in the light of the considerations set out above. First, thfie
Court considered that it was dealing with a dispute regarding territoriafil
sovereignty over the area in which the Temple was located and that it wafis
not engaged in delimiting the frontier. Thus, the Court, referring back fito

its 1961 Judgment on Preliminary Objections (Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand), I.C.J. Reports 1961, p. 22, quoted in para -
graph 17 above), defined the matter before it in the following terms :

“Accordingly, the subject of the dispute submitted to the Court is
confined to a difference of view about sovereignty over the region of
the Temple of Preah Vihear. To decide this question of territorial
sovereignty, the Court must have regard to the frontier line between
the two States in this sector. Maps have been submitted to it and

various considerations have been advanced in this connection. The
Court will have regard to each of these only to such extent as it may
find in them reasons for the decision it has to give in order to settle fi
the sole dispute submitted to it, the subject of which has just been
stated.” (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 14.)

This characterization of the dispute as one regarding sovereignty over a
defined area of territory, rather than boundary delimitation, is also evfii -

dent in the Court’s decision that :
“Cambodia’s first and second Submissions, calling for pronounce -

ments on the legal status of the Annex I map and on the frontier line
in the disputed region, can be entertained only to the extent that they fi
give expression to grounds, and not as claims to be dealt with in the
operative provisions of the Judgment” (ibid., p. 36).

No mention was made of either the Annex I map or the location of the
frontier in the operative part. No map was attached to the Judgment, norfi
did the Court make any comment on the difficulties of transposition of fi

the Annex I map line, a matter which had been discussed by the Parties
during the 1962 proceedings and which would have been of obvious
importance in a judgment on delimitation of the frontier.

77. Secondly, however, the Annex I map played a central role in the
reasoning of the Court. After reviewing the history of the map and its

relationship with the 1904 Treaty, the Court stated :

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8 Ord 1050.indb 58 25/06/14 13:11 309 request for interprefitation (judgment)

“The real question, therefore, which is the essential one in this casfie,
is whether the Parties did adopt the Annex I map, and the line indi -

cated on it, as representing the outcome of the work of delimitation
of the frontier in the region of Preah Vihear, thereby conferring on it fi
a binding character.” (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 22.)

It then considered the conduct of the Parties with regard to the map andfi
other practice, including the visit of Prince Damrong to the Temple in
1930, when he was received by the French authorities. Although the
Court considered that the circumstances of Prince Damrong’s visit were

such as to amount to “a tacit recognition by Siam of the sovereignty fiof
Cambodia (under French Protectorate) over Preah Vihear” (ibid., p. 31),
that incident, together with Thailand’s other conduct subsequent to
1908-1909, was treated primarily as confirmation of the earlier acceptance
by Thailand of the Annex I map line. The Court stated :

“Even if there were any doubt as to Siam’s acceptance of the map
in 1908, and hence of the frontier indicated thereon, the Court would

consider, in the light of subsequent course of events, that Thailand is fi
now precluded by her conduct from asserting that she did not accept
it . . .
The Court however considers that Thailand in 1908-1909 did accept
the Annex I map as representing the outcome of the work of delimi -

tation, and hence recognized the line on that map as being the frontier fi
line, the effect of which is to situate Preah Vihear in Cambodian ter -
ritory. The Court considers further that, looked at as a whole, Thai -
land’s subsequent conduct confirms and bears out her original
acceptance, and that Thailand’s acts on the ground do not suffice tofi
negative this. Both Parties, by their conduct, recognized the line and

thereby in effect agreed to regard it as being the frontier line.” (Ibid.,
pp. 32-33.)

The Court went on to state that “the acceptance of the Annex I map by
the Parties caused the map to enter the treaty settlement and to become fi
an integral part of it” (ibid., p. 33) and concluded that it “therefore, feels
bound, as a matter of treaty interpretation, to pronounce in favour of tfihe

line as mapped in the disputed area” (ibid., p. 35).

78. Thirdly, in defining the dispute before it (in the passage quoted in
paragraph 76 above), the Court made clear that it was concerned only
with sovereignty in the “region of the Temple of Preah Vihear”.

That this region comprised only a small area is apparent from the 1962
proceedings. Thus, counsel for Cambodia stated :

“As I shall have occasion to remind the Court more than once, the
area in dispute in these proceedings is very small indeed. A variation

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8 Ord 1050.indb 60 25/06/14 13:11 310 request for interprefitation (judgment)

of half a mile, or even less, would place the Temple wholly on one
side or the other of the frontier.” (I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah

Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. II, p. 145.)
Later in the hearings, counsel for Cambodia observed that “the Court fi

and counsel will have spent pretty much the entire month of March dis -
cussing an area of land hardly a kilometre in breadth” (ibid., Vol. II,
p. 464) and subsequently referred to “a frontier area of less than two fior
three square kilometres” (ibid., Vol. II, p. 473). These statements were not

contradicted during the 1962 proceedings.
The Judgment shows that the Court considered that the disputed area
was a small one. Immediately after the passage in which it defined the
dispute as one regarding sovereignty over the region of the Temple, the fi
Court described that region in the following terms :

“The Temple of Preah Vihear . . . stands on a promontory of the
same name, belonging to the eastern sector of the Dangrek range of

mountains which, in a general way, constitutes the boundary between
the two countries in this region — Cambodia to the south and Thai -
land to the north. Considerable portions of this range consist of a
high cliff-like escarpment rising abruptly above the Cambodian plain.
This is the situation at Preah Vihear itself, where the main Temple

buildings stand in the apex of a triangular piece of high ground juttingfi
out into the plain.” (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 15.)

While the Annex I map deals with a part of the frontier region more than
100 km in extent, the Court made clear that it had to pronounce upon it
only “in the disputed area” (ibid., p. 35).

4. The Operative Part of the 1962 Judgment

79. In the light of these elements in the reasoning of the 1962 Judg -
ment, the Court will now turn to the operative part of that Judgment, the

text of which is reproduced in paragraph 21 above. The findings set out
in the second and third paragraphs are expressly stated to be conse -
quences following from the decision in the first operative paragraph. Itfi
follows that the three operative paragraphs have to be considered as a
whole; the task of ascertaining their meaning and scope cannot be reduced

to an exercise of construing individual words or phrases in isolation.

A. The first operative paragraph

80. The Court considers that the meaning of the first operative para -

graph is clear. In that paragraph, the Court ruled on Cambodia’s prinfici-
pal claim by finding that the Temple was situated in territory under thefi

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sovereignty of Cambodia. It will, however, be necessary to return to thefi
scope of this paragraph once the Court has examined the second and

third operative paragraphs.

B. The second operative paragraph

81. The principal dispute between the Parties concerns the second
operative paragraph. In that paragraph, the Court required, as a conse -

quence of the decision in the first operative paragraph, the withdrawal fiof
Thai military or police forces, or other guards or keepers “stationedfi by
her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory”. The seficond
operative paragraph did not indicate expressly the Cambodian territory
from which Thailand was required to withdraw its personnel, nor did it

state to where those personnel had to be withdrawn. The only context in fi
which the paragraph refers to an area of territory — “the Temple, or its
vicinity on Cambodian territory” — was in indicating which of its per -
sonnel Thailand was under an obligation to withdraw, namely those
whom it had stationed in that area.
82. During the hearings in the present proceedings, a Member of the

Court put the following question to the Parties :
“What is the precise territorial extent that each of the Parties con -

siders as the ‘vicinity’ of the Temple of Preah Vihear ‘on Cambfiodian
territory’ referred to in the second paragraph of the dispositif of the
Court’s Judgment of 1962 ?”

and requested that each Party provide a set of geographical co-ordinates
or refer to one of the maps produced in the 1962 proceedings.

83. In its response, Cambodia maintained that “the Court’s use of the fi

term ‘vicinity’ can best be appreciated in the light of the overlafip between
the Annex I map line and the watershed line proposed by the Thai experts
in the original proceedings”. As indicated on the map annexed to Cambfio -
dia’s response, the area between these two lines includes the entirety of
the promontory of Preah Vihear and the hill of Phnom Trap. The Annex I
map line is shown as the northern limit of this area. The western and

eastern limits of the area identified by Cambodia consist of the points
where the Annex I map line and the watershed line advocated by Thai -
land intersect. Cambodia accepts Thailand’s estimate that this area
measures approximately 4.6 square kilometres.

84. Thailand responded to the question by stating that “[i]n 1962, the
‘vicinity’ of the Temple was identified by the Council of Ministerfis for the
purposes of the withdrawal of the Thai troops who were stationed there”fi.

The 1962 resolution of the Thai Council of Ministers was based upon a
report, which outlined two possible methods for determining the extent of

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8 Ord 1050.indb 64 25/06/14 13:11 312 request for interprefitation (judgment)

the “vicinity [of the Temple] on Cambodian territory”. The resolutfiion
chose the second of these methods, which involved confining the Temple
within an area bounded, to the south and east, by the escarpment and, tofi
the west, north and north-east, by a line close to the Temple. That line

(referred to in paragraph 22, above, as the “Thai Council of Ministers’
line”) consisted of three segments. The first segment began at the
south-western part of the escarpment and ran north in a straight line,
parallel to, and a few metres to the west of, the Temple buildings, untifil it

reached a point a few metres north of the most northern part of the Tem -
ple buildings. The second segment ran east from this point in a straightfi
line until it reached a point just north of the eastern extreme of this part
of the Temple. The third segment ran south-east from that point, broadly
following the course of a feature known as the Broken Stairway (which

was described in the report as falling within the vicinity of the Templefi)
until it reached the eastern escarpment. The report estimated the area
enclosed within these limits as approximately 0.25 square kilometres. Fol -
lowing the adoption of the resolution, Thailand erected a barbed wire

fence along the Council of Ministers’ line and put up signs stating tfihat
“the vicinity of the Temple of Preah Vihear does not extend beyond thfiis
limit”.

85. Since the second operative paragraph of the 1962 Judgment
required Thailand to withdraw “any [of its] military or police forcesfi, or
other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinfiity

on Cambodian territory”, the Court considers that it must begin by
examining the evidence that was before the Court in 1962 regarding the
locations at which such Thai personnel were stationed.

86. The only such evidence was given by Professor Ackermann, who
was called by Thailand as an expert and witness and who had visited the fi
Temple for several days in July 1961 in the course of preparing a report
to be submitted in the proceedings. Under cross-examination by counsel

for Cambodia, Professor Ackermann testified that, during that visit, the
only people he had seen at the Preah Vihear promontory were a detach -
ment of Thai frontier police and one Temple guard. He stated that the
police had been stationed in blockhouses at a camp located to the
north-east of the Temple, while the guard had lived in a separate house a

short distance to the west of the police camp (I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. II, pp. 401-402) 2.

2Professor Ackermann indicated these locations on a map shown to the Court. A copy fi
of the map, entitled “Annex 85 (d)”, is enclosed at the end of Volume II of I.C.J. Plead‑
ings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand).

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8 Ord 1050.indb 66 25/06/14 13:11 313 request for interprefitation (judgment)

87. The location of the police station was subsequently confirmed by
counsel for Thailand, according to whom the police camp was located

south of the Annex I map line but north of a line which Cambodia main -
tained was the watershed line (I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. II, p. 559). During the 1962 proceedings,
Cambodia had advanced an alternative argument that if, contrary to its
primary position, the boundary was required to follow the watershed

rather than the Annex I map line, then it was this Cambodian line which
represented the watershed and not the watershed line advocated by Thai -
land (to which reference has already been made). In the event, the Court
found that it was unnecessary to consider the location of the watershed fiin
the area of the Temple (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 35). Neverthe -
less, the reference to that line in the speech by counsel for Thailand is

significant, because, as Thailand has stated in the current proceedings,fi the
Thai Council of Ministers’ line follows a course very close to that ofif the
watershed line advanced by Cambodia in 1962. It is apparent, therefore, fi
that the Thai police detachment was stationed at a location north of thefi
line subsequently drawn by the 1962 resolution of the Thai Council of

Ministers and thus outside what Thailand considers to be the “vicinity [of
the Temple] on Cambodian territory”.

88. When the Court required Thailand to withdraw military or police

forces, guards or keepers which it had stationed in the Temple, or in thfie
vicinity of the Temple on Cambodian territory, it must have intended thafit
obligation to apply to the police detachment referred to by Professor Ack -
ermann, since, except for the solitary Temple guard (who seems to have fi
been living near the police camp), there was no evidence of the presencfie
of any other Thai personnel anywhere near the Temple. Accordingly, the

term “vicinity on Cambodian territory” has to be construed as extending
at least to the area where the police detachment was stationed at the tifime
of the original proceedings. Since that area lies north of the Thai Counficil
of Ministers’ line, that line cannot represent the correct interpretation
of the territorial scope of the second operative paragraph as Thailand

contends.

89. That conclusion is confirmed by a number of other factors. As the
Court emphasized in its description of the area around the Temple (ibid.,
p. 15), the Temple is located on an easily identifiable geographical featufire.

This feature is a promontory. In the east, south and south-west, the prom -
ontory descends by a steep escarpment to the Cambodian plain. In the wesfit
and north-west, the ground drops into what Professor Ackermann described
in his evidence as a “valley . . . between the Pnom Trap mountain and the
Phra Viharn mountain” (I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambo ‑
dia v. Thailand), Vol. II, p. 385). It is through this valley that access to the

Temple from the Cambodian plain can most easily be obtained. The hill offi
Phnom Trap rises from the western side of this valley. A natural under -

36

8 Ord 1050.indb 68 25/06/14 13:11 314 request for interprefitation (judgment)

standing of the concept of the “vicinity” of the Temple would extefind to the
entirety of the Preah Vihear promontory.

90. Furthermore, the Court’s reasoning regarding the significance of
the Annex I map (considered in paragraph 77 above) shows that the
Court considered that Cambodia’s territory extended in the north as ffiar
as, but no farther than, the Annex I map line. Although Professor Acker -
mann did not give any estimate of the distances between the various

places on the promontory to which he referred in his evidence, it is clefiar
that, for example, the police post which he identified was only a very
short distance to the south of the nearest point on the Annex I map line.

91. The Court was therefore dealing with a small area with clearly
defined geographical limits to the east, south, west and north-west, and

bounded in the north by what the Court had stated in its reasoning was
the limit of Cambodian territory. In these circumstances, the Court
considers that the territorial scope of the second operative paragraph
must be construed as extending to the whole of the promontory, rather
than being confined to the part of it chosen by the Thai Council of Min -

isters in 1962.
92. Turning to the position of Cambodia, the Court is also unable to
accept its interpretation of “vicinity”. In its answer to the quesfition put by
a Member of the Court (see paragraph 83 above), Cambodia maintained
that the vicinity includes not only the promontory of Preah Vihear but

also the hill of Phnom Trap. There are several reasons why the Court
considers that this is not the correct interpretation of the second operfiative
paragraph.
93. First, Phnom Trap and the promontory of Preah Vihear aredistinct
geographical features which are clearly shown as separate on the maps
used in the 1962 proceedings and, in particular, on the Annex I map,

which was the only map to which the Court made more than passing
reference in the Judgment.
94. Secondly, there are certain indications in the record of the 1962
proceedings that Cambodia did not treat Phnom Trap as falling within
the “region of the Temple” or “Temple area” (the terms usedfi by the

Court in defining the scope of the dispute before it). Thus, a former Cfiam -
bodian provincial governor, Mr. Suon Bonn, who was called as a witness
by Cambodia, testified that Preah Vihear had formed part of his provincefi
(I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Vol. II, p. 333), but that he thought that Phnom Trap belonged to a

neighbouring province (ibid., p. 434). Moreover, as explained in para -
graph 78 above, in referring to the area with which the Court was con -
cerned, counsel for Cambodia spoke of its dimensions in terms which
would be too small to encompass, at the same time, Phnom Trap as well
as the promontory of Preah Vihear (ibid., pp. 464 and 473). He also stated
that Phnom Trap was not part of the “crucial area” with which the fiCourt

was concerned (ibid., p. 465).

37

8 Ord 1050.indb 70 25/06/14 13:11 315 request for interprefitation (judgment)

95. Thirdly, there was no evidence before the Court of any Thai mili -
tary or police presence on Phnom Trap in 1962 and no suggestion that

Phnom Trap was relevant to Cambodia’s claim that Thailand should be
required to withdraw its forces.

96. Lastly, Cambodia’s interpretation depends upon identifying the
location of the points at which the Annex I map line intersects with the

watershed line advocated by Thailand. Yet, in the 1962 Judgment,
the Court made clear that it was not concerned with the location of the
watershed and did not decide where the watershed lay (I.C.J. Reports
1962, p. 35). It is, therefore, implausible to suggest that the Court had the
watershed line in mind when it used the term “vicinity”.
97. While no one of these considerations is conclusive in itself, taken

together they lead the Court to conclude that, in 1962, the Court did nofit
have this wider area in mind and, accordingly, that it did not intend thfie
term “vicinity [of the Temple] on Cambodian territory” to be underfistood
as applicable to territory outside the promontory of Preah Vihear. That fiis
not to say that the 1962 Judgment treated Phnom Trap as part of Thai -

land; the Court did not address the issue of sovereignty over Phnom
Trap, or any other area beyond the limits of the promontory of Preah
Vihear.

98. From the reasoning in the 1962 Judgment, seen in the light of the

pleadings in the original proceedings, it appears that the limits of thefi
promontory of Preah Vihear, to the south of the Annex I map line, con -
sist of natural features. To the east, south and south-west, the promon -
tory drops in a steep escarpment to the Cambodian plain. The Parties
were in agreement in 1962 that this escarpment, and the land at its foot,
were under Cambodian sovereignty in any event. To the west and

north-west, the land drops in a slope, less steep than the escarpment but
nonetheless pronounced, into the valley which separates Preah Vihear
from the neighbouring hill of Phnom Trap, a valley which itself drops
away in the south to the Cambodian plain (see paragraph 89 above). For
the reasons already given (see paragraphs 92-97 above), the Court consid -

ers that Phnom Trap lay outside the disputed area and the 1962 Judg-
ment did not address the question whether it was located in Thai or
Cambodian territory. Accordingly, the Court considers that the promon -
tory of Preah Vihear ends at the foot of the hill of Phnom Trap, that isfi to
say: where the ground begins to rise from the valley.

In the north, the limit of the promontory is the Annex I map line, from
a point to the north-east of the Temple where that line abuts the escarp -
ment to a point in the north-west where the ground begins to rise from
the valley, at the foot of the hill of Phnom Trap.
The Court considers that the second operative paragraph of the 1962
Judgment required Thailand to withdraw from the whole territory of the

promontory, thus defined, to Thai territory any Thai personnel stationedfi
on that promontory.

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8 Ord 1050.indb 72 25/06/14 13:11 316 request for interprefitation (judgment)

99. The Court notes Thailand’s argument about the difficulty of trans -
posing the Annex I map and thus of ascertaining the precise location on

the ground of the Annex I map line in the area described in the preceding
paragraph. The 1962 Judgment did not, however, address that question
and the Court cannot now, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Artifi -
cle 60 to interpret the 1962 Judgment, deal with a matter which was not
addressed by that Judgment. Nevertheless, the parties to a case before tfihe

Court have an obligation to implement the judgment of the Court in
good faith. It is of the essence of that obligation that it does not perfimit
either party to impose a unilateral solution.

C. The relationship between the second operative paragraph and the rest of ▯

the operative part

100. The Court has already stated (see paragraph 79 above) that the
three paragraphs of the operative part of the 1962 Judgment have to be
considered as a whole. Having determined the meaning and scope of the
second paragraph, the Court now turns to the relationship between that

paragraph and the other two paragraphs of the operative part. While
there is no dispute between the Parties regarding the third operative para-
graph, it is nonetheless relevant to the extent that it sheds light on tfihe
meaning and scope of the rest of the operative part.
101. The scope of the operative part of a judgment of the Court is
necessarily bound up with the scope of the dispute before the Court. Thefi

1962 Judgment defined the dispute which was then before the Court as
one concerning “sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah
Vihear” (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 14 ; emphasis added). It was entirely con-
sistent with this view of the dispute that the Court, having decided in fithe
first operative paragraph of the Judgment that the Temple was located infi

territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia, determined, as a conse -
quence of that finding, that Thailand was under an obligation to with -
draw its forces and other personnel stationed “at the Temple, or in ifits
vicinity on Cambodian territory” and to restore objects removed from
“the Temple or the Temple area” (emphasis added). The second and third

operative paragraphs each, therefore, imposed obligations with respect to
an area of territory which extended beyond the Temple itself. The secondfi
operative paragraph expressly described this area as Cambodian terri -
tory. The third operative paragraph did not do so but the Court considerfis
that such a description was implicit ; an obligation to restore artefacts

taken from the “area of the Temple” would be a logical consequence of a
finding of sovereignty only to the extent that the area in question was fi
covered by that finding.
102. The area with which the Court was concerned in the original pro -
ceedings, as has already been explained (see paragraph 78 above), is small
and bounded, except to the north, by readily identifiable geographical

features. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the terms
“vicinity [of the Temple] on Cambodian territory”, in the second pfiara -

39

8 Ord 1050.indb 74 25/06/14 13:11 317 request for interprefitation (judgment)

graph, and “area of the Temple”, in the third paragraph, refer to fithe
same small parcel of territory. The obligations which the Court imposed fi

in respect of that parcel of territory were stated to be a consequence ofif
the finding in the first paragraph. In view of the characteristics of thfie
dispute which confronted the Court in 1962 — in particular, the nature of
the submissions of each Party — the obligations imposed by the second
and third paragraphs would be a logical consequence of the finding of

sovereignty in the first operative paragraph only if the territory referfired
to in the first paragraph corresponded to the territory referred to in tfihe
second and third paragraphs.
103. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the territorial scope of the
three operative paragraphs is the same : the finding in the first paragraph
that “the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory under the sfiover -

eignty of Cambodia” must be taken as referring, like the second and third
paragraphs, to the promontory of Preah Vihear, within the limits des-
cribed in paragraph 98 of the present Judgment.
104. In these circumstances, the Court does not consider it necessary
further to address the question whether the 1962 Judgment determined

with binding force the boundary line between Cambodia and Thailand.
In a dispute concerned only with sovereignty over the promontory of
Preah Vihear, the Court concluded that that promontory, extending in
the north to the Annex I map line but not beyond it, was under Cambo -
dian sovereignty. That was the issue which was in dispute in 1962 and

which the Court considers to be at the heart of the present dispute overfi
interpretation of the 1962 Judgment.
105. Nor is it necessary for the Court to address the question whether
the obligation imposed on Thailand by the second operative paragraph
was a continuing obligation, in the sense maintained by Cambodia. In thefi
present proceedings, Thailand has accepted that it has a general and confi -

tinuing legal obligation to respect the integrity of Cambodian territoryfi,
which applies to any disputed territory found by the Court to be under
Cambodian sovereignty. Once a dispute regarding territorial sovereignty fi
has been resolved and uncertainty removed, each party must fulfil in goofid
faith the obligation which all States have to respect the territorial infiteg -

rity of all other States. Likewise, the Parties have a duty to settle anfiy
dispute between them by peaceful means.

106. These obligations, which derive from the principles of the Charter
of the United Nations, are of particular importance in the present con -

text. As is clear from the record of both the present proceedings and thfiose
of 1959-1962, the Temple of Preah Vihear is a site of religious and cul -
tural significance for the peoples of the region and is now listed by
UNESCO as a world heritage site (see paragraphs 25-27 above). In this
respect, the Court recalls that under Article 6 of the World Heritage Con -
vention, to which both States are parties, Cambodia and Thailand must

co-operate between themselves and with the international community in
the protection of the site as a world heritage. In addition, each State fiis

40

8 Ord 1050.indb 76 25/06/14 13:11 318 request for interprefitation (judgment)

under an obligation not to “take any deliberate measures which might fi

damage directly or indirectly” such heritage. In the context of thesefi obli-
gations, the Court wishes to emphasize the importance of ensuring access
to the Temple from the Cambodian plain.

5. Conclusions

107. The Court therefore concludes that the first operative paragraph
of the 1962 Judgment determined that Cambodia had sovereignty over
the whole territory of the promontory of Preah Vihear, as defined in

paragraph 98 of the present Judgment, and that, in consequence, the sec -
ond operative paragraph required Thailand to withdraw from that terri -
tory the Thai military or police forces, or other guards or keepers, thafit
were stationed there.

*
* *

108. For these reasons,

The Court,

(1) Unanimously,

Finds that it has jurisdiction under Article 60 of the Statute to entertain
the Request for interpretation of the 1962 Judgment presented by Cam -
bodia, and that this Request is admissible ;

(2) Unanimously,

Declares, by way of interpretation, that the Judgment of 15 June 1962
decided that Cambodia had sovereignty over the whole territory of the
promontory of Preah Vihear, as defined in paragraph 98 of the present

Judgment, and that, in consequence, Thailand was under an obligation to fi
withdraw from that territory the Thai military or police forces, or othefir
guards or keepers, that were stationed there.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at

the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eleventh day of November, two thousand
and thirteen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of
the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Kingdom offi
Cambodia and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand, respectively.

(Signed) Peter Tomka,
President.

(Signed) Philippe Couvreur,

Registrar.

41

8 Ord 1050.indb 78 25/06/14 13:11 319 request for interprefitation (judgment)

Judges Owada, Bennouna and Gaja append a joint declaration to the
Judgment of the Court ; Judge Cançado Trindade appends a separate
opinion to the Judgment of the Court ; Judges ad hoc Guillaume and

Cot append declarations to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initialled) P.T.

(Initialled) Ph.C.

42

8 Ord 1050.indb 80 25/06/14 13:11

Bilingual Content

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION
OF THE JUDGMENT OF 15 JUNE 1962 IN THE CASE

CONCERNING THE TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
(CAMBODIA v. THAILAND)

(CAMBODIA v. THAILAND)

JUDGMENT OF 11 NOVEMBER 2013

2013

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

DEMANDE EN INTERPRÉTATION
DE L’ARRÊT DU 15 JUIN 1962 EN L’AFFAIRE

DU TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
(CAMBODGE c. THAÏLANDE)

(CAMBODGE c. THAÏLANDE)

ARRÊT DU 11 NOVEMBRE 2013

8 Ord 1050.indb 1 25/06/14 13:11 Official citation :
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case

concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 281

Mode officiel de citation :
Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en l’affaire
du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande)

(Cambodge c. Thaïlande), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2013, p. 281

Sales number

ISSN 0074-4441 N ode vente: 1050
ISBN 978-92-1-071165-4

8 Ord 1050.indb 2 25/06/14 13:11 11 NOVEMBER 2013

JUDGMENT

REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION
OF THE JUDGMENT OF 15 JUNE 1962 IN THE CASE

CONCERNING THE TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
(CAMBODIA v. THAILAND)

(CAMBODIA v. THAILAND)

DEMANDE EN INTERPRÉTATION
DE L’ARRÊT DU 15 JUIN 1962 EN L’AFFAIRE
DU TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR

(CAMBODGE c. THAÏLANDE)

(CAMBODGE c. THAÏLANDE)

11 NOVEMBRE 2013

ARRÊT

8 Ord 1050.indb 3 25/06/14 13:11 281

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paragraphs

Chronology of the Procfiedure 1-13

I. Historical Backgroundfi 14-29

II. Jurisdiction and Admisfisibility 30-57
1. Jurisdiction of the Court under Article 60 of the Statute 31-52

A. The existence of a dispute 37-45
B. Subject-matter of the dispute before the Court 46-52

2. Admissibility of Cambodia’s Request for interpretation 53-56
3. Conclusion 57

III. The Interpretation offi the 1962 Judgment 58-107
1. Positions of the Parties 59-65

2. The role of the Court under Article 60 of the Statute 66-75
3. The principal features of the 1962 Judgment 76-78
4. The operative part of the 1962 Judgment 79-106

A. The first operative paragraph 80
B. The second operative paragraph 81-99

C. The relationship between the second operative paragraph
and the rest of the operative part 100-106

5. Conclusions 107
Operative Clause 108

4

8 Ord 1050.indb 4 25/06/14 13:11 281

TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Paragraphes

Qualités 1-13

I. Contexte historique 14-29

II. Compétence et recevabilfiité 30-57
1. La compétence de la Cour en vertu de l’article 60 du Statut 31-52

A. L’existence d’une contestation 37-45
B. L’objet de la contestation portée devant la Cour 46-52

2. La recevabilité de la demande en interprétation du Cambodge 53-56
3. Conclusion 57

III. Interprétation de l’afirrêt de 1962 58-107
1. Les positions des Parties 59-65

2. Le rôle de la Cour en vertu de l’article 60 du Statut 66-75
3. Les principaux éléments contenus dans l’arrêt de 1962 76-78
4. Le dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962 79-106

A. Le premier point du dispositif 80
B. Le deuxième point du dispositif 81-99

C. Le lien entre le deuxième point et le reste du dispositif 100-106

5. Conclusions 107
Dispositif 108

4

8 Ord 1050.indb 5 25/06/14 13:11 282

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

2013 YEAR 2013
11 November
General List
No. 151 11 November 2013

REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION

OF THE JUDGMENT OF 15 JUNE 1962 IN THE CASE
CONCERNING THE TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR

(CAMBODIA v. THAILAND)

(CAMBODIA v. THAILAND)

Historical background.

*

Jurisdiction and admissibility.
Article 60 of the Statute of the Court — Conditions of jurisdiction — Existence
of a dispute — Dispute as to the meaning or scope of Judgment of 15 June 1962 —
Subject‑matter of the current dispute — Characterization of Annex I map line —

Extent of area of Temple of Preah Vihear — Meaning and scope of phrases “ter
ritory under the sovereignty of Cambodia” and “vicinity on Cambodi▯an territory”
contained in operative par— Nature of Thailand’s obligation to withdraw its
personnel — Question of admissibility — Purpose of request must be limited to
interpretation — Need to interpret second operative paragraph of the 1962 Judg
ment and legal effect of the Court’s statements regarding Annex I map line —
Request for interpretation found admissible.

*

Interpretation of the 1962 Judgment.
Role of the Court under Article 60 of the Statute — Relationship between oper

ative clause and reasoning in original judgment — Role of pleadings, evidence and
submissions of Parties in original case — Principle of non ultra— Nature
and purpose of headnote — Conduct of the Parties occurring after original judg
ment given.

5

8 Ord 1050.indb 6 25/06/14 13:11 282

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

2013
ANNÉE 2013
11 novembre
Rôlo général
11 novembre 2013 n 151

DEMANDE EN INTERPRÉTATION

DE L’ARRÊT DU 15 JUIN 1962 EN L’AFFAIRE

DU TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR

(CAMBODGE c. THAÏLANDE)

(CAMBODGE c. THAÏLANDE)

Contexte historique.

*

Compétence et recevabilité.
Article 60 du Statut de la Cour — Conditions de la compétence — Existence
d’une contestation — Contestation sur le sens et la portée de l’arrêt du
15 juin 1962 — Objet de la contestation — Qualification de la ligne de la carte de
l’annexe I — Etendue de la zone du temple de Préah Vihéar — Sens et portée des
expressions « territoire relevant de la souveraineté du Camb» et « environs
situés en territoire cambodgien », contenues dans le dispositif — Nature de l’obli

gation de la Thaïlande de retirer ses personnels — Question de la recevabilité —
Demande devant avoir pour seul objet l’interprétation de l’arrê▯t initial — Nécessité
d’interpréter le deuxième point du dispositif de l’arrêt ▯de 1962 et l’effet juridique
des déclarations de la Cour concernant la ligne de la carte de l’a▯nnexe I —
Demande en interprétation jugée recevable.

*

Interprétation de l’arrêt de 1962.
Rôle de la Cour en vertu de l’article 60 du Statut — Lien entre le dispositif
et les motifs de l’arrêt initial — Rôle des écritures et plaidoiries ainsi que des

éléments de preuve et conclusions présentés par les Parties dans la procédure
initiale— Principe non ultra petita — Nature et objet du sommaire — Compor
tement des Parties postérieur au prononcé de l’arrêt initial▯.

5

8 Ord 1050.indb 7 25/06/14 13:11 283 request for interprefitation (judgment)

Principal features of the 1962 Judgment.
Role of Annex I map in reasoning of the Court — Submissions of the Parties —
Subject‑matter of the dispute before the Court — Court concerned with question
of sovereignty over the Temple area and not frontier delimitation.

Operative part of the 1962 Judgment.
First operative paragraph of the 1962 Judgment clear in meaning — Temple
situated in territory under sovereignty of Cambodia — Scope of this operative
paragraph to be assessed in light of the Court’s examination of the s▯econd and
third operative paragraphs.
Second operative paragraph of the 1962 Judgment — No express indication of

territory from which Thailand was required to withdraw — Term “vicinity on
Cambodian territory” to be construed as extending at least to area wh▯ere Thai
personnel stationed — 1962 Thai Council of Ministers’ line — Natural under ‑
standing of concept of “vicinity” of Temple in view of geographica▯l context —
Phnom Trap outside Temple area — 1962 Judgment required Thailand to with ‑

draw from whole territory of promontory of Preah Vihear.

Operative part of the 1962 Judgment to be considered as a whole — Territorial
scope of the three operative paragraphs is the same.
Determination of boundary line between Cambodia and Thailand beyond scop▯e

of 1962 Judgment — Not necessary for the Court to consider whether Thailand’s
obligation to withdraw is a continuing one — Territorial integrity of a State must
be respected.
Temple of Preah Vihear a UNESCO world heritage site — Cambodia and
Thailand must co‑operate to protect the site — Each State under obligation not to

take any deliberate measures which might damage Temple — Access to Temple
from the Cambodian plain to be ensured.

JUDGMENT

Present: President Tomka ;Vice‑President Sepúlveda-Amor ; Judges Owada,

Abraham, Keith, Bennouna,fi Skotnikov, Cançado Trinfidade,
Yusuf, Greenwood, Xue, Donfioghue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhfiandari ;
Judges ad hoc Guillaume, Cot ; Registrar Couvreur.

In the case concerning the Request for interpretation of the Judgment offi
15 June 1962,

between

the Kingdom of Cambodia,
represented by

H.E. Mr. Hor Namhong, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs and International Co-operation,

6

8 Ord 1050.indb 8 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 283

Principaux éléments contenus dans l’arrêt de 1962.
Rôle de la carte de l’annexe I dans la motivation de la Cour — Conclusions des
Parties — Objet du différend porté devant la Cour — Cour ayant eu à connaître
d’une question de souveraineté sur la zone du temple et non d’u▯ne question de déli

mitation frontalière.
Dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962.
Sens du premier point du dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962 étant clair — Temple
étant situé en territoire relevant de la souveraineté du Cambod▯ge — Portée de ce
point du dispositif devant être appréciée à la lumière de l’examen par la Cour des

deuxième et troisième points.
Deuxième point du dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962 — Absence d’indication expresse
du territoire cambodgien dont la Thaïlande devait se retirer — Expression « envi ‑
rons situés en territoire cambodgien » devant être interprétée comme s’étendant au
moins à la zone où des personnels thaïlandais étaient instal▯lés — Ligne du conseil

des ministres thaïlandais de 1962 — Sens naturel de la notion d’« environs», au vu
du contexte géographique — Phnom Trap étant située en dehors de la zone du
temple — Arrêt de 1962 ayant prescrit à la Thaïlande de se retirer de l’intégralité
du territoire de l’éperon de Préah Vihéar.
Dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962 devant être considéré comme un tout — Portée

territoriale des trois points du dispositif étant la même.
Détermination de la ligne frontière entre le Cambodge et la Thaïlande dépassant
la portée de l’arrêt de 1962 — Cour n’estimant pas nécessaire d’examiner la ques ‑
tion de savoir si l’obligation de retrait incombant à la Thaïlande est de nature
continue — Intégrité territoriale d’un Etat devant être respectée.

Temple de Préah Vihéar ayant été inscrit par l’UNESCO au patrimoine mon ‑
dial — Cambodge et Thaïlande devant coopérer pour protéger le site — Chacun
des deux Etats ayant l’obligation de ne prendre délibérément▯ aucune mesure sus ‑
ceptible d’endommager le temple — Accès au temple depuis la plaine cambod ‑

gienne devant être garanti.

ARRÊT

Présents : M. Tomka, président ; M.Sepúlveda-Amor, vice‑président ;
MM. Owada, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado
mes
Trmedade, Yusuf, Greenwood, M Xue, Donoghue, M. Gaja,
M Sebutinde, M. Bhandari, juges ; MM. Guillaume, Cot, juges
ad hoc ; M. Couvreur, greffier.

En l’affaire de la demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15fi juin 1962,

entre

le Royaume du Cambodge,
représenté par

S. Exc. M. Hor Namhong, vice-premier ministre et ministre des affaires étran -
gères et de la coopération internationale,

6

8 Ord 1050.indb 9 25/06/14 13:11 284 request for interprefitation (judgment)

as Agent ;
H.E. Mr. Var Kimhong, Minister of State,

as Deputy Agent ;
H.E. Mr. Long Visalo, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

and International Co-operation,
Mr. Raoul Marc Jennar, Expert,
H.E. Mr. Hem Saem, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the
Kingdom of Cambodia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
H.E. Mr. Sarun Rithea, Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and
International Co-operation,

Mr. Hoy Pichravuth, Assistant to the Deputy Prime Minister,
as Advisers ;

Mr. Jean-Marc Sorel, Professor of International Law at the University of
Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Sir Franklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., member of the English Bar, member
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Visiting Professor of Internationfial
Law at Oxford University and the University of Cape Town,

Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, member of the New
York Bar, Eversheds LLP (Paris),
as Counsel and Advocates ;

Mr. Guillaume Le Floch, Professor at the University of Rennes 1,
Ms Amal Alamuddin, member of the English and the New York Bars,
Ms Naomi Briercliffe, solicitor (England and Wales), Eversheds LLP (Parisfi),

as Counsel ;

and

the Kingdom of Thailand,

represented by
H.E. Mr. Virachai Plasai, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
the Kingdom of Thailand to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

as Agent ;
Mr. Voradet Viravakin, Director-General, Department of Treaties and Legal

Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Deputy Agent ;

H.E. Mr. Surapong Tovichakchaikul, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
for Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. Phongthep Thepkanjana, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Education,
H.E. A.C.M. Sukumpol Suwanatat, Minister of Defence,

Mr. Thana Duangratana, Vice-Minister attached to the Office of the Prime
Minister,
Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Nuttavudh Photisaro, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreignfi

Affairs,
General Nipat Thonglek, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence,fi

7

8 Ord 1050.indb 10 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 284

comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Var Kimhong, ministre d’Etat,

comme agent adjoint ;
S. Exc. M. Long Visalo, secrétaire d’Etat au ministère des affaires étrangèfires

et de la coopération internationale,
M. Raoul Marc Jennar, expert,
S. Exc. M. Hem Saem, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du
Royaume du Cambodge auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
S. Exc. M. Sarun Rithea, conseiller du ministre des affaires étrangères et de la
coopération internationale,

M. Hoy Pichravuth, assistant du vice-premier ministre,
comme conseillers ;

M. Jean-Marc Sorel, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Parifis I
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
sir Franklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage, professeur invité de drofiit
international à l’Université d’Oxford et à l’Universitfié du Cap,

M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau
de New York, cabinet Eversheds LLP (Paris),
comme conseils et avocats ;

M. Guillaume Le Floch, professeur à l’Université de Rennes 1,
M me Amal Alamuddin, membre des barreaux d’Angleterre et de New York,
M me Naomi Briercliffe, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles), cabinet Ever -

sheds LLP (Paris),
comme conseils ;

et

le Royaume de Thaïlande,

représenté par
S. Exc. M. Virachai Plasai, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du
Royaume de Thaïlande auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,

comme agent ;
M. Voradet Viravakin, directeur général du département des traitéfis et des

affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agent adjoint ;

S. Exc. M. Surapong Tovichakchaikul, vice-premier ministre et ministre des
affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. M. Phongthep Thepkanjana, vice-premier ministre et ministre de
l’éducation,
S. Exc. M. Sukumpol Suwanatat, A.C.M., ministre de la défense,

M. Thana Duangratana, vice-ministre rattaché au cabinet du premier
ministre,
M. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, secrétaire permanent du ministère des affairfies
étrangères,
M. Nuttavudh Photisaro, secrétaire permanent adjoint du ministère desfi

affaires étrangères,
le général Nipat Thonglek, secrétaire permanent adjoint du minifistère de la
défense,

7

8 Ord 1050.indb 11 25/06/14 13:11 285 request for interprefitation (judgment)

Lieutenant General Nopphadon Chotsiri, Director-General, Royal Thai Sur -
vey Department, Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters,

Mr. Chukiert Ratanachaichan, Deputy Secretary-General, Office of the
Council of State, Office of the Prime Minister,

Mr. Jumpon Phansumrit, Expert Public Prosecutor, Office of Policy and
Strategy, Office of the Attorney General,
Mr. Darm Boontham, Director, Boundary Division, Department of Treaties
and Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ;

*

Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Lawfi,
University of Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,

Barrister,
Mr. Donald McRae, Hyman Soloway Professor, University of Ottawa, Mem -
ber of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institufit
de droit international, member of the Ontario Bar,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La

Défense, President of the Société française pour le droit infiternational, asso
ciate member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Thomas Grant, member of the New York Bar, Senior Research Associ -
ate, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge,
Ms Alina Miron, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre

(CEDIN), University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
as Counsel ;

Mr. Alastair Macdonald, M.B.E., Honorary Fellow, International Bound-
aries Research Unit, Department of Geography, Durham University,

Mr. Martin Pratt, Director of Research, International Boundaries Researcfih
Unit, Department of Geography, Durham University,

as Expert Advisers ;

Mr. Ludovic Legrand, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterfire
(CEDIN), University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,

as Assistant Counsel,

The Court,

composed as above,

after deliberation,
delivers the following Judgment :

1. On 28 April 2011, the Kingdom of Cambodia (hereinafter “Cambodia”)
filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedingfis in

which, referring to Article 60 of the Statute of the Court and Article 98 of the
Rules of Court, Cambodia requests the Court to interpret the Judgment which
it delivered on 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 6 (hereinafter

8

8 Ord 1050.indb 12 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 285

le lieutenant général Nopphadon Chotsiri, directeur général fidu service géo -
graphique royal thaïlandais, quartier général des forces arméfies du Royaume
de Thaïlande,
M. Chukiert Ratanachaichan, secrétaire général adjoint du bureau du conseil

d’Etat, cabinet du premier ministre,
M. Jumpon Phansumrit, procureur expert au bureau des politiques et straté -
gies, bureau de l’Attorney General,
M. Darm Boontham, directeur de la division des frontières du département
des traités et des affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires éfitrangères;

*

M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international, titulaifire
de la chaire Whewell, à l’Université de Cambridge, membre de l’Institut de
droit international, avocat,
M. Donald McRae, professeur à l’Université d’Ottawa, titulaire de la cfihaire
Hyman Soloway, membre de la Commission du droit international, membre

associé de l’Institut de droit international, membre du barreau de l’Ontario,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
président de la Société française pour le droit internationafil, membre asso
cié de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Thomas Grant, membre du barreau de New York, maître de recherche au

meuterpacht Centre for International Law de l’Université de Cambrifidge,
M Alina Miron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre
(CEDIN), Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,

comme conseils ;
M. Alastair Macdonald, M.B.E., membre honoraire de l’unité de recherche
sur les frontières internationales du département de géographiefi de l’Uni -

versité de Durham,
M. Martin Pratt, directeur de recherche à l’unité de recherche surfi les fron-
tières internationales du département de géographie de l’Unifiversité de
Durham,

comme conseillers experts ;
M. Ludovic Legrand, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre

(CEDIN), Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseil adjoint,

La Cour,

ainsi composée,
après délibéré en chambre du conseil,

rend l’arrêt suivant :

1. Le 28 avril 2011, le Royaume du Cambodge (dénommé ci-après le « Cam -
bodge») a déposé au Greffe de la Cour une requête introductive d’instance dans
laquelle, se référant à l’article 60 du Statut de la Cour et à l’article 98 de son

Règlement, il demande à la Cour d’interpréter l’arrêt fiqu’elle a rendu le
15 juin 1962 en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande),
fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 6 (ci-après l’« arrêt de 1962 »). Le même jour,

8

8 Ord 1050.indb 13 25/06/14 13:11 286 request for interprefitation (judgment)

the “1962 Judgment”). Cambodia on the same day, referring to Article 41 of the
Statute and Article 73 of the Rules of Court, also filed a Request for the indica -
tion of provisional measures in order to “cause [the] incursions [by fiThailand]
onto its territory to cease”.

2. In accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Registrar
communicated the Application forthwith to the Government of the Kingdom fiof
Thailand (hereinafter “Thailand”) ; and, pursuant to paragraph 3 of that Arti -
cle, all other States entitled to appear before the Court were notified of the
Application. Pursuant to Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the

Registrar transmitted a certified copy of the Request for the indication of provi -
sional measures to Thailand.
3. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of
either of the Parties, each Party exercised its right, conferred by Artificle 31, para
graph 3, of the Statute, to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case ; Cambodia

chose Mr. Gilbert Guillaume, and Thailand Mr. Jean-Pierre Cot.

4. By an Order of 18 July 2011, the Court, after rejecting Thailand’s request
for the case to be removed from the General List of the Court, indicatedfi the
following provisional measures :

“(1) Both Parties shall immediately withdraw their military personnel cur -
rently present in the provisional demilitarized zone, as defined in par -

agraph 62 of the present Order, and refrain from any military presence
within that zone and from any armed activity directed at that zone ;

(2) Thailand shall not obstruct Cambodia’s free access to the Temple of
Preah Vihear or Cambodia’s provision of fresh supplies to its non-

military personnel in the Temple ;
(3) Both Parties shall continue the co-operation which they have entered into
within ASEAN and, in particular, allow the observers appointed by that
organization to have access to the provisional demilitarized zone;
(4) Both Parties shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or

extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolvfie.”
(Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cam ‑
bodia v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011,
I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), pp. 555-556, para. 69, points B.1 to 4 of the

operative part.)
It further decided that “each Party shall inform the Court as to its ficompliance

with the above provisional measures” and that, “until the Court hafis rendered its
judgment on the request for interpretation, it shall remain seised of the matters
which form the subject of this Order” (ibid., points C and D of the operative
part).
5. Thailand filed written observations on Cambodia’s Request for interprfieta -

tion within the time-limit fixed by the Court for that purpose, in accordance
with Article 98, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court.
6. The Court decided to afford the Parties the opportunity of furnishing furfi -
ther written explanations, pursuant to Article 98, paragraph 4, of the Rules of
Court. Each of the Parties filed such further explanations within the tifime-limits

prescribed by the Court.
7. The Court also decided, in response to a request from Thailand to
which Cambodia did not object, to give the Parties an opportunity to pro -

9

8 Ord 1050.indb 14 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 286

le Cambodge, se référant à l’article 41 du Statut et à l’article 73 du Règlement,
a également déposé une demande en indication de mesures conservfiatoires afin
de «faire cesser [l]es incursions [de la Thaïlande] sur son territoire ».

2. Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 40 du Statut, le greffier a
immédiatement communiqué la requête au Gouvernement du Royaume fide
Thaïlande (dénommé ci-après la « Thaïlande»); conformément au paragraphe 3
du même article, il en a également informé tous les autres Etatfis admis à ester
devant la Cour. En application du paragraphe 2 de l’article 73 du Règlement de

la Cour, le greffier a transmis une copie certifiée conforme de la dfiemande en
indication de mesures conservatoires à la Thaïlande.
3. La Cour ne comptant sur le siège aucun juge de la nationalité des fiParties,
chacune d’elles s’est prévalue du droit que lui confère le pfiaragraphe 3 de l’ar -
ticle 31 du Statut de procéder à la désignation d’un juge ad hoc pour siéger

en l’affaire ; le Cambodge a désigné M. Gilbert Guillaume, et la Thaïlande,
M. Jean-Pierre Cot.
4. Par une ordonnance en date du 18 juillet 2011, la Cour, après avoir rejeté
la demande de la Thaïlande tendant à obtenir la radiation de l’fiaffaire du rôle de
la Cour, a indiqué les mesures conservatoires suivantes :

«1) Les deux Parties doivent, immédiatement, retirer leur personnel militfiaire
actuellement présent dans la zone démilitarisée provisoire, telfile que défi-

nie au paragraphe 62 de la présente ordonnance, et s’abstenir de toute
présence militaire dans cette zone et de toute activité armée dfiirigée à
l’encontre de celle-ci ;
2) La Thaïlande ne doit pas faire obstacle au libre accès du Cambodgefi au
temple de Préah Vihéar ni à la possibilité pour celui-ci d’y ravitailler son

personnel non militaire ;
3) Les deux Parties doivent poursuivre la coopération qu’elles ont enfigagée
dans le cadre de l’ANASE et permettre notamment aux observateurs man -
datés par cette organisation d’accéder à la zone démilitafirisée provisoi;re
4) Les deux Parties doivent s’abstenir de tout acte qui risquerait d’fiaggraver

ou d’étendre le différend dont la Cour est saisie ou d’en renfidre la solu -
tion plus difficile.» (Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962
en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) (Cam ‑
bodge c. Thaïlande), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 18 juillet
2011, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (II), p. 555-556, par. 69, points B.1 à 4 du

dispositif.)
Elle a en outre décidé que « chaque Partie informera[it] la Cour de la manière

dont elle assurera[it] l’exécution des mesures conservatoires ci-dessus indiquées »
et que, « jusqu’à ce [qu’elle] rende son arrêt sur la demande en interfiprétation,
elle demeurera[it] saisie des questions qui font l’objet de [cette] ofirdonnance »
(ibid., points C et D du dispositif).
5. Conformément au paragraphe 3 de l’article 98 du Règlement de la Cour,

la Thaïlande a déposé des observations écrites sur la demandfie en interprétation
du Cambodge dans le délai fixé par la Cour à cet effet.
6. La Cour a décidé de donner aux Parties la possibilité de lui fournir par
écrit un supplément d’information, conformément au paragraphe 4 de l’ar -
ticle 98 du Règlement. Chacune des Parties a déposé le sien dans le dfiélai prescrit

par la Cour.
7. En réponse à une demande de la Thaïlande qui n’avait pas suscité d’objec -
tion de la part du Cambodge, la Cour a également décidé de donnfier aux Parties

9

8 Ord 1050.indb 15 25/06/14 13:11 287 request for interprefitation (judgment)

vide further oral explanations under Article 98, paragraph 4, of the Rules of
Court.
8. In accordance with Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the
Court decided, after ascertaining the views of the Parties, that copies fiof the
pleadings and documents annexed would be made accessible to the public ofin the

opening of the oral proceedings.
9. Public hearings were held from 15 to 19 April 2013, at which the Court
heard the oral arguments and replies of :

For Cambodia : H.E. Mr. Hor Namhong,
Mr. Jean-Marc Sorel,
Sir Franklin Berman,
Mr. Rodman Bundy.

For Thailand : H.E. Mr. Virachai Plasai,
Mr. Donald McRae,
Ms Alina Miron,
Mr. Alain Pellet,

Mr. James Crawford.
10. At the hearings, a Member of the Court put a question to the Parties, tofi
which replies were given orally and in writing, in accordance with Articfile 61,

paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court. Pursuant to Article 72 of the Rules of
Court, each Party presented written observations on the written replies received
from the other.

*

11. In the Application, Cambodia presented the following claims :

“Given that ‘the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory ufinder the
sovereignty of Cambodia’ (first paragraph of the operative clause [ofif the
1962 Judgment]), which is the legal consequence of the fact that the Temple fi
is situated on the Cambodian side of the frontier, as that frontier was fi
recognized by the Court in its Judgment, and on the basis of the facts
and arguments set forth above, Cambodia respectfully asks the Court to

adjudge and declare that :
The obligation incumbent upon Thailand to ‘withdraw any military or
police forces, or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Templfie,

or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory’ (second paragraph of the operative
clause [of the 1962 Judgment]) is a particular consequence of the general
and continuing obligation to respect the integrity of the territory of Cam -
bodia, that territory having been delimited in the area of the Temple and
its vicinity by the line on the Annex I map, on which the Judgment of the

Court is based.” (P. 36, para. 45.)
12. In the written proceedings, the Parties made the following submissions :

On behalf of the Government of Cambodia,

in the further explanations presented on 8 March 2012 :

“On the basis of the facts and arguments set out in its Application ffior
interpretation and in this Response, Cambodia respectfully asks the Courfit
to adjudge and declare :

10

8 Ord 1050.indb 16 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 287

la possibilité de lui fournir oralement un supplément d’informafition, conformé-
ment au paragraphe 4 de l’article 98 du Règlement.
8. Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 53 de son Règlement, la Cour
a décidé, après s’être renseignée auprès des Parties, que des exemplaires des

pièces de procédure et des documents annexés seraient rendus accessibles au
public à l’ouverture de la procédure orale.
9. Des audiences publiques ont été tenues entre le 15 et le 19 avril 2013, au
cours desquelles ont été entendus en leurs plaidoiries et réponfises:

Pour le Cambodge : S. Exc. M. Hor Namhong,
M. Jean-Marc Sorel,
sir Franklin Berman,

M. Rodman Bundy.
Pour la Thaïlande : S. Exc. M. Virachai Plasai,
M. Donald McRae,
me
M Alina Miron,
M. Alain Pellet,
M. James Crawford.

10. A l’audience, un membre de la Cour a posé une question aux Partiesfi, à
laquelle celles-ci ont répondu oralement et par écrit, conformément au para -
graphe 4 de l’article 61 du Règlement. En application de l’article 72 du Règle -
ment, chacune des Parties a présenté des observations écrites sfiur les réponses

écrites fournies par la Partie adverse.

*

11. Dans la requête, le Cambodge a présenté les demandes suivantes :

«Etant donné « que le temple de Préah Vihéar est situé en territoire
relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge » (point 1 du dispositif [de l’arrêt
de 1962]), ce qui est la conséquence juridique du fait que le Temple esfit situé

du côté cambodgien de la frontière telle qu’elle fut reconnufie par la
Cour dans son arrêt, et sur la base des faits et arguments juridiques défive -
loppés ci-dessus, le Cambodge prie respectueusement la Cour de dire et
juger que :

L’obligation pour la Thaïlande de « retirer tous les éléments de forces
armées ou de police ou autres gardes ou gardiens qu’elle a installfiés dans le
temple ou dans ses environs situés en territoire cambodgien » (point 2 du
dispositif [de l’arrêt de 1962]) est une conséquence particulière de l’obliga-

tion générale et continue de respecter l’intégrité du terfiritoire du Cambodge,
territoire délimité dans la région du Temple et ses environs pafir la ligne
de la carte de l’annexe I sur laquelle l’arrêt de la Cour est basé. » (P. 36,
par. 45.)

12. Au cours de la procédure écrite, les conclusions ci-après ont été présen -
tées par les Parties :

Au nom du Gouvernement du Cambodge,

dans le supplément d’information présenté le 8 mars 2012 :
«Sur la base des faits et arguments avancés dans sa requête en intefirpré -

tation et dans la présente réponse, le Cambodge prie respectueusemfient la
Cour de dire et juger :

10

8 Ord 1050.indb 17 25/06/14 13:11 288 request for interprefitation (judgment)

(i) that the submissions made to the Court by each of the two Parties show,
both in the light of the facts and in themselves, that the Parties are ifin
disagreement regarding the meaning and scope of the 1962 Judgment;
(ii) that the disputes between the Parties concern both the first and sec -

ond paragraphs of the dispositif of the 1962 Judgment, as well as the
link between those two paragraphs ;
(iii) that the dispute relating to the first paragraph concerns the meaning
and scope of the Court’s use of the term ‘territory’ (‘is sfiituated in
territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia’), particularly in connefic -

tion with the Court’s decisions regarding the legal status of the
Annex I map as representing the frontier between the two States ;
(iv) that the dispute relating to the second paragraph concerns the mean -
ing and scope of the Court’s use of the terms ‘vicinity’ and ‘territory’
(‘at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory’) ;

(v) that the dispute relating to the link between the two paragraphs relates
to the question of whether the second paragraph must be read in the
light of the first paragraph, or whether the particular terms employed
by the Court in the second paragraph must be read as seeking to limit

the general scope of the first paragraph ;
(vi) that each of those disputes concerns matters decided by the Court with
binding force in the Judgment ;
(vii) that on account of the terms used and given the context (specifically, fi
the Court’s decision concerning the legal status of the Annex I map

as representing the frontier between the two States), the first para -
graph of the dispositif must be understood as determining, with bind -
ing force, that all of the disputed area that lies on the Cambodian sidefi
of the line on the Annex I map — including, therefore, the Temple of
Preah Vihear itself — is to be regarded as falling under Cambodian

sovereignty ;
(viii) that on account of the terms used and given the context (particularly
the expression ‘in consequence’ linking it to the first paragraph), the
second paragraph of the dispositif must be understood as representing

a particular consequence stemming from the decision taken in the
first paragraph, implying that the scope of the second paragraph, both
in space and in time, must be understood in the light of the first
paragraph;
(ix) that on account of the terms used and given the context (particularly

the link with the first paragraph, of which it is a ‘consequence’), the
second paragraph of the dispositif must be understood as imposing on
Thailand both an explicit obligation to withdraw immediately to its
own territory all military or police forces stationed at the Temple or
at nearby sites at that time and an implicit obligation not to send those

forces — or similar forces — back to the Temple or to nearby sites in
the Temple area, which must, on account of the terms used in the
first paragraph of the dispositif, be regarded as Cambodia’s sovereign
territory.

On that basis, Cambodia respectfully asks the Court, under Article 60 of its

Statute, to respond to the question concerning the interpretation of itsfi
Judgment of 15 June 1962 set out in paragraph 45 of the Application for
interpretation filed on 28 April 2011, namely :

11

8 Ord 1050.indb 18 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 288

i) que les conclusions soumises à la Cour par chacune des deux Parties
démontrent, aussi bien à la lumière des faits qu’en elles-mêmes, que les
Parties sont en désaccord sur le sens et la portée de l’arrêfit de 1962;
ii) que les différends entre les Parties portent tant sur le premier que sfiur

le deuxième paragraphe du dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962, ainsi que sur
le lien entre ces deux paragraphes ;
iii) que le différend portant sur le paragraphe premier concerne le sens et la
portée de l’emploi par la Cour du terme « territoire» («est situé en ter -
ritoire relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge »), particulièrement

dans sa liaison avec les décisions de la Cour sur le statut juridiquefi de la
carte de l’annexe I comme représentant la frontière entre les deux Etat;s
iv) que le différend portant sur le deuxième paragraphe concerne le senfis et
la portée de l’emploi par la Cour des termes «environs» et «territoire»
(«dans le Temple ou dans ses environs situés en territoire cambodgie»n );

v) que le différend portant sur le lien entre les deux paragraphes porte sur
la question de savoir si le deuxième paragraphe doit être lu à fila lumière
du paragraphe premier ; ou si les termes particuliers employés par la
Cour dans le deuxième paragraphe doivent être lus comme ayant le

but de restreindre la portée générale du paragraphe premier ;
vi) que chacun desdits différends se rapporte à ce que la Cour a décfiidé
avec force obligatoire dans l’arrêt ;
vii) que, en raison des termes utilisés et en fonction du contexte (et spfiéci -
fiquement ce que la Cour a décidé concernant le statut juridique dfie la

carte de l’annexe I comme représentant la frontière entre les deux
Etats), le paragraphe premier du dispositif doit être compris comme
déterminant, avec force obligatoire, que toutes les zones en litige se
trouvant au côté cambodgien de la ligne de la carte [de l’]annefixe I — y
inclus donc le Temple de Préah Vihéar lui-même — sont à regarder

comme relevant de la souveraineté cambodgienne ;
viii) que, en raison des termes utilisés et en fonction du contexte (et nofitam -
ment l’expression «en conséquence» qui le lie au premier), le deuxième
paragraphe du dispositif doit être compris comme représentant une fi

conséquence particulière qui découle de la décision prise dafins le para-
graphe premier ; avec comme implication que la portée du deuxième
paragraphe, aussi bien dans l’espace que dans le temps, doit être ficom -
prise à la lumière du premier paragraphe ;
ix) que, en raison des termes utilisés et en fonction du contexte (et nofitam -

ment du lien avec le paragraphe premier, dont il est unec« onséquence»),
le deuxième paragraphe du dispositif doit être compris comme impo -
sant à la Thaïlande à la fois une obligation explicite de retirfier immé -
diatement sur son propre territoire tous les éléments de forces arfimées
ou de police qui, à ce moment-là, étaient stationnés dans le Temple ou

dans des lieux à proximité; et également une obligation implicite de ne
pas réintroduire ces éléments — ou des éléments similaires — ni dans
le Temple ni dans des lieux à proximité dans la zone du Temple quifi
doivent, en raison des termes utilisés dans le paragraphe premier du

dispositif, être considérés comme territoire souverain du Cambofidge.
Sur cette base, le Cambodge prie respectueusement la Cour, en applicatiofin

de l’article 60 de son Statut, de répondre à la question portant sur l’interfi -
prétation de son arrêt du 15 juin 1962 formulée dans le paragraphe 45 de la
requête en interprétation déposée le 28 avril 2011, à savoir :

11

8 Ord 1050.indb 19 25/06/14 13:11 289 request for interprefitation (judgment)

‘Given that ‘the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory ufinder
the sovereignty of Cambodia’ (first paragraph of the operative clause),
which is the legal consequence of the fact that the Temple is situated ofin the
Cambodian side of the frontier, as that frontier was recognized by the

Court in its Judgment, and on the basis of the facts and arguments set ffiorth
above, Cambodia respectfully asks the Court to adjudge and declare tha:t
The obligation incumbent upon Thailand to ‘withdraw any military or

police forces, or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Templfie,
or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory’ (second paragraph of the opera-
tive clause) is a particular consequence of the general and continuing fio-bli
gation to respect the integrity of the territory of Cambodia, that terrifitory
having been delimited in the area of the Temple and its vicinity by the filine

on the Annex I map, on which the Judgment of the Court is based.’”
On behalf of the Government of Thailand,

in the written observations presented on 21 November 2011 :

“The Kingdom of Thailand requests the Court to adjudge and declare :

— that the Request of the Kingdom of Cambodia asking the Court to inter-
pret the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) under Article 60 of the Statute of
the Court does not satisfy the conditions laid down in that Article and
that, consequently, the Court has no jurisdiction to respond to the

Request and/or that the Request is inadmissible ;
— in the alternative, that there are no grounds to grant Cambodia’s Reqfiuest
to construe the Judgment and that there is no reason to interpret the
Judgment of 1962 ;
— in the further alternative, that the 1962 Judgment does not determine

that the line on the Annex I map is the boundary line between the King-
dom of Thailand and the Kingdom of Cambodia.”

in the further explanations presented on 21 June 2012 :

“In view of the reasons given above and its written observations of
21 November 2011, the Kingdom of Thailand requests the Court to adjudge
and declare :

— that the Request of the Kingdom of Cambodia asking the Court to
interpret the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Tem‑
ple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) under Article 60 of the
Statute of the Court does not satisfy the conditions laid down in that

Article and that, consequently, the Court has no jurisdiction to respondfi
to that Request and/or that the Request is inadmissible ;
— in the alternative, that there are no grounds to grant Cambodia’s
Request to construe the Judgment and that there is no reason to inter -
pret the Judgment of 1962 ; and

— to formally declare that the 1962 Judgment does not determine that the
line on the Annex I map is the boundary line between the Kingdom of
Thailand and the Kingdom of Cambodia.”

13. At the oral proceedings, the following final submissions were presented fi
by the Parties :

On behalf of the Government of Cambodia,

12

8 Ord 1050.indb 20 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 289

«Etant donné « que le temple de Préah Vihéar est situé en territoire
relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge» (point 1 du dispositif), ce qui
est la conséquence juridique du fait que le Temple est situé du côfité cam -
bodgien de la frontière telle qu’elle fut reconnue par la Cour dans son

arrêt, et sur la base des faits et arguments juridiques développéfis d-ssus,
le Cambodge prie respectueusement la Cour de dire et juger que :
L’obligation pour la Thaïlande de « retirer tous les éléments de forces

armées ou de police ou autres gardes ou gardiens qu’elle a installfiés dans
le temple ou dans ses environs situés en territoire cambodgien » (point 2
du dispositif) est une conséquence particulière de l’obligatiofin générale
et continue de respecter l’intégrité du territoire du Cambodge,fi territoire
délimité dans la région du Temple et ses environs par la ligne fide la carte

de l’annexe I sur laquelle l’arrêt de la Cour est basé. »»
Au nom du Gouvernement de la Thaïlande,

dans les observations écrites présentées le 21 novembre 2011 :

«Le Royaume de Thaïlande prie la Cour de dire et juger :

— que la demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en l’affaire
du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) présentée par le
Royaume du Cambodge en vertu de l’article 60 du Statut de la Cour ne
satisfait pas aux conditions énoncées audit article et que la Cour n’est,
par conséquent, pas compétente pour en connaître, ou que cette

demande est irrecevable ;
— à titre subsidiaire, que la demande en interprétation de l’arrêfit de 1962
est sans fondement et qu’il n’existe aucune raison justifiant de pfirocéder
à une telle interprétation ;
— à titre très subsidiaire, que l’arrêt de 1962 n’a pas établi que la ligne de

la carte de l’annexe I constituait la ligne frontière entre le Royaume de
Thaïlande et le Royaume du Cambodge. »

dans le supplément d’information présenté le 21 juin 2012 :

«Pour les raisons exposées ci-dessus et dans ses observations écrites
du 21 novembre 2011, le Royaume de Thaïlande prie la Cour de dire et
juger :

— que la demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en l’affaire
du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) présentée par le
Royaume du Cambodge en vertu de l’article 60 du Statut de la Cour ne
satisfait pas aux conditions énoncées audit article et que la Cour n’est,

par conséquent, pas compétente pour en connaître, ou que cette
demande est irrecevable ;
— à titre subsidiaire, que la demande en interprétation de l’arrêfit de 1962
est sans fondement et qu’il n’existe aucune raison justifiant de pfirocéder
à une telle interprétation ; et

— de déclarer formellement que l’arrêt de 1962 n’a pas établi que la ligne
de la carte de l’annexe I constituait la ligne frontière entre le Royaume
de Thaïlande et le Royaume du Cambodge. »

13. Au cours de la procédure orale, les conclusions finales ci-après ont été
présentées par les Parties :

Au nom du Gouvernement du Cambodge,

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8 Ord 1050.indb 21 25/06/14 13:11 290 request for interprefitation (judgment)

at the hearing of 18 April 2013 :

“— Rejecting the submissions of the Kingdom of Thailand, and on the basis
of the foregoing, Cambodia respectfully asks the Court, under Arti -

cle 60 of its Statute, to respond to Cambodia’s Request for interpreta -
tion of its Judgment of 15 June 1962.
— In Cambodia’s view: ‘the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory
under the sovereignty of Cambodia’ (first paragraph of the operative
clause), which is the legal consequence of the fact that the Temple is

situated on the Cambodian side of the frontier, as that frontier was
recognized by the Court in its Judgment. Therefore, the obligation
incumbent upon Thailand to ‘withdraw any military or police forces,
or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its
vicinity on Cambodian territory’ (second paragraph of the operative
clause) is a particular consequence of the general and continuing obli -

gation to respect the integrity of the territory of Cambodia, that terrifi -
tory having been delimited in the region of the Temple and its vicinity fi
by the line on the Annex I map, on which the Judgment of the Court is
based.”

On behalf of the Government of Thailand,

at the hearing of 19 April 2013 :
“In accordance with Article 60 of the Rules of Court and having regard

to the Request for interpretation of the Kingdom of Cambodia and its
written and oral pleadings, and in view of the written and oral pleadingfis of
the Kingdom of Thailand, the Kingdom of Thailand requests the Court to
adjudge and declare :

— that the Request of the Kingdom of Cambodia asking the Court to
interpret the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Tem ‑
ple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) under Article 60 of the

Statute of the Court does not satisfy the conditions laid down in that
Article and that, consequently, the Court has no jurisdiction to respondfi
to that Request and/or that the Request is inadmissible ;
— in the alternative, that there are no grounds to grant Cambodia’s
Request to construe the Judgment and that there is no reason to inter -

pret the Judgment of 1962 ; and
— to formally declare that the 1962 Judgment does not determine with
binding force the boundary line between the Kingdom of Thailand and
the Kingdom of Cambodia, nor does it fix the limit of the vicinity of thfie
Temple.”

* * *

I. Historical Backgroundfi

14. The Temple of Preah Vihear is situated on a promontory of the
same name in the eastern part of the Dangrek range of mountains,
“which, in a general way, constitutes the boundary between the two cofiun -

13

8 Ord 1050.indb 22 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 290

à l’audience du 18 avril 2013 :

«— Rejetant les conclusions du Royaume de Thaïlande, et sur la base des fi
points qui précèdent, le Cambodge prie respectueusement la Cour, efin

application de l’article 60 de son Statut, de répondre à la requête du
Cambodge portant sur l’interprétation de son arrêt du 15 juin 1962.
— Selon le Cambodge : « le temple de Préah Vihéar est situé en territoire
relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge » (point 1 du dispositif), ce
qui est la conséquence juridique du fait que le Temple est situé dfiu côté

cambodgien de la frontière, telle qu’elle fut reconnue par la Courfi dans
son arrêt. Dès lors, l’obligation pour la Thaïlande de « retirer tous les
éléments de forces armées ou de police ou autres gardes ou gardfiiens
qu’elle a installés dans le Temple ou dans ses environs situés fien terri-
toire cambodgien» (point 2 du dispositif) est une conséquence particu -
lière de l’obligation générale et continue de respecter l’fiintégrité du

territoire du Cambodge, territoire délimité dans la région du Tfiemple et
ses environs par la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I et sur laquelle l’arrêt
de la Cour est basé. »

Au nom du Gouvernement de la Thaïlande,

à l’audience du 19 avril 2013 :
«Conformément à l’article 60 du Règlement de la Cour et au vu des

moyens exposés dans la demande en interprétation et dans les écfiritures et
plaidoiries du Royaume du Cambodge, ainsi que dans ses écritures et pfilai -
doiries, le Royaume de Thaïlande prie la Cour de dire et juger :

— que la demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en l’affaire
du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) présentée par le
Royaume du Cambodge en vertu de l’article 60 du Statut de la Cour ne

satisfait pas aux conditions énoncées audit article et que la Cour n’est,
par conséquent, pas compétente pour en connaître, ou que cette
demande est irrecevable ;
— à titre subsidiaire, que la demande en interprétation de l’arrêfit de 1962
est sans fondement et qu’il n’existe aucune raison justifiant de pfirocéder

à une telle interprétation ; et
— de déclarer formellement que l’arrêt de 1962 n’a pas établi avec force
obligatoire la ligne frontière entre le Royaume de Thaïlande et lefi
Royaume du Cambodge, et n’a pas fixé les limites des environs du
temple. »

* * *

I. Contexte historique

14. Le temple de Préah Vihéar s’élève sur un éperon du même nom
situé dans la partie orientale de la chaîne des Dangrek, « qui d’une façon
générale constitue dans cette région la frontière entre les fideux pays — le

13

8 Ord 1050.indb 23 25/06/14 13:11 291 request for interprefitation (judgment)

tries in this region — Cambodia to the south and Thailand to the north”
(Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment,

I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 15).
15. On 13 February 1904, France (of which Cambodia was then a pro -
tectorate) and Siam (as Thailand was then called) concluded a treaty
(hereinafter the “1904 Treaty”) which specified that the frontier in the
Dangrek sector was to follow the watershed line “between the basins ofif

the Nam Sen and the Mekong, on the one hand, and the Nam Moun, on
the other hand”. The 1904 Treaty provided for the establishment of Mixed
Commissions composed of officers appointed by the two parties and
responsible for delimiting the frontier between the two territories. The first
Mixed Commission was thus established in 1904. The final stage of the
operation of delimitation was to be the preparation and publication of

maps, a task assigned to a team of four French officers, three of whom fihad
been members of the Mixed Commission. In 1907, that team prepared a
series of 11 maps covering a large part of the frontiers between Siam and
French Indo-China (of which Cambodia formed part). In particular, it
drew up a map entitled “Dangrek— Commission of Delimitation between

Indo-China and Siam”, on which the frontier passed to the north of
Preah Vihear, thus leaving the Temple in Cambodia. That map was duly
communicated to the Siamese Government in 1908, but was never
approved by the Mixed Commission which had ceased to function some
months before the production of the map (see Temple of Preah Vihear

(Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 21).
16. Following Cambodia’s independence on 9 November 1953, Thai -
land occupied the Temple of Preah Vihear in 1954. Negotiations between
the Parties regarding the Temple were unsuccessful and, on 6 October
1959, Cambodia seised the Court by unilateral application. Thailand filefid
preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court.

17. In its Judgment of 26 May 1961 on Thailand’s preliminary objec -
tions, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) and set
out the subject-matter of that dispute in the following terms :

“In the present case, Cambodia alleges a violation on the part of
Thailand of Cambodia’s territorial sovereignty over the region of thefi
Temple of Preah Vihear and its precincts. Thailand replies by affirm -

ing that the area in question lies on the Thai side of the common
frontier between the two countries, and is under the sovereignty of
Thailand. This is a dispute about territorial sovereignty.” (I.C.J.Rep‑
orts 1961, p. 22.)

18. During the merits phase, Cambodia relied upon the map referred
to in paragraph 15 above, which was annexed to its pleadings and was
referred to as the “Annex I map”. Cambodia argued that this map had
been accepted by Thailand and had entered into the treaty settlement,

thereby becoming binding on the two States. According to Cambodia, the
line shown on the map (hereinafter “the Annex I map line”) had thus

14

8 Ord 1050.indb 24 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 291

Cambodge au sud et la Thaïlande au nord » (Temple de Préah Vihéar
(Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 15).

15. Le 13 février 1904, la France (dont le Cambodge était alors un prot-ec
torat) et le Siam (ainsi que la Thaïlande était alors dénomméfie) signèrent une
convention (ci-après la « convention de 1904 ») aux termes de laquelle la
frontière, dans le secteur des Dangrek, devait suivre la ligne de parfitage des

eaux « entre les bassins du Nam Sen et du Mékong, d’une part, et du
Nam Moun, d’autre part». La convention de 1904 prévoyait la création de
commissions mixtes composées d’officiers désignés par les dfieux parties et
chargées de procéder à la délimitation de la frontière enfitre les deux terri -
toires. La première commission mixte fut ainsi établie en 1904. L’étape finale
de l’opération de délimitation devait être l’établissefiment et la publication de

cartes, tâche qui fut confiée à une équipe de quatre officifiers français, dont
trois avaient été membres de la commission mixte. Cette équipe fiétablit,
en 1907, une série de onze cartes couvrant une grande partie des frontièfires
entre le Siam et l’Indochine française (dont le Cambodge faisait fipartie). Elle
dressa notamment une carte intitulée «Dangrek — Commission de délimi -

tation entre l’Indo-Chine et le Siam », sur laquelle la frontière passait au
nord de Préah Vihéar, laissant ainsi le temple au Cambodge. Cette carte fut
dûment communiquée au Gouvernement siamois en 1908, mais ne fut
jamais approuvée par la commission mixte, celle-ci ayant cessé de fonction -
ner plusieurs mois avant que la carte soit dressée (voir Temple de Préah

Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 21).
16. Après l’accession du Cambodge à l’indépendance, le 9 novembre
1953, la Thaïlande occupa le temple de Préah Vihéar en 1954. Lefis négocia -
tions entre les parties concernant le temple n’aboutirent pas et, le fi6 octobre
1959, le Cambodge saisit la Cour par requête unilatérale. La Thaïfilande
présenta des exceptions préliminaires à la compétence de la fiCour.

17. Dans son arrêt du 26 mai 1961 sur les exceptions préliminaires sou -
levées par la Thaïlande, la Cour se déclara compétente pour ficonnaître du
différend relatif au Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) et
exposa l’objet de celui-ci dans les termes suivants :

«Dans la présente affaire, le Cambodge invoque la violation par la
Thaïlande de la souveraineté territoriale du Cambodge sur la région
du temple de Préah Vihéar et ses environs. La Thaïlande répond en

affirmant que ce territoire est situé du côté thaïlandais de la frontière
commune entre les deux pays et qu’il relève de la souveraineté thaï -
landaise. Il s’agit là d’un différend portant sur la souveraifineté terri -
toriale. » (C.I.J. Recueil 1961, p. 22.)

18. Lors de la phase de l’examen au fond, le Cambodge s’appuya sur
la carte mentionnée au paragraphe 15 ci-dessus, qui était annexée à ses
écritures et fut dénommée « carte de l’annexe I ». Il fit valoir que celle-ci
avait été acceptée par la Thaïlande et avait été intéfigrée au règlement

conventionnel, devenant de ce fait obligatoire pour les deux Etats. Selon
le Cambodge, la ligne représentée sur cette carte (ci-après la « ligne de la

14

8 Ord 1050.indb 25 25/06/14 13:11 292 request for interprefitation (judgment)

become the frontier between the two States. Thailand denied that it had fi
accepted the Annex I map, or that the map had otherwise become bind -

ing upon it, and maintained that the boundary between the two States
followed the watershed line, as provided in the text of the 1904 Treaty,
with the result, according to Thailand, that the Temple lay in Thai terrfii -
tory (cf. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judg ‑
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 21).

19. In the 1959 Application and its Memorial, Cambodia asked the
Court to rule : (1) that Thailand was under an obligation to withdraw the
detachments of its armed forces stationed in the ruins of the Temple of fi
Preah Vihear and (2) that the territorial sovereignty over the Temple of
Preah Vihear belonged to Cambodia (ibid., p. 9). In its final submissions

presented at the conclusion of the oral proceedings in 1962, however,
Cambodia went further, asking the Court to rule : (1) that the Annex I
map had been drawn up and published in the name and on behalf of the
Mixed Commission set up by the 1904 Treaty, that it set forth the deci -
sions taken by the said Commission and that, by reason of that fact and fi
also of the subsequent agreements and conduct of the Parties, it presentfied

a treaty character ; (2) that the frontier line between Cambodia and Thai -
land, in the disputed region in the neighbourhood of the Temple, was thefi
Annex I map line ; (3) that the Temple of Preah Vihear was situated in
territory under Cambodian sovereignty ; (4) that Thailand was under an
obligation to withdraw the detachments of armed forces it had stationed fi

since 1954 in Cambodian territory in the ruins of the Temple; and (5) that
Thailand must return property removed from the Temple since 1954
(ibid., p. 11).
20. In its Judgment on the merits, delivered on 15 June 1962, the Court
stated that “the subject of the dispute submitted to the Court [was] ficon -

fined to a difference of view about sovereignty over the region of the
Temple of Preah Vihear” (ibid., p. 14). For that reason, the Court con -
cluded that Cambodia’s first and second final submissions could be enfiter -
tained “only to the extent that they give expression to grounds, and finot
as claims to be dealt with in the operative provisions of the Judgment”fi

(ibid., p. 36). In its reasoning, the Court stated that, in 1908-1909, Thai -
land had accepted the Annex I map “as representing the outcome of the
work of delimitation, and hence recognized the line on that map as beingfi
the frontier line, the effect of which is to situate Preah Vihear in Cambo -
dian territory” (ibid., p. 32).
21. The operative part of the Judgment reads as follows :

“The Court,

[1] by nine votes to three, finds that the Temple of Preah Vihear is
situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia ;

finds in consequence

[2] by nine votes to three, that Thailand is under an obligation to
withdraw any military or police forces, or other guards or keepers,

15

8 Ord 1050.indb 26 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 292

carte de l’annexe I ») était ainsi devenue la frontière entre les deux Etats.
La Thaïlande contesta qu’elle eût accepté la carte de l’afinnexe I ou que

celle-ci fût, d’une autre façon, devenue obligatoire à son égarfid, soutenant
que la frontière entre les deux Etats suivait la ligne de partage desfi eaux,
comme le prévoyait la convention de 1904 ; il en résultait, selon elle, que
le temple était situé en territoire thaïlandais (voir Temple de Préah Vihéar
(Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 21).

19. Dans sa requête de 1959 et dans son mémoire, le Cambodge priait
la Cour de juger : 1) que la Thaïlande devait retirer les éléments de forces
armées qu’elle avait installés dans les ruines du temple ; et 2) que la sou -
veraineté territoriale sur le temple appartenait au Cambodge (ibid., p. 9).
Les conclusions finales que le Cambodge présenta à la fin de la prfiocédure

orale en 1962 allaient cependant plus loin, puisque celui-ci priait la Cour
de juger: 1) que la carte de l’annexe I avait été dressée et publiée au nom
et pour le compte de la commission mixte créée par la convention dfie 1904,
qu’elle énonçait les décisions prises par ladite commission fiet qu’elle pré -
sentait, tant de ce fait qu’en conséquence des accords et comportefiments
ultérieurs des Parties, un caractère conventionnel; 2) que la ligne frontière

entre le Cambodge et la Thaïlande, dans la région contestée voifisine du
temple, était la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I ; 3) que le temple de
Préah Vihéar était situé en territoire relevant de la souveraineté cambod -
gienne; 4) que la Thaïlande devait retirer les éléments de forces arméefis
qu’elle avait installés depuis 1954 en territoire cambodgien, dans les ruines

du temple de Préah Vihéar ; et 5) que la Thaïlande devait restituer les
biens enlevés de l’édifice depuis 1954 (ibid., p. 11).

20. Dans l’arrêt qu’elle a rendu sur le fond de l’affaire le 15 juin 1962,
la Cour a considéré que « [l]’objet du différend soumis à la Cour [était]

limité à une contestation relative à la souveraineté dans lafi région du
temple de Préah Vihéar » (ibid., p. 14). Elle en a déduit que les première
et deuxième conclusions finales du Cambodge ne pouvaient être retenuefis
«que dans la mesure où elles énon[çai]ent des motifs et non des fidemandes
à retenir dans le dispositif de l’arrêt » (ibid., p. 36). Dans les motifs de son

arrêt, la Cour précisa que, en 1908-1909, la Thaïlande avait accepté la
carte de l’annexe I «comme représentant le résultat des travaux de délimi -
tation et a[vait] ainsi reconnu la ligne tracée sur cette carte comme étant
la frontière dont l’effet [était] de situer Préah Vihéar dans le territoire du
Cambodge » (ibid., p. 32).
21. Le dispositif de cet arrêt se lit comme suit :

«La Cour,

[1] par neuf voix contre trois, dit que le temple de Préah Vihéar est
situé en territoire relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge ;

dit en conséquence,

[2] par neuf voix contre trois, que la Thaïlande est tenue de retirer
tous les éléments de forces armées ou de police ou autres gardefis

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8 Ord 1050.indb 27 25/06/14 13:11 293 request for interprefitation (judgment)

stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian
territory ;

[3] by seven votes to five, that Thailand is under an obligation to
restore to Cambodia any objects of the kind specified in Cambo -
dia’s fifth Submission which may, since the date of the occupation
of the Temple by Thailand in 1954, have been removed from the
Temple or the Temple area by the Thai authorities.” (I.C.J.

Reports 1962, pp. 36-37.)
22. Following the delivery of the 1962 Judgment, Thailand withdrew

from the Temple buildings. It erected a barbed wire fence which divided fi
the Temple ruins from the rest of the promontory of Preah Vihear. This
fence followed the course of a line (hereinafter sometimes referred to fias
the “Thai Council of Ministers’ line”) depicted on the map attached to a
resolution, adopted by the Council of Ministers of Thailand on 10 July

1962 but not made public until the present proceedings. By that resolu -
tion, the Thai Council of Ministers fixed what it considered to be the
limits of the area from which Thailand was required to withdraw.

23. On 5 January 1963, the Head of State of Cambodia, Prince Siha -

nouk, and a large party of Cambodian officials and monks, as well as
diplomatic representatives of other States, visited the Temple. During tfihe
course of this visit, they remained within the area enclosed by the barbfied
wire fence. The events of this period are considered in paragraphs 38 to
42 below.

24. On 21 June 1997, the Parties established the “Thai-Cambodian
Joint Commission on Demarcation for Land Boundary”, entrusting it
with the task “of placing markers in order to indicate the land boundfiary
between the two countries”. On 14 June 2000, they concluded a “Memo -
randum of Understanding on the Survey and Demarcation of the Land

Boundary” (hereinafter the “Memorandum of Understanding”), whfiich
provided for the demarcation of the frontier line between the two Statesfi
and included, in particular, the terms of reference for the work of the
Thai-Cambodian Joint Commission on Demarcation for Land Boundary.
25. In 2007, Cambodia requested that the UNESCO World Heritage

Committee inscribe the site of the Temple of Preah Vihear on the World
Heritage List established under the provisions of the 1972 Convention
concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
(hereinafter the “World Heritage Convention”). To that end, it cfiommuni -
cated to the Committee, in accordance with the Guidelines for the Imple -

mentation of the World Heritage Convention adopted by the Committee,
a map depicting the site of the property. Cambodia included on the map
what it considered to be the course of the frontier separating it from
Thailand, the actual site of the monument and a buffer zone (described ifin
the Committee’s Guidelines as “an area surrounding the nominated prop-

erty which has complementary legal and/or customary restrictions placed fi
on its use and development to give an added layer of protection to the

16

8 Ord 1050.indb 28 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 293

ou gardiens qu’elle a installés dans le temple ou dans ses environfis
situés en territoire cambodgien ;

[3] par sept voix contre cinq, que la Thaïlande est tenue de restituer
au Cambodge tous objets des catégories spécifiées dans la cin -
quième conclusion du Cambodge qui, depuis la date de l’occupa -
tion du temple par la Thaïlande en 1954, auraient pu être enlevés
du temple ou de la zone du temple par les autorités thaïlandaises.» fi

(C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 36-37.)
22. A la suite du prononcé de l’arrêt de 1962, la Thaïlande se rfietira des

bâtiments du temple et érigea une clôture de barbelés sépfiarant les ruines
du temple du reste de l’éperon de Préah Vihéar. Cette clôture suivait le
tracé d’une ligne (ci-après dénommée, dans certains cas, la « ligne du
conseil des ministres thaïlandais ») représentée sur la carte jointe à une
résolution adoptée par le conseil des ministres thaïlandais le 10 juil -

let 1962, mais qui n’a été rendue publique que dans le cadre de la fiprésente
instance. Par cette résolution, le conseil des ministres thaïlandafiis établis-
sait ce qu’il considérait être les limites de la zone dont la Tfihaïlande était
tenue de se retirer.
23. Le 5 janvier 1963, le prince Sihanouk, chef de l’Etat du Cambodge,

accompagné d’une importante délégation d’officiels et de moines cambod-
giens, ainsi que d’agents diplomatiques d’autres Etats, effectua unfie visite
au temple. Au cours de celle-ci, ils restèrent dans la zone délimitée par la
clôture de barbelés. Les événements datant de cette périofide sont examinés
aux paragraphes 38 à 42 ci-dessous.

24. Le 21 juin 1997, les Parties établirent une « commission conjointe
thaïlando-cambodgienne sur la démarcation de la frontière terrestre »
chargée «de placer des bornes pour indiquer la frontière terrestre entre les
deux pays». Le 14 juin 2000, elles conclurent un « mémorandum d’accord
sur le levé et la démarcation de la frontière terrestre » (ci-après le «mémo-

randum d’accord »), qui prévoyait la démarcation de la ligne frontière
entre les deux Etats et, en particulier, définissait le mandat de la ficommis-
sion conjointe thaïlando-cambodgienne de démarcation de la frontière
terrestre.
25. En 2007, le Cambodge demanda au comité du patrimoine mondial

de l’UNESCO d’inscrire le site du temple de Préah Vihéar sur la liste du
patrimoine mondial, établie en vertu des dispositions de la conventiofin
de 1972 concernant la protection du patrimoine mondial culturel et natu -
rel (ci-après dénommée la « convention du patrimoine mondial »). A cette
fin, il communiqua au comité, conformément aux orientations devant

guider la mise en œuvre de la convention du patrimoine mondial adoptéfies
par ledit comité, une carte représentant le site du monument. Le Cfiam -
bodge y fit figurer ce qu’il considérait être le tracé de la frontière le sépa -
rant de la Thaïlande, l’emplacement même du monument, ainsi qu’une
zone tampon (décrite dans les orientations du comité comme « une aire

entourant le bien proposé pour inscription dont l’usage et l’amfiénagement
sont soumis à des restrictions juridiques et/ou coutumières, afin fid’assurer

16

8 Ord 1050.indb 29 25/06/14 13:11 294 request for interprefitation (judgment)

property”). According to that map, the entire promontory of Preah
Vihear, as well as the hill of Phnom Trap 1 immediately to the west of the
promontory, were within Cambodian territory.
26. On 17 May 2007, Thailand contested that map by means of an

aide-memoire, which it sent to Cambodia and to the World Heritage
Committee, to which it attached its own map showing the international
boundary between the two States as following the line drawn on the map
attached to the 1962 resolution of the Thai Council of Ministers (see

paragraph 22 above).
27. On 7 July 2008, the World Heritage Committee decided to inscribe
the site of the Temple of Preah Vihear on the World Heritage List, albeifit
with what the Committee described as “a revised graphic plan of the pfirop -
erty”, which excluded the area disputed between Cambodia and Thailandfi.

28. Following the Temple’s inscription on that List, a number of armed
incidents took place in the border area close to the Temple. On 14 Febru -
ary 2011, the United Nations Security Council called for a permanent
ceasefire to be established and expressed its support for the efforts of fithe

Association of South-East Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) to find a solution
to the conflict. The Chair of ASEAN, Indonesia, was subsequently invitfied
by Cambodia and by Thailand to send observers to the affected border
areas so as to avoid further armed clashes. This invitation was welcomed

by the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN and their representatives but was
not acted upon.

29. It is recalled that, on 28 April 2011, Cambodia filed a Request for
interpretation of the 1962 Judgment, together with a Request for the indi -

cation of provisional measures (see paragraph 1 above). In its Order of
18 July 2011 on provisional measures, the Court found that there existed,
prima facie, a dispute within the meaning of Article 60 of the Statute and
indicated provisional measures which, in particular, required both Partifies

to withdraw their military personnel from a “provisional demilitarizefid
zone” around the Temple, as defined by the Court (Request for Interpre ‑
tation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple
of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Provi ‑

sional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 537)
(see paragraph 4 above).

II. Jurisdiction and Admisfisibility

30. The Court will first determine whether it has jurisdiction over the
Request for interpretation submitted by Cambodia and, if so, whether
this Request is admissible.

1 In the original proceedings, and in the 1962 Judgment, the spelling usedfi was “Pnom”.
However, the spelling “Phnom” is the one generally used today. It fihas therefore been
employed in the present Judgment.

17

8 Ord 1050.indb 30 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 294

un surcroît de protection à ce bien »). Cette carte situait l’intégralit1 de
l’éperon de Préah Vihéar, ainsi que la colline de Phnom Trap , qui se
trouve immédiatement à l’ouest dudit éperon, en territoire cambodgien.
26. Le 17 mai 2007, la Thaïlande contesta cette carte par un aide-
mémoire qu’elle adressa au Cambodge et au comité du patrimoine fimondial.

Elle joignit à cet aide-mémoire sa propre carte, sur laquelle la frontière
internationale entre les deux Etats suivait la ligne tracée sur la cafirte
annexée à la résolution du conseil des ministres thaïlandaisfi de 1962 (voir
paragraphe 22 ci-dessus).
27. Le 7 juillet 2008, le comité du patrimoine mondial décida d’inscrirefi

le site du temple de Préah Vihéar sur la liste du patrimoine mondial, sur
la base, toutefois, de ce qu’il qualifia d’« esquisse cartographique révisée
du bien», qui excluait la zone en litige entre le Cambodge et la Thaïlandfie.
28. A la suite de cette inscription, plusieurs incidents armés eurent liefiu

dans la zone frontalière proche du temple. Le 14 février 2011, le Conseil
de sécurité de l’Organisation des Nations Unies demanda la conclusion
d’un cessez-le-feu permanent et apporta son soutien à l’action menée par
l’Association des Nations de l’Asie du Sud-Est (ANASE) en vue de trou -
ver une solution au conflit. L’Indonésie, qui assurait alors la fiprésidence

de cette organisation, fut par la suite invitée par le Cambodge et la Thaï -
lande à envoyer des observateurs dans les zones frontalières touchées afin
d’éviter de nouveaux affrontements armés. Cette initiative, salufiée par les
ministres des affaires étrangères de l’ANASE et leurs représefintants, ne fut

pas suivie d’effet.
29. Il est rappelé que, le 28 avril 2011, le Cambodge a déposé une
demande en interprétation de l’arrêt de 1962, qui était accompagnée d’une
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires (voir paragraphe 1
ci-dessus). Dans son ordonnance du 18 juillet 2011 relative à cette der -

nière demande, la Cour a jugé qu’il existait prima facie une contestation
au sens de l’article 60 du Statut et indiqué des mesures conservatoires
prescrivant notamment aux deux Parties de retirer leur personnel mili -
taire d’une « zone démilitarisée provisoire » entourant le temple, telle que
définie par la Cour (Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962

en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) (Cam ‑
bodge c. Thaïlande), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 18 juillet 2011,
C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (II), p. 537) (voir paragraphe 4 ci-dessus).

II. Compétence et recevabilfiité

30. La Cour commencera par déterminer si elle a compétence pour
connaître de la demande en interprétation présentée par le Cfiambodge et,

dans l’affirmative, si cette demande est recevable.

1La graphie «Pnom» a été employée dans la procédure initiale et dans l’fiarrêt de 1962.
La graphie « Phnom» étant aujourd’hui la plus usitée, c’est celle-ci qui sefira utilisée dans

le présent arrêt.

17

8 Ord 1050.indb 31 25/06/14 13:11 295 request for interprefitation (judgment)

1. Jurisdiction of the Court under Article 60 of the Statute

31. Cambodia submitted its Request for interpretation pursuant to

Article 60 of the Statute of the Court (see paragraph 29 above). That
Article provides that
“The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute

as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe
it upon the request of any party.”

This provision is supplemented by Article 98, paragraph 1, of the Rules
of Court, which stipulates that “[i]n the event of dispute as to the fimean -
ing or scope of a judgment any party may make a request for its interprefi-
tation . . .”. Further, Article 98, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court,
requires a party to indicate in its request for interpretation “the pfirecise

point or points in dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment”fi.
32. The Court begins by recalling that “[its] jurisdiction on the basis ofif
Article 60 of the Statute is not preconditioned by the existence of any
other basis of jurisdiction as between the parties to the original case”fi and
that “by virtue of Article 60 of the Statute, [the Court] may entertain a

request for interpretation provided that there is a ‘dispute as to thfie mean -
ing or scope’ of any judgment rendered by it” (Request for Interpretation
of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Provi ‑
sional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 542,

para. 21 ; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in
the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v.
United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Provi ‑
sional Measures, Order of 16 July 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 323,
paras. 44 and 46 ; and Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 9, paras. 15-16).

33. The Court also recalls that, while the English text of Article 60 uses
the term “dispute”, which also appears in the English text of Artificle 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute, the French text of Article 60 uses the term
“contestation”, which has a broader meaning than “différend”fi, the term
used in the French text of Article 36, paragraph2. The Court further recalls

that “a dispute within the meaning of Article 60 of the Statute must be
understood as a difference of opinion or views between the parties as to the
meaning or scope of a judgment rendered by the Court” (Request for Inter ‑
pretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerningthe Temple
of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Provi ‑
sional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 542,

para. 22). As the Court has previously confirmed, the existence of a dispute
under Article 60 of the Statute “does not require the same criteria to be
fulfilled as those determining the existence of a dispute under Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute” (ibid. ; see also Interpretation of Judgments
Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J.,

Series A, No. 13, pp. 10-12 ; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of
31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals

18

8 Ord 1050.indb 32 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 295

1. La compétence de la Cour en vertu de l’article 60 du Statut

31. Le Cambodge fonde sa demande en interprétation sur l’article 60

du Statut de la Cour (voir paragraphe 29 ci-dessus), qui se lit comme
suit :

«L’arrêt est définitif et sans recours. En cas de contestation sfiur le
sens et la portée de l’arrêt, il appartient à la Cour de l’fiinterpréter, à
la demande de toute partie. »

Cette disposition est complétée par le paragraphe 1 de l’article 98 du
Règlement de la Cour, qui précise que, « [e]n cas de contestation sur le
sens ou la portée d’un arrêt, toute partie peut présenter une demande en

interprétation…». En outre, le paragraphe 2 de ce même article prescrit à
la partie qui présente pareille demande d’y indiquer « avec précision le
point ou les points contestés quant au sens ou à la portée de lfi’arrêt».
32. La Cour rappelle tout d’abord que « la compétence que l’article 60
du Statut [lui] confère … n’est subordonnée à l’existence d’aucune autre

base ayant fondé, dans l’affaire initiale, sa compétence à l’fiégard des par -
ties» et que, « en vertu de l’article 60 du Statut, [elle] peut … connaître
d’une demande en interprétation dès lors qu’existe une « contestation sur
le sens et la portée » de tout arrêt rendu par elle » (Demande en interpré‑
tation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar

(Cambodge c. Thaïlande) (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), mesures conserva ‑
toires, ordonnance du 18 juillet 2011, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (II), p. 542,
par. 21 ; Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en l’affaire
Avena et autres ressortissants mexicains (Mexique c. Etats-Unis d’Amé -

rique) (Mexique c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), mesures conservatoires, ordon‑
nance du 16 juillet 2008, C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 323, par. 44 et 46 ; et arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 9, par. 15-16).
33. La Cour observe également que, si le texte anglais de l’article 60
emploie le terme « dispute», qui figure aussi dans la version anglaise du

paragraphe 2 de l’article 36 du Statut, le texte français de l’article 60 uti -
lise le terme « contestation», lequel a un sens plus large que le mot « diffé-
rend», employé dans la version française du paragraphe 2 de l’article 36.
Elle rappelle en outre qu’« une contestation au sens de l’article 60 du Sta -
tut doit être comprise comme une divergence d’opinions ou de vues entre

les parties quant au sens et à la portée d’un arrêt rendu pafir la Cour »
(Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en l’affaire du Temple
de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) (Cambodge c. Thaïlande),
mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 18 juillet 2011, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (II),
p. 542, par. 22). Ainsi que la Cour l’a déjà confirmé, l’existence

d’une contestation au sens de l’article 60 du Statut «n’exige pas que soient
remplis les mêmes critères que ceux qui déterminent l’existefince d’un diffé -
rend visé au paragraphe 2 de l’article 36 du Statut » (ibid.; voir également
Interprétation des arrêts n os7 et 8 (usine de Chorzów), arrêt n o 11, 1927,
C.P.J.I. série A n o 13, p. 10-12 ; Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt

du 31 mars 2004 en l’affaire Avena et autres ressortissants mexicains

18

8 Ord 1050.indb 33 25/06/14 13:11 296 request for interprefitation (judgment)

(Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of Amer ‑
ica), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 July 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008,

p. 325, para. 53). Furthermore, it is not required that a dispute as to the
meaning and scope of a judgment “should have manifested itself in a ffior -
mal way; . . . it should be sufficient if the two Governments have in fact
shown themselves as holding opposite views in regard to the meaning or
scope of a judgment of the Court” (Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and

8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judgment No.11, 1927, P.C.I.J., SeriesA, No. 13,
p. 11; see also Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of
24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1985, pp. 217-218, para. 46; Request for Interpretation of the
Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexi -

can Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United
States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 July 2008,
I.C.J. Reports 2008, pp. 325-326, para. 54).
34. In accordance with the jurisprudence of the Court, “a dispute within
the meaning of Article 60 of the Statute must relate to the operative clause

of the judgment in question and cannot concern the reasons for the judg -
ment except in so far as these are inseparable from the operative clausefi”
(Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case con ‑
cerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v.
Thailand), Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports

2011 (II), p. 542, para. 23; see also Request for Interpretation of the Judg ‑
ment of 11June 1998 in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Bound -
ary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary
Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I),
p. 35, para. 10; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004
in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v.

United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Provi ‑
sional Measures, Order of 16July2008, I.C.J.Reports 2008, p.323, para.47)
or, in the words of the Permanent Court, constitute “a condition essefintial
to the Court’s decision” (Interpretation of Judgments Nos.7 and 8 (Factory
at Chorzów), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 13, p. 20).

That said, “a difference of opinion as to whether a particular point has or
has not been decided with binding force also constitutes a case which cofimes
within the terms of Article 60 of the Statute” (Request for Interpretation of
the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah
Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Provisional Mea ‑

sures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 544, para. 31; see
also Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judg ‑
ment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 13, pp. 11-12).
35. In its Order on provisional measures in the present case, the Court
observed that “a difference of opinion or views appears to exist betwefien
[the Parties] as to the meaning or scope of the 1962 Judgment” and that

“this difference appears to relate” to three specific aspects of thfiat Judg -
ment :

19

8 Ord 1050.indb 34 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 296

(Mexique c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique) (Mexique c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique),
mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 16 juillet 2008, C.I.J. Recueil 2008,
p. 325, par. 53). De surcroît, il n’est pas nécessaire qu’une contestation
sur le sens et la portée d’un arrêt « se soit formellement manifestée … il

doit suffire que les deux Gouvernements aient en fait manifesté des opi -
nions opposées quant au sens et à la portée d’un arrêt defi la Cour» (Inter‑
prétation des arrêts n os7 et 8 (usine de Chorzów), arrêt n o11, 1927,
C.P.J.I. série A n o 13, p. 11; voir également Demande en revision et en

interprétation de l’arrêt du 24 février 1982 en l’affaire du Plateau continen -
tal (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne) (Tunisie c. Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 217-218, par. 46; Demande en
interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en l’affaire Avena et autres
ressortissants mexicains (Mexique c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique) (Mexique

c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 16 juil ‑
let 2008, C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 325-326, par. 54).

34. Selon la jurisprudence de la Cour, « une contestation au sens de

l’article 60 du Statut doit porter sur le dispositif de l’arrêt en cause et fine
peut concerner les motifs que dans la mesure où ceux-ci sont inséparables
du dispositif» (Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en l’af ‑
faire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) (Cambodge

c. Thaïlande), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 18 juillet 2011,
C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (II), p. 542, par. 23; voir également Demande en inter ‑
prétation de l’arrêt du 11 juin 1998 en l’affaire de la Frontière terrestre et
maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria), excep -
tions préliminaires (Nigéria c. Cameroun), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (I),

p. 35, par. 10; Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en
l’affaire Avena et autres ressortissants mexicains (Mexique c. Etats-Unis
d’Amérique) (Mexique c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), mesures conservatoires,
ordonnance du 16 juillet 2008, C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 323, par. 47) ou,

pour reprendre les termes de la Cour permanente, constituent «une condi os -
tion absolue de la décision de la Cour » (Interprétation des arrêts n 7 et 8
(usine de Chorzów), arrêt n o11, 1927, C.P.J.I. série A n 13, p. 20). Cela
étant, «une divergence de vues sur la question de savoir si tel ou tel point

a été décidé avec force obligatoire constitue, elle aussi, ufin cas qui rentre
dans le cadre de l’article 60 du Statut » (Demande en interprétation de l’ar ‑
rêt du 15 juin 1962 en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge
c. Thaïlande) (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), mesures conservatoires, ordon ‑
nance du 18 juillet 2011, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (II), p. 544, par. 31 ; voir
os
également Interprétation des arrêts n 7 et 8 (usine de Chorzów), arrêt
no 11, 1927, C.P.J.I. série A n 13, p. 11-12).

35. Dans l’ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires qu’elle fi

a rendue en la présente espèce, la Cour a observé qu’« une divergence
d’opinions ou de vues para[issait] exister entre [les Parties] sur lefi sens et la
portée de l’arrêt de 1962» et que «cette divergence para[issait] porter» sur
trois aspects particuliers dudit arrêt :

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8 Ord 1050.indb 35 25/06/14 13:11 297 request for interprefitation (judgment)

“in the first place, to the meaning and scope of the phrase ‘vicinfiity on
Cambodian territory’ used in the second paragraph of the operative

clause of the Judgment . . . next, to the nature of the obligation imposed
on Thailand, in the second paragraph of the operative clause of the
Judgment, to ‘withdraw any military or police forces, or other guardsfi
or keepers’, and, in particular, to the question of whether this oblifigation
is of a continuing or an instantaneous character; and . . . finally, to the

question of whether the Judgment did or did not recognize with binding
force the line shown on the Annex I map as representing the frontier
between the two Parties . . .” (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment
of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Provisional Meas ‑

ures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 544, para. 31.)
36. The Court stated, however, that the decision rendered on the

Request for the indication of provisional measures “in no way prejudgfie[d]
any question that the Court may have to deal with relating to the Requesfit
for interpretation” (ibid., p. 554, para. 68). Accordingly, the Court must
at this stage determine whether a dispute indeed exists between the Partfiies

as to the meaning or scope of the operative clause of the 1962 Judgment,
and, if so, identify the precise point or points that require interpretafition.
The Court will address these two questions in turn.

A. The existence of a dispute

37. Cambodia maintains that the Parties are in dispute as to the mean -
ing and scope of the 1962 Judgment, specifically in the following respects :
(a) whether the Court in the 1962 Judgment did or did not recognize
with binding force the Annex I map line as constituting the frontier
between the two Parties in the area of the Temple ; (b) whether or not the

meaning and scope of the phrase “situated in territory under the sovefir -
eignty of Cambodia” and the phrase “its vicinity on Cambodian terri -
tory” included, respectively, in the first and second paragraphs of tfihe
operative clause of the 1962 Judgment, must be understood by reference
to the line depicted on the Annex I map which the Court “recognized” as

constituting the frontier between the Parties in the area of the Temple ;
and (c) whether or not Thailand’s obligation to withdraw from the area
of “the Temple [and] its vicinity on Cambodian territory”, derivinfig from
the second paragraph of the operative clause, is of a continuing charactfier.
38. Cambodia asserts that this dispute emerged immediately after the

1962 Judgment. In particular, Cambodia maintains that, immediately after
the 1962 Judgment and throughout the 1960s, it continually protested
against Thailand’s unilateral determination, in July 1962, of the “vicinity
of the Temple” (as manifested by the barbed wire fence and notices efirected
by Thailand), and against Thailand’s view that the geographical scopfie of

its obligation to withdraw under the 1962 Judgment was limited to the
ruins of the Temple and the ground on which the Temple stood. Cambo -

20

8 Ord 1050.indb 36 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 297

«tout d’abord, sur le sens et la portée de l’expression «environs situés
en territoire cambodgien» utilisée au deuxième paragraphe du dispo-

sitif de l’arrêt ; … ensuite, sur la nature de l’obligation imposée à la
Thaïlande, dans le deuxième paragraphe du dispositif de l’arrêfit, de
«retirer tous les éléments de forces armées ou de police ou autrfies
gardes ou gardiens», et notamment sur le point de savoir si cette obli-
gation est de caractère continu ou instantané; et … finalement, sur la

question de savoir si l’arrêt a ou non reconnu avec force obligatofiire la
ligne tracée sur la carte de l’annexe I comme représentant la frontière
entre les deux Parties… » (Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du
15 juin 1962 en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge
c. Thaïlande) (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), mesures conservatoires,

ordonnance du 18 juillet 2011, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (II), p. 544, par. 31.)
36. La Cour a toutefois précisé que la décision rendue sur la demanfide

en indication de mesures conservatoires « ne préjuge[ait] aucune question
dont [elle] aurait à connaître dans le cadre de l’examen de la demande en
interprétation » (ibid., p. 554, par. 68). Aussi doit-elle, à ce stade, recher -
cher s’il existe effectivement une contestation entre les Parties quanfit au

sens ou à la portée du dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962 et, si tel est le cas,
déterminer le point ou les points précis qu’il y a lieu d’infiterpréter. La
Cour examinera successivement ces deux questions.

A. L’existence d’une contestation

37. Le Cambodge soutient que les Parties sont en désaccord sur le sens
et la portée de l’arrêt de 1962 et, plus particulièrement, sur les aspects sui -
vants :a) la question de savoir si la Cour a ou non, dans cet arrêt, reconnu
avec force obligatoire la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I comme constituant
la frontière entre les deux Parties dans la zone du temple; b) la question de

savoir si le sens et la portée des expressions « situé en territoire relevant de
la souveraineté du Cambodge » et « ses environs situés en territoire cam -
bodgien», figurant respectivement aux premier et deuxième points du dis -
positif de l’arrêt de 1962, doivent ou non être déterminés par référence à lfia
ligne représentée sur la carte de l’annexe I, que la Cour « a reconnue »

comme constituant la frontière entre les Parties dans la zone du tempfil;eet
c) la question de savoir si l’obligation de se retirer de la zone du «fitemple
[et de] ses environs situés en territoire cambodgien», que le deuxième point
du dispositif impose à la Thaïlande, revêt un caractère contfiinu.
38. Le Cambodge affirme que la présente contestation s’est fait jour

immédiatement après le prononcé de l’arrêt de 1962. Il fait notamment
valoir qu’il a aussitôt, puis tout au long des années 1960, protesté contre la
détermination unilatérale par la Thaïlande, en juillet 1962, des e «nvirons du
temple» (telle que matérialisée par la clôture de barbelés et files panneaux
érigés par la Thaïlande), et contre la position de celle-ci, à savoir que la p-r

tée géographique de l’obligation de retrait que l’arrêt dfie 1962 lui imposait se
limitait aux ruines du temple et au sol sur lequel il était érigéfi. Le Cambodge

20

8 Ord 1050.indb 37 25/06/14 13:11 298 request for interprefitation (judgment)

dia emphasizes that in those protests it expressed its view that this unfiilat-
eral determination by Thailand was incompatible with the 1962 Judgment.

39. Cambodia acknowledges that it made no protests either during the
period of armed conflicts in Cambodia or during the succeeding years
when, according to Cambodia, Thailand refrained from imposing its uni -
lateral determination of the vicinity of the Temple. Nonetheless, Cambo -
dia contends that the dispute between the Parties concerning this issue fi

re-emerged in 2007-2008, following Cambodia’s request for the inscrip -
tion of the site of the Temple on the UNESCO World Heritage List, and
continued until the time of its Request for interpretation. Cambodia
argues that this dispute is evidenced by a series of incidents which occfiurred
in the vicinity of the Temple after 2008 and into early 2011, as well asfi by

certain events and statements of the Parties following Cambodia’s reqfiuest
for the inscription of the site of the Temple on the UNESCO World
Heritage List in 2007. In particular, Cambodia refers to the statements fi
made by each Party in their respective correspondence with the United
Nations in the context of Cambodia’s complaint concerning the allegedfi

incursions of Thai forces into Cambodian territory in the area of the
Temple.
40. For its part, Thailand denies the existence of a dispute within the
meaning of Article 60 of the Statute, since the language of the 1962 Judg -
ment is clear and in need of no interpretation. Thailand asserts that Cafim -

bodia accepted (or, at least, did not contest) that Thailand had
implemented the 1962 Judgment by withdrawing to the Thai Council of
Ministers’ line. According to Thailand, the events and statements relfiied
upon by Cambodia in respect of the period following Cambodia’s requesfit
for the inscription of the site of the Temple on the UNESCO World Heri-

tage List reflect only an ongoing delimitation dispute between the Parfities.
Noting that this delimitation dispute was not part of the dispute beforefi
the Court in 1962 and that the Court had expressly declined to pronouncefi
upon it in the operative part of the 1962 Judgment, Thailand argues that
this issue cannot be brought before the Court today in the context of

proceedings under Article 60 of the Statute.

*

41. The Court observes that the events and statements dating from the

period immediately following the 1962 Judgment clearly demonstrate that
Thailand was of the view that the Court had left the term “vicinity ofif the
Temple” in the second operative paragraph undefined and that Thailandfi
could thus determine unilaterally the limits of that “vicinity”. Ifin particu-
lar, this position is reflected in the 1962 resolution of the Thai Council of

Ministers which determined the

“location of the limit of the vicinity of the [Temple], from which Thfi-ai
land has the obligation to withdraw police forces, guards or keepers,

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8 Ord 1050.indb 38 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 298

souligne avoir, à l’occasion de ces protestations, fait valoir quefi cette dét-r
mination unilatérale de la Thaïlande était incompatible avec l’fiarrêt de 1962.

39. Le Cambodge admet n’avoir élevé aucune protestation pendant la
durée des conflits armés au Cambodge ou dans les années qui suivirent,
période au cours de laquelle la Thaïlande s’est, selon lui, absfitenue d’imposer
sa détermination unilatérale des environs du temple. Il affirme cfiependant
que la contestation entre les Parties sur ce point a émergé de noufiveau

en 2007-2008, après qu’il eut présenté une demande tendant à ce que le site
du temple soit inscrit sur la liste du patrimoine mondial de l’UNESCO, efit a
continué de se manifester jusqu’à la présentation de sa demafinde en interpré -
tation. Le Cambodge avance que l’existence de cette contestation est attestée
par une série d’incidents qui se sont produits dans les environs du temple

après 2008 et jusqu’au début de l’année 2011, ainsi que par certains événe-
ments et déclarations des Parties qui ont fait suite à sa demande fide 2007
tendant à l’inscription du site du temple sur la liste du patrimoifine mondial
de l’UNESCO. Il se réfère, en particulier, aux déclarations ficontenues dans
les communications adressées par chacune des Parties à l’Organifisation des

Nations Unies suite aux plaintes du Cambodge concernant des incursions
des forces armées thaïlandaises sur son territoire, dans la zone dfiu temple.
40. La Thaïlande, quant à elle, récuse l’existence d’une contfiestation au
sens de l’article 60 du Statut, soutenant que le libellé de l’arrêt de 1962 est
clair et n’appelle aucune interprétation. Elle fait valoir que le fiCambodge a

admis (ou, du moins, n’a pas contesté) qu’elle s’était conformée à cet arrêt
en se retirant jusqu’à la ligne du conseil des ministres thaïlafindais. Selon elle,
les événements et déclarations invoqués par le Cambodge concfiernant la
période qui a suivi la demande d’inscription du site du temple sur la liste du
patrimoine mondial de l’UNESCO ne sont que l’expression d’un dififférend

persistant entre les Parties sur la délimitation de leur frontièrefi. Relevant
que ce différend relatif à la délimitation n’entrait pas dansfi le champ du
différend dont la Cour était saisie en 1962 et que celle-ci a expressément
refusé de se prononcer à cet égard dans le dispositif de son arfirêt, la Thaï-
lande soutient que cette question ne saurait être soumise aujourd’fihui à la

Cour dans le cadre d’une procédure au titre de l’article 60 du Statut.

*

41. La Cour observe que les événements et déclarations remontant àfi

la période qui a immédiatement suivi le prononcé de l’arrêt fide 1962
démontrent clairement que la Thaïlande considérait que la Cour n’avait
pas défini l’expression «environs du temple» employée au deuxième point
du dispositif et que, partant, il lui était loisible de déterminerfi unilatérale-
ment les limites de ces « environs». La position de la Thaïlande trouve en

particulier son expression dans la résolution du conseil des ministres thaï -
landais de 1962, qui a défini

«l’endroit où se situ[ait] la limite des environs du temple … dont la
Thaïlande [était] tenue de retirer ses forces de police, gardes etfi gar-

21

8 Ord 1050.indb 39 25/06/14 13:11 299 request for interprefitation (judgment)

on the principle that Cambodia will only obtain the ruins of the [Tem -
ple] and the ground on which the Temple stood”.

In implementation of this decision, Thailand erected a barbed wire
fence on the ground along the line determined by the resolution, and

posted signs stating that “the vicinity of the Temple of Preah Vihearfi does
not extend beyond this limit”.
42. Contrary to Thailand’s assertions, the record before the Court
shows that Cambodia did not accept Thailand’s withdrawal as fully
implementing the 1962 Judgment. Rather, Cambodia protested the Thai

presence on territory which, according to Cambodia, the 1962 Judgment
had recognized as Cambodian. Cambodia also complained that the
barbed wire fence erected by Thailand “encroach[ed] fairly significanfitly”
upon that territory in contravention of the Court’s Judgment. In partfiicu-
lar, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cambodia in an aide-memoire

issued in November 1962 stated, inter alia, that “this limit [of the Temple
zone]”, marked with barbed wire, “was in complete disagreement witfih the
Court’s decision which confirmed the frontier as it appeared on the 1907
[Annex I] map”.

43. This divergence of views reappeared in the Parties’ correspondence
following Cambodia’s request for the inscription of the site of the Tfiemple
on the UNESCO World Heritage List in 2007-2008. For instance, on
17 May 2007, the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent an aide-memoire
to the Cambodian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the World Heritage

Committee, objecting to “Cambodia’s nomination file . . . in particular,
the delineation of the indicative boundary line, the monumental zone,
and the development zone” depicted on the map attached to the file
which, in Thailand’s view, implied “the exercise of Cambodian sovefir -
eignty in the area where [the two] countries assert different claims on

boundary line”. Thailand further contended that this depiction “cafinnot
in any way prejudice the existing international boundary between Thai -
land and Cambodia” as it appeared in Thailand’s own map series L7017.

44. On 18 and 19 July 2008, Cambodia sent letters to the President of
the Security Council and the President of the General Assembly of the
United Nations, stating inter alia that “[o]n 15 July 2008, about 50 Thai
soldiers crossed into . . . Cambodia’s territory about 300 metres from the
Temple of Preah Vihear”. Cambodia asserted that “[t]aking into accfiount

[the 1962 Judgment of the Court], the only map which legally delimits the
border in the area of the Temple of Preah Vihear is the ‘Annex I map’
based on which the Court made its judgment”.

In response, Thailand, in a letter sent on 21 July 2008 to the President

of the Security Council, stated inter alia that “the area adjacent to the
Temple of Preah Vihear . . . is part of Thailand’s territory” and that

22

8 Ord 1050.indb 40 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 299

diens, partant du principe que le Cambodge obtiendra[it] unique -
ment les ruines du temple … et le sol sur lequel [celui-ci était] érigé ».

En application de cette décision, la Thaïlande a érigé une cfilôture de
barbelés sur le terrain, le long de la ligne établie par la résfiolution, et ins -

tallé des panneaux portant la mention « Les environs du temple de
Préah Vihéar ne s’étendent pas au-delà de cette limite ».
42. Contrairement à ce qu’indique la Thaïlande, il ressort des éfiléments
versés au dossier que le Cambodge ne considérait pas que le retraifit opéré
par la Thaïlande assurait l’application pleine et entière de l’fiarrêt de 1962.

Le Cambodge émit en effet des protestations contre la présence thaïfi -
landaise sur un territoire que, selon lui, la Cour avait, dans son arrêfit
de 1962, reconnu comme étant cambodgien. Il se plaignit également de fice
que la clôture de barbelés érigée par la Thaïlande « empié[tait] assez large-
ment» sur ce territoire, contrevenant de la sorte à l’arrêt de lfia Cour. Ainsi

le ministère cambodgien des affaires étrangères affirma-t-il notamment,
dans un aide-mémoire de novembre 1962, que « cette délimitation [de la
zone du temple] » matérialisée par des barbelés « était en complet désac -
cord avec la décision de la Cour qui confirmait la frontière portéfie sur la
carte de 1907 [la carte de l’annexe I] ».

43. Cette divergence de vues est réapparue dans la correspondance des
Parties qui a fait suite à la demande d’inscription du site du temple sur la
liste du patrimoine mondial de l’UNESCO, présentée en 2007-2008 par le
Cambodge. C’est ainsi que, dans un aide-mémoire en date du 17 mai 2007
adressé au ministère cambodgien des affaires étrangères et aufi comité du

patrimoine mondial, le ministère thaïlandais des affaires étrangères s’est
élevé contre le dossier déposé par le Cambodge et, en particfiulier, la façon
dont étaient représentés sur la carte jointe à ce dossier «la frontière indica-
tive, le site du monument et la zone de développement »; selon la Thaï -
lande, cette représentation impliquait « l’exercice de la souveraineté

cambodgienne dans la zone où [les deux] pays défendent des revendifica -
tions différentes concernant la ligne frontière ». La Thaïlande poursuivait
en affirmant que cette représentation cartographique ne «pouvait en aucun
cas porter atteinte à la frontière internationale existant entre lfia Thaïlande
et le Cambodge», telle que figurée sur sa propre carte de la série L7017.

44. Dans des lettres qu’il a adressées les 18 et 19 juillet 2008 au pré -
sident du Conseil de sécurité et au président de l’Assembléfie générale des
Nations Unies, le Cambodge a entre autres signalé que, « [l]e 15 juillet
2008, une cinquantaine de soldats thaïlandais [avaient] franchi la frfiontière
et [s’étaient] installés … en territoire cambodgien, à quelque 300 mètres

du temple de Préah Vihéar », précisant que, « [c]ompte tenu de [l’arrêt
de 1962], la seule carte qui délimit[ait] officiellement la frontièrfie dans la
région du temple de Préah Vihéar [était] la carte de l’annexe I, sur la base
de laquelle la Cour s’[était] prononcée ».
La Thaïlande a répondu par une lettre en date du 21 juillet 2008 adres -

sée au président du Conseil de sécurité, affirmant notamment que « la
zone adjacente au temple de Préah Vihéar … fai[sait] partie du territoire

22

8 Ord 1050.indb 41 25/06/14 13:11 300 request for interprefitation (judgment)

“Thailand’s position in this regard is fully consistent with the [fi1962 Judg-
ment], which Thailand has fully and duly implemented”. Thailand furthfier

stated that
“Cambodia’s territorial claim in this area is based on Cambodia’fis

unilateral understanding of the said ICJ Judgment that a boundary
line was determined by the Court in this Judgment. Thailand contests
this unilateral understanding since the ICJ ruled in this case that it
did not have jurisdiction over the question of land boundary and did
not in any case determine the location of the boundary between Thai -

land and Cambodia. . . . Taking into account Article 59 of the Statute
of the ICJ and the fact that the issue before the ICJ in this case was
limited solely to the question of sovereignty over the region of the
Temple of Preah Vihear, the boundary line claimed by Cambodia has
no legal status from the Judgment.” (Emphasis added.)

45. In the opinion of the Court, these events and statements clearly
demonstrate that at the time Cambodia filed its Request for interpret-

ation the Parties had a dispute as to the meaning and scope of the
1962 Judgment. The Court now turns to the precise subject-matter of
this dispute in order to ascertain whether it falls within the scope of the
Court’s jurisdiction under Article 60 of the Statute.

B. Subject‑matter of the dispute before the Court

46. In its final submissions Cambodia expressed the view that

“‘[t]he Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory under the fisov-
ereignty of Cambodia’ (first paragraph of the operative clause), whfiich
is the legal consequence of the fact that the Temple is situated on the
Cambodian side of the frontier, as that frontier was recognized by the
Court in its Judgment. Therefore, the obligation incumbent upon
Thailand to ‘withdraw any military or police forces, or other guards

or keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cam -
bodian territory’ (second paragraph of the operative clause) is a pfiar-
ticular consequence of the general and continuing obligation to respect
the integrity of the territory of Cambodia, that territory having been
delimited in the area of the Temple and its vicinity by the line of the

Annex I map, on which the Judgment of the Court is based.”
47. In its final submissions, Thailand requested the Court to adjudge
and declare that :

“— the Request of the Kingdom of Cambodia asking the Court to
interpret the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning
the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) under

Article 60 of the Statute of the Court does not satisfy the
conditions laid down in that Article and that, consequently, the

23

8 Ord 1050.indb 42 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 300

thaïlandais» et que « [l]a position de la Thaïlande à cet égard [était] tout
à fait conforme à [l’arrêt de 1962], que la Thaïlande a[vait] pleinement et

dûment respecté». Elle a en outre indiqué ce qui suit :
«La revendication territoriale du Cambodge sur cette zone est fon-

dée sur son interprétation unilatérale dudit arrêt de la Coufir, selon
laquelle celle-ci aurait déterminé la ligne frontière. La Thaïlande
conteste cette interprétation unilatérale, étant donné que la Cour afi,
dans cette affaire, jugé qu’elle n’avait pas compétence à fil’égard de la
question de la frontière terrestre et n’a en aucun cas déterminfié l’em -

placement de la frontière entre la Thaïlande et le Cambodge. … fi
Compte tenu de l’article 59 du Statut de la Cour internationale de
Justice et du fait que la question dont celle-ci était saisie se limitait à
la seule question de la souveraineté sur la région du temple de
Préah Vihéar, la ligne frontière que revendique le Cambodge ne tire
aucun statut juridique de cet arrêt. » (Les italiques sont de la Cour.)

45. Selon la Cour, ces événements et déclarations démontrent clafiire -
ment que, au moment du dépôt de la demande en interprétation dufi Cam-

bodge, il existait une contestation entre les Parties quant au sens et àfi la
portée de l’arrêt de 1962. Elle en vient maintenant à l’objet précis de cette
contestation, afin de déterminer si celle-ci entre dans le champ de sa com -
pétence en vertu de l’article 60 du Statut.

B. L’objet de la contestation portée devant la Cour

46. Dans ses conclusions finales, le Cambodge a exprimé les vues sui -
vantes :

««le Temple de Préah Vihéar est situé en territoire relevant de la
souveraineté du Cambodge » (point 1 du dispositif), ce qui est la
conséquence juridique du fait que le Temple est situé du côtéfi cam -
bodgien de la frontière telle qu’elle fut reconnue par la Cour danfis
son arrêt. Dès lors, l’obligation pour la Thaïlande de « retirer tous les
éléments de forces armées ou de police ou autres gardes ou gardfiiens

qu’elle a installés dans le Temple ou dans ses environs situés fien terri -
toire cambodgien» (point 2 du dispositif) est une conséquence parti -
culière de l’obligation générale et continue de respecter l’fiintégrité du
territoire du Cambodge, territoire délimité dans la région du Tfiemple
et ses environs par la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I sur laquelle l’arrêt

de la Cour est basé. »
47. Dans ses conclusions finales, la Thaïlande a prié la Cour de dire et
juger :

«— que la demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en
l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande)
présentée par le Royaume du Cambodge en vertu de l’ar -

ticle 60 du Statut de la Cour ne satisfait pas aux conditions
énoncées audit article et que la Cour n’est, par conséquent,fi pas

23

8 Ord 1050.indb 43 25/06/14 13:11 301 request for interprefitation (judgment)

Court has no jurisdiction to respond to that Request and/or
that the Request is inadmissible ;

— in the alternative, that there are no grounds to grant Cambo -
dia’s Request to construe the Judgment and that there is no
reason to interpret the Judgment of 1962 ; and
— to formally declare that the 1962 Judgment does not determine
with binding force the boundary line between the Kingdom of

Thailand and the Kingdom of Cambodia, nor does it fix the
limit of the vicinity of the Temple”.

*

48. The Court observes that both Parties accept that there is a dis -

agreement between them as to whether or not the Court, in the 1962 Judg-
ment, decided with binding force that the Annex I map line represents the
frontier between them in the area of the Temple. The Parties’ divergefince
of views on this issue is further reflected in their positions expressed in the
events and statements analysed above (see paragraphs 41-44) and clarified

in the course of the present proceedings. Contrary to Thailand’s assefir -
tions concerning the Court’s lack of jurisdiction in this regard, the Court
reiterates that “a difference of opinion as to whether a particular point
has or has not been decided with binding force also constitutes a case
which comes within the terms of Article 60 of the Statute” (see para -

graph 34 above).
49. Further, the Court considers that the Parties’ positions, expressed
during the period following the 1962 Judgment as well as that following
Cambodia’s request to have the site of the Temple inscribed on the Wofirld
Heritage List (see paragraphs 41-44 above) and in the course of the pres -
ent proceedings, also reveal their divergent views as to the meaning andfi

scope of the phrase “vicinity on Cambodian territory” in the second
operative paragraph of the 1962 Judgment and the relationship between
that paragraph and the Court’s finding, in the first operative paragrfiaph,
that the Temple is situated in “territory under the sovereignty of Cafimbo -
dia”. Cambodia maintains that the Annex I map line necessarily determines

the meaning and scope of the operative clause since the Court’s recogfinition
of that line as representing the frontier between the Parties in the Temfiple
area constituted the “essential” reason underlying its conclusionsfi therein.
By contrast, Thailand asserts that the Court’s reasoning concerning tfihe
Annex I map line cannot be seen as “essential” and that it is therefore fi

neither necessary nor possible to resort to that reasoning in order to efilu -
cidate the meaning and scope of the operative clause of the 1962 Judg -
ment. Rather, Thailand asserts that the terms “territory” and “fivicinity”
were not explicitly defined by the Court and should be interpreted as
strictly confined to the grounds on which the Temple stands and its imme -
diate surroundings — the “Temple area”, as defined by the 1962 resolu -

tion of the Thai Council of Ministers.

24

8 Ord 1050.indb 44 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 301

compétente pour en connaître, ou que cette demande est irre -
cevable ;

— à titre subsidiaire, que la demande en interprétation de l’arrêfit
de 1962 est sans fondement et qu’il n’existe aucune raison jus -
tifiant de procéder à une telle interprétation ; et
— de déclarer formellement que l’arrêt de 1962 n’a pas établi
avec force obligatoire la ligne frontière entre le Royaume de

Thaïlande et le Royaume du Cambodge, et n’a pas fixé les
limites des environs du temple ».

*

48. La Cour relève que les deux Parties admettent qu’un désaccord lfies

oppose sur la question de savoir si la Cour a ou non, dans l’arrêtfi de 1962,
décidé avec force obligatoire que la ligne de la carte de l’annfiexe I représen -
tait la frontière entre elles dans la zone du temple. La divergence dfie vues
entre les Parties sur cette question ressort également des positions exprimées
par celles-ci à l’occasion des événements et dans les déclarations efixaminés

ci-dessus (voir paragraphes 41-44), positions qui ont été précisées dans le
cadre de la présente procédure. Contrairement aux assertions de lafi Thaï -
lande selon lesquelles la Cour n’a pas compétence à cet égarfid, la Cour ré-af
firme qu’«une divergence de vues, sur la question de savoir si tel ou tel point
a été décidé avec force obligatoire, constitue, elle aussi, fiun cas qui rentre

dans le cadre de l’article 60 du Statut» (voir paragraphe 34 ci-dessus).
49. La Cour considère en outre que les positions exprimées par les Parfi -
ties dans la période qui a suivi le prononcé de l’arrêt de 1962, ainsi qu’à la
suite de la demande du Cambodge tendant à l’inscription du site dufi temple
sur la liste du patrimoine mondial (voir paragraphes 41-44 ci-dessus) et
dans le cadre de la présente procédure, révèlent égalemenfit leur divergence

de vues quant au sens et à la portée de l’expression « environs situés en
territoire cambodgien», employée au deuxième point du dispositif de l’ar -
rêt de 1962, et quant au lien entre ce point et la conclusion que la Cour a
énoncée au premier point du dispositif, à savoir que le temple fiest situé en
«territoire relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge». A cet égard, celui-ci

fait valoir que la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I détermine nécessairement le
sens et la portée du dispositif, étant donné que la reconnaissafince par la
Cour de cette ligne comme représentant la frontière entre les Partfiies dans
la zone du temple constitue le motif «essentiel» des conclusions auxquelles
elle est parvenue dans le dispositif. La Thaïlande affirme au contrafiire que

le raisonnement de la Cour au sujet de la ligne de la carte de l’annefixe I ne
saurait être considéré comme « essentiel», et qu’il n’est donc ni nécessaire
ni possible d’y recourir pour élucider le sens et la portée du fidispositif de
l’arrêt de 1962. Elle soutient que les termes « territoire» et « environs»
n’ont pas été explicitement définis par la Cour et devraientfi être interprétés
comme étant strictement limités au terrain sur lequel le temple esfit érigé et

à son voisinage immédiat, c’est-à-dire la « zone du temple», telle que défi -
nie dans la résolution du conseil des ministres thaïlandais de 1962.

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8 Ord 1050.indb 45 25/06/14 13:11 302 request for interprefitation (judgment)

50. Finally, the Court turns to the contention that the Parties disagree
about the nature of Thailand’s obligation to withdraw from “the Tefimple

[and] its vicinity on Cambodian territory”, deriving from the second para-
graph of the operative clause of the 1962 Judgment. The correspondence
of the Parties surrounding the inscription of the site of the Temple on fithe
World Heritage List, and the armed clashes that took place in the borderfi
area close to the Temple (see paragraph 28 above), reveal that the Parties

disagreed, prior to the filing of Cambodia’s Request for interpretatifion,
about where Thai personnel could lawfully be located in the light of thefi
1962 Judgment. That difference of views has been confirmed by the writ -
ten and oral arguments of the Parties in the present proceedings.

51. According to Cambodia, Thailand’s obligation to withdraw relates
to an area which the Judgment had placed under Cambodia’s sovereigntyfi
and must consequently be understood as having a continuing character,
in line with the general principle of respect for territorial sovereignty and
integrity of States. Thus, in its final submissions, Cambodia claims thafit
Thailand’s obligation to withdraw “is a particular consequence of fithe

general and continuing obligation to respect the integrity of the territfiory
of Cambodia” (see paragraph 13 above). Thailand accepts that it has a
“general and continuing obligation” under international law to resfipect
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cambodia. However, it rejecfits
Cambodia’s assertion that “the obligation to withdraw as specifiedfi in the

[1962] Judgment has the same character”. Rather, Thailand maintains
that this latter obligation applied to its relations with Cambodia only fi“in
respect of one place at one time” and that it fully discharged that ofibliga-
tion once it withdrew from the vicinity of the Temple in accordance withfi
the 1962 resolution of the Thai Council of Ministers.

52. In the light of the above considerations, the Court concludes that
the dispute between the Parties as to the meaning and scope of the
1962 Judgment relates to three specific aspects thereof. First, there is a
dispute over whether the 1962 Judgment did or did not decide with bind -
ing force that the line depicted on the Annex I map constitutes the fron -

tier between the Parties in the area of the Temple. Secondly, there is a
closely related dispute concerning the meaning and scope of the phrase
“vicinity on Cambodian territory”, referred to in the second operafitive
paragraph of the 1962 Judgment, a paragraph which the Court stated was
a consequence of the finding, in the first operative paragraph, that thefi
Temple is situated in “territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia”fi.

Lastly, there is a dispute regarding the nature of Thailand’s obligatfiion to
withdraw imposed by the second paragraph of the operative part.

2. Admissibility of Cambodia’s Request for Interpretation

53. Thailand maintains that Cambodia’s Request for interpretation is
inadmissible since its real purpose is not to obtain the Court’s intefirpret-

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8 Ord 1050.indb 46 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 302

50. La Cour en vient enfin à l’affirmation selon laquelle les Partiesfi sont
en désaccord quant à la nature de l’obligation de la Thaïlanfide de se reti -

rer du « temple [et de] ses environs situés en territoire cambodgien », telle
qu’elle résulte du deuxième point du dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962. Il ressort
de la correspondance des Parties dans le contexte de la demande d’insfi -
cription du site du temple sur la liste du patrimoine mondial, ainsi quefi des
affrontements armés qui se sont produits dans la zone frontalière vfioisine

du temple (voir paragraphe 28 ci-dessus), que, avant le dépôt de la
demande en interprétation du Cambodge, les Parties étaient en défisaccord
sur la question de savoir où, selon l’arrêt de 1962, les personnels thaï -
landais avaient le droit de se trouver. Cette divergence de vues a étfié
confirmée par les écritures et plaidoiries en la présente instafince.

51. Selon le Cambodge, l’obligation de retrait de la Thaïlande se rapporte
à une zone que l’arrêt avait placée sous souveraineté camfibodgienne, et doit
donc s’entendre comme revêtant un caractère continu, conformément au
principe général du respect de la souveraineté et de l’intéfigrité territoriales
des Etats. Ainsi, dans ses conclusions finales, le Cambodge fait valoir fique
l’obligation de retrait de la Thaïlande «est une conséquence particulière de

l’obligation générale et continue de respecter l’intégritfié du territoire du
Cambodge» (voir paragraphe 13 ci-dessus). La Thaïlande, quant à elle, bien
que reconnaissant qu’elle est soumise, en vertu du droit internationafil, à
«l’obligation générale et continue» de respecter la souveraineté et l’intégrité
territoriales du Cambodge, conteste l’assertion de celui-ci selon laquelle

«l’obligation de retrait spécifiée dans l’arrêt [de 1962 a] le même caractère ».
Elle avance que cette dernière obligation ne valait, pour ses relatiofins avec le
Cambodge, que «dans un lieu et à un moment donnés», et affirme s’en être
pleinement acquittée dès lors qu’elle s’est retirée des efinvirons du temple,
conformément à la résolution du conseil des ministres thaïlafindais de 1962.

52. A la lumière des considérations exposées ci-dessus, la Cour conclut
que la contestation entre les Parties sur le sens et la portée de l’fiarrêt
de 1962 se rapporte à trois aspects spécifiques de cette décision. Première -
ment, il existe une contestation sur le point de savoir si, dans l’arfirêt
de 1962, la Cour a ou non décidé avec force obligatoire que la ligne firepré -

sentée sur la carte de l’annexe I constituait la frontière entre les Parties
dans la zone du temple. Deuxièmement, il existe une contestation, étroite-
ment liée à la précédente, sur le sens et la portée de l’fiexpression «environs
situés en territoire cambodgien», employée au deuxième point du disposi-
tif de l’arrêt de 1962, point dont la Cour a dit qu’il était une conséquence
de la conclusion énoncée au premier point, à savoir que le temple est

situé en «territoire relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge». Troisième-
ment, il existe une contestation sur la nature de l’obligation de retfirait que
le deuxième point du dispositif impose à la Thaïlande.

2. La recevabilité de la demande en interprétation du Cambodge

53. La Thaïlande soutient que la demande en interprétation du Cam -
bodge est irrecevable au motif que son véritable objet n’est pas lfi’interpré-

25

8 Ord 1050.indb 47 25/06/14 13:11 303 request for interprefitation (judgment)

ation of the 1962 Judgment but, rather, to obtain the Court’s ruling on
the Parties’ delimitation dispute in the area of the Temple by havingfi the

Court recognize with binding force that the Annex I map line constitutes
their common frontier in that area. Thailand recalls that the Court explfiic -
itly refused to pronounce on the Parties’ common frontier in the Tempfile
area in 1962 and asserts that it is therefore barred from determining thfiis
question now, through the interpretation of the 1962 Judgment.

54. Cambodia insists that it is not requesting the Court to delimit any
boundary between the Parties on the basis of the Annex I map. Rather, it
is “merely asking the Court to explain the findings that it reached ifin its
1962 Judgment . . . in particular as regards the relationship between those
findings and the meaning and scope of the dispositif of the Judgment”.

*

55. The Court recalls that the process of interpretation is premised

upon the “primacy of the principle of res judicata” which “must be main -
tained” (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the
Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v.
Cameroon), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), pp. 36-37, para. 12).

Accordingly, as the Court has previously held :
“[t]he real purpose of the request must be to obtain an interpretatiofin
of the judgment. This signifies that its object must be solely to obtainfi

clarification of the meaning and the scope of what the Court has
decided with binding force, and not to obtain an answer to questions
not so decided. Any other construction of Article 60 of the Statute
would nullify the provision of the article that the judgment is final
and without appeal.” (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of

20 November 1950 in the Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 402; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment
of 11 June 1998 in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Bound -
ary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Prelim-
inary Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports

1999 (I), pp. 36-37, para. 12.)
56. Having regard to the Parties’ divergent views over the meaning and

scope of the 1962 Judgment, identified above (see paragraph 52), the
Court considers that there is a need for the interpretation of the seconfid
operative paragraph of the 1962 Judgment and of the legal effect of what
the Court said regarding the Annex I map line. Within these limits, Cam -
bodia’s Request is admissible. Nevertheless, in line with the Court’fis prev-i
ous observation on this matter, in as far as Cambodia’s Request for

interpretation “may go further, and seek ‘to obtain an answer to ques -
tions not [decided with binding force]’, or to achieve a revision of fithe

26

8 Ord 1050.indb 48 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 303

tation de l’arrêt de 1962, mais qu’elle vise en réalité à ce que la Cour se
prononce sur le différend qui oppose les Parties en ce qui concerne lafi

délimitation dans la zone du temple, afin qu’elle reconnaisse avec force
obligatoire que la ligne tracée sur la carte de l’annexe I constitue leur
frontière commune dans cette zone. A cet égard, la Thaïlande rappelle
que la Cour a, en 1962, expressément refusé de se prononcer sur la ques -
tion de la frontière commune entre les Parties, et qu’elle ne saurfiait donc

le faire aujourd’hui en interprétant l’arrêt rendu à l’fiépoque.
54. Le Cambodge soutient qu’il ne cherche pas à obtenir de la Cour
qu’elle délimite une quelconque frontière entre les Parties surfi la base de la
carte de l’annexe I, mais « se contente de [lui] demander … d’expliquer les
conclusions qu’elle a dégagées dans son arrêt de 1962 … en particulier en
ce qui concerne la relation entre ces conclusions et le sens et la portéfie du

dispositif de l’arrêt ».

*

55. La Cour rappelle que le processus d’interprétation repose sur la

«primauté du principe de l’autorité de la chose jugée », qui «doit être pré -
servé » (Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 11 juin 1998 en l’affaire de
la Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Came -
roun c. Nigéria), exceptions préliminaires (Nigéria c. Cameroun), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (I), p. 36-37, par. 12). En conséquence, ainsi qu’elle

l’a déjà indiqué,
«[i]l faut que la demande ait réellement pour objet une interprétatfiion
de l’arrêt, ce qui signifie qu’elle doit viser uniquement à fifaire éclaircir

le sens et la portée de ce qui a été décidé avec force obfiligatoire par
l’arrêt, et non à obtenir la solution de points qui n’ont pafis été ainsi
décidés. Toute autre façon d’interpréter l’article 60 du Statut aurait
pour conséquence d’annuler la disposition de ce même article sefilon
laquelle l’arrêt est définitif et sans recours. » (Demande d’interpréta ‑

tion de l’arrêt du 20novembre 1950 en l’affaire du droit d’asile (Colom‑
bie c. Pérou), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 402 ; Demande en
interprétation de l’arrêt du 11 juin 1998 en l’affaire de la Frontière
terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun
c. Nigéria), exceptions préliminaires (Nigéria c. Cameroun), arrêt,

C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (I), p. 36-37, par. 12.)
56. Compte tenu des vues divergentes des Parties sur le sens et la portéefi

de l’arrêt de 1962 exposées ci-dessus (voir paragraphe 52), la Cour consi -
dère qu’il est besoin d’interpréter le deuxième point du fidispositif de cet
arrêt ainsi que la portée juridique de ce que la Cour a dit concerfinant la
ligne de la carte de l’annexe I. Dans le cadre ainsi défini, la demande du
Cambodge est recevable. En revanche, comme la Cour a déjà eu l’fioccasion
de le préciser, pour autant que la demande en interprétation préfisentée par

le Cambodge «irait plus loin et chercherait «à obtenir la solution de points
qui n’ont pas été [décidés avec force obligatoire]» ou à aboutir à une revi -

26

8 Ord 1050.indb 49 25/06/14 13:11 304 request for interprefitation (judgment)

Judgment, no effect can be given to it” (Application for Revision and Inter‑
pretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the

Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 223, para. 56).

3. Conclusion

57. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that a dispute

exists between the Parties as to the meaning and scope of the 1962 Judg -
ment pursuant to Article 60 of the Statute. Accordingly, the Court has
jurisdiction to entertain Cambodia’s Request for interpretation of thfie
1962 Judgment, and the Request is admissible.

III. The Interpretation offi the 1962 Judgment

58. The Court now turns to the interpretation of the 1962 Judgment.

1. Positions of the Parties

59. Cambodia maintains that the first and second operative paragraphs
of the Judgment are “symbiotically linked” : in the first paragraph, the
Court held that the Temple was “situated in territory under the sover -
eignty of Cambodia”, while in the second paragraph it found, in

consequence, that Thailand was required to withdraw the personnel
which it had stationed “at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodiafin
territory”. According to Cambodia, the requirement to withdraw, in thfie
second operative paragraph, can only be understood as a requirement
that Thailand should withdraw the personnel from the Temple, and the

Cambodian territory in its vicinity, to Thai territory and that the Cambo -
dian territory referred to in the second operative paragraph coincides
with the territory identified as being under Cambodian sovereignty in thfie
first operative paragraph. In Cambodia’s view, the obligation to withfi -
draw has a continuing character, in the sense that the requirement that fi

Thailand withdraw its forces implied an obligation not to return them atfi
any future time to the Cambodian territory identified in the Judgment.

60. For Cambodia, these findings in the operative part are the conse -
quence of the Court’s determination, in the reasoning of the 1962 Judfig -
ment, that the Annex I map line constituted the frontier between the

Parties in the region of the Temple (see paragraph 20 above). Cambodia
maintains that this part of the reasoning stated a condition essential ffior
the findings contained in the operative part of the 1962 Judgment and
thus has binding force. Accordingly, the area of territory to which the fi
Court referred, in the first operative paragraph, and from which, in thefi

second operative paragraph, it required Thailand to withdraw, extended
beyond the confines of the Temple itself and included all of the land infi

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8 Ord 1050.indb 50 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 304

sion de l’arrêt, aucune suite ne pourrait lui être donnée» (Demande en revi‑
sion et en interprétation de l’arrêt du 24 février 1982 en l’affaire du Plateau

continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne) (Tunisie c. Jamahiriya
arabe libyenne), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 223, par. 56).

3. Conclusion

57. Au vu de ce qui précède, la Cour conclut qu’il existe entre les Par -

ties, sur le sens et la portée de l’arrêt de 1962, une contestation entrant
dans les prévisions de l’article 60 du Statut ; en conséquence, la Cour est
compétente pour connaître de la demande en interprétation de l’fiarrêt
de 1962 présentée par le Cambodge, et celle-ci est recevable.

III. Interprétation de l’afirrêt de 1962

58. La Cour en vient maintenant à l’interprétation de l’arrêtfi de 1962.

1. Les positions des Parties

59. Le Cambodge soutient que les premier et deuxième points du dis -
positif de l’arrêt sont « liés par une symbiose », étant donné que la Cour a
jugé, au premier point, que le temple était « situé en territoire relevant de
la souveraineté cambodgienne », et a dit, au deuxième point, que, en

conséquence, la Thaïlande devait retirer les personnels qu’ellefi avait instal -
lés «dans le temple ou dans ses environs situés en territoire cambodgien ».
Selon le Cambodge, l’obligation de retrait énoncée au deuxièfime point du
dispositif ne peut se comprendre autrement que comme une obligation
faite à la Thaïlande de retirer ses personnels du temple et du terfiritoire

cambodgien situé dans les environs de celui-ci jusqu’à son propre terri -
toire, et ne peut que signifier que le territoire cambodgien mentionnéfi au
deuxième point du dispositif coïncide avec celui dont il a étéfi établi, au
premier point du dispositif, qu’il relevait de la souveraineté cambod -
gienne. Le Cambodge estime que l’obligation de retrait revêt un cafiractère

continu, au sens où l’obligation faite à la Thaïlande de retfiirer ses forces
impliquait celle de ne pas les redéployer, à une date ultérieurfie, sur le ter -
ritoire cambodgien tel que défini dans l’arrêt.
60. Selon le Cambodge, les conclusions ainsi formulées dans le dispositiffi
résultent de ce que la Cour avait, dans les motifs de l’arrêt dfie 1962, déter -
miné que la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I constituait la frontière entre les

Parties dans la région du temple (voir paragraphe 20 ci-dessus). Le Cam -
bodge soutient que cette partie du raisonnement de la Cour énonçaifit une
condition essentielle des conclusions contenues dans le dispositif, et afi donc
force obligatoire. Ainsi, la portion de territoire qui était mentionnée au pre -
mier point, et dont la Thaïlande était tenue de se retirer en applfiication du

deuxième point, s’étendait au-delà du temple lui-même, englobant la zone
litigieuse dans son ensemble jusqu’à la ligne de la carte de l’fiannexe I. Le

27

8 Ord 1050.indb 51 25/06/14 13:11 305 request for interprefitation (judgment)

the disputed area up to the Annex I map line. Cambodia considers that
this area encompasses the whole promontory of Preah Vihear and the hill fi

of Phnom Trap as far north as the Annex I map line. Cambodia rejects
the Thai Council of Ministers’ line (see paragraph 22 above) as a unilat -
eral action which ran counter to the reasoning of the 1962 Judgment.
According to Cambodia, the practice of the Parties since 1962 has no
relevance for the interpretation of the 1962 Judgment, although it denies

that its conduct amounted to acceptance of Thailand’s interpretation fiof
the 1962 Judgment. Cambodia maintains that the Memorandum of
Understanding deals only with the demarcation of the frontier, thereby
implying that delimitation of the frontier has already occurred.
61. Thailand maintains that the dispute which was before the Court in
1962 concerned territorial sovereignty, not delimitation of a frontier, fiand

that the 1962 Judgment decided only that the Temple fell under the sov -
ereignty of Cambodia. The Annex I map was significant only as evidence
of whether the Temple lay in Cambodian territory and did not serve the
purpose of defining the boundary, a task which had to be carried out by fi
agreement between the Parties. In Thailand’s view, it would have beenfi

contrary to the principle non ultra petita for the Court to have ruled upon
the boundary line, since Cambodia had not included any request for a
ruling on the map in its original submissions and the Court had declinedfi
to entertain the new submissions which Cambodia had advanced at the
end of the oral proceedings.

62. Thailand also argues that more than one version of the Annex I
map is in existence and that the different versions contain important disfi -
crepancies. In addition, Thailand claims that there are important deficifien -
cies in the Annex I map, including topographical and positioning errors,
that it is imprecise and that it departs in significant respects from thfie
watershed line stipulated in the 1904 Treaty. According to Thailand, it

would be impossible to transpose the Annex I map line onto a modern
map without more information.
63. In any case, Thailand contends, the Annex I map was only one of
the reasons on which the Judgment was based, since the Court also reliedfi
upon entirely distinct grounds, in particular, the visit to the Temple ifin

1930 by Prince Damrong of Thailand, which the Court described as
“significant” and considered to be recognition by Thailand of the sovefir -
eignty of Cambodia (then a protectorate of France) over the Temple
(I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 30-31). Thailand concludes that the 1962 Judg -
ment decided only that Cambodia had sovereignty over the small parcel

of land on which the ruins of the Temple are located, the area which wasfi
later depicted on the map attached to the 1962 resolution of the Thai
Council of Ministers. According to Thailand, the Judgment did not deal
with sovereignty over the remainder of the Preah Vihear promontory or
the hill of Phnom Trap.

64. Thailand denies that the obligation to withdraw in the second
operative paragraph of the 1962 Judgment has a continuing character, in

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8 Ord 1050.indb 52 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 305

Cambodge considère que cette zone comprend l’intégralité de fil’éperon de
Préah Vihéar ainsi que la colline de Phnom Trap, et s’étend, au nord,

jusqu’à la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I. Il conteste la ligne du conseil des
ministres thaïlandais (voir paragraphe 22 ci-dessus), faisant valoir qu’il
s’agissait d’une mesure unilatérale allant à l’encontre dfiu raisonnement suivi
dans l’arrêt de 1962. Le Cambodge soutient que la pratique des Parties
depuis 1962 est dépourvue de toute pertinence aux fins de l’interprétafition

de l’arrêt de 1962, tout en niant que son comportement ait pu équivaloir à
une acceptation de l’interprétation de l’arrêt de1962 faite par la Thaïlande.
Selon lui, le mémorandum d’accord ne traite que de la démarcatifion de la
frontière, ce qui implique que celle-ci a déjà été délimitée.
61. La Thaïlande fait valoir que le différend dont la Cour était saisie
en 1962 avait trait à une question de souveraineté territoriale, et nfion à la

délimitation d’une frontière, et que, dans l’arrêt, il a uniquement été décidé
que le temple relevait de la souveraineté du Cambodge. La carte de l’fian -
nexe I n’était pertinente qu’en tant qu’élément de preuve afiux fins de déte-r
miner si le temple était situé en territoire cambodgie;nelle n’était pas destinée
à délimiter la frontière, tâche qui devait être effectuéfie d’un commun accord

entre les Parties. Selon la Thaïlande, il eût été contraire au principe non ultra
petita que la Cour statue sur la ligne frontière, étant donné que le fiCambodge
n’avait pas, dans ses conclusions initiales, demandé que cette question soit
tranchée, et que la Cour avait refusé d’examiner les nouvelles ficonclusions
que celui-ci avait présentées au terme de la procédure orale.

62. La Thaïlande avance également qu’il existe plusieurs versions dfie la
carte de l’annexe I, lesquelles présentent des différences notables. De sur -
croît, elle considère que la carte de l’annexe I contient d’importantes
erreurs — notamment en matière de topographie et de localisation —,
qu’elle manque de précision et s’écarte, à bien des égfiards, de la ligne de
partage des eaux convenue dans la convention de 1904. Selon la Thaï -

lande, il serait impossible de transposer cette ligne sur une carte moderne
sans disposer d’informations complémentaires.
63. La Thaïlande affirme que, en tout état de cause, la carte de
l’annexe I n’était qu’un des motifs qui sous-tendaient l’arrêt, la Cour
s’étant également fondée sur d’autres motifs tout à fafiit distincts, notam -

ment la visite effectuée au temple par le prince Damrong de Thaïlande
en 1930. Cet événement, que la Cour qualifia d’« important», constituait,
selon elle, une reconnaissance par la Thaïlande de la souverainetéfi du
Cambodge (qui était alors un protectorat de la France) sur le templfie
(C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 30-31). La Thaïlande en conclut que, dans l’arrêt

de 1962, il a uniquement été décidé que le Cambodge avait souvefiraineté
sur la petite parcelle de terrain sur laquelle se trouvent les ruines dufi
temple, parcelle qui fut ensuite représentée sur la carte jointe àfi la résolu -
tion du conseil des ministres thaïlandais de 1962. Selon elle, la question de
la souveraineté sur le reste de l’éperon de Préah Vihéar ou sur la colline
de Phnom Trap n’a pas été examinée dans l’arrêt.

64. La Thaïlande conteste que l’obligation de retrait énoncée aufi
deuxième point du dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962 revête un caractère continu

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8 Ord 1050.indb 53 25/06/14 13:11 306 request for interprefitation (judgment)

the sense suggested by Cambodia. Thailand argues that it discharged its fi
obligation when it withdrew its personnel behind the Council of Minis -

ters’ line and that Cambodia accepted that line when Prince Sihanouk fi
visited the Temple in 1963 (see paragraph 23 above). Thereafter, the obli -
gation not to enter Cambodian territory was derived not from the 1962
Judgment but from the duty, arising under general international law, of
one State to respect the territorial integrity of another.

65. Thailand concludes that the delimitation of the frontier in the rele -
vant area remains to be accomplished and that the Memorandum of Unde -r
standing provides the mechanism for the Parties to undertake that task.

2. The Role of the Court under Article 60 of the Statute

66. The Court begins by recalling that its role under Article 60 of the
Statute is to clarify the meaning and scope of what the Court decided infi the
judgment which it is requested to interpret (Request for Interpretation of the
Judgment of 20 November 1950 in the Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 402). Accordingly, the Court must keep

strictly within the limits of the original judgment and cannot question mat -
ters that were settled therein with binding force, nor can it provide anfiswers
to questions the Court did not decide in the original judgment.
67. While the existence of a dispute between the parties regarding the
original judgment is a prerequisite for interpretation under Article 60 of

the Statute, the way in which that dispute is formulated by one or both fiof
the parties is not binding on the Court. As the Permanent Court of Interfi -
national Justice explained :

“the Court does not consider itself as bound simply to reply ‘yes’fi or
‘no’ to the propositions formulated in the submissions of [the Appfili -
cant]. It adopts this attitude because, for the purpose of the interpretfi-
ation of a judgment, it cannot be bound by formulae chosen by the
Parties concerned, but must be able to take an unhampered decision.” fi

(Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judg ‑
ment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 13, pp. 15-16.)

68. In determining the meaning and scope of the operative clause of
the original Judgment, the Court, in accordance with its practice, will fi
have regard to the reasoning of that Judgment to the extent that it sheds
light on the proper interpretation of the operative clause.
69. The pleadings and the record of the oral proceedings in 1962 are

also relevant to the interpretation of the Judgment, as they show what
evidence was, or was not, before the Court and how the issues before it fi
were formulated by each Party.

70. Thailand argues that the principle of non ultra petita precluded the

Court from going beyond the submissions of the Parties and that the
1962 Judgment must be interpreted accordingly.

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8 Ord 1050.indb 54 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 306

au sens où l’entend le Cambodge. Elle soutient qu’elle s’estfi acquittée de
l’obligation qui lui incombait en repliant ses forces derrière la filigne du
conseil des ministres thaïlandais, et que le Cambodge a accepté lafidite
ligne lorsque le prince Sihanouk s’est rendu au temple en 1963 (voir para -
graphe 23 ci-dessus). Par la suite, l’obligation de ne pas pénétrer en terrfii-

toire cambodgien découlait non pas de l’arrêt de 1962, mais du droit
international général, qui impose à tout Etat de respecter l’fiintégrité terri -
toriale des autres Etats.
65. La Thaïlande conclut que la délimitation de la frontière dans lfia
zone en question reste à effectuer, et que le mémorandum d’accorfid pré -

voit le mécanisme permettant aux Parties de procéder à cette tâfiche.

2. Le rôle de la Cour en vertu de l’article 60 du Statut

66. La Cour commencera par rappeler que son rôle en vertu de l’ar -

ticle 60 du Statut consiste à éclaircir le sens et la portée de ce qufii a été
décidé dans l’arrêt qu’il lui est demandé d’interprfiéter (Demande d’inter ‑
prétation de l’arrêt du 20 novembre 1950 en l’affaire du droit d’asile
(Colombie c. Pérou), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 402). En conséquence,
elle doit respecter strictement les limites de l’arrêt initial et fine saurait

remettre en cause ce qui a été réglé avec force obligatoire, ni trancher des
questions sur lesquelles elle ne s’est pas prononcée dans l’arrfiêt initial.
67. Si l’existence d’une contestation entre les parties sur l’interfiprétation
de l’arrêt initial est une condition préalable à l’interpfirétation en vertu de

l’article 60 du Statut, la Cour n’est pas pour autant liée par la manièrefi
dont ladite contestation est formulée par l’une ou l’autre des fiparties, ou les
deux. Ainsi que la Cour permanente de Justice internationale l’a préficisé,

«la Cour ne se considère pas comme tenue de répondre simplement
par oui ou non aux propositions formulées dans les conclusions [du
demandeur]. Elle se place à ce point de vue parce que, pour interpréfi -
ter un arrêt, elle ne saurait être liée par des formules choisifies par les

Parties en cause, mais doit pouvoir se prononcer librement. » (Inter ‑
prétation des arrêts n os7 et 8 (usine de Chorzów), arrêt n o 11, 1927,
C.P.J.I. série A n o13, p. 15-16.)

68. Aux fins de déterminer le sens et la portée du dispositif de l’fiarrêt
initial, la Cour, conformément à sa pratique, tiendra compte des mfiotifs
de ce dernier dans la mesure où ils éclairent l’interprétatifion à donner au

dispositif.
69. Les écritures et plaidoiries de 1962 sont elles aussi pertinentes aux
fins de l’interprétation de l’arrêt, puisqu’elles montrenfit quels éléments de
preuve ont, à l’époque, été présentés à la Cour — et quels éléments ne
l’ont pas été —, ainsi que la manière dont les questions soumises à celle-ci

ont été formulées par chacune des Parties.
70. La Thaïlande soutient que le principe non ultra petita interdisait à
la Cour d’aller au-delà des conclusions des Parties, et que l’arrêt de 1962
doit être interprété en conséquence.

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8 Ord 1050.indb 55 25/06/14 13:11 307 request for interprefitation (judgment)

71. The principle of non ultra petita is well established in the jurispru -
dence of the Court (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of

20 November 1950 in the Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 402 ; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002,
pp. 18-19, para. 43) and is one reason why the claims contained in the
final submissions of the Parties in the original case are of relevance ifin

interpreting the 1962 Judgment. Nevertheless, that principle cannot jus -
tify an interpretation which runs counter to the terms of the 1962 Judg -
ment. The Court in 1962 necessarily made an assessment of the scope of
the petitum before it; Article 60 of the Statute does not give the Court the
power today to substitute a different assessment for that made at the timfie
of the Judgment.

72. Cambodia suggests that the headnote to the 1962 Judgment dem -
onstrated that the Judgment determined the course of the frontier in thefi
relevant area.
73. Under Article 95, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court (Article 74,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court of 1946 applicable in 1962), the head -

note is not one of the elements of the Judgment and it does not form parfit
thereof. Moreover, the purpose of the headnote is only to give the reader
a general indication of the points examined in a judgment ; it does not
constitute an authoritative summary of what the Court has actually
decided. The Court does not consider that the headnote to the 1962 Judg -

ment assists in resolving the questions of interpretation raised in the fipres-
ent proceedings.
74. Thailand makes extensive reference to the conduct of the Parties
between 15 June 1962, when the Judgment was delivered, and 2007-2008,
when the present dispute may be said to have crystallized. The principalfi
purpose for which Thailand refers to that conduct is in connection with fi

its argument that there is no dispute, within the meaning of Article 60,
between the Parties, an issue to which that conduct is of course relevanfit
(see paragraphs 38-45 above). However, Thailand suggests that this con -
duct is also relevant to the interpretation of the Judgment.

75. A judgment of the Court cannot be equated to a treaty, an instru -
ment which derives its binding force and content from the consent of thefi
contracting States and the interpretation of which may be affected by thefi
subsequent conduct of those States, as provided by the principle stated fiin
Article 31, paragraph 3 (b), of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law

of Treaties. A judgment of the Court derives its binding force from the fi
Statute of the Court and the interpretation of a judgment is a matter offi
ascertaining what the Court decided, not what the parties subsequently
believed it had decided. The meaning and scope of a judgment of the
Court cannot, therefore, be affected by conduct of the parties occurring
after that judgment has been given.

More generally, as the Permanent Court of International Justice made
clear,

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8 Ord 1050.indb 56 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 307

71. Le principe non ultra petita est bien établi dans la jurisprudence de
la Cour (Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 20 novembre 1950 en

l’affaire du droit d’asile (Colombie c. Pérou), arrêt, C.I▯.J. Recueil 1950,
p. 402 ; Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (République démocratique du
Congo c. Belgique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 18-19, par. 43). Il est
l’une des raisons pour lesquelles les demandes contenues dans les conclu -
sions finales présentées par les Parties dans la procédure initfiiale sont

pertinentes aux fins d’interpréter l’arrêt de 1962. Néanmoins, ce principe
ne saurait justifier une interprétation allant à l’encontre desfi termes de
cet arrêt. La Cour a, en 1962, nécessairement établi la portée du petitum
dont elle était saisie, et l’article 60 du Statut ne lui donne pas la faculté
de substituer aujourd’hui une nouvelle détermination à celle faite à
l’époque.

72. Selon le Cambodge, le sommaire apparaissant en tête de l’arrêt
de 1962 démontre que ce dernier a fixé le tracé de la frontièrefi dans la zone
pertinente.
73. Selon le paragraphe 1 de l’article 95 du Règlement de la Cour
(paragraphe 1 de l’article 74 du Règlement de 1946, qui s’appliquait

en 1962), le sommaire n’est cependant pas l’un des éléments cofinstitutifs
de l’arrêt, dont il ne fait pas partie. En outre, il a pour uniquefi objet de
donner au lecteur une vue d’ensemble des points examinés dans un afirrêt;
il ne s’agit pas d’un résumé faisant autorité de ce que lfia Cour a effective -
ment décidé. Aussi la Cour ne considère-t-elle pas que le sommaire de

l’arrêt de 1962 puisse aider à trancher les questions d’interprétation quifi
ont été soulevées en la présente procédure.
74. La Thaïlande se réfère abondamment au comportement des Par -
ties entre le 15 juin 1962, date à laquelle l’arrêt a été rendu, et les annéfies
2007-2008, lorsque la présente contestation peut être considérée ficomme
s’étant cristallisée. Si elle le fait, c’est avant tout pourfi étayer son argu -

ment selon lequel il n’existe pas entre les Parties de contestation au sens
de l’article 60, ce comportement étant bien évidemment pertinent pour
décider de l’existence d’une telle contestation (voir paragraphes 38-45
ci-dessus). La Thaïlande semble toutefois laisser entendre que ce compofir -
tement est également pertinent aux fins de l’interprétation de fil’arrêt.

75. Un arrêt de la Cour ne saurait être considéré comme équivfialant à
un traité, qui tient sa force obligatoire et son contenu du consentemfient
des Etats contractants dont le comportement ultérieur peut, conforméfi -
ment au principe énoncé à l’alinéa b) du paragraphe 3 de l’article 31 de la
convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969, avoir une incidence

sur l’interprétation de l’instrument en question. Un arrêt tfiient sa force
obligatoire du Statut, et son interprétation consiste à détermifiner ce que la
Cour a décidé, et non ce que les parties ont par la suite penséfi qu’elle avait
décidé. Le sens et la portée d’un arrêt de la Cour ne saufiraient donc être
affectés par le comportement des parties après le prononcé de cefit arrêt.

D’une manière plus générale, ainsi que la Cour permanente l’fia claire -
ment indiqué,

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8 Ord 1050.indb 57 25/06/14 13:11 308 request for interprefitation (judgment)

“the Court, when giving an interpretation, refrains from any exami -
nation of facts other than those which it has considered in the judg -

ment under interpretation, and consequently all facts subsequent to
that judgment” (Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at
Chorzów), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 13, p. 21).

3. The Principal Features of the 1962 Judgment

76. Three features of the 1962 Judgment stand out when that Judg -
ment is read in the light of the considerations set out above. First, thfie
Court considered that it was dealing with a dispute regarding territoriafil
sovereignty over the area in which the Temple was located and that it wafis
not engaged in delimiting the frontier. Thus, the Court, referring back fito

its 1961 Judgment on Preliminary Objections (Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand), I.C.J. Reports 1961, p. 22, quoted in para -
graph 17 above), defined the matter before it in the following terms :

“Accordingly, the subject of the dispute submitted to the Court is
confined to a difference of view about sovereignty over the region of
the Temple of Preah Vihear. To decide this question of territorial
sovereignty, the Court must have regard to the frontier line between
the two States in this sector. Maps have been submitted to it and

various considerations have been advanced in this connection. The
Court will have regard to each of these only to such extent as it may
find in them reasons for the decision it has to give in order to settle fi
the sole dispute submitted to it, the subject of which has just been
stated.” (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 14.)

This characterization of the dispute as one regarding sovereignty over a
defined area of territory, rather than boundary delimitation, is also evfii -

dent in the Court’s decision that :
“Cambodia’s first and second Submissions, calling for pronounce -

ments on the legal status of the Annex I map and on the frontier line
in the disputed region, can be entertained only to the extent that they fi
give expression to grounds, and not as claims to be dealt with in the
operative provisions of the Judgment” (ibid., p. 36).

No mention was made of either the Annex I map or the location of the
frontier in the operative part. No map was attached to the Judgment, norfi
did the Court make any comment on the difficulties of transposition of fi

the Annex I map line, a matter which had been discussed by the Parties
during the 1962 proceedings and which would have been of obvious
importance in a judgment on delimitation of the frontier.

77. Secondly, however, the Annex I map played a central role in the
reasoning of the Court. After reviewing the history of the map and its

relationship with the 1904 Treaty, the Court stated :

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8 Ord 1050.indb 58 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 308

«la Cour écarte dans ses interprétations toute appréciation de faits
autres que ceux qu’elle a examinés dans l’arrêt qu’elle ifinterprète, et,
en conséquence, tous faits postérieurs à cet arrêt » (Interprétation des
arrêts nos 7 et 8 (usine de Chorzów), arrêt n 11, 1927, C.P.J.I. série A
no 13, p. 21).

3. Les principaux éléments contenus dans l’arrêt de 1962

76. Trois éléments se dégagent d’une lecture de l’arrêt de 1962 à la
lumière des considérations exposées ci-dessus. Premièrement, la Cour a

estimé qu’elle avait à connaître d’un différend relatif à la souveraineté
territoriale sur la région dans laquelle le temple était situé,fi et qu’elle ne
procédait pas à la délimitation de la frontière. Ainsi, renvfioyant à son
arrêt de 1961 sur les exceptions préliminaires (Temple de Préah Vihéar
(Cambodge c. Thaïlande), C.I.J. Recueil 1961, p. 22, cité au paragraphe 17

ci-dessus), elle a défini comme suit le différend dont elle était fisaisie:

«L’objet du différend soumis à la Cour est donc limité à une
contestation relative à la souveraineté dans la région du templfie de
Préah Vihéar. Pour trancher cette question de souveraineté territo -
riale, la Cour devra faire état de la frontière entre les deux Etafits dans
ce secteur. Des cartes lui ont été soumises et diverses considéfirations

ont été invoquées à ce sujet. La Cour ne fera état des unfies et des
autres que dans la mesure où elle y trouvera les motifs de la décifision
qu’elle doit rendre pour trancher le seul différend qui lui est soufimis
et dont l’objet vient d’être ci-dessus énoncé. » (C.I.J. Recueil 1962,
p. 14.)

Cette définition du différend comme ayant trait à la souverainetfié sur une

portion donnée de territoire, et non à la délimitation d’une frontière, res -
sort par ailleurs clairement de la décision de la Cour selon laquellefi

«les première et deuxième conclusions du Cambodge priant la Cour
de se prononcer sur le statut juridique de la carte de l’annexe I et sur
la ligne frontière dans la région contestée ne peuvent être firetenues
que dans la mesure où elles énoncent des motifs et non des demandefis
à retenir dans le dispositif de l’arrêt » (ibid., p. 36).

Ni la carte de l’annexe I ni l’emplacement de la frontière n’ont été

mentionnés dans le dispositif. Aucune carte n’a été jointe àfi l’arrêt, et la
Cour n’a fait aucune observation sur les difficultés de transposition de
la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I, question dont les Parties avaient débattu
au cours de la procédure de 1962 et qui, de toute évidence, aurait été
importante s’il s’était agi d’un arrêt portant sur la défilimitation de la fron -

tière.
77. Deuxièmement, la carte de l’annexe I a néanmoins joué un rôle
central dans la motivation de l’arrêt de la Cour. Après avoir rappelé l’his -
torique de cette carte ainsi que son lien avec la convention de 1904, la

Cour a indiqué ce qui suit :

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8 Ord 1050.indb 59 25/06/14 13:11 309 request for interprefitation (judgment)

“The real question, therefore, which is the essential one in this casfie,
is whether the Parties did adopt the Annex I map, and the line indi -

cated on it, as representing the outcome of the work of delimitation
of the frontier in the region of Preah Vihear, thereby conferring on it fi
a binding character.” (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 22.)

It then considered the conduct of the Parties with regard to the map andfi
other practice, including the visit of Prince Damrong to the Temple in
1930, when he was received by the French authorities. Although the
Court considered that the circumstances of Prince Damrong’s visit were

such as to amount to “a tacit recognition by Siam of the sovereignty fiof
Cambodia (under French Protectorate) over Preah Vihear” (ibid., p. 31),
that incident, together with Thailand’s other conduct subsequent to
1908-1909, was treated primarily as confirmation of the earlier acceptance
by Thailand of the Annex I map line. The Court stated :

“Even if there were any doubt as to Siam’s acceptance of the map
in 1908, and hence of the frontier indicated thereon, the Court would

consider, in the light of subsequent course of events, that Thailand is fi
now precluded by her conduct from asserting that she did not accept
it . . .
The Court however considers that Thailand in 1908-1909 did accept
the Annex I map as representing the outcome of the work of delimi -

tation, and hence recognized the line on that map as being the frontier fi
line, the effect of which is to situate Preah Vihear in Cambodian ter -
ritory. The Court considers further that, looked at as a whole, Thai -
land’s subsequent conduct confirms and bears out her original
acceptance, and that Thailand’s acts on the ground do not suffice tofi
negative this. Both Parties, by their conduct, recognized the line and

thereby in effect agreed to regard it as being the frontier line.” (Ibid.,
pp. 32-33.)

The Court went on to state that “the acceptance of the Annex I map by
the Parties caused the map to enter the treaty settlement and to become fi
an integral part of it” (ibid., p. 33) and concluded that it “therefore, feels
bound, as a matter of treaty interpretation, to pronounce in favour of tfihe

line as mapped in the disputed area” (ibid., p. 35).

78. Thirdly, in defining the dispute before it (in the passage quoted in
paragraph 76 above), the Court made clear that it was concerned only
with sovereignty in the “region of the Temple of Preah Vihear”.

That this region comprised only a small area is apparent from the 1962
proceedings. Thus, counsel for Cambodia stated :

“As I shall have occasion to remind the Court more than once, the
area in dispute in these proceedings is very small indeed. A variation

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8 Ord 1050.indb 60 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 309

«Le vrai problème, et le problème essentiel en l’espèce, est donc de
savoir si les Parties ont adopté la carte de l’annexe I, et la ligne qu’elle

indique, comme représentant le résultat des travaux de délimitafition
de la frontière dans la région de Préah Vihéar, conférant ainsi un
caractère obligatoire à cette carte.» (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 22.)

La Cour s’est ensuite intéressée au comportement des Parties àfi l’égard de
ladite carte et à d’autres éléments de leur pratique, notamment à la visite
que le prince Damrong avait effectuée au temple en 1930, à l’occasion de
laquelle il avait été reçu par les autorités françaises. fiBien qu’elle ait consi

déré que les circonstances de cette visite constituaient «une reconnaissance
tacite par le Siam de la souveraineté du Cambodge (sous protectorat fifran -
çais) à Préah Vihéar » (ibid., p. 30-31), la Cour a essentiellement traité cet
événement, ainsi que d’autres aspects du comportement de la Thafiïlande
postérieurs à 1908-1909, comme confirmant l’acceptation antérieure par la
Thaïlande de la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I. La Cour a ainsi précisé que,

«[m]ême s’il existait un doute sur l’acceptation par le Siam en 1908
de la carte, et par conséquent de la frontière qui y est indiquéfie, la

Cour, tenant compte des événements ultérieurs, considérerait que la
Thaïlande, en raison de sa conduite, ne saurait aujourd’hui affirfimer
qu’elle n’a pas accepté la carte…
Toutefois la Cour considère qu’en 1908-1909 la Thaïlande a bien
accepté la carte de l’annexe I comme représentant le résultat des tra -

vaux de délimitation et a ainsi reconnu la ligne tracée sur cette ficarte
comme étant la frontière dont l’effet est de situer Préah Vihéar dans
le territoire du Cambodge. La Cour estime d’autre part que, considéfi -
rée dans son ensemble, la conduite ultérieure de la Thaïlande afi
confirmé et corroboré son acceptation initiale et que les actes acficom -
plis par la Thaïlande sur les lieux n’ont pas suffi à l’annfiuler. Les deux

Parties ont par leur conduite reconnu la ligne et, par là même, elfiles
sont effectivement convenues de la considérer comme étant la fron -
tière. » (Ibid.,p. 32-33.)

La Cour a poursuivi en précisant que « l’acceptation par les Parties de la
carte de l’annexe I a[vait] incorporé cette carte dans le règlement conven -
tionnel, dont elle [était] devenue partie intégrante » (ibid., p. 33), et conclu
qu’elle « s’estim[ait] donc tenue, du point de vue de l’interprétation defis

traités, de se prononcer en faveur de la frontière indiquée sur la carte
pour la zone litigieuse » (ibid., p. 35).
78. Troisièmement, lorsqu’elle a défini le différend dont elle éfitait saisie
(dans le passage cité au paragraphe 76 ci-dessus), la Cour a clairement
indiqué qu’elle ne s’intéressait qu’à la souverainetéfi dans la « région du

temple de Préah Vihéar ».
Le fait qu’il s’agissait d’une zone ayant une superficie rédfiuite ressort de
la procédure de 1962. Ainsi, un conseil du Cambodge déclara ce qui suit :

«Comme [j’aurai] certainement plus d’une fois l’occasion de le
rappeler à la Cour, la région contestée dans cette affaire est tfirès

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8 Ord 1050.indb 61 25/06/14 13:11 310 request for interprefitation (judgment)

of half a mile, or even less, would place the Temple wholly on one
side or the other of the frontier.” (I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah

Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. II, p. 145.)
Later in the hearings, counsel for Cambodia observed that “the Court fi

and counsel will have spent pretty much the entire month of March dis -
cussing an area of land hardly a kilometre in breadth” (ibid., Vol. II,
p. 464) and subsequently referred to “a frontier area of less than two fior
three square kilometres” (ibid., Vol. II, p. 473). These statements were not

contradicted during the 1962 proceedings.
The Judgment shows that the Court considered that the disputed area
was a small one. Immediately after the passage in which it defined the
dispute as one regarding sovereignty over the region of the Temple, the fi
Court described that region in the following terms :

“The Temple of Preah Vihear . . . stands on a promontory of the
same name, belonging to the eastern sector of the Dangrek range of

mountains which, in a general way, constitutes the boundary between
the two countries in this region — Cambodia to the south and Thai -
land to the north. Considerable portions of this range consist of a
high cliff-like escarpment rising abruptly above the Cambodian plain.
This is the situation at Preah Vihear itself, where the main Temple

buildings stand in the apex of a triangular piece of high ground juttingfi
out into the plain.” (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 15.)

While the Annex I map deals with a part of the frontier region more than
100 km in extent, the Court made clear that it had to pronounce upon it
only “in the disputed area” (ibid., p. 35).

4. The Operative Part of the 1962 Judgment

79. In the light of these elements in the reasoning of the 1962 Judg -
ment, the Court will now turn to the operative part of that Judgment, the

text of which is reproduced in paragraph 21 above. The findings set out
in the second and third paragraphs are expressly stated to be conse -
quences following from the decision in the first operative paragraph. Itfi
follows that the three operative paragraphs have to be considered as a
whole; the task of ascertaining their meaning and scope cannot be reduced

to an exercise of construing individual words or phrases in isolation.

A. The first operative paragraph

80. The Court considers that the meaning of the first operative para -

graph is clear. In that paragraph, the Court ruled on Cambodia’s prinfici-
pal claim by finding that the Temple was situated in territory under thefi

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8 Ord 1050.indb 62 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 310

réduite. Une modification d’un demi-mile et même moins placerait le
temple entièrement d’un côté ou de l’autre de la frontièfire». (CR 62/1,

p. 19 de la traduction française.)
Par la suite, le conseil du Cambodge releva que « la Cour et les conseils

a[vaient] passé presque tout le mois de mars à débattre d’unfie bande de
terrain large à peine d’un kilomètre » (CR 62/17, p. 16 de la traduction
française), faisant plus tard état d’« une région frontière de moins de deux
à trois kilomètres carrés » (ibid., p. 36 de la traduction française). Ces

affirmations n’ont pas été contredites au cours de la procéfidure de 1962.
Ainsi que cela ressort de l’arrêt, la Cour a considéré que lfia zone liti -
gieuse était d’une superficie réduite. Immédiatement aprèfis le passage dans
lequel elle a défini le différend comme étant un différend relfiatif à la souve
raineté sur la région du temple, la Cour a décrit cette régifion comme suit:

«Le temple de Préah Vihéar … s’élève sur un éperon du même
nom faisant partie du secteur oriental de la chaîne de montagnes des fi

Dangrek, qui d’une façon générale constitue dans cette réfigion la
frontière entre les deux pays — le Cambodge au sud et la Thaïlande
au nord. Des parties considérables de la chaîne consistent en un
escarpement présentant l’aspect d’une haute falaise qui se dresfise à
l’abrupt au-dessus de la plaine cambodgienne. Telle est la situation à

Préah Vihéar même, où les bâtiments principaux du temple s’éfilèvent
au sommet d’un triangle montagneux en saillie sur la plaine. »
(C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 15.)

Alors que la carte de l’annexe I représente une partie de la région fronta -
lière s’étendant sur plus de 100 kilomètres, la Cour a clairement indiqué
qu’elle ne se prononçait en faveur de la ligne représentée sfiur cette carte
que «pour la zone litigieuse » (ibid., p. 35).

4. Le dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962

79. A la lumière de ces éléments figurant dans les motifs de l’afirrêt de
1962, la Cour en vient maintenant au dispositif de cet arrêt, dont le libellé

est reproduit au paragraphe 21 ci-dessus. Il y est expressément indiqué
que les conclusions formulées aux deuxième et troisième points fisont des
conséquences découlant de la décision énoncée au premier fipoint. Il s’en-
suit que les trois points du dispositif doivent être considérés comme un
tout; la tâche consistant à déterminer leur sens et leur portée fine saurait

être réduite à un exercice d’interprétation de différenfits mots ou membres
de phrase pris isolément.

A. Le premier point du dispositif

80. La Cour estime que le sens du premier point du dispositif est clair.

Elle s’y est prononcée sur la demande principale du Cambodge en
concluant que le temple était situé en territoire relevant de la sfiouveraineté

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8 Ord 1050.indb 63 25/06/14 13:11 311 request for interprefitation (judgment)

sovereignty of Cambodia. It will, however, be necessary to return to thefi
scope of this paragraph once the Court has examined the second and

third operative paragraphs.

B. The second operative paragraph

81. The principal dispute between the Parties concerns the second
operative paragraph. In that paragraph, the Court required, as a conse -

quence of the decision in the first operative paragraph, the withdrawal fiof
Thai military or police forces, or other guards or keepers “stationedfi by
her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory”. The seficond
operative paragraph did not indicate expressly the Cambodian territory
from which Thailand was required to withdraw its personnel, nor did it

state to where those personnel had to be withdrawn. The only context in fi
which the paragraph refers to an area of territory — “the Temple, or its
vicinity on Cambodian territory” — was in indicating which of its per -
sonnel Thailand was under an obligation to withdraw, namely those
whom it had stationed in that area.
82. During the hearings in the present proceedings, a Member of the

Court put the following question to the Parties :
“What is the precise territorial extent that each of the Parties con -

siders as the ‘vicinity’ of the Temple of Preah Vihear ‘on Cambfiodian
territory’ referred to in the second paragraph of the dispositif of the
Court’s Judgment of 1962 ?”

and requested that each Party provide a set of geographical co-ordinates
or refer to one of the maps produced in the 1962 proceedings.

83. In its response, Cambodia maintained that “the Court’s use of the fi

term ‘vicinity’ can best be appreciated in the light of the overlafip between
the Annex I map line and the watershed line proposed by the Thai experts
in the original proceedings”. As indicated on the map annexed to Cambfio -
dia’s response, the area between these two lines includes the entirety of
the promontory of Preah Vihear and the hill of Phnom Trap. The Annex I
map line is shown as the northern limit of this area. The western and

eastern limits of the area identified by Cambodia consist of the points
where the Annex I map line and the watershed line advocated by Thai -
land intersect. Cambodia accepts Thailand’s estimate that this area
measures approximately 4.6 square kilometres.

84. Thailand responded to the question by stating that “[i]n 1962, the
‘vicinity’ of the Temple was identified by the Council of Ministerfis for the
purposes of the withdrawal of the Thai troops who were stationed there”fi.

The 1962 resolution of the Thai Council of Ministers was based upon a
report, which outlined two possible methods for determining the extent of

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8 Ord 1050.indb 64 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 311

du Cambodge. Il sera cependant nécessaire de revenir sur la portéefi
de ce premier point, une fois que la Cour aura examiné les deuxième et

troisième points du dispositif.

B. Le deuxième point du dispositif

81. C’est le deuxième point du dispositif qui fait l’objet de la prfiincipale
contestation entre les Parties. La Cour y a prescrit, en conséquence fide la

décision prise au premier point, le retrait des éléments de forfices armées
ou de police ou autres gardes ou gardiens que la Thaïlande «a[vait] instal-
lés dans le temple ou dans ses environs situés en territoire cambofidgien ».
Le deuxième point du dispositif n’indiquait pas expressément lefi territoire
cambodgien dont la Thaïlande devait retirer ses personnels, et n’ifindiquait

pas non plus les lieux dans lesquels ceux-ci devaient se retirer. La Cour
n’y a fait référence à une zone de territoire — «le temple ou … ses envi -
rons situés en territoire cambodgien » — qu’en désignant les personnels
que la Thaïlande était tenue de retirer, à savoir ceux que cellfie-ci avait
installés dans la zone en question.
82. Au cours des audiences qui se sont tenues en la présente instance,

un membre de la Cour a posé la question suivante aux Parties :
«Quelle est précisément la portée territoriale que chacune des Pfiar -

ties considère être celle des « environs» du temple de Préah Vihéar
«situés en territoire cambodgien », mentionnés au deuxième point du
dispositif de l’arrêt rendu par la Cour en 1962 ?»

Il était en outre demandé à chacune des Parties de fournir une fisérie de
coordonnées géographiques ou de se référer à l’une desfi cartes qui avaient
été présentées dans la procédure de 1962.
83. Dans sa réponse, le Cambodge a avancé que « l’utilisation par la

Cour du terme « environs» p[ouvait] être mieux comprise à la lumière du
chevauchement de la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I et [de] la ligne de par -
tage des eaux proposée par les experts de la Thaïlande telles qu’fielles
apparaissaient devant la Cour lors de la procédure à l’origine ». Ainsi que
cela ressort de la carte annexée à la réponse du Cambodge, la zfione située
entre ces deux lignes comprend l’intégralité de l’éperon de Préah Vihéar et

la colline de Phnom Trap. La ligne de la carte de l’annexe I est représen -
tée comme étant la limite septentrionale de cette zone. Les limitefis occi -
dentale et orientale de la zone ainsi définie par le Cambodge correspfiondent
aux points d’intersection entre la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I et la ligne
de partage des eaux préconisée par la Thaïlande. D’après ficette dernière,

la superficie de cette zone est d’environ 4,6 kilomètres carrés, ce que le
Cambodge ne conteste pas.
84. La Thaïlande, quant à elle, a répondu à la question en déclarant
que, « [e]n 1962, le conseil des ministres a[vait] déterminé en quoi consis -
taient les « environs» du temple pour les besoins du retrait des forces

armées thaïlandaises qui y étaient installées». La résolution du conseil des
ministres thaïlandais de 1962 était fondée sur un rapport dans lequel

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8 Ord 1050.indb 65 25/06/14 13:11 312 request for interprefitation (judgment)

the “vicinity [of the Temple] on Cambodian territory”. The resolutfiion
chose the second of these methods, which involved confining the Temple
within an area bounded, to the south and east, by the escarpment and, tofi
the west, north and north-east, by a line close to the Temple. That line

(referred to in paragraph 22, above, as the “Thai Council of Ministers’
line”) consisted of three segments. The first segment began at the
south-western part of the escarpment and ran north in a straight line,
parallel to, and a few metres to the west of, the Temple buildings, untifil it

reached a point a few metres north of the most northern part of the Tem -
ple buildings. The second segment ran east from this point in a straightfi
line until it reached a point just north of the eastern extreme of this part
of the Temple. The third segment ran south-east from that point, broadly
following the course of a feature known as the Broken Stairway (which

was described in the report as falling within the vicinity of the Templefi)
until it reached the eastern escarpment. The report estimated the area
enclosed within these limits as approximately 0.25 square kilometres. Fol -
lowing the adoption of the resolution, Thailand erected a barbed wire

fence along the Council of Ministers’ line and put up signs stating tfihat
“the vicinity of the Temple of Preah Vihear does not extend beyond thfiis
limit”.

85. Since the second operative paragraph of the 1962 Judgment
required Thailand to withdraw “any [of its] military or police forcesfi, or
other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinfiity

on Cambodian territory”, the Court considers that it must begin by
examining the evidence that was before the Court in 1962 regarding the
locations at which such Thai personnel were stationed.

86. The only such evidence was given by Professor Ackermann, who
was called by Thailand as an expert and witness and who had visited the fi
Temple for several days in July 1961 in the course of preparing a report
to be submitted in the proceedings. Under cross-examination by counsel

for Cambodia, Professor Ackermann testified that, during that visit, the
only people he had seen at the Preah Vihear promontory were a detach -
ment of Thai frontier police and one Temple guard. He stated that the
police had been stationed in blockhouses at a camp located to the
north-east of the Temple, while the guard had lived in a separate house a

short distance to the west of the police camp (I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. II, pp. 401-402) 2.

2Professor Ackermann indicated these locations on a map shown to the Court. A copy fi
of the map, entitled “Annex 85 (d)”, is enclosed at the end of Volume II of I.C.J. Plead‑
ings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand).

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8 Ord 1050.indb 66 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 312

étaient exposées deux méthodes possibles pour déterminer l’fiétendue des
«environs [du temple] en territoire cambodgien ». C’est la seconde
méthode qui a été retenue dans la résolution, méthode quifi consistait à
confiner le temple dans une zone délimitée, au sud et à l’est, par l’escarpe-
ment et, à l’ouest, au nord et au nord-est, par une ligne proche du temple.

Cette ligne (définie au paragraphe 22 ci-dessus comme étant la « ligne du
conseil des ministres thaïlandais ») était constituée de trois segments. Le
premier, qui partait du sud-ouest de l’escarpement, se poursuivait en ligne
droite vers le nord, parallèlement aux bâtiments du temple — et à quelques
mètres à l’ouest de ceux-ci —, jusqu’à atteindre un point situé à quelques

mètres au nord de la partie la plus septentrionale desdits bâtiments. A
partir de ce point, le deuxième segment se dirigeait vers l’est enfi ligne
droite, jusqu’à atteindre un point situé immédiatement au nofird de l’extré -
mité orientale de cette partie du temple. A partir de ce point, le trfioisième

segment prenait une direction sud-est en suivant l’orientation générale
d’un élément connu sous le nom d’Escalier brisé (dont le rapport indi -
quait qu’il faisait partie des environs du temple), jusqu’à atfiteindre la par-
tie orientale de l’escarpement. Selon le rapport, la superficie de lafi zone
ainsi circonscrite était d’environ 0,25 kilomètre carré. A la suite de l’adop -

tion de la résolution, la Thaïlande érigea une clôture de bafirbelés le long
de la ligne du conseil des ministres thaïlandais, et installa des panfineaux
portant la mention «Les environs du temple de Préah Vihéar ne s’étendent
pas au-delà de cette limite ».

85. Etant donné que le deuxième point du dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962
prescrivait à la Thaïlande de retirer « tous les éléments de forces armées
ou de police ou autres gardes ou gardiens qu’elle a[vait] installéfis dans le
temple ou dans ses environs situés en territoire cambodgien », la Cour
considère qu’il lui faut commencer par examiner les élémentsfi de preuve

qui ont été présentés en 1962 concernant les lieux où ces personnels thaï -
landais étaient installés.
86. Les seuls éléments de preuve à cet égard furent fournis par file pro -
fesseur Ackermann, qui était présenté par la Thaïlande en tant qu’fiexpert
et témoin et avait séjourné plusieurs jours au temple au mois dfie juil -

let 1961 en vue d’établir un rapport devant être soumis dans le cadre de la
procédure. Au cours de son contre-interrogatoire par l’un des conseils du
Cambodge, le professeur Ackermann déclara que, durant cette visite, les
seules personnes qu’il avait vues sur l’éperon de Préah Vihéar étaient un

détachement de la police des frontières thaïlandaise et un gardfie du temple.
Il déclara en outre que les policiers étaient installés dans defis fortins situés
dans un camp se trouvant au nord-est du temple, le garde séjournant
quant à lui dans une habitation différente, un peu à l’ouest fidu camp de la
police (CR 62/13, p. 35-37 de la traduction française) 2.

2 Le professeur Ackermann désigna ces lieux sur une carte présentée à la Coufir. Un
exemplaire de cette carte, intitulée « Annexe 85 d) », figure à la fin du volume II de la série

C.I.J. Mémoires, Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande).

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8 Ord 1050.indb 67 25/06/14 13:11 313 request for interprefitation (judgment)

87. The location of the police station was subsequently confirmed by
counsel for Thailand, according to whom the police camp was located

south of the Annex I map line but north of a line which Cambodia main -
tained was the watershed line (I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. II, p. 559). During the 1962 proceedings,
Cambodia had advanced an alternative argument that if, contrary to its
primary position, the boundary was required to follow the watershed

rather than the Annex I map line, then it was this Cambodian line which
represented the watershed and not the watershed line advocated by Thai -
land (to which reference has already been made). In the event, the Court
found that it was unnecessary to consider the location of the watershed fiin
the area of the Temple (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 35). Neverthe -
less, the reference to that line in the speech by counsel for Thailand is

significant, because, as Thailand has stated in the current proceedings,fi the
Thai Council of Ministers’ line follows a course very close to that ofif the
watershed line advanced by Cambodia in 1962. It is apparent, therefore, fi
that the Thai police detachment was stationed at a location north of thefi
line subsequently drawn by the 1962 resolution of the Thai Council of

Ministers and thus outside what Thailand considers to be the “vicinity [of
the Temple] on Cambodian territory”.

88. When the Court required Thailand to withdraw military or police

forces, guards or keepers which it had stationed in the Temple, or in thfie
vicinity of the Temple on Cambodian territory, it must have intended thafit
obligation to apply to the police detachment referred to by Professor Ack -
ermann, since, except for the solitary Temple guard (who seems to have fi
been living near the police camp), there was no evidence of the presencfie
of any other Thai personnel anywhere near the Temple. Accordingly, the

term “vicinity on Cambodian territory” has to be construed as extending
at least to the area where the police detachment was stationed at the tifime
of the original proceedings. Since that area lies north of the Thai Counficil
of Ministers’ line, that line cannot represent the correct interpretation
of the territorial scope of the second operative paragraph as Thailand

contends.

89. That conclusion is confirmed by a number of other factors. As the
Court emphasized in its description of the area around the Temple (ibid.,
p. 15), the Temple is located on an easily identifiable geographical featufire.

This feature is a promontory. In the east, south and south-west, the prom -
ontory descends by a steep escarpment to the Cambodian plain. In the wesfit
and north-west, the ground drops into what Professor Ackermann described
in his evidence as a “valley . . . between the Pnom Trap mountain and the
Phra Viharn mountain” (I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambo ‑
dia v. Thailand), Vol. II, p. 385). It is through this valley that access to the

Temple from the Cambodian plain can most easily be obtained. The hill offi
Phnom Trap rises from the western side of this valley. A natural under -

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8 Ord 1050.indb 68 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 313

87. L’emplacement du poste de police fut par la suite confirmé par un fi
conseil de la Thaïlande, qui précisa que le camp en question étfiait situé au

sud de la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I, mais au nord de la ligne que le
Cambodge considérait comme étant la ligne de partage des eaux
(CR 62/21, p. 33 de la traduction française). Au cours de la procédure
de 1962, le Cambodge avait, à titre subsidiaire, fait valoir que, si la fron -
tière devait suivre la ligne de partage des eaux et non la ligne de lfia carte

de l’annexe I — contrairement à sa position principale —, la ligne de par -
tage des eaux qu’il convenait de retenir était celle proposée pfiar le Cam -
bodge, et non celle préconisée par la Thaïlande (à laquelle il a déjà été fait
référence). En fait, la Cour a jugé qu’il n’était pasfi nécessaire de se pencher
sur la question de l’emplacement de la ligne de partage des eaux dans la
zone du temple (arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 35). La référence alors faite

à cette ligne par le conseil de la Thaïlande a cependant son imporfitance,
étant donné que, ainsi que cette dernière l’a indiqué danfis la présente pro -
cédure, le tracé de la ligne du conseil des ministres thaïlandafiis est très
proche de celui de la ligne de partage des eaux avancée par le Cambodfige
en 1962. Il apparaît donc que le détachement de police thaïlandaisfi était

installé en un lieu situé au nord de la ligne ultérieurement trfiacée dans la
résolution du conseil des ministres de 1962 et, partant, en dehors de la
zone que la Thaïlande considère comme constituant les « environs [du
temple] situés en territoire cambodgien ».
88. Lorsque la Cour a prescrit à la Thaïlande de retirer les éléfiments de

forces armées ou de police, gardes ou gardiens qu’elle avait instafillés dans
le temple ou dans les environs de celui-ci situés en territoire cambodgien,
son intention était assurément que cette obligation s’appliquâfit au déta -
chement de police mentionné par le professeur Ackermann, puisque, hor -
mis le garde solitaire (qui séjournait d’ailleurs, semble-t-il, à proximité du
camp de la police), rien n’indiquait que d’autres personnels thaïfilandais

fussent installés en quelque lieu proche du temple. En conséquencefi, l’ex -
pression « environs situés en territoire cambodgien » doit être interprétée
comme s’étendant au moins à la zone où était installé file détachement de
police à l’époque de la procédure initiale. Cette zone étant située au nord
de la ligne du conseil des ministres thaïlandais, cette ligne ne saurfiait,

contrairement à ce que soutient la Thaïlande, refléter l’ifinterprétation
exacte de la portée territoriale du deuxième point du dispositif.
89. Un certain nombre d’autres éléments viennent corroborer cette
conclusion. Ainsi que la Cour l’a souligné en décrivant la zone située aux
abords du temple (ibid., p. 15), celui-ci s’élève sur un accident géogra -

phique aisément identifiable, à savoir un éperon. A l’est, au sud et au
sud-ouest de cet éperon, un escarpement abrupt mène à la plaine camfibod -
gienne; à l’ouest et au nord-ouest, le terrain s’infléchit vers ce que le pro -
fesseur Ackermann a, dans sa déposition, décrit comme étant une « vallée
entre les montagnes de Pnom Trap et de Phra Viharn » (CR 62/12, p. 60
de la traduction française). C’est par cette vallée que l’aficcès au temple

depuis la plaine cambodgienne peut être le plus aisé. La colline dfie Phnom
Trap s’élève du côté occidental de cette vallée. Selon le sens naturel du

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8 Ord 1050.indb 69 25/06/14 13:11 314 request for interprefitation (judgment)

standing of the concept of the “vicinity” of the Temple would extefind to the
entirety of the Preah Vihear promontory.

90. Furthermore, the Court’s reasoning regarding the significance of
the Annex I map (considered in paragraph 77 above) shows that the
Court considered that Cambodia’s territory extended in the north as ffiar
as, but no farther than, the Annex I map line. Although Professor Acker -
mann did not give any estimate of the distances between the various

places on the promontory to which he referred in his evidence, it is clefiar
that, for example, the police post which he identified was only a very
short distance to the south of the nearest point on the Annex I map line.

91. The Court was therefore dealing with a small area with clearly
defined geographical limits to the east, south, west and north-west, and

bounded in the north by what the Court had stated in its reasoning was
the limit of Cambodian territory. In these circumstances, the Court
considers that the territorial scope of the second operative paragraph
must be construed as extending to the whole of the promontory, rather
than being confined to the part of it chosen by the Thai Council of Min -

isters in 1962.
92. Turning to the position of Cambodia, the Court is also unable to
accept its interpretation of “vicinity”. In its answer to the quesfition put by
a Member of the Court (see paragraph 83 above), Cambodia maintained
that the vicinity includes not only the promontory of Preah Vihear but

also the hill of Phnom Trap. There are several reasons why the Court
considers that this is not the correct interpretation of the second operfiative
paragraph.
93. First, Phnom Trap and the promontory of Preah Vihear aredistinct
geographical features which are clearly shown as separate on the maps
used in the 1962 proceedings and, in particular, on the Annex I map,

which was the only map to which the Court made more than passing
reference in the Judgment.
94. Secondly, there are certain indications in the record of the 1962
proceedings that Cambodia did not treat Phnom Trap as falling within
the “region of the Temple” or “Temple area” (the terms usedfi by the

Court in defining the scope of the dispute before it). Thus, a former Cfiam -
bodian provincial governor, Mr. Suon Bonn, who was called as a witness
by Cambodia, testified that Preah Vihear had formed part of his provincefi
(I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Vol. II, p. 333), but that he thought that Phnom Trap belonged to a

neighbouring province (ibid., p. 434). Moreover, as explained in para -
graph 78 above, in referring to the area with which the Court was con -
cerned, counsel for Cambodia spoke of its dimensions in terms which
would be too small to encompass, at the same time, Phnom Trap as well
as the promontory of Preah Vihear (ibid., pp. 464 and 473). He also stated
that Phnom Trap was not part of the “crucial area” with which the fiCourt

was concerned (ibid., p. 465).

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8 Ord 1050.indb 70 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 314

terme, les «environs» du temple devraient s’étendre à l’intégralité de l’épe-
ron de Préah Vihéar.

90. En outre, il ressort du raisonnement suivi dans l’arrêt de 1962
concernant l’importance de la carte de l’annexe I (point qui a été examiné
au paragraphe 77 ci-dessus) que, selon la Cour, le territoire cambodgien
s’étendait, au nord, jusqu’à la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I, mais pas
au-delà. Quoique le professeur Ackermann n’ait donné aucune indication

de distance entre les différents endroits de l’éperon auxquels il s’est référé
dans sa déposition, il apparaît clairement, par exemple, que le poste de
police qu’il avait repéré ne se trouvait qu’à une trèsfi faible distance au sud
du point le plus proche de la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I.
91. La zone considérée par la Cour était donc restreinte, circonscrfiite
par des limites géographiques clairement établies à l’est, au sud, à l’ouest

et au nord-ouest, et, au nord, par la limite du territoire cambodgien telle
que la Cour l’avait déterminée dans les motifs de son arrêt.fi Dès lors, la
Cour considère qu’il convient d’interpréter la portée territoriale du
deuxième point du dispositif comme couvrant l’intégralité defi l’éperon, et
non comme étant limitée à la partie de celui-ci qui fut retenue par le

conseil des ministres thaïlandais en 1962.
92. La Cour ne saurait davantage souscrire à l’interprétation des
«environs» avancée par le Cambodge. Dans sa réponse à la question
posée par un membre de la Cour (voir paragraphe 83 ci-dessus), celui-ci a
en effet soutenu que les environs incluaient non seulement l’éperon de

Préah Vihéar mais aussi la colline de Phnom Trap. La Cour estime que
telle n’est pas l’interprétation exacte du deuxième point dufi dispositif, et
ce, pour plusieurs raisons.
93. Premièrement, Phnom Trap et l’éperon de Préah Vihéar sont des
accidents géographiques distincts, qui apparaissent clairement comme fi
étant séparés sur les cartes utilisées dans la procédure de 1962 et, notam -

ment, sur la carte de l’annexe I, seul élément cartographique auquel la
Cour a, dans l’arrêt, fait plus qu’une référence incidentfie.
94. Deuxièmement, certains éléments du dossier de l’affaire de 1962
portent à penser que le Cambodge ne considérait pas Phnom Trap comme
faisant partie de la « région du temple » ou de la « zone du temple » (pour

reprendre les termes employés par la Cour lorsqu’elle a défini fila portée du
différend dont elle était saisie). Ainsi, un ancien gouverneur de fiprovince
cambodgien, M. Suon Bonn, présenté en tant que témoin par le Cam -
bodge, déclara que Préah Vihéar avait fait partie de sa province
(C.I.J. Mémoires, Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande),

vol. II, p. 333) mais que, selon lui, Phnom Trap appartenait à une pro -
vince voisine (ibid., p. 434). De surcroît, ainsi que cela a été indiqué au
paragraphe 78 ci-dessus, un conseil du Cambodge, se référant à la zone
considérée par la Cour, en évoqua les dimensions en des termes fitrop res -
trictifs pour que cette zone englobe à la fois la colline de Phnom Trap et
l’éperon de Préah Vihéar (CR 62/17, p. 16 et 36 de la traduction fran -

çaise), précisant en outre que Phnom Trap n’était pas « le point essentiel»
aux fins de l’examen par la Cour (ibid., p. 18 de la traduction française).

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8 Ord 1050.indb 71 25/06/14 13:11 315 request for interprefitation (judgment)

95. Thirdly, there was no evidence before the Court of any Thai mili -
tary or police presence on Phnom Trap in 1962 and no suggestion that

Phnom Trap was relevant to Cambodia’s claim that Thailand should be
required to withdraw its forces.

96. Lastly, Cambodia’s interpretation depends upon identifying the
location of the points at which the Annex I map line intersects with the

watershed line advocated by Thailand. Yet, in the 1962 Judgment,
the Court made clear that it was not concerned with the location of the
watershed and did not decide where the watershed lay (I.C.J. Reports
1962, p. 35). It is, therefore, implausible to suggest that the Court had the
watershed line in mind when it used the term “vicinity”.
97. While no one of these considerations is conclusive in itself, taken

together they lead the Court to conclude that, in 1962, the Court did nofit
have this wider area in mind and, accordingly, that it did not intend thfie
term “vicinity [of the Temple] on Cambodian territory” to be underfistood
as applicable to territory outside the promontory of Preah Vihear. That fiis
not to say that the 1962 Judgment treated Phnom Trap as part of Thai -

land; the Court did not address the issue of sovereignty over Phnom
Trap, or any other area beyond the limits of the promontory of Preah
Vihear.

98. From the reasoning in the 1962 Judgment, seen in the light of the

pleadings in the original proceedings, it appears that the limits of thefi
promontory of Preah Vihear, to the south of the Annex I map line, con -
sist of natural features. To the east, south and south-west, the promon -
tory drops in a steep escarpment to the Cambodian plain. The Parties
were in agreement in 1962 that this escarpment, and the land at its foot,
were under Cambodian sovereignty in any event. To the west and

north-west, the land drops in a slope, less steep than the escarpment but
nonetheless pronounced, into the valley which separates Preah Vihear
from the neighbouring hill of Phnom Trap, a valley which itself drops
away in the south to the Cambodian plain (see paragraph 89 above). For
the reasons already given (see paragraphs 92-97 above), the Court consid -

ers that Phnom Trap lay outside the disputed area and the 1962 Judg-
ment did not address the question whether it was located in Thai or
Cambodian territory. Accordingly, the Court considers that the promon -
tory of Preah Vihear ends at the foot of the hill of Phnom Trap, that isfi to
say: where the ground begins to rise from the valley.

In the north, the limit of the promontory is the Annex I map line, from
a point to the north-east of the Temple where that line abuts the escarp -
ment to a point in the north-west where the ground begins to rise from
the valley, at the foot of the hill of Phnom Trap.
The Court considers that the second operative paragraph of the 1962
Judgment required Thailand to withdraw from the whole territory of the

promontory, thus defined, to Thai territory any Thai personnel stationedfi
on that promontory.

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8 Ord 1050.indb 72 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 315

95. Troisièmement, aucun élément ne fut présenté à la Courfi en 1962
indiquant une quelconque présence militaire ou policière thaïlafindaise à

Phnom Trap, et rien ne laissait penser que cette colline était pertinente
aux fins de la demande du Cambodge tendant à ce que la Thaïlande soit
tenue de retirer ses forces.
96. Enfin, l’interprétation du Cambodge repose sur la localisation des
points d’intersection entre la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I et la ligne de

partage des eaux préconisée par la Thaïlande. Or, dans son arrêfit de 1962,
la Cour a clairement indiqué qu’elle ne s’intéressait pas à l’emplacement
de la ligne de partage des eaux, et elle ne s’est pas prononcée sufir ce point
(C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 35). Il n’est donc guère plausible qu’elle ait eu
cette ligne à l’esprit en employant le terme « environs».
97. Bien qu’aucune de ces considérations ne soit déterminante en tafint

que telle, prises conjointement, elles conduisent la Cour à conclure que,
en 1962, la Cour n’avait pas à l’esprit cette zone plus étenduefi et, par
conséquent, n’entendait pas que l’expression « environs [du temple] situés
en territoire cambodgien » soit comprise comme s’appliquant à un quel -
conque territoire situé en dehors de l’éperon de Préah Vihéar. Cela ne

signifie pas que, dans l’arrêt de 1962, Phnom Trap ait été considérée
comme faisant partie de la Thaïlande ; la Cour n’a pas examiné la ques -
tion de la souveraineté sur cette colline, ni sur aucune autre zone sfiituée
au-delà des limites de l’éperon de Préah Vihéar.
98. Au vu des motifs de l’arrêt de 1962, examinés à la lumière des écri -

tures et plaidoiries en l’instance initiale, il apparaît que les lfiimites de l’ép-e
ron de Préah Vihéar, au sud de la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I, sont des
accidents géographiques naturels. A l’est, au sud et au sud-ouest de cet épe -
ron, un escarpement abrupt mène à la plaine cambodgienne. Les Parties
convenaient, en 1962, que cet escarpement ainsi que le terrain situé au pied
de celui-ci relevaient, en tout état de cause, de la souveraineté du Cam -

bodge. A l’ouest et au nord-ouest, le terrain s’infléchit en une pente moins
abrupte mais néanmoins prononcée menant à la vallée qui séfipare
Préah Vihéar de la colline voisine de Phnom Trap (voir paragraphe 89
ci-dessus); cette même vallée, vers le sud, descend dans la plaine cambod -
gienne. Pour les raisons déjà indiquées (voir paragraphes 92-97 ci-dessus), la

Cour estime que Phnom Trap ne fait pas partie de la zone litigieuse et qfiue
la question de savoir si elle est située en territoire thaïlandaisfi ou cambodgien
n’a pas été examinée dans l’arrêt de 1962. En conséquence, elle considère
que l’éperon de Préah Vihéar se termine au pied de la colline de Phnom
Trap, c’est-à-dire là où le terrain commence à remonter depuis la vallée.

Au nord, la limite de l’éperon est la ligne de la carte de l’anfinexe I, à
partir d’un point, au nord-est du temple, où cette ligne rencontre l’escar -
pement, jusqu’à un point, au nord-ouest, où le terrain commence à s’éle -
ver depuis la vallée, au pied de la colline de Phnom Trap.
La Cour estime que le deuxième point du dispositif de l’arrêt dfie 1962
prescrivait à la Thaïlande de retirer de l’intégralité dufi territoire de l’épe -

ron ainsi défini tous les personnels thaïlandais qui y étaient fiinstallés,
jusqu’à son propre territoire.

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8 Ord 1050.indb 73 25/06/14 13:11 316 request for interprefitation (judgment)

99. The Court notes Thailand’s argument about the difficulty of trans -
posing the Annex I map and thus of ascertaining the precise location on

the ground of the Annex I map line in the area described in the preceding
paragraph. The 1962 Judgment did not, however, address that question
and the Court cannot now, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Artifi -
cle 60 to interpret the 1962 Judgment, deal with a matter which was not
addressed by that Judgment. Nevertheless, the parties to a case before tfihe

Court have an obligation to implement the judgment of the Court in
good faith. It is of the essence of that obligation that it does not perfimit
either party to impose a unilateral solution.

C. The relationship between the second operative paragraph and the rest of ▯

the operative part

100. The Court has already stated (see paragraph 79 above) that the
three paragraphs of the operative part of the 1962 Judgment have to be
considered as a whole. Having determined the meaning and scope of the
second paragraph, the Court now turns to the relationship between that

paragraph and the other two paragraphs of the operative part. While
there is no dispute between the Parties regarding the third operative para-
graph, it is nonetheless relevant to the extent that it sheds light on tfihe
meaning and scope of the rest of the operative part.
101. The scope of the operative part of a judgment of the Court is
necessarily bound up with the scope of the dispute before the Court. Thefi

1962 Judgment defined the dispute which was then before the Court as
one concerning “sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah
Vihear” (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 14 ; emphasis added). It was entirely con-
sistent with this view of the dispute that the Court, having decided in fithe
first operative paragraph of the Judgment that the Temple was located infi

territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia, determined, as a conse -
quence of that finding, that Thailand was under an obligation to with -
draw its forces and other personnel stationed “at the Temple, or in ifits
vicinity on Cambodian territory” and to restore objects removed from
“the Temple or the Temple area” (emphasis added). The second and third

operative paragraphs each, therefore, imposed obligations with respect to
an area of territory which extended beyond the Temple itself. The secondfi
operative paragraph expressly described this area as Cambodian terri -
tory. The third operative paragraph did not do so but the Court considerfis
that such a description was implicit ; an obligation to restore artefacts

taken from the “area of the Temple” would be a logical consequence of a
finding of sovereignty only to the extent that the area in question was fi
covered by that finding.
102. The area with which the Court was concerned in the original pro -
ceedings, as has already been explained (see paragraph 78 above), is small
and bounded, except to the north, by readily identifiable geographical

features. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the terms
“vicinity [of the Temple] on Cambodian territory”, in the second pfiara -

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8 Ord 1050.indb 74 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 316

99. La Cour prend acte de l’argument de la Thaïlande concernant la
difficulté de transposer sur le terrain la carte de l’annexe I et, partant, de

déterminer l’emplacement précis de la ligne qui y est représfientée dans la
zone décrite au paragraphe précédent. Cette question n’a cepfiendant pas
été examinée dans l’arrêt de 1962, et la Cour ne saurait, aujourd’hui, en
exerçant la compétence qu’elle tient de l’article 60 pour interpréter cet
arrêt, traiter une question qui ne l’a pas été dans celui-ci. Il n’en demeure

pas moins que les parties à une affaire portée devant la Cour sont fitenues
d’exécuter de bonne foi l’arrêt rendu par celle-ci. Par essence, cette obli -
gation n’autorise aucune d’elles à imposer une solution unilatéfirale.

C. Le lien entre le deuxième point et le reste du dispositif

100. La Cour a déjà précisé (voir paragraphe 79 ci-dessus) que les
trois points du dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962 devaient être considérés comme
un tout. Ayant déterminé le sens et la portée du deuxième, efille en vient
maintenant au lien entre celui-ci et les deux autres points. Bien qu’il

n’existe aucune contestation entre les Parties en ce qui concerne le fitroi -
sième point, celui-ci est néanmoins pertinent dans la mesure où il éclaire
le sens et la portée du reste du dispositif.

101. La portée du dispositif d’un arrêt de la Cour est nécessairefiment
liée à celle du différend dont elle est saisie. Dans l’arrêfit de 1962, la Cour

a défini le différend dont elle avait à connaître comme ayantfi trait « à la
souveraineté dans larégion du temple de PréahVihéar» (C.I.J.Recueil 1962,
p. 14; les italiques sont de la Cour). C’est de manière tout à faitfi cohérente
avec cette définition du différend que la Cour, ayant jugé au prfiemier point
du dispositif que le temple était situé en territoire relevant de fila souverai-

neté du Cambodge, a décidé que, en conséquence, la Thaïlafinde était tenue
de retirer ses forces et autres personnels installés « dans le temple ou dans
ses environs situés en territoire cambodgien » et de restituer les objets qui
avaient été enlevés «du temple ou de la zone du temple » (les italiques sont
de la Cour). Les deuxième et troisième points du dispositif imposfiaient

donc l’un comme l’autre des obligations se rapportant à une porfition de
territoire qui s’étendait au-delà du temple lui-même. Dans le deuxième
point, il était expressément précisé que la zone ainsi viséfie était située en
territoire cambodgien. Quoique cette précision n’ait pas étéfi apportée dans
le troisième point, la Cour considère qu’elle était implicite ; l’obligation de

restituer des pièces prises dans la « zone du temple » ne peut être une
conséquence logique d’une conclusion relative à la souverainetéfi que dans
la mesure où ladite zone est couverte par cette conclusion.
102. Ainsi que cela a déjà été précisé (voir paragraphe 78 ci-dessus), la
zone à laquelle la Cour s’est intéressée dans la procédurfie initiale est réduite
et, hormis au nord, délimitée par des accidents géographiques aisément

identifiables. Dès lors, la Cour considère que les expressions «fi environs
[du temple] situés en territoire cambodgien », employée dans le deuxième

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8 Ord 1050.indb 75 25/06/14 13:11 317 request for interprefitation (judgment)

graph, and “area of the Temple”, in the third paragraph, refer to fithe
same small parcel of territory. The obligations which the Court imposed fi

in respect of that parcel of territory were stated to be a consequence ofif
the finding in the first paragraph. In view of the characteristics of thfie
dispute which confronted the Court in 1962 — in particular, the nature of
the submissions of each Party — the obligations imposed by the second
and third paragraphs would be a logical consequence of the finding of

sovereignty in the first operative paragraph only if the territory referfired
to in the first paragraph corresponded to the territory referred to in tfihe
second and third paragraphs.
103. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the territorial scope of the
three operative paragraphs is the same : the finding in the first paragraph
that “the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory under the sfiover -

eignty of Cambodia” must be taken as referring, like the second and third
paragraphs, to the promontory of Preah Vihear, within the limits des-
cribed in paragraph 98 of the present Judgment.
104. In these circumstances, the Court does not consider it necessary
further to address the question whether the 1962 Judgment determined

with binding force the boundary line between Cambodia and Thailand.
In a dispute concerned only with sovereignty over the promontory of
Preah Vihear, the Court concluded that that promontory, extending in
the north to the Annex I map line but not beyond it, was under Cambo -
dian sovereignty. That was the issue which was in dispute in 1962 and

which the Court considers to be at the heart of the present dispute overfi
interpretation of the 1962 Judgment.
105. Nor is it necessary for the Court to address the question whether
the obligation imposed on Thailand by the second operative paragraph
was a continuing obligation, in the sense maintained by Cambodia. In thefi
present proceedings, Thailand has accepted that it has a general and confi -

tinuing legal obligation to respect the integrity of Cambodian territoryfi,
which applies to any disputed territory found by the Court to be under
Cambodian sovereignty. Once a dispute regarding territorial sovereignty fi
has been resolved and uncertainty removed, each party must fulfil in goofid
faith the obligation which all States have to respect the territorial infiteg -

rity of all other States. Likewise, the Parties have a duty to settle anfiy
dispute between them by peaceful means.

106. These obligations, which derive from the principles of the Charter
of the United Nations, are of particular importance in the present con -

text. As is clear from the record of both the present proceedings and thfiose
of 1959-1962, the Temple of Preah Vihear is a site of religious and cul -
tural significance for the peoples of the region and is now listed by
UNESCO as a world heritage site (see paragraphs 25-27 above). In this
respect, the Court recalls that under Article 6 of the World Heritage Con -
vention, to which both States are parties, Cambodia and Thailand must

co-operate between themselves and with the international community in
the protection of the site as a world heritage. In addition, each State fiis

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8 Ord 1050.indb 76 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 317

point, et «zone du temple», figurant dans le troisième, renvoient à la même
petite portion de territoire. Les obligations prescrites par la Cour en fice qui

concerne cette portion de territoire ont été présentées commfie découlant de
la conclusion énoncée dans le premier point. Compte tenu des caractéris -
tiques du différend dont la Cour était saisie en 1962 — et, en particulier,
de la nature des conclusions de chacune des Parties —, les obligations
prescrites aux deuxième et troisième points du dispositif ne pouvafiient être

une conséquence logique de la conclusion relative à la souverainetfié énon -
cée au premier point que si le territoire qui y était visé corrfiespondait au
territoire qui était visé aux deuxième et troisième points.
103. En conséquence, la Cour conclut que la portée territoriale des trofiis
points du dispositif est la même : la conclusion énoncée au premier point,
selon laquelle «le temple de Préah Vihéar est situé en territoire relevant de

la souveraineté du Cambodge », doit être considérée comme renvoyant,
ainsi que les deuxième et troisième points, à l’éperon defi Préah Vihéar,
dans les limites exposées au paragraphe 98 du présent arrêt.
104. Dès lors, la Cour n’estime pas nécessaire de se pencher plus avfiant
sur la question de savoir si la ligne frontière entre le Cambodge et fila Thaï -

lande a été déterminée avec force obligatoire par l’arrêfit de 1962. Saisie
d’un différend ayant exclusivement trait à la souveraineté sufir l’éperon
de Préah Vihéar, la Cour a conclu que celui-ci, qui s’étend au nord jusqu’à
la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I, mais pas au-delà, relevait de la souverai -
neté du Cambodge. Telle était la question en litige en 1962, et telle est la

question que la Cour considère comme étant au cœur de la préfisente
contestation relative à l’interprétation de l’arrêt de 1962.
105. Il n’y a pas davantage lieu pour la Cour d’examiner la question defi
savoir si l’obligation imposée à la Thaïlande par le deuxièfime point du
dispositif était de nature continue, au sens où l’entend le Camfibodge. En
la présente procédure, la Thaïlande a reconnu que lui incombaitfi une obli -

gation juridique générale et continue de respecter l’intégrifité du territoire
cambodgien, obligation qui s’applique à tout territoire en litige fidont la
Cour a jugé qu’il relevait de la souveraineté du Cambodge. Lorsfiqu’un
différend relatif à une question de souveraineté territoriale a fiété tranché et
que l’incertitude a été levée, chacune des parties doit s’fiacquitter de bonne

foi de l’obligation qu’a tout Etat de respecter l’intégrité territoriale des
autres Etats. De même, les Parties ont l’obligation de régler pfiar des
moyens pacifiques tout différend qui les oppose.
106. Ces obligations, qui découlent des principes de la Charte des
Nations Unies, revêtent une importance particulière dans le présent

contexte. Ainsi que cela ressort clairement des dossiers de la présenfite pro -
cédure et de celle de 1959-1962, le temple de Préah Vihéar est, du point de
vue religieux et culturel, un site important pour les peuples de la région,
et il a été inscrit par l’UNESCO au patrimoine mondial (voir pfiara -
graphes 25-27 ci-dessus). A cet égard, la Cour rappelle que, en application
de l’article 6 de la convention du patrimoine mondial, à laquelle ils sont

tous deux parties, le Cambodge et la Thaïlande ont le devoir de coopérer
entre eux et avec la communauté internationale afin de protéger lefi site en

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8 Ord 1050.indb 77 25/06/14 13:11 318 request for interprefitation (judgment)

under an obligation not to “take any deliberate measures which might fi

damage directly or indirectly” such heritage. In the context of thesefi obli-
gations, the Court wishes to emphasize the importance of ensuring access
to the Temple from the Cambodian plain.

5. Conclusions

107. The Court therefore concludes that the first operative paragraph
of the 1962 Judgment determined that Cambodia had sovereignty over
the whole territory of the promontory of Preah Vihear, as defined in

paragraph 98 of the present Judgment, and that, in consequence, the sec -
ond operative paragraph required Thailand to withdraw from that terri -
tory the Thai military or police forces, or other guards or keepers, thafit
were stationed there.

*
* *

108. For these reasons,

The Court,

(1) Unanimously,

Finds that it has jurisdiction under Article 60 of the Statute to entertain
the Request for interpretation of the 1962 Judgment presented by Cam -
bodia, and that this Request is admissible ;

(2) Unanimously,

Declares, by way of interpretation, that the Judgment of 15 June 1962
decided that Cambodia had sovereignty over the whole territory of the
promontory of Preah Vihear, as defined in paragraph 98 of the present

Judgment, and that, in consequence, Thailand was under an obligation to fi
withdraw from that territory the Thai military or police forces, or othefir
guards or keepers, that were stationed there.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at

the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eleventh day of November, two thousand
and thirteen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of
the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Kingdom offi
Cambodia and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand, respectively.

(Signed) Peter Tomka,
President.

(Signed) Philippe Couvreur,

Registrar.

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8 Ord 1050.indb 78 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 318

tant qu’élément du patrimoine universel. En outre, les deux Etats ont
l’obligation de ne « prendre délibérément aucune mesure susceptible

d’endommager directement ou indirectement » ce patrimoine. Au vu de
ces obligations, la Cour tient à souligner qu’il est important de figarantir
l’accès au temple depuis la plaine cambodgienne.

5. Conclusions

107. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, la Cour conclut que, dans le pre -
mier point du dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962, il a été décidé que le Cambodge
avait souveraineté sur l’intégralité du territoire de l’éfiperon de Préah Vihéar,
tel que défini au paragraphe 98 du présent arrêt, et, dans le deuxième point
du dispositif, que la Thaïlande était, en conséquence, tenue defi retirer de

ce territoire les éléments de forces armées ou de police ou autfires gardes et
gardiens thaïlandais qui y étaient installés.

* * *

108. Par ces motifs,

La Cour,
1) A l’unanimité,

Dit qu’elle a compétence en vertu de l’article 60 du Statut pour connaître
de la demande en interprétation de l’arrêt de 1962 présentée par le Cam -

bodge, et que cette demande est recevable ;
2) A l’unanimité,

Déclare, à titre d’interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962, que la Cour

a, dans cet arrêt, décidé que le Cambodge avait souverainetéfi sur l’intégra-
lité du territoire de l’éperon de Préah Vihéar tel que défini au para -
graphe 98 du présent arrêt, et que, en conséquence, la Thaïlande était
tenue de retirer de ce territoire les éléments de forces arméesfi ou de police
ou autres gardes ou gardiens thaïlandais qui y étaient installéfis.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palafiis de la
Paix, à La Haye, le onze novembre deux mille treize, en trois exemplaires,
dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les autres fiseront tran-
mis respectivement au Gouvernement du Royaume du Cambodge et au

Gouvernement du Royaume de Thaïlande.

Le président,
(Signé) Peter Tomka.

Le greffier,

(Signé) Philippe Couvreur.

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8 Ord 1050.indb 79 25/06/14 13:11 319 request for interprefitation (judgment)

Judges Owada, Bennouna and Gaja append a joint declaration to the
Judgment of the Court ; Judge Cançado Trindade appends a separate
opinion to the Judgment of the Court ; Judges ad hoc Guillaume and

Cot append declarations to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initialled) P.T.

(Initialled) Ph.C.

42

8 Ord 1050.indb 80 25/06/14 13:11 demande en interprétafition (arrêt) 319

MM. les juges Owada, Bennouna et Gaja joignent une déclaration
commune à l’arrêt; M. le juge Cançado Trindade joint à l’arrêt l’exposé

de son opinion individuelle ; MM. les juges ad hoc Guillaume et Cot
joignent une déclaration à l’arrêt.

(Paraphé) P.T.

(Paraphé) Ph.C.

42

8 Ord 1050.indb 81 25/06/14 13:11

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Judgment of 11 November 2013

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